

PREM 19/2561

Possible attendance by Heads of State  
 or Government at U N General  
 Assembly.

UNITED  
NATIONS

April 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>22.4.83</del>							
<del>4.5.83</del>							
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<del>13.9.88</del>							
<del>26.9.88</del>							


PREM 19/2561

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(83) 29 <sup>th</sup> Item 1	06/10/1983

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed 

Date 5. 3. 2016

PREM Records Team

RESTRICTED

135717  
MDHIAN 5367

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK  
TO DESKBY 270830Z FCO  
TELNO 1162  
OF 262220Z SEPTEMBER 88  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDIS GENEVA

*ms*

UNGA 43: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, 26 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VALEDICTORY ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY EMPHASISED RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND DWELT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS (INCLUDING CW). THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE UN, AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE PROGRESS ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN BEGAN HIS VALEDICTORY ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 26 SEPTEMBER (FAXED TO HIGSON, NAD) BY REFERRING TO THE HOPES FOR PEACE IN THE GULF, AFGHANISTAN, SOUTH AFRICA AND CAMBODIA. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST OVER THE WORTH OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN SOCIETY HAD ALSO SHOWN SIGNS OF EASING. THIS CHANGE, WHICH MIGHT GO DOWN AS QUOTE ONE OF THE SIGNAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF OUR HISTORY UNQUOTE HELD OUT THE PROSPECT NOT ONLY OF A NEW ERA IN U S/SOVIET RELATIONS BUT A NEW AGE OF WORLD PEACE. BECAUSE OF THIS THE UN HAD NOW HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO LIVE, BREATHE AND WORK AS NEVER BEFORE. THE UNITED STATES WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ORGANISATION SHOULD NOT GO THE WAY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PROGRESS CONTINUED IN THE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. SOME OF THIS WAS DUE TO THE RELATIONSHIP HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH GORBACHEV AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT. BUT MUCH OF THE MOMENTUM WAS DUE TO AMERICAN DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH THE SDI PROGRAMME, WHICH MIGHT BE MORE RAPID AND LESS COSTLY THAN AT FIRST THOUGHT AND TO WHICH HE REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT. IT WAS DOUBTFUL IF A START TREATY COULD BE ACHIEVED IN A FEW MONTHS, THOUGH SUCCESS A YEAR FROM NOW WAS MORE THAN A POSSIBILITY. BUT THERE WAS NO DEADLINE AND NO AGREEMENT WAS BETTER THAN A BAD AGREEMENT.

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4. ON CW - QUOTE A TERROR WE THOUGHT THE WORLD HAD PUT BEHIND UNQUOTE - THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR THE SIGNATORIES TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL AND OTHER CONCERNED STATES TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER ACTION TO REVERSE THE SERIOUS EROSION OF THE PROTOCOL. HE URGED ALL COUNTRIES TO COOPERATE IN NEGOTIATING A VERIFIABLE AND GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AT THE CD.

5. THE PRESIDENT DREW ATTENTION TO THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR PEACE. WHEN HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WERE NOT PARAMOUNT AT THE UN THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ORGANISATION WAS AT STAKE AND THE PURPOSE OF ITS EXISTENCE IN QUESTION. IN ITS RECENT CONSIDERATION OF CUBA THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION HAD TAKEN A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS ENDING DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CYNICISM. BUT MORE MUST BE DONE AND THE UN MUST BE RELENTLESS AND UNYIELDING IN SEEKING CHANGE. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION SHOULD NOT BE DEBASED WITH FURTHER EPISODES LIKE QUOTE THE ZIONISM IS RACISM UNQUOTE RESOLUTION.

6. TURNING TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE RESOLUTION AND FIRMNESS OF THE ALLIED NATIONS IN KEEPING THE GULF OPEN TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING HAD LAID THE BASIS FOR PEACE. THIS WAS A WAR IN WHICH THERE HAD BEEN NO VICTOR OR VANQUISHED, ONLY VICTIMS. HE URGED BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN IMPLEMENTING SCR 598. ON AFGHANISTAN HE ENCOURAGED THE SOVIET UNION TO COMPLETE ITS TROOP WITHDRAWAL AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE SO THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE COULD DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT FURTHER OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. IN SOUTH AFRICA THE U S LOOKED FORWARD TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS - PRIMARILY CUBAN - FROM ANGOLA AND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435. IT ALSO BELIEVED THERE COULD BE NO END TO THE CONFLICT IN THE REGION WITHOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA. THERE WERE NEW HOPES FOR CAMBODIA AND HE LOOKED TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT.

7. THE CONTINUING DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA, WAS THE ONE EXCEPTION TO PROGRESS IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE CONGRESS TO STAND BEHIND THOSE WHO RESISTED THE ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A TOTALITARIAN REGIME IN NICARAGUA. HE CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW IN CENTRAL AMERICA THE SAME CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM IT HAD SHOWN IN OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS BY HALTING THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO THE SANDINISTA REGIME.

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8. IN MOST OF THESE AREAS, THE PRESIDENT SAID, HE SAW THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INCREASING ROLE FOR MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE UN. THE ORGANISATION MUST CONTINUE TO INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH BUDGET AND PROGRAMME REFORM. SWEEPING MEASURES HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN AND HAD ALLOWED HIM TO RELEASE FUNDS WITHHELD BY CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS. HE EXPECTED THE REFORM PROGRAMME TO CONTINUE AND FURTHER FUNDS TO BE RELEASED IN THE NEW FISCAL YEAR.

9. AFTER CONGRATULATING THE UN ON THE WORK IT HAD DONE ON TERRORISM, AIDS AND DRUGS, THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED HIS SPEECH WITH A PASSAGE ON THE NEED FOR A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE. THERE WERE SIGNS THAT AMERICA WAS REDISCOVERING OLD AND TESTED VALUES SUCH AS THE FAMILY. ONLY BY RECOGNISING THE NEED FOR DEVOTION TO QUOTE AN IDEAL GREATER AND HIGHER THAN WE ARE OURSELVES UNQUOTE COULD THE ORGANISATION HOPE TO SUCCEED.

COMMENT

10. ONCE AGAIN THIS WAS A VERY AMERICAN SPEECH ON WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD PUT HIS PERSONAL STAMP. BUT IN CONTRAST TO HIS PREVIOUS ADDRESSES THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REFERENCES TO SOVIET POLICIES AND IDEOLOGY WERE MOSTLY CONCILIATORY.

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 139/88



File Jo  
SUBJECT  
cc MASTER  
OPS  
cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 September 1988

Dear Ron

Thank you for your invitation to a meeting of NATO Allies, Japan, Australia and South Korea to discuss common security on 27 September in the margins of the UN General Assembly and your kind offer of lunch thereafter. Unfortunately I shall be unable to attend this meeting myself, but Geoffrey Howe will be in New York and will represent me.

Yours ever

The President of the United States of America



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September 1988

*Dear Charles*

Meeting of Western Leaders in the margins of the UN  
General Assembly: Message to the Prime Minister from  
President Reagan

Thank you for your letters of 1 and 2 September about President Reagan's invitation to the Prime Minister to attend a meeting of Western leaders in the margins of the forthcoming UN General Assembly.

The Foreign Secretary will be happy to attend on the Prime Minister's behalf. I attach a draft reply which I assume you will send directly.

*Yours ever*

*R N Peirce*

(R N Peirce)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/No 10 Downing Street



UN: Attendance of Gen Assembly

Apr 87



DS 1 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:  
PRIME MINISTER  
DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:  
President Reagan

80

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

Thank you for your invitation to a meeting of NATO Allies, Japan, Australia and South Korea to discuss common security on 27 September in the margins of the UN General Assembly and your kind offer of lunch thereafter. Unfortunately I <sup>shall</sup> be unable to attend this meeting myself but Geoffrey Howe will be in New York and will represent me.

Ch

Enclosures flag(s) .....



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file DTS

bc = PC

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

2 September 1988

I wrote to you yesterday about President Reagan's invitation to Western leaders to attend a meeting with him and Secretary Shultz in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27 September. I can now confirm that the Prime Minister will not be able to take up this invitation and would be grateful if the Foreign Secretary could attend the meeting.

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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DTS

PRIME MINISTER

I attach a message from President Reagan suggesting that leaders from the NATO countries, Japan, Australia and Korea attending the United Nations General Assembly should meet him and Secretary Shultz for a discussion and lunch on 27 September.

A similar invitation was issued last year. The meeting was attended almost entirely by Foreign Ministers attending the United Nations General Assembly and I imagine that the same will be true this time.

I assume that you will not want to go but be represented by Sir Geoffrey Howe.

Agree?

Yes not  
CDP

C. D. POWELL

1 September 1988

DASAOW

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file JSAOV

bc: pc



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

1 September 1988

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan proposing that he and Secretary Shultz meet with other NATO leaders attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27 September. I will consult the Prime Minister but imagine that she will not be able to go and that, as last year, the Foreign Secretary will attend in her place. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

C. D. POWELL

Stephen Wall, Esq.  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CPC



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

August 31, 1988

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Reagan.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Raymond Seitz". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping tail on the letter "z".


R. G. H. Seitz  
Charge d'Affaires  
ad interim

Enclosure:

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.

# **A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>2561</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details:  <i>Message from Reagan to Prime Minister (T.133/88) dated 31 August 1988</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
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*Instructions for completion of Dummy Card*

Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

Enter extract details if it is an extract rather than a whole piece.  
This should be an indication of what the extract is,  
eg. Folio 28, Indictment 840079, E107, Letter dated 22/11/1995.  
Do not enter details of why the extract is sensitive.

If closed under the FOI Act, enter the FOI exemption numbers applying to the closure, eg. 27(1), 40(2).

Sign and date next to the reason why the record is not available to the public ie. Closed under FOI exemption; Retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958; Temporarily retained; Missing at transfer or Number not used.

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cc AP

HU  
DSG

CC MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 October 1983

Prime Minister's visit to New York

I enclose the record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the UN Secretary General in New York on Friday 30 September.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE  
UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK AT 1145 HOURS ON FRIDAY,  
30 SEPTEMBER 1983

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Present:

Prime Minister	Mr. Perez de Cuellar
Sir Antony Acland	Mr. Urquhart
Sir John Thomson	Mr. Dayal
Mr. Coles	Mr. Stopford

\* \* \* \* \*

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he thought the Summit which had just taken place as a result of Indian initiative in New York had been reasonably useful. There had been a frank exchange of views and the participants had been wise enough not to try to produce a communique. The third world representatives had stressed that they were not opposed to the existing international institutions but wanted to adapt them to new realities.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of the Lebanon. Experience in Cyprus showed that once an international force became involved in an area it was difficult to extract it. The multinational force in the Lebanon should not stay there indefinitely. If it did so Lebanon would not sort out its problems. We were very pleased that a ceasefire had been agreed and hoped that it would hold. The British contingent was now guarding the venue of talks between the various Lebanese parties.

It was essential that observers under the authority of the United Nations should enter the Lebanon to supervise the ceasefire. How could we influence Syria to that end? Was it possible to use UNTSO which had a good reputation? Was UNIFIL another possibility? She had earlier in the day asked Mrs. Gandhi to try to use her influence with Syria constructively but Mrs. Gandhi had not felt her intervention would be useful.

/ What was

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What was the best procedure for getting agreement on U.N. observers?

Mr. Urquhart said that the U.N. Secretary-General could put a written proposal to the President of the Security Council who could then circulate it to the Council's members. But the problem was that the concurrence of the latter would be required.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he had just seen the President of the Security Council who was ready to initiate consultations that afternoon. The Soviet Permanent Representative was not opposed to consultations but his position on the substance was a different matter.

On 29 September he (the Secretary-General) had had a fruitless meeting with the Syrian Foreign Minister. Khaddam had argued that the Lebanese conflict was an internal affair and that any U.N. involvement was unacceptable. In reply he had pointed out that it was difficult to describe the conflict as internal when so many external parties were directly involved.

The use of UNIFIL to supply observers would require a new Security Council resolution. It was worth remembering that the U.N. already had 50 observers in Beirut.

The Prime Minister said that if Syria refused to accept an adequate means of supervising the ceasefire the implication was that it did not want the ceasefire to continue. Mr. Urquhart said that that was the heart of the matter. In 1958 a large U.N. observer group had been instituted and that had given the U.S. troops then in the Lebanon a basis for withdrawal. The Prime Minister observed that the Syrian preference was doubtless that the MNF should depart and that no-one should replace it.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that the Syrians might be compelled to change their position on observers. Several neutral countries such as Sweden, Finland and Yugoslavia had made it plain that they could not send observers unless under a U.N. umbrella -

/ and indeed

and indeed that it would be constitutionally impossible for them to do so. He was concerned about the attitude of Greece and was in touch with the Algerians who had influence with Syria.

The Prime Minister said that we should expose the Syrian attitude. It would be difficult for them if they were seen to be isolated.

Sir Antony Acland asked whether a draft Security Council resolution establishing an observer force would obtain the necessary votes for adoption. Mr. Urquhart said that at present the Soviet Union would veto it. The Prime Minister said that that would be an interesting position in the light of Andropov's recent statement on foreign policy. Sir John Thomson said that he believed that the Soviet position might be more open. His talks with the Soviet Ambassador suggested that the latter would be very reluctant to use his veto. He had used words to the effect that even if the Soviet Union abstained we should still have difficulty with the Syrians who might not observe the terms of the resolution. Nevertheless, Syria might press the Soviet Union to use its veto. Mr. Urquhart said that he found this indication of possible Soviet flexibility most interesting.

Sir Antony Acland said that the tradition was that the U.N. did not send troops to a country which did not want them. But in this case it was Syria which was resisting the despatch of observers to another country which wanted them. Agreeing, the Prime Minister said that Lebanon's rights as an independent member of the United Nations were being infringed.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he had encouraged the President of the Security Council to continue his consultations. So had Jordan which was keen that a solution to the problem of observers should be found before it became President of the Council.

The Prime Minister remarked that President Mitterrand had apparently told the UNGA that the Multinational Force should remain in the Lebanon until all foreign forces had withdrawn. That was an appalling prospect.

/ Mr. Perez de Cuellar

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that the Syrians had their own aims in the Lebanon which were independent of those of the Soviet Union. It was possible that at the moment they were just buying time. Their idea of establishing neutral observers would be very difficult to implement. Governments would not want to send observers if they were under local control.

Mr. Urquhart observed that in these circumstances their lives would be in danger. Proper authority and organisation were necessary. The U.N. had plenty of resources on which to draw - UNIFIL, UNTSO, the force in the Golan - but the question was whether a decision could be obtained from the Security Council.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that some of the Communist countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia might be willing to supply observers. The Polish contingent on the Golan had been very effective. Mr. Urquhart said that the basic problem was Syria's attitude to Lebanon which it did not regard as a state. The Prime Minister said that the U.N. had a duty to uphold Lebanon's rights. Mr. Urquhart agreed that it was very important to assert this.

Turning to Cyprus, the Prime Minister said that the reputation of the Secretary-General in Cyprus stood high. Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that this was unfortunately true! The Prime Minister expressed the belief that the only possibility of progress rested in his personal involvement.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that later in the morning he would receive the President of Cyprus who would give his reactions to the ideas presented in August. Kyprianou would accept the procedure proposed by the Secretary-General but, rather than accepting the indicators proposed on the three questions of substance, would make comments on them. Kyprianou wished to appear constructive but was not as forthcoming as he had hoped. The aim had been to get agreement on the indicators so that they could form the basis for further discussion in the inter-communal talks. But Kyprianou's response would not represent much progress. There might also be difficulties from the Turkish

/ Cypriot

Cypriot side. The only ally was the Turkish Foreign Minister who was a personal friend and very sensible.

Nevertheless, the mere presentation of the new ideas had shaken things up. Even if the comments on them by the parties were not helpful he would continue his personal efforts.

Turkey did not favour partition but Denktash did because it was the only way he could survive politically. It was very important to avoid a unilateral declaration of independence. The Cyprus Communist Party was against partition and was also a good influence on Kyprianou.

The Prime Minister raised the question of Afghanistan. Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he was not over-optimistic about progress though there was a good deal of activity. He had seen the Pakistan Foreign Minister and on Monday would meet the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. He would then press for Afghan agreement to a timetable for action. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan were pleased with the U.N. exercise. So long as they wished it to continue he could not abandon his efforts.

He had earlier in the day seen the Foreign Minister of Iran who wished to be kept informed. He claimed that Iran now had 2 million Afghan refugees though the correct figure was probably nearer 1 million.

Efforts were now being made to include the refugees in the negotiating process. But it was not possible for him to meet the "rebels" because the credentials of the Afghan delegation had been accepted by the UNGA.

Turning to the Falklands, the Prime Minister said that the Secretary-General would understand that there could be no question of negotiations. We had tried very hard to arrange through the Swiss for a visit to the islands by Argentine next-of-kin, but had received no response. British banks were involved in the financial consortium which was helping Argentina.

/ Mr. Perez de Cuellar

Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he had discussed this matter at length with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Argentina was insisting that Britain had turned the Falklands into a military base. Brazil had also made some reference to this. The Prime Minister commented that before the Argentine invasion we had had but a handful of soldiers on the islands. Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he would have to present a report but it would be an anodyne one.

The Prime Minister referred to the Secretary-General's visit to Southern Africa. Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that it had produced some results but these were now relatively meaningless since they had been made dependent on a solution to the problem of Cuban troops in Angola. This was an additional requirement, not laid down in Resolution 435. He could not accept a new stipulation for this would open the doors to more, for example from South Africa. If it were not for preconditions the implementation of Resolution 435 could begin tomorrow.

The Prime Minister said that she had been more optimistic about Namibia two years ago than she was now.

The discussion ended at 1225 hours.

A.J.C.

3 October 1983



CONFIDENTIAL



ls  
cc: PP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 October, 1983.

Meeting with Mrs. Gandhi

The Prime Minister called on Mrs. Gandhi in New York at 1030 a.m. on Friday, 30 September. Mrs. Thatcher was unavoidably delayed by traffic congestion due to heavy rains and flooding in New York. The conversation, for which an hour had been set aside, lasted in the event for only 35 minutes. It was tete-a-tete. The Prime Minister gave me the following account of it afterwards.

There was no suggestion that Mrs. Gandhi was upset, as the Indian press suggested earlier, that the Prime Minister had not been able to attend the Indian summit meeting. Mrs. Gandhi put a brave face on the outcome of the latter and claimed that it had been constructive.

The two Prime Ministers discussed CHOGM briefly. The Prime Minister warned against a Commonwealth initiative on Cyprus. She did not warn similarly about an initiative on disarmament since she judged that this would not be tactful so soon after Mrs. Gandhi's remarks to the UNGA on this question.

Mrs. Gandhi was preoccupied with and worried about the problem of securing finance for Indian development. She thanked the Prime Minister for the help we had given in connection with IDA.

Mrs. Gandhi said that it was still not clear whether Andropov would take up his invitation to visit India. She expressed some doubt as to whether he would be physically capable of doing so.

On the Lebanon the Prime Minister enquired whether India could use its influence helpfully with Syria and the Soviet Union, but Mrs. Gandhi said that she doubted whether she could intervene effectively with either.

There was some discussion about Indian internal affairs. Mrs. Gandhi appeared to be concerned about tension in the Punjab where she had held three large political meetings. She made no reference to the activities of Sikhs in the United Kingdom.

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The Prime Minister asked whether we could do anything to help while the wife of Ranjiv Gandhi is in London for medical treatment. Mrs. Gandhi was grateful for the offer.

It was clear that Mrs. Gandhi wished her visit to London on her return from New York to Delhi to be regarded as entirely private.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM NEW DELHI 280810Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 656 OF 28 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY), UKMIS  
NEW YORK.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MRS GANDHI : INDIAN PRESS COVERAGE

1. THE TONE OF INDIAN PRESS COMMENT HAS BEEN SOUR.
2. ON 26 SEPTEMBER THE INDIAN EXPRESS QUOTED THE SUNDAY OBSERVER AS SAYING THAT MRS GANDHI WAS BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED BY MRS THATCHER'S (AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "SNUB" IN TURNING DOWN HER INVITATION TO THE MINI-SUMMIT.
3. THE MAJOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILIES TODAY (28 SEPTEMBER) CARRY AN INDIAN AGENCY REPORT FROM LONDON AGAIN HIGHLIGHTING THE FACT THAT MRS THATCHER HAS NO PLANS TO ATTEND THE INFORMAL UN SUMMIT CALLED BY MRS GANDHI IN HER CAPACITY AS NAM CHAIRPERSON. A "GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN" IN LONDON IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE TWO LEADERS WOULD MEET ON 30 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS BILATERAL ISSUES AND DENYING THAT ANY SNUB WAS INTENDED.

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V.C.

MEETING WITH MRS GANDHI: AIRCRAFT SALES

The 80-100 BAE 146 is the chief contender as a replacement aircraft for Indian Airlines (IA) ageing turbo prop fleet. However, IA have yet to make a recommendation to the Indian Government on their procurement needs. IA is a valued BAE customer and the U.K. and India have a long history of association in aerospace matters. The 146 programme is of great industrial importance. Aid funding could be considered if the Indians request it and give the purchase essential priority.

British Embassy


28 September 1983

CODE

18-78

Mr Coles ✓ *M 3/10*  
*U.A.*

British Aerospace has been anxious to use the opportunity of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mrs Gandhi to promote the sale of British Aerospace 146 aircraft to Indian Airlines. However, it has been agreed that this is not the appropriate moment (FCO Tel No. 1599). You may, however, care to have the attached background note.



R P Maynard  
Counsellor Civil Aviation and Shipping  
British Embassy  
Washington D.C.

28 September 1983

c.c. Minister  
Minister (Commercial)  
Mr Sheinwald  
Mr Allan

UN  
file  
VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TO NEW YORK

I attach the programme for the Prime Minister's visit to New York Friday, 30 September. The times and venues have been agreed with all concerned and are known to and approved by the Secret Service detail and the Prime Minister's own detective, Superintendent Edgar.

2. Two slightly loose ends remain - they are -

- 1) as we do not know Mr Thatcher's programme we will lose contact with him once he leaves the motorcade (Events 8 in the programme). Given that the timing of the programme is immensely tight I have separately briefed his driver, Mr McElwain, to ensure Mr Thatcher either rejoins the motorcade at the UN for its return to JFK or goes direct to JFK in sufficient time before the VC10 is scheduled to leave;
- 2) I do not know or have details of Mr Ingham's plans. He too will have to watch the time of return to JFK. However as he is accompanied by Mr Lyne hopefully this will not be a problem.

*M.W. Marshall*

M.W. Marshall  
28 September 1983

Distribution:

Ambassador  
Mr Margetson  
Hon. Gore-Booth  
Mr Lyne  
Miss Hopkins  
Mr Chapman  
Mr Tambone  
Mr McElwain  
2 advance copies to  
Prime Minister's party

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TO NEW YORKFRIDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER

<u>Event</u>	<u>Time</u>	
1	0730	Two office station wagons leave for JFK with JAO representatives (Mr M.W. Marshall, Miss J. Hopkins and Mr T. Chapman)
2	0800	Ambassador (accompanied by Mr Lyne) leaves for JFK (BA Terminal)
3	0855	Ambassador arrives JFK Met by Mr M.W. Marshall - escorted to VIP Lounge or tarmac
4	0855	Rolls procedes to tarmac to join motorcade
5	0900	Ambassador escorted to tarmac to meet VC 10
6	0905	VC 10 on ramp
7	0905/0910	Motorcade (details on attached sheet) leaves JFK Motorcade route Van Wyck/Triboro Bridge/FDR Drive/49th Street East
8	0930/40	Mr Thatcher's car leaves motorcade on FDR Drive for business appointment
9	0950/55	Motorcade arrives Helmsley Palace Hotel Prime Minister and Ambassador Sir Anthony Acland Mr A.J. Coles 1 detective Secret Service detail

The armoured limousine only enters Helmsley Palace Basement off 50th Street for access to lift to 53<sup>rd</sup> floor for the Prime Minister's party. The Indians plan to have an officer from their Mission standing by the lift to escort the party up to Mrs Gandhi's suite but the Administration Counsellor from UK will liaise/escort as necessary if the Indian escort fails to appear

<u>Event</u>	<u>Time</u>	
10	0950/55	The Ambassador changes from the armoured limousine to the Rolls and proceeds to 845 Third Avenue
11	1045	Ambassador leaves 845 Third Avenue for Helmsley Palace (Rolls)
12	1055	Prime Minister and party leaves Helmsley Palace (rejoined by Ambassador) in armoured limousine
13	1100	Motorcade leaves for United Nations
		<u>Armoured limousine</u>
		Prime Minister
		Ambassador
		Sir Anthony Acland
		Mr A.J. Coles
		One detective
		Secret Service detail
		<u>Rolls</u>
		One detective
14	1110	Motorcade arrives U N. Delegates Entrance
		Prime Minister and party met by Hon. David Gore-Booth, Head of Chancery, UKMIS, and escorted to Room GA 200
15	1120 <i>Approx</i>	Prime Minister's party (accompanied by Ambassador) call on Secretary-General
16	1145	Mr Thatcher arrives at U.N. Delegates Entrance #
17	1145	Mr Ingham arrives at U.N. Delegates Entrance #
18	1200	Party leaves Secretary-General and goes either to UN Plaza Hotel or direct to JFK Airport
		(NB The Manager's Suite in the nearby UN Plaza Hotel is available for the Prime Minister should she wish a brief respite before returning to airport - Suite 3008 - Office (if wanted) 3004)



<u>Event</u>	<u>Time</u>	
19	1200/15	Motorcade leaves for JFK  <u>Armoured limousine</u> Prime Minister Ambassador Sir Anthony Acland Mr A.J. Coles One detective Secret Service detail  <u>Rolls</u> Mr D. Thatcher Administration Counsellor One Detective  One station wagon (spare)¶
20	1215/30	JFK party reboards VC 10 (i.e. all those who remained at JFK whilst the Prime Minister and party came into Manhattan)
21	1245	Motorcade on ramp JFK Prime Minister and party board aircraft and depart
22	1300	Ambassador returns to New York (Rolls)
23	1300	JAO and other UK Mission staff return to New York (station wagon)

NB ¶ Separate transport is available for Mr Ingham at all times

# Although Mr Thatcher will "peel off" from the motorcade on the FDR Drive (Event 8) he must rejoin the motorcade at the UN Secretariat at 11.45 (at the latest) to enable him to return with the rapid escort to JFK. Otherwise he could, at the conclusion of his business, proceed direct to JFK arriving not later than 1230 (i.e. 11.30 Manhattan departure).

¶ Similarly if Mr Ingham's business takes him elsewhere he must either rejoin the motorcade at 11.45 (see Event 17) or go direct to JFK to be there by 12.30 (i.e. 11.30 Manhattan departure).

Event  
(see main  
programme)

Motorcade

- Four motor cycle outriders  
 One New York police Department car marked  
 (white top)  
 One New York Police Department car  
 (unmarked)  
 One spare limousine
- 7(a) One armoured limousine carrying  
 Prime Minister )  
 Ambassador )  
 Sir Anthony Acland ) Passengers  
 Mr A.J. Coles )  
 One detective )  
 One Secret Service Agent with driver
- (b) One Rolls Royce carrying Administration  
 Counsellor and one detective
- (c) One BGO station wagon carrying Mr D. Thatcher
- (d) One BGO station wagon carrying Mr Ingham  
 and Mr Lyne  
 One BGO station wagon - spare §  
 One station wagon carrying Federal Agents  
 One station wagon carrying Secret Service  
 Agents

Total

4 motor cycles  
 10 motor vehicles

With the exception of the Rolls (see event 2), BGO cars must  
 assemble at the PA Building at JFK at 0800 hours. The  
 motorcade will arrive at the British Airways Ramp at 08.30 hours

§ retains at JFK if not needed.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT - NEW YORK - 30 SEPTEMBER 1983Who is doing what

1. Hon. David Gore-Booth will meet party on arrival at UN (Event 14) and escort to Room GA 200. Will stand by to escort party back to motorcade (Delegates Entrance).
2. Mr Rod Lyne will travel to JFK before VC10 arrives (either with the Ambassador or in one of the office station wagons - see events 1 and 2 - and will return in motorcade accompanying Mr Ingham. If Mr Lyne stays with Mr Ingham throughout the visit could he please ensure he returns to or is present at the UN by 11.45 to rejoin motorcade for return to JFK (Events 17 and 18).
3. Mr Michael Marshall
  - 1) will escort the Ambassador through JFK (event 3)
  - 2) will accompany motorcade to offer liaison at Helmsley Palace on arrival and departure (events 6 and 7)
  - 3) will liaise at JFK on departure.
4. Miss Joan Hopkins
  - 1) will remain at JFK with VC10 and party;
  - 2) will assist in getting Prime Minister's party into correct cars a.s.a.p. at JFK.
  - 3) will encourage re-boarding of VC 10 by JFK party (Event 20)
  - 4) will liaise with motorcade re boarding VC10 on return to JFK (Event 21)
5. Mr Tom Chapman
  - 1) will arrange with British Airways for the Rolls to proceed to the tarmac to join the waiting motorcade after the Ambassador has arrived at JFK (Event 4).
  - 2) will liaise with British Airways and the VC10 to ensure that there are no departure snags;
  - 3) will assist Miss Hopkins as necessary throughout the wait at JFK.

/cont.....

6. Mr John McElwain (driver station wagon 26 DPL 9) is assigned to Mr D. Thatcher and will ensure that Mr Thatcher either rejoins the motorcade at UN Plaza at 11.45 (event 16) or gets to the airport direct at least 30 minutes before take off.
  
7. Mrs Angela Benninck will (subject to agreement) accompany Mr Thatcher to give guidance on return timings to UN Plaza or airport.

## NEW YORK

TELEPHONE NUMBERS

British Airways Executive Suite JFK Airport	(212)	995 2363
British Airways - 24 hours Duty JFK Airport	(212)	995 2330
Helmsley Palace Hotel Mrs Gandhi's Suite	(212)	888 7000 Ext 5207
UN Plaza Hotel Manager - Mr Bruno Brunner	(212)	355 3400 Ext 'Manager's Suite'
UK Mission New York	(212)	752 8400/8586
UK Office in United Nations Building	(212)	754 7604 or 752 8400 Ext 235/236/237
Secretary-General's Office United Nations Building (38th Floor) Direct line	(212)	754 5012
British Embassy, Washington D.C.	(202)	462 1340

SUBJECT cc Master  
ofs

T.

f a.

MESSAGE FROM MRS. GANDHI TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Message begins:

Dear Prime Minister

I look forward to seeing you later this week in New York. In the meanwhile, as I overfly your country, I send greetings and good wishes to you and the British people.

Message ends.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T114 A

26/9

UNFile  
GRS 125

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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FM OTTAWA 261105Z SEPT 83  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 02 OF 26 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON AND FCO

FOLLOWING FROM PS TO PRIME MINISTER.

YOUR TELNO 872: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO NEW YORK

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1. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ACCOMPANIED ON HER CALLS BY THE PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY AND COLES. SHE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ALSO ACCOMPANY HER FOR HER CALL ON THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL.
2. INGHAM WILL TRAVEL TO NEW YORK TO LOOK AFTER THE PRESS. HE WILL NOT ATTEND THE CALLS.
3. TWO DETECTIVES WILL ALSO ACCOMPANY THE PRIME MINISTER.
4. A SEPARATE CAR SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR MR THATCHER WHO WISHES TO PAY A BUSINESS CALL IN NEW YORK (THE BILL SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO NO.10 IN DUE COURSE FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY MR THATCHER).
5. ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY WILL REMAIN AT JFK.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

28<sup>th</sup> Sept 1983

SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr President,

May I begin by joining other speakers in congratulating you on your election to the Presidency of the 38th Session of the General Assembly. You have my best wishes for the difficult task which lies ahead of you. May I also express my thanks to the outgoing President, Mr Imre Hollai, who has so ably fulfilled his role on behalf of the Assembly?

It gives me particular pleasure to pay tribute also to the Secretary-General. We owe a great deal already to his careful authority and leadership. His report to last year's session brought out in a striking way the gravity of the problems facing us in the United Nations. It is now up to us to do something about them. As my distinguished predecessor said last year, the blame for the state of the world does not lie with the United Nations system or with the Charter, but with us, the member states. I endorse that conclusion, wholeheartedly; but I see little evidence that it has sunk in.

AC2AAA



### International Cooperation

This is my first year as a Foreign Minister. But it is a reflection of today's increasingly complex and interdependent world that this year has not by any means been my first taste as a minister of international affairs.

My own particular experience has been in international economic and financial affairs, and I have learned from it one very clear lesson: the problems which face us can only effectively be tackled through close international cooperation - and, of course, with the necessary determination and patience. If that is true - as it is - of economic and social questions, it must be even more so in the political field, where major questions of peace and security are at stake.

Economic and political problems are, of course, often interlinked. Indeed, the former can cause, or exacerbate the latter. That is why Foreign Ministers, even if they were so minded, cannot fail to concern themselves with economic questions. These are, of course, questions which require effective action at the national level, and national determination to solve; but the need for action

on the international plane is no less clear.

So, as a Foreign Minister, I remain very interested in what is happening - and what is not happening - in the world economy. There are signs of recovery, in my country and in others; but complacency and over-confidence would be equally damaging to the prospects of sustained non-inflationary growth: complacency because there will not be much growth if we rest on the laurels of our achievements so far; and over-confidence because growth will not be sustained if we abandon the fight against inflation. The consequences of inflation, of inflated expectations and of over-ambitious and over-promising governments, are still very much with us: in particular, the problems of debt, and the pressures to resort to quick and wrong solutions, like protectionism. It will take patience as well as energy to ensure that they are safely overcome.

On the whole, I am optimistic. Whilst vast problems remain, there have been encouraging signs that many members of the international community recognise that we are all affected by the same economic conditions and are ready to respond to the challenge of joint action. For example, the Interim Committee

of the IMF was able to reach agreement in February to an increase in quotas and a parallel enlargement of the General Arrangements to Borrow - an agreement which would not have been possible if all parties had not been willing to show considerable flexibility. It remains vitally important for countries to take legislative action necessary to implement their increasing quotas so that the IMF can be more effective.

Some of these problems are technical; or perhaps it is just that they are made to sound that way by the economists who propose technical solutions in a language which does not always make for easy understanding. But the underlying reality shines through any amount of jargon: we need to restore the balance and vitality of the world economy in order to provide a rising standard of living and above all to meet the basic human needs of the people of the world for food, shelter and a decent standard of life.

For the last decade, the world has been proving Malthus wrong - but only just: world agricultural production has kept slightly ahead of population increase. But this conceals the fact that in many countries agricultural

production per capita has stagnated or declined. So we must do better.

Population policy must be part of the answer, and much progress has already been made. Agricultural policy is also crucial, and aid has a vital part to play. But food aid is only first aid. The main requirement is for aid to increase production where it is most needed, and it is on this that the international community should concentrate.

Production alone is not enough. We cannot afford not to make the best use of the resources at our disposal; and we cannot therefore afford to relent in the fight against protectionism. Barriers to trade are barriers to economic efficiency and the creation of wealth. We all need to fight more resolutely against them. There must be no new upward twist to the spiral of protection. Instead, I should like to see a vigorous programme of commercial disarmament.

#### | Arms Control and Disarmament

If I have mentioned the world disarmament in an unusual context, it is not because I under-rate its importance in the more normal one. Indeed, nothing

could illustrate more vividly the link between the economic and the political world.

| Without security there can be no lasting prosperity; arms control and disarmament can contribute to both by reducing at the same time the risks of war and the costs of defence.

It would, of course, be madness to turn our backs on such a prospect, or to reduce our efforts to achieve so obviously beneficial a result. But there is no invisible hand which will guarantee in practice what is indisputable in theory: that agreements can be reached which will bring lasting economic and military benefit to both sides.

There have been examples over the last two decades of agreements between East and West of which that is true, and the fact should encourage us to persevere in our efforts. But history shows also that the road is not an easy one: confidence is hard to build up, and all too easy to destroy; secrecy inevitably breeds suspicion; and the stakes are high enough to underline the

need for caution.

But caution should not prevent movement; and - on the Western side at least - it has not. President Reagan has proposed major cuts in strategic missiles, and the elimination of a whole class of intermediate range missiles. These are radical measures by any standards. They have our full support. So do the Western proposals to cut the forces facing each other in Central Europe down to a common ceiling. And we have put forward proposals of our own to bring nearer a ban on chemical weapons.

Our objective in these and other negotiations is simple: we want realistic, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament which will enhance peace and security. Not just for ourselves, but for all participants. We do not seek unilateral advantage. Nor shall we give in to those who seek it at our expense.

That, for the moment, is what the Soviet Union is trying to do by claiming that British and French systems should be included in the INF negotiations. The

two participants in the negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed that their own strategic systems should be excluded. There can be no reason in equity or logic why the strategic systems of non-participants should be included. The Soviet attempt to suggest otherwise should perhaps be dismissed as a smokescreen, designed to hide what I hope is only a temporary unwillingness to negotiate seriously.

But, taken literally, what the Soviet leaders are asking for is either the unilateral strategic disarmament of Britain and France, or a monopoly of intermediate range missiles in Europe at the expense of the United States and its allies.

These demands are unacceptable and will remain so. Not because British weapon systems would be affected - but because what is proposed is unbalanced and inequitable, and would benefit one side at the expense of the other.

When it comes to arms control and disarmament, we in Britain claim no special privileges and no sanctuary. The record makes this clear, and we remain

ready to play a full part in the arms control and disarmament process.

| As far as the British deterrent is concerned, we must naturally take into  
account that our force is a strategic one, and that it represents less than 3%  
| of the strategic nuclear forces available to the United States or to the Soviet  
Union. It would be absurd as things stand for us to seek to trade reductions  
with a super power. But we have never said "never". On the contrary, we have  
made it clear that, if Soviet and US strategic arsenals were to be very  
substantial reduced, and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet  
defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and to  
consider how best she could contribute to arms control in the light of the  
| reduced threat. That remains our position.

Mr President,

| I have spent some time on the subject of arms control and disarmament,  
because it is one which rightly is at the centre of the international stage and  
rightly of concern to the United Nations and its member states. But, as



Mrs Thatcher made clear when she addressed the UN Special Session last June, the causes of war do not lie in the existence of particular weapons, whether nuclear or conventional, or even in particular numbers of weapons. They lie in the disposition of states to ignore international law and to seek to impose change on others by resort to force.

#### The Falklands

We in Britain had direct experience of this last year, when Argentina invaded the Falklands in flagrant violation of one of the most fundamental principles of the UN Charter. That invasion has not faded into history. We, for our part, will continue to uphold those principles of the Charter. We will defend the Islands and their inhabitants against the possibility of renewed attack; we will continue to assert the inalienable right of the people of the Islands to self-determination [a right to which they are no less entitled than other small island peoples] and we will carry forward economic and constitutional development in close consultation with the Islanders.

At the same time, we shall continue to seek a more normal relationship with Argentina and a reduction of tension in the South Atlantic. We have played a constructive part in international efforts to reschedule Argentine debt, and it was very much at our initiative that progress has been achieved in the removal of bilateral financial restrictions and we hope that Argentina will stick to the agreement that has been reached. We would like to do the same in the commercial and economic fields, and have supported the initiative of the European Community to this effect and we have taken other initiatives intended to promote the development of a more normal bilateral relationship.

The return of these efforts, I regret to say, has not been encouraging. The Argentine authorities have shown no regret at their resort to the use of force, no interest in reducing tension and no response to these various initiatives from the British side aimed at restoring a better relationship between our two countries. A radical change of approach is required in Buenos Aires.

AC2AAA

We can take little satisfaction from the fact that so many of the political problems which confronted us last year are no less acute now. The Middle East is a prime example. Violence and the rule of force are the order of the day. There is not much time left for peaceful change. The United Kingdom was greatly disappointed that the proposals put forward by President Reagan last September were not taken up by the parties. They offered a realistic starting point for negotiations aimed at reconciling the right of Israel to live within secure and recognised borders with the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own future.

Only through negotiation will there be a just and lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute. But we are a long way from a negotiation; and we will stay a long way away as long as the parties do not take the first steps to build mutual confidence and trust. On each side there is a long-canvassed step which could transform the picture: for Israel, to halt its policy of building illegal settlements in occupied territory; for the Arabs, including the Palestinians, to show that they are ready to accept Israel's right to live in peace and security.

Efforts to tackle the central issue of the future of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza have been diverted by events in Lebanon. This is a tragedy for Middle East peace. But it is a greater tragedy for the people of Lebanon. Let us be honest about this: Lebanon has internal problems which it would be difficult to solve in conditions of peace. She has no chance of solving them as long as she is at the mercy of foreign forces. That is why we shall continue to support all efforts to restore Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and to secure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country.

The disgraceful Israeli invasion of Lebanon last year has only led to more suffering and made more difficult the essential process of national reunification. Meanwhile, Syrian refusal to withdraw, despite the clear wishes of the Lebanese Government, only prolongs the agony and increases the risk of partition.

Sadly, conflict in the Middle East is not an isolated phenomenon. In the Gulf we shall support all efforts to reconcile Iran and Iraq in their bloody

| war. The work of the UN Mission of Enquiry provides a starting point for a consensus. Meanwhile, members of the international community should avoid any action which could extend or increase the level of conflict in the area.

#### Korea

This is an appropriate place to mention also two other issues in which the United Kingdom remains closely involved: Korea and Cyprus. The best prospect of peaceful reunification in Korea lies in direct talks between the two sides. The Republic of Korea has made clear its positive approach. It is high time that it received a constructive response from Pyongyang.

#### Cyprus

| In Cyprus the UN have been tireless in their efforts to promote a settlement. The Secretary-General has this year increased his own personal involvement. My Government welcome this and stand ready to help in whatever way he feels appropriate. Despite some limited progress in intercommunal talks held under UN auspices, a peaceful and lasting settlement regrettably still seems to be a long way off. I cannot believe that it is in the interests of any of the

parties that the current situation should become frozen - still less that it should deteriorate.

#### Southern Africa

And that conclusion applies overwhelmingly also in Southern Africa. Violence cannot be the solution. Human rights must not be trampled upon or ignored. South Africa will not succeed, in the end, in coercing its neighbours, through the use of military force, into subversion or a change of heart. Nor on the other hand will bomb attacks against innocent people by its internal opponents incline the South African Government to change its course.

The only hope for a peaceful future in Southern Africa lies in political change and the creation of greater trust through regional cooperation and international support. We believe these can be achieved, and achieved peacefully. The independence agreement for Zimbabwe was an important first step. A settlement in Namibia has still to be reached, but I am confident that it can be reached. My country is committed to it and will continue to use its weight and influence to help bring it about.

## Afghanistan

We do not see, or seek to present, all the problems and conflicts in the world in terms of East against West. It would be factually wrong to do so, and wrong also in terms of policy. Problems like those in Southern Africa and the Middle East are quite hard enough to deal with as it is. To introduce an element of East/West rivalry, or to add to it where it already exists, could only make things worse. And it is indeed the case that problems are worse where the hand of a super power can be seen exploiting tension and thwarting international efforts to promote peaceful change. In Afghanistan one such power continues to use military force to suppress a small and non-aligned people. But after nearly four years of brutal military occupation in support of an unpopular and unrepresentative regime, the struggle of the Afghan people for national liberation continues to inspire widespread admiration. Only a complete and prompt Soviet withdrawal can open the way to the return of the Afghan refugees and to the establishment of an independent government in accordance with the true wishes of the people and with the resolutions adopted by this General Assembly.

### Cambodia

The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is another example of a situation in which foreign military force is being used to deny the right to self-determination of a neighbour. But we shall continue our full support for the efforts of the United Nations and the neighbouring ASEAN countries to find a comprehensive political solution based on self-determination.

### Central America

In Central America there is no doubt that many problems stem from social, economic and political injustice. There is equally no doubt that there has been interference from outside by those who seek to exploit these problems for their own ends. Our own position is clear. On the one hand, we support all efforts to correct injustice by peaceful and democratic means. And we welcome efforts such as those of the Contadora Group, to reduce tension and encourage dialogue. On the other hand, we condemn the action of those, whether on the right or the left of the political spectrum, who use force to block the path to peaceful reform. And we condemn in particular the cynical encouragement of revolutionary excesses from the outside.



### East/West Relations

The conduct of the Soviet Union in these regional problems has contributed to the present state of strain in East/West relations. The Soviet military build up, the situation in Poland and disregard for human rights in the East have also played a part. The brutal destruction of the Korean Airlines airliner and the murder of its passengers only a few weeks ago were a reminder of how far Soviet international behaviour can fall short of civilised norms. Britain has made plain to the new Soviet leadership that these are matters of grave and continuing international concern to the entire free world. But, together with our partners, we have also said - and said repeatedly - that we are ready for a more constructive relationship, provided that the Soviet Union is prepared to adopt a new approach. What we are calling for is willingness by the Soviet Union to base their actions and their policies on respect for internationally accepted standards of behaviour. If the Soviet Union is ready to take real steps in this direction, I have no doubt that the international response would be overwhelming.

## Human Rights

I have already had occasion to mention human rights when I spoke of Southern Africa and East/West relations. I could equally have done so in relation to the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere. This year is the 35th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet human rights continue to be widely disregarded in so many parts of the world. It is an appalling comment on the failure of the international community to implement the commitments which we so readily espouse.

Personal freedom and individual rights are the foundation stones of national and international order. If they are absent, both national and international edifices, however imposing and monolithic, are a betrayal of those they serve, and must ultimately crumble away. Where they are encouraged, international cooperation - and thus international security and prosperity - will grow on firm foundations. Let each country look honestly at its own performance in this field and resolve to do better: that, rather than speeches, will produce the improvements the people of the world demand.

### Conclusion

Mr President, I have ranged widely in my speech, and yet left many important subjects untouched. The challenge before us is indeed formidable. But it can be faced successfully if we are prepared to work effectively together. To take a relatively small, but nonetheless instructive example: the world community decided that smallpox should be eradicated. A huge task. But it was achieved through international cooperation. We need to apply the same sense of urgency and common purpose to other issues, no matter how difficult. We need to think more about our neighbours and to cooperate more with them. We need to take more seriously our international obligations, including respect for individual rights and freedoms and the need to settle problems by peaceful means.

Confrontation is easy. Pursuit of national interest appears to be. But neither confrontation nor blind nationalism can provide the conditions of stability essential for peace to break out and the world economy to flourish. That is what our people want. And we owe it to them to make a reality of international cooperation under the Charter.

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AND TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER)

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

**IN**  
**ACTION COPY**

*PS/PM.*

YOUR TELNO 1563: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT: CHURCHILL AWARD SPEECH

1. THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE, IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, PASSED US THE TEXT (IN MIFT) OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE UNGA ON 26 OCTOBER.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAS APPROVED THE PRESENT TEXT, BUT THERE MAY BE FURTHER POLISHING BEFORE DELIVERY. THE ARMS CONTROL INSERT WILL BE ON THE LINES ALREADY COMMUNICATED TO US.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 2765 OF 24 SEPTEMBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER)  
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

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f.c.

HO/NAD  
HO/News Dep  
HO/UND  
HO/Planning Staff  
PS  
PS/PUS  
Mr Giffard  
Mr Ute  
R-c

(18)

M I P T: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT : CHURCHILL AWARD SPEECH.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO UNGA :

QUOTE

MR. SECRETARY GENERAL, MR. PRESIDENT, DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES,  
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE WORLD.

THANK YOU FOR GRANTING ME THE HONOR OF SPEAKING TODAY, ON THIS  
FIRST DAY OF GENERAL DEBATE IN THE 38TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY. ONCE AGAIN I COME BEFORE THIS BODY PREOCCUPIED WITH PEACE.  
LAST YEAR I STOOD IN THIS CHAMBER TO ADDRESS THE SPECIAL SESSION  
ON DISARMAMENT. I HAVE COME TODAY TO RENEW MY NATION'S COMMITMENT  
TO PEACE. I HAVE COME TO DISCUSS HOW WE CAN KEEP FAITH WITH THE  
DREAMS THAT CREATED THIS ORGANISATION.

THE UNITED NATIONS WAS FOUNDED IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II TO  
PROTECT FUTURE GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR, TO PROMOTE  
POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND GLOBAL PROSPERITY, AND TO STRENGTHEN  
THE BONDS OF CIVILITY AMONG NATIONS. THE FOUNDERS SOUGHT TO REPLACE  
A WORLD AT WAR WITH A WORLD OF CIVILIZED ORDER. THEY HOPED THAT A  
A WORLD OF RELENTLESS CONFLICT WOULD GIVE WAY TO A NEW ERA, ONE  
WHERE FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE PREVAILED.

WHATEVER CHALLENGES THE WORLD WAS BOUND TO FACE, THE FOUNDERS  
INTENDED THIS BODY TO STAND FOR CERTAIN VALUES, EVEN IF THEY COULD

NOT BE ENFORCED, AND TO CONDEMN VIOLENCE, EVEN IF IT COULD NOT BE STOPPED. THIS BODY WAS TO SPEAK WITH THE VOICE OF MORAL AUTHORITY. THAT WAS TO BE ITS GREATEST POWER.

BUT THE AWFUL TRUTH IS THAT THE USE OF VIOLENCE FOR POLITICAL GAIN HAS BECOME MORE, NOT LESS, WIDESPREAD IN THE LAST DECADE. EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS HAVE PRESENTED NEW, UNWELCOME EVIDENCE OF BRUTAL DISREGARD FOR LIFE AND TRUTH. THEY HAVE OFFERED UNWANTED TESTIMONY ON HOW DIVIDED AND DANGEROUS OUR WORLD IS, HOW QUICK THE RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE DREAMS OF THE U.N.'S FOUNDERS?

WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE SPIRIT WHICH CREATED THE U.N.?

THE ANSWER IS CLEAR: GOVERNMENTS GOT IN THE WAY OF THE DREAMS OF THE PEOPLE. DREAMS BECAME ISSUES OF EAST VERSUS WEST. HOPES BECAME POLITICAL RHETORIC. PROGRESS BECAME A SEARCH FOR POWER AND DOMINATION. SOMEWHERE THE TRUTH WAS LOST THAT PEOPLE DON'T MAKE WAR, GOVERNMENTS DO.

AND TODAY IN ASIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE NORTH PACIFIC, THE WEAPONS OF WAR SHATTER THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES WHO LIVE THERE, ENDANGER THE PEACE OF NEIGHBORS, AND CREATE EVER MORE ARENAS OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS. DURING THE PAST YEAR ALONE, VIOLENT CONFLICTS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE HILLS AROUND BEIRUT, THE DESERTS OF CHAD AND THE WESTERN SAHARA, IN THE MOUNTAINS OF EL SALVADOR, THE STREETS OF SURINAME, THE CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE OF AFGHANISTAN, THE BORDERS OF KAMPUCHEA, AND THE BATTLEFIELDS OF IRAN AND IRAQ.

WE CANNOT COUNT ON THE INSTINCT FOR SURVIVAL TO PROTECT US AGAINST WAR. DESPITE ALL THE WASTED LIVES AND HOPES THAT WAR PRODUCES, IT HAS REMAINED A REGULAR, IF HORRIBLY COSTLY, MEANS BY WHICH NATIONS HAVE SOUGHT TO SETTLE THEIR DISPUTES OR ADVANCE THEIR GOALS.

AND THE PROGRESS IN WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY HAS FAR OUTSTRIPPED THE PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. IN MODERN TIMES, A NEW, MORE TERRIFYING ELEMENT HAS ENTERED INTO THE CALCULATIONS - NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON AND MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. I BELIEVE THAT IF GOVERNMENTS ARE DETERMINED TO DETER AND PREVENT WAR, THERE WILL NOT BE WAR. NOTHING IS MORE IN KEEPING WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE U.N. CHARTER THAN ARMS CONTROL.

WHEN I SPOKE BEFORE THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, I AFFIRMED THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT, AND MY PERSONAL COMMITMENT, TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH TOWARD THAT END.

TODAY, I REAFFIRM THOSE COMMITMENTS. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLD WIDE AND, WHILE REPLACEMENT OF OLDER WEAPONS IS UNAVOIDABLE, WE WISH TO NEGOTIATE ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT, EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. AND LET ME ADD, WE MUST ENSURE THAT WORLD SECURITY IS NOT UNDERMINED BY THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION MUST NOT BE THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT OF THE WORLD'S ARMS CONTROL AGENDA.

AT THE TIME OF MY LAST VISIT HERE, I EXPRESSED HOPE THAT A WHOLE CLASS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS -- THE LONGER-RANGE INF MISSILE -- COULD BE BANNED FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH. I BELIEVED THAT TO RELIEVE THE DEEP CONCERN OF PEOPLES IN BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA, THE TIME WAS RIPE, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, TO RESOLVE A SECURITY THREAT EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. I STILL BELIEVE THE ELIMINATION OF THESE WEAPONS -- THE ZERO OPTION -- IS THE BEST, FAIREST, MOST PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION DECLINED TO ACCEPT THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS.

WHEN I WAS HERE LAST, I HOPED THAT THE CRITICAL STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS WOULD FOCUS, AND URGENTLY SO, ON THOSE SYSTEMS THAT CARRY THE GREATEST RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR -- THE FAST-FLYING, ACCURATE, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH POSE A FIRST STRIKE POTENTIAL. I ALSO HOPED THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD REDUCE BY ONE-HALF THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC MISSILES ON EACH SIDE AND REDUCE THEIR WARHEADS BY ONE-THIRD. AGAIN, I WAS DISAPPOINTED WHEN THE SOVIETS DECLINED TO CONSIDER SUCH DEEP CUTS, AND REFUSED AS WELL TO CONCENTRATE ON THESE MOST DANGEROUS, DESTABILIZING WEAPONS.

DESPITE THE REBUFFS, THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ABANDONED AND WILL NOT ABANDON THE SEARCH FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. LAST JUNE, I PROPOSED A NEW APPROACH TOWARD THE START NEGOTIATIONS. WE DID NOT ALTER OUR OBJECTIVE OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, BUT WE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE A VARIETY OF WAYS TO ACHIEVE THIS END. DURING THE LAST ROUND OF GENEVA TALKS, WE PRESENTED A DRAFT TREATY WHICH RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF CONCERNS RAISED BY THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BUILD UPON THIS INITIATIVE.

SIMILARLY, IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THESE WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES MADE A NEW OFFER. WE PROPOSED, AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION, SOME EQUAL NUMBER ON BOTH SIDES BETWEEN ZERO AND 572. WE RECOMMENDED THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

ONCE AGAIN, THE SOVIETS REFUSED AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION AND PROPOSED INSTEAD WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED A QUOTE HALF ZERO OPTION UNQUOTE -- ZERO FOR US, AND MANY HUNDREDS OF WARHEADS FOR THEM. THAT IS WHERE THINGS STAND TODAY, BUT I STILL HAVEN'T GIVEN UP HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS ARMS CONTROL INSERT CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS.

I WANT TO MAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL PLEDGE TO THOSE GATHERED TODAY IN THIS WORLD ARENA. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS AND WILL ACCEPT ANY EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT THAT STABILIZES FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS THAN CURRENTLY EXIST. WE'RE READY TO BE FLEXIBLE IN OUR APPROACH, INDEED, WILLING TO COMPROMISE. WE CANNOT, HOWEVER, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, COMPROMISE ON THE NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

REACTIONS TO THE KOREAN AIRLINER TRAGEDY ARE A TIMELY REMINDER OF JUST HOW DIFFERENT THE SOVIETS' CONCEPT OF TRUTH AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS FROM THAT OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. EVIDENCE ABOUNDS THAT WE CANNOT SIMPLY ASSUME THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE FULFILLED. WE NEGOTIATED THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, BUT THE PROMISED FREEDOMS HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED, AND THOSE IN THE SOVIET UNION WHO SOUGHT TO MONITOR THEIR FULFILLMENT LANGUISH IN PRISON. WE NEGOTIATED A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, BUT DEADLY YELLOW RAIN AND OTHER TOXIC AGENTS FALL ON HMONG VILLAGES AND AFGHAN ENCAMPMENTS. WE HAVE NEGOTIATED ARMS AGREEMENTS, BUT THE HIGH LEVEL OF SOVIET ENCODING HIDES THE INFORMATION NEEDED FOR THEIR VERIFICATION. A NEWLY DISCOVERED RADAR FACILITY AND A NEW ICBM RAISE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS ALREADY NEGOTIATED.

PEACE CANNOT BE SERVED BY PSEUDO ARMS CONTROL. WE NEED RELIABLE, RECIPROCAL REDUCTIONS. I CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION TODAY TO REDUCE THE TENSIONS IT HAS HEAPED ON THE WORLD IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, AND TO SHOW A FIRM COMMITMENT TO PEACE BY COMING TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF ITS OBLIGATIONS. I URGE IT TO MATCH OUR FLEXIBILITY. IF THE SOVIETS SIT DOWN AT THE BARGAINING TABLE SEEKING GENUINE ARMS REDUCTIONS, THERE WILL BE ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WEST AND THEIR PEOPLE WILL NOT BE DIVERTED BY MISINFORMATION AND THREATS. THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO SHOW PROOF THAT IT WANTS ARMS CONTROL IN REALITY, NOT JUST IN RHETORIC.

MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MAKE OUR WORLD LESS DANGEROUS; SO WOULD A NUMBER OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING STEPS WE'VE ALREADY PROPOSED TO THE SOVIET UNION.

----- NATIONAL INTERESTS



ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES A SPIRIT BEYOND NARROW NATIONAL INTERESTS. THIS SPIRIT IS A BASIC PILLAR ON WHICH THE U N WAS FOUNDED. WE SEEK A RETURN TO THE SPIRIT.

A FUNDAMENTAL STEP WOULD BE A TRUE NONALIGNMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THIS WOULD SIGNAL A RETURN TO THE TRUE VALUES OF THE CHARTER, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY. THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS MUST BE ALIGNED ON THE SIDE OF JUSTICE RATHER THAN INJUSTICE, PEACE RATHER THAN AGGRESSION, HUMAN DIGNITY RATHER THAN SUBJUGATION. ANY OTHER ALIGNMENT IS BENEATH THE PURPOSE OF THIS GREAT BODY AND DESTRUCTIVE OF THE HARMONY IT SEEKS. WHAT HARMS THE CHARTER HARMS PEACE.

THE FOUNDERS OF THE U N EXPECTED THAT MEMBER NATIONS WOULD BEHAVE AND VOTE AS INDIVIDUALS, AFTER THEY HAD WEIGHED THE MERITS OF AN ISSUE -- RATHER LIKE A GREAT GLOBAL TOWN MEETING. THE EMERGENCE OF BLOCS AND THE POLARIZATION OF THE U N UNDERMINE ALL THAT THIS ORGANIZATION INITIALLY VALUED.

WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WAS FOUNDED TO COUNTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLOCS AND TO PROMOTE DETENTE BETWEEN THEM. ITS FOUNDERS SPOKE OF THE RIGHT OF SMALLER COUNTRIES NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN OTHERS' DISAGREEMENTS. SINCE THEN, MEMBERSHIP IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT HAS GROWN DRAMATICALLY, BUT NOT ALL THE NEW MEMBERS HAVE SHARED THE FOUNDERS' COMMITMENT TO GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT. INDEED, CLIENT GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHO HAVE LONG SINCE LOST THEIR INDEPENDENCE, HAVE FLOCKED INTO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND ONCE INSIDE HAVE WORKED AGAINST ITS TRUE PURPOSE. PSEUDO NON-ALIGNMENT IS NO BETTER THAN PSEUDO ARMS CONTROL.

THE UNITED STATES REJECTS AS FALSE AND MISLEADING THE VIEW OF THE WORLD AS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE EMPIRES OF THE EAST AND WEST. WE REJECT IT ON FACTUAL GROUNDS. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HEAD ANY BLOC OF SUBSERVIENT NATIONS, NOR DO WE DESIRE TO. WHAT IS CALLED THE WEST IS A FREE ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENTS, MOST OF WHOM ARE DEMOCRATIC AND ALL OF WHOM GREATLY VALUE THEIR INDEPENDENCE. WHAT IS CALLED THE EAST IS AN EMPIRE DIRECTED FROM THE CENTER WHICH IS MOSCOW.

THE UNITED STATES, TODAY, AS IN THE PAST, IS A CHAMPION OF FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR ALL PEOPLE. WE WELCOME DIVERSITY: WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF ALL NATIONS TO DEFINE AND PURSUE THEIR NATIONAL GOALS. WE RESPECT THEIR DECISIONS AND THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, ASKING ONLY THAT THEY RESPECT THE DECISIONS AND SOVEREIGNTY OF OTHERS. JUST LOOK AT THE WORLD OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS, AND THEN DECIDE FOR YOURSELF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES OR THE SOVIET UNION HAS PURSUED AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY.

TODAY, THE UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTES TO PEACE BY SUPPORTING COLLECTIVE EFFORTS BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE GIVE OUR UNWAVERING SUPPORT TO THE PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS OF THIS BODY, AS WELL AS OTHER MULTILATERAL PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AROUND THE WORLD. THE U.N. HAS A PROUD HISTORY OF PROMOTING CONCILIATION AND HELPING KEEP THE PEACE. TODAY, U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCES OR OBSERVERS ARE PRESENT IN CYPRUS AND KASHMIR, ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND IN LEBANON. AND WE SUPPORT THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN AND VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM KAMPUCHEA.

IN ADDITION TO OUR ENCOURAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY, THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO USE ITS OWN INFLUENCE FOR PEACE. FROM THE DAYS WHEN THEODORE ROOSEVELT MEDIATED THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR IN 1905, WE HAVE A LONG AND HONORABLE TRADITION OF MEDIATING OR DAMPENING CONFLICTS AND PROMOTING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. IN LEBANON, WE, ALONG WITH FRANCE, ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, HAVE WORKED FOR A CEASEFIRE, FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES, AND FOR THE RESTORATION OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IN CHAD, WE HAVE JOINED OTHERS IN SUPPORTING THE RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, WE ARE SEEKING TO DISCOURAGE RELIANCE UPON FORCE AND TO CONSTRUCT A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. WE SUPPORT A POLICY TO DISENGAGE THE MAJOR POWERS FROM THIRD WORLD CONFLICT.

THE U.N. CHARTER GIVES AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE U.S. EFFORTS IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE ARE ONLY ONE EXPRESSION OF A SPIRIT THAT ALSO ANIMATES OTHERS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES WAS A PIONEER IN REGIONAL SECURITY EFFORTS. IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTADORA GROUP ARE STRIVING TO LAY A FOUNDATION FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THAT REGION'S PROBLEMS. IN EAST ASIA, THE ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE BUILT A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION THAT HAS GREATLY STRENGTHENED THE PROSPECTS FOR LASTING PEACE IN THEIR REGION. IN AFRICA, ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES ARE BEING FORGED TO PROVIDE PRACTICAL STRUCTURES IN THE STRUGGLE TO REALIZE AFRICA'S POTENTIAL.

FROM THE BEGINNING, OUR HOPE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEEN THAT IT WOULD REFLECT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT ITS BEST. THE U.N. AT ITS BEST CAN HELP US TRANSCEND FEAR AND VIOLENCE AND CAN ACT AS AN ENORMOUS FORCE FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN COMBAT INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS AND PROMOTE HUMAN DIGNITY.

IF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED IN THIS CHAMBER WANT PEACE AS GENUINELY AS THEIR PEOPLES DO, WE SHALL FIND IT. WE CAN DO SO BY REASSERTING THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE MORAL OUTRAGE OF THE WORLD SEEMS TO HAVE REAWAKENED.

OUT OF THE BILLIONS OF PEOPLE WHO INHABIT THIS PLANET, WHY, SOME MIGHT ASK, SHOULD THE DEATH OF A RELATIVE HANDFUL SHAKE THE WORLD SO PROFOUNDLY? WHY SHOULD THE DEATH OF A MOTHER FLYING TOWARD A REUNION WITH HER FAMILY OR THE DEATH OF A SCHOLAR HEADING TOWARD NEW PURSUITS OF KNOWLEDGE MATTER SO DEEPLY? WHY ARE NATIONS WHO LOST NO CITIZENS IN THE TRAGEDY SO ANGRY?

THE REASON RESTS ON OUR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CIVILIZED LIFE AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. THE CONFIDENCE THAT ALLOWS A MOTHER OR A SCHOLAR TO TRAVEL TO ASIA OR AFRICA OR EUROPE OR ANYWHERE ELSE ON THIS PLANET MAY BE ONLY A SMALL VICTORY IN HUMANITY'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE YET WHAT IS PEACE IF NOT THE SUM OF SUCH SMALL VICTORIES?

EACH STRIDE FOR PEACE AND EVERY SMALL VICTORY ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE JOURNEY TOWARD A LASTING LARGER PEACE. WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS. WE HAVE AVOIDED ANOTHER WORLD WAR. WE'VE SEEN AN END TO THE TRADITIONAL COLONIAL ERA AND THE BIRTH OF 100 NEWLY-SOVEREIGN NATIONS. EVEN THOUGH DEVELOPMENT REMAINS A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE, WE'VE WITNESSED REMARKABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH AMONG INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE U.N. AND ITS AFFILIATES HAVE MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE QUALITY OF LIFE ON THIS PLANET, SUCH AS DIRECTLY SAVING COUNTLESS LIVES THROUGH ITS REFUGEE AND EMERGENCY RELIEF PROGRAMS. THESE BROAD ACHIEVEMENTS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY THE PROBLEMS THAT WEIGH SO HEAVILY UPON US. THE PROBLEMS ARE OLD, BUT IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO A NEW BEGINNING, A BEGINNING FRESH WITH THE IDEALS OF THE U.N. CHARTER.

TODAY, AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS 38TH SESSION, I SOLEMNLY PLEDGE MY NATION TO UPHOLDING THE ORIGINAL IDEALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. OUR GOALS ARE THOSE THAT GUIDE THIS VERY BODY. OUR ENDS ARE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE U.N.'S FOUNDERS, WHO SOUGHT TO REPLACE A WORLD AT WAR WITH ONE WHERE THE RULE OF LAW WOULD PREVAIL, WHERE HUMAN RIGHTS WERE HONORED, WHERE DEVELOPMENT WOULD BLOSSOM, WHERE CONFLICT WOULD GIVE WAY TO FREEDOM FROM VIOLENCE.

IN 1956, PRESIDENT DWIGHT EISENHOWER MADE AN OBSERVATION ON WEAPONRY AND DETERRENCE IN A LETTER TO A PUBLISHER. HE WROTE: QUOTE WHEN WE GET TO THE POINT, AS WE ONE DAY WILL, THAT BOTH SIDES KNOW THAT IN ANY OUTBREAK OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES, REGARDLESS OF THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, DESTRUCTION WILL BE BOTH RECIPROCAL AND COMPLETE, POSSIBLY WE WILL HAVE SENSE ENOUGH TO MEET AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ERA OF ARMAMENTS HAS ENDED AND THE HUMAN RACE MUST CONFORM ITS ACTIONS TO THIS TRUTH OR DIE UNQUOTE. HE WENT ON TO SAY, QUOTE . . . WE HAVE ALREADY COME TO THE POINT WHERE SAFETY CANNOT BE ASSUMED BY ARMS ALONE . . . THEIR USEFULNESS BECOMES CONCENTRATED MORE AND MORE IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AS DETERRENENTS THAN IN INSTRUMENTS WITH WHICH TO OBTAIN VICTORY . . . UNQUOTE

DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, LET DIPLOMACY TRIUMPH. DIPLOMACY, THE MOST HONORABLE OF PROFESSIONS, CAN BRING THE MOST BLESSED OF GIFTS, THE GIFT OF PEACE. IF WE SUCCEED, THE WORLD WILL FIND AN EXCITEMENT AND ACCOMPLISHMENT IN PEACE BEYOND THAT WHICH COULD EVER BE IMAGINED THROUGH VIOLENCE AND WAR.

I WANT TO LEAVE YOU TODAY WITH A MESSAGE I HAVE OFTEN SPOKEN ABOUT TO THE CITIZENS OF MY OWN COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY IN TIMES WHEN I'VE FELT THEY WERE DISCOURAGED AND UNSURE. I SAY IT TO YOU WITH AS MUCH HOPE AND HEART AS I'VE SAID IT TO MY OWN PEOPLE. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DREAM GREAT DREAMS. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK A BETTER WORLD FOR YOUR PEOPLE. AND ALL OF US HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK FOR THAT BETTER WORLD. AND, AS CARING, PEACEFUL PEOPLES, THINK WHAT A POWERFUL FORCE FOR GOOD WE COULD BE. DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES, LET US REGAIN THE DREAM THE UNITED NATIONS ONCE DREAMED. UNQUOTE

WRIGHT

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~~Tan VIV~~  
dont le rôle a <sup>tellement</sup> tant contribué à faire  
du Canada le grand

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1983

*UN*  
*File.*  
  
*Dear John,*

The Prime Minister's Visit to New York; 30 September 1983

I enclose briefs for the meetings which the Prime Minister will have with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30 September.

These have been agreed where necessary with the ODA, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence.

The briefs for the meeting with Mrs Gandhi are in three parts, covering international issues, bilateral questions, and the political and economic situation in India.

The Prime Minister should be aware that Mrs Gandhi may stop-over in the UK for 24 hours between 1 and 4 October, probably on 1 October, on her way home. The brief suggests that the Prime Minister express willingness to meet Mrs Gandhi, adding that it would be understood if she wished to keep the visit private (as she very likely would). However since then we have heard that she does indeed wish her stop-over here, if it happens, to be private. This suggests that the Prime Minister might refer to the possibility of a stop-over with the aim of agreeing that, after such a hard week, both Prime Ministers might prefer to keep the Saturday free.

/The brief

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The brief for the meeting with the Secretary-General covers a range of international issues. The Secretary-General may mention Namibia, Iran-Iraq, and disarmament, but we do not think there is any need for the Prime Minister to raise these issues.

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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10 DOWNING STREET

Mr. Ingham

Can you confirm specifically  
that you are not  
expecting the S. R. to do  
breakfast TV in Westminster  
on the Friday morning?

A. J. C. - 22/9.

Mr. Colles

No interviews are being  
rel. up for the Friday  
morning.

W 22/9.



2219

File No. ....  
Department United Nations  
Drafted by M J L KIRK  
(Block Capitals).....  
Tel. Extn. 233 4233

OUTWARD  
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
Precedence IMMEDIATE
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Mr. Holmes  
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PREAMBLE

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AND TO SAVING.....

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10 DOWNING STREET

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 855: MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT

1. Grateful if you would take action with the Secretary General's Office to arrange a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Secretary-General on Friday 30 September, preferably as soon after the meeting with Mrs Gandhi as is practicable (your para 2 refers).

2. Grateful if you would accept the Indian suggestion for a meeting at the Helmsley Palace Hotel. We would prefer, from a logistic point of view, for the meeting to be a little later in the morning (eg 1030 or 1100), but we appreciate that Mrs Gandhi's schedule may already

be 'full' and we would not repeat not want the later start of the meeting to mean a shorter meeting. If therefore the only reasonable length of meeting that Mrs Gandhi can manage would be starting at 0945, you should accept this time.

3. As to travel arrangements, we would suggest that the Prime Minister travel by helicopter from JFK to the heliport on the East Side and go on from there by car. We would be grateful for any suggestions you may have if you think the journey from JFK can be done more quickly by other means. Please advise us urgently what time the Prime Minister's VC10 would need to arrive at JFK in order for her to get to the meeting with Mrs Gandhi at the time that you will have arranged.

4. Your para 3: there have already been press reports here that the Prime Minister will be (and the ~~not~~ Secretary-General) meeting Mrs Gandhi. We will advise as to the timing of a formal announcement here. Confirm that you should use the line in para 4 of my telno 512 to Delhi.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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18945 - 1

*Pa.*  
*UN Summit*

*MRK*

DD DELHI 200330Z  
PP CANBERRA  
PP WELLINGTON  
PP ROME  
PP ATHENS

GRS 486

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DESKBY 200330Z DELHI

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FROM FCO 191730Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 512 OF 19 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SOFS'S PARTY) AND UKMIS NEWYORK

INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS WASHINGTON OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON

OSLO MADRID LISBON

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 612: MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT

1. THE PRIME MINISTER NOW PROPOSES TO VISIT NEW YORK ON FRIDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER FOR A BILATERAL MEETING WITH MRS GANDHI. WE HOPE THIS CAN BE IN THE MORNING. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE PART IN ANY ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS NOR DOES SHE PROPOSE TO SEEK A MEETING WITH ANY OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH SHE DOES HOPE TO CALL ON THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL.
2. PLEASE DELIVER THE PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MRS GANDHI CONTAINED IN MIPT (NOT REPEATED).
3. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS GOING OUT OF HER WAY TO MAKE A GESTURE OF PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR MRS GANDHI. YOU SHOULD RESIST ANY SUGGESTION THAT MRS THATCHER SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON 30 SEPTEMBER, POINTING OUT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL HAVE LITTLE TIME AT HER DISPOSAL IF SHE IS TO GET BACK TO LONDON AT A REASONABLE HOUR.
4. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES SHOULD TAKE NO REPEAT NO ACTION UNTIL WE KNOW THAT MRS GANDHI AGREES TO THE ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER. THEY SHOULD THEN SPEAK TO THEIR HOST GOVERNMENT MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:  
(A) THE PRIME MINISTER IS NOT REPEAT NOT PARTICIPATING IN

1

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18945 - 1

MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT. HER ENGAGEMENTS IN CANADA AND IN WASHINGTON IN ANY CASE PRECLUDE ATTENDANCE AT THE ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS ON 27 AND 29 SEPTEMBER. SHE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY SIMILAR GATHERING ON 30 SEPTEMBER:

- (B) THE DECISION TO OFFER A STRICTLY BILATERAL MEETING SHOULD BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRESENCE IN NEIGHBOURING PARTS OF NORTH AMERICA THAT WEEK AND HER NATURAL WISH TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION OF A SNUB TO MRS GANDHI (WITH WHOM SHE ENJOYS CLOSE RELATIONS) THAT MIGHT BE GIVEN BY A DECISION TO RETURN DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON TO LONDON:
- (C) MRS THATCHER DOES NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSE TO SEE ANY OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DURING HER TIME IN NEW YORK, WHICH WILL BE LIMITED.
5. THE PUS SAW RASGOTRA TODAY AND TOLD HIM THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE WRITING TO MRS GANDHI TO PROPOSE A MEETING ON THESE LINES. RASGOTRA WELCOMED THIS.
6. FOR UKREP BRUSSELS. WE UNDERSTAND THORN WILL BE RAISING MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 20 SEPTEMBER. THORN IS GOING, AS IS MITTERRAND, BUT PAPANDREOU HAS WITHDRAWN. SO FAR AS WE KNOW, NO OTHER EC HEAD OF GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT EXPECTS TO ATTEND. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT CARE TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN THE SUMMIT BUT MAY MEET MRS GANDHI BILATERALLY ON HER WAY BACK FROM HER BILATERAL VISIT TO THE US.
- HOWE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

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CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Kirk UNO

We spoke about this. I have passed the contents to the duty clerk in No 10, who has spoken to one of the duty P.S.s. John Coley will revert to you today.

UN SUMMIT                      ADVANCES                      + 5  
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ERD  
RESIDENT CLERK

Feed ukem.  
22/ix

No 10 DOWNING ST  
**IMMEDIATE**  
ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 220900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 212005Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 855 OF 21 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON, NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, OSLO, MADRID, LISBON, EC POSTS.

YOUR TELS NOS 512 TO NEW DELHI AND 158 TO NICOSIA (NOT TO ALL):  
MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT.

1. AS ALREADY REPORTED IN TELECOM GORE-BOOTH/RESIDENT CLERK THE INDIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT MRS GANDHI HAD AGREED TO THE ARRANGEMENT PROPOSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE MRS THATCHER AT THE HELMSLEY PALACE HOTEL AT 0945 OR 1000 ON FRIDAY 30 SEPTEMBER.

2. I AM TAKING STEPS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL WILL BE ABLE TO SEE MRS THATCHER LATER THE SAME MORNING.

3. PLEASE LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS MRS THATCHER'S STOP IN NEW YORK IS ANNOUNCED AND IN WHAT TERMS. IN BRIEFING THE PRESS I WOULD PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE IN PARA 4 OF YOUR FIRST TUR.

THOMSON



3

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

We have already sent  
this message by  
telegram but the DCO  
would like to be able to  
send the signed version  
as well.

WJ  
19/9

I thought it  
was Nelson  
wasn't it?  
or was it?

SUBJECT

ce Meles  
+  
Ops



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 136c/83

10 DOWNING STREET

19. 9. 83

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Prime Minister

I have been following with great interest the various developments in connection with your idea of a meeting of Heads of Government in New York in the week beginning 26 September and I much appreciated the opportunity to meet your Special Adviser, Mr. L.K. Jha.

As I think you know, I have long-standing plans to spend much of that week carrying out engagements in Canada and Washington, and as a result I really do not think it would be possible for me to participate in the round table discussions which are now envisaged - much as I should like to. But I can make enough time to visit New York on Friday, 30 September on my way back to London, and I should very much like to take that opportunity to have a talk with you as Chairman of the meetings you are arranging, to learn from you how the meetings have gone and to discuss matters of common concern. Would you be able to set aside an hour or so for me in the course of that day? I very much hope we shall be able to meet.

Yours sincerely

Rajiv Gandhi

Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi



FLK

RW

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 September, 1983

MRS GANDHI'S UN SUMMIT

Thank you for your letter of 16 September to John Coles.

The Prime Minister has agreed to go to New York for a bilateral meeting with Mrs. Gandhi. She has very slightly revised the personal message to Mrs. Gandhi and I enclose a copy of the new version. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch. You will see that the Prime Minister would be willing to stay in New York until the afternoon of 30 September if that proved absolutely necessary.

The Prime Minister feels that if she is to go to New York, she should call on the UN Secretary-General. I should be grateful if you could make the necessary arrangements.

Finally, the Prime Minister has expressed some concern that President Mitterrand's participation in Mrs. Gandhi's summit may give France an edge in winning exports to India.

J. W. P. S. RICKETT

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

HL



✓ Ce RT

①



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 September 1983

I think you should go to  
New York and see Mrs. Gandhi  
but I also think that you ought  
to see the U.S. Secretary-General as  
well. Agree?

Also, agree message? A.S.C. 16/9

Dear John,

Mrs Gandhi's UN Summit

In your letter of 5 September you said that the Prime Minister might not rule out a brief visit to New York on 30 September if this became unavoidable.

The Foreign Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should now decide to go to New York for a bilateral meeting with Mrs Gandhi. This might be best conveyed in the form of a personal letter from Mrs Thatcher and I enclose a draft. The Foreign Secretary continues to think that the Prime Minister should avoid being drawn into any kind of round-table discussion with other Heads of Government (Mrs Gandhi is now thinking in terms of two round-table meetings on 27 and 29 September. Nothing is at present planned for 30 September, but Mrs Gandhi may of course change her mind again). We would instruct our High Commissioner in New Delhi, when handing over the Prime Minister's letter, to make it clear that Mrs Thatcher would not consider any suggestion that she should participate in any such meetings. He would emphasise that the Prime Minister was going out of her way to make a gesture of personal support for Mrs Gandhi and would be interested to learn from her about the proceedings she had organised as well as discussing the international issues of the day.

It is still impossible to be absolutely sure what Heads of Government will be participating in Mrs Gandhi's Summit, but it appears that they will include those from Egypt, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Colombia, Sierra Leone, France, Finland, Sweden, Hungary and Greece. As you know, we have been considering whether the Prime Minister might also be advised to hold bilateral meetings with some of these other Heads of Government. But on reflection we think it might be best to drop this idea and to confine the Prime Minister's visit to New York to a meeting with Mrs Gandhi. This would avoid the danger of the Indians

/suggesting

Can't we say  
on how things  
the same?  
the day?  
does that make  
it too late?  
no?

Yes no  
Yes no

Will this  
give  
France  
some  
treatment  
in exp. 20th  
as general  
no?



suggesting that if the Prime Minister had time to meet a number of Heads of Government bilaterally she could surely agree to see them jointly, that is to say participate in a round-table discussion. There will in any case be very little time if the Prime Minister is to leave New York to return to London at a reasonable hour. The idea of a small lunch is overtaken by news that the Finnish President will be holding a large lunch party for Summit participants and others.

We see no need for the Prime Minister to call on the Secretary-General, unless she particularly wishes to do so, or on the President of the General Assembly (who may be the Panamanian Illueca, whose attitude was so hostile during the Falklands crisis). Sir Geoffrey Howe will of course be seeing the Secretary-General earlier in the week.

As you know, President Reagan now intends to address the General Assembly on 26 September. He will be in New York from 25-27 September. Our understanding is that he would not attend any of Mrs Gandhi's round-table discussions but will meet some other Heads of Government bilaterally, as well as the Secretary-General. He may give a lunch or dinner, as well as bilaterals. He will certainly meet Mrs Gandhi. All this further strengthens the case for the Prime Minister making the gesture we propose.

We understand that Mrs Gandhi may be stopping over in London on 1-2 October on her way home. We do not think a meeting between the two Prime Ministers in this country would be a substitute for the proposed meeting in New York. Equally, we see no necessity for the Prime Minister to offer to receive Mrs Gandhi here as well as to meet her in New York. But if they do meet in New York, the Prime Minister would no doubt wish to refer to Mrs Gandhi's plans and to say that she assumes Mrs Gandhi would like to have the weekend free to relax after her busy time at the United Nations.

On 19 September Sir Antony Acland is receiving his Indian counterpart who has suddenly decided to come to London with Mr Parthasarathy the Indian emissary to Sri Lanka. It would be helpful to have the Prime Minister's decision by then.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
 (J E Holmes)  
 Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
 10 Downing Street

UN: Possible att. at UN  
Gen. Assembly  
1983

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PRIME MINISTER

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

MRS GANDHI

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I have been following with great interest the various developments in connection with your idea of a meeting of Heads of Government in New York in the week beginning 26 September and I much appreciated the opportunity to meet your Special Adviser, Mr L K Jha.

As I think you know, I have long-standing plans to spend much of that week carrying out engagements in Canada and in Washington, and as a result I really do not think it would be possible for me to participate in the round table discussions which are now envisaged - much as I should like to. But I ~~shall have~~ <sup>can make</sup> just enough time to ~~come to~~ visit New York on Friday, 30 September on my way back to London, and I should very much like to take that opportunity to have a talk with you ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> Chairman of the meetings you are arranging, ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> learn from you how the meetings have gone and to discuss matters of common concern. ~~Would~~ <sup>Would</sup> you be able to set aside an hour or so for me in the course of that ~~morning~~ <sup>day?</sup>? I very much hope we shall be able to meet.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

ABE

11 6 SEP 1983



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Prime Minister

②

MR. COLES ✓

There is still no need for  
a decision.

A.C. 6/7

MRS. GANDHI'S SUMMIT


I see from New Delhi Telegram Number 593 (copy attached) that the pressure is still being applied for the Prime Minister to attend at least part of Mrs. Gandhi's summit. I do not think that the Prime Minister should help Mrs. Gandhi herself to decide whether or not to go to New York by indicating at this stage that she will go (thus making it certain that Mrs. Gandhi will) or that she will not (thus equally certainly offending Mrs. Gandhi).

Once it appears inevitable that Mrs. Gandhi is going to New York, then I think that the Prime Minister should express willingness to pay a very short visit to New York in order to talk to Mrs. G. The atmosphere at the CHGM would be distinctly sour if Mrs. Gandhi knew that the Prime Minister had been in Washington while she had been in New York and no meeting had taken place.

If the Prime Minister eventually decides to divert to New York on the way home, I suggest that she should aim to waste only half a day at the most. There will be great pressure on her to undertake a number of UN-type engagements. She would be well advised to settle for the absolute minimum, ie calls on the President of the General Assembly and on the Secretary General. Both take place on the 38th Floor (or could be so arranged) and both should not take up more than one hour. The Prime Minister could then have a meeting or lunch with Mrs. Gandhi and return to London in the afternoon.

---

ms



A.D. PARSONS  
6 September 1983

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GRS 450

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DESKBY 021430Z

FM NEW DELHI 021315Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 593 OF 02 SEPTEMBER 1983

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 468 : MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT

1. IN RASGOTRA'S ABSENCE ABROAD UNTIL 10 OR 11 SEPTEMBER, I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON TEJA (DUS EQUIVALENT, RESPONSIBLE FOR UN AFFAIRS AS WELL AS EUROPE), WHO IS HIMSELF LEAVING FOR MOSCOW EARLY TOMORROW MORNING.
2. AFTER I HAD SPOKEN AS INSTRUCTED, TEJA SAID THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF MRS THATCHER'S BILATERAL VISITS TO CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRESSURES ON THE DIARIES OF THOSE INVOLVED. HE APPRECIATED THE ADVANCE NOTICE OF OUR PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT. BUT WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM LEFT ONE QUESTION UNANSWERED. WOULD THE BILATERAL VISITS ON THE DATES I HAD MENTIONED PRECLUDE MRS THATCHER COMING TO NEW YORK AFTER THE END OF HER WASHINGTON VISIT ON 29 SEPTEMBER AND SPENDING AT LEAST PART OF THAT DAY AND/OR 30 SEPTEMBER AT THE SUMMIT? I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS ENQUIRY.
3. TEJA SAID THAT THE INDIANS WOULD AWAIT YOUR ANSWER WITH GREAT INTEREST. MEANWHILE HE WOULD REPORT WHAT I HAD SAID TO MRS GANDHI'S OFFICE IMMEDIATELY. AS WE KNEW, SHE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE PARTICIPATION OF EUROPEAN LEADERS. IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT REAGAN OR ANDROPOV WOULD ATTEND BUT THE RESPONSE FROM OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SEEMED ENCOURAGING : THE FRENCH, GREEKS, SWEDES, DANES, FINNS, DUTCH AND SPANIARDS WERE ALL MAKING FAVOURABLE NOISES. TRUDEAU HAD ALSO GIVEN THE INDIANS THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT IF HIS OTHER ENGAGEMENTS PERMITTED, SO IT WAS INTERESTING TO LEARN THAT HE WOULD FINISH ACTING AS MRS THATCHER'S HOST ON 28 SEPTEMBER. MRS GANDHI WAS VERY GRATEFUL TO MRS THATCHER FOR HAVING AGREED TO RECEIVE L K JHA IN JULY AND HAD BEEN INTERESTED AND IMPRESSED BY THE POINTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE TO JHA ON THAT OCCASION. THE INDIANS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY LEADERS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BE PRESENT IN NEW YORK FOR MORE THAN A SHORT TIME. BUT THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE EXTREMELY WORTHWHILE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THOSE WHO WERE PRESENT AT ANY ONE STAGE.

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/4.

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4. TEJA WENT ON TO SAY THAT PROVISIONAL INDIAN PLANNING FOR THE SUMMIT PROGRAMME HAD ALTERED SINCE RASGOTRA'S TALK WITH MR WHITNEY IN LONDON LAST MONTH (YOUR TELNO 430). SHE NOW INTENDED TO ADDRESS MEMBERS OF THE NAM ON 26 SEPTEMBER. ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS AMONG WORLD LEADERS WERE PLANNED FOR 27 AND 29 SEPTEMBER (BETWEEN 4 AND 6:30 PM EACH EVENING), NOT 26, 28 AND 30 SEPTEMBER AND FURTHER MEETINGS THAT DAY WERE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE VERY WELCOME.

5. TEJ'S MANNER WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT MRS GANDHI WILL FEEL HURT, IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TERMS, IF THE PRIME MINISTER SPENDS 29 OR 30 SEPTEMBER RETURNING TO LONDON AND DOES NOT TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF STOPPING EVEN BRIEFLY IN NEW YORK. MRS GANDHI WOULD BE BOUND TO FIND THAT HUMILIATING IN A WAY THAT WOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED TO A DECISION BY THE PRIME MINISTER NOT TO COME FROM LONDON SPECIALLY.

WADE-GERY

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*Lu JB.*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

5 September 1983

MRS. GANDHI'S UN SUMMIT

Thank you for your letter of  
30 August.

There was some discussion of this  
matter when the Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary called on the Prime Minister this  
afternoon.

Mrs. Thatcher does not wish to take a  
final decision now on whether she should  
visit New York for Mrs. Gandhi's Summit but  
might not rule out a brief visit on  
30 September if this became unavoidable.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 August 1983

Prime Minister:

To note, but a  
decision will be  
needed soon

Dear Tim,

Mrs Gandhi's UN Summit

JD 31/8.

I wrote to you on 3 August reporting that we had been told that President Mitterand would definitely be going to New York for Mrs Gandhi's Summit and suggesting that there might be a case for the Prime Minister putting in a brief appearance on 30 September after her visit to Washington. You replied on 10 August that the Prime Minister would prefer to avoid such a visit if at all possible.

There have been two main developments since then. Rasgotra, the PUS in the Indian Foreign Ministry, called on Mr Whitney on 16 August to press for the Prime Minister to attend the Summit, emphasising that Mrs Gandhi attached particular importance to her being present. He said that the Indians now envisaged having three round-table discussions on the afternoons of 26, 28 and 30 September. There would be no formal agenda but disarmament and development would be the main theme. Other Indian sources have suggested that a third theme might be the need to enhance the effectiveness of the UN.

The other development is that Mr Papandreou has announced his intention of going to New York and the Greeks will be asking the Foreign Ministers of the Ten at their political co-operation meeting in Athens on 12 September whether he could be authorised to attend in his capacity as President of the European Council as well as in his national capacity.

We had earlier gained the impression that the Indians would probably be content for the Summit to take the form of a series of bilateral meetings, addresses to the General Assembly and meals rather than a proper conference. Their revival of the conference format may well put off more heads of government than it attracts. As Sir Geoffrey Howe told the Prime Minister on Monday, we remain of the view that the Prime Minister should not become involved in the unorganised and unpredictable discussions envisaged by the Indians. There is no certainty as to who will attend. The Prime Minister might find herself opposite Castro or the Argentine President. We might find ourselves faced with



the standard non-aligned demands on such issues as Southern Africa, the Middle East, nuclear disarmament and transfer of resources.

But we are concerned that with the Prime Minister in North America at the time Mrs Gandhi may take it as a snub if we ignore the New York proceedings entirely. This would be unfortunate not only for our bilateral relations with India, but also in the run-up to the CHOGM, and, as Sir Geoffrey also explained, makes it difficult to dismiss completely the idea that the Prime Minister might pay a short visit to New York on 30 September. A possible way of dissociating any such visit from any conference proceedings would be to confine it to a lunch date with Mrs Gandhi and perhaps some other selected leaders, though it might also be possible to arrange one or two bilateral meetings. Mrs Gandhi might then feel that we had helped to rescue her Summit idea but we could continue to take the line with our partners that the Prime Minister was not participating in any way in the Summit proceedings proper.

Sir Geoffrey Howe does not think that any decision need to be taken for the time being. We should first wait and see what the Indian reaction is to the announcement, which we expect to make soon, about the Prime Minister's bilateral visits to the United States and Canada. I am writing separately about this.

At the meeting of Ministers of the Ten on 12 September Sir Geoffrey Howe would propose to say that the Prime Minister had no plans to participate in any Summit Conference. He would also take the line that while Papandreou should of course have regard to agreed Community positions in anything he might say in New York, it was impossible to give him a mandate to attend in his capacity as President of the European Council when we had no clear idea of what proposals might be put to such a meeting, or even of what subjects were to be discussed.

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street

UN  
Apr 93  
Attendance by  
heads of state  
at UN General Assembly.



30 APR 1993

UN



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 August 1983

Thank you for your letter of 3 August about the Prime Minister's forthcoming visit to North America. The Prime Minister has noted the arguments for her brief visit to New York set out in your letter but at this stage she would prefer to avoid such a visit if at all possible. There will however no doubt be an opportunity for this possibility to be discussed again before the visit if necessary.

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Bo



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 August 1983

Prime Minister:

Do you want to take up Mrs Gandhi's invitation to New York, possibly for a dinner with heads of government.

Dear Tim,

PA 9/2

Mrs Gandhi's Proposal for a United Nations Summit

The outline programme we sent you recently for the Prime Minister's visit to North America left Friday, 30 September, free for a possible visit to New York.

We have noted the Prime Minister's view that Mrs Gandhi's Summit would not be worthwhile unless Andropov were present. It now seems virtually certain that there will be no proper Summit in the sense of a conference between Heads of Government. The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, who has recently been in Delhi, has confirmed that the Indians are still quite unable to come up with any clear organisational proposals. The principal heads of government currently expected in New York that week are those from India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Tanzania, Algeria, France and Sweden. The Indians claim that the total will be between 30 and 40, but it is not at all clear what they will do other than meet each other and in most cases address the General Assembly.

This does not amount to a very attractive proposition. But the Prime Minister's close relationship with Mrs Gandhi, combined with the fact that she will in any case be in Washington that week (so that not to go to New York at all could be seen as deliberately and publicly turning our back on Mrs Gandhi's initiative), changes the picture somewhat. Moreover, given France's persistent attempts to cultivate India and her rivalry with us in competition for important commercial contracts, it would be particularly irritating and unhelpful if President Mitterrand were to upstage us and earn Mrs Gandhi's special gratitude as the one Western leader who gave a semblance of success to her Summit idea.

/For these

PM's note attached



For these reasons, Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that we should now give serious thought to the possibility of the Prime Minister spending a few hours on 30 September in New York. Such a gesture would of course be warmly appreciated by other non-aligned countries too, without giving the appearance that we are running after them.

We see no need for any early move on our part, which could indeed give unwanted impetus to the Summit idea. We believe Mrs Gandhi has known for a long time of Mitterrand's plans (they have spoken several times on the telephone), and there is no question of our getting in ahead of him. There have already been leaks about the Prime Minister's visit to North America and we may soon receive enquiries from the Indians. We propose to try to hold the line for a few more weeks but could then issue instructions to the High Commission in New Delhi asking them to let the Indians know that out of regard for Mrs Gandhi the Prime Minister was contemplating paying a short visit to New York on 30 September and would be glad to have a meeting with her and to meet some of the other Heads of Government who might be there.

If it is in the end decided that the Prime Minister should go to New York, we do not suggest that she should address the General Assembly as Mitterrand will do. It is not necessary in order to earn Mrs Gandhi's appreciation and it would cause embarrassment to those major Western leaders, especially President Reagan, who prefer to continue to avoid involvement in Mrs Gandhi's 'summit' altogether. On present plans, Sir Geoffrey Howe will in any case already have given the UK national speech on 28 September. But it could be very valuable if the Prime Minister were to set aside some time for a meeting with Mrs Gandhi and for meetings with other Third World leaders and possibly for a meal with some of them.

It would however be necessary to explore the possibilities carefully, through the Indians and otherwise, and to retain strict control over the Prime Minister's commitments. We would need to ensure, for example, that the other Heads of Government invited to a meal the Prime Minister was considering attending were acceptable company. One possibility would be for the Prime Minister herself to offer to host a meal. This would enable us to ensure complete control over the participants. It could be quite small.

/We would



We would obviously need to brief the Americans and our European partners. We could assure them that it was not the Prime Minister's intention to participate in any Summit conference or to address the General Assembly as Mitterrand is doing, but say that she was considering taking the opportunity to meet other Heads of Government briefly. It would be hard for our partners to criticise us for taking advantage in this natural way of the Prime Minister's presence in North America and the simultaneous presence of friendly Heads of Government.

*Yours ever*  
*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq  
10 Downing Street



UN: Attendance at UN General Assembly

GRS 130

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FM PARIS 221635Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 654 OF 22 JULY

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, NEW DELHI, WASHINGTON,  
INFO SAVING MOSCOW.

*mf*

MY TELNO 651 (NOT TO ALL): YOUR VISIT TO PARIS 22 JULY: MRS  
GANDHI'S PROPOSAL FOR A WORLD SUMMIT.

1. CHEYSSON REVEALED THAT MITTERRAND HAD DECIDED TO GO TO THIS  
YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE WILL MAKE THE FRENCH SPEECH ON 28  
SEPTEMBER. HE EXPECTED TO HAVE A BILATERAL THERE WITH MRS GANDHI  
AND NO DOUBT OTHER HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WHO MIGHT ATTEND.  
SHULTZ HAD TOLD CHEYSSON THAT REAGAN WOULD NOT GO TO THE GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR BUT HAD HINTED AT A POSSIBLE VISIT NEXT  
YEAR IN THE PRE-ELECTORAL PERIOD.

2. YOU SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT BEEN CONSIDERING  
ATTENDANCE. THERE SEEMED TO BE A LACK OF CLARITY ABOUT THE KIND  
OF MEETING MRS GANDHI WANTED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING MOSCOW.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

FRETWELL

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MR. COLES ✓ *Mr 1/7*  
*P.C.*

UN SUMMIT

Your query on UKMIS New York Telegram No 582.

It is true that I attended the meeting in Switzerland referred to by the UKMIS. The Indian Permanent Representative was not present. I left the meeting 36 hours before it ended. At that stage, the question of Mrs. Gandhi's proposals had not been mentioned, except that Buffum told me privately that not a single Head of State/Government had formally notified the UN that he or she would be coming to New York this autumn (with the exception of course of Mrs. Gandhi herself).

It would not surprise me if the San Francisco idea did start to run at the Switzerland meeting. There were one or two people present who had been at the original San Francisco conference and the whole meeting tended to hark back to a UN golden age.

*AS*

A.D. PARSONS  
19 July 1983

*Tony James*

**RESTRICTED**

GPS 275

RESTRICTED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 151859Z JUL 83

TO ROUTINE FCO

TEL NO 582 OF 15 JULY 1983

AND TO ROUTINE NEW DELHI WASHINGTON PARIS BONN ROME  
MOSCOW PEKING TOKYO BERNE

UN SUMMITRY

1. I HAVE JUST HEARD FROM MY FRG COLLEAGUE OF A DEVELOPMENT WHICH MAY INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF MRS GANDHIS PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT AT THIS YEARS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT A RECENT MEETING OF THE STANLEY FOUNDATION IN BURGENSTOK, SWITZERLAND, ATTENDED BY SOME INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE INCLUDING THE INDIAN AND FRG UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AND BUFFUM (UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL RESPONSIBLE FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFAIRS) IT WAS AGREED TO PROPOSE THAT THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE UN CHARTER SHOULD BE CELEBRATED AT SAN FRANCISCO IN 1985 AND THAT HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE INVITED TO ATTEND. THE INTENTION IS FOR THIS TO SUBSUME AND TRANSFORM MRS GANDHIS PROPOSAL: IT WOULD ALLOW FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS PREPARATION.

2. SEEN FROM HERE THIS PROPOSAL HAS MUCH TO COMMEND IT. IT COULD SAVE MRS GANDHI FROM THE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY OF A FLOP AT THIS YEARS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THROUGH LACK OF PREPARATION AND NON-ATTENDANCE OF MAJOR FIGURES. IT COULD ALSO PROVIDE A WAY OUT FOR THOSE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHO ARE APPREHENSIVE AT THE THOUGHT OF ATTENDING SUCH AN ILL-PREPARED SUMMIT AS MIGHT OCCUR THIS YEAR. AND GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONA RELATIONS, THE TIMING, 1985, MIGHT WELL BE MORE PROMISING.

3. ACCORDING TO THE JAPANESE MISSION, BUFFUM IS RETURNING TO NEW YORK WITH A PROPOSAL TO INSCRIBE IN THIS YEARS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AGENDA AN ITEM SETTING UP A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR SUCH A SUMMIT.

**MARGETSON**

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

U N SUMMIT

STANDARD

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**THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED**

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FM WASHINGTON 150340Z JUL 83 AMENDED DISTRIBUTION  
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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1990 OF 15 JULY

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, NEW DELHI

*lead in here.*  
*MS*

YOUR TALKS WITH SHULTZ: MRS GANDHI'S SUMMIT

1. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE SUMMIT PROPOSED BY MRS GANDHI. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A MEETING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL COULD BE VALUABLE AND A REAGAN/ANDROPOV SUMMIT WAS NOT EXCLUDED. BUT MRS GANDHI'S PROPOSAL WAS NOT THE RIGHT WAY TO GO ABOUT IT.
2. YOU SAID THAT WE SHARED THIS VIEW. IN PLANNING FOR A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN SEPTEMBER WE OBVIOUSLY HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SUMMIT MIGHT GET OFF THE GROUND. IF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS ATTENDED WE COULD NOT AVOID GOING IN AS WELL, A POINT WHICH SHULTZ ACKNOWLEDGED. BUT WE DID NOT WISH TO GIVE IMPETUS TO MRS GANDHI'S PROPOSAL BY ANNOUNCING A VISIT TO THE US BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN SEPTEMBER AT THIS STAGE. WE WERE KEEPING OUR PLANS CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPOSED NO ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL MUCH NEARER THE TIME.
3. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION BURT ADDED THAT, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF INF DEPLOYMENT, SEPTEMBER WOULD BE A VERY BAD TIME FOR A SUMMIT SINCE THE GERMANS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO PRESS MR REAGAN TO COME UP WITH AN OFFER TO POSTPONE DEPLOYMENT IN RETURN FOR SOME AS YET UNDEFINED CONCESSION FROM THE SOVIET UNION. BURT SAID HE FAVoured A REAGAN/ANDROPOV SUMMIT BUT IN MARCH OR APRIL OF 1984. THE TIMING WOULD BE GOOD POLITICALLY IE NOT TOO NEAR, OR TOO FAR, FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

WRIGHT

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U N SUMMIT

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 July 1983

R

Mrs. Gandhi's Proposal for a Summit at the UN

Thank you for your letter of 28 June.

The Prime Minister agrees that, if approached by the Indians, you should say that she continues to have an open mind about Mrs. Gandhi's proposal and would be interested to know if the Indians have developed clearer ideas for the form, agenda and objectives of the proposed Summit.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June 1983

Agree that we should  
speak as in penultimate para.  
if the Indians approach us  
again?

A.S.C. 25/16.

Dear John,

Yes [initials]

Mrs Gandhi's Proposal for a Summit at the UN

I last wrote to you on this subject on 26 May, in a letter about Indian lobbying prior to Williamsburg. So far as we are aware, Mrs Gandhi's proposal was not discussed at Williamsburg (nor at Stuttgart).

You will recall that last month, with your agreement, we instructed the High Commissioner in New Delhi to convey an oral reply to Mrs Gandhi's letter to the Prime Minister to the effect that in present circumstances she was unable to give a substantive response. Sir Robert Wade-Gery took action on 16 May and Mrs Gandhi expressed her understanding of the Prime Minister's position. Now that the election is over, it is necessary to devise a different line for use with the Indians. They have not yet returned to the charge. We recommend that we should take no initiative ourselves but should wait for the Indians to raise the subject.

The French have told us that they had in fact been considering whether President Mitterrand should be advised to visit New York to address the General Assembly this year. But he appears not yet to have sent any formal reply to Mrs Gandhi at all. Replies from other partners and from the Americans have been non-committal. We continue to hear that the Soviet attitude is similarly cautious. Western and Eastern European Missions in New York have joined in vetoing a Secretariat suggestion that the week beginning 26 September (the first of the 3 weeks normally set aside for speeches by Foreign Ministers) should be reserved for Heads of Government.

/We think



- 2 -

We think the odds are at present against the proposed Summit meeting taking place, but this could change very rapidly if one of the major Western leaders, or the Russians, were to break ranks and announce a willingness to participate. We shall need to keep a particularly close watch on the French, who might think that a gesture from them would help secure credit for them in the Third World and also defence and civil contracts in India for which they are in direct competition with us. We need to be careful not to appear to the Indians to be taking a lead in frustrating Mrs Gandhi's proposal. We have been saying informally to them that we have an open mind about it.

The Americans are particularly concerned about the idea of a UN Summit because of the pressure it would generate for a Reagan/Andropov Summit, for which they think the timing would be wrong (as you may have seen, the Russians have also signalled publicly that they do not favour an early Summit). They have asked us and other allies to intervene in Delhi to express doubts about the efficacy of a UN Summit. We know that several of our partners have already turned the Americans down. We propose to tell them that we do not think it appropriate to give a negative reply, but that if the major countries continue to be non-committal Mrs Gandhi's proposal is likely to fade away of its own accord.

We recommend that, if approached by the Indians for an indication of the Prime Minister's attitude, we should say that she continues to have an open mind and would be interested to know if Mrs Gandhi has now developed clearer ideas for the form, agenda and objectives of the proposed gathering. (The ideas volunteered by Indian spokesmen so far have been different on every occasion and it is clear that the Indians are having difficulty in evolving a scheme which would be both practical and attractive to the prospective participants.)

I should be grateful if you would let me know whether the Prime Minister is content that we should take this line.

*G. P. Fall*

(B F P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Number 10 Downing Street



ungarisch Sammler un 4/87



28 JUN 1983



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*Original on  
Econ Pd: Williamsburg  
PH3*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1983

*1) Type letter to Mr. Gandhi.  
→ 2) Mr. Jay - pl. take copies  
of copy to Williamsburg  
A.S.C. - 2/5*

*Dear John,*

Indian Lobbying prior to Williamsburg

Thank you for your letter of 20 May, enclosing a copy of Mrs Gandhi's letter of 9 May to the Prime Minister. According to the High Commission in New Delhi a similar letter has gone to all the Williamsburg Summit leaders.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Acting High Commissioner should be instructed to convey a short personal message from the Prime Minister to Mrs Gandhi in reply to her letter. I enclose a draft. It is easier to reply before the Summit than after but there is no overriding reason why a reply must be sent now.

The Indians have also been lobbying, both here and in New Delhi, on their proposal for a meeting of Heads of State/Government at this year's UNGA. I enclose a copy of a Speaking Note left with Lord Belstead by the Indian High Commissioner on 23 May. Lord Belstead told the High Commissioner that Williamsburg was primarily concerned with economic matters but undertook to inform the Prime Minister of his approach. I also enclose a copy of Delhi telegram number 378 reporting a meeting between the Ambassadors and High Commissioners of the Williamsburg Seven in Delhi, and the PUS in the Indian Foreign Ministry. You will be interested to know that the Soviet Permanent Representative in New York has told us privately that Moscow has considerable doubts about Mrs Gandhi's proposal.

Nevertheless, the Indians have expressed the wish that the proposal should be discussed at Williamsburg. They seem to be concerned about the damage to Mrs Gandhi's prestige if no adequate Summit takes place in New York. Community Foreign Ministers discussed Mrs Gandhi's idea on 24 May and agreed that

/members

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members of the Ten should not return a flat negative to Mrs Gandhi but should seek to discourage her initiative. We have heard from Washington that Shultz takes the same view.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks that in the interests of our relations with the Indians we should not take the lead in pouring cold water on Mrs Gandhi's idea and suggests that the Prime Minister should not take any initiative on the matter at Williamsburg. We have heard that Chancellor Kohl may raise it. If he, or another Head of Government does so, Mr Pym suggests that the Prime Minister should be ready to agree that the proposal presents many difficulties and that the Williamsburg Seven should continue to avoid any commitment to it.

*Yours ever*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'John E. Holmes', written in a cursive style.

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

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DRAFT MESSAGE TO MRS GANDHI

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

*which reached me a few days ago*

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 9 May about the concerns of the Non-Aligned Movement <sup>with regard to</sup> ~~about~~ the prevailing world economic situation. ~~Unfortunately, your letter did not reach me until a few days ago. That is why I am only replying on the eve of Williamsburg.~~ *and the Williamsburg Economic Summit.*

I agree that all countries are affected by the world recession; that we live in a world of growing economic interdependence; and that the developing countries are important for the trade of the developed countries (and, of course, vice versa). I am not convinced, however, that structural reforms are needed in the world economic system. It seems to me that the international financial and economic institutions have adapted well to the challenges which they have faced during the past ten years and that they have displayed a considerable capacity for flexibility and imagination in doing this.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/The general

The general theme for the Economic Summit Meeting at Williamsburg is the state of the world economy and the prospects for recovery. My colleagues and I will be reviewing the signs of recovery which are now beginning to emerge in several of the developed countries; considering how this recovery might be nurtured without rekindling inflation; and looking at ways in which the developed and developing countries might cooperate in promoting non-inflationary growth worldwide. The fact that the Sixth Meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development is due to begin in Belgrade on 6 June will be very much in our minds.

*I was very glad to have your thoughts on the  
eve of my departure for Williamsburg.*

*W.D.*  $\frac{27}{5}$

GRS 700

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FM DELHI 210530Z MAY 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 378 OF 21 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PAR

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23 MAY 1983	
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S, IN BONN, ROME, TOKYO, OTTAWA.	

Register

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WILLIAMSBURG AND THE UNGA SUMMIT

1. RASGOTRA (PUS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY) SUMMONED AMBASSADORS OF THE WILLIAMSBURG SEVEN TO A JOINT MEETING YESTERDAY EVENING. HIS MESSAGE, HE SAID, WAS POLITICAL NOT ECONOMIC. WE WERE ASKED TO PASS ON TO OUR GOVERNMENTS INDIA'S 'FERVENT PLEA' THAT THE WILLIAMSBURG MEETING SHOULD GIVE FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION TO THE NAM PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT MEETING AT THE UNGA IN THE AUTUMN. INDIAN AMBASSADORS WERE BEING INSTRUCTED TO MAKE PARALLEL REPRESENTATIONS IN OUR CAPITALS.

2. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE INDIANS ARE BEGINNING TO PANIC ABOUT THE DAMAGE TO MRS GANDHI'S PRESTIGE IF NO ADEQUATE UNGA SUMMIT TAKES PLACE SEMICOLON AND ARE THEREFORE ANXIOUS TO PERSUADE THE WEST THAT THE NAM WILL NOT USE THE OCCASION FOR POLEMICS OR CONFRONTATION.

3. RASGOTRA'S MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) INDIA'S PROVISIONAL IDEA WAS A WEEK-LONG SUMMIT FROM 26 SEPTEMBER, IE THE SECOND WEEK OF THE SESSION. BUT ALTERNATIVES WERE POSSIBLE.

(B) INDIA WAS MAKING A SUGGESTION NOT A DEMAND. THE SUMMIT WOULD NOT SOLVE THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS. BUT IT COULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE TO THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH AND EAST-WEST DIALOGUES. THE 1960 SUMMIT HAD HELPED TO MAKE THE SIXTIES A GOOD DECADE FOR ARMS CONTROL. THE SEVENTIES HAD BEEN MUCH MORE BARREN. IT WAS TIME TO TURN THE TIDE IN THE EIGHTIES.

(C) DECISIONS WOULD BE BY CONSENSUS, NOT MAJORITY. IT MIGHT BE THAT THE ONLY RESOLUTION EMERGING FROM THE SUMMIT WOULD BE A REAFFIRMATION OF EXISTING UN PRINCIPLES. ANYTHING MORE WOULD COME ABOUT ONLY IF CONSULTATION OVER THE NEXT 2-3 MONTHS REVEALED WIDER AREAS OF AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES.

(D) THE SUMMIT WOULD NOT NEED AS METICULOUS PREPARATION AS A BILATERAL OR REGINAL ONE. BUT IF THE RESPONSE WAS FAVOURABLE INDIA WOULD BE READY THIS SUMMER TO RUSH TASK FORCES TO THE MAJOR CAPITALS INVOLVED FOR ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS ON ORGANISATION AND SUBSTANCE, AS SHE HAD SUCCESSFULLY DONE WITH ABOUT HALF THE NAM MEMBERSHIP IN ADVANCE OF THE NEW DELHI SUMMIT.

(E) THE UN HAD BEEN CHOSEN AS THE SETTING FOR THIS SUMMIT BECAUSE IT BELONGED TO US ALL AND THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE MORE USE OF. ATTENDANCE WOULD SYMBOLISE, BY ACTION RATHER THAN WORDS, EACH COUNTRY'S COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER.

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/(E)

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(F) ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS EG ON NAMIBIA WOULD NOT BE INTERRUPTED. SUCH ISSUES NEED NOT BE ADDRESSED AT ALL. INDIA HAD AN OPEN MIND. EVEN A GENERAL DEBATE COULD BE AVOIDED IF IT WAS NOT WANTED. THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE SUMMIT WOULD BE SMALL GATHERINGS OF KEY LEADERS, EG UNDER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AUSPICES (NOT INDIA'S). AN INNER CAUCUS, EG OF CANCUN POWERS, MIGHT BE ONE ELEMENT. THE ESSENTIAL POINT WOULD BE FOR THE LEADERS TO GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER'S CHARACTERS AND PREOCCUPATIONS.

(G) THE EAST HAD NOT YET SHOWN ITS HAND ON THE SUMMIT PROPOSAL ANY MORE THAN THE WEST. IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHICH EASTERN LEADERS MIGHT ATTEND. NAM LEADERS WERE UNANIMOUSLY IN FAVOUR OF THE SUMMIT BUT NOT ALL OF THEM WOULD IN FACT BE THERE. INDIA HOPED FOR PERHAPS 50-70 HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT IN ALL.

(H) THE SUMMIT WOULD NOT DISCUSS MODALITIES FOR THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE ON MONEY AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCE. BUT GENERAL NORTH-SOUTH ECONOMIC ISSUES WOULD OF COURSE FEATURE.

(I) IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK COULD BE INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS IDEAS ABOUT THE SUMMIT WITH THE INDIANS AND OTHERS THERE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TOOK A FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE AND HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO MRS GANDHI'S APRIL LETTER ABOUT THE NEW DELHI MESSAGE.

(J) THE PRESENT APPROACH WAS NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH MRS GANDHI'S MORE GENERAL LETTER TO THE WILLIAMSBURG SEVEN, WHICH HAD BEEN DESPATCHED ON 9 MAY (MOST OF US SAID WE WERE NOT AWARE THAT IT HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED).

(K) INDIAN DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY SOME IN THE WEST REGARDED THE NAM AS ANTI-WESTERN (SIC).

WADE-GERY

LIMITED

ERD		PS/LORD BELSTEAD
ESID		PS/MR RIFKIND
WED		PS/MR HURD
FED		PS/MR RAISON
NAD		PS/PUS
ECDS		SIR J BULLARD
PLANNING STAFF		MR EVANS
TRED	— UN	MR HANNAY
ESSD	— SRO	MR THOMAS
EESD		MR DONALD
NEWS D		MR HAYES
PS	— PCD	MR ADAMS

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 May, 1983

I have agreed that  
this telegram may be  
despatched. A.S.C. 13/5

Dear John,

Possible New York Summit

Thank you for your letter of 4 May.

We have now established that our European partners are also cautious about Mrs Gandhi's idea, and that none of them has sent or will be sending more than a non-committal reply at this stage. Sir R Wade-Gery is seeing Mrs Gandhi on other business on 16 May and we had thought this might be an opportunity for him to hand over a reply from the Prime Minister. However in present circumstances it might be better for him simply to speak along the lines of the attached telegram of instructions. It would be helpful if this could be despatched today. If this is not possible perhaps you could arrange for the Resident Clerk here to be told over the weekend when it has been cleared.

Yours ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

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IMMEDIATE

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 2 GRS  
 3 CONFIDENTIAL  
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 6 FM FCO MAY 83  
 7 TO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI  
 8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
 9 INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK  
 10 MY TELNO 238: MEETING WITH MRS GANDHI: SUMMIT AT UNGA  
 11 1. When you see Mrs Gandhi you should say only that while the  
 12 Prime Minister is grateful for her letter, she hopes Mrs Gandhi  
 13 will understand that in present circumstances she is not able  
 14 to give a substantive reply.  
 15 2. If asked to comment informally on current thinking in  
 16 London, you should not go beyond what the PUS said to Rasgotra  
 17 about our having an open mind (my telno 228).  
 18  
 19 PYM  
 20 NNNN  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Limited UND SAD ERD ACDD PS PS/PUS Sir J Bullard Mr Adams
Drafted by (Block capitals) JOHN HOLMES		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Concurrence reference	Time of despatch	

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 May 1983

Possible New York Summit

Thank you for your letter of 29 April.

As I told John Holmes earlier today, the Prime Minister agrees that we should take a fairly cautious, and perhaps even slightly discouraging line, about this proposal at the discussion of the Political Committee of the Ten today. The only value which Mrs. Thatcher sees in Mrs. Gandhi's proposal is the prospect which it could conceivably offer of getting Andropov to the United States and the opportunity this would present for meetings between him and Western leaders.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

*In view of your interest in this, you should know of the proposed F/C-O. line.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 April 1983

*do you want them to be discouraging about Mr. Gandhi's proposal? Or just cautious?*

*Dear John*

*A.T.C. 3/8*

*I think so. The only person in my view would be to get Mr. Andropov to the U.S. if he would go. MT*

Possible New York Summit

When I wrote to you on 21 April, transmitting Mrs Gandhi's letter of 3 April to the Prime Minister, I said that we would be discussing the Indian idea for a 'General Assembly Summit' with our European partners and with the Americans.

The Americans were strongly critical of the New Delhi Declaration, which made many explicit attacks on them (and none on the Russians), and they view the Summit proposal with considerable caution. The President's reply to Mrs Gandhi is likely to be entirely non-committal. I enclose a copy of Washington telegram No 1151.

There will be a chance for us to sound out our European partners when the Political Committee of the Ten discusses the subject on 4 May. We would expect most delegations to be reluctant to sound too negative towards a proposal which, if it makes headway at all, may well gather speed and prove hard to resist. On the other hand, there can be little attraction for Western countries in a Summit based on the judgements and demands made by the Non-Aligned at Delhi; it is, at the least, probable that such a meeting would achieve very little; and there is a clear risk that the developing countries, with help from the East, would seek to put the blame on the West. At the moment, it is still not clear what real support there may be in the Non-Aligned Movement for Mrs Gandhi's idea, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations has publicly expressed doubts about it.

Another point we should bear in mind is the possibility that Mr Andropov would represent the Soviet Union. If he did, there would obviously be high expectations of a US/Soviet Summit, either in New York or, on the analogy of Glassboro, at some point suitably between there and

/Washington.

UN. Heads of State Attendance

UN Gen Ass . U.N  
April 85



Washington. If this were to happen, it would obviously be the main focus of attention and might serve to reduce the amount of time Andropov would have for meetings with other world leaders in New York. Another possibility is that Andropov would go to New York knowing that a meeting with President Reagan was not on the cards: in that case, his visit might take on a more than usually propagandist and anti-American colour. Either way, however, we would assume that if the Prime Minister were to go to New York and wish to arrange a bilateral meeting with Andropov, this could be arranged quite naturally as between two Permanent Members of the Security Council; but there might not be time for much discussion of substance.

Subject to the Prime Minister's views, Mr Pym thinks that we should take a fairly cautious - and perhaps even slightly discouraging - line at the meeting of the Political Committee of the Ten on 4 May. We could make it clear that our minds were not closed to Mrs Gandhi's proposal, but that the idea needed careful consideration and that there were a number of possible disadvantages to be taken into account. In the light of what transpires, we will submit a draft reply to Mrs Gandhi. At this stage, something friendly but non-committal would seem about right.

If there is to be a Summit in New York, the most likely time would appear to be the last week in September.

*Adms over,  
J.P.F.*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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FM WASHINGTON 281700Z APR 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1151 OF 28 APRIL 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE UKNIS NEW YORK, NEW DELHI PRIORITY EC POSTS

YOUR TELNO 707: NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT MEETING: FOLLOW-UP

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED A SIMILAR LETTER FROM MRS GANDHI ON THE RESULTS ON THE NON ALIGNED SUMMIT. THIS STATES THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE DOMINATED BY CONCERN ABOUT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE PREPARED TO JOIN A MEETING WITH HIS FELLOW HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT YET REPLIED. A DRAFT REPLY, APPROVED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND MRS KIKRPATRICK, IS GOING OVER TO THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY. THIS STATES THAT THE US HAS GREAT RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE FORMATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. IT EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE TREATMENT OF SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES AT THE NEW DELHI MEETING. IT STATES US READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN SEEKING PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO URGENT AND SERIOUS PROBLEMS. ON THE PROPOSAL FOR A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, THE DRAFT IS ENTIRELY NON-COMMITTAL (QUOTE YOU MAY BE SURE THAT YOUR PROPOSALS WILL RECEIVE THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION UNQUOTE).
3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE INSTRUCTING THEIR EMBASSIES IN THE CAPITALS OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SEVEN TO DISCUSS MRS GANDHI'S PROPOSAL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE MAKES CLEAR THAT THE US VIEWS THE PROPOSED MEETING WITH CONSIDERABLE CAUTION. THE PRESENCE OF WESTERN HEADS OF STATE COULD HELP TO INJECT SOME REALISM INTO THE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK. BUT THE US IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTEXT IN WHICH SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE HELD, GIVEN THE PROPENSITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO BLAME THE WEST, IMPLICITLY, FOR THE ARMS RACE; AND EXPLICITLY FOR THE ECONOMIC DISTRESS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IT WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY PRACTICAL RESULTS. THE LAST HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TURNED INTO A MEDIA CIRCUS, INCLUDING THE KHRUSHCHEV SHOE-BANGING EPISODE AND CASTRO'S VISIT TO HARLEM. THE STATE DEPARTMENT NOTE THAT THE INDIAN PROPOSAL IS A RE-HASH OF ONE MADE SOME TIME AGO BY BREZHNEV AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL CERTAINLY SEEK TO EXPLOIT IT.
4. THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE INDIANS CLAIM THAT THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL SUPPORTS THE PROPOSAL. THE AMERICANS ARE CHECKING THIS. THE INDIANS WILL NOW TRY TO PERSUADE EACH GOVERNMENT THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE RESPONDING MORE POSITIVELY THAN, SO FAR, IS THE CASE. THE AMERICANS HAVE HEARD RUMOURS THAT AT SUCH A MEETING THE NON-ALIGNED MIGHT ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS PALESTINE AND NAMIBIA, NEITHER ISSUE WAS MENTIONED IN MRS GANDHI'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT.

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/ 5.

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5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO ENSURE THAT NONE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WILLIAMSBURG SEVEN SHOULD RESPOND SUBSTANTIVELY TO THIS PROPOSAL WITHOUT FULL PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHERS.

6. THE AMERICANS, IN SHORT, ACTIVELY DISLIKE THIS IDEA, THOUGH THEY REALISE THAT IT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO STOP THIS BANDWAGON STARTING TO ROLL.

WRIGHT

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UND  
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ECJ(E)  
PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
PS/PUS  
SIR J. BULLARD  
MR GIFFARD  
MR DONALD  
MR ADAMS  
MR GOODISON  
MR EVANS  
MR THOMAS

2

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I have spoken to  
the F.C.O.  
A.S.C. 26.  
4

PRIME MINISTER

POSSIBLE ATTENDANCE BY HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT

AT U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I attach Mrs. Gandhi's letter. We shall let you have a  
reply in due course.

You will see that Mr. Pym proposes to discuss the idea of  
a "General Assembly Summit" with our European partners and with the  
Americans. If you agree, I should like to convey to the Foreign  
Secretary and Sir Antony Acland (for their own information and not  
to broadcast to anybody else) your thought that if this gathering  
takes place in New York it might provide a useful opportunity for  
you to meet ~~and~~ Andropov. I believe that this idea will need the  
most discreet handling. We must certainly avoid the idea becoming  
public in any way - and not court at any stage the risk of a rebuff.  
Clearly, nothing should be said to the Russians until very much later  
on and then only with your explicit approval.

A.S.C.

The main purpose would be  
(1) to get Andropov to see the U.S.  
(2) to arrange bilateral meetings for him  
with several Western nations - on U.S.  
territory.

22 April, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 April, 1983

Dear Jim,

As part of the follow up to the Non-Aligned Summit Conference in New Delhi last month the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Prime Minister of India has addressed letters to the Heads of State or Government of all countries. I enclose Mrs Gandhi's letter to the Prime Minister. Although it is dated 3 April it has only now been delivered here.

The letter and its enclosure address the subjects of disarmament and development in terms consistent with non-aligned thinking but which we cannot easily accept. It urges the Prime Minister to meet other Heads of Government in New York during the General Assembly this autumn 'to give fresh thought to ways and means of tackling the major problems of the day'.

B/F 1 We think Mrs Gandhi's letter should have a thoughtful and reasoned reply. If you agree, we will send you considered advice and a draft reply in two or three weeks' time. We shall in the meantime be discussing the non-aligned proposals, in particular the idea for a 'General Assembly Summit', with our European partners and with the Americans.

Chancellor Kohl will have received an identical letter and may perhaps mention it during the talks tomorrow. We would not recommend that the Prime Minister raise it.

Yours ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

SUBJECT LL MASTER  
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 44<sup>IA</sup> / 83



PRIME MINISTER  
INDIA

New Delhi,  
April 3, 1983

My dear Prime Minister,

As you know, the 7th Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned countries was held in New Delhi from the 7th to the 12th March, 1983. I wanted to write personally to inform you, however, briefly, about the Conference and the issues with which we were principally pre-occupied.

A little over half of humankind was represented at the New Delhi Conference. So it was natural we should all be concerned with the problems that confront the international community as a whole, namely peace, independence, disarmament and development. On all these questions of overriding priority we had a united approach.

The Conference adopted a Declaration on several political and economic issues. In addition, the assembled Heads of State or Government issued a special "New Delhi Message". I enclose the text of the Message. As you will see, it embodies our fears and apprehensions as well as our hopes and aspirations. Our proceedings were dominated by a deep awareness of the threat of

nuclear war and the global economic crisis. The Message brings these concerns into sharp focus.

A number of proposals have been made on the highly complex question of nuclear disarmament. We, the non-aligned countries, earnestly urge an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict by taking the necessary steps outlined in the Message. There is pressing need for the nuclear weapon Powers to agree on a reassuring gesture.

The world is confronted with an acute economic crisis. We have invited attention to the necessity of restructuring the existing world economic system through a process of global negotiations. In the meantime, there should be a set of immediate measures to bring the world back to the path of sustained growth. We have suggested the convening of an International Conference on Money and Finance for Development with universal participation. It is now widely recognised that the economies and other aspects of the developed and developing nations are so interlinked that the search for solutions has to be made together by us all,

developed and developing. We believe we have made constructive proposals to this end.

The Message sets out our positive approach to other problems of worldwide concern such as Palestine and the Middle-East, the independence of Namibia, racism and apartheid, and stresses the need to find internationally acceptable solutions to the problems of different regions.

Urgent, even dramatic action is needed to rebuild confidence. We felt that it would be useful for the Heads of State or Government of the members of the United Nations to meet in New York for a few days at the time of the 38th Session of the General Assembly. The idea is to give fresh thought to ways and means of tackling the major problems of the day. We are realistic enough not to expect spectacular results since these problems are complex. But the least we can hope to achieve, at such a high-powered gathering, is a reduction in international tension and the initiation of a process which would improve the political climate and make it more conducive to the solution of problems. It would be a collective manifestation of our political will to grapple with our problems instead of letting problems overwhelm us.

I earnestly hope, Prime Minister, that you will agree with our basic approach. I am fully conscious that Heads of State or Government are extremely busy with urgent and important issues in their own countries. But at the N.A.M. we all thought that we should find some time to meet in New York. I do hope you also will be able to come to New York next autumn for a few days, to join fellow leaders in a common search for answers to our common problems. Need I say that your contribution will be invaluable.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely  
Indira Gandhi.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister, First Lord of the  
Treasury and the Minister for the  
Civil Service,  
London



## THE NEW DELHI MESSAGE

1. Our world is increasingly turbulent and insecure. International economic relations continue to be characterized by inequality, domination and exploitation. The gravity of the situation is evident in the intensification of the arms race, in the resistance of the strong to the initiatives for change in favour of the weak, in great power involvement in regional conflicts and in the threat of a worldwide nuclear catastrophe.
2. Peace and peaceful co-existence, independence, disarmament and development are the central issues of our time. But peace must be based on justice and equality because the intolerable inequality and exploitation established by colonialism and imperialism remain the most important causes of tension, conflict and violence in the world.
3. We, the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, appeal to the great powers to halt the arms race which is consuming, at an ever-increasing rate, the scarce material resources of our planet, destroying the ecological balance and wasting much of our finest scientific talent in sterile and destructive pursuits. These should be used to revitalize and restructure the world economy. The resources released by measures of disarmament should be diverted to promote the development of developing countries.
4. The non-aligned countries, speaking for the majority of the world community, want an immediate halt to the drift towards nuclear conflict which threatens not only the well-being of humanity in our times but of future generations as well. The nuclear weapon powers must heed this voice of the people of the world. From all indications, 1983 may be a crucial year for nuclear disarmament. We urge the nuclear weapon powers to adopt urgent and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. They should agree on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances and stop further production and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is also essential that they observe existing arms limitation agreements while seeking to negotiate broader and more effective programmes leading to general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, under international supervision.
5. The world economic crisis, which originated in some of the major industrialized countries, has now become truly global in character and scope. In developed countries it has led to economic stagnation and rising unemployment, to which they have reacted by adopting protectionist and other inward-looking policies. In developing countries, whose economies are specially vulnerable, it has led to enormous balance of payments deficits, mounting debt burdens and worsening terms

of trade due to the steep fall in their commodity prices and to the sharp rise in the prices of industrial products which they have to import. All this has brought many of these countries to the brink of disaster.

6. Never before have the economic fortunes of the developed and developing nations been so closely linked together. Yet many rich nations of the world are turning in the midst of this common crisis to the catastrophic bilateralism of the 1920s and 1930s rather than to enlightened multilateralism. They still refuse to recognize that the economic revival of the North is simply not possible without the economic survival of the South. Solutions to these problems must necessarily be global.

7. The present crisis has demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing international economic order to deal with the problems of development. A thoroughgoing restructuring of this order through a process of global negotiations is necessary. All hurdles must now be overcome so that these negotiations can be launched without delay. Non-aligned countries are committed to strive for the establishment of the New International Economic Order based on justice and equity.

8. Concurrently, immediate measures must be taken to start a process of recovery and to bring the world economy back to the path of sustained growth. The activation and stimulation of the growth process in the developing countries must be a key objective of this endeavour. Immediate measures are needed in several areas. Special emphasis must be placed on enabling developing countries, particularly the Least Developed Countries, to solve their acute balance of payments problems without interrupting their development process. At the same time, satisfaction of their basic needs of food and energy, enhanced access to markets and fair prices for commodities must be ensured. Protectionist trends must be reversed and immediate measures to dismantle trade barriers implemented. It is necessary to put an end to unequal exchange between developed and developing countries. Besides, many developing countries are in a tragic situation because of their inability to meet their debt obligations. This serious problem should be urgently addressed.

9. We propose the immediate convening of an international conference on money and finance for development, with universal participation, and a comprehensive restructuring of the international monetary and financial system.

10. We are deeply concerned about the tensions and confrontations between the great powers and their disturbing effects on non-aligned countries. We are determined to resist economic and political pressures that might be exerted by any great power against small and vulnerable States.

11. Urgent political issues, such as the pressing need to restore to the brave Palestinian people, who are waging a heroic struggle against Israeli forces, their inalienable right to establish a national sovereign State of their own in accordance with United Nations resolutions; the withdrawal of Israel from Jerusalem, occupied Palestine and Arab territories and from Lebanon; the independence of Namibia to be achieved by the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435; the need to achieve peace in Central America through political negotiations between the parties concerned, as well as the problems in South-East Asia, South-West Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and other areas in the world, call for a sincere effort on the part of all countries of the world to resolve them in accordance with the principles of peace and justice, independence and equality. No less urgent is the

common responsibility of all of us to ensure that our fellow human beings everywhere live in dignity and honour. Many wrongs have been perpetrated on the continent of Africa and its long-suffering people. The people of South Africa are bravely struggling against the obnoxious and oppressive system of racism and *apartheid*. We reaffirm our solidarity with the African people and their noble cause. There are some great powers in a position to help achieve this objective faster and, hopefully, with less suffering all round. We earnestly urge them to do so.

12. We, on our part, are committed to pressing these and other critical issues at the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We urge the Heads of State or Government of all countries of the world to join us there. We stand ready to co-operate with them in finding equitable, fair, speedy and just solutions to these problems. Our destiny is common.

13. The crisis which confronts our civilization today is unprecedented in history. Great tasks call for wise decisions. We appeal to the great powers to give up mistrust, engage in sincere, forward-looking negotiations in a spirit of shared good faith to reach agreement on various disarmament measures and to find a way out of the deepening economic crisis which threatens all of us. Unitedly, the members of the Non-Aligned Movement are prepared to do everything in their power to assist in this process. The earth belongs to us all — let us cherish it in peace and true brotherhood, based on the dignity and equality of man.



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