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PREM 19/3785

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Confidential fitting

Official history of Intelligence in World War II
PM's agreement in principle sought to publication
of volume covering counter intelligence.

HISTORIES

January 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
28.1.80		11.5.80					
5.2.80		9.9.92					
20.2.80							
15.4.80		PART CLOSED					
4.6.80		1.5.97					
3.7.80							
28.7.80							
30.7.80							
22.8.80							
3.10.80							
11.2.84							
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16.7.86							
18.7.86							
9.11.87							
27.11.87							
3.11.87							
3.12.87							
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1.4.88							

PREM 19/3785

SERIES CLOSED

**END OF
CONSERVATIVE
ADMINISTRATION**

1 MAY 1997

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

12 October 1992

Dear John,

THE HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Thank you for your letter of 9 September which the Prime Minister has seen, together with the Home Secretary's comments of 28 September.

Subject to the views of any other colleagues, the Prime Minister is content for the History of the Intelligence Corps to be published.

The Prime Minister does, however, think that it is taking a needless risk to refer to the operations of the Intelligence Corps in Northern Ireland. He would like the passage enclosed with your letter deleted from the text.

I am copying this letter to Richard Gozney (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Colin Walters (Home Office), Colin Pipe (Law Officer's Department), William Fittall (Northern Ireland Office) and Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).

*John
Saph*

J. S. WALL

J. S. Pitt-Brooke, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

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Prime Minister ①

Ref. AO92/2775

MR WALL

*A agreed
of 11/10*

*This strikes me as acceptable —
though I would omit any
reference to the work of the Corps in
Northern Ireland. Why take any*

The History of the Intelligence Corps

with? Joseph

The Defence Secretary has sought the Prime Minister's approval for publication of an official history of the Intelligence Corps (Mr Pitt-Brooke's letter of 9 September to you).

8/6

2. Mr King sought Lady Thatcher's approval for publication of this history in September 1990. She considered that the timing was inappropriate in view of events in the Gulf; expressed concern about highlighting the role of the Intelligence Corps in post-war Germany; and felt that the material on the Falklands and Northern Ireland came too soon after the events in question (though I think it likely that her opposition stemmed from a general aversion to publications about intelligence, whether authorised or not, rather than from particular passages). MOD accordingly invited the author to prepare a shorter version of the history covering events only up to 1968. They would, however, prefer to publish the original, full version; and it is the publication of this version for which the Defence Secretary is seeking the Prime Minister's approval.

3. Officials from the Departments concerned have examined the text of the full version, with particular reference to the material on Germany, the Falklands and Northern Ireland (attached to Mr Pitt-Brooke's letter). Subject to certain minor amendments officials see no difficulty with publication of the full version of the history. (One of these amendments - the deletion of the third paragraph of page 6 of the material on Germany is not reflected in the text attached to Mr Pitt-Brooke's letter; but

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MOD have confirmed that this paragraph would not appear in the published text).

4. The material on post-war Germany, the Falklands and Northern Ireland is in itself anodyne. The broader question is whether the publication of any material, whether its precise nature, about intelligence operations in the relatively recent past would weaken our hands in dealing with other disclosures about intelligence operations which are, or would be, damaging to national security. Such disclosures pose a real threat, particularly in relation to Northern Ireland. The danger arises, however, from disclosures which are unauthorised, and made by people who are not in a position to judge, or do not care, whether they are damaging to national security. In contrast, the history of the Intelligence Corps would be an authorised publication and the text has been vetted by experts. A clear and defensible line could therefore be drawn between this history and other disclosures of intelligence operations which might cause trouble. Publication would not set an awkward precedent or undercut our position in dealing with unauthorised disclosures. I do not see that it would be likely to lead to difficulties in the context of the SIS/GCHQ Bill.

5. I therefore see no reason for the Prime Minister not to agree to the Defence Secretary's proposal.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

6 October 1992

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URB



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT
28 SEP 1992

Dear Stephen,

THE HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CORPS

John Pitt-Brooke sent me a copy of his letter of 9 September to you in which he sought the Prime Minister's approval to the publication of the full version of the official History of the Intelligence Corps. ^{attached}

I am writing to confirm that the Home Secretary has no objection to publication of the full version. However, there is one passage in Chapter 11 as enclosed with Mr Pitt-brooke's letter which might set some hares running. The first full paragraph on page 4 refers to investigations into killings of British soldiers by German forces during the war. In the light of recent interest in Parliament and the Press about allegations that a German national currently living in Germany committed war crimes against (mostly) Russians in Alderney, publication of this part of the History might, at least, lead to questions about the outcome of the investigations mentioned there. Any possibility that people still living who might have had a hand in the killings have not been fully investigated and brought to trial would lead to calls for further action. The Government could only respond by explaining that Germany is prohibited by its constitution from extraditing its own nationals, and that the War Crimes Act does not apply to people who are not British citizens or resident here.

The Home Secretary would not wish, on this account, to press for the removal of the passage in question. But the risk that it may re-open some old wounds needs to be borne in mind.

I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours,
Suzanne McCarthy
MRS S MCCARTHY

Stephen Wall Esq, CMG, LVO
10 Downing Street
London SW1

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/2/3

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 23/2M

9 September 1992

Dear Stephen,

THE HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CORPS

pps attached
In September 1990 the previous Defence Secretary sought approval from the then Prime Minister to proceed with the publication of an official history of the Intelligence Corps.

The original request reflected the desire of the Corps to mark its 50th anniversary with an official Regimental history. The author chosen was Dr Tony Clayton (a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst). The manuscript was exhaustively examined by the departments and agencies concerned; and the relevant official committee - then OD(DIS)(O), now OSIP - was satisfied that no issues of principle militated against publication. In particular no incompatibility was found between the proposed publication and the life-long duty of confidence which applies to those who have worked in the intelligence field. The principle of the life-long duty of confidence does not preclude publication where this is done with authority.

The Committee looked particularly carefully at material dealing with post-war Germany, the Falklands campaign and Northern Ireland (the relevant passages are attached). They were satisfied that the passages on Germany were acceptable, despite the heightened sensitivities prompted by recent political developments in Central and Eastern Europe, and the references to the Falklands went no further than those in an Army book which had already been published. The Committee regarded references to Northern Ireland as innocuous in themselves but believed that Ministers should consider whether it was appropriate to publish these, given that the campaign in the Province was still continuing. Mr King looked carefully at this aspect and concluded that there was no reason in principle why recent events in the intelligence field should not be described in an authorised publication.

J S Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

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OD(DIS)(O) concluded also that publication would establish a useful precedent, by confirming that the Government does not seek to impose a blanket ban on books dealing with intelligence matters but would be prepared to consider each case on its merits and to allow publication of material which is not sensitive. This book is not an account by an intelligence "insider" of his experiences (though Dr Clayton is a former member of the Territorial Army Intelligence Corps) and, with the assistance of OD(DIS)(O) members, the contents were extensively purged of sensitive material.

When the proposal was presented to Mrs Thatcher, she expressed two main concerns - that some controversy could arise from the fact that the document confirmed that the Intelligence Corps had carried out duties in post-war Germany, and that passages dealing with the Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland might be seen to come too soon after the events. In an attempt to remove any basis for the concerns expressed by Mrs Thatcher in 1990, the author has now produced an amended version of the manuscript which covers operations only up to 1968. It does not cover Germany after that date, nor events in the Falkland Islands, nor Northern Ireland. From the Corps point of view, this is clearly a second-best solution since the product is a volume which leaves out the last 20 years of their 50 year history. Indeed the Corps would still wish to publish the fuller version submitted in 1990 if authority could be obtained for this.

Accordingly, OSIP officials have studied again the fuller original version: they are satisfied that, subject to some further minor expurgation (which has been carried out), this manuscript deals uncontroversially with post-war Germany, the Falklands war and Northern Ireland and would not be damaging in any way.

The Defence Secretary agrees, and wishes to seek the Prime Minister's approval to the publication of the "full" history, as cleared by OSIP.

I am sending copies of this minute to Richard Gozney (Foreign Office), Colin Walters (Home Office), Colin Pipe (Law Officers' Department), William Fittall (Northern Ireland Office) and to Melanie Leech (Cabinet Office).



(J S PITT-BROOKE)
Private Secretary

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CHAPTER 11: AFTERMATH

The German and later Japanese capitulations changed the nature of much of the work of Intelligence Corps personnel, but in the first months of peace the quantity of that work was only slightly reduced. There arose a very large number of residual commitments, some directly concerned with Intelligence and Security for the Army and some in which the Corps acted as a uniformed military executive arm of wider British government policies. Although many wartime experts were demobilized in late 1945 and 1946 the supply of personnel was maintained by the Corps' use of National Service officers and soldiers. This chapter looks at these wide residual commitments that fell to the Corps, but has also to conclude with the much reduced role that the Army of the time saw for the Corps after the end of those commitments.

In the final stages of the German collapse and immediately after the surrender, small Intelligence Corps detachments on several occasions received the surrender of German personnel and units. Sometimes the liberation commitments were distressing. Sergeant Stanetto of 317 FSS with a small detachment from the Section were the first Allied troops to enter the appalling Belsen concentration camp, taking photographs of the conditions in the camp at the moment of its liberation. Later 53 FSS under Captain K. M. Stephens arrived, Sergeant Turgel of the section interrogating Kramer, Belsen's Commandant.

A Black List increased by 1945 to 70,000 known War Criminals believed to be in the British Zone of Occupation was an immediate Corps priority, but on-going investigations led to the arrest of many thousands more. Among the leading Nazis and personalities arrested were Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the SS, taken by 45 FSS. Himmler had disguised himself by removing his moustache, adding an eye patch and giving himself a new identity as a sergeant in the German Army secret field police. At the head of a small party of close associates he attempted to move from Flensburg in north Germany to Bavaria, but he was cut off by British troops movements. Following up information gathered elsewhere, 45 FSS arranged for a number of checkpoints on important routes to be set up. At one of these, at Bremervoerde, Himmler and two associates were detained, the disguise that they unwisely selected being in an automatic arrest category. However their real identity did not become clear for a further two days, when Himmler admitted all. Himmler's suicide precautions - a small quantity of cyanide concealed in the left cheek - unfortunately escaped his medical examiner until too late. A little later FSS personnel picked up Hitler's Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, in Hamburg. Other much wanted personalities included Rudolf Hoess, the Commandant of Auschwitz and the entire post-Hitler government of Admiral Doenitz, taken by 61 FSS at Flensburg. This latter group included Colonel General Jodl and a number of ministers and senior officials. Lesser fry included the Commandant of Sachsenhausen concentration camp arrested by 53 FSS and the Gauleiter of Magdeburg by 9 FSS, the latter official being, paradoxically, part-Jewish.

The Corps' next task in Germany and Austria was threefold. The first and most immediate was the unearthing of numerous members of the Nazi party and related Nazi organisations who had gone to ground under one name or another, and at the same time to see if there was any likelihood

of a final resistance movement emerging. In the event the former engaged Corps FSS for many months, while the latter threat, apart from very occasional minor sabotage, emerged only once in any significant form. A widespread movement under the cover of a transport organisation in both the British and American zones was watched for a while and then destroyed by a series of arrests on 31 March 1946.¹ The second was initially to report on civilian morale and later to provide expert personnel to the rebuilding of a German educational, cultural and eventual political life. The third was to contribute, again in the form of special personnel, to the search for German technology of use to Britain. This latter duty often took the form of a race against other Occupying Powers, a race not always friendly even among close allies.

Supreme Allied Headquarters had set out the basis for immediate denazification and counter-intelligence work in a 1944 directive. The main features of this included an Allied Military Government, non-fraternisation, control of movement, food, identity documents, education, the media, local government and such productive capacity as remained. Regional governments would later assume much more power than under the Nazis. A 21 Army Group Counter-Intelligence Instruction for the British Zone provided greater detail. FSS, whose name was later to change to Counter-Intelligence - CI - Sections, were to be posted to Bezirk, or district, administrative centres and other towns over 1000,000. There were also to be Port, Frontier and Anti-Sabotage sections; for this work eighty-five CI Sections and twenty CI Reserve Detachments were formed from the FSS of 21 Army Group and new drafts. By the latter months of 1945 this organisation had taken shape, with Headquarters Intelligence Corps (Field) administering eighty-three FSS (with one additional Netherlands Army section), an Army Refugee Interrogation Team, twenty Military Government Interrogation Sections, sixteen area security offices and a Counter-Intelligence laboratory, together with three Counter-Sabotage detachments and a small number of Port and frontier Security Sections. The Intelligence Corps played a very large part in the manning of all these sections and sub-units, initially controlling and supervising drafts under Intelligence Corps (Field), after that headquarters disbandment and replacement with the Intelligence Division of the Control Commission Germany, by 273 FSS.

Of these sub-units initially two, 23 FSS and 309 FSS were posted to Berlin; they were joined by a third, 50 FSS, late in 1945 when all were placed directly under Berlin Headquarters Intelligence Staff. By March 1946 only 309 FSS remained, but it was reinforced during the 1948-49 Berlin blockade crisis by 903 FSS, whose main task was the screening of the 12,000 civilian labour force at Gatow airfield serving the airlift.

Essentially the immediate FSS work of denazification can be summed up in four words, search, detain, interrogate, document. For this work good German was essential, together with a knowledge of the now defunct Nazi regime. For this latter the Nazi's own 1943 handbook, Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, was invaluable. In command of the Field Investigation Unit of the War Crimes Group North West Europe was Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Nightingale. The basis of questioning was a twelve page Questionnaire Fragebogen, covering every aspect of an individual's life: personal particulars, religious beliefs, schools and Nazi party special schools,

University and Nazi Party student organizations, employment, military service, Nazi Party social and professional organizations, income, property, travel and persons visited. Thoroughness was all important.² Former Nazis sympathisers faced prison, loss of employment and if illegally acquired, home, and in lesser cases disenfranchisement.

In the denazification process an immediate task was the thousands of German military personnel, all having to be screened before release. Major T. Peters recalls, of this work, priority release being given to agricultural workers for the 1945 harvest and to entertainers to raise German morale. German speakers from a variety of sources - Jewish refugees, Alsatians and others were often co-opted in to assist as interpreters. Another early task was the purging of German industry, particularly heavy, electrical and chemical concerns.

Officers of the Corps were employed in the interrogation of a number of senior officers and Nazi officials; Lieutenant Colonel Scotland, for example, led the interrogation of Marshal Kesselring, in which Captain M. F. Cornish also participated. Later Captain Cornish was sent to Moscow to assist in the interrogation of the Gauleiter of Breslau.

Another early commitment was the denazification of universities and Hochschulen and supervision of their return to a normal life. Captain F. O. P. Brann was, for example, responsible for Bonn University. Candidates for entry, students, and staff had to be screened, student societies watched and text books monitored - gifts from British and Swiss universities being especially useful. In the academic year 1945-46 the task was enormous - university buildings lacked water, heating, electricity, doors and windows; students wrote lecture notes on the backs of old envelopes, lived in cellars of ruined houses and worked part-time as labourers to qualify for a hot meal.

Related to University work was that of scientific research. In this field Lieutenant Colonel B. K. Blount was at work in the Research Branch of the Control Commission's Economic Subcommittee. He was tasked to end all scientific research work of military potential, but to encourage other work. His duties varied from the prevention of needless dismantling and destruction to the preservation and funding of numerous research institutes.³

Local authorities and public services were another important area for denazification - in Hanover an SS Standartenfuhrer with a particularly unpleasant reputation was found by 45 FSS working as a council labourer. Major T. X. H. Pantcheff's investigation into Nazi atrocities in penal camps at Esterwegen and Aschendorfer Moor provide a good example of the Corps' contribution into war crime enquiries. At the former, French and Belgian resistance members had 'disappeared', at the latter some 200 prisoners were killed with Nazi Party connivance in April 1945, the killings being the work of a lance-corporal posing as an officer. Major Pantcheff's team comprised himself, a captain, a warrant officer and two staff sergeants, all Intelligence Corps. Careful investigations were carried out among the former prison guards (now themselves prisoners of war) and former inmates of the camps, now released. Eventually a British Military Government court imposed six death sentences in respect of the Aschendorfer

Moor killings, and a second court imposed two death and several long term prison sentences in respect of the Esterwegen brutalities.⁴

Three investigations were especially distressing; two concerned the execution in May 1940 of British Army soldiers who were at the time German Army prisoners. These included a group from the Royal Norfolk Regiment killed near Calais, and a much larger group of some ninety, mostly Royal Warwickshire Regiment, killed near Dunkirk. The latter killings, by the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Regiment, were ordered as a reprisal for their previous stubborn resistance. Among those who assisted in this investigation was, again, Major Pantcheff. A third investigation, in which Captain Cornish worked with RAF investigators, was into murders of British prisoners in a German Camp, Stalag Luft III.

Another FSS task, reflecting the changing international scene, was investigation of Soviet agents pushed into the British Zone after training at a special unit at Torgau in the Soviet Zone. The agents were generally Germans who had been former members of the KPD. About one half immediately gave themselves up on arrival, thankful to leave the Soviet Zone; the rest were not too difficult to apprehend.⁵

At high political level Lieutenant Colonel N. Annan was appointed to the Political Directorate of the British Control Commission, with the task of advising the military government on matters such as denazification and the renewal of German political life.⁶ The latter context the British Zone area was of key importance. Almost immediately in October 1945 a crisis arose from the arbitrary dismissal of Dr K. Adenauer from his post as Oberbürgermeister of Cologne by the local British military administrator, a brigadier. Adenauer had committed no offence, but the brigadier, distrusting Adenauer's known political ambitions to lead a restored democratic and Catholic Western Germany, banned him from entry to Cologne and also from any form of political activity. The unwisdom of this action was recognised by Colonel Annan and his Foreign Office superiors. They did however experience some difficulty in persuading the military administration that a return to political life was not only inevitable, but if that life was healthy, also desirable. Colonel Annan then proceeded to call on Adenauer and in a somewhat delicate interview reassured him that he could pursue political activities towards his goal.

Early in 1946 Colonel Annan called a meeting of German personalities known to want to resume political activity to advise them that this would now be permitted. Of this meeting he later wrote:

'The response was touching, "this news is better for us than white bread" said one old Social Democrat. - Here were men who had come many kilometers in most cases with extreme difficulty as roads and railways were still so terribly damaged, men with sallow faces and with the strained expression that hunger gives ... At that meeting I saw for the first time that spirit of dedication to democracy as a form of government. That spirit sprang from the knowledge both of what dictatorship had been and what dictatorship still was in the

eastern zone of Germany.'

It next fell to Colonel Annan to guide the Social Democratic Party (SDP) back to a proper political path, guidance involving restrictions on certain party leaders of the 1930s who had been prepared to compromise with the Nazis. More serious was heavy Soviet pressure on SPD leader in Berlin and the Soviet Zone to merge with the Communist Party (KPD). Colonel Annan and his Foreign Office chief were unable to persuade Grotewohl the Berlin SPD leader, against the fusion. But by research and the exposure of the pre-war record of Ulbricht, the Communist leader; Colonel Annan was able to ensure that a majority of the SPD delegates at a special conference rejected the merger, despite the fact that the conference was held in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The Soviets then went their own way in their own Zone, but another consequence, however, was a greater appreciation by the USA of the wisdom of British policies. Colonel Annan's reporting of the emerging German political scene went through the Foreign Officer to the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, personally.

These reports used the careful observations of the political scene by several Intelligence Corps officers among them being Major Peters, Major D. Royce and Captain M. P. Thomas. The latter was in fact a native German but totally opposed to Nazism. The pressurising of the SPD leaders represents a good example of such observation. At first the Soviets had been content to allow both the SPD and the KPD to emerge. The clear, large lead of the SPD over the KPD caused them to change tack and seek an amalgamated party that would carry out Soviet policy. Paper and publicity facilities were given to the KPD and denied to the SPD, anti-fusionist SPD meetings and officials were harassed and on at least one occasion beaten up, meetings to discuss fusion were convened at short notice with only the KPD members warned in advance, and SPD waverers were bribed by food parcels.

Also at work at the political level was Major N. Gash, now head of MI 14(d), the only remaining operational unit of MI 14. During the war this section had been concerned with Nazi party-controlled military forces; now as a unit its ambit was extended to the collation and analysis of all information of a military or security nature concerning Occupied Germany and Austria. The unit published a weekly Intelligence bulletin, MITROPA, in the first year of occupation.⁷

Other, very varied tasks, were carried out by members of the Corps in Germany at this time. Major J. C. Phipps served as Personal Assistant to Lord Justice Lawrence at the Nuremberg War Criminal Trials. Lieutenant-Colonel K. Garside, who had from late 1944 been collecting captured enemy documents that might be of use for the Control Commission, continued work on documents that were of importance. He was instrumental in helping the 'Enemy Publications Committee' establish a field organization to locate German learned and scientific books and treatises produced in the Nazi era. Major (late Professor) N. R. C. Cohn was engaged in similar work in Austria, some of his finds being used at the Nuremberg trials. A NCO, J. Packman, organised the main Intelligence Bureau registry at the Control Commission headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel J. F. E. Stephenson, was in charge of an MI5 liaison section concerned with collection of evidence against British traitors in Germany. Major W. Stallybrass served with the Commission's Enemy Document Unit. Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Rowan-

Robinson was in charge of all German interpreters at work for the Commission. Lieutenant Colonel H. Boggis-Rolfe served in the Commission's Legal Division and Major C. A. Cox was tasked with organising a new police force in the British Zone. Other officers served as Regional Intelligence Officers, Lieutenant Colonel B. Kemball Cook, for example, so serving in Bremen. In Britain some Corps officers were at work in the political re-education of German prisoners of war, Wilton Park at Beaconsfield being one centre for their work. Others were at work in different prisoner of war camps questioning former members of the SS in order to identify the most notorious. In the United States, Colonel D. A. Prater was bringing his massive experience to the German Military Document Centre at Camp Ritchie in Maryland.

One sensitive issue was the different Allies' attempts to secure German wartime scientific and technological inventions. An Anglo American unit, FIAT or Field Information Agency (Technical) was set up near Frankfurt with a joint staff, among the British officers was Major Stallybrass.

The Federal Republic of Germany is now a flourishing healthy parliamentary democracy. The work of the Intelligence Corps in those immediate post-war years made a significant contribution to this German return to political health. The return could not have been achieved without the foundation of well-prepared military and political advance intelligence.

A similar FSS system to that in Germany was established for Austria. An initial twelve FSS were deployed in the British Zone of occupation in Austria, under the control of two Area Security Offices at Klagenfurt and Graz, with until 1949 additional Frontier Sections and a further three FSS in the British sector of Vienna.⁸ Factors complicating the immediate post-war situation were the large number (120,000) of prisoners of war, equally large and ever increasing numbers of displaced persons, the consequence of a brief Soviet occupation of (and some reluctance to depart from) areas of the British Zone, and the fact that Vienna was entirely surrounded by Soviet-occupied territory. In the areas entered by Soviet troops unpopular Communists installed by the Red Army had to be removed from office. Actual relations with Soviet military personnel, combat units who had fought their way into Austria, were at first very cordial, political officers often being openly ignored. But from 1947-48 these units were replaced by others who had been heavily indoctrinated politically. There was also the sensitive issue as to whether Austria was an occupied or a liberated territory.

As in Germany, the tasks were the tracking down and arrest of Nazi Party members, zone demarcation - and line-crossers, attempts by hundreds of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to depart illegally for Palestine, and from 1946 the questioning of Austrians returning from captivity and forced labour in Soviet camps. Some had even worked in or near Soviet armaments factories. The three sections in Vienna had wider duties. No 310 FSS at Schönbrunn Palace had special security commitments and 291 FSS located near the British Embassy concentrated on protective security. The third, 20 FSS, was enlarged, totalling some 50, and carried out a

Falklands campaign

undertaken by a number of Field Intelligence NCOs, working in plain clothes and living with local communities near the frontier, and by an All Source Assessment Centre (formerly the Intelligence Cell) at Force Headquarters; sources include infantry patrols, observation posts and in theatre and UK based reconnaissance systems. There is also a Counter Intelligence Detachment component of the Section. Commitments have extended to some internal security work, most notably at the time of independence in 1981 when there was considerable unrest in Belize City, and training the Intelligence Section of the Belize Defence Force.

An event in 1982 is an example of operational Intelligence work in Belize. In July of that year an Intelligence Corps Warrant Officer acting as Field Intelligence NCO for the Western area, was informed that a car containing four men had been seen crossing the border having first handed in small arms to the Guatemalan border military checkpoint. The sighting had been made by a British Army observation post on top of a hill in a very isolated area. Accompanied by Police Constable Oscar Wilde of the Belize Police, the Warrant Officer began an investigation and found the car stopped near a customs post, clearly the object of a reconnaissance. While Constable Wilde was questioning the occupants of the car, one of them threw an object out of the window, which the Warrant Officer found to be a grenade. The four Guatemalans were then arrested, all proving to be soldiers, with one identified as the commander of the garrison detachment across the border. A second grenade was also found. It was decided to return the four Guatemalans. This gesture headed off a raid about to be mounted by a company of Kaibuls, Guatemalan Special Forces, on the Belize border customs post, for which the captured men had been an advance reconnaissance party.¹³

If Borneo and Belize were commitments for which the Intelligence Corps had ample notice, the South Atlantic conflict of 1982 was the reverse. The Argentinian seizure firstly of South Georgia and later of the Falkland Islands were operations that involved very hurried preparation by the Ministry of Defence. The decision to send a recovery Task Force presented especial problems for a small Corps already stretched, but some thirty members of the Corps were despatched to the South Atlantic to serve in a variety of roles, with a further forty, mostly NCOs, deployed on work in connection with the campaign in Britain - at Northwood, the Ministry of Defence or the Cabinet Office.

Shortly after the Argentine invasion Major D. M. Burrill took a hurriedly assembled team of two officers, three senior NCOs and a Corporal to Northwood, to provide an Intelligence Section for Major-General J. Moore's land force headquarters. When Headquarters Land Forces Falkland Islands, LFFI, was formally opened an additional officer and senior NCO were added, while at Northwood a workable package of basic Intelligence was prepared.¹⁴

There then followed the assembling, preparing and briefing of other Corps personnel; these included specialist officers and NCOs and the Intelligence Cell for 5 Infantry Brigade who travelled to the theatre in style aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2.¹⁵ One NCO served with 3 Commando Brigade Intelligence Cell in particularly dangerous conditions. Intelligence tasks, sometimes discharged under Argentinian air strikes or artillery fire, included the interviewing of Argentinian prisoners of war, captured document translation, examination of captured equipment, debriefing of civilians and operational Intelligence

collation, analysis and dissemination. Prisoner interviewing, conducted in a carefully pre-planned humane way, was the responsibility of Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFITs) these operated at San Carlos, Ajax Bay and Teal Inlet. Prisoner Intelligence was of particular value in assessing strengths, order of battle, Argentine weapon capabilities and morale. Captured documents were also valuable, one in particular was perhaps the most important piece of ground forces Intelligence acquired after the San Carlos landings. In what was in some respects a traditional infantry operation, patrolling was a very important source of Intelligence, in this work Corps members played a vital part in briefing and debriefing infantry and special forces patrols.

The whole campaign, small scale though it was, illustrated vividly the contribution the Corps could make to Service Intelligence - the ability, through experience, to understand and therefore effectively manage information from all sources and to control, or at least influence tasking. The almost instantaneous production of so many and varied specialists for an unforeseen operation was yet further proof of the value of a Corps of specialist regular soldiers permanently at work in military intelligence. Of the Corps' work the commander of 3 Commando Brigade, Brigadier (later Major General) J. Thompson wrote later:

'The response by those members of the Corps involved in the operation was positive and professional. As the brigade commander charged with carrying out the initial landings on the Falklands, what impressed me most was the quality of the intelligence assessments that were produced from quite early on, and right through the campaign, by the intelligence staffs in my superior headquarters, and in my own headquarters. The 'piece de resistance' was the identification of positions occupied by the Argentine regiments, before we landed, which proved to be amazingly accurate ~~when weeks later we captured a map showing their layout. The unit boundaries on this map fitted over our maps in their dispositions almost like a trace.~~ I also felt that the way the Intelligence Staffs in the theatre of operations coped with the interrogation of prisoners, a mammoth task, when one considers the numbers taken, and the short time available in which to process them, was a model of efficiency, and humanity.'

The campaign was also another milestone in the Corps' history in that for the first time the principal Intelligence Officer in theatre was an Intelligence Corps officer, Major Burrill.

Northern Ireland

The second major present day commitment of the Corps, involving a large number of officers and NCOs and also some WRAC personnel permanently attached to the Intelligence Corps, is of course Northern Ireland.

For obvious reasons this campaign cannot be discussed in any detail. But it has been an Intelligence-oriented action from very early days. The first officers and NCOs of the Corps despatched to the Province as individual reinforcements went in August 1969, some to supplement the in-place members of the 39 Infantry Brigade Intelligence Support Section, others to liaise with the RUC.

Intelligence skills have been deployed, often very much developed, at different times and with different degrees of emphasis as the campaign has unfolded. Organisational changes have been many but a number of constants can be identified. Firstly, there is the support of military formations on the ground; this includes the training of all-arms personnel in most Intelligence duties as well as the training of Corps specialists to fulfil specific functions. In the Province itself, Headquarters Northern Ireland and each of the Infantry Brigade Headquarters have their own dedicated operational intelligence support; Security expertise and advice is provided from Headquarters Northern Ireland. A number of senior and junior staff officer posts are filled by Intelligence Corps officers. Support is also provided to the RUC by officers and NCOs of the Corps.

The deep commitment of the Corps as a whole and the great personal bravery of individual members in Northern Ireland can be assessed from the large number of awards made to Corps personnel.¹⁶ There are but few members of the Corps who do not wear the General Service medal with the Northern Ireland clasp.

Two events epitomise the Corps as it enters the 1990s. On 1 February 1985 the Intelligence Corps was re-defined by the Executive Committee of the Army Boards as an 'Arm' in place of its former status as a supporting Service. And the Corps' commemoration, in 1990, of its 50th Anniversary as a distinct, badged, Arm of the Army can justly be seen as a moment of family pride in achievements increasingly professional and successful.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

17 September 1990

THE HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CORPS

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 7 September seeking agreement to publish the Regimental History of the Intelligence Corps. In the light of events in the Gulf, the Prime Minister thought the timing of this was inappropriate and that it should be deferred. She also felt that the passages on the Falklands and Northern Ireland came too soon after the events and would give rise to questions in the House. She also expressed reservations about highlighting the role of the Intelligence Corps in post-War Germany.

I am copying this letter to Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office), Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Colin Walters (Home Office), Stephen Leach (Northern Ireland Office), Juliet Wheldon (Law Officers' Department) and to Sir Robin Butler.

ANDREW TURNBULL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

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PRIME MINISTER

HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CORPS

The Defence Secretary's minute seeks agreement to the publication of a regimental history of the Intelligence Corps which has recently celebrated its 50th anniversary.

There are two issues:

(i) Is it right in principle for an official history on intelligence matters to be published? The Defence Secretary argues that it is, as this would underline the point the Government made during the passage of the Official Secrets Act that the life-long duty of confidence does preclude publication where this is done with authority. This was an assurance given to Sir Julian Amery and others during the debate. The Government has, of course, recently published two further volumes of the history of intelligence in the Second World War.

In view of the Gulf, I think the timing is thoroughly obvious. I suggest we defer consideration on principle.

(ii) If publication is right in principle, is the text itself acceptable? Mr. King highlights three areas, the role of the Intelligence Corps in post-war Germany, in the Falklands campaign and in Northern Ireland. The first two have a positive message to get across, particularly the passage on Germany which highlights the contribution the Intelligence Corps made to establishing democracy in Germany. The case for the material on Northern Ireland is more questionable though Mr. King believes it is innocuous.

I am horrified at this proposal. It is much too soon and will only give me to endless questions with the House. No to post-war Germany, the Falklands, Northern Ireland.

Content for the history to be published?

Content for the inclusion of the passages on Germany, Falklands and Northern Ireland?

AT

ANDREW TURNBULL

14 September 1990

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PRIME MINISTERHISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE CORPS

The Intelligence Corps celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of its formation last year. To mark this, the Corps commissioned a regimental history which it hopes to publish this year. The author is Dr Tony Clayton (a lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst), who has undertaken the task in his spare time and thus owns the general copyright in the book, and the publisher is to be Brassey's.

2. The manuscript has been exhaustively examined by the Departments and agencies concerned. The relevant official committee, OD(DIS)(O), has given thorough consideration to the issues of principle involved in publication. Questions that have received particular attention are the compatibility of the book's publication with the life-long duty of confidence which applies to those who have worked in the field of intelligence; and the desirability of making reference to recent events in a work on intelligence matters.

3. The book is not an account by an intelligence "insider" of his experiences, though Dr Clayton is an ex-member of the Territorial Army Intelligence Corps and some of the material derives explicitly or implicitly from the experiences of others. In any event, the principle of the life-long duty of confidence does not preclude publication where this is done with authority. The advice of OD(DIS)(O) is that publication would establish a useful precedent, by confirming that the Government does not seek to impose a blanket ban on books dealing with intelligence matters but is prepared to consider each case on its merits and to allow publication of material which is not sensitive.



4. Officials are satisfied that the manuscript contains nothing that could be damaging to national security. OD(DIS)(O) has looked particularly carefully at material dealing with post-war Germany, ^{Flag A} the Falklands campaign ^{Flag B} and Northern Ireland: ^{Flag C} I attach the relevant passages. The Committee is satisfied that the passages on Germany are acceptable, despite the heightened sensitivities prompted by recent political developments in Central and Eastern Europe, and that the references to the Falklands go no further than those in an Army book which has already been published. The Committee regard the references to Northern Ireland as innocuous in themselves but believe that Ministers should consider whether it is the right time to publish these, given the current prominence of the Wallace case and the fact that the campaign in the Province is still continuing. I have looked carefully at this aspect and concluded that there is no reason in principle why recent events in the intelligence field should not be described in an authorised publication. The wording of the passages concerned are acceptable - that on Northern Ireland is particularly anodyne.

5. I should be grateful to know whether you and colleagues are content that publication should be authorised and that the text should include the passages dealing with recent events.

6. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord President, Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary, Northern Ireland Secretary and Attorney General, and to Sir Robin Butler.

(T K)

Ministry of Defence
7th September 1990

Excerpt from CHAPTER 11: AFTERMATH

The German and later Japanese capitulations changed the nature of much of the work of Intelligence Corps personnel, but in the first months of peace the quantity of that work was only slightly reduced. There arose a very large number of residual commitments, some directly concerned with Intelligence and Security for the Army and some in which the Corps acted as a uniformed military executive arm of wider British government policies. Although many wartime experts were demobilized in late 1945 and 1946 the supply of personnel was maintained by the Corps' use of National Service officers and soldiers. This chapter looks at these wide residual commitments that fell to the Corps, but has also to conclude with the much reduced role that the Army of the time saw for the Corps after the end of those commitments.

In the final stages of the German collapse and immediately after the surrender, small Intelligence Corps detachments on several occasions received the surrender of German personnel and units. Sometimes the liberation commitments were distressing. Sergeant Stanetto of 317 FSS with a small detachment from the Section were the first Allied troops to enter the appalling Belsen concentration camp, taking photographs of the conditions in the camp at the moment of its liberation. Later 53 FSS under Captain K. M. Stephens arrived, Sergeant Turgel of the section interrogating Kramer, Belsen's Commandant.

A Black List increased by 1945 to 70,000 known War Criminals believed to be in the British Zone of Occupation was an immediate Corps priority, but on-going investigations led to the arrest of many thousands more. Among the leading Nazis and personalities arrested were Heinrich Himmler, the leader of the SS, taken by 45 FSS. Himmler had disguised himself by removing his moustache, adding an eye patch and giving himself a new identity as a sergeant in the German Army secret field police. At the head of a small party of close associates he attempted to move from Flensburg in north Germany to Bavaria, but he was cut off by British troops movements. Following up information gathered elsewhere, 45 FSS arranged for a number of checkpoints on important routes to be set up. At one of these, at Bremervoerde, Himmler and two associates were detained, the disguise that they unwisely selected being in an automatic arrest category. However their real identity did not become clear for a further two days, when Himmler admitted all. Himmler's suicide precautions - a small quantity of cyanide concealed in the left cheek - unfortunately escaped his medical examiner until too late. A little later FSS personnel picked up Hitler's Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, in Hamburg. Other much wanted personalities included Rudolf Hoess, the Commandant of Auschwitz and the entire post-Hitler government of Admiral Doenitz, taken by 61 FSS at Flensburg. This latter group included Colonel General Jodl and a number of ministers and senior officials. Lesser fry included the Commandant of Sachsenhausen concentration camp arrested by 53 FSS and the Gauleiter of Magdeburg by 9 FSS, the latter official being, paradoxically, part-Jewish.

The Corps' next task in Germany and Austria was threefold. The first and most immediate was the unearthing of numerous members of the Nazi party and related Nazi organisations who had gone to ground under one name or another, and at the same time to see if there was any likelihood

of a final resistance movement emerging. In the event the former engaged Corps FSS for many months, while the latter threat, apart from very occasional minor sabotage, emerged only once in any significant form. A widespread movement under the cover of a transport organisation in both the British and American zones was watched for a while and then destroyed by a series of arrests on 31 March 1946.¹ The second was initially to report on civilian morale and later to provide expert personnel to the rebuilding of a German educational, cultural and eventual political life. The third was to contribute, again in the form of special personnel, to the search for German technology of use to Britain. This latter duty often took the form of a race against other Occupying Powers, a race not always friendly even among close allies.

Supreme Allied Headquarters had set out the basis for immediate denazification and counter-intelligence work in a 1944 directive. The main features of this included an Allied Military Government, non-fraternisation, control of movement, food, identity documents, education, the media, local government and such productive capacity as remained. Regional governments would later assume much more power than under the Nazis. A 21 Army Group Counter-Intelligence Instruction for the British Zone provided greater detail. FSS, whose name was later to change to Counter-Intelligence - CI - Sections, were to be posted to Bezirk, or district, administrative centres and other towns over 100,000. There were also to be Port, Frontier and Anti-Sabotage sections; for this work eighty-five CI Sections and twenty CI Reserve Detachments were formed from the FSS of 21 Army Group and new drafts. By the latter months of 1945 this organisation had taken shape, with Headquarters Intelligence Corps (Field) administering eighty-three FSS (with one additional Netherlands Army section), an Army Refugee Interrogation Team, twenty Military Government Interrogation Sections, sixteen area security offices and a Counter-Intelligence laboratory, together with three Counter-Sabotage detachments and a small number of Port and frontier Security Sections. The Intelligence Corps played a very large part in the manning of all these sections and sub-units, initially controlling and supervising drafts under Intelligence Corps (Field), after that headquarters disbandment and replacement with the Intelligence Division of the Control Commission Germany, by 273 FSS.

Of these sub-units initially two, 23 FSS and 309 FSS were posted to Berlin; they were joined by a third, 50 FSS, late in 1945 when all were placed directly under Berlin Headquarters Intelligence Staff. By March 1946 only 309 FSS remained, but it was reinforced during the 1948-49 Berlin blockade crisis by 903 FSS, whose main task was the screening of the 12,000 civilian labour force at Gatow airfield serving the airlift.

Essentially the immediate FSS work of denazification can be summed up in four words, search, detain, interrogate, document. For this work good German was essential, together with a knowledge of the now defunct Nazi regime. For this latter the Nazi's own 1943 handbook, Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, was invaluable. In command of the Field Investigation Unit of the War Crimes Group North West Europe was Lieutenant Colonel R. A. Nightingale. The basis of questioning was a twelve page Questionnaire Fragebogen, covering every aspect of an individual's life: personal particulars, religious beliefs, schools and Nazi party special schools,

University and Nazi Party student organizations, employment, military service, Nazi Party social and professional organizations, income, property, travel and persons visited. Thoroughness was all important.² Former Nazis sympathisers faced prison, loss of employment and if illegally acquired, home, and in lesser cases disenfranchisement.

In the denazification process an immediate task was the thousands of German military personnel, all having to be screened before release. Major T. Peters recalls, of this work, priority release being given to agricultural workers for the 1945 harvest and to entertainers to raise German morale. German speakers from a variety of sources - Jewish refugees, Alsations and others were often co-opted in to assist as interpreters. Another early task was the purging of German industry, particularly heavy, electrical and chemical concerns.

Officers of the Corps were employed in the interrogation of a number of senior officers and Nazi officials; Lieutenant Colonel Scotland, for example, led the interrogation of Marshal Kesselring, in which Captain M. F. Cornish also participated. Later Captain Cornish was sent to Moscow to assist in the interrogation of the Gauleiter of Breslau.

Another early commitment was the denazification of universities and Hochschulen, and supervision of their return to a normal life. Captain F. O. P. Brann was, for example, responsible for Bonn University. Candidates for entry, students, and staff had to be screened, student societies watched and text books monitored - gifts from British and Swiss universities being especially useful. In the academic year 1945-46 the task was enormous - university buildings lacked water, heating, electricity, doors and windows; students wrote lecture notes on the backs of old envelopes, lived in cellars of ruined houses and worked part-time as labourers to qualify for a hot meal.

Related to University work was that of scientific research. In this field Lieutenant Colonel B. K. Blount was at work in the Research Branch of the Control Commission's Economic Subcommittee. He was tasked to end all scientific research work of military potential, but to encourage other work. His duties varied from the prevention of needless dismantling and destruction to the preservation and funding of numerous research institutes.³

Local authorities and public services were another important area for denazification - in Hanover an SS Standartenfuhrer with a particularly unpleasant reputation was found by 45 FSS working as a council labourer. Major T. X. H. Pantcheff's investigation into Nazi atrocities in penal camps at Esterwegen and Aschendorfer Moor provide a good example of the Corps' contribution into war crime enquiries. At the former, French and Belgian resistance members had 'disappeared', at the latter some 200 prisoners were killed with Nazi Party connivance in April 1945, the killings being the work of a lance-corporal posing as an officer. Major Pantcheff's team comprised himself, a captain, a warrant officer and two staff sergeants, all Intelligence Corps. Careful investigations were carried out among the former prison guards (now themselves prisoners of war) and former inmates of the camps, now released. Eventually a British Military Government court imposed six death sentences in respect of the Aschendorfer

Moor killings, and a second court imposed two death and several long term prison sentences in respect of the Esterwegen brutalities.⁴

Three investigations were especially distressing; two concerned the execution in May 1940 of British Army soldiers who were at the time German Army prisoners. These included a group from the Royal Norfolk Regiment killed near Calais, and a much larger group of some ninety, mostly Royal Warwickshire Regiment, killed near Dunkirk. The latter killings, by the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Regiment, were ordered as a reprisal for their previous stubborn resistance. Among those who assisted in this investigation was, again, Major Pantcheff. A third investigation, in which Captain Cornish worked with RAF investigators, was into murders of British prisoners in a German Camp, Stalag Luft III.

Another FSS task, reflecting the changing international scene, was investigation of Soviet agents pushed into the British Zone after training at a special unit at Torgau in the Soviet Zone. The agents were generally Germans who had been former members of the KPD. About one half immediately gave themselves up on arrival, thankful to leave the Soviet Zone; the rest were not too difficult to apprehend.⁵

At high political level Lieutenant Colonel N. Annan was appointed to the Political Directorate of the British Control Commission, with the task of advising the military government on matters such as denazification and the renewal of German political life.⁶ The latter context the British Zone area was of key importance. Almost immediately in October 1945 a crisis arose from the arbitrary dismissal of Dr K. Adenauer from his post as Oberbürgermeister of Cologne by the local British military administrator, a brigadier. Adenauer had committed no offence, but the brigadier, distrusting Adenauer's known political ambitions to lead a restored democratic and Catholic Western Germany, banned him from entry to Cologne and also from any form of political activity. The unwisdom of this action was recognised by Colonel Annan and his Foreign Office superiors. They did however experience some difficulty in persuading the military administration that a return to political life was not only inevitable, but if that life was healthy, also desirable. Colonel Annan then proceeded to call on Adenauer and in a somewhat delicate interview reassured him that he could pursue political activities towards his goal.

Early in 1946 Colonel Annan called a meeting of German personalities known to want to resume political activity to advise them that this would now be permitted. Of this meeting he later wrote:

'The response was touching, "this news is better for us than white bread" said one old Social Democrat. Here were men who had come many kilometers in most cases with extreme difficulty as roads and railways were still so terribly damaged, men with sallow faces and with the strained expression that hunger gives ... At that meeting I saw for the first time that spirit of dedication to democracy as a form of government. That spirit sprang from the knowledge both of what dictatorship had been and what dictatorship still was in the

eastern zone of Germany.'

It next fell to Colonel Annan to guide the Social Democratic Party (SDP) back to a proper political path, guidance involving restrictions on certain party leaders of the 1930s who had been prepared to compromise with the Nazis. More serious was heavy Soviet pressure on SPD leader in Berlin and the Soviet Zone to merge with the Communist Party (KPD). Colonel Annan and his Foreign Office chief were unable to persuade Grotewohl the Berlin SPD leader, against the fusion. But by research and the exposure of the pre-war record of Ulbricht, the Communist leader, Colonel Annan was able to ensure that a majority of the SPD delegates at a special conference rejected the merger, despite the fact that the conference was held in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The Soviets then went their own way in their own Zone, but another consequence, however, was a greater appreciation by the USA of the wisdom of British policies. Colonel Annan's reporting of the emerging German political scene went through the Foreign Officer to the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, personally.

These reports used the careful observations of the political scene by several Intelligence Corps officers among them being Major Peters, Major D. Royce and Captain M. P. Thomas. The latter was in fact a native German but totally opposed to Nazism. The pressurising of the SPD leaders represents a good example of such observation. At first the Soviets had been content to allow both the SPD and the KPD to emerge. The clear, large lead of the SPD over the KPD caused them to change tack and seek an amalgamated party that would carry out Soviet policy. Paper and publicity facilities were given to the KPD and denied to the SPD, anti-fusionist SPD meetings and officials were harassed and on at least one occasion beaten up, meetings to discuss fusion were convened at short notice with only the KPD members warned in advance, and SPD waverers were bribed by food parcels.

Also at work at the political level was Major N. Gash, now head of MI 14(d), the only remaining operational unit of MI 14. During the war this section had been concerned with Nazi party-controlled military forces; now as a unit its ambit was extended to the collation and analysis of all information of a military or security nature concerning Occupied Germany and Austria. The unit published a weekly Intelligence bulletin, MITROPA, in the first year of occupation.⁷

Other, very varied tasks, were carried out by members of the Corps in Germany at this time. Major J. C. Phipps served as Personal Assistant to Lord Justice Lawrence at the Nuremberg War Criminal Trials. Lieutenant-Colonel K. Garside, who had from late 1944 been collecting captured enemy documents that might be of use for the Control Commission, continued work on documents that were of importance. He was instrumental in helping the 'Enemy Publications Committee' establish a field organization to locate German learned and scientific books and treatises produced in the Nazi era. Major (late Professor) N. R. C. Cohn was engaged in similar work in Austria, some of his finds being used at the Nuremberg trials. A NCO, J. Packman, organised the main Intelligence Bureau registry at the Control Commission headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel J. F. E. Stephenson, was in charge of an MI5 liaison section concerned with collection of evidence against British traitors in Germany. Major W. Stallybrass served with the Commission's Enemy Document Unit. Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Rowan-

Robinson was in charge of all German interpreters at work for the Commission. Lieutenant Colonel H. Boggis-Rolfe served in the Commission's Legal Division and Major C. A. Cox was tasked with organising a new police force in the British Zone. Other officers served as Regional Intelligence Officers, Lieutenant Colonel B. Kemball Cook, for example, so serving in Bremen. In Britain some Corps officers were at work in the political re-education of German prisoners of war, Wilton Park at Beaconsfield being one centre for their work. Others were at work in different prisoner of war camps questioning former members of the SS in order to identify the most notorious. In the United States, Colonel D. A. Prater was bringing his massive experience to the German Military Document Centre at Camp Ritchie in Maryland.

One sensitive issue was the different Allies' attempts to secure German wartime scientific and technological inventions. An Anglo American unit, FIAT or Field Information Agency (Technical) was set up near Frankfurt with a joint staff, among the British officers was Major Stallybrass.

The Federal Republic of Germany is now a flourishing healthy parliamentary democracy. The work of the Intelligence Corps in those immediate post-war years made a significant contribution to this German return to political health. The return could not have been achieved without the foundation of well-prepared military and political advance intelligence.

A similar FSS system to that in Germany was established for Austria. An initial twelve FSS were deployed in the British Zone of occupation in Austria, under the control of two Area Security Offices at Klagenfurt and Graz, with until 1949 additional Frontier Sections and a further three FSS in the British sector of Vienna.⁸ Factors complicating the immediate post-war situation were the large number (120,000) of prisoners of war, equally large and ever increasing numbers of displaced persons, the consequence of a brief Soviet occupation of (and some reluctance to depart from) areas of the British Zone, and the fact that Vienna was entirely surrounded by Soviet-occupied territory. In the areas entered by Soviet troops unpopular Communists installed by the Red Army had to be removed from office. Actual relations with Soviet military personnel, combat units who had fought their way into Austria, were at first very cordial, political officers often being openly ignored. But from 1947-48 these units were replaced by others who had been heavily indoctrinated politically. There was also the sensitive issue as to whether Austria was an occupied or a liberated territory.

As in Germany, the tasks were the tracking down and arrest of Nazi Party members, zone demarcation - and line-crossers, attempts by hundreds of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to depart illegally for Palestine, and from 1946 the questioning of Austrians returning from captivity and forced labour in Soviet camps. Some had even worked in or near Soviet armaments factories. The three sections in Vienna had wider duties. No 310 FSS at Schönbrunn Palace had special security commitments and 291 FSS located near the British Embassy concentrated on protective security. The third, 20 FSS, was enlarged, totalling some 50, and carried out a

undertaken by a number of Field Intelligence NCOs, working in plain clothes and living with local communities near the frontier, and by an All Source Assessment Centre (formerly the Intelligence Cell) at Force Headquarters; sources include infantry patrols, observation posts and in theatre and UK based reconnaissance systems. There is also a Counter Intelligence Detachment component of the Section. Commitments have extended to some internal security work, most notably at the time of independence in 1981 when there was considerable unrest in Belize City, and training the Intelligence Section of the Belize Defence Force.

An event in 1982 is an example of operational Intelligence work in Belize. In July of that year an Intelligence Corps Warrant Officer acting as Field Intelligence NCO for the Western area, was informed that a car containing four men had been seen crossing the border having first handed in small arms to the Guatemalan border military checkpoint. The sighting had been made by a British Army observation post on top of a hill in a very isolated area. Accompanied by Police Constable Oscar Wilde of the Belize Police, the Warrant Officer began an investigation and found the car stopped near a customs post, clearly the object of a reconnaissance. While Constable Wilde was questioning the occupants of the car, one of them threw an object out of the window, which the Warrant Officer found to be a grenade. The four Guatemalans were then arrested, all proving to be soldiers, with one identified as the commander of the garrison detachment across the border. A second grenade was also found. It was decided to return the four Guatemalans. This gesture headed off a raid about to be mounted by a company of Kaibuls, Guatemalan Special Forces, on the Belize border customs post, for which the captured men had been an advance reconnaissance party.¹³

If Borneo and Belize were commitments for which the Intelligence Corps had ample notice, the South Atlantic conflict of 1982 was the reverse. The Argentinian seizure firstly of South Georgia and later of the Falkland Islands were operations that involved very hurried preparation by the Ministry of Defence. The decision to send a recovery Task Force presented especial problems for a small Corps already stretched, but some thirty members of the Corps were despatched to the South Atlantic to serve in a variety of roles, with a further forty, mostly NCOs, deployed on work in connection with the campaign in Britain - at Northwood, the Ministry of Defence or the Cabinet Office.

Shortly after the Argentine invasion Major D. M. Burrill took a hurriedly assembled team of two officers, three senior NCOs and a Corporal to Northwood, to provide an Intelligence Section for Major-General J. Moore's land force headquarters. When Headquarters Land Forces Falkland Islands, LFFI, was formally opened an additional officer and senior NCO were added, while at Northwood a workable package of basic Intelligence was prepared.¹⁴

There then followed the assembling, preparing and briefing of other Corps personnel; these included specialist officers and NCOs and the Intelligence Cell for 5 Infantry Brigade who travelled to the theatre in style aboard the Queen Elizabeth 2.¹⁵ One NCO served with 3 Commando Brigade Intelligence Cell in particularly dangerous conditions. Intelligence tasks, sometimes discharged under Argentinian air strikes or artillery fire, included the interviewing of Argentinian prisoners of war, captured document translation, examination of captured equipment, debriefing of civilians and operational Intelligence

collation, analysis and dissemination. Prisoner interviewing, conducted in a carefully pre-planned humane way, was the responsibility of Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFITs) these operated at San Carlos, Ajax Bay and Teal Inlet. Prisoner Intelligence was of particular value in assessing strengths, order of battle, Argentine weapon capabilities and morale. Captured documents were also valuable, one in particular was perhaps the most important piece of ground forces Intelligence acquired after the San Carlos landings. In what was in some respects a traditional infantry operation, patrolling was a very important source of Intelligence, in this work Corps members played a vital part in briefing and debriefing infantry and special forces patrols.

The whole campaign, small scale though it was, illustrated vividly the contribution the Corps could make to Service Intelligence - the ability, through experience, to understand and therefore effectively manage information from all sources and to control, or at least influence tasking. The almost instantaneous production of so many and varied specialists for an unforeseen operation was yet further proof of the value of a Corps of specialist regular soldiers permanently at work in military intelligence. Of the Corps' work the commander of 3 Commando Brigade, Brigadier (later Major General) J. Thompson wrote later:

'The response by those members of the Corps involved in the operation was positive and professional. As the brigade commander charged with carrying out the initial landings on the Falklands, what impressed me most was the quality of the intelligence assessments that were produced from quite early on, and right through the campaign, by the intelligence staffs in my superior headquarters, and in my own headquarters. The 'piece de resistance' was the identification of positions occupied by the Argentine regiments, before we landed, which proved to be amazingly accurate ~~when weeks later we captured a map showing their layout. The unit boundaries on this map fitted over our maps in their dispositions almost like a trace.~~ I also felt that the way the Intelligence Staffs in the theatre of operations coped with the interrogation of prisoners, a mammoth task, when one considers the numbers taken, and the short time available in which to process them, was a model of efficiency, and humanity.'

The campaign was also another milestone in the Corps' history in that for the first time the principal Intelligence Officer in theatre was an Intelligence Corps officer, Major Burrill.


The second major present day commitment of the Corps, involving a large number of officers and NCOs and also some WRAC personnel permanently attached to the Intelligence Corps, is of course Northern Ireland.

For obvious reasons this campaign cannot be discussed in any detail. But it has been an Intelligence-oriented action from very early days. The first officers and NCOs of the Corps despatched to the Province as individual reinforcements went in August 1969, some to supplement the in-place members of the 39 Infantry Brigade Intelligence Support Section, others to liaise with the RUC.

Intelligence skills have been deployed, often very much developed, at different times and with different degrees of emphasis as the campaign has unfolded. Organisational changes have been many but a number of constants can be identified. Firstly, there is the support of military formations on the ground; this includes the training of all-arms personnel for most Intelligence duties as well as the training of Corps specialists to fulfil specific functions. In the Province itself, Headquarters Northern Ireland and each of the Infantry Brigade Headquarters have their own dedicated operational intelligence support; Security expertise and advice is provided from Headquarters Northern Ireland. A number of senior and junior staff officer posts are filled by Intelligence Corps officers. Support is also provided to the RUC by officers and NCOs of the Corps.

The deep commitment of the Corps as a whole and the great personal bravery of individual members in Northern Ireland can be assessed from the large number of awards made to Corps personnel.¹⁶ There are but few members of the Corps who do not wear the General Service medal with the Northern Ireland clasp.

Two events epitomise the Corps as it enters the 1990s. On 1 February 1985 the Intelligence Corps was re-defined by the Executive Committee of the Army Boards as an 'Arm' in place of its former status as a supporting Service. And the Corps' commemoration, in 1990, of its 50th Anniversary as a distinct, badged, Arm of the Army can justly be seen as a moment of family pride in achievements increasingly professional and successful.



CONFIDENTIAL

Like EAMAVI



*cc. CO.
Press
MLD*

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 May, 1989.

Dear Mr Kinosh

When I wrote to the then Leader of the Opposition in 1980 about the 'Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War', publication of the first three volumes was progressing under the General Editorship of Professor Sir Harry Hinsley. Publication of Volumes I, II and III is now complete; the final part, Volume III Part 2, was published in February 1988.

Volumes IV and V are now ready for printing and I have given instructions that the process of publication should go ahead. I propose to announce this in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question on Friday 12 May. Publication is likely to take place around the end of this year or early next year.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Right Honourable Neil Kinnock, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



*Like
to 57*

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

Sir Robin Butler

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE, VOLUMES IV AND V

The Prime Minister has accepted your recommendation that the announcement of the intention to publish these two volumes should be made on Friday, 12 May, in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question. As soon as we have confirmation that Royal Assent for the Official Secrets Bill is being given today, we will table the necessary Parliamentary Question. The Prime Minister has asked that this should be offered to Mr. John Wheeler. We will then despatch the letter to Mr. Kinnock, a copy of which is attached for your records.

I am copying this minute to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Colin Walters (Home Office), and Michael Carpenter (Law Officers' Department).

AT

11 May, 1989.

CONFIDENTIAL

Note
 Prime Minister agreed
 and signed letter to M Kinnoch
 Sir wanted to John Wheeler
 to be offered by
 question.

Ref. A089/1177

MR TURNBULL

AT
9/5

Prime Minister
 Content to make announcement
 on Friday, thereby upstaging the
 Dalyell? If so, a draft of the
 short letter you requested to M Kinnoch
 is attached.
 To whom would you like to offer PQ?
 Mr Amery? (Not Mr Atkinson!)

AT

Official History of Intelligence, Volumes 4 and 5

Thank you for your minute of 8 May. I am content with the revised draft letter from the Prime Minister to the Leader of the Opposition which you propose.

2. The timing of the announcement will now need to take account of a Parliamentary Question which Mr Tam Dalyell has tabled for answer by the Prime Minister on 15 May - 'To ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to her answer of 11th April, Official Report, column 442, what forms of publication of Sir Michael Howard's volume on the history of British Intelligence are being considered'. The question is not in a form which easily lends itself to being the vehicle of the announcement, and in any case I am sure that the Prime Minister would not wish to make the announcement in response to a question from Mr Dalyell.

3. One possibility would be to answer Mr Dalyell's question along the lines 'This volume forms part of the series of Official Histories of British Intelligence of which Volumes 1-3 have been published and publication is being considered in that context', and announce publication of Volumes 4 and 5 subsequently.

4. An alternative, which may be neater, would be to make the announcement before Mr Dalyell's question is due for answer. I understand that the Official Secrets Bill is planned to receive Royal Assent on Thursday 11 May, and so it would be consistent with this if the announcement were made on Friday 12 May. I recommend accordingly, and suggest that you arrange for a question to be inspired for tabling on 11 May. The letter to the Leader of the Opposition should also be sent on 11 May.

5. I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth and Home Secretaries, and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

H.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

9 May 1989

HISTORIES: Intelligence, Jan 80



CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

3W2AUG



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBIN BUTLER

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE: VOLUMES 4 AND 5

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 4 May. She has accepted your proposal that the Government should announce its intention to publish volumes 4 and 5 soon after Royal Assent to the Official Secrets Bill. She was content with the terms of the proposed Parliamentary Question and Answer.

She would prefer to send a shorter letter to the Leader of the Opposition, simply informing him of her decision but omitting the explanation of why publication is thought desirable now but was resisted over the past eight or nine years. I attach a re-draft of the letter along these lines.

If you are content with the letter, could we confer to agree a date for the tabling of the PQ.

I am copying this minute and enclosure to Stephen Wall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Colin Walters (Home Office) and Michael Carpenter (Attorney General's Office).

AT

(ANDREW TURNBULL)

8 May 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

2

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
NEIL KINNOCK, MP, HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON, SW1A 0AA

When I wrote to the then Leader of the Opposition in 1980 about the "Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War", publication of the first three volumes was progressing under the General Editorship of Professor Sir Harry Hinsley. Publication of Volumes I, II and III is now complete; the final part, Volume III Part 2, was published in February 1988.

Volumes IV and V are now ready for printing and I have given instructions that the process of publication should go ahead. I propose to announce this in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question on ^{Friday, 12 May} ~~12 May~~. Publication is likely to take place around the end of this year or early next year.

SAMAVF

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE: VOLUMES IV AND V

You last considered the question of publication in November 1987 and took a decision in principle that publication would be appropriate but you did not commit yourself to the timing of an announcement of either intention to publish or publication itself. When volume III, part 2 was published in February 1988 the subsequent volumes were described as "forthcoming".

There were two hurdles to be overcome, the Spycatcher case and the passage of the Official Secrets and Security Service Bills. We are now approaching the point where these obstacles will have been surmounted. The process of checking the text and clearing for publication is now complete and Sir Robin invites you to make an announcement soon after Royal Assent of the Official Secrets Bill, expected later this month. Agree an announcement in terms suggested at Flag A?

The other step is a letter from you to the Leader of the Opposition. You need to decide whether to confine this simply to informing Mr Kinnock or whether, as Sir Robin's draft at Flag B suggests, you include a paragraph of explanation of why No publication is being approved now when it was refused earlier. —

I rather incline to the former. This could be achieved by deleting paragraph 3 and reversing the sequence of paras. 1 and 2. Do you prefer the longer or shorter version?

AT

Shorter version
It will need a
bit of redrafting.

Andrew Turnbull

5 May 1989

MJ2D00

Ref. A089/1116

MR TURNBULL


Official History of British Intelligence: Volumes IV and V

at 11:00

In November 1987 the Prime Minister considered the publication of Volumes IV and V of the History of British Intelligence to which, subject to Volume IV being re-written and both Volumes being cleared with our intelligence allies, she had given approval in principle in May 1985. The Prime Minister decided that the time was not then appropriate for an announcement to be made but that she would wish to reconsider the matter when the Wright litigation had been concluded and after publication of the third Volume of the Official History. Volume III, Part 2 of the Official History of British Intelligence by Sir Harry Hinsley and others was published in February 1988. The first three Volumes have recently been awarded the Annual Prize of the American National Centre for Intelligence Studies, and the presentation of the award on 9 May may draw attention again to the question of the publication of the last two volumes.

2. Work has continued in the intervening period to prepare Volumes IV and V which, as a consequence of the Prime Minister's agreement to publication in principle, were referred to as "forthcoming" in Volume III, Part 2. There has been no other public statement with regard to publication. The response to questions has been that "no decision has been made" and, on 11 April 1989 Mr Tam Dalyell was told, in a Written Reply that "The decision about timing and form of publication will be taken in the light of our best judgment of the national interest" (OR Col 442 11 April 1989).

3. The rewriting of Volume IV (Security and Counter-Intelligence) by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr C A G Simkins has now been completed and the text cleared with the relevant Government



departments and intelligence allies. Work on Volume V (Strategic Deception) by Professor Sir Michael Howard was completed some time ago, including clearance with departments and intelligence allies, but a further check has been carried out for consistency of content with Volume IV (with which it is closely linked and, to some extent, overlaps) and with the earlier Volumes for consistency of style. Subject to the Prime Minister's consent, arrangements could now be made to send the texts to HMSO for printing and publication.

4. The advice given expressed when the Prime Minister was last asked to consider this question was that an announcement of the forthcoming publication of the two Volumes should cause no embarrassment to the Government; rather it could serve to strengthen the Government's position by reinforcing the contention that the Government does not seek to prevent publication of all information about the Security Services, but to protect and enforce the duty of confidence owed by present and former members. During recent Parliamentary consideration of the Official Secrets Bill there has been much interest in the question of authorisation and non-authorisation of books on these topics. It would no doubt be reassuring for Parliamentary opinion to know that the Government is prepared to proceed with its plans for publication of the Official History. Although Volumes IV and V describe and pay tribute to the work of the Security Services, Volume IV in particular also describes the friction which existed between the organisations. Such frankness should help to dispel any idea that the purpose of publishing the Official Histories is to present a whitewash.

5. I would recommend that an announcement should be made of the Government's intention to publish Volumes IV and V by means of an Arranged Parliamentary Question along the lines of the attached draft following Royal Assent to the Official Secrets Bill expected later this month. Printing, binding and preparation of indexes etc will take some time; publication is therefore unlikely before the end of the year, or early next year. The

A

wording of the suggested draft reply retains some flexibility with regard to the actual date of publication.

--- 6. Also attached is a draft letter for the Prime Minister to send, if she agrees, to the Leader of the Opposition. This should also not go until after Royal Assent to the Official Secrets Bill.

7. If the Prime Minister agrees to this proposal I should be grateful if you could let me know in due course when an announcement is imminent, to enable us to forewarn the authors.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Attorney General.

CONQUEROR

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

4 May 1988

A



DRAFT ARRANGED PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

To ask the Prime Minister when publication of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War will be completed.

DRAFT REPLY

Volumes I, II and III of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War by Professor Sir Harry Hinsley and others have been published; Part 2 of Volume III was published in February 1988. Volume IV (Security and Counter-Intelligence) by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr C A G Simkins and Volume V (Strategic Deception) by Professor Sir Michael Howard are being prepared for publication towards the end of this year or early next year.

B

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE RT HON NEIL KINNOCK MP, HOUSE OF COMMONS, LONDON SW1A 0AA

I am writing to let you know that I shall be announcing in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question on [] the decision to publish Volumes IV and V of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War.

(3) Publication is likely to take place around the end of this year or early next year.

When I wrote to the then leader of the Opposition about this series in 1980, publication of the first three volumes was progressing under the General Editorship of Professor Sir Harry Hinsley. Publication of Volumes I, II and III is now complete; the final part, Volume III, Part 2 was published in February 1988.

(1)

Vol IV & V are now ready for printing

It was thought in 1980 that publication of Volumes IV and V - Volume IV on Security and Counter-Intelligence by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr C A G Simkins, and Volume V on Strategic Deception by Sir Michael Howard - was not appropriate because of the possible adverse effect on the work of the intelligence and security agencies. Subsequently, however, the Government took the view that, as a number of unofficial accounts had been published, an authorised and authoritative account about the work of the agencies and the individuals involved would help to mitigate the ill effects of the other, less informed, works which had appeared.

(2)

These Volumes are now ready for printing and I have given instructions that the process of publication should go ahead.

HISTORIES: Official
History of Intelligence
Jan 1940



CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

B/f then file to
re on 8/5

Tuesday 11 April 1989

★Q192 Mr Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): To ask the Prime Minister, when she expects an announcement to be made on the possible publication of the volume prepared by Professor Sir Michael Howard in the series entitled the Official History of British Intelligence; what criteria are being used in determining whether publication can take place; whether publication with appropriate deletions is being considered; on whose authority Sir Michael Howard was commissioned to write his volume; what has been the cost to public funds of work on this volume; and what assessment she has made of the utility and cost-effectiveness of the commissioning of official histories on intelligence matters which are not subsequently published.

(Answered by the Prime Minister)

CIRCULATED AS WRITTEN.

The Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War was commissioned in 1971 by the Government of the day. The right to decide on publication of this history, as with all Official Histories, rests exclusively with the Government. Four Volumes of the History of British Intelligence have already been published, Volume I in 1979, Volume II in 1981, Volume III, Part 1 in 1984 and Volume III Part 2 in 1988. The decision about timing and form of publication of the volume commissioned from Professor Sir Michael Howard, the direct cost of which was in the region of £10,000, will be taken in the light of our best judgement of the national interest.

ms

BACKGROUND NOTE

Mr Tam Dalyell has asked several Questions about the publication of Professor Sir Michael Howard's volume of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War. On the last two occasions the Prime Minister has said simply that when a decision on publication is taken she will inform the House. Mr Dalyell has now asked for more detail.

Sir Michael Howard was appointed in 1973 to write a volume of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War to be entitled 'Strategic Deception'. He produced a classified version. At a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister on 4 June 1980 it was agreed that the volume should be sanitised and left in cold storage with no date set for publication.

The Prime Minister agreed, in principle, at a meeting on 8 May 1985 that Volume V "Strategic Deception" should be prepared for publication together with Volume IV "Security and Counter-Intelligence" by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr C A G Simkins. Again no date was set for publication.

The Prime Minister last considered the question of publication in November 1987 and concluded that the matter should be considered again well after litigation in the Wright case had been completed.

Nothing has been said publicly about a publication date for Volumes IV and V but, following the 1985 decision in principle referred to above, Sir Harry Hinsley, the main author of Volumes I-III, was given permission to refer to the Howard and Hinsley/Simkins volumes as "forthcoming" and they were so referred to in Volume III, Part 2 which was published in February 1988.

Written Answers to Questions

Friday 17 June 1988

PRIME MINISTER

Food Surpluses

Mr. Allen: To ask the Prime Minister if she has responded to the petition delivered to No. 10 Downing street on 20 April requesting the fairer distribution of European Economic Community food surpluses.

The Prime Minister: The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food replied on 18 May to the petition from the Common Market fair food campaign.

Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee

Mr. Livingstone: To ask the Prime Minister, pursuant to the written reply of 26 April, *Official Report*, column 96, to the hon. Member for Brent, East, on what date she wrote to the Chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee.

The Prime Minister: I wrote the letter to which I referred on 12 March 1987.

Parliamentary Questions

Dr. Thomas: To ask the Prime Minister on what basis it was judged appropriate in her reply to the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison), *Official Report*, 6 May, columns 628-44, on Government achievements in the United Kingdom since May 1979, to incur an expenditure above the standard upper limit for resourcing answers to parliamentary questions.

The Prime Minister: I refer the hon. Member to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Paymaster General on 14 March 1988, at column 429. On this occasion it was decided that since the question concerned a large number of Departments it was appropriate to give a consolidated answer.

"Strategies for Deception"

Mr. Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister for what reason Her Majesty's Government have intervened to halt the publication of the academic work on "Strategies for Deception" by Professor Sir Nicholas Howard, All Souls.

The Prime Minister: I assume that the hon. Gentleman is referring to the volume in the "Official History of British Intelligence" series prepared by Professor Sir Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History and Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Publication of this volume is still under consideration. At such time as a decision is taken, I shall, of course, inform the House.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Birmingham Pub Bombings

Mr. Cohen: To ask the Attorney-General what guidance the Director of Public Prosecutions gave to the

City of London police on their inquiry into contacts between the two principal Crown witnesses at the recent appeal hearing relating to the Birmingham pub bombings trial.

The Attorney-General: The Director of Public Prosecutions passed to the City of London police the information that he had received. In all cases in which the director requests police inquiries it is for the police themselves to determine how those inquiries are conducted.

On occasion, advice is offered to assist the police in their investigation. It is not the practice of either the director or myself to disclose whether any advice has been offered, and, if so, in what terms, in any particular case.

NATIONAL FINANCE

Value Added Tax

Mr. Heddle: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the number of value added tax refund claims under Customs and Excise notice No. 719 processed for the fiscal year 1986-87.

Mr. Lilley: I presume my hon. Friend refers to the fiscal year 1987-88 as my hon. Friend's question on notice No. 719 for the year 1986-87 was answered on 26 November 1987 at column 291. The number of claims processed in the fiscal year 1987-88 was 9,254.

Business Registrations

Mr. William Powell: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) how many businesses were registered for value added tax in the Corby district at the end of (a) 1981 and (b) 1986;

(2) how many businesses were registered for value added tax in the East Northants district at the end of (a) 1981 and (b) 1986.

Mr. Lilley: I regret that records are not maintained on a town or district basis. Corby and east Northants lie within the area covered by the local VAT office at Peterborough. There were 15,097 businesses registered at this office at the end of 1981 and 19,070 at the end of 1986.

Dredging

Mr. David Porter: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many firms were licensed to carry out industrial dredging off the United Kingdom coast in each year since 1979.

Mr. Lawson: The number of firms to which licences have been issued by the Crown Estate Commissioners to extract sand and gravel off the United Kingdom coastline is as follows:

Year	Firms
1979	19
1980	20
1981	19
1982	20
1983	19
1984	20
1985	20
1986	20
1987	20



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

MR. WOOLLEY
CABINET OFFICE

**OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE:
VOLUMES IV AND V**

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute of 11 February about HMSO's reply to Mr. Allason's enquiry regarding the publication of the Hinsley/Simkins volume in the Intelligence History series.

The Prime Minister agrees that HMSO should reply to Mr. Allason as you suggest in your minute.

N.h.W.

N. L. WICKS

15 February 1988

eu

1. NEA to see.

2. CF m.



Prime Minister

I think the suggested reply from HMSO is fine.

Agree?

Yes not

N. L. W.

Ref. A088/494

MR WICKS

Official History of British Intelligence: Volumes IV and V

In response to submissions ^{fiat} from Sir Robert Armstrong late last year, the Prime Minister said that she had concluded that the time was not appropriate for announcing the publication of Volumes IV and V of the Intelligence History ("Security and Counter-Intelligence" by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr Simkins, and "Strategic Deception" by Sir Michael Howard) which should be reconsidered after the Wright litigation had been concluded and well after the third volume of the Official History had been published.

2. After the decision was taken at the Prime Minister's meeting on 8 May 1985 that, in principle, both volumes could be published, the Intelligence History team was given permission to refer to them as "forthcoming" in footnotes to the last volume of the main series, Volume III Part 2, which was published on 3 February 1988.

Mr Rupert Allason MP (no doubt in Nigel West's interests) wrote immediately to Her Majesty's Stationery Office seeking information about the publication date of the Hinsley/Simkins volume (see attached copy letter).

3. The drafting of the Hinsley/Simkins volume is not yet finished. With clearances needed to be sought from, inter alia, the intelligence allies, it will be some time yet before the text would be ready to go for publication. Sir Michael Howard's volume would be ready sooner and you should see the attached extract from a recently published edition of "Contemporary Record" which refers to the Howard book being "embargoed by direct fiat of the Prime Minister".

4. If the Prime Minister is content we should suggest that HMSO should say, in response to Mr Allason's inquiry:



"Thank you for your letter of 3 February 1988. Her Majesty's Stationery Office has not yet received "Security and Counter-Intelligence" for publication. No date has therefore been set."

and that, should the question of the publication of either volume be raised at Prime Minister's Questions, the line in the light of the Prime Minister's view mentioned above, should be that:

"No decision has yet been taken."

"Forthcoming" as stated in the recently published volume does not, after all, necessarily mean "in the near future" as Mr Allason has surmised.

T. A. Woolley

T. A. WOOLLEY

11 February 1988

HISTORIOS: Intelligence in WWII, Jan 80



CONFIDENTIAL

13

MISSING HISTORIES?

The Postwar Official Histories

In this article John Gooch examines the story of the 'official' peacetime histories and explores why more have not seen the light of day earlier.

If everything runs according to schedule, the last volume in the military series of the *Official History of the Second World War* and the final instalment of Sir Harry Hinsley's multi-volume history of *British Intelligence* will be in print this year. When that happens the official record of the war will be well-nigh complete and we shall await only Sir Michael Howard's history of war-time deception — a work which (so far as I am aware) has never been announced anywhere in print but whose existence has been an open secret inside the profession for some years. Embargoed, it is rumoured, by direct fiat of the Prime Minister, it is now said to have been cleared for publication — though the historical section of the Cabinet Office is unable to confirm or deny this. Whether further volumes by Charles Cruickshank on the history of the Special Operations Executive — a bizarre and unsatisfactory 'privatisation' of what should be an official project — will appear is anyone's guess. But the official record will be complete.

The case for such histories is a fairly obvious one, although some of the later authors were overtaken by the advent of the thirty year rule and found one part of their task superfluous just as they went to press. The case for a peace-time series is much less obvious; yet this is what was announced by Harold Wilson in a written House of Commons answer, on 9 March 1966. After revealing the Government's intention to introduce a thirty year rule, the Prime Minister reported the decision to extend the official histories to include 'selected periods or episodes of peace-time history'. He gave no indication as to what the new histories would be about or who would write them; but HMSO subsequently announced four volumes on Environmental Planning, one on the Nationalisation of British Industry 1945–51, five on Colonial Development, two on External Economic Policy and one

on Defence Organisation since 1945. Twelve years later, on 5 July 1978, the House of Commons learned that two further volumes had been commissioned, on the British Contribution to the Korean Campaign and on the Health Services since the War.

Harold Wilson did not give away very much about the reasons behind the decision to extend the official histories. Some of the planned volumes, he suggested, would not be publishable until the thirty year rule had advanced beyond their subject matter. The intention, apparently, was to have 'comprehensive and authoritative narratives' ready for publication soon after the documents were open but before scholars had had time to read and digest them. The other — and wholly laudable — objective behind the commissioning of the new volumes at this time was to enable their authors to take advantage of the recollections of the officials who had been involved in the events with which the histories dealt. Here, there is an interesting echo from the past. In 1939 William Strang, then assistant under-secretary of state, supported the proposal to put Sir E.L. Woodward to work on a diary of the events leading to the outbreak of the Second World War on the grounds that 'the historian of the future will have to work from papers alone. If Mr Woodward does this work now, some parts of the truth would be saved which would otherwise be lost'. Oral history, it seems, was to be an important, if subsidiary, part of the new official histories.

Although, perhaps, too slowly for some tastes, almost all the proposed volumes have now appeared. We await only four — Charles Webster's work on the Health Services (now printing), the second of L.S. Pressnell's volumes on External Economic Policy, and those on the Korean War and Defence Organisation. More, however, is in the pipeline: Professor Margaret Gowing, for one, is continuing her history of atomic energy after 1952. The process is a slow one, and critics inside and outside the circle of official historians have complained about this.

At times, something certainly seems to have gone awry in the commissioning process. Although the volume of Defence Organisation was announced in 1966, Professor D.C. Watt did not start work on it until 1974. An even better example of this problem, and one which raises important questions about the content of the volumes, is the history of the Korean war. This apparently owed its genesis to Sir Henry Hardman, permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defence from 1964 to 1966, who wished to breach the unwritten rule that there were to be no peace-time official histories. (Whether, and to what extent, this

influenced Harold Wilson's 1966 decision we may know in 1997.) Having decided to produce a history of Korea, the next questions to be answered were: who should write it? and what should it cover? The late Alastair Buchan, then director of the Institute of Strategic Studies, suggested Professor Laurence Martin as a suitable author. He wanted to produce a volume which concentrated on policy decisions and the disputes which surrounded them. The fact that the volume was finally announced in 1978 hints that the fight was long and hard; the selection of General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley as author might seem to suggest that policy lost out to operations in the contest over subject matter. The veil of secrecy drawn over the whole process of appointing official historians and selecting their subjects makes it impossible to know whether similar problems have bedevilled other volumes in the series.


The system which brings forth the official histories, once decisions about subject matter and author have been taken, seems to mitigate against speedy production. The senior scholars who are chosen to write the official record are busy people, able to devote only a small part of their energies to the task. The provision of adequate research assistance is one obvious way to help diminish the consequences of this fact; creating teams of historians rather than burdening individuals with onerous tasks is another (and has already happened). The fact that the Cabinet Office historical section normally only handles four peacetime histories at a time is scarcely calculated to produce a large number of official histories — though whether or not the Government wants many more is impossible to tell. The printers, at least, have an unblemished record in the matter: HMSO produces a first-class product at a speed which easily matches that of most commercial houses.

The more one considers the postwar official histories, the more questions come to mind. What, for example, of the in-house histories, dealing with the post-1945 period, which still await de-classification? To have to wait thirty years in the hope that some of these questions may be answered by official documents about official documents is very frustrating. Instead, we should ask those involved in the process to tell us more about it. Sir William Strang and Lord Wilson have already provided at least one compelling reason for doing just that.

John Gooch

John Gooch is Lecturer in History at the University of Lancaster.

RUPERT ALLASON, M.P.



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

3rd February 1988

Dear Sir

Security & Counter-Intelligence in World War II

I understand that the above-mentioned title, co-authored by Professor Sir Harry Hinsley and Anthony Simkins, is to be published in the near future. Would you be kind enough to let me have the publication date in due course?

Many thanks for your help,

Yours faithfully
Rupert Allason

Rupert Allason MP

CABINET OFFICE
66
9 FEB 1988
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

I think that the answer does not create hostages regarding the publication of volumes IV and V of the British Intelligence in the Second World War, which you discussed with Robert Armstrong recently. The important sentence is that marked in yellow. It refers to the "completion date" for the series, not "publication" date. There is therefore no commitment to publish in 1989.

NLW

3 December 1987



Alie

ECH

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE VOLUME V

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute of 30 November which covered a draft letter which you wish to send to Professor Sir Michael Howard about the publication of Volume V of the Official History of British Intelligence.

The Prime Minister is content for you to write in the terms of the draft attached to your minute.

N.L. WICKS

2 December 1987



Ref. A087/3358

MR WICKS

70nd

*Prime Minister
Agree RIA to
write in terms of
the draft overleaf?
N.C.W.*

Official History of British Intelligence Volume V 30.11

As I told the Prime Minister on 27 November, her decision not after all to make an announcement about publication of Volume V came as a disappointment to the author, Sir Michael Howard, who on the basis of your minute of 3 November had been told that an announcement was to be made.

2. Following my discussion with the Prime Minister, I propose
--- to write to Sir Michael Howard as in the draft attached. I should be grateful for your confirmation that the draft reflects what the Prime Minister decided.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

30 November 1987

2nd Draft of 30 Nov 1987

DRAFT LETTER FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG TO PROFESSOR
SIR MICHAEL HOWARD, HISTORY FACULTY LIBRARY, BROAD
STREET, OXFORD, OX1 3BD

I am writing, on my return from New Zealand, to reiterate Patricia Andrews's apology for the mix-up about the announcement of the intention to publish your volume on "Strategic Deception".

Before I left, it seemed as if we were far enough advanced to be ready to indicate that the book would be published in the middle of next year. When Patricia Andrews wrote to you, she - and I - thought that the Prime Minister was content to proceed in that way. The Prime Minister subsequently decided that she would prefer to make no announcement while the Spycatcher proceedings were still calling attention to the Security Service and its affairs. She has agreed, however, that your book (and indeed the Hinsley-Simkins volume) should continue to be prepared for publication; and that the date of publication and its announcement should be reconsidered once the "Spycatcher" litigation has been concluded.

RTAAEW



File V6
LOG ADD

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE:
VOLUMES IV AND V

You raised with the Prime Minister this morning my minute of 9 November which recorded her conclusion that the time is not appropriate for announcing the publication of Volumes IV and V of this Official History.

You explained to the Prime Minister that you were not seeking a decision on the date of publication for Volume IV on Security and Counter Intelligence. But you were anxious that an announcement should be made about Volume V, on which Sir Michael Howard had made strong representations to you. The publication of this Volume presented no difficulty in relation to the litigation of Spy Catcher and related matters.

The Prime Minister said that she understood Sir Michael's wish to see publication of his Volume, and she was willing to see it prepared for publication. But she was not ready at this stage to make any commitment, let alone an announcement, about the date of publication. She would wish to reconsider this when the Wright litigation had been concluded.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretary to the Home Secretary and the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

N. L. WICKS

27 November 1987

Bo



File

DA (44)

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE VOLUMES IV AND V

The Prime Minister has considered, in the light of your Private Secretary's minute of 5 November, the terms of her letter to the Leader of the Opposition informing him about the publication of Volumes IV and V of the Official History of British Intelligence. For this purpose she has re-read the letter which she sent a previous Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Callaghan, on 7 August 1980.

The Prime Minister has concluded in the light of re-reading the previous letter, that the time is not appropriate for announcing the publication of Volumes IV and V. She believes that an announcement should be left until well after the current legal cases have been disposed of and well after the third volume of the Official History has been published.

N. L. WICKS

9 November 1987

GH

PRIME MINISTER

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE VOLUMES IV & V

You agreed earlier this week that you should announce, through an arranged Parliamentary Question and Answer, the publication of Volumes IV and V of the Official History of British Intelligence. The draft of the (slightly) revised Question and Answer is at Flag A.

Sir Robert Armstrong, in his minute below, advises that you should write to the Leader of the Opposition to inform him of the position. The appropriate terms of your letter to Mr Kinnock are not altogether easy. You told Mr Callaghan on 7 August 1980 that the Government had concluded that these two volumes should not be published because:

"We have concluded that the time for publication has not yet come. The publication of these volumes now, at a time when there is active and not always well-disposed interest in the intelligence and security agencies, would provide material which would be used as a basis for investigations of, and pressures for disclosure about, current tasks and techniques and the way in which the agencies approach their task. This could damage their capability and effectiveness. We have therefore decided not to publish these volumes for the time being, but to put them in cold storage until it is thought appropriate to review the possibility of publishing them."

The text of the full letter is at Flag B.

Robert has suggested that we should explain the decision to announce publication on the grounds that we took the view that, as a number of unofficial accounts had been published, an authorised and authoritative account, giving due credit to the agencies and the individuals involved, would help to

*New that I have
revised the previous letter
I think we cannot do
it until both of the
current issues
have been*

*disposed of
and will
of the
third volume
has been
published
no*

mitigate the ill-effects of the other, less informed, works which had appeared.

I think that this approach raises more questions than it answers. Much better, in my view, simply to say that the Government now takes the view that the two volumes should be published. The draft letter attached reflects that approach.

N. L. W.

N L WICKS
5 November 1987

DASADE



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

In 1980 I wrote to the then Leader of the Opposition about publication of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War.

At that time, publication of the first three volumes was progressing under the General Editorship of Professor Sir Harry Hinsley. The texts of Volume IV and V had just been received. Publication of the first three volumes is now almost complete with the final part, Volume III Part 2, due out early in 1988.

It was thought in 1980 that publication of Volumes IV and V was not appropriate because of the possible adverse effect on the work of the intelligence and security agencies. Subsequently, however, the Government has taken the view that these two volumes should be published so as to provide an authorised and authoritative account which gives due credit to the agencies and the individuals involved.

Work was therefore put in hand to prepare Volume IV on Security and Counter Intelligence by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr. C.A.G. Simkins, and Volume V on Strategic Deception by Professor Sir Michael Howard for publication. Volume V should be ready for publication in about mid 1988 and Volume IV hopefully some months later.

I shall be announcing the decision to publish Volumes IV and V to the House of Commons, in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question on Wednesday 11 November 1987.

The Rt. Hon. Neil Kinnock, M.P.

Ref. A087/3194

MR WICKS

Official History of British Intelligence: Volumes IV and V

In your minute of 3 November to Sir Robert Armstrong you recorded the agreement of the Prime Minister to the announcement of the publication of Volumes IV and V of the Official History of British Intelligence by means of the written Parliamentary Question and Answer attached to Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 2 November; and asked for advice on whether the Prime Minister needed to write to the leader of the Opposition to inform him of the position.

2. The original announcement about publication of an official history of British intelligence, which was the subject of a letter from the Prime Minister to Mr Callaghan, covered only the first three volumes. Sir Robert Armstrong therefore agrees that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister now to write again --- to the leader of the Opposition, and I attach a draft to this end which was cleared by Sir Robert Armstrong before his departure abroad.

3. I should be grateful if you could amend the last sentence of the draft Parliamentary Answer attached to Sir Robert Armstrong's minute of 2 November to read: "A date for publication of Volume IV, Security and Counter Intelligence, by Professor Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr C A G Simkins, will be announced in due course".

4. Perhaps you could let me know when the announcement is imminent to enable us to forewarn the authors.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretary to the Home Secretary and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

T A Woolley

T A WOOLLEY

5 November 1987

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO

The Rt Hon Neil Kinnock MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA

In 1980 I wrote to the then leader of the Opposition about publication of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War.

At that time, publication of the first three volumes was progressing under the General Editorship of Professor Sir Harry Hinsley. The texts of Volume IV and V had just been received. Publication of the first three volumes is now almost complete with the final part, Volume III Part 2, due out early in 1988.

It was thought in 1980 that publication of Volumes IV and V was not appropriate because of the possible adverse effect on the work of the intelligence and security agencies. Subsequently, however, the Government ^{has taken the view that} ~~took the view that~~ ^{as a number of} ~~unofficial accounts had been published,~~ ^{so as to provide} ~~an authorised and~~ ^{what is} ~~authoritative account~~ giving due credit to the agencies and the individuals involved, ~~would help to mitigate the ill effects of the other, less informed, works which had appeared.~~

Work was therefore put in hand to prepare Volume IV on Security and Counter Intelligence by Sir Harry Hinsley and Mr C A G Simkins, and Volume V on Strategic Deception by

Professor Sir Michael Howard for publication. Volume V should be ready for publication in about mid 1988 and Volume IV hopefully some months later.

I shall be announcing the decision to publish Volumes IV and V to the House of Commons, in answer to a Written Parliamentary Question on [] .

✓ Wednesday 11 November
1987.

Paul; is this date OK?

HISTORIES

WORLD WAR II

1/80



DRAFT

A

To ask the Prime Minister when publication of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War will be completed.

DRAFT REPLY

Volumes I, II, and III Part 1 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War by Professor Sir Harry Hinsley have already been published. Volume III Part 2 will be published early next year. Volumes IV and V are now being prepared for publication. Volume V, Strategic Deception, by Professor Sir Michael Howard will be published during 1988. A date for the publication of Volume IV, by Mr C A G Simkins and Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, will be announced in due course.

Security and
Counter Intelligence,
by Professor Sir
Harry Hinsley and

mt





File

DJSCU

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE: VOLUMES IV AND V

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute of 2 November in which you sought her approval to an announcement of the publication of Volumes IV and V of the Official History of British Intelligence. You suggested in the attachment to your minute the draft of a Written Parliamentary Question and Answer announcing publication.

The Prime Minister is content for the publication of these two volumes to be announced through the Question and Answer attached to your minute.

Before arranging for the Question to be tabled, I should be grateful for advice on whether the Prime Minister needs to write to the Leader of the Opposition to inform him of the position. I see from our papers that the Prime Minister wrote to the then Leader of the Opposition on 7 August 1980 to inform him that the time for publication had not yet come. I think, therefore, that she will need to write to the present Leader of the Opposition to inform him of the Volumes' forthcoming publication and, presumably, of the reasons why it has now been decided to do so. If you agree, I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft of a suitable letter.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretary to the Home Secretary and to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

N. L. W.

N L WICKS
3 November 1987

DJ

010
Ref. A087/3095

MR WICKS

Prime Minister

Agree to announce

y
as per

publication of Vols IV and V in terms of the draft question and answer attached?

N.C.U.

Official History of British Intelligence: Volumes IV and V 2.11

In May 1985 the Prime Minister consented to the publication of Volumes IV and V of the History of British Intelligence in the Second World War, subject to Volume IV being rewritten and both Volumes being cleared with our intelligence allies.

See record of discussion at Flag A.

2. Volume V (Strategic Deception) by Professor Sir Michael Howard has been so cleared and is in the last stages of preparation for publication. It is hoped to publish it by July 1988. The re-writing of Volume IV (Security and Counter Intelligence) by its original author Mr C A G (Anthony) Simkins in conjunction with Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, the General Editor of the Intelligence History series, is well under way. It is being cleared piecemeal with the relevant Government Departments and as necessary with the intelligence allies. It is not yet possible to say when it is likely to be ready for publication; but a publication date in the first half of 1989 seems likely to be achievable.

3. No public announcement has yet been made of the decision to publish these two volumes. The last statement on the matter was the Prime Minister's Written Answer on 6 February 1984 (Col 428), in answer to a question from Mr Tam Dalyell MP. The Guardian reported the Prime Minister's agreement to publish in an article which appeared on 16 July 1986. As at that stage we were not approaching publication, we recommended that there should be no official response to the report unless a question was asked; it was not.

4. Now, however, Volume V is almost ready to go to HMSO for printing. Sir Michael Howard is anxious for official confirmation that his work is to be published, and we believe that Contemporary Record, the journal of the Institute of Contemporary British History, will shortly be giving further publicity to the matter.



5. I have consulted the Law Officers, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Antony Duff and Sir John Bailey about whether an announcement of the forthcoming publication of the two volumes could be embarrassing for legal or any other reason, particularly in the light of the Wright case. The unanimous view is that such an announcement should cause no embarrassment; indeed it could serve to strengthen the Government's position by reinforcing the contention that the Government does not seek to prevent publication of all information about the Security Services, but to protect and enforce the duty of confidence owed by present and former members. Volume V - the Michael Howard volume - presents no difficulty in relation to the litigation on Spycatcher and related matters; Volume IV may well not do so, but that is a factor to which we should have to have regard when we are in a position to consider and decide upon a definite publication date.

6. I therefore recommend an announcement should be made by means of an Arranged Parliamentary Question along the lines of the attached draft. It would be useful if that announcement could have been made before the next bout of litigation starts on 16 November.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretary to the Home Secretary and the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

2 November 1987



1. NW ~~see~~
 2. Mr. P. ~~to see~~
 to see.

cc ~~see~~

Ref. A086/2113

N.L.V
 18.7

MR WICKS

You have seen the article in the Guardian of 16 July (copy attached) which reports that the Prime Minister has agreed to the publication of two official histories of the wartime activities of the Security Service. The reference is evidently to Volumes IV and V of the Official History of Intelligence. Volume IV, written by Mr Anthony Simkins, is entitled "Security and Counter-intelligence"; Volume V, written by Professor Michael Howard, is entitled "Strategic Deception".

2. The last public statement about these matters was the Prime Minister's Written Answer on 6 February 1984 (col 428), when she said that the process of evaluating Professor Howard's text had not yet reached a stage where a decision about publication could be made. As far as I am aware, no public statement has been made about the Simkins volume.

3. At the Prime Minister's meeting on 8 May 1985 it was decided in principle to publish both volumes, and Sir Robert Armstrong was invited to prepare a detailed plan leading up to publication. Evidently it is this decision of a year ago which the article refers to. It appears to be a coincidence that news of it should have reached the press only now, though it is not surprising that, having found out about it, Mr Norton Taylor should play up the alleged contradiction with the Government's position over the Peter Wright case.

4. The position is now as follows. Volume V is being prepared for publication by its original author, Professor Howard. The main task is external sanitisation (clearance, or amendment as necessary to take account of foreign sensitivities); in addition preparation of maps, indexes etc is required. The work



is well in hand but we cannot yet name a date for publication. Volume IV has already been externally sanitised, but the text is being rewritten in a more digestible style by the General Editor of the series, Professor Sir Harry Hinsley; again we are not sure at this point how long it will take.

5. You enquired whether it would be right, in the light of the Guardian article referred to above, to confirm that we do indeed plan to publish these two volumes. Since we are not in a position to announce publication dates there seems little point in arranging a Question and Answer which could add very little to what we have already said. I would therefore recommend that we should not initiate such an exchange. If the article should provoke a Question, we could answer it in terms which do not commit us to any particular deadline for publication of either volume.

MS

M C STARK

18 July 1986

Thatcher drops ban on MI5 war books

By Richard Norton-Taylor

MI5 has finally persuaded Mrs Thatcher to drop her ban on publication of two official histories of the wartime activities of the security service.

It has done so at a time when it has won a High Court order preventing the Guardian and the Observer from repeating allegations of misconduct by the security service made by Mr Peter Wright, a former senior MI5 officer living in Australia.

One of the books, by Mr Anthony Simkins, a former deputy director-general of the security service, concentrates on the activities of MI5 and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Europe.

The other, by Professor Michael Howard, regius professor of history at Oxford University, is provisionally entitled the History of Strategic Deception in the Second World War and includes material about United States, Soviet and French intelligence activities.

Both books, which tell how enemy agents captured in Britain collaborated with MI5 by sending back false information to their German masters, were commissioned by the Cabinet Office. But publication was blocked in 1980 on Mrs Thatcher's instructions.

"When I was called to the bar," she is reported to have said in support of her decision to suppress the books, "the first and best piece of advice that I received was never to admit more than you have to." MI6, the secret intelligence service, raised objections, but the MI5 establishment pressed for publication — of the Simkins book in particular — on the grounds that it was time its successes were placed on record.

Sir Howard Smith, then head of MI5, favoured its release, as did Sir Dick White, a former head of MI6, and academics were also angry about the Prime Minister's attitude. Both books are being vetted, Professor Howard's almost certainly by the CIA.

The arguments of those in favour of disclosure were strengthened by the proliferation of books, some of them by former employees of the intelligence services. In the Double Cross System, published in 1972, Sir John Masterman, who served in MI5 during the war, described how

EXCESS PROFITS

Backing for man who told

27

By Richard Norton-Taylor

OVER a hundred MPs from all parties have signed a motion urging the Government to compensate Mr Jim Smith, an accountant who helped the Ministry of Defence recover £700,000 in excess profits from his former company.

The Government should compensate Mr Smith, it says, for loss of income arising from his decision to blow the whistle. Mr Smith was made redundant



Mr Campbell-Savours

after refusing to ratify the accounts of Aish, the Poole-based firm of which he was a director and financial adviser.

The motion was drawn up by Mr Dale Campbell-Savours, a Labour member of the Commons Public Accounts Committee, which in a report last month said that Mr Smith should be helped by public funds. It was the first time an

all-party committee of MPs supported the principle—recognised in legislation in the US—that "whistle-blowers" should be compensated by Whitehall.

FINANCIAL TIMES

Second US company in bidding for dockyard

A SECOND US company has entered the bidding to run one of Britain's two naval dockyards under the Government's controversial plans to introduce commercial management into their operations next year.

The Ministry of Defence said yesterday that Brown and Root (UK), the offshore engineering company which is a subsidiary of Halliburton of the US, had been invited to bid for the management of Devonport dockyard in south-west England.

Like Foster Wheeler, the other US company in the bidding for the yard's management, Brown & Root will be restricted to a 30 per cent share in the operation.

Brown and Root declined to say who its UK partner would be. The ministry said the company was being supported in its tender by Lazard Brothers, the merchant bank, "on behalf of UK clients."

Brown & Root said it had indicated to the ministry who its partner would be. Foster Wheeler is being partnered by Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering. The present management of the dockyard is also in the running.

The Government last week shrugged off a defeat in the House of Lords over an amendment to the Bill introducing commercial management into Devonport and Rosyth, the dockyard in Scotland. It said the amendment, giving unions specific rights to consultation with companies seeking to run the yards, did not present any problems.

THE STANDARD

AIDS adviser appointed

ISLINGTON Health Authority has appointed an AIDS information adviser to try to remove the myths surrounding the deadly disease.

Psychologist David Panter, 24, starts work on Monday and will be touring schools and firms to talk about the disease.

PQ
6/2/84

captured Nazi spies became double agents channelling false information about Allied plans back to Germany.

More recently, Mr Charles Cruickshank has published books about SOE operations in Scandinavia and the Far East, and Mr Nigel West, whose book on GCHQ will be published

Turn to back page, col. 3

Continued from page one

lished later this month, has written books on MI5 and MI6. Many of these books have been criticised on the grounds that they do not give a fair and accurate picture.

Mrs Thatcher's agreement to the publication, subject to vetting, of the official histories comes as the government is trying to stop publication in Australia of memoirs written by Mr Wright.

The Guardian and the Observer will today appeal against a High Court order preventing them from repeating evidence by Mr Wright of unlawful and criminal acts by MI5. The order also prevents

the two newspapers from referring to allegations by Mr Wright even if they are made by independent sources.

The Guardian is therefore unable to describe disclosures written by Mr Chapman Pincher in yesterday's Daily Telegraph. Mr Pincher reviewed a book by Mr Robert Lamphere, an FBI officer in charge of the American end of the Maclean-Philby affair. His book was cleared and officially vetted by the FBI.

The Government has also made clear that it remains opposed to publication of an account of successes achieved by the Code and Cypher School—the forerunner of GCHQ—during the war.

41

Nissan Motor Company

Mr. Alan Williams asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry what percentage the selective financial assistance quoted for Nissan represents of the cost of phase I and what percentage of phase II and what gross sum is represented by the combined regional development grant and the selective financial assistance if the project is (a) in a special development area and (b) in a special development

Mr. Butcher: The Heads of Agreement signed on 1 July 1983 between the Department and Nissan, which is available in the Library of the House, states at paragraph 10 that selective financial assistance will be made available at a rate of 11.72 per cent. of the agreed eligible costs of phase II, up to a maximum of £35 million. The estimated capital costs of phase II of some £300 million, and regional development grant at 15 per cent., are 11.72 per cent. of eligible capital costs respectively, the rounded figures for phase II are therefore (a) in a special development area, up to 26.72 per cent. or some £80 million, depending on eligibility; (b) in a special development area, up to 33.72 per cent. or some £101 million, depending on eligibility.

British Technology Group (Regional Boards)

Mr. Foster asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if he is satisfied that other agencies will be able to act as intermediaries in negotiations for regional funding from the European Commission, in the event of the demise of the British Technology Group's regional boards in the special development region.

Mr. Trippier [pursuant to the reply, 2 February 1984,] asked the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry since all negotiations for grant from the European Commission development fund are conducted by the Department with the Commission and the ERDF Development Committee, the question does not arise.

PRIME MINISTER

GCHQ, Cheltenham

Mr. Dalyell asked the Prime Minister what information was given to the Franks committee on the Falklands about the Government's current dissatisfaction with the Falkland Islands communications headquarters during the period covered by its remit.

Prime Minister: None.

European Community Budget (UK Contributions)

Mr. Austin Mitchell asked the Prime Minister what progress has been made in implementing the mandate of the European Economic Community Heads of Agreement under paragraph 7 of the agreement reached in 1980 on the United Kingdom contribution to the European Economic Community budget; and what changes have been proposed by the Commission to the budget in her answer on this subject on 5 June 1980, HC Deb, c. 778.

Prime Minister: Following the 30 May 1980 report of the Commission reported to the Council in June 1980, in spite of strenuous efforts in the Council — the London European Council in November

1981 which I chaired—it proved impossible to reach an agreement. Negotiations are continuing on the matters covered in the declaration adopted by the Stuttgart European Council in June 1983, which covered the same areas, and which I reported to the House on Thursday 23 June—[Vol. 44, c. 145-54.]

Confidential Material

Mr. Forsyth asked the Prime Minister what use the Government makes of the services of private security firms and the Post Office for the handling of confidential material; and whether any of them has had experience of such material then being leaked.

The Prime Minister: The handling and transmission of classified material is governed by confidential guidance issued to all Government Departments. It would not be appropriate for me to give details relating to this guidance. There is, however, no evidence that leaks have occurred as a result of the use of private security firms or the Post Office for the handling of classified material.

Falkland Islands

Mr. Dalyell asked the Prime Minister what response she made to Signor Craxi's offer of mediation in the Falklands.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the reply I gave to the hon. Member on 1 February.—[Vol. 53, c. 210.]

Civil Servants (Disciplinary Proceedings)

Mr. Forsyth asked the Prime Minister if she will give for each of the past 10 years the number of civil servants disciplined for leaking information, broken down by the grade they then occupied.

The Prime Minister: It would not be appropriate for me to give details of the kind requested by my hon. Friend.

Counter-Intelligence Operations (Publication)

Mr. Dalyell asked the Prime Minister further to her answers of 22 December 1983, *Official Report*, c. 340, on what date Professor Michael Howard's volume of the official history of British counter-intelligence operations in the Second World War was finished by the author; when the process of evaluating its contents to avoid the risk of damage to current intelligence and security work began; and when it is due to be completed.

The Prime Minister: Professor Howard's completed text became available towards the end of 1981. The process of evaluating its contents has been going forward since then, but has not yet reached a stage where a decision about publication can be made.

Local Government

Mr. Dubs asked the Prime Minister (1) which Government Departments are represented on the inter-departmental committee co-ordinating the Government's campaign on local government;

(2) how many civil servants, and of what grade, represent Government Departments on the inter-departmental committee co-ordinating the Government's

campaign on local government to the taxpayer and from which departments and from which departments which they are

The Prime Minister: The practice to maintain departmental control so far as a number of government policies carried out as part of the Directorates of the Department of the Environment's responsibility. The normal department

EDUCATION

Mr. Fisher asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what steps have been taken to reduce the number of years since 1980.

Mr. Brooke: The

Requests for instalment payments in respect of:

1. Undergraduates
Initial registration fee
Final registration fee
Course tuition fee
Summer school fee

2. Associate students
Initial registration fee
Final registration fee


* The facility for payment of Associate Students fees is available. No student who has been refused.

Mr. Fisher asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science how many students have been refused assistance have been refused for which statistics are available to the universities.

Mr. Brooke: The statistics are available. I shall be able to give a more precise answer if possible.

Mr. Fisher asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science what steps are being taken to ensure that ordinary degree in statistics are available to the universities.

Mr. Brooke: The Open University's fees are high. Elements: tuition fees, book costs such as books, school fees are not included. Estimated. Assuming ordinary degree statistics are available, the best estimate of the number of students required to complete the course is 100,000, prevailing in each





10 DOWNING STREET

CF.

NB, I have
asked Michael
Stark whether
there needs to
be a PQ among
the decisions of
the meeting on
8 May 1985

NCLW.
16.7

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

file A (41) SRW
SUBJECT
a Master Set

From the Principal Private Secretary

Sir Robert Armstrong

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

The Prime Minister discussed with the Foreign Secretary, the Home Secretary and yourself this morning your submission of 1 April (A085/990) about the publication of volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II.

In discussion, it was recognised that the decision on publication depended on a balance between the advantages of presenting a factual account which would give deserved credit to the services and individuals involved and the disadvantages of stirring up speculation and curiosity about these matters which could stimulate further publication, whether well informed or not, about the present-day operations of the services involved. It was reported that both the present and previous Director-General of the Security Service favour publication and that the SIS and GCHQ were also content in principle.

It was noted that Volume 4 would need considerable re-writing and both volumes would need detailed clearance with intelligence allies. The Foreign Secretary said that there would be some advantages if the preparation and clearance of the two volumes for publication could proceed in parallel.

BF | Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that on balance the conclusion of the meeting was in favour of publication. She asked you to consult the intelligence agencies and prepare a detailed plan leading up to publication. If Professor Howard were willing to undertake the re-writing of volume 4, this would present advantages since both volumes would then be in a similar style.

I am copying this minute to Mr Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Mr Taylor (Home Office).

8 May 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ECU

HISTORIES: off history of Intelligence
in World War II Jan '80.

PRIME MINISTER

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

There are two remaining volumes of the Official History of Intelligence of World War II:-

Volume 4 on counter intelligence by Mr Simkins

Volume 5 on strategic deception by Professor Howard

The more sensitive is Mr Simkins', but it also needs most work on it. Sir Robert Armstrong's minute asks you to decide in principle now to publish both volumes. Professor Howard's would appear first, and Mr. Simkins' not for some time.

The arguments for publication are set out in Sir Robert Armstrong's minute. They are supported by Sir John Jones and Sir Antony Duff. The argument against - assuming that any material prejudicial to current operations has been removed from the volumes - is best summed up by your public statement that the Government has probably published too much about intelligence and would have been wiser to publish less. The publication of these volumes will make more material available to the popular market for intelligence material, and makes it more difficult for the Government to discourage the activities of people like Nigel West.

F.R.B.

7 May 1985

BF // C.P. These are the papers
for meeting on 25. 4
F.R.B. RRB 0.30
10.00 -
on Thursday
April - CR
4/4

MRS. RYDER

Could you please arrange a meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, and Sir Robert Armstrong after our return about publication of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II. No special urgency.

F.R.B.

3 April, 1985.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

Sir Robert Armstrong

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

The Prime Minister has seen and read your minute of 1 April. She is still sceptical whether the arguments against publication have lost their force, and has asked why the risks are thought to have been very substantially reduced since 1980. She has, however, indicated that she would be prepared to discuss this matter with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary, and would be grateful if you could arrange for copies of your minute of 2 January, mine of 9 January, and your submission of 1 April to be sent to their Private Secretaries.

With a view to that, I am copying this minute to Mr. Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and Mr. Taylor (Home Office).

3 April, 1985.



File
[Handwritten signature]

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

Sir Robert Armstrong

10.00-10.30
2574

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

The Prime Minister has seen and read your minute of 1 April. She is still sceptical whether the arguments against publication have lost their force, and has asked why the risks are thought to have been very substantially reduced since 1980. She has, however, indicated that she would be prepared to discuss this matter with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary, and would be grateful if you could arrange for copies of your minute of 2 January, mine of 9 January, and your submission of 1 April to be sent to their Private Secretaries.

With a view to that, I am copying this minute to Mr. Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and Mr. Taylor (Home Office).

3 April, 1985.

[Handwritten initials]

Prime Minister

1

Ref. A085/990

MR BUTLER

Sir Robert Armstrong proposes a decision now to publish both Mr. Simkins' history (vol. 4) and Professor Howard's (vol. 5). Professor Howard's would come first and Mr. Simkins' in 2 years or so.

Sir Robert concludes that there is no intrinsic intelligence reason for not publishing. So the decision turns on the general policy question whether

Official History of Intelligence in World War II You are now

Thank you for your minute of 9 January. ¹ willing to publish official material on intelligence.

2. I should first of all report that ^{Yes no} satisfactory arrangements were made for Mr Ewen Montagu to see Professor Howard's typescript. Mr Montagu saw and returned the book within a very few days (during which it was securely held in a safe at his house) and subsequently wrote to express his gratitude for the exception that had been made to allow him to see the work - and also to urge that further consideration be given to publication. I attach copies of his two letters.

FERB

2.4

3. Since receiving your minute, the Security Service have reassessed the implications of publishing Mr Simkins's volume on counter-intelligence, paying particular attention to the points of difficulty identified in my minute of 3 April 1980. Before writing that minute, I had asked my then Private Secretary, Mr David Wright, who was at that stage new to the subject, to read the History. It was his conclusions that were reported in paragraph 5 and following of that minute. My present Private Secretary, Mr Richard Hatfield, has reread both works to provide a similar independent perspective.

4. There is no reason to call in question the analysis that was made in 1980; indeed, the individual points identified remain those most likely to cause difficulty. But, as I said in my minute of 2 January, so much has been published since 1980, without authority, about intelligence activity during the Second World War that the impact of the publication of the Official History would now be very different. The most important and



comprehensive account is Nigel West's "MI5 (1909-45)", but his book on MI6 covering the same period and a recent volume of essays entitled "Unreliable Witness" are also relevant. In addition there has been a biography of a former Security Service officer ("The Man Who Was M" by Anthony Masters), which touches on wartime agent operations, and a whole series of articles, of varying accuracy. A collaborative work between West and GARBO is still to come.

5. While we might have wished that some at least of this material had not been published, the fact remains that, since it has been, many of the risks seen in 1980 are much less serious and in some cases are no longer relevant. While publication of a major official history on this subject would be bound to attract attention whenever it occurred, the collective impact of these recent publications will be to deprive of their more "sensational" impact both Mr Simkins's work and that of Professor Howard.

6. In particular, there is now a good deal on the unofficial record, of variable accuracy, about all the agents referred to in my minute of 3 April 1980 and also about many others of lesser importance. Although the appearance of the Official History might prompt further media treatments of individual subjects, it would not reveal any significant new cases and could serve to correct some of the more fanciful accounts currently in circulation and present them within their proper overall perspective.

7. My minute of 3 April 1980 also drew attention to a number of detailed points which might give rise to comment:

- a. Camp 020 - the sanitised account gives no details of the way in which the interrogation centre operated. While it is possible that a detailed account of the information



that was obtained by the centre may encourage further journalistic investigation, I doubt whether the risk would be substantially increased by publication.

b. Internment - the discussion of internment is indeed interesting and is likely to give rise to comment. Nevertheless I do not see why such comment need be damaging and, since the Home Office have now released most of the papers relating to the internment of Sir Oswald Mosley, one of the difficulties seen in 1980 is no longer relevant.

c. Normandy - the general outline of the security preparations for the Normandy landings is, I think, already well known, including the restrictions that were placed on individual movement. What is perhaps not so well known is the very serious debate that took place within Government, despite the exigencies of war, about the degree to which such restrictions were acceptable.

d. Individual personalities - the sanitisation is not as yet quite perfect. This can easily be remedied but, in any case, most if not all the names mentioned in the book are public property, even if they have not been officially confirmed.

e. Spain and Ireland - the History draws attention to the use that the Germans tried to make of both Spain and Ireland as a base for intelligence operations. As I pointed out in my 1980 minute, Spain was at the time governed by a fascist regime and there now seems little risk of sensitivity as a result. Although Ireland's neutrality provided the Germans with an opportunity for penetration, the History also makes it clear that there was considerable co-operation between the Irish and British security authorities and that the



Irish Government, despite its neutrality, was determined to do all it could to ensure that Ireland should not be used as a base for espionage against the United Kingdom.

8. I believe that the risks arising from the publication of the Official History of counter-intelligence operations have been very substantially reduced since 1980. The arguments in favour of publication stand. The appearance of a number of unauthorised and often inaccurate accounts since 1980 has added to the case for publishing a definitive authorised account. If this argument is accepted, and a decision is taken in principle that the History should be published, it will in any case be some time before Mr Simkins's book can appear on the streets, as we still have to seek clearance from our intelligence allies and the text will in any case require complete revision in order to make it a readable book. I do not think it likely that these processes can be completed in less than two years, during which time the risks involved in publication would, if anything, diminish still further.

9. The main objection in the past to publishing Professor Howard's volume on strategic deception has been its link with the volume on counter-intelligence operations. While publication of Professor Howard's work would undoubtedly emphasise the importance of the double-cross system described by Mr Simkins (and in his published volume by the late Sir John Masterman) and give rise to questions about plans for the publication of Mr Simkins's volume, it is not necessary for an understanding of Professor Howard's book to know in detail how individual agents were captured and turned. The book has been sanitised and the agencies are satisfied that no danger to their current activities would arise from publication. As one would expect from Professor Howard, it is a well-written and highly readable book and the only processes still required are minor editing and clearance with our intelligence allies.



10. In sum, I believe there are no longer any fundamental objections to the publication of either work; publication would probably titivate interest in intelligence matters for a while but would be unlikely significantly to affect the activities of those writers who specialise in current intelligence matters. Sir John Jones has also made the point that an official account of the very substantial achievements of the Security Service in the Second World War could help to discourgage revelations by former members of the Service intended to "set the record straight". I believe that publication would now in fact be very much a matter of "setting the record straight" and would provide a firm and defensible position on which to rest.

11. If a decision in principle were taken to publish the two histories, I would suggest that we proceed first with the publication of Professor Howard's volume on strategic deception. There is much less to be done to prepare this for publication and it has always been seen as less problematical. Its appearance would undoubtedly raise questions about the volume on counter-intelligence and at that stage we could let it be known that there was still a considerable amount of work to be done (we have yet to arrange a rewrite), but that subject to the satisfactory completion of that work the intention would be to publish it also in due course. The actual appearance of Mr Simkins's volume on counter-intelligence, suitably edited, would thus still be some way off, and the interval should both reduce any remaining risks and allow us to take account of the reaction to Professor Howard's work.

12. My recommendation is that a decision should now be taken in principle to publish both volumes, and that we should proceed as proposed in the immediately foregoing paragraph. This recommendation was strongly endorsed by Sir John Jones before he retired, and is also endorsed by Sir Antony Duff.



13. If the Prime Minister were disposed to reconsider the question of publication she would no doubt wish to consult the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary. In that event I will arrange for copies of my minute of 2 January, your minute of 9 January and this submission to be sent to their Private Secretaries.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

1 April 1985

FROM

THE HON. EWEN E. S. MONTAGU, C.B.E., Q.C., D.L.

24, MONTROSE COURT,
EXHIBITION ROAD,
LONDON, SW7 2QQ.

64

Jan. 25th 1985

Dear Sir Robert,


I cannot thank you enough for enabling me to read Professor Michael Howard's book before it is too late for me to do so. I find it quite fascinating and, in many ways it rounded off some ~~all~~ very hardworking years of my life.

Please forgive me if I revert to the question of publication. Not to publish it would (pardon the word) wickedly distort history. Even the best historians would get hopelessly wrong about why the Germans did this and how we succeeded in doing that. And, the longer the delay, the more of such distorted histories get published.....to the confusion of future generations.

And what can be against publication? Surely not "security". What else? It is a history of good and successful work and all to the credit of this country.

Again many thanks

Yours sincerely,



FROM

THE HON. EWEN E. S. MONTAGU, C.B.E., Q.C., D.L.

24, MONTROSE COURT,
EXHIBITION ROAD,
LONDON, SW7 2QQ.

c. ~~M. Stevens~~

Very Urgent Advice please

Can't 7/12

Dec. 6th 1984

Dear Sir Robert.

Please forgive my bothering you but something has just come to my knowledge which defies all other explanation than that its subject has got overlooked in some "decide later" category of documents.

In a similar way, I and some others, devoted more than 5 years of ^{our lives} ~~my life~~ (when in Naval Intelligence and the Double Cross Cttee) to attempting to deceive the enemy and, on all the evidence then available, we seemed to have been very successful. Naturally, as an ex-Judge, I feel intensely keen to know what the official verdict is, based on the totality of evidence, so I awaited eagerly the publication of Professor Michael Howard's Official History. as I am sure did all the others who worked so devotedly.

As the doctors have now given me only a very few months more to live, I wrote to him to ask what the situation is.

I was astounded to learn that the publication was officially banned some years ago, since when there has been no move. Surely this must be an oversight. There can be virtually nothing of what we did which has not been published with authority, so there can surely be no security bar (especially after 40 years).

And surely from all other points of view publication is desirable. We are surrounded by an atmosphere of difficulties, ^{discussion} and trouble, yet the public is deprived of (what I believe to be) an account of a real triumph of co-operation and ability. Surely that is worth publishing from every point of view, history, morale etc etc, and the continued ban is only an oversight.


Yours sincerely

E. S. Montagu

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB etc
Cabinet Office
Downing Street, SW 1.

P.S. In view of my now limited life-span, and to delay before publication, would it be possible for me to see a copy of the typescript in confidence? I have never written security and I know Professor Howard would not object.

HISTORIES: Official history of Intelligence in CWG
Jan 80



01 APR 1985



file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD
WAR

Thank you for your minute (A085/6) of 2 January.

The Prime Minister is content that Mr. Ewen Montagu should be allowed to see the typescript of Professor Howard's unpublished fifth volume of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War, on condition that he reads and returns it and does not show it to anyone else.

On the wider question of publishing the sanitised versions of volumes four and five of the Official History of British Intelligence, the Prime Minister's general feeling, which she has stated publicly, has been that too much has been said and written about intelligence and that less should be said. She has not therefore wanted the Government to stimulate discussion of these matters. The Prime Minister has been particularly influenced by the illustrations in paragraphs 5 to 7 of your minute of 3 April, 1980, written by someone who had read Mr. Simkin's History without any previous involvement in intelligence matters, of ways in which the press and others would be able to derive material for public discussion from this history. She has now asked who it was who produced those illustrations so that she can consider further how much weight to give to those arguments as against those in Professor Howard's letter and in your latest minute.

RB

9 January, 1985

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B

Prime Minister

The reasons why you decided against publication are in paras 5-7 of the minute at flag A and your comment of last February is at flag B. But you should also read Professor Howard's letter at flag C.

Ref. A085/6

MR BUTLER

Who gave the news in paras 5-6-7? me

Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War

Do you
i. want to reconsider your decision against publishing volumes 4 + 5 of the Official History of Intelligence?
ii. agree to lending Mr. Montagu the typescript of Professor Howard's volume
Yes, on the condition in para. 3?

I last minuted you on this subject on 6 February 1984 (A084/410).

FERS
7.12.

--- 2. I have recently received two letters, of which I attach copies. One is from Mr Ewen Montagu, who was much involved in intelligence in the war and, you may remember, published (with authority) an account of one operation under the title "The Man Who Never Was". He is 83, dying of cancer, and would like to read Professor Michael Howard's account of deception in the war (the unpublished fifth volume of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War). The second is from Professor Howard himself, both supporting Mr Montagu's request, and in effect renewing his representations that authority should be given for the publication of his book.

3. By the rule book, we should not release the typescript of Professor Howard's book to Mr Montagu, if the book is not to be published. If a copy is sent out, there is always a danger (perhaps reasonably remote in this case) that it will get into hands that are not intended, and in effect get out. The Security Service would prefer to see no exceptions to the embargo. We could allow Mr Montagu to come in to the Cabinet Office and read it. But I am afraid that he may be too ill for that; and, if he is, I should like, if the Prime Minister agrees, to take the risk and lend him a typescript, on condition that he reads it and returns it, and does not show it to anyone else.

4. As to Professor Howard's letter, I really have nothing to add to my minute of 6 February 1984. Professor Howard's volume has been scrutinised and in that form it contains nothing unsuitable



for publication. So much has now been published without authority, and not always entirely accurate, that I think that there would be advantage, at a time when the Security Service has been coming in for a good deal of unfavourable comment as a result of the activities of Mr Peter Wright and Mr Chapman Pincher, and of the Bettaney affair, in publishing the two remaining volumes of the Official History which put on official record the truth about the very considerable successes of the Service in countering German espionage activities in the war. There is also the point, made by Professor Howard, of making this act of recognition while there are still a number of those concerned alive to appreciate it.

5. So I ask:

- a. whether the Prime Minister agrees that Mr Montagu should be allowed to see the typescript of Professor Howard's volume;
- b. whether the Prime Minister would now be prepared to reconsider the possibility of publishing the sanitised versions of volumes four and five of the Official History Of British Intelligence in the Second World War: volume four dealing with the Security Service and volume five with deception.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

2 January 1985

FROM

THE HON. EWEN E. S. MONTAGU, C.B.E., Q.C., D.L.

24, MONTROSE COURT,
EXHIBITION ROAD,
LONDON, SW7 2QQ.

c - Mr. Stevens -

Very Urgent Advice please

Can't 7/12

Dec. 6th 1984

Dear Sir Robert,

Please forgive my bothering you but something has just come to my knowledge which defies all other explanation than that its subject has got overlooked in some "decide later" category of documents.

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As the doctors have now given me only a very few months more to live, I wrote to him to ask what the situation is.

I was astounded to learn that the publication was officially banned some years ago, since when there has been no move. Surely this must be an oversight. There can be virtually nothing of what we did which has not been published with authority, so there can surely be no security bar (especially after 40 years).

And surely from all other points of view publication is desirable. We are surrounded by an atmosphere of difficulties, ^{dis}ension and trouble, yet the public is deprived of (what I believe to be) an account of a real triumph of co-operation and ability. Surely that is worth publishing from every point of view, history, morale etc etc, and the continued ban is only an oversight.

Yours sincerely

Ewen Montagu

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB etc
Cabinet Office
Downing Street, SW 1.

P.S. In view of my now limited life-span, and to delay before publication, would it be possible for me to see a copy of the typescript in confidence? I have never broken security and I know Professor Howard would not object.

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Oxford 240043

From MICHAEL HOWARD
Regius Professor of Modern History

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

3rd December, 1984.

c- H. Stevens.
For Advice, draft reply
& back papers please

Part 5/12

Dear Robert,

I recently received a sad letter from Ewen Montagu. He is dying of cancer and asked whether I could possibly confidentially show him a copy of the typescript of my Deception history before the end. I naturally replied that I was unable to do so and that in any case I did not have a copy in my possession.

This does make me, however, return to the charge about publication. As you know, I have been very good and not bothered either you or the Prime Minister; neither have I lent my support to the periodical agitation which occasionally flares up for the book to be published. Nevertheless, the generation is now fast dying off who were involved in what was one of the greatest success stories of the war, and it is sad that they should not be given the opportunity in their lifetime to enjoy public recognition for the amazing services which they rendered to their country.

To the best of my knowledge there is nothing in the book, especially in its "sanitised" version, that is not already known in general terms to the public. The public knowledge is however distorted by inaccurate, often mendacious and always self-interested accounts, which only detract from the credit which is properly due to everyone concerned in the Deception operations.

It has never been made clear to me what there is in my book that is regarded as unsuitable for publication, and I have not pressed for an explanation. I undertook the work in the knowledge that publication would be at the discretion of the government, and I cannot claim to have been personally ill-treated in any way. The people who are being ill-treated, however, are those who were involved in these operations, and all who can reasonably expect to be informed of the remarkable contribution which Deception


operations played in the victorious conclusion of the Second World War.

I am writing to you on a personal and confidential basis in the hope that you may be able to secure a review of the position by the informal exercise of your influence.

With all good wishes,

Yours ever,

Michael



Sir Robert Armstrong, GCMG, CVO,
The Cabinet Office,
Whitehall,
London, SW1.



FUE

R57

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

As you know, the Prime Minister had to approve the Parliamentary reply to Mr. Dalyell, attached to your minute of 6 February (A084/410), at short notice on Monday. She has now considered the substantial point in that minute and has refreshed her memory about the reasons why she decided in 1980 that it was too early for volumes 4 and 5 of this history to be published yet. The Prime Minister has now minuted:-

"Having re-read the reasons, they still seem to me very powerful. It is too early to re-consider publication."

Please could the reply to Mr. Dalyell's further question be drafted in the light of the Prime Minister's view.

8 February, 1984



B.1

10 DOWNING STREET

P.T.O

Prime Minister

You approved the
Pg. I have been asked
by Sir Robert Armstrong
whether you agree to
reconsider publication of
Volumes 4 and 5.

The reasons why you
decided against publication are
in paras. 5, 6 & 7 of the minute
at flag A. These reasons still
seem to me strong in the light of
the action we have recently taken
eg. with Rupert Allason. FERB 7.2.

Having re-read the
reasons, they still seem
to me very powerful.
It is too early to
consider publication?
no

Monday 6 February 1984

Papers with Robin.

History - British Int. FEB 80 - 7/2

(Answered by the Prime Minister on Monday 6 February 1984)

UNSTARRED Mr Tam Dalyell: To ask the Prime Minister, further
NO. 7 to her Answers of 22nd December 1983, Official
(W) Report, column 340, on what date Professor Michael
Howard's volume of the official history of British
counter-intelligence operations in the Second
World War was finished by the author; when the
process of evaluating its contents to avoid the
risk of damage to current intelligence and security
work began; and when it is due to be completed.

Professor Howard's completed text became available
towards the end of 1981. The process of evaluating
its contents has been going forward since then,
but has not yet reached a stage where a decision
about publication can be made.

Mr Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): To ask the Prime Minister, further to her Answers of 22 December 1983, Official Report, column 340, on what date Professor Richard Howard's volume of the official history of British counter-intelligence operations in the Second World War was finished by the author; when the process of evaluating its contents to avoid the risk of damage to current intelligence and security work began; and when it is due to be completed.

DRAFT ANSWER

Professor Howard's completed text became available towards the end of 1981. The process of evaluating its contents has been going forward since then, but has not yet reached a stage where a decision about publication can be made.

MF

Histories Jan '80

Official History of Intel.

74

Ref.A084/410

MR BUTLER

Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War

The Prime Minister will remember that this history was planned in five volumes. The first two volumes, by Professor Hinsley, have been published; the first part of the third volume is due to be published this year, and the second part next year; a draft exists of the fourth volume on counter-intelligence; and Professor Michael Howard has written the fifth volume on strategic deception.

2. Proposals for the publication of the fourth and fifth volumes were put to Ministers in 1980: my minutes of 28 January (A01127), 3 April (A01887) and 22 May 1980 (A02231). As recorded in Mr Whitmore's minute of 4 June 1980, Ministers agreed that these volumes dealt with events too near in time for them to be published now. They were to be sanitised and put in cold storage, and should remain on the shelf until it was thought appropriate to raise once again the possibility of publishing them. The authors and the Leader of the Opposition were to be so informed.

3. The matter was discussed then in the wake of the disclosures about Anthony Blunt. Much has happened since then, and I believe that the time has come to reconsider the question of publication.

4. Much has already been published about counter-intelligence and strategic deception in the Second World War: some of it reluctantly authorised (like J C Masterman's account of the Double Cross System and Ewen Montagu's The Man that Never Was), some of it very unauthorised (like parts of Chapman Pincher's book Their Trade is Treachery and most recently the history of MI5 in two volumes by Rupert Allason ("Nigel West"). The result is that, if volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History were to be published now, they would not so much be telling a new story as putting the record straight of a story that has been the subject of a variety of unauthorised and only moderately accurate accounts.



5. Professor Howard was under no misapprehensions that there was no commitment to publish his volume. But he nonetheless regretted the decision; and the existence of the volume, and the facts of the decision not to publish and his regret, were the subject of an article in The Guardian on 25 November 1983. This led Mr Dalyell to put down a question to the Prime Minister just before Christmas: she gave a temporising answer on 22 December 1983. Mr Dalyell has now returned to the charge with another question, asking for details of the date when Professor Howard's volume was finished and when the process of evaluating its contents (referred to in the Prime Minister's answer of 22 December) is due to be completed.

6. We can of course give another temporising reply, and a draft accordingly is attached. But it will not be possible to keep that up indefinitely, and if the decision not to publish is to stand indefinitely it would perhaps be better to give a different answer, to the effect that the Prime Minister has decided that in view of the risk of damage to current intelligence and security work no date can be set for publication, and that she will make a further statement when it is possible to set a publication date (that might block further questions).

7. It has to be said, however, that "the risk of damage to current intelligence and security work" is wearing thin. The security and intelligence agencies believe that it would be possible to publish volumes that would not risk such damage; and would certainly not add to whatever damage may have been done by the unauthorised books that have been published since this matter was last considered by Ministers. It is arguable that an unauthorised book carries less weight than an official history would, and therefore does less damage; but Nigel West's book was in most respects sufficiently near the mark and has been accepted by public commentators as sufficiently accurate.

8. If Ministers were now to decide in favour of publication, there would still be processes of clearance to complete before either volume could be published. Volume Four - the history of counter-intelligence - has been sanitised but needs to be



rewritten; and though Professor Howard's book has been cleared by the United Kingdom authorities we should need before publication to secure clearance from wartime allies. So a temporising reply would still need to be given to Mr Dalyell's question; but at least there would be the prospect of publication in the foreseeable future.

9. I should be grateful if you would consult the Prime Minister. If she is minded to reconsider the question of publication of these two volumes, I will then prepare a submission which can be copied to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary - who would both come new to this subject, since they were in other posts in 1980.

RA

Approved by
ROBERT ARMSTRONG
and signed in his absence

6 February 1984



CONFIDENTIAL

Histories

MR. WHITMORE

mm
3x.

Official History of British Intelligence in World War II

I minuted you on 7th August about the meeting which Sir Robert Armstrong held with Professor Michael Howard to inform him of Ministers' decision that it was not yet timely to publish Volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence. In addition to that meeting with Professor Howard, it was arranged for the Security Service to see Anthony Simkins, the author of Volume 4, and for the Ministry of Defence to see Colonel Hesketh, the author of "Fortitude", a book which covers much of the same ground as that dealt with in Volumes 4 and 5.

2. Both Simkins and Hesketh have now been seen and told of the decision. Simkins was very disappointed but observed that he had always recognised that this might be the outcome. Hesketh's case was rather more difficult since he had been told in 1976 that a slightly expurgated text of "Fortitude" could be published; his more immediate interest was, however, to make the final chapter alone available for the use of two American academics. He was told, as had been agreed between Ministers, that there was no objection to his making the final chapter of "Fortitude" available as he wished. He is in touch with the Treasury Solicitor's Department about the question of royalties on this chapter in view of the Crown copyright on the work. As for the expurgated text whose publication was authorised in 1976, Hesketh was left in no doubt that Ministers would prefer that he should not publish given their own decision in respect of Volumes 4 and 5. The Ministry of Defence say that Hesketh told them that those publishers to whom he had shown his text so far had thought it unsuitable for publication but he left the clear impression that if he saw a prospect of publication he would probably still take it. This is a risk which we will have to take.

3. We are now arranging for copies of Volumes 4 and 5 to be assembled for storage and also for further sanitisation to take place of Volume 5.



CONFIDENTIAL

4. A Steering Committee (HI) was set up in 1974 to exercise a general oversight of the Official History of Intelligence. Its task is now basically completed and following consultations with the Chairman (Sir Dick White) and the Heads of the Departments represented on it, Sir Robert Armstrong has decided that the Committee should be dissolved. Any residual matters, e.g. sanitisation can be pursued quite satisfactorily by those concerned out of Committee.

(D.J. Wright)

3rd October 1980



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

? CF
Handwritten

From:

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P.

22 August 1980

R27

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 7th August about the volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence.

I note that you do not propose to publish them at this time, and as I have not seen them, I am not able to comment on your view that they will provide material that could damage the capability and effectiveness of the Services.

*Yours sincerely
Jim Callaghan*

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL



cc. T. Woolley

Hinsley B

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 August 1980

Dear Sir,

In 1978 we corresponded about the publication of an Official History of Intelligence during the Second World War. I am enclosing with this letter copies of that correspondence, and of the answer which you subsequently gave in the House.

The first three volumes, under the editorship of Professor Hinsley, have been going ahead: one volume has already been published and two are shortly to come.

That leaves Volumes 4 and 5, on the history of counter-intelligence activities (basically the wartime history of the Security Service) and the history of strategic deception. We now have texts for both of these, the first prepared by a former Deputy Director General of MI5 and the second by Professor Michael Howard.

More work needs to be done on both before they could be ready for publication, but my colleagues and I have been considering whether, subject to further revision and to checking by the appropriate authorities, they should go forward for publication.

We have concluded that the time for publication has not yet come. The publication of these volumes now, at a time when there is active and not always well-disposed interest in the intelligence and security agencies, would provide material which would be used as a basis for investigations of, and pressures

/for disclosure

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

for disclosure about, current tasks and techniques and the way in which the agencies approach their task. This could damage their capability and effectiveness. We have therefore decided not to publish these volumes for the time being, but to put them in cold storage until it is thought appropriate to review the possibility of publishing them.

Yours sincerely
Rapport Thelma

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Ref. A02837

MR. WHITMORE

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

In your minute of 31st July to Sir Robert Armstrong, you said that the Prime Minister had agreed that Sir Robert Armstrong should speak to Professor Michael Howard before the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Callaghan was despatched.

2. Sir Robert saw Professor Howard yesterday. He explained why the Prime Minister and her Ministerial colleagues had decided that Volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II should not be published for the time being. He told Professor Howard that his own Volume 5 was to be sanitised and would be left in cold storage until it was thought appropriate once again to consider the possibility of publication. He would of course be given an opportunity to see and comment on the results of the sanitisation.

3. Professor Howard took this news well. He regretted that the History was not going to be published, but he had no ground for complaint: when he had taken on the task in the first place it had been made clear that there was no guarantee of publication. He undertook that all three copies of the History currently in his possession should be returned to the Cabinet Office. He made two further points. First, if it were decided at some later date that Volume 5 could be published, he would almost certainly not be available himself to rework the text in the light of whatever might have been written in the meantime by private historians. This would mean that, if and when Volume 5 was published, it would have to be made clear that the text had been written by him in 1980. Secondly, he would like to consider whether to propose that he should be permitted to publish an article to correct some of the more blatant current errors and misconceptions about the work of double-agents during the war. Any such article would of course be subject to the usual clearances. Sir Robert said that he could see the case for this, and had some sympathy with the proposal: he did not wish to object in principle, and thought that permission to publish such an article would not be unreasonably withheld.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



Done - see separate note on file

4. The way is therefore now clear for the Prime Minister's letter to Mr. Callaghan to issue. Sir Robert is arranging for the Security Service and the Ministry of Defence to contact respectively Mr. Simkins about Volume 4 and Colonel Hesketh about "Fortitude".

5. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Halliday (Home Office), Mr. Walden (FCO) and Mr. Norbury (MOD).


D. J. Wright
D. J. WRIGHT

7th August, 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL



HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT

31 July 1980

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3min

Dear David,

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE IN
WORLD WAR II

This is simply to let you know that the Home Secretary has no comments on the proposals submitted to the Prime Minister by Sir Robert Armstrong with his minute A02727 of 28 July about the official history of intelligence in World War II, which I now see from Clive Whitmore's minute of 30 July have been approved by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this to Clive Whitmore at No. 10, George Walden at the FCO and Brian Norbury at MOD.

Yours sincerely,

(J F HALLIDAY)

D J Wright Esq

CONFIDENTIAL

31 JUL 1980

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CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II

The Prime Minister has seen your minute AO2727 of 28 July 1980 about the Official History of Intelligence in World War II.

She has approved the draft letter to the Leader of the Opposition letting him know of the decision not to publish Volumes 4 and 5 of the History. The Prime Minister agrees, however, that you should speak to Professor Michael Howard before her letter to Mr. Callaghan is despatched. I should be grateful therefore if you could let me know when the way is clear for us to send off the letter.

The Prime Minister also agrees that Colonel Hesketh should be treated in the way proposed in paragraph 3 of your minute.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Halliday (Home Office), Mr. Walden (FCO) and Mr. Norbury (MOD).

JWS.

30 July 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister.

CONFIDENTIAL

The letter for you to send to Mr Callaghan is attached for your signature.

A02727

PRIME MINISTER

Yes

Do you agree with Colonel Hesketh's change to include as proposed in paragraph 3 below?

MS.

Yes

Content for Professor Howard to be told your before your letter goes to Mr Callaghan?

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

file 25iii

In his minute of 3rd July, Mr Whitmore said that you wished the last paragraph of the draft letter for you to send to Mr. Callaghan to be amended so as to make more explicit the reason for the decision not to publish Volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence. I have consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Security Service and "C" about a revised final paragraph. They have agreed a draft which follows closely the suggestion contained in Mr. Whitmore's minute. I have included this in a revised draft of a letter for you to send to Mr. Callaghan which I attach.

2. In the course of clearing this revised draft with the Security Service, it was brought to my attention that another book on allied deception measures, "Fortitude", was written shortly after World War II by Colonel Roger Hesketh. This book covers the operation of the "Double Cross" system in Europe in the closing years of the war, in somewhat more detail than Sir John Masterman's published book did. It thus covers some of the same ground as the draft Volume 5 of the Official History, on strategic military deception, written by Professor Michael Howard. Colonel Hesketh's book is still waiting to be published.

3. Much of the material which it contains was reproduced in the early 1970s, not only by Sir John Masterman but also by Sefton Delmer in his book on World War II deception techniques.

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The publication of these books, and the use in them of much of his material, led Colonel Hesketh to get in touch with the Ministry of Defence in 1971 about the publication of his own work. There were protracted negotiations between Colonel Hesketh and the Ministry of Defence from 1971 until 1976 about publication. These concluded with an agreement that Colonel Hesketh should make a number of amendments to his text and that once these had been made there was no further reason to object to publication. Earlier this year, Colonel Hesketh was told by the Ministry of Defence that although his book could not be declassified (it remains Top Secret), he could publish an expurgated version. Hesketh has still not published - we think he may have been unable to find a publisher - but he has recently told the Ministry of Defence that he wishes the final chapter of "Fortitude" to be used in a study of deception during the Second World War currently being assembled by two academics at the Naval Post-Graduate School in California.

3. I have consulted all those concerned with the official histories about this and also the Treasury Solicitor. The Ministry of Defence are clearly of the view that, following the agreement reached in 1976 about certain amendments to the "Fortitude" text, all of which have been made in accordance with the agreement, it would not be possible now to tell Colonel Hesketh that he cannot publish. The Treasury Solicitor agrees that Colonel Hesketh's legal position is unassailable and that he could not now approach Hesketh's solicitors to require them to withhold publication. I have also discussed the question with the former Director General of the Security Service, Sir Dick White, who has been closely involved in the preparation of these histories and who knows Colonel Hesketh. He confirmed that there would be a bad reaction if we were to try to forbid Hesketh from publishing

CONFIDENTIAL

any part of his book, but that he might well be content to agree not to publish the rest, if agreement could be given for him to make available his concluding chapter for the American study.

If you agree, therefore, I will ask the Ministry of Defence, with whom Colonel Hesketh has been negotiating, to treat him on this basis.

4. This now leaves the question of timing. The most sensitive person involved in the official histories is likely to be Professor Michael Howard. I should like to arrange to see Professor Howard over the next two weeks to explain the problem and the Government's decision not to publish either Volume 4 or 5. I think that he will accept the decision; but, since he has been so closely involved in all this work himself and his acquiescence and co-operation will be most important if we are to minimise the risk of an academic outcry about the decision not to publish, it would be preferable if he was to be the first to hear officially of the decision. I should therefore like my discussion with him to take place shortly before your letter to Mr. Callaghan is despatched and not afterwards. I would also want to arrange for the Ministry of Defence to speak to Colonel Hesketh and for the Security Service to speak to Mr. Simkins at the same time.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

28 July 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



Completed

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
THE RT. HON. JAMES CALLAGHAN, MP

In 1978 we corresponded about the publication of an Official History of Intelligence during the Second World War. I am enclosing with this letter copies of that correspondence, and of the statement which you subsequently made in the House.

The first three volumes, under the editorship of Professor Hinsley, have been going ahead: one volume has already been published and two are shortly to come.

That leaves Volumes 4 and 5, on the history of counter-intelligence activities (basically the wartime history of the Security Service) and the history of strategic deception. We now have texts for both of these, the first prepared by a former Deputy Director General of MI5 and the second by Professor Michael Howard.

More work needs to be done on both before they could be ready for publication, but my colleagues and I have been considering whether, subject to further revision and to checking by the appropriate authorities, they should go forward for publication.

We have concluded that the time for publication has not yet come. The publication of these volumes now, at a time when there is active and not always well-disposed interest in the intelligence and security agencies, would provide material which would be used as a basis for investigations of, and pressures for disclosure about, current tasks and



techniques and the way in which the agencies approach their task. This could damage their capability and effectiveness. We have therefore decided not to publish these volumes for the time being, but to put them in cold storage until it is thought appropriate to review the possibility of publishing them.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

B/P 127-80

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Historia

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute AO2419 of 1 July about Volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II.

The Prime Minister is unhappy about the last paragraph of the draft letter for her to send to Mr. Callaghan: she thinks that, as at present drafted, it does not make clear the real reason for the decision not to publish the volumes for the time being. She would prefer something on the following lines:-

"We have come to the conclusion that the time for publication has not yet come. The fact is that there is a great deal of public interest at present in the intelligence and security agencies, and to publish these volumes now would be to make available a great deal of material which the media would be quick to exploit. This could lead to revelations about current techniques and about the way in which the agencies approach their tasks. This might be damaging to our capability both now and in the future. We have therefore decided not to publish these volumes for the time being, but to put them in cold storage until it is thought appropriate to review the possibility of publishing them."

I should be grateful if you could let me know whether you, the FCO, the security services and "C" are content with the revised paragraph.

CW

DB

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

The Prime Minister agrees that only Volume 5 should be sanitised at present and that no further work on sanitising Volume 4 should be done for the time being, though the Prime Minister has emphasised that Volume 4 will still need to be completely sanitised before publication.

3 July 1980

G. A. WHITMORE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A02491

MR. WHITMORE

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

In your minute of 4th June about the Prime Minister's meeting with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that day to discuss the publication of Volumes 4 and 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II, you asked me to let you have a draft letter in which the Prime Minister could let the Leader of the Opposition know what Ministers had decided. I attach a draft which has been cleared with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Security Service and "C".

2. In clearing this draft with them I have been made aware that a further book about the use of double agents on strategic military deception in World War II exists in draft. It was written after the war by a Colonel Hesketh. Its possible publication was discussed in detail between the Ministry of Defence and Colonel Hesketh in 1971-72. The discussions concluded with an agreement that permission might be given for the book to be published after review in 1975. Colonel Hesketh agreed at that time that the copyright for his book was held by the Crown but that he would be given the first option to publish provided that permission could be given from the security point of view.

3. There can be little doubt from the extracts of the book that I have seen that it covers very similar ground to that dealt with in Volumes 4 and 5. It would be very difficult to defend a decision not to publish Volumes 4 and 5 and to allow Hesketh's book to appear. I am therefore getting in touch with the Ministry of Defence to discover where they stand in regard to Colonel Hesketh and what can be done to persuade him to accept that permission still cannot be given for him to publish.

4. Both Sir Howard Smith and "C" have raised with me a further point in your minute of 4th June, namely that both Volumes 4 and 5 should be sanitised before they go into cold storage. They believe that Volume 4 has already been sanitised as fully as possible, short of rewriting prior to

CONFIDENTIAL

publication. They do not think it would be appropriate to divert their resources to a further and more refined sanitisation until publication is decided upon. The sanitisation of Volume 5 on the other hand seems unlikely to be a major job and since the officers who sanitised Volume 4 are still available, both Sir Howard Smith and "C" think that they could get on with this task without further ado. I agree with their views on not devoting further resources to Volume 4: it would in any case have to be rewritten if it were going to be published, and the time to sanitise it again is after not before it is rewritten - if it ever is. So I recommend that they should make arrangements now for only the sanitisation of Volume 5 to be put in hand.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

(Robert Armstrong)

1st July, 1980

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
THE RT. HON. JAMES CALLAGHAN, MP

In 1978 we corresponded about the publication of an Official History of Intelligence during the Second World War. I am enclosing with this letter copies of that correspondence, and of the statement which you subsequently made in the House.

The first three volumes, under the editorship of Professor Hinsley, have been going ahead: one volume has already been published and two are shortly to come.

That leaves Volumes 4 and 5, on the history of counter-intelligence activities (basically the wartime history of the Security Service) and the history of strategic deception. We now have texts for both of these, the first prepared by a former Deputy Director General of MI5 and the second by Professor Michael Howard.

More work needs to be done on both before they could be ready for publication, but my colleagues and I have been considering whether, subject to further revision and to checking by the appropriate authorities, they should go forward for publication.

We have come to the conclusion that the time for publication has not yet come. Changes and omissions would have to be made in the interests of current security, or to avoid the risk of embarrassment to people still living; and with potentially damaging material excised, the histories might give only an incomplete and thus to some extent unfair account of what they purported to relate. We have therefore decided not to publish these volumes for the time being, but to put them in cold storage until it is thought appropriate to review the possibility of publishing them.

COVERING SECRET

History
II

MR. WRIGHT

Official History of Intelligence
in World War II

I am returning herewith Volume 4 (Parts I-VIII) by Mr. Simkins and Volume 5 by Professor Michael Howard which Sir Robert Armstrong let us have with his minute AO1887 of 3 April and AO2231 of 22 May respectively.

4 June 1980

COVERING SECRET

SECRET

10



BP 13-6-80

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II

The Prime Minister met the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and you this morning to consider the issues raised in your minute A01887 of 3 April 1980 about Volume 4 of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II and in your minute A02231 of 22 May about Volume 5 of the History.

The meeting agreed that these volumes dealt with events which were too near in time for them to be published now. They contained too many references to individual agents and their activities. Both volumes should be sanitised and then left in cold storage for the time being. No date should be set now for their eventual publication, and they should remain on the shelf until it was thought appropriate to raise once again the possibility of publishing them. In the meantime there was no point in spending £5000 on re-writing Volume 4 to make it more readable.

It was agreed that you should see Professor Michael Howard to let him know that Ministers had decided that Volume 5 was to be sanitised and that it would not be published for the time being. You should also ask him to return any copies of the complete volume which might be in his possession. If he wanted to see the sanitised version of the volume when it was ready, that should be arranged.

The Prime Minister said that she would let Mr. Callaghan know what Ministers had decided, and you undertook to provide a draft letter.

/Finally,

SECRET

gp.

SECRET

- 2 -

Finally, you mentioned the forthcoming Panorama programmes on intelligence and security matters, and you said that you would arrange for the Home Secretary to be briefed about them so that he could consider whether an approach should be made about them to the Chairman of the Governors of the BBC.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Chilcot and Mr. Walden.

See: —
Security:
June 1980
file

JAW.

4 June 1980

SECRET

MS



You are not due to have your frequently postponed meeting on Tues with Mr Whitmore but look tonight with Monday week, but I am submitting Sir Robert Armstrong's minute now in case you wish to read Professor Howard's volume over this week-end.

Ref. A02231

PRIME MINISTER

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

*KMM
22v.
* Now delayed again - until Wednesday 16 June 23v.*

You are to have a meeting on Monday, 2nd June, with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to discuss the proposal to publish Volume 4 of the Official History of Intelligence which deals with counter-intelligence operations during the Second World War.

flag 'A'

2. In my minute of 3rd April, I set out both the arguments in favour of publication as well as the aspects of the book which could provide a source of material for investigative journalism. You will wish to discuss these at your meeting on 2nd June.

3. I suggested in my minute of 3rd April that you might wish to consider discussing the general question of publication with some informed outsiders, such as Professor Michael Howard or Lord Dacre. I understand from Mr. Whitmore's minute of 15th April that you do not think that such a discussion would be likely materially to influence Ministers' decisions on publication. You should be aware that Professor Howard has now completed the first draft of Volume 5 of this History, entitled "Strategic Interception in World War II". You may like to look at Professor Howard's work, the latest draft of which is attached. It is shorter and much more readable than the present version of Volume 4. It deals with the same general area, but whereas Volume 4 described the individual activities of Nazi agents who had been persuaded to work for the Allies during the war, Professor Howard's volume considers how their work on the Allied side was turned to direct military advantage. It is thus directly linked with Volume 4. It contains a multitude of references to the work of those agents whose co-operation with the intelligence agencies is described in Volume 4. These references are so widespread and so essential to Professor Howard's volume that it is difficult to see how they could possibly be omitted without invalidating the entire book. If, on the other hand, Professor Howard's book were to be published with all these references, it would reveal a great deal about the activities and running of the agents and would give rise to questions about whether Volume 4 was ever likely to be published.



4. In considering whether to publish an amended version of Volume 4, we must reckon that, if we decide not to publish it, this will almost certainly mean that Professor Howard's work also will have to remain closed to the public. Professor Howard would have to be told why this decision had been taken.

5. I do not think that this is a very good time to publish either volume. On the other hand I remain reluctant to conclude that neither Volume 4 nor Volume 5 should ever be published. I am therefore inclined to suggest that:

(i) Without commitment to the publication of either volume, we should proceed without haste with the further processes that both volumes still require: in the case of Volume 4, the rewriting which it badly needs and the "sanitisation" of the rewritten version, and in the case of Volume 5, the further editing which still remains to be done and the "sanitisation" which has not yet been started.

(ii) I should be authorised to approach Professor Howard, to explain why we think it right not to commit ourselves to publication at this stage, and to ask him whether he would consider writing a new version of Volume 4, on the basis of the work incorporated in Mr. Simkins's study. We have hitherto been thinking in terms of asking Dr. Charles Cruickshank to do this, and he would no doubt do it competently. If, however, Professor Howard would do it at all, he would certainly make an admirable job of it, and there would be much to be said for Volumes 4 and 5, which share a good deal of ground, being by the same hand.

6. If Professor Howard would agree, that would build in a year or two's delay before Volume 4 could be ready. It has to be said, however, that it would not be right to approach Professor Howard on these lines unless there was at least a 50:50 chance of the Government agreeing to publication at the same time, when both volumes were completed and approved: indeed, he might want a more positive commitment if he was to take it on. If you feel that it would be wrong ever to publish either volume, there is no point in having Volume 4 rewritten, and we must tell Professor Howard that it has been decided not to publish his existing Volume 5.

SECRET



7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

22nd May, 1980

SECRET

SECRET

History

BK

8

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pmlty ~ BK

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

The Prime Minister has now had an opportunity to consider your minute A01887 of 3 April 1980 about the Official History of Intelligence in World War II and to read the History itself.

She agrees that the next step is for her to discuss again with the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary the proposal to publish the History, and we will arrange a meeting in the near future.

The Prime Minister has considered your suggestion that she might have a meeting with some outsiders such as Michael Howard, one or two former participants in this field and your own predecessors but she doubts whether such a discussion would materially influence Ministers' decision on publication in one way or the other. Her own view is still that it would be damaging to publish the volume for the reasons set out in paragraphs 5 - 7 of your minute.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Chilcot and Mr. Walden.

C. A. WHITMORE

15 April 1980

SECRET

CB

Sunday
Telegraph
(Illustrated
Supplement)
20 January 1966
M.A.

Shortly after 10 p.m. on September 4 1940, a year and a day after Chamberlain's announcement that "a state of war now exists between Great Britain and Germany", a very unusual aircraft took off from a military airfield near Rennes in Nazi-occupied Brittany. It was a matt-black Heinkel 111 showing no identification marks or insignia. The Luftwaffe pilot at the controls was Captain Karl Gartenfeld and his one passenger was a 27-year-old Swede, Goesta Caroli, who sat in the bomb bay clutching two leather suitcases. Their destination was England and, in particular, a five-square-mile area of the Buckinghamshire countryside.

This was a special "reconnaissance" mission to drop a spy by parachute into enemy territory and, although an experienced airman, Gartenfeld had flown only one of these before. Just a week earlier he had delivered an agent to South Wales and made the return journey safely. The weather conditions for the flight were perfect - a quarter moon and little cloud. Both men were confident that they would remain undetected.

The full details of this mission and its consequences remained secret until 1972 when Sir John Masterman obtained permission from the Cabinet Office to publish extracts from a report on German wartime intelligence which he had written for government archives in 1945. It was his fantastic claim that in actual fact every agent sent to England by the Abwehr - the German Army's intelligence service - was intercepted and operated under the control of MI5.

Gradually more information on this remarkable coup has come to light from both the Germans who were duped and the British counter-espionage experts who, some 40 years later, feel less inhibited by the Official Secrets Act. Indeed, some of the spies themselves have emerged from their anonymity to give their versions of what may well have been the most sensational stories in the history of espionage and deception.

As Caroli prepared himself for the signal to jump, a young Scottish major in London waited patiently for news of his arrival. His name was "Tar" Robertson, late of the Seaforth Highlanders and now attached to "Room 055, The War Office", the somewhat transparent cover of MI5. How Robertson and his counter-intelligence unit known as B1(a) came to be expecting the Abwehr spy's imminent arrival dated back to the months leading up to the war.

Some 12 months earlier Robertson had enlisted the help of Guy Liddell, the Head of MI5's "B" Division, and his brilliant assistant, Dick White, to organise a highly daring project which was later to become known as Doublecross. The idea itself was really quite simple and had been

explained at length by a visiting counter-intelligence team from the French Deuxième Bureau early in 1939. Instead of locking up enemy agents they were to be put to work "in harness" and allowed to keep their masters supplied with deceptive information.

Robertson had seen the opportunity of initiating a Doublecross system when some 7,500 people were rounded up for detention under the Emergency Regulations in September, 1939. Among those arrested by the police was Arthur Owens, a middle-aged Welshman with strong Nationalist sympathies who had been kept under surveillance for several months by Scotland Yard's Special Branch.

As an electrical engineer with his own battery manufacturing business, Owens had frequently travelled to Germany to visit clients. On one of these trips he had been recruited by the Abwehr and entrusted with a small wireless set to send his coded messages. But by this time Owens had already become well known to the authorities in London. He had once volunteered to the British Secret Intelligence Service (Whitehall's overseas intelligence-gathering organisation) to spy while abroad.

SIS at first accepted his offer and gave him a code-name, SNOW (a partial anagram of his real name), but then found him too unreliable to keep on their books. He was passed to MI5 and, eventually, to Inspector Gagen of Special Branch, who arrested SNOW as war was declared.

As soon as Gagen had deposited a protesting Owens in Wandsworth Prison, Owens demanded to see a senior MI5 officer. Robertson was quickly on hand to accept the proposal which Owens made: that in exchange for his freedom he would reveal all he knew about German intentions in England and produce his radio from its hiding place. Robertson agreed terms, and before long JOHNNY (as the Abwehr called him) was signalling that he had escaped the dragnet which had trapped several other German spies. Major Nikolaus Ritter, JOHNNY's Abwehr controller in Hamburg, fell for the ruse and Doublecross was under way.

Some ten days before Caroli's scheduled arrival, Gartenfeld had delivered JOHNNY another assistant, or so he believed. His mission was to help the master spy organise the Welsh nationalists and persuade them to collaborate when the invasion of England, Operation Sealion, took place. Unfortunately the unnamed spy was blown off course; instead of landing in South Wales he drowned in the Bristol Channel. This time, however, the landing zone was to be centred on the Oxfordshire-Buckinghamshire border village of Stokenchurch

and to ensure a safe arrival JOHNNY was signalled the location. This knowledge put B1(a) into something of a quandary. They could not allow Caroli to operate freely, but at the same time they could not draft troops into the area and perhaps risk scaring off the Germans. Robertson opted for the discreet approach, and as soon as he learned the exact target area he sent MI5's agent in the region to contact the two Chief Constables concerned, Colonel Tom Warren of Buckinghamshire and Colonel Eric St Johnston (later knighted) in Oxfordshire. Outside London, MI5 made itself known through Regional Security Liaison Officers, and Michael Ryde, the RSLO for this Army District, warned the police of Caroli's arrival.

"There were false alarms about enemy parachutists almost every week," recalls Sir Eric St Johnston, now retired but still living on his old "patch", near Burford. "But this warning from Major Ryde was obviously based on good information. Of course I didn't ask where he got it from, but passed on his instructions to all my officers. They were to detain anyone acting suspiciously with the minimum of fuss and then I would take over."

On the morning of September 5 1940, these precautions paid off. A sharp-eyed farmer's daughter near Stokenchurch challenged a somewhat dazed Caroli as he climbed over a gate. He had landed in a recently harvested field some hours earlier but as he hit the ground the strap of his radio had snapped and it had struck him on the chin, knocking him out. He came round shortly after dawn, picked up his suitcase and transmitter and staggered across the fields towards a small lane, where he was spotted. The village policeman was quickly called and he confidently took charge of the situation.

A triumphant Colonel Warren was soon on the telephone to Major Ryde and Colonel St Johnston. "I rushed over to Aylesbury to inspect the parachutist at the police headquarters," recalls Sir Eric. "He was still rather shocked by the speed of events but he seemed almost relieved to be in custody. He told me that before the war he had lived for a while in Birmingham - just around the corner from the street in which I was born!"


By lunchtime a team from B1(a)'s office in St James's Street had arrived and established that Caroli really was the man they had all been waiting for. He was bundled into an unmarked car and driven to MI5's secret, detention centre at Ham Common near Richmond. This large, ugly Victorian mansion, Latchmere House, set in its own densely wooded grounds, had been transformed into a top security "cage" by Major "Stimmy" Stimson, who became the deputy camp commandant.

The accommodation had been enlarged with a 40-prisoner cell block and was now designated "Camp 020",


FOLIO
5

German
bomb
camp)

Agent
project
assign



Richmond (above, photographed the day after a...
ers like Dickie Metcalfe (below right, at the former...
ation to German intelligence until as late as 1943



...a) was one of the men who set up the Doublecross
gence, photographed with William Luke who was
d in the capture of the spy Richter (below, pointing)



although it never appeared on any lists of prisons submitted to the Red Cross for inspection under international agreement. Security was probably tighter than anywhere else in Britain and was the responsibility of the fearsome and monocled Commandant, Colonel "Tin-eye" Stevens. The local residents of Ham Common and even the Intelligence Corps guards on the perimeter fences were unaware of "020"'s significance.

Caroli's interrogation started immediately he arrived, conducted by Colonel Stevens dressed in the jodhpur and knee-boot uniform of his old Indian regiment, the Peshawar Rifles. Also present was the more benign figure of Harold Dearden, the distinguished criminal psychiatrist.

The spy put up no defence and admitted why he had come to England and, in order to save his own skin, offered his services as a double agent. He said that in exchange for his life he would reveal all he knew about the Abwehr and their future operations. He also threw in an especially tempting piece of intelligence... all the details of his friend Wulf Schmidt, who was due to arrive shortly afterwards.

Robertson could hardly believe his luck. "We gave the wretched chap the codename SUMMER," remembers Robertson, who left MI5 soon after the war and is now retired, "and signalled Hamburg to confirm a safe arrival and firm contact with our Welshman; the result was that Major Ritter prepared his best agent yet, Wulf Schmidt, for the flight over the Channel."

Schmidt was a 26-year-old adventurer who had travelled widely from his native Schleswig-Holstein. He was a natural linguist, with a Danish father and German mother, but he had never really had the opportunity to perfect his English. Nevertheless Ritter was confident that he could pass unnoticed among all the foreign accents which were to be found in the British Isles in 1940. When asked what name he would like to have on his forged British identity card, Schmidt could only think of "Harold Johnson", the name of the District Commissioner he had met in the Cameroons where he had been posted for a period before the war.

On September 19, Schmidt, now dubbed "3725" by Major Ritter, jumped from Captain Gartenfeld's Heinkel over Cambridgeshire with a wireless set and instructions to make his way to London and contact JOHNNY. From the moment he leaped from the gliding aircraft he was dogged by bad luck; his arm was struck by a projecting strut and his wristwatch was smashed. Recovering from this as his parachute opened, he realised that he was drifting gently in the moonlight towards an airfield and was about to land dangerously close to an anti-aircraft battery on the perimeter. His arrival, though, went completely unnoticed by the sleepy

gun-crew and Schmidt was able to bury his parachute undisturbed and spend the night in a hedge, nursing a bruised ankle and a painful wrist.

Limping and somewhat bedraggled after a night on the fens, Schmidt made his way towards the sound of a church clock and found himself shortly before eight in the morning, in the village of Willingham. He stopped on the village green by an ancient water pump to bathe his ankle, and then continued his way down the High Street to find breakfast. At Connie Mills's grocery shop he bought something to eat and was directed on to the barber's to buy a new pocket watch.

In a small Cambridgeshire village like Willingham a stranger is immediately obvious and by the end of the long "invasion" summer of 1940 the inhabitants were constantly on the lookout for suspicious characters. Private Tom Cousins of the Home Guard experienced several spy scares: "We had airfields all round us and RAF Oakington, the Blenheim base, right on our doorstep. Our detachment was called out several times to search the fen for parachutists. The area was such a good target for an airborne attack that the army concreted many of the local tracks so the enemy could be reached quickly after a landing."

Schmidt was quite unaware of the stir his appearance had caused in the village until he was challenged as he came out of Margery Field's newsagent's shop, a copy of *The Times* under his arm. He was taken back down the High Street to The Three Tuns, the local pub which doubled as the Home Guard HQ, under the command of the licensee Colonel Langton. The confrontation which followed was disastrous for Schmidt partly because he was entirely unprepared for arrest or questioning. Major Ritter had trained him in all aspects of espionage except this crucial area, as it was thought that even to discuss capture would lower the morale of the agents. Langton contacted the police and by the following afternoon "3725" was alone in a cell in Ham Common.

Colonel Stevens and his team went into action again but they soon realised that their latest prisoner was made of sterner stuff than SUMMER. He resisted every threat and inducement and for a while it looked as though the whole Doublecross system would be in jeopardy. After some ten days of intensive but non-violent interrogation Schmidt suddenly changed his mind and offered his captors his full co-operation. "Harry was a very intelligent chap," recalled one of those sitting in on the interviews. "To start with he was rather arrogant. The Abwehr had led him to believe that England was in a state of imminent collapse. But his journey


from Cambridge to Richmond, right through Whitehall and Parliament Square, must have impressed him."

Colonel Robertson was told quickly of the transformation and he travelled down to 020 to meet his new chief to whom he took rather a liking. At their first session it was arranged for "3725" to be known by the cover-name Harry Tate, after the popular music-hall comedian. An MI5 Officer, Bill Luke, was assigned to look after the German and during the first nights of October the two of them, together with Russell Leigh, a wireless expert, drove out into the Home Counties to broadcast to Hamburg. Contact was soon established and the next link in the chain well and truly forged.


By the end of the year the system was in full swing and the three main Doublecross agents were allowed to operate under a more liberal regime. SUMMER moved into an MI5 country house near Hinxton and TATE joined him for Christmas. However the two did not get on very well together in their new "reversed" roles and BI(a) decided to move TATE to a smaller house near Radlett where he was allowed more freedom. This trust was a good investment, because it was clear by early 1941 that "3725" was high in the estimation of his German controllers and was outshining both SNOW and SUMMER.

Major Ritter lavished praise on Schmidt, who was gradually building up an extensive network of sub-agents and, through (Sir) John Masterman's Twenty Committee, supplying a mass of well co-ordinated deceptive information. The function of the Committee (referred to as XX or Twenty as a security-conscious abbreviation for Doublecross) was to prepare the intelligence which would eventually pass to the German High Command and liaise with all the interested parties, from the Admiralty to the War Cabinet. Sir John, affectionately known as "JC" to his colleagues, had been a distinguished Oxford don and, like many of his friends at the University, had been recruited into espionage for the duration.

The system did not, however, always work smoothly. Early in the new year of 1941 SUMMER became very depressed and decided to escape. His supervision was fairly relaxed and one afternoon he took the opportunity to attack his two guards, apologising to the young corporal he hit rather hard. He managed to steal a motorcycle and headed towards the fens. A dramatic chase ensued and SUMMER was captured a few hours later near Ely. He was immediately sent back to 020 and, then, after further interrogation, consigned for the rest of the war to a newly constructed MI5 cage at Hunterscombe Place on Lord Nuffield's estate near Henley. After this incident he understandably fell from grace in the eyes of his captors, though he was



Tom Cousins (above left) and Harry Smith were in Willingham and saw Schmidt after he had parachuted into Cambridgeshire. The spy bought food at this shop



never executed. At the end of the war he was repatriated to Sweden, where he now lives, claiming to suffer from amnesia.

SNOW, too, came under suspicion of abusing the freedom MI5 allowed him. He was sent back to Wandsworth Prison after a trip to Lisbon to see his Abwehr masters. BI(a) decided that he was far too tricky a character to have direct access and communication with the enemy and he was quietly taken out of circulation without arousing any Abwehr fears. He was released at the end of the war and died some years later in Ireland where he had used the name Arthur White. Right up until his demise he was convinced that MI5 had him under constant surveillance and at one stage became so desperate that he tried writing to some of his old German contacts for money.

Ironically though, the greatest threat to the flow of misinformation to the Abwehr came from TATE himself, though indirectly. He was proving himself to be thoroughly reliable and efficient (to both sides) but he was running low on the cash which he had originally been given. An elaborate operation was organised from Hamburg to deliver a fresh supply of currency to the star agent who had started to exert some pressure on Major Ritter. Yet

another "double", a Yugoslav playboy introduced by MI6, participated in keeping up the supply, but BI(a) was anxious to uncover other German networks, if they existed. He succeeded when on one occasion the Japanese Military Attaché was used by the Germans to deliver a bundle of notes over to TATE on the top of a bus in Edgware Road.

A further coup seemed likely when, in April, TATE requested a new valve for his wireless. In fact he had long discarded his Abwehr supplied Telefunken set as it lacked power and had relied on a British Army model, which had proved very satisfactory.

Faced with silence from their best spy the Germans responded by announcing the following month that an old friend of "3725" had been selected for the next mission to England. This was to be Carl Richter, a 28-year-old Obersturmführer who had trained with Schmidt. A rendezvous was arranged with "3725" at the Regent Palace Hotel in London or, failing that, at the British Museum. These instructions were a little more sophisticated than the ones TATE had originally arrived with and left MI5 with the same problems. They were

completely in the dark about Richter's mode of entry into the country so they had to rely on keeping the rendezvous under close observation.

This proved to be unnecessary. Richter was dropped by parachute in Tyttenhanger Park, near London Colney, and was quickly picked up. A suspicious country policeman, Constable Alec Scott, had questioned him just hours after his landing and had arrested him.

Initially Richter was co-operative with his captors and agreed to show staff from 020 where he had hidden his parachute. That, however, was the limit of the help he was prepared to offer and he effectively signed his own death warrant by refusing to join the Doublecross system. He was sent to the Old Bailey for a trial "in camera" in October and was hanged at Wandsworth Prison on December 10. In the final moments before being led to the trapdoor on the scaffold he suddenly put up a desperate struggle with the hangman, Albert Pierrepont and his two assistants which amazed the MI5 officers who knew the circumstances of his peaceful surrender to a lone constable six months earlier.

Within two years of Owens' arrest Colonel Robertson and his BI(a) staff had developed a highly effective deception organisation. As more ULTRA material became available from the codebreakers at Bletchley, MI5 could accurately monitor the Abwehr's reactions to the faked intelligence. Ironically, most of the Case Officers, the MI5 individuals responsible for the day-to-day running of the agents, were amateurs. All had been recruited into the Security Service for wartime duty from a variety of different (but "safe") backgrounds. John Marriot (Robertson's deputy and later secretary to the XX Committee), Christopher Harmer and Ian Wilson had all qualified as solicitors. Hugh Starr had just come down from New College, Oxford, but his lameness prevented him from joining a regular unit; Bill Luke had been working in industry in Scotland and was waiting to join the Navy; Cyril Mills took leave from his family's renowned circus; Tommy Harris had been a successful painter and art dealer with a gallery in Mayfair. Most returned to their civilian jobs when Germany surrendered, their lips sealed.

Altogether some 50 agents passed through their hands with varying degrees of success. Some, like SUMMER were reluctant collaborators; others, such as TRICYCLE, the Yugoslav playboy, proved to be enthusiastic volunteers. Dusko Popov was passed to the men of "Room 055, The War Office" by MI6 and survived to retire to the South of France and write. When Eddie Chapman had originally tried to go into print to tell his experiences as ZIGZAG he was not so lucky; the

Sunday paper which bought his story was hurriedly withdrawn from distribution at the last minute and Chapman was prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act.

The Germans had found him in 1941 locked up in a cell in Jersey jail. He had been serving a sentence for safe-breaking when the Channel Islands had been occupied. His subsequent arrival in England by parachute had been suspected by MI5 who had followed his progress at Abwehr spy schools via ULTRA intercepts.

"I thought I would be quite a surprise for the sleuths," recalls Chapman, "but in fact they never ceased to amaze me. The extent of their knowledge was fantastic. They even knew I had been to the dentist a couple of days beforehand in France." Since all ZIGZAG's activities had been intercepted at Bletchley there was little BI(a) did not know.

Of all the double agents, TRICYCLE is probably the best known because J. Edgar Hoover refused to heed his warnings about an attack on Pearl Harbour. In February, 1941 TRICYCLE returned from a briefing with his German masters in Lisbon and broke the news to "Major Matthews" (actually Bill Luke, who favoured the names of saints as pseudonyms), his case officer, that he had been ordered to the United States. He had been instructed to complete a detailed questionnaire on American war preparations with special emphasis on torpedo defences in Pearl Harbour.

TRICYCLE was allowed to go to America and two new agents were recruited to operate in his absence. The two MI5 candidates were Dickie Metcalfe, who was presented to the Abwehr as an ex-Army officer willing to answer technical and military questions, and a well-connected Austrian woman living in London who had already done some prewar counter-intelligence work. They became GELATINE (because BI(a) thought she was "a jolly little thing") and BALLOON, so-named because Metcalfe was a trifle overweight!

BALLOON was at the time working for a small-arms company just off Piccadilly and he was immediately welcomed as a replacement for TRICYCLE. One of his first tasks, with the aid of the XX Committee, LCS (the deception outfit run by Colonel

Bevan) and Roger Hesketh, the misinformation wizard, was to persuade the German High Command that an Allied landing on the coast of Norway was imminent.

A variety of ploys were used to reinforce the fiction. Advertisements were placed in Aberdeen's local newspaper for "fishermen with a knowledge of Norwegian waters". BALLOON reported, via his secret writing, that the King of Norway had recently been on an inspection tour of troops training in Scotland. The threat was taken seriously and the real operation went ahead smoothly. This deception, under the name OMNIBUS, was not very sophisticated in comparison with later efforts but one lesson was learned: that if enough corroborating evidence could be provided in the form of heavy wireless traffic and sightings of large troop movements, the German Intelligence Services could be well and truly fooled.

When, in 1942, Operation TORCH was planned several other "covers" were prepared. The attack was due to take place on the North African Coast but BALLOON, along with TATE, GARBO, GELATINE and others, reported that the target was France. The build-up of troops in Gibraltar, which had been difficult to mask, was presented as reinforcements for Malta. TORCH succeeded against little opposition and the importance of strategic deception was established.

Dickie Metcalfe remained in contact with the Abwehr until November, 1943 and escaped detection as a double. He is now retired and lives near Maidenhead.

By 1944 BI(a) was controlling every German network in England and was thus able to present the Germans with a mass of information which was used as the basis for many of Berlin's decisions. The subtle process of feeding the enemy with scraps of intelligence and allowing them to reach a final (erroneous) conclusion became an art which reached its zenith in FORTITUDE.

Roger Hesketh, David Strangeways, John Bevan and the other "deceivers" developed an extraordinarily elaborate series of operations to cover D-Day. Much of this heavy responsibility fell on GARBO, a Spaniard who had volunteered his services to the British Embassy in Madrid, only to be told, "I am afraid His Britannic Majesty's Embassy has nothing to do with espionage and that

BBC TV SPY SERIES

Our article complements a special six-part series on spies and spying called *Spy!* which starts on BBC1 tonight at 9.20. The first 50-minute programme is a dramatised reconstruction of the espionage case involving Admiralty clerk John Vassall. Camp 020, featured in our story this week, where German

agents were "turned" and persuaded to spy for Britain, is the theme of the programme next Sunday, January 20. The BBC's series will continue with stories about a KGB assassin; Cynthia, a beautiful American spy in the Second World War; the snatch by Nazis of British intelligence chiefs just as war was to be declared in 1939; and of Richard Sorge, perhaps the most successful spy of all time.

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sort of thing." But after he had been accepted by the Germans his value was appreciated and he was taken to Tommy Harris and enrolled into MI5. He helped inform the Abwehr of a whole new and fictitious American Army (First United States Army Group, or FUSAG) which Roger Hesketh had created, complete with shoulder flashes, insignia, and wireless traffic.

GARBO reported that it was based in East Anglia and eventually the Germans came to believe that a major invasion force was massing for an assault in the Pas-de-Calais area. Even after D-Day the Abwehr clung to the belief that the Normandy landings were merely a diversion.

GARBO did not, however, always find his role as spymaster to a completely imaginary espionage ring easy. On one occasion he went to the Surrey docks to inspect some authentic bomb damage and ended up under arrest for spying. He had asked one of the many onlookers what time the attack had happened and unfortunately the spectator turned out to be a policeman in plain clothes who took a dim view of his foreign questioner. Tommy Harris arranged for GARBO's release and then went to considerable lengths to persuade the Germans that the arrest was a genuine mistake. GARBO lodged a formal complaint against the police and a letter from the Home Office was forged and eventually passed to

the Abwehr in Lisbon. The apology for the "unlawful detention" was received with huge amusement.

GARBO preserved his credibility and continued to send misleading intelligence until the very last days of the war. His valuable work was rewarded by an Iron Cross Second Class from the Germans and the MBE from the British. He is now retired in Madrid.

Not all the Doublecross spies were as enthusiastic about the Allied war effort as TRICYCLE, ZIGZAG, BALLOON and GARBO. Early in the morning of April 7 1941, two Norwegians were set afloat from a German flying boat in the Moray Firth. They paddled a small rubber dinghy ashore near Crovie in Banffshire. The two men who had crossed the North Sea from a base near Stavanger were Jack Moe and Tor Glad, both excellent linguists and well equipped with codes, money, forged papers, explosives and a wireless set. They were to commit sabotage and report daily.

The two men surrendered themselves immediately to the Chief Constable of Banffshire and were soon in the hands of BI(a) at Camp 020. Christopher Harmer became their Case Officer and they were dubbed MUTT and JEFF. Jack Moe, whose grandfather (on his mother's side) had once been Mayor of Manchester, soon established himself as an able "double" but Tor Glad was not so successful. By August, MUTT had to transmit a message

explaining that his companion had been called up for the army and had been sent to Iceland. The tale was believed, while in fact JEFF was interned with other "unreliables" on the Isle of Man, in Stafford jail and, finally, on Dartmoor. Nevertheless the Abwehr remained confident of them both and their wirelasses were active until February 1944.

Demands for acts of sabotage were satisfied by one or two specially organised performances. Southern Command participated in an operation which led to the destruction of some Nissen huts in Hampshire. Harmer had arranged for some revealing clues to be left at the scene of the crime (including a Norwegian compass) so as to impress the Abwehr, but the force of the explosion was larger than expected and destroyed everything in sight. To make matters worse a soldier from a nearby camp was arrested for the sabotage and seemed unlikely to extricate himself from the charges. New clues were laid by Harmer and Inspector Gagen of Special Branch and finally everyone, including the local press, seemed satisfied.

Both MUTT and JEFF survived their experiences. Jack Moe works in a ceramics factory in Malmo, Sweden. Tor Glad is a senior executive with

the Norwegian Radio Corporation.

In recent years some of the war's most closely guarded secrets have become common knowledge as the official historical archives are opened to public view. But the role of BI(a) in this dramatic success has remained unrecognised and unpublicised. The Enigma cipher machine was defeated by the boffins only with the help of the double agents.

GARBO broadcast a meteorological report to Germany each morning and a summary was transmitted on to Berlin, via the Enigma machine. Each day the Abwehr cipher was changed slightly in the belief that it would make the traffic unreadable except to those with altered Enigmas. By comparing the intercepted message from one German base to another with the original MI5 version the decrypters were able to calculate the daily adjustment. Thus the process of "tapping" the Enigma transmissions was able to be continued with the minimum of interruption.

Few of the Doublecross spies have sought or received any publicity. The security service took the attitude that the less said about counter-intelligence the easier their job would be in the future but gradually, in spite of their efforts and the Official Secrets Act, the story of BI(a) has emerged. But certainly the full details stored away in the files of the Security Service will never see the light of day. (1)



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I don't think we

Prime Minister. A7

need correct substance -

They will find the account of something as I did, but I think it would be dangerous to publish it

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I suspect that this minute will reinforce rather than allay your fears about the use to which investigative journalists would be likely to put this History.

Ref. A01887

PRIME MINISTER

officially for the reasons given in

Agree to another meeting with the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary?

(para 5, 6 & 7 below)

Do you want to see some eminent outsiders, as Sir Robert Armstrong suggests? If you do, it would make sense to do so before the meeting with Mr Whitlam and Lord Carrington.

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

You held a meeting of Ministers on 20th February to discuss the proposal to publish the volume of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II that deals with counter intelligence. You suggested that you would like to read the History yourself and asked that copies should also be made available to the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for the same purpose. You asked in addition that passages about which there might be doubt should be drawn to Ministers' attention.

2. I attach a copy of the History which has been "sanitised" by both the Security Service and SIS. Copies are also available for the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to whom I am copying this minute.

3. Mr. Simkins's History is long and indigestible. It would certainly need to be rewritten if it were decided that it should be published, and the immediate question is whether to spend £5,000 on having it rewritten: it would not be worth doing so if we were not reasonably sure that we were going to publish it at the end of the day. The sanitisation of the text, which has been carried out by retired senior officers of the Security Service and SIS, was designed to ensure that the History does not reveal still-applicable intelligence techniques or organisation, wartime intelligence operations which still need protection (i.e. those against neutrals or allies), the identity of agents or sources, and the nature of certain GCHQ activities. As a result, therefore, one of the principal sources of anxiety about publication, which was expressed at your 20th February meeting, namely the revelation of information relevant to our current Intelligence techniques and approach, has already been removed to the satisfaction of the two intelligence services.

4. But you also expressed reservations deriving from the high current level of interest in intelligence activities and the possibility that the publication of an official history might provide fresh material to skilled investigative journalists.



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I have therefore arranged for the History to be read anew, with this particular aspect in mind, this time by someone without any previous involvement either in these intelligence matters or in the discussion about whether the book should be published.

5. His conclusion is that the book certainly could provide a valuable source of material for journalists, academics and the media. If published, it would be unique. Although a good deal of the Security Service's wartime operations in detecting and turning German agents to Britain's advantage have already been revealed by unofficial sources, no work has yet appeared which covers the whole field of counter-intelligence, as Simkins's History does, with its exclusive access to the official sources. The publication of the History would be something of an event, as the first appearance of an officially sponsored work dealing in detail with intelligence and counter-intelligence operations. It would allow writers in this field to pursue their work further, using this official product as a base for further investigation. The media would find an interesting new range of subjects for either television or Press serialisation. The recent BBC "Spy" series of dramatisations of individual spy cases seems to be the sort of programme which could benefit from the publication of this material. One of the programmes in January, I believe, dealt with Camp 020, an interrogation centre for suspected enemy agents which is frequently mentioned in the History (Chapter XXIV, Flag A). Although the detailed description of the work of Camp 020 has been omitted in the sanitisation, the activities (sometimes understandably rather grisly) of an interrogation centre are likely to remain of real interest to journalists and the object of further investigative "digging".

6. The most evident source of interest to journalists would be the activities of the individual agents whose presence in Britain was detected by the Security Service and of whom a significant number agreed to co-operate with the Allies in a complicated and highly successful game of deception. The main feature of the History is the handling of the individual cases of these agents. The case studies appear through the History on an episodic basis. Some of the German agents who were "turned" to work for the Allies were of little importance and

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were used only for a short period. There was, however, a hard core whose work continued throughout the war and whose activities are at the heart of this History. Some details of their activities have already been made public and have been written up, particularly by Sir John Masterman. An article in the Sunday Telegraph colour supplement in January reproduced some of Masterman's writings. I attach a copy (Flag B). The cases involving the most important of these agents (such as those code-named Garbo, Snow, Zigzag, Tricycle, Brutus, Artist, etc.) could make attractive material for media treatment, and the material provided in the History would considerably supplement that already available as well as having the added advantage of coming from the original source. Given the length of the History, I do not suggest that you should try to follow many of these case studies through the text. But you might like to look at:

Chapter IX on Snow (Flag C)

Chapter XIV on Garbo, Brutus and Zigzag (Flag D)

Chapter XVIII on Brutus, Tricycle and Garbo (Flag E)

7. The studies of agents and their activities are, I think, the elements in the History most likely to attract the attention of the sort of investigative journalism about which you expressed concern at your meeting on 20th February. But there are other features which could provoke interest and comment:

- (a) Chapter VII contains details of a long and difficult interdepartmental debate about the internment both of aliens and members of Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union. It revealingly exposes the residual strength of the Civil Liberties lobby in Britain, even in crisis circumstances (Flag F).
- (b) The same consideration applies to Chapters XXVII and XXVIII which recount the use of the counter-intelligence network and deception techniques in preparing for the Normandy landings. This was a success story which could easily be condensed into an interesting self-contained account, and it also again sheds light on the difficulties which British Governments can face over restricting personal freedoms in the interest of national security (Flags G and H).

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(c) The sanitisation process has removed from the History the extensive references to the personalities involved in counter-intelligence during the War, some of whom are still alive e.g. Sir Dick White and Lord Dacre of Glenton (Hugh Trevor-Roper). A major source for the book was the diary of Guy Liddell, Head of MI5's "B" Division. (Flags J & K) References to this document (Chapters IV and VI) and to Liddell himself (Flag L) and to others by name (Chapter X) have now been made less explicit. But there are reasonable grounds for assuming that those outside the Government service interested in these subjects would have little difficulty in deducing the identities of the principal actors in the wartime counter-intelligence operations. This may be of particular relevance to the aftermath of the Blunt affair: both Guy Liddell's name and that of Tomas Harris (who was Garbo's case officer) were widely, and incorrectly, associated in the Press with that of Blunt.

(d) There is much in the History about the use which the Germans tried to make of Ireland and Spain as bases for launching operations against both Great Britain and, in the case of Spain, Gibraltar. The History re-emphasises the extent to which Ireland and the IRA represent a potential asset to be exploited by any enemy of the United Kingdom (Chapters XI and XXVII). (Flags M & N) The Spanish case is somewhat different, given the nature of the Franco regime, but Chapter XXIII contains a description of German activities in Spain and the active collusion of the Spanish Government. Although this aspect of the book may attract attention since it contains unfavourable comments on foreign governments (especially Spain), the circumstances of the time were such as to make it unlikely that these comments would have a damaging effect on present-day relations.

8. The Heads of the two Services are satisfied that an account based upon the sanitised version of the Simkins book would not put at risk current security and intelligence operations, techniques and procedures. Neither (presumably) would television programmes based on material derived from the book. Neither the book nor any programmes would tell the Russians anything they cannot be

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*Plus - that
does it
follow.*

presumed to know already. It might be argued that there was something to be said for diverting journalistic and public interest into far-off things and battles long ago and thus away from current security affairs. But there would obviously be some danger that the publication of the history would stir up speculation about, and investigative journalistic probing into, the extent to which and the ways in which the tasks, techniques and procedures and the very nature of the two Services had changed and developed since the war, to the possible detriment of current security.

9. The arguments in favour of publication remain those advanced at your meeting on 20th February:

- (a) the general duty to put on public record whatever historical material there is not good and positive continuing reason to keep secret;
- (b) the particular duties not just to complete this part of the canvas of the Official History of the Second World War but also to ensure that the contribution of these people to winning the war does not go unrecorded;
- (c) without some such official publication the popular image of the Security Service during the war will continue to be a highly impressionistic and considerably unfair one; in other words, we are talking not just about publishing a record where none exists, but of correcting a record which is at present patchy, partial, inaccurate and in many respects unfair, and establishing that, after a shaky start, the record of counter-intelligence activities during the war is one of remarkable success which deserves to be recorded and remembered, along with the other successes of the war.

10. It should be added that some former members of the intelligence community (and I dare say some present members too) are anxious to promote greater contact and understanding between that community and serious academics like Michael Howard and Christopher Andrew. They believe that that would be good for the intelligence services, which inevitably tend to be isolated, and that the publication of an official history would be an indispensable starting point for a process of this kind. It might even result in the intelligence services finding greater support from outside the Government, to buttress the support they already enjoy from the Government.

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11. No doubt you will want to discuss this again with the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, to whom I am copying this minute. I wonder if you might also think of discussing the general question with some of the better informed and more responsible outsiders, such as Michael Howard, one or two former participants, such as Sir Dick White, Lord Dacre of Glenton, and Lord Rothschild; and my own predecessors Lord Trend and Lord Hunt of Tanworth.

RA

(Robert Armstrong)

3rd April, 1980

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~~B/F 17/5-80~~

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10 DOWNING STREET

cc Master set

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

OFFICIAL HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II

The Prime Minister met the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Michael Palliser and you this morning to discuss the proposal set out in your minute A01127 of 28 January 1980 that the volume of the Official History of Intelligence in World War II that deals with counter intelligence should be published when the text prepared by Mr. Simkins had been edited and re-written.

You said that the first volume of the Official History, which dealt with strategic and operational intelligence, had already been published and had been acknowledged as a considerable contribution to the history of the war. The second volume was the one about counter intelligence. The third, which was being written by Professor Michael Howard, was on deception, and although no decision had been taken about the publication of this volume, there was no doubt that Professor Howard was working in the expectation that it would be published in due course. There was a good case for publishing the volume about counter intelligence. A number of unofficial accounts had already appeared, and these were often partial and incorrect. If a balanced and objective official record was not published, the impression of the work of the two secret services which would survive publicly would be one of bungling, inefficient organisations heavily penetrated by foreign agents. This would be very unfair since our intelligence effort against Germany had been a success story which should be made known publicly both for the sake of history itself and for the reputations of those concerned. The other elements of our war effort, such as the Armed Forces and the civil administration, had received their fair share of credit, and those who had played a part in the intelligence services should be similarly treated. Clearly any

/published record

SECRET

Published record would have to be sanitised so that it did not reveal anything which would be detrimental to the present day and future work of the Security Service and of the SIS. Both services had already scrutinised Mr. Simkins' text rigorously to ensure that it disclosed nothing of importance, and if it was decided to re-write the volume with a view to publication, they would have to check that version too for the same purpose.

The Prime Minister said that she shared the reservations which were attributed to 'C' in your minute. There was a great deal of interest in the Security Service and the SIS at present, and the publication of an official history of counter intelligence in the last war would hand fresh material on a plate to skilled investigative journalists for further exploitation. Moreover she was concerned that publication might reveal information relevant both to current techniques and to the way in which the Security Service and the SIS approached their tasks. This might be damaging to our capability now and in the future. She had been opposed, when Leader of the Opposition, to the decision to publish the first volume of the Official History and she did not believe that that decision should be a precedent for the second volume.

The Home Secretary said that the Director General of the Security Service would like to see the history published. He was worried that if this was not done, there would be more speculative histories by unofficial authors which would not do the Security Service any good. There was a good story to be told about counter intelligence in the last war and it should be told authoritatively. The Security Service and the SIS were at present under fire and now would be a good time to publish the wartime history.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that if the text revealed information about current techniques and about people still serving in the Security Service or the SIS, he was inclined to share the Prime Minister's doubts about the wisdom of publishing. But he was also anxious to do justice to those who had contributed so much in both services during the war. Everything turned on whether the work contained information which should not be disclosed, and he did not know whether this was the case, since he had not seen it.

/Sir Michael Palliser

SECRET

- 3 -

Sir Michael Palliser said that 'C' had some reservations and we should take account of these. But he had also said that if there were strong arguments in favour of publication, he would not want to hold out against the appearance of the history. There was a strong case for publishing the volume since it would help to explain to posterity how the war was won. It was right to try to tell the truth about the war period. But he agreed that the text should not be allowed to compromise present techniques or anybody who was still serving. If there was any risk of this which could not be eliminated by sanitising the text, there was then an obvious case for delaying publication for the time being.

The Prime Minister said that she remained very sensitive about the possible effect of the publication of the history on the work of the Security Service and the SIS today. She agreed with the Foreign Secretary that the text needed to be looked at closely again with this risk in mind. She would be grateful if you could let her, the Home Secretary and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary have copies so that they could read the history themselves. It would be helpful if you could draw to Ministers' attention the passages about which there might be doubt. When they had read the text, they would better be able to reach a decision about publication.

I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Chilcot, Mr. Walden and Sir Michael Palliser.

G. A. WHITMORE

20 February 1980

SP

SECRET

B/F 19-2-80



for Mr. W. G. Whitmore

10 DOWNING STREET

Butter!

Mr. Whitmore. Mr.

Plans arranged
for 9.30 on
Wednesday 20th
February. All
parties informed.

C.P.

5/2.

Arthur



Can't we really not
do this before 3rd
March?

No briefing required
in addition to Sir R.

10 DOWNING STREET
Amending's
minutes of 28 January.

Clive

Monday 3 March . 4th

11.15 - 12.00.

No to.

I have spoken to
the Private Office
of Foreign Sec:
of Home Sec: but
have not written to
confirm ~~and~~ have
not requested
briefing?

C.P.

4/2 * Cabinet
Office

SECRET



5

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

1 February 1980

Official History of Intelligence
in World War II

I enclose copies of a recent exchange of minutes about the official history of counter intelligence in World War II.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Home Secretary would join the meeting which she is having with the Foreign Secretary to discuss the possible publication of the history. We will be in touch with you about the time of the meeting.

I am sending copies of this letter to George Walden and David Wright.

G. A. WHITMORE

John A. Chilcot, Esq.

SECRET

SECRET



4

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Official History of Intelligence
in World War II

Thank you for your minute A01300 of
31 January 1980.

The Prime Minister readily agrees that the Home Secretary should be present at the meeting to discuss the possible publication of the official history of counter intelligence, and I have accordingly written to Mr. Chilcot (copy attached) sending him, as you suggested, copies of your minute of 28 January and of my minute of 30 January.

C. A. WHITMORE

1 February 1980

SECRET

SECRET

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Ref. A01300

MR. WHITMORE

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

Thank you for your minute of 30th January.

2. I note that the Prime Minister would like to discuss this matter further with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

3. The volume in question - an official history of counter-intelligence in World War II - is basically the wartime history of the Security Service. That is the responsibility of the Home Secretary, and I think that, if it is to be discussed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, it should also be discussed with the Home Secretary.

4. I hope that you will be prepared to send copies of the two minutes to Mr. Chilcot - or to authorise me to do so.

RA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

31st January, 1980



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

The Prime Minister has considered your minute AO1127 of 28 January 1980 about the proposal to prepare, with a view to its publication, an official history of counter-intelligence in World War II.

The Prime Minister has reservations about the proposal. She is inclined to agree with 'C', especially after recent events. She is concerned that the publication of an official history will stimulate enquiries and make his work more difficult.

But before reaching a final view the Prime Minister would like to discuss the matter with the Foreign Secretary, and I am therefore sending a copy of this minute and of your minute of 28 January to Mr. Walden.

JWW.

30 January 1980

SECRET.

DBA

PRIME MINISTER

SECRET

Official History of Intelligence in World War II

The original plan for this History was that it would be written in three parts. The first, dealing with Strategic and Operational Intelligence (i.e. Intelligence required by the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and Commanders in the field), will comprise three volumes: approval for publication of these was given by your predecessor after consultation with you and the Leader of the Liberal Party. This part of the work has been in the hands of Professor F.H. Hinsley and a team of research assistants. The first volume, published earlier in the year, has been well received and has been acknowledged as a considerable contribution to the main-line history of the war. It is a work of sound scholarship which provides a valuable antidote to the sensationalism and special pleading of previous unofficial accounts. It is hoped to publish Professor Hinsley's second volume in 1980 and the final volume in 1981.

2. Meanwhile, the second and third parts of the original plan are nearing completion. They deal with the separate but closely related subjects of Counter-Intelligence and Strategic Deception. The volume on Deception is being written by Professor Michael Howard. There should be no great problem about whether it is suitable for publication, since its source material and documentation are already largely in the public arena. I shall, however, be making a separate submission to you on this volume when it has been completed.

3. I am now seeking your agreement in principle to the publication of the volume which will complete the whole: the part covering counter-intelligence. We have a text of 600 pages, prepared by Mr. Anthony Simkins, a former Deputy Director General of the Security Service. It is thorough and well-researched, but it needs to be edited and rewritten if it is to be published. It would not be worth doing that unless you were content for the work to go ahead with a view to its publication in due course.

I agree with C - especially the next events.

Prime Minister

Agree in principle to the publication in due course of the history of counter-intelligence in World War II?

It will stimulate his work and will make more difficult.

If so, are you content with Sir Robert Armstrong's views on the Cokayne House which is planned?

K.H. 29.



SECRET

4. The counter-intelligence history deals in considerable detail with the work of the two Secret Services during the war. Our main intelligence work against Germany developed after a slow start into a resounding success story at the end. To tell that story now would provide a valuable boost to the morale of present day intelligence staffs. That would fit in well with your declared purpose of doing everything possible to improve the morale and effectiveness of the Security Service and like organisations.

5. The absence of a volume on counter-intelligence would leave an obvious gap in the overall picture of intelligence activities in the Second World War. There would, I am sure, be considerable pressure to close this gap, as indicated by the correspondence which you recently had with Mr. Michael Latham, MP.

6. The existing text has been thoroughly scrutinised by representatives of the Secret Services. In the light of their reports and recommendations, the two Heads of Service have expressed themselves satisfied that their current security would not be threatened by publication in the form proposed by their representatives. The Director General of the Security Service (DGSS) has consistently favoured publication. 'C' is somewhat less enthusiastic for fear that the publication might encourage more unofficial intrusions into his field. The DGSS believes, and I agree, that the present text needs considerable revision if the material is to be more easily understood by a general readership. He would like to see the work entrusted to a professional historical writer with experience in this field, whose association with the work as second author would extend its authority and remove suspicions of Departmental bias. We agree with this view and have a candidate in mind.

7. My recommendation is to go ahead with a revised version. There is a good story to tell of wartime events, now more than thirty years old. The relevant source material is not, and is not likely to be made, available in the Public Record Office, and this in itself is a justification for the writing of an official history. We believe that, far from harming the present day security and intelligence services, publication would be positively helpful. If you agree,



SECRET

there would be a final opportunity to decide on publication when the revised text was complete; but it would not be worth spending the money on the editing and revision unless you were in principle prepared to approve publication.

8. I believe that, when Mr. Callaghan consulted you in the summer of 1978, you were not enthusiastic about the whole project for an Official History of Intelligence: you felt that it would have been better not written, and would only encourage interest in a subject better not discussed. I understand that feeling. I can only say, to balance it, that there remains a strong feeling, among the survivors of those who were involved, that their contribution to winning the war should be chronicled and recognised, as well as the contributions of the fighting services and the civilian public services, and that at this distance of time it can be done without detriment to current effectiveness or security. I hope you will be prepared to agree that, since the project has been embarked upon, it should in principle be carried through to completion.

9. I do not think that it is necessary to consult Mr. Callaghan or Mr. Steel if you agree that we should proceed as I propose: it is covered by Mr. Callaghan's own decision as Prime Minister, and Mr. Steel's agreement at that time. But I should like, as a matter of courtesy, to tell Mr. Callaghan what is proposed.

REA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28th January, 1980

Grey Scale #13



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