

PART 7

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe

Deployment of GCMs

Modernisation of Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe

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3006

DEFENCE

PT1: May 1979

PT7: June 1989

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
9.6.89		- See Defence : Nuclear Issues					
4.8.89							
14.12.89							
7.2.90							
3.4.90							
10.4.90							
3.5.90							
14.5.90							
14.10.90							
6.12.90							
28.5.91							

PREM 19/3254

Series closed



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MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/AH/9/18

229 28 May 1991

Dear Mr Major,

I am writing to let you know that the Soviet Union has given notice of its intention to conduct another INF inspection within the UK.

Two inspection teams will be arriving at Greenham Common at 1200 today Tuesday 28 May, and they have until 0800 tomorrow to specify the sites they want to inspect. As was the case with the inspection in January, it is likely that both Greenham Common and Molesworth will be involved.

Your sincerely,

J. A. —————

for ARCHIE HAMILTON

*(Approved by Mr Hamilton
and signed in his absence)*

The Rt Hon John Major MP

IN CONFIDENCE

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(2)



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MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

D/MIN(AF)/AH/4/2/1

14 December 1990

John Hamilton

EDN 17/ki

Dear Mr Major,



The US Secretary of Defence, Mr Cheney, wrote to Tom King on 21 August informing him of the US intention to reduce their forces in Europe by a total of 40,000 of whom 10,000 would be Air Force personnel.

We have now received details of how this will apply to the US Air Force in the UK, and RAF Alconbury, which is of course in your constituency, will be affected.

The 2879 US military personnel currently stationed at RAF Alconbury will be reduced by 461 and 5 US civilian posts and 19 UK employees will also be lost. These measures will come into effect in September 1991.

The US authorities intend to announce these reductions publicly in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
A. H.

ARCHIE HAMILTON

*(Approved by Mr Hamilton
at night in his absence)*

Rt Hon John Major MP

IN CONFIDENCE

SECRET



18.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 December 1990

Dear Sir,

DEPLOYMENT OF US DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO THE UK

The Prime Minister has seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 3 December about the deployment of additional American dual capable aircraft to the UK. He would like more time to think about this and would prefer the Defence Secretary not to raise it with Secretary Cheney during this week's NATO meeting in Brussels. He will want to talk about it with the Defence Secretary and perhaps other colleagues. One opportunity would be the meeting of Gen 1 next week.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Simon Webb, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



OK - delay of
week as
suggested
7.5.12

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Returned as
requested.

The Defence Secretary
is of course trying
a bounce, by saying
he wants to tell
Cherney in Brussels
(where he is now).

At the least, you might
say that more time
is needed.

C.D.V. 5/12



SECRET

Ref. AO90/2967
PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
Agree to ask the King
to hold on the issue
for discussion & give
next week (be commensurate a
needed issue)?

AT 5/12

DEPLOYMENT OF US DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) TO THE UK

The Defence Secretary's minute of 3 December contains his proposals for the basing of DCA in the United Kingdom. He seeks an answer before the opening of the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting tomorrow. It is very short notice and the issue deserves a bit more time for reflection.

2. The Defence Secretary's preferred option avoids creating a third US nuclear strike base in the UK - Bentwaters, in addition to Upper Heyford and Lakenheath - and could indeed lead to the closure of Bentwaters. This would be well received locally though the Americans would still basically prefer to use Bentwaters.

3. The Defence Secretary's approach has operational drawbacks which led your predecessor to reject it (Mr Powell's letter of 14 October): *- flap.*

- the new F15Es would be 200 kilometres further west than the Americans proposed;
- there would be fewer F111s dual-based at Upper Heyford than the Americans proposed (40 compared with 66);

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SECRET

- the survivability advantage of a third peacetime strike base would be lost.

The first of these drawbacks is potentially the most serious. The range of stand-off theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) is an important and difficult issue, which will be debated in GEN1 next week when it considers the question of a replacement TNW for the UK. There is a close link between this question and that of the US Tactical Air to Surface Missile (TASM) which would be carried by the F15Es.

4. You may wish to withhold agreement to the Defence Secretary's proposals for the moment, and to ask for the item to be added to GEN1's agenda for 11 December so that the advantages and disadvantages can be thrashed out properly. You could ask Mr King to report at the same time on the prospects for deployment of DCA in Germany now that the elections are over. It may be that Ministers will come to agree with the Defence Secretary's approach on the balance of political and military factors, but no great harm will be done by a further week's delay for a full discussion.

R.R.B.

ROBIN BUTLER

5 December 1990

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DEFENCE: Deployment pr 7



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cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 October 1990

See Simon,

DEPLOYMENT OF US DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA)
TO THE UK

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 11 October about his discussions with Secretary Cheney on deployment of additional US dual-capable aircraft to the UK. She reaches rather different conclusions about the way in which we should respond to the American proposals, and would like the Defence Secretary to reconsider.

The Prime Minister's starting point is the Government's avowed policy of doing whatever is necessary to keep our defences strong and effective, and not to shirk the consequences. We took the lead, at the time of the INF agreement, in asking for additional nuclear forces to be made available to SACEUR. Our first choice was admittedly SLCMs. But now the Americans have offered additional DCA, we should take them up and ensure that the aircraft are as effective as possible in operational terms. There is no point in 'political' aircraft.

The Prime Minister notes that the operational arguments for stationing the F15Es at Bentwaters are strong, and this is where the Americans wish them to be. She reaches the conclusion that we should agree to this despite the other considerations mentioned in the Defence Secretary's minute. She would also favour an early announcement, commenting that this is no time for our staunchness to be diminished by (unstaunch) German electoral considerations.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary, and to Sir Robin Butler.

Your sincerely,

CHARLES POWELL

Simon Webb Esq
Ministry of Defence

SECRET

PRIME MINISTERDEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO THE UK

In the wake of the INF Treaty, we pressed for additional American nuclear strike forces to be made available to SACEUR to compensate for the withdrawal of the Cruise and Pershing missiles. To meet this, the Americans offered to put more dual-capable aircraft into Europe. Decisions on this are now required. There are two aspects:

- where additional aircraft in the UK should be stationed.
- when an announcement should be made.

Where

The original American proposal was to increase the number of nuclear strike bases in the UK from 2 to 3 by stationing 36 new nuclear-capable F15Es at Bentwaters (in addition to the F111s at Upper Heyford and at Lakenheath). The change was slightly more optical than real, in that the F111s at Upper Heyford would return to the US, coming back to Upper Heyford only in time of crisis.

The Defence Secretary is anxious about opening a new nuclear-capable base at a time of reducing international tension: he thinks it would lead to much public criticism. He is therefore trying to persuade the Americans towards a militarily less satisfactory alternative: reducing the number of F111s which would return to Upper Heyford in time of crisis, so as to leave room for the F15Es to be permanently based there. There would then be no need for Bentwaters to be activated.

This looks quite slick, but there is a penalty. The F15Es are already shorter-range than the F111s. Basing them at Upper Heyford rather than Bentwaters puts them 200 km. further from their targets, at a time when the targets are anyway moving further East. We would also lose the survivability advantage of an extra base.

When

The choice is complicated because we are - so far - the only European nation to agree to take additional dual-capable aircraft. That could be uncomfortable. There is a possibility that the Germans will agree to dual-basing of some additional aircraft (i.e. agree to have them in times of crisis): but no chance of their agreeing to announce even this until after their election in early December. The Americans would like an early announcement of our decision: and there are financial and operational penalties for them in delay. But the Defence Secretary wants to delay any announcement until after the German elections.

It boils down to the following questions:

- how strong are the operational arguments for basing at Bentwaters? Common-sense suggests that they are strong.
- how vehement is public opposition to this likely to be? Are we going to get a new Greenham Common movement? How much does that matter?
- do we mind being the only European country ready to accept additional dual-capable aircraft?
- is this such a sensitive issue that we have to delay any announcement until after the German elections?

The Defence Secretary's minute opts for caution on all counts. He thinks the presentational disadvantages of a row over Bentwaters outweigh the operational benefits from basing F15Es there: and he thinks it better to delay any announcement until December. One could argue, on the other hand, that such a cautious approach is not easy to reconcile with the government's avowed policy of doing whatever is necessary to keep our defences strong and effective and not to shirk the consequences of this. In a nutshell: is it worth having the additional dual-capable aircraft at all, if we are so nervous of the political effect

that we are not prepared to base them where the Americans prefer and where they will be most effective? There's not much to be said for 'political' aircraft.

Agree the Defence Secretary's recommendations?

or

Write back with the arguments above?

Yes - This is no

time to have differences with the U.S.

C.D.P.

- and no need to let

C. D. POWELL

12 October 1990

Our staunchness be diminished

tmw a:\deployment

by the ~~defeat~~ of the German
(unstable) election considerations
not



14A (a-g) ^{cepc}

MO 13/1/34

PRIME MINISTER

DEPLOYMENT OF US DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) TO THE UK

For some time I have been discussing with Dick Cheney detailed proposals for the deployment of additional longer-range US dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to the UK. We have now arrived at what I believe to be a satisfactory proposal which strikes the right balance between the various operational, environmental, presentational and political factors at issue. I am now seeking your agreement, and that of colleagues, before responding to the US Defence Secretary next week.

2. The proposal to deploy additional US DCA to Europe formed part of SACEUR's plans for the restructuring of NATO's longer-range Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) in the wake of the INF treaty, and was designed principally to ensure that targets within Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact territory could be held at risk by European-based non-strategic nuclear systems.

3. Present position is that there are two nuclear bases at Upper

SECRET



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Heyford and Lakenheath with 66 and 61 F111s respectively and non-nuclear A10s at Bentwaters. Dick Cheney put originally to me in June a US proposal under which 36 new F15Es would deploy to Bentwaters, whilst Upper Heyford would be placed on a peacetime standby basis with all its aircraft withdrawing back to the US. The 66 F111Es thus withdrawn would however be "dual based" at Upper Heyford ie they would return there in a crisis and some aircraft would deploy there for a few weeks each year to exercise.

4. The advantages of this proposal were that larger numbers of US DCA (including the new F15E) would be available to SACEUR in war, whilst actually reducing the number of US aircraft permanently stationed here. Survivability would be enhanced by distributing US DCA amongst three bases instead of the current two (Bentwaters, as well as Upper Heyford and Lakenheath). Against that was the problem that it would require the re-opening of a third US nuclear strike base in the UK. I believe this would be a very difficult step to justify publicly in current world circumstances and therefore I have explored, jointly with the Americans, alternative deployment options which avoid the creation of a third US strike base, but which would still demonstrate, credibly, our continuing commitment to European nuclear burden-sharing.

5. Various permutations are possible: but the alternative which I regard as most satisfactory would provide (as in the US original plan) for the withdrawal of the F111s from permanent basing at Upper



Heyford, but for about 40 F111Es to be dual based there. This would leave room at Upper Heyford for the 36 F15Es to deploy there permanently in peacetime, thus avoiding the need to re-open Bentwaters as a strike base. Bentwaters seems likely to lose the A10s currently based there, either under CFE or as a US national savings measure, and under this plan would gain no replacement aircraft - although the US say they would wish to retain the base on standby.

6. This alternative avoids environmental problems (extra noise, some at night) and presentational difficulties (ie re-opening a new strike base at a time of easing East/West tension). It also retains some of the advantages of the US's original proposal for Upper Heyford, in that there would be a reduced number of permanently-deployed aircraft there in peacetime - normally 36 F15Es with a proportion of the F111Es (perhaps 25 or so) returning for exercise for 2-3 weeks every 6 months.

7. There are however operational penalties: the F15E, already of more limited range than the F111E, would be based 200km further from its operational area, when its potential targets are themselves moving further East. The range difference has greater significance in the conventional than the nuclear role; F15Es are capable of over twice the daily sortie rate of the F111Es but longer transit times between target and base will hinder full exploitation of this capability. In addition the survivability advantage of an



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additional strike base would be lost; and, it would also reduce the number of F111Es available to SACEUR in a crisis (only about 40 dual based as opposed to 66).

8. These operational points have force: but I do not regard them as decisive. Although there would be some disappointment in the US Air Force, the US Administration have confirmed that they would be content with a decision in favour of the alternative proposal. This would provide a sensible approach to sustaining peacetime public support for US DCA deployments. In any future period of rising East-West tension which might unfold over months or years, there might be options open for us to enhance survivability (the Alliance is already considering plans for the dispersal of DCA to other airfields in wartime). My clear preference is therefore for the alternative proposal - the deployment of the F15Es to Upper Heyford permanently, together with the dual basing there of about 40 F111Es.

PRESENTATIONAL ISSUES AND TIMING

9. Our position on possible F15E deployments has throughout been that we would not wish to be the only European nation to accept additional DCA. Only the FRG, however, have shown any willingness to accept them, and for them the proposal is only for the dual-basing of 48 F15Es at Ramstein. The US and the Germans assure us that the proposals for the FRG remain on track, but that they



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expect no progress in advance of the Federal German elections later this year. The linkage is therefore awkward. We cannot be sure that we shall not be "on our own" until the end of the year and possibly beyond, and there might be a case for delaying our decision in order to seek to apply leverage on the Germans. A prior UK decision to accept F15E deployments might allow a newly elected Federal Government to conclude that this is an issue which they could safely duck without great detriment to the Alliance's deterrent posture.

10. There are also wider considerations in relation to the German elections. Any announcement of such a decision now would be likely to lead to questions being asked about other European participation, and to focus on Germany in particular. Chancellor Kohl's Government will probably seek to avoid discussion of nuclear issues as far as possible in the run-up to the elections; they have long been sensitive in West Germany, and even more so in the strongly anti-nuclear East. If these became election issues, Chancellor Kohl could give assurances that damaged NATO's nuclear posture - eg to reject the deployment of TASM. At worst, a nuclear row could damage Kohl's chances of re-election.

11. My judgement is therefore that it would be preferable to delay the announcement of our decision until after the German elections. It would be possible (and appropriate) to make an announcement at the next meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group on 6th/7th



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December - ie immediately after the elections. Depending upon the outcome, however, there could be advantage in delaying still longer, to enable us to deploy any possible leverage our own decision might have with the new Government. As against all this, I shall be under some pressure from Dick Cheney to announce an early decision. The US have taken out leases on housing currently under construction at Bentwaters, which they will wish to terminate as soon as possible if the F15Es are not to deploy there in order to reduce cost penalties (in the order of \$10m - \$30m). There are also other construction issues, such as the building of simulators and weapon storage vaults. They also have wider reasons for wanting our decision made public soon, as funding for SRAM-T development (which the F15E's will eventually carry) may be at risk if Congress gains the impression that no European nation will accept its deployment. (A misleading impression could be created if the cancellation of work at Bentwaters emerged in advance of a positive statement accepting F15E deployment). The US can therefore be expected to press for an early announcement, but I believe that holding till at least early December should be possible.

12. I plan to discuss these issues with Dick Cheney when he is in London on 15th October, when I would put to him forcefully the reasons for delay of any announcement. Nor would I commit us to a final decision at this stage, given all the difficulties of guaranteeing confidentiality during these uncertain weeks in the US and Germany. I would have liked to discuss it also with Dr



9

Stoltenberg at the next opportunity, but with the total obsession with unification and the election, I do not think we shall get much out of him.

13. I should be grateful to know that you are content with this approach. I am copying this minute to Douglas Hurd, John Major and to Sir Robin Butler.

B.H. Wells

Ministry of Defence
11th October 1990

(T K)
(Approved by the Defence
Secretary and signed in
his absence)

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Pl guide

SNF : UK/US TALKS : LONDON : 25 JUNE

SUMMARY

1. STATE DEPARTMENT TEAM ENVISAGE BRAINSTORMING SESSION. THINKING REMAINS MUCH AS OUTLINED BY BARTHOLOMEW. CLARKE TO DEPART AT LUNCHTIME ON 25 JUNE.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE FORTHCOMING UK/US BILATERAL TALKS ON SNF IN LONDON ON 25 JUNE WITH BOTH ANDREASEN AND VAN DIEPEN (WHO TOGETHER WITH CLARKE, COMPRISE THE STATE DEPARTMENT TEAM FOR THE MEETING). THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEY ENVISAGE THAT THE MEETING WILL BE A BRAINSTORMING SESSION, AND THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE HANDING OVER ANY PAPERS. ON SUBSTANCE, THE POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAU THINKING REMAINS MUCH AS OUTLINED BY BARTHOLOMEW IN LONDON ON 12 JUNE (FCO TELNO 1034) AND AS FOLLOWS:

(I) A BAN ON GROUND-LAUNCHED NUCLEAR MISSILES, THE POL-MIL LINE IS THAT SUCH A BAN SHOULD PROBABLY BE GLOBAL WITH LAUNCHERS BEING THE PROBABLE UNIT OF ACCOUNT. HOWEVER ANDREASON WARNED THAT THE JCS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED TO LIMIT ANY SUCH BAN TO EUROPE AND TO PROTECT CONVENTIONAL SHORT-RANGE MISSILES (IE THE ATACMS/MTCRS PACKAGE). THE EXPERIENCE OF BOTH START AND INF SHOWED THAT CONGRESS WOULD PROBABLY BE SYMPATHETIC ON THE LATTER:

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(II) A DECLARATORY REGIME FOR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, THIS MIGHT DIFFER FROM THAT PROPOSED FOR SLCMS IN START IN THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CONFIDENCE BUILDING COMPONENT (INVOLVING VISITS TO AMMUNITION STORAGE SITES). BUT EVEN THIS MAY WELL BE RESISTED BY THE JCS (WHO AGAIN WOULD STRONGLY FVOUR GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS (ATTU)). WARHEADS WOULD BE THE LIKELY UNIT OF ACCOUNT,

(III) CONFIDENCE BULDING MEASURES FOR DCA, SELF-EVIDENTLY THE MOST DIFFICULT CATEGORY OF ALL, AND ONE WHERE CBMS APPEAR MOST APPROPRIATE GIVEN THE NEED TO PROTECT TASM, THE PROBLEMS OF DISTINGUISHING NUCLEAR/NON-NUCLEAR ROLES AND THE PROBLEMS OF INCLUDING AIRCRAFT BEYOND THE EXTENT OF THEIR PROPOSED INCLUSION IN CFE.

3. ANDREASEN SAID THAT US THINKING WAS STILL AT A FORMATIVE STAGE (AND THEY WOULD BE COMING TO LONDON TO QUOTE LISTEN AND LEARN UNQUOTE AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE). HE SAID THAT CLARKE HAD YET TO FINALISE HIS PLANS ON THE SCHEDULE OF SCG MEETINGS. BUT HE WAS TENDING TO THE VIEW THAT THE FIRST SHOULD TAKE PLACE TOWARDS THE END OF JULY, AND THEN EVERY THREE OR FOUR WEEKS THEREAFTER.

4. CLARKE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE THE TALKS JUST AFTER MIDDAY (TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON). THEY WOULD THEREFORE PREFER AN EARLY START (0830?). ANDREASEN AND VAN DIEPEN WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF SNF FOR THE REST OF THE DAY. FAILING THAT, THEY WOULD WELCOME CONTACT ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WITH RELEVANT DESK OFFICERS (THEY COVER THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES, BAR CW).

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MODUK FOR DUS(P), AD(NUC POL), DACU

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE : FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. IN TWO INTERVIEWS GENSCHER COMES OUT MORE CLEARLY (BUT STILL NOT DEFINITELY) AGAINST TASM. WIDESPREAD GERMAN PRESS COVERAGE OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP PRESENTS STOLTENBERG AS SEEKING TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT OBJECTIVES IN FACE OF BRITISH (AND US) OPPOSITION.

DETAIL

2. AN INTERVIEW WITH GENSCHER IN THE 'EXPRESS' OF 13 MAY CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING EXCHANGE:

'QUESTION

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER APPARENTLY PLANS THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR MISSILES BASED ON AIRCRAFT IN THE FRG. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THAT?

ANSWER

I WARN AGAINST A NEW NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. WE MUST NOT NOW GAMBLE AWAY THE HISTORIC CHANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT. IT IS NOT NEW MISSILES WHICH ARE NEEDED. WHAT IS NOW REALLY NECESSARY IS THE REMOVAL OF SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES AND NUCLEAR ARTILLERY.

QUESTION. WHAT EFFECTS WOULD SUCH A DECISION, IN YOUR OPINION, HAVE ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE 2 PLUS 4 TALKS ON GERMAN UNITY?

ANSWER.

A NEW NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WOULD BE A DANGER TO GERMAN AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. WE MUST NOT ENDANGER THIS HISTORIC PROCESS. IN TRUTH WE NEED NEW COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES AND A STRONGER POLITICAL ROLE FOR OUR ALLIANCE. THAT MUST ALSO HAVE AN EFFECT ON STRUCTURE AND WEAPONRY.'

3. THE LATEST ISSUE OF DER SPIEGEL ALSO CARRIES AN INTERVIEW WITH GENSCHER. IN THIS HE SAYS THAT HE KNOWS FROM HIS TALKS WITH THEM THAT THE AMERICANS DO NOT WANT A NEW MISSILE DISCUSSION. HE CAN ONLY AGREE: IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE REPLYING TO THE DEMOCRATISATION IN THE EAST WITH A ROUND OF ARMAMENT INSTEAD OF DISARMAMENT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE A TOPIC DURING THE US-FRG TALKS IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK. ASKED ABOUT OPPOSITION AT THE NPG TO A ZERO OPTION FOR SNF MISSILES, GENSCHER SAID HE THOUGHT THAT 'REASON WOULD PREVAIL'.

4. THE GERMAN PRESS HAVE GIVEN THE NPG WIDESPREAD AND PROMINENT COVERAGE. THE MAIN THEMES HAVE BEEN THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF TASM AND THE FAILURE TO AGREE EITHER ON THE DESIRABILITY OF ELIMINATING ALL GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS OR ON THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. ON TASM, THE SPD IS ALREADY TRYING TO EXPLOIT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GENSCHER AND STOLTENBERG. ON THE TWO LATTER POINTS STOLTENBERG IS PRESENTED IN THE PRESS AS HAVING ADVOCATED MORE FAR-REACHING DISARMAMENT, BUT FAILING IN THE FACE OF BRITISH (AND TO A LESSER EXTENT US) OPPOSITION.

5. ONE REPORT SAYS THAT STOLTENBERG FAVOURS THE INCLUSION OF AIR-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS IN THE (SNF) NEGOTIATIONS, WITH THE AIM OF AGREEING ON CEILINGS. FMOD DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT STOLTENBERG SAID, BUT CONFIRM THAT THIS REMAINS THEIR PREFERENCE, ALTHOUGH THEY WITHDREW THE IDEA IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP.

MALLABY

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10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Re discussion

of SNF or

the Nuclear Planning

Group meeting

in Canada. m

CBM

12. CHENEY (US) REPORTED ON PROGRESS ON DEFENCE AND SPACE TALKS WITH SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT THE US SAW MERIT IN BOTH SIDES DEVELOPING BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCES USING SINGLE COMMON TECHNOLOGY. ON NUCLEAR TESTING THE US HOPED TO SEE A NEW PROTOCOL TO TTBT AND PNET SIGNED AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT THIS SUMMER. THE US FEARED THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT RENEW THE ATTEMPT TO CUT BACK ON NUCLEAR TESTING. ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN RESISTING THIS PRESSURE WOULD BE TESTED AGAINST A CRITICAL YARDSTICK, BECAUSE TESTING WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PROGRESS TOWARDS FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INF TREATY BY END-MAY 1991 WAS SATISFACTORY, WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVING ALREADY REMOVED 86 PER CENT OF

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- THEIR SS20 MISSILES, AND THE US 57 PERCENT OF THEIR PERSHING AND GLCMS. THE US WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISCOVERY OF SS23 MISSILES IN THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BULGARIA, AND HAD GRAVE DOUBTS AT THE SOVIET DISCLAIMER THAT THESE SYSTEMS WERE NOT UNDER SOVIET OWNERSHIP
13. CHENEY REPORTED THAT THE SDI PROGRAMME HAD PASSED ITS SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY AND WOULD REQUIRE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT IN 1993. HE BELIEVED THAT ACTIVE SDI DEFENCES WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT THE US AND ITS ALLIES IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT OF SRBM SYSTEMS, WITH CW, BW AND POTENTIALLY NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
14. CHENEY REPORTED GOOD PROGRESS ON SRAM-T, STRESSING ITS IMPORTANCE IN VIEW OF INCREASED RELIANCE IN NATO ON DCA/TASM. HE SAID THAT SRAM-T WOULD MEET SACEUR'S TARGET OF 400 KILOMETRES RANGE, WITH AN INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY IN 1995. FULL SCALE DEVELOPMENT HAD BEEN AUTHORISED ON 3 APR 90, AND A NEW WARHEAD WAS BEING DEVELOPED. 385 SRAM-T WERE EARMARKED FOR NATO AND THE WEAPON WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH F15E AND F111 AS WELL AS TORNADO AND F16S IN NATO AIR FORCES

PAGE 7 RBDWC 4877 S E C R E T

15. CHENEY NOTED THAT THE US DEFENCE BUDGET WAS 2 POINT 6 PERCENT BELOW FUNDING FOR FY 91. ALTHOUGH MANY SAVINGS WERE BEING MADE TO REFLECT THE IMPROVING MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE, EXTENSIVE FORCES WERE REQUIRED TO MEET FRESH CHALLENGES CAUSED BY THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES, CW AND BW CAPABILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD
16. MR SCHULTE (US, DIRECTOR STRATEGIC FORCES POLICY) AND MAJ CHILCOTE (US, DIA) GAVE A SERIES OF PRESENTATIONS ON THE EMERGING STRUCTURE OF SOVIET AND US FORCES IN THE POST-START ERA, POINTING OUT AREAS OF DISPUTE (ALCM RANGE, SLCM DECLARATION, LIMITATIONS ON HEAVY CBM MODERNISATION).

BT

£4877

BT

S E C R E T

SIC ACA/CFJ

ANAL SECTION OF 3

DECLARATION. LIMITATIONS ON HEAVY ICBM MODERNISATION). THEY ALSO STRESSED THE BENEFITS LIKELY TO ACCRUE FROM ENFORCED REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT AND FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY WHICH SHOULD INCREASE STRATEGIC STABILITY. THE PRESENTATION HIGHLIGHTED MANY SOVIET ICBM, SLBM AND BOMBER FORCE ENHANCEMENTS WHICH WILL INCREASE THE PROPORTION OF NEW SOVIET DELIVERY SYSTEMS FROM 27 PER CENT IN 1990 TO 94 PER CENT IN 1998. A FURTHER PRESENTATION COVERED THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL UPHEAVALS AND UNREST IN EASTERN EUROPE AND OUTLYING SOVIET PROVINCES. 17. THEY CONCLUDED BY HIGHLIGHTED SOVIET THEATRE FORCE MODERNISATION AND PERCEIVED CHANGES IN TARGETTING PLANS. IN ADDITION TO THE LARGE NUMBER AND INCREASINGLY MODERNISED SRBMS IN THE ATTU AREA, DCA WERE BEING ENHANCED BY NEW ASM WEAPONS. SOVIET SSBN AND SLCM SYSTEMS WERE BEING TESTED AND ADAPTED FOR THE SUB-STRATEGIC ROLE. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS

REPRESENTED A VERY REAL ENHANCEMENT TO SOVIET THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN THE DECADE AHEAD.

ITEM II (WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP).

18. HADLEY (US, CHAIRMAN OF THE HLG) GAVE AN ORAL REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE HLG IN FULFILLING ITS REMIT TO REVIEW THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CFE AGREEMENT FOR THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR FORCES. HE NOTED THAT THE GROUP HAD FOUND THAT A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS REMAINED THE SAME:.

- A. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES REMAINED ESSENTIAL.
- B. TNF WERE CRITICAL IN DETERRING ATTACK, TO PROVIDE LINKAGE AND TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE COHESION.
- C. TNF NEEDED A STRONG EUROPEAN CHARACTER.
- D. TNF MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO HOLD AT RISK: AN AGGRESSORS HOMELAND AND MILITARY FORCES; AND THE HOMELAND AND MILITARY FORCES OF ANY ALLY.

E. A MIX OF SYSTEMS OFFERED ADVANTAGES.

19. POTENTIAL TRENDS IDENTIFIED FOR THE FUTURE INCLUDED:

- A. A REDUCED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE FUTURE.
- B. REDUCTIONS IN NATOS NUCLEAR STOCKPILE WERE ALREADY POSSIBLE

AND THERE WAS A PROSPECT OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS.

C. THE NEED TO RESORT TO EARLY FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE.

D. THERE WAS A REDUCED ROLE FOR SYSTEMS OF THE SHORTEST RANGE.

E. ORIENTATION TOWARDS SYSTEMS OF LONGER RANGE - WHICH HAD THE INHERENT CAPABILITY FOR THE ENTIRE RANGE OF MISSIONS.

F. THERE WOULD BE GREATER RELIANCE ON DCA: THIS MADE AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF A STAND-OFF CAPABILITY.

G. NATOS ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS SHOULD BE FURTHER DEVELOPED.

H. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF NATOS NUCLEAR POLICY REMAINED VALID: OTHERS MIGHT NEED REFINEMENT. SEVERAL ISSUES SHOULD BE

ADDRESSED, INCLUDING THE CRITERIA FOR SITING NATOS NUCLEAR STOCKPILE: COUNTRIES TO BE COVERED IN PRE-PLANNED NUCLEAR

TARGETTING: DELIBERATE ESCALATION ON NATO SOIL: AND QUOTE BATTLEFIELD UNQUOTE NUCLEAR OPTIONS IN DELIBERATE ESCALATION.

20. IN DISCUSSION THE REPORT WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED, ALTHOUGH SOME DELEGATIONS REPEATED COMMENTS MADE IN PART ONE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE NEED TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARTILLERY ALTOGETHER. THE MEETING INSTRUCTED THE HLG TO COMPLETE ITS WORK TAKING FULL

PAGE 5 RBDWC 4916 S E C R E T

ACCOUNT OF THE EMERGING POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE,
AND INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS ON FORCE COMPOSITION. AT THE
SAME TIME SACEUR WAS INVITED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS WORK IN
DEVELOPING FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS. THE RESULTS OF
BOTH SETS OF WORK SHOULD BE REPORTED TO THE SPRING 1991 MEETING
OF THE NPG.

SECRET BURNING BUSH

DEDIP BURNING BUSH

FM UKDEL NATO

TO DESKBY 031500Z FCO

TELNO 199

OF 031411Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO (A): 2+4

1. BAKER RAISED THE HANDLING OF THE 2+4. ON THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR, WE SHOULD SAY THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE CFE, NOT THE 2+4. ALL PRESENT AGREED. ON THE QUESTION OF GERMANY'S STATUS AS AN NON-NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS POWER, WE SHOULD SAY THAT THAT WAS PRIMARILY A MATTER FOR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO TELL THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THE FRG'S INTENTIONS. THE GDR COULD DO THE SAME FOR THEIR PART. BAKER SAID WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY WOULD BE DETERMINED IN THE SINF NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSED WITHIN NATO. ALL PRESENT AGREED.

2. ON ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP, WE SHOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS NOT SOMETHING FOR DECISION IN 2+4 TALKS. WE COULD ALLOW IT TO BE DISCUSSED THERE BUT DECISIONS WERE FOR GERMANY AND NATO. THE SAME WAS TRUE OF THE MILITARY STATUS OF THE GDR, IE IT COULD BE DISCUSSED BUT NOT DECIDED.

3. GENSCHER SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANNOUNCE GERMAN INTENTIONS SO AS TO ELICIT A SOVIET RESPONSE. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS THE GERMANS WOULD WISH TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY, ESPECIALLY THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DEUTSCHMARK IN THE GDR AND THE COST OF STATIONING SOVIET TROOPS, IE THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT MORE THAN TRADING RELATIONS. THESE FINANCIAL QUESTIONS WERE IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO LEARN FROM THE FRG HOW THEY SAW FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN A UNITED GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY IN ECONOMIC MATTERS. GENSCHER WOULD BE DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON FRIDAY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD A NUMBER OF CONCERNS:

1) ITS FEAR THAT AFTER UNIFICATION IT WOULD BE PUSHED OUT OF GERMANY, HENCE ITS INTEREST IN EXTENDING AND INSTITUTIONALISING THE CSCE:

2) ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH A UNITED GERMANY.

1) WAS A MATTER FOR THE WHOLE ALLIANCE, 2) WAS MAINLY FOR THE GERMANS.

3) MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS RAISED ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE, IE ON CONVENTIONAL TROOP STRENGTHS, WHICH WERE FOR DISCUSSION IN VIENNA BUT ALSO THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF HOW TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GDR WOULD LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT AND JOIN NATO. THE SOVIET POSITION HAD CHANGED. FIRST OF ALL THEY HAD URGED GERMAN NEUTRALITY, THEN MEMBERSHIP OF THE TWO ALLIANCES (WHICH IMPLIED THAT THEY ACCEPTED THAT THE FRG WOULD REMAIN IN NATO AFTER UNIFICATION). SHEVARDNADZE HAD NEVER MADE THIS HIS OWN PROPOSAL BUT ATTRIBUTED IT TO UNSPECIFIED SOURCES IN GERMAN OPINION. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD TOLD THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW THAT, SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED ON GDR TERRITORY, THIS, FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF VIEW, MEANT THAT THE GDR WAS PART OF THE WARSAW PACT. THIS APPROACH SHARED SOME FLEXIBILITY. THE RUSSIANS KNEW IN THE END THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD BE IN NATO. THEY WERE PREPARING FOR THAT BY DIVESTING NATO OF SOME OF ITS DEMONIC CHARACTER. HENCE SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO NATO HQ AND THE RECENT PORTRAIT OF AND INTERVIEW WITH, HARMEL IN THE SOVIET PRESS. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. WE HAD TO HANDLE THE ISSUE RESPONSIBLY. WE WOULD GET WHAT WE WANTED. THE GERMAN POSITION WAS THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN PART OF NATO BUT WE NEED NOT RUB IT IN BY SAYING IT PUBLICLY EVERY DAY.

4. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE DECISIVE QUESTIONS WERE THE ECONOMIC ONES. THE SOVIET UNION HAD REMARKABLE EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT THE FRG WOULD DO FOR THEM. THEY HAD HAD SOME TALKS WITH THEM ON MONDAY. GENSCHER THEN WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT POLAND (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM).

5. WHEN THE CONVERSATION CAME BACK TO 2+4, DUMAS SAID THAT WE HAD DEFINED WHAT THE 2+4 COULD NOT DO. HE HOPED THAT WOULD LEAVE SOMETHING TO DISCUSS. THE MEETING SHOULD DISCUSS THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN EAST GERMANY - NOT JUST THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS BUT THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEIR PRESENCE. WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO FIND OUT WHAT THE SOVIETS FELT AND TO LEARN HOW SHEVARDNADZE'S THINKING HAD EVOLVED.

6. GENSCHER SPOKE OF THE SEQUENCE OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS OF THE 2+4: BONN, EAST BERLIN, PARIS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, LONDON. HE HOPED THAT THE POLES COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE THIRD MEETING IN PARIS AND THAT THE FIRST FOUR MEETINGS COULD ALL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE SUMMER BREAK. THE 2+4 COULD THEN MEET IN WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER AND LONDON IN OCTOBER. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM. BAKER SAID HE WAS HAPPY TO WORK TOWARDS AN EXPEDITIOUS SERIES OF MEETINGS BUT GENSCHER'S TIMETABLE WAS AMBITIOUS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE BUSH/GORBACHEV SUMMIT AT THE END OF MAY. GENSCHER SAID THAT WE SHOULD SUGGEST TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY HOLD A MEETING IN MOSCOW BEFORE THE SUMMER BREAK BUT IF THEY SAID THEY WOULD PREFER THE MEETING TO BE HELD IN SEPTEMBER, WE COULD LIVE WITH THAT. BOTH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DUMAS ALSO REFERRED TO THE AMBITIOUS NATURE OF THE TIMETABLE WITHOUT RULING IT OUT.

7. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF PRESS HANDLING OF THE 2+4 MEETING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE RISK THAT A PRESS CONFERENCE BY ALL SIX WOULD LEAD TO ISSUES DISCUSSED IN PRIVATE BEING AIRED IN PUBLIC. THE OTHERS DID NOT SEEM TO THINK THAT THIS MATTERED. BAKER SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO FEEL THE ODD MAN OUT. ALTHOUGH NO FIRM CONCLUSION WAS REACHED, THE CLEAR SENSE WAS THAT GENSCHER WOULD PROPOSE A PRESS CONFERENCE INVOLVING ALL SIX FOREIGN MINISTERS.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10

NNNN

SECRET BURNING BUSH DEDIP

FM UKDEL NATO

TO DESKBY 031500Z FCO

TELNO 198

OF 031328Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS BONNN WASHINGTON

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO (A): LITHUANIA

1. BAKER SAID THE UNITED STATES HOPED FOR A PRODUCTIVE U S/SOVIET SUMMIT AT THE END OF MAY. THEY WERE AIMING TO REACH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL MATTERS, EG STRATEGIC ARMS. THEY HAD SOME HOPE OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THEY HOPED TO BE ABLE FINALLY TO AGREE PROTOCOLS TO THE NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES AND TO PURSUE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MTCR. ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING, THERE WAS A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET APPROACH AND A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THEIR FLEXIBILITY. THEIR POSITION WAS WHAT HE CALLED QUOTE STEADY STATE UNQUOTE. THE MAY DAY PARADE HAD SHOWN SOME OF THE PRESSURES GORBACHEV WAS UNDER. IT WAS THEREFORE FOR NATO TO KEEP UP THE INITIATIVE. THE U S MEANWHILE WAS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE ON LITHUANIA. THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN THINKING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BUT HAD RECEIVED LITTLE, IF ANY, SUPPORT FOR ANY ACTION FROM THE ALLIES, INCLUDING, BAKER IMPLIED, THE JAPANESE. THE WHOLE TREND OF ALLIED OPINION HAD BEEN TO PUSH THE RUSSIANS AND THE LITHUANIANS TOWARDS DIALOGUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE INTERJECTED THAT THE LITHUANIAN PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE COMING TO LONDON. THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD SEE HER.

2. DUMAS SAID LITHUANIA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT KEY LARGO, WHERE FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES HAD WORKED OUT THE BEGINNINGS OF AN APPROACH. THAT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY LED TO THE KOHL/MITTERRAND LETTER, WHICH HAD EVOKED VARIED REACTIONS. ITS RECEPTION HAD BEEN COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT IT HAD ARRIVED AT THE SAME TIME AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT BE IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON THE SOVIET UNION. SO INITIALLY THE LITHUANIANS HAD ACCUSED THE WEST OF ABANDONING THEM. ONCE THEY HAD CALMED DOWN, THEY HAD REALISED THAT THE LETTER REPRESENTED A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. IN DUBLIN, THE TWELVE HAD BEEN ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH. EVERYONE WAS UNDER PRESSURE: HE HIMSELF HAD TO ANSWER A QUESTION IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT ONCE A WEEK ON LITHUANIA. BUT WE ALL HAD MORE OR LESS THE SAME LINES OF CONDUCT. POLICY RATED ON TWO PREMISES. ONE WAS LITHUANIA'S PROGRESS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE: THE SECOND WAS THAT THIS WAS AN INTERNAL SOVIET ISSUE IN WHICH WE COULD NOT INTERFERE. IF WE HOPED THAT DIALOGUE COULD TAKE PLACE, THEN THAT EXCLUDED ANY PROSPECT OF SANCTIONS, WHICH WOULD JEOPARDISE THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD APPROACH AND COMPLICATE THINGS FOR GORBACHEV. IF WE EXCLUDED SANCTIONS, THEN DIALOGUE WAS THE ONLY ANSWER. LANDSBERGIS HAD APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT IN THE REPLY HE HAD SENT TO THE KOHL/MITTERRAND LETTER, THOUGH HE TALKED OF MEDIATION. DUMAS DID NOT REGARD MEDIATION AS FEASIBLE: YOU COULD NOT MEDIATE IN AN INTERNAL SITUATION. THE TWELVE SHOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE, AGREEING IF NECESSARY ON HUMANITARIAN AID, WHICH SHOULD BE DONE AT THE COMMUNITY RATHER THAN NATIONAL LEVEL. THE COMMUNITY SHOULD ACT IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE ACCUSED OF ANOTHER MUNICH - EVEN THOUGH NOT MANY PEOPLE KNEW WHAT THAT MEANT.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THOUGHT WE HAD KEPT PRETTY WELL IN LINE AND SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. A SECONDARY COMPLICATION WAS THE FACT THAT NONE OF US HAD EVER RECOGNISED THE ANNEXATION OF LITHUANIA AS LEGITIMATE. WE SHOULD STRESS DIALOGUE. THERE WAS NO SCOPE FOR MEDIATION. HE AGREED WITH DUMAS THAT SANCTIONS WERE NOT THE RIGHT ANSWER NOW BUT, IF THE SITUATION IN LITHUANIA DETERIORATED, THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS PRESSURE ON GORBACHEV TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. JARUZELSKI HAD DESCRIBED THESE PRESSURES TO HIM IN WARSAW. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO GORBACHEV TO KNOW THAT, IF HE GAVE THE SOLDIERS A FREE HAND IN LITHUANIA, HE WOULD COME UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM THE WEST, IF THERE WOULD BE A PRICE TO PAY. WHAT FORM THAT PRICE SHOULD TAKE WAS NOT FOR DECISION NOW. WE NEEDED TO SHOW THAT A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN LITHUANIA WOULD AFFECT RELATIONS.

4. DUMAS SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN LITHUANIA WOULD START TO GET REALLY SERIOUS AT THE END OF MAY AS A RESULT OF SANCTIONS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO LOOK THEN AT WHAT WE MIGHT DO AND HE WAS ALREADY ENCOURAGING THE COMMISSION TO DO PREPARATORY WORK. THERE WAS NO POINT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN OFFERING OIL AND GAS IF WE COULD NOT GET IT IN TO LITHUANIA. GENSCHER COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONDUCTING MILITARY EXERCISES WHICH HAD THE EFFECT OF BLOCKING ACCESS TO THE PORT. DUMAS SAID THAT THE END OF MAY WAS QUITE A LONG WAY OFF AND THERE WERE SIGNS THAT THINGS MIGHT BE GETTING BETTER POLITICALLY. ESTONIA AND LATVIA WERE SHOWING THE BEST WAY TO CARRY FORWARD A CLAIM FOR INDEPENDENCE. GORBACHEV WAS PREPARED TO TALK OF A FUTURE FEDERAL STRUCTURE.

5. BAKER SAID THAT WE SHOULD GIVE SOME THOUGHT AS TO HOW TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND LITHUANIA. THE SOVIET UNION HAD SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO TALK IF THE LITHUANIANS FROZE OR SUSPENDED THEIR DECLARATIONS THEY DID NOT HAVE TO REVOKE OR ANNUL IT. THEY HAD ALSO SAID THE LITHUANIANS SHOULD COME TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THE MATTER NOT AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERATION COUNCIL BUT SIMPLY AS LITHUANIANS. SINCE THEN, THE LITHUANIANS HAD SAID THEY WERE CONSIDERING SUSPENDING OR FREEING THEIR DECLARATION. SO WHAT WAS KEEPING THE TWO SIDES APART? BAKER WOULD TALK TO SHEVARDNADZE IN BONN BUT ANYTHING WE COULD FIND OUT WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS WOULD BE USEFUL.

6. DUMAS SAID THAT THE LITHUANIANS HAD A REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS. THEY HAD USED HIM UNOFFICIALLY BEFORE TO GET MESSAGES THROUGH TO LANDSBERGIS WITHOUT DELAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ANIMOSITY, AND LACK OF PERSONAL TRUST, WERE KEEPING THE TWO SIDES APART. THE POLES THOUGHT THAT THE CHURCH, WHICH HAD GREAT INFLUENCE IN LITHUANIA, COULD ACT AS A GO-BETWEEN. THIS WAS NOT A BAD IDEA. BAKER SAID HE HAD TALKED TO GEREMEK, WHO WAS TRUSTED BY THE LITHUANIANS. WE NEEDED TO FIND A MECHANISM TO SPLIT WHATEVER DIFFERENCES REMAINED.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10 ✓

ZCZC

SECRET

DB 031500Z FCOLN

OO PARIS BONNM WASHI

FM BRNAT TO FCOLN

031317Z MAY

GRS 430

SECRET BURNING BUSH *DE DIP*

FM UKDEL NATO

TO DESKBY 031500Z FCO

TELNO 197

OF 031317Z MAY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO(A): PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH ON NATO

1. BAKER SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ADDRESS THE ADAPTATION OF NATO, POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, TO CHANGING REALITIES. HE DESCRIBED THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH, WHICH WE HAVE SINCE SEEN.
2. GENSCHER WELCOMED THE SPEECH AS A GOOD MOVE, NOT LEAST FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE 2+4 TALKS. IT SHOWED THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS READY TO ADJUST TO CHANGE AND HAD ALREADY DRAWN THE CONSEQUENCES FROM EVENTS IN EUROPE.
3. DUMAS SAID THE SPEECH WAS A GOOD STARTING POINT FOR A NECESSARY THINKING PROCESS. BUSH'S APPROACH HAD BEEN AGREED AT THE FRANCO- U S TALKS IN FLORIDA. WE WOULD NEED TO LOOK IN DETAIL AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. HOW DID BAKER ENVISAGE THE TIMETABLE? THERE APPEARED TO BE A PROLIFERATION OF MEETINGS. TO HAVE SO MANY MEETINGS WOULD NOT BE SERIOUS.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED THAT, TO THE EXTENT HE COULD, THE PRESIDENT WOULD LAY EMPHASIS ON THE PREPARATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE LEADING UP TO HIS ANNOUNCEMENT. IT WOULD BE VERY UNDESIRABLE IF THE RUSSIANS COULD SEE ANY DAYLIGHT BETWEEN US. ON MATTERS NOT YET FULLY DISCUSSED, THE EXACT TIMING COULD PERHAPS BE KEP OPEN.

5. BAKER SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD FIND THESE POINTS ADEQUATELY CATERED FOR IN THE SPEECH. EVERYTHING IN IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY. HE THOUGHT THE TEXT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THEY WOULD SEE THAT NATO WAS ADAPTING. THE SPEECH CONTAINED CLEAR RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF THE CSCE ON THE LINES OF BAKER'S OWN LETTER, WHICH ITSELF CONSTITUTED AN EVOLUTION IN U S THINKING. WE NEEDED AN UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE COULD TALK. THE UNITED STATES' MAIN RESERVATION WAS THAT IN LOOKING FOR A SECURITY ROLE FOR THE CSCE, THAT MUST NOT IN ANY WAY SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE. THE CSCE SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTARY.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE LETTING THEM OFF THE HOOK IN VIENNA. BAKER SAID THAT BUSH'S SPEECH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THE U S VIEW THAT WITHOUT A CFE AGREEMENT THERE SHOULD BE NO CSCE SUMMIT, THOUGH THE UNITED STATES RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONCLUDING THE CFE TALKS THIS YEAR, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH UNIFICATION. DUMAS HOPED THAT THE POINT COULD BE MADE MORE POSITIVELY, IE THAT WE COULD ANTICIPATE A CSCE SUMMIT SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON CFE. THAT IN TURN MEANT THAT WE MUST START PREPARATIONS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE CONDITIONS EXISTED FOR A SUMMIT. BAKER SAID THE UNITED STATES AGREED TO PREPARATIONS ON A CONDITIONAL BASIS.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO 10 ✓

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

The records of
the Quadrupartite
Foreign Ministers
meetings in Brussels
this morning.

Refer to your
meeting with
Reider Litterand.

CAP

SECRET



13(a-b)

Prime Minister
CDP

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

mb

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1990

Dear Richard,

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 3 May suggesting points which I might make to General Scowcroft about the President's speech tomorrow.

General Scowcroft is apparently tied up with the President and a number of foreign visitors for almost the whole day. I have therefore spoken to Bob Gates. I said that we were taking a supportive line of the President's decisions on FOTL and nuclear artillery and that would continue. We continued to be worried by the absence of any firm assurances by the German government about the stationing of TASM in the Federal Republic. We hoped that the Americans would do everything possible to obtain such assurances as a quid pro quo for the decisions which the President would be announcing tomorrow. I realised that the President would not wish to refer to this specifically in his speech. But I hoped that there would be the strongest possible statement of the need to keep nuclear weapons in Europe. Bob Gates said he thought this was adequately covered. He read me a passage in which the President would say that it was not his purpose to make Europe safe for conventional war: it was clear that deterrence by conventional means did not work and that only nuclear weapons could be guaranteed to prevent conflict in Europe. I said this was both a familiar thought and a very welcome one. It would be further improved by a reference to keeping nuclear weapons modernised and up to date. That would point clearly to TASM. Bob Gates said he would consider how this could be included in the text.

I said that it would also be very helpful from our point of view if there could be a clear reference in the speech to the fact that the President had reached his decisions in close consultation with America's allies. Bob Gates said that this was already taken care of. The relevant section of the speech began:

"I have decided, after consulting with our Allies ..."

I said this was welcome, but it would be even better if there could be a specific reference to Bermuda. This would help us deal with attempts by the British media to suggest that the President's decision on FOTL was somehow a defeat for the Prime Minister. Bob Gates said again that he would see whether a reference could be worked into the text.

SECRET

I decided that I had probably pushed my luck as far as it would go with these points - although there is of course no guarantee that we shall get the amendments we seek. The further point in your letter about early bilateral consultations could perhaps be made through other channels.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Secret

12



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 May 1990

*Jean Claude
at floor*

Nuclear Weapons in Europe

When you speak to General Scowcroft this evening (your letter of 3 May) you might make the following points:

- We have already begun to take a line strongly supporting the President's decisions, and will continue to do so.
- Of much help to Prime Minister if Americans' comments can underline consultation with allies, especially UK, in run up to these decisions.
- Important immediate aim, in our view, is to seek more of an assurance from Kohl, privately, that he will come good on TASM.
- Hope you and others will agree that early bilateral consultations should begin in three areas. This means starting in May/June before the Summit:
 - (a) preparation of the substance of SNF arms control;
 - (b) decision on stockpile cuts, whether or not to be announced at the Summit;
 - (c) preliminary work on the review of NATO strategy, which we all agree is needed.

As the two powers with nuclear forces committed to the Alliance we must get together on this.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence).

John ever,

Richard Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DEFENCE = INT w Europe
A7



SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

*the pm
call
a foreign/nuclear*

3 May 1990

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

I enclose a copy of President Bush's message about his proposed speech on NATO and nuclear weapons in Europe, which has just come in. It does not add a great deal to what General Scowcroft told me last night.

I shall need to speak to Scowcroft again this evening, with any comments. I should be grateful for advice on this by 1700 today.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

~~Prime Minister~~ Agreed *AM*

This is the Resident's message
about his speech. Some
good, some less good.

Realistically we are not going
to stop it. We need to

decide what the crucial points


to make. They seem to me:

- the strongest possible
reaffirmation of the continuing
need for modernized under

weapons in Europe including
Germany, a pledge to
resist the denuclearization of
Europe.

- acceptance that NATO should
begin preparations for SWF
negotiations: but a suggestion
that the proposal to bring forward
the opening of negotiations themselves
should be delayed until a NATO
summit.

- reiteration of the importance of
clearing undertakings - private if necessary
- from the Germans about stationing
of TASM.
CAF.

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3254</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>T92/90 vs President to PM dated 3 May 1990 (2 copies)</i>	
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SIC EME

UKDEL NATO FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY.

OUR TELNO 993 AND UKDEL NATO TELNO 188 : US POLICY ON
SNF/PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON 4 MAY

SUMMARY

1. WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED THE PROMISED PREVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO BE DELIVERED AT OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY ON 4 MAY, IN WHICH SNF ISSUES - AND OTHER SECURITY POLICY QUESTIONS - WILL BE COVERED AS PART OF A WIDE RANGING REVIEW OF US POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE AND CHANGLNG SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER IS EXPECTED TO BE DISPATCHED OVER NIGHT 2/3 MAY, POSSIBLY PRECEDED BY TELEPHONE CALL FROM SCOWCROFT.

DETAIL

2. ZELIKOW (NSC) SAID THAT THE THEME OF THE SPEECH WOULD BE AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE, WLTH SUBORDINATE EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF NATO AS A CONTINUING AGENT FOR CHANGE. IT HAD BEEN PROMPTED, ESSENTIALLY BY THE GROWING CONCERN WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THE DEBATE WHICH IS BEGINNING TO BREW IN AMERICA ABOUT WHETHER THE US SHOULD, OR COULD, SUSTAIN A MAJOR EUROPEAN ROLE IN THE NEW CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. SIMILAR RE-ASSESSMENTS OF US INTERESTS HAD TAKEN PLACE AFTER EACH MODERN EUROPEAN UPHEAVAL: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: 1914-20: THE 1930S: 1941-50: THE EARLY 1990S WERE THUS BEING SEEN, SIMILARLY AS THE FIFTH SUCH FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE BROAD SWEEP OF HISTORY. TNE PRESIDENT WOULD BE SEEKING TO MOVE TO CONTROL THE DEBATE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BY SETTING OUT THE CLEAR CASE FOR AN UNDIMINISHED AMERICAN ROLE IN EUROPE, AVOIDING THE ISOLATIONIST ERRORS OF

THE PAST AND OUTLINING POLICIES WHICH RECOGNISED THAT AMERICA'S FATE WAS INEXTRICABLY BOUND UP WITH THAT OF EUROPE. THERE WOULD BE A SECTION ON THE ALLIANCE, POINTING OUT THE ATLANTIC TREATY WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST A POLITICAL COMPACT AND THAT ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS A BY-PRODUCT, DICTATED BY CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. HOW FAR BUSH WOULD GO IN CALLING FOR BROADER POLITICAL ROLES FOR NATO WAS UNCERTAIN, BUT THE GENERAL DIRECTION WAS CLEAR. HE WAS ALSO EXPECTED TO STRESS THAT THE US SAW ITSELF AS A EUROPEAN POWER IN THE BROADER SENSE - POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AS WELL AS MILITARY - AND WOULD SPEAK, APPARENTLY IN FAMILIAR TERMS AGAIN, ABOUT US/EC AND STRENGTHENING OF CSCE.

3. AS REGARDS SPECIFICS, THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROPOSE THAT A NATO SUMMIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY (NOTWITHSTANDING RECENT FRANCO-GERMAN LOBBYING FOR THIS TO BE PUT OFF UNTIL THE AUTUMN). HE WOULD SAY NOTHING ABOUT VENUE. FOUR MAIN AGENDA TOPICS WOULD BE SUGGESTED:

- (A) NATO'S FUTURE POLITICAL MISSIONS
- (B) REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE AND RELATED ARMS CONTROL
- (C) THE NUCLEAR POSTURE AND CONTINUING ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
- (D) DEVELOPING A COMMON ALLIANCE VISION FOR THE FUTURE OF CSCE (WHERE THE PRESIDENT WOULD SPEAK VERY MUCH ON THE SAME LINES AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S KONIGSWINTER SPEECH AND AS FORESHADOWED IN BAKER'S LETTER TO COLLEAGUES).

4. IN CALLING FOR A NEW APPROACH ON HOW THE ALLIANCE DEFENDS ITSELF, THE PRESIDENT WAS EXPECTED TO INDICATE ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT CFE SHOULD MOVE SMOOTHLY INTO FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT A CHANGE OF MANDATE. HE WAS ALSO LIKELY TO SAY THAT CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO REVIEWING US/SOVIET FORCE LEVELS AS WELL AS OTHERS IN THE CENTRAL

REGION, BUT WOULD STRESS THAT A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN PRESENCE WAS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE THE REFERENCES TO CANCELLATION OF FOTL AND 155 MM ARTILLERY (THE LATTER AFFECTING DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE ONLY).

5. ZELIKOW SAID THAT IT WOULD BE FOR THE MID-YEAR SUMMIT TO AGREE ON SUCH ISSUES AS UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS IN THE SNF FORCE POSTURE (AND NOT, HE EMPHASISED, THE NPG), PREPARATIONS FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS, OBJECTIVES FOR CFE II AND A REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY. THE PRESIDENT WOULD NEVERTHELESS FORESHADOW A FORWARD-LOOKING POSITION ON THESE ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME HE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE STILL IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION, WITH PROFOUND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, SO THAT ANY SECURITY PRINCIPLES FOR THE FUTURE WHICH MIGHT BE DEVELOPED IN THE COMING MONTHS COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNTIL POSITIVE CHANGE HAD BEEN ASSURED (CF OUR TELNO 959). IN THAT CONTEXT, ZELIKOW COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING A NATO SUMMIT IN THE AUTUMN AS WELL AS IN JUNE TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF WORK THAT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MIGHT COMMISSION FOR THE SUMMER.

6. ZELIKOW STRESSED THAT THE PRECISE TEXT WAS STILL BEING FINALISED. THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENTS HAD DONE THEIR WORK, BUT THE WHITE HOUSE SPEECH WRITERS WERE NOW BUSILY ENGAGED IN SEEKING TO REDUCE WHAT THEY REGARD AS AN ACADEMIC TRACT TO A PUBLICLY ATTRACTIVE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH. SOME OF THE DETAIL MIGHT THEREFORE BE LOST, BUT THE MAIN THRUST WOULD BE PRESERVED.

7. WE ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO SAY, PARTICULARLY IN THE PASSAGE ON NUCLEAR FORCES, THAT THIS IS IN LINE WITH THE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN BERMUDA (WARSAW TELNO 002). ZELIKOW SAID THAT THERE WAS AN INTENTION TO REFER TO QUOTE CONSULTATION WITH NATO COLLEAGUES UNQUOTE BUT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SINGLE OUT HMG SPECIFICALLY. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF IN OUR OWN BACKGROUNDING TO THE SPEECH AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT WE WERE TO REFER TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH MUCH OF THE SPEECH REFLECTED THE COMMON VIEWS

EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT IN BERMUDA. ZELIKOW THOUGHT THAT GENERAL SCOWCROFT WAS LIKELY TO SPEAK TO MR POWELL IN NO 10 LATER TODAY AND THE POINT MIGHT BE DISCUSSED FURTHER THEN. IN ANY EVENT, MESSAGES WERE BEING PREPARED TO ALL NATO LEADERS FOR DISPATCH OVER NIGHT, BUT THAT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE MORE DETAILED AND MORE PERSONAL.

8. IN THE EVENT THAT SCOWCROFT DOES CALL (THE POSITION ON THIS IS UNCLEAR) IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF NO REFERENCE WERE MADE TO THE PREVIEW WHICH ZELIKOW PROVIDED.

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

2 May 1990

*From the Private Secretary*US POLICY ON SNF

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had a discussion this evening about the reports from Washington and from UKDEL NATO that President Bush will shortly make a speech to announce the cancellation of FOTL and of further modernised nuclear artillery, possibly combining it with a proposal to bring forward SNF negotiations to run in parallel with a further round of conventional force reduction negotiations. They agreed that we needed to clear up as rapidly as possible the uncertainty about what the President was intending to say, and establish whether he had secured any prior private assurances from the Federal German Government on the stationing of TASM in Germany. If the President's speech were limited only to FOTL and nuclear artillery, we would not be in a strong position to raise objections, in the light of the Prime Minister's discussion with the President in Bermuda, although it would be helpful if the President would make clear that the proposal had been discussed in advance with her. But the wider proposals involving SNF negotiations and further reductions in conventional forces would not give the right signal to the Russians at this particular time: and would be even more damaging if no assurances had been obtained from the Germans about the stationing of TASM.

It was agreed that I would try to telephone General Scowcroft this evening to establish more about the President's intentions: and in the light of that, the Foreign Secretary would raise the matter with Secretary Baker tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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9a-6
Prime Minister
I talked to

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

General Scowcroft.
The result is not

2 May 1990

entirely satisfactory.
We shall need to
look closely at
the President's message

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

As agreed between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, I spoke this evening to General Scowcroft about the speech which the President intends to give on 4 May dealing with nuclear weapons in Europe.

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General Scowcroft said he was glad I had called: he had been going to telephone me tomorrow. The President would be sending a message to the Prime Minister and some other NATO Heads of Government overnight setting out his intentions. I said that the Foreign Secretary would be seeing Secretary Baker tomorrow morning. I would be grateful if he could give me a foretaste of what the President would say.

General Scowcroft said that he did not have the text in front of him. But he could recall the main elements. The President would propose a NATO summit to start the process of looking at NATO's future strategy and at preparations for SNF negotiations. On the follow-on to Lance (FOTL), he would say that the United States had completed R&D but did not propose to take the missile into production. He would also say that the United States was not intending to carry out any further production of modernised nuclear artillery shells.

I said that I was grateful for this, but it raised a number of questions. First, had the Americans obtained any private assurance from the Federal German Government about the future stationing of TASM in Germany? General Scowcroft said that it would not be accurate to say that the Americans had any firm assurance. They had certainly had discussions. Indeed he himself had talked to Stoltenberg only yesterday and there had been a complete congruence of views. The Americans planned further discussions on how the issue should be managed. They were confident of Kohl's intentions, but he could not say they had any sort of guarantee. I recalled that the Prime Minister had laid great stress in Bermuda on the importance of obtaining assurances from the Germans on this point before committing ourselves on SNF negotiations.

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This led me to my second point. I noticed that General Scowcroft had spoken of "preparations" for SNF negotiations. That was fully consistent with what the Prime Minister had said in Bermuda. But would the President go beyond this and refer to the possibility of bringing forward the opening of SNF negotiations to follow immediately from the completion of a CFE agreement? General Scowcroft admitted that the President would put this forward as one option, if there was general agreement in the Alliance. I said this would considerably increase our misgivings: there would be really nothing left to bargain with when it came to talking to the Germans. The Foreign Secretary would want to raise this point with Secretary Baker tomorrow. General Scowcroft said he noted our concern and would reflect on the point. He suggested that we should look closely at the text of what the President intended to say, which would be conveyed in his message overnight.

I asked whether the speech would make any reference to a further round of conventional force reductions. We thought it would convey the wrong signal to the Soviet Union to make any specific proposal for these at this stage. General Scowcroft said that the speech would say only that the Alliance should begin to think about the next steps after a CFE agreement. The main reason for this was to deflect pressure from the Russians in the Two plus Four Group to discuss limitations on the size of German forces. We needed to be able to say that this was a matter for future multilateral negotiations.

I said that all this caused me some concern. We would await the President's message and study it very carefully. The Foreign Secretary would want to speak to Secretary Baker tomorrow. General Scowcroft said that he hoped I would telephone again tomorrow, once we had seen the text of the President's message, and let him know our particular concerns. I suggested that it would be helpful if the President made clear in his speech that it followed on consultations with the United States' closest allies and in particular with the Prime Minister in Bermuda. General Scowcroft said that this had been in an earlier draft and he would try to ensure that it remained.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



the bar 8
call

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

10 April 1990

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 9 April about the handling of the discussion on sub-strategic nuclear weapons at the Prime Minister's meeting with President Bush. The Prime Minister has approved this.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (H.M. Treasury) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

cd/c
7A(A-F)

This simply puts into language

[Attached]

the approach which you agreed last week. It is carefully balanced:

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9 April 1990

would make an excellent outcome

Dear Charles, for the Bermuda meeting.

I hope you will agree to proceed as proposed.

Nuclear Deterrence in Europe

at flap

My letter of 2 April reported that the Americans were considering an early initiative on sub-strategic nuclear weapons.

cd/c
9/4.

President Bush plans to discuss this subject with the Prime Minister in Bermuda. An agreed position with the Americans would put us in a strong position for subsequent discussion in NATO. The Foreign Secretary believes that an understanding could be reached with the Americans on an initiative designed to:

Agreed
not

- protect the basing of TASM in Germany;
- pre-empt Soviet proposals in the Two Plus Four negotiations on the de-nuclearisation of Germany; and
- respond to the public view (particularly in Germany, but gaining ground more widely in the Alliance) that NATO's very short-range, land-based nuclear weapons no longer correspond to the political realities of Europe.

The Foreign Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister speaks to President Bush on the lines of the enclosed note. The Defence Secretary has seen this note, and agrees with it. The key features of a NATO initiative would be:

- an announcement of further reductions in the nuclear stockpile, to be carried out unilaterally (so that NATO keeps control of the process) and contingent on the signature of a CFE agreement;

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- (if President Bush confirms our assessment that prospects for FOTL in Congress are bleak) a public signal that NATO would not deploy FOTL in Europe if the situation continues to evolve favourably.
- an indication that preparations will begin soon in NATO for SNF negotiations (but with the aim of delaying negotiations with the Soviet Union until the Comprehensive Concept conditions are fulfilled, and certainly until after the German elections).

The Foreign Secretary believes that an initiative on these lines would provide a solid basis for defending our key interest: that TASM should be deployed as widely as possible in Europe, including in Germany.

There is also the question of the timing of such an initiative. The Americans appear to be thinking in terms of preparing the ground in NATO for an announcement at the Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 9-10 May. The Foreign Secretary has considered whether there would be tactical advantage in making clear publicly the way our minds are moving, particularly on FOTL, in advance of that. There is deep scepticism in all parts of the House on whether it is sensible for NATO to be spending money on the development of FOTL, given that from Germany it only has the range to reach East European countries. In the light of our assessment that Congress is likely to end funding for FOTL soon, the Foreign Secretary thinks we should avoid a situation in which, when Congress refuses the funding, this is portrayed as a snub to the British Government.

There are, however, disadvantages in making a separate announcement about FOTL in advance of a broader NATO initiative. It would put the spotlight on TASM and risk making that an issue prematurely in the German election campaign. The FOTL decision is also one that should be taken by NATO, and therefore as part of a NATO initiative.

But the Prime Minister's meeting with President Bush would be an important opportunity to prepare for such a NATO initiative. He therefore suggests that the Prime Minister and the President might make coordinated public

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Memo have nuclear weapons - go to deliver
No. Quarterly Times

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statements following their meeting, making clear that they are in agreement, and that the changes in Europe affect the numbers and types of nuclear weapons which NATO needs in Europe, although not the principle that some nuclear weapons should continue to be stationed there. This should provide a sounder public position until the NATO initiative can be announced at the NPG, and, while differing from the Comprehensive Concept, can be justified in public as consistent with its underlying approach. I enclose a note of possible points for public use.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE :

Speeding NATO

- Our primary objective should be to preserve TASM, based widely in Europe including in Germany. Once the F1-11 bombers reach the end of their lives in the mid-1990s, TASM will be the only sub-strategic NATO system with the range to reach the Soviet Union.
- Chancellor Kohl took a generally helpful line at the Anglo-Germans Summit. But the Soviet Union are likely to press hard in the Two Plus Four negotiations for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Germany. In a German election year this could be difficult for us.
- There is also a growing feeling in Europe that nuclear weapons with the range only to reach East European countries no longer serve any military purpose and send the wrong political signal.
- Aware that these views are shared in Congress. Your own views on prospects for survival of FOTL? If some Congressional funding continues, prospects for a) keeping R + D going or b) limited production/stockpiling in US?
- NATO should anticipate these developments, and taking the initiative. Our aim would be to preserve the essential element for nuclear deterrence in Europe in the 1990s (air-delivered weapons, and especially TASM) and make a virtue of relinquishing the less essential elements.
- Propose that elements for a NATO initiative would be:
 - further unilateral reductions in NATO's stockpile (so that NATO keeps control of the process)
 - acceptance that FOTL will not be deployed in Europe, if the situation continues to evolve favourably
 - an indication that preparations will begin soon in NATO for SNF negotiations

- An initiative on these lines should give Chancellor Kohl what he needs in the run up to the German elections. But our aim should be to delay negotiations with the Soviet Union on SNF until the Comprehensive Concept conditions are fulfilled, and certainly until after the German elections.

- On timing, suggest that this initiative could be launched at the NPG Ministerial on 8-10 May: would then be on the table in time for your Summit with Gorbachev at end of May.


- Suggest that in speaking to the press we both use the attached guidelines.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE: PUBLIC LINE

- Nuclear weapons based on the continent of Europe and in the UK will remain vital for NATO's security.
- But the dramatic spread of democracy in Eastern Europe affects both the numbers and the types of weapons that NATO needs.
- We intend to discuss with other NATO allies what changes are needed to ensure that NATO's nuclear forces are fully suited to the political realities of Europe in the 1990s.
- NATO has already reduced its nuclear stockpile in Europe by over 35% in the last decade.
- We believe that it will be possible to make further substantial reductions.
- We invite the Soviet Union to begin matching these cuts.

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DEFENCE: JNF P17





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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

4 April 1990

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE

Thank you for your letter of 2 April dealing with recent developments over sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, and covering also a paper on alternative means of ensuring deterrence in Europe in the event of the deployment of either FOTL or TASM in Germany. I have been discussing these with the Prime Minister over the last two days, trying to resolve a number of problems which she has raised. I think the best way to sum up the position reached is to let you have the enclosed copy of my most recent note to the Prime Minister, with her comments, so that you can see precisely what she has agreed. I think it adds up to a useful redefinition of our position on sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, which can form the basis for briefing for her talk with President Bush next week and for our subsequent position in the various international discussions which will be taking place over the next month or so. But I do not think it would be wise to present it publicly yet as a significant change in the UK position: it would be better to let it emerge gradually as the result of the various meetings in which these issues will be discussed. Indeed, on reflection, it might be helpful if you and MOD were to work up the agreed points into a statement of our position, which we could put to the Prime Minister for her agreement, and then use more widely. The Foreign Secretary may like to discuss this with the Prime Minister (as indeed may the Defence Secretary).

I should be grateful if you could pay particular attention to the security of the enclosure to this letter. It is against normal practice to allow internal No. 10 documents outside the building.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence) but not, at this stage, more widely.

C. D. POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PRIME MINISTER

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

You read my note and the FCO/MOD letter on nuclear deterrence last night. You commented that things were going too fast for your liking, especially with a big question mark over Lithuania.

I sympathise with that sentiment. But I think that our chances of slowing things down are actually better if we show readiness to envisage some reductions in NATO's nuclear weapons, than if we try to stand pat on the status quo.

The situation we face has four characteristics:

- an unstable and unpredictable Soviet Union, which will appear less of a threat, but could nonetheless go bad quite quickly;
- German elections in which the issue of nuclear weapons stationed on German soil will play a significant part, with a growing demand to remove them altogether;
- a general perception on the part of public opinion that developments in Eastern Europe do affect the sort of nuclear weapons which NATO needs (and in the minds of many, raise the question whether NATO still needs them at all);
- an American Administration which is clearly in the process of adapting its policy on nuclear weapons in Europe to take account of these two latter factors.

In the face of these pressures we need to decide how best to ensure that NATO keeps sufficient nuclear weapons in mainland Europe to meet our essential requirements.

The biggest danger is that, once support (or tolerance) for theatre nuclear weapons starts to slip, it will very quickly disappear altogether. The chances of that happening are probably higher if we resist any change in the current NATO position than if we are prepared to envisage some reductions. That is of course a political judgment. But the evidence for it is strong: and in the American idiom, there is much to be said for putting ourselves ahead of the curve, as President Bush did with Congress on the 195,000 floor for US forces in the central region.

If one accepts that some reductions are inevitable, the next step is to work out which are the least damaging and which we have to avoid.

It seems to me that what we do not want is:

- to lose the prospect of stationing TASM in Germany. This is a modern and longer-range weapon, and the only one with the capability to hit Soviet territory from the mainland of Europe.

✓ We must keep it;

✓ - to start to unpick NATO's Comprehensive Concept, because we don't know where the process will stop;

✓ - to get involved in negotiations with the Russians, because we could lose control and get pushed down by the dynamic of negotiation and public opinion towards zero.

On the other hand:

- we have never really had a satisfactory concept of use for nuclear artillery and our own military are not really pressing to retain it;

✓ - we have mentally written off the chances of getting a successor to LANCE. There is a high chance that Congress will kill it this year. There is not much point in expending political capital to defend FOTL;

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✓ - it is better to agree unilateral reductions in NATO's stockpile of nuclear warheads, which is a matter for NATO alone, than be subject to the pressures of negotiations;

- we want to guard against a reversal of Soviet policies e.g. over Lithuania which would lead us to halt reductions and preserve the most effective deterrent possible. This again favours unilateral reductions where there is no Treaty obligation to go on. It favours, too, preserving the most modern system possible.

To my mind this all adds up to a strong case to construct a policy for the next phase which:

✓ - recognises that there is a case for reducing the number of NATO's nuclear weapons, and that others including the Americans and Germans are anyway going to move in this direction;

✓ - gives the highest priority to preserving the most essential element of nuclear deterrence in Europe i.e. the TASM even if that means sacrificing the less essential i.e. nuclear artillery and FOTL;

✓ - preserves NATO's Comprehensive Concept;

✓ - avoids, for as long as possible, negotiations with the Russians and focuses instead on unilateral reductions in NATO's nuclear stockpile, making such reductions contingent on completion of a CFE Agreement;

✓ - accepts that FOTL will not materialise;

- meets the German requirement for some sign of activity on SNF negotiations (to which we are committed eventually by the Comprehensive Concept) during their election campaign, by agreeing to preparatory discussions within NATO.

If you can accept these points, there is a good basis for discussion with President Bush in Bermuda next week, and for

d

constructing a joint US/UK position for the difficult next phase.

Agree?

ed?

(C. D. POWELL)

3 April 1990

a:\foreign\nuclear (srw)

Done or less
The SMC 'start negotiating'
now 'path is in some
difficulty' but I suspect
Congress will soon cancel
the research expenditure.
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE

SUMMARY

1. AMBIGUOUS STATEMENT BY GENSCHER ON TASM. HE CALLS NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES AN ILLUSION.

DETAIL

2. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG ON 30 MARCH, GENSCHER SAID THAT BOTH NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES MUST BE THE OBJECT OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THEY WOULD NO LONGER HAVE A PLACE IN THE EUROPE NOW EMERGING. HE COULD NOT IMAGINE THAT ANYONE WOULD GO ON PUSHING FOR MODERNISATION.

3. ASKED WHETHER HE WANTED A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE GEMANY, GENSCHER REPLIED THAT IN POINT OF FACT NOT A SINGLE SQUARE METRE OF THIS EARTH COULD BE NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE AS LONG AS THERE WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH COULD REACH IT. IT WAS AN ILLUSION TO SPEAK OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE AREAS. LAND-BASED SYSTEMS NO LONGER HAD A PLACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES. THE INTERVIEWER ASKED WHETHER GENSCHER COULD ACCEPT MODERNISATION WITH AIR-BASED SYSTEMS. GENSCHER REPLIED: 'THAT IS NOT CURRENTLY ON THE AGENDA. WE HAVE AIR-BASED SYSTEMS ON BOTH SIDES AND WE WANT TO CONCENTRATE IN DISARMAMENT ON WHAT IS NOW FEASIBLE'.

4. CDU SECRETARY-GENERAL, RUEHE, SPEAKING AT THE CDU'S 'BUNDESWEHR FORUM' IN STOLTENBERG'S PRESENCE IN BONN ON 29 MARCH, SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS, NATO NO LONGER NEEDED A FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE. A MINIMUM OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WOULD REMAIN NECESSARY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR, BUT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH REMAINED AFTER THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO GERMAY BY 'USE AND STORAGE'.

5. THE GERMAN PRESS, QUOTING DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES IN BRUSSELS, SAID THAT EXPERTS HAD AGREED ON 15 AND 16 MARCH THAT NATO COULD REDUCE

ITS 4,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN EUROPE BY AT LEAST HALF AND THAT THE SNF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE PREPARED. DEFENCE MINISTERS WOULD DISCUSS A WESTERN NEGOTIATING CONCEPT AT THE NPG ON 8-9 MAY. A BRUSSELS CORRESPONDENT REPORTS THAT AMONG THE FIFTEEN NATO STATES PARTICIPATING IN NUCLEAR PLANNING IT IS NO LONGER DISPUTED THAT NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND LANCE NO LONGER HAVE A REALISTIC PURPOSE AND THAT FOTL HAS NO CHANCE. HIS LEADING ARTICLE, PRINTED IN TWO MAJOR NEWSPAPERS, SUGGESTS THAT BONN SHOULD PROPOSE THE IMMEDIATE UNILATERAL SCRAPPING OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY.

COMMENT

6. GENSCHER'S DISMISSAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE AREAS IS WELCOME. HIS REPLY ON TASM IS CHARACTERISTICALLY AMBIGUOUS, BUT LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN TO DEPLOYMENT IN THE FUTURE. WHEN A CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTER OF DETERRENCE LIKE RUEHE SPEAKS OUT AGAINST FOTL, IT IS CLEAR THAT NO GERMAN POLITICIAN WILL ANY LONGER SUPPORT IT.

7. AS A RESULT OF HELLA PICK'S RECENT GUARDIAN ARTICLE, IT IS ASSUMED HERE, BOTH BY PRESS AND OFFICIALS, THAT THE UK TOO WILL NO LONGER PRESS FOR FOTL.

MALLABY

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PRIME MINISTER

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The attached papers deal with two aspects of nuclear deterrence in Europe:

- the likelihood that we shall face an initiative from the Americans and/or the Germans in the very near future for a further reduction in NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe.
- how we could continue to ensure deterrence in Europe without a follow-on to LANCE and without a TASM based forward in Germany. Answer: only with great difficulty.

We can't - we must have TASM

Possible US Initiative

You will have seen from the telegrams that the Americans seem to be reaching the conclusion that the best chance of ensuring that NATO can continue to keep some nuclear weapons in Germany is to reduce others. Their thinking is that if we offer substantially to reduce those which can only hit targets in Eastern Europe - LANCE and nuclear artillery - we can get the Germans to accept the system which can reach the Soviet Union, i.e. TASM.

At the same time, as part of their electoral calculations, the German Government are likely to propose that we start preparing now for SNF negotiations.

I think the American assessment is very probably right: after what has happened in Eastern Europe, we cannot hope to preserve the nuclear status quo. Your Konigswinter speech left open the door to a move in this direction. But how it is done is very important: and the FCO letter spells out some options. The general conclusion is that we would be better off offering unilateral cuts in NATO's nuclear warhead stockpile, contingent on conclusion of a CFE agreement, than by varying the terms of

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NATO's Comprehensive Concept to allow an earlier start to SNF negotiations (although we could offer to start preparations within NATO for SNF negotiations). An offer to reduce NATO's stockpile by 1,000 warheads (25 per cent) would put pressure on the Russians and give the German Government some progress to show during their election campaign. We would want, in return, to secure from the Germans a firm commitment to accept TASM.

Are you content with this approach? (The TASM condition is not made explicitly in the FCO letter but seems to me vital - although it would not bind an SPD Government in Germany). If so, you might discuss with President Bush next week.

Alternative deterrence

The short answer is that without TASM or other nuclear systems in Germany, flexible response is mortally wounded. If the Germans refuse to have nuclear weapons on their soil, it is most unlikely that other mainland European countries will agree to do so (except France). The Americans are most unlikely to deploy ALCMs forward in Europe, because they are an essential part of the strategic deterrent and will be more vulnerable forward. They might agree to assign SLCMs to SACEUR - indeed, they are supposed to have done so already. But SLCMs do not have the same psychological effect or visibility as ground-based weapons: and if the other Europeans once get the idea that sea-borne nuclear weapons are an easy option, it will only encourage them to insist on removal of all other nuclear systems in Europe. We might be able to base our TASM forward in France, at least in times of crisis. But although this could be a political signal, it would not actually help militarily vis-a-vis the Soviet target (it is not significantly nearer).

In short, none of the options - even TASM based in Germany - is as effective a deterrent as we have now. But TASM in Germany is an awful lot better than anything else, and the clear deduction from the paper is that we should go all out for it. (Even so, it is not entirely free of problems: some would argue that, because of its long-range in-circumvents - in spirit - the INF Agreement.) Again, it would be useful to discuss this with

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President Bush and agree that you will both make it your highest priority to secure German agreement to accept TASM - basing on German soil, even if the price is giving up most other short-range nuclear weapons over a period of years. It is better to secure our bottom line now, than find ourselves in a free-fall situation later.

C.D.P.

This is going too fast for my liking. I readily see a big question mark over Lithuania

CHARLES POWELL

2 April 1990



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1990

Dear Charles,

Nuclear deterrence in Europe

1. Your letter of ^{11 Apr 1990} 1 February recorded the Prime Minister's general endorsement of the conclusions of the joint minute by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries on this subject, and accompanying papers; and her wish for us to consider alternative means of ensuring deterrence in Europe in the event of the deployment of neither a Follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) nor a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) in Germany. A paper covering these points is enclosed (see below).

Recent Developments

2. The main purpose of this letter is to inform the Prime Minister of more recent developments. We have learned that the Americans are considering an initiative on sub-strategic nuclear weapons, to be launched at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 9/10 May, or possibly sooner. We do not believe that they have yet reached a decision. But their thinking seems to be governed by:

- recognition of the declining usefulness of nuclear artillery post-CFE;
- the likely demise this year of FOTL at the hands of Congress (because they do not believe it will be acceptable in Germany); and
- reported anxiety in Bonn about the pressure which the Soviet Union will bring in the Two Plus Four negotiations for the denuclearisation of a unified Germany.

3. This latter factor is likely to be the key one. Ideally, we should hold to the Comprehensive Concept and defer decisions until 1992 but the Americans may come to the conclusion that only an early change in NATO's nuclear posture or policies in Europe can ensure the retention of Germany in NATO and of nuclear weapons in Germany. Unless the Alliance is seen to be reflecting in the nuclear field the changes in Eastern Europe, German public opinion will be dangerously vulnerable to a determined Soviet campaign for denuclearisation. German Ministry of Defence officials have told MOD that at a recent meeting Dr Stoltenberg and Herr Genscher affirmed their commitment to the retention of nuclear weapons on German soil, and also to TASM, although they would

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not be willing to say so publicly this year. Chancellor Kohl implied at Friday's press conference that he shared the Stoltenberg/Genscher view but he backed off when the question was pursued. German officials fear that an early Soviet arms control initiative on all sub-strategic nuclear weapons would be difficult for the FRG to handle in the feverish mood of 1990, unless the Alliance is prepared to take the initiative to reshape its approach to reflect developments in Europe and in CFE. We understand that the FRG therefore intends to press before the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in May for NATO to begin preparing for SNF negotiations and, perhaps, for an announcement on unilateral reductions.

4. Any Alliance initiative could address the stockpile or the arms control dimensions. The options include:

i) Stockpile cuts. A CFE agreement will, independent of nuclear modernisation, allow very substantial cuts in the stockpile. Ministers could announce at the NPG in May a significant reduction in the number of warheads deployed by NATO in Europe contingent on the signature of a CFE agreement. This would be presented as the first step in a restructuring of the stockpile, with the promise of further substantial reductions once the full implications of a CFE agreement and changes in the Warsaw Pact, as well as SNF arms control, had been analysed.

ii) The complete removal of specific systems, either surface-to-surface missiles, or nuclear artillery (less likely), from the stockpile. This could be linked to option (i) and perhaps made contingent on the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Eastern Europe: but we would need to consider the effect of such an approach on the Alliance's SNF arms control position.

iii) Preparations for arms control. Ministers could announce that the Alliance is preparing its position for SNF negotiations.

iv) Arms control. Ministers might amend the terms of the Comprehensive Concept decisions by offering to begin SNF negotiations on CFE signature rather than once implementation of a CFE agreement is underway. Such negotiations might encompass nuclear artillery (although there are verification problems) as well as surface-to-surface missiles but not air-delivered weapons.

v) A combination of the above.

5. In assessing what kind of initiative to take, the crucial consideration for us is to ensure that we can stay within the policy set out in the earlier papers on this subject - that is, a substantially reduced stockpile but with widespread basing including of TASM.

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6. On this test, bringing forward SNF arms control ((iv) above) looks very risky. It means altering within 12 months the consensus reached in the Comprehensive Concept. More important, it would risk launching a public debate on the merits of various arms control proposals while Two Plus Four talks are in progress and pan German elections are imminent. It would be difficult for the West to control the SNF agenda as we have done in CFE. Any arms control proposal from NATO which envisaged numbers of missiles or artillery above zero or which excluded air-delivered weapons from the negotiation would probably be rejected by the Soviet Union on the grounds of inequity; and would no doubt lead to counter-proposals for a more far-reaching regime involving constraints on air-delivered systems and constraints on modernisation. This is a problem which the Alliance will have to face at some stage, given its commitment to SNF negotiations once certain conditions are fulfilled. But to have to do so this year in parallel with the 2 + 4 talks would be hazardous.

7. By contrast, stockpile cuts ((i) above) conditional on CFE signature would be easier to accommodate. In combination with preparations for SNF arms control, it would show that the Alliance is responsive in the nuclear field to current political and military developments in Europe. To achieve the desired effect the reduction would need to be substantial - for example, a reduction of 1,000 warheads would be a 25% reduction in NATO's arsenal - and would need to be depicted as a first step in advance of SNF negotiations as set out in the Comprehensive Concept, and towards further stockpile reductions in future (perhaps towards the 1,000 warhead stockpile postulated in our earlier papers). As a unilateral measure it would not invite a Soviet counter-proposal (though it would put political pressure on the Russians to reduce their own nuclear stockpile in Europe). We might even consider going further and faster. This move, plus evidence that the Alliance was preparing for SNF negotiations in 1991 ((iii) above), would help Kohl and might dampen debate about the content of those negotiations. The Alliance could also invite the US Administration to cancel the FOTL programme before being forced to do so by the refusal of Congress to fund it. But we would need to consider carefully what effect this would have on the Alliance's SNF arms control position ((ii) above).

8. American thinking is now developing in ways which are likely to be compatible with the conclusions set out in our earlier papers. But if we are to influence their thinking on an initiative, we will need to move quickly. If, therefore, they approach us at official level about the idea of an initiative during 1990 to help inoculate German public opinion, we propose to be guided by paragraphs 3 to 7 above. The subject is in any case one which the Prime Minister may

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wish to discuss with President Bush when she sees him in April.

9. The views of other allies on these issues have probably not been thought through in detail. Nevertheless, at a meeting this month of NATO's High Level Group of officials there was general agreement on the increasing importance of longer range systems (and therefore TASM); the diminishing importance of nuclear artillery; and the scope for substantial reductions in the stockpile: all this is in line with the approach described in the Foreign and Defence Secretaries' earlier minute. This is not necessarily an indication of firm support at the political level for the widespread deployment of TASM in Europe, but is at least evidence that there is some agreement on the principles among defence officials.

10. The discussion at the Summit on Friday 30 March clarified the position with the Germans helpfully. At his meeting with the Defence Secretary, Dr Stoltenberg indicated a clear willingness to move towards TASM, but with the usual concerns that other European countries should accept basing too. It looks quite possible that we shall carry the Germans through, though it may be prudent in coming months to avoid forcing them into public positions.

Paper on Alternative Means of Ensuring Deterrence

11. As mentioned in the opening paragraph, I also enclose a paper approved by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries which addresses the issues raised in your letter of 1 February: essentially how we might maintain deterrence if there were no FOTL, and no TASM in Germany. It does so in the context of the accelerating pace of change in the military balance in Europe and on the assumption of no ground-launched nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The paper leads to certain conclusions:

i) the best outcome - and therefore our priority in this area - is to secure the deployment of TASM where it is most effective - on longer-range aircraft in Germany, Italy and the UK and if possible on other dual-capable aircraft in Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey. We should seek from the US agreement that this should be our key aim;

ii) having secured this agreement, we should seek Chancellor Kohl's acceptance of the importance of TASM deployment and encourage the US and France to do likewise. But we should not now seek a public commitment from him: to do so would be risky and almost certainly unattainable at least before the German elections and perhaps even after. Raising the issue too early might prejudice the possibility of ever achieving TASM deployment;

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iii) If Germany, and therefore probably other continental Allies, declined TASM deployment but retained nuclear bombs, our deterrent posture would be substantially weakened but deterrence in a recognisable form could be maintained;

iv) If Germany declined to take any nuclear weapons in peacetime, even if some other continental Allies continued to do so, some of our criteria (survivability and broad participation) would probably not be met satisfactorily: our deterrent posture would be significantly weaker than in (iii)

v) In the event that no nuclear weapons at all were present in normal peacetime circumstances in Germany, certain palliative measures might be worth considering in order to facilitate their deployment there in times of crisis or war;

vi) The deployment to Europe of US long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) is not a practical option, not least because the US would be most unlikely to agree to the forward deployment (and therefore increased vulnerability) of strategic nuclear systems. There would almost certainly be strong domestic opposition in the UK. With regard to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), a concept of operations is being produced for whatever SLCMs may be available for use by SACEUR at time of war. The assignment of additional and specific SLCMs to SACEUR for theatre use might be possible, although it is questionable whether the US would agree to such an option because of the constraints which it would impose on the tasking of the naval vessels which carry such weapons.

vii) In the scenario where nuclear weapons were no longer widely deployed in the Alliance, closer co-operation with the French in the sub-strategic nuclear field might be of value. Deploying some British nuclear-capable aircraft forward to French airfields would not add much to our target coverage of the Soviet Union and could be an expensive option. But it might be useful symbolic measure and conceivably of potential relevance to a conflict in the Central Region.

12. The Defence Secretary has seen this letter in draft and agrees. I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD), John Gieve (Treasury) and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

James,
Stephen Wall
(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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[This was
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agreed
in the
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE: THE LONGER TERM

1. The Foreign and Defence Secretaries' earlier minute and accompanying papers considered how to sustain nuclear deterrence in Europe against the background of the prospective CFE Treaty.

ASSUMPTIONS

2. This further paper examines additional options in the perspective of an even faster pace of change in Europe. It rests upon the premise of the following developments, in addition to the conclusion of a CFE treaty this year along the lines currently under negotiation:

(i) Agreement by the end of this year on the conditions for the unification of Germany;

(ii) Agreement by the Soviet Union, in that context, to withdraw all its forces from the former territory of the GDR by the end of a fixed period (which might, for illustrative purposes, be assumed to be around five years);

(iii) The withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by the end of 1991; and the probability (though this is less certain) that they would be withdrawn from Poland as well;

(iv) An understanding, also in the context of German unification, that there would be, following the CFE treaty, further negotiations about reductions in conventional force levels in Central Europe.

3. These premises involve a dramatic change in the strategic East/West force balance in Europe upon which NATO's requirements for nuclear deterrence have previously been calculated. The Soviet Union would retain formidable conventional forces on its own territory; and the possibility of a different, less welcome, leadership could never be discounted. But its capability for a surprise attack against Western Europe would be eliminated and it would only be capable of a conventional offensive with limited objectives. Moreover, uniquely in the Alliance's history, there

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would be a buffer zone of potentially friendly countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) between NATO's front line in Central Europe and any Soviet forces.

4. There would no doubt also be a parallel change in public and political attitudes in Western Europe to the requirements of deterrence. There would be many - perhaps even a majority in Germany following the assimilation of the GDR - who would argue that there was no longer any need for any nuclear weapons to be based on the continent of Europe; and that extended deterrence, if necessary at all, should be provided by US central strategic or off-shore systems.

5. The paper also assumes that there will be no chance of the deployment in the Alliance of any successor to LANCE; and that there will be political pressure for the withdrawal in the course of the 1990s of all the existing surface-to-surface missiles and all nuclear artillery shells in Europe. It might be possible to resist such pressure for a time. But beyond the short-term sub-strategic deterrence in Europe is likely to be provided by air-delivered systems alone.

CRITERIA FOR DETERRENCE

6. In these circumstances we will need to assess what are the minimum requirements for a sub-strategic force which is a credible link between conventional and US strategic nuclear forces. The yardsticks which have been applied up to now are the following:

- widespread participation in basing arrangements and/or nuclear delivery;
- military effectiveness;
- survivability against attack;
- capability to strike the Soviet Union; and
- range of response options.

All these criteria will continue to be relevant. But the extent to which NATO's sub-strategic capabilities should meet them in the future will need to reflect the changes in the politico/military balance in Europe.

OPTIONS

7. Against these criteria we have considered four options for the maintenance of an adequate sub-strategic nuclear contribution to NATO's deterrent capability. All assume that there would, within a few years, no longer be any ground-based (surface-to-surface missile or nuclear artillery) nuclear systems in Western Europe; and that the overall size of NATO's stockpile would be reduced to, at a maximum, around a thousand warheads. The scenarios are:

(a) A modernised air-delivered stockpile involving the deployment on German territory of a Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM);

(b) No TASM in Germany (or, perhaps, elsewhere in continental Europe) but nuclear bombs retained;

(c) The removal of all nuclear weapons from Germany but with existing or modernised air-delivered weapons deployed reasonably widely elsewhere in Europe;

(d) A situation in which there were no nuclear weapons in Western Europe other than in the UK and France.

8. We have also considered whether deterrence could be better sustained if US strategic air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were deployed in Europe; or if specific sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) were assigned to SACEUR for theatre use. We have concluded, however, that neither is likely to provide a satisfactory substitute if we can no longer sustain a land-based nuclear deterrent in Europe in the form we would wish. We think it most unlikely that the US would agree to the deployment to Europe of ALCMs, and the aircraft to carry them, given that these will be a key part of the US strategic deterrent in the 1990s. From the US point of view these strategic systems would be more vulnerable to attack if based

forward and would, in any case, lack credibility as sub-strategic weapons given their strategic identity.

9. SLCMs are valuable sub-strategic systems and NATO is developing a concept of operations for their use on the basis that the US would make some SLCMs available to SACEUR at time of war, although none are assigned to SACEUR on a permanent basis. The assignment of specific SLCMs to SACEUR on a permanent basis might enhance deterrence in Europe. But they are not an adequate substitute for ground-launched weapons: off-shore US systems, because of their lack of visibility, their lack of linkage with the potential theatre of operations, and absence from Europe, are a less satisfactory instrument for extended deterrence than weapons based on land. Moreover, too great an emphasis on the role of SLCMs might give an added excuse for some Allies to abandon their own contribution to nuclear deterrence on the grounds that SLCMs were a satisfactory, and politically less problematic, substitute. It is also questionable whether the US would agree to assign on a permanent basis specific SLCM carriers (as opposed to those that would already be available in European waters) to SACEUR at a time when US resources are likely to be thinly stretched.

OPTION ONE: TASM IN GERMANY

10. With the deployment of TASM in Germany (and therefore probably elsewhere) the Alliance would be able to count on deterrence in Europe for the remainder of the century even without ground-launched nuclear weapons. However, an SPD-led coalition in Germany would almost certainly refuse to accept the stationing on German territory of any new nuclear system such as TASM (if indeed they were prepared to accept the stationing of any nuclear weapons at all). A CDU-led government might be more open; but would be likely to be extremely cautious about committing itself. From one angle, TASM may be politically acceptable because its range would allow strikes against the only real threat - the Soviet Union - rather than the emerging East European democracies. But its long range also leads to the principal source of potential political difficulty in Germany: in an anti-nuclear atmosphere it will be argued, and not only by the Russians, that the long range of TASM means that it is a substitute

for INF missiles and is therefore a breach of faith with the INF Treaty.

11. Careful judgement would be needed therefore over the handling of the issue. As a first step, it would be useful to establish with the US and France that the deployment of TASM in Europe is our first priority: the Prime Minister might wish to speak to President Bush along these lines when they meet in Bermuda next month. That would prepare the ground for the US, the UK and France to persuade Chancellor Kohl privately of the importance which we place on the deployment of TASM. We understand that at a recent meeting Dr Stoltenberg and Herr Genscher agreed that they supported TASM, but (not unreasonably) they were unwilling to say so publicly this year. The French might be prepared to go along with such a joint approach provided that it was done discreetly. We might also seek from Chancellor Kohl public support for TASM. But it is doubtful if, even after the elections, any German leader would be willing - or able - to offer assurances on the deployment of TASM in seven or more years time, which would carry any weight at all. We would also need to be sure that an approach to the Germans did not raise the profile of TASM too early; a public dispute over TASM similar to that over FOTL would probably doom our chances of ever getting the system deployed.

OPTION TWO: NUCLEAR BOMBS BUT NO TASM IN GERMANY

12. Under this scenario Germany would decline to accept the deployment on its territory of a TASM, but would be willing to retain nuclear bombs for use on German/US/UK aircraft. Other European countries, such as the Netherlands and Italy would be prepared to take TASMs, as would the UK. In terms of deterrence, this option would not be substantially worse than Option One: there would still be enough dual-capable aircraft equipped with TASM to strike a range of targets in the Soviet Union. But we regard as slight the likelihood that other European countries would allow TASM deployment if Germany did not. If TASM could not be deployed, other than in the UK, NATO's deterrence posture would be substantially weakened even if our continental Allies kept nuclear bombs.

OPTION THREE: NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY BUT STILL DEPLOYED ELSEWHERE IN THE ALLIANCE

13. It is possible that the German Government will at some point ask its allies to withdraw all nuclear weapons from its territory. The effect of such a decision on those others among the European allies who currently allow the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil is difficult to predict. It could well lead to a general disposition to shed the nuclear burden (see Option Four below). But it is conceivable that the Netherlands and Italy, together perhaps with Turkey, might be prepared to hold the line.

14. If they did so, then some of the criteria for deterrence set out in paragraph 6 could be met. But active participation in the Alliance's nuclear strategy would be reduced to a minority of Allies which would diminish the sharing of risks and burdens on which the credibility of the Alliance's strategy rests. In addition, the survivability of the remaining nuclear forces would be dangerously reduced: of NATO's present total of 20 European strike bases, 7 are in Germany and would be presumably lost to the Alliance in their current role. Some palliative measures would however be possible.

OPTION FOUR: NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE EXCEPT IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE

15. It is more likely that, if Germany declined to have nuclear weapons deployed on its territory, other European allies would follow suit. If the only nuclear weapons in Western Europe were those of the US and UK based in the UK, and those of France, then extended nuclear deterrence in its present form would have disappeared. We would no longer be able to strike from within the theatre anything like the variety of targets which we have thought necessary until now. Apart from the French nuclear deterrent, NATO's forces would be over-reliant on a handful of strike bases in the UK.

16. In such circumstances we could pursue the palliatives in para 19 below. But these measures would be accompanied by a change in NATO's nuclear strategy. Flexible response, even under the most

liberal interpretation, makes little sense unless nuclear forces are adequately survivable, with wide participation in the provision of bases and delivery facilities. In such circumstances, it might be less credible that the US and the UK would be willing to use nuclear weapons in defence of their allies. Indeed the willingness of the United States to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe at all might be called into question. The role of nuclear weapons would be of a more "existential" kind: it might be argued that they would, by their physical presence, constitute a cautionary and thus stabilising element in politico/military decision making, but their deterrent effect would be questionable.

ASSESSMENT AND PALLIATIVES

17. Even the most attractive of the four options would result in a deterrent which did not meet the criteria set out in paragraph 6 as satisfactorily as our present stockpile. In particular, reliance on air-delivered weapons alone substantially decreases the survivability on the ground of our nuclear forces and depends entirely on the ability of the weapons to penetrate Soviet air defences. But from the viewpoint of a would-be aggressor the threat posed by any of the options would still be very great as long as sea-based forces (carrier-launched aircraft, SLCMs and SLBMS assigned to SACEUR) remained and were tied in to the US and UK strategic deterrents.

18. What is critical under any option is that a would-be attacker should not be able to assume that nuclear weapons would not, in the last resort, be used. The credibility of nuclear use is much increased the more allies participate actively in nuclear deployments. Failing that, it is important that they should at least support Alliance nuclear policy in peacetime.

19. There are a number of palliative measures which, under the four options, we could adopt:

- Encourage the US to maintain modern, long-range dual-capable aircraft in Europe. If, because of budget pressure, some savings have to be made, we should persuade the US Administration to station

aircraft in the US, dual-based and committed to Europe in time of war, rather than withdraw them altogether.

- In respect of countries, particularly Germany, who were not willing to allow nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, we should try to negotiate arrangements for the forward deployment of nuclear weapons at time of crisis. For maximum conviction, these arrangements could include maintenance of nuclear weapons storage facilities and a commitment that the dual-capable aircraft of the countries concerned would remain certified for nuclear use if needed.

- Maintain and improve plans for the dispersal of aircraft at time of war, perhaps across national borders.

ANGLO/FRENCH CO-OPERATION


20. Under any of these scenarios, but particularly under Options Three and Four, nuclear co-ordination with the French would become even more important. Sustaining public support for nuclear weapons would be less difficult if we and the French were seen to be in harness with the US. As the share of the theatre nuclear burden carried by the US declines under any of these eventualities the logic of co-ordinating residual nuclear forces becomes more compelling. A deterrent based more heavily on a European component might be politically more acceptable in Europe. But a solely Anglo/French deterrent without the commitment of US theatre and strategic forces would be a very poor substitute for our present arrangements.

21. The form which a co-ordinated Anglo/French/US nuclear deterrent would take, and how it would fit into NATO is difficult to assess. As far as the Anglo/French legs are concerned there would need to be co-ordination of targeting and employment policy which would need much greater flexibility than either we or the French have accepted so far. Arrangements for greater use of each others facilities, notably dispersal of aircraft to each others airfields if necessary, would be an important political signal and desirable from a practical perspective (mainly because it would offer greater

survivability rather than wider target coverage). Some co-ordination of SSBN patrols might be possible. But it would be necessary to achieve this without sacrificing the independence to which both we and the French attach so much importance. Procurement of an Anglo-French TASM would be an important symbol of our commitment to closer nuclear links, but in itself would not necessarily lead to the deeper operational co-operation which may be necessary in future.

DEFENCE : Arms Control

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PS TO PRIME MINISTER
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MY TELNO 338: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE

SUMMARY

1. FRG INTEND TO PRESS BEFORE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP IN MAY FOR NATO TO START PREPARING FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS.

DETAIL

2. DREHER, HEAD OF THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT'S NATO DEPARTMENT TOLD FIRST SECRETARY (POL-MIL) ON 20 MARCH THAT THE FRG WOULD PRESS FOR NATO TO START PREPARING ITS POSITION FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) IN EARLY MAY. THIS WOULD PUT THE WEST IN A BETTER POSITION IN THE 2 PLUS 4 TO DEFLECT SOVIET PROPOSALS TO LIMIT NUCLEAR FORCES IN OR AROUND GERMANY.

3. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, DREHER SAW THE SNF NEGOTIATIONS AS A MEANS OF AGREEING NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURES IN EUROPE, INCLUDING LAND-, AIR- AND SEA-BASED SYSTEMS, FOR THE NEXT 15 YEARS OR SO. BRINKLEY REFERRED TO THE MORE LIMITED MANDATE IN THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT AND ARGUED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION A HANDLE ON NATO'S AIR-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS, PARTICULARLY IF NATO NO LONGER HAD LAND-BASED SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. DREHER DISMISSED THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT POINT AND SUGGESTED THAT AIR-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PUBLIC IF THEY WERE AN AGREED RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS.

4. DURING THE UK-FRG DEFENCE STAFF TALKS HERE THIS WEEK, GENERAL NAUMANN HAS REITERATED THAT THE GERMANS WANT DEFENCE MINISTERS TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT AT THE NPG ABOUT SNF NEGOTIATIONS, AND POSSIBLY ALSO ABOUT UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS.

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 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
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MO 25/3/4S

7th February 1990

COP 19/2.

Dear Charles,

PROLIFERATION

You asked for some figures for the Prime Minister's forthcoming speech to the Young Conservatives on the number of countries that might acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. I attach a note, which also includes the classified background since that might be of interest to you.

The figures mentioned in paragraph one are lower than those quoted elsewhere, for example, by US sources. Our advice is, however, to use lower figures which we could defend readily if necessary rather than the higher ones based on more speculative intelligence. Whether 15 or 20, the figures are significant. The point about international trade in ballistic missiles is important. During a conversation with the Defence Secretary last weekend, Mr Scowcroft commented that the Chinese would sell anything to anyone.

Yours sincerely

Simon Webb

(S WEBB)
 Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
 No 10 Downing Street

NUCLEAR WEAPON AND INF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION BY THE YEAR 2000

1. (U) By the year 2000, at the worst, 15 countries (including USSR and USA) could have nuclear weapons and some 14 (including USSR and USA (1)) could have INF (500-5,500 km) range ballistic missiles. The number of countries with INF range missiles could be even greater if international trade in such weapons increases.

BACKGROUND

Nuclear Weapons

2. (U) The 5 countries which have declared that they have nuclear weapons are the USA, the USSR, the UK, China and France. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974.
3. (S) We believe that Israel, South Africa and Pakistan have either nuclear weapons or the components from which nuclear weapons may be assembled in a very short time.
4. (S) The nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iraq suggest that they may be working towards developing nuclear weapons but we have no direct evidence for a weapons programme itself.
5. (S) Four countries - South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina and Brazil - have the capability to develop nuclear weapons by the year 2000, but we have no evidence of such programmes.

INF Range Ballistic Missiles

6. (U) In addition to the USA and USSR (1), France, China, Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia already possess deployed ballistic missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km.
7. (C) By the year 2000 four more countries - India, North Korea, Pakistan and South Africa - are likely to achieve the same range (or more) if their current R&D programmes proceed unhindered.
8. (C) By the year 2000, countries such as Brazil, Egypt and Argentina are possible candidates.
9. (S) The quantity of trade in missiles will be a significant factor, although it may become subject to international agreements. China sold its CSS-2 missile to Saudi Arabia and has three new missiles under development for export. Reportedly, it has promised not to sell in the Middle East.

(1) The INF Treaty forbids deployment of land-based INF missiles by the USSR and USA





10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 February 1990

**NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE AND NEGOTIATIONS
ON SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES**

The Prime Minister has read the joint minute by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries covering papers by officials on NATO's Nuclear Stockpile in the 1990s and Negotiations on Short Range Nuclear Forces. She has not dissented from the conclusions, although she has made clear her continuing objections to a negotiated third zero on surface-to-surface missiles. She certainly agrees that we should not prod these issues to life in NATO before we have to, since we shall all too likely get the wrong answer. But in addition to the points in the conclusions, she would like us to consider whether we can agree a joint Anglo/US (or preferably Anglo/US/French) position on deployment of TASM in Germany, which we would put forcefully to the Germans after their elections. She would also like to have an idea of what alternatives would be available to us, in the event we cannot get either FOTL or agreement to deploy TASM in Germany. Should we ask the Americans to assign specific SLCM and ALCM forces to SACEUR (the ALCM would presumably have to be based in the UK)? Should we also be exploring with the French whether cooperation over procurement of TASM could be extended to cooperation over its deployment, so that in times of heightened tension we could deploy our aircraft and their weapons forward in France? These are very tentative suggestions. But the Prime Minister takes the view that the prospects both for FOTL and deployment of TASM in Germany are sufficiently bleak to warrant some serious thought about alternatives.

It would be helpful to have views on these points. The Prime Minister does not see any need at the moment for Ministerial discussion, but the subject might be added to the agenda of the next MISC7.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (H.M. Treasury) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(CHARLES POWELL)

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

One of the tasks set by the Chequers Seminar last September was to consider the future of NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe, and what outcome to SNF negotiations might be acceptable.

The attached joint minute by the Foreign and Defence Secretaries covers two papers on this subject. The minute itself summarises the conclusions of the papers. In essence they say that NATO really does need a modernised LANCE if we are to maintain an effective deterrent in Europe. But the prospects of getting it are poor, and we could get by with air-delivered nuclear weapons (TASM), provided the Germans agree to their deployment in Germany (which must now be in question). Meanwhile there is scope for considerable reductions in NATO's total nuclear stockpile in Europe from the present 3,900 warheads to somewhere around 1,000. Nuclear artillery is pretty much redundant except perhaps in Turkey. Indeed the best way to 'sell' the German public on deploying TASM is to combine it with a substantial overall reduction in warheads (although there is always the danger they will take the cherry without the cake).

When it comes to SNF negotiations, we shall have a very weak hand to play if the Germans refuse to modernise LANCE. Without it, we don't really have any leverage. The Russians will know that LANCE will just wither on the vine and they won't need to reduce their SNF to obtain its removal. Either they just stand pat: or they demand that NATO reduce other sorts of nuclear weapons in return for their dismantling their SNF. Moreover there are great technical problems which make it virtually impossible to verify SNF ceilings. One could argue in these circumstances that it is actually better to go for another zero solution, because at least that ensures we get rid of the Russian SNF missiles, without our having to give away other sorts of nuclear weapon.

The conclusion is that there is no point in our raising these issues before the German election: but the best hope thereafter is to drop LANCE modernisation in return for German agreement to deployment of modernised TASM, in the context of an overall reduction in the nuclear stockpile to 1,000 warheads.

Some questions which need to be considered are:

- are we are being too defeatist in writing off a Follow-on to LANCE (FOTL)? At least it must be right not to address the issue until we have to, ie. 1991/2. A lot can change in twelve months - in either direction;
- alternatively are we being too sanguine in believing that German public opinion (and therefore a German government) will accept there is a distinction between FOTL and TASM? Won't they just say they don't want any nuclear weapons on German soil?
- if the Germans won't have them, who else will? Apart from us, the prospects are not too good. The Italians would surely melt away if the Germans do: and the French won't accept American nuclear weapons on their soil;
- in that event, we would be without ground-based American nuclear weapons on mainland Europe (and the Americans have still not committed any SLCMs to SACEUR). Do we have to change NATO's strategy? Or can we provide an Anglo-French substitute for American weapons, by collaborating on TASM carried by French and British aircraft based in France?

I would not disagree with the conclusions of the joint minute. Certainly we should not prod the issue to life in NATO before we have to, since we shall all too likely get the wrong answer. But we might use this year rather more actively than is suggested in the joint minute:

- to try to get a joint Anglo/US (or preferably Anglo/US/French) position on deployment of TASM, to be put forcefully to the Germans after the elections;

- to consider alternatives in the event we cannot get either FOTL or agreement to deploy TASM in Germany. The only possibility which I can devise is to persuade the Americans to assign specific SLCM and ALCM forces to SACEUR (the SLCM of course at sea, the ALCM based in the UK - although that would mean having nuclear-armed B52s here).

- to explore with the French whether co-operation over procurement of TASM could be extended to co-operation over its deployment, so that at least in times of heightened tension we could deploy our aircraft forward in France.

It would be possible to have a discussion in MISC 7: but I am not sure it would get us much further forward at this stage, and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries do not ask for one.

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

31 January 1990

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PRIME MINISTER

Nuclear Deterrence in Europe and Negotiations on Short
Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)

1. In the Comprehensive Concept adopted at their Summit in May, Allied Heads of Government agreed that land-, air- and sea-based nuclear weapons would be needed in Europe for as long as could be foreseen; that negotiations leading to partial reductions in US and Soviet short range nuclear missiles could begin once a Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement was being implemented; and that the question of a follow-on to LANCE (FO TL) would be dealt with in 1992 in the light of overall security developments.

2. Following the discussion at your seminar on 30 September on the implications of a CFE agreement for NATO strategy, FCO and MOD officials have considered how we should approach the future of NATO's nuclear weapons in Europe, including what outcomes to SNF negotiations might be acceptable. They have done so on the assumption that:

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- there is a high likelihood that a CFE Treaty will be signed in 1990 and that the conditions for initiating negotiations on short range nuclear forces will therefore be met not long thereafter;
 - the CFE agreement and events in Eastern Europe will undermine public support, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, for the presence of nuclear weapons, at any rate in such large numbers, on European territory;
 - the public will perceive a continuing diminution of the threat posed to Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact.
3. The results of this work are contained in two attached papers on "NATO's Nuclear Stockpile in the 1990s" and "Negotiations on Short Range Nuclear Forces". Their conclusions, which we both endorse, are in essence the following:-
- The deployment of a follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) would give NATO a more flexible, survivable and effective deterrent. A strong presentational case can be made for it as a component of the most cost-effective theatre nuclear weapons package available (in terms both of stockpile numbers and delivery system costs). Nevertheless, the prospects for deploying FOTL are poor;

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- Failure to secure the deployment of a FOTL would weaken extended deterrence in several ways. But we could still sustain a credible nuclear deterrent without FOTL. An adequate number of air-delivered weapons, including a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) would still be able to strike the necessary targets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Such a force structure would depend crucially on the willingness of German public opinion a decade hence to accept the deployment of TASM, which will anyway be the most important system in our theatre armoury from the mid-1990s onwards;

- The overall size of NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe (excluding sea-based weapons) in the 1990s can and should be significantly reduced. It would be possible to sustain flexible response after CFE with a stockpile including some FOTL and TASM of around 1,000 warheads (by comparison with the 3,900 which will be available after INF Treaty implementation). Such a reduced stockpile would offer the best chance of securing decisions to deploy FOTL and TASM, as well as sustaining public support for nuclear deterrence generally. Lesser, but still very substantial, reductions would be possible even if we could not deploy FOTL.

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- The optimal composition of such a stockpile would include a modest number of FOTL warheads (say 300) and 700 or so air-delivered weapons including a reasonable proportion of tactical air-to-surface missiles. The retention of some nuclear artillery, though perhaps desirable in the Southern Region, would not be vital.

- The technical difficulties in SNF arms control are formidable. It is possible to envisage outcomes which would be compatible with the maintenance by NATO of an adequate number of short range nuclear missiles (eg a regime of equal ceilings of 300-500 missiles a side); but there would be little point in seeking to negotiate on the basis of such an outcome unless there was an adequate assurance that the Alliance would deploy a successor to LANCE within the permitted numbers. If the Soviet Union came to believe that the Alliance would not introduce FOTL, Western negotiating leverage would disappear, and the Russians would press hard for reductions in other Western nuclear systems as the price for cuts in Warsaw Pact short range missiles. (We understand informally that the United States are now considering again whether the life of LANCE itself can be further prolonged.)

- It is an open question whether, in the absence of any adequate prior assurance about the deployment of a successor to LANCE, a negotiated third zero on all surface-to-surface missiles would be better than allowing NATO's current LANCE force to wither away without replacement.

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5. Any consideration of possible SNF arms control negotiating approaches cannot therefore be divorced from the nature of eventual decisions about the composition and modernisation of NATO's stockpile. In an ideal world NATO's arms control proposals should reflect decisions taken about stockpile re-structuring and modernisation. Such a parallel approach is however likely to be difficult to achieve. The present German Government will, almost certainly, decline to involve itself in any serious discussion of SNF modernisation before the Federal German elections in December. It may however press for some consideration within the Alliance of possible approaches to SNF arms control during 1990.

6. Discussions about an SNF negotiating position will make little sense if the future of LANCE remains completely up in the air. We cannot reopen the modernisation issue in advance of the German elections without harming Kohl's position as well as the prospects for FOTL deployment. Our tactical aim therefore should be to try to ensure that any discussion of SNF arms control within the Alliance is kept to a technical level - for example, discussion of verification - until the German election has taken place. Whether it will be possible to achieve this depends largely on the US. The Administration might conclude that more substantive discussion was needed to help Kohl electorally. In addition Congress might in 1990 tie future FOTL funding

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to resolution of the arms control and modernisation issues. But although the Americans may agree to some ventilation of SNF arms control in NATO before the German elections, they are in no mood to see the issue raised too soon. They rebuffed a German attempt to discuss it bilaterally with them in the summer in strong terms.

7. Thereafter, much will depend on the German elections. If they result is an SPD led government, or a government in which the SPD are represented, then realistically we would need to accept that, short of some major upheaval in Eastern Europe, the prospects of securing the deployment of a follow-on system to LANCE are zero. In that situation we should concentrate our energies on:

(a) preserving deterrence by other means - essentially through the air-delivered stand-off missile but with some reliance on free-fall bombs, off-shore SLCMs and, perhaps, nuclear artillery;

(b) trying to extract as high a price as possible, in terms of removal of Warsaw Pact systems, for the disappearance of LANCE in the mid-1990s while resisting any extension of SNF arms control to other theatre nuclear weapons.

8. In the event that the present coalition returns to power, the prospects for deploying a FOTL would still be very poor, particularly if the situation continues to

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evolve along the present lines in Eastern Europe. But under the Comprehensive Concept no decisions on SNF modernisation fall to be taken until after the German elections. And, as long as FOTL remains on the Alliance's agenda, it draws the fire away from TASM as well as giving us some negotiating leverage with the Russians. Our tactics for 1990 should therefore be:

(a) to work towards a minimum force of land-based nuclear missiles in Western Europe as part of a greatly reduced stockpile of about 1,000 land-based warheads;

(b) to give priority to maximising our chances of securing German acceptance of the deployment in the FRG of a TASM whose role in ensuring deterrence is more crucial.

There may well come a point at which these two objectives become incompatible. At that stage we would need to consider abandoning FOTL in order to avoid a prolonged dispute which would undermine the chances of securing TASM.

RECOMMENDATIONS

9. We invite you to note the following main conclusions and recommendations for the short to medium term:

(i) We should press ahead with studies of UK TASM options on the basis already agreed;

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(ii) The prospects for deployment of FOTL are poor. The only hope of achieving it would be to portray FOTL, and TASM, as part of a drastically reduced stockpile of about 1,000 warheads which could be represented to the public as a real minimum deterrent which also takes account of the changed political and military circumstances which we are likely to face in the 1990s.

(iii) We should not reopen the modernisation issue before the German elections, not least because the German coalition would be obliged for electoral reasons to oppose it (although there is a danger that the US Congress will force the issue as a condition for the continued financing of the FOTL programme).

(iv) But we should make clear that it makes no sense for the Alliance to stake out a firm position on SNF negotiations before we know whether FOTL will be deployed. No clarity on this can be expected before the German Federal elections in December. Although some preparatory work on SNF arms control in NATO is probably unavoidable in 1990 - and could help Kohl's electoral chances - we should try to ensure that substantive discussion in NATO of an SNF arms control mandate, or of a NATO proposal under it, does not take place until after the German elections.

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(v) There are possible outcomes to an SNF negotiation (eg a limit of 3 - 500 missiles a side) which might be technically viable and which would be compatible with the maintenance of deterrence. But the merit of such outcomes is that they preserve a short range missile capability. Other options would have to be considered if it turned out that we could not deploy FOTL.

(vi) Our tactic should be to ensure that the arms control and modernisation strands of NATO policy are brought together again after the German elections.

(vii) Officials should discuss the future of NATO's European stockpile and SNF negotiations with the Americans this spring.

(viii) As separately proposed, we should develop our dialogue with the French on sustaining nuclear deterrence in Europe.

10. We are copying this minute and the attachments to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Robin Butler.

(TOM KING)

(DOUGLAS HURD)

NATO'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN THE 1990s

The Rationale for Theatre Nuclear Weapons

1. NATO's strategy of flexible response is designed to deter war by confronting a potential aggressor with incalculable risks out of proportion to the possible gain. In the last resort these risks rest on the intolerable consequences of a strategic attack, but theatre nuclear weapons play a key role in two ways. First, they give a capability for selective, restrained use which by its implicit threat of escalation to more massive strikes gives, in peacetime, credibility to nuclear deterrence and in war a means of restoring deterrence. Secondly, by being based in Europe with support and participation by European allies, they give a NATO - particularly a European NATO - identity to what otherwise might be perceived as a solely US deterrent capability. This is important to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence.

2. Selective use, although directed at military targets for maximum effect, would be intended to induce the Warsaw Pact to take a political decision - to withdraw - rather than to inflict defeat in a classical military sense. Ideally the theatre deterrent should consist of a diversity of systems which will have the essential characteristics of range, survivability and the ability to penetrate defences. In addition, by their wide deployment, they should demonstrate the collective resolve of the Alliance to resort to the use of nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Current Stockpile

3. Disregarding weapons which will, by 1991, have been withdrawn under the INF Treaty, the NATO land-based stockpile in Europe consists of about 3,900 nuclear warheads (bombs, short range missiles and nuclear artillery shells). Mainly because of the continuing modernisation of nuclear artillery shells, this will fall to 3,600 in 1991. In addition, there are about 700 sea-based warheads (SLBMs and bombs) which may be augmented by US sea-launched cruise missiles. This broadly meets our deterrence requirements as

currently conceived, but with a significant shortfall in our ability to threaten targets in the Soviet Union with land-based systems.

4. In order to sustain stockpile effectiveness and address this shortfall, we plan to introduce two new nuclear systems in the 1990s:

- a Follow On To LANCE (FOTL). Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) have advantages of survivability and penetrativity, and the increased range of a LANCE successor will allow it to strike targets from close to the battlefield to deep within the Warsaw Pact. While air-delivered weapons could reach the same targets, the deployment of a SSM complicates Warsaw Pact defensive planning and therefore bolsters deterrence; a SSM is also more cost-effective given the greater cost of an aircraft as the delivery vehicle.
- A Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM). As Soviet air defences improve, a stand-off air-delivered nuclear missile becomes more important. It would also restore coverage of some targets in the Soviet Union which will be beyond our reach once the INF Treaty has been fully implemented. The ability to hold at risk targets in the Soviet Union is of crucial importance in order to prevent any Soviet perception that their territory could be immune from nuclear attack in the event of a war in Europe. FOTL will have insufficient range and thus, while the deployment of both remains our objective, the greater priority applies to TASM.

The Case for Stockpile Reductions

5. The stockpile size needs to reflect the two prime functions of theatre nuclear forces - selective use and a European-based contribution to overall nuclear deterrence. For the former, it is hard to conceive of a selective strike option requiring more than 100-150 weapons. Even allowing for an appropriate deployment to ensure availability when and where needed and a contingency against attrition losses, the total required would remain in the hundreds.

But the total requirement for nuclear weapons in Europe as defined by SACEUR has been driven by the need for a European-based contribution to overall nuclear deterrence. This has been expressed as a theatre contribution to General Nuclear Response, although the resulting stockpile would allow any conceivable selective strike option. Thus SACEUR has calculated the requirement by assessing the number of mobile and fixed targets he judges should be held at risk (some 5-10% of the total) by theatre nuclear weapons. But there is tacit SHAPE acknowledgement that the basis for this assessment is essentially subjective; and, from a practical point of view, theatre weapons would make little difference to the outcome of a US strategic exchange. An assessment based on targets relevant to selective use would produce a much lower figure which, in deterrence terms, would still be perceived by the Warsaw Pact as an intolerable threat and adequate evidence of European NATO participation.

6. In this regard there are particular grounds for reducing the number of short range weapons designed for use against land battle targets (some two-thirds of the current and projected stockpiles). While these have a deterrent role against massed conventional forces, it is not one which demands this degree of emphasis nor are strikes on battlefield targets likely to figure strongly in selective use actions designed to influence Soviet political decisions. Moreover, it is the perception that there are too many short-range systems with a potential for nuclear war-fighting which alarms many Europeans. In his private guidance to his staff SACEUR recognised this, seeing his 1988 stockpile requirement assessment as essentially an interim step towards a lower ceiling, more properly reflecting the theme emerging from the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group at Montebello in 1983.

7. Two further and positive incentives for stockpile reductions also apply:

- NATO's requirement for theatre nuclear weapons is based on a sufficiency for deterrence, not the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. But that is not understood by the public. Stockpile reductions, which can be justified on their merits,

will be helpful in maintaining public support for nuclear deterrence post-CFE and at a time of improving East/West relations.

- The potential opposition to the deployment of any new nuclear weapons, particularly FOTL, on German soil is formidable. While there is some evidence that developing Soviet thinking on minimal deterrence may be less opposed to the idea of theatre nuclear weapons, it remains that if we are to have any chance of bringing the German Government to accept in 1992 a LANCE successor system we will need to find ways of making its introduction less politically objectionable. To portray it as a key element in a substantially reduced and re-shaped stockpile would be helpful. It is doubtful whether even this approach would persuade the German Government to accept the deployment of a new ground-launched system in the FRG, but without it the prospects for a LANCE successor would be non-existent.
8. The deployment of FOTL and TASM will in any case reduce the requirement for nuclear weapons in the 1990s. The improved range and survivability of modern weapons mean that fewer are needed to meet any given objective, reducing SACEUR's projected requirement for 1991 from 3,600 to 3,000. Furthermore, without any change to SACEUR's methodology relating weapon requirements to opposing forces, a CFE agreement will reduce the requirement still further, particularly in regard to short-range weapons, to around 2,200 in the early 90s and (assuming FOTL and TASM deployment) around 1,600 in the late 90s. A further technically and presentationally feasible refinement to that methodology, relating it more to selective use options, would point towards a further reduction to around 1,000 warheads.
9. Reductions of this order will help us to persuade the public that appropriate account has been taken of changed international circumstances, while still presenting an adequate European-based contribution to deterrence. But it will be important to pursue this objective in conjunction with SACEUR, in order to construct a rigorous political and military rationale for a revised stockpile

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rather than risk an unstructured debate leading to proposals for a stockpile so low as to lack credibility. (The work underway in NATO's High Level Group - in which SHAPE participates - has an important role to play here). If this approach is successful, and informal discussion with UK staff at SHAPE is encouraging, it could produce a stockpile which was both a true minimum deterrent and politically acceptable.

The Options for a Restructured Theatre Nuclear Force

10. We have therefore considered a number of options for a reduced and restructured nuclear stockpile in Europe for the late 1990s. We judge some 1,000 land-based warheads would be sufficient to meet NATO's deterrence needs but only if the stockpile included a modest number of warheads on new ground-based missiles (FOTL) and a more substantial number of air-delivered weapons including some stand-off missiles (TASM). Such a force, in addition to our sea-based weapons, would be capable of fulfilling any selective strike requirement which we can foresee, as well as constituting a sufficient European-based contribution to the Alliance's deterrence posture. Close study would need to be made of the survivability, flexibility and geographical spread - given the need for maximum Alliance participation in nuclear burdensharing.

11. Whether nuclear artillery should be included in such a stockpile is an open question. The US, and particularly the US Army, can be expected to quote intelligence evidence that the Russians believe nuclear artillery does have a specific deterrent value because it inhibits the massing of Warsaw Pact forces. To the extent that its range gives artillery no other role than to present an unambiguous threat to the leading edge of enemy forces, this argument has some validity; but other systems offer this capability and, undoubtedly, the short range of artillery, the near certainty that if used it would detonate on NATO territory, and the problem therefore of including it in selective use for political purposes, all combine to make artillery politically the least attractive of NATO's nuclear systems, particularly in Germany and Benelux, and practically the least useful. It can be argued that on a thinner

post-CFE battlefield the limited range of nuclear artillery would make it an ineffective weapon whose role could be comfortably subsumed by a surface-to-surface missile. In Greece and Turkey, where short-range missiles are not and will not be deployed, there is a deterrent argument for retaining artillery and we should encourage these countries to retain a residual capability of some 100 nuclear shells in addition to nuclear bombs. In summary, our preferred stockpile would contain about 300 new warheads for a FOTL, 600 air delivered bombs and stand-off missiles and a residue of 100 artillery shells.

12. We have also considered the scenarios which could develop if we fail to secure the deployment of a LANCE successor system in the mid-1990s and therefore lose any short range missile capability. Since the prospects for retaining nuclear artillery anywhere in NATO Europe would then be poor, our theatre-based deterrent would rest on air- and sea-delivered weapons. This would be a second best option. A nuclear deterrent whose land-based component comprised only air-launched weapons would lack diversity and the survivability and penetrativity offered by mobile ground-launched missile systems. Nevertheless, extended deterrence and flexible response would be sustainable: bombs and stand-off missiles could still hold at risk the necessary targets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and a stockpile of rather more than 1,000 such weapons would probably be sufficient. But this would place even greater emphasis on the improved range and flexibility of TASM as well as on enhancement to airfield and aircraft survivability.

13. The most damaging scenarios would be those emerging from a situation where a failure to deploy FOTL then developed into serious opposition to a TASM. The United States plan to deploy their TASM (SRAM (T)) on American aircraft in Europe and it is envisaged that aircraft of other allies (notably Germany and Italian Tornados) would also be equipped with the US TASM, with the usual custodial arrangements for the warheads. British Tornados both in the UK and FRG would be equipped with a UK TASM carrying a British warhead. Air-delivered weapons have hitherto been less politically controversial, but it is not difficult to conceive of growing opposition over the 5 to 6 years to the first US deployment,

particularly in Germany, and encouraged by intelligent Warsaw Pact propaganda.

14. There are several possible outcomes of varying degrees of gravity:

- the European allies might agree to the deployment on their territory of TASM for use on US and UK aircraft alone, while retaining nuclear bombs for delivery by their own aircraft. Deterrence could be sustained;

- the European allies might refuse to allow any TASM on their territory, although retaining nuclear bombs - thus confining TASM deployment to the US and UK alone. Although tolerable, this would begin to sharpen the focus undesirably on the US and UK as the only threat to Soviet territory;

- any further move, for example to remove all US warheads from the FRG and hence probably from other continental allies, would have grave consequences and would seriously undermine the credibility of flexible response and US extended deterrence. A fundamental re-examination of NATO strategy would be required in which French and British nuclear forces might play a more prominent role. It is not inconceivable that Anglo-French collaboration on a TASM, and the attraction that might have in European terms, could have some relevance in these circumstances.

Conclusions

15. The prospects for the deployment of FOTL in Western Europe in the 1990s are very poor. They will be non-existent unless FOTL can be portrayed as part of a substantially reduced stockpile which takes account of the post-CFE environment. Such a substantial reduction in the size of the European nuclear stockpile to a level of around 1,000 can in any case be justified in deterrence terms.

16. Failure to deploy FOTL could still be tolerable in deterrence

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terms. But if accompanied by a prolonged row in NATO, it might prejudice the deployment of an air-delivered stand-off weapon. Non-deployment of a TASM could have grave consequences. At the least, the credibility of a deterrent based only on bombs and sea-based weapons would be diminished; at worst, the current basis of our nuclear defence - flexible response and extended deterrence - could be fatally impaired. This might lead to a much greater emphasis on French and UK forces in European deterrence.

NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF)

1. At their Summit on 29 - 30 May Allied Heads of State and Government agreed that "once implementation of a (CFE) agreement is underway, the United States, in consultation with the Allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a partial reduction of American and Soviet land-based missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels."

2. This paper considers how SNF negotiations might be tackled on the lines of the Comprehensive Concept, but also whether there are circumstances in which other negotiating options would be worth looking at; and what would be the most desirable outcome from a British perspective. It starts from the assumption that a CFE agreement will probably be signed this year; and that as the German election in December approaches there will be growing pressure from the FRG at least to show that the Alliance is preparing an SNF negotiating position.

General Aims

3. Our primary aim in SNF negotiations should be to ensure that they do not prejudice the maintenance of the nuclear stockpile in Europe of around 1,000 warheads which we judge necessary to fulfil deterrence. In particular, negotiations should not indirectly prejudice the deployment of TASM, which will be the most important theatre nuclear system for the future. A second, and very much subsidiary, negotiating aim should be to reduce the current disparity in the Warsaw Pact's favour in short range surface-to-surface missiles in Europe which, apart from their obvious nuclear capability, also pose a conventional and chemical threat to forward NATO air bases and command and communications centres.

The Negotiations

4. The negotiations will present multiple difficulties, both because of their unusual technical complexity and because the Soviet Union and the Allies have conflicting objectives. Nevertheless, we

are committed to them. It might be argued that a stalemate over negotiations on SNF missiles could be our best assurance against a slippery slope which led to further negotiations on nuclear artillery or air-delivered systems. But if we encounter an early show-stopper - such as verification or unwillingness of the Soviet Union to focus on surface-to-surface missiles alone - there will be great pressure within the Alliance to seek a new approach, involving, for example, zero options or the inclusion of other theatre nuclear forces. Indeed, it is hard to envisage others agreeing to the deployment of any new theatre systems unless SNF arms control has been seriously tested. So it is in our interest to try to make the negotiations work. Furthermore, a successful negotiation which established ceilings above zero for short range missiles would legitimise their presence in Europe and could establish a floor as well as a ceiling on their numbers. This might make a decision to deploy a successor to LANCE easier.

The Characteristics of SNF missile systems

5. There are a number of reasons why negotiation of verifiable equal ceilings of SNF missile systems would be technically difficult.

(i) There is no single obvious unit of account. The elements which might be treaty limited include:

- launchers
- missiles
- nuclear warheads.

(ii) Nuclear warheads for these weapons are almost certainly unverifiable: they are small, easily transported and relatively easy to conceal. We have no accurate estimate of the number of such Soviet warheads.

(iii) The Warsaw Pact systems involved are dual- or triple-capable (nuclear, conventional, chemical) and there is no obvious means of distinguishing nuclear variants. On the

Alliance side the introduction of a Follow-on to LANCE (FOTL) could compound the problem since, on present plans, the US designated launcher is the same as that to be used for conventional systems (notably the Multi Launch Rocket System - MLRS) which a number of Allies have ordered.

(iv) The ownership of the delivery systems is not confined to the US and Soviet Union. In both Alliances a number of countries own and operate nuclear capable short-range missile systems.

(v) Short-range missiles of the type deployed in Europe are also deployed by both the US and Soviet Union outside Europe, as well as by a number of non-members of either military pact (notably in the Middle East). They could easily be moved within range of Western Europe at short notice.

(vi) On the Allied side there are a number of French systems (a third of the total Alliance capability) which the French insist will not be included in the negotiation.

Soviet Aims

6. Soviet aims are substantially different from ours. The Soviet Union admits to a massive superiority in short range missile launchers (about 13:1 using Soviet figures and including French systems). But it argues that a negotiation confined to surface to surface missiles would be inequitable because of the advantage which it claims NATO has in nuclear capable aircraft, and thus of air-delivered weapons. The Soviet Union's priority aim will probably be to inveigle NATO's air-launched weapons into negotiations since, post-INF, they will be the only Europe-based nuclear weapons capable of striking Soviet territory. Given also the Russians' ultimate aim of a denuclearised Europe, they would be likely to resist the idea of negotiations on surface-to-surface missiles alone. Precisely what alternative formula they might propose is not clear. There have been a number of hints over the last year, including from Mr Gorbachev, that the Soviet Union might

be willing to embrace a concept of 'minimum deterrence', with the implication that this could involve legitimisation of equal ceilings of theatre nuclear weapons of some kind. But this may be no more than a device designed to entice the Alliance into negotiations. At present there is insufficient evidence about a change in Soviet intentions upon which to base our policy.

Verification and Unit of Account

7. A detailed consideration of this issue is attached as an annex. Until we have discussed it with the Americans it is difficult to draw firm conclusions, since most conceivable verification regimes would require some degree of modification both to the FOTL system which the US is developing, and to Soviet systems. However, the main conclusions of the initial work we have done are that:

- an arms control regime based on nuclear warheads is almost certainly unverifiable;
- verification regimes based on missiles, launchers or a combination of the two would probably be feasible; identifying missiles as the primary unit of account, perhaps with secondary limits on launchers, might be the most attractive option;
- but all regimes designed to capture nuclear missiles or launchers alone would require substantial modifications to the existing Warsaw Pact force of short range missiles and some changes to US plans for FOTL so that the missiles and launchers would be distinguishable from conventional systems. Alterations designed to distinguish between nuclear and conventional systems would be easier for the missiles alone than for the launchers. Any regime which required changes to the M270 launcher which the US has selected for FOTL so that it could fire only nuclear missiles would impose substantial penalties in terms of cost, survivability and flexibility. But given the probable political difficulty of deploying a large number of launchers theoretically capable of firing FOTL, this may be unavoidable. The US is currently reviewing its choice of the M270 with these



points in mind;

- if changes to the missile or launcher are not made, there is no apparent means of verifying ceilings unless we are prepared to accept that the limits apply to some conventional, as well as nuclear, systems. Failing that, the only arms control regime would involve unverifiable ceilings;

- because of the danger that warheads could be clandestinely stored, a third zero - no nuclear short range missiles on either side - would be verifiable only if it entailed the removal of all missiles on the Warsaw Pact side.

Systems to be Negotiated

8. The Comprehensive Concept commits us only to negotiations on land-based missile forces. The Soviet Union, however, will no doubt want the negotiations to cover all theatre nuclear weapons - including bombs and air-to-surface missiles. From NATO's perspective an overall ceiling on nuclear warheads might, in some long term scenarios, be worth considering, despite the verification difficulties, since an acceptably liberal ceiling would let us adjust our force posture as we wished. But an all-embracing negotiation would risk pressure to reduce our air-delivered weapons to unacceptably low levels, perhaps even zero, thus ensnaring TASM. At this stage it would be a tactical error to broaden the scope of negotiations in this way. We should therefore make clear in negotiating an East/West mandate for SNF talks, that negotiations on air-delivered weapons are not on the agenda.

9. The Germans and others may, however, argue for an agreement which includes nuclear artillery shells. We should keep an open mind about this since the case for excluding nuclear artillery from a negotiation is less compelling than that for excluding air-delivered weapons. The future for nuclear artillery in NATO is generally assessed as bleak. Although a case can be made (and the US Army can be expected to make it) for a deterrent rationale for nuclear artillery shells, the practical difficulties involved in

using them are formidable. Politically they are the least acceptable of all remaining nuclear systems since they would almost inevitably be used on the Alliance's own territory. For these reasons, the elimination or negotiated reduction of nuclear artillery as part of an otherwise satisfactory arms control agreement might be acceptable. But this would on present form meet with opposition from the US military; and limits on nuclear artillery shells would probably be impossible to verify.

Geographical Scope

10. The issue is whether the zone of application of any agreement should be limited to the Atlantic-to-the Urals area (easier to verify; greater risk of circumvention) or global (may not be acceptable to US or Soviet Union). We see difficulties with either option. We will need to weigh the advantages of a global regime in which we would have greater confidence against the technical and political difficulty of such a solution. In addition, there may be a case for demanding that the transfer of treaty limited items should be notified in order to limit the break-out potential afforded by third country (eg. Syria or Iraq) holdings of treaty limited systems.

Participation

11. The Comprehensive Concept refers to negotiations on US and Soviet missile forces only. If interpreted literally this formulation could be held to apply on the Western side only to those launchers and missiles which are US-owned, and not to those owned by the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and the UK. But this would make little military or political sense, given that the warheads for all these systems are American. In reality therefore any arms control regime would have to apply to all the missile systems in Europe which are equipped, or capable of being equipped, with American and Soviet warheads. Whatever the coverage the Americans may prefer a bilateral US/Soviet negotiation on the grounds that they would be less open to pressure from European Allies to change the Western position if agreement proved elusive. But we should consider the potential implications (eg. for future START

negotiations) of a situation in which British owned launchers and missiles were discussed around a table at which no British representatives were present. A more attractive alternative might be to include in the negotiation all those NATO and Warsaw Pact countries who own or operate SNF missile systems. Another option would be to confine participation in the negotiations to the US and Soviet Union, but for Western policy to be formulated in a special group of those Allies which operate SNF missile systems. At this stage we should keep the options open.

Possible Outcomes

12. A table of possible outcomes, with an assessment of their acceptability, is attached. An obvious conclusion is that although our initial negotiating position might aim solely at equal and verifiable ceilings on short range nuclear missiles, we would need to reconsider the options if we came to the conclusion that the deployment of new ground- or air-delivered systems (FOTL or TASM) was not achievable, or only achievable at the price of a wider negotiation.

13. Three of the options, (e), (f) and (g), need greater explanation:

- (e) Commitment to equal ceilings on SNF warheads but with no water-tight verification. If the point were reached where, because of verification difficulties, a treaty-type agreement on SNF ceilings proved unattainable, but if we judged that nevertheless some kind of East/West understanding on SNF was a precondition to FOTL or TASM deployment, we might consider a non-verifiable arrangement. This would entail the declaration of agreed common ceilings on SNF missiles (and, perhaps, nuclear artillery shells), but not in the form of a binding international treaty, nor subject to rigorous verification. Instead there could be confidence-building measures (data exchanges, inspections of storage sites and production facilities) and an arrangement for discussion of disputes. This would, of course, leave room for cheating. But from a military

viewpoint the fact that the Warsaw Pact might exceed its declared ceilings would not be disastrous: our SNF nuclear requirement is not geared directly to the size of Soviet nuclear forces. The key question would be whether such an approach, post CFE, would be politically acceptable.

- (f) Equal ceilings on short range missiles whether nuclear or conventional. Such a solution would impose limits on all Soviet short range systems (SS-21s, FROGs and SCUDs) and, for the Alliance, on FOTL and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The primary advantages would be relative ease of verification (since no distinction would need to be made between nuclear and conventional systems); the limitation of the threat represented by Soviet conventionally armed SNF missiles; and flexibility to mix our nuclear and conventional capability as we wished. But we would need to judge carefully whether there were numerical ceilings which imposed meaningful constraints on Soviet capability without cutting unacceptably into the valuable conventional capability which ATACMS will give us. We would have to discuss this further with the Americans and the Germans.

- (g) No SNF missile systems on either side. If at some point in the future we concluded that there are no circumstances in which we can achieve the deployment of FOTL, we would need to consider the possibility of a third zero: if we do not have short-range missiles we would be better off if the Warsaw Pact had none either. Such a solution might be difficult to achieve since, once the Warsaw Pact appreciated that NATO did not intend to deploy FOTL, the Western negotiating leverage would evaporate. We would also have to consider the possibly unwelcome impact of a negotiated third zero solution on possible future arms control negotiations on other theatre nuclear systems.

Conclusions

14. The achievement of a satisfactory outcome to an SNF negotiation will be bedevilled by uncertainty over whether NATO will decide to deploy FOTL and TASM; the Soviet aim of extending any cuts in

theatre nuclear forces as wide and deep as possible; and the technical problems of verification. At present we can identify no method of verifying SNF ceilings with reasonable assurance unless substantial changes are made to US and Soviet procurement plans. Nor is it possible to predict a satisfactory outcome to SNF negotiations until we know whether or not a FOTL will be deployed. If FOTL is not achievable, our negotiating aims may have to change.

15. If, as is probable, some preparatory work takes place this year within the Alliance, we should be guided by the following points:

- since we do not want NATO to reach any firm conclusions about an SNF negotiating mandate or the substance of a negotiating position until after the German elections, we should try to keep the work at a technical level. This would give us ample opportunity to point out the obstacles to a successful negotiation, such as verification, and to ventilate, but not reach decisions on, issues such as geographical coverage and who should participate in the negotiations;

- we should make clear from the start that air-delivered systems are off the negotiating agenda but, at least privately, we should keep a more open mind about the inclusion of nuclear artillery.

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TABLE OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS

<u>Outcome</u>	<u>Acceptability</u>
(a) Equal ceilings of 3-500 * short range missiles with or without limits on launchers.	Yes, if agreement is reached to deploy FOTL.
(b) Equal ceilings below 300 short range missiles with or without limits on launchers.	Doubtful. Any short range nuclear missiles better than none but depends if US would proceed with FOTL programme for such small numbers.
(c) Acceptable equal ceilings on SNF missiles as in (a), but with limits, or a ban, on nuclear artillery shells.	Acceptable as the price of deploying FOTL. But may meet with opposition from US (notably the US Army).
(d) Overall ceiling on all land-based theatre nuclear weapons (including air-launched).	Not desirable because air-delivered weapons hitherto excluded from arms control equation. But if such a deal was a precondition to widespread deployment of TASM, it would be worth considering.
(e) Declared commitment to equal ceilings on SNF warheads (for missiles and artillery). No watertight verification, but some confidence-building measures.	If neither (a) or (c) achievable, worth considering. Avoids verification problems which bedevil any other solution. Leaves scope for cheating. But within limits that is a political rather than military problem - our theatre nuclear requirements are not driven principally by considerations of the size of the equivalent Soviet stockpile.

(f) Equal ceilings on all short range missiles whether conventional or nuclear.

Easier to verify - unlikely to require substantial modifications to existing or planned systems. Would constrain Soviet CW and conventional capability as well as nuclear. But unclear whether ceilings exist at which Alliance conventional capability would not be unacceptably limited.

(g) No SNF missile systems on either side.

Not acceptable if we retain hopes of deploying FOTL. If we cannot deploy a new short range nuclear missile, militarily we would be better off if the Warsaw Pact could not either. This would have to be weighed against the possibly unwelcome impact of a zero solution on air delivered weapons or nuclear artillery.

* The numbers in options (a) and (b) are necessarily illustrative - a judgement on how many SNF missile systems is enough will depend on a variety of factors (such as the outcome of CFE, and what countries would agree to take FOTL) which cannot be predicted now.

ANNEX: VERIFICATION AND UNIT OF ACCOUNT

1. Any agreement to impose a ceiling on nuclear Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) will be difficult to verify because:

- many of the systems are dual- or triple-capable. Any verification regime for an agreement to constrain only nuclear systems must not catch conventional capability;
- the systems themselves are highly mobile and their key elements are relatively small and easy to conceal. Yet we must have adequate confidence that significant quantities of SNF components have not been concealed.

2. The problems which are presented by these requirements are somewhat different for Alliance and Warsaw Pact systems:

Alliance SSMs

In principle there would be no difficulty in verifying a ceiling on LANCE SSMs. The number of launchers is well known and the Russians will also have a clear idea of the number of warheads.

The problem will come with the introduction of FOTL. Essentially, FOTL consists of three elements: the launcher; the missile, contained in a launch pod; and the warhead. The US has already selected the M270 as the launcher. This launcher will also be used for the Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) both of which are indispensable conventional missile systems. Because of its conventional role a number of Alliance countries (including France) have ordered nearly 1000 M270 launchers with MLRS. The US plans no distinction between those M270s capable of firing FOTL, and those capable of firing MLRS/ATACMS. An arms control regime could not, therefore, be based on constraints on unmodified launchers without biting unacceptably into the conventional capability of the Alliance.

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The dual capability of the M270 launcher does not present only an arms control problem. It is most improbable that the Germans could be persuaded to deploy a FOTL system for which the number of potential launchers had risen from 88 to a thousand. It is unclear how the US intends to address this problem. Even if the US were willing to sacrifice the advantages which a fully dual capable launcher presents in terms of flexibility and survivability, equipping the nuclear M 270 launchers with functionally related observable differences (FRODing) would not be easy. It would necessarily require corresponding design changes to the missile. We understand that the US is now reviewing its decision to use an unmodified version of the M270 launcher for FOTL in the light of exactly these considerations.

The US has not yet selected the missile for FOTL but there have been clear indications that its dimensions will be different from any conventional missile to be fired from the M270. Thus a verification regime based on missiles would avoid the problem of dual and triple capability at least as far as Alliance systems are concerned.

Warsaw Pact SSMs

The problem of a verification regime for Warsaw Pact SSMs is considerably greater. All current Warsaw Pact SSMs (the SS21, SCUD and FROG) are triple capable. We know of no means of distinguishing between missiles for conventional/CW/nuclear use. It follows that the launchers are also identical.

We cannot, therefore, envisage a verification regime based on existing launchers or missiles which would be able to capture Warsaw Pact nuclear capability alone. There are no obvious, easy solutions. If the Russians want a verifiable agreement, they will have to find the answer as it relates to their own forces. Three options might be workable if the Warsaw Pact :

- (i) agreed to SSM ceilings but sacrificed its existing conventional and CW capability while allowing NATO to retain its own conventional systems. Although the Russians might be prepared to sacrifice the modest conventional capability of the

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substantial number of FROGs remaining, it is most unlikely that they would also be willing to sacrifice the much greater capability of SS21s and SCUDs (without imposing similar sacrifice on NATO);

(ii) withdrew all but those SSMs permitted under agreed ceilings for nuclear systems (ie. all such systems will in future count as nuclear) and replaced its conventional capability with a dedicated conventional SSM. Although the Soviet missile procurement system makes this a less daunting task than would be the case for NATO, it is unlikely to be an attractive option to the Soviet Union given budget pressures.

(iii) introduced a FRODeD version of an existing SSM which would be conventionally dedicated. This appears the most feasible option although the development and engineering costs would be substantial. It might be made more feasible by stretching the draw-down period over a sufficiently long time (after a CFE agreement had been implemented) for SCUDs and FROGs to need replacing anyway. That would limit the problem to SS-21s.

Warheads

A verification system based solely or primarily on warhead numbers would be attractive to the Warsaw Pact because it would dovetail neatly with a wider arms control regime covering all categories of theatre nuclear forces. The Warsaw Pact would also have greater assurance that the Western democracies were not breaching agreed limits than we could have in respect of the Warsaw Pact.

But a warhead ceiling would almost certainly not be adequately verifiable. The overriding objection is that we could not be satisfied that clandestine stocks of nuclear warheads had not been cached in hidden storage sites. This problem is heightened since we have only the roughest idea of how many warheads the Soviet Union has for its theatre nuclear forces; we can only guess at annual warhead production rates; we cannot be sure that we have identified all existing Soviet warhead storage sites; warheads only need a

modest amount of periodic servicing to maintain an effective capability; and they are easily portable and could be deployed from clandestine storage sites, even east of the Urals, at short notice.

3. If warheads are excluded, and assuming that launchers and missiles could be FRODED, should a verification regime rest on either missiles or launchers, or both? A missiles only regime would place a high premium on being able to monitor fairly small items (an SS-21 missile is 6 metres long) but would probably require the least amount of modification to US or Soviet short range systems. A regime based on launchers would mean a distinction between nuclear and conventional varieties which would carry cost and operational penalties (unless such distinctions are anyway needed for political reasons). It would be unattractive to the Alliance given the very limited room for reductions below the current number of missile launchers. And a regime based on launchers alone would be complicated by disputes about refire capability. The best conclusion from a purely verification perspective, would be a regime whose primary unit of account was missiles, perhaps with secondary controls on launchers. To be effective, this would need a missile/launcher ratio calculated to minimise the impact of clandestine breaches in missile ceilings.

4. No firm conclusions can be drawn at this stage about the best method of verifying limits on SNF missile systems. We will need to discuss in more detail with the Americans their intentions with regard to the FOTL system as well as drawing on US verification expertise derived from INF and START.

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DAS



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 December 1989

Dear Simon,

THE FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH

The Prime Minister has seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 21 December responding to her suggestion that the Joint Intelligence Centre to be set up by the Americans at RAF Molesworth should have a less explicit title. She has commented that it is clear from the minute that the facility is not an Intelligence Centre but an Assessment Centre and, in her view, it would be better to describe it as such. If the Americans really want to label it a Joint Intelligence Centre then we can hardly stand in the way. But she would like to see them persuaded to be rather more imaginative.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Simon Webb, Esq.
Ministry of Defence

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(1) APC



It seems to me that it is NOT

Prime Minister

MO 14/2/5L

an Intelligence Centre in the light of this
human Assessment Centre. If the explanation, agreed

PRIME MINISTER

American with

to withdraw your objection

to hold it - we have to agree - but I think a little more to the Joint Intelligence Centre title?
is another name

THE FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH

CJP 24/xii top ed

I have seen your Private Secretary's letter of 14th December indicating that you had misgivings about announcing that a Joint Intelligence Centre is to be set up by the Americans at Molesworth and that you would prefer a less explicit title.

2. I would normally agree that we should avoid focusing attention on new intelligence facilities. The circumstances at Molesworth are slightly different. Attention will already be focused on the station, because of its short lived status as a cruise missile base. In my view we would create more speculation than we would save by trying to pass off the new unit as something else. Two new buildings are to be constructed, one of which is to be semi-hardened and mostly below ground, and 700 US Servicemen are to be allocated to this facility. It would be difficult to play down this development as an administrative centre or something similar, not least at a time when the public is expecting US Force levels in the UK to decline rather than increase. The Americans themselves wish to be reasonably open about this facility, which is known as the Joint Intelligence Centre at its present location near Stuttgart. It would be difficult to explain a change of name on



transfer to the UK. Moreover the purpose of the facility is primarily to process and analyse intelligence gathered by other means not, as at some other more sensitive establishments, to collect raw intelligence data direct.

3. So far we have encouraged the Americans to be reasonably open about this facility. When Ministers agreed in the summer that the facilities planned for Molesworth should proceed, it was suggested that the name of the secondary unit should be changed from Northern Region War Support Centre and the Americans have readily agreed to rename this the Northern Region Command Centre. No objections were raised to the term Joint Intelligence Centre at that stage and I would be reluctant to ask them for a further change of name so late in the day.

4. I hope you will agree that we should proceed with an early announcement on the Joint Intelligence Centre when Parliament reassembles. If you are content I will liaise with John Major over the timing of the announcement because of his constituency interest.

5. I am copying this minute to the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Chief Secretary and Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence

21st December 1989

T K

DEFENCE


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Pt 7



COMMUNICATIONS

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c:/foreign/molesworth. DAS



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1989

See Brian.

FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute about the future of RAF Molesworth. She has doubts whether it is wise to announce the establishment of an Intelligence Centre anywhere, on the grounds that it simply draws attention to it. Do we really have to spell out exactly what it is that the Americans are relocating at Molesworth? She would much prefer it to be wrapped up in some less explicit language about "administrative duties" or something similar.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

*your sincerely,
C. D. Powell*

C. D. POWELL

Brian Hawtin, Esq.
Ministry of Defence

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①

I think it is absurd to announce the use of Molesworth as a joint Intelligence Centre.

MO 14/2/5L

It will act as a magnet for

PRIME MINISTER

the very people we do not wish to attract

[I suppose its with to announce Intelligence Centres?] *flat*

Eric Hunter
Content?

13/xii

THE FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH

My predecessor wrote to you on 7th June this year concerning proposals which the United States had put to us for the follow-on use of RAF Molesworth, the former cruise missile base in Cambridgeshire. You may recall that the US proposals for Molesworth were to relocate their European Command Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) from Stuttgart and establish an alternate wartime headquarters for US forces in this country. Your private secretary's letter of 9th June recorded your agreement to these proposals.

2. In the period since June, we have completed the necessary consultations with NATO and the US authorities have informed the Germans about the relocation of the JIC. The US have also reviewed and confirmed their proposals and we are now in a position to announce the decision. Subject to the views of John Major, who I am consulting separately in his capacity as constituency MP, I propose to make the announcement before Christmas by means of an inspired parliamentary question (the draft text of which I enclose).

3. I am copying this letter and its attachment to the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

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Ministry of Defence

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13 December 1989

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ANNEX A

FUTURE FOR RAF MOLESWORTH - DRAFT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND ANSWER

Question: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the future of RAF Molesworth.

Answer: RAF Molesworth has been placed on a care and maintenance basis since the USAF 303rd Tactical Missile Wing was disbanded in January 1989.

The base was specially developed in 1985/87 to house the ground launched cruise missiles of the 303rd Tactical Missile Wing. Both the military and domestic infrastructure remain in excellent condition and there are a number of specialist facilities on the base which it would be difficult and expensive to remove. Some of these facilities are subject to inspection by the Soviet Union for the next 12 years under the terms of the INF Treaty. However the INF Treaty does not prohibit the use of former GLCM bases for other military purposes.

The Government has been discussing with the United States and NATO authorities alternative military roles for RAF Molesworth which would make good use of the existing facilities whilst remaining consistent with the terms of the INF Treaty. As a result of these discussions the Government has agreed that, subject to the normal planning procedures, the United States European Command may use the site for the relocation and reorganisation of its Joint Intelligence Centre. [This military facility is currently located at Stuttgart but the site is considered unsuitable for future requirements.] ?

The Joint Intelligence Centre will be constructed on a fresh site within the base at RAF Molesworth and will not be subject to Soviet inspection. Major construction work is planned to start in 1991 and complete in 1995 and many of the existing facilities at the base will be modified to support the Joint Intelligence Centre. This work will commence next year and the 496th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, currently based at RAF Alconbury, will transfer

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
to Molesworth on completion. Some 700 US personnel will eventually be assigned to Molesworth, a similar number to those stationed at the base with the 303rd Tactical Missile Wing.

In addition certain buildings at RAF Molesworth will be converted to accommodate the Northern Region Command Centre, the wartime Headquarters for the United States Third Air Force, whilst other buildings will be used for administrative purposes as an annex to RAF Alconbury. The Government considers that these developments will make optimum use of a valuable military installation for the benefit of the United States, the United Kingdom and NATO.

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DEFENCE: FNF PT 7



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3254</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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MODUK FOR AUS(POL), DACU, ACDS(POL/NUC), ACDS(NATO/UK)

WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS 2062 AND 2068: FRG AND SNF. *mt*

SUMMARY.

1. CONTACT HERE WITH NAUMANN AFTER HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON SUGGESTS THERE IS LIGHT BETWEEN HIS VIEWS AND THE THINKING IMPLIED IN THE INFORMAL GERMAN PAPER HANDED OVER IN WASHINGTON. UNLIKELY THAT THE CHANCELLERY ARE AWARE OR WOULD APPROVE.

DETAIL

2. AS IT HAPPENS, IN COMPANY WITH THE DA, I HAD LUNCH WITH NAUMANN ON 28 JULY (FULL RECORD BY BAG - NOT TO ALL). THIS WAS JUST AFTER HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH WAS NOT DISCUSSED DIRECTLY, THOUGH HE MADE NO SECRET OF HAVING BEEN THERE. HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PAPER DESCRIBED IN TURS IS SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY. REMARKS MADE TO US ABOUT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PARA 4 OF TUR INDICATE HOWEVER PERCEPTIBLE LIGHT BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVES AND EFFECTS OF GERMAN POLICY DESCRIBED THERE AND HIS OWN VIEWS ON WHAT THESE SHOULD BE.

3. NAUMANN HAS TALKED TO THE SPD ABOUT THEIR PAPERS ON DEFENCE POLICY (WHICH ARE JUST APPEARING AND ON WHICH WE ARE COMMENTING SEPARATELY) BUT HE WOULD BE HORRIFIED TO BE BRACKETED WITH THEM. HE IS NO THIRD ZERO MAN. HE CONSIDERS MAINTAINING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO BE VITAL AND HE WOULD BE VERY UNHAPPY AT THE THOUGHT OF THE FRG NOT ACCEPTING ITS PROPER SHARE OF THE RESULTING OBLIGATIONS. NAUMANN SAID INCIDENTALLY THAT HE VERY MUCH WANTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE MOD. (ACDS (NATO/UK) WILL BE IN FMOD FOR TALKS ON TUESDAY 8 AUGUST). THE REMARK WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF CFE, BUT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF NAUMANN WAS DELIBERATELY EXCLUDING OTHER MATTERS RELEVANT TO SECURITY IN EUROPE.

4. SPECIFICALLY ON THE POINTS IN PARA 4 OF TUR:

A) NAUMANN COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE 'AN IRRATIONAL

ATTACHMENT' TO NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. HE DOES SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS COMPLETE ELIMINATION, BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL/TASM. IT WOULD NOT BE IN LINE WITH THE REST OF HIS THINKING TO REGARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL PARITY AS BEING THE MAIN RELEVANT CRITERION:

B) POSSIBLE RETENTION OF UNMODERNISED LANCE BEYOND 1991 WAS NOT DISCUSSED BETWEEN US. THIS WAS BECAUSE NAUMANN'S GOALS ARE A GOOD DEAL MORE AMBITIOUS AND HE WAS THINKING ALOUD ABOUT THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DEPLOYMENT OF FOTL/TASM WOULD BE POSSIBLE. WE HAVE ALREADY COMMENTED THAT WE THINK THE FMOD OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF GETTING COALITION AGREEMENT TO FOTL BUT, AS EXPRESSED BY NAUMANN, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT OF FMOD'S STRONG CONTINUING WISH FOR FOTL. FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THEY TALK OF LIMITED NUMBERS. NAUMANN IS ALSO CANVASSING THE IDEA OF FOTL BEING BASED OUTSIDE THE FRG IN PEACE TIME:

C) LESS RELIANCE ON FOTL AND MORE ON TASM IS CERTAINLY ATTRACTIVE HERE, INCLUDING IN THE FMOD, PRIMARILY AGAIN FOR REASONS OF GREATER POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY. TO US, NAUMANN TALKED EXPLICITLY OF TASM BASING IN THE FRG, COMMENTING, INTER ALIA, ON THE ADVANTAGES OF FRANCE AND THE UK HAVING THE SAME SYSTEM. (I, HOWEVER, DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS INTENDED TO IMPLY EXCLUSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN SYSTEMS IN THE FRG.)

5. HARTMANN (TELTSCHIK'S DEPUTY IN THE CHANCELLERY) TOLD ME OVER LUNCH YESTERDAY (3 AUGUST) THAT THERE HAD SO FAR BEEN NO CONSIDERATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES POST THE NATO SUMMIT. I SHREWDLY SUSPECT THE CHANCELLERY DOES NOT KNOW ABOUT THE PAPER HANDED TO THE AMERICANS AND I DOUBT THEY WOULD APPROVE. ON TIMING, HE DID SAY THAT WHATEVER WENT ON IN PRIVATE BETWEEN CLOSE ALLIES, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO DEBATE IN NATO ON NUCLEAR ISSUES BEFORE THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN 1990. THIS WOULD FORCE THE PRESENT COALITION INTO A 'VERY UNHELPFUL' POSTURE. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS, I THINK, THAT THE TIMING SUGGESTED IN THE PAPER FOR LANCE/ARTILLERY NEGOTIATIONS (PARA 5 OF TUR) WOULD NOT HAVE CHANCELLERY ENDORSEMENT.

6. IF THE GERMANS DO HAND THE 'INFORMAL' PAPER TO US, IT WOULD BE IN ORDER (AND SENSIBLE) TO TALK DISCREETLY TO THE CHANCELLERY ABOUT IT.

NEVILLE-JONES

YYYY

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MODUK FOR AUS(POL), DACU, ACDS POL NUC

GERMANS AND SNF

SUMMARY

1. GERMANS ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE AMERICANS IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS AND TO DELIVER A PAPER ON THE SUBJECT (STATUS UNCLEAR). AMERICANS CLAIM THAT THE APPROACH WAS REBUFFED AND PAPER REFUSED. BUT DETAILS WE HAVE GLEANED INFORMALLY SUGGEST THAT THE GERMANS WILL BE PRESSING FOR RADICAL DENUCLEARISATION OBJECTIVES.

DETAIL

2. WE HAVE LEARNT FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THAT HOLIK AND NAUMANN WERE IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK IN AN ATTEMPT TO ENGAGE THE ADMINISTRATION IN SOME QUIET PRELIMINARY THINKING ON SNF ARMS CONTROL AND TO DELIVER AN INFORMAL PAPER.

3. AVIS BOHLEN (NOW DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN STATE) TOLD US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION KNEW WHAT WAS COMING AND THE LINE WAS AGREED BEFOREHAND THAT ANY PAPER BROACHING THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE REFUSED WITHOUT DISCUSSION, ON THE STANDARD GROUNDS OF BEING PREMATURE WHEN THE SUMMIT CONDITIONS WERE NOWHERE NEAR BEING MET. HOLIK WAS ACCORDINGLY GIVEN SHORT SHRIFT AND SENT BACK TO BONN ON THAT BASIS. ALLEN HOLMES (IN HIS LAST DAY IN THE POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAU) CONFIDED SUBSEQUENTLY HOWEVER THAT THE NON-ACCEPTANCE POLICY WENT SOMEWHAT HAYWIRE AND THAT HOLIK DID IN FACT MANAGE TO DELIVER THE PAPER AT ONE OF HIS PORTS OF CALL. HOLMES ALSO SAID THAT BAKER HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON THE CONTENTS AND WAS INCENSED.

4. WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED SOME MORE DETAIL FROM THE NSC, BASED ON POINTS IN THE PAPER PLUS INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS MADE BY HOLIK TO KANTER AND MAHLEY (PLEASE PROTECT). THEY SAY THAT THE NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE GERMAN TEXT WOULD LEAD TO THE FOLLOWING OUTCOME:

A) THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY (AS BEING NO LONGER REQUIRED ONCE CONVENTIONAL PARITY WAS ACHIEVED IN CFE).

- B) THE RETENTION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF LANCE MISSILES BEYOND 1991 (AMOUNTING TO THOSE OPERATED BY THE US ONLY) - BUT NO FOTL OR LIFE-PROLONGATION PROGRAMME FOR LANCE.
- C) RELIANCE ON TASM FOR THE LONGER TERM: HOLIK SUGGESTED THAT THESE MIGHT BE BASED IN THE UK RATHER THAN ON GERMAN SOIL, SUPPLEMENTED BY OFFSHORE SLCM AND ALCM.
5. ON TIMING, IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON ARTILLERY AND LANCE COMBINED SHOULD BEGIN BEFORE THE END OF NEXT YEAR. THE FORMULATION AT (B), WAS SEEN BY THE AMERICANS AS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A FIGLEAF AND ENABLE THE APPROACH TO BE DESCRIBED AS A QUOTE PARTIAL UNQUOTE REDUCTION, BUT IT WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO PRODUCE THE THIRD ZERO, SINCE LANCE WOULD WITHER ON THE VINE WITHOUT REPLACEMENT.
6. AS REGARDS PROCEDURES, THE PAPER EVIDENTLY INCLUDED A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVE MERITS OF GENEVA OR VIENNA AND CONCLUDED WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO QUOTE BUILD ANOTHER TABLE IN VIENNA UNQUOTE. THIS HAS PREDICTABLY UPSET THE NSC AS MUCH AS THE PROPOSED OUTCOME FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS.
7. BOTH MAHLEY AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THAT THE GERMANS MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE THINKING OF SHOWING THE PAPER TO US ON THE SAME INFORMAL BASIS BEFORE POSSIBLY FLOATING IT IN THE HLG AND A RESURRECTED SCG. WHETHER THEY WILL NOW TAKE IT FURTHER, AFTER THE RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THE REFUSAL ON ALL SIDES TO OFFER ANY COMMENT OR (OFFICIALLY) RECEIVE THE PAPER MIGHT GIVE CAUSE FOR SOME SECOND THOUGHTS, ESPECIALLY IF IT WAS INTENDED AS NO MORE THAN A TRIAL BALLOON. MAHLEY ALSO SAID THAT, DESPITE NAUMANN'S PRESENCE, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS AGREED WITH THE FMOD. IF THERE WAS ANY EVIDENCE OF CO-AUTHORSHIP IT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM: MAHLEY SAID THAT THE PAPER BORE AN UNCANNY RESEMBLANCE TO IDEAS WHICH EGON BAHR WAS PEDDLING AROUND WASHINGTON DURING HIS MOST RECENT VISIT HERE ON 11/12 JULY.
8. THIS MAY NOT BE A FULLY ACCURATE ACCOUNT SINCE THE AMERICANS ARE CAGEY ABOUT THE DETAIL. BONN MAY THEREFORE WISH TO PROBE FURTHER. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT TO VOLUNTEER THAT WE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PAPER, EITHER TO GERMANS OR OTHER AMERICANS AT THIS STAGE. BUT STATE DEPARTMENT CAN AT LEAST BE SAID TO HAVE INFORMED US OF THE VISIT AND OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE GERMAN PAPER.

FALL

cell

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 June 1989

*3a**COB 16/20**Idea Brian,*

The Future of RAF Molesworth

The Foreign Secretary has seen the Defence Secretary's minute to the Prime Minister of 7 June, and Charles Powell's letter of 9 June. He agrees that we should tell the Americans that we are content for them to proceed as planned.

He has two comments on the proposed Parliamentary announcement. Two of the likely grounds, however ill-informed, for public criticism of the plan are (a) that it contravenes the INF Treaty and (b) that the facilities to be moved in are offensive or destabilising. It would be worth underlining in the announcement that the Treaty does not rule out former INF bases being given alternative military uses, and that the Russians are finding similar alternative uses for theirs. (This would also help pre-empt any attempt by the Russians to make the same criticism.)

The Americans' proposed open public line on the new facilities should help to disarm the second criticism.

It might also help if the facilities had less aggressive-sounding names: Northern Region Command Support Centre for instance?


I am copying this letter to Charles Powell (No 10), Alex Allan (HMT), Roger Bright (DOE) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Jam,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Brian Hawtin Esq
PS/Defence Secretary



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>3254</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 June 1989

Dear Brian,

THE FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH

The Prime Minister has seen the Defence Secretary's minute of 7 June about the future of RAF Molesworth. She is all in favour of the proposals put forward by the United States and thinks it not at all an unhelpful signal at present to have some US forces transferred from the FRG to the United Kingdom. She agrees that the Defence Secretary should tell the Americans that we are content for them to proceed as planned.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

Brian Hawtin, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET



1(A-D)

Rui Pereira

MO 14/2/5L

PRIME MINISTER

Agreed

The transfer of US forces from Germany to the UK is rather a good signal in better circumstances I hope you can agree this proposal.

CAF 2/6

THE FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH

Cruise missiles were withdrawn from RAF Molesworth at the end of last year and the station placed on a care and maintenance basis since January this year, when the USAF 303rd Tactical Missile Wing formally disbanded. Since then my officials have been discussing the future of the base with the US Authorities.

2. RAF Molesworth was specially developed in 1985/87 as our second cruise missile base predominantly at US and NATO expense. The base is exceptionally well protected, and the facilities there are in good condition. Many of the specially designed facilities would prove difficult and expensive to remove, and of course certain of them are subject to inspection by the Russians for the next 12 years under the terms of the INF Treaty. For these reasons we believe that it would be best to adapt the base to an alternative military role rather than dispose of it to another Government Department or sell it on the open market. In any case disposal would lead to difficult financial problems both with the US and NATO who have largely funded the present facilities.

3. The US Authorities have now come forward with two proposals which make good use of the existing facilities, although considerable new construction is also envisaged. These proposals would be advantageous to the US in military terms and I am therefore disposed to approve them, although they may give rise to some political and presentational difficulties.



4. The main American proposal is to move to Molesworth the Joint Intelligence Centre for US European Command currently at Stuttgart. The JIC is an all source intelligence centre manned 24 hours a day, responsible for providing intelligence support to a wide variety of strategic and tactical missions. The US consider that the present location in West Germany is too small for future expansion plans and too vulnerable, as they wish to re-locate this facility in the UK. The Defence Intelligence Staff strongly support this proposal; they see it as fostering the bilateral UK/US intelligence relationship and envisage particular benefits accruing from the proximity of Molesworth to the Joint/Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre at RAF Brampton.

5. The JIC and its supporting units will use most of the existing facilities at the base. The Americans would like to start conversation work on these before the end of the year and transfer to Molesworth a first unit from within Britain very soon thereafter. Eventually some 700 US personnel will be assigned to Molesworth, a very similar number to those stationed at the base with the 303rd Tactical Missile Wing. The JIC itself would constitute two new buildings one of which would be semi-hardened and mostly below ground. Work on these buildings is planned to start in 1990 and finish in 1996. This will inevitably attract considerable public interest, but the Americans propose to adopt a reasonably open public line on the facility, admitting that it is an Intelligence Centre, although declining to give details on its operation. A suggested Parliamentary announcement which my officials have agreed with the Americans is set out at Annex.

6. It is possible that the Russians might seek to make political capital out of this proposal. The US Authorities have assured us that the JIC will not be subject to inspection under the INF



Treaty, and that they considered carefully the risk to the perception of their INF compliance before they made their proposals. There is nothing in the Treaty which precludes former INF bases from alternative military use; indeed the Russians themselves are using many of their former SS-20 bases to house alternative missile systems whereas no munitions, apart from small arms, will be deployed at Molesworth.

7. The second American proposal involves converting the existing Command Post and Alternative Command Post at Molesworth to provide a wartime headquarters for US Third Air Force to be known as the Northern Region War Support Centre. At present HQ Third Air Force at RAF Mildenhall has no secure survivable facility, from which to exercise its expanded wartime responsibilities for control of reinforcement forces and the management of Air Force logistic support for the whole of North West Europe. The existing buildings at Molesworth could be modified to fill this role with little outward alteration. No additional US personnel would be allocated to the NRWSC in peacetime, but some 250 personnel would deploy to it from other locations in time of tension or war. Once again the Americans are prepared to adopt a reasonably open line on the NRWSC and this is reflected in the draft statement at Annex.

8. I consider that these proposals make good use of the military assets which have been newly built at RAF Molesworth, mainly at American and NATO expense. They may give rise to some political and presentational problems domestically and possible some criticism from the Russians. But we should be able to live with this given the open line which the Americans propose to adopt both on the JIC and the NRWSC. I therefore propose to inform the US Authorities that the Government is content for them to proceed as planned on the understanding that they will now advise the Federal



German Government of their intentions. No immediate announcements are to be made since these proposals need to be endorsed by NATO once our approval has been given. I will minute you again when we are ready to make a public announcement prior to construction commencing later this year.

8. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Chief Secretary and to Sir Robin Butler.

G.Y.

7th June 1989

George Younger

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COMMISSIONER

FUTURE OF RAF MOLESWORTH - DRAFT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION AND ANSWER

Question: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he will make a statement on the future of RAF Molesworth.

Answer: RAF Molesworth has been placed on a care and maintenance basis since the USAF 303rd Tactical Missile Wing was disbanded in January 1989.

The base was specially developed in 1985/87 to house the ground launched cruise missiles of the 303rd Tactical Missile Wing. Both the military and domestic infrastructure remain in excellent condition and there are a number of specialist facilities on the base which it would be difficult and expensive to remove. Some of these facilities are subject to inspection by the Soviet Union for the next 12 years under the terms of the INF Treaty.

The Government has been discussing with the United States and NATO authorities alternative military roles for RAF Molesworth which would make good use of the existing facilities whilst remaining consistent with the terms of the INF Treaty. As a result of these discussions the Government has agreed that, subject to the normal planning procedures, the United States European Command may use the site for the relocation and reorganisation of its Joint Intelligence Centre. This military facility is currently located at Stuttgart but the site there is considered unsuitable for future requirements.

The Joint Intelligence Centre will be constructed on a fresh site within the base at RAF Molesworth and will not be subject to Soviet inspection. Major construction work is planned to start in 1990 and complete in 1996. In addition most of the existing facilities at the base will be modified to support the Joint Intelligence Centre. This work will commence during the current year and the 496th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, currently based RAF Alconbury, will transfer to Molesworth on completion. Some 700 US personnel will eventually be assigned to Molesworth, a similar number to

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those stationed at the base with the 303rd Tactical Missile Wing.

Certain existing buildings at RAF Molesworth will be converted to form the Northern Region War Support Centre, the wartime Headquarters for the United States Third Air Force whilst other buildings will be used for administrative purposes as an annex to RAF Alconbury. The Government considers that these developments will make optimum use of a valuable military installation for the benefit of the United States, the United Kingdom and NATO.

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