

PREM 19 | 3942

CAB ON

PART TWO

MT.

TOP SECRET

NEW FILE COVER

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Security of the Secret Service - Professor Blunt

SECURITY

Terms of Reference of the Home Affairs Select Committee with regard to the Security Service.

PT1: May 1979

PT2: November 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
23.6.87							
<p>PREM 19/3942</p>							

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Works of Art

A basic guide to Capital Taxation and the National Heritage

Office of Arts and Libraries

HMSO 1982 Db 8298789 Pro 18201

Signed

M. W. J.

Date

24/2/18

PREM Records Team

SECRET

B.0960

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

c Mr Turnbull

18(a-c)
Prime Minister
To be aware that AG
wishes to say that he would
not seek to prosecute Cairncross
for spying (he was given official
immunity in 1970) but that
to Security Service would
seek to interview him.

AF 4/2

CAIRNCROSS

You will wish to know that further developments may be imminent in this case, following receipt of the attached letter from Mr Rupert Allason MP to the Attorney General, asking on Cairncross's behalf whether the latter would be prosecuted if he returned to the United Kingdom. Mr Allason's motive in writing is unclear. On a previous occasion he purportedly wrote on behalf of an ex-agent who was subsequently found to be dead. So he could simply be seeking material on his own account for a further book.

2. A reminder of the principal features in the story is attached.

3. The following considerations have weighed with the Attorney General in determining what answer he should give to Mr Allason:

a. In an ordinary case, the prosecuting authorities would be under no obligation to respond to an enquiry of this kind. But Cairncross has been granted immunity previously, and that fact has to be taken into account.

b. Although Cairncross appears uncertain whether immunity had been confined to his specific visits to the UK in the 1970s, the notes of the key interview imply that immunity was not limited in that way.

c. The grant of immunity was in respect of the matters to which Cairncross confessed in 1964. The

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then Attorney General held that that confession was not admissible evidence. Theoretically, there could still be other matters, not disclosed by Cairncross at the time, which would not attract immunity now. The 1964 confessions were in very general terms. Unless anything emerges from Russian archives (not to be excluded), or Cairncross makes a voluntary confession, it is unlikely that admissible evidence against him will emerge.

d. If Cairncross were to come to the United Kingdom, however, the Security Service will try to interview him again.

e. The response to the Allason letter cannot go into the question of immunity. It is likely, however, that any response which implies that Cairncross will not be prosecuted, particularly if he follows that up by coming to this country, will lead to questions why not. At that stage, a statement to Parliament, inter alia correcting the 1979 statement, would become unavoidable.

4. Against this background, the Attorney General proposes to reply as follows:

"You wrote to me on 18 January saying that you had been asked by Mr Cairncross to enquire whether there is any intention to prosecute him if he returns to England. You said that he believed there might have been a written reply on this topic recently.

The only Parliamentary Question relating to Mr Cairncross which I have answered recently concerned the possibility of seeking his extradition from France. I enclose a copy of the Question and Answer.


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I am in the circumstances prepared to say that there is no intention of prosecuting Mr Cairncross in respect of espionage which he has already confessed to the authorities. In the event of his return to this country, however, the authorities would propose to interview him further about his past activities."

5. This formulation has the advantage of being factually correct, while being a deterrent to Cairncross attempting to come to this country. It reflects the real intentions of the Security Service.


6. Subject to any comments, the Attorney General proposes to write in these terms on Thursday, 6 February.



Miss L P NEVILLE-JONES

4 February 1992

RUPERT ALLASON, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

17A(a-c)
Ack.
★ 27 JAN 1992 ★
DEPARTMENT

L.O.D

18th January 1992

see :462
22/1/92

Dear Patrick,

John Cairncross

I have been asked by the above to enquire whether there is any intention to prosecute him if he returns to England.

He believes there may have been a written reply on this topic recently and, if so, he would be grateful for the details.

Yours,
Rupert

Rupert Allason

Rt Hon Patrick Mayhew QC MP

6

SECRET

BACKGROUND NOTE

CAIRNCROSS: KEYPOINTS

- 1936 : Cairncross enters Foreign Office and serves subsequently in the Treasury and wartime intelligence.
- 1951 : Cairncross resigns from the public service, following challenge over a document by him found amongst Burgess's possessions. Decision taken not to prosecute. Cairncross has been out of the United Kingdom for most of the succeeding period.
- 1964 : Cairncross interviewed by the Security Service in the United States, after evidence from a Russian defector pointed to him: he admitted (but not under caution) to disclosures to a succession of Russian handlers during most of his official career.
- 1970 : Cairncross is invited to come to the UK to confront the man who had originally recruited him. The Attorney General agrees that Cairncross can be assured that if he comes to the UK to assist in a particular operation, he will not be prosecuted in respect of the espionage admitted by him. Peter Wright's notes of the interview in question suggest, however, that this assurance was put in more general terms: Cairncross has subsequently appeared uncertain whether that immunity extended to other visits or longer term residence here.
- 1979 : Attorney General tells Parliament that no immunity was offered to anyone other than Blunt in connection with the Burgess and Maclean affair.
- 1980 : Attorney General states in PQ Answer that Cairncross's extradition from Italy (where he then was) would not be possible for OSA offences "even if there were admissible evidence, which there is not".
- 1991 : Attorney General states in answer in PQ Answer that there are no plans to seek Cairncross's extradition from France.

SECRET

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Mr. John Cairncross

Mr. Flynn: To ask the Attorney-General whether Her Majesty's Government has any plans to seek the extradition of Mr. John Cairncross, former Foreign Office civil servant, from France.

The Attorney-General: No.

From: LORD HOME OF THE HIRSEL K.T.



March 31st. 1990.

Jan L. Turnbull

Thank you for your letter.

My memory is pretty faulty, but I wasn't told about Blunt's activities before the knowledge was public property.

Andrew Turnbull

Andrew Turnbull Esq.
10 Downing Street. SW1A 2AA.

Home

SECURITY:

Blunt pt 2



(R)
file to
c: Lord

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

23 March 1990

Sir Robin Butler spoke to you on the issue of when you learned of Anthony Blunt's confession and the offer of immunity from prosecution which was raised in a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Charles Higham. In case Mr. Higham contacts you further on this, you might like to have a copy both of his letter and the reply which has been sent from No.10.

ANDREW TURNBULL

The Rt. Hon. Lord Home of the Hirsel, KT.

Kew



file to
c: Higham

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

23 March 1990

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of 13 March about the stage at which Lord Home was informed of the treason of Anthony Blunt.

I think that you may have misunderstood Lord Home's letter to you. Lord Home has confirmed that he did not know of Blunt's treason at the time when he was Prime Minister and first learned of it at the time of Mrs. Thatcher's statement to Parliament in November 1979. The cause of the misunderstanding may be that Lord Brooke wrote to Lord Home at that time, i.e., in November 1979, to explain the background.

Lord Home, to whom I am copying this letter with yours, has said that, if you are in any remaining doubt about this point, you should feel free to write to him again.

ANDREW TURNBULL

Mr. Charles Higham

Ref. AO90/743

MR TURNBULL

?
~~Sir Anthony Blunt~~

Thank you for your minute of 20 March.

2. The letter on your file is supported by our papers, which indicate that Sir Robert Armstrong spoke to Lord Home on 15 November 1979, when Lord Home said that he had no recollection of being told about Blunt's confession in 1964, and proposed to say that he had not been. Sir Robert Armstrong confirmed that there was no record of his being told either of the offer of immunity from prosecution or of Blunt's confession. The offer of immunity was authorised by the then Attorney General, Sir John Hobson, who would have been entitled to take the view that this was a decision made in his capacity as a law officer, which did not engage collective responsibility. As you know from a more recent case, the Prime Minister made arrangements, following the Blunt announcement, to ensure that she and the Home Secretary would be informed of such cases in the future.

3. I have spoken to Lord Home on the telephone and have confirmed with him that Mr Higham has misunderstood Lord Home's letter to him. Lord Home has repeated that he had never heard of Blunt until 1979. It was at that point that he was informed by Henry Brooke of what had happened - no doubt through the letter referred to on your file.

4. I attach a draft reply which you might send to Mr Higham: I suggest that you then copy the exchange to Lord Home.

R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

22 March 1990

DRAFT LETTER FROM MR TURNBULL TO CHARLES HIGHAM ESQ

The Prime Minister has asked me to reply to your letter of 13 March about the stage at which Lord Home was informed of the treason of Anthony Blunt.

I think that you may have misunderstood Lord Home's letter to you. Lord Home has confirmed that he did not know of Blunt's treason at the time when he was Prime Minister and first learned of it at the time of Mrs Thatcher's statement to Parliament in November 1979. The cause of the misunderstanding may be that Lord Brooke wrote to Lord Home at that time ie in November 1979, to explain the background.

Lord Home, to whom I am copying this letter with yours, has said that, if you are in any remaining doubt about this point, you should feel free to write to him again.

Summary: Blank pt 2

CONFIDENTIAL



C-1 w/p doct (pps) blunt
(man)

(ack)

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

SIR ANTHONY BLUNT

The Prime Minister has received the attached letter from an American writing a book about The Queen seeking clarification on what Lord Home had been told about Blunt. As you will see, he claims that Lord Home has written to him stating that he was advised at the time by the Home Secretary, Mr. Brooke. This conflicts with a letter we have on our files from Lord Brooke to the Prime Minister, which was written shortly after her speech in the debate. In it he says:

"I have written to Alec to explain why in April 1964 I did not bring him in on what was happening about Blunt, and to say how sorry if in my well meant effort not to add to his burdens I may, with hindsight, have exercised my discretion wrongly."

BeH I would be grateful for any advice you can give on this paradox.

ANDREW TURNBULL

20 MARCH 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

Charles Higham
4027 Farmouth Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90027

20/3.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

March 13, 1990

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP
10 Downing Street
London, SW1
England

Dear Prime Minister:

I hesitate to write and ask you if you could spare me just a little of your valuable time with help that only you can give; how many times have you heard that?

I am presently engaged with a co-author in writing about Her Majesty's reign. The book entitled Elizabeth and Philip will be published in the United States by Doubleday and in Great Britain by Sidgwick and Jackson.

You may recall that in November 1979, in answer to a question concerning Professor Anthony Blunt, you stated that Lord Home did not recall that he had been informed of Professor Blunt's treason at the time that Lord Home was Prime Minister.

It was inaccurately reported in the press, based upon your statement, that Lord Home did not know about Professor Blunt at the time, when in fact you had only said that he did not recall the matter. Several books have repeated the error.

Would you be kind enough to advise me of the basis upon which your statement rested?

Lord Home has written to me stating that he was advised at the time, by the Home Secretary, Mr. Brooke.

I am, Prime Minister, with great respect and admiration,

Yours sincerely,

Charles Higham

Charles Higham

CH/vas

RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute (reference A087/1816) of 23 June about the Blunt papers.

The Prime Minister has read it without comment.

N.L. WICKS

24 June 1987

RESTRICTED

pa
Prime Minutes 17

to see; no
problems here.

Ref. A087/1816

MR WICKS

↖ N.L.W

23.6.

The Blunt Papers

You will remember that in January 1987 Mr Tam Dalyell asked the Prime Minister about "the documents relating to national security allegedly bequeathed by the late Anthony Blunt to his brother and held in an institution in London".

2. In your minute of 20 January you said that the Prime Minister would like me to consider further the decision taken in 1985 not to seek access to the Blunt papers deposited at the British Library.

3. When I approached the new Chairman of the British Library, Lord Quinton, I found him more relaxed than his predecessor about giving access to the papers. He did not think that, when considerations of national interest were involved, the conditions under which the papers were held by the British Library should be regarded as precluding their being seen under suitable conditions by the Security Service. The main condition was that there should be no question of public use of or public reference to the papers without consultation with the British Library.

4. The papers have now been read by the Security Service expert on Blunt. They consist of a loose-leaf folder with much typescript and manuscript draft, with a clean carbon copy of the whole thing which runs to 75 pages. There must have been a clean original, of which the carbon is a copy; but the original is not among the papers deposited at the British Library. The original could have been destroyed; but it seems more likely that it is being held somewhere else. We do not know who is

holding it: it could be Blunt's solicitor, Michael Rubinstein; it could be Blunt's surviving brother, Christopher Blunt; or it could be Lady Rothschild, since Blunt did at one time say that he was going to leave a memoir of his life with her.

5. The draft in the British Library is of an autobiographical sketch, which is concerned more with the development of art history than with security matters. There is an account of Blunt's childhood, his schooldays, his time as an undergraduate and as a postgraduate at Cambridge, and his career in art history. On the security side no new revelations emerge. The sketch confirms the main elements of the story as it is already known, including Blunt's recruitment by Burgess in late 1935 to early 1936 to work for the Comintern; Blunt's own recruitment of Michael Straight and Leo Long, and his talent-spotting of John Cairncross; a visit to Russia with his brother Wilfrid in the summer of 1935 (as an art-loving tourist and on the same boat as a group of younger undergraduates including Brian Simon (a known Communist), Michael Straight and Charles Fletcher-Cooke); a visit to Spain with Louis MacNeice in Easter 1936; his advice to Burgess not to accompany Maclean in 1951; and his own decision (against the advice of his KGB contact in London) not to follow Burgess and Maclean to Russia that year. His time in the Security Service from 1940 to 1945 is lightly sketched. The account says that he was recommended for the Security Service by "a friend" (not identified, but we know it to have been Lord Rothschild); and that, after his own flat at the Courtauld Institute was requisitioned for the armed forces in 1940, Lord Rothschild offered him (and two girls, not identified though we know them to have been Tessa Mayor, later Lady Rothschild, and Pat Rawdon-Smith, later Lady Llewelyn-Davies) houseroom at Lord Rothschild's house in Bentinnck Street from which the Rothschilds themselves had moved out. There is no other named reference to the Rothschilds, though some of their actions are described. There is nothing to suggest that either of them was a Russian agent.

6. None of this proves anything: the sketch could have been so written as to make sure that it contained nothing inconsistent with what Blunt knew that the Security Service already knew. Negatively, however, it is useful to know that it contains no unwelcome surprises.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

23 June 1987

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION FROM MR. TAM DALYELL: BLUNT PAPERS

The Prime Minister has considered further the Answer to Mr. Dalyell's Question on which you advised on 15 and 19 January. She decided, in the end, to revert to the original Answer, namely "I have nothing to add to my statement on Mr. Blunt on 21 November 1979, col. 402-410".

However, the Prime Minister would like you to consider further, in consultation with the other departments concerned, the decision taken in 1985 not to seek access to the papers deposited at the British Library. This consideration should include advice on legal powers which would permit Government access to the papers and on what might be said in public to further enquiries on the lines of Mr. Dalyell's recent Question.

N.L.W.

N. L. WICKS

20 January 1987

SECRET

Prime Minister.

SECRET

I think Robert Armstrong's suggestion, "No", is the right answer. Agree?
MEAT 16/1

N 04075

MR MALLABY
MR WOOLLEY
MR ADDISON

Now we have a word. We are not entitled

To conclude the details of the embargo if we don't know. Because I doubted we have any responsibility for a

I attach a draft Answer to an unreachable oral Question from Mr Tam Dalyell, down for reply by the Prime Minister on 20 January.

2. Some papers of the late Anthony Blunt are deposited under embargo at the British Library: the details of the embargo are not known to the Government, but it appears from Mr Dalyell's speech in the Security Services debate on 15 December (see paragraph 3 below) that it covers twenty years from Blunt's death. Blunt's brother, Wilfred, read the papers and told the Security Service after Blunt's death that he did not think they contained much of interest to them. In January 1985, Sir Robert Armstrong discussed with the Security Service, Lord Trend and Sir Frederick Dainton (the Chairman of the British Library Board) the possibility of government access to the papers. It would not be possible to read the papers without the Keeper of Manuscripts at the Library becoming aware that the embargo had been broken, and it was decided not to seek access unless there were some definite reason to believe that the papers included important and relevant material.

3. In the debate on the Security Services on 15 December, Mr Dalyell said he had been informed that a Government Agency had had sight of the papers and he asked if Ministers had been told about the papers and whether the latter had positively identified Sir Roger Hollis as a Soviet spy. He suggested that "the Security Commission, either itself or - better still - as a tribunal under the 1921 Act, should have a sight of what the Government Agencies know" (Official Report, Col 823).

Please consider further
MT
19/1/87
In reaching
five "nothing"
to add reply
with

SECRET

4. Wilfred Blunt has now also died. Although nothing concrete has emerged since January 1985 to cause us to reconsider the decision not to seek access to the paper, the Security Service are reviewing whether in the present climate the decision should be re-examined. Whatever the outcome, the obvious answer to Mr Dalyell's Question is "No", but this would invite a subsequent Question "Why not?". In view of the Prime Minister's statement on Blunt on 21 November 1979 (Cols. 402-410), it would also not be appropriate on this occasion to adopt the standard line about following the precedent set by previous Governments of not commenting on security matters. The best course would be for the Prime Minister to make clear that she has nothing more to say on Blunt than was contained in her November 1979 statement.

B. H. Dinwiddy

B H Dinwiddy

14 January 1987

Att.

I agree that the answer 'No' will provoke further questions. But it is a direct answer to the question. If the Prime Minister is not happy with the attached draft, a possibility designed to pre-empt some of the likely subsequent questions would be "I see no reason to do so."

CM
15.1.87

No answer will prevent Mr Dalyell from asking further questions. I amended the answer 'No'. If the Prime Minister wanted to hint that the Government have not seen the paper, a reference in answer as a Annex B will be possible. RA 15.1.87

JURORS

Mr. Christopher Price accordingly presented a Bill to clarify the law governing the conduct of jurors and former jurors outside the courtroom; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 30 November and printed [Bill 82].

MR. ANTHONY BLUNT

Motion made, and Question proposed.
That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Wakeham.]

Mr. Speaker: Before the debate begins, I should like to make a statement.

As the House knows, it is the general rule that matters which would entail legislation must not be discussed on a motion for the Adjournment. However, as I reminded the House on Monday, I am given discretion under Standing Order No. 16 to permit incidental reference to legislative action when enforcement of the prohibition would unduly restrict discussion. I propose today to exercise this discretion in respect of the general matter of the possible modification of the Official Secrets Act.

In the Prime Minister's written reply to a question by the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter), reference was made to information conveyed to the Palace. I therefore think it wise at this stage to draw the attention of the House to our well-established rule that any references to the Royal Family must be phrased in courteous language and must not reflect upon the conduct of the Sovereign. This does not, however, inhibit the full discussion of any advice which may or may not have been given to Her Majesty.

4.15 pm

The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher): In the early part of last week, Professor Blunt was publicly identified as having been a suspect Soviet agent. This disclosure understandably gave rise to grave concern.

Last Thursday, in response to a priority written question from the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter), I thought it right to confirm that Professor Blunt had indeed been a Soviet agent and to give the House the salient facts. Today we have an opportunity to debate the whole matter. It may be convenient, therefore, if I start by setting out the facts in greater detail.

Professor Blunt has admitted that he was recruited for Russian intelligence when he was at Cambridge before the war. In 1940 he joined the Security Service.

[The Prime Minister.]

To us today it seems extraordinary that a man who had made no secret of his Marxist beliefs could have been accepted for secret work in any part of the public service, let alone the Security Service. But that is with the benefit of hindsight. Perhaps standards were relaxed because it was a time of considerable expansion and recruitment to deal with the wartime tasks of the service, which were directed against Hitler's Germany.

Professor Blunt has said that during his period in the Security Service from 1940 to 1945 he regularly passed to Russian intelligence anything that came his way which would be of interest to it. We do not know exactly what information he passed; we do know, however, to what information he had access by virtue of his duties. There is no doubt that British interests were seriously damaged by his activities. But it is unlikely that British military operations or British lives were put at risk. Further, the story that he jeopardised the lives of secret agents in the Netherlands is without foundation; he was never in the Special Operations Executive.

After he left the Security Service in 1945 and resumed his career as an art historian, Professor Blunt ceased to have access to classified information. He has said that from 1945 to 1951 he passed no information to the Russians.

In May 1951 an investigation which had continued for some years caught up with Donald Maclean. It was Philby who warned Burgess to tell Maclean that he was about to be interrogated. And it was Burgess who used Blunt as a contact with a Soviet controller to help with the arrangements for Maclean's flight to Russia—a journey in which he was joined by Burgess.

Blunt admits that on one occasion between 1951 and 1956 he assisted Philby in contacting Russian intelligence. He has said that he has had no contact with Russian intelligence since then.

The defection of Burgess and Maclean led to intense and prolonged investigations of the extent to which the security and other public services had been infiltrated by Russian intelligence.

At an early stage in these investigations Professor Blunt came under inquiry. This was as a result of information to the effect

that Burgess had been heard in 1937 to say that he was working for a secret branch of the Comintern and that Blunt was one of his sources. Blunt denied this. Nevertheless, he remained under suspicion, and became the subject of intensive investigation. He was interviewed on 11 occasions over the following eight years. He persisted in his denial, and no evidence against him was obtained. Of course, until his confession, the authorities did not know the extent of his involvement with the Russians or the period over which it lasted.

It was early in 1964 that new information was received relating to an earlier period which directly implicated Blunt. I cannot disclose the nature of that information but it was not usable as evidence on which to base a prosecution. In this situation, the security authorities were faced with a difficult choice. They could have decided to wait in the hope that further information which could be used as a basis for prosecuting Blunt would, in due course, be discovered. But the security authorities had already pursued their inquiries for nearly 13 years without obtaining firm evidence against Blunt.

There was no reason to expect or hope that a further wait would be likely to yield evidence of a sort which had eluded them so far. Alternatively, they could have confronted Professor Blunt with the new information to see whether it would break his denial. But Blunt had persisted in his denial at 11 interviews; the security authorities had no reason to suppose that he would do otherwise at a twelfth. If the security authorities had confronted him with the new information, and he still persisted in his denial, their investigation of him would have been no further forward and they might have prejudiced their own position by alerting him to information which he could then use to warn others.

Therefore, they decided to ask the Attorney-General, through the acting Director of Public Prosecutions, to authorise them to offer Blunt immunity from prosecution, if he both confessed and agreed to co-operate in their further investigations.

I should like to pause for a moment on this question of granting immunity, because I think that there may remain some misunderstanding about it. It is not

unusual for the Attorney-General to be asked to authorise immunity from prosecution in return for co-operation in the pursuit of inquiries. It happens from time to time in the course of criminal investigations. Under our constitutional arrangements, the decision is taken by the Attorney-General in his capacity as a Law Officer.

Dennis Canavan (West Stirling-shire): It is one law for them and another law for everybody else.

The Prime Minister: He takes it on the basis of what, in his view, is best in the public interest. He may consult his ministerial colleagues but he is not bound by their advice. The decision is his alone.

In this case, the then Attorney-General, Sir John Hobson, decided that it was in the public interest to offer an immunity from prosecution. In fact, to this day there is no evidence which could be used as a basis for prosecution against Blunt. So the offer of immunity was made. Professor Blunt confessed. Both at the time of his confession and subsequently he has co-operated in the inquiries of the security authorities. He had provided information about Russian intelligence activities and about his association with Burgess, Maclean and Philby.

After the Attorney-General's authority to offer immunity had been given, the Queen's private secretary was invited to a meeting with the permanent secretary at the Home Office and the Director-General of the Security Service. The Queen's private secretary was asked to the meeting because Blunt had, since 1945, held an unpaid appointment in the Royal Household for which he had been awarded a knighthood in the Royal Victorian Order in 1956. At this meeting, the Queen's private secretary was told that Professor Blunt was suspected of having been an agent of Russian intelligence, but that, provided he confessed and co-operated in the inquiries of the security authorities, he would be granted immunity from prosecution.

The Queen's private secretary asked what action the Queen was advised to take if Blunt confessed. He was told that the Queen was advised to take no action. Any action, of course, would have alerted Blunt's former Russian controllers and others who were already under suspicion to the fact that he had

confessed and could well be providing information to our security authorities. After Blunt had been interviewed and had confessed, as I have already described, the Palace duly followed the advice that had already been given.

I turn now to the question of how Ministers were informed. Relations between the Security Service and Ministers are governed by the directive given to the Director-General of the Security Service by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, in 1952. It is reproduced in Lord Denning's report of September 1963. When discussing and endorsing the principles embodied in that directive, Lord Denning said:

"The Head of the Security Service is responsible directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the Prime Minister. . . . The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has any direct responsibility for the Security Service. . . . If the Director-General of the Security Service is in any doubt as to any aspect of his duties—as, for instance, when he gets information about a Minister or a senior public servant indicating that he may be a security risk—he should consult the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary will then have to take responsibility for further action."

I can tell the House that in the case of Blunt the Director-General of the Security Service followed scrupulously the procedures that had been laid down. He had a meeting with the Home Secretary on 2 March 1964, in the course of which he told the Home Secretary about the new information implicating Blunt and he indicated that he would be discussing with the Director of Public Prosecutions how to conduct the interview with Blunt, bearing in mind the Security Service's need to obtain as much intelligence as possible about Soviet penetration.

The Home Secretary drew his attention to the need to inform the Queen's private secretary. On 17 June 1964 a further meeting was held between the Home Secretary, his permanent secretary and the Director-General, in which the Director-General reported that Blunt had admitted spying for the Russians throughout the war when he was serving in the Security Service.

The Home Secretary of the day, now Lord Brooke, who, at first, did not recall being told—[*Interruption.*] At first, he

[The Prime Minister.] did not recall being told, which is quite understandable—[*Interruption*].

Mr. Speaker: Order.

The Prime Minister: I shall start the sentence again. The Home Secretary of the day, now Lord Brooke, who, at first, did not recall being told, has been reminded of these meetings and has, with characteristic integrity, accepted that his memory must have been at fault. [*Interruption.*] There is no more honourable or devoted servant.

It is also clear that when the Attorney-General took his decision to authorise the offer of immunity from prosecution he knew that the Home Secretary had been made aware of the matter.

There was therefore no failure on the part of the Security Service to carry out its duty to inform the Home Secretary of these matters. It was for the Home Secretary to decide whether the Prime Minister should be informed. There is no record on this point. Neither Lord Brooke nor Lord Home can recall discussing the matter.

In the light of these events, I see no need to change the principles governing the relationships between the Security Service and Ministers, as set out in the Denning Report. I think it right, however, that there should be a clear understanding among all those concerned about how we expect those principles to be applied. I have accordingly agreed the following points with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General.

First, the Director-General should report to the Home Secretary if he receives information about a present or former Minister or senior public servant indicating that he may be, or may have been, a security risk, unless circumstances are so exceptional that he judges it necessary to report direct to the Prime Minister.

Secondly, when the Director-General has reported to the Home Secretary, it is the Home Secretary's responsibility to inform the Prime Minister or make sure that the Prime Minister is informed.

Thirdly, if the Attorney-General is asked to authorise a grant of immunity from prosecution in a case involving national security, he should satisfy himself that the Home Secretary is aware

that the request has been made. In cases of especial doubt or difficulty, the Attorney-General or the Home Secretary, or both, may wish to see that the Prime Minister is also aware that the request has been made. The Attorney-General and the Home Secretary should always be informed of the outcome of the offer of immunity. It is the responsibility of the Home Secretary to ensure that the Prime Minister is informed.

So much for the procedures between the Security Services and Ministers. I turn now to another matter. I am advised that since 1967 successive Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries have all been informed about the position on Blunt.

Further, as I indicated in my written reply, the matter was brought to the attention of successive Attorney-Generals in 1972, June 1974 and June 1979. That was to inform them of the immunity that had been given.

Any legal matters will be dealt with by my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General when he replies to the debate.

I have been asked why a day's notice of my intention to reply to a written question was given to Professor Blunt's solicitor. Had there been any question of prosecuting Blunt, of course there would have been no advance notice—and, for that matter, no detailed reply either. Since there was no question of prosecution, there was no question of enabling Blunt to escape justice. His name had already been published, and it was reasonable therefore to tell his solicitor that I was going to give the facts in reply to a question in this House.

Clearly the public services are an attractive target for Soviet penetration, and the Security Service especially so. The service is very conscious of that danger. Indeed, in the light of all that has happened, it should be. Procedures for recruitment, vetting and monitoring members of the public services who have access to classified information have been much extended and improved. Of course nothing can be absolutely proof against penetration. In a democratic society it is always possible that a few will try to use freedom to destroy freedom. We must do everything that we can to prevent them.

May I sum up. First, the procedures under which the Security Service is directly responsible to the Home Secretary were scrupulously followed. After 1967 successive Prime Ministers and Home Secretaries were all informed about this case.

Secondly, the immunity was offered to not to get information on Soviet penetration into the public services. Neither at the time nor since has there been any evidence on which he could be prosecuted. I am advised that a confession obtained as a result of an inducement given would not be admissible as evidence in any prosecution.

Thirdly, the events of this case began well over 40 years ago. Many of the principal figures concerned, some of whom I have mentioned, have long since retired, and some have died. For obvious reasons, it is therefore not possible, and never will be, to establish all the facts accurately.

Mr. William Hamilton (Fife, Central): How many are still living?

The Prime Minister: These are some of the factors that will have to be taken into account in deciding whether there should be an inquiry, a matter on which hon. Members will doubtless wish to express their views.

Fourthly, we have now put beyond doubt the arrangements for reporting to and consulting the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister on security matters.

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover):
rose—

The Prime Minister: May I go straight through? It is a very carefully marshalled statement.

In practice my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I both make a point of keeping in close touch with the Director-General of the Security Service.

Fifthly, it is important not to be so obsessed with yesterday's danger that we fail to detect today's. We know what happened to a very few of that pre-war generation who had Marxist leanings and who betrayed their country. We find it contemptible and repugnant. Our task now is to guard against their counterparts of today.

Finally, the Security Service, by its very nature, has to work in secrecy.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer (Liverpool, Walton): What about the brother of the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery)? The right hon. Lady cannot have it both ways. There were others as well—Marxists.

The Prime Minister: It cannot therefore defend itself in public. That task falls to Ministers. The Government's purpose is to do everything possible to improve the morale and effectiveness of the Security Service, and to do nothing to undermine or weaken it. In that aim I believe that we shall have the support of the House.

4.38 pm

Mr. Merlyn Rees (Leeds, South): One point that has arisen from the Blunt affair is the accountability of the Security Service and what part this House should play. I shall turn to that in a moment, but first I simply observe that this House will be unworthy of playing any part in security matters if today's debate develops into a witch hunt.

The Prime Minister has revealed the names of those who had knowledge of the matter. I make clear my disgust at the sordid activities of the group that have now been revealed. In my view "conscience" is the wrong word to invoke in that respect. However, it would be unworthy of this House to concern itself with political trivia in that context.

I have played a part in security matters over the years and I know that for either side of the House to believe that all the problems are on one side or the other would be a mistake. I shall concern myself with three matters—the events of April 1964, the directive given by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and the way in which that directive works—the House must put its mind to that matter—and the future.

It is clear that the events of 1964 have been clouded by the memories of old men, the deaths of some of the participants and the self-justification offered in recent days.

It may be that the procedures at that time, despite what was on paper afterwards, were not carried out well, but we are concerned with more recent years and the present. That is certainly what I was

recall that he sought to interest Conservative members, including the Chairman of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, in his allegations and to try to get them by various routes to the Prime Minister.

There is a crusading aspect to all this, and although it does not vindicate his subsequent actions it was serious in itself and leads me to remind the Minister that at the very least there ought to be a proper internal mechanism by which an officer who believes that something is seriously wrong can ventilate his grievance. That was one of the issues discussed by the Security Commission and the Prime Minister spoke about it in her statement to Parliament. I gathered from the Home Secretary when he replied to an intervention by me in the debate on 3 December that it is still under discussion and is one of the aspects of the Security Commission report which has not been fully resolved. Something must be done about that.

I see that in the end as linking naturally to some external oversight, because people are likely to have more confidence in an internal inspector-general, or whatever he may be, if he reports, as does the Ombudsman, ultimately to some external or parliamentary body. If there is no internal mechanism, that is yet another reason why people may believe that they have an excuse to go outside. I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Southport (Sir I. Percival) that no one can be allowed to be the sole judge of whether he has sufficient reason to break the confidence which is enjoined upon him in his position as an officer or former officer of the Security Service. He cannot be the sole judge, but if he has no other recourse and nowhere else to go, he is left in a very unsatisfactory position. I speak not only of Wright, but of very many officers who have found themselves in this position—[*Interruption.*]

Sir Ian Percival: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that the officer should be his own judge of when to speak? That really is a slippery slope.

Mr. Beith: Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman was unable to hear me because of the noise behind me. I was agreeing with his statement that no security officer should be the sole judge of whether what is on his conscience or mind should be brought into the public domain. That cannot be right. Therefore, we must look for other mechanisms whereby people can ventilate grievances in a proper manner and feel that their case is being heard.

There are many things we have discussed today to which we will have to return. The Minister of State said in his speech that the public understand perfectly well what is at stake, and that they know and have a basic feeling about what is right and wrong in these matters. That is so, but the public at large also can see the total inconsistency of the position of the Government. The public can see that there is no distinction, as the Government pretend to draw, between someone who publishes a book in his own name, disclosing secrets learnt in his office, and someone who supplies that information, whether for money or not—in this case, it was for money—to another author to be included in a book which is subsequently described as being co-authored by the two individuals. There is no difference, moral or otherwise, in the importance of confidentiality in those two cases.

The Government are right to be concerned about ensuring that the confidentiality of the security services is kept, but they have undermined their case both by their

inconsistency and their consistent failure to recognise what really matters. It is absurd that we should go on pretending that we do not have an intelligence service and for Sir Robert Armstrong to be expected to deny in court that there is such a thing as MI6. But there are things which have to be kept confidential. If the Government were more consistent and offered genuine opportunities for oversight and for the aggrieved officer to raise his grievance in a suitable manner, they would be in a better position to work for the preservation of the confidentiality and day-to-day secrecy on which the security services depend to do their job on our behalf.

6.32 pm

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): First, let me say constructively what I believe should now be done. The Security Commission should be converted into a tribunal of inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921. The Security Commission consists of Lord Griffiths, Sir Anthony Lloyd, the deputy chairman, and Lord Allen of Abbeystead and four others. Therefore, they have the legal firepower and are already in the business of security matters. I have discussed this with two former permanent secretaries of the Home Office and one former permanent secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and believe that it is a sensible proposition.

To save time, I quote the powers. On 23 January 1964, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Prime Minister, in announcing the setting-up of the Security Commission said:

"Exceptionally, the Commission might find that they were unable to make progress without powers to compel evidence. In such a case, Parliament would be asked to pass the necessary Resolution under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, to vest the Commission with the powers of that Act for that particular inquiry. The Commission would then proceed in all respects as a Tribunal of Inquiry." — [*Official Report*, 23 January 1964; Vol. 687, c. 1272-3.]

I am glad that we are not voting tonight, because I would have been uncomfortable about doing so, believing that these matters are very serious and that we must wait until the end of the court case in Australia. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours) for agreeing to this.

The Security Commission or tribunal should discuss certain specific matters. The first of them concerns Anthony Blunt. I do not think it edifying for people like me, or most of us in this generation, to try to pass censorious moral judgments on men when in their late teens or early twenties in Cambridge or elsewhere in the 1930s. The lines between pro-Communism and passionate, and justified, anti-Fascism were blurred. From 1941 to 1945, Russia was on our side. For my part, I will remember Anthony Blunt as an inspiring lecturer who awakened my interest in the French impressionists.

What I am about to say I am perfectly prepared to repeat outside the Chamber. I do not shelter under privilege, but the House of Commons is the right place where a Member of Parliament should make such statements for the first time.

I believe that Anthony Blunt left a collection of documents compiled by himself and that those documents were bequeathed to his brother, whom I have not approached. The condition was that the documents should

[Mr. Tam Dalyell]

not be made public for 20 years. I do not know whether Mr. Blunt's brother has read them. The papers were transferred to an institution in London for safekeeping.

However, I am informed and believe that a Government agency has had a sight of those papers. They revealed to the agency not only who the so-called fifth man was, but many other names and facts. Because the Prime Minister said that there was no proof that Sir Roger Hollis was a Soviet spy—that is before the papers being read, so I am sure that the Hollis statement was made in good faith by the Prime Minister on the basis of knowledge available at the time—it is difficult for the Prime Minister to admit any knowledge of who was a spy at this late stage. I take on board what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot).

This brings me to the subject of burglary. For a Government agency to have read these papers was strictly illegal. Illegal or not, it has now been done. The parallel case is the break-in at Sidgwick and Jackson. That was illegal. That was six weeks before the book "Their Trade is Treachery" was published.

I ask the direct question: have Ministers been told about the documents bequeathed by Anthony Blunt? Have they been told whether knowledge that Hollis was positively identified as being a spy has come from these documents? I am not asking that the documents, which are very personal, should be made available, but I am asking that the Security Commission, either itself or—better still—as a tribunal under the 1921 Act, should have a sight of what the Government agencies know.

I am concerned about ministerial control over house-breaking by state agencies, which is akin to the problem of state telephone tapping. Is there effective ministerial control over breaking into and entering houses? This is a legitimate and important question, unless the House of Commons is told that there was no authorised breaking and entering.

House-breaking is illegal, just as phone tapping is illegal, infringing the right of privacy. A Minister may authorise phone tapping on internal matters. Which Minister is responsible for any rules of breaking into and entering houses, be they private houses or those of publishers? Peter Wright was the senior case officer when Blunt was supposed to have confessed. I understand that it is simply not true that he confessed all. Apparently, there is an affidavit that the Prime Minister misled the Commons on Blunt. Furthermore, parts of Blunt's testimony were kept out. Why? A tribunal should be told. After all, the Prime Minister came in with a great fanfare of trumpets, saying "I am going to get control of the security services", and then did nothing about it. Why have the doubtless good intentions gone astray? As I told him at the Islwyn constituency Labour party Chartist rally in November 1985, I am sure that my right hon. friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnoch), when he becomes Prime Minister, must give his mind to those problems. Does the Blunt testimony reveal who tipped off Burgess and Maclean? The late Colonel Marcus Lipton told me before he died that he believed that Burgess and Maclean had been tipped off by a senior figure of the so-called establishment, who did so out of the kindness of his heart on an old-boy network, and not by a spy or agent. This issue should be clarified by a commission or tribunal.

Another matter to which a commission or tribunal should turn its attention is a letter from Sir Michael Hanley to Wright, which reads:

"The firm is doing well and has passed recent examinations."

Was this a reference to a private inquiry by Sir Robert Armstrong into M15's activities against the Wilson Government? If so, on whose initiative and authority does the Security Service investigate some 30 persons such as Lord Kagan? Was it freelance or part of coherent control, and where was the accountability? What could Peter Wright have meant by using the words "deniable, authorised, illegal" when referring to activity in the Wilson years? It is the opinion of Mr. Richard Morton Taylor, who was in court, that he did not make this up.

The tribunal must consider the Attorney-General's role. Why did it take 10 days for Sir Robert Armstrong to apologise? The apology came 10 days after my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition—this is column 426 of *Hansard* of 27 November—had asked about the Attorney-General's role. Why was the Attorney-General not consulted about Rupert Allason? Why was he not consulted about Chapman Pincher? These are all questions to which there must be sensible answers.

For reasons of time I shall omit other questions that could be asked about the Attorney-General, save for one. The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot say that they have M15 in control and then say at the same time that the Attorney-General did not know. Either the Government are in control—they are indivisible, are not they?—or they are not. When did Sir Robert Armstrong know about "Their Trade is Treachery"? Was it February 1981 or December 1980? How could Mr. Pincher be quoted as saying, "All is well now. All is hunky-dory"? I asked the question of the hon. Member for Stroud (Sir A. Kershaw) about the time in 1984 that he was sending Clive Ponting's letter to me to the Ministry of Defence. He sent another document to Sir Robert Armstrong, which was a dossier from Wright. Why were Her Majesty's Government not as active about the Wright dossier as they were about the Ponting dossier?

It is important that the Labour party is committed to the Cirencester and Tewkesbury amendment of the Bournemouth conference of 1985, when it was promised that we would have some sort of tribunal to which civil servants could go who felt that they had been abused. Did Sir Robert Armstrong hush up the Kershaw note concerning the memorandum from Wright? Were other members of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs told? If so, should a chairman of a Select Committee keep such a matter to himself?

Finally, Mr. Deputy Speaker, it may be within your recollection that I raised with Mr. Speaker the issue of Members' telephones. My hon. Friend the Member for Warley, East (Mr. Faulds) has received a letter which I have cross-checked, which I think should be the property of the House. It reads:

"First of all, let me make it plain that I am not and never have been subject to the Official Secrets Act."

This is an anonymous letter. It continues:

"I will not identify myself because I am apprehensive of the Security Services. For 12 years, from 1968 to 1980, I was associated with the modernisation of the Government's telephone network covering the Whitehall area. The project consisted of eight central branch exchanges, each covering a geographical area of Whitehall, and all included all Government offices and buildings within that area. Each of these CBXs was connected to each other and to the outside

public network via a CBX tandem exchange located in the building known as the North Rotunda under the Department of the Environment at the entrance on Great Peter Street. In this building were located three of the eight CBXs, the others being located around central London. The Palace of Westminster was served by a CBX located in an underground bunker in Storey's Gate, since modernised, I believe.

You will appreciate from the above that the key to the whole network is the CBX tandem access, which would give anyone access to all telephone calls internally and externally, which is open to some 70,000 telephone lines. These included all MPs' telephones, Downing Street and any other telephones serving Government Departments for roughly one square mile around Whitehall. Access to the North Rotunda building is via a door to the right of the Great Peter Street entrance of the Department of the Environment, and required a pass issued by the authorities to visitors, who were allowed to fill in a visitor's pass that had to be handed over on leaving the building. On entering the building one is confronted by a flight of steps, opposite which is a glass-fronted office that is manned at all times by uniformed security officers. Over a period of time, mostly outside normal working hours, a room immediately to the left at the bottom of the steps was installed with extensive and very sophisticated equipment.

One day two severe-looking men turned up at the site and refused to show either identification passes or to fill in a visitor's document. After being refused admission, uniformed security guards received a telephone call instructing them and their colleagues to give all these men access day and night without question. These men and others manned the equipment in this room 24 hours a day. They never spoke or acknowledged normal greetings and access to the room was barred, of course. I cannot remember when this started, having no access to records, but it was a few weeks after MPs received push-button telephones instead of dial telephones. I am sure that this can soon be ascertained.

It soon became accepted by all the Post Office BT staff and the contracting engineers that the only possible purpose for which this equipment could be used was intercepting telephone calls. I am sure that you realise the implications. Imagine the political advantage if you were the Government of the day and you had access to every telephone call made and received by Opposition MPs, every civil servant in Whitehall, not to mention—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): Order. I hope that the extract is about to come to an end. The hon. Gentleman should be making a speech rather than reading a letter.

Mr. Dalyell: I merely say that it is not explained how telephone calls between my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and Australia were intercepted. The answer that Mr. Speaker gave me was to refer the matter to the Prime Minister. Many hon. Members are concerned about what has happened and I believe that the information that came to my hon. Friend the Member for Warley, East rings true.

6.48 pm

Mr. David Winnick (Walsall North): I am sure that the concluding point of my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) should be taken up by the authorities in the House. It is a serious matter which cannot be dismissed out of hand.

The only thing that I would say about the case in Australia, which my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Campbell-Savours) made much of, and rightly so, is that it was a mistake in the first place for the Government to pursue the case. I doubt whether they will win it, and the Government will be left with much egg on their face. The case has done nothing for the reputation of the Cabinet Secretary, who had an embarrassing brief, and to say the least. In the eyes of many in Australia, and perhaps in Britain as well, he made rather an ass of himself.

When the Select Committee on Home Affairs decided to look into the activities of the special branch, a number of witnesses came before the Committee to assure us that there was nothing to worry about. We know that the special branch works closely with the Security Service, and we were told that the work being undertaken by the Security Service and by the special branch was legitimate and that there was no question of anyone being inquired into because of his political views, that political dissent was legitimate, and that there was little to worry about. The majority of the Committee came to the conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to justify a report which stated that the work being undertaken by the special branch was perfectly in order.

Some Labour Members, however, were not convinced. I am sure that much of the work undertaken by the special branch is necessary and justified but many people—certainly many people in the Labour movement—are concerned that some activities carried out by the special branch have little to do with the security of the state.

It was near the end of our inquiry into the special branch that a television film called "M15's Official Secrets" was shown. Some people have said that we should not take too much notice of what Mr. Wright told the court—that he has exaggerated, and so on. In the television film, Cathy Massiter, a former official of M15, stated that a number of people and organisations were the subject of inquiries because of their political views. They are people and organisations who in no way can be described as trying to undermine our democratic institutions.

One of the organisations mentioned by Miss Massiter was the National Council for Civil Liberties. She said, as I remarked in an intervention in the speech of the Minister, that anyone who worked for the NCCL, anyone on the executive council and anyone who is active enough to be a branch secretary of that organisation is subject to inquiry, and a file is kept by M15. One of the people who was the subject of an investigation—and certainly a file by M15—was, apparently, my hon. Friend the Member for Peckham (Ms. Harman) when she was the legal officer of that organisation. Is it suggested that my hon. Friend wants to undermine our democratic institutions and that she wants to turn this country into a Soviet republic? Therefore, inevitably, an argument that those activities are going on must give rise to a great deal of anxiety and undermine our confidence in the Security Service.

I wish to give another illustration. When a journalist of some 30 years resigned as the editor of the CND journal—he had fallen out, as people tend to do in various organisations—he was subject to several questions from the special branch. It wanted to know who lived with whom, and what was the leadership style of the then general secretary of the CND. What is the purpose of such questions? If it is claimed by Ministers, including the Prime Minister, that it is perfectly legitimate to argue that one can be in favour of nuclear disarmament without being a security risk, why are those questions asked? They must give rise to much concern.

From reports in the press and from what Miss Cathy Massiter states, I understand that in M15 there is what is known as an F branch. It is sub-divided into other branches. For example, F2 investigates trade unions, F7 investigates various political groups, including Members of Parliament—that is interesting to know—teachers,

file

JA188J

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Mr. Cloke

Cabinet Office

Your minute ref A086/2844 of 9 October.

I have looked through all the papers we can find covering the events mentioned in your minute.

As regards the Blunt affair, Sir Robert Armstrong saw papers on this in February and March 1983 (when they were shown to Mr. Edward Heath) and in July 1984 (when they were shown to Lord Wilson).

We can find no record on our files of Mr. Peter Wright speaking or writing to Sir Robert about the succession of Jones to Hanley as DGSS. I will get Mr. Wicks to check the papers in his cupboard when he returns from Bournemouth.

We cannot find any papers relating to Hollis earlier than 1977. This seems curious to me, and I am having a further search made.

C. D. POWELL

9 October 1986

OM

Ref. A086/2844

MR POWELL

You queried with me on the telephone why I asked on behalf of Sir Robert Armstrong to see certain papers in Confidential Filing. It may be useful for you if I outlined the background. As you know, Sir Robert is required to appear in Australia re the Wright case. Because of this he asked me to establish whether:

1. During his time as Principal Private Secretary he would have seen a minute from the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, to the then Prime Minister, Mr Edward Heath, alerting the latter to the Blunt affair. Sir Robert thinks he saw this minute some time in 1972 (and I can say from personal experience of Sir Robert's memory that he is usually correct).
2. As Peter Wright alleges in his book, he either spoke to or wrote to Sir Robert Armstrong about the succession of Jones to Hanley as DGSS.
2. Also, Sir Robert will need to refresh his memory as to whether he knew during his time as Principal Private Secretary about the investigation into Hollis

Christopher Cloke

C G CLOKE

9 October 1986

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London SW1P 3AL
Telephone 01-233 8610

From the Minister for the Arts

31 May 1984

Robin Butler Esq
Principal Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Robin,

OFFER IN LIEU OF TAX: POUSSIN'S 'ELIEZER AND REBECCA'

Thank you for your letter of 18th May. We are instructing the Capital Taxes Office to refuse the offer in lieu of tax of the Poussin from Professor Blunt's estate.

The disposal of the picture will now be a matter purely for the Trustees. It will be open to them to sell it, either on the open market or by a private treaty sale to a public museum or gallery. Private treaty sales are tax exempt and the vendor receives a *douceur* of 25% of the notional tax saved. We will of course let you know if we hear that such a sale is in the offing: but there is no direct Government involvement in such cases, and no payment from Government Votes.

Yours sincerely,

Mary Brown

MRS M E BROWN
Private Secretary

SECURITY: BLUNT : PTZ



YOUR WILL I
2002



RAM

C. DOE
CO.
fin Sec/Hmt

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

18 May, 1984

OFFER IN LIEU OF TAX BY THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ANTHONY
BLUNT: POUSSIN'S 'ELIEZER AND REBECCA'

The Prime Minister has now further considered the question in Lord Gowrie's letter of 26 April. Her view is that, since Lord Gowrie does not feel unduly alarmed at the prospect of this particular painting going abroad and since the acceptance in lieu arrangements involve paying a douceur to the Blunt estate to induce the executors to offer the picture in lieu of tax, the Government should not accept this particular painting.

I am copying this letter to those who have the earlier correspondence.

FRBS

Mrs. Mary Brown,
Office of Arts and Libraries.

RAMAAT

80

PRIME MINISTER

THE BLUNT POUSSIN

You will remember that Lord Gowrie told you that the executors of Blunt's estate had offered the Government a Poussin 'Eliezer and Rebecca' in lieu of estate duty. The picture is valued at £350,000, and the OAL would have to pay £190,000 for it. But Lord Gowrie's letter said that there might be criticism that the Blunt estate was benefiting undeservedly if the Government accepted this picture in lieu of estate duty. We could not understand how the Government could be getting a picture below its market price and the Blunt estate could be benefiting at the same time.

My efforts to clear up the figures have provided the most marvellous illustration what happens when the Government gives a tax subsidy. It turns out that there are two alternatives:-

(a) The Poussin is sold on the open market, in which case the Government gets £200,000 of tax on the sale;

and

(b) The Government accepts the picture in lieu of estate duty, in which case the Government gets no tax and pays out £190,000.

So the real cost of the picture to the Government is the difference between these two alternatives - i.e. £390,000: the OAL had just 'ignored' the loss of £200,000 of duty.

So the question is whether the Government accepts the

No - I don't think
we should buy
it at this
price.
mt

picture in lieu of duty at a total cost of £390,000 - £40,000 above the market valuation: this £40,000 is the benefit to the Blunt estate of handing over the picture direct to the Government instead of selling it on the open market. Lord Gowrie does not feel unduly alarmed at the prospect of this particular painting being sold abroad, but since the present arrangements are that he only has to pay £190,000 from his vote for it he would like to acquire it for a national collection. What worries him is that the Blunt estate would benefit to the tune of £40,000.

To my mind, this episode illustrates that the present arrangements give the Office of Arts and Libraries an incentive to buy pictures for the nation, because they have to meet from their vote much less than the real cost to the taxpayer. You may think that this needs looking at. But the particular question here is: do you think that this picture should be accepted from the Blunt estate, at a cost to Lord Gowrie's vote of £190,000 but at a total cost to the taxpayer of £390,000.

F. K. R. B.

17 May, 1984



FILE

RM

cc: FSI
RTA
McFarlane.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 May, 1984

Dear Mary,

Many thanks for your further letter of 16 May and for being so patient.

I think that we are now agreed about the facts. We have two practical courses to choose between:-

(a) Market Sale: effect on the Government - plus £200,000

(b) Acceptance in lieu: effect on the Government - minus £190,000 plus the acquisition of the Poussin.

The difference in hard cash between (a) and (b) is £390,000 offset by the acquisition of the Poussin.

I am now putting the papers again to the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to those who have the earlier correspondence.

Yours ever,

Robin Butler

Mrs. M.E. Brown,
Office of Arts and Libraries

RAMAAP



OFFICE OF ARTS AND LIBRARIES
Great George Street
London SW1P 3AL
Telephone 01-233 8610

From the Minister for the Arts

16 May 1984

Robin Butler Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Robin,

Thank you for your letter of 11th May about the Blunt Poussin.

By virtue of the Finance Act 1976, s78(4), the acceptance of an exempted picture is not a chargeable event for tax purposes: therefore no tax arises and none is foregone. Only if sold on the market does the picture become a taxable item, in which case there would be around £200,000 tax to pay. The financial options are:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| (a) market sale: | loss to HMG of picture,
gain of c£200,000 in tax |
| (b) acceptance in lieu: | gain of picture by public
collection, value £350,000,
at special price of £190,000
(paid to Revenue and offset
against estate liability) |

The transaction under (b) is tax exempt and the total cost to the taxpayer cannot therefore be increased by adding the tax arising from a non-existent open market sale.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely,

Mary

MRS M E BROWN
Private Secretary

Security: Blunt Az



1961 APR 11



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

11 May 1984

Dear Mary,

Thank you for Paul Cann's letter of 8 May with its clear explanation of the acceptance in lieu of tax rules.

I am extremely sorry to delay this matter by coming back to you. But before I put this decision to the Prime Minister again, I want to make sure that I do not mislead her.

Lord Gowrie's letter of 26 April says that "the net cost to the Government, which would be paid to the Inland Revenue from OAL and DOE vote provision for acceptances in lieu would be about £190,000". Later the letter refers to "the benefit to the nation of saving this picture at well below market price" (my underlining).

Is that correct? Paul Cann's letter of 8 May and the leaflet enclosed with it say that, if accepted in lieu, the Poussin would be exempt from tax. If so, surely the total cost to the Government is the £190,000 paid by OAL and DOE to the Inland Revenue and credited against the duty on the rest of the estate plus the duty of £200,000 foregone on the picture itself, i.e. £390,000. The statement in Lord Gowrie's letter appears to refer only to the amount paid from OAL and DOE votes and to ignore the duty foregone on the picture.

I feel it necessary to be clear on this point since the balance of considerations is changed a bit if the total cost to the taxpayer is £390,000 rather than £190,000.

I am copying this letter to recipients of the earlier correspondence.

Yours ever,

Mrs. Mary Brown,
Office of Arts and Libraries.

Robin Butler

DCAAAP

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CC
FST
RTA
Sport/Gw

SSS



OFFICE OF ARTS AND LIBRARIES
Great George Street
London SW1P 3AL
Telephone 01-233 8610

From the Minister for the Arts

8 May 1984

Robin Butler Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Robin,

OFFER IN LIEU OF TAX BY THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ANTHONY BLUNT:
POUSSIN'S ELIEZER AND REBECCA

You asked for some additional information about the tax implications of accepting this picture, about which we have consulted the Inland Revenue. The position is as follows.

(a) The total value of the estate is £850,000. We have not been able to establish the tax liability on this because, under the Inland Revenue's confidentiality rules, such details are not disclosed to either officials or Ministers.

(b) If the Poussin were to be sold on the open market (at an estimated price of £350,000) the executors' tax liability on such a disposal would be based on the rate obtaining at the date of death. Again we do not have Revenue information, but on our own rough calculations this would probably mean a tax payment by the executors of around £200,000, leaving a net gain to the estate of £150,000. But the picture could well be lost to this country by being sold to a foreign buyer.


(c) Alternatively, the Poussin may be accepted in lieu of tax, in which case the picture itself is by statute exempt from tax. Under these arrangements the Government gains a £350,000 picture for a special price of approximately £190,000 which is paid over to the Revenue (not to the executors) from the acceptance in lieu and offset against the total tax liability of the estate. This special price is arrived at by working out the net price that the executors would expect to receive after deduction of the tax arising from a sale on the open market, to which is then added an amount (known as the *douceur*) equal to one quarter of the hypothetical tax liability on such a disposal.

The inducement offered to the executors by the Government in order to secure the picture for the nation is equal to one quarter of the tax the executors would have to pay if

they dispose of the Poussin on the open market at the agreed valuation. The acceptance in lieu of tax arrangement reduces the risk of losing the picture to an overseas buyer, and secures it for an appropriate public institution which might otherwise have to pay the full price realised in the open market.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Financial Secretary, Mr Macfarlane and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'P L Cann'. The signature is written in dark ink on a light-colored paper.

P L CANN
Assistant Private Secretary

Summary
Blume
Part 2



BF

10 DOWNING STREET

Mrs. Brown has agreed to
send a child's guide to
tax calculations.

FERB

1.5



If we receive the picture for less than the market price, it would mean that the Blunt estate is better off than it is.

OFFICE OF ARTS AND LIBRARIES
Great George Street
London SW1P 3AL
Telephone 01-233 8610

From the Minister for the Arts

26 April 1984

Robin Butler Esq
Principal Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

Prime Minister

Neither Andrew nor I can follow the economics of this, and this letter arrived too late for me to be able to contact anyone who can unravel it.

Dear Robin,

OFFER IN LIEU OF TAX BY THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ANTHONY BLUNT
POUSSIN: ELEIZER AND REBECCA

It is not clear either how "the Blunt estate is benefiting undeservedly" or "the nation is saving this picture at below market price". All that appears to be happening is that tax is being paid in kind rather than money. If you would like, we will explain this point and put it back to you with a better explanation.

Lord Gowrie thinks the Prime Minister should be aware that the executors of the estate of the late Professor Blunt have formally offered to the Government in lieu of tax the Poussin "Eleizer and Rebecca", at a market valuation of £350,000. In view of the sensitive nature of this offer both Lord Gowrie and Mr MacFarlane, as the heritage Ministers concerned with acceptances in lieu of tax, would welcome the Prime Minister's views.

The offer is a straightforward one: under capital transfer tax arrangements, a work of art can be offered in lieu of tax by the executors of the estate. It is probable in this case that the picture would meet all the usual "heritage" requirements for acceptance in lieu in this way, though expert advice (which is usual in these cases) has not yet been sought. If the picture were accepted the net cost to the Government, which would be paid over to the Inland Revenue from OAL and DOE vote provision for acceptances in lieu, would be about £190,000. The picture would then be allocated to a public institution.

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ms

Lord Gowrie feels that the political arguments for accepting such a painting are fairly evenly balanced. If it is acquired in lieu the Government could face substantial objections from individuals and sections of the media that the Blunt estate was benefiting undeservedly. On the other hand if the picture is rejected it will almost certainly be sold on the open market for a high price and be likely to go abroad (perhaps to the Getty Museum), in which case the heritage interests will express public concern.

Lord Gowrie does not feel unduly alarmed at the prospect of this particular painting going abroad. He must add, however, that in the ordinary way of business the benefit to the nation of saving this picture at well below market price would lead him to accept it, particularly as it can be afforded within his vote for these purposes. The issue therefore turns on Blunt. He would welcome the Prime Minister's views as to whether there would be political difficulties for the Government in accepting this particular painting.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Lord Whitelaw and Mr Macfarlane.

Yours sincerely,
Mary Brown.

MRS M E BROWN
Private Secretary



PLATE 19/3942

9233

CHRISTIES

PHOTOGRAPHED BY A. C. COSTER

01 629 7505

Security

MR. RICKETT

The papers below are self-explanatory.
Could you please arrange for a copy of
the transcript of the interview with
Mr. Whitney Straight to be placed in
the Library, if Robert Armstrong's office
have not already done so.

PERB
....

25 February, 1983

Placed in library of House on
25-2-1983



FIVE

82

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Thank you for your minute of 23 February (A083/0625). She has written to Mr. Ted Leadbitter and Mr. Arthur Lewis on the lines which you recommended, and I attach copies of her letters.

I have asked Mr. Rickett to make arrangements with your office about placing a copy of the transcript of the interview in the Library of the House.

E. E. R. BUTLER

25 February, 1983



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 February, 1983

Dear Mr. Leadbitter,

When you asked a Question about Mr. Michael Whitney Straight's interview on Canadian television, I said that reports of the interview suggested that it contained no new information which had implications for British national security.

I have now received the full transcript of the interview, and a copy has been placed in the Library of the House. I can confirm that it contains no new information which has implications for British national security. It does not add anything to what Mr. Straight told the security authorities 20 years ago, which was fully investigated.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Storer

Ted Leadbitter, Esq., M.P.

F105 *DSG*
cc: Igo (24/2)
CO

SW



FIVE
ASG
cc: I GAD (24/2)
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 February, 1983

Dear Arthur

When you asked a Question about Mr. Michael Whitney Straight's interview on Canadian television, I said that reports of the interview suggested that it contained no new information which had implications for British national security.

I have now received the full transcript of the interview, and a copy has been placed in the Library of the House. I can confirm that it contains no new information which has implications for British national security. It does not add anything to what Mr. Straight told the security authorities 20 years ago, which was fully investigated.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Delbe

—

Arthur Lewis, Esq., M.P.

SW

Ref. A083/0625

MR BUTLER

Prime Minister
 Letter to Mr.
 Leadbitter and Mr. Lewis
 attached for your signature
 FEB 23.2

Towards the end of January Mr Ted Leadbitter asked the Prime Minister a Parliamentary Question for Written Answer about the interview on Canadian television with Mr Michael Whitney Straight. On 26 January he wrote her a letter on the same subject. I attach for ease of reference copies of the Question and Answer and of Mr Leadbitter's letter of 26 January and the Prime Minister's reply of 14 February.

2. In her Parliamentary Answer to Mr Leadbitter, the Prime Minister said that reports of the Straight interview suggested that it contained no new information which had implications for British national security. She said that, if it proved otherwise when the full transcript was available, she would let Mr Leadbitter know.

3. Subsequently, in a further Answer to a Parliamentary Question by Mr Arthur Lewis, the Prime Minister said that she would arrange for a copy of the transcript of the interview to be placed in the Library of the House.

4. We have now obtained a copy of the transcript of Mr Straight's interview; I attach a copy herewith. As expected, the interview contains no new information with implications for British national security. The only three persons named as spies are Mr Anthony Blunt, Mr Guy Burgess and Mr Kim Philby. Mr Straight is recorded as saying that he gave the Security Service the names of at least 150 people who were associated with Blunt as members of the Communist Party before the Second World War and he guesses that 30 or 40 had been leading the lives of "moles" in England; but he does not name any names. As his book makes clear, the 150 he names are people who were or may have been Communists. Though he speaks in the interview of 30 or 40 "moles", when he was interrogated he named only two people who might have been "moles" in that sense: Lady Llewelyn-Davies and Mrs Hubback.

5. The full transcript confirms that the interview contained no new information. The Prime Minister is not therefore strictly under any obligation to write further to Mr Leadbitter. But she is under an obligation to put a copy of the transcript in the Library.

6. I attach a copy of the transcript for that purpose.
7. The Prime Minister may like to write both to Mr Leadbitter and Mr Lewis to tell them that she is placing a copy of the _____ transcript in the Library. I attach a draft letter.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

23 February 1983

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Mr. Ted Leadbitter (Hartlepool): To ask the Prime Minister, if she will seek to obtain a transcript of an interview on Canadian television with Mr. Michael Whitney Straight: and if she will assess whether the content of the interview has any implications for national security.

DRAFT ANSWER

I am seeking to obtain a transcript of Mr. Straight's interview. Reports of the interview already available to me suggest that it contains no new information which has implications for British national security. If it proves to be otherwise when the full transcript is available, I will let the hon. Gentleman know.

MACMILLAN:

In the 1930's Cambridge University was a fertile breeding ground for Communist sympathisers. Many undergraduates were disillusioned with Capitalism and worried by the rise of Fascism, some saw Communism as the only answer to regimes like that of Adolf HITLER's. At the centre of the Communist movement at Cambridge was an exclusive club called "the Apostles", a group made up of leading intellectuals, many of them homosexual. Some joined the Communist Party, a few went on to become spies for the Soviet Union. Spy number one was Anthony BLUNT, pictured here in an open necked shirt. A leading member of "the Apostles", BLUNT became a talent spotter for the Soviets. His job was to pass on promising recruits to his Soviet bosses. At one point he made an unsuccessful attempt to recruit Michael STRAIGHT.

Spy number two was Guy BURGESS, a close friend of BLUNT's and also a member of "the Apostles". BURGESS, who was called the most brilliant undergraduate at Cambridge, joined the British Foreign Service and ended up working at the British Embassy in Washington. It was there that Michael STRAIGHT says he threatened to blow the whistle on BURGESS. In 1951 BURGESS fled to Moscow after being warned that the British authorities had discovered he was a Spy. Spy number three was Donald MACLEAN who defected to Russia with Guy BURGESS. Another Cambridge man, he too worked in the British Foreign Service. It is not known how much information he fed the Soviets, but it is assumed he gave them valuable details about American nuclear weapons while he worked at the British Embassy in Washington.

The fourth recruit from Cambridge was Kim PHILBY. He is regarded as the spy who did ^{the} most damage to Western Security. In 1940 PHILBY joined MI6, Britain's Secret Service, he was recommended for the job by his friend Guy BURGESS. In 1949 PHILBY went to Washington as Liason Officer with the CIA. In fact he helped the CIA set up their anti-Soviet spy network. He was forced to resign from MI6 after being accused of helping BURGESS AND MACLEAN escape to Russia. Although an official

MACMILLAN cont.:

investigation cleared PHILBY of spying, he fled to Moscow in 1963 and was presented with the Red Banner Order, one of the U.S.S.R.'s highest honours. Of the four Cambridge spies only Anthony BLUNT has remained in Britain, for many years he worked as Art Adviser to the Royal Family and the Queen made him a Knight for his loyal service. BLUNT confessed to being a spy in 1964 when faced with evidence Michael STRAIGHT gave the FBI, but he was given immunity from prosecution in return for supplying information about Soviet spy rings.

U...
The BLUNT confession was not made public until 1979 and that's when Michael STRAIGHT's long involvement with the Spies first came to light. STRAIGHT was never a spy himself, he was the son of a wealthy and well connected family. He worked for the ROOSEVELT administration, was editor of "The New Republic" and was a one time Deputy-Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts.

MACMILLAN:

But it wasn't until he was offered a post in the KENNEDY administration that the anguished Michael STRAIGHT revealed to Western Security Forces all he knew about the Spy ring. Now Michael STRAIGHT has gone public with a recently published book "After Long Silence".

Mr STRAIGHT, I'd like to begin with an overall question if I could. How is this book going to make your anguish any easier to bear?

Michael STRAIGHT:

The only answer I can give you is DOSTOIEWSKI's, that through suffering we are redeemed. It's a very large answer but I understand it. I understand what Mrs GINSBERG(ph), who is in a Soviet slave camp for eighteen years, said, that repentance and confession are good for the human soul. I believe that, not that this book is a confession, it is not, but she had nothing to confess and yet people who have been a part of a great world tragedy need to share their experiences with others and I needed to share mine. (3)

MACMILLAN

What took so long to come to terms with? Why was it so hard? You had so many opportunities to tell people, people in high places, your own cousin, Deputy Director of the CIA. What stood in your way?

STRAIGHT:

Several things. First, I was not speaking for myself alone. As the book points out, not only my own family, but two other families who were connected with me would have suffered greatly from this experience, had it been made known. At the time there was no question at all that the FBI was leaking like a sieve to Joseph MACARTHY. I felt that if I went to the FBI I would be before the MACARTHY Committee in a couple of weeks. I felt that if I went to the British Intelligence I would be facing BLUNT and BURGESS in a British court.

MACMILLAN:

Now these were two people who didn't mind sending you, in the late 30's, to work against your family by joining the Morgan Bank.

STRAIGHT:

Right... I wasn't motivated by love of them, so much as by fear of the pain that I would cause to others in my own family and to the magazine that I was editing, and I suppose to myself, selfishly.

MACMILLAN:

When you think back at your student times together with these men, and knowing what they did subsequently, what do you think of that circle that you formed in the early thirties at Cambridge?

STRAIGHT:

I think it could be only judged in the light of that time. The nation state was collapsing in Europe, unemployment was devastating, war was coming, HITLER was on the march.

MACMILLAN:

Mr STRAIGHT, what bound that world of friends together (4)

MACMILLAN cont.:

at that time? I mean ideology and intellectual thinking is one thing, but what was the intensity of that friendship based on, that lasted so long and did so much damage finally.

STRAIGHT:

A sense of brotherhood. Very deep sense for me. A sense of great love... I... in the book I mentioned, in a letter to my mother: I don't love Communism but I love the Communist friends that I have. And I did love them. They were fine people, most of them. Misled as I was.

MACMILLAN:

Do you remember the meeting that you describe so well in 1959, when BURGESS says to you, after a long dinner, to try to sound you out "Are you still with us".?

STRAIGHT:

Yes.

MACMILLAN:

And you said "you can see from the way I talk I'm not with you".

STRAIGHT:

Yes.

MACMILLAN:

And, and he says "but you're not totally unfriendly either". (Yes.) And you said "If I were totally unfriendly I wouldn't be here." (Yes.) What game were you playing?

STRAIGHT:

I wasn't playing a game. I think what he was trying to do was to say 'Have you turned us in, or are you about to turn us in?' And I was replying, 'I haven't gone to British Intelligence and I'm not about to'. That was all. As I explain in my book, I grew up as a young child, I was not built to confront people and to have enemies, and I found it very hard to say " Yes I'm going to turn you in". (5)

MACMILLAN:

But were you... I mean, it seems absurd. I mean even if you thought he was low level, you knew enough about the way that system worked, that he'd be connected to others. That he would have higher up control.

STRAIGHT:

I don't ~~don't~~ see your point.

MACMILLAN:

Well, ^{when} you say I'm not totally unfriendly and you don't turn him in, you're putting, sort of, this decency towards someone that you've really broken with. You don't believe in his faith anymore, you quite despise the faith he holds (Yes.) And yet you defend him.

STRAIGHT:

Not defend him, no.

MACMILLAN:

Well protect him.

STRAIGHT:

Yes, I suppose. I can only repeat what I have said, that at that moment I found it very hard to go to court in an open struggle and to confront both of those men.

MACMILLAN:

Both BURGESS and BLUNT told you, several years later, that they were always wondering how long it would take you to turn them in.

STRAIGHT:

Yes. No, Mr BLUNT said that. He told that to me, yes.

MACMILLAN:

Did you take that as... as something of forgiveness? How did you interpret that statement?

STRAIGHT:

I interpreted it as not forgiveness, but as repentance on the part of Anthony BLUNT, who was essentially non-political(6)

STRAIGHT cont.:

a decent good human being, who, like me, was dragged out of his depth at a terrible moment in world history. I don't, I don't put BURGESS in this category, I think BURGESS was an amoral vagabond, but I think BLUNT was a moral human being who was dragged out of his depth.

MACMILLAN:

Since the exposure of HOLLIS and the suggestion that not just PHILBY but HOLLIS, head of what.. MI.. MI (Five.) Five. There's talk now, fifth man, sixth man, seventh man. (Yes.) Are there big shots still protected?

STRAIGHT:

I think so. Incidentally Mr HOLLIS has not been found guilty, Mrs THATCHER simply said: "Not proven", which means that no final case was established against him.

MACMILLAN:

Um, let me pick up on what you said, big shots still being protected, by whom? And why?

STRAIGHT:

Either they've talked and ^{have} been assured in turn that they would not be exposed, or they've chosen not to talk and were allowed to retire by the British Government, as long as they got out quietly.

MACMILLAN:

Do you know who they are?

STRAIGHT:

No. I know that... I went to MI5 and.. and gave them names of at least a hundred and fifty people and of those one hundred and fifty I would guess that thirty or forty had been leading the lives of "moles" in England. That is to say as members of the Labour Party in Parliament, as barristers, as judges, ah, various other people in public life, one or two in the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Treasury, who've been allowed to retire. Who is in those roles, I don't know. I'm sure that British Intelligence does know... ah... I don't know what happened to them. I simply went over with British Intelligence the names that I could identify and they went on from there. (7)

STRAIGHT cont.:

I didn't ask them questions and they didn't volunteer information to me.

MACMILLAN:

The 'old boys net.' lives.

STRAIGHT:

Well, yes and no. I think there is every reason, as the British Government said, not to air all this in the newspapers if you can learn more from somebody by protecting them. I am for learning more and not washing all this in the newspapers, after the point at which the British people themselves have been led to understand what the problem is, and the British Government has been led to take the Security measures that it has to take.

MACMILLAN:

Mr STRAIGHT, we thank you so much.

STRAIGHT:

Thank you.



10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE

A 2573

15 FEB 1983

FILE INSTRUCTIONS

FILE No.

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 February 1983

Dear Mr. Leadbitter,

Thank you for your letter of 26 January concerning an interview on Canadian television with Mr. Michael Whitney Straight.

Although I am seeking to obtain a transcript of this interview, I have not so far obtained one. Nevertheless, as I said in reply to your Written Question of 27 January, reports of the interview already available to me, including points referred to in your letter, suggest that it contains no new information with implications for British security.

In your letter you refer to the disclosures made by Mr. Straight in 1964 about Mr. Anthony Blunt and Mr. Leo Long: I gave a detailed account of the circumstances in response to a Written Question from the hon Member for Stirlingshire West on 9 November 1981 (OR, Col 40-42). Mr. Straight was subsequently interviewed by British security authorities on a number of occasions. The only people whom he identified as possible Russian agents and who were for a time employed by the Government were Blunt, Burgess and Long. He mentioned a number of other individuals as having been Communist associates of his at Cambridge. All the information provided by Mr. Straight was thoroughly examined at the time and, on the basis of reports of the interview so far, I see no reason to reopen these investigations.

I should also make clear, as I did in my statement on the Blunt case and my Written Answer about Long, the fact that

/ somebody

somebody has been the subject of investigation or has been interviewed does not necessarily or even generally mean that they have been positively suspected. Many people have been investigated simply to eliminate them from the inquiry, while others have been interviewed not because they themselves were suspected but for any information they might be able to give about those who were.

Your letter also mentions other breaches of security, including "recent happenings at Cheltenham", which I take to refer to the Prime case. The case of Prime and two other cases are currently the subject of references to the Security Commission who have been asked to investigate their implications for national security.

Yours sincerely
Raymond White

Ted Leadbitter, Esq., M.P.

Security 202



Lie AH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Thank you for your minute of
2 February (A083/0374) about Mr Chapman
Pincher's article in the Daily Express
of Thursday 20 January about Mr. Anthony
Blunt, which the Prime Minister has seen
and noted.

FERB
...

4 February 1983

AH

12
Prime Minister

Ref. A083/0374

MR BUTLER

c Mr Ingham

You may have seen an article by Chapman Pincher in the Daily Express for Thursday 20 January about Mr Anthony Blunt.

2. It suggested that Blunt had been tasked in 1946 to visit Germany on the Royal Family's behalf to retrieve any captured German records of conversations between the Duke of Windsor and Hitler and other prominent Nazis.

3. Mr Blunt subsequently denied this allegation.

4. Mr Blunt did visit Germany on two occasions in 1945 at the request of the Security Service in connection with the resettlement of a Security Service agent in Germany. On both occasions he also brought back on behalf of the King various Royal treasures and documents, including letters between Queen Victoria and the Empress Frederick. He went to Germany again in October 1946 in connection with the resettlement of the same Security Service agent, but there is no record that he transacted any business on behalf of the Palace on that occasion.


5. So far as Sir Philip Moore is aware, there is no truth in the allegation that he was selected on the advice of MI5 to visit Germany in 1946 on the Royal Family's behalf to retrieve captured German records of conversations between the Duke of Windsor and leading Nazis.

6. The Palace have not been asked to comment on these allegations and do not propose to do so. I see no need for us to do so either. But I thought that you might like to tell the Prime Minister what the position is.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

2 February 1983



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

The Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

26th. Jan '83.

Dear Margaret,

National Security.

Michael W. Straight is well known to our intelligence service. As a student in Cambridge in 1937 he was recruited by A. Blunt in support of the Russians. He was later to expose Blunt.

I will not add to this introduction of him for all the facts of his background will be known, only to stress his importance in that he became a speech writer for President Roosevelt and confessed to his activities in 1964.

In a television programme in Toronto two evenings ago he stated that' plenty of people in England are aware of the circumstances about spying but have chosen not to speak..'

He was asked if there was a 5th. 6th. or 7th. man - are there any big shots being protected by whom and why? Although in response to the question, 'Do you know who they are?' ~~was~~ 'No', he went on to say that 'I know I went to MI5 and gave them names of at least 150 people and of these I would guess 30 to 40 who have been leading lives of Moles in the Labour Party (I am not aware of the reason for naming one Party) as barristers and judges and various other people in public life. One or two in the Foreign Office, the Home Office, and in the Treasury who have been allowed to retire..'

Mr. Straight claimed they have either talked and not been exposed or not talked and allowed to retire as long as they got out gently. He states he doesn't know what actually happened to them, but that he did supply to British Intelligence the names he could identify and they went on from there. They didn't ask him any questions and they didn't disclose information to him.

The above is to my knowledge a correct account of the interview in Toronto. In view of the serious import of Mr. Straight's comment, his own disclosures on A. Blunt and Leo Long, the recent happenings in Cheltenham, the unfortunate record over many years of breaches of national security and the continuing belief that there is penetration of our intelligence service and communications I respectfully suggest a full scale enquiry into these related matters and any others arising from Mr. Straight's revelations.

I may seek to table some questions.

Yours sincerely,

Neil Maclean

Security
PRIME MINISTER
MS
//



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PA
(CF security file)
MS

4/3

23 February 1981

Dear Michael,

Sir Geoffrey Harrison

You will have seen the Sunday Times and other media stories of Sir Geoffrey Harrison's reported admission to having been withdrawn from Moscow in 1968 as the result of a KGB compromise. Sir Geoffrey has since told us that he gave no interview as such. But, as you know, he admitted the accuracy of the story to two Daily Mirror journalists in November 1979, and a contingency brief for the Prime Minister's use in answer to possible Questions in the House was prepared at that time.

I now enclose an updated version of that brief, with identical "Line to Take", for possible use by the Prime Minister at Question Time tomorrow.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

BACKGROUND NOTE

1. The Sunday Times of 22 February reported that Sir Geoffrey Harrison had admitted to having been withdrawn as HM Ambassador Moscow in 1968, as the result of a KGB compromise. Sir Geoffrey has told the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that he gave no interview as such. But he admitted the general accuracy of the story to two Daily Mirror journalists in November 1979.

HISTORY OF THE INCIDENT

2. On 22 August 1968 Sir Geoffrey Harrison was withdrawn from Moscow a few days before he was due to leave on retirement. He had reported that KGB pressure had been put on him to provide information as a result of his affair with a Russian maid in his personal household.

3. He was formally reprimanded.

4. He was interviewed three times by the Security Service. It was finally concluded that he had given a true and complete account of the affair and that there had been no loss of classified information of any substance, though he might have revealed personality information about some British Embassy staff.

MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT

5. The Foreign Secretary (Mr Michael Stewart) and the Prime Minister were immediately informed (and were kept informed). When the investigations had been completed the American Secretary of State (Mr Rusk) and the Director of the CIA (Mr Helms) were informed.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE PALACE

6. Sir Geoffrey had been awarded the GCMG in the Birthday Honours 1968. Sr M Adeane was informed and arrangements made whereby the Insignia was delivered to Sir Geoffrey at home and he did not attend a ceremony at the Palace, nor did he have the customary farewell interview with The Queen.

SOURCE OF PUBLICATION OF THE INCIDENT

7. Sir Geoffrey Harrison told the FCO in November 1979 that the journalists who had approached him then claimed to have been told of the story by Lady Falkender and Mr Joe Haines.

FREQUENCY OF SUCH INCIDENTS

8. There have been a few cases over the years of members of the staff of the British Embassy in Moscow being compromised. The most noteworthy publicised case was that of Vassall who was arrested in 1962. He was Clerical Officer in the Naval Attaché's office and became the victim of homosexual compromise in 1955. (Whenever possible, compromise cases are dealt with

/by

by our own Security authorities without publicity, since the prospect of publicity could deter staff from coming forward.)

THE RUSSIAN CHAMBER-MAID

9. She was given notice by Sir Duncan Wilson, Sir Geoffrey Harrison's successor.

My KGB chambermaid, by British envoy

by Simon Freeman and Barrie Penrose

A FORMER British ambassador in Moscow has disclosed how the KGB lured him into having an affair with a chambermaid.

When he realised he had been trapped, Sir Geoffrey Harrison confessed to London what he had done. He was immediately summoned home — just days after Russian tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Harrison, now 73, lives in retirement in Sussex. His account of events nearly 13 years ago follows on the heels of the disclosure that an American diplomat — victim of a similar classic KGB “dirty trick” — was forced to leave the Soviet Union.

In the latest case, the Russians have denied that the American assistant military attaché in Moscow, Major James Holbrook, was “set up.” They said that western reports alleging that Holbrook and another officer, Lieut-Col

Thomas Spencer, were victims of a KGB plot were part of a campaign to build up anti-Soviet feeling.

Harrison says he sympathises with Holbrook, who was recalled to Washington after a hotel party now thought to have been arranged by the KGB.

Harrison told *The Sunday Times* that, like Holbrook, he had “let his defences drop.” In 1968, after a lengthy and distinguished diplomatic career, he had had a short affair with a Russian chambermaid who worked at the embassy in Moscow.

He said: “She was a young, attractive girl. I did not ask whether she was working for the KGB but the assumption was that every Russian working in our embassy was a KGB employee. As a trained diplomat, it was an

aberration on my part. It was absolutely crazy, but it may now give added warning to western diplomats who might find themselves similarly tempted.”

Harrison's sudden departure from Moscow in August 1968, in the immediate aftermath of the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia, was never officially explained by the Foreign Office. It was assumed he had been recalled to London because of the sudden Czech crisis. In fact, the opposite was the case. His enforced absence from Moscow at a critical moment caused consternation at Number 10 and the Foreign Office.

The incident was reported to the then prime minister, Harold Wilson, and his political secretary, Lady Falkender, but was handled personally by the foreign secre-

tary, Michael Stewart. There was considerable surprise that such a highly experienced diplomat had fallen for an obvious and well-tried KGB ploy.

Harrison—married, with three sons and a daughter—became ambassador to Moscow in 1965.

The chambermaid was working at the embassy when he arrived in Moscow. “She was apparently a trusted member of staff,” he said. “She didn't live within the embassy compound but came in in the morning and stayed behind afterwards. My flat was on the first floor of the embassy and the offices were below. It was quite separate and I had no reason to suppose that anyone knew about us.”

It was a growing realisation of the security implications of his relationship with the girl, and the sudden Czech crisis, that prompted him to inform the

Foreign Office in London. “Perhaps no one would really have known about it,” he said. “But I believed it would be wrong to keep quiet, so I reported what had been happening. I felt that, however unpleasant the consequences might be, I had to tell the Foreign Office. Otherwise the Russians might try something.”

After the information reached London, Harrison was immediately summoned to London.

The Holbrook incident in Moscow last month did not surprise Harrison. “There are many cases like this which go unreported,” he told *The Sunday Times*. “It is happening all the time to diplomats and journalists, even to politicians. Diplomats can be caught out by women, or something in their drinks. If you are on a long tour abroad then your defences can drop. It's unforgivable but it happens.”



Sir Geoffrey Harrison

Our Man in a KGB sex trap

A FORMER British Ambassador to Moscow claims he was tricked by the KGB into having an affair with a chambermaid.

When he realised he had been trapped, he owned up to the Foreign Office and was immediately recalled.

The diplomat, Sir Geoffrey Harrison, 72, makes his astonishing confession in a newspaper interview today.

He admits his affair with the Russian maid was "absolutely crazy."

She was young and attractive and he "let his defences drop," he says in the Sunday Times article.

Trusted

The incident happened in 1968, the time of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The maid worked at the British embassy in Moscow. She was an "apparently trusted member of staff," says Sir Geoffrey.

"I did not ask whether she was working for the KGB, but the assumption was that every Russian working in our embassy was a KGB employee.

"She didn't live within the embassy compound

Sunday Mirror Reporter

but came in the morning and stayed behind afterwards. My flat was on the first floor of the embassy and the offices were below.

"It was quite separate and I had no reason to suppose that anyone knew about us."

Sir Geoffrey, who is married with three sons and a daughter, became Our Man in Moscow in 1965.

He admitted the affair when he realised it made him a security risk, says the report.

Sir Geoffrey, who had a long and distinguished career in the Diplomatic Corps, is now retired and lives in Sussex.

America's former Assistant Military Attache in Moscow, Maj. James Holbrook, recently claimed he and another officer were victims of a similar KGB plot.

Our ex-man in Moscow confesses

BRITAIN'S former ambassador in Moscow told last night of his affair with a KGB agent.

Sir Geoffrey Harrison said he was "trapped" into a relationship with a young chambermaid. As soon as he realised the trap, he told the Foreign Office and was immediately brought home.

Sir Geoffrey said last night he was "very embarrassed" that the Sunday Times had revealed the story.

"It seems reasonable to think that after 13 years what happened would not be revealed."

The report says Sir Geoffrey called the affair "an aberration on my part . . . absolutely crazy."

Invasion

He "let his defences drop" after a long and distinguished career.

The "young and attractive" girl was an apparently trusted member of the embassy staff.

"I did not ask whether she was working for the KGB but the assumption was that every Russian working in the embassy was a KGB employee," he says.

The girl did not live at the embassy.

Sir Geoffrey's flat was above the offices and "I had no reason to suppose anyone knew about us," says Sir Geoffrey, now 73.

He confessed after Russia's invasion of



Sir Geoffrey Harrison

Czechoslovakia because he realised the security risk.

He says: "I believed it would be wrong to keep quiet about what had been happening."

"I felt that however unpleasant the consequences I had to tell the Foreign Office—otherwise the Russians might try something."

Prime Minister Harold Wilson was told and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart ordered his recall.

Regret

Sir Geoffrey said at his home in Horsham, Sussex, last night: "At the time I made a full confession both to the Foreign Office and my wife."

"She has known all about it all these years and she is standing by me."

"Naturally I very much regret what happened. It's not very pleasant for me or my wife."

"And I very much regret that all this has come out."


"I certainly didn't promote the disclosure. It has been forced upon me."

"I don't know exactly how the story has come out but I have a pretty good idea."

The disclosures follow the claim by America's former assistant military attache in Moscow, Major James Holbrook, that he and another officer were victims of a KGB blackmail attempt.

23 FEB 1961

cutting dated



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Envoy's affair: There was no official comment from the Foreign Office on the disclosure yesterday that Sir Geoffrey Harrison, a former British Ambassador in Moscow, had been recalled to London after he had reported having an affair with a Russian chambermaid employed in the embassy (Our Diplomatic Correspondent writes).

The episode dates back to 1968, shortly before the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia but is echoed today by the return of a senior American diplomat to Washington from Moscow last month after being caught in a compromising situation.

Love-affair envoy: I've been betrayed

By GUY RAIS

THE former British ambassador to Moscow, who admitted at the weekend that he had an affair 15 years ago with a Russian maid at the embassy, said yesterday: "I have been stabbed in the back."

Sir Geoffrey Harrison insisted that someone else had leaked the story of his involvement with the blonde, who was described yesterday by the wife of his successor as "a bit of a tart, certainly not in the first flush of youth."

Standing in the doorway of his home in Lower Beeding, near Horsham, Sussex, Sir Geoffrey said:

"People have asked me why I chose this moment to bring this matter out into the open."

"Let me be quite clear—and I feel quite strongly about this. I did not do so."

No disclosures

"I did not take any initiative in its timing. I made no disclosures whatsoever, but I do know who was responsible. Someone has stabbed me in the back."

Could the Russians have been responsible for the leak? "I am not prepared to say if this was so."

He also declined to say if the Russians tried to use the affair with the maid against him.

Sir Geoffrey's admission of the scandal followed last week's disclosure that American assistant military attache Maj James Holbrook had been recalled from the Soviet Union after a "sex orgy" trap by KGB agents.

The former ambassador, silver-haired and looking considerably younger than his 72 years, said:

"Of course I have my regrets. It was a very silly thing to do. My wife knew what had occurred at the time, and she stood by me."

Lady Harrison remained inside the house during the interview. The couple have three sons and a daughter.


The Russian maid was already working at the embassy when Sir Geoffrey arrived in Moscow in 1965.

Daily visits

She lived outside the compound, and came in every day to work in his flat on the first floor.

He was quoted on Saturday as saying: "She was a young, attractive girl. I did not ask whether she was working for the KGB, but the assumption was that every Russian working in our embassy was a KGB employee. As a trained diplomat, it was an aberration on my part."

After informing London of his involvement with her, he



Lady Harrison

was immediately recalled by Mr Michael Stewart, the Foreign Minister, in August, 1968, a few days after the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia to oust the Dubcek regime.

Sir Geoffrey was replaced a month later by Sir Duncan Wilson, who confirmed last night from his home in Scotland that he had been briefed about the Harrison affair before he took up the post.

"Sir Geoffrey was due to retire at the age of 60 anyway and I knew in the spring of 1968, when I was Ambassador in Belgrade, that I was taking over Moscow."

"It was my wife who had to fire the chambermaid."

Sir Duncan retired in 1971 to become Master of Corpus Christi, Cambridge, a position he held until last summer.

Asked why the embassy had kept the maid on after Sir Geoffrey's recall, Sir Duncan said: "The incident was known only to a few, and I can only presume that they did not want to talk about it, so she stayed on for a while, which I thought was highly improper."

Lady Wilson recalled: "We knew her as Galya, although her christian name in Russian was Galina. She was blonde, of ample proportions, and really looked a bit of a tart. She was not a young slip of a girl, and certainly not in the first flush of youth."


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THE GUARDIAN

23 FEB 1981

cutting dated 19



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Sir Geoffrey Harrison, the British Ambassador to Moscow at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, has said that he had an affair with a chambermaid who was probably working for the KGB. Becoming aware of the security risks, he informed London and was summoned home at once.

Sir Geoffrey (pictured here at his home at Handcross, Sussex, yesterday) told the story to the Sunday Times. He said:

"As a trained diplomat, it was an aberration on my part. It was absolutely crazy, but it may now give added warning to Western diplomats who might find themselves similarly tempted."

His admission comes after the disclosure of an alleged KGB set-up of the American assistant military attaché in Moscow, Major James Holbrook. He was also recalled after reports of a compromising hotel party.

23 FEB 1981

Love-trap envoy's KGB girl

BRITAIN'S former Ambassador in Moscow Sir Geoffrey Harrison, who has admitted an affair with a KGB chambermaid, said last night: "I prefer to let sleeping dogs lie."

Sir Geoffrey, 73, and married with three children, became ambassador in 1963 and was pulled out in 1968, soon after Russia invaded Czechoslovakia. This was after he had voluntarily owned up to MI6.

FCO

Attractive

He said: "She was a young attractive girl. I did not ask whether she was working for the KGB but the assumption was that every Russian working in our embassy was a KGB employee."

"As a trained diplomat it was an aberration on my part. It was absolutely crazy, but it may now give added warning to Western diplomats who might find themselves similarly tempted."

The disclosure, in yesterday's Sunday Times, follows an outcry over American military attaché in Moscow Major James Holbrook, victim of a similar "dirty tricks" set-up.

Envoy: My Moscow love affair

By JOHN PASSMORE, JOHN
DICKIE and RAYMOND
RODGERS

THE blonde Russian chambermaid who trapped Britain's Ambassador in Moscow into an affair tried to get a new job at the Australian Embassy as soon as she was sacked.

But the girl, a KGB agent named Galia, failed because the British revealed her background.

Nevertheless, it is believed that she went on to another embassy under a different name.

The Ambassador who fired Galia, Sir Duncan Wilson, recalled that she was clearly no ordinary chambermaid.

Class

He said last night: "There was no doubt that she was one of the Russians top-drawer girls.

"She was noticeably in a completely different class from the rest of the domestics they sent us."

Now the Foreign Office is facing pressure to tighten up security checks on local staff employed at British embassies around the world.

It was pointed out that while more than 70 per cent. of the people working at British diplomatic posts overseas are recruited from the local population, the Russians do not have a single non-Soviet person working in any of their embassies abroad. Nor do any other Communist countries.

The affair, which happened in 1963, ended the distinguished diplomatic career of Sir Geoffrey Morrison. He realised he had fallen into a KGB trap, confessed to the Foreign Office and was recalled to London.

Suspicious were not aroused

at the time because the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, so it appeared that Sir Geoffrey was being withdrawn as a sign of Britain's disapproval. He was also close to retiring age.

Yesterday he spoke of his regret over the relationship. At his rambling home near Horsham, Sussex, 73-year-old Sir Geoffrey said he had realised at the time that Galia was probably a Communist 'plant'.

He said: "I did not ask her if she worked for the KGB,

but the assumption was there. I regret it, of course I regret it. I was warned before I went to Moscow about this sort of thing—anyone going to the Iron Curtain countries is warned this can happen.

Referring to the disclosure of the affair in a Sunday newspaper Sir Geoffrey said: "I took no initiative in arranging or encouraging the publication.

"Somebody has stabbed me in the back quite deliberately. I know who it was, and I will not say any more about that."

Sir Geoffrey, wearing an Army-type sweater and slacks, was relaxed and courteous as

he stood at his front door.

The telephone inside rang frequently, and his wife Amy occasionally called to him. She did not come to the door.

My wife knew about this at the time and stood by me," said Sir Geoffrey. The couple married 43 years ago and have three sons and a daughter.

Had the Russians at any time tried to compromise him or blackmail him as a result of his liaison? "I am not prepared to say if the Russians tried to use it against me."

Sir Geoffrey said he volunteered information about the relationship to the Foreign Office after he became concerned about the security

"The girl was still working in the Embassy," he said. "My successor Sir Duncan Wilson fired her."

The diplomat who ran the Embassy until the new ambassador was appointed was instructed not to fire her.

Mr Peter Dalton, 66, who is now retired and living in Mayfield, Sussex, said: "If she had been dismissed at the time, immediately after Sir Geoffrey's departure, everyone would have been rushing about asking why she had been sacked."

Now retired and living in Port Charlotte, Scotland, Sir Duncan said:

"I have no idea how good she was at housework because I dismissed her a few days after I arrived."

x

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x
FCO

Bed-making

IT HAS now been revealed that one of our diplomats in Moscow back in 1968 had to be rapidly summoned home after he admitted sleeping with a Russian chambermaid who worked in the Embassy.

The Soviet Embassy in London employs no British staff. Our embassies in the Soviet Union and elsewhere always take on local men and women to cook, clean, bug, seduce and otherwise 'do' for them.

If we allow Reds—especially curvaceous ones—to make our diplomatic beds, it is not surprising that they sometimes get into them as well as under them!

23 FEB 1981

THE SUN SAYS

Man of honour

SIR Geoffrey Harrison, Britain's one-time Ambassador in Moscow, got caught in a tender trap—just like many another full-blooded man.

The story of how he fell for the charms of a KGB chambermaid at the British Embassy is astonishing but understandable.

At least he had the good sense and patriotism to confess to his bosses at the Foreign

Office—and thus foil the KGB's nefarious intentions.

His action—revealed now more than 12 years after the event—is also an object lesson to other Western diplomats caught in similar doubtful circumstances.

However dotty his original indiscretion Sir Geoffrey is a man of honour. And we hope that all the hullabaloo will soon die down.

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23 FEB 1981

19

The sexy tricks of Galya, the KGB's spy trap girl



Sir Geoffrey yesterday . . . he fell for a Russian spy

THE RUSSIAN chambermaid who lured a British ambassador into a love trap was last night named as a stunning blonde called Galya.

She was revealed as a top KGB girl who used "every trick in the book" to make herself desirable.

The envoy who fell for her charms was Ambassador Sir Geoffrey Harrison, Britain's man in Moscow.

He was recalled in 1968 after confessing to his superiors that he had an affair with Galya.

The girl was named last night by Sir Duncan Wilson — the man who replaced Sir Geoffrey.

His revelation followed yesterday's startling disclosure of the incident in the Sunday Times.

Sir Duncan, now retired, said at his home in Port Charlotte, West Scotland:

"It was pretty obvious she was a top

By SHAN LANCASTER

KGB girl. She was attractive and intelligent.

When Sir Duncan arrived in Moscow his first priority was to sack Galya.

But he soon heard from her again.

Within weeks she had applied to the Australian embassy in Moscow for a job — and told them

to ask the British embassy for references.

"She had quite a nerve," recalled Sir Duncan.

"Of course I advised the Australians that she was not the most reliable or desirable of employees and they did not take her on.

"But I am sure that did not stop her career. I expect she simply changed her name and

went from strength to strength."

Sir Geoffrey, married with three sons, said last night at home near Horsham, Sussex, that he had been told by the Foreign Office to "say nothing."

Sir Geoffrey, now 73, confessed the affair when he thought he might be blackmailed.

His recall was thought to be part of the British protest at the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Warned

Sir Duncan said he believed that every Russian member of the embassy staff in Moscow was in the pay of the KGB.

He added: "But the young female staff were a special risk.

"All members of embassy staff from the most senior to the most junior are always warned to watch their Ps and Qs."

X
F20

23 FEB 1961

'Tender trap' of the KGB

By JOE CLANCY

A FORMER British ambassador to Russia spoke last night about the "tender trap" facing diplomatic staff in Moscow.

And he revealed that he knew the sexy chambermaid who brought about the downfall of his predecessor Sir Geoffrey Harrison.

Sir Duncan Wilson, who replaced Sir Geoffrey in 1968, said: "She was a blonde in her early 30s.

"She was rather outstanding to look at."

Sir Geoffrey was summoned home when he confessed to having an affair with the chambermaid.

He realised the implications after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Sir Duncan, 69, speaking at his home in Fort Charlotte on the remote island of Islay, off West Scotland said the trap was a "well-worn ploy."

★ Star comment—
Page 11

Make love, not war . . .

★ IF WESTERN diplomats carry on the way they are going, James Bond will be out of business. Film-makers will shoot spy thrillers based on official reports of the Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department.

★ First came revelations that an American military attache had to leave Moscow after being lured into a sex trap—with the paraphernalia of the bedroom door kicked in and the flashing camera bulbs.

★ Now comes a confession from Sir Geoffrey Harrison, a former British ambassador, that the KGB tricked him into an affair with a chambermaid.

He says it is happening all the time to diplomats and journalists. "Even to politicians," he adds, perhaps a little unkindly.

★ The Russians must be out of their tiny, ponderous minds. Don't they know that all the world loves a bit of spice? The shame that was attached to that sort of thing was left behind 20 years ago.

★ So why don't we play them at their own game?

★ Our men in Moscow—or Prague or Budapest for that matter—should join in . . . go along with their clumsy plots. Ridicule them. Exaggerate them, even.

★ "What do you mean I was in bed with a woman? I was in bed with TWO women. You do me less than justice, sir, and I demand a correction."

The diplomats and the generals could at last take up the peace slogan of "Make love, not war."

STAR COMMENT

x
Fco

23 FEB 1981

cutting dated

19

British Envoy Admits Tryst

LONDON (Reuters) — A former British ambassador to the Soviet Union has told The Sunday Times he was trapped by KGB security agents into having an affair with a young chambermaid at the embassy in Moscow.

Sir Geoffrey Harrison, now 73, said that when he realized the security implications of the affair, which took place just before the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, he told the British Foreign Office. He was immediately recalled to London.

Sir Geoffrey, married with four children, said: "She was a young, attractive girl. As a trained diplomat, it was an aberration on my part. It was absolutely crazy, but it may now give added warning to Western diplomats who might find themselves similarly tempted."

Fco



cc: C.O

Pps in Garden Room

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 July 1980

From Mr. Leadbetter

Thank you for your letter of 6 June.

As I told the House of Commons on 21 November, I do not propose to confirm or deny or comment on further allegations and insinuations of the kind you mention in your letter. The offences alleged would, if the allegations were substantiated, be serious criminal offences. If those making the allegations have evidence to back them up, and they will produce that evidence to the proper authorities, it can be investigated and decisions can be taken on whether to prosecute by those whose business it is to take such decisions. If they do not have such evidence, then they are in my view acting irresponsibly and reprehensibly in publishing their allegations and insinuations and I should be acting no less irresponsibly if I gave them further currency in statements in the House or letters to Members of Parliament.

Mr. Blunt's case was entirely special. He had on his own admission committed serious offences; but I was in a position to say so in a statement to the House only because there was no possibility of prosecuting him, on account of the offer of immunity from prosecution on which his admission - the only available evidence - was based.

/ I

I would add only one other point. In the course of the prolonged and thorough investigations that followed the defection of Burgess, Maclean and Philby and the admission of Blunt, a great many people were interviewed sometimes to obtain any relevant information they could provide, sometimes to see if they could be eliminated from further enquiries. The fact that somebody was interviewed cannot and should not be assumed to mean that he was himself under suspicion, and it would be quite unfair to suggest that it did mean that.

As to the case of Miss Lamble, that involved quite different considerations from the case of Mr. Blunt. I explained in my speech to the House on 21 November the circumstances which in 1964 caused the Attorney General to authorise an offer of immunity from prosecution which led in due course to Mr. Blunt's confession. In the case of Miss Lamble, as the Attorney General explained to you in his letter of 18 January, the police investigation established a prima facie case against her which was thought to justify charges under the Official Secrets Act, and she was thus arrested and charged. Her subsequent statements indicated that she might not have intended to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the State. The Attorney General took that into account in deciding not to consent to a prosecution.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Ted Leadbitter, Esq., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

cc C.O.
Pr in G/L

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 July, 1980

Dear Mr. Hamilton,

Thank you for your letter of 10 June.

As I told the House of Commons on 21 November, I do not propose to confirm or deny or comment on further allegations and insinuations of the kind you mention in your letter. The offences alleged would, if the allegations were substantiated, be serious criminal offences. If those making the allegations have evidence to back them up, and they will produce that evidence to the proper authorities, it can be investigated and decisions can be taken on whether to prosecute by those whose business it is to take such decisions. If they do not have such evidence, then they are in my view acting irresponsibly and reprehensibly in publishing their allegations and insinuations, and I should be acting no less irresponsibly if I gave them further currency in statements in the House or letters to Members of Parliament.

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Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

W.W. Hamilton, Esq., M.P.



10 DOWNING STREET

cc: C

ps in GAR

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 July, 1980

Dear Mr. George,

Thank you for your letter of 10 June.

As I told the House of Commons on 21 November, I do not propose to confirm or deny or comment on further allegations and insinuations of the kind you mention in your letter. The offences alleged would, if the allegations were substantiated, be serious criminal offences. If those making the allegations have evidence to back them up, and they will produce that evidence to the proper authorities, it can be investigated and decisions can be taken on whether to prosecute by those whose business it is to take such decisions. If they do not have such evidence, then they are in my view acting irresponsibly and reprehensibly in publishing their allegations and insinuations and I should be acting no less irresponsibly if I gave them further currency in statements in the House or letters to Members of Parliament.

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Yours sincerely

Royall H. H. H.

Bruce George, Esq., M.P.

Security



10 DOWNING STREET

CLIVE *MS*

The letters are being typed for the

PM

MS

30/6

A02446

MR SANDERS

With your letters of 10 and 11 June, you enclosed letters to the Prime Minister from Mr Ted Leadbitter MP, Mr Willie Hamilton MP and Mr Bruce George MP. All three letters asked the Prime Minister if she would comment or make a statement on allegations that the Government knows of other spies who were involved with Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt, some of whom were allowed to continue working in Whitehall after their discovery and who went on to occupy positions of influence and importance. You asked for draft replies to all three.

2. These three letters are a result of the publication of the paperback edition of Andrew Boyle's book, The Climate of Treason, and of press accounts of statements allegedly made by Boyle after the book's appearance. The paperback edition of the book added very little to the original hardback version, beyond the definite identification of "Maurice" with Anthony Blunt. In his statements to the press, Boyle seems to have talked about "another 25 moles", and to have alleged that at least three titled men, one of whom is ^ahereditary peer and all of whom have since achieved prominent positions in public life, were investigated as possible spies following the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951, but that no action was taken against them because of a lack of evidence.

3. One can only speculate about the people to whom Boyle (and the three MPs who have written to the Prime Minister) is referring. The hereditary peer is widely believed - not least by himself - to be Lord Rothschild; another possible candidate is Lord Talbot de Malahide. The other people referred to could be Lord Llewelyn-Davies, Sir Michael Stewart, Sir Frederick Warner MEP, or Sir Dennis Proctor. All of them had links either through friendship or work with Burgess, Maclean or Blunt. All of them have been thoroughly investigated. Some, like Lord Rothschild have been investigated more than once and entirely cleared. Others may have been unconscious sources for Burgess, but no evidence has been found to show that they were agents of the Russian Intelligence Service.

4. Sir Robert Armstrong is sure that the Prime Minister should not be drawn into commenting on these allegations. They are quite unspecific and unsupported by any evidence. He recommends that the Prime Minister should reply to Mr Leadbitter along the lines of the attached draft, which includes a paragraph on the comparison Mr Leadbitter has drawn between the Blunt and Lamble cases and which follows closely the form of a reply which the Attorney General sent to Mr Leadbitter about Miss Lamble's case earlier this year. The Prime Minister might use the first few paragraphs of the same draft to reply to Mr Hamilton and Mr George; for them the final paragraph on Miss Lamble should be omitted.

5. The draft reply has been cleared with the Home Office, the Attorney General's Office and the Security Service.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D J Wright', with a long horizontal line extending to the right from the end of the signature.

D J WRIGHT

Cabinet Office

27 June 1980

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 6 June.

2. As I told the House of Commons on 21 November, I do not propose to confirm or deny or comment on further allegations and insinuations of the kind you mention in your letter. The offences alleged would, if the allegations were substantiated, be serious criminal offences. If those making the allegations have evidence to back them up, and they will produce that evidence to the proper authorities, it can be investigated and decisions can be taken on whether to prosecute by those whose business it is to take such decisions. If they do not have such evidence, then they are in my view acting irresponsibly and reprehensibly in publishing their allegations and insinuations and I should be acting no less irresponsibly if I gave them further currency in statements in the House or letters to Members of Parliament.

3. Mr Blunt's case was entirely special. He had on his own admission committed serious offences; but I was in a position to say so in a statement to the House only because there was no possibility of prosecuting him, on account of the offer of immunity from prosecution on which his admission - the only available evidence - was based.

4. I would add only one other point. In the course of the prolonged and thorough investigations that followed the defection of Burgess, Maclean and Philby and the admission of Blunt, a great many people were interviewed sometimes to obtain any relevant information they could provide, sometimes to see if they could be eliminated from further enquiries. The fact that somebody was interviewed cannot and should not be assumed to mean that he was himself under suspicion, and it would be quite unfair to suggest that it did mean that.

5. As to the case of Miss Lamble, that involved quite different considerations from the case of Mr Blunt. I explained in my speech to the House on 21 November the circumstances which in 1964 caused the Attorney General to authorise an offer of immunity from prosecution which led in due course to Mr Blunt's confession. In the case of Miss Lamble, as the Attorney General explained to you in his letter of 18 January, the police investigation established a prima facie case against her which was thought to justify charges under the Official Secrets Act, and she was thus arrested and charged. Her subsequent statements indicated that she might not have intended to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the State. The Attorney General took that into account in deciding not to consent to a prosecution.

Another voice

Lord Rothschild is innocent

Auberon Waugh

About ten years ago a man called James Cameron – no relation to the doyen of left-wing newspaper correspondents who sometimes rejoices in the witty if obscure nickname of Lunchtime O'Boccaccio's Decameron – was murdered in nasty circumstances in Islington. I had never met or even heard of this second James Cameron until that moment. His death was just another of those sad events recorded daily in the newspapers.

A few days later I was dining with some people in Wiltshire when one of the company said he had known this Cameron, who was employed by a well-known firm of pill manufacturers and made frequent trips behind the Iron Curtain. In fact these trips were of a frequency which made my informant doubt whether they could be entirely explained by his pill-pushing activities. Perhaps, like Harold Wilson's sorties behind the Iron Curtain on behalf of the timber firm of Montagu Meyer before his election as party leader, they were also of use in providing Mr Cameron with background information about conditions and attitudes in Eastern Europe, contacts with important people in the pill world and a rounding of his knowledge and experience in accordance with the general concept of Renaissance Man. But my informant was of the opinion that he probably worked for the FCO's Secret Intelligence Service.

If so, his murder became more interesting. Like so many others who worked in that dangerous trade, Cameron was an active homosexualist. Might he, perhaps, have been compromised in some way by the Moscow authorities and subjected to blackmail? Was he rather the victim of some lover's tiff within the hot-house atmosphere of MI6, or had he been murdered as a security risk by someone from the equally susceptible but opposed ranks of MI5? The possibilities seemed endless, but it was not a line of inquiry one could usefully pursue within the hysterically secretive corridors of our intelligence and security establishments so I contented myself with writing a concerned but not entirely serious paragraph in *Private Eye* urging our intelligence and security Services to concentrate on their jobs and stop wasting tax payers' money murdering each other in this way.

A few days later the telephone rang in the country and I found myself summoned to the Murder Inquiry Headquarters at Essex Road Police Station. A friendly exasperated Detective Chief Superintendent asked me if I had anything to add to my information: he had spent many hours of his time checking my allegations, he said. I had the uneasy impression that his inquiries may have taken him as far as the Head of the

Secret Intelligence Service whom I had rashly named as the Guilty Man in my article. No, I said I had nothing to add. I did not really know why I had written that paragraph: it seemed a good idea at the time.

I tell this anecdote at such enormous length because it seems to provide an important insight into Andrew Boyle's cryptic revelations of last week that among those questioned by MI5 after the defection of Burgess and Maclean was a hereditary peer who worked in Intelligence during the war and who later rose to great eminence. I am not in Mr Boyle's confidence, but nobody who has followed the Blunt case at all closely can be in any doubt that this refers to Lord Rothschild, the immensely distinguished spermatologist who sits as a Labour peer in the House of Lords – nothing wrong with that! – and who was appointed by Mr Heath as the first Director General of the Central Policy Review Staff when the august body was formed in the Cabinet Office in 1971. It would be most surprising if Lord Rothschild had not been asked by MI5 to help in their investigations into the disappearance of Burgess, since he was not only a colleague of Burgess's at Trinity College Cambridge, like everyone else, but also something of a personal friend, in whose London house Burgess lived at one time. It would be equally true to say that I was questioned by police investigating the murder of James Cameron, and there would be nothing untrue in the statement that police investigating the murder of James Cameron had found no evidence against me. Both these statements may fail to convey the full extent of my uninvolvedness, but where murder is concerned, in my experience, people generally give one the benefit of the doubt. It is only in the hysterical world of espionage that people are prepared to lose all sight of common sense.

Any suggestion which might be implied that Lord Rothschild could even have been under suspicion by MI5 as a Soviet agent or witting concealer of Soviet agents is so preposterous as to belong to the world of pulp fiction. Quite apart from anything else, Mr Heath would scarcely have been able to appoint him to a position in the Cabinet Office where he had instant access to any government information he required. It is true that Mr Heath was not always as careful in security matters as he might have been, as the sudden resignation of two Ministers in 1973 brought home. After the first 1974 election he offered Jeremy Thorpe a senior position in the Cabinet while in a position to suspect that Thorpe was being actively blackmailed by a former homosexual acquaintance. Although we may never know whether Thorpe was

offered the Home Office, as I heard at the time, or the Foreign Office, as the *Sunday Times* later claimed, both are highly sensitive posts, and it seems curious that Mr Heath was so concerned with his own continuation in office that he should have been prepared to take such an obvious risk. But no such consideration swayed his appointment of Lord Rothschild to the Cabinet Office, and as a civil servant, Rothschild would have been subject to a very thorough security vetting.

It is only within the conventions imposed by our murderous libel laws, where nothing may be discussed except obliquely, with a nudge and wink, that such absurd inferences are likely to be drawn. We should also, in my view, be on our guard against attempts to smear the hereditary peerage. Only this week, in the *Sunday Times*, there was an extraordinary reference to some human excrement found in a grave in the Valley of the Kings which dated from the 1920s, with the unmistakable suggestion that it had been left there by my august great-uncle, Lord Carnarvon. There was not so much as a title of evidence in support of this innuendo. Those who knew him and his extraordinarily scrupulous habits will affirm that the idea is preposterous, but there the smear remains in the *Sunday Times* Colour Magazine for any of its gutterish, proletarian readers to pick up if they choose.

My purpose in raising this matter was not simply to reaffirm what anybody who has given the matter any thought will have decided long ago, that Lord Rothschild is innocent. So is Lord Carnarvon, of defiling the Royal Tombs of Egypt. So am I, of murdering James Cameron, although it is true I am not a peer of the realm, so my innocence is of less importance. My real purpose is to appeal for a general amnesty on all Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Men who may still be lurking as venerable septuagenarians around the portals of the Athenaeum.

At one time socialism might have been a good idea. Its inspiration, in those days, was generous and humane. Nowadays, it can appeal only to those whose social maladjustment might otherwise push them into the criminal classes, or whose intellectual inadequacies make them hungry for a dogmatic system in which they can hide their inability to think for themselves. Socialism, as anyone can see, has turned out to be a thoroughly bad idea. Is it not time to allow those who made a mistake in their early years, when conditions were so different, to admit it quietly to themselves and quietly retire? Then we can concentrate on the sad rearguard of this intellectual movement, the intellectual runts of our universities and technical colleges, the rooting hogs of the trade union movement and the psychopathic opportunists of the Labour Party who still hope to impose – whether by trickery or brute force – a system they cannot hope to recommend by ordinary persuasion. There are Soviet agents still active in our cosy little world of make-believe.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Andrew Boyle has now published a paperback edition of his book The Climate of Treason, the publication of the hardback edition of which led to the disclosure that Anthony Blunt had been a Soviet agent.

2. The text of the original edition has been altered very little except in so far as Boyle is now able to proclaim openly Blunt's identity. There are additional passages in the new edition giving biographical information about Blunt, and the last part of the book is expanded by the inclusion of a new chapter entitled "Close of Play" which incorporates most of the original Epilogue, and a new Epilogue which relates events since the publication of the original edition.

3. There is very little new information of substance or significance, but Boyle does state in his new chapter (pages 475 and 476) that Blunt's confession in 1964 came after he had been told of new evidence of American origin. [According to The Times of 6 June Boyle identified the source of this new information as being a KGB defector, which we know to be incorrect].

4. The evening papers of 5 June and the daily papers of 6 June contained varying accounts of statements allegedly made by Boyle, but not reflected in the text of his book, at the launching of the paperback edition. According to these newspaper reports Boyle alleged that at least three titled men, one of whom is an hereditary peer and all of whom have since achieved positions of prominence in public life, were discovered to be spies following the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951, but no action was taken against them because of lack of evidence. There is disagreement in the Press as to whether the two apart from the hereditary peer were a life peer and a knight or two knights, but all three are alleged to have been interrogated and The Times reports Boyle as having said that one of the three was a peer who served in "the intelligence services" during the Second World War. Several papers (The Daily Star and the Daily Express) report Boyle as saying that one of the three was a homosexual.

5. One can only speculate about the names of the people to whom Boyle is referring. The hereditary peer might be either Lord Rothschild or Lord Talbot de Malahide. Lord Rothschild was in MI5 from 1940 until 1964, was a member of the Apostles at Cambridge before the War, and was responsible for introducing Blunt to MI5. He has been very thoroughly investigated, in particular when he became Head of the CPRS in 1971, and has been cleared.

6. Lord Talbot de Malahide was a contemporary and friend of Burgess at Cambridge, and a homosexual associate. He was Head of the Security Department at the Foreign Office at the time when Burgess and Maclean defected, only having joined that day. He resigned from the Foreign Office in 1958 for personal reasons and died in 1973. He may well have been an unconscious source for Burgess, but there is no evidence to believe that he was actively and deliberately an agent of the Russian Intelligence Service.

7. The other people referred to might be any one of:

- (a) Lord Llewelyn-Davies, a fellow member of the Apostles at Cambridge with Blunt and Burgess before the War, who shared the Rothschild flat with them during the War: a Communist at the university, whose views probably remain unchanged; but no evidence that he has ever been an agent of the RIS.
- (b) Sir Frederick Warner, MEP, worked with Burgess in Hector McNeil's private office after the War: a close friend and possibly a homosexual associate of Burgess; probably an unconscious source, but he has been intensively investigated, and there is no evidence to connect him with the RIS.
- (c) Sir Dennis Proctor, a lifelong and self-confessed Marxist, who was a friend of Burgess and Blunt before the War and is still a very close friend of Blunt: joined the Civil Service in 1929, and worked in the Treasury and Ministry of Transport, finishing his career in 1965 as Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Power. Has admitted to being very indiscreet in what he said to Burgess, but no reason to suppose that he was actively and deliberately an RIS agent.

8. I attach a line to take, if this matter is raised in Questions. I do not think that the Prime Minister ought to be drawn beyond this, in the face of these very unspecific allegations.

COVERING TOP SECRET

Security

C/W

10.6.80.

DRAFT ANSWER

I am aware of the allegations to which the hon. Gentleman refers. As I made clear to the House in answer to a Question by the Hon. Gentleman the Member for Oldham, West on 29 November last, I do not propose to comment further on suggestions of this kind.

MR WHITMORE

WJ

1986



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON S.W.1.A. 0.A.A.

*Correspondence
in ER*

The Prime Minister,
10, Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

6th. Jun'80.

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

On the 15th. Nov'79 I tabled a question in the House referring to Anthony Blunt asking if you would make a statement. You provided an answer far more forthcoming than any previous Prime Minister. I make this comparison because history has shown that with one exception other Prime Ministers were informed but took no steps either to inform the House or have Blunt removed from the Palace.

I had every reason to suppose I and the House received a full statement. Indeed the positive steps you took, followed by a Parliamentary debate, and the withdrawal of the Protection of Information Bill, led me to consider that all that need to be said had been said.

However, this does not appear to be the case. While it may be considered that there is no Prime Ministerial responsibility for what is published in the press recent revelations open up, nevertheless, the vexing question of 'people in high places' deliberately covering up matters involving national security. I recall Blunt himself in a television interview brazenly stating without any sense of remorse that he felt a loyalty to his friends rather than his country. This was his excuse for silence as the fourth man in the Mclean, Philby and Burgess scandal.

That people do exist who consider themselves above the law and even not accountable to Governments can no more be in doubt. We now learn if reports are correct, and so far the sources of these reports have been profoundly correct, there were three more spies working for Russia - a Peer and two knights - who subsequently went on to distinguished Whitehall careers. It is also alleged that there were 25 'moles'. Some were turfed out of office. Some were not.

So we have it that there are people who hitherto have had knowledges of this serious breach in our national security, but apparently have also had the power to get rid of some, yet promote the interests of others. Were previous Prime Ministers informed of this? Have you been informed?

I do not believe the country will accept a plea that has been made in the House that, in the case of the Blunt debate, the passing of time, the age of people, can be a reason for not pursuing this matter officially.

Blunt himself, according to reports, is stated as saying so far as his activities were concerned ' he has no blood on his hands'. But an account has been given that a lot of Poles and others died as a result of information he gave to his masters in Russia.

This raises another important question. When Blunt was exposed he was allowed to make public comment, and comment of the kind calculated to mitigate the enormity of his betrayal, appear to have not involved the loss of life, and to suggest reasons for treachery. Miss Lambie was arrested, charged and put in Holloway prison for some weeks before Xmas of last year. At that time there were suggestions more names of Moles might be revealed. Was her release in connection with that? Was the instruction that she had to make no public comment the condition of her sudden release? In any case why was she treated so differently from Blunt? The one has been favoured, but the less influential lady was not. I would appreciate your comments on these serious matters.

Ted Leadbitter



Security

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Professor Anthony Blunt

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute AO1391 of 12 February 1980 and she has noted that the Army Board has decided that Professor Blunt should forfeit his honorary rank of captain and that, in accordance with the Army Board's request, he has returned four medals.

CAW

14 February 1980

020

2.

Prime Minister.

AKH

13ii

Ref. A01391

MR. WHITMORE

Professor Anthony Blunt

The Prime Minister will wish to know that the Army Board has decided that Professor Blunt should forfeit his honorary rank of captain and be asked to return any war medals in his possession.

2. Today's London Gazette includes the notification of his deprivation of rank, and he has returned four miniature medals which he says are the only medals in his possession.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

12th February, 1980

Thursday 17 January 1980

Security

(Answered by the Prime Minister on 18 January)

UNSTARRED Mr. Dennis Canavan: To ask the Prime Minister, how
NO. 210 many people still living have been granted immunity
from prosecution after being involved in espionage
activities; and whether she will name them.

The grant of immunity from prosecution is not a
matter for me or the Government but for my right
hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General, who
gave the information requested in the course of
his speech in the House on 21 November 1979.

Background letter returned
to ~~Robert Ameron's~~ office
C.F. 18.1.80

Ref: A01192

MR. WHITMORE

With my minute of 11th January I provided notes, in question and answer form, about the various "spy" cases that might be raised with the Prime Minister in supplementary questions.

2. In the event no such questions were asked but the material remains available.

3. You will have seen the article by Andrew Boyle in yesterday's Observer, describing the conversation which he had with Mr. Goronwy Rees, when Mr. Rees was on his death bed. It really is a remarkable and disagreeable example of guilt by association and innuendo. It is said - correctly - that Guy Liddell was a friend of Guy Burgess; and from that it is insinuated first that he was a homosexual partner of Burgess and perhaps of Blunt and further that he was or might have been implicated in their espionage activities. It is also alleged that he was retired prematurely from the Security Service in disgrace.

4. The allegations are so entirely without substance or supporting evidence that I think the Prime Minister should stick to her line of refusing to comment on unsubstantiated allegations about individuals. But she could, if she wished, comment on the insinuation that Mr. Liddell was prematurely retired. As the Security Service note I sent you ten days ago made clear, that is the reverse of the truth: he was actually asked to stay on for another year after reaching the normal retirement age of 60.

5. I attach an additional "Question and Answer" note, in case this point is put to the Prime Minister and she wishes to respond.

RA

Robert Armstrong

21st January 1980

Q. Will the Prime Minister comment on the allegations on Guy Liddell made by the late Goronwy Rees and reported in The Observer for Sunday, 20th January?

A. I have read the article in question. It is all innuendo and not a scintilla of evidence; and of course it is no longer possible for Mr. Goronwy Rees to be questioned about it. I have already told the House that I am not prepared to comment on unsubstantiated allegations of this kind about individuals. Hon. Members will have seen reports of what Mr. Liddell's surviving colleagues think of these particular stories. For my part, I deplore the way in which some newspapers have, apparently without regard to the distress that they may be causing to surviving relatives and friends, published unsupported allegations and innuendoes about people who served their country well and loyally and are no longer alive to defend themselves.

On one aspect of the matter, however, I am prepared to make this comment. It is alleged that Mr. Guy Liddell was prematurely retired from his post in the Security Service because the Americans refused to work with him. That is not true: indeed, it is the reverse of true. Mr. Liddell reached the retirement age of 60 in 1952. He was asked to extend his service by one year, and he retired in 1953. So his retirement was delayed, not brought forward; and there is no evidence of any American unwillingness to work with him or representations for his early retirement. It is true that on his retirement he took an appointment as Chief Security Officer at Harwell; but that was a perfectly ordinary case of taking a job on retirement from a service career, and there was absolutely no question of demotion or disgrace about it.

SECRET

01-405 7641 Ext. 3291

Communications on this subject should
be addressed to
THE LEGAL SECRETARY
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

3

17 January 1980

CABINET OFFICE
A 8129
17 JAN 1980
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Martin Vile Esq
Cabinet Office
Whitehall
LONDON S W 1

*Mr Sanders
RTA is correct
M.V.
17/1*

*- Cabinet Office content
for Mr to read
Tel 18-1-80.*

Dear Martin,

You asked on the telephone for a draft answer to Mr Dennis Canavan's question to the Prime Minister. After speaking to the Attorney General, I would suggest the attached answer.

The suggested answer makes the point that immunities are for the Attorney General, not for the Prime Minister or the Government and I think that is an important point for the Prime Minister to make.

In his winding-up speech in the Blunt Debate (Official Report 21 November 1979 col 519) the Attorney General said -

"It may interest the House to know that in these matters of secrecy one immunity has been granted since the war - the one in the case of Blunt."

To my knowledge from papers here Blunt is the only person to whom immunity was granted in a secrets case. Bernard Sheldon has no recollection of any other case.

Mr Canavan asks his question about immunities "granted" and the Attorney General in the Blunt Debate specifically referred to immunities "granted". Immunities authorised, however, are a different matter since in March 1970 the then Attorney General, now Lord Rawlinson, did authorise the Security Service that they could assure John Cairncross that he would not be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. This was in connection with a proposed interview with Cairncross at which it was hoped to secure his co-operation to confront Norman John Klugmann about the latter's involvement with the spy network of which Burgess and Maclean were members. At the time of the Blunt Debate the Attorney General was informed that in the event no such immunity was granted to Cairncross. We have since been informed, however, by Bernard Sheldon that on looking at the investigator's notes

/of

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SECRET

01-405 7641 Ext.

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THE LEGAL SECRETARY
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LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

of his interview with Cairncross in Paris the investigator did say to Cairncross that "he was free to come to the UK".
The Attorney General does not regard this as amounting to the grant of an immunity from prosecution. There was no admissible evidence against Cairncross (his admissions in 1964 in the United States would not have been admissible here) and he has not made any other admissions that could be used against him.

The Attorney General is satisfied, therefore, that Blunt is the only person to whom an immunity from prosecution has been granted.

Yours sincerely,
Bill Beckett

W C BECKETT

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A01161

MR. WHITMORE

Blunt

In your minute of 10th December to Sir Robert Armstrong you conveyed the Prime Minister's views on the question of stripping Blunt of his honorary rank of Captain and of his wartime medals.

2. We have now heard that the Army Board has decided that Blunt should forfeit his honorary rank and be asked to return any war medals in his possession. Blunt is being informed of this and an announcement of his loss of honorary rank will be published in the London Gazette.

MJV.
(M. J. Vile)

17th January, 1980

2.

Prime Minister.

To note.

MJV

17.

MJV

Prime Minister .2A

A B J
Duty Clerk.
11.1.80.

Ref. A01129

MR. WHITMORE

I attach notes, in question and answer form, about the various "spy" cases that might be raised with the Prime Minister in supplementary questions when the House resumes.

2. The three names most publicised are those of John CAIRNCROSS, Tomas HARRIS and Guy LIDDELL. Notes on these are attached.

3. John Cairncross was tracked down in Italy by Barry Penrose, who has been commissioned by the Sunday Times to do an investigative job on the whole surroundings of the Blunt affair. Penrose was enabled by a lead from Sir John Colville to identify Cairncross as someone who had given information to Guy Burgess. When interviewed by Penrose, Cairncross admitted to having been a Communist before the war and having given Burgess certain information at that time, and to having been asked to resign from the public service in the aftermath of Burgess's defection. As the Security Service note makes clear, there was a good deal more to his activities than that. He later admitted spying for the Russians from 1936 to 1951. For part of his career, during the war, he was at Bletchley Park in the GC and CS, and subsequently in the SIS. But his admissions were made abroad, and he refused to return to this country and repeat his statement under caution to a police officer. I am told that it would not be possible to get him extradited, and it is thought to be doubtful whether he could be prosecuted if he came back to this country. As the Security Service says, the case was considered by Ministers, including the then Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) in February and March 1964. It has been covered in successive reports to Ministers on Professor Blunt on every occasion since 1972.

4. The case of Cairncross differs from that of Blunt, in that the admissions obtained from Cairncross were not made in return for a promise of no prosecution. He remains liable to prosecution, should he return to this country. It is, as I say, doubtful whether he could be prosecuted, but he does not know that, and it is not desirable that he should. The Prime Minister cannot deny that he was

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required to resign in 1952, nor that he was not prosecuted; but she should in my judgment say no more about the case than is necessary to account for those facts, and should refuse to be drawn on developments in the case since he was required to resign.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 22
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

6. Tomas Harris was a painter, a friend of Blunt, ^{and of Philby} who had a distinguished career in SOE, ^{and in MI5} during the war. There is no evidence whatever that he was a Soviet spy, and no reason to suspect his loyalty to his country. He was killed in a road accident in February 1964, and it has been suggested in the Press that it was his death that released Blunt from the obligations to friends which, he claims, had hitherto prevented him from confessing. Blunt has stated categorically, and as we know truthfully, that Tomas Harris' death had nothing to do with his confession. The Prime Minister will remember that Mr. Ewen Montagu wrote to the Attorney General and to me, and Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams MP wrote to her, about this matter, because of the distress caused to Tomas Harris's sisters by the allegations.

7. Guy Liddell was a Deputy Director of the Security Service at the time of the defection of Burgess and Maclean. He was a personal friend of Blunt, but there is no evidence that he was a Soviet agent, and no reason whatever to suspect his loyalty. He is now dead, but the allegations that he was a spy has much angered and distressed former friends and colleagues.

SECRET

8. The Prime Minister is sufficiently familiar with the case of Miss Pamela Lamble. She may be asked why she was treated differently from Blunt - "one law for the Establishment, another for the rest". The salient differences are that there was no evidence which could be used to substantiate charges against Blunt (whereas there was such evidence in the case of Lamble), and it was desirable to secure Blunt's co-operation in providing information to assist the pursuit of other inquiries (whereas the Lamble case stood on its own). Answers to these and other questions that may be put to the Prime Minister on the Lamble case are included in the Q. and A. notes attached.



Robert Armstrong

11th January 1980

Q. Has the Prime Minister seen the accounts in the Press of a number of people believed to have been associated with the espionage activities of Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt? Will she now take action to set up a full public inquiry to allay public disquiet about these matters? Will she make a further statement?

A. I have seen references to one case where a man was required to resign from the public service because he had given material he should not have given to Guy Burgess, but was not prosecuted. I have also seen, and much deplore, references to a number of people who served their country well and loyally and are no longer alive to defend themselves against the unsubstantiated allegations and innuendos being published about them. I have seen nothing to cause me to change my view that there is no need or justification for a public inquiry.

Q. Will the Prime Minister make a statement about the espionage activities of John Cairncross.

A. Mr. John Cairncross entered the public service in 1936 ^{from Cambridge,} ~~After the~~ ^{where he joined the Communist Party in 1935.} After the defection of Guy Burgess it was discovered that Mr. Cairncross had passed certain material to him in 1939. Mr. Cairncross was interviewed. He admitted responsibility for the material in question, but made no other admissions. The material was not prejudicial to national security, but it was material which Mr. Cairncross had no business to pass to Burgess. The Director of Public Prosecutions decided that no prosecution was justified, but it was considered that Mr. Cairncross's conduct was not consistent with continued membership of the public service, and in April 1952 he was required to resign. He has since lived and worked abroad.

Q. Why has no attempt been made to seek the extradition of Mr. Cairncross to stand trial in this country?

A. Whether his extradition could be sought would depend on whether he could be charged with an offence which was extraditable under the law of the country in which he was living. This has so far not been the case.

Q. Was Mr. Cairncross granted immunity from prosecution?

Has Mr. Cairncross been interviewed since 1952?

A. I do not think I can add to what I have said. Though Mr. Cairncross was not prosecuted in 1952, ^{his admissions were not made in return for a promise of} ~~he has never been granted~~ immunity from prosecution. I have therefore to be very careful what I say.

Q. Will the Prime Minister make a statement on the allegations that Tomas Harris/Guy Liddell etc. was a Russian spy?

A. I have already made it clear to the House that I am not prepared to comment on unsubstantiated allegations of this kind about individuals. If any hon. Member or any one else has any evidence to support such allegations, then it is his duty to make it available to the authorities for investigation. I deplore the way in which some newspapers have, apparently without regard to the distress that they may be causing to surviving relatives, published unsupported allegations and innuendoes about people who served their country well and loyally and are no longer alive to defend themselves.

Q. Why was LAMBLE treated differently from Blunt?

Q. Please explain the difference in the treatment of Blunt and Lamble.

A. The two cases involved quite different kinds of considerations. Blunt, suspected of espionage on behalf of the Russian Intelligence Service, had been interrogated on numerous occasions and had consistently refused to make any admissions. As I explained in my speech in the House on 21st November, it was desirable to secure his co-operation in the provision of information which could assist the pursuit of other inquiries by the security authorities. It was in these circumstances that the Attorney General of the day authorised the grant of an immunity from prosecution. No such considerations applied to Lamble. In her case it was possible to adopt the normal course. She was interrogated by the police, her home was searched under warrant, and she made a statement to them. This police operation produced evidence which was thought to justify charges under the Official Secrets Acts.

Q. Why was Lamble kept in custody for four weeks?

A. The police investigations established a prima facie case against her. However, her statements indicated that she might not have intended to act in a manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. This necessitated further enquiries. When these had been completed the Attorney General decided that it was not a case in which he should consent to prosecution.

Q. Is there any truth in reports that the prosecution was unable to proceed because of the sensitivity of the information involved?


A. It is for the Attorney General to decide whether or not a prosecution should proceed in such cases. He does not, and is not required to, give reasons for his decisions. It is certainly not for me to do so.

Q. What steps have been taken to investigate and remedy Miss Lamble's allegations about deficiencies in the security of the Security Services?

A. I do not propose to comment on the allegations attributed to Miss Lamble on these matters, but I can assure the House that the security of the agencies is kept under constant and vigilant review. For obvious reasons I could not disclose what steps are taken at any particular time.

Q. Is it true that Miss Lamble was arrested because she had complained about working conditions in her employment?

A. No, that is nonsense. She was arrested because there was reason to believe that she had committed offences under the Official Secrets Acts.



John CAIRNCROSS

CAIRNCROSS was born 27 July 1913 in Lesmahagow, Lanarkshire, Scotland. He was educated at Hamilton Academy, Glasgow University, The Sorbonne and, from 1934 to 1936 at Trinity, Cambridge. He was a brilliant student and passed top into the Civil Service in 1936 being accepted for the Foreign Office. He did not make a success of his time in the Foreign Office as he was deemed 'unsuitable for representation' and, despite his academic record, he was unable to cope with the administrative work demanded of him. In 1938 he was transferred to the Treasury and while there acted as Private Secretary to Lord Hankey.

2. In 1942 CAIRNCROSS enlisted and was posted to GC and CS at Bletchley where he remained until he joined Section V of SIS in June 1943. In SIS he worked on Analysis, Collation and circulation of intelligence reports, particularly those dealing with Germany. Later he transferred to Section I of SIS dealing with political intelligence.

3. In 1945 he returned to the Treasury and worked in the Defence Material Division. In 1948 he submitted his resignation, as he wanted to take up a position with a business firm, but this fell through and he withdrew his resignation. In 1950 he was appointed UK representative on Western Union and NATO Finance and Economic Division and in August 1950 was transferred to the Exchange Control Division of the Treasury. In 1951 he went for a short time to the Ministry of Supply, but returned to the Treasury later that year.

4. In June 1951 his address and telephone number were found in the office diary of Donald MACLEAN and he was interviewed about this in August of that year. He volunteered information about a casual acquaintanceship with Guy BURGESS but made no other admissions of significance.

5. A document was found amongst BURGESS's possessions soon after his defection in 1951 recording conversations with Government officials in the aftermath of the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Enquiries

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (2).
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

established that the author was CAIRNCROSS and he was interviewed by the Security Service on 31 March 1952 and made a written statement on 2 April. He admitted authorship of the document and claimed that it had been prepared after a discussion with BURGESS in 1939 about Chamberlain's intentions. He had lent it to BURGESS who had promised to return it but had subsequently said that he had accidentally destroyed it. He made no other admissions.

6. The Director of Public Prosecutions, who had been consulted before the interview, was informed of CAIRNCROSS' statement and decided that no prosecution was justified. CAIRNCROSS was suspended from duty on 31 March and resigned in April 1952. He thereafter lived and worked abroad.

7. In 1962 information was obtained from a Russian defector about a British spy network known as the Ring of Five, of which BURGESS, MACLEAN and PHILBY were believed to be members. The Security Service suspected that CAIRNCROSS might also have been a member.

8. In February 1964 CAIRNCROSS obtained a post with a university in the United States. The appropriate United States intelligence authorities were informed of the full facts of his security record and did not object to the grant of a visa.

a senior Security Service
officer should interview CAIRNCROSS on his arrival in the United States.

9. This interview took place on 16 February 1964

It was agreed that the officer could offer to intercede with the United States authorities if CAIRNCROSS was frank but it was stipulated that he should make no promises to him that he would be allowed to stay in the United States. CAIRNCROSS then made a statement admitting spying for the Russians from 1936 to 1951.

10. On 19 February 1964 the Secretary of the Cabinet informed the Prime Minister of these developments. At a meeting held by the Prime Minister on 21 February 1964 the Attorney General advised that none of the information provided by CAIRNCROSS was admissible in evidence (presumably upon the ground that it might be tainted by inducement) and said that he could only

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consider a prosecution if CAIRNCROSS made a statement under caution to a police officer. He also expressed some doubts about whether it would be right to prosecute for things which had occurred at least twelve years previously. In an interview in the United States on 1 March with a Security Service officer, CAIRNCROSS formally declined to return to this country (and under US law he could not be compelled to return) or to make such a statement. After a further submission about the case, the Prime Minister ruled on 9 March 1964 that there was no sufficient reason to justify taking further action.


11. CAIRNCROSS' confession in 1964 is not now believed to have been entirely frank and subsequent interviews have not completely clarified the position. He claimed to have been recruited in October 1936 (after he had joined the Foreign Office) by James KLUGMAN who he had known at Cambridge and he has admitted that he worked to some five Russian controllers. He has been interviewed by the Security Service on twenty-three separate occasions but has said that he is a man who only speaks the truth when he feels the consequences of doing so are better than continuing to lie. Even then the record shows that he has only told as much of the truth as seemed necessary in the circumstances.

12. After 1964 he was seen by the Security Service on a number of occasions up to 1974 in order to try to establish how he was recruited and what he had passed to the Russians when he was active as a spy. Although he gave some information about how he was rewarded by the Russians it was never established precisely how he was recruited, how he was controlled and what information he passed to them. It was decided in 1974 not to interview him further unless new intelligence became available that might make it possible to prize further admissions from him.

SECURITY SERVICE

10 January 1980

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
Press Exposure of CAIRNCROSS

1. The public exposure of CAIRNCROSS as a spy stems from a report in the Sunday Times of 18 November 1979 based on information supplied by Sir John Colville. Colville did not name CAIRNCROSS but gave a clue to his identity. He said that character sketches of senior civil servants had been found amongst BURGESS' possessions after his defection. One of these had been written by a man who had lunched with Colville in March 1939. In 1952 Colville had helped security officials identify the handwriting as that of a FO official - "one of the best brains in the FO". According to Colville, the man who was subsequently given the sack was working for the Communist Party in 1938/1939.
2. A report in the Sunday People of the same date claimed that the man had worked in British intelligence. Other papers carried similar stories over the next few days, still not mentioning CAIRNCROSS by name.
3. The 23 December 1979 issue of the Sunday Times carried a report by David LEITCH and Barry PENROSE headed "I was spy for Soviets". In this article CAIRNCROSS made a seemingly frank confession that in the 1930s he had belonged to the Cambridge University communist cell and that later he had given BURGESS information on Britain's diplomatic strategy and political options. He claimed that he had stopped giving information to BURGESS after the outbreak of the Second World War.
4. The same day (23 December 1979) the Observer quoted Andrew BOYLE as saying that CAIRNCROSS was one of six diplomats who were investigated by MI5 during the enquiry following the BURGESS/MACLEAN defections. CAIRNCROSS, a minor conspirator, had not been prosecuted as his trial would have smacked of a witch-hunt.
5. Other newspapers carried similar stories. The Scotsman of 24 December 1979 quoted Dennis Canavan (Lab MP W Stirlingshire) as saying the case was "another cover-up" about which he would question the PM. The Daily Telegraph of 27 December 1979 reported that Canavan and Bob Cryer (Lab MP Keighly) would raise the case by PQ. The MPs said

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that de facto immunity had been given; an enquiry was needed into the security services generally and that in the case of prosecutions there was one rule for the Establishment, another for the general run of cases. The Sunday Times of 30 December 1979 carried another article by LEITCH and PENROSE forecasting a parliamentary "double standards" attack by the Opposition in relation to OSA prosecutions, that there would be a call for an enquiry and demands to know whether CAIRNCROSS would be extradited and prosecuted.

SECURITY SERVICE

11 January 1980

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FP441-0302-5-1/LN(BM.21)

Guy Maynard LIDDELL

LIDDELL was born on 8 November 1892 and educated at St George's Windsor and Repton. He then spent a year at the University of Angers in France and a further year in Germany studying the cello before going to a crammer to prepare for the Civil Service examination. The War then intervened and he joined the Royal Artillery in 1914 serving in France and winning the M.C. On being demobilised in 1919 he joined the Counter Espionage/Counter Subversion department at New Scotland Yard where he remained until that department was absorbed into the Security Service in 1931. He retired from the Service in 1953 at the age of 61 having become DDG in 1946. He then joined the Atomic Energy Department and served as Chief Security Officer at Harwell until his death in December 1958. He was married in 1926 and had four children, but divorced his wife in 1942. He was awarded the CBE in 1944 and the CB in 1953.

2. In 1978/79 there were two published suggestions that LIDDELL might not have been wholly trustworthy. In April 1978 Encounter published an article by Robert Cecil who spoke about LIDDELL's friendship with BURGESS and claimed that a few days after BURGESS's disappearance LIDDELL was demoted to Chief Security Officer at Harwell. Two extracts from Richard DEACON's book "The British Connection", which was subsequently withdrawn because of its many inaccuracies, were published in The Guardian

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on 29 and 30 May 1979, and in the second of these there was a reference to LIDDELL's friendship with BURGESS and PHILBY and his consequent early removal from MI5. More recent reports in the Press - in particular an article in the Daily Mirror of 30 December 1979 -, based on a yet unpublished book called "Master of Deception" by David Mure have alleged that LIDDELL was a spy. The basis of these allegations seems to be that LIDDELL was a friend of BLUNT, BURGESS and PHILBY, that he deliberately misrouted intelligence about the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbour in 1941, and that LIDDELL was prematurely retired in 1953 because the Americans refused to continue to work with him.

3. It is true that LIDDELL was friendly with BLUNT, BURGESS and PHILBY even though they were much younger than he. He was a particularly close friend of BLUNT with whom he shared artistic interests, and he had a close working relationship with PHILBY during the War. There is no evidence of a close friendship with BURGESS but he certainly knew him well. One or two acquaintances of LIDDELL have suggested, without any evidence, that he might have been a homosexual, but a number of friends, including BLUNT, have denied this.

4. There is no evidence whatsoever that LIDDELL deliberately misrouted intelligence about Pearl Harbour, and the allegation that LIDDELL was prematurely retired in 1953 because the Americans refused to work with him is false. He was, in fact,

asked to extend his service by one year in 1952 when he reached the retirement age of 60. Furthermore, on leaving the Security Service in 1953, he went on to serve for five years as Chief Security Officer at Harwell. LIDDELL had many friends at management level in the American intelligence and security organisations, and there is no evidence of any American representations for his early retirement.

5. In view of his position as DDG of the Security Service LIDDELL was undoubtedly unwise in continuing to associate with BLUNT and PHILBY after the defection of BURGESS and MACLEAN when he knew them to be under suspicion and when he himself had serious doubts about PHILBY in particular. There are, however, no reasons to doubt LIDDELL's loyalty. The number of independent reports from past members of the Security Service that, both during and after the War, LIDDELL was almost obsessively concerned about Russian Intelligence Service penetration of our Intelligence and Security Services does not suggest that he was engaged in espionage himself. The Security Service has never received any information that would warrant his investigation as an espionage suspect. A number of former close colleagues including Sir Dick White have recently testified in public to their faith in his integrity.

mm

SECURITY SERVICE

10 January 1980

Thomas HARRIS

HARRIS was born in 1908 of a British father and a Spanish mother. He was educated at University College School and University College, London. He spent the year 1925 - 1926 at the British Academy in Rome. He was a talented artist and musician and became a successful art-dealer running an art gallery in Conduit Street. He died in a car crash in 1964 in Majorca where he was then living.

2.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

3. HARRIS is said to have met BLUNT through their common artistic interests in about 1932 and BURGESS, probably through BLUNT, in 1935. He may have met PHILBY through BURGESS at the time of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

4. Richard DEACON, in his book "The British Connection" accused HARRIS of having been recruited by the Russians when in Rome in 1926 (when he was aged 18), but as DEACON has mis-identified the agent GARBO, and his book has had to be withdrawn

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because of its many other inaccuracies, there is little ground for confidence in anything he has said about HARRIS. Since the recent publicity about the BLUNT case following the publication of Andrew BOYLE's "Climate of Treason" there has been some Press speculation that HARRIS also might have been a spy.

5. There is nothing in our records to support DEACON's theory of a recruitment in Rome. HARRIS was interviewed twice in 1951 to find out what he knew, if anything, about the defection of BURGESS and MACLEAN. He proved entirely co-operative, and no evidence was discovered then or thereafter to connect him with espionage. BLUNT has always maintained that HARRIS never worked for the Russians.

6. HARRIS was devoted to PHILBY, lending him money which was never repaid, paying for the education of one of PHILBY's children and standing by him throughout the wilderness years of 1951 - 1963. After PHILBY's disappearance from Beirut he is reported to have said he would never speak to PHILBY again if PHILBY had been deceiving him. HARRIS died before PHILBY re-appeared in Moscow.

SECURITY SERVICE

11 January 1980

N J Sanders Esq



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With
the Compliments of
Sir Frank Cooper, G.C.B., C.M.G.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
SW1A 2HB

SECRET

Security 2



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2119 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
SIR FRANK COOPER GCB CMG

PUS/80/24
31/5

8 January 1980

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO
Cabinet Office
Whitehall

Dear Robert

HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 10 December to Brian Cubbon, with its enclosures.

2. I have an interest in this because of the way in which the costs of the Security Service and of other security and intelligence agencies are spread across Departmental Votes. In theory any department carrying provision in its Votes is open to examination in respect of that provision by its "marking" Select Committee, or conceivably by more than one Committee sitting in joint session, assuming of course that the provision became known to the Committee. The FCO "Secret" Vote is, of course, exceptional in being open. In practice if a Committee sought to investigate this area of Department's Votes it would be extremely difficult to disclose information within the present conventions governing the communication of classified information to the Committees.

3. Controversy and unproductive discussion with the Committees would therefore be avoided if we can hold the line you have taken. Whether we can do so remains to be seen since the arrangements for ensuring the accountability of the intelligence agencies are increasingly a matter of public debate. I should be grateful to be kept in touch with developments.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to the other recipients of yours.

Yours ever
Frank Cooper

FRANK COOPER

SECRET



Original in R.



FILE

Security *WFO*

cc CO
HO
MOD
DES
*Par Gov
Constituents*

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 December 1979

Dear Mr Hamilton

I am replying to your letter of 30 November about Mr. Blunt's pension rights.

Blunt was paid throughout his war service in the Army and the Security Service from Army funds. His service was not sufficient to earn a pension. His positions in the Royal Household were unpaid and not pensionable. As Deputy Director and then Director of the Courtauld Institute Mr. Blunt was a member of the Federated Superannuation System for Universities. Under the particular scheme in question a policy is taken out, with two thirds of the premium met by the employer and one third met by the individual. Once the policy is matured the beneficiary receives a lump sum; he receives no pension.

I have no information about Blunt's emoluments in respect of his fellowship of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Jackson

W. W. Hamilton, Esq., M.P.



DS9

cc CO
lan Gow

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

17 December 1979

Dear Brandon,

Thank you for your letter of 4 December. I think that the most helpful thing I can do is to let you have the enclosed copy of a letter which Sir Robert Armstrong, the Secretary of the Cabinet, sent earlier this week to Ewen Montagu about the same matter. There is nothing that I can add to that letter.

Lawson

Harriet

Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, Bt., M.P.

Never heard of him, says Blunt

By David Leigh

Mr Anthony Blunt, after much discussion with the Cabinet Office of "national security," yesterday gave his reaction to newspaper stories naming his Soviet contact as one Ernst Henry.

He had never heard of him, he said, and he did not recognise his picture.

To offer guidance on national security Sir Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, has agreed to look at various other questions journalists have submitted to the retired Russian spy. But the Cabinet Office stresses that neither Sir Robert nor MI5 is censoring, vetting, or giving any official imprimatur, to Mr Blunt.

Yesterday Mr Blunt's letter of resignation as an honorary fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects was accepted by the RIBA Council. It arrived just before they were due to discuss the problem of Mr Blunt, who has been already stripped of his knighthood by the Queen after his public naming as a Soviet agent who had been allowed immunity.

Mr Blunt's lawyer, Mr Michael Rubinstein, said: "He has told me he wishes to take this sort of step with any body which has a royal patron."

FILE

Original in C/R

cc: CSD
CO

C.F. to note



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 December 1979

Dear Mr. Stang,

Thank you for your letter of 21 November which I have read with considerable interest. I am sorry that you have had to wait for this reply.

As you know, it has been the policy of successive administrations that the Government should not be concerned with the political beliefs of its employees except where considerations involving national security have to be taken into account. This exception does of course apply not only to those employed on security work as such but also to substantial numbers of those in the Civil Service whose work gives access to classified information over a wide range of Government activities.

It is therefore established policy, going back over a number of administrations of both political parties since the war, that individuals who are known to be members of, or associated with, extremist political parties or organisations, whether of the right or the left, dedicated to the overthrow of Parliamentary democracy, are not employed on secret work.

The reasons for relating these criteria to membership of (or associated with) extremist political parties or organisations is that experience in this country and elsewhere has shown that it is

/in such

in such close associations that the individual is most tempted to forget his primary loyalty to the State.

I think your prime purpose in raising this question was your concern lest my statement on 21 November reflected some underlying change in Civil Service recruitment policy. I hope that what I have said in this letter reassures you on this score.

Yours sincerely

Richard Ingham

8



GR
pp please

CABINET OFFICE

Nick
You asked for a copy of this
letter to send to Sir Brandon Rhys Williams.

With the compliments of
The Private Secretary to the
Secretary of the Cabinet

Sydney

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone 01-233 3000



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet. Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref. A0935

12th December, 1979

Dear Mr Montagu,

Thank you for your letter of 28th November.

I should like to be able to be helpful in the matter about which you are very understandably concerned, but I know that you will understand the limitations that constrain me. For reasons with which you are clearly familiar, it is long-standing practice for the Government neither to confirm nor to deny speculation on security matters, and the Prime Minister has recently confirmed in an answer in the House of Commons to Mr. Michael Meacher MP, that she is not prepared to comment further on suggestions that other individuals are involved in the case of Anthony Blunt.

I am, of course, bound by what the Prime Minister has said. But I should like to remind you of three statements that are on the record:

- (a) The Prime Minister has said in the House of Commons that it was as a result of new information directly implicating Professor Blunt that in April 1964 he was interviewed again, and was offered immunity from prosecution, which led to his confession. It is self-evident that "new information directly implicating Professor Blunt" would have had nothing to do with Tomas Harris, or with his death.
- (b) In one of his answers at his Press conference on 21st November, Professor Blunt said that he was absolutely certain that the allegation made by Richard Deacon in his book The British Connection that Tomas Harris was a Russian agent was untrue.
- (c) In a letter to the Daily Telegraph, published on 1st December, Professor Blunt's solicitor, Mr. Michael Rubinstein, stated that Tomas Harris's death bore no relation whatever to Professor Blunt's decision to confess.

Yours sincerely,
Robert Armstrong

The Hon. Ewen E. S. Montagu, CBE, QC, DL

MR. VILE

cc. Mr. Whitmore ~~_____~~

Security
JW
LW

Blunt and The Guardian

I think I ought to write to David Leigh at The Guardian as attached, especially as the whole thing has gone off the boil in the Lobby. I would help to be able to say we have no power to require changes.



B. INGHAM

12 December, 1979



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Press Secretary

12 December, 1979

Dear Mr. Leitch,

Having now seen your piece about Blunt, MI5, etc. of December 5 - it did not appear in my editions - I think I should let you have a few facts.

First, Mr. Rubinstein came in at his own request to see Sir Robert Armstrong on the evening of December 3. He left a list of questions put to Mr. Blunt by a newspaper. He showed Sir Robert those proposed answers on which he wished to satisfy himself and Mr. Blunt that they did not contain anything prejudicial to national security. Sir Robert took delivery of those answers and rang him back the next day to let him know that he was not suggesting any deletions or changes.

I believe Mr. Rubinstein would deny quite a bit of what you reported him as saying on December 5, including the piece of fiction that "Sir Robert would have to meet MI5 representatives who would make up their minds what else Mr. Blunt was to be allowed to say".

However, the facts are that the Government has not, repeat not, asked Mr. Blunt to submit any of his proposed statements or answers to them. We have been asked by Mr. Rubinstein to advise on whether Mr. Blunt's proposed statements contained anything prejudicial to national security. In tendering our

/advice,

advice, there is no question of our requiring deletions or changes. We have no power to do so. We are not, therefore, seeking to exercise or exercising censorship. Nor is there any question of our advising on what would or would not be technically a branch of the Official Secrets Act. That would be for the courts to pronounce upon. Nor is there any question of Security Service vetting of Mr. Blunt's proposed answers.

All this is, I agree, quite dull stuff compared with your story but it does happen to be the truth.




B. INGHAM

David Leigh, Esq.,
The Guardian.

GUARDIAN WEDNESDAY 5 DECEMBER 1979

Blunt studies MI5 script

By David Leigh

A STATELY minute continued yesterday between Mr Anthony Blunt and Sir Robert Armstrong, secretary to the Cabinet, over what Mr Blunt is allowed to say about the Russians.

Mr Blunt's lawyer, Mr Michael Rubinstein, who went once again to the Cabinet Office in Whitehall yesterday, was told, he said, that Sir Robert would have to meet MI5 representatives, who would make up their minds what else Mr Blunt was to be allowed to say.

He said the statement

would have to be composed by Mr Blunt and returned to the Cabinet Office secretariat, so that they could pass it on for MI5 vetting.

Mr Blunt's original statement about his spying was vetted by the Cabinet Office, which told him not to give anything away about certain areas during the ensuing press conference.

Last week the Observer named Mr Blunt's wartime Soviet controller as Mr Ernst Henry, a German then based at the Soviet Embassy in London. Mr Blunt says he did not know his contact's real name, although he

helped to identify him after his 1964 confession under immunity.

Mr Blunt also refused to describe exactly how he met him during the war and in 1951, when the spies Burgess and Maclean were fleeing. Mr Blunt also failed to disclose, until Mrs Thatcher pointed it out, that he had been in touch with Russia in 1958 over the "third man," Kim Philby.

Downing Street said yesterday: "The Cabinet Secretary said he was prepared to guide him about whether his answers were prejudicial to national security."



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. VILE
CABINET OFFICE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 10 December (A0905) about Tomas Harris and the correspondence from Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, M.P. She is content that Sir Robert should proceed as he suggests. I should be glad to have a copy of his letter in due course to send to Sir Brandon.

N. J. SANDERS



11 December 1979



Original GFR cc CO HS

[Handwritten signature]

CF to note

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 December 1979

Mr. A. Henderson

Thank you for your letter of 24 November. I am afraid that it contains a number of inaccuracies.

First, it is not correct to say that Professor Blunt was offered immunity from prosecution by officials without Ministerial authority. As the Attorney General and I explained in our speeches in the House on 21 November, the then Attorney General authorised the immunity, and the then Home Secretary was kept aware of developments in the case.

Second, it is not true that officials took steps to place Professor Blunt in Buckingham Palace. He had been Surveyor of The Queen's (originally The King's) Pictures since 1945. The question in 1964 could only be whether he should be removed. The view was taken that to remove him would put at risk the purposes which the offer of immunity was intended to achieve - above all, his co-operation in the continuing inquiries of the security authorities. If that was a reasonable view to take in 1964 - and I am not disposed to find fault with it - clearly it held good for as long as the inquiries to which his co-operation could be expected to make a contribution.

/ Third,

JS

Third, Professor Blunt did not forfeit his knighthood on my recommendation. Awards in the Royal Victorian Order are in The Queen's personal gift, and are neither conferred nor forfeited on the Prime Minister's recommendation.

I have given the House a full account of the facts of the case in my answer to your Question on 15 November and in my speech on 21 November. I cannot answer for reasons and motives for what was decided and done in Administrations for which I am not answerable.

I share the view expressed by the Leader of the Opposition in our debate that an inquiry into the Blunt affair, so long after the event, would be unlikely to serve a useful purpose. What we should be concerned with is the future. I am satisfied that the arrangements that govern relations between the Security Service and Ministers, as I described them to the House, are as they should be. I am not persuaded, therefore, that there is a sufficient case for setting up an inquiry.

Yours sincerely
Roger Dainton

Ted. Leadbitter, Esq., M.P.

PRIME MINISTER

Ref. A0905

MR. SANDERS

To see. Are you contact

that Sir R Armstrong should write as at flag C and that you should then send a copy to Sir R Rhys Williams?

Wm

You have asked for advice and a draft reply for the letter which

[A] Sir Brandon Rhys Williams MP sent to the Prime Minister on 4th December about Mr. Tomas Harris.

MJS
Wm

2. As Sir Brandon indicates, there have been a number of suggestions in the Press that Tomas Harris was associated with Mr. Blunt in his espionage activities. Because Tomas Harris was killed in a motor accident in Spain in 1964, it has been suggested that it was his death which released Mr. Blunt from the obligations of loyalty which, he claims, had up till then prevented him from confessing.

3. The "new information directly implicating Blunt" which led to his being interviewed in April 1964 has nothing whatever to do with Tomas Harris, and there is no reason to believe that Harris was ever involved in espionage. Indeed, he had a distinguished career in intelligence during the war.

4. Sir Brandon Rhys Williams' letter is one aspect of something like a campaign which is being conducted to try to clear Tomas Harris' name. His family is, understandably, considerably distressed by the suggestions that he was a spy, and one of the sisters is said to be almost hysterical.

[B] 5. Mr. Ewen Montagu QC wrote to me on 28th November about this: I attach a copy of his letter.

6. We are, of course, constrained by the answer which the Prime Minister gave to Mr. Meacher on 29th November, to the effect that she does not propose to comment further on suggestions about people involved in the Burgess/Maclean/Philby affair. One's personal inclination would be to make a categorical statement about Tomas Harris; but, if we start down that road, we shall get a series of questions about individuals.

[C] 7. I have therefore agreed with the Attorney General and the Security Service a draft letter to Mr. Montagu, which I was about to send.

8. I wonder whether, if the Prime Minister is content with that reply, she would be ready to deal with her letter from Sir Brandon Rhys Williams by sending him a copy of my letter to Mr. Montagu. That seems to me to be on the whole the best way of dealing with this matter.

ReA

FROM

THE HON. EWEN E. S. MONTAGU, C.B.E., Q.C., D.L.

24, MONTROSE COURT,
EXHIBITION ROAD,
LONDON, SW7 2QQ.

01-000 0000

CABINET OFFICE
A. 6790.....
29 NOV 1979
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

28th November 1979.

Dear Sir Robert.

I am writing to you in the hope that you may be able to assist in preventing what is, to the best of my belief, a gross slur, which will last for all time unless something is done now, to the memory of a man who has deserved well of this his country and is causing deep distress to his family.

The man is Tomas Harris with whom I worked during the war. The slur has already been reported in many newspapers -- both those allegedly responsible like the Daily Telegraph and in the sensational press -- and in many periodicals such as "Now". It is also already in sensational books and is, I know, to be repeated in at least one other already in the press.

Tommy had an English father and a Spanish mother and it was his brilliant handling of "CARBO" (a Spaniard) in our double-agent deception work that formed the greatest part of the cover for the landings in Normandy -- saving thousands of lives -- apart from many other deceptions of the greatest value.

Tommy was a very talented painter and he and Blunt became friends -- and through Blunt he became friends with Philby, Burgess and Maclean. He was killed in a motor smash in Majorca in January 1964 which, unfortunately, fits in with Blunt's having said that an event in 1964 released him from the need for secrecy so that he could confess in that year -- though I have heard from one of Tommy's sisters that Blunt has said to someone that, when he made his statement to that effect, he had thought that Tommy had died in 1965.

24, MONTROSE COURT,
EXHIBITION ROAD,
LONDON, SW7 2QQ.

The result of all this is that, as I have said, many newspapers and magazines, led repeatedly by the Daily Telegraph with large headlines (a paper which, unfortunately, is read by many Anglophiles and expatriates in Spain) have accused Tommy of being the so-called "fifth man".

I, personally, cannot know that Tommy was not that man, but feel strongly that he was not, and there seem to me to be three alternative situations possible:-

1. That Tommy was working for the Russians.
2. It was someone else's death ~~that~~ ~~or~~ that enabled Blunt to confess.
3. It was something quite different that had that effect in 1964.

If possibility 1 above is correct that is the end of this matter and this letter is misconceived.

If possibility 2 is correct, my experience in intelligence work makes me understand why MI5 would be reluctant to break normal practice and make, or concur in the making of, a statement exculpating Tommy. The reasons are so well known that I need not detail them here.

If possibility 3 is correct, those reasons would or might still apply but, it would seem, far less strongly.

But surely, where a man has given loyal and invaluable service and his memory is being blackened forever through no fault of his own, and exception can be made through a statement, worded carefully enough to protect other interests, when that is the only way in which things can be put right. He can't sue for defamation as he is dead and if any of his friends say that he was not a traitor, the answer is "How do you know?".

Please forgive this long letter but the injustice to the memory of a fine man is great if Tommy is innocent and the distress to his family is immense (one of his sisters, devoted to him, is almost hysterical).

Yours sincerely
Eric S. Tomlin

DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
TO THE HON. EWEN E. S. MONTAGU, CBE, QC,
DL, 24, MONTROSE COURT, EXHIBITION ROAD,
SW7 2QQ

Thank you for your letter of 28th November.

I should like to be able to be helpful in the matter about which you are very understandably concerned, but I know that you will understand the limitations that constrain me. For reasons with which you are clearly familiar, it is long-standing practice for the Government neither to confirm nor to deny speculation on security matters, and the Prime Minister has recently confirmed in an answer in the House of Commons to Mr. Michael Meacher MP that she is not prepared to comment further on suggestions that other individuals are involved in the case of Anthony Blunt.

I am, of course, bound by what the Prime Minister has said. But I should like to remind you of three statements that are on the record:

- (a) The Prime Minister has said in the House of Commons that it was as a result of new information directly implicating Professor Blunt that in April 1964 he was interviewed again, and was offered immunity from prosecution, which led to his confession. It is self-evident that "new information directly implicating Professor Blunt" would have had nothing to do with Tomas Harris, or with his death.
- (b) In one of his answers at his Press conference on 21st November, Professor Blunt said that he was absolutely certain that the allegation made by Richard Deacon in his book The British Connection that Tomas Harris was a Russian agent was untrue.

(c) In a letter to the Daily Telegraph, published on 1st December, Professor Blunt's solicitor, Mr. Michael Rubinstein, stated that Tomas Harris's death bore no relation whatever to Professor Blunt's decision to confess.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

MR. ANTHONY BLUNT

The Prime Minister has seen your minute AO886 of 7 December 1979. She agrees that the Army Board should consider on the known facts, without inviting Blunt to make representations, whether he should be stripped of his honorary rank of Captain.

She also agrees that the Ministry of Defence cannot take action, under the current rules, to deprive Blunt of his medals. She has, however, commented that it was during the war period that Blunt gave away most information and that he would surely return the medals which he was awarded for his service during that period if his solicitor was invited to ask him to do so. You may wish to consider with the Ministry of Defence whether we should take action on these lines.

C. A. WHITMORE

10 December 1979

CONFIDENTIAL



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

N. J. Sanders, Esq.

1. CLIVE ^{ARMSTRONG} 11/xii
To see

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319

2. NBPM,
I think
11/xii mjs

CONFIDENTIAL



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

10th December, 1979

Ref. A0899

Home Affairs Select Committee

Thank you for your letter of 6th December.

We are, of course, all agreed that the aim should be to ensure that the Select Committee does not investigate Security Service matters; and I think that for the time being we can rest on what the Chief Whip has said to Mr. Graham Page.

But it remains my view that it would be wise, if it came to the point, to rest on the principle that the Security Service and its affairs are not within the terms of reference of the Select Committee. I think that one would be on good ground if one were to argue that the Security Service was not "a public body associated" with the Home Office, in the sense that (for instance) the Commission for Racial Equality and the Equal Opportunities Commission. One would also, and fairly, argue that the Home Secretary would not be prepared to deal with the Security Service or its affairs in correspondence with a backbench Member of Parliament or in reply to a Parliamentary Question. I believe that it would be very much easier to stand on that sort of line than on a line which sought to distinguish between those Security Service issues that could be discussed by the Select Committee and those that could not. I also believe that the line is true: I don't believe that it was the intention to bring the Security Service within the Committee's remit. And I believe that the Government will need to take a similar line in relation to other security and intelligence agencies.

So I was encouraged to see, from Mr. Whitmore's recent minute and George Walden's letter of 7th December, that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed with paragraph 5 of my minute of 3rd December.

I am sending copies of this letter to Ian Bancroft, Michael Palliser, Frank Cooper (with copies of previous documents in the series) and Nick Sanders.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Sir Brian Cubbon, KCB

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

Agree x/ and y/ when?

Ref. A0886

PRIME MINISTER

*Yes - but surely he would hold
return the medals if his 1x
to Minister asked him.*

Mr. Anthony Blunt

*was at the 40-45 period
when he gave most information
and of
re:.*

Mr. Blunt was awarded an emergency commission when he joined the Army in 1939. He was released from military duty in 1945, in the rank of acting Major. When he relinquished his emergency commission on exceeding the age limits for recall in 1954, he was granted the honorary rank of Captain. He was awarded the 1939-45 Star and may also hold the Defence Medal.

2. Recent events raise the question whether he should be stripped of his honorary rank and his wartime medals.

3. If he were being dealt with under normal Army disciplinary procedures, and it was proposed to strip him of his rank, it would be necessary for the Ministry of Defence to communicate with him through his solicitor to establish whether he wished to make any representation before his case was considered. This is because disciplinary proceedings are based on the principle that no action should be taken which gives the appearance of judging an officer without trial. In this case, an approach of that kind to Mr. Blunt could lead to unfavourable public comment; and in any case it is not clear what representations he could make which could affect the case, since he is a self-confessed spy. It is therefore proposed that the Army Board should consider the case on the known facts, without inviting Blunt to make representations. If the Board decides to strip Blunt of his honorary rank, he would be told by letter and there would be a notice in the London Gazette.

X |

4. As to Blunt's war medals, Queen's Regulations provide for forfeiture where a person has been convicted of treason or sedition. As Blunt was given immunity from prosecution, he has not been convicted and it would not be possible to deprive him of his medals under the current rules. Deprivation would also involve going to him and demanding to have the medals back. On balance, the Ministry of Defence consider it preferable to take no action in respect of Mr. Blunt's medals.

Y |

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The Secretary of State for Defence agrees with this course, as do I myself. May I tell the Ministry of Defence that you are content?

RTA

(Robert Armstrong)

7th December, 1979

C.F. to note



10 DOWNING STREET

Original
LGR
Security

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 December, 1979.

Dear Mr. Stewart,

Thank you for your letter of 26 November about the grant to Professor Anthony Blunt of immunity from criminal prosecution.

Immunity from criminal prosecution in Scotland is the responsibility of the Lord Advocate, and he would be consulted in any question relating to prosecution for an offence where the suspect was within the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts. There was no information at any time to substantiate the commission by Professor Blunt of any offence in respect of which the Scottish courts were able to exercise jurisdiction over him. In these circumstances the Lord Advocate was not consulted.

It would not be proper for me to request the Lord Advocate to initiate any criminal prosecution: if evidence of an offence in respect of which Scottish courts were able to exercise their jurisdiction came to his notice, the decision whether to prosecute would be for him alone to take in the light of all the information available to him, including the grant of immunity from prosecution in England.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Donald Stewart, M.P.

4

From: Ministry. 2 10
To: sec.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Security

7 December 1979

amt.

Dear Mick,

HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has seen a copy of Sir R Armstrong's minute of 3 December.

Lord Carrington would see grave objection to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee

He therefore hopes that it will be possible to avoid a decision in the present case which would make it more difficult to resist any attempt by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to concern itself with the activities of these two agencies. He entirely supports the line suggested by Sir R Armstrong.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Chief Whip, Sir I Bancroft and Sir R Armstrong.

In ever
JJR

(G G H Walden)

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

N J Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street



NJ Sanders Esq.

With the Compliments
of the
Permanent Under Secretary
of State

1. CW ~~to see~~ ^{KW} ^{bring} _{Yes}
2. NBPM at this stage
I think
mjs

Home Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Security



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

SIR BRIAN CUBBON KCB
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

6th December 1979

Dear Robert

HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

I have seen your minute of 3rd December to Nick Sanders.

I think we are all agreed that the aim should be to keep the Select Committee off all Security Service matters.

In pursuit of this aim we should use all the arguments and influence that lie to hand. But are we on wholly safe ground in saying flatly that "the Security Service and its affairs are not within the Committee's terms of reference"?

The Committee's terms of reference cover the expenditure, policy and administration of the Home Office and its "associated public bodies". In the debate on 25th June the Leader of the House said that "The test in every case will be whether there is a significant degree of Ministerial responsibility for the body concerned". I see also from David Faulkner's letter to Departments of 3rd September that it was decided that at any rate at this stage the Select Committees should not be given a list of subjects on which information would not usually be disclosed - such a list having been given in 1967 to certain old-style Select Committees.

As far as I can see, the particular question of the Security Service was not raised in the interdepartmental discussions at this time.

As I have said, we should still use for all it is worth the general argument that the Security Service should not be subject to investigation by a Parliamentary Committee for the same reason as security matters are not discussed on the floor of the House. As David Faulkner's letter suggests, we can argue

/that,

Sir Robert Armstrong, KCB, CVO.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

that, on the scope of these Select Committees generally, "a reasonable test would be whether the matter is one with which the Minister would be prepared to deal in correspondence with a member or in reply to a Parliamentary Question". But even this formula does not exclude all issues concerning the Security Service. We should remember the questions dealt with in such Parliamentary documents as the Reports by Denning, Birkett, Radcliffe and the Security Commission. The Home Secretary would not refuse to answer all Questions relating to these issues. This is another reason for not being provocative in what we assert to the Committee about their terms of reference as such.

For a start, you will be glad to know, the Chief Whip has told the ^{likely} Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee (Mr Graham Page) that in his view it would be a mistake for the Committee to discuss security matters. Mr Page apparently agreed with the Chief Whip. But there are the Members.

As John Chilcot's letter suggested, the Departments concerned will need to keep in close touch about how we handle any questions which any of these Committees ask about security or intelligence matters, so that the Committees cannot play off one Department against another. (I raised the question of these Select Committees at Ian Bancroft's meeting on 5th December, with a view to a further exchange at a subsequent meeting; but I had in mind the general handling of the Committees and I would not raise the security and intelligence aspect.)

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ian Bancroft, Michael Palliser and Nick Sanders, as they will have seen your minute. Should we also copy the correspondence to Frank Cooper?

Yours ever

Brian Cribben

CONFIDENTIAL

File

88

Sir B. Rhys WILLIAMS

(The Harris)

MR. VILE
CABINET OFFICE

Here is a copy of a letter from Sir Brandon Rhys Williams. I should be grateful if you could suggest a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to him, to reach us here by Friday, 14 December.

N. J. SANDERS



5 December 1979

ds

5 December 1979

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 4 December about Mr. Harris. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N. J. SANDERS

Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, Bt., M.P.

Prime Minister.

To see.

This seems to be getting

a little out of hand.

John
Siri

Ref. A0864

MR. INGHAM

c Mr. Whitmore ✓

I have seen the article in today's Guardian (page 2) by David Leigh about Mr. Anthony Blunt's answers to questions.

2. It is an absolute travesty of the facts. Mr. Rubinstein came in on the evening of 3rd December. He left with me a list of questions put to Mr. Blunt by one newspaper (in fact the Evening News, though I should not wish to disclose the name); and he also showed me those of the proposed answers on which he desired to satisfy himself and Mr. Blunt that what was proposed to be said was not prejudicial to national security. I took delivery of the answers concerned. I rang him back within 24 hours to let him know that we did not ask for or suggest any deletions or changes.

3. Mr. Rubinstein has told me that he did not say to Mr. Leigh what Mr. Leigh reports him as having said in the second and third paragraphs of the article. He did not say that I should have to meet MI5 representatives, who would make up their minds what else Mr. Blunt was to be allowed to say. He did not say that "the statement" (whatever that is) would have to be returned to the Cabinet Office Secretariat so that they could pass it on for MI5 vetting.

Mr. Rubinstein would have no objection to it being disclosed that he did not say the things he was reported to have said. You could go on to say that I did not say what I was reported to have said. However what is pernicious about this piece is the implication that there is some kind of Security Service censorship on Mr. Blunt's statements and answers. We have not asked Mr. Blunt to submit his statements and answers to us. I have been asked whether I should be prepared to deal with Mr. Blunt's written answers to questions on the same basis as I dealt with his original statement: viz., that I should advise whether there was anything in them that might be prejudicial to national security. This is a matter of advice. There is no question of requiring deletions or changes. There is no question of our seeking censorship. There is no question of advising what would or would not be technically a breach of the Official Secrets

Act - something which would be for the courts and not for me to pronounce upon. There is no question of Security Service vetting.

4. The Cabinet Office role in this is a purely passive one; we are only responding to requests made by Mr. Blunt's legal adviser, and we are only concerned with those questions which they choose to draw to our attention. Our role is purely advisory. We cannot and do not require changes, and we are not vetting or taking any responsibility for the accuracy of the answers.

5. If you have an opportunity to make these points clear at the Lobby, I think it would be helpful that you should do so.

6. As I say, you are authorised to quote Mr. Rubinstein as saying that he has been misrepresented. I have asked him, if he must talk to the Press, to adhere strictly to the line agreed between us that the Cabinet Office role is to respond to requests for guidance as to whether certain proposed answers might be prejudicial to national security.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG
ROBERT ARMSTRONG

5th December, 1979

Blunt studies MI5 script

By David Leigh

A STALELY minute continued yesterday between Mr Anthony Blunt and Sir Robert Armstrong, secretary to the Cabinet, over what Mr Blunt is allowed to say about the Russians.

Mr Blunt's lawyer, Mr Michael Rubinstein, who went once again to the Cabinet Office in Whitehall yesterday, was told, he said, that Sir Robert would have to meet MI5 representatives, who would make up their minds what else Mr Blunt was to be allowed to say.

He said the statement

would have to be composed by Mr Blunt and returned to the Cabinet Office secretariat so that they could pass it on for MI5 vetting.

Mr Blunt's original statement about his spying was vetted by the Cabinet Office, which told him not to give anything away about certain areas during the ensuing press conference.

Last week the Observer named Mr Blunt's wartime Soviet controller as Mr Ernst Henry, a German then based at the Soviet Embassy in London. Mr Blunt says he did not know his contact's real name, although he

helped to identify him after his 1964 confession under immunity.

Mr Blunt also refused to describe exactly how he met him during the war and in 1951, when the spies Burgess and Maclean were fleeing. Mr Blunt also failed to disclose, until Mrs Thatcher pointed it out, that he had been in touch with Russia in 1953 over the "third man," Kim Philby.

Downing Street said yesterday: "The Cabinet Secretary said he was prepared to guide him about whether his answers were prejudicial to national security."



2

10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER


This letter from Brandon Rhys Williams asks you to clear Thomas Harris' name. I do not think you will want to do this but we will ask Sir Robert Armstrong for advice.

MS

5 December 1979

From: Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, Bt., M.P.

cf 10



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

4 December 1979

15/12

Dear Margaret,

I have been approached by relatives of the late Tomas Harris through a solicitor with a request that I should seek an authoritative statement that he is not known to have been engaged in espionage on behalf of the Russian Government. Since they are constituents I would like to help them, but I know nothing of the truth or falsehood of the allegations which recently have been printed about him. I have, of course, seen the reply you have very properly given, declining to give further information on the subject of Anthony Blunt.

If you feel that it would be possible to make a statement clearing Tomas Harris's name, it would obviously be very welcome to his sisters. Should you prefer not to make any statement at all in regard to him, I would recommend them simply to let the matter rest.

I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by my pressing for disclosure of confidential information and I would like to make clear that I am happy to leave the matter entirely to your discretion.

Yours ever
Brandon

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



2

~~PRIME MINISTER~~

Good.

MS

Government Chief Whip

12 Downing Street, London SW1

4 December 1979

Dear Martin

[Handwritten mark]

When the Chief Whip saw Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 3 December to Nick Sanders about the possibility that the Home Affairs Select Committee may wish to investigate the Blunt case, he commented:-

"I have had a short conversation with Graham Page suggesting that I felt that it would be a great mistake for them to discuss security. He agreed."

I am copying this to Nick Sanders, John Chilcot George Walden, John Stevens and Sir Ian Bancroft.

*Gave Sidney
Peter [unclear]*

(P J MOORE)

M J Vile Esq
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
SW1A 2AS

CONFIDENTIAL

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HL
Security

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

MR. VILE
CABINET OFFICE

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to me of 3 December about the possibility that the Home Affairs Select Committee might wish to investigate the Blunt case.

She agrees entirely with the recommendation in paragraph 5 of that minute.

I am copying this minute to John Chilcot (Home Office), George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Stevens (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and David Laughrin (Civil Service Department).

N. J. SANDERS

4 December 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

218

CONFIDENTIAL

Agree X?

MR. SANDERS

Yes *ans*

MJS
3/xii

Home Affairs Select Committee

I have seen Mr. Chilcot's letter of 29th November about the risk that this Committee may wish to investigate the Blunt case.

2. I agree that it would be quite wrong for the Committee to investigate the Blunt case, or any other individual security case, and that the Home Secretary (I think that it should be he rather than the Prime Minister in the first instance) should seek to dissuade the Chairman accordingly.

3. I wonder, however, whether there is not a more fundamental point to be taken. Any such investigation raises the question whether the Select Committee's reference extends to the Security Service. The Security Service is not included in the list of Departments which the Committee marks, and is not part of the Home Office. For the Committee to include the Security Service in its remit would be by implication to concede the argument, which Ministers have never accepted (and which front-bench Opposition spokesmen declared against in the debate on the Blunt affair), that the Security Service should be subject to investigation by a Parliamentary Committee.

4. If the Home Affairs Select Committee seek to investigate the Blunt case, and the ground for dissuading the Chairman is that the Committee should keep out of individual cases in the security field, that might be taken as implying that matters of general policy affecting the Security Service were or might be within the Committee's remit. It would then be harder to resist a subsequent attempt by the Committee to investigate such matters; and harder to resist an attempt by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to interest itself in matters of general policy affecting overseas intelligence and communications.

5. For these reasons I hope that any attempt by the Home Affairs Select Committee to investigate the Blunt affair will be resisted not just because it would be wrong for the Committee to involve itself in an individual case but also, and primarily, on the ground that the Government does not accept that the Security Service and its affairs are within the Committee's terms of reference.

X |

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6. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Chief Whip and Sir Ian Bancroft.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of the letters 'R' and 'A' in a stylized, cursive script.

(Robert Armstrong)

3rd December 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

cc CDR
CWO
CSD
CO

H8



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1979

Home Affairs Select Committee

The Prime Minister was grateful to see your letter to me of 29 November. She agrees with the suggestion that the Home Secretary, and she herself if necessary, should see the Chairman of Home Affairs Committee if any question arises of it seeking to investigate the Blunt case.

I am copying this letter to John Stevens (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office), David Laughrin (Civil Service Department) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

N. J. SANDERS

John Chilcot, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

NBPM
MS

3 December 1979

Joan Nick

HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

The Chancellor of the Duchy has seen John Chilcot's letter to you of 29 November and has commented:

"I entirely agree that the Committee be deflected from such a course, but think it better for the Home Secretary to take the lead (if it becomes necessary) rather than the Prime Minister".

I am copying this letter to John Chilcot, and Michael Townley.

Yours sincerely
Petra Laidlaw

PETRA LAIDLAW
Private Secretary

N Sanders Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
SW1



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 December 1979

Dear Henry,

Thank you very much for your letter.

To say what I did in the House last week was, after all the devoted service you have given this country, the very least I could do.

The events we were discussing in the debate all occurred of course a long time ago, and it has not been easy to establish now precisely what happened. I know how very helpful you have been in our attempts to throw light on those events and I am most grateful to you for your ready cooperation. I only hope that you have not found it all too exhausting.

Thank you again for writing. It was very kind of you to do so.

*Warm personal regards,
Yours sincerely*

Raymond

The Right Honourable the Lord Brooke of Cumnor, CH

Security

MPS



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 December 1979

Dear Lady Hobson

Thank you for your letter and
for the nice things you said.

I am grateful to you for writing
as you did. It was a kind thought.

Yours sincerely

MT

Lady Hobson

jfh



CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Further-helpful-advice.

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE LONDON SW1H 9ATMS
30/xi

29 November 1979

ant

Dear Nick,

HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

Thank you for your letter of 26 November. We, too, have recognised the risk that the Committee might wish to investigate the Blunt case and have given some initial thought to what our response should be.

We consider that it would be quite wrong for the Committee to attempt to investigate an individual case in the security field in this way. If they persisted in trying to do so we could quickly reach a position in which the Home Secretary or officials would have to refuse to answer questions on security grounds. This might well provoke a confrontation in which the Home Secretary would be reported by the Committee to the House of Commons for his lack of co-operation. The Government would then have to rely on their majority to support him.

Clearly, it would not be in anyone's interest to have such a confrontation, especially in the early days of the Committee's existence. In these circumstances we would hope that the Chairman of the Committee, who, if it is Mr. Graham Page, is himself a Privy Counsellor and has been a Minister, would have the good sense not to embark on such a course and would be content for the Committee to start on some other subject which would not present difficulties of this sort. Accordingly, if the Committee were to favour looking at the Blunt case or indeed at other sensitive Security Service issues, we believe that the best plan would be for the Home Secretary, or if necessary the Prime Minister, to see the Chairman and to seek to dissuade him by drawing attention to the security problem and indicating that the Government would be obliged to take a restrictive line and if necessary rely on its majority in the House to support this stance.

Answer

We shall clearly have to watch closely the way in which the new Select Committees approach sensitive areas generally. The Departments concerned will need to keep in touch with each other.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Chief Whip, and to Martin Vile, and also to David Laughrin, given that the CSD is the lead Department on the question of appearances before Select Committees.

Yours,
John

J. A. CHILCOT

N. J. Sanders, Esq.

CONFIDENTIAL



ZFE/280

*Prime Minister is
aware of this article.
H. P. W.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 November 1979

Dear Michael,

You will wish to know that the extreme left wing French daily "Liberation" published a number of articles between 21 and 26 November about the Blunt affair and the "British Intelligence Services".

The articles were signed by Roger Faligot, the leading light of the Comité Irelande in Paris. "Liberation" is known to have links with the PIRA and with Agee and the Leveller group. It seems likely that the Russian Intelligence Service was also involved.

The articles seem to contain speculative information from sources as far apart as the Workers' Revolutionary Party and Private Eye. Among the allegations is one in an article of 24/25 November that Sir Maurice Oldfield, in briefing Philby before the latter's appointment to Washington, effectively tipped him off, albeit for reasons of inefficiency, personal advancement, or convenience to SIS, rather than because Oldfield was himself a KGB agent. Oldfield is portrayed as the outsider wanting revenge on the establishment. The article maintains that the Security Service has long been hostile to Oldfield and that this hostility came to a head over his recent appointment to Belfast. In an earlier article it had been alleged that the Security Service wanted the Belfast appointment to go to Sir Michael Hanley, a former Director-General of that Service.

The article concludes by saying that the Prime Minister, in her statement about Blunt, was preempting the CIA who had decided to publish his name in the USA. Mrs Thatcher was hoping to protect Oldfield, knowing she could count on the Opposition to help bury the affair. "Putting Oldfield on the spot would put into question the whole of the Intelligence community not to say the whole of the political class in Britain."

FCO News Department will of course refuse to be drawn if asked about the "Liberation" articles. There have been no questions so far.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the Home Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

G G H Walden
(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

cc Sir Robert Armstrong

16, DEODAR ROAD,
PUTNEY,
LONDON, S.W.15.

2 PA.
PRIME MINISTER

Tel: 01-788 2678

Bea

! MS
29/xi

November 28th 1979.

! out.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, PC, MP,
10 Downing Street, S.W.1.

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

This is a simple note of thanks and congratulations. It would be impertinent of me to suggest that I expected a "fudged" or at any rate less than positive answer to the question put to you by the Hon. Member for Hartlepool, Mr. Ted Leadbitter, on Thursday, November 13th. Fingers crossed, I hoped for the truth - and the nation got it, I (the writer of that notorious book) with all the rest.

May I just say, tired as I am, how greatly I admire your courage, consistency, and sensible order of priorities, even on a day dolorous for its bad economic news. As you will have noticed, I type my own letters and am an imperfect typist. Had I been less put upon, I should certainly have written before now. I expect no reply or acknowledgement but cannot refrain from saying "Mille mercis - de tout coeur".

Yours very sincerely,

Thomas Boyle

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PRIME MINISTER

I attach a very nice letter to you from Henry Brooke about last week's debate on Blunt.

He urges you not to reply, but you may well want to let him have a response, and I accordingly attach a letter for your signature.

KMJ

28 November 1979



House of Lords

Prime Minister

2.
ALS
27.10.79

26 November 1979

The Globe House

Millbank

Marlborough, Wilts

Dear Margaret

This is just a line to thank you for your reference to me in your speech last Wednesday about the case of Anthony Blunt. The words you used were very kind.

I have written to Alec to explain why in April 1964 I did not bring him in on what was happening about Blunt, and to say how sorry I am if in my well-meant effort not to add to his burdens I may, with hindsight, have exercised my discretion wrongly.

All good wishes to you, and please do not dream of replying to this.

Yours gratefully

Henry

0.
Acknowledge?

WOODBINE HOUSE,
PAXFORD,
CHIPPING CAMPDEN,
GLOS. GL55 6XD
Tel: Paxford 326

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R26

Dear Mr Thatcher

As John Hobsons
widow I would like to
write & tell you what a
wonderfully clear & concise
statement you made in
the House over the blint
Affair & to thank you
very much for making
it understood that John
did his duty. Haven't

the media - some D.P.'s
loved all the drama!

Many people have
said how what a fine
job you are doing, so
lots of luck to you in the
future

Yours Sincerely,

Bob Hobson.

P.S. PLEASE PLEASE NO REPLY
I really MEAN it. I just
wanted to thank & congratulate
you on the way you handled
this difficult affair.

64
CONFIDENTIAL



Security DS

~~BF 30-11-79~~

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 November 1979

Home Affairs Select Committee

The Prime Minister is concerned about the possibility that the Home Affairs Select Committee, when appointed, might wish to investigate one aspect or another of the Blunt case. I should be grateful to have your advice on how any such move might be handled. May we please have something from you by the end of the week?

I am copying this letter to John Stevens (Office of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), Murdo Maclean (Chief Whip's Office) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

N. J. SANDERS

John Chilcot, Esq.,
Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

TGR

PART 1 ends:-

Sir Philip Moore to Canavan MP

23.11.79

PART 2 begins:-

NJS to Ho 26.11.79