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Meetings with the Commonwealth - Secretary - General	COMMONWEALTH
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PART

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Stephen o.r.

Commonwealth Sec. Gen has asked to call on PM in with of 30 Sept to discuss CHOGM agenda.

Chief Anyaoku leaves for Harare weekend of 5-6 Oct, + hopes to have the comments of other leaders by beginning of Oct.

I have provisionally in Wed. 2 Oct at 0915 - 1000, ~~[illegible]~~ + informed FCO.

S 28/8

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT cc MASTER

FILE SRW

bcPC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 June 1991

Dear Simon,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

Thank you for your letter of 4 June with briefing for Chief Anyaoku's call on the Prime Minister.

South Africa

Chief Anyaoku said that the Front Line Presidents had met on the eve of the OAU meeting in Abuja, from which Anyaoku had just returned. Most unusually, there had been no consensus on South Africa and the issue had been passed to Foreign Ministers who had ended up producing a draft declaration saying that sanctions on South Africa would be kept but empowering the chairman to convene a meeting of Front Line States when events in South Africa called for a review and looking forward to the return of South Africa to the international community.

Chief Anyaoku said that it had also been agreed for the first time that the OAU Secretary General should liaise more closely with the Commonwealth Secretary General. The Prime Minister said he was sure a lot could be done once the blot of South Africa was off the agenda. Chief Anyaoku said that he hoped that, by Harare, the decisions taken in South Africa would make for a more positive CHOGM than in the past. He expected the Foreign Ministers to meet in July. The new Canadian Foreign Minister had pressed for a meeting in June but it would be more helpful if Foreign Ministers met after South Africa had abolished its apartheid legislation. Moreover, the ANC conference was in July. Anyaoku attributed the Canadian wish for a June meeting to the fact that the July international agenda was very full. The Prime Minister thought it more likely that the Canadians had not wanted to get into a situation where the Commonwealth was caught out in July by the US having lifted its sanctions in June.

Chief Anyaoku added that he had got into hot water with Barbara McDougall by suggesting to Brian Mulroney that Jo Clark might be allowed to conclude his role as chairman of the Commonwealth group. Mr. Mulroney had agreed. But the first Barbara McDougall had heard of the idea was when it was mentioned in Cabinet. Having already lost international trade to Michael Wilson, Barbara McDougall had reacted strongly against the idea and it had been dropped.

The Prime Minister referred to divisions within the ANC. Anyaoku was inclined to blame President de Klerk for not doing

more to bolster Mr. Mandela and he had made this point to the South African ambassador in London with whom he had recently had a productive meeting. At Abuja, Mr. Mandela had argued strongly for flexibility on sanctions. He had put up a very spirited and noble fight. It would have been much easier for him to adopt a hawkish line. But he was a man of great principle. De Klerk should persist in his original approach. He too faced a divided house, as was evident in his ambivalent response to the role of the security fores in township violence. If de Klerk slipped we would be back to square one. The Prime Minister said that this was why it was so important to encourage the reform process in South Africa.

The Prime Minister referred to our hopes that South African cricket could be re-admitted to the ICC. Mr. Anyaoku said that he had a very positive meeting with Steve Tshwete. Anyaoku had recently had a call from the Foreign Minister of Barbados asking for advice as to whether Gary Sobers should be allowed to go to South Africa. Anyaoku had consulted Tshwete who had given his full support for the visit.

Commonwealth Appraisal meeting

The Secretary General said he could not conceal his disappointment at the postponement of the meeting. He had twice spoken to Mr. Hawke to try to persuade him to come but his arguments for not coming had been compelling. Anyaoku would now write to the Ten putting forward proposals he would have put at the meeting. These would be turning proposals which the preparatory group had already discussed into an operational plan. He would do this "in the context of secretariat structures". He had set in train a rigorous look at resources and hoped to have an outside management audit of the Secretariat role, which had tended to grow ad hoc. It was time to take an integrated look.

CHOGM

The Prime Minister said that we saw the future of the Commonwealth, the environment and drugs as significant issues for CHOGM. Anyaoku said he would shortly send round a letter on the provisional agenda though he had hoped matters would be made clearer at the meeting which had been due next week. He hoped CHOGM would discuss the promotion of democracy. He spoke enthusiastically of election observers. For a cost of £250,000 a year the Commonwealth could monitor two elections, a fraction of the cost when the UN undertook a similar task.

Chief Anyaoku described his difficulties with Dr. Mahathir in Malaysia over monitoring of the Malaysian elections. Despite the difficulties he thought the Commonwealth's involvement in election monitoring in Malaysia had proved the credibility of the role. The Prime Minister indicated that he thought the Commonwealth could have a really useful role to play in election monitoring.

NGO Trust Fund

The Secretary General made a pitch for the proposed trust

fund. The Prime Minister said that the Secretary General's description gave him the impression that perhaps his ideas had evolved since he had first written. We were prepared through experts to have another look. Chief Anyaoku welcomed this, though he pointed out that he had already discussed the issue with Mrs. Chalker and with Simon Hemans. He would not claim that his discussions with other Commonwealth colleagues had led to any firm commitments but their reactions had not been discouraging.

North/South Dialogue

Chief Anyaoku hoped that the Prime Minister and Mr. Mulroney would give a plug at the G7 summit for Mr. Manley's forthcoming report and the idea of North/South conversations. The Prime Minister said that he would need to study the report but he thought he was likely to get a dusty answer from the G7. He doubted whether the Japanese would go along with the idea of a new North/South dialogue.

UN Secretary General

The Prime Minister asked whether there would be an agreed African candidate. Chief Anyaoku said that Africa had been rather bruised by the fact that last time round they had had a candidate, Salim Salim. He had been vetoed and then Africa was out of the running. The discussion in Abuja (which had not concluded when he left) seemed to be moving towards the idea of running a slate of African candidates so that if one was knocked out others would still have a chance. Chief Anyaoku said there were three firm African candidates: Obasanjo, Chidzero and Dadzie. He doubted if James Jonah of Sierre Leone would in the end run because he thought that the President of Sierre Leone would respond to Babangida's appeal not to run a competitor to Obasanjo. He gave the impression that Otunnu of Uganda was a credible candidate but without much chance, in the absence of backing from his own government.

The Prime Minister asked which was the best of the African candidates. Chief Anyaoku would not really be drawn. What was clear was that it was Africa's turn and Perez de Cuellar had said as much publicly. Chief Anyaoku added that, nonetheless, there were strong rumours that the Russians (and maybe the French) wanted Perez de Cuellar to stay on. The Prime Minister was inclined to doubt that this would happen. Perez de Cuellar had made clear his intention of going.

Yours,
Stephen
(J. S. WALL)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CALL BY CHIEF ANYAOKU: CHECKLIST

COMMONWEALTH HIGH-LEVEL GROUP MEETING

* Right decision not to go ahead. Should meet just before Harare.

* Hope Harare can give real impetus to future development of Commonwealth. Interesting discussion with Mugabe on good government.

* South Africa has been a divisive issue in the Commonwealth. We should try to play to the Commonwealth strengths (example of Commonwealth support for Trinidad Initiative).

* OAU meeting in Abuja.

* What was final outcome on South Africa?

* Bad enough if OAU gets behind reality. Tragedy if Commonwealth did as well.

* When will Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa next meet? If in July, after pillars of apartheid removed, hope they will recommend immediate lifting of sanctions (economic and financial as well as visas/tourism).

* South Africa needs foreign capital: Commonwealth should fulfil its commitment at 1989 CHOGM to approach IFIs.

* Grateful for line you have taken on violence. My telephone conversation with Mandela.

* Balance between South Africa and other issues at Harare. CHOGM should also focus on environment and drugs (as well as good government).

NGO Trust Fund

* Did not like the idea of new institution.

* Our alternative approach of 50% increase in budget of Commonwealth Foundation offers greater resources sooner.

* Happy to have further expert discussion on this.

UN Secretary-General

What prospects of Africa agreeing a candidate?

6 June 1991

tmw a:\anyaoku

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

I will update this in the morning but you might want to look now at p3 onwards – which remain relevant.

[signature]

5/6

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

4 June 1991

Dear Stephen,

Meeting of Ten Heads of Government, 11/12 June: Commonwealth Secretary-General's Call on the Prime Minister: 6 June

Chief Anyaoku is calling at his own request. He paid an introductory call on 22 January (Sir Charles Powell's letter of 22 January).

Our objectives are:-

(i) to encourage the Secretary-General to steer discussion at the High Level Review meeting to our agenda for the Commonwealth;

(ii) to seek the Secretary-General's initial views on the CHOGM agenda;

(iii) to encourage a more positive approach to South Africa, and a forward-looking debate at CHOGM;

(iv) to contain the "NGO Trust Fund" proposal and promote the UK's alternative scheme.

Chief Anyaoku's objectives are likely to include:

(a) lobbying for his NGO Trust Fund project;

(b) presenting his view of the Review meeting on 11/12 June;

(c) Election monitoring, especially in Guyana;

(d) an exchange of views on South Africa and the Commonwealth.

(e) possibly, to refer to a forthcoming report by a Commonwealth Working Group on a North/South dialogue.

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Meeting of Ten Heads of Government, 11/12 June: Harare Declaration

I wrote to you on 23 May about the themes and objectives for the meeting. Chief Anyaoku envisages the meeting opening with a round of short general statements focussing on the role of the Commonwealth in tackling the problems of the next few years, setting the context for the Harare Declaration. He will have his "own input" to this. The Prime Minister may like to stress that we do not want a debate on the lengthy officials' report, which is a background document only. Anyaoku wants the discussion of the Declaration to begin at tea on the first day, so that officials can as necessary redraft that evening. We support this.

The Prime Minister may wish to welcome the draft Declaration prepared by Senior Officials. But it can be further tightened up, AND reflect better our preference for human rights, good government and democracy as the main priorities for action in the future. We have briefed the Australians and Canadians on the broad lines of the good government initiative (my letter of 31 May), but do not expect to have their comments by the time of the Secretary- General's call. The Prime Minister may nevertheless wish to signal to the Secretary-General that he is considering an initiative on good government. South Africa should not be a substantive issue in the meeting, although it will certainly be prominent in bilaterals.

Other Agenda Items

Other agenda items in June include Commonwealth membership and election monitoring. Since my letter of 23 October 1990 on the Cameroon application, Cameroon has made no progress towards good government. It is difficult to see how, at present, Cameroon could meet the Singapore principles. The Prime Minister might invite Anyaoku to address in June the question of criteria for other potential applicants, who include Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and Burma.

The proposed election monitoring guidelines are basically sound, but we differ on finance. The Secretary-General claims that this cannot be done within his Zero Real Growth budget, and may seek support for a special fund. We believe that resources can be reallocated and old activities dropped.

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CHOGM Agenda

The Secretary-General is preparing his "pre-agenda" letter. The Prime Minister may wish to explore his views on the likely balance between South Africa (see below) and other issues, and encourage him to promote a forward-looking approach, in line with the overall emphasis of the Review exercise. Among the areas where CHOGM could make a useful contribution are the Environment, where Commonwealth Delegations have already begun to cooperate in the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on Environment and Development, drugs and good government in general.

South Africa

South Africa is likely to be a prominent issue at Harare, whether or not further progress has been made. Anyaoku says he wants to see its dominance of CHOGM reduced and the Commonwealth's role made more positive (including that of the Committee of Foreign Ministers which he hopes we might then join) but accepts that it will depend on events.

On 7 May Chief Anyaoku issued a helpful press release (after a telephone call from Mandela) in which he expressed his concern that the "threatened rupture in relations and the consequent suspension of dialogue between the South African Government and the ANC is a matter of grave concern to the Commonwealth". He warned that a breakdown in negotiations could be "cataclysmic" for hopes for the peaceful end to apartheid. He called on all concerned, the SAG, the ANC, and Inkatha to address the problems of violence.

Against this background, the Prime Minister might wish to say:

- Welcome your statement on 7 May. While the South African Government is primarily responsible for law and order, it needs to agree new measures with leaders of all parties. Hope you will continue to use your influence with all leaders. Violence no reason to delay constitutional talks - only by talking will solutions be found.

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- Sport excepted, Commonwealth still dormant on sanctions. When will Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa next meet? If in July, after pillars of apartheid removed, hope they can recommend immediate lifting of sanctions: not just "peoples' sanctions" (visas, tourism) but, more important, economic and financial sanctions. We need to make progress soon, well before Harare CHOGM. Crucial to restore growth to South African economy. South Africa badly needs foreign capital: essential that Commonwealth fulfil its commitment at 1989 CHOGM to approach the international financial institutions about South African access.

NGO Trust Fund

The Secretary-General will want to reverse our opposition to his proposal for a £10 million Trust Fund to finance development activities by Commonwealth NGOs (Prime Minister's letter of 3 May, attached). [not attached] At Anyaoku's initiative, his Deputy, Peter Unwin, went through the proposal in detail with Simon Hemans, who set out our objections, but said that we had not yet taken irrevocable decisions. Chief Anyaoku raised the issue with the Foreign Secretary on the flight back from New Delhi, who also agreed to look at the question again. Anyaoku may say:-

(a) he had wanted to discuss it with the Prime Minister personally;

(b) he accepts that we prefer direct contributions rather than a Trust Fund which requires money up front and does not deliver early benefit;

(c) he believes that NGO development activities are a proper charge to the Secretariat. He would not therefore charge any Secretariat administrative costs to the Fund;

(d) the Foundation do not have the capacity or the contacts to run the Fund.

The Prime Minister might say that his prompt reply to the Secretary-General's letter was intended to be helpful. It was important to be clear that the changes

/introduced

RETAINED BY DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4)

TEMPORARILY RETAINED
J. Gray
22/4/2017

introduced to the original concept had not removed our concerns. We still do not like the idea of a new institution, however lightly staffed. Our alternative approach of a 50% increase in the Foundation's budget offers greater resources sooner. ODA's experience of working with indigenous NGOs is that few of them are able to handle foreign funded projects without intensive support. We believe that the new fund would need to meet its own running costs rather than the Secretariat budget carrying them. Only then could proper priorities for Secretariat funds be established: in our view good government, human rights and the environment have a better claim on resources. We continue to believe that the proper place to administer additional resources for NGOs is the Commonwealth Foundation, in close cooperation with NGOs and the technical experts in the Secretariat. This is a time to strengthen the Foundation. That is why he has nominated a high calibre candidate for Chairman of the Foundation, Sir Richard Luce.

[redacted] There was however some sadness at the extent to which the Secretary-General might feel disappointed. The Foreign Secretary has therefore been giving some thought to ways of softening the blow, and we understand that the Canadians are also working on an alternative approach. The Prime Minister might suggest a meeting with the major contributors to the Secretariat and Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation budgets after the June meeting to work out an alternative way forward. It might still be possible to associate this with Her Majesty's 40th Anniversary. But equally it is not too late for the Commonwealth to look for other ways to mark the occasion.

The Prime Minister should know that although the Secretary-General will claim the contrary, our approaches to those countries which he has lobbied showed no positive support for the idea. The Secretary-General has however gone out on a limb, particularly with President Babangida, who has offered a contribution of £0.5 million, and will need to be allowed to withdraw gracefully.

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North/South Dialogue

The Secretary-General may refer to a report under preparation by a Commonwealth working party on the possibility of arranging a meeting of some Heads of Government representing developed and developing countries to consider a wide range of developmental issues. This follows a remit from the CHOGM in Kuala Lumpur in 1989 in response to a call for renewal of a North/South dialogue from Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica. The interim report produced for last year's Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Meeting was, on the whole, constructive with welcome reference to the importance of political pluralism, popular participation and market-orientated economic reform. This suggests that there is likely to be some useful material which could provide the basis for a discussion of development issues perhaps, in particular, promoting discussion of good government at CHOGM. The Secretary-General may say that the final report is about to issue, and might suggest that we should take an opportunity to commend it to other G7 countries at the London Economic Summit.

We will wish to study the report carefully and would not in any sense wish to be insensitive to the anxieties of the developing countries. But we would be instinctively cautious about the advantages of a North/South dialogue however carefully prepared.

If this is raised, therefore, the Prime Minister might remind the Secretary-General of the hesitations we expressed when this was raised in Kuala Lumpur, and say that we will want to consider the report very carefully.

Sri Lanka

The Prime Minister might also thank the Secretary-General for his offer of assistance following the explusion of the British High Commissioner in Colombo, David Gladstone. (The Secretary-General, who was in Lagos, had passed messages both through our High Commissioner there, and through his Deputy here.)

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

KW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 May 1991

Dear Simon,

CALL BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

The Commonwealth Secretary General will now be calling on the Prime Minister on Thursday 6 June in preparation for the meeting of the High Level Appraisal Group. I should be grateful if a brief for the meeting could reach me by noon on Wednesday 5 June.

Yours,

Stephen

J S WALL

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

KW

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alp

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 May 1991

COMMONWEALTH NGO TRUST FUND

Thank you for your letter of 29 July enclosing a draft letter from the Prime Minister to the Commonwealth Secretary General. The letter has now issued and enclose a copy.

J.S. Wall

Simon Gass Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

HK

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 May 1991

Dear Eneka,

I am grateful to you for sending me a copy of your note on the Trust Fund.

The Commonwealth's non-governmental organisations are one of its strengths. Commonwealth governments can, and should, help them. They play important roles in individual member countries, and in the many networks which bind the Commonwealth together. It is with some regret, therefore, that I have to say that I am not able to support what you propose.

As you know better than I, since 1965 the governmental and non-governmental aspects of the Commonwealth have come under separate umbrellas. This arrangement has been twice renewed, which I think shows its merit. I see no advantage either in creating new fund raising machinery, nor in looking beyond the Commonwealth Foundation to allocate funds: indeed, we believe that the Foundation would be able to handle increased resources. I appreciate your determination to avoid new costs by reallocating the Secretariat's existing resources, but I doubt whether, with the Foundation's machinery in place, an NGO grant administration unit within the Secretariat ought to have a high priority. The Secretariat's efforts on human rights, election monitoring, good government, the impact of environmental change and the need for sustainable development, all call for substantial resources and I believe that they have a prior claim.

We would be ready to support proposals which build on the Foundation's existing mandates and machinery, drawing on additional advice and expertise as necessary, and to join with other members in setting in Harare a substantially higher level of support for NGOs through the Foundation's annual budget. This should result in larger sums being available to NGOs sooner than using the Trust approach. I am glad that the preliminary work you have done has focused on this important need.

I am sure that Heads of Government in Harare will be able to build on your ideas to create, through the Foundation, a way of expressing to Her Majesty their appreciation of the devoted service She has given to the Commonwealth during the last forty years.

Yours sincerely,

John M.

Chief Emeka C. Anyaoku, CON

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1991

Dear Stephen,

Commonwealth NGO Trust Fund

Thank you for your letter of 19 April.

I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the Commonwealth Secretary-General's letter of 19 April. This follows the line recommended in my letter of 25 March, to which you recorded the Prime Minister's agreement in your letter of 26 March. Sir Patrick Wright subsequently spoke both to the Secretary-General and to Sir Robert Fellowes and set out our preferred approach.

The only significant difference between the proposal as set out in the Secretary-General's letter and our earlier understanding is the proposal for a "NGO desk" in the Secretariat to coordinate and administer the fund's work and resources. Although the Secretary-General indicates that he believes that he can reallocate resources from elsewhere in the Secretariat to staff this new unit, we believe that such an approach represents a poor use of scarce Secretariat resources and would usurp the role of the Commonwealth Foundation as the Commonwealth's non-Governmental arm.

It seems likely that Chief Anyaoku intends to seek endorsement for his proposal at the 11/12 June meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, although he has not given formal notice or included it on the draft agenda. The Australian High Commission tell us that the Secretary-General intends to raise it with Mr Hawke when they meet in Canberra next week. We shall make our reservations and alternative proposals known to Mr Hawke's advisors, and to the other recipients of the Secretary-General's note.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

J S Wall Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

To: Chief Emeka C Anyaoku, CON
Commonwealth Secretary-General
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
LONDON SW1Y 5HX

I am grateful to you for sending me a copy of your note on the Trust Fund.

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through the Foundation's annual budget. This should result in larger sums being available to NGOs sooner than using the Trust approach. I am glad that the preliminary work you have done has focussed on this important need.

I am sure that Heads of Government in Harare will be able to build on your ideas to create, through the Foundation, a way of expressing to Her Majesty their appreciation of the devoted service She has given to the Commonwealth during the last forty years.

Commonwealth: mtgs
with sec
may 79

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

20 April 1991

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Anyaoku.

I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature. It would be helpful if this could reach me by Friday 3 May.

J. S. WALL

Simon Gass
~~Christopher Prentice~~, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc PC

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

CONFIDENTIAL

19 April 1991

Dear Prime Minister,

record at flap

At our meeting in January, I undertook to let you have in due course a note on the objectives, scope and operating principles of the Trust Fund for which I was seeking your support. The attached paper sums up the outcome of my thoughts and fairly wide informal consultations on the matter.

In principle, you will notice that I have been careful to respond to your concern that this initiative should not involve any duplication of structures or unnecessary administrative costs. The Fund will have about six Trustees from the non-governmental sector who under normal circumstances will not need to meet more than once a year. Administrative support to the Board of Trustees will be provided by a new NGO desk in the Secretariat which I propose to create and finance entirely through a re-allocation of existing resources. I have since my assumption of office been reviewing the internal operation of the Secretariat with a view to shifting resources from activities of decreasing to those of increasing priority. The Commonwealth Foundation and the Commonwealth Trust will also have their important roles in supporting the activities of the Fund. The enlistment of the contributions of the NGOs in tackling some of our member states' socio-economic problems at the grass roots level is clearly one of our future priorities.

Another important feature of the proposal relates to the size of the Fund. I appreciate that resources are not unlimited but there is a strong feeling that the Fund should be substantial enough both to provide proper recognition of the 40th Anniversary of the Queen's Accession as Head of the Commonwealth (with the Fund established under her Patronage) and also able to finance a reasonable annual programme of activities. For these reasons as well as for the reason of securing the future of the initiative, I believe we should seek a Fund of the order indicated in the paper.

.../2

The Rt Hon John Major MP
Prime Minister of Britain

CONFIDENTIAL

I leave for Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific today and will not return until early in May. I hope it will be possible for me to call on you soon thereafter to discuss matters pertaining to the June meeting of ten Commonwealth Heads of Government.

With deep respect and warm regards

Yours Ever

Emeka.

Emeka Anyaoku

The Rt Hon John Major MP
Prime Minister of Britain
10 Downing Street
London SW1

THE HEAD OF THE COMMONWEALTH'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY

1. 1992 will see the 40th Anniversary of the Queen as the Head of the Commonwealth. The occasion could provide a suitable opportunity for acknowledging Her Majesty's forty years of service to the Commonwealth in a way that strengthens the capacity of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) within the Commonwealth to serve the association more effectively. This note outlines a possible approach that might be considered by Heads of Government. It reflects informal consultations between representatives of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Commonwealth Foundation, the Commonwealth Trust and others who have been concerned to combine formal recognition of the Anniversary with action which enhances the role of Commonwealth NGOs in the social and economic development of member countries.

2. Heads of Government have on many occasions stressed the value of NGOs to the maintenance and furtherance of Commonwealth relations and objectives. At their meeting in Vancouver in 1987, for example, they "expressed renewed appreciation of the contribution made by NGOs to national life in member countries and to Commonwealth understanding and co-operation". More recently, the importance of the unofficial Commonwealth, and of the work of NGOs, has been highlighted in the Report of the Working Group of Officials to the High-Level Appraisal Group of Ten Heads of Government, due to meet in London in

June. NGOs are active in many parts of the Commonwealth and in many areas of endeavour. In them, private citizens have an opportunity to serve their societies and fellow citizens especially at the grass-roots level. Most contribute to development by work in fields as diverse as poverty alleviation, education, welfare for the blind and disabled, training, health, sport and culture, and social development. There is little doubt that the role of NGOs in support of development will assume greater importance in emerging Commonwealth priorities in the 1990s and beyond, especially if the challenge of development is to be effectively met at the grass-roots level.

3. NGOs are by their nature essentially self-supporting. They are financed in the main by subscription and voluntary contributions. Some benefit also from subventions from official sources. It is suggested that the initiation in 1992 of a limited capacity to provide subventions on a Commonwealth footing would represent a suitable acknowledgement of the 40th Anniversary of the position of the Head of the Commonwealth.

4. Specifically it is proposed that Commonwealth governments might wish to contribute to the establishment of a Trust Fund which would provide support to NGOs' endeavours which particularly advance agreed Commonwealth objectives. The Fund should be established on a scale which is modest but which reflects the importance of the initiative and marks appropriately the 40th Anniversary of the Queen's

Accession to the Throne and as Head of the Commonwealth. A fund of, say, £10 million built up over three years would provide an initial income of perhaps £5-600,000 per annum, increasing with a growing flow of dividends from the underlying investments, and would represent an appropriate starting point for the Fund.

5. It is hoped that Her Majesty might agree to become the Trust's Patron. Overall responsibility for the Trust would, however, have to be taken by a Board of Trustees. The choice of Chairman of the Board is critical for the success of the project. He or she should be a person of authority, familiar with a number of Commonwealth countries, the Commonwealth ethos and the modus operandi of NGOs. The Chairman should be supported by a small Board of about six Trustees who, taken together, should be representative of all the main regions of the Commonwealth. Like the Chairman they should be familiar with the work of NGOs. It is envisaged that the Board of Trustees would normally meet annually. It would be responsible for the funds initially provided to the Trust by Commonwealth governments; for possible further fund raising; for the investment and management of resources; and for broad questions of grants policy.

6. It will clearly be important to avoid the creation of new structures and avoid unnecessary administrative costs. Administrative support to the Board of Trustees should therefore be provided by a new NGO desk in the

Secretariat, staffed and financed entirely through a reallocation of existing resources. The individual concerned would act as Secretary to the Board of Trustees and a central point of contact and co-ordination for the Fund. He or she would work in close liaison with the Commonwealth Foundation and Commonwealth Trust and with Divisions throughout the Secretariat, acting as the focal point of a working group (in effect a grants committee) on which the Commonwealth Foundation and the Trust would be fully represented. The group would deal with applications for support for socio-economic development work while submissions dealing with cultural co-operation and activities could be handled by the Commonwealth Foundation. The working group would also be able to draw on advice from liaison units throughout the Commonwealth and, where appropriate, informal committees established in individual Commonwealth countries to advise on the merits of individual applications for subventions. The proposed structure at working level will therefore be a hybrid, built upon the three elements of Commonwealth Trust, Commonwealth Foundation and Commonwealth Secretariat (with the last ensuring a continuing interface with governments).

7. Once a decision is taken to establish such a Trust Fund, it will be for the Trustees, in close consultation with others and with the Commonwealth Secretary-General in particular, to formulate policy and establish priorities between broad areas of activity. But three principles suggest themselves:

(a) Given the fact that 46 of the Commonwealth's 50 members are developing countries, priority should be given to projects advancing the human and material development of Commonwealth countries;

(b) It would similarly be appropriate to give particular attention to small-scale projects that directly address human needs at the grass-roots level; and

(c) Projects which promote co-operation and contact within the Commonwealth should also receive priority.

Many NGO activities concerned with promoting the interests of women and young people, with sustainable rural development and the protection of the environment and with the dissemination of art and culture, for example, meet all three criteria.

8. It would of course be necessary for projects supported by the Trust Fund to supplement rather than compete with national governmental objectives, with the Fund concentrating on work at the interface between the Governmental and non-Governmental sectors.

Commonwealth Secretariat
April 1991

COMMONWEALTH

Mtgs with SEC GEN

May 1979



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cc PC

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street SW1P 3AG
071-270 3000
Fax 071-270 5456

S L Gass Esq
Private Secretary
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London
SW1

15 April 1991

attached will-e-mail to Treasury

Dear Simon,

COMMONWEALTH NGO TRUST FUND

The Chief Secretary has seen a copy of your letter of 25 March to Stephen Wall about the Foreign Secretary's proposal to increase funding of the Commonwealth Foundation. He has also seen a copy of the reply of 26 March.

2 The Chief Secretary welcomes and supports the Foreign Secretary's efforts to resist a new institution being set up. The Chief Secretary is convinced that if it is decided to increase UK funding to the Commonwealth Foundation, the costs must be from within the present FCO/ODA expenditure plans.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Wall at No.10, Suma Chakrabarti at the ODA and to Sonia Phippard at the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever

Nicholas

N I HOLGATE
Private Secretary



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cl foreign dary.
MEM

bcc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1991

COMMONWEALTH NGO TRUST FUND

Thank you for your letter of 25 March suggesting a way of diverting Chief Anyaoku's proposal for a £10m Trust Fund for Commonwealth Voluntary Organisations.

Subject to the financial arrangements being worked out with the Treasury, the Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign Secretary's proposal to promote a decision at CHOGM to increase the programme resources of the Commonwealth Foundation.

I am copying this letter to Philip Rutnam (PS/Financial Secretary) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

STEPHEN WALL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(1)

Content

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Subject to working out the finances with the Treasury (which should not be hard given that only £250,000 new money is involved) this looks like a good way of diverting Angaston's idea of a £10 m. Commonwealth Tower Fund.

Stephen

21/3

Foreign &
Commonwealth
Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

25 March 1991

Dear Stephen,

Commonwealth NGO Trust Fund

Sir C Powell recorded in his letter of 22 January, reporting the Commonwealth Secretary-General's call on the Prime Minister, Chief Anyaoku's statement that he proposed to launch a £10 million Trust Fund for Commonwealth Voluntary Organisations to mark the 40th Anniversary of Her Majesty's Accession. He later also raised it with the Foreign Secretary.

We understand that exchanges are still going on between the Secretariat and other parties over the final form of this idea. It may be some time before the Secretary-General follows up the Prime Minister's invitation to write. But what we have learnt so far suggests that the Prime Minister's scepticism is well-founded. We should act soon to divert the initiative into a more positive and acceptable direction.

The origin of the idea lies in several private sector initiatives suggesting a public appeal to mark the 40th Anniversary. None have found favour with the Palace. The idea of a more narrowly targeted appeal to Governments has however been welcomed by Her Private Secretary, and it is this that the Secretary-General is trying to develop. The present version would create a new institution (and bureaucracy) to administer the investment income from the Fund. This would work with the Secretariat and the Commonwealth Foundation (which already administers £1.5 million per annum of resources for Commonwealth professional and voluntary organisations).

/The

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

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The Foreign Secretary considers that more support to the private sector Commonwealth is a small but significant element in our efforts to develop political pluralism. But he sees no need to set up a new institution. The Foundation has an excellent reputation for apolitical support for professional and voluntary organisations, and since the 1979 CHOGM has a mandate which includes many areas of NGO activity.

A Trust will cut across an effective existing structure, create unnecessary new overhead costs and confuse the relationship between the Secretariat, responsible for supporting intergovernmental cooperation, and the Foundation, responsible for supporting and fostering NGO activity. But if we do not move to outflank the proposal early the combination of Royal approval and Secretariat promotion will make it politically very difficult for the Prime Minister to resist at Harare.

Given Her Majesty's view that Commonwealth NGOs deserve greater support (a view broadly endorsed by the senior officials preparing for the review meeting of ten Heads of Government), the Foreign Secretary believes that we should promote, as an alternative, a decision at CHOGM to increase the Foundation's programme resources substantially, perhaps from £1.5 million to £2.25 million per annum. The cost (including extra overheads) to Britain, if all other members contributed their "share" would be no more than £250,000 per annum as against the £1 million for three years implied by the Trust Fund proposal. An appropriate provision will be sought in the PES round. Sir Patrick Wright would speak on these lines to Sir Robert Fellowes and Chief Anyaoku, and we would also seek to coopt the Australians and Canadians, who are the other major contributors to the Foundation's budget. I should be grateful if you would let us know the Prime Minister's reaction to this alternative approach.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Flanagan (PS/Financial Secretary) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Stephen Wall Esq CMG
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 February 1991

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Election Monitoring Groups

Your letter of 22 January asked for a copy of the proposed guidelines on Commonwealth monitoring of elections. These are enclosed.

The Secretary General's draft guidelines are on the whole sensible. We have two reservations. The guidelines do not adequately reflect the contribution which can be made by voluntary organisations in the Commonwealth - for example, we believe that the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association has a role to play in any Commonwealth election monitoring initiative. The financial proposals are also unsatisfactory: if monitoring teams are to become a regular feature of Commonwealth cooperation, provision must be made in the regular budget (the guidelines propose contributions from other Commonwealth countries).

We shall pass these observations to the Secretariat.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMONWEALTH GROUPS TO OBSERVE ELECTIONS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES

Introduction

In their discussions at Langkawi and Kuala Lumpur in October 1989, Heads of Government requested the High-Level Appraisal Group to examine the modalities of a facility for mounting election observer missions at the request of member governments. The Working Group of Experienced Officials which is assisting the Appraisal Group has now met and held discussions on this matter. In the light of Commonwealth experience in the past, and most recently in Malaysia, the Secretary-General undertook to prepare a set of the following guidelines which would serve as a basis for Commonwealth activities in the future in this area.

Establishing Commonwealth Observer Groups

2. The Commonwealth Secretary-General would consider establishing an independent group of appropriate size when he receives a formal request from a Commonwealth government for the Commonwealth to observe its own country's elections. Recognising the sensitivities and essential differences between constituting an observer mission for self-determination and decolonisation-related elections (as in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1980) and observing elections in an independent country, the Secretary-General in the latter cases would need to receive an express invitation from the government concerned and be assured directly by the political parties of their support. The agreed understandings and other organisational arrangements outlined in this paper would form the basis for an approach by the Secretary-General to member governments seeking material and other support for the proposed mission.

3. The electoral standards and procedures to be applied should be the subject of broad agreement among the parties wishing to contest the election. While consideration would need to be given to particular local customs, circumstances and traditions, these standards and procedures would have regard in particular to those laid down in relevant international instruments and be in accordance with fundamental Commonwealth beliefs and principles. In determining whether to accede to a particular request the Secretary-General would need to take into account whether the election process as a whole in that country was in general conformity with internationally-accepted norms, and that any differences were accepted by the parties.

4. Where the Commonwealth Secretary-General is asked to provide a Commonwealth observer group, consideration would have to be given as to whether, in the context of the presence of other groups which may also have been invited, the Commonwealth per se has a special role to play in the process.

Terms of Reference

5. The purpose of an observer group would be to say whether in its independent judgement the poll was free and fair. In recognition that it would be the wish of all concerned that the poll be free and fair, the observer group would be expected to reflect in its report and, where appropriate, bring to the attention of the appropriate authorities any matters which caused it concern. This latter function would be confined to a "good offices" role and the group would have no express or implied executive function. Its terms of reference should therefore be drawn broadly. They should reflect the fact that the group has to make a judgement as to whether, notwithstanding any particular difficulties, overall the process taken as a whole - the campaign together with registration of voters and the poll itself - has been such as to be likely to represent the wishes of the people.

6. To reflect the broad nature of this process and of the judgement ultimately to be made, the terms of reference should be drawn in general terms and read in conjunction with this paper. A possible formulation appears as Annex A. Use of similar terms of reference would have the advantage of both the government concerned and the various political parties knowing from the outset what the Commonwealth can offer. However drawn, the terms of reference should enable the observer group to take into account in its overall assessment the fairness of the registration process; the freedom of the parties to nominate candidates, to campaign, and to get their message across to the electorate; the freedom of parties to publish and distribute campaign literature in compliance with the general law of the land and the election law; where permits for rallies are necessary, whether these were granted or denied on a discriminatory basis; whether relevant officials were neutral as between the parties; whether the parties were permitted to satisfy themselves as to the integrity of the poll (e.g. to be represented at all times when the ballot box is unsealed; to inspect boxes as empty prior to the start of polling; to affix their own seals at relevant times and to inspect them subsequently; to be present at the count and to accompany boxes if they are transported for counting elsewhere); whether the act of voting was secret, and whether the ballot boxes, when not closed, were in the full view of the presiding officials and the party polling agents; whether voting took place in an atmosphere conducive to voting without intimidation; and whether the count was properly conducted.

Composition

7. The group would be appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General on an ad hoc basis and would comprise individuals of high standing and proven integrity whose considered opinions would be likely to carry weight. In determining its membership, the Secretary-General would have regard to the need for the group to be able to command the confidence and trust of all those participating in the elections. The precise size would depend on the size of the country where the poll was to be observed, both

ographically and in terms of its electorate. The minimum size a group would be three. In addition, the group would be serviced by a small team, from the Commonwealth Secretariat (augmented from outside as may be necessary) which would provide logistical support and expert advice on such matters as the relevant electoral laws and the conduct of elections generally.

Modus Operandi

8. The Secretary-General would need to be assured from the outset that the members of the group would enjoy free and open access to polling places and counting stations and that it would be free generally to pursue its mandate. The group would, where possible, arrive in the country concerned before the conclusion of the election campaign. In some circumstances it might be desirable to be present for at least a part of the registration process and/or for the nomination of candidates. The group would remain until the count was concluded and the result announced. In the ordinary course of events a group might be in a country for up to two weeks (the final week of the campaign, the days of the poll and the period of the count). In accordance with international practice it would be open to the group, should it wish to do so, to make an interim announcement of its findings to date ahead of the count commencing (as recognised international practice suggests that this can prevent a group from being criticised subsequently for having allowed the results of the count to influence its judgement as to other events). The group would act in its own independent judgement and would not be representative of governments, either individually or collectively, or of the Secretary-General. The opinions expressed would be those of its members only. Members would serve in their individual capacities. The group would be asked to send its report initially to the Commonwealth Secretary-General and to the government of the country in question, and thereafter to the leaderships of the political parties taking part in the election. The Secretary-General would then transmit copies of the report to other Commonwealth governments in the usual way.

Financial

9. Funding of observer missions should be on a pan-Commonwealth basis rather than be the responsibility of the particular government concerned. The costs of observing an election would vary widely from country to country, and could be high, particularly where a large team of observers was necessary. Before agreeing to appoint a group, the Secretary-General would need to be satisfied that the likely costs of the exercise were covered in an appropriate manner and that there were no implications for the Secretariat's headquarter's budget.

[redacted]er Commonwealth Assistance

10. The Commonwealth, in addition to providing such observer groups, could also be prepared to respond positively to requests from individual governments for technical assistance in the organisation and conduct of elections, and, where needed, for the loan or gift of materials and equipment required for the administration of the poll.

Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1

December 1990

ANNEX A

MODEL DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

"The Group is established by the Commonwealth Secretary-General at the request of the government of ..... supported by the political parties. It is to observe every relevant aspect of the organisation and conduct of the elections in accordance with the law of ..... relating to elections. Its function is to ascertain whether, in its impartial judgement and in the context of that law, the elections have been free and fair.

"The Group has no executive role; its function is neither to supervise nor act as a commission of inquiry but to observe the process as a whole and to form a judgement accordingly. It is to submit its report initially to the Secretary-General and to the government of ..... , and thereafter to the leaderships of the political parties taking part in the election."

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 January 1991

Dear Richard,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Prime Minister had a talk this morning with Chief Anyaoku, the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

The Prime Minister regretted the need to postpone the intended meeting of a number of Commonwealth Heads of Government in London this week, to discuss the future of the Commonwealth. He had seen the draft declaration which had been prepared for the meeting, and thought it very much on the right lines. Chief Anyaoku said he understood the need for postponement and had proposed new dates of 10-12 June which appeared acceptable to everyone. The Prime Minister said that he had not yet been consulted about the dates, but would look at them.

Chief Anyaoku said that the Gulf situation had very important implications for the Commonwealth. With twenty-five small states among its members, it had a direct interest in seeing the aggression of a large neighbour against a small country reversed.

The Secretary-General referred to the guidelines for Commonwealth observance of elections, which he had been planning to bring forward at the meeting of Heads of Government. Observers had already been sent to the elections in Malaysia, and now Guyana and Bangladesh were asking for them. He understood that the Australian Prime Minister had some reservations about the experience in Malaysia. The Prime Minister said that he was unaware of the guidelines but would make a point of looking at them (I should be grateful if you could provide me with a copy).

The Prime Minister said he wanted to talk to Chief Anyaoku about the prospects for CHOGM in Harare in October. He had been a bit scarred by his first CHOGM in Kuala Lumpur and found it a bruising encounter. He would not want to see it repeated. The task in Harare should be to set the agenda for the Commonwealth's future and to break away from the obsession with South Africa. It was clear that President De Klerk would continue with his reforms and would spell out the next steps in his speech at the opening of the South African Parliament. By the autumn, the European Community would in all likelihood have lifted more of the restrictive measures against South Africa, and the United

States would also have started easing restrictions. Trade would be flowing and there was pressure to restore sporting links. If the Commonwealth had not made a move before October, it would find itself stranded. In his view, it would be far better if the Commonwealth had also begun to lift measures before then so that discussion in Harare could concentrate on more constructive issues.

Chief Anyaoku said that he was hopeful that Harare would be a different type of meeting from Kuala Lumpur so far as discussion of South Africa was concerned. He had spoken recently by telephone to Nelson Mandela and had seen a delegation from the ANC. They were hoping for a meeting of all political parties in South Africa by June. If the promised developments took place, the focus of attention would move away from sanctions and the Commonwealth would not have to engage in the same controversy as in the past. Rather, it could focus on how the Commonwealth could best sustain the negotiating process and help post-apartheid South Africa.

The Prime Minister repeated that, if the rest of the world had moved on sanctions but the Commonwealth had not, there were bound to be problems at Harare. The least likely place to get an agreement to lift sanctions was a meeting in Harare under the chairmanship of Robert Mugabe. It was important to take action beforehand. He wondered how that could be activated. Chief Anyaoku said that he had already begun to discuss with Joe Clark, Gareth Evans and the Zimbabwe Foreign Minister the possibility of action by the Commonwealth at the time of the meeting of Heads of Government in June, or even before. The Committee of Foreign Ministers on South Africa was due from 15-17 March and would discuss this. He recognised that it would be unwise for the Commonwealth to be left behind. If President De Klerk acted as he had promised, the Commonwealth should begin to reconsider some of the trade, sporting and cultural sanctions, and to some degree investment sanctions as well. The Prime Minister underlined the importance of supporting President De Klerk. It would be very foolish of the Commonwealth to refuse to ease restrictions until it had the whole loaf. What President De Klerk had already done deserved practical recognition.

Chief Anyaoku referred to the work of the Expert Group on the North/South questions which Mr. Manley had proposed in Kuala Lumpur. It was adopting a thoroughly realistic approach. He hoped that the Prime Minister would give serious consideration to its report when it issued.

Chief Anyaoku continued that he was in the process of formulating a proposal for a Commonwealth Trust Fund to help NGOs, to mark the 40th Anniversary of The Queen assuming the role of Head of the Commonwealth. He had discussed this informally with Sir Robert Fellowes and Sir Philip Moore and had the impression the idea would be well received by The Queen. He had in mind raising a capital sum of £10 million over three years, of which the United Kingdom's share might be £3 million. He intended to approach the Canadians for a similar contribution. He already had a commitment of £500,000 from President Babangida. The Primed Minister said that he had not previously

been aware of the proposal. Was there any paper spelling out the details? His initial reaction was sceptical. Chief Anyaoku promised to let the Prime Minister have a note about the proposal.

I am copying this letter to Suma Chakrabarti (Overseas Development Administration).

C. D. POWELL

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc B'KG
PR

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January 1991

RESTRICTED

Dear Charles,

Call by Commonwealth Secretary-General, 22 January

Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Commonwealth Secretary-General since July 1990, will make his first call on the Prime Minister on 22 January. He last called on Mrs Thatcher on 4 July. The introductory call had been intended partly as a curtain raiser for the meeting of ten Heads of Government which has now been postponed. It now offers a more general opportunity to start setting the scene for the Harare CHOGM (16-22 October), and to probe the Secretary-General's intentions and expectations. He is likely to seek confirmation of our support for the review process and to try to identify any changes in our approach to major Commonwealth issues. He will also no doubt want to hear the Prime Minister's views on the Gulf.

Review

The Prime Minister could welcome the postponement of the 21/22 January meeting. The Heads of Government when they meet will now be able to take into account in their work on the "draft Harare Declaration", developments in the Gulf and over the Uruguay Round. It will also allow the Secretary General to outline his proposals for modernising the Secretariat's programmes and structures. It may be right for the Working Group of Experts (on which Lord Armstrong sits) to meet again briefly in advance. If the Secretary-General mentions his intention to use outside consultants to review the Secretariat, the Prime Minister might encourage him to take a radical view of the Secretariat's new programme priorities. There will have to be new areas of focus particularly "good government" and support for democratic institutions. The

/draft

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draft Declaration (copy attached) is a welcome blueprint for change, but it will need to be imaginatively applied.

Harare CHOGM (16-22 October)

The Prime Minister might ask Chief Anyaoku how he sees his first CHOGM as Secretary-General, and what emphasis he will be trying to achieve. Our aim is to see the emphasis shift from the sterile rehearsal of South African positions, to positive encouragement of good government in all its aspects.

South Africa

The Commonwealth has not yet responded realistically to political progress in South Africa. The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFM-SA) is a sanctions lobby group to which the UK does not belong and an ANC mouthpiece. It postponed a meeting fixed for last December, largely because the ANC had not agreed a way forward on sanctions. It may meet in March in New Delhi. In the run up to the next CHOGM (Harare, October) there seems little prospect of the Commonwealth's position on sanctions keeping up with events on the ground despite the fact that the Gleneagles Agreement on sporting contacts looks set to fray at the edges as individual sports become integrated and international contacts "respectable". Much of black opinion within South Africa (including the ANC) now favours a sport by sport relaxation.

Chief Anyaoku has however begun to focus on the need to prepare the Commonwealth to assist post-apartheid South Africa (as he showed when he spoke to Commonwealth senior officials at Port Moresby in November). He has created a non-governmental expert Committee on Human Resource Development (ie training) in South Africa. He plans to visit Washington soon to discuss South Africa's access to the IFIs, thus implementing a CHOGM decision (Kuala Lumpur 1989) and he has asked us to bring him together discreetly with the South African Ambassador.

Chief Anyaoku might raise the moribund "Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa" (not the CCFM-SA, but meetings of High Commissioners in London) which used to be attended by an FCO Assistant Under Secretary and sometimes by the Minister. Chief Anyaoku has suggested that the time may be right to revive this forum.

/Against

RESTRICTED

Against this background the Prime Minister may like to say:

- The Rome European Council in December lifted the ban on new investment so as to signal encouragement to de Klerk to continue reforms, and to help stimulate economic growth (vital for the success of a political settlement). Important that the Commonwealth position should be realistic and keep pace with change.

- As you said in Port Moresby, we must now look to South Africa's economic future. Access to the IFIs will be crucial. What objectives do you have for your forthcoming visit to Washington?

- Looking ahead to Harare, grateful for your preliminary views on prospects for adapting the Commonwealth's South African policy in line with events.

- [If raised] Informal meetings of the "Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa" could help inject new realism. Perhaps a meeting should be held in February when the South African Government's new legislative plans for dismantling apartheid are clear.

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Sir Charles Powell KCMG
10 Downing Street

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

DRAFT HARARE COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION

Twenty years ago at Singapore, in the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, the Commonwealth gave itself a charter. Commonwealth leaders pledged our association to work for international understanding and peace, for the elimination of racism, for free and democratic political processes, and for liberty and equal rights for all citizens. Much has been achieved, but much remains to be done.

2. At our meeting here in Harare, we, the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, have reviewed the nature of our association, its past achievements, and the changes required to enable it to sustain its distinctive and constructive role in world affairs into the next century.

3. We meet against the backdrop of a changed and rapidly changing international environment, one which is almost unrecognisable compared with that which faced the modern Commonwealth at its birth in 1949. Foremost amongst the changes have been:

- the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bi-polar tension and rivalry which dominated and regimented international relations for over forty years. This change has released enormous potential resources and energies for more productive purposes, including economic and social development, and has created a more complex world order with greater diffusion of power and new patterns of international relations and co-operation;

- the largely completed process of post-war decolonisation and the more than six-fold increase in our membership. The Commonwealth has provided a bridge from empire to sovereignty and co-operation, helped its developing members in their search for progress and prosperity, and assisted the international community in finding solutions to global problems;

- the progressive achievement of today's worldwide condemnation of the moral and political bankruptcy of apartheid, which has contributed to the process of change now taking place in South Africa. When complete, this change will present great new challenges and opportunities in a region of particular concern to the Commonwealth;

- growing acceptance of democratic principles and practices;

- the threats to society from the problems of drug abuse and illicit trafficking, and the spread of AIDS;

- general recognition of the importance and urgency of economic and social development to satisfy the basic needs and aspirations of the vast majority of the peoples of the world;

- the emergence of sustainable development as one of the pre-eminent issues on the global agenda, reflecting a growing

- global awareness of the interdependence between the environment and development;

- the globalisation of technology, commerce and information, which is forcing the world community into ever greater interdependence;

- increasing reliance on private economic initiative and market forces; and

- the evolution of world trading patterns, with threats to the open international trading system and increasing regionalisation.

4. Having helped to advance political freedom, the Commonwealth must now intensify its efforts to promote freedom from want. The peoples of the Commonwealth need the blessings of education, good health and personal security. The vast majority face acute problems: in many countries population growth, crushing poverty and environmental degradation; and for more than half our member states the particular vulnerability of their very small societies. Only sound development can offer these millions the prospect of betterment. Achieving this will require a flow of public and private resources from the developed to the developing world, and domestic and international regimes conducive to the realisation of these goals. We will work to these ends.

5. We recognise the pre-eminent need to marshal human and material resources in the cause of development. We recognise also the special role played in development by the participation of all sections of society through free and democratic processes, and through the protection and promotion of fundamental human rights.

6. In these endeavours all our governments can be assisted by the vigorous and extensive networks of organisations throughout the Commonwealth which bring together professional and special-interest groups.

7. We believe that the Commonwealth is uniquely placed to serve as a model and a catalyst for new forms of practical, consensual international co-operation.

8. We recognise that with its shared inheritance in the common law, the Commonwealth is well-qualified to make its collective voice heard in the development of international law.

9. We recognise that the Commonwealth is a special community of nations with a shared heritage and loyalty to common ideals. Ours is a community of freely-associated, independent, sovereign states and peoples which has evolved in response to changing circumstances, and whose membership is drawn from every region of the globe, comprehends every stage of economic development and encompasses a rich variety of race, language, religion, culture and tradition.

10. The Commonwealth way is to seek consensus through pragmatic consultation, co-operation and the sharing of experience. We commend it to the nations of the world as they free themselves

:om the constraints of rigid and narrow dogma and ideology. We believe it can make a valuable contribution to the conduct of world affairs, and to the renewal of the spirit of multilateralism and internationalism embodied in a strong United Nations. We pledge ourselves to strengthening this sense of solidarity and community in order to equip the Commonwealth for its important work in the years ahead.

11. Mindful of the challenges which the world faces in this period of transition, we record here our vision of the Commonwealth in the years ahead. We do so in a spirit of confidence and optimism, proud of our association's creative role in world affairs over the past four decades. In moving forward, we reaffirm our full and continuing commitment to the principles of the Singapore Declaration. We dedicate ourselves, our nations and our association with renewed vigour to:

- the belief that international peace and order and the rule of international law are essential to the security and prosperity of mankind;

- belief in the liberty of the individual, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, creed or political belief, and in their inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which they live;

- recognition of racial prejudice as a dangerous sickness threatening the healthy development of the human race and racial discrimination as an unmitigated evil of society;

- opposition to all forms of colonial domination and racial oppression and the commitment to the principles of human dignity and equality; and

- the belief that the wide disparities in wealth existing between different sections of mankind are too great to be tolerated.

12. The Commonwealth has distinctive and enlarging roles to play in the service of these values and beliefs and in responding to the changing needs of its members in the 1990s and beyond. Through our association, working in multilateral co-operation and in our individual states, we commit ourselves to action in the following priority areas in the 1990s:

- to protect and promote the basic political values of the Commonwealth: democracy, democratic processes and institutions, the rule of law, fundamental human rights, and equality for women;

- to assist the emergence of a just and equitable global society and in particular to continue assistance towards the ending of apartheid and the establishment of a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa;

- to promote development and alleviate poverty through:

- effective and where possible increased bilateral fr multilateral co-operation programmes;

- a stable international economic framework within which growth can be achieved;

- sound economic management with the active participation of the private sector;

- an adequate flow of government and private resources to the developing countries;

- sound public administration; and

- effective management of scientific and technological change;

- to work for the freest possible flow of multilateral international trade on terms fair and equitable to all, taking into account the special requirements of developing countries;

- to protect the environment for future generations by engendering global respect for the principles of sustainable development as enunciated in the Langkawi Declaration;

- to realise the full potential for co-operation between Commonwealth governments, parliaments and non-governmental organisations;

- to promote the development of human resources, in particular through education, training, health, culture, sport and programmes for strengthening family and community support, paying special attention to the needs of women and youth; and

- to combat the scourge of drug abuse and drug-trafficking, drawing in particular on enhanced co-operation based on shared Commonwealth traditions and approaches in the fields of public education, public administration, legal systems and law enforcement.

In developing programmes in support of these priorities for the 1990s and beyond, we shall give special attention to the needs of the smallest and most vulnerable members, especially those whose welfare and security may be in jeopardy, and to the needs of young people throughout the Commonwealth.

13. Convinced of the value of our association and of its potential to contribute further to the welfare of our countries, we pledge ourselves to increase awareness and understanding of the Commonwealth and its work among all our peoples.

Carcosa Seri Negara
Kuala Lumpur

December 1990

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

You are to see Emeka Anyaoku tomorrow. When we first fixed the call, it was intended as a curtain-raiser for the Commonwealth review meeting. That has, of course, now been postponed: you will want to thank him for his help over this while acknowledging his disappointment. The draft declaration which would have been considered at that meeting is in the folder. It is solid motherhood, and shouldn't give anyone much difficulty when it is eventually discussed. You could tell him that you think it's very much on the right lines.

You might use the meeting instead to talk about how he sees next autumn's CHOGM in Harare: and more widely how he thinks the Commonwealth can make the transition from overwhelming obsession with South Africa to a more balanced view of the world. It has singularly failed even to start on that transition so far. No action has been taken to respond to the changes in South Africa itself. The truth is that most members of the Commonwealth are terrified of letting go of the security blanket which opposition to South Africa constitutes for them. It's the main thing which unites the Commonwealth. Without it, many of them are terrified that attention will turn to their own unsatisfactory practices, whether over human rights, duff economic policies or incompetent government generally. The result is that the Commonwealth still acts as a front for the ANC - and some of the white members are as responsible for this as the others.

I think you are going to have to be quite tough with Anyaoku, nice as he is, about this. We are not prepared to contemplate another CHOGM like Kuala Lumpur. The situation in South Africa has changed enormously. It will have changed a lot more by October. The likelihood is that the European Community will have lifted most of its restrictions by then, and the United States will have indubitably have made a start. The Commonwealth is going to look absurd if it is still prating about sanctions. In

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practice they are crumbling anyway. It would be much better to start work now on a clear programme for lifting restrictive measures against South Africa. Indeed we want to get decisions well in advance of October, because the most difficult situation of all in which to lift sanctions will be at a meeting in Harare under the chairmanship of Robert Mugabe. If the others are not prepared to recognise reality, they should not expect Britain to stay in step with them. We shall have to take our own decisions and decline to subscribe to unrealistic Commonwealth declarations.

It would be much better all round if South African issues could be dealt with before CHOGM, so that the Harare meeting becomes the occasion on which the Commonwealth takes its first steps in a new direction. It should be the world's best standing seminar, a model of civilised and jargon-free discourse, a practical support above all for its smaller members, and a forum which brings together Commonwealth Ministers from many different fields of government so that each may benefit from the experience of all. (All the stuff in the draft declaration about the Commonwealth and democracy is sadly for the birds in most cases). It is not a time for gradual change in the Commonwealth: the end of apartheid in South Africa should be the Big Bang which gets the Commonwealth off to a new start.

You will find some rather less stentorian briefing from the FCO in the folder.

C.D.?

CHARLES POWELL

21 January 1991

c:\wpdocs\foreign\common.dca

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1990

The Commonwealth Secretary General, Chief Anyaoku, is calling, at his own request, on the Prime Minister on Wednesday 16 January at 1030.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the Department to supply, by 11 January, a compact brief covering the subjects likely to be raised.

SANDRA PHILLIPS

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

CH

SUBJECT cc MASTER

file apc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 July 1990

Dear Simon,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Prime Minister had a short talk this morning with the new Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Chief Anyaoku.

South Africa

Most of the conversation concerned South Africa. Chief Anyaoku referred to the "dreadful mistake" which Mandela had made over the IRA. He put it down to tiredness and failure to read the situation right. He hoped that the Prime Minister's discussions with Mandela could focus on the future rather than on sanctions.

The Prime Minister welcomed Chief Anyaoku's initiative in holding a dinner for Mandela to meet leading businessmen. His comments on nationalisation were absurd, and would only deter the investment which would be needed if South Africa was to remain prosperous. Mandela must not make the same mistakes as Mugabe. She regretted that the Commonwealth had not given more recognition to the enormous progress made by President de Klerk. The ANC must be brought to realise that South Africa was not a Namibia or Rhodesia but a fully-functioning sovereign state. There was no prospect whatsoever that the South African Government would agree to dissolve itself and set up a constituent Assembly.

Chief Anyaoku said that he took a reasonably optimistic view of the prospects. He believed that negotiations would be under way by the time of the next Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. He was convinced that the Prime Minister herself would have a very important role to play in South Africa. In his judgement, de Klerk was wise to negotiate primarily with the ANC. He acknowledged the force of the Prime Minister's comments about a constituent Assembly. But once negotiations had made a certain amount of progress, it would be useful if de Klerk could find some way to involve Mandela in Government on the basis of partnership.

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Future of the Commonwealth

The Prime Minister referred to the Review of the Commonwealth. She had always been rather dubious of the need for this. There was no doubt in her mind about the Commonwealth's role. But she hoped that in future it would focus rather less on South Africa. Chief Anyaoku endorsed this: he hoped the future thrust would be in many different directions, including support for democracy, action against drugs, and so on.

Commonwealth Secretariat: Accommodation

Chief Anyaoku referred to the search for additional accommodation for the Commonwealth Secretariat. He had instructed his officials to look for suitable premises in the Vauxhall area, south of the River. It must be cost-effective and within reasonable range of Marlborough House. They had not found anything yet. He might in due course need to come to the Prime Minister for help. The Prime Minister encouraged Chief Anyaoku to deal with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on this.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

You have a brief meeting tomorrow with Chief Anyaoku, the new Commonwealth Secretary General. You are the first Head of Government whom he will meet in his new capacity.

Anyaoku is well intentioned and you will want to encourage his better instincts. He says he wants to focus less on South Africa, and give more weight to encouraging democracy, human rights and good government throughout the Commonwealth. That is an admirable intention, but I suspect he will find it difficult to maintain, especially in his early years as Secretary General. I have kept in touch with him myself over the last few years and know that he is a considerable admirer of yours and desperately wants to be on good terms.

Apart from wishing him well in his new job there are three issues which you might raise:

The high level review. We see this as an opportunity for the Commonwealth to get away from its obsession with South Africa and focus on other issues of more practical and direct benefit to its members.

Heads of Government Meeting in Harare. There is already a lobby to make it as long as the one in Kuala Lumpur. We want to go back to the Vancouver practice of one working week. Our preferred dates are 14-18 October 1991.

South Africa. You will want to mention your forthcoming talk with Mandela. Chief Anyaoku will be giving a dinner for him to meet businessmen. The Commonwealth is still behaving shortsightedly on South Africa, refusing to recognise the evidence for change. You will want to leave Chief Anyaoku in no doubt that the EC is moving towards lifting sanctions, and the Commonwealth risks finding itself not just impotent but irrelevant.

A fuller note is in the folder.

CDP.

Charles Powell

2 July 1990

c:Anyaoku(MJ)

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FILE MJ
C/Ramphal

SUBJECT c. Mandela

bc P.C

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 June 1990

FAREWELL CALL BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

Sir Sonny Ramphal paid a farewell call on the Prime Minister this morning. Nothing of great substance took place.

The Prime Minister thanked Sir Sonny warmly for his work as Secretary General over fifteen years, and encouraged him to continue to take an interest in the Commonwealth. Sir Sonny Ramphal said that he was determined not to get in his successor's way. He hoped to be doing some work for the United Nations.

Sir Sonny Ramphal apologised at unseemly length for the account of his views on the Prime Minister which had appeared in the Independent recently, claiming that the article had been distorted. The Prime Minister dismissed it as characteristic of the Independent.

The Prime Minister expressed interested in a reference by Sir Sonny Ramphal to Guyana's gift of some 900,000 acres (or hectares) of virgin rain forest to the Commonwealth, as a proving ground of techniques of forest management. The Prime Minister said she had not previously been aware of this initiative and hoped that we would be involved in it. She would write to President Hoyte. (I should be grateful for more background.)

BF

The Prime Minister said she had been rather disappointed by her telephone conversation with Mr Mandela, who seemed in thrall to ANC positions. Sir Sonny Ramphal said the Prime Minister should not discount the effect of 27 years of isolation on Mr. Mandela.

Other points covered briefly included Cyprus, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Sir Sonny Ramphal spoke rather lukewarmly (I thought) about his successor.

I am copying this letter to Sarah Gillett (Overseas Development Administration).

Charles Powell

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

AK

CC PC
Bkup

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

RESTRICTED

29 June 1990

Dear Charles,

The Commonwealth Secretary-General's Introductory Call on the Prime Minister: 3 July, 0930

Chief Emeka Anyaoku will call on the Prime Minister at 0930 on 3 July. I attach a copy of the background brief for his introductory calls and a biographical note.

With Mr Mandela in London (Chief Anyaoku is giving a dinner for Mr Mandela on 3 July). South Africa will be uppermost in Mr Anyaoku's mind. To judge by the Abuja Declaration of the Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers (copy enclosed) the Commonwealth have so far ignored the evidence of change in South Africa. They take their cue from the ANC. Mr Anyaoku was in Abuja. The Commonwealth needs to consider instead what it can do to promote negotiations and give positive support to the process of transition. Both sides - black and white - need to be encouraged. The Prime Minister might wish to ask what has happened to the Kuala Lumpur CHOGM call for discussions with the IFIs on the financial needs of post-apartheid South Africa (Mr Waldegrave wrote to Mr Ramphal on 5 June to remind him of this commitment: the Secretariat have not replied). After the Abuja meeting the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Australian and Canadian Foreign Ministers setting out what was wrong with the Commonwealth's approach. I enclose a copy.

The Prime Minister might also raise our approach to the High Level Review exercise. The Commonwealth should take this opportunity to break its image of a one-issue body by identifying an attractive set of new priorities relevant to a changed world. It can make selective, high quality contributions to analysing aspects of the new global issues, such as global warming and sustainable development. It should promote and sustain more open, more responsive government, and encourage observance of human and political rights. It should concentrate its services where the common Commonwealth heritage (language, law, education and shared professionalisms) offers added value, as in drug enforcement, and support for small states, and on sharing the experience of

/success

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success. It is encouraging that in recent press commment, Chief Anyaoku gives the impression that he is eager that the Commonwealth should play a greater role in encouraging democracy, human rights and "good Government". The Prime Minister may also wish to confirm her preference for late January dates for the Head of Government level review meeting (your letter of 6 June). We have so far had no firmly negative reactions, although Australia (and perhaps India and Nigeria) would prefer February.

The Prime Minister may also wish to raise the dates and format of the Harare Heads of Government Meeting. The Zimbabweans now seem to be thinking of mid-October dates, but with a weekend retreat, making seven days in all, as in Kuala Lumpur. It will be important to try to gain Anyaoku's support for a repeat of the Vancouver experiment of one working week, with a mid-week retreat, or at least his benevolent neutrality before we return to the charge in Harare. Our preference is for 14-18 October 1991 (Monday to Friday).

Yours ever,

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CHIEF EMEKA ANYAOKU: NEW COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

BACKGROUND BRIEF

1. Chief Emeka Anyaoku takes over as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth on 1 July, after 13 years as Deputy Secretary-General (Political).

2. The Secretariat (including the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and other small associated programmes) employs just over 400 staff in London, on an annual headquarters budget of just over £13 million. It was established in 1965 to take on some CRO responsibilities and incorporate a number of existing secretariats. CFTC (founded in 1971) has a programme budget in 1990/91 of £24.6 million, and £2.5 million of special programmes.

3. Britain contributes 30% of its budgets. It occupies Marlborough House (now being refurbished at a cost of some £16 million) rent free, but two thirds of its staff are housed in other rented offices. Under budgetary pressure from West End rent increases it is seeking alternative office accommodation for half its staff, with the capacity of Marlborough House being increased at a further cost of over £3 million to Britain.

4. Successive British Governments have had a difficult time with the retiring Secretary-General (Ramphal) and his Canadian predecessor (Smith), particularly over Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. But working relationships are generally good, and much of the practically oriented work both useful and effectively delivered.

5. The Kuala Lumpur Heads of Government Meeting set up a High Level Review (by ten Heads of Government including the Prime Minister), which will include a review of the "adequacy" of the Commonwealth's institutions "including the Secretariat". We are working for a careful, selective approach to the new problems which the Commonwealth's strengths (one language, shared educational and professional culture, one legal heritage etc) should help it attack. In the process we consider that the Secretariat needs a thorough

/overhaul

[redacted]verhaul after 15 years of ineffective management through a cabal of the former Secretary-General's intimates, with new transparent, budgetary procedures and more rapid turnover of staff.

/ 6. A biography of Chief Anyaoku is attached.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
June 1990

CHIEF EMEKA ANYAOKU

Commonwealth Secretary-General Designate
(Deputy Secretary-General since 1977)

Born Nigeria 1933. Read Classics at Ibadan University, studied subsequently at Cambridge and in France. After service with the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the Nigerian Foreign Service, he was seconded to join the newly-established Commonwealth Secretariat in 1966. Subsequently Director of the International Affairs Division and Assistant Secretary-General (1975). In 1983 he was for two months Nigerian Foreign Minister but returned to the Secretariat following the military takeover.

Anyaoku is an accomplished, perceptive and experienced diplomat. He is well disposed towards Britain and has exercised a moderating influence in the Secretariat and on Mr Ramphal. Chief Anyaoku played a key role in Commonwealth involvement in the Rhodesia crisis. He retains high level contacts in Nigeria.

Chief Anyaoku was selected by Commonwealth Heads of Government at Kuala Lumpur CHOGM to succeed Sonny Ramphal as Secretary-General on 1 July 1990.

Married with four children, one at least at Harrow.

Commonwealth News Release

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

Fifth Meeting: Abuja, 16-17 May 1990

Members of the Committee

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark (Canada) - Chairman; Senator The Hon. Gareth Evans (Australia); The Hon. Rashleigh E Jackson (Guyana); The Hon. Hari Kishore Singh (India); The Hon. Dato' Abu Hassan bin Haji Omar (Malaysia); The Hon. Alhaji Dr Rilwanu Lukman (Nigeria); The Hon. Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania); The Hon. Luke J. Mwananshiku (Zambia) and The Hon. Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira (Zimbabwe).

The Foreign Minister of Namibia, The Hon. Theo-Ben Gurirab, attended the meeting as an Observer at the invitation of the Committee.

CONSULTATIONS

The Committee greatly valued its special session with Mr Nelson Mandela, Deputy President of the African National Congress (ANC) and its consultations with Dr. Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, Director of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa, and Mr. Ahmed Gora Ebrahim, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC).

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Developments in and prospects for Southern Africa

Situation in South Africa

1. The Committee noted that for the first time since its establishment developments in South Africa seemed to offer real opportunity for movement away from the apartheid policy. The unbanning of the ANC, the PAC

Issued by the INFORMATION DIVISION, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, MARLBOROUGH HOUSE, PALL MALL, LONDON SW1Y 5HX. *Tel:* 01-839 3411

and other political organisations; the abolition of the media emergency regulations; the rescinding of restrictions on 33 organisations; the release of some political prisoners - most notably the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela - and the Groote Schuur meeting between the South African Government and the ANC at the beginning of May - suggest the South African Government may be recognising the need to take concrete steps towards breaking the logjam and initiating genuine negotiations with the representatives of the majority population of South Africa.

2. The Committee welcomed these significant developments but stressed that they were still partial and preliminary measures which have not yet met Commonwealth and agreed international objectives of the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial, democratic and non-fragmented South Africa. The Committee recognised that the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations was still to be fully achieved. The prisoners released so far were only a small fraction of South Africa's political prisoners. The Committee further noted that despite the lifting of bans and restrictions on individuals and organisations on 2 February, repression continues. According to the South African Human Rights Commission, 324 people were being held under the State of Emergency as of 9 May, 1990, with a further 74 detained under internal security and other legislation. Hundreds of people have been wounded and over one hundred killed in confrontations with police since 2 February. The Committee condemned these instances of continuing repression which were at variance with the Government's own pronouncements.

3. In the face of all this, the Committee called on the South African Government to implement in full and as a matter of utmost urgency the measures first put forward by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and more recently amplified and adumbrated in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Special Session Declarations as agreed international consensus on the way forward. These are to:

- release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them;

- lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons;

- remove all troops from the townships;

- end the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and

- cease all political trials and executions.

4. In this context, the Committee noted the decision of the Groote Schuur meeting to establish a Working Party to examine the question of the release of political prisoners. It expressed the hope that the efforts of this Working Party will lead to the removal of all the remaining obstacles to negotiations and improvement of the prospect that the other outstanding issues would be addressed, thereby facilitating the commencement of genuine negotiations. This was a point of paramount concern to the Committee.

The situation in the region

5. The Committee warmly welcomed Namibia's independence on 21 March, its accession to the Commonwealth the same day, and the participation of Foreign Minister Gurirab at its fifth meeting. Namibia's long-awaited independence and exemplary constitution should be a convincing demonstration to South Africans that fundamental change to a non-racial society can be achieved through a democratic and negotiated process. Ministers observed that the new nation would look to the international community to support its promising start, and urged Commonwealth and other donors to respond generously at the aid conference in New York next month. The Committee also expressed the hope that early reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia, as called for in the Security Council Resolution 432(78), could be achieved, and looked forward to the start of productive negotiations on this subject in the near future.

6. The Committee noted that since Kuala Lumpur, the Governments of Angola and Mozambique had continued to seek negotiated solutions to the conflicts in their countries and to this end had taken steps to bring about direct talks with their respective rebel movements. The Committee welcomed President Chissano's announcement of impending talks with the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and commended President Dos Santos's continuing commitment to the Gbadolite proc-

ess. But notwithstanding the initiatives of the Government of Mozambique, the MNR had continued to commit acts of murder and destruction in all the provinces of Mozambique but especially in the provinces of Gaza, Sofala and Manica. In Angola, the search for a negotiated settlement proceeded against a background of continuing hostilities between the Government and UNITA forces exacerbated by external interference. The Committee called for cessation of all such interference as neither the MNR nor UNITA could continue their campaigns of destruction without continuing political and material support from South Africa and other countries. The Committee reiterated its appeal to all governments to contribute to meeting the identified security needs of Angola and Mozambique and again requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to encourage increased security assistance for the Front-Line States, particularly Mozambique.

Sanctions

7. Having reviewed the current situation in South Africa and the region, Ministers noted the indispensable role that international sanctions and other pressures continue to play in bringing about change in South Africa.

8. As Heads of Government had stated at Kuala Lumpur, the purpose of sanctions was not punitive but to abolish apartheid by bringing Pretoria to the negotiating table and keeping it there until fundamental political change was irreversibly secured. There was growing evidence that the white community in South Africa is coming to terms with the reality that the only way to counter the deteriorating economic and social situation was to end the international isolation through political change. Such recognition underlies the steps that Pretoria has recently taken towards the process of negotiations. The Committee was, therefore, of the view that to relax sanctions now would abort the process towards negotiations that had barely commenced. The Committee called on the international financial community, whose withdrawal of credit and investment from South Africa continues to be a powerful source of pressure on Pretoria, not to relent in applying such pressure; and called on all Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries to maintain existing sanctions and measures until Pretoria was brought to the negotiating table and change was clearly and irreversibly secured.

Certainly, it would be wrong to withdraw pressure now.

9. In this context, it attached importance to the considered view of Mr Mandela that the Committee should seek to impress upon governments that if the trend to relax sanctions is not stopped, all the gains in the first steps towards negotiations will be reversed. The Committee underlined the importance of maintaining the existing consensus on international sanctions. Given the importance of the international community acting in concert and not relaxing sanctions prematurely, the Committee agreed to convey its views to non-Commonwealth governments and, in particular, to the members of the EC and G7 groupings of countries.

10. The Committee noted the establishment of the Independent Centre for the Study of the South African Economy and International Finance at the London School of Economics, as called for by the Commonwealth (other than Britain) at Kuala Lumpur, whose purpose is to study and report on South Africa's international financial relations and their implications for its economy; and to publicise factual information on financial flows to, and policies towards, South Africa. The terms of reference provide that, at the appropriate time, the Centre should examine ways of mobilising resources for post-apartheid South Africa. Ministers expressed the hope that as the pillars of apartheid crumble, the Centre could develop into an agency studying how best to restore economic growth and dynamism into a new, democratic South Africa. Ministers commended Australia and other Commonwealth governments for the financial support provided to the Centre. They looked forward to the Centre's first regular report starting from July.

The arms embargo

11. The Committee received a report on the work of the United Nations Security Council 421 Committee on the Arms Embargo chaired by Malaysia. Ministers agreed to offer every assistance to the Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate. Ministers also agreed to continue to press for greater transparency in the operation of the Committee to ensure a more effective application of the Arms Embargo by the international community.

Support for dialogue and negotiations

12. The Committee commended the common commitment of the ANC and the South African Government to a peaceful process of negotiations. Recalling the historic work of the EPG in the evolution of this process, the Committee affirmed that the Commonwealth stands ready to assist in facilitating the negotiating process. In this context the Committee welcomed initiatives to provide assistance, through, for example, the provision of constitutional expertise and funding for research, conferences and seminars on issues and options for a post-apartheid South Africa.

Aid to victims and opponents of apartheid

13. The work of the Commonwealth network of non-governmental organisations, Skills for South Africa, established to provide training and work experience for black South Africans has assumed particular importance and relevance. The Committee therefore urged all governments to make more resources available to the network to enable it to meet the expected increase in the demand for its services. The Committee welcomed the proposal to establish an Expert Group on human resource development for a post-apartheid South Africa to assist the Committee in addressing human resource issues as an integral part of the Commonwealth's efforts to support South Africa's transition to a successful and stable non-racial democracy. The Committee requested the Secretary-General to establish the Expert Group and facilitate its work.

14. The imminent return to South Africa of many thousands of refugees following the unbanning of the political parties will require a substantial infusion of financial resources to meet the cost of resettlement. In the light of this new situation, the Committee called on all Commonwealth governments and the wider international community to use appropriate channels for contributing financially and in kind to the resettlement of the returnees. In this respect the Committee welcomed the announcement by Australia this week that it would respond to ANC requests by making available A$15 million over the next three years for resettlement, training and related purposes.

Process of consultation

15. The Committee noted the uncertainty of future developments and stressed the importance of ensuring that the views of those most directly involved are taken into account in a timely fashion into future Commonwealth responses. The Committee requested the Secretary-General to maintain close contact with all the parties concerned. Ministers also mandated the Chairman to convene a special meeting of this Committee at any point it was deemed necessary and helpful.

Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique

16. The Committee welcomed the Secretary-General's Report on the Special Commonwealth Fund for Mozambique and expressed satisfaction that further contributions and pledges from Australia, Britain, Canada, Malaysia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone will permit a build-up of activities in 1990 and 1991. Thereafter additional resources will be required. The Committee urged Commonwealth governments to contribute additional resources to maintain the Fund's activities over a full five years.

Other items

17. The Committee took note, with appreciation, of the substantial progress that has been made in implementing other elements of the Okanagan Programme of Action, notably the Commonwealth Strategy for countering South African Propaganda and Censorship and the Plan of Action for the Promotion of Trade and Investment in Southern Africa.

Next meeting

18. The Committee gratefully accepted the offer of India to host its next meting which will again review the evolving situation in South Africa with a particular focus on how the Commonwealth can facilitate progress towards a non-racial future for that country.

19. Ministers expressed their warm appreciation to the Government of Nigeria for its generous hospitality and the excellent arrangements for the meeting of the Committee in the congenial atmosphere of Abuja.

Nicon Noga Hilton Hotel
Abuja, Nigeria

17 May 1990

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29 MAY 1990

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SOUTH AFRICA : CCFM-SA.

1. SENATOR EVANS HANDED MINISTER COLLINS ON 18 MAY, IN HIS PRESIDENCY CAPACITY, A LETTER SIGNED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA (TEXT IDENTICAL TO THAT IN MY TELNO 255 TO OTTAWA). COLLINS CIRCULATED THIS AT THE INFORMAL MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 19/20 MAY AT PARKNASILLA. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM ME.

BEGINS

AT THE INFORMAL MEETING OF EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AT PARKNASILLA OVER THE WEEKEND, GERRY COLLINS DISTRIBUTED COPIES OF YOUR LETTER TO HIM ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE OF COMMONWEALTH FOREIGN MINISTERS ON SOUTH AFRICA.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAD A USEFUL SESSION OF TALKS WITH PRESIDENT DE KLERK AT CHEQUERS ON 19 MAY. I HAD A PARALLEL MEETING WITH PIK BOTHA. WE WERE BOTH IMPRESSED BY THE SINCERITY OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO CHANGE AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO BUILD A NEW SOUTH AFRICA. I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO LET YOU KNOW WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY.

THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ANC IN CAPE TOWN ON 2-4 MAY ON REMOVING THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATION HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. A GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN PRESIDENT DE KLERK AND MR MANDELA. EARLY AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY OVER THE DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND THE RETURN OF THE EXILES. THE ANC NOW ACCEPTED THAT, IN THE INTERESTS OF CURBING VIOLENCE, THE PRESENCE OF TROOPS IN SOME TOWNSHIPS WAS DESIRABLE.

THE STATE OF EMERGENCY COMES UP FOR RENEWAL ON 12 JUNE. PRESIDENT DE KLERK'S DECISION WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE QUESTION OF VIOLENCE IS GOING TO BE TACKLED, ON WHICH POINT HE IS LOOKING FOR HELP FROM THE ANC. HE HAS MADE AN UNEQUIVOCAL COMMITMENT TO REPEAL ALL APARTHEID LEGISLATION. HE TOLD US THAT THE SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT WILL GO NEXT MONTH. THE GROUP AREAS ACT AND THE LAND ACTS WOULD FOLLOW NEXT YEAR. CARE WAS

GOING TO BE TAKEN TO REPLACE THESE WITH MEASURES TO PREVENT WHITES FROM BUYING LAND FROM THE BLACK COMMUNITY WHILE THE BLACKS HAD NO MONEY TO DO THE REVERSE. SIMPLE REPEAL WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. THE POPULATION REGISTRATION ACT WOULD GO WITH THE ENACTMENT OF A NEW CONSTITUTION.

CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL 1991. THE ANC ARE NOT READY FOR THEM AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS MUCH WORK TO DO. PRESIDENT DE KLERK IS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE A CONSTITUTION BASED ON ONE PERSON - ONE VOTE, WITH PROTECTION FOR MINORITIES. HE SAID THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A BILL OF RIGHTS AND A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES TO PREVENT MISUSE OF POWER BY THE MAJORITY.

PRESIDENT DE KLERK WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE HAD THE FULL SUPPORT OF HIS PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, BUT WAS CONCERNED THAT THE NATIONAL PARTY SUPPORTERS IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE WERE CONFUSED AND APPREHENSIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, PRESIDENT DE KLERK HOPED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD GIVE DUE RECOGNITION THAT AN IRREVERSIBLE PROCESS OF CHANGE HAD BEEN SET IN MOTION AND THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD REQUIRE ASSISTANCE IN THE TRANSITION TO A POST-APARTHEID SOCIETY.

I WENT STRAIGHT FROM THE MEETING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO IRELAND FOR AN INFORMAL MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS. SEVERAL OF MY COLLEAGUES HAD ALREADY HAD SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. OTHERS WERE TO SEE THEM THIS WEEK. DE KLERK HAD MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION EVERYWHERE. THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT THAT MAJOR CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA IS UNDER WAY AND THAT SOME SIGNAL OF ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS REQUIRED. WE ARE DUE TO DISCUSS THIS AGAIN IN MORE DETAIL, ON 18 JUNE, AT WHICH TIME WE WILL ALSO CONSIDER STEPPING UP POSITIVE ACTION:

- TO HELP THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS:
- TO HELP THE DISADVANTAGED PREPARE FOR THE TIME WHEN THEY WILL PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN SOUTH AFRICA: AND
- TO SEE HOW WE MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW SOUTH AFRICA.

OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE APPROACH TAKEN AT PARKNASILLA GIVE A DIFFERENT ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THAN THOSE IMPLIED BY THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE'S LETTER, WHICH WAS CIRCULATED AT OUR MEETING IN IRELAND. NOW THAT THE END OF APARTHEID MAY AT LAST BE IN SIGHT, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE LOOKING FORWARD TO HOW BEST WE CAN HELP THE TRANSITION TO A NEW SOCIETY, NOT BACKWARDS ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE. IN ANY CASE, NOBODY IS PROPOSING TO LIFT ALL SANCTIONS OR RELAX ALL PRESSURE. THE IMMEDIATE TASK IS TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO MIX ENCOURAGEMENT

AND PRESSURE TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.
WE ARE ALL WORKING TO THE SAME END. I ACCEPT IT IS TOO EARLY TO THROW OUR HATS IN THE AIR BUT THE COMBINATION OF MANDELA AND DE KLERK IS THE MOST HOPEFUL IN YEARS. THE REFORM PROCESS IS NOT SO SECURE IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT WE CAN TAKE PRESIDENT DE KLERK FOR GRANTED. THE WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTORATE HAVE THE POWER TO HALT THE REFORMS. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC IF, BY STANDING PAT ON OLD POSITIONS WE CONTRIBUTED TO THAT HAPPENING. I SENSE FROM WHAT YOU SAID WHEN WE MET LAST WEEK THAT YOU WOULD AGREE WITH THIS.
ENDS

HURD

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 8

SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH SIR SONNY RAMPHAL

Sir Sonny Ramphal is coming to pay a formal farewell call on you tomorrow, his last day as Commonwealth Secretary General. His successor, Chief Anyaoku, is calling on you early next week.

There are no specific points to raise. But you should be aware that Sonny was quoted in the Independent last week as having made some fairly disobliging comments about you in an interview. He rang me up in considerable consternation about this some days ago, denying everything and saying that his speech at dinner represented his true feelings about you. The Independent is of course particularly spiteful where you are concerned: none the less, I am in no doubt that Sonny did say some of the things attributed to him. I am not suggesting that you mention this at all, but he may do so.

Otherwise, I suggest you look to the future and the review of the Commonwealth which is now getting under way.

CDP

CHARLES POWELL
28 June 1990

With the compliments of

PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

15/6.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

FROM: S W F Martin
Protocol Department

DATE: 15 June 1990

cc: Private Secretary
Mr Waldegrave
PS (10 Downing St)
PS/PUS
PA/Mr Tomkys
PA/Mr Fairweather
PA/Mr Hervey

Mr Stitt
CCD

1. The new Commonwealth Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, will arrive in London on 22 June and assume his functions on Sunday 1 July. I shall call on him, to welcome him formally on behalf of the Secretary of State, at noon on Monday 2 July.

2. The Secretary General will have an audience of The Queen at 12.20 pm on Wednesday 4 July and he will call on the Prime Minister at 3.30 pm on that day.

3. Appointments for the Secretary General to pay his initial calls at the FCO have been made as follows:

	Date	Time
Permanent Under Secretary	Mon 2 July	3.00 pm
Secretary of State	Tue 3 July	10.15 am
Minister of State (Mr Waldegrave)	3 July	5.00 pm

4. For these calls you would please prepare a **biography** of the new Secretary General and a **short brief** on our relations with the Commonwealth Secretariat.

The biography and brief should be given the following distribution:

Top copy on blue paper to:

Protocol Department (Mr Martin) to forward to the Private Secretary to The Queen. This copy should have the date and 'Foreign and Commonwealth Office' typed at the bottom.

Private Secretary (10 Downing St)

Other copies on white paper to:

Private Secretary - for the Secretary of State
APS to Secretary of State
Minister of State (Mr Waldegrave)
PUS
DUS (Mr Tomkys)

AUS (Mr Fairweather)
Vice Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps
3 copies to Protocol Department for Mr Martin (to arrive before first courtesy call please).

5. When we discussed the matter, you said that you might consider recommending some form of welcoming hospitality for the Secretary General. In 1974, the then Secretary of State gave a reception at Trinity House in honour of Mr Ramphal, about ten weeks after his arrival. At that time, High Commissioners were given a welcoming Ministerial lunch but, as you know, that practice was discontinued at the end of 1989. Now, no new High Commissioner or Ambassador receives welcoming hospitality as a matter of course. In fact, the Secretary General will be a guest at the Secretary of State's lunch for Mr Nelson Mandela on 3 July.

S W F Martin
Protocol department



MARGARET BELL

The new Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Chief Anyaoku, would like to call on the Prime Minister during his first week in office, and I am sure this would give a very good signal. The days that he could manage would be Wednesday 4/Friday 6 July. Can we find him 45 minutes then please? Ideally we need to let him know (via his Secretary in the Commonwealth Secretariat) later today, since he has to return to Nigeria tomorrow.

CHARLES POWELL
3 May 1990

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Relevant to your
meeting with
Sonny Ramphal
tomorrow.

MO

CDP
11/X

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 3244 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Attachment to Note Powell to PM dated 11 April 1989	X
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Instructions for completion of Dummy Card

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.
This should be an indication of what the extract is,
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

FCO CP

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

You are to have a talk with Sonny Ramphal tomorrow, to go over the agenda for CHOGM. You will not want to raise the Secretary-General post directly, but he may try to establish your views.

CHOGM

The main point is that we do not want CHOGM overshadowed by a pointless argument on sanctions. That would be counter-productive, with De Klerk probably just elected as President and the Namibia elections just ahead. You are absolutely firm in your refusal to consider further sanctions, and think the Commonwealth would bring itself into disrepute if it makes an issue of sanctions this time.

You could say that you would be ready to see environmental issues given more prominence as well as the traditional subjects.

You will want to ask him about progress over Pakistan rejoining the Commonwealth. There is no need for the Secretariat to make a meal of this: it should be settled rapidly and well in advance of CHOGM.

If he asks for more money or accommodation the answer is no.

Secretary-General

You might tease him by asking how he assesses the respective prospects of Anyaoku and Fraser. We remain studiously neutral.

C.D.P.

C D POWELL
11 April 1989

cc PC
Backup

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

11 April 1989

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Secretary General

Mr Ramphal will call on the Prime Minister at 11.30 am on 12 April. His primary objective is probably to assess the Prime Minister's attitude to possible CHOGM agenda items, before writing his traditional letter setting out his thoughts. We would expect him also to be interested in a first hand account of the Prime Minister's visit to Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Malawi, and particularly Namibia.

The Foreign Secretary considers that our primary objectives should be to make clear that:

(a) we want to avoid CHOGM being overshadowed again this year by differences of view on South Africa and sanctions. It would be wholly inappropriate for CHOGM to consider new measures against South Africa just weeks before the elections in Namibia.

(b) we attach the greatest importance to the Commonwealth Secretariat avoiding any action which could upset the delicately poised Namibia agreement and cut across the UN impartiality package.

South Africa and Sanctions

It is almost certain that the Committee of Foreign Ministers set up under Joe Clark in Vancouver will recommend the introduction of further economic/financial sanctions, particularly in the area of export credits. The Prime Minister will wish to leave Mr Ramphal in no doubt that this is not the time for any such proposals, not only because they will do nothing to assist the process of a peaceful change in South Africa, but also because of their potentially damaging interaction with the final stages of the Namibian electoral process, and

/because

because a new State President - probably Mr de Klerk - will just have taken over in South Africa. The Commonwealth should aim to build on the potential for change of the Namibia agreement and the coming to power of a new generation of leaders in South Africa.

Other Issues for CHOGM

Mr Ramphal is likely to seek the Prime Minister's views on giving environmental issues prominence in Kuala Lumpur. This was originally a Malaysian idea (in spite of their blindspot over deforestation in Sarawak). The Foreign Secretary believes that it is right that CHOGM should address itself to environmental issues, particularly as it will be receiving the report of the Expert Group set up at Vancouver, at the proposal of the Maldives, on climatic change and sea level rise.

The Secretary-General may also raise the question of Pakistan's wish to rejoin. The Prime Minister may wish to confirm that we would welcome Pakistan back as a full member of the Commonwealth. There is however some evidence that between them the Pakistanis, the Malaysians and the Secretariat are making heavy weather of what ought to be a straightforward process, and the Prime Minister might wish to encourage Mr Ramphal to try to simplify things so that Pakistan can receive its invitation to CHOGM in good time.

We do not expect that Mr Ramphal will wish to raise the administrative issues on which the Secretariat currently has differences with us. These are in the area of accommodation, where the Secretariat is seeking to extend our obligation to provide free accommodation beyond the Marlborough House site, and budgetary ceilings where the Secretariat is seeking to evade Zero Real Growth and budgetary control, and where we are seeking to encourage a much more transparent approach to the Secretariat's budgetary procedures. If Mr Ramphal raises them, the Prime Minister might wish to say on accommodation, that it is surely right to concentrate on establishing the most efficient use of the facilities available at Marlborough House before considering expensive alternatives for the overflow, and that Zero Real Growth budgeting is an essential management discipline which most Commonwealth governments use domestically and which is applied to the UN family.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL

The Foreign Secretary discussed with the Prime Minister on 23 March the question of the Secretary Generalship. We do not expect Ramphal to raise this but he may be looking for indications that we do not exclude his serving a fourth five-year term. There have been no recent developments, and the Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should not at this stage go beyond our position of neutrality towards declared candidates.

Yours.

Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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FILE KK

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 March 1989

MEETING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Ramphal has asked to see the Prime Minister. We have offered him 1130 am on 12 April. I should be grateful if you could let me have some briefing for the meeting by 11 April.

BELL

(C. D. POWELL)

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

22 March 1989

Dear Stephen,

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

Thank you for your letter of 21 March about the Commonwealth Secretary Generalship. The Prime Minister is increasingly coming to the view that the least bad result is probably to ask Ramphal to continue, provided he accepts certain conditions. In particular that seems to offer the best prospect of blocking Malcolm Fraser from obtaining the post. Our line in response to any enquiries about our willingness to support particular candidates would simply be that we have not yet made up our minds.

Yours ever,

Charles

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PS
(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CONFIDENTIAL

21 March 1989

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Secretary General

Among the subjects the Foreign Secretary proposes to raise with the Prime Minister on 23 March is the present state of play on the Commonwealth Secretary Generalship.

As you know, the Australian Government are campaigning strongly on behalf of Malcolm Fraser: Senator Evans went on record recently as saying that he "believed that Fraser had a better than even chance of getting the job". The Foreign Secretary was very struck by Evans' confidence on this when they met last week. The Australians clearly believe that the South Pacific countries, Singapore and Brunei and the Caribbean are now lining up behind Fraser.

Meanwhile Chief Anyaoku, and the Nigerian Government continue to claim that he has solid African support. The best assessment that we can make at the moment is that both may have reasonably firm commitments from 10-15 of the 46 Commonwealth countries who can be present in Kuala Lumpur, with another 15-20 undecided. There is no evidence that Anyaoku has any significant support outside Africa, and some reason to believe that Fraser, using the direct links with Heads of State and Government which he established in his period as Prime Minister and subsequently as co-Chairman of the Eminent Persons Group, may be able to attract some key African leaders to his side. He also has the advantage of being the candidate who can attract media attention, and has a busy programme planned for the summer, including a major lecture to the Royal Society of Arts in London on 19 June on "The Effectiveness of the Commonwealth". There is no evidence that Anyaoku is campaigning on anything like this scale.

If the field remains limited to Fraser and Anyaoku the odds must be that Fraser will finish more strongly, although this may not lead Nigeria to withdraw Anyaoku before or at the Heads of Government meeting.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL

Rice Christian

I think this is unwise & risks misleading the Nigerians. If we are reconciled to Ramphal continuing, the more we should say to the candidates & their supporters is that we are waiting to see what other candidates emerge before we make up our minds. Agree?

CDP 21/3

Yes

MF

CONFIDENTIAL

The Foreign Secretary believes that Anyaoku would, from our point of view, be less undesirable than Fraser, though he would not provide the Secretariat with the efficient management and breath of fresh air we should like to see it have. Fraser would be a high profile operator. He would be likely to give greater emphasis to sanctions. On balance therefore, Anyaoku would serve our interests better, if he reaches Kuala Lumpur as a credible choice. But if the Fraser bandwagon is as strong as it seems, Anyaoku may well not be the man to stop him.

Meanwhile, we are also receiving indications that Sonny Ramphal would be open to an appeal to serve beyond the end of his current term. He has all the well known disadvantages, but is at least the devil we know. And he may turn out to be the only way to stop Fraser.

In these unsatisfactory circumstances, the Foreign Secretary believes that our position should probably be:

(i) to indicate that we are not opposed to Anyaoku (as he himself seems to believe);

(ii) not actively to discourage the notion of a further term for Sonny Ramphal;

(iii) if Ramphal looks like being a viable alternative to Fraser, to try to extract some concessions in return for our support, particularly on costs/running of Secretariat. We have some leverage: Ramphal realises we are crucial to whether he stays or goes.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that one way in which we might indicate that we are not opposed to Anyaoku would be for the Prime Minister to say to President Babangida on 28 March that if Nigeria's - and Africa's - candidate is going to succeed then we believe that more will have to be done to promote his candidature: so far all the running seems to have been made by Malcolm Fraser.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

12 April
1130 to
1215

Charles

MRS. PONSONBY

The Commonwealth Secretary-General wants to call on the Prime Minister after Easter and after her return from Africa. Could you kindly find 40 minutes in the diary sometime in April when he can come in? You may like to talk direct to his secretary at the Commonwealth Secretariat to fix a time.

CDP

C. D. POWELL
16 MARCH 1989

MRM

file

EL

SUBJECT cc MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

9 July 1986

From the Private Secretary

Dear Tony.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

The Prime Minister had a meeting this morning with the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth. It was a good natured discussion. The Prime Minister went out of her way to be conciliatory.

The Prime Minister said that she regretted talk of a possible break up of the Commonwealth over the issue of sanctions against South Africa. When one considered what the Commonwealth had been through in the past, it was clear that preserving the Commonwealth bond was more important than any individual issue. The Prime Minister continued that the Eminent Persons Group had conducted themselves in an exemplary way and, in her view, had come close to success. She believed that the South African Government was moving slowly in the right direction but needed to be kept under constant pressure to move faster.

The Secretary-General said that Commonwealth leaders were very grateful for all that the Prime Minister had done to help the Eminent Persons Group. It had been a good group and had won respect in South Africa. It had also enlarged the Commonwealth's knowledge of and contacts with the black nationalist movement inside and outside South Africa. He agreed that it was a tragedy that the Group had not succeeded. The Secretary-General continued that the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at the beginning of August was clearly going to be difficult. Passions were strong. He would be talking to as many as possible of the seven Heads of Government before that meeting and had already spent some time with President Kaunda. He saw his prime duty as Secretary-General as being to prevent the break up of the Commonwealth. But the risk had to be taken seriously. If President Kaunda were to take this step, others such as Nigeria and India would probably feel a political compulsion to follow suit, even if they did not necessarily think it right. He had argued with President Kaunda that it was illogical to take reprisals against the Commonwealth because of a disagreement with Britain. His efforts had been reinforced by Julius Nyerere. He had thought that he had laid the issue to rest with Kaunda. But subsequent statements had made him less sure.

JA

The Secretary-General said that the Prime Minister's very firm line against sanctions had caused considerable concern to the other Commonwealth Heads of Government. There was a risk that they would misinterpret her opposition as a difference not just about means but about the end, that is the abolition of apartheid. He himself had read carefully everything which the Prime Minister had said and did not interpret her position as being that she was opposed to all sanctions of any kind. The other Commonwealth Heads of Government would argue in August that it had been agreed at Nassau to give the Eminent Persons Group time to achieve a result but that if there was no progress, further measures would be considered. They would be looking for evidence in August that the Prime Minister was now prepared to take some further measures. He was quite clear that the bottom line for most Commonwealth leaders was not general economic sanctions but further specific actions, preferably from the list agreed at Nassau.

The Prime Minister said that her concern was to find the best way to end apartheid as fast as possible, and achieve political rights for black people in South Africa. She would not tolerate any allegations that Britain was racist. We had after all accepted coloured minorities expelled by other Commonwealth countries. She was convinced that general economic sanctions would not achieve an end to apartheid. Instead they would cause very considerable hardship to black people in South Africa and to neighbouring countries and would drive the Afrikaaners deeper into the laager. She was fundamentally opposed to such sanctions. There were, however, steps short of this which could be described as signals or gestures of disapproval. We had already taken several measures of this sort. Whether further such steps would be justified must depend on the outcome of the Foreign Secretary's mission and the consultations which the Community was holding with other industrialised countries. A way had to be found to reconcile the position taken by the Commonwealth, by the European Community and by the United States. The Secretary-General commented that he thought it would be difficult for other Commonwealth leaders to accept in August that decisions would have to be postponed until the European Community had made up its mind. He thought there was a considerable chance that the United States would decide on further measures by the end of July.

The Secretary-General said that he hoped the August meeting would reach agreement which could be commended to the rest of the Commonwealth. But he had to make contingency plans in the event of disagreement. It would be essential in those circumstances not to regard the outcome of the meeting as the critical test for the Commonwealth's future. He therefore envisaged a decision in the circumstances to summon an emergency meeting of all Commonwealth Heads of Government. He recognised that this would take a matter of months rather than weeks.

The Secretary-General confirmed that the August meeting would be held at Marlborough House and that the Commonwealth

Secretariat would be arranging dinner on the Sunday evening. He welcomed the Prime Minister's offer to hold a lunch at No.10 and suggested this might be on Monday 4 August. It should be limited to Heads of Government plus one.

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TEMPORARILY RETAINED
J. Gray
22/4/2017

Finally, the Secretary General said that he hoped the Prime Minister would ensure that every assistance was given with security for the meeting. The Prime Minister undertook that we would do so. I should be grateful if you would follow this up with the Home Office and others as necessary.

You may find it helpful to have the enclosed transcript of the Secretary-General's remarks to the press after the meeting.

Yours ever,

Charles Powell

CHARLES POWELL

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

INTERVIEW WITH SONNY RAMPHAL, 9 JULY 1986

SR: .... conversations with Prime Ministers are with Prime Ministers. The ground rules are, if anything is to be said it should be said by the Prime Minister.

Q: But you did discuss South Africa today?

SR: Yes I discussed the arrangements really for the meeting in August, which is now just about a month away.

Q: What arrangements are those?

SR: Those are the arrangements for the meeting of the seven Commonwealth leaders who will be coming here, along with Mrs Thatcher, that will be held in Malborough House on 3 August. So there is quite a lot to talk about that.

Q: How real is the danger of some Commonwealth countries withdrawing from the Commonwealth, if Mrs Thatcher sticks to her current policy?

SR: Well I believe so absolutely in the importance and the value of the Commonwealth, and I believe leaders themselves share that commitment, but I think serious as are the difficulties - obviously there are serious difficulties - the Commonwealth must find a way of getting through them. And I will.

Q: Mrs Thatcher said this morning she had great faith the Commonwealth will endure, that seemed to imply that leaders would not withdraw from the Commonwealth.

SR: Well I share that faith and all Commonwealth leaders will have to give something to ensure that it is fulfilled.

Q: By "all Commonwealth leaders", do you mean Mrs Thatcher?

SR: I mean all Commonwealth leaders. Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH SONNY RAMPHAL

You have half an hour with Sonny Ramphal tomorrow morning. The only subject is South Africa and the Commonwealth meeting in early August. He has recently seen President Kaunda and Rajiv Gandhi. He was anxious to see you before your meeting with Mr. Mulroney.

The temptation to lay into him is almost irresistible. And indeed he deserves a firm reproof for his disobliging preface to the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group's report (which is in the folder). But given that he could be quite useful at the Commonwealth meeting because of his over-powering interest in preserving his own job, I expect you will wish to forego the pleasure and concentrate on encouraging him to work for a sensible outcome at the August meeting.

As regards the Foreign Secretary's mission, the key point to get across is that this is not meant to cut across Commonwealth efforts but to build upon them. This is recognised by a number of Commonwealth Heads of Government, for instance the message which you received yesterday from the President of Tanzania wishing Sir Geoffrey well in his mission. There has also been helpful support from General Obasanjo. The Foreign Secretary's mission is going ahead and it would be best if Mr. Ramphal was to join others in lending it his support.

When it comes to the Commonwealth meeting in August, you will not want to reveal to Mr. Ramphal too much of how you intend to play your hand since he will certainly pass on everything you say to his cronies. You are not, in any case, in a position to reach conclusions before the Foreign Secretary's mission has even properly started. You might say that you are looking forward to a very thorough discussion. But it must also be a realistic one which takes account of the views, not just of the United Kingdom but of South Africa's main trading

partners such as the United States and Germany. It must be evident to all that these governments - and indeed many others - are not prepared to move towards full economic sanctions though they may be prepared to consider further means of bringing home to the South African government the international community's disapproval of apartheid and repression unless there is evidence of intention to make progress in the next few months. Moreover, the meeting in August will not be in a position to take decisions which are binding on the Commonwealth as a whole. It can discuss and reach conclusions. But you hope there will be no talk of retaliation or withdrawal from the Commonwealth unless a certain course is followed. This is not in the tradition of the Commonwealth and does not take account of the reality of the different levels of Commonwealth countries' interests in South Africa.

There is one practical point which you should discuss and that is when you might offer hospitality to the Heads of Government attending the meeting. It is not clear yet what Mr. Ramphal's own plans are. But the main possibilities for you would seem to be dinner on the Sunday night or the Monday night or a lunch on the Monday at No. 10, ideally limited to Heads of Government (and the Secretary General) only.

C.D.P

(CHARLES POWELL)

8 July 1986

VC2ALU

cc PC
CUP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 July 1986

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Secretary-General's call on
The Prime Minister: 9 July 1986

You asked for briefing for Mr Ramphal's call tomorrow.

We have ascertained from the Commonwealth Secretariat that, as far as they know, Mr Ramphal wishes to discuss only policy towards South Africa and the forthcoming Review Meeting. Accordingly, I enclose a brief which addresses this subject only.

IN ATTACHED FOLDER

The Secretariat have enquired, quite separately, whether the Prime Minister wishes to offer any entertainment to her colleagues during the meeting. Although HMG is not the host government in the traditional CHOGM sense, it is nonetheless the home team, and it would seem right for the Prime Minister to offer hospitality. Not to do so might be interpreted as a snub to the Commonwealth at a time when this would be particularly unhelpful to our overall objectives. The Prime Minister may therefore like to consider offering dinner or lunch on the Monday.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

The National Archives

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8G2A05

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 October 1985

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH

The Prime Minister saw Mr. Ramphal this afternoon to discuss the prospects for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Ramphal that she objected very strongly indeed to the remarks made in his introduction to the 1985 Report of the Commonwealth Secretary General to the effect that countries with a high level of economic involvement in South Africa were accomplices in apartheid. She regarded this comment as unforgiveable. Mr. Ramphal wriggled.

Mr. Ramphal said that South Africa would inevitably be the main subject at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. He did not think that any of the participants wanted a confrontation. He had seen most of the African leaders and they felt passionately about the situation in South Africa. They wanted the Commonwealth to emerge as champion of action for change there. This would involve additional economic measures against South Africa. It was not conceivable that the Commonwealth should lag behind the United States in this respect. But only relatively small steps were involved. The Front Line States had considered the likely effect of sanctions on them and were resolved to pay the price. He urged the Prime Minister to come to the meeting in a mood of openness.

The Prime Minister said that she would not mince words. Nothing would persuade her to undertake additional economic sanctions against South Africa. Britain was already doing more than most. We had with some reluctance joined a common position with the European Community countries and that was as far as we would go. It was no good asking Britain to do more. The fact was that, whatever their public position, virtually all African countries traded with South Africa, and several European countries were less than scrupulous in applying the arms embargo. It was all very well saying that the Front Line States were resolved to pay the price of sanctions: in reality they would demand aid to compensate

055

them, so that we would end up paying the price. Under no circumstances would she agree at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to steps which would create unemployment in Britain in order to create economic misery in South Africa. She was committed to helping bring about change in South Africa, particularly through the opening of a dialogue between the South African Government and representatives of the black community. But ruining the country was not the right way to go about it.

Mr. Ramphal said that the Commonwealth had survived difficult debates before. He believed that 48 of the 49 members of the Commonwealth wanted international action. None of them wanted comprehensive sanctions and the Africans at least were not wedded to mandatory sanctions. What they had in mind was a package of carefully selected measures on the economic side. He implored the Prime Minister not to arrive in the Bahamas saying that she had made up her mind in advance against agreeing to further measures. It was essential that she should show readinesss to discuss the matter. The Prime Minister said that the fact of the matter was that she had made up her mind in advance and would not subscribe to any measures which went beyond those already agreed by the European Community. It was better that this should be recognised from the start. She had no objection if others wanted to do more. She did not want to leave Mr. Ramphal in any doubt that she would refuse to agree to additional measures.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Ramphal had some inconclusive discussion of the handling of the South African debate. The Prime Minister said that she saw some advantage in trying to get it over early, to leave time for healing. Mr. Ramphal was inclined to think this would be difficult.

There was also a brief exchange on the other issues likely to feature on the agenda, notably economic matters, terrorism, drugs and the security of small states. Nothing of consequence was said.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

yours ever

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 October 1985

Dear Charles,

Mr Ramphal's Call on the Prime Minister
5.00 PM, 3 October

As requested in Caroline Ryder's letter of 16 September, I enclose a brief for this call. Annexed to the brief is an advance copy (press embargoed until 4 October) of Mr Ramphal's personal introduction, entitled "A Testing Time", to his report for 1985 to the CHOGM (also enclosed). The brief refers to the strong criticism in "A Testing Time" of Britain over the South Africa sanctions' issue. I also enclose a cutting from last Saturday's Financial Times reporting a slightly more moderate line by Mr Ramphal on that subject.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH SONNY RAMPHAL

He is making his traditional call to talk about the prospects for CHOGM.

You might start by giving him a right ticking-off for his remarks in his introduction to the 1985 Commonwealth Secretariat report. Talking of countries which have "invested most in South Africa and trade most with South Africa" he says: "by the level of their economic involvement they underwrite apartheid, however much they may dislike it ..... to resist sanctions when everyone else is wishing to impose them comes close to becoming an accomplice in apartheid". This is intolerable and the worst possible augury for CHOGM.

i.e. us

He is also saying that with enough pressure, Britain will give way at CHOGM and agree to selective economic sanctions. You will want to disabuse him. We don't want a wrangle, but are ready for a rational discussion of what Commonwealth countries can do about apartheid, both individually and jointly, with each member making up its own mind in accordance with its own circumstances and policies.

You will want to urge him to ensure that there is time for a proper discussion of drugs and of terrorism. It would help if Pindling were to mention drugs in his opening statement.

You might confirm you will be lead speaker on the World Political Scene; and reply to the Toast at Pindling's dinner.

C D P

2 October 1985

CHARLES POWELL

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR RAMPHAL, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 5.00 PM, 3 OCTOBER

OUR OBJECTIVES

(a) To discuss prospects for CHOGM generally;

(b) To reaffirm the Prime Minister's desire to have a discussion on drugs and hijacking/terrorism; and to clarify with him how these subjects could best be introduced into the debate at Nassau;

(c) To explain our thinking about Southern Africa, and how it might be handled at CHOGM, making it quite clear that we will not be pressured into agreeing to economic sanctions;

(d) To stress the need for firm guidance by Mr Ramphal to Prime Minister Pindling as the Chairman, and for the meeting as a whole, so as to maintain Commonwealth unity.

ARGUMENTS TO USE

(a) Look forward to frank discussion of important topics at Nassau. Also - equally important - getting to know several new Commonwealth leaders. Some may need to be guided into understanding the unique nature of Commonwealth meetings in their frankness and informality, unlike the UN.

(b) Commend annotated agenda as in Mr Ramphal's letter of 4 September. Have read advance copy of his introduction to his 1985 report "A Testing Time".

(c) Pleased to be lead speaker on World Political Scene. intend to touch briefly on many of the items under this head; and will mention need to preserve Commonwealth unity despite deep-felt differences over certain topics.

/(d)

(d) Want to discuss drugs and terrorism. Will Sir L Pindling mention drugs in his opening statement? It would make it easier for others if he would.

(e) On Southern Africa, need to achieve positive and constructive result. Should start from our shared objectives in seeking end to repression and urgent reforms in South Africa. The central issue is not about sanctions, but about change in South Africa and what we can do to encourage this in the right directions. Ready for a rational and realistic discussion of what Commonwealth countries can do, individually or jointly, with each member making up its own mind in accordance with its own circumstances and policies.

(f) Must make it quite clear that Britain will not be pressured by CHOGM into agreeing to economic sanctions, even limited ones. Should be no doubts about this.

(g) South African Government has made some small steps. Parts of white community, eg. business, showing readiness for significant reform. Commonwealth should expose how to promote negotiations between the communities. Need for positive thinking.

(h) Nassau meeting must not be a wrangle. A public division would only benefit Botha regime. It would also damage Commonwealth's standing - in Britain and other countries.

(i) Look to Mr Ramphal to use his influence and guide the meeting accordingly. Disappointed by Secretariat's role in Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa and Ramphal's introduction to his 1985 report. Suggestion that Britain is coming close to becoming an "accomplice" in apartheid quite unacceptable. Expect Secretariat to play a more neutral and statesmanlike role.

/MR RAMPHAL'S OBJECTIVES

MR RAMPHAL'S OBJECTIVES

(a) To discuss the prospects for the CHOGM generally.

(b) (As an introductory point) To reassure the Prime Minister that, although her wishes for amending the style and format of CHOGMs have not been universally accepted, some of them have, and to that extent she should find the meeting at Nassau better than at New Delhi.

(c) (His main point) To persuade the Prime Minister that unless she changes British policy to accept some economic sanctions against South Africa, Britain risks being unacceptably isolated at CHOGM, and that Commonwealth unity may suffer.

MR RAMPHAL'S ARGUMENTS

(a) Feelings throughout the world are extremely strong - not just in Third World but elsewhere - eg. Australia, Canada, US.

(b) Only Britain is out of step; she must make some move to meet other countries' positions.

(c) Firmly believe that threat of sanctions is exerting major pressure on South African regime.

(d) Rising tide of anger and violence among the blacks in South Africa cannot be contained or suppressed any longer.

(e) Rejection of argument that sanctions should not be applied because it would hurt blacks in South Africa and in neighbouring countries. They have made it clear that they are prepared to share the sacrifice.

(f) ANC the only legitimate representative of the blacks, not Buthelezi whom the regime wants to promote as their "moderate" alternative.

/YOUR RESPONSE

YOUR RESPONSE

(a) Britain has greater involvement in, and so greater understanding of, South Africa than most other countries - especially those more remote.

(b) A large part of the appeal for economic sanctions is emotional, not logical - based on a wish to "do something" without any clear idea of what or how.

(c) Symbolic gestures are useful for sending signals to the South African Government; but they do not achieve real results.

(d) Onus is on those who call for sanctions to provide convincing proof that they will force South African Government to make reforms and will not have damaging consequences for black community and South Africa's neighbours. Not possible to do this. How therefore can Britain agree?

(e) South African Government very strong militarily and economically. A struggle to overthrow it by force would be prolonged, bitter and bloody. Much better to seek change through negotiation, and by exploiting the internal pressures caused by the contradictions of the system.

PRESS LINE

1. It is customary for the Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary-General to have a general exchange of views before a CHOGM, about the prospects for the meeting and the main items of interest.

2. They discussed several of the issues that are likely to come up, including Southern Africa, of which there will be a full discussion at Nassau. The Prime Minister made clear the British Government's views on Southern Africa while Mr Ramphal stressed the depth of concern throughout the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister stressed that the

/real

real point at issue was not the question of whether Britain applied economic sanctions, but what could be done to bring about the desired changes in South Africa.

3. The Prime Minister looks forward to the usual frank discussions at the CHOGM, leading to a reaffirmation of the strength of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

1 October 1985

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR RAMPHAL, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 5 PM, 3 OCTOBER

BACKGROUND

1. Mr Ramphal customarily has a meeting with the Prime Minister prior to each CHOGM. This meeting is at his request.

2. He has had two talks with Sir Geoffrey Howe about the CHOGM;
A one in July and the other on 17 September. Record of the latter attached.

3. In his discussion with Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mr Ramphal left it unclear how the subjects of drugs and terrorism would be raised in the meeting. He said that he had dissuaded the Sri Lankans from having terrorism listed as a specific item, on which they wanted to be the lead speaker. It is possible that part of Mr Ramphal's motive is to counter what he may discern as our tactic of using these subjects to divert attention from Southern Africa.

4. Mr Ramphal did extensive travelling in the summer to Zambia, Zimbabwe, India and Malta. He will have returned from the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting in the Maldives on 3 October, and leaves for Canada on 7 October, from where he will go straight to Nassau.

B 5. Mr Ramphal has circulated a Secretariat Note for CHOGM summarizing the views expressed at the Commonwealth Senior Officials meeting in Barbados last December about the British proposals for changing the style and format of meetings. The paper is largely, but not wholly negative towards the Prime Minister's ideas.

6. A copy is attached (with a summary) of Mr Ramphal's introduction
C,D "A Testing Time" to his 1985 report which will be submitted to the CHOGM. The introduction and report are under press embargo until 4 October.

/7.

7. The passage on Britain and sanctions (pp 13-14) is quite unacceptable, suggesting that Britain is close to becoming an accomplice of apartheid. This follows the very partisan role taken by the Secretariat in drafting a report for the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa designed to put pressure on Britain over sanctions. Mr Ramphal has been saying privately that with enough pressure Britain will give way at CHOGM and agree to some form of selective economic sanctions. He draws a misleading parallel with what happened over Rhodesia at the CHOGM in Lusaka.

Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

1 October 1985

Ramphal urges Britain to fall into line over sanctions

BY ROBERT MAUTHNER, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

SIR Shridath (Sonny) Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, said yesterday that Britain was the odd man out in the Commonwealth as regards economic sanctions against South Africa.

With the exception of Britain, all the other member countries agreed on applying such sanctions and would press Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, to change her mind at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, due to be held in Nassau, the Bahamas, in the middle of next month.

The conference would provide a unique opportunity for the Commonwealth to send "powerful signals" to Pretoria to abolish apartheid and create a genuinely democratic system on the basis of "one man, one vote."

If Mrs Thatcher refused to move on sanctions, she was honour bound to come forward with viable alternative proposals for achieving the objective of getting rid of apartheid, to which the British Government had long subscribed.

However, nobody would be asking Britain to pull out its present investments from South Africa, estimated at £12bn. What was at stake was future action.

Though Australia had proposed that sanctions should be mandatory, Sir Sonny said he was "reasonably sure" that the African leaders would not be talking in these terms in Nassau. What they would be suggesting would be selective economic sanctions—a proposal on which a consensus was possible, he said.

"Mandatory sanctions are wrong in terms of tactics and political realism," the Secretary-General said.

The sanctions on which the Commonwealth countries should agree, according to Sir Sonny, are much in line with those spelled out by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania during his visit to Canada.

They include a suspension of air links with South Africa, agricultural imports from South Africa, the buying of Krugerrands from South Africa and an embargo on future investments in and bank loans to South Africa.

Sir Sonny warned that if Britain refused to go along with the other member states on economic sanctions, it would deal a damaging blow to the Commonwealth. It could also boomerang to Britain's disadvantage in the longer term.

Sir Sonny claimed that, in spite of the crippling damage that might be done to the economies of some of the African Frontline states by any retaliatory action which Pretoria could take, all the African countries were prepared to shoulder the cost.

Dr Fritz Leutwiler, the Swiss mediator between South Africa and the commercial banks, has commissioned the London branch of Price, Waterhouse, the "auditing group, to provide him with the "necessary infrastructure" for his task, writes William dullforce in Geneva.

He has also called the 29 principal creditor banks to a first meeting in London on October 23. The meeting will focus on South Africa's estimated $14bn in short-term debt and the procedure to be followed in unravelling the crisis caused when Pretoria on September 1 imposed a freeze on debt payments following the decision by some U.S. banks not to roll over credits.

A team from Pretoria, headed by Dr Chris Stals, director general of finance and chairman of South Africa's newly formed standstill co-ordinating committee (SCC), will be in London on October 23.

However, according to a spokesman for Dr Leutwiler, it is not yet clear whether there will be any formal meeting between the South Africans and their creditors.

FINANCIAL TIMES
28 SEP 1985
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

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH HIGH COMMISSIONERS:
WEDNESDAY 2 OCTOBER

Notes for Opening Statement (20 mins)

General

- Last met almost exactly a year ago. Since then Lady Young has received you (June).
- Valuable chance to compare notes in run-up to CHOGM. Nassau meeting comes at important time.
- Much ground to cover this year in shorter meeting.
- Will touch briefly in opening statement on some major issues not directly relevant to Commonwealth, and then deal with principal subjects on CHOGM agenda.
- Will then be glad to have questions.

East/West

- Our approach: building up better understanding, but not at price of national security.
- Advent of Gorbachev: new style, but not substance.
- Visits to Eastern Europe: meetings with Shevardnadze.
- Reagan/Gorbachev Summit: opportunity for searching, substantive discussion. Build new foundation for greater East/West confidence.

Arms Control

- Geneva talks top priority. Security at lowest level of armaments. Need serious agreements not just declarations.
- NPT: important and successful.

Falklands

- Twin track policy: improve relations with Argentina: respect rights of Islanders to self-determination.
- Our series of positive steps since 1982. Most recently unilateral lifting of trade restrictions. But each time Argentine has failed to reciprocate.
- Many areas for cooperation: e.g. fisheries. support for FAO initiative.
- Given importance of issues, hope for as much support as possible in UN vote.

- Now come to major subjects for CHOGM.

Southern Africa obviously central

- Angola: strongly condemn invasion: Security Council Resolution 435.

- Namibia: determined to see brought to early independence.

- South Africa: Reject apartheid: deplore repression.
  - Britain united with all Commonwealth countries in determination to see fundamental changes made.
  - We have consistently applied pressure:
    - comply fully with arms embargoes
    - no nuclear collaboration
    - North Sea oil guidelines exclude sales to S. Africa
    - discourage sporting contacts
    - fully apply European Code of Conduct, ensure companies contribute effectively to changes.
  - Question is likely effectiveness of economic/trade boycotts.
  - Understand passions that prompt calls
  - Not persuaded such measures would achieve aims
  - They would diminish pressure for change and bear heaviest on the weakest
  - All those with longstanding contacts with South Africa have responsibility to use links to promote change
  - Commonwealth not a forum for efforts to coerce members. Unity should be maintained; otherwise will give comfort to South Africans, and damage Commonwealth itself.

Cyprus

- Do all we can to assist UN Secretary-General. Hope Kyprianou/Denktash meeting as soon as possible. Responsibility of parties.

- Commonwealth Action Group should complement UN initiative.

CCBPP

RECORD OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE
AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL MR RAMPHAL ON 17 SEPTEMBER

Present: Secretary of State
Mr Appleyard
Mr Le Breton, CCD
Mr Ramphal

1. Mr Ramphal said that he had been doing much travelling during the summer, to Forbes Burnham's funeral and seeing Kaunda, Mugabe, Rajiv Gandhi and Julius Nyerere (in New Delhi - though he would not be going to CHOGM); also Mifsud Bonnici (Malta) who was very pro-Commonwealth and anxious to improve relations all round. He would be seeing Mrs Thatcher on 3 October. There would be a good turn out at Nassau. The main doubtful representative was Mahathir (Malaysia); he had asked if Mahathir would be one of the speakers at the opening ceremony, and the Malaysians had not said no.

2. The Secretary of State referred to the need for a role for Foreign Ministers. Mr Ramphal agreed that there was such a need if Foreign Ministers were to be attracted to the meeting, although some Prime Ministers were Foreign Ministers themselves (eg. India), and some other Foreign Ministers would not come under any circumstances.

3. On the Agenda, Mr Ramphal said he had thought it would be unwise to have too many specific items, eg. for drugs and terrorism. The Sri Lankans had asked to open the debate on terrorism, but he had suggested that it might be better not to have the substantive debate around the table, but to let the subject arise in discussion. He was confident that Sir L Pindling would make a point of assuring the meeting that he was happy for there to be a discussion about drugs.

4. The Secretary of State asked about Pakistan. Mr Ramphal said that, in response to a Canadian approach, he had raised this in New Delhi, and had received strong negative reactions, especially from Rajiv Gandhi. Gandhi was opposed because of the Punjab, and nuclear issues. So Ramphal had told the press, with Gandhi's agreement, that while Pakistan's rejoining would be a good thing, the timing was important and this was not the time. He had told the Canadians and Sri Lankans that anyone who wanted to raise it should discuss with the Indians first. He had met Benazir Bhutto (at Oxford) and she had said she wanted to see Pakistan rejoin, but not now.

5. The Secretary of State commended the Consultative Group's Report on Small States. Mr Ramphal agreed; it was hard headed and not too philosophical. He wanted to give the small states' leaders a chance to react first. He had asked Ratu Mara (Fiji) to open the discussion.

/6.

6. Turning to Southern Africa the Secretary of State said he was concerned and dismayed by the draft report of the Commonwealth Committee. The differences of view could not be concealed, but the approach was unbalanced and slanted, with unqualified assertions which were unhelpful. If the Commonwealth were to emerge from Nassau with minimum damage over the Southern African issue, it would require very skillful handling. The present draft report should be replaced by a more balanced one. Mr Ramphal said the Committee's report would not be central to the issues to be debated at Nassau. But the report reflected the mood of the Committee.

7. The Secretary of State said that Britain was not alone in asserting the view that mandatory sanctions would be positively damaging to the Commonwealth and to a possible Southern African settlement. Some front line states and others shared our view to some extent. We needed to join with them in our general approach to seeking solutions, but that would be very difficult if the line taken by the Commonwealth Committee were accepted. Mr Ramphal said that Britain was very much alone. He referred to Mr Joe Clark's speech explaining the need for economic sanctions. Ramphal had been trying to move the argument away from comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, but to reach agreement on selective sanctions. He had told Kaunda and Mugabe that demands for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions might be all right for the UN, but were not suitable for the Commonwealth. One needed a progressive range of measures against South Africa, not to throw the whole economic book at them, for if they survived that there would be nothing else left. He thought that Kaunda and Mugabe would accept that argument.

8. The Secretary of State reverted to the Commonwealth Committee's report, which began on the wrong line of isolating Britain, and so making agreement virtually impossible. It would be difficult to renegotiate the text in the Committee, so it would be better if it could be withdrawn and replaced by an amended text. Mr Ramphal said the Committee was unlikely to agree to a withdrawal of the present draft; some members would be unhappy if the report was weakened. No doubt they would be prepared to discuss some amendments at their meeting on 19 September. But at Nassau the debate would be in the context of his annotated Agenda, which represented the Secretariat's framework, not the Committee's report. The Secretary of State said that Mrs Thatcher would feel it difficult to approach the debate at Nassau against the kind of vibrations which the Committee's report would generate. He accepted Mr Ramphal's view that sentiments about South Africa were very strong throughout Africa and in India and the US and Canada etc. In Britain we were equally opposed to apartheid but our perception of the best way to persuade the South Africa Government in favour of reform was different. The US and Canada were much further from the scene, and infinitely much less involved with South Africa than Britain was.

/9.

9. Mr Ramphal said he would like to see the debate between Mrs Thatcher and the Africans in those terms. As for the argument about South Africa being a free world bastion, the Africans would say that apartheid was the best means of influence the Russians could have. Mrs Thatcher had said that she had no wish to misrepresent the British view, nor to conceal differences over sanctions.

10. The Secretary of State described the complexity of the problems. One aspect was the different measures that might be adopted. But another was that different countries would have different ways of dealing with the various possible measures. It would be wrong to approach the issue purely in terms of whether there should be economic sanctions or not. For example, there were strong market pressures too, as shown by the slump in the rand.

11. Mr Ramphal said that the Pretoria regime took comfort from British opposition to economic sanctions. The Secretary of State said that they would also take comfort from a split in the Commonwealth. Mr Ramphal asked what alternative there was. The one measure that would head off the pressures for sanctions would be the release of Mandela. The Secretary of State said that Britain had already called for that in the EC, along with other measures. He agreed there must be effective contact between the races within South Africa. Mr Ramphal said that the Africans would insist that discussions should only be with the ANC, not with Chief Buthelezi whom the South African Government was trying to build up as the respectable alternative.

12. The Secretary of State said the situation was quite different from the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe case. We could only act from the outside. Yet there had been movements within South Africa leading to government claims of intended changes which would have been unimaginable six months ago. Mr Ramphal said that the Africans would say that was a result of the threat of sanctions.

13. The Secretary of State concluded by saying that they could not take matters further now, but he hoped that Mr Ramphal would have these facts clearly in his mind.

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ANNEX A

MR RAMPHAL'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS 1985 REPORT: "A TESTING TIME"

Summary

Communication between people an especially valuable feature of the Commonwealth. Improved technology, eg. in communications, must be used to spread and share prosperity throughout the world, which does not always happen at present. The Commonwealth must uplift its collective vision of human relationships to match soaring technology. The issues at Nassau go to the heart of the Commonwealth's principles and practical concerns; a particularly testing time for the Commonwealth and its leaders.

The global setting

Since the 1983 Goa Declaration the global environment has become slightly less threatening, but remains unsettled. There are hopes of change in US and Soviet policies. But East-West relations are still dangerously fragile, with regional flashpoints endangering peace. Multilateralism is still under attack; the strong tend to dictate. "Economic crisis is the hand maiden of political retrogression." World wide recovery has been frustrated; developing countries suffer most. No relief of the debt crisis; and protectionism increasing. Nairobi Women's Conference showed potential for practical measures by consensus through compromise.

Commonwealth can help reverse these trends; reform the institutions; improve and strengthen the UN system.

Economic regression

Industrial countries are unwilling to discuss the evolution of more equitable international economic relations. The existing structures of economic co-operation are weakening. The world's economic institutions are under active threat from industrial countries led by the US, which has taken conscious decision to elevate national power and assert its ideology. Commonwealth's expert and consultative groups have done valuable work in sustaining dialogue. The Nassau meeting is a opportunity to explore what the Commonwealth can do to restore co-operation.

Debt

The Lever report's recommendations are still topical. Low income countries are still the hardest hit by banking measures, trade prices, the IMF's adjustment and debt recovery programmes. Need for more IDA resources, and increased international capital flows.

/Trade

Trade

Protectionism on the increase; GATT being eroded. Developing countries the hardest hit. Remedial measures not adopted (no Common Fund, nor an effective Integrated Programme for Commodities; no expansion of Compensatory Financing, and Generalised System of Preferences being eroded.) In multilateral trade negotiations developing countries - especially the smaller ones - at a serious disadvantage. Role for Commonwealth in assisting them and encouraging dialogue with the developed countries.

Economic help for Africa

Response to famine more notable in the media and by voluntary agencies than by governments. Agricultural development, not emergency relief, the objective. Zimbabwe an example of what can be done to increase food production.

Commonwealth Action Group has helped Secretariat to increase support services and encourage governments to prepare and implement food production strategies. CFTC an especially valuable source of expertise.

Southern Africa - apartheid

No progress over independence for Namibia. Contact Group has faded away in failure. US "constructive engagement" has meant business as usual; South African Government has not shown good faith; US policies now under increasing censure within US and elsewhere.

South African constitutional "changes" have led, as predicted in New Delhi, to "a rising tide of anger" which is no longer containable. Opposition to apartheid throughout the world has increased, but especially in the US. But the US and British Governments still shy away from sanctions. Their arguments: (i) that sanctions will not work, quoting the Rhodesian case, ignores South Africa's role in enabling Rhodesia to survive; and (ii) that sanctions would hurt blacks more than their white oppressors ignores that "those blacks in South Africa who most want to end apartheid have made it pellucidly clear that they are for sanctions". South Africa's major investment and trading partners have the greatest responsibility to impose sanctions, otherwise they are close to becoming accomplices in apartheid.

The public in major democratic countries recognise the shams of internal "reforms", "bantustans" and the "internal settlement" in Namibia.

The Commonwealth has always given a lead against apartheid. While an immediate and complete economic boycott of South Africa would be unrealistic it would be more unwise and unworthy not to apply sanctions of any kind. Many options are open; the rising

/demand

demand for economic sanctions is helping to make Pretoria pause. The Commonwealth must be in the van of the final push against apartheid.

Cancellation of the New Zealand rugby tour an impressive national contribution to upholding the Gleneagles Agreement.

Small States

The Consultative Group's report an impressive examination of the problems, and of measures that can be adopted. Security is multi-faceted, action is required in many arenas. Defencelessness and poverty are linked.

Youth and women

Both groups deserve a higher place in national priorities. The Commonwealth Youth Programme and the Secretariat's Women and Development Programme do valuable work.

Student mobility

Some encouraging developments have been offset by negative ones. The increased flow of students to non-Commonwealth countries has serious implications for Commonwealth relations. The Nassau meeting will receive recommendations from Commonwealth Education Ministers meeting in early October.

CFTC

The Fund's growth in operations has been justified by developmental needs. It requires committed support from governments. The Fund represents the best value for the Commonwealth's money. A special appeal to middle income countries to help.

The Secretariat: Twenty years on

Informality and pragmatism are valuable Commonwealth attributes. Although the Secretariat is a comparatively small organisation, its quality is high. Its gradual growth has been in response to emerging needs.

Some new directions

The value of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) is increasingly recognised. The Secretariat has drawn on their expertise, and it is now time to institutionalize arrangements.

The success of the Industrial Development Unit (IDU) has shown the need for a Commonwealth risk capital facility. Proposals requested by Commonwealth Industry Ministers will be ready for consideration by governments soon.

/Looking

Looking to Nassau

The meeting will show both continuity and change. A tribute to past personalities no longer attending, through death or retirement.

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HGM(85)17

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
NASSAU, 1985

THE STYLE AND FORMAT OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS

Note by the Commonwealth Secretary-General

At each Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting the opportunity exists for leaders to review the style and format of their Meetings which are widely recognised, both within and beyond the Commonwealth, as uniquely valuable. Commonwealth leaders themselves have long recognised the need to cherish and enhance the special qualities of their biennial Meetings. This has again been emphasised in my consultations in preparation for Nassau. What the Commonwealth has achieved in this respect is the product of continuing efforts to improve the style and format of these Meetings for collective Commonwealth benefit. Avoidance of too rigid an agenda and preservation of informality have been watchwords in ensuring that these occasions provide real opportunities for political leaders to explore what they can do together for the betterment of their countries, the strengthening of the Commonwealth and the resolution of global problems.

2. The value of informal ground rules or 'guidelines' in securing this has long been acknowledged. The 'guidelines', first adopted in Ottawa in 1973, were refined and elaborated at the 1979 Meeting in Lusaka and were further updated and reaffirmed in 1983 in New Delhi. None of the 'guidelines' agreed in New Delhi (a copy of which I attach) marked a radical departure from prior practice; all were conceived as evolving out of experience and designed to consolidate strengths and eliminate weaknesses. It follows that they are not carved in stone. They have been consciously and continuously developed, and leave open the possibility of further improvement and refinement.

3. It was in this spirit that in Barbados last year a Memorandum circulated by the British Government was put forward to form the basis for consideration by Senior Officials. It proposed five modifications or refinements of the established 'guidelines':

(a) **a reduction in the duration of Heads of Government Meetings** to four, or a maximum of five days;

(b) **a reduction in the duration of the Retreat** to one and a half days and facilitation of access during the Retreat by Heads of Government to selected officials from their delegations;

(c) the identification of **a specific role for Foreign Ministers** during Heads of Government Meetings, for instance in the drafting and approval of the Communique;

(d) the acceptance of a self-denying ordinance by Heads of Government and Senior Officials to shorten the Communique by restricting to the most exceptional cases references to subjects not actually aired during the Executive Sessions; and

(e) avoidance of set speeches and formal positions in Executive Sessions.

4. The broad outcome of the discussions in Barbados was that, although efforts to improve the format of Heads of Government Meetings should never be ruled out, a workable balance had already been struck in the existing 'guidelines'. It was, therefore, agreed that I should prepare for Heads of Government, in the light of the Barbados discussions and any subsequent consultations, a synopsis of the ideas canvassed and views expressed. This follows under heads (a) to (e).

(a) The Duration of Meetings

The Commonwealth Meeting is unique - and one element of difference from other summits is its duration. There are pressures on the time of all leaders; but a major element of the value of Commonwealth Summit Meetings is its character - and this derives in part from its duration. Can more be done to shorten it without impairing that character or the value of the occasion to most participants?

There had been a significant expansion in Commonwealth membership in recent years - and with it of the range of topics of interest and concern to the leaders present. Heads of Government prized the deliberate and informal pace of their biennial summits. Already, the duration of Meetings had been severely pruned in recognition of contemporary demands, both national and international, on the time of leaders. In New Delhi, nevertheless, it had been agreed that the Meetings should not be reduced beyond a core of six days, two on either side of the weekend Retreat. A further abbreviation of the Meeting may take compression of substantive discussion too far. A slick, fast-paced Meeting could be engineered; but only at the expense of the informal exchanges which have been so highly valued in the past for deepening its sense of community among leaders.

On each occasion, of course, Heads of Government would decide, in the light of prevailing circumstances, and a collective assessment of their requirements, what the timing and length of the Meeting should be. For instance, for Nassau, a slight but significant shortening had been agreed on account of the special commemorative session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York which a number of leaders wish to attend. This would not be without sacrifice at Nassau. A decision permanently to contract the Meeting beyond the agreed six days would not only serve to undermine its essential character, but also deny leaders the flexibility they now have to limit or, indeed, lengthen the Meeting in accordance with their wishes at any occasion. It was, on balance, the feeling at Barbados that, while the question raised was a fair one, to go further by way of contraction could be counter-productive. For the time being, at any rate, it might be best to stay with present arrangements making ad hoc accommodations, as at Nassau, when they proved necessary.

(b) **The Retreat**

Great caution should be exercised over changes to the evolved pattern of the Retreat. That pattern had emerged out of experience and responds to widely felt needs in providing a time when Commonwealth leaders meet informally, often in small groups, to discuss matters of mutual interest. Past Retreats had also been the occasion when major issues left unsettled in Executive Sessions were resolved among the Heads themselves. If the Retreat is transformed into a series of regular working sessions, its intrinsic character of informality and its potential for dealing with difficult issues might be undermined and opportunity for bilateral or group discussion entirely lost. It is largely as the result of the absence of formality and structure that past Retreats had been high points of Commonwealth achievement and success: for example, the Gleneagles and Lusaka Agreements, the Melbourne and Goa Declarations, and those Communique paragraphs devoted to Grenada formulated during the Goa Retreat.

Not all contentious issues are capable of resolution at a Retreat; equally, however, the Retreat had been a powerful complement to the formal Executive Sessions. Senior Officials in Barbados were close to unanimity in concluding that closely to structure and shorten the Retreat would in effect diminish the value of a real asset. For the same reason, the presence at the Retreat (even in the wings) of the Senior Officials of 49 delegations would clearly deprive it of its 'Retreat' character - which is its real strength. Access by telephone to delegations was, however, entirely appropriate.

(c) **Commonwealth Foreign Ministers**

There was little support in Barbados for developing a specific role for Foreign Ministers at Heads of Government Meetings. Foreign Ministers already performed a valuable 'back-up' function to their Heads of Government in the Executive Sessions and it was unlikely that many Heads would wish them to be preoccupied elsewhere at that time. On occasions, Heads of Government had asked their Foreign Ministers to carry out specific tasks. Foreign Ministers had frequently played an important behind-the-scenes role in Executive Sessions, in bilateral or group consultations with their colleagues. There would be real problems, therefore, in identifying a precise role for Foreign Ministers during Heads of Government Meetings. However, there might be occasions when it would be appropriate for Foreign Ministers to meet formally outside the biennial summits and this possibility should be further explored - for example, in the context of the United Nations General Assembly or, more selectively, in exercises like the Commonwealth Action Group on Cyprus.

(d) **The Communique**

The proposals made under this head amounted to a call for closer adherence than so far achieved to the established 'guidelines' in formulating the Communique. There was a tendency for the Communique to become too long and to lose in impact by being verbose or cluttered. What was needed was a self-denying ordinance, particularly within the

Committee of the Whole, to ensure that the Communique faithfully reflected the course of discussions in the Executive Sessions. Equally, however, there would be pitfalls in adopting this as a rigid rule; there should be room for manoeuvre to incorporate references to subjects and issues which, even if they had not been debated as such by Heads in the Executive Sessions, were significant enough to merit inclusion in the Communique. These references would, of course, receive the attention of Heads of Government in their own consideration of the Communique. Experience showed it often became a question of what to omit when delegations and, later on, leaders themselves pressed for coverage of issues of special concern to them. The objective of a shorter Communique required not a change in the 'guidelines' but rather the co-operation of all participants.

In New Delhi, a new 'split level' formula was followed: a Communique with an annex on Commonwealth functional co-operation, and a separate Declaration on Security and Statement on Economic Action. The device worked well and efforts might be made to improve on this approach.

(e) Set Speeches

The existing 'guidelines' reaffirmed in New Delhi clearly stated the desirability of avoiding set-piece statements and of limiting the time for lead speeches and interventions. The need to adhere to these conventions was underlined in the wider interest of preserving the spontaneity of dialogue and exchange of views which lay at the heart of Commonwealth deliberations.

Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
London SW1

September 1985

ANNEX

THE STYLE AND FORMAT OF COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS

Guidelines Agreed in New Delhi, 1983

A. Representation

i) Given the importance Commonwealth Heads of Government have traditionally attached to a Heads of Government Meeting being "their Meeting" and since the rationale of the Meeting is dialogue at the highest political level, the expectation of personal attendance at Head of Government level cannot be over-emphasised.

ii) Where the absence of a Head of Government is unavoidable, the expectation of his colleagues is that he would be represented by his Deputy or by a senior Minister. The Lusaka Guidelines regarding the pre-eminence of Heads of Government over Ministers would apply in such cases.

iii) It is not expected that any delegation to a Heads of Government Meeting would be led by an official. Where this happens, however, the delegation will participate on the basis of a 'listening' brief only but the views of the delegation on agenda items could be transmitted to the Chairman who would convey them to the Meeting. The official leading the delegation will not sit at the main table either in Plenary or in Executive Session, nor would he/she attend the Retreat or Restricted Sessions which are confined to Heads of Delegation at the political level and the Secretary-General. Such a delegation would, however, participate fully in the work of the Committee of the Whole.

B. Agenda

The Ottawa formula on the Agenda, namely, a judicious blend of the general and the specific will be faithfully adhered to, it being understood that Heads of Government will wish to avoid inscription on their Agenda of a large number of sub-items.

C. Speeches

i) The Lusaka Guidelines on the avoidance of set speeches in the form of prepared texts should be observed; the exception being that lead speakers if they wished, could make prepared presentations or, alternatively, speak to such presentations which would then be circulated.

ii) While recognising the difficulties in setting precise time limits, lead speakers should make every effort to keep their speeches short and generally not exceed 15 to 20 minutes. In the interest of stimulating discussion and giving more Heads of Government an opportunity to speak, other interventions should be as succinct as possible and within the framework of a "10-minute rule".

iii) Where a sub-item does appear on the Agenda, it will not as a general rule be introduced by an individual lead speaker but be touched upon by the lead speaker on the main Agenda item itself.

D. Chairman

As endorsed in Lusaka, Heads of Government recognise the Chairman as the principal custodian of the Meeting's style and format. In order to consciously facilitate discussion and to avoid the Meeting becoming stylised the Chairman should actively seek the free exchange of ideas and opinions to the point of encouraging interventions and, if necessary, interruptions.

E. Restricted Sessions

While the number of advisers allowed to accompany Heads of Government into Executive Sessions should remain at the present level of two, a conscious effort should be made to have at least one Restricted Session confined to Heads of Government and the Secretary-General, in addition to the opportunities for private discussion provided during the Retreat.

F. Length of Meeting

The duration of a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting is an essential part of its character. It should not be shortened to less than six days, two on either side of the weekend Retreat. The Melbourne formula of allowing for four working sessions before the weekend Retreat is an acceptable model.

G. Communique

i) While the final Communique should reflect what Heads of Government actually discuss, it is not desirable to exclude altogether from it matters which they may not have discussed specifically but which for good reason they wish to see embodied in the Communique. However, the inclusion of such matters will be restricted to exceptional cases.

ii) It will be accepted practice that, save for special reasons, no entirely new topics will be raised for inclusion in the Communique once the draft has been finalised by the Committee of the Whole and sent for consideration by Heads of Government.

iii) As a mechanism for shortening the Communique and highlighting its essentially political character the experiment will be tried of issuing a separate document on Commonwealth functional co-operation and the Secretariat's work programme which will then be referred to only briefly in the final Communique.

H. Press Briefings

i) The Ottawa Guidelines, requiring national representatives not to disclose "the views or attitudes of other delegations unless they have been made public by them", will be faithfully respected, with all participants accepting a self-denying ordinance in this matter.

ii) While the requirement to provide more 'political' briefings for the press is acknowledged, it should be left to the Chairman to determine at each conference what is appropriate to the situation.

I. General

The Guidelines on Style and Format as they emerged from Ottawa and Lusaka have served the Commonwealth well. While there will always be the possibility of refinement, the basic requirement is for adherence to the Guidelines. To ensure this, the Chairman will need the whole-hearted co-operation of colleagues and their understanding that adherence to the Guidelines is crucial to preserving the special attributes of their Meetings.

NOTE

John has instructed that no copies of the city-record for 10/11 should be sent to Press Office

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SIR PERCY CRADOCK

I have consulted the Prime Minister but I am afraid that she cannot see the Commonwealth Secretary General before the UN Secretary General comes here next week.

Nor, I am afraid, can we commit her to seeing him later.

RETAINED BY DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4)

TEMPORARILY RETAINED
J. Gray
22/4/2017

A.J. COLES

10 April, 1984

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

Sonny Ramphal recently made an extensive tour of Latin America. He was apparently struck by the emergence of a liberal/social democratic grouping involving Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Alfonsin.

We have been told (though not by him directly) that he would welcome an opportunity for a talk with you about his trip before Perez de Cuellar arrives at the beginning of next week.

Frankly, I do not think this rates a high priority. You have enough to do already this week.

Agree that we should send polite regrets?

A.J.C.

8 April 1984

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 November 1983

Dear Peter,

Commonwealth Secretary-General

Mr. Ramphal called on the Prime Minister yesterday at 1800 hours. I enclose a summary record of the conversation. He also left with the Prime Minister the introduction to his 1983 report entitled "A Healing Touch" as well as the text of his address on 10 November to the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Writers Association. I assume that both these documents are available to you.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Charles.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL AT 1800 HOURS ON THURSDAY 10 NOVEMBER AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present: Prime Minister
Sir Antony Acland
Mr. A.J. Coles
Shridath S. Ramphal

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that in their pronouncements on the Grenada affair the Americans seemed to be resorting to considerable distortion of the facts. Had Mr. Ramphal any information about the casualties that had occurred? Mr. Ramphal said that he had not. He was aware of reports that Grenadan casualties were higher than had been reported. He doubted very much whether the United States was concealing the extent of its own casualties.

The Prime Minister said that it was vital that the Alliance should not suffer from this episode. She well understood that Grenadans and many others in the Caribbean were delighted at the outcome. Given United States aid intentions, there was probably little point in Britain giving aid to Grenada.

Mr. Ramphal said that he was stressing in public that the important thing now was to look to the future. He was worried about the Indian attitude. Mrs. Gandhi was taking the line that the situation in Grenada was a matter for the United Nations rather than the Commonwealth. He wondered whether this owed something to Soviet and/or Cuban promptings. In his own view it was necessary to secure early United States withdrawal and to insert a Commonwealth force. Mr. Trudeau had been deeply hurt by the affair because of Canada's traditional relationship with the Caribbean. If Canada could be involved in a peace-keeping force, this could have a very positive effect on its attitude. He had seen the Jamaican Prime Minister in New York a few days ago. Mr. Seaga's remarks had caused him great concern. Seaga had taken the line that there should be no question of the withdrawal of military forces. On the contrary, he would be asking the United States for land, sea and air cover. In response

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to a question from Sir Antony Acland, Mr. Ramphal said that Seaga might want the United States forces to withdraw formally but then come back to provide back-up for Caribbean forces on the Island. He was seeking from the United States aircraft, ships and two American rifle companies. The Prime Minister pointed out that if American troops stayed in Grenada it would be very difficult for the United States to maintain that they had been conducting a rescue mission.

Mr. Ramphal said that he had argued strongly with Mr. Seaga that the need now was that the gains for democracy in Grenada should not be squandered. This risk would arise unless the right dispositions were made for the future. A credible and viable Commonwealth operation was the best course. The Prime Minister said that she thought that a fundamental consequence of the Grenada episode was that some of the Caribbean states would now look to the United States to protect the whole area. She could well see that Mr. Seaga would welcome that. Mr. Ramphal said that he believed that the mood in Jamaica was changing. The euphoria had been replaced by questioning. Reverting to the Indian attitude, he wondered what lay behind Mrs. Gandhi's thinking. Had she been influenced by the Soviet Union and Cuba? The Prime Minister said that she was not sure that that was the explanation. Mrs. Gandhi had always been anti-American and that would have played its part. Mr. Ramphal still thought that the Cubans might have influenced her in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Soviet/Cuban objective would be to prevent Commonwealth involvement so that American troops would remain in Grenada and be a constant focal point for adverse propaganda.

He saw a Commonwealth force as conducting essentially a police operation. It would need to provide some military back-up in aid of the civil power but its essential purpose would be the maintenance of law and order.

Sir Antony Acland said that by the time of CHOGM it was possible that the position in Grenada would still not be sufficiently clear for Heads of Government, even if they could agree, to make a proposal in respect of Grenada. Perhaps the most important point

 / was that

was that CHOGM should not close off any option. It was desirable that the Communiqué should say nothing about the past in respect of Grenada, except perhaps to record that the views of participants had been made clear in United Nations debates in New York. The Communiqué might further state that Commonwealth countries would respond, individually or collectively, to requests from the Government of Grenada. Mr. Ramphal agreed that the Commonwealth could only respond to Grenada's requirements. That was why he had been concentrating on getting an interim administration in place. The last remaining obstacle to the appointment of Mr. MacIntyre was approval from the United Nations Secretary-General. MacIntyre was a very bad diabetic. There was a bureaucratic but apparently serious problem about insurance cover for him while he was in Grenada. This was being discussed within the United Nations Secretariat now.

It was important that the Governor-General should revert as quickly as possible to being a Governor-General of the classic type. But that implied that the interim administration should be quickly established. A proclamation had been drawn up which would return the Governor-General to his former role and allow the caretaker administration to function. MacIntyre would approach his task with great integrity. He would not associate himself in any way with the intervention. Britain should encourage the United States to withdraw both in its own interests and in those of the Western Alliance. The Prime Minister said that she thought that the United States would need to do much work by way of repairing the infra-structure before leaving. Mr. Ramphal commented that troops were not necessary for that task. There was no reason why the Americans could not stay on to carry out civilian tasks.

The Prime Minister said that some people argued that the American intervention had been a brilliant success. It was the first reverse that Cuba had suffered. Others who sympathised with Cuba would draw the right conclusion. Surinam had already acted accordingly. Nicaragua was scared. Those who argued in this way thought that we in Britain should be praising the American role. Mr. Ramphal said that the authority of the West must rest on its moral principles. We should recall that the Dominican

 / Republic,

Republic, after United States intervention, had been a running sore in relations between the United States and Latin America.

In response to questions from the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramphal said that he thought there were able people in Grenada who would eventually stand in the elections; as regards the former political prisoners, Mr. MacIntyre had told him that he believed that they had all been released. When MacIntyre had started to function, it would be easier to have a more serious dialogue with the United States and convince them of the need to tidy up the situation in Grenada and heal the divisions in the Caribbean. It was not good, for example, that Trinidad was out on a limb.

He had reassured Mr. Seaga and Mr. Adams that no-one would be out to attack them at CHOGM. He did not even envisage a debate in New Delhi, though there might be some discussion in restricted session. Seaga and Adams would be very much on the defensive. The aim must be to try to get things right in Grenada before CHOGM began. One problem was whether Grenada should be represented. He had advised MacIntyre not to send anyone to New Delhi but to send a letter instead. Otherwise problems of recognition might arise. The letter might say that the United States troops would shortly leave Grenada and that Grenada would like to discuss with the Commonwealth the prospects of assistance. The Prime Minister commented that any Commonwealth help must be strictly limited in time. Mr. Ramphal said that Mr. MacIntyre wanted to complete his own task within six months. The Commonwealth could provide useful assistance, perhaps especially with the elections. The Governor General himself had said that the New Jewel movement would put up candidates in the elections. As to the future of Austin and Coard, they should probably be tried in Grenadan courts under the human rights provisions of the Constitution. They would have a right of appeal to the Caribbean court and an ultimate right of appeal to the Privy Council.

Mr. Ramphal said that he had told a Press Conference in London today that when the dust was settled consideration would have to be given to the problem of smallness. Sir Antony Acland said

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that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had referred to this in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister said that the main method of dealing with the problem was probably through regional security arrangements. It might be possible to involve Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific and Canada in the Caribbean.

On the economic side, the main issue for CHOGM would probably be that of a new international monetary conference. Mr. Muldoon would take the lead in arguing for this. Mrs. Gandhi would probably be critical of the report which would be before CHOGM. This talked about a process of preparation possibly leading to a conference. But the Indians and others would say that they wanted immediate agreement on a conference and on the restructuring of international institutions. The Prime Minister made it plain that we could not agree to a conference. Sir Antony Acland said that it might be better to establish a small group to look at the various institutions one by one and see whether there was any scope for extending their activities. Mr. Ramphal said that the report distanced itself very considerably from the idea of global negotiations. Mrs. Gandhi would not get her way at CHOGM because others, including some African countries, wanted practical progress. The Prime Minister commented that we must think of ways to influence Mrs. Gandhi so that the outcome of CHOGM was reasonable from her point of view. Mr. Ramphal agreed. He had been pointing out that the important thing was agreement between Mrs. Gandhi as leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Prime Minister, as the host for the next Economic Summit.

The discussion ended at 1915.

A.J.C.

10 November 1983

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 November, 1983

Dear John,

Mr Ramphal's Call on Prime Minister, 10 November

I attach a brief for Mr Ramphal's call on the Prime Minister. Mr Ramphal has just returned from a short visit to New York during which discussions on Grenada predominated. Sir Geoffrey Howe has not seen these briefs. I am sending him a copy in his next box.

You might find it useful to have the enclosed copy of the record of Mr Ramphal's call on Sir Geoffrey on 28 October.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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bc A Parsons

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 November 1983

CHOGM: Meeting with Mr. Ramphal

Thank you for your letter of 1 November.

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Mr. Ramphal at 1800 hours on Thursday 10 November. I should be grateful if you could so inform the Commonwealth Secretariat.

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SR

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PRIME MINISTER

MS

Mr Ramphal

The above asked today whether he could see you before he went off to New York on Thursday. This would have been very difficult to fit in. Moreover, a call by Mr. Ramphal now would at once revive all the speculation about whether we are going to contribute towards a Commonwealth force for Grenada.

The Foreign Secretary advised that you need not see him now but should try to see him before CHOGM. This seems sensible. May we fit him in at 1800 on Thursday, 10 November (which will be the last chance before he leaves for Delhi)?

Yes

Meanwhile, I attach a letter which he has just sent to you about a Commonwealth force. I have asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for advice and a draft reply.

A.J.C.

1 November 1983

RESTRICTED

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 November 1983

Dear John,

CHOGM: Meeting with Mr Ramphal

Thank you for your letter of 24 October.

This is to confirm my telephone message that the Foreign Secretary believes that it would be useful for the Prime Minister to have a further meeting with Mr Ramphal before CHOGM. The best time might be in the period 8-11 November, when Mr Ramphal will be back in London. By then the prospects for Commonwealth help for Grenada should be much clearer, and a meeting could provide a valuable opportunity for Mrs Thatcher and Mr Ramphal to exchange views about that and other matters shortly before CHOGM.

I confirm that we shall be covering the Commonwealth Secretary-General's report entitled "A Healing Touch" in the briefing for New Delhi.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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commonwealth
Item
p45

- 1 NOV 1983

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telegram/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
X Unclassified X

TO:

His Excellency
Mr S S Ramphal AC KT CMG QC
Commonwealth Secretary-General

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Typed 3/11/83 RS.

Please type

In your letter of 20 October you were kind enough to say that Mrs Ghandi and you would like me to be one of those who respond to her address of welcome during the opening ceremony of the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. ~~It gives me great pleasure to~~ I gladly accept this invitation.

3/11

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Top Copy on Grenada, International Situation, Pt 2

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

CONFIDENTIAL

1 November 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

Your officials will have conveyed the statements I have made on recent developments on Grenada and more particularly my brief remarks at the meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa in London on Thursday last. I have consciously deferred communicating with you directly until events assumed a clearer shape. They still have not; but as world-wide demands for the early withdrawal of the intervening force from Grenada have grown steadily over recent days so also has a widely shared expectation that the Commonwealth might, responsive to the wishes of Grenada, help to ensure that withdrawal and assist a genuine process of renewal by the people of Grenada of their right to self-determination.

The major requirement of the Commonwealth may turn out to be an interim security presence designed to instil confidence and assist in the process of national reconciliation. I am assuming that such a Commonwealth contribution at Grenada's invitation would only be feasible on the basis of a withdrawal of the intervening force from Grenada, and the establishment of a credible, impartial and non-political interim administration responsible for returning Grenada to constitutional government through free and fair elections within a prescribed time-frame. If these conditions were satisfied and the Commonwealth was asked by Grenada to provide an appropriate security presence in the interim, I earnestly hope your Government would be agreeable in principle to it and would be willing to examine what contribution it might make to that joint effort in furtherance of an internationally accepted objective.

Contd... 2

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
& Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London SW1

As soon as I am in a position to put more specific proposals to you I shall do so. Meanwhile, I will make such contingency plans as I can, using as my guidelines the principles of respect for the will and interests of the people of Grenada and the preservation of the island's integrity as a member state of the Commonwealth.

The Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, is now back in office and, despite communication difficulties, has been in touch with me about a number of immediate problems. He is keenly aware of the importance of ensuring that the head of the interim administration is a person of outstanding ability and national reputation transcending politics who would be broadly acceptable to all shades of Grenadian opinion. I have agreed to give the Governor-General what assistance I can in taking this matter further, as well as in making available through normal Commonwealth technical assistance programmes a few key advisory personnel to assist him in the difficult months ahead.

I have been in touch with Geoffrey Howe throughout these events and have been grateful for the assistance and support I have received from him and his officials. I shall maintain close contact with them.

With deep respect,

Shridath S. Ramphal

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SUBJECT

FILE

cc master

C. Ch Ex. Office

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1983

Dear John,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Commonwealth Secretary-General

Mr. Ramphal called on the Prime Minister this morning for a general discussion of the prospects for the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

Mr. Ramphal said that he had recently visited Australia. It was clear to him that Mr. Hawke was determined in virtually all areas of policy to set a different course from that followed by Mr. Fraser. So his approach to Commonwealth affairs might well be very different. Mr. Hayden had said that he did not intend to attend CHOGM - he was apparently still feeling rather bruised because he believed that his party could have won the election under his own leadership. The Delhi meeting would provide a good opportunity for Mr. Hawke to get to know the Commonwealth and it was important that this opportunity be seized.

A number of the Commonwealth leaders were now rather old. Mr. Nyerere, Dr. Kaunda, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and Mr. Trudeau (for whom this would probably be the last CHOGM) represented the end of an era. It was still not clear whether the President of Sri Lanka would attend. The worst of the recent troubles were over and President Jayewardene had been in fairly close touch with Mrs. Gandhi about them. But there was a personal antipathy between them, stemming perhaps from President Jayewardene's feeling that he had been a contemporary of Nehru and Gandhi at a time when Mrs. Gandhi was just a small girl. Nor had the past relationship between Mrs. Gandhi and Mrs. Bandaranaike helped.

Some of the remarks made by Mr. Mugabe on his current visit to Western countries were unfortunate. In a speech which the Secretary-General would be making by video to the Commonwealth Law Conference in Hong Kong later this month he intended to answer Mr. Mugabe's statement that the system of justice which Zimbabwe had inherited was ridiculous. Mr. Ramphal would emphasise the Commonwealth's debt to Britain in respect of its legal inheritance.

On the economic side, there would be two documents before the conference. The first was the report on "Protectionism: Threat to International Order". The Prime Minister warned that

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not too much should be expected of discussion of this subject. The reality was that every country could accuse the others of protectionist behaviour.

Mr. Ramphal said that the second report would be on the North-South dialogue. The Prime Minister commented that she continued to dislike the term "dialogue" which was so often an unspecific prescription for talk without a purpose.

Mr. Ramphal said that CHOGM would also receive a major study entitled "Towards a new Bretton Woods". The Prime Minister said that she was aware of this study. The truth was that it was not possible to produce new technical solutions for current global economic problems. World inflation had been caused by the competition of politicians in promising economic panaceas which they had been unable to deliver. The gap between promise and performance had been filled by printing money and it was that which had broken the Bretton Woods system. Countries had to look to their own salvation. The fault lay in individual economies and unless the right policies were adopted by individual countries progress was not possible.

Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the mood of the meeting would be reflective rather than confrontational. There was a general consensus that in the economic field things had gone wrong. Tanzania knew that its policies could not work. President Shagari now had his elections behind him and had one more term in which he wished to put Nigeria on the right course.

The election results in Mauritius had been good in the sense that, had the opposition won, Diego Garcia would have been much more of an issue at Delhi.

On the political side the major cloud was Namibia. He had been pressing the United States to try to ensure that some progress was made by November. He believed that a deal could be struck with Angola under which the Cuban troops left that country. Delhi would provide an opportunity for quiet discussion with, for example, Mr. Nyerere and Dr. Kaunda on Namibia. It was conceivable that the Commonwealth could play a role in providing a force which would doubtless be necessary to replace the Cubans in Angola if their departure was achieved.

It was too early to make a judgement about Zimbabwe. Mugabe was passing through a terrible period. An essentially tribal society was trying to forge nationhood. This was bound to take time. He had worked hard for Mr. Nkomo's return to Harare and was glad this had come about.

As to Uganda, Obote had learnt a lot during his exile. He had realised that Tanzania's policies did not work. His attitude towards economic policy was very moderate. Uganda was now beginning to export its coffee again and to earn foreign exchange. But its political situation was bedevilled by security problems and tribalism.

/ At

At the end of the recent Pacific Forum he had met the Pacific leaders and discussed preparations for Delhi. They were beginning to feel a little more confident about the Commonwealth environment now that African issues had ceased to dominate it.

Finally, Mr. Ramphal pointed out that the Prime Minister, as host to next year's Economic Summit, and Mrs. Gandhi, as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, were now effectively the leaders of North and South. He hoped that between them they would be able to set in train a process of increased co-operation.

Yours ever

John Cole.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 September 1983

Dear John,

Briefing for the Commonwealth Secretary-General's Call on the Prime Minister: 13 September

As requested in your letter of 12 August, I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister when the Commonwealth Secretary-General calls on her on 13 September.

I understand that the Treasury will be sending you direct briefing on the report "Towards a new Bretton Woods" recently published by the Commonwealth Secretariat.

You willl note that in paragraph 2 of the Points to Make and paragraph 3 of the Essential Facts there are alternative formulations about the Prime Minister's reply to Mr Ramphal on the CHOGM agenda. I am writing separately to you about this. The appropriate alternative will depend on the timing of the Prime Minister's reply to Mr Ramphal.

I am copying this letter to John Kerr (HM Treasury).

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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12 SEP 1983

BRIEF FOR COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER 1983

POINTS TO MAKE

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

1. Look forward to the meeting in November. Welcome opportunity to meet new colleagues, renew friendships and reaffirm the value of the Commonwealth association.

AGENDA

2. ~~[You have my comments]~~ [My comments will come to you shortly] on ideas for the agenda. Look forward to frank informal discussions: the true value of our meetings is in such exchanges.

STYLE AND FORMAT

3. Await your paper with interest. Businesslike informal meetings are vital. A shorter communiqué is also highly desirable.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT ACTIVITIES

4. Glad to see the Secretariat active in so many useful ways: e.g. careful preparation of well received reports on economic issues, organising the Commonwealth Military Training Team in Uganda, seeking assistance for Belize.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS MEETING

5. Finance Ministers' Meeting has always been an example of fruitful Commonwealth cooperation. Valuable that it allows developed and developing Commonwealth countries to discuss major economic and monetary issues in a friendly and informal atmosphere in advance of the IMF/IBRD Annual Meetings.

6. How do you think the discussions are likely to develop?

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE

7. Regret the need for temporary removal of Secretariat from Marlborough House. We will do all we can to minimise disruption.

/CYPRUS ...

CYPRUS

8. Rather there were no discussion of sensitive issue of Cyprus at Heads of Government Meeting. Any review of developments should be purely factual.

COMMONWEALTH MILITARY TRAINING TEAM IN UGANDA (CMTTU)

9. Welcome your personal interest and involvement in CMTTU.

10. We were pleased to be able to confirm HMG's continued participation in the team until March 1984.

11. Welcome progress that has been made in improving the standards of discipline and administration of the Ugandan Army.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: BRITISH GARRISON (only if raised)

12. Sorry your efforts to establish Commonwealth training force have so far proved unsuccessful. Hope you will continue to encourage Commonwealth countries to establish bilateral military relations with Belize. Garrison will remain as long as considered appropriate but cannot be there forever. How could Belize's security be protected after it goes?

BELIZE/GUATEMALA NEGOTIATIONS (if raised)

13. Still uncertain about new Guatemalan Government's precise policy towards Belize. Hope it will be based on recognition of realities. Obviously it is for the two principals to reach settlement of dispute, but we would be willing to participate in any resumed negotiations as observers if both parties wish.

LESOTHO/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS (if raised)

14. Have sympathy for Lesotho in its vulnerability to South Africa. Have urged restraint on South Africa, encouraged the peaceful settlement of problems through dialogue, and impressed on Lesotho the need to be realistic. UK cannot condone South African bullying tactics; nor can it condone acts of violence, planned or conducted from Lesotho.

SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEES IN LESOTHO (if raised)

15. Recognise Lesotho's right to accept refugees in accordance with UN Conventions. No-one - not even South Africans - expect Lesotho

/to ...

to forgo this right. But can understand South Africans wish to curb ANC. Lesotho's long-term interest that refugee issues settled directly with South Africa. Believe agreement in principle reached. Concerned that removal of more than minimum necessary refugees would cause unwarranted disruption and hardship; would present serious resettlement problems; set unfortunate precedent for other countries in the region. Welcome the lead taken by the UN Secretary-General (and the UNHCR). Believe international involvement should be constructive and not impede or mask need for direct negotiations between Lesotho and South Africa.

COMMONWEALTH ASSISTANCE TO LESOTHO (if raised)

16. Welcome your decision to send a 3-man mission to Lesotho to advise its government on the country's development and security priorities.

UK ASSISTANCE TO LESOTHO (if raised)

17. Economic: UK already a major aid donor. Hope to be able to continue assistance at a reasonable level. [if necessary]: our resources are under great pressure and it would be difficult to do more.

18. Military: We provide a modest but well targetted programme of military and police training assistance. There is a 3-man military training team in Lesotho.

SRI LANKA (if raised)

19. Hope law and order is permanently restored and process of rebuilding can begin. What is your assessment of the situation?

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP (if raised)

20. Note what you say .. Have no view yet but will wish to consider carefully all possible candidates.
(If Mr Ramphal presses his own case). Have greatly valued the splendid service you have given, which will clearly be a factor in Heads of Government's eventual decision.

BRIEF FOR COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER

ESSENTIAL FACTS

PURPOSE OF MEETING

1. The Commonwealth Secretary General called on the Prime Minister in the months preceding the Lusaka 1979 and Melbourne 1981 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs). It is assumed this call is principally to discuss the forthcoming CHOGM in New Delhi (23 - 29 November).

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

2. Mr Ramphal and his staff remain active on a wide range of political issues. In the last year these have included political/defence problems in Uganda, Belize, Nigeria, Lesotho, Zimbabwe (Nkomo) and of course the Falklands and economic issues between developed and developing countries, especially the reports ''North-South Dialogue - Making it Work'' and ''Towards a new Bretton Woods''. This is in addition to the normal servicing of meetings e.g. this year's meetings of Law, Employment, Finance and Health Ministers and managing of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.

CHOGM: AGENDA

3. Mr Ramphal circularised Heads of Government with his ideas about the agenda for CHOGM on 2 August. The Prime Minister ~~[replied on ? September]~~ [will reply shortly]. Copies of the two letters and a summary of Mr Ramphal's are annexed. It is expected Mr Ramphal will circulate a draft annotated agenda at the end of September. This will be discussed by senior officials before CHOGM begins.

CHOGM: STYLE AND FORMAT

4. In his circular letter of 2 August Mr Ramphal said he would circulate shortly a paper on the style and format of CHOGMs. We hope this will reflect our wish for greater informality, spontaneous dialogue and frank exchange of views. Shorter agenda, speeches, and communiqués would help, as would more restricted sessions and preservation of the confidentiality of discussions at press briefings.

/Mr Ramphal ...

Mr Ramphal has already gone some way to meeting the Prime Minister's wish for shorter meetings. The New Delhi meeting will be a day shorter than originally proposed and than the 1981 Melbourne meeting.

COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS' MEETING (CFMM)

5. The CFMM will be in Port of Spain, Trinidad on 20/22 September. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will lead the UK delegation. The meeting is traditonally held shortly before the IMF/IBRD Annual Meetings (this year 27/30 September) and covers the same issues.

6. The main IMF/IBRD issues this year are:

i) access to Fund resources following the decision earlier this year to increase quotas

ii) access to the Compensatory Finance Facility (CFF)

iii) a proposed new issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)

iv) the 7th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA 7).

There is pressure from developing countries on all these issues. The chief difficulty is to match the demands of developing countries for increased financial flows to help them to tackle the effects of the recession with the limited resources available. Discussion at the CFMM as well as the IMF/IBRD meetings could be difficult. The Chancellor is likely to come under pressure within the Commonwealth to take a more generous stand than is consistent with present UK policies.

7. An additional issue this year will be the Commonwealth Study Group report 'Towards a New Bretton Woods' (separate briefing is being provided).

/ 8. The CFMM Agenda is attached.

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE

9. In 1959 The Queen made Marlborough House available to the Government, to be used for Commonwealth purposes. When the Commonwealth Secretariat was established in 1965, the then British Government agreed to make Marlborough House available as its headquarters.

/10. ...

10. Following an extensive survey, the PSA have recently discovered that Marlborough House in is urgent need of extensive repair, and is rapidly becoming unsafe. They consider that it needs complete rewiring; that the heating system needs to be replaced and modernised; and that the floors need substantial strengthening. They consider that, for the necessary work to be done satisfactorily, the building should be evacuated completely for $3\frac{1}{2}$ years. They estimate that the work would cost at least £4 million, and have approached the Treasury accordingly. They would like to start work during the second half of 1984.

11. Mr Ramphal was initially dismayed when he heard the news; we believe he suspected that we were trying to move the Secretariat permanently away from Marlborough House. We have now reassured him on this point, and the Secretariat are discussing with the PSA possibilities for temporary accommodation. But Mr Ramphal will undoubtedly want to tell Heads of Government at New Delhi of the situation. In particular, he will look to the Prime Minister to give an assurance that the British Government will pay for the necessary repairs to be done as quickly as possible, and for the Secretariat to be adequately rehoused in the meantime (at an estimated cost of a further £3 million).

CYPRUS

12. The Government of Cyprus is currently engaged in a campaign to internationalise the problems of Cyprus and to step up their criticism of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. There are signs that they intend to pursue this campaign at CHOGM. We need to avoid this if at all possible, and would like to discourage Mr Ramphal from allowing CHOGM to be misused in this way.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: COMMONWEALTH TRAINING FOR BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE

13. During the past 18 months Mr Ramphal has tried to persuade Commonwealth Caribbean governments, and the Canadians, to contribute to the establishment of a Commonwealth Training force in Belize for the Belize Defence Force. Although the presence of such a

/training ...

training force was not (nor could it be) intended to replace the garrison, the Canadian Prime Minister considered that it was an attempt to facilitate our withdrawal. Mr Trudeau refused to consider putting Canadian troops on the ground, although he has agreed to some training in Canada for members of the Belize Defence Force. Other Caribbean governments expressed willingness to contribute to a Commonwealth training force only if the garrison remained.

14. As a result of resolute Canadian unwillingness to participate in a training team, Mr Ramphal's initiative appears to have reached an impasse.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: COMMONWEALTH CONSULTATIVE AGREEMENT

15. On Belize's independence certain Commonwealth Caribbean governments, and Canada and the UK, signed an agreement to consult in the event of an armed attack, or threat of attack against Belize.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: BRITISH GARRISON

16. Mr Ramphal has not been told by us that it is our present intention to withdraw by the end of 1983, although he has been told that the garrison cannot remain indefinitely, and Mr Price may have spoken more frankly with him.

BELIZE/GUATEMALA: NEGOTIATIONS

17. A meeting between Belize and Guatemala, with UK observer participation, scheduled for 15 August, was postponed because of the coup in Guatemala on 8 August. The meeting is now planned for later in September, in Miami. Prospects for progress are not great, since the new Guatemalan régime still claims territory (though on a reduced scale to the historic claim to the whole of Belize). Belize refuses to consider ceding territory.

COMMONWEALTH MILITARY TRAINING TEAM IN UGANDA (CMTTU)

18. The CMTTU, which deployed to Uganda in March 1982, stemmed from a request by President Obote to Mr Ramphal for assistance in training the Ugandan Army. The team whose total complement is

/currently ...

currently 36, started by running courses at the School of Infantry at Jinja, but soon extended its programme to include specialist courses, the creation of an Officer Cadet School and follow-up visits to battalions. The team soon established good relations with Ugandan Ministers and senior officials, who regularly praise its work.

19. After a year, it was clear that much remained to be done, and that if the team were withdrawn, there would be a danger that some of the achievements would be nullified. Accordingly, HMG responded favourably to Obote's request through Mr Ramphal that the team continue its work until September 1983, with the possibility of a further extension to March 1984. Ministers have recently agreed that suitable personnel can be provided for this further extension, which is likely to be the last to be requested by the Ugandans. The team has now changed the emphasis of its work and is concentrating on more courses for officers, including senior officers, and an increased number of specialist courses, e.g. in the medical field. All courses now include discussion on human rights, relationships with the civil authorities and the place of the military within society.

20. Since the beginning of the training programme, the UK has provided the Commander and half of the team. Other contributing countries are Australia, Canada, Tanzania, Guyana, Sierra Leone and Jamaica. At the end of August the second Commander (Col. Holman) stated in his end of tour report that training of formed companies had begun, using (Ugandan) company officers and NCOs to instruct, which has given them practice and confidence. This is very worthwhile, as the impact of the team is greater and units learn how to train. The next 6 months should see a considerable increase in training within units, as younger more knowledgeable officers gradually replace the old guard. These developments are in line with the expectation of the Ugandan Government and the Commonwealth Secretariat that the team should work itself out of a job.

/LESOTHO ...

LESOTHO/SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS

21. These are characterised by deep distrust on both sides.

22. South African attitude: the South Africans are irritated by Lesotho Prime Minister Jonathan's persistent denunciation of apartheid, his refusal to recognise the 'independent' homelands and recent strengthening of Lesotho's relations with the Soviet Union.

23. Lesotho's attitudes: Jonathan believes the South Africans wish to destabilise Lesotho. His response to direct and indirect South African pressure has been to seek international support for Lesotho's position.

24. Present Position: there was a Lesotho/South African meeting on 10 August at official level on security matters (measures to control ANC and Lesotho Liberation Army - LLA). We believe tentative agreement was reached involving expulsion of up to 100 named ANC activists from Lesotho's South African refugee community. In response, South Africa would lift border restrictions, release arms shipments, and control LLA. Lesotho is apparently preparing to accept these terms. However, prior to the 10 August meeting Lesotho representatives in London and New York suggested that Lesotho was considering expulsion of all South African refugees as the only way to meet longer term South African concerns about the refugee community. The international community have been asked to restrain South African demands and pressure. Whilst we have not taken any specific action on this, the South Africans are fully aware of our views.

25. The United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) raised the issue with the South Africans during his recent visit (23/24 August in Cape Town). The UN attitude to Lesotho's appeal is sober. UN officials appear keen to keep the temperature down.

COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT FOR LESOTHO (May be drawn on as necessary)

26. Following discussions between Chief Jonathan and Mrs Gandhi, the Commonwealth Secretariat have sent a three-man mission to Maseru to assess the country's development and security priorities

/and ....

and to suggest how resources should best be allocated to meet these.

SRI LANKA

27. Since the rioting in July, Sri Lanka has remained relatively quiet, although there were minor incidents in the last week of August. Law and order have now been re-established. The Sri Lankan Government has claimed that 'anti-government' forces were responsible for the violence, and has banned several left wing parties, but the most likely instigators were the extreme Sinhala-Buddhist element.

28. The economic and financial consequences of the violence are still to be assessed, but they will be severe. There has been widespread destruction of property throughout the Island, resulting in large numbers of displaced persons.

29. Indian concern remains at a high level and Sri Lanka has resented what it sees as Indian interference, although the visit of Mrs Gandhi's special emissary, Mr Parthasarathy, to Colombo in the last week of August may have cleared the air.

30. Future prospects of a solution to the communal problem are not good. The violence has widened the breach between the Sinhalese and Tamils, and has possibly led to more support amongst the latter for a separate Tamil state.

EXPANSION OF THE COMMONWEALTH

31. St Kitts-Nevis will become the 48th member of the Commonwealth on independence on 19 September. The Commonwealth Secretariat will soon be consulting Commonwealth members about Brunei's wish to join the Commonwealth when she attains independence on 1 January 1984.

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERALSHIP

32. It is rumoured that Mr Ramphal intends to offer to serve for a further, third, term. Although his present term will not

/end ...

end until mid-1985 the question of his successor will probably be determined at the forthcoming CHOGM. We know of no other firm candidates, although it has been suggested that Mr Malcolm Fraser might be interested. There is no need for the Prime Minister to do more than note any interest Mr Ramphal might mention.

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

COPY No. 059

C.152/12/3

2 August 1983

With the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi now less than four months away, the time has come for me to submit for your consideration some preliminary ideas on the agenda and to ascertain your thinking.

In doing so, I am all too conscious that in the period since the Melbourne Meeting the world has continued to be beset by seemingly intractable political and economic problems. For the greater part, the will and capacity of the international community to deal with these problems has yet to be mobilised. Inevitably, Commonwealth countries have not been left untouched. On the contrary, many have had to shoulder a disproportionate share of the consequences in terms of economic distress and social and political insecurity. In a situation where agreement has eluded the international community with such damaging results consensus remains of critical importance; convergences at the Commonwealth level can therefore be of major significance to member countries and to the world community. Perhaps never before has the Commonwealth's "healing touch", of which Jawaharlal Nehru spoke so feelingly in the early days, been more needed. Where better to apply it than in New Delhi at the first ever Commonwealth summit held in India?

The customary structure of the agenda, with broad and flexible headings covering international, political and economic issues and Commonwealth functional co-operation is by now well settled; I assume you will wish to adhere to it.

Political Issues

On the political front I believe that Heads of Government will, as on previous occasions, wish to have a tour d'horizon of significant international developments since their last Meeting. There will, of course, be a variety of issues and concerns and the discussions can be expected to be truly global

in range, reflecting both national and regional perspectives and covering the full gamut of problems. I do not need to single out issues; regrettably, none has disappeared from the international agenda since Melbourne, while some have been added. Transcending them all is the broader question of the global political environment, its acute tensions and uncertainties and the pervasive effects of the arms race and super-power rivalry.

No other occasion in the international calendar provides an opportunity of the kind that will arise at New Delhi for leaders representing a wide range of views to consult together, away from the glare of publicity, about their concerns and hopes and to explore the scope for common action in the interest of a more harmonious world. Perhaps Heads of Government would see value in a reflective discussion of current trends and their implications for the future, the manner in which they affect prospects for global security and whether there are ways in which the Commonwealth might raise its voice, as it did in 1961 on disarmament, to influence the course of events. At a time of palpable danger, can Commonwealth leaders at New Delhi glimpse a pathway to common security and invite the world to take it with them?

Many had hoped to welcome Namibia to the Commonwealth fold at New Delhi. That hope has been thwarted; it remains to be seen whether there will be any significant progress by November towards Namibia's independence. Against the background of the Commonwealth's long-standing involvement in Southern Africa and its total opposition to racism, I expect Heads of Government will also wish to hear from their colleagues in that region about other aspects of the situation. South Africa's policy of destabilisation has been intensified with potentially far reaching consequences for Commonwealth countries. It will be helpful to consider how Commonwealth efforts might assist the countries concerned to withstand these pressures. Similarly, in reviewing developments in Cyprus and Belize, the Meeting may wish to assess the prospects of a distinctive Commonwealth contribution to wider international efforts to find solutions.

Economic Issues

On the economic front I need not dwell on the gravity of the situation and the problems which it poses for all member countries, especially the more vulnerable developing countries. The issues are unhappily all too familiar and the disappointments in trying to find answers to them all too acute. In their Melbourne Declaration Commonwealth leaders:

> "Assert(ed) that what is at stake - in terms of how hundreds of millions will live or die; of the

prospects for co-operation or conflict; and of the prospects for economic advance or stagnation - is of such vital importance in human terms that it would be an indictment of this generation if that political will and the readiness to find a creative compromise were not found".

Matters are in many ways even more serious now than when Heads of Government discussed them in Melbourne.

Throughout most of the developing world there has been further deterioration in economic circumstances and prospects. For most of the developed countries also it has been a time of continued contraction, particularly in employment. In the United States and to a more limited degree in some OECD countries there have been signs of recovery, but there is uncertainty about its strength and durability. Taken as a whole the world economy remains in need of 'intensive care'.

Discussion of international economic issues has been vigorous at all levels, including that of Heads of Government. At the Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi and the Western Economic Summit at Williamsburg, Commonwealth leaders played major roles. There have been Ministerial Meetings of the Group of 77, of OECD, of the Interim Committee and the GATT, and most recently the major occasion of UNCTAD VI. Additionally, there have been meetings of established inter-governmental bodies and informal expert gatherings. At the end of it all, however, there remains widespread unease over lack of progress on substantive issues and with the process of international negotiation and decision making.

The time is ripe to initiate a sustained process of reform and renewal in response to the urgent need for real development, to buttress and broaden recovery so that it becomes vigorous and durable and, overall, to improve the ways by which we co-operate to achieve these objectives. The Commonwealth is particularly well placed to help with this process. Heads of Government will have before them two studies which they commissioned at Melbourne. The first, PROTECTIONISM: THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER, is the work of the Group which was set up to study the impact of protectionism on developing countries in particular and its implications worldwide as well. As envisaged the report was made available to the GATT Ministerial Meeting in 1982. The second study relates to the obstacles to progress in the North-South dialogue arising from the negotiating process itself. That report, NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE: MAKING IT WORK, was also published in 1982. Both reports have attracted wide international notice and been welcomed for their dispassionate professionalism, candour and practical thrust.

Even more specifically, however, Heads of Government at New Delhi will have before them a major study, TOWARDS A NEW BRETTON WOODS, on the working of the international financial and trading system. This study was commissioned by Commonwealth Finance Ministers when they met in London last year and will be examined initially by them when they meet in Port of Spain in September. The resulting report, on which a most distinguished Expert Group has just concluded work, is the first overall examination initiated by governments of the "international trade and payments system as a whole and, in particular, the role of the international economic institutions". Taken together with the 1982 reports, it will provide Commonwealth leaders with a comprehensive, authoritative and up-to-date survey of contemporary international economic issues. The New Delhi Meeting therefore will be particularly well placed to contribute to global consensus-building in this area of critical importance to all countries.

Functional Co-operation

Additionally, and separately, intra-Commonwealth co-operation at the functional level remains a vital element of the Commonwealth connection. Such co-operation is central to the Secretariat's functions and is nowhere better expressed than in the wide range of technical assistance activities for which the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation is responsible. At Melbourne, Heads of Government agreed to make increased resources available to the Fund to enable its activities to be restored to earlier levels: it has been possible, as a result, to upgrade the extent and range of assistance which the CFTC offers. The New Delhi Meeting will I hope serve to sustain the Fund's effectiveness and future prospects.

In the context of the many comparative advantages of Commonwealth functional co-operation, but given the very real fiscal pressures constraining member governments it would, I believe, be the wish of Commonwealth leaders that the period immediately ahead should be one of consolidation in which we seek to maximise the benefits of existing services to member countries. Among such services the Commonwealth Youth Programme and the Commonwealth Foundation hold important places. Both were helped by the Melbourne decisions; both look to Heads of Government for continued support in the discharge of their mandates. The same is true of the Commonwealth Science Council whose programmes in the new areas of science and technology are likely to be of major significance to development efforts in the next decades. Commonwealth Employment/Labour Ministers have already signalled the need for more intensive sharing of Commonwealth experience in managing technological change with particular reference to the micro-electronics revolution. And among the newer activities required by Heads of Government, the

Women and Development Programme, now nearing the end of its third year, has injected significant perspectives on issues and strategies across the full range of the Secretariat's development activities. Particularly as we approach the final year of the United Nations Decade of Women (in 1985), Commonwealth leaders may wish to underline the importance of this very special Commonwealth co-operative effort.

The Meeting will also have before it the recommendations of the Commonwealth Standing Committee on Student Mobility, established pursuant to the recognition by Heads of Government at Melbourne of the importance of educational interchange within the Commonwealth. It is a matter of much consequence to the Commonwealth's own future, no less than to national development, that educational interchange, which has been such a distinctive and enduring element of Commonwealth links in the past, should continue to flourish.

As requested by Senior Officials at their meeting in Arusha, the Secretariat will provide a background paper on the possibilities for co-operation in the cultural field.

In the period since Melbourne I have received a number of suggestions from Heads of Government about the style and format of their Meetings, directed principally at ensuring that their unique character of informality and dialogue is maintained. The Guidelines adopted at Ottawa in 1973 and developed further at Lusaka in 1979 have served us well, but there is scope for further refinement in the light of experience. Drawing also on the discussion of this matter among Senior Officials at Arusha, I shall shortly be circulating a paper on the subject for your consideration.

I had earlier conveyed to you that the Meeting would run from 23 to 30 November. Unlike Melbourne, where the Opening Session was held in the afternoon, proceedings at New Delhi will begin in the morning of the 23rd. In view of this it is envisaged that the Meeting will conclude on the evening of 29 November - a modest contraction which I believe Heads of Government will welcome.

I much look forward to recieving your views, together with an indication whether it will be your intention to present any papers to the Meeting. I am aiming to prepare and circulate an annotated draft agenda by the end of September and would therefore welcome replies by the first week of September if possible.

Meanwhile, having recently returned from Delhi, I am delighted to be able to say that you are assured both of a very warm welcome and excellent facilities.

With deep respect,

Shridath S. Ramphal

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~telegram/despatch/note~~ TYPE: Draft/~~Final~~

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

TO: HE Shridath S Ramphal, AC Kt CMG QC
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

SUBJECT:

I am writing in reply to your circular letter of 2 August about the agenda for this year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. As you say, the world continues to be beset by seemingly intractable political and economic problems; and I share your hope that we may collectively be able to apply the Commonwealth's ''healing touch'' to at least some of them in New Delhi.

I share your view that we should adhere to the customary broad and flexible structure of the agenda. On the political front, the customary tour d'horizon of significant international developments provides a useful opportunity for us all to exchange thoughts and perspectives with our colleagues. Like you, I would see great value in a private, reflective discussion of current trends and their implications for the future. It is indeed the opportunity for this sort of discussion that gives these Meetings their unique value.

As far as individual issues are concerned, you have I think identified those of particular Commonwealth concern I look forward to discussing them all, and to

/exchanging .....

CONFIDENTIAL

exchanging thoughts about them with our colleagues. With so many problems to discuss, it will be more than ever important not to spend too long on one or two, however important, at the expense of the others.

I fully agree that Heads of Government should devote time to a reflection on the prospects for global security, and I shall be prepared to take part in the wide-ranging discussion you have in mind. I look forward to hearing the views of our colleagues on these vital issues. But I must say that I am not optimistic that a specifically Commonwealth initiative would in present circumstances advance significantly the work already under way in arms control negotiations in the UN and other fora. // You suggest that, in reviewing developments in Cyprus, the meeting may wish to assess the prospects of a distinctive Commonwealth contribution to wider international efforts to find a solution. You will recall that, following discussion of Cyprus in the UN in May, a resolution was adopted which referred inter alia to the UN Secretary-General's intention of increasing his own involvment in search for a settlement. Although the UK abstained on the resolution, we particularly supported this reference. We believe that the best prospects for reaching a settlement lie in the intercommunal talks in Nicosia held under the auspices of the UN. Initiatives outside this framework would seriously risk cutting across the efforts of the UN Secretary-General and could well prove counter-productive. For this reason we would prefer to avoid consideration of

/this .....

this question. It follows also that we would wish to discourage possible efforts by members of the Commonwealth with a particular point of view on the Cyprus question from using the occasion of CHOGM to publicise these views internationally. We would prefer any review of developments in Cyprus to be as purely factual as possible.

I agree that the problems of Southern Africa should be discussed by Commonwealth leaders in order to see how best to contribute to the search for solutions. I share your disappointment at the slow rate of progress towards Namibian independence. I shall naturally be ready, with Mr Trudeau, to give an account of the activities of the Contact Group. Some of our colleagues will no doubt want to discuss implementation of Gleneagles, but I would hope we need not spend a great deal of time on this. I was, as you know, greatly encouraged by the recent decisive vote by the MCC against sending a team to South Africa.

As you mentioned to Janet Young, it might be opportune for me at the Meeting to bring Heads of Government up to date on our thinking on the Falklands. I would propose to say something about our plans for the Falkland Islands, to thank those of our colleagues who have given us general support on this issue, and to urge them to continue doing so.

As you say in your letter there has been a great deal of discussion about international economic issues in the first half of 1983. A number of major international meetings have taken place, and there is now general agreement

/that .....

that we live in an interdependent world, and that the prosperity of industrialised and developing countries is closely interwoven. We now have to ensure that economic recovery materialises, endures and spreads, for recovery in the world economy will do more than anything else to alleviate the problems currently facing the developing countries. The Commonwealth report entitled ''The North/South Dialogue - Making it Work'' is an impressive document. It would be in the interests of all countries, developed and developing alike, if the suggestions it makes for more constructive ways of conducting the dialogue were adopted. We are now studying the report on the working of the international financial and trading system, which we have just received. I look forward with great interest to the views of Commonwealth Finance Ministers on it. For my part, I would be very ready at New Delhi to offer to ensure that the Commonwealth's concerns are taken into account at the 1984 Economic Summit.

I agree that we should look closely at the various aspects of functional cooperation within the Commonwealth I am sure you are right to say that, in present financial circumstances, we should aim for a period of consolidation. If there are to be proposals for increased activities in any area, it would be helpful if these could be costed, and if proposals could also be put forward for balancing savings. I note the concern of the Commonwealth Employment/Labour Ministers about the need for more intensive sharing of Commonwealth experience in managing technological change, especially in relation to the micro-electronics revolution.

/The ....

The UK for example has particular experience of micro computers in education. The employment effect of new technology is, of course of world-wide concern and a number of international bodies are promoting discussion and study of it. Exchanges of experience on this subject can be valuable, but we need to be sure that any Commonwealth initiative in this area does not duplicate work in progress elsewhere, and that the expenditure can be clearly justified by the likely results

You will no doubt want to say something about the need for repairs to Marlborough House, and the likely implications for the work of the Secretariat. I would be glad to explain the background if you thought this helpful.

One other issue not covered in your letter on which there might usefully be discussion at New Delhi is the management of environmental aspects of development. At the last UNEP Governing Council meeting many developing countries said that they required assistance in this field and we supported that view. Also we are aware of interest by senior professionals on your staff and by other organisations involved with the subject, in a Commonwealth initiative along these lines. I think it is very much for my colleagues in the developing Commonwealth to judge whether there should be discussion of such an initiative in New Delhi but if you or they wished to raise it, the UK would be happy to dicuss such an idea, in the context of the recently agreed increase in CFTC resources. In addition 1985 sees International Youth Year. It would be entirely appropriate for the Commonwealth as a whole to be associated with some aspect of the international events

/which .....

which mark this year. It may be worthwhile exploring the possibility of Commonwealth sponsorship of, or involvement in, International Youth Year activities concerned with the protection of the environment. One aspect of environment protection and improvement that might be suitable is tree planting.

I look forward to seeing your paper about the style and format of our Meetings. As you know, I would like to see them become even more informal and businesslike. But I recognise the problems, and realise that the solution essentially lies with Heads of Government themselves. I believe that the Chairman has a particularly crucial rôle to play, and know that we can rely on Mrs Gandhi to exercise the right mixture of firmness and tact. In this connection, I welcome your suggestion that the Meeting should conclude on the evening of 29 November. Finally, I hope we can pursue with real determination our search for a shorter communiqué. We all seem to favour this in principle, but it always eludes us in practice. I hope we may have some success at New Delhi!

CIRCULAR LETTER FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, DATED 2 AUGUST 1982: THE AGENDA FOR CHOGM

SUMMARY AND INITIAL COMMENTS

1. Mr Ramphal has written his letter after discussion with the Indians, and the ideas in it undoubtedly represent Indian thinking as well as his own. It seems clear that, beneath the generalities, they want CHOGM to focus on the following subjects:

Disarmament (it sounds as if Mr Ramphal may be hinting at a possible Commonwealth initiative).

Namibia

South Africa's policy of destabilisation; can the Commonwealth help the countries concerned?

Cyprus) Can the Commonwealth help wider inter-
) national efforts to find solutions?
Belize)

Economic issues: CHOGM will have before it the two 1982 Commonwealth studies, plus the one commissioned by 1982 Finance Ministers (''Towards a New Bretton Woods''). Together these ''will provide Commonwealth leaders with a comprehensive, authoritative and up-to-date survey of contemporary international economic issues''. Mr Ramphal hopes that CHOGM can ''contribute to global consensus-building in this area of critical importance to all countries''.

/Commonwealth

Commonwealth Functional Cooperation

Mr Ramphal indicates that Heads of Government will be invited to endorse the activities of, and perhaps authorise increased funds for:

CFTC

Commonwealth Youth Programme

Commonwealth Foundation

Commonwealth Science Council

Meetings of Commonwealth Employment/Labour Ministers (''need for more intensive sharing of Commonwealth experience in managing technological change with particular reference to the micro-electronics revolution'').

Women and Development Programme

Finally, Mr Ramphal makes it clear that Heads of Government will be invited to consider student mobility, and ''possibilities for cooperation in the cultural field'' (ie, the future of the Commonwealth Arts Organisation).

2. There will undoubtedly be a host of subjects discussed at CHOGM which Mr Ramphal has not mentioned. Subjects likely to be raised by other Commonwealth members include:

Sporting links with South Africa

Diego Garcia (perhaps)

UNLOSC

The future of the Falklands

Antarctica

Commonwealth Coordination Department
5 August 1983

FMM(83)2

MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, 21-22 SEPTEMBER, 1983

Draft Agenda

1. Election of Chairman
2. Adoption of Agenda
3. Current World Economic Situation and Problems (including IMF and World Bank Questions)
4. Commonwealth Functional Co-operation
5. Communiqué
6. Any Other Business (including venue for 1984 Meeting)

FMM(83)2.Add 1.

MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH FINANCE MINISTERS
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, 20-22 SEPTEMBER,1983

Annotated Draft Agenda*

Item 1 - Election of Chairman

The Chairman of the Meeting will be elected in accordance with customary practice.

Item 2 - Adoption of Agenda

2. A draft agenda has been circulated as FMM(83)2. It will be revised, if necessary, in the light of discussions at the Senior Finance Officials' Meeting on 20 September.

Item 3 - Current World Economic Situation and Problems

3. Last year, Ministers expresssed deep concern at the state of the world economy and increasing strains in the international financial system and they requested of the Secretariat an overall examination of the international trading and payments system. The study will be before Ministers as FMM(83)8 and, in addition to longer-term systemic issues, it is concerned with immediate problems of recovery. A Secretariat paper (FMM(83)3) also outlines the more recent features of the current world economic situation and raises a number of specific financial issues.

4. Notwithstanding the fact that economic recovery is at last taking place in a number of industrialised countries, and is stronger in the U.S. than expected earlier, a number of problems remain which Ministers might particularly wish to consider. Both papers mentioned above refer to the weakness of the recovery, which is in any case still very unbalanced between countries, and to the risk that the recovery might be aborted or constrained by a number of factors. These include the possibility of real interest rates remaining at historically high levels, mainly as a result of domestic policies in the U.S; the dangers of increased protectionism, particularly arising from over-valued currencies or misaligned exchange rates; and

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* For ease of reference, a list of relevant documents is given in FMM(83)2.Add.2 and FO(83)2.Add.2.

the threat of default by one or more of the major developing borrowers because of their inability to carry through extremely severe adjustment programmes and/or to secure sufficient liquidity through appropriate debt restructuring arrangements. There is also an increased concern about the threat to economic and social stability in the poorest countries arising from disturbed economic and other factors such as lack of external resources and liquidity. Ministers may wish to focus on the international measures that could be taken to sustain and broaden the recovery and any special arrangements that may be required in relation to the debt problem or to the severe difficulties being faced by the poorer countries.

5. The Commonwealth Study Group on the international financial and trading system has pointed out that current recovery, even if realised as now projected, will not solve the problems of the world economy and that to reinforce it and to promote a more durable process of economic growth in both developed and developing countries, a sustained process of international reform will be required. While most of the measures required could be implemented through existing institutions, special machinery is required to develop and give impetus to the process. While Ministers will no doubt be concerned with the substantive recommendations of the Group, they may wish to give particular attention to the process required to resolve these problems.

6. An important part of the solutions to both current and longer-term problems might be a strengthening of the respective roles of the IMF and the World Bank. While a number of significant and welcome changes have been made in the Fund's operations in recent years, particularly since the last Annual Meeting, the Ministers may wish to give urgent attention to (i) the need to ensure that the recent decisions to augment its resources are urgently and adequately implemented; (ii) further steps required to provide additional resources to the Fund in the light of expanding demands on it; (iii) the appropriate level of SDR allocations in 1983/84 and beyond; (iv) possible improvements in the CFF and in the conditionality practices under other facilities.

7. As in all recent years, the precarious position of IDA VI and IDA VII remains of great concern and Ministers might wish to focus on practical means to prevent the Seventh Replenishment from falling in real terms below the level of the previous replenishment. Ministers may also wish to discuss the need to increase the World Bank's lending, at least in line with the Management's recent proposals to attain the long established goal of a 5 per cent real rate of increase, and the means to augment the Bank's capacity to achieve such an expansion, including a further capital increase.

Item 4 - Commonwealth Functional Co-operation

8. Among the sub-items that may be considered under this heading are:

(i) intra-Commonwealth aid in the general context of the overall aid effort (FMM(83)6) - a review of CFTC operations will take place at the meeting of the CFTC Board of Representatives on 23 September.

(ii) developments under the Commonwealth programme on capital markets and suggestions for future activities including initiatives in the field of private foreign direct investment (FMM(83)7).

(iii) the facility to provide advice on economic and financial management issues (FMM(83)7).

In view of the continuing inadequacy of aid flows and the recent cut-backs in commercial finance, the above activities being carried out by the Secretariat in response to Ministers' recent decisions may be of particular interest.

Item 5 - Communiqué

9. The last substantive item on the Agenda will be the consideration and adoption, with amendments if any, of the draft Communiqué prepared by the Committee of the Whole.

Item 6 - Any Other Business (including venue for 1984 meeting)

PRIME MINISTER

Call by Mr. Ramphal

Just in case he raises it - I understand that when he last called on the Foreign Secretary he sought Sir Geoffrey Howe's private advice on an application which Mr. Jeremy Thorpe had made for a job in the Commonwealth Secretariat (as a kind of travelling cultural salesman). The Foreign Secretary apparently said that he did not believe there would be any Governmental objection to this, though he could see that it was perhaps not an ideal appointment from the point of view of the Secretariat.

A. J. C.

12 September, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

A J Coles Esq.
No. 10 Downing Street

9 September 1983

Dear John,

MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

I understand that the FCO will be letting the Prime Minister have the bulk of the briefing for her meeting with the Commonwealth Secretary General on 13 September. But we have been asked to supply a note on the attached report of the Commonwealth Study Group "Towards a new Bretton Woods", which was published on 8 September, and to which Ramphal may well refer.

2. The Prime Minister will recall that this report was commissioned during the last Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference in London last September when Mr Muldoon argued the case for a "second Bretton Woods". He has since exchanged correspondence with the Prime Minister and with the former Chancellor on this point. The report that has emerged is in some respects Muldoon writ large. The attached summary critique sketches out its main features.

3. At their Press Conference yesterday the Study Group Team (which included Sir Jeremy Morse but no British Government representative) were studiously moderate in their presentation, suggesting that their analysis represented the middle ground and indicating that the further international studies they recommend might or might not lead to a full scale Conference. It is clear that they expect the study to be taken seriously, and to feature not only at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting in Trinidad later this month but perhaps also at the Heads of Government meeting later in the year. Ramphal, when he saw the Chancellor in July, suggested that he shared this view, and expected the report to feature prominently at the Finance Ministers" meeting, and be discussed at Delhi. I guess that he will commend it to the Prime Minister, who might wish in reply to draw on the attached "Line to take", which reflects our scepticism about the "New Bretton Woods" proposal.

4. Basically, our first impression is that the report contains some useful analysis of the present international economic scene, and displays a measure of understanding of the reasons for the macro-economic policy stance in the major countries. But it also includes a long shopping list, of a familiar kind, setting out reforms which might help developing countries, and

unspecific calls for policy changes. Above all, it does not begin to make a persuasive case for a new international monetary conference.

5. The Chancellor will of course be pursuing these points as appropriate at the meetings in Trinidad and Washington later this month.

6. I am copying this letter to Brian Fall at the FCO.

Yours ever,
John Kerr.

J O KERR

COMMONWEALTH STUDY GROUP REPORT

Line to take

(i) Have not yet had opportunity to study Report in detail. Secretary General may like to outline some main features.

(ii) Emphasise desirability of sustained non-inflationary growth, greater convergence of economic policies of major industrial countries. These were themes of Williamsburg. Understand Study Group themselves underlined importance of responsible macro-economic stance.

(iii) Current discussion rightly stresses interdependence and linkages between trade and finance.

(iv) Summit Conferences themselves, and surveillance arrangements, illustrate recognition of interdependence. Heads of State, like members of Study Group, seek to step back from immediate problems to consider strategic objectives. Conclusions of Williamsburg intended to help in practical way towards adoption of responsible policies while respecting national sovereignty.

(v) Not persuaded that some technical panacea for present problems if could only trouble to sit down and work it out and arrange a jumbo conference to agree it. Obvious dangers of creating false expectations with all damage that could result from that.

(vi) If malfunctioning of system in past, reflects inflationary policies of past. No answer to flinch from adjustment or seek easier conditionality.

(vii) Wrong to imply that present international problems (eg debt issues, exchange rate instability) stem from break of Bretton Woods system. Is not cause and effect the other way round?

(viii) Welcome continuing dialogue. This will identify ideas all agree worth following up. Our response will emerge as debate taken up in Trinidad.

HELLEINER REPORT TO CFM: SUMMARY

The report is long and rather unwieldy, but it does manage to avoid both inflammatory rhetoric and apocalyptic gloom. Equally it has little new to offer. It is much better on analysis of problems than prescriptions or solutions. And those it does offer are either familiar or non-starters. While avoiding the worst excesses of Brandt, they are pitched towards LDC's regular demands.

Chapter 2: Evaluation of the international economic system

2. After the introductory chapter, there follows an analysis of the development of international finance since the war. It runs through the key changes: increasing interdependence, the expansion in the number of developing countries, the growth of bank finance, the increasing prevalence of floating exchange rates and the emergence of the multiple currency reserve system. Much of the analysis is sound. For example, the need for non-inflationary growth is emphasised as a prerequisite for a sustainable international economic system.

Chapter 3: Recovery and improved stabilisation

3. This part of the report explores the main international consultation arrangements in the international economic scene. Throughout there is a worrying assumption that the economic deterioration and disruption of the 1970s resulted from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangements. There is no hint that causality might run in the other direction. Consequently, the report pins its hopes on recreating the immediate post Bretton Woods era by more international co-ordination: expanded LDC participation in surveillance, consultations, more co-ordination between the various international organisatoins - IMF, GATT, UNCTAD etc. There is something in this but what is proposed sounds Byzantine.

4. The report reads exchange volatility and misalignments as proof that official action is needed. It is suggested that this should be achieved by establishing target zones for the major currencies, co-ordinating intervention, expanding swaps and developing forward cover to protect the weakest countries from exchange losses. However there is sensible recognition that improved macro-economic policy co-ordination among the major countries is the key.

5. The chapter ends with a section on stabilising commodity prices to protect poor countries against the effects of further reductions in export earnings. Only "effective

macro-economics contra-cyclical policy" is suggested as a fundamental response. Implementation of the Common Fund is endorsed.

Chapter 4: International liquidity and the IMF

6. The Fund's policies are reviewed with a distinct LDC bias reminiscent of Brandt. The recent downward fluctuation in international reserves is adduced as justification for resuming allocations of SDRs. There is a plug for greater IMF resources in order that the Fund may adopt more generous and less conditional lending policies to debtor countries.

7. Some of this is sensible. But the recommended merger between the Fund's General and SDR Accounts is confused. The idea seems to be that the IMF should create SDRs and then lend them. There is a plea for more regular quota reviews, with some criticism of the scale and distribution of the recently negotiated eighth.

8. Discussion of the Fund's facilities concentrates on undermining the Fund's main strength: encouraging adjustment. Access limits for programme finance should be pitched liberally, and conditionality in programmes should be eased "in response to overall macro-economic conditions". Use of the CFF (to compensate for export shortfalls in primary producer countries) should not be limited by quotas and should be innocent of conditionality. There is a useful recognition of the overlapping role of IMF extended arrangements and World Bank structural adjustment loans, but unfortunately the recommended solution is merger on the less conditional style of the World Bank rather than emphasising the desirability of structural adjustment through Fund sponsored programmes.

Chapter 5: Commercial lending and debt management

9. This chapter offers a coherent and basically sound analysis of commercial bank finance. Much of it is familiar, eg the history of the development of debt problems in developing countries. The need for a global recovery is seen as all important, with stress on the need for major debtors to restore their own creditworthiness by rectifying their current deficits and rebuilding reserves. Debt relief schemes are outlined but rejected as impractical, though there is a hint that they might be kept as contingency plans.

10. The report recommends a more prominent role for the World Bank in rescheduling, with general principles replacing the present ad hoc approach. There are familiar calls for longer timescales in Paris Club agreements and better information flows to warn of impending difficulties. There is sensible recognition that balance of payment support should rely less on bank finance, but unfortunately the solution is seen as greater official flows, not more direct investment. This leads on to an unfortunate passage blaming the "inadequate

earlier official acceptance of responsibility for the recycling of OPEC surpluses" for the recent debt problems.

11. The chapter is rounded wth a plea for more official intervention in cases of major difficulties among banks, given that neither the IMF nor the BIS can do this. Because the banks cannot (will not?) establish their own safety net, some kind of official lender of last resort facility the report thinks will be needed eventually. In the meantime supervisory responsibilities should be better defined and new inter-central bank lines of credit should be set up.

Chapter 6: Long term finance for development

12. This is rather better than its companion piece, chapter 4. Once again, however, the market mechanism is assumed not to work: here it is criticised for not providing adequate long term capital flows. There is no recognition that this may be partly the fault of debtor countries rather than the market. Recognising that bank finance is going to fall, and realising that bond finance is unlikely to expand much, private direct investment is held out as the LDCs' best hope. There are some sober suggestions on how it could best be promoted.

13. The bulk of the chapter, however, is a paean for the World Bank and a plug for its expansion. The report urges easing its conservative financial policy and a selective capital increase of some $20 billion, enabling a real rise of 5 per cent per annum in its commitments by the mid-1980s. The US is acknowledged to be critically important to IDA: full completion of its IDA7 contribution and early completion of IDA8 negotiations are urged. There is familiar stuff on enlarging aid and making its bigger volume more predictable.

Chapter 7: International trade

14. A balanced analysis of the recent decline in world trade highlights diminished compliance with GATT, and the links between restrictive trade practices and debt servicing problems, exacerbated by volatile and misaligned exchange rates. The main recommendation is for an effective multilateral policy-making body incorporating GATT and UNCTAD.

Chapter 8: Contingency plans

15. This chapter asks what would happen if the recovery faltered, or if for some other reason satisfactory resolution of debtor countries' problems is delayed. There are proposals for a special contingency fund to be set up by major aid donors to help the poorest in dire emergencies; and for discounting poor quality debt. Resales of debt on the market, perhaps at substantial discounts, are not ruled out.

Chapter 9: Next steps

16. The report culminates with a recommendation for setting up preparatory work for an international monetary conference.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

12 August 1983

As I mentioned on the telephone, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Mr. Ramphal, has asked to see the Prime Minister, and I have provisionally arranged for him to do so at 1200 on Tuesday, 13 September.

I should be grateful if you could arrange for a brief to reach us here by Monday, 12 September.

(TIM FLESHER)

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

MFJ/JS

SUBJECT.

cc. Master set.

Commonwealth: CHGM Policy: Pt 3.

10 DOWNING STREET

Commonwealth

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1981

Dear Roderic,

Commonwealth Secretary General

The Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Mr. Ramphal, called on the Prime Minister earlier this afternoon.

The Prime Minister asked after Mr. Fraser's health. Mr. Ramphal said that he had talked to Mr. Fraser on the telephone recently. Mr. Fraser was on his farm and, albeit reluctantly, taking things easy. The doctors seemed to think that CHGM would not give rise to difficulties provided Mr. Fraser continued to rest in the interim. The Prime Minister said that she hoped that Mr. Fraser could be persuaded to forgo most of the socialising during the meeting.

The Prime Minister asked about the other participants. Mr. Ramphal commented that it seemed the Malaysian Prime Minister would not be coming. Although Dr. Mahathir had made disobliging remarks about his country's relationship with the Commonwealth, it was not clear that this was the real reason for his absence. It was being said that he was unwell and suffering from a similar complaint to his two predecessors. The criticism of the Commonwealth was intended to distract attention from the real reason for Dr. Mahathir's non-appearance. Dr. Mahathir had passed through London on his way to Spain at the end of last week and would probably be coming back by the same route in a few days time. Perhaps someone in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would be able to discover something. For his part, Mr. Ramphal said that he had invited Musa Hitam, who was visiting Paris at present, to come to London next weekend.

Mr. Ramphal was uncertain as to whether or not Miss Charles intended to make the journey. It would be a pity if she were not present since she would be particularly well placed to keep Mr. Bishop in line. The Prime Minister said that she too would regret Miss Charles' absence. If, as she had heard, the reason was financial surely something could be done. Mr. Ramphal said that he had hoped to arrange for Mr. Trudeau to give her a lift but this seemed to have fallen through.

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/As regards

As regards other participants Mr. Ramphal said that President Obote still hoped to attend. It would be a miracle if he did so. President Kaunda was also in a somewhat unhappy position. There was a good deal of disaffection in Zambia. However he too still planned to come. President Nyerere was a certain attender. He had asked Mr. Ramphal to see him in Paris next Monday evening. Mrs. Gandhi intended to be present for the whole conference.

Pakistan

Mr. Ramphal said that Mr. Fraser was pushing very hard for agreement on the readmission of Pakistan to the Commonwealth. Mr. Ramphal said that he had been warning Mr. Fraser that thinking in Delhi was not necessarily as positive as he (Mr. Fraser) seemed to think. The Indians did not consider that Mrs Gandhi had been as forthcoming as Mr. Fraser was now inclined to assert. It was important that the question of Pakistan's readmission should be seen in a Commonwealth context rather than in relation to the situation in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister said that it would be "disastrous" if the question of Pakistan's membership was raised and agreement was not secured. There should be no formal discussion until it had been established in the course of informal contacts among the Heads of Government that unanimous agreement would be forthcoming. Mr. Ramphal said that he entirely agreed. This was why he had rejected the proposal that the matter should be discussed by officials. He added that it seemed to him important that the Indian Government should not merely go along with the proposal but that they should be genuinely content. The Prime Minister agreed. We would not wish to find ourselves at a later stage in a position where we had swopped Pakistani membership for Indian membership. It was also necessary to bear in mind that the next CHGM might be held in Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi might prefer that Pakistan should not be there. Mr. Ramphal thought this point could be argued either way.

Gleneagles

The Prime Minister said that so far as she was concerned the less said in Melbourne about Gleneagles the better. Mr. Ramphal said he entirely agreed and had been working to that end. He did not think any great issue of principle was involved. All the members other than New Zealand would probably be prepared to allow the issue to go virtually undiscussed and to settle for a simply reaffirmation of the Gleneagles agreement in the communique. However Mr. Muldoon still seemed inclined to take the offensive. He had complained that the issue of human rights did not figure sufficiently prominently on the agenda. He was a "bruiser" and might be strengthened in his determination by the possibility of deriving electoral advantage from it in New Zealand. The Prime Minister said that she thought Mr. Muldoon had himself been "bruised" by recent events. She had a good deal of sympathy for his predicament. He was right not to have withheld visas: HMG would not have done so in a similar situation. Mr. Ramphal said that there was a feeling in the Commonwealth that Mr. Muldoon had not, in fact, leaned as hard on the Rugby Football Association

/in New Zealand

in New Zealand as HMG had done on the RFU here in the past. It seemed doubtful whether he had ever made his views unequivocally clear to the rugby administrators. If he were to insist on raising the temperature in Melbourne, the Commonwealth Games in Brisbane might well suffer.

International Economic Issues

Mr. Ramphal said that Mr. Fraser was, of course, keen that economic issues should figure prominently at Melbourne. He saw this as his way of making a contribution to the meeting in Mexico. Mr. Ramphal hoped that it would be possible to do something tangible. He had in mind a food initiative. He believed that a limited, if concerted, effort by the Commonwealth could have very important results. He had mentioned the idea earlier to President Shagari who was enthusiastic. A "resource input" from HMG would be required. The Prime Minister undertook to look into Mr. Ramphal's proposal. She herself had for long thought that the continued production of food surpluses in Europe was undesirable and had a damaging effect on the will and capability of the developing countries to increase their own food production. Mr. Ramphal said that he very much hoped the Prime Minister would make this point in Melbourne. It was increasingly accepted that food aid had inhibited food production in many countries.

Arrangements

In response to a question from Mr. Ramphal about the opening ceremony, the Prime Minister said that she did not mind when she spoke.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 September 1981

Dear Michael,

Call by Commonwealth Secretary-General

In his letter of 1 September, Willie Rickett asked for briefing, by noon today, for the Commonwealth Secretary-General's call on the Prime Minister at 14.30 on Monday 7 September. This is now enclosed.

We understand from Mr Ramphal's office that he intends to discuss prospects for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and this is covered, along with related issues. Given the Prime Minister's familiarity with economic matters, we have notincluded specific briefing on these.

The Prime Minister will recall that Mr Ramphal paid a similar call shortly before the Lusaka CHGM in 1979.

Yours sincerely,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

MELBOURNE - 1981

DRAFT AGENDA

1. OPENING SESSION

2. ORDER OF AGENDA

3. WORLD POLITICAL SCENE

   (a) Global Trends and Prospects
   (b) Developments in Asia
   (c) Southern Africa

4. WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION

   (a) The overview of crisis
   (b) Approaches to solutions:
      i) Trade
      ii) Financial flows
      iii) Energy
   (c) Food: A Commonwealth role

5. ISLAND DEVELOPING AND OTHER SPECIALLY DISADVANTAGED MEMBER COUNTRIES

6. COMMONWEALTH CO-OPERATION

   (a) Regionalism
   (b) CFTC in the '80s
   (c) Commonwealth Foundation
   (d) Commonwealth Youth Programme
   (e) Culture

(f) Studies mandated by the Heads of Government Meeting, 1979

i) Report of the Commonwealth Working Party on Human Rights

ii) Report of the Consultative Group on Student Mobility within the Commonwealth

iii) Report of the Commonwealth Committee on Communications and the Media

iv) Feasibility Study on Commonwealth Film and Television Institute

7. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

8. OTHER BUSINESS

9. COMMUNIQUE

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER:
14.30 HOURS MONDAY, 7 SEPTEMBER 1981

POINTS TO MAKE

CHGM: GENERAL

1. Looking forward to Melbourne. Arrangements going well? Any notable absentees? Who else has agreed to make introductory speeches? (Prime Minister has accepted Mr Ramphal's invitation to respond to Mr Fraser's address of welcome and introduce main political discussion.)

2. Commonwealth relationships impaired recently. Important to make good damage done by controversy over Springbok tour of New Zealand.

DISCUSSION AT CHGM OF GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

3. Unfortunate if Gleneagles took up too much time at Melbourne, or spoilt atmosphere. Hope Mr Muldoon will neither provoke nor be provoked. (I can understand his grievance at what he sees as unfair treatment after fulfilling, in his (and our) eyes the terms of the Gleneagles Agreement.) Are you hopeful that problem can be contained and temperature kept down?

4. Would not be prepared to see Gleneagles' scope increased in any way. Strongly hope text can be reaffirmed as it stands, and without extended discussion.

/BELIZE

BELIZE

5. Commonwealth has played a most valuable role in supporting principle of Belizean independence with sovereignty and territory intact. Now look forward to Belize becoming independent on 21 September, joining the Commonwealth and attending CHGM. Commonwealth Committee on Belize has made a major contribution. Commonwealth support will be valuable as Belize seeks negotiated settlement with Guatemala after independence. Satisfactory progress being made towards joint undertaking by certain Commonwealth governments to consult in the event of armed attack on Belize.

NAMIBIA (IF RAISED)

FIVE'S CONTINUING EFFORTS

6. South Africa incursion into Angola and resultant loss of life reinforces need for early negotiated settlement. Consultations amongst the Five continue and Foreign Ministers will meet in New York 23 September to review the results. A statement will then be issued.

DISCUSSION AT CHGM

7. We share African frustration at continuing delay, but no viable alternative to the Five's present course. Should not expect much visible progress before CHGM. But hope that extreme statements damaging to the Five's work can be avoided. The Africans wish the Five to continue their efforts (as the recent visiting OAU delegation underlined).

/UGANDA

UGANDA (IF RAISED)

8. We support President Obote's efforts to master the enormous political, economic and security problems he faces. Urgent need for reconciliation. Deplore those advocating violence.

9. Appreciated Secretary-General's role in mounting Commonwealth observer exercise for elections. Continuing opportunity for Commonwealth cooperation in assisting Uganada's recovery.

PAKISTAN'S POSSIBLE READMISSION TO COMMONWEALTH (IF RAISED)

10. Indian signals a little confusing recently but understand they have said they would be ready to accept a Commonwealth consensus in the matter, while not wishing to see it hurried. Looks an appropriate topic for informal discussion perhaps during weekend retreat? Your views?

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT (IF RAISED)

11. UK's national security policy based on deterrence, which has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 30 years. But we take every opportunity to negotiate balanced reductions of forces and armaments. We believe that declaration are less useful than the negotiation of concrete measures.

COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION (CFTC)(IF RAISED)

12. Glad that Britain has participated in the CFTC Working Party and that its recommendations have found general support. We shall continue to play our part, and will seek to maintain our 30% contribution (but not more).

/13.

FOOD INITIATIVE (WORLD FOOD CRISIS - A COMMONWEALTH RESPONSE)

(IF RAISED)

13. More needs to be done to increase food production but the CFTC is a mutual fund. It will require a hard effort on the part of all members to reverse the decline in real terms in the CFTC's resources and the Secretary General's proposal to the last CHGM for earmarked contribution to establish the Industrial Development Unit was only responded to by Britain and India.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENERAL

1. Commonwealth Secretary General last called on Prime Minister on 17 March when his principal purpose was to brief the Prime Minister before her visit to India. Mr Ramphal also called on Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (at latter's request) on 4 August when they discussed inter alia Pakistan's possible readmission to Commonwealth, Gleneagles, Namibia and Belize.

CHGM: GENERAL

2. Arrangements are going well. Miss Charles (Dominica), and Dr Mahathir (Malaysia) are known absentees and there is some doubt whether President Jawara (The Gambia), Mr Mintoff (Malta), Mr Chambers (Trinidad & Tobago) and the Hon Tupuola Efi (Western Samoa) will attend.

3. The provisional agenda is attached. We know that Mr Ramphal has invited Mrs Gandhi (with the Prime Minister) to lead discussion on agenda item 3(a) 'World Political Scene: Global Trends and Prospects', Mr Lee Kwan Yew - 3(b) 'Developments in Asia', President Shagari - 3(c) 'Southern Africa', and Mr Trudeau - (4) 'World Economic Situation'. (Mr Muldoon has declined an invitation to lead on (4bii) 'Financial Flows'.)

4. Mr Ramphal recently sent Prime Minister copy of his 1981 Report which will be one of the basic Commonwealth Secretariat documents for CHGM.

DISCUSSION AT CHGM OF GLENEAGLES AGREEMENT

5. Springbok tour of New Zealand caused a major controversy in Commonwealth, and resulted in transfer from Auckland of Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting. Neither Mr Ramphal nor Mr Muldoon have helped. Secretary of State told former on 4 August that there was a need to reduce temperature and minimise damage (to Commonwealth and CHGM). UK could be next in firing line (and Mr Ramphal seems to know this):

inter alia rumours of possible Springbok tour of UK during winter 1982/83, and definite plans for South Africa tour by Welsh Academicals in 1982. Strong pressure likely at CHGM for strengthening of Gleneagles Agreement. Prime Minister has already told Mr Ramphal of her hope that Commonwealth heads of government will not try to change it; Mr Ramphal appears to agree.

BELIZE

6. Belizean independence fixed for 21 September. Application to join the Commonwealth was notified to Commonwealth governments by a circular letter from the Secretary General on 13 August stating that he would assume concurrence in absence of reply by 10 September. Belizean membership should be confirmed in time both for independence and CHGM.

7. Despite failure to reach settlement with Guatemala a cordial atmosphere has been established in which to take Belize to independence. At the same time we have agreed security arrangements with Belize. British troops are to stay for a limited period. There is to be British help with development of Belize Defence Force. Certain Commonwealth countries in the region are being approached with view to agreement on a joint declaration to consult, in the event of an externally supported attack on Belize, on measures to be taken. Reactions have so far been favourable and we are hopeful that this initiative can be finalised before independence.

NAMIBIA

8. Mr Haig has now agreed to unfreeze the Namibian negotiations which were held up by disagreement amongst the Five on the relationship with the Cuban/Angolan issue. Officials of the Five will meet twice before the Foreign Ministers discuss Namibia in New York on 23 September. They expect to be able to issue a statement outlining a provisional timetable for implementation of the UN plan.

9. South African raid into Angola, US veto in the Security Council and Special Session of UN (3-11 September) will all have increased

African frustration at apparent lack of progress by the Five. We can expect in discussion of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa's report on Namibia (itself a moderate text) some fierce criticism from African members of the role of the Five. Privately the Africans remain much more reasonable.

UGANDA

10. Elections: December 1980 elections were monitored by a 9-man Commonwealth Observer Group (including UK representative) at request of Ugandan Government and contesting parties. First occasion any international body ever asked to observe elections in sovereign state. Elections given qualified endorsement.

11. Commonwealth Role: Mr Ramphal has kept in close touch with us over events in Uganda and sent Deputy Secretary General, Anyaoku, to the OAU summit in Nairobi to urge a policy of reconciliation on President Obote. Possibility of Commonwealth assistance may be discussed in sidelines of CHGM in September.

PAKISTAN'S POSSIBLE READMISSION TO COMMONWEALTH

12. Recent signs of some softening of Mrs Gandhi's opposition to Pakistan's reentry led President Zia to hope that discussion of issue during early part of CHGM might result in consensus in time for him to attend Meeting's closing stages. Indian Government attitude appears to have hardened again in reaction. Now doubtful that CHGM will see a consensus on this issue. Present delicate state of Indo-British relations preclude UK appearing too enthusiastic: Mr Ramphal likely to be similarly cautious. But Mr Fraser is clearly keen to promote progress. Informal discussion in margins, or at weekend retreat, seems likely.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

13. Mr Ramphal is a member of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, the former Swedish Prime Minister. The Commission is preparing proposals for the second UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1982. In the introduction

to his 1981 report Mr Ramphal contrasted the increase in global expenditure on arms with the increase in world poverty and drew attention to the fact that in 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers had issued a statement on disarmament. Arms control negotations in which the UK is involved include the forthcoming US/Soviet negotiations on theatre nuclear forces (TNF), through our membership of NATO; Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR); negotiaion of a mandate for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in the CSCE context; and work on Chemical and Radiological Weapons Conventions in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. We have also been engaged with the United States and Soviet Union in talks on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION (CFTC)

14. Following a decline in the resources available to the CFTC, a Working Party was appointed to consider proposals designed to achieve a more secure financial base for the fund. The Working Party's report recommended that the level of activities of the CFTC should be restored by 1983/84 to the level attained in 1978/79, that an operational reserve be established and that a 3-year Planning Profile should be introduced to give a reasonable assurance of future resources. These recommendations have been approved by the CFTC Board of Representatives and the replenishment of the Planning Profile will be considered at meetings in Nassau later this month.

POSSIBLE COMMONWEALTH FOOD INITIATIVE

15. The Secretary General has proposed to the CHGM that earmarked contributions be made to the CFTC for a special Commonwealth programme for increased food production. The target is £5m over 3 years. We intend to raise the level of Britain's annual contribution to the CFTC regular programme (but not above our traditional 30% of total Commonwealth contributions). While making the point that the higher amount

recognises the need for more to be done to increase food production, we can see no case for a new fund within the CFTC and we do not think others will do so. Priorities within the regular programme can easily be adjusted by the CFTC's Board of Representatives.

1 September 1981

BF F98

Mr. Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, will be calling on the Prime Minister at 1430 on Monday 7 September. I imagine he will wish to discuss prospects for the CHGM. I should be grateful if you could provide a suitable brief by noon on Friday 4 September so that Clive Whitmore can show it to the Prime Minister over her weekend in Scotland. Clive leaves for Scotland on Friday afternoon.

WR

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Some diary matters:

(1) Mr. Ramphal has asked to come and see you for about half-an-hour to discuss the prospects for the CHGM. I have provisionally agreed that he should come at 1430 on Monday 7 September.

(2) Sir Keith Joseph has returned from holiday, and asked if he could see you briefly. I have provisionally agreed 1430 tomorrow, 2 September.

1 September 1981

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 March 1981

Call by Mr. Ramphal

The Commonwealth Secretary General paid a call on the Prime Minister this morning as arranged.

Mr. Ramphal's principal purpose, as you anticipated, was to brief the Prime Minister before her forthcoming visit to India. He said that when he had seen Mrs Gandhi in Delhi recently, he had found her in very good form. She had a real sense of achievement about the recent meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. Mr. Ramphal's meeting with Mrs Gandhi also fell the day after she had addressed a well organised meeting of some 2 million people. She appeared to have drawn much encouragement from this.

According to Mr. Ramphal, Mrs Gandhi is much looking forward to the Prime Minister's visit. She is nervous about the Nationality Bill at present before Parliament here. She agrees that this is a domestic UK matter and should be treated as such by the Indian Government. Nonetheless, she is exposed to pressure on the issue and is worried that there might be some public reaction during Mrs Thatcher's visit. Mr. Ramphal suggested that anything the Prime Minister could do to "remove the wrinkles" from the legislation before her arrival in India would be helpful. The Prime Minister did not react.

Mr. Ramphal said that he was fairly certain that Mrs Gandhi would go to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Melbourne. Nonetheless, it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could encourage her. It would also be helpful if Mrs Gandhi could be encouraged to go through with the idea that the Indian Government should host the next Heads of Government meeting, in 1983, in New Delhi. Mrs Gandhi appeared to be favourably inclined to the proposal but was worried as to whether it would be welcome to other Heads of Government. The Prime Minister said that she thought the idea of holding the meeting in India was an excellent one.

In response to a query from Mrs Thatcher, Mr. Ramphal said that he doubted whether the Gleneagles Agreement would be a major issue in Melbourne. He thought that by far the greater part of the discussions would be devoted to the global economic situation and to relations between the developed and the developing countries. The Commonwealth was the only grouping within which a genuine North/South dialogue was at present possible. The meeting in Melbourne

/ would acquire

RESTRICTED

would acquire additional relevance from the fact that it would immediately precede the North/South Summit in Mexico.

On the meeting in Mexico, Mr. Ramphal said that he was arguing vigorously in favour of its being organised along "Commonwealth" lines, i.e. a brief formal session and then a closed session in which informality would prevail. He and the Prime Minister agreed that it was essential if at all possible to avoid a meeting which consisted of 22 set speeches. On the broader problems of the North/South relationship, Mr. Ramphal observed that the real problem was the failure of the third world to "get its act together". They needed an equivalent organisation to the OECD. Until they had something like this, it would be difficult for them to negotiate effectively. Sadly, the differences among the various developing countries remained very great. The present lack of cohesiveness seemed likely to continue.

Reverting to Mrs Gandhi, the Prime Minsiter asked whether she was taking a substantial interest in foreign affairs at present. Mr. Ramphal said that the larger part of her attention was concentrated on domestic matters. But she was extremely concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. She was prepared in private to distance herself from the Soviet Union to a greater extent than her public attitude might suggest. She seemed ready to tell the Russians that they should leave Afghanistan and to look for ways to facilitate their exit.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR SONNY RAMPHAL, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL, TUESDAY 17 MARCH 10 AM

POINTS TO MAKE

Ramphal's recent visit to India

1. Interested to have full account of your visit. Hope I will be able to have useful exchange of views with Mrs Gandhi in Delhi in mid April.

2. Any indication of issues Mrs Gandhi will want to raise with me?

Pakistan and the Commonwealth

3. Any mention of Pakistan's renewed membership. Can you see any way of overcoming Indian objections?

Possible Indian offer to host 1983 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM)

4. An excellent idea for this to be in South Asia in 1983. India the obvious candidate in region. What is Mrs Gandhi's latest thinking? Any difficulties with other countries of the region who might themselves hope to be asked?

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM), Melbourne, 30 September - 7 October

5. Australians seem to have arrangements well in hand. Any problems?

POINTS TO MAKE (IF RAISED)

Belize

6. Independence date a matter for discussion at the Conference. Implications for British forces remaining in Belize have to be studied.

Namibia

7. UN plan best approach yet devised but should not rule out variants yet. We shall continue to use our influence with South Africa. Our priority is to work out a common approach for the West with new US administration.

8. During visit to Washington, we urged US to work with all concerned for a settlement. US unfortunately not yet ready to take decisions, a problem not confined to Namibia.

Sporting contacts with South Africa

9. Ready to discuss all aspects of the Gleneagles Agreement (GA) at Melbourne if other Commonwealth countries wish to place it on agenda. Our view is that there is no need to modify it.

10. In our view it does not require action by one Commonwealth country against national of another.

Canadian Constitution

11. When a request is received we shall try to deal with it as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with precedent. This is a matter entirely between Canada and the United Kingdom.

12. HMG's relations are with the Canadian Federal Government, not the Provinces, and to refuse to take action on a proper Canadian request, from a fully democratically elected Parliament to a similarly democratically elected Parliament, would be to invite a first-class row with a close friend and ally.

Economic relations with Third World

13. Support Mexico Summit and expect to attend. Glad sponsors include so many Commonwealth countries (India, Canada, Nigeria, Tanzania).

/14.

14. Welcome US willingness to attend. Hope that, if necessary to secure their presence, it will be possible to postpone Summit until Autumn.

Nationality Bill

15. The position of Commonwealth citizens under the Immigration law will not be affected.

16. There is nothing in the Bill which need disturb our friends in Commonwealth countries.

17. The Special Voucher Scheme will be continued.

Overseas student fees

18. Withdrawal of subsidies for fees because of need to reduce public expenditure. Decision applies to all Commonwealth and foreign (other than EC) countries.

19. Scholars under aid-funded grants (ODA, British Council) will have their fees met at the new rates. Necessity for decision regretted; its effects on individual countries are being carefully monitored.

Aid to the Commonwealth (including Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation (CFTC)

20. Our support for the CFTC is only one small part of our aid to the Commonwealth. Additional contributions to such bodies as the Commonwealth Youth Programme, Commonwealth Foundation and Commonwealth Institute. Over two-thirds of our bilateral aid goes to Commonwealth countries.

BACKGROUND

Prime Minister's visit to India

1. The Prime Minister will be in India from 15-19 April. The programme is still under discussion, but will be based on Delhi and Bombay, possibly with a day elsewhere. It is hoped that the Prime Minister will address a joint session of both Houses of the Indian Parliament.

Venue for 1983 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting

2. Mr Ramphal initially suggested to Mrs Gandhi, at meeting in New Delhi of Commonwealth Heads of Regional Government (CHGRM) in September, that India host next (1983) meeting. Mrs Gandhi then responded positively and agreed to discuss matter further.

3. Following CHGMs in Singapore (1971), Ottawa (1973), Kingston (1975), London (1977), Lusaka (1979) and Melbourne (1981), it will be South Asia's turn to host CHGM in 1983. Three possible candidates: Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India. India is regionally the most significant, has the most suitable capital and as the last CHGRM's successful host, has the best claim.

Pakistan and Commonwealth membership

4. India have insistently maintained time is not ripe for Pakistan's readmission and that matter should move very slowly. Commonwealth Secretary-General raised issue again with Mrs Gandhi in February subsequently reporting an ''extremely negative'' reaction. Canadians, who had earlier been promoting idea, now inactive; but Australians, no doubt with CHGM in mind, consider that India's reservations should not be allowed to remain an obstacle indefinitely, and are now considering what action if any they might take.

5. Pakistan's readmission remains in Britain's (as well as Commonwealth and Pakistan's) interests. India is resisting it. For the time being at least, we are lying low, not wishing to damage Indo-British relations before the Prime Minister's visit to India. Publicly we say we favour Pakistan's readmission but that it is a matter for the Commonwealth as a whole.

Belize/

Belize

6. The 1977 Heads of Government meeting established the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize to assist HMG in bringing Belize to a secure independence. The Committee usually meets annually at Foreign Minister level during the UN General Assembly.

7. We hope to announce soon that the Constitutional Conference will start on 6 April. The independence date will be a matter for discussion at the Conference, but we hope to meet the end-1981 deadline included in last year's UNGA Resolution.

Namibia

8. African frustration with the breakdown of the negotiations has welled up at the OAU and at the UN. The more moderate Africans (including Nigeria) realise that sanctions and increased fighting are not the answer, but they do not see an alternative and have lost the initiative to the more extreme.

9. South Africa has ruled out resuming the negotiations on the UN plan for the next few months. We hope either that they will reconsider or that they will be prepared to go along with a fresh approach that can be agreed by all concerned once (and if) the US decides to promote a negotiated settlement. The Five kept together during the General Assembly but could not commit themselves to a future course. This aroused African suspicions that the Five were not serious about working for Namibian independence.

Gleneagles Agreement (on sporting links)

10. Pressure is mounting within the Commonwealth, either to strengthen the GA or to secure its more effective implementation. In a statement on 9 March, the Commonwealth Secretary-General welcomed a recent suggestion by a number of Caribbean Commonwealth Governments that, at their meeting at Melbourne, Heads of Government reaffirm their adherence to the Agreement's principles.

Nationality Bill

11. Commonwealth citizens who are not at present citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKCs) but who already have the right of abode in the United Kingdom under the immigration act would not become British citizens, but their rights would be preserved.

/12.

12. British Overseas citizenship would be acquired by those CUKCs whose ancestral or residential connections with the United Kingdom are not sufficiently close to qualify them for British Citizenship. The majority of them have a citizenship of another country and are permanently settled in that country.

13. The Home Secretary has given assurances that the new nationality law would in no way affect the eligibility of certain UK Passport Holders mainly from East Africa, for entry to the UK under the Special Voucher Scheme.

Economic relations with Third World

14. American attitude to Mexico Summit remains crucial. President Reagan has told President Lopez Portillo that he will participate if the Summit is postponed until Autumn and Cuba is excluded. Decisions on timing and participation are for the Vienna preparatory meeting of co-sponsors 13/15 March.

15. We would welcome postponement of Mexico Summit until after the Ottawa Summit (20/21 July), thus allowing for effective Western co-ordination. Developing country sponsors likely to resist postponement, for the same reason. Postponement would also be difficult for Mexicans who will be involved in preparations for a change of President in September.

Overseas students fees

16. 67,000 overseas students are at present in UK colleges. To grant exemption to any one category of students (eg Commonwealth countries or dependent territories who form two-thirds of the total) would cut too deeply into these savings (£90 million expected in 1980).

17. The full rate of enhanced fees does not apply to students already enrolled in past years. But otherwise they do apply to all Commonwealth and non-EC foreign countries.

/18.

18. We are contributing £3.7 million in 1980/81 to the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan, under which 500 students from Commonwealth developing countries, and a further 150 from other Commonwealth countries, are now studying in Britain.

Aid to the Commonwealth

19. At their last meeting Ramphal expressed to PM hope that the UK would be prepared to channel more aid through the Commonwealth itself. In his address to the Royal Commonwealth Society in December he remarked that we had reduced our contribution to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC). It is true that our £3 million minimum contribution this year is less than our 1979/80 contribution but only since due to other Commonwealth contributors defaulting we ended up as almost 40% of the whole. In 1980/81 we have returned to the 30% norm. Apart from CFTC, over three-quarters of our total aid goes to Commonwealth countries (with India the single biggest recipient).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 March 1981

Dear Michael,

Call by Mr Ramphal on Prime Minister

The Commonwealth Secretary-General is to call on the Prime Minister on 17 March. I enclose a brief.

We understand from Mr Ramphal's office that he wishes to brief the Prime Minister, in advance of her visit to India next month, about his conversations with Mrs Gandhi during his own recent visit to New Delhi. He also wishes to discuss the 'strong possibility' that India may offer to host the 1983 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM).

Other subjects which might come up include the forthcoming CHGM at Melbourne, Belize, Namibia, sporting contacts with South Africa, the Canadian constitution and Pakistan's possible readmission to the Commonwealth (which Mr Ramphal discussed with Mrs Gandhi).

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL (Commonwealth)

File FCO

Subject

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 December 1980

Dear Rodric,

CALL BY THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL

As you know, the Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Ramphal, called on the Prime Minister yesterday evening. Their conversation ranged very widely indeed over Commonwealth issues and I do not propose to record it all. However, I have noted below one or two points of interest which came up.

Mr. Ramphal said that the recent meeting of Commonwealth officials in Cyprus had been a success. He believed that there had been an upsurge of confidence in the Commonwealth in recent months and this was attributable in large measure to the successes achieved at Lusaka and at Lancaster House. Successes in Uganda and Namibia would reinforce the trend.

On Namibia, Mr. Ramphal commented on the useful role played by President Machel. It would be much wiser to hold the PIM in Maputo than in Lusaka. He had urged this view on Mr. Nujoma.

The recent Commonwealth Regional Conference in New Delhi had had a useful effect on Indian attitudes towards the Commonwealth. Mrs. Gandhi in particular had found the discussions she had had with Commonwealth leaders such as Mr. Lee very valuable. They had shifted her position somewhat on both Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Mr. Ramphal said that he had proposed to Mrs. Gandhi that the 1984 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting should be held in New Delhi. She had responded positively and agreed to discuss the idea further. Mr. Ramphal noted in passing that Mrs. Gandhi had recently sent a personal emissary, Mr. B. K. Nehru, to Mr. Reagan. Mr. Nehru had seen Mr. Reagan and had conveyed Mrs. Gandhi's message which was, in essence, that she was not "pro-Soviet".

Mr. Ramphal suggested that there was some risk of the United Kingdom becoming isolated in the continuing North/South dialogue. People believed that Britain was "pulling back" on the aid front. The Prime Minister made it clear that she entirely rejected this analysis. It was because she was aware of it that she had dealt with the subject in her Guildhall speech. She would, it was true, like to do more through bilateral channels and less through multilateral channels. But she was not prepared to be lectured on the overall scale of the British effort. Mr. Ramphal said that, no doubt, the problem was primarily presentational.

/Mr. Ramphal

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Mr. Ramphal also expressed the hope that we would be prepared to channel more aid through the Commonwealth itself. At present only some £3 million of Britain's aid went to the Commonwealth as such. The Prime Minister agreed that this was "ludicrous".

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

KCB

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Commonwealth

2 December 1980

Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Commonwealth Secretary-General, 4 December, 6.30 pm

I enclose briefing for the above call.

Mr Ramphal apparently wishes to have a tour d'horizon with the Prime Minister. We have not sought to cover all the subjects which he may raise (e.g. East/West relations, Zimbabwe, North/South etc), but have focussed on the less obvious points.

Yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

2 DEC 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 4 DECEMBER, 1980

POINTS TO MAKE

Uganda

1. Welcomed your initiative in organising Commonwealth observer team. Observers face tough time. Hope their presence will help to ensure free and fair elections.

Overseas Student Fees [If raised]

2. Understand concern about increase in fees for overseas students. Regret it is unavoidable in present financial circumstances.

The Caribbean

3. (a) Political scene changed by Mr Seaga's election victory in Jamaica. How do you assess him?

(b) Elections also due in Guyana on 15 December. What are prospects?

Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC): British 1980/81 Contribution [If raised]

4. (a) Recognise value of CFTC. We are prepared to contribute 30% of net expenditure in 1980/81 up to maximum of £3.36m. Cannot contribute £3.75m as in 1979/80. This was given as 30% of a supposedly larger programme, but in fact it turned out to be 40% because of disappointing contributions from others. £3.75m could again represent about 38% of approved 1980/81 expenditure.

(b) Have also offered CFTC £180,000 representing 30% of cost of new Industrial Development Unit (IDU).

Belize [If raised]

5. (a) Grateful for constant Commonwealth support and understanding on Belize for many years.

(b) As you know, we have announced our intention to convene a Constitutional Conference in the near future (no date set yet).

/The aim

The aim will be to bring Belize to independence in time to apply for UN membership before the close of the 36th General Assembly.

(c) Our aim is still to seek a negotiated settlement since this is manifestly in Belize's best interest. We have suggested to the Guatemalans that another negotiating meeting should be held soon. British forces would stay on for a limited period after independence if there were no settlement.

Disarmament [If raised]

6. We shall pursue our efforts to achieve balanced and verifiable measures of arms control. Sweeping declarations are of little use and can generate unrealistic expectations. Prospects for progress are not good, because of the deterioration in international security since the invasion of Afghanistan. Shall be interested to see whether the Palme Commission can suggest practical ways forward.

Commonwealth Consultation on Lome Affairs [If raised]

7. Douglas Hurd will be chairing a meeting with Commonwealth ACP representatives in London on 11 December, on lines discussed with you. We are inviting Mr Small from the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Sporting Contacts with South Africa [If raised]

8. Made every effort to discourage 1980 British Lions' rugby tour in full conformity with Gleneagles Agreement. But our sports bodies are independent and it would be against democratic traditions of this country to restrict freedom of travel.

Afghanistan

9. (a)Delighted UNGA resolution calling for "immediate withdrawal of foreign troops" adopted with increased support. We are pressing UN Secretary-General to appoint Special Representative without delay.

/(b)

(b) Need to keep Afghanistan question in forefront of world attention as deterrent to Soviet aggression elsewhere. Hope other bodies besides UN will repeat demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Pakistan and the Commonwealth

10. British Government would join consensus in favour of Pakistan's readmission, but no desire to see issue lead to controversy within Commonwealth. Doubt if any progress possible until improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. Question of procedure should not present too much difficulty as and when time comes.

Maldives [If raised]

11. HMG would support application from Maldives to join Commonwealth.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHGRM)

12. Britain not directly involved but was glad to hear that you felt it was a good meeting.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 1981 (CHGM)

13. Looking forward to Melbourne. Glad to know dates now agreed. Favour usual pattern for agenda. No special subjects to raise at present.

Possible Foreign Ministers' Meeting [If raised]

14. Might be merit in occasional ad hoc meeting; but not in a regular series. Already a large number of Commonwealth meetings at Ministerial level.

Overseas Aid [If raised]

15. Regret necessity to cut aid along with other government expenditure. UK programme remains substantive - we are fifth largest donor. Our record on distribution is good: about two-thirds of all our aid goes to the poorest.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 4 DECEMBER, 1980

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Uganda

1. Commonwealth observer team to monitor elections on 10 December despatched as soon as essential precondition - that all 4 parties acquiesce in election ground-rules and agree to take part - achieved. Team comprises observers from Ghana (in chair), Australia, Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Cyprus, India, Sierra Leone, UK. Our principal observer, Robin Wainwright CMG, one of British observers during 1980 Rhodesian elections. We are making significant contribution (7 observers, up to £100,000 towards observer costs, £700,000 from aid funds towards election costs, 1 747 flight to airlift election materials, and early delivery of 20 Land-Rovers under aid programme).

Overseas Student Fees

2. Mr Ramphal told Lord Carrington on 10 November that he hoped there might be some reconsideration of Britain's decison to charge full fees to overseas students. Lord Carrington replied that this was unlikely in the present financial climate. Numbers of overseas entrants in 1980 have fallen slightly, though some countries have been more affected than others: but dependable figures will not be available for departmental study until mid-December.

The Caribbean

3. (a) Mr Seaga's victory a culmination of a series of moderate election victories in the Caribbean which have transformed political outlook. But Caribbean still suffers economic difficulties made worse by world recession.

(b) Guyanese elections due 15 December. Generally expected that Mr Burnham (who recently became Executive President under a new Constitution of his own devising) will, as usual, rig them sufficiently to win.

/Commonwealth Fund

Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC): British 1980/81 Contribution

4. (a) (i) We traditionally contribute 30% of net expenditure to such Commonwealth programmes. In 1979/80 we paid £3.75m to CFTC on assumption of expenditure of £12.5m which, in the event was very far from being realised, and our contribution ended up being approximately 40% of total expenditure.

(ii) Fund's Plan of Expenditure for 1980/81 totals £11.8m of which £600,000 is for the Industrial Development Unit, to which we contribute separately at 30% level. We pledged £3m to CFTC for 1980/81 on assumption that actual expenditure would not be above £10m (against a programme of £11.2m "subject to availability of necessary resources"). Following strong pressure at Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting in September we have agreed to pay up to £3.36m on basis of 30% of net expenditure, and to pay £3m even if net expenditure does not reach £10m, as well as continuing separate provision for IDU. Doubt whether £10m figure will be reached.

(b) Following 1979 CHGM Secretary General pressed all Heads of Government for additional funds for CFTC. Prime Minister indicated in letter of 22 October 1979 intention to remain at traditional 30%. (Copy letter attached).

Belize [If raised]

5. (a) UNGA on 11 November passed a resolution (139-0-7) calling on the UK to convene a Constitutional Conference and for Belize to proceed to independence by the end of the 36th General Assembly.

(b) The resolution also called on the UK as the administering power to continue to ensure Belize's security. It enjoined the UN to guarantee its security after independence.

(c) The Government will have announced in Parliament on 2 December (written reply to Mr Ted Rowlands) their intention to convene a Constitutional Conference. No date has yet been fixed for this.

/Patriation of the

Patriation of the Canadian Constitution

6. On 10 November Mr Ramphal (following discussions with Mr Trudeau) raised this with Lord Carrington, who denied any Commonwealth dimension. It was, he said, a matter entirely between Britain and Canada and he could be assured that whatever we did would be constitutionally correct.

Disarmament

7. The Commonwealth Secretary-General has recently been appointed a member of Olof Palme's 'Independent Commission for Disarmament and Security Issues' (a successor to Brandt). He has shown a personal interest in making a direct connection between disarmament and development.

Commonwealth Consultation on Lome Affairs

8. (a) The 11 December meeting is in response to the Commonwealth ACP's wish for closer consultation with the UK over Lome matters.

(b) To take account of sensitivities Mr Hurd discussed it this summer with Mr Ramphal, who welcomed the idea, provided the meetings were informal and low key. He suggested some Commonwealth Secretariat involvement. Hence invitation to Mr Small, Deputy Secretary General (Economics). Proposal put to ACP Ambassadors in Brussels by Sir M Butler. Also welcomed it. Expected those attending will be a number of Ministers, (an ACP Ministerial meeting is taking place in Brussels shortly beforehand), with other ACP represented either by Ambassadors to EC, or High Commissioners in London.

Sporting Contacts with South Africa

9. Mr Ramphal has strongly condemned decision by New Zealand Rugby Football Union to invite Springboks to tour New Zealand in 1981. His reference to 'ritual bow' towards Gleneagles not being sufficient drew a sharp rejoinder from Mr Tallboys, New Zealand Minister of External Affairs. Mr Ramphal is well aware of position of ourselves and New Zealand on this subject and seems unlikely to raise it during his call.

/UK-South Africa

UK-South Africa Relations/Sanctions

10. (a) Our principle objectives remain internationally recognised settlement in Namibia and progress towards a government in South Africa based on consent of all the people.

(b) Sanctions would not help achieve these objectives. They would make South Africans more obdurate, would damage blacks in South Africa and neighbouring states, as well as the West.

Internal Reform (South Africa)

11. Present moves towards reform patently inadequate. Blacks not included on President's Advisory Council and no sign of willingness to give black South Africans a role in central government. (Blacks still expected to exercise their political rights in the homelands). Recent Bills to improve local administration and life residence restrictions for urban blacks will also mean stricter controls on black migration to towns. But moves are a step in the right direction and may generate their own momentum.

Namibia

12. Recent developments promising. Hope all-parties meeting in January 1981 now proposed by Secretary-General will lead to final decision to carry out UN plan. Flexibility needed on all sides. The UN proposal, put forward after consultation with all concerned, is that implementation should start with a cease-fire in March 1981. Five will do all they can to see negotiations through to success. Have told South Africans that further delay dangerous and pressed them to live up to their commitment to an international settlement.

Pakistan and the Commonwealth

13. (a) Pakistanis have made clear they would welcome resumed membership but, for "face" reasons, want to be invited and not have to apply. A number of Commonwealth countries (Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, Malaysia, Sri Lanka) known to favour readmission, but Mrs Gandhi remains firmly against. Very little prospect of any action until improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations, at present strained over Kashmir and Pakistanis reactions to intercommunal tension in India. Pakistan's

/readmission

readmission would be in British interest, but it could damage Indo-British relations (where much is presently at stake) if we were seen taking any lead. Canadians have shelved matter for the time being.

(b) Australians, clearly with CHGM in mind have told us privately that they consider India's reservations must not be allowed to remain an obstacle indefinitely, and are considering possibility of organising a 'groundswell' in the Commonwealth in favour of Pakistan's reentry which India would find irresistible. We find the idea attrative but it would not be in UK's present interests to appear to be too active in the orchestration. Australian suggestion can be taken into account when British policy is reviewed again early in the New Year. We shall be considering then whether there appears to be any prospect that discreet diplomacy might lead to some progress before or during the Melbourne CHGM.

Maldives

14. Earlier this year Maldivians asked our Ambassador about joining the Commonwealth, particularly for the aid and economic advantages. Maldives past status as a British protected state is sufficient to make the country eligible to apply for Membership. Ambassador suggested that Maldivian Government might approach Commonwealth Secretary General. Minister of External Affairs saw latter 10 October and Ramphal suggested procedure for applying. He would consult Sri Lanka and India (the two nearest Commonwealth neighbours) informally to seek their reaction; if favourable Maldives might then formally apply for Commonwealth Membership and Ramphal would circulate Commonwealth Governments.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting (CHGRM) New Delhi 4-8 September

15. This was the second CHGRM, the first having been in Sydney in 1978. The next is to be in Suva in 1982. We are in favour, provided they do not have divisive effect within the Commonwealth. Mr Ramphal told Lord Carrington on 10 November that he felt it had been a remarkably good meeting: good for Mrs Gandhi to hear

/some home

some home truths from Lee Kuan Yew and Mr Fraser on Afghanistan and Cambodia. Mrs Gandhi initially doubtful about meeting but emerged committed to Commonwealth. Mr Muldoon not impressed. Mr Fraser pleased. Some inconclusive discussion of proposal for regional "Secretariat" which Ramphal is strongly against. We see little reason for it either.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 1981 (CHGM)

16. Dates (30 September - 7 October 1981) and venue (Melbourne) now agreed. Weekend retreat to be held in Canberra. No decision yet on agenda, though we favour usual pattern combining wide-ranging discussions of international political and economic issues with specific topics including Commonwealth cooperation. North/South issues likely to predominate. We have no topics to suggest at this stage. As is customary, The Queen will be present in Melbourne.

Commonwealth Senior Officials' Meeting (CSOM)

17. Took place in Cyprus 5-7 November and went well. Main feature was constructive discussion of Commonwealth role in 1980's. We submitted agenda item proposing periodic reviews of Secretariat structure and staffing. We consider some check on Secretariat's growth and expense essential. Satisfactory agreement reached after discussion in corridors: there are to be two separate reviews, one of priorities in Secretariat's work, one a Management review - which was our real objective.

Possible Foreign Ministers' Meetings

18. At a Royal Commonwealth Society Seminar earlier this year, Mr Peter Shore suggested biennial meetings of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers. Idea has apparently gained some currency in Commonwealth countries. There might be some advantage in occasional ad hoc meetings, but with a CHGM or CSOM every year, and regular meetings of other Ministers (eg Finance Ministers annually and several other triennially) we have enough regular fixtures.

/Overseas Aid

Overseas Aid

19.(a)Despite being unable to exempt official aid from the expenditure cuts, we remain a major aid donor. We have a substantial programme with a spending target in the current financial year of £960 million gross. In calendar 1979 only four countries ie United States, France, West Germany and Japan gave more money than Britain. Our aid that year was equivalent to 0.52 per cent of GNP. The overall average for OECD countries was 0.39 per cent.

(b) Our record on distribution is good. About two-thirds of all our aid goes to the poorest where the need is greatest. The percentage of outright grant is above the average for all industrialised donor countries.

(c) The effect of the recently announced public expenditure cuts will be to reduce the 1981/82 aid programme by £12m. This will not affect existing commitments and is not out of line with cuts in other spending programmes.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
December 1980

R H

Commonwealth

4 November, 1980

Call by the Commonwealth Secretary General

Thank you for your letter to Michael Alexander. This is to confirm that I have offered Mr Ramphal 1630 hrs on Thursday, 4 December. Could you office please supply us with a brief to reach us here by close of play on Tuesday, 2 December.

CAROLINE STEPHENS

R M J Lyne, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

f/c

ono

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 November 1980

Dear Michael,

Call by the Commonwealth Secretary General

You asked for advice on Mr Ramphal's request for a meeting with the Prime Minister before the end of the year. As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary thinks it would be a good idea if the Prime Minister could agree to see the Commonwealth Secretary General though there is no particular urgency about this. Lord Carrington will himself be seeing Mr Ramphal as soon as we can find time for the appointment.

I shall be writing separately about a possible call by the High Commissioner for Zimbabwe which I also mentioned.

yours ever

Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

16.30
4/12

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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cc Master set JSH
Rhodesia 7 Sit"
Commonwealth

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

4 December 1979

Dear Rodric,

Call by Mr. Ramphal

As you know, Mr. Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, called on the Prime Minister yesterday evening to discuss the present situation in the Lancaster House Conference. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was present.

Mr. Ramphal raised four issues.

The Conference

Mr. Ramphal passed on to the Prime Minister a message from Mr. Nkomo to the effect that Mr. Nkomo recognised that "the bus was on the move" and that he intended to be on it. Of the other members of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Ramphal said that Mr. Tongogara wanted a settlement and that Mr. Mugabe probably did too although he was still "in a dialectic". The real difficulty lay with Mr. Tekere who was still resisting agreement. However Mr. Ramphal was confident that the Patriotic Front would come up to the mark, probably on the following day. He himself would be seeing both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe later in the evening and would be telling them that the time for delay was past. Mr. Sule, the Nigerian observer, would be doing the same. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary stressed that the Conference would have to be completed by the end of this week. He hoped that the Patriotic Front were clear about this and that they recognised that the discussions on implementation could only take a few days. Mr. Ramphal thought there would be no difficulty about this. Mr. Nkomo, at least, was desperate to get back to Rhodesia.

South African Involvement

Mr. Ramphal said that the revelation that South African troops were present in Rhodesia had been very damaging. It had caused real concern within the Patriotic Front. They seemed to be alarmed lest the South Africans should remain in the country and should subsequently get hold of planes and bomb them or take hostile action in some other form. Mr. Ramphal said that he had told the Patriotic Front that they had no cause for alarm. A British Governor would not allow the South Africans to remain in the country. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made it clear that he agreed with this. He had told Mr. Pik Botha that, while

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/he had no

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he had no wish to be informed officially about whether or not there were South Africans in Rhodesia, any troops there should be removed as soon as possible. He was more worried about what would happen if the talks broke down. There was a real possibility that in those circumstances the South Africans would go into Rhodesia.

The Interim Period

Mr. Ramphal said that the Patriotic Front were worried about the role of the Rhodesian Air Force, and in particular of their combat planes, during the interim period. Could the combat planes not be grounded? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Rhodesian Air Force planes would have to be used during the interim period for communications and monitoring purposes. It was absurd to suppose that the planes would be used to shoot up the Patriotic Front in their assembly areas. The Prime Minister pointed out that there would in any case be monitors in the assembly areas and that it was unlikely that anyone would take the risk of attacking them.

The Commonwealth Observers

Mr. Ramphal said that he had not come to talk in detail about the Commonwealth observers but he had been in touch with the Canadian and Australian Governments and he thought they would agree to participate both in the national and in the collective Commonwealth effort to observe the elections. He thought that the views of a credible Commonwealth group would carry a great deal of weight with the world at large. The present mood of the Commonwealth was in any case helpful and constructive. The group would make it easier to control the views of potentially difficult countries like Nigeria. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented that the composition of the group proposed by the Secretary General seemed reasonable.

Mr. Ramphal said as he left the meeting that Mr. Nkomo had asked him to convey to the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary his deep sense of appreciation of what they had done in trying to resolve the Rhodesia problem in recent months.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc Martin Vile (Cab. Off) Top Original
Stephen Wall (FCO)

Commonwealth 2

Commonwealth - Lusaka Policy.

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

PM: FCO/6

19 June 1979

Dear Prime Minister, PSMM

I am deeply grateful that, despite your many other preoccupations, you gave me so much of your time yesterday to discuss various issues of Commonwealth interest in the context of the forthcoming Lusaka Meeting. I greatly valued the opportunity to converse in such a friendly atmosphere and, as I mentioned to you, my services are at your disposal in our common objective of strengthening the Commonwealth and making the most of the opportunities which Lusaka will present.

You were kind enough to agree to be one of the Heads of Government who will respond to President Kaunda's address of welcome at the formal Opening Session on 1 August. I am proceeding on that basis, and will be in touch with you again in respect of your wish to speak last.

For the rest of the Meeting it is intended to have only a single introductory statement to the main Agenda items and sub-items in order to promote a greater and more meaningful exchange of views. In consultation with President Kaunda, I have asked Prime Minister Fraser to introduce the discussion on the World Economic Scene where, as you will have seen from my explanatory letter, no sub-division into individual topics is envisaged; I hope, however, that you will consider making an early intervention which would include your reflections on the Tokyo Summit.

With deep respect,

Yours sincerely,

Shridath Ramphal

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
SW1

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CE CO
Rhodesia (Sit)
Commonwealth (CHGM)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 June 1979

Dear Stephen,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Commonwealth Secretary General at 10 Downing Street on 18 June 1979

The Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Ramphal, paid his first call on the Prime Minister at No. 10 at 1715. Sir Antony Duff was present. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during just over an hour's discussion.

The Commonwealth

Mr. Ramphal said that he could report to the Prime Minister that the Commonwealth was in good shape. Rhodesia presented a special problem but, apart from that, the Commonwealth was at a high level of collective confidence. The period which had been marked by doubts on the part of the new members as to whether the Commonwealth was practicable or useful, and on whether it was still dominated by the UK, had passed; and the general mood was now more confident and relaxed. The public view of the Commonwealth was, however, less satisfactory. There was still a tendency to see the UK's decision to join the EEC as an act of voluntary separation from the Commonwealth, despite the fact that this view was not held to any significant extent, if at all, within the Commonwealth itself. Some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, had their own problems with the EEC and there were current difficulties over the Lome renegotiation: but there was no hostility whatsoever within the Commonwealth to UK membership of the Community. The Commonwealth was, Mr. Ramphal said, highly valued in the international community, particularly by men like Secretary General Waldheim and Mr. McNamara. They recognised that the Commonwealth community was sufficiently small to make it possible to do business within it but that, at the same time, it had a wide geographical and racial spread. For these reasons, the Commonwealth could draw on an immense reservoir of international goodwill.

/Rhodesia

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Rhodesia

Some remarks by Mr. Ramphal about the nature of the meetings of Commonwealth Heads of Government led into a discussion of the substance of the Rhodesia problem. The Prime Minister said that there would be certain things which she would have to say and do about Rhodesia which she was convinced were right: once the grounds for Rhodesia's illegal status had been purged, certain consequences had to follow. The UK and others had recently recognised a number of African regimes - for example, Uganda and Ghana - who did not owe their authority to any kind of democratic elections and whose constitutions were in no way superior to the present constitution of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. At Lusaka, all those concerned would have to put forward their respective views on Rhodesia; but, the Prime Minister said, it would be important to avoid a heated argument about the issue. Mr. Ramphal said the Front Line Presidents would tend to argue that the First Principle had not yet been fulfilled and that Rhodesia did not in fact enjoy majority rule; President Carter's determination would have reinforced them in this view. Lord Harlech's mission might, Mr. Ramphal said, contribute to a good climate for discussion and perhaps point the way forward. Mr. Ramphal emphasised that the Front Line Presidents, even President Machel, had a very real concern lest developments in Rhodesia could lead eventually to the strengthening of Soviet influence in Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that President Machel was not particularly well placed to talk about Soviet influence. In the eyes of the ordinary British citizen, there was now no reason for not helping Bishop Muzorewa. If he were not supported, the war would intensify. Rhodesia could contribute so much to the region, not least to Zambia, and the British Government had a duty to bring Rhodesia back to legality and to lift sanctions. When Mr. Ramphal suggested the the Front Line Presidents might take the line that the war should first be ended by discussions leading to a ceasefire, the Prime Minister pointed out that some of the Front Line Presidents were harbouring terrorists on their territory. The Prime Minister recalled President Kaunda's statement to her that "force was the only way". The Prime Minister stressed that the British Government was confronted by a problem of timing: sanctions would lapse in November since there was no way in which Parliamentary approval could be won for their renewal. The Prime Minister said that her fear was that the talks in Lusaka would get nowhere and that positions would then harden on all sides.

/Mr. Ramphal

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Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the Front Line Presidents were taking their discussions with Lord Harlech very seriously: none of the Heads of Government wanted the Lusaka meeting to be another Singapore - they did not wish the fabric of the Commonwealth to be damaged. Mr. Ramphal explained that he thought that the other Heads of Government would react positively to a frank explanation by the Prime Minister, in restricted session, of the Parliamentary dimension to the Government's handling of the Rhodesia problem although they would, of course, respond by describing their own political difficulties on the issue. Sir Antony Duff said that he thought that the Front Line Presidents were genuinely concerned that a solution should be found but that the issues had been totally obscured by emotion and by their hatred for Mr. Smith; since 1976, they had seen no way of making progress except by means of force. A thorough political discussion in restricted session at Lusaka could create an easier relationship which would be valuable to the UK when the Government did what it would have to do. The Prime Minister said that it would be important to show the African Heads of Government that she was not simply waiting to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime as soon as the Lusaka Conference was over. In further discussion of Rhodesia, the Prime Minister stressed that it would be important to give Bishop Muzorewa some kind of support and encouragement in order to strengthen him against the possibility of a Marxist Zimbabwe under Mugabe. The Prime Minister made it clear that there could be no accommodation with terrorism of any kind: she was not prepared to accept arguments to the effect that what could not be achieved politically should be achieved by the bullet. When Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the Patriotic Front would be more interested in negotiation than in the continued use of force, the Prime Minister commented that they were only interested in negotiations if they were confident of ending up on top. Mr. Ramphal said that President Nyerere would take the view that there would be a better chance of keeping Marxism out of Rhodesia by reaching a settlement now, even if Robert Mugabe were to become President.

C.H.G.M.

Mr. Ramphal told the Prime Minister that he would be sending her a letter about the procedure for the C.H.G.M.. He explained the importance of the restricted sessions at these meetings. It would be important to choose the right moment to begin the discussion on Rhodesia. The Prime Minister agreed that this part of the debate could best begin once a good relationship had been established on other issues; her own preference would be to tackle Rhodesia on the Friday afternoon. Mr. Ramphal strongly agreed with this approach

/ and said

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and said that he thought that President Nyerere would be the best opening speaker in the discussion on Rhodesia; he could be relied upon to tackle the matter in a balanced manner and to set the tone for what followed. Mr. Ramphal said that the Conference would then adjourn for the weekend but that there would be opportunities on Saturday and Sunday for bilateral discussions from which he hoped that some convergence of view would emerge. He had been urging President Kaunda to take the chair for the discussion of Rhodesia, in the hope that the duties of chairmanship would act as a constraint on his sometimes emotional approach.

Mr. Ramphal went on to say that he hoped that the Prime Minister could agree to be one of the four speakers who would respond to President Kaunda's speech of welcome to the participants on the first day of the meeting; the other speakers he had in mind were Mr. Malcolm Fraser, President Zia of Bangladesh and, if he attended the meeting, General Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Prime Minister said that she would be prepared to make one of the opening speeches, provided that her speech could be the last of the four. She said that she appreciated that Mr. Ramphal was trying to be helpful to her in making his proposal.

Mr. Ramphal said that after the opening session, which was the only public occasion during the meeting, there would be a general debate on the international political situation, which he hoped Mr. Desai would open; this would cover such topics as detente, disarmament and the changing power structure in the world. On the Thursday morning, there would be a specific debate on the problems of South East Asia, including those of Indo-China, the policies of the "new" China and of the Vietnamese refugees. He had been intending to ask the Malaysian Prime Minister to open this debate but in view of recent developments doubted whether he would now be suitable. Mr. Ramphal said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would take part in this debate and say a word about the problems of Hong Kong. These debates, together, would take the meeting up until the afternoon of Friday, 3 August and the discussion of Rhodesia could then begin. Other political topics which would be tackled at the beginning of the following week were Belize and Cyprus. These would be followed by an economic debate, to be opened by Mr. Fraser and in which Mr. Manley would speak on the deficit situation in the l.d.c.s. Mr. Ramphal said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would tell the meeting, during this debate, about the Economic Summit in Tokyo. Finally, Mr. Ramphal said, there would be a number of functional issues to discuss: follow-up to the Bangalore Meeting on industrialisation, multilateral aid programmes and, Mr. Ramphal suggested, the phenomenon of the micro-states.

/ I should be

I should be grateful if Mr. Ramphal's suggestions for the Lusaka agenda could be borne in mind in the preparation of the draft list of briefs for the C.H.G.M..

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Bryan Cartledge.

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 June 1979

Dear Bryan,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Commonwealth Secretary-General; 18 June

Further to my letter to you earlier today on this subject, I now enclose a Personality Note on Mr Ramphal and a Background Note on the Commonwealth Secretariat and British financial contributions to official Commonwealth organisations.

/ included in briefing attached

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

His Excellency Mr Shridath ("Sonny") Ramphal, Kt CMG QC
Commonwealth Secretary-General

(Does not use his title)

Chosen as Commonwealth's second Secretary-General 1975.

Born 1928; early education Guyana. LL.B(Hon) King's College, London 1950, LL.M with distinction 1952. Called to Bar from Gray's Inn (Arden and Atkins Prizeman 1952). Spent year at Harvard Law School on Guggenheim Fellowship.

Legal Department, British Guiana 1952-58. Legal Draftsman, Federal Government of West Indies (1958-59); Solicitor General British Guiana (1959-61); Assistant Attorney General to Federation (1961-62). Appointed Attorney-General of Guyana as country approached independence. Helped to write independence constitution. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 1967; Foreign Minister in 1972 and, from 1973, also Minister of Justice. As Foreign Minister centrally involved in creation of Caribbean regional economic integration programme. Vice-President UN General Assembly 1968 and 1973. Spokesman for Caribbean in ACP economic negotiations with EEC and, on trade arrangements, spokesman for all 42 ACP countries, thus contributing substantially to 1975 Lome Convention.

Intelligent and articulate, energetic and ambitious; has contributed much to the development of the modern Commonwealth. Recognises his responsibility to Commonwealth as a whole, but on North/South issues shows a pro-South bias. Balanced against this is his undoubted standing within the Commonwealth, especially among developing countries, and helpful and constructive attitude on various contentious issues.

Thought to have an eye on UN Secretary-Generalship in longer term, but is seeking another five year term as Commonwealth Secretary-General from 1980. Indians have suggested Indian candidate. We have remained non-committal on issue.

Married, four children. Wife of British origin.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

15 June 1979

Dear Bryan.

Prime Minister's Meeting with Commonwealth Secretary-General: 18 June

I enclose, for Mr Ramphal's call, separate short briefs on:-

a) Commonwealth matters, including the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and possible re-appointment of the Secretary-General;

b) Rhodesia;

c) UNCTAD V;

d) Vietnamese refugees;

e) Belize;

Mr Ramphal will no doubt be ready to give the Prime Minister an account of how preparations for the CHGM are progressing, and his ideas about the handling of the agenda, including the potentially difficult subject of Rhodesia. It might be useful to steer him towards the idea of beginning the Southern Africa discussions on, say, the Friday afternoon and concluding them on Monday - use could then be made of the weekend for private discussions on the subject with selected Heads of Government.

In the brief on Commonwealth matters it is suggested (para 4 of Points to Make) that the communique should be made shorter than has become usual. The point here is that we look to the Secretariat to produce drafts for the communique which reflect the discussions the Heads of Government have actually had, rather than trying to include references to every subject which officials think ought to have been discussed.

We have included in the brief on Vietnamese refugees a suggestion that the Prime Minister might seek to enlist Commonwealth support through Mr Ramphal for the proposal for a UN Conference and for practical assistance.

We have learnt privately from the Secretariat that Mr Ramphal may ask the Prime Minister to be one of the four speakers who would reply to President Kaunda's words of welcome in the opening session.

Yours ever.
Stephen

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
18 JUNE

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS
POINTS TO MAKE

THE COMMONWEALTH

1. Government commitment to Commonwealth clear.

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

2. Look forward to Lusaka, a valuable opportunity to meet colleagues and to renew friendships. Occasion for frank and constructive discussion. Would welcome briefing from Mr Ramphal about Meeting.

Security

3. Public concern in Britain growing, especially as regards The Queen's visit. Although primarily for President Kaunda, hope Mr Ramphal will do all he can to ensure adequate security. We are keeping close watch.

Format

4. Fully support informal procedures eg more restricted sessions, short unscripted interventions and a much shorter communique reflecting actual discussion. Understand informal week-end to be spent wholly in Lusaka? What subjects does Mr Ramphal have in mind for discussion in restricted session?

Agenda

5. Recognise Southern Africa discussion will be important but hope sufficient time allocated for other world political and economic issues and Commonwealth cooperation.

SECRETARY-GENERAL (IF RAISED)

6. Very glad to know of readiness to serve again [not UK policy to make advance commitment.]

ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION (CFTC) (IF RAISED)

7. Ready to look positively at this.

COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION (IF RAISED)

8. Fully support its work. Will endeavour to maintain our contribution at present rate (30%).

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
18 JUNE

COMMONWEALTH MATTERS: ESSENTIAL FACTS

CHGM FORMAT

1. At our suggestion Commonwealth Senior Officials Meeting 1978 discussed ways and means of preserving informality at CHGMs(made difficult by ever increasing size of Commonwealth - 39 countries eligible to attend Lusaka). Mr Ramphal has been exploring ideas in consultation with individual Heads of Government.

AGENDA

2. Agenda on usual lines, with broad headings covering international political and economic developments and Commonwealth cooperation. We welcome wide ranging discussions. On economic topics we hope discussions will not repeat those on specific issues already thrashed out in other forums (eg UNCTAD V). Non-African heads of government hope issues other than Southern Africa, eg developments in South East Asia, will receive adequate airing.

[FOLLOWING INFORMATION NOT TO BE DISCLOSED]

CHGM: SECURITY

3. Mr Ramphal will be aware of growing concern, voiced recently by Mr Muldoon. Any change in venue would be matter for Mr Ramphal and President Kaunda in first instance and ultimately for all Heads of Government. We would be reluctant to take lead in suggesting switch of venues but circumstances could force a change eg to Nairobi (in which event some postponement would be unavoidable). However, as of now, a change looks unlikely.

4. Our major concern for The Queen. President Kaunda has given assurance that necessary steps will be taken including removal of guns and missiles from near airfields. We are arranging visit of senior Air Force officer and seeking assurances from President Kaunda which Prime Minister might use publicly.

RETAINED BY DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3 (4)

TEMPORARILY RETAINED
G. Gray
22/4/2017

/SECRETARY-GENERAL

SECRETARY-GENERAL

5. Mr Ramphal's 5-year term expires July 1980: Heads of Government can reappoint him or appoint someone else. Indians have suggested Indian candidate and Mr Ramphal therefore wrote to Heads of Government expressing readiness for reappointment. Prime Minister replied non-committally. This will probably be discussed in restricted session at Lusaka.

ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION

6. Mr Ramphal mentioned this to Lord Carrington. Subject will come up at CHGM and we are considering positive response.

COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION

7. The Commonwealth Foundation will be asking at the CHGM for increased funds, to cover increased costs and also some expansion of activity. Britain contributes 30% annually. Some governments are in arrears with their payments.

BACKGROUND NOTE

COMMONWEALTH OFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

1. Established 1965. Mr Arnold Smith (Canada) first Secretary-General 1965-75. Promotes consultation, disseminates information, organises meetings. Amongst other functions, provides technical assistance under CFTC.

Britain's Contributions

2. Britain pays largest contributions under agreed arrangements worked out according to capacity to pay, based on population and annual income.

(a) COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

1978/79 Britain contributed £735,000 of total of approximately £2.4 million, representing 30%. Next largest contributors are Canada (20.38%), Australia (10.32%), India (4.56%).

(b) COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION (CFTC)

1978/79 Britain pledged £3.6 million of total of about £11.3 million, representing approximately 30%.

(c) COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION (promoting professional links)

Britain's annual contribution approx £232,500 of total of about £670,000; roughly 30%.

(d) COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTES

London and Edinburgh Institutes promote greater understanding of Commonwealth in Britain. Britain pays total cost; £1,158,900 and £63,100 per annum respectively in 1978/79.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 18 JUNE 1979

RHODESIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Lord Harlech is in Africa for consultations with Commonwealth and other African Presidents. We shall be considering the way forward in the light of his report. We shall be looking for a constructive discussion at Lusaka on Rhodesia. But the starting point should be what has been achieved there. There is evidence of wide popular support for Bishop Muzorewa.

2. We are not excluding any of the ways of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international recognition. An attempt to achieve a wider agreement is not ruled out, if any realistic basis could be found. The Commonwealth could have a role to play in this. Lord Harlech has authority to talk to the Patriotic Front. But the wishes of the Rhodesian people, as expressed in the elections, must be taken fully into account.

(If raised) President Carter's "determination". We are in close touch with the Americans about Rhodesia. President Carter's "determination" recognised the progress which had been made. We intend to build on that progress.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 18 JUNE 1979

RHODESIA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. A delegation of Commonwealth High Commissioners and Mr Ramphal called on Lord Carrington on 23 May to express their concern about the implications for the Commonwealth if we recognised the Muzorewa
A government, (report in FCO telegram no 202 attached). Lord Carrington assured them that the Commonwealth would be fully consulted over Rhodesia.

2. On 8 June the Commonwealth Committee met to consider a draft report to the Heads of Government meeting. The UK requested amendments to sections of the report which condemned the Rhodesian elections and appeared to exclude the possibility of building on the progress made there. Other member countries did not support our reservations, though they welcomed the Government's assurances that the Commonwealth would
B be consulted. A separate passage is therefore being drafted for the report to protect our position.

3. In Commonwealth African countries - notably Nigeria and Zambia - suspicions have been voiced that, irrespective of our consultations with the Commonwealth, we intend to recognise the Muzorewa government after the Lusaka meeting. We have assured Commonwealth Governments that it is our intention to hold genuine consultations with them at Lusaka. The Commonwealth will need to consider whether it can play a part in helping to bring about a situation in which Rhodesia can proceed to legal independence with wide international recognition.

C 4. <u>President Carter's "determination"</u>. In his statement about the Rhodesian elections President Carter recognised the progress which has been made, but took the view that the Constitution, which had not been voted on by the African electorate, was intended to perpetuate white control over the army, the judiciary and the Civil Service. The US Senate has passed an amendment to the Defence Department's Appropriation Bill which would require sanctions to be lifted by 30 June. A similar amendment is proposed to the State Department Authorisation Bill. These amendments will be considered by the House of Representatives. The outcome is uncertain but Mr Vance has made it clear that the Administration will strongly resist the lifting of sanctions at this stage. (A Presidential veto could only be overturned by a two-thirds majority in both Houses, but would have to be applied to the Bill as a whole.)

5. Mr Day has reported from Salisbury that there is a recognition that some changes in the Constitution might be necessary to secure wider acceptance. There is no sign at this stage of de-escalation of the war. The Rhodesian military commander, General Walls, considers that there will be a hard fight ahead in the next few months.

14 June 1979

Rhodesia Department

DRAFT REPORT TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN LUSAKA

New paragraph to be added after paragraph 8.

9. The British Government Representative did not concur in all aspects of the preceding paragraphs. The Committee has, however, noted that it is the stated objective of the British Government to bring Rhodesia back to legality with the widest possible international recognition; and that assurances have been given by that Government to the effect that "every effort will be made to end the conflict in Rhodesia and to bring about a lasting settlement based on the democratic wishes of the people of that country". The Committee particularly welcomed the undertaking given by the British Government to consult with Commonwealth countries in the achievement of the independence of Zimbabwe under majority rule. It believes that the unfolding of these assurances and undertakings can contribute to the fulfilment of shared Commonwealth objectives for Zimbabwe.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL, 18 JUNE

NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE, INCLUDING UNCTAD V

POINTS TO MAKE

1. UNCTAD V reached useful consensus on some issues, eg commodities and protectionism. Encouraging lack of acrimony. More dramatic results unlikely in current difficulty economic circumstances.

2. UK view that developed and developing countries share common interest in maintaining and strengthening - not in overturning - the existing international arrangements for co-operation on trade and financial issues.

3. Oil price rises exacerbate the problems of the developing countries and reduce our ability to help solve them. Developing countries ought to play their part in persuading OPEC countries to keep prices down.

4. British Government see their main task as being to put the UK economic house in order. This will make the UK a more effective partner in the North/South Dialogue. We intend to encourage trade and investment in and with the developing countries. We shall maintain a substantial aid programme but it will not be exempt from public expenditure cuts which go right across the board.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

5. Mr Ramphal is a North/South warrior of long standing. He tends to side with the G77. He was intending to attend UNCTAD V but changed his plans at the last moment. He will certainly regard the outcome as a "failure". He may attribute this to lack of solidarity in G77 as compared with Group B. He advocates establishment of an OECD for the developing countries or OECDC.

6. UK announced willingness to contribute to Second (voluntary) Window of Common Fund at Manila. Specific figure not yet decided.

7. UK kept Commonwealth partners informed of UK attitude to UNCTAD both before and during the Conference where a number of Commonwealth meetings were held.

8. Even after the £50 million reduction the Aid Programme in 1979/80 will be £842.9 million. This is higher in both cash and real terms than the £778 million provided in 1978/79. As a percentage of GNP will still be well above FRG, Japan and USA.

9. North/South Dialogue, and especially UNCTAD V outcome, bound to be discussed at Lusaka CHOGM. UK likely to be criticised for negative attitude to G77 proposals for a "New International Economic Order" (NIEO).

FINANCIAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

13 JUNE 1979

THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL: 18 JUNE 1979

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

POINTS TO MAKE

1. South East Asia already on the Agenda.

2. Need for an international effort to deal with the refugees. Malaysia and Hong Kong are hardest hit; latter has 52,000 boat people.

3. Helpful if Mr Ramphal could urge members to support the proposal for a UN Conference and to provide additional practical help.

4. If no decision on a Conference before Lusaka, consider there how to proceed.

5. Need for pressure to be brought on the Vietnamese authorities to stop persecuting their ethnic Chinese community; otherwise the problem will get worse. We have left the Vietnamese in no doubt of our views and have asked the Russians and others to support us on humanitarian grounds.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

COMMONWEALTH ATTITUDES

1. South East Asia is on the CHGM Agenda at the request of regional members. It is in our general interest to encourage discussion of non-African topics.

2. Malaysia and Singapore are concerned, as members of ASEAN, with both the humanitarian, and political effects of the Vietnamese Government's expulsion policy. Both now refuse to let boat refugees land. Australia is seeking a reference in the communiqué.

3. The following Commonwealth countries have already been asked to support the call for a Conference:

Australia	India
Bangladesh	Malaysia
Canada	New Zealand
Guyana	Sri Lanka
Jamaica	Singapore

4. We have not lobbied African members, because of the severe refugee problems there: Botswana and Zambia have considerable numbers of Rhodesian refugees. Mr Ramphal could however seek their support on our behalf without our inhibitions.

NUMBERS OF REFUGEES

5. About 350,000 are awaiting resettlement. The Americans and Chinese have already taken over 200,000 each. The French have received 50,000 the Canadians 15,000, and Hong Kong 9,200. The UK had already accepted 1,573 Vietnamese by 22 May, and 350 other Indo-Chinese.

6. We have accepted over 1,000 from the MV Sibonga (to be offset, as far as possible, against the unused part of a quota of 1,500 agreed by the previous Government). Future ships' cases will be considered on their merits. Refugees from the MV Roachbank will be accepted, if the Taiwanese will not take them.

THE UNHCR-VIETNAM AGREEMENT

7. The Vietnamese are claiming that arrangements under an agreement of 30 May with the UN Deputy High Commissioner to allow "refugees" to leave Vietnam directly to countries of final settlement show their willingness to cooperate with the world community. This proposal only covers people who already have offers of settlement places, because of links with relatives already in the USA etc., at present levels of outflow the 20,000 to 30,000 who qualify equal about 2 weeks' flow of boat people.

/THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROPOSAL

HE PRIME MINISTER'S PROPOSAL

8. Dr Waldheim has reacted positively. The UNHCR who is conducting soundings with interested governments, is reluctant to convene the Conference without receiving advance pledges of resettlement and financial contributions from major countries like the UK. Unless Dr Waldheim can be persuaded to take the initiative, a conference will be delayed, or will be of insufficient scope.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
14 June 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL: 18 JUNE.

BELIZE

POINTS TO MAKE (if subject raised by Mr Ramphal)

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON BELIZE

1. We shall continue to cooperate with the Committee.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE

2. Our aim is a negotiated settlement with Guatemala acceptable to the Belizeans. We doubt if progress can be made before the Belize elections.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GENERAL: JUNE.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON BELIZE

1. Committee of Foreign Ministers was set up at Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London in 1977 in response to the concern expressed over the delay in bringing Belize to independence. At annual meetings the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary has given the Committee an account of negotiations and developments. Members of Committee are Canada, Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana, Nigeria, Tanzania, India and Malaysia. Although not members, British and Belize Governments attend meetings.

BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE OF BELIZE

2. Policy is currently under review by FCO Ministers but the Guatemalan Foreign Minister has been informed that we shall continue to pursue a negotiated settlement. Although the Guatemalans publicly rejected the settlement proposals put to them in September 1978 they said they were willing to continue negotiations and our proposals remain on the table.

3. Elections are due in Belize before February 1980. The Guatemalans hope that a victory by the Opposition, who at present prefer to delay independence, will relieve the pressure for early independence. The defence of Belize costs £15 million per year (£3.5 million in extra costs).

Mexico & Caribbean Department
June 1979

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TELNO 1396 OF 7 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE MIRIMBA SALISBURY, CAPE TOWN, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, PRETORIA.
RHODESIA: PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION
1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT CARTER AT 1720 WASHINGTON TIME TODAY.
2. BEGINS.
AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION, I HAVE MADE A DECISION ON THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN SANCTIONS. FIRST, I AM ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING THE SANCTIONS.

SECOND, I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS.

FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR TO ME THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME VERY ENCOURAGING PROGRESS MADE IN THAT COUNTRY, THAT THE ACTION TAKEN HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE PROVISION OF THE UNITED STATES LAW DESCRIBED IN THE SO-CALLED CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT.

IN REACHING THIS DECISION, WE HAVE CAREFULLY ASSESSED RECENT EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA. WE HAVE CONSULTED VERY CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH WHO RETAIN BOTH LEGAL AND HISTORIC INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THAT COUNTRY.

THE ACTUAL VOTING IN THE APRIL ELECTIONS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED IN A REASONABLY FAIR WAY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD UNDER A CONSTITUTION THAT WAS DRAFTED BY AND THEN SUBMITTED ONLY TO THE WHITE MINORITY, ONLY 60 PERCENT OF WHOM THEMSELVES SUPPORTED THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

THE BLACK CITIZENS, WHO CONSTITUTE 96 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, NEVER HAD A CHANCE TO CONSIDER NOR TO VOTE FOR OR AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION UNDER WHICH THE ELECTIONS WERE HELD.

/THE CONSTITUTION

THE CONSTITUTION PRESERVES EXTRAORDINARY POWER FOR THE FOUR PERCENT WHITE MINORITY. IT GIVES THIS SMALL MINORITY VASTLY DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBERS OF VOTES IN THE COUNTRY'S PARLIAMENT. IT GIVES THIS FOUR PERCENT CONTINUED CONTROL OVER THE ARMY, THE POLICE, THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, AND IT ALSO LETS THE FOUR PERCENT MINORITY EXERCISE A VETO OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. MOREOVER, WHILE THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT CALLED FOR FREE PARTICIPATION OF ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS OR GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY IN THE RECENT ELECTION, THE INTERNAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OPPOSING POLITICAL PARTIES WERE BANNED FROM THE ELECTION. THEY WERE UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THEY WERE PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING MEETINGS, FROM HAVING POLITICAL RALLIES, FROM EXPRESSING THEIR VIEWS AGAINST VOTING IN THE ELECTION, AND EVEN PREVENTED FROM ADVERTISING THEIR VIEWS IN THE NEWS MEDIA.

FOR THESE REASONS, I CANNOT CONCLUDE THAT THE ELECTIONS WERE EITHER FAIR OR FREE. NOR CAN I CONCLUDE THAT THE OTHER CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES LAW HAS BEEN FULLY MET. THE AUTHORITIES IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING, BUT THEY HAVE NOT INDICATED THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ABOUT ''ALL RELEVANT ISSUES''. ALL RELEVANT ISSUES HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE UNITED STATES LAW.

WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO KEEP THE QUESTION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF SANCTIONS UNDER REVIEW. I SINCERLY HOPE THAT FUTURE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE AND MADE RAPIDLY. ALONG WITH THE BRITISH, WE WILL PARTICULARLY LOOK FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A WIDER POLITICAL PROCESS AND MORE LEGITIMATE AND GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. IN SO DOING, WE WILL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND OBVIOUSLY CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS ON A MONTHLY BASIS ON THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA.

THE POSITION THAT I HAVE OUTLINED BEST SERVES NOT ONLY AMERICAN INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES IN A REGION OF THE WORLD OF INCREASING IMPORTANCE TO US. IT SHOULD PRESERVE OUR DIPLOMATIC AND TIES OF TRADE WITH FRIENDLY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND ALSO LIMIT AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT -- LIMIT THE OPPORTUNITY OF OUTSIDE POWERS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.

/NO OTHER

NO OTHER GOVERNMENT ON EARTH HAS EXTENDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OR RECOGNITION TO THE ZIMBABWE-RHODESIAN GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, THESE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES THAT I AM DESCRIBING SHOULD HELP AND ENCOURAGE THE NEWLY-ELECTED AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING MR. MUZOREWA, TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE GENUINE MAJORITY RULE, AN END TO APARTHEID AND RACISM, BASED ON FIRM, REASONABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES THAT EXEMPLIFY THE VERY PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN FOUNDED.

I CONSIDER THIS PRINCIPLE TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO REPRESENT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WHAT OUR NATION STANDS FOR, WHAT OUR PEOPLE BELIEVE IN.

I RECOGNIZE, TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK WITH YOU, THAT I DO NOT HAVE A MAJORITY OF SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE. MY GUESS IS THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE HOUSE WE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN THIS POSITION PREVAILING. BUT BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO ME PERSONALLY, AND TO OUR COUNTRY, BECAUSE I SEE THE PROSPECT OF OUR NATION BEING SERIOUSLY DAMAGED IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE TO LIFT SANCTIONS AT THIS TIME WOULD DIRECTLY VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, OUR PAST AGREEMENTS EVER SINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF EITHER OUR COUNTRY OR THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA, I INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN WITHIN MY POWER TO PREVAIL IN THIS SITUATION.

IT MEANS A LOT TO OUR COUNTRY TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS DECENT, AND WHAT IS FAIR, AND WHAT IS PRINCIPLED. AND IN MY OPINION THE ACTION THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED FULFILLS THESE REQUIREMENTS.

JAY

F I L E S
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LEGAL ADVISERS
(MR FREELAND)
(MR STEEL)
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PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR RIDLEY

PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR LEAHY
MISS BROWN
MR THOMAS
MR WILLSON
MR WILLIAMS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

10 DOWNING STREET

MR. CARTLEDGE

Briefing required by noon on 15/6 8/6

Mr. Ramphal the Commonwealth Secretary-General is coming to see the Prime Minister on Monday, 18 June at 1715 at the House of Commons. Will you organise a briefing if any?

CS.

7 June 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 24 MAY 1979
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON CANBERRA GABORONE OTTAWA PORT OF SPAIN GEORGETWON NEW DELHI NAIROBI LILONGWE WELLINGTON DAR ES SALAAM ACCRA LUSAKA ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA MAPUTO BRIDGETOWN BANJUL KINGSTON FREETOWN NICOSIA LUANDA MASERU KUALA LUMPUR VALLETTA PORT LOUIS DACCA SINGAPORE COLOMBO MBABANE KAMPALA
INFO SAVING HONIARA NASSAU NUKUALOFA PORT MORESBY SUVA

RHODESIA: MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS

1. A DELEGATION OF COMMONWEALTH HIGH COMMISSIONERS AND MR RAMPHAL CALLED ON ME ON 23 MAY AT THEIR REQUEST FOLLOWING A MEETING ON 18 MAY OF THE COMMONWEALTH COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES WERE REPRESENTED AUSTRALIA CANADA GHANA SINGAPORE INDIA NIGERIA ZAMBIA AND TRINIDAD.

2. THE TRINIDAD HIGH COMMISSIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP, STRESSED THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDLY COMMONWEALTH COOPERATION IN WHICH THEIR APPROACH WAS MADE: IT WAS INSPIRED BY CONCERN THAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONSIDER RECOGNITION OF THE MUZOREWA GOVT. AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS. THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES THOUGHT THAT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS WAS BEING PLACED ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION: TO BE SEEN AS AN ADEQUATE TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY (IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE) IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT THE CONSTITUTION WAS UNDERSTOOD AND CLEARLY APPROVED BY THE ELECTORATE. THAT HAD NOT BEEN THE CASE. MOREOVER, DESPITE CLAIMS THAT THE 3 MARCH 1978 AGREEMENT WOULD REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONFLICT, IT HAD INTENSIFIED AND SPREAD. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN HAD BEEN BUILT ON THE PROSPECT OF ENDING THE WAR - BUT THERE WAS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT THAT WOULD BE ACHIEVED. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN POLICY TOWARDS RHODESIA WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH DANGER. A WIDER POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS NEEDED.

/3. INDIVIDUAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. INDIVIDUAL HIGH COMMISSIONERS EXPANDED ON THIS GENERAL APPROACH. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

(A) THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION:

(B) THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT AFRICAN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL OPINION:

(C) THE NEED FOR A SOLUTION THAT WOULD BRING AN END TO THE WAR: THIS WAS UNLIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED UNLESS THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WERE INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT. IF THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION WERE READY TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EXTERNAL PARTIES, A WAY FORWARD MIGHT BE FOUND.

(D) THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT PROVIDE FOR A GENUINE TRANSFER OF POWER: AND WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY: IT HAD NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO A BLACK REFERENDUM.

(E) THE DEEP CONCERN FELT BY AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE BALANCE ALONGSIDE UK DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS.

MR RAMPHAL REAFFIRMED THE CONSENSUS OF COMMONWEALTH VIEWS THAT NEITHER THE CONSTITUTION NOR THE GENERAL SITUATION IN RHODESIA CONSTITUTED AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE. IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE TO RECOGNISE THE ADMINISTRATION ON THIS BASIS THEY WOULD NOT BE RESPECTING THEIR PRINCIPLES. HE HOPED THAT NO STEPS TOWARDS RECOGNITION WOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NECESSARY FOR GENUINE MAJORITY RULE.

4. IN REPLY, I WELCOMED THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES HAD COME AND I ASSURED THEM THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL CONSULTATION. OUR AIMS WERE THE SAME: PEACE AND A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF RHODESIA. WE BELIEVED THAT THE ELECTION HAD ALTERED THE SITUATION FUNDAMENTALLY. LORD BOYD AND HIS COLLEAGUES, IN A CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF THE ELCTIONS, HAD CONCLUDED THAT THEY HAD BEEN GENERALLY FAIR (I UNDERTOOK TO MAKE COPIES OF THE BOYD AND DRINKWATER REPORTS AVAILABLE TO THEM). AS THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES HAD REFERRED TO THE CONSTITUTION IN THEIR ELECTION CAMPAIGN, IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT A VOTE FOR THEM REPRESENTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE CONSTITUTION MIGHT NOT BE AS ANY OF US WOULD HAVE DRAFTED BUT THAT DID NOT GIVE US THE

/RIGHT TO

RIGHT TO DICTATE TO OTHERS. CONSULTATIONS WERE ALREADY TAKING PLACE. SIR A DUFF HAD HELD EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA LAST WEEK: AND A SENIOR DIPLOMAT BASED IN LONDON WOULD GO TO SALISBURY SHORTLY TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE ADMINISTRATION TO BE THERE FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY AND TO TRAVEL BACK TO LONDON AS OFTEN AS NEED BE. THIS WOULD NOT (NOT) BE IN ANY WAY AN ACT OF RECOGNITION. MR. LUCE WAS LEAVING FOR AFRICA THAT DAY, MAINLY FOR TALKS ON NAMIBIA. AN EMISSARY WOULD VISIT AFRICA SOON FOR TALKS WITH THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS AND OTHERS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM. I REMINDED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OF THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE STRONG VIEWS HELD ON THE RHODESIAN QUESTION NOT ONLY WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY BUT IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE. THEY MUST NOT UNDERESTIMATE THIS.

5. IN ANSWER TO SPECIFIC COMMENTS, I SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT SET OURSELVES UP IN JUDGEMENT OVER THE RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION. THERE WAS A MORAL ISSUE FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM : IF WE JUDGED THAT THE RHODESIAN PEOPLE HAD FULFILLED THE SIX PRINCIPLES THAT HAS BEEN PUT TO THEM, WE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO CONFER LEGALITY: BUT WE HAD ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO CONSULT OTHER GOVERNMENTS FULLY. MOST VOTERS HAD VOTED FOR PEACE. WE WOULD CERTAINLY TALK TO THE PF LEADERS IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS, BUT AT PRESENT IT WAS HARD TO SEE THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT A SOLUTION WHICH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SALISBURY ADMINISTRATION - WE HAD TO FIND A WAY THROUGH THIS DILEMMA. FOR THEIR PART, COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT MAKE CONTACT WITH BISHOP MUZOREWA AND EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS DIRECTLY TO HIM.

6. YOU MAY DRAW ON THIS WITH THE NIGERIANS AS NECESSARY (YOUR TELNO 220 REFERS) FOWORA WAS AT THE MEETING.

CARRINGTON

FCO D

RHODESIA D

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RHODESIA POLICY

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