

PREM 19/2560

Call on PM by

~~Visit of~~

Sir A. Parsons the British

Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

UNITED NATIONS

JULY 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
8.8.74							
4.8.74							
18.2.83							
15.4.87							
<div data-bbox="42 803 418 1182" data-label="Text"><p>CLOSED</p></div> <div data-bbox="503 906 1494 1136" data-label="Text"><p>PREM 19/2560</p></div>							



cc CDP

House of Commons

CDP

BRITISH POWER IN THE WORLD

SUMMARY

In the 1930s Britain was as great a power as any. During the war we became junior partners to the Americans. Thereafter we were reluctant to admit the extent of our decline. Our economy would not support partnership with the Americans and by trying to do too much we missed opportunities. (Paras 1-4)

Recently we have over-stressed the modesty of our position. The tide of world events is favourable to us. (Para 5)

US dominance declining. The Soviet system failing and the Russians a less serious threat than before. We should avoid risks and NATO remains our best bet but military considerations need not be dominant. We are well placed to check drifting apart within the Atlantic community. (Paras 6-9)

Britain and France have a major responsibility in dealing with relations between the West and developing countries. The increasing number of players in the world game offers greater flexibility. It will be our fault if our prosperity does not keep pace with rise in wealth of world's biggest market. (Paras 10-12)

Economic conditions changed to our advantage eg raw materials, energy. Knowledge forms high proportion of unit costs. Importance of London. We retain traditional advantages. (Paras 13-15)

/Suggestions

CONFIDENTIAL



Suggestions for making use of our blessings. Closer relations with the Japanese. The Americans are our best friends and we should not hesitate to press our views, selectively, on them. We have the capacity to influence arms control negotiations and to improve NATO efficiency through more European military-industrial integration. Reform of agricultural policies should involve developing countries. It is time to concentrate on Africa. Encourage talks between the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Strive to improve Anglo-French cooperation. (Paras 16-24)

We are in the second rank but nonetheless a Great Power and have more influence than we always recognise. The future looks brighter than it did in 1950. The Diplomatic Service is a national asset. (Paras 26-26)

CONFIDENTIAL



United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations
845 Third Avenue New York NY 10022

Telephone 752-8400

Your reference

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
LONDON SW1

Our reference

Date 15 April 1987

Sir

BRITISH POWER IN THE WORLD

1. In this my farewell despatch I reflect on the fluctuations of British power in the world during my lifetime, especially since 1945, and draw some conclusions. (Incidentally, I regret the decline in recent years of reflective and forward-looking despatches. They have a value in encouraging thought and debate.)

2. In the 1930s Britain was by any yardstick except population a very great Power. There was none greater. I recall my mother sending aid parcels to my Depression-stricken cousins in America as well as to the children of a persecuted Jewish scientist in Austria. The Royal Navy was second only to the US Navy and the gap was small. We owned 27% of the world's shipping (3.5% in 1985) and the UK on her own did about 15% of world trading (5.7% in 1985). The Sterling Area accounted for almost 25% of world trade but many other countries traded in sterling and it is likely that as much as 50% of pre-war trade was undertaken in sterling (about 5% in 1985). For international business our banking was dominant and our overseas investment was greater than that of any other country. British science was second to none with the largest proportion of Nobel prizes (now the Americans win 4 times as many as we do). J J Thomson, Rutherford, Eddington and Jeans were discovering how the universe worked both at the micro and at the macro level. Sherington and Adrian were showing how man worked physiologically and Keynes how he sometimes functioned economically. We were also innovative in literature and the arts. However, the 1930s were redolent of wishful thinking. There was a lag between reality and perception. We were less powerful than we liked to think.

3. In World War II we suffered a series of sobering defeats. At length we triumphed because of grit (the Blitz and the convoys) and imagination (Dunkirk and Churchill), but also because of science (radar, Spitfire and nuclear fission) and our extensive overseas assets and connections. Yet it became a matter of us helping the Americans rather than vice versa. We became the

/junior

CONFIDENTIAL



junior partner. We drew some correct conclusions from the shift in the balance of power. For example, Atlee accepted the inevitability of Indian independence and Bevin saw the need to grasp the Marshall Plan. Although we manned the dykes against Soviet expansionism, not least in Greece and Berlin, in the end the main brunt had to be borne by the Americans.

4. We were in decline but reluctant to admit the extent of it. By 1950 when I joined the Service we were committing ourselves to some unrealistic policies. Partly for prestige and partly because of the sterling balances we continued for too long in proping up sterling and the Sterling Area at the expense of our domestic economy. In international affairs also we aimed to do more than we had the power to do, and thus made poor use of such power as we had. Even so sensible a man as Sir R Makins, who served the Treasury as well as the Foreign Office, said in his state paper of August 1951, "if we accepted a lesser role, it would be so modest as to be intolerable". He continued "if we were classed as just a European Power and bound in an organic relationship to a predominantly Latin and Catholic grouping we should soon lose our world position and a great deal of our liberty of action without strengthening either Europe or ourselves". He opted for NATO as "our best bet by far" and for Anglo-American partnership but saw that it depended upon economic independence, "the strand of our policy which is in the greatest danger of breaking". His conclusion that "the way to success abroad lies in the mines, blast furnaces and factories at home" was not taken seriously enough. In this climate we missed the chance to shape Europe and revive our own economy. Suez, industrial inefficiency and unrest, stop-go policies, the wrong system of nuclear power and Skybolt instead of Polaris, led to a series of defence reviews designed to shape our coat according to our cloth, but the amount of cloth always diminished before the coat was fully cut.

5. It cannot be denied that Britain fell into a "lesser role", but in the last several years we have been in danger of overstressing the modesty of our position. Just as formerly we allowed a lag to develop between reality and our perception of diminished British power, so today there is a lag between the changing world balance of power and our perception of the opportunities it offers us. The tide of world events is in a direction favourable to us if we have the will to make use of it.

6. The United States is by far the world's greatest power, but the extent of her dominance is declining. Vietnam and the attempt to run the Great Society simultaneously began the trouble. Now America is embroiled with such small fry as Nicaragua, while her public debt has tripled under Reagan's presidency and the US has become the largest international debtor. As the US has lost sympathy for and with the Third World, Britain, as the country with the best access in Washington, has become a more valuable interlocutor for most governments.

/7. Fortunately



7. Fortunately the Soviet Union has been still less successful than the US. Whereas American initiative will almost certainly set the United States to rights, it is doubtful that even Mr Gorbachev wants to or could change the stifling Soviet system to a decisive extent. The world has seen that the Soviet system has failed economically, eg grain imports, socially and morally. Afghanistan has been a disaster for the Russians. They have observed that the world does not like Russian expansionism and does not want communism. The Russians have missed what Marx thought would be the greatest opportunity for communism. Decolonisation has come and gone without the capitalist world collapsing or the newly independent people turning to Moscow. Taken overall, the Russians are a less serious and immediate threat than they were to us and to the West in general.

8. It has turned out that there are important limits to what military power can achieve. Nevertheless, what it has done has been crucial: it has prevented through deterrence a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As the Super Powers have come to understand each other and the military equation, war in Europe has become improbable. Clearly we should not take risks and must maintain our own military power and that of NATO, which remains our best bet, but the fact that military considerations need no longer be dominant should be helpful to us.

9. There are signs - trade wars, misunderstandings, mis-information, lack of sympathy, failure to hear the other chap - to suggest that Europe, the US and Japan are drifting apart. The anti-Americanism rampant in much of the West, including the UK, is short-sighted, mean and confused. No European is as well placed as we are to help keep the Atlantic community together. This necessary effort will be a test of our statesmanship, but I believe we are up to it.

10. The relationship between the West and developing countries is likely to be the most important problem of the early 21st century. Before the end of the century 80% of mankind will live in the developing countries and in the 21st century these people, over 4 billion of them, will constitute a significant proportion of our markets. (The world population will be close to 6 billion compared with 1.6 billion at the beginning of this century.) Self-interest as well as morality suggests that we need to act in a spirit of generosity and partnership with developing countries, though on the basis of hard-headed assessments. This will be the easier politically since the big blocs in the Third World are beginning to splinter into sub-groups based on mutual self-interest. Europe is already the main interlocutor of the Group of 77 and of most of the sub-groups. Britain and France have far more links with developing countries than anyone else does. This, together with our privileged position in the IMF and World Bank, makes us an important player in the world game.

/11. We are



11. We are also helped by the fact that the number of effective players in the international arena has increased, thus producing a flexible and delicate balance in which the weight of the United Kingdom can more readily make an impression than in the days when only the US and the USSR counted. China is fitfully emerging from her shell. India has become a self-sufficient and moderately successful democracy. Germany feels more settled and has become one of the world's strongest and most stable economies. And above all, Japan under democratic government has amassed enormous wealth and bought large hunks of American industry and real estate. When the US threatens retaliation against Japanese exports it is the dollar not the yen which falls.

12. Amongst such powers of the second rank at least three - Germany, France and Britain - are inside the world's biggest market and provided this market is properly organised, a matter not to be taken for granted, are in a favourable position to grow economically. Membership of the Community limits our flexibility and initiative but on balance adds to our prosperity and power. It will be our own fault if our prosperity does not at least keep pace with the general rise in European wealth. In the period 1966-85 we had a per capita growth rate of 2.1 whereas Germany achieved 2.8, France 2.9 and Italy 3.5. These 20 year averages combine in our case a very poor performance over roughly the first half with a good one since about 1979. We are now doing as well or better than our partners. This is a notable achievement and one on which we can build. Continued improvement is a sine qua non for greater international influence.

13. There are other reasons for optimism. First, as the political scene has altered so too the economic conditions which prevailed for some 30 years after World War II have decisively changed. We are now living in an interdependent world with a world economy. This is quite different from a world of national economies. There is a stable world surplus of food and raw materials, and as a major importer of both this benefits us. Our energy position with oil, gas, coal and nuclear production all available is enviable. We are one of the most efficient agricultural producers in the world and this should stand us in good stead when the great and painful shake-out in agricultural policy comes in the next few years. Raw materials, which in general we lack, now account for a relatively much smaller amount of unit costs. The bulk of unit costs in modern products relate to technology, research and development, testing and marketing; in other words the cost of brain power has become far more important than the costs of raw materials. This points decisively to an enhanced need to spend on education and research, areas in which, though traditionally strong, we have been lagging. If we do not improve on these traditions we shall lose our competitive edge technologically.

14. The figures are striking. For example, 100 lbs of fibreglass cable transmits as many telephone messages as does one ton of copper wire and the energy required to produce the former is only 5% of that needed for the copper wire. The manufacturing costs of semi-conductor microchips are about 70% knowledge, 12% labour and only about 3% raw materials. Nor is this phenomenon confined to top-of-the-art products.*

/In 1984



In 1984 Japan consumed across the board only 60% of the raw materials needed for the same volume of industrial production in 1973. The West (including Japan) is heading towards a situation where the blue collar workers, already outnumbered by those in the service industries, may find they are no more numerous than those engaged in the production of knowledge. *Pari passu* major developed countries may come to derive as much income from invisibles as from exports (in 1984 UK invisibles were 33% of total trade). Our lead in invisibles especially in financial invisibles is therefore significantly encouraging. Capital now counts for more than trade in producing wealth and the cost of capital is increasingly important in international competition and in the debt problem which overshadows so much of the Third World. We own an impressive amount of capital. Total external assets of the UK in 1985 amounted to \$595 billion. Total net assets in 1986 were in excess of \$80 billion (the comparable figure for just 10 years earlier was \$3 billion). This makes the UK the world's second biggest creditor, after Japan. And the auspices are hopeful. With modern information technology the position of London midway in time zones between Tokyo and New York gives us a special advantage. The London Eurodollar market which can finance both trade and capital investment turns over \$300 billion each working day, a volume many times that of world trade (\$2570 billion p.a. in 1984).

15. In addition to such recent improvements we continue to enjoy our traditional advantages. We speak English and have a culture which is pretty generally admired. The demand for the services of the British Council demonstrates this. Apart from the subtle influence our language and culture confer they bring us increasing revenue as the world pays more for tourism, books, TV films, etc. The Commonwealth and English law are not in themselves political forces but they give us a degree of understanding and influence which only the French can rival. They help to maintain our reputation for speaking good sense. We have, partly for such reasons, a special position at the United Nations, the Hyde Park Corner of the world. Our voice is more influential there than our GNP would suggest and our permanent membership of the Security Council provides practical political leverage to the extent we are willing to use it.

16. So much for some of our blessings. What use can we make of them in international affairs? The following suggestions, which necessarily tread on turf belonging to others, are in general simplified terms.

17. The cohesion of the Western community is the foundation of our security. We are particularly well placed to forward this as between Europe and America, but the latter are rightly increasingly concerned about Japan. It would be good for our relations with the US as well as for Western cohesion if, despite the obvious difficulties, we could get closer to the Japanese. We probably have more assets in Tokyo than do our fellow Europeans.

/18. Our future



18. Our future does not lie under the Soviet shadow to the extent it did, say, 25 years ago. The corollary is that we do not have to accept American domination, as distinct from gratefully acknowledging the US as the most influential member of the Alliance. The US is our best friend and probably always will be, but we should have the confidence of our own convictions and analysis - our batting average is better than theirs - and we should not hesitate, selectively, to press our views and to act on them. This is true consultation between friends and will not drive the Americans to leave Europe.

19. Defence through arms control (in addition of course to defence through military deployment) is of crucial importance to the cohesion of the Alliance. A balance of conventional forces properly verified ranks as a very high priority. The US ground and air forces in Europe are more important to us than exact numbers and categories of tactical nuclear weapons. Accordingly, significant concessions in the latter field would be justified to produce a deal which gave us a conventional balance without major reduction in US forces. We have the capacity through rigorous intellectual analysis as well as political leadership to influence the Americans and the rest of the Alliance in this direction.

20. It is disappointing that the NATO countries, the home of industrial effectiveness and cost efficiency, continue to tolerate the inefficiencies involved in uncoordinated weapons programmes and discrepant logistical inventories. The fact that the problem is old and intractable underlines the need for political effort to overcome it. Progress seems most likely to lie along the path of more European military-industrial integration.

21. I need not dilate on the importance of restructuring the CAP, together with American agricultural policies, but it is worth adding that it would be helpful if encouragement of agriculture in developing countries could take place *pari passu*.

22. The resources which industrialised countries can devote to development in the Third World are limited and therefore we have to be selective. Our concentration on India paid dividends. Seen from the UN now is the time to concentrate on Africa. Delay will rapidly compound Africa's problems. We and the France are particularly well placed to take the lead.


23. As world population activities and agricultural policies in Africa have been the most important developments on the economic-social side during my time at the UN, so on the politico-security side the most significant development has been the institution of confidential talks between the 5 Permanent Members of the Security Council, sometimes with, sometimes without the Secretary General. This has been as much a British initiative as anyone's. Though no agreement has yet emerged (except on the re-election of the Secretary General), the practice of such consultations is valuable in itself. Besides skillful use of it opens to us better chances than otherwise of influencing substantive measures on matters of major importance, eg Iran-Iraq and Arab-Israel.



24. Africa and the Security Council are only two of the fields in which there is at one and the same time Anglo-French rivalry and a need for more effective cooperation. Difficult though it is, more of the latter and less of the former seems a specially desirable objective.
25. I recognise that action is proceeding on all these matters, but from my soapbox at Hyde Park Corner it seems that we have potentially more influence than we always recognise. Although we are in the second rank behind Super Power America, we are nevertheless a Great Power. And we are capable, assisted by the present favourable trends, of setting high standards in democratic government and the quality of everyday life. Provided of course that we at least maintain intellectual inventiveness and improve competitiveness, we could be the world leader in these fields.
26. In short, Sir, if we have the confidence and the energy to exploit our blessings - a matter in which leadership is crucial - the future looks notably brighter for Britain than it was when I entered the Service in the early 1950s. As I close my farewell despatch, I commend to you the abilities of our Diplomatic Service. Though a few, such as the French, are our equals, I do not recognise that any are our superiors. This is a valuable, if not always recognised, national asset.
27. I am sending copies of this despatch to HM Representatives at Washington, Paris, Moscow, Peking, Bonn, Rome, Tokyo, New Delhi. UKREP Brussels and UKDEL NATO.

I have the honour to be
Sir
Your obedient Servant

J A Thomson



UN

PRIME MINISTER

Stevenson Memorial Lecture

Sir Anthony Parsons is delivering the above at the London School of Economics on Thursday afternoon. This is his last commitment to a speaking engagement entered into before he took up his post here. The press will be present.

I attach the speech which he proposes to make. He makes it clear that he is speaking in a purely personal capacity. The speech is an assessment of the effectiveness of the United Nations, especially in its peace-keeping role. It contains one suggestion - namely (see page 11) that the Security Council should more often take "pre-emptive action" before disputes reach a point where peaceful solutions become impossible. By "pre-emptive action" Tony means that the Council should be convened when the signs of conflict are apparent and not when it has broken out.

I do not think this talk will embarrass you in any way.

Thankyou
MS

A.J.C.

A.J.C. 2/2
h-a

18 February 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



JATMP.
United Nations

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 August 1979

Dear Stephen,

RHODESIA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Sir Anthony Parsons called on the Prime Minister this morning for a short discussion before leaving to take up his new appointment as UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned about the possibility that unhelpful statements on Rhodesia might emerge from the forthcoming conference of the Non-Aligned in Havana next month. She said that everything possible should be done to ensure that the Commonwealth participants in the Non-Aligned conference stuck to their commitment to the Rhodesia section of the Lusaka communique. In particular, the Prime Minister would like the maximum advantage to be taken of such leverage as our aid programmes towards those Commonwealth countries may give us in keeping them in line. As you know, the Prime Minister has already asked that the new £10 million grant aid to Zambia for agricultural development should be kept up our sleeve for the time being: she would like the same tactic to be adopted so far as any other impending aid agreements with Non-Aligned Commonwealth members are concerned.

Sir Anthony Parsons told the Prime Minister of his views on how the issue of sanctions against Rhodesia should be handled in the Security Council if a constitutional conference were to produce proposals acceptable to all the parties, except the Patriotic Front, and to "reasonable Governments" in general. Sir Anthony Parsons said that his recommendation would be that the UK should address a letter to the Secretary General of the UN, or to the President of the Security Council, stressing the UK's status as the power responsible for ending the state of rebellion in Rhodesia and setting out the steps by which the UK had brought or proposed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. Depending on the stage reached at the time of sending the letter (and in particular on whether elections had been held or were still in the stage of preparation), it would set out the grounds for the UK's view that the rebellion in Rhodesia was at an end: and would go on to state flatly that, in this situation, the UN resolutions on mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia had fallen away. The letter would not call for any reply. The onus would then be on the UK's adversaries in the UN Council (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and possibly China) to launch a counter-attack against the UK's statement of the position.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that when the counter-attack had been launched, it would be open to the UK to veto a resolution reaffirming sanctions. Much the better course, however, would be to bring about a situation in which such a resolution failed to attract a requisite number of votes in the Council. The UK could, if the

CONFIDENTIAL

/proposed

↳

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

proposed constitutional arrangements were reasonable and defensible, count on the abstentions of the five Western members of the Council. Two more would be needed: these should be available from among Kuwait, Bolivia (to whom a new offer of UK aid was in the pipeline) Gabon, Jamaica, Bangladesh or Zambia itself. Sir Anthony Parsons said that, on this basis, there should be a fair chance of ensuring that the Security Council was unable to demonstrate its capacity to reaffirm the resolutions on sanctions.

On the question of the form of a Rhodesia settlement, Sir Anthony Parsons expressed the view that transitional periods should be kept to an absolute minimum (eg 24 hours if practicable). The Prime Minister agreed and said, with reference to the FCO paper on the preparation of new elections in Rhodesia which she had read on her way back from Lusaka, that the period of 3 months envisaged in the paper for the preparation of elections was much too long and that some means would have to be found of completing all the preparations within one month.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Byron Goodwin.

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

United Nations

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 August 1979

Dear Mike,

Sir A Parsons' Call on the Prime Minister

The Prime Minister has agreed to receive Sir A Parsons, our Permanent Representative designate to the United Nations at 3pm on 9 August at No 10.

I attach a biographical note on Sir A Parsons and a factual note on the UN, together with a brief note on major issues likely to arise at the UN in the near future.

Yours etc

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



- 8 AUG 1979



Sir Anthony Parsons KCMG MVO MC

Permanent Representative-designate to the United Nations, New York.

Born: 9 September 1922

Educated: King's School, Canterbury;
Balliol College, Oxford

HM Forces and Palestine Government 1940-54.

Foreign Office 1954.

Service in Baghdad, Ankara, Amman, Cairo, Khartoum and Bahrain.

Counsellor and Head of Chancery, UK Mission, New York 1969.

Assistant Under-Secretary of State, FCO 1971-74.

HM Ambassador, Tehran 1974-79.

Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary, FCO January 1979.

Married; 2 sons, 2 daughters

Interests - Modern poetry; ornithology; tennis



UNITED NATIONS

/ 1 A fact sheet on the UN is attached.

Security Council

2 For the remainder of the year, the dominant issues will be Southern Africa and the Middle East. A meeting on Palestine is scheduled for 23/24 August. The Arabs' draft resolution is likely to call for recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, for which the quid pro quo would be the PLO's acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

3 On Namibia, the Africans seem content not to call for another debate until they see the outcome of the talks with the South Africans which the envoy of the Five (Sir James Murray) begins in Pretoria on 11 August. Similarly, on Rhodesia, they will await developments post-Lusaka; though a meeting could be called at any time to take the latest report of the UN's Rhodesia Sanctions Committee.

4 Without some progress to show on the Middle East and Namibia, there will sooner or later be increased pressure for Chapter VII measures (ie economic or other sanctions) against both South Africa and Israel - leading to some difficult decisions for the UK.

5 No debate on Cyprus is likely until November (in the wake of General Assembly consideration of the question). The possibility of an early Security Council debate on Cambodia is still under discussion with ASEAN countries, the US and others, but the balance of opinion seems to be against.

General Assembly

6 The 34th General Assembly starts its three-month session on 18 September, with a general debate at Ministerial level, following which the 124 Agenda items are taken in one of the 7 committees and/or Plenary.



- 2 -

7 The tone of this year's Assembly will be strongly influenced by the non-aligned summit meeting in Havana in early September. Cuba, in the chair, will work for an anti-Western communiqué, features of which will re-surface in Assembly resolutions.

8 Like the Security Council, the Assembly will devote much of its time to Southern Africa and the Middle East; there will be similar calls for Chapter VII measures. There will be the usual set of apartheid resolutions: we are trying to coordinate the European voting pattern more effectively than we did last year, but policy differences remain.

9 On the economic side, this Assembly's most important task is to draft a new International Development Strategy for the 1980s and beyond; the plan is for this to be adopted at a special session of the Assembly in 1980.

10 Other issues will include:

- (i) Indo-China refugees. The Secretary-General is to report on follow-up to the Geneva Conference. In order to secure a fuller debate, we are pressing the ASEAN countries to inscribe a separate agenda item.
- (ii) UN finances. The position may become critical because of (a) certain countries' withholding of their assessed contributions for peacekeeping operations, and (b) the "Helms Amendment", adopted by the US Congress, which has stopped the UN making use of the US contribution (25% of the total budget): the US Administration is trying to get the amendment withdrawn.
- (iii) Western representation in UN bodies will again be under pressure from the developing countries.

/(iv)



- (iv) Rationalisation of business. Assembly sessions have become increasingly unmanageable; delegations are considering proposals to make the system function more effectively.

ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

1. 151 member states.
2. UN regular budget for 1978 and 1979 about \$986 million. UK assessed contribution 4.5%; £9 million in 1978. Additional UK contribution to UN funds and agencies in 1978 £72 million.
3. Under the UN Charter, the principal organs are:
 - a) The General Assembly, comprising all UN members and meeting in regular session from September to December each year. Emergency or special sessions may also be held.
 - b) The Security Council. 15 members. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UK has permanent membership under the Charter).
 - c) The Economic and Social Council. 54 members. Concerned with economic, social, cultural, health, and related matters and human rights. (UK has consistently secured re-election).
 - d) The Trusteeship Council. 5 members. Concerned with trust territories of which only the US trust territory of the Pacific remains (UK is a member under the Charter).
 - e) The International Court of Justice. The principal judicial organ.
 - f) The Secretariat.
4. Under provision for a Secretariat, the Charter provides for a Secretary-General (to be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council) and such staff as the organisation may require. Headquarters staff now number about 5,700, worldwide UN staff about 18,300.
5. There are in addition a number of intergovernmental agencies related to the UN by special agreements. They include the International Labour Organisation, The Food and Agriculture

Organisation, The World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation is the only specialised agency based in London.

6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).

RESTRICTED

? → please file
9 August
Bryon requested.
10/7



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Would you like to
see Sir A. Parsons?
If so, I shall fix
a time. GHW
6/7

6 July 1979

Dear Bryon.

BF 8/8/79

Sir A Parsons is due to take up his appointment as British Permanent Representative to the United Nations early in September. He will be leaving on 10 August. The Prime Minister might wish to see him before he leaves. We will be faced with a number of difficult issues in the United Nations later on this year, including Rhodesia, Namibia and the Middle East: it would be most useful for Sir A Parsons to have a chance of discussing some of these questions with the Prime Minister before he leaves the Office.

I should be grateful if you would let me know if the Prime Minister would like to see Sir A Parsons. He would be available at any time up to 10 August.

Yes please
ref.

[Handwritten signature]

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

RESTRICTED



IT8.7/2-1993

2009:02



IT-8 Target

Printed on Kodak Professional Paper

Charge: R090212