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2004

PREM 19/2863



*file 1/10
cc Sir Pender*

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 July 1989

SOUTH AFRICA

I enclose a copy of a reply from President Bush to the Prime Minister's message about her meeting with Mr. de Klerk.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.




EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

July 10, 1989

Dear Prime Minister:

President Bush has requested that I deliver the attached letter to you. A signed original will be delivered as soon as it is received at the Embassy.



Sincerely,


Henry E. Catto
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL Enclosure

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.

The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2863</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Bush to Thatcher 9/7/89</i>	
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

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EMAXJ
CPC

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 June 1989

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH DE KLERK: MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT BUSH**

Thank you for your letter of 27 June enclosing a draft message to President Bush about the Prime Minister's talk with Mr de Klerk. As I told you on the telephone, this may issue with the addition of the following two sentences in the fourth paragraph:

"He seems prepared to give up white domination, but does not want to go to black domination. He sees some kind of cantonized or 'Swiss' system as the long term solution for South Africa."

CHARLES POWELL

Stephen Wall Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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①
cc: pc



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

It's not quite how 27 June 1989
we would have written it
here. But I think it's adequate.
Content to Herd?

Dear Charles,

CAP 27/6

Prime Minister's talk with De Klerk:
Message to President Bush

As we discussed, I now enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Bush about her talks with Mr De Klerk last week. We think it is worth sending a message in order to encourage President Bush to see De Klerk.

Jam.
Stephe

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



Isn't the point that he is

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dominion but does not want to go
to black dominion but rather does
kind of 'contaminated' South Africa

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not

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FM PRETORIA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO LDN
TELNO 155

OF 270635Z JUNE 89

AND TO IMMEDIATE CAB OFFICE (FOR NO. 10)
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, LUANDA, HARARE, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO
INFO PRIORITY GABORONE, MASERU, MBABANE, WINDHOEK, WASHINGTON,
INFO PRIORITY LAGOS, BONN, LISBON, ROME, CONSULATE DURBAN,
INFO PRIORITY CONSULATES CAPE TOWN AND JOHANNESBURG

FROM H OF C

F.W. DE KLERK'S VISIT: SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS COVERAGE. *ms*

SUMMARY

1. SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS FOCUSES ON EVIDENCE OF RAPPORT ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND FW DE KLERK.

DETAIL

2. ARTICLES FROM THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS COVERING FW DE KERK'S VISIT TO THE UK ARE BEING FAXED TO SAFD.

3. FW DE KLERK'S VISIT TO LONDON WAS, NOT SURPRISINGLY, FULLY AND FAVOURABLY REPORTED HERE. THE PRESS HAVE GENERALLY HAILED IT AS A SUCCESS, WITH NEWS REPORTS DRAWING MAINLY ON OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO EMPHASISE THE 'GOOD RELATIONSHIP' STRUCK BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND DE KLERK: THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SAID TO BE ENCOURAGED BY THE MEETING AND OPTIMISTIC ABOUT REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA.

4. OF THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PAPERS THE 'SUNDAY STAR'S' MORE ANALYTICAL COVERAGE OF DE KLERK'S EUROPEAN TOUR SAID THAT DE KLERK HAD SUCCEEDED IN BUYING TIME BY CONVINCING EUROPEAN LEADERS THAT HE WAS SERIOUS ABOUT REFORM, WINNING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN DUE CREDIT FOR CHANGES THAT HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. AN IMPORTANT OUTCOME HAD BEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THAN COULD EVER HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED POSSIBLE FOR A NATIONAL PARTY LEADER. THE PRIME MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR KOHL WERE CREDITED WITH PUSHING HARD FOR THE EARLY RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA. 'BUSINESS DAY' LIKewise DESCRIBED THE 'GUARDED APPROVAL' WON FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AS 'THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT' OF THE TOUR. DE KLERK IS QUOTED AS TELLING REPORTERS IN ROME THAT EUROPEAN LEADERS WERE NOT SEEKING TO DICTATE TO SOUTH AFRICANS HOW TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS.

5. IN THE AFRIKAANS PRESS 'BEELD' PROCLAIMED DE KLERK'S TOUR AS A 'GREAT GAIN' FOR SOUTH AFRICA WHICH HAD DEALT A SERIOUS SETBACK TO EFFORTS TO EXTEND SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION. BUT A 'BEELD' EDITORIAL ALSO STRUCK A CAUTIONARY NOTE. IT POINTED OUT THAT A PREREQUISITE FOR SUCCESSFUL REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS THE BELIEF BY THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS SERIOUS ABOUT IT. NO COUNTRY TODAY COULD LIVE AS IF IT WAS THE ONLY PLACE ON EARTH. SOME FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS HAD DESCRIBED DE KLERK'S VISIT IN TERMS OF 'BOER-GLASNOST'. BUT, BEELD (R) BEELD SAID, A BRITISH NEWSPAPER HAD WARNED THAT DE KERK HAD CREATED EXPECTATIONS HE DARE NOT DISAPPOINT: 'UNFULFILLED PROMISES HAVE INJURED US MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE - OUR THREADBARE CREDIBILITY WILL SURVIVE NO MORE SUCH DEBACLES'. LIKewise THE WEEKLY 'RAPPORT' CONTRASTED DE KLERK'S TRIP WITH THE 'DO YOUR DAMNEDEST' ATTITUDE OF PREVIOUS YEARS. GOOD OVERSEAS RELATIONS WERE BASED ON GOOD INTERNAL RELATIONS: 'FOREIGN COUNTRIES ARE DEMANDING OF US WHAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO DOING - A SOUTH AFRICA FREE OF DISCRIMINATION, EVEN THOUGH MANY PEOPLE DIFFER ABOUT HOW THIS SHOULD BE ACHIEVED'. 'RAPPORT' CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS FOR SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS PEOPLE TO GO DOWN THE LONG AND DIFFICULT REFORM ROAD - 'WHAT IS GOOD ENOUGH FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S PEOPLE SHOULD THEN BE GOOD ENOUGH FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES.'

6. FCO PLEASE PASS NO. 10 DOWNING STREET.

RENWICK

SECRET 2a-d a

SUBJECT cc MASTER



me from
ck

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

23 June 1989

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. DE KLERK

The Prime Minister had a meeting this morning with Mr. De Klerk which lasted for some one and three quarter hours. We had arranged that Mrs. De Klerk would accompany her husband so that she could meet the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister gave Mr. and Mrs. De Klerk a conducted tour of Downing Street, followed by coffee. The meeting proper started when Mrs. De Klerk left. The South African Ambassador remained throughout, except at the very end when the Prime Minister and Mr. De Klerk had a private word.

The Prime Minister said that Mr. De Klerk faced a very difficult task. A great deal would be expected of him in terms of rapid change in South Africa. At the same time everything he promised would be viewed with great scepticism and suspicion. She welcomed many of the public statements which he had made, but did not think his emphasis on group rights and the need to avoid tyranny by any one group over others was very helpful. People would say he was asking black South Africans not to use their power in order to oppress others, when white South Africans had done precisely that. In effect, it would look as though white South Africans were expecting blacks to behave better towards them than they had behaved towards the blacks. It was important that Mr. De Klerk should be aware of the sort of things which would be said so that he could be prepared to deal with them.

Mr. De Klerk was rather taken aback by this opening salvo, but said that he would like to put things in perspective. The biggest step which South Africa had taken in 40 years was to switch to the policy of power sharing before the 1987 elections. This had administered a major shock to the system and explained the rise of the ultra-conservative parties. But power sharing would work only if there was no domination by any one group. Those with vested rights had to be offered security and the assurance that they would not become the oppressed. It was a balance of power that white South Africans were seeking. You could not have simple majority system in South Africa or one man one vote in a unitary state. There had to be a system which preserved the essential interests of each racial group.

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The Prime Minister said that the vital step which Mr. De Klerk must take after the elections in September was to show that his government was ready for negotiations, without hedging them with limits and constraints or trying to prescribe their outcome in advance. The outside world would also be looking for the early release of Mandela, Sisulu and Mpetha. The worst possible thing would be for Mandela to die in prison. She assumed that Mr. De Klerk had thought through how to handle these matters so that things could get off to a positive start. We understood that it was not helpful to Mr. De Klerk to have external pressure before the elections. We would do our best to restrain this. But the world would be expecting a great deal and would be disappointed unless there was rapid movement. The settlement in Namibia must also be seen through to a successful conclusion. Good progress over Namibia would make it easier to restrain the Commonwealth from trying to insist on further sanctions. Mr. De Klerk should not for a moment underestimate the continuing pressure for financial sanctions.

Mr. De Klerk said that he recognised the need for an early breakthrough in South Africa's relations with the rest of the world. He was also fully aware of the importance of the Namibia settlement. The South Africa government was very grateful for the role played by the Prime Minister in keeping it on the rails at a crucial moment. He accepted the importance of getting a process of negotiation going within South Africa. It would not be possible to move straight to a structured negotiation. He would need first to mobilise the moderates for a constructive approach. It was essential to have wide participation in negotiations, otherwise they would be a flop. He would try to discourage black representatives from setting preconditions for negotiations: all disputed issues should be on the agenda of the negotiations themselves. The Prime Minister interjected that Mr. De Klerk might have to offer some concessions as an earnest of good faith. Mr. De Klerk appeared to accept this.

Mr. De Klerk continued that he accepted that negotiations must be seen to be broadly representative. Only then would their results be accepted. He favoured a process of informal negotiations in the first instance, to discuss how the actual negotiations should be conducted. One possibility would be to hold elections throughout the country, in order to choose delegates to a constitutional conference. He noted that Chief Buthelezi was opposed to this. This would enable urban blacks to have a say. In response to the Prime Minister's question whether ANC representatives would be acceptable if elected, Mr. De Klerk said they would be, always assuming that they did not boycott the elections. What the South African government could not accept was that negotiations should be with the ANC only. There had to be a place for anybody and any organisation prepared to negotiate a peaceful settlement. But the first task was to try to build up trust. It was the absence of trust which explained the failure of earlier attempts to negotiate.

Mr. De Klerk said that he would like to add two further important thoughts. First, he could not accept a situation where the authority of the government was put aside and negotiations were held in a vacuum, as had happened in Zimbabwe or Namibia. There must not be a breakdown of authority and everything must be approved and channeled through Parliament. The object was to agree on a new constitution by following constitutional processes. Second, he had to emphasise that the course he was following would not produce significant results in the short term. There should be a period of informal discussion leading to wider meetings with Buthelezi and other leaders. There would be an impression of movement but no great events or decisions. He would need a honeymoon period before he could produce the bold steps which were needed, and it would take more than six or nine months. As for Mandela, he could not be released into a void. That would only lead to a revolutionary onslaught. His release must lead to an improvement in the climate for negotiations and moderate black leaders in South Africa must be seen to have contributed to it. He was grateful for the Prime Minister's comments about external pressures. They were indeed unhelpful. She was right to insist that South Africans must be left to sort out their problems themselves.

The Prime Minister said there would be no prospect of negotiations before Mandela was released. She could not emphasise the importance of this too strongly. Those like her who had fought off sanctions had waited a long time for a renewal of reform in South Africa. Their position would be greatly undermined unless Mandela was released rapidly and a framework for negotiation established. We had to be able to say that it was clear that the new government represented a genuinely new approach. We could not go on urging restraint on the international community without some visible progress. De Klerk would find he had messed up his chances and the goodwill which his statements had created if he failed to match up to expectations on this point. De Klerk said he understood this. But he did not want Mandela's release to be part of an international deal. It should be seen as something which had come about because things were happening in South Africa. The Prime Minister said that there was bound to be some commotion when Mandela was released: the South African government must react calmly.

Mr. De Klerk said that he had a number of other ideas. He attached great importance to the recent report of the South African Law Commission which had recommended a Bill of Rights. He was now considering asking the Commission to report on how to co-ordinate concepts of individual and group rights. The Law Commission was an authoritative body and its views had carried great weight. He also recognised the need to follow the Prime Minister's example in restructuring South Africa's economy. The Prime Minister said that Britain would continue to provide help on such matters as housing and education for black South Africans. We were opposed to disinvestment. But Mr. De Klerk must realise how vulnerable the South African economy would be to financial sanctions.

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The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. De Klerk's meeting with President Bush was yet assured. Mr. De Klerk said he thought that it was, although no announcement had been made. The Prime Minister said that, although the President was himself opposed to sanctions, he was under great pressure from Congress. She thought he would look to Mr. De Klerk to give some indication of his good faith ahead of their meeting. Mr. De Klerk asked whether the Prime Minister meant that he should go with a peace offering. The Prime Minister said she did indeed have something of this sort in mind.

The Prime Minister said that she welcomed the news from Angola. Mr. De Klerk agreed that it was a positive step. He believed that Savimbi was working on plans for a federal state.

Mr. De Klerk concluded by saying that he did not want there to be any misunderstanding about his position. He had a bottom line. His people must continue to play a leading role in South Africa. He would not go the way of other African States. Whites had to have unity and a guaranteed future.

~~Handwritten scribbles and signatures~~

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

The Prime Minister cautioned Mr. De Klerk to be very careful in contacts with the press. It might be better to stick to an agreed statement rather than expose himself to too much questioning. She and Mr. De Klerk then discussed the line which No.10 would take on the press. I enclose a copy of the statement which was issued at the end of the meeting.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Brian Hawtin (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

C)P

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. DE KLERK

The Prime Minister and Mr. de Klerk met for one and three quarter hours today for a very thorough, friendly and constructive discussion.

It was evident that there is a new mood in South Africa and a determination to resolve the great issues of the day through negotiation. It is for the people of South Africa themselves - all of them - to decide on the way ahead. Our hope - which the Prime Minister expressed - is that these new opportunities will be grasped and there will be an end to violence.

The Prime Minister welcomed progress over Namibia and the fact that South Africa was adhering strictly to the agreements, and stressed the importance of bringing the Namibia Agreement to a successful conclusion. This would have a very positive effect on the future prospects for Southern Africa as a whole.



As in the past, the Prime Minister raised the great importance we attach to the early release of Mr. Mandela.

The Prime Minister expressed our wish to maintain regular contacts with South African Ministers and representatives of all groups in South Africa so long as they do not pursue their goals by violence. She and Mr. de Klerk agreed to stay in touch.

The Prime Minister was encouraged by the meeting.

23 June 1989

The National Archives

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CONFIDENTIALPRIME MINISTERMEETING WITH MR. DE KLERK

You are to see Mr. De Klerk tomorrow morning. We have set aside an hour and a half for a thorough talk.

Yes
Mr. de Klerk has asked whether he could bring his wife for the first ten minutes or so to meet you and have a cup of coffee. She has with her a letter for Mr. Thatcher from a South African friend. I have said that I am sure you would agree.

During his time in Europe, De Klerk is also seeing Kohl and Genscher, Andreotti and Caraco Silva. President Mitterrand's son is coming to see him privately in London. It seems likely that President Bush will now agree to see him, although I do not think this is confirmed.

The background to the visit and the subjects to raise are set out in telegrams from Robin Renwick which you will find in the folder. It will be very important to get the atmosphere right, as you did so successfully with Du Plessis. You will want to use this first meeting to win his confidence, so that he feels that he has a friendly and secure point of contact and advice outside South Africa. To achieve this, you will need to show understanding for the problems he will face and the fact that external pressure will be counter-productive, particularly during the election campaign.

But you also need to bring home to him the reality of the external pressures on South Africa. He has only very limited experience of the outside world and of the continued strength of the demands for financial sanctions in the US and the Commonwealth. You will need to take him carefully through the consequences of failure to move forward with reform.

Generally, you will want to let him do most of the talking and tell you as much as possible about his thinking and his plans. Depending on how the conversation goes, points which you could

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- 2 -

make are:

- a warm welcome. You have heard a lot about him from many different quarters, and very favourable. You look forward to working with him and staying in close and regular contact. You want to put behind us days when South Africa was isolated.
- you are encouraged by his public statements about reform and his meetings with Buthelezi and Mabuza. You do not have unrealistic expectations (one man one vote in a unitary state). But there must be a reform process, it must involve black South Africans and it must lead somewhere.
- you understand the difficulties which overt pressure from outside during the election campaign will cause him. You will do your best to hold it in check. But the time gained must be used wisely.
- you must underline the seminal importance of releasing Mandela. You understand the worries of renewed violence, but surely something can be worked out with Mandela under which he would appeal for calm. He must be allowed to conduct normal activity. Only then will negotiations with authoritative black leaders like Buthelezi become possible. They ought also to release Walter Sisulu (76) and Oscar Mpetha (80), preferably before CHOGM.
- if he is prepared to take this step, you believe he has a real chance to lead South Africa out of its isolation. But release of Mandela is not enough on its own. It must lead on to negotiations with representatives of black South Africans. You would be interested to hear more about his constitutional thinking, and his proposal for a 'Great Indaba'. Does he envisage a parliament in which black representatives can participate?

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- it is very important to see the Namibia settlement through to a satisfactory conclusion. This will greatly improve the climate of international opinion. South Africa has done very well so far;

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- you remain unalterably opposed to sanctions and will continue to argue against them. But he should not underestimate the pressure which still exists, both in the Commonwealth, the EC and the US. It is likely to be an issue at CHOGM. It needs some early and substantial movement on reform to defuse this. You cannot successfully hold back the tide on your own for ever. Financial sanctions could be particularly damaging. South Africa will only attract new lending if it demonstrates movement on reform;
- you hope that he will continue the policy of seeking contacts with South Africa's neighbours. We are willing to help with this where needed. If any group in South Africa is still giving help to Renamo, it should be stopped;
- we shall continue our policy of providing assistance for black education and housing and try to persuade our companies to stay in South Africa. But it's their judgment and much will depend on how they see the political prospects.

CDP
(C. D. POWELL)

22-June 1989

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 June 1989

Jean Charles,

Visit of Mr F W de Klerk

The leader of the South African National Party, F W de Klerk, will call on the Prime Minister at 0930 on 23 June. He will subsequently have talks and lunch with the Foreign Secretary. Mr de Klerk arrived in Britain on 21 June; the South African Ambassador arranged for him to meet a group of MPs and senior editors. Today he will travel to Germany for the day where, at our suggestion, he will be received by Chancellor Kohl; we shall get a very early briefing on this from our Embassy. A visit to Washington and a meeting with President Bush remains uncertain but may be arranged in July.

The South African election campaign is just beginning. General elections for the tri-cameral Parliament (white, coloured and Indian) will be held on 6 September. An electoral college drawn from all three assemblies will then meet to elect the new State President. It is virtually certain that the National Party will be returned to power and that, consequently, F W de Klerk will become State President in late September.

/ I enclose a biographical note on Mr de Klerk. Mr de Klerk's background lies with the conservative wing of the National Party. His power base in the Transvaal has been seriously eroded in recent years by the rise of the South African Conservative Party. Nevertheless, since his election as leader of the National Party Mr de Klerk has made a number of speeches calling for a renewal of the process of constitutional reform. He has met moderate black leaders such as Chief Buthelezi and Enos Mabuza. There are indications that he may also be willing to explore contacts with the ANC. He seems to be aiming at a "Great Indaba" to discuss ways of giving blacks a say in government. But he remains wedded to the concept of racial "group rights" as a safeguard for the whites. Blacks see this as a device to preserve white rule.

/ Sir Robin Renwick saw de Klerk on 20 June. I enclose copies of his reporting telegram and his advice on the handling of the talks.

/Objectives

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Objectives for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr de Klerk are:

- to stress the crucial importance for South Africa of standing by its commitments to the Namibian independence process;
- to bring home to Mr de Klerk the need for actions to match his words; and to warn that in the absence of early movement on constitutional reform in the window of opportunity after the election, pressure for more sanctions, particularly from the US, may prove overwhelming;

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For his part, we expect Mr de Klerk's objectives to be:

- to seek electoral benefit from the fact of his being received by Mrs Thatcher;
- to convince Mrs Thatcher of his commitment to change but to point out that he cannot be seen to be reacting to foreign pressure;
- perhaps to seek public endorsement of his "Great Indaba" proposal;
- to seek British intervention with the Front Line States, especially Zimbabwe, to engage in dialogue with South Africa.

Namibia

The Foreign Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister might begin with Namibia and make the following points:

- successful implementation of the Namibian independence process can be an important factor not only for the region but also for the climate of international opinion on South Africa;
- refer to her own visit, to our condemnation of SWAPO's incursions on 1 April and to our subsequent efforts to keep SWAPO to the rules. We recognise the distance South Africa has travelled. All the more reason why South Africa must, in its own interest, play its part in ensuring that the elections are seen to be free and fair so that the UN and the international community can support them.

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/South Africa



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South Africa

While emphasising that we do not ourselves prescribe solutions to South Africa's constitutional problems, the Prime Minister may wish to question Mr de Klerk on his own vision of the way ahead. (On current evidence, we would judge that while Mr de Klerk may move the reform process forward, his idea of a future constitutional dispensation remains insufficiently advanced to satisfy the aspirations of South Africa's black majority. I enclose a digest of key statements.)

There is a danger that exaggerated expectations may have been raised over the pace and scale of the changes Mr de Klerk is prepared to make. The Prime Minister will wish to leave him in no doubt about the need for some concrete steps towards reform as early as possible in his new administration. Failure to do so will increase the pressure for new sanctions, particularly in the United States, and that may prove uncontainable. Moreover, there will be no chance of the banks being willing to resume long term loans unless they can be convinced by reform that there is a prospect of long term stability.

The Prime Minister may wish to outline the principal steps we are looking for; in particular the release of Mr Mandela, not as an end in itself (although this is highly desirable: the consequences of his dying in detention would be very serious) but as a step towards initiating a dialogue with genuine representatives of all political groups in South Africa. Such a dialogue can only be conducted successfully with representatives who can deliver.

If Mr de Klerk raises the question of a quid pro quo for Mandela's release, the Prime Minister might refer to the agreed UK/FRG paper provided to Pik Botha in March (copy attached). Mr de Klerk is already aware of this.

The Prime Minister may also wish to tell Mr de Klerk that the credibility of South Africa's commitment to reform is undermined by Government actions in the contrary direction. The recent reimposition of the State of Emergency has been accompanied by a tightening up of restriction orders on individuals. Activities such as forced removals, detention without trial, and restrictions on the freedom of the press continue. In many cases, the supposed benefits must be outweighed by the adverse effect on South Africa's international image.

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I am copying this letter to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Jans,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

22/6/89



Secretary of State

Blay

FROM: P S FAIRWEATHER

DATE: 22 June 1989

cc: PS/Mrs Chalker
Mr Dales, SAFF
News Dept

PS

DE KLERK'S VISIT: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

1. It is clear that De Klerk envisages negotiations for a new constitution after the elections are out of the way. He may take advantage of his tete-a-tetes with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State to tell us something of his ideas. But it would not be surprising if he was vague: I doubt whether they are fully worked out; and he will not want to say anything which could create difficulties for himself in the election campaign.
2. In the circumstances there is a risk of misunderstanding, with De Klerk convincing himself that we support his views, which point to limited change, negotiated with blacks of his own choice who are not credible representatives. Reporting from the post in recent weeks suggests that the National Party is thinking in terms of a new constitution which would continue to give whites a preponderant voice, even if there were black representatives in the government and other changes. One man, one vote on a common electoral role (or in a unitary state) De Klerk says, is unacceptable because it would lead to black domination.
3. We have rightly avoided prescriptions for the constitution of a post-apartheid South Africa and clearly should not get into this business now. Nevertheless it would be worth pointing out to De Klerk that there is a difference between a constitutional settlement which recognises cultural, religious and other differences and which ensures that a majority cannot ride roughshod over minorities - a dozen examples spring to mind of societies where this applies, including Switzerland and Belgium - and one which, as it were, suspends the laws of arithmetics for ever. The ANC may eventually accept that they have to give ground on safeguards for minorities (though they have not done so yet) but they will not accept that the white minority should be in a position to veto policies which would permit, for example, a re-distribution of the national cake - an issue which will have a priority in a post-apartheid South Africa.
4. As Sir Robin Renwick has said, it is important that De Klerk should make clear to Black Africans that the outcome of the negotiations will depend on the negotiations themselves. Negotiation on the basis of the NP co-opting token blacks into government will not get off the ground. Only the participation of authentic representatives of black groups will provide the evidence which we and the US Administration need of real change.

P S Fairweather



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UK-FRG RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE RELEASE OF NELSON MANDELA

- We believe that Mandela's release is in South Africa's own interests;
- In our assessment it would create a new and improved climate of benefit to South Africa internally and in her relations with the outside world;
- It would also reinforce our joint stand against sanctions and other restrictive measures;
- And it would make it easier for us to play a helpful role over the problems facing South Africa in its dealings with the banks over bearer bonds;
- Looked at realistically it would not on its own lead to the dismantling of any sanctions;
- But if the South African Government were to build on Mandela's release to launch a dialogue between all political groups in South Africa, we would then see what could be done to meet South Africa's concerns on sanctions (although we could not give advance assurances affecting others).

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6/11/19



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DE KLERK, FREDERICK WILLEM (FW) DMS

Minister of National Education and Chairman of the Minister's Council of the House of Assembly. Leader of the Transvaal NP. MP for Vereeniging, Transvaal.

Born 1936 in Johannesburg. Son of a former Cabinet Minister, Senator Jan de Klerk, and brother of "Wimpie" de Klerk, former editor of "Rapport". Studied law at the University of Potchefstroom and in 1961 took up a legal practice in Vereeniging. Elected to Parliament 1972.

1978 joined Cabinet as Minister of Posts and Telecommunications and of Social Welfare and Posts January 1978. Appointed Minister of Sport and Recreation November 1978, but failed to achieve a rapport with the sporting world. In June 1979 moved to Mines, Environmental Planning and Energy (Mineral and Energy affairs from 1980). Following the National Party split in 1982, succeeded Treurnicht (qv) as leader of Transvaal National Party. 1984 was appointed to present Ministerial post with additional responsibility for the civil service. Became Chairman Minister's Council in the House of Assembly in 1985.

An ambitious and astute politician with a powerful presence on a public platform. No liberal but no ideologue either. Close connections to the Johannesburg business community. Transvaal's candidate for party leader in succession to P W Botha, but increasingly beleaguered as the Conservative Party's support in Transvaal has grown. Did not do particularly well in highly-publicised TV debate with Dr Treurnicht in early 1988. A tough pragmatist rather than a verligte.

Category I visitor to UK in 1975.

Wife, Marike, is very ill. Two sons, one daughter.

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FM PRETORIA
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 148
OF 200930Z JUNE 89

SOUTH AFRICA: VISIT OF FW DE KLERK

1. I CALLED ON DE KLERK THIS MORNING BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON. IN THE COURSE OF HIS EUROPEAN VISIT HE WILL ALSO BE SEEING KOHL AND GENSCHER IN BONN ON THURSDAY; AND, AFTER LONDON, CAVACO SILVA IN LISBON AND ANDREOTTI IN ROME. MITTERRAND IS SENDING HIS SON AND PRINCIPAL AFRICAN ADVISER, JERN-CHRISTOPHE MITTERRAND, TO SEE DE KLERK PRIVATELY WHILE HE IS IN LONDON.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL FIND DE KLERK A REFRESHING CHANGE FROM PW BOTHA. HE IS MUCH CALMER, MORE RATIONAL AND LESS MILITARISTIC IN HIS APPROACH AND LISTENS CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. HE IS NOT A DOCTRINARE, BUT A TOUGH CONSERVATIVE WHO IS NOT PREPARED TO TAKE RISKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY AND WHO IS FACING A MAJOR BATTLE WITH THE RIGHT WING IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTION. HE IS GENUINELY COMMITTED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH REFORM, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ONE MAN ONE VOTE ON A COMMON VOTERS ROLL WILL GIVE ADEQUATE GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF THE WHITE POPULATION. HE CANNOT AFFORD DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SOUTH AFRICA IS GOING TO BOW TO FOREIGN PRESSURE. BUT HE ASSURED ME AGAIN THAT HE IS NOT GOING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE RIGHT IN THE ELECTION.

3. DE KLERK SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE LARGELY TETE-A-TETE, AS HE WANTS TO TALK FRANKLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES AND THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS HERE. HE REGARDS THAT MEETING AS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF HIS CONTACTS WITH EXTERNAL LEADERS. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE EXPOSED TO A LOT OF PUBLIC PRESSURE, WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO REJECT FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS. I SAID THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF EMBARRASSING HIM DURING HIS ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND I DID NOT IMAGINE THAT WE WOULD BE GIVING DETAILS OF THE TALKS. BUT OUR POSITION ON THE MAIN ISSUES E.G. MANDELA WAS WELL KNOWN AND I KNEW THAT HE WOULD BE BRIEFING THE PRESS HIMSELF. HE MUST EXPECT THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU TO SET OUT CLEARLY OUR VIEWS AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH AFRICA OF NOT MOVING FORWARD. THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS, BUT MUST EXPECT TO BE JUDGED BY WHAT THEY DID. DE KLERK SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THIS.

4. I REMINDED DE KLERK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE ATTENDING THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN KUALA LUMPUR FROM 18-24 OCTOBER. AT THAT MEETING ALL THE OTHERS - INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIANS AND CANADIANS - WOULD BE CLAMOURING FOR FURTHER FINANCIAL SANCTIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER ONCE AGAIN WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT ON HER OWN. DE KLERK SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TAKING OVER AS PRESIDENT BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER. IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT ITS POLICIES. BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO TRY TO SEND SOME POSITIVE SIGNALS BEFORE CHOGM.

5. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

F C O PSE ADVANCE TO NO. 10.

RENWICK

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 149
OF 201030Z JUNE 1989

MIPT: VISIT OF FW DE KLERK

SUMMARY

1. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO IMPRESS ON DE KLERK THAT THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEADERSHIP WILL HAVE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AFTER THE ELECTION. IF MISSED, THIS WILL NOT OCCUR AGAIN. THE FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON THEIR DETERMINATION TO SEE THROUGH THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT: FIND A WAY TO RELEASE MANDELA, ENGAGE NEGOTIATIONS WITH REAL BLACK LEADERS AND MOVE TOWARDS THE LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY: AND TO GET THE LUNATIC FRINGE ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITY FORCES UNDER CONTROL.

DETAIL

2. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO ASK DE KLERK ABOUT THE PROSPECTS IN THE ELECTIONS AND HIS PLANS THEREAFTER. HE HAS MADE SOME ENCOURAGING STATEMENTS ABOUT REFORM AND HAS PROMISED NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW CONSTITUTION. HE HAS SET OUT, IN UNDERSTANDABLY GUARDED TERMS AT THIS STAGE, THE GOVERNMENT'S IDEAS. HE ENVISAGES BLACK PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLY ALSO IN PARLIAMENT, THOUGH THAT HAS BEEN LEFT DELIBERATELY OBSCURE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE OUTCOME WILL DEPEND ON THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES AND THAT OTHERS WILL BE FREE TO COME FORWARD WITH THEIR IDEAS.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO EMPHASISE THAT SHE HAS NO WISH TO EMBARRASS DE KLERK DURING THE ELECTIONS AND THE PRESS WILL NOT BE GIVEN DETAILS OF THEIR TALKS. BUT IT REMAINS THE CASE THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH BLACK LEADERS WHO HAVE REAL SUPPORT WITHOUT THE RELEASE OF MANDELA. BUTHELEZI CONTINUES TO POINT OUT THAT SO LONG AS MANDELA IS IN JAIL, HE WILL REMAIN A MYTHICAL FIGURE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS NOT AN EASY DECISION FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS WORRIES ABOUT SECURITY. BUT THIS SITUATION HAS DRAGGED ON FAR TOO LONG. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY PRESIDENT BOTHA. IF MANDELA DIES IN PRISON THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE DEVASTATING.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS HELD THE LINE AGAINST SANCTIONS IN MANY INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. AT THE CHOGM IN OCTOBER ALL THE OTHERS WILL BE CLAMOURING FOR FURTHER FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, IE AN END TO BANK LENDING AND EXPORT CREDITS TO SOUTH AFRICA. WE WILL OPPOSE THAT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT INFLECTING FURTHER ECONOMIC DAMAGE CAN HELP THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S PROBLEMS. BUT THE SAG HAS TO FACE THE FACT THAT FURTHER ECONOMIC DAMAGE IS LIKELY TO BE INFLECTED, AT ANY RATE BY OTHERS, IF A WAY IS NOT FOUND TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE.

5. THE NAMIBIA AGREEMENT, WHICH WE HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED, HAS WON SOUTH AFRICA SOME TIME AND SPACE TO MAKE PROGRESS INTERNALLY. IT ALSO HAS TRANSFORMED SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING

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COUNTRIES. WE GAVE SOUTH AFRICA OUR FULL SUPPORT IN THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE SWAPO INCURSIONS. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THEY SHOULD SEE THE SETTLEMENT THROUGH. THIS MUST BE MATCHED BY INTERNAL PROGRESS. PRESIDENT BUSH IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES THAT ARE LIKELY TO DEVELOP NEXT YEAR. ALL THIS CAN BE AVOIDED IF DE KLERK IS INDEED DETERMINED TO MAKE PROGRESS. BUT THE KEY REMAINS THE RELEASE OF MANDELA. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT, IN ITS EARLY PRONOUNCEMENTS, SHOULD NOT PAINT ITSELF INTO THE SAME CORNER AS PRESIDENT BOTHA. DIFFICULT DECISIONS HAVE TO BE TAKEN EARLY IN THE LIFE OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT: OTHERWISE IT WILL BECOME MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO TAKE THEM LATER. WE HOPE THAT MANDELA'S RELEASE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY THAT OF HIS NUMBER TWO, WALTER SISULU (NOW 76 YEARS OLD) AND OF THE TRADE UNION LEADER, OSCAR MPETHA, WHO IS STILL IN JAIL EVEN THOUGH HE IS NOW NEARLY 80. (IT IS IMPORTANT TO MENTION SISULU, AS DE KLERK SHOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE THAT DECISION BEFORE CHOGM WHETHER OR NOT HE IS ABLE BY THEN TO MOVE TOWARDS RELEASING MANDELA).

6. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO EMPHASISE THAT SHE BELIEVES THAT DE KLERK HAS A REAL CHANCE TO LEAD SOUTH AFRICA OUT OF ITS PRESENT ISOLATION. THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE NEXT YEAR OR SO. IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD, WE SHALL BE SEEKING TO HELP THEM - AND TO DAMP DOWN EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS. BUT THIS OPPORTUNITY, IF NOT TAKEN, WILL NOT OCCUR AGAIN. SOUTH AFRICA, DESPITE OUR OPPOSITION, WILL FIND ITSELF FURTHER ISOLATED. THE FINANCE MINISTER AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE RESERVE BANK KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS IN TERMS OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE GROWTH. SOUTH AFRICA CANNOT AT PRESENT ATTRACT NEW CAPITAL. THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THE COUNTRY ATTRACTING NEW LENDING UNLESS THERE IS MUCH FASTER PROGRESS WITH REFORM.

7. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO ASK DE KLERK ABOUT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PLANS. DOES HE ENVISAGE A PARLIAMENT WITH REAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY IN WHICH BLACK REPRESENTATIVES CAN PARTICIPATE? SERIOUS MODERATE LEADERS LIKE BUTHELEZI AND MABUZA WILL REGARD THAT AS THE SINE QUA NON.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER MAY WISH TO ASK WHAT DE KLERK ENVISAGES VIS A VIS THE ANC AND THE EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION. IF THEY ARE TO BE BROUGHT INTO NEGOTIATIONS, OF COURSE THEY MUST STOP VIOLENCE. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AN OFFER SHOULD BE MADE TO THEM TO PARTICIPATE TO PUT SERIOUS PRESSURE ON THEM TO DO JUST THAT. WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE THEMSELVES DIVIDED ON THIS AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO CHALLENGE THEM. BUT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO GIVE UP VIOLENCE IF THEY ARE STILL GOING TO BE BANNED OR DOUBT WHETHER REAL POLITICAL CHANGE IS GOING TO BE ON THE AGENDA. WE ARE NOT SAYING TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THEY MUST BRING IN THE ANC. BUT WE ARE SAYING THAT THE ONUS SHOULD BE PLACED SQUARELY ON THE ANC WHETHER TO PARTICIPATE OR NOT. WE DO NOT FAVOUR A NEW EMINENT PERSONS GROUP (WHICH WOULD BE REJECTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS). BUT WE DO WANT THE OFFER TO BE MADE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE CONTEXT OF A CESSATION OF VIOLENCE.

9. DE KLERK MAY SAY, AS HE HAS SAID TO ME, THAT HE BELIEVES THAT BEFORE PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A NEW CONSTITUTION, THEY SHOULD BE ELECTED. THIS WOULD DISQUALIFY ALL BLACK REPRESENTATIVES EXCEPT THE HOMELAND LEADERS AND THE BLACK MUNICIPAL COUNCILLORS WHO WERE ELECTED ON A LOW FRANCHISE AND HAVE LITTLE SUPPORT. IF THE ANC AND UDF (THEIR INTERNAL 'POLITICAL' WING) ARE LEFT IN THE POSITION OF BEING ABLE TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE NO

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CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE, THE VIOLENCE WILL CONTINUE AND SO WILL THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IN NORTHERN IRELAND FIRM ACTION IS TAKEN AGAINST THE MILITARY WING OF THE IRA BUT SINN FEIN ARE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS.

12. I HOPE THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO WILL RAISE THE STATE OF EMERGENCY, WHICH HAS JUST BEEN RENEWED. WE ARE GLAD THAT, OVER THE LAST THREE MONTHS, SEVERAL HUNDRED DÉTAINÉES HAVE BEEN RELEASED. BUT IT CANNOT BE IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERESTS TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY WITH A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL. WE HOPE THAT, AFTER THE ELECTIONS, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RELEASE THE REMAINING DÉTAINÉES AND TO LIFT THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS. DE KLERK HAS BEEN SHOWING INTEREST IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSIONS PROPOSAL THAT SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD CONSIDER ADOPTING A BILL OF RIGHTS. THAT WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

// ON THE GROUP AREAS ACT, DE KLERK WILL EXPLAIN THAT HE CANNOT REPEAL IT IMMEDIATELY. IF HE DID, HE WOULD LOSE A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS TO THE RIGHT-WING CONSERVATIVE PARTY WHO, ANYWAY, ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY THEIR STRENGTH IN PARLIAMENT. THERE WILL BE FURTHER EROSION OF RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION THROUGH THE CREATION OF THE NEW "FREE SETTLEMENT" AREAS BUT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS REMAIN SEGREGATED. MUCH PETTY APARTHEID HAS BEEN ABOLISHED AND WHILE THERE ARE MUNICIPALITIES IN WHICH TREURNICHT'S PARTY ARE TRYING TO REINSTATE IT, THERE ARE HOPES THAT DE KLERK WILL MOVE AFTER THE ELECTIONS TO ABOLISH THE SEPARATE AMENITIES ACT.

12. DE KLERK HAS A GREAT ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER WILL NOT WANT THIS FIRST MEETING TO BE CONFRONTATIONAL. BUT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR DE KLERK TO BE TOLD AT FIRST HAND HOW SERIOUS THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE IF HE DOES NOT FIND A WAY TO RELEASE MANDELA AND TO GET REAL NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT, PERSONALLY, HE WISHES TO DO SO. BUT IN RELATION TO MANDELA, HE STILL IS INFLUENCED BY THE FEARS OF THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT THAT THEY MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION IF HE WERE RELEASED. WHAT THEY FAIL TO UNDERSTAND ARE THE CERTAIN DANGERS FOR SOUTH AFRICA IF THAT DECISION IS DUCKED YET AGAIN. MANDELA WILL NOT AGREE TO ABIDE BY ANY RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON HIM AFTER HIS RELEASE OR TO GIVE UNDERTAKINGS THAT HE WILL OPERATE WITHIN THE EXISTING LAWS. THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF GOVERNMENT CONTACT WITH MANDELA RECENTLY AND THEY WILL KNOW BETTER THAN WE DO WHAT HE MIGHT AGREE TO. BUT HELEN SUZMAN, WHO HAS SEEN HIM, TELLS ME THAT SHE IS CONVINCED THAT MANDELA WOULD BE PERSUADED TO MAKE APPEALS FOR CALM AND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF ANY VIOLENCE IF HE WERE RELEASED.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

14. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER SUBJECTS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH MIGHT PERHAPS BE DEALT WITH IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

PLEASE SEE M I F T.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO NO. 10.

RENWICK

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LIMITED.

HD/SAFD

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HD/NEWS D

PS

PS/Mrs Chalker

PS/PUS

Mr Fairweather.

ADDITIONAL:

PS/No 10 Downing Street.

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EXTRACTS FROM PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY F W DE KLERK, LEADER
OF THE NATIONAL PARTY

Speech, 1 March, at Nigel, Transvaal

"South Africa finds itself in a transition phase....
our country is inexorably on its way towards a new
dispensation."

"I wish to say to all leaders who aspire to peaceful
solutions: the time for the great Indaba has dawned.
We must have in-depth discussions on how we can
reconcile the aspirations and expectations of your
followers and mine."

"To the white electorate I wish to give the assurance
that the NP, in its search for an understanding which
will offer full political participation to all South
Africans, will jealously guard your safety and
interests with those of other minority groups. The
National Party will never desert you."

"White security cannot be found in the unattainable, liberal, non-racial utopia projected by the PFP.... South Africa will have to accommodate its diversity - cultural and racial - in the future planning."

"White security can only be guaranteed if we have an understanding with other population groups which mutually assures non-domination of one by another."

Interview with Financial Times published on 12 June 1989

"We regard groups as building blocks for power sharing and working together."

"We in the NP have committed ourselves to bringing all South Africans into the decision making process at all levels of Government on a basis which will prevent group domination and avoid the typical consequences of majority rule".

Address to Parliament, 12 May 1989

"One-man-one-vote in a unitary state would inevitably lead to majority rule and domination and is totally unacceptable."

"Everyone should participate in decision making on the basis of consensus."

Interview with Christian Science Monitor Television
Broadcast on 30 May 1989

"We will have to bring drastic changes about. In the final analysis the bill must be fairness to all the people of South Africa."

"White domination, we have clearly stated, must come to an end. But that cannot be exchanged for another form of domination within which minorities can no longer feel secure."

"What we need to do is to draw all the people into a joint decision-making process, into economic activity, into a situation where through cooperation between

Whites, Coloureds and Indians and the various black communities we can align ourselves behind common goals."

(On a future constitution) "You will therefore need a final decision making body..... that arbiter must be constituted in such a way that also will not be seen as domination..... it must have the respect of the whole population..... it must truly be an objective body which can be trusted with the values which are dear to all of us."

(On racial groups). "We sincerely believe that, on the basis of non-discrimination, on the basis of equal provision by the State, that will be part of the future as well."

"One should not be ideologically obsessed with race. But the fact that South Africa is a multi-racial country is a reality..... the existence of a white group must be taken into account."

(On segregated schools). "Schools, as far as the white population is concerned, is one of the most sensitive areas and there is an overwhelming consensus that they would like their own schools."

(On residential areas). "We have just passed a law to make it possible for specific residential areas to be open to all, irrespective of race or colour. We call them free-settlement areas, and we will be actively advancing this concept so that an optionality will be brought into the situation."



South African Embassy
Trafalgar Square
LONDON WC2N 5DP

22 June 1989

Charles Powell Esq
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON WC1A 2AL

Dear Charles,

I am writing to confirm the arrangements we made telephonically for Minister de Klerk's discussions with the Prime Minister tomorrow morning at 09H30.

I trust it will still be in order for Mrs de Klerk to accompany Minister de Klerk to Downing Street, to meet the Prime Minister briefly and to leave a letter for Mr Thatcher from Mr Jan Pickard before the commencement of talks between Mrs Thatcher and Mr de Klerk. You very kindly indicated that it might be possible for Mrs de Klerk to have tea at Downing Street before the Minister's Private Secretary takes her to her next appointment. The Minister and Mrs de Klerk will be accompanied by Mr Henning van Wijk, the Private Secretary, and Ambassador Killen will, as discussed, remain for the talks between the Prime Minister and Minister de Klerk.

I am very grateful for the arrangements made for Minister de Klerk's visit. I attach a curriculum vitae in respect of Minister de Klerk.

Yours sincerely,

Justus

Justus de Goede
MINISTER

copy
Backup

F.W. DE KLERK, M.P.

CURRICULUM VITAE

FEDERIK WILLEM DE KLERK was born in Johannesburg on March 18, 1936. His school career was mainly spent in Krugersdorp, where he matriculated at the Hoërskool Monument.

He attended the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education and gained the BA LLB degree (cum laude) in 1958. As a student he was actively involved in student affairs.

Mr De Klerk joined a firm of attorneys in Vereeniging and soon took the lead in numerous community activities. He was offered the Chair of Administrative Law and the Potchefstroom University as from January 1973, which he had to decline when he was elected as Member of Parliament for Vereeniging in November 1972.

His appointment to the Cabinet followed shortly after his forty second birthday in 1978. The portfolios which ensued were, Posts and Telecommunications, Social Welfare and Pensions; Sport and Recreation and Mineral and Energy Affairs and Internal Affairs, with the inclusion of the Civil Service under delegation by the Prime Minister. National Education followed in September 1984.

On July 1, 1985 Mr De Klerk became Chairman of the Ministers' Council in the House of Assembly, while he retained the portfolio of National Education. He also became Leader of the House of Assembly on December 1, 1986.

Mr De Klerk's election as Leader of the National Party on February 2, 1989 followed upon the Transvaal leadership, to which he was elected on March 6, 1982.

The Decoration for Meritorious Service was awarded to Mr De Klerk on July 27, 1981.

Mr and Mrs De Klerk (Marika Willemse) have three children, two sons and a daughter.



22 III

From John Carlisle, MP

cc Mrs. ✓
②



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Ri Annin
Refer to
your meeting
with Mr. de
Klerk tomorrow
CBD

R22/b
mt

21 June 1989

Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London SW1

See Prime Minister

I have been asked by Dr Danie Craven, President of the South African Rugby Board to pass on to you his greetings and best wishes.

Dr Craven is anxious that during your talks with Mr F W de Klerk, Leader of the National Party in South Africa, you should be aware of the work and efforts being made by the Rugby Board to eliminate all forms of discrimination in their sport. Dr Craven and his Manager, Mr Ian Kirkpatrick, and their team have worked tirelessly over the last few years to bring this policy of fully integrated rugby to all races in South Africa, including the remote parts of rural regions. The South Africa Rugby Board has shared considerable sums of money and made substantial grants to these clubs on the basis that where they previously were divided on grounds of ethnic origin, they are now willing to share facilities and become one club eligible to all races.



I myself can confirm that this policy has received enthusiastic support from those involved and where on the odd occasion there has been some local opposition, the South Africa Rugby Board have declined to offer financial and administrative help.

It is, therefore, in the spirit of meeting the challenge that faces South African sport that the Rugby Board have taken the lead in what, of course, has been for many years a traditional and much loved activity. I am sure that Mr de Klerk will confirm that future Government policy will include these efforts and Dr Craven is most anxious that amending legislation - which is still necessary in certain areas - be passed at an early opportunity.

Finally, I can confirm that rugby in South Africa does now fulfil the terms of the Gleneagles Agreement whereby selection is not based on ethnic origin. Hopefully, Her Majesty's Government will take this into account when formulating future policy in their worthy attempt to continue dialogue and contact with those who are bringing South Africa towards an equitable system that is acceptable to the Western world.

Yours Ever
John

The National Archives

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South Africa

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 February 1980

Dear Bill,

Proposed visit by the South African
Minister of Mines, Environmental
Planning and Energy

F. V. Hunt
- 3/3

I enclose a copy of a Note from the South African Ambassador saying that the South African Minister of Mines, Environmental Planning and Energy, the Hon F W de Klerk, will be in London from 22 to 25 April and would like to call on Mr Howell and an FCO Minister.

According to the Embassy, Mr de Klerk would like to discuss energy problems of common interest to our two countries, and, in particular, the oil-from-coal process of which South Africa has considerable experience. Since our policy is to seek to have a more positive relationship with South Africa and to encourage her rehabilitation in the international community, Lord Carrington hopes that Mr Howell will be able to see Mr de Klerk. He will be accompanied by Mrs de Klerk and they will come on from a visit to West Germany.

Lord Carrington recognises that Mr de Klerk may seek some undertaking from us to supply South Africa with North Sea oil, or to exploit his visit by suggesting that Britain and South Africa should cooperate (or even are cooperating) to get round the OAPEC and OAU oil embargoes against South Africa. This could have implications for our relations with Nigeria and other African countries. (We understand that Mr Nott is tentatively thinking of visiting Nigeria in mid-May.) But Lord Carrington thinks the visit could be defended on the grounds that the discussions are of a technical nature and that there is no question of our agreeing to supply North Sea oil. To turn down the visit would appear churlish to the South Africans at a time when we are trying to engage them in a dialogue. Perhaps you would let me know Mr Howell's views so that we can reply to the South African Embassy.

/If Mr Howell

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If Mr Howell sees no difficulty over our agreeing to the visit in principle, Mr Luce, as the FCO Minister responsible for Africa, will also offer to see Mr de Klerk. We shall have to be careful about how we present the visit publicly so as to arouse the minimum of suspicion internationally, and we are seeking the advice of HM Ambassador in Cape Town on this.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries at No 10, Departments of Trade, Industry and Environment, to Sir Robert Armstrong in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Dr Bill Burroughs
PS/The Rt Hon David Howell MP
Secretary of State for Energy
Department of Energy
London

CONFIDENTIAL



UK/7/9/21/2

South African Embassy

The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to advise that the South African Minister of Mines, Environmental Planning and Energy, the Hon. F.W. de Klerk, will be visiting the United Kingdom over the period 22 to 25 April 1980. Minister de Klerk will be accompanied by his wife.

It would be appreciated if arrangements could be made for Minister de Klerk to call on the Secretary of State for Energy as well as a Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office during the period of his visit.

The Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs the assurance of his highest consideration.

LONDON WC2N 5DP

12 February 1980





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