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

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Henry Kissinger's visit to the UK.

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KW / to
a/F Kissinger
bc. PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary 10 April 1991

Dear Richard,

CALL BY DR KISSINGER

Christopher Prentice wrote on 5 April enclosing a brief for the call that Dr Kissinger paid this afternoon. Thank you in particular for the useful summary of Dr Kissinger's views.

Because the Prime Minister's timetable had gone awry the Foreign Secretary and Dr Kissinger coincided and the Foreign Secretary was present for the call. The main points of interest were:

Iraq

Dr Kissinger thought that if Saddam Hussein survived, in a couple of years the Arabs would start to do business with him again, treating him as a man who had had the right basic position but had exercised bad tactics.

As far as the US were concerned the President's public problems came less from concern for the plight of the Kurds than dismay that Saddam Hussein was still free to exercise a reign of terror.

The President had nonetheless been right not to go all the way to Baghdad. If for example a Shi'ite Government had been put in power in Baghdad, the President would have come under severe criticism.

GATT: Fast Track Approach

Dr Kissinger said that there was a nationalist, protectionist and isolationist trend in the US, especially among the Democrats. The President would not get the necessary votes for approval of the fast track if a vote were held at present. Dr Kissinger was trying to organise a lobby for the fast track by former Secretaries of State. Cy Vance would almost certainly join which would be a great help.

United States/Europe

Dr Kissinger said that he had picked up a feeling in Europe that other member states were distinctly uncomfortable now that they could no longer count on

/ Mrs

Mrs Thatcher to do their work for them. They now had to express their own reservations for themselves.

Dr Kissinger asked how we could maintain close trans-atlantic relations in a more integrated Europe. There was a real danger from the French approach of forming an agreed European line and then presenting it to the Americans on a take it or leave it basis.

The Prime Minister set out the rationale for a continued US presence in Europe. Sir Percy Cradock added that even if the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russia would still be militarily the most powerful state in Europe, armed with nuclear weapons and with traditional Russian designs on some of her neighbours. That itself would represent a continued and fairly potent threat. Dr Kissinger agreed. The President and Scowcroft needed no reminding of these arguments. But other opinion-formers did, and it would be useful if these points could be deployed in bodies like the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Dr. Kissinger thought that one important reason for the UK to play a role in Europe was that the German problem would be insoluble if she were the only big power. The dominant French role vis-a-vis Germany would not last because Germany no longer needed the respectability which the relationship with France had given her.

Soviet Union

Dr Kissinger did not see how President Gorbachev could permit elections for President in Russia on 12 June without himself being castrated. He thought the Soviet Union would tilt towards repression over the next few months unless it proved, as might be the case, that Gorbachev had more democratic instincts than Yeltsin and jibbed at the use of force in Moscow and Leningrad. Violence in the Soviet Union could cause enormous problems for the US though the President would probably try to salvage the US/Soviet foreign policy achievements of the last few years. Dr. Kissinger could not bring himself to believe that the Soviet authorities would let three hundred years of empire go down the drain.

Italy

Dr. Kissinger had found President Cossiga less emotional and more determined than in the recent past. Cossiga was pressing for institutional reform including the direct election of the President. He was hoping to thwart Andreotti's ambitions to become President. But Kissinger thought Andreotti was still too clever a fox for his opponents to corner. On his recent visit to Rome, he had found Andreotti very relaxed. Andreotti had claimed to have no plan for dealing with the present crisis: "people with plans exhaust themselves".

The Prime Minister concluded the meeting by hoping that Dr. Kissinger would call on him again and perhaps come to lunch or dinner.

Yours,

J.S. WALL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File
F/Bohemia

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 April 1991

Dear Richard,

DR. KISSINGER AND THE BOHEMIAN GROVE

At the end of his meeting with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, Dr. Kissinger pressed the Foreign Secretary to be his guest at the Bohemian Grove in 1992. The Foreign Secretary was suitably enthusiastic.

Yours,

Stephen

J.S. WALL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

See also the FCO note attached, which includes a useful summary of Kissinger's recent views.

Stephen

9/4

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PRIME MINISTER 9 APRIL 1991

CALL BY DR KISSINGER - 10 APRIL

1 Dr Kissinger has no particular message to bring: he will simply want to establish contact with you so that he continues to have all world leaders on his visiting list. His call gives you an opportunity for a strategic overview.

2 You will naturally wish to discuss the Gulf situation with him. As the arch-exponent of realpolitik, he should not have much to quarrel with in our conduct of the war (though he favoured a strike against Iraq in the very early days of last autumn). He will not want a dismembered Iraq and seeks a balance of power between Iran, Iraq and Syria. His views on current encroachments into the sovereignty principle (Article 2(7)), eg Security Council Resolution 688 and now the idea of an enclave for the Kurds, should be interesting.

3 It will be useful to have his views on some of the main consequential issues of the war: conventional and non-conventional arms supplies, proliferation, and above all Arab/Israel.

4 You might ask him how he sees future East/West relations in the light of the threatened disintegration of the Soviet Union. How should we handle Gorbachev? And the individual republics? Should we concentrate our efforts and our aid in Central Europe, in particular Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland? A messy situation in the Soviet Union with patches of autocracy and lots of nuclear weapons requires continuing effective Western defence, but the political/economic environment is not too propitious. What is his formula for maintaining NATO's health?

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5 He may be most interesting on American power. He apparently sees the Gulf war as a one-off operation and rightly notes the disjuncture between US political and military dominance and relative economic weakness. It is also true that the war sits uneasily with Options for Change and the equivalent US plans for defence reductions. But on the other hand the Gulf war has seen the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, with greatly increased self-confidence, and if a reactivated UN is to mean anything, it will have to depend on the US as leader of its executive arm.

6 Finally you might ask him about the future global balance between the US, Japan and Europe and the prospects of preventing a relapse into protectionist blocs.

PERCY CRADOCK

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

5 April 1991

Dear Stephen,

Dr Kissinger

Thank you for your letter of 25 March, asking for briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with Dr Kissinger.

The Prime Minister last saw Dr Kissinger in January 1990, when Mr Major was Chancellor of the Exchequer. Dr Kissinger also had meetings with Mrs Thatcher, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Waldegrave and Messrs Kinnock and Kaufman. Mr Major had agreed to see Dr Kissinger on an earlier visit (September 1989, when Foreign Secretary) but the death of Dr Kissinger's mother-in-law intervened.

Dr Kissinger remains a leading opinion former in the United States and an active writer and broadcaster. He wrote a glowing testimonial to Mrs Thatcher's leadership in his Los Angeles Times column of 2 December, describing her as "the rock that breakers recoil from". I enclose his CV and a paper produced by Dr Raymond in BIS New York. This summarises the main themes of his recent writings and broadcasts on foreign policy subjects.

Dr Kissinger remains active in his Consultancy Company "Kissinger Associates" in which General Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger also worked before they joined the Bush Administration. (Dr Kissinger is said to keep in touch with both). Dr Kissinger's working relationship with President Menem of Argentina continues, although at a less intensive level than a year ago and he is still well connected in Peking. He has also cultivated useful contacts since the beginning of 1991 with the Russian Republic's Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, and may have some insights to offer on internal developments in the Soviet Union.

/So far

RESTRICTED

POAAAH

RESTRICTED

So far as we can determine, Kissinger does not have any particular axes to grind on this trip and sees it principally as an opportunity to "touch base with No 10".

Yours ever,

Christopher Prentice

(C N R Prentice)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG LVO
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

POAAAH

DR HENRY KISSINGER

Born Germany 1923. Arrived in US 1938 as Jewish refugee. Educated at Harvard University. Assistant to the President for National Security 1969 - 75. US Secretary of State 1973 - 77. Consultant. Opinion column writer for major US newspapers. Awarded Nobel peace Prize 1973.

DR KISSINGER'S VIEWS

General Strategy/The New World Order

Kissinger disagrees with the Administration's concept of a New World Order because it cannot fulfil the President's idealistic expectations. America's most difficult challenge is to define international order. The US does not have the resources to dominate the world; so it must return to the concept of a balance of power. A foreign policy based on this concept would recognise few permanent enemies and few permanent friends. Rather it would seek to balance rivalries - in the Gulf, between Iran, Iraq and Syria; and in North-east Asia, between China, Japan and the Soviet Union. In short, US policy must be selective, husband its resources carefully, and distinguish between the levels of threat which require US military force and those which do not.

Kissinger believes that the US should never again have to assume a disproportionate share of the risk as it did in the Gulf, and that the US military should be employed only for causes for which the US is prepared to pay itself. Kissinger has repeatedly warned that American pre-eminence cannot last. The US economy cannot sustain a policy of global interventionism, nor will the US military be able to execute it following the Defence Secretary Cheney's cuts. Therefore, America's allies should not treat the concept of the New World Order as an institutionalisation of recent practices.

The Gulf War And Its Aftermath

Throughout the Gulf Crisis Kissinger was generally supportive of Administration policy, although he disagreed with the President's decision to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad and saw no point in the latter's subsequent meeting with Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Today, Kissinger supports Bush's limited war aims, favours a prompt US military withdrawal from southern Iraq, and would like to see a balance of power restored in the area. Kissinger has stated bluntly on several occasions recently that the US "has no interest in the break-up of Iraq as a State". He has warned the Administration to avoid the mistake of the Iran/Iraq war, in which the West allowed Iran to be weakened to the point that Iraq became the dominant power in the region.

In a recent interview Kissinger argued that American interests were served by Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the destruction of its offensive military capability. But he would not pursue the war beyond that point. Interestingly, he remarked that the US should "enable" Iraq

to retain a defensive capability "lest Syria and Iran replay the Iraqi's script at the end of the Iran/Iraq war".

Soviet Union/US Soviet Relations

Kissinger has never been a "Gorbophile" and has been consistently critical of the degree to which the Bush Administration has identified US interests too closely with Gorbachev's fate. Instead, Kissinger has argued that US policy should be based "on a cold analysis of the national interest" and the requirements of international order. He was not surprised by the recent turn towards autocracy in the Soviet Union and has warned that the USSR is rapidly heading towards repression and chaos; not only between the Kremlin and the Constituent Republics but between the various nationality groups, especially in the Caucasus. He believes that an unstable autocracy will emerge with over 30,000 nuclear weapons.

Kissinger's prescriptions for the US and the West are to:

- base policy "on balancing fundamental interests", rather than on personalities;
- develop "a definition of co-existence and an agenda for its achievement, even as we disapprove of some Soviet domestic actions";
- identify those areas where common action can promote a structure of peace (eg technical assistance and economic aid);
- stick firmly to the principle of self-determination for the Baltics;
- ensure that ominous developments in the Soviet Union are met by a strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and the rapid economic and political integration of Eastern Europe, particularly Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia into the EC.

c/Foreign/Kissinger

MEM

bcc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

25 March 1991

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

Dr. Kissinger is calling on the Prime Minister on Wednesday, 10 April. Could you kindly let me have a briefing for the meeting by Monday, 8 April. We do not need much but it would be useful to have an indication of any particular ideas which Dr Kissinger is pushing and copies of any recent press articles.

STEPHEN WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sender
to expire
CA

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

Yes

DR KISSINGER

Henry Kissinger has asked to see you on 10 April when he is in London. He is always good value and you would probably find thirty minutes well spent. We could squeeze it in. Agree to see him?

CDP

CHARLES POWELL
15 March 1991
(kw)

Charles
In the diary for 1600-1700 on 10 April. Are you in touch with his office, or should I confirm through US Embassy?
S 18/3

File : Mem.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 December 1990

DR. KISSINGER

I have seen Washington telno 2986 about Henry Kissinger's visit on 17 December. I am afraid there is no chance of the Prime Minister seeing him that day.

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

177377
MDLIAN 3521

UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 2986
OF 080047Z DECEMBER 90

No

Prime Minister

This would be difficult in diary terms unless you are very keen to see him. CDP 10/XII

HENRY KISSINGER: 17 DECEMBER

1. WHEN I SAW HENRY KISSINGER ON 7 DECEMBER, HE MENTIONED THAT HE WAS PLANNING TO BE IN LONDON ON MONDAY 17 DECEMBER. SO FAR AS HE KNEW, HE HAD NO COMMITMENTS THAT AFTERNOON. HE KNEW HOW BUSY MINISTERS WERE, AND HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR AN INTERVIEW. BUT IF YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER WERE AVAILABLE AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM, THEN HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO COME FOR A TALK.
2. I WARNED HIM THAT YOU MIGHT BE TIED UP AT THE NAC. BUT I UNDERTOOK TO PASS HIS MESSAGE TO YOU AND TO GET BACK TO HIM WITH A REPLY.

ACLAND

YYYY

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NNNN

HENRY A. KISSINGER

(2)

January 31, 1990

14/2

Dear Mme. Prime Minister:

I want to thank you again for your great kindness in making time available to see me during my visit to London earlier this month. I have, as you know, always admired your courageous leadership, which is especially needed in these days of unprecedented change. The opportunity to talk with you at this time, therefore, meant a great deal to me.

With appreciation and all good wishes,

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

The Right Honourable
Margaret Thatcher
The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

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bc: PC
CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

SUBJECT cc MASTER

10 January 1990

Dear Stephen,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH DR KISSINGER

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with Dr Kissinger. Much of it covered the same ground as his earlier session with the Foreign Secretary.

The main subject was German reunification. Dr Kissinger thought this inevitable although not desirable. The best one could do was to try to establish a process for achieving it, under which a number of conditions had to be satisfied, eg in relation to a new security system for Europe, so that it took a considerable time.

The Prime Minister said that one should not regard anything in international relations as inevitable. Her starting point was to establish what would serve British interests and then try to make it happen. We could not escape the fact that, over the years, we had frequently endorsed the aim of self-determination in freedom for Germany, even though no process by which this might be achieved had ever been defined. But she was very sceptical whether German reunification was in the interests of Europe. It would create an over-mighty Germany. It would put at risk the institutions through which Europe's and the West's security had been guaranteed for the last forty years. It could fatally undermine the position of Mr Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Her approach was, therefore, to say that the priority must be to establish democracy, freedom and the rule of law throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These were bigger goals than German reunification. If they were achieved - and even in the most favourable circumstances that would take a long time - then the whole shape of Europe would be very different and German reunification might take on a different aspect. She agreed with Dr Kissinger that we needed to think through the implications, above all for NATO. She did not believe that the idea of a unified Germany inside NATO made any sense.

Dr Kissinger agreed that this was perhaps the most difficult aspect. In his view, the Germans would soon be asking for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Germany. But on the wider issue, he continued to think that the best way of slowing down German reunification was to accept the aim and then subject it to a number of clear conditions. Under the Prime Minister's

approach, there was a risk that it might just happen anyway. He thought the policy of the present United States Administration was inadequate. President Bush's four points were not specific and, in practice, meaningless. The West needed a clear operational concept within which to handle reunification and there was no sign that anyone was working on this. Personally, he traced the origin of the problems with Germany with which we were now confronted back to the Reagan Administration's decision to go for elimination of INF. This had split the Right Wing in Germany from top to bottom and had rekindled nationalism.

Dr Kissinger rose with alacrity to the Prime Minister's invitation to give his views on Japan. The Japanese were increasingly self-assertive and doing now what the Germans had done in the 1920s and 1930s: that is, create a core for future rapid expansion. The Japanese knew how to be superior or subordinate but not how to be equal. They regarded the United States' economic performance pityingly, rather in the same way as the West regarded the Soviet Union. They were clearly intent on building up their military strength and were developing a considerable space programme. He believed that Japan would be one of the United States' biggest security problems by the turn of the century. That was one reason why he thought it essential for the United States to repair its relations with China. China was one of the very few countries which Japan took seriously, and they must not come to believe there was a fundamental breach between China and the United States.

The Prime Minister regards her conversations with Dr Kissinger as very much a personal matter. <u>This letter should be given very limited distribution only</u>.

Yours ever,

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH HENRY KISSINGER

You are to have a private talk with Henry Kissinger tomorrow. He is seeing several Ministers, as well as the Leader of the Opposition. He is coming back to the UK on 8 February to address the Oxford Union.

Henry has not really been very helpful recently (see below). But he exerts considerable influence on some of the key fgures in the Bush Administration, notably Scowcroft and Eagleburger who used to work for him. He is credited with being behind the policy of re-establishing contacts with China.

His views on current issues were set out in his Newsweek article which you read at the time (copy in folder). The main points are:

- he is pessimistic about Gorbachev's chances of survival and worried abut the sort of regime likely to succeed him. This makes him helpful on the need to preserve NATO and keep US forces and nuclear weapons in Europe. But he is sceptical whether in practice flexible response can be maintained: sees no prospect of LANCE modernisation: and expects the US to press ahead with defence cuts;

- he sees German reunification as inevitable and thinks we may see the first steps this year. He suggests that we try to steer the Germans towards a loose confederation rather than full reunification, but is sceptical whether we can succeed. He reckons that the Soviet Union will feel safer with a united Germany inside NATO than neutral and on the loose (but does not explain how that is compatible with the existing structure of NATO, and the presence of British and American troops in Germany);

- he has got quite the wrong end of the stick on the EC, accusing us of dragging our feet on 1992 and arguing

that Britain should be a more whole-hearted participant in moves towards European unity as a counter-weight to Germany. You will need to re-educate him about the differences between our concept of Europe and that of the federalists, and the implications for the US of the latter's views;

- he is much preoccupied with Japan and its political and military ambitions. He believes that both the Soviet Union and China could be driven closer to the West by growing fear of Japan.

One or two further points on which you might sound him out are:

- does he believe the present US Administration will remain rock solid in letting us have Trident? All the indications we have are that they will;

- what does he think would be the correct defence policy for Britain if there is rapid progress towards German reunification? Does it still make sense for us to keep a large standing army in Germany? Or should we revert to our traditional pre-1914 role?

- with his extensive contacts with China (and commercial interests there), how does he expect the politics of China to develop? Does he believe it can remain immune to the changes sweeping over Communism elsewhere? How does he think we should handle the issue of more directly-elected seats for Hong Kong? (But remember that anything you say on this is likely to be reported back to the Chinese leaders.)

C D P

C. D. POWELL
9 January 1990
c:\wpdocs\foreign\kiss
(slh)

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL London SW1A 2AH

9 January 1990

Prime Minister

CDP

9/1

Dear Charles,

Dr Kissinger

Dr Kissinger called on the Foreign Secretary this evening. You may like to have a note of the main points before he calls on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

Eastern Europe

Dr Kissinger thought the glorious part of Eastern Europe was now behind us. Very few revolutions ended the way they had started. It would be hard to run fair elections in many of those countries. Romania looked like an anti-Ceausescu coup from within the Communist Party. He had recently talked to Charlie Schulz. Schulz said he had written lots of papers about the operation of a free market economy. But no-one had written a paper about how to move from a command economy to a free market economy. It was largely uncharted territory, though, in Dr Kissinger's view, the Chinese had come closer to achieving it than anybody. You needed strong government to implement austerity measures. If the transformation could be achieved at all, it required a large dose of cold turkey treatment. Dr Kissinger thought that Czechoslovakia and Hungary had a good chance of successfully achieving democracy. He hoped that Poland would too but he was not sure.

East/West relations

Dr Kissinger said that for years East/West relations had effectively been in the hands of the arms controllers. They were now largely irrelevant. Arms control negotiations could now be conducted at the level of Colonel. Conventional arms negotiators wanted to draw a dividing line down the middle of Europe and work out the balance of forces on either side. He had been saying to the Russians that the conventional arms process was likely to allow them more troops than they could actually muster, if left to their own devices. His interlocutors had not demurred. The real question for the US was how to make the Soviet Union feel secure within its 1941 borders and with neighbours who no longer wanted to be part of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union would be better off surrounded by ex-satellites in the mould of Finland and Austria rather than by trying to maintain two military blocs.

German reunification

Dr Kissinger thought that for most purposes there would be a unitary German state, but there needed to be a confederation for military purposes with a demilitarised East Germany. The reason Dr Kissinger argued for a unitary German state for all but the military aspects was the need to avoid two foreign policies. It had to be remembered that as many wars had been started by Germany weak as by Germany strong.

[Simply not true]

Dr Kissinger said that, if he was a Russian, he would rather have the FRG in NATO than neutralist. Apart from the Soviet Union, it was the Western European countries who had the greatest interest in avoiding massive German rearmament. And NATO remained the best inspection system we had. But if the Soviet Union wanted to play a dangerous game, they might still offer the FRG the prospect of reunification in exchange for neutrality.

US Presence in Europe

Dr Kissinger said there would be great pressure to bring back US troops from Europe. When President Nixon had started to pull American troops out of Vietnam, Kissinger said to him that it was like eating salted peanuts: once you started, you could not stop. The pressure for US troop withdrawals would move faster than the negotiating process could accommodate.

China

Dr Kissinger said that he had been to China in November. Deng Xiaoping was a tragic figure. He knew that his position in history depended on his reputation for reform. He had told Kissinger that he still believed in reform. But he did not believe in democracy for China. Deng would resume economic reform if he could. In Dr Kissinger's view, if economic reform could continue, with the attendant prosperity of the coastal states, then the prospects for eventual political reform would be better. In the meantime, sanctions against China had helped the Li Peng group.

Dr Kissinger said he had been in Peking in the week of the Party Plenum and that Li Peng had given a banquet in his honour on the day that composition of the Military Commission had been decided. Li Peng had questioned Dr Kissinger closely about his reaction to the decision - never giving his own view, which was a sure sign he was not happy with the outcome. The President, on the other hand, had made a point of telling Dr Kissinger what had been decided. Dr Kissinger said that Li Peng reminded him of the kind of person you met in the Soviet Union in the Brezhnev era. He was not a man of superior intelligence, unlike most Chinese leaders in the

recent past.

China's worries about Japan and the Soviet Union led them to want good relations with the United States, but the domestic situation in the US made that very difficult. Dr Kissinger thought that the Congress would impose further sanctions and that China would retaliate. What was of interest to China was the strategic relationship with the United States. They felt they could afford to make economic sacrifices. The issue was a hot one domestically in the US, partly because Bush's opponents had no other lever against him. The China issue would not harm him in the short-term but, come the next Presidential elections, the very people who were now pressuring him to be tough on China would accuse him of screwing up. To an essentially isolationist people like the Americans, isolating China was a very attractive proposition. Dr Kissinger had not known about the first Scowcroft visit to China. The second visit had been a tactical mistake. The US should have got what it wanted from the Chinese before sending anyone and should then not have sent someone as close to the President as Scowcroft.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 January 1990

Dear Charles,

Dr Kissinger

Dr Kissinger will pay a 30-minute call on the Prime Minister at 1000 hrs on 10 January.

When Christopher Mallaby lunched with him in Bonn on 4 December, Kissinger said he saw the loss of any part of Soviet territory as being fatal to Gorbachev, but that Eastern Europe was now in a different category. He put Gorbachev's chances of survival at less than 50-50. Massive food aid would not greatly help, since the miserable distribution system in the Soviet Union could not cope with it. There was a possibility of an expansionist or at least unreliable Soviet regime in the future. So we would continue to need a Western security system, whether or not there was German reunification. The pace of change in Eastern Europe was breathtaking. Reunification - or a decision on self-determination for it - seemed possible in 1990. Kissinger chided the Ambassador about the British attitude to European unity, with Christopher Mallaby making the salient points in response. Kissinger also talked a lot and with concern about Japan. He was sure that Japan had political ambitions commensurate with her economic strength. She was building up her military strength in preparation for this. She wanted to be a world power. If the West played its cards right, not only the Soviet Union but also China would be driven towards us by fear of Japan. I attach a fuller note on his views obtained from a confidential source in New York.

Kissinger is visiting London primarily on "Kissinger Associates" business. His programme (so far as we know it) is attached. He plans an early return to Europe and has accpeted an invitation to address the Oxford Union on 8 February. His last major overseas trip was to the Far East in November.

Yours Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

DR KISSINGER'S VIEWS

1. The following information has been given to us in confidence by contacts in New York.

Current Activities

2. Since September Kissinger has been actively writing and broadcasting on the need for a new comprehensive Western strategy towards the Soviet Union and Europe; the future of NATO and European security; the German question, the evolution of the European Community and China.

3. Kissinger's working relationship with the Argentinian government continues. It is believed that, with the arrival of Menem, his links have grown stronger.

4. We should not under-estimate Kissinger's considerable influence on Scowcroft and Eagleburger, particularly on China.

Western Strategy

5. Kissinger has argued that the West needs to define a new strategy based on three concepts:

(a) an adequate defence in an era of declining defence budgets in the US and Europe, and increasing opposition to US nuclear deployment in Central Europe;

(b) a new arms control concept that reduces the potential for superpower military confrontation in Central Europe and promotes greater freedom for the people of the East;

(c) a political concept that devises new obstacles to Soviet pressures on Western Europe and Soviet domination of Eastern Europe to replace the military structures now being eroded.

6. In brief, Kissinger's new design aims to ensure the end of Soviet political domination of Eastern Europe; of the threat of Soviet domination of Western Europe; and to reduce military tensions in Central Europe.

7. In his recent writings and broadcasts, he has argued that the West must avoid "recklessness" but that caution can only preserve an unstable status quo. He has consistently criticised the Bush Administration's propensity for pursuing short-term political advantage and resorting to ad hoc solutions. He has also been critical of what he sees as the unwillingness of senior members of the National Security team to challenge each other intellectually and of Baker's failure to build a better working relationship with the career foreign service.

NATO/European Security

8. The main theme of Kissinger's writings on this subject is that a reassessment of NATO's purpose is in order; the Alliance will have to be fundamentally altered to take into account the unification of Germany and the perceived erosion of the Soviet threat. NATO, he suggests, must face facts: Lance modernisation is dead; the progressive reduction of conventional forces on the central front is irreversible; cuts in US force deployments are "highly probable"; flexible response cannot be sustained under current conditions.

9. In the medium term, NATO must be preserved; the drawdown of US and Soviet forces must be accompanied by a halt to European defence spending cuts. The US must avoid precipitate defence cuts and must retain some nuclear presence in Europe. In the short term, he advocates the implementation of Bush's May proposals; a cut in US and Soviet forces to equal ceilings of 275,000; accompanied by a total Soviet withdrawal from at least one Eastern European country; establish four security zones from the Atlantic to Moscow with roughly equal NATO and Warsaw Pact forces; and work towards a loose confederal Germany.

Germany

10. German reunification is inevitable; changes in East Germany have set in motion political and economic foces that are irreversible. De facto reunification will occur in four years or less. Free elections will undermine the GDR. The four powers should be under no illusions that they will have much impact on the future of Germany.

11. Kissinger has repeatedly expressed concern about West Germany's behaviour. In a Newsweek interview (16 November), he denounced the idea of a "German special vocation in Eastern Europe" as "absurd". He is particularly concerned about the political consequences of German commercial ambitions in Eastern Europe. "What happens when the Soviets wake up and find that they have lost Eastern Europe economically to the Germans"?

EC

12. EC integration will have to be accelerated to anchor Germany in the West and respond constructively to developments in the East. Britain must be a much more wholehearted participant because its political experience is vital in establishing the appropriate balance within the Community, thereby avoiding an EC dominated by Germany. The EC, Kissinger argues, should have an institutional voice in NATO and the US and the EC should have a full consultative mechanism.

China

13. Although he has publicly declared that he would not have advised Bush to send Scowcroft and Eagleburger to China, and has denied that he recommended it, a Washington Times report suggests that Kissinger did meet Bush before the mission departed. In numerous television broadcasts, Kissinger has defended the Scowcroft visit, arguing that in time it will bring about improvements in human rights in China, and that it underscored the importance the US attached to relations with China. Commentators have argued that Bush's decision to reestablish relations with China shows the influence of Kissinger in style, strategy and objectives and reflects the policy that Kissinger has been urging the Administration to adopt since Tiananmen Square. This in turn has sparked further public controversy over Kissinger's "excessive" influence on the Bush Administration and whether his commercial interests in China colour his policy views.

10 30 on
Wed 10
Jan.

AMANDA PONSONBY

Dr Kissinger will be in London on 9/10 January and wonders whether he could see the Prime Minister. I am sure she would like to see him if it can be fitted in.

C D P

CHARLES POWELL
1 December 1989

Kissinger's Office confirmed this suited him.
5/12

(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Henry Kissinger has sent me this article, which is to be published tomorrow. I for it is not in general very helpful — although it has some interesting parts.

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Living With the Inevitable

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BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

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"Policy," the 19th Century Austrian Foreign Minister, Metternich, once wrote, "is like a play in many

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acts which unfolds inexorably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not go on is an absurdity. The play will be completed either by the actors or by the spectators who mount the stage.''+

[9]

In recent weeks, the curtain has risen on a new play in Europe. Many of the players are still hesitant, waiting to see what roles others assume first. Still, in the end, only one choice will remain: to complete the play or to be consumed by it.+

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Although the weight of the past—and uneasiness about the reemergence of a unified Germany—may keep some from acknowledging it, we are witnessing the end of the immediate postwar era. The political world familiar for over a generation is disintegrating before our eyes.+

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The new realities are:+

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German unification in some form has become inevitable,

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whatever the misgivings of Germany's neighbors and World War II victims. The only statesman who seems to understand this fully is President Mitterrand of France—despite France's visceral fears of German unification.+

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■ Integration of the European Community will have to be accelerated to take account of new opportunities in Eastern Europe, hkmost recently in Czechoslovakiahk.+

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■ These trends will require a new look at East-West relations, including (and perhaps especially) arms control negotiations.+

[3]

The observer's perplexity is the statesman's challenge. President Bush has an opportunity unequaled since the period im-

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mediately following World War II. Rarely have so many elements of international relations been so fluid simultaneously. The occasion to build a more stable and more hopeful international order occurs no more than once in a century.+

[10]

□Though it will take many months and perhaps years to complete, that process must now begin at the Malta summit between President Bush and Secretary Gorbachev. What had been conceived-at least on the American side-as a relaxed, philosophical stocktaking has turned into an urgent opportunity to begin shaping a revolutionary situation. To be sure, President Bush will not fall into the Reykjavik trap of negotiating a surprise Soviet agenda. But this does not change the fact that the Malta summit will take place with an agenda and under conditions of international upheaval not foreseen when it was planned.+

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□Let me discuss the key issues in turn:+

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German Unification [1]

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In recent weeks German unification, for so long the subject of ambivalent rhetoric, has become a real possibility. Now that it is disintegrating, a sudden nostalgia has developed for the status quo. Atlanticists insist that the alliance can continue unchanged and that German unification remains the responsibility of World War II's victors. Believers in detente warn against promoting German unification for fear of disquieting the Soviet Union.

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To be sure, the West has no reason to get ahead of German desires on reunification. Perhaps forty years of Communist rule have produced the ironic result of stimulating East German nationalism. But if this is not the case, it would be extremely dangerous for the Western democracies-what-

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ever their secret yearnings or their theoretical legal rights to try to keep Germany divided against the wishes of the German people. For sooner or later, such a stand would ignite a new German nationalism. And that would only serve to undermine the responsible, essentially pro-Western leaders in all of West Germany's pamajorhk political parties.+

[19]

Until recently, German unity, in so far as it had any operational meaning, was equated with the unification of Europe. Extending some of the benefits of the European Community to Eastern Europe was expected to help repair Europe's various fault lines. Though that program remains essential, recent events leave no doubt that the unification of Europe has a different rhythm than the unification of Germany. For in Germany, the moving force is not a pragmatic concept of integration but elemental pressures for popular

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participation in government.+

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When the new East German leader, Egon Krenz, was appointed deletion,paa month ago, he announced that the so-called German Democratic Republic had to be a Communist state or it was nothing. He was right. There is no historic basis for the East German state except as a Communist outpost. If it becomes democratic, it loses the rationale for its separate existence.+

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But democracy is exactly what the rebellious East German population is so passionately demanding, and what its government has promised. The impact of free elections would be quite different, however, in the German Democratic Republic than it has been elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In hkPoland, Hungary or Czechoslovakiahk, free elections arguably strengthen the state; in the paGDRpa they are likely to undermine it. Genuinely free elections would in all likelihood bring to power parties similar to those of the Federal Republic. The winners would almost certainly seek to synchronize West and East German policies and move the country toward unity.+

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□Political tendencies will be reinforced by economic realities. Now that the border between the two Germanies has for all practical purposes been opened, it will be necessary to match economic conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise there will be an exodus, especially of younger and more ambitious groups, that will drain the East German economy. Such improvement will require massive help from the Federal Republic. That is unlikely—and indeed senseless—if the Communist party insists on maintaining its dominance over East German political life. (Of course, the Soviet Union has the physical power to stop all this. But it hkcouldhk do so only at the cost of heavy civilian casualties and the collapse of Gorbachev's mystique in the West.)+

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□What form will the new Germany ultimately take? It is conceivable that the two Germanies may form some sort of confederation, with separate democratic governments linked by some common institutions. There is a historical precedent: 19th century Germa-

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ny was organized as a Confederation of separate states linked by a Customs Union—though it proved the precursor of a national state. A confederation may make it easier to satisfy Soviet security concerns by maintaining East Germany as a special security zone with limited armaments.+

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□In the end, the outcome will be shaped by the wishes of the German people, not by outside forces. Outsiders can impose a solution only if they are prepared to use force—and to defy a people whose desire for freedom was strong enough to puncture the Berlin Wall after 28 years of repression.+

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□The synchronization of political and economic policies will inevitably raise the issue of the German Democratic Republic's military role. Even in a confederation, its membership in the Warsaw Pact would become questionable. It is hard to imagine how a German confederation whose Eastern portion was dominated by more or less

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the same political parties as the Western portion could be allied to both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And it is inconceivable in the event of a federal state.+

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□How can Moscow be persuaded to allow East Germany to leave the Warsaw Pact? On one level, the Soviet Union has no choice. For after free elections, membership of the German Democratic Republic in the Warsaw Pact will become untenable. Certainly, the Soviet Union is entitled to guarantees against its nightmare of military aggression from the West. Some sort of special military status for East Germany is desirable, and the presence of some Soviet forces for an agreed period is conceivable. The United States and its allies should be prepared to deal with these subjects generously. But in the end, Soviet security concerns will have to be met by new arms control arrangements or by a European peace treaty rather than by East German membership in the Warsaw Pact.+

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□If the German Democratic Republic cannot remain in the Warsaw Pact indefinitely, what about West German membership

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in NATO? The Soviet spokesman, Gerasimov, has asserted that unification is impossible so long as the two Germanies are each part of opposing military blocs. Does this mean that Gorbachev has decided to play ``the German card?'' Will the Kremlin offer unification in return for German military neutrality? Indeed, in his speech to the East German parliament in October, Gorbachev referred favorably to a proposal along those lines made by Stalin in 1953.+

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It is to be hoped that the Soviet leader will not be tempted by a specious symmetry between East Germany's membership in the Warsaw Pact and West Germany's alliance with NATO. If East Germany leaves the Warsaw Pact, it does not follow that the Soviet Union is any better off if the Federal Republic leaves NATO. I would argue in fact that it is worse off. No Russian leader should disregard the lessons of history: that this century's two world wars grew out of Germany's attempt to pursue a purely national policy in the center of the Continent. Seeking to preempt any possible combination of surrounding countries, Germany threatened each of its many neighbors indi-

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vidually and provoked them to form rigid military structures that contributed to war.+

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"Today, a nation of 80 million standing alone in the center of the Continent would again threaten European stability-and in the long run Soviet security as well. How would one define neutralization for a nation of such magnitude? How would one monitor it? Over time, such a Germany would be bound to become a military force. Or else the Soviet Union might be tempted to exploit a neutralization agreement by insisting on verification measures tantamount to hegemony over Germany. Either course would threaten European stability.+

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"Thus the safest outcome would be a united (or confederated) Germany that remains integrated into NATO but is constrained by new arms limitations throughout Europe. Strange as it may sound, membership in NATO would provide the best mechanism for monitoring agreed limits on armaments, because Germany's allies

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would have a selfish interest in seeing them observed. Such limits would have to prohibit NATO deployments beyond present dividing lines in Europe, and include special provisions for the territory that is now the German Democratic Republic.+

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□The problem of German unification is above all conceptual. It requires an idea of process—of how Germany might be unified, and over what period of time. Will it become a single country with federal institutions, a confederal state, or something in between? What arms limitations are needed or acceptable? What is the appropriate Eurpean and Atlantic framework in which these changes should take place?+

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□As they seek to answer these questions, it is imperative that the Federal Republic and its Western allies work together closely. But in doing so, they must keep in mind one overriding reality: the prerequisite for

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the continued adherence of the Federal Republic to the Western camp will be to concede some form of unification. The challenge is to ensure that it happens under circumstances that make every nation feel secure, including the Soviet Union.+

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NATO and Western Europe+ [1]

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□Events in East Germany will undoubtedly speed up a process of attrition that has been going on within the Atlantic Alliance for several years. Driven by arms control negotiations and ``Gorbachev fever,'' the NATO countries have all stopped any serious efforts to hkimprovehk the armaments. The Bush Administration agreed last May to postpone the modernization of medium-range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic. Now that postponement is likely to become permanent; under current conditions, there is no political party in Germany prepared to reopen the issue. A recent German visitor to Washington called the [1]

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modernization prospect ``laughable.''+ Genscher.

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□Yet the argument made against modernizing Lance missiles—that Germany must take special measures to avoid becoming a nuclear battlefield because it is so geographically exposed—logically applies to all nuclear weapons deployed on German soil. Thus the likely next phase of the NATO debate, even before the recent upheaval in East Germany, was the promotion of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe. And once the concept of a nuclear free zone is accepted, a doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons—that NATO will not fire first under any circumstances—cannot be far behind. For given the range of nuclear weapons, the only way for participants in a nuclear free zone to avoid nuclear war is by foregoing any use of nuclear weapons based outside that zone.+

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□The progressive reduction of Western conventional forces on the central front appears to be

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irreversible. West Germany already plans to reduce the length of compulsory military service, a move that will cut its armed forces from 600,000 to 420,000—proportionally a larger unilateral reduction than what the West has proposed for the Soviet Union. And the Soviets will surely insist on additional reciprocal German cuts as a part of arms control negotiations later on.

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A significant reduction of American ground forces in Europe has also become highly probable. Whether undertaken under direct or indirect pressure from Congress, the result will be a further erosion of NATO strategy. The concept of flexible response—that deterrence is only credible if it includes many stages short of all-out nuclear war—cannot be sustained under current conditions.

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Even if the Federal Republic remains in NATO, a reassessment of NATO's purpose has become imperative. Against what threat—and with what forces—should

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NATO hkbehk organized? What reductions of U.S. forces should be made, and based on what strategy? How hklargehk a U.S. presence should be left in Europe? What is to be the role of Eurpean forces? What should be the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces?+

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The answers to these questions ought to be the subject of the fullest and deepest NATO consultations since the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, a number of principles can be stated:+

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NATO should be adapted to new realities, not abandoned. The end of NATO would spell political chaos in Europe, trigger nationalist rivalries and tempt renewed Soviet expansionism.+

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The process may well lead to substantial reductions of U.S. and Soviet ground forces-perhaps their total removal if hkoverall Soviet forces are sharply reduced and withdrawn deephk into the paU.S.S.R.pa. But this prospect can be realized only if the NATO nations put an end to the irresponsible process of unilateral reductions now going on. While no country has anything to be proud

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of, the United States—as the leader of the alliance—runs the risk of setting an appalling example by prematurely suggesting dramatic defense cuts. If this process is not stopped, NATO will hand the Soviets an impotent Europe at the precise moment that the postwar generation's goals are within sight.+

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■Whatever the balance of conventional forces, some American nuclear presence and airforces must be retained on the European continent, with the exact level subject to negotiation. If the defense of Europe were again to rely exclusively on conventional weapons, peace would be at the mercy of historical hkinstabilitieshk. War after war has occurred despite the existence of conventional forces that on paper appeared more or less in balance. This is because success in conventional war depends on so many intangibles—of leadership and maneuver—that actual balances of power have proved very difficult to calculate.+

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■Reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons based on American soil or at sea is not the answer, either. It was the lack of credibility of such

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a distant deterrent that brought American nuclear forces to Europe in the first place. What was true when NATO's deterrent was hugely superior is even more crucial today, given the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the trend of strategic arms control negotiations. In short, NATO must link the nuclear defense of Europe and America, whatever happens with German unity or convential disarmament. Otherwise we are on the road to Soviet hegemony if perestroika succeeds, and to nationalist chaos if perestroika fails.+

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Conventional arms control negotiations must be redesigned. Currently, they are based on the continued existence of two military blocs. But the future of the Warsaw Pact—and especially of East German membership—is now in question. Above all, arms control proposals must get away from the pedantic ``bean counting'' approach—weapons system by weapons system—so much in vogue. It must be brought into line

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with the growing sense of independence in East Europe and the need for a special status for the territory of the German Democratic Republic.+

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■ Whatever happens, the relative weight of America within NATO is bound to diminish. A major withdrawal of U.S. forces, combined with a politically integrated Europe, will make it necessary to rethink an organization that evolved when America had a nuclear monopoly and was economically dominant. Europe must assume a growing responsibility for its own defense, with the United States playing a supporting role.+

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□ For the European Community to assume this strengthened position, it will have to come to terms with German unification. Some leading Europeans and Americans have warned that the European Community was never designed to accommodate a united Germany with a population of some 80 million. Though historically accurate, that view is irrelevant to the existing situa-

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tion. For the European Community cannot survive if the Germans see it as a device to thwart unification.+

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□There is merit to the concern that a unified Germany would have disproportionate weight within the European Community. But the other members have the capacity to prevent German hegemony. Surely Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, not to mention the smaller states, could shape a consensus that prevents domination by any one country, however powerful. Indeed, the strongest argument for Britain's wholehearted participation in the 1992 process is the need for Britain's political experience in establishing an appropriate balance within the European Community.+

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□The precise balance is for Europeans to decide. But Americans can help to close a growing gap between the European Community, where frontiers are being blurred and the United States is not represented, and NATO, where nations still speak with separate voices and the European Community has no means of ex-

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pression. This suggests a two-fold task: (1) Europe should be given some institutional voice within NATO, perhaps by reviving the West European Union; (2) the European Community and the United States should develop some systematic method of political consultation at a high level.+

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East-West Relations+

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□Ever since the advent of Gorbachev, the West has been obsessed with his mercurial and courageous personality. But reliance on a single personality is a counsel of despair. For if Gorbachev's foreign policy is a personal tour de force, it will not be sustainable in the long run. Indeed, the possibility that Gorbachev will not survive cannot be excluded, given his challenge to so

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many vested interests within the Soviet Union.+

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For the moment, however, Gorbachev's position still seems deletion,hkstrong. No Soviet leader could have risked the Soviet Union's position in Central Europe without the support of the paSoviethk Army and the KGB. Those two institutions must have concluded that the only other option-repression-would require such brutality as to thwart any hopes of enlisting Western help in modernizing the Soviet economy. Yet if one believes that there exists a relatively wide consensus in the Soviet leadership, it becomes especially important to analyze the elements of that consensus.+

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There are three possibilities: (1) the Soviet leaders may believe that by relaxing the grip on Eastern Europe, they will be able to maintain existing arrangements at less cost; (2) they may be playing the German card-that is, using the prospect of a neutral unified Germany to drive American military power from the Continent; (3) the Soviets may genuinely want to con-

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duct a serious negotiation on a new East-West equilibrium. Unfortunately, Soviet leaders have made statements supporting all three theories. The most likely reason is that the Soviets have yet to make up their own minds.+

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□At least some high-level Soviet officials may hope that discarding a failed ideology will allow them to continue the historic Russian policy of crushing any power center within Moscow's reach. Last summer an eminent Russian scientist, a member of the Supreme Soviet, told me that the Soviet Union's strategic position could not be challenged so long as it retained a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and Germany and Japan were denuclearized. Hence, he argued, the thrust of Soviet policy should be to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Eurasia. After that, it would be safe to ask Germany and Japan to help rebuild the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union could always keep those countries in line by brandishing its nuclear monopoly in Eurasia.+

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□At the time, I considered these the theo-

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retical musings of an out-of-power intellectual. I am no longer so sure. It is not impossible that some in the Kremlin are gambling for high stakes. This group may calculate that a neutral unified Germany would enable the Soviet Union to salvage the Warsaw Pact and frighten Western Europe while exploiting new disarmament provisions to achieve step-by-step political domination over Central Europe.+

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Gorbachev is too intelligent not to recognize the perils of such a strategy. For on the road to hegemony lie many potential pitfalls for the Soviet Union, any one of which could spell disaster. Every effort should therefore be made to negotiate a true equilibrium. History teaches that a stable peace can occur only if the interests of all major players are met—if the security concerns of all sides are adequately recognized. Both the Soviet Union and the United States will have to break with traditional patterns. The Soviet Union will have to abandon the strategy of weakening every other power center in Eurasia. The United States will have to drop challenges to the Soviet Union within its national frontiers. We have no

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reason to help sustain the internal arrangements of the Soviet Union, but we should be prepared to leave their erosion to the forces of history.+

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In practice, the new equilibrium should include the following elements: (1) a concept for German unification based on self-determination; (2) a special security status for East German territory; (3) a negotiated balance of forces on both sides of the present dividing line in Europe; (4) a hksharp reduction of Soviet ground forces and the withdrawal of most of them deep intohk the Soviet Union, coupled with a withdrawal of a major portion of U.S. ground forces; (5) some provision for keeping U.S. nuclear weapons and airforces as part of the common Western defense strategy; (6) an integrated Western Europe with strengthened ties to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe; hk(7) a verifiable strategic arms agreement.hk+

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¶The United States, which did so much to build the postwar era, hknow must help prepare a newhk international order. The meeting in Malta cannot produce any agreements, as President Bush has repeatedly pointed out. But it can mark the first step of a long march toward a hopefully better world. In that journey, the United States cannot solve every problem, but it can contribute a sense of direction.+

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¶In a period of turmoil, it is important to avoid recklessness. But caution can only preserve the status quo; boldness is needed to reach a better future. Few presidents have had the opportunity that President Bush now has to leave hkhishk imprint on an era. The time has come—it has never been more urgent—for what President Bush has called "that vision thing."+

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Living With the Inevitable

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BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

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To be sure, the West has no reason to get ahead of German desires on reunification. Perhaps forty years of Communist rule have produced the ironic result of stimulating East German nationalism. But if this is not the case, it would be extremely dangerous for the Western democracies-what-

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ever their secret yearnings or their theoretical legal rights-to try to keep Germany divided against the wishes of the German people. For sooner or later, such a stand would ignite a new German nationalism. And that would only serve to undermine the responsible, essentially pro-Western leaders in all of West Germany's pamajorhk political parties.+

[19]

Until recently, German unity, in so far as it had any operational meaning, was equated with the unification of Europe. Extending some of the benefits of the European Community to Eastern Europe was expected to help repair Europe's various fault lines. Though that program remains essential, recent events leave no doubt that the unification of Europe has a different rhythm than the unification of Germany. For in Germany, the moving force is not a pragmatic concept of integration but elemental pressures for popular

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participation in government.+

[17]

□When the new East German leader, Egon Krenz, was appointed deletion,paa month ago, he announced that the so-called German Democratic Republic had to be a Communist state or it was nothing. He was right. There is no historic basis for the East German state except as a Communist outpost. If it becomes democratic, it loses the rationale for its separate existence.+

[9]

□But democracy is exactly what the rebellious East German population is so passionately demanding, and what its government has promised. The impact of free elections would be quite different, however, in the German Democratic Republic than it has been elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In hkPoland, Hungary or Czechoslovakiahk, free elections arguably strengthen the state; in the paGDRpa they are likely to undermine it. Genuinely free elections would in all likelihood bring to power parties similar to those of the Federal Republic. The winners would almost certainly seek to synchronize West and East German policies and move the country toward unity.+

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Political tendencies will be reinforced by economic realities. Now that the border between the two Germanies has for all practical purposes been opened, it will be necessary to match economic conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise there will be an exodus, especially of younger and more ambitious groups, that will drain the East German economy. Such improvement will require massive help from the Federal Republic. That is unlikely—and indeed senseless—if the Communist party insists on maintaining its dominance over East German political life. (Of course, the Soviet Union has the physical power to stop all this. But it hkcouldhk do so only at the cost of heavy civilian casualties and the collapse of Gorbachev's mystique in the West.)+

[19]

What form will the new Germany ultimately take? It is conceivable that the two Germanies may form some sort of confederation, with separate democratic governments linked by some common institutions. There is a historical precedent: 19th century Germa-

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ny was organized as a Confedera-
tion of separate states linked by a
Customs Union—though it
proved the precursor of a national
state. A confederation may make
it easier to satisfy Soviet security
concerns by maintaining East
Germany as a special security
zone with limited armaments.+

[17]

¶In the end, the outcome will be
shaped by the wishes of the Ger-
man people, not by outside forces.
Outsiders can impose a solution
only if they are prepared to use
force—and to defy a people whose
desire for freedom was strong
enough to puncture the Berlin
Wall after 28 years of repression.+

[9]

¶The synchronization of political and eco-
nomic policies will inevitably raise the is-
sue of the German Democratic Republic's
military role. Even in a confederation, its
membership in the Warsaw Pact would
become questionable. It is hard to imagine
how a German confederation whose East-
ern portion was dominated by more or less

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the same political parties as the Western portion could be allied to both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And it is inconceivable in the event of a federal state.+

[12]

□How can Moscow be persuaded to allow East Germany to leave the Warsaw Pact? On one level, the Soviet Union has no choice. For after free elections, membership of the German Democratic Republic in the Warsaw Pact will become untenable. Certainly, the Soviet Union is entitled to guarantees against its nightmare of military aggression from the West. Some sort of special military status for East Germany is desirable, and the presence of some Soviet forces for an agreed period is conceivable. The United States and its allies should be prepared to deal with these subjects generously. But in the end, Soviet security concerns will have to be met by new arms control arrangements or by a European peace treaty rather than by East German membership in the Warsaw Pact.+

[19]

□If the German Democratic Republic cannot remain in the Warsaw Pact indefinitely, what about West German membership

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in NATO? The Soviet spokesman, Gerasimov, has asserted that unification is impossible so long as the two Germanies are each part of opposing military blocs. Does this mean that Gorbachev has decided to play ``the German card?'' Will the Kremlin offer unification in return for German military neutrality? Indeed, in his speech to the East German parliament in October, Gorbachev referred favorably to a proposal along those lines made by Stalin in 1953.+

[14]

□It is to be hoped that the Soviet leader will not be tempted by a specious symmetry between East Germany's membership in the Warsaw Pact and West Germany's alliance with NATO. If East Germany leaves the Warsaw Pact, it does not follow that the Soviet Union is any better off if the Federal Republic leaves NATO. I would argue in fact that it is worse off. No Russian leader should disregard the lessons of history: that this century's two world wars grew out of Germany's attempt to pursue a purely national policy in the center of the Continent. Seeking to preempt any possible combination of surrounding countries, Germany threatened each of its many neighbors indi-

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vidually and provoked them to form rigid military structures that contributed to war.+

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Today, a nation of 80 million standing alone in the center of the Continent would again threaten European stability-and in the long run Soviet security as well. How would one define neutralization for a nation of such magnitude? How would one monitor it? Over time, such a Germany would be bound to become a military force. Or else the Soviet Union might be tempted to exploit a neutralization agreement by insisting on verification measures tantamount to hegemony over Germany. Either course would threaten European stability.+

[14]

Thus the safest outcome would be a united (or confederated) Germany that remains integrated into NATO but is constrained by new arms limitations throughout Europe. Strange as it may sound, membership in NATO would provide the best mechanism for monitoring agreed limits on armaments, because Germany's allies

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would have a selfish interest in seeing them observed. Such limits would have to prohibit NATO deployments beyond present dividing lines in Europe, and include special provisions for the territory that is now the German Democratic Republic.←

[18]

The problem of German unification is above all conceptual. It requires an idea of process—of how Germany might be unified, and over what period of time. Will it become a single country with federal institutions, a confederal state, or something in between? What arms limitations are needed or acceptable? What is the appropriate Eurpean and Atlantic framework in which these changes should take place?←

[13]

As they seek to answer these questions, it is imperative that the Federal Republic and its Western allies work together closely. But in doing so, they must keep in mind one overriding reality: the prerequisite for

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the continued adherence of the Federal Republic to the Western camp will be to concede some form of unification. The challenge is to ensure that it happens under circumstances that make every nation feel secure, including the Soviet Union.+

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NATO and Western Europe+

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□Events in East Germany will undoubtedly speed up a process of attrition that has been going on within the Atlantic Alliance for several years. Driven by arms control negotiations and ``Gorbachev fever,'' the NATO countries have all stopped any serious efforts to hkimprovehk their armaments. The Bush Administration agreed last May to postpone the modernization of medium-range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic. Now that postponement is likely to become permanent; under current conditions, there is no political party in Germany prepared to reopen the issue. A recent German visitor to Washington called the

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modernization prospect ``laughable.''+ Genscher.

[16]

□Yet the argument made against modernizing Lance missiles—that Germany must take special measures to avoid becoming a nuclear battlefield because it is so geographically exposed—logically applies to all nuclear weapons deployed on German soil. Thus the likely next phase of the NATO debate, even before the recent upheaval in East Germany, was the promotion of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe. And once the concept of a nuclear free zone is accepted, a doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons—that NATO will not fire first under any circumstances—cannot be far behind. For given the range of nuclear weapons, the only way for participants in a nuclear free zone to avoid nuclear war is by foregoing any use of nuclear weapons based outside that zone.+

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□The progressive reduction of Western conventional forces on the central front appears to be

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irreversible. West Germany already plans to reduce the length of compulsory military service, a move that will cut its armed forces from 600,000 to 420,000- proportionally a larger unilateral reduction than what the West has proposed for the Soviet Union. And the Soviets will surely insist on additional reciprocal German cuts as a part of arms control negotiations later on.+

[15]

□A significant reduction of American ground forces in Europe has also become highly probable. Whether undertaken under direct or indirect pressure from Congress, the result will be a further erosion of NATO strategy. The concept of flexible response-that deterrence is only credible if it includes many stages short of all-out nuclear war-cannot be sustained under current conditions.+

[10]

□Even if the Federal Republic remains in NATO, a reassessment of NATO's purpose has become imperative. Against what threat-and with what forces-should

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NATO hkbehk organized? What reductions of U.S. forces should be made, and based on what strategy? How hklargehk a U.S. presence should be left in Europe? What is to be the role of Eurpean forces? What should be the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces?+

[11]

The answers to these questions ought to be the subject of the fullest and deepest NATO consultations since the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, a number of principles can be stated:+

[5]

NATO should be adapted to new realities, not abandoned. The end of NATO would spell political chaos in Europe, trigger nationalist rivalries and tempt renewed Soviet expansionism.+

[5]

The process may well lead to substantial reductions of U.S. and Soviet ground forces-perhaps their total removal if hkoverall Soviet forces are sharply reduced and withdrawn deephk into the paU.S.S.R.pa. But this prospect can be realized only if the NATO nations put an end to the irresponsible process of unilateral reductions now going on. While no country has anything to be proud

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of, the United States—as the leader of the alliance—runs the risk of setting an appalling example by prematurely suggesting dramatic defense cuts. If this process is not stopped, NATO will hand the Soviets an impotent Europe at the precise moment that the postwar generation's goals are within sight.+

[17]

Whatever the balance of conventional forces, some American nuclear presence and airforces must be retained on the European continent, with the exact level subject to negotiation. If the defense of Europe were again to rely exclusively on conventional weapons, peace would be at the mercy of historical hkinstabilitieshk. War after war has occurred despite the existence of conventional forces that on paper appeared more or less in balance. This is because success in conventional war depends on so many intangibles—of leadership and maneuver—that actual balances of power have proved very difficult to calculate.+

[15]

Reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons based on American soil or at sea is not the answer, either. It was the lack of credibility of such

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a distant deterrent that brought American nuclear forces to Europe in the first place. What was true when NATO's deterrent was hugely superior is even more crucial today, given the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the trend of strategic arms control negotiations. In short, NATO must link the nuclear defense of Europe and America, whatever happens with German unity or convential disarmament. Otherwise we are on the road to Soviet hegemony if perestroika succeeds, and to nationalist chaos if perestroika fails.+

[17]

Conventional arms control negotiations must be redesigned. Currently, they are based on the continued existence of two military blocs. But the future of the Warsaw Pact-and especially of East German membership-is now in question. Above all, arms control proposals must get away from the pedantic ``bean counting'' approach-weapons system by weapons system-so much in vogue. It must be brought into line

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with the growing sense of independence in East Europe and the need for a special status for the territory of the German Democratic Republic.+

[18]

■ Whatever happens, the relative weight of America within NATO is bound to diminish. A major withdrawal of U.S. forces, combined with a politically integrated Europe, will make it necessary to rethink an organization that evolved when America had a nuclear monopoly and was economically dominant. Europe must assume a growing responsibility for its own defense, with the United States playing a supporting role.+

[12]

For the European Community to assume this strengthened position, it will have to come to terms with German unification. Some leading Europeans and Americans have warned that the European Community was never designed to accommodate a united Germany with a population of some 80 million. Though historically accurate, that view is irrelevant to the existing situa-

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tion. For the European Community cannot survive if the Germans see it as a device to thwart unification.+

[12]

□There is merit to the concern that a unified Germany would have disproportionate weight within the European Community. But the other members have the capacity to prevent German hegemony. Surely Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, not to mention the smaller states, could shape a consensus that prevents domination by any one country, however powerful. Indeed, the strongest argument for Britain's wholehearted participation in the 1992 process is the need for Britain's political experience in establishing an appropriate balance within the European Community.+

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□The precise balance is for Europeans to decide. But Americans can help to close a growing gap between the European Community, where frontiers are being blurred and the United States is not represented, and NATO, where nations still speak with separate voices and the European Community has no means of ex-

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pression. This suggests a two-fold task: (1) Europe should be given some institutional voice within NATO, perhaps by reviving the West European Union; (2) the European Community and the United States should develop some systematic method of political consultation at a high level.+

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East-West Relations+

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□Ever since the advent of Gorbachev, the West has been obsessed with his mercurial and courageous personality. But reliance on a single personality is a counsel of despair. For if Gorbachev's foreign policy is a personal tour de force, it will not be sustainable in the long run. Indeed, the possibility that Gorbachev will not survive cannot be excluded, given his challenge to so

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many vested interests within the Soviet Union.+

[14]

¶For the moment, however, Gorbachev's position still seems deletion,hkstrong. No Soviet leader could have risked the Soviet Union's position in Central Europe without the support of the paSoviethk Army and the KGB. Those two institutions must have concluded that the only other option—repression—would require such brutality as to thwart any hopes of enlisting Western help in modernizing the Soviet economy. Yet if one believes that there exists a relatively wide consensus in the Soviet leadership, it becomes especially important to analyze the elements of that consensus.+

[15]

¶There are three possibilities: (1) the Soviet leaders may believe that by relaxing the grip on Eastern Europe, they will be able to maintain existing arrangements at less cost; (2) they may be playing the German card—that is, using the prospect of a neutral unified Germany to drive American military power from the Continent; (3) the Soviets may genuinely want to con-

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duct a serious negotiation on a new East-West equilibrium. Unfortunately, Soviet leaders have made statements supporting all three theories. The most likely reason is that the Soviets have yet to make up their own minds.+

[15]

¶At least some high-level Soviet officials may hope that discarding a failed ideology will allow them to continue the historic Russian policy of crushing any power center within Moscow's reach. Last summer an eminent Russian scientist, a member of the Supreme Soviet, told me that the Soviet Union's strategic position could not be challenged so long as it retained a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and Germany and Japan were denuclearized. Hence, he argued, the thrust of Soviet policy should be to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Eurasia. After that, it would be safe to ask Germany and Japan to help rebuild the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union could always keep those countries in line by brandishing its nuclear monopoly in Eurasia.+

[19]

¶At the time, I considered these the theo-

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retical musings of an out-of-power intellectual. I am no longer so sure. It is not impossible that some in the Kremlin are gambling for high stakes. This group may calculate that a neutral unified Germany would enable the Soviet Union to salvage the Warsaw Pact and frighten Western Europe while exploiting new disarmament provisions to achieve step-by-step political domination over Central Europe.+

[11]

Gorbachev is too intelligent not to recognize the perils of such a strategy. For on the road to hegemony lie many potential pitfalls for the Soviet Union, any one of which could spell disaster. Every effort should therefore be made to negotiate a true equilibrium. History teaches that a stable peace can occur only if the interests of all major players are met—if the security concerns of all sides are adequately recognized. Both the Soviet Union and the United States will have to break with traditional patterns. The Soviet Union will have to abandon the strategy of weakening every other power center in Eurasia. The United States will have to drop challenges to the Soviet Union within its national frontiers. We have no

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reason to help sustain the internal arrangements of the Soviet Union, but we should be prepared to leave their erosion to the forces of history.+

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□In practice, the new equilibrium should include the following elements: (1) a concept for German unification based on self-determination; (2) a special security status for East German territory; (3) a negotiated balance of forces on both sides of the present dividing line in Europe; (4) a hksharp reduction of Soviet ground forces and the withdrawal of most of them deep intohk the Soviet Union, coupled with a withdrawal of a major portion of U.S. ground forces; (5) some provision for keeping U.S. nuclear weapons and airforces as part of the common Western defense strategy; (6) an integrated Western Europe with strengthened ties to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe; hk(7) a verifiable strategic arms agreement.hk+

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The United States, which did so much to build the postwar era, hknow must help prepare a newhk international order. The meeting in Malta cannot produce any agreements, as President Bush has repeatedly pointed out. But it can mark the first step of a long march toward a hopefully better world. In that journey, the United States cannot solve every problem, but it can contribute a sense of direction.+

In a period of turmoil, it is important to avoid recklessness. But caution can only preserve the status quo; boldness is needed to reach a better future. Few presidents have had the opportunity that President Bush now has to leave hkhishk imprint on an era. The time has come—it has never been more urgent—for what President Bush has called ''that vision thing.''+ [11]

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(((END))) [1]

Charles o/r
I today had a call from Ambassador Brenner. Mr Kissinger would like to see us 11.15 on 6 September if possible. I said I thought this would be alright but that you would confirm it - and the arrangements.

CDS 16/8

Charles o/r

I passed on the PM's regrets and your invitation to see Mr Kissinger if he were free. It was Ambassador Brenner from Kissinger Associates who rang.

CDS 15/8

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR KISSINGER

Mr Kissinger plans to be in London on 6 - 7 September and asked whether you might see him.

You are in Scotland on 7 September and have a major speech on the afternoon of 6 September. You will be preparing your speech in the morning, but could fit in half an hour if you feel able to. The morning would be convenient for Mr Kissinger.

Do you want to see him then?

Very much regret - please tell him why

CDS

and shall have to stay to meet many people afterwards.

Caroline Slocock
8 August 1989

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CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

FILE JD

Subject cc Master

DC PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 May, 1989.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with Dr. Kissinger about a number of current NATO and defence issues. The two main features were Dr. Kissinger's strong support for our position on SNF and his deep distrust of current trends in Germany.

Dr. Kissinger said that negotiations on SNF could not possibly serve NATO'S interest. There was no common ceiling below 88 which made sense. Gorbachev's recent offer to withdraw 500 Soviet warheads from Europe was little short of insulting. The SNF decision was not a technical military problem: it went to the heart of NATO's strategy and political dependability. In his view, any prospect of modernisation would end if NATO adopted a text which held out the possibility of negotiations on SNF. He believed that negotiations would lead inexorably to denuclearisation of Europe and the withdrawal of US (and, he assumed, UK) forces from Germany. It would be absurd if the West were to give up its defences at the very moment when the Soviet Empire was beginning to come apart. He had no sympathy with the argument that we had to make concessions to the Germans to keep Chancellor Kohl in office. If the only way Kohl could save himself was by adopting SPD policies, then it would be better to have the SPD itself in Government, with the CDU in opposition and supporting NATO. The Germans seemed to have lost their nerve on defence, right across the political spectrum. The logic of their position on SNF was there should be no nuclear weapons based on German soil and that NATO should adopt a No First Use policy.

The Prime Minister said that she was confident we could get a satisfactory solution at the NATO Summit provided the US remained firm against negotiations. So far the Administration had done very well. She was worried about the intentions of some of those in the State Department who would argue that we must avoid a row at the Summit itself. Dr. Kissinger said that he would speak to the President and Secretary Baker next weekend.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

KC

Dr. Kissinger spoke gloomily of the rebirth of German nationalism. The Germans still believed that they had some mystical relationship with the Russians and a special role in Eastern Europe. But it would be a great mistake to let them take a lead in East/West relations. The Russians had not yet woken up to the risks for them: once it dawned upon them that they were trading their dominance in Eastern Europe for attempted German dominance, matters could come very rapidly to a crisis. He was no less distrustful of German attempts to lead a continental bloc within NATO. Dr. Kissinger was particularly vituperative about the role of Genscher. He was convinced Genscher was preparing the way for the FDP to form a coalition with the SPD after the next election. The only way to deal with Genscher was by direct confrontation.

I am copying this letter to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C.D. Powell

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc Rachel

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

You have time for a talk with Henry Kissinger tomorrow morning. You read his latest article on East/West relations over the weekend. It will be a useful opportunity to get his views on several isues. I suggest the main ones are:

- the new US Administration. The President is much criticised for being slow off the mark and failing to produce convincing counters to Gorbachev's stream of initiatives. But is this right? The absence of initiatives seems to be serving the US well, in that Gorbachev keeps coming forward with concessions (some of them pretty optical), in what might be seen as mounting desperation. Arguably the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have acquired a momentum of their own and may be beyond Gorbachev's control. Rather than take new initiatives, the West's most important task is to manage these changes, and prevent them getting out of hand with a risk of East/West confrontation. This seems to me a perfectly respectable policy, indeed a thoroughly rational one, in present circumstances. There is no need for the West to be hyperactive: we are not the system which is crumbling. The problem is convincing public opinion in mainland Europe that standing pat is satisfactory response to Gorbachev;

- arms control initiatives. Rather, there remains an apparently insatiable appetite for arms control initiatives in Europe. These would actually come better after political change rather than trying to lead it. With so much political movement, the US forces in Europe (and their counter-part of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe) provide security and reassurance and should be preserved. We can negotiate for a better balance, but not to reduce too far. That would only create new risks;

- SNF. When you last talked, Henry Kissinger correctly predicted that the INF agreement would lead to trouble on SNF.

(He claimed then that the INF Agreement had "broken the back of pro-Americans" in the FRG). He will presumably agree that SNF negotiations must be avoided. In practice, it seems to me that such negotiations make no sense at all. There is no correlation between NATO's SNF and those of the Warsaw Pact: they are not targetted on each other, and the size of the Soviet stockpile has no bearing on what we need, which is decided by our strategy of flexible response. Ergo there is simply nothing about which to negotiate: it's a matter for unilateral decisons. Anyway, it would be madness for NATO to commit itself to negotiations on SNF when it has no idea what its negotiating position would be;

- Eastern Europe. This is clearly going to be the cockpit of political change over the next few years and the focus of tension. There is a potentially destabilising mix of moves towards democracy coupled with continued economic decline before things get better. It poses a lot of questions: how great is the risk of 'conservative' back-lash within Eastern Europe? How far can countries like Hungary and Poland go in the direction of reform before the Soviet Union calls a halt? How can the West encourage and sustain progress, within reasonable bounds, without getting into a position where the reformers expect more help from us than we are prepared to give? Is the idea of 'Finlandisation' of Eastern Europe a realistic one? Or would the Soviet Union regard that as threatening its security (given that there is no neutral country as a buffer to the West of Eastern Europe, in the sense that Sweden is there for Finland)? How does he think we can manage this change?

- START. At your last talk, Dr. Kissinger was very concerned that the START negotiations were bound to turn out to the West's disadvantage, particularly because the US submarine-launched deterrent would be dangerously reduced. The new Administration has agreed to re-open the negotiations in June, but has not given any clue yet to its negotiating position. Is there any reason to think they will rectify the apparent mistakes of their predecessors? Or will they fall

into the same trap? Does he expect them to go ahead with development of both the MX missile and the Midgetman missile (small, transportable, single-warhead)?

- SDI. How confident is he that the Bush Administration will keep SDI going, developing the concept of Brilliant Pebbles, despite cutting the funding for research work?

- minimum deterrence. Professor Ullman gave a lecture at the Woodrow Wilson school towards the end of last year, proposing a strategy of minimum deterrence by which the two super-powers would reduce to 2000 nuclear warheads each (both strategic and tactical). This would, he argues, get rid of the concept of nuclear war-fighting and emphasise the purely deterrent nature of the remaining forces. How does Dr. Kissinger assess this idea and its likely influence on US strategic thinking?

- Labour's defence policy. It would be useful to get an opinion from him on Labour's new defence policy: he can produce some devastating comments;

- Germany's future. Last time he was very scathing about what he described as Kohl's abject pursuit of Gorbachev (while you stood up for him). How can we get Kohl back on the right lines and encourage him to give a lead, rather than just adopt the SPD Opposition's policies? Where is Germany heading?

- Sino/Soviet. Does he expect only a limited rapprochement, as we do?

I attach a note of your last meeting with Dr. Kissinger.

C.D.P.

(C. D. POWELL)
15 May 1989

E. R.

MRS. PONSONBY

Chequers
16 May
0930 - 1015

AP 26/4

Dr. Kissinger is coming to London in May and wants to see the Prime Minister. She usually likes to see him: she finds him stimulating and interesting. The times he is around are:

9 May in the afternoon
15 May in the afternoon
16 May in the morning

Could you possibly find him 45 minutes some time then?

CDP

C. D. POWELL

25 April 1989

Amanda
Leave ya - have told
W.S. office
CDP.

File

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cc Backup

SUBJECT c MASTER

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 January 1988

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DR. KISSINGER

The Prime Minister had a long talk with Dr. Kissinger yesterday evening. Since she regards it as a private conversation I am not recording it in detail. In fact nothing very new or surprising emerged.

Dr. Kissinger's views on the INF agreement remain unchanged, although he intends to support ratification by the Senate. He was particularly critical of the way in which the Administration had handled the Germans over INF. They had in effect broken the back of pro-Americans in the FRG, leaving them vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Meanwhile the Russians were getting the best of both worlds on short-range nuclear weapons. They could stir up dissension in NATO by playing on the West German desire to get rid of these weapons while themselves continuing to enjoy the security given by their massive superiority in them.

Dr. Kissinger said that he was worried about the START negotiations which, he claims, are bound to result in an outcome which leaves the United States disadvantaged. The Soviet Union would retain a significant preponderance in heavy ICBMs. The US submarine launched deterrent would be dangerously reduced and made vulnerable. No-one knew precisely how many warheads the bigger Soviet missiles carried although it was almost certainly more than the numbers agreed for the counting rules at the Washington Summit. His overall judgement was that the Russians were not being called upon to give up anything significant.

Dr. Kissinger was no less gloomy about the SDI. In practice the Administration were well on the way to emasculating it by promising to clear all tests which went beyond the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty with Congress. Moreover it was clear that the Russians had, with their proposal to link implementation of a START agreement to observance of a moratorium on SDI, latched on to a way to get the Americans to abandon the SDI without needing a Presidential signature.

Dr. Kissinger was scathing in his comments about developments in Germany and what he described as Kohl's abject pursuit of Gorbachev. The Prime Minister was moved to stout defence of him: Kohl was basically a loyal supporter of NATO and of the Americans. More generally, Dr. Kissinger thought that the West was too ready to give Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt. There had been no significant change in Soviet foreign policy, except that it had become more skilful and more insidious.

The Prime Minister raised the recent report on Discriminate Deterrence, to which Dr. Kissinger had put his name. She agreed with most of the report except for its treatment of the role of nuclear deterrence. Dr. Kissinger was evasive: he had not been involved in the drafting of the report, and agreed that the nuclear aspect was not handled satisfactorily (although he had insisted on a strong statement of support for the British and French nuclear deterrents). He realised that there was some unease in Europe about the report, although its basic sense was strongly pro-defence and pro-American commitment to Europe. He was trying to get together a small group of European commentators (and had already approached de Rose in France) who would send him an open letter about the report, to which he could reply with some clarifications. He would like to see the group include a British member.

There was some discussion of the Middle East and Nicaragua, but I do not recall anything of note.

On the Presidential elections in the United States, Dr. Kissinger thought that the balance between Republicans and Democrats was about even. He was sceptical of Vice-President Bush's prospects: people were now blaming him for Irangate more than they blamed the President. From some of his comments, I rather got the impression that Dr. Kissinger was positioning himself for a role in a Dole Administration.

I am copying this letter on the same personal basis to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

You are seeing Dr. Kissinger on Thursday afternoon at his request. He has been attending a meeting of Nobel Prizewinners in Paris.

There is one point which you need to take up with him really quite sharply. When he last saw you he briefed you on the consultations which he had had with the Chinese about the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank. It was agreed that nothing should be said about this to anyone else in London. Dr. Kissinger said he would make this quite clear to the Chinese. But shortly afterwards the Chinese started alluding to the matter in contacts with our Ambassador in Peking and the Governor of Hong Kong, giving rise to a great deal of agitated cable traffic. Moreover the Chinese Ambassador here raised it with a senior official (who knew nothing of the background) specifically citing Dr. Kissinger's involvement. All this has caused no little embarrassment and you are disappointed at the lack of discretion. Even so you have refused to divulge details here, saying only that there appeared to have been an unofficial approach to the Chinese on the matter. I don't think you should have any compunction about making him feel bad about this.

That apart, you will want to hear his views on the US Presidential election prospects.

You will also want to hear what he has to say about the US/Soviet Summit and about the prospects for the next one. Your particular concerns are that progress on arms control should not outstrip movement to solve regional problems; that the START negotiations should not lead to destabilisation of the US deterrent by disproportionate cuts in submarine-launched missiles; that SDI research and testing should

continue; and that our own Trident programme should remain unaffected. You might refer in particular to Afghanistan and the importance of getting the end-game right.

Finally you might refer to the recent report, to which Kissinger contributed, on Discriminate Deterrence. While there is much in it with which we agree, you are concerned that its thrust will erode confidence in the US nuclear guarantee. The arguments are set out in my minute (attached).

CDP

(C.D. POWELL)

19 January 1988
DA1ACG

PRIME MINISTER

meeting agreed
PBS 13/1

Henry Kissinger will be in London on 21/22 January and has asked if he may come to see you for half an hour. He has nothing specific to discuss, but I know you always enjoy talking to him.

You could fit in 45 minutes at 5.30 on Thursday 21st after you have seen Michel Rocard. Content?

PBS

(P.A. BEARPARK)

12 January 1988

[FILE NOTE.
Contact in Kissinger's Office is Suzanne Macfarlane
New York 212-759-7919]

FILE
DA
cPC

SUBJECT
CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

15 September 1987

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

The Prime Minister had a talk this evening with Dr. Kissinger. The Doctor was in an even more apocalyptic mood than on the last occasion. The INF agreement was a disaster (he would, however, support ratification of it. There were too many unratified agreements). The agreement would be an irretrievable step towards the denuclearization of Germany. The Germans would inevitably insist on negotiations to remove SNF on their territory. The credibility of flexible response would be left in tatters. The main rationale for deploying Cruise and Pershing had been to bolster the declining credibility of the nuclear guarantee to Europe based on US strategic weapons. It also threatened to wreck the structure of German politics and would lead inevitably to the downfall of Chancellor Kohl. Genscher was already beginning to move the FDP slowly back towards the SPD, even though the final shift at national level might not take place until after the next Federal elections. Given the SPD's slide towards neutralism, this held out the prospect of Germany as a vacuum in the heart of Europe, with revival of vague dreams of German reunification. Finally, by eliminating a whole class of weapons, one invited the question: why not eliminate other categories? It was wrong to stigmatize the very weapons on which our security rested. The reason that conservative Republicans in the US supported the INF agreement was isolationism. They did not want to be involved in the nuclear defence of Europe.

But there was worse. The bureaucracy and Congress between them were ensuring the strangulation of the SDI. By arguing for a ten year moratorium on deployment, while Congress simultaneously insisted on the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, they were killing off strategic defence. The President would never knowingly renounce it. But the sophistry of his advisers and his own ambition to go down in history as a man of peace put the SDI at grave risk.

Even a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons carried risks. The US would have to halve the number of its SLBMs, while Soviet anti-submarine capabilities would in no way be

constrained, indeed would develop further. This would undermine the effectiveness of the strategic deterrent.

His conclusion was that, if Gorbachev were able to say at the end of President Reagan's term that he had got rid of the threat to the Soviet Union from US nuclear weapons in Europe and had extinguished the SDI, all at a time of maximum weakness for the Soviet Union, he would rightly be hailed as a genius. The outlook for the West was gloomy. All that one could do was work for the election of a Republican President - who might bring back Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State? asked the Prime Minister - and try to limit the damage.

The Prime Minister acknowledged that there was substance in some of Dr. Kissinger's fears. No-one pretended that a zero-zero INF agreement was our preferred solution. But after the Reykjavik Summit, we had to assess the options and cut our losses. In order to preserve nuclear deterrence, to prevent the US from negotiating away its strategic nuclear weapons and ensure that we would receive Trident, we accepted the lesser evil of a zero INF agreement. Indeed there had been no real option in the light of the original dual track decision. Now that an agreement seemed virtually certain, it was wrong to attack it and undermine confidence. We had to put the best face on it. She was resolved to oppose any attempt to negotiate on short-range systems in Europe, until Soviet preponderance in chemical and conventional weapons had been eliminated. She did not believe that SDI would perish in the way which Dr. Kissinger predicted, although she strongly disapproved of Senator Nunn's activities. Indeed she thought most likely Presidential nominees would want to continue research. She intended to use all her energy to remind people that peace would continue to depend on effective nuclear deterrence. She had no doubt that the case would be accepted if the arguments were put forward with sufficient vigour and confidence.

The Prime Minister regards these conversations as strictly personal. I should be grateful that my note receives only a very limited distribution, to the Secretary of State and a few senior officials. I am copying it to John Howe with a similar caveat.

Yours sincerely,

(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 September 1987

CDP
8/9

Dear Charles

Dr Kissinger

Thank you for your letter of 28 August. Dr Kissinger gratefully accepts the offer of a call on the Prime Minister at 1615 on 15 September. Dr Kissinger will call on the Foreign Secretary at 1700.

Dr Kissinger's staff are still unable to shed light on the particular issue he wishes to raise with the Prime Minister. The Embassy at Washington will continue to pursue.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Papers removed from file

Date 7-9-87

FCO to CDP 7-9-87

USA: Kissinger visits Aug '79

file DTS
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 August 1987

DR KISSINGER

Thank you for your letter of 26 August relaying Dr Kissinger's request to call on the Prime Minister in September. The Prime Minister could see Dr Kissinger at 1615 on 15 September.

C D POWELL

Robert Culshaw, Esq., M.V.O.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15th at 1400 or 1600

CCPC (1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 August 1987

Prime Minister

Agree to see Dr. Kissinger briefly?

Dear Mark

Dr Kissinger

Dr Kissinger will be in London on 14 and 15 September, and has asked for a call on the Prime Minister if convenient. He would be free before noon on 14 September, and between 2 pm and 5 pm on 15 September. 24/8

Dr Kissinger would not wish to take much more than about 10 minutes of the Prime Minister's time. There is apparently one particular issue he would wish to raise, but at present neither his staff nor the Embassy at Washington are aware of what issue this is. We would obviously try to find out should a call be arranged.

The Prime Minister last saw Dr Kissinger on 3 December 1986. Some background on his current work, views and standing was set out in Colin Budd's letter of 1 December 1986 to Charles Powell. Dr Kissinger still has some influence, primarily through his syndicated articles. It may be more doubtful whether he still has much influence with the Administration or Congress, but the Prime Minister may still like to see him if her diary permits.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

Mark Addison Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

— D NAD (82)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1986

'M. Tucknott. 2 cc Mr Holdich 3. PM.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
3 DEC 1986

Dear Charles,

Dr Henry Kissinger

The Prime Minister has agreed that Dr Kissinger may call on her at 10.45 on 3 December. As background, you may care to have the following brief outline of his current work, views, standing and prospects.

At present, Dr Kissinger is Chairman of Kissinger Associates, a consulting firm working for US and foreign corporations providing mostly analysis and contacts but also lobbying Congress on his customers' behalf. He also undertakes some academic teaching and writing as professor at Georgetown University, and regularly commands high fees as a keynote speaker (he gave the Ernest Bevin Memorial Lecture at the House of Commons on 1 December) and he continues to write for leading newspapers in the United States.

Dr Kissinger is a regular pundit on almost all foreign policy issues and it is never easy to pin down his exact position on any given subject. However, he has been very critical of the current Administration's handling of foreign policy, especially the Reykjavik meeting. For ease of reference I attach copies (already sent to you by Washington) of two recent articles. He has also made critical public references to the Administration's role in the Iran/Nicaragua affair. He is also a consistent advocate of the withdrawal of some US forces from Europe and their redeployment in more strategically vital regions.

Dr Kissinger is a well respected elder statesman and foreign policy guru but is not an insider with the current Administration because the Republican Right have never trusted him. His name has been mentioned in the last few days as a possible National Security Adviser but this is unlikely. It is not impossible that he could play a role in some future Administration.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Ric OA

4

PRIME MINISTER

You will want to see the rather odd message attached. It is a telegram to me from Antony Acland reporting a call from Henry Kissinger. Kissinger claimed to have come direct from the White House where he had been told that it was essential that you should let the President have your views direct on the current arms control proposals. As Antony says, this is pretty curious, because of course you have sent the President a message with your views.

I therefore telephoned the White House and spoke to General Powell to try to clarify this confusion. He said that of course they had received your message, had shown it to the President and indeed discussed it with him. He added that they were hearing from one or two sources, probably based on wishful thinking, that this was not necessarily your final position and that you might not really be willing to accept a zero-option between 500-1,000km. They had noted that your message had described your views as preliminary. He wondered whether you would have anything to add. I said that, to the best of my knowledge, these were your firm views. There might be a certain amount of detail to add, when it came to discussions in NATO. But I did not expect any modification in your basic position and had no reason to think that you would want to send the President a further message at this stage.

CDP
1 May 1987

JA2AOO

3

TELEGRAM

TO: WASHINGTON

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

* * * * * * *

STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM CHARLES POWELL, No. 10

Thank you for your message about Henry Kissinger. I am just as mystified. I have spoken to General Powell on the secure line. He assures me that the Prime Minister's message has been received, is recognised to represent her personal views, has been seen by the President, and has been discussed with him. He added that there were one or two voices who claimed that the message was not necessarily the Prime Minister's last word, especially on the zero option between 500 - 1000 km. They noted that her message spoke of preliminary views. This probably represented wishful thinking. I said that the Prime Minister had only this afternoon repeated emphatically to Ambassador Price the views in her message. I had no reason to think that they would alter significantly (although some of the details might be expanded) or that she intended a further message at this stage.

I think, therefore, that you can speak with confidence to the President tomorrow on the basis of the Prime Minister's message. The points from it which I know she would particularly want you to emphasise are:

(i) the vital importance of not allowing ourselves to be drawn into still further zero options after the present negotiations are complete. We must set a firm floor

and make clear that NATO will not countenance further reductions in shorter-range missiles, at least until chemical weapons are eliminated and parity in conventional forces achieved;

(ii) the need for the US to assign additional dual-capable aircraft and, even more important, SLCMs to SACEUR, to maintain confidence in the United States' nuclear commitment to Europe's defence.

[illegible]YAN 0172 ORWBAN 1382
SECRET
DD 011500Z CAOFF
FM WASHI TO CAOFF
011430Z MAY
GRS 350

2

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 011500Z CABINET OFFICE
TELNO U/N
OF 011430Z MAY 87

STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR POWELL, NO 10
1. HENRY KISSINGER TELEPHONED TO ME ON THE EVENING OF 30 APRIL WITH A MESSAGE WHICH I DID NOT WHOLLY UNDERSTAND. HE SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER RECENTLY AND THAT MRS THATCHER HAD SAID THAT I COULD ALWAYS PASS A MESSAGE TO HER.
2. KISSINGER SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN IN THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THAT IT WAS THE VIEW OF CARLUCCI AND HOWARD BAKER THAT IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TO EXPRESS HER VIEWS ABOUT THE PRESENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THE UNDESIRABILITY OF A NON-NUCLEAR EUROPE. SHE SHOULD DO THIS IN WHOLLY UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS.
3. KISSINGER ASKED ME WHETHER I WAS AWARE OF YOUR (REPEAT YOUR) MESSAGE TO CARLUCCI. IT MAY BE THAT CARLUCCI AND BAKER HAD NOT WANTED TO REVEAL TO HIM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD IN FACT ALREADY SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. IN VIEW OF THE CAVEATS, I TOLD KISSINGER THAT I WAS NOT (NOT) AWARE OF ANY MESSAGES TO THE WHITE HOUSE.
4 IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEWS HAVE BEEN MADE VERY CLEAR IN THE MESSAGE WHICH HAS BEEN SENT, AND THAT NO MORE NEEDS TO BE SAID FOR THE TIME BEING. BUT I THOUGHT THAT I MUST REPORT WHAT HENRY SAID TO ME SINCE I MAY NOT BE AWARE OF ALL THE BACKGROUND.
5. KISSINGER EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS NOT A PIECE OF PERSONAL DIPLOMACY ON HIS PART (HE HAS RECENTLY BEEN STATING IN PUBLIC HIS OWN RESERVATIONS ABOUT A ZERO INF AGREEMENT), THAT HE WOULD NOT PRESUME TO TELL THE PRIME MINISTER WHAT SHE SHOULD SAY TO THE PRESIDENT, BUT THAT IMPORTANT DECISIONS MIGHT BE TAKEN IN THE NEXT WEEK. ON THE LAST POINT I THINK THAT HE MAY BE RIGHT, THOUGH SOMEWHAT PREMATURE, BUT I REPEAT THAT BRITISH VIEWS WOULD APPEAR FOR THE TIME BEING TO HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY CONVEYED.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 1382

NNNN

STRICTLY PERSONAL

SUBJECT
cc MASTER

File
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

26 April 1987

From the Private Secretary

Dear Lyn,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

The Prime Minister had a talk with Dr. Kissinger this evening. I did not take a record. But the following is my recollection of the main points. I should be grateful if you (and John Howe to whom I am copying this letter) would show it to your respective Ministers and Permanent Secretaries only. The Prime Minister regards these conversations as strictly private.

The Doctor was in sombre and apocalyptic humour (possibly the effect of the Bilderberg Conference). He was deeply worried about the United States Administration's arms control policies. The President seemed hell-bent on pursuing disarmament proposals which even CND would applaud. The effect would be to destroy conservatism in the United States, to undermine the few strong West European leaders and to drive the Germans into neutralism and (sic) nationalism. There was also a lot of confused thinking, for instance the belief that abolishing nuclear weapons was the best way to preserve the SDI. Some blunt speaking was needed and only the Prime Minister could provide it, rather like Churchill in the 1930s. The dangers of what the President was doing and saying had to be pointed out clearly. He did not understand the issues and had no sense of history. As far as he was concerned, history would end when he left office.

Dr. Kissinger rehearsed his objections to a zero INF agreement in familiar terms. It was a further step in stigmatising nuclear weapons and isolating the Europeans. And the CIA claimed that the Russians has already concealed 150 SS20 warheads. It was too late to go back. But he and former President Nixon had just put out a statement proposing that the last instalment of reductions in LRINF should be dependent on progress in reducing the conventional imbalance. He thought it virtually certain that Gorbachev would visit the United States this year to sign an INF agreement. What worried him was that President Reagan would want another agreement to sign in Moscow next year.

More generally, he could not understand the Administration's tactics. In a moment of maximum Soviet weakness they were making the Russians a present of withdrawal

of Cruise and Pershing and accepting constraints on the testing and deployment of SDI. What would happen when Gorbachev was strong? It was one thing to discuss the phasing of SDI tests and the level of SDI deployment: but quite wrong to put the nature and quality of the tests and the fact of deployment on the negotiating table. He continued to believe that SDI was vital to the United States' security despite the views of the scientific community. In his experience, the scientific community always opposed every new weapon on the grounds either that existing ones were good enough or that even more super-duper ones would be available in ten years time.

The Prime Minister took this catalogue of woe with equanimity (that, I suppose, being the only alternative to suicide). She thought that she had dissuaded the President from pursuing the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world at their Camp David meeting, although he continued to refer to it. (Dr. Kissinger interjected that the President claimed to have convinced the Prime Minister of his views.) She explained the practical realities of the INF negotiations. She agreed that European concerns needed to be voiced more bluntly and would persuade her colleagues of this. She would discuss these matters with the President at the Venice Summit, and would give further thought to how she could best influence American opinion.

I am copying this letter, on a strictly personal basis, to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever,
Charles Powell

C.D. POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER: ARMS CONTROL

Much of the Prime Minister's talk today with Dr. Kissinger was taken up with arms control and the follow-up to Reykjavik. I did not take any notes. The following is my recollection of the main points.

The Prime Minister spoke frankly. Reykjavik had been an earthquake. All the good work done by the Reagan Administration to strengthen United States relations with Europe had been put at risk. She was determined to set aside Reykjavik. She had decided at Camp David that the best course was first to reaffirm the essentials of NATO strategy; and second to pick out the elements of Reykjavik which we could accept and argue that they should receive priority. By implication everything else would be left aside, although not explicitly abandoned. Even the points which she had accepted went further than she would have chosen. This applied particularly to the zero option for INF in Europe. But politically there had been no alternative. Her main concern remained to bring home to the President that the effect of what he had done in Reykjavik ran flatly contrary to his real objectives.

Dr. Kissinger spoke generally along the lines of his recent articles. He understood the considerations which had guided the Prime Minister at Camp David and thought the statement agreed there extremely skilful. In his own view, none of the proposals discussed in Reykjavik would have improved the West's security. Rather they would have undermined deterrence, separated the United States from Europe and given help and comfort to the 'semi-neutralists' in Europe. In negotiating terms Reykjavik had been a disgrace. The origins of the problem could be traced to the President's inability to reconcile the conflicting currents in the United States bureaucracy. For instance it was absurd that Richard Perle, who wouldn't even give away three rifles from the US army, had supported the proposal for eliminating strategic ballistic missiles. The reason was a cynical belief that the more extravagant the proposals, the less likely it was that any progress at all would be made. This was a high-risk game.

His nightmare was that Gorbachev might subtly alter his position on SDI testing, leading to a bureaucratic stampede in Washington to reach agreements on the basis outlined in Reykjavik.

Dr. Kissinger continued that his main worry was over the zero option for INF in Europe. This would have very little effect on the Soviet Union's offensive capability. The SS-20s were not very significant. On the other hand, the West would be deprived of a strategic retaliatory capability based in Europe. He was also worried about the decoupling effect. He hoped that it would be possible to work towards an alternative solution. This might be found by including LRINF in the 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. This would be less damaging.

Dr. Kissinger said that he also had reservations about the proposals put forward in Reykjavik on SDI. He was opposed in principle to a moratorium on SDI deployment. Were a moratorium established, Congress would stop voting funds for SDI and the military would lose interest because they would not guarantee that the investment which they made would see a return in terms of an effective system. Moreover, history showed that the United States had never been the first to break a moratorium. The result would be that the United States' SDI would wither while the Soviet Union pursued its own work. He acknowledged that the SDI would never offer the impenetrable shield claimed by President Reagan. But equally he could not understand the position of those who made a virtue of defencelessness. The right course was to agree an extension of the period of notice for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, say to two years, while negotiating limits on the size and scale of an SDI system when deployed. The Prime Minister commented that she had never understood the President's offer to share the results of SDI research with the Soviet Union. Dr. Kissinger agreed. It would mean sharing the most up to date computer technology, when in the real world the United States was still denying the Soviet Union access to computer technology which was several generations out of date.

Dr. Kissinger said that it was in the overwhelming interest of Mr. Gorbachev to reach an arms control agreement with President Reagan rather than wait for a successor. Waiting would in effect mean postponing any agreement for 4-6 years; and the difficulty for a successor of negotiating <u>any</u> agreement in the shadow of failure by President Reagan to do so should not be underestimated. In his judgement, the President's need for a new political initiative to distract attention from Iran pointed to a further effort to reach an arms control agreement, but one much more limited in scope than Reykjavik. The main elements would be - as set out in his own recent article - a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and LRINF, an extension to two years of the period for abrogation of the ABM Treaty, a limitation on the number of warheads each missile could carry, and action to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. This would be a signal of getting back to business as usual.

Dr. Kissinger said that he was unable to make up his mind about Gorbachev. Was it just the same rigid Communism under a shiny cover? Or was there a prospect of new policies? He saw a basic contradiction. Gorbachev needed the political support of the Army and the KGB, as the two groups in the Soviet Union who had at least some contact with the outside world, for economic reforms. But they were the groups most opposed to changes or concessions in foreign policy. The Party, on the other hand, might support concessions in foreign policy but were opposed to economic and social reform. At some point, probably still some years away, Gorbachev would have to face up to this contradiction and make a move either to reduce defence spending or to push through major economic reform. What happened in China might be a catalyst. He thought that the Soviet Union dreaded the success of China's experiment with more liberal policies, to the point where they might in the end attack China.

The Prime Minsiter regards this very much as a private conversation. This letter should not therefore be shown at all widely. I should mention that she sees some attraction in Dr. Kissinger's limited package on arms control.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

You have a meeting with Dr. Kissinger at 7 p.m. on Sunday. He is on his way back from a Bilderberg Conference at the Villa d'Este.

The two main subjects seem likely to be your visit to Moscow and arms control, particularly the prospects for an INF agreement. I have put in the folder Dr. Kissinger's Newsweek article following his own visit to Moscow, and a note of your last talk with him on arms control. As you will remember, he is opposed to a zero LRINF agreement, and has spoken out recently against a zero option for SRINF. There is an element of irresponsibility in this. No-one in his right mind wants a zero option, but that pass was sold years ago. The question now is the best terms which are available to us. You might give him an account of our ideas for dealing with SRINF.

You might also ask him about the general situation in Washington and the prospects for the remainder of the Reagan Administration.

CDP

CDP

24 April, 1987.

JD3AYC

BF

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

Henry Kissinger is going to be in London next Sunday evening en route to a Bilderberg Conference somewhere in Europe. He has particularly asked whether he could pop in and see you.

You have M. Chirac during the day at Chequers but will be free of him by about 3 pm. You will no doubt be coming back up to London later that evening and could in theory see Henry (who does not get in until about 5 pm) some time later here at No.10.

It might well be interesting to hear what he has to say about the latest developments in arms control negotiations and related matters.

Agree to see him for a drink at say 1930: or after supper at 2100 that evening?

For a drink at say 7 p.m.

CDP

Dr. Kissinger informed CDP 22/4

(212 - 759 - 7919)

CHARLES POWELL
21 April 1987

ECL/63

Kissinger: How to Deal With Gorbachev

Taking stock after a meeting with the Soviet leader

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

It had been a decade since I last visited the Soviet Union. So it was a bittersweet experience to find that Moscow has not lost its capacity to inspire ambivalence. The seediness of the accommodations had not changed, nor the backwardness of what in the West are considered life's amenities. One remains amazed that a country subsisting at so marginal a standard of living should conduct so assertive a global policy.

Yet the surface impression of stagnation was misleading. There is clearly an unprecedented ferment underneath the gloomy surface of wintry Moscow. The new leadership is different. It displays a vigor, dynamism and flexibility inconceivable 10 years ago. Brezhnev was ebullient but slightly insecure in dealing with American visitors. Reflecting a combination of vulnerability and inward doubt, he insisted on proclaiming the equal status of the Soviet Union. He came to meetings with a prepared statement and plowed through it, come what may. He seemed heavily reliant on his associates.

Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues are far more urbane. They take Soviet equal status with America for granted; reaffirming it would surely have evoked an indignant outburst. When I and a group of former senior officials from four administrations called on him on a private visit, Gorbachev had also brought a prepared statement. But he did not start reading from it until near the end of a three-hour conversation. In the event he did not finish the reading, and we only saw the full text in the newspapers the next day. Alternately bantering and caustic, threatening and conciliatory, Gorbachev addressed various members of our delegation individually, displaying an impressive knowledge of his subject and a subtle intuition for each interlocutor.

That the Soviet Union is now led by so forceful a personality is not an unalloyed blessing. The Brezhnev group seemed exhausted by its experiences in Stalin's purges and in the war. It was—until tempted by American domestic divisions—extremely cautious. Gorbachev and his associates seem less constrained by the past and more assertive with respect to Soviet power. They have the intellectual equipment for a far more dynamic foreign policy than their predecessors. These qualities also make them far more formidable adversaries.

YURCHENKO—AP

Alternately bantering and caustic, threatening and conciliatory, Mikhail Gorbachev is the most urbane Soviet leader I have encountered

I emerged from the sojourn in Moscow with six fundamental conclusions:

- "Reform" is in the air. I do not doubt the sincerity of the effort to overcome the stagnation, technological backwardness and corruption of traditional Soviet-style central planning.
- The purpose of that reform is not to spur democracy or freedom; it is to encourage efficiency and industrial progress, hence to make the Soviet Union more powerful.
- So far we are dealing with a program that has just been announced—with a theory and not yet a practice.
- Even if the program succeeds it does not automatically guarantee a more benign foreign policy. On the contrary, it may provide additional resources for expansionism and ideological challenges.
- The American scope to influence—or even to evaluate correctly—Soviet internal development is limited. American concessions should therefore be geared to Soviet foreign-policy conduct and not to its domestic economic program.
- All this imposes on the democracies the necessity of developing a purposeful, long-range and subtle strategy on East-West relations. This is all the more important to prevent the Soviet leaders from using their newfound skill in public relations to manipulate the desire in the democracies for peace.

Domestic Reform

The criticism of the inefficiency of central planning heard from high Soviet officials in Moscow today could be mistaken for that of a conservative American think tank. One is told horror stories about the impact of subsidized prices. For example, one senior official told us that subsidized children's clothing is so cheap that eligible buyers use it to polish their cars because rags, being unsubsidized, are more expensive.

High Soviet officials are vigorous in their insistence that such evils will be overcome. They assert that soon enterprises will be able to deal with each other on the basis of consumer demand rather than deal only with ministries by means of quotas imposed from the top. They advance vague concepts of worker and peasant participation in economic decision making. They speak of elections with multiple candidacies, heretofore a heresy in Soviet thinking. They condemn aspects of the existing censorship, such as bureaucrats defending their turf or taking care of personal friends.

What makes these propositions more impressive is that they are not put forward in the traditional Soviet manner as revealed truth. Rather they are advanced with a disarming admission of ignorance about the means to achieve them. Andrei Sakharov, whom we met in a moving encounter, stressed his belief in the seriousness of the reform program. He argued almost plaintively that there was no choice; any alternative would be worse.

All this is music to the ears of Westerners who believe that the Soviet vocabulary mimics that of the West. It is easy to overlook the fact that reform so far consists essentially of a major speech by Gorbachev to the Central Committee—and that several of his recommendations, such as retirement at the age of 70, were not reflected in the Central Committee statement ending

the plenum. When I asked about the discrepancy, a member of the Central Committee explained that the best talent in the Central Committee staff had worked on the speech, not the resolution.

Gorbachev's program clearly faces major obstacles. Not the least significant is the historical Russian tendency to bend pronouncements from on high to the elemental rhythm of a long-suffering people. Then there are major contradictions—to use a Marxist phrase—in Gorbachev's program. It seeks to rely on markets while emphasizing central planning. Those two objectives are likely to prove as incompatible in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. So is the attempt to base production on real costs while subsidizing the prices of major items. The theory of *glasnost*—or openness—may well be based on the misconception, which comes naturally to a Leninist, that there is only one truth.

But left to their own devices, men and women tend to reach contradictory conclusions from the same body of facts. Eventually that tendency toward pluralism is likely to oblige the new Soviet leadership to choose between Western-style democracy and repression. When confronting this choice in the past, Communist leaders have always opted for repression.

Similarly, economic decentralization is likely to spawn demands for political decentralization. This was a serious problem even in China, which is culturally homogeneous. The implications are much graver for an empire like the Soviet Union, composed of many nationalities that may well see in decentralization a first step toward national autonomy.

In the euphoria engendered by the new style of Soviet leadership, there has been a deafness to explicit Soviet statements emphatically rejecting any intention of moving toward a market economy or any kind of Western democracy. True, our Soviet hosts expressed grave doubts about the efficacy of central planning, but they were equally emphatic on the need to retain its key features.

This reflects the realities of the Soviet system. What would be the function of the Communist Party if there were no central planning? And what leader who owes his eminence to the communist system—as is the case with Gorbachev and all his colleagues—can imagine a communist state without a dominant Communist Party? In short, the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state today and it will be a totalitarian state even after the reforms are completed, albeit a somewhat more benign one.

The new Soviet reform program has unleashed the perennial nostalgia of the democracies for seeking salvation in a conversion of the Soviet system to Western values. The West German foreign minister has already announced that we must not let this opportunity pass. In other words, some concessions not justified on foreign-policy grounds should be made to encourage a reform program which the Soviet Union needs for its own purposes.

But the sophisticated, tough-minded, able and urbane Soviet leaders we met are not reforming their society as a favor to us. They seek efficiency, productivity, technology—not democracy. They need a respite in the international field to accomplish these objectives; they have not been converted to Western pacifist notions. If they succeed in the objective of making their country stronger—without changing the foreign policy that produced current tensions—the democracies will in the long run be less secure.

I am not suggesting that the West has an interest in the failure of Gorbachev's experiment. Rather it cannot gear its foreign policy to a Soviet domestic program, however attractive. The only Soviet leader who did not die in office was also the principal reformer; Khrushchev was overthrown by the Central Committee. He also carried out the most adventurous foreign policy, witness the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis.

It cannot be in the interest of the democracies to gamble on an international structure dependent on Soviet self-restraint. The test of Gorbachev's statement that his top priority is domestic reform must be whether it can be translated into specific conditions that make a difference for international security.

SHONE—SIPA PRESS

In a moving encounter, Sakharov stressed his belief in the seriousness of the reform program, arguing that there was no better alternative

Foreign-Policy Issues

For visiting delegations in a communist capital, discussing foreign policy can be treacherous. While diplomatic solutions usually result from an accumulation of nuances, a brief visit tends to focus on general propositions. One must resist the temptation of cooperating in the myth that diplomacy is like a detective story in which one side throws out vague hints and the other must guess at the answers. Serious proposals should be made through established channels, not to visiting delegations.

To some extent, a visiting delegation is always used for the purposes of the host country. For example, at one reception a Soviet space scientist took me aside to tell me with great earnestness about a laser experiment he wished to conduct with one of the moons of Mars. It was extremely flattering to be the recipient of such information, especially as no Western space scientist ever thought me worthy of his confidence (on the correct premise that I would not understand it). In this case the purpose was clearly to convey a hint of Soviet flexibility with respect to testing in space—though people more knowledgeable than I soon enlightened me that it was not much of a concession.

Of the foreign-policy topics we discussed, the Soviets proved most interesting on the subject of Afghanistan. I had arrived in Moscow persuaded that the Soviet Union would never permit the overthrow of a regime established by Soviet power; that is certainly the essence of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. I am no longer so sure. Our Soviet hosts emphasized their desire for total withdrawal. They also affirmed the goal of a government of national reconciliation that would include representatives of the guerrilla groups. They hinted at a short period for withdrawal; they seemed prepared to discuss—though not to be specific about—the evolution of the Kabul government after a withdrawal. I asked a senior Communist whether it was possible for the Soviets to stand by while a communist government collapsed. He replied that the Kabul government was not communist and technically not even socialist.

It would be rash to draw dramatic conclusions from these statements. It is possible that this apparent flexibility was designed to soften us up for the major onslaught on

arms control. Perhaps these hints are designed to tempt Pakistan to stop the supply of arms to the Afghan guerrillas. But it should be relatively easy to test Soviet intentions. If the Soviets are serious about an Afghan settlement, they will have to meet two conditions: (1) to set a short deadline for withdrawal—say six months or less; (2) to leave the future of the so-called government of reconciliation to Afghan domestic evolution without the threat of a new Soviet intervention.

In return, the United States can agree to end the supply of arms to the Afghan freedom fighters as Soviet forces withdraw and to respect Afghan neutrality. Such an agreement, were it attainable, would represent the most significant Soviet foreign-policy move since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria 30 years ago.

But Afghanistan seemed a secondary problem for our hosts. Their overwhelming preoccupation was with ending President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Our hosts, including Gorbachev, seemed determined to enshrine the Reykjavik framework as sacrosanct—and to interpret it as eviscerating SDI. The Reykjavik framework has three components: (1) a reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces by 50 percent, (2) the removal and destruction of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe, the so-called "zero option," (3) limitations on the Strategic Defense Initiative not yet finally negotiated.

After agreement on the first two points, Reykjavik broke down over SDI. Reagan and Gorbachev had already agreed on a 10-year moratorium on deployment of SDI. But President Reagan refused to accept Gorbachev's proposition that during the moratorium testing on strategic defense should be restricted to "laboratories"—that is to say, no field testing would be permitted.

Since then Soviet negotiators have thrown out tantalizing hints—like those of the space scientist I talked with—that "laboratory testing" could be defined liberally and that some SDI components might even be tested in space. The Soviets were very careful to avoid precision, probably because they want to elicit an American offer. For after an American proposal, Soviet negotiators could then whittle away at it until the combination of test limitations and deployment moratorium effectively kills SDI.

I consider the Reykjavik framework extremely disadvantageous. Moreover, it may be squandering the historic opportunity represented by a new and more dynamic Soviet leadership. For one thing, the Reykjavik framework is not balanced. The 50 percent reduction of strategic forces should stand by itself. It is not Nirvana, since it still leaves each side with close to twice as many warheads as President Kennedy had at the time of the Cuban missile crisis (when he thought he was facing Armageddon). But it would be a significant symbolic achievement. Whatever its ultimate merits, the balance of benefits and risks in such an agreement would be the same for both sides. Thus, no additional price should be paid to obtain them.

But the two additional components of the Reykjavik framework—the zero option on medium-range missiles and the restrictions on SDI—are in effect unilateral concessions on our part. The removal of American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe leaves unimpaired the Soviet ability to devastate Europe with short-range missiles and ICBM's. It eliminates the American ability to retaliate from Europe. It thus magnifies European fears that America might not respond to a nuclear attack confined to Europe, much less to a conventional one. With such an agreement, the Soviet strategy to decouple the defense of Europe from that of the United States will gain momentum.

The Reykjavik treatment of Asian-based missiles compounds the problem. It "balances" 100 Soviet warheads on medium-range missiles aimed at the Far East (and transportable to Europe) by 100 warheads located in the continental United States, where they can retaliate against Mexico or Canada but not against the Soviet Union. The Soviets even object to basing these missiles in Alaska, though no realistic base for them would be within range of any significant Soviet target.

The Reykjavik framework culminates in the relentless Soviet pressure to do away with SDI. I consider SDI a major contribution to Western strategy. In its absence, the West must rely on the mutual assured destruction theory, which seeks deterrence through the devastation of civilian populations and industrial targets.

This strategy has two huge handicaps: it leaves the democracies with no choice between surrender and suicide. And it imposes an unbearable psychological burden. For how long can democractic leaders tell their public that their security is based on leaving them naked to extermination? Faced with such prospects, pacifism and unilateral disarmament will sooner or later sap the will to defend the West.

In Moscow, responsible military figures told us that major conventional disarmament can take place only in a global context—in other words, only if China and other countries bordering the Soviet Union join in. This position has the practical consequence of neatly deferring the issue into an indefinite future. The West is therefore being asked to accept an arms-control regimen that leaves it facing a massive conventional imbalance from which it could extricate itself only by the early use of nuclear weapons. Yet the very arms-control agreements now being contemplated would render such a course suicidal.

The attitude of our European allies is hard to comprehend. It is confusing enough that they do not make explicit the grave reservations they have about the zero option. In addition, most of them actively seek to dissuade the Reagan administration from pursuing SDI. It takes more than uncertainty about SDI technology to explain why democratic leaders should prefer to leave their public undefended even against small-scale attacks, third-country strikes and accidents. It is the triumph of a theory that exalts the fact of agreement over its substance. In the end it stakes everything on the escapist gamble that Gorbachev's reform program will render the Soviets benign.

This is why the quest for "compromise" is so dangerous within the Reykjavik framework—and why the Soviet leaders are so eager to declare it sacrosanct. My visit to Moscow leaves me with little doubt that a "compromise" can be had for the asking. It would permit testing sensors even in space. It would prohibit the testing in space of antiballistic missile devices or of



ROGER RESSMEYER—STARLIGHT

Within the Reykjavik framework, no genuine compromise is possible: the Soviets want to destroy SDI, the Reagan administration to preserve it

systems linking sensors to killing devices.

Though such a solution would be presented as a Soviet retreat, it would not be a compromise but an American concession which would render SDI nearly meaningless. In the democracies various peace groups, scientific congresses, legislators and the media would vigilantly police the agreement. In the Soviet Union it would prove impossible to verify—whatever the formal arrangements. Indeed, with the passage of time the incentive for vigilance would diminish. If the democracies cannot agree that the radar near Krasnoyarsk—the size of three football fields, hundreds of miles from its permitted location under the 1972 ABM treaty—is a violation, how can they possibly agree on disputed violations in outer space?

The compromise that the Soviets so subtly hinted at to our delegation is likely to turn into a one-way street. In effect, the Soviets would be given an interval to catch up with SDI or even to surpass it while we immobilize our program. Given that prospect, I would prefer a complete ban on space testing for both sides to the qualitative restraints now being considered.

The visit to Moscow left me with little doubt that within the present framework no genuine compromise on SDI is possible. The Soviets clearly want to destroy SDI; the Reagan administration so far has sought to preserve it. The Soviets will not agree to a research program that explores practical feasibility; the United States, if it is true to itself, can do no less. Any formula that fudges the issue would lead to endless controversy and insecurity.

But a deeper issue is involved than either negotiating tactics or even military strategy. It goes to the heart of East-West relations. If at a moment of maximum Soviet preoccupation with domestic change the West feels obliged to strike such a disadvantageous bargain, what conceivable incentive exists for further Soviet concessions? What will be our negotiating stance after the contemplated agreement is consummated? When will it be possible to achieve a truly balanced agreement or a genuine improvement in global security?

With some melancholy, I am driven to wonder how the intelligent Soviet leadership group might have reacted to a philosophical approach, rather than the numbers game of standard arms-control talks, when the Reagan presidency was at its height—say, at the Geneva summit. What would have been their response to a conceptual discussion on the relationship between strategic offense and defense—or, even better, to an attempt to define the superpower relationship a decade hence? Perhaps the outcome would have been the same; but it is a pity not to have tried.

Instead the democracies are in danger of succumbing to self-induced emotional blackmail. Every Soviet proposal, however one-sided and however much a variation on the same theme, elicits pressures for some reciprocity. The practical consequence is to nudge the Western bargaining stance step by step toward the Soviet position.

What the U.S. Should Do

At this point, President Reagan finds his choices limited. He is told that his place in history depends on making an arms-control agreement. Yet the agreement being urged on him would in effect eviscerate SDI, which may be his greatest contribution to strategic theory.

EUGENE POMEROY—VISIONS

I had arrived in Moscow persuaded that the Soviet Union would never permit the overthrow of its regime in Afghanistan; I am no longer so sure

The time has therefore come to return to fundamentals. The greatest public service President Reagan can perform at this stage is to advance a coherent statement of America's philosophy regarding both security and arms control. Specifically, this requires some conceptual definition of SDI. It is too late to pursue the mirage of eliminating nuclear weapons. This is simply impossible, either by agreement among statesmen or by technological expedients such as a leakproof space shield. For the foreseeable future, the best hope is to achieve such a balance between offense and defense that the attacker would be penalized under any predictable circumstance. This is not an easy matter. It will surely emphasize the growing significance of the conventional threat. But it is time for our allies to face the fact that this is inherent in the evolution of technology, not in American choices.

Specifically:

- The Reykjavik framework should be abandoned.
- The administration should propose a 50 percent cut in both strategic and medium-range forces. This would bring about a substantial reduction while avoiding the danger of decoupling the defense of Europe from that of the United States.
- The administration should offer to negotiate a *quantitative* relationship between offensive and defensive forces. It should avoid the twin traps of *qualitative* limitations on testing and a prolonged moratorium on deployment. It could accept a quantitative limit on ABM tests to a fixed number each year without limiting their type or nature. This might provide time for realistic negotiations. But it would not change the direction or thrust of SDI.
- To permit this process to proceed, the United States could offer to extend the present abrogation clause in the ABM treaty from six months to, say, two years.

In our conversation with Gorbachev, he asked rhetorically why I was turning against my accomplishments of a decade ago. Had there been an occasion to reply, I would have pointed out that the agreements of a decade and a half ago were an important achievement of which I am proud. But they were intended to be a starting point, not a final destination. Fifteen years later—in a decade of multiple warheads, of Angola and Afghanistan and Cambodia—they cannot possibly be enough.

The same willingness to transcend established patterns that has characterized Gorbachev's and Reagan's thinking on some domestic matters is also needed on both sides in foreign policy. The two superpowers have nothing to gain by eternal conflict. A war between them would leave both so gravely weakened that other countries or regions would thereafter determine the future. Attempts to achieve a unilateral advantage cannot succeed in the long run. Why not make a new attempt that starts with a concept of what the political and security relationship of the two superpowers might look like a decade hence and work back from there? This would at least be the right question. And these next two years—with a conservative American president who has nothing to lose from a bold approach and a new Soviet leadership that has everything to gain from tranquillity—may be the right occasion.

Subject cc Master

STRICTLY PERSONAL

SH

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1986

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER: POLITICAL MATTERS

The Prime Minister had a long talk with Dr. Kissinger this morning. Much of it was about arms control, and I am recording this part separately. There was also some discussion about developments in Washington. Dr. Kissinger specifically asked that his views on this should not be reported. Please therefore treat this letter as for the personal information of the Foreign Secretary and Permanent Under-Secretary.

The Prime Minister said that anything which weakened the United States weakened the free world. President Reagan had, over the past six years, rebuilt American strength and leadership. It was essential to help restore his confidence in himself and his ability to get out of the present situation. The worst outcome would be a crippled Presidency for the next two years. He had to be able to convey the message that, for better or worse, Iran was behind him and there was important work to be done. This in turn meant that he needed some new initiative to restore momentum to his Administration. This needed careful consideration. The worst outcome would be a crippled Presidency for the next two years.

Dr. Kissinger agreed with the Prime Minister. The President and what he stood for must be preserved and restored. He had spoken three times to the President in the last week. He had found the President still confused. His main concern was with defending his decisions on Iran and protecting his staff. He needed to stop being defensive and concentrate on the real task which was saving his Presidency. He could not win on Iran and must not allow the Presidency to become obsessed with the details of the investigation, while the initiative on policy issues passed out of the White House. Dr. Kissinger continued that he had advised the President to sack everyone in the Administration who had not supported him. This was essential to restore discipline and authority. He was fairly certain that Mr. Regan would go within the week. He welcomed the appointment of Carlucci. The President was also turning again to Mike Deaver and Spencer for advice. The President was at his best when he relied on his instincts

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which were usually right. But he needed people who would explain to him frankly the consequences of various decisions. That was what the White House had lacked. In this respect the Prime Minister's role was absolutely crucial. She was the only person outside the United States to whom the President listened and he constantly referred to her. It was important that she should offer him continuing support and advice. She ought to telephone him more often.

Dr. Kissinger agreed that some initiative in the foreign policy field was required. It had to be identifiably the President's own initiative. His own preference would be to see the President say to Gorbachev that, in the remaining two years of his Presidency, they should focus on a limited arms control package (details in my separate letter). But this would need most careful management in which, once again, the Prime Minister would have to play a leading part. The risk was that others in the Administration might go racing off after some hare-brained scheme while the President's authority was diminished.

At the end, Dr. Kissinger said that he would be talking to the President at the weekend and would convey the general sense of his discussion with the Prime Minister. He was at great pains to establish that he himself would not be joining the Administration.

(C.D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SUBJECT / MASTER

SH

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

bcPC file

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 December 1986

Dear Tony,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER: ARMS CONTROL

Much of the Prime Minister's talk today with Dr. Kissinger was taken up with arms control and the follow-up to Reykjavik. I did not take any notes. The following is my recollection of the main points.

The Prime Minister spoke frankly. Reykjavik had been an earthquake. All the good work done by the Reagan Administration to strengthen United States relations with Europe had been put at risk. She was determined to set aside Reykjavik. She had decided at Camp David that the best course was first to reaffirm the essentials of NATO strategy; and second to pick out the elements of Reykjavik which we could accept and argue that they should receive priority. By implication everything else would be left aside, although not explicitly abandoned. Even the points which she had accepted went further than she would have chosen. This applied particularly to the zero option for INF in Europe. But politically there had been no alternative. Her main concern remained to bring home to the President that the effect of what he had done in Reykjavik ran flatly contrary to his real objectives.

Dr. Kissinger spoke generally along the lines of his recent articles. He understood the considerations which had guided the Prime Minister at Camp David and thought the statement agreed there extremely skilful. In his own view, none of the proposals discussed in Reykjavik would have improved the West's security. Rather they would have undermined deterrence, separated the United States from Europe and given help and comfort to the 'semi-neutralists' in Europe. In negotiating terms Reykjavik had been a disgrace. The origins of the problem could be traced to the President's inability to reconcile the conflicting currents in the United States bureaucracy. For instance it was absurd that Richard Perle, who wouldn't even give away three rifles from the US army, had supported the proposal for eliminating strategic ballistic missiles. The reason was a cynical belief that the more extravagant the proposals, the less likely it was that any progress at all would be made. This was a high-risk game.

His nightmare was that Gorbachev might subtly alter his position on SDI testing, leading to a bureaucratic stampede in Washington to reach agreements on the basis outlined in Reykjavik.

Dr. Kissinger continued that his main worry was over the zero option for INF in Europe. This would have very little effect on the Soviet Union's offensive capability. The SS-20s were not very significant. On the other hand, the West would be deprived of a strategic retaliatory capability based in Europe. He was also worried about the decoupling effect. He hoped that it would be possible to work towards an alternative solution. This might be found by including LRINF in the 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. This would be less damaging.

Dr. Kissinger said that he also had reservations about the proposals put forward in Reykjavik on SDI. He was opposed in principle to a moratorium on SDI deployment. Were a moratorium established, Congress would stop voting funds for SDI and the military would lose interest because they would not guarantee that the investment which they made would see a return in terms of an effective system. Moreover, history showed that the United States had never been the first to break a moratorium. The result would be that the United States' SDI would wither while the Soviet Union pursued its own work. He acknowledged that the SDI would never offer the impenetrable shield claimed by President Reagan. But equally he could not understand the position of those who made a virtue of defencelessness. The right course was to agree an extension of the period of notice for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, say to two years, while negotiating limits on the size and scale of an SDI system when deployed. The Prime Minister commented that she had never understood the President's offer to share the results of SDI research with the Soviet Union. Dr. Kissinger agreed. It would mean sharing the most up to date computer technology, when in the real world the United States was still denying the Soviet Union access to computer technology which was several generations out of date.

Dr. Kissinger said that it was in the overwhelming interest of Mr. Gorbachev to reach an arms control agreement with President Reagan rather than wait for a successor. Waiting would in effect mean postponing any agreement for 4-6 years; and the difficulty for a successor of negotiating <u>any</u> agreement in the shadow of failure by President Reagan to do so should not be underestimated. In his judgement, the President's need for a new political initiative to distract attention from Iran pointed to a further effort to reach an arms control agreement, but one much more limited in scope than Reykjavik. The main elements would be - as set out in his own recent article - a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and LRINF, an extension to two years of the period for abrogation of the ABM Treaty, a limitation on the number of warheads each missile could carry, and action to strengthen NATO's conventional forces. This would be a signal of getting back to business as usual.

Dr. Kissinger said that he was unable to make up his mind about Gorbachev. Was it just the same rigid Communism under a shiny cover? Or was there a prospect of new policies? He saw a basic contradiction. Gorbachev needed the political support of the Army and the KGB, as the two groups in the Soviet Union who had at least some contact with the outside world, for economic reforms. But they were the groups most opposed to changes or concessions in foreign policy. The Party, on the other hand, might support concessions in foreign policy but were opposed to economic and social reform. At some point, probably still some years away, Gorbachev would have to face up to this contradiction and make a move either to reduce defence spending or to push through major economic reform. What happened in China might be a catalyst. He thought that the Soviet Union dreaded the success of China's experiment with more liberal policies, to the point where they might in the end attack China.

The Prime Minsiter regards this very much as a private conversation. This letter should not therefore be shown at all widely. I should mention that she sees some attraction in Dr. Kissinger's limited package on arms control.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

cc BJUP

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

You are seeing Henry Kissinger tomorrow morning.

You might start by getting his assessment of the situation in Washington and how much worse it is likely to get before it gets better. How badly wounded is the President? Can he recover sufficiently to mount a strong and coherent foreign policy for the remaining two years of his term? Or are we going to see drift? If there are new initiatives, from where are they most likely to come? How does he rate Frank Carlucci (now nominated as Poindexter's successor)?

You might then go on to discuss Reykjavik and its aftermath. As you will see from his two articles (attached), Kissinger is very sceptical indeed of Reykjavik. He is particularly opposed to the zero option for INF (though strongly fails to mention shorter-range systems) and thinks the 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons barely relevant. He is appalled by the proposed elimination of strategic ballistic missiles. In his view, the key requirement is to reduce the proportion of warheads to vulnerable launchers. His own solution is to go for an interim agreement, with a modest reduction of strategic forces, a limitation on the warheads each missile can carry, extension of the time for abrogating the ABM Treaty to two years, a modest reduction in INF, and immediate efforts to improve the conventional military balance. On this score, he should generally welcome the Camp David points, but not be entirely happy with them on INF. You might ask his view on how best to handle the Administration in the post-Reykjavik phase. Is Gorbachev likely now to wait for the next President rather than negotiate seriously with this one? What more should the Alliance be doing to get its views across ?

You might next discuss the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, in the light of your forthcoming visit. How great are the pressures on Gorbachev to restrain defence spending? Does he expect changes in the substance as well as the presentation of Soviet policies?

Finally, you might ask how he sees the prospects of getting the US Administration to make some serious move on the Middle East. You are trying hard, but it is like trying to push water uphill. What does he think offers the most promising way forward?

C D P.

C. D. POWELL

2 December 1986

LOGABW

Fundamental Agreements Do Not Happen Overnight

WSP
19/10/87

Predictably, the Reykjavik summit has unleashed an intense debate about its wisdom and its outcome. But the most important need is to draw the appropriate lessons for the future. Too many administration spokesmen are extolling the "agreement" they claim was all but consummated, thereby supporting the Soviet fiction that the president's Strategic Defense Initiative was the principal obstacle to a historic breakthrough.

As a veteran of four summits, I get a sinking feeling when I read of fundamental agreements being drafted overnight on subjects never explored in preliminary conversations. Nor do I think the United States and the Soviet Union were anywhere close to a completed agreement, much less a useful one.

My view as to the merit of Reykjavik can be summed up in two propositions: the president, to his eternal credit, was right and courageous in walking away from Mikhail Gorbachev's propositions. The tentative agreements at Reykjavik were not breakthroughs; some of them indeed were traps. The need to think through the American position therefore remains urgent.

At Reykjavik the Reagan administration paid the price for never resolving its deep internal divisions over arms control and East-West relations. And the country paid a price for the relentless domestic pressures by Congress and other groups that led the Soviets to believe they could make an appeal over the head of the president, as Gorbachev had the gall to state publicly.

The administration has partially invited them pressures by trying to paper over fundamental disagreements by slogans. The so-called zero option—the removal of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe—is a good example. The relentless Soviet strategic buildup over the past two decades raised the question of whether the United States would commit national suicide by using nuclear weapons based in the United States against threats to Europe. And hundreds of Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles aimed at Western Europe placed America's allies under a direct threat. American missiles were deployed in Europe to reassure Europe and to remove ambiguity from Soviet calculations.

President Reagan's first term witnessed an intense debate between those who wanted to negotiate limits to deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe—mostly in the State Department and among the NATO allies—and those who considered the project nonnegotiable—mostly in the Defense Department. To pull the teeth of these controversies the administration put forward the zero option. Ironically, it was first suggested by the Defense Department, which calculated that the Soviets would reject it. In the end a tactical ploy wound up developing a life of its own.

The acceptance of the zero option is a major political point. Removing Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe reduces the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe only marginally if at all, because the removal of hundreds of medium-range American missiles would destroy the direct link between the nuclear defense of Europe and of the United States. It would also magnify the psychological disparity between the two sides of the Atlantic and improve the Soviets' ability to subject Europe to nuclear blackmail.

The very offer to remove intermediate-range American missiles from Europe will have a significant domestic impact on both Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. For years these governments have fought courageously against often violent domestic opposition to the American missile deployment. Before the deployment is even completed they now find the United States declaring it dispensable. The upshot must be a weakening of friends of the United States and a strengthening of the neutralist trend in Europe.

"Deep cuts" is another consensus slogan that unites liberals eager for arms control and conservatives seeking a popular platform for their opposition to arms control. The phrase obfuscates the fundamental dilemma. In the absence of SDI—the key Soviet condition—the 50 percent reduction of each category of strategic nuclear weapons that was discussed at Reykjavik will ease significantly neither the danger of surprise attack nor the danger of civilian extermination. So long as each missile carries up to 10 warheads, one launcher can simultaneously attack several submarines. Unless the number of warheads per missile is reduced, the danger of a first strike will remain at almost any negotiated total of launchers.

Moreover, under the Reykjavik proposal the number of missile-launching submarines would have to be cut at least in half. Since antisubmarine forces are not considered strategic, the remaining submarines will become proportionately more vulnerable.

Nor is the safety of the civilian population improved in the slightest. Six thousand unopposed warheads are more than enough to destroy civilized life in the United States and in Western Europe. The best that can be said for the first stage of the Reykjavik scheme on offensive weapons is that it would not worsen the situation.

Even more worrisome is the matter of the next stage, which envisages the complete abolition of ballistic missiles at the end of 10 years.

"The president, to his eternal credit, was right and courageous in walking away from Mikhail Gorbachev's propositions."

The negotiations defining what weapons are to be destroyed, the rate of destruction and the verification of the process would be so complex that they could easily consume much of the 10 years and might break down at any of the many stages needed.

I do not understand how administration spokesmen can present such a vague statement of objectives as a nearly achieved agreement in this regard. And it is astonishing that it was presented, according to administration spokesmen, without any discussion with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Moreover, as Secretary of State George P. Shultz has stated, the scheme could go into effect only if Britain, France and China followed suit, and this would involve similar negotiations with each of these countries. I do not believe that China and France would go along, since they would be left with no counter to Soviet air attacks.

In any event, is the United States to permit itself to join with the Soviet Union in discussing friendly countries in matters about which they were never consulted? It is clearer now why the Soviets did not accept the 10-year moratorium on deployment offered by the United States, a moratorium that, in my view, would slowly kill SDI.

Administration spokesmen do no service to public understanding by falling in with the Soviet pretense that eliminating nuclear weapons is either realistic or realizable. No conceivable verification scheme could account for the tens of thousands of warheads in the arsenals of both sides. A reserve force would therefore have to be left to protect against possible violations. Provision would have to be made against possible threats from third countries. Before they knew it, the negotiators would be back at the starting point: to analyze the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with mutual security.

Finally, an alliance dependent on nuclear weapons should think twice before surrendering the means of

their abolition without at the same time agreeing to a massive increase in conventional forces to meet the massive Soviet conventional threat. Yet there is not the slightest evidence that such a course is even contemplated.

As for SDI, I consider the so-called Star Wars program one of the seminal decisions of the Reagan presidency. SDI provides at least a partial way out of a nihilistic strategy based on mutual extermination. At a minimum, it would complicate the calculations of an attacker. Those who blame Reagan for letting SDI abort Reykjavik should remind themselves that it was SDI that brought the Soviets back to the negotiation table and produced whatever concessions have since been offered.

Faced with predictable opposition, the administration chose to elaborate a distinction between research, testing and deployment, deferring the ultimate decision until the outcome of technical investigations was clearer. The tactic separated offensive and defensive negotiations and tempted the Soviets to isolate SDI in Reykjavik. The same weird coalition that supported the zero option and "deep cuts" formed also on SDI. Groups that wanted to kill SDI combined with groups seeking to sustain it in a compromise that gave the critics a powerful lever, especially in Congress. SDI was transformed by critics from a strategic program into a bargaining chip to be given away for arms reductions—regardless of whether these reductions made strategic sense.

America's allies have encouraged these tendencies.

"The tentative agreements at Reykjavik were not breakthroughs; some of them indeed were traps."

They have seen in U.S. nuclear strategy a means to limit their own defense expenditures; they have urged arms control to placate essentially implacable domestic critics. Arms control in Europe is on the verge of [illegible] government will dare to make explicit its misgivings about the zero option that was nearly struck at Reykjavik.

Perhaps the most interesting question about Reykjavik is what induced Gorbachev to exploit American domestic ambiguities. And why, instead of agreeing to study the proposal, the U.S. delegation permitted itself to be rushed into using what had been announced as a pre-summit to try to conclude a comprehensive arms control agreement within 36 hours. (After all, Gorbachev had taken three months to study a much less complicated proposal by Reagan.) Reagan courageously resisted the attempt to panic him into a one-sided agreement. Now he faces the problem of putting the pieces together again.

A remarkable opportunity for fundamental negotiation with the Soviets still exists. A new Soviet leadership faces nearly insuperable domestic problems. It badly needs a respite from international tensions and seeks to purchase it by retaining all options: for nuclear blackmail; for a first strike; of a superiority in conventional weapons; of splitting the United States from its allies. But in the end if the president remains firm, Gorbachev will adopt more equitable positions. The Soviets will not easily give up their goal of committing the most conservative and most popular president of his generation to arms control. Waiting for a successor is too uncertain, too time-consuming and too risky for them.

When negotiation resumes—probably after the American elections in November and the German elections in January—it must be in a different context. A way must be found to explore U.S.-Soviet relations so that the misunderstandings that led to deadlock at Reykjavik are avoided and a conceptual discussion can take place before numbers are tossed around.

Specifically:

- The president's proposal of eliminating all ballistic missiles is important. But the stages of reaching it must be made precise if it is not to backfire. The first goal of arms control must be to reduce the proportion of warheads to vulnerable launchers. The next step must be to reduce the number of launchers to the lowest possible level.
- The political significance of American missiles in Europe must be recognized. Reductions must not be to a level that decouples the nuclear defense of Europe from that of the United States.
- SDI must be given a strategic rationale. The pretense that we are dealing with a research program must be abandoned. The 10-year limitation on deployment proposed at Reykjavik by the United States would spell the end of SDI. The administration should make clear that the level of its proposed defense will always be proportional to the offensive threat. The lower the level of offense, the lower can be the level of defense. Soviet concerns that some kinds of SDI can support a first-strike strategy can be taken care of in this context.
- Verification is another slogan in search of a program. It is not a substitute for meaningful agreements. It depends on three factors: the intrinsic importance of an agreement; the margin within which it is estimated violations are possible; the strategic importance of the violations and the degree to which countermeasures have been prepared. For example, the Soviets have built in Krasnoyarsk a radar the size of two football fields 1,000 miles from where it is permitted under the ABM treaty. That fact has been known for years. But other than denouncing the ABM treaty—probably too strong a response—no countermeasure has occurred to anyone.
- America must recognize that in a difficult period it is essential to unite. Gorbachev is clearly counting on the divisions and disagreements in America and in NATO to hand him his goals on a silver platter. It is clearly within the power of free peoples to prove him wrong.

Henry Kissinger

The 'Reykjavik Revolution':

WP
18/11/86

President Reagan has suggested that the sole remaining issue in arms control negotiations is when an agreement will be signed. the mélange of agreements, near-agreements and contradictory proposals that emerged at the Reykjavik presummit run the risk of undermining deterrence and the cohesion of the Western alliance.

There are three components to what can properly be called the Reykjavik revolution:

a) An agreement to reduce strategic forces by 50 percent coupled with a moratorium for 10 years on deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Though the Soviets have asked for more—to confine SDI to the laboratory for 10 years—I suspect that this issue will be compromised.

b) An agreement to withdraw U.S. and Soviet missiles of ranges of 1,500 kilometers and above from Western Europe and European Russia.

c) An American proposal to do away with all ballistic missiles over a 10-year period, countered by a Soviet proposal to do away with all strategic forces or, in its even more exalted form, with all nuclear weapons.

Grotesque as this may sound to the layman, a 50 percent cut of strategic forces would not ease the growing vulnerability of land-based missiles. It would increase the vulnerability of sea-based forces. And it would not diminish the Soviet capacity to exterminate American and allied civilian populations. The 6,000 warheads remaining after a 50 percent cut would be more than enough to maintain all existing threats.

Standing by itself, a 50 percent reduction could be counted as a modest symbolic success. It emphatically would not justify a prolonged moratorium on deploying SDI; I am convinced that such a delay would atrophy that program.

The key issue, however, is not the arcane disputes of military experts. It is that the Reykjavik edifice puts the entire postwar doctrine of deterrence into question, because it makes it even more doubtful that the United States would use nuclear weapons in defense of its allies. A 50 percent cut coupled with a moratorium on strategic defense would accentuate the tendency toward mass extermination inherent in current strategy. This would increase European fears that the United States would not respond to Soviet aggression against them with nuclear weapons from its own territory.

And the Reykjavik proposals would eliminate altogether the possibility of nuclear retaliation, either American or European, from European soil. They remove American medium-range missiles from Europe without diminishing significantly the capacity of the Soviet Union to attack Europe either with the hundreds of shorter-range missiles stationed in Eastern Europe or with intercontinental missiles based in the Soviet Union. And, according to the State Department, the proposals require the abandonment by France, Britain and China of their national missile forces.

It has been argued and I agree that changing technology requires a substantial buildup of conventional forces in any event. But wise statesmanship would take care not to leave a vacuum while the transition to a greater reliance on a conventional strategy is taking place—a process that cannot be completed in less than 15 years, assuming it takes place at all: defense budgets are under pressure in all democracies. It cannot be in the interest of the West to withdraw nuclear missiles in the United States and to eliminate all means of nuclear retaliation based in Europe while there is no nonnuclear force at hand or foreseeable to fill the gap.

No wonder that Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze insist that any future negotiations proceed from the Reykjavik basis, which would force the West to deal with Soviet conventional superiority around its periphery only by threatening or using the very nuclear weapons it has stigmatized by its arms control policies. Such a state of affairs tempts Soviet adventurism.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President Francois Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher have gone further in expressing their disquiet than I would have thought possible in the light of the domestic pressures on them. Did the U.S. negotiators understand that they were maneuvering allies into a position

where their need to hold on to nuclear missiles could be represented as an obstacle to agreement? Or that the U.S. position on nuclear weapons at Reykjavik was so close to that of the British Labor Party that it could deprive the Conservatives of a potential issue as the British elections approach? To be sure, the United States should not intervene in allied domestic politics. But neither should it weaken the Atlanticists in Europe in their often desperate struggle against a course perilously close to neutralism.

To some extent the European allies have invited this highhanded American behavior by their tendency to take a free ride on American efforts. But I cannot believe that the best way to bring about a reassessment of NATO strategy is through negotiations at the summit with the Soviet Union about which allies are neither notified nor consulted yet which go to the very heart of their own security system.

While strategy stagnates, political conflicts are neglected. The preoccupation in East-West diplomacy with arms control overwhelms political issues such as Afghanistan, the Middle East or Central America. Such political negotiations as take place turn into ritualistic repetitions of standard positions. There is a considerable risk that over the next decade some conflict or other will slide out of control in a strategic environment

Putting Deterrence in Question

made increasingly intractable by arms control diplomacy.

The United States in fact is likely to wind up in the worst of all worlds. Domestically the reiteration of the Reykjavik formulas will strengthen those who seek to emasculate SDI in the mistaken belief that so doing would speed arms control. It will, unintentionally, to be sure, strengthen neutralists and unilateral disarmers around the world.

How did the United States get into this position? Perhaps the fundamental reason is the absence of a system for setting long-range goals. American negotiating positions generally reflect an uneasy compromise among idealists, skeptics and technicians. The internal struggle absorbs more energy and thought than the elaboration of national strategy.

In the Brezhnev era the United States and its allies were often rescued from incoherence by the inflexibility of an aged Soviet leadership and the wariness of Andrei Gromyko, who suspected a deep design behind every tenuous bureaucratic compromise. But Gorbachev, perhaps tutored by Anatoly Dobrynin, is more subtle. At Reykjavik the Soviets suddenly em-

BY OHLSSON

braced American schemes, such as the proposal to eliminate all American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe, and thereby made U.S. internal contradictions startlingly evident.

And the imminence of negotiations causes the American bureaucratic process to generate spontaneous inconsistencies. The new justification for SDI, first advanced publicly at Reykjavik, is a good example. What had previously been advocated as a program to protect the civilian population against missile attack emerged at Reykjavik as a hedge against Soviet cheating after all ballistic missiles are eliminated. But if the United States can do without strategic defense in the 10 years when, under the American scheme, ballistic missiles are retained, why is it necessary to acquire a missile defense after ballistic missiles are eliminated? At that point a defense against airplanes would make much more sense. In any event, Congress is unlikely to spend billions for an anti-missile defense in a non-ballistic missile world.

The disputes within the bureaucracy mirror the disagreements of the body politic. For the moment the domestic stalemate has produced an eerie silence about Reykjavik. Conservatives are silent because, while uneasy about American proposals, they are reassured by the apparent diplomatic deadlock. Liberals are silent because, while uneasy about the deadlock, they do not want to be caught off guard by a sudden breakthrough. In this vacuum the bureaucracy pushes forward the only available program, which happens to be the unfortunate Reykjavik formula.

It will be painful to alter course, especially when a superficial success and accolades seem so near. But America's leaders must remember that their work will last longer in history than in headlines.

To devise more promising approaches the National Security machinery must be put in a position to raise its sights. It must stop acting primarily as the arbitrator between extreme positions developed for purposes of bureaucratic compromise. Moreover, the present negotiating method leaves too big a gap between the numbers crunchers at Geneva and the secretary of state or the president. Experience teaches that the Geneva forum tends to be submerged in detail and summits oscillate between atmospherics and imprecision. There can be no real progress by endlessly modifying numbers. It is necessary to begin with a vision of a more secure world and develop negotiating positions and strategies in relation to it.

The strangest aspect of the current situation is that by a rational analysis, and indeed by an analysis of their body language, both sides want an agreement. But they are so preoccupied with tactical maneuvering that they pass each other like ships in the night. The U.S. position drowns in technical complexity; the Soviets seem obsessed with their new-found skill at public relations. The most desirable moratorium would be on public diplomacy. Both sides should negotiate quietly about what they are trying to achieve before returning to the numbers game.

This will surely require a lowering of stated objectives. Perhaps the best solution is to aim for an interim agreement: a modest reduction of strategic forces, a limitation on warheads each missile can carry and an extension of the time period for abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty from six months to two years. Intermediate-range forces should be reduced by the same percentage as strategic forces but, in order to maintain the psychological link to Europe, not to zero. Immediate efforts must be undertaken to improve the conventional military balance in Europe, either by arms control measures or by a buildup. Indeed Reykjavik will prove a blessing if it shocks the alliance into overcoming the evasions of recent decades and developing a coherent military and arms control strategy.

The key role will be the president's. He has an important choice to make: he can try to abolish nuclear weapons at one fell swoop or he can be the president to inaugurate a new approach that will ultimately make the world a safer place. He is now leaning toward the first approach, which is impossible, is demoralizing to the allies and would relegate him to arbitrator of technical disputes.

The second course is still open to him. I continue to believe that the Soviets attach extraordinary importance to concluding an agreement with the most popular and most conservative president of his era. There is still time to interrupt the compulsive momentum, to reassess and to proceed to what can be a lasting service to the cause of peace.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1986

Dear Charles,

Dr Henry Kissinger

The Prime Minister has agreed that Dr Kissinger may call on her at 10.45 on 3 December. As background, you may care to have the following brief outline of his current work, views, standing and prospects.

At present, Dr Kissinger is Chairman of Kissinger Associates, a consulting firm working for US and foreign corporations providing mostly analysis and contacts but also lobbying Congress on his customers' behalf. He also undertakes some academic teaching and writing as professor at Georgetown University, and regularly commands high fees as a keynote speaker (he gave the Ernest Bevin Memorial Lecture at the House of Commons on 1 December) and he continues to write for leading newspapers in the United States.

Dr Kissinger is a regular pundit on almost all foreign policy issues and it is never easy to pin down his exact position on any given subject. However, he has been very critical of the current Administration's handling of foreign policy, especially the Reykjavik meeting. For ease of reference I attach copies (already sent to you by Washington) of two recent articles. He has also made critical public references to the Administration's role in the Iran/ Nicaragua affair. He is also a consistent advocate of the withdrawal of some US forces from Europe and their redeployment in more strategically vital regions.

Dr Kissinger is a well respected elder statesman and foreign policy guru but is not an insider with the current Administration because the Republican Right have never trusted him. His name has been mentioned in the last few days as a possible National Security Adviser but this is unlikely. It is not impossible that he could play a role in some future Administration.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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File

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 November 1986

Dear Colin,

MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

I see from Washington telegram number 2429 that Dr. Kissinger is visiting London on 3 December and wants to see the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister would equally like to see him. Could you please arrange for him to come at 1045 hours that day.

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

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Prime Minister
It might be rather useful to see him. Agree?
CDP
19/XI

GRS 240

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON
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VISIT TO LONDON BY DR KISSINGER

1. DR KISSINGER'S OFFICE HAVE TOLD US THAT HE WILL BE IN LONDON FOR ONE DAY ON 3 DECEMBER AND WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER IF SHE WERE ABLE TO SEE HIM. HE ARRIVES EARLY THAT MORNING FROM STOCKHOLM AND HAS A DINNER ENGAGEMENT AT CLARIDGES IN THE EVENING: OTHERWISE HE COULD MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME WHICH SUITED THE PRIME MINISTER.

Yes pl

2. DR KISSINGER IS STILL INFLUENTIAL, THOUGH HE HOLDS NO FORMAL GOVERNMENT POSITION. HIS SYNDICATED ARTICLES ARE WIDELY READ. IN THE TWO LATEST ONES HE HAS STRESSED (HELPFULLY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW) THE DANGERS FOR THE US AND FOR THE ALLIES OF SOME OF THE PROPOSITIONS DISCUSSED AT REYKJAVIK, AND HAS URGED THE ADOPTION OF MORE MODEST POST-REYKJAVIK OBJECTIVES WHICH WOULD PRESERVE STABLE DETERRENCE (TEXTS BY FAX TO PAKENHAM, ACDD AND TO POWELL AT NO 10).

3. GRATEFUL TO KNOW HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS TO POWELL AT NO 10.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 7854

LIMITED
NAD MR GILLMORE
DEFENCE D MR GOODALL
NEWS D MR FEARN
INFO D MR FALL
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MR POWELL NO10
DOWNING ST.

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Subject to master

File MT2 AWI

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 July 1985

Dear Len,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR KISSINGER

The Prime Minister had a talk with Dr Kissinger this morning covering arms control, Central America, international debt, South Africa and the Middle East.

Arms Control/SDI

Dr Kissinger took the view that the prospects for reaching arms control agreements with the Russians were reasonably good. President Reagan had built up United States' strength and gained the Russians' respect in his first term. He had put himself in a strong position to negotiate in his second term. But Geneva was not the right forum. It was a setting in which bureaucrats could trade numbers which represented no more than their own internal compromises. Real progress would require an impetus at the Reagan/Gorbachev level.

Dr Kissinger continued that his initial reaction to Strategic Defence Initiative had been that it ran contrary to every idea which he had ever had. But on further reflection he had changed his view. He believed that it could become the key to unlock arms control negotiations. If combined with reductions in offensive missiles - particularly if such reduction could also comprise a move away from MIRVs and back towards single-warhead missiles - it should be possible to eliminate the danger of a first strike, while building a defence against rogue third countries. It could also play a vital role in maintaining support for deterrence. As long as deterrence rested upon two large offensive forces facing each other, unilateralism or pacificism would eventually gain plausibility. SDI, by its emphasis on defence, offered a more respectable concept which could defuse opposition to deterrence without in practice significantly reducing dependence upon it.

Dr Kissinger said that the main trend in the Administration's thinking with which he disagreed was the Nitze approach. He identified this as drawing a line

between research and deployment and making the latter dependent upon first a demonstration of strategic defence's cost-effectiveness and survivability and second negotiations with Congress, the allies and the Soviet Union. This would be a recipe for ensuring that no strategic defence was ever deployed. The SDI would never meet the cost-effectiveness and survivability criteria if judged in isolation; it had to be seen as part of the totality of the US strategic armoury. Nor would SDI ever cross the hurdle of negotiations with the allies - even though they would inevitably benefit from it, because an effective system would have to be able to destroy Soviet missiles before it was clear where they were headed. The right course was therefore to make only the level of deployment, not deployment itself, negotiable. President Reagan's position was strong enough to be able to carry this.

Central America

Dr Kissinger said that he was against United States intervention in Nicaragua. But there was everything to be said for letting the Nicaraguans believe that the United States might well attack them. The only occasions in the past when the Sandinistas had shown any serious willingness to negotiate was when the US Fleet had appeared off Honduras and landed marines there, and following the US invasion of Grenada. He found it hard to judge whether the Administration was seriously contemplating an attack. One could argue that the likelihood would grow at the time of the mid-term elections. He did not accept any analogy with the difficulties which the US had encountered in Vietnam. He thought that the US could mount a successful military action. The main difficulty would be in finding local forces to take over.

International Debt

Dr Kissinger said that he was convinced that Latin American debt problems could not be settled through current procedures. By the end of 1986 it would become politically impossible to use the IMF in Latin America. If Peru was able to get away with setting a unilateral ceiling on its debt repayment, there was a real risk that other countries including Brazil would follow. The Brazilian Foreign Minister had told him that the United State's only choice lay in acting creatively before the plug was pulled or after. His own view was that the issue had gone beyond the ability of banks to settle and governments would have to intervene.

South Africa

Dr Kissinger described public attitudes in the United States towards South Africa as 'revolting hypocrisy' and 'reverse racism'. He was opposed to sanctions. The South Africans would never be moved by them. The weight of United States influence should be used to encourage President Botha to go on moving in the right direction but faster.

Middle East

Dr Kissinger said that his concern about current US policy in the Middle East was that President Reagan and Secretary Shultz believed that it was enough to start a process, after which United States' responsibility would lapse and the parties be left to get on with it. In practice any negotiations would rapidly reach deadlock. There was no way in which Jordan's requirements could be reconciled with the politics of Israel, without United States' involvement. King Hussein would be left exposed and his position at risk. His conclusion was that the United States should not start the process unless it was prepared to push Israel hard and to impose a settlement. He doubted whether the Administration was ready for this.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Rachel Lomax (HM Treasury) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office). Since it was a private conversation, this note of it should be given only a very limited distribution.

yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER

He is coming to see you tomorrow morning. Up to an hour is available (but he doesn't know that).

There is quite a wide range of subjects which you could cover. But I suggest:

- the US/Soviet Summit. How does he expect the President to handle it? What does he think the Administration should aim for? What points should the Allies be seeking to impress on the US Administration?

- the SDI. Does he see signs of growing Russian readiness to discuss strategic defence? What sort of bargain on SDI does he regard as possible? An understanding on permitted research? Agreement not to deploy without negotiation?

- Central America. What is his personal feel for the likelihood of direct US intervention in Nicaragua? Does he think that pressures short of intervention are likely to bring about changes in Nicaragua?

- Middle East. He feels that the time is not ripe for a US initiative (please see attached article from last week's Observer). He argues that Israel is too weak and divided to cope with peace negotiations, that American influence in the area has declined, and that the US is in no state to give the necessary wholesale commitment to negotiations.

/International debt.

- International debt. He has taken a close interest in this recently, particularly in relation to Latin America. You will recall that Mr. Volcker told you of his worries. And the new President of Peru has now said publicly that Peru will pay only 10 per cent of its export earnings to servicing its external debt. Does he think this will set off a chain reaction of repudiation/restriction?

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

30 July 1985

Why the US needs to think before it leaps

Dr Kissinger : America must listen to Talleyrand.

DR HENRY KISSINGER argues that this is not the moment for the Reagan administration to launch itself once again into the so-called Middle East peace process.

THE Reagan administration seems bent on launching itself once again into the so-called Middle East peace process — less than two years after the collapse of its previous effort, and only a few weeks after the hostages crisis in Beirut. Those events should supply a warning to look — and think — before taking the leap.

The premises of the imminent peace offensive appear to be as follows: the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East has been the inability to engage the Palestinians, as represented by the Palestine Liberation Organisation in the peace process, due to the refusal of the PLO and Israel to deal with each other. Hence the search for some formula that will lure the PLO into recognising Israel by the prospect of talks with the United States, while easing Israel's fear of an imposed peace by the prospect of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs.

In the most recent expression of this theory, King Hussein of Jordan has asserted, without contradiction from the PLO, that Yasser Arafat, its leader, is prepared to accept the relevant UN resolutions, especially Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Since these resolutions presume the legitimacy of the State of Israel, Arafat is thus alleged to have met the preconditions of the 1975 US understanding with Israel not to negotiate with the PLO until it recognised Israel.

As another means to get around Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO, the King has proposed — and Israel and the US seem to have accepted — the creation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation whose Palestinian component would be composed of individuals not technically members of the PLO but necessarily acceptable to it.

This delegation would have at least one preliminary meeting with high US officials. All this is supposed to culminate in direct talks between a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and Israel on the future of the West Bank. The end of the process foresees a Palestinian political unit on the West Bank loosely confederated with Jordan.

However, the key test of this minuet is not so much how to start negotiations as to define their objective. So far the chief actors have obscured their conflicting purposes by a fog of imprecisions. King Hussein, the most clear-sighted of the principals, rightly perceives that he needs Palestinian support for the concessions without which Israel will not give up even part of the West Bank. But, as the target of several assassination attempts by the PLO, he knows that beyond the issue of the role of the PLO in negotiations looms the issue of the role of the PLO on the West Bank. He must aim for effective control of those portions of the West Bank he recovers; in other words, he must at some point seek to subdue the PLO.

As for the PLO, its objective is exactly the opposite. Once it is introduced into the negotiations, however convoluted the procedure, its goal must be ultimate sovereignty over at least the West Bank. Until now, the PLO has been reluctant to accept even this limited objective, because in its view the State of Israel, whatever its eastern borders, is located on the territory that at one time was home for most of the PLO's members or at least of their ancestors.

PLO leaders may be willing to muffle their ultimate objective of full sovereignty until the goal of American recognition has been harvested. But if they seriously pursue reconciliation with Israel, and a secondary role within Jordan, they may find themselves without followers.

The divided Israeli Government, obsessed with politics, beset with domestic unrest and an unprecedented economic mess, would, above all, like the issue of negotiations to go away. Since that will not happen, it hides behind procedure so as to defer substance until after a new election or a change of government.

The American administration is divided between a top leadership eager to limit America's role to the promotion of direct negotiations and a bureaucracy determined to nudge these negotiations in the direction of its standard solution: the 1967 borders with minor modifications; a Palestinian entity which, however it starts, must wind up with sovereign attributes for the PLO; and some sort of neutral status for the Old City of Jerusalem.

If there are to be significant changes in these positions, they must be extracted by a major engagement — and, let us be frank, pressure — by the United States on one or probably both sides. It has ever been thus — even in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. And Egypt, as the largest and geographically most remote Arab country dealing with a territory to which Israel had little historical and emotional attachment, was in a much stronger position to be flexible than is little Jordan adjoining better armed and hostile neighbours and contesting a land to which Israelis attach biblical significance.

The projected peace process can thus succeed only if the United States is prepared to use all its influence to press both sides. If the United States is not fully committed to such a role, the negotiations will fail; Hussein, like Lebanese President Gemayal, may be undermined by the peace process.

Negotiations, moreover, never occur in a political vacuum, especially in the Middle East. Historically, progress in Middle East negotiations has emerged from three factors: an Israel powerful enough to stand against any combination of Arab states; some evidence that radical Arab rhetoric and Soviet support are impotent: and, finally, a purposeful American policy that enables moderate Arab states to justify co-operation with America as indispensable to achieving at least some Arab objectives.

None of these conditions exists today. Israel is more divided than at any period in its history. Its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, its release of 1,000 convicted terrorists in exchange for only three prisoners of war, its panicky ambivalence during the Beirut hostage crisis, must have strengthened the hand of those radical Arabs who argue that in the end Israel will yield to pain if persistently administered.

As for America, one need only compare the original Reagan plan of 1982 with the final results in both Lebanon and the West Bank to see the decline of its influence. Throughout 1983 the United States strove to expel Syria from Lebanon and to unify that country under Christian dominance. Less than two years later the US required the assistance of Syria to extract 40 hijacked American hostages held by one of the many Moslem factions in a known location in Beirut.

The decision-makers in the area judge America by its actions, not its assertions. It would be self-delusion to deny the growing perception that America may lack the means or the will to achieve its designs. The United States should have learned that excluding the tough, ruthless Syrians guarantees a major confrontation, which will be conducted by Damascus with characteristic guile and persistence. Before launching a new set of negotiations, an exploration of Syrian views would seem essential. And, if these views are rejected, the United States must be willing to devote the energy and resources necessary to prevail in the resulting showdown.

If the United States is not willing to pay that price, it would be reckless to launch a process on the basis of platitudes about 'creating momentum' and 'beginning exploration' put forward by a bureaucracy ingenious in devising formulae but rarely willing to face their consequences.

There is no self-evident need for throwing the dice. But there is an overwhelming need to avoid another failure in the Middle East. The key test of any foreign policy is to assemble the means appropriate to its ends. The time is not ripe for an all-out diplomatic effort staking American credibility in the Middle East. Talleyrand's adage is particularly apt: 'above all, not too much zeal.'

CCPC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 July 1985

CDP 29/7

Dear Charles,

Dr Henry Kissinger

In your letter of 16 July you said that the Prime Minister would be happy to see Dr Kissinger at 0900 on 31 July. We have now had confirmation from Washington that Dr Kissinger will call at that time.

Dr Kissinger's staff have been unable to identify any matters that he is likely to wish to raise but have commented that he has shown much interest in international debt problems, particularly in South America, and also in the various problems of Central America. He may well also want to raise US-Soviet relations and arms control and you will have seen his article in The Observer yesterday suggesting that the time was not ripe for a renewed US initiative on the Arab/Israel question.

Could you let me know if you require briefs on any or all of these subjects?

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

USD Aug 79

Kissengers visit

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 July 1985

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

I have seen a copy of Tim Hollaway's letter of 11 July to Peter Fowler in the North African Department about Dr Kissinger's request to call on the Prime Minister on 31 July.

The Prime Minister would be happy to see Dr Kissinger at 9 am that day.

C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington DC 20008

Telex Domestic USA 89-2370/89-2384
Telex International 64224(WUI)/248308(RCA)/440015(ITT)
Telephone (202) 462-1340

Prime Minister
Would you like to see Henry.
We've already got two foreigners that day.
C.D.P. 15/7

Your reference

Our reference

Date 11 July 1985

P J Fowler Esq
NAD
FCO

cc C D Powell Esq
No 10

Dear Peter,

DR HENRY KISSINGER

1. Dr Kissinger's office have asked whether it would be possible for him to call on the Prime Minister on 31 July during a visit to London.

2. As you know Kissinger continues to write a syndicated column on foreign affairs. He is still widely recognised as one of the great American experts on geopolitics. But his views on East/West issues are not precisely those of the Reagan administration, and he earned black marks for his critical attitude in frequent media interviews during the Beirut hostage crisis. His criticisms were in marked contrast to the pulling together attitude of Democrats from the Carter administration, whose line was that the President deserved support.

3. With the passage of time his influence declines and a call on the Prime Minister would redound more to his advantage than to the Prime Minister's. He runs, as you know, an International Consultancy firm which charges vast fees to client governments in exchange for know-how about and introductions to the Washington scene. It is all part of the normal form here, with the Kissinger Associates in a higher class and therefore with higher fees than most. Larry Eagleburger, formerly Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, as President to Kissinger's Chairman, runs the day to day affairs of the office.

4. That said, no umbrage would be taken here if the Prime Minister decided that she would like to receive Dr Kissinger on 31 July. Could you consult No 10 and let us know their answer?

Yours ever,
Tim.

T P Hollaway

Mufaxed to Cheques

HENRY A. KISSINGER

July 9, 1984

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I have wanted to thank you more formally for our meeting in London last month. It means a great deal to me to have a chance to see you from time to time. I have the highest regard for your views and enormous admiration and respect for your courage and leadership. And it goes without saying that I always enjoy a discussion with one of the most courageous statesmen of the West.

With appreciation and warm good wishes,

Henry A. Kissinger

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England

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E.R. Subject to master

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER ON 14 JUNE

The Prime Minister had an hour's discussion with Dr. Kissinger this afternoon. Mrs. Kissinger was also present. This note summarises points made by Dr. Kissinger.

East-West Relations

Dr. Kissinger agreed that Soviet rhetoric was hard line. But, except for refusing to negotiate on arms control, they were not actually doing anything hard line. Gromyko was more pedantic than hard line.

He saw the main significance of Chernenko's elevation as being to demonstrate that the coalition round Andropov had not been strong enough to hold on to power.

He disparaged nervousness in the West about the absence of dialogue with the Soviet Union. It was a great mistake to give the Russians the idea that we were worried. He saw little point in a US/Soviet Summit at present. He could not see what Reagan and Chernenko would talk about.

The Gulf

Dr. Kissinger identified the main Western interest for the next two to three years as preventing Iran from destabilising the Gulf. It would be a disaster if they were to win against Iraq. On this point, Western and Soviet interests ran temporarily parallel. But it would not last. He thought that a nationalist regime would eventually emerge in Iran. This would find itself driven towards the West principally by fear of the Soviet Union.

Central America

Dr. Kissinger was pessimistic about Nicaragua, which had clear ambitions to hegemony in Central America. The

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/ elections

elections if held would be of little significance. The army and police who would supervise them were instruments of the Sandinistas not of the state. He was scathing about opinion in Western Europe which saw the Sandinistas as struggling democrats threatened by the US. He identified Cheysson as a particular villain in this respect.

He will urge the President of Costa Rica to unburden himself frankly on the problems of the area when he meets the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister would find him 'scared'.

South Africa

Dr. Kissinger thought Botha was feeling his way ahead. He had achieved astonishing results in South Africa's relations with neighbouring countries. Internally, Botha's ideas would not work. But nor would one man, one vote.

Latin America

Dr. Kissinger did not believe that the present system of negotiations on debt could continue. There was a strong risk of a head-on challenge from the debtors, possibly led by Brazil. They had drawn the conclusion from the creditors' behaviour over Argentina at the end of March that they would agree almost anything to avoid default. A political arrangement was needed to get the debtors to take the necessary economic measures. He was not specific what this might be.

Hong Kong

Dr. Kissinger was pessimistic about the prospects for an agreement with China. His own experience led him to doubt whether the Chinese would stick to agreements. But he agreed that the right course was to make arrangements for the future of Hong Kong as detailed and comprehensive as possible.

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Middle East

Dr. Kissinger did not expect any major initiative from a Republican Administration after the Presidential election. In general he thought it a mistake to try settling final frontiers in the area. Formal peace was less important than a practical interim arrangement for the West Bank. He instanced the agreements with Syria over Golan as a model.

C.D.P.

14 June 1984

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 June 1984

Prime Minister

C.D.P. 13/6

Dear John,

Visit of Dr Kissinger: 9-14 June

I enclose briefs on the following subjects which may come up during the Prime Minister's meeting with Dr Kissinger at 1700 hours on 14 June:

- State of the Alliance (picking up some of the points in Dr Kissinger's Time article of 5 March)
- East/West Relations
- Central America
- Iran/Iraq War

I assume the Prime Minister will be aiming for a general discussion to which she may wish to add her impressions of the London Economic Summit.

You will recall that Dr Kissinger last called on the Prime Minister on 21 December 1983. On this occasion he is at the beginning of a three-week European tour.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

VISIT OF DR KISSINGER

STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

Points To Make

1. Washington Ministerial underlined cohesion of the Alliance. "Washington Statement on East/West Relations" should provide useful point of reference for allied policy in coming months.

2. Health of the Alliance fundamentally sound. But important to show that it is vigorous and flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances and meet the political and military challenges it faces.

3. Interested in your article in Time Magazine earlier this year. Timely reminder that we cannot be complacent. But we should not under-estimate the extent to which NATO structures and strategy have adapted to changes in the past (eg change from massive retaliation to flexible response) and Europe has already assumed responsibility for defence of the continent and surrounding waters. Of Alliance's ready forces in Europe, 90% of ground forces, 80% of combat aircraft, 80% of tanks and 70% of fighting ships.

4. Agree that strong conventional defence, which maintains high nuclear threshold, is desirable. But strategy of flexible response remains valid. Objective should be to enhance its credibility, not replace it.

5. Welcome your reaffirmation of centrality of transatlantic relationship. Encouraged by President Reagan's statement at NAC Ministerial in Washington that, for the US 'our NATO partnership is an anchor, a fixed point in a turbulent world'. There may sometimes be differences of perspective in European and American approaches to major issues. But much more unites us than divides us. Important to demonstrate this fundamental unity to public opinion.

VISIT OF DR KISSINGER

STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Despite difficulties over INF in the Netherlands and Denmark, the Washington Ministerial showed the Alliance to be in reasonable shape and underlined its essential cohesion.

2. President Reagan used the occasion of his meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers on 31 May to refer to the Alliance's record in preserving the peace for 35 years and to say that it could look to the future with confidence. The meeting had reinforced his confidence in the strength and durability of the Alliance.

3. Nevertheless, the view has been widely publicised in the US recently that there is a crisis confronting the Alliance and that a process of continental drift is drawing the US away from its European Allies. In his Time Magazine article of 5 March, Dr Kissinger argued that the crisis was both unprecedented and unsettling. He claimed that the absence of an agreed credible strategy in NATO was leading to the Alliance being trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons in (c) a strategic environment which made the threat of their use less and less credible and (d) a public climate of growing pacifism which undermined what credibility remained. He also drew attention to transatlantic differences in relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World and, above all, to Western disunity. He made a number of proposals designed to give the Europeans greater responsibility for their own defence and security policy, thereby strengthening their contribution to a global Western defence posture in which European and American efforts would be more rationally divided.

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4. His specific prescriptions do not appear to have been fully thought out. For example, he suggests that SACEUR should be a European (but it is inconceivable that the Americans would assign their nuclear weapons in Europe to a European commander): that the Secretary General should be an American; and that the Europeans should take over arms control negotiations dealing with weapons stationed in Europe, notably INF and MBFR (the Europeans are already involved in the MBFR negotiations, but it is difficult to see how they could take the lead in negotiations concerning US INF systems). He argues that if the Europeans are unwilling to make more than token improvements to their conventional defences, the US would have no choice but to opt for a deployment of its forces in Europe that "makes strategic and political sense". In his view this would involve the gradual withdrawal of up to half US ground forces.

Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 June 1984

A Plan to Reshape NATO

By HENRY KISSINGER

After 35 years of preserving peace in Western Europe, the Atlantic Alliance confronts new military, political and social realities. In this article, a former Secretary of State proposes dramatic—and in his view, vital—steps to help the alliance meet the challenges ahead. Among them: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander should be a European, not an American, as is now the case; Europe should have a decisive voice in certain nuclear arms-control talks and greater responsibility for its ground defense. If Europe refuses to accept that responsibility, the U.S. should withdraw up to half of its ground forces from Europe.

Lebanon and the Soviet succession have preoccupied us in recent weeks, but the Atlantic Alliance must remain the pivot of American policy. On its unity depends the security of free peoples. From its cohesion will flow whatever hopes the Soviet succession offers for a new dialogue. Unfortunately, just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them. However, the present controversies in NATO are both unprecedented and unsettling.



In West Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and even in Britain (though to a lesser extent), "peace" movements have been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies, even though those governments disagree with their premises. In addition, the main opposition parties in West Germany and Great Britain—which, in the nature of democratic politics, can be expected to get into office eventually—are advocating policies that amount to unilateral nuclear disarmament for their countries. Because these groups hold sway over key segments of public opinion, too many European leaders—even conservative ones—have yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive U.S. through their ministrations. As a result, among those who shape public attitudes—and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible—there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation. An alliance cannot live by arms alone. To endure it requires some basic agreement on political aims that justify and give direction to the common defense. If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later stagnate. It will surely prove unable to take advantage of diplomatic opportunities for an easing of tensions. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a remedy that is fundamental, even radical—in the literal sense of going to the root.

Four problems in particular are gnawing at the alliance:

1) *Lack of an agreed, credible strategy.* The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called flexible response devised in the 1960s remains NATO's official doctrine. It contemplates a defense of Europe that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation—until it reaches whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet aggression. In today's circumstances this doctrine has a fatal weakness: neither existing nor projected NATO conventional ground forces are adequate to repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet strategic nuclear parity deprives the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason, public opinion, essentially unopposed by most NATO governments, is moving powerfully against *any* reliance on nuclear weapons—even tactical ones.

The alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines what credibility remains. Lack of a coherent defense policy leaves the alliance, possessing a huge stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming itself psychologically.

2) *Intermediate-range weapons and arms control.* The arrival of the new U.S. intermediate-range weapons in Europe late last year was properly hailed as a major success. For if public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment, the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over NATO's military dispositions. But unless the alliance clarifies the purpose of these missiles, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the basic European attitude toward the missiles is that of a host toward a now unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it would be too awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset the alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the U.S. Weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory stake the American homeland to the defense of Europe; they do not enable America to remain immune.

European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward arms control, while the nearly desperate eagerness with which progress is pursued makes its attainment less likely. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal balancing U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe against the Soviet arsenal at a lower level. They insist on total withdrawal of American missiles while retaining a large number of their own. The goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet nuclear blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion persist in blaming the U.S. for the deadlock. In Europe

Illustrations for TIME by David Suter

...n the U.S., this attitude must in ...erode the public support needed ... missile deployment but ... for co... ent arms control.

3) *Ea... /est relations.* Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the alliance's posture toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans accept the caricature of a U.S. run by trigger-happy cowboys whose belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Many Americans, on the other hand, consider such European notions naive and believe that together with the pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, they reflect a trend toward appeasement that encourages Soviet intransigence.

4) *Relations with the Third World.* Most European leaders believe that they have a special opportunity to establish preferential relationships with Third World countries. In the flash points of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they see U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; some hope to win favor in the Third World by an ostentatious dissociation from the U.S. More than a few Americans view such behavior as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

These differences could be healthy if they led to compatible and constructive policies for the 1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual recriminations have created opportunities for Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo is obviously convinced that the West has become so paralyzed concerning nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; the Soviets can simply wait for a while to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast, there may be concern in Moscow that NATO will move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to resume the talks, moribund for ten years, about limiting conventional arms. Does this reflect a genuine interest in arms control, or is it a means to thwart the desperately needed Western conventional buildup by creating the same conditions by which public opinion was mobilized on the missile question? And what is one to make of the almost deferential pleas by all major NATO countries for the resumption of a dialogue that the Soviets have interrupted? Or of the upgrading of all major European delegations except the French to the Andropov funeral, compared with the Brezhnev rites 15 months ago—especially as Andropov's rule was marked by the flagrant attempt to influence the German election, the walkout from arms-control talks and the shooting down of the Korean airliner, not to speak of Andropov's 15-year stewardship of the KGB?

Will the Soviets see Western pleas for dialogue as a demonstration of good will, or will they learn from the compulsion to demonstrate good intentions after months of harassment that intransigence pays because the West has weak nerves? Will we fail to relax tensions because the Soviets conclude that atmospherics can substitute for dealing with the real causes dividing the world? Europe is not moderating the U.S., and the U.S. is not stiffening Europe's spine, as the folklore on each side would have it. More likely, each is in danger of paralyzing and demoralizing the other. Western disunity is perhaps the principal obstacle to progress in East-West negotiations.

This state of affairs has deeper causes than particular policies on either side. The present NATO structure is simply not working, either in defining the threat or in finding methods to meet it.

Existing arrangements are unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues—when that one country chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World—little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

> **A European officer should take the traditionally American place as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, probably with a U.S. deputy.**

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be corrected by "consultation," however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display *independence* of the U.S. wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because the generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared. Those who governed Europe during the early postwar years were still psychologically of the era when Europe bestrode the world. Global thinking came naturally. European leaders assumed responsibility for their own security policies and gave it up only reluctantly because of special circumstances. But nearly 40 years have passed since the end of World War II. The new leaders were reared in an era when the U.S. was pre-eminent; they find it politically convenient to delegate Europe's military defense to us. Too many seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers—the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus Europe's schizophrenia: a fear that the U.S. might not be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by clumsy handling of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of their leaders? Even making allowance—especially in the case of Britain—for totally inadequate consultation, they could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely have affected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas, ultimately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we would exact no penalty and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score points with "progressives" at home and with Third World radicals abroad.

The change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the U.S. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity, more a military arrangement than a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves threatened by the dominance of domestic politics over global political strategy. In Europe this leads in too many countries to a faintly disguised neutralism. In the U.S. it accelerates our already strong tendency toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude toward intermediate-range missiles in Europe is an example. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1957-58, in-

> **Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil.**

stalled [illegible]ritain, Italy and Turkey by 1960 and withdrawn in 1963. They reappeared later in 1963 as part of a NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again by 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and accepted once again in 1979. Not surprisingly, Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by the knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

Similarly, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response; from a policy of détente to one of confrontation and back to conciliation, not to speak of the gyrations in our Middle East policy—all in addition to the reassessments that occur whenever a new Administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their domestic positions on policies that the U.S. later abandons. Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead to the demoralization of the Western alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

A NEW ROLE FOR EUROPE

During the entire post–World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at best—at least since the failure of the European Defense Community—to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security. The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the U.S. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict it would be nearly impossible to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden sharing," paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural—a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling—if more imperceptibly—statesmanship impels a new approach.

STRUCTURAL REFORM

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity, it can help catalyze the development of shared political purposes. These common objectives require that European judgments on security, East-West diplomacy and other matters emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings and pressures provides a façade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation. Specifically:

1) By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a group of countries with nearly one and one-half times the population and twice the G.N.P. of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, moreover, have to divide their forces on at least two fronts.

2) This requires that planning for Europe's defense become a more explicitly European task. Heretofore, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has been American. In the new arrangement a European officer should take that traditionally American place, probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to allied strategic planning. The U.S. has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment that our vast industrial potential has made available. This has tended to tempt our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a material margin; rather, they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics—precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3) Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary-General, who is responsible for running the alliance's political machinery, has been European. In the new structure, with its greater emphasis on political coordination, it would make more sense for this official to be American—whenever the new Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. Meantime, no Western leader is better qualified for guiding NATO's transition than the wise and thoughtful Carrington.

4) Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (for intermediate-range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (on conventional forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure that I am proposing would enable Europeans to confront—on their own initiative and in their own context—issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold—the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense failed, Europe would be responsible for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of augmenting its conventional defenses.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place final responsibility for both conventional force levels and intermediate-range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt—for good or ill—of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially important with respect to the American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe

on Soviet territory will help deter a Soviet conventional attack or nuclear blackmail. If our principal allies do not share this conviction, the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF talks would oblige Europe's leaders to face the issue head-on; their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue (as they do now) that U.S. intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.

As for the U.S., it would of course participate in these deliberations—in a less dominant position—through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air forces in Europe.

If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of up to half of our ground forces would be logical.

REDEPLOYMENT

The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to become a central issue in the alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of a program of NATO reform, a few facts must be noted:

1) The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation—to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to nonnuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave the Soviets no doubt that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: they too were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

2) This situation became anomalous when the growth of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but has not closed the gap in such forces. As the current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons—and yet much of their public opinion shies away from even thinking about nuclear deterrence.

3) Were we to start all over again, we would therefore hardly repeat the decision of the '50s in today's circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men and women from both sides of the Atlantic came together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume further that it started from the premise that ultimately the defense of the West is indivisible and that European security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense of the West in Europe—as a thoughtful French observer, François de Rose, put it. Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, with economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent. To maintain the global balance of power—by definition as essential for Europe as for America—the U.S. would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibilities would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much more likely. In such regions our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort.

Even if we were to start all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining considerable American ground forces in Europe. This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should also preserve and preferably strengthen existing U.S. land-based airpower on the Continent. And we should continue our responsibility for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate-range missiles should remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desired them. No change in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities not realized? The principal obstacle is psychological. For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism in the U.S. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon would rather maintain our troops in Europe in a less than rational deployment than return a portion to the U.S., where they are more exposed to congressional budget cutters.

In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its rationale accelerates these attitudes. Pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present setup; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless allied disputes. An alliance that cannot agree on its political premises cannot sustain itself by clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means—the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against the U.S. A change in deployment without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression.

There is an urgent need for a serious and rapid re-examination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies, conducted by men and women known for their dedication to Western unity. The group—to be formed immediately after our elections—must begin with one of the most divisive issues before the alliance: an agreement on the nature and scope of the threat. The group must avoid the tendency of previous such efforts, which set unrealistic goals and thereby magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should be set—certainly no longer than two years.

We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of three outcomes: 1) The group could come to the same conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities in an agreed global strategy outlined above. Given the dis-

[illegible]greement about the nature of the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and the domestic priorities of most European countries, such a conclusion, however rational, is extremely improbable. 2) The group could agree that the strategic interests of the West require a full conventional defense, but that for practical and psychological reasons, Europe can undertake the required effort only if the present American ground deployment in Europe is maintained intact. 3) The group could decide that the realities of European domestic politics preclude more than the current gradualistic, marginal improvement of defense efforts.

I hope very much that Europe would choose the second option. If Europe should agree to build a full conventional defense and were prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous yearly obligations to increase its forces, the U.S. should accept the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component. Such a decision might in fact invigorate the conventional arms-reduction talks and in time lead to stability at a lower level. But if Europe should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence or for only a token improvement, then the U.S. will owe it to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. If Europe by its own decision condemns itself to permanent conventional inferiority, we will have no choice but to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strategic and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further, we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time afterward in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it. Any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded, the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.



The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval forces, as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation of the existing inventory of very short-range tactical nuclear weapons, a legacy of three decades of *ad hoc* decisions; these weapons now represent at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war because, being deployed so far forward, they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme, withdrawal would be not an end in itself—as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further—but one component of an adaptation to new circumstances extending over some eight years that rededicates the U.S. to the alliance for the indefinite future.

Psychology is immensely important in international relations, especially when policies turn not only on cold, professional assessments of the national interest by trained political leaders, but on public opinion. I would like to believe that restructuring the alliance to give Europeans greater responsibility for their own defense, while important American forces remain in Europe, will be seen not as an abandonment but as an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting Europeans as full partners in the process of decision on which their safety as well as ours depends. For a son of Europe reared on the existing NATO orthodoxy, the very idea of even a partial redeployment is painful—all the more so after Lebanon. But we will not be fulfilling our obligations to the West if we fail to put forward an initiative to forestall the crisis that will otherwise confront us in much worse circumstances.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However, a few general observations on the alliance's political problems are necessary.

1) Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the alliance, with all its failings, as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom must seek urgently to end political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy, especially Western conduct in the flash points of conflict in the Third World. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness, will in time make a mockery of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that we share a common approach to security. Defense requires after all *some* agreed political purpose in the name of which it is conducted. The Atlantic Alliance must urgently develop a grand strategy for East-West problems and Third World relations applicable for the rest of this century. Otherwise, it will tempt constant pressures and crises.

2) The U.S. cannot lead the alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Viet Nam War, we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings on essential elements of our policies. But the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the presidential election faces no more important and urgent challenge than to restore the element of bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

3) European governments must meet head-on the disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries. These movements are led by people of conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of a new future. If European governments continue to humor those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union, they will find themselves making concession after concession and will become hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the alliance cries out for a rethinking of its structure, its doctrine and its unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which we approach this challenge will determine whether the alliance enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied cohesion by defining clear responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic, to be implemented over a period of years. On that basis European leaders could defend cooperation with the U.S. as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction and in their own national interest. American leaders would have a rational, understandable policy to defend and would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to the generation that has come to maturity since World War II and since the postwar crises that infused NATO's founders with their sense of common purpose.

We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts. The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments of policy or domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen a North Atlantic alliance that represents the hope of human dignity and decency in our world. ■

VISIT OF DR KISSINGER

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Your perception of Soviet intentions? Clear that leadership will persist with defiant, dismissive tactics until Presidential election. Rejection of Reagan's offer to discuss principle of No First Use of Force (NOFUF) symptomatic. But if Reagan re-elected, how will Russians respond; have left themselves little room for manoevre. Will they wish or, be able to, break out of current phase, return to arms control negotiations without unacceptable loss of face?

2. Outlook bleak; but despite Soviet bitterness at failure of policies and inflexibility of current leadership, no evidence that Russians have already taken final decision that no business to be done with Reagan. Will rather continue to assess impact of their policies in US and Europe and whole range of other factors; eg measure of congressional and domestic support for President's policies; cohesion and firmness of Alliance after second round of INF deployment; US economy; and Soviet leadership and economic problems.

3. West - and US in particular - should start to think now how to develop approach in 1985. In Alliance (and especially Western Europe) need to remain firm and united behind INF double decision; not be rattled by Soviet attacks or blandishments, Reagan speeches of 16 January and 4 June (Dublin) struck right note. "Washington statement" significant message of Alliance unity. Reagan himself impressed participants at London Economic Summit with sincerity at wish to open up US/Soviet dialogue. Will

there be domestic political pressure on him to revise this line in the run up to elections?

4. How to avert prolonged period of stand-off with rising levels of conventional and nuclear forces? Western initiative may be needed - not of course in any way rewarding Russians for walking out of START/INF. But some step to rebuild mutual trust and restart process of negotiation.

5. Your views? Role of confidential diplomacy? Do you detect any sign of realisation on part of Soviet foreign policy professionals in Party that US policy is genuine and offers more than Soviet leadership prepared to admit publicly at this juncture? To what extent is Gromyko personally responsible for present rigidity?

Relations with Eastern Europe

6. Positive discrimination the guideline. Must seek, while protecting our own interests, to broaden dialogue, identify points in common on which to build.

Poland

7. We need to re-engage Western influence and counteract Soviet efforts to tighten grip. Unreasonable to continue judging Poland by higher standards than we apply to other Eastern European countries.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Dr Kissinger's views will be of considerable interest on

a) his assessment of the state of mind of Soviet leadership and how their policies are likely to evolve in 1985;

b) how the US should be developing its policies in order to avert prolonged period of immobility, in US/Soviet relations.

A valuable sidelight on these themes; will supplement President Reagan's and Mr Shultz's comments at Economic Summit.

2. Soviet tactics increasingly strident and hostile: aim to isolate US from its allies and discredit President Reagan personally; unsettle Western Europeans in NATO. Focussing in particular on issues which are sensitive within West, eg Central America. In every field of arms control sustained effort to put onus on US for lack of movement. Out of hand rejection of proposals in President Reagan's 4 June Dublin speech characteristic.

3. No firm evidence that Soviet Union has finally committed itself to long-term confrontational, unyielding relationship with President Reagan (if re-elected). In practice Soviet policy likely to stem from careful evaluation of impact of their policies and how best to advance Soviet interests.

4. But element of personal bitterness and affront at US attacks is strong among old guard in Politburo. Any initiative to break deadlock would require an unaccustomed readiness to overcome self-justification and inertia based

on traditional sense of insecurity and unadmitted sense of inferiority vis-a-vis West.

Poland

5. Some features of martial law remain (political detainees, harassment of dissidents and intellectuals) but in many ways Poland still least repressive country in Eastern Europe. Appropriate that Western countries gradually resume range of contacts that permit "critical dialogue" with the regime and show Polish people they are not forgotten.

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 June 1984

VISIT OF DR KISSINGER
CENTRAL AMERICA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Encouraged by Shultz visit to Managua. Your view of prospects for serious negotiation of settlement?

2. Duarte well received in Washington by all sides. How would you describe attitudes in Congress towards El Salvador after his election?

3. How does Congress view developments in Nicaragua and the US Government reaction to them?

CENTRAL AMERICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, headed by Dr Kissinger, published its report on 10 January. As he told us he hoped to do, Dr Kissinger has managed to stand aside from the ensuing debate and from further involvement in US Central America policy.

2. The report was immediately accepted by President Reagan and used as a basis for legislative proposals (named the Jackson Plan) to Congress. This legislation which involves financial assistance for Central America of some $8 bn over 5 years is still going through Congress. Emergency military aid for El Salvador has been voted, and substantial economic assistance continues to all the friendly states of the region but Congress have three times refused to vote funds for US Government support for contra attacks on Nicaragua. Central America has been a subject for debate in the US primaries, and is likely to become an issue in the Presidential election.

3. The surprise visit by Secretary of State Schultz to Managua on 1 June, in which he proposed to the Sandinistas procedures for serious bilateral talks on a settlement, is a positive development. It has however been seen as an effort to improve the Administration's image for the Presidential elections. Schultz's move has the blessing of the Contadora Group. It is too early to say whether the Sandinistas will negotiate in earnest, but they feel hard-pressed by the 'contras' and economic difficulties. These developments in US strategy are consistent with the Kissinger Report's main political recommendations.

4. President Duarte of El Salvador visited Washington 19-23 May. He was successful in convincing Congressional and public opinion of his credentials, his determination to end human rights abuses, and generally that he deserves US support. Congress voted $62m in emergency military aid which had been held up since January.

5. Elections are due to be held in Nicaragua on 4 November (two days before those in the US). They will be the first since the 1979 Sandinista revolution. Opposition parties continue to be hampered by laws under the State of Emergency limiting the right of public assembly and free speech. When this is lifted before the election campaign a more restrictive press law is likely to be put in its place. The Sandinistas have certain structural advantages as Sandinista influence is all-pervading in the country. But they have made some concessions to the opposition internal parties in order to persuade them to participate in the elections. Since the Sandinistas want the elections to legitimise their Government it is in their interest to make the elections look fair. Most observers agree that they could win a fair election and outside pressure could further unite the country. However a strong protest vote cannot be ruled out and could be increased by the deteriorating economic situation.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 June 1984

VISIT OF DR KISSINGER

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

POINTS TO MAKE

Attacks on Shipping

1. International community should continue their efforts to persuade both sides to stop attacking neutral shipping in the Gulf, building on the reference to respecting freedom of navigation in SCR 552.

Land War

2. Iranian preparations for a major land offensive continue. Iraqis should be able to withstand it as long as their morale holds.

Mediation

3. We see little prospect of successful mediation in near future because of Iranian intransigence. However, acceptance by both Iran and Iraq of UN Secretary General's appeal for an end to attacks on civilian population centres is encouraging.

4. Does Dr Kissinger, with his wealth of experience in mediation, have any ideas on how to resolve the conflict? We remain prepared to support any initiative which offers a realistic prospect of success, particularly through the good offices of the UN Secretary General.

Contingency Planning (Defensive)

5. We are glad that informal UK/US regular contacts have revealed a broad identity of view. We must try to resolve any crisis by diplomatic means. We cannot rule out military action as a last resort, but this would only by considered after all diplomatic efforts had failed and could only occur after a public request by the Gulf States.

Arms Sales (Defensive)

6. We are impartial in the conflict and have not supplied any lethal items to either side.

BACKGROUND

Attacks on Shipping

1. Despite UN Security Council resolution 552, both Iran and Iraq have continued to attack shipping. On 3 June the Iraqis hit a Turkish tanker, and on 10 June the Iranians hit a Kuwaiti tanker. (An Iraqi claim to have hit two other vessels on 7 June has not been confirmed).

Land War

2. Relative lull in fighting on land since series of Iranian offensives earlier this year. Preparations for a large scale Iranian attack continue (delay may have been due to flooding and logistical difficulties); speculation is growing that this may materialise before hot weather at end of June. Our assessment is that Iraqis should be able to contain offensive unless their morale cracks.

Mediation

3. Given Iran's apparent desire to end the war by military means, their appears little prospect of a successful mediation attempt in the near future. We are ready to support any mediation effort which has a chance of success, particularly through the UN Secretary General. Iran and Iraq's acceptance of his appeal to them for a cessation of attacks on civilian centres, while a welcome step, should not at this stage be taken to imply a readiness to negotiate on the part of the Iranians.

Contingeny Planning

4. The next round of UK/US political/military talks will take place on 26/27 June in London. This will seek to build on the broad convergence of view about how to respond to a crisis in the Gulf which emerged at the last round of talks in May.

Arms Sales to Iran

5. Our policy is not to supply any lethal equipment to either side in the conflict. All export licences are rigorously scrutinised to ensure that no lethal equipment is supplied.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 June 1984

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cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 May 1984

Visit to London by Dr. Kissinger

Thank you for your letter of 29 May. The Prime Minister will be glad to see Dr. Kissinger at 1700 hours on Thursday 14 June.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED

Prime Minister.

Would you like to see Dr. Kissinger at 5.00 p.m. on Thursday, 14 June?

A.J.C. 29/5

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 May 1984

Dear John,

Visit to London by Dr Kissinger

As you will have seen from Washington telegram 1568 (copy attached) Dr Kissinger will be visiting London from 9-14 June. The Foreign Secretary will give him lunch on 13 June and he has an appointment to see the Chancellor of the Exchequer at 10am on 12 June. Dr Kissinger has also asked whether he might call on the Prime Minister.

You will recall that Dr Kissinger last called on the Prime Minister on 21 December 1983. We understand from the Embassy in Washington that he has no specific business to discuss on this occasion. However the Foreign Secretary considers this would be a useful opportunity for a general discussion if the Prime Minister could spare the time. As you know, Dr Kissinger continues to exercise considerable influence over US thinking on foreign policy.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

SofS: lunch 13/V
12.45 for 1
or call 11.45 - 12.4

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PM

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FROM WASHINGTON 182217Z MAY 84
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1568 OF 18 MAY

VISIT TO LONDON BY DR KISSINGER

1. DR KISSINGER IS PLANNING TO VISIT LONDON FROM 9 TO 14 JUNE, AND HAS TOLD US THAT HE WOULD BE VERY GLAD IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, YOU, AND THE CHANCELLOR.

2. AT THE MOMENT DR KISSINGER IS FREE FROM 0900 TO 1530 ON 11 JUNE, FROM 0900 TO 1130 ON 12 JUNE, AND FROM 0900 TO 1400 ON 13 JUNE - AND ALSO ON THE AFTERNOON OF 10 JUNE, THOUGH THAT IS NOT I IMAGINE A STARTER. HE WILL BE STAYING AT CLARIDGES.

WRIGHT

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SIR W HARDING
MR D THOMAS

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PRIME MINISTER

CONVERSATION WITH DR. KISSINGER

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have enquired whether they might send a copy of John Coles' record of your conversation with Dr. Kissinger to Sir Oliver Wright on a strictly personal basis.

Agree?

Yes MT

Dms

FCO told by phone to go ahead.

Dms
29/12

23 December 1983

SECRET

cc Master.

cc MOD CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 December 1983

Dear Brian,

Dr. Kissinger called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was present. The discussion lasted for about 70 minutes.

Dr. Kissinger said that he believed that his Bipartisan Commission on Central America would complete its report on 10 January. He hoped to keep the Democrats on board. They would be torn between the demands of an election year and what commonsense told them. He did not envisage a very early deterioration in El Salvador but a worsening of the situation was certainly possible during 1984. He had told President Reagan that once he had reported on Central America, he would withdraw from further action on its problems. He was not prepared to take on operational responsibilities.

The fundamental problem was Nicaragua. He believed that if the present situation, involving a large Cuban presence and a substantial supply of Soviet and Cuban arms, continued, the whole of Central America could be adversely affected. The present Nicaraguan regime had given him, during his visit, an intelligence briefing which displayed knowledge of the tracks of all United States aircraft in the Caribbean area. This demonstrated, perhaps unintentionally, how closely involved Nicaragua was in the Soviet and Cuban network.

Events in Grenada had had a marked effect on Nicaragua and on the opposition in El Salvador. All kinds of overtures were now being received. If these were tested rapidly, it was conceivable that there would be movement. If it were possible to stop the supply of arms to Nicaragua and get the Cubans out, the prospects for Central America would be greatly improved. If, conversely, El Salvador went the same way as Nicaragua, then Guatemala would be the next to suffer.

The ultimate problem was Cuba, but it could not be dealt with without an international crisis. Nicaragua could be handled without risking such a crisis. With regard to Cuba, he had earlier thought that the 1962 Agreement between the

/United States

United States and the Soviet Union was a success for the Americans. But in retrospect it was probably a defeat. The United States commitment to non-intervention in Cuba had led to Cuba becoming a major source of Soviet influence and military and intelligence activities in the area.

The Bipartisan Commission's report would not rule out the use of force but would say nothing more explicit on the subject. It would describe the significance of the Nicaraguan situation for the rest of Central America and establish the minimum conditions which America would require to be fulfilled if its attitude to Nicaragua were to change.

With regard to the Middle East, he agreed with the Prime Minister that the situation had become incomparably worse. He further agreed that it was essential to shore up King Hussein, whom he had seen in London. The United States Strategic Agreement with Israel made little sense and had no content. If King Hussein entered the peace negotiations - and he seemed to want to - it would be essential for the United States to have a confrontation with Israel. For if negotiations failed, King Hussein would have lost on all fronts. America should not let him enter the negotiations unless it was determined to make them succeed.

The American position in the Middle East would be very seriously undermined if it was driven out of Lebanon and if there were no progress on the West Bank. The next focal point might be hegemony in the Gulf where the industrialised countries would have to back up the moderate regimes.

With regard to Syria, the Saudi Arabians lacked the nerve to put real pressure on Damascus. It was worth remembering that the Syrians had stood up to the Americans and had been the first Arabs to bring about Israeli withdrawal without American pressure. The Israelis had never withdrawn before because of casualties in war. Syria would not fight Israel directly. Indeed it did not have to. The Israelis might well withdraw from Lebanon in the next twelve months, merely because of the domestic situation.

In Lebanon there were two broad strategic options. The first was to accept a de facto partition and for the Multi-National Force to leave. The other was to set aside the political provisions of the 17 May Agreement, which could not be carried out anyway. The only possible agreement with the Syrians now was a military disengagement agreement. It was pointless to work for a political agreement on the unification of Lebanon. As King Hussein had said to him, if the United States withdrew from Lebanon under Syrian pressure, this would mean American withdrawal from the whole Middle East. But there was no question of the Syrians withdrawing from the whole country. The objective should be to secure their withdrawal from Beirut and also Israeli withdrawal from Sidon and Tyre. That would give the Multi-National Force the excuse

/ to withdraw.

to withdraw. It was not wise to invest too much capital in the idea of a reconstituted Lebanese government. A broader Lebanese government would be pro-Syrian and would ask the Western countries to leave. He kept urging his American friends that they should stay out of the bog of Lebanese politics. They should simply make military arrangements.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of East/West relations. Dr. Kissinger said that it was hard to see how the Soviet regime, in its present state, would handle decision making in a day-to-day crisis. He had been told by the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior in June that Andropov was receiving dialysis twice a week. Dobrynin had not been in Washington for the last six weeks (he had gone to Moscow for a Central Committee meeting and had not returned). The Prime Minister said that Moscow seemed rudderless. She could barely recall a situation where there was at once so much uncertainty and so little contact.

Dr. Kissinger said that the European perception of President Reagan (excluding the British perception) was totally wrong. He was not a maniacal cowboy but was in fact slightly softer than Nixon. The Grenada affair had been miniscule - it was not a test of anything. And in the Western hemisphere its effects had been good. President Reagan's biggest problem was that he was heavily influenced by the liturgy of those who surrounded him. They liked the tough rhetoric. Shultz and Bush were reasonable men and there would no obstacle on the United States side to a restored East/West dialogue. But it was more difficult to decide how to initiate that. European leaders, again the Prime Minister excepted, gave the impression that their role was to press Reagan to adopt conciliatory positions - and thus to put forward new proposals in the arms field. He himself had adopted the tactic of asking his audiences what the latest American arms control proposal was. He rarely got an answer.

He had advocated to Mr. Shultz last Saturday that a quiet dialogue should begin with the Soviet Union. But it should be of a general kind. In his experience, one needed to secure an agreement at Politbureau level on the aims of a negotiation. Then the technical negotiators would get the right instructions. Dobrynin always used to tell him that if he had a message to get to the Soviet Union it should be sent to Brezhnev first. Otherwise the rigid Soviet bureaucracy would take it over. The West should stop making proposals in the arms control field, at least until there had been high level agreement on the general aims of the East/West relationship. The fact was that even if the Soviet Union accepted current Western arms control proposals. this would not make a fundamental difference to the present dangerous situation.

The General Secretary in Moscow, with one or two supporters in the Politbureau, might be able to crystallize a consensus

/ and make

and make changes in foreign policy. It was much more doubtful wehther he would be able to make changes in domestic policy.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Robin Lamb.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

E.R.

PRIME MINISTER

Dr. Kissinger

I have not commissioned any briefing because I expect that you will wish to have your usual broad discussion. But on this occasion the most valuable subject for discussion will probably be Central America. You could get him to tell you about the work of his Commission and to speak about the prospects for El Salvador and Nicaragua.

If there is time, you could then go on to discuss the Middle East and, just possibly, Hong Kong.

A.J.C.

20 December 1983

John

- Mtg with Dr Kissinger 21/12.

I understand from Fco that no briefing has been commissioned for this mtg. Will you require any?

Peter.

Peter 20/12

No. 20. 12

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YOUR TELNO 2055 : DR KISSINGER

1. DR KISSINGER WILL BE DELIGHTED TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT 1445 ON 21 DECEMBER, AND ON LADY YOUNG AT 1100 ON 20 DECEMBER.

BRAITHWAITE

Caroline 12/12

9.12

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SIR J. BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR URE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

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D. STREET

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(2)

Prime Minister.

I think the Foreign Secretary would like to be present.

Content? Yes no

A.J.C. 6/12

MR. COLES

Dr. Kissinger is coming to London on 19 December and we have allocated him a time in the Prime Minister's absence as she always likes to see him. We have an hour blocked out on Wednesday 21 December from 1445 to 1545. Could you tell the Prime Minister?

C.P.

Caroline

A.J.C. 7/12.

5 December 1983

Confirmed with F.C.O.

A.J.C. 7/12

7/12

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GRS 170
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FM WASHINGTON 232316Z NOV 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3543 OF 23 NOVEMBER

MY TELNO 3297 : DR KISSINGER

1. DR KISSINGER'S STAFF HAVE INFORMED US THAT HE WILL BE PAYING A FURTHER VISIT TO LONDON IN DECEMBER, AND WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU IN THE COURSE OF IT, SHOULD YOU BE FREE.

2. DR KISSINGER PLANS TO ARRIVE IN LONDON AT 1810 HRS ON 19 DECEMBER AND WILL BE FREE ON THE MORNING OF 20 DECEMBER UNTIL ABOUT NOON, WHEN HE HAS A MEETING THAT WILL RUN THROUGH THE REST OF THE DAY, INCLUDING DINNER. HE HAS FURTHER MEETINGS ON THE MORNING OF 21 DECEMBER, BUT MAY BE FREE FOR AN HOUR AFTER LUNCH, PRIOR TO DEPARTING HEATHROW AT 1725 HRS. HE WOULD PREFER APPOINTMENTS ON THE MORNING OF THE 20TH AS HE WILL BE LESS RUSHED THEN.

WRIGHT

LIMITED
NAD
PUSD
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

COPIES SENT TO No. 10 DOWNING STREET

RESTRICTED

E. R.

(4)

PRIME MINISTER

Dr. Kissinger

The above, who is passing through London, telephoned today to convey to you his warmest congratulations. He said that all your admirers are thrilled, and wish you every success.

A. S. C.

13 June, 1983.

USA cc FCO RM

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

14 January 1983

PERSONAL

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Thank you so much for your letter of 20 December. I was very glad that you were able to come to dinner in November and I much appreciated the views you expressed then on China and Hong Kong.

If I may say so, I think your remarks to Ambassador Cai Zemin hit just the right note, particularly your point about preserving Hong Kong's stability and prosperity.

The Ambassador's remarks about being 'flexible on all other matters', were we to recognise Chinese sovereignty, are encouraging as far as they go. But I believe they still fall a long way short of a really satisfactory package. The present Chinese ideas appear to envisage an autonomous, capitalist style Hong Kong under China's control. This is the scheme of which the Chinese are currently spreading word, but it does not, it seems to me, offer any genuine guarantees whatsoever that Hong Kong's stability and prosperity, let alone the people's confidence in a free way of life, would be preserved.

Finally, I note with interest what you and the Ambassador have said about informal talks on the subject. We shall, of course, bear this in mind but I do not think that the time is yet right

/to pursue

to pursue this. We need to see how our diplomatic contacts develop.

Thank you once again for taking the trouble to write. Do let me know when you are in London next. I am always pleased to hear from those like you who have great experience of Chinese affairs.

And it is always good to hear from you

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

December 20, 1982

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I am taking the liberty of writing to you to follow up on the very pleasant dinner to which you invited me some weeks ago.

Last Friday, December 17, the retiring Chinese Ambassador, Chai Zemin, called on me for a farewell call. He had with him extensive notes for a tour d'horizon. Toward the end of the conversation he asked me what I thought about Hong Kong. I told him that we were having so many troubles with them on Taiwan that I did not wish to compound them with problems that were between Britain and China. Undeterred he volunteered that the problem of Hong Kong was much easier than that of Taiwan. And he asked what I thought the basic British concerns were. I said that there might be some question whether any new constitutional arrangement would not be challenged sooner or later. Moreover preserving "the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong"--as stated in the British-Chinese communique--seemed impossible unless the current currency and legal code was maintained.

The Ambassador replied that of course China would be unbending on the issue of regaining sovereignty. Having achieved it however it would have no reason to wish to alter it. Moreover, recognition of sovereignty would enable it to be extremely flexible on all other matters, including currency and legal institutions. Talks were now going on with some Chinese from Hong Kong to enable the Chinese to judge their level of tolerance. He also indicated that they were eager to have both formal and informal talks with British officials or others having the confidence of the Prime Minister. Though he

The Right Honourable
Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1
England

SUITE 1100 · 55 EAST FIFTY-SECOND STREET · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10055 · (212) 759-7919

clearly wanted me to pass this on I did not tell him I would do so.

With every good wish for the New Year.

Warm personal regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET

USA / Sir DG

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 November 1982

Dear John,

The Prime Minister gave a working dinner for Dr. Henry Kissinger on Friday 12 November. The other guests were the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Antony Acland, Lord Maclehose, Sir Anthony Parsons, and Mr.Donald. The Primary purpose of the dinner was to draw on Kissinger's experience of negotiating with China, and to find out what he had discovered during his recent visit to China about our negotiations with the Chinese on Hong Kong. I record in this letter the main points made by him.

Situation in China

Kissinger said that his principal impression of China, formed on his visit there in October, was that there was no sense of direction. He could find no clear relationship between the statements of people in Peking and what was happening in the Provinces. When he asked in each of the Provinces he visited whether the Governor or the Party Secretary was the most important, he received a different answer each time - and in one Province the answer was "the question has not yet been settled" - he thought that that was the truth.

He had asked Deng how he evaluated the 12th Party Congress. Deng had replied that he had achieved 80% of the policy changes and 60% of the personnel changes which he had wanted. This perhaps indicated that there was still a good deal of opposition to him.

It was important to bear in mind that at the time when the Prime Minister was in China, Deng appears to have been engaged in a major argument with the Chinese Armed Forces.

Deng Xiaoping

Kissinger agreed with the Prime Minister that Deng was capable of great cruelty. But he had understood the problems of Communism and in particular the problems of government in a country of one billion people. He (Kissinger) had spent more time in the past with Zhou En Lai who had charm. Deng was rather rough but he had come to like him, though he admitted that he was an acquired taste. There was no doubt that he was the most reasonable of Chinese leaders. But he was old.

Deng's dilemma was that he did not know how to achieve what he wanted. He was powerful, but unlike Mao, did not have the "mandate of Heaven".

/ Hong Kong

SECRET

Hong Kong

Kissinger had not discussed Hong Kong with Deng in any detail. His impression was that Deng did not know what was meant by a capitalist Hong Kong. But he was nevertheless prepared to have it. The Chinese found it hard to work out the legal implications of a new status for Hong Kong. They were groping for a legal framework which gave them sovereignty but enabled Hong Kong to remain more or less what it is. They had said that they did not understand the British insistence on the Treaty basis for the present situation in Hong Kong because the Treaties relating to the New Territories would run out in 1997 anyway.

His clear impression was that the Chinese did not want a showdown over Hong Kong (they were not "out for blood"). He believed that they would accept titular sovereignty with British administration continuing. They had mentioned the idea of a British Deputy Governor performing the present functions of the Governor. They envisaged a Chinese Governor but he would be more like a constitutional monarch with the Deputy Governor acting as a kind of Prime Minister. Chinese history showed that they were used to the concept of vague suzerainty without actual control.

Kissinger thought that we should use the negotiations to define operationally who would do what in a future Hong Kong, rather than attempt to define legal status. The Chinese would find this approach more palatable.

The Chinese were not angry with the Prime Minister. They respected her and did not regard her as hostile.

Negotiating Tactics

Kissinger said that negotiating with the Chinese was very different from negotiating with the Russians. With the Russians, maximum positions were stated on both sides and then a process of trading began. Such an approach to negotiations with the Chinese would be a nightmare because everything would become a question of pride. His own technique had been to avoid putting anything on paper to begin with, to explain the essential US requirements and invite the Chinese to explain theirs, and then to stand on the most reasonable US position. He did not engage in salaami tactics.

If we put forward our concept of sovereignty and the Chinese retaliated with theirs, there would never be a meeting of minds. The important thing for us to establish was what kind of administration the Chinese would accept under their own titular sovereignty.

The Chinese reporting system was miraculous. Whichever Chinese you talked to, and wherever he was, the reports all went into a central file. Thus, it was possible to hold informal discussions with particular individuals and be sure that they would be accurately reported to Deng.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Andrew Knight has done an interview with Henry Kissinger which you might like to see before your dinner tonight.

12 November 1982

Private Secretary

DR KISSINGER'S VISIT TO LONDON

1. The Secretary of State, who is attending tonight's dinner which the Prime Minister is giving for Dr Kissinger, may wish to be aware that Dr Kissinger has been the subject of harrassment by one Lyndon La Rouche.

2. The story is confused and the Department do not have all the facts. In essence, however, it appears that La Rouche is a wealthy American businessman who, with his associates, produces a publication called The Executive Intelligence Digest. La Rouche apparently believes that Dr Kissinger is leading an international conspiracy to have him assassinated. He also thinks that Britain is at the centre of a conspiracy to regain the American colonies! He apparently produces printed material making wild accusations about Dr Kissinger and others which comes through the post to various prominent people in Britain.

3. The latest activity of La Rouche and his group has been to telephone various people including Private Office, the Daily Mirror, Lord Roll and Lord Weidenfield, saying that tonight's dinner with the Prime Minister has been cancelled.

4. As a private individual, Dr Kissinger would not normally qualify for police protection during his visit to Britain. However, in view of La Rouche's activities, Protocol and Conference Department asked Special Branch to consider whether any special measures should be taken to protect Dr Kissinger on this occasion. Special Branch replied that they did not consider that Dr Kissinger was under any threat in this country and that they did not propose to give him protection.

5. We have asked the Washington Embassy to contact Dr Kissinger's office and let them know what is going on.

6. On a separate matter, I attach a report by HM Consul-General in New York which gives an account of Dr Kissinger's current views on the international scene as expressed to the Association for a Better New York on 5 November. This may be worth a glance.

D R MacLennan
North America Department
233 8169

12 November 1982

cc: PS/PUS
PS/No 10
Mr Wright, Mr Ure, PCD

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 November 1982

Dear John,

Future of Hong Kong: Recent Developments and the Prime Minister's Dinner with Dr Kissinger on 12 November

This letter sets out recent developments under a number of headings and covers some suggested Points to Make for use by the Prime Minister at the dinner with Dr Kissinger on 12 November. I have not been able to show this letter or its enclosures to Mr Pym. I shall be putting copies in his box tonight.

Talks with the Chinese

As you will have seen from the telegrams, HM Ambassador, Peking, is still waiting, at the time of writing, for the Chinese to come back to him following his meeting of 19 October with Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin. We understand a number of personnel changes within the Foreign Ministry are likely to take place shortly, including the departure of Vice Minister Zhang Wenjin as Ambassador to Washington, or to some other appointment in Peking. These impending changes may well be the reason for the apparent delay on the Chinese side. As soon as the Chinese come back to us we will submit further advice accordingly.

Chinese Ambassador

In the meantime, HM Ambassador, Peking, has had a chance to see Ke Hua, the Chinese Ambassador in London, who is on leave in Peking. Ke Hua harked back again to the sovereignty premise, but expressed confidence that talks would continue.

/The Americans

The Americans

You will know that HM Ambassador, Washington, and Alan Donald held useful talks in Hong Kong in Washington on 4 November with Secretary of State Shultz and Vice President Bush. Alan Donald also discussed Chinese negotiating tactics with senior State Department officials. These talks were on a strictly personal and confidental basis. The Americans were most grateful and would be glad to be kept in the picture. Secretary of State Shultz expects to visit China early next year. Meanwhile, we see advantage in authorising the Ambassador in Peking and the Governor to tell the American Ambassador and the Consul-General in Hong Kong respectively about the high level contacts in Washington on a strictly personal basis.

Dr Kissinger's Visit

For the working dinner with Dr Kissinger, I attach some suggested Points to Make for the Prime Minister. It will be particularly valuable to hear about Dr Kissinger's discussions with Chinese leaders in Peking last month and have his views on how we might best play our hand in our negotiations with the Chinese on the future of Hong Kong.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

POINTS TO MAKE

Introduction

1. Welcome Dr Kissinger to London. Always glad to see him.

2. Valuable to hear his experience of Chinese negotiating tactics, against the background of our present talks with the Chinese over Hong Kong. Dr Kissinger talked to Chinese leaders including Deng in early October.

Prime Minister's Talks with Chinese Leaders

3. On strictly personal and confidential basis Dr Kissinger may like to hear our views on meetings with Deng and Zhao in September and developments since.

4. Chinese took hard line on sovereignty. Not negotiable. Recovery in or before 1997. If it came to the crunch sovereignty took priority over prosperity.

5. Subject to this Chinese were prepared to pursue special policies to allow capitalist way of life to continue. British interests would be taken into account. British officials could remain in certain posts.

6. But China would not let others administer Hong Kong on its behalf. Deng and Zhao did not believe that without British administration and link with UK Hong Kong economy would decline. Sought co-operation in ensuring smooth transition to Chinese sovereignty and overall control in 1997.

7. I recognised how important sovereignty was to China. But a difficult issue for us also. Need first to consider

/definite

definite arrangements for administration and control which would command confidence of Hong Kong people and could be justified to Parliament. Moral obligation to people. Important connection between confidence and continuity of British administration.

Subsequent Talks with Chinese

8. Since then meetings held through diplomatic channels in Peking. Chinese have insisted that talks be based on premise that China recovers sovereignty no later than 1997. We are still discussing with them framework within which talks can take place with common aim as agreed with Deng of maintaining stability and prosperity.

9. Chinese stand predictable. Encouraging that they agreed to joint press statement in September that did not refer to sovereignty, in spite of subsequent remarks made publicly and privately.

Talks in Washington

10. Last week, HM Ambassador Washington went over all this, in strict confidence, with Vice-President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz. Very useful exchange of views, especially on negotiations over arms sales to Taiwan, where we see a possible analogy, in spite of several differences.

Dr Kissinger's Views

11. Very interested to know what impressions Dr Kissinger gained from his talks with Deng and others. Does Dr Kissinger have any ideas on how we might play our hand with the Chinese? They appear reluctant to make a distinction between sovereignty

/and

and administrative control. This is the key element. We cannot give up the sovereignty card early in the negotiations. Nevertheless, a clear hint was given to Deng that we could consider this later, provided that satisfactory arrangements could be agreed.

12. At present discussions continuing through diplomatic channel. Very slow. Perhaps due to current re-organisation of senior posts in the Foreign Ministry. Or alternatively to make us sweat. At some stage we may need to use special emissary. Dr Kissinger's views on when that might be tactically useful.

Message to Get Across to the Chinese

13. Chinese leaders continue to show ignorance about basis of confidence on which Hong Kong's prosperity depends. Message we wish to get across is that present system of British administration provides Hong Kong people and investors with insurance against Peking's interference or imposition of Communist policies. Obviously will be changes but if link with UK is severed altogether, Hong Kong people will have little confidence in general Chinese assurances.

Sue
No need to bother the P.M.
I agree. AJC 10/11.

MR. COLES

Dinner for Dr. Kissinger
Friday, 12 November

I attach the list of guests attending the dinner for Dr. Kissinger on Friday together with a draft seating plan.

If you agree the seating plan, please could it go into the Prime Minister's box?

Sue Goodchild

10 November 1982

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE DINNER TO BE GIVEN
BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HONOUR OF THE HON.
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER ON FRIDAY 12 NOVEMBER 1982
AT 8.00 PM FOR 8.15 PM LOUNGE SUIT

The Prime Minister

The Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MP

The Lord MacLehose

Sir Anthony Parsons

Sir Antony Acland

Mr. A.E. Donald

Mr. John Coles

cc: HM Minister, Washington
Head of NAD, FCO

DR KISSINGER'S ADDRESS TO THE ASSOCIATION FOR A BETTER NEW YORK, 5 NOVEMBER 1982

Dr Kissinger was the Guest Speaker at today's breakfast. In a 15 minute survey of the international scene, he made the following points:-

a) the international situation is exceptionally confused and in movement. This provides more opportunities for "constructive shaping" of developments than ever before;

b) this applies to the Middle East. Recent events there have shown the futility of relying upon Soviet assistance, and the inferiority of Soviet arms. If Jordan can be induced to step forward, the situation could become really promising;

c) it also applies to the Soviet Union, where a double succession of the leadership, Brezhnev followed by a 70 year old successor, is bound to take place over the next 10 years or so. The Soviet experiment has disclosed the total failure of central planning, without which however the Communist system is impossible. The result of central planning has been bureaucracy, feuding and shortage. These factors create the possibility of, and the need for a "fundamental negotiation" between East and West, based on the fact that they are ideological rivals but nuclear partners. Both the military and the economic relationship should be discussed;

d) in this context, the argument with Europe about the oil pipeline was miscast. What should be considered is the balance of economic advantage to either side, including all the necessary elements: credit, subvention, know-how, sales benefit, etc, etc. The calculation should obviously include grain sales, which also constitute a benefit to the Soviet Union despite the argument that they are different because of payment in cash;

e) the international financial scene is critical. There is a clear need for an international regulatory mechanism, to go into

/action

action before a crisis occurs rather than after it. There is also - pace the bankers - need for a concept of "conditionality" which takes account of the political situation in the country concerned as well as the economic situation. It is counterproductive to insist upon economic conditions which precipitate political collapse;

f) the most striking feature of all these and other issues outstanding in the world is that they can be solved by conscious decision of the industrial democracies. "The future is in our hands".

2. Asked to comment on the proposed declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons, Dr Kissinger said that he saw four main objections to such a declaration. First, it would tend to stigmatize nuclear weapons still further, when we needed them for our defence. Second, there was a need to build up conventional forces first. Third, a declaration might create the impression that the United States was ready to see Europe overrun by conventional weapons. Fourth, establishing a balance of conventional weapons was extremely difficult, as European history showed. Answering a further question about proposals for a nuclear freeze, Dr Kissinger said that many of the same considerations applied. There was a question of which weapons would be covered by the freeze; which weapons were new and which replacement weapons, etc., etc. Such arguments risked protracting the negotiation process for further years. He would prefer to stick to the SALT framework, which offered a better chance of early progress.

3. Dr Kissinger evaded a question about President Reagan's military budget. The cost of defence was a secondary question, he said; there was a need to clarify the strategy first, and sort out the value and interrelation of the various competing weapons systems. On the Middle East, Dr Kissinger said that there was no single central figure after the death of Sadat, but a clear need for Jordan to "step forward" if the other Arab countries would allow her to do so. This was the only thing which could clarify the Israeli attitude towards the West Bank, understandably the Israelis would not give cards away in a theoretical argument. In reply to a question about the conventional military balance in Europe, Dr Kissinger said that the advantage always lay with the attacker, and in the first stage at least the Soviet forces would probably

/win.

win. But it would be a major decision for the USSR to wage war on the US in this way, and he did not think they were likely to do it, especially with their own succession problems in mind. (NB. Dr Kissinger's reply assumed that a Soviet conventional attack on Europe would be an act of war against the United States, and no one questioned this assumption).

H T A Overton

5 November 1982

USA (1)

PRIME MINISTER

DR. KISSINGER

You have agreed to offer him a small working dinner on 12 November. Your principal purpose is to draw on his experience of negotiating with China.

For this reason, I suggest that you keep the guest list very small and include only those who are aware of the nature of our negotiations over Hong Kong. Would you like us to invite: the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Acland and Mr. Donald?

Other possible candidates are: Sir Anthony Parsons, Lord Maclehose (but, I suggest, only if he is in London anyway)?

Yes no A.J.C.

27 October 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

USA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 October 1982

Dear John,

VISIT TO LONDON BY DR. KISSINGER

We discussed Washington telegram No. 3404.

The Prime Minister much looks forward to seeing Dr. Kissinger and would like to offer him a small working dinner on the evening of 12 November. I should be grateful if you could arrange for Washington to deliver this invitation to Kissinger.

Yours ever

John Holmes.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 320

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 202155Z OCT 82
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3404 OF 20 OCTOBER.

VISIT TO LONDON BY DR KISSINGER

1. DR KISSINGER PLANS TO ARRIVE IN LONDON AT 1750 LOCAL TIME ON 12 NOVEMBER FOR A TWO-DAY VISIT. HIS OFFICE HAVE ASKED WHETHER WE COULD ARRANGE FOR HIM TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER WHILE HE IS THERE.

2. DR KISSINGER, WHO WILL BE STAYING AT CLARIDGES, HAS DINNER ENGAGEMENTS ON THE EVENINGS OF 12 AND 13 NOVEMBER, AND IS DUE TO ATTEND A BUSINESS MEETING BETWEEN 9.00 AM AND 12.00 NOON ON 13 NOVEMBER. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP HIS DINNER ENGAGEMENT ON 12 NOVEMBER. IT IS AT PRESENT UNDECIDED WHETHER HE WILL LEAVE ON A 1030 HRS OR A 1800 HRS FLIGHT ON 14 NOVEMBER.

3. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THIS FALLS AT A WEEKEND. IF, HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER OR YOU WISHED TO SEE DR KISSINGER, IT WOULD BE OF INTEREST TO HEAR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS TALKS WITH CHINESE LEADERS IN PEKING LAST WEEK (HE HAS BEEN TRAVELLING CONSTANTLY SINCE HIS RETURN). AND OF COURSE HE IS VERY GOOD VALUE ON ALL ASPECTS OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ON THE DOMESTIC U.S. POLITICAL SCENE.

WRIGHT

LIMITED
NAD
INFO.D
NEWS.D
PCD
FED
PS
PS|MR ONSLOW
PS|PUS
MR GIFFARD
MR URE

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 May 1982

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

The above called on the Prime Minister today. The conversation lasted for about an hour but the Prime Minister directed that no record should be made, this being a private meeting.

You should, however, know that after the meeting Dr. Kissinger told me that his impression was that the US Administration was not fully aware of our thinking, in particular on the option of a UN trusteeship arrangement for the Falkland Islands. He believed that the State Department saw this option as a means whereby Argentina would acquire sovereignty in due course. It was clear to him from his conversation with the Prime Minister that we saw this arrangement in a quite different light. I understand that OD(SA) will be considering tomorrow the recent note by FCO officials on UN trusteeship and administration. Following that discussion, it may be desirable to let the State Department have a clear account of our views.

I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear John,

Dr Henry Kissinger

I confirm that Dr Kissinger will be glad to call on the Prime Minister at 16.15 on 10 May.

The Prime Minister will wish to know that Dr Kissinger was in London on a private visit two weeks ago to promote the second volume of his memoirs entitled "Years of Upheaval". Dr Kissinger's lecture in our bicentennial series with the title "Reflections on a partnership: British and American attitudes to post-war foreign policy" will take place at Chatham House at 18.00 on 10 May.

I enclose an advanced text of the lecture. It is primarily historical but Dr Kissinger makes several helpful references to the Falklands crisis. A general theme of the lecture is that the differences in NATO over a wide range of central issues are now more serious than ever before and that sooner or later such divisions could affect the field of security. But the Falklands crisis is seen as strengthening Western cohesion. For Dr Kissinger, the general lesson of the crisis is that, although the United States and Europe may sometimes have different perceptions of their interests in the Third World, each must take care not to let these differences undermine the basic self-confidence and sense of mission of the other. One of Britain's contributions to the Western Alliance is "the awareness that those who cherish the values of Western civilisation must be willing to defend them. In the Falkland crisis, Britain is reminding us all that certain basic principles such as honour, justice and patriotism remain valid and must be sustained by more than words".

I should briefly note that Dr Kissinger was incensed by some remarks by Mr Ray Whitney, in a recent interview on ABC's Nightline, comparing Dr Kissinger's style of shuttle diplomacy unfavourably with that of Mr Haig. Dr Kissinger telephoned our Embassy in Washington to protest at Mr Whitney's

/remarks

RESTRICTED

? remarks, which he did not believe could have been made without official encouragement, and to ask whether he should reconsider his plans to visit London. Dr Kissinger appeared to be mollified by the Embassy's explanation that Mr Whitney had been expressing a purely personal opinion which did not represent any official view.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

As prepared for delivery

REFLECTIONS ON A PARTNERSHIP:

BRITISH AND AMERICAN

ATTITUDES TO POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY

-

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE

HENRY A. KISSINGER

IN COMMEMORATION OF THE

BICENTENARY OF THE

OFFICE OF FOREIGN SECRETARY

-

MONDAY, MAY 10, 1982

Royal Institute of International Affairs

Chatham House

LONDON

Embargoed until delivery, scheduled for 1:30 PM EDT.
Not to be previously published, quoted from, or used in any way.

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REFLECTIONS ON A PARTNERSHIP: BRITISH AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES TO POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

Introduction

Michael Howard, in his earlier lecture in this series, confirmed what I had suspected: that the United States deserves some of the credit for Britain's decision to create a Foreign Office in the first place. The Foreign Office was founded only a few months after the battle of Yorktown. The "politicians" of the time having just mislaid America, the need was evidently felt for some more professional machinery to run Britain's newly expanded sphere of "foreign" affairs.

Since then, Britain and America have never ceased to play important roles in each other's history. On the whole it has been a productive and creative relationship, perhaps one of the most durable in the history of nations. In the last 200 years, we have approached each other sometimes warily, and dealt with foreign affairs often from different perspectives. Still, on balance the relationship has been of considerable benefit to world peace. This has been true particularly of the period since the Second World War.

All accounts of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War and in the early postwar period draw attention to the significant differences in philosophy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill reflecting our different national histories. America, which had never experienced a foreign threat to its survival, considered wars an historical aberration caused by evil men or institutions; we were preoccupied with victory defined as the unconditional surrender of the Axis. Britain had seen aggression take too many forms to risk so personal a view of history; she had her eyes on the postwar world and sought to gear wartime strategy toward forestalling Soviet domination of Central Europe. Many American leaders condemned Churchill as needlessly obsessed with power politics, too rigidly anti-Soviet, too colonialist in his attitude to what is now called the Third World, and too little interested in building the fundamentally new international order towards which American idealism has always tended. The British undoubtedly saw the Americans as naive, moralistic, and evading responsibility for helping secure the global equilibrium. The dispute was resolved according to American preferences--in my view, to the detriment of postwar security.

Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid awakening to maturity in the years following. In the 1940s and 50s our two countries responded together to the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union and took the lead in creating the structures of Western cooperation for the postwar era which brought a generation of security and prosperity.

In the process a rather ironic reversal of positions took place. Today it is the United States that is accused of being obsessed with the balance of power, and it is our European allies who are charged by us with moralistic escapism.

I believe that the extraordinary partnership among the democracies will overcome the occasional squabbles that form the headlines of the day and, even more important, meet the objective new challenges that our countries face.

Philosophies of Foreign Policy

The disputes between Britain and America during the Second World War and after were, of course, not an accident. British policy drew upon two centuries of experience with the European balance of power, America on two centuries of rejecting it.

Where America had always imagined itself isolated from world affairs, Britain for centuries was keenly alert to the potential danger that any country's domination of the European continent--whatever its domestic structure or method of dominance--placed British survival at risk. Where Americans have tended to believe that wars were caused by the moral failure of leaders, the British view is that aggression has thrived on opportunity as much as on moral propensity, and must be restrained by some kind of balance of power. Where Americans treated diplomacy as episodic--a series of isolated problems to be solved on their merits--the British have always understood it as an organic historical process requiring constant manipulation to keep it moving in the right direction.

Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this field. Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters Britain has traditionally practiced a convenient

form of ethical egoism, believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. This requires a certain historical self-confidence, not to say nerve, to carry it off. But she has always practiced it with an innate moderation and civilized humaneness such that her presumption was frequently justified. In the nineteenth century, British policy was a--perhaps the--principal factor in a European system that kept the peace for 99 years without a major war.

American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradition. The Founding Fathers, to be sure, were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and skillfully manipulated it to win independence. But for a century and more after that, America, comfortably protected by two oceans--which in turn were secured by the Royal Navy--developed the idiosyncratic notion that a fortunate accident was a natural state of affairs, that our involvement in world politics was purely a matter of choice. Where George Canning viewed the Monroe Doctrine in terms of the world equilibrium, "call[ing] the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old," Americans imagined the entire Western Hemisphere a special case, safely insulated from the rest of the world. We had created a nation consciously dedicated to "self-evident" truths, and it was taken for granted in most American public discourse that our participation (or non-participation) in the world could be guided exclusively by moral precepts. That geography gave us this luxury was only evidence of God's blessing upon us; we owed Him that quid pro quo. The competitive, sometimes cynical, and always relativistic style of European power politics was viewed in America as an unsavory example of what to avoid and as further evidence of our moral superiority.

In American discussion of foreign policy, even through much of the twentieth century, the phrase "balance of power" was hardly ever written or spoken without a pejorative adjective in front of it--the "outmoded" balance of power, the "discredited" balance of power. When Woodrow Wilson took America into the First World War, it was in the expectation that under American influence the postwar settlement would be governed by a "new and more wholesome diplomacy" transcending the wheeling and dealing, secrecy, and undemocratic

practices that were thought to have produced the Great War.[1] Franklin Roosevelt, on his return from the Crimean Conference in 1945, told the Congress of his hope that the postwar era would "spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries--and have always failed."[2] Both Wilson and Roosevelt put their faith in a universal organization of collective security in which the peace-loving nations would combine to deter, or combat, the aggressors. It was assumed that all nations would come to the same conclusions regarding what constituted aggression and be equally willing to resist it, no matter where it occurred, regardless of how far from their borders, irrespective of the national interest involved.

In the American view, nations were either inherently peaceful or inherently warlike. Hence, after World War II the "peace-loving" US, Britain, and USSR had together to police the world against Germany and Japan even though the former enemies had been rendered impotent by unconditional surrender. If there were doubts about the peace-loving virtue of our wartime allies, they seemed to many American leaders to apply as much to Britain as to the USSR: Roosevelt toyed with the idea of nonalignment between a balance-of-power-oriented, colonialist Britain and an ideologically obstreperous Soviet Union. Even Truman took care not to meet with Churchill in advance of the Potsdam conference; he did not want to appear to be "lining up" with Britain against the USSR. The secret dream of American leaders, if great power conflict proved unavoidable, was to arrogate to themselves the role to which the nonaligned later aspired: that of moral arbiter, hurling condescending judgments down at all those engaged in the dirty game of international diplomacy.

As late as 1949, the Department of State submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a memorandum that strove mightily to distinguish the new North Atlantic Treaty from traditional military alliances and above all from any relationship to the very balance of power it was supposed to establish. The Treaty, the memorandum said,

> is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting "balance of power" but to strengthen the "balance of principle."[3]

American attitudes until quite literally the recent decade have embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended, that problems can be solved permanently, that harmony can be the natural state of mankind. Thus our diplomacy has often stressed the concepts of international law, with its procedures of arbitration and peaceful settlement, as if all political disputes were legal issues, on the premise that reasonable men and women could always find agreement on some equitable basis. Theodore Roosevelt won a Nobel Peace Prize for helping mediate the Russo-Japanese war in 1905; thus Alexander Haig's recent efforts on the Falklands have a long tradition behind them. There is also a perennial American assumption that economic well-being automatically ensures political stability, a belief which has animated American policies from Herbert Hoover's relief efforts after World War I to the Marshall Plan to the recent Caribbean initiative--never mind that, in many parts of the world, the timeframes for economic progress and the achievement of political stability may be seriously out of phase. In our participation in the two world wars of this century, and afterward, our bursts of energy were coupled with the conviction that our exertions had a terminal date, after which the natural harmony among nations would be either restored or instituted.

Disillusionment was inevitable. America fluctuated between moral crusading and frustrated isolationism, between overextension and escapism, between extremes of intransigence and conciliation. But history was kind to us. For a long time it spared us from the need to face up to fundamental choices. Not being called upon to help preserve the equilibrium--a service rendered gratis by Great Britain--we could avoid the responsibility of permanent involvement in world politics, of unending exertion with no final answers or ultimate resolution.

Even when the United States finally entered the world stage of permanent peacetime diplomacy after 1945, it did so under conditions that seemed to confirm our historical expectations. For several decades we had the overwhelming resources to give effect to our prescriptions, and thus conducted foreign policy by analogy to the great formative experiences of the 1930s and 40s: The New Deal translated into the Marshall Plan; resistance to Nazi aggression translated into the Korean "police action" and the policy of "containment." We tended to attribute our dominance in the Western Alliance to the virtue of our motives rather than to the preponderance of our power. In fact, the United States enjoyed nearly half the world's Gross National

Product and an atomic monopoly; our NATO allies, given their dependence, conducted themselves less as sovereign nations than as lobbyists in Washington decision-making.

It was therefore a rude awakening when in the 1960s and 70s the United States became conscious of the limits of even its resources. Now with a little over a fifth of the world's GNP, America was powerful but no longer dominant. Vietnam was the trauma and the catharsis but the recognition was bound to come in any event. Starting in the 70s, for the first time, the United States has had to conduct a foreign policy in the sense with which Europeans have always been familiar: as one country among many, unable either to dominate the world or escape from it, with the necessity of accomodation, maneuver, a sensitivity to marginal shifts in the balance of power, an awareness of continuity and of the interconnections between events.

Our perennial domestic debates reflect the pain, and incompleteness, of that adjustment. The American Right still yearns for ideological victory without geopolitical effort; the American Left still dreams of reforming the world through the exercise of goodwill unsullied by power. We are edging towards a synthesis but it will be a slow, painful, perhaps bitter process.

The Nature of the Special Relationship

That two countries with such divergent traditions could form a durable partnership is remarkable in itself. The periods of the close Anglo-American "special relationship," the object of such nostalgia today, were also times of occasional mutual exasperation.

For quite a while we stressed different aspects of our histories; in more senses than one, we lived in different time zones. It was only some while after the settlement of the Alabama affair just over a century ago that American and British interests began to run parallel. The need for intimacy seemed to be greater on this side of the Atlantic (that is, in Britain), and Britain began to avoid alliances that could entangle her against the United States--including a tantalizing offer from Germany around the turn of the century.[4] American memories were longer: The First World War was a temporary exertion, after which we withdrew into isolationism; during the 20s the US Navy Department still maintained a "Red Plan" to deal with the contingency of conflict with the British fleet.

It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed permanently. In the immediate postwar period we were held together by strategic circumstances which imposed the same necessities, whatever the different philosophical premises. American resources and organization and technological genius, and British experience and understanding of the European balance of power, were both needed to resist the sudden threat from the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty, while formally American initiatives, were inconceivable without British advice and British efforts to organize a rapid and effective European response. Ernest Bevin, as Professor Howard pointed out in the first lecture, was the indispensable architect of the European response as well as the staunch helmsman of Britain's journey from power to influence.

Even then, Anglo-American difficulties persisted occasionally. The anguished disagreements over immigration into Palestine; the misunderstandings over atomic cooperation; competition over Iranian oil; the abrupt, unilateral ending of Lend-Lease; and the race to demobilize were only some of the items in a stream of irritants. More serious policy differences were to follow in the 50s, causing Anthony Eden to reflect on the "tough reality of Anglo-American relations."[5] Even when the politics were parallel, the personalities were often divergent. Eden and Dean Acheson were friends as well as colleagues; the same could not be said for Eden and John Foster Dulles. Misunderstandings and conflicts of interest continued through European integration, the rearmament of Germany, and Indochina, right up to the tragic climax of Suez--to which I will return in a few moments.

That these irritations never shook the underlying unity was due to statesmanship on both sides. One factor was a brilliant British adjustment to new circumstances. To the outside world it may have seemed that Britain clung far too long to the illusion of Empire; in her relations with Washington, she proved that an old country was beyond self-deception on fundamentals. Bevin, the unlikely originator of this revolution in British diplomacy, shrewdly calculated that Britain was not powerful enough to influence American policy by conventional methods of pressure or balancing of risks. But by discreet advice, the wisdom of experience, and the presupposition of common aims, she could make herself indispensable, so that American leaders no longer thought of

consultations with London as a special favor but as an inherent component of our own decision-making. The wartime habit of intimate, informal collaboration thus became a permanent practice, obviously because it was valuable to both sides.

The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder--and no little resentment--to third countries. Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American "arrangements" and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents. The stationing of B-29 atomic bombers in Britain in 1948 was agreed between political and service leaders but not committed to writing. Less happily, only general principles were recorded when Churchill and Roosevelt agreed in 1942 to cooperate in producing the atomic bomb. After Roosevelt died, Clement Attlee reflected with admirable restraint: "We were allies and friends. It didn't seem necessary to tie everything up."[6]

The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union--indeed, they helped draft the key document. In my White House incarnation then, I kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department--a practice which, with all affection for things British, I would not recommend be made permanent. But it was symptomatic.[7]

For a brief moment in the early 1970s, Britain seemed to decide to put an end to the special relationship in order to prove itself a "good European" in the year that it entered the European Community. The attempt was short-lived.[8] By 1976, James Callaghan and Anthony Crosland had restored the traditional close relationship--without resurrecting the label--and it was enormously valuable, indeed indispensable, in the Southern Africa negotiations that began in that year. In my negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when I did not fully grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. The practice of collaboration thrives to our day, with occasional ups and downs but even in the recent Falkland crisis, an inevitable return to the main theme of the relationship.

Clearly, British membership in Europe has added a new dimension. But the solution, in my view, is not to sacrifice the special intimacy of the Anglo-American connection on the altar of the European idea, but rather to replicate it on a wider plane of America's relations with all its European allies, whether bilaterally or with a politically cohesive European Community--that is for Europe to decide. The special frankness and trust that may have been originally resorted to as compensation for a disparity of power may now be even more essential in the partnership of equals that must characterize the future relations between America and Europe.

Britain, America, and Europe

In fact, Europe has been a traumatic issue for both Britain and the United States.

Americans often forget that Britain, too, has been a reluctant internationalist, at least as far as Europe was concerned. Tradition pulled Britain across distant oceans. The glory of foreign policy was identified with Empire and Commonwealth, its problems and perils with the continent of Europe. It was Czechoslovakia--in the heart of Europe--which Chamberlain described as a small faraway country of which Britons knew little--after a century and a half of fighting on the borders of India.

In Britain, reluctance to enter Europe was always bipartisan, and somewhat mystical. Eden once said that Britain knew "in her bones" that she could not join it; and Hugh Gaitskell spoke of the impossibility of throwing off 1000 years of history. But there were more substantial reasons: worries about sovereignty--which on the Left was combined with concern for the unfettered development of socialist planning; an instinctive disinclination to deal with continentals on an equal footing; trade ties with the Commonwealth; and the special relationship. Even Churchill, despite his intimations of the future, remained as ambivalent in government as he had been prescient in opposition when he had called as early as 1947 for a United States of Europe. In office, he never quite found the balance among his three concentric circles--the Commonwealth, Europe, and the English-speaking peoples.

Only after Suez did the risks of isolation become obvious, as well as the opportunity that the emerging Europe offered for exercising in a different but equally effective form

Britain's traditional role of guardian of continental equilibrium. If the economic benefits were ambiguous, the political necessities were not: Only as one of the leaders of Europe could Britain continue to play a major role on the world scene.

By entering the European Community, Britain did not abandon her instinct for equilibrium. But for the first time in peacetime she threw herself into the scales. As I have already noted, she did so with the fervor of a frustrated convert who had been kept waiting for a decade at the doors of destiny.

If Britain has had a difficult adjustment to make in its relationship to Europe, so has the United States.

After the war, American leaders applied a heavy dose of our usual missionary zeal and the full rigor of our "problem-solving" energy to the task of promoting European integration. Federalism, of course, was a hallowed American principle. Shortly after the Philadelphia Convention, Benjamin Franklin was urging on the French the attractions of a federal Europe. A similar evangelism, in a more practical form, shone through the Marshall Plan. Even Acheson, not usually seen as a moralist, was carried away by the European idea; he recalled listening to Robert Schuman outlining his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community: "As he talked, we caught his enthusiasm and the breadth of his thought," Acheson wrote, "the rebirth of Europe, which, as an entity, had been in eclipse since the Reformation."[9]

Despite the idealism of our commitment, tensions between America and a unified Europe were inherent in the logic of what we were so enthusiastically endorsing. We had grown accustomed to the devastated, temporarily impotent Europe of the postwar period; we forgot the Europe that had launched the industrial revolution, that had invented the concept of national sovereignty, and that had operated a complex balance of power for three centuries. A Europe reasserting its personality was bound to seek to redress the balance of influence with the United States; Charles de Gaulle in this respect differed largely in method from Jean Monnet, who never disguised his hopes for a more powerful and effective European voice.

Thus, later American disillusionments were inherent in our goals. It was naive for Americans to take for granted that a federal Europe would be more like us, that a united Europe would automatically help carry our burdens, and that it would

continue to follow American global prescriptions as it had in the early postwar years of European recovery--and dependency. That cannot be so.

Yet even if some of our more unhistorical expectations were disappointed, our original judgment was correct: European unity, strength, and self-confidence are essential for the future of the West. It is beyond the psychological resources of the United States--not only the physical--to be the sole or even the principal center of initiative and responsibility in the non-Communist world. (This is one reason why I always favored the independent British and French nuclear deterrents.) American support for European unification was therefore an expression of self-interest even if it paraded under the banner of altruism; it was to our advantage even if we paid occasionally in the coin of clashing perspectives--provided we found a way toward creative unity on fundamentals.

Britain, Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union

The central foreign policy problem that Britain, America, and Europe have had to confront together since 1945 is, of course, the Soviet Union. And the need for creative unity among us as we do so has not ended.

One thing that is clear from the historical record is that neither side of the Atlantic has had a monopoly of special insight into this problem. As soon as the war had ended, both Britain and America fell over each other in the rush to demobilize. All American troops were due to leave Europe by 1947. After a visit to Moscow in May 1945, Harry Hopkins told President Truman that he saw no major sources of conflict between America and Russia on the horizon.[10]

After Churchill left office, British policy for a brief period ironically fell prey to some of the same illusions that had bedeviled American leaders. The Labour Government at first hoped that "Left could speak unto Left." The brief moment of nostalgia reflected the hope that Britain would stand neither for the unbridled capitalism of the United States nor for Soviet Communism. A resolution calling for the "progressive unity" between the British Labour and Communist parties was only narrowly defeated. There is not much doubt, in fact, that once the US was committed after the Greek-

Turkish aid program in 1947, some in Britain were tempted--as Roosevelt and Truman a few years earlier--by the idea of enhancing British influence by remaining aloof not just from Europe but from the emerging superpower confrontation, adding to her traditional role as manipulator of the balance in Europe that of intermediary between East and West. This attitude has reappeared in some circles in Europe today.

No amount of revisionist distortion can change the fact that it was the Kremlin which turned Anglo-American hopes into mirages. There is today in some circles a curious assumption of diabolic Soviet cleverness and foresight. Yet in those years, Stalin's conduct of relations with his former allies made him the chief architect of NATO. A few more fleeting smiles on the wooden features of Mr. Molotov, and a modicum of self-restraint and diplomatic delicacy, would have done much to prise apart the young and still brittle Atlantic cooperation: and all the boys might have been home, as planned, by 1947.

The Soviets did not manage this degree of subtlety. Instead, Moscow went out of its way to estrange and alienate, where it could have softened through a little courtship, however heavy-handed. The Russians declined Britain's invitation to send a Soviet contingent to a victory parade, and Stalin side-stepped an offer from Attlee to renew the wartime alliance. Every door that Ernest Bevin, mindful of the influential left wing of his party, was careful to keep open was resoundingly slammed and loudly bolted. As was soon to be shown in the persecution of social democrats in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union countenanced only one form of "socialism" and fought other, democratic versions even more bitterly than capitalists. The outright Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan was an egregious blunder; a mild expression of interest, however disingenuous, could have caused untold disruption and delay in the Western camp. Acceptance would have changed the face of postwar politics.

It was one of those moments when America's activism and idealism brought out the best in her. The 40s were years of imaginative men and bold measures on both sides of the Atlantic: The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin airlift, the Brussels treaty, and finally NATO, were inspired and creative initiatives. And in the years following, the United States and its allies stood fast against Soviet pressures and blackmail in crises over Korea, Berlin, and missiles in Cuba.

But we in America had only begun to scratch the surface of the long-term problem of US-Soviet relations in the nuclear age, which would soon produce more ambiguous challenges. The problem was, at bottom, conceptual. Americans were uncomfortable with the notion of a Cold War. They tended to treat war and peace as two distinct phases of policy. Total victory was the only legitimate goal for war; conciliation the appropriate method for peace. In this sense the postwar period fulfilled neither of America's conceptual expectations. If in wartime we lacked a sense of political strategy, in peacetime we had difficulty forming an understanding of the permanent relation between power and diplomacy. The policy of containment, and its variant called "negotiation from strength," was based on the experience with the anti-Hitler coalition. It focused on the buildup of military strength towards some hypothetical day of greater parity; it aimed at eventual negotiation of some kind with the Soviet Union but offered no clue as to either its timing or its content, nor even a clear definition of the nature of the relevant military strength. George Kennan's famous "X" article in Foreign Affairs in 1947 looked vaguely to the eventual "mellowing" of the Soviet system; Dean Acheson spoke of building "situations of strength" which, somewhere down the road, would induce the Kremlin "to recognize the facts..."[11] But how precisely this negotiation would emerge or to what end it would be conducted was left vague.

The flaw in containment was not only, as the cliché has it today, that it was overly preoccupied with military counterforce but that it misunderstood that the West in the immediate postwar period was precisely at the apex of its relative strength. Containment thus deferred the moment for a diplomatic encounter with the Soviet Union to a later time by which Soviet power could only have grown. In 1945 the United States had an atomic monopoly and the Soviet Union was devastated by 20 million casualties. Our policy paradoxically gave the Kremlin time to consolidate its conquests and to redress the nuclear imbalance. The West's military and diplomatic position relative to the USSR was never more favorable than at the very beginning of the containment policy in the late 40s. That was the time to attempt a serious discussion on the future of Europe and a peaceful world.

As so often, Winston Churchill understood it best. In a much neglected speech at Llandudno in October 1948, out of office, he said:

> The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against using this strange new power against them, what will they do when they themselves have huge quantities of atomic bombs?... No one in his senses can believe that we have a limitless period of time before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement. We ought not to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for something to turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad for us to turn up. The Western Nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just demands while they have the atomic power and before the Russian Communists have got it too.[12]

So the postwar world came into being. A precarious peace was maintained, based on a nuclear equilibrium, with occasional negotiations to ease tensions temporarily, but ultimately dependent on a balance of terror. The problem of maintaining security took on an unprecedented new dimension. Technology was soon to make the United States directly vulnerable to attack; the Atlantic Alliance increasingly based its defense strategy on reliance on weapons of mass destruction that posed risks more and more difficult to reconcile with the objectives being defended.

In the nuclear age, peace became a moral imperative. And it imposed a new dilemma: The desire for peace is the mark of all civilized men and women. Yet the democracies' desire for peace, if divorced from a commitment to defend freedom, could turn into a weapon of blackmail in the hands of the most ruthless; if the desire to avoid nuclear war turns into undifferentiated hysteria, nuclear blackmail may well be encouraged. The problem of the relationship of power to peace, the balance between ends and means, has been evaded for a generation by an abdication to technology. But history tolerates no evasions. To develop a strategy that relates ends to means, to build military forces that avoid the choice between Armageddon and surrender, is a preeminent moral as well as political problem for

our period. Of at least equal importance is to develop an Allied consensus behind proposals of arms control based on analysis not panic and freed of either the quest for confrontation or the tendency towards abdication.

Third World Perspectives: What is the Limit of Inter-Allied Confl

In a period of nuclear stalemate, ironically, conflict became more likely at the level of local, nonnuclear crisis. In an age of decolonization, many of these clashes were bound to occur in the Third World. This was another area in which, in the immediate postwar period, American and European attitudes diverged sharply.

Americans from Franklin Roosevelt onward believed that the United States, with its "revolutionary" heritage, was the natural ally of peoples struggling against colonialism; we could win the allegiance of these new nations by opposing and occasionally undermining our European allies in the areas of their colonial dominance. Churchill, of course, resisted these American pressures, as did the French and some other European powers for a longer period than did Britain.

As Europe decolonized, partly under American pressure, there began a reversal of roles, the march by each side towards the philosophical positions vacated by the other--to an America focused on international security and a Europe affirming general moral precepts of conduct. On Third World issues especially, many in Europe have ended up adopting the attitude embodied in Roosevelt's anticolonialism and Eisenhower's conduct over Suez. Now Europe would seek to identify with Third World aspirations, economic and political, intensifying its efforts at conciliation the more insistent, peremptory, and radical that Third World demands become. At the same time, the United States, at least in some administrations, has come to a perception closer to Eden's: that appeasement of radical challenges only multiplies radical challenges.

Different perceptions of national interest were involved as well. Thus in the India-Pakistan war of 1971 Britain did not share our sense of concern for the country which had opened the first tenuous links to China; the historic nostalgia for India was too strong. So too in the early stages of the Falkland crisis America hesitated between its Atlantic and its Western Hemisphere vocations. But neither of these disagreements did any lasting damage. In the end we came

together; the old friendship prevailed over other considerations.

The lesson I draw is that in the Third World we may occasionally operate from different perspectives. But we must take care not to let these differences reach a point where they undermine the basic self-confidence and sense of mission of the other party, lest we threaten prospects for progress and stability transcending the immediate issue.

In this context the experience of Suez is instructive. Our prolonged and never-reconciled clash had lasting consequences not only for the Middle East and the Third World but also for the long-term evolution of Western policies.

The details of that disaster are not relevant to my immediate purpose. The British-French expedition against the Suez Canal was clearly misconceived. The fact remains that Eden had got hold of what was intellectually the right problem, while the American reaction, among other things, begged some crucial questions: to what extent our "revolutionary" historical analogy was relevant; to what extent it was wise to humiliate one's closest ally; and what would be the long-term consequence of such a course.

Britain and France, in my view, were acting on a strategic analysis which may have been traditional and even self-serving but was far from frivolous. Nasser was the first Third World leader to accept Soviet arms and to play the radical, pro-Soviet game in an attempt to blackmail the West. Eden's perception was that a dangerous precedent was being set: can there be any dispute of this today? Had Nasser's course been shown a failure, a quite different pattern of international relations would have developed, at least for a decade or more. As it turned out, Nasser's policy was vindicated; revolutions spread in the Middle East in the following years, and he has countless imitators today around the world relying on Soviet arms to increase their influence and to destabilize their neighbors.

Even more important, our humiliation of Britain and France over Suez was a shattering blow to these countries' role as world powers. It accelerated their shedding of international responsibilities, some of the consequences of which we saw in succeeding decades when reality forced us to step into their shoes--in the Persian Gulf, to take one notable example.

Suez thus added enormously to America's burdens--and simultaneously fueled a European resentment at America's global role which continues to this day.

It is clear that a world of progress and peace requires that more than 100 new and developing nations be made part of the international system; no international order can survive unless they feel a stake in it. It is incontestable that many conflicts in the developing world arise from legitimate social, economic, or political grievances; this, however, does not exclude the possibility that these can be exploited by extremists and turned against the long-term security interests of the West. The democracies, whatever their shifting positions, have failed to relate their philosophical and moral convictions to a coherent analysis of the nature of revolution and an understanding of how best to foster moderation. Above all, disputes among the democracies over this problem should not be permitted to turn into a kind of guerrilla warfare between allies. Whatever the merit of the individual issue, the price will be a weakening of the West's overall psychological readiness to maintain the global balance.

The strategic position or self-confidence of a close ally on a matter it considers of vital concern must not be undermined. It is a principle of no little contemporary relevance. In this sense the Falkland crisis in the end will strengthen Western cohesion.

Suez, by weakening Europe's sense of its own importance as a world power, accelerated the trend of Europe's seeking refuge in the role of "mediator" between the United States and the Soviet Union. The role that some American leaders naively saw the United States as playing between Churchill and Stalin, in the end too many Europeans seek to adopt between Washington and Moscow.

It is not a new phenomenon. It began, at least where Britain was involved, as wise advice to us that negotiation could be an element of strategy. This is a lesson of which Americans often need to be reminded. It has its antecedents in Attlee's flight to Washington for reassurance when Truman seemed to hint at using nuclear weapons in Korea; in Eden's efforts at various Geneva conferences to sponsor a dialogue in the era of Dulles's moralism; in Macmillan's appearance in an astrakhan hat in Moscow in 1959; in the strenuous Western European importunings of the Nixon Administration in 1969 to join Europe in the pursuit of détente. But carried too far,

it runs the risk of abdicating any share of responsibility for a cohesive Western strategy toward the USSR, or toward anti-Western radicalism in the Third World.

And thus we see the ironic shift of positions reflected in some of our contemporary debates. The deprecation of the importance of power, the abstract faith in goodwill, the belief in the pacific efficacy of economic relations, the evasion of the necessities of defense and security, the attempt to escape from the sordid details of maintaining the global balance of power, the presumption of superior morality--these features once characteristic of America now seem to be more common in Europe. Where the United States has never quite abandoned its earlier moralism or fully developed a concept of equilibrium as Europe had once maintained, many in Europe paradoxically seem to have adopted some of the illusions that Americans clung to in years of isolation from responsibility.

The unity of the industrial democracies remains crucial to the survival of democratic values and of the global equilibrium. We must at last answer the perennial questions of all alliances: How much unity do we need? How much diversity can we stand? An insistence on unanimity can be a prescription for paralysis. But if every ally acts as it pleases, what is the meaning of alliance? There is no more important task before the Alliance than to deal with these problems concretely, seriously, and above all immediately.

The Contemporary Debate

Let me make a few general points, therefore, about the contemporary debates between America and Europe.

I do not claim that the United States is always correct in its perceptions. But Europeans ought to take care not to generate such frustrations in America that either an embittered nationalism, or unilateralism, or a retreat from world affairs could result.

I fully acknowledge that the United States by its actions has sometimes stimulated or intensified the feelings in Europe that Europe had to strive to maintain its own interests, its own policies, its own identity. Indeed, as I said, naive American expectations that a rejuvenated Europe would follow our lead are partly responsible for the sometimes petulant

reaction to Europe's assertions of its own role. In recent times the United States may have appeared unintentionally callous toward the danger of nuclear war or insufficiently alert toward the opportunities for peace. But the United States has nevertheless been more nearly correct than its critics in warning that those who seek peace not backed by strength will sooner or later find the terms of peace dictated to them; that peace to be meaningful must be just; that nations live in history, not utopia, and thus must approach their goals in stages. To ask for perfection as a precondition of action is self-indulgence, and in the end an abdication.

Observers, including myself, have been sounding the alarm for decades about this or that "crisis" in the Western Alliance. But today's, I am afraid, is more genuinely, objectively, serious than ever. It comes after decades of a relentless Soviet military buildup, when the West, for a decade, is edging in some areas toward a dangerous dependency on economic ties with the East; while in Poland the Soviet Union enforces the unity of its empire, its clients press on to undermine the security interests of the West from Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Africa to Central America. Not all our difficulties are caused by the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union has shown little restraint in exploiting them, and their solution --whatever their cause--has been impeded by the lack of a unified Western response.

One of Britain's contributions to the Western Alliance has been to supply a needed global perspective: the knowledge, from centuries of experience in Europe, that peace requires some clear-eyed notion of equilibrium and a willingness to maintain it; the insight, from centuries of world leadership, that Europe's security cannot be isolated from the broader context of the global balance; the awareness, from heroic exertions in this century, that those who cherish the values of Western civilization must be willing to defend them. In the Falkland crisis, Britain is reminding us all that certain basic principles such as honor, justice, and patriotism remain valid and must be sustained by more than words.

The issue before the allies now is not to assess blame but to face our future. An alliance at odds over central issues of East-West diplomacy, economic policy, the Middle East, Central America, Africa, and relations with the Third world is in serious, and obvious, difficulty. Indeed it cannot be called an alliance if it agrees on <u>no</u> significant

issue. Sooner or later such divisions must affect the field of security. For too long, all of us in the community of free nations have put off the uncomfortable questions; our evasions are now coming home to roost.

Thirty-five years ago after the war, the democracies for a time overestimated the immediate dangers and underestimated their own capabilities; yet in the end they came up with a creative and effective response. Today too, we may be underrating our own capacities and confusing long- and short-term dangers.

The strange aspect is that the disarray is taking place at the precise moment that the bankruptcy of the system that denies the human spirit seems to become clear beyond doubt. The Communist world has fundamental systemic problems and has not shown any ability to solve them except by recurrent brute force, which only delays the day of reckoning. In the sixty-five-year history of the Soviet state, it has never managed a legitimate, regular succession of its political leadership; the country faces the demographic time-bomb of its growing non-Russian population, soon to be a majority. The system has failed to deal seriously with the desire for political participation of its intellectual and managerial elite. Or else it has sought to preempt their political aspirations by turning the ruling group into a careerist "new class" bound to produce stagnation if not corruption. Its ideology is a discredited failure, without legitimacy, leaving the Communist Party a smug privileged elite with no function in the society except its own self-perpetuation, struggling to deal with bottlenecks and crises which its own rigidity has caused. It is an historic joke that the ultimate crisis in every Communist state, latent if not evident, is over the role of the Communist Party.

Soviet economic peformance is a disaster. It seems impossible to run a modern economy by a system of total planning, yet it seems impossible to maintain a Communist state without a system of total planning. How ironic that the West is tearing itself apart over how best to coordinate Western financial, technological, and agricultural aid to a so-called "superpower" incapable of sustaining a modern economy.

In short, if Moscow is prevented by a coordinated Western policy from deflecting its internal tensions into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side.

It is the Communist world, not the West, that faces a profound systemic crisis. Ours are problems of coordination and policy, theirs are of structure. And therefore it is not beyond the realm of hope that a coherent, unified Western policy could at long last bring into view the prospect of a negotiated global settlement that Churchill foresaw at Llandudno.

The solutions to the West's problems are, to a significant degree, in our own hands.

One problem is that the democracies have no forum for addressing the future in a concrete way, let alone harmonizing disagreements or implementing common policies. As my friend Christopher Soames has recently emphasized, the Atlantic Alliance has no institutional machinery for addressing economic or Third World issues, or any long-term political strategy; the European Community, while eminently successful in its political coordination, has no mechanism as yet for formulating a coherent European view on matters of defense. The economic summits of Western and Japanese leaders, begun in the mid-70s, are an attempt to surmount this procedural impasse, but they can do little more than call key leaders' attention to key problems in an informal, unsystematic way. Procedures do not solve substantive problems. Nevertheless, creating an appropriate forum for broader and deeper consultation would be an important first step.

America has learned much in the postwar period, perhaps most of all from Britain. In the last decade we have also learned something of our limits, and in the new Administration we have shaken off the trauma of perhaps excessive preoccupation with our limits. An America that has recovered its vitality and its faith in the future is as much in the interests of the West as a Europe shaping its identity.

Both Britain and America have learned that whatever their histories, their futures are part of the common destiny of freedom. Experience has taught that moral idealism and geopolitical insight are not alternatives but complementary; our civilization may not survive unless we possess <u>both</u> in full measure. Britain and America, which have contributed so much to the free world's unity and strength, have another opportunity now, together with our allies, to show that the democratic nations are the masters of their destiny.

Thank you.

NOTES

[1] Woodrow Wilson, address before the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1916.

[2] Franklin D. Roosevelt, address to Congress on the Yalta (Crimea) Conference, March 1, 1945.

[3] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949), pt. 1, Appendix, p.337.

[4] See R.B. Mowat, The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States (London, 1925), p.92.

[5] Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p.225.

[6] Clement Attlee and Francis Williams, Twilight of Empire (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1962), p.108.

[7] Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson/Michael Joseph, 1982), pp.274-286.

[8] Ibid., pp.140-143.

[9] Dean Acheson, Sketches from Life (New York: Harper & Bros., 1961), pp.36-37.

[10] Attlee and Williams, above, p.161.

[11] U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (1951), p.2083.

[12] Winston Churchill, speech at Llandudno, October 9, 1948, in New York Times, October 10, 1948.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

USA

19 January 1982

cl.
1) Carlini - [illegible]
2) B.U. 5/3.

A.J.C. 20/1

10/2/82.
Kissinger visit cancelled.
CT.

Dear John,

Dr Henry Kissinger

Thank you for your letter of 7 January. Dr Kissinger will be glad to call on the Prime Minister at 0900 on 10 March.

I suggest that the Prime Minister may need no special briefing for this meeting. But I will write to you nearer the time if there are any particular current subjects on which briefing might be useful. As background, the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to know that Dr Kissinger's lecture in our bicentennial series will take place at Chatham House on Thursday 11 March, with the title, "Reflections on a partnership: British and American attitudes to post-war foreign policy".

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

B/F

Caroline
To see.

Noted
Sic? 9 for 0900.
cd.

A.J.C.

WONFO 026/18

PP FCO

GRS 70

ADVANCE COPY
Hd. Planning Staff, (MIN),
PS
PS/No.10, Downing St,

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 182113Z JAN 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 18 JANUARY 82

[Not passed by COD to Hd. News Dept.]

OUR TELNO 123: FCO BICENTENARY.

1. KISSINGER'S OFFICE NOW CONFIRM THAT HE WILL FLY TO LONDON ON 9 MARCH, TO ALLOW HIM TO CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER THE FOLLOWING MORNING. HE PLANS TO RETURN BY THE 1800 HRS CONCORDE ON FRIDAY 12 MARCH. GRATEFUL IF HOTEL RESERVATIONS COULD BE ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY.

HENDERSON

NNNN

RESTRICTED

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 January 1982

BF

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

You wrote yesterday about the visit of the above in March.

The Prime Minister would be very willing to see Dr. Kissinger when he is in London and could make available up to an hour at 0900 on Wednesday 10 March. But, in view of her very crowded programme in March, she is not inclined to arrange a special dinner for Dr. Kissinger. She thinks it might be more appropriate for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to arrange such an event.

JC

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

I really think that ① such a dinner party should be arranged by the F.O and not by me.

10 DOWNING STREET

I will see H.K. for 45-60 mins

Prime Minister

Henry Kissinger

I am sure he would like to call on you (see attached letter).

2. A small dinner in the small dining room would

(a) flatter him more than a call

(b) help to ensure that he does not indulge in one of his monologues

(c) all the right guests be very interesting.

3. I think we could improve on the F/C.O. guest list and will submit separately.

4. Agree to give small working dinner on 11 April? A.J.C. 6/T

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 January 1982

Dear John,

Dr Henry Kissinger

We shall be marking the bicentenary of the office of Foreign Secretary, which falls on 27 March, by a series of four lectures at Chatham House. The second of these, on 11 March, will be given by Dr Kissinger.

Lord Carrington, who will be giving a lunch for Dr Kissinger on 11 March, wonders whether the Prime Minister would like to see him during his visit. One possibility which Mrs Thatcher might wish to consider might be to invite Dr Kissinger to dinner along with a handful of other experts on international matters, chosen for their ability to contribute to a lively discussion. Lord Carrington (who has an unbreakable commitment on that evening) suggests that the Prime Minister might invite Mr Douglas Hurd; Professor Lawrence Martin of Newcastle University, who delivered this year's Reith Lectures on the subject of arms control; Lord Harlech; Sir Isaiah Berlin; Mr Philip Windsor of the London School of Economics; Mr David Watt and Professor Michael Howard (who are also lecturing in our bicentennial series); Mr Christopher Tugendhat; and Mr Andrew Knight of the Economist.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

I have spoken to Mr Lyne USA & he has set out a manuscript below. [illegible] (1)

10 DOWNING STREET

MR ALEXANDER P.A.

Visit to London of Dr. Kissinger

Wednesday 20 May is the day of the Conservative Women's Conference - a major Party speech for the Prime Minister. On her return from Central Hall Westminster she has the Prime Minister of Dominica at 1700 hours followed by OD at 1730.

But if she agrees, I could fit in Dr. Kissinger at 1830.

[illegible]

Prime Minister: The Prime Minister of Dominica may not come. Even so this is a fairly heavy day. Regret this time & look forward to seeing him next time? [illegible] 6/5

Yes ~~no~~

6 May 1981

RESTRICTED

Copy to
Michael Alexander Esq
No 10

We spoke.

GPS 102

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 272340Z
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELNO 1306 OF 27 APRIL 1981.

KISSINGER

1. HENRY KISSINGER HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS LEAVING ON 5 MAY FOR TWO AND A HALF WEEKS IN EUROPE. HE WILL VISIT LONDON, ARRIVING ON WEDNESDAY 20 MAY AT 11.45 AM FROM BRUSSELS, AND LEAVING FOR MUNICH AT 13.30 THE FOLLOWING DAY. BEING OUT OF OFFICE, HE WOULD NOT BE BEARING ANY PARTICULAR INFORMATION BUT, FROM THE WAY HE SPOKE, I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY WELCOME THE CHANCE OF A FEW MINUTES WITH YOU AND, IF POSSIBLE, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASKED ME TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIS OFFICE HERE IF ANYTHING WAS FIXED UP.

HENDERSON

LIMITED
NAD
INFORMATION D
NEWS D
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/PUS
MR DAY
MR URE

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

RESTRICTED

USA

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 December 1980

Dear Michael,

Dr Kissinger and US Foreign Policy

You asked for a short note on Dr Kissinger's prospects and the likely direction of US foreign policy under the Reagan Administration before the Prime Minister sees Dr Kissinger on 4 December.

It now seems unlikely that Dr Kissinger will become Secretary of State. Such an appointment might offend Mr Reagan's right wing supporters who view him as the begetter of detente and the SALT process. He has also said that he would refuse the post of Ambassador to Peking.

The most likely formal role for him is that of Ambassador-at-large, to be sent by the President on missions of special difficulty or importance (eg the Middle East). There are precedents: President Carter used Ambassadors-at-large in the Middle East and over the Panama Canal Treaties.

There is one rumour of which the Prime Minister should perhaps be aware. A couple of newspapers (here and in the US) have reported the possibility that Dr Kissinger might be appointed Ambassador here. When questioned directly about it, Dr Kissinger apparently remained silent. We think it unlikely that Dr Kissinger would accept an Ambassadorship after having been a powerful Secretary of State; but the gossip columnists say that his wife Nancy is keen on the idea.

US Foreign Policy under President Reagan

The Prime Minister will know from briefing for the Anglo-German and Anglo-Italian consultations how we view the likely development of US foreign policy under President Reagan. In brief, much will depend on what appointments the President makes. Mr Reagan will wish at the outset to strike a distinctive note in his conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. Firmness and consistency will be the aim. The super power relationship will be restored as the central pre-occupation of US foreign policy. Wider global perspectives and regional issues will be viewed through the East/West lens. The commitment of Mr Reagan to regain military superiority is an important feature of the Republican Party Platform. But it is impossible to say how it will be

/pursued

pursued in practice, and pragmatism is likely to soften some of the edges of the policies Reagan sketched out during his campaign.

We can welcome the strong commitment which Mr Reagan has made to the Alliance and to consultation with the allies. But there is already some impatience with the allies in the Republican camp, and there are two potential factors which might lead to friction. First, the new Administration may wrongly believe that Alliance problems are no more than a relic of uncertain Carter leadership. They will be disappointed when they find that this is not true; real differences of interest (eg the German commitment to detente, European interests in the Middle East) will not vanish. Secondly, they seem likely to take up the cry that the allies are not pulling their weight in the collective defence of common Western interests, particularly outside the NATO area.

One immediate issue on which the attitude of the Reagan Administration is an important factor is Namibia. The South Africans appear to have convinced themselves that Reagan will be far more understanding of the South African case than Carter (or the Five as a whole). This could encourage the South Africans to indulge in delaying tactics. If this happens, the whole sanctions issue could come alive. This is against the interests of both ourselves and the US.

Mr Reagan's advisers recently gave an interview on the likely course of his foreign policy. I enclose a copy of Washington telno 4609 which gives a detailed summary.

Yours ever
G

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

(59)

See ou/2.

Amu 011/1

TOP COPY

GR 750
UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 190900Z
FM WASHINGTON 182105Z NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NO 4609 OF 18 NOVEMBER
INFO MODUK, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW
INFO SAVING PEKING

Pr J 20/11

US FOREIGN POLICY

1. THE 24 NOVEMBER EDITION OF US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT CARRIES INTERVIEWS WITH RICHARD ALLEN, FRED IKLE AND WILLIAM VAN CLEAVE ABOUT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S LIKELY APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY (FULL TEXT BY BAG TO DEPARTMENT). THE FOLLOWING EXTRACTS MAY BE RELEVANT TO DISCUSSIONS IN THE FCO ON 19 NOVEMBER.

SALT
2. ONE DOES NOT JUST SCRAP THE RESULTS OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS. WE CAN USE GOOD PARTS OF SALT II AND BUILD FROM THERE. SOME OF OUR ADVISERS WANT TO HALT ALL SALT ACTIVITY UNTIL WE RESTORE MILITARY PROGRAMMES ... I DO NOT AGREE. WE MUST BEGIN THINKING RIGHT NOW ABOUT WAYS TO ACHIEVE A NEW MORE EQUITABLE SALT TREATY WITH THE RUSSIANS. (ALLEN)

3. ARMS AGREEMENTS, IN PARTICULAR SALT, HOWEVER IMPORTANT MUST BE SEEN WITH A SENSE OF PROPORTION. SALT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THE BE-ALL AND END-ALL OF FOREIGN POLICY ... WE WANT TO HAVE GENUINE ARMS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS. BUT WE CANNOT INDUCE THE RUSSIANS TO GO ALONG WITH THIS IF WE CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO KEEP PACE SHOULD THEY CHOOSE TO CONTINUE THEIR ARMS BUILDUP. (IKLE)

DEFENCE PROGRAMMES
4. TWO PARAMOUNT PROBLEMS ARE THE MANPOWER CRISIS AND THE DECLINING CREDIBILITY OF OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES ... WE MUST INCREASE PAY AND BENEFITS. (UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD YOU COUNSEL A RETURN TO CONSCRIPTION?) WE SHOULD GIVE THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCES A CHANCE TO SUCCEED THEN MAKE OUR EVALUATIONS ... WE CANNOT ALLOW CONTINUING DETERIORATION IN THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN TROOPS ... WE CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF RETAINING GOOD PEOPLE IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FRAMEWORK. BUT I HAVE SOME DOUBT THAT WE CAN ATTRACT HIGH QUALITY RECRUITS IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS. ON STRATEGIC QUICK FIXES, THREE OPTIONS - ACCELERATE MX, REBASE MINUTEMAN IN DECEPTIVE SILOS, OR COMBINE THE TWO. (VAN CLEAVE).

/5.

5. AN ABM SYSTEM IS NOT A SHORTTERM SOLUTION. IT MAY BE USEFUL AFTER MID DECADE TO DEFEND THE FORCE AGAINST GROWING THREATS. (DO YOU FAVOUR ABROGATION OF THE ABM TREATY?) NOT AT THIS POINT. WHAT MAKES SENSE IS A SERIOUS REVIEW OF ABM PROSPECTS ... WE MAY WANT TO RENEGOTIATE THE TREATY. (VAN CLEAVE)

6. (HOW MUCH DEFENCE SPENDING IS ENOUGH?) MY GUESS IS THAT 6-7% OF GNP WILL BE THE LIKELY RANGE BY 1983-5 (VAN CLEAVE)

7. THE US WON'T COUNTENANCE BY TREATY OR NEGLECT A POSITION OF MILITARY INFERIORITY TO THE SOVIET UNION (ALLEN).

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

8. IN GENERAL TRADE IS DESIRABLE BUT WE NEED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF OUR HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE WITH THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. WE MUST NOT TRADE AWAY OUR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE (ALLEN).

9. WHEN OUR GOALS CONVERGE WITH CHINA'S WE SHOULD ALLOW TRADE IN CERTAIN HIGH TECHNOLOGY ITEMS WITH A MILITARY APPLICATION - EG RADAR. WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN RESISTING SOVIET DOMINANCE IN ASIA. NOW THAT DOESN'T AMOUNT TO AN ALLIANCE. A US/CHINESE ALLIANCE IS NOT IN THE CARDS TODAY (ALLEN).

10. THE ONLY WAY TO RESTORE VITALITY TO THE NATO ALLIANCE IS TO TREAT OUR ALLIES AS EQUALS WHILE THE US MAKES ITS OWN CASE. PECULIAR ECONOMIC, GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS SOMETIMES PUT WEST EUROPEAN NEEDS IN CONFLICT WITH AMERICAN WISHES ... WEST GERMANY, FOR INSTANCE, MUST PRACTICE OSTPOLITIK.. FRICTION CANNOT BE AVOIDED ... WE CANNOT REVERT TO THE DAYS WHEN THE US DICTATED ALLIANCE POLICY THAT PASSED FOR UNANIMITY (ALLEN).

11. (HOW SHOULD THE US COUNTER THE SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD?) MILITARY FORCE IS A LAST RESORT BUT IN THIS IMPERFECT WORLD MILITARY STRENGTH IS THE BACKBONE OF DIPLOMACY ... WORDS CAN BE EFFECTIVE ... IF BEHIND THEM THERE IS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH ... I WOULD HOPE ONE CAN FIND A POLICY TO DISCOURAGE THE ROLE OF CUBAN MERCENARIES ON BEHALF OF SOVIET IMPERIAL OBJECTIVES AND TO RAPIDLY REDUCE IT. (IKLE).

SW ASIA

12. MILITARY POWER IS SECONDARY TO THE EXERCISE OF STRONG CONSISTENT POLICY IN THAT AREA. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR A CLEAR CONCEPT OF WHAT VITAL AMERICAN INTERESTS REALLY ARE, UNDERSTOOD BY ALLY AND ADVERSARY ALIKE. CLEARLY A STRONG US MILITARY POSITION IS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THAT POLICY WORK. (ALLEN).

13. STRENGTHEN NATO - TURKEY AND GREECE ... BUILD ON OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL AND EGYPT .. IN THAT CONNEXION EXPLORE VARIOUS FORMS OF MILITARY PRESENCE THAT ARE DEFENSIBLE BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY ... BY STEADINESS OF COMMITMENT AND OBJECTIVE THE US CAN ATTRACT SUPPORT INCREASINGLY FROM ISRAEL, EGYPT AND OTHER MODERATE STATES FOR A US AND WESTERN ROLE IN THE STABILITY OF THE GULF (IKLE).

14. URGENT NEED FOR BASES TO SUPPORT A CONSISTENT AMERICAN PRESENCE ... NAVAL AND AIR BASES RATHER THAN BIG CONCENTRATIONS OF GROUND FORCES. WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE SINAI AIR BASES EGYPT WILL GET FROM ISRAEL IN 1982. ISRAEL ITSELF IS A STRATEGIC ASSET TO THE US AND WE WANT BASES NEAR THE PERSIAN GULF (VAN CLEAVE).

(EESD PLEASE ENSURE SIR N. HENDERSON SEES THIS TELEGRAM).

FCO PASS SAVING PEKING

FRETWELL

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

FCO | WH
NAD

USA R29/1.

(2)

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Prime Minister (2 letters)
H+S

April 24, 1980

Dear Mrs. Thatcher:

Now that I have returned to Washington, I would like to let you know how much I appreciated your seeing me last week. I enjoyed our discussion enormously. I want to thank you for giving me so much of your time during an exceedingly busy period. You are one of the hopes of the West.

With warmest personal good wishes and the hope that we can get together again soon,

Best regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

The Right Honourable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, S.W.1
England

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

23 April 1980

PS/PUS
PS
Mr Alexander
Chlo 10
25/4

G G H Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

Dear George

DR HENRY KISSINGER

1. Kissinger telephoned me today on getting back from Europe.

2. He greatly valued the chance to talk with the Prime Minister. He hopes he may be able to see the Secretary of State when he is here at the beginning of May.

3. As you know, Kissinger does not think the international scene has been so precarious since the end of the Second World War. Even if sanctions could have some effect on the hostage problem, this cannot be expected to take place within the time limit that the President has allowed himself. He would therefore have to resort to some form of military action and it would have to be mining.

4. Saying he did not want it to go any further, Kissinger told me that he was most concerned by his talk with Helmut Schmidt. He thinks he knows him as well as anybody does. Although he may not realise it himself, Schmidt's policy is one of near neutralisation, the fruit partly of profound and incorrigible contempt for Carter.

Yours ever,

Nicko

Nicholas Henderson

cc: HE Sir J Oliver Wright GCVO KCMG DSC
BONN

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

bcc: Mr Alexander
No 10

Germany April 80
Visit of Schmidt to Moscow.

Private Secretary

GUADELOUPE II

A 1. At the end of his conversation with the Prime Minister on 16 April Dr Kissinger expressed surprise that no attempt had been made to organise a second 4 power summit meeting on the model of Guadeloupe. The Prime Minister is recorded as saying that she would reflect on this point. Mr Alexander has invited FCO advice.

2. The idea is open to all the usual objections: risk of excessive expectations leading to disappointment, offence to those not invited etc. Certainly Italy, Canada and Japan may feel sore at having got in on the Venice Group only to be up-staged by a second Guadeloupe.

3. All the same I find Dr Kissinger's suggestion attractive. The announcement alone could do something to reduce Trans-Atlantic disunity, of which we have seen so many signs recently. The task of preparing for a summit would have a steadying effect in the 4 capitals. And one hopes that the meeting itself would produce something valuable.

B 4. As to how to explain matters to the uninvited, perhaps we could make use of Chancellor's Schmidt's request for advice on how to reply to the invitation to him to visit Moscow this summer. The 3 Heads of Government whom he has consulted about this are the 3 who would be present at Guadeloupe II. We could take the line that Chancellor Schmidt's approach has crystallised the idea of a second meeting of this kind and made it natural to bring together the German Chancellor with the representatives of the 3 Western powers holding special responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole. And Chancellor Schmidt might find it easier to reply to the invitation, whether positively or negatively, with a Quadripartite summit behind him.

5. In the absence this afternoon of the PUS and Sir D Maitland I am sending you this minute direct. If the Secretary of State thought the idea worth pursuing, he might wish to hold a small meeting on Monday morning, and perhaps to speak to the Prime Minister after that.

J L Bullard

18 April 1980

Copies: PS/LPS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/Mr Blaker
PS/PUS
Sir D Maitland
Lord N Gordon Lennox
Mr Fergusson
WED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

USA

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 April 1980

cc'd. Master set

Middle East Situation Pt 2

Foreign Policy: East/West Relations July 79

Call by Dr. Kissinger

Dr. Kissinger called on the Prime Minister this afternoon and stayed for rather over an hour. This account of the conversation will be rather more impressionistic than usual since the Prime Minister, at Dr. Kissinger's prompting, instructed me not to take a record. Dr. Kissinger told me afterwards that he had no objection to a letter describing the conversation being written provided it was not given too wide a distribution. He said that he would be content for it to be seen by Sir Nicholas Henderson (for whose performance as HM Ambassador in Washington he had earlier expressed the warmest appreciation).

The US Administration

Dr. Kissinger said that President Carter was excessively isolated in the White House. President Nixon has also been isolated. But, unlike President Carter he had not tried to do everything himself. Moreover President Carter continued to give an impression of inexperience (Dr. Kissinger also commented disparagingly on Governor Reagan's lack of experience). The Administration had apparently still failed to formulate an overall strategy for dealing either with the Iranian problem or with the much graver issues raised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As regards Iran there was a specific problem in that some of the middle and lower echelons in the White House and the State Department sympathised with the objectives of the Iranian revolution. This accounted, at least in part, for the lack of credibility in the Administration's threats to take a tough line. The situation would have been very different had the hostages been taken by e.g. the Pinochet regime.

Iran

Dr. Kissinger said that he had favoured military action of some kind at a very early stage in the crisis. The taking of hostages should never have been accepted by the US Administration. However, in the situation which had now arisen, he was opposed to military action. He did not see how it could be made effective. A naval blockade by ships would rapidly result in a "nervous collapse" in Washington. Every time a blockading ship sighted an approaching vessel, there would have to be a meeting in Washington to decide whether or not it should be stopped (Dr. Kissinger made it clear that his experience of running a blockade off Vietnam was still fresh in

/his

his mind). If, on the other hand, mines were used, the US Administration would rapidly be faced with a decision as to whether or not to sink vesselstrying to sweep the mines.

In general, the balance of the situation in and around Iran was markedly less favourable to the United States than it had been in Vietnam. The US Administration had then had overwhelming local force at its disposal. Moreover the United States was involved in a series of negotiations to which the Soviet Union attached importance and which therefore gave Washington leverage. The United States now had neither adequate forces to deploy locally nor any bargaining counters to use with the Soviet Union. Moreover the weakness which the United States had already shown in Iran had caused a collapse of confidence in the United States in the Middle East generally and, specifically, in Saudi Arabia.

Having made these points about the difficulties for the US Administration of resorting to force, Dr. Kissinger said that nonetheless it had to be recognised that US opinion was now running out of control. The US intellectual establishment had always, in his view, underestimated the potential bellicosity of an American middle class whose members had never suffered any serious reverse and for whom the prospect of an American humiliation was intolerable. There was a real danger of a more or less involuntary slide towards the use of military force. The situation was, as others had said, reminiscent of 1914.

The Prime Minister said that HMG would make a major effort to ensure that the European Community gave President Carter the backing, e.g. on sanctions, which he required. However the present situation had been arrived in, it was in the last resort essential to support the US Government. But if it were agreed to go down the road of sanctions, time would be needed to put through the necessary legislation and then to give the sanctions an opportunity to work. The Prime Minister said that she would not be able to carry the Opposition with her in present circumstances in supporting a resort to force.

East/West Relations

Dr. Kissinger said that he had seen President Tito in the autumn, some weeks before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and that President Tito had even then expressed grave concern about the intentions of the Soviet leadership. He had expressed the view that there was a real possibility that the present generation of leaders - and still more the next generation - would take rash action. The present situation in Afghanistan had arisen because of the lack of a clear signal from the West. It remained of great importance that the Soviet Union should receive a clear signal. The situation throughout the so-called arc of crisis was clearly moving in favour of the Soviet Union. More situations would arise in which they might be tempted to intervene. The West as a whole was still not doing enough to maintain the credibility of its defences. The present crisis was the most serious that had arisen since 1945.

Dr. Kissinger commented on the growing weakness of Chancellor Schmidt's position. He greatly admired Chancellor Schmidt and his policies but the Chancellor was losing his party. Messrs Brandt, Bahr and Wehner were already far too deeply involved with the Soviet Union (Dr. Kissinger commented in passing on the heavy price which was being paid for the Ostpolitik). Herr Apel was a nationalist who was increasingly inclined to try to charge a price for the maintenance of

Germany's central position in the Alliance. There was no obvious successor to Chancellor Schmidt if, as was possible, the SPD tried to drop him after the election. (The Prime Minister expressed considerable sceptism of the likelihood of this last eventuality occurring.) As regards the French, Dr Kissinger said that they made a profession of cynicism. Their policy consisted of picking up pennies. Nonetheless he agreed with the Prime Minister that they would probably follow the British and German lead on Iran: their analysis of the fundamentals of the situation was probably not so different from that of other members of the Alliance.

The Arab/Israeli Dispute

Dr Kissinger said that he did not think there was any chance that the autonomy talks would result in progress towards a solution of the Palestinian problem. It was unrealistic to suppose that the Palestinians would be prepared to disarm themselves and live contentedly in an enclave on the West Bank. Nor would the PLO cease its subversive activities elsewhere in the Middle East in the circumstances. The Israeli Government, for their part, were faced with a choice between trying to set up a Bantustan, which would clearly be unacceptable to the Palestinians, and engaging in an irreversible process leading to an independent Palestinian state, which would be unacceptable to Israeli opinion. Dr Kissinger said that he had been rung by Mr Begin the previous day. Mr Begin had told him that the Americans were proposing the establishment of an autonomous entity in which the Israeli Government would retain responsibility for foreign affairs and defence but the Palestinians would be responsible for all other aspects of policy. Mr. Begin said that he could not accept this approach because it clearly implied the eventual establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Dr. Kissinger thought that Mr. Begin's analysis was accurate.

Dr. Kissinger said that the only way to resolve the problem (and he admitted that he had few supporters in the United States for his approach) was to involve Jordan. The Israelis should hand over the West Bank and Gaza to the Jordanian Government as soon as possible and in as unencumbered a state as possible. Israel's security requirements should be protected by arrangements based on those envisaged in the Allon plan. Once the West Bank had been transferred to Jordan, the problem of the Palestinians would become an Arab rather than an Arab/Israeli problem. The Prime Minister commented that when she had last seen King Hussein he had seemed willing to assume responsibility for the West Bank. But it seemed to her that this approach would be gravely destabilising for Jordan. Dr. Kissinger admitted that this might be so but said that he considered it the least damaging option.

A Western Summit

Dr. Kissinger said that he had been surprised that, given the present disarray in transatlantic relations and the gravity of the general situation, no attempt had been made to have a Guadeloupe-style summit. It was essential that some way should be found, privately, to force President Carter to spell out his strategy. The process of having to describe it to his principal allies might lead

/him

him to elaborate it in more detail than he seemed so far to have done. The Prime Minister indicated that she would reflect on the point.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

USA.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1980

Dear Michael,

Briefing for Dr Kissinger's Call on the Prime Minister: Wednesday 16 April

I attach Briefs as follows:

1. A background note on Dr Kissinger's political position, and a domestic matter which he may possibly mention (Hubert Humphrey Memorial Dinner).
2. A background brief on the US internal political scene.
3. Points to Make and a background note on Afghanistan.
4. Arab/Israel situation - Dr Kissinger's views and a background note.
5. A note on Iran.

Yours ever

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

BRIEF NO 1

BACKGROUND NOTE

DR KISSINGER

Dr Kissinger's Political Position

Dr Kissinger does not seem to have any immediate prospects for a return to the political arena. During the 1976 presidential campaign, he consistently supported President Ford's attempt to secure the Republican nomination against Governor Reagan. This year he publicly urged President Ford to enter the Republican race. Now that Governor Reagan seems almost certain to secure the Republican nomination, if he is elected President, it would seem unlikely that he should appoint Dr Kissinger Secretary of State (a position Dr Kissinger is still thought to covet). Nor does a Senate seat seem in prospect. Dr Kissinger is thought to have had ambitions to fill the New York Republican Senate seat which Senator Jacob Javits (aged 76) had said he would give up. But Senator Javits has now said that he intends to seek re-election this year.

Hubert Humphrey Memorial Dinner

It is possible that Dr Kissinger will raise this topic with the Prime Minister. He was to have attended and spoken at a dinner on 12 June at Lancaster House, to be jointly hosted by Mr Prior and Sir Hector Laing of United Biscuits. The purpose of the dinner would be to raise funds for the Hubert Humphrey Memorial Campaign. Subsequently, he found he could not attend on 12 June and the date was switched to 19 June to accommodate him. Unfortunately, Mr Prior is not free on that date. Sir Hector Laing is therefore looking for some other Minister to act as joint host: without Ministerial sponsorship, Lancaster House cannot be made available.

BRIEF NO 2

US INTERNAL SCENE

Presidential Election: Democratic Contenders

1. Now that Governor Brown has finally dropped out of the race, the contest is strictly between President Carter and Senator Kennedy. President Carter has beaten Mr Kennedy consistently in all state primaries and caucuses with the exception of Massachusetts (expected, since this is Kennedy's home territory) New York and Connecticut. The defeats in New York and Connecticut took the Carter camp by surprise. But the explanation seems to be that Mr Carter's totally inept handling of a Security Council vote on the Middle East so alienated Jewish voters that they deserted him en masse in New York, where they account for over 40% of registered Democrats. Connecticut is not so easy to explain: but it may be that the much smaller number of voters there were affected by the New York press, which is mostly what they read. In the primaries since then (Wisconsin and Kansas) Mr Carter has won convincingly. Although Senator Kennedy remains in the race, President Carter already has over half the delegates he needs and is therefore odds-on favourite to get the Democratic nomination.

2. The tactis of the Kennedy camp are therefore to try to change the rules of the game. If Senator Kennedy can do well in the primaries from now on, his supporters may try to argue that since the earlier primaries, when Mr Carter secured his delegates, the mood of the country has changed in favour of the Senator, and that the delegates who committed themselves then to Mr Carter should not be bound to vote for him on the first ballot at the Democratic Convention (New York, 13 August).

Republican Contenders

3. Governor Reagan is almost home and dry. The other two contenders still in the race are Congressman Anderson, whose liberal policies are out of tune with main stream Republican thinking and who has helped in several of the early primaries

/by

by Democrat ''cross-over'' votes; and Ambassador George Bush, who will probably struggle on with ever-diminishing hopes that Mr Reagan will stumble during the remaining two months of the Republican primary season (the Convention is in Detroit on 16 July).

Issues

4. The major contributary factor in President Carter's success so far has been a feeling among voters that they should stand by their President during a time of crisis. At least initially, candidates found it difficult to criticise his handling of the Iranian and Afghan situations. But now this forebearance is wearing thin and President Carter is likely in any event to have a tougher time ahead. Even before the Ayatollah Khomeini's latest pronouncement on the hostages, the President was bracing himself to impose a further round of sanctions on Iran. The refusal of Khomeini to go along with Bani Sadr's plan to transfer the hostages from the militants to Iranian government custody was only the catalyst for the latest measures. From now on, so long as the hostages are not released, criticism will mount. (One side effect of this is a growing feeling that America's allies are not doing enough to help). If the hostages are released, opinion will concentrate more on home affairs, where high inflation and the state of the economy make the President vulnerable.

North America Department
FCO

14 April 1980

BRIEF NO 3

AFGHANISTAN

POINTS TO MAKE

NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL

1. Hope that wide support will be given (eg as in EC/ASEAN Declaration of 7 March) to the idea of a Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan. The proposal works on two levels; if the Soviet Union does ever seek a way out, it offers a means of solution. Second, it maintains at all times the political pressure.

2. Neutrality is wholly compatible with non-alignment. It is not ''neutralisation'', imposed from outside. It accords with traditional policy of Afghanistan. It is complementary to other pressures; there is no evidence that the proposal has led to any ''backsliding'' in the opposition to Soviet aggression.

3. Reactions to the proposal received to date have been generally favourable eg. EC/ASEAN declaration. The Soviet Union has neither rejected nor accepted it.

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

4. The Islamic Conference meets in Islamabad in May, postponed from April because of Zimbabwe's Independence.

5. Habib Chatty, Secretary-General to the Islamic Conference, saw Lord Privy Seal in London on 3 April and spoke warmly of the Neutral and Non-Aligned proposal. To be hoped that the Conference will declare its support.

OLYMPICS

6. Political and propaganda importance to Soviet Union. Boycott therefore very effective and cannot be hidden from Russian people. British Government doing everything possible to dissuade athletes from going. Decision of United States Olympic Committee not to go will be influential.

AFGHANISTAN

BACKGROUND

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

1. The Islamic Conference, which produced a robust resolution on Afghanistan at its meeting in January, was due to meet in Islamabad in April but the meeting was postponed until May because of Zimbabwe's Independence.

2. Habib Chatty, Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference, called on the Lord Privy Seal on 3 April; his views are close to our own and he hopes that the Conference support a Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan.

3. Posts accredited to members of the Islamic Conference have been asked to explain our views, either handing over or drawing upon our ''sanitised'' version of the ''Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan'' paper, and to suggest that the forthcoming Conference could usefully declare its support.

CUBAN ''INITIATIVE''

4. Malmierca has been commuting busily around the area, though with no obvious profit. The Indians seem to have given him a cool shoulder. It is generally thought he was acting at Soviet behest, possibly hoping to confuse the issue and distract attention from other (less attractive to Moscow) initiatives such as the Neutral and Non-Aligned idea.

BRIEF NO 4

ARAB/ISRAEL - DR KISSINGER'S VIEWS

1. Dr Kissinger continues to take a close interest in Middle East peace efforts. He disapproved of President Carter's initial 'comprehensive' approach but has supported Camp David since it fits better with his own view that only a step-by-step approach can produce genuine progress.

BACKGROUND

1. The prospects for the autonomy talks are bleak. Although the three sides are committed to making a success of them and none has an interest in their breakdown, the gap between the Egyptians and Israelis has not narrowed. President Carter has made clear that he believes the Israeli approach is too restrictive but Mr Begin is ready to resist US pressure in a presidential election year. He is determined to continue his policy of expanding settlements in the West Bank and resisting any move which could threaten Israeli control there. His inflexibility and provocative settlement decisions have ruled out any possibility of persuading moderate Arab governments to take a less hostile view of the autonomy talks. Even if an agreement on autonomy is reached, there is very little chance of any Palestinians agreeing to operate it.

2. The Nine are agreed that the need for progress towards a comprehensive settlement has become more urgent still in the light of the Afghanistan and Iranian crises. There is no question of undermining US peace efforts but consideration is being given to what might be done if these efforts run into the sand. We are seeking European support for a new Security Council resolution to supplement 242 on Palestinian rights. The Americans are aware of our thinking and content that we should pursue it in the background. The main aim of a new resolution would be to secure PLO support for the principles of 242, which could open the way to wider negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

BRIEF FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH
DR KISSINGER : 16 APRIL

IRAN

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Appreciate US predicament; frustration with Iran and impatience with allies. Determined to persuade the Nine to support the US. Hope Foreign Ministers will take decisions on 21 April. But a wider circle of support is also needed. We should portray this as Iran versus the world and avoid East/West or developed/under-developed polarization.

2. Not convinced that sanctions will produce speedy results. See danger that they may provoke further shift to the left in Iran. Western withdrawal will leave way clear for Soviets to take advantage of increased tension and further chaos in Iran. Iranian resistance to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will also be weakened. Nonetheless believe we must back US.

3. Entire Gulf area, on which we are so dependent, causes great concern. Local regimes are brittle and militarily weak. US must have capacity to intervene but keep it low profile. Essential to achieve Arab/Israel solution and reduce our dependence on Gulf oil.

15 April 1980 MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT

GRS 60

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM F.C.O. 081035Z APR 80
TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 660 OF 8 APRIL.

FOLLOWING FROM ALEXANDER, 10 DOWNING STREET.

YOUR TELEGRAM 1325: DR. KISSINGER
BEGINS

THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE DR. KISSINGER AT NO.10 ON WEDNESDAY, 16 APRIL, AT 1645. UNLESS WE HEAR TO THE CONTRARY, WE SHALL ASSUME THAT THIS IS CONVENIENT FOR DR. KISSINGER.
ENDS

CARRINGTON

FILES
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PS/PUS
SIR D. MAITLAND

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File No. _____

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[TEXT]

Following from Alexander, 10 Downing Street.

Your telegram 1325: Dr. Kissinger

The Prime Minister would be happy to see Dr. Kissinger at No.10 on Wednesday, 16 April, at 1645. Unless we hear to the contrary, we shall assume that this is convenient for Dr. Kissinger.

Ends

GR 140 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 022049Z APR 82
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1325 OF 2 APRIL

DR KISSINGER

1. KISSINGER WILL BE IN LONDON ON WEDNESDAY 16 APRIL. HE WONDERS WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE A CHANCE TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER. (HE SAYS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER ENCOURAGED HIM, WHEN THEY MET HERE IN DECEMBER, TO LET HER KNOW WHEN NEXT HE WOULD BE IN LONDON). HE ALSO ASKED TO SEE YOU, BUT I SAID THAT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD HAVE LEFT, OR BE ON THE POINT OF LEAVING, FOR RHODESIA.

2. HE IS DUE TO ARRIVE LATE THE PREVIOUS EVENING AND TO LEAVE EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING. HE WILL BE STAYING AT CLARIDGES. HE HAS A LUNCHEON SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT ON THE WEDNESDAY WHICH WILL TIE HIM UP FROM 1245 TO 1445 AND A DINNER ENGAGEMENT (WHICH HE COULD BREAK). OTHERWISE HE IS FREE.

3. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO 10.

HENDERSON

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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File No. U

Department No. 10

Drafted by (Block Capitals) MICHAEL ALEXANDER

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M LEVER
(FCO)

[TEXT]

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM ALEXANDER, NO. 10

YOUR TELNO 3508: DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT

The Prime Minister ~~has~~ agrees with the suggestion in the second paragraph of your telegram under reference.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

Mr Alexander.

We won! I have told George Walden, Private Office of the FCO that you would like to cope with the F.O.

CL.

6/11

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH DR. KISSINGER

I have had a word with Michael Alexander about this, and can you really confirm that you do wish to see him? It is the day before the CTU speech in Nottingham (I keep having to give away more time for other meetings) and although Dr. Kissinger no longer has any official standing, he will naturally bring up all sorts of subjects which will necessitate a proper Foreign Office brief. Can I have your views please?

5 November 1979

NO

~~WONFO 342/32~~

PP FCO

~~GR 165~~

T+2 PS/No 10 Downing St

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Prime Minister

Agree A?

2/XI

CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON Ø21637Z NOV 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 3508 OF 2 NOVEMBER 79
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR MICHAEL ALEXANDER, NO 10:
HENRY KISSINGER SPOKE TO ME TODAY ABOUT HIS VISIT TO ENGLAND ON 15TH AND 16TH NOVEMBER. HE IS GOING THERE TO LAUNCH HIS BOOK. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED HIM SOME TIME AGO TO BE SURE TO LET HER KNOW WHENEVER HE CAME TO LONDON, IN CASE SHE WISHED TO SEE HIM. HE WAS THEREFORE ASKING ME TO TELL NUMBER 10 ABOUT HIS VISIT BUT HE EMPHASISED THAT HE HAD NOTHING PARTICULAR TO SAY. IF HOWEVER MRS THATCHER DID WISH TO SEE HIM HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE COULD GET A MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE HIS PROGRAMME WAS VERY FULL.

A IT OCCURS TO ME TO SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT LIKE TO SAY IN REPLY THAT SHE LOOKS FORWARD TO SEEING HIM WHEN SHE COMES TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD LIKE TO INVITE HIM TO A LUNCH SHE IS GIVING HERE ON MONDAY 17 DECEMBER.

HENDERSON

We had another message only - and I thought I agreed to see him for drinks on Monday not.

Prime Minister again

This was Mr NNNN Brzezinski

5/XI

U.S.A.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 8 October 1979

The Prime Minister has seen Washington telegram 2938 of 1 October about Dr. Kissinger's visit to London next week. She has asked that Dr. Kissinger should be informed that she would have very much liked to have seen him during his visit but that, owing to her trip to Luxembourg, this will not be possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TRS

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GR 100

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 012212Z OCT 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2938 OF 1 OCTOBER

DR KISSINGER

1. KISSINGER'S OFFICE HAVE TOLD US THAT HE WILL BE IN LONDON FROM THE MORNING OF THURSDAY 18 OCTOBER UNTIL 5.00 PM ON 19 OCTOBER. HE WILL STAY AT CLARIDGES.

2. KISSINGER WILL BE PROMOTING HIS BOOK AND TAPING A TV INTERVIEW. BUT HIS SCHEDULE IS FLEXIBLE, AND SHOULD THE PRIME MINISTER WISH TO SEE HIM HE WOULD OF COURSE BE AT HER DISPOSAL.

3. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO NO. 10.

HENDERSON

Prime Minister

If on that visit to Luxembourg it will not be possible for you to see Dr Kissinger on this occasion.

Yes

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p.1.

RESTRICTED
FM WASHINGTON 222030Z AUG 79
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2383 OF 22 AUGUST

I have told the FCO that the PM will be out of town throughout this period.

DR KISSINGER.

1. KISSINGER'S OFFICE CALLED US TODAY TO SAY THAT HE WILL BE ARRIVING IN LONDON ON THE EVENING OF THURSDAY 30 AUGUST, STAYING AT CLARIDGES, AND LEAVING FOR BRUSSELS AT 3.45PM THE FOLLOWING DAY. HIS OFFICE TOLD US THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM TO LET HER KNOW WHEN HE WOULD NEXT BE IN LONDON.
2. KISSINGER HAS A TENTATIVE LUNCH ARRANGEMENT ON THE FRIDAY, BUT IS FREE ALL MORNING.
3. FCO PLEASE PASS ADVANCE TO NO 10.

ROBINSON

FILES
NAD
PS
PS/LPS

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

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