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FILE TITLE: Relations / Internal Sit		SERIES
CLOSED		AFGHANISTAN
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT  
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB

My ref:  
Your ref:

15 JUN 1994

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8 file Ruyk. l.w.

Mrs Mary Francis  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AA

Dear Mary,

**OVERFLIGHT OF AFGHANISTAN: ADVICE TO TRAVELLERS**

You ought to be aware, for travel planning purposes, of the attached consular advice from the FCO for travellers to Afghanistan. In addition to giving advice on the internal situation, the note highlights a risk to civilian aircraft overflying the region.

UK airlines are not overflying Afghanistan, whilst in the US legislation has been passed to prohibit US carriers from overflying the region. At present, we believe that whilst a few Asian carriers have decided not to re-route, only two European carriers, Swissair and KLM, continue to overfly Afghanistan. The FCO has instructed posts to ask why the Swiss and Dutch believe the region to be safe when intelligence reports demonstrate clearly that, even at high altitude, safety cannot be guaranteed.

The FCO has advised their travel booking office not to book staff on airlines which overfly Afghanistan. I am writing therefore, so that you can appraise your own travel centre of the situation, and advise them to check which routes carriers propose to use before booking tickets. It is important to check each time as the carriers tend to vary their attitudes to the situation. If you do not intend to instruct your travel centre to follow the FCO example, I should be grateful if you would let me know.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of the Cabinet, and to Melanie Leech.

Yours,

PHIL CAREY  
Private Secretary

c 12/80

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
CONSULAR TRAVEL ADVICE**

AFGHANISTAN

Travel to Afghanistan should be avoided. Continuing tensions between different Afghan groups have led to recurrent outbreaks of fighting in Kabul and other parts of the country. The situation generally remains extremely volatile.

Those who nevertheless propose to travel to Afghanistan are strongly urged to check the situation before setting out. While the British High Commission in Islamabad, Pakistan (tel: 010 92 51 822131/5), can supply limited advice, visitors should be aware that there is no resident mission in Afghanistan to provide consular help.

Because of armed conflict in Afghanistan there may be risk to civil aircraft overflying that country. Travellers are advised not to travel on flights which overfly Afghanistan. British, Hong Kong and US carriers, among others, avoid Afghan airspace. Prospective travellers can check direct or via travel agents on routes carriers are using.

Issued on 02 June 1994  
By Travel Advice Unit  
Consular Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Clive House  
Petty France  
London SW1H 9HD

Tel: 071 270 4129  
Fax: 071 270 4223

NB: While every care has been taken in preparing these notes, neither Her Majesty's Government nor any member of the British Consular staff abroad can accept liability for injury, loss or damage arising in respect of any statement contained therein.

FCC travel advice is displayed on BBC2 (CEEFAX) p. 564 onwards.

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SIC A3A

YOUR TELNO 279 AND TELECONS CAIE, FREEMAN AND NOBLE: **RELEASE OF  
DLOS FROM AFGHANISTAN**

SUMMARY

1. DLOS RELEASED AND DRIVEN ACROSS BORDER TO CHAMAN LAST NIGHT IN A CHANGE OF PLAN. **ALL IN REASONABLE SHAPE AND NOW IN QUETTA.** WILL TRAVEL ON TO KARACHI LATER TODAY TO BE REUNITED WITH FAMILIES. PRESS ASPECTS.

DETAIL

2. DODDS AND HIS GERMAN AND DUTCH COLLEAGUES REGAINED THEIR FREEDOM LAST NIGHT IN AN UNEXPECTEDLY QUICK MANNER. AS PLANNED THEY WERE TAKEN TO THE GUEST-HOUSE IN SPIN BOLDAK (OUR TELNO 268). BUT INSTEAD OF WAITING THERE UNTIL THIS MORNING FOR THE EXPECTED EXCHANGE, THE COMMISSIONER QUETTA APPARENTLY GAVE ORDERS TO AKHTAR JAN AND SAYED JALAL (WHO WERE BY THEN HOLDING THEM) IMMEDIATELY TO BRING THEM ACROSS THE BORDER LAST NIGHT. THEY WERE GOT AWAY AMID SCUFFLES AND ATTEMPTS TO RESIST THEM FROM WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN SOME OF NABI'S MEN.

3. THE DLOS SPENT THE NIGHT IN AN OFFICERS' MESS IN CHAMAN, FROM WHERE DODDS WAS ABLE TO SPEAK TO HIS WIFE IN KARACHI BY TELEPHONE. THEY WERE ASKED BY THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER IN QUETTA TO GIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE DETENTION. DODDS PRODUCED A THREE-PAGE VERSION IN ENGLISH, AGREED AND SIGNED BY ALL THREE OF THEM, **CLAIMING THEY WERE UNAWARE THEY HAD CROSSED INTO AFGHANISTAN AT THE TIME THE INCIDENT OCCURRED.** AN ISI OFFICER WAS

PAGE 1  
RESTRICTED

APPARENTLY PRESENT DURING THE PREPARATION OF THIS STATEMENT, BUT DODDS ASSURES US THAT THEY WERE UNDER NO DURESS AND VOLUNTEERED ALL THAT THEY WROTE. ROPER IS TRYING TO SECURE A COPY OF THE TEXT FROM THE COMMISSIONER QUETTA BEFORE LEAVING FOR KARACHI TODAY.

4. THE DLOS WERE DRIVEN TO QUETTA EARLY THIS MORNING AND SAW THE HOME SECRETARY AT 8.30 AM (LOCAL). DODDS AND HIS DUTCH COLLEAGUE ARE LODGED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL SUITE OF THE SERENA HOTEL. THEIR GERMAN COLLEAGUE IS STAYING AT A FRIEND'S HOUSE LOCALLY. THEY ARE ALL BOOKED ON THE 4.30 PM (LOCAL) FLIGHT TO KARACHI (WITH FIRST-CLASS TICKETS) WHERE THEY WILL BE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES AND GIVEN A CHANCE TO REST. DODDS CLAIMS TO BE IN REASONABLE SHAPE, APART FROM LOSING A LITTLE WEIGHT.

5. BOTH THE DLOS AND THE LIAISON TEAM IN QUETTA ARE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM THE LOCAL PRESS TO SPEAK. ROPER HAS BEEN USING PRESS LINE IN TUR (AS INDEED WE HAVE WITH ENQUIRERS IN ISLAMABAD). ROPER IS ALSO TRYING TO ENSURE THAT THE DUTCH AND GERMANS TAKE A SIMILAR LINE IN QUETTA. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE TO EASE THE DLOS' PATH THROUGH BOTH QUETTA AND KARACHI AIRPORTS TO MINIMISE PRESS ATTENTION.

6. WE HAVE BEEN TAKING THE LINE WITH THE PRESS THAT THE PRIORITIES ARE FOR THE DLOS TO BE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES AND REST. HOWEVER, I DO WONDER IF A VERY SHORT STAGE-MANAGED APPEARANCE BY THE DLOS IN KARACHI THEREAFTER MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. THERE IS A RISK THAT WITHOUT THIS, THE DLOS AND THEIR FAMILIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE HOUNDED. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE DLOS ARE AT PRESENT NOT KEEN TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE PRESS. I ALSO SEE THE SENSE OF THE ARGUMENTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY. POSSIBLY A WRITTEN STATEMENT BY THE THREE IS THE ANSWER: THIS WOULD AVOID THE CAMERAS. WE SHALL EXPLORE THIS WITH THE GERMANS AND DUTCH HERE.

COMMENT

7. WE HAVE HAD NO EXPLANATION AS YET FOR THE APPARENT CHANGE OF PLAN BY THE BALOCHISTAN AUTHORITIES. EITHER THE COMMISSIONER QUETTA THOUGHT THE EXCHANGE MIGHT GO WRONG AND WANTED TO GET THE DLOS ACROSS THE BORDER AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY: OR POSSIBLY HE HAD NO INTENTION AT ANY STAGE OF DOING A DEAL WITH NABI. IN TALKING TO THE LIAISON TEAM TODAY, NASIR IMPLIED THAT THE TWO AFGHANS HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN RELEASED. LOCAL PRESS REPORTS HERE REFLECT WHAT MUST BE OFFICIAL BRIEFING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE

RELEASE WAS UNCONDITIONAL.

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10 DOWNING STREET  
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From the Private Secretary

10 May 1993

**DETENTION OF WESTERN DRUGS LIAISON OFFICERS  
IN AFGHANISTAN**

The Prime Minister was grateful for the report in your letter of 6 May.

He would like to send a message of support to Mrs Jack Dodds in Karachi. I enclose the text. I should be grateful if you could arrange for this to be telegraphed to her (there will not be a signed original), assuming that it is still relevant.

Could you also please continue to keep us informed of developments in this case.

**RODERIC LYNE**

J S Smith Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

M



DRAFT MESSAGE TO BE SENT BY TELEGRAM TO MRS DODDS,  
KARACHI, VIA BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD

The Foreign Office are keeping me informed of their determined efforts to secure your husband's release as soon as possible from Afghanistan.

I am very sorry that the vital work he was undertaking should have led him into this difficult situation. I would like to convey my sympathy and support to you, and to assure you that we shall continue to do all we can to help Jack. Our thoughts are with you, and we hope that you will soon have your husband back safe and well.

Prime Minister

Would you like to  
send Mr Dodds a  
message? I attach  
a draft. Rm/L. - Yes please  
6 May 1993

SECRET



CC/22  
23(a-c)

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Roderic,

**DETENTION OF WESTERN DRUGS LIAISON OFFICERS IN AFGHANISTAN**

The Prime Minister might welcome an account of our efforts to secure the release of Jack Dodds, the Drugs Liaison Officer (DLO) from our Deputy High Commission in Karachi, who has been detained in Afghanistan.

Dodds was captured on 22 April along with his German and Dutch colleagues after a joint duty visit to Quetta in Baluchistan. The precise circumstances of their detention are unclear; according to some reports, the three men had entered Afghanistan illegally. They are being held on the orders of a local Afghan leader, Mohammad Nabi Noorzai, outside the town of Spin Boldak. We have so far received three messages from the DLOs describing their conditions. By western standards these are primitive and the three appear to be chained at night. However, We have succeeded in getting food, water and clothing to them.

Nabi has demanded the release of two fellow tribesmen who are being held in Pakistan in exchange for the DLOs' release. There have also been unconfirmed references to other prisoners' release and to ransom payments. From our knowledge of previous such detentions in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and reports about Nabi, we assess that there is no imminent threat to their lives (although their physical and psychological well-being may deteriorate, if they are held for a long time). Our High Commissioner in Islamabad recommends patience. The complex web of tribal, political, religious and personal affiliations make it difficult to achieve a quick solution.

We are in close touch with the Dutch and German Governments both in Islamabad and in capitals, and our policies are broadly in line, including sharing relevant covert intelligence. However, the police authorities in both countries (the DLOs' parent organisations) and the German Ambassador in Islamabad are more nervous and are pressing for a deal to be made. We need to keep these tendencies in check. Officials from the FCO and HM Customs & Excise are keeping in close contact with their Dutch and German colleagues to this end.

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The Pakistani Government are devoting considerable time and effort to the DLOs' question, and we are in close touch with them. We cannot press them to release the two Afghans in breach of their judicial process. Nevertheless, the crimes for which they are held (stealing a motor-cycle and possession of a gun and ammunition) are common in that part of Pakistan, and the former at least, is minor. The Nurzai tribe cause the Pakistani authorities a number of problems and Nabi's men are a part of this. Their importance to Nabi is probably mirrored by the Pakistanis' wish to keep them out of circulation - albeit on a pretext. Nevertheless, the Pakistani authorities have some room for manoeuvre and we are encouraging them to show maximum flexibility, in the hope that the two Afghans will be released quickly. We will not, however, encourage the Pakistanis to do a deal.

We are using all available Afghan channels to put local pressure on Nabi. Through overt and intelligence channels, we are encouraging important local Afghans to encourage Nabi to release the DLOs unconditionally, but this may take time.

*Temporarily Retained*

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

The UK press have shown sporadic interest in the story. On the whole they are avoiding sensationalism and we have explained the advantage for now of not drawing undue attention to the DLOs' plight and thereby tempting their captors to raise the stakes. German and Dutch officials are taking a similar line.

We are in close touch with Mrs Dodds in Karachi and the Dodds family in Northumberland. Mr Lennox-Boyd has also spoken to Jack Thompson MP, Mr Dodds' parents' MP. He was grateful for the briefing and content with the way forward.

SECRET



C

I am copying this letter to "C", Joan MacNaughton (Home Office), Jeremy Heywood (HM Treasury), Sarah Harlen (HMCE), John Pitt-Brooke (MOD) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever,*

*Stephen*

(J S Smith)  
Private Secretary

Roderic Lyne Esq CMG  
10 Downing Street

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MY TELNO 203: PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY

1. AFTER LONG NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER PLAYED A MAJOR PART AGREEMENT WAS REACHED BY ALL THE AFGHAN LEADERS ON A CEASE FIRE, FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND, MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL, FORMATION OF THE CABINET FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD. RABBANI WOULD BE PRESIDENT AND HEKMATYAR PRIME MINISTER FOR 18 MONTHS. NO GUARANTEES AND NO ILLUSIONS BUT PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THERE WAS A WILL TO MAKE THIS AGREEMENT WORK. CONGRATULATIONS ARE IN ORDER.

DETAIL

2. THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN SECRETARY SUMMONED HEADS OF MISSION AT SHORT NOTICE TODAY TO BRIEF THEM ON THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE AFGHAN LEADERS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND A NEW GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN. SHAHARYAR STARTED BY STRESSING THAT PAKISTAN HAD OFFERED HER GOOD OFFICES AS A NEIGHBOUR AND AS A CATALYST, HOPING THAT BY BRINGING THE AFGHAN LEADERS TOGETHER THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN HAD DEVOTED ALMOST ALL OF THE LAST 4 OR 5 DAYS TO MEETINGS INDIVIDUALLY AND SEVERALLY WITH THE AFGHAN LEADERS. HE HAD BEEN GREATLY HELPED BY THE PRESENCE OF SPECIAL ENVOYS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN WHO HAD HAD THEIR OWN MEETINGS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS DELIGHTED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED THIS MORNING. NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN TOUGH BUT CONDUCTED AGAINST A BACKGROUND THAT THE LEADERS HAD A WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT. THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE EXCEPT THIS WILL TO AGREE, TOGETHER WITH THE STRONG DESIRE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO LIVE IN PEACE.

3. AS SHAHARYAR BRIEFED US, NAWAZ SHARIF WAS BRIEFING THE PRESS AND THE AFGHAN LEADERS WERE BEING RECEIVED BY THE PRESIDENT OF

PAKISTAN. MOST OF THEM WILL NOW FLY OFF TO PERFORM RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND BE RECEIVED BY KING FAHAD.

#### BACKGROUND

4. SHAHARYAR EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE ARRIVAL OF THE LEADERS IN PAKISTAN HIS GOVERNMENT HAD CONSULTED THE 7 MAIN GROUPS OPPOSING PRESIDENT RABBANI, HAD CONSOLIDATED THEIR VIEWS INTO A PAPER (THE LINES OF WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH ME EARLIER) AND PUT THESE VIEWS THEN TO RABBANI.

5. THERE HAD BEEN EARLY CONSENSUS ON SOME OF THE POINTS: SUCH AS AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE, THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL ARMY, THE COLLECTION OF HEAVY WEAPONS AND WITHDRAWAL FROM RANGE OF THE CITIES, FREEDOM OF PASSAGE ON THE ROADS INTERNALLY AND ACROSS AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS AND THE FACT THAT THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE MONITORED BY THE PARTIES INCLUDING THE OIC. SHAHARYAR LATER ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR THE OIC, WHO OF COURSE COMPLAINED THEY WERE SHORT OF MONEY, TO GET MILITARY OBSERVERS INSTALLED. MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON WHETHER THE CEASE FIRE DID HOLD.

#### DIFFICULT AREAS

6. THE FIRST DIFFICULT AREA THAT HAD BEEN AGREED WAS THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. AN ELECTION COMMISSION WOULD BE SET UP WHICH WOULD HOLD A FORM OF ELECTIONS WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS (EIGHT MONTHS FROM THE PREVIOUS SHOURA). THIS MIGHT BE IN THE FORM OF A TRADITIONAL LOI JIRGA, A SHOURA OR WHATEVER BUT SHAHARYAR EXPECTED IT TO BE SIMILAR TO THE SHOURA CONVENED BY RABBANI AT THE END OF LAST YEAR BUT ON A BASIS ACCEPTED AS FAIR BY ALL.

7. THROUGH THIS PROCESS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD BE ELECTED WHICH WOULD FRAME THE CONSTITUTION AND DECIDE THE FUTURE FORM OF GOVERNMENT. AS A THIRD STAGE THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT A GENERAL ELECTION WITHIN 18 MONTHS FOR THE FUTURE PRESIDENT AND PARLIAMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

8. THE SECOND AREA THAT WAS RESOLVED WAS THAT RABBANI SHOULD STAY AS PRESIDENT FOR 18 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE LAST SHOURA (29 DECEMBER) AND THAT HEKMATYAR OR HIS NOMINEE SHOULD BE PRIME MINISTER (THE INDICATIONS WERE NOW THAT HEKMATYAR WOULD TAKE UP THIS POST HIMSELF).

9. THE THIRD PROBLEM AREA WAS THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND

PRIME MINISTER INVOLVING DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE PAKISTANIS HAD HELPED TO RESOLVE. AGREEMENT WAS EVENTUALLY REACHED AMICABLY AND SET OUT AS AN ANNEX TO THE MAIN AGREEMENT.

10. BY FAR THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM HAD BEEN THE FORMATION OF THE CABINET. RABBANI HAD INSISTED ON KEEPING MASOOD AS DEFENCE MINISTER, THUS GOING AGAINST THE FEELING OF THE OTHERS THAT THE SIX KEYS POSTS SHOULD ALL BE HELD BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT PARTIES. HEKMATYAR WAS EQUALLY ADAMANT. THE PAKISTANIS HELPED EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS AND EVENTUALLY AT 3 AM THIS MORNING THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A COMMISSION WOULD BE FORMED TO DECIDE IN TWO WEEKS TIME ON A DEFENCE COUNCIL WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTIES WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE FUNCTION OF DEFENCE MINISTER. ALSO IN TWO WEEKS TIME DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE ON A CABINET WHICH SHOULD BE CHOSEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE PRESIDENT. THERE HAD BEEN VARIOUS IDEAS ABOUT HOW MANY POSTS IN THE CABINET EACH PARTY SHOULD HAVE BUT THERE WAS NOW A CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO BE DECIDED BY THE COMMISSION. IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE FOR MASOOD TO REMAIN AS THE DEFENCE MINISTER THOUGH HIS POWERS WOULD BE MUCH WEAKENED BY THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTROLLING DEFENCE COUNCIL. THERE SHOULD BE ALSO ROOM IN THE CABINET FOR A NUMBER OF NEUTRAL TECHNOCRATS.

11. OTHER POINTS IN THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT, THE TEXT OF WHICH WILL BE AVAILABLE LATER THIS EVENING, WERE THAT ALL SIDES SHOULD RELEASE DETAINEES, THAT ORIGINAL OWNERS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RE-OCCUPY THEIR HOMES, INCLUDING THOSE TAKEN OVER BY ARMED GROUPS, AND THAT AN ALL PARTY COMMITTEE SHOULD CONTROL THE CURRENCY AND MONETARY POLICY. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

12. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN HAD MADE A PLEA FOR RECONCILIATION AND AN APPEAL FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL THOSE TAKEN PRISONER SINCE THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES. HE WAS REFERRING IN PARTICULAR TO SOVIET PRISONERS BUT HIS REMARKS WOULD ALSO HAVE COVERED NAJIB. THE LATTER'S POSITION DID NOT FIGURE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, SHAHARYAR SAID THAT ALL AFGHAN PARTY LEADERS PRESENT HAD SIGNED THE AGREEMENT. KHALES HAD NOT PARTICIPATED AT ALL ON THE BASIS THAT HE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY AGREEMENT WITH SHIAS. DOSTAM HAD ALSO NOT BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE INSISTENCE OF JAMIAT. THE PAKISTANIS HAD REGRETTED THIS, AS HAD OTHERS. WE WERE TOLD THAT MOJADDEDI HAD JUST MADE A PLEA THAT DOSTAM'S ORGANISATION SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO

THE MAIN STREAM AT THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN, AND THE LATTER HAD APPEALED TO RABBANI AND HEKMATYAR TO DO THIS. SHAHARYAR THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH DOSTAM'S PEOPLE HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (AND HAD HAD TO BE BRIEFED SEPARATELY) THE OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE UNWELCOME TO THEM AND THEY MIGHT END UP BEING INCLUDED IN SOME OF THE COMMISSIONS.

14. SHAHARYAR SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN THE PROVINCES WHERE REGIONAL COMMANDERS EXERCISED AUTHORITY AND WERE ENSURING SECURITY. THESE PEOPLE WOULD REMAIN IMPORTANT AND WOULD WATCH WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CENTRE. SOME OF THEM, EG ISMAIL KHAN FROM HERAT, HAD TAKEN PART IN THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS (ISMAIL KHAN CALLED ON ME YESTERDAY TO ASK FOR MORE HELP, TO BE REPORTED SEPARATELY).

15. SHAHARYAR AGREED THAT THERE WAS SOME FEELING AMONG THE LESSER LEADERS THAT THINGS WERE BEING WORKED OUT MAINLY TO SHARE POWER BETWEEN RABBANI AND HEKMATYAR AND THEIR GROUPS. THE PAKISTANIS HAD TRIED TO ASSUAGE THEIR FEELINGS BY SEPARATE BRIEFINGS. THOUGH SOME RESENTMENT PERSISTED, THE MINOR LEADERS HAD IN THE END, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KHALES, ENDORSED THE AGREEMENT. THIS INCLUDED THE TWO SHIA GROUPS, WAHDAT AND MOHSINI.

16. SHAHARYAR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO ILLUSIONS. STICKING TO THE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. BUT THERE WAS HOPE THAT GIVEN THE GENERAL DESIRE AND NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT A SELF-IMPOSED DISCIPLINE AMONG THE LEADERS WOULD OVERCOME THEIR DIFFERENCES.

#### RECOMMENDATION

17. I WAS AMONG SEVERAL HEADS OF MISSION PRESENT (INCLUDING THE AMERICAN, THE FRENCH, THE JAPANESE AND THE EGYPTIAN) WHO BEFORE ASKING QUESTIONS SAID THAT WE WERE SURE OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD WISH TO CONGRATULATE THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS CONCERNED IN THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE TREMENDOUS EFFORTS THEY HAD MADE OVER THE LAST SIX DAYS TO PROCURE AN AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE WELCOME IF SOME SUCH CONGRATULATORY STATEMENT COULD BE MADE MORE FORMALLY BY A BRITISH MINISTER OR BY NEWS DEPARTMENT, EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED WILL NOW MAKE THE AGREEMENT WORK.

BARRINGTON



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TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD  
TELNO 70  
OF 041429Z FEB 93

MY TELNO 47: MESSAGE TO RABBANI

1. WHEN AFGHAN MINISTER FOR CIVIL AVIATION CALLED ON MR LENNOX-BOYD (TUR) HE DELIVERED A LETTER FROM RABBANI TO THE PRIME MINISTER (FAXED TO YOU). PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRIME MINISTER TO RABBANI.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER. I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THAT MARK LENNOX-BOYD HAD A USEFUL MEETING WITH YOUR EMISSARY AND HIS DELEGATION ON 27 JANUARY.

I AND MY GOVERNMENT RECOGNISE THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WHICH FACE AFGHANISTAN. WE STAND READY TO PLAY OUR PART IN THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN. AS A MEASURE OF THIS COMMITMENT, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTRIBUTED POUNDS STERLING 7.55 MILLION TO ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES FOR AFGHANISTAN IN 1992. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO HELP AS BEST WE CAN.

I WAS INTERESTED TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT THE RECENT MEETING OF THE GRAND COUNCIL (SHURA-E-HAL-O-AQD). I HOPE THAT THIS WILL ACT AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS A GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

YOU HAVE MY SINCERE WISHES FOR THE PEACEFUL AND DEVELOPMENT OF YOUR COUNTRY.

JOHN MAJOR.

ENDS

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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PS/MR LENNOX-BOYD	1

~~SUBJECT MASTER~~

Filed on:



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 February 1993

**AFGHANISTAN:**  
**LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM PRESIDENT RABBANI**

Thank you for your letter of 4 February enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Rabbani's recent letter.

The draft reply is fine and can issue.

J. S. WALL

J S Smith Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

file

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 February 1993

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Dear Stephen,

Afghanistan:

Letter to the Prime Minister from President Rabbani

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Rabbani which was handed over by the Afghan Minister for Civil Aviation when he called on Mr Lennox-Boyd on 27 January. In the letter Rabbani thanks the Prime Minister for past British support for the mujahideen and asks for help with Afghanistan's reconstruction.

Rabbani was re-elected on 30 December for a further two year period. However, five of the nine major political parties in Afghanistan did not take part in the electoral process, which they claim was illegitimate and rigged in Rabbani's favour. Like the US and some other western countries, we have reservations about the way in which Rabbani secured re-election and, without questioning his authority, we need to maintain a certain distance. We believe that we should encourage Rabbani to enhance the prospects for internal reconciliation by broadening the base of his Government and making it more representative of the ethnic and religious groups within Afghanistan. Mr Lennox-Boyd made this point when he saw Rabbani's emissary. A brief message from the Prime Minister would reinforce this and, at the same time, reaffirm our interest in and commitment to Afghanistan's reconstruction (we are significant contributors to the UN's programme for Afghanistan).

We recommend the Prime Minister replies in the terms of the enclosed draft which can be delivered to Rabbani via our High Commission in Islamabad. Our earlier letters to Rabbani were equally short.

Yours ever

Stephen Smith

(J S Smith)

Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

ZCZC

RESTRICTED

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

TELNO

OF 041429Z FEB 93

OUR TELNO 47: MESSAGE TO RABBANI

1. WHEN AFGHAN MINISTER FOR CIVIL AVIATION CALLED ON MR LENNOX-BOYD (TUR) HE DELIVERED A LETTER FROM RABBANI TO THE PRIME MINISTER (FAXED TO YOU). PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRIME MINISTER TO RABBANI.

BEGINS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER. I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT MARK LENNOX-BOYD HAD A USEFUL MEETING WITH YOUR EMISSARY AND HIS DELEGATION ON 27 JANUARY.

I AND MY GOVERNMENT RECOGNISE THE DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WHICH FACE AFGHANISTAN. WE STAND READY TO PLAY <sup>our</sup> ITS PART TO HELP THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN. AS A MEASURE OF THIS COMMITMENT, THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTRIBUTED POUNDS STERLING 7.55 MILLION TO ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES FOR AFGHANISTAN IN 1992. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO HELP AS BEST WE CAN.

I

ISLAM4-2

SAD

J M BRADLEY

2386

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE

I WAS INTERESTED TO HEAR FROM YOU ABOUT THE RECENT MEETING OF THE GRAND COUNCIL (SHURA-E-HAL-O-AQD). I HOPE THAT THIS WILL ACT AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS A GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

YOU HAVE MY SINCERE WISHES FOR THE PEACEFUL ~~AND PROSPEROUS~~ DEVELOPMENT OF YOUR COUNTRY.

JOHN MAJOR.

ENDS

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED ORIGINAL.

HURD

YYYY

MAIN

AFGHANISTAN

SAD

NNNN

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

# دولت اسلامی افغانستان

وزارت امور خارجه

ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT  
MASTER

The Prime Minister John Major,  
10 Downing Street,  
London

Filed on:

(27) January 1993

Sir,

I am pleased to present my good wishes to you.

Allow me to express my gratitude on behalf of the people of the Islamic State of Afghanistan for the generous support given by your country and people, to the people of Afghanistan during their valiant fourteen year struggle.

The Islamic revolution in our country has succeeded through the fourteen years of courageous struggle of our Mujahid Muslim nation against a superpower and its supporters. This victory is a bright new phase in our history, however, it's costs have been very high. During the past fourteen years one and a half million Afghans have been killed, hundreds of thousands of our people were maimed, more than five millions of our population were forced to flee the country, hundreds of thousands of hectares of forests were destroyed, health centres, hospitals, highways, roads, houses, electrical installations were either completely destroyed or suffered immense damage, and approximately ten million mines were scattered across Afghanistan by the Russian occupation forces.

The new founded Islamic administration in our country is inheriting a ruined and devastated economy which is the result of the fourteen years of fighting our country has suffered.

Through the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, positive steps have been taken towards bringing peace and changes into the lifes of the people.

Providing security all over the countryside, general amnesty, the freeing of all prisoners were among the first tasks of the Islamic State of Afghanistan as it came into office. The Islamic State of Afghanistan has plans for the reconstruction of the devastated country, clearing mines, repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees, raising the standard of living of the people and other potential plans.

Repairing such a devastated country in such a short period of time without the assistance of the nations of the world concerned about peace is an extremely difficult task. We hope that the peace loving countries of the world will help us in our difficult task as they have done in the past fourteen years of our nation's struggle.

With the establishment of the Islamic State in our country and its recognition by other states of the world, a number of countries have pledged their urgently needed assistance for the reconstruction of our country. We believe that other countries will follow this human concern and will pursue a similar course of humanitarian action.

Regarding a new development in our country, we would like to inform that recently our nation has witnessed a major development in its history and that is the convening of a Grand Council with the participation of prominent representatives of our people in an atmosphere of peace and harmony in order to elect its new leadership and decide upon historical decisions for our people and country.

We are confident that the holding of the Grand Council will result in establishing security and stability. In regards to its foreign policy the Islamic State of Afghanistan, desires friendly and warm relations with all the countries and nations of the world we believe that the existence of traditionally friendly relations between our people and countries is based on mutual respect and this relationship will deepen and expand on the basis of future co-operation, benefiting our friendship and peace.

Taking this opportunity to wish you excellent health and continued success, and wish happiness and comfort for the people of the United Kingdom.

Yours faithfully

Professor Burhannuddin Rabbani  
The President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan  
Kabul

English Translation of the letter dated January 1993



UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO  
TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD  
TELNO 562  
OF 241711Z JULY 92

*Froot*

MESSAGE TO RABBANI

1. AFGHAN EMBASSY HAVE FORWARDED A MESSAGE FROM RABBANI TO THE PRIME MINISTER ASKING FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN'S RECONSTRUCTION (FAXED TO YOU). PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO RABBANI THROUGH AFGHAN EMBASSY AND JAMIAT CONTACTS.

QUOTE

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HAVE GREATLY ADMIRERD THE COURAGE AND RESILIENCE OF THE MUJAHIDEEN IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND WE ARE VERY HAPPY TO HELP WITH THE URGENT TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION IN YOUR COUNTRY. I HAVE PLEASURE IN INFORMING YOU THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL THIS YEAR PROVIDE #7.55 MILLION TO HELP AFGHANISTAN OVERCOME SOME OF THE ENORMOUS CHALLENGES IT FACES. WE INTEND TO CHANNEL THESE FUNDS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: #4 MILLION TO UNHCR, #1M TO ICRC, #0.5 TO UNOCA, #1.6 TO AFGHAN AID AND #0.45 TO OTHER BRITISH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WORKING IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAVE INFORMED THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THESE CONTRIBUTIONS, WHICH DEMONSTRATE OUR SINCERE SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN BRINGING ABOUT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AND A LASTING FORM OF REPRESENTATIVE, ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN YOUR COUNTRY.

UNQUOTE

HURD

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 July 1992

*Dear Christopher,*

**MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER**  
**FROM THE PRESIDENT OF AFGHANISTAN**

Thank you for your letter of 22 July enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the President of Afghanistan. The draft is fine and can issue.

*Jane,*  
*Steph*

J. S. WALL

Christopher Prentice, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



CORB

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

RESTRICTED

22 July 1992

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Stephen,

Message to the Prime Minister from the  
President of Afghanistan

/ I enclose a copy of a message from President Rabbani  
to the Prime Minister thanking him for past British  
support for the mujahideen and asking him for help with  
Afghanistan's reconstruction. The message is in response  
to the Prime Minister's message to Rabbani soon after he  
took power. We recommend that the Prime Minister replies  
along the lines of the draft telegram: we will arrange  
/ delivery through our High Commission in Islamabad.

The Foreign Secretary has decided that since British  
interests in Afghanistan are small and pressure on  
resources is acute, we should not reopen our Embassy  
in Kabul but that our High Commissioner in Islamabad,  
Sir Nicholas Barrington, should be accredited as  
Ambassador (non-resident) to Afghanistan. The Afghan  
government will be disappointed when we inform them of  
this decision. A message from the Prime Minister, making  
reference to our recent decision to contribute £7.55m in  
humanitarian and developmental aid to Afghanistan this  
financial year, should reassure President Rabbani of our  
continued commitment to Afghanistan's development.

Yours ever,  
Christopher Smith  
for (J S Smith)  
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
لندن

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
Telephone: 071-589 8891/2

Kabul, Afghanistan

13 July 1992

The Rt. Hon. John Major MP  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

Your Excellency,

Thank you for your very kind and friendly message of congratulation being the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

I have the pleasure in thanking you and the British people, on behalf of the people of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and on my self in supporting the Afghan Mujahedeen during the up-rising.

At present, my country is in urgent need for the reconstruction, caused by the war and my government and the people of the Islamic State of Afghanistan would very much appreciate for your immediate support.

Lastly, I wish Your Excellency, the best of health and success along with happiness and prosperity for the people of Great Britain.

With respect,

Burhanuddin Rabbani  
President of the Islamic State of  
Afghanistan

UNCLASSIFIED

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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

TELNO

OF Z JULY 92

MESSAGE TO RABBANI

1. AFGHAN EMBASSY HAVE FORWARDED A MESSAGE FROM RABBANI TO THE PRIME MINISTER ASKING FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN'S RECONSTRUCTION (FAXED TO YOU). PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO RABBANI THROUGH AFGHAN EMBASSY AND JAMIAT CONTACTS.

QUOTE

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HAVE GREATLY ADMIRERD THE COURAGE AND RESILIENCE OF THE MUJAHIDEEN IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND WE ARE VERY HAPPY TO HELP WITH THE URGENT TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION IN YOUR COUNTRY. I HAVE PLEASURE IN INFORMING YOU THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL THIS YEAR PROVIDE £7.55 MILLION TO HELP AFGHANISTAN OVERCOME SOME OF THE ENORMOUS CHALLENGES IT FACES. WE INTEND TO CHANNEL THESE FUNDS IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: £4 MILLION TO UNHCR, £1M TO ICRC, £0.5 TO UNOCA, £1.6 TO AFGHAN AID AND £0.45 TO OTHER BRITISH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WORKING IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAVE INFORMED THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THESE CONTRIBUTIONS, WHICH DEMONSTRATE OUR SINCERE SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

I

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SAD

M J WILLIAMS

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<<<<

I WISH YOU EVERY SUCCESS IN BRINGING ABOUT POLITICAL  
RECONCILIATION AND A LASTING FORM OF REPRESENTATIVE, ELECTED  
GOVERNMENT IN YOUR COUNTRY.

UNQUOTE

HURD

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AFGHANISTAN

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 July 1992

*Dear Stephen,*

Message from the Prime Minister to President of  
Afghanistan

We recommend that the Prime Minister should send a personal message of congratulations to Professor Rabbani, the new President of Afghanistan, who succeeded Professor Mojaddedi as planned on 28 June. The transfer of power was laid down in the Peshawar Agreement of 24 April, which set out the timetable for Afghanistan's transitional arrangements.

A message would be a useful gesture of our support to the Afghan transitional leadership in their efforts to move towards an elected form of Government. The Prime Minister sent a message to Mojaddedi when the latter assumed power (copy of text enclosed). I submit a suggested text in the form of a draft telegram to our High Commission in Islamabad, who can arrange for its delivery.

*Jawover, S L Gass*

(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO  
10 Downing Street



UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO  
TO ISLAMABAD  
TELNO 356  
OF 07 May 92

MESSAGE FOR PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED  
FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD  
TELNO 356  
OF 071700Z MAY 92

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH, TEHRAN  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA, ROME, NEW DELHI, BONN

YOUR TELNO 406 : MESSAGE FOR PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO SEND MOJADDEDI THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.  
PLEASE ARRANGE DELIVERY THROUGH HIS OFFICE IN PAKISTAN.

QUOTE:

I WISH TO SEND YOU MY WARM PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR  
APPOINTMENT, AND ON THE TRANSFER OF POWER TO YOUR INTERIM COUNCIL.  
YOU HAVE MY SINCERE GOOD WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN THE CHALLENGES YOU FACE  
IN BRINGING ABOUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND CREATING THE WAY FOR A  
BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. I HOPE THIS  
WILL SOON PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF YOUR  
MUCH INJURED COUNTRY AND THE RETURN OF YOUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN WHO WERE  
FORCED TO SEEK REFUGEE ABROAD. UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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Outlook

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resident club &

tell him that his  
can come

John

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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

TELNO

OF 020945Z JULY 92

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, RIYADH, TEHRAN

INFO PRIORITY NEW DELHI, UKMIS GENEVA, ROME, BONN, ACTOR

YOUR TELNO 625: MESSAGE TO RABBANI

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO RABBANI, THROUGH AFGHAN EMBASSY AND JAMIAT CONTACTS.

QUOTE.

I ~~WISH TO~~ SEND YOU MY WARM PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PRESIDENT, AND ON THE SMOOTH TRANSFER OF POWER FROM YOUR PREDECESSOR. YOU HAVE MY ~~SINCERE~~ GOOD WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN THE MANY DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WHICH YOUR COUNTRY FACES, AND IN WHICH WE STAND READY TO PLAY OUR PART TO HELP.

UNQUOTE

2. THERE WILL BE NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

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R J CODRINGTON

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Foreign & Commonwealth Office

covering SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

14 May 1992

*Dear Stephen,*

*Prime Minister* (4)

*As asked for a background note.*

Afghanistan

*attached*

*Att*

Thank you for your letter of 8 May. As requested, I  
/ enclose a short brief on Afghanistan.

*ulu*

*Yours ever,*  
*S L Gass*

(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO  
10 Downing Street

covering SECRET

## AFGHANISTAN

Historical Background Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. A UN-brokered peace agreement led to their withdrawal in February 1989. President Najibullah's regime held onto power, until the Russians ended their support in January 1992, and some of his key troops defected a few months later. He resigned in favour of some of his colleagues on 16 April.

The UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Benon Sevan, tried since 1989 to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power from Najibullah to a broadly-based regime acceptable to all the Afghans. But mutual suspicions between the various mujahideen groups and the personal ambitions of some of the leaders prevented agreement. The seven groups based in Peshawar finally agreed in April on an interim council, whose leader, Professor Mojaddedi, arrived in Kabul on 28 April to take over the government.

Who was who in the mujahideen? The leaders of the seven Peshawar groups were Hekmatyar (the most radical fundamentalist), Khales, Sayyaf (also fundamentalist), Rabbani (more pragmatic Islamicist), Mojaddedi, Mohammedi (moderate) and Gaelani (democrat). All are Sunni Muslims, and all are ethnically Pushtun (the main tribe in South East Afghanistan) except Rabbani, a Tajik (from the North East). Also there were nine Shia Muslim groups based in and supported by Iran. The US, Saudi and especially Pakistani governments considered Hekmatyar the most effective opponent of Najibullah, and gave most of their aid to his group.

Inside Afghanistan the fighting was led by various field commanders, most of them associated with one or other of the Peshawar or Iran-based groups. These commanders controlled most of Afghanistan outside the main towns. The most effective

commander was Ahmed Shah Masoud, (a Tajik associated with Rabbani) who came to control most of North Eastern Afghanistan.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Who the men in power are The interim council now in power is headed by the leaders of the former Peshawar-based mujahideen groups, and their nominees. Mojaddedi, the President, is a moderate theologian with no strong power base. After 2 months Rabbani, a former academic in Islamic law, is to take over. The strong man of the council is Masoud, now Defence Minister, whose military forces predominate in Kabul. Also powerful in Kabul is General Dostam, commander of the Uzbek militia (from North West Afghanistan) whose defection to Masoud precipitated Najibullah's fall.

What we expect to happen next The Peshawar leaders agreed the following (optimistic) political arrangements: (1) for 2 months an Interim Council, led by Mojaddedi; (2) for the next 4 months a caretaker cabinet under Rabbani to govern the country and organise; (3) some process (probably a traditional tribal gathering) to choose a successor regime; and finally (4) full elections about 18 months afterwards.

Mojaddedi's priority tasks are to:- restore law and order in Kabul; reconcile Hekmatyar, who has reneged on the Peshawar deal, and the Shias, who were never part of it; avoid civil war between the Pushtuns (traditionally the rulers in Kabul, although not the majority ethnic group) and the various non-Pushtun groups who now dominate there. Only then can the country tackle the massive problems of reconstruction, demining, and reabsorption of the 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran. However, the immediate outlook is uncertain: Hekmatyar has not stopped fighting Masoud's forces and there are ominous signs that he is trying to whip up wider Pushtun support against the non-Pushtuns now in control of Kabul.



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

8 May 1992

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI  
OF AFGHANISTAN

Thank you for your recent letter containing a draft message from the Prime Minister to Professor Mojaddedi. The Prime Minister has approved the draft with the amendments shown on the enclosed copy. I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be delivered.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for a note, on no more than two sides of paper, to brief him on Afghanistan. It should set out:

- the historical background;
- who was who in the Mujahideen;
- our support for Masoud;
- who the men in power are;
- what we expect to happen next.

I should be grateful if this could reach me by Tuesday 12 May.

J. S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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c/r/gass  
c/c

KE





Foreign & Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

S/ H. Acker  
for Katwood  
F65

Dear Sir,

Prime Minister ①  
Agree? We helped  
Masoud, whose forces succeeded.  
D.H.  
G.S.

Message from Prime Minister to President of the Interim Council of Afghanistan

Our High Commissioner in Islamabad has suggested that a personal message of congratulations be sent to Professor Mojaddedi, the President of the Mujahideen-backed interim council which assumed power in Kabul on 28 April from the remnants of the Najibullah regime.

The Foreign Secretary thinks a message would be well received and recommends that one on the lines of the enclosed draft telegram to Islamabad should issue from the Prime Minister as soon as practicable.

J. L. Gass  
(S L Gass)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO  
10 Downing Street

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FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

TELNO

OF Z MAY 92

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, RIYADH, TEHRAN

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKMIS GENEVA, ROME, NEW DELHI, BONN

YOUR TELNO 406 : MESSAGE FOR PROFESSOR MOJADDEDI

1. The Prime Minister wishes to send Mojaddedi the following message. Please arrange delivery through his office in Pakistan.

Quote :

~~I wish to send you my warm personal congratulations on your appointment following the victory of the Mujahideen, whom we have firmly supported in the struggle for freedom since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. I welcome the transfer of power to your interim council. You have my sincere good wishes for success in the challenges you face in bringing about an end to the fighting and creating the way for a broad-based government acceptable to the Afghan people. I hope this will soon provide the necessary conditions for reconstruction of your much injured country and the return of your fellow countrymen who were forced to seek refuge abroad.~~ Unquote

2. There will be no (no) signed original.

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R J CODRINGTON

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
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*cc/c*

Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Dear Stephen, R-  
R-*

Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 13 April <sup>*Asat*</sup> about one sent to the Prime Minister from General Najibullah. You were right in thinking that no reply should be sent, in accordance with our normal policy.

The capture of Khost by the resistance, which Najibullah discusses in his letter, has been the first significant setback for the Kabul regime since the Soviet withdrawal. It may encourage the Kabul regime and the Soviet Union to hold further talks with the US about a possible political settlement. We have been told by the Pakistan Government that they now favour attempts at a political settlement and greater involvement by the United Nations. They see the fall of Khost as the end of the military phase, and a point of departure for a political one.

We shall be discussing the prospects for revived talks on a possible settlement with the US and also the UN Secretariat. We do not want to get ahead of the Americans, who have been negotiating for more than a year on the shape of a peaceful conclusion to the conflict.

*Juss eva,  
S. J. Gass*

(S. J. Gass)  
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

AFGHANISTAN : let Sur 178



سازمان اسناد و کتابخانه ملی  
جمهوری اسلامی افغانستان

د افغانستان د اسنادو او کتابخانه  
سازمان



No Ack.  
MEM

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

13 April 1991

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the President of Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you would let me have your advice, to reach this office by Friday, 26 April please, if you think a reply is necessary. If I remember rightly, our normal policy is not to reply to Najibullah.

J. S. WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

MEM



د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
لندن

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
Telephone: 071-589 8891/2

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to present enclosed herewith the letter of His Excellency Dr. Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, received through telex, to His Excellency John Major, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Protocol Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 9th April 1991







د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
لندن

Kabul, Afghanistan

4th April 1991

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
Telephone: 071-589 8891/2

Rt. Hon. John Major MP  
The Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

Your Excellency,

As Your Honourable Excellency are aware the Afghan extremist opposition with the collaboration and direct guidance of the military circles of Pakistan together with the armed detachments of Pakistan recently carried out regular military attacks on Khost city. As a result of artillery and rocket shells by Pakistan on Khost city, hundreds of civilians including children, women and old men were either killed or injured.

The military circles of Pakistan, stages the attack on Khost city, at a time when on the one hand the new international atmosphere has provided the opportunity for the countries and nations of the world to settle their mutual differences, through understanding and dialogue and on the other hand, the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, through the adopting of a new formulation in its foreign policy, is desirous to improve its relations with all her neighbours and particularly in regard with Pakistan. We have proposed the establishment of economic and good neighbourly relations, instead of military confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

At the present sensitive moment that the military men of Pakistan based on its conspiratorial programme for the disintegration of the territory of Afghanistan and as against, to the principles of co-existence among nations and in flagrant violation of inter-state laws and the spirit of the Geneva agreements, have pinned a covetous eyes against the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Republic of Afghanistan and have conducted their attacks on Khost city.

We appeal to Your Excellency, and urge you, that by using your moral and humanitarian influence and its accepted principles which you advocate and believe in it, to put pressure on the government of Pakistan to respect the national sovereignty of the Republic of Afghanistan, to stop its attacks on the cities of Afghanistan and to treat the prisoners of war humanly. Otherwise it is clear



د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
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Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
Telephone: 071-589 8891/2


that the continuation of such provocations will make the situation more tense and out of control which will result the intensification of confrontation in the region.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I wish Your Excellency health and further successes.

Najibullah  
President of the Republic of Afghanistan

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MR POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

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Afghanistan: Mujahedin Attacks on Kabul

the Pakistanis had recently increased the supply of arms not just to Hekmatyar, but also to the other main Mujahedin groups. Their aim was to co-ordinate a major attack on Kabul. CIA expected the offensive to begin before the end of this month and - as usual - claim to have some hopes that it might succeed in bringing down Najibullah.

2. Last Friday the Mujahedin launched a two-pronged attack on Kabul. We have reliable intelligence that at least one Mujahedin group was expecting a coup against the régime that day. In the event, however, nothing appears to have happened and Najibullah's forces seem to have successfully repulsed the offensive, which was not large-scale. Hekmatyar has reportedly denied that this was the start of the major attack he had been predicting.

3. Even if the Mujahedin do succeed in mounting a major assault on Kabul before winter sets in, victory is unlikely to come easily. There are three main reasons for this. First, although Mujahedin military activity has increased in a few areas (and on 3 October the commander of a provincial capital went over to them) the régime's forces are not badly overstretched; secondly, in Kabul itself Najibullah has a large garrison, air power and a well-prepared and extensive defensive perimeter; and thirdly, there is the possibility of fighting breaking out within the Mujahedin because the other groups will probably want

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to prevent Hekmatyar seizing Kabul. A coup against Najibullah would, however, improve Hekmatyar's chances of success.

le

PERCY CRADOCK

16 October 1990



COMPTROLLER

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CEPC  
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*Dear Charles*

*mt*

Algerian

the Ford...  
 Algerian...  
 development...  
 resistance is increasing...  
 they do not currently...  
 military or political...  
 success in attempt...  
 his measures are...  
 possibility that...  
 Soviet Union...  
 could accept and...  
 turn could lead to...  
 more active Britain

Three...  
 assessment...  
 the Soviet Union...  
 President has been...  
 time...  
 seen no signs yet that the...  
 Saudis or the Pakistanis...  
 resistance...  
 Arabia...  
 in...  
 relations...  
 military actions

None of this...  
 US/Soviet Union...  
 energy to keep...  
 touch with the Arab...  
 they could be on...

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

(2)

## CONFIDENTIAL

## AFGHANISTAN

in the last year, the resistance have been making some setbacks. Militarily, they have been generally held around inside Afghanistan, but they have failed to capture cities or to make any significant gains. If supply difficulties and reports of differing loyalties rather than the waning of the resistance are a continual rocketing of reinforcements, the resistance has suffered casualties, and has lost some of its political momentum. Politically, the resistance has been more than ever, unable to carry out a coherent programme. The UN mandate ended on 15 April 1990, and the body, although it remains weak and unrepresentative.

The growing extremism and Islamic fanaticism shown by some resistance groups, and the risks driving away more moderate groups, and brutal attacks attributed to the number of aid agencies, the main support of the resistance, Pakistanis, who are military victory, and it looks increasingly support for the Afghan Defence Minister, and support among other



Saudi support for him continues, and it is clear that the new Pakistan government will continue to support for him (not USA). Bokmatyar has given...

The regime have likewise... they continue to control most of the... depend on the large... supplies they receive... survived for 18 months... would collapse as... they are if anything... launched a program... which he changed to... Homeland Party) and... Although he has... has undeniably... Afghans.

The bilateral talks between... the best hope of making real progress... this year at... the fine detail... UN Secretary General... continues wide-r... including Najibullah... for a settlement... genuinely to make the talks succeed... remains whether Najibullah could... interim period leading up to international supervised elections. The... Najibullah might... of government... to an Electoral... Mr Baker at his... Irkutsk on 2 August... made there, and cons... overshadowed by the...

idea of an Electoral Commission has  
for both sides. In the meantime  
draw up plans for implementation  
reached between the two sides.

The Russians want a political settlement, partly because of  
Congressional pressures, and partly because Afghanistan is  
fast becoming yesterday's war and a source of serious  
conflicts of interest between the two sides.  
still favour support for the Afghan Government  
to continue funding the war.

- (a) the Afghan Government
- (b) the Soviet Union
- (c) some private individuals
- anti-war

The Senate International Security Committee has  
military aid to the Afghan Government  
not yet been approved.

The Russians also want to see the Afghan Government  
pouring aid into Afghanistan and will be  
dispute with the US which could result in a withdrawal of  
support to the Soviet Union.

idea of a settlement is being discussed  
him to, and possibly to the Afghan Government  
any election and to the Afghan Government  
resistance. The Afghan Government is  
are clinging to the idea of a settlement  
are becoming disillusioned with the Afghan Government  
their failure seen to be inevitable.  
Americans and the Afghan Government  
elections, the Afghan Government  
break ranks and the Afghan Government  
receives large amounts of aid  
enjoys much support from the Afghan Government  
to any compromise.

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The water problem still cuts across the divide between the two sides over a million refugees have launched a program of development. Its program targets especially the needs of the Afghan people and is ready available.

UNC's direct involvement is limited. We are not ready to take the lead in the talks. The talks are being conducted through the Americans and the Soviet Union. The development is likely to be the result of the talks. This year's General Assembly will be held in Kabul. The talks are to be held in Kabul. The talks are to be held in Kabul. In achieving a consensus result. The talks do bear the Security Council's attention. Afghanistan is a country where it is clear that the process of development is considerable. The talks could in due course be held in Kabul.

CLP/C

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

28 August 1990

Dear Charles,

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Afghanistan

The Foreign Secretary has been reviewing the situation in Afghanistan and believes the Prime Minister may wish to know of recent developments.

I enclose a note which concludes that dignity within the resistance is increasing rather than diminishing, and that they do not currently pose a coherent and credible challenge military or political. The Islamic Mujibin has had some success in attempting to widen the regime's appeal although his measures are largely ineffective. There is growing possibility that before the end of the year the USSR and the Soviet Union could agree on a settlement which the regime could accept and which might end the resistance. This in turn could lead to further involvement and requests for more active British involvement.

Three recent developments are relevant to this assessment. First, Najibullah has been absent from Kabul, in the Soviet Union, for an unprecedented three weeks. An acting President has been appointed in his absence for the first time. This may presage political changes. Secondly, we have seen no signs yet that the crisis in the Gulf is causing the Saudis or the Pakistanis to withdraw their backing for the resistance. The Pakistanis are sending 3,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. Thirdly, the change of government in Islamabad could involve Pakistani support for the resistance, while reinforcing the existing division between the moderate and hardline factions.

None of this need affect the progress of the bilateral US/Soviet Union talks as long as the principals retain the energy to keep addressing the issues. We shall remain in touch with the Americans. Real progress has been made and they could be on the verge of a deal.

*C. Powell*  
*[Signature]*

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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## AFGHANISTAN

In the last year, the resistance have had nothing but setbacks. Militarily, they have not actually lost ground inside Afghanistan, but they have failed to capture cities or to make any significant gains. There have been serious supply difficulties from Pakistan. There are frequent reports of different resistance groups fighting each other, rather than the Afghan Government forces. The continual rocketing of regime-held cities has caused many civilian casualties, and has lost sympathy for the resistance. Politically, the various resistance groups are more divided than ever, unable to agree even the basic principles of a programme. The Afghan Interim Government whose initial mandate ended on 15 February, has failed to find a successor body, although it is itself unpopular and widely held to be weak and unrepresentative.

The growing extremism and Islamic fanaticism shown by some resistance groups, particularly Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, risks driving away Western aid agencies and alienating the more moderate groups. There have been a series of threats and brutal attacks against aid workers. These have all been attributed to Hezb-i-Islami and caused the withdrawal of a number of aid agencies. Hekmatyar previously enjoyed the main support of the Americans, the Saudis and the Pakistanis, who saw him as the best prospect for securing a military victory. He still says this is his aim, although it looks increasingly unrealistic. His own opportunistic support for the abortive coup attempt by the regime's Defence Minister, General Tanai, in March, has lost him support among other parts of the resistance. Nevertheless,

/Saddi

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Saudi support for him continues, and there is some evidence that the new Pakistan caretaker Government will step up its support for him (not least in return for the assistance Hekmatyar has given in supporting Kashmiri extremists).

The regime have likewise made no military progress, although they continue to control most of the cities. They still depend on the large amounts of military and non-military supplies they receive from the Soviet Union. But they have survived for 18 months, despite many predictions that they would collapse as soon as Soviet troops withdrew. Indeed, they are if anything stronger now than before Najibullah launched a programme of "national reconciliation", under which he changed the name of his Party (to watan, or Homeland Party) and appointed a non-Party Prime Minister. Although he has retained all real power in his own hands, he has undeniably increased his regime's acceptability to many Afghans.

The bilateral talks between the US and Soviet Union offer the best hope of making real progress. Regular exchanges this year at official and ministerial level have got down to the fine detail of a settlement process. In parallel, the UN Secretary General's personal representative, Benon Sevan, continues wide-ranging consultations with all parties, including Najibullah, in an effort to identify possibilities for a settlement. The Soviet Union appears to be trying genuinely to make the talks succeed. The key issue still remains whether Najibullah should retain power during an interim period leading up to internationally supervised elections. The latest Soviet proposal is that, while Najibullah might remain Head of State, the actual business of government during the electoral period would be entrusted to an Electoral Commission. This proposal was discussed by Mr Baker at his most recent meeting with Mr Shevardnadze at Irkutsk on 2 August. Little progress seems to have been made there, and consideration of Afghanistan has since been overshadowed by the Gulf crisis. But it is clear that the

## CONFIDENTIAL

idea of an Electoral Commission has considerable interest for both sides. In the meantime, the UN are continuing to draw up plans for implementing any agreement which may be reached between the superpowers.

The Americans want a political settlement, partly because of Congressional pressures, and partly because Afghanistan is fast becoming yesterday's war and one of the last remaining conflicts of the Brezhnev era. Although some Congressmen still favour support for the resistance, many see no reason to continue funding when:-

- (a) the Russians have withdrawn;
- (b) the resistance is getting nowhere; and
- (c) some parts of the resistance are turning nastily anti-Western.

The Senate Intelligence Committee voted in mid-July to cut military aid to the resistance by a third (though this has not yet been approved by the House Committee).

The Russians also want a settlement, so they can stop pouring aid into Afghanistan and wind up this residual dispute with the US which could hold up Western economic support to the Soviet Union. Najibullah goes along with the idea of a settlement partly because the Russians are telling him to, and partly because he may well fancy his chances in any election against the chronically disorganised resistance. Although the Resistance, especially Hekmatyar, are clinging to the hope of a victory, the moderate groups are becoming disillusioned by the poor prospects, and by their failure even to achieve a common front. If the Americans and Russians agree a programme leading to free elections, the moderate groups in the resistance may well break ranks and support it. Hekmatyar himself still receives large amounts of Saudi aid, is heavily armed, and enjoys much support from Pakistan. He is unlikely to agree to any compromise.

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The major problem still outstanding is the return of the over 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran. The UNHCR have launched a programme for this. But it is making slow progress. Its prospects are doubtful given the continued dangers, especially from mines and the shortages of food inside Afghanistan; and, for the men, the relative comfort and ready availability of guns in the camps in Pakistan.

UNMO's direct involvement is limited. We are not party to the US-Soviet talks, although we are following them closely through the Americans and through Saatchi Bevan. The next UN development is likely to be the resolution on Afghanistan at this year's General Assembly. Advance preparation between Pakistan, the US and the Soviet Union should again succeed in achieving a consensus resolution. If the US-Soviet talks do bear fruit, we shall, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, need to know what is happening in Afghanistan as preparations are made to hold elections. It is clear that the UN intend to play a major part in this process. We shall be invited to contribute. There will be considerable international and domestic interest. All this could in due course make it advisable to reopen our Embassy in Kabul.





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CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

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The Foreign Secretary has been reviewing the situation in Afghanistan and believes the Prime Minister may wish to know of recent developments.

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*Dawson*  
*S. L. Gass*

(S L Gass)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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AFGHANISTAN

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/Saudi

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AFGHANISTAN : US/SOVIET UNION TALKS.

## SUMMARY

1. US AMBASSADOR GIVES UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING POINTING TOWARDS US WITHDRAWAL FROM INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. REPORTS THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ARE LIKELY TO ACQUIESCE IN ANY US/SOVIET AGREEMENT SEEM WIDE OF THE MARK.

## DETAIL

2. I WAS INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT THERE ARE AS MANY PRESS REPORTS IN THE US AS HERE ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN IMMINENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON AFGHANISTAN. THIS IS NOT JUST BASED ON SPECULATION. MY US COLLEAGUE GAVE AN UNATTRIBUTABLE PRESS CONFERENCE ABOUT A WEEK AGO WHICH WAS WIDELY REPORTED HERE AS COMING FROM AN AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE IN THE US EMBASSY. A GOOD DEAL OF GROUND WAS COVERED INCLUDING KASHMIR BUT ONE OF THE MAIN THRUSTS OF OAKLEY'S BRIEFING WAS TO EMPHASISE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS SERIOUSLY INTENDING TO WITHDRAW FROM ITS COMMITMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THE AREA WAS NO LONGER THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IT HAD BEEN IN THE PAST. THERE WOULD BE CUTS IN FUNDING. IT LOOKED AS IF OAKLEY MAY HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY TRYING TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR SUCH AN AMERICAN POLICY MOVE.

3. THE REPORTS OF THE SENATE'S PROPOSED CUT IN US COVERT AID TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WAS WIDELY REPORTED SHORTLY AFTERWARDS.

4. WASHINGTON TEL UNDER REFERENCE DESCRIBES AN ABC TELEVISION REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CONCEPT OF A CEASFIRE AND ELECTIONS HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE KABUL GOVERNMENT AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. ON THE LATTER POINT WE HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS. FOR A START, OF COURSE, THERE IS NO UNIFIED ENTITY WHICH COULD BE DESCRIBED AS THE AFGHAN

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RESISTANCE. THE AIG, JUDGING BY ITS PAST STATEMENTS, WILL NEITHER AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE NOR TO US/USSR PROPOSALS FOR ELECTIONS. IT IS TRUE THAT SOME OF THE MORE MODERATE PARTY LEADERS COULD SUPPORT SUCH PROPOSALS. GAELANI HAS HINTED AS MUCH TO US, AND MOJADEDDI MIGHT FOLLOW SUIT. BUT THE OTHERS ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE NOR DO I THINK THAT THE NEW COMMANDERS SHURA (SEE MY TELNO 936) IS YET SUFFICIENTLY WELL ESTABLISHED TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A POSITIVE POLITICAL STATEMENT IN FAVOUR OF ELECTIONS.

5. THERE HAS BEEN SOME WELL INFORMED AND PERCEPTIVE PRESS COMMENT HERE ABOUT THE LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS IN RELATION TO AFGHAN AGREEMENT. THEIR COMMON GROUND IS THAT IT IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND, GIVEN THAT MANY OF THEIR AIG CLIENTS WILL TRY TO RESIST THE SORT OF AGREEMENT THAT IS ENVISAGED.

BARRINGTON

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US/SOVIET UNION: AFGHANISTAN  
SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION DENY THAT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON AFGHANISTAN IS IMMINENT. BUT THEY HOPE TO MAKE PROGRESS DURING THE IRKUTSK MEETING. SENATE COMMITTEE VOTES TO CUT COVERT AID TO AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

DETAIL

2. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL PRESS REPORTS THIS WEEK THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION ARE ON THE POINT OF STRIKING AN AGREEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. AN ABC TELEVISION REPORT CLAIMED THAT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WOULD BE ANNOUNCED NEXT WEEK BY BAKER AND SHEVARDNADZE, AND THAT ELECTIONS WOULD FOLLOW WITHIN SIX MONTHS UNDER UN-AUSPICES. IT ALSO SAID THAT THE KABUL GOVERNMENT AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE HAD ACCEPTED THIS FORMULA. SECRETARY BAKER SAID ON 25 JULY THAT THESE REPORTS QUOTE ARE THE PRODUCT OF THE RUMOUR MILL UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO RULE OUT MAKING PROGRESS, BUT THERE HAD NOT BEEN MUCH TIME FOR DISCUSSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN PARIS, AND THERE WAS MUCH TALKING STILL TO BE DONE. QUOTE WE'VE NARROWED THE GAP BUT WE'RE NOT THERE YET UNQUOTE.

3. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO TOMSEN, SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, KIMMITT'S OFFICE AND TO THE AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN OFFICE IN STATE DEPARTMENT. THEY WERE UNCLEAR WHAT HAD LED TO THE RECENT PRESS STORIES. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES DURING THE 18 JULY PARIS BILATERAL, AND NO PROGRESS ON THE KEY QUESTION OF NAJIBULLAH'S ROLE DURING THE TRANSITION PROCESS. THEY SAID THAT THE PAPER PROMISED BY SHEVARDNADZE, FLESHING OUT SOVIET IDEAS ON AN ELECTORAL COMMISSION (MY TELNO 1600), HAD STILL NOT MATERIALISED. STATE BELIEVE THIS TO BE A CONSEQUENCE OF SOVIET DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATIONS RATHER THAN A CHANGE OF MIND.

4. STATE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DECLINED A SOVIET ATUGGESTION OF EXPERTS TALKS AT THE KELLY/ALEXEYOV LEVEL BETWEEN THE PARIS AND IRKUTSK MEETINGS. STATE TOLD US THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SOVIET PAPER, THEY SAW NO VALUE IN A FURTHER MEETING WITH ALEXEYOV, WHO WAS CLEARLY NOT EMPOWERED TO TAKE



DECISIONS. THEY ARE NOW HOPING THAT, AT IRKUTSK, SHEVARDNADZE WILL OFFER CLARIFICATION OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION IDEA, PARTICULARLY THE POWERS WHICH THE SOVIETS ENVISAGE BEING DEVOLVED TO IT BY NAJBULLAH. IF THIS WERE ENCOURAGING, STATE ENVISAGED AN EXPERTS MEETING AT KIMMITT/BESSMERTKNYKH LEVEL, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO A JOINT STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN AT ONE OF THE SEPTEMBER BAKER/SHEVARDNADZE BILATERALS.

5. ON THE US DOMESTIC FRONT, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE VOTED THIS WEEK TO CUT US COVERT AID TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE IN FY 1991 BY ABOUT DOLLARS 100 MILLION (IE ABOUT ONE THIRD). ONE COMMITTEE MEMBER SAID THAT THE RATIONALE FOR THE PROPOSED CUT WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ACHIEVED ITS PURPOSE IN AFGHANISTAN WHEN SOVIET TROOPS WITHDREW IN FEBRUARY 1989. HE ADDED THAT SOME SENATORS WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF MUJAHIDEEN INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HAS YET TO CONSIDER COVERT AID TO AFGHANISTAN FOR FY 1991. ITS CHAIRMAN SAID THIS WEEK THAT HIS COMMITTEE HAD POSTPONED CONSIDERATION UNTIL AFTER CONGRESS' AUGUST RECESS, ADDING THAT IN THE NEXT SIX OR SEVEN WEEKS QUOTE MAYBE NEGOTIATIONS WILL WORK UNQUOTE.

6. SENATOR HUMPHREY, ONE OF THE MAIN SUPPORTERS OF MILITARY AID TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, HAS SAID THAT HE STILL HAS HIGH HOPES OF THE CUT BEING RESTORED, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOTED THAT THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE'S ACTION COULD NOT HAVE COME AT A WORSE TIME IN VIEW OF UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT, GIVEN THE MILITARY STALEMATE THIS YEAR, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT THERE WOULD BE MOVES TO CUT THE COVERT AFGHAN PROGRAMME. THEY STILL BELIEVE THAT, DESPITE THE SENATE COMMITTEE VOTE, THE ADMINISTRATION COULD, IF THEY WANTED, SUCCESSFULLY LOBBY CONGRESS TO RESTORE MOST OF THE PROPOSED CUT IN THE 1991 PROGRAMME. BUT THE PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE A DEAL WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT AN END TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BOTH SIDES IS OBVIOUSLY THAT MUCH GREATER: AND THE DESIRE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION TO GET AFGHANISTAN OFF THE US/SOVIET AGENDA IN OUR VIEW REMAINS STRONG.

ACLAND

YYYY

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FM WASHINGTON  
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TELNO 1187  
OF 222312Z MAY 90  
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, RIYADH, UKMIS NEW YORK

AFGHANISTAN: BAKER/SHEVARDNAZE DISCUSSION ms

## SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW OF AFGHANISTAN SQUEEZED BY OTHER ISSUES. BUT SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS A SET OF COMMON PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT. POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT STATEMENT AT THE BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT.

## DETAIL

2. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO POLICY PLANNING STAFF, STATE DEPARTMENT ABOUT DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE BAKER/SHEVARDNAZE BILATERAL. THEY SAID THAT DISCUSSION HAD BEEN BADLY SQUEEZED BY OTHER, PRINCIPALLY ARMS CONTROL, ISSUES. AFGHANISTAN WAS THE ONLY REGIONAL ISSUE WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN BAKER'S TALKING POINTS FOR THE ONE-TO-ONE. IN THE EVENT, THERE WAS ONLY TIME TO HAND OVER A US SUGGESTED LIST OF PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION AT THE SUBSEQUENT SMALL GROUP MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES, AND ROSS CHAIRED A 45 MINUTE EXPERTS MEETING

3. AT THE END OF THESE MEETINGS, THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING FOUR PRINCIPLES:

- I) A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD INVOLVE A TRANSITION PERIOD.
- II) THE UNITED NATIONS (AND THE OIC) SHOULD BE INVITED TO WORK WITH THE AFGHANS TO ESTABLISH APPROPRIATE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.
- III) THERE SHOULD BE ELECTIONS TO CREATE A FINAL GOVERNMENT.
- IV) HUMANITARIAN NEEDS WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED AS PART OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

STATE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD SEEMED RATHER LESS ENTHUSIASTIC THAN PREVIOUSLY ABOUT THE IDEA OF OIC INVOLVEMENT (ALTHOUGH IT WAS THEY WHO HAD PUT IT TO THE US SIDE DURING THE HELSINKI TALKS). THE US SIDE HAD TRIED TO INCLUDE, AS A FIFTH PRINCIPLE, THAT THE TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY SHOULD RECEIVE POWER FROM THE NAJIBULLAH GOVERNMENT. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT THIS, BUT HAD PRESSED FOR REFERENCE TO A CEASEFIRE AND NEGATIVE SYMMETRY. THEY SUGGESTED THAT BOTH OF THESE, BUT PARTICULARLY A CEASEFIRE, SHOULD

BE AGREED IN ADVANCE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THESE POINTS, IN TURN, HAD BEEN REJECTED BY THE US SIDE.

4. STATE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET REACHED A DECISION ON HOW TO PLAY THINGS, BUT THE LIKELIHOOD WAS THAT THEY WOULD PREPARE A DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT, INCORPORATING THE FOUR AGREED PRINCIPLES, TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT AND HOPEFULLY, ISSUED AT ITS CONCLUSION. THE DRAFT WOULD PROBABLY INCORPORATE SOME WORDING ON A CEASEFIRE AND NEGATIVE SYMMETRY, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF AN AGREEMENT TO TALK ABOUT THE SUBJECTS ONCE THE POLITICAL PROCESS GOT UNDERWAY. STATE WERE ADAMANT THAT IT MADE NO SENSE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE IN ADVANCE OF A POLITICAL PROCESS: IT WOULD BE TIME CONSUMING AND PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT. THERE APPEAR TO BE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ON WHETHER IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO TALK NOW ABOUT A WILLINGNESS TO CUT OFF ARMS SUPPLIES. SOME ARGUE THAT THIS WOULD DISCOURAGE THE MUJAHIDEEN, LEADING TO A RELAXATION OF MILITARY PRESSURE. OTHERS SAY THAT THAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED.

5. WE ASKED WHAT CONTACTS THE ADMINISTRATION HAD HAD WITH THE UN. STATE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS WITH SAVAN. HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE UN WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO HOLD POWER ON AN INTERIM BASIS IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO PLAY THE ROLE OF HELPFUL PARTNER. THIS COINCIDED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF THE UN ROLE, THOUGH THERE WOULD CLEARLY NEED TO BE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. WE ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PAKISTANIS AND THE SAUDIS. STATE SAID THAT PAKASTANI IDEAS ON A POLITICAL PROCESS WERE ALONG SIMILAR LINES (THEY REFERRED TO PRESIDENT GHULAM ISHAQ'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AIG LEADERS). THE SAUDIS APPEARED TO BE AVOIDING THINKING ABOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION, BUT STATE THOUGHT THAT KING FAHD WOULD BE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH A SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE THE SAUDIS TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE OR TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY. STATE ADDED THAT THEY HAD MADE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON NEGATIVE SYMMETRY WOULD BE A PURELY US/SOVIET DEAL: THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO COME TO THEIR OWN AGREEMENT WITH THE SAUDIS. ON THE MUJAHIDEEN, STATE SAID THAT WHILE SOME WOULD OPPOSE - SAYYAF HAD DENOUNCED ELECTIONS AS UNISLAMIC - MOST ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE JIHAD WAS OVER AND WERE WILLING TO LOOK FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THEY ADDED THAT, WHILE THE AIG COULD NOT EXPECT A ROLE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, THERE WAS NO REASON WHY THE AIG LEADERSHIP SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED AS PROMINENT AFGHANS.

6. STATE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS STILL APPEAR TO BE GIVING LIMITED ATTENTION TO FINDING A SETTLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, LARGELY BECAUSE OF

PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, STATE WERE HOPEFUL THAT A JOINT STATEMENT COULD BE AGREED. THE MAIN STICKING POINT REMAINED THE ROLE OF NAJIBULLAH IN THE RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS. SECRETARY BAKER CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT NAJIB SHOULD NOT BENEFIT FROM THE ADVANTAGE OF INCUMBENCY. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE EXPERIENCE OF NICARAGUA HAD ENCOURAGED BAKER TO BELIEVE THAT A POLITICAL PROCESS BASED ON ELECTIONS SHOULD BE ACHIEVABLE, AND PRODUCE THE RIGHT RESULT IN AFGHANISTAN. STATE THOUGHT THAT THE NAJIBULLAH PROBLEM WAS INCREASINGLY A SYMBOLIC ONE AND IMPLIED THAT, IF OTHER FACTORS CAME TOGETHER, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A WAY AROUND IT.

ACLAND

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
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
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PRIME MINISTER  
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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT**  
AFGHANISTAN

16 May 1990

I agree with

100P I share your unease about the Foreign Office letter of 14 May. Under the guise of contingency planning they are coming close to advocating cutting our losses and acquiescing in the present state of affairs.

It is true that the Resistance are desperately divided and have made little military progress. Also that the Americans are thinking about a possible compromise with the Russians, perhaps allowing Najibullah to stand for election to the final Afghan government, rather than disappearing gracefully from the scene. Also that Congressional patience is limited and we cannot afford to be left out on a limb.

But, as the letter admits, no early US/Soviet compromise is likely and Congress still supports arms supplies. We do not want to get ahead of them and thereby encourage a cut-off of arms from the West. Nor do we want to give the Russians a half victory - they withdraw but their puppets stay. Massoud is still a considerable asset; we do not want to abandon him before we have to. Our aid costs little: most of the expenses are borne by the Americans.

I do not argue for a rigid policy of no change. But we should not cut and run before we have to.

As for the Embassy, until the political situation has changed it cannot go back without giving great and undeserved comfort to Najibullah.

le  
PERCY CRADOCK

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AFGHANISTAN  
(MEM)  
bcc PC 17



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

15 May 1990

AFGHANISTAN

Thank you for your letter of 14 May with the Foreign Secretary's thoughts on the way ahead over Afghanistan. The Prime Minister is distinctly uneasy about what is proposed, seeing it as conceding a victory to the Russians. She thinks that a decision to return our Embassy staff would be seen as writing off the prospects for the Resistance and equally would not wish us to take any decision at this stage against further supply of military equipment to the Resistance. She would like to discuss this at her next bilateral with the Foreign Secretary.

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL



PRIME MINISTERAFGHANISTAN

The attached letter says:

- The Resistance are not going to win.
- We shall have to be prepared to accept whatever successor regime emerges, provided it is chosen by a vaguely democratic process endorsed by UN observers.
- The Americans likewise accept this.

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- The French and Italians are returning staff to their Embassies in Kabul. We should make contingency plans to do the same within the next few months. Our return to Kabul in present circumstances would of course be seen as writing off the Resistance.

The key judgement is whether we are giving up too soon. The Americans are clearly losing confidence in the Resistance, but are continuing their military help and are not yet re-opening their Embassy (although they might not consult us in advance). It would be a pity to break ranks now, after the stalwart support we have given to the Resistance and with the current uncertainty in the Soviet Union. The Foreign Secretary's recommendations postpone final decisions. I think you can accept them, making clear that you regard them as keeping options open and not pre-judging the actual decisions.

Agree?

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

14 May 1990

*This will give the Russians their victory - the only one they have had. It is very difficult to withdraw all help from guerrillas who have fought bravely for several years.*

15(a-g)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL London SW1A 2AH

Dear Charles,

14 May 1990  
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Afghanistan

The Foreign Secretary has been reviewing within the Office [redacted] and the next steps which we should be considering. The following sets out his general thinking, and deals with two particular points of which he considers the Prime Minister should be aware.

It is now 14 months since the Russians withdrew. Contrary to the general expectation, Najibullah and his regime have not yet fallen, and still give no sign of doing so. They retain control of most of the towns, at least by day. They continue to receive massive Soviet aid, both military equipment and other supplies.

The Mujahideen groups are even more disunited, now that the Russians have left, than they were while the Russian forces formed a common target. The recent coup attempt, which saw Hekmatyar, an Islamic fundamentalist Mujahideen leader, making common cause with Tanai, a hardline Communist ex-colleague of Najibullah, illustrates the degree of cynical opportunism now being practised. It has also made mutual trust between the various Mujahideen leaders even more problematic. The Americans and Pakistanis have made determined efforts to get them to cooperate more effectively, but even the progressive decline in international sympathy and material support has not brought about a greater coherence.

With the withdrawal of Soviet forces, we have few direct interests in Afghanistan. Our general objectives must be to bring about the emergence of a stable, non-extremist regime which would not have a destabilising effect on Pakistan or on contiguous areas of the Soviet Union; to see a government installed in Kabul which will take effective action against the production of and traffic in illicit drugs; and to enable the Afghan refugees now in Pakistan and Iran to return to Afghanistan and resume a normal life there. The realisation of these objectives would require the replacement of the present Najibullah regime by a government acceptable to Afghans of all persuasions and prepared to live in peace with its neighbours.

The Americans and Russians have made some progress in their negotiations about the steps by which a new regime might be installed, although the Americans do not expect an early

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solution. We are not directly involved in these talks, but are following them closely. The main differences remain:

- at what point would Najibullah step down;
- when to terminate the supply of weapons both to the regime and to the Mujahideen, and what to do about the regime's stocks of weapons, which give it a decided advantage;
- how to obtain an agreed representative voice from the multifarious Mujahideen and refugee groups.

Najibullah himself has recently proposed various liberalisation measures designed to woo the resistance and help to bring about a settlement. Although most of these have been rejected by the main Mujahideen groups, his efforts appear to be having some effect, at least with purely local commanders.

The disarray amongst the Mujahideen means that they have little hope of toppling Najibullah militarily and are unable to articulate a coherent political programme. For these reasons, they have been told by the Americans that they risk forfeiting US Congressional support. This prospect might induce them to improve their coordination, but it is unlikely that they will ever be able to organise themselves into a credible political force. In the last resort, we should be prepared to do business with any successor regime - provided it emerges as a result of some kind of democratic process (involving Afghans both inside the country and those in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran); and that the process itself is endorsed by observers from the United Nations and the organisation of Islamic countries, a principle which both the Americans and Russians have accepted.

#### Aid to the Resistance

In the meantime, the Americans are continuing, with the Saudis, to meet the bulk of the Resistance requirements for military supplies. Our own assistance to the Mujahideen within Afghanistan has been directed to Massoud, who controls a substantial area of territory to the north-east of Kabul. He would have a role to play in a settlement. Nevertheless, as a Tadjik, one of the minority tribes in Afghanistan, he is not a plausible candidate to head a national administration.

The Foreign Secretary doubts whether, if we were starting afresh with the situation as it is now, we would wish to become so involved in a country where few direct

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British interests are at stake.

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British Embassy, Kabul

France has decided to return staff to its mission in Kabul, probably in May. Italy plans to follow suit. German intentions are not yet clear, but they seem unlikely to favour an early return.

Although the Americans are unlikely to follow the European lead, at least initially, the Foreign Secretary takes the view that it is not too soon to be thinking of re-establishing our mission. It will be of value to be represented on the spot. Without a presence there, it would be more difficult for us to play a role in bringing about a settlement as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.


You will recall that the original decision to withdraw was precipitated by the Americans. Once the Americans do decide to return, we cannot rely on them to consult us in advance; they would be more likely simply to go ahead, leaving us to follow in their wake. Against this background, the Foreign Secretary believes we should now start contingency planning for a possible reopening within a matter of months. We would, of course, need to give careful thought to the presentation of an eventual decision to return, to avoid giving Najibullah a propaganda victory. We should also need to consider what dealings we wanted to have with the regime once our mission was in place. The Foreign Secretary will be reflecting on these points and will consult the Prime Minister in due course.

*Stephen Wall*

(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 March 1990

CDP ②  
Rice Minister  
C800

Dear Bob,

mt

AFGHANISTAN

The younger brother of Commander Massoud came to see me this afternoon together with Massoud's Private Secretary. Sandy Gall also came along.

Yahya Massoud's main message was that Pakistan's tactics in Afghanistan had failed. They had supported the wrong groups and their military advice to the Resistance had been faulty and responsible for last year's defeats. Their latest ploy, which was to propose a revolutionary council to be headed by Hekhtmayar and the former Afghanistan Defence Minister, had no chance of success. All the other Resistance leaders had refused to join. They had known nothing of General Tanai's coup attempt, although the Pakistanis had undoubtedly been involved.

Yahya Massoud continued that the Resistance Commanders within Afghanistan were determined that the only way forward was to form a Defence Shura in the provisional Government, which would co-ordinate and direct operations within Afghanistan. The nucleus for it already existed with the Shura which Commander Masood had already organised in the north of the country. The Pakistanis must leave it to the Shura to allocate weapons and supplies among the resistance various groups and to set the strategy. Commander Massoud's view was that this should concentrate on the quick capture of two major northern towns, which would tilt the balance further against the régime in Kabul and attract more support to the Resistance, allowing them to advance rapidly to Kabul itself. If the Pakistanis refused to co-operate in this, Massoud hoped that the United Kingdom and others would send supplies direct to the Shura rather than through the Pakistanis. He hoped that HMG would use its influence with the Pakistan Government to persuade them to co-operate. Yahya Massoud said that the Resistance Commanders would go ahead without Pakistan's support if necessary: they were determined to make decisive advances in the current year, after the disappointments and misjudgements of 1989.

I said that the divisions and quarrelling of the various groups in Peshawar had caused some disillusionment with the Resistance in the West. We would in principle be keen to see a closer co-ordination between them, particularly on the military


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- 2 -

side. I would need to take advice on the extent to which we would think it useful to intervene with the Pakistanis, but I saw no reason in principle why we should not encourage them to support the ideas which he had put to me. I would report his remarks and requests in a positive light. I asked how he saw the prospects for a major offensive against the Salang Road. Yahya Massoud claimed that it had been cut recently and that his brother regarded it as a major and important target. But to be confident of dominating it, he had to be sure of adequate supplies of weapons and ammunition.

May I leave it to you to follow this up as appropriate? I will show a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister so that she is aware of Resistance views. I am also sending a copy to James Richards in Century House.

*Yours sincerely,*  
  
C. D. POWELL

R. N. Peirce, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

7 March 1990

Dig Clerk  
~~Please say that~~  
I agree with CAP/B.  
x  
✓ Done 1.3.90

Dear Charles

Afghanistan *flat*

Thank you for your letter of 22 February about a letter from Mr Najibullah to the Prime Minister.

Although we have not broken diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, our policy has long been not to have substantive dealings with the politicians and senior officials of the Kabul regime. We do not acknowledge formal diplomatic communications from the PDPA regime other than on technical and administrative matters. A letter from Najibullah to the Prime Minister is clearly outside this category.

Since the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, Najibullah has been conducting a propaganda campaign to try to legitimise and gain wider acceptance for his government. His letter to the Prime Minister is part of this effort. We recommend that the letter be ignored. There is all the more reason for doing so in the light of recent events in Kabul.


X | If you agree we shall inform other EC countries of this approach and our response, and ask them if they have received similar letters.



Yours ever  
R N Peirce

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

22 February 1990

AFGHANISTAN

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from President Najiballah. I should be grateful for advice and a draft reply if appropriate.

Charles Powell

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*(Red handwritten mark)*



د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
لندن

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
Telephone: 01-589 8891/2

ccpc

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the Protocol Department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to present enclosed herewith the letter of His Excellency Dr. Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, received through telex, to Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Protocol Department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 21st February 1990



Protocol Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Old Admiralty Building  
Whitehall  
London SW1A 2AF



ПОСОЛЬСТВО  
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ  
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

СВ. 242

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime-Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

221  
20 February 1990

Dear Prime Minister,

Please find enclosed a synopsis of the latest Soviet proposals on the Afghan settlement, which I hope might be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

*L. Zamyatin*

L. Zamyatin  
USSR Ambassador

## SOVIET POSITION ON THE AFGHAN SETTLEMENT

(Latest proposals)

Indeed, the situation in and around that country remains a difficult one. But the Soviet Government firmly believes that a year since the Soviet withdrawal there are grounds to state that the prerequisites have emerged for putting the process of political settlement in Afghanistan on practical lines.

That is why on February 15th the Soviet Government, after consultations with the Afghan Government, put forward a comprehensive set of ideas on the settlement in Afghanistan.

First, a broad dialogue with the participation of all political forces operating in Afghanistan and beyond its borders is of paramount importance to the settlement.

The opening of an inter-Afghan dialogue meets with considerable difficulties. We believe that the involvement in this process, as early as at the preparatory stage, of the United Nations Organisation which has vast authority and experience of such work, would be important for overcoming these difficulties.

Second, appropriate conditions should be created for an Afghan dialogue. Most importantly, the fighting must stop.

Third, the nuts and bolts of the Afghan settlement will be the focus of the Afghan dialogue. It could be held in the form of an Afghan peace conference which could be convened in Afghanistan or in any third country upon the arrangement among its participants.

Fourth, the Afghans themselves must work out a mechanism for the internal settlement.

Fifth, during the period of transition, which would begin from the convocation of an all-Afghan peace conference and conclude in the election of a broad-based government, the warring sides could preserve the territorial status-quo currently held by them.



In other words, the question of joint armed forces and of the joint administration for the whole territory of the country would be put off until the creation of a broad-based Afghan government.

All this, certainly, does not preclude the possibility of other versions. Much will depend on the atmosphere at the conference and attitudes of its participants.

Sixth, if the Afghan negotiating parties announced that they pledge to recognise the results of the general elections and will not try to change them by force, it would certainly promote the all-Afghan dialogue and strengthen their mutual trust. President Najibullah of Afghanistan has already pledged this.

Effective international control not only by the United Nations Organisation, but also by other organisations, for example the Islamic Conference, should take place. The Non-Aligned Movement, of which Afghanistan is an active member, could also play an important part in it.

Such are the internal aspects of the settlement.

The specific character of the development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it, as well as the very emergence of the Afghan question, are connected with a certain degree of involvement in it on various stages of a number of countries, primarily the United States, Pakistan, Iran and the USSR. The reaching of mutual understanding between these countries on the main aspects of the political settlement of the Afghan problem seems to be more and more necessary.

With due account for these preliminary observations, I shall again set forth our proposals, and, to make the picture more complete, I shall continue the numbering.

Seventh, in light of the importance of forming a consensus between the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan and Iran, we propose a conference of these four countries with the participation of the UN Secretary-General or its representatives.

It could be held in Geneva, Rome or Vienna. We know about the difficulties Iran could face because of its difficult relations with the US. That is why the Soviet side proposes to act as a mediator.

Eighth, it is clear, however, that the conference would not be valid without the participating of warring parties - both the Republic of Afghanistan and the various groups opposing it.

For this reason it would be worthwhile to set up a working group of experts for preparing the conference, for the purpose of determining the participants and the agenda and settling organisational problems.

Ninth, one of the key issues on which it would be desirable to reach international consensus is the complete termination of all arms deliveries to the warring parties in Afghanistan, no matter where they come from, along with announcing a break or suspension of hostilities.

There is one more thing. In order to support measures to fully stop arms deliveries, it would be reasonable to discuss the removal from Afghanistan of all weapons' stockpiles and not to deliver them to that country in the future.

Tenth, the termination of arms deliveries would be the first step towards the demilitarisation of Afghanistan. An international conference could consolidate the status of Afghanistan as a neutral and demilitarised country.

There seems to be no need to point out that the USSR does not regard these ideas as the only possible platform for the settlement of the Afghan problem.

Noteworthy are the latest proposals to advance the settlement put forward by President Najibullah a few days ago. He suggested that an all-Afghan meeting (a shura) be held in Kabul, Jelalabad or Kandahar. The UN Secretary-General's representative could act as an observer at that meeting. All Afghan political parties and groups could participate in this conference.

The Afghan Government has also proposed to send negotiating teams to Peshawar and Tehran made up of well-known Afghans not associated with the PDPA or the Government to meet the opposition and seek out ways of bringing the settlement forward.

The Soviet Government supports these ideas, viewing them as potentially capable of starting the inter-Afghan dialogue.

After all it is up to the Afghans to resolve their differences. As to the Soviet Union - it will render its assistance to all constructive moves towards peace in Afghanistan.



ПОСОЛЬСТВО  
СОЮЗА СОВЕТСКИХ  
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Mr. C. Powell  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

20 February 1990

сф  
СОД/2

Dear Mr. Powell,

Please find enclosed the full text of the article by  
Mr. E. Shevardnadze on the USSR position on Afghanistan,  
which I hope will be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

*L. Zamyatin*

L. Zamyatin  
USSR Ambassador



# THE USSR EMBASSY

## PRESS RELEASE

13 KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS LONDON W8 4QX

Friday, February 16, 1990

[7 pages/2447 words]

PR02390

### Eduard Shevardnadze's article in Izvestia

**Moscow February 14 TASS -- Here follows the full text of an article by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, published in Izvestia today:**

The last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan a year ago, on February 15. It is no exaggeration to say that this event was close to the hearts of all Soviet people. They waited for it impatiently, discussed it and took it to heart.

There is no denying the fact that before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan many people both at home and abroad could not be sure of their attitude toward the goals of perestroika. We passed this trial of political responsibility, as we did the exams that followed. The second Congress of USSR People's Deputies gave a courageous and honest assessment of the decision, taken in December 1979, to send troops into Afghanistan.

The leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan passed the exam with flying colours. It proved, in very difficult conditions, that its platform enjoys the broad support of the Afghan people. It began the quest for a political solution to the Afghan problem on a local basis.

In terms of the Soviet troop withdrawal, it is worth analysing the internal aspect of the event and its place in the general context of Soviet perestroika. When taking to the path of perestroika, we could not overlook the fact that Soviet troops were fighting in Afghanistan, that the blood of Soviet soldiers was being spilled there.

The way to the withdrawal of our troops was not easy. It was easier to get involved in the Afghan conflict than to get out of it. The situation created a number of intertwined conflicts that were fraught with far-reaching upheavals. We had to settle them quickly. We sharply intensified the Geneva negotiations and sustained a

*more/...*

difficult diplomatic struggle. It was crowned with the signing of the Geneva Accords on April 14, 1988, after which we could begin to withdraw our troops.

30 When this is all over, we must give their due both to the signatories of the history-making international accords on Afghanistan and to all those who promoted them. I should like to make special mention of India, which has invariably acted in a constructive way and made a substantial contribution to the overall efforts.

The stand of the People's Republic of China also deserves mention. As a neighbouring country, it played an important part in maintaining a proper atmosphere around the talks. And, of course, the accords would have been virtually impossible without Iran's constructive stand.

40 It is natural that this crucial event made a strong impact both on the domestic and international situation. Speaking at the 19th Party Conference, Mikhail Gorbachev said that "the Geneva Accords became an important landmark in the political settlement of regional conflicts, which are endangering universal peace and hampering the progress of nations."

The breakthrough in the settlement of the Afghan problem convincingly showed that new political thinking in international affairs meant, among other things, practical actions aimed at strengthening trust between states and peoples and at settling the most complicated situations. The Afghan precedent definitely accelerated the termination of the Iran-Iraq war, the settlement of the Namibian problem and the consolidation of the movement to find mutually acceptable, compromise solutions in South-East Asia and Central America.

50 Much depends on the position of Pakistan and Iran which border on Afghanistan. Pakistan seems to be slowly and with great difficulty reassessing values and bringing its policy in line with Afghan realities. In general Iran is conducting a constructive policy. In particular, it stresses the role that countries of the region can play in the Afghan settlement.

Even the opposition is waking up to the inevitability of solving the internal Afghan problem through a dialogue that involves the entire range of Afghan political forces. This encompasses wide circles of the opposition, from field commanders to the moderate leaders of the "seven-party alliance."

Thus there are all grounds to state that the prerequisites have emerged for putting the process of attaining national reconciliation and a political settlement in Afghanistan on practical lines.

60 We are not indifferent to the fate of Afghanistan and the Afghan people. I think this is obvious. This country is our neighbour, a traditional and close partner. It was and will remain so. Therefore there is nothing strange in the fact that, having withdrawn troops, we are far from being indifferent to how Afghan affairs develop: will the desire for peace and accord triumph or will this courageous and wise people be doomed to endless bloody strife.

It is general knowledge that we have our own vision of the optimal model for a peaceful Afghan settlement which we elaborated through close consultations with the government in Kabul, while maintaining contacts with other forces of Afghan society.

70 The main thing now is not to let slip a chance of launching a full-scale inter-Afghan political dialogue. Nobody doubts that there is now such a chance. Just as most other regional conflicts, the Afghan problem has two aspects -- domestic and foreign.

With all the nuances characteristic of the Afghan question, the domestic aspect is undoubtedly the priority. And this is understandable: no one can decide Afghans' affairs for them.

However, there is no denying that those who got involved in the Afghan events in one way or another are obliged to help Afghans achieve accord. They should offer help, and should not implant their own recipes and, what is more, should not attach preliminary conditions.

80 We believe that there are the following stages on the way to Afghan settlement and this opinion is shared by leaders of the Republic of Afghanistan.

**First**, a broad dialogue with the participation of all political forces operating in Afghanistan and beyond its borders is of paramount importance to the settlement. This applies, above all, to the forces who treasure national interests and who want a fratricidal war to end as soon as possible.

And if most such groups decide to begin an inter-Afghan dialogue, an initial and the most important practical step towards the solution of the Afghan problem will be taken.

90 The opening of an inter-Afghan dialogue meets with considerable difficulties. We believe that the involvement in this process, as early as at the preparatory stage, of the United Nations Organisation which has vast authority and experience of such work, would be important for overcoming these difficulties.

*more/...*

**Second**, appropriate conditions should be created for an Afghan dialogue. Most importantly, the fighting must stop.

We understand that, most probably, it would be impossible to agree immediately on the complete ending of the war which, even counted formally, has been lasting for eleven years, and actually even longer. Therefore, at the initial stage, it would be expedient to press for a ceasefire.

100 **Third**, the nuts and bolts of the Afghan settlement will be the focus of the Afghan dialogue. It could be held in the form of an Afghan peace conference which could be convened in Afghanistan or in any third country upon the arrangement among its participants.

**Fourth**, the Afghans themselves must work out a mechanism for the internal settlement. We believe a solid basis could be provided by the plan advanced by Afghanistan's president at the ninth Non-Aligned Summit Conference in Belgrade. The plan outlines the basic stages of settlement and envisages filling them with specific contents. What is particularly valuable in present conditions is that it is flexible and opens room for proposals.

110 **Fifth**, the concept of a period of transition could involve the preservation of the territorial status quo between the factions participating in the dialogue. The period of transition would be the period beginning from the convocation of an all-Afghan peace conference and concluding in the election of a broad-based government.

In other words, the question of joint armed forces and of the joint administration for the whole territory of the country would be put off until the creation of a broad-based Afghan government.

All this, certainly, does not preclude the possibility of other versions. Much will depend on the atmosphere at the conference and attitudes of its participants.

120 **Sixth**, if the Afghan negotiating parties announced that they pledge to recognise the results of the general elections and will not try to change them by force, it would certainly promote the all-Afghan dialogue and strengthen their mutual trust. As for President Najibullah of Afghanistan, he has already pledged this at a meeting with journalists in Kabul on January 24, 1990.

There is one more important thing about the elections which should draw a line under military confrontation. The existing experience of the settlement of regional conflicts, specifically, in Namibia and Nicaragua, shows that effective international



control to make them really free and democratic is very important for the organisation of such elections.

130 So far as Afghanistan is concerned, not only the United Nations Organisation, but also other organisations, for example the Islamic Conference, could act as observers. The Non-Aligned Movement, of which Afghanistan is an active member, could also play an important part in it.

Such are the internal aspects of the settlement. It is difficult to separate internal aspects from external in a situation like the one existing in Afghanistan, for example, in the problem of elections under international control. However, since we agreed to separate them, although in a somewhat artificial way, I should like to set forth our view of the second group of issues.

140 The specific character of the development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it, as well as the very emergence of the Afghan question, are connected with a certain degree of involvement in it on various stages of a number of countries, primarily the United States, Pakistan, Iran and the USSR. The signing of the Geneva Accords provided a legal basis for the responsibility of the USSR and the US As guarantors of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The most important thing is that Pakistan should take measures to stop this interference from Pakistani territory, that Pakistani side should live up to its commitments. The reaching of mutual understanding by the USSR, the US, Pakistan and Iran on the main aspects of the political settlement of the Afghan problem seems to be more and more necessary.

With due account for these preliminary observations, I shall again set forth our proposals, and, to make the picture more complete, I shall continue the numbering.

150 **Seventh**, in light of the importance of forming a consensus between the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan and Iran, we propose a conference of these four countries with the participation of the UN Secretary-General or its representatives.

It could be held in Geneva, Rome or Vienna. We know about the difficulties Iran could face because of its difficult relations with the US This is why the Soviet side proposes to act as a mediator.

**Eighth**, it is clear, however, that the conference would not be valid without the participation of warring parties -- both the Republic of Afghanistan and the various groups opposing it.

*more/...*

160 For this reason it would be worthwhile to set up a working group of experts for preparing the conference, for the purpose of determining the participants and the agenda and settling organisational problems.

**Ninth**, one of the key issues on which it would be desirable to reach international consensus is the complete termination of all arms deliveries to the warring parties in Afghanistan, no matter where they come from, along with announcing a break or suspension of hostilities.

We have spoken about it with the US Side on more than one occasion, because we have believed and continue to believe that only this comprehensive approach can really bring closer the termination of the bloodshed in Afghanistan.

170 There is one more thing. In order to support measures to fully stop arms deliveries, it would be reasonable to discuss the removal from Afghanistan of all weapons' stockpiles' and not to deliver them to that country in the future.

**Tenth**, the termination of arms deliveries would be the first step towards the demilitarisation of Afghanistan. An international conference could consolidate the status of Afghanistan as a neutral and demilitarised country. The USSR would be ready to take parts, including the material aspect, in the creation of an international mechanism which would monitor demilitarisation of Afghanistan on all stages.

180 There seems to be no need to point out that the USSR does not regard these ideas as the only possible platform for the settlement of the Afghan problem. We are sure, however, that their putting into practice would really give a start to the national reconciliation process in Afghanistan. We hope for a constructive response from those on whom progress in the Afghan settlement depends.

We also count on the support of the UN Secretary-General. This would be fully in line with the mandate given to him by the General Assembly. We are deeply convinced that the UN has far from exhausted its considerable potential for ensuring a most-favoured treatment for the Afghan settlement.

190 On our part, we are ready for constructive exchange of views with the US, Pakistan and Iran on all aspects of the Afghan settlement, including practical steps to ensure its progress. The Soviet side does not refuse to take part in a dialogue with field commanders, leaders of Peshawar and other groups on the understanding that such contacts will not be interpreted in a wrong way, as our recognition of the "transitional government." We are also open for talks with Zahir Shah, his associates, with all those who would like to help settle the Afghan problem.

There is one more humanitarian issue which is of tremendous importance to us: the release of our soldiers captured by Afghan opposition forces. The Soviet government and the Soviet people in general cannot but be concerned over the destiny of our compatriots who are still in captivity a year after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

200 The USSR Foreign Ministry will not believe that it has fulfilled its mission until all our soldiers are set free and join their families. We regard it as our sacred duty and direct professional responsibility.

Life and memory are inseparable. Dates such as this anniversary invariably provoke people to analyse the past and to take actions directed towards the future. This is what we are going to do.

The Soviet Union is eager and determined to do its utmost for neighbouring Afghanistan to become again a peaceful, non-aligned country friendly to all nations, for this painful period in its history full of internicine strife to be over, never to return.

**\*\* Ends \*\***

SOVIET POSITION ON THE AFGHAN SETTLEMENT

(Latest proposals)

Indeed, the situation in and around that country remains a difficult one. But the Soviet Government firmly believes that a year since the Soviet withdrawal there are grounds to state that the prerequisites have emerged for putting the process of political settlement in Afghanistan on practical lines.

That is why on February 15th the Soviet Government, after consultations with the Afghan Government, put forward a comprehensive set of ideas on the settlement in Afghanistan.

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The opening of an inter-Afghan dialogue meets with considerable difficulties. We believe that the involvement in this process, as early as at the preparatory stage, of the United Nations Organisation which has vast authority and experience of such work, would be important for overcoming these difficulties.

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With due account for these preliminary observations, I shall again set forth our proposals, and, to make the picture more complete, I shall continue the numbering.

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It could be held in Geneva, Rome or Vienna. We know about the difficulties Iran could face because of its difficult relations with the US. That is why the Soviet side proposes to act as a mediator.

Eighth, it is clear, however, that the conference would not be valid without the participating of warring parties - both the Republic of Afghanistan and the various groups opposing it.

For this reason it would be worthwhile to set up a working group of experts for preparing the conference, for the purpose of determining the participants and the agenda and settling organisational problems.

Ninth, one of the key issues on which it would be desirable to reach international consensus is the complete termination of all arms deliveries to the warring parties in Afghanistan, no matter where they come from, along with announcing a break or suspension of hostilities.

There is one more thing. In order to support measures to fully stop arms deliveries, it would be reasonable to discuss the removal from Afghanistan of all weapons' stockpiles and not to deliver them to that country in the future.

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
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Noteworthy are the latest proposals to advance the settlement put forward by President Najibullah a few days ago. He suggested that an all-Afghan meeting (a shura) be held in Kabul, Jelalabad or Kandahar. The UN Secretary-General's representative could act as an observer at that meeting. All Afghan political parties and groups could participate in this conference.

The Afghan Government has also proposed to send negotiating teams to Peshawar and Tehran made up of well-known Afghans not associated with the PDPA or the Government to meet the opposition and seek out ways of bringing the settlement forward.

The Soviet Government supports these ideas, viewing them as potentially capable of starting the inter-Afghan dialogue.

After all it is up to the Afghans to resolve their differences. As to the Soviet Union - it will render its assistance to all constructive moves towards peace in Afghanistan.







د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
کابل

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
Telephone: 01-589 8891/2

Kabul, 15 February 1990

Her Excellency,

I cordially dispatch you this letter when my country Afghanistan, is burning in the flames of war. As a result of this war, hundreds of thousands of this country's people have either been killed or wounded. And millions of others compelled to abandon their homes and lands. The national economy has sustained losses worth billions of dollars, and the social and cultural fabric of our society has suffered enormously.

The new way of thinking and approach in the field of International relations as well as inside Afghanistan on the one hand, made it possible for the Geneva Agreements to be signed on April 14, 1988, and on the other, paved the way for the proclamation and successful implementation of the humane policy of National Reconciliation since more than three years aimed at a complete cessation of the war in Afghanistan.

In accordance with the inter-related and mutual commitments under the Geneva Agreements, which were the outcome of six-year-long untiring efforts under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, all forms of foreign interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan were to be ceased forthwith. The USA and The USSR were to provide guarantees for their implementation. It was on the basis of these agreements that the Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989, in accordance with the agreed time frame. However, far from ending, foreign interference and intervention rapidly escalated until it became a full-fledged war against Afghanistan after the signing and entry into force of the Geneva Agreements and particularly after the completion of Soviet troops withdrawal.

Since the Geneva Agreements have entered into force thousands of Pakistani violations have been registered out of which 8531 instances have been brought to the attention of the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) through 1112 verbal notes. Over this period more than half a million rockets and other heavy artillery shells have been fired at cities and other residential areas as well as at civilian and military establishments, as a result of which around ten thousand persons, the vast majority of whom were women, children and the old, and other civilian people, have martyred or severely injured, material losses due to these attacks surpassed billions of dollars.



د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
لندن

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
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I deem it necessary to mention that thousands of men belonging to Pakistan's armed forces and Saudi Arabia mercenaries participated directly along with Afghan armed opposition groups in the extensive frontal attacks against the cities of Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar. They continue to actively take part in the military operations in other parts of Afghanistan. Several Pakistani intelligence and military personnel and Saudi mercenaries have been captured and tens of them killed in the course of their attacks.

In the same period, the quantity and quality of weapons made available to the opposition groups were substantially up-graded, while a plan for economic blockade of cities through attacking and destroying convoys of food staffs and other items of necessity was carried out which brought about a lot of suffering to the residents of cities.

All these acts were intended to help materialize the unrealistic and illusory expectations of toppling down the government of the Republic of Afghanistan by force. Now that one year elapses since the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops, the government is stronger from the military, political, economic and morale points of view, and the possibility of achieving a military victory against it has been realistically nullified.

Many a time one ponders that after so many deaths and destructions, what objectives they are after, those who persist in their policy of continuation of war in Afghanistan.

We have proposed that broad negotiations be held between the Leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan and all the Afghan political forces, both in and outside the country, who are in favour of ensuring peace and stopping of war. These negotiations are meant to holding of a national peace conference in which all forces involved may take part and which will reach an agreement on setting up a leadership council of the country representing the convictions and views of all forces. The conference will declare a six month-long ceasefire, within which a socially broad-based coalition government will be formed by and under supervision of the leadership council that shall also establish a commission to draft a new constitution and a law on new elections.

Having confirmed the drafts of these legislations, the council shall call the traditional Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly) of Afghanistan to consider and then to ratify them. Afterwards, on the basis of the new legislating a free direct, fair and nationwide parliamentary election with secret ballot will be held, and a new government will be formed, subject to the result of the election, by a party or a coalition of parties that has won a majority of seats in the parliament, and will assume the administration of the country according to the new constitution.



د افغانستان د جمهوریت سفارت  
لنډ

Embassy of the Republic of Afghanistan  
31 Princes Gate London SW7 1QQ  
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Besides, the state is ready to accept the monitoring by an international commission of the election process to avoid any mistrust and to guarantee the rule of law therein.

In order to solve the external aspects of the problem, the Republic of Afghanistan has proposed that an international conference be convened with participation of Afghanistan, Pakistan, The United State, USSR, China, Iran, India, The Chairmen of NAM and Organization of Islamic Conference, and other nations concerned. In the first stage, to reinforce the ceasefire in Afghanistan, the conference will reach an agreement on stopping the delivery of any kind of weapons to the warring sides and in the next stage, it will protect and guarantee the legal status of Afghanistan both as a permanently neutral and demilitarized country to be stipulated in the new constitution.

The establishment of a free and democratic political, social and economic system in Afghanistan can in no way harm the legitimate and legal interests of neither political forces in our society. Similarly, an independent, neutral and demilitarized Afghanistan shall not only ensure peace and tranquility within our country but shall also fall in line with the interests of peace, stability and cooperation in our region.


These are our peace initiatives and the mechanism for their implementation, which, in our view can and must replace the unrealistic and futile concept of military solution, with the help of Almighty and with reliance on the sound reason and action of all Afghans. We sincerely and steadfastly strive for the effective implementation of the policy of National Reconciliation in our country and firmly believe in the triumph of this noble Islamic and humane ideal.

Your Excellency, I would like to request you as Prime Minister of a country which is a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations to spare no efforts in restoring peace in Afghanistan which would further consolidate democratic institutions in the country.

Please accept, Excellency, my best wishes for your good health and for the further successes of the people of Great Britain.

Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher  
Prime Minister of Great Britain

Najibullah  
President of the Republic of  
Afghanistan



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CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 December 1989

CD  
28/12/89

Dear Charles,

Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 18 December about Sandy Gall's letter.

I enclose a draft reply. Arms supplies cannot readily be discussed in open correspondence, and though we can rely entirely on Mr Gall's discretion we cannot be certain that others (eg his secretary at ITN) will not have access to his mail. I suggest, however, that you might draw on the following points, which we would be happy to make to him but not to see recorded on paper, in a telephone call to supplement the letter:

- our own information about supplies to Massoud is very much the same as Gall's - he and those with him have been complaining for some time that no weapons have been reaching them;
- the reason for this does indeed seem to be a basic difference of opinion between Massoud and the Pakistan military authorities about how the war ought to be fought;
- we have now seen reports suggesting that some supplies may have been sent to Massoud, though it is not clear whether any of them will have found their way through the passes before the snows cut the routes through the Hindu Kush;
- we shall have to see whether this help reaches him, and if so, whether it is the start of better things for Massoud, or just a temporary relief from continuing problems;
- we shall in any case continue to make it clear to the US and Pakistan that we see Massoud as a competent and politically mature operator, who deserves their political and material support; indeed we see him as an indispensable ingredient in any political or military solution in Afghanistan.

Sandy Gall believes - rightly - that Pakistan military intelligence, who control the flows of supplies to the resistance, are biased against Massoud and in favour of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (whose fanatical and unscrupulous

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organisation has, incidentally, just sent a characteristically unpleasant death threat to the BBC's Pakistan correspondent). He believes - again rightly - that the CIA measure Massoud's value to them largely in terms of his willingness to carry out military operations of their choice according to their timetable, an approach which they know we (and most other outside observers) believe to be misguided. But he knows that our ability to influence Pakistan and American tactics in Afghanistan is limited.

Lord Brabazon is hoping to have a talk with Sandy Gall in the New Year.

*John*  
*Stephen Wall*  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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IN CONFIDENCE

Mr Sandy Gall  
ITN  
48 Wells Street  
LONDON W1

Thank you for your letter about Afghanistan, which you gave me when we met on 15 December.

I agree with you about the importance of Massoud, and that his strength and skills will be needed both in turning Najibullah out of Kabul, and in building an acceptable future for Afghanistan once Najibullah does fall (as I am sure he will, though not perhaps as quickly as we all once hoped). We can only share his wish to see free democratic elections decide the future government of Afghanistan - it would be a tragedy if one unelected, intolerant and anti-Western autocracy were to give way to another. Our views on these subjects are well known to the American and Pakistan governments - and, I believe, broadly shared by them. But you know, as well as anybody, what the problems are. Our own ability to influence the conduct of the war is very limited.

Thank you again for taking the trouble to write. Your reports from Afghanistan will have served to focus public and parliamentary concern on issues which, with so much happening in other parts of the world, are far too easily forgotten, and deserve not to be.

C D Powell  
Private Secretary

PADAAP/1

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Handwritten text, mostly illegible due to fading and bleed-through.





*F don't want*



FILE KK

cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

18 December 1989

*From the Private Secretary*

**AFGHANISTAN**

I enclose a copy of a personal letter which I have received from Sandy Gall. It would be helpful to have any comments which I could pass on.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS  
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)  
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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268296 Newsroom: World News  
269317 Film and Videotape Library  
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Friday.

✓

Dear Charles,

I enclose a VHS of the  
Afghan stories. The first is the key one.

It was very good to see you.

Yours ever,

Caroly.

Sandy Gall, ITN

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Afghanistan

Dear Sir:

I have just come back from a mission in Afghanistan. I came away with a very strong feeling that the situation is critical. I think this is true generally, as you are sure you know, but I can only speak to my own-hand knowledge of the northeast, now largely under the control of the so-called Shah MASUD'S forces. I met Masud in Paktia Province, near Taloqan, the main city of that Province.

The main problem I learned from a couple of talks with Masud is that he has received no help via the Pakistani pipeline at all this year. The air routes to the north are now blocked by snow. This is a deliberate policy, he says, enforced by the Soviets. He says he will not fight the war their way. They have always refused his interference and his refusal to take ISI's Pakistani military that he would instructs him not to infuriated them to the extent of cutting off his arms supply. I don't believe that the capture of Kabul is only possible with Masud's active participation. It is not only a matter of Masud's own efforts and pressure, but affects the whole of the Afghan war effort as well.

His chief aide, Mr. Reshad, subsequently told me that Masud's organization is a mixture of top mujahideen military commanders inside Afghanistan and a group of advisers in Kabul. Obviously, the Pakistani Government would like Masud to do everything to sabotage the peace. Many of the mujahideen in Afghanistan might well welcome the peace, but they are not only a joint effort based on a single agreement. They have a long history of getting paid by the Soviet regime. Such a peace Masud would not be drawn up by the mujahideen's own committee, but by the

Sandy Gall

Sandy Gall, ITN

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Afghanistan

Dear Charles

I have just come back from a mission in Afghanistan. I came away with a very strong feeling that the situation is critical. I don't think this is true generally, as you know, but I can only speak for the area of my own knowledge of the north-east, now largely under the control of General MASUD'S forces. In the North I met Masud in the town of Taloqan, the main city of the Farda Province.

The main problem started from a couple of talks with Masud. He has received no supplies via the Pakistan pipeline at all this year. The arms routes to the north are now blocked by snow. This is a deliberate policy. He said, endorsed by the Soviets and Bengalis, he will not fight the war their way. They have always resented his independence and he refuses to take ISI tactics and military intelligence instructions and has now infuriated them to the extent of cutting off his arms supply. Some believe that the capture of Kabul is only possible with Masud's active participation. This is not only a serious blow to Masud's morale and prestige but also affects the role of Mujahideen war effort as well.

His second in command, Hekmatyar, subsequently told me that Masud's organization is the site of top mujahideen military commands in the Afghan area. He drew up a plan for an attack on Kabul. Hekmatyar, Hekmatyar, Hekmatyar Masud will do everything to sabotage the plan. Many of the commanders in Afghanistan might well welcome the idea. Hekmatyar is only a joint effort based on a single agreement. The race is to get the Mujahideen to get the Mujahideen to get the Mujahideen. Masud will be drawn out of the Mujahideen's line of command. Hekmatyar will be drawn out of the Mujahideen's line of command. Hekmatyar will be drawn out of the Mujahideen's line of command.

Sandy Gall

Sandy Gall, ITN

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan.

Dear Charles,

I have just come back from a month in Afghanistan. I came away with a very strong feeling that the situation is critical. I think this is true generally, as I'm sure you know, but I can only speak with first-hand knowledge of the north-east, now largely under the control of Ahmad Shah MASUD'S Council of the North. I met Masud in his 'capital' of Taloqan, the main city of Takhar Province.

The main fact I learned from a couple of talks with Masud is that he has received no weapons via the Pakistani pipeline at all this year (the arms routes to the north are now blocked by snow). This is a deliberate policy, he says, enforced by the Pakistanis because he will not fight the war their way. They have always resented his independence and his refusal to take ISI (Pakistani military intelligence) instructions has now infuriated them to the extent of cutting off his arms supply. Since I believe that the capture of Kabul is only possible with Masud's full participation, this is not only a serious blow to Masud's own effectiveness and prestige, but affects the whole mujahideen war effort as well.

His brother Yahya, in Peshawar, subsequently told me that Masud wants to organize a conference of top mujahideen military commanders inside Afghanistan to draw up a plan for an attack on Kabul. (Obviously Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who hates Masud will do everything to sabotage the plan, but many other commanders in Afghanistan might well welcome the idea.) Masud's argument is that only a joint attack based on a single, agreed plan will have any chance of getting rid of President Najib's regime. Such a plan, Masud says, must be drawn up by the mujahideen's best commanders, of whom he is particularly sure, independent of the politicians in Peshawar. Only after a military solution, he argues, can there be a political solution, and "free, democratic elections."

My conclusion is that unless Masud gets some in substantial quantities next year, the prospects for him, his Council of the North and the wider mujahideen cause will be seriously if not fatally flawed. He is the main power in the strategic Salang Highway area, the only commander who can block access to Kabul by road, and in my opinion the key player for the eventual attack on Kabul. If the mujahideen, under ISI control, could not even capture Jalalabad, the same combination minus Masud have no hope at all of taking Kabul, in my opinion.

< Sandy Gall

Sandy Gall, ITN

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My conclusion is that unless Masud gets some in substantial quantities next year, the prospects for him, his Council of the North and the wider mujahideen cause will be seriously if not fatally flawed. He is the main power in the strategic Salang Highway area, the only commander who can block access to Kabul by road, and in my opinion the key player for the eventual attack on Kabul. If the mujahideen, under ISI control, could not even capture Jalalabad, the same combination minus Masud have no hope at all of taking Kabul, in my opinion.

Sandy Gall

END



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November 1989

Apart from these considerations, I think you really for too busy see Charles to see him. Agree not on this occasion?

Visit by President of the Afghan Interim Government, 8-11 November

Professor Mojaddedi will be visiting Britain from 8-11 November with a 7-man delegation, including his Ministers for Information and for Communications. Mojaddedi is the Head of the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF), one of the main Afghan resistance groups, and since February has been President of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG).

The Foreign Secretary will see Mojaddedi and we are treating him as an FCO/COI sponsored visitor during his stay.

Mojaddedi will arrive after visiting France (5-8 November), where he will be received at Minister of State level in the Foreign Minister's absence. He goes on from here to the US, where we understand he may be received by President Bush.

You may remember writing to Mojaddedi's representative in Paris on 5 September (copy attached), giving a non-committal reply to the possibility of a call on the Prime Minister. In the event, Mojaddedi did not come then, but the visitors have made it clear that they would welcome a call on the Prime Minister during this visit.

Mojaddedi himself is a senior and respected, though not a particularly impressive figure, and his party is moderate and pro-Western. But the AIG have failed to establish their authority either within Afghanistan or even among the resistance. Strong UK and Pakistan support has probably done as much to damage their credibility as to enhance it. We will want to give the visitors a friendly and sympathetic hearing, and to assure them of our continuing support for the resistance. But we see no strong reason to press the Prime Minister to find time to see them, though there is no reason why she should not do so if she wishes.

/On

COO  
3/Ki  
Agree -  
not.  
Too much  
at that time  
no

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On a previous visit to Britain in late 1987 in his capacity as leader of the ANLF, Mojaddedi was received by Lord Glenarthur. Following the formation of the Afghan Interim Government, Sir Geoffrey Howe called on him and his AIG colleagues, in Islamabad in March 1989.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R N Peirce', followed by a horizontal line.

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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**MOJADDEDI, PROFESSOR SIBGHATULLAH**

President of the Afghan Interim Government.

Born 1926 in Kabul into the family of the Shor Bazaar religious leaders of the Naqshbandi Sufi sect whose influence extends to the Moslems of the Indian continent. His family originally came from Xinqiang in China and migrated to Afghanistan from the USSR after the basmachi revolt failed in the twenties. After secondary education in Kabul, he went to Al-Azhar University in Cairo. In 1953 he obtained a Doctorate in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and returned to Afghanistan. Was Professor of Islamic Law at Kabul University. Jailed 1960-65 for allegedly taking part in an assassination plot against Krushchev. Considered pro-monarchy.

In 1972 founded "Jamiat-ul Ulema-e Mohammadi", the Society of Muslem Scholars, a politico-religious society of Afghan anti-communist scholars and intellectuals. Imprisoned by Daoud 1974-75. Lectured in theology in Copenhagen during the 1970's and was abroad during both the 1973 and 1978 coups. Took part in Islamic Christian conferences of Tripoli in 1975 and London in 1976. Made a member of the convention of Islamic Medical Associations, USA, in 1978. Went to Pakistan after 1978 coup, in which all his family in Kabul were arrested and the men (about 40) executed. Deputy leader of Jamiat, but left in 1978 to found the Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF) (Jabha-e Najat-e Melli). ANLF joined the Seven-Party Resistance Alliance, 1985. Elected President of the Interim Government by the resistance Shura in Rawalpindi on 23 February 1989. Speaks English. Visited Europe and USA, 1986. Visited UK as Category II visitor, November 1987. Enjoys Saudi and Jordanian support.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 September 1989

*Y*  
*Mr. Modjadeddi*  
*Mr. Powell*  
*Mr. Assem Akram*  
*Enter 2/9*  
*2/9*

FSA 027/4		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 61		
11 SEP 1989		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken
		<i>[Signature]</i>

Thank you for your letter of 14 August to the Prime Minister about Mr. Modjadeddi's plans to visit Europe. I have been asked to reply.

The Prime Minister was pleased to hear that Mr. Modjadeddi expects to include London in his itinerary and hopes that his visit here will be successful.

You will, however, understand that it is rather difficult, because of her very crowded diary, to give you an indication of whether the Prime Minister would be able to see Mr. Modjadeddi until we know the exact dates when he will be in London. I should be grateful if you could let me know as soon as you are able to do so.

CHARLES POWELL

Mr. Assem Akram



me  
ask

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 September 1989

AFGHANISTAN: LETTER FROM NAJIBULLAH

Thank you for your letter of 13 September covering the unsigned missive from President Najibullah. I am sure the Prime Minister would agree that we should ignore it.

C. D. POWELL

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September 1989

CDP  
13/9

Dear Charles

Afghanistan: Letter from Najibullah to the Prime Minister

I enclose an unsigned letter from President Najibullah to the Prime Minister asking for assistance in stopping rocket attacks on Afghan cities and preventing Pakistani intervention in Afghanistan. The letter was sent to Sir C Tickell in New York by the Afghan Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Similar letters have been received by a number of the UN missions, including the Americans and French.

In line with our long established practice, Sir C Tickell - like his French and German colleagues - has not acknowledged receipt of Najibullah's letter, and we propose simply to ignore it.

Yours ever

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

866 UN PLAZA, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017


28 August 1989

Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from H.E. Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, addressed to Her Excellency, The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P., Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, relating to the present situation in Afghanistan.

I would appreciate if the same could be forwarded to its high destination.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
NOOR AHMAD NOOR  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative

H.E. Sir Cyprian Tickell,  
G.C.M.G., C.V.O.  
Ambassador & Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom  
to the United Nations  
845 Third Avenue, 10th Floor  
New York, N.Y. 10022



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

866 UN PLAZA, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017


28 August 1989

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I would appreciate if the same could be forwarded to its high destination.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



NOOR AHMAD NOOR  
Ambassador

Permanent Representative

H.E. Sir Robin Tickell,  
G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O.  
Ambassador & Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom  
to the United Nations  
845 Third Avenue, 10th Floor  
New York, N.Y. 10022

SUBJECT:  
ce:MASTER.  
OPS.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. ....

Excellency,

The international situation is changing on a large scale, in favour of understanding and confidence. This is a significant achievement for the international community. Unfortunately, however, due to the irresponsible and selfish policy pursued by certain states, the Republic of Afghanistan and our region, which has been turned into one of the dangerous hotbeds of regional conflicts, are intentionally and forcefully kept away from this positive process. The consequences of such an approach are tragic for the Afghan people and detrimental to the cause of peace and security in our region and in the world.

As you are aware, Excellency, the Geneva Agreements have been signed to establish peace and stability in and around Afghanistan. In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Afghanistan has been completed. However, two other fundamental issues of non-intervention and non-interference and voluntary, peaceful return of refugees to the Republic

Her Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.  
Prime Minister of United Kingdom  
of Great Britain & Northern Ireland

of Afghanistan remains unfulfilled. On the contrary, due to aggressive and interventionist policy of Pakistan, intervention and interference against our country have acquired new and dangerous dimensions.

After the signing and entry into force of the Geneva Agreements, war and aggression against Afghanistan has gained a surreptitious and terroristic character, the main targets of which are civilians, residential areas and public institutions. Rocket attacks, particularly on residents of Kabul and other cities of the Republic of Afghanistan, have not brought about the kind of military success expected by their organizers. This mood of terrorist action however, has brought about mourning to hundreds of families of our compatriots.

Taking into account its responsibility for the high interests of the Afghan people and, as a member of the United Nations, for peace and stability in the region, the Republic of Afghanistan appeals to your Excellency, hoping that, using your moral authority and influence, you will encourage Pakistan, one of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Agreement, to fulfill her obligations, cease intervention and aggression against the Republic of Afghanistan and to put an end to the rocket attacks on innocent Afghans.



We believe that the Geneva Agreements constitute an important step towards a peaceful political solution of the situation relating to Afghanistan, the observance of which will pave the way for the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/20.

The people of Afghanistan are tired of, and hate, the decade-long imposed war. The tragedy of rocket attacks on residential areas, bus stops, schools, kindergatens, hospitals etc., to which the Afghan people have been subjected, shocks the conscience of every human being.

Once again we appeal for your urgent assistance with regards to the cessation of rocket attacks on our civilian compatriots and of Pakistani intervention and aggression. We are confident that your assistance would place a great role towards the materialization of the Afghan people's hope for cessation of war and fratricide, realization of peace in our country and establishment of a broad-based government, representing all segments of Afghans.

Availing this opportunity, Excellency, I renew the assurances of my highest considerations.

NAJIBULLAH  
President of the  
Republic of Afghanistan

Kabul, August 1989

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ISLAMABAD  
TO DESKBY 191200Z FC0  
TELNO 646  
OF 190630Z MAY 89  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, PARIS, BONN, ROME, RIYADH

ADVANCE COPY

AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY

1. BENAZIR BHUTTO CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET THREATS AND FAILURES OF INTELLIGENCE IN JALALABAD. AIMS TO HELP INTERIM GOVERNMENT BROADEN ITS BASE AND KEEP OUT FUNDAMENTALISTS. DISTRUSTFUL OF ISID CONSIDERS APPROACHING SAUDIS ABOUT EXTREMIST MUSLIM ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. UNCERTAIN OF WAY FORWARD.

DETAIL

2. LAST WEEKEND I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN INFORMALLY WITH BENAZIR BHUTTO. GENERAL BABAR WAS PRESENT. I THEN PAID A TWO DAY VISIT TO PESHAWAR MAINLY TO OPEN THE NEW PREMISES OF A PROSTHETICS CLINIC FUNDED BY SANDY GALL'S CHARITY, WHICH GAVE ME THE CHANCE NOT ONLY FOR CONTACT WITH PROF MOJADDEDI BUT TO MEET FOR THE FIRST TIME GEN NAWROZ, THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE IN THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND ALSO THE TWO BROTHERS OF AHMED SHAH MAHSOOD WHO LIVE IN PESHAWAR. ON 17 MAY SEVAN, THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHAN QUESTIONS, WHO IS TRYING TO FIND COMMON GROUND FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN, CAME TO CALL. MY IMMEDIATE FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS COVER WHAT I LEARNED IN PESHAWAR AND FROM SEVAN.

3. BENAZIR BHUTTO STARTED THE CONVERSATION BY REFERRING TO SOVIET THREATS TO ESCALATE THE WAR INTO PAKISTAN, WHICH MIGHT NOW BE BECOMING SERIOUS. THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT WAS THEIR POSTPONEMENT OF THE VISIT TO MOSCOW OF PAKISTAN'S MINISTER FOR PRODUCTION. BABAR WAS DISMISSIVE, SAYING THAT BULLYING TACTICS WERE SECOND NATURE TO THE RUSSIANS BUT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THEY COULD DO AGAINST PAKISTAN. THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO RE-ENGAGE IN AFGHANISTAN FOR DOMESTIC REASONS. I CONCURRED.

4. BENAZIR THEN DREW ATTENTION TO THE MAJOR FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, IN

PARTICULAR THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FALL OF JALALABAD. SHE BLAMED BOTH ISID AND THE CIA (WHO WERE IN CONTINUAL CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER). MY COMPANION AND I SUGGESTED THAT SUCH ERRORS OF ASSESSMENT COULD OCCUR WHEN THE SAME ORGANISATIONS WERE RESPONSIBLE BOTH FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS AND FOR ASSESSING THEM. THE WISH COULD BECOME FATHER TO THE ANALYSIS.

5. IT WAS CLEAR THAT MS BHUTTO STILL HOPED FOR THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PDPA GOVERNMENT AND SUCCESS FOR THE MUJAHIDDEEN IN AFGHANISTAN. SHE RECOGNISED THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN NEEDED TO DO MORE TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THEIR INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND GET IT WORKING EFFECTIVELY. THE PAKISTANIS 2343 5468, & 59 #3)0 ?6 049=8^8, & - D-5#-, 2#9 COULD OPERATE AS CHIEF SECRETARY OR CABINET SECRETARY. BENAZIR ALSO REITERATED THAT HER GOVERNMENT WISHED TO AVOID THE EMERGENCE OF A FUNDAMENTALIST GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. SHE SPECULATED ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH HEKMATYAR, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A FUNDAMENTALIST RATHER THAN AN OPPORTUNIST.

6. I EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HEKMATYAR'S ANIMUS AGAINST THE UK ( INCLUDING GUILT ABOUT SKRZPKOWIAK) AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THAT HIS ACCUSATION REPORTED THAT DAY IN THE PRESS, WAS IN CAHOOTS WITH INDIA AND RUSSIA TO BRING BACK THE KING TO AFGHANISTAN, WAS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE. (I REFUTED THIS ON THE RECORD IN A SPEECH IN PESHAWAR).

7. I SAID I HAD ALREADY HEARD (IN FACT FROM BENAZIR BHUTTO'S AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, MINWALLA) THAT A PAKISTANI CIVIL SERVANT WAS BEING PROVIDED FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. IN MY OWN PERSONAL VIEW THIS MIGHT CAUSE RESENTMENT SINCE THE AFGHANS WANTED TO DO THINGS THEMSELVES. WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER TO FIND SOME SUITABLE AFGHAN FOR THE JOB? I QUESTIONED BABAR'S VIEW THAT NONE OF THE QUALIFIED EXILED AFGHANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO COME AND WORK IN PESHAWAR. BENAZIR BHUTTO TOOK THE POINT ABOUT THE AFGHAN'S WISH TO BE SELF-RELIANT BUT SAID THAT AT LEAST PROVIDING A CIVILIAN OFFICIAL WOULD HELP GET DEALINGS WITH THE MUJAHIDEEN OUT OF THE HANDS OF ISID. SHE OBVIOUSLY REMAINED DISTRUSTFUL OF ISID'S INVOLVEMENT. SHE SAID THAT IT HAD COME TO THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S NOTICE THAT SAYYAF, ONE OF ISID'S CHIEF PROTEGES, WAS NOW SELLING WEAPONS TO THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI RELIGIOUS PARTY IN PAKISTAN. BABAR INTERJECTED THAT HEKMATYAR AND SAYYAF RARELY TRAVELLED WITHOUT ISID ESCORTS.

8. I GAVE IT AS MY VIEW THAT THE THREE MAIN REASONS FOR THE FAILURE BY THE MUJAHIDEEN TO TAKE JALALABAD WERE:

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(I) THAT THE DEFENCES HAD BEEN EXTREMELY WELL PREPARED AND STOCKED WITH AMMUNITION:

(II) THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE SADLY STILL NOT WORKING TOGETHER:

(III) THAT ATROCITIES AND STORIES OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE MUJAHIDEEN, CLEVERLY EXPLOITED BY THE REGIME, WERE DISCOURAGING THE ORDINARY AFGHANS LIVING IN THE CITIES TO DEFECT OR SUPPORT THE MUJAHIDEEN.

MS BHUTTO WAS AWARE OF THE STORIES OF THE ATROCITIES, INCLUDING THOSE COMMITTED BY WAHIBIS AND FOREIGN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS, OFTEN FUNDED FROM SAUDI ARABIA. SHE SAID THAT PRINCE TURKI (WHO WAS "AS THICK AS THIEVES" WITH GENERAL HAMID GUL, HAD TOLD HER THAT HE WOULD ALWAYS FOLLOW PAKISTAN'S LEAD ON AFGHANISTAN. SHE WONDERED WHETHER THE TIME HAD NOT COME FOR A HEART TO HEART TALK WITH THE SAUDIS TO PERSUADE THEM TO RESTRAIN THE MUSLIM ELEMENTS WHO WERE BEING SUPPORTED BY SAUDI FUNDS. I SAID THAT PROF MOJADDEDI SHOULD MAKE A WELL PUBLICISED STATEMENT SAYING THAT ALL ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE A CRIME AGAINST THE JEHAD. HE SHOULD ALSO, IN MY VIEW, MAKE A MAJOR APPEAL TO QUALIFIED AFGHANS LIVING OVERSEAS TO COME AND HELP THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

9. BENAZIR BHUTTO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SHE WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW THINGS WOULD OR SHOULD DEVELOP IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WAS NOT YET READY FOR RADICAL NEW SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT SHE IS COLLECTING WHAT INFORMATION SHE CAN FROM ALL SOURCES IN AFGHANISTAN PRIOR TO HER TALKS IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE.

10. SEE MIFT.

BARRINGTON

YYYY

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ISLAMABAD TELNO 399: AFGHANISTAN INTERIM GOVERNMENT  
SUMMARY

1. US ADMINISTRATION CLOSE TO APPOINTING A SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE MUJAHIDEEN. OPTIONS FOR SOME SYMBOLIC POLITICAL ACTION AGAINST THE KABUL REGIME ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION. BUT 'RECOGNITION' OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT NOT A SHORT TERM OPTION. ISSUE OF THE AFGHAN UN SEAT TO BE LOOKED AT LATER IN THE SUMMER.

DETAIL

2. THE US PRESS REPORTED LAST WEEKEND THAT, IN RESPONSE TO CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE, BAKER WAS CLOSE TO A DECISION TO APPOINT A SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE MUJAHIDEEN. SCHAFFER (DAS/NEA) CONFIRMED TO GILLMORE (VISITING WASHINGTON) ON 21 MARCH THAT THIS 'COULD HAPPEN ANY TIME'. HE DESCRIBED IT AS A HALF-WAY HOUSE WHICH FELL SHORT OF RECOGNITION BUT GAVE FURTHER SUBSTANCE TO US SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE. HE DISMISSED THE PRESS LINE, FED BY SOME IN CONGRESS, THAT THE MOVE WOULD REFLECT DISSATISFACTION WITH AMBASSADOR OAKLEY'S PERFORMANCE OR ABILITIES.

3. SCHAFFER ALSO CONFIRMED THAT, SEPARATELY, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONSIDERING VARIOUS MOVES TO SIGNAL THE WEAKENING OF THE KABUL REGIME'S CLAIM TO REPRESENT AFGHANISTAN. ONE OPTION WAS TO BREAK RELATIONS COMPLETELY: ANOTHER WAS TO EXPEL THE 3 KABUL DIPLOMATS ACCREDITED TO WASHINGTON BUT NOT BREAK RELATIONS. THE WITHDRAWAL OF US STAFF FROM KABUL HAD BEEN PRESENTED AS A RESPONSE TO SECURITY CONCERNS. THIS HAD DELAYED FOR A TIME ANY POLITICAL MOVE TO 'DERECOGNISE' THE REGIME BUT THIS ISSUE WAS NOW AGAIN TO THE FORE.

4. BUT THE US WERE NOT, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, CONTEMPLATING 'RECOGNITION' OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAD STILL NOT ESTABLISHED ITSELF WITHIN AFGHANISTAN. THE US WOULD CERTAINLY NOT MOVE ON THIS BEFORE PAKISTAN AND WOULD PREFER THAT THE MAJOR ISLAMIC COUNTRIES ALSO

MOVED FIRST. (SCHAFER AGREED THAT THE OIC'S MOVE TO SEAT THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD NOT BEEN FULL RECOGNITION.)

5. SCHAFER SAID THAT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THOUGH NOT FULLY REPRESENTATIVE, WAS A BETTER RESULT THAN AT ONE TIME HAD SEEMED LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE SHOURA, IE BEFORE ISID LOST CONTROL OF THE SHOURA PROCESS. GAGLANI HAD USED HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON (HE SAW KIMMITT AND GATES) TO EXPRESS STRONG DOUBTS ABOUT THE SHOURA RESULTS AND TO CANVASS HIS OWN ALTERNATIVE. (GILLMORE INDICATED WE HAD HEARD THE SAME FROM GAGLANI). THE DEPTH OF SUPPORT FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AMONG INTERNAL COMMANDERS WAS STILL A GREY AREA. AMBASSADOR OAKLEY WAS PERHAPS DOING MORE THAN HE STRICTLY SHOULD IN PROMOTING SUPPORT FOR THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT AMONG RESISTANCE LEADERS WHO WERE STILL WAVERING. BUT THE US WANTED THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP INTO AN EFFECTIVE CHANNEL FOR US AID, BY INTER ALIA INCORPORATING THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF ALLIANCE COMMITTEES.

6. SCHAFER AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF A CHALLENGE TO THE KABUL REGIME OVER THE AFGHAN SEAT AT THE UN SHOULD BE LOOKED AT NEARER THE TIME, WHEN THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE CLEARER. (HE ADMITTED THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN WOULD HAVE TO SHOW RESULTS AT JALALABAD WITHIN A FEW WEEKS IF DOUBTS WERE NOT TO TAKE ROOT AT POLITICAL LEVELS HERE ABOUT SOME FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS IN US ASSESSMENTS.)

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*From the Private Secretary*

27 January 1989

KABUL EMBASSY

Thank you for your letter of 27 January about the position of our Mission in Kabul, in the light of the American decision to withdraw their Embassy.

I have discussed this with the Prime Minister. She is naturally reluctant to see us go after we have stayed right throughout the Civil War. But with the departure of other Western missions, she thinks that our people would be exposed, not least because it is widely known that we have given substantial material support to the Resistance. That could make them the target for revenge by supporters of the régime. Moreover, her understanding is that we have formally advised British citizens to leave and that there is no significant British community left in Afghanistan to protect, other than journalists. In these circumstances, the remaining role of our mission would only be to report developments and this does not justify putting their safety at risk. She agrees, therefore, that we should now take the decision to withdraw, preferably in concert with the French and Italians (you told me that they have now agreed to this).

The Prime Minister has also commented that she hopes that we will make arrangements to look after the Afghan staff of our mission, for instance, by giving them access to emergency food supplies if necessary.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

27 January 1989

Dear Charles,

The Kabul Embassy

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discussed the position of our mission in Kabul on 19 January.

At that time, they agreed that we should not pull out our mission for the time being, but that we should stay in close touch with the Americans and take into account the conclusions they reached. That same afternoon, Mr Shultz took a decision that the US Embassy should remain in Kabul. However, the new Secretary of State, James Baker, has now reviewed that decision and (without the prior consultation we had been expecting) has sent instructions to the US mission in Kabul to withdraw on 3 February, if not earlier. The State Department have confirmed to us through the US Embassy that no new factors influenced Mr Baker's decision; in particular, there has been no change in their assessment of the threat to the staff of their mission. As for the others, the Germans have already left Kabul. The Italians have sent out a mission to decide what to do, and the French are reducing their mission to a Chargé d'Affaires and one other. These two countries are likely to review their position in the light of the American decision. The French have indicated that they want to keep in close touch with us and that they would be unlikely to stay on if we now left.

There is no reason why we should automatically follow the American lead. The Foreign Secretary believes that the US decision has, however, changed the situation in three significant respects. First, the need to stay close to the Americans in order to be well placed to exert influence on their policy on Afghanistan at a particularly critical moment was an important part of the case for remaining in Kabul. Second, if we stay in Kabul alone among the major Western countries we shall give a misleading signal of the part we intend to play in shaping the future of Afghanistan, thus increasing the vulnerability of our staff, particularly from fundamentalists like Hekmatyar who are hostile to us. Third, the risks to our staff would increase because, in the absence of the Americans, our mission would become the prime target for Communist revenge, for asylum-seekers and for hostage-takers in any breakdown of law and order.

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When the Foreign Secretary discussed this issue with the Defence Secretary yesterday, they agreed that the advantages of staying in Kabul could not justify putting the safety of our own people at risk. The Foreign Secretary has now concluded that the risks of staying do outweigh the advantages, and that we should bring our people home.

Withdrawal is unlikely to be feasible before the middle of next week, and we propose to tell our people to go on 3 February or as soon as possible thereafter. The Foreign Secretary would, however, prefer to delay any announcement until we have informed the French and Italians of our decision, and given them an opportunity to coordinate their departure with our own.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Hawtin in the Ministry of Defence and to Trevor Woolley.

*Jaws,*  
*Stephen Wall*  
(J S Wall)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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*This is a bit  
of a blow. I fear  
we shall probably  
have to follow  
suit. can.*

KABUL CONTINGENCY PLANNING: THE AMERICANS

SUMMARY

1. AMERICAN EMBASSY TO BE CLOSED AND PERSONNEL EVACUATED ON 3 FEBRUARY. SOME ARGUMENTS FOR NOT FOLLOWING SUIT. EARLY INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CLOSE HIS EMBASSY AND EVACUATE ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. HE HAS ARRANGED TO CHARTER AN ARIANA BOEING 727 ON FRIDAY 3 FEBRUARY FOR THIS PURPOSE. BUT THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO SPARE SEATS FOR OTHERS.

3. GLASSMAN DESCRIBED THE INSTRUCTION AS A BOLT FROM THE BLUE. LESS THAN A WEEK AGO WASHINGTON HAD ACCEPTED HIS RECOMMENDATIONS ON A REDUCED MISSION TO SIT OUT THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. STATE HAD GIVEN NO EXPLANATION FOR THEIR DECISION, BUT BALDLY STATED THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD DECIDED TO CLOSE THE EMBASSY. GLASSMAN WILL BE TALKING TO FLATEN LATER THIS EVENING, AND HAS SAID HE WILL PASS ON ANY MORE INFORMATION HE PICKS UP.

4. I REALISE, HAVING ATTENDED MEETINGS IN LONDON LAST WEEK, THAT THE AMERICAN DECISION WILL WEIGH HEAVILY IN FAVOUR OF YOUR DECIDING WE MUST FOLLOW SUIT (ON WHICH SEE MIFT), BUT WE ARE NOT NECESSARILY IN THE SAME POSITION AS THEY ARE, AND ANY

RECONSIDERATION OF OUR PLANS NEEDS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OTHER FACTORS. THE PRINCIPAL ONES ARE:

A. WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE SEEN AS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE MUJAHEDDIN.

B. ONCE CLOSED IT WOULD BE A POLITICAL ACT TO REOPEN THE EMBASSY. IF THE PDPA REGIME LASTED SEVERAL MONTHS, THE WEST WOULD BE UNSIGHTED ON EVENTS IN KABUL. SIMILARLY, TO REOPEN IF AN UNATTRACTIVE FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP CAME TO POWER WOULD BE TO ENDORSE THEIR REGIME, WHEREAS IF WE HAD STAYED OPEN SUCH AN ENDORSEMENT WOULD ONLY COME THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF AN AMBASSADOR.

C. A WESTERN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE MIGHT DETER BOTH SIDES FROM EXCESSES.

5. IF YOU DECIDE TO CLOSE, WE SHALL HAVE TO ENGAGE IN SOME FAIRLY FAST FOOTWORK TO BE AT THE FRONT OF THE QUEUE WHEN THE AMERICAN DECISION LEAKS AND THE BANDWAGGON STARTS ROLLING. SOME EARLY THOUGHTS ARE LISTED IN MIFT. ALL RECIPIENTS PLEASE NOTE THAT WE ARE NOW INTO THE KABUL WEEKEND, AND FOR OPERATIONAL REASONS DESKBY TELEGRAM ONLY WILL BE RECEIVED BEFORE SUNDAY 0530Z. PLEASE CONSIDER MINIMISE.

6. GRATEFUL FOR VERY EARLY INSTRUCTIONS.

MACKLEY

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

25 January 1989

*9:10-d  
cele*

Dear Archie,

*mt  
—  
In please.  
You will want to  
be kept abreast  
of this. CAF 2571*

Thank you for your letter of 10 January about contingency planning in Kabul, in which you agreed that we should apply for visas for MOD personnel who could, if necessary, provide additional security for our Embassy. Since then my officials have had some very useful discussions with yours, for which I am most grateful.

*Temporarily retained*

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Last week we reviewed once again our decision to keep open our Embassy. Since I wrote to you on 6 January the Germans (as expected) have gone, and the French and Italians are likely to follow them. The Americans however, have decided to stay for the time being. The Turks, Pakistanis, Austrians, Japanese and Chinese show no signs of leaving.

The Hon A Hamilton MP  
Minister for the Armed Forces  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

SECRET

/The Prime Minister



SECRET

b

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had a full discussion of the pros and cons of staying in Kabul on 19 January. They agreed that it would be a pity to pull out our mission now after it had stayed right through the war (Mr Powell's letter of 19 January). The Prime Minister had earlier made it clear (Mr Powell's letter of 12 January) that she tended to the view that, if the staff of other major embassies in Kabul had armed protection, our people should have it too.

We shall obviously keep the decision under continuous review as the situation develops. Meanwhile, we must work on the assumption that we shall stay. I therefore believe that the time has now come to seek your agreement in principle to the deployment of an MOD armed protection team, when preparations are ready and visas can be secured. Once the preparations are complete, we shall need to take a very quick decision, in the light of any developments in the security outlook, on whether to proceed to actual deployment of men (and weapons).

Timing is important. Soviet withdrawal is due to be complete by 15 February. The situation in Kabul could deteriorate quickly during the final stages of withdrawal; the airport might cease to operate normally. I believe that the team should complete its preparation and be ready to leave by 29 January. The logistics of getting their arms and equipment out to Kabul are being worked out now by officials. We should obviously not despatch anything until the final decision I have referred to has been taken.

Clearly it will be for the MOD to decide on the size and composition of the team, bearing visa availability in mind. We can be reasonably confident of securing the three visas already applied for (we have just granted one visa, and are in the process of granting two more, to Afghans paying official visits to London - so we shall be looking for reciprocity). It may conceivably be possible to obtain a further two visas, though given the time constraints we should not bank on these. We doubt that the Afghans would give us more. The size of the protection team would then be out of all proportion to the number of other staff in the mission.

SECRET

/I gave details





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I gave details of the perceived threat in my letter of 6 January. The most likely problem will be a general breakdown of law and order during, and after, the final days of the regime. We are specifically concerned that our mission might be threatened by marauders operating singly or in small bands and armed with light weapons. We believe that this could be effectively deterred, or defeated, by the sort of deployment we have been discussing with your officials. We accept that such a team could not deal with a threat from a sizeable organised military unit, especially one equipped with medium or heavy weapons, and should not offer any resistance to such an attack. But we have no reason to anticipate any threat of this kind.

We would see an armed protection team having two major and three subsidiary tasks:

Main tasks:

- To protect our compound (an area of diplomatic inviolability) against the limited threat described above through its own direct efforts and by training, arming and organising our existing ex-Gurkha guards.
- More generally, the team leader should act as military adviser to the Chargé d'Affaires, for example with regard to the planning and execution of an evacuation.

Subsidiary tasks:

- To provide occasional close protection for members of the Embassy travelling outside the compound during a general breakdown of law and order. In such circumstances, Embassy personnel would try to remain in the compound. But they might have to venture outside (eg to move to the airport for evacuation, to obtain medical treatment, to seek assistance from, or go to the help of, another diplomatic mission). If so, they would probably require armed protection.
- If possible, to provide portable satellite emergency communications capable of communicating with the UK, and with Royal Air Force aircraft in the event of a Services Assisted Evacuation. This, too, is a bonus rather than an essential requirement. The Embassy already has effective main line and emergency communications.
- To provide medical support. We do not need a doctor or full-time medical orderly, as medical assistance is available from other sources, chiefly the surgical hospital belonging to the International Committee of the Red Cross. But it would be useful if one of the soldiers had sufficient medical skills to deal with minor problems and to stabilize more serious cases pending a move to hospital.

SECRET

/The situation



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YRTELNO 25: KABUL: CONTINGENCY PLANNING: PROBABLY CLOSURE OF  
FRENCH EMBASSY

1. THE FRENCH CHARGE TOLD EC COLLEAGUES TODAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CLOSE HIS MISSION. THE TIMING AND OTHER MODALITIES ARE TO BE LEFT TO HIM.
2. PETIT IS CHALLENGING THIS DECISION, WHICH HE BELIEVES IS MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO FOLLOW THE FRG EXAMPLE. HE WILL PROPOSE TO THE QUAI THAT HE AND ONE TECHNICAL MEMBER OF STAFF REMAIN. HE ASKED WHETHER, IF HE WERE ALLOWED TO REMAIN, HE MIGHT TAKE SANCTUARY IN OUR COMPOUND. I SAID I HAD NO OBJECTION IN PRINCIPLE TO THIS IDEA, IF OUR EMBASSY WERE STILL OPEN. I INFORMED HIM OF THE CONTENTS OF TUR.
3. THE REMAINING FRG EMBASSY STAFF LEFT TODAY (21 JAN) AS PLANNED.
4. THE ITALIAN CHARGE CONTINUES TO CLAIM THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS. ROME MAY BE DELAYING A DECISION BECAUSE OF ANDREOTTI'S ROLE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND ZAHIR SHAH.

MEATH BAKER

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MR MOSS  
MISS PESTELL  
MR RATFORD  
MR SLATER  
MR TOMKYS  
MR WINCHESTER

ADDITIONAL 19

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 January 1989

Dear Mr. Wall

AFGHANISTAN

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a brief discussion this evening about the position of our mission in Kabul as the date of Soviet withdrawal comes closer. They agreed that it would be a pity to pull out our mission now after it had gone right through the Civil War. The staff were prepared to stay and steps were being taken to see whether we could provide some additional protection for them. Of our main allies, it appeared that the Germans would be pulling out and the French and Italians were likely to do so. The Americans were undecided: they wanted to stay but were rather nervous about the prospects. While we would reach our own decision, it would be sensible to stay in very close touch with the Americans and take into account whatever conclusion they reached.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely

*C. D. Powell*

pp. C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

SECRET



FILE DAS

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cc MOD  
bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

12 January 1989

*See letter.*

The Prime Minister has followed the exchange of correspondence between Lord Glenarthur and Mr Hamilton about the question of security for our Embassy in Kabul. She tends to the view that, if the staff of other major embassies in Kabul have armed protection, then our staff should have it too. The precise form which it should take is very much a matter for professional advice. But she would not want our people to feel let down by comparison with the protection given to other embassies.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence).

*Yours sincerely,  
Charles Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MRM

7(A-D)

CP (2)



MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

*Prime Minister*

*COB copy*

SECRET

D/MIN(AF)/5/3/73

10<sup>th</sup> January 1989

*attached*

*Dear Simon*

*will request if required*

*- Yes please do not*

Thank you for your letter of 6 January concerning possible military assistance as part of your contingency planning in relation to the security of our Embassy in Kabul.

I note that you do not at present believe that the level of threat after the Soviet withdrawal is likely to require armed military assistance but, given the likely delays involved in a deployment (particularly in obtaining visas), you have suggested that we should take preparatory action to allow us to send a small armed team relatively quickly if the situation were to deteriorate. While we are, of course, very willing to consider how we might help, I have to say that we are doubtful as to whether this would be the most appropriate response to such a development.

Before we could send servicemen to Kabul we would need to be very clear about the nature of the threat, the task they were expected to undertake and our ability to equip and, if necessary, resupply or withdraw them. The worst thing we could do is send in a team which was inadequate or ill-prepared and equipped. The crux of the problem is that while there is no need at present for military assistance, it is very difficult indeed to predict the range of threats which may arise if the PDPA regime were to collapse. This makes it very difficult to judge in advance what sort of response would be appropriate but, because of the problems of access to and from Kabul, we cannot afford to wait on events. Nevertheless, I must make it clear that we believe that the constraints on the size and equipment of any armed team we might be able to get into Kabul are such



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that it would be adequate only against the lowest level of threat envisaged by the recent JIC paper.

I think we are both agreed that this is not a classic close-protection (ie "bodyguard") task, as there is no specific threat to the Charge or individual staff. A small armed presence might offer protection against a single opportunist gunman trying to force his way in and this, as I understand it, is the level of protection provided, for example, by the Marine guards who are part of the normal staff at the US embassy. But this is a very limited threat indeed and one to which your existing physical security precautions and your Gurkha guard force should act as a considerable deterrent. Your letter accepts that we could not resist an attack by a large body of armed men but, in fact, it would be impossible to provide a realistic defence of the Embassy compound - with a perimeter of nearly a mile and containing some 19 buildings - against armed attack without a sizeable and well equipped military force. Your letter envisages the possibility of bands of armed marauders perhaps seeking loot, hostages or revenge and the intelligence assessments have also drawn attention to the possible dangers in these circumstances from disorganised groups of regime soldiers or even, though more remotely, from an organised threat from PDPA hardliners with nothing to lose. We do not know whether any of these possibilities will arise but a small armed team could do little against them and there is no doubt that if law and order breaks down Kabul is likely to be full of armed men with a wide range of weapons, including relatively heavy support weapons.

I think I should also draw attention to the practical difficulties which we would face in deploying any armed force. We do not know whether the Afghans would grant the necessary visas and, with an anticipated delay of at least three weeks and probably more like six weeks, it would in any case be questionable whether they could reach Kabul before the Soviet withdrawal puts the continued operation of the airport in doubt. Moreover, the only way in which we could send people to Kabul even at present is by Aeroflot or Ariana (Afghan Airlines) which have one flight a week each. Although I understand that in these circumstances you are, exceptionally, prepared to consider the use of the diplomatic bag to carry weapons and equipment but, especially given the airlines involved, this would be bound seriously to constrain what we might send. We are also concerned that if the security situation deteriorated it is probable that we would be unable to resupply or withdraw the force if required.

C

SECRET

It is, of course, for you to judge the diplomatic advantages of staying as opposed to a temporary withdrawal during an uncertain and dangerous transition period but you should not be under any illusions that we could provide any assistance which would materially alter the risks to the embassy staff if order were to break down. If you do decide that the risks are outweighed by the advantages, I believe that the most practical help that we could offer would be a military security adviser and a communications expert. The former would be capable of advising the Charge on the developing threat to the compound and of training and organising the Gurkha guard force to best effect. He and the communicator (although bringing in the necessary satellite communication equipment on the airlines concerned could be very difficult) would also be very useful if it became necessary to contemplate an evacuation.

This would I believe improve your security against what might be called the 'casual' threat, which is I believe the only threat which we could consider resisting. But even against this threat, our best defence is deterrence - although the Gurkhas are unarmed this is not likely to be apparent to a would be intruder (indeed it was news to us). It would certainly have been possible for us to provide training which would allow you to arm the Gurkhas as an additional precaution but I doubt whether there is now sufficient time to do so. It would also be possible to envisage providing a military protection team to provide an overt armed presence as an additional deterrent but the real increase in security would be very marginal indeed and, as I said at the outset, I am very reluctant to send in a military team without a properly defined military task and which would be inadequate against any serious threat to the Embassy - or to themselves.

Despite the very serious reservations I have expressed, I would not want to foreclose any options at present. For that reason, I agree that it would be sensible to approach the Afghans now about visas. My clear preference, if we do provide assistance, would be for a two man team of the sort I have described and I would regard five men as the absolute maximum we might wish to send. Nevertheless, because of the lead times and because the circumstances under which any military assistance might be required and the nature of the task involved are so unclear, it will be necessary to seek visas for about ten people in order to have a sufficient range of military skills on which to draw. I have asked my officials to be in touch with your department on the necessary details. They will have very much to depend on your officials' information about the practicalities - eg equipment - of any possible deployment.

Finally, you referred to costs. The well established precedent for assistance of this sort is that your department would meet the costs involved.

D

SECRET

In view of her close interest in the threat to the British Embassy in Kabul, I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister and also to Sir Robin Butler.

*Yours ever*  
*Archie*

ARCHIE HAMILTON

The Lord Glenarthur  
Minister of State  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ISLAMABAD  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 42

ADVANCE COPY

OF 100932Z JANUARY 89  
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MY TELNO 021 (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN: VORONTSOV'S VISIT TO  
PAKISTAN

## SUMMARY

1. PAKISTAN MFA REPORT COMPLETE DEADLOCK WITH VORONTSOV OVER INCLUSION OF PDPA IN A CONSULTATIVE SHOURA OR INTERIM BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. VORONTSOV STOPS SHORT OF UNCONDITIONAL COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW BY 15 FEBRUARY. MUJAHIDEEN, WHO INITIALLY AGREED TO FURTHER TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS, NOW SAY THEY WILL REFUSE FURTHER CONTACT UNTIL THE RUSSIANS COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL UNCONDITIONALLY AND STOP TRYING TO IMPOSE THE NAJIB REGIME. MUJAHIDEEN SAY THEY ARE WILLING TO GIVE SAFE PASSAGE TO WITHDRAWING SOVIET TROOPS. LACK OF AGREEMENT AMONG MUJAHIDEEN ON COMPOSITION AND POWERS OF THE SHOURA PERSISTS.

## DETAIL

2. THE PAKISTAN MFA (QAZI, ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, AND MURSHED, DIRECTOR-GENERAL, AFGHANISTAN) BRIEFED EC HEADS OF MISSION ON 9 JANUARY ABOUT VORONTSOV'S TALKS IN ISLAMABAD FROM 4-7 JANUARY. VORONTSOV HAD HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH YAQUB KHAN, A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER AND TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS WITH THE MUJAHIDEEN WHOSE DELEGATION INCLUDED TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE GROUPS BASED IN IRAN.

3. VORONTSOV HAD TOLD THE PAKISTANIS AND THE MUJAHIDEEN THAT THE REMAINING SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM AFGHANISTAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENEVA AGREEMENT. BUT THIS UNDERTAKING WAS NOT MADE ABSOLUTELY UNCONDITIONAL: IF FIGHTING INTENSIFIED AND SOVIET FORCES CAME UNDER HEAVY ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO THINK AGAIN. THE MFA REGARDED THIS AS A RESERVATION MADE FOR THE RECORD AND BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL INDEED WITHDRAW BY 15 FEBRUARY, SINCE MUJAHIDEEN ARE WILLING TO ALLOW THE DE FACTO ARMISTICE WITH SOVIET FORCES TO CONTINUE.

4. VORONTSOV REFERRED TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS IN HIS SPEECH AT THE

UN ON 7 DECEMBER AND URGED PAKISTAN TO RE-EXAMINE THEM. HE ARGUED THAT A CEASE-FIRE WOULD CREATE A CONDUCIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR AN INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESENCE IN KABUL OF A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WOULD PROVIDE USEFUL PROTECTION TO ANY BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT WHICH TOOK OFFICE. VORONTSOV CONCEDED THAT THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD BE PRACTICABLE ONLY AFTER A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT WAS INSTALLED.

5. VORONTSOV SAID THAT HIS MAIN PURPOSE IN COMING TO PAKISTAN WAS TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSAL, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, FOR A CONSULTATIVE GROUP OR SHOURA, WHICH SHOULD EMBRACE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL SECTIONS OF AFGHAN SOCIETY, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WOULD BE TO DISCUSS THE FORMATION OF A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. VORONTSOV DESCRIBED THIS SHOURA AS A GOOD PROPOSAL WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO ACCEPT, BUT INSISTED THAT IF IT WAS TO BE CREDIBLE AND VIABLE ALL SHADES OF AFGHAN OPINION MUST BE REPRESENTED ON IT, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE KABUL GOVERNMENT/PDPA. VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN COULD DEVELOP IN ONE OF TWO WAYS. THERE COULD BE PEACE IF THERE WERE ACCEPTRNCE OF A CEASE-FIRE AND CONVENING OF A CONSULTATIVE SHOURA OF ALL PARTIES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, WAR WOULD RESULT IF, BECAUSE OF ''MUJAHIDEEN RIGIDITY'' THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON THE SHOURA. IN THIS CASE, SOVIET TROOPS WOULD LEAVE BUT THE KABUL REGIME WOULD NOT CRUMBLE AND WOULD FIGHT FOR ITS SURVIVAL. IN THAT CASE THE MUJAHIDEEN WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR FURTHER BLOODSHED. IF THERE WERE CONTINUED FIGHTING, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE ITS MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE KABUL REGIME INCLUDING THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS SUCH AS HAD NOT YET BEEN SEEN IN AFGHANISTAN.

6. THE PAKISTANIS HAD TOLD VORONTSOV THAT THEY DID NOT SHARE HIS PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SITUATION NOR THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THE SOVIET POSITION WAS BASED. THE MUJAHIDEEN WOULD NEVER AGREE TO DEAL WITH THE PDPA, AS VORONTSOV HAD BEEN TOLD AT TAIF, IN IRAN, BY THE EX KING AND BY THOSE INTERNAL MUJAHIDEEN COMMANDERS WHOM HE ADMITTED TO HAVING MET. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE PAKISTANIS OR ANYONE ELSE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE MUJAHIDEEN TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF PDPA REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SHOURA. THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING IN THE MUJAHIDEEN'S FAVOUR AND IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT THEY WOULD RELENT ON THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE PDPA. THE PAKISTANIS HAD THEN SUGGESTED A COMPROMISE: THE SHOURA SHOULD EMBRACE ALL SHADES OF AFGHAN OPINION INCLUDING INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH, BUT NOT MEMBERS OF, THE PDPA AND AGAINST WHOM THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD NO COMPLAINTS (I.E THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY). TO ASK FOR MORE THAN THIS WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY

TO ABORT THE SHOURA. THE PAKISTANIS HAD SAID THAT THE KABUL REGIME WAS RIDDLED WITH FACTIONS, ITS MORALE WAS LOW, THE MILITARY PROGNOSIS DID NOT FAVOUR IT, AND DESPITE CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES WITH THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE ABLE TO HARMONISE THEIR VIEWS IN ORDER TO PROSECUTE THE JEHAD. VORONTSOV HAD BEEN TOLD IN IRAN THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS BASED THERE WERE AT ONE WITH THOSE IN PAKISTAN IN THEIR DEMAND FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BY 15 FEBRUARY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THE REPLACEMENT OF THE KABUL REGIME BY A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. IT WAS THE PAKISTANI UNDERSTANDING THAT ZAHIR SHAH HAD TOLD VORONTSOV PRECISELY THE SAME.

7. IN REPLY VORONTSOV HAD SAID THAT IF THERE WERE NO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, SOVIET TROOPS WOULD LEAVE BUT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT IT HAD DONE ITS BEST TO AVOID FURTHER BLOODSHED. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR CONTINUING WOULD DEMONSTRABLY REST ON THE MUJAHIDEEN.

8. VORONTSOV HAD TAKEN THE SAME LINE IN HIS MEETINGS WITH THE ALLIANCE BUT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NO LONGER CONCERN ITSELF WITH INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS. A MUJAHIDEEN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD ADOPT A NON-ALIGNED POLICY WITH NO FOREIGN BASES AND WOULD POSE NO THREAT TO THE RUSSIANS. BUT THEY ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO HAVE ANY TRUCK WITH PDPA. DESPITE THIS FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED DURING THESE TALKS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A FURTHER MEETING (BUT SEE PARA 10 BELOW). VORONTSOV INVITED THE MUJAHIDEEN TO GO TO MOSCOW.

9. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS QAZI SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD TOLD VORONTSOV THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED FOR A CEASE-FIRE AT THIS JUNCTURE. THEY WERE, HOWEVER, WILLING TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS THE DEPARTING SOVIET FORCES. THEY WOULD NOT ATTACK THE LAND WITHDRAWAL ROUTES, NOR THOSE AIR BASES USED FOR WITHDRAWAL, AND THEY WOULD EASE UP THEIR PRESSURE ON MAJOR CITIES. THE PAKISTANIS BELIEVE THAT IF VORONTSOV WERE TO MOVE TOWARDS ACCEPTING THE CONCEPT OF A SHOURA WITH 'GOOD MUSLIMS' FROM KABUL INCLUDED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES FOR SETTING IT UP: LISTS OF NAMES COULD BE EXCHANGED ETC.

10. IT HAD BEEN EVIDENT FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MUJAHIDEEN REPRESENTATIVES SHORTLY AFTER VORONTSOV'S VISIT CONCLUDED THAT THEY WERE INCENSED BY THE THREATENING LINE HE HAD TAKEN AT HIS FINAL PRESS CONFERENCE. IT WAS, THEREFORE, NOT A SURPRISE WHEN MUJADIDI

CALLED APRESS CONFERENCE ON 9 JANUARY AND ANNOUNCED THAT THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIANCE HAD AGREED THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE AND UNNECESSARY IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET THREATS AND DISRESPECT FOR THE AFGHANS' RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION. THE MUJAHIDEEN WOULD HOLD NO FURTHER TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNLESS THE LATTER WITHDREW ITS TROOPS UNCONDITIONALLY AND RENOUNCED ITS INSISTENCE THAT THE PDPA BE INCLUDED IN A FUTURE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIETS PRESS STATEMENT HAD NOT BEEN IN THE SAME SPIRIT AS THAT IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN HELD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD PUT FORWARD NO PRACTICABLE OR SENSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION AND HAD WANTED THE MUJAHIDEEN TO ACCEPT MOSCOW'S TERMS FOR A FUTURE GOVERNMENT. MUJADIDI SAID THAT A CEASE-FIRE WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE CAUSE OF THE WAR I.E THE NAJIB GOVERNMENT, WAS REMOVED. HE DID HOWEVER STATE THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS PREPARED TO GIVE SAFE PASSAGE TO SOVIET TROOPS DURING THEIR WITHDRAWAL AND TO CONSIDER AN AMNESTY FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF NAJIB'S GOVERNMENT. ASKED ABOUT THE RODE OF ZAHIR SHAH, MUJADIDI SAID MERELY THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION FOR THE AFGHANS TO DECIDE. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE IRAN-BASED GROUPS CONFIRMED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITH THE RESISTANCE BASED IN PAKISTAN.

11. FOR COMMENT SEE MIFT.

JOHNSON

YYYY

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
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SECRET Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From The Minister of State

6 January 1989

6(A-D)

PSI

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*If other embassy staff  
have armed protection -  
I think we should have  
Gen. Archie, we have  
no*

*Prime Minister  
You asked to  
see this.  
COP 1/1*

I am writing, following a meeting I held here yesterday which was attended by MOD officials, to ask for your help in a matter that has arisen in our contingency planning for improving the security of our Embassy in Kabul during the difficult period which may follow Soviet withdrawal.

It might be helpful if I were to set out the current position. Barring a dramatic deterioration in the outlook, we envisage keeping our Embassy open after completion of Soviet withdrawal (due under the Geneva Agreements by 15 February). There is a strong political case for doing this. From the outset we have played a prominent role in orchestrating the western response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. We are one of the main opinion-formers on the issue among the Twelve. We have exercised considerable influence over policy-making on Afghanistan by the Pakistanis, who have regularly sought our advice - and we seem to have won grudging respect from the Russians. We have links with certain key elements in the resistance and may be able to put these to effective use if a resistance-dominated government comes to power. But we shall only be able to do this if we retain our Embassy. The Americans, French, Turks and Pakistanis plan to keep their missions open. The Germans and Italians are wavering, but may yet decide to stay. It would not go well with the stance the British Government has taken on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan over the past 9 years for the British Embassy to join the exodus of fleeing Communist officials at the moment of resistance victory.

The Hon A Hamilton MP  
Minister for the Armed Forces  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1

/A major consideration

SECRET





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A major consideration, of course, has been the physical risks our people may have to run during the confused period which will follow Soviet withdrawal, when Kabul airport might well close for a time, effectively cutting off our mission. The security outlook has been well covered in a JIC Immediate Assessment - JIC(88)(IA)103 - of 30 December, to which the DIS made a major contribution. We judge that, while the threat will increase once the Russian garrison leaves Kabul, it will remain within acceptable limits. Our Chargé in Kabul (who is currently in London) subscribes strongly to this view. We therefore see no case for a decision to withdraw as things now stand.

But we do owe it to our Embassy staff to do whatever we can to enhance their security during the uncertain days ahead. They have a right to expect this, and I believe that Parliament and public opinion will also need to be convinced that we have taken all reasonable steps to protect our people.

Clearly we cannot provide defences against the full range of threats outlined in the JIC paper. Such steps as can be taken to reduce the risks from cross fire and stray rockets have been taken. It would clearly be foolish to offer armed resistance to an assault by a large body of armed men. But neither risk seems particularly great. The Embassy's location on the edge of the city well away from major regime installations means that it stands a good chance of avoiding being caught up in fighting; there is no intelligence to suggest that any group in Afghanistan is planning to seize our mission.

We share our Charge's view that the main threat would probably result from a breakdown of law and order during the regime's final days and for a time afterwards. The Embassy could then become a target for armed marauders (eg seeking loot, hostages or revenge), probably operating singly or in small bands and armed with the ubiquitous AK-47 rather than heavier weapons.

The Embassy compound already has some defences, including a 12 foot high perimeter wall and a guard force of 12 unarmed ex-Gurkhas. The mission holds a stockpile of food and essential commodities, so that members of staff need not venture outside the compound in times of danger. But we believe that a modest increment to the guard forces in the shape of a small armed team of British military personnel, would significantly increase our chances of deterring and, at worst, countering the sort of attack by casual marauders which we see as a major element in the overall threat.

SECRET

/The Americans,



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The Americans, French and German missions already have armed protection teams. If we were to fail to provide our own people with a comparable level of protection and if, as a result, a relatively small scale incident were to lead to casualties amongst our staff, we would be criticised, in my view justly.

I am not asking that the Ministry of Defence should take a final decision to deploy soldiers for this purpose now - our Charge d'Affaires' view is that the moment for this will probably come several weeks from now, unless political developments (such as the negotiated establishment of a mujahideen-led government) make this unnecessary. But if we do not prepare ourselves immediately for such a deployment, the option will simply disappear - flying into Kabul could become highly problematic after 15 February (or even before) and it takes anything up to six weeks to secure visas. I imagine you too would need a little time to prepare and train for such an operation. We shall also need to agree on rules of engagement. The decision whether actually to proceed to deployment will therefore be quite distinct from this initial contingency step, which I hope you will agree needs to be taken urgently.

I should be grateful for your advice on how our requirement might best be met. I understand that some thought is being given to the use of Special Forces soldiers. Their military skills and qualities of resourcefulness, flexibility and self-reliance would presumably well fit them for the unique task we have in mind. In addition to providing armed protection they would also be able to give the Charge expert advice on security matters and supervise the general security measures taken by the Embassy. Their communications and medical skills could be useful bonuses - although we are not specifically asking you to provide either. A possible alternative might be a team of serving Gurkhas who should be able to work well with our existing ex-Gurkha guard force, although, unlike SAS personnel, they would not be able to provide expert advice. (We do not, however, see arming the ex-Gurkhas as a viable option as their military skills are no longer current).

The size of the team will be dictated not simply by the task but also by practical considerations. The Afghan authorities will probably be guided, when it comes to issuing visas, by the size of the protection elements in the American, French and German missions (2-4 men). We would be prepared to consider taking the exceptional step of sending out the team's weapons and ammunition by diplomatic bag (no other method seems possible). There would of course be size and weight constraints. But it seems probable that sidearms, machine pistols and/or rifles (possibly dismantled) could be despatched to Kabul in this way.

SECRET

/The deployment of



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The deployment of a team would involve significant costs which we anticipate considerable difficulty in funding. If you can see any way in which these might be mitigated, this would be enormously helpful. Could account be taken, for example, of the training value of a unique deployment like this?

I am well aware that I am bowling you something of a fast ball by asking MOD to provide a service which lies outside its normal commitments and which may involve some risks to those involved (though if we believed them to be very substantial, we should not be putting this request to you). But this is very much a one-off situation, and I am sure you will recognise the need for us to respond to it with imagination and flexibility.

The Prime Minister has expressed a close interest in the welfare and safety of our staff in Kabul. We shall wish to inform her by the middle of January of the steps we are taking to protect them. It would, therefore, be very helpful if you would let me have at least an initial response by early next week.

*Yammar*  
*Lima*

THE LORD GLENARTHUR

SECRET



5. HWE  
DA  
PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

4 January 1989

**AFGHANISTAN: THREAT TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY  
AND THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN KABUL**

The Prime Minister has read the recent JIC assessment of the threat to the British Embassy and the British community in Kabul. She has commented that we should co-ordinate very closely with other Western missions on the subject of possible evacuation of our staff.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Sir Percy Cradock.

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**SECRET**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 040900Z FCO

TELNO 10

OF 040041Z JANUARY 89

INFO PRIORITY KABUL

INFO ROUTINE PARIS, ROME, ANKARA, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, TOKYO

OUR TELNO 3075: AFGHANISTAN: CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
SUMMARY

1. NO CHANGE IN US INTENTION TO MAINTAIN THEIR MISSION IN KABUL AT ITS PRESENT SIZE. THEY SHARE OUR SUSPICION OF SOVIET CEASEFIRE OFFERS AND HAVE STONEWALLED SOVIET EFFORTS TO INVOLVE THEM. IN VORONTSOV'S CURRENT DIPLOMACY. SOME THOUGHTS ON HOW THE SITUATION MIGHT EVOLVE IMMEDIATELY AFTER 15 FEBRUARY.

DETAIL.

2. WE HAVE NOW MADE A FURTHER ROUND OF CONTACTS IN STATE AND THE NSC. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS IN CURRENT US THINKING.

3. US EMBASSY IN KABUL. THERE IS NO CHANGE FROM THE ASSESSMENT IN OUR TUR. THE US KNOW OF NO SPECIFIC THREATS AGAINST THEIR PERSONNEL AND HAVE NOT DETECTED ANY PARTICULAR HOSTILITY TOWARDS THEM FROM MEMBERS OF THE REGIME. THEY THEREFORE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE US EMBASSY OR ITS PERSONNEL WOULD BE TARGETS. IT WAS NOT OF COURSE TO BE EXCLUDED THAT SOME MAVERICK INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP MIGHT TRY TO ATTACK AMERICANS IN THE CONFUSION FOLLOWING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE JUDGEMENT HERE IS THAT ON BALANCE THAT IS UNLIKELY AND THAT THE US EMBASSY SHOULD REMAIN IN KABUL AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL, PREPARED TO WEATHER STORMS EITHER DURING OR AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

4. SOVIET POLICY. US ARE WATCHING VORONTSOV'S ROUND OF VISITS TO ZAHIR SHAH IN ROME, TO TEHRAN AND TO THE ALLIANCE IN PAKISTAN WITH CLOSE ATTENTION. THEY BELIEVE THAT IT MAY INDICATE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE BEGINNING TO FACE UP TO THE REALITY OF THEIR SITUATION. THEY SEEMED TO BE MAKING AN EFFORT TO KEEP THE ZAHIR SHAH OPTION OPEN. AND VORONTSOV MIGHT TRY TO ENCOURAGE AT LEAST SOME OF THE ALLIANCE LEADERS TO JOIN AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT HEADED BY ZAHIR SHAH. VORONTSOV WOULD ALSO NO DOUBT BE LOOKING FOR POSSIBILITIES TO SOW DISSENSION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER THE FACT OF CONTINUING SOVIET CONTACTS WITH THE MUJAHADEEN WAS IMPORTANT SYMBOLICALLY. AS ONE STATE CONTACT PUT IT, THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEMED TO BE ENGAGED

IN QUOTE PACKAGING THEIR HUMILIATION UNQUOTE.

5. US POLICY. VORONTSOV HAS ALSO BEEN TRYING TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH ARMACOST. STATE HAVE SO FAR FENDED HIM OFF. THE US HAD NOTHING TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS AT PRESENT. THEY SHARED OUR VIEW THAT THE OFFER OF A CEASEFIRE WAS A TRAP TO BE AVOIDED. THE REALITY WAS THAT THE MUJAHADEEN WERE NOT WILLING TO MAKE ANY FURTHER CONCESSION, BEYOND THE RESTRAINT THEY WERE AT PRESENT EXERCISING TO ENABLE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE. THE AMERICANS HAD NO INTENTION OF BEING PUT IN THE POSITION OF TRYING TO PERSUADE THE MUJAHADEEN AGAINST THEIR WILL TO MAKE FURTHER MOVES TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN SOVIET AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE RESISTANCE HAD BEEN STEPPED UP. IN SHORT, THE US SAW THEMSELVES AS ESSENTIALLY ON THE SIDELINES AT PRESENT (THE TRANSITION HERE WAS A FURTHER DISINCENTIVE TO HIGH PROFILE US ACTIVITY). BUT THEY HAD TAKEN OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE RABBANI TO DEVELOP HIS IDEAS FOR A SHOURA IN TALKING TO VORONTSOV.

6. IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS. THE US ASSESSMENT REMAINS THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL ON SCHEDULE. THEIR BEST GUESS AS TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN THEREAFTER IS THAT THE REGIME WILL DISINTEGRATE RAPIDLY WITH OFFICIALS DISAPPEARING OR JOINING THE RESISTANCE, AND INDIVIDUAL PDPA UNITS CUTTING DEALS WITH LOCAL RESISTANCE COMMANDERS. THERE WAS THEN LIKELY TO BE A PERIOD OF CONFUSION AND IN-FIGHTING WITHIN KABUL. IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE COULD PUT TOGETHER A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT BUT IN DUE COURSE SOME TEMPORARY COALITION LEADER WOULD EMERGE, WHO WOULD THEN BECOME A CHANNEL FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND WOULD THEREBY GAIN A BREATHING SPACE TO PROVE WHETHER HE HAD THE QUALITIES TO SURVIVE AS A MORE PERMANENT LEADER.

7. ONE ADDITIONAL POINT WHICH THE US ARE WATCHING CLOSELY IS WHETHER THE PRESENT RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE RESISTANCE MAY BREAK DOWN AS THE END OF THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL APPROACHES. GIVEN THE LACK OF ANY HATCHING SOVIET RESTRAINT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD IN ITSELF MUCH INCREASE THE THREAT TO WESTERN MISSIONS, BUT IT MIGHT EXTEND THE PERIOD OF CONFUSION IN AND AROUND KABUL.

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TELNO 706

OF 061100Z DECEMBER 88

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MY TELNOS 699 AND 701: AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET/MUJAHIDEEN TALKS

SUMMARY

1. KING FAHD RECEIVED VORONTSOV FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF SOVIET/MUJAHIDEEN TALKS AT TAIF.

2. ACCORDING TO STATEMENT RELEASED BY MUJAHIDEEN THE TALKS COVERED THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, COMPENSATION AND FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. DIALOGUE TO RESUME SOON IN PAKISTAN.

DETAIL

3. THE SAUDI PRESS AGENCY TODAY (6 DECEMBER) REPORTED THE KING FAHD RECEIVED SOVIET FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YURI VORONTSOV IN RIYADH ON 5 DECEMBER FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF HIS TALKS WITH MUJAHIDEEN LEADERS. THE MEETING WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH, PRINCE TURKI AL FAISAL (WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED THE SOVIET DELEGATION FROM TAIF), AND A NUMBER OF OTHER SAUDI MINISTERS.

4. THE MUJAHIDEEN DELEGATION ISSUED A STATEMENT AFTER THE TALKS IN WHICH THEY REITERATED THEIR FIRM RESOLVE TO SEE AN END TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF THEIR COUNTRY. THE STATEMENT SAID THAT THEIR POSITION IN THE TAIF TALKS HAD BEEN BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

- THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS AND ALWAYS WOULD BE A FREE ISLAMIC STATE WHOSE FATE LAY IN THE HANDS OF ITS OWN PEOPLE:
- THAT THERE COULD BE NO DELAYS IN THE SOVIET WITHDRAWALS:
- THAT FOLLOWING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, POWER IN THE COUNTRY WOULD BE IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE,

REPRESENTED BY THEIR 'VANGUARD', THE MUJAHIDEEN.

5. THE STATEMENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE TALKS HAD COVERED THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS:

- THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS AND THE HANDOVER OF POWER TO THE PEOPLE AS REPRESENTED BY THE MUJAHIDEEN:
- THE PAYMENT OF REPARATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN IN COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE OCCUPATION:
- THE NEUTRALITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

THE DELEGATION APPRECIATED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TURN OVER A NEW PAGE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND HOPED TO SEE CLEARER INDICATIONS OF THIS IN THE FUTURE. THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE TALKS WOULD RESUME IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN PAKISTAN. THE STATEMENT ENDS WITH AN EFFUSIVE EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE FOR SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN.

6. VORONTOV ALSO ISSUED A STATEMENT, IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS ENDING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE FORMATION OF ABROAD-BASED AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. HE TOO THANKED THE SAUDIS FOR THEIR HELP WITH THE TALKS, AND CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD RESUME SOON IN PAKISTAN.

7. RABBANI IS REPORTED IN AL SHARQ AL-AWSAT AS SAYING THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD REJECTED THE SOVIET IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND INSISTED ON DIRECT TALKS. THE TAIF MEETING HAD BEEN AT SOVIET REQUEST. RABBANI CLAIMED THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD REJECTED A SOVIET REQUEST FOR A CEASEFIRE, BUT HAD SAID THEY WOULD SAFEGUARD THE WITHDRAWAL IF THE RUSSIANS AGREED NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. HE ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF POWER SHARING AND COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN ANY REGIME ESTABLISHED AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, BUT THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER. RABBANI SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD GO AHEAD WITH WITHDRAWAL AS PLANNED. THE TAIF MEETING REPRESENTED AN ADVANCE IN



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THE SOVIET/MUJAHIDEEN DIALOGUE, TAKING IT A STEP BEYOND THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

COMMENT

8. THE MEETING BETWEEN VORONTSOV AND THE KING HAD NOT BEEN FORESHADOWED IN EARLY REPORTS OF THE TAIF TALKS, AND SEEMS TO IMPLY SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

9. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON JINDAN, HEAD OF THE POLITICAL ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON 5 DECEMBER. JINDAN CLAIMED NO SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT HAD GONE ON IN TAIF BUT SAID THAT THE MEETING SEEMED TO HAVE GONE WELL, AND MIGHT PROVE TO BE A SIGNIFICANT LANDMARK IN SAUDI/SOVIET RELATIONS. IN HIS VIEW, IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE RELATIONS WERE RESUMED (THOUGH HE WAS CAREFUL TO LINK THIS TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, AND AGREEMENT ON SATISFACTORY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN). HE WAS DISMISSIVE OF THE SUGGESTION THAT THE 'ULEMA MIGHT BE ABLE TO RESTRAIN SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IF THE POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT WANTED IT FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND ISLAMIC REASONS.

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AFGHANISTAN: DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE MUJAHIDEEN AND RUSSIANS

1. CONTACTS WITHIN THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE IN ISLAMABAD HAVE TOLD US THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN ARE DUE TO HOLD DIRECT TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS IN RIYADH ON 3 DECEMBER. THE MEETING SEEMS TO HAVE EMERGED FROM CONTACTS MADE BY MARUF-AL-DAWALIBI, A SYRIAN ADVISOR AT THE SAUDI ROYAL COURT AND HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, IN THE COURSE OF A SHUTTLE BETWEEN MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD AND RIYADH. THE MOVE IS SAID TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WE ARE TOLD THAT VORONTSOV WILL LEAD FOR THE RUSSIANS. THE MUJAHIDEEN DELEGATION HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED BUT INDICATIONS ARE THAT RABBANI WILL LEAD SUPPORTED BY MOJADIDI (WHO IS DUE TO SUCCEED RABBANI AS ALLIANCE CHAIRMAN SHORTLY). IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THERE WILL BE THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION BUT THE CHANCES ARE THAT PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, THE OIC AND POSSIBLY THE UN WILL ATTEND. HEKMATYAR IS SAID TO HAVE VETOED US PARTICIPATION. THERE IS ALSO SOME TALK OF AN INDIAN PRESENCE.

3. RABBANI, WHO HAD DELAYED HIS RETURN TO PAKISTAN FOR TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA, FINALLY CAME BACK TO ISLAMABAD ON 25 NOVEMBER. GEN HAMID GUL OF ISI INFORMED THE ALLIANCE LEADERS OF THE PROPOSED TALKS ON 26 NOVEMBER AND INVITED THEM TO AGREE ON A DELEGATION AND A NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE ALLIANCE SUPREME COUNCIL IS DUE TO MEET IN PESHAWAR ON 28 NOVEMBER FOR THIS PURPOSE. KHALES AND SAYYAF ARE REPORTED TO BE OPPOSED TO DIRECT TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS BUT ARE UNDER PRESSURE, INCLUDING FROM THE SAUDIS, TO COME ROUND. IF THEY DO NOT, THEIR OPPOSITION WILL PROBABLY BE IGNORED AND THEY WILL SIMPLY BE LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT.

4. WE UNDERSTAND FROM OUR CONTACTS THAT NO AGENDA FOR THE TALKS HAS YET BEEN AGREED. HOWEVER, IF VORONTSOV IS INDEED TO LEAD THE SOVIET DELEGATION IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT ISSUES CONNECTED WITH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ARE TO BE DISCUSSED.

5. IN A SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT, THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND MUJAHIDEEN ON RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR WAS HELD AT THE PAKISTAN MFA ON 27 NOVEMBER. ONLY JAMIAT AND HEZB-E-ISLAMI (HEKMATYAR) WERE REPRESENTED FROM THE ALLIANCE.

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TELNO 653

OF 161030Z NOVEMBER 88

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INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, BONN, PARIS, ROME

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MYTELNO 622 (NOT TO ALL): AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS

## SUMMARY

1. VORONTSOV QUIETLY CONFIDENT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION BEFORE SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAW, PINNING HIS EXPECTATIONS ON REGIONAL DEALS WITH MUJAHEDDIN COMMANDERS. DISMISSIVE OF THE "FAT CATS OF PESHAWAR". AMERICAN COOPERATION DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL. SOVIET/MUJAHEDDIN NEGOTIATION IN TWO WEEKS. HE ALSO CONFIRMED GULABZOI HAD BEEN DISCIPLINED, AND THAT THE REGIME'S NEXT MOVE WOULD BE TO SEPARATE PARTY FROM GOVERNMENT TO MAKE COALITION PROPOSALS MORE ATTRACTIVE. THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL BE DEPLOYING THE WELL TESTED TACTIC OF BOUNCING THEIR OPPONENTS INTO A DEAL IN AN ARTIFICIALLY ABBREVIATED END GAME.

## DETAIL

2. I HAD ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY LAST NIGHT (15 NOVEMBER: AT THE GDR AMBASSADOR'S HOUSE), TO DISCUSS A RANGE OF AFGHAN QUESTIONS WITH VORONTSOV. THE DIALOGUE WAS A LITTLE MORE STRUCTURED TOO, BECAUSE FOR THE MOST PART NATO COLLEAGUES SEEMED CONTENT TO LET ME MAKE THE RUNNING. IN CONTRAST TO THE PREVIOUS OCCASION, VORONTSOV SEMED QUIETLY CONFIDENT RATHER THAN BELLICOSE, BUT WAS TANTALISINGLY COY ON POINTS OF SUBSTANCE.

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3. FOR EXAMPLE, VORONTSOV REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL BY 15 FEBRUARY, ALTHOUGH AT NO POINT, DESPITE BEING GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY, DID HE REITERATE HIS EARLIER THREAT THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS CONDITIONAL ON THE CONCLUSION OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION. INSTEAD HE PROFESSED CONFIDENCE THAT A SOLUTION WAS LIKELY SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY PROSPECT OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE MUJAHEDDIN, AND HE SAID THERE WOULD BE A MEETING IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS TIME, BUT IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION SAID THIS WOULD "NOT NECESSARILY" TAKE PLACE IN PAKISTAN (HE ALSO SAID TALKS ON SOVIET POWS HAD EITHER JUST STARTED OR WOULD VERY SOON BEGIN IN ISLAMABAD). VORONTSOV WAS CAUSTICALLY DISMISSIVE OF "THE FAT CATS OF PESHAWAR", AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE WITH IN-COUNTRY COMMANDERS. HE SAID, AS HE HAD DONE BEFORE,, THAT COMMANDERS HELD THE KEY TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE AGREED WITH MY SUGGESTION THAT MASSOUD WAS ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT POTENTIAL INTERLOCUTORS. I THEN ASKED WHY IT WAS, IN THAT CASE, THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD RESUMED BOMBING OF THE PANJSHIR VALLEY WITH AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE THIS SEEMED LIKELY TO ANTAGONISE MASSOUD AND HIS FOLLOWERS, ESPECIALLY IF IT WAS THE CASE (AS UNHCR OFFICIALS HAD TOLD ME EARLIER IN THE DAY) THAT 16,000 FAMILIES HAD RECENTLY RETURNED TO THE AREA. VORONTSOV REPLIED, SOMEWHAT DELPHICALLY, THAT I SHOULD CHECK WITH PESHAWAR AS TO PRECISELY WHOSE FOLLOWERS HAD BEEN BOMBED. ALTHOUGH HE WAS GUARDEDLY VAGUE, VORONTSOV GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE CONTINUING WITH A FORM OF BALKANISATION, WHEREBY (AS NAJIB HAS HINTED IN THE PAST) LEADING MUJAHEDDIN COMMANDERS WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO FORM LOCALLY AUTONOMOUS POLITICAL FIEFDOMS WITH WHICH KABUL WOULD COOPERATE. THE REGIONS WOULD IN TURN NOMINATE REPRESENTATIVES TO JOIN A COALITION NON PARTY GOVERNMENT (SEE PARA 6 BELOW). I THEN ASKED WHETHER HE REALLY BELIEVED THAT A SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE WHILE ANY SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED IN AFGHANISTAN: IT SEEMED TO ME THAT RESISTANCE HEARTS WOULD RUE THEIR HEADS AND THAT EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR AFGHANS TO DO DEALS REGARDLESS OF PRINCIPLE, NONE OF THE LEADERS WAS LIKELY TO RISK THEIR FRAGILE UNITY BY CHANGING THE GROUND RULES AND ATTEMPTING ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THOSE AGAINST WHOM THE JEHAD HAD BEEN WAGED. VORONTSOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE AFGHANS WERE CAPABLE OF DOING DEALS WITHOUT COMPROMISING PRINCIPLES THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD BE IN PLACE BEFORE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED.

I ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY PLANS FOR VORONTOV TO ACCOMPANY GORBACHEV ON HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID IT WAS UNLIKELY. HE SPECULATED THAT THE MAIN ITEM ON THE AGENDA WOULD BE DISARMAMENT , AND CONCEDED THAT A MEETING OF MINDS ON AFGHANISTAN WAS POSSIBLE IF THE DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS WENT SMOOTHLY. I SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING OF AN IMBALANCE HERE: THE RUSSIANS WERE WELL-PLACED TO DELIVER THE REGIME, BUT THE SAME DID NOT APPLY TO THE AMERICANS AND THE MUJAHEDDIN. HE COMMENTED THAT WHILST HE HOPED THE AMERICANS COULD BE PARTY TO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, THEY WERE NOT ESSENTIAL.

5. VORONTOV CONFIRMED THAT BAKLANOV'S VISIT HAD BEEN TO RE-NEGOTIATE THE MILITARY AID AGREEMENT, AND VOLUNTEERED THAT MUCH OF THE 3 DAY NEGOTIATION HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN. HE ADDED THAT BAKLANOV'S DELEGATION HAD BEEN ONE OF THE BIGGEST THE RUSSIANS HAD EVER SENT TO ANY COUNTRY, AND THAT HE (VORONTOV) HAD PARTICIPATED IN ALL SESSIONS.

6. ON REGIME DOMESTIC POLITICS, VORONTOV TOLD ME THAT THE DECISION TO REMOVE GULABZOI WAS INDEED A SUDDEN ONE, WAS INTENDED TO ENSURE PARTY UNITY, AND HAD BEEN TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF GULABZOI'S BEHAVIOUR AT THE PARTY PLENUM. HE PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW HOW LONG GULABZOI WAS LIKELY TO RETAIN HIS POST AS AMBASSADOR TO USSR. I ASKED WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT TO INTERPRET FROM STATEMENTS OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS THAT THE REGIME PLANNED IN DUE COURSE TO ATTEMPT A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN ITS IMAGE BY STAGE MANAGING A SEPARATION OF PARTY FROM GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THIS WAS RIGHT, AND THAT THE OBJECTIVE WAS FURTHER TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF A GENUINE BROAD BASED COALITION. HE AGREED WITH MY SUGGESTION THAT THIS WOULD PRESENT NAJIB WITH A DIFFICULT CHOICE, BETWEEN HIS POSITIONS AS PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY AND AS PRESIDENT, BUT DECLINED TO BE DRAWN ON WHICH WAY NAJIB WOULD GO.

7. VORONTOV CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE STILL MANY SOVIET TECHNICAL ADVISERS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND SAID THERE WERE NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO REMOVE THEM. AS EVIDENCE, HE POINTED TO THE RECENT INTRODUCTION OF AEROFLOT WINTER SCHEDULES OF ONE FLIGHT A WEEK BETWEEN MOSCOW AND KABUL.


8. ON A LIGHTER NOTE, VORONTSOV CREATED SOME AMUSEMENT BY GENTLY SNUBBING THE ACTING FRENCH CHARGE, WHO HAD SOUGHT TO INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH REMARKS ON THE QUALITY OF HIS FRENCH BY REFERENCE TO HIS PERIOD AS AMBASSADOR IN PARIS. VORONTSOV PUT ON HIS MOST WINNING SMILE AND SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD FRENCH, HE HAD NOT HAD MANY OPPORTUNITIES IN HIS THREE YEARS IN PARIS TO PRACTICE IT, BECAUSE "EVERYONE VERY KINDLY ALWAYS TALKED TO ME IN ENGLISH".

COMMENT

9. AS ALREADY NOTED, VORONTSOV GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE THAT HE WILL BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. IT IS POSSIBLE HE WILL MAKE AN OFFER THE MUJAHEDDIN CANNOT REFUSE, OR THAT GORBACHEV WILL DO SO IN HIS FORTHCOMING FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH OR AT WASHINGTON. BUT I STILL FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT, HOWEVER GOOD THE OFFER, RESISTANCE LEADERS WILL COME ON BOARD BEFORE THE LAST SOVIET SOLDIER HAS LEFT, OR UNLESS THE PDPA IS JETTISONED ENTIRELY. PERHAPS, INSTEAD, VORONTSOV HOPES TO ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK, WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE A DIMINUATION IN FIGHTING IF NOT A FORMAL CEASEFIRE, FOR A RAPID POST WITHDRAWAL SETTLEMENT.

10. ONE TACTIC AVAILABLE TO THE RUSSIANS, AS IN THE WEEKS BEFORE THE GENEVA SETTLEMENT AND AS THEY HAVE DEPLOYED IN OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, IS TO CAPITALISE ON THE BREVITY OF TIME AVAILABLE TO FORCE THROUGH A SETTLEMENT - PLAYING ON THE FEARS OF THEIR OPPONENTS THAT THE ALTERNATIVE IS A PROLONGATION AND ESCALATION OF THE WAR TO SECURE A DEAL THAT FALLS SOME WAY SHORT OF THEIR REAL BOTTOM LINE. TO AN EXTENT, THIS RHETORIC IS ALREADY BEING DEPLOYED, WITH THREATS TO DELAY WITHDRAWAL, INTRODUCTION OF SCUD AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS, READINESS TO DESPATCH SOVIET BASED BOMBERS IF THE MUJAHEDDIN PRESS TOO HARD ON SENSITIVE AREAS, ETC. THE MESSAGE, IN SHORT, SEEMS TO BE "YOU CANNOT WIN: ACCEPT HALF A LOAF OR RISK GETTING NOTHING". THERE WILL DOUBTLESS BE MORE IN THIS VEIN IN WEEKS TO COME, AT LEAST PARTLY DESIGNED TO CAUSE WOBBLING AMONG SOME OF PAKISTAN'S AND THE RESISTANCE'S FRIENDS AND ADVISERS, AS WELL AS AMONG THE PLAYERS THEMSELVES.

MACKLEY

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AFGHANISTAN : MEETING WITH RABBANI

SUMMARY

1. RABBANI DESCRIBES MUJAHIDEEN SUCCESSES AND THE DISARRAY OF THE NAJIB REGIME. IT IS TIME FOR A NEW INITIATIVE FOR BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT THOUGH NOT INCLUDING THE PDPA, AND NOT ALL THE SEVEN ALLIANCE PARTIES MIGHT AGREE. DISCUSSION OF VORONTSOV'S OBJECTIVES. RABBANI ASKS FOR REASSURANCE ON CERTAIN POINTS, BUT APPEARS GENERALLY CONFIDENT AND POSITIVE.

DETAIL

2. DURING THE ONE AND A HALF DAYS I SPENT WITH DAVID GILLMORE IN PESHAWAR LAST WEEK WE CALLED ON RABBANI, THE JAMIAT LEADER AND NEW ALLIANCE CHAIRMAN. ALTHOUGH HE CAME STRAIGHT TO THE MEETING AFTER RETURNING BY CAR FROM ISLAMABAD, RABBANI WAS ON GOOD FORM: FRIENDLY, OPEN AND CHEERFUL AND MORE ROBUST AND POSITIVE THAN I HAD SEEN HIM IN THE PAST.

3. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD NOT MET SINCE BEFORE THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND CONGRATULATED HIM ON THE ALLIANCE CHAIRMANSHIP. WE THEN ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION INSIDE AFGHANISTAN IN THE LIGHT OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE INTERIOR. HE SAID HE HAD FOUND HIS VISIT VERY REWARDING. THE MORALE OF THE MUJAHIDEEN WAS HIGH AND THAT OF THE REGIME FORCES WAS CORRESPONDINGLY LOW. MILITARY SUCCESS WAS INCREASINGLY COMING WITHOUT THERE BEING A NEED TO FIGHT. OFTEN REGIME FORCES JUST RAN AWAY. THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE CAPTURING SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING TANKS AND GUNS.

4. RABBANI SAID THAT MUJAHIDEEN AUTHORITY WAS WIDESPREAD AND APPARENT. IT WAS INTERESTING TO SEE THE SELF CONFIDENCE WITH WHICH THEY WERE ENGAGING IN RECONSTRUCTION, PARTICULARLY OF SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND ROADS. (HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY MORE TRUE

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OF CERTAIN JAMIAT CONTROLLED AREAS IN THE NORTH THAN OTHER PLACES).

5. THE NAJIBULLAH REGIME WAS IN DISARRAY. THERE WERE AN INCREASING NUMBER OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE MUJAHIDEEN AND REGIME OFFICIALS AND ARMY OFFICERS, EVEN AT THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS, WHO WERE SEEKING AMNESTY IN RETURN FOR DEFECTIONS. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME WAS DIMINISHING FAST. IN TAKHAR, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE THERE HAD ONCE BEEN 5,000 PARTY MEMBERS ONLY 70 PEOPLE HAD RENEWED THEIR PARTY DOCUMENTS WHEN RECENTLY CALLED UPON TO DO SO.

6. RABBANI SAID THAT IT SEEMED THAT THE USSR WAS NOW UNCERTAIN WHAT POLICY TO PURSUE TOWARDS THE KABUL REGIME. SOVIET TROOPS NO LONGER PARTICIPATED IN COMBINED OPERATIONS WITH REGIME FORCES. IN MANY CASES THE RUSSIANS HAD DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE MUJAHIDEEN ON LOCAL MILITARY AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS. THE LEVEL VARIED FROM AREA TO AREA, IN SOME CASES THE RUSSIANS MAKING A PLEA THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT INTERFERENCE SINCE THEY WERE LEAVING AFGHANISTAN ANYWAY. HE CONFIRMED THAT CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS WERE TACTICAL AND NOT POLITICAL. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE MUJAHIDEEN RESPONDING TO ANY OVERTURES ABOUT JOINING THE GOVERNMENT.

7. GILLMORE AND I THEN ASKED WHAT PROGRESS THE MUJAHIDEEN WERE MAKING IN ESTABLISHING A POLITICAL STRUCTURE TO REPLACE THE NAJIB REGIME, IF IT FELL SWIFTLY AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. WE HAD RECENTLY HEARD RUMOURS IN ISLAMABAD OF PLANS FOR A MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT EMERGING FROM AN ELECTED SHOURA. RABBANI REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THE ALLIANCE LEADERS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF A SHOURA BUT TIME WAS SHORT AND THE ALLIANCE WOULD NEED TO FIND WAYS OF GETTING A SHOURA IN PLACE QUICKLY. NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN, ALTHOUGH THE MATTER WAS NOW UNDER URGENT DISCUSSION IN THE ALLIANCE. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HIS PARTY FAVOURED MAKING PROGRESS WITHOUT WAITING FOR A SHOURA.

8. HE THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK US A QUESTION. SINCE IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO FORM A NEW ADMINISTRATION OR GOVERNMENT COMPRISING ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WHAT WOULD BE THE POSITION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IF THE MUJAHIDEEN, INCLUDING JAMIAT, FORMED A GOVERNMENT WHICH COMPRISED SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THE SEVEN PARTIES. (WHEN I ASKED IF HE WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF SIX RATHER THAN SEVEN HE DECLINED TO BE SPECIFIC. BUT OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THIS WAS WHAT HE HAD HAD IN MIND IE. EXCLUDING HEKMATYAR.

9. GILLMORE AND I BOTH MADE THE POINT THAT BRITISH POLICY WAS TO RECOGNISE STATES NOT GOVERNMENTS. WE WOULD NORMALLY DEAL WITH ANY

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ADMINISTRATION OR GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORITY IT EXERCISED AND THE DEGREE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IT ENJOYED. GILLMORE SAID THAT ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH EMERGED AS A RESULT OF DELIBERATIONS OF A SHOURA WOULD TEND TO HAVE BETTER CREDENTIALS WITH THE PUBLIC AND PRESS ABROAD. AS FAR AS DEALING WITH ANY GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED WE SAID THAT IT WOULD OF COURSE DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT AN EXAMPLE WAS THE ADMINISTRATION OF RESETTLEMENT AID. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT BRITISH AID WOULD NOT BE DISPENSED THROUGH THE KABUL REGIME BUT WE COULD NOT IMAGINE THERE BEING ANY INHIBITIONS IN DISPENSING AID THROUGH AN ADMINISTRATION CONSISTING OF MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS, WHETHER OR NOT IT REPRESENTED ALL OF THE SEVEN PARTIES.

10. RABBANI THEN ASKED ANOTHER QUESTION: PAKISTAN WAS A FRIEND OF THE MUJAHIDEEN BUT DID THE AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION AT THE UN WITH REFERENCES TO A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT MEAN THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAD AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE PDPA PARTICIPATION IN SUCH GOVERNMENT? WE SAID WE THOUGHT NOT. WE WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE PAKISTANIS AT THE UN AND AGREED WITH THEIR TACTICS ABOUT A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. BUT WHILE BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A 'BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT' THE PHRASE HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY LEFT VAGUE. IT WAS UP TO THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES TO DETERMINE THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANTED. ONE MIGHT IMAGINE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENJOY SUPPORT FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY FROM SHIAS AS WELL AS SUNNIS ETC BUT NOT THAT IT SHOULD COMPRISE ANY SPECIFIC POLITICAL GROUPS, SUCH AS THE COMMUNISTS. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT OF A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD ENJOY SUPPORT AMONG THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN AND WHERE THE ROLE OF THE MUJAHIDEEN WOULD BE RECOGNISED.

11. RABBANI THEN SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT GILLMORE HAD RECENTLY SEEN VORONTSOV. WHAT DID HE THINK OF THE LATTER'S ROLE IN KABUL? GILLMORE REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED VORONTSOV HAD BEEN SENT TO AFGHANISTAN WITH CONSIDERABLE AUTHORITY. HIS AIM WAS PROBABLY TO EXTRACT SOVIET MILITARY FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN BY 15 FEBRUARY WITH MINIMUM DAMAGE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME LEAVING BEHIND IF POSSIBLE A REGIME WITH WHICH THE RUSSIANS COULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS. IN MOSCOW VORONTSOV HAD DISMISSED NAJIB AND EXTROLLED SHARQ. HE HAD BEEN TOLD, HOWEVER, THAT WE BELIEVED SHAQ WOULD BE JUST AS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE MUJAHIDEEN AS NAJIB (RABBANI CONCURRED). IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THE RECENT PDPA PLENUM IN KABUL HAD NOT PRODUCED THE AGREEMENT ON A MORE MODERATE GOVERNMENT THAT VORONTSOV HAD HOPED FOR. THE LATTER WAS NO

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DOUBT CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROPECTS OF MAJOR DISSENSION INSIDE THE REGIME.

12. WE SURMISED THAT VORONTSOV'S AIM MIGHT FIRST HAVE BEEN TO ORCHESTRATE A COALITION BETWEEN PDPA AND MUJAHIDEEN, AND WHEN THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE, AT LEAST TO SEE THAT THE PDPA COULD REMAIN IN EXISTENCE AS A POLITICAL FORCE. IF BOTH THESE OPTIONS WERE UNOBTAINABLE, AS SEEMED LIKELY TO BE THE CASE (RABBANI AGAIN CONCERRED), THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER VORONTSOV WOULD PURSUE A FALLBACK POSITION OF DEALING WITH AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS FREE OF ANY CONNECTIONS WITH THE PDPA, SO LONG AS IT WAS NOT OVERTLY HOSTILE TO THE USSR. WHEN ASKED FOR HIS OWN VIEWS, RABBANI SAID THAT VORONTSOV HAD NO DOUBT GONE TO KABUL TO TRY AND BOOST THE MORALE OF THE REGIME. HE WAS PERHAPS AIMING TO SPLIT THE MUJAHIDEEN BY ATTEMPTING TO BUY OR OTHERWISE WIN THE SUPPORT OF SOME MILITARY COMMANDERS. THIS POLICY WOULD FAIL.

13. I SAID THAT I HAD HEARD THAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN THE RECENT PAST BEEN PREPARED TO TALK DIRECTLY TO THE MUJAHIDEEN ABOUT PRISONERS OF WAR, WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO THE DISCUSSION OF MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS: BUT THAT RECENTLY THEY HAD PULLED BACK. RABBANI WAS NOT SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT BUT INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD INDEED NOT FOLLOWED UP THE IDEA OF PRISONER OF WAR TALKS.

14. AS A LAST QUESTION, RABBANI ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED PLANS TO DIVIDE AFGHANISTAN INTO NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SECTORS. GILLMORE SAID THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER SUCH PLANS WOULD BE CAPABLE OF REALISATION SINCE THEY WOULD NECESSITATE A MAJOR INFLUX OF SOVIET TROOPS NOW SOLELY CONCENTRATED IN TWO RIBBANDS STRETCHING NORTHWARDS FROM KABUL AND SHINDAND. THE IMPACT ON WORLD OPINION WOULD BE VERY NEGATIVE. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, OR LIKE MINDED GOVERNMENTS, SUPPORTING A POLICY OF DIVIDING AFGHANISTAN INTO TWO.

15. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION GILLMORE RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS AMONG THE MUJAHIDEEN. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO LEAVE THE INITIATIVE TO THE RUSSIANS AND THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE ADVANTAGES IN HAVING NEW PROPOSALS IN PLAY BEFORE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. RABBANI AGREED VERY MUCH THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO MAKE SOME NEW MOVES.

16. FINALLY, RABBANI ASKED FOR HELP OVER SCHOLARSHIPS FOR ONE OR TWO YOUNG JAMIAT ADMINISTRATORS. I EXPLAINED THAT THERE HAD BEEN PROBLEMS IN THE PAST OVER AWARDS FOR AFGHANS WHEN THERE WAS NO

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GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD GO BACK TO WORK FOR THEIR COUNTRY. THE SITUATION WAS NOW CHANGING AND THOUGH I COULD GIVE NO COMMITMENT WE WOULD CERTAINLY LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY IF WE RECEIVED A FIRM REQUEST.

17. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER RABBANI HAD ANY PLANS TO TRAVEL ABROAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE HE SAID HE MIGHT DO THIS BUT HAD AS YET NO PLANS.

18. SEE MIFT

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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*Summary only*

MYTELNO 503-505: AFGHANISTAN: THE END GAME

SUMMARY

1. THE RUSSIANS HAVE GRADUALLY MODIFIED THEIR NEGOTIATING STANCE, AND ALTHOUGH THEIR BOTTOM LINE IS NOT YET CLEAR IT IS LIKELY TO BE BASED ON SELF INTEREST, NOT ALTRUISM. KABUL COULD FALL AFTER PROLONGED BOMBARDMENT OR AS A RESULT OF A MAINLY ECONOMIC SIEGE. VORONTSOV COULD PRODUCE A POLITICAL SOLUTION, BUT TIME IS SHORT AND SOVIET AND PAKISTANI INFLUENCE OVER THE PARTICIPANTS IS LIMITED. FIGHTING LIKELY TO CONTINUE AT LEAST UNTIL NEXT SPRING, PROBABLY SUMMER. INITIALLY, SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT WILL BE UNSTABLE, BUT KABUL UNLIKELY TO BECOME ANOTHER BEIRUT. *mf*

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE HINTS THAT THE START OF PHASE 2 OF THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL MAY BE DELAYED BEYOND 15 NOVEMBER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PRESSURISE NEWLY ELECTED ADMINISTRATIONS IN PAKISTAN AND THE USA TO BRING THE MUJAHEDDIN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, THE RUSSIANS ARE NEVERTHELESS COMMITTED TO HAVE COMPLETED THE EXERCISE WITHIN THE NEXT 16 WEEKS. THIS MAY THEREFORE BE A CONVENIENT MOMENT TO REASSESS THE LIKELY COURSE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN OVER THAT PERIOD, AND IN PARTICULAR THE EFFECT ON LIFE IN KABUL.

POLITICAL

3. IT REMAINS MY VIEW, AND VORONTSOV'S APPOINTMENT TENDS TO STRENGTHEN IT, THAT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES TO BE MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE TO ITS OWN INTERESTS RATHER THAN BY ALTRUISM, BUT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL STOP SHORT OF DELAYING TROOP WITHDRAWAL BEYOND 15 FEBRUARY (GIVE OR TAKE A FEW DAYS) OR OF SUBSEQUENTLY REINTRODUCING

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TROOPS, BECAUSE THE PRICE OF CONTINUED OR RENEWED SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD BE TOO HIGH, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY. BUT IT IS STILL FAR FROM CLEAR WHAT MOSCOW'S BOTTOM LINE REALLY IS. THERE HAS BEEN A SERIES OF MOVES OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS TO SUCCESSIVE FALL-BACK POSITIONS: FROM RETENTION OF ALL POWER BY THE PDPA TO AN OFFER OF COALITION (WITH THE PARTY A MINORITY IN GOVERNMENT BUT RETAINING THE VITAL PORTFOLIOS), FOLLOWED MORE RECENTLY BY HINTS OF A SEPARATION OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AND OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE RESISTANCE. SHARQ'S IMMINENT VISIT TO NEW YORK WILL PROBABLY TAKE THIS ONE STAGE FURTHER, WITH AN APPEAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AFGHANISTAN, AND MAY EVEN INCORPORATE A QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE OF THE CORDOVEZ PLAN. IN ALL CASES, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE SEEMS TO BE TO RETAIN A ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE PDPA, EITHER AS A POLITICAL FORCE OR FAILING THAT IN THE FORM OF INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SURVIVAL WOULD PROVIDE A NUCLEUS AROUND WHICH TO RESTORE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE FUTURE.

4. SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF HMA IN MOSCOW, IT SEEMS LIKELY HOWEVER THAT WHILE THE RUSSIANS WILL GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS TO PRESERVE AT LEAST A TOE HOLD IN THE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN KABUL, AND MAY DO SO STRENUOUSLY AND WITH DIRE THREATS TO PAKISTAN - PERHAPS EVEN ENCOURAGING TERRORIST-STYLE ATTEMPTS TO UNSETTLE THE NEWLY ELECTED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT THERE - THEIR JUDGEMENT OF THE PROBABILITY OF A LONGER TERM SOVIET DROIT DE REGARD OVER AFGHANISTAN WILL LEAD THEM TO CONCLUDE THAT NOTHING WILL BE GAINED BY CONTINUING TO ATTEMPT TO PROP UP THE REGIME AFTER 15 FEBRUARY, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE LIKELY TO SEEK TO ENSURE IT DOES NOT FALL UNTIL A DECENT INTERVAL AFTER THEIR LAST SOLDIER HAS LEFT. THIS WOULD SAVE FACE, AND ENABLE THE RUSSIANS SUBSEQUENTLY TO CLAIM THE ENSUING CHAOS WAS DESPITE THEIR BEST ENDEAVOURS AND BECAUSE OF AN ESCALATION OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. IT WOULD ALSO ALLOW THEM TO CONTINUE TO GIVE RHETORICAL IF NOT PRACTICAL SUPPORT TO THE PDPA (IN EXILE OR UNDERGROUND), AND THEREBY DAMPEN DOWN OTHER CLIENT REGIME'S SUSPICIONS AS TO THEIR CONSTANCY.

#### MILITARY

5. THE REGIME MIGHT YET SURVIVE WITHOUT SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT, ALBEIT IN A MUCH WEAKENED STATE IN A BALKANISED AFGHANISTAN. PRESSURE FROM REFUGEES TO RETURN IN THE SPRING COULD BECOME UNCONTAINABLE IF THE BORDER PROVINCES REMAINED AT RELATIVE



PEACE, AND A MASS RETURN WOULD CERTAINLY DISTRACT MANY MUJAHEDDIN FROM THEIR EARLIER MILITARY OBJECTIVES. OR THE REGIME MIGHT DO DEALS WITH MAJOR RESISTANCE COMMANDERS, WHICH IN PRACTICE WOULD AMOUNT TO LITTLE MORE THAN A RETURN TO THE PRE 1973 - AND SEMI FEUDAL - ADMINISTRATIONS, WHERE A WEAK CENTRE MANIPULATED AN UNEASY BALANCE OF POWER WITH AND AMONG STRONG REGIONAL FIEFDOMS. ON PRESENT EVIDENCE HOWEVER IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAT THE REGIME WILL FALL SOME TIME AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO BROAD VIEWS AS TO HOW THIS MIGHT COME ABOUT:

A. THE ARMAGEDDON THEORY (WHICH MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE FAVOURS) POSTULATES THAT KABUL WILL COME UNDER CONTINUOUS SEIGE WITH MASSIVE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS BRINGING UNACCEPTABLY HIGH CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, EVENTUALLY FORCING THE REGIME TO CAPITULATE AS MUCH BECAUSE THE CIVIL POPULATION HAS NO INCLINATION TO EMULATE THE DEFENDERS OF STALINGRAD AS FOR PURELY MILITARY REASONS. OBJECTORS TO THIS LINE ARGUE THAT TO SUSTAIN SUCH A SEIGE THE MUJAHEDDIN WOULD HAVE TO 'GO CONVENTIONAL' OR AT LEAST SIGNIFICANTLY BEEF UP BOTH THEIR MANPOWER AROUND KABUL AND THEIR SUPPLY LINES, THEREBY EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO THE REGIME'S SUPERIOR FIREPOWER, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE MUJAHEDDIN WERE IN A POSITION TO BLITZ KABUL THE WAR WOULD BE VIRTUALLY WON ALREADY AND RESISTANCE COMMANDERS WOULD SEE NO POINT IN ALIENATING THE CIVIL POPULATION OR RISKING THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE.

B. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS IS A CONTINUED WAR OF ENCIRCLEMENT, INCLUDING A WINTER BLOCKADE OF KABUL (BASICALLY ONLY THE JALALABAD AND SALANG ROADS NEED TO BE CUT), AND SOME ESCALATION OF SOFTENING UP ROCKET ATTACKS, BUT WITH THE MUJAHEDDIN AVOIDING ANY SET PIECE BATTLE WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE NO GUARANTEE OF WINNING. THE 'BATTLE FOR KABUL' COULD WELL BE FOUGHT ELSEWHERE, WHERE THE REGIME'S CAPABILITY IS LESS AND RESUPPLY DIFFICULT, EG KANDAHAR OR GHAZNI. EVEN IF THIS DID NOT ALTOGETHER OBIATE THE NEED FOR A FINAL PUSH ON THE CAPITAL ITSELF, IT WOULD PROBABLY LIMIT ITS DURATION.

6. WE ARE NOT WELL SIGHTED ON RESISTANCE THINKING, BUT MY GUESS IS THAT ALTHOUGH AT LEAST SOME OF THE PESHAWAR LEADERSHIP MIGHT PREFER THE ARMAGEDDON APPROACH, IF ONLY FOR FEAR THAT THEIR PERSONAL AMBITIONS MIGHT OTHERWISE BE FRUSTRATED DURING A LONG DRAWN OUT CAMPAIGN EITHER BY A UN SPONSORED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OR THROUGH A DWINDLING OF SUPPORT AMONG ORDINARY

AFGHANS, MUJAHEDDIN COMMANDERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO OPT FOR AND SUCCEED IN IMPLEMENTING, THE MORE COST-EFFECTIVE WAR OF ENCIRCLEMENT.

## TIMING

7. VORONTSOV MAY YET CONJURE UP A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE CAN RELY ON CORDOVEZ TO SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS. HE MAY BE ABLE, THROUGH PROPAGANDA, TO CAPTURE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND AND THEREBY BRING INTERNATIONAL (ESPECIALLY NON-ALIGNED) PRESSURE ON THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN TO CONCEDE THAT LESS THAN THE WHOLE LOAF IS VICTORY ENOUGH FOR THE MUJAHEDDIN. BUT VORONTSOV'S ABILITY TO ACHIEVE SUCH AN OUTCOME WILL BE SEVERELY CONSTRAINED: HE MIGHT CONVINCE A PAKISTANI CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT IT COULD NOT DELIVER THE MUJAHEDDIN. HIS ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE WITH THE REGIME WILL ALSO BE IN INVERSE PROPORTION TO THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TROOPS REMAINING IN AFGHANISTAN. I THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS NOT IN THE OFFING BY THE END OF YEAR, THEN A CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IS INEVITABLE. GIVEN THE PROBLEMS OF CAMPAIGNING AROUND KABUL IN WINTER, THIS IS LIKELY TO MEAN A PROLONGATION OF FIGHTING AT LEAST UNTIL THE SPRING, PROBABLY INTO THE SUMMER, BEFORE THE AFGHANS FIND THEIR OWN SETTLEMENT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF SOVIET OR UN MEDIATION.

8. ONE ASPECT OF A SETTLEMENT, WHETHER POLITICAL OR MILITARY, THAT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED IS A SUCCESSOR REGIME'S POTENTIAL STABILITY. WITHOUT KNOWING THE LIKELY FORM OF A SUCCESSOR REGIME, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE TURN EVENTS MIGHT TAKE, BUT IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT ANY PATCHED UP ADMINISTRATION WILL REMAIN UNITED FOR LONG. IF THE PDPA SURVIVE, ITS LATENT FACTIONALISM WOULD RESURFACE WITH A VENGEANCE. IF THE SEVEN PARTY RESISTANCE ALLIANCE TOOK OVER, IT WOULD NOT BE LONG BEFORE ITS MEMBERS FELL OUT. IT IS ALSO INCONCEIVABLE THAT A UN OR SOVIET INSPIRED JOINT RESISTANCE/REGIME ADMINISTRATION WOULD SURVIVE LONG. THAT IS NOT TO SAY HOWEVER (AS SOME DO) THAT KABUL WOULD BECOME ANOTHER BEIRUT. FOR ONE THING THERE ARE NOT THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES IN AFGHANISTAN THAT CONSPIRE TO KEEP LEBANESE FACTIONS APART. FOR ANOTHER, THE AFGHANS ARE RENOWNED PRAGMATISTS WITH A LEGENDARY CAPABILITY TO DO DEALS WITHOUT NECESSARILY COMPROMISING THEIR PRINCIPLES (PARA 5 ABOVE). BUT IT IS NEVERTHELESS LIKELY THAT POLITICAL DIRECTION WILL BE FRAGILE FOR SOME TIME AFTER ANY SETTLEMENT, AND IN ALL PROBABILITY THE LEADERSHIP WILL GO THROUGH SEVERAL

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METAMORPHOSES BEFORE GENUINE STABILITY IS RESTORED. SOME QUARRELS WILL INEVITABLY SPILL ON TO THE STREETS, AND ALTHOUGH THE WESTERN COMMUNITY WILL NOT BE A TARGET IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT HISTORY WILL REPEAT ITSELF AND THAT, AS IN 1928/9, WESTERNERS MAY NEED TO LEAVE KABUL FOR A TIME AFTER RATHER THAN DURING THE REVOLUTION, SIMPLY BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ADMINISTRATION WITH WHICH TO DO BUSINESS OR TO MAINTAIN SUPPLY OF BASIC NECESSITIES SUCH AS POWER AND FOOD.

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YOUR TELNO 1301 : AFGHANISTAN : CALL BY SAYED GAELANI ON  
LORD GLENARTHUR

## SUMMARY

1. GAELANI SAID EVENTS UNFOLDING RAPIDLY IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT NO PROGRESS IN PESHAWAR. NO ORGANISATION EXISTED TO SPEAK FOR RESISTANCE AS A WHOLE. HE PROPOSED SUPREME COUNCIL EXERCISING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS OVER GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY LOYA JIRGA. FIRST STEP SHURA (COUNCIL) INCLUDING RESISTANCE COMMANDERS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS. ROOM IN THIS PROCESS FOR REGIME FUNCTIONARIES - BUT NOT FOR PDPA ACTIVISTS.

## DETAIL

2. AT HIS OWN REQUEST, GAELANI CALLED ON LORD GLENARTHUR ON 20 OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT EVENTS WERE MOVING QUICKLY INSIDE AFGHANISTAN BUT THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN MATCHED IN PESHAWAR. THERE WAS A RISK THAT CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WHO LACKED POPULAR SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD EXPLOIT ANY CHAOS THAT FOLLOWED SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND SEIZE POWER.
3. LORD GLENARTHUR ASKED ABOUT THE RUMOURS THAT NAJIB WOULD STEP DOWN. GAELANI SAID THAT IF NAJIB DID GO HE WOULD PROBABLY BE REPLACED BY SOMEONE SIMILAR. BUT THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT NAJIB WAS PREPARED TO HANDOVER TO A COUNCIL WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE RESISTANCE AND THE EX-KING, AS WELL AS NAJIB HIMSELF. NEVERTHELESS THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE RESISTANCE. IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THE PDPA TO RETAIN IMPORTANT POSTS: IT WOULD NOT EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY TO THE PEOPLE WHY THE PDPA SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO KEEP MINOR POSITIONS.
4. LORD GLENARTHUR ASKED IF DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN VORONTSOV AND THE RESISTANCE WERE ON THE CARDS. GAELANI SAID THAT THE RESISTANCE HAD ALWAYS BEEN PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE RUSSIANS: BUT THERE WAS NO ORGANISATION ABLE TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE RESISTANCE AS A WHOLE. FOR YEARS HE HAD CALLED FOR THE ELECTION

OF A COUNCIL TO REPRESENT THE RESISTANCE. FOR A LONG TIME THE PAKISTANIS HAD IGNORED THIS PROPOSAL BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT A STRONG RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP TO EMERGE: THE FUNDAMENTALISTS HAD OPPOSED IT BECAUSE THEY FEARED REJECTION BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. RECENTLY THE PAKISTANIS HAD GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT - BUT IT WAS TOO LATE.

5. GAELANI SAID THAT THE BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE THE FORMATION OF A SUPREME COUNCIL (AS IN THE SUDAN) WITH HALF A DOZEN OR SO MEMBERS UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF ZAHIR SHAH. (ZAHIR SHAH WOULD HOWEVER BE NO MORE THAN A FIGUREHEAD.) THE SUPREME COUNCIL WOULD EXERCISE PRESIDENTIAL POWERS OVER A GOVERNMENT WHOSE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE A SEAT ON THE COUNCIL. THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SET UP BY A LOYA JIRGA ORGANISED BY A SHURA WHICH INCLUDED THE PESHAWAR SEVEN,

RESISTANCE INTERNAL COMMANDERS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS. THERE WOULD BE NO ROLE IN THE PROCESS FOR NAJIB OR PDPA ACTIVISTS, ALTHOUGH REGIME FUNCTIONARIES MIGHT BE INVOLVED.

6. LORD GLENARTHUR REFERRED TO THE RECENT VEILED SOVIET THREATS TO DELAY WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT THESE SMACKED OF BRINKMANSHIP. THE AIM WAS TO PUT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN AND THE RESISTANCE. BUT WE STILL EXPECTED TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO BE COMPLETE BY 15 FEBRUARY.

7. GAELANI REMARKED IN PASSING THAT HE EXPECTED THE ISID TO BE BROUGHT UNDER GREATER PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT CONTROL AFTER 16 NOVEMBER ELECTION.

COMMENT

8. GAELANI WAS NOT ON GOOD FORM. THE HEATHROW INCIDENT HAD UPSET HIM. HE HAD BEEN UNWELL (BLOOD PRESSURE). HIS REMARKS WERE DISJOINTED AND CONFUSED.

9. HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF A SHURA SEEMED TO REFLECT THE ALLIANCE PROPOSALS REPORTED IN PARA 4 OF YOUR TUR.

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MY TELS 1330 AND 1340 AND ISLAMABAD TEL 1011: SOVIET  
UNION/AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY

1. FORCEFUL ASSERTION BY VORONTSOV THAT PRESIDENT ZIA IS BENT ON A MILITARY TAKEOVER IN AFGHANISTAN. VORONTSOV THREATENS A "PROPER REACTION" BY THE SOVIET UNION.

DETAIL

2. AT THE FAREWELL LUNCH WHICH HE GAVE FOR ME ON 10 AUGUST FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VORONTSOV DENOUNCED THE BEHAVIOUR AND INTENTIONS OF PRESIDENT ZIA TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.
3. THE THRUST OF VORONTSOV'S REMARKS WAS THAT ZIA HAD A GRAND DESIGN TO ESTABLISH PAKISTANI SUZERAINTY OVER AFGHANISTAN BY WAGING AN AGGRESSIVE CAMPAIGN THROUGH AND WITH THE MUJAHIDDEEN OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. VORONTSOV SAID THAT THE PROBLEM DID NOT LIE WITH PAKISTAN IN GENERAL, BUT WITH ZIA ALONE. HE WAS A MILITARY MAN AND WAS SEEKING A MILITARY SOLUTION. HE WAS SENDING PAKISTANI OFFICERS TO DIRECT OPERATIONS BY RESISTANCE UNITS. HE WAS TRYING TO FORCE THE RESISTANCE INTO AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN FOR WHICH THEY WERE UNTRAINED AND UNSUITED. ZIA WANTED THEM TO ATTACK AND FORCIBLY TAKE OVER THE CITIES. VORONTSOV'S PRESENTED THIS AS THE CULMINATION OF A LONG-TERM PLAN BY ZIA. TO THIS END, ZIA WAS FORCIBLY RESTRAINING REFUGEES FROM RETURNING, AS THEY WISHED, TO RESUME A PEACEFUL LIFE IN THEIR HOME VILLAGES.
4. I COUNTERED THAT VORONTSOV'S LINE DID NOT CORRESPOND WITH THE IMPRESSIONS GIVEN TO ME BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER DURING OUR CONVERSAION ON THE PREVIOUS DAY (MY TELNO 1340). NOR DID WE SHARE HIS ANALYSIS. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT ZIA WOULD RUN THE RISKS WITH PAKISTAN'S STABILITY. AND ZIA WOULD BE PARTICULARLY CAREFUL NOT TO EXPOSE HIMSELF TO PRESSURE FROM INDIA. HOWEVER,

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VORONTSOV WAS NOT TO BE DETERRED. HE REITERATED HIS ARGUMENT THAT ZIA WAS PURSUING A RISKY AND DANGEROUS POLICY. IN THIS, HE DID NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT OF HIS PEOPLE, AS THE RUSSIANS KNEW FROM THEIR OWN SOURCES. HE THOUGHT THAT ZIA WOULD FAIL, AND THAT THIS STRATEGY COULD BE THE UNDOING OF HIM. HE WARNED THAT, IF ZIA WENT TOO FAR, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RESPOND WITH A 'PROPER REACTION'. NOT SURPRISINGLY, HE DECLINED TO BE DRAWN ON THE NATURE OF THAT REACTION. BUT HE COUPLED IT WITH A STATEMENT THAT INDIA WAS WATCHING THE SITUATION VERY CLOSELY, AND THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE INDIANS MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO ACT. VORONTSOV MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ISSUED AN EXPLICIT WARNING TO THE PAKISTANIS.

5. DRAWING AN ANALOGY WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ SITUATION, VORONTSOV SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST COURSE FOR AFGHANISTAN NOW WOULD BE A CEASEFIRE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, HE INDICATED THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL HAD BEEN PUT (UNSUCCESSFULLY) TO YAQUB KHAN. HE LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ISSUE SOME FORM OF STATEMENT ON 15 AUGUST, ON THE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST HALF OF THEIR TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THIS MIGHT INCLUDE A RENEWED CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE. HE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE WAS LIKELY TO BE CHANGED IF THE FIGHTING CONTINUED.

## COMMENT

6. VORONTSOV'S REMARKS DEMONSTRATED THE SAME CONFRONTATIONAL MOOD WHICH THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER ENCOUNTERED DURING HIS VISIT LAST WEEK, AND WHICH WAS SURPRISINGLY ABSENT FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH SHEVARDNADZE. VORONTSOV SEEMED OBSESSED (AS I BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN AT TIMES WITH OTHER INTERLOCUTORS) WITH THE SPECTRE THAT THE PAKISTANIS MIGHT ENGINEER A RAPID TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN BY EXTREMIST ELEMENTS, DIRECTED BY AND COMPLIANT TO PRESIDENT ZIA. (HE RESERVED HIS BLAME EXCLUSIVELY FOR ZIA AND DID NOT ASSOCIATE THE AMERICANS OR OTHER EXTERNAL BACKERS WITH THE ALLEGED MASTER PLAN EXCEPT BY IMPLICATION IN A SIDE SWIPE AT THE SUPPLY OF WESTERN ARMS).

7. AS I HAVE SUGGESTED IN MY TURS, THERE MAY WELL BE AN ELEMENT OF THEATRE IN THIS. THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW LOCKED INTO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM WHICH IT WOULD NOT BE SENSIBLE TO DEPART. THEY WOULD OBVIOUSLY LIKE TO MINIMISE THE ATTACKS ON THEIR FORCES AND THOSE OF THE KABUL REGIME THROUGH INTIMIDATION OF PAKISTAN. THEY WILL ALSO WISH TO SECURE NAJIB'S CONTINUING COOPERATION BY SHOWING EVIDENCE OF THEIR STRONG POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT. TAKEN AT FACE VALUE, VORONTSOV'S TONE WAS DISTINCTLY MANAGING TOWARDS PAKISTAN. BUT IT MAY HAVE BEEN NO MORE THAN A FURTHER PIECE OF SABRE-RATTLING, SUCH AS

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WE HAVE SEEN ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS SINCE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL STARTED: AND PART OF A GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO SOW ANXIETIES AMONG PAKISTAN'S FRIENDS WHICH COULD INCLINE THEM TO MONITOR PAKISTANI BEHAVIOUR WITH INCREASED VIGILANCE.

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
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YOURTELNO 583 TO ISLAMABAD

AFGHANISTAN: SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR

1. I WAS ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT A FAREWELL RECEPTION FOR THE CUBAN LAST NIGHT. I ASKED YEGORYCHEV WHETHER THERE REALLY WERE 300 OR SO SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR, OR WHETHER THAT WAS THE TALLY OF TROOPS MISSING. HE AGREED THAT "MISSING" WAS PERHAPS A BETTER WORD THAN "PRISONERS", AND ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED 10 OR 11 WERE IN "OTHER COUNTRIES" AND THAT AT LEAST 62 HAD BEEN KILLED OR DIED AFTER CAPTURE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE THE BALANCE MIGHT BE, BUT DID NOT QUARREL WITH MY SPECULATION THAT IF JAN GOODWIN IS RIGHT AND ZIA HAD OBLIGED THE RESISTANCE TO BRING SOVIET PRISONERS BACK INTO AFGHANISTAN, AT LEAST SOME COULD HAVE BEEN KILLED IN BOMBING RAIDS ON THEIR CAPTORS. WHEN I ADDED THAT YET OTHERS MIGHT HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS WITH THE MUJAHEDDIN, HE MERELY SHRUGGED.

2. I TOLD YEGORYCHEV THAT I WAS NOT SURE WHAT THE RUSSIANS EXPECT OF US IN KABUL, AND THIS HAD NOT BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT WONDERED IF HE THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO SPEAK TO THE ICRC. HE SAID THAT MIGHT HELP. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE THAN 300 MUJAHEDDIN PRISONERS OF THE REGIME. WAS AN EXCHANGE POSSIBLE? YEGORYCHEV SAID IT WAS, AND ADDED THAT THE RESISTANCE HAD RECENTLY AGAIN DEMANDED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID THE DEMAND HAD ONLY BEEN MADE TWO DAYS AGO, AND MOSCOW HAD YET TO FORMULATE A REACTION. I THEN ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THE ISRAELI EXAMPLE AND COUNT ONE

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OF THEIR MEN AS WORTH A HUNDRED OR EVEN A THOUSAND AFGHANS. HE SAID HE WAS SURE SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES COULD BE WORKED OUT AND, IN REPLY TO A FURTHER QUESTION, SAID HE SAW 'NO PROBLEM' IN THE FACT THAT THE REGIME NOT THE RUSSIANS HELD THE MUJAHEDDIN PRISONERS.

## COMMENT

3. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS A USEFUL EXCHANGE, I DO NOT THINK IT ALTERS MY FIRST REACTION ON RECEIPT OF TUR, WHICH IS THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO IN KABUL. I COULD OF COURSE SPEAK TO THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE, BUT SINCE TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE THERE ARE NO SOVIET PRISONERS IN THE KABUL AREA, AND LAVOYER'S MOVEMENTS ARE AS CONSTRAINED AS OURS, HIS REACTION IS LIKELY TO BE THAT THERE IS LITTLE HE CAN DO THAT COULD NOT BE BETTER DONE EITHER BY ICRC HEADQUARTERS IN GENEVA OR HIS COUNTERPARTS IN PAKISTAN. HE IS AN INNATELY CAUTIOUS MAN, AND IS LIKELY TO ADD THAT ICRC HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE DELICATE BUSINESS FOR SOME YEARS, IS STILL WORKING HARD AT IT, AND THEREFORE DOES NOT NEED TO UNDERTAKE NEW INITIATIVES, AT LEAST IN KABUL. THE ONE POSSIBLE LINE I COULD TAKE MIGHT BE TO URGE HIM TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO STEP UP HIS EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PRISONERS OF THE REGIME, AS ONE ELEMENT IN A THREE OR FOUR CORNERED NEGOTIATION. BUT I SUSPECT HE WOULD BE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE IN THAT DIRECTION FROM GENEVA THAN FROM ME.

4. WHILE IT IS CLEARLY RIGHT, IN BOTH HUMANITARIAN TERMS AND IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THAT WE SHOULD SHOW WILLING ON THIS ISSUE, I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT FOR MANY YEARS THE SOVIET UNION WAS AS INDIFFERENT TO THE FATE OF ITS SOLDIERS CAPTURED BY THE MUJAHEDDIN AS TO THOSE WHO WERE KILLED AND AND BURIED AT HOME WITHOUT CEREMONY, REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE FOR THEIR RELEASE AND METING OUT PRETTY SHABBY TREATMENT TO ANY WHO MANAGED TO MAKE THEIR WAY BACK TO THE USSR. WHILE THE RECENT OFFICIAL CONCERN FOR PRISONERS IS DOUBTLESS PARTLY A REACTION TO GENUINE DOMESTIC PRESSURE, I ALSO DETECT A CYNICAL USE OF AN EMOTIVE ISSUE TO FURTHER THE OBJECTIVE OF CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WAR ENDED AT GENEVA IN APRIL, THAT CONTINUED FIGHTING IS A BREACH OF A CEASEFIRE, AND THAT THE MUJAHEDDIN AND THEIR SPONSORS ARE HEARTLESS TERRORISTS. THIS WILL ALL HELP IN THE GARNERING OF SUPPORT FOR AN ANTI-PAKISTAN RESOLUTION AT UNGA.

5. AS BECAME CLEAR IN MY CONVERSATION WITH YEGORYCHEV, THE STATISTIC OF 300 PRISONERS OF WAR IS MISLEADING. IN REALITY, APPROXIMATELY THAT NUMBER HAVE GONE MISSING. MANY WERE DOUBTLESS KILLED IN ACTION BUT THEIR BODIES NEVER RECOVERED. MANY MORE THAN YEGORYCHEV'S 62 WERE PROBABLY KILLED AFTER CAPTURE BY THE MUJAHEDDIN. THIS IS NOT A WAR IN WHICH MANY PRISONERS ARE TAKEN. THE SOVIET AND REGIME HAVE OFTEN SHOT CAPTURED MUJAHEDDIN OUTRIGHT, AND WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THE MUJAHEDDIN BEHAVED SIMILARLY, AND CLAIMED GREATER JUSTIFICATION: SOVIET PRISONERS ARE A LOGISTICAL LIABILITY: NEW FOUND SOVIET CONCERN FOR THEIR PRISONERS IS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE MASS EXECUTIONS OF HUNDREDS OF MUJAHEDDIN PRISONERS IN PUL-I-CHARKHI GAOL EARLIER THIS YEAR.

6. GIVEN THE ABOVE, I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THERE WERE AS MANY AS 100 SOVIET PRISONERS STILL ALIVE IN MUJAHEDDIN HANDS. SOME MAY BE HELD IN THE TRIBAL AREAS OF PAKISTAN AND OTHERS IN LIBERATED ZONES OF AFGHANISTAN NEAR THE BORDER. WE KNOW THAT YET OTHERS ARE ACTIVELY CO-OPERATING WITH THE RESISTANCE. DESPITE SOVIET ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, I SUSPECT THE LATTER WOULD NOT GET A WARM RECEPTION IF RETURNED HOME. I ACCEPT THAT WE MAY NOT WISH TO OFFER TO RESETTLE SUCH MEN, BUT THEY SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE FORCIBLY RETURNED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN A REPEAT OF THE MASS REPATRIATIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II.

UM ICRC REPRESENTATIVES HAVE VISITED MOST PRISONERS IN KABUL. ONE OF THEIR CONCERNS IS THAT IF THE REGIME CRUMBLES, COMMUNIST HARDLINERS MAY BE TEMPTED TO MASSACRE REMAINING MUJAHEDDIN PRISONERS - THERE ARE AT LEAST 8,000 IN PUL-I-CHARKHI ALONE. TO PREVENT SUCH A TRAGEDY, THE RESISTANCE MAY WELL WISH TO HANG ON TO ANY BARGAINING CHIPS THEY MAY HAVE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, AND I DOUBT IF IT WOULD BE POLITIC FOR HMG TO COUNSEL THEM OTHERWISE. INDEED, I BELIEVE OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO CONCENTRATE ON PREVENTING THE RUSSIANS FROM MAKING POLITICAL CAPITAL OUT OF THEIR SUDDENLY-DISCOVERED COMPASSION FOR THEIR MISSING SOLDIERS, AND TO STRESS THE POOR TREATMENT CAPTURED MUJAHEDDIN RECEIVE. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE DOCUMENTED SOME HORRENDOUS EXAMPLES.

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AFGHANISTAN: CORDOVEZ

### SUMMARY

1. CORDOVEZ EXUDES OPTIMISM ON IMPLEMENTATION OF GENEVA ACCORDS. HE IS READY TO LEAVE ON THE TABLE THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF TECHNOCRATS TO TAKE OVER PEACEFULLY FROM NAJIB AND PREPARE FOR A LOI JIRGA NEXT SPRING, THOUGH HE HAS NOT REVEALED THIS YET IN PUBLIC AND APPRECIATES THE DIFFICULTIES OF OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON SUCH A PLAN.

### DETAIL: CORDOVEZ'S PROGRAMME

2. CORDOVEZ ARRIVED IN ISLAMABAD ON THE EVENING OF 30 JULY. HE LUNCHEDED WITH SATTAR AT THE MFA ON 1 JULY AND AT HIS OWN REQUEST CAME ROUND FOR A LONGISH PRIVATE TALK WITH ME THAT EVENING. HE SAW YAQUB KHAN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 2 JULY (YAQUB HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM CHINA AND NEEDING TO BRIEF THE PRESIDENT IN THE MORNING) AND ZIA ON THE SAME EVENING. ON 3 JULY CORDOVEZ TOLD ME HE WOULD BE GOING TO PESHAWAR PARTLY TO LOOK AT A BORDER CROSSING IN HIS "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS" ROLE AND PARTLY, HE HOPED, TO SEE AFGHANS OF DIFFERENT GROUPS. NEXT WEEK HE WOULD MAKE A VISIT TO SEE NAJIB IN KABUL BUT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE ANY SHUTTLE ON THIS OCCASION.

### IMPLEMENTATION OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS

3. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN HIS OPTIMISTIC FRONT. THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WAS GOING ENTIRELY ACCORDING TO SCHEDULE AS EVEN THE AMERICANS ADMITTED: ANY IDEA THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DELAY THIS WITHDRAWAL OR SUSPEND IT WAS QUITE WRONG. HE DID NOT REALLY UNDERSTAND WHY THE RUSSIANS WERE MAKING SUCH A FUSS ABOUT PAKISTANI BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT HE COULD ONLY IMAGINE IT WAS OUT OF DEFERENCE TO NAJIB. ONLY 10 RUSSIANS HAD BEEN KILLED SINCE 15 APRIL. THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATED TO HIM THAT THEY WERE PRETTY FED UP WITH NAJIB IN MANY WAYS. FOR EXAMPLE THEY HAD NOT WELCOMED HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK (CORDOVEZ HAD HEARD THAT THIS WAS MAINLY THE IDEA OF THE INDIANS).

4. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT CONTRARY TO HIS EXPECTATIONS THE PAKISTANIS HAD TREATED THE UNGOMAP TEAM BADLY AT THE BEGINNING. THE COMPETENT OFFICERS INVOLVED HAD BEEN (AS WE KNOW) VERY FRUSTRATED. NEVERTHELESS THE SITUATION WAS BETTER NOW. HE ASKED IF I REALISED THAT THEY HAD AS YET FOUND NO EXAMPLES OF ARMS BEING TRANSPORTED OVER THE FRONTIER. I CONTENTED MYSELF WITH SAYING THAT THIS DID NOT SURPRISE ME. AS FAR AS THE SYMMETRY AGREEMENT WAS CONCERNED, CORDOVEZ SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THIS APPLIED TO PAKISTAN, THOUGH I POINTED OUT THAT THE US HAD SIGNED ON THE BASIS THAT IT DID. IN CORDOVEZ'S VIEW THE WHOLE SOVIET/AMERICAN AGREEMENT WHICH HAD MADE GENEVA POSSIBLE WAS A FASCINATING STUDY WHICH OUGHT ONE DAY TO BE WRITTEN UP. IN ANY CASE ALL CONCERNED NOW SHOULD KEEP THE WITHDRAWAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE RAILS, AS HE HAD AGREED WITH ZIA. HE TOLD ME, INCIDENTALLY, THAT ZIA HAD KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM PRIVATELY THROUGHOUT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

#### INTERIM GOVERNMENT

5. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT WE HAD NO DOUBT HEARD FROM OUR PEOPLE IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE PROPOSAL WHICH HE WOULD BE PUTTING TO THE VARIOUS PARTIES IN FULFILMENT OF HIS MANDATE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD PROPOSE AN ADMINISTRATION OF TECHNOCRATS, INCLUDING FORMER MINISTERS, TAKEN FROM PEOPLE IN PESHAWAR, PEOPLE LIVING IN KABUL (BUT NOT PDPA MEMBERS) AND PEOPLE IN EXILE, PERHAPS TEN FROM EACH GROUP. HE HAD FOUND THAT WHEN HE HAD STARTED TO DISCUSS NAMES THERE HAD BEEN A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF AGREEMENT AND MANY OF THEM WERE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES. HE WAS PROPOSING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE SET UP ON 1 SEPTEMBER, I.E. SHORTLY AFTER THE 15 AUGUST DATE BY WHICH HALF THE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD HAVE LEFT AFGHANISTAN. HE HAD ARGUED WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT THIS SORT OF NEUTRAL ADMINISTRATION, IF IT TOOK OVER, COULD ENSURE A SMOOTH WITHDRAWAL. (THE RUSSIANS HAD LISTENED BUT MADE NO COMMITMENT.) THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE SIX MONTHS IN WHICH TO ORGANISE A LOI JIRGA WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE IN AFGHANISTAN, NOT NECESSARILY IN KABUL, ON 1 MARCH 1989, BY WHICH TIME ALL THE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD HAVE LEFT. WHEN I ASKED IF AN ELECTION WAS AN ALTERNATIVE, CORDOVEZ DID NOT RULE IT OUT, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT AN ELECTION WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ORGANISE.

6. CORDOVEZ SAID TAHT HE WAS FAIRLY CONVINCED AFTER TALKING TO A WIDE RANGE OF AFGHAN OPINION THAT THE SORT OF PROPOSAL HE HAD IN MIND COULD WORK, THOUGH HE DID NOT EXPECT IT TO BE ACCEPTED NOW: IN PARTICULAR NAJIB WAS LIKELY TO REJECT IT FOR IT HAD LITTLE TO OFFER HIM. IT WOULD BE AWAY OF REMOVING NAJIB WITHOUT FIGHTING. CORDOVEZ NEVERTHELESS HOPED TO LEAVE THE PLAN ON THE TABLE SO THAT IT WOULD

BE READY SHOULD THE TIME BE RIGHT.

7. BEARING IN MIND OUR OWN RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL I MADE NO COMMENT EXCEPT TO SAY THAT A CRUCIAL FACTOR WOULD NO DOUBT BE THE ATTITUDE OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, INFLUENCED, PERHAPS, BY WHETHER OR NOT HEKMATYAR COULD BE PERSUADED TO GO ALONG WITH ANY SUCH IDEA. I WONDERED WHETHER THE FORMER MINISTERS WITH WHOM CORDOVEZ HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WOULD WANT THEIR NAMES TO GO FORWARD IF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT WERE NOT BEHIND THE IDEA. CORDOVEZ ACCEPTED THE LATTER POINT BUT SAID HE HAD FOUND THAT IT WAS NECESSARY WHEN DISCUSSING SUCH OPTIONS TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE ABOUT INDIVIDUALS. (CORDOVEZ HAD IN MIND PEOPLE SUCH AS ABDUS SAMAD HAMED, DR ABDUL WAKIL AND SEIRAT). HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT PRESIDENT ZIA'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE TO HIS PROPOSAL THOUGH HE WOULD SHORTLY FIND OUT. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT SOME OF THE SENIOR ARMY PEOPLE IN KABUL MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SWITCH ALLEGIENCE AWAY FROM NAJIB TO THE SORT OF NEUTRAL ADMINISTRATION HE HAD IN MIND. HE ACCEPTED HOWEVER THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN MIGHT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE THE CONTINUATION OF THE AFGHAN ARMY IN ANYTHING LIKE ITS PRESENT FORM AND THAT THE ARMY AND SIMILAR ORGANISATIONS MIGHT HAVE TO BE DISBANDED OR RECONSTITUTED ON A MORE NEUTRAL BASIS.

8. I MENTIONED THAT SOME PEOPLE WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF EXPANDING THE SO-CALLED AHMED SHAH GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE THE SORT OF PEOPLE CORDOVEZ HAD IN MIND, NOT SO MUCH AS A PEACEFUL TRANSITION FROM THE NAJIB REGIME BUT MORE EFFECTIVELY TO COMBAT IT.

9. CORDOVEZ SAID LITTLE ABOUT HIS VISIT TO IRAN WHERE HE HAD DISCUSSED THE AFGHAN SITUATION FRANKLY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HOWEVER OBSTINATE THE IRANIANS WERE SHOWING THEMSELVES ON THE WAR WITH IRAQ VELAYATI HAD SEEMED SENSIBLE AND REALISTIC ON AFGHANISTAN. HE HAD SAID THAT GENEVA WAS NOW A THING OF THE PAST. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS IN IRAN WERE NOT HAPPY ABOUT THE AHMED SHAH GOVERNMENT PROPOSED IN PESHAWAR BUT WOULD CONSIDER COOPERATING IN ANY STRUCTURE THAT REMOVED NAJIB AND THE PDPA FROM POWER IN KABUL.

#### PUBLIC STATEMENTS

10. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS CORDOVEZ HAS MENTIONED HIS IDEAS FOR A LOI JIRGA UNDER THE GENERAL APPROACH THAT THE AFGHANS NOW, WITH THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DECIDE ABOUT THEIR OWN FUTURE GOVERNMENT BY THEIR OWN TRADITIONAL METHODS. HE HAS NOT HOWEVER REVEALED IN PUBLIC HIS IDEA FOR AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OF TECHNOCRATS TO TAKE OVER FROM NAJIB'S GOVERNMENT AND TO PREPARE THE

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WAY FOR THE LOI JIRGA. CORDOVEZ DID NOT IN THE END MEET MUJAHIDEEN LEADERS DURING HIS VISIT TO THE NWFP ON 3 JULY BUT HE MADE NO COMMENT EXCEPT TO SAY THAT HE WAS READY TO MEET ANYONE WHO COULD HELP TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN PROBLEM. HE WAS ALLOWED TO TALK TO A LARGE GROUP OF AFGHAN REFUGEES AT A CAMP NEAR PESHAWAR WHERE HE EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE THAT THE AFGHANS WOULD SURMOUNT THEIR PROBLEMS SUCCESSFULLY AND AMICABLY. THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE USSR, NOW WANTED PEACE AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND WOULD ACCEPT THE DECISION OF THE AFGHANS. IT WAS UP TO THE AFGHANS TO ORGANISE A PROCESS AND FORM A GOVERNMENT THAT HAD LEGITIMATE SUPPORT.

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
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*From the Private Secretary*

29 June 1988

**AFHANISTAN**

Thank you for your letter of 28 June explaining rather more fully the Foreign Secretary's reasoning in recommending that we should encourage the UN to sponsor a dialogue between the various groups in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister remains sceptical about the advantages of this and certainly would not wish us to encourage it. But she agrees that we need not actively discourage it either.

(C. D. POWELL)

R. N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Ria Lewis*

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1988

*I don't think we need to encourage the dialogue -*

*Dear Charles but I suppose we need not actively discourage it. Agree?*

Afghanistan

*CD 20/6*

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You wrote to me on 17 June to say that the Prime Minister was generally content with the Foreign Secretary's plans for policy on Afghanistan, but that she would prefer us not to advocate an interim government, or encourage a UN-sponsored intra-Afghan dialogue.

The Foreign Secretary does not attach a great deal of importance to the first of these; it is simply one way to arrange a peaceful transfer of power, which has been regularly endorsed by the Twelve. He has no special affection for it.

The Foreign Secretary would however like to explain more fully his reasoning on the matter of the UN-sponsored dialogue. He entirely shares the Prime Minister's view that the Resistance should gain the victory over Najib that they deserve; they should not be expected to come to terms with the PDPA. But he does not believe that there is a contradiction between wholehearted support for the Resistance and support for an intra-Afghan dialogue. He does not see these as real alternatives. The point of the UN effort, for us, is that it counters Najib's pretensions to legitimacy through his version of "national reconciliation". As I said in my letter of 16 June, the dialogue is most unlikely to succeed. But without it Najib may well be able over time to secure some international support for his position. Either way, the fighting seems bound to continue. It would plainly be helpful if this could be seen and presented as the result of the intransigence of the regime, not that of the Resistance.

All four parties to the UN Agreement on Afghanistan (US, USSR, Pakistan and the Kabul regime) have expressed support for Cordovez's continuing efforts. The Russians have thereby implicitly accepted that the present regime is not broadly based. We have not wanted to let them off this hook. We also have reports that one of the key resistance leaders, Abdul Haq, recognises the value of talking to the UN in the search for a solution.

For these reasons the Foreign Secretary hopes that the Prime Minister can agree that we should not discourage UN efforts to promote a dialogue.

*Ross Peirce*

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRIME MINISTER

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17 June 1988

POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN:  
FOREIGN OFFICE LETTER OF 16 JUNE

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The Foreign Secretary seeks approval for the policy objectives set out in the enclosure to the letter.

I broadly agree with the analysis and the objectives, though the list may be rather over-detailed and ambitious. Our immediate objective is to get the Russians out; as this week's JIC assessment concludes, we think they will keep to their programme despite hiccups. Next, we want to make sure the withdrawal is seen for what it is, a defeat in a war of occupation. As part of that, we want to ensure a speedy and spectacular collapse of the PDPA regime; to that end we should press for a truly representative Government and maintain our support for Masood (on the last point you have seen other papers). What precisely will replace Najib we cannot be sure; it is here that a recognition of the limits on our ability to control events is salutary. We may well have an unpleasant fundamentalist Government and a country where internecine fighting continues. I hope this will not happen and that, for example, our help to Masood will show dividends; he should be an influential figure. But in the end this is the Afghans' affair. Future relations with Pakistan, India and Iran are speculative as yet.

Then there is the aid aspect - important presentationally as well as in reality. We need to be prominent and, subject to the proviso in the letter, we should refuse to channel aid through the PDPA regime. We need to emphasise Soviet responsibility for the devastation and call on them to contribute to a multilateral aid programme.

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In short, I am sure you can approve. But we should not try to plan too far ahead; for the present we should concentrate on the great success in our hands; and ensure that poor presentation does not spoil it.

*PC*

PERCY CRADOCK

<sup>2</sup>  
**SECRET**

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bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

17 June 1988

**AFGHANISTAN**

Thank you for your letter of 16 June about our future policy on Afghanistan. The Prime Minister agrees with most of the conclusions which the Foreign Secretary draws for the way ahead with the exception of the proposal that we should support the United Nations effort to promote an intra-Afghan dialogue and advocate an interim government. Having supported the Resistance through the long and difficult years of the conflict, our aim now should be to see them achieve the victory they deserve, even recognising that a fundamentalist government would not be at all easy to deal with. We should not dilute our support by recommending half measures, particularly since, as your letter recognises, our ability to influence the course of events is very limited anyway. The Prime Minister would therefore like to see paragraphs 3(i)(b) and 3(v) dropped from the list of policies/areas of action in the enclosure to your letter.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R.N. Peirce, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SUMMARY

1. FURTHER OBLIQUE WARNING TO THE US IN A PRAVDA EDITORIAL, WHICH CONTINUES THE ATTACK ON PAKISTAN. SOVIET DENIAL THAT TROOP WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE HAS CHANGED.

DETAIL

2. THE FRONT PAGE LEADER IN PRAVDA OF 16 JUNE IS HEADED 'OBSERVING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS'. THE FIRST TWO THIRDS OF THE EDITORIAL DESCRIBE AGAIN HOW THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS CAN PROVIDE 'THE KEY TO THE SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICT SITUATIONS. IN THIS SENSE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN HAS BECOME A SORT OF POLITICAL LABORATORY'. THE EXPERIENCE OF RECENT DECADES AND THE WHOLE HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS AROUND AFGHANISTAN SHOWED THE 'RUINOUSNESS AND FRUITLESSNESS OF ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS BY THE MILITARY PATH. ARMED INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AFFAIRS AND THE CONVERSION OF PAKISTAN INTO A LAUNCHING PAD FOR AGGRESSION HAVE NOT PRODUCED THE RESULTS ON WHICH THE ORGANISERS OF THE UNDECLARED WAR CALCULATED'. THE LEADER THEN HOLDS UP COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AS A POSITIVE EXAMPLE OF THE WAY TO SOLVE REGIONAL CONFLICTS: IT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS THIS CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF UN MACHINERY.

2. WHAT ONE ASSUMES TO BE THE REAL POINT OF THE ARTICLE IS REACHED IN THE LAST FIVE PARAGRAPHS, WHICH ONCE AGAIN DEAL WITH NON-COMPLIANCE WITH GENEVA. AS IS USUAL, THE CORRECT BEHAVIOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ROA IS UNDERLINED. 'HOWEVER, TOGETHER WITH OPTIMISM, THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN EVOKES SERIOUS ANXIETY. IT IS INTOLERABLE WHEN

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ONE SIDE CARRIES OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS, BUT THE OTHER SIDE BREAKS THEM IN THE MOST FLAGRANT MANNER. AND PRECISELY THIS IS TAKING PLACE'. THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT PAKISTAN WAS NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, BUT, AS BEFORE, WAS ALLOWING ITS TERRITORY TO BE USED BY ARMED GROUPS OF THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION. 'IN THESE CONDITIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE POSITION OF WASHINGTON. THE UNITED STATES ARE EVIDENTLY FORGETTING ABOUT THE FACT THAT AN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY RESTS ON THEM, TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THEY ARE GUARANTORS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, GUARANTORS OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, AND ARE OBLIGED IN THIS SPIRIT TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE ON THE PAKISTANI VAUTHORITIES. THERE IS AND CAN BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS, WHICH LAY CLEAR OBLIGATIONS ON THEIR PARTICIPANTS.'

SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL

3. FILE SEPARATELY, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF HAD REBUTTED THROUGH TASS SUGGESTIONS IN THE WESTERN MEDIA THAT THE TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN CHANGED AND THAT SOME UNITS HAD RETURNED TO THE SITES OF THEIR FORMER DEPLOYMENT. PE HAS STATED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL IS CONTINUING IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE TIMETABLE.

COMMENT

4. WHILE THE PRAVDA LEADER DOES NOT BREAK SUBSTANTIALLY NEW GROUND, AN ARTICLE OF THIS STATUS GIVES FURTHER EMPHASIS TO WHAT HAS BECOME ALMOST A DAILY THEME IN THE SOVIET MEDINK AND IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH A SECOND REMINDER WITHIN A FEW DAYS TO THE UNITED STATES OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY



Prime Minister

This seems on the right line. But just as you were right to reject an interim government before, so you Foreign and Commonwealth Office



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would be now. There is no point in our supporting an "intra-Afghan dialogue" or

16 June 1988

*Dear Charles,*

"an interim government". It won't work - as you told Perez de Cuellar. We want the resistance Afghanistan to win. Agree? *CGP*

In your letter of 23 February, you outlined the Prime Minister's views on how we should play our hand during the final round of Geneva negotiations. She felt that, if Pakistani efforts to put together an interim government in Kabul were to fail, we should advise the Pakistanis to sign a Geneva Agreement with the Najib regime anyway in order to ensure that there was no delay in getting the Russians out. This is what happened. The agreement was signed on 14 April; Soviet withdrawal began on 15 May; the Soviet Union is committed to pulling out half its forces by 15 August and the rest by 15 February 1989.

The Foreign Secretary has reached the following conclusions on the way ahead:

- (a) The Russians are going, and will not be stopped. It would make military sense for them to get all their troops out before the onset of winter makes movement difficult. But their withdrawal may be slowed down for genuine logistical reasons (there is some evidence) or in retaliation for the continuation of aid to the resistance (the Russians have threatened this). Soviet allegations about the latter could be used to justify any delays resulting from the former. Nevertheless, when Secretary Shultz was here on 3 June, he told the Foreign Secretary that the US were confident that the Russians would withdraw as planned; it was the reality of the situation not their Geneva obligation which was compelling them to leave.
- (b) The Najib regime will fall; nobody knows when. The key imponderables are the cohesion of the faction-ridden regime and the solidarity of the resistance. But Soviet withdrawal will probably lead to a siege of Kabul. Then it should only be a matter of time.
- (c) However, the end game will be messy; there is no easy route to the replacement of the regime by a truly representative government. There is no formal intra-Afghan dialogue yet in progress although all those party to the UN agreement agreed to encourage Cordovez to make the effort. As the Prime Minister pointed out to Perez de Cuellar in May, such UN efforts are unlikely to succeed. The resistance factions cannot agree on the composition of an alternative government. President Zia,

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seems to be backing the ambitions of the arch-fundamentalist resistance leader, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar; this is disturbing the other resistance leaders and military commanders. There is scope for increased Iranian meddling. The best guess is that, if the fundamentalists do come to power, we shall be faced with a radical Sunni government dominated by military (resistance) commanders. There is no real precedent for this (the Iranian government is, of course, Shia and dominated by the mullahs). It is not easy to predict how such a government would interact with the USSR, Pakistan, Iran - or the West. A resistance victory would not automatically produce a government in Kabul with which we could easily do business, although there is a pragmatic streak in Afghan fundamentalism from which we can derive some comfort.

- (d) These uncertainties, coupled with the devastation of the Afghan infrastructure, the continued fighting and the presence of large numbers of uncleared mines, are delaying the mass return of refugees. Mr Shultz thought however that this hiatus might not last as long as we feared, and suggested that a return movement of some sort was already underway.

The Foreign Secretary believes that we must keep in mind the limits to our real ability to influence the course of events. Nevertheless, we are regarded as well informed observers and our advice is frequently sought by Pakistan; we have played an influential role in the evolution of EC thinking on Afghanistan; we shall be significant aid donors; we shall need to influence Western tactics at the UN General Assembly in November. The Foreign Secretary would welcome therefore the Prime Minister's general endorsement of our objectives, summarised in the attached note.

Our primary aim has been to get the Russians out. We must keep up the political pressure until the last Soviet soldier has crossed the Oxus. Beyond that, our objective is that Afghanistan should no longer be a source of regional instability, but an independent, non-aligned country living at peace with its neighbours.

National self-determination is central. But we should not be afraid to give history a helping hand; the regime installed by the Russians enjoys the unfair advantage of a "sitting tenant". We need to keep up the pressure on it to step down.

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We should support the UN effort to promote an intra-Afghan dialogue. We cannot expect much to come of it, but the lack of a UN strategy could lead to creeping international acquiescence in Najib and leave the Russians room for propaganda manoeuvring.

We should continue to limit the level of our dealings with any Afghan "authorities", Najib or an alternative or successor regime, unless it has passed a genuine test of public opinion. But we should of course stay in touch with a broad spectrum of Afghan opinion apart from the PDPA.

The main leverage we (and our EC partners) have is our aid. We must be careful that it does not help prop up Najib, or any equally unrepresentative alternative regime. But there is a strong moral imperative to base our emergency aid programmes on humanitarian, not political, considerations. If this means helping the needy in some areas controlled by the regime, we shall have to insist that the aid is provided direct, not via the regime. The Russians aim to retain influence through a network of bilateral economic agreements; we should press them to contribute instead to international aid programmes.

There was some discussion along these lines among EC Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg on 13 July. The Japanese are stimulating a similar process within the Group of Seven. All this should help the maintenance of a Western consensus, which will be strained by Soviet accusations of continuing Pakistani and US cross-border military support for the resistance and by internal developments in Pakistan.

It is bound to be a long haul in Afghanistan. Soviet withdrawal will be a triumph for Western firmness and Afghan grit. But things could still go wrong for us, if for example an unrepresentative fundamentalist government were installed, if the Russians were able to extricate themselves with more kudos than they deserve, or if they were able to deflect the blame for post-withdrawal problems on to Pakistani or US cheating.

*Yours ever*  
*R N Peirce*  
(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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Afghanistan - Policy

1. Our aim should be the removal of Afghanistan as a source of regional instability.
2. Our objectives should be:
  - (i) complete Soviet withdrawal in 1988;
  - (ii) the installation of a truly representative government, replacing the existing PDPA regime;
  - (iii) the voluntary return of refugees in safety and honour;
  - (iv) the failure of Soviet attempts to convert a military defeat into a propaganda victory.
3. The policies/areas of action through which we seek to achieve the above objectives should be to:
  - (i) maintain pressure on the Soviet Union and PDPA regime by:
    - (a) identifying the continued presence of Soviet troops and survival of the PDPA regime as the obstacles to Afghan independence and self-determination, and as the main threats to regional stability;
    - (b) advocating an interim government as the best means of facilitating a peaceful transfer of power from the regime to a truly representative government;
    - (c) calling for the full involvement of the resistance in any comprehensive internal political settlement;
    - (d) underlining the Soviet responsibility for the devastation of Afghanistan;
    - (e) refusing to channel aid through the regime (unless there are overwhelming humanitarian reasons for providing essential emergency relief to those in regime controlled areas).
  - (ii) work (eg with the French) for an effective EC position on Afghanistan which reflects our thinking and which would form the basis for effective public diplomacy at the UN later this year;

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- (iii) sustain Western solidarity, particularly in the fact of Soviet claims that Pakistan and the US are in breach of the Geneva agreement, and against the background of a possible hiatus in Pakistan's progress back to democracy;
- (iv) support Pakistan in the fact of Afghan-related threats to its stability;
- (v) encourage a UN sponsored intra-Afghan dialogue;
- (vi) exploit fully the opportunities open to our Mission in Kabul, while maintaining the restrictions on UK relations with the present regime;
- (vii) develop links with key resistance figures including selected internal commanders;
- (viii) contribute financially and with ideas to an international aid programme for Afghanistan, whilst continuing support for the refugees in Pakistan;
- (ix) put pressure on the Soviet Union to contribute to the multi-lateral programme of aid for Afghanistan;
- (x) highlight the vulnerable parts of the Soviet and Kabul regime's position over Afghanistan through a vigorous information policy and at the United Nations.

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*COB*  
*10/6*

Jp 0571

MR POWELL

c Sir Robin Butler

Afghanistan: Soviet Withdrawal

At a briefing in Kabul on 6 June, the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister said that the Soviet withdrawal had been halted because of reported Pakistani violations of the Geneva accord. There have been other unsubstantiated reports that the withdrawal has been halted. Yesterday, however, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gerasimov, said that the USSR was continuing the withdrawal "but cannot ignore violations of the Geneva Accord".

2. I cannot confirm from intelligence which of these statements is correct; but I believe it unlikely that the withdrawal has been completely halted, or if it has, that the halt will be other than of short duration. It is more likely that there has been a temporary halt in withdrawal from Kandahar: and that the Russians by their veiled threats of action in response to Pakistani violations may be laying the ground for a change in the timetable for total withdrawal. They are committed under the Records to pull out half their troops by 15 August (three months after the beginning of the withdrawal). They may have decided that they can justify a more protracted withdrawal, which would of course provide a longer period of support to the Najib regime.


3. We shall be issuing a JIC paper on the state of withdrawal on 16 June.

*PC*  
PERCY CRADOCK

10 June 1988

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**A** The National Archives

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
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YOUR TELNO 375: AFGHANISTAN: POLICY OPTIONS

SUMMARY

1. THE RUSSIANS ARE FIRMLY BENT ON WITHDRAWAL, AND WILL HAVE DECIDED TO LIVE WITH AN AFGHAN FUNDAMENTALIST-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT IF THEY MUST. HOWEVER, SHORT OF MILITARY RE-INTERVENTION THEY WILL TRY TO PROP UP THEIR EXISTING CLIENTS FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THE EC'S POLICY SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO COUNTER THIS.

DETAIL

2. PARAGRAPH 8(E) OF TUR, IN PARTICULAR, RAISES THE QUESTION OF FUTURE SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.

3. ALL RECENT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE SUGGESTS THAT THE POLITBURO HAVE TAKEN A DECISION TO WITHDRAW WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO REGARD AS "IRREVERSIBLE". ARTICLES HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO APPEAR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DECISION TO INVADGE WAS A MISTAKE MADE BY A VERY NARROW GROUP OF LEADERS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE ACCEPTED FRONT-LOADING AND SEEM KEEN NOT ONLY TO REMOVE HALF THEIR TROOPS BY MID-AUGUST, BUT TO WITHDRAW THE ENTIRE FORCE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR IF POSSIBLE. AT THE CRUNCH POINT, SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV APPLIED PRESSURE TO NAJIB TO FALL IN WITH THE GENEVA PACKAGE. DESPITE DELAY AT GENEVA, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RETAINED 15 MAY FOR THE START OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL. I STILL KNOW OF NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DECISION TO CUT THE AFGHAN KNOT, IN GORBACHEV'S WORDS, HAS PROVOKED SERIOUS INTERNAL DIVISIONS.

4. IN TAKING THIS DECISION, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WERE FULLY AWARE THAT THE FUTURE NATURE OF AFGHANISTAN WAS UNPREDICTABLE AND POTENTIALLY HOSTILE. THEY WERE ALSO FULLY AWARE OF THE ISLAMIC FACTOR. THEY HAVE ACCEPTED THEIR FAILURE TO IMPOSE COMMUNISM ON AFGHANISTAN. THEY NO LONGER TALK OF BUILDING SOCIALISM THERE, AND

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OPENLY POINT TO THE RELIGIOUS STRAND IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AS A REALISTIC AND CREDIBLE PLANK. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT IT CANNOT CONTROL THE NATURE OF AFGHANISTAN'S GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY WITHOUT BEING PREPARED TO SUSTAIN OR REVIVE THE MILITARY INTERVENTION. BUT ONCE WITHDRAWAL IS UNDER WAY, THE LAST THING THEY WILL WISH TO DO IS TO GO BACK AGAIN.

5. I WOULD NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO A SINGLE REMARK BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN KABUL. THE SOVIET UNION HAS REASONABLE RELATIONS WITH MANY ISLAMIC STATES, AND WITH ISLAM WITHIN THE SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS INDEED NERVOUS ABOUT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND ITS POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION HERE. BUT IT KNOWS THAT AFGHAN FUNDAMENTALISM IS NOT THE SAME AS IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALISM (I UNDERSTAND THAT THE MAJORITY OF AFGHAN MUSLIMS ARE SUNNI RATHER THAN SHIA) AND THAT AFGHANISTAN DOES NOT HAVE THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, HOMOGENEITY OR POTENTIAL STRENGTH OF IRAN. THERE IS AT PRESENT NO AFGHAN KHOMEINI: AND THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE CALCULATED THAT A FUNDAMENTALIST LEADER IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MOBILISE HIS NATION AS KHOMEINI HAS MOBILISED IRAN. IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE GENUINELY NOT PREPARED TO TOLERATE ANOTHER ISLAMIC STATE ON ITS BORDER, IT WOULD NOT HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW.

6. I THEREFORE JUDGE THE SOVIET CALCULATION TO BE ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) ISLAM (INCLUDING SOME FUNDAMENTALIST ELEMENTS) WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN AFGHAN LIFE.
- (B) FUTURE AFGHAN REGIMES ARE UNLIKELY TO SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO BE ACTIVELY HOSTILE TO THE USSR, AND MAY BE ATTRACTED BY ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
- (C) THROUGH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT BACKED UP WITH MILITARY SUPPLIES AND ADVISERS AND WITH SUBVERSION OF THE OPPOSITION, THE RUSSIANS MAY BE ABLE AT LEAST TO DELAY NAJIB'S FALL, AND PERHAPS TO SUSTAIN HIS CLIENT REGIME'S CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL AND OF CERTAIN OTHER AREAS, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTH, FOR SOME TIME TO COME.
- (D) IF THEY CANNOT ACHIEVE (C), THEY WILL HOPE THERE IS ENOUGH STRENGTH IN THE PRESENT PDPA TO MAKE IT A FACTOR IN A FUTURE AFGHAN REGIME AND A COUNTER-BALANCE TO ELEMENTS HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

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(E) IF CIVIL WAR AND INTERNAL INSTABILITY PREDOMINATE IN AFGHANISTAN OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THE RUSSIANS NEED FEEL NO PARTICULAR THREAT. AFGHANISTAN WILL BE TURNED INWARDS RATHER THAN OUTWARDS. THE INSTABILITY WILL HAVE A WORSE EFFECT ON PAKISTAN AND PERHAPS IRAN THAN ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND MAY BE EXPLOITABLE BY THE LATTER.

(F) IF, ON A WORST CASE ANALYSIS, THE FUNDAMENTALIST ELEMENTS COME OUT ON TOP, THEY WILL NOT BE STRONG ENOUGH TO BECOME A SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS BEEN SURROUNDED BY AWKWARD NEIGHBOURS. IT COULD LIVE WITH A FUNDAMENTALIST-LED AFGHANISTAN.

EC POLICY

7. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE SHOULD DO ALL WE CAN TO PREVENT THE RUSSIANS MAKING A VIRTUE OF THEIR DEFEAT. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TUR) SHOULD SURELY BE TO WORK FOR PEACE AND THE WELFARE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF SUCCESS WILL PRESUMABLY BE THE RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES.

8. I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE EC'S INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT BE OVER-RATED. BUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORM OF GOVERNMENT GENUINELY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BROAD INTERESTS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE SHOULD SURELY CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT PLANK IN THE EC PLATFORM. THIS WOULD BE A POLITICAL COUNTER TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLIENTS. TO THIS END, WE SHOULD TAKE A HARD LINE ON RECOGNITION OF THE PDPA: AND SHOULD PRESS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND CORDOVEZ TO MAKE GENUINE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A NEW GOVERNMENT.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

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MY THREE IPTS: MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ZIA

BEGINS

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIGNATURE OF  
THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN AFGHANISTAN. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR  
MOST KIND AND GENEROUS WORDS.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE CREDIT FOR SECURING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL  
LIES FIRST AND FOREMOST WITH THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WHO HAVE  
RESISTED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION WITH OUTSTANDING COURAGE AND  
TENACITY. BUT THEIR SUCCESS HAS BEEN DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO  
THE STEADFAST SUPPORT WHICH THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM PAKISTAN. I  
WISH TO EXPRESS MY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND TO THE GOVERNMENT  
AND PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN FOR THE RESOLUTION WHICH YOU HAVE  
DISPLAYED OVER THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUE IN THE FACE OF INTENSE  
PRESSURE.

I WELL RECALL OUR MEETING IN RAWALPINDI IN 1981 WHEN YOU MADE IT  
CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE, EVEN THEN, FAILING IN THEIR  
ATTEMPT TO SUBDUDE AFGHANISTAN. IT HAS TAKEN THEM SEVEN MORE  
YEARS TO COME TO TERMS WITH THIS. EVEN IN 1981 THE BURDEN BORNE  
BY PAKISTAN IN SHELTERING THE REFUGEES WAS A HEAVY ONE. SINCE  
THEN THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES HAS INCREASED ENORMOUSLY. I CANNOT  
SPEAK TOO HIGHLY OF PAKISTAN'S GENEROSITY IN PROVIDING A SAFE  
HAVEN FOR THOSE WHO HAVE FLED FROM SOVIET OPPRESSION. I VERY  
MUCH HOPE THAT IT WILL SOON BE POSSIBLE FOR THE REFUGEES TO  
RETURN HOME IN SAFETY AND HONOUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE PLEDGED  
POUNDS 10 MILLION THIS YEAR FOR REFUGEE RELIEF AND RESETTLEMENT.

THE READINESS OF THE REFUGEES TO RETURN WILL DEPEND UPON THE FULL  
RESTORATION OF PEACE. LIKE YOU, I BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL  
REQUIRE THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL  
THE AFGHAN PEOPLE INCLUDING THE RESISTANCE. WE SUPPORT THE

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EFFORTS OF MR CORDOVEZ TO PROMOTE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS AFGHAN GROUPS. IT IS BOUND TO TAKE TIME FOR THE POLITICAL WOUNDS OF AFGHANISTAN TO HEAL. BUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES WILL REMOVE THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PEACE AND LEAD TO CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN CAN FORM A TRULY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

FINALLY, MAY I SAY THAT I HOPE THAT IT WILL INDEED BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO PASS THROUGH LONDON IN JUNE, SO THAT WE CAN HAVE A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES FACE TO FACE.  
WITH WARM REGARDS.  
ENDS

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MR MCLAREN

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. T60810



10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 May 1988

**PAKISTAN: MESSAGES FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT ZIA  
AND PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO**

The Prime Minister has approved replies to the recent messages from President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo in somewhat amended form. I enclose the text which she has agreed. Subject to comments, they may now be despatched.

C. D. POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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50

PRIME MINISTER

Afghanistan

Both President Zia and Prime Minister  
Junejo sent you warm messages on the signing  
of the Geneva Agreement on Afghanistan.

---

Agree to send the attached replies?

ed?

yes no

C D POWELL

29 April 1988

# OUT TELEGRAM


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11	MY FOUR IPTS: MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER
12	1. Please pass the following message to Prime Minister Junejo
13	BEGINS
14	Dear Prime Minister,
15	Thank you for your message on the occasion of the signature
16	of the Geneva accord in Afghanistan. It has been an outstanding
17	achievement to secure the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops
18	from Afghanistan. The credit belongs, above all, to the people
19	of Afghanistan, whose determined resistance to Soviet occupation
20	has been nothing short of magnificent. Pakistan's courage
21	and steadfastness in the face of massive pressure and your
22	generosity in providing help to millions of Afghan refugees
23	have also earned the world's admiration.
24	
25	Soviet withdrawal is essential but only the first step. The
26	next stage must be for the Afghan people to reach an internal
27	political settlement so that they can fully reclaim their
28	freedom and independence and enjoy the benefits of peace.
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I send you and the people of Pakistan my congratulations and warm good wishes.

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
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MY THREE IPTS: MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
1. Please pass the following message to President Zia  
BEGINS  
Dear Mr President,  
Thank you for your message on the occasion of the signature  
of the Geneva accords in Afghanistan. I greatly appreciate  
your most kind and generous words.

I share your view that the credit for securing Soviet withdrawal  
lies first and foremost with the people of Afghanistan who  
have resisted the Soviet occupation with outstanding courage  
and tenacity. But their success has been due in no small  
measure to the steadfast support which they have received  
from Pakistan. I wish to express my congratulations to you  
and to the Government and people of Pakistan for the resolution  
which you have displayed over the Afghanistan issue in the  
face of intense pressure.

I well recall our meeting in Rawalpindi in 1981 when you made  
it clear that the Russians were, even then, failing in their



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 2 attempt to subdue Afghanistan. It has taken them seven more  
 3 years to come to terms with this.  
 4  
 5 Even in 1981 the burden borne by Pakistan in sheltering the  
 6 refugees was a heavy one. Since then the number of refugees  
 7 has increased enormously. I cannot speak too highly of Pakistan's  
 8 generosity in providing a safe haven for those who have fled  
 9 from Soviet oppression. I very much hope that it will soon  
 10 be possible for the refugees to return home in safety and  
 11 honour in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva agreement.  
 12 As you know, we have pledged pounds 10 million this year for  
 13 refugee relief and resettlement.  
 14  
 15 The readiness of the refugees to return will depend upon the  
 16 full restoration of peace. Like you, I believe that this  
 17 will require the formation of a government which is acceptable  
 18 to all the Afghan people including the resistance. We support  
 19 the efforts of Mr Cordovez to promote a dialogue between the  
 20 various Afghan groups. It is bound to take time for the political  
 21 wounds of Afghanistan to heal. But the withdrawal of Soviet  
 22 forces will remove the main obstacle to peace and lead to  
 23 conditions under which the people of Afghanistan can form  
 24 a truly representative government.  
 25  
 26 Finally, may I say that I hope that it will indeed be possible  
 27 for you to pass through London in June, so that we can have  
 28 a chance to discuss these important issues face to face.  
 29 With warm regards.  
 30 ENDS  
 31  
 32 HOWE  
 33  
 34 YYYY

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*Cm.*

PRIME MINISTER

Afghanistan

Both President Zia and Prime Minister  
Junejo sent you warm messages on the signing  
of the Geneva Agreement on Afghanistan.

Agree to send the attached replies?

C D POWELL


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	9	
	10	MY THREE IPTS: MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER
	11	1. Please pass the following message to President Zia
	12	BEGINS
	13	Dear Mr President,
	14	Thank you for your message on the occasion of the signature
	15	of the Geneva accords in Afghanistan. I greatly appreciate
	16	your most kind and generous words.
	17	
	18	I share your view that the credit for securing Soviet withdrawal
	19	lies first and foremost with the people of Afghanistan who
	20	have resisted the Soviet occupation with outstanding courage
	21	and tenacity. But their success has been due in no small
	22	measure to the steadfast support which they have received
	23	from Pakistan. I wish to express my congratulations to you
	24	and to the Government and people of Pakistan for the resolution
	25	which you have displayed over the Afghanistan issue in the
///	26	face of intense pressure.
//	27	
/	28	I well recall our meeting in Rawalpindi in 1981 when you made
	29	it clear that the Russians were, even then, failing in their



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
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8 INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA, KABUL  
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11 MY FOUR IPTS: MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
12 1. Please pass the following message to Prime Minister Junejo  
13 BEGINS  
14 Dear Prime Minister,  
15 Thank you for your message on the occasion of the signature  
16 of the Geneva accord in Afghanistan. It has been an outstanding  
17 achievement to secure the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops  
18 from Afghanistan. The credit belongs, above all, to the people  
19 of Afghanistan, whose determined resistance to Soviet occupation  
20 has been nothing short of magnificent. Pakistan's courage  
21 and steadfastness in the face of massive pressure and your  
22 generosity in providing help to millions of Afghan refugees  
23 have also earned the world's admiration.  
24  
25 Soviet withdrawal is essential but only the first step. The  
26 next stage must be for the Afghan people to reach an internal  
27 political settlement so that they can fully reclaim their  
28 freedom and independence and enjoy the benefits of peace.  
29



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1988

Dear Charles

OAD 29/4.

Hop

Messages to the Prime Minister from President Zia and  
Prime Minister Junejo

Thank you for your letter of 14 April enclosing the above messages to the Prime Minister. I attach telegrams to Islamabad incorporating draft replies.

The reply to President Zia is the more substantive since his message touches on the questions of a broad-based government in Afghanistan and on a possible aid programme. The Foreign Secretary considers that the reply should reiterate our support for a comprehensive political settlement and for a government in Afghanistan that truly represents the Afghan people. It also refers to our support for an international aid programme and to the £10 million we have pledged this year, if such a programme can be organised.

The reply to Prime Minister Junejo confines itself to a tribute to Pakistan's stance and a hope that Afghans will soon be able to return to a genuinely independent and free Afghanistan.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street

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AFGHANISTAN

Situation pt 8


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11	MY 2 IPTS: MESSAGES TO THE PRIME MINISTER
12	1. Following is text of message from Prime Minister Junejo to
13	the Prime Minister.
14	BEGINS
15	Your Excellency,
16	The Geneva agreements being signed today, provide for the
17	withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. Their
18	implementation will lead to the restoration of the sovereignty
19	and independence of Afghanistan and pave the way for the free
20	exercise of self-determination by the Afghan people and the
21	return of the refugees in safety and honour.
22	Your Excellency will agree that the pride and honour of this
23	historical achievement belongs to the Afghan people who have
24	given monumental sacrifices in their epic struggle for recovery
25	of national sovereignty and freedom. Throughout these difficult
26	years, your government, madam Prime Minister, has been in the
27	front rank of nations that have given staunch and generous
28	support to the Afghan cause. This is a testimony above all to
29	the clarity of your vision and your statesmanship. The British

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2 Foreign Office, with its heritage of knowledge and wisdom, has

3 extended to us very valuable cooperation.

4 On this occasion I want to convey to your Excellency, the

5 Government and people of the United Kingdom our abiding gratitude

6 for the generous assistance and staunch support your country has

7 extended to Pakistan thereby enhancing our ability to promote

8 respect for the rights of the Afghan nation. In the process we

9 have together strengthened the principles indispensable to the

10 maintenance of international peace and security and contributed

11 to defusing world tensions. Please accept, Excellency, the

12 assurances of my highest consideration.

13 ENDS

14

15 HOWE

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18 YYYY

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22 ~~UND~~

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24 PS/LORD GLENARTHUR

25 ~~PS/MR EGGAR~~

26 ~~PS/PDS~~

27 MR GILLMORE

28 MR MCLAREN

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
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1 <<<<  
 2 Your personal example, in support of the Afghan freedom fighters,  
 3 has been a beacon of light for the entire western world, and a  
 4 steadfast source of strength for all Afghans.  
 5 Peace and harmony will not return to Afghanistan until and unless  
 6 a government is formed which is acceptable to the Afghan people,  
 7 specially the Mujahideen, who represent the genuine aspirations  
 8 of their people. We are glad that Mr Cordovez has pledged to  
 9 initiate efforts to promote a broad-based government in  
 10 Afghanistan. This would encourage the early return of the 5  
 11 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere, and  
 12 enable the people of Afghanistan to exercise their right to  
 13 self-determination.  
 14 As we await early Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, our  
 15 attention must inevitably turn to the monumental task of  
 16 repatriating and re-settling the Afghan refugees and re-building  
 17 their devastated country. I am confident that the United Kingdom  
 18 will, through the appropriate avenues, play a leading role in the  
 19 process of Afghanistan's economic reconstruction.  
 20 At this historic moment, I wish to convey to you my deep  
 21 gratitude and appreciation for all that you and the British  
 22 Government have done in the service of Afghanistan's freedom and  
 23 for the restoration of peace and stability in our region. Our  
 24 long and fruitful cooperation over the past year is an example of  
 25 what can be jointly achieved by nations when they stand firm in  
 26 the defence of principles and justice.  
 27 I pray for your health, happiness and long life and for ever  
 28 greater progress and prosperity of the people of the United  
 29 Kingdom.  
 30 ENDS  
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INFO PRIORITY KABUL, ISLAMABAD

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AFGHANISTAN: BRIEFING OF NAC BY U S DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PECK

SUMMARY

1. PECK REPORTS ON GENEVA AGREEMENT. GIVES DETAILED INFORMATION ON SITUATION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN. OPTIMISTIC ON PROSPECTS FOR DEFEAT OF KABUL REGIME AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

DETAIL

2. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PECK BRIEFED THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL TODAY (15 APRIL) ON THE GENEVA ACCORDS. HE BEGAN BY NOTING THAT IT WAS NOT DIPLOMACY ALONE WHICH HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE AGREEMENT, BUT RATHER THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE, PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE AND THE REFUGEES, AND THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY GENERALLY. A DIFFICULT PERIOD OF IMPLEMENTATION WAS NOW IN PROSPECT, WHICH WOULD BE CRITICAL FOR THE AREA.

GENEVA ACCORDS

3. PECK OUTLINED THE FOUR INSTRUMENTS. ON THE U S/USSR DECLARATION OF GUARANTEES HE OBSERVED THAT 'GUARANTEES' WAS A MISNOMER. THE WORD APPEARED ONLY IN THE TITLE OF THE DOCUMENT. THE U S AND USSR HAD ENTERED INTO OBLIGATIONS ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THEIR OWN BEHAVIOUR: TO REFRAIN FROM INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND TO RESPECT THE COMMITMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

SYMMETRY

4. PECK REVIEWED THE GENEVA NEGOTIATING HISTORY. IT WAS ONLY IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS, WHEN IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE COMMITTED TO AN AGREEMENT, THAT THE U S HAD BEGUN TO EXAMINE THE BASIC DRAFT UNDERTAKINGS SERIOUSLY. IT HAD BECOME APPARENT THAT THESE CONTAINED A SERIOUS FLAW, GIVING POLITICAL AND MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO KABUL. WHILE THE U S HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT WITHOUT THE SOVIET PRESENCE THE KABUL REGIME COULD NOT LONG SURVIVE,

PAGE 1  
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CONTINUED ACCESS TO SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOLLOWING A CUT OFF OF AID TO THE RESISTANCE COULD HAVE PROLONGED THE CONFLICT UNNECESSARILY. PAKISTAN AND THE U S HAD THEREFORE SET OUT TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, PAKISTAN BY EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON A BROAD-BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THIS HAD REGRETTABLY NOT PROVED POSSIBLE SINCE NEITHER THE RESISTANCE NOR THE REGIME WERE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE.

5. THE U S HAD THEREFORE EMPHASISED THE SECOND TRACK (SYMMETRY), ASSERTING THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TWO GUARANTORS MUST BE BALANCED. AT THE WASHINGTON MINISTERIAL THE U S HAD PROPOSED NEGATIVE SYMMETRY (IE SUSPENSION OF SUPPLIES DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND FOR A FURTHER THREE MONTHS THEREAFTER). THIS HAD PROVED UNACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS. THE U S HAD SUBSEQUENTLY RECONSIDERED AND PROPOSED THAT THE U S WOULD SIMPLY ASSERT UNILATERALLY THAT IT RETAINED THE RIGHT TO SUPPLY THE RESISTANCE. THE U S HAD EMPHASISED TO THE RUSSIANS THAT IT WAS CONFIDENT OF ITS ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY THE RESISTANCE, BUT WOULD PREFER BOTH SUPERPOWERS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. SHULTZ SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE U S WAS PREPARED TO SIGN THE GENEVA ACCORD UNDER THAT UNDERSTANDING. PECK EMPHASISED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED A FORMAL AGREEMENT (THIS HAD BEEN EVIDENT IN SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT GENEVA) BUT HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD TO A SETTLEMENT ON THIS BASIS.

#### DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND

6. PECK SAID THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF THE IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING ON SYMMETRY WOULD NOT LEAVE THE RESISTANCE AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE U S EXPECTED THAT THE SUPERIOR STRENGTH OF THE RESISTANCE WOULD QUICKLY ASSERT ITSELF. FIGHTING WOULD CONTINUE. THE RESISTANCE WOULD MOVE DEEPER INTO AFGHANISTAN AND OVER TIME WOULD PREVAIL. ESTIMATES OF HOW LONG THE KABUL REGIME COULD SURVIVE VARIED. THE U S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DOUBTED THAT IT COULD LAST LONG: IT MIGHT EVEN FALL BEFORE THE LAST SOVIET TROOPS LEFT.

#### SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

7. PECK NOTED THAT WHILE THE FORMAL PERIOD FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WAS 9 MONTHS, SHEVARDNADZE HAD INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE OUT BY THE END OF 1988. SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HIN GENEVA HAD BEEN HINTING WITHDRAWAL COULD BE EVEN FASTER, PERHAPS COMPLETED WITHIN 6 MONTHS. THE DEPARTING SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN KABUL AND ALONG THE ROAD TO THE SOVIET BORDER.

#### REFUGEES

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8. PECK CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH A REFERENCE TO THE REFUGEES. THERE MIGHT BE A TOTAL OF 6 MILLION (2 1/2 MILLION IN PAKISTAN, 1-2 MILLION IN IRAN AND 2 MILLION INTERNAL REFUGEES). THEIR RETURN WOULD REQUIRE A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EFFORT. THE UNHCR WOULD PLAY THE MAJOR ROLE. THE U S HAD URGED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL CO-ORDINATOR, AS FOR ETHIOPIA, WHO WOULD CALL A DONORS CONFERENCE TO TAKE MATTERS FORWARD.

9. IN SUBSEQUENT DEBATE HANSEN (FRG) DREW ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT BY THE TWELVE. HIS AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE AGREEMENT VERY IMPORTANT FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN GENERAL. HE NOTED THAT AFTER 1979 THERE HAD BEEN FEARS ABOUT LONGER RANGE GEOSTRATEGIC SOVIET OBJECTIVES, (INCLUDING ACCESS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN). WHAT WAS THE U S ASSESSMENT NOW? PECK SAID THAT THE DEBATE ON SOVIET MOTIVATION FOR THE ORIGINAL INVASION COULD PROBABLY NEVER BE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY, BUT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A FACT IN THE REGION, LIMITING SOVIET ABILITY TO BRING DIRECT MILITARY PRESSURE TO BEAR IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT. AT THE SAME TIME IN STRATEGIC TERMS AFGHANISTAN WAS (RELATIVELY) UNIMPORTANT. IRAN, ON THE CONTRARY, WAS: IT MIGHT BE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REASSESSED THEIR GAINS AND LOSSES AND THAT CURRENT SOVIET POLICY REFLECTED A MORE REALISTIC JUDGEMENT OF WHERE SOVIET LONG TERM INTERESTS LAY. FOR SOME TIME THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN SEEKING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

10. HANSEN ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS REALLY INTENDED TO STOP SUPPLIES TO THE KABUL REGIME. PECK REPLIED THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INDEED PREPARING TO SUSPEND MILITARY SUPPLIES. RECENT MASSIVE DELIVERIES HAD BEEN NOTED IN ANTICIPATION OF 15 MAY. HE ADDED IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NETHERLANDS) THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAD ALSO BEEN A SERIES OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL SOVIET REPUBLICS AND NORTHERN AFGHAN PROVINCES. ADDITIONAL PROMISES HAD PROBABLY ALSO BEEN MADE TO KABUL IN TASHKENT.

11. BERG (NORWAY) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES SUBSCRIBED TO THE MAIN TERMS OF THE TWELVE'S DECLARATION. ON AID, NORWAY HAD PROVIDED VERY LARGE AMOUNTS INSIDE PAKISTAN. HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD NOW BE PREPARED TO DO THE SAME INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES OUGHT TO BE MANAGED IN AN ORDERLY MANNER. HE ASKED FOR U S VIEWS. PECK SAID THAT THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES WAS LIKELY TO BE EXTENDED AND INFLUENCED BY SEASONAL FACTORS, NOT LEAST THE NEED TO PLANT A SPRING WHEAT CROP IN APRIL FOR JULY HARVESTING. THE LIKELIHOOD WAS THAT MANY WOULD REMAIN WHERE THEY WERE FOR THE PRESENT BEFORE STARTING TO RETURN.

WITH REGARD TO PROVISION OF AID THE RESISTANCE HAD LIMITED BUT NOT NEGLIGIBLE ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES. IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN HOW THESE COULD BE USED. THE U S HAD EMPHASIED TO THE UNHCR THAT IT SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH REPRESENTATIVE AFGHAN INSTITUTIONS, NOT WITH THE REGIME. THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS FOOD. THE SITUATION HAD BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE FAILURE OF THE PAKISTANI WHEAT CROP. OTHER PRIORITIES WERE ANIMAL FEED, DRAFT ANIMALS, AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS AND, FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD, TRANSPORTATION AND IRRIGATION INFRASTRUCTURE. ANOTHER MAJOR CONSIDERATION WAS MINE CLEARING (PECK ESTIMATED SOME 4-5 MILLION MINES HAD BEEN LAID INSIDE AFGHANISTAN). THE U S HAD RAISED THIS DIRECTLY WITH THE RUSSIANS, SUGGESTING THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT REMOVE THE MINES AS THEY WITHDREW. THIS WAS CLEARLY IN THE SOVIET INTEREST: THE SOVIET IMAGE ABROAD AND SOVIET/AFGHAN RELATIONS GENERALLY WOULD SUFFER IF HUNDREDS OF AFGHANS CONTINUED TO BE MUTILATED.

12. ROBIN (FRANCE) NOTED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD ALSO ISSUED A STATEMENT. THERE WERE STILL SEVERAL INCALCULABLE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION. THE SUCCESS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER MOSCOW HAD TAKEN A POLITICAL DECISION TO ALLOW THE PDPA REGIME TO FALL AND TO WHAT EXTENT NAJIB COULD COUNT ON DIVISION WITHIN THE RESISTANCE. PECK SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT NAJIB WAS A FORMIDABLE LEADER: IF HIS CREDIBILITY HAD NOT BEEN FATALLY UNDERMINED BY ASSOCIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS HE COULD HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE FUTURE. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATED THAT HE WAS PLANNING A 'FORTRESS KABUL' STRATEGY, WITH THE REGIME PREPARING TO FALL BACK ON THE CAPITAL CONCURRENT WITH SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM OUTLYING AREAS, AND TO HOLD A SMALL BUT EASILY DEFENSIBLE AREA AROUND THE CAPITAL. WHILE THE CONSCRIPTED AND DEMORALISED ARMY WERE OF LITTLE USE, OTHER FORCES AT NAJIB'S DISPOSAL - THE 70-80,000 MILITARY POLICE AND THE 20,000 STRONG SECRET POLICE - WOULD GIVE A BETTER ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES. THEY COULD PROBABLY HOLD A SMALL AREA AROUND KABUL FOR SOME TIME. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE RESISTANCE HAD BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN DENYING TERRITORY TO THE REGIME/RUSSIANS BUT NOT IN TAKING AND HOLDING AREAS THEMSELVES. THERE MIGHT THEREFORE BE A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE RESISTANCE HELD THE COUNTRY-SIDE AND NAJIB HELD KABUL. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT A PROVISION AFGHAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED INSIDE AFGHANISTAN BY THE RESISTANCE, PERHAPS IN KANDAHAR, TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. IF SO, THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY SHOULD SUPPORT IT. BUT A MORE LIKELY PROSPECT WAS THE FALL OF KABUL AS MUTINIES, FACTIONAL PDPA FIGHTING AND CREEPING RESISTANCE ENCROACHMENT REDUCED THE REGIME'S ABILITY AND WILL TO DEFEND ITSELF.

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13. I DREW ATTENTION TO YOUR STATEMENT OF 14 APRIL. I NOTED THAT THE GENEVA AGREEMENT WOULD NOT OF COURSE CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE KABUL REGIME. THE UK HAD NO PLANS TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF OUR DEALINGS WITH IT. WE MIGHT RECONSIDER IF THE PDPA REGIME WAS REPLACED BY A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WHOSE INDEPENDENCE COULD NOT BE CONTESTED. BUT IN THE MEANTIME WE HOPED OTHER ALLIES WOULD LIKEWISE REFRAIN FROM UPGRADING RELATIONS WITH THE REGIME PREMATURELY. I NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS, ALTHOUGH FACING A CONSIDERABLE REVERSE, WOULD CLEARLY SEEK TO EXTRACT THE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA BENEFIT FROM THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE TASK FOR THE ALLIES WAS TO ENSURE THAT OUR PUBLICS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DID NOT FORGET THE SOVIET INVASION AND SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEVASTATION OF AFGHANISTAN. THAT SAID, WE STOOD READY TO MAKE A FINANCIAL AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE. I NOTED THAT THE UK HAD DECIDED TO PLEDGE PDS 10M FOR RELIEF AND RESETTLEMENT.

14. I ASKED PECK WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY KIND OF UNDERSTANDING THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE UNMOLESTED. PECK REPLIED THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN NO UNDERSTANDING THAT THE RESISTANCE WOULD DISENGAGE FROM THE RUSSIANS, GORBACHEV HAD PROMISED THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ONCE THEIR WITHDRAWAL BEGAN. DESPITE PROVOCATIVE RESISTANCE THREATS TO ATTACK THE RUSSAINS AS THEY WITHDREW, PECK DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM. THE RESISTANCE WOULD RECEIVE SOME 'VERY CLEAR ADVICE' AS TO THE LACK OF WISDOM OF SUCH A COURSE. THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE HEEDED: PROVIDED THE RUSSIANS DID SUSPEND DELIVERIES TO THE REGIME, WITH THE U S DOING LIKEWISE FOR THE RESISTANCE, THE RESISTANCE WOULD BE LEFT WITH A FINITE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. IT WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE TO WASTE IT ON RUSSIAN TROOPS WHO WERE ALREADY ON THEIR WAY OUT.

15. PECK WAS UPBEAT IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT BETWEEN FUNDAMENTALIST AND MODERATE GROUPS WITHIN THE RESISTANCE. WHILE DIVISIONS WERE CLEARLY EVIDENT IN THE RESISTANCE, THEY WERE NOT CLEAR CUT. IT WAS WRONG TO SPEAK OF 'FUNDAMENTALISTS' VERSUS 'MODERATES'. EVEN THE 'FUNDAMENTALISTS' HAD NO GRUDE AGAINST OUTSIDE FORCES, EXCEPT THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAN (SINCE IRAN HAD NOT SUBSTANTIALLY HELPED THE RESISTANCE). FUTURE IRANIAN MEDDLING IN SUPPORT OF THE RESISTANCE WAS NOT LIKELY: IRAN WAS WHOLLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE GULF WAR. WHILEST THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE A STRUGGLE FOR POWER AMONG RESISTANCE FORCES THIS WOULD NOT CENTRE AROUND THE PESHAWAR PARTIES. THE DECIDING FIGURES WOULD BE THE TEN OR SO REGIONAL COMMANDERS. THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE (MASUD AND ISMAIL KAHN) HAD NEVER LEFT AFGHANISTAN AND WERE REALLY UNKNOWN

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QUANTITIES. THERE WAS NO LOGICAL COMBINATION OF ONE SET OF COMMANDERS AGAINST ANOTHER. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE DEFEAT OF THE PDPA REGIME WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY REMAIN ATOMISTIC. WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGED IN KABUL WOULD BE LARGELY IRRELEVANT AT FIRST, ALTHOUGH FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A LOYA JIRGA OF THE MAIN CHIEFS TO SELECT A LEADERSHIP AND PROMOTE RECONCILIATION. EVOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN WOULD NOT BE LOGICAL OR ORDERLY, BUT NOR WOULD IT BE CHAOTIC OR PARTICULARLY VIOLENT.

16. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONS, PECK SAID THAT THE U S BELIEVED THE RESISTANCE WERE ADEQUATELY EQUIPPED FOR VICTORY. SUCH EQUIPMENT AS THEY ALREADY HAD WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY THAT OBTAINED BY BATTLE OR BY DEFECTIONS. HE REPEATED THE PUBLIC U S LINE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION REMAINED CONFIDENT OF ITS ABILITY TO SUPPLY THE RESISTANCE IF NECESSARY, BUT DID NOT ADDRESS THE MODALITIES.

ALEXANDER

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TO IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

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INFO IMMEDIATE KABUL, NEW DELHI, PARIS, BONN

AFGHANISTAN: VISIT OF PAKISTANI ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER TO LONDON

SUMMARY

1. NOORANI SAID PAKISTAN STILL REGARDED INTERIM GOVERNMENT AS VITAL STAGE ON ROAD TO PEACE. BEST WAY FORWARD WOULD BE FOR CORDOVEZ TO ESTABLISH POST-GENEVA INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE. BUT DE CUELLAR LUKEWARM. PAKISTAN LOOKING TO HER FRIENDS TO PUT PRESSURE ON DE CUELLAR OVER THIS: AND TO RALLY INTERNATIONAL OPINION BEHIND GENEVA AGREEMENT. DESPITE GENEVA PROVISIONS ON NON-INTERFERENCE, PAKISTAN WOULD NOT LEAVE RESISTANCE IN LURCH. PAKISTAN EAGER THAT REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AID SHOULD NOT BE CHANNELLED VIA EXISTING KABUL REGIME.

DETAIL

2. ZAIN NOORANI STOPPED IN LONDON OVERNIGHT 14/15 APRIL ON HIS WAY BACK FROM GENEVA TO ISLAMABAD. HE CALLED ON LORD GLENARTHUR THIS MORNING AT OUR SUGGESTION. DISCUSSION CENTRED ON AFGHANISTAN, ALTHOUGH LORD GLENARTHUR ALSO OFFERED CONDOLENCES OVER THE AMMUNITION DEPOT EXPLOSION, AND BRIEFLY RAISED INDIAN ALLEGATIONS OF PAKISTANI SUPPORT TO SIKH EXTREMISTS (WE ARE REPORTING THIS SEPARATELY).
3. NOORANI SAID THAT THE GENEVA AGREEMENT'S MAIN ADVANTAGE WAS THE FRONT LOADED TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. BUT, WITHOUT PROGRESS ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, FIGHTING WOULD CONTINUE AND THE BULK OF THE REFUGEES WOULD NOT RETURN, ALTHOUGH SOME WOULD TRICKLE BACK TO CONFLICT FREE, RESISTANCE-HELD AREAS.
4. THE PAKISTANIS STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT CORDOVEZ SHOULD PROCEED WITH HIS PRIVATE EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN INTRA-AFGHAN DIALOGUE, POSSIBLY INVOLVING TRI-LATERAL PROXIMITY TALKS BETWEEN THE RESISTANCE, EXILES AND REGIME. ONE PROBLEM WAS THE ATTITUDE OF DE CUELLAR: ON 14 APRIL HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO NOORANI THAT HE WAS NOT HAPPY ABOUT CORDOVEZ CONCERNING HIMSELF WITH INTERIM GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS. NOORANI THREATENED THAT, IN THAT CASE,

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PAKISTAN MIGHT ASK THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR UNGA TO FACILITATE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS DE CUELLAR AGREED TO REFLECT FURTHER. PAKISTAN LOOKED TO THE UN AND OTHER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS TO PUT PRESSURE ON DE CUELLAR OVER THIS ISSUE: AND TO PROMOTE PUBLICLY THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. IF INTERNATIONAL OPINION WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE AGREEMENT, THIS WOULD INCREASE THE CHANCES OF THE SOVIET UNION IMPLEMENTING IT PUNCTILIOUSLY. IT MIGHT ALSO ENCOURAGE THE PDPA AND RESISTANCE TO COMPROMISE.

5. NOORANI WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR COMPROMISE. ALTHOUGH THE RESISTANCE'S REACTION TO THE GENEVA PROCESS HAD HITHERTO BEEN ADVERSE, MANY OF THEIR COMMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR EFFECT. WE SHOULD DISREGARD WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BEFORE 14 APRIL. THE AGREEMENT WAS NOW A FAIT ACCOMPLI. THE PAKISTANIS WOULD NOW WORK HARD TO SELL THE FULL AGREEMENT TO THE RESISTANCE. A WEEK OR TWO'S REFLECTION MIGHT SUBTLY CHANGE RESISTANCE ATTITUDES. THE REGIME MIGHT ALSO BE MORE FLEXIBLE, NOW THAT THEY WERE FACING THE REALITY OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

6. THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR A LOYA JIRGA, PERHAPS TO BE HELD ON THE PAKISTAN-AFGHAN BORDER. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRADITIONAL LOYA JIRGA (TRIBAL LEADERS MEETING AT THE KING'S BEHEST - RATHER LIKE A VICE-REGAL DURBAR) WAS NOT REALLY RELEVANT TO MODERN AFGHANISTAN. IT MIGHT NOT CARRY CONVICTION: MANY OF THE CURRENT RESISTANCE AND PDPA LEADERS WOULD BE EXCLUDED. AND NO ONE KNEW WHO COULD LEGITIMATELY CONVENE IT.

7. NOORANI CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF SYMMETRY OVER ARMS SUPPLIES IMPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW PREPARED TO REGARD THE RESISTANCE AS BEING ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE REGIME. THE US POSITION ON SYMMETRY (MATCHING WHATEVER POLICY THE RUSSIANS ADOPTED OVER ARMS SUPPLIES, WHILST HOPING THAT THE LATTER WOULD OPT FOR RESTRAINT) HAD PUT THE BALL IN THE RUSSIAN COURT. PAKISTAN'S OFFICIAL POSITION WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THAT (AS IN THE PAST) THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW ARMS TO CROSS THEIR BORDER OR THE RESISTANCE TO OPERATE FROM BASES IN PAKISTAN. HOWEVER, NOORANI MADE IT CLEAR PRIVATELY THAT, NOT WITHSTANDING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, THE PAKISTANIS WOULD NOT LEAVE THE RESISTANCE IN THE LURCH.

8. LORD GLENARTHUR EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE MAKING ?10 MILLION AVAILABLE FOR REFUGEE RELIEF/RESETTLEMENT IN THIS FINANCIAL YEAR. HE EMPHASISED THAT WE WANTED TO ENSURE THAT OUR MONEY WAS NOT USED TO SUPPORT PROGRAMMES WHICH BOLSTERED THE REGIME. NOORANI

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SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE UNHCR THAT THEY SHOULD ENSURE THAT ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE REGIME OVER REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT GAVE UNHCR FREE ACCESS THROUGHOUT AFGHANISTAN AND THE RIGHT TO DISTRIBUTE AID DIRECT RATHER THAN VIA THE REGIME. IF UNHCR DEVIATED FROM THIS, PAKISTAN WOULD NOT COOPERATE AND WOULD ENCOURAGE DONORS TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE TO UNHCR AS A CHANNEL FOR FUNDS (EG THE ICRC) 9. LORD GLENARTHUR ASKED IF THERE WERE LIKELY TO BE A SHIFT IN INDIAN POLICY FOLLOWING THE GENEVA AGREEMENT. NOORANI SPOKE CRITICALLY OF INDIAN CLAIMS TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN BY VIRTUE OF THEIR OCCUPATION OF JAMMU - KASHMIR. INDIAN ADVICE TO THE KABUL REGIME OVER THE REFERENCES TO THE BORDER IN THE GENEVA AGREEMENT HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL, AS FAR AS PAKISTAN WAS CONCERNED. PAKISTAN HAD NO OBJECTION TO INDIA SUPPLYING HUMANITARIAN AID TO AFGHAN REFUGEES: OTHERWISE INDIA SHOULD KEEP OUT OF AFGHANISTAN.

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14 April 1988

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL NO. 746 B/88

From the Private Secretary

Subject. CC OPS  
MASTOC

I enclose copies of messages to the Prime Minister from President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo about the signature of the Geneva Agreements on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. I think it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to reply in due course, and I should be grateful for drafts.

Charles Powell

Robert Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

LONDON

April 13, 1988

Excellency,

I have the honour to convey to you the following message from the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo:

BEGINS:

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS BEING SIGNED TODAY, PROVIDE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL LEAD TO THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAVE THE WAY FOR THE FREE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOUR.

YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL AGREE THAT THE PRIDE AND THE HONOUR OF THIS HISTORICAL ACHIEVEMENT BELONGS TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE GIVEN MONUMENTAL SACRIFICES IN THEIR EPIC STRUGGLE FOR RECOVERY OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND FREEDOM. THROUGHOUT THESE DIFFICULT YEARS, YOUR GOVERNMENT, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, HAS BEEN IN THE FRONT RANK OF NATIONS THAT HAVE GIVEN STAUNCH AND GENEROUS SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN CAUSE. THIS IS A TESTIMONY ABOVE ALL TO THE CLARITY OF YOUR VISION AND YOUR STATESMANSHIP. THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, WITH ITS HERITAGE OF KNOWLEDGE AND WISDOM, HAS EXTENDED TO US VERY VALUABLE COOPERATION.

ON THIS OCCASION I WANT TO CONVEY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OUR ABIDING GRATITUDE FOR THE GENEROUS ASSISTANCE AND STAUNCH SUPPORT YOUR COUNTRY HAS EXTENDED TO PAKISTAN THEREBY ENHANCING OUR ABILITY TO PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE AFGHAN NATION. IN THE

CONTD.....P/2.



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN  
LONDON

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PROCESS WE HAVE TOGETHER STRENGTHENED THE  
PRINCIPLES INDISPENSABLE TO THE MAINTENANCE  
OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND  
CONTRIBUTED TO DEFUSING WORLD TENSIONS.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES  
OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ENDS

Let me take this opportunity to convey to  
Your Excellency the assurances of my own highest  
consideration.

*Shaharyar M. Khan*  
( SHAHARYAR M. KHAN )  
Ambassador of Pakistan

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
10, Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1





AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN  
LONDON

April 13, 1988

Excellency,

I have the honour to convey to you  
the following message from the President of Pakistan  
General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq:

Begins:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

THE SIGNING TODAY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON  
AFGHANISTAN WILL BE A HISTORIC MILESTONE IN  
OUR COMMON ENDEAVOUR TO RESTORE FREEDOM AND  
PEACE IN THAT COUNTRY. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL  
FROM AFGHANISTAN WILL BE AN ACHIEVEMENT  
WITHOUT PRECEDENT.

THE PRIDE AND HONOUR OF SECURING THE WITHDRAWAL  
OF THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION BELONG, FIRST  
AND FOREMOST, TO THE VALIANT AFGHAN PEOPLE.  
THEY HAVE GIVEN MONUMENTAL SACRIFICES IN THEIR  
EPIC 'JIHAD' TO RECOVER NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY  
AND FREEDOM. THEY DESERVE THE ADMIRATION AND  
APPRECIATION OF ALL PEOPLES WHO CHERISH LIBERTY  
AND OPPOSE AGGRESSION.

THIS WELCOME OUTCOME IS, TO A LARGE MEASURE, DUE  
TO YOUR PERSONAL COURAGEOUS AND UNFALTERING  
COMMITMENT TO A GREAT CAUSE, AND THE SUBSTANTIAL  
POLITICAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED  
BY THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE HEROIC AFGHAN  
RESISTANCE AND TO PAKISTAN. YOUR PERSONAL EXAMPLE,  
IN SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS, HAS  
BEEN A BEACON OF LIGHT FOR THE ENTIRE WESTERN  
WORLD, AND A STEADFAST SOURCE OF STRENGTH FOR  
ALL AFGHANS.

PEACE AND HARMONY WILL NOT RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN  
UNTIL AND UNLESS A GOVERNMENT IS FORMED WHICH  
IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE, SPECIALLY THE  
MUJAHIDEEN, WHO REPRESENT THE GENUINE ASPIRATIONS  
OF THEIR PEOPLE. WE ARE GLAD THAT MR. CORDOVEZ  
HAS PLEDGED TO INITIATE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A  
BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS WOULD  
ENCOURAGE THE EARLY RETURN OF THE 5 MILLION AFGHAN  
REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, IRAN AND ELSEWHERE, AND  
ENABLE THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO EXERCISE THEIR



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN  
LONDON

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RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

AS WE AWAIT EARLY SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, OUR ATTENTION MUST INEVITABLY TURN TO THE MONUMENTAL TASK OF REPATRIATING AND RE-SETTLING THE AFGHAN REFUGEES AND RE-BUILDING THEIR DEVASTATED COUNTRY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL, THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE AVENUES, PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE PROCESS OF AFGHANISTAN'S ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

AT THIS HISTORIC MOMENT, I WISH TO CONVEY TO YOU MY DEEP GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION FOR ALL THAT YOU AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE DONE IN THE SERVICE OF AFGHANISTAN'S FREEDOM AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN OUR REGION. OUR LONG AND FRUITFUL COOPERATION OVER THE PAST YEARS IS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT CAN BE JOINTLY ACHIEVED BY NATIONS WHEN THEY STAND FIRM IN THE DEFENCE OF PRINCIPLES AND JUSTICE.

I PRAY FOR YOUR HEALTH, HAPPINESS AND LONG LIFE AND FOR EVER GREATER PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM.

Ends

Let me take this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the assurances of my own highest consideration.

*Shaharyar M. Khan*  
( SHAHARYAR M. KHAN )  
Ambassador of Pakistan

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
Prime Minister,  
10, Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1

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OUR TELNO 946: AFGHANISTAN: POSITIVE SYMMETRY  
SUMMARY

1. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NO FORMAL AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON POSITIVE SYMMETRY. BUT THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT SOVIET ASSURANCES, BACKED BY AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS AND OTHER RECORDS, AMOUNT TO A RELIABLE BASIS FOR US SIGNATURE AS GUARANTORS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BROAD CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT.

DETAIL

2. THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON A BRIEFING BY ARMACOST OF WESTERN AMBASSADORS ON 13 APRIL (MINISTER ATTENDED IN MY ABSENCE), AND OTHER RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS IN STATE AND NSC.

3. ARMACOST EMPHASIZED THAT US AND PAKISTANI INSISTENCE ON SYMMETRY OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS HAS NOT BEEN A LAST-MINUTE ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON THE SOVIET UNION, AS ALLEGED BY THE RUSSIANS AND IN SOME MEDIA REPORTS. THE ISSUE AT STAKE, SECURING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL ON ACCEPTABLE AND BALANCED TERMS, HAS REMAINED THE SAME THROUGHOUT. THE ISSUE OF FUTURE SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY TO KABUL ONLY CAME TO CENTRE STAGE AFTER THE FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND ON DETAILED TERMS FOR AFGHAN NEUTRALITY. REPEATED SOVIET STATEMENTS THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE THE MODEL FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS ONLY REINFORCED THE NEED TO INSIST ON BALANCE AND SYMMETRY IN THE OVERALL AFGHANISTAN AGREEMENT.

4. THE POSITION EVENTUALLY REACHED BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION ON POSITIVE SYMMETRY IS NOT ENSHRINED IN ANY ONE FORMULA OR FORMAL AGREEMENT. AFTER RUSSIAN REJECTION OF NEGATIVE SYMMETRY AND OF THE US PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON ARMS SUPPLIES, SHULTZ WROTE TO SHEVARDNADZE ON 30 MARCH. IN THE LETTER, HE SET OUT US TERMS FOR POSITIVE SYMMETRY, STATED THE ASSUMPTION THAT QUOTE THIS WILL NOT PROVE AN OBSTACLE TO SOVIET SIGNATURE AS GUARANTOR UNQUOTE AND REQUESTED A FORMAL SOVIET RESPONSE. THE TERMS USED FOR POSITIVE SYMMETRY WERE THAT THE US INSISTED ON RETAINING THEIR OWN RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE TO PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN: THAT THEY WOULD EXERCISE THAT RIGHT, IF THE SOVIETS

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CONTINUED TO SUPPLY KABUL AFTER THE BEGINNING OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL: AND THAT THE US WOULD RETAIN EFFECTIVE MEANS TO DO SO AS NEEDED.

5. IN HIS REPLY LAST WEEK, SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT EXPLICITLY ACCEPT THE US TERMS IN ANY DETAIL. STATE HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT PASSAGE: QUOTE IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER, WHICH WAS CONSIDERED POSITIVELY, ..... WE CAN AFFIRM WITH YOU OUR MUTUAL READINESS TO BECOME GUARANTORS. UNQUOTE. THERE WAS ALSO A DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE RECORD OF US-SOVIET EXCHANGES AND DISCUSSIONS.

6. THE ADMINISTRATION TOOK THE SHEVARDNADZE LETTER AS FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THEIR POSITION ON SYMMETRY. AT THE VERY LEAST, BEFORE SIGNATURE AT GENEVA THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN OFFERED AND HAD DECLINED A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY TO CONTEST THE US ASSERTION OF THEIR RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE RESISTANCE. AND ON THAT BASIS, TOGETHER WITH THE NEGOTIATING RECORD AND THE MINUTES OF RECENT SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETINGS, THE ADMINISTRATION CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT GROUNDS (WHICH, CRUCIALLY, WOULD BE DEFENSIBLE ON THE HILL) TO AGREE TO SIGN AS GUARANTORS AT GENEVA.

7. BOTH THE ADMINISTRATION AND, IT APPEARS, THE PAKISTANIS HAVE FULLY CONSIDERED THE RISKS OF SOVIET CRITICISM OF PAKISTAN IF CROSS-BOARDER SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE DOES CONTINUE AFTER 15 MAY. STATE TOLD US THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ADMITTED THAT THEY WOULD CRITICISE PAKISTAN IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF SO, THE US AND PAKISTAN WOULD RESPOND IN KIND WITH CRITICISM OF SOVIET SUPPLIES TO KABUL. IT WAS BELIEVED UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD MOVE BEYOND CRITICISM TO ACCUSATIONS THAT PAKISTAN WAS IN BREACH OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT OR TO OTHER ATTEMPTS (EG AT THE UN) TO PUT PAKISTAN IN THE DOCK. THE RUSSIANS WOULD KNOW THAT, IN THAT CASE, THE US AND PAKISTAN WOULD BE ABLE TO PUBLISH THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE EXCHANGES AND THE NEGOTIATING RECORD. EVERYONE WOULD BE REMINDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN AWARE OF US AND PAKISTANI INTENTIONS BEFORE THE GENEVA AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.

8. THE ADMINISTRATION APPEAR TO HAVE PRESERVED BROAD SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR THEIR POSITION. SHULTZ, ARMACOST AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN ENERGETICALLY BRIEFING KEY FIGURES. SENATOR BYRD WHO ENGINEERED THE SENSE OF THE SENATE RESOLUTION ON 29 FEBRUARY CRITICAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY HAS ENDORSED THE PRESENT TERMS FOR US SIGNATURE AT GENEVA. ONLY A VOCIFEROUS RIGHT-WING CAUCUS CONTINUE THEIR ACCUSATIONS OF A SELL-OUT. THEY WERE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO LET OFF STEAM AT A MEETING ON 12 APRIL WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, CARLUCCI, COLIN POWELL AND HOWARD BAKER. BUT THE OPPOSITION OF THIS SMALL MINORITY IS NO LONGER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR, EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR THEIR CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO STIR UP OPPOSITION TO THE

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GENEVA SETTLEMENT AMONG THE RESISTANCE. (US OFFICIALS EXPECT RESISTANCE CRITICISMS TO DIMINISH AS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL ACTUALLY PROCEEDS.)

9. OTHER POINTS OF NOTE IN ARMACOST'S BRIEFING WERE:

I) SOVIET AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW WAS AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT FOR WHICH THE WEST IN GENERAL COULD TAKE CREDIT. (HE PAID DUE TRIBUTE ALSO TO THE RESISTANCE AND THE PAKISTANIS.)

II) SOVIET WITHDRAWAL MIGHT WELL IN THE END BE COMPLETED WITHIN SIX MONTHS FROM 15 MAY, NOT NINE MONTHS AS IN THE AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS HAD THEMSELVES SPOKEN OF COMPLETING WITHDRAWAL WITHIN 1988. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT WELL FURTHER ACCELERATE THEIR DEPARTURE.

III) THOUGH THERE WAS NO UNDERSTANDING TO THIS EFFECT, THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL NOT CONTINUE THEIR MILITARY SUPPLIES TO KABUL BEYOND 15 MAY. THERE WAS AMPLE TIME BEFORE THEN FOR LAST MINUTE SUPPLY. WEAPONS COULD ALSO BE LEFT BEHIND BY SOVIET FORCES. NUMEROUS SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD SAID PRIVATELY THAT LACK OF WEAPONRY WAS NOT THE PDPA'S PROBLEM. AND THE TASHKENT COMMUNIQUE, DESPITE MANY REFERENCES TO ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, HAD BEEN NOTICEABLY SILENT ABOUT MILITARY AID.

IV) THE US WOULD NOW TURN TO THE MAJOR TASKS OF ASSISTING THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND RECONSTRUCTION. IN THESE WE ALL HAD A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY. THE US HAD ASKED THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL CO-ORDINATOR. ONE OF THE CO-ORDINATOR'S FIRST ACTS SHOULD BE TO CALL A DONORS CONFERENCE (SEE UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO MODEV 6).

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OUR TEL NO 223: AFGHANISTAN: PROXIMITY TALKS

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SUMMARY

1. PECK BRIEFS EC HEADS OF MISSION ON OUTCOME OF TALKS.

DETAIL

2. PECK, US OBSERVER, BRIEFED HEADS OF MISSION ON 12 APRIL. THE FOLLOWING NEW POINTS EMERGED:

(A) BOTH THE US AND PAKISTAN WOULD ENTER WRITTEN RESERVATIONS INDICATING NON-RECOGNITION OF PDPA,

(B) THE SIGNING CEROMNY WOULD BE PUBLIC, BUT WAS LIKELY TO BE LIMITED TO THE SIGNATORIES AND PRESS ONLY. PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD EMPHASISE NON-RECOGNITION OF THE KABUL REGIME,

(C) THE US DID NOT KNOW SOVIET INTENTIONS ON CONTINUED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THE CURRENT INTENSIFIED SOVIET RESUPPLY MIGHT SUGGEST THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE THEREAFTER WOULD BE WITHHELD. THE AMERICANS WOULD ONLY RESUPPLY THE RESISTANCE IF THEY HAD EVIDENCE OF SOVIET RESUPPLY TO THE REGIME,

(D) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL INTENDED TO APPOINT CORDOVEZ AS HEAD OF THE UN IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNIMAG). HE WOULD BE BASED IN NEW YORK, SUPPORTED BY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIELD. THE US EXPECTED SOVIET AND AFGHAN ARMY FORCES TO FALL BACK AROUND KABUL AND TO COVER WITHDRAWAL THROUGH THE SALANG TUNNEL. THE CURRENT US ASSESSMENT DID NOT FORESEE THE PDPA LASTING BEYOND THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD,

(E) THE ACCORDS AND MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE MONITORING GROUP WOULD BE PUBLISHED.

3. PECK EMPHASISED THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT A PEACE SETTLEMENT. THE

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AFGHAN RESISTANCE, AS EXPECTED, HAD ALREADY REJECTED IT AND SAID THEY WOULD CONTINUE THE ARMS STRUGGLE FROM AFGHANISTAN. US ADVICE TO RESISTANCE WOULD BE NOT TO PROVOKE SOVIET FORCES DURING WITHDRAWAL.

4. AS PECK UNDERSTOOD IT, THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD LIKE A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORISING HIM TO ESTABLISH THE MONITOING GROUP. THIS WOULD BEST BE HANDLED ON AN INFORMAL BASIS THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MEMBERS.

5. AFGHANISTAN'S NEED FOR CONTINUED IMPORTS OF FOOD AND OTHER ESSENTIALS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT SOVIET ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES CONTINUE. SOVIET UNION HAD SAID PRIVATELY THEY WOULD CONTRIBUTE THROUGH UNHCR, WHICH THE AMERICANS WELCOMED. INITIALLY, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT WELL BE TEMPTED TO CHANNEL AIDD THROUGH THE KABUL REGIME.

6. DESPITE CHANGES IN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT EG, THE APPOINTMENT OF A DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR THE NORTH, PECK THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT GORBACHEV WOULD WISH TO RISK THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY A DE FACTO PARTITION OF AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A CLEAN BREAK.

COMMENT

7. PECK'S BRIEFING WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO CONVINCe THE COMMUNITY ON THE VALUE OF THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, IN GENTLE QUESTIONING, PECK LOOKED UNEASY WHENEVER IT WAS IMPLIED THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE OBLIGATION OF PAKISTAN TO ENSURE NON-INTERFERENCE IN AFGHANISTAN ACROSS ITS BORDERS AND THE RIGHT OF THE US, FACED WITH CONTINUED SOVIET SUPPLY, TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN.

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UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 219: AFGHANISTAN  
SUMMARY

1. US WELCOME CORDOVEZ'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT GENEVA ACCORDS WILL BE SIGNED NEXT WEEK. STILL NO FORMAL RESPONSE FROM THE RUSSIANS ON SYMMETRY. PROVIDED THIS IS POSITIVE, SHULTZ PLANS TO SIGN IN GENEVA.

DETAIL

2. WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF HOWARD BAKER TOLD THE PRESS ON 8 APRIL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE ENCOURAGED BY GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS IN TASHKENT ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BEGINNING ON 15 MAY. HE ADDED QUOTE WE HAVE MADE IT KNOWN THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO AID THE MUJAHADEEN IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE THEIR AID TO THE KABUL GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE. ONCE THE ADMINISTRATION HAD SEEN THE FINAL GENEVA TEXTS AND HEARD THE FORMAL SOVIET RESPONSE ON SYMMETRY, THEY WOULD DECIDE WHETHER ALL THE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET FOR THE US TO PARTICIPATE AS A GUARANTOR OF THE AGREEMENT. 'THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US CONSIDERS THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO BE POSITIVE. WE VIEW THE SITUATION AS HOPEFUL.'

3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BAKER DENIED A REPORT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 8 APRIL THAT THE US AND SOVIET UNION HAD REACHED A PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING TO SUSPEND ALL ARMS DELIVERIES TO AFGHANISTAN FOR A PERIOD OF 9 MONTHS. BAKER ADDED 'IF BOTH SIDES HAD A CUT-OFF OF AID THAT WAS VERIFIABLE, THEN THAT WOULD BE AN OUTCOME WE COULD ACCEPT. BUT AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS RETAIN THE RIGHT AND ARE PROVIDING AID, WE RETAIN THE SAME RIGHT AND WILL PROVIDE AID AS WE FIND IT NECESSARY.'

4. WHITEHEAD CONFIRMED TO ME ON 8 APRIL THAT SHULTZ WAS NOW PLANNING TO FLY TO GENEVA ON 13 APRIL TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. OTHER CONTACTS IN STATE AND NSC TOLD US THAT LATE ON 8 APRIL THE FORMAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE US PROPOSAL ON SYMMETRY HAD NOT YET BEEN RECEIVED. BUT THERE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE US/SOVIET CONTACTS IN MOSCOW, GENEVA AND WASHINGTON, AND THE RUSSIANS WERE SIGNALLING THAT THEY WOULD ACQUIESCE. THEIR FORMAL RESPONSE WAS EXPECTED OVER THE WEEKEND. SHULTZ (BACK FROM THE MIDDLE EAST LATE ON 8 APRIL) WOULD REVIEW THE PACKAGE AND CONSULT THE PRESIDENT. THE US WOULD THEN MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE SYMMETRY POINT

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AND WOULD EXPECT THE RUSSIANS AT THE LEAST NOT TO GAINSAY IT.

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OUR TELNO 909: AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION STILL WAITING FOR FINAL WORD FROM THE RUSSIANS ON SYMMETRY. BUT THEY NOW FORESEE NO SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO EARLY SIGNATURE AT GENEVA. US THINKING ON INITIAL PUBLIC RESPONSE CLOSE TO OUR OWN.

DETAIL

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON 7 APRIL QUOTE

WE HAVE NOTED WITH GREAT INTEREST THE TASS STATEMENT REPORTING ON THE RESULTS OF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S MEETING WITH NAJIBULLAH IN TASHKENT. WE TOO HOPE THAT RAPID PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN CONCLUDING THE GENEVA ACCORDS. OUR POSITION IS CLEAR. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST BE A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS, AN INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES IN SAFETY AND HONOUR.

WE CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO THE CONCEPT OF SYMMETRY AND BALANCED RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AS THE ONLY LOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS ON NON-INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERFERENCE.

HOWEVER, WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON OUR PROPOSAL. UNTIL IT'S RECEIVED, WE MUST RESERVE JUDGMENT AND FURTHER COMMENT ON THE ISSUE. UNQUOTE

3. WE HAVE COMPARED NOTES WITH CONTACTS IN STATE ABOUT THE PUBLIC LINE THEY WOULD TAKE ONCE AGREEMENT AT GENEVA IS CONFIRMED (YOUR TELNOS 294 AND 295 TO ISLAMABAD). STATE SAY THAT THEIR DRAFT PRESS LINE IS STILL EVOLVING. BUT THEY APPEAR TO BE THINKING ALONG VERY MUCH THE SAME LINES AS OURSELVES. THEY TOO INTEND TO CONGRATULATE CORDOVEZ, THE PAKISTANIS AND THE RESISTANCE. THEY WILL ALSO MAKE SOME REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT US/SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE SINCE 1979 BEEN STRAINED BY THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT WITH COMPLETE SOVIET WITH-

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DRAWAL THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS.

4. THE INITIAL US PRESS LINE WILL ALSO NEED TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF SYMMETRY, IF ONLY FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSUMPTION.

5. ON THE OTHER ISSUES RAISED IN YOUR TELNO 294 TO ISLAMABAD, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE WORKING HARD ON BOTH POLICY AND PUBLIC PRESENTATION ASPECTS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IN PARTICULAR, STATE TELL US THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF WORK GOING ON IN THE AREA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION AID, TO FLESH OUT THE POINTS IN THE PAPER HANDED TO US IN LONDON (YOUR TELNO 278 TO ISLAMABAD). THE US WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THIS ONCE THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED. THEY ARE PLANNING TO APPOINT A WHITE HOUSE CO-ORDINATOR TO PULL TOGETHER THE THREADS IN THE US GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO AGREE (YOUR PARA 7) THAT A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA.

6. WE SHALL REPORT ON ANY FURTHER EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN THINKING IN ADVANCE OF PEREZ DE CUELLARS VISIT TO LONDON

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MY TELNO 471 : AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENT ZIA SPEAKS OF IMMINENT  
AGREEMENT

1. IN HIS FORMAL SPEECH TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT TODAY, AN ANNUAL EVENT, PRESIDENT ZIA INCLUDED A MAJOR PASSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD LONG SPOKEN UP FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN AFGHANISTAN. IT WAS IN PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS THAT THE REFUGEES SHOULD HONOURABLY GO BACK TO THEIR COUNTRY. FOR THIS IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE SOVIET TROOPS TO BE WITHDRAWN AND BEFORE THAT FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO TAKE CHARGE IN KABUL. MR GORBACHEV HAD NOW DECIDED THAT SOVIET TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO A MODERATE TIMESCALE, PHASING AND UN MONITORING.

2. THE LATEST ISSUE THAT HAD ARISEN WAS THAT OF FAIR TREATMENT IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO BOTH SIDES, IE. SYMMETRY. THIS WAS AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. HE COULD TELL THE JOINT SESSION THAT FROM UNOFFICIAL SOURCES HE HAD HEARD THAT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT HAD NOW BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED BY WHICH THERE WOULD BE A BALANCE IN THE SUPPORT EACH SIDE GAVE TO ITS ALLIES. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO AGREED THAT MR CORDOVEZ IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO WORK OUT THE COMPOSITION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS A POSITIVE STEP.

3. PAKISTAN HAD REFUSED TO BE RUSHED BY THE PROPOSED 15 MARCH DEADLINE BUT NOW THE GENEVA ACCORDS WERE GOING TO BE SIGNED AT ANY MOMENT. (THIS WAS RECEIVED WITH APPROBATION BY THUMPING OF TABLES ROUND THE CHAMBER.) ZIA SAID HE CONGRATULATED THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE GOVERNMENT ON WHAT THEY HAD DONE TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE MUJAHIDEEN ALLIANCE WERE STILL RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THE GENEVA ACCORDS IN WHICH THEY HAD NOT PARTICIPATED, BUT THE AFGHANS WERE CLEVER AND REALISTIC AND HE HOPED THEY WOULD COOPERATE IN THE SETTLEMENT. PAKISTAN WOULD CONTINUE TO STAND BY THE MUJAHIDEEN (THIS WAS PHRASED IN GENERAL TERMS).

5. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PEOPLE WERE ASKING WHETHER THE REFUGEES

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WOULD GO BACK. HE HAD SEEN IN THE EYES OF OLD AND YOUNG THE DESIRE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMETLAND. SOME REFUGEES WERE FRIGHTENED THAT THEY WOULD BE ORDERED BACK, BUT THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT AFGHANS WERE THEIR BROTHERS AND NO-ONE WOULD EVER BE COMPELLED TO GO. THEY WOULD ONLY LEAVE WHEN THEY COULD HONOURABLY AND SAFELY DO SO. IN HIS OWN VIEW THIS MIGHT TAKE FIVE TO SIX MONTHS, IE TWO MONTHS FOR THE INTERVAL BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND THE START OF WITHDRAWAL AND THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW 50 PERCENT OF THEIR OWN FORCES, UNDER THE PHASING ARQNEEMENTS. INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES HAD AGREED TO PROVIDE AID WHEN THE REFUGEES RETURN. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT PAKISTANIS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SHOW MAXIMUM HOSPITALITY TO THEIR AFGHAN GUESTS IN THIS INTERIM PERIOD.

6. PRESIDENT ZIA GAVE CREDIT FOR THE 'MIRACLE' OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM TO HIS GOVERNMENT, TO THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES AND TO PAKISTAN'S FRIENDS OVERSEAS, PARTICULARLY FOR THE WAY THE LATTER HAD HELPED WITH THE UN VOTE. HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, THE US, THE UK AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN DONE IN EUROPE AND THE US TO KEEP THE AFGHAN CAUSE ALIVE.

7. WONDERING TO MYSELF WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN A BIT TOO SOON ABOUT AGREEMENT IN GENEVA I ASKED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, AS HE WAS LEAVING, ABOUT PROSPECTS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT AGREEMENT WAS VIRTUALLY ASSURED AND WOULD BE SETTLED IN ONE OR TWO DAYS, AND SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DISAGREE WITH WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID IN PUBLIC.

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INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, ROME, NEW DELHI, KABUL, RIYADH

KUALA LUMPUR FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY  
UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 215 AND ISLAMABAD TELNO 471: AFGHANISTAN  
SUMMARY

1. ADMINISTRATION SHARE THE VIEW THAT AGREEMENT AT GENEVA MAY NOW BE CLOSE. BUT THEY ARE STILL WAITING FOR A DEFINITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE RUSSIANS TO THE LATEST US PROPOSALS ON SYMMETRY. US DECISION ON WHETHER TO SIGN AT GENEVA, WILL BE TAKEN IN LIGHT OF THAT RESPONSE.  
DETAIL
2. WE HAVE TOUCHED BASE WITH CONTACTS IN THE NSC AND STATE. THEY AGREE THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN RECENT DAYS AND THAT AGREEMENT MAY NOW BE CLOSE. BUT THE US HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED AN UNAMBIGUOUS REPLY FROM THE RUSSIANS TO THEIR LATEST PROPOSALS FOR 'POSITIVE SYMMETRY': I.E. THAT THE RUSSIANS AND US WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING THE KABUL REGIME AND THE RESISTANCE RESPECTIVELY. THERE HAD BEEN SOME POSITIVE SIGNALS FROM THE RUSSIANS, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD REQUIRE A CLEAR UNDERTAKING IN ORDER TO REASSURE CONGRESS. FINAL US DECISIONS WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNTIL A FORMAL SOVIET RESPONSE WAS RECEIVED. THIS COULD COME AS EARLY AS 7 APRIL.
3. WE ASKED ABOUT THE PROBLEM WHICH THE POSITIVE SYMMETRY PROPOSAL WOULD POSE FOR THE PAKISTANIS GIVEN THAT IT COULD INVOLVE THEM VIOLATING THE AGREEMENTS (PARA 4 OF ISLAMABAD TUR). STATE AND THE NSC BOTH EMPHASISED THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAKISTANIS. THE LATTER HAD FOR YEARS ROUTINELY DENIED THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS REACHING THE RESISTANCE FROM PAKISTAN. THE PRIORITY NOW FOR PAKISTAN WAS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IN GENEVA WHICH PROTECTED THEIR KEY INTERESTS. AND THE FACT OF A US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUE OF SUPPLIES TO THE TWO PARTIES WOULD GIVE THEM SOME COVER FROM CHARGES THAT THEY WERE VIOLATING THE AGREEMENTS. THE NSC ADDED THAT THE US HAD IN RECENT WEEKS BEEN ACCELERATING SUPPLIES TO THE RESISTANCE: THERE MIGHT NOT THEREFORE BE A NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT FURTHER SUPPLIES FROM PAKISTAN IN THE CRUCIAL FIRST WEEKS AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED.
4. ON THE BORDER ISSUE, OUR US CONTACTS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS

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IS AN ISSUE FOR PAKISTAN RATHER THAN THE US. STATE TOLD US LATE ON 6 APRIL THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT A FORM OF WORDS HAD NOW BEEN AGREED IN GENEVA.

5. IN SHORT, OUR CONTACTS ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT A DEAL CAN BE TIED UP VERY SOON IN GENEVA. STATE THOUGHT THAT PROVIDED THERE WERE NO MORE HITCHES, SIGNATURE COULD TAKE PLACE AS EARLY AS 13 APRIL. NSC EMPHASISED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO TAKE A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE WHOLE PACKAGE, BUT THAT IF THERE WAS A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE ON SYMETTRY, HE WAS LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE US SHOULD SIGN AT GENEVA.

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## ADVANCE COPY

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FM ISLAMABAD  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 471

OF 060958Z APRIL 88  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, KABUL,  
INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
INFO PRIORITY ROME, PARIS, BONN, NEW DELHI, RIYADH

*mf*

MY TELNO 468: AFGHANISTAN: GENEVA TALKS

### SUMMARY

1. INDICATIONS FROM PAKISTAN AND US EMBASSY SOURCES THAT AGREEMENT AT GENEVA MAY NOW AFTER ALL BE CLOSE. AMERICANS TELL US IT IS LIKELY TO BE BASED ON US/SOVIET AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING THEIR CLIENTS. PAKISTAN WOULD ACCEPT ONUS OF DECIDING WHETHER TO PASS US SUPPLIES TO MAJAHIDEEN.

### DETAIL

2. THE GENEVA LOG-JAM MAY FINALLY BE MOVING. BEFORE GOING WITH MR TEDDY TAYLOR MP TO CALL ON THE PRESIDENT I WAS TOLD MY AZIZ KHAN (ADDITIONAL SECRETARY MFA) HE HAD BEEN UP ALL NIGHT WITH MESSAGES TO AND FROM GENEVA CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE TEXTS TO PROVIDE A COMPROMISE ON THE SYMMETRY POINT AND ALSO ON THE BORDER QUESTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. EVIDENTLY SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN INITIATING NEW PROPOSALS FROM KABUL WHERE HE WOULD BE STAYING UNTIL 7 APRIL.

3. THE PRESIDENT HAD TIME TO SAY ONLY THAT "THINGS WERE NOW AT LAST MOVING", BUT HE SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT SIGNATURE AT GENEVA WAS NOT FAR OFF. AZIZ KHAN EXPECTED PAKISTAN'S TEAM TO RETURN FAIRLY SHORTLY.

4. IN CONFIRMATION A CONTACT WITH THE POLITICAL COUNSELLOR IN THE US EMBASSY (NECESSARILY BRIEF BECAUSE CARLUCCI ARRIVE TODAY) HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE PARTIES ARE VERY CLOSE TO AN AGREEMENT IN GENEVA. THIS HAD BEEN MADE POSSIBLE BY A MODIFICATION OF THE SOVIET STANCE IN THAT THEY (AND THE KABUL REGIME) WERE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT "POSITIVE SYMMETRY", IE BOTH SIDES HAVING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THEIR CLIENTS. THE PAKISTANIS WERE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO TAKE ON THEMSELVES RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECIDING WHETHER US SUPPLIES SHOULD BE PASSED ON TO THE RESISTANCE, EVEN THOUGH THIS COULD MEAN A VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE FIRST INSTRUMENT.

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5. IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE SKETCHY INFORMATION GIVEN US BY THE AMERICANS HERE WHETHER THE US WOULD GUARANTEE THE AGREEMENT THOUGH AZIZ KHAN SEEMED TO THINK THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. ON THE FACE OF IT, THEY SEEM TO BE GUARANTEEING THAT PAKISTAN WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT WHILE KNOWING THAT THE PAKISTANIS INTENDED TO DO SO.

6. ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS, THE PAKISTANIS HAVE PUT FORWARD A VARIETY OF FORMULATIONS TO GET AROUND KABUL'S OBJECTION TO THE PHRASE "INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BORDERS" IN INSTRUMENT I. THE US EXPECT THAT THIS WILL NOT PROVE TO BE AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE.

COMMENT

7. IT LOOKS AS IF, GIVEN THE WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT, ALL SIDES ARE MAKING EFFORTS TO FIND FORMULAS THAT WILL ENABLE GENEVA TEXTS TO BE SIGNED, AND SOVIET WITHDRAWAL TO BE STARTED. WE SHALL NEED TO DISCOVER MORE DETAIL TO DECIDE WHETHER AMBIGUITIES COULD LEAD TO DAMAGING MISUNDERSTANDINGS. I IMAGINE WE CAN TRUST THE US ADMINISTRATION NOT TO RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT GUARANTEES AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL NOT STICK.

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
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INFO PRIORITY KABUL, NEW DELHI, UKMIS NEW YORK

KUALA LUMPUR FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN SECRETARY

MY TELNO 210: AFGHANISTAN: PROXIMITY TALKS

SUMMARY

1. UN, PAKISTAN AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS REGARD SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO KABUL AS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. SYMMETRY ISSUE SOLVED AND BORDER ISSUE NEAR SOLUTION. SIGNATURE POSSIBLE IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

DETAIL

BORDER ISSUE

2. PECK (AMERICAN OBSERVER) TOLD ME LATE ON 5 APRIL THAT MAIN PURPOSE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO KABUL HAD BEEN TO PUT PRESSURE ON NAJIB TO COMPROMISE ON BORDER ISSUE. SHEVARDNADZE HAD LATER TELEPHONED WASHINGTON TO ASK FOR AMERICAN HELP TO PERSUADE PAKISTAN TO BE FLEXIBLE. NAJIB HAD NOW LEFT KABUL WITH SHEVARDNADZE, AND IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD MEET GORBACHEV IN TASHKENT. THIS WOULD PUT STILL MORE PRESSURE ON NAJIB.

3. PAKISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE NOW DISCUSSING POSSIBLE TEXTS IN GENEVA. THE BORDER WAS THE LAST OUTSTANDING ISSUE: SYMMETRY WAS NO LONGER A PROBLEM AS THE SOVIET UNION APPEARED TO HAVE ACQUIESCED IN THE SHULTZ STATEMENT ON NON-RESUMPTION OF SUPPLY BY BOTH SIDES. IN PECK'S WORDS, 'WE HAVE A DEAL'.

4. THIS OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT WAS CONFIRMED BY PICCO (ASSISTANT TO CORDOVEZ) AND BASHIR BABAR (PAKISTAN DEPUTY FOREIGN SECRETARY) ON 6 APRIL. PICCO SAID THAT TWO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE PHRASE 'EXISTING INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES' WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION. PAKISTAN COULD ACCEPT EITHER, AND CORDOVEZ WAS NOW AWAITING A REPLY FROM WAKIL (AFGHANISTAN). BASHIR CONFIRMED THAT PAKISTAN WAS BEING ACCOMODATING ON THE BORDER PROBLEM, WHICH WAS NEAR SOLUTION.

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5. PICCO SAID THE SEPARATE CORDOVEZ STATEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT ETC. WOULD PROBABLY BE WHITTLED DOWN TO VAGUE PHRASES ON THE DESIRABILITY OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND THE NEED FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHANS. HE AND BABAR WERE BOTH SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REAL ROLE FOR CORDOVEZ IN PROMOTING INTER-AFGHAN CONTACT AFTER THE ACCORDS HAD BEEN SIGNED. BABAR SAID THAT THE PREVIOUS PAKISTAN CONCERNS ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT AND PHASING OF WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN MET BY THE RUSSIANS AGREEING TO PROVIDE DETAILS ON DISENGAGEMENT DIRECT TO THE FINNISH COMMANDER OF UN MONITORING TEAM, AND BY SHEVARDNADZE'S INDICATION IN WASHINGTON THAT ITS TROOPS WOULD HAVE LEFT AFGHANISTAN BY THE END OF 1988.

6. PICCO NOTED THAT MODIFICATIONS TO THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENTS, TOGETHER WITH VARIOUS UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER SIGNATURE, MIGHT MAKE IT LESS EFFECTIVE THAN PREVIOUSLY HOPED IN FACILITATING THE PEACEFUL RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE WAS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT A LENGTHY DEBATE IN CONGRESS ON THE AMERICAN DECLARATION ON SYMMETRY. BABAR ALSO COMMENTED ON THE CYNICAL APPROACH OF US CONSERVATIVES, WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUFFER MORE CASUALTIES, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES. WHILE THE CONCEPT OF SYMMETRY OF SUPPLY WOULD BE AT VARIANCE WITH PAKISTAN'S OBLIGATION TO PREVENT MOVEMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO RESISTANCE LEADERS ACROSS ITS FRONTIER, THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD TACITLY AGREED WITH THE US NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO SEND NEW SUPPLIES TO THE PDPA AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE ACCORDS.

7. BABAR DISMISSED THE VIEWS OF RESISTANCE SPOKESMEN IN PESHAWAR AS UNIMPORTANT: IT WAS THE MILITARY COMMANDERS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN WHO REALLY MATTERED. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY THE ACCORDS WOULD HELP CREATE THE RIGHT ATMOSPHERE FOR REFUGEES TO RETURN. IN HIS VIEW, THE SOONER THE ACCORDS WERE SIGNED, THE BETTER.

8. BABAR HIMSELF WAS DUE TO FLY TO TEHRAN LATER ON 6 APRIL, IRAQI MISSILES PERMITTING, TO BRIEF THE IRANIANS ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE TROUBLE. EVEN THE IRANIANS WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND HAD ENOUGH DIFFICULTIES OF THEIR OWN WITHOUT PROVOKING MORE.

COMMENT

9. SIGNATURE OF THE ACCORDS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS NOW POSSIBLE.

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BUT WE HAVE BEEN ON THE VERGE OF SIGNATURE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS,  
AND UNEXPECTED HITCHES CAN STILL OCCUR.

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