

PREM 19/2049

CAB ONE

TOP SECRET —



CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting on South Africa in London.

COMMONWEALTH

(Briefs in separate folders)
+ Background Papers

In attached folders: The Commonwealth Report: Mission to South Africa.

July 1986



plus: Action Briefs from Commonwealth

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
10.7.86							
16.7.86							
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12.8.86							
13.1.87							

PREM 19/2049

OK

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report.
Report of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons appointed under the Nassau Accord on Southern Africa.
Published by Commonwealth Secretariat, Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London SW1Y 5HX

Signed J. Gony Date 2/7/2016

PREM Records Team



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 January 1987

Dear Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 18 December with which you sent me a specially bound volume of the final Record of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting held in London last August. I was grateful to receive this.

With best wishes for the New Year,

Yours sincerely
Rajiv Gandhi

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, A.C. Kt., C.M.G., G.C.

05



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 January 1987

Dear Charles,

Record of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review
Meeting: 3-4 August 1986

The Commonwealth Secretariat have now produced the formal record of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting held in London from 3 to 4 August 1986. In accordance with the usual practice with Heads of Government meetings, the Secretary-General has asked that the enclosed letter and bound volume be transmitted to the Prime Minister.

The Commonwealth Secretariat have classified the record "Secret" but we propose, as usual, to treat it as "Confidential".

I am copying this letter, and a copy of the CRM record, to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

C.152-40/10

Covering SECRET
18 December 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

I have pleasure in enclosing a specially bound volume of the final Record of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review Meeting held in London from 3 to 4 August 1986.

This special copy, prepared for each Head of Government, is additional to the copies which I am forwarding through your High Commissioner in London for your Government's archives.

With respect,



Shridath S. Ramphal

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain & Northern Ireland



CF ~~CF~~
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 August 1986

Dear Tim

GM
Reddaway
SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING:
MESSAGE FROM MR LANGE

Charles Powell wrote to Tony Galsworthy on 1 August enclosing a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr Lange about the Commonwealth Review Conference. I now enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr Lange.

Yours Sincerely

David Reddaway

David Reddaway
Private Secretary to
Baroness Young

Tim Flesher Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Commonwealth
London Mini Summit
7/86



DSR 1 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

The Rt Hon David Lange

Secret

Prime Minister of New Zealand

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

KL3BJI

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for your message of 1 August about the problems which confront us in Southern Africa. This reached me just before the start of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Review meeting. By way of reply I wanted to let you have my impressions of that meeting and to tell you of the action which we in Britain will now be taking on the South Africa ~~question~~.

CAVEAT

^{Will}
You have ~~no doubt~~ seen the joint Communique from Marlborough House. As it says, our discussion was characterised by a spirit of frankness in friendship. There were many points of which we were all closely agreed. On those where we differed, we were able to agree to differ and to respect each other's positions.

Enclosures flag(s)

First and most importantly we were in full agreement on our common purpose. Namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative

government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency. As I said afterwards, no one can claim that the British Government is easy on apartheid. It has not been and it is not going to be. The system is just wrong and must go.

We began by hearing a personal report from the Co-Chairmen of the Eminent Persons Group, General Obasanjo and Malcolm Fraser. Geoffrey Howe then described his own mission on behalf of the European Community. Both these accounts made it clear that, as you yourself conclude, the South African Government has failed to respond to our call for a start to genuine dialogue. We were therefore all able to agree that since our meeting in Nassau there had not been the adequate progress by the South African Government that we had been looking for.

On the British side, we reiterated our doubts that general economic sanctions would in fact bring about the internal change in South Africa that we all sought. Others round the table, however, took a different view. They were bent on further action against South Africa in the general belief that only this would move President Botha. In the light of their views as well as our own commitments as a member of the European Community - and the country now holding the Presidency of that organisation - ^{the British} ~~my~~ Government decided on a number of further measures.

First, we said that if, next month, the European Community decided to introduce the measures mentioned in the Hague Communique of 27 June, we would accept and implement them. That would mean that we, along with the EC as whole, would ban imports of coal, iron and steel. (As you know, we have already brought into operation the other measure envisaged by the EC, a ban on the import of gold coins).

Second, we agreed now to introduce a voluntary ban on new investment - the only other measure mentioned in the Hague Communique - and a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. Both of those measures were, of course, mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord.

Our readiness to take these steps was intended to demonstrate Britain's commitment both to the Commonwealth and to the European Community.

Others were prepared to go further. But I am sure that you will recognise that the scale ^{of} Britain's involvement, together with that of Europe, in South Africa means that even a relatively few measures taken by the EC impart a sharper shock than a much longer list of measures taken by the Commonwealth as a whole.

Moreover the particular measures identified by the EC which we have now said we are prepared to accept and

implement are very significant. Their impact is likely to be as great if not greater than that of the measures in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord. South African exports of coal, for example, represent 7% of all South African exports and the European Community takes around half of these. South African exports of iron and steel represent a further 5% of South African exports, of which the European Community takes 10%. By comparison even a worldwide ban on the imports of agricultural products, as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, would involve only some 5% of South African exports. // I think it is also worth making the point that the voluntary ban on new investment which we have agreed to adopt now has a considerable symbolic and practical importance, given Britain's historical role as the largest single provider of investment capital for South Africa. No other Commonwealth country even begins to approach Britain in this regard as an investment source. Similarly the voluntary ban on tourism means much more in the case of Britain than of any other Commonwealth country, since traditionally far more people from Britain go to South Africa for holidays.

I very much hope that it will be recognised that the undertakings which Britain has now given are both significant and fully consistent with our objectives. These remain unchanged from the Nassau Accord: we want, above all, to bring about the promotion of dialogue and the suspension of violence on all sides, since it is

only through negotiation that the South African problem can finally be resolved.


I naturally share your concern for Commonwealth unity. I believe that the agreement we reached at Marlborough House demonstrates that the Commonwealth has the strength and maturity to accommodate the legitimate differences of view that may arise from time to time among its members. A mutual respect for each others' views and interests must be a necessary part of what binds us together. I am glad to record therefore that the seven of us, while regretting the absence of full agreement, nevertheless took the opportunity, as the Communique records, to renew our firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years.


~~With kind regards.~~

R12/8

Peter Munk

12/8
2

COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT  12/8
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE PALL MALL LONDON SW1Y 5HX
TELEPHONE 01-439 3411 CABLES COMSEGEN LONDON SW1



August 8, 1986.

Dear Prime Minister,

I was greatly honoured
that during the Review Meeting you
used my room at Marlborough House.
The more so as in the ordinary way it
is a focus of unproductive and
uncommercial activity of direct
benefit to Commonwealth developing
countries, and of benefit also to
Britain.

In returning it full to your
great responsibilities, I hope you will
experience the least possible discomfort
and inconvenience.

Yours sincerely

Herbert Hoover



1 Pennington Street, London E1 9XN Telephone: 01-481 4100

LETTERS

MRS THATCHER'S DILEMMA

Mrs Thatcher entered the Commonwealth mini-summit at what seemed to be a crucial disadvantage. She had consistently — and in our view rightly — maintained that sanctions would impoverish black South Africans without bringing the end of apartheid appreciably nearer. But it was thought that she would be compelled by Commonwealth pressure to accept a sanctions package and thus be made to look both inconsistent and imprudent.

To resolve that dilemma, the Prime Minister proposed her own sanctions package which was likely to have a far less severe impact, whether on the blacks or on the Botha government, than the measures sought by the six leaders. That did not, of course, mean that it would have no adverse impact at all. Even a voluntary ban on tourism is bound to cause unemployment among blacks in the hotel and tourist industries.

But Mrs Thatcher, secondly, did not deny the fact. Far from arguing that her sanctions were unique in not being immoral, she candidly admitted that she would not wish to defend their effects upon South African families; that she did not believe they would achieve their object; and that she had proposed them solely as a gesture towards Commonwealth unity.

It is rare for politicians to address difficult topics in so honest a fashion. The Prime Minister's candour contrasts favourably with the unconvincing high-mindedness of her critics. It is hardly credible, for instance, that Mr Bob Hawke should have given no thought whatsoever to the advantages to Australia of sanctions when, within hours of the conference communique, Reuters news agency

was carrying an interview with the marketing director of the Australian joint coal board in which he speculated enthusiastically about the improved prospects for his industry.

Mrs Thatcher's modest concessions did not, of course, achieve their aim of Commonwealth unity on the basis of a compromise package. Nor could they have done. Both the communique and the press conferences have established that the other leaders are publicly committed to the view that sanctions must be progressively increased until Pretoria surrenders. They were not prepared to retreat even slightly from the Nassau measures — and indeed added three additional sanctions.

If the Prime Minister, following the advice of her domestic critics, had publicly accepted the usefulness of sanctions as a weapon against apartheid and offered substantial concessions for the sake of an agreed package, that would have been merely the start. When that package failed, she would have been faced with equal pressure to support a further set of sanctions, and so *ad infinitum*. And having accepted the full logic of sanctions, she would have been ill-placed to resist.

By resisting on this occasion, she perhaps contributed to the disarray and recrimination with which the mini-summit ended. But the alternative was a bogus unity based upon an unsound policy that merely postponed the recriminations. And the meeting did register some useful gains. It established, for instance, that the Commonwealth does not always have to reach unanimous agreement on thorny questions of international politics. It can agree to differ. Commonwealth countries, including Britain,

can debate their mutual concerns with a healthy concern for self-interest.

The argument now moves from the Commonwealth to Europe and the US. Whatever package of sanctions emerges in America is likely to be a compromise between President Reagan and Congress. The Reagan administration will almost certainly wish to ensure that any concessions it makes are in line with British policy.

Similarly, in European discussions Mrs Thatcher will have the general support of Germany and France in shaping an acceptable set of measures. Her pledge not to veto or oppose a European sanctions package must be read in the light of that fact.

Since the Commonwealth communique declares that its sanctions should be part of wider international action, Britain is in a strong position to influence whatever is finally agreed between all the parties. Mrs Thatcher should use that influence to ensure that the final package includes positive measures to improve black housing, education and employment prospects in South Africa — thus undermining apartheid rather than simply shouting at it.

That debate is unlikely to be finally resolved. Even if the Botha government were to make the concessions currently demanded, to release Nelson Mandela and unban the ANC, both the Commonwealth advocates of harsh measures and the European supporters of diplomacy and positive intervention would claim credit — and President Botha would deny that outside factors had influenced him at all. In those unlikely circumstances, however, there would be more than enough credit to go round.

OILPOLITIK

A week is a long time in oil politics. But Opec ministers who took that long to reach their new deal at Geneva, must

A more profitable outlook for oil would encourage future investment in the North Sea. But the emergency repair job

of 1.2 million. It is significant partly because it recognizes the truth that Baghdad would never have agreed to cut back

Substitutes for nu

From Mr John G. Kapp
Sir, Your leader (July 31) is right that Sizewell has inescapably become a measure of political commitment to the future of the British nuclear industry, on which the Cabinet should make up its mind. However I think that you are wrong to say that "the British people ... have not yet turned against civil nuclear power in any electorally clear-cut way" since a Gallup poll in May showed 75 per cent against, and only 18 per cent for, and all but the Tory party have publicly declared their opposition.

Most thinking people are naturally worried about building Sizewell, and would prefer alternatives which reduce the risks and increase the benefits. Although conservation has been Government policy, with all-party support, since 1973, its proportion of capital investment has so far been tiny.

Spending the £2 billion earmarked for Sizewell on freely insulating the 10 million unlagged hot water tanks and attics in Britain could save the equivalent energy output of eight Sizewells, knock £1 billion a year off the national fuel bill, reduce fuel poverty and pollution, and create a quarter of a million jobs for a year.

Yours faithfully,
JOHN G. KAPP,
55 Hove Park Road,
Hove, Sussex.
July 31.

From Professor Ian Fells, FEng
Sir, It is anticipated that the £8 billion flotation of British Gas will take place in the autumn. For once, instead of pouring the "windfall" into the "housekeeping", as we did with the North Sea oil revenues, would

National Gallery

From Sir Denis Mahon, FBA
Sir, You conclude your leader on the future of the National Gallery (August 4) by justifiably stressing the role which contributions in cash or in kind from the private sector could play in supplementing the public funds very properly devoted to a nationally-owned institution of this kind.

Since the recent spectacularly generous gifts of Sainsbury and Getty moneys are evidently, as you imply, quite exceptional benefactions, it still remains necessary to give positive encouragement to substantial private participation of a more regular kind, even though at a relatively low level.

There is little doubt, however



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 August 1986

From the Secretary of State

Dear Colleague

*W
7/8*

It may be helpful if I let you have a summary of the Government's view of the outcome of the recent Commonwealth Review Meeting on South Africa.

The meeting provided what the Prime Minister described at her press conference as:

"a further substantial demonstration of our collective disapproval of the indefensible system of apartheid".

We agreed there had not been the adequate concrete progress called for at Nassau, and that indeed the situation in South Africa had deteriorated. Although there were different opinions on the likely effectiveness of further measures in producing internal change, the British Government demonstrated our commitment to the Commonwealth and the European Community by agreeing to follow the measures suggested at The Hague Summit and to take additional voluntary action. The meeting reached agreement on how, in our different ways, we should register our abhorrence of apartheid and the urgent need for further reform in South Africa.

/ I attach a copy of the communique, which lists the measures agreed by the six and those agreed by Britain. Those agreed by Britain represent a very considerable step, since the trading and economic importance of Britain and her /European



European partners for South Africa is much greater than that of other Commonwealth countries. For example, coal represents 7% of South African export earnings, and Europe takes about half of these exports.

These measures will be discussed within the EC in September, and the other Commonwealth governments will follow up their proposals over a similar or longer timescale. In the meantime the British Government will stay in touch with the other major industrialised nations, particularly the United States and Japan.

We remain committed to securing progress through negotiations rather than through violence in South Africa. We will continue to use a combination of persuasion with sustained pressure for change. But there is little prospect of progress while the South African Government remains hostile to efforts at conciliation, and inflexible in its approach to dialogue with black leaders within South Africa. We seek not the destruction of the South African economy but the establishment of a non-racial representative government in South Africa.

Yours truly
Geoffrey Howe

GEOFFREY HOWE

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING
LONDON, 3-5 AUGUST, 1986

COMMUNIQUE

As agreed at Nassau last October, our Meeting was held in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa. At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau. We reaffirmed, in particular, the united belief we expressed in the Accord that "apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end".

2. At our request the Co-Chairmen of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (EPG), General Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr. Malcolm Fraser, introduced the report of the EPG and answered the many questions we put to them. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who undertook a mission to Southern Africa in his capacity as President of the Council of Ministers of the EEC, also briefed us on the results of his mission.

3. The Report of the EPG, Mission to South Africa, was the central document at our discussions. That unanimous Report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa. We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end apartheid and establish a non-racial and representative Government in South Africa. We particularly commend the EPG's 'negotiating concept' and deeply regret its rejection by the South African Government.

4. At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa. It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring about concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing apartheid dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.

5. As envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation. We are profoundly disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency". Nelson Mandela and other

political leaders remain in prison. A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed; the ANC and other political parties are still banned. Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that "at present there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative Government". We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.

6. We receive the Group's findings with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work, terminated its efforts for peaceful change. We continue to believe with the EPG that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end. It is clearly established that the situation in South Africa constitutes a serious threat to regional peace and security.

7. It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for there. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.

8. Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change. We acknowledge that the Commonwealth cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.

9. We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.

10. In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in para. 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures. But we have looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere. In deciding on the adoption of further measures, we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect they should be part of a wider programme of international action.

11. The British Government's position is set out in

paragraph 12. The rest of us have agreed as follows:

- (a) The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.
- (b) We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider international community for urgent adoption and implementation:
 - (i) all the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:
 - a) a ban on air links with South Africa,
 - b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa,
 - c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa,
 - d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa,
 - e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa,
 - f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa,
 - g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and
 - h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
 - (ii) the following additional measures:
 - i) a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors,
 - j) a ban on the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and
 - k) the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own nationals and nationals of third countries to whom we render

consular services.

- (c) While expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned in paragraph 12 below.
- (d) We feel, however, that we must do more. We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

12. The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will:

- (i) put a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa
- (ii) put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
- (iii) accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins from South Africa.

13. As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action, we have requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from our Governments, to co-ordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

14. We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps for which we called in paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ready to review the situation and to rescind the measures we have adopted if appropriate; and to contribute in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.

15. On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even these further measures have not had the desired effect,

still further effective measures will have to be considered. We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve. Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation, or otherwise will activate that resolve.

16. Regretting the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven Governments will keep the situation under review with the view to advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full Heads of Government Meeting, is desirable. We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously. We believe the Commonwealth must retain its capacity to help to advance the objectives of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.

17. Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years. We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.

SUBJECT
CC MASTER
O.P.S

file

8/86



cc FCO
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T148/86

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 August 1986

Dear Sir Lynden.

I should like to congratulate you upon your most skilful and effective chairmanship of the Commonwealth Review Meeting. I am most grateful for all you did to ensure a fruitful discussion and an outcome which satisfactorily encompassed the different perspectives of the Commonwealth countries taking part.

I hope that you will have a satisfactory discussion of bilateral issues when you meet Lady Young today.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

The Right Honourable Sir Lynden O. Pindling, K.C.M.G., M.P.

8/86



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

5 August 1986

Dear Secretary-General

I should like to thank you and, through you, all the Commonwealth Secretariat staff for the arrangements made for the Commonwealth Review Meeting at Marlborough House. They were excellent and I am most grateful to all concerned, particularly for their dedication in staying so late on Monday night.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, A.C., Kt., C.M.G., G.C.

sfw

C 10
5/2PRESS CONFERENCE : POINTS TO STRESS

- All countries present had common purpose, end to apartheid as quickly as possible. Total repugnance for apartheid on our part: wish to see replaced as quickly as possible with fair and democratic system.
- In support of that have thought it right to join with partners in adopting certain measures, and declaring willingness to accept certain other measures if acceptable to EC partners.
- Purpose is to impress upon authorities in Pretoria compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and instituting structure of democracy in South Africa.

HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR MIND?

No. Have been willing to take certain measures in the past: now taking some additional ones. No secret do not believe external forces will be critical in removing apartheid, but may perhaps help to jolt the South African Government towards reform. Certainly hope so.

HOW SIGNIFICANT ARE THESE MEASURES?

Not our purpose to destroy South African economy and these measures we have agreed to will not do so. But nevertheless a considerable step, and hope will have sufficient impact to ~~jolt~~ move South African Government.

WHY NOT MORE MEASURES?

Matter of judgement how far to go in order to ^{influence} ~~jolt~~ South African Government without inflicting unacceptable damage on South African economy. Believe our judgement right.

AWKWARD QUESTIONS

1. Is this another "tiny little move" - as you said in Nassau - or a substantial concession on your part?
2. If you don't believe in the efficacy of sanctions why agree to budge at all?
3. If Reagan is forced to move next week are you prepared to march in step? Or is this your last word?
4. What happens if the EC extends its range of measures in September/October?
5. Is the effect of this weekend to underline the declining relevance/importance of the Commonwealth to Britain? Is this the beginning of the end of the Commonwealth?
6. Why allow yourself to be isolated in this way? Or don't you care if you believe you are right? Does principle mean more to you than political popularity?
7. What effect do you think your willingness to compromise have on your Government and party?
8. Is the logic of your position that you will say "Well, don't blame me. I told you so" if in 6 months' time we hear of starving black miners' families in South Africa?
9. How are you going to pursue the EC Mission?
10. Have you any reason to hope that Botha will introduce further reforms in the EC timescale?

11. Have you ever contemplated the carrot approach inherent in Senator Lugar's plans - ie measures would cease to take effect if Botha introduced some or all of a list of specified measures?

SECRET

4

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING

DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

Our Meeting was held, as agreed at Nassau last October, in the special context of the crisis in Southern Africa. At the outset of our discussions we specifically reaffirmed our commitment to the Commonwealth Accord on Southern Africa which, with our other colleagues, we had concluded at Nassau. We reaffirmed, in particular, the united belief we expressed in the Accord that "apartheid must be dismantled now if a greater tragedy is to be averted, and that concerted pressure must be brought to bear to achieve that end".

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Report has commanded attention worldwide as pointing the way forward for South Africa and for the world in relation to South Africa. We warmly commend the Group's work which has made a positive and enduring contribution to the efforts to end apartheid and establish a non-racial and representative Government in South Africa. We particularly commend the EPG's 'negotiating concept' and deeply regret its rejection by the South African Government.

4. At Nassau, the Commonwealth unanimously adopted a common programme of action which included a number of economic measures against South Africa. It was our collective hope that those measures and the efforts of the EPG to promote a process of dialogue in South Africa would, within six months, bring about concrete progress towards our objectives of seeing apartheid dismantled and the structures of democracy erected in South Africa.

5. As envisaged in the Accord, we have reviewed the situation. We are ^{profoundly} disappointed that the authorities in Pretoria have taken none of the five steps which at Nassau we called on them to take "in a genuine manner and as a matter of urgency". Nelson Mandela and other political leaders remain in prison. A new and more widely repressive emergency has been imposed and political freedom more rigorously curtailed; the ANC and other political parties are still banned. Beyond these, however, it has been a matter of deep concern to us that the EPG after its most patient efforts has been forced to conclude that "at present

there is no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid and no present prospect of a process of dialogue leading to the establishment of a non-racial and representative Government". We had looked at Nassau for the initiation by Pretoria of a process of dialogue in the context of a suspension of violence on all sides. Instead, as the EPG found, the cycle of violence and counter-violence has spiralled.

6. We receive their findings with disappointment, and deplore the conduct of the South African Government whose actions, including the raids on neighbouring countries at a crucial moment of the EPG's work, terminated their efforts for peaceful change. We continue to believe with them that the cycle of violence in South Africa must end. *It is clearly established that the situation in Southern Africa is a result of apartheid.*

7. It is thus clear to us that since our meeting in Nassau there has not been the adequate concrete progress that we looked for there. Indeed, the situation has deteriorated.

8. Accordingly, in the light of our review and of our agreement at Nassau, we have considered the adoption of further measures against the background of the EPG's conclusion that the absence of effective economic pressure on South Africa and the belief of the South African authorities that it need not be feared are actually deferring change. We, acknowledge that the Commonwealth

cannot stand by and allow the cycle of violence to spiral, but must take effective concerted action.

9. We are agreed that one element of such action must be the adoption of further measures designed to impress on the authorities in Pretoria the compelling urgency of dismantling apartheid and erecting the structures of democracy in South Africa.

10. In doing so, we have looked particularly at the measures listed in para. 7 of the Accord which some of us at Nassau had already indicated a willingness to include in any consideration of further measures. But we have looked as well to other measures under consideration elsewhere. In deciding on the adoption of further measures, we recognise that if they are to have maximum effect they should be part of a wider programme of international action.

11. The British Government's position is set out in paragraph 12. The rest of us have agreed as follows:

(a) The adoption of further substantial economic measures against South Africa is a moral and political imperative to which a positive response can no longer be deferred.

(b) We ourselves will therefore adopt the following measures and commend them to the rest of the Commonwealth and the wider

international community for urgent adoption and implementation:

(i) all the measures listed in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord, namely:

a) a ban on air links with South Africa,

b) a ban on new investment or reinvestment of profits earned in South Africa,

c) a ban on the import of agricultural products from South Africa,

d) the termination of double taxation agreements with South Africa,

e) the termination of all government assistance to investment in, and trade with, South Africa,

f) a ban on all government procurement in South Africa,

g) a ban on government contracts with majority-owned South African companies, and

h) a ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and

(ii) the following additional measures:

i) a ban on all new bank loans to South Africa, whether to the public or private sectors,

j) a ban on ^{the} import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa, and

k) the withdrawal of all consular facilities in South Africa except for ^{citizens of third countries} our own nationals ~~and others~~ to whom we render consular services.

(c) While expressing both concern and regret that the British Government does not join in our agreement, we note its intention to proceed with the measures mentioned in paragraph 12 below.

(d) We feel, however, that we must do more. We look beyond the Commonwealth to the wider international community. We will, therefore, immediately embark on intensive consultations

within the international community with a view to securing concerted international action in the coming months, our emphasis being on those countries that presently sustain a significant level of economic relations with South Africa.

12. The British Government, while taking a different view on the likely impact of economic sanctions, declares that it will:

- (i) put a voluntary ban on new investment, *in South Africa*
- (ii) put a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, and
- (iii) accept and implement any EEC decision to ban the import of coal, iron, and steel and of gold coins *from South Africa.*

13. As a further element of our collective commitment to effective action, we have requested the Secretary-General, with assistance from our Governments, to co-ordinate the implementation of the agreed measures and to identify such adjustment as may be necessary in Commonwealth countries affected by them.

14. We renew the call we made at Nassau on the authorities in Pretoria to initiate, in the context of a

suspension of violence on all sides, a process of dialogue across lines of colour, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial ^{and} representative government in a united and non-fragmented South Africa. If Pretoria responds positively to this call and takes the other steps for which we called in paragraph 2 of the Nassau Accord, we stand ^{to review the situation and} ready to rescind the measures we have adopted ^{if- irresponsible;} and to contribute in all ways open to us, to an orderly transition to social, economic and political justice in South Africa and to peace and stability in Southern Africa as a whole.

15. On the other hand, we are equally mindful of our further commitment at Nassau that if in a reasonable time even these further measures have not had the desired effect, still further effective measures will have to be considered. We trust that the authorities in Pretoria will recognise the seriousness of our resolve. Acts of economic or other aggression against neighbouring states by way of retaliation or otherwise will activate that resolve.

16. Regretting the absence of full agreement but recognising that the potential for united Commonwealth action still exists, we agree that the seven Governments ^{will} ~~should~~ keep the situation under review with the view to ^a advising whether any further collective Commonwealth action, including a full Heads of Government Meeting, is desirable. We are conscious that the situation in South Africa may evolve rapidly and dangerously. We believe the Commonwealth must retain its capacity to help to advance the objectives

of the Nassau Accord and be ready to use all the means at its disposal to do so.

17. Meeting in London at a time of heightened strains within our association, we take the opportunity to renew our own firm commitment to the future of the Commonwealth and to the aims and objectives which have guided it over the years. We are fortified in this renewal by the spirit of frankness in friendship which characterised our discussions and our belief that they have helped to light a common path towards fulfilment of our common purpose, namely, the dismantling of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial and representative government in South Africa as a matter of compelling urgency.

mt

SECRET

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SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

cc Mr Powell, No 10 ✓
Mr Culshaw, FCO
Sir Patrick Wright, FCO
Mr Fergusson, FCO
Mr Reeve, FCO
Mr Anderson, MAFF
Mrs Morris, MAFF
Mr Titchener, DTI

Commonwealth Review Meeting on South Africa

This minute records the advice I gave to Mr Powell at 1600 today, after he had told me that a ban on imports of sugar from South Africa had been proposed in the Commonwealth Review Meeting. I consulted the FCO and the MAFF, as well as the European Secretariat here.

2. I told Mr Powell that:-

a. The European Community and the United Kingdom do not import sugar from South Africa.

b. A ban on imports to the United Kingdom would be legal only on a Community basis, probably under Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. It would take effect by means of a regulation on the basis of a Commission proposal which would apply directly in all member states. No national legislation would be required. The public policy exception, which in certain circumstances may allow national as distinct from Community action, could not apply in this case.


CONFIDENTIAL

c. We would therefore need, if we accepted this idea, to make clear that a ban could take effect in the United Kingdom only if the Community took action. This could be done by adding a sentence at the end of a passage in the communique on the Commonwealth Review Meeting about our not standing in the way of implementation by the Community of the measures identified at the European Council in June. Such a sentence might read:

"The United Kingdom is also prepared to support similar measures to ban imports of sugar from South Africa." On reflection, I think that "similar measures" would better read "on a similar basis".

d. The reaction of the people concerned with sugar in the Community to the idea of a ban on imports from South Africa would probably be that it was economically meaningless but acceptable if there were overriding political reasons.

3. DTI would not like a ban on sugar imports, for GATT reasons, but would live with it.


C L G MALLABY

4 August 1986

PRIME MINISTER

OK to file
original returned
to Press

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE - MEDIA

This note is written against the eventuality that there is agreement tonight and that you will need to present it immediately.

The first obvious point is the time factor. You are the only head of Government playing to a domestic audience and up against media deadlines. Consequently, you will need to be flexible where you give your press conference. We are going into alternatives in consultation with the police.


Second, it will be very important, having got a press conference out of the way, to do the full range of radio and television, including breakfast television.

The press conference will be difficult - but it will be torn between some grudging admiration of your stand and for what you have done to the Commonwealth.

There will also be questions on the effect of this weekend, and the Commonwealth's failure to agree a single package, on South Africa's morale.

I have not attempted to argue the "blockbuster" nature of the ban on iron, coal and steel imports while at the same time discounting the effect of sanctions on the South African Government. It is very difficult to make the two add up with the media.

Attached is a draft speaking note and a list of awkward questions - both intended as a stimulant at this incomplete stage of the proceedings.



BERNARD INGHAM
4 August 1986

PRIME MINISTER

You have probably got it in mind, but Bernard and I both feel that you should continue to push hard for a conclusion tonight. Both because it offers the best prospect of a satisfactory outcome, and because it will present well.

I am getting in touch with Chancellor Kohl or his staff in Austria to say that we are now likely to implement the investment and tourism ban.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell

4 August 1986

Prime Minister

CD

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE BUFFET LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER ON MONDAY, 4 AUGUST 1986

The Prime Minister

His Excellency Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda

President of the Republic
of Zambia

The Hon. Luke Mwananshiku

Foreign Minister

Rt. Hon. Sir Lynden Pindling

Prime Minister of
The Bahamas

His Excellency the High Commissioner for The Bahamas

The Hon. Robert G. Mugabe, MP

Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

The Hon. Dr. W.M. Mangwende

Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Hon. Robert Hawke, MP

Prime Minister of Australia

Mr. J. Bowan

Principal Private Secretary
Prime Minister's Office

Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, PC, MP

Prime Minister of Canada

Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, MP

Secretary of State for
External Affairs

Shri Rajiv Gandhi

Prime Minister of India

Shri P. Shiv Shanker

Minister of External
Affairs and Commerce

Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP

His Excellency the Commonwealth Secretary General

Chief Emeka Anyaoku

Deputy Secretary General

Sir Robert Armstrong

Mr. Charles Powell

HE The High Commissioner for
The Bahamas

Sir Robert Armstrong

Chief Emeka Anyaoku

The Hon. Dr. W.M. Mangwende

Rt. Hon. Joe Clark

HE Commonwealth Secretary-
General

The Hon. Robert G. Mugabe

The Hon. Robert Hawke

PRIME MINISTER

Rt. Hon. Sir Lynden Pindling

HE Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda

Shri Rajiv Gandhi

Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney

Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe

Shri P. Shiv Shanker

The Hon. Luke Mwananshiku

Mr. J. Bowan

Mr. Charles Powell

ENTRANCE

Daily Mail COMMENT

When the bluffing has to stop

TOO OFTEN the Commonwealth stage is dominated by the cavorting of those two ugly sisters: Humbug and Bluff. Threats to pull-out should be treated with a sceptical yawn. Nor need we lose too much sleep over sanctions lectures from those who have little to lose.

But having said that, these wet and windy gatherings of this most exasperating club do retain some value.

There is, for example, no counterfeiting the intensity of passion roused by apartheid in leaders as different in temperament as the excitable Kenneth Kaunda, the sibilant Robert Mugabe or the quiet and sad-eyed Ravi Gandhi.

It is a question of colour. That is because the essence of the evil in South Africa is not poverty or cruelty (there are many regimes in modern times with hands bloodier than those of the Boers).

The heart of the matter is the race tyranny of a white minority over a black majority.

To be sure, this Commonwealth mini-summit cannot be allowed to dictate to Britain what further measures we should take to put pressure on President Botha. That can only be decided after we have also consulted our own best interests and our partners in Europe, together with the United States and Japan.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth—for all its faults and for all the less-than-democratic ways of many of its non-white members—does remain a unique multi-racial association of countries, both poor and rich.

Our future economic development and influence in the world may now be far more with Europe than with the Commonwealth. But we must not forget how the other half lives and thinks and feels. Especially when the other half is black and brown and when South Africa is the issue of the moment.

On the other side

THERE he lay in the street. Kicked, punched and stabbed; an off-duty policeman, the blood-stained victim of

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE. Do you have a complaint against a hospital or doctor? We can advise and, where appropriate, fight for disclosure of your case notes and take action. If you have no case, we will tell you and hopefully at least set your mind at rest. First consultation and assessment is free of charge. Telephone Graham Ross & Co., Solicitors. 051 647 6128.

● This is the sort of advert (left) which is putting British surgeons (right) under even more pressure

Risks today's doctor can

DR MAURICE BURROWS tells the story for effect not laughs. An American friend went into hospital for a routine operation. He could have gone home that night but decided to stay the weekend.

When he got home a letter from a local lawyer was already waiting. Clearly, it said, the extended stay indicated something had gone wrong. How about suing?

It illustrates, says Dr Burrows, head of a British Medical Association working party, not some piece of Stateside fantasia, but the future this country faces if a new system of dealing with medical malpractice claims isn't found quickly.

In the US, law firms have paid informers inside hospitals to tip them off when something goes wrong. But look what's happening here. My local newspaper is already carrying solicitors' ads touting for business from hospital patients.

Victims

Week the BMA gave approval to a radical new scheme that would automatically compensate victims of medical errors.

Its most dramatic side

The long, painful slog of the law is, at present, the only recourse. Yet the growth of both actions and damages has been astounding. Last year the Medical Defence Union which insures doctors saw legal costs and pay outs rise by 43 per cent. The size of awards made by British courts is now nearing the breathtaking level of American settlements with two recent pay outs of over £600,000.

Tory MP Michael McNair-Wilson believes that despite the Government's ideological dislike of public funding, the 'no fault' system may have to be accepted as an alternative to chaos.

The present system is a public scandal, he said. 'People are having to wait six or seven years for their claims to be settled in court. It's going to get worse.'

In the US doctors are resorting to what's called 'defensive medicine' which means vast numbers of extra tests and precautions simply to reduce the chances of being sued.

I estimate the cost of the 'no fault' scheme at around £25 million a year. Considering doctors' insurance premiums (which the public ultimately pays for) the public ultimately pays for



by
WILLIAM



SECRET

Plan H
(S/M) 3

1. UK position at first session was assisted by Geoffrey Howe's presentation which carried conviction on anti-apartheid sentiment and rejection of genuine intention on part of Pretoria to make fundamental change. Mrs. Thatcher did not help, however, by excessively defensive attitude towards Botha regime and, afterwards, by repudiating Chairman's press briefing that on the strength of joint conclusions of EPG and Howe, meeting had accepted that there was at present 'no genuine intention on the part of Pretoria to dismantle apartheid'. Howe did specifically agree in meeting that he shared EPG view on this.

Mulroney made impassioned pro-sanctions statement which clearly irritated Mrs. Thatcher and produced instant reaction from her and warning of rebuttal tomorrow. All this may undo the good impression Howe created. Overall, signals from Mrs. Thatcher at first Session have confirmed others in belief that she does not contemplate any significant move in their direction. If this is confirmed tomorrow, six are likely to concentrate on what they can do together and can persuade US, Japan and Europe to do with the Commonwealth.

2. EEC measures are being presented simply as a ban of coal, iron and steel imports. This is not seen as stronger than paragraph 7 measures and will be further devalued if UK position on them is in terms of postdated cheque.

SECRET

3. Kaunda idea of "Monitoring Committee" does not provide a basis for compromise over timing. In conception it assumes UK commitment to at least some significant measures.

4. Among para. 7 measures (a), (b) and (c) are all regarded as important. Ban on air links is seen as being reinforced by recent OAU resolution calling on African countries to sever air links with South Africa. India also sees scope for banning air links with countries that maintain air links with South Africa. The ban on new investment is seen as an important governmental statement despite greatly reduced investment flows. Ban on agricultural products is much favoured by ANC and will be seen by blacks as a significant measure of support. Ban on private sector loans (originally in Nassau List and now covered by Lugar Bill) will also be given some priority. Overall, however, para 7 measures are seen as fulfilment of Nassau expectations and has important political justification on this basis as underscored at first Session by Mulroney.

5. Ban on air links does contemplate feeder routes but both Zambia and Zimbabwe will terminate flights. Concerted international action, even without UN Security Council Resolution, is believed sufficient to deter Swiss Air; Indian-type retaliation against airlines maintaining air links with South Africa would in any case be expected to deter at least the Swiss.

SECRET

- 3 -

There is little sympathy for the UK opposition to ban on air links based on BA's loss of earnings. Apart from other factors most believe BA's business can be maintained through adjusted flights to neighbouring countries fed by overland traffic from South Africa.

6. There are no signs whatever of divisions between Zambia and Zimbabwe save in respect of Mugabe's conviction that Kaunda is wrong in talking of leaving the Commonwealth.

✓

PRESS CONFERENCE BY SIR LYNDEN PINDLING - 3.8.86

There was a review of the situation on the South African question in Nassau. Point 1 in that review was a report from the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group. Making that report were the co-Chairman Mr Malcom Fraser and General Obasanjo. The meeting also heard from Sir Geoffrey Howe who reported on recent visits to Southern Africa. We then moved on to part B in the review and that was whether any adequate progress had been made in South Africa since ^{the meeting of} the Heads of Government in Nassau in 1985. It was significant that Heads of the Meeting agreed readily that adequate progress had not been made and as far as the viewpoint of those who had visited South Africa in the interim was concerned there was no genuine intention on the part of the South African Government to dismantle apartheid. That was essential to the meeting which is taking place. As you will recall we had agreed ^{in Nassau} last year that this review meeting would take place. We at that time said 6 months now 8 months have passed that this review meeting would have taken place in order to determine what progress if any had been made in South Africa with a view to bringing about peaceful change and the installation of ^a democratic system ^{based} of freedom, justice and equal rights. Today was not a day for startling conclusions having now settled the agenda and having agreed that no adequate progress has been made in South Africa over the last few months. We have suspended our sitting until tomorrow morning ^{at half past nine} when we would get down to the business of determining and considering ^{further} what measures might be taken by the Commonwealth in respect of the situation in South Africa. We have essentially covered the highlights of today there may be one or two questions that you would have so I will be available for just a few.



Prime Minister
CDD
4/P.

PM/86/051

PRIME MINISTER

Commonwealth Review Meeting

1. Following this afternoon's opening session, and our subsequent discussion at Number 10, I offer some further personal thoughts about how to play our hand tomorrow.

2. Our starting point is that we want the outcome which will be best for British interests. This will not be easy to achieve, given the way some of the other participants have approached the meeting. It is clear that real suspicion still persists about our motives - above all about the strength of our commitment to secure an end to the political domination that is the heart of apartheid. If Britain continues to be mistrusted in that way, that will make it much less likely that the movement we can offer will prove sufficient, especially if offered too late in the day.

/3.



3. But there is, in fact, much common ground between all the participants. We all accept that the South African Government has not since Nassau made adequate progress towards the objectives stated. No one is yet calling for comprehensive or mandatory sanctions. And, as you have already hinted to Gandhi and Pindling, we are all prepared to concede that some further measures should now be set in train: the crucial and difficult judgement is what combination of measures is best judged to produce the desired effect.

4. We should be ready to accept, to emphasise and to build on this common ground. We should underline from the outset that we genuinely share the objective of keeping up the pressure on Pretoria. The tone will be important: over-emphasis by us on balancing or mitigating factors will arouse suspicion even if the points are valid. Kaunda is not the only person round the table who believes we are still "kissing apartheid". For the same reason we must avoid any arguments which might seem to resemble those in P W Botha's defensive brief (for example, that other African regimes have shortcomings; or that racial discrimination is found outside South Africa too). Such arguments are not relevant in the context of this meeting: we have all agreed that the South African system is evil and must change, and that external pressure has played, and can play, a part in achieving this.

5. Hence my conclusion (see again paragraphs 5(a) to (e) of my last minute) that it will be wise to say early on that we shall move without at that stage underlining how limited our room for movement is. Once discussion of possible measures has run a reasonable time, and the principle of compromise over details has been established, we can begin quietly to make plain why there are certain measures which we are not able to accept.



6. In course of this argument (and after an acceptable package has been agreed) we should not seek to diminish the importance of the measures. On the contrary, we want to take advantage of the point offered by Mulroney and emphasize the extent to which action by the UK, in concert with EC partners, is effective. We need to make it clear too that we shall not play down the outcome of the meeting when briefing the press. That would undo whatever good is achieved by reaching agreement. The measures must not be described as signals or gestures. We should resist the temptation to say that we argued against the measures: that too could all too easily be seen as a last ditch stand in Pretoria's defence. Nor should we argue in public that they will not work - whatever our private doubts may be. Above all we must not contrast the paucity of the measures taken with the broad range for which others pressed.

7. I am convinced that this approach is the one that is most likely to succeed in

- reassuring the meeting of our good faith in wanting to end apartheid;

- establishing a position which we have a chance of holding through to the next regular CHOGM and beyond;

- showing the South African Government that they must accelerate the pace of change;

- safeguarding British interests as a whole.



8. I am copying this minute to Robert Armstrong only.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

3 August 1986

DRAFT OPENING STATEMENT

This meeting of the Commonwealth to review the Nassau Accord has ended with a further substantial demonstration of our collective disapproval of the indefensible system of apartheid.

The signal comes immediately before the National Party conference in South Africa, and my hope is that it will not fall on deaf ears.

It comes after a difficult conference. Our discussions have been very frank, indeed very blunt.

But, notwithstanding all the plain speaking, we have been able to reach agreement on how, in our different ways, we should register our abhorrence of apartheid and the urgent need for further reform in South Africa.

During our discussions I made a number of points:

- First, I very much hoped that no one would suggest that the British Government is soft on apartheid; it hasn't been and it isn't going to be. The system is just plain wrong, and must go.

- Second, the rest of the Commonwealth, whatever it might choose to do, has relatively little impact compared with the jolt that Britain even alone or with the European Community in concert with other industrialised countries might do. Moreover, some of us as members of other groups - in our case the European Community - have legal obligations to those groups. For example, we can only move on trade matters if the European Community as a whole agrees to move with us.

Third, I remain profoundly unconvinced, however, that further sanctions will have a positive effect on South Africa. On the contrary, I very much fear they will be counter-productive for, to repeat, there is no evidence from recorded history of sanctions changing a country's internal policies. Nor would I care to defend sanctions in the face of unemployment, poverty and famine among black families in South Africa where, it should be remembered, there is no social security welfare.

It was, however, perfectly clear that others around the table took a different view. They were bent on further action against South Africa in the belief that only this would move President Botha.

It was in this situation that I decided to reveal my hand this morning.

I said that if in the autumn the European Community decided to introduce the measures mentioned in The Hague Communique about six weeks ago, I would not stand in their way. That would mean that we, along with the EC as a whole, would ban imports of coal, iron and steel over and above a ban on the import of gold coins which we have already brought into operation.

I also said that I was prepared to agree to introduce a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa, the only other measure mentioned in The Hague communique; and also a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa, which is mentioned in the Nassau Accord.

That, I made clear, was what I thought we should do as a further mark of disapproval of apartheid and as a

demonstration of my concern for solidarity in the Commonwealth and the European Community. And that is where I stood in subsequent discussions.

My Commonwealth colleagues recognised that this was the limit of Britain's further movement. They therefore decided, as they are entitled to do, to implement all the measures mentioned in the Nassau Accord and some others.

In the meantime we shall, as presidents of the European Community, pursue our mission which has nearly 2 months still to run.

I continue to believe that the goal of racial equality in South Africa will be reached in the end by negotiation.

It is that goal, in the context of a suspension of violence, which I seek - racial justice with peace, not amid an economic wasteland but the growing prosperity which a multi-racial South Africa could enjoy.

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

3 August 1986

File 4/10
over PC
SUBJECT
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From the Private Secretary

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF
INDIA

The Prime Minister saw Mr. Gandhi this morning for some 40 minutes. The Indian Foreign Minister and Mr. Gharekhan were also present.

The Prime Minister said that she was grateful to Mr. Gandhi for the restrained tone of his public statements. It was important to avoid posturing which would only make the Review Meeting more difficult. Remarks attributed to an Indian official about retaliation against the United Kingdom had been very unfortunate. No-one could say where a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation would lead. She had also been distressed to hear talk of a break up of the Commonwealth. Mr. Gandhi interjected that on no account should the Commonwealth be allowed to disintegrate.

The Prime Minister continued that she would be able to move a little at the Review Meeting but would want to be convinced that all Heads of Governments were equally prepared to move. All belonged to different regional groupings and had to take account of their obligations as members. We had already undertaken within the European Community to consider a number of additional measures if there was not tangible progress in South Africa by the end of September. She would not willingly impose such measures: indeed, she recoiled from creating additional poverty and starvation in Southern Africa. But she would acquiesce if need be. She remained convinced that change was inevitable in South Africa and would continue. The biggest forces for change were world opinion, its disapproval of apartheid more manifest every day, and the pressure of the market which saw South African society as unstable. A majority of whites in South Africa wanted change. The task was to manage change so as to avoid an explosion. She believed that the remaining pieces of apartheid legislation would soon disappear. In sum, she was prepared to move, even though some of the measures talked of were deeply repugnant to her and she did not believe that they would bring about change.

/Mr. Gandhi

Mr. Gandhi said that he agreed with many of the points which the Prime Minister had made. There must be no split in the Commonwealth. He did not want to give the impression of 48 Commonwealth countries versus the United Kingdom. But failure to take additional measures would certainly not help the situation in South Africa which was approaching the point of explosion. The Eminent Persons Group were objective and had warned of the need for action now. Commonwealth Heads of Government had appointed them and must rely on their judgement. He would not be seeking an outcome from the Meeting which isolated the United Kingdom. But paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord was on the table and the situation in South Africa was actually worse than it had been at the time of the Nassau meeting. The Commonwealth could not retreat from that. Effective measures must be taken. They must be more than gestures. Measures were essential if moderate blacks were to be given encouragement.

The Prime Minister said that the measures envisaged by the European Community would have considerable impact although most of them were not on the Nassau list. She did absolutely exclude taking one or two of the measures on the list. But she came back to the essential to co-ordinate any measures with all the main industrialised countries. Mr. Gandhi commented that the measures in paragraph 7 of the Nassau Accord would probably have less effect on employment of blacks in South Africa than those envisaged by the European Community. He accepted the need for measures to be co-ordinated with the United States and other industrialised countries although he hoped that the Commonwealth could give a lead in pointing the way ahead.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

3 August 1986

From the Private Secretary

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING
WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE BAHAMAS**

The Prime Minister saw Sir Lynden Pindling for some 45 minutes this morning.

The Prime Minister said that she had three points to make about the mechanics of the Commonwealth Review Meeting. First, she hoped that Sir Geoffrey Howe could be invited to report on his recent visit to South Africa immediately after the co-Chairman of the Eminent Persons Group had spoken. Second, she thought that an effort should be made to finish the Meeting on the Monday evening, working late if necessary. Otherwise momentum would be lost. Thirdly, she hoped that when difficult and sensitive points were broached, Sir Lynden would go into restricted session with Heads of Government only present. Sir Lynden took note of these proposals. He was confident there would be no objection to the Foreign Secretary reporting on his visit at an early point in the proceedings.

The Prime Minister said that she hoped that the meeting would be calm and unemotional. Her intention was to listen carefully in the early stages, so that she could judge whether the possibility of a reasonable outcome existed. She had a certain amount of movement to offer although not very much. The various participants represented different geographical regions and had different viewpoints. The consequences of measures against South Africa would be different for all of them. They all had to take account of their obligations as members of other groups. The Commonwealth must be able to accommodate different interests and show tolerance and understanding. Any measures would need to be coordinated between major industrialised countries if they were to have any effect. To sum up the position, she remained convinced that comprehensive punitive sanctions would not work. But the United Kingdom had been taking measures against South Africa for a number of years, had adopted further measures at Nassau and recognised the need to give visible evidence of disapproval of the apartheid system without harming those who we most wished to help. She repeated that she would be able to move a little

file

JADACY
a PCSUBJECT
a Master

but would not want to show her hand too early in the proceedings.

Sir Lynden Pindling said that, on the basis of his contacts to date, no-one appeared to be arguing the case of comprehensive sanctions. Equally moral persuasion alone was not enough. He thought that the "natural" economic sanction of the market had already had some effect. He welcomed the fact that the Prime Minister would be in a position to move a little. He thought that other participants would be ready to do so too. Since the Prime Minister had not been specific about further measures he could not say whether her "little" would be enough. His own over-riding aim as Chairman would be to keep the Commonwealth together. He believed that the Heads of Government would be reasonable and would weigh the issues carefully. It ought to be possible to come to a conclusion which might not be satisfactory to everyone but which they could all live with. So much depended on what the Prime Minister's "little" turned out to be.

The Prime Minister said that a "little" by the United Kingdom was worth a great deal, given that our links with South Africa were far greater than the other participants. But she would not take additional measures with the conviction that they would be effective, only in order to try to preserve Commonwealth unity. Indeed, she thought it immoral to take measures which would increase poverty and starvation in Southern Africa and would have no hesitation in saying publicly that she had advised against such measures. Other Commonwealth Heads of Government must bear the responsibility for inflicting injury upon the very people whom we most wished to help.

Sir Lynden Pindling concluded by saying that Chairmanship of the Review meeting was the most difficult task which he had ever taken on. He could not yet see how the Meeting could reach a satisfactory outcome.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

over Commonwealth sanctions

will keep lowering

FE

regional power... metals available only to sympathisers.

Sanctions against even coal are not assured even within the EEC...

Pretoria has been planning for sanctions for 30 years and has already turned the oil and arms embargoes to its advantage...

Although world disapproval is focused on Pretoria, practical measures from outside to effect change are proving impossible to formulate.

Even if such a bizarre coalition could be formed, South Africa would simply respond, as it has to gold's fall from \$600 to \$350...

The brutal fact is that by virtue of its self-sufficiency, its hold over its neighbours, its control over millions of black "bootlegs" within its borders...

White liberals under pressure

By PETER TAYLOR

AT A WHITE liberal dinner party in Johannesburg a few days ago someone smilingly asked me if I knew of a satirical ditty about South Africa from the TV programme Spitting Image...

You've never met a nice South African And that's not bloody surprising, man, Because we're a bunch of murdering bastards...

The smiles froze, and an outbreak of spluttering ensued. "What the hell do these people know about South Africa... it's just appalling, barring us all with the same brush..."

Another day, I fell into conversation with an elderly African shopkeeper and asked him what he thought of freeing Mandela and talking to the ANC...

In a community as diverse and volatile as the whites of South Africa it is not easy to draw conclusions about mood. But perhaps the author Benin Rockwell comes close in it: "The average white guy—Right, Left or indifferent—is just plain chased off. He hates the Government, he hates everyone. He doesn't mind the black man having a piece in the sun...

Among liberals, there is certainly a great deal of constitutional chatter nowadays. At a public meeting I attended last week, 500 supporters of the Progressive Federal Party packed a suburban civic hall to listen to...

Looked bleak

The only black speaker on the platform, Percy Qobusa, editor of the City Press, received, it seemed to me, an over-generous ovation. Some whites will applaud any black who can string a few sentences together without sounding too strident...

A PERSONAL VIEW

By EDWARD PEARCE

Why Mrs Thatcher is right to be stubborn

THE GUARDIANS of received standard opinion, the editor of Newsnight, the Guardian's Mr Hugo Young, Sir Shridath Ramphal (Order of Excellence), the Liberal Party and indeed the Queen herself, should contemplate a disagreeable proposition: that Mrs Thatcher is right about South Africa.

It is universally agreed by the congregation of the good and judicious, a giant conga stretching from Sir Geoffrey Howe to Bernie Grant, that sanctions in some form must be applied. Not to apply them is to affront the Commonwealth, to devote from an EEC directive, to outrage the Throne, and make the angels cry. It is also certain proof that "as everyone knows," Mrs Thatcher (and the British) are racist plus any two adjectives selected from the recent speeches of President Kaunda.

Am I quite alone in being distinctly weary of the word "racist" used as a short cut in conversation with about as much finesse as Senator McCarthy used the word "Communist"? It is a promiscuous, malfeasant label which brings out pre-emptive embarrassed defences such as "I am no racist but..."

Neither Mrs Thatcher nor this newspaper needs that defence. If anyone is so bigoted as to call a refusal to kick ourselves in the head over sanctions "racist," he is best left in the desert of his own deficient vocabulary.

Mrs Thatcher is against sanctions because she thinks them the humberg which they are. She does not wish to injure the investments we already have in South Africa. Neither does she propose to light matches in a petrol refinery. If that is a stubborn policy it is stubborn in a good cause. Ironically it carries her against her own worst political fault, that of reflexive moralising.

She is now seen, rather to her glory, as the great political immortal. In terms of an H. E. Saterian cartoon, she is "the world statesman who refused to institute sanctions" and is surrounded by a sea of emperied features and cigars slipping from fallen jaws. Except of course that the rational part of the world has no intention of imposing meaningful sanctions anyway.

Are there any takers for the idea of France or Italy striking a high moral tone and passing up with averted eyes any trade we might surrender? "A moral truth," said an American poet "is a hollow tooth, and must be stopped with gold."

So either we are being asked to impose sanctions so draconian that they will have no effect, or we are supposed to do our utmost to injure the whites, the blacks and the British.

And anyway what exactly is it that we are trying to achieve? An accelerated conclusion of the laws sustaining apartheid, six man one vote, or the sort of liberty you wish "our neckties and our matches" that Mrs Mandela promises?

To the extent that it is in any way our business to try to change the laws of another country (and received standard opinion does not ask us to impose sanctions on Russia), how do we get it right?

How do we at once dissuade the policeman with the sjambok



Kaunda: incandescent vanity

and as effectively held back the young man with the can of petrol? What is this laser-technology of diplomacy by which rights are wronged, consciences assuaged, Commonwealth conferences sent happy home and the dead not called into being to redress the balance of the living?

Faced with the lobby sanctions of the great uninvolved countries, the vicarious morality of the rampolling classes and all the possibilities of calling up bloody chaos, Margaret Thatcher does well to be stubborn.

Part of the trouble is the itch to moralise. The British quite like rational self-interest in the way that a man might enjoy the company of a mistress but they keep quiet about it and indulge only spasmodically and guiltily. The French have their bleak little community states frayed in line as satellite dependencies, and so messing, but the British, ill advisedly encouraged by the Mombalton-instructed goodwill of a much loved head of state, treat that agglomeration of tyrannies, reversals and zones of regression which makes up the African part of the Commonwealth with sedulous tenderness.

We are threatened with the break-up of the Commonwealth. It cannot be said too plainly that this placenta of independence is an embarrassment of which we should be rid. The EEC, with all its faults, has a specific set of purposes and is sustained by a treaty going as far as the contracting parties were willing to go; the Commonwealth is all nostalgia and blackmail.

Every Commonwealth conference is an operatic rehearsal with a chorus full of prima-donnas. Mr Kaunda has always reminded me of Maria Callas without the voice; but his incandescent vanity has still to be flattered and assuaged along with that of two dozen other assorted mango dictators.

The moralising on South Africa is something else. It is like the Eastern Question rising again from the textbooks, with South Africa cast as Turkey and a posture guess of people—Sir Shridath, Brian Maloney, David Steel, Michael Buerk and

Mr Heath—lining up to audition for the part of Gladstone. "The unspeakable Turk" was not our business when the rumbling rummy of High Church morality began to thunder against him, nor is South Africa our business now.

South Africa is a tyranny. But in the House of Justice there are many mansions. Nigeria, where military dictatorship alternates with stupefyingly corrupt civilian regimes, one staying pretty corrupt itself, and where the preponderance of Hausa privilege is not safely called racism, is not a morally better country than South Africa. Yet in spite of the civil war and the public executions on the pleasure beaches, one hears no call for the most limited sanctions against Nigeria.

If our relations with the ex-colonies were the rational mix of trade, aid and civility, which it all we need, the mass hound-out of the Commonwealth Games and the absurd bulldozing of Sir Sardaiah would not have occurred.

But we put ourselves in a false, self-flattering position, not the big Denmark with a dodgy economy we actually are, but a nation a bit above other nations, a slightly eternal Force for Good with its moral frontiers on the Himalayas.

The sort of nonsense which Harold Wilson used to talk to fill in time at party conferences appears actually to be the foundation for what is laughingly called our thinking.

But it will not stop either the necklaces or the sjamboks. The only useful, halfway anodyne thing is trade. Trade is benign; it makes most people richer. It has raised black standards of living, it has made people live who would have died. Given time it is the force most likely to bring cautious reformers to power in South Africa. But we are blind not to trade.

We are a sovereign country, also a rather decent, humane country which owes nobody an apology for its treatment of black or brown people. Orwellian decency runs very deep in the British. We can trust ourselves to act honourably without an obligation of cast from the morality graders.

Where we can do no good let us agree with the Prime Minister to abstain from officiously doing harm.

innesty plea: end low executions

By RMAN KIRKHAM, Diplomatic Correspondent

STY International is urging the Nigerian Government to end state executions of offenders in the central state who die slowly repeated shots when firing squads.

A large number of offenders have been executed elsewhere in Nigeria for armed robbery, usually three dead with a single robbery from a single squad.

The offence became a serious problem in Lagos and other southern cities before the death penalty was reintroduced for it in 1984 by the military government of General Mohammed Buhari.

An Amnesty spokesman said in London yesterday: "We are particularly concerned because Nigeria has abolished the death penalty recently for illegal currency dealing and drug smuggling."

The orders for the new type of executions in Niger state were given by the State Governor's office.

Chile Army ponders

The army ponders...

D/Telegraph

STURDAY, AUGUST 2, 1986

Telegraph

01 351 4342 TELE: 2287458
001 472 5838 TELE: 888881

class

in the *Lancet*, manual more likely to die young and the difference is fatalities of income. This, % for Thatcherism. Not, clear why the relationships of health and th should exist at all. e of disease, what mat- ight, is the standard of (surely, on the whole, ment) rather than their

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ate of Directors has come g revelation that it is the try and finance and their y are killing themselves by much of the work is unsec- om motives of Stakhanovite e effect of making them ries and uncaring of their

ad for health and longevity? out it if one is Scottish or ase for others would surely of the small business and racy, contentedly making n shed and generally behav- le of Thatcherite man, free ns of poverty and riches.

ry

ehnuist, who has been n as his next Chief Justice, is public cross-examination in that has become the humili- blood-sports. Last year, we igation of Mr Edwin Meese, allation as Attorney-General he grounds for the tortuously y the FBI proved to be trivial ese, and would appear to be sh Justice Behnuist. He is ned black or Hispanic voters rizona more than two decades ns that he did no more than to challenged such electors about ght not do under the law.

ite confirmation hearings now lish the facts about this and rs, such as whether or not w when he bought a house that wish ownership. This brilliant never broken the law, but his eral establishment. Long after opinion in the United States era of "judicial activism"—in ourt came close to disregarding s eagerness to innovate—seems close. Many people are dis- they are expressing their frus- ht on the future Chief Justice's of the damage this may do to his

High time Mrs Thatcher called the Commonwealth bluff

THE TROUBLE with the coming Commonwealth crisis which can fairly be described as a racing certainty, is that publicity has put the Government in the wrong when its conduct, though clumsy, is rational and long sighted.

South Africa is indeed a harsh, cruel place where things happen which are disgraceful — whippings, shootings, deaths in captivity, and subordination on institutional systematic lines of one lot of people to another lot of people.

An intelligent Afrikaner with a knowledge of his country's history would point out the greater cruelties culminating in the deaths of more than a million people out of a population of six million in the Dislakane, the tribal wars fought before the first white man, Louis Trichardt, crossed the Drakensberg mountains in 1836/37. None of these excuses what the Afrikaners do today. But their actions are lent a certain perspective.

The cruelty of Africa is, after all, not confined either to one decade or one race: Africa as a continent has produced in our own time some of the most melancholy little tyrannies imaginable. But there is no call from the media, the Opposition or (even Sunday newspaper headlines) from the Palace for their expulsion and the mounting of international campaigns of sanctions to reform them. The silence of Sir Sonny Ramphal on non-South African evil is of a profound and oceanic nature.

There is other uncensored oppression within the Commonwealth. Deaths in Gujarat out ran those in the Boer Republic; inter-communal war between Tamils and Sinhalese is the fearful norm in Sri Lanka. They are lamented. A tear brims and is treasured for them. Political action remains unthinkable and unthought.

Yet we come to the Commonwealth Conference with Mrs Thatcher under scrutiny and ready for condemnation: All the stones of St Stephen are piled up at the ready to be cast against Britain, for declining to impose a trade ban which Mrs Thatcher fears might widen imperceptibly in to blockade and jihad.

Of course illusions about the Commonwealth are not confined to Sir Sonny Ramphal and the wilder shores of Fleet Street. The television media have presented a systematic case that any conflict with Commonwealth countries is, by definition and without recourse to argument, an evil, and thus to be avoided. Thatcher Clashes With Christianity would not be a bad portmanteau headline for the message coming out of TV newsrooms in the last few weeks. The existence of the Commonwealth flatters the liberal nostalgic opinion which sees India through soft focus as the just republic of E. M. Forster.



● Moment of unity: Rajiv Gandhi, India's Premier, pours for Mrs Thatcher

Paul Scott and Edwina Mountbatten.

A loser in the real world stakes to long-patronised Italy whose economy now outperforms ours, we cut, like the nation of nostalgic movie makers we are, to our platonic

Imperial nostalgia, not logic, inspires the moralists and sanctioners, argues EDWARD PEARCE

empire. Its faults, from the caste system to those executions in Nigeria which start at the ankles as a firing squad works its way up, are blurred into the notion of a humane community sharing our values, a great if disparate family, a force for something in the world.

"Something" is the word. For the phantom procreancy of the Commonwealth is ruining our judgment. We are calling for strawberries at unreasonable times. We indulge ourselves in the Commonwealth for the

same reason we make endless films about the 1939-45 War.

But above all we let ourselves be bullied by the noisier and most truculent emerging states and readily accept a guilt which is not ours. Other ex-colonial powers have coped better than we have, either by dismissing the past entirely from their minds or by maintaining a cold-bloodedly cynical relationship with former dependencies acknowledging as France always does that "dependence" is the true nature of the tie and that moral uplift, if bodied, will not make soap.

It would be a good idea as we clench our teeth for the ritual abrasion in public and private delivered by the reverse missionaries who have distilled all the sanctimony of the soul-gathering evangelists who taught them, that up with such more we will not put. British dislike of South African internal policy is real and unaffected. But Britain has no interest in destroying the South African whites or in bringing about the dis-economies and unemployment which would represent revolutionary conditions.

We are on the side of reform in South Africa which will not be extracted by peremptory injunction. We are against blockades, against an

economic war to destroy the Afrikaners. The morality that demands this must explain why similar crusades are not to be waged against Ethiopia and Sri Lanka and two dozen others.

Oddly enough if this had been said good and loud at an earlier time and if Mrs Thatcher, so wrong on some issues, so thumpingly right on this one, had been given the fighting support she really deserves, the Commonwealth would have got the message. Most of Sir Sonny's speeches are made off the cuff most of the drum-rolling rhetoric which makes the TV media cringe with guilt is the cynical operation of people who know a soft touch when they see it.

Mrs Thatcher, never mind temporary blips from the pollsters shows every sign of having determined to call the Commonwealth bluff. In our enfeebled country full of nostalgia, this is heroic. We will happily keep the Commonwealth as a friendly association. We would sooner be nice to people than not. But we will follow the policies which seem rational to us. If the Commonwealth does not like them its members must do what they think right. The beginning of wisdom this weekend will be a public refusal to regard tragically a conflict which contains most of the elements of farce.

The safest country

SIR—As a wife who has been fortunate enough to accompany her husband during his work in Saudi Arabia, I do think that people who have never lived in that country should not pontificate on what they obviously do not understand.

The Islamic laws which operate there, have among other things, made Saudi Arabia the safest country in the world in which to live. Businessmen such as those quoted in your article would do well to think of their future business there, before criticising the customs of Islam.

As regards the picture of the Duke and Duchess of York (July 31) which was published, this is not unusual, and while I'm sure no insult was intended to our lovely newly weds, a little less emphasis on sex in this country would not go amiss.

DOREEN CROSBY
Shrewsbury

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The great hotel dilemma

SIR—There are still, surprisingly, people who travel under their own steam and seek out pleasant hotels in tourist areas. Two things, however, can ruin their eccentric holiday-making—coach parties and conferences. Yet both seem dearly loved by hotel-keepers.

Picture a couple arriving at a peaceful hotel with magnificent views. They settle down for a cup of tea or a drink, then a juggernaut road cruiser disgorges a tide of chattering people followed by sounds of luggage. The once-quiet hotel is now invaded by these happy travellers, all newly acquainted and thus swapping family

tenuous documents. After suitable alcoholic intake, the dining room is attacked by the party, and all normal conversation by others is over.

At one time the AA Handbook included a hotel-symbol—"NCP", meaning "No Coach Parties", a blessing to members. But presumably hotel-keepers objected.

Leaving aside the modern mania to confer about everything, why must the confering be done in tourist hotels in the Lake District or the Scottish Highlands? Would no-one confer without this bait? Wouldn't conferences seem more genuine if they occurred in empty colleges or schools?

To the hotel-keeper it is obviously

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By J

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PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

I attach a speaking note setting out the sort of approach which might just work in a restricted session of Heads of Government only.

E.D.P.

CDP

2 August 1986



U. M. M.

We agree that adequate progress has not been made towards dismantling apartheid.

Agree - agreed

Although we do not believe that economic measures



will have the effect desired for them -

indeed will have the opposite effect - we

are prepared to agree some further

measures should be taken as a mark of

disapproval.

I would not myself want to defend publicly publicly

P. Bank loans

- new



U.

Coal Iron Steel

Caravan Justice

the effects which these measures would
have on black families in South Africa:
indeed I would say that I had advised
against them, but they were what the
Commonwealth wanted.

But account must be taken of the constraints of
membership of other groups (in our case
the EC) and the need to co-ordinate
measures, in order to minimise evasion and

prevent others from taking unfair
advantage.

In that precise context, we are prepared to

volunteer now that the United Kingdom will
not stand in the way of the adoption by
the EC of the few specific measures
considered in the communiqué of the Hague
European Council - a voluntary ban on new
investment, and bans on the import of

coal, iron steel and kruggerands.

The jolt which these measures would give South
Africa would far outweigh adoption by the
Commonwealth of the steps listed in the
Nassau Accord.

For that reason, there is no way in which the UK can
be expected also to adopt the additional
measures listed in the Nassau Accord.

We shall already in practice be doing
more than that.

Of course perfectly possible for other Commonwealth
countries to declare their intention to
adopt the Nassau Paragraph 7 measures: and
for these two steps - the UK with the four
European measures (in due course) and the
rest of the Commonwealth with paragraph 7
of the Nassau Accord - to be presented as

a package.

That would be a substantial result from
this meeting.

If we are all interested in a practical result, we
could agree quickly on this approach.
There is really no point in an endless
haggle over individual measures on the
list.

If what we want is a clear and

unmistakeable signal going forth from this
meeting of our strong disapproval of
apartheid and our determination not to
treat South Africa as a 'normal' country
until
~~when~~ apartheid is abolished, then this
offers the best way forward.

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(2)

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Private Secretary

*Mr E Ferguson
Mr Mackenzie
Mr Reed*

*Mr Humphrey
Mr McCooms
1 August 1986*

JL

MAED

HP/8

Dear Prendergast,

I enclose a note on the lines we discussed this morning, and which I believe your Secretary of State subsequently discussed with mine. I hope it may be of some help. If you should need to discuss the subject with me at any time during the weekend my telephone number is Brighton (0273) 26928, or for factual background you could go to Peter Lee telephone number (0734) 428867.

Yours sincerely

H M G STEVENS

COMMONWEALTH MEETING: AIR SERVICES TO SOUTH AFRICA

This paper summarizes the risk to British air services which might arise from Commonwealth action, and tries to identify those approaches which would minimize damage. Annex 1 lists current air services to and from South Africa whilst Annex 2 shows the value of UK services to South Africa and to other countries in Africa which might be at risk.

2. The primary risk is to BA's services between the UK and South Africa. These bring in revenue of approximately £70m per annum and the profit is probably upwards of £10m which would be a serious loss not least in the context of privatisation. Termination of these services would also affect the viability of BA's Nairobi services (which run through to Johannesburg) and those to Harare (one of which runs through to Durban) which together are worth some £45m per annum. The effect of these losses on the balance sheet would be reduced given reasonable time for adjustment and redeployment of the relevant resources.

3. There are also a number of secondary risks:

a. termination of all overflying rights for services to and from South Africa. Strictly speaking this would be contrary to the international obligations of at least some African States who have signed the International Air Services Transit Agreement, and we would be entitled to respond by denying overflight of the United Kingdom. At some cost in terms of passenger loads BA could manage now without overflying rights, and more easily within eight to ten months as they acquire aircraft with longer range capabilities. We should protest, but if that were all that happened we could live with it.

b. African Commonwealth States might sever air links with us because we refused to sever ours with South Africa. The value

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of the air services involved is listed at Annex 2. BCal is probably most at risk in Nigeria and Zambia; but BA could lose valuable services too to Kenya and Zimbabwe. Instant action would be contrary to our ASA treaties, which generally require 12 months notice. The cumulative loss to British airlines would be severe, but if we responded by terminating their air services, the African airlines concerned would also lose their London services which in virtually all cases are their most valuable international link. Given time to think about it they might not necessarily go through with it.

4. A key factor in any ban on air services with South Africa will be the extent of it. If everyone stops services, all lose alike. If the front line States alone are allowed to maintain services we could expect to get a reasonable share of essential South African traffic diverted through Harare, Lusaka and Gaborone. But this calculation depends critically on whether all European countries can be persuaded to join the ban. If some European links are maintained passengers will undoubtedly prefer to change planes in Zurich or Frankfurt, Paris or Luxembourg rather than risk the much greater hassle of having to do so in an African airport. On that basis our airlines would lose virtually the whole of their traffic to European competitors and the effect on South Africa would of course be imperceptible.

5. It has been suggested that the ideal answer might be to ban all South African Airways flights on the assumption that they would not wish to be cut off from the world and would therefore allow our services to continue coming in. But we have no right to withdraw SAA permits on anything other than civil aviation grounds and any withdrawal of an existing operating permit is at risk of challenge in a UK court: the chances of success of such a challenge are much increased whilst the ASA is in force and our ASA with South Africa can only be terminated after 14 months (2 months for consultation plus 12 months for termination). If the ban on South African Airways was not world wide, they would terminate agreements themselves with those countries which proposed to prevent them operating, and concentrate their

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services on those countries where they could continue to operate reciprocally. The option of banning SAA services alone therefore only works if the whole of Europe at least is prepared to act together to terminate their agreements and thus bring pressure to bear on South Africa to accept unreciprocated services by foreign airlines.

6. Gaining time is very important to us for the following reasons:

i. it would be an act of the highest folly for the UK with 10% of all international air services to establish a fashion for terminating air services without due notice on political grounds; we would be highly vulnerable to such action by others in the future.

ii. consultation (2 months) and termination (12 months) would give us time to try to persuade Europe to join in the same action.

[iii. if this were successful the pressure on South Africa could be real enough to be of value in persuading the South Africans to change their policies.]

iv. if no such wide spread international ban on air services could be achieved we would have time to consider whether to withdraw our own notice of termination and risk the loss of air services to a number of African countries or maintain it and lose our South African traffic to countries not maintaining such a ban.

v. whatever the outcome there will be time for airlines to adjust to the changed circumstances

7. In all the circumstances our order of preference for the possible outcomes might be as follows:

i. no action on air services at all pending future meetings of Commonwealth Leaders and/or European leaders to agree a common approach.

ii. action by African Commonwealth countries to ban overflights of aircraft to and from South Africa.

iii. agreement that all Commonwealth countries would take the appropriate steps towards the proper and legal termination of their Air Service Agreements with South Africa and seek to persuade European countries to do the same.

iv. same as (iii) but without reference to European support.

v. agreement that all Commonwealth Governments except the front line States would do so (again better with European support).

vi. illegal termination of services to and from South Africa at an early date.

AIRLINES SERVING SOUTH AFRICA

AFRICA	Frequency/week
<u>Commonwealth</u>	
Botswana	Air Botswana 13. SAA 7.
Kenya	No services by Kenya Airways or SAA but 8 other airlines (European and Israeli) carry local traffic from Kenya to South Africa
Lesotho	Lesotho Air 8
Malawi	Air Malawi 3. SAA 2.
Mauritius	Air Mauritius 3. SAA 5.
Swaziland	Royal Air Swazi 11
Zambia	Zambia Airways 2. SAA 2.
Zimbabwe	Air Zimbabwe 12. SAA 14.
<u>Non-Commonwealth</u>	
Cape Verde Islands	SAA 6 (primarily used as staging pointing for European services)
Comoros Islands	SAA 1
Congo	No services by Air Afrique or SAA but UTA and TAP carry local traffic from Congo to South Africa
Mozambique	LAM (Air Mozambique) 2. SAA 1.
Namibia	SAA 20
Reunion	SAA/UTA joint service 1
Zaire	Air Zaire 5
 EUROPE	
<u>EEC</u>	
Belgium	Sabena 2. SAA 1
Denmark	No services. Scandinavians have terminated all Air Services Agreements and services
France	Air France 2. SAA 1.

W. Germany	Lufthansa 5. SAA 4.
Greece	Olympic 2. SAA 2.
Ireland	No services
Italy	Alitalia 2. SAA 2.
Luxembourg	No services
Netherlands	KLM 2. SAA 2.
Portugal	TAP Air Portugal 4. SAA 3
Spain	Iberia 2. SAA 1.
UK	BA 8. SAA 9 plus 1 to Hong Kong

NON-EEC

Austria	SAA 1
Norway) Sweden)	No services. See Denmark
Switzerland	Swiss Air 3. SAA 2.

OTHER

Commonwealth

Australia	SAA 1 (Qantas operates once weekly to Harare, with SAA connection on to Johannesburg).
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Non-Commonwealth

Brazil	Varig/SAA joint service 1
Taiwan	SAA 1
Israel	El Al 1. SAA 1
USA	SAA 4

VALUE OF AFRICAN ROUTES TO UK AIRLINES**COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES**British Airways Routes

Kenya	£29.8m: year to July 83
Tanzania	£4.8m: year to Oct 79
Malawi	£3.8m: year to Mar 81
Seychelles	£5.2m: year to Oct 85
Mauritius	£4.3m: year to Oct 82
Zimbabwe	£15.3m: year to Mar 84

British Caledonian Routes

The Gambia	£4.8m: approximately annually
Sierra Leone	£4.6m: year to Dec 85
Ghana	£4.7m: year to Mar 84
Nigeria	£77.7m: year to Oct 85
Zambia	£9.3m: year to Mar 85

NON-COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIESBritish Airways Routes

Egypt	£23.8m: year to Mar 84
Morocco	New route in April: no figures available
Sudan	£8.6m: year to Oct 84
South Africa	£70m approximately annually

British Caledonian Routes

Liberia	£1.7m: year to Mar 81
Libya	£10.2m: year to Oct 83
Ivory Coast	£2.3m approximately annually
Tunisia	£1.4m: year to Mar 85
Cameroon	£3.5m approximately annually
Gabon	£2.2m approximately annually



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

2 August 1986

*From the Private Secretary**Dear Robert,*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA

The Prime Minister had a talk lasting about an hour with President Kaunda this evening at the Churchill Hotel. The Zambian Foreign Minister and Dr. Phiri were also present. President Kaunda was in a rather disagreeable and uncooperative frame of mind. But he did not at any stage make any threats or mention the possibility of Zambian withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister opened by saying that she hoped the Commonwealth Review Meeting would be friendly. Each participant should try to take account of the point of view of the others. For her part, she intended to hear what others had to say before deciding what the United Kingdom was prepared to do. The Prime Minister continued that she thought that Sir Geoffrey Howe's visit to South Africa had been useful. He had been able to put across the arguments for change to a wide audience in a convincing and effective manner. A large number of whites were clearly ready for peaceful and managed change. The South African Government itself was by no means united in opposition to further reform or to the release of Mandela.

The Prime Minister said that, as President Kaunda would know, she was totally opposed to apartheid and wished to see it brought to an end as soon as possible. Where we differed from a number of countries was over the most effective means of achieving this. We did not believe that comprehensive economic sanctions would help to bring about internal change. There was no precedent for this in history. Moreover, extensive preparations had already been made to circumvent sanctions. And it was clear the South African Government would retaliate against neighbouring countries. We had hoped that the Eminent Persons Group would be able to bring about negotiations and indeed it had come close. But the South African raids on neighbouring countries had removed that hope. This did not diminish our determination to try to bring about a peaceful solution in South Africa.

The Prime Minister continued that, in deciding how to proceed one had to bear in mind that the Commonwealth was a

JA
cc Pp
cc
cc Master

SUBJECT*JA*


group of countries with different interests and different points of view. She valued it very highly as an institution. She was certain that it would stay together and that its members would continue to work together. Britain had played a constantly constructive role in the Commonwealth with aid, military training, support for Commonwealth countries seeking help through the IMF and in a myriad other ways. She hoped that at the Commonwealth Review Meeting everyone would keep calm and concentrate on the issues. There were some things to which she could agree and others which she could not accept. We attached particular importance to acting in concert with the European Community. All the participants in the Commonwealth Review Meeting belonged to other groupings as well and had to take the obligations imposed by their membership into account. Her own impression was that the more people studied in detail the practical aspects of comprehensive economic sanctions, the more they realised the difficulties. One could not ignore the railway lines and the roads, where they went and where they did not go. The Prime Minister concluded by repeating that she wanted change in South Africa just as much as President Kaunda did. She therefore hoped for a reasonable conclusion to the Commonwealth Review Meeting, with any action agreed upon being co-ordinated with others.

President Kaunda said that the Prime Minister's remarks worried him a lot. The United Kingdom had not hesitated to apply sanctions against Libya by bombing its innocent citizens. Yet Boers were killing blacks in South Africa and we seemed to attach more importance to the supply of strategic minerals than to black lives. Britain talked about not wanting to cause unemployment among blacks in South Africa. But there were already millions of black unemployed. Unless further measures, comprehensive or selective, were applied, South Africa would explode. In 1966 he had warned the Portuguese Government that unless they gave independence to Angola and Mozambique both countries would become communist. The Portuguese had delayed and he had been proved right. He had warned successive British Governments that they had to quell the rebellion in Rhodesia or thousands would die. Again he had been proved right. Now he was saying that if sanctions were not applied, South Africa would go up in flames. Britain and the United States should be taking action to show the majority in South Africa that we were on their side. If we failed to act, God would not forgive us. He was not being emotional. But if the Commonwealth Review Meeting ended without additional measures, the West would be sending the wrong signals and it would be a sad day. We would all be caught up in a catastrophe. The West seemed to care more about profits it earned from South Africa than about the fate of the people. It was ready to apply sanctions against others - the Soviet Union, Poland, Nicaragua, Libya - but not it seemed against South Africa.

The Prime Minister said that it was impossible to condemn apartheid strongly enough. But the fact was that things were changing in South Africa. President Kaunda

believed that comprehensive economic sanctions would accelerate change. She feared that they would retard change. We were already taking a substantial list of measures against South Africa. We had done everything which we had promised to do at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Nassau. President Kaunda said that he did not see how the Prime Minister's opposition to sanctions could be squared with the effect when the bankers had taken action against the South African government last year. The Prime Minister said that, to the contrary, it strengthened her argument. What affected South Africa was not action by foreign governments but the disapproval of ordinary people and companies who recognised that the present system of Government simply could not go on. President Kaunda said that it was essential to strengthen the measures already taken against South Africa. He was depressed by the Prime Minister's opposition to sanctions. The Prime Minister said that it was clear that she and the President would make no further progress in their discussions for the time being. It would be better to continue the next day. The Commonwealth Review Meeting seemed likely to be more difficult than she had hoped.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,


(CHARLES POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 August 1986

Blk V/B
ch P.C.
cc B1
SUBJECT
cc Master

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF
CANADA

The Prime Minister saw Mr. Mulroney for 45 minutes this afternoon to discuss the Commonwealth Review Conference. It was an amicable discussion, but the Prime Minister was careful not to reveal any details of our negotiating position despite Mr. Mulroney's efforts to prize out something.

Mr. Mulroney said that his assessment of the situation was that, in the wake of the Eminent Persons Group Report and the Foreign Secretary's visit, the Commonwealth needed to agree on some further measures against South Africa though implementation of them needed to be co-ordinated with the European Community, the United States and other industrialised countries. He had in mind only a very limited number of measures, falling well short of comprehensive sanctions. The Commonwealth must reach agreement, or it risked being "blind-sided" by the United States. He hoped very much that the United Kingdom would give a lead by itself proposing some limited additional measures. He believed that rapid agreement could be achieved on that basis. He well understood the need to accommodate other timetables, particularly in our case that of the European Community. Mr. Mulroney continued that he had discussed the position with President Reagan shortly before leaving Ottawa. His impression was that the United States Administration was trying to delay further action by Congress, but had only limited prospects of succeeding in this. President Reagan had made clear to him that he could live with some additional measures emerging from the Commonwealth meeting, though he hoped they would be such as to minimise the effects on black employment in South Africa.

The Prime Minister thanked Mr. Mulroney for the message he had sent about the Foreign Secretary's visit to South Africa. Despite President Botha's crude response, she believed the visit had been valuable. The Foreign Secretary

Blk

had been able to get across a lot of arguments which many people had not heard before. He had also received a first hand impression of the damage which sanctions would do to the front line states. It would be helpful if he were able to report this to the Commonwealth Review meeting.

The Prime Minister continued that no-one had anything to gain from a confrontation at the Commonwealth Review Meeting. It was important that the participants should recognise the very disparate scale of their respective interests and involvement in South Africa. There was no point in an emotional set-to at the meeting. We all wanted the same objective, namely the end of apartheid. Where we disagreed was over the means to achieve that. She did not believe that economic sanctions would ever achieve what their proponents claimed for them. They were more likely to produce a hardening of positions. But each Government at the Commonwealth Review meeting would know what it could do and what it could not do. In our case the conclusions of the European Council in June were on the record for all to see. She detected some signs of greater realism about sanctions, not least in a message which she had that afternoon received from President Babangida of Nigeria. This made clear that Nigeria would support limited measures and had no desire to see the South African economy devastated. There was no question of our compensating the Front Line States if sanctions were imposed and South Africa retaliated against them. The timing of the Commonwealth Review meeting was unfortunate: it would have been better to have held it after the Nationalist Party Congress in South Africa in August. She had some hope that there might be further steps there towards removing the legislative framework of apartheid.

Mr. Mulroney said that he of course accepted that the Prime Minister was as committed to the destruction of apartheid as anyone. He shared her view that the Commonwealth was a two-tier organisation and a lot of cant was talked by some of its members. His impression was that "no-one would jump off the bridge if the Commonwealth took a walk" either in Canada or in the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister interjected that she would in fact be very upset if that were to happen. Mr. Mulroney continued that he wanted to stress the need for the United Kingdom to give a lead. It would be much better if we volunteered some additional measures rather than have them wrung out of us. This would be an opportunity to put an end to the unfair criticism of the United Kingdom's attitude towards South Africa. He repeated that he accepted that the United Kingdom could only implement additional measures as part of a co-ordinated process involving the European Community, the United States and other industrialised countries.

The Prime Minister said that she was glad to hear this last point emphasised. She did not want another Nassau meeting where concessions were pocketed and then the Commonwealth came back for more. She had to draw a line. She knew what she could do and could not do. Mr. Mulroney

pressed the Prime Minister to be more specific. Could she, for instance, agree to ban agricultural products from South Africa? The Prime Minister said that she ruled this out absolutely. But she would prefer to hear what the other participants in the meeting had to say before giving any indication of what the United Kingdom was prepared to do. Mr. Mulroney was visibly disappointed by this.

I enclose a transcript of Mr. Mulroney's remarks to the press immediately after the meeting.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MR. MULRONEY'S INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESS OUTSIDE NO. 10 ON
SATURDAY 2 AUGUST 1986

It was a very constructive and positive meeting and you know my view that the Commonwealth must remain united and the United Kingdom must continue to play a leadership role in the Commonwealth. As usual Mrs. Thatcher had an excellent meeting.

(French)

Q. You said this morning you believed there might be progress and movement at the Summit. Do you still think so?

A. Absolutely. Very much so. I think that the Commonwealth stands for reasonableness and honourable compromise or it stands for nothing. And when confronted with a serious situation serious people ought to know how to respond and they will. And so I am satisfied that things will improve.

Q. Do you get the impression that Mrs. Thatcher is about to compromise?

A. I wouldn't comment on the meeting except to - you know the high regard I have for Mrs. Thatcher and I have always viewed her contributions as constructive. She speaks her mind very clearly. She looks at the problem from a different perspective because the interests are different and that has to be respected as well. And so we had a very very good meeting. And I think it will continue to be positive.

Nassau to put into this?

3 points

1. Have already made it clear that if EC is willing to adopt the measures listed in The Hague Communiqué, the UK will both accept this decision and itself implement the measures. They are as significant as any listed in the Nassau accord (SA exports of coal and steel = 11% of total export earnings: exports of agricultural produce less than 10%).
2. If measures are to act as maximum jolt to South African Government, need to present as consensus, not in a way which looks divided. So need to avoid communiqué which suggests divisions, and look for language suggesting common approach.
3. UK willing to accept endorsement in communiqué of package approach so long as accepted that some member states wish to implement more and in some cases different measures.

1. The Prime Minister had two bilaterals this evening each lasting 45 minutes - Mr. Mulroney from 1730 to 1815, President Kaunda from 1830-1920. In each case the Prime Minister made it clear that she was seeking a calm and friendly conference with a sensible conclusion. She was concerned to listen to what others had to say.

2. She stressed that each of those participating would have different perceptions as well as different stand points. But the UK had always played a constructive role and wanted the Conference to success.

3. Both Mr. Mulroney and President Kaunda set out their points of view in familiar terms and in a sincere manner.

Background

1. The Prime Minister tried to take emotion out of these preliminary talks and to direct the discussion into a calm and serious consideration of the issues.

2. She has stressed repeatedly the end i.e. dismantling of apartheid; the UK wants change in South Africa as much as anyone; the discussions were about means.

3. Every body knew the Government's approach to general economic sanctions. It did not see them as the way forward for they had not been proved in practice.

4. The Prime Minister felt that these preliminaries had been very useful in helping to understand basic positions and enabled her to get over (a) her abhorrence of apartheid and (b) her desire for a positive outcome to the Conference.



PM/86/050

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
CDP
2/8

1. As promised, I am letting you have some personal thoughts about the handling of the Review Meeting. They may have some value, since they take account not only of my talks in recent weeks with Kaunda and Mugabe but also of what I heard yesterday from Joe Clark (Canada) and Ramphal about their view of the meeting. (As agreed at OD, I was careful to give them no hint of our own position or possible room for manoeuvre.)

2. Three points first of all on procedure:

(a) Ramphal visualises the Sunday afternoon as being given over to what he calls the Review Part of the meeting (has "adequate progress" been made, in terms of the Nassau Accord?). Opening statements from Pindling and himself would be followed by a report from the Co-Chairmen of the EPG. He has already urged Fraser to confine himself to reporting on conclusions and not on recommendations/sanctions: tea might make a convenient cut-off point. Ramphal wondered whether you might wish to suggest, perhaps after tea, that the meeting should also hear a report on my two visits. That idea is usefully in line with our own thinking.

/(b)



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(b) Ramphal was sympathetic to the idea that participants in the Meeting should be encouraged to refrain from public statements, broadcasts and so on at least while the conference was in progress. He said that he would be briefing Pindling to deal with this at the opening lunch and perhaps also to appeal for restraint in unattributable briefings.

(c) Ramphal explained his perception of the possibility of an emergency CHOGM later this year. He visualised it as a possible "safety net": in the event of failure of the Review Meeting, the prospect of a CHOGM might turn events away from "the precipice" and allow time for other processes to "bridge the gap". From our point of view (I did not tell him this, of course) it would be much better to reach agreement this week than to allow pressures to build up in advance of a full chorus of protest in the autumn - probably in Delhi.

3. Then there are some general points affecting the style and flavour of our approach which it is worth making:

(a) We cannot over-do the vigour and clarity with which we denounce and deplore apartheid. However unjustly, the SAG (and others) have had some success in casting doubt upon our sincerity in this respect. I think it will be a great help if at an early stage you are able to repeat in strong terms

/the

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL



the repugnance for apartheid which you have expressed on many occasions, and your wish to see it speedily replaced by a more just society.

- (b) We need to be generous in our recognition of the role and importance of the Commonwealth, not least in this context. This is said to be particularly important if we are to keep General Obasanjo (and so Babangida) committed to a reasonably restrained approach. We can (and should) do this by paying due tribute to the role and work of the EPG. It is indeed the case that such a balanced and authoritative group could only have come from the Commonwealth and that its "negotiating concept" has been the best vehicle so far for dialogue in South Africa. It was the foundation on which my own mission was built.
- (c) Even so, we need to recognise that a common Commonwealth approach - desirable, of course - is only possible if each of us is ready to take account of differences in the approach, background, connections and so on of the others. We need to be ready to coax, and not to coerce each other on to common ground.
- (d) We need to be particularly sensitive to the extent to which apartheid is - and is bound to be - an intensely emotional issue for so many of the others. For every black-over-black dictatorship that we feel tempted to denounce, they can think of a

/white-over



white-over-white equivalent (past or present) with which to compare it. There would be no value in swapping perceptions of that kind. For it misses the real point. If we were facing one exceptional state in Europe, in which a black minority was ruling a much larger white majority by manifestly undemocratic and authoritarian means, I suspect that even we would not approach the problem on the basis of a very meticulous cost/benefit analysis. Nor should we be much persuaded to do so by the argument that the black rulers were clearly more advanced than the whites - all the more so if that happened to be true. In such circumstances, a sense of conscience or solidarity seems more important than cash.

4. That is the kind of background against which it may, even so, be useful for me, in my review, to try to make to the meeting two cost/benefit type points, that could usefully emerge from my mission:

- (a) The need - however understandably difficult it may be for most of us - to judge the right balance of pressures on the Afrikaner leadership. There are people there whose commitment to change may yet be the best hope for speedy progress: let us not extinguish their influence.
- (b) The comparable need to take account of the likely consequences, both ways, of further measures. They can do severe harm to the BLS states, for example; and they can provoke retaliation and worse.



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None of this amounts to a case in principle against any kind of measure. Nor are we arguing that. That is why we have already put a number of measures in place and indicated a willingness to consider others. But before we take further decisions, a proper, balanced, consideration of the effect is only prudent. It would perhaps be surprising if we were all able to come to exactly the same view. But that is no reason not to seek as much common ground as possible: on the contrary.

5. Finally, some specific points that I believe we should be able and willing to acknowledge or assert at a fairly early stage of the Meeting:

- (a) The EPG were right to conclude that there has been no adequate response from the SAG. This has been confirmed by the way in which my mission has been received by the SAG.
- (b) This meeting - foreshadowed as it was by the Nassau Accord - cannot fail to make a response to that conclusion.
- (c) We should all, therefore, be able to agree here and now on the need for some further movement by all of us.
- (d) But the nature of that movement need not - indeed cannot - be the same for all of us.
- (e) And the timing too of different moves should take account of the effectiveness of acting in concert with others, not only in the Commonwealth.

/(f)



(f) That is the basis on which we are ready to make clear today our willingness to join our EC partners in taking together with them the steps which we have had under consideration. ("You are familiar with our time-table".)

(g) We are at this meeting ready not only to make that clear but also to agree ourselves to take, in concert with our Commonwealth partners, certain specific and not unimportant steps, which will take effect before the others that are under consideration with our European partners.

6. We can discuss exactly how far and how soon we should be ready to put forward each of these points. One point put to me by Ramphal does, I think, deserve consideration: the other Commonwealth heads, he believes, do not really understand/will not find it easy to accept what he describes as the "Brussels technique" of negotiation, in which concessions come only at the eleventh hour. Coming from him it is easy (and up to a point right) to regard this as special pleading. But I believe there is some sense in this argument - even in the Brussels setting! On this occasion when we do have a need to disarm suspicion in advance, I think the point does have real force.

7. On that basis, I should see positive advantage in being ready at an early stage to make at least points (a) to (c) in paragraph 5 above, and probably (d) and (e) as well: but we can, of course, have a word about that. (g) is clearly for the end game.



8. Three final pieces of advice from Ramphal, which we shall want to think about:

- Make of disapproval*
- (a) Best not to describe fresh moves just as "signals" or "gestures", which is to diminish their value; we shall need to think of some description that can be reconciled with our approach;
 - (b) We should take care not to express any greater enthusiasm for the EC than for the Commonwealth;
 - (c) Best to justify the delayed timing of our EC measures not by reference to any hope that Botha may move in the interval. Nobody will believe that to be true: I'm afraid I don't! Better to say instead that the delay is justified in order to secure concerted, and so more effective, action.

?
9. I hope all this is not too discursive. I have not had time to revise what is no more than my own first draft. Officials have not had a chance to consider it and might wish (like you?) to comment vigorously! But I hope it will help to push us on to the right approach. I am copying it to Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
2 August 1986

✓ CDP
MR. POWELL.

PRIME MINISTER

BILL CASH MP

Bill Cash, MP, today phoned from Canada where he is participating in a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association visit. He wished you to know that there is considerable opposition in Mr. Mulroney's own Progressive Conservative party to his stance on sanctions. Indeed, he believed that Mr. Mulroney did not have the support of the party caucus, a view which was expressed to him by senior members of the PCP. He was not sure what significance this information had since it does not seem to have deflected Mr. Mulroney from his high profile stance in favour of sanctions. But Mr. Cash thought you may like to be aware of it.

W

(TIM FLESHER)

1 August 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Duty Clerk

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING
 MARLBOROUGH HOUSE: 3-5 AUGUST 1986
 SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

1. The conference takes place from 1500 on Sunday 3 August to 1200 on Tuesday 5 August at the premises of the Commonwealth Secretariat in Marlborough House. A full programme is at Annex A; the Secretariat paper on Conference Arrangements at Annex B.
2. The Prime Minister, accompanied by the Secretary of State and the Secretary to the Cabinet, will represent the United Kingdom at the Executive Sessions in the main conference room at Marlborough House. The Green Room, adjacent to the Conference Room, will be reserved exclusively for the use of Heads of Government. The Blenheim Salon (the room through which one approaches the Conference Room) is for the use of Foreign Ministers. Room A and the Library will be the delegates' lounges.
3. The United Kingdom delegation office will be in Room PM 14 in Marlborough House. It will be staffed by the Delegation Secretary (Mr Macan), a secretary from No 10 and additional FCO secretarial support as required. It can be reached either via the Commonwealth Secretariat switchboard (839 3411 ext 2204) or via a direct line from No 10. A few rooms can also be booked for bilaterals if required.
4. A press centre has been set up in the Old Bath Club. There is a UK briefing room there. Press conferences/briefings by Heads of Government will take place in Lancaster House.
5. Access will be strictly controlled. All those on the delegation list (Annex C) will be issued with a blue pass superimposed with a red cross. This will give access to Marlborough House Courtyard, the Old Bath Club and Lancaster House. Access to Marlborough House itself will require in addition a pin. Each delegation is limited to 12 pins; they are being issued separately to those who require regular access, those who require ad hoc access should telephone the Delegation Office so that a pin can be issued. Apart from the Prime Minister, who requires no pass, those attending the Executive Sessions will require an additional red pass. These are being issued to the Secretary of State and the Secretary to the Cabinet: they may be transferred if the need arises.
6. The following social events are taking place in connection with the conference:

Sunday 3 August : Lunch given by Mr Gandhi
 at the Churchill Hotel
 for Heads of Government

Lunch given by the Secretary of State
 at 1 Carlton Gardens for
 Foreign Ministers

/...

Dinner given by The Queen
at Buckingham Palace
for Heads of Government
plus the Secretary of State

Monday 4 August : Lunch given by the Prime Minister
at No 10 for Heads of Government
plus one

Reception given by the
Commonwealth Secretary-General
for Heads of Government plus a
limited number of delegates

7. A list of home and office telephone numbers of FCO staff is at
Annex D.

Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

1 August 1986

ADMINISTRATION IN CONFIDENCE

OUTLINE PROGRAMME FOR COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

2 August	06:30 0620 approx t.b.c. 0740	President Kaunda arrives Met by Lady Young	Heathrow Special flight Air Zambia
		Prime Minister Mugabe arrives Met by Mrs Chalker	Gatwick UM 124
	0900	Prime Minister Mulroney arrives Met by Lady Young	Heathrow RCAF Special flight
	1445	Prime Minister Hawke arrives Met by Lady Young	Heathrow RAAF
3 August	0605	Prime Minister Gandhi arrives Met by Mr Renton	Heathrow IAF Special flight
	1300	Luncheon given by Mr Gandhi at the Churchill Hotel for Heads of Government	
		Luncheon given by the Secretary of State at 1 Carlton Gardens for Foreign Ministers	
	1500	FIRST CONFERENCE SESSION at Marlborough House	
	2000	Dinner (for Heads of Govt, Secretary-General and Secretary of State only) given by The Queen at Buckingham Palace	
4 August	0930	SECOND CONFERENCE SESSION	
	1300	Luncheon given by the Prime Minister at No 10 Downing Street (for Heads plus one)	
	1500	THIRD CONFERENCE SESSION	
	1830-2000	Reception given by the Commonwealth Secretary-General at Marlborough House	
5 August	0930-1200	FOURTH CONFERENCE SESSION	
	1300	Mr Gandhi departs	Heathrow
	1730	Mr Hawke departs	Heathrow
	1700	Mr Mulroney departs	Heathrow
	2000	President Kaunda departs	
6 August			
7 August	1045	Sir L Pindling departs	
	1900 t.b.c.	Mr Mugabe departs	Gatwick

Accommodation:

Sir L Pindling	:	Churchill Hotel
President Kaunda	:	Churchill Hotel
Mr Mulroney	:	Inn on the Park
Mr Hawke	:	Inn on the Park
Mr Gandhi	:	Churchill Hotel
Mr Mugabe	:	Grosvenor House Hotel

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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING
LONDON 1986

CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS

Note by the Commonwealth Secretariat

Venue and Times of Meetings

The Meeting will be held from Sunday, 3 August to Tuesday, 5 August at the Commonwealth Secretariat Headquarters, Marlborough House, London.

2. There will be no formal Opening Ceremony. On Sunday, 3 August the times of departure from places of residence and arrival at Marlborough House of Heads of Government will be arranged in consultation with the security authorities. There will be photographs as Heads of Delegation arrive, a group photograph before the Meeting, and a brief photo-call when they take their seats in the Executive Session Room. The First Session is expected to commence at around 3.20 pm
3. Apart from the opening time, the time of commencement and duration of sessions will be subject to endorsement by Heads of Government. The provisional programme is set out in paragraph 10.
4. Executive Sessions will be held in the main Conference Room on the Ground Floor of Marlborough House. Restricted Sessions will, if required, be held in the same room. Where necessary, meetings of Ministers and/or Senior Officials will take place in Room PM10 on the First Floor of Marlborough House.
5. Accommodation for delegations in Marlborough House is extremely limited. It has therefore become necessary to restrict the numbers from each delegation present in Marlborough House at any one time to a maximum of twelve (12) (excluding the Head of Government). To accommodate members of larger delegations extra lounge facilities have been made available at Lancaster House, conveniently situated a short walking distance from Marlborough House.
6. The floor plans of Marlborough House and Lancaster House, indicating the location of rooms in use during the Meeting, together with a map of the local area, are at Annexes I and II respectively.

Directory of Delegations and Secretariat

7. A list of delegates, delegation secretaries and Secretariat officials with addresses and telephone numbers in London will be distributed, in provisional form, before the Meeting and, with the co-operation of delegates, in final form on Sunday, 3 August.

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Responsibility for Arrangements

8. The Secretary-General is responsible for the general organisation and arrangements for the Meeting.

9. The two Deputy Secretaries-General will be the Deputy Secretaries-General of the meeting.

10. Details of Secretariat officials with, where appropriate, telephone numbers, appear in the Delegation Directory. In the principal areas of conference administration the key personnel are:

Mr Hugh Craft	Conference Secretary
	- all matters pertaining to the organisation of the Meeting, the Agenda, Minutes, Notices and Memoranda
Tunku Abdul Aziz	Director of Administration
Mr Peter Dunne	Conference Officer
Mr Jack Cowan	Senior Executive Officer (Services)
	- all matters relating to conference services and administration
Mr Charles Gunawardena	Director of Information
Mrs Patsy Robertson	Assistant Director of Information
	- all matters relating to the media
Colonel Peter Durrant	Security Co-ordinator

Provisional Programme

11. It is proposed that the programme for the Review Meeting will be as follows:

SUNDAY, 3 AUGUST

3.00 pm Arrival at Marlborough House and First Session

8.00 pm for 8.15 pm Dinner for Heads of Government and the Secretary-General hosted by H.M. The Queen at Buckingham Palace.

RESTRICTED

SUNDAY, 4 AUGUST

9.30 am - 12.45 pm

Second Session

1.00 pm

Working Lunch for Heads of Government, the Secretary-General and one member of each delegation, hosted by Prime Minister Thatcher at 10 Downing Street

3.00 pm - 6.00 pm

Third Session

6.30 pm - 8.00 pm

Reception, by invitation, hosted by the Secretary-General at Marlborough House

TUESDAY, 5 AUGUST

9.30 am - 12.00 noon

Fourth Session

pm

Departure

Record of Proceedings

12. The Secretariat will prepare minutes of all Executive Sessions. These will normally be circulated in provisional form within 24 hours of the conclusion of each Session. Amendments should be notified to the Conference Secretary within 24 hours of circulation.

Documentation

13. A document distribution point will be located in the vicinity of the main Conference Room (see floor plan at Annex I).

Support Services

14. A general office has been established to provide support services for delegations. This is located in Room D adjacent to the main conference room (see Annex I) in Marlborough House. It will provide secretarial pool, a photocopier and a shredder; and Secretariat personnel will be on hand to deal with enquiries, specifically those relating to travel, finance, communications and postage.

Office Facilities

15. Individual delegation offices in Marlborough House have been allocated as follows (see floor plan at Annex 1):

RESTRICTED

Australia	PM1 (Ext. 2100)
The Bahamas	PM5 (Ext. 2105)
Canada	PM6 (Ext. 2106)
India	PM15 (Ext. 2205)
United Kingdom	PM14 (Ext. 2204)
Zambia	PM8 (Ext. 2108)
Zimbabwe	PM9 (Ext. 2109)

Security Arrangements

16. The British Government will be responsible for security arrangements. A note on security matters, to which the attention of all delegates is drawn, is at Annex III.

17. Entrance to Marlborough House precincts will be controlled by means of security passes which will be issued to accredited persons through Liaison Officers on Friday, 1 August.

18. Access to the Centre Block of Marlborough House itself will be strictly controlled and delegations will be issued with 12 transferable stick-pins for this purpose.

19. Access to the Executive Session room in Marlborough House will be limited to Heads of Government plus two delegates; delegations will be issued with two transferable passes for this purpose.

20. With respect to documents, the record of the Meeting will be classified SECRET and other documents graded according to contents.

Lounge Facilities

21. The Heads of Delegation lounge (the Green Room) is immediately adjacent to the Executive Session room. The Blenheim Salon is reserved for Ministers. Accommodation for a limited number of delegates will be provided in lounges located in the Bar, Room A and the Library on the Ground Floor of Marlborough House; and at Lancaster House in the Garibaldi, the Eagle and State Dining Rooms. Coffee, tea and light refreshments will be available in all lounges while the Meeting is in session.

Communications

22. The following facilities are available in Marlborough House:

- (1) telephone - national and international (Commonwealth Secretariat telephone no: 01-839 4311);

RESTRICTED

- (ii) telex (Commonwealth Secretariat no: 27678 - answer back COMSEC);
- (iii) telegram - national and international (Commonwealth Secretariat cable address: COMSECGEN LONDON SW1);
- (iv) facsimile (Commonwealth Secretariat no: 01-930 0827)

23. The Secretariat switchboard will be manned throughout the Meeting. A bank of telephones is located in the corridor adjacent to the Blenheim Salon (see floor plan at Annex I) and additional telephones are available for use in all delegates lounges.

24. The costs of international telephone calls, telegrams, telex and facsimile messages made from Marlborough House will be charged to individual delegations.

25. Postage can be arranged through the general office in Room D.

Messages

26. Messages received for delegation members working in Marlborough House will be received at the Message Desk in the entrance foyer of Marlborough House and will be delivered to or collected by delegates when the Meeting is in Session. Messages for the Executive Session room will not normally be delivered while the Meeting is in progress. In cases of real urgency the Conference Officer must be consulted.

27. Messages for delegation members in the Lancaster House holding lounges can be transmitted via the Marlborough House Message Desk.

Transport

28. Transport requirements for Heads of Government and members of delegations are the responsibility of their Government/High Commission.

29. Secure and controlled parking space at Marlborough House will be allotted to each Head of Government's vehicle, the immediate police back-up car and to the Foreign Minister's vehicle (Red Stickers). All other delegation vehicles (Blue Stickers) will be permitted to enter Marlborough House confines for setting down or collecting passengers but will park in the Horse Ride (on the Mall) where secured parking is available. A car call-up system linked to the Horse Ride will operate from Marlborough House and Lancaster House.

30. There are no car-parking facilities available at Lancaster House and the same arrangement in the Horse Ride will apply as above.

Medical Facilities

31. A doctor will be on duty in Marlborough House whenever Heads of Government are in session. Additionally, the London Ambulance Service with fully qualified personnel will be on stand-by at Marlborough House over the

RESTRICTED

period of the Meeting. St Thomas' Hospital in Westminster with a round-the-clock emergency/accident facility will be on stand-by over the period of the Meeting.

Press Centre

32. The Press Centre is situated in the Old Bath Club, Little St James' Street, near Marlborough House. Members of the Press will be admitted to Marlborough House only on the basis of special arrangements by the Press Office.

33. A separate note has been issued on media arrangements.

Banking

34. There are banks in the immediate vicinity of Marlborough House where travellers cheques, foreign currency, etc can be changed. Opening hours are 9.30 am to 3.30 pm (Monday to Friday). The Secretariat's Finance Division will be on hand to advise if required and enquiries should be made in Room D.

Travel


35. The Secretariat could assist, through its Travel Section, ticket re-confirmation, flight bookings, etc on behalf of delegations, if this is required. Enquiries should be made in Room D.

Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
London SW1

July 1986

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE


Ground Floor



ANNEX 1

PALL MALL GATES





Direct line.

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE

CENTRE BLOCK

Second Floor

NOT IN USE

PM 14

UNITED
KINGDOM
DELEGATION
OFFICE

PM 15

INDIAN
DELEGATION
OFFICE

PRIVATE
OFFICE

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
OFFICE

NOT IN USE



COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF REVIEW MEETING

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

General

The United Kingdom accepts full responsibility for the protection of Heads of Government during their stay in the United Kingdom. Arrangements have been made for the protection of all Heads of Government and certain Ministers by attaching a team of armed Special Branch officers to them for the duration of their stay in the United Kingdom. Similar protection arrangements will be in place at the hotels where Heads of Government will reside, and Special Escort Group personnel will accompany Heads of Government from their respective hotels to Marlborough House and on return; similar security measures will apply whenever a Head of Government travels to and from Lancaster House.

Fire-arms

Security personnel within national delegations will not be permitted to carry fire-arms. Any fire-arms must be deposited upon arrival at the first port of entry with the police or HM Customs, and be claimed on departure.

Marlborough House and Lancaster House will be made secure by the Metropolitan Police. The grounds and buildings will be searched, and kept secure throughout the Review Meeting by Royal Military Police. Access to the precincts of Marlborough House, to its East and West Wings, to its Centre Block in which the Review Meeting will take place, to Lancaster House and to the Press Centre in the Old Bath Club, Little St James' Street, will be strictly controlled by the following security pass system:

FOR VEHICLES

- | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Large RED windscreen stickers | - | permitting access to, and parking in the Courtyard of Marlborough House. Stickers will be supplied, one for the Head of Government's vehicle, a second for the police back-up vehicle and a third for the Foreign Minister's. |
| Large BLUE windscreen stickers | - | permitting access to Marlborough House Courtyard for setting down or collecting passengers, and for parking thereafter in the House Ride. |

RESTRICTED

PERSONNEL PASSES

(Heads of Government do not require a pass of any description)

- RED - permitting access to all buildings and areas including the Executive Sessions, but confined to senior officers of the Commonwealth Secretariat and two delegates per country. These passes are transferable - only two delegates per country (in addition to the Head of Government) are permitted to be in the Executive Session room at any one time.
- BLUE with RED cross - permitting access within the security cordon of Marlborough House and to Lancaster House. These will be issued to all delegates on the lists provided by High Commissions and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Only 12 delegates from each delegation are permitted access to the Centre Block at any one time. To effect that ceiling, twelve numbered transferable metal badges will be supplied to each delegation. Delegates may transfer badges outside the Centre Block or at Lancaster House.
- BLUE, overprinted "STAFF" - permitting access to Marlborough House (Centre Block and the East and West Wings and to Lancaster House); to be issued to Secretariat support staff only.
- BLUE - permitting access to the East and West Wings only of Marlborough House; for Secretariat support staff.
- BLUE with unnumbered pin - permitting High Commissioners only (of the non-7 Governments) access to Marlborough House Centre Block.
- GREEN - permitting access to the Centre Block, the East and West Wings of Marlborough House, and Lancaster House. Issued to catering staff.
- YELLOW, with photographs - permitting media representatives access to the Press Centre only. Access by the press to Marlborough House/Lancaster House for accredited members of the press will be on a pooling basis and by means of a "one time tie-on tag".

RESTRICTED

To control access to three main Conference Room in Marlborough House, a manned pass-transfer arrangement will be set up in the Blenheim Salon at the entrance to the Conference Room. The Red transferable Executive Session passes are to be worn in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the ordinary security pass. Passes must be worn at all times and the on duty security personnel are under firm instructions to refuse entry to anyone not wearing an authorised security pass.

Vehicular access to Marlborough House is via the main gate and all egress will be through the gate adjacent to the Royal Chapel leading to Marlborough Road. Arrangements will be made for the Mall and Marlborough Road to be kept open on Sunday, 3 August for vehicles with Blue stickers. Vehicular passage from Marlborough House to Lancaster House will be via Cleveland Row; in the opposite direction vehicles must proceed from Lancaster House via Queen's Walk, the Mall, Marlborough Road and right turn (authorised and controlled by the police) into Marlborough House.

All mail addressed to Heads of Government or delegates will be subjected to X-ray security before being passed to the addressee.

The safe custody of all classified material is the responsibility of the delegation to which it belongs. Delegations are therefore advised to make their own arrangements for the secure transmission of classified material to and from their respective High Commissions/Government Departments.

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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING

LONDON: AUGUST 1986

LIST OF DELEGATES

COUNTRY BRITAIN

 (Please complete in order of precedence with full titles and indicate by an asterisk immediately preceding the name, if accompanied by spouse.)

(Please continue list of names on separate sheet if necessary.)

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| 1. Name | The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher FRS MP |
| Designation | Prime Minister |
| 2. Name | The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP |
| Designation | Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs |
| 3. Name | Sir Robert Armstrong GCB, CVO |
| Designation | Secretary of the Cabinet |
| 4. Name | Sir Patrick Wright KCMG |
| Designation | Permanent Under Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office |

When completed kindly return this form, by 21 July 1986, to:

Mr Mervyn Jones
 Assistant Director
 International Affairs Division
 Commonwealth Secretariat
 Marlborough House
 Pall Mall
 LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Telex: 27678 COMSEC

/...

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COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT REVIEW MEETING

LONDON: AUGUST 1986

LIST OF DELEGATES

BRITAIN

Mr E A J Fergusson CMG
Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr C L G Mallaby CMG
Deputy Under Secretary, Cabinet Office

Mr N L Wicks CBE
Principal Private Secretary, Prime Minister's Office

Mr A Reeve CMG
Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr C D Powell
Private Secretary, Prime Minister's Office

Mr B Ingham
Chief Press Officer, Prime Minister's Office

Mr A C Galsworthy CMG
Principal Private Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr C J R Meyer
Head, News Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr W K Prendergast
Head, Southern African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr C A K Cullimore
Head, Central African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr T T Macan
Head, Commonwealth Co-ordination Dept, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr C T W Humfrey
Assistant Head, Southern African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

/...

C R Budd
Private Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr R N Culshaw MVO
Private Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr T D Curran
First Secretary, Southern African Dept,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mrs A J Phillips
First Secretary, Commonwealth Co-ordination Dept,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr G D Quinn, First Secretary, Commonwealth Co-ordination Dept,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr M J Horne
Press Officer, Prime Minister's Office

Delegation Secretary

Name	T T Macan
Address	Commonwealth Co-ordination Department, FCO
Telex	
Telephone	01 233 3366

In addition, passes will be required for the following:

Mr S L Cowper-Coles, Private Secretary to Permanent Under Secretary,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr J Harrod, Assistant Private Secretary to Permanent Under
Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr D I Lewty, Assistant Head of Central African Dept,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Miss E G M Gallagher	Personal Assistant
Miss C P Williams	Personal Assistant
Miss L K Maxwell	Personal Assistant
Miss J Auld	Personal Assistant, No 10
Miss D Green	Personal Assistant, No 10
Miss V Cummings	Personal Assistant, No 10

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

OFFICE/HOME TELEPHONE NUMBERS


	<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>HOME</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
E A J Fergusson DUS (PA Mrs Hooker)	233 4591 233 4664 (direct) 233 5622	01 938 1136 (London) 0580 211114 (Country)	
A Reeve AUS (PA Miss Pitts)	233 4691 233 5245 (direct) 233 4691/4735	940 1093	Duty AUS
A C Galsworthy PS/SofS (PA Miss Williams)	233 5791 233 5340 233 5791/5783	542 7069	Over weekend contact Robert Culshaw
I A Roberts News Dept	233 3219	0732 822256	At No 10 on Sa for Press Conf
M Hilton News Dept	233 8618/4112/ 4329	349 4379	
W K Prendergast SAfD (PA Miss Easter)	233 5189 233 5874 (direct) 233 3735	274 8445	Office/MH over the w/e
C A K Cullimore CAfD (PA Maggie Handley)	233 4176 233 8665 (direct) 233 8154	0892 31044	Office over the w/e
T T Macan CCD	233 3366 233 5326 (direct)	01 892 2827	MH on Sun pm
C T W Humfrey SAfD	233 4954	946 5075	
Ms C M McComb WAD	233 5274	226 7398	
R N Culshaw	233 4641	670 3043	Radio pager No 0893 785381 Sun pm at MH
S L Cowper-Coles	233 5142 233 3609	228 7830	Sat lunchtime 073 782 2633 Sun lunchtime 0483 272099
J Harrod APS/PUS	233 5501	722 7488	
D I Lewty CAfD	233 5485	876 3681	
Car Pool (for standby car)	212 6548		

END


SUGAR

1. There are no Community or British imports.
2. But it would be a matter for the EC and we could not act unilaterally.
3. We would have to say, in any conclusions, is; "the UK is also prepared to support similar measures to ban imports of sugar from South Africa".


A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2049</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Telegram N° 1027 dated 1 August 1986</i>	
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R.C. Arora,
Deputy High Commissioner.

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सत्यमेव जयते

Telephone: 01-436 8484 EXT.

Telegram: HICOMIND. LONDON, W.C.2.

भारत का हाई कमिश्न
लन्दन

THE HIGH COMMISSION OF INDIA.

DEPARTMENT.

INDIA HOUSE,

ALDWYCH,

LONDON, WC2B 4NA

Our Reference:

No.946/DHC/86

August 1, 1986.

Dear Mr. Powell,

This is to confirm that the meeting for the Prime Minister of United Kingdom, the Right Hon'ble Margaret Thatcher, with the Prime Minister of India, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, has been arranged for 12.30 p.m. on Sunday, 3 August, 1986, at the Churchill Hotel (Penthouse Suite).

Yours sincerely,

(R.C. Arora)

Mr. C.D. Powell,
Private Secretary to Prime Minister,
Prime Minister's Office,
10, Downing Street,
London SW1.

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bc pc



✓ RWAHM

Prime Minister

10 DOWNING STREET

CDP 1/8

From the Private Secretary

1 August 1986

mt
Dear Tony,

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

I spoke today to Herr Neuer who is with Chancellor Kohl on holiday in Austria, and briefly with the Chancellor himself, about the possibility that the Prime Minister would feel constrained to agree to one or two further measures against South Africa at the forthcoming Commonwealth Review Meeting. This letter records the upshot of our conversations.

I said that the Prime Minister had very much in mind the undertaking which she had given Chancellor Kohl not to adopt further measures against South Africa without consulting him. She wanted him to know that, at the forthcoming Commonwealth Review Meeting, it was her intention to go no further than make plain that the United Kingdom would not stand out against the implementation of the measures against South Africa identified by the European Council if, at the end of the three month period set aside for Sir Geoffrey Howe's European mission, the other members of the Community were agreed to impose them. However, she could not entirely exclude the possibility that she would come under strong pressure to impose one or two measures on the spot and would find it politic to agree to do so. I emphasised that the Prime Minister hoped to avoid this but could not be sure. The measures to which she might in these circumstances agree would be a voluntary ban on new investment in South Africa and a voluntary ban on the promotion of tourism to South Africa. The Prime Minister wanted Chancellor Kohl to know of this contingency plan. In view of her undertaking to him, she also wanted to be confident that it would not cause him undue difficulty.

Chancellor Kohl understood the Prime Minister's position. His view remained that sanctions would not be effective in bringing about internal reform in South Africa. He was no less opposed to them than when he and the Prime Minister had discussed the matter in June. I said that the Prime Minister was equally opposed to economic sanctions. Any measures taken would be presented as a signal of our disapproval of apartheid. Chancellor Kohl asked to be kept closely in touch and, if possible, warned before we announced a decision to take additional measures. I said that we would do our best to get in touch. Finally Chancellor Kohl represented most strongly that we should not

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tell anyone in Bonn what we had in mind. He would prefer this to be a personal understanding between himself and the Prime Minister. I said that we would observe this.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,
Chris Powell

(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 August 1986

T143(B) - On S. AFRICA - Relations
Pt. 13

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from Mr. Lange about the forthcoming Commonwealth Review Conference. The Prime Minister will wish to reply after the Conference. I should be grateful for a draft.

(CHARLES POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

file

BM

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

I attach a folder of basic background material for this meeting.

In the front you will find Ramphal's letter about the meeting and the OD paper.

Next a note on the reform measures taken by the South African government (A) and on measures against South Africa already taken by the UK (B).

Then come the papers on further possible measures and their effects as well as the legal implications (C).

A note at D spells out the scope for the UK to retaliate against Commonwealth countries.

We have assembled some 'black' material about the record of Commonwealth countries (E) which includes the Bandung Declaration.

Finally some material on aid to blacks in South Africa and to neighbouring countries is at F.

Your 'familiar' copies of basic documents - Lusaka, Nassam, European Council, EPG report - are in the envelope at the front.

C.D. POWELL

1 August 1986

BM2ATC

en

GRS 285

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FM NEW DELHI

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1018

OF 310601Z JULY 86

INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, CANBERRA, HARARE, LUSAKA

MY TELNO 1012 AND TELECON WITH DICKINSON (SAD):

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

1. SEN (PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY) GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION LATE YESTERDAY EVENING:

(A) MRS THATCHER HAD ACCEPTED MR GANDHI'S INVITATION TO LUNCH ON 3 AUGUST.

(B) MR GANDHI WOULD CALL ON MRS THATCHER FOR A BILATERAL MEETING BEFORE LUNCH ON 3 AUGUST.

(C) IT DID NOT LOOK AS IF A MEETING WITH MR HURD WOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S AIM DURING HIS TIME IN LONDON WAS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE REVIEW MEETING. A GREAT MANY REQUESTS FOR BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH PROMINENT INDIANS AND OTHERS HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN.

2. SEN ALSO GAVE ME THE LIST OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING THE PRIME MINISTER. NOT ALL OF THEM WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS IN LONDON. QUITE A NUMBER WOULD BE GOING STRAIGHT ON TO MEXICO. SEN WAS NOT, HOWEVER, ABLE TO SAY WHO WOULD BE DOING WHAT AND YOU MIGHT WISH TO ASK THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSION:

- PRIME MINISTER
- FOREIGN MINISTER (SHIV SHANKAR)
- MINISTER OF STATE MEA (FALEIRO)
- MINISTER OF TOURISM (MUFTI MOHAMMAD SAYED)
- MINISTER OF STATE RAILWAYS (SCINDIA)
- FOREIGN SECRETARY (VENKATESWARAN)
- PETROLEUM SECRETARY (RAMAKRISHNAN)

GALMR) (KUMARAMA

CONFIDENTIAL 11W

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IN ADDITION THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S PRIVATE OFFICE WOULD BE TRAVELLING WITH HIM:

GHAREKHAN (PRIVATE SECRETARY)
SEN (ASSISTANT PRIVATE SECRETARY)
SHARADA PRASAD (INFORMATION ADVISER)
MANI SHANKAR AIYER (SPOKESMAN)
GOPI AURORA (SPEECH WRITER/POLITICAL ADVISER)

BROOKFIELD

YYYY

NDHPAN 8618

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MR REEVE

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PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

-2-
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INDIA HOUSE,

ALDWYCH,

LONDON, W.C.2.

July 30, 1986

Dear Mr. Powell,

This is to confirm our Prime Minister's invitation to the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, for lunch at 1.00 P.M. on 3rd August 1986 at the Churchill Hotel.

An invitation card is being sent separately.

Yours sincerely,


P.C. Alexander

P.C. Alexander

Mr. C.D. Powell,
Private Secretary to Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW 1

*C.D.P.
31/7*

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM <i>2049</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: <i>Cradock to Powell dated 30 July 1986</i>	
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(10)
31/7

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1986

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Review Meeting, 3-5 August

I understand that the Prime Minister will be leaving for Edinburgh on Thursday afternoon, and has requested as much briefing material as possible before her departure for use at the Commonwealth Review Meeting.

I enclose the following background briefs (further copies will follow tomorrow) :

- Attitudes of six participating countries (including personality notes on delegations) - Brief A;
- Attitudes of other Commonwealth countries - Brief B;
- Possible further measures against South Africa as listed in the Commonwealth Accord (prepared by the Cabinet Office from the work done by MISCl18) - Brief C;
- Aid to Disadvantaged South Africans - Brief D;
- Assistance to South Africa's Neighbours - Brief E;
- Measures taken by the UK - Brief F;
- South Africa Internal - Brief G;

The last includes details on the full range of legislative measures implemented by the South African government since the Nassau CHOGM (your letter of 28 July refers) and a note on latest developments in the South African economy. None of these briefs has yet been seen by Sir Geoffrey Howe or by those who went with him to South Africa.

/The



The main Steering Brief will be finalised in the light of the discussions in OD and Cabinet tomorrow on the outcome of the Foreign Secretary's mission to Southern Africa and handling of the Review Meeting. We shall also provide bilateral briefs for the Prime Minister's use with the six individual Heads of Government which will reflect the line of the Steering Brief.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R N Culshaw', written in a cursive style.

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

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LCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1986

CDW
2/7.

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Review Meeting

This letter sums up the state of play following your letters of 28 and 29 July and our various telephone conversations.

President Kaunda. Bilateral fixed for 1730 on Saturday 2 August at the Churchill Hotel. We have written to the Zambian High Commissioner saying that the Prime Minister will be accompanied only by a note taker and making it clear that it is not normal practice in Britain to have press and television present at the opening stages of such meetings.

Sir Lynden Pindling. Bilateral fixed for 1100 on Sunday 3 August at No 10.

Mr Mulroney. Bilateral fixed for 1140 on Sunday at No 10. Sir Geoffrey Howe hopes also to see Mr Clark on 1 August.

Mr Gandhi. Bilateral fixed for 1230 on Sunday 3 August at the Churchill Hotel, followed by Mr Gandhi's lunch for the participating Heads of Government.

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In my letter of 23 July I undertook to let you know who would be meeting the Heads of Government on arrival. Mr Renton met Sir Lynden Pindling this morning, and will meet Mr Gandhi on Sunday. Mrs Chalker will meet Mr Mugabe on arrival at Gatwick on Saturday. Lady Young will meet President Kaunda, Mr Mulroney and Mr Hawke at Heathrow, also on Saturday.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R N Culshaw'.

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing St

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COMMONWEALTH: CHOCMA July 86
in London



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(1)

PRIME MINISTER

BILATERALS WITH COMMONWEALTH LEADERS

I attach some speaking notes which you could draw upon in speaking to other Commonwealth leaders in your bilaterals at the weekend.

It may well be necessary in the Commonwealth meeting itself to get tough and use to the full your powerful arguments about the perverse effect, indeed immorality of sanctions, as well as pointing to the poor record of many Commonwealth countries on human rights, racial harmony and so on.

But before getting to that stage, it would be well worth trying the Charm School approach of emphasising the areas of agreement and explaining just how far we are (and are not) prepared to go. This applies particularly to your meetings with Kaunda, Rajiv Gandhi and Pindling. I think that, for all the talk, most of them would relish avoiding a bust-up. If you can from the beginning convince them an acceptable conclusion can be reached by harmonious discussion, you can probably secure our objectives at less cost. The crucial factor will be exactly what you are prepared to say on further measures - eg that we are in principle prepared to take further measures of the sort identified by the European Council provided etc. I think you need to decide exactly what you are prepared to say on this crucial point, say it from the beginning and stick to it.

CJP

Charles Powell

30 July 1986

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SOUTH AFRICA: POINTS TO MAKE IN MEETINGS WITH
COMMONWEALTH LEADERS

1. There will be nothing to be gained from a public wrangle at this meeting. It would not benefit black people in South Africa. It would harm the Commonwealth. A display of unity and firmness of purpose on the other hand would make a very considerable impression, not least on the South African government.
2. In any case, there is a wide area of agreement on
 - detestation of apartheid, a wish to see it eliminated completely, a desire for political reform which gives black people a full part in running their country;
 - praise for the work of the EPG, disappointment at their failure and conviction that the South African government must bear a heavy share of the responsibility for this;
 - a determination to avoid or at least minimise bloodshed and suffering in South Africa;
 - readiness to consider taking further measures against South Africa.
3. Where we disagree is in our judgment of the effectiveness of general economic sanctions, and on the extent and timing of any further measures.
4. It's not a question of being for or against measures as such. The list of measures which we are already taking against South Africa is extensive. And because our links with South Africa are more substantial than those of any other Commonwealth country, our measures are those which have the most impact. So in practical terms - as opposed to words - we are doing more than anyone else.

5. We have now had Sir Geoffrey Howe's mission. The results so far are disappointing. And of course it was not helped by the refusal of some representatives of the black community in South Africa to cooperate with it, and the apparent determination of some governments to denigrate it. Botha's immediate reaction was no great surprise: we all know that the South African government are determined not to appear to yield to external pressure. The test will be whether the very strong demands for change which Sir Geoffrey Howe put to President Botha will sink in and be acted upon. There are important events in August such as the Nationalist Party Congress which could provide an occasion for decisions, although we have no exaggerated expectations.

6. The situation is that we are ready to discuss the implementation of some further measures against South Africa. But we cannot do so just within the Commonwealth framework. We have obligations to our partners in the European Community, particularly while we hold the Presidency. We are committed to reaching decisions jointly with them and in consultation with other industrialised countries.

Some
others
ind.
and

7. We made clear at the time that we would not be bound by the Nassau list. But we are in principle prepared to implement some of the measures on it, and others which are not on that list, provided that they are judged appropriate by the European Community as a whole when it has assessed the results of the Foreign Secretary's mission and provided similar measures are taken by other industrialised countries. Always remember that the impact of selected measures taken together by the industrialised countries will have far more practical impact as a signal of our determination to see apartheid ended than any declaration about general economic sanctions by the Commonwealth.

8. But we are not ready to contemplate general economic sanctions because we do not believe they will bring about internal change, but will only hurt the people we most want to help. It is an illusion, pure and simple, to believe that

only one last push is needed to bring about the collapse of the present system.

9. There should be enough common ground here for officials to work up a joint communiqué which we could all agree and would make a powerful impact.

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FM CANBERRA
TO DESKBY 301000Z FCO
TELNO 459
OF 300815Z JULY 1986

YOUR TELNO 319: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

1. AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS TELL ME THAT RAJIV GANDHI IS HOSTING A LUNCH FOR THE 7 HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON SUNDAY 3 AUGUST, THAT MR HAWKE HAS ACCEPTED HIS INVITATION AND THAT ACCORDING TO THEIR HIGH COMMISSION IN LONDON MRS THATCHER WILL BE ATTENDING THAT LUNCH.

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MR. REEVE

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PS/NO 10. DOWNING ST

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PRIME MINISTER

N.L.U
30.7)

Bill Heseltine has asked whether you have any views on whether there should be photographs of The Queen with the seven Commonwealth Heads of Government, which would be taken before the dinner at the Palace on Sunday evening. He says that there are arguments either way. It is normal for The Queen to be photographed with the heads of delegations attending Commonwealth conferences (though this is not a Commonwealth conference). On the other hand, photographs are not normally taken in the Palace when, e.g., a Head of Government comes for a meal.

Agree?

-yes but as we (I seem to remember) have a photograph when European Heads of State go to meet here in conference, Commonwealth Heads may also like to have one

N.L.W.

N. L. WICKS
29 July 1986

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OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

c: Mr Wicks

1. MR POWELL
2. PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE - MEDIA

This conference is going to be a media-festival with at least as much critical attention devoted to it as a Euro-Council or Economic Summit.

The media's interest can be simply summarised:

- is the Lady for turning?; and, if not
- will the Commonwealth crack up?

We have three problems in approaching and handling the conference:

- UK Government unity; and on this Thursday's Cabinet is very important
- the propensity for the six other nations present, and Ramphal, to brief extensively and immediately to your disadvantage; I shall need up-to-the-minute accounts of your line from the conference in order to argue your case fully and to counter theirs
- the likelihood that other leaders, notably Kaunda, will play everything for TV kicks; we must eliminate his chances (and that of others) for public posturing and lectures at your expense.

In short, this is going to be a very sensitive conference in which the use - indeed the manipulation - of the media will be a prime concern.

There are likely to be calls from Friday onwards for briefing from me and Christopher Meyer - and in my view we must always be seen to be acting together on the same platform. We shall need a clear pre-conference line which combines firmness with reasonableness.


As the conference arrangements are in the hands of the Commonwealth Secretariat, we shall have to strive to minimise the chances for mischief at photocalls. My strongest advice to you is to decline to say anything and to depart forthwith if any other leader shows the slightest inclination to harangue the media; such attempts will lose their point if you are not there to hear them.

I think it is also important on this occasion to decline to be doorstepped; the media are seldom, if ever, in the business of helpful quotes. Their business is conflict.

Finally, I cannot stress too strongly the importance of keeping me fully briefed if your position is to be protected. It would be particularly helpful if I could see you for a rundown on content, tone and line to be taken after each session/meal etc.

We must of course keep open the possibility of your giving interviews while the conference is in progress if they would serve your purpose. It may well be necessary to discourage the Foreign Secretary from doing so.

We are building a press conference by you into the programme at the end of the conference.



BERNARD INGHAM

29 July 1986

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bcpc



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

29 July, 1986.

Dear Robert,

**SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING:
PRIME MINISTER'S BILATERALS**

The Indian High Commissioner telephoned me this afternoon to extend an invitation to the Prime Minister on behalf of Mr. Gandhi to lunch with other Commonwealth Heads of Government attending the Review Meeting on Sunday, 3 August. I told the High Commissioner that the Prime Minister had herself offered to host lunch that day. But since she was also giving lunch on Monday, and since it appeared that Mr. Gandhi had also invited the other Commonwealth Heads of Government, I was sure that she would be ready to attend his lunch. I suggested to the High Commissioner that the Prime Minister's bilateral with Mr. Gandhi might take place immediately before the lunch, that is at 1230 at the Churchill Hotel. The High Commissioner said that he would put this to Mr. Gandhi's office.

I am sure that the Prime Minister will be ready to meet President Kaunda at the Churchill Hotel rather than at No.10 on Saturday at 1730. It should be made clear to the Zambians in discussion of the arrangements that it is not the practice in this country to have Press and Television present for the opening stages of such meetings.

I have seen a copy of Ottawa telegram No. 490 dealing with a possible bilateral with Mr. Mulroney. This would be hard to accommodate in the Prime Minister's programme. But it seems to me that they will have plenty of opportunities to talk both at lunch on Sunday and in the margins of the Meeting itself. I suggest that this might be explained to Mr. Mulroney's office. Were he to persist in seeking a bilateral before the start of the Meeting, I am sure the Prime Minister would do her best to find the time.

Yours sincerely,

C.D. Powell

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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OF 290802Z JULY 86

Mr Reere (4)

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YOUR TELNO 319: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

MR HAWKE'S OFFICE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S
INVITATION, BUT ARE UNABLE TO GIVE US A REPLY BEFORE TOMMORROW.

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TO DESKBY 290800Z FCO

TELNO 490

OF 282155Z JULY 86

INFO IMMEDIATE NASSAU, CANBERRA, NEW DELHI, HARARE, LUSAKA

YOUR TELNO 319: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

1. MR MULRONEY'S OFFICE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION AND WILL GIVE US HIS RESPONSE TOMORROW.
2. MEANWHILE MR MULRONEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW IF THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE FREE TO MEET HIM FOR A BILATERAL DISCUSSION EITHER OVER LUNCH ON THE SATURDAY OR ANY TIME FROM 7PM THAT EVENING. IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE FREE TO JOIN HIM FOR DINNER, MR MULRONEY WOULD WELCOME THAT.
3. THE NOTE STRUCK BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE WAS RATHER MORE FORTHCOMING THAN THAT OF DEA OFFICIALS, WHO TOLD DHC THIS AFTERNOON OF MULRONEY'S PLANS FOR SEPARATE BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH THE OTHER FIVE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND WITH RAMPHAL, AND SAID, IN ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION, THAT THE MEETING AT MARABEL WAS REGARDED AS THE BILATERAL WITH BRITAIN AHEAD OF THE REVIEW MEETING.
4. GRATEFUL TO KNOW PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSE.

DAY

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MR REEVE.

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FM NASSAU
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 187
OF 282035Z JULY 86
INFO IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, HARARE, LUSAKA

YOUR TELNO 319 TO OTTAWA : COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

1. SIR L PINDLING ASKS THAT HIS THANKS BE CONVEYED TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE LUNCH INVITATION ON SUNDAY 3 AUGUST, BUT TELLS ME THAT HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND SINCE HE HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FROM MR GANDHI FOR LUNCH ON THAT DAY.

HEAP

YYYY

NCLNAN 0738

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JPW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1986

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

Could I make one further request for background material for this meeting, in addition to those in my letter of earlier today. That is for the fullest statement possible of measures which the South African Government has implemented in legislative form since the Nassau Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in the direction of reducing apartheid and of political reform.

BF

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

The Foreign Secretary will be reporting to the Prime Minister on Wednesday on the outcome of his recent visit to South Africa and providing advice on tactics at the Commonwealth Review Meeting. In the meantime you may find it helpful to have some pointers as to what the Prime Minister would regard as a tolerable outcome to the Review Meeting, so that you can take account of them in preparing briefing. The elements which she is resigned to seeing in an acceptable package are:

- some strongish criticism of the South African Government's failure to take the steps required for the EPG mission to succeed;
- acknowledgement (probably grudging) of the existence of the European initiative and the UK's obligation to move in step with its EC partners;
- recognition that unanimous decisions on future measures are not therefore possible at this stage;
- statement that nonetheless the great majority of Commonwealth countries believe such measures to be required immediately and are ready to implement them;
- identification of measures which should be taken, preferably as an indicative list;
- declaration of the United Kingdom's readiness to implement some further measures from this list, provided
 - (a) they are judged appropriate by the European Community as a whole, when it has assessed the results of the Foreign Secretary's mission and
 - (b) similar measures are taken by other industrialised countries.

This follows the lines of the "post-dated cheque" solution canvassed in the Foreign Secretary's earlier minute. You will note that one element speaks of "declaration of the United Kingdom's readiness to implement some further measures". The Prime Minister's strong preference would still be to have language which spoke of "not excluding" further measures.

When it comes to further measures, priority obviously needs to be given to the four measures identified at the

European Council in June. Any further measures should be such as to have only the limited effects, for instance a ban on the promotion of tourism and the introduction of a visa regime for South Africa.

I am passing this on to you privately as an indication of the Prime Minister's views, so that you can take account of it in work being put in hand for the Commonwealth Review Meeting. We do not want it in any way trailed publicly. I should be grateful if the letter could be shown to a limited number of people only.

I am copying this letter to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



10 DOWNING STREET

CDP,

Re: Commonwealth Review
meeting on South Africa.

When will you require
the briefing by? (I will
be collecting).

Do you agree the following
list for copies?

PM

~~NELO~~

CDP

BI


Press Office

Sir P.C.

Duty Clerk.

G:U
28/7

A The National Archives

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING: BILATERALS

I have now been able to discuss with the Prime Minister the bilaterals she would like to hold before the Commonwealth Review Meeting.

The Prime Minister would like to see President Kaunda at 1730 on Saturday 2 August at No.10. She would prefer to see him with just a note-taker present.

The Prime Minister would like to see Sir Lynden Pindling at 1100 on Sunday 3 August at No.10.

The Prime Minister would also like to have a bilateral with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. I note that he does not arrive until 1100 on Sunday 3 August. One possibility would be to invite him to No.10 for a bilateral more or less immediately he arrives in central London, for instance 1215.

I should be grateful if you could establish urgently whether these meetings are agreeable to those concerned.

The Prime Minister has raised a further point and that is lunch on Sunday. There appears to be no provision in the programme for a collective lunch. The Prime Minister would herself be happy to offer an informal lunch here at Downing Street to the Heads of Government (and no doubt the Commonwealth Secretary General) in addition to the lunch already planned for Monday. Among other things this could have the advantage of disrupting plans by the others to get together to plan joint tactics for the meeting. I should be grateful if you could establish urgently with the Commonwealth Secretary General and others whether an invitation to such a lunch would be regarded as helpful. It would start at 1300 and be over by 1430 to enable those present to get to the opening session of the Commonwealth Meeting at Marlborough House at 3pm.

(CHARLES POWELL)

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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TO DD 270730Z FCO LONDON
TELNO 185
OF 262030Z JULY 86

FOLLOWING STRICTLY PERSONAL FOR RESIDENT CLERK FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

PLEASE PASS STRICTLY PERSONAL TO CHARLES POWELL, NO. 10 FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.

FCO TELNO 161 : SUNDAY TELEGRAPH ARTICLE.

1. THANK YOU FOR WARNING US. WE HAVE NOW RECEIVED THE TEXT AT OUR REQUEST FROM ROBERT CULSHAW. I HAVE SHOWN IT TOGETHER WITH YOUR TELEGRAM TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.
2. HE UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES YOUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT OR CURTAIL PUBLICATION OF THE ARTICLE. AS YOU REALISE, ALTHOUGH IT CONTAINS SOME POSITIVE THINGS, IT ALSO CONTAINS SOME MATERIAL WHICH COULD NOT BE LESS HELPFUL. THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE MEDIA ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS (WITHOUT REGARD TO THE FACT THAT SOME OF THEM ARE NOT NEW) ON THOSE BITS WHICH ARE LEAST HELPFUL. AND EACH FOREIGN READER WILL BE STRUCK BY THOSE BITS WHICH MOST REINFORCE (OR DISTURB) HIS OWN THINKING. FOR INSTANCE THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE IS NO WHITE INVOLVEMENT IN THE TROUBLES IN MOZAMBIQUE IS BOUND TO UPSET MACHEL, WHO HAS BEEN DOING HIS BEST TO HELP US. ALL THIS WILL UNDERMINE THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S EFFORTS TO CONVINCe BLACK LEADERS OF OUR SINCERITY OF PURPOSE.
3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VIEW IS THAT THE FOCUS OF THE WHOLE EXERCISE IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED HAS ALREADY EXTENDED BEYOND ITS ORIGINAL AIM OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA ON TO THE DEFENCE OF BRITISH INTERESTS WHICH ARE INCREASINGLY THREATENED BY SOME OF OUR COMMONWEALTH PARTNERS. THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH ARTICLE WILL CERTAINLY NOT DIMINISH THAT THREAT.
4. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL GIVE FURTHER ADVICE ON THE PROSPECTS OF ANY HELPFUL MOVE BY THE SAG FOLLOWING HIS TWO FURTHER MEETINGS WITH PIK BOTHA SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW AND TUESDAY, AND HIS MEETING WITH P W BOTHA ON TUESDAY. THE INITIAL RECEPTION, AS YOU KNOW, WAS TRUCULENT AND TOTALLY OBLIVIOUS OF THE PRESSURES IN THE OUTSIDE WORLD. HERE TOO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FEARS THAT THE GENERAL TONE OF THE ARTICLE IS UNLIKELY TO INCREASE HIS LEVERAGE WITH THE BOTHAS.
5. IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VIEW THE MESSAGE WE NEED TO GET ACROSS IN THE RUN UP TO THE COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING IS HMG'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THE IDEALS SET OUT IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE NASSAU DECLARATION, AND IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT LETTERS TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND ROBERT MUGABE. WE SHOULD BE MAKING IT CLEAR ABOVE ALL THAT WE HAVE TAKEN MEASURES AND THAT WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER MORE. THE SOLE QUESTION IS ONE OF JUDGEMENT AS TO WHEN SUCH MEASURES, AND WHICH MEASURES, ARE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE IN STIMULATING THE CHANGES WHICH WE ALL WANT. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY IS STRUCK BY THE LACK OF REALISATION IN MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF THE EXTENT OF WHAT WE HAVE DONE ALREADY IN TERMS OF ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA : CONTINUING ATTACKS ON THE IMMORALITY OF SANCTIONS TEND TO UNDERMINE OUR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION.

6. IN FACT A NUMBER OF RECENT EPISODES HAVE JARRED WITH THE GENERAL IMPRESSION WHICH WE NEED TO GIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FOR EXAMPLE AGREED AT THEIR SUBSEQUENT MEETING THAT INTERVIEWS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE SHE WENT TO CANADA MEAN THAT HIS EC MISSION WAS LESS WELL RECEIVED BY AFRICAN LEADERS THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. THIS WAS WHY HE ADVISED IN HIS MINUTE OF 15 JULY THAT WE NEEDED TO CONCENTRATE OUR MORAL INDIGNATION ON APARTHEID AND THOSE WHO UPHOLD IT. IT IS ALSO WHY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY EMPHASISED THE NEED TO SEEK OPENINGS FOR THE RIGHT KIND OF STATEMENTS ON THE COMMONWEALTH GAMES.

7. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE RIGHT RESPONSE FROM US, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY BELIEVES THAT THE IMPRESSION WILL CONTINUE TO GROW IN COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES THAT WE ARE THE DEFENDERS OF APARTHEID AND THAT MATERIAL THREATS TO OUR INTERESTS WILL MOUNT. THERE HAS BEEN PLENTY OF EVIDENCE OF THIS IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE RECENT JIC ASSESSMENT, AND IN TELEGRAMS FROM POSTS IN AFRICA. (FOR INSTANCE ADDIS ABABA TELEGRAM NO 244 AND HARARE TELNO 316, WHICH ARE THE ONLY EXAMPLES WE HAVE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT). IF AN ALMOST INDELIBLY WRONG IMPRESSION HAS BEEN CREATED THEN CORRECTIVE STATEMENTS NEED TO BE CLEARLY AND OFTEN REPEATED IF THEY ARE TO HAVE AN OFFSETTING EFFECT.

8. THE REAGAN SPEECH GAVE A FURTHER TWIST, AND WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE DANGERS. ALTHOUGH 90% OF WHAT HE SAID WAS FINE, MEDIA ATTENTION FOCUSSED ONLY ON THE REMAINING 10%, AND AS A RESULT THIS WAS ALL AFRICAN LEADERS NOTICED. THEY THEREFORE THINK THE SPEECH WAS LIMITED TO AN ATTACK ON THE ANC AND AN ASSURANCE TO THE SAG THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST THEM.

9. THIS HAS REBOUNDED IN CONGRESS AS WELL, APPARENTLY IN WAYS THAT EXCEEDED THE PRESIDENT'S EXPECTATIONS. ALL THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NOW HAVE TO ACCEPT MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES SOONER THAN THEY HAD INTENDED. THIS WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE UK'S OWN EXPOSURE.

10. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS CAST INCREASING DOUBT ON THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S EARLIER ADVICE THAT THE VERY MINIMUM WE COULD GET AWAY WITH AT THE COMMONWEALTH REVIEW CONFERENCE WOULD BE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SPECIFIED LIMITED MEASURES IF THE MISSION HAD NOT ACHIEVED TANGIBLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, AND TO RECOMMEND THEM TO THE EC AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES.

11. MEANWHILE AS REGARDS THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH ARTICLE, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL DO EVERYTHING HE CAN ALONGSIDE WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE WHICH WILL BE CAUSED IF IT RECEIVES WIDESPREAD MEDIA ATTENTION. THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS WOULD BE TO MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO POINT UP THOSE ELEMENTS IN IT WHICH ARE POSITIVE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF COMMONWEALTH LEADERS:

- PRAISE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WORLD-GIRDLING GROUP AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISH FOR IT TO SAY TOGETHER,
- THE REPUGNANCE FELT FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE SAG,
- THE PRIME MINISTER'S CERTAINTY THAT APARTHEID WILL COME TO AN END AND HER WISH TO SEE THAT HAPPEN,
- THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN FOR DEATHS, WHETHER BLACK OR WHITE, AND HER CONDEMNATION OF THE ACTION AGAINST STEVE BIKKO AS BEING 'ABSOLUTELY APPALLING',
- HER ENDORSEMENT OF THE NEED TO RELEASE MANDELA AND LIFT THE BAN ON THE ANC,
- HER WISH TO SEE MORE OBVIOUS AND VISIBLE SIGNS THAT THE SAG ARE GOING TO GET RID OF APARTHEID.

12. DESPITE ALL THIS WE ARE IN GOOD HEART FOR OUR NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WITH THE BOTHAS.

MOBERLY

YYYY

POHPAN 6559

NNNN

*Heads of Gov't meeting:
Commonwealth July 86*

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PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

The Commonwealth Review Meeting is just a week away. The main outlines of the situation which will confront you are becoming clear.

The background

We shall have no concrete progress to show on the release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC. At best, we shall have hints that the South African government will take these steps, but on conditions and in their own time. There may be a promise of further reforms following the Nationalist Party Convention in mid-August. This should be enough - just - to keep the Foreign Secretary's mission alive and justify further meetings with the South Africans in September.

We shall have made some progress in coordinating views with other industrialised countries on the sort of measures against South Africa which may be needed. But the US Government's stand against sanctions is quite likely to be hijacked by Congress, in September if not before. This will be widely perceived and will make us appear as the main opponent of further measures, and thus the main target for pressure.

The other participants in the Review Conference will rapidly coordinate a common position on further measures. While Kaunda and Mugabe may start by demanding comprehensive mandatory sanctions, they will probably move quite quickly off this. The basic position of the others will be the Nassau list plus, to be implemented immediately. They will press very hard for this. We shall be confronted with a 6:1 split.

There will be threats of unpleasant steps to be taken if there is no agreement. These will range from simply going ahead with measures against South Africa without us, through the holding of an emergency CHOGM to an immediate decision to

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require withdrawal of High Commissioners and/or suspend Commonwealth membership. In practice I doubt whether the others would go beyond an emergency CHOGM at this stage. But one cannot discount the possibility that one or other of the less stable will be carried away by their own rhetoric into more drastic measures.

Our objectives

Your aims will be:

- to rule out comprehensive mandatory sanctions;
- to establish that the EC mission must be allowed to run its full course and its results assessed before we are ready to consider any further measures (bearing in mind the need not to let down Chancellor Kohl);
- not to rule out further measures but to indicate those which we would consider (i.e. those agreed by the European Council perhaps with one or two minor additions) if no progress has been achieved by the end of September.

The sort of agreed package towards which we might work would include the following elements:

- some strongish criticism of the South African Government's failure to take the steps required for the EPG mission to succeed;
- grudging acknowledgement of the existence of the European initiative and the UK's obligation to move in step with its EC partners;
- recognition that unanimous decisions on future measures are not therefore possible at this stage;
- statement that nonetheless the great majority of Commonwealth countries believe such measures to be required immediately and are ready to implement them;
- identification of measures which should be taken, preferably as an indicative list;
- declaration of the United Kingdom's readiness to implement some further measures from this list, provided (a) they are judged appropriate by the European partners.

Would not include them if no further progress

Commonwealth: July 1986

Heads of Gov't meeting on South Africa

Prime Minister (2)

By his standards, Ransford's letter and paper are not too contentious.

I don't think that we need waste much energy objecting to them. But we could ask that the Foreign Secretary report to

Ref. A086/2175

MR POWELL

Commonwealth Review Meeting: 3-5 August

Sir Peter Marshall, Deputy Secretary-General (Economic) of the Commonwealth, called on Sir Robert Armstrong on 25 July to discuss the forthcoming Review Meeting on Heads of Government in London.

He needs, since he has been to South Africa more recently than

- 2. He gave Sir Robert the attached draft of a letter which the Secretary-General proposes to send to the Prime Minister, and
- the attached background paper for the Review Meeting. Sir Robert Armstrong commented on the draft letter that -

than N EPG. CDD 25/7

i. the closing paragraphs, with their appeal to Commonwealth unity, went beyond his conception of the role of a Secretary-General and would, in his view, be better omitted;

ii. the draft agenda proposed in the letter for the Review Meeting went beyond the terms of the Nassau Accord which gave the Review Meeting only the role of determining whether there had been adequate progress in South Africa in the past six months.

3. Sir Peter Marshall replied to the first point by saying that, while the closing paragraphs of the proposed letter did indeed go beyond the Secretary-General's proper role, the latter had been pressed by others in the Secretariat to go even further and would be most unlikely to withdraw these paragraphs. It would be best, Sir Peter implied, to take no particular notice of these paragraphs. On the second point, Sir Peter accepted Sir Robert's interpretation of the terms of the Nassau Accord

but argued that discussion of possible further measures would be inevitable at the Review Meeting and that the proposed agenda said only that they should be given "consideration".

4. Sir Peter Marshall made two suggestions. His first, which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office may wish to consider, was that we might circulate a paper at the Review Meeting showing the devastating effects which South African retaliation against sanctions could have on other states in southern Africa. Sir Robert replied that such action ran the risk of a response at the meeting from Zimbabwe and Zambia to the effect that they were willing to accept these sacrifices, and challenged the United Kingdom to pay a price as well. Sir Peter Marshall's other suggestion was that the Prime Minister might wish to have a bilateral meeting with Sir Lynden Pindling, whose role as Chairman would be important. Sir Lynden is due to reach London at 11.00 am on Wednesday 30 July. Sir Robert thinks there would be advantage in the Prime Minister seeing him, perhaps on 1 or 2 August, after the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has reported on his present trip to southern Africa.

I am
dealing
separately
with this

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Private Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

MS

M C STARK

25 July 1986



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 July 1986

Dear Charles,

Commonwealth Review Meeting

Thank you for your letters of 16 and 24 July.

We would see advantage in the Prime Minister meeting the participants on arrival, but the practical problems are formidable. Their arrivals are spread out over four days : see attached schedule. Not to accord all equal treatment is asking for trouble, but for the Prime Minister to do this would impose a severe burden on her time. The Foreign Secretary therefore takes the view that it would be right for FCO Ministers of State to take on this task at Heathrow and Gatwick. I had hoped to let you know by now how these duties would be allocated, but this information will have to follow.

We do however see considerable advantage in bilaterals, particularly with Sir Lyndon Pindling as Chairman of the meeting, with Mr Kaunda and possibly also with Mr Hawke. A bilateral with Mr Gandhi is more difficult purely on time grounds: we are looking at this separately in the context of the suggestion in Stephen Boys Smith's letter of 15 July (which the Foreign Secretary also fully supports, if time allows it) that the Home Secretary should have talks with

/Mr Gandhi



Mr Gandhi about the Sikh problem. Given the timing constraints a working breakfast on either the Monday or the Tuesday looks the best opportunity: would the Home Secretary wish to offer this? Otherwise it may only be possible at the last moment to determine whether such talks can be fitted in.

I am copying this letter to Stephen Boys Smith at the Home Office.

Yours ever

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'R N Culshaw' with a stylized flourish at the end.

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St



COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Arriving Head of Government</u>
Thursday 31 July	1000	Heathrow	Sir Lyndon ² Pindling
Saturday 2 August	0600	Heathrow	Mr Kaunda
" "	0740	Gatwick	Mr Mugabe
" "	1000	Heathrow	Mr Mulroney
" "	1245	Heathrow	Mr Hawke
Sunday 3 August	1105	Heathrow	Mr Gandhi

C. Hoag in border: Commonwealth A. F. H.

July '86.



RF FOR FRIDAY 1/8



10 DOWNING STREET

CF

We shall need
these when we
put together
briefing for next
week's
meeting. Commonwealth

Meanwhile please copy
the letter & the paper
(but not the board
documents) to R N
Cubhan FCO under
my compliments.
CSP

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING: ARRANGEMENTS

I set out below some thoughts on the arrangements for this meeting.

Briefing

The Foreign Secretary gets back on the morning of Wednesday, 30 July. You have an hour with him that evening to discuss the outcome of his mission and what he should say to Cabinet. There is a slot for an OD the following morning (allocated to Falklands Force levels, but we may be able to settle that), which would be an opportunity for wider Ministerial consideration, before Cabinet later the same morning. Cabinet would be asked to approve a general approach to the Review Meeting but not a detailed mandate. We would look for a slot for a final briefing meeting on the Saturday or Sunday (the Review Conference starts at 3.00 pm).

Arrival arrangements

I have consulted the Foreign Office on whether you should meet some of the Heads of Government on arrival. They advise that you could not meet some without meeting all: and that the arrival times are so spread out as to require too many trips to the airport. It might be possible to meet most of them at some central point in London if they were helicoptered in. But the FCO have not taken up this suggestion; formally we are not hosts to the meeting; and the timings of arrival for some of them would be impossible for you.

Agree not to pursue the idea of meeting them on arrival?

Or

Disband it
PM
CDD
2577

Agree
not
to

RESTRICTED

Instruct FCO to arrange for them to be helicoptered to a central point where you would meet some of them at least?

Bilaterals

The FCO recommend that you seek bilaterals with Pindling, Kaunda and Hawke. I would not attach so much importance to Hawke, but would give priority to Gandhi and Mugabe.

I therefore suggest the following timetable (bearing in mind that you have to have Saturday lunch in the country with the Sultan of Oman):

Saturday 2 August:

1700 Meeting with Sir Lynden Pindling
1800 Meeting with President Kaunda
1900 Meeting with Mr. Mugabe

Sunday 3 August

Working lunch with Mr. Gandhi (assuming he is not already committed; otherwise meeting just before or after lunch.

Agree?

CDP

(C. D. POWELL)

25 July 1986

RESTRICTED

PRIME MINISTER

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

In the attached folder you will find:

- (i) a note on the practical arrangements for the meeting, on which some decisions are needed;
- (ii) the Commonwealth Secretary-General's introductory letter and background paper for the meeting; and
- (iii) a note by me on the meeting, on which decisions are also needed.

C D P

C D POWELL

25 July 1986



DG2AIN
lee
bc pc

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 July 1986

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

I wrote some time ago to ask for recommendations on bilaterals which the Prime Minister might have with Heads of Government attending the Commonwealth Review Meeting on South Africa in early August.

I should report that the Zambian High Commissioner has today been in touch to say that President Kaunda would very much like a bilateral with the Prime Minister, preferably in the early evening of Saturday 2 August. I told him that I was sure the Prime Minister would like to see the President, and indeed we had ourselves intended to propose such a meeting. I was not in a position yet to propose an exact time until I knew the arrival arrangements of the other participants, but I expected a meeting on the Saturday evening to be possible.

I hope you can now let me have more details of arrival arrangements so that we can start to plan bilaterals on the Saturday evening and Sunday morning.

BF
(connect)
to C/P to
FEO 16/7

Charles Powell

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Covering CONFIDENTIAL

C.152-40/3

22 July, 1986

EDP
317

I write to confirm arrangements for the Heads of Government Review Meeting to be held from 3 to 5 August at Marlborough House. Your officials have been in close touch with us in recent weeks, and I hope you have been receiving all the information to date on our preparations. I am now in a position to send to you directly the limited documentation we have prepared and to inform you of final arrangements.

I am grateful for the general concurrence I have had in the meeting starting at 3.00 p.m. on Sunday. The first session from 3.00 to 4.15 should, I feel, provide an opportunity for the meeting to begin the review of developments since Nassau, and to invite the Co-Chairmen of the Eminent Persons Group (as envisaged in my earlier letter) to join it at, say, 3.30, to talk with Heads of Government before the tea-break, continuing, if necessary, over tea. I would not expect you to make further calls on them, although if you wish, they could be asked to remain on standby.

You agreed generally with my initial proposition that the London meeting should be as informal as consistent with its objectives. In keeping with this, I have tried to limit documentation to the minimum. The Report of the Eminent Persons Group is, of course, the central document before the meeting and I am enclosing further copies of the initial version prepared in the Secretariat. I am sending you only one document and making another available through normal Government channels. The first, which I enclose, is a Note from me placing the meeting and the issues before it in the setting of the Nassau Accord and the work of the Eminent Persons Group. The second is a technical paper prepared in the Secretariat, which aims to help provide some analysis and information on possible measures against South Africa. It is not by any means a definitive document and we would, in fact, welcome supplementation from Governments. I hope, however, that it can be of some assistance.

2/

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
10 Downing Street
London SW1

You have only a limited time for the meeting since we cannot go beyond noon on Tuesday. The social engagements take full account of this. Her Majesty the Queen is inviting Heads of Government to Dinner on Sunday evening (8.00 for 8.15); it will be an intimate occasion held in Her Majesty's private apartments. I am explaining to colleagues that the Buffet Lunch at 'No. 10' on Monday to which you are inviting them has been specially arranged so as not to put pressure on the meeting and to allow for conversations over lunch. My own Reception on Monday evening will be a small one, allowing Heads of Government to meet a number of those closely engaged in Commonwealth affairs in Britain; but strictly limited in time to allow you to leave by 7.45.p.m.

As regards the Agenda for the meeting, I assume you would want to follow the process envisaged in the Nassau Accord. As such, I see the need only for two basic items of discussion. First, a review of the situation since Nassau, which will provide an opportunity for you to consider the EPG Report and to address the question whether, in the six months of their work (i.e. since 1 January, 1986), there has been "adequate progress" within the meaning of paragraph 7 of the Accord. The second item is consideration of the adoption of further measures against South Africa if the meeting concludes that there has not been "adequate progress". I would hope that the first item can be taken quite far on Sunday afternoon, leaving most of Monday available for the question of further measures. On this basis, a possible Agenda might be as follows:

Draft Agenda

1. Review of the situation since Nassau
 - (a) The Report of the Eminent Persons Group
 - (b) Has there been adequate progress?
2. Consideration of further measures
3. Any other business
4. Communique.

I merely offer this as a basis for consideration. You will wish, when you meet on Sunday, to determine how to proceed.

I do not need in this letter to traverse the ground so much trodden in recent weeks. The EPG's Report contains most of the material I would wish to bring to your notice; the papers I am sending seek to complement it. But I would be failing in my duty to you, and to the Commonwealth generally, if I did not underline what I know must be in your mind, namely, the immense importance that everyone in the Commonwealth attaches to the Review Meeting finding a consensus on the way forward. Indeed, that concern for our success exists beyond the Commonwealth among the many who count it an asset to the international community. The need to succeed derives mainly from the gravity of the issues in South Africa and the compelling importance of the Commonwealth continuing its work for a free and just South Africa so notably advanced by your decisions in Nassau and the ensuing EPG effort.

But the need for agreement in London arises also from the implications of failure for Commonwealth relations generally. The Commonwealth has faced many difficult situations in the past. It has become stronger for overcoming each of them. Its occasional vulnerability derives from the very diversity which is its strength, and arises when the balance tips too far over away from harmony. Restoring that balance will be a rather special and pressing challenge to the Review Meeting.

I know that you and all your colleagues attach the utmost importance to ensuring that Commonwealth relations continue to be sustained and that the Commonwealth itself grows in strength through performance consistent with its highest principles.

With deep respect,

Shridath S. Ramphal



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 July 1986

CRB 17/7

Dear Charles,

South Africa: Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

Thank you for your letter of 7 July which enclosed one from the Commonwealth Secretary General.

I understand that, when the Secretary General called on the Prime Minister on 9 July he agreed to her request to put back the Sunday start until 3.30 pm. That is the basis on which the Secretariat are now planning.

We doubt whether the presence in the wings of Mr Fraser and General Obasanjo will be helpful to us in managing the Review Meeting. But it is almost certainly unavoidable and it would seem best to acquiesce with good grace.

Since the point on timing has been dealt with, and the EPG attendance is subject only to a nihil obstat, we doubt if the Prime Minister need send a reply.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq.
PS/10 Downing Street

~~SALICA~~

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PT 11



EL3BIB



bc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 July 1986

COMMONWEALTH REVIEW MEETING

I have had a couple of thoughts about the arrangements for this meeting on which I would welcome your views. I have mentioned them to the Prime Minister but not pursued them with her.

The first concerns meeting arrangements. I wonder whether we should encourage the Prime Minister to meet some at least of the visitors, either at Heathrow or a special arrival ceremony such as was arranged for the London Economic Summit (at Kensington Palace as I recall). The obvious candidates are Kaunda, Mugabe, Gandhi and Pindling (as Chairman), though I can see that it would be difficult to discriminate. This might help create a good atmosphere for the meeting.

The second is whether we should seek separate bilaterals with some at least of the participants before the Review Meeting starts. The obvious candidates are Gandhi, Kaunda and Pindling.

PS

Would you let me know what you think?

CHARLES POWELL

PH

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

010

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

14 July 1986

We were not told of it
in advance of CDP 14/7.
I doubt that the
Prime Minister would agree. But
it is too late

Dear Ken,

Commonwealth Review Meeting: Entertainment

The Foreign Secretary takes the view that while there is no overriding requirement for The Queen to offer hospitality on this occasion, it is of course customary for Her to host some occasion for Commonwealth Heads of Government, and he would be content if She were to wish to do so again this time. He sees considerable advantage in any such hospitality coming as early as possible in the programme. Had lunch on Sunday been possible, that would have been his preference, but he understands that this would cause practical difficulties. He would not however wish to advise The Queen to offer hospitality any later than the Sunday evening, since to do so would run the risk of involving Her in what may be a controversial occasion.

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
I am copying this letter to Nigel Wicks.

Yours ever,
A C Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

K B A Scott Esq CMG
Buckingham Palace

A The National Archives

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10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

7 July 1986

**SOUTH AFRICA: COMMONWEALTH
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING**

BK

I enclose a copy of a further letter to the Prime Minister from the Commonwealth Secretary-General. (dated 6.7.86)

I should be grateful for a draft reply.

(Charles Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CC


4 July 1986

Dear Prime Minister,

I am most grateful for the replies I have received to my letter of 16 May about the Heads of Government Review Meeting next month and for confirmation that the arrangements I outlined in my letter are acceptable to you. We are now moving ahead with detailed planning and are in touch with your officials about administrative details.

It has become clear that because of the commitment of some Heads of Government proceedings will need to conclude promptly by noon on Tuesday, 5 August. As a consequence, and to ensure adequate time for deliberations, it has been suggested that your Meeting commences with an afternoon session from 3.00 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. on Sunday, 3 August. I hope that this proposed change will be acceptable to you and that I may now plan on that basis.

Some Heads of Government have also expressed the hope that the Co-Chairmen of the Eminent Persons Group, Mr Fraser and General Obasanjo, will be available in London at the time. It is not, of course, the intention that they should be involved substantively in the Meeting; it is felt, however, that Heads of Government might find it helpful to have an opportunity to talk to them informally at an appropriate occasion. Unless therefore I hear from you to the contrary, I propose to inform them accordingly.




Shridath S. Ramphal

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
London

South Africa Relations: SOUTH
AFRICA (H)





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