

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Visit of Mr. Nakasone Prime  
Minister of Japan.

JAPAN

Briefs + Speech by Mr. Nakasone to International  
Institute for Strategic Studies in folder.

PART ONE  
FEBRUARY 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>16.2.84</del>							
<del>8.5.84</del>							
<del>14.5.84</del>							
<del>24.5.84</del>							
<del>4.6.84</del>							
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<del>12.6.84</del>							
<del>21.6.84</del>							
<del>3.7.84</del>							
<del>18.7.84</del>							
<del>27.7.84</del>							
<del>23.10.81</del>							
Part Ends							

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PART ONE ends:-

CDP to FCO 23.10.87

PART TWO begins:-

Tokyo Tel 1006 11.12.87

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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

23 October 1987

The Japanese Ambassador has given Sir Percy Cradock to understand that Mr Takeshita is likely to want to visit Europe in advance of the Economic Summit next June. The Prime Minister would, I think, regard this as useful. If we have a more formal approach from the Japanese, it would be in order to say that the Prime Minister would welcome a visit from Mr Takeshita, assuming convenient dates could be agreed.

I am copying this letter to Alex Allan (HM Treasury) and to Tim Walker (Department of Trade and Industry).

C D POWELL

Robert Culshaw, Esq., MVO  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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*mm*

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①

MR POWELL

21 October 1987

MR TAKESHITA

Yes not

Prime Minister  
Would you wish to  
see Mr Takeshita  
next year?

COP  
22/11

not

1. At lunch today the Japanese Ambassador offered a character sketch of the new leader, Takeshita, much along the lines we have had from our Embassy, ie the party manager, who preferred to build up a consensus first rather than lead from the front like Nakasone - much more the typical Japanese product than his predecessor. The decisive factor in his favour had been the strength of his domestic and party support and Nakasone, realising this, had chosen him in order to avoid an open contest, which would have had the same result but which would have ruffled party waters for some time. The other candidates had all been rewarded: Miyazawa would become Deputy Prime Minister, Abe Secretary General of the LDP (a nicely rounded Japanese package). Policy would not change, though personal style might and the Japanese were very alive to the need to guard against fears that after Nakasone Japan might retreat into its shell.

2. Takeshita would be making his first foreign appearance at the Asean Summit. The Ambassador thought it important he should visit Europe soon and in particular was recommending that he should try to come here and see the Prime Minister in advance of the Economic Summit next year. I think if this can be done it would be valuable, following the projected visits of the Foreign Secretary and Lord Young to Japan. Takeshita has been Finance Minister but he will need a lot of drawing out and educating about the outside world. I reminded the Ambassador of the great importance we, and the Prime Minister in particular, attached to tangible signs that the Japanese market was being opened up to British suppliers of goods and services.

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3. The Ambassador also spoke of Japanese anxieties to help over the Gulf, and particularly the proposal to fund the supply of new navigational aids to be supplied by Racal and readiness to explore with Pakistan the provision of a radio beacon sited in Pakistan to guide ships in the approaches to the Gulf.

u.  
PERCY CRADOCK

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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY  
1-19 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-215 5422  
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JF6998

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

27 July 1984

Charles D Powell Esq  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON  
SW1

*FCO advice already  
passed on to  
Mr. Alison.*

*C.D.P. 31/7.*

*Dear Charles,*

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 18 July to Peter Ricketts at the FCO concerning the "2000 Group".

2 This is a matter on which the FCO are in the lead and I do not think that we can usefully add to their comments. We should, however, like to be kept in touch with developments.

3 I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts.

*Yours sincerely,  
Ruth*

RUTH THOMPSON  
Private Secretary

Japan Feb 84

Visit of NAKASONE

27 JUL 1984

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 July 1984

~~X~~ [Handwritten signature]

Japan: 2,000 Group

I attach a copy of a minute from Michael Alison on this subject, which you will recall was raised by Mr. Nakasone with the Prime Minister during his visit here.

BF

I should be grateful if you could let me know where matters stand on the Group and whether it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to write as proposed by Sir Julian Ridsdale.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry).

C.D. POWELL

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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E. R.  
Charles Powell

Sir Julian Ridsdale came to see me at his own request yesterday afternoon. He referred to a body called the "2,000 Group" which was apparently the subject of some discussion between the Prime Minister and Mr Nakasone, the Japanese Prime Minister, during the recent Summit Conference. I am afraid that I know too little about this topic to be able to take the matter further forward without reference to you.

Sir Julian informed me that he, Lord Boardman (Chairman of the National Westminster Bank) and Sir Michael Wilford (former Ambassador to Japan) have all agreed to act as patrons to the Group; whilst Richard Needham has agreed to act as the sort-of Convenor!

Sir Julian really came to see me to ask that the Prime Minister should send a short letter of appreciation to each of the three patrons - ie. himself, Boardman and Wilford - just to pat them on the back and to put a marker down that they were all enrolled.

Does this make sense? If you think this is something which the Prime Minister should do, could you draft a suitable text of a letter for her to send to the three patrons?



MICHAEL ALISON

17.7.84

Wakasave  
J. Pitt



COOPERATIVE

01-493 6030

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OM

EMBASSY OF JAPAN  
46 GROSVENOR STREET  
LONDON W1X 0BA

3rd July 1984

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I am asked by Prime Minister Nakasone to forward a letter to you.

I have much pleasure in enclosing this herewith.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*Tsuyoshi Hirahara*

Tsuyoshi Hirahara

Ambassador

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,  
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury,  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W.1.



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 June 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your kind message. She was delighted with the gift from Prime Minister Nakasone and has written to thank him.

C D Powell

His Excellency Mr Tsuyoshi Hirahara

SSM

SUBJECT

④

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER  
TOKYO



Prime Minister

June 19, 1984

CDP

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mt

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T107A/84.

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you very much for the picture "Blossom in Kew Gardens" you have so kindly presented to me. I shall treasure it as the precious memento of my visit to your country. Please accept my heartfelt appreciation for your very kind consideration.

With warmest regards,

Yours sincerely,

Yasuhiro Nakasone  
Prime Minister of Japan

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher MP  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

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3 Duty Clerk. No 10.  
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**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 97/84**

Advance copy of  
text submitted to

d.r.  
A.P.C. 12/6.

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'FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED AT SCOTTISH ATCC FROM JAPANAIR  
1424 FOR RELAY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

ON MY HOMEBOUND PLANE LEAVING LONDON I WISH TO  
EXPRESS ONCE AGAIN MY GRATITUDE FOR THE GRACIOUS HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE  
EXTENDED TO ME THROUGHOUT MY STAY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

THE LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY A GREAT SUCCESS NOT ONLY  
FOR THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES BUT ALSO FOR THE CAUSE OF GLOBAL  
PEACE AND PROSPERITY, AND WE OWE MUCH TO YOU, YOUR EXPERT  
CHAIRMANSHIP FOR THE MANY ACHIEVEMENTS THE SUMMIT HAS MADE.

I ALSO HAD A MOST PLEASANT AND FRUITFUL STAY IN YOUR BEAUTIFUL  
COUNTRY FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT, I THINK THE TALKS WE HAD WERE  
SIGNIFICANT IN FURTHER STRENGTHENING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND I  
ENJOYED THE DELIGHTFUL LUNCHEONS.

NOW WE MAKE MANY HAPPY MEMORIES OF YOUR COUNTRY, AND I LOOK FORWARD  
TO MEETING YOU AGAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

YOKAHIRO NAKASONE.

END OF MESSAGE. BROWN - ATC  
INFORMATION SC ATCC

NNNN  
27582 CABOFF GV



*With the compliments of*  
**FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT**

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
LONDON, SW1A 2AH**

RECORD OF TALKS HELD AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET DURING THE OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN, 11 JUNE 1984

Present:

Prime Minister	HE Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone
The Rt Hon Norman Tebbit MP	HE the Japanese Ambassador
Mr Richard Luce MP	Mr M Motono
Sir William Harding	Mr T Nishiyama
Mr Coles	Mr Komatsu
Mr Powell	Mr N Abe
Mr Elliott	

1. The Prime Minister welcomed Mr Nakasone to the talks held at the opening of the bilateral part of his visit to the UK. Japan's role in the world was now of increasing importance. She had read an advance text of the talk which Mr Nakasone was to deliver that evening at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and had found it most impressive; she was sure that it would be a success.

2. Mr Nakasone thanked the Prime Minister for her welcome and for the invitation to extend his stay in the UK as a guest of the British Government. He had spent the previous day on a visit to Oxford and had seen Prince Hiro there. The Prince was enjoying a very pleasant student life and appeared much more settled and confident than he had been before coming to the UK. Mr Nakasone expressed his gratitude to the British Government for all that they had done and said that he would be pleased to report to Prince Hiro's family how well he was doing. He had taken the opportunity of conveying the Emperor's gratitude to The Queen during the State Banquet at the conclusion of the Summit. The Prime Minister said that Prince Hiro's stay represented a great honour for the UK and strengthened still further the links between the two Royal Families. Prince Hiro had his own natural courtesy but was also beginning to make a distinctive contribution, as she had found when she entertained him at Chequers.

/UK/Japan



UK/Japan Relations

3. Mr Nakasone identified three specific topics which he wished to mention on the political side of bilateral relations. The first was the 2000 Group. He personally had given his hearty support to the aim of establishing a forum for meetings of politicians, businessmen and academics to supplement the contacts at official and Ministerial level between the two countries and to add an element of continuity and stability. Japan had established wise men's groups with the US, France and Germany but not as yet with the UK. There were of course the bilateral Parliamentary groups and societies such as the Japan/British Society in Tokyo; but he personally had a feeling that there were too many old men about and the time had come to bring the new generation of those active in the front line forwards into prominence, without necessarily sacrificing those who were older but could still make a contribution.
4. The second topic was NATO. He would like to ask for as detailed as possible an exchange of information on NATO affairs with Britain, within the limits of confidentiality, because of Japan's concern for peace and security. Only on the basis of early information of this kind could Japan respond quickly and appropriately to the situation. In return Japan could offer information on China, Korea and Hong Kong. Details could be discussed at official level.
5. The third topic was Hong Kong. Japan had much investment there and was therefore concerned about the future. Mr Nakasone said that he had heard something already of the negotiations from both the British and the Chinese sides, and well understood the need for secrecy, but would be grateful for anything more which the Prime Minister could tell him. He personally had close relations with Hu and Deng, and would be willing to offer Japan's assistance if it could be of any use.
6. The Prime Minister agreed that the 2000 Group was a worthwhile project and said that the British Government would take an interest in it at Ministerial level. The large number of Japanese firms now established in the UK provided a further reason for intensifying contacts. On NATO she agreed that a further exchange of information could be valuable particularly if it were reciprocal; security was now a global question. The Political Committee had already discussed this matter and there was a need for further study of possible ways of developing contacts.

7. The Prime Minister then summarised the background to the Hong Kong negotiations. She described the three treaties which governed the status of the territory and said that it was not possible to run Hong Kong except as a single unit or without cooperation from China. The original intention had been to exchange a concession on sovereignty for the right of continued British administration of Hong Kong, not with the aim of retaining control over Hong Kong (given the normal British policy of granting independence to Dependent Territories) but because the people of Hong Kong themselves wanted to maintain the status quo. However this had not been possible because the Chinese saw administration and sovereignty as indissolubly linked and insisted that Hong Kong was part of Chinese sovereign territory. It appeared however that the Chinese wished for the continuance of Hong Kong's prosperity and they had agreed that special administrative regions could be set up and could maintain a capitalist economic system.

8. The question was, however, whether the Chinese really understood the capitalist system. Britain had negotiated on the basis that it would be possible to maintain Hong Kong's lifestyle and to provide for aspects such as the legal system, nationality, freedom of movement and the currency, which could be incorporated in a binding and detailed agreement. Without such an agreement confidence would not be maintained. It was essential that this message reached the Chinese not only from the people of Hong Kong and from the British Parliament but from those in the international community who invest in Hong Kong. As the Prime Minister had explained to Deng Xiaoping, Britain took nothing out of Hong Kong but felt a moral responsibility for the future of the territory and for the maintenance of freedom and justice there; there were people in Hong Kong who had already escaped from communism once and Britain had to look after them; but the Chinese did not appear to understand this moral responsibility. Recently it seemed that there were differences emerging within the Chinese leadership, some of whom understood the British position and were prepared to make concessions, but other hardliners being less prepared to give way. The Prime Minister said that anything which Mr Nakasone could do to assist in the maintenance of confidence and of the status quo in Hong Kong would be most valuable.

#### Economic Issues

9. The Prime Minister then invited Mr Tebbit to talk about trade and other economic issues. Mr Tebbit said that he wished first to express his regret at having been unable to visit Japan in April. His present responsibilities and the many decisions which were required now compelled him to remain in Britain almost continually. He hoped that a visit might be possible in the spring of 1985.

10. Mr Tebbit said that he was pleased with the progress which had been made in encouraging Japanese firms to invest in Britain. The Nissan decision had been welcome and he had hopes that the European Commission would agree to an investment by Yamazaki. However there were still only 29 Japanese companies in Britain as compared with 1500 from the US, 200 from the FRG and 75 from Switzerland. Another favourable development was industrial collaboration such as that between BL and Honda and between Fujitsu and ICL. He realised that Japan's success in trade was due to product excellence but British products were also excellent. In the field of aerospace alone there was the BAE 146 and the Harrier. It would be easier to balance trade if the Japanese were to purchase large items rather than just bottles of whisky and chocolates. He hoped that Japan would continue efforts towards liberalisation, and would look in particular at the requests put forward by the European Community. Meanwhile Japanese restraints on exports were welcome.

11. Mr Tebbit said that he would be interested also to hear the Japanese view of prospects for the new GATT round. One particular problem was the newly industrialised countries (NICs); they asked for continued protection but meanwhile were mounting successful attacks on the markets of the developed countries.

12. Mr Nakasone said that he was well aware of what Britain had to offer in the field of aircraft and defence equipment. Quite frankly, Japan had traditionally been in the US sphere for these items. Boeing was strong in Japan and the Japan/US Security Treaty resulted in unified planning and the need for compatibility of equipment. Japan was interested in the Airbus, but the Government was not able to force decisions on private companies. Mr Tebbit said that the Harrier was compatible with US equipment because the Americans had bought many Harriers. He asked that Japan should also consider the advantages of Rolls Royce engines for their aircraft, particularly because of the collaboration with Japanese companies in the V2500 project. Mr Nakasone said that the V2500 project was very good. He know all about the Harrier but this was for the future. Japan was very interested in helicopters, and British companies should study Japan's performance requirements in this field.

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13. On GATT, Mr Nakasone said that the reference in the Summit Declaration had brought the new round closer. The need now was to talk to the developing countries and to discuss procedure. At the State Banquet he had suggested to M. Thorn that the next economic summit in Bonn next year should be an occasion for making further progress and for deciding the date of the new round; M. Thorn had agreed. The problem of the NICs concerned Japan too. They had already acquired their graduation diploma but still expected the privileges of students. In handling them we should be careful not to disappoint those other developing countries who were following in their tracks. This should be an item for the new GATT round and could be discussed at working level now.

14. Mr Nakasone asked if there were any other points on which he should comment. The Prime Minister said that she would like to see two dozen more Japanese companies investing in the UK. Mr Nakasone said that half of those Japanese companies now established in the EC were in the UK. The Nissan decision would have an effect on the intentions of others. But the labour relations situation in Britain was a problem. The Prime Minister said that this was not a problem only in Britain; workers even in the FRG were seeking a 35-hour week. Mr Nakasone said that labour relations in Japanese companies in Britain were very good. The special incentives offered by the British Government had a valuable effect and he hoped that they would continue. Mr Tebbit said that he well understood the worry which investors felt about labour relations but in practice the problems occurred largely in the public sector of British industry - hence the Government's policy of denationalisation. Labour relations in private companies, and in particular Japanese companies, were generally good.

15. Mr Nakasone said that the Japanese Government were encouraging direct investment abroad by Japanese companies as a means of reducing the large trading surplus which was otherwise likely to persist. They were looking for a total of \$20bn of overseas investment. Mr Tebbit said that the British Government were grateful for the initiatives which the Japanese had taken in the field of trade, although they believed that many of them had been designed with the needs of the US particularly in mind.

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16. The Prime Minister asked for Mr Nakasone's views on likely development in the yen/dollar exchange rate after the recent US/Japan announcement. Mr Nakasone said that the recent measures had not so far had any significant effect on the exchange rate, which remained at about Yen 230 - 231. They had expected that the yen might weaken as an initial result of the measures towards internationalisation and because of the level of US interest rates. However if the US took steps to cut their Government deficit the yen would strengthen. His personal view was that no such steps would be taken before the presidential election but something might happen afterwards. The Prime Minister agreed that the US were not likely to make any move in this direction until after the election.

17. Reverting to inward investment Mr Nakasone said that he was glad to hear about the approach to the European Commission on Yamazaki and hoped that it would be successful. He believed that there was now a need for smaller industries such as component manufacturers to set up in Britain so as to ease the problem for the major manufacturers in importing Japanese-made components. Investment by smaller companies of this kind could have a greater positive effect on employment in Britain than investment by some of the larger firms. Mr Tebbit said that another avenue was collaborative projects between Japanese and British companies manufacturing for export to other EC countries and even to Japan.

18. Mr Tebbit added that he hoped Japan would help the UK to bring the US to understand the dangers of their present attitude on the transfer of technology, whose effect might be to kill projects such as the V2500. Mr Nakasone asked whether this phenomenon had arisen earlier. Mr Tebbit said that the constraints imposed by the US on exports to third countries were now a familiar phenomenon. The Prime Minister said that extra-territorial legislation by the US had hindered technical collaboration, and this was most unfortunate. Mr Nakasone said that Japan and the UK should certainly cooperate because their interest was identical. The same applied to unitary taxation in the US. The Prime Minister said that once again progress before the presidential election might be difficult. Mr Tebbit said that the Governor of California had told him that unitary taxation was a problem for him too.

19. The meeting ended at 1300 when the participants adjourned for lunch.

Distribution:

PS  
PS/Mr Luce  
PS/PUS  
Sir J Bullard  
Sir P Cradock  
Sir W Harding  
Sir C Tickell  
Dr Wilson  
Mr Weston  
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TRED

Mr Powell, No 10 Downing Street ✓

Mr Bottrill, HM Treasury

DTI: PS/Mr Tebbit  
Mr Sunderland, OT2  
Mr Dunning, OT2  
Mr Ivins, IBB

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*S.H.*



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 June 1984

*Dear Peter,*

Visit of Japanese Prime Minister

I enclose a record of the discussion which took place at the working lunch given by the Prime Minister for Mr. Nakasone today.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*John*  
*for Mr.*

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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## RECORD OF CONVERSATION AT WORKING LUNCH GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

### Present:

Prime Minister	H.E. Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone
The Rt. Hon. Paul Channon, M.P.	H.E. the Japanese
Mr. Richard Luce, M.P.	Ambassador
Sir Robert Armstrong	Mr. M. Motono
Sir William Harding	Mr. K. Nishiyama
Mr. Coles	Mr. Y. Sato
	Mr. K. Hasegawa

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The Prime Minister asked Mr. Nakasone to give her his impressions of China. As she had explained earlier we had reached a position of some difficulty on Hong Kong. China and Britain used the same words but they did not have the same meanings. We doubted whether China could run Hong Kong as a free society. UK/Chinese relations were generally good. We were glad that the Chinese tended to share our view of the Soviet Union. But beyond that point one was up against the divide between the free world and the Communist world.

Mr. Nakasone agreed that this difference of view inevitably came up in due course - and in the middle and long terms we should have to face the implications of that difference. But in the short term Japanese/Chinese relations were good. The two sides had established the 21st century committee to study the ways and means of continuing friendship. The present regime of Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang was very enthusiastic about the modernisation policy. They wished to increase the per capita income from 250 dollars per head to 1000 dollars per head by the year

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2000. Otherwise, they believed, the stability of Chinese society would not be maintained. It was not clear how long a leadership of this persuasion would continue. But he judged that it would last for a considerable time.

The Prime Minister asked whether Hu Yaobang was more hard line than Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. In our negotiations, there appeared to be a split between the hard liners and the more pragmatic group. Mr. Nakasone described Hu Yaobang as a flexible man - a smaller Deng Xiaoping. The latter looked on Hu Yaobang as his successor. Consequently, Hu Yaobang was now well above Zhao Ziyang in the pecking order.

The Prime Minister said that we had told the Chinese that if they were thinking of stationing troops in Hong Kong after 1997, we would recognise their right to do so but consider that it would be unwise for them to exercise that right. Clearly, this matter had been the subject of debate in the Chinese leadership. Deng had then made it clear publicly that the Chinese were going to station troops in Hong Kong - and it was now probably impossible to change that. Mr. Luce added that Deng had found it necessary to speak publicly in order to counter the statements of others who had spoken in a different sense.

Mr. Nakasone said that although Deng was Chairman of the military committee, he did not think that he fully controlled the military. But if China insisted on stationing troops in Hong Kong, it would be wise to give them the functions of the troops guarding Buckingham Palace. The Prime Minister pointed out that those soldiers also had an active role. If there was trouble in Hong Kong and Chinese troops were used to suppress it, that would be the end of confidence in the colony. Mr. Nakasone said that China was faced with a serious dilemma over Hong Kong. It felt it must save face (hence its wish to station troops,

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which could have implications for Taiwan). On the other hand, it very much feared losing its income from Hong Kong. The Prime Minister questioned whether the latter consideration was strong. The Chinese had told her that they would rather take over an unprosperous Hong Kong than a prosperous Hong Kong with British administration. She had regarded that as a negotiating position. Mr. Nakasone replied that the leadership was pragmatic and he believed that their attitude was flexible. If they attempted to exert too great a control of Hong Kong, Japanese firms would leave. The Prime Minister commented that it would be helpful if Japan would indicate that to China. Mr. Nakasone replied that since Japan's attitude was much the same as ours it would certainly speak frequently with the Chinese.

The Prime Minister said that we always bore in mind the need to maintain good relations with China. Mr. Nakasone said that when he had visited China he had been told that the Chinese Government was studying the establishment of 14 free economic zones and was considering issuing a special currency for those zones. He had asked whether they were trying to immitate Hong Kong and what provision they were making for capital depreciation. Hu Yaobang had not understood a word of this. The Prime Minister said that our experience was similar. But we had got to maintain good relations with China for political reasons. It was important to the free world that the Soviet Union and China remained apart. Mr. Nakasone fully agreed. Indeed, Japan's most important strategic role was to keep these two countries apart. The instrument for this was the extension of Japanese economic cooperation to China which could be very vital to that country. This might make China unable to draw back from the free world.

When Hu Yaobang had visited Japan in November 1983 he had invited him to his private home where he had been greeted by the whole family. Hu Yaobang had returned the  
/ compliment

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compliment when he himself had visited China. The two of them got on well together, being party men. With regard to the Korean question and the Soviet Union they shared similar feelings but what they said to each other in private was very different to what they said in public. He could tell the Prime Minister, in strict confidence, that the Chinese had imposed three conditions for the development of relations with the Soviet Union in order to ensure that that development was very limited. Hu Yaobang had undertaken that if China wished to move beyond that limit he would notify Mr. Nakasone in advance. That had never happened before. He had pointed out to Hu Yaobang that the issue of the northern territories imposed similar constraints on Japan's relationship with the Soviet Union.

With regard to Korea, he had pressed Hu Yaobang to support the proposal for a meeting of the four countries concerned, saying that this would benefit China. But Hu Yaobang had explained that the relationship between China and North Korea was delicate and that he could not help but support North Korea. They had agreed that discussion on this subject should continue. The Prime Minister observed that if China was unable to make concessions to South Korea it could hardly ever hope to influence Taiwan. They were both very prosperous societies. Mr Nakasone pointed out that the difference was that the Chinese maintained that Taiwan was part of China. The way they disposed of Hong Kong would inevitably affect Taiwan. Already quite a number of Hong Kong people were moving to Taiwan. Mr. Luce referred to the difficulty of providing reassurance to Hong Kong in the light of the Chinese intervention in Tibet and the cultural revolution.

The Prime Minister then said that she had read in advance a copy of the lecture which Mr. Nakasone would make today to the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

/Mr. Nakasone

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Mr. Nakasone said that he was honoured that the Prime Minister had read it. He had personally prepared the first draft which had contained a reference to Japan always being most happy when allied with the Anglo-Saxons. But the Foreign Ministry had emasculated the draft.

He had one favour to ask. Could we support, in the elections to the International Court of Justice, the candidature of Mr. Justice Oda who was a capable lawyer with a very good reputation? The Prime Minister said that we would look at this matter and give it very careful consideration.

Mr. Nakasone said that he would be grateful for the Prime Minister's views on the conduct of policy towards the Soviet Union. Japan did not know what was happening in the Kremlin. But the Soviets knew what was happening in Tokyo. They would come out of their hibernation only when they decided to do so. The West should wait for that. If we made overtures before they took that decision we should harm our negotiating position. While maintaining this attitude, he was urging on them the need for dialogue. He believed that their Siberian development projects, for which they needed Japanese cooperation, would be a powerful influence in inducing them to abandon their hibernation. They were apparently keen to make the Eastern region self-sufficient in the sense that the expense of military ports and bases in that region would be financed by development. It was because Japan was aware of these factors that it intended to play for time.

The Prime Minister said that she did not disagree. The policy of the Soviet leadership was dangerous. If its members met only one another their mutual fears fed themselves. It was difficult to know how influential the Soviet military were. The leadership was clearly not yet ready to abandon its hibernation. Mr. Nakasone had said at

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the No. 10 Economic Summit dinner that the most important judgement the West had to make was when the Soviet Union would be ready to start negotiating again. This would not be before the US elections. She doubted if it would be soon after. Meanwhile, we should try to maintain contacts by visits in both directions and by trade.

The Russians doubted whether the Americans were sincere in their desire for disarmament. Her efforts to persuade Mr. Kadar and Mr. Chernenko of this did not appear to have succeeded. We would as a matter of course inform Japan about our own contacts. The next would be the visit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to Moscow.

If Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko, the question was whether the former's generation, which did not know war, would take a harder line. This was quite possible. There was no capacity for change in the Soviet system. They were concerned to sustain the system that had put them into power. But we should keep talking and we should be active in broadcasting. The Russians listened to Western broadcasts, especially the BBC. Mr. Nakasone said that he often listened to the BBC at about 8 o'clock in the morning. It was easier to receive than the Voice of America. The Prime Minister observed that he probably received these broadcasts via the Hong Kong transmitters.

/The Prime Minister

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- 7 -

The Prime Minister said that it was worrying that Mr. Gromyko, who knew the West better than most Russians, was so rigid. Moreover, he seemed to be increasingly powerful. Mr. Nakasone said that it looked to him like the last days of Malenkov. Gromyko might eventually become the chief manager of an electrical plant or Ambassador to Mongolia. The Prime Minister commented that she doubted this.

Mr. Nakasone then stated that there used to be consultations between the Soviet and Japanese Foreign Ministers. But Gromyko had refused to visit Tokyo when his turn had come. So the talks were in abeyance. Until Gromyko came, he would never send the Japanese Foreign Minister to Moscow. However, there were fisheries negotiations which involved the responsible Japanese Minister visiting Moscow, and the Soviet Minister of Culture came to Japan.

In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he said that Japan had no contact with the Soviet military. The Prime Minister referred to the shooting down of the Korean airliner. This had indicated a total failure of contact between the military and the politicians, together with a weakness in the chain of military command. Moreover, the Russians had shown a fundamental weakness in their inability to admit their mistake. Mr. Nakasone recalled that Japan had given to the UN Security Council recorded tapes of the conversations between the KAL pilot and his ground command. Since then the Soviet Union had accused Japan of a revival of militarism. Relations had become colder. But Japan would not initiate conciliation.

The Prime Minister referred to other recent Anglo/Soviet contacts, including a recent round-table in

CONFIDENTIAL

E.R.

CONFIDENTIAL

-8-

Moscow and a visit by a Russian ballet. She believed that the Russians had withdrawn from the Olympics because they feared the defection of able people and did not like the prospect of demonstrations.

With regard to the Gulf, we had reason to believe that there were contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to make the Russians aware that, if action were taken, it would be to protect freedom of navigation and not to score an advantage in East/West relations. The Soviet Union and the West might share a common interest in not letting Islamic fundamentalism spread. Mr. Nakasone agreed that there was a common task of maintaining the stability of the Gulf.

The discussion ended at 1430.

A. J. C.

11 June 1984

SAHAAS  
MFJAAZ

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr Coles

2 MARSHAM STREET  
LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

Dear David

✓ June 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER

I told you that my Secretary of State is opening a new Hitachi-Maxell factory in Telford this morning. He had met Sir Hugh Cortazzi the former Ambassador to Japan, and both felt that it would be very useful if the Prime Minister could mention this development - as a good example of Japanese investment in this country - to Mr Nakasone at some point during his visit. If reference to this could be included in the press release following their meeting, this would be picked up in Japan and would provide a further boost to inward investment by Japanese companies.

I enclose a copy of the press notice that we have released this morning which I think provides all the background that you will need. But, if you need more detailed information about the development perhaps the simplest thing would be for you to talk direct to Henry Cleary here on 212 3839.

Yours ever

Alan

ALAN DAVIS  
Private Secretary

David Barclay Esq



**Press Notice**

279

8 June 1984

JAPANESE INVESTMENT BOOSTS TELFORD JOBS AND INDUSTRY: PATRICK JENKIN

Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment, emphasised today the value that Government places on Japanese investment in Britain when he opened the new Maxell European manufacturing headquarters at Telford, Shropshire.

"I am delighted that recent negotiations between the Government, Telford Development Corporation and Maxell have been successful and led to this ultra modern factory set in a highly attractive semi-rural campus location. It will, I understand, eventually create 200 jobs, most of which will be recruited locally.

"But the creation of new jobs is not the main reason why the Government welcomes Japanese investment. More importantly, the right kind of Japanese investment, investment that is which brings benefit to our economy, has other advantages. For instance, import substitution and the creation of new exports which help our balance of payments; new technology and advanced production methods which strengthen our industrial base; and the introduction of management techniques which are already proving very much to the liking of the British worker, and markedly effective in commercial terms.

"But the picture is not all one-sided. The United Kingdom in turn has much to offer the overseas investor. That Maxell chose to manufacture in the UK suggests that the advantages of the UK as a European manufacturing location are increasingly recognised by overseas investors. It is a fact that the UK has been successful in attracting more Japanese investment than any other country in the European Community. Why? Because we have a highly developed industrial infrastructure with a skilled and adaptable workforce operating in a low-inflation economy; a wide range of component suppliers; an advanced system of education; a large and sophisticated home market and near self sufficiency in energy.

"On top of this we speak English - Japan's second language and the commonest medium of international business. Given these reasons alone it is no great surprise to find that the UK is now regarded in many Japanese circles as the 'preferred location' when considering European investment.

"In addition to this most prestigious factory, the Telford Development Corporation have been able to announce in recent months a number of other very important and exciting new developments. These include a 45 acre campus site at Priorslee for Ricoh UK Ltd., another Japanese firm. And the establishment by Tatung of Taiwan of its new European manufacturing and distribution plant at Stafford Park could create up to 1,000 new jobs. I know that discussions are proceeding with a number of other companies and I look forward to further announcements."

Press Enquiries: 01-212 4682/5/6 & 4690  
Night Calls (6.30pm-8.00am)  
Weekends and Holidays: 01-212 7071

Public Enquiries: 01-212 3434;  
ask for Public Enquiry Unit

cc Mr Ingham  
Sir P Cradock

4 June 1984

Visit by Mr. Nakasone

Thank you for your letter of 1 June.

The Prime Minister agrees that the nine members of the Japanese Diet who will be accompanying Mr. Nakasone to London should be photographed together with Mr. Nakasone when he arrives at No.10 before the start of the talks. Unless it is raining, the Prime Minister will receive Mr. Nakasone outside the door of No.10 and the photograph will be taken at that point.

There is no difficulty about Mr. Komatsu attending the talks.

AJC

Peter Ricketts Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc [signature] ①



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

See X. This will mean  
you going outside No. 10 to  
be photographed with Mr. Nakasone  
and the nine members of the Diet

1 June 1984

Agree?

A.S.C. 7/6.

Provided it isn't  
raining!  
[initials]

Dear John,

Visit by Mr Nakasone

I am sending you separately briefing for the talks to be held with Mr Nakasone on Monday 11 June. This letter takes up two separate administrative points.

Your letter of 14 May recorded the Prime Minister's agreement to the guest list for the working lunch and you have subsequently agreed that each side will be expanded for the talks by an extra notetaker. The Japanese have now asked that one further person should attend the talks, but not the lunch. He is Mr Komatsu, a very senior official in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry who will be in London as Mr Nakasone's senior adviser from that Ministry for the Summit. I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to agree to his inclusion among those who will be present on the Japanese side.

X

The second request which we have received from the Japanese is that the nine members of the Japanese Diet who will be accompanying Mr Nakasone to London should, exceptionally, be photographed together with Mr Nakasone when he arrives at No 10 before the start of the talks. I recognise that this is a most unusual request, but the Japanese have confirmed that Mr Nakasone personally attaches importance to it. Although he would certainly not wish the Diet members to attend the talks, for his own domestic political reasons he is anxious to have them included in the events of his visit to Britain to the maximum extent possible. For them to be photographed with him as he is received at No 10 by the Prime Minister would be a mark of favour which he would appreciate most warmly and which may pay dividends not only for his own future in Japanese politics but also for our relations with him. I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be willing to agree to this request.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts


(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

JAPAN: Unit d Nakasone, Feb 84

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AND  
MRS NAKASONE: 10-12 JUNE 1984

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

TRANSPORT

Cars are provided for the Prime Minister, Mrs Nakasone and the members of the official suite throughout the visit and seating plans are shown at Annex 1.

Interpreters

Mr Koji Tsuruoka will interpret for the Prime Minister and Miss Yoko Yajima will interpret for Mrs Nakasone.

PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFICIAL SUITE IN PRIME MINISTER'S PROGRAMME

Sunday 10 June

Visit to Oxford and River Trip

All members of the official suite will accompany the Prime Minister and Mrs Nakasone.

Monday 11 June

Talks with the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:

Japan

HE Mr T Hirahara  
Mr T Mizuhira  
Mr M Motono  
Mr T Nishiyama  
Mr K Hasegawa  
Mr Komatsu (to be confirmed)  
Mr N Abe (note-taker)  
Interpreter

UK

The Rt Hon Norman Tebbit  
Mr R Luce  
Sir Robert Armstrong  
Sir William Harding  
Mr J Coles  
Mr M Elliott (note-taker)

Luncheon hosted by the Prime Minister

The following are also invited:

HE Mr T Hirahara  
Mr T Mizuhira  
Mr M Motono  
Mr T Nishiyama  
Mr K Hasegawa

/Alistair

Alistair Buchan Memorial Lecture

HE Mr T Hirahara and Mrs Hirahara, 'all members of the official suite and Japanese members of Parliament will accompany the Prime Minister and Mrs Nakasone.

Dinner given by the Speaker and Mrs Weatherill

The following are also invited:

HE Mr T Hirahara and Mrs Hirahara  
Mr T Mizuhira  
Mr M Motono  
Mr T Nishiyama  
Mr K Hasegawa

Mrs Nakasone's Programme

When Mrs Nakasone visits Bollingbroke Hospital on Monday morning she will be accompanied by:

Mrs Hirahara  
Mrs Paterson  
Mr Miyagawa  
Interpreter  
Japanese Security Officer

Luncheon hosted by Mrs Nicholas Edwards

The following are also invited:

Mrs Hirahara  
Interpreter  
Mrs Paterson

*J. H. W. Reid.*

J H W Reid (Miss)  
Inward Visits Section  
Protocol Department  
273-3582

31 May 1984

CAR SEATING PLAN

Cars are allocated as follows:

Rolls Royce	HE Prime Minister Nakasone Mrs Nakasone
Car 2 (Limousine)	Mr Mizuhira 2 Private Secretaries Member of Japanese Embassy Gp Capt O'Neill
Car 3 (Limousine)	Mr Motono Mrs Paterson Interpreter
Car 4 (Limousine)	Mr Nishiyama Mr Sato Mr Abe
Car 5 (Saloon)	Mr Hasegawa

A Limousine will be allocated to Mrs Nakasone and her entourage when she undertakes her own programme.



DISTRIBUTION  
\*\*\*\*\*

10 DOWNING STREET

Private Secretary (2)  
Press Office (2)  
Mr Joce (1)

EMBASSY OF JAPAN (10)

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Private Secretary (2)  
PS/PUS (1)  
Sir William Harding (1)  
Mr D C Wilson (1)  
Mr M Elliott (1)  
FED (3)  
News Department (3)  
Protocol Department (10)  
Resident Clerk (1)

SPEAKER'S OFFICE

Mr W A Beaumont (2)

GOVERNMENT HOSPITALITY FUND (15)



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 May 1984

Visit by the Prime Minister of Japan

Thank you for your letter of 23 May. I shall bring to the attention of the Prime Minister your Secretary of State's views on the points to be made to Mr. Nakasone. But I take it that you will arrange for these points to be incorporated in the briefing material.

I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Miss Ruth Thompson  
Department of Trade and Industry.

CPC



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY  
1-19 VICTORIA STREET  
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Telephone (Direct dialling) 01-215) 5422  
GTN 215) .....  
(Switchboard) 215 7877

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

23 May 1984

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary to the  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

Dear John,

VISIT BY MR NAKASONE

Peter Ricketts' letter of 11 May to you outlined the topics which Mr Nakasone is likely to want to raise during his discussions with the Prime Minister on 11 June. My Secretary of State agrees that the agenda for the meeting will need to be wide-ranging in its coverage of international issues, though it will be important to take full advantage of this opportunity to take up with Mr Nakasone some of our bilateral concerns about the imbalance in our trading relationship with Japan as well as backing up the Community's representations on this front. He considers it to be most important that the Japanese Government should be reminded whenever appropriate that they need to take full account of the interests of their international trading partners in Europe as well as the United States, on whom last month's import liberalisation measures seems to have been more closely focussed.

2 Hence my Secretary of State will wish to point out the need for effective results to follow from the moves on import liberalisation that the Japanese Government have made and for further initiatives in the areas for example of greater public purchase from overseas, incentives for importers, and the early implementation of changes in Japan's financial markets. If these topics were to be omitted, there is a real risk that the Japanese Government may assume that we now attach less priority to these economic issues than in the past at a time when our visible trade deficit is continuing to grow.

3 While it would be right to acknowledge the public statements which Mr Nakasone has made on the desirability of increased imports into Japan, it would be fair to ask him how this message is to be

JH1AEE



got through to middle managers in Japanese companies who take purchasing decisions, and who have always preferred to rely on traditional Japanese suppliers rather than overseas sources. In the last resort what counts are not statements by the Japanese Government, but the actual level of our exports. Despite a rising trend in recent months these are still far lower than British companies, with their improved competitiveness, should be able to achieve.

4 I am copying this letter to Peter Ricketts.

*Yours ever,*

*Ruth*

RUTH THOMPSON  
Private Secretary

JAPAN  
Nakasone  
Visit  
2/84

1984



COMPLIMENT



See to

John Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

18 May 1984

VISIT BY MR. NAKASONE

Thank you for your letter of 17 May.

There will be no difficulty about two Japanese interpreters being present at the lunch. I note that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry will not be able to attend the lunch. I am sure that the Prime Minister will be grateful if Mr. Channon could do so.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 May, 1984

Dear John,

Visit by Mr Nakasone

You asked in your letter of 14 May whether Sir Julian Bullard or Sir William Harding should be taken off the guest-list for the Prime Minister's lunch on 11 June, to make room for Sir Robert Armstrong. Sir Julian Bullard has agreed to stand down.

We spoke on the telephone recently about who should attend the Prime Minister's talks with Mr Nakasone on the morning of 11 June. We agreed that each side would be represented by those who will be at the lunch, with the addition of an extra note-taker on the Japanese side (Mr N Abe). In addition, the Japanese will have one interpreter at the talks. They would like to have two interpreters at lunch if this is acceptable to the Prime Minister.

There is one further alteration to the proposals in my letter of 11 May. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry will be able to attend the talks starting at 11.30 am, but will not after all be able to remain for the lunch. Mr Tebbit has suggested that Mr Channon should take his place at the lunch.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (DTI) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

P F Ricketts


(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Japan: Visit of Mr. Nakasone FEB 84.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 9AB







F15 Sfr

bcc: SPC.  
Sue Goodchild

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 May, 1984

Visit by Mr. Nakasone

Thank you for your letter of 11 May.

The Prime Minister has considered the draft guest list which you propose for the working lunch for Mr. Nakasone on Monday, 11 June. She agrees with the proposals, subject to the following point. As Mr. Nakasone's personal representative for the Summit is apparently to accompany the Japanese Prime Minister at this lunch, Mrs. Thatcher would be grateful if Sir Robert Armstrong could also attend. I am afraid that this would mean either Sir Julian Bullard or Sir William Harding standing down. Could you please let me know which of them would wish to come.

I agree that briefing should be prepared to cover the subjects described in your final paragraph.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (Department of Trade and Industry) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Ry

① CPC



Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Agree guest list?

London SW1A 2AH

11 May, 1984

A.J.C. 11/5

Dear John,

MS ~~11/5~~  
never as below

Visit by Mr Nakasone

In your letter of 8 May you asked for a proposed guest list for the working lunch to be given by the Prime Minister for Mr Nakasone on Monday 11 June.

We have consulted the Japanese, and the proposals which I set out below reflect their provisional views. They have not yet decided whether the Japanese Minister of Finance, Mr Takeshita, will remain in London after the Summit until 11 June, and there are other possible changes. We shall communicate to you any alteration in the Japanese plan as soon as we hear of it.

The Foreign Secretary will be out of London on that day. We therefore suggest that Mr Richard Luce be invited from the FCO, together with the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

On this basis our proposals are as follows:

British Side

Prime Minister

Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

Mr Richard Luce

X { Sir Julian Bullard  
Sir William Harding (deputy secretary in F.C.O. handling Japan).

Mr Coles

Japanese Side

Mr Nakasone

The Japanese Ambassador

Mr T Mizuhira (Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary)

Mr M Motono (Deputy Foreign Minister: Prime Minister's Personal Representative for the Summit)

Then we must have Roberts and one of those marked X will have to find way

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Mr K Nishiyama (Director General, European and Oceanic Affairs  
Bureau, MFA)

Mr K Hasegawa (PS to Mr Nakasone)

The Japanese have also spoken to us both in Tokyo and in London about Mr Nakasone's likely approach to the bilateral talks. The Japanese have expressed a wish that the conversations should not be too structured because of the relatively limited time; Mr Nakasone is likely instead to wish to talk generally about the international situation and the prospects for world peace. He will probably wish to touch on such subjects as the need for solidarity and cooperation between Japan, the European countries and the United States; the need for disarmament and for dialogue with the Soviet Union; the importance of Sino-Japanese relations; the revitalisation of the world economy, including the prevention of protectionism and the prospects for a new GATT round; and the importance of economic aid and of cooperation and dialogue with the non-aligned countries. Mr Nakasone will probably also mention the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Iran/Iraq conflict. Unless the Prime Minister has any criticism of this approach which she would wish us to convey to the Japanese, we shall prepare briefing accordingly.

I am copying this letter to Callum McCarthy (DTI).

*Yours ever,  
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

TAPPA

Naka Same

Visit

21/84

file  
cc PC

BM



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 May 1984

Visit by Mr. Nakasone

Thank you for your letter of 26 April, the contents of which the Prime Minister has noted.

Mrs. Thatcher does not wish to give a large lunch for Mr. Nakasone on Monday, 11 June since she has a very full programme on that day. We therefore propose to hold a working meal for a total of 12 people (without spouses). I should be grateful if you could let me have this week a proposed guest list.

BT

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

h

PRIME MINISTER

Your Lunch for Mr. Nakasone

I am not quite sure how to interpret your comments on the attached letter. Do you mean that you will give a working meal in the small dining room?

—

A.S.C.

Yes - ~~not~~

ahj one  
mt

4 May 1984

MR COLES

Re the attached. The Prime Minister knows all about Mr. Nakasone having talks and lunch on Monday 11 June. So don't worry. You had better make it a working lunch.

CR  
B/S.  
Now agreed.  
ADL 8/5.

It was only agreed last week that she would do a big European rally connected with the European elections. This is now going to be on the same day as the Nakasone lunch as is a recording of a Party Political Broadcast for the European elections. She is very worried about this particular day hence her comment on the side of the page of the FCO letter dated 26 April.

CR.

30 April 1984

cc/B  
cc/B  
89



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister (4)

26 April 1984

Agree lunch for 48 on 11 June, 84  
include spouses?

-No. That day

Agree attached guest list?

I have to record

Jon [unclear]

Does a party political  
26/4 for the European  
details any I have  
a major  
evening  
reception.

Visit by Mr Nakasone

The Prime Minister may like to be aware of the current state of preparations for Mr Nakasone's Guest of Government visit on 10 - 11 June immediately after the London Summit.

The Japanese have made it abundantly clear that Mr Nakasone wishes for the most informal possible schedule on Sunday 10 June. Mr Nakasone wishes to visit Prince Hiro at Oxford, but the Japanese have on his behalf declined various complementary suggestions, for example that he should be received by the Vice Chancellor. Apart from this visit to Oxford, the only engagements on 10 June therefore are a reception to be given in London in the evening by the Japan Association, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other related organisations, and a private dinner to be hosted by the Japanese Ambassador.

We must  
get the  
diary  
co-ordinated  
MS

On Monday 11 June the first engagement is Mr Nakasone's call on the Prime Minister for talks at 11.30 am. The Prime Minister has agreed that these talks should be followed by lunch. I enclose a draft guest list, drawn up on the assumption that the Prime Minister will wish spouses to be included. As Mrs Nakasone will be accompanying her husband to London, and as there will have been ample opportunity during the Summit and in the working talks in the morning of 11 June for official exchanges, it seems appropriate to regard the lunch as a primarily social occasion. The list has been drafted on the basis that the total numbers for such a lunch would be 48. If however the Prime Minister wished to make the lunch a working meal without spouses, the Japanese (for whom this would be entirely normal) would be unlikely to raise any objection. I should be grateful for guidance on this point. (We have not included the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Lady Howe on the guest list for the lunch as they will not be in London at the time.)

In the small  
change room

/After the





After the lunch Mr Nakasone wishes to devote most of the afternoon to preparing for the lecture which he is to give at 6 pm at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (the Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture). In the evening the Speaker has said that he would be willing to host a "state dinner" for Mr and Mrs Nakasone, and the Japanese have expressed themselves as pleased with this proposal. The Speaker will presumably wish to invite politicians and others from a wider spectrum who have connections with Japan.

Mr Nakasone will be leaving the UK on the morning of 12 June to return to Japan. He has decided to cancel his visit to other European countries because of domestic political pressures in Japan.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R B Bone', written in a cursive style.

(R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

Japan Feb 84  
Visit of Mr Nakasone

## LIST OF SUGGESTED GUESTS

FOR LUNCH

ON 11 JUNE AT 1.00 PM

IN HONOUR OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

<u>Full Name, title and Decorations</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Reason for invitation</u>
The Prime Minister and Denis Thatcher Esq		
TE Mr Y Nakasone and Mrs Nakasone	c/o Embassy of Japan 43/46 Grosvenor St W1X OBA	
TE Mr Hirahara and Mrs Hirahara	Embassy of Japan	
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary	c/o Embassy of Japan	Accompanying Mr Nakasone
Mr M Motono Deputy Minister, MFA	c/o Embassy of Japan	Accompanying Mr Nakasone
Mr T Nishiyama Director-General, MFA	c/o Embassy of Japan	Accompanying Mr Nakasone
Mr R Murata Director-General, MFA	c/o Embassy of Japan	Accompanying Mr Nakasone
Up to three Private Secretaries	c/o Embassy of Japan	Accompanying Mr Nakasone
3 Diet Members	c/o Embassy of Japan	Accompanying Mr Nakasone
The Rt Hon Nicholas Edwards MP and Mrs Edwards	The Welsh Office 233 6160	Secretary of State for Wales. Visiting Japan October 1984
Richard Luce Esq MP and Mrs Luce	FCO	
Sir Antony Acland KCMG KCVO and Lady Acland	FCO	
Sir William Harding KCMG CVO and Lady Harding	FCO	
Private Secretary and Wife	No 10 Downing Street	
Sir Anthony Rawlinson KCB and Lady Rawlinson	DTI	Permanent Secretary DTI
OR		
Adm Sir James Eberle GCB and Lady Eberle	c/o Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London SW1 930 2233	Director of Chatham House. Visited Japan April 1984

Sir Austin Bide  
and Lady Bide

Glaxo Holdings Ltd  
6-12 Clarges House,  
Clarges Street  
W1Y 8DH  
493 4060 (Miss Davies)

non-Executive  
Chairman of British  
Leyland who have a  
successful collabor-  
ative venture with  
Honda

OR

John Cater Esq and  
Mrs Cater

Distillers, 20 St  
James Square, SW1  
930 1040

Chairman of Distillers  
and of the Scotch  
Whisky Association.  
Scotch remains the  
UK's largest export  
to Japan

Sir J Pilcher GCMG  
and Lady Pilcher

33 The Terrace  
SW13  
876 9710

Chairman, Japanese  
Society of London  
HM Ambassador, Tokyo  
1967-72

OR

Sir John Clark  
and Lady Clark

The Plessey Co,  
Millbank Tower  
21-4 Millbank SW1  
834 9641

Chairman of the  
Plessey Co Ltd

Sir Julian Ridsdale CBE MP  
and Lady Ridsdale

House of Commons  
SW1  
219 3000

Chairman of the Japan  
British Parliamentary  
Group

OR

Richard Needham Esq MP  
and Mrs Needham

House of Commons, SW1  
219 3000

The Rt Hon James Callaghan  
MP and Mrs Callaghan

House of Commons, SW1  
219 3000

Visiting Japan, October  
1984

OR

Gordon Bagier Esq MP  
and Mrs Bagier

House of Commons  
SW1  
219 3000

Joint Vice-Chairman  
Japan British Parliam-  
entary Group

Ian Wrigglesworth Esq MP  
and Mrs Wrigglesworth

House of Commons, SW1  
219 3000

Visited Japan January  
1983

OR

Russell Johnston Esq MP  
and Mrs Johnston

House of Commons,  
SW1  
219 3000

Liberal Party  
Foreign Affairs  
Spokesman

Sir Hugh Cortazzi GCMG  
and Lady Cortazzi

Ballsocks, Ballsocks  
Lane, Vines Cross,  
Heathfield, E Sussex  
TN21 9ET; Horam Road  
2000

HM Ambassador, Tokyo  
1981-84

OR

Sir M Wilford GCMG  
and Lady Wilford

Brook Cottage, Abbots  
Ann, Endover, Hants  
Abbots Ann 509

Director Lloyds Bank  
International, HM  
Ambassador Tokyo  
1975-80

The Lord Roll of Ipsden  
CB and Lady Roll

30 Gresham St EC2  
600 4555

Chairman, SG Warburg  
plc

OR

Lord Greenhill of Harrow  
GCMG OBE and Lady Greenhill

25 Hamilton House  
Vicarage Gate W8  
937 8362

Ex-PUS: Director  
SG Warburg plc

The Rt Hon Sir Michael  
Palliser GCMG and  
Lady Palliser

12b Wedderburn Road  
NW3  
794 0440

Organising Mr Nakasone's  
Alastair Buchan  
Memorial Lecture

OR

Sir Rex Richards and  
Lady Richards

Wardens Lodgings  
Merton College, Oxford  
Oxford 49651

Warden of Merton  
College, where Prince  
Hiro is studying

Mr S Ohki and  
Mrs Ohki

Mitsui Ltd, Temple  
Court, 11 Queen Victoria  
Street, EC4  
600 1777

Chairman, Japanese  
Chamber of Commerce  
and Industry (Mitsui)

OR

Sir Adrian Cadbury  
and Lady Cadbury

Cadbury Schweppes Ltd  
1-10 Connaught Place  
W2  
262 1212

Chairman of Cadbury's  
Ltd who have  
recently concluded a  
licensing deal to  
market their soft  
drinks in Japan

Sir William Duncan KBE  
and Lady Duncan

65 Buckingham Gate  
SW1  
222 9020

Chairman of Rolls  
Royce who are colla-  
borating with Japan-  
ese and other firms  
on the development of  
the V2500 engine.  
Also deputy Chairman  
ICI

OR

Sir Austin Pearce CBE  
and Lady Pearce

100 Pall Mall SW1  
930 1020

Chairman, British  
Aerospace

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 February 1984

1) No. 1/2

2) p-a.

A.J.C. 17/2

Dear John,

Invitation to Mr Nakasone

The Japanese Embassy tell us that Mr Nakasone has now decided to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to talks and lunch on Monday 11 June. They have not given us any further news about Mr Nakasone's intentions for arrival and departure.

Yr ever

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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