

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

1984 FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA

DISASTERS

OCTOBER 1984

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
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PREM 19/1699



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January 1986

CDD
2/1

Dear Charles,

Ethiopia : Hercules Airlift Operation

The Prime Minister may wish to know that the Secretary of State has received a letter of thanks from the Ethiopian Foreign Minister on the completion of the Hercules airlift operation.

I attach a copy of the letter along with the Secretary of State's reply.

I am copying this to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Defence.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No.10 Downing Street



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

From the Secretary of State

21 January 1986


Dear colleague

Thank you very much for your letter of 31 December following the departure of the Royal Air Force and Army detachment from Ethiopia at the completion of the airlift operation.


I am very grateful for your kind words of praise for the British Service personnel involved in the airlift. The British Government and people have witnessed with great sadness the tragedy that has struck Ethiopia and have been anxious to help with the relief efforts. As part of this assistance the RAF and Army were pleased to collaborate with their Ethiopian colleagues in transporting food and other supplies, including to some areas that could not be reached by any other means.

I am very glad that we were able to cooperate in this successful humanitarian relief operation.

GEOFFREY HOWE



His Excellency Goshu Wolde



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Provisional Military Government
of Socialist Ethiopia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

42

PS/Mr Benson

Please coordinate a draft
reply from Secretary of
State; ~~and~~

ቁጥር MAF/1/43/85
No. 31 DEC 1985 ተገ 19

PS
PS/Mr Riffkin
Mr Fergusson
Mr Johnson

10 JAN 1986
ACD.....

is also to PS/Secretary of State for Defence

R. Murdoch

9/1

cc: Minister
de l'Empire
de l'Industrie
de l'Énergie
de l'Équipement
de l'Économie
de l'Éducation
de l'Enseignement
de l'Élevage
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I have particular pleasure to address this letter to you in connection with the withdrawal of the members of the Royal Air Force and Army Detachment who are leaving Ethiopia upon the conclusion of their relief aid mission.

It is with a sense of gratification that I express the deep appreciation and gratitude of the people, Government of Ethiopia and that of my own for the very outstanding services rendered by the Royal Air Force, the British Military Detachment and all British citizens who have been directly or indirectly involved in the air-lift and the air-drop of relief supplies to the famine victims in my country.

Your Government's emergency relief aid programme has, indeed, played a very useful and effective role in the life saving endeavours of our people.

I am convinced that the exemplary humanitarian role played by your government will not only enhance the already existing friendly relations between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, but will also foster better understanding and a more fruitful co-operation between our two peoples and governments in the future.

Mr Hancock ...2
Draft pre

10/11


I, therefore, take this opportunity to convey to you and, through you, to the people and Government of the United Kingdom my Government's appreciation and indebtedness for your generous and prompt assistance.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Goshu Wolde
Goshu Wolde
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir Geoffrey Howe, QC, MP
Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland
London


 Prime Minister
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 January 1986

Pretty much of a
 nil return, but a
 stepped up
 effort & some sign of a
 more robust attitude by
 the EC. Agree to leave it at that
 Dear Charles. for the time being? COP 11/1
 Ethiopia

Thank you for your letter of 29 November.

The Foreign Secretary agrees that jogging along with the Ethiopian regime would not be right. That is why we have, as described in my letter of 27 November, been taking the lead in the EC in pressing for a genuinely tough stance on Ethiopia's development policies, human rights record and international role.

Now that leadership is beginning to produce results: EC opinion is moving significantly in our direction. The French Government, spurred on finally by the public row between the Ethiopian Government and Medecins sans Frontieres, last month made clear that they would regard as unacceptable any EC aid proposals which could be construed as supporting the Ethiopian Government's resettlement policies. The European Parliament has been moved to make helpful contribution in the form of three resolutions on 12 December criticising Ethiopia's policies and imposing conditions on the Commission's negotiations with Ethiopia. As a result of all these pressures the Commission has committed itself to report to the Council and the Parliament before decisions are taken on its aid programming negotiations with Ethiopia.

This lever of EC development aid is the best means of influence at present open to us. It is hard to find any further scope for putting pressure on the Ethiopian regime or for promoting a change to a regime we like better. The government has dug itself in deep and has substantial Soviet support. There are some 1750 military advisers and about 3,000 Cubans financed by Moscow. Moreover, the UK's direct interests in Ethiopia are limited and do not justify high risk policies which would be very costly in resources.

As regards the first of your points, FCO officials, after preliminary discussion with our friends, assess that covert support for the rebels in Eritrea and Tigray would not serve our ends. First it is very unlikely that the rebels will be successful. Second, support for the rebels would almost certainly increase Mengistu's dependence on the Soviet Union and incite the

/ Soviet Union

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 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.



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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.**

Soviet Union to greater efforts on his behalf, giving the conflict a more obviously East-West character. Third, such action would encourage Mengistu to increase his own efforts at bringing about the downfall of the regime in the Sudan (because they support the rebels). Fourth, it would lead to even greater misdirection of the resources in Ethiopia towards civil war and would thus increase the likelihood of further famine and the need for further large-scale Western humanitarian aid. Finally, it has to be borne in mind that the rebel groups are fiercely antagonistic one to another and many of their leaders are as extreme in their broadly Marxist political attitudes as the Derg.

It is perhaps surprising that Arab countries continue to support rebel activity, but Arab support for rebel groups is based on long-standing hostility for "Christian" Ethiopia and on the belief that the more disrupted the internal scene, the less the threat (coupled with some expectation that for the Soviet Union, Ethiopia could parallel Afghanistan). The Arabs, however, do not have to face up to the consequences, in humanitarian terms, in the way that we do.

We are monitoring potential opposition so far as this is possible and liaising with the Americans. There are, however, no serious opposition groups within or outside Ethiopia at the moment to whom we could profitably give active encouragement. The most likely source of effective opposition is from within the army, though at present Mengistu keeps his potential military opponents well occupied outside Addis Ababa.

In conclusion, we do not believe that support for the rebels would work to our advantage. We have stepped up our effort. We are keeping in close touch with the Americans, but they are not disposed to be active with Mengistu's opponents. In our view, the right course is to concentrate our efforts in coordinating policy towards Ethiopia within the European Community. As I have suggested above, opinion in the Community is hardening. We should now therefore be able to count on considerable support for a robust reaction by the Community should the Ethiopian Government attempt to impose restrictions or conditions on EC aid.

/ The Foreign Secretary



The Foreign Secretary shares the Prime Minister's distaste for pouring aid into a country whose policies are objectionable. Nevertheless, he does not see how we can avoid regarding humanitarian considerations as paramount. We shall of course continue to keep a close watch on Ethiopia and use any available means to exert pressure on the regime to modify their policies in an acceptable direction.


Yours ever,

Le Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 December, 1985.

ETHIOPIAN FAMINE RELIEF

The Prime Minister would be grateful if her warm appreciation could be conveyed to the members of the RAF and Army Detachment who carried out the British Airlift in Ethiopia for their magnificent effort. Their work in saving lives reflects the greatest credit on them personally and on the Services as a whole.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and to Martin Dinham (Overseas Development Administration).

C.D. Powell

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

SD 3 AHD

cf.

[Handwritten initials]



PM/85/108

PRIME MINISTER

Ethiopia Famine Relief: British Airlift

1. You will know that the RAF and Army Detachment have now returned safely to RAF Lyneham at the completion of this remarkable and outstandingly successful operation. During the thirteen months of the operation the British detachment provided the sole source of food and other essential supplies for many thousands of the famine victims. They won the wholehearted admiration, affection and respect of all who witnessed the operation, not least of the Ethiopian Government.
2. Tim Raison has written to John Stanley expressing his thanks and congratulations, which I wholeheartedly endorse, to all those involved in the airlift.
3. I am copying this minute to Michael Heseltine.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

30 December 1985



Copy No 2 of 2 Copies
Page No 1 of 2 Pages

2

10 DOWNING STREET

29 November 1985

From the Private Secretary

**THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.**

ETHIOPIA

Thank you for your letter of 27 November about the political implications of the aid which we give to Ethiopia.

The Prime Minister continues to believe that it is not enough just to jog along in our relations with the distasteful regime in Ethiopia. If the conclusion is that our present relations offer no serious scope for exercising beneficial and positive influence, she would like serious thought given to ways in which we could make life harder for the Ethiopian regime. These might, as examples, include:

- (i) support for the rebels in Eritrea and Tigray;
- (ii) a more active effort in conjunction with the Americans to identify and perhaps encourage opponents of Mengistu within Ethiopia;
- (iii) continued attempts to get the Ten to be more forthright in criticising abuses of human rights in Ethiopia; and
- (iv) a more robust line by the European Community when there are examples of the Ethiopian Government abusing European Community aid or imposing restrictions and conditions (such as customs duties) on it. This might embrace suspension of all but humanitarian aid until such abuses have been put right.

None of this is of course incompatible with continuing humanitarian aid with the people of Ethiopia.

The Prime Minister would like serious examination made of these points and others of similar import which may occur to you. She feels that her original question - is it not inherently wrong to pour tens of millions of pounds of aid into a country and yet conclude that we have no serious scope for influencing its particularly cruel and objectionable government? - has still not been adequately answered.

You will recognise the sensitivity of this letter.

(Charles Powell)

L.V. Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.**

PRIME MINISTER

ETHIOPIA

You asked for more thought by the FCO on how we could influence the unpleasant regime in Ethiopia (Flag A).

The FCO response (Flag B) lists exhaustively the reasons why we can't.

It probably is the case that we can't do much to influence them through normal channels. But we could make life harder for them in a number of ways:

(i) support for the rebels in Eritrea and Tigray, who are already backed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. (The FCO, on the other hand, conclude that it would be better to discourage the Saudis and Kuwaitis from giving the rebels further support.)

(ii) attempts to get the Ten to be more vigorous in criticising Ethiopian human rights abuses;

(iii) coming down harder on the Ethiopians when they abuse European Community aid or impose illegal conditions on it (e.g. imposing customs duties on aid equipment);

(iv) a more active effort in conjunction with the Americans to identify and perhaps encourage opponents of Mengistu within the country.

The purpose of action on these lines - and I have not discussed the practicalities of (i) and (iv) - would be to

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

-2-

put the Ethiopians under pressure and even destabilise them rather than try to influence them in conventional ways. It would probably have costs, e.g. for our trade (which is small). But it might be better than simply going along with the present regime. And it would not be incompatible with continuing humanitarian aid to the people of Ethiopia.

Prefer: (a) to continue as we are? *No*
mt

or

(b) to examine scope for action outlined above? *Yes*
mt

CDP

(C.D. POWELL)

28 November 1985

GAPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 November 1985

Dear Charles,

Ethiopia

at flap

In response to your letter of 23 September about the political implications of the aid which we give to Ethiopia, we have taken another hard look at the problem.

Our starting point is our assessment that there are no likely alternatives to the present Ethiopian regime, which we conclude is set to stay for the foreseeable future. Barring an assassin's bullet, Mengistu looks secure, and the opposition movements inside and outside Ethiopia remain deeply divided. The choice therefore is between seeking to influence the present regime, and a policy of containment.

Has it?

The US, which alone among Western countries was inclined to the latter policy, has considered and rejected it in favour of an approach similar to our own. Containment would give us the worst of both worlds. There would be no damage to Ethiopia but some damage to us. We should lose what limited influence we have over Ethiopian policies. With contact reduced to a minimum, we should also be unable to further our bilateral objectives, for example securing compensation in respect of claims by British companies. (Mitchell Cotts have secured a settlement, and with our support Grindlays have recently opened negotiations.)

We have therefore to consider ways of influencing the Ethiopian Government's internal and external policies. Our bilateral relationship offers no scope since our involvement in Ethiopia is already at a very low level, compared with that of many of our partners. Our investments are small, and our trade is modest (though the balance is in our favour and our exports increased by over 80% in 1984). Our decision in 1979 to discontinue bilateral development aid will remain unchanged, unless there are fundamental changes in Ethiopia's more extreme policies. We have not, however, attached political conditions to the provision of relief aid. We believe this to be right and that, at a time of widespread awareness and concern about the suffering in Ethiopia, public opinion would not understand such conditionality.

We have examined carefully the possibilities for exerting influence in a multilateral context, or through other countries with a greater stake in the region. It remains to be seen whether

/ any




any progress will be possible on President Reagan's peace initiative launched at the UN General Assembly, which includes Ethiopia. Otherwise, the scope is very limited, because the Ethiopian regime remains committed to the Soviet Union for the arms and equipment it needs to pursue the civil war in Eritrea and Tigray. This is the regime's greatest political priority, and there is no prospect that they can be weaned away from the Soviets while it remains so. If political settlements could be found for Eritrea and Tigray and the perceived threat from Somalia were reduced, the Soviets' hold might be weakened. But we should need to persuade conservative Arabs such as the Saudis and Kuwaitis who support and finance the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels that their longer-term interests would be best served by a political settlement in Ethiopia. We intend to take an early opportunity to raise the problem with the Saudis. But the clear impression from our recent discussions on the Horn with the US, FRG and Egypt is that the Saudis remain avowedly hostile to Mengistu and this, coupled with Islamic/Arab pressures, will ensure continuing support for the rebels.

The Foreign Secretary described in his minute of 18 September to the Prime Minister our plans to focus our Community partners' attention on the political dilemma we face. The UK paper circulated in July setting out Western policy options (copy enclosed) has been endorsed by the Political Directors. This should ensure that the Commission's forthcoming discussions with Ethiopia regarding the application of development funds from EDF VI take place in the light of a clear, agreed political assessment. The sums of money involved (£135 million over the next five years), of which the Ethiopians have already been notified, are not open to adjustment. In accordance with practice already established in previous Lome Conventions, they are fixed by the application of objective criteria by the Commission. This practice is in fact in our general interest since it ensures that Commonwealth ACP States get a fair share. It is also relevant that Ethiopia, though desperately poor, has one of the lowest levels of per capita aid (\$7.82 per annum) in Africa. The agreed political assessment of Ethiopia will however help us to ensure that the aid is used in ways which improve the lot of the peasants, help to avoid future famine and do not support politically or economically objectionable policies. As a result of our initiative, we have brought a number of our partners round to our point of view, and the Commission are showing growing signs of understanding what is required of them. We shall keep up the pressure.

The more radical alternative of seeking to persuade our EC partners to cease aid to Ethiopia on human rights grounds would

/ remove



remove this possibility of exerting influence on the regime. Furthermore, although we managed, against ACP opposition, to insert a reference to human rights in the preamble to Lome III and references to human dignity in the text of the Convention and a Joint Declaration, we know that it is only when there is evidence of some new, large-scale and outrageous violation of human rights as there was in Amin's Uganda, or in Equatorial Guinea or Bokassa's Central African Empire, that our EC partners are likely to agree to withhold aid. Nor would public opinion understand, given the continuing need for famine relief. Nonetheless, as a result of our present campaign our partners will probably be more receptive in the future to proposals for action should human rights conditions sharply deteriorate.

To sum up, the prospects of exerting any significant influence on the Ethiopian Government are far from good. But we now have the toughest stance among our EC and Western partners on Ethiopia's development policies, human rights record and its international role. It allows us to make a positive input to Western policy-making on the political and strategic issues and to apply pressure on how EC money is spent. It also enables us to continue to respond to the continuing public demand for humanitarian assistance.

Yours,

Lee Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

POLITICAL COMMITTEE,
LUXEMBOURG, 16 - 17 JULY
ETHIOPIA

1. Although the Ten have discussed Ethiopia on a number of occasions in the past year, Political Directors have not recently had occasion to discuss the general question of European policy towards that country.
2. In the view of the UK it would be useful for them to do so. The central problem may be briefly stated. Ethiopia has a repressive regime, increasingly Soviet oriented, with a bad human rights record and pursuing economic and development policies which can only increase the likelihood that she will need large amounts of humanitarian and development assistance in the future. But she is the largest recipient of aid under EDF VI, aid which will, unless some action is taken, serve to confirm the Ethiopian regime in its present policies.
3. Our main short term aim must be to establish with the Ethiopian Government a meaningful policy dialogue about the assistance to be provided under EDF VI. The UK believes that the Ten/Community can in this way use their economic and political influence in a more coherent way, in order to encourage changes in Ethiopian policies.
4. To assist reflection on this matter the UK is circulating the attached analysis to partners as a possible basis for future discussion.

1. Ethiopia, by virtue of its size, population and geographical position is the key country of the Horn. Its economic potential is unlikely to be realised for many years and in any case depends crucially upon the resolution of its internal political problems and also upon a large and sustained flow of development assistance. In the meanwhile Ethiopian policies seem likely to perpetuate and intensify a situation disadvantageous to the West in general and to the Community in particular:-

- (1) Humanitarian assistance will be needed on a larger scale and for a longer time than if more appropriate policies were adopted. Such assistance involves not only direct relief, but also that provided indirectly eg through UNHCR.
- (2) Ethiopia's quarrels with its neighbours affect adversely the latter's development efforts and economic prospects in which the Community has a major stake.
- (3) The prospects for achieving respect for the human rights of the populations of the area become even more remote.
- (4) The opportunity for the Soviet Union to achieve dominance in a strategic area critical to the Community's trade becomes even greater.

2. The causes of this situation are of course complex and deeply rooted in the history of the region. Consequently, any efforts to reverse present trends require great delicacy and great persistence. But the outcome is of indisputable importance to member states, individually and collectively. Since the Community already commits substantial resources to Ethiopia, the UK believes that what is required is not so much an increased effort as a more coherent application of the Community's influence. Such action would extend and build upon the initiative already being considered in Political Cooperation to defuse the tensions in the border area between Ethiopia and Somalia.

3. The UK considers that the Community should tackle these problems as a matter of urgency, because:


- (1) The imposition of a Stalinist system in Ethiopia is proceeding apace and the opportunities for a coherent political dialogue with the Mengistu regime seem likely to diminish. Of course, any effective regime in Ethiopia is likely to have strong authoritarian and centralist tendencies, but this need not involve the degree of ideological extremism and commitment to Soviet foreign policy that now seems in prospect.
- (2) The trend described above is not inconsistent with the traditional Ethiopian activity of playing off external powers against each other. But it is against the interests of the Community, to be exploited in this way. The longer the drift, the harder it will be to reverse.
- (3) The Community is better placed to act than other members of the international community. Moderate African and Arab states, which have great interest in the outcome of the political development of Ethiopia, are preoccupied with internal problems and in any case do not have the material resources required to make an impact. The United States, on the other hand, while making an enormous contribution to the relief effort, is the subject of an antagonism on the part of the Ethiopian regime which impedes an effective dialogue.
- (4) The EC now has an opportunity - which will not recur for several years - to influence Ethiopian Government policies. Political conditions should obviously not be attached to the humanitarian aid which the Community has provided to those who so desperately need it. But article 215 of Lome III provides for an exchange of views between the Community and recipients of EDF development aid during the aid programming /process

process in order to ensure the maximum effectiveness of co-operation schemes. In the Internal Statements on Article 215 (Document 5143/85) the Council and the Commission agreed that where no agreement on support for a sectoral policy is reached, other ways of implementing the Community aid provided to the country in question, will be sought. This provides a forum in which the Community as a whole, while in no way detracting from the Commission's responsibility for the programming of EDF aid, could demonstrate in a practical way its collective will to bring about more favourable economic policies. Ethiopia's objections to the concept of a policy dialogue should not be underestimated, but it should also be borne in mind that failure to make full use of the mechanisms provided for in the Convention in the case of Ethiopia would set a very bad precedent for other EDF recipients.

4. Given their long-term structural food deficit and massive famine, the development policy reforms for which we should press are primarily those relating to agricultural production and marketing, to stimulate production and so increase the marketable food surplus. These could include: /the terms of trade between towns and rural areas; /greater freedom for private peasant producers to sell their surpluses direct to consumers; /guaranteed land users' rights as a greater incentive to investment by peasant producers; /and allocation of domestic and external investment funds between state farms and private producers in proportion to their respective contributions to national production.

5. As the UK has previously pointed out, it is essential that the Community's mechanisms should be used in a coordinated fashion if results are to be achieved. The political aspects of the situation in the Horn, which are regularly discussed in Political Cooperation, with which the Commission is fully associated, cannot be divorced from the Community's action in the economic sphere. The UK proposes therefore that, as a matter of urgency, the Ten should examine with the Commission means by which their political and economic policies towards Ethiopia can be brought into closer accord.

Disasters; Ethiopia; 10/84





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

22 November 1985

AIRLIFT IN ETHIOPIA

The Prime Minister has noted the Foreign Secretary's minute of 21 November reporting the intention to discontinue the RAF Hercules operation in Ethiopia in December.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



PM/85/95

PRIME MINISTER

Airlift in Ethiopia

1. The recent emergencies in Mexico and Colombia have served as reminders of the need to keep our disaster relief programmes under regular review, and to avoid becoming locked into commitments which would rob us of the flexibility we need if we are to be able to respond to new emergencies. There will never be a time when we can make a completely painless withdrawal from our airlift commitment in Ethiopia. But Tim Raison and I are persuaded that the time is now right to make the break.

2. When Tim Raison returned from Ethiopia in July he decided that our airlift there should be further extended, beyond the end of September, to the latter part of December. This was because it was still needed; the build-up of road transport had proceeded more slowly than expected and areas inaccessible by road transport needed to be supplied by air until their own harvests were in at the end of the year. The additional cost of the operation worked out at about £1.5 million per month, at present shared equally between ODA and the Ministry of Defence.

3. In the last two months the transport picture has altered considerably and the outlook is brighter. The 30 trailers we are providing will start to arrive soon. In the next few months the United States will be supplying 150 trucks and Band Aid a further 100. Other donors are also providing more road transport. The former United Nations Coordinator, Mr Jansson, has confirmed - most recently to Tim Raison on 28 October - that by the end of the year there will be an adequate supply of road transport available for relief operations. By then most of the roads damaged during the recent rains should be in use again.

/The

MB

Prime Minister
Agree that we should
suspend the airlift at
the end of the year?
CDP 21/11/95

CCPC

016



4. The rains in Ethiopia have been prolonged and widespread this year and, while they have hampered some relief operations, the prospects for the main harvest are much better than 1984.

A shortage of seeds, tools and oxen and the weakness of many peasant farmers, will result in the overall crop being below normal, but even so, it should be sufficient to reduce considerably Ethiopia's food aid needs in 1986.

5. These improvements were confirmed by the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Major Dawit, when he called on Tim Raison on 5 November and expressed gratitude for the relief we have provided over the last year, particularly the part played by the RAF.

6. Having first discussed the matter with the UN Coordinator and John Stanley, Tim Raison considers that the RAF operation need not continue into 1986, and should be discontinued in December (indeed the main international airport at Addis Ababa - at which our detachment is based - will be closed for two months early in 1986 for runway maintenance). He mentioned this likelihood to Major Dawit who said twice that he had no complaints; he would have been happy if the RAF could stay (probably largely for political reasons) but quite understood that it was a costly operation and accepts our position.

7. Before an announcement were made in this country we would ask our Embassy in Addis Ababa to let the Ethiopian Government and the United Nations Coordinator there have formal notice of our decision. We propose to announce the decision by means of a Parliamentary Question. We would also announce at the same time that we would be providing further food aid in 1986

/and



and £3 million rehabilitation assistance with seeds, tools and water supply needs in Ethiopia. The whole package might eventually cost about £12 million, including the UK share of similar European Community programmes.


8. I think we can fairly point out that there will be little need for the RAF operation beyond December, that we have performed a great service to the starving people of Ethiopia since November 1984 by our air transport operations, and that our most cost-effective way of helping in the future is by other means. We would not exclude the return of the airlift if circumstances were to change.


9. I am sending a copy of this minute to Michael Heseltine.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

21 November 1985





10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 September 1985

ETHIOPIA

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 18 September about the political implications of the aid which we give to Ethiopia.

The Prime Minister agrees very much with the Foreign Secretary about the dilemma we face. There is something inherently wrong about the West pouring tens of millions of pounds of aid into a country, and yet finding itself unable to influence a particularly cruel and objectionable Government which consistently acts in ways inimical to Western interests. But she is not satisfied that the minute is sufficiently bold in its analysis of the scope for exerting influence. The suggestion that we should start by trying to influence the Ethiopian government's agricultural policy does not strike her as germane: it is not their agricultural policy to which we object, or at least there are other things to which we object a lot more. She regards the European Community as a broken reed when it comes to influencing third world governments: they will always duck out.

It is not clear from the papers available to the Prime Minister how far we are presently trying to influence the Ethiopian government and in what ways. Are we doing so? Or have we given up? Can we do more by co-operating with other countries in the region? Would we be better off by joining the United States in a policy of containment?

In short, the Prime Minister recognises the difficulties but thinks that a rather more imaginative study is required which examines other options as well as that of trying to use EC aid as a lever.

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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APC ①



PM/85/82

PRIME MINISTER

CDP
Prime Minister
There is little hope of
influencing Ethiopia through
the European Community: the
others simply won't join in.
And we give no bilateral
financial aid, only emergency

Ethiopia

1. I have recently been considering the political implications of the aid we give to Ethiopia. As you know, in addition to the most generous public response to the Ethiopian famine, the government have made available substantial sums of money to help the victims, both bilaterally and through the EC. And we are also indirectly committed (see paragraph 8 below) to a programme of development aid.

relief. There is very little to which we can attach
strings. But we ought to

2. Our aid is inevitably helping a regime which is harsh and repressive. This poses a real policy dilemma.

3. There are superficial attractions in the idea that we should simply turn out backs on Ethiopia, but that in my judgement would only reinforce the Soviet grip. The Russians have already gained bases in the Red Sea, and a Marxist Ethiopia with strong military forces would continue to pose a threat to neighbouring countries well disposed to the West. Our long-term aim is clearly to reduce local tensions in the region, and finally to supplant Soviet with Western influence in the Horn, especially Ethiopia. If we are to have any hope of succeeding, the West must remain involved in Ethiopia.

do something. FCO to
think harder? CDP 2/19

Yes
no

4. We have discussed the Ethiopian dilemma with the other Western countries most closely concerned (United States, France, Canada, Germany, Italy). So far it has not been possible to find a basis

/for

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for coordinated action. Special interests have been one impediment:

- (a) The Italians for example retain important material interests in the area, and have a close political relationship with Ethiopia. They believe that as long as the United States regard Ethiopia as another Afghanistan, it is particularly important for the Europeans to maintain contact with Ethiopia, and thus try to reduce the Soviet Union's grip.
- (b) Both Canada and Italy are considering offering support for Ethiopia's resettlement programme, in an effort to become involved and - they would argue - more influential.
- (c) For the United States, the Ethiopian revolution and transfer of allegiance was especially traumatic, and the loss of substantial military assets directly damaging. In 1982, the United States sought unsuccessfully to enlist the support of other Western powers for a policy of containment against Ethiopia, apparently writing off the country as irredeemably in the Soviet camp. Although the United States have more recently been seeking a discreet dialogue with Mengistu, the Ethiopians have not been forthcoming, and mutual suspicions remain intense.

5. We will of course remain in close touch with our EC partners and other Western countries, especially the United States. We need to make sure they are all alert to the fact that while the West has contributed the vast bulk of relief aid - both bilateral assistance and multilateral development aid through the EC, World Bank and UNDP - it has had little influence on Ethiopian economic policy and political attitudes. And we need, too, to examine - with them as well as for our own purposes - the scope for leverage.



6. One realistic short-term aim for the West would be to prevent the present waste of scarce Western aid resources - which could be deployed more effectively elsewhere - by persuading Ethiopia to adopt more sensible agricultural policies. This in itself would lessen the grip of Marxist dogma.

7. Like other Western countries, we have attached no political conditions to our provision of humanitarian aid - and rightly so. But this reluctance to attach conditions to emergency aid should not apply to long-term development aid. The UK ceased its bilateral financial aid programme to Ethiopia in 1979, and we have made clear that without fundamental changes in that country's more extreme policies there is no question of restarting it. Our small technical cooperation programme in education does not raise the same issues. Timothy Raison underlined this point during his recent visit to Addis Ababa, where he found some signs of flexibility over policy.

8. We have, however, continued to provide Ethiopia indirectly with financial development aid, through our support for the aid programmes of the European Community: under the Sixth European Development Fund Ethiopia will receive 230 mecu (some £130 million: UK share £24 million). Although these funds are to be committed from 1985-1990, actual disbursement will take place over the next 8-10 years, at an average annual cost to the UK of about £2.5 million.

9. The European Community aid programme presents us with one possible forum for concerted action, in our efforts to influence the policies of the Ethiopian Government. Under the terms of the new Lome Convention, provision is made for a discussion of policy objectives between donors and recipients. If

/Member



Member States were able to convince the Commission, which administers the European Development Fund, to take a firm stand on agricultural policies, we might yet be able to ensure that EC aid is used to support viable projects and policies which will succeed in increasing Ethiopia's agricultural production.

10. This is not a very promising avenue: the EC Commission and other Member States, not to mention the Ethiopians themselves, are reluctant to introduce political considerations into a contractual aid relationship. During a visit to Ethiopia earlier this year, Commissioner Natali singularly failed to grasp the policy dialogue nettle. It remains, however, the best available option. Full use of the limited leverage offered by the new Lome Convention could permit the EC to be involved constructively in Ethiopia, but on our own terms.

11. We have introduced this question in Political Cooperation, and it is due to be discussed in Coreper. Success is far from assured. But I thought you would find it helpful to know that we are promoting this initiative.

12. I am sending copies of this minute to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

18 September 1985

RESTRICTED



CC CDP
Questions
✓ Press.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH

Telephone 01-213 5409

From the Minister

T Flesher Esq
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

22 July 1985

Dear Tim,

POSSIBLE STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIAN FAMINE RELIEF: MONDAY 22 JULY

1. Following his visit to Ethiopia last week, Mr Raison discussed with Sir Geoffrey Howe, Mr Stanley, and subsequently the Prime Minister the question whether the RAF Hercules operation in Ethiopia should be extended beyond the currently announced withdrawal date of 30 September. It was agreed that it should be continued until the end of the year.

2. I understand that the Prime Minister agreed with Mr Raison that an announcement should be made today and that she favoured its taking the form of a Statement if that could be accommodated in the Parliamentary timetable.

... 3. The proposed Statement, a copy of the first draft of which I attach, would report on the present situation in Ethiopia and explain why the Government has now decided to extend the airlift operation. A Statement would enable Mr Raison to give a rather fuller account of his visit and the Government's contribution to Ethiopian relief than the alternative procedure of picking up and taking at the end of his Oral Questions the two PQs which have been put down relating to Ethiopia.

... 4. He would therefore be grateful for agreement to his making a Statement along the lines of the enclosed draft. I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to those on the attached list.

*Sincerely,
Michael.*

M C McCulloch
Private Secretary

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P Ricketts Esq
PS/Secretary of State

S Eldon Esq
PS/The Rt Hon Baroness Young

C M J Marshall Esq
PS/Lord Privy Seal

M Maclean Esq
PS/Government Chief Whip
House of Commons

D R Beamish Esq
PS/Government Chief Whip
House of Lords

B Ingham Esq
Chief Press Secretary
10 Downing Street

R Hatfield Esq
PS/Secretary of the Cabinet

J Oughton Esq
PS/Minister of State for the Armed Forces

(DRAFT)

STATEMENT ON RELIEF OF ETHIOPIAN FAMINE

Mr Speaker, with permission, I should like to make a statement on the relief of the Ethiopian famine.

I visited Ethiopia from 16 to 19 July in order to assess the current famine situation and the need for further relief there. I revisited the feeding centres at Korem, which I saw last November, spent half a day at Assab, the port through which most food imports must come, went on to an airdrop operation in one of the RAF Hercules, and had discussions with several Ethiopian Government Ministers, the UN Coordinator, Mr Kurt Jansson, the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner, and representatives of international and voluntary agencies.

I am glad to be able to tell the House that the great international relief effort, in which both the British Government and people have played an important part, has indeed alleviated much of the worst suffering which we saw on our television screens in the latter part of 1984. It is encouraging that rain is now falling in many parts of Ethiopia, some crops have been planted and livestock is beginning to recover.

However, there are still large areas, notably Wollo and parts of Tigray and Eritrea, where the rains have been only intermittent or have yet to come at all. It will be several weeks before any reliable assessment of the probable 1985 harvest can be made. It will be several months before that harvest can be gathered and enable people once again to feed themselves. All to whom I spoke in Ethiopia agreed that even with the most favourable rains this year's harvest will be well below that of a normal year. It is essential, therefore, that the current relief efforts are maintained and, in some respects, strengthened, and that the Ethiopian Government and external donors prepare themselves to continue relief well into 1986.

What are the immediate priorities? The UN Coordinator estimates that with current stocks in Ethiopia and firm pledges of further deliveries, the overall food supply should be adequate for the rest of this year. During my visit to Assab last Wednesday I was able to see something of the considerable flow of European Community food aid into Ethiopia - three ships were unloading food grain from the Community. Effective use is being made of the dumper trucks, grain conveyors and tarpaulins we have provided - we shall be sending in the next few days a further supply of tarpaulins for use at Massawa and on relief trucks.

The overriding priority now is to improve food distribution. The main problem here is that there are still not enough trucks available. The situation should soon improve significantly with the arrival and deployment of trucks pledged earlier. The Ethiopian Government have recently made efforts to increase the number of Ethiopian trucks allocated to the relief programme, but it is essential they continue to do all they can.

The UN Coordinator's assessment is therefore that another long-haul and short-haul trucks will be required, over and above those already pledged by donors and yet to arrive in Ethiopia.

We have already provided 23 Land Rovers, 28 trucks, and £750,000 for trailers and the hire of trucks. We shall consider whether there is more we can do in this area, taking account of the need to avoid a proliferation of makes of vehicle without adequate spares and maintenance support.

As the House is aware, our major contribution to food distribution in Ethiopia has been the provision since 3 November last year of two RAF Hercules aircraft and their accompanying detachment, including in recent months specialists from the Royal Corps of Transport. This operation has now airlifted well over 12,000 tonnes of grain and dropped a further 7,000 tonnes to places inaccessible by any other means of transport. It is an operation which has earned widespread admiration and gratitude, and, as I have seen for myself, calls for the highest of professional skills, dedication, and cool courage.

It was one of the purposes of my visit to Ethiopia to judge whether we should maintain the decision I announced to the House on
to withdraw our aircraft by 30 September. As I told the House, we believed that by 30 September the ending of the rains and the build up of trucks would enable food to be distributed more widely and efficiently by road. My visit has confirmed that this remains the most cost-effective way of moving large quantities of grain, but the build up of road transport has gone more slowly than expected. Areas inaccessible by road will continue to depend on food brought from outside until their own harvest is in, as we all hope it will be, at the end of the year. The Hercules also provided for the relief effort a much valued flexibility.

My visit enabled me to weigh up carefully the future of the Hercules operation, and to discuss it fully with the Ethiopian Government - who asked us to extend it -, with the UN Coordinator and with other relief agencies. I have concluded that the aircraft will continue to be needed until the end of the year. We are therefore conveying to the Ethiopian Government our offer to keep the two aircraft and accompanying detachment on relief operations until the latter part of December, when they would be withdrawn.


Mr Speaker, this new commitment, together with the further 10,000 tonnes of food aid which we shall send when the ports are ready to handle it, demonstrates the Government's continuing concern for the victims of the Ethiopian drought. Our contribution has been prompt - we helped the Save the Children Fund set up its feeding centre in Korem early in 1983 - generous - £70 million of emergency aid since 1982 - and sustained. We shall continue to do all we can.

PRIME MINISTER

Timothy Raison would like to have a word with you very briefly on the telephone, perhaps just after lunch, about the line he should take in the House of Commons on the Ethiopian airlift. He is quite clear that it should continue at least until the end of the year. But he feels he should report to you personally since the press are hounding him to know whether he has spoken to you. I have suggested that he should present an announcement about continuing the airlift carefully, pointing out that we cannot be expected to go on doing this for ever, and look to the Ethiopians to use transport available to them to take over the burden. He takes this point.

He is worried about the cost of his budget and may ask for some help from the contingency reserve later in the year if he cannot find the money.

I suggest that you let Switch know when you want to talk to him. I said provisionally that it might be between 1400 and 1430 when he will be at his house in Buckinghamshire.



p.p. CHARLES POWELL

20 July 1985

P.M

We are paying

for the cluster of

a Herules by

save the Children Fund

in Sudan.

C D P



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Mr. Raison said on
10 June that the
airlift would end on
30 September.

He said on 16
July that Mr. Raison
would be considering
the need to keep
going with Hercules.

C.D.P.

happening from the European Commission? In the past month I have tabled several written questions, only to receive equivocal answers. Those answers are given in both committed and delivered terms, but we never find out what has been delivered to the people who need it and to those who are starving in the Sudan, Ethiopia and southern Saharan countries. Has not the problem of delivery been exacerbated by the fact that, despite my right hon. Friend's urgings, the European Commission waited nearly three months before getting started on the railway which could deliver food to the western Sudan and Darfur? The quantities that the European Commission has delivered are far short of what is needed and what it undertook to deliver at Dublin and before then.

Mr. Raison: With respect to my hon. Friend, the figures that I gave are delivery figures. I am not saying that in every case they relate to what has been delivered to individuals. My hon. Friend will understand that it is remarkably difficult to give accurate figures for that. Nevertheless, I have given delivery figures.

My hon. Friend's point about the railway refers to the Sudan rather than to Ethiopia, which is the subject of the question. However, I think that he will know that progress is now being made towards getting the railway line to western Sudan working effectively.

Mr. Beith: Are not the revelations of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs about the double counting of EEC aid and the Department's budget pressures so important and urgent that they cannot await the normal process of Government response and debate in the House before something is done?

Mr. Raison: Hon. Members will have a chance tomorrow to debate all these matters. However, it is only right that we should reply to the Select Committee in the usual way, and we certainly intend to do so before the House rises for the recess.

Mr. Baldry: Does the assistant secretary-general in Addis Ababa, who has responsibility for co-ordinating activity, send the Government detailed of what aid has been delivered and whether it is getting through to those who need it? If so, how often are they sent to the Government? Is my right hon. satisfied with their detail?

Mr. Raison: We have the closest contact with Mr. Jansson through our embassy in Addis Ababa. I cannot say exactly how often such reports come, but from reading the telegrams I know how much detail there is and how regularly the whole question is discussed.

Dame Judith Hart: Has the Minister heard, perhaps on the radio this morning, the appeal of United Nations officers in the area for more vehicles to expedite deliveries in Ethiopia and, particularly, in Sudan? What response is he likely to make to that appeal? One's impression is that the right hon. Gentleman has a certain complacency towards the provision of vehicles.

Mr. Raison: The next question on the Order Paper is specifically about vehicles, and I shall give some information then. In Ethiopia, which is the subject of the question, there are, I believe, a large number of road vehicles available. I have been pressing the Ethiopian Government to make available the substantial number of trucks that they have available but which are not being used.

Ethiopia

44. **Mr. Chapman** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement about vehicles available for relief and rescue operations in Ethiopia.

48. **Mr. Forman** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assistance the Government are providing for transport of relief supplies within Ethiopia.

Mr. Raison: About 3,000 long and short haul trucks are needed in all. Of these, about 1,300 are currently deployed, including 350 recently made available by the Ethiopians. A further 450 trucks pledged by donors should arrive soon and we hoped that the Ethiopians will provide more. We shall now provide further assistance of £750,000 for transport needs in Ethiopia, including semi-trailers and truck hire costs. In addition, and provided it can operate effectively during the rains, we have decided to extend the British airlift until 30 September. It will then be withdrawn after 11 months' magnificent work.

Mr. Chapman: I welcome the latter part of my right hon. Friend's statement but does he agree that it is an absolute disgrace that the Ethiopian Government have failed to carry out the commitment that they gave some months ago—which was both practicable and reasonable—to provide 4,000 vehicles for the much needed distribution of aid in parts of Ethiopia? Has my right hon. Friend made any estimate of the additional suffering caused to the Ethiopian people by that oppressive non-commitment of their Government?

Mr. Raison: I cannot give any such estimate, but for some months we and other Western donors have been pressing the Ethiopians to fulfil their earlier promises to provide vehicles. They have at last undertaken to deploy military vehicles and all other available transport to increase the daily take-off from the port of Assab from 1,200 tonnes to 4,000 tonnes a day to clear congestion there. I hope that that exercise will be carried out successfully.

Mr. Forman: I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Chapman). Do the 350 vehicles that the Ethiopians have already made available represent a significant part of total transport needs? If not, will my right hon. Friend put on record the number of vehicles that the Ethiopians could use if they were minded to do so?

Mr. Raison: The 350 vehicles are a valuable and significant contribution. I believe that the Ethiopians have about 4,000 military trucks. The more trucks that are made available, the sooner the task of transporting food across the country will be able to proceed.

Mr. MacLennan: Why has the Minister announced the proposal to discontinue our valuable transport service after 11 months? Does he believe that the service is complete?

Mr. Raison: I believe that by the end of September there should be sufficient road transport available. It already accounts for 90 per cent. of the distribution of food and other relief supplies. Moreover, the roads should be usable after the rainy season.

Famine Prevention

46. **Mr. Spearing** asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a

House to have lighthouse tender ships built in this country? Is she aware that she is being asked merely to match the offer and to repay the efforts of the shipbuilders on Tyneside who built the Endeavour for the Falklands campaign as well as the Ark Royal but who for their pains now see ships for Britain being built in Korea? Will she show some compassion? Will she show the kind of woman she is and repay the people who work for us? They are British.

The Prime Minister: The hon. Gentleman is aware that the gap between the price quoted in Korea and that quoted by British Shipbuilders was too great to be bridged by subsidies under the intervention system. The hon. Gentleman knows that we subsidise the business, but if we are to get business, we must be able to match competitiveness and efficiency.

Q2. Mr. Nicholas Winterton: asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 16 July.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Mr. Winterton: Does my right hon. Friend agree that a substantial reduction in interest rates would be much to the advantage of British industry and therefore outweigh any disadvantage to the value of the pound? Will she therefore have a word with the Bank of England and get the British banking system to act in the interests of manufacturing industry in the United Kingdom?

The Prime Minister: Many interests have to be considered in the determination of interest rates. My hon. Friend is aware that, when the value of the pound went down seriously, that was extremely damaging to the reputation of Britain, to British industry and bad for inflation. My hon. Friend is aware that we shall keep interest rates at whatever level is needed to maintain downward pressure on inflation, but no higher than that.

Mr. Kinnoek: May I join the Prime Minister in her praise for the performers and contributors to Live Aid? As she said, it was humanity in action. By the same token, is it not inhumanity in action when a Government cut 18 per cent. off an aid budget in real terms in five years, when that same Government reduce the aid budget by three per cent. in real terms—£40 million just in this year—and when that Government, despite the emergency in Sudan and Ethiopia during the past two years, have not added one penny to the aid budget except for the Hercules services, which they are now thinking of withdrawing? With a record such as that, what price the brotherhood of man?

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman is comparing the taxpayers' aid with voluntary aid. There has always been a place for voluntary aid. Voluntary services have done a great deal. For example, Christian Aid, Oxfam, War on Want and Save the Children have always been extremely active in this area and the new Live Aid was an extremely welcome addition. As for what we have done for Ethiopia and Sudan, in 1984 we provided £266 million, of which £248 million went to sub-Saharan countries, including £234 million for long-term development. In the year to March 1985, we spent £95 million on famine relief operations in Africa. This year, we expect to spend at least £60 million. As the right hon. Gentleman is aware, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas

Development is now in Ethiopia and considering the needs for future months, especially the need to keep going with the Hercules.

Mr. Kinnoek: I am more than prepared to compare Government aid—taxpayers' aid—with the charitable contributions made freely by people in Britain. When I do, I see that, in the past year, a year in which the Government took £40 million off aid, the people were prepared to subscribe £67 million in aid.

Several Hon. Members: What is wrong with that?

Mr. Kinnoek: Well, why do we not have it all together, public and private? I also see that the Government have cut an amount equivalent to 10 times that which has been subscribed in the wake of the Live Aid concert. In any case, is the Prime Minister not ashamed of the fact—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—that the only way in which she is prepared to provide short-term aid to the starving is by robbing the hungry of the world as she shuffles round the aid budget? Will she do three things? First, will she reverse this disastrous and cruel cut in aid policy? Secondly, will she make a contribution—[*Interruption.*] I can understand the irritation, embarrassment and shame of Conservative Members. Secondly, will she make a contribution to the international food and agricultural development fund, which helps poor farmers in Africa? Thirdly, will she give us a guarantee now that the essential Hercules service will continue—and not be withdrawn—for as long as the need for it exists in Ethiopia?

The Prime Minister: First, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the majority of general aid is spent on capital long-term projects of the sort that he proposes should take place, that is on the development of food resources in Africa. Secondly, I am extremely proud of the Government's record on aid to Ethiopia and the Sudan. We were the first to respond, and that is what the right hon. Gentleman cannot stand. As he knows, within the aid budget there is always a certain amount both for disaster and famine relief and for contingencies. The right hon. Gentleman is well aware that the Government were the first to respond to the need in Ethiopia, and quick to respond in Sudan. We were the first to respond to the need for transport to take food to its destination. Yesterday, in response to a serious shortage of transport, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas Development announced further assistance of £2 million to help with the purchase of transport.

Mr. Steen: Will my right hon. Friend seek time this afternoon to drop a congratulatory note to Bob Geldhardt—[*Interruption.*]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Interruptions take up the time of the House.

Mr. Steen: Will my right hon. Friend seek time this afternoon to drop a congratulatory note to Bob Geldof—[*Interruption.*]—and will she thank him for raising £50 million to be sent to Ethiopia? Will she remind him that young people, far from being hooligans on the football terraces, are as compassionate and caring as any people in the world?

The Prime Minister: Obviously, I sent a letter to Mr. Geldof before the concert congratulating him on the idea. We are all delighted that it had such a magnificent result.

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TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1763 OF 4 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY O D A, ROME UKREP BRUSSELS, ADDIS ABABA,

INFO NAIROBI (BBDEA), UKMIS NEW YORK-^{KM} IS GENEVA.

Further evidence that
a major problem
is ~~not~~ lack
of food but
hopeless arrangements
for storage,
handling &
distribution.
CDP

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT: US VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. REPORT BY DEPUTY USAID ADMINISTRATOR ON HIS VISIT TO ASSAB. WESTERN DONOR REPRESENTATIVES WARNED THAT AMERICANS WILL SOON MAKE PUBLIC THEIR INCREASED CONCERN ABOUT ETHIOPIAN HANDLING OF DROUGHT RELIEF SUPPLIES.

DETAIL

2. MORRIS (DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, USAID) CALLED A MEETING OF WESTERN DONOR GROUP REPRESENTATIVES ON 4 JUNE, TO REPORT ON HIS 21-23 MAY VISIT TO ETHIOPIA.

3. MORRIS SAID THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED BY WHAT HE HAD SEEN IN ASSAB IN PARTICULAR. HE HAD FOUND AN ASTONISHING DEGREE OF QUOTE ALMOST DELIBERATE INEFFICIENCY UNQUOTE. THE PRESS WERE ALSO NOW BEGINNING TO LEARN JUST HOW BAD THE PICTURE WAS, WHICH RISKED PROVOKING A VERY NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION. THE AMERICANS WERE THEREFORE PROPOSING TO MAKE MORRIS' FINDINGS PUBLIC LATER THIS WEEK (PROBABLY ON 6 JUNE), IN THE HOPE OF STIMULATING GREATER ETHIOPIAN EFFORTS. THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT MEETING WAS TO GIVE FELLOW DONORS ADVANCE WARNING AND TO ALERT THEM TO A POSSIBLE NEED FOR EVEN GREATER DONOR COORDINATION IN THE COMING MONTHS.

4. MORRIS SAID THAT HE HAD INSPECTED A NUMBER OF PORT AREAS AT ASSAB NOT SEEN BY JANSSON AND MENGISTU ON 8 MAY. HE HAD ALSO SPOKEN VERY FRANKLY WITH UN PORT COORDINATOR NIELSEN. FROM ALL THAT HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD IT SEEMED OBVIOUS THAT THE PROBLEMS AT ASSAB WERE INCREASING, NOT DECREASING. ALTHOUGH THE ETHIOPIANS WERE CLAIMING THAT SUPPLIES AWAITING DISTRIBUTION WERE DOWN FROM 100,000 TO 70,000 TONNES, THERE WERE NOW A FURTHER 45,000 TONNES ON BOARD SHIPS WAITING OFF-SHORE. MORRIS HAD SEEN AND PHOTOGRAPHED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SPOILT WHEAT, OF IDENTIFIABLE US, EC, ITALIAN, GREEK, CANADIAN AND AUSTRALIAN ORIGIN (AND WOULD BE MAKING THE PHOTOGRAPHS PUBLIC). SINCE WHEAT WAS BEING STORED IN THE OPEN, WITHOUT TARPAULINS OR PALLETS, FURTHER DAMAGE WAS INEVITABLE. GIVEN THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF POLYPROPYLENE SACKING, IT WAS EVIDENT FROM THE SACKS THAT HAD ALREADY DISINTEGRATED THAT SUPPLIES WERE BEING HELD UP AT THE DOCKS FOR AT LEAST A MONTH AND PROBABLY MUCH LONGER. MEANWHILE, NO STEPS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE STORM DAMAGE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH; EVEN JANSSON HAD NOW REVISED HIS ESTIMATE

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/ OF THE

OF THE LOSS FROM THIS EPISODE UP FROM 3,000 TONNES TO 6-8,000 TONNES. (THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT 13,000 TONNES IN ALL MIGHT RECENTLY HAVE BEEN WASTED - AND MAINTAINED THAT 15,000 TONNES WERE SUFFICIENT TO FEED A MILLION PEOPLE FOR A MONTH).

5. MORRIS SAID THAT HE HAD COME ACROSS COUNTLESS JAPANESE BLANKETS LYING UNUSED, AND HAD FOUND A LOT CONTAINING SCORES OF NEW MERCEDES, SCANTIA, FIAT AND ISUZU TRUCKS AS WELL AS INNUMERABLE TYRES. HE HAD SEEN NO SIGN OF THE ADDITIONAL TRUCKS THE ETHIOPIANS HAD PROMISED, BUT HAD SEEN TANK TRANSPORTERS MOVING AMMUNITION RATHER THAN FOOD IN THE DOCK NEIGHBOURHOOD AND HAD FOUND A COMPOUND CONTAINING OVER 100 MILITARY VEHICLES, NONE OF WHICH WERE EVER USED (ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS).

6. MORRIS SAID THAT, WITH MAJOR TONNAGES DUE TO ARRIVE AT ASSAB IN JUNE AND JULY, THE AMERICANS COULD NOT FAIL TO BE ALARMED BY THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS (ALTHOUGH HE ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT WE AND THE FRENCH WOULD BE PROVIDING STACKING EQUIPMENT, TARPAULINS AND PALLETS TO HELP WITH GRAIN STORAGE). IF REMEDIAL ACTION WAS NOT TAKEN SOON, DONORS MIGHT HAVE TO RESCHEDULE FUTURE AID SHIPMENTS. MORRIS CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD TOLD JANSSON OF HIS CONCERN, AND HAD ALSO GONE OVER THE GROUND VERY THOROUGHLY WITH THE ETHIOPIANS (BUT WITHOUT WARNING THEM THAT THE US WOULD GO PUBLIC). IN RESPONSE, DERESSA HAD CLAIMED THAT THE ETHIOPIANS WERE DOING THEIR BEST, AND HAD ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT THEY HAD CONFLICTING PRIORITIES TO BALANCE. MILITARY NEEDS HAD TO BE MET, AS DID THOSE OF THE POPULATION WHO WERE NOT FACING STARVATION (MORRIS MENTIONED THAT HE HAD ALSO SEEN ETHIOPIAN EXPORTS ALL BUT ABANDONED AT ASSAB).

7. COMMENT. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED THIS PRESENTATION THAT THE AMERICANS ARE DETERMINED TO PUBLICISE MORRIS' FINDINGS BUT HAVE YET TO DECIDE WHAT TONE TO ADOPT. WE AND OTHER DONOR REPRESENTATIVES (SOME OF WHOM PRIVATELY WONDERED IF MORRIS WAS NOT OVER-STATING THE CASE) WARNED OF THE RISK OF DAMAGING WESTERN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE RELIEF EFFORT AND OF PROVOKING A COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE ETHIOPIAN RESPONSE (GIVEN THE MORE PROMISING ETHIOPIAN REACTION TO IBNAT). SOME COLLEAGUES WERE CLEARLY UNHAPPY ABOUT ANY US PUBLICITY WHICH FOCUSED ON PHOTOGRAPHS ILLUSTRATING THE NEGLIGENT HANDLING OF THEIR OWN AID SUPPLIES (MORRIS GAVE NO INDICATION THAT UK SUPPLIES WOULD FEATURE IN THE US ACCOUNT, BUT DID ADD THAT NIELSEN FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THE INADEQUATE PACKAGING OF SOME UK AND ITALIAN GOODS AND WOULD BE LIKELY TO SAY AS MUCH TO THE PRESS).

8. MORRIS APPEARED TO TAKE NOTE OF THESE CONCERNS AND SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT TRYING TO PICK A FIGHT WITH THE ETHIOPIANS. HE STRESSED THAT THE BASIC US OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS PUT RIGHT. HE ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD EMPHASISE

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/ THAT

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THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES APPEARED TO AFFECT GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AID, NOT AID CHANNELED THROUGH PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS. THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY APPRECIATED THAT THE ETHIOPIANS WERE FACING MASSIVE PROBLEMS WITH MINIMAL RESOURCES (EVEN IF, PRIVATELY, THE AMERICANS FOUND THEM INDIFFERENT, INEFFICIENT AND DOWNRIGHT UNCOOPERATIVE IN SOME RESPECTS). THEY WOULD DEMONSTRATE THEIR OWN GOODWILL BY ANNOUNCING THAT THEY WOULD BE LEASING UP TO 150 KENYAN TRUCKS AND DRIVERS TO INCREASE THE OFF-LOADING CAPACITY AT ASSAB. THEY ALSO HOPED THEIR ACTION WOULD ENCOURAGE OTHER DONORS TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE PROBLEM, BUT SUSPECTED THAT ULTIMATELY THE SOLUTION LAY WITH THE ETHIOPIANS ALONE.

WRIGHT

AFRICAN DROUGHT

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

3 June 1985

AIRLIFT IN ETHIOPIA

The Prime Minister has considered the Foreign Secretary's minute of 31 May on this subject. She agrees that we should end the airlift in September but announce our decision to do so soon, and that an announcement should be made at the same time of a package of further relief measures.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

eu



PM/85/55

PRIME MINISTERAirlift in Ethiopia

1. When Tim Raison announced in March that our airlift in Ethiopia would be extended he said the Government was assessing how long the British detachment would stay in Ethiopia. We promised to give the Ethiopians one month's notice of any intention to withdraw.
2. We have now completed that assessment. Many millions of Ethiopians remain at risk but sizeable shipments of grain are reaching Ethiopian ports. Much of this remains at the ports and the warehouses while inadequate transport prevents it being distributed to those in need, particularly in the northern provinces.
3. Land transport, which already accounts for 90% of the distribution of supplies, is nevertheless improving and should do so further in the next few months. The trucks we have supplied, and those provided by other donors, notably the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, will soon be in use. The UN Coordinator and Western donors have been pressing the Ethiopians to provide more of their own vehicles, including military ones, and they are at last doing so.
4. However over the next few months the rains should come to Ethiopia. They would end the drought and allow farmers to plant crops. But they will also make road transport impossible in some areas, thus increasing for the time being the importance of the airlift. Flying conditions will also be more difficult

/and

Prime Minister ①

Agree intention to end airlift
in September be announced soon?

HT

31/5

Y
L. S.



and some airstrips may be unusable, so that we expect that the quantity of food that can be delivered by air will be reduced, though by how much we cannot say now.

5. Our overall judgement is that Jansson, the UN Coordinatory in Addis, is right to conclude that airlift and airdrop facilities, in which our detachment has played the leading role, will continue to be needed for the next three months or so. His own and our inquiries show that other donors are unlikely to fulfil this requirement.

6. A decision to withdraw this conspicuously successful operation will at any time be received with disappointment by Parliament and public in this country and by the Ethiopian Government and people. But the operation cannot go on indefinitely. There are financial penalties for ODA and the MOD, and the latter have been required to make compensatory cuts in other air transport activities including the continued cancellation of planned exercises. Withdrawal at the end of September, when more vehicles should be available, roads usable again after the rains, and, we hope, a new season's crop beginning to appear, is fully defensible.

7. Tim Raison has therefore decided, in consultation with John Stanley, that the RAF operation should be extended to the end of September but then withdrawn.

8. In announcing our decision we need to allow for the possibility the rains may be so heavy as to make the airlift completely ineffective and for the contingency that the policies of the Ethiopian Government become such as to make us think our continued presence undesirable. We shall also naturally want to ensure that satisfactory accommodation will be available for our detachment after their present accommodation has been given up in June.

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9. In order to show our commitment to continue helping the famine victims in Ethiopia, and to meet some of their other urgent needs, Tim Raison proposes to announce at the same time a package of further relief measures, which will include additional food aid for delivery later this year, as well as more help with road transport when the airlift ends.

10. I share his view that we should declare our decision on the airlift as soon as possible so that we gain credit for taking the initiative now to extend it through the rains and minimise the risk of the Ethiopians mounting a press campaign on the issues in this country in the wake of the Foreign Affairs Committee report on the African famine. We propose therefore to
/ arrange for an inspired PQ along the lines of the draft enclosed.

11. I am sending a copy of this minute to Michael Heseltine.


(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
31 May 1985

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DRAFT PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

Ethiopian Airlift

QUESTION: How long will the RAF Hercules aircraft remain in Ethiopia?

ANSWER: The aircraft will be withdrawn by 30 September by which time more vehicles will be available for the distribution of food and roads should be more readily usable after the rainy season. We intend to maintain the airlift until 30 September provided that it can operate effectively during the rains and, of course, that it attracts the continued goodwill and cooperation of the Ethiopian Government.

RAF AIRLIFT IN ETHIOPIA (OPERATION BUSHEL)

LINE TO TAKE

*PM Announced
on 21 March.*

We shall continue the RAF's Operation after the end of March, if the Ethiopian authorities agree. I cannot say how long we shall stay but we have told the Ethiopians that we would be prepared, in any case, to give one month's notice of any intention to withdraw. We need to assess changing estimates of the need for this operation and its usefulness, and the help other donors might give.

BACKGROUND

We had hoped the Canadians might take over responsibilities from the RAF, at least for a time, when our present commitment came to an end on 31 March. The Canadians explained that they were unable to take over from us at present but will reconsider later in the year.

2. We are now considering how long a new commitment to offer. This requires a better assessment than we have now of the value of aircraft in the rainy period which should start in June (operations may be more difficult, reducing the amount of food carried, but also more necessary and valuable if roads are impassable). We will also take into account other donors' intentions.

3. In the meantime the Ministry of Defence and Overseas Development Administration have agreed to continue the airlift at least until the end of April each bearing 50% of the additional costs. Our Ambassador has been instructed to tell the Ethiopians that we are willing to stay after the end of March and to give one month's notice of any intention to withdraw. The RAF needs almost a month to complete the logistics for withdrawal most effectively.

2.3.85

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 February 1985

Airlift in Ethiopia

Thank you for your letter of 25 February enclosing a draft message from the Foreign Secretary to the Canadian Foreign Minister seeking Canadian participation in the airlift in Ethiopia.

The Prime Minister agrees to the despatch of the message.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

file 507

JSC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Pine Martin:

Agree to his
message to the
Canadian government?

25 February 1985

Dear Charles,

25/2

Yes

Airlift in Ethiopia

The Foreign Secretary would like to send a telegram to the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, seeking Canadian participation in the airlift in Ethiopia to facilitate a withdrawal, possibly temporary, by the RAF. A draft message, agreed with the Ministry of Defence, is enclosed. If the Canadians do not agree we propose to pursue a possible sharing of responsibility with other donors; we think the Belgians and possibly the Australians might be interested.

The RAF airlift of food and relief supplies within Ethiopia has been a conspicuous success and a great boost to morale in the country. The extra cost of this operation was borne by the Ministry of Defence for the first three months but since 3 February is being shared equally by the MOD and ODA. We have told the Ethiopians that the RAF will continue their work until the end of March and that we shall consider the possibility of an extension near that time. The relatively high cost of carrying food by air is properly justified only when it is taken to areas that would otherwise be inaccessible because of difficult terrain, bad weather or military conflict.

Other donors, in particular the Canadians, have shown some interest in providing planes but may be holding back because of the presence of the RAF and because there is a limit to the number of aircraft which can be used effectively in Ethiopia. Following an informal contact that Mr Stanley had during his visit to Ethiopia with David Macdonald, the Canadian Government's Famine Relief Coordinator for Africa, we have discussed with the Canadians the possibility that they should send a detachment with two Hercules to take over from the Royal Air Force. If the Canadians and Ethiopians so wished, and if conditions nearer the time suggested that a continuing airlift was justified, we would consider taking over again from the Canadians in a few months time.

We would welcome participation by another Western donor, sharing responsibility with the RAF, for several reasons. It would lessen the burden on our already over-stretched resources for aid and defence, it would be a gesture of cooperation and it would make the final withdrawal of the RAF much easier politically. Our Ambassador in Addis Ababa considers that we have

/gained already

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already the main political advantage from the RAF presence. However the withdrawal of the RAF detachment, even though it would be for the clear reason that we thought aid resources could be used better in other ways, is likely to provoke some protests from the Ethiopians and some criticisms here at home. These would be lessened if the RAF Hercules were replaced by aircraft from one of our partners. The final withdrawal of the airlift, perhaps after the RAF had flown in Ethiopia for a further three months period later in the year, would then be less conspicuous.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Michael MacCullough (ODA).

Yours ever,

Le Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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ROUTINE

Page

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2 initially for a period of three months. This was subsequently
 3 extended to the end of March 1985. In recent weeks the
 4 operation has become even more complex with air drops in
 5 cooperation with the Ethiopians, Russians and West Germans and
 6 using Polish helicopters provided for the Red Cross. This
 7 has increased the political value of the exercise and has
 8 also helped to bring food to the people in need,
 9 discouraging the long trek to relief camps. There might be
 10 some further advantage in bringing in another Western Air Force
 11 at this time to share the experience. We would be prepared to
 12 look at the possibility of returning the RAF aircraft should you
 13 wish to withdraw your planes after a few months, subject to a
 14 further assessment at that time.

15 If we are to withdraw the Royal Air Force planes at the
 16 end of March we need to start preparing for this fairly early
 17 next month and I should therefore be grateful if you could let
 18 us know quite quickly whether your Government would consider
 19 taking over the operation at that time.

20 ENDS

22 HOWE

23 NNNN

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TO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA

MODEVO19 17JAN

INFO MODUK OTTAWA WELLINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK UKREP BRUSSELS
ROME (FOR MCLEAN)

CONTINUATION OF RAF PRESENCE

MINISTERS HAVE AGREED RAF HERCULES PRESENCE MAY CONTINUE ON PRESENT BASIS UNTIL END OF MARCH. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ADDITIONAL COSTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THIS OPERATION WILL BE SHARED EQUALLY BETWEEN MOD AND ODA AT ESTIMATED TOTAL OF BETWEEN PDS STG 1M AND PDS STG 1.5M EACH.

2. GRATEFUL YOU NOW APPROACH ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES OFFERING AN EXTENDED STAY. AT ONE STAGE WE DISCUSSED WITH DAWIT AN OFFER OF 3 MONTHS STAY RENEWABLE FOR FURTHER 3 MONTHS BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT. HOWEVER OFFER MADE TO ETHIOPIANS AND ACCEPTED BY THEM AS DESCRIBED IN FCO TELNO 260 OF 29 OCTOBER DID NOT SPECIFY ANY PERIOD FOLLOWING RENEWAL. TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT RENEWAL FOR 2 MONTHS RATHER THAN FOR 3 WE SUGGEST YOU SAY ONLY THAT WE PROPOSE TO EXTEND THE OPERATION, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT OF ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT, AND TO REVIEW POSITION FURTHER NEAR THE END OF MARCH IN THE LIGHT OF REVISED ESTIMATES THEN OF NEED FOR AIRLIFT AND EXTENT TO WHICH THIS NEED MAY BE MET BY OTHER DONORS.

3. YOU MAY TELL ETHIOPIANS IN CONFIDENCE THAT WE UNDERSTAND OTHER COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS ARE CONSIDERING OFFERS OF AIRCRAFT TO HELP MEET PROBLEMS OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICA BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WILL OFFER OR WHETHER THEIR HELP WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO ETHIOPIA OR OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. IN RESPONSE TO ANY PRESS ENQUIRIES OR PQS WE PROPOSE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE ASKED YOU TO OFFER AN EXTENSION TO THE ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES AND WILL REVIEW THE POSITION NEAR THE END OF MARCH.

5. GRATEFUL YOU ADVISE US IMMEDIATELY HOW SOON THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO RESPOND.

~~HOWE~~

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

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MINISTER OF STATE FOR
THE ARMED FORCES

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2216 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

NBPM
2. 19/1

D/MIN(AF)/JS/5/3/83

9 January 1985

Dear Tom,

attached.
Please let me
see
APP

1. Thank you for your letter of 31 December concerning the need to discuss with the Canadians a joint Hercules operation in Ethiopia.
2. I have now seen Brian Barder's telegram of 2 January which makes it clear that other western contributions to the airlift are likely to be extended well into 1985. Before making a final decision on our own presence, I agree that we should explore with the Canadians the proposals outlined in paragraph 3 of your letter. It would also be useful if our High Commission in Ottawa could sound out the Canadians on the possibility that, at some stage, each of our Air Forces might provide one Hercules and half the necessary manpower.
3. One important consideration is the availability of suitable accommodation for our personnel if any extension or re-deployment is agreed. It will be important to do all we can to ensure continued use of the excellent facilities at the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA). If the Canadians take over from us the best arrangement might be to ask ILCA to accept them in our place, on the understanding that the accommodation would revert to us if we subsequently returned. I should be grateful if HMA Addis could explore the continuing availability of accommodation with Dr Brumby, Director General ILCA, without, of course, committing either the Canadians or ourselves.
4. On the financial side, I was grateful for your agreement to bear a reasonable proportion of the cost. I assume that this will apply to any continuation of the British detachment beyond 3 February as well as to any subsequent redeployment of our Hercules following say a temporary handover to the Canadians. My officials have already passed our latest cost estimates to your Department and I should be glad to hear what you would consider to be a reasonable monthly share, taking account of the cost of civil chartering.

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5. I shall be happy to discuss the terms of a draft announcement with you as soon as you are ready.

6. I am copying this to Malcolm Rifkind and to Charles Powell.

Yours etc.

John

JOHN STANLEY

The Rt Hon Timothy Raison MP

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

- 9 JAN 1985

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OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH

Telephone 01-213 5409

From the Minister

31 December 1984

The Rt Hon John Stanley MP
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON SW1

*Sub
2/.*

Dear Minister,

When we met in the House before Christmas you suggested that we should urgently pursue with the Canadians the idea of a joint Hercules operation in Ethiopia, under which they would deploy two aircraft in replacement of ours for three months from 3 February, when our present commitment expires, and we would then alternate with them for three-month stretches throughout the rest of 1985.

... You will since have seen our Ambassador's views as set out in his telegram 460, but maybe not his Modev 154 or Ottawa telegram 703, of which I enclose copies. I do not think further delays will give us a clearer assessment of the possible requirements throughout the whole of 1985. There must remain considerable uncertainty over the actual needs, and I am sure that we shall only be able to judge these for a month or two ahead at a time. Nevertheless it seems clear that the Ethiopians will put strong pressure on us to stay on as long as possible, even if the Canadians come in.

I agree that we ought now to explore formally with the Canadians the idea of a joint operation, and that we should start the ball rolling as soon as possible through our normal diplomatic channels, following up the latest contacts between McDonald and Derek Day. I think we should float with them the suggestion that they might replace us for a period of at least three months, with our being ready at a later stage to take over from them again if the needs and priorities show this as desirable nearer the time; but that we have obviously not reached a firm decision on this, and that of course satisfactory mutual arrangements would have to continue with the Ethiopian authorities.

I also think we ought separately to ascertain from other Western aircraft donors what their own intentions are about withdrawing or continuing their support. We should explore particularly the prospects of other new contributors coming in, eg the Swedes, who were also earlier said to be interested. This would give us a clearer overall picture against which to firm up our own decisions.

Your officials will be presenting detailed costings of the Hercules operations, but I believe we should not wait until these are examined before we approach the Canadians. I am prepared therefore to agree now that if it were necessary to re-deploy the Hercules, the Aid Programme would bear a reasonable proportion of the cost, taking into account what we should have to pay for civil charters.

/I feel

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I feel we ought also to give early thought to the terms in which their possible eventual handover to the Canadians would be announced.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'T. Raison'.

for TIMOTHY RAISON
(Approved by Mr Raison
and signed in his absence)

cc Mr Malcolm Rifkind, FCO
Mr Charles Powell, 10 Downing Street

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FM OTTAWA 211900Z DEC 84
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 703 OF 21 DECEMBER
INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA, UKMIS NEW YORK

MODEV TELNO 155 TO ADDIS

1. I HAVE SPOKEN TO DAVID MACDONALD AS INSTRUCTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. MACDONALD TOOK NOTE THAT WE MAY HAVE PROPOSALS TO PUT SOON AFTER CHRISTMAS. I WAS NOT PRESSED ABOUT ROTATION OF DUTIES. NOR DID MACDONALD GIVE ANY INDICATION OF FURTHER CANADIAN THINKING ABOUT TAKING OVER THE AIR LIFT FROM US IN FEBRUARY. HE MERELY REITERATED THAT THIS COULD PROVIDE A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ANGLO/CANADIAN COOPERATION AND BE TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH.

DAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

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FM ADDIS ABABA 211240Z DEC 84

TO IMMEDIATE ODA

TELEGRAM NUMBER MODEV 154 OF 21 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO MODEV 155: POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF RAF OPERATION
BUSHELL.

SUMMARY.

1. RRC EXPECT AIRLIFT REQUIREMENT WELL INTO 1985, FOR AREAS
SUBJECT TO INTERRUPTED ROAD ACCESS AND FOR EMERGENCY NEEDS.
CONCERN ABOUT IMPENDING WITHDRAWAL OF MOST USEFUL AIRCRAFT NOW
OPERATING. NEEDS AND CAPACITY UNLIKELY TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY
AFFECTED BY RAINS.

DETAIL.

2. I CALLED WITH TAYLOR ON RRC DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, COL HABTE-
MARIAM AYENACHEW, ON 21 DECEMBER, AND REQUESTED ASSESSMENT AS IN
PARA 1 OF YTUR.

3. HABTE-MARIAM CONFIRMED THAT, AS STATED IN RRC DOCUMENT
CIRCULATED AT MEETING ON 11 DECEMBER (MY TELNO MODEV 135, PARA
3(D)), RRC WAS CONVINCED OF CONTINUING NEED FOR AT LEAST AS
MANY AIRCRAFT AS WERE AT PRESENT AVAILABLE FOR MANY MONTHS BEYOND
EARLY FEBRUARY, WHEN INITIAL RAF COMMITMENT EXPIRED. OF AIRCRAFT
CURRENTLY PROVIDED (ANNEX V OF RRC DOCUMENT), SOVIET TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT WOULD BE NEEDED FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE TO CARRY SETTLERS
UNDER RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME: FRG TRANSALLS WERE DUE TO BE
WITHDRAWN ON 5 JANUARY: US CIVILIAN HERCULES DUE TO BE WITHDRAWN
ABOUT SAME TIME ALTHOUGH EXTENSION WAS POSSIBLE: GDR AND LIBYAN
ANTONOV 26S WERE TOO SMALL TO BE OF MUCH REAL USE: SO ITALIAN
G222S, WHICH MIGHT WELL BE REMAINING INTO FEBRUARY OR LATER,
ALTHOUGH SMALL, WERE THE ONLY OTHER REALLY USEFUL TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT OF WHICH RRC WAS CONFIDENT OF CONTINUING AVAILABILITY.
WITHDRAWAL OF RAF HERCULES WOULD THUS PRESENT REAL PROBLEMS, NOT
ONLY BECAUSE OF MAXIMUM UTILITY OF HERCULES COMPARED WITH OTHER
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF NOTABLE
EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY OF RAF COMPARED WITH OTHER AIR
CONTINGENTS NOW AT WORK IN ETHIOPIA.

4. HABTE-MARIAM AGREED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A SIGNIFICANT
IMPROVEMENT IN CAPACITY OF ROAD TRANSPORT SYSTEM SINCE START
OF OPERATION BUSHELL, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE FURTHER IMPROVED
WHEN LONG-HAUL VEHICLES PROMISED BY ITALIANS AND GERMANS ARRIVED.
BUT HE INSISTED THAT ROAD TRANSPORT SYSTEM WOULD CONTINUE TO
REQUIRE SUPPLEMENTATION BY AIR, ESPECIALLY TO FILL SUDDEN GAPS.
HE ALSO STRESSED DIFFICULTY OF SUPPLYING AREAS LIABLE TO ROAD
SECURITY PROBLEMS WITHOUT AN AIR CAPACITY. RAF ALONE HAD SAVED
MANY LIVES IN MERKELE AT TIMES WHEN ROAD CONVOYS FROM ASHARA
WERE PREVENTED FROM GETTING THROUGH.

HABTE-MARIAM THOUGHT RAINS UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON ROAD TRANSPORT, EXCEPT ON MINOR ROADS AND TRACKS USED FOR LOCAL DISTRIBUTION FROM MAIN RELIEF CENTRES, MANY OF WHICH WOULD BECOME IMPASSABLE: THE 24 SOVIET HELICOPTERS WOULD HELP TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM, PROVIDED THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT LONG-HAUL VEHICLES AND LARGE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT TO MAINTAIN FLOW OF GRAIN FROM PORTS TO DISTRIBUTION CENTRES. HE BROADLY CONFIRMED ASSESSMENT IN MY TELNO 470 OF EFFECTS OF RAINS ON AIRSTRIPS, EXCEPT THAT MASSAWA AIRSTRIP WOULD BE UNUSABLE FOR WEEKS AT A TIME DURING RAINY SEASON (THIS COULD HOWEVER BE OVERCOME BY USE OF ROAD TRANSPORT BETWEEN MASSAWA AND ASMARA WHOSE AIRSTRIP IS USABLE ALL YEAR ROUND): AND HE DOUBTED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AT MEKELE IF 1955 RAINS WERE AS BAD THERE AS 1954. WHERE AIRSTRIPS WERE UNUSABLE THROUGH RAIN, HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF AIR DROPS ALONGSIDE STRIPS (MY TELNO 460, PARA 1(C)).

6. I EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM ABOUT PRACTICALITY OF USING 53 MORE AIRCRAFT IN ADDITION TO EXISTING 27 FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT, AS PROPOSED IN RRC DOCUMENT (PARA 5.1.3.3). HABTE-MARIAM DID NOT DEMUR.

7. COMMENT: CLEARLY RRC'S TWO MAIN WORRIES ARE THAT ALMOST ALL THE MOST USEFUL AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY OPERATING MAY BE WITHDRAWN DURING FIRST FEW WEEKS OF 1955, AND THAT THEY WILL BE LEFT WITHOUT ADEQUATE CAPACITY FOR SUPPLYING MEKELE AND OTHER DROUGHT AREAS SUBJECT TO INTERRUPTION OF ROAD ACCESS. BOTH WORRIES ARE GENUINE AND WELL-FOUNDED. THEY ARE ALSO JUSTIFIABLY ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT AIRLIFT CAPACITY TO MEET URGENT NEEDS FOR WHICH DELAYS IN SUPPLY BY ROAD COULD HAVE BAD CONSEQUENCES (EG MEDICAL, SUPPLEMENTARY FOODS, SHELTER, ETC). IF WE, THE AMERICANS AND THE WEST GERMANS ALL PULL OUT AT THE SAME TIME, OUR WITHDRAWAL WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND, AND WILL CREATE REAL PROBLEMS. A HANDOVER TO CANADIANS, IF THIS PROVES FEASIBLE, WOULD MUCH REDUCE NEGATIVE IMPACT, ALTHOUGH EVEN THEN WE SHOULD HAVE TO EXPECT STRONG PRESSURE FOR RAF TO REMAIN ALONGSIDE CANADIANS. WE UNDERSTAND FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY THAT THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY OF THEIR EXTENDING PROVISION OF TWO CIVILIAN CHARTER HERCULES UNTIL EARLY MARCH, BUT NO DECISION HAS APPARENTLY BEEN TAKEN.

BARDER

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

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MR FERGUSSON	MR G A WILLIAMS (UNCD))
MR JOHNSON	MR ARBUTHNOTT)
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2 JAN 1985



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 December 1984

EMJ 11/12

Charles Ricketts

Dear Tim,

United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator in Ethiopia

On 7 November, the Prime Minister wrote to the United Nations Secretary General urging him to appoint a coordinator to oversee the massive relief operations in Ethiopia. We have now received the Secretary General's reply, which I enclose. Senor Perez de Cuellar refers to his appointment of Dr Kurt Jansson as Assistant Secretary General for Emergency Relief Operations in Ethiopia.

Since his appointment nearly a month ago Dr Jansson has been active in New York, Rome, Geneva and in Ethiopia itself, consulting donors and the Ethiopian authorities. Mr Raison met him in Addis Ababa during his visit and formed the view that he would probably do an effective job in improving coordination and planning there. More recent reports from our Ambassador in Addis Ababa confirm that useful progress has already been made.

Yours,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street

DISASTERS: Ethiopia

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 1AA



DEC 1984



cc 720 JP

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 December 1984

Y
Youn Kinnare

Many thanks for your letter of 14 November and for coming to see me following your visit to Ethiopia.

As you will have seen in the press, I discussed the problem of famine in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa with my colleagues in the European Community in Dublin earlier this week. We agreed that the Community as a whole should publicly commit itself to providing 1.2 million tonnes of grain during the first part of 1985, as food aid to help relieve the suffering and starvation which you so graphically described to me.

Since our conversation, the Minister for Overseas Development, Timothy Raison, has visited the same parts of Ethiopia to which you went. Following his return, he announced that the United Kingdom would immediately send a further 15,000 tonnes of grain to Ethiopia and make available another £5 million from our overseas aid programme to deal with the effects of famine in Africa.

I am particularly glad that we have been able to make so much of our aid available through the British voluntary agencies, including the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, who have played such a major role in stimulating and organising the public outpouring of sympathy

JK


which we have witnessed in Britain over the last few months. Tim Raison found that the Ethiopian Government were deeply appreciative of the generous way in which the British Government and public have responded.

As I said when you called on me, the essential long-term goal is now to help the Ethiopians grow their own food. On 8 December, Tim Raison will sign on our behalf the third Lomé Convention under which Britain will contribute £740 million over five years to the sixth European Development Fund, the majority of which will be devoted to projects in Africa. Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of development aid from the present EDF; we shall be working with our Community partners to try to ensure that full use is made of this aid and that it helps the Ethiopian Government to implement a development policy which will reduce the chances of famine on this scale happening again.

Yours sincerely

Raymond Hunt

His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster



2
Prime Minister

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

6 December 1984

This letter
arose out of the
Lord Privy Seal's exchange
with Neil Kinnock at
PM's Questions on Tuesday

Dear Neil

Do you

mb

In the House on Tuesday, I undertook to study the reports to which you had referred, that the RAF Hercules were not able to operate at full capacity because there was, at the present time, little grain in Ethiopia to be moved.

We have been in touch with the British Ambassador in Addis Ababa who reports that the RAF has airlifted 1873 tonnes of relief supplies between 4 November and 4 December inclusive. The Hercules aircraft have flown for a total of 303 hours over the same period. Each of the aircraft has typically flown 3 relief sorties per day, limited by the need to confine operations to daylight hours. Supplies carried include grain (more than 1360 tonnes), flour, blankets, high energy foods, edible oils, medical supplies, vehicles and miscellaneous relief equipment.

Since 2 December, there has been some reduction in the average number of sorties due to:

- (a) much increased efficiency of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission road transport operation, which has cleared recent grain arrivals from ports much more quickly than hitherto; and
- (b) temporary interruption to the grain supply pipeline for Ethiopia, with a time-lag between new pledges in late October and first arrivals in Ethiopia.

Despite the reduction in the availability of food supplies for the airlift, since 2 December the RAF, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and voluntary agencies have worked in close cooperation to ensure the transport of urgent non-food relief supplies to drought areas. From 2 to 4 December inclusive, the RAF airlifted 77 tonnes in 17 1/2 hours' flying, with an average of 3 sorties a day. The RAF has thus continued to perform invaluable service without interruption.


The Rt Hon Neil Kinnock MP
House of Commons

The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission now say 350 tonnes of grain is available for collection by RAF from Assab, starting 6 December (ie. about 7 days' airlift using both aircraft). The World Food Programme also expects to ask RAF to airlift 300-400 tonnes of grain in the next few days. The RAF also has commitments (definite or prospective) to deliver during the next few days, 22 tons of food and clothing to Mekele and much of the Daily Mirror consignment due on 8 December.

The first large new grain shipments are expected at Assab on about 11 December. The World Food Programme has advised us that more than 62,000 tonnes (including UK's 6500 tonnes) are expected to arrive in Ethiopia before the end of this month.

I think you will agree, on the basis of this evidence, that full use continues to be made of the RAF Hercules.

With regard to the point you made about the Common Market grain surplus, you will have noted that the European Community decided in Dublin on 4 December to provide 1.2m tonnes of grain to drought-stricken countries in Africa in the period to the next European harvest. Much of this will go to Ethiopia.



JOHN BIFFEN

6 DEC 1984

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Subject in Briefing
for Euro Council in
DUBLIN, December 1984

DISASTERS; Ethiopia Famine.

with CDO
6/12

ETHIOPIA FAMINE

Britain has helped Ethiopia for many years. 1973-82 British aid averaged over £2 million per year rising in 1982 to £5.6 million. Over the past 18 months it has been worth more than £10 million including our share of support given by the EC.

On 5th July we cancelled Ethiopia's existing aid debts to us worth more than £2.5 million.

What we are doing now

6,000 tons more food and best part of £5 million for trucks. Following the British initiative the EC approved on 29 October a £20 million programme.

On 6 November EC Development Ministers endorsed plans for food and other emergency aid to Africa at £35 million much of it for Ethiopia.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 December, 1984

Dear Charles,

Thank you for your letters of 13⁴ November and 14 November about Cardinal Hume's call on the Prime Minister on 13 November to discuss his visit to Ethiopia. I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature.

With many apologies for the delay.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

'DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM Prime Minister

AOV

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Cardinal Basil Hume
Archbishop of Westminster
Archbishop House
LONDON SW1

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Many thanks for your letter of 14 November and for coming to see me following your visit to Ethiopia.

CAVEAT.....

As you will have seen in the Press, I discussed the problem of famine in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa with my colleagues in the European Community in Dublin earlier this week. We agreed that the Community as a whole should publicly commit itself to providing 1.2 million tonnes of grain during the first part of 1985, as food aid to help relieve the suffering and starvation which you so graphically described to me.

Since our conversation the Minister for Overseas Development, Timothy Raison, has visited the same parts of Ethiopia to which you went. Following his return he announced that the United Kingdom would immediately send a further 15,000 tonnes of grain to Ethiopia and make available another £5 million from our overseas aid programme to ~~help relieve~~ *deal with* the effects of famine in Africa.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I am particularly glad that we have been able to make so much of our aid available through the British voluntary agencies including the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, who have played such a major role in stimulating and organising the public outpouring of sympathy which we have witnessed in Britain over the last few months. Tim Raison found that the Ethiopian Government were deeply appreciative of the generous way in which the British government and public have responded.

As I said when you called on me, the essential long term goal is now to help the Ethiopians grow their own food. On 8 December Tim Raison will sign on our behalf the third Lome Convention under which Britain will contribute £740 million over five years to the sixth European Development Fund, the majority of which will be devoted to projects in Africa. Ethiopia has been the largest recipient of development aid from the present EDF; we shall be working with our Community partners to try to ensure that full use is made of this aid and that it helps the Ethiopian Government to implement a development policy which will reduce the chances of famine on this scale happening again.



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DISKETS
HARRISON
OUT 82





THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

(4)

This is Perez de Cuellar
saying that he has taken
up your suggestion and
appointed a UN Relief

Prime Minister

QJ

28 November 1984

Coordinator for Ethiopia

EDP 11/12

Dear Prime Minister,

ms

I wish to thank you for your letter of 7 November 1984 concerning the disastrous situation which has developed in Ethiopia as a result of prolonged drought and famine. During my visit to that country earlier this month I had the opportunity of visiting Korem where large numbers of people have converged in search of food and medicine. I was appalled by the extent of human suffering and by the grim prospect facing the population in the famine-stricken areas unless adequate assistance reached them in time.

In my discussions with the relief officials as well as with the Ethiopian authorities, I was encouraged to learn that international assistance had begun to reach the affected areas in increasing quantities. If this assistance can be sustained during the critical months ahead it might be possible to contain the situation and save countless lives.

I share your view that in a situation of this complexity and magnitude it is important to have a focal point on which the international community can rely for an assessment of needs, and for facilitating coordination at all levels.

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
The United Kingdom

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With these considerations in mind, I have recently appointed Mr. Kurt Jansson of Finland as Assistant Secretary-General for Emergency Relief Operations in Ethiopia. His task will be to strengthen operational coordination and planning with regard to the emergency. Mr. Jansson will work closely not only with the agencies and organizations of the United Nations system, but also with bilateral donors and voluntary agencies.

I have asked Mr. Jansson to formulate within the next two weeks a concrete programme covering emergency relief assistance required until the harvest in November 1985. He will institute a monitoring system and arrange for his reports to be disseminated through the office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator in Geneva.

I am confident that these arrangements will enhance the effectiveness of relief operations and will accelerate the delivery and distribution of vital supplies to the affected areas.

Yours sincerely

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

DISASTERS: Ethiopia

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ROME (FOR MCLEAN), UKMIS GENEVA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR RAISON'S VISIT TO ETHIOPIA. ms

SUMMARY.

1. MR RAISON VISITED DROUGHT AREAS AND PORT, MET MENGISTU AND OTHER ETHIOPIAN LEADERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF NUMEROUS RELIEF AGENCIES. ETHIOPIAN THANKS FOR UK RELIEF EFFORT: TRIBUTES TO RAF. MR RAISON RESERVES JUDGEMENT ON RESETTLEMENT. BOOST TO BILATERAL RELATIONS: LONGER-TERM EFFECTS DEPEND ON UK ROLE IN NEXT YEAR. GRATITUDE TO MR RAISON AND PARTY.

DETAIL.

2. DURING HIS VISIT FROM 25 - 27 NOVEMBER TO LOOK AT FAMINE PROBLEMS, THE UK CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE NEEDS, MR RAISON (USING RAF HERCULES) VISITED FAMINE AREAS IN WELO AND TIGRAY AND THE MAIN PORT AT ASSAB, AND HAD TALKS WITH: CHAIRMAN MENGISTU, MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY (IN ABSENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WAS MANAGING CLIMAX OF HIJACK CRISIS), BERHANU BAYIH (POLITBUREAU MEMBER RESPONSIBLE FOR RELIEF AID COORDINATION, AND MINISTER OF LABOUR), DAWIT (RRC COMMISSIONER), MINISTER MERSIE IJUGU (DEVELOPMENT PLANNING), YOUSOUF AHMED (MINISTER OF TRANSPORT), JANSSON (UN ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL RESPONSIBLE FOR RELIEF COORDINATION), AND REPRESENTATIVES OF NUMEROUS AGENCIES INCLUDING EC COMMISSION, IBRD, WFP, UNDRP, UNICEF, FAO, ICRC, SCF, OXFAM, CRDA AND CANADIAN AMBASSADOR.

3. ALL ETHIOPIAN OFFICIALS WHOM MR RAISON MET, INCLUDING MENGISTU, EXPRESSED WARM THANKS FOR BRITISH ROLE IN PROMPTING INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO FAMINE, AND TO BRITISH 'GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE' (MENGISTU) FOR SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE RELIEF AID. MENGISTU, DAWIT AND TRANSPORT MINISTER ALL PAID SPECIAL TRIBUTES TO MAJOR CONTRIBUTION OF RAF WITH THEIR PROFESSIONALISM, FLAIR AND FRIENDLY COOPERATION. THESE HAD MADE A DEEP IMPRESSION WHEREVER THEY WERE OPERATING. MFA PERMANENT SECRETARY PRAISED RAF EFFICIENCY, SPEED AND COOPERATIVE AND FRIENDLY ATTITUDES - 'IN OTHER WORDS THEIR BRITISHNESS'. TRANSPORT MINISTER NOTED THAT OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT CARRYING RELIEF SUPPLIES RAF WERE TOP OF LEAGUE TABLE FOR QUANTITIES CARRIED AND NUMBER OF SHUTTLES ACCOMPLISHED.

4. MENGISTU AND OTHER ETHIOPIAN OFFICIALS CONCENTRATED IN DISCUSSIONS ON RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME AS MAJOR SOLUTION TO IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF FAMINE, ALTHOUGH NONE MADE ANY SPECIFIC

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REQUEST FOR BRITISH AID TOWARDS RESETTLEMENT, NOR MENTIONED BERHANU BAYIH'S EARLIER REQUEST FOR USE OF RAF HERCULES FOR RESETTLEMENT MR RAISON NOTED INEVITABLE QUESTIONS IN WESTERN MINDS ABOUT RESETTLEMENT AND SAID HMG WOULD WATCH CLOSELY TO SEE HOW PROGRAMME WORKED OUT IN PRACTICE BEFORE DETERMINING ITS ATTITUDE. MR RAISON SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY MAGNITUDE OF NEED AND BY HIGH LEVEL OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN BRITISH (ESPECIALLY RAF) AND ETHIOPIANS IN PUTTING UK RELIEF AID INTO EFFECT. HE ACCEPTED THAT IMMEDIATE RELIEF NEEDS WOULD CONTINUE AT LEAST TO END 1985 AND PROMISED CONTINUED BRITISH SUPPORT. AT A MEETING WITH ETHIOPIAN AND BRITISH PRESS JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE, MR RAISON ANNOUNCED THAT IN ADDITION TO CURRENT UK RELIEF AID HMG WOULD BE SENDING 20,000 BLANKETS BY AIR, SOME PROVIDED BY UK NGO'S, AND SOME BY HMG: AND THAT HMG WOULD PROVIDE 2 MORE ADDITIONAL GRAIN CONVEYORS FOR ASSAB PORT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ETHIOPIA HAD URGENTLY TO CONSIDER LONGER-TERM MEASURES TO PREVENT FUTURE FAMINES: HMG, LIKE OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT WAS NEEDED AND HOW BEST TO HELP. MAJOR PART OF OUR PARTICIPATION IN SUPPORT FOR AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THROUGH EC AND IBRD, AS IN PAST. BUT WE WOULD SEE IF THERE MIGHT BE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT USEFULLY HELP.

5. SEVERAL ETHIOPIANS MENTIONED PRIVATELY TO MR RAISON AND HIS PARTY THEIR IMPRESSION THAT PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE RESPONSE BY UK AND US HAD MADE DEEP IMPRESSION ON ETHIOPIAN LEADERSHIP INCLUDING MENGISTU PERSONALLY, AND THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE STIMULATING FRESH THINKING ABOUT WESTERN ATTITUDES TO ETHIOPIA AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE COOPERATION. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT MR RAISON WAS INVITED TO CALL ON CHAIRMAN MENGISTU (AN APPOINTMENT FOR WHICH WE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKED): FIRST CONTACT SINCE REVOLUTION BETWEEN ETHIOPIAN HEAD OF STATE AND A BRITISH MINISTER (AND INCIDENTALLY MY OWN FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH MENGISTU). MEETING WAS FAIRLY FORMAL BUT CERTAINLY NOT UNFRIENDLY.

ASSESSMENT.

6. AS SEEN FROM HERE, MR RAISON'S VISIT MARKED SIGNIFICANT NEW PROGRESS IN PROCESS OF INJECTING MORE SUBSTANCE AND WARMTH INTO UK/ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS, AND GAVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO GOODWILL AND CONCERN IN BRITAIN REPRESENTED BY HMG'S AND BRITISH PEOPLE'S RESPONSE TO ETHIOPIAN FAMINE. WHETHER IT PROVES POSSIBLE TO CONVERT CURRENT WARMTH, GREATLY ENHANCED BY MR RAISON'S VISIT AND CONTACTS INTO PERMANENT UPGRADING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THUS OF OUR CAPACITY FOR INFLUENCING EVENTS IN THE HORN AND FUTURE EVOLUTION OF ETHIOPIA'S INTERNATIONAL ALIGNMENT, WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER WEST IN GENERAL AND HMG IN PARTICULAR

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CAN SUSTAIN RELIEF EFFORT AT AT LEAST PRESENT LEVELS FOR ANOTHER YEAR, AND ON WHETHER WE CAN PARTICIPATE IN A CONCERTED WESTERN EFFORT TO STEER AND PROMOTE ETHIOPIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

7. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO MR RAISON AND HIS ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS FOR UNDERTAKING AN ARDUOUS AND EXHAUSTING PROGRAMME. IT HAS BEEN A MAJOR BOOST FOR US HERE AND WE SHALL NEED TO MAKE SURE WE EXTRACT FULLEST ADVANTAGE FROM IMMEDIATE BENEFITS OF VISIT.

8. FULLER ACCOUNT AND COMMENTS FOLLOW BY BAG.

BARDER

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ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

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
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10 DOWNING STREET

Mr Barclay
for information

Mr Powell
26/11

From the Press Secretary

26 November 1984

Dear John,

Thank you for the draft letter which Mr Raison proposes to send to the Chairman of Granada about the 'World in Action' programme of November 12.

I would not advocate suggesting that the Broadcasting Complaints Commission is an inadequate way of dealing with the issue, because the Minister may wish to go to them in the end. Nor do I feel Granada should be asked to make a contribution or threatened with other unspecified remedies. I think they should first be given rope to hang themselves with.

Consequently, I would strongly urge the last three paragraphs be re-drafted as follows:

"I hope you will agree that this needs to be put right and that you will instruct "World in Action" to retract its inaccurate assertions.

"I am copying this letter to Lord Thomson, Chairman, Independent Broadcasting Authority."

John Samuel
Bernard Ingham

BERNARD INGHAM

J.E. Murphy, Esq.,
Overseas Development Administration,
Eland House,
Stag Place,
London, SW1E 5DH.

DRAFT LETTER FOR SIGNATURE BY MR RAISON

I write with reference to the World in Action programme on the 12th of November, entitled "The Politics of Starvation".

The essence of the programme was the claim that British (and certain other) food aid designed to meet the famine in Ethiopia and certain other countries had been held back for political reasons. It was made clear that as a result many people had died or were starving. It was not a programme about development aid; nor was the argument simply that there had not been enough food aid. It was, as the title of the programme indicates, about an alleged political line by this and other governments.

At the beginning of the programme I am shown saying that there are no political constraints on food aid. (You will no doubt wish to study the film and the transcript, as I have). From then on, much of the programme is taken up with material which is designed directly or indirectly to contradict this, though it covers European and American food aid as well. Statements are made both by people interviewed and the narrator.

You will see for yourself these statements. The narrator says, for example, of the FAO "They told Western governments that the famine was coming, asked for help and saw it refused". Later he says "The contrast between aid given to Ethiopia and other African countries is striking. 24 states needed help this year. Only Marxist Mozambique and Ethiopia failed to get what they needed".

Later Dr C Elliott is quoted as saying "There is a quite clear blacklist of countries, which is quite clearly politically determined". He says this has covered food aid. There are other relevant statements.

What was completely absent from the programme was any attempt to look at the facts. Do they support the view that food aid to Ethiopia and Mozambique over the period of the recent severe drought and famine was not delivered as a result of a policy of blacklisting?

I attach a table which shows the facts. It covers 1983 and 1984, the relevant years. If you look at the figures covering Ethiopia and Mozambique, you will see that (together with Sudan) they were much the largest recipients of food and emergency relief.

At the very least, the figures provide a devastating counter-argument to the programme's assertions. To have made no attempt to give the facts seems to me to be appalling. After all, the programme was making accusations of exceptional gravity.

Clearly the matter must be put right. I do not think the Broadcasting complaints commission is an adequate way of dealing with it. I propose that you should instruct World in Action to retract - those inaccurate assertions.

I also propose that Granada should make a substantial contribution to the Disasters Emergency Committee.

If you are not willing to do this, I shall have to look to other remedies.

	Via ODA Disaster Unit		UK national food aid		national orgns.		emergency aid (UK share)		1983 (10)	1984 (11)	TOTAL (12)
	1983 (2)	1984 (3)	1983 (4)	1984 (5)	1983 (6)	1984 (7)	1983 (8)	1984 (9)			
Angola	-	0.09	-	-	-	-	0.59	0.61	0.59	0.70	1.29
Benin	-	0.15	-	-	-	-	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.20	0.28
Botswana	0.11	0.10	-	-	-	0.03 ^a	0.19	0.19	0.30	0.32	0.62
Burkina Faso	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.17	0.41	0.17	0.41	0.58
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.44	0.53	0.44	0.53	0.97
C.A.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.10	-	0.10	-	0.10
Chad	0.10	0.25	-	1.30	0.07	-	0.25	0.90	0.42	2.45	2.87
Ethiopia	0.42	0.37	3.15	5.15	-	0.12 ^a	1.89	5.41	5.46	11.05	16.51 ^c
Gambia	-	0.09	-	-	-	-	0.13	0.10	0.13	0.19	0.32
Ghana	-	0.04	-	3.70	0.01 ^a	-	0.74	1.12	0.75	4.86	5.61
Guinea	-	-	0.02	-	-	-	0.23	0.19	0.25	0.19	0.44
Guinea-Bissau	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.21	0.32	0.21	0.32	0.53
Lesotho	-	-	-	-	-	0.04 ^a	0.23	0.35	0.23	0.39	0.62
Mali	-	0.17	0.35	0.45	-	0.02	0.72	1.10	1.07	1.74	2.81
Mauritania	0.11	0.24	1.14	-	-	-	1.10	1.44	2.35	1.68	4.03
Mozambique	0.40	0.37	0.34	3.70	-	-	1.94	2.63	2.68	6.70	9.38
Sao Tome & Principe	0.02	-	-	-	-	-	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.13
Senegal	0.09	-	-	-	-	-	0.71	1.16	0.80	1.16	1.96
Somalia	-	0.15	-	-	0.27 ^a	0.57 ^a	0.85	1.27	1.12	1.99	3.11
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	-	0.02 ^a	0.10	-	0.10	0.02	0.12
Tanzania	-	-	-	-	-	0.08 ^a	1.05	0.76	1.05	0.84	1.89
Togo	0.01 ^b	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.21	0.01	0.21	0.22
Zambia	-	-	0.50	-	-	0.05 ^a	1.09	0.80	1.59	0.85	2.44
Zimbabwe	0.14	0.55	-	1.30	0.01	-	1.60	1.74	1.75	3.59	5.34
Burundi	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.06
Comoros	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.22
Djibouti	-	0.005	-	-	0.10	-	0.10	0.13	0.20	0.14	0.34
Kenya	-	0.21	-	-	-	0.10 ^a	0.32	0.90	0.32	1.21	1.53
Madagascar	-	-	0.10	-	-	-	0.59	0.46	0.69	0.46	1.15
Morocco	-	0.15	-	-	-	-	0.07	0.30	0.07	0.45	0.52
Niger	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.04	0.83	0.04	0.83	0.87
Rwanda	-	-	-	-	0.05 ^a	0.05 ^a	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.23	0.41
Sierra Leone	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.30	0.23	0.30	0.23	0.53
Sudan	0.40	0.50	8.55	2.0	0.99 ^a	1.81 ^a	0.48	0.54	10.42	4.85	15.27
Uganda	0.29 ^b	-	0.21	-	0.15 ^a	0.25 ^a	-	0.07	0.65	0.32	0.97
Zaire	-	-	-	-	0.05 ^a	0.05 ^a	0.40	-	0.45	0.05	0.50
COUNTRY TOTAL	2.07	3.46	14.36	17.60	1.70	3.19	17.02	25.14	35.15	49.39	84.54
Africa drought appeals - grants to international organizations not allocated by country									0.75	5.60	6.35
UK share of EC food aid allocations to international organizations sub-allocated to countries above									8.45 ^d	9.00 ^d	17.45 ^d
Emergency allocation to Ethiopia and other African countries, Oct 84									-	5.00	5.00
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>									<u>44.35</u>	<u>68.99</u>	<u>113.34</u>


*Bilateral development aid which may contribute to prevention of famine is not included in this table.

a Grants to the refugee relief programmes of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees

b Famine not drought-related.

c Does not include emergency aid October 1984 - see last entry.

d Approximate figure.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

19 November 1984

Y
Your Eminence

Thank you for your letter of 19 November about the Question tabled in the House of Commons about our meeting following your visit to Ethiopia. I do appreciate, of course, the need to explain as fully as possible the situation in Ethiopia and the Government's response to it, and I believe that we have done this extensively in recent weeks. Equally, however, it has been my constant policy that what passes at private meetings between myself and others should remain confidential unless it is agreed at the meeting that a public statement should be made. To depart from this policy in a parliamentary reply might inhibit some who wish to pass on their views to me privately from doing so. I hope you will understand therefore if my Answer to this Question refers only to the subject matter of the meeting.

Y
Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster

010
ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

19 November, 1984

Dear Prime Minister,

A message reached this house to the effect that a certain Mr. Parry of Liverpool Riverside had tabled a question in the House for Tuesday next asking you to make public what you discussed with me at our recent meeting. I know nothing about this.

As far as I am concerned there is no reason at all why the content of our conversation should not be made public. Indeed I think that it would be wise for you to speak openly, given the misunderstandings that are abroad on this and other matters at the present time.

Yours very sincerely,

Basil Hume
Archbishop of Westminster

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher



OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH
Telephone 01-213 5409

~~CCP~~

NBP

am

From the Minister

15 November 1984

The Rt Hon Patrick Jenkin MP
House of Commons
LONDON SW1A 0AA

P Jenkin

Thank you for your letter of 5 November about possible contributions by County Councils to famine relief funds for the benefit of Ethiopia.

In view of the urgency, my reply was communicated to your office by telephone. This is just to place on record that I did not advance any objections to what you proposed.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw and Geoffrey Howe.

T. Raison

TIMOTHY RAISON

DISASTERS

NOV 04

ETHIOPIA

20 NOV 1984
12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



JL VC.
cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 November 1984

I wrote to you on 12 November about Cardinal Hume's call on the Prime Minister to discuss his visit to Ethiopia. Cardinal Hume has subsequently written to the Prime Minister to amend his letter to the Bishops' Conferences. I enclose a copy of his letter. I should be grateful for a draft reply in due course.

BN

Pl att. copy

(C.D. POWELL)

L.V. Appelyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

507

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

14 November 1984

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I am extremely grateful to you for giving me so much of your time yesterday morning and for arranging a meeting at such short notice.

I must apologise to you for the confusion which arose because I had left with you a draft letter to the Presidents of the European Bishops' Conferences within the EEC. Naturally, in the light of our conversation, that letter had to be modified by me. This I have done and enclose a copy of the letter which has, in fact, now gone to the Presidents.

Allow me to take this opportunity to urge that action be taken as I proposed at EEC level. I recognise that the proposal for action must come from the member states, but how can it be ensured that the matter is raised for Community consideration in the first place?

For completeness' sake, I would like to assure you that the passing reference in The Times this morning about my visit to you, did not originate from this house. I mention this, not because there is anything inappropriate in the report, but simply because I assured you I would not make public reference to the content of our conversation.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

Basil Hume

Archbishop of Westminster.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Prime Minister
I spoke to
Cardinal. He
repented!

CJP

14/11

mt

(2)

FOR INFORMATION

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

13 November 1984

I am writing to you in your capacity as President of your National Conference of Bishops, to ask for your immediate support in a situation of grave urgency which has become increasingly apparent in Ethiopia and throughout Central Africa. In response to widespread concern in my own country, I visited Ethiopia from November 5th to 9th, in order to report my impressions, not only to my own Bishops, but to the Conferences of the European Community.

During my four-day visit to Ethiopia, including the areas worst affected by the drought and famine, I had discussions with a wide range of relief workers, voluntary agency officials, Church leaders, missionaries, diplomats and Government officials. I became convinced that the famine is on a scale never before known; that some 7 million people are affected; that the worst is yet to come. The severest shortages can be expected in February and March 1985, given the most recent harvest failure.

The regime in Addis Ababa is Marxist and can be criticised for its past performance, but I have satisfied myself that they are now co-operating fully in the relief effort. The official Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is doing its best and was commended by the voluntary agencies and missionaries, who deal with it on a day to day basis. Aid is very definitely reaching the people who need it and the Apostolic Nuncio and others were emphatic that there is no evidence that aid has been diverted to other purposes.

I was able to witness that food supplies are getting through to many of the affected populations, but the volume is still utterly inadequate to the needs. In the little town of Makele, in Tigray, which I visited, 50,000 displaced people are registered for food provision. The monthly ration being distributed is less than a quarter of the basic minimum and many people remain unregistered, hungry and starving. 60 people died during the night of my stay in Makele.

For a 365-day feeding period in 1985, Ethiopia needs at a very conservative estimate:

- 100,000 tons of basic grains per month;
- 10,000 tons of supplementary food and oil per month;
- transport assistance with trucks, tyres, spare parts and petrol costs.

Regular, planned and programmed arrival of grains is crucial, given the limited port facilities. There is, however, confidence that with the provision of mechanical bagging and other improvements at Assab Port, 60,000 tons of grain can be handled there each month. The rest must arrive by other channels such as Djibouti.

I believe that we must look to the EEC to make a major contribution from European food stockpiles to fend off starvation and death. I understand that during 1984 less than 100,000 tons of grain will have been delivered from the EEC, plus 8000 tons of supplementary foods. For 1985 there is only, so far, a small commitment of regular food aid. A much greater response is demanded of our European Economic Community. Part of the European grain mountain can surely be transported there provided that the political decision is taken at the highest levels.

I very much hope that this can be achieved. It would mean making available the necessary funds for the purchase, dispatch and distribution of 30,000 tons of EEC grain and 5,000 tons of supplementary foods every month in 1985. This would be from the Community as an institution and from existing Community funds.

I am informed by both EEC representatives in Addis Ababa and EEC officials in Brussels, that this proposal is entirely feasible and that funds under both emergency and food-aid headings could be found, either from contingency funds, by re-ordering the budget, or by bringing forward from future years.

For the success of this initiative, it is imperative that several EEC Governments are prepared to make this same political commitment. Can I ask you, therefore, whether you can arrange to visit either the Head of Government or your Foreign Minister and to press this proposal with all the force at your disposal?

I am convinced we must try to secure continued assistance to Ethiopia by our own countries, particularly with reference to aid for rehabilitation and long-term development. Unless there is investment in agriculture, rural infrastructure and water resources geared towards self-sufficiency in food, a similar catastrophe will almost certainly recur within a very few years. Could I suggest that you make proposals of this kind to your own Government?

Finally, I would like to tell you how impressed I was by the generosity and commitment of our missionary fathers and sisters, working in collaboration with the local church in the service of the suffering poor of Ethiopia. I met many religious communities during my stay, carrying on their religious life and work peacefully and effectively and I was assured, time and time again, that the relief work of the Christian organisations was now being given every possible support by the Ethiopian authorities, who value their contribution highly.

Yours devotedly,

Archbishop of Westminster,
President of CCEE.

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2 3
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11 12 1

Subject



file

cc Harter

10 DOWNING STREET 13 November 1984

From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH CARDINAL HUME

Cardinal Hume called on the Prime Minister this morning to report on his visit to Ethiopia.

Cardinal Hume described in graphic terms the human misery and suffering which he had encountered. He warmly praised the work of the voluntary agencies. He had high praise for HM Ambassador. He had tried to form a judgement on whether aid was reaching those whom it was intended to benefit, and concluded that in general it was. He believed that the food situation in Ethiopia would continue to deteriorate reaching its worst point in February or March next year. He hoped that our Hercules aircraft could stay in Ethiopia at least until then. He had met the Deputy Head of the EC's office in Addis Ababa. As a result of their talks, he had concluded that the EC could make available 30,000 metric tons of grain a month with a further 5,000 tons of supplementary food throughout next year all from within existing funds. He hoped that HMG would support this in discussions in Brussels. He would be writing to the various Presidents of the National Councils of Bishops in other European countries to inform them of his visit to Ethiopia and to urge them to lobby their governments to support this specific proposal (he handed over a copy of his letter). As a final and more general point, Cardinal Hume

urged the Prime Minister to divorce questions of humanitarian aid from political considerations about the nature of the Ethiopian regime.

The Prime Minister thanked Cardinal Hume for his account. She recalled that both Britain and the EC had been giving aid to Ethiopia for many years. Much of it appeared to have been misapplied. There had been an interesting leader in the Times on 12 November on the subject. The key task was to help the Ethiopians grow their own food, even though this was a long-term goal. It was also vital to improve access to water, which was why the UK was providing drilling rigs.

The Prime Minister continued that she would consider Cardinal Hume's request that we should extend the presence of the Hercules aircraft in Ethiopia until the end of March. It was not as easy as it sounded: keeping two aircraft in the country involved five aircraft in all and 100 men. The question of further food supplies from the Community would be looked into. In principle she was against paying farmers in the Community high prices to produce surplus food and justifying it as enabling the Community to give food aid. It was more important, and a better use of resources, to concentrate on encouraging indigenous food production. Finally it was essential not to focus so exclusively on Ethiopia as to forget the needs of other countries. There was a risk that the fashionable cause would get a disproportionate share of available funds.

The Prime Minister enquired about the fate of the Church in Ethiopia. She understood that the Ethiopian regime had closed many churches. Cardinal Hume said that he had been able to conduct services, meet nuns and missionaries and attend the ordination of priests. His impression was that, in the case of the Roman Catholic Church at least, there was no particular pressure of


hostility from the Government. In any case, he hoped that this issue would not become an obstacle to building on the goodwill which existed between the voluntary agencies and the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

The Prime Minister observed that one could not overlook the nature of the Ethiopian regime and its relations with the Soviet Union. There was a risk that the Soviet Union would go on arming Ethiopia while looking to the West to feed it. It was also important to take action to end the civil war.

Cardinal Hume said that, if the Prime Minister agreed, he proposed to say to the press that he had seen her to report on the situation in Ethiopia but would not reveal the content of their conversation. He would also say that he had left a copy of the letter which he was sending to the National Conferences of Bishops. He could assure the Prime Minister that its contents would not cause her any embarrassment. The Prime Minister agreed that Cardinal Hume could speak as he had suggested.

Reading Cardinal Hume's letter after his departure I see that it says that he asked the Prime Minister to take the initiative in the Council of Ministers to propose 30,000 tons a month of Community food aid to Ethiopia. He did not in fact ask this. The letter also says that he asked the Prime Minister to include Ethiopia's famine on the agenda of the Dublin Summit. He did not raise this matter at all. I have subsequently spoken to him and asked him to amend his letter to take account of these points.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), David Peretz (H.M. Treasury), Carole Tolley (Lord Trefgarne's Office, MOD) and Michael McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FOR INFORMATION

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE,
WESTMINSTER, LONDON, SW1P 1QJ

13 November 1984

I am writing to you in your capacity as President of your National Conference of Bishops, to ask for your immediate support in a situation of grave urgency which has become increasingly apparent in Ethiopia and throughout Central Africa. In response to widespread concern in my own country, I visited Ethiopia from November 5th to 9th, in order to report my impressions, not only to my own Bishops, but to the Conferences of the European Community.

During my four-day visit to Ethiopia, including the areas worst affected by the drought and famine, I had discussions with a wide range of relief workers, voluntary agency officials, Church leaders, missionaries, diplomats and Government officials. I became convinced that the famine is on a scale never before known; that some 7 million people are affected; that the worst is yet to come. The severest shortages can be expected in February and March 1985, given the most recent harvest failure.

The regime in Addis Ababa is Marxist and can be criticised for its past performance, but I have satisfied myself that they are now co-operating fully in the relief effort. The official Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is doing its best and was commended by the voluntary agencies and missionaries, who deal with it on a day to day basis. Aid is very definitely reaching the people who need it and the Apostolic Nuncio and others were emphatic that there is no evidence that aid has been diverted to other purposes.

I was able to witness that food supplies are getting through to many of the affected populations, but the volume is still utterly inadequate to the needs. In the little town of Makele, in Tigray, which I visited, 50,000 displaced people are registered for food provision. The monthly ration being distributed is less than a quarter of the basic minimum and many people remain unregistered, hungry and starving. 60 people died during the night of my stay in Makele.

For a 365-day feeding period in 1985, Ethiopia needs at a very conservative estimate:

- 100,000 tons of basic grains per month;
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- transport assistance with trucks, tyres, spare parts and petrol costs.

Regular, planned and programmed arrival of grains is crucial, given the limited port facilities. There is, however, confidence that with the provision of mechanical bagging and other improvements at Assab Port, 60,000 tons of grain can be handled there each month. The rest must arrive by other channels such as Djibouti.

I believe that we must look to the EEC to make a major contribution from European food stockpiles to fend off starvation and death. I understand that during 1984 less than 100,000 tons of grain will have been delivered from the EEC, plus 8000 tons of supplementary foods. For 1985 there is only, so far, a small commitment of regular food aid. A much greater response is demanded of our European Economic Community. Part of the European grain mountain can surely be transported there provided that the political decision is taken at the highest levels.

In conversation with the British Prime Minister, I have asked that the British Government propose an initiative at the Council of Ministers. This would be to make available the necessary funds for the purchase, dispatch and distribution of 30,000 tons of EEC grain and 5,000 tons of supplementary foods every month in 1985. This would be from the Community as an institution and from existing Community funds.

I am informed by both EEC representatives in Addis Ababa and EEC officials in Brussels, that this proposal is entirely feasible and that funds under both emergency and food-aid headings could be found, either from contingency funds, by re-ordering the budget, or by bringing forward from future years.

For the success of this initiative, it is imperative that several EEC Governments are prepared to make this same political commitment. Can I ask you, therefore, whether you can arrange to visit either the Head of Government or your Foreign Minister and to press the same proposal with all the force at your disposal. I have raised with our Prime Minister the possibility that the question of

Ethiopia's famine might be included on the agenda of the Dublin Summit next month.

I also pleaded for an intensification of assistance to Ethiopia on a national basis, particularly with reference to aid for rehabilitation and long-term development. Unless there is investment in agriculture, rural infrastructure and water resources geared towards self-sufficiency in food, a similar catastrophe will almost certainly recur within a very few years. Could I suggest that you make similar proposals to your own Government?

Finally, I would like to tell you how impressed I was by the generosity and commitment of our missionary fathers and sisters, working in collaboration with the local church in the service of the suffering poor of Ethiopia. I met many religious communities during my stay, carrying on their religious life and work peacefully and effectively and I was assured, time and time again, that the relief work of the Christian organisations was now being given every possible support by the Ethiopian authorities, who value their contribution highly.

Yours devotedly,

Archbishop of Westminster,
President of CCEE.



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Cardinal Hummel

He will want to talk
about his visit to

Ethiopia.

2. You might like to
look at the leader in
today's Times which makes
some telling points about the
misuse of aid. You might
also ask him about the
fate of the Church in
Ethiopia or which, in public,
he has been curiously
silent.

C.D.P. 12/XI



P.O. Box 7, 200 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8EZ. Telephone: 01-837 1234

EMBEZZLED AID

Arguments about foreign aid always seem to generate more heat than light and today's reception of the Chancellor's likely cut in the aid budget will be no exception. In fact the crisis in Ethiopia provides an object lesson in the false premises and false practices of so much aid policy, which should not be overlooked simply because emotions have been aroused by the spectacle of so much human misery.

Dr Charles Elliott formerly of Christian Aid, would like us to believe that the West is responsible for the Ethiopian famine. How right he is, though for reasons which are diametrically opposite to those which he puts forward. The Elliott argument contends that the Marxist regime in Addis Ababa has been deprived of funds from the West because of its Soviet orientation, and has thus not been able to develop the areas which are now suffering.

The facts tell a different story, though they lead to the same conclusion of Western culpability. Between 1978 and 1982, the Ethiopian regime received one billion dollars of Western aid. What happened to the money, most of which was channelled through multi-lateral agencies which are not explicitly accountable to anybody and which, as we heard last week, tend to squabble among themselves about disbursements and whose main effect is to bolster recipient regimes, many of which are dictatorships, regardless of their internal policies?

One look at the records suggests that Western aid has helped the Ethiopian regime to finance its civil wars; or/and perhaps finance the absurd and extravagantly pretentious maintenance of the OAU whose potentates are gathering in Addis today while the rest of the world is struggling to save Ethiopian citizens from the follies and iniquities of their government. Certainly Western aid has enabled the regime in Addis Ababa to pursue policies which, without such help, would have brought it down much more quickly and

saved Ethiopians from so much misery.

We have seen only too vividly that a billion dollars have not been used to pursue agricultural, social or economic policies which could have equipped the rural population far more effectively to cope with the drought. A billion dollars has provided the regime with foreign exchange, perhaps to help pay for Soviet tanks to use on its citizens and certainly to sustain conscription. It has helped the Dergue to suppress policies of private trade in favour of public monopoly; to expropriate assets, particularly American ones; to expel unpopular groups to cause major refugee problems in the Sudan.

The aid policy of the West has played into the hands of rulers such as Colonel Mengistu whose politburo now quite naturally reasserts its role as the organizer and distributor for foreign assistance. If Western aid agencies persist in giving money to rulers on the basis of the poverty of their subjects, that means that policies which persistently cause the impoverishment of local populations will in effect be rewarded though the rewards may only be visible in the amount of weapons bought or in the life style of officials in the capital. In that sense therefore Dr Elliott was right to blame the West for helping to disable Ethiopian peasants from meeting the challenge of drought, because it supported a regime whose active measures of oppression, large scale evictions and prevention of peasant agriculture have all contributed as much to this catastrophe as have the years of drought.

What is more perplexing is that the charitable relief agencies seem to have made so little of this themselves. To listen to Dr Elliott one would not gather that the regime for which he feels so concerned has destroyed 70 per cent of Ethiopian churches (and Cardinal Hume in his BBC interview yesterday was surprisingly silent about this matter too, preferring the interview to be given over entirely to sentiment without any attempt to put this chronic African condition into

some kind of perspective). The Christian charities might argue that they have kept quiet about Ethiopian oppression for fear of being prevented from doing any good. In fact they have themselves become so politicized on the side of so-called "revolutionary development economics" that their demands for increased Western aid now have a hollow ring about them. When War On Want launched its campaign against world poverty, for instance, it started with a statement from its then General Secretary which asserted that poverty was explicitly linked to Western policies of development aid and imperialism. Its current General Secretary, George Galloway, is of the same view, on the far left of the Labour party and hoping for a parliamentary seat in Scotland.

The enormous demands of Ethiopian relief command automatic support across the political spectrum, though it is incongruous that those who call loudest for Britain to go into Ethiopia unilaterally and increase its direct aid are normally those who would decry unilateral intervention in the affairs of other states - however humanitarian the causes - and would certainly favour an emphasis on multilateral rather than bi-lateral aid flows. In a crisis they demand direct action from Britain and receive it but they do not yet seem to absorb the full implications of that procedure, which would be to accept that multilateral aid is misemployed and incapable of effective action.

It will thus be regrettable if the Chancellor today announces a cut in the proportion of foreign aid which is directly paid from Britain rather than those funds which filter through multilateral agencies. Western aid agencies are culpable for what has occurred in Ethiopia. Their culpability should cause Britain to review its aid policies and to concentrate most of foreign aid on bi-lateral programmes where parliament can scrutinize them more carefully and see that the funds are not being embezzled in the cause of dictatorship or otherwise abused.

Jenkins's ear



David Jenkins: An

ions he is rather to be counted among the "simple" himself. He has a fairly literal understanding of the doctrines of the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection: he does not think they are "myths".

It is also clear that the Church of England has something of an authority problem. The Bishop of Durham is not, in fact, answerable to anybody, and Anglicans are generally opposed to the idea of a central authority.

It is not unknown for a Roman Catholic bishop in England to find a high Vatican official on the telephone within 24 hours of him being linked publicly with some controversy; and hitherto Anglicanism has felt rather superior to that way of behaving.

Ironically it is now the Evangelicals, traditionally the least inclined to favour any copying of the Roman Catholic Church, who are pressing for a firmer display of central authority in the Church of England.

Dr Runcie's response, the only one possible, is to express his concern about the Bishop of Durham's controversial manner with gradually increasing volume and sharpness until the message gets through.

To some extent the Archbishop of York, Dr John Habgood, shares Dr Runcie's view that controversial questions must be handled delicately. Their difficulty is that the Bishop of Durham believes, obviously, that delicacy equals evasion of the issues, which must be faced.

That at least unites him with his critics: they do not want him to be quiet, but to believe what they believe.

Parliament this week

Commons. Today (2.30): Continuation of debate on the Queen's Speech. Topic: Industry and employment. Tomorrow (2.30): Conclusion of debate on the Queen's Speech. Topic: The economy. Wednesday (2.30): Debate on Opposition motion on schools and further education. Thursday (2.30): Elections (Northern Ireland) Bill, second reading. Friday (9.30): Friendly Societies Bill and Mineral Workings Bill. Second readings.

Select committees. Today: Environment. Subject: Operation and effectiveness of the Wildlife and Countryside Act. Witnesses: Nature Conservancy Council; Countryside Commission (4.30). Wednesday: Trade and industry. Subject: Export Credit Guarantee Department. Witnesses: Committee of London Clearing Bankers (10.30); Citibank (11.15). Welsh affairs. Subject: Public transport in Wales. Witnesses: Welsh Office; British Rail; National Bus Company (10.30). Defence. Subject: Defence Estimates. Witness: Ministry of Defence (10.45). Energy. Subject: Electricity reports and accounts. Witnesses: Electricity Council; CEBG (II). Environment. Subject: Operation and effectiveness of the Wildlife and Countryside Act. Witness: Dept of Environment (II). Foreign affairs. Subject: The events surrounding the weekend of May 1 and 2 1982. Witnesses: Mr A. Gavshon; Mr D Rice (II). Welsh affairs. Subject: Public transport in Wales. Witnesses: Welsh counties committee; Transport 2000; Institute of Chartered Transport (4).

SOCIAL SERVICES
Subject: Community care, with special reference to adult mentally ill and mentally handicapped. Witnesses: Association of County Councils; Association of Metropolitan Authorities; Association of Directors of Social Services (4.15).

clearly intended to be the scope of his more than one individual controversial new is not much of a church that he Bishop of Dur- nce that simple be confronted the truths held by gians to be self- theological opin-

owship under Title D; E us Professor of Greek, under Title C; J W an of Chapel and college ; A M Strathern, MA, lecturer in social arch fellowships under Boucher (applied iges, BA (history), D W thematics), J K Leonard Ogilvie (history), D J ology). Visiting Fellow 4-85; Professor G Santl, professor of University of Siena; Nelson, professor of ity of Washington; S list; Professor A H of toxicology and ard; N A Trueman, aral research. Choral 4; S J Davis (tenor), C A Holmes (soprano), Millner (tenor), King's r Painter (baritone), s S, Elstree, I E C ton, C F L Weller m Ladies' C. Organ 84; C E Matthews, 1985; G P Jackson.

n scholarship from of Trinity Hall. Bath is to confer degree of doctor of William Glock at a on to be held on

OBITUARY

PROF L. F. LA COUR

Authority on plant chromosomes

Professor L. F. La Cour, OBE, FRS died on November 3 at the age of 77. A distinguished and respected biologist, he was an authority on plant chromosomes.

At the age of 15, he joined the staff of the then John Innes Horticultural Institution at Merton, near Wimbledon, and retired at 65, from the John Innes Institute at Norwich in 1972 after 50 years' service. He then held an Honorary chair at the University of East Anglia, from 1973 to 1978.

La Cour rose from Laboratory assistant to professor and Fellow of the Royal Society, without university education or formal scientific training, and he worked actively in the laboratory for the whole 55 years of his career. This was extremely difficult to achieve then and, today, would be almost impossible, as rigidly defined professional qualifications are now all important for a scientist and many good scientists are channelled away from their laboratories into administration.

Leonard Francis La Cour was born in London on July 28, 1907. On leaving Merton School in 1922, he obtained a post as Laboratory Assistant at the John Innes. In 1926, he was promoted to Technical Assistant and in 1929 published his first paper, in *Nature*.

He soon came under the influence of C. D. Darlington, with whom he had a close professional relationship, jointly publishing ten papers between 1938 and 1952 and a very successful practical manual, *The Handling of Chromosomes*.

In 1948, La Cour was promoted to Senior Experimental Officer and in 1949 moved with the John Innes to Bayfordbury, near Hertford. In 1953, Darlington left the John Innes, and La Cour, having been

appointed MBE the previous year, became acting head of the Cytology Department ("acting because he had no university degree).

He was given the unusual status of Chief Experimental Officer in 1956 and, having again moved with the John Innes in 1967, this time to Norwich, he received an Honorary MSc at the University of East Anglia in 1969. Next year, he became a Fellow of the Royal Society and was promoted to Senior Principal Scientific Officer. His appointment as OBE came in 1973 and his ScD (East Anglia) in 1977.

As well as his outstanding research on chromosome structure and behaviour and his development of new cytological techniques, he bred a new triploid lily, "Formobel". Indeed, he was a keen and meticulous gardener.

Unlike many scientists of his generation, La Cour had strong Tory convictions. He seemed to feel that he had been able to succeed by his own efforts, despite his humble origins, and that egalitarianism would encourage idleness, which he despised. Although he appeared to have few illusions about the Establishment, he was respectful towards those in authority, without being in the least sycophantic. Strikingly, he did not make enemies.

La Cour was particularly good with the new members of the Institute and visitors from abroad and, later, with university research students. He will be remembered by the many who knew him as a kindly man, supremely competent at anything he undertook, generous in helping others with their work, but quite capable of expressing himself with asperity and indignation on conduct which he considered outrageous.

In 1935, he married Anne Wilkes, who survives him.

MR PHIL WELD

Phil Weld, winner of the 1980 Observer Singlehanded Transatlantic Race died in Boston, Massachusetts, on November 6 at the age of 70.

A successful newspaper publisher he did not take up racing until after retiring from business.


A resolute amateur with the private means to support the passionate interest he developed for short-handed ocean racing, his exploits and the active encouragement he gave to others seeking outside support did much to foster the idea of sponsored yacht-racing within America.

He also finished third in the next two Round Britain events and in the first Route du Rhum Transatlantic Race from St Malo to Guadeloupe in 1978.

In 1976 his 60ft trimaran Gulfstream capsized in mid-Atlantic during the voyage across for the start of that year's single handed Transatlantic race, but the five days he and his crew were forced to endure inside the upturned craft failed to dim his appetite for short handed racing.

Four years later he returned to Britain to compete in the sixth Observer race with another Newick-designed trima-

Entering this competition the 510...



P.O. Box 7, 200 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8EZ. Telephone: 01-837 1234

EMBEZZLED AID

Arguments about foreign aid always seem to generate more heat than light and today's reception of the Chancellor's likely cut in the aid budget will be no exception. In fact the crisis in Ethiopia provides an object lesson in the false premises and false practices of so much aid policy, which should not be overlooked simply because emotions have been aroused by the spectacle of so much human misery.

Dr Charles Elliott formerly of Christian Aid, would like us to believe that the West is responsible for the Ethiopian famine. How right he is, though for reasons which are diametrically opposite to those which he puts forward. The Elliott argument contends that the Marxist regime in Addis Ababa has been deprived of funds from the West because of its Soviet orientation, and has thus not been able to develop the areas which are now suffering.

The facts tell a different story, though they lead to the same conclusion of Western culpability. Between 1978 and 1982, the Ethiopian regime received one billion dollars of Western aid. What happened to the money, most of which was channelled through multi-lateral agencies which are not explicitly accountable to anybody and which, as we heard last week, tend to squabble among themselves about disbursements and whose main effect is to bolster recipient regimes, many of which are dictatorships, regardless of their internal policies?

One look at the records suggests that Western aid has helped the Ethiopian regime to finance its civil wars; or/and perhaps finance the absurd and extravagantly pretentious maintenance of the OAU whose potentates are gathering in Addis today while the rest of the world is struggling to save Ethiopian citizens from the follies and iniquities of their government. Certainly Western aid has enabled the regime in Addis Ababa to pursue policies which, without such help, would have brought it down much more quickly and

saved Ethiopians from so much misery.

We have seen only too vividly that a billion dollars have not been used to pursue agricultural, social or economic policies which could have equipped the rural population far more effectively to cope with the drought. A billion dollars has provided the regime with foreign exchange, perhaps to help pay for Soviet tanks to use on its citizens and certainly to sustain conscription. It has helped the Dergue to suppress policies of private trade in favour of public monopoly; to expropriate assets, particularly American ones; to expel unpopular groups to cause major refugee problems in the Sudan.

The aid policy of the West has played into the hands of rulers such as Colonel Mengistu whose politburo now quite naturally reasserts its role as the organizer and distributor for foreign assistance. If Western aid agencies persist in giving money to rulers on the basis of the poverty of their subjects, that means that policies which persistently cause the impoverishment of local populations will in effect be rewarded though the rewards may only be visible in the amount of weapons bought or in the life style of officials in the capital. In that sense therefore Dr Elliott was right to blame the West for helping to disable Ethiopian peasants from meeting the challenge of drought, because it supported a regime whose active measures of oppression, large scale evictions and prevention of peasant agriculture have all contributed as much to this catastrophe as have the years of drought.

What is more perplexing is that the charitable relief agencies seem to have made so little of this themselves. To listen to Dr Elliott one would not gather that the regime for which he feels so concerned has destroyed 70 per cent of Ethiopian churches (and Cardinal Hume in his BBC interview yesterday was surprisingly silent about this matter too, preferring the interview to be given over entirely to sentiment without any attempt to put this chronic African condition into

some kind of perspective). The Christian charities might argue that they have kept quiet about Ethiopian oppression for fear of being prevented from doing any good. In fact they have themselves become so politicized on the side of so-called "revolutionary development economics" that their demands for increased Western aid now have a hollow ring about them. When War On Want launched its campaign against world poverty, for instance, it started with a statement from its then General Secretary which asserted that poverty was explicitly linked to Western policies of development aid and imperialism. Its current General Secretary, George Gallo-way, is of the same view, on the far left of the Labour party and hoping for a parliamentary seat in Scotland.

The enormous demands of Ethiopian relief command automatic support across the political spectrum, though it is incongruous that those who call loudest for Britain to go into Ethiopia unilaterally and increase its direct aid are normally those who would decry unilateral intervention in the affairs of other states - however humanitarian the causes - and would certainly favour an emphasis on multilateral rather than bi-lateral aid flows. In a crisis they demand direct action from Britain and receive it but they do not yet seem to absorb the full implications of that procedure, which would be to accept that multilateral aid is misemployed and incapable of effective action.

It will thus be regrettable if the Chancellor today announces a cut in the proportion of foreign aid which is directly paid from Britain rather than those funds which filter through multilateral agencies. Western aid agencies are culpable for what has occurred in Ethiopia. Their culpability should cause Britain to review its aid policies and to concentrate most of foreign aid on bi-lateral programmes where parliament can scrutinize them more carefully and see that the funds are not being embezzled in the cause of dictatorship or otherwise abused.

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LEVEL OF THE AID PROGRAMME

Line To Take

1. The Government intends to maintain a substantial aid programme.
2. The aid programme could not be exempt from the general discipline of controlling public expenditure. But in the last two financial years the aid programme has increased by more than the rate of inflation.
3. The fundamental objective of the aid programme remains the economic and social development of the poorer developing countries and the long term alleviation of poverty.
4. The aid programme is focused on the poorest developing countries, and it is nearly all provided in the form of grants. Considerable priority is given to assisting the agricultural, health and education sectors.
5. Aware of serious long term problem facing Sub-Saharan Africa. Much of Britains' aid goes to this region either directly or through our contributions to the World Bank and European Community aid programmes. But aid by itself is not enough. Developing country governments must adopt the right policies if there is to be agricultural development, and an alleviation of poverty.

Aid as percentage of GNP

6. The Government remains committed to the UN target for aid of 0.7 per cent of GNP but, like previous Governments, is unable to set a timetable for achieving it. Progress towards the UN target depends upon developments in the UK economy and other pressing claims on resources.
7. In 1983 Britain's aid performance was 0.35 per cent of GNP. This was close to the average for OECD donors. Britain has the fifth largest aid programme.

A I D P R O G R A M M E

BACKGROUND

Aid Programme Expenditure

1. Between 1978/79 and 1982/83 the aid programme declined by 17 per cent in real terms. In the last two financial years it has increased by slightly more than the rate of inflation. In cash terms the aid programme expenditure increased by 6.4 per cent in 1983/84 and by 6.7 per cent in 1984/85. Gross Aid Programme in 1984/85 amounted to £1,174 million.

2. In the last Public Expenditure White Paper [Cmd 9143], the planned cash allocations for aid (the net aid programme) were:

	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
£'m	1099	1130	1170

Aid as a Percentage of GNP

3. In 1970 the United Nations called upon economically advanced countries to exert their best efforts to reach a minimum of 0.7 per cent of GNP as official development assistance. Attainment of the target is now set for 1985, or not later than the second half of the decade.

4. As a percentage of GNP aid has fallen from 0.52 per cent in 1979 to 0.35 per cent in 1983. But the figure for 1979 was exceptionally high for statistical reasons unrelated to the actual level of aid expenditure: the underlying level was about 0.44 per cent.

5. At 0.35 per cent of GNP Britain's performance in 1983 was very close to the average for OECD donors (0.36 per cent). Of the major donors we are below France and Germany but ahead of US, Japan and Italy.

Bilateral Aid Programme

6. Sixty per cent of the aid programme is provided as bilateral aid, over ninety per cent of which is given as grants.

7. In 1983

- (i) 126 countries received £693 million. Of this 74 per cent (£429 million) went to the poorest and very low income countries (under \$600 per capita);
- (ii) 73 per cent of bilateral aid went to Commonwealth countries;
- (iii) Africa received £236 million under regular bilateral programmes.
Among the top 10 recipients were:

	£m		£m
Sudan	32	Zimbabwe	20
Kenya	32	Malawi	15
Tanzania	30	Zambia	14

- (iv) £100 million was spent on agricultural investment projects. At the end of last year UK was financing 630 experts and volunteers in the field and 670 developing country students on agricultural courses in the UK. £11 million spent on agricultural research and development in UK institutions.



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 November, 1984

Dear Mr. Maxwell,

I was grateful to you for coming in yesterday and reporting to me on the position which you found in Ethiopia.

I take this opportunity to put on record my appreciation of the initiative which you and the Daily Mirror took to help the people of Ethiopia and of the significant contribution which you made to helping with the problems there in the name of Britain.

I should be glad if you would pass on my thanks to Lord King for providing the aeroplane, and to the companies and individuals who provided help to your venture.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Robert Maxwell, Esq., M.C.

Box

SUBJECT
Master Set



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

8 November 1984

Dear Colin

MR. ROBERT MAXWELL

The Prime Minister was very grateful for the briefing provided with your letter of 7 November.

Mr. Maxwell said that he had arranged his visit to Ethiopia because of the astonishing response of Daily Mirror readers to the television pictures of the famine. He received 30,000 letters in two days: those who sent gifts gave an average of £13 a head - an astonishing figure for Daily Mirror readers. The charities told him that, while they would gladly receive the money, they were hamstrung by the lack of cooperation on the part of the Ethiopian authorities in getting food and other supplies to those suffering from the famine. On contacting Lord King, Mr. Maxwell had been told that the Sun had got in first and arranged a flight but would not be ready for at least a week: Mr. Maxwell had been able to say that he would be ready to go within three days. He had received remarkable cooperation from Sainsburys, Boots and other British companies. He also paid a warm tribute to the help which he had received from the FCO, who had provided a team to help him over the weekend, and from HM Ambassador in Addis Ababa.

Mr. Maxwell had told the Ethiopians that if 22 trucks were not available on his arrival, he would immediately turn the plane round and take it on to Jedda. He had refused the proposal of the Ethiopian Government that his supplies should be handed over to the Ethiopian authorities. At his meeting with the Politbureau member responsible for inter-governmental aid, he had asked why the Ethiopian Government were impeding the deployment of the RAF Hercules: when he had been told that this was because the Ethiopian Government regarded the deployment of the Hercules as a propaganda exercise, Mr. Maxwell replied that this was untrue and that if the restrictions were not lifted immediately the Daily Mirror would have nothing more to do with the Ethiopian cause. Mr. Maxwell claimed that the Politbureau member had immediately lifted the telephone and given instructions that permission should be given for the RAF Hercules to go to Ethiopia. He had asked what the Ethiopian Government were doing to help the situation in the

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short-term and had been told that they were buying 50,000 tonnes of grain with their own resources. In the longer-term, they were planning to move people from the north to the south of the country, but Mr. Maxwell was satisfied that such moves were not going to be undertaken by compulsion.

Mr. Maxwell added that the Ethiopians needed 50,000 tonnes of grain a month. They were short of railway stock, and both roads and lorries were poor. Mr. Dawit had come back from the United States with a promise of 80,000 tonnes of grain from official sources and 90,000 tonnes from non-Governmental sources; and the United States Government was to give Ethiopia 50% of the costs of internal distribution. About 400-450,000 tonnes were needed on top. Mr. Maxwell thought that in the longer run these would best be distributed through Djibouti where the French had a military presence and where the port and the airport were good. Mr. Maxwell suggested that the British Government should not yield to present Ethiopian pressure on the RAF Hercules to move to Djibouti: his experience was that, faced with a firm stand, the Ethiopian authorities would give way. But he thought that the problem would best be tackled through an EEC initiative operated from Djibouti with the help of the French: he understood that this idea was acceptable to the French Government. The Ethiopian Government would even accept a NATO operation.


The Prime Minister said that the British Government had made an early approach to the President of the European Community, and Dr. FitzGerald had reacted quickly. The Italians were the next in line for the Presidency and they would have a particular interest in being helpful towards Ethiopia. But we did not think it likely that a NATO operation would turn out to be practical.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Mike McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

7 November 1984

Dear Secretary General,

As you will be aware the horrifying famine in Ethiopia has produced a massive and generous response both from governments and individuals. The British Government is sending a new allocation of 6,500 tonnes of food grains, spending £5 million on other emergency assistance and providing two RAF Hercules aircraft for internal distribution. The European Community, at my request, has also just announced a very large emergency allocation of food and other items. Many other governments have also made new pledges within the last few days.

There is a great danger now that our efforts will be hampered by the physical difficulties of distribution within Ethiopia. The government of Ethiopia's own Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is, I am sure, aware of the problems. But I am afraid they will find it hard to cope with the variety and possibly duplication of assistance being provided from outside. In these circumstances the international Community needs to have one focal point on which it can rely for assessments of needs, information on what other donors are doing and for monitoring the effectiveness of the relief operation.

/ May I therefore

May I therefore appeal to you urgently to nominate a lead agency within the UN system who can play the role that I have described and with whom we can all work.

Yours sincerely

Raymond D. Hunter

—

His Excellency Senor Javier Perez de Cueller



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

7 November 1984

Dear Robin,

Call by Mr Robert Maxwell

/ I enclose the brief requested in your letter of today for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Robert Maxwell tomorrow morning.

I am copying this letter to Michael McCulloch (ODA).

*Yours Sincerely,
Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

F E R Butler Esq
10 Downing Street

MR ROBERT MAXWELL'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 8 NOVEMBER 1984

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Grateful for Mr Maxwell's efforts and his support for Mr Barder's representations to ensure that RAF Hercules could be based on Addis.
2. World Vision Plan. Aspirations expressed in the plan are admirable. But not clear who is to provide the extra food promised or how the guerilla movements are to be persuaded to abandon their military activities. Commissioner Dawit has told officials that his encouragement of World Vision's efforts does not constitute an agreement.
3. NATO (if raised). No role in Ethiopia. It is outside NATO area and many member governments would object to NATO's involvement on principle. Nor can we imagine Ethiopian government agreeing to NATO (as opposed to some of its member states) functioning in Ethiopia. So impracticable and undesirable.

EAST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

7 November 1984

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MR ROBERT MAXWELL'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, 8 NOVEMBER 1984

BACKGROUND

1. Before leaving Addis Ababa Mr Maxwell sought acknowledgement from our Ambassador, in front of British press representatives, that his intervention with Ethiopian Politbureau members had been decisive in securing Ethiopian agreement to "Operation Bushel". The Ambassador had been in direct contact with the Ethiopian authorities throughout the negotiations and had already asked the Ethiopian Foreign Minister to seek the positive intervention of the No 3 in the Party and Government hierarchy, Fisseha Desta, before Mr Maxwell's arrival in Addis Ababa. Fisseha Desta seems to have played a key role in the Ethiopian decision to allow the RAF in, probably contrary to Russian pressures. However, the sense of drama generated by Mr Maxwell's activities may well have helped him to set a more favourable climate for the consideration of our request.

2. World Vision Plan. World Vision, an American Baptist organisation, plays a relatively small part in the activities of voluntary organisations operating in Ethiopia. It has sought but failed to obtain membership of the British Disasters Emergency Committee, grouping the main British agencies in this field. The Plan presents a simplified history of the drought problem in Ethiopia and expresses the intention that grain be flown to and within Ethiopia; that the main response should come from governments and that secessionist groups in Ethiopia should refrain from all activities that would impede delivery of relief supplies. These and other provisions represent a set of aspirations which others are left to implement. The Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner sent the President of World Vision a letter, enclosing a "Statement of Understanding" representing a summary of his discussions about the Plan. He has told us that this does not represent an agreement, merely his welcome for World Vision's efforts to generate additional food supplies and means of delivering them. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this Plan represents an attempt by World Vision to upstage other voluntary agencies active in providing relief for the Ethiopian famine.

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3. NATO sponsorship of relief. Just before leaving Addis Ababa, Mr Maxwell told our Ambassador that two Ethiopian Politbureau members, Berhanu Bayih and Amanuel Amde-Mikael, had with Colonel Mengistu's apparent agreement, accepted in principle a plan by World Vision consisting of large-scale relief aid to be coordinated by a Western government consortium, and a ceasefire between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels to permit famine relief to go to both sides. According to Mr Maxwell, the Ethiopians had agreed in principle for this to be done under NATO auspices.

HM Ambassador told Mr Maxwell that, in practice, it was extremely unlikely that the Ethiopian leaders would agree to anything which had a NATO label. Sir J Graham has commented that this would in any case be difficult to achieve and in his view undesirable. Many NATO members would object in principle and it would inject East/West rivalries into the situation.

EAST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

7 November 1984

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 333 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO ODA, NAIROBI (FOR EADD), UKDEL NATO (FOR PARA 7)

MR MAXWELL'S VISIT.

SUMMARY.

1. MR MAXWELL'S SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO BRING RELIEF SUPPLIES. RECEIVED BY 2 POLITBUREAU MEMBERS AND FOREIGN MINISTER. PLAIN TALKING ABOUT BETTER ETHIOPIAN PR AND BETTER RELATIONS WITH WEST. IMPROBABLE PLAN FOR NATO INITIATIVE ON WESTERN RELIEF AID CONSORTIUM AND TIGRAY AND ERITREAN CEASE-FIRE.

DETAIL.

2. MR MAXWELL LEFT (BY RAF TRISTAR) ON 3 NOVEMBER, AFTER DELIVERING RELIEF SUPPLIES BOUGHT WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DAILY MIRROR READERS FOR USE BY SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND, OXFAM AND RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMISSION (RRC). HE BROUGHT A PARTY OF JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE GONE TO NORTHERN WELO TO COVER SUPPLIES' ARRIVAL.

3. WHILE IN ADDIS, MR MAXWELL WAS RECEIVED BY TWO SENIOR MEMBERS OF ETHIOPIAN POLITBUREAU, BERHANU BAYIH AND AMANUEL AMDE-MIKAEL BOTH RESPONSIBLE AS POLITBUREAU MEMBERS, FOR DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE RELIEF EFFORT, AND ALSO RESPECTIVELY MINISTERS OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND OF LAW AND JUSTICE). HE WAS ALSO RECEIVED, WITH ME, BY FOREIGN MINISTER.

4. MR MAXWELL WAS FULLY BRIEFED BY HIS ETHIOPIAN HOSTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF RELIEF EFFORT, AND IN TURN TOLD THEM ABOUT RESPONSE OF BRITISH PUBLIC. WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING FOR HMG, HE WELCOMED RECENT IMPROVMENTS IN UK-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS, AND PROMISED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE AS NEWSPAPER PROPRIETOR AND PUBLISHER TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS. HE URGED ETHIOPIANS TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY SYMPATHY FOR FAMINE VICTIMS THROUGHOUT WESTERN WORLD TO IMPROVE DECISIVELY THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. HE WARNED AGAINST FOLLOWING SOVIET AGRICULTURAL MODEL, AND OFFERED SOME (MUCH-NEEDED) ADVICE ON HOW ETHIOPIA MIGHT IMPROVE ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE WEST.

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5. VISIT RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION FROM ETHIOPIAN TELEVISION AND PRESS, AND WAS WIDELY COVERED (IN PART SCEPTICALLY) BY LARGE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORPS NOW IN ADDIS.

6. MR MAXWELL TOLD THE ETHIOPIANS FRANKLY OF DAMAGE DONE BY RRC COMMISSIONER'S ILL-JUDGED REMARKS IN LONDON ABOUT MOTIVES FOR HMG'S RELIEF EFFORTS. FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THAT DAWIT HAD BEEN MISQUOTED, AND URGED MR MAXWELL TO PUBLICISE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT'S AND PEOPLE'S WARM APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE FOR MAGNIFICENT EFFORT OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. MR MAXWELL SPOKE WARMLY OF THE PRIME MINISTER, TO WHOM HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT ON HIS RETURN. HE TOLD ME HE WOULD ALSO HOPE TO REPORT TO YOU.

7. JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE, MR MAXWELL SAID BERHANU AND AMENUEL, WITH MENGISTU'S AGREEMENT, HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A PLAN BY WORLD VISION FOR A HUGE-SCALE RELIEF AND COORDINATED BY WESTERN GOVERNMENT CONSORTIUM AND A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT, AND ERITREAN AND TIGREAN REBELS, TO PERMIT FAMINE RELIEF TO GO TO BOTH SIDES. REMARKABLY, MR MAXWELL CLAIMS ALL 3 HAD ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE UNDER NATO, REPEAT NATO, AUSPICES. MR MAXWELL SAID HE WOULD GIVE YOU COPY OF DETAILED WRITTEN PLAN HE HAD RECEIVED HERE, AFTER HIS RETURN: AND THAT HE HOPED TO FIND TIME TO DISCUSS WITH LORD CARRINGTON. I CAUTIONED HIM ABOUT EXTREME IMPROBABILITY OF ETHIOPIAN LEADERS ACTUALLY AGREEING TO ANYTHING FLYING NATO COLOURS. WE HAVE IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) COPY OF 'PLAN' FROM CANADIANS WITH COPY OF CANADIAN COVERING COMMENTS AND CAUTION, WITH WHICH I VERY MUCH AGREE. COPIES OF BOTH BY CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING HERE 5 NOVEMBER TO EAD AND EWD ONLY).

/s.

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8. COMMENT: MR MAXWELL LEFT WELL PLEASED WITH SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT. HELPED BY MUCH PRODDING FROM US, RRC EVENTUALLY PULLED OUT ALL STOPS AND LAID ON A USEFUL DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR ABILITY TO HANDLE INCOMING RELIEF AID QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY. THEY PAID MR MAXWELL CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION, AND IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT HE WAS RECEIVED AT SUCH HIGH LEVEL. ETHIOPIAN LEADERSHIP IS CLEARLY CONCERNED TO UNDO BAD EFFECTS OF DAWIT'S VISIT TO LONDON. THE NATO PLAN SEEMS FAR-FETCHED.

BARDER

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

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PS/MR RAISON
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON
SIR C TICKELL (ODA)

COPIES TO:

MR BUIST)
EWAD)
ECD) ODA
DU)
MR R BROWNING)
MR H ARBUTHNOTT)

DS 8)
DS 11) MOD
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DCS (ROW))

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

7 November, 1984

Dear Colin,

Mr. Robert Maxwell

I am writing for confirm my telephone message of this morning that Mr. Robert Maxwell has asked to come to report to the Prime Minister about his impressions of the situation in Ethiopia. He will also want to tell her about the World Vision plans, reported in telegram 333 of 3 November from Addis Ababa. I have mentioned to him that our first reaction to that plan is that any proposal for an operation under NATO auspices is unlikely to be realistic. I have also suggested to Mr. Maxwell that he should be prepared to discuss the World Vision plan as an interesting idea rather than as a proposal which he puts to the Prime Minister.

I should be very grateful if you could let me have by close of play today a brief for the Prime Minister, covering in particular what she might say about the World Vision scheme. It is not necessary to cover the general facts of the Government's measures to assist Ethiopia on which she has already been provided with a full brief for Parliamentary Questions.

I am copying this letter to Michael McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

Your sincerely,

Robin Butler

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



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CC/No

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AT

7 November 1984

Dear Patrick

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Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 5 November to Timothy Raison.

I agree entirely with the line of reasoning that has led you to conclude that you should not give sanction to local authority donations relating to the Ethiopian famine. No doubt there will be some who will seek to make capital from this but your proposed announcement seems to me to put matters in the right context and to be readily defensible.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Howe and Timothy Raison.

The Rt Hon Patrick Jenkin MP

1984

1984





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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 November 1984

LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND ETHIOPIAN FAMINE APPEAL

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's letter of 5 November to Mr. Raison. She agrees very much with the conclusions he has reached.

I am copying this letter to Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office), Len Appleyard (FCO) and Michael McCulloch (Overseas Development Administration).

(ANDREW TURNBULL)

Alan Davis, Esq.,
Department of the Environment.

52



Prime Minister ①
Agree with Mr Jenkins
judgement on the
matter?

2 MARSHAM STREET
LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

My ref:

Your ref:

Yes. very much
so.

AT 6/11

5 November 1984

Dear Minister

The Leader of West Yorkshire County Council has launched a National Ethiopian Famine Appeal. Humberside County Council wishes to donate £25,000 but consider it would be illegal to do so. Quite separately the Chairman of Derbyshire County Council wishes to launch his own appeal with a donation of £100,000, but again doubts the legal powers to incur such expenditure. In both cases the councils have applied to me for a sanction, under S.19 of the Local Government Finance Act 1982, so that they may make these contributions. If I approve these applications, I can expect numerous others.

This particular power of sanction is summarised at Annex 1. In short, it is a technical device which removes an item of account from the purview of the auditor. It is designed to protect councils from challenge at audit in instances where they have inadvertently incurred expenditure without the power to do so, or where they wish to make ex-gratia payments to individuals in recompense for acts of unfairness or injustice. The granting of sanction does not affect the legality or otherwise of the expenditure in question. That remains a matter for the courts to determine, and a challenge may still be made by any interested individual direct to the courts. However, in practice granting of sanction would minimise the likelihood of court action where authorities are doubtful over whether they possess the requisite powers.

The technicalities of my powers are however unlikely to be understood when I make my decision known in these cases. It is instead likely to be portrayed as an indication of the Government's lack of sincerity in supporting the famine relief operation for Ethiopia. If this were the sole consideration, I can see that the argument for granting sanction might appear strong. There are, however, other factors which we must weigh.

First, while it seems entirely reasonable for civic leaders to use the prestige of their office to support voluntary international charitable efforts, it is not in my view justifiable that they should be given in effect a dispensation to spend ratepayers' money. Local authorities are by definition concerned with the provision of local services, and there can be no proper role for them spending internationally on matters which do not affect their responsibilities. Each penny contributed to disasters abroad - no matter how good the cause in itself may be - necessarily takes away from individual ratepayers' capacity to donate to a voluntary body concerned with the disaster.

Secondly, only central government has the organisation to co-ordinate effort and, more importantly, to provide the kind of resources (ie aircraft) which voluntary groups cannot provide.

Thirdly, it does not seem to me constitutionally correct for local government to attribute to itself a collective role in relation to international disasters. I should not wish to encourage local government in this direction by issuing sanction in this instance.

By way of background, I should add that my Department did apparently issue a sanction for a single local authority which donated to the Turkish Earthquake Appeal in 1967. However, 6 applications were refused between 1976 and 1977 in relation to the Italian and Romanian earthquakes and the East African Appeal. (All these were of course under Labour Governments).

My conclusions are that the arguments against sanction outweigh those in favour. I recognise that this is likely to attract hostile press comment (but the issue of sanction could permit authorities such as Derbyshire to claim that they were upstaging the Government.) Clearly, the decision which I propose will pose problems of presentation, but I hope that these will be mitigated if I accompany an announcement with the enclosed Press Notice. I should, however be glad to know that you endorse the course I propose. May I ask for an urgent reply? The authorities themselves are seeking instant decisions and while it is not necessarily a reason for me to respond rapidly, any delay can clearly be turned to our disadvantage.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw and Geoffrey Howe.

Yours sincerely

Atkin

" PATRICK JENKIN

*Approved by the Secretary of State
and signed in his absence*

The Rt Hon Timothy Raison MP

ANNEX I

1. Local authorities may not legally incur expenditure except where powers have been specifically provided by Parliament. Any expenditure incurred where powers do not exist is therefore open to challenge in the Courts by the independent auditor appointed by the Audit Commission, or by a local elector. However, under section 19(1) of the Local Government Finance Act 1982, the Secretary of State is empowered to sanction illegal items of expenditure and thereby remove them from the purview of the auditor, and from the possibility of legal challenge by a local elector.

2. The Department receives about 250 applications for sanction every year. Sanction is generally granted only where it is judged that the expenditure is justifiable and reasonable. Reasonableness in itself is not sufficient to justify sanction because this could be seen as an attempt to overcome the statutory limitations laid down by Parliament - "Legislation by Sanction".

3. Sanction may be applicable in two broad sets of circumstances - for expenditure incurred already or for proposed ex-gratia payments. Past expenditure may be justified if it was incurred:

- (a) in good faith, but in ignorance of the strict letter of the law; or
- (b) inadvertently, without the observance of the necessary formalities.

4. Ex-gratia payments are generally sanctioned where there is clear evidence of a moral obligation on the local authority's part. Normally this would mean that the council had in some way made an error, misinformed or misled an individual, or failed to take into account factors it should have in reaching a decision. Simple compassionate grounds - for example where somebody suffers hardship from narrowly failing to qualify for a grant or benefit - are not normally accepted. To sanction payments in those circumstances would move dangerously close to 'legislation by sanction'.

5. A final consideration is the interests of local inhabitants of the area as a whole. As a sanction functions in part to protect councillors from the possibility of legal challenge by electors, and perhaps ultimately from disqualification and surcharge, the Department must always be convinced that granting sanction does not interfere unjustifiably with existing patterns of local accountability.

DRAFT PRESS NOTICE

Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for the Environment, today made the following announcement about the contribution of local authorities to famine relief in Ethiopia:

" A number of local authorities want to make donations to various appeals relating to the Ethiopian famine. Because they have doubts about the legality of making such payments they have sought my sanction under S.19 of the Local Government Finance Act 1982. My sanction would not affect the legality of the expenditure, which would remain a matter ultimately for the courts. It would however, remove the expenditure in question from the purview of the council's independent auditor, and thus prevent challenge to the expenditure being made during the audit process.


The Government has the utmost sympathy for the people of Ethiopia. It has taken rapid, substantial and numerous direct steps to aid the relief effort. In addition, my colleagues and I fully support the voluntary agencies in the magnificent work they are doing. And we admire the generosity of all the private individuals who have contributed in support of those efforts.

The question that arises for the Government is whether it would be appropriate to encourage expenditure by local authorities when they themselves apparently have doubts as to its legality. I have taken the opportunity to review all sanction applications from local authorities in the last 10 years for donations to similar kinds of catastrophe. During that period,

6 applications were received and rejected - all in 1976 or 1977. (Those applications related to the Italian and Romanian earthquakes and the East African Appeal). In the light of these precedents, the Government is reinforced in its view that the fundamental decisions within local communities on whether, and how much, to contribute should properly rest with individual citizens and should not be taken on their behalf by local councils.

Local authorities exist to provide local services within the framework of powers and responsibilities set by Parliament, and their prime responsibility in respect of their ratepayers' money must be for local purposes. I have not in these circumstances felt able to grant the sanctions which have been sought. This in no way detracts from our support for local initiatives to raise funds from individuals for relief work, and to channel these funds. I applaud in particular those civic leaders who have used the prestige of their office to encourage voluntary fund-raising campaigns. It is precisely in the area of encouraging individual donations that local authorities are best placed to help."

E 5 NOV 1997



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



5 November 1984

Prime Minister

Agree to send

a message to Perez

de Cuellar urging him to
appoint a UN Co-ordinator
for aid to Ethiopia?

Dear Charles,

Yes no

Ethiopia: Message to UN Secretary General

CJP
5/11

I enclose the draft of a message which the Foreign Secretary recommends the Prime Minister should send to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

As the Prime Minister knows, many other governments have followed our example and announced greater or lesser sums for immediate assistance in Ethiopia. Some have pledged food (the United States for example has committed 80,000 tonnes and announced its intention of committing more); many have promised money for non-food items, often channelled through voluntary organisations; and we know at least eight Hercules planes, as well as our own, are due to arrive in Ethiopia very soon.

We consider that there is a real risk that the Ethiopians will not be able to cope with the influx of aid. For humanitarian reasons we need to ensure that the internal distribution system works as well and as quickly as it can, but we must also do all we can to promote this against the day when the media begin to show pictures of food that has been sent to Ethiopia lying in transit for some considerable period.

In previous relief operations of this kind the Secretary General of the United Nations has appointed as coordinator the head of the UN agency most closely concerned. In Ethiopia the obvious body is the World Food Programme both because the essence of the problem is lack of food and because they have a considerable team already in place in Addis Ababa (headed by a British member of staff). The Executive Director of the WFP has already been in touch with UNICEF (which has experience of managing the international relief operation in Cambodia five years ago), the UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) and other UN agencies but needs a clear mandate from the UN Secretary General before he can coordinate the UN inputs, let alone those of bilateral donors. It might create opposition from other UN agencies if the WFP were mentioned in the Prime Minister's message, but we shall ask our Ambassador to the UN to make our preference known informally. I should add

/that



that our preference for WFP does not reflect a lack of confidence in UNDRO but a judgement that in the Ethiopian case WFP is the more suitable agency for the task. WFP's team in Addis would be backed up by the WFP and FAO in Rome, the latter reporting to the UN Secretary General.


Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED



hite
upc
JH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

5 November 1984

Ethiopia's response to British relief
Aid: Eastern Block Assistance

Thank you for your letter of 2 November enclosing Addis Ababa telegram numbers 315 and 322. The Prime Minister has seen these and I shall also be showing her this evening Addis Ababa telegram number 333 summarising Mr Robert Maxwell's visit.

C D Powell

Colin Budd Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED

6

PS (6)

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS

MR FERGUSSON

MR JOHNSON

HD/EAD ~~AA~~

HD/ECD(E)

HD/MAED

HD/NEWS D

HD/DEFENCE D

PS/MR RAISON

SIR C TICKELL

MR BUIST

EWAD

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RESIDENT CLERK

OR OBU

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FM ADDIS ABABA 031240Z NOV 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 333 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO ODA, NAIROBI (FOR EADD), UKDEL NATO (FOR PARA 7)

MR MAXWELL'S VISIT.

SUMMARY.

1. MR MAXWELL'S SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO BRING RELIEF SUPPLIES. RECEIVED BY 2 POLITBUREAU MEMBERS AND FOREIGN MINISTER. PLAIN TALKING ABOUT BETTER ETHIOPIAN PR AND BETTER RELATIONS WITH WEST. IMPROBABLE PLAN FOR NATO INITIATIVE ON WESTERN RELIEF AID CONSORTIUM AND TIGRAY AND ERITREAN CEASE-FIRE.

DETAIL.

2. MR MAXWELL LEFT (BY RAF TRISTAR) ON 3 NOVEMBER, AFTER DELIVERING RELIEF SUPPLIES BOUGHT WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM DAILY MIRROR READERS FOR USE BY SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND, OXFAM AND RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMISSION (RRC). HE BROUGHT A PARTY OF JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE GONE TO NORTHERN WELO TO COVER SUPPLIES' ARRIVAL.

3. WHILE IN ADDIS, MR MAXWELL WAS RECEIVED BY TWO SENIOR MEMBERS OF ETHIOPIAN POLITBUREAU, BERHANU BAYIH AND AMANUEL ANDE-MIKAEL BOTH RESPONSIBLE AS POLITBUREAU MEMBERS, FOR DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE RELIEF EFFORT. AND ALSO RESPECTIVELY

3. WHILE IN ADDIS, MR MAXWELL WAS RECEIVED BY TWO SENIOR MEMBERS OF ETHIOPIAN POLITBUREAU, BERHANU BAYIH AND AMANUEL AMDE-MIKAEL BOTH RESPONSIBLE AS POLITBUREAU MEMBERS, FOR DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF THE RELIEF EFFORT, AND ALSO RESPECTIVELY MINISTERS OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND OF LAW AND JUSTICE). HE WAS ALSO RECEIVED, WITH ME, BY FOREIGN MINISTER.

4. MR MAXWELL WAS FULLY BRIEFED BY HIS ETHIOPIAN HOSTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF RELIEF EFFORT, AND IN TURN TOLD THEM ABOUT RESPONSE OF BRITISH PUBLIC. WHILE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING FOR HMG, HE WELCOMED RECENT IMPROVMENTS IN UK-ETHIOPIA RELATIONS, AND PROMISED TO USE HIS INFLUENCE AS NEWSPAPER PROPRIETOR AND PUBLISHER TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS. HE URGED ETHIOPIANS TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY SYMPATHY FOR FAMINE VICTIMS THROUGHOUT WESTERN WORLD TO IMPROVE DECISIVELY THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. HE WARNED AGAINST FOLLOWING SOVIET AGRICULTURAL MODEL, AND OFFERED SOME (MUCH-NEEDED) ADVICE ON HOW ETHIOPIA MIGHT IMPROVE ITS PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE WEST.

5. VISIT RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION FROM ETHIOPIAN TELEVISION AND PRESS, AND WAS WIDELY COVERED (IN PART SCEPTICALLY) BY LARGE INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORPS NOW IN ADDIS.

6. MR MAXWELL TOLD THE ETHIOPIANS FRANKLY OF DAMAGE DONE BY RRC COMMISSIONER'S ILL-JUDGED REMARKS IN LONDON ABOUT MOTIVES FOR HMG'S RELIEF EFFORTS. FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THAT DAWIT HAD BEEN MISQUOTED, AND URGED MR MAXWELL TO PUBLICISE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT'S AND PEOPLE'S WARM APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE FOR MAGNIFICENT EFFORT OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. MR MAXWELL SPOKE WARMLY OF THE PRIME MINISTER, TO WHOM HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT ON HIS RETURN. HE TOLD ME HE WOULD ALSO HOPE TO REPORT TO YOU.

7. JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE, MR MAXWELL SAID BERHANU AND AMANUEL, WITH MENGISTU'S AGREEMENT, HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A PLAN BY WORLD VISION FOR A HUGE-SCALE RELIEF AID COORDINATED BY WESTERN GOVERNMENT CONSORTIUM AND A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT, AND ERITREAN AND TIGREAN REBELS, TO PERMIT FAMINE RELIEF TO GO TO BOTH SIDES. REMARKABLY, MR MAXWELL CLAIMS ALL 3 HAD ALSO AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE UNDER NATO, REPEAT NATO, AUSPICES. MR MAXWELL SAID HE WOULD GIVE YOU COPY OF DETAILED WRITTEN PLAN HE HAD RECEIVED HERE, AFTER HIS RETURN: AND THAT HE HOPED TO FIND TIME TO DISCUSS WITH LORD CARRINGTON. I CAUTIONED HIM ABOUT EXTREME IMPROBABILITY OF ETHIOPIAN LEADERS IN FACTUALLY AGREEING TO ANYTHING FLYING NATO COLOURS. WE HAVE IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE

IMPROBABILITY OF ETHIOPIAN LEADERSHIP ACTUALLY AGREEING TO ANYTHING FLYING NATO COLOURS. WE HAVE IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) COPY OF 'PLAN' FROM CANADIANS WITH COPY OF CANADIAN COVERING COMMENTS AND CAUTION, WITH WHICH I VERY MUCH AGREE. COPIES OF BOTH BY CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING HERE 5 NOVEMBER TO EAD AND EWD ONLY).

8. COMMENT: MR MAXWELL LEFT WELL PLEASED WITH SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT. HELPED BY MUCH PRODDING FROM US, RRC EVENTUALLY PULLED OUT ALL STOPS AND LAID ON A USEFUL DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR ABILITY TO HANDLE INCOMING RELIEF AID QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY. THEY PAID MR MAXWELL CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION, AND IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT HE WAS RECEIVED AT SUCH HIGH LEVEL. ETHIOPIAN LEADERSHIP IS CLEARLY CONCERNED TO UNDO BAD EFFECTS OF DAWIT'S VISIT TO LONDON. THE NATO PLAN SEEMS FAR-FETCHED.

BARDER

NNNN

gepc

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 November 1984

Prime Minister

To note.

Dear Charles,

*sub
2/11*

Ethiopian Response to British Relief Aid: and Eastern
Bloc Assistance

Sir Geoffrey has seen the attached telegrams number 315 and 322 from Addis Ababa which deal respectively with the Ethiopians' response to our relief aid, and the scope of Eastern bloc help. He has requested they be shown to the Prime Minister.

The background to Addis telno 315 is as follows. Major Dawit Wolde-Giorgis, the Ethiopian Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation, called on Mr Raison and Lord Trefgarne on 27 October. He accepted gratefully the relief supplies and equipment offered him. But he was critical of the proposal to make available two Hercules aircraft for one month only. He claimed that the effects of the famine would be much worse in December than they were now. He asked Ministers to consider extending the offer to six months.

After the meeting, Dawit was interviewed by press and radio. He praised the response by the British public but criticised the Government. On the BBC's "World at One" programme, broadcast on Sunday 28 October, he described the Hercules offer as a political gesture aimed at gaining publicity. On 30 October his comments were formally disowned by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister who, as reported by HM Ambassador (Addis Ababa telno 315), warmly welcomed the aid we have offered.

Dawit has a well-merited reputation as a prickly, xenophobic nationalist, though Western Ambassadors in Addis Ababa have found him more cooperative in recent weeks. Dawit's character reflects that of Mengistu, to whom he is said to be close politically. The Foreign Minister, Goshu Wolde, is more forthcoming politically and in personal temperament, but may reflect less accurately the attitude of the regime as a whole. He has for example

/been



been misleadingly optimistic about the prospects for the release of political prisoners. The two men represent two different tendencies within the regime; though neither is among the pro-Soviet hardliners who are seeking to achieve total dominance.

Until the last few days, the only Eastern bloc aid of which we were aware was the 1,000 tonnes of rice, not a staple food in Ethiopia, which some time ago the Soviet Union agreed to provide. Only in the past 48 hours has there been any sign in the Soviet media or official pronouncements of concern about the drought or readiness to provide practical relief. The detailed Ethiopian announcement of Soviet aid (reported by HM Ambassador in Addis Ababa in his telno 322) has not yet been mentioned in Moscow. Only a few days ago it was the Americans who paid for the fuel to enable the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission to use the Ethiopian Air Force's Antonov transport aircraft. But the signs now seem to be that the Russians and their allies, in particular East Germany and Bulgaria, have decided that they must be seen to be doing something. The Ethiopians have announced that the Russians will be sending 300 vehicles, 12 aircraft, 24 helicopters, and other assistance. There were yesterday reports of substantial offers of help from East Germany and Bulgaria.

From the humanitarian point of view it is clearly better that the East Europeans should help than not do so. We think it would be a tactical mistake to criticise them for joining in. Depending upon what they do in practice, we may be able to stick on them the charge of too little too late. It may also be that the relative performance of West and East will make a real impression on the Ethiopian regime, even if it is not reflected in the Ethiopian media. This could well strengthen the hands of those interested in greater detachment from the Soviet Union, provided that Western Governments do not press too forcefully on the regime the political moral to be drawn.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

VZCZCFDG RES

IMM

301310Z OCT 84
FROM COMMCEN HSP
TO MODUK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

Hd/LEAD

Hd/News Dept

PS

PS/Mr Rufford

PS/Mr Rawson

Mr Johnson

ODA

RC

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RESTRICTED

FM ADDIS ABABA 301310Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ODA, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, NAIROBI (FOR EADD) AND OTHER EC
POSTS

MY TELNO 311 AND TELECON 30/10 WENBAN-SMITH/BARDER: BRITISH
RELIEF AID FOR ETHIOPIA.

SUMMARY

1. FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSES ETHIOPIA'S THANKS FOR GENEROUS
RESPONSE TO ETHIOPIAN RELIEF NEEDS BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC
AND RELIEF ORGANISATIONS. RRC COMMISSIONER'S ALLEGEDLY
DISOBLIGING COMMENES IN LONDON DISOWNED AS MISINTERPRETATIONS.
NO OBJECTION TO MAKING PUBLIC THIS CORRECTION IN BRITISH
PARLIAMENT IF DESIRED.

DETAIL.

2. HE WAS SUMMONED ON 30 OCTOBER BY FOREIGN MINISTER. HE MADE
TWO POINTS:

(A) GOSHU EXPRESSED ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT'S WARM APPRECIATION
FOR THE OUTPOURING OF CONCERN, SYMPATHY AND VERY TANGIBLE
ASSISTANCE AND HELP ON PART OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC AND
CHARITABLE ORGANISATIONS. ALL IN ETHIOPIA HAD BEEN IMMENSELY
IMPRESSED BY THE SCALE OF BRITAIN'S RESPONSE. HE ASKED ME TO
CONVEY GRATITUDE OF HIS HEAD OF STATE, AND PARTY AND THE
GOVERNMENT:

(B) HE WISHED TO CORRECT IMPRESSION GIVEN BY ALLEGATIONS IN
BRITISH MEDIA ABOUT REMARKS REPORTEDLY MADE IN BRITAIN BY
THE RRC COMMISSIONER. GOSHU HAD CONTACTED DAWIT IN NEW YORK
ABOUT THESE. DAWIT HAD BEEN VERY SURPRISED BY THESE REPORTS.
HE HAD NEVER USED THE TERM 'PUBLICITY STUNT' OF HMG'S OFFERS
OF AID. DAWIT HAD HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR MINISTER FOR
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT, AND HAD SPOKEN ONLY BRIEFLY TO THE
PRESS. HE HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED AND MISUNDERSTOOD. DAWIT
HIMSELF HAD ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO SAY TO ME PERSONALLY
THAT HE (DAWIT) WAS SORRY IF WRONG IMPRESSION HAD BEEN LEFT
BEHIND FROM HIS UK VISIT.

BEHIND FROM HIS UK VISIT.

3. H SAID H WAS GLAD TO HAVE THESE MESSAGES AND PROMISED TO REPORT THEM IMMEDIATELY, IN TIME FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT TODAY. IF THE PM WAS QUESTIONED IN THE HOUSE ABOUT REPORTS OF DAWIT'S REMARKS, COULD SHE CONFIRM THAT HMG HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT DAWIT HAD BEEN MISQUOTED AND MISREPORTED, AND THAT HIS ALLEGED REMARKS DID NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT OR RRC? GOSHU CONFIRMED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE HOPED THE PM WOULD TAKE THIS LINE.

4. H POINTED OUT THAT IF MATTER DID NOT ARISE IN PARLIAMENT, HMG HAD NO MEANS OF CORRECTING BAD IMPRESSION CREATED BY REPORTS OF DAWIT'S REMARKS. THIS WAS FOR ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, H SUGGESTED MINISTER MIGHT CONSIDER SOME PUBLIC STATEMENT IN BRITAIN TO PUT THE RECORD STRAIGHT, EG BY A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS OR LETTER TO A LEADING BRITISH NEWSPAPER. GOSHU WELCOMED THIS SUGGESTION AND UNDERTOOK TO INSTRUCT ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON ACCORDINGLY.

5. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

BARDER

BT

NNNN

ODA 018/31
LBY 301/ 231

PP FCO

PP ODA

PP MODUK

PP WASHINGTON

PP MOSCOW

PP SOFIA

PV EAST BERLIN

13 OCT 1984

VZCZCFDG UNC
PRI
310655Z OCT 84
FROM COMMCEN HSP
TO MODUK

UNCLASSIFIED
SIC

GR 80
UNCLASSIFIED
FM ADDIS ABABA 310655Z OCT 84
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 322 OF 31 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY ODA, MODUK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, SOFIA, EAST BERLIN

MY TELNO 312: ETHIOPIA RELIEF - AID FROM EASTERN EUROPE.

1. ETHIOPIAN MEDIA ANNOUNCED LATE ON 30 OCTOBER THAT PRESIDENT CHERNENKO HAD INFORMED THAIRMAN MENGISTU OF SOVIET INTENTION TO SEND QUICKLY 300 VEHICLES, 12 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, 24 HELICOPTERS WITH NECESSARY SUPPORTS, ALL FOR TRANSPORTING RELIEF SUPPLIES IN ETHIOPIA, 1000 MT RICE, 10 WATER-WELL DRILLING RIGS WITH INSTRUMENTS AND EXPERTS. RICE AND 1 RIG HAVE ALREADY ARR ZED ANE BEEN PRESENTED.

BARDER

NNNN

NOV 22 1984

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5 6 7 8 9

11-22-84

PRIME MINISTER

Ethiopia

Lord Trefgarne phoned. He thought you ought to know that the Ethiopians are proving difficult about the landing site for the two Hercules. They want the aircraft to land at Assak, not Addis Ababa, and have cited as a reason a forthcoming OAU meeting. MOD think that the reason is more likely to be that a number of Russian aircraft have been landing at Addis. Lord Trefgarne has put back the departure time of the Hercules by 24 hours and is making sure the press know the reasons for the delay.

TIM FLESHER

31 October, 1984

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GR 400

RESTRICTED

FM ADDIS ABABA 301310Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 315 OF 30 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ODA, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, NAIROBI (FOR EADD) AND OTHER EC POSTS

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SUMMARY

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DETAIL.

2. I WAS SUMMONED ON 30 OCTOBER BY FOREIGN MINISTER. HE MADE TWO POINTS:

(A) GOSHU EXPRESSED ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT'S WARM APPRECIATION FOR THE OUTPOURING OF CONCERN, SYMPATHY AND VERY TANGIBLE ASSISTANCE AND HELP ON PART OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC AND CHARITABLE ORGANISATIONS. ALL IN ETHIOPIA HAD BEEN IMMENSELY IMPRESSED BY THE SCALE OF BRITAIN'S RESPONSE. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY GRATITUDE OF HIS HEAD OF STATE, AND PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT:

(B) HE WISHED TO CORRECT IMPRESSION GIVEN BY ALLEGATIONS IN BRITISH MEDIA ABOUT REMARKS REPORTEDLY MADE IN BRITAIN BY THE RRC COMMISSIONER. GOSHU HAD CONTACTED DAWIT IN NEW YORK ABOUT THESE. DAWIT HAD BEEN VERY SURPRISED BY THESE REPORTS. HE HAD NEVER USED THE TERM 'PUBLICITY STUNT' OF HMG'S OFFERS OF AID. DAWIT HAD HAD GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR MINISTER FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT, AND HAD SPOKEN ONLY BRIEFLY TO THE PRESS. HE HAD BEEN MISINTERPRETED AND MISUNDERSTOOD. DAWIT HIMSELF HAD ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO SAY TO ME PERSONALLY THAT HE (DAWIT) WAS SORRY IF WRONG IMPRESSION HAD BEEN LEFT BEHIND FROM HIS UK VISIT.

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/ HMG HAD

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5. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

BARBER

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

LIMITED

EAD
ECD(E)
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NEWS D
WED
MAED

PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR RAISON
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON
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Ethiopia

3.32 pm

The Minister for Overseas Development (Mr. Timothy Raison): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement.

The House knows of the very deep concern felt throughout the country at the effects of famine in Ethiopia—and indeed in other countries. Last Wednesday my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs announced three important further measures designed to help tackle the problem. These follow the substantial steps that we and the European Community were already taking, embracing almost £10 million from the British aid programme in the last eighteen months, including our share of over £24 million from the European Community.

The new measures were, first, the dispatch by the United Kingdom of a further 6,000 tonnes of food aid; secondly, the allocation of a further £5 million for spending on famine relief in Ethiopia and other African countries; and thirdly, a pledge to press the European Community for additional action.

The House will wish me to report on the action that we have put in hand. On Saturday night, my noble Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Trefgarne, and I met in London Commissioner Dawit, Head of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

I informed him of the additional 6,000 tonnes of grain, which will be shipped within the next few days. We discussed ways of speeding up the transport and distribution of supplies through the port. I agreed that we should draw on our £5 million offer to provide dump trucks to help with unloading at the port of Assab and Landrovers and spare parts for them to help with distribution. I also agreed to supply water drilling rigs and medical requirements.

In addition, we told him of our offer of a Royal Air Force detachment of two Hercules and the appropriate support to undertake internal relief operations within the famine areas. There was some discussion about this offer, but I can tell the House that it has been agreed that we will make the detachment available for three months. The initial deployment will involve several additional flights to Ethiopia to ensure that our detachment is self-sufficient and fully equipped for the task. So far as we are concerned, the first two aircraft are ready to leave tomorrow. Two RAF officers have now arrived in Addis Ababa to discuss urgently the practical arrangements. I am sure that those aircraft will make a valuable contribution to distributing food where it is most needed.

I have also agreed to make available two further civil aircraft—one of them a Hercules—to support the voluntary agencies which are doing such a fine job in Ethiopia. Both will take our relief supplies and the Hercules will stay in Ethiopia for some weeks for use by the international committee of the Red Cross. We are also paying for some of the supplies needed. I had this morning a constructive discussion of priorities and implementation with the Disasters Emergency Committee led by Lord Hunt. All that represents a significant British contribution. In addition, the European Community is taking valuable action.

So far this year the European Community has already made direct allocations of 53,000 tonnes of cereals and 3,000 tonnes of other products to Ethiopia. But the needs of Ethiopia are so great that we have pressed the Community to do more. Following my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's message to Dr. Fitzgerald, President of the European Council, the Council's budget committee has approved, and the European Parliament is to consider today, a special programme of food and transport assistance worth £20 million, of which the British share would be about £4.5 million.

The needs of Ethiopia and other parts of drought-stricken Africa will be further discussed by Community Foreign Ministers in Ireland at the end of the week and by the Development Council—which I shall attend—in Brussels next Tuesday.

We have been active in other international organisations. The Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, the supervisory body of the World Food Programme, is currently meeting in Rome. On a British initiative the meeting is giving priority to the needs of Ethiopia. At the same time, other western donors have offered increased assistance.

The grave problem of drought in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa cannot be solved overnight or by one massive airlift. But the measures that we have announced are very valuable in themselves and have given an important lead.

Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton): The House is glad to hear of the Government's action to assist in the Ethiopian famine. All hon. Members believe that the images of the starving victims of the drought, which have electrified the British people into dramatic and spontaneous generosity in the past few days, matter much more than prodigal debate here. Therefore, we warmly welcome the Government's response so far in increasing both the emergency aid and, in the time available, the Hercules transport and other logistic support. However, are the Government satisfied that their aid response is yet sufficient and appropriate? Is it not still small compared with both the need and the relative generosity of countries such as Sweden and Holland?

Does the Minister agree with the British ambassador in Addis Ababa that long-term help is necessary if the same crisis is not to be repeated year after year? Is he satisfied that the aid offered—both the food on its way and that promised—will get through to the starving people, including the majority who are in rebel-held areas in Ethiopia?

Mr. Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield): How can my right hon. Friend guarantee that?

Mr. Robertson: Will the right hon. Gentleman arrange for the Hercules planes to take the food and logistic equipment, which I am glad to notice he mentioned, through Djibouti and Sudan, for instance, in order to get it to the people who need it?

What is the Government's response to War on Want's proposal for an independent commission to negotiate on the spot effective action—a proposal which so far has had the support of both Willy Brandt and Pierre Trudeau? Will the Government give that proposal their support too?

Will the Prime Minister and the Government bear in mind the fact that Ethiopia happens to be in today's

that if they now had a ballot the majority would wish to go back. The hon. Gentleman referred to the cost of the strike. The miners have already lost £500 million in wages, 19 coal faces have already been lost and 79 are causing concern. Much investment has also been lost. We Conservatives wish that many of the striking miners would go back to work, where they will get excellent pay and where they have a guarantee of jobs in the future or the best voluntary redundancy ever offered. The money is there to be taken. Will not the hon. Gentleman urge them to go back to work, or does the Labour party prefer people to be on strike and to encourage them to be in poverty?

Mr. Maclean: Has my right hon. Friend thought about asking her right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary to ask the Metropolitan police to initiate an investigation into the sinister links between the NUM and Colonel Gaddafi, to establish what the nature of those links are?

The Prime Minister: I believe that the overwhelming majority of the country was shocked at the NUM's attempt to go to Libya to seek funds.

Mr. Skinner: What about your husband's companies?

The Prime Minister: That does not include the hon. Gentleman, but I believe that the majority of the country was shocked that part of the NUM should go to Colonel Gaddafi, who allowed his embassy to be used for murder on London's streets. That is shocking.

Q4. Sir John Biggs-Davison asked the Prime Minister if she will list her official engagements for Tuesday 30 October.

The Prime Minister: I refer my hon. Friend to the reply that I gave some moments ago.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: While applauding the efforts and lead of the Government, the RAF and the charitable organisations, in relieving famine in Ethiopia, may I ask whether the Government will seek joint measures and machinery with our European and Commonwealth partners, as well as the United States, for a better disposal of food surpluses?

The Prime Minister: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The fact that we were fairly quick off the mark, got a good deal of aid to Ethiopia announced and were able to approach Garret Fitzgerald in his capacity as President of the Community, helped with the speed of relief. However, it would have been slightly faster in relation to the aircraft had we been able to obtain visas for two of our RAF personnel to go to Ethiopia immediately. We might then have been able to get aircraft there to help with distribution from a ship which is carrying huge amounts of grain. We shall do all that we can to co-operate so that the maximum amount of aid can be distributed.

Mr. D. E. Thomas: Will the Prime Minister take this opportunity to respond to the serious statements made by Dr. Charles Elliott this week that the Government have been slow in releasing funds to the regime in Ethiopia, for ideological reasons?

The Prime Minister: The Government have not been slow in releasing funds. Over the past two years British aid to Ethiopia has been worth more than £13 million, including our share of European Community support. In addition, this July we cancelled Ethiopia's debts to Britain which were worth more than £2.5 million. As well as giving ourselves, we have been giving through the European Community, which in the last two years has also given about £22 million.

Food shipments from Britain are arriving. A total of 14,000 tonnes reached Assab yesterday. The main problem is internal distribution. As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, lavish expenditure of about £200 million on the tenth anniversary celebrations of Ethiopia's Socialist revolution hardly helps.

Mr. Skinner: In view of all the talk about Libyan blood money, and to remove any charge of hypocrisy, will the Prime Minister issue instructions that all those firms that have donated money to the Tory party and have had contracts with Libya should have the money sent back because she does not want the Tory party to be tainted with it? Will she tell the House directly that during the period that she has been Prime Minister none of the companies with which her husband has been associated have had any trading links with Libya whatsoever?

The Prime Minister: The NUM's leadership went to a Government which had used its embassy for murder on London streets. If the hon. Gentleman does not recognise the difference between that and trading arrangements then nothing will teach him. Hon. Members will have seen today's *Daily Mirror* in which Mr. Windsor is reported as having said to Colonel Gaddafi:

"We need all the money that you can send us through the Libyan trade unions."

He apparently received the reply

"We shall make sure that the money is sent to you into a foreign bank account."

Mr. Allen McKay (Barnsley, West and Penistone): On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Since the Prime Minister has failed completely to say whether she and the Government have confidence in the chairman of the Coal Board, will you consider—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I hope that hon. Members will not raise points of order designed to prolong Prime Minister's Question Time. That is not a point of order.

headlines and on today's television screens, but that other people are starving too in famines in Chad, the Sudan and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa?

Will they be remembered when the publicity dies away? The famine has alerted many people throughout the world to the dreadful imbalance of life and wealth in the world. We all feel the message in a letter that I received today from an 11-year-old constituent. She wrote:

"Some people have diseases and some people die of starvation. I feel as if it was me who caused that because of all the food I get in one day. I would give them all the food I get but I can't because I don't stay there. Can you help the situation?"

We can help the situation and the Government must help it. The whole House will give them full support and assistance when they do that.

Mr. Raison: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his response. I entirely agree with what he said about the profound sense of involvement of people throughout the country. He asked whether what we are doing is enough. I believe that our effort has been substantial and that our new measures make it extremely important. I also believe that the lead that we have given in the past few days has had a considerable impact in encouraging other donors to step up their efforts considerably. We shall of course continue to keep the problem under the closest review and take further steps as we feel them to be necessary.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether the aid will get through, especially to rebel-held areas. In the past few years, many people have asked whether aid is getting through in Ethiopia. Many bodies, especially the European Commission, have been involved in trying to check whether it gets through. I believe that the great bulk of it reaches the destination for which it is intended. As the House knows, our work in rebel-held areas is done essentially through the medium of the voluntary agencies. I have talked to them and they are satisfied that they are literally able to deliver the goods.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether the Hercules might take food through Djibouti and Sudan. I am not sure whether they might go through Djibouti. Two Royal Air Force officers are out there at the moment establishing the most effective way of delivering food to Ethiopia. The voluntary agencies are operating in other areas. We shall ensure that the food and resources that we make available to them reach their destination.

The hon. Gentleman asked about a proposal advanced by War on Want for an independent commission. I understand War on Want's anxiety, but believe that in present circumstances it is better to use existing mechanisms rather than to think that the response to the crisis is to set up a new body. The hon. Gentleman properly reminded the House that Ethiopia is not alone in suffering and mentioned other countries. I have recently authorised relief for Chad. We are well aware that there are other parts of the world in which we might face substantial problems. I assure the House that I shall do all that I can, within the limit of what we can provide, to give the most effective assistance possible.

Sir Bernard Braine (Castle Point): May I express satisfaction at the Government's swift response to an appalling and pressing need at the diplomatic success in difficult circumstances in securing the co-operation of the Ethiopian authorities and at the decision to reinforce the splendid charities in famine areas as my right hon. Friend

outlined? Might not the problem get worse rather than better in the year ahead? Will the Government direct their attention to the possibility of calling the international community together to consider a longer-term strategy to deal with famine, not merely in Ethiopia but in many other parts of the world and, above all, devising an early warning system, which was lacking in this case?

Mr. Raison: Again, I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his kind words. It is difficult to give categorical answers about whether the problem will get worse or better. The important thing is that we get on with the immediate relief job. Long-term issues of development and how to prevent such problems recurring, as they have repeatedly done in the past, will have to be faced. The House will understand what my hon. Friend has said about the international community working together. We have the World Food Programme and there are other bodies in Rome which operate on the same basis. I am not sure whether new bodies are the right answer. It is vital that the existing international forums should tackle the problem, which is one of enormous scope and gravity.

Mr. Roy Jenkins (Glasgow, Hillhead): Will the Minister give an undertaking that as much grain as he believes can be distributed effectively will be made available from United Kingdom and European surplus stocks, and that budgetary restraints will not be allowed to prevent this?

Mr. Raison: We are determined to make use of the reserves and the stores which the right hon. Gentleman has rightly mentioned. It will be our task at the Development Council meeting in a few days' time, and in the other Community councils, to ensure that we do all that we can to meet this terrible problem.

Mr. Michael Latham (Rutland and Melton): Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will do everything possible to tackle the Brussels red tape when dealing with this matter? Nothing is more offensive to our constituents than the nightly sight on their television screens of barns full of grain while millions starve.

Mr. Raison: I well understand the feeling which has been relayed by my hon. Friend. However, if it were not for the grain surpluses, the so-called grain mountains, our ability to get hold of food in the short term would be much more difficult.

Dame Judith Hart (Clydesdale): While one appreciates what the Government are now doing, does the Minister agree that it might have been better if there had been a reaction several weeks ago, when everything was known about the forthcoming famine in Ethiopia, rather than waiting for television programmes and public pressure?

The Minister has had something to say about his discussions with the voluntary agencies this morning. There is a real problem, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) has mentioned, of delivery to the rebel areas in Ethiopia. How much of the transport and food aid that we are now providing will go directly through Addis Ababa, or possibly Djibouti, for distribution in the Government-held areas? How much is the Minister proposing to allocate to the voluntary agencies which, as he says, are the most effective bodies to distribute supplies in the Eritrean and Tigré areas, which are rebel-held? Lastly, will he undertake to report to the

[*Dame Judith Hart*]

House on what development assistance he proposes to make available for agriculture and education assistance to sub-Saharan Africa for the sake of future prevention of famine?

Mr. Raison: The right hon. Lady has asked me why we did not react earlier. She knows that we have been reacting for a considerable time, and I have given the relevant figures. A shipment would not have arrived in Assab yesterday, which takes a bit of time to arrange, unless it had been dispatched well before recent television programmes. We have been reacting and we shall continue to react.

The right hon. Lady knows that the allocation of food to rebel-held areas is a sensitive matter. There is enormous need to be met in the rebel areas. We are working closely with the voluntary agencies that are operating in the areas. I shall ensure that they receive a substantial slice of our resources but I cannot give an exact figure. I have no intention of forgetting that a great measure of the starvation exists in rebel areas.

I shall be happy to respond to the House on the longer-term issue of development assistance. The House will have a chance to raise the matter on other occasions and I shall do all that I can to meet its requests for a debate.

Mr. Charles Morrison (Devizes): The Government are to be warmly congratulated on the manner on which they have responded to the crisis. My right hon. Friend is correct to emphasise that the problem will not be solved overnight. Will he say specifically whether the Government are proposing to give any assistance in the construction of wells, which may help in the short term? To take the point of the right hon. Member for Clydesdale (*Dame J. Hart*) a little further, and given the fact that the scale of the disaster is infinitely worse because of the enormous population expansion in Africa, will the Government undertake to consider once again the assistance that they are giving towards population control?

Mr. Raison: On the point about water, I said in my statement that drilling rigs were one form of supply that we were sending out. We all recognise that that is of great importance. I agree with my hon. Friend that there is no doubt that one of Africa's major problems is the rapid expansion of population in some parts of the continent. My Department will certainly contribute in efforts to bring that expansion under control.

Mr. David Steel (Tweeddale, Etrick and Lauderdale): I thank the Minister for his positive statement and for what he is now doing. I shall pursue previous questions, in view of the Minister's last statement that this problem cannot be solved overnight. Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that during his last Question Time before the summer recess, he rejected a suggestion by my hon. Friend the Member for Roxburgh and Berwickshire (*Mr. Kirkwood*) that he should visit the area during the summer recess? Does the Minister accept that what has really outraged public opinion is the knowledge that massive grain surpluses were sitting uselessly in Europe throughout the summer while the position was worsening? It was only a television programme that prodded the European Governments into action. Why did they not act sooner?

Mr. Raison: It really is not true that we have been doing nothing to provide grain surpluses to the area. The

European Community has a good record in providing food from those surpluses to Ethiopia and other parts of the world. I am not, of course, saying that what has been provided is sufficient. We must press on with that provision. Well before last week's television programmes — I do not deny that they were important — the Community was heavily involved in the business of shipping grain to Ethiopia. Ethiopia is the largest single recipient of aid under the Lomé convention. I shall visit Ethiopia if that seems appropriate and necessary. I do not wish to do so in a spirit of gimmickry, but if my visit serves a purpose I shall visit Ethiopia.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I remind the House that an important debate will follow in which more than 40 right hon. and hon. Members seek to take part. I shall allow questions on this important matter to continue until 4 pm, when we shall consider the ten-minute Bill.

Mr. Robert Rhodes James (Cambridge): Is my right hon. Friend aware that the performance of the British voluntary organisations in Ethiopia — my right hon. Friend knows my connection with the Save the Children Fund — has been beyond all praise and has been going on for years, not just a few recent weeks? None of that assistance would have been possible without the strong support given by the Government and volunteers amounting to about £30 million spent in Ethiopia alone and 40,000 tonnes of grain sent to Ethiopia. Although it is important to look at the current crisis and the Government's response, which has been admirable, surely after this tragedy has been resolved, or at least alleviated, we can look again at the long-term problems of how to resolve the problems and assist in areas of the world that are affected in such ways.

Mr. Raison: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what he says about the Government's contribution. I am happy to endorse what he said about the magnificent work done by the voluntary agencies. There can be no doubt that they are doing a tremendous job.

We shall, of course, have to cast our attention to the long term. It is difficult to work with Ethiopia — nobody can doubt that. There are many problems, and they have affected our policy towards that country. As I said, I think that everyone is aware that something is happening in Africa as a whole. We must find an adequate response to what is occurring and that is what my Department will do.

Mr. Max Madden (Bradford, West): In tackling starvation and malnutrition, does the Minister understand that the overwhelming majority of the British people would like to see the mobilisation of political will and resources that we saw in the defence of the Falklands? Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that the overwhelming majority of the British people would like the £3 million a day that we are spending on the Falklands to be diverted towards combating starvation and malnutrition? Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that the overwhelming majority of the British people would like the British Government to declare war on poverty and to mobilise the resources that are necessary to combat it effectively?

Mr. Raison: I believe, of course, that what we are doing in the Falklands is essential. However, I can see similarities between the spirit shown by our people,

perhaps particularly in the voluntary sector and their sense of deep involvement in and commitment to the problem, and the way in which people threw themselves into support of our policy on the Falklands.

Mr. Norman Buchan (Paisley, South): Do it now.

Mr. Raison: They show that this country contains the skill, enthusiasm and human understanding that are vital if the problem is to be tackled effectively.

Mr. Tony Baldry (Banbury): Is my right hon. Friend now satisfied that the food pledges from the international community as a whole will meet the estimated need of some 60,000 tonnes of grain for Ethiopia for each month between now and next year's harvest? Of course, Ethiopia is not alone—Sudan, Chad, Somalia and other African countries face famine and food shortages. Is not it time to run a sustained and co-ordinated campaign in order to assist agriculture in Africa and thus enable those countries to grow food with which to tackle hunger?

Mr. Raison: I do not think that we can possibly say that we have yet got enough food committed to solving the problem. However, there has been a substantial international response and we are making very good progress in that respect. I note that even the Communist countries seem to have been shamed into providing some sort of food aid for Ethiopia. My hon. Friend's comments on long-term agriculture are correct, and I should stress that within the Overseas Development Administration I attach great importance to the development of natural resources in Africa, and believe that we have an enormous amount to contribute. I regard that as one of my real priorities.

Mr. Donald Stewart (Western Isles): Although I welcome the aid that the Minister has outlined, is he aware that there is widespread feeling in the country that Government aid was minimal and lethargic until the Government were galvanised into action by public opinion? Is he further aware that the public are concerned about the EEC's grain surplus on the one hand and the starvation in Ethiopia on the other? In that respect, I welcome the Minister's assurance that he will put pressure on the EEC to release grain. Is he aware that people are now looking towards the wealthier nations of the West to assist in the long term in raising the standard of living in Third world countries permanently, and not only when there is famine or crisis?

Mr. Raison: People may accuse us of being lethargic, but the facts that I have tried to set out show very clearly that we have been involved in, and committed to, providing aid for a long time. I can only repeat that we are in a sense fortunate to have grain surpluses in the EC. At least there is a substantial supply of food available and through the EC's institutions we are doing much to ensure that that supply is available.

We all know that once we have got to grips with the short-term problem of the famine there is still an important

long-term problem. That is why we put a very high priority on the long-term development of agriculture and natural resources in Africa and other parts of the world that may face famine.

Sir Peter Emery (Honiton): Although I accept that the Government are doing a considerable amount, will my right hon. Friend make it clear that the problem of starvation in Africa is much larger than any one country can cope with? There is thus a considerable need for this Government to play a major role, along with Europe and the United Nations, in helping to resolve the problem? Will he look at the great difficulty of dispersing food when it reaches Ethiopia? This summer, I flew over the country and saw that it is almost impossible to get lorries and transport into the areas in greatest need. Does my right hon. Friend realise that this summer there were more than 24 helicopters on the airfield at Asmara, which had been provided for the Marxist regime by the Russians? Will he work on the possibility of getting the Ethiopian Government—in co-operation with the Russians—to use those helicopters to distribute food throughout the most dispersed areas of Ethiopia?

Mr. Raison: I agree that working together internationally is the only way of providing the quantities necessary. We have given a lead in that respect, but others are bound to be involved. The distribution of food in Ethiopia is very difficult. I believe that several aircraft that belong to the Ethiopian Government, but which have been supplied from Russian or Communist sources, have not been fully used in helping to resolve the food aid problem. I understand that they are changing their policy and that they will make the aircraft available, and I certainly hope that that is so.

With regard to the exact airfields from which our Hercules aircraft should operate, that is exactly what the RAF officers at present in Ethiopia are finding out, and will be reporting on immediately.

Mr. Guy Barnett (Greenwich): Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what is happening in Ethiopia today is a devastating indictment of this country and of rich countries in general in not taking seriously the objectives of the 1974 world food conference? Is he aware that, during the last decade, the number of hungry people in the world has doubled, to 500 million? Will the Government do everything they can, through the United Nations and the EC, to get the problem properly tackled on an international scale?

Mr. Raison: We have been doing many things but it is true that there is still an enormous problem to be faced. As I hope I have made completely clear already, my Department is dedicated to doing all it can to develop the proper functioning of agriculture throughout the countries which are at risk. That is our prime objective. It is shared, I think, by the World Bank and many other international and national organisations, and we must accelerate our efforts in that regard.

Green Belt Preservation

4.1 pm

Mr. Iain Mills (Meriden): I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to preserve the existing areas of Green Belt land covered by the present regulations from a change of status which could lead to a reduction of Green Belt areas.

I am grateful for the opportunity today of moving a Bill which introduces a short amendment to the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, so that the House of Commons would be consulted formally during the decision-making process on certain major developments involving planning applications for areas of confirmed green belt land.

The precious green acres of our small and highly industrialised country are constantly under pressure for development into housing or industrial estates. We lose about 50,000 acres of green land each year and reclaim only about 10,000 acres, yet there are about 113,000 acres of derelict land in Britain, of which about 85,000 are reclaimable. Much of that land lies in the urban industrial sprawls created by the haphazard locations resulting from our first industrial revolution.

It is vital, in the present situation of a tragically high level of unemployment, to achieve the reclamation of that land and to provide jobs in the reclamation process and in the factories built on the reclaimed land. However, the ease and cheapness of developing new housing or industrial projects on green field sites creates more pressures on green belt land.

Legislation controlling development provides for restrictions through the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, but gives the Minister a final say where projects of natural or regional importance demand an apparent exemption.

After the system of planning application, refusal, appeal to the Minister against the refusal, public inquiry and the inspector's report, the Secretary of State for the Environment has the final decision on the project. He can make that decision independent of Parliament.

My proposal would insert minor amendments in section 9(4) of the Act so that after the word "person", where the Act allows the Secretary of State to consult outside bodies in considering a structure plan, my Bill would add "and in relation to any proposed alteration of the green belt provisions of a structure plan under new section 10 of this Act, the Commons House of Parliament".

The new section 10 would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the Commons, and would read:

"The Secretary of State shall not approve any proposals to alter the green belt provision of any structure plan unless he has consulted with, or considered the views of, the Commons House of Parliament in relation to these green belt provisions".

By limiting those provisions, my intention is to see them invoked in only a very few cases of major national or regional importance.

Such a project in my constituency is the proposal by the West Midlands county council to site a huge high-tech factory site in the green belt near the National Exhibition Centre. That site is confirmed in the structure plan as green belt and is in the very vulnerable 6-mile gap between Birmingham and Coventry, despite the availability elsewhere in the west midlands of about 2 million sq ft of derelict or other land.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Hams (Mr. Steen), who is supporting the Bill, tells me that the same pressures exist in his area for development in green belt land near Plymouth. Other hon. Members tell of similar pressures, so we can be sure that it is a national problem requiring the involvement of Parliament.

The Bill would, of course, aid Ministers who, however sympathetic, sometimes have to make horribly difficult decisions. I pay tribute to the sympathy of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment and my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, who have listened to my reasoning on my own constituency matters on the site with great care. I am sure that the end decision will also be taken in the full light of the many representations made to them. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House for being present to listen to my speech in asking leave to bring in the Bill. From the presence of right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House, I am fascinated to see that my Bill has commanded an even better attendance than I expected.

Let us ensure that Parliament can help the Minister and guide his decision where the balance of helping new enterprises and the creation of new jobs must be held against the need to make the green belt real and long lasting and to ensure the reclamation of land that is useless and derelict. Where there are better alternatives, such as the redevelopment of derelict land, our planning procedures must not encourage the easy options and obvious attractions of fresh green sites.

I have quoted an example in my constituency. There are areas in the west midlands where industry is accepted—indeed, expected—and where the infrastructure and job skills exist.

The lure of virgin sites is obvious, and where the decision is a fine balance it would seem to be more democratic for the House to debate the issue and for the constituency Member to have an opportunity to state his case, either on the Floor of the House or in Committee. To consider the release of green belt land as a mechanism for achieving a higher degree of stability ignores the evergreen—and legitimate—eagerness of developers to choose the easiest and most cost-effective solution to finding new housing or industrial sites. The green belt must be stable and absolute, and any exceptions which, by their very nature, are of special importance would, I believe, justify my proposal in the Bill that they be brought to the attention of the House.

It is my view that the House would have to consider only a small number of such projects. I should certainly be happier to sit in Committee on them rather than on the many statutory instruments that happily engage hon. Members on Wednesday mornings.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Iain Mills and Mr. Anthony Steen.

GREEN BELT PRESERVATION

Mr. Iain Mills accordingly presented a Bill to preserve the existing areas of Green Belt land covered by the present regulations from a change in status which could lead to a reduction of Green Belt areas: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 234.]

STATEMENT BY THE RT HON TIMOTHY RAISON MP, MINISTER FOR OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT, TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FAMINE RELIEF FOR ETHIOPIA

The House knows of the very deep concern felt throughout the country at the effects of famine in Ethiopia - and indeed in other countries. Last Wednesday my rt hon and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs announced three important further measures designed to help tackle the problem. These follow the substantial steps that we and the European Community were already taking, almost £10 million from the British aid programme in the last eighteen months, including our share of over £22 million from the European Community.

The new measures were : first, the despatch by the UK of a further 6,000 tonnes of food aid; second, the allocation of a further £5 million for spending on famine relief in Ethiopia and other African countries; and third a pledge to press the European Community for additional action.

The House will wish me to report on the action we have put in hand.

On Saturday night, my noble Friend the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Trefgarne, and I met in London Commissioner Dawit, Head of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

I informed him of the additional 6,000 tonnes of grain, which will be shipped within the next few days. We discussed ways of speeding up the transport and distribution of supplies through the port. I agreed that we should draw on our £5 million offer to provide dump trucks to help with unloading at the port of Assab and Landrovers and spare parts for them to help with distribution. I also agreed to supply water drilling rigs and medical requirements.

/In addition,

In addition, we told him of our offer of a Royal Air Force detachment of two Hercules and the appropriate support to undertake internal relief operations within the famine areas. There was some discussion about this offer, but I can tell the House that it has been agreed that we will make the detachment available for three months. The initial deployment will involve several additional flights to Ethiopia to ensure that our detachment is self-sufficient and fully equipped for the task. So far as we are concerned the first two aircraft are ready to leave tomorrow. Two RAF officers have now arrived in Addis Ababa to discuss urgently the practical arrangements.

I am sure these aircraft will make a very valuable contribution to distributing food to where it is most needed.

I have also agreed to make available two further civil aircraft - one of them a Hercules - to support the voluntary agencies who are doing such a fine job in Ethiopia. Both will take out relief supplies and the Hercules will stay in Ethiopia for some weeks for use by the International Committee of the Red Cross. We are also paying for some of the supplies needed. I had this morning a constructive discussion of priorities and implementation with the Disasters Emergency Committee led by Lord Hunt.

All this represents a very significant British contribution. In addition, the European Community is taking valuable action.

So far this year the European Community has already made direct allocations of 53,000 tonnes of cereals and 3,000 tonnes of other products to Ethiopia. But the needs of Ethiopia are so great that we have pressed the Community to do more. Following my rt hon Friend the Prime Minister's message to Dr Fitzgerald, President of the European Council, the Council's Budget Committee has approved and the European Parliament is to consider today a special programme of food and transport assistance worth £20 million, of which the British share would be about £4.5 million.

The needs of Ethiopia and other parts of drought-stricken Africa will be further discussed by Community Foreign Ministers in Ireland at the end of the week and by the Development Council - which I shall attend - in Brussels next Tuesday.

We have been active in other international organisations. The Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes (CFA), the supervisory body of the World Food Programme, is currently meeting in Rome. On a British initiative the meeting is giving priority to the needs of Ethiopia.

At the same time, other Western donors have offered increased assistance.

The grave problem of drought in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa cannot be solved overnight or by one massive airlift. But the measures we have announced are valuable in themselves and have given an important lead.



cc EPO
cc J
cc Press

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH

Telephone 01-213 5409

From the Minister

30 October 1984

T J Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Tim,

STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA

I understand that the Prime Minister has now agreed that Mr Raison should make a statement to the House today provided, as I said in my letter last night, that we get adequate confirmation from our Embassy in Addis Ababa that we are at one with the Ethiopians on the scope of the offer of two MOD Hercules. Accordingly, I attach a copy of Mr Raison's draft statement.

Copies of this letter go to the Private Secretaries to the Leader of the House, the Chief Whip House of Commons, the Chief Whip House of Lords, the Chief Press Secretary, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Trefgarne) and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Sincerely,
Michael McCulloch

(Michael C McCulloch)
Private Secretary

now received. M.C.



FILE

RM

w.fco

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 October, 1984

The Prime Minister has asked me to send your Imperial Highness her thanks for your telemesssage dated 26 October about the relief we and others in this country are providing to help combat the effects of the prolonged drought in Ethiopia. She was touched by your kind words.

(C.D. Powell)

His Imperial Highness Crown Prince Assfa
Wossen Haile Sellassie



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 October 1984

Dear Charles,

In your letter of 29 October you sought advise about the reply that might be sent to the telegram from the Ethiopian Crown Prince to the Prime Minister. We recommend that you reply on the Prime Minister's behalf. I attach a suggested draft.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/teletype/airmail/parcels/notes

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PS NO 10

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

His Imperial Highness Crown Prince
Assfa Wossen Haile Sellassie

82 Portland Place
London W1

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

The Prime Minister has asked me to send your Imperial Highness her thanks for your teletype message dated 26 October about the relief we and others in this country are providing to help combat the effects of the prolonged drought in Ethiopia. She was touched by your kind words.

CA

Enclosures—flag(s).....

DISASTERS : Ethiopian Famine
OVR

FROM : M C McCULLOCH
PS/Mr Raison

DATE : 30 OCTOBER 1984

APS/Secretary of State (Mr Budd)

NOTE OF HELP FOR ETHIOPIA

I attach a one-page note on the help we have given Ethiopia directly and through the European Community, which you told me was required in 10 Downing Street today. For convenience I am sending a copy of this minute and enclosure directly to Charles Powell.



M C McCulloch
30 October 1984

BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA

The British Government has responded swiftly to the urgent need for further humanitarian assistance to help the victims of famine in Ethiopia.

On 24 October Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, told the House of Commons that the Government pledged an extra £5 million for drought-affected areas in Africa, including Ethiopia, and more than 6,000 tonnes of food aid for people facing starvation in Ethiopia.

On 30 October Mr Timothy Raison, Minister for Overseas Development, announced in the House of Commons that the Ethiopian Government had accepted the British Government's offer of a Royal Air Force detachment of two Hercules aircraft for three months to carry out relief operations within the Ethiopian famine areas. Two RAF officers arrived in Addis Ababa on 30 October to settle the practical arrangements for these internal relief operations. Britain is also supporting the use of a civilian Hercules in Ethiopia for some weeks by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Among the uses to which the British offer of £5 million will be put are the supply of dump trucks to help with unloading at the port of Assab, landrovers and spare parts for them to help with internal distribution, water drilling rigs, medical requirements, and the shipment of relief supplies to Ethiopia.

This help is over and above the 40,000 tonnes of bilateral food aid Britain has given Ethiopia during the past two years, including 3,000 tonnes of cereals approved in October and which reached Ethiopia on 28 October.

Britain has taken the initiative in stimulating additional help from the European Community. During 1984 the European Community has already made direct allocations of 53,000 tonnes of cereals and 3,000 tonnes of other products for Ethiopia. On 25 October the Prime Minister sent a message to Dr Fitzgerald as President of the European Council of Ministers, to urge new specific assistance for Ethiopia from the European Community. The Community is expected to approve very soon a special programme of food and transport assistance worth £20 million, of which the British share would be about £4.5 million.

RESTRICTED



OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH

Telephone 01-213 5409

Answer Prime Minister

Agree to a statement on these lines tomorrow, subject

29 October 1984 to confirmation by the Leader of the House?

C.D.P. 29/10

*Answered
Told OJK
30.10.84
JC*

From the Minister

T J Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Tim,

PROPOSED STATEMENT ON ETHIOPIA

I think you know that following the Speaker's refusal of the Private Notice Question on Ethiopia put down today by Mr David Harris MP, Charles Powell suggested that in view of the continued high level of interest in the Ethiopian famine, and to relieve some of the pressure on Prime Minister's Question Time, Mr Raison should offer a statement to the House tomorrow, Tuesday 30 October.

Mr Raison has discussed this with the Leader of the House who has concurred in principle that a statement should be made, subject to reviewing tomorrow morning that there is enough new and significant information to convey to the House.

We envisage that the statement, as well as briefly reviewing the situation in Ethiopia, would report on Mr Raison's meeting with the Ethiopian Relief Commissioner last Saturday, the probable uses of the financial aid announced by Sir Geoffrey Howe last week, the latest position on the offer of MOD Hercules aircraft for internal airlifts, EC relief assistance (on which we are awaiting confirmation of a £20 million package) and discussions going on in Rome at the World Food Programme.

In particular it seems very probable that Mr Raison would be in a position to inform the House that agreement has been reached with the Ethiopian authorities for two RAF Hercules to be made available for an initial period of three months, with the possibility of a further three months subject to agreement by both parties. As you know, public interest has tended to focus on this aspect of the relief effort in the last few days.

Mr Raison would be grateful if you would seek the Prime Minister's approval to his making a statement on the basis outlined. A copy of the draft statement will be sent to you first thing tomorrow morning.

/I am

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I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Leader of the House, the Chief Whip House of Commons, the Chief Whip House of Lords, the Chief Press Secretary, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Trefgarne) and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Sincerely,
Michael McCulloch

(Michael C McCulloch)
Private Secretary

Onayes

MOD private office phoned:

MESSAGE — ETHIOPIA.

- ① Maxwell operation is underway. Chartering Tristar for wsd to take items to Addis Ababa.
- ② Problem: Request of Hercules to distribute items internally. Technically this is OK but prob. is finance. MOD cannot pay the estimated 1/2 million (for a month) as the operation is not a "defence charge". They suggest ODA could finance this!
- ③ Pro are having a meeting tonight to discuss the problem.

Duty Clerk

JKRANKP

bePC



a MASTER SET

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1984

ETHIOPIA: FAMINE RELIEF

The Prime Minister held a meeting this morning to consider further the Government's response to the famine in Ethiopia. Mr. Raison, Mr. Stewart and Lord Trefgarne were present, together with officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and HM Treasury.

Mr. Raison reported on his talks with the Ethiopian Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation. Following these, the Ethiopians had agreed in principle to accept two Hercules aircraft for a period of three months, with consideration to be given to a possible extension of this period. The cost in the first instance would be about £2 million. We now needed urgently to get RAF representatives to Ethiopia to consider the deployment of the aircraft. Visas were awaited from the Ethiopian Embassy. Meanwhile the ODA were putting together a package of further assistance from the £5 million aid announced by the Foreign Secretary last week. This would include vehicles and drilling equipment for water. The ICRC were providing overall coordination of relief efforts. It had to be recognised that the Ethiopian problem was a long-term one and it was estimated that some 500,000 tons of food would be needed over the next twelve months. 100,000 tons was already in the pipeline. British food aid shipments were moving regularly and one was expected to arrive in Assab today or tomorrow.

Lord Trefgarne confirmed that the RAF could make available the Hercules aircraft, though this could restrict its ability to provide support for exercises in Norway early next year. The Falklands commitment would not, however, be affected. To provide two aircraft on permanent duty would require an initial mission of four to five aircraft, with a regular weekly supply flight. There would also be a need

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for 100 men to constitute a self-sufficient contingent. He confirmed that the estimated £2 million were extra costs. It was necessary to conduct a survey urgently of available airfields and jet fuel. First indications were that only Addis Ababa, Asmara and Direedawa had the necessary facilities. The most efficient arrangement would be to use Djibouti which was a well-found base readily accessible to Assab and to the affected areas. But the Ethiopians might raise difficulties over this.

In discussion it was noted that both the MOD and the ODA would have difficulty in absorbing the costs. The ODA were already having to find the additional £5 million promised by Sir G. Howe and would have to find a further £4.5 million for the UK share of the Community's additional help. The Economic Secretary said that no funds were available from the Contingency Reserve.

As regards the handling in Parliament, it was noted that PNQs had been tabled in both Houses.

The Prime Minister said that it was agreed that the two aircraft should be made available for three months in the first instance. The MOD and ODA must settle between them how the costs were to be borne. The Government's response should be presented positively in Parliament, with a full account of what had been done in the past, what was in the pipeline and what new steps the Government now envisaged, both bilaterally and through the European Community. The uncooperative and surly attitude of the Ethiopian Government should not be concealed. The point should also be made that we might well need to find additional help in the coming months for other countries, notably Bangladesh, Kenya and Mozambique. Finally, a fuller draft reply should be prepared and submitted today to the letter which she had received from Church leaders.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael McCulloch (ODA), Richard Mottram (MOD), David Arnold Forster (Ministry of Defence), Adrian Ellis (Economic Secretary's Office) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

PRIME MINISTER

CAZ

MEETING ON ETHIOPIA

Points which you will want to consider are:

- (i) Exactly what is the UK doing?
- (ii) What more are the Community doing? Is the Commission acting effectively? What about co-ordination on the spot?
- (iii) How to respond to the Ethiopian request for aircraft. Can we agree to two aircraft for six months? What is the cost (i.e. the real additional cost) and who will meet it? Can we agree that aircraft should be under Ethiopian command?
- (iv) What more does HMG need to do? Other sorts of aid? Need to keep some back for Mozambique and Kenya.
- (v) Action in Parliament.
- (vi) Fuller replies needed by this afternoon to Bishops' letter.

CDP

29 October 1984



CMH.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Ethiopia

The attached telegrams bring you up to date.

The Ethiopians want two aircraft for six months. Cost would be

about £4 million. Neither MOD nor ODA can/will pay.

I have asked for a short paper this morning: and you may want a brief meeting with Ministers directly concerned.

CDP 29x.

WORLD THIS WEEKEND

INTERVIEW WITH MR TIMOTHY RAISON ON ETHIOPIA: 28 OCTOBER 1984

Well, inadequate though Stuart Holland MP may consider the Government's response to be, its announcement of the offer of Hercules and other very practical help came after the letter to Mrs Thatcher from the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Home and the Moderator of the Free Churches Council, urging imaginative action by the Government perhaps in the form of an airlift. It would be unfair, of course, to assume that the one was a direct consequence of the other, but it does seem at first sight that Government aid as well as private help was stepped up dramatically in the wake of public reaction to Michael Burke's film from Korem and Tigre. I asked the Overseas Development Minister Timothy Raison if that was indeed the case, that it took a few minutes of television to get the Government to put its hand deeper in its pocket.

A. No, I think we have taken note of the enormous public response to the films and of course that's had an impact on the situation. I wouldn't deny that for one minute. We have of course been providing aid, ~~since~~ famine relief and so on to Ethiopia for some time - £10 million-worth before ~~these~~ these last few days, so it's certainly not the case that we have been doing nothing in this field. But I don't deny that the enormous strength of public feeling, the extremely vivid and moving way in which this has been brought home to us all has influenced the Government and made us determined to get on with the job even faster.

Q. Would it be fair to say, as someone who knows Ethiopia well was saying yesterday, that in stepping up the level of aid in the short term we're saving lives which anyway are lost because the long term problems remain?

A. Well, there's something in that. ~~What~~ I think what is tremendously important to realise is that on top of the urgent relief job ~~which~~

which is what's preoccupying us all at the moment, there is a long-term development task of considerable magnitude. Yes, that's certainly true.

Q. But is that a long-term development task in which the British Government, or indeed other Western Governments, will be prepared to participate if in doing so they can be seen to be propping up a régime of which in every other respect they thoroughly disapprove?

A. Well, I think ~~there's~~ there's something in what you say, but I'd put it a bit differently. We have had considerable problems about the idea of mounting long-term development aid in Ethiopia and it's partly to do with the Ethiopian Government. But the point is not so much that we have seen them as being a Communist Government and a Government with a bad human rights record and so on. It really is a doubt as to whether it would have been possible to operate effectively in long-term development plans. After all you have to remember that they are an independent country. We can't just walk in and tell them how they've got to organise themselves.

Q. We're already having reports that Bangladesh will go the same way very soon, that Chad is already going the same way, that the problems of the poor countries are so great that there is a need for a genuine, full international effort with EEC participation, perhaps with NATO participation on transport, with all manner of co-operation, to get rid of these obscene mountains of food that we have in Europe and the rest of the world to put it where it's needed. I mean, is there any prospect of, you see of that?

A. ~~The~~ The Community is a very big donor of food aid and it's perhaps worth making the point, even if it's an obvious one, that if we didn't have the food mountains we wouldn't have the food available to ~~provide~~ ^{provide} relief aid, so it's no good attacking the EC on that score. The EC has a pretty good record. But I think it's a mistake always to think in terms of setting up great new organisations. After all we have the World Food Programme. We have the FAO. We have bodies in being and I think really that its by and

large much better to use what you've got rather than thinking ^{that the} response to a crisis is always to invent some new body to deal with it .

Q. Is there any prospect , do you think, in the light of the immense public sympathy that's been shown in the case of Ethiopia and which would no doubt be shown if similar pictures were shown of Chad or Bangladesh, or anywhere else, that you will be able so to fight your corner in Overseas Development , that you can get the cuts in overseas aid restored and maybe an even higher budget than you had before?

A. Well, I'm always prepared to stick up for my own Department. Of course I am.

Q. Returning finally, if we may, Minister, to what Mr Dawit was saying earlier in the programme, I'm bound to say that he was less than enthusiastic about British Government aid. It seemed rather like biting the hand that fed him.

A. Well, it's for him to say what he thinks. But can I make one point about the aircraft, the Hercules. I told him that we were prepared to provide these two Hercules aircraft immediately and that they would be available anyway for a period of a month. Now he wasn't particularly happy about this and I have since told him that if he doesn't think that's the best approach, then we'll have a look and see whether we can use them in a different way which will meet the development needs better. I wanted to send somebody out straight away , or the Ministry of Defence do straight away, to see on the ground what the practicalities of it are . We're still trying to, still having discussions about how we can handle this . But I'm sure we can come up with something positive.

~~The Minister of Overseas Development, Mr Timothy Ralson.~~

Copied to MOD
Press Offices ODA
at :- No 10
and to EAD.

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OO CABINET OFFICE (FOR NO 10)

@4' 587

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FM FCO 281510Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 28 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, CANBERRA

INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER EC POSTS, NAIROBI (FOR EADD),

TEL AVIV (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK

MY TELNO 258

ETHIOPIA: PROVISION OF RAF ASSISTANCE

SUMMARY

1. PERMISSION FOR RAF OFFICER TO TRAVEL TO ADDIS SUSPENDED UNTIL ETHIOPIANS CAN CONSIDER A WRITTEN PROPOSAL FROM US TO MAKE AVAILABLE AT LEAST ONE HERCULES FOR A LONGER PERIOD. POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT.

DETAIL

2. ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR TELEPHONED THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT BRITISH PRESS AND RADIO THIS MORNING APPEARED TO TAKE FOR GRANTED THAT ETHIOPIA WAS ACCEPTING THE OFFER OF TWO AIRCRAFT FOR ONE MONTH. THERE WAS NO REFLECTION OF THE POINTS THE RELIEF COMMISSIONER HAD MADE TO MR RAISON. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT PERMIT SQUADRON LEADER MORLEY TO TRAVEL TO ADDIS TONIGHT. WE EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE DECISION AND POINTED OUT THAT:-

(A) MR RAISON HAD BEEN PROPERLY NON-COMMITTAL IN HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING LAST NIGHT'S MEETING:

(B) MINISTERS HAD AGREED TO CONSIDER DAWIT'S COUNTER-PROPOSAL:

(C) SQUADRON LEADER MORLEY'S MISSION WAS NECESSARY IN ITS OWN RIGHT.

3. MR RAISON AND LORD TREFGARNE LATER AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TELL DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS OF THEIR READINESS TO MAKE AVAILABLE AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT FOR A LONGER PERIOD, PERHAPS THREE-FOUR MONTHS. WITH SOME DIFFICULTY WE CONTACTED HIM AS HE WAS ABOUT TO BOARD HIS PLANE FOR NEW YORK. DAWIT SAID THAT:-

(A) WE SHOULD PUT OUR PROPOSAL, WHICH HE CONSIDERED A MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, IN WRITING TO THE AMBASSADOR WHO WOULD HAVE DISCRETION TO APPROVE ISSUE OF MORLEY'S VISA IF HE JUDGED OUR PROPOSAL ADEQUATE (THE AMBASSADOR HAS, HOWEVER, SINCE TOLD US THAT HE HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE VISA WITHOUT CONSULTING ADDIS):

(B) WHEN (SIC) THE AIRCRAFT WERE IN ETHIOPIA THEY WOULD NEED TO WORK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITIES SET BY THE ETHIOPIAN RELIEF AIR SERVICES AND UNDER THEIR DIRECTION.

4. IN A SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT, THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION CONTACTED US TO ESTABLISH WHAT WE WERE DOING. THEY SAID THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING ONE OF ITS OWN HERCULES AIRCRAFT TO WORK WITH THE RAF. WE EXPLAINED THE POSITION DESCRIBED ABOVE AND IN TUR (NOW BEING REPEATED TO CANBERRA) AND ENCOURAGED THEM NOT TO CLOSE OFF THIS OPTION BECAUSE OF THE SNAG WE HAD ENCOUNTERED.

5. MOD ARE NOW CONSIDERING HOW LONG AN EXTENSION THEY ARE PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO. EVEN IF THEY COULD DO THIS TODAY, THE NEED FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO CONSULT ADDIS PRECLUDES SQUADRON LEADER MORLEY'S TRAVELLING TODAY. WHILE WE DO NOT WANT THIS OFFER OF HELP TO COME TO NOTHING FOR WANT OF FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART, THE CURMUDGEONLY ATTITUDE OF THE RELIEF COMMISSIONER DOES NO SERVICE TO PEOPLE WHOSE NEEDS ARE DIRE AND IMMEDIATE. PENDING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS YOU SHOULD MAKE QUITE CLEAR TO YOUR ETHIOPIAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT THE HOLD UP IN PROVIDING RELIEF IS NOT OF OUR MAKING. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF 3(B) ABOVE.

6. (BONN AND WASHINGTON): PLEASE REPORT SOONEST WHAT ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN PROMISED BY THE GERMANS AND US AIR FORCES (PARA 4 OF TUR REFERS).

7. (UKMIS NEW YORK): WOULD YOU PLEASE MONITOR DAWIT WOLDE-GIORGIS' ACTIVITIES AND UTTERANCES IN NEW YORK.

8. (FOR CANBERRA): GRATEFUL FOR NEWS OF AUSTRALIAN PLANS.

HOWE

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DESKBY 280400Z CBF CYPRUS

FM ODA 272330Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA

TELEGRAM NUMBER MODEV U/N OF 27 OCTOBER

AND TO CBF CYPRUS FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE SIR G. HOWE.

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS, EC POSTS,

NAIROBI (FOR EADD), MODUK(DS8).

ETHIOPIA: MEETING WITH RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER.

SUMMARY

1. AN OCCASIONALLY STICKY MEETING WITH DAWIT WOLDE-GIORGIS AT WHICH MR RAISON AND LORD TREFGARNE EXPLAINED WHAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPED TO DO AND THE COMMISSIONER DESCRIBED ETHIOPIAN NEEDS. NO AGREEMENT REACHED ON PROVISION OF RAF HERCULES AIRCRAFT.

DETAIL

2. DAWIT WOLDE-GIORGIS CALLED ON MR RAISON AND LORD TREFGARNE AT ODA AT 9.30 PM THIS EVENING. AT MR RAISON'S INVITATION HE DESCRIBED THE MAIN AREAS IN WHICH ETHIOPIA REQUIRED HELP AS BEING FOOD AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AIR TRANSPORT. HE EXPRESSED DEEP GRATITUDE AT THE RESPONSE OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC AND CONTRASTED THIS WITH THE SLOWNESS AND PAUCITY OF THE GOVERNMENTS RESPONSE TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S EARLIER APPEALS.

3. MR RAISON SAID THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE POUNDS STERLING 5 MILLION PLEDGE I HAD ANNOUNCED TO THE HOUSE LAST WEEK WOULD BE ALLOCATED TO ETHIOPIA: THAT WE COULD HELP WITH LANDROVERS AND SPARES FOR THEM, WITH DUMP TRUCKS AND WITH WATER DRILLING RIGS. DAWIT

WELCOMED THIS ASSISTANCE. LORD TREFGARNE DESCRIBED OUR OFFER TO MAKE AVAILABLE TWO RAF HERCULES AIRCRAFT FOR A MONTH IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, EMPHASISING, WITH SUPPORT FROM MR RAISON, THEIR VALUE (PREVIOUSLY SHOWN IN NEPAL) IN GETTING RELIEF QUICKLY TO WHERE IT WAS NEEDED IN REMOTE AREAS.

4. DAWIT QUIZZED LORD TREFGARNE ON TWO POINTS. FIRST HE QUERIED THE SUGGESTION THAT THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED ON ASSAB OR DJIBOUTI, SUGGESTING THAT THEY COULD EQUALLY BE BASED WHERE THE RRC HAD STRATEGIC STORES, EG ADDIS ABABA OR DIREDAWA. LORD TREFGARNE REPLIED THAT OUR IDEAS WERE NOT CUT AND DRIED: WE WOULD OF COURSE WANT TO DISCUSS THE BEST USE OF THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE ETHIOPIAN AUTHORITIES, BEARING IN MIND THE NEED FOR ACCESS TO FUEL SUPPLIES. HE PROPOSED THAT SQUADRON LEADER MORLEY SHOULD PROCEED TOMORROW NIGHT TO ADDIS TO PURSUDE SUCH QUESTIONS ON THE SPOT: THE FIRST AIRCRAFT WOULD BE READY TO LEAVE ON THE EVENING OF 30 OCTOBER. THE PROPOSAL TO SEND SQUADRON LEADER MORLEY WAS ACCEPTED. SECOND, DAWIT OBJECTED STRONGLY TO THE IDEA THAT THE PLANES SHOULD BE COMMITTED ONLY FOR A MONTH. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD DO LITTLE TO MEET ETHIOPIA'S LONG-TERM NEEDS AND WAS MORE IN THE NATURE OF A PUBLICITY STUNT TO RESPOND TO CURRENT MEDIA INTEREST. MR RAISON FIRMLY REBUTTED THIS SUGGESTION, BUT WITHOUT CONVINCING DAWIT. AFTER GOING ROUND THE COURSE TWO OR THREE TIMES, DAWIT SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER COMMITTING THE PLANES FOR, SAY, SIX MONTHS AND, AS HE LEFT THE BUILDING, MENTIONED TO OFFICIALS THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED OFFERS FROM THE GERMAN AND US AIR FORCES. IT WAS LEFT THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER HIS COUNTER PROPOSAL AND LET HIM HAVE OUR REACTIONS IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO.

5. MR RAISON ASKED ABOUT COORDINATION. DAWIT DESCRIBED ARRANGEMENTS FOR MONTHLY MEETINGS IN ADDIS BETWEEN RRC AND DONOR GOVERNMENTS (MAINLY WESTERN) AND 31 VOLAGS OPERATING IN ETHIOPIA. REPLY TO MR RAISON'S QUESTIONS, DAWIT SAW NO OBJECTION TO ANY ARRANGEMENTS DONOR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT WANT TO ESTABLISH OUTSIDE ETHIOPIA.

6. ASKED ABOUT SECURITY IN TIGRAY, DAWIT SAID THAT GOVERNMENT

DID HAVE PROBLEMS, BUT COULD REACH ALL AREAS, IN SOME CASES BY USE OF ARMED CONVOYS. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF ERITREA.

7. ON RESETTLEMENT, DAWIT SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT PLANNED TO RESETTLE FIFTY THOUSAND FAMILIES IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. THEY WOULD BE MOVED, AS HAD BEEN TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS, FROM THE OVER-POPULATED AREAS WITH DE-GRADED SOILS IN THE NORTH TO THE MORE FERTILE AND LESS-POPULATED SOUTH. THE RE-SETTLEMENT WOULD BE VOLUNTARY AND WOULD NOT ENTAIL POLITICAL PROBLEMS EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS BOUND TO BE NOSTALGIA FOR THEIR TRADITIONAL HOMES.

8. DAWIT EMPHASISED HIS GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH YOU AND HOPED THAT YOU WOULD DISCUSS OUR IDEAS IN DETAIL WITH HIS STAFF. SUGGEST YOU FOLLOW UP IDEAS IN FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 3 ABOVE AT THE MEETING ARRANGED FOR 28 OCTOBER, LEAVING THE HERCULES PROBLEM FOR DISCUSSION AFTER SQUADRON LEADER MORLEY'S ARRIVAL, BY WHICH TIME WE HOPE TO GIVE YOU FURTHER GUIDANCE.

9. FOR ROME. PLEASE ENSURE THAT MCLEAN AND FREEMAN SEE THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HOWE

NNNN

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ETHIOPIA DROUGHT

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DESKBY 280400Z

FM F C O 272345Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE CBF CYPRUS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 272345Z OF 27 OCTOBER.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY/SECRETARY OF STATE FROM PS/MR RAISON.
ETHIOPIA.

1. BEFORE YOUR ROME TELNO 727 WAS RECEIVED MR RAISON FELT, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING PRESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST, THAT HE SHOULD BRIEF PRIME MINISTER BY TELEPHONE.
2. PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT MOD OFFER OF TWO RAF HERCULES TO HELP AIR-LIFT FOOD TO FAMINE AREAS AND SAID FIRMLY THAT MOD WOULD MEET COSTS.
3. OFFER OF THESE AIRCRAFT FOR ONE MONTH WAS PUT TO ETHIOPIAN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER DAWIT WOLDE-GIORGIS WHO CALLED ON MR RAISON AND LORD TREFGARNE LATE ON SUNDAY 27 OCTOBER. ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT YET ACCEPTED OFFER, DAWIT HOLDING OUT FOR A LONGER COMMITMENT. FULL ACCOUNT OF MEETING IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM TO ADDIS ABABA BEING COPIED TO YOU.
4. REFERENCE PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR ROME TELNO 727, THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER AND MR RAISON ON QUESTION OF ADDITIONS TO AID PROGRAMME.

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LESKBY 261500Z
FM UKREP BRUSSELS 261548Z OCT 84
TO IMMEDIATE F C D
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3453 OF 26 OCTOBER
INFO IMMEDIATE ODA, ADDIS ABABA
PRIORITY UKNIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, UKNIS GENEVA,
MOGADISHU, KHARTOUM, NAIROBI
ROUTINE COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, ROME, DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN,
ATHENS, STRASBOURG
INFO SAVING BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG.



DROUGHT IN ETHIOPIA.

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE COMMISSION ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO THE DROUGHT IN ETHIOPIA, FOLLOWING AGREEMENT IN COREPER YESTERDAY THAT THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL ON 6 NOVEMBER SHOULD FOCUS ON THE CRISIS (MY TELEGRAM NO. 3452).
2. THE POSITION IS STILL FLUID. AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THE COMMISSION HAVE ANNOUNCED AN ADDITIONAL 35,000 TONNES OF FOOD AID, 10,000 TONNES OF WHICH WILL BE FOR DELIVERY THIS YEAR AND 25,000 TONNES NEXT YEAR (IN FEBRUARY AND APRIL). DECISIONS ON THIS FOOD AID (WHICH IS FROM THE CURRENT PROGRAMME) WERE IN FACT TAKEN ALMOST TWO WEEKS AGO. BUT NEW EMERGENCY AID WORTH 3 MECU FROM LOME II WHICH HAS ALSO JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED HAS FOR THE MOMENT BEEN PUT ON ICE PENDING THE COUNCIL'S RULING ON THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF 20 MECU WITHIN THE BUDGET FOR FOOD AID PURPOSE WHICH THE COMMISSION ARE ABOUT TO PROPOSE. THE COMMISSION HOPE THAT THE COUNCIL WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY BUDGETARY DECISIONS AND THAT THE PARLIAMENT WILL GIVE ITS AGREEMENT SO AS TO ALLOW THE FUNDS TO BE RELEASED NEXT WEEK. (WE SHALL REPORT FURTHER FOLLOWING THE BUDGET COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON).
3. WE HAVE PUT TO THE COMMISSION THAT LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DELIVERY OF EXTRA AID MUST BE ADDRESSED. THIS IS FULLY ACCEPTED. THEY ARE CONSIDERING WAYS OF TACKLING THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF MOVING FOOD AID SUPPLIES OUT OF THE PORTS. THIS COULD INVOLVE PROVIDING FUEL AND SPARE PARTS TO HELP MOBILISE TRANSPORT FLEETS ON THE GROUND, AND ALSO FURTHER AIRLIFT OPERATIONS TO SUPPLEMENT ONE WHICH IS ALREADY UNDERWAY.

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4. THE COMMISSION HAD A MEETING YESTERDAY WITH NGOS, INCLUDING THOSE FROM THE UK. ACCORDING TO THE COMMISSION THE PROBLEMS REHEARDED THERE IN RELATION TO AID DELIVERIES TO ETHIOPIA WERE ALREADY WELL-KNOWN ON BOTH SIDES. NGOS WILL BE CLOSELY INVOLVED IN DISTRIBUTING SOME OF THE AID TO BE DELIVERED.

FOO ADVANCE TO:

FOO - CROWE, EAD.

ODA - ARBOTHNOTT, FREEMAN, OSBORNE.

FOO PLEASE PASS SAYING TO LUXEMBOURG.

BUTLER

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

LIMITED

EAD
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PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR RAISON
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON

COPIES TO:

MR BUIST)
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DISTRIBUTION POINTS

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FRAME ECONOMIC/DEVELOPMENT

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 261830Z OCT 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELGRAM NUMBER 3497 OF 26 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ODA

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, MORGADISHU, KHARTOUM, NAIROBI

INFO ROUTINE COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, ROME, DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN, ATHENS LUXEMBOURG, STRASBOURG

INFO SAVING BRUSSELS

MY TELNO.3493 : DROUGHT IN ETHIOPIA

SUMMARY

1. COMMISSION WILL PROPOSE BUDGETARY TRANSFER OF 32 MECU FOR EMERGENCY AID TO AFRICA. PRESIDENCY HAVE ASKED MEMBER STATES TO REACT BY 11.00AM LOCAL TIME ON 29 OCTOBER SO THAT THEY CAN INFORM EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT OF COUNCIL'S POSITION.



DETAIL

2. IN COREPER DEPUTIES THIS MORNING, AND LATER IN MORE DETAIL IN THE COUNCIL BUDGET COMMITTEE, THE COMMISSION ANNOUNCED PLANS TO RESPOND TO THE CALLS FROM EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS FOR FOOD AID TO AFRICA. THEY WILL TABLE A TRANSFER PROPOSAL AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK WHICH WILL MOVE 32 MECU TO CHAPTER 95 OF THE BUDGET. (EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES TO ASSIST DEVELOPING COUNTRIES). OF THIS, 20 MECU WILL BE TAKEN FROM ARTICLE 705 (ENERGY INVESTMENT) AND A FURTHER 12 MECU FROM ARTICLE 7570 (UPDATED VALUE OF MORATORIUM ON INTEREST PAYMENTS).

3. WE SAID THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORTED ACTION TO BRING EMERGENCY AID TO AFRICA, BUT WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO FIND THE MONEY FROM WITHIN TITLE 9. THE COMMISSION SAID THAT THERE WERE NO APPROPRIATIONS AVAILABLE IN TITLE 9. THE FRENCH ASKED THE COMMISSION TO PRODUCE INFORMATION ON THE STATE OF EXHAUSTION OF TITLE 9 AND THE COMMISSION UNDERTOOK TO MAKE THIS AVIALABLE BY 10.00AM ON 29 OCTOBER.

4. THE GERMANS SAID THAT THEY WERE FULLY IN FAVOUR OF AID TO AFRICA, BUT THEY OBJECTED TO THE SPEED WITH WHICH THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER. THEY THOUGHT THE TRANSFER SHOULD BE TO CHAPTER 92 (FOOD AID) NOT 95. THE COMMISSION SAID THAT CHAPTER 95 WAS MORE FLEXIBLE AND ALLOWED FOR EXPENDITURE ON TRANSPORT. /S. THE.

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5. THE PRESIDENCY SAID THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND ANY DELAY. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S BUDGET COMMITTEE WAS MEETING ON MONDAY AND THE PRESIDENCY WANTED TO BE IN A POSITION TO ANNOUNCE THE COUNCIL'S SUPPORT FOR THE TRANSFER THEN, THEY ASKED MEMBER STATES TO TELEPHONE THEIR AGREEMENT BY 11.00AM LOCAL TIME ON MONDAY MORNING. THE COUNCIL BUDGET COMMITTEE WOULD NOT MEET AGAIN UNLESS A MEMBER STATE ASKED FOR THIS.

FCO ADVANCE TO:

FCO - WALL ECD(I) CROWE ECD(E)
CAS - LAMBERT
ODA - ARBUTHNOTT
TSY - HOPKINSON, LENNON

BUTLER

FRAME ECONOMIC / DEVELOPMENT.

ECD (E)
ECD (I)
EAD.

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 182^{AA}/84

MASTER
OPS

DISASTERS: ETHIOPIA: Oct 84.

ORIGINAL FILE COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

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OO DUBLIN

GRS 195

UNCLASSIFIED

FM FCO 251530Z OCT 1984

TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 292 OF 25 OCT 84

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO DR FITZGERALD

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO DR FITZGERALD.

BEGINS: YOU WILL HAVE READ AND SEEN REPORTS OF THE TERRIBLE FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT IN SPITE OF PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ON THE SPOT MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. GEOFFREY HOWE ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WERE MAKING AVAILABLE A FURTHER 5 MILLION POUNDS FOR DROUGHT RELIEF IN ETHIOPIA AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AND A FURTHER 6,000 TONNES OF GRAIN FOR ETHIOPIA. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY ARE PLANNING BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNITY AS SUCH COULD AND SHOULD DO MORE. THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR MINISTERS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION AT THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL ON 6 NOVEMBER. I HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENCY WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN PREPARING FOR IT BY BRINGING FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, AND IN THE MEANTIME CONSIDERING HOW BEST AND MOST QUICKLY TO BRING MORE HELP TO THE VICTIMS OF THIS HUMAN DISASTER. ENDS.

HOWE

ETHIOPIAN DROUGHT

LIMITED

EAD
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PS
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR RAISON
PS/PUS
MR FERGUSSON
MR JOHNSON

COPIES TO:

MR BUIST)
EWAD) ODA
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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
UNCLASSIFIED

Precedence/Deskby
IMMEDIATE

ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2	GRS
CLASS	3	UNCLASSIFIED
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO DR FITZGERALD
	10	1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to
	11	Dr FitzGerald.
	12	BEGINS: You will have read and seen reports of the terrible
	13	famine in Ethiopia.
	14	European Community assistance over the last two years has
	15	been substantial, but it is clear that in spite of practical
	16	difficulties on the spot much more needs to be done. Geoffrey
	17	Howe announced yesterday that Her Majesty's Government were
	18	making available a further 5 million pounds for drought relief
	19	in Ethiopia and other African countries, and a further 6,000
	20	tonnes of grain for Ethiopia. I do not know what other members
	21	of the Community are planning but I believe that the Community as
///	22	such could and should do more. There will be an opportunity for
//	23	Ministers to discuss the question at the Development Council on
/	24	6 November. I hope that the Presidency will take the lead in
	25	preparing for it by bringing forward specific proposals for

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword action
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution EAD FRAME DEVELOPMENT → ECD(E)
Drafted by (Block capitals) C R BUDD		
Telephone number 233-4831		
Authorised for despatch <i>CR Budd</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats UNCLASSIFIED	Page 2
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action, and in the meantime considering how best and most
quickly to bring more help to the victims of this human
disaster. ENDS.

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26 OCT 1984

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Lambeth Palace, SE1 7JU.

17/10/84

From :

25th October 1984

The Archbishop of Canterbury
The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster
The Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council

Dear Prime Minister,

We welcome the statement made by Sir Geoffrey Howe in the House of Commons on Wednesday 24th October regarding increased aid in cash and kind to Ethiopia and other African countries from Her Majesty's Government. Similarly, we welcome the Government's determination to urge the European Community and other members of the international community to increase their aid.

We find it particularly appropriate that this gesture has been made during One World Week in which all our churches are actively engaged. We are greatly encouraged that H.M.G. should be responsive to the already manifested compassion of our fellow citizens, who have given generously to the Disasters Emergency Committee Appeal and who have been shocked and sickened by the scenes of starvation in Ethiopia.

CAFOD, Christian Aid and all non-governmental organisations are fully aware that the measures which have so far been taken are short term. They are also aware that public opinion finds the scenes of suffering shown on television quite unacceptable in view of bumper crops in Europe and the ensuing food mountains.

We believe that the climate of opinion is right for even further measures, given the gravity of the present situation, and would strongly urge :

- i the making available of Hercules aircraft to airlift grain to Ethiopia and for its internal distribution;
- ii the implementation of a radical initiative by both H.M.G. and the European Community for emergency food aid to Ethiopia and other affected African countries until such time as adequate food supplies are available;
- iii a concerted effort by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the EEC to expedite the processing of applications for emergency aid by non-governmental organisations made to the EEC.

We are confident that a generous and extraordinary response will be welcomed by the whole nation.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Carr-Saunders
Basil Hume
Howard Williams

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
10 Downing Street,
London S.W.1.



FILE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 October, 1984

FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA

This subject came up in discussion between Ministers this morning. It was agreed that the Prime Minister should write to Dr. FitzGerald, as Prime Minister of the country holding the Presidency of the Community, to propose a concerted Community initiative to deal with the famine in Ethiopia. It was agreed that it would be desirable for her to have signed such a letter before speaking in the House at 1515 hrs this afternoon. I should be grateful for a draft as early as possible.

(C.D. Powell)

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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