

SECRET,

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Aircraft for Zimbabwe

ZIMBABWE

February 1987

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D. H. H. H.

PRIME MINISTER

29 July 1987

*CD
29/7.*

ZIMBABWE: PURCHASE OF ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

ms

1. The Treasury and the Bank are rightly concerned over Zimbabwe's economic weakness. There is the additional unwelcome news that Mugabe is contemplating self-destructive action by imposing economic sanctions against South Africa. Despite these discouraging factors I incline to agree with the Foreign Secretary's recommendation.

2. My main reasons are first the importance of Zimbabwe in the Central and Southern African context and the damage that would be done to our interests by a major Soviet arms deal; and secondly the fact that the game is still in its early stages; we should not at this point abandon the field to the Russians.

3. If Mugabe were actually to impose sanctions we should of course have to reconsider the situation. But the most likely prospect is that as before, pressed by his advisers, he will draw back. Equally, on the possible purchase of Migs, nothing irrevocable has happened; the signs are that both sides are lowering their sights; some Zimbabwean leaders would like to avoid aircraft purchases altogether; Mugabe is ready to examine Western alternatives. In your talk with him on 28 June you said we were ready in principle to help. We ought to follow that up, with due financial caution.

4. Further exploration of Zimbabwe's needs in this field would at the very least make difficulties for the Russians. There would be no commitment of credit at this stage; it


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might not prove necessary. But if in the end it did prove necessary, I would argue that on political grounds the extension of credit would be justified.

5. We need also to look at the case in the broader context of policy towards the Front Line States. You have already established a degree of influence with President Chissano and argued his case cogently in Washington. Soviet interests have suffered in consequence. It would be inconsistent to reach too early adverse conclusions on Mugabe, maddening though he is, and to give the Russians an unnecessary opening next door.

6. We should play this long.


PERCY CRADOCK

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copy

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B.0239

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Zimbabwe: Purchase of Advanced Fighter Aircraft
OD Meeting on Thursday 30 July
(OD(87)11)

CONCLUSION

Subject to discussion, the Committee might be guided:

- a. to agree that we should offer to discuss with the Government of Zimbabwe their air defence needs and the possible sale of modified Sea Harrier or Hawk 200, without any commitment as to availability of credit;
- b. to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to report to the Committee on the outcome of these exploratory discussions so that the difficult question of credit can if necessary be decided.

BACKGROUND

2. Zimbabwe is concerned about the air threat from South Africa and has been discussing with the Soviet Union a possible purchase of some fourteen MIG 29 fighter aircraft.

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

We

cannot supply Tornado but could offer either a modified Sea Harrier (an air defence version of the Harrier) or the Hawk 200. Zimbabwe has also approached the United States about

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the F.16, but the Americans cannot supply it. The French have given a presentation in Harare on the Mirage 2000; little is known of this, but Zimbabwe may prefer not to purchase Mirage, since the South Africans have them. Zimbabwe is also interested in obtaining British air defence radar and missiles.

3. Only £192 million of Zimbabwe's current ECGD credit limit of £400 million remains unallocated. This will not cover the cost (£300 million) of a full squadron of Sea Harriers. It could cover half a squadron, or the proposed Hawk 200 package (£155 million). But this would leave insufficient cover for the radar and missile sales (up to £100 million) being discussed separately, not to speak of £370 million of potential civil business.

4. You told Mr Mugabe on 28 June that we were working on proposals and that the most likely candidates seemed to be Sea Harrier and the Hawk 200.

5. A last minute development of background relevance is that Mr Mugabe has recently given instructions that imports from South Africa should cease. This measure would harm Zimbabwe more than South Africa, and South African retaliation would do serious damage. It is so far uncertain whether the decision will be implemented at all and, if so, in what form; for instance, an elastic loophole, that essential imports could continue, may be allowed.

ATTENDANCE

6. All members of the Committee will be present. The Chief of the Defence Staff is attending.

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HANDLING

7. After the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has introduced his memorandum, discussion should address the following points:

A. The Threat to Zimbabwe

Does the South African air threat justify Zimbabwe acquiring advanced fighter aircraft? Would South Africa soon destroy any new aircraft in a pre-emptive strike? Would up-to-date radar and ground-based missiles be sufficient (as well as cheaper), at least for the present? (Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff)

B. Mr Mugabe's Intentions

Mr Mugabe, when you met him on 28 June, made no mention of buying Soviet aircraft. What is the most up-to-date information about his intentions? May his apparent surprise when you mentioned the possibility of British aircraft mean that he has no real interest in considering them? Or is the evidence rather that important elements in the Zimbabwe Government have doubts about a Soviet purchase, and might welcome discussions with ourselves? (Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary)

C. United Kingdom offer

i. Operational performance

Would Sea Harrier and Hawk cope with the threat? Which would be better for Zimbabwe's needs? Is half a squadron (6 aircraft) of Sea Harriers (as against 12 Hawks) a realistic proposition in air defence terms? (Defence Secretary, Chief of Defence Staff)

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ii. Cost

Mr Mugabe has referred to budgetary concerns. How do the costs of the Sea Harrier (£150 million for half a squadron) and Hawk (£155 million) compare with those of the MIG 29 and MIG 23? (Defence Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary)

D. ECGD Cover

The Treasury and Bank of England oppose any increase in Zimbabwe's ECGD credit ceiling, already in their view uncomfortably high. The Department of Trade and Industry are concerned that any aircraft sale would crowd out important civilian projects (including the Kariba and Hwange power stations). ECGD would be prepared to raise the limit of £400 million by £30 million, to help accommodate an aircraft deal. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes a separate tranche of £150 million outside the existing ceiling to cover an aircraft sale, which would lapse if none came about. Given Zimbabwe's key position in Central and Southern Africa and the strong political case for blocking Soviet influence there, might such an exceptional step be justified, should there be no way of preventing a purchase of Soviet aircraft other than by a British offer? (Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary)

E. Way Ahead

There are many uncertainties: differing views in the Zimbabwe Government on the need for and affordability of advanced fighters, lack of clarity about the state of negotiations with the Soviet Union and on whether Zimbabwe is interested in British aircraft. It seems early to decide the contentious question of export credit, since no clear prospect of a sale, let alone

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knowledge of its size and nature, can yet be said to exist. On the other hand, the political case for starting a dialogue, with the minimum objective of causing Zimbabwe to look more sceptically at a Soviet purchase, is strong. We might offer to discuss with Zimbabwe its air defence needs and suggest how they might be met by Sea Harrier or Hawk, subject to its being made explicit that the question of credit has yet to be addressed by Ministers. Could such a line be taken without its being assumed (as the Treasury might argue) that sufficient credit would ultimately be forthcoming? (Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Trade and Industry Secretary). If such a fire break is thought to be unworkable, it may be necessary to accept that some amount of credit would later be provided if necessary; even so, no commitment should be given to Zimbabwe at this stage.

F. British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT)
Purchase of Soviet aircraft would probably result in Soviet military personnel being sent to Zimbabwe. Should we pull out BMATT at that stage? The Team (currently 44 strong) has helped to sustain British influence in Zimbabwe and increase it in Mozambique. Its withdrawal would compound the Soviet political gain from the sale of aircraft and leave the field (including Mozambique) even more wide open for the Russians. Are there not other countries (India, Nigeria) where both British and Soviet advisers are to be found? The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Defence Secretary should be invited to comment.

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G. Radar and Missiles

If Zimbabwe were to purchase Soviet aircraft, is the Foreign Secretary right that there would be security objections to selling radar and Rapier and/or Javelin? Is this similar to BMATT, in that our withdrawal would be an extra gain to the Soviet Union, but different in that the Russians, if we supplied this equipment, might gain valuable technology by exploiting the relatively easy environment for finding out about these systems? How valuable would that technology really be to them? (Defence Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary)

C L G Mallaby

C L G Mallaby

28 July 1987

PRIME MINISTER

AIRCRAFT FOR ZIMBABWE

There is to be a short OD meeting after Cabinet to discuss aircraft for Zimbabwe.

The OD paper is in the folder. You are familiar with the main issues which are summarised in my note (attached).

I do not think that OD can reach any clear decision yet. We do not know whether the Zimbabweans are at all serious in expressing interest in British aircraft. Certainly we are nowhere near the point where you would be justified in over-ruling the healthy misgivings of the Treasury and ECGD about extending extra credit cover (particularly now that Mugabe seems once again to be set on ruining his own economy by interfering with trade with South Africa).

The only sensible conclusion seems to be that we should continue to probe Zimbabwe's intentions, but without giving any commitment about the availability of credit cover. Only when we have a much clearer idea of Zimbabwe's intentions, would we need to address the question of credit.

Whatever the temptation, I think it would be wrong to conclude that if Zimbabwe does eventually buy from the Soviet Union we should end our military training programme. There is no harm in letting Mugabe worry that this might happen. But in practice we would still have a strong interest in keeping a foothold in Zimbabwe; and there is also the Mozambique angle.

C.D.P.
CDP

28 July, 1987.

PRIME MINISTER

AIRCRAFT FOR ZIMBABWE

As you know, the Zimbabwe Government have been considering the purchase of advanced fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union. Even though Mugabe did not seem very enthusiastic about it when you raised the matter with him, it seems that contacts with the Soviet Union continue (although probably for purchase of less sophisticated Mig-23s rather than Mig-29s).

To head off this incursion by the Soviet Union into what has hitherto been a British preserve as main supplier of aircraft to Zimbabwe, and to avoid bringing the Russians right into the frontline with South Africa, we have indicated that we would be ready in principle to supply Sea Harrier or the Hawk 200.

But we are inhibited from pursuing our offer by problems over credit. If the aircraft sale were to go ahead, there would be no cover left within Zimbabwe's market limit for other civil and military projects (see note).

The Treasury and ECGD are very reluctant to extend additional cover for Zimbabwe. They point to the high budget deficit, high debt service ratio and acute foreign exchange problems. They do not rule out a balance of payments crisis next year involving rescheduling.

There is therefore a conflict between our perceived political interest in preserving Zimbabwe from Soviet clutches and the limits of prudence in extending credit cover. Ministers have been unable to resolve the dilemma. The proposal is to have an OD next week.

Agree:

- (a) to rule now?
- (b) to have an OD next week?

We need more info before we can decide if to buy Russian

C.D.P

(C. D. POWELL)

22 July 1987

I do not see why we should continue to bring his hands. What are the chances of his buying British not

CREDIT FOR ZIMBABWE

- Zimbabwe's existing ECGD credit limit is £400million.
About £170million of that is unused.

- There are substantial civil projects in prospect amounting to £360million. There are separate negotiations in progress on a prospective sale of missiles and radar up to £100million.

what are the responsibilities of selling these?

- Cover for the sale of aircraft would be in the area of £150-175million.

- Treasury and ECGD are unwilling to increase the limit.

- If we allocate what remains within the £400million ceiling to the aircraft sale, there will be no cover for any other business.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

23 July 1987

From the Private Secretary

AIRCRAFT FOR ZIMBABWE

As you know, we have now set a date for an OD discussion of the sale of military aircraft to Zimbabwe and the constraints imposed by the limited amount of credit cover available. No doubt you or the Cabinet Office will be producing a paper for discussion at that meeting. The Prime Minister has commented that we shall need a good deal more information than is available to her at present if a decision is to be reached. In particular, we need a further assessment of how realistic the prospects are that he can be persuaded to buy from the United Kingdom.

I should also mention that the Prime Minister's view, at this stage, is that a decision by the Zimbabwe Government to purchase Soviet aircraft would make it inappropriate to continue to provide military training for the Zimbabwe armed forces.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence), Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Timothy Walker (Department of Trade and Industry) and Christopher Mallaby (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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File

Corrected
Copy.

cc MOD
HMT
DTI
C. Mallaby

JA

PRIME MINISTER

AIRCRAFT FOR ZIMBABWE

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CCPC



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

David Ball Esq
 Private Secretary
 to the Secretary of State for Defence
 Ministry of Defence
 Main Building
 Whitehall
 London
 SW1

CD
 21/7

Dear David,

21 July 1987

ZIMBABWE: PURCHASE OF ADVANCED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

You explained in your letter of 7 July to Lyn Parker that Mr Younger was concerned that we should not adopt an inflexible attitude on credit cover for non-aircraft defence sales by turning down any application for cover on defence sales while the aircraft deal remained very provisional. *WILL BE SOUGHT IF REQUIRED*

The current position on the market limit was set out in Lyn Parker's letter of 26 June to Charles Powell. A balance of about £170 million remains. The fighter aircraft would require cover of between £150 million and £175 million. If that contract went forward there would be no cover remaining for the substantial civil projects which amount to some £360 million or the prospective missiles and radar sales of up to £100 million. *at top*

The Treasury concerns about Zimbabwe's economy are set out in the PCO letter and in our view, there are no grounds for increasing the market limit. I understand that FCO still consider that the aircraft deal will go forward. On that basis for so long as ECGD cover for the prospective fighter aircraft contract is likely to be necessary, the Chief Secretary considers that there should be no presumption that there can be any scope for flexibility on credit cover for civil or other military contracts.

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SOVIET UNION: Military Dependence
May 79

It would be helpful if the FCO could clarify the position on the aircraft sales shortly and before other contracts come forward for indications of cover.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Lyn Parker, Tim Walker and Trevor Woolley


Yours sincerely,

Jill Rutter

JILL RUTTER
Private Secretary



cepc



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B.0205

~~MR POWELL~~

cc Sir Robert Armstrong
Mr Unwin

Zimbabwe: Purchase of Advanced Fighter Aircraft

In his letter of 26 June, Mr Parker mentioned that the Foreign Secretary felt that the possible offer of fighter aircraft for sale to Zimbabwe, on which there is some departmental disagreement, might best be discussed in OD.

2. If this were to be taken in a Cabinet Committee, OD would be the most appropriate forum. The alternative would be EX, which is concerned with Government support for exports; but, although the economic implications are significant, the proposal raises important politico-military issues, which would fall to OD.

C L G Mallaby

C L G Mallaby

2 July 1987

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LAC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 June 1987

*Dear Charles,*Zimbabwe: Purchase of Advanced Fighter Aircraft

The Foreign Secretary believes the Prime Minister may find it helpful, before her meeting with Mr Mugabe on Sunday, to have an account of the current position on the possible purchase by Zimbabwe of advanced fighter aircraft. In your letter of 7 May you said that the Prime Minister would wish to be consulted over our proposed response to the Zimbabweans. Since then there has been further evidence indicating that neither the Zimbabweans nor the Russians have fully committed themselves to a deal involving a sale of MIG 29s, though it is likely that Mr Mugabe will have discussed it further with Soviet leaders in Moscow just before the Prime Minister sees him.

Soviet Intentions

At the latest round of Anglo-Soviet official talks on Africa in May, the Russians confirmed the Zimbabwean approach, and said they were puzzled by their interest in "such an expensive and sophisticated aircraft". They implied, however, that if Zimbabwe pressed them they might be prepared to supply a squadron of Mig 29s: "it was difficult to tell Zimbabwe point-blank that the balance in air defences should be in South Africa's favour". We believe that the Russians may well have reservations about supplying Mig 29s, not least because of the risk that one might be hijacked by the South Africans. They might try to persuade Zimbabwe to accept the more basic and less expensive Mig 23 instead.

Ever since Zimbabwean Independence the Russians have been trying to recover from backing the wrong contender (Nkomo rather than Mugabe). If they do supply fighter aircraft this will give them a foot in the door. They would no doubt try to exploit such an opening. Over time, they could well try to build up a special relationship with Zimbabwe - the key black African country in the region - akin to that between Delhi and Moscow. This would have a profound knock-on effect on

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Zimbabwe's neighbours, and in particular would undermine what we have been trying to achieve in Mozambique.

The US and France

The US Administration have made it clear to us that there is little prospect of offering P16s to Zimbabwe, largely because of the general disarray in American policy on Southern Africa arising from Congress' effective veto on the Administration's initiatives: this is probably also why Schultz's projected visit to the region has just been cancelled. The Americans have said that they are therefore looking to us to take the lead in countering the proposed Soviet deal.

A Dassault team visited Zimbabwe in May to give a presentation on the Mirage 2000 (Mirage III already provides the backbone of the South African Air Force). While a French sale to Zimbabwe would be satisfactory in terms of restraining Soviet influence in the region, it would give them a foothold in the market which would be very much against Britain's commercial interests.

Zimbabwean Motives

In view of South Africa's recent behaviour, notably cross-border raids into the front-line states, it is entirely understandable that Zimbabwe should regard South Africa as a military threat. Mugabe appears to be ready to make substantial economic sacrifice in order to acquire aircraft of sufficient sophistication to match, and possibly surpass, the South Africans. While he has made overtures to the Russians, he has invited offers from the West as well. If we rebuff him, or are unable to offer him a competitive deal, it will be difficult for us to object strongly if he eventually decides to go ahead and buy from the Russians. The Foreign Secretary believes that we should be prepared to offer an alternative package; and that we must be prepared to recognise the implications if we do not.

Possible UK offer

The MOD have concluded for security reasons that we cannot offer Tornado; nor in any case could it be provided in a competitive timescale. We could however offer either a modified version of the Sea Harrier or the new Hawk 200. In MOD's view neither of these would



prejudice our security or affect the equipment of our own forces. In both cases we could supply adequate spares, back-up and training. Although neither aircraft is directly comparable to the Mig 29, the Zimbabweans might nevertheless find them attractive. They are less expensive than Tornado. The ability to deploy Sea Harrier away from regular air bases would make it much less vulnerable to pre-emptive South African attack, and it has a proven record in the South Atlantic against the Mirage III. Hawk 200 is both cheap and the natural successor to the Hawk 60s already in operation with the Zimbabwe Air Force. The cost of a squadron of 12 aircraft, plus two trainers and a simulator would be £300 million for Sea Harrier and £155 million for Hawk 200.

The cost of a full squadron of Sea Harriers could not be accommodated within the existing ECGD credit limit for Zimbabwe of £400 million. It would however be possible to provide around £150 million of ECGD credit and leave some room to cover civil exports, without exceeding the limit significantly. This would be adequate for the Hawk 200 package or for half a squadron of Sea Harriers. The MOD believe that the latter could credibly be presented as a viable option because of the Harriers' greatly reduced vulnerability on the ground; though Mugabe might nevertheless regard it as inadequate. Such an agreement would however leave insufficient cover for missile and radar sales of up to £100 million which we are already discussing separately with the Zimbabweans.

Treasury officials and the Bank of England do not believe that an allocation of £150 million of existing cover for fighter aircraft would be justified. They are concerned at Zimbabwe's high budget deficit, high debt service ratio and acute foreign exchange problems. They do not rule out a balance of payments crisis next year involving debt rescheduling. DTI officials share these concerns; they are also concerned at the prospect of a deal on military aircraft pre-empting virtually all the remaining cover within existing ECGD limits, thus excluding substantial civilian projects already under negotiation for which ECGD have already indicated willingness to consider cover.

The DTI's concerns might be met to some extent by raising the credit limit for Zimbabwe from its present level of £400 million to eg £450 million. For the reasons set out above, this would be unwelcome to the Treasury and ECGD.



The Foreign Secretary recognises that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry are, for all these reasons, likely to have reservations about any proposal to offer an aircraft package to Zimbabwe. He nevertheless considers that a positive response to the Zimbabwean request offers us the best chance of rolling back the Soviet challenge at minimum risk and with some commercial advantage to the UK. A positive response to the Zimbabwean request would buy time and make it more likely that Mr Mugabe's underlying caution, together with the known reluctance of senior Zimbabwean Air Force officials and some Zimbabwean Ministers to purchase highly sophisticated aircraft, would cause him to reconsider. Even if he did decide to go ahead with a major purchase, we would stand some chance of scaling down his requirements to a more reasonable level and creating a significant export opportunity for British industry.

The Foreign Secretary considers that, in view of the differences between Departments over this question and the importance of this issue for the future of our position in Southern Africa, the best way forward may be a discussion in OD. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister may wish, when she sees Mr Mugabe on Sunday, to take the line that Zimbabwe's request is under active consideration.

I am copying this letter to David Ball (Ministry of Defence), Alex Allan (Treasury), Mike Gilbertson (Department of Trade and Industry), John Footman (Bank of England), and Trevor Woolley, Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

Some papers on
ZIMBABWE Air!!?



file DAS 3
AHK

cc Sir PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 May 1987

ZIMBABWE/SOVIET UNION: ARMS SALES

Thank you for your letter of 6 May about recent developments in relation to Zimbabwe's possible purchase of the Soviet military aircraft. The Prime Minister notes that no final decision appears to have been taken by the Zimbabweans about the purchase of such aircraft. Since the evidence about their intentions does not appear conclusive either way, the Prime Minister would want us to proceed with some contingency planning in the event that Zimbabwe does in the end decide in favour of Soviet advanced aircraft.

BF // The Prime Minister notes that the Zimbabweans are showing some interest in purchase of aircraft from the United States and the United Kingdom as an alternative. She agrees that we need to consider very carefully how to respond. She would like to be consulted about the terms of our reply.

I am copying this letter to David Ball (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET

JB



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 May 1987

Prime Minister
CDP/GJ

Dear Charles,

mt

Zimbabwe/Soviet Union: Arms Sales

The Prime Minister may wish to be brought up to date on the most recent developments in relation to the possible purchase of Soviet military aircraft by Zimbabwe.

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It appears that the Zimbabweans have signed the equivalent of a letter of intent regarding the purchase of Mig 29s. They have publicly denied that firm orders have been placed (the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister at a press conference in Moscow on 30 April and the Minister for Defence in the Zimbabwean Assembly on 15 April). At the press conference, the Foreign Minister confirmed that Zimbabwe wished to increase its air defence capacity but said that his country was comparing prices and effectiveness of aircraft from France, Britain, the United States and China as well as the Soviet Union. Quite apart from Zimbabwean intentions, both we and the Americans remain doubtful whether the Russians would really be willing to supply Mig 29s to Zimbabwe, which they have hitherto only sold to Iraq and India.

Meanwhile, as you know from David Ball's letter of 28 April to me, the MOD have, on a contingency basis, carried out a very preliminary assessment of the security implications of possible supply by HMG to Zimbabwe of either a sanitized version of Tornado ADV or Hawk 200 or a modified version of the Sea Harrier. As you will have seen the tentative conclusion of the report is that, while Tornado would probably be out of the question for security reasons and there might be practical difficulties about the combat version of the Hawk 200 which is still only a paper aircraft, supply of the Sea Harrier version might be possible. The assessment does not cover such potentially difficult areas as training and supply of spare parts. Nor



does it address the question of how Zimbabwe might pay for such a deal.


In the light of these developments the Foreign Secretary considers it unlikely that Mugabe has taken a firm decision in favour of a deal with the Soviet Union, although he clearly does believe that Zimbabwe needs additional defence against a threat from South Africa. The recent South African raid on Zambia will no doubt have reinforced this belief. The Foreign Secretary believes that we need to consider very carefully how to respond to the Zimbabwean request for information.


I am copying this letter to David Ball (MOD).

Yours ever,
A C Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2576</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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