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PART 13 4074 42.3

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Arms Control Talks and the Effect on Nuclear Arms

SALT MBFR

Nuclear Advisory Panel.

Comprehensive Test Ban.

DEFENCE

PT1: May 1979

PT13: July 1987

PREM 19/2056

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~16.7.87.~~		~~1.10.87~~					
~~23.7.87~~		~~9.10.87~~					
~~28.7.87~~		~~20.10.87~~					
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INF: RATIFICATION
SUMMARY
1. MAIN THEMES OF INF RATIFICATION DEBATE LIKELY TO BE OBJECTIONS IN SOME QUARTERS TO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS GENERALLY (WITH EMPHASIS ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE), CONCERNS ABOUT EUROPEAN SECURITY, VERIFICATION, AND THE SENATE'S ROLE IN THE TREATY-MAKING PROCESS. ONLY 34 VOTES NEEDED TO BLOCK THE TREATY OR FORCE AN AMENDMENT. PROCESS LIKELY TO BE LENGTHY AND CUMBERSOME. SENATE CONSENT TO RATIFICATION STILL SEEMS THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME. BUT PROBABLY A CLOSE RUN THING.
DETAIL
2. NOW THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAVE SETTLED THE OUTSTANDING INF ISSUES, AND ASSUMING SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY DURING GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 7-10 DECEMBER, YOU MAY WELCOME A PREVIEW OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE RATIFICATION PROCESS SEEMS AT PRESENT LIKELY TO PLAY OUT. NUNN WILL HAVE THE MATTER VERY MUCH IN MIND DURING HIS VISIT TO LONDON ON 26 NOVEMBER.
3. THE ADMINISTRATION PLAN THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD FORWARD THE TREATY (AND THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT) TO THE SENATE ON ABOUT 20 DECEMBER. THE SENATE WILL THEN BEGIN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY NOW WHEN THE ADVICE AND CONSENT PROCESS WILL BE COMPLETED BUT THIS IS MOST UNLIKELY TO BE BEFORE MARCH/APRIL AT THE EARLIEST AND COULD BE AS LATE AS JUNE/JULY. THE SENATE COMMITTEE WITH PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TREATY WILL BE THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WHICH WILL HOLD HEARINGS AND TAKE A VOTE BEFORE THE TREATY GOES TO THE SENATE FLOOR. THE ARMED SERVICES AND INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES ARE ALSO LIKELY TO HOLD HEARINGS, THOUGH IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER ACTION IN EACH OF THE THREE COMMITTEES WILL BE SEQUENTIAL (WHICH WOULD OBVIOUSLY TAKE LONGER) OR IN PARALLEL. A FAVOURABLE VOTE BY TWO-THIRDS OF THE FULL SENATE IS REQUIRED

FOR CONSENT TO BE GIVEN TO RATIFICATION. LOOKED AT THE OTHER WAY ROUND, ONLY 34 VOTES ARE ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE A BLOCKING THIRD AGAINST RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

4. ONLY NINE MONTHS AGO, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HARD TO ARGUE AGAINST THE ACCEPTED WISDOM THAT ANY ARMS CONTROL TREATY NEGOTIATED BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD RECEIVE THE CONSENT OF THE SENATE WITHOUT UNDUE DIFFICULTY. BUYT THE SCENERY HAS CHANGED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THEN. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE DRAMATIC DECLINE OF THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY (THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR, ETC) HAS MADE IT MUCH EASIER FOR DOUBT TO BE CAST ON HIS POLICIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS, INCLUDING THE INF TREATY. SECONDLY, THE 1988 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS ALREADY CASTING ITS SHADOW BACKWARDS IN A WAY THAT COULD DIRECTLY AFFECT THE INF RATIFICATION DEBATE. THIRDLY, THERE IS NOW A MUCH SHARPER AWARENESS THAT THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE INF TREATY IS LIKELY TO HAVE VERY FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR ANY START TREATY THAT MAY BE CONCLUDED OVER THE COMING MONTHS, AS WELL AS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS GENERALLY. A TREATY WHICH MANY REGARDED EARLIER AS BEING OF ONLY MINOR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES IS THEREFORE NOW SEEN BY MANY AS A POSSIBLY CRUCIAL DETERMINANT OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMS CONTROL AND US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

5. THE SENATE (AND WIDER PUBLIC) DEBATE IS LIKELY TO FOCUS ON FOUR MAIN THEMES:

(A) WHETHER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE DESIRABLE IN PRINCIPLE. A HARD CORE OF CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN SENATORS IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO VOTE AGAINST RATIFICATION OUT OF OPPOSITION TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS GENERALLY ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PROCESS PRODUCES A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY AND UNDERMINES THE WILL OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS TO FUND NECESSARY DEFENCE (AND PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR) PROGRAMMES. THE NUMBER OF SUCH SENATORS MAY BE ABOUT TWENTY, BUT COULD BE HIGHER (NUNN'S OFFICE CURRENTLY ESTIMATE 15-20: THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CURRENT ESTIMATE IS 24, THOUGH ARMACOST'S ESTIMATE IS ONLY 14-18: AND WHITE HOUSE ESTIMATES VARY BETWEEN UNDER 20 AND 28). SUCH HARD CORE OPPONENTS OF THE TREATY ARE LIKELY TO STRESS SOVIET UNTRUSTWORTHINESS AND, IN PARTICULAR, SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PAST ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, A POINT ON WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION'S OWN APPROACH AND REPORTS WILL PROVIDE PLENTY OF USEFUL AMMUNITION (WHITE HOUSE CONTACTS ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION RUNS THE RISK OF BEING HOIST WITH ITS OWN PETARD IN THIS RESPECT). WHETHER THE NUMBER OF VOTES

AGAINST THE TREATY FOR THESE REASONS RISES MUCH ABOVE 20 WILL DEPEND TO AN IMPORTANT EXTENT ON WHETHER THE PRESIDENT IS ABLE TO EXERCISE REAL LEADERSHIP VIS-A-VIS MORE MODERATE REPUBLICAN ELEMENTS IN THE SENATE. IN THIS, THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT BE HELPED BY THE FACT THAT THE RANKING REPUBLICAN ON THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IS SENATOR HELMS, THE FOCAL POINT OF CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICAN OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY. THE WHITE HOUSE WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR SENIOR REPUBLICANS PREPARED TO TAKE A LEAD ON THE HILL IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY. DOLE WOULD BE THE ADMINISTRATION'S BEST CANDIDATE BUT HE HAS SO FAR HEDGED HIS BETS IN PUBLIC, NO DOUBT OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO ALIENATE THE CONSERVATIVE WING OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL BID. OTHER REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES FOR TAKING THE LEAD IN THE SENATE IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION ARE SENATORS LUGAR, STEVENS AND WARNER. SO FAR, THE PRESIDENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY HAVE SHOWN LITTLE SIGN OF BEING ABLE TO GIVE A REAL LEAD IN THIS RESPECT ON THE HILL:

(B) WHETHER THE TREATY IS GOOD FOR WESTERN AND IN PARTICULAR EUROPEAN SECURITY. THIS ASPECT OF THE DEBATE IS LIKELY TO FOCUS ON WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE LINKAGE OF SOME SORT BETWEEN THE INF TREATY AND OTHER SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. THE LINKAGE DEBATE SEEMS LIKELY TO TAKE A NUMBER OF FORMS. SOME COMMENTATORS ARE INTERESTED IN CREATING A LINKAGE WITH START AND HAVE BEEN POINTING OUT THAT THE INF TREATY WILL BRING NO SECURITY BENEFITS TO NATO UNLESS THE SOVIET ABILITY TO COVER SS20 TARGETS WITH SOVIET STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IS ALSO CONSTRAINED BY A START TREATY. OUR PRESENT ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, IS THAT PROPONENTS OF THIS LINE OF THOUGHT ARE UNLIKELY TO BE WILLING OR ABLE TO PRESS THE ISSUE TO THE POINT OF INSISTING ON FORMAL LINKAGE BETWEEN INF RATIFICATION AND A SATISFACTORY START RESULT. THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE LINKAGE DEBATE IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO BE BETWEEN THE INF TREATY AND THE CONVENTIONAL (AND CHEMICAL) IMBALANCE IN EUROPE. THIS IS A PREOCCUPATION OF MANY MODERATE SENATORS, BOTH REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT, WHO MAY SEEK REASSURANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT, BEFORE VOTING FOR THE INF TREATY, THAT STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM ARE IN HAND. THEIR VOTES, COMBINED WITH THOSE OF CONSERVATIVE

OPPONENTS OF THE TREATY AS AT (A) ABOVE, WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CONSTITUTE A BLOCKING THIRD. WE ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO SEE STRONG SENATE INTEREST IN RENEWED NATO COMMITMENTS TO CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE IMPROVEMENTS AND IN CLEAR EVIDENCE OF WESTERN READINESS TO ADDRESS THE IMBALANCE IN THE NEW CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS. WE UNDERSTAND, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NUNN IS CONSIDERING INSISTING THAT A SOUND WESTERN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL BE READY OR IN AN ADVANCED STATE OF PREPARATION BEFORE GIVING HIS CONSENT TO THE INF TREATY. AT PRESENT, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE RATIFICATION DEBATE WILL BE CONTAINABLE ALTHOUGH MUCH WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE SENATE PERCEIVES THE APPROACH OF EUROPEAN NATO GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONVENTIONAL (AND CHEMICAL) IMBALANCE PROBLEM:

(C) VERIFICATION. THE PRECISE DETAILS OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME WILL BE THE OBJECT OF EXTREMELY CLOSE SCRUTINY IN THE SENATE, AS WAS THE CASE WITH SALT II. THE SCRUTINY WILL BE PARTICULARLY CLOSE GIVEN THAT THE INF VERIFICATION REGIME WILL BE SEEN AS SETTING, IN LARGE PART, A PRECEDENT FOR THE START TREATY. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW TO PREDICT HOW THE VERIFICATION DEBATE MAY INFLUENCE THE VOTING OF PARTICULAR SENATORS ON THE TREATY AS A WHOLE. BUT THERE MAY BE SOME DEMOCRATS AS WELL AS REPUBLICANS WHO WILL HAVE OBJECTIONS ON VERIFICATION GROUNDS. THE DEBATE WILL CERTAINLY BE VOLATILE, AND IT MAY NOT BE ALTOGETHER EASY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO PERSUADE THE SENATE THAT THE INF VERIFICATION REGIME MEETS THE VERY RIGOROUS CRITERIA THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE ESTABLISHED OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS:

(D) THE QUOTE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE UNQUOTE OF THE ROLE OF THE SENATE IN THE TREATY MAKING PROCESS. THIS ISSUE ARISES OUT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO THE MATTER OF ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION, WHERE THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN PRESENTING A TREATY TO THE SENATE ARE LESS AUTHORITATIVE NOT ONLY THAN THE TREATY TEXT ITSELF BUT ALSO THAN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD. THIS IS, IN LARGE PART THE BASIS ON WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE TRIED TO ESTABLISH THE VALIDITY OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY. LEADING FIGURES IN THE SENATE, NOTABLY NUNN, HAVE HITHERTO ARGUED THAT,

IF THIS IS THE CASE, THE SENATE WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO EXAMINE THE DETAILS OF THE INF NEGOTIATING RECORD ITSELF (AN EXTREMELY LABORIOUS AND TIME-CONSUMING BUSINESS) AND MAKE ITS OWN CLEAR STATEMENT ABOUT WHAT THE TREATY MEANS WHEN GIVING ITS CONSENT TO RATIFICATION. IT IS NOT AT THIS STAGE CLEAR HOW HARD NUNN AND OTHERS MAY PRESS THIS ISSUE NOR HOW MUCH SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE IN THE SENATE AS A WHOLE. BUT THERE IS AT LEAST THE POTENTIAL FOR AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX PROCESS DURING WHICH THE SENATE WOULD GIVE ITS CONSENT TO THE TREATY ONLY ON CONDITION THAT IT IS UDERSTOOD BY ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS, TO HAVE A PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION. IN THE WORST CASE SCENARIO, THIS COULD INVOLVE SENATE INSISTENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS IN EFFECT AGREE TO SOMETHING IN ADDITION TO THE TREATY TEXT ITSELF, WHICH COULD CLEARLY CAUSE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES. THE EASIEST WAY AROUND THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE TERMS IN WHICH TYEY PRESENT THE TREATY TO THE SENATE CAN BE RELIED UPON AS A DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO WHAT THE TREATY MEANS. BUT IT IS NOT EASY TO SEE QUITE HOW THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION HAVING TO DRAW BACK FROM ITS POSITION IN THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY.

6. IT IS OPEN TO THE SENATE TO INSIST ON RESERVATIONS OR UNDERSTANDINGS BEFORE GIVING THEIR CONSENT TO THE TREATY, AND EVEN ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH RESERVATIONS, AND IT IS AGAINST THIS POSSIBILITY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE LIKELY TO HAVE TO CONCENTRATE THEIR FIRE DURING THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. SINCE ONLY 34 VOTES ARE REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE A BLOCKING THIRD, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT SHIFTING ALLIANCES AMONG THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF DOUBTERS AND OBJECTORS WILL BE STRONG ENOUGH TO FORCE THE ADOPTION OF BINDING AMENDMENTS AND/OR RESERVATIONS. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PRESENT HOPE AND BELIEF IS THAT THIS CAN BE AVOIDED AND THAT ANY RIDERS ATTACHED BY THE SENATE IN CONSENTING TO THE TREATY WILL BE OF A NON-BINDING CHARACTER.

7. MOST OF OUR ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE VOLATILE MIX OF INGREDIENTS LISTED IN PARA 3 ABOVE (OF WHICH (A), (C) AND (D) CAN BE DESCRIBED AS PROBLEMS LARGELY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S OWN MAKING), THE SENATE WILL IN FACT CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION WITHOUT INSISTING ON DISABLING AMENDMENTS. WE AGREE WITH THIS JUDGEMENT: A DECISIVE FACTOR SEEMS LIKELY TO BE THE UNWILLINGNESS OF DEMOCRATIC SENATORS TO VOTE AGAINST AN ARMS CONTROL TREATY IN AN ELECTION

YEAR. BUT IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BY NO MEANS HAVE EVERYTHING HIS OWN WAY DURING THE RATIFICATION DEBATE AND THAT THE VOTE MAY BE A VERY CLOSE-RUN THING.
8. SENATE PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN VIEWS WILL BE A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE RATIFICATION DEBATE. I SHALL SHORTLY BE OFFERING ADVICE ON HOW EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY HMG, SHOULD ADDRESS THIS ISSUE.

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

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): INF INSPECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK

1. FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF INF INSPECTIONS IN THE UK WHICH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE DRAWN ON NOW IN PUBLIC COMMENT BY BRITISH MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS.

2. TWO SO-CALLED DECLARED FACILITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (GREENHAM COMMON AND MOLESWORTH) WILL BE LIABLE TO THE FOLLOWING INSPECTION PROCEDURES:

(A) BASELINE INSPECTIONS. EACH FACILITY WILL BE INSPECTED ONCE, BETWEEN THIRTY AND NINETY DAYS INTO THE THREE YEAR ELIMINATION PERIOD, IN ORDER TO VERIFY DATA EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

(B) CLOSE-OUT INSPECTIONS. EACH FACILITY WILL BE INSPECTED ONCE, ON COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL OF TREATY LIMITED ITEMS (MISSILES, LAUNCHERS) FROM THAT FACILITY, IN ORDER TO VERIFY THAT WITHDRAWAL HAS INDEED BEEN COMPLETED. AGAIN THIS WILL TAKE PLACE DURING THE ELIMINATION PERIOD.

(C) SHORT NOTICE INSPECTIONS. AT ANY TIME DURING THE THIRTEEN YEAR INSPECTION REGIME' EITHER FACILITY COULD BE SUBJECT TO A SHORT NOTICE INSPECTION BY A SOVIET TEAM NUMBERING NO MORE THAN TEN INSPECTORS. SUCH INSPECTIONS WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE QUOTAS AVAILABLE TO EITHER PARTY (IE, TWENTY PER YEAR IN FIRST THREE YEARS, FIFTEEN PER YEAR IN SUBSEQUENT FIVE YEARS, TEN PER YEAR IN FINAL FIVE YEARS). NOT MORE THAN FIFTY PERCENT OF THE ANNUAL QUOTAS CAN BE USED IN A SINGLE BASING COUNTRY.

2. THE CONDUCT OF THESE INSPECTIONS WILL BE GOVERNED BY AN INSPECTION PROTOCOL, A BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT AND AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE RUSSIANS. THESE WILL ALLOW FOR ESCORT OF SOVIET INSPECTORS BY BOTH US AND UK OFFICIALS, AND FULLY PROTECT UK SECURITY INTERESTS. INSPECTORS WILL BE ACCORDED PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AS AGREED BY THOSE CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE UK.

COMMENT

3. REMARKABLY, THE EXISTENCE OF THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT HAS NOT YET LEAKED HERE. NOR HAS THE PLAN FOR AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES. MINISTERS MAY THEREFORE BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME IMPACT BY NOW REVEALING THEIR EXISTENCE AND THE DEGREE OF THE PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSPECTION REGIME THAT BASING COUNTRIES HAVE THEREFORE ENJOYED. WE SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN DOING THIS IN GENERAL TERMS NOW TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION LATER THAT THESE DOCUMENTS WERE AN AFTERTHOUGHT OR THRUST ON US BY THE US AT THE LAST MOMENT. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AGREE.

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MIPT: SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC, 25 NOVEMBER

SUMMIT ARRANGEMENTS

1. SHULTZ SAID THAT IT WAS TO BE A WORKING, NOT CEREMONIAL SUMMIT. 5 REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETINGS WERE PLANNED (2 ON TUESDAY, 2 ON WEDNESDAY AND ONE THURSDAY MORNING) AND THE INF TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOME 'INTERACTION' WITH CONGRESS ON WEDNESDAY MORNING HAD YET TO BE FINALISED: THERE WOULD ALSO BE CONTACTS WITH U S BUSINESS AND ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. THE MAIN AIM OF THE SUMMIT WAS TO FURTHER THE CONCEPTS EMBODIED IN THE HARMEL REPORT.

OTHER SUMMIT ISSUES

2. HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE AT THE TOP OF THE NON-ARMS CONTROL AGENDA. THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAD BECOME MORE INTENSE THAN EVER IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS WHICH HAD INCLUDED THE VISIT BY THE ASSITANT SECRETARY WHITEHEAD TO MOSCOW. WHILE THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SATIFACTION WITH THE NEW SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS, SUCH DIALOGUE MUST ALSO HAVE RESULTS. THE U S WOULD WISH TO SEE CONTINUING PROGRESS ON : RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING HUMANITARIAN CASES: RELEASE OF POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS PRISONERS AND PROGRESS WITH REVISION OF LEGAL CODES: IMPROVEMENT IN EMIGRATION PROCEDURES: PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS: AND FREEDOM TO PRACTISE RELIGION. THE U S HOPED TO SEE EVEN MORE CONTACT BETWEEN U S AND SOVIET OFFICIALS AND LEGISLATIVE EXPERTS (AND SHULTZ MENTIONED THAT AN INVITATION HAD BEEN ISSUED TO THE SOVIET UNION TO VISIT THE U S SUPREME COURT TO HEAR IT CONSIDER ONE OF THE U S CASES ABOUT WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD COMPLAINED). SHULTZ SUMMARISED THE OUTLOOK ON PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AS 'MIXED'. FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE 9 IMPORTANT DIVIDED SPOUSE CASES REMAINING ON THE U S LIST, 4 HAD BEEN APPROVED BUT 4 HAD BEEN DENIED. IT WAS THUS IMPORTANT TO KEEP PRESSING ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

3. TURNING TO REGIONAL ISSUES, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD AIM TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN, IRAN/IRAQ AND SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THAT ORDER OF PRIORITY. HE HAD NOTHING VERY NEW TO REPORT ON THESE TOPICS. THERE WERE HINTS THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING SPECIFIC TO SAY ON A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN IN WASHINGTON AND BOTH THE AMERICANS AND SOVIET UNION SAW SOME SIGNS OF INCREASING FLEXIBILITY IN ANGOLA. THERE HAD BEEN NO SOVIET MOVEMENTS SO FAR, HOWEVER, ON IRAN/IRAQ DESPITE U S EXPRESSIONS OF INCREASING CONCERN THAT IRANIAN STALLING TACTICS WERE BEGINNING TO MAKE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL LOOK RIDICULOUS.

4. IN CONCLUSION, SHOULTZ SAID THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD ALSO INCLUDE THE USUAL ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON BILATERAL ISSUES.

5. OPENING DISCUSSION, ANDREOTTI (ITALY) EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE EXEMPLARY AMERICAN RECORD ON CONSULTATION. HE HAD NEVER DOUBTED THAT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD END IN SUCCESS. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE MAJORITY OF THE OPPOSITION WOULD EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE FORTHCOMING NAC COMMUNIQUE SHOULD STRESS THE FAVOURBALE ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE. IT SHOULD INDICATE THE NEXT TARGETS FOR ARMS CONTROL. OF THESE, START WAS THE MOST URGENT, AND THIS SHOULD LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT A LOWER LEVEL AND THEN TO A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THIS PROGRAMME WOULD COVER ALL THE ELEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE REYKJAVIK COMMUNIQUE. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GET THE SOVIET UNION TO RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND IRAN-IRAQ.

6. GENSCHER (FRG) ALSO PRAISED THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. THE AGREEMENT WAS A VINDICATION OF ALLIANCE TACTICS AND SOLIDARITY. 1987 WOULD GO DOWN IN HISTROY AS THE YEAR OF DISARMAMENT. NO-ONE IN THE U S SHOULD HAVE ANY DOUBT ABOUT FRG SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY, WHICH SERVED EUROPEAN AND ESPECIALLY GERMAN INTERESTS. THIS WOULD BE MADE PUBLICLY CLEAR. AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PRESS ON WITH THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AS AGREED AT THE REYKJAVIK NAC, COVERING CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND SNF : BUT THE MEETING SHOULD ALSO DEVELOP PERSPECTIVES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN THEIR TOTALITY. THE NEXT TARGET SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS AT A SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. GENSCHER SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN SO SATISFIED AS HE WAS TODAY. THE AGREEMENT ON INF, FAR FROM DIVIDING THE U S AND EUROPE, MEANT THAT THE TWO HAD NEVER BEEN SO CLOSE. THIS SOLIDARITY WOULD BE EQUALLY NECESSARY IN FUTURE.

7. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) SHARED GENSCHER'S ASSESSMENT. HE UNDERTOOK TO MAKE DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY PUBLICLY CLEAR. BUT HE WARNED THAT PROGRESS AT THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA ON HUMAN RIGHTS HAD NOT SO FAR BEEN GOOD. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD STICK WITH ITS VIENNA PROPOSAL AND DEMAND A SUBSTANITAL RESULT. HE ASKED SHULTZ TO CLARIFY THE POSITION ON FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS IN BASING COUNTRIES AFTER SIGNATURE : SUCH CLARIFICATION COULD NOT WAIT UNTIL THE SUMMIT TOOK PLACE. IN REPLY SHULTZ SAID THAT AFTER SIGNATURE, THE U S WOULD NOT EXPECT ANY FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS OR CONTINUING ACTIVITY IN THE BASING COUNTRIES. THE EXISTING SITUATION SHOULD BE QUOTE HELD IN PLACE UNQUOTE BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION. THE THREE-YEAR DESTRUCTION PERIOD WOULD BEGIN AFTER RATIFICATION.

8. STOLTENBERG (NORWAY) SAW THE TREATY AS EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AS A WHOLE. HE WOULD EMPHASISE THIS TO THE NORWEGIAN PUBLIC. THE TREATY WAS A GOOD BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK ON THE REYKJAVIK AGENDA. NO-ONE COULD SAY WHO WOULD SUCCEED PRESIDENT REAGAN, OR EVEN WHETHER GORBACHEV WOULD STAY IN POWER : IT WAS ACCORDINGLY URGENT TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

9. BARROSO (PORTUGAL), WELCOMING THE TREATY AND PROMISING SUPPORT, EMPHASISED THAT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WERE NOT AN END IN THEMSELVES, BUT VALUABLE ONLY IF THEY STRENGTHENED SECURITY. U S/EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY REMAINED VITAL. THE SOVIET UNION MUST REALISE THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN AREAS SUCH AS HUMAN RIGHTS WERE ALSO CRUCIAL FOR PROGRESS IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

10. FOR THE UK, I CONVEYED YOUR REGRET AT YOUR INABILITY TO BE PRESENT, AND THE CONGRATULATIONS OF HMG ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN HISTORIC AGREEMENT. SHULTZ HAD SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE TREATY WAS WHAT WE HAD WANTED : BUT THAT IT DID NOT SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS. I QUOTED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S GUILDHALL SPEECH, WHICH ADDRESSED BOTH THESE POINTS. IN CONCLUSION, I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE DOCUMENTS PROMISED WOULD SOON BE MADE AVAILABLE.

11. ROBIN (FRANCE) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION WAS QUOTE CONVINCED BY SHULTZ'S EXPLANTATION THAT THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATION ACCORDED WITH ITS OBJECTIVES UNQUOTE. IN THE FIELD OF VERIFCATION, CONSIDERABLE NEW RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. ACCORDINGLY, ALTHOUGH NOT A PARTY TO THE TWIN-TRACK DECISION, FRANCE COULD ASSOCIATE HERSELF WITH THE SATISFACTION THAT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED. AT THE SAME

TIME, THE INF TREATY SHOULD NOT LEAD TO EUPHORIA. IT WAS PART OF A PROCESS, AND WHAT FOLLOWED, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT. THE ALLIANCE MUST REMAIN VIGILANT ABOUT ITS SECURITY AND ITS DETERRENT POSTURE.

12. CASSIERS (BELGIUM) PROMISED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY. HE ASKED IF THERE WOULD BE DECLARATIONS ON SIGNATURE, AND IF SO, WHAT THEY WOULD CONTAIN. SHULTZ REPLIED THAT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WOULD MAKE STATEMENTS WELCOMING THE TREATY, BUT THESE WERE NOT LIKELY TO CONTAIN ANY SURPRISES.

13. POOS (LUXEMBOURG), BORCH (DENMARK), ZACHARAKIS (GREECE), OJEDA (SPAIN), BENEDIKTSSON (ICELAND), OLCAY (TURKEY) AND SMITH (CANADA) ALL WELCOMED THE TREATY AND THE PROSPECTS OF FURTHER PROGRESS.

14. SUMMING UP, CARRINGTON STRESSED THREE POINTS. FIRST, THE TREATY SET A VALUABLE PRECEDENT ON ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS : SECOND, IT CONTAINED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE AT THE TIME OF THE TWIN-TRACK DECISION: AND THIRD, IT AMPLY DEMONSTRATED THAT ALLIANCE STEADFASTNESS HAD PAID OFF.

ALEXANDER

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

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SHULTZ BRIEFING OF NAC, 25 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY SHULTZ REPORTED THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA HAD ACHIEVED AGREEMENT ON ALL ELEMENTS OF THE INF TREATY AND ON DETAILS OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. IN MANY WAYS, HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERED THE GENEVA TALKS TO HAVE BEEN JUST ANOTHER ROUTINE MEETING IN A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIM AND MR SHEVARDNADZE. HE FORESAW A CONTINUATION OF THIS KIND OF EFFORT. HE EMPHASISED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SUMMIT SHOULD HAVE SUBSTANCE. ARMS CONTROL SESSIONS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON START BUT THE SUMMIT WOULD NOT FOCUS SOLELY ON ARMS CONTROL: IT WOULD DEAL WITH ISSUES ACROSS THE BOARD, EG HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND BILATERAL ISSUES.

INF

2. ON INF, SHULTZ ONCE AGAIN EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WESTERN OBJECTIVES. THE KEY LESSON FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT PATIENCE, PERSISTENCE AND COHESION PAID OFF. HE ALSO PAID PARTICULAR TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE BASING COUNTRIES.

3. IN OUTLINING DETAILS OF THE INF AGREEMENT, SHULTZ CONCENTRATED ON VERIFICATION ASPECTS. HE SAID THAT FULL DETAILS OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME WOULD BE PROVIDED LATER TO ALLIES. HE THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- EXCHANGE OF NOTES.
  SHULTZ DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS BUT SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED WOULD SATISFY THE CONCERNS OF BASING COUNTRIES:

- EXCHANGE OF DATA
  THE BALANCE OF DATA (DISAGGREGATED DATA FOR NON DEPLOYED FORCES) WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET UNION BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

THE DATA SO FAR EXCHANGED HAD BEEN CREDIBLE AND CORRESPONDED WITH U S EXPECTATIONS. SHULTZ WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE REMAINING EXPECTED DATA WOULD BE SATSIFACTORY:

- BASE LINE INSPECTIONS
INSPECTIONS OF EACH OTHERS FACILITIES TO VALIDATE THE INITIAL DATA EXCHANGE HAD BEEN AGREED:

- DESTRUCTION
SHULTZ CONFIRMED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON A 3-YEAR ELIMINATION PERIOD DURING WHICH ALL MISSILES, LAUNCHERS AND SOME SUPPORT FACILITIES WOULD BE DESTROYED. DURING THE FIRST 6 MONTHS SOME MISSILES (SHULTZ DID NOT SAY HOW MANY) COULD BE DESTROYED BY LAUNCHING. THERE WERE PROVISIONS FOR THE VISUAL MONITORING OF DESTRUCTION BY BOTH SIDES.

- CLOSE OUT INSPECTIONS
THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR INSPECTION OF FACILITIES AT END OF THE ELIMINATION PERIOD:

- MONITORING.
AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WHEREBY FOR 13 YEARS AFTER SIGNATURE THE U S WOULD CONDUCT PERIMETER PORTAL MONITORING OF THE SS20 ASSEMBLY PLANT (WHICH ALSO ASSEMBLES SS25 MISSILES) THERE WAS AN AGREED INSPECTION PROCEDURE UNDER WHICH U S INSPECTORS COULD CHECK MISSILES EMERGING FROM THE FACILITY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE MISSILES IN QUESTION WERE NOT SS20 SYSTEMS. IN RETURN, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT PERIODIC INSPECTIONS OF THE PLANT IN SAN DIEGO MAKING GLCM LAUNCH FACILITIES. THERE WOULD BE NO PROVISION FOR INSPECTION OF CRUISE MISSILES PRODUCTION PLANTS SINCE THESE WOULD STILL MAKE SLCMS WHICH WERE UNFETTERED BY THE TREATY. THERE WOULD ALSO BE SOVIET PERIMETER PORTAL MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PLANT WHICH NOW MAKES PERSHING MISSILES. THIS PLANT WOULD CONTINUE TO PRODUCE MISSILES AND THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ALLOWED CHECKS TO ENSURE THAT THESE WERE NOT PERSHINGS.

- FLIGHT TESTING
SHULTZ STRESSED THAT THE PROHIBITION OF FLIGHT TESTING IN THE TREATY WAS A WAY OF ENSURING A RAPID DIMINUTION IN CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPABILITY OF ANY COVERT SS20 SYSTEMS WHICH MIGHT BE RETAINED:

- SUSPECT SITE INSPECTIONS
A QUOTA OF SHORT NOTICE INSPECTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN AGREED AS

FOLLOWS: FIRST 3 YEARS - 20: NEXT 5 YEARS - 15: FINAL 5 YEARS - 10. SHULTZ SIAD NOTHING ABOUT SUB-QUOTAS FOR INSPECTIONS WITHIN BASING COUNTRIES:

- INSPECTION OF SS25 BASES
THE RUSSIANS HAVE RESISTED THIS. IT APPEARED THAT ABOUT HALF OF THE SS25S WOULD BE DEPLOYED ON FORMER SS20 BASES AND WOULD THUS BE CAPTURED UNDER THE SUSPECT SITE ARRANGEMENTS. FOR THE REMAINDER, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT FOR THE FIRST 3 YEARS AFTER SIGNATURE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN TO FACILITATE U S INSPECTIONS OF SS25 BASES BY 'ENHANCED TECHNICAL MEANS'. UNDER THIS, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE REQUIRED AT SHORT NOTICE TO OPEN UP ITS MISSILES GARAGES ETC AND ALLOW FULL U S SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY.

4. CONCLUDING HIS REPORT ON INF, SHULTZ EMPHASISED ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM ALLIES FOR THE INF TREATY AND STRESSED THAT IMPORTANT AS THIS TREATY WAS, IT WAS MERELY A MILESTONE IN OUR SEARCH FOR A MORE STABLE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP: THE THREAT REMAINED AND THE STATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS NO LESS VALID. IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE REMAINED VERY IMPORTANT AND WOULD STRENGTHEN THE WEST'S HAND IN CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

START

5. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ARMS CONTROL SESSIONS IN THE SUMMIT WOULD FOCUS ON START AND (IN CONFIDENCE) THAT THERE WOULD BE A PRE-SUMMIT MEETING ON THE MONDAY EVENING BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE TO DISCUSS THIS. IN GENEVA THERE WERE SIGNS OF INCREASING FLEXIBILITY BY THE SOVIETS ON THE ISSUE OF SUB-LIMITS AND THE SUGGESTION OF A SUB-LIMIT OF 5100 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS HAD NOW BEEN PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIETS. (THE U S PROPOSAL IS FOR 4800). SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT WHILE THIS SHOULD BE SEEN AS PROGRESS THERE REMAINED CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING AN EFFECTIVE START VERIFICATION PACKAGE. THERE HAD BEEN NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON LINKAGE WITH THE ABM TREATY.

6. SEE MIFT.

ALEXANDER

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

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FCO TELNO 1915: AFGHANISTAN: US-SOVIET TALKS: US VIEWS OF POSSIBLE EUROPEAN COUNCIL STATEMENT.

SUMMARY

1. ARMACOST MAKES SOME PROGRESS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH VORONTSOV ON AFGHANISTAN. AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT APPEARS NO LONGER TO BE A PRE-CONDITION FOR WITHDRAWAL. ARMACOST BELIEVES THAT AN EC DECLARATION ON AFGHANISTAN AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL COULD BE HELPFUL.

DETAIL

2. ARMACOST (UNDER SECRETARY, STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD GILLMORE ON 19 NOVEMBER THAT HIS DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN AT GENEVA HAD REVEALED NO DRAMATIC SOVIET CHANGE OF POSITION, BUT HAD NONE-THELESS BEEN ENCOURAGING. VORONTSOV HAD BEEN MORE SPECIFIC THAN IN THE PAST ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. IN PARTICULAR, AS REGARDS WITHDRAWAL, HE HAD INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO AGREE TO A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE SEPARATE FROM THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE COMPOSITION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. VORONTSOV HAD NOT BEEN READY TO SPECIFY A WITHDRAWAL TIME-FRAME BUT HE HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION WITH ''BODY LANGUAGE'' THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WHOLE PROCESS COMPLETED IN 1988. THIS TIED IN WITH RUMOURS WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE PICKING UP IN KABUL THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWING 30-40 THOUSAND TROOPS IN THE PERIOD FEBRUARY-APRIL 1988, IN A MOVE UNRELATED TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS. A DIFFERENT RUMOUR WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARING TO PROPOSE A 10 MONTH TIMETABLE AT THE NEXT ROUND WITH CORDOVEZ IN FEBRUARY.

3. ARMACOST ADDED THAT VORONTSOV HAD ALSO MADE POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT THE ROLE OF ZAHIR SHAH AS THE POTENTIAL CONVENOR OF A LOYA JIRGA: ABOUT ANALOGIES FOR THE NEUTRAL STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY: AND ABOUT PAKISTANI IDEAS FOR A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE HAVING THEIR NEXT CONTACTS WITH PAKISTAN OVER AFGHANISTAN IN MID-DECEMBER.

4. GILLMORE ASKED HOW FAR AFGHANISTAN WOULD FEATURE AT THE

REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT. ARMACOST SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE. THE PRESIDENT WOULD CERTAINLY RAISE AFGHANISTAN BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR HOW FAR THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE READY TO MAKE COMMITMENTS OF A SPECIFIC AND DETAILED KIND.

5. GILLMORE SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOW FOLLOWED UP EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH US ABOUT AN EC STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN WITH A PROPOSAL THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF 4/5 DECEMBER SHOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR A STATEMENT. THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE A STATEMENT WHICH CUT ACROSS US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN. ARMACOST REPLIED THAT HE SAW SOME MERIT IN A STRONG EC STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT. A DECLARATION WHICH CHALLENGED THE RUSSIANS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES BY A DATE CERTAIN AND TO FACILITATE INTERIM GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE USEFUL AND INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY HARD DECISIONS. ARMACOST SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS LANGUAGE WITH US WHEN A DRAFT TEXT WAS AVAILABLE.

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

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SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN GENEVA

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE TO MEET IN GENEVA ON 23-24 NOVEMBER. MAIN FOCUS LIKELY TO BE AN EFFORT TO WRAP UP REMAINING INF ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED ON 20 NOVEMBER THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE WOULD MEET (FOR THE FOURTH TIME IN TWO MONTHS) IN GENEVA ON 23-24 NOVEMBER: THAT THEY WOULD COVER HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES AS WELL AS ARMS CONTROL: AND ALSO DISCUSS THE PROGRAMME FOR GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. SHULTZ WOULD RETURN VIA BRUSSELS TO BRIEF THE NAC (UKDEL NATO TELNO 361).

3. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS THE SPOKESMAN ADDED THAT SHULTZ TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ASK FOR THE MEETING, AFTER REVIEWING THE OUTCOME OF THE SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN KAMPELMAN, ARMACOST AND WHITEHEAD WITH THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS OVER THE LAST WEEK. THERE WAS NO CRISIS ON INF.

4. OUR STATE AND NSC CONTACTS CONFIRM THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WILL BE TO WORK THROUGH THE REMAINING INF ISSUES AND TO RESOLVE AS MANY OF THEM AS POSSIBLE. THEY ADD THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE MADE PLAIN THAT THEY WANT TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE REFERRING ANY OF THE REMAINING HIGHLY TECHNICAL ISSUES FOR SETTLEMENT AT THE SUMMIT.

5. THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED ON 20 NOVEMBER (QUOTING STATE DEPARTMENT SOURCES) THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS LIKELY TO BE A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS, IN THE LIGHT OF SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY IN THIS WEEK'S ARMACOST/VORONTSOV TALKS (OUR TELNO 2531). OUR STATE AND NSC CONTACTS DOUBT THAT THERE WILL IN FACT BE MUCH TO TALK ABOUT ON AFGHANISTAN: THE GROUND HAS BEEN WELL TILLED IN RECENT BILATERAL EXCHANGES. THEY REGARD THE BALL AS NOW VERY MUCH IN THE SOVIET COURT. AN NSC CONTACT ADDED THAT EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PLANNING TO UNVEIL A CHANGE OF POSITION AT THE SUMMIT (WHICH MANY OF OUR CONTACTS ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT) SHEVARDNADZE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO STEAL GORBACHEV'S THUNDER BY REVEALING THIS TO SHULTZ TWO WEEKS BEFOREHAND.

6. STATE HOPE THAT SHEVARDNADZE WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE SOME

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GUIDANCE ON GORBACHEV'S PREFERENCES FOR HIS PROGRAMME IN WASHINGTON. MEANWHILE A ROW HAS ERUPTED HERE OVER SUGGESTIONS THAT GORBACHEV SHOULD BE INVITED TO ADDRESS A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS. THE HOUSE SPEAKER'S OFFICE AND THE WHITE HOUSE EACH MAINTAIN THAT THE OTHER ORIGINATED THE PROPOSAL: AND A NUMBER OF REPUBLICANS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD BLOCK AN INVITATION. SENATOR DOLE COMMENTED THAT A FORMAL ADDRESS BY GORBACHEV TO CONGRESS COULD PROVOKE QUOTE UGLY SCENES UNQUOTE: AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT GORBACHEV SHOULD INSTEAD GIVE A 15 MINUTE SPEECH ON US TELEVISION PROVIDED PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS GIVEN A RECIPROCAL OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

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From the Private Secretary

18 November 1987

INF AGREEMENT

I have seen a copy of Michael Alexander's letter to you of 13 November asking that the Prime Minister find an early opportunity to give public support to the INF Agreement.

You will no doubt ensure that Michael sees a copy of the Prime Minister's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet.

But I accept that this should be a continuing process. There are likely to be opportunities for her to say something in Parliament at the time of the US/Soviet summit itself. I will discuss with Bernard Ingham whether, immediately after signature of the Agreement, we can find an opportunity for her to give an interview to television or the American press.

I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander.

CHARLES POWELL

B. J. P. Fall, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonweatlh Office.

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YOUR TELNO 1866: INF: NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS
SUMMARY
1. OUR CONCERNS EXPLAINED AND OUR PROPOSAL PUT TO SHULTZ. SHULTZ UNDERTAKES TO CONSIDER, AND CONFIRMS THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION THAT NOTHING IN THE INF TREATY SHOULD AFFECT EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH ALLIES. CONFIRMATION THAT THE ADMINISTRATION UNWILLING TO ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSAL ON FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. SHULTZ REMINDED OF OUR INTEREST IN EXCHANGE OF NOTES, AND FLAGS A SUSPECT SITE INSPECTION PROBLEM. SHULTZ CONFIRMS THE IMPORTANCE, IN THE RATIFICATION CONTEXT, OF EUROPEAN STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INF TREATY PARTICULARLY BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND KOHL. UNDERTAKES TO THINK ABOUT WHEN SUCH STATEMENTS MIGHT MOST USEFULLY BE MADE.
DETAIL
2. I SAW SHULTZ ON 13 NOVEMBER.
3. I SAID THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED ME TO UNDERLINE OUR ANXIETIES ABOUT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ASPECTS OF THE INF AND PROSPECTIVE START TREATIES. WE SAW TWO POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES. THE FIRST WAS THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE MIGHT INHIBIT NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS TO NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE AFTER COMPLETION OF THE INF TREATY. SHULTZ WOULD REMEMBER THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THE SUMMER THAT, IN HER VIEW, ADDITIONAL DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT SHOULD THEN BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE AND THAT SLCMS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO SACEUR. THE SECOND POTENTIAL DIFFICULTY WAS THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE IN THE INF TREATY MIGHT CREATE A DIFFICULT PRECEDENT IN THE START CONTEXT AND THEREFORE HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BRITISH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT, NOTABLY TRIDENT. I SAID THAT WE THEREFORE VERY MUCH SUPPORTED US OPPOSITION TO THE CATCH ALL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS IN GENEVA.
4. AS FAR AS THE US COUNTER-PROPOSAL WAS CONCERNED (QUOTE EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO ASSUME ANY INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH THIS TREATY UNQUOTE), I SAID THAT WE REALISED

THAT FORMULATIONS ON THESE LINES WERE RECOGNISED IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HAD BEEN USED IN THE ABM AND SALT II TREATIES. BUT AS A WAY TO MEET OUR CONCERNS, I HAD BEEN ASKED TO SUGGEST THAT, WHEN SHULTZ SUBMITTED THE INF TREATY TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE SENATE, HE MIGHT MAKE CLEAR THAT ITS NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS DID NOT CARRY ANY IMPLICATIONS THAT MIGHT DAMAGE THE BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT OR NATO'S ABILITEKQH ADJUST ITS NUCLEAR POSTURE AS NECESSARY. I REMINDED SHULTZ THAT THIS WAS THE PROCEDURE THAT HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY VANCE WHEN THE SALT II TREATY HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS AND QUOTED THE LANGUAGE THEN USED BY VANCE. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO US IF SIMILAR STATEMENTS COULD BE INCLUDED IN SHULTZ'S LETTER OF SUBMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT. IF SHULTZ SAW MERIT IN THIS IDEA, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT THE PRECISE LANGUAGE TO BE USED.

5. I REMINDED SHULTZ THAT THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION ASPECTS OF THE PROSPECTIVE START TREATY WOULD PROBABLY BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. WE HOPED FOR VERY CLOSE COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION ON THIS.

6. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT NOTHING IN THE INF TREATY SHOULD AFFECT EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH ALLIES. THE PRESIDENT HAD SUCCESSFULLY SECURED GORBACHEV'S AGREEMENT AT REYKJAVIK THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN A VERY TOUGH POSITION ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE GERMAN P1AS. IT WAS INDEED THE CASE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT THE BROAD NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSALS MADE BY RUSSIANS IN GENEVA. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT A TIGHTLY DRAWN CLAUSE PROHIBITING CONFLICTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WOULD NOT COST THE US ANYTHING.

7. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WISHED TO EXCLUDE FROM THE TREATY THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS ON FOLLOW-ON INF NEGOTIATIONS. ANY SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AIRCRAFT AND OTHER INF SYSTEMS. I SAID THAT WE STRONGLY SHARED THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE. WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S STRONG STAND ON THE EXCION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS. IF THE POINT ABOUT NOT AFFECTING EXISTING PATTERNS OF COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION COULD BE MADE EXPLICIT IN THE WAY WE WERE PROPOSING, THAT WOULD PROVIDE US WITH ADDED ASSURANCE. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER OUR PROPOSAL AND WHETHER THE LANGUAGE USED BY VANCE MIGHT BE A MODEL FOR USE IN THE INF CONTEXT.

8. I ASKED HOW THE RUSSIANS WERE REACTING TO THE DRAFT EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN BASING COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOW THAT THEY HAD BEEN SHOWN THE NATO BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT. SHULTZ

DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY BUT REFERRED TO THE PRESENT PROBLEM IN GENEVA OVER SUSPECT SITE INSPECTIONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE SAYING THAT, IF ONLY US OWNED OR OPERATED FORMERLY DECLARED INF FACILITIES IN BASING COUNTRIES WERE OPEN TO INSPECTION, THEY WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO INSPECT IF THE FACILITIES IN QUESTION REVERTED TO HOST COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OR OPERATION. THIS WOULD MEAN AN INEQUALITY IN THE INSPECTION REGIME. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD ASK BASING COUNTRIES WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE US TO DROP THE US OWNED OR OPERATED ASPECT OF THEIR PROPOSAL SO THAT FORMERLY DECLARED INF FACILITIES IN BASING COUNTRIES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE OPEN TO INSPECTION EVEN IF THEY CEASED TO BE US OWNED OR OPERATED. BUT IT HAD NOT YET BEEN FINALLY DECIDED WHETHER SUCH A REQUEST SHOULD BE PUT TO BASING COUNTRIES.

9. I ASKED SHULTZ WHEN HE THOUGHT THE MOST HELPFUL TIME WOULD BE FOR BRITISH MINISTERS TO MAKE CLEAR PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE INF TREATY. MR YOUNGER HAD BEEN AS FORTHRIGHT AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THIS IN HIS SPEECH AT THE CSIS DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 6 NOVEMBER. HE HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR TO ALL THE SENATORS HE HAD MET DURING HIS VISIT THAT WE FULLY SUPPORTED THE TREATY. IF SHULTZ HAD VIEWS ON WHEN, FOLLOWING TREATY SIGNATURE, BRITISH MINISTERS CIFKX
MAKE THEIR MOST USEFUL CONTRIBUTION, THESE WOULD BE WELCOME. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO COUNTER SUGGESTIONS THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE NOT FULLY BEHIND THE TREATY. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED WHAT I HAD SAID. HE WOULD THINK ABOUT WHEN SENIOR EUROPEAN POLITICAL FIGURES MIGHT BEST MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY. THE VOICES OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND OF CHANCELLOR KOHL WOULD BE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE IN THIS RESPECT. SHULTZ NOTED THAT VERY FEW EUROPEANS WERE SAYING ANYTHING CRITICAL OF THE TREATY. SUCH REMARKS WERE BEING MADE ONLY BY AMERICANS WHO CLAIMED TO KNOW ABOUT EUROPEAN THINKING. HE HATED TO CONTEMPLATE THE REACTION IN EUROPE AND IN THE ALLIANCE IF THE TREATY FAILED TO BE RATIFIED. GETTING THE TREATY TEXT FINALISED WAS A STRUGGLE EVERY INCH OF THE WAY. BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE READY ON THE DAY.

10. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP WITH STATE DEPT. EXPERTS DRAWING THEIR ATTENTION TO THE VANCE LANGUAGE AND ASKING TO BE FULLY CONSULTED.

ACLAND

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Charles Powell Esq

With the compliments of

THE UNITED KINGDOM
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS

UNITED KINGDOM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OTAN/NATO
1110 BRUSSELS
TELEPHONE 2426775

13 November 1987

B J P Fall Esq CMG
AUSS
FCO

Dear Brian,

INF AGREEMENT

1. You will be familiar with the concerns of the US Administration about the ratification of the INF agreement - assuming signature takes place on schedule. You will need no persuasion from me as to the probably grave consequences for trans-Atlantic relations and for the Alliance were ratification not to take place.

2. One reason why many Americans (not only my US colleague here) wanted a western Heads of Government meeting in close proximity to the signing of the agreement was to get the most authoritative possible statement of public support from the European members of the Alliance. In the first instance, this meant, of course, from the Prime Minister and from Chancellor Kohl - the object being to defuse the arguments of those on the American right (eg Haig) who argue that the Europeans do not want the agreement.

3. Now that there is to be no western summit until some time next year, there must be a strong case for trying to find an occasion when Mrs Thatcher could put her support for the agreement on the record. Ideally this should be a speech or an on the record interview (with the Washington Post, New York Times or a major TV company) directed specifically at a US audience.

4. Assuming the idea is sound, the timing and occasion would, obviously, be decided by Number 10. I had thought of suggesting that the Prime Minister

/might

might, as she sometimes does, give an interview or interviews before her visit here in February. However, while such interviews might be in any case a good idea, I think that for present purposes the delay would be too great. The message ought probably to be given pretty soon after signature, as the public debate gets under way in the United States. It will always be possible to revert to the subject later if developments in the Senate made this seem necessary.

Yours ever

Richard.

Michael Alexander

The National Archives

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8/W

12 November 1987

ARMS CONTROL: INF TREATY:
CONFLICT OF OBLIGATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 10 November about the clause prohibiting conflicting international obligations which the Americans are thinking of including in the INF Treaty. The Prime Minister is content with the way in which it is proposed to deal with this and the draft telegram enclosed with your letter may issue (but could you please substitute "strongly" for "forcibly" in the first line).

(C. D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 November 1987

Dear John,

An INF Agreement and Restructuring of NATO's Nuclear Forces

I can confirm that the Foreign Secretary is content with the public presentation line on post-INF force adjustments suggested in the Defence Secretary's minute of 30 October to the Prime Minister; as well as with the additional point suggested in Charles Powell's letter of 3 November to you.

I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

John Howe Esq
PS/Ministry of Defence

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PT 13



OFFICIAL TEXT

November 6, 1987

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. EMBASSY, 55/56 UPPER BROOK STREET, LONDON W1A 2LH

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS

(Text: ACDA "Issues Brief")

("Issues Briefs" are a series of quick reference aids on U.S. arms control and reduction policy issued by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)

The United States seeks a more secure and stable world, with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against offensive ballistic missiles. In our ongoing research into strategic defense through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), we are seeking to establish the feasibility of comprehensive defenses protecting the United States and our allies against ballistic missile attack.

At the Defense and Space (D and S) talks in Geneva, we are endeavoring to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offense and defense. We are also seeking to discuss how, if effective defenses prove feasible, the U.S. and USSR could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defense rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons. We are also expressing our deep concern over Soviet violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty.

In an effort to reach agreement with the Soviets, the United States has proposed a mutual commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the (ABM) treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses not permitted by the ABM treaty; and during this period to observe strictly all ABM treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM treaty.

Such a commitment would be contingent upon implementation of 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, each with no more than 6,000 warheads and appropriate sublimits on the most dangerous missiles. Reductions would take place over a period of seven years after the treaty enters into force. Either side would have the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 if it so chose, unless the parties agree otherwise. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems not permitted by the ABM treaty, any remaining restrictions associated with the ABM treaty will be terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise. The right is preserved to withdraw, suspend, or terminate this commitment for reasons of supreme national interest or material breach of treaty obligations.

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In response to stated Soviet concerns, and to enhance predictability as both sides proceed with work on strategic defenses, the United States has also proposed a set of confidence building measures which include an annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on strategic defense efforts, visits to associated research facilities, and establishment of procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

On the other hand, the Soviet objective in the D and S talks has been to kill or cripple the SDI program. The United States cannot -- and will not -- accept any measures which would do so. SDI is being conducted in full compliance with the ABM treaty and is important to the future security of the United States and our allies, as well as to prospects for ensuring a safe strategic balance over the long term. The United States has made it clear that it will not accept any restrictions on strategic defenses beyond those the parties actually agreed to in the ABM treaty.

Many differences continue to separate the two sides, including the length of time of the nonwithdrawal period from the ABM treaty and the types of inactivities which the sides may conduct during the nonwithdrawal period. The Soviets, for example, want to place restrictions on the SDI program that go beyond the ABM treaty.

During Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Washington in September, and earlier in Geneva, the Soviets proposed that the United States and USSR agree on a list of space-based devices which could not be put into space if they exceeded certain performance parameters. The list provided by the Soviets would impose limitations beyond those actually agreed in the ABM treaty by prohibiting space-based research on certain devices. Alternatively, they proposed agreeing to strict compliance with the ABM treaty as "signed and ratified in 1972." Although the Soviets have not fully explained these proposals, previous Soviet statements have been aimed at imposing limits on SDI which are far more restrictive than what the parties actually agreed to in the Treaty in 1972. We continue our efforts to clarify the Soviet proposals but will accept nothing which cripples SDI.

Soviet unwillingness to acknowledge the existence and extent of its own long-standing strategic defense activities is another major problem. Recent Soviet activities include:

-- upgrading and modernizing the operational ABM defense around Moscow, the world's only deployed anti-ballistic missile system;

-- construction of a large phased-array radar (LPAR) at Krasnoyarsk for ballistic missile early warning and tracking, in direct violation of the ABM treaty;

-- construction of three additional LPARs, permitted by the ABM treaty, bringing the total to nine;

-- further modernization of their enormous strategic air defense forces, the world's largest;

-- construction of a new over-the-horizon radar in the Soviet Far East for detecting long-range aircraft operating over the Pacific Ocean;

-- continued extensive research into and development of advanced technologies for ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and air defense, including laser, particle beam, and kinetic energy weapons; and

-- improving passive defenses by constructing and maintaining

deep underground bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel and enhancing the survivability of some offensive systems through mobility and hardening.

At their recent meeting in Washington, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze spent a good deal of time on defense and space issues. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stressed that he did not want to debate about SDI or ABM Treaty interpretation. Rather, he indicated, both sides should tackle the issue in terms of "strategic stability." Secretary Shultz welcomed this kind of conceptual approach, since strategic stability has long been the goal of our efforts and it has been the driving consideration behind our strategic arms reduction proposals and our SDI program. In that sense, these U.S.-Soviet discussions about defense and space were more positive, resulting in a constructive exchange about how to proceed in the future.

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Arms Control in Europe: Challenge and Opportunity

An Address By

The Honorable Charles H. Price, II

U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James's

To

The Mid-America Committee

Chicago, Illinois

November 5, 1987

(As prepared for delivery)

Mr. Miner; Ambassadors John Lewis and Paul Robinson; Mrs. Doe Thornberg and guests of the English-Speaking Union; distinguished members and guests of the Mid-America Committee. It is an honor and a pleasure to address this prestigious group.

Tonight I would like to discuss a topic that dominates our foreign-policy agenda and that has stirred feelings of every sort: the potential arms-control treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Although a few details, especially about verification, still must be resolved, it appears almost certain that we will sign an accord with the Soviets when General Secretary Gorbachev visits Washington early next month.

I want to look at three aspects of that agreement. First, what circumstances allowed it to develop. Next, how certain of our European allies regard it. Finally, what opportunities it offers and what challenges it poses. All three have relevance beyond any arms deal and serve to concentrate our minds on the larger subject of Western defense.

To begin with, though, I want to review briefly the primary truth at work in international politics.

The fundamental geo-political reality of the post-War years has been the attempt of the liberal democracies to contain aggressive communism. Global in reach, using propaganda, diplomacy, and military power, aggressive communism has revealed itself in many ways and in many areas.

In Korea, Viet Nam, and Afghanistan, it took the form of invasion. In other areas, such as Latin America and Africa, it has appeared as terrorism, subversion, or revolution. In some of these cases, communism triumphed. In others, it was thwarted. In still others, the battle goes on.

In every case, though, these conflicts have taken place away from the flashpoint of East-West tensions, Central Europe. There, where the Red Army faces a confident and powerful West, peace has prevailed since the last war.

NATO's strength has deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe for some forty years. But it has not persuaded the Soviets to abandon their designs on those prosperous and free countries. Although they may no longer seek to dominate Western Europe by force of arms, the Soviets unquestionably aspire to greater political influence there, and ultimately, a Europe detached from the United States.

We suffer no delusions about their ambitions. For that reason the West remains well-armed and vigilant. On that premise the West conducts its international affairs.

Yet, despite predictable Soviet attempts to extract concessions at the last moment, we have arrived on the threshold of an historic arms agreement with them. How and why, given Soviet behavior, have we gotten to this point?

The answer, I think, can be found in Western resolve, changing circumstances within the Soviet Union, and, as always in international affairs, the self-interest of both sides.

In my judgment, Western resolve and unity have been the key factors in the equation, by far the most important elements. I want to look at one manifestation of that resolve in some detail.

In 1979, at the behest of the Western European governments, NATO unanimously adopted its "dual-track" decision. This called for the deployment in Europe of intermediate-range nuclear missiles -- the cruise and Pershing II -- if the Soviets refused to withdraw their recently installed intermediate-range missiles, the SS-20s.

We asked for negotiations and, in 1981, met with the Soviets in Geneva. We reiterated our pledge not to deploy if the Soviets withdrew their missiles. They repeatedly rejected our offer. The West therefore proceeded with its plans to install the Pershing and cruise missiles. At the same time, President Reagan proposed the "zero option," to which the Soviets finally agreed this year.

In the short term, however, NATO's resolve met with a predictable response. The Soviets bombarded the West with propaganda and threats. But despite these efforts, and despite the clamorous objections of so-called peace groups within the democracies, the first cruise and Pershings arrived in Europe in 1983. The Soviets then walked out of the arms talks in Geneva.

Deployment, together with President Reagan's determination to improve America's armed forces and the willingness of the Europeans to spend more on defense, conveyed to the Soviets, as no mere expressions of solidarity ever could, that the Western Alliance remained cohesive and its members committed to one another's security. Recognizing this, the Soviets returned to the negotiating table in 1985, prepared to deal with America in a more mature and direct fashion.

During the first week of these negotiations, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Communist Party. This marked the emergence to power of a new generation of Soviets. Few of them had experience in the Second World War. Few of them had served prominently in the tyrannical regime of Stalin. They therefore had a perspective on foreign affairs distinct from their predecessors, whose views were disfigured by the unspeakable ferocity of Stalin and molded by the trauma of war.

To be sure, Gorbachev and his associates are products of a tough totalitarian system, no different in this respect from Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and the others. They did not move to the fore because they subscribed to Plato's ideal of a republic or modelled themselves after a Periclean democrat. They fought their way to the top. In the process they learned a lot about power and how to use it.

Once in power, however, this new generation of Soviet leaders confronted an array of stubborn problems. Primary among them was a dismal and structurally unsound economy. Characterized by corruption and inefficiency, the Soviet economy has been unable to satisfy the needs of its people for 70 years. Although it can serve competently the demands of a voracious military establishment, it does so at the cost of 15% of the country's gross domestic product, thus diminishing its productive capacity in other areas.

Gorbachev, by all indications a pragmatist, wants to tackle these problems. He has initiated economic reforms and hopes that through them, and through a creative foreign policy, he can consolidate his position.

Whether his reforms go far enough, and whether the pampered and privileged members of the communist elite will allow them, and him, to take hold, remains uncertain. But the Soviet leader has pursued them with vigor. Moreover, when combined with President Reagan's determination to achieve real arms reductions, his readiness to compromise in this field has made an accord likely.

Although most Western Europeans welcome the prospect of this accord for political reasons, some express misgivings about its long-term effects on European security. Specifically, they ask if the removal of cruise and Pershing will decouple the United States from Europe; if it will lead to other, less advantageous, agreements, and perhaps from there to a more vulnerable, non-nuclear Europe; and, if it will weaken Western defense and erode the doctrine of "flexible response."

The West has based its deterrent on this doctrine for two decades. It holds that if our conventional arms cannot repulse a Soviet invasion, we would resort to our nuclear arsenal in ascending order of power, from tactical, through intermediate, to intercontinental weapons.

"Flexible response" for twenty years and the American commitment to Europe for forty years have been constants in Western European political and military thinking. The first entirely theoretical, the second in large measure psychological, they have allowed the West Europeans to prosper in peace. Our allies, since the arrival of the Americans and the advent of nuclear weapons, have avoided the type of conflict that twice devastated their countries this century. It is not surprising, then, that they are reluctant to tamper with NATO's nuclear deterrent and regularly seek reassurances from the Americans.

Europeans, we must understand, share a continent with the Soviet Union, which enjoys an overwhelming preponderance in conventional weapons and in manpower. Most NATO generals, including a succession of supreme allied commanders, conclude that they could not resist a Soviet invasion for more than two weeks using only their conventional forces. At the end of that brief time, they would have to employ nuclear weapons or submit.

But what nuclear weapons? Those Europeans skeptical of the INF agreement argue that, by removing the cruise and Pershing missiles, the West would eliminate a rung on the ladder of "flexible response." This in turn would require that NATO have quicker recourse to America's intercontinental ballistic missile force. The responsibility for nuclear retaliation then would reside with the country least threatened by the invasion.

Europeans naturally ask themselves if, under no imminent danger itself, the United States would respond. In other words, would the United States sacrifice Chicago to save Cologne? Some go even further. They assert that, even if no invasion had taken place, but doubt lingered on the American willingness to push the button, the Soviets could hold Europe hostage to nuclear blackmail.

Although these skeptics admit that neither scenario is probable, they contend that the question raises subtle, almost subconscious, doubts about America's reliability. Like small but persistently open sores, such worries expose the European NATO nations to the infection of Soviet propaganda, make them more susceptible to pernicious invitations to neutralism. Insidiously and over time, they debilitate the entire body. Reduced to this weakened state, the critics maintain, NATO comes apart, severing America from Europe. Just as we have recently seen the unraveling of international financial markets, they see the possible unraveling of our collective defense.

The question of decoupling greatly concerns the Europeans. Their ultimate security depends on the American nuclear arsenal and the readiness of America to use these weapons in Europe's defense. It is a psychological tie, one they see threatened by any change in our defense posture.

Their reservations about the proposed INF treaty extend to other areas as well. For example, they point out that the removal of cruise and Pershing will leave only tactical, or battlefield, missiles in Europe. Because of their limited range, these weapons will be based largely in West Germany and could reach only East Germany.

NATO, they argue, could not expect the German people to support such a strategy. Nor, they say, should the German people incur such a disproportionate burden for Western defense or accept such disproportionate risks.

According to other skeptics, even to those who cautiously endorse the INF agreement, momentum engendered by this arms deal could induce a false sense of security. This in its turn would lead to other, less wise, nuclear accords, and eventually to a "denuclearized" Europe.

They argue that for so long as the Warsaw Pact retains its superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons, the West must rely on a nuclear deterrent. NATO therefore should confine its arms reductions to those already negotiated and perhaps to mutual reductions in intercontinental ballistic missiles. To go beyond such reductions, at least at this stage, would damage the West's defense.

These are legitimate concerns. They can, however, be answered.

In the first instance, the proposed arms agreement is a good deal for NATO. We will lose missiles and launchers capable of delivering fewer than 400 warheads. The Soviets will surrender similar systems capable of delivering almost 1600. We will accomplish more than we set out to accomplish when we demanded in 1979 that the Soviets withdraw their SS-20s from Europe.

Once implemented, the agreement will rid not only Europe, but also Asia, of these weapons. No longer will our European and Asian allies live under this threat, or the threat of older Soviet intermediate-range missiles, which must also be destroyed.

As Valery Giscard D'Estaing, one of the architects of the "dual-track" decision, said in a recent article, "When you succeed in attaining your goal you must call a success a success."

The agreement also succeeds on other counts. Despite early Soviet demands, it does not affect the British and French independent nuclear forces. Nor, as we will accept it, does it place limits on SDI research, a central theme in all Soviet arms-control positions.

In additon, it provides for effective verification, including, for the first time, on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. And because the treaty requires the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, verification will be made easier.

Finally, and perhaps of the most lasting value, it will vindicate the difficult decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles taken by NATO in 1979. It will prove conclusively that strength, and not appeasement, influences Soviet behavior. As such, it should guide Western defense strategy and serve as the model for future arms negotiations.

But will it, as the skeptics have claimed, result in America drifting away from Europe? And will it place an unfair burden on the West Germans and subject them to risks that the other Alliance members will escape?

The United States committed itself to NATO when we signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Beginning on that day, long before cruise and Pershing were imagined, much less deployed, the United States bound its defense to the defense of Europe. Many years from now, when cruise and Pershing are historical footnotes, the United States will still be a steadfast partner in NATO.

It is not one weapon, or one class of weapon, that links America to Europe. It is not one weapon, no matter how accurate or versatile, that assures our collective defense. Rather, at its most compelling, it is a shared belief in freedom and democracy. It is a recognition that American prosperity depends on European prosperity, that our security depends on their security.

We of course must give tangible expression to those sentiments. For that reason, when cruise and Pershing are gone, 330,000 American troops will remain in Europe, protected by a formidable nuclear shield. Tactical weapons, fighter-bombers, and missile-equipped submarines provide NATO in Europe with some 4,000 nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them.

Many of these weapons can strike deep into the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet homeland, just as similar Soviet systems can hit any European NATO state. No one country will be especially exposed. Moreover, the planes and bombs will be distributed -- as they are now -- throughout the Alliance, ensuring a fair and equitable sharing of the nuclear burden.

At the same time, these weapons, along with the British nuclear deterrent, will preserve "flexible response." They, in tandem with the French deterrent, will render hollow any Soviet threats to Europe of nuclear blackmail. After this agreement, as before it, the West will possess a potent and persuasive deterrent.

I have endorsed this accord in my talk, and with cause. As I said, it eliminates an entire category of weapon -- with the Soviets surrendering four warheads to every one the West gives up -- and it allows for effective verification. It leaves NATO strong and capable.

As it does that, it gives impetus to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. There, American and Soviet negotiators are discussing 50% reductions in their respective inventories of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most destructive weapons in the world.

But, as it offers these opportunities on the one hand, it challenges Western diplomacy, and America's leadership of NATO, on the other.

This challenge is delicate and complex. Basically, though, it has two components. First, it asks the United States to manage real arms reduction with the Soviet Union. Second, it demands that America, while attempting to achieve this goal, keep in proper perspective its defense needs and the concerns of its European allies.

We cannot know with confidence Gorbachev's motives in seeking a deal with the West. We cannot describe with certainty what impels his domestic agenda. But, if we had ignored his international overtures and disregarded his internal reforms, if we had rebuffed his every gesture and dismissed his every word, we might have squandered an opportunity to enhance our security and perhaps improve a dangerous world.

As we explore this opportunity, however, we must be clear in our strategies, candid in our intentions, and realistic in our expectations.

First, we must reassure our allies of America's continuing commitment to NATO. This is no time to tinker with American contributions to the Alliance, no time to renew the call for a unilateral troop withdrawal from Europe. Although it may play well on this side of the Atlantic, such a tune would reinforce the worst European fears about decoupling and America's reliability as an ally.

Next, in order to proceed with other nuclear arms negotiations, we must redress the Soviet proponderance in conventional forces and chemical weapons. The elimination of intermediate-range missiles, and the reduction by half of intercontinental ballistic missiles, if that should come to pass, will enhance our security. To go beyond this, without first achieving a rough parity in the conventional and chemical fields, would invite international instability.

Finally, we must recognize the INF agreement for what it is: a solid accord that eliminates only about 4% of the world's nuclear inventory. It is a small step toward enhanced security and toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals. But it is not a panacea for other international problems. It does not herald a new age of harmony.

As Lord Carrington, the secretary general of NATO said recently, "We should not let any euphoria (the treaty) engenders push us towards some mythical non-nuclear nirvana." Lord Carrington is right.

Democracy and communism are antagonistic systems. The former derives legitimacy through the consent of the people, subscribes to the rule of law, guarantees individual liberties, and aspires only to protect itself. The latter governs through the power of the state and frequently attempts to extend its influence through force. It is, after all, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, its invasion of Afghanistan, and its active support for world revolution that, to a large measure, perpetuate international tension.

No arms agreement, no series of arms agreements, can conceal that crucial fact. As President Reagan has said, if we are to achieve better relations with the Soviets, it will depend upon their respect for human rights, their conduct in regional conflicts, their adherence to existing treaties. It is a matter of attitude, behavior, and the use and abuse of power.

We welcome Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Washington. But, as we do so in our typically warm fashion, as we exchange kind words and expressions of hope, we will keep in mind that soothing sentiments and diplomatic summits can never substitute for a strong West. Only this tempers Soviet actions, only this assures our safety.

In this period of opportunity and challenge, as in earlier, more acrimonious, times, NATO requires strength and unity. United and strong, we will protect our liberties and our democracies. United and strong, we can deal effectively with the Soviet Union.

It will not be easy. It never is. But we must do it.

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SECTION 1 OF 4
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MODUK FOR APS/S OF S, AUS(POL), ACDS(POL)(NUC), DACU
FCO FOR SEC POL DEPT
SUBJECT: NPG
SUMMARY
1. THE 42ND NPG WAS HELD IN MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA, ON 3 AND 4 NOVEMBER. THE MEETING WAS DOMINATED BY INF, WITH MINISTERS EXPRESSING STRONG UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE PROSPECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AND AGREEING SOMEWHAT LESS ENTHUSIASTICALLY THE HLGS PROGRESS REPORT ON POST INF RESTRUCTURING. THE PRESS MADE LITTLE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
DETAIL
2. OPENING THE MEETING THE SECRETARY GENERAL SPOKE OF A TIME OF OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE. THE INF AAGREEMENT REPRESENTED AN

ENORMOUS ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE ALLIANCE AND WOULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT

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CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. AT THE SAME TIME THERE WERE CROSS CURRENTS WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL HANDLING: EUPHORIA AT THE AGREEMENT AND CALLS FOR FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS ON THE ONE HAND, PRESSURE FOR QUOTE COMPENSATING UNQUOTE NEW WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS ON THE OTHER. THE BUSINESS OF CAREFUL, METHODICAL PLANNING NECESSARY TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT IN THIS CLIMATE. THE ALLIANCE HAD TO EXPLAIN HOW SUCH PLANNING NEEDED TO CONTINUE IN SPITE OF AN INF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, THOUGH THE LATTER WAS OBVIOUSLY A FACTOR TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
ITEM 1: STATUS OF NUCLEAR FORCES
3. THE US TEAM (WEINBERGER, GAFFNEY, BARKER) GAVE A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON RECENT US/SOVIET EXCHANGES OVER INF, START, SPACE/DEFENCE AND NUCLEAR TESTING. NO NEW DETAILS EMERGED. GENERAL ABRAHAMSON FOLLOWED WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF RECENT EXTRAORDINARY PROGRESS WITH THE SDI PROGRAMME. WEINBERGER CLAIMED THAT THE EXTENT OF THIS PROGRAMME AND THE DIVERSITY OF PROMISING PROJECTS DEMONSTRATED THE COMPLETE FOLLY OF SOVIET PROPOSALS TO DRAW UP LISTS OF PERMITTED ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PURSUE A SENSIBLE PROGRAMME UNDER

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SUCH A REGIME. THE US GOAL REMAINED DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY RESTRAINTS WHICH MIGHT DELAY OR PREVENT THIS. THE PROGRAMME WAS ON TRACK FOR INFORMED DECISIONS IN THE EARLY 1990S.
4. WEINBERGER ALSO BRIEFED MINISTERS ON HIS FAILURE IN TWO ATTEMPTS TO INTEREST THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER IN A GENERAL BILATERAL DISCUSSION. THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO MEET ONLY TO DISCUSS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ABMT AND HOW TO RESOLVE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS BY EACH SIDE.
ITEM II: IMPLEMENTATION OF 1979 DECISION:
A. DEPLOYMENTS
5. WOERNER (FRG) AND ZANONE (ITALY) REAFFIRMED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY ON DEPLOYMENTS AND CONFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTING MISSILE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE UNTIL SIGNATURE. DE DONNEA (BELGIUM) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD

ANNOUNCE A SIX MONTH FREEZE ON DEPLOYMENTS IF, AS IT WAS ASSUMED THE INF TREATY WAS SIGNED ON 7 DECEMBER. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN LEST THE RATIFICATION PROCESS BECAME DEFLECTED AND THE AGREEMENT DID NOT ENTER INTO FORCE.

6. VAN EEKELEN (NETHERLANDS) SAID DUTCH PREPARATIONS FOR INF

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DEPLOYMENTS WOULD CONTINUE UP TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT. THEY HAD NOT DECIDED WHAT THEIR POSITION WOULD BE ONCE AN INF AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED. THEY WERE COMMITTED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH PARLIAMENT AFTER SIGNATURE. IN THE EVENT OF NO DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES THEY WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE F16 AND ORION TASKS. THE NETHERLANDS WOULD ALSO WORK FOR AN EARLY DISCUSSION OF THE USE OF INF BASES AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF MISSILES. MR YOUNGER EMPHASISED THE NEED TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS BY MAINTAINING THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE. HMG HAD NOT TAKEN A POSITION ON DEPLOYMENT POST SIGNATURE.

7. WEINBERGER SAID THE INF AGREEMENT WAS A PROUD MOMENT FOR THE ALLIANCE. IT WAS VERY LIKELY THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED IN EARLY DECEMBER. OVER USD 6.2 BILLION US MONEY HAD BEEN SPENT ON DEPLOYMENTS. OVER USD 300M HAD ALSO COME FROM THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE FUND. OVER 13000 US PERSONNEL WERE ENGAGED IN OPERATING THE EXISTING INF BASES. THE OPERATION OF RETURNING THE MISSILES TO THE US FOR DESTRUCTION WOULD COST USD 50M. HE EMPHASISED THESE WERE WORTHWHILE COSTS. AFTER AN AGREEMENT MONTEBELLO IMPROVEMENTS AND OUR REMAINING NUCLEAR FORCES TOOK

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ON AN ADDED IMPORTANCE.

B. ARMS CONTROL

8. WEINBERGER REPEATED THAT HE THOUGHT SIGNATURE OF AN INF AGREEMENT WAS PROBABLE THOUGH VERIFICATION PROBLEMS REMAINED TO BE SOLVED. BUT RATIFICATION COULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. COUNTRIES MUST SPEAK OUT IN SUPPORT OF THE AGREEMENT TO HELP THE PROCESS IN THE SENATE. THE ALLIANCE MUST ALSO MAKE CLEAR ITS OPPOSITION TO A THIRD ZERO/ZERO. WE MUST NOW TURN OUR ATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS. ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT RANGE FORCES, IN WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD SEEK TO CAPTURE ALLIANCE DCA, COULD INCREASE THE RISK OF US DECOUPLING FROM EUROPE.

9. HOLST (NORWAY) URGED THE ALLIANCE TO ADOPT A STRUCTURED APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL/NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE PLANNING WERE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. WOERNER SAID IT WAS TIME FOR THE ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY THE EUROPEAN PARTNERS BT

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

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TO SHIFT THE EMPHASIS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. WE MUST NOT LEAD OUR PUBLIC OPINIONS TO TALK ALWAYS OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. WE NEEDED AN OVERALL CONCEPT OF WHAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO DETER ATTACK. THIS DETERMINED OUR SECURITY, NOT ANY PARTICULAR (NUMBER OF) SYSTEMS. OUR ARMS CONTROL POLICY SHOULD REFLECT OUR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE. WE WERE IN MUCH BETTER SHAPE THAN THE WARSAW PACT.

10. MR YOUNGER SAID THE INF AGREEMENT WAS A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE ALLIANCE. WE APPRECIATED THE IMMENSE TROUBLE THE US HAD TAKEN TO CONSULT ALL THE ALLIES AND TO BRIEF US ON DEVELOPMENTS. THERE WERE PLENTY WHO HAD TRIED TO DIVERT US FROM THIS COURSE WE COULD NOT ASSUME ALL THE DIFFICULTIES WERE OVER. PRESSURE WOULD BE KEPT ON US RIGHT THROUGH SIGNING TO RATIFICATION WE SHOULD NOW MAKE GREAT EFFORTS TO SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE ON THE SUCCESS OF THE AGREEMENT. OTHER MEASURES WOULD NEED TO FOLLOW TO MAINTAIN OUR SECURITY. THE THREAT THAT FACED US WAS NOT ONLY NUCLEAR. WE MUST LOOK AT THE OVERALL BALANCE. OUR MILITARY LEADERS NEEDED A RANGE OF RESPONSES. OUR PUBLIC

OPINION SHOULD BE REMINDED OF THIS AND THE NEED TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. VAN EEKELEN HOPED THAT THE INF TREATY WOULD BE A GOOD TREATY. BUT THIS WOULD IN PART DEPEND ON THE VERIFICATION REGIME WHICH WAS STILL BEING WORKED OUT.

11. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN USEFUL. HE ECHOED THE NEED NOW TO LOOK TO THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. HE THANKED THE US FOR CALLING 59 SPECIAL MEETINGS TO BRIEF THE ALLIES ON PROGRESS ON INF.

ITEM III. MONTEBELLO IMPLEMENTATION.

12. SACEUR REPORTED THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN BELOW THE MONTEBELLO AGREED CEILING OF 4600 WARHEADS IN EUROPE FOR OVER A YEAR NOW, WELL AHEAD OF THE 1988 DEADLINE. THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES IN EUROPE HAD REDUCED FROM 128 TO 82 AND WOULD COME DOWN FURTHER AS NIKE HERCULES UNITS CONTINUED TO BE WITHDRAWN. AS FOR STOCKPILE IMPROVEMENTS, HE WAS HAPPY TO REPORT A GENERAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO PROCEED WITH HIS IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSALS, BUT THERE REMAINED MALDEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY IN THE S REGION AND THE ALLIANCE HAD GOT TO GET TO GRIPS WITH OBSOLESCENCE AND MODERNISATION. THERE WOULD NOW INEVITABLY BE CHARGES OF CIRCUMVENTION OF THE INF AGREEMENT LEVELLED AT ANYTHING THE ALLIANCE MIGHT DO IN THIS AREA. BUT IN FACT WE WOULD MERELY BE UPDATING EXISTING CAPABILITIES, AS WE HAD DONE IN THE PAST. THE INF AGREEMENT OF COURSE MADE SOME REQUIREMENTS MORE IMPORTANT THAN BEFORE, IN PARTICULAR THE STAND-OFF AIR DELIVERED WEAPON , WHERE HE WAS LOOKING FOR AT LEAST 400 KM IN RANGE, AND THE FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE WHERE HE SAW ATACMS AS THE MOST PROMISING CANDIDATE PROVIDED THE US CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTION COULD BE LIFTED. SACEUR EXPRESSED HIS FIRM PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR THE INF AGREEMENT BUT CALLED UPON MINISTERS FOR THEIR PART, TO GIVE CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT TO THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND TO THE PROGRAMMES NECESSARY TO ALLOW ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

ITEM IV: WORK OF HLG

13. GAFFNEY (HLG CHAIRMAN) BRIEFED MINISTERS ON THE WORK OF THE GROUP OVER THE LAST 6 MONTHS AND ON THE CONTENT OF ITS REPORT ON POST INF RESTRUCTURING OF NATOS NUCLEAR FORCES. ON THE FAVOURED MIX OF FORCE POSTURE ADJUSTMENT OPTIONS, HE WARNED AGAINST THE TEMPTATION TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SOFT OPTIONS IE THOSE WHICH INVOLVED NO NEW DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE. THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF THE GROUP WAS THAT A BALANCED MIX WAS NECESSARY. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR ADJUSTMENTS COULD NOT BE MADE

IN ADVANCE OF AN INF AGREEMENT BUT FURTHER MORE DETAILED WORK BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES COULD NOW BE PUT IN HAND. THIS WOULD FEED INTO A SECOND REPORT BY THE HLG IN THE NEW YEAR LEADING TO MINISTERIAL DECISIONS AT THEIR MEETING IN DENMARK IN APRIL.

14. WEINBERGER WELCOMED THE HLG REPORT. HE HOPED NATIONS WOULD BEGIN TO TAKE ITS CONCLUSIONS INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR OWN

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

PLANNING IN ADVANCE OF NATO DECISIONS NEXT YEAR. HE FOR HIS PART HAD ALREADY BEEN DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO REVIEW ALL ELEMENTS OF US CAPABILITY COMMITTED TO NATO (CONVENTIONAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR) IN THE LIGHT OF AN INF AGREEMENT. ANY ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS THROWN UP BY THIS REVIEW WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE US DEFENCE BUDGET. HE PROMISED A PROGRESS REPORT TO COLLEAGUES AT THE DECEMBER DPC MINISTERIAL.

15. OLCAY (TURKEY) MADE A FORMAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD SETTING OUT TURKEYS UNDERSTANDING OF THE MONTEBELLO DECISIONS AND THE STATUS OF SACEURS NWRS 85 (IE AS CONSTITUTING PROPOSALS ONLY, TO WHICH NATIONS WERE IN NO WAY COMMITTED). ON THAT UNDERSTANDING, AND ASSUMING THAT THERE WOULD BE FULL SCOPE FOR NATIONS TO REGISTER THEIR VIEWS IN THE CURRENT EXERCISE BEFORE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS WERE PUT TO MINISTERS NEXT YEAR, TURKEY WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE HLG REPORT.

16. VAN EEKELEN AGREED THE THRUST OF THE REPORTS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THOUGH QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE YET IN THE

BUSINESS OF PLANNING AS OPPOSED TO WORK (FIRST RECOMMENDATION). HE FELT THE REPORT MIGHT HAVE DWELT MORE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF DOUBLE ZERO FOR THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THIS DID NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF ITS ANALYSIS OF NATOS MILITARY PROBLEMS AT THE LONGER RANGES. THE REPORT PROVIDED A GOOD BASIS FOR DETERMINING ADJUSTMENTS, WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE MADE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MONTEBELLO DECISION ON THE STOCKPILE SIZE. IN THIS CONTEXT HE NOTED THE MARITIME COMMANDERS RESERVATIONS ON THE SLBM AND SLCM OPTIONS: THE TWO SYSTEMS WHICH WENT BEYOND MONTEBELLO (SIC).

17. HOLST STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT BEING SEEN TO CIRCUMVENT OR UNDERMINE THE INF TREATY. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THE SLCM OPTION IN THIS RESPECT, AND SAW A RISK OF A COMPETITIVE BUILD UP OF US AND SOVIET SLCM DEPLOYMENTS IN NORTHERN WATERS. THE ALLIANCE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A CONTINUOUS SPECTRUM OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS WELL AS SEEK FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, BUT IT SHOULD ALSO REMEMBER THAT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE AND US STRATEGIC FORCES WAS CRITICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE CONVENTIONAL ELEMENT.

18. DE DONNEA URGED THE ALLIANCE TO ABANDON THE ARITHMETICAL APPROACH TO THE THEATRE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE WHICH RISKED LEAVING EUROPE WITH AN INADEQUATE NUMBER OF WEAPONS UNRELATED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STRATEGY. THAT SAID, FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, IT WAS NECESSARY TO REAFFIRM THE MONTEBELLO DECISION AND THE ALLIANCES LONG-STANDING POLICY OF MAINTAINING ONLY THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF WEAPONS REQUIRED FOR DETERRENCE.

19. MR YOUNGER WELCOMED THE REPORT. IT REPRESENTED THE IMPORTANT FIRST STAGE IN A PROCESS LEADING TO MINISTERIAL DECISIONS NEXT YEAR. MINISTERS MUST RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO THINK THAT THESE DECISIONS COULD ENDLESSLY BE PUT OFF: THEY WOULD CERTAINLY NOT GET EASIER WITH TIME, RATHER THE REVERSE. THE UK ACCEPTED THE REPORTS ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AND WELCOMED THE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THE NEXT STAGE OF THE EXERCISE WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS NOW HAD TO BE TURNED INTO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS. IT WAS VITAL THAT NATIONS GIVE EARLY INDICATIONS OF WHERE THEY STOOD ON EUROPEAN BASING FOR NEW SYSTEMS. WIDE PARTICIPATION IN ANY ADJUSTMENTS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THE UK, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. THE UK WOULD ALSO PLAY ITS PART. MR YOUNGER AGREED WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES POST INF (THOUGH CONVENTIONAL COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR NUCLEAR) AND

HOPED THOSE WHO STRESSED THIS POINT WOULD COME FORWARD WITH ACTUAL IMPROVEMENTS. ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION HE SAID THE ALLIANCE MUST KNOCK DOWN THE IDEA THAT ANY ADJUSTMENT WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE INF TREATY. WE MUST REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION THAT WE WERE FULLY COMMITTED TO AN INF AGREEMENT AND TO NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, BUT SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DICTATE THE BALANCE OF WHAT WAS LEFT. CHANGES TO REMAINING FORCES WERE INEVITABLE.
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NPG MINISTERIAL: GERMAN POSITION ON SNF: PRESS REPORTS

SUMMARY

1. REPORTS OF GERMAN ISOLATION AT MONTEREY ON SNF DISARMAMENT. RENEWED TALK OF SINGULARISATION. RIGHT WING POLITICAL LEADERS APPEAL TO NPG.

DETAIL

2. SEVERAL SERIOUS GERMAN PAPERS TODAY RUN REPORTS FROM MONTEREY ON THE CURRENT NPG MINISTERIAL. ALL HIGHLIGHT GERMAN ISOLATION ON THE NEED FOR SNF NEGOTIATIONS. GERMAN DELEGATION SOURCES AR QUOTED EMPHASISING THE SINGULARISATION OF THE FRG WHICH THE CONTINUED SNF IMBALANCE BRINGS, AND EXPRESSING ''BITTERNESS'' THAT WHILE THE ALLIANCE INSISTS ON THE VALUE OF SNF FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, NO OTHER COUNTRY WHERE STATIONING WOULD MAKE SENSE (IMPLICITY BENELUX) IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE MODERNISED LANCE. THE UNITED STATES IS NAMED AS THE PRINCIPLE ADVOCATE OF A FIRE BREAK, ALTHOUGH THE UK AND FRANCE ARE MENTIONED AS OPPOSED TO A FURTHER ZERO OPTION AND PROGRESSIVE DENUCLEARISATION OF EUROPE.

3. SOME ARTICLES NOTE THAT THE NPG IS CONSIDERING POST-MONTEBELLO MODERNISATIONS, INCLUDING EXTENDING LANCE'S RANGE TO OVER 400 KMS AND TASM. WOERNER IS QUOTED SAYING THAT A NUMERICAL INCREASE IN LANCE HOLDINGS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. HE ALSO REJECTED A FIRE BREAK, BUT SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST CONCENTRATE ON THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE BEFORE NEGOTIATING OVER SNF.

4. KOHL YESTERDAY APPEALED AGAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION UNILATERALLY TO REDUCE ITS SNF HOLDINGS (AS IN HIS 26 AUGUST PERSHING 1A STATEMENT).

5. DREGGER (CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY PARTY LEADER) AND WAIGEL (DREGGER'S CSU DEPUTY) TODAY SENT A TELEGRAM TO THE NPG, IN RESPONSE TO THE REPORTS THAT THE NPG WAS OPPOSED TO EARLY DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF. THEY SAID IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GERMAN

PEOPLE (MEANING BOTH GERMANIES) NOT TO NEGLECT DISARMAMENT IN THE AREA OF SNF. THEY PLEADED URGENTLY FOR THE ELABORATION WITHIN NATO OF A DISARMAMENT CONCEPT COVERING GROUND-BASED SNF AND THE INCORPORATION OF THIS CATEGORY INTO THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS (NUCLEAR CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL).

COMMENT.
6. THESE REPORTS FOLLOW SEVERAL WEEKS OF RELATIVE QUIET IN PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE. IF THE EMPHASIS ON GERMAN ISOLATION REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT BY WOERNER TO DAMPEN PRESSURE WITHIN THE COALITION FOR EARLY MOVEMENT ON SNF, IT MAY WELL BACK-FIRE. THE DREGGER/WAIGEL APPEAL IS A FURTHER REMINDER THAT SENSITIVITY OVER SNF IS AS ACUTE ON THE RIGHT AS ON THE LEFT.

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C O N T E N T S

PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE STATUS OF ARMS CONTROL

WORLDNET NOTICE: AMBASSADOR KEEL TO BE INTERVIEWED ON U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON NATO

Wednesday,
November 4, 1987

OFFICIAL TEXT

4 November 1987

UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S. EMBASSY, 55/56 UPPER BROOK STREET, LONDON W1A 2LH

INF TREATY MUST BE REALISTIC, IN NATO'S LONG-TERM INTEREST

(Text: Reagan Worldnet Address)

Washington -- President Reagan says any nuclear arms treaty he signs with the Soviet Union "will be realistic and in the long-term interest of all the members of the (Atlantic) Alliance, or no agreement will be signed."

Discussing the current negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the president said "any new treaty will contain iron-clad provisions for effective verification, including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reductions, and short-notice inspections afterwards.

"The verification regime we have put forward is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations. None of us in the alliance can settle for anything less," Reagan said in remarks prepared for transmission November 4 over the U.S. Information Agency's "Worldnet" satellite television network.

In his address, the president also made these points:

-- The Soviet tactic of holding offensive nuclear weapons reductions hostage to measures that would cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is "totally unacceptable." He said SDI "offers the promise of a safer world in which both sides would rely more on defenses -- which threaten no one -- than on offensive forces."

-- Concerning the Soviet policy of glasnost (openness), Reagan said, "Who cannot but hope these reports are true, that the optimism is justified? Good sense, however, dictates that we look for tangible changes in behavior."

-- "This year some people, including few very prominent individuals, were permitted to leave the Soviet Union. It is better than the record of recent years, yet many more emigration and divided-family cases remain."

-- "Soviet leaders can win accolades from people of good will everywhere and free their country from a no-win situation by grounding their helicopter gunships, promptly withdrawing their troops, and permitting the Afghan people to choose their own destiny."

-- "The commitment of the United States to the alliance and to the security of Europe -- INF treaty or no INF treaty -- remains unshakable."

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Following is the text of Reagan's Worldnet address, as prepared for delivery:

Greetings. I am speaking with you from here in Washington via the satellite channels of Worldnet and Voice of America. This is but another demonstration of the dramatic effect technology is having on our lives. Science is shrinking distances, overcoming obstacles, and opening borders. Today, individuals in distant lands are working, trading, and even playing together on a global scale. We are, as would never have been thought possible a century ago, truly becoming a community -- perhaps even a family -- of free people, united by humane values and democratic ideals, and sharing in a prosperity that is closely linked to the trade and commerce between us.

Earlier in this century, during a time when fascism and communism were on the rise, there were those who believed that the light of democracy might well be extinguished. It was feared that the era of representative government, of political and economic freedom, would prove to be a short interlude of history and would disappear just as the democracy of Greece and the Roman Republic had vanished.

Well, our cause may have seemed precariously perched, fragile, and without the power projected by strutting troops and mass political spectacles. But it should be clear now that the courage and resilience of free people are too easily underestimated, as is our resolve to cooperate, to see a common purpose, and to act together in our own defense.

Victor Hugo once wrote, "People do not lack strength; they lack will." Well, in my life, I have time and again seen evidence that gives me great confidence that those who live in freedom do indeed have the will to remain free, even under enormous pressure, even against great odds. Those of us who lived through the Second World War saw that in the British people, whose indomitable spirit never broke under heavy bombardment. We saw it in the French troops and resistance fighters who battled to free their homeland; in Polish home army soldiers who rose in Warsaw; in the moral heroes throughout the continent, including within Germany itself, who resisted Nazism often at the cost of their own lives; and others who risked all to save Jews, sometimes perfect strangers, from the death camps. We saw it in Normandy where Americans joined with people from all over Europe to breach the Atlantic wall and head inland, joined together in one mighty crusade to rid the continent of Hitler's national socialism and all the horrors that went with it.

Yes, and in the four decades since the end of the Second World War, the free peoples of the world have continued to prove their courage and, just as important, as never before to demonstrate their solidarity with one another. The North Atlantic Alliance, a lasting triumph of unity and cooperation among free peoples, has maintained peace on the European continent for four decades. It has been the shield of democracy and the greatest deterrent to war in history.

Four decades of European peace have been no accident. They have been earned by those in uniform who stood guard, and paid for by all of us whose taxes kept our allied forces manned, equipped, and armed with the conventional and nuclear weapons needed to deter aggression. We've all had to do our part or it would not have worked. But it has worked. The alliance has been prepared to meet any challenge. The message to anyone who would threaten the peace has been simple and direct: "Don't even think about it."

Pl. file

And when our will has been tested, we have come together as allies, as people whose destinies are inextricably linked, and have acted in unison to meet the challenge. It has not been easy, yet we have done what was necessary to keep our countries free and to preserve the peace. That certainly was true of the alliance's response to the vast expansion of Soviet military power in the late 1970s, especially their introduction of the new SS-20 intermediate-range missiles.

It was in 1977 when the Soviet Union deployed its first SS-20s. This triple-warhead weapon could hit anywhere in Western Europe, and much of Asia. Though NATO had no comparable missile to counter this new threat, by August of 1982, the number of Soviet INF missiles had climbed to over 300, with more than 900 warheads.

What we were witnessing was an attempt to tip the military balance of power in Europe and erode the security bond between Europe and the United States. It tested our cohesion and could well have had serious, even catastrophic, long-term consequences had the alliance not acted with resolve.

But we did act. In December of 1979, Western leaders made the decision to move forward on a "two-track" approach:

First, the United States would negotiate with the Soviets in an attempt to convince them to withdraw their new missiles.

Second, as long as the Soviets continued on their course and kept their missiles in place, NATO would deploy in Europe a limited number of Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles. What the alliance sought, however, were fewer missiles, not more.

Our plan depended upon unflagging solidarity and steadfastness of purpose even under immense pressure, and the pressure was put on. Had the nuclear freeze and unilateral disarmament protestors won, Europe would now be condemned to live under the shadow of Soviet, nuclear-armed INF missiles. To democracy's credit, the political courage of far-sighted European leaders carried the day. That resolve has now made it possible to achieve an historic agreement -- an agreement that will eliminate a whole class of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles from the face of the planet.

The agreement we are now nearing is based upon the proposal that the United States, in full consultation with allied leaders, put forward in 1981 -- "the zero option." The plan will require the Soviets to remove four times as many nuclear warheads as the United States. Not only will the entire Soviet force of SS-20s and SS-4s be destroyed, but also the shorter-range SS-12s and SS-23s. It will be the first mutual reduction of the world's nuclear arsenals in history.

And more than that, the shorter-range Soviet missiles that will be eliminated are capable of carrying not just nuclear but also chemical and conventional warheads. Thus, we will be making a promising start in cutting back these threats to Europe as well.

Achievements like this are not the result of wishful thinking, nor are they made more likely by loud proclamations of a desire for peace. Lasting progress derives from hard-nosed realism, strenuous effort, and firmness of principle. I can assure you that any treaty I sign will be realistic and in the long-term interest of all the members of the alliance, or no agreement will be signed.

The Soviet Union, for example, has a poor record of compliance with past arms control agreements. So any new treaty will contain iron-clad provisions for effective verification, including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reductions, and

short-notice inspections afterwards. The verification regime we have put forward is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations. None of us in the alliance can settle for anything less.

Arms reduction -- if done with care to ensure the continuing credibility of our deterrent, both nuclear and conventional -- is the interest of all Western countries. And any INF agreement should be viewed not as the end of the process, but the beginning, a first big step.

We and the Soviets have also been negotiating possible reductions in our strategic arsenals, which for us is a high priority. Again, it's an American proposal that is the centerpiece of the negotiation -- a dramatic proposition to cut our strategic arsenals in half. Considerable progress has been made, and further movement can be expected if Soviet flexibility is evident.

What is totally unacceptable, however, is the Soviet tactic of holding these offensive reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative. We won't bargain away SDI, which offers the promise of a safer world in which both sides would rely more on defenses -- which threaten no one -- than on offensive forces. It shouldn't escape our attention that the Soviets themselves have been spending billions (thousands of millions) on a strategic defense program of their own.

Much has been heard as of late about reforms being instituted within the Soviet Union. Glasnost, we are told, is ushering in a new era. Well, who cannot but hope these reports are true, that the optimism is justified? Good sense, however, dictates that we look for tangible changes in behavior -- for action not words -- in deciding what is real or illusionary.

We will, for example, closely watch the condition of human rights within the Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine that a government that continues to repress freedom in its own country, breaking faith with its own people, can be trusted to keep agreements with others.

Yes, this year some people, including a few very prominent individuals, were permitted to leave the Soviet Union. It is better than the record of recent years, yet many more emigration and divided-family cases remain. And let us remember, denial of the right to emigrate is only a small part of the problem of the repressive Soviet system. A recognition of freedom of speech, religion, and press, a release of all prisoners of conscience, and ending of the practice of sending perfectly sane political dissidents to psychiatric hospitals, tolerance of real opposition, and freedom of political choice: these things -- which we all take for granted -- would signal that a true turning point has been reached and would offer hope of positive changes in the international arena as well. If there is one observation that rings true in today's changing world, it is that freedom and peace go hand in hand. The further the Soviet leadership opens their system and frees their people, the more likely it will be that the tensions between East and West will lessen.

Reflecting this, we also hope to see changes in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is most certainly a dreadful quagmire. The Afghan people have proven themselves the bravest of the brave. They will continue to have the sympathy and support of free nations in their struggle for independence. Soviet leaders can win accolades from people of goodwill everywhere and free

their country from a no-win situation by grounding their helicopter gunships, promptly withdrawing their troops, and permitting the Afghan people to choose their own destiny. Such actions would be viewed, not as a retreat, but as a courageous and positive step.

Another sign to look for -- this one closer to home for you on your side of the Atlantic -- would be a loosening of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe. Why should the peoples of Europe remain divided as they are with barbed wire, watch towers, and machine guns? Why shouldn't all Europeans be free to travel, to visit one another, or to conduct business with each other? Shouldn't the Brezhnev Doctrine finally be renounced? Four decades after the war, why should 17 million Germans be treated like prisoners in their own land? A true opening-up and recognition of their sovereign independence would be welcomed by all the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, and it would not threaten the security of the Soviet Union or anyone else.

A few months ago, I visited Berlin. I stood there alongside the cruel wall that symbolizes so powerfully the scar that divides the European continent. It is time for that wound to heal and that scar to disappear. Wouldn't it be a wonderful sight for the world to see, if someday General Secretary Gorbachev and I could meet in Berlin and together take down the first bricks of that wall -- and we could continue taking down walls until the distrust between our peoples and the scars of the past are forgotten.

A few months ago, I recalled the valiant fight, 40 years ago, to liberate the European continent. Who cannot help but appreciate that, in the epic struggle, the peoples of the Soviet Union fought bravely and sacrificed so immensely to defeat the common enemy. After the war, we became adversaries, at times bitter adversaries. Yet this need not have happened and need not to continue. Any philosophy or leader suggesting that there is a predetermined course of history and that conflict between or peoples and systems is inevitable, is wrong. We are not condemned by forces beyond our control. We, all peoples in every land, can shape the world in which we live and determine the future. We in the Western democracies have been doing just that. Together we've built a freer and more prosperous way of life, a community of free people. I'm certain you agree with me that the door is open to all who would join with us.

German literary figure Heinrich Heine has written, "...Do not mock our dreamers...their words become the seeds of freedom." Well, today our vision, not only of a more peaceful world, but of a world of freedom in which democratic rights are enjoyed in every land, seems ever more in focus, almost as if it is within reach. We will continue to watch and to be hopeful, yet we must also remain vigilant. The strength and viability of the alliance remains essential, even as an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union opens new opportunities for peace. It is just such strength as NATO has demonstrated that is a precondition to such progress. Weakness, vulnerability, and wishful thinking can undo what has been accomplished by standing firm.

This, nevertheless, can be a time of great change. As you are likely aware, General Secretary Gorbachev has accepted my invitation to come to Washington for a summit in early December. We'll be discussing face-to-face the wide spectrum of issues I've spoken to you about today. I, in fact, expect we will sign that agreement concerning U.S. and Soviet INF missiles during the time of our meetings.

For our part, the commitment of the United States to the alliance and to the security of Europe -- INF treaty or no INF treaty -- remains unshakable. Over 300,000 American servicemen with you on the continent and our steadfast nuclear guarantee, underscore this pledge. Those who worry that we will somehow drift apart or that deterrence has been weakened are mistaken on both counts.

Our ties will be strengthened, not diminished, by this success. Such an historic reduction in nuclear weapons, as now appears on the way, will be a resounding vindication of the unity, strength, and determination of the alliance.

As for our ability to keep the peace, the NATO strategy of flexible response will continue to ensure that aggression, at any level, is blocked. A viable deterrent force of nuclear weapons of many types, including ground-based systems, as well as those carried by aircraft and submarines, still protects Europe and remains in place. And we have agreed with our allies that the existing imbalances in conventional forces and chemical weapons must be redressed prior to any further nuclear reductions in Europe.

The alliance has had underway for some time a program of modernizing our forces so that a credible deterrent is maintained over the long term. That is why major initiatives are moving forward to upgrade NATO's conventional strength. And, after 18 years of unilaterally refraining from any production of chemical weapons, improvements are being made in our modest chemical weapon inventory. The Soviet Union, of course, possesses what is by far the world's most extensive chemical weapon stockpile.

But just as we are doing in our INF talks, we are also seeking through negotiation to correct the disparities we face in both the chemical and conventional areas. In fact, in 1984, the United States, with allied support, proposed an effective global ban on chemical weapons.

As for conventional forces, the alliance stands ready -- if the East meets us halfway -- to make reductions in Central Europe through mutual balanced forced reductions, or MBFR, as they are called. At the same time, in Vienna, an agreement between East and West is being sought that would mandate new negotiations on conventional stability from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains.

Our common security agenda, as you can see, is broad and ambitious. An INF agreement is an important first step, but only the first one, toward our greater goal.

And let there be no doubt, the citizens of the United States fully understand and appreciate that we are partners for peace with you, the peoples of our fellow Western democracies. That is why we applaud what we see as a new willingness, even eagerness, on the part of some of our allies to increase the level of cooperation and coordination among themselves in European defense. The growing cooperation between France and Germany is a positive sign, as is the modernization of the British and French independent nuclear deterrents, which are both vital components of the Western security system. Last week, the foreign and defense ministers of the Western European Union issued an impressive declaration. It reaffirmed the importance of maintaining our nuclear and conventional deterrents and affirmed a positive Western European identity in the field of defense within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We welcome these developments.

Over these last four decades, all too often the United States has been viewed as the senior partner of the alliance. Today, when the economic strength of Western Europe and the United States are fully comparable, the time has long since come when we will view ourselves as equal partners. And a more equal relationship should not diminish our bonds, but strengthen them. It should not limit our potential, but expand it.

Goethe, the soul of German literature, once wrote, "If you would create something, you must be something." Well, in these last four decades the people of the United States and Europe have been a force for progress and freedom on this planet. And, only a few short years from now, as mankind literally enters into a new millennium, we will have laid the foundation for a prosperous and free future. We've proven wrong -- dead wrong -- those doubters and despots who earlier in this century thought democracy was soon to be extinct. We have ensured that, in the centuries ahead, it is free people who will dominate the affairs of mankind. And let me predict that, someday, the realm of liberty and justice will encompass the planet. Freedom is not just the birthright of the few, it is the God-given right of all His children, in every country. It won't come by conquest. It will come because freedom is right and freedom works. It will come because cooperation and goodwill among free people will carry the day.

There is a story that was brought to my attention a few years ago about an elderly couple who live in the small town of Marstal on the Island of Aero in Denmark -- Natalia and Nels Mortensen. For the last 40 years they have tended the grave of a young man they never met. They dig the weeds and place flowers, and always there is a small American flag. When it becomes worn, they replace it with another.

They are watching over the final resting place of U.S. Air Force Sergeant Jack Wagner, who died when his plane was shot down on June 20, 1944, near Aero, which was then occupied territory. Jack Wagner's body washed up on shore a few days later, and the word quickly spread through the tiny community. When the Nazi occupation troops came to bury the young American they found nearly the whole town of 2,000 had been waiting by the grave since early in the morning to pay tribute to the young flyer. The path had been lined with flowers. And when the troops laid young Jack Wagner in his grave, the townspeople conducted a funeral service and placed red, white, and blue flowers on his grave, along with a banner that read, "Thank you for what you have done."

Jack was a 19-year-old American from Snyder County, Pennsylvania. The Danish townspeople had never met him, but they knew this young man had given his life for them. He cared enough for people he'd never met to make the supreme sacrifice for their freedom. The Mortensens' never forgot this. They still care for that grave as if he was a member of their family. And, in a way he was. Just as we are -- all part of the family of free people.

Many young people, from all of our countries, have died to preserve the freedom we now enjoy. Many of our children still serve. They stand together on the ramparts of freedom. We care about each and every one of them as if he or she was our own. Let us be as brave as they are brave; as proud ass they are proud.

Thank you for letting me share these moments with you. God bless you.

United States Information Service

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LIVE SATELLITE NEWS CONFERENCE

"U.S. PERSPECTIVES ON NATO"

with

AMBASSADOR ALTON G. KEEL
U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO NATO

Ambassador Keel will feature in a live television news conference to discuss U.S. perspectives on NATO and take questions from participating journalists at the American Embassy on Friday, November 6, starting at 2:00 p.m.

Ambassador Keel has a distinguished background in the defense and security field. He served on the professional staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee before his 1981 appointment by President Reagan as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research, Development and Logistics. From 1982 to 1986 he served in the Executive Office of the President with the Office of Management and Budget as Associate Director of National Security and International Affairs. From February to August of 1986 he served concurrently with the National Security Council (NSC) and as Executive Director on the Rogers Committee investigating the causes of the explosion of the space shuttle "Challenger". From July to November of 1986 he served as Admiral John Poindexter's principal deputy at the NSC and then as acting National Security Advisor to the President between Poindexter's resignation and the appointment of Frank Carlucci.

Journalists wishing to attend this live WORLDNET program are requested to call the Press Office of the American Embassy on 499-5261 or 499-6479 by no later than noon on Friday.

Admission will be via the main entrance in Grosvenor Square and regular press credentials are required.

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3 November 1987

From the Private Secretary

AN INF AGREEMENT AND RESTRUCTURING OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 30 October about the restructuring of NATO's theatre nuclear forces following an INF agreement. She thinks the work done so far within NATO is satisfactory but acknowledges that the next phase is likely to be more difficult and that we shall need to give a lead. Subject to anything which emerges at the Monterey meeting she is generally content with the proposed line to take in public presentation. One additional point which we might make is that we shall deploy those of NATO's weapons which are not covered by the INF agreement in the way which best enables us to maintain the strategy of flexible response.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

John Howe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

2 November 1987

ARMS CONTROL

The Prime Minister has noted the United States proposal in paragraph 2 of Washington tel no 2350, in the context of the INF negotiations, that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree not to enter into international agreements which would conflict with the INF Treaty. She considers that this might be a dangerous precedent, in that if it were subsequently applied to a strategic arms limitation agreement, it might affect our Trident arrangements. I should be grateful if you and the Ministry of Defence could let me have views on this as soon as possible.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

NATO's NUCLEAR FORCES AFTER AN INF AGREEMENT

The Defence Secretary's minute (attached) sets out where matters stand on the "compensation" which will be needed in order to maintain the effectiveness of NATO's nuclear forces in Europe after the elimination of LRINF and SRINF missiles under an INF agreement.

A NATO study has identified four options:

- increase deployment to Europe of dual capable aircraft armed with stand-off weapons;
- assignment of SLCMs to SACEUR;
- incorporation of American SLBMs in NATO's planning for selective use (ie for the sort of purposes which Cruise or Pershings would formerly have been used for);
- incorporation of strategic bombers based in the United States into NATO's planning for selective use.

However no decisions have yet been reached about which of these options - or which mix of them - would be the most effective. Nor will any decision be reached at the current meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group for two reasons:

- there is no clear understanding yet of the scale of the requirement. This is largely because the military have not yet given a view.
- NATO Governments are not yet ready to say openly that they would accept the additional deployments needed on their soil.

All that is likely to happen at the current meeting is that a further study will be commissioned so that NATO Ministers can reach decisions in the Spring. This is just about all right, since reductions in INF will certainly not start before then.

SECRET

We need to give careful thought to the presentation of these discussions and, eventually, the decisions. The Labour Party are already coming back with accusations that you are bent on circumventing an INF treaty and increasing the number of nuclear weapons. The response to that seems to me to come in two separate stages:

- for now, our line should be that we are still at the stage of considering the implications of an INF agreement for NATO's nuclear strategy of flexible response. We shall take whatever steps are necessary, consistent with our arms control obligations, to maintain that strategy.

- once decisions on how to "compensate" for an INF agreement have been reached, we should say that we are fully committed to the INF agreement, that we are in the business of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe, but that we shall deploy the weapons which are not covered by the INF agreement in the way which best enables us to maintain the strategy of flexible response.

C.D.P

CDP
2 November 1987

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From the Private Secretary

2 November 1987

ARMS CONTROL

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I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU
MIPT: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 30 OCTOBER: ARMS CONTROL

1. NITZE SAID THERE HAD BEEN A FULL REVIEW OF NST ISSUES BUT NO ATTEMPT BY EITHER SIDE TO TAKE OVER THE JOBS OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA.

2. INF HAD BEEN THE MAIN SUBJECT. SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN OPTIMISTIC THAT THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES COULD BE WRAPPED UP WITHIN THE NEXT 2-3 WEEKS. SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE US OBJECTIVE BUT THAT THE PACE OF WORK IN GENEVA, PARTICULARLY ON THE SOVIET SIDE, WOULD HAVE TO BE STEPPED UP, NOTABLY ON VERIFICATION ISSUES, IF THIS TIMETABLE WAS TO BE MET. NITZE SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT HAD ENABLED THE ADMINISTRATION TO EXPLAIN THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE US PROPOSAL IN GENEVA THAT THERE SHOULD BE INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES FOR GLBMS WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 500 KM. BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD STILL NOT ACCEPTED THIS. IN THEIR TURN, THE RUSSIANS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR CATCH-ALL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROPOSAL AND THEIR PROPOSAL FOR IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATONS ON INF SYSTEMS. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT NEITHER SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTABLE ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A NARROWER NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION THAN THAT CURRENTLY BEING PROPOSED BY THE RUSSIANS. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE AN OBLIGATION BY BOTH SIDES NOT TO ENTER INTO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE INF TREATY. THERE HAD BEEN SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE US PROPOSAL FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF FORMERLY DECLARED INF FACILITIES. THE RUSSIANS HAD CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS AN UNEQUAL ONE SINCE THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT US-OWNED OR OPERATED FACILITIES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION BY THE RUSSIANS. NITZE SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD UNDERLINED GENERALLY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN THE INF TREATY, NOT LEAST IN THE RATIFICATION CONTEXT. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD MEET REGULARLY WITH MATLOCK AND DUBININ RESPECTIVELY TO DISCUSS OUTSTANDING INF ISSUES AND FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE TWO NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA.

[This would surely be a very dangerous precedent for us if subsequently applied to strategic weapons.]

I agree

3. NITZE SAID THAT THE DISCUSSION OF START HAD FOCUSSED ON SUB-LIMITS AND VERIFICATION. THE AMERICANS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A SUB-LIMIT OF 1800 - 2000 SLBM RVS WAS UNACCEPTABLE BUT THAT, IF GORBACHEV'S NEW PROPOSALS REFLECTED THE PREFERRED SOVIET FORCE POSTURE UNDER A 6000 RV CEILING, IT SHOULD AT LEAST BE POSSIBLE FOR THE RUSSIANS NOW TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A SUB-LIMIT OF 4800 ON BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS. THE ADMINISTRATION ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS SUB-LIMIT. NO CONCLUSIONS HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE SUB-LIMITS ISSUE. ON START VERIFICATION, SHULTZ HAD UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR EARLY PROGRESS, WHICH SHEVARDNADZE HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE. NITZE AND RIDGWAY EMPHASISED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT NOTHING SHORT OF A FULL START TREATY WOULD BE SATISFACTORY: A FRAMEWORK OR QUOTE KEY PROVISIONS UNQUOTE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME.

4. NITZE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGES IN THE POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE ON DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUES. BUT SHEVARDNADZE HAD AVOIDED ATTACKING THE SDI AS SUCH AND HAD ARGUED THAT THE MAIN ISSUE CONCERNED THE ABM TREATY AND QUOTE STRATEGIC STABILITY UNQUOTE IN GENERAL. THIS NEW SOVIET EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN STRATEGIC STABILITY WAS WELCOME TO THE ADMINISTRATION SINCE THEY HAD ALL ALONG TAKEN THE VIEW THAT IT WAS THE OFFENCE/DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP RATHER THAN THE SDI OR ABM TREATY AS SUCH THAT WAS THE REAL ISSUE. THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES TO THE ISSUES WERE THEREFORE NOW SOMEWHAT MORE IN LINE. NITZE NEVERTHELESS EMPHASISED THAT SOVIET POSITIONS REMAINED UNALTERED.

5. NITZE SAID THAT COMPLIANCE ISSUES HAD ALSO BEEN TOUCHED ON. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL.

6. NITZE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF CW.

JENKINS

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FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 2349
OF 311745Z OCTOBER 87
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU
MY TELNO 2344: SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 30 OCTOBER
1. RIDGWAY AND NITZE BRIEFED ALLIED AND OTHER FRIENDLY EMBASSIES ON SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT ON THE EVENING OF 30 OCTOBER.
2. RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE'S TALKS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD STARTED WITH A PRIVATE SESSION BETWEEN HIM AND SHULTZ AND CARLUCCI. THE GROUP HAD THEN BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE RIDGWAY, MATLOCK, BESSMERTNYKH AND DUBININ AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, NITZE, KAMPELMAN AND KARPOV. SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE DAY HAD LASTED FOR A LITTLE MORE THAN HALF AN HOUR. THE TALKS WITH SHULTZ HAD CONCLUDED AT ABOUT 1630.
3. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT (MY TUR) ESTABLISHED AN OVERALL CONCEPT AND SOME OBJECTIVES FOR US/SOVIET RELATIONS OVER THE COMING MONTHS. THREE OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN SET FOR THE 7 DECEMBER SUMMIT: SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON THE FULL RANGE OF US/SOVIET ISSUES: SIGNATURE OF AN INF AGREEMENT: AND PROGRESS ON START ISSUES WITH A VIEW TO SIGNATURE OF A START TREATY DURING A VISIT BY THE PRESIDENT TO MOSCOW IN THE FIRST HALF OF NEXT YEAR. THE SUMMIT BEGINNING ON 7 DECEMBER WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON ONLY, AT SOVIET INSISTENCE. IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR GORBACHEV TO CARRY OUT HIS PROGRAMME WHICH, AS WELL AS ALLOWING AMPLE TIME FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, WOULD INCLUDE SOME PROTOCOL EVENTS AND APPROPRIATE MEETINGS WITH CONGRESS (AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON ON 30 OCTOBER, SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE OF A PROBABLE NEED FOR 2-3 DAYS).
4. ON GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT, DELIVERED BY SHEVARDNADZE, RIDGWAY SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED TO COMPLETE AN INF TREATY AND TO CONCENTRATE ON REACHING A START AGREEMENT BY NEXT SPRING. THIS WAS SATISFACTORY. THE LETTER HAD CONTAINED NO SPECIFIC CHANGES IN SOVIET POSITIONS ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES.
5. RIDGWAY SAID THAT SHULTZ HAD RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE. SHEVARDNADZE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT QUOTE THESE ISSUES WILL NOT

GO AWAY UNQUOTE. THE ADMINISTRATION THOUGHT THAT IT WAS NOW FINALLY ESTABLISHED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE A SUBJECT FOR REGULAR AND SERIOUS DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. SHULTZ HAD EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR INCREASED EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON INDIVIDUAL CASES. IT HAD BEEN AGREED, AT SOVIET SUGGESTION, THAT DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS (WHITEHEAD ON THE US SIDE) WOULD MEET BEFORE THE 7 DECEMBER SUMMIT TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

6. RIDGWAY SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT REGIONAL ISSUES WOULD BE ON THE 7 DECEMBER SUMMIT AGENDA BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION ON 30 OCTOBER. THE IRAN/IRAQ ISSUE HAD NOT REALLY BEEN ADDRESSED GIVEN THAT BOTH SIDES WERE AWAITING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT ON HIS CONTACTS WITH IRAN AND IRAQ AND THAT VORONTSOV WAS PRESENTLY IN THE REGION. BUT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT ARMACOST AND VORONTSOV WOULD MEET IN MID-NOVEMBER (PRECISE DATES STILL TO BE AGREED) FOR A REVIEW OF REGIONAL ISSUES BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

7. RIDGWAY SAID THAT BILATERAL ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE BUT NOT IN DETAIL. SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BUT AGREEMENT ON A PACKAGE OF MEASURES ON IMPROVED WORKING CONDITIONS FOR THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD NOT BEEN FINALISED.

8. ON THE PUBLIC HANDLING OF SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT, RIDGEWAY MADE CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE LOOKING FORWARDS NOT BACKWARDS AND WOULD NOT BE SEEKING TO RUB SOVIET NOSES IN THE FACT THAT THEY HAD HAD AN APPARENT CHANGE OF HEART ON SETTING DATES FOR A SUMMIT. THERE WAS TOO MUCH WORK TO BE DONE TO WASTE TIME TRYING TO EMBARRASS THE RUSSIANS.

9. FOR NITZE'S BRIEFING ON ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT, SEE MIFT.

JENKINS

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MO 13/5/32V

PRIME MINISTER

POST INF RESTRUCTURING OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES

You will wish to be aware of where we stand with NATO's work on the restructuring of our theatre nuclear forces following an INF agreement. A report on this by the NATO High Level Group (HLG) is the main item on the agenda of next week's ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) at Monterey.

Background

2. As you will recall, defence ministers were given a preliminary view on this at Stavanger in May in a report by the HLG Chairman. That concluded inter alia that NATO would need to adjust its theatre nuclear forces following the elimination of LRINF and SRINF missiles under an INF arms control agreement. In particular NATO would need to enhance its longer range theatre options for deliberate escalation, especially against the Soviet Union; reinforce linkage between Europe and US strategic systems; and underscore nuclear burdensharing.

3. At that stage, the Group had identified five possible longer range adjustment options:

a. Increased F111 deployments to Europe.

b. Assignment of SLCMs to SACEUR.

c. Increased emphasis on SLBMs.

d. Deployment of ALCMs on NATO aircraft.

e. Deployment of US strategic bombers to Europe.

of which SACEUR strongly preferred the F111s and SLCMs. The Group also concluded that consequential or complementary adjustments might be required in shorter range forces. Ministers took note of the report and invited the HLG to give the matter further consideration.

HLG Report

4. In response to that remit, the Group has prepared for the Monterey NPG a much more detailed and comprehensive review of possible force posture adjustments.

5. Like the earlier report by the Chairman, the current review is focussed on longer range adjustments, and on selective use rather than General Nuclear Response (GNR) requirements. From the five basic options identified in May, the Group has developed a number of variations and sub-options which are measured in the report against a series of politico/military criteria and whittled down to the following:

a. Increased deployment to Europe of longer range dual capable aircraft (DCA) (F111, FB111 and perhaps F15E - all of which would need in due course to be armed with stand-off weapons). Up to 7 additional squadrons might be available by the mid to late 1990s, including the 3 squadrons of F15E already earmarked in US plans to come to the UK.

b. Assignment to SACEUR of US SLCM on an "as available" basis. Numbers of nuclear SLCMs are very limited today but will build up steadily over the next decade until some 280 missiles are deployed with the US Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets in the late 1990s, a significant proportion of which would be available to SACEUR in wartime.

c. Incorporation of US SLBMs in NATO's planning for selective use. This would involve no change in the planned assignment of SLBMs to SACEUR, nor in their primary role as the backbone of SACEUR's capability for GNR.

d. Incorporation of strategic bombers based in the US in NATO's planning for selective use.

6. In assessing these options the Group has been somewhat constrained by not having been able to reach a view on the scale as opposed to the nature of the requirement (ie. on the numbers of new systems needing to be deployed or reassigned/reemployed). It has not done so partly for lack of a full military analysis, partly because at the end of the day the scale of nuclear deployments necessary to support the strategy is a matter for political judgement, and in this case, with the INF treaty still not even signed, nations have not been ready to make such judgements. By the same token, potential basing countries have not been in a position to indicate whether they would be prepared to accept additional DCA deployments post INF. There will thus be no specific deployment recommendations before Ministers at Monterey.

7. The report is nevertheless able to conclude, on the basis of its qualitative analysis, that none of the longer range adjustments on its own would meet the full range of relevant politico/military criteria, and that a mix of some or all of them would therefore be needed. The recommendations propose further work by the NATO Military Authorities and by the HLG with a view to the Group submitting detailed recommendations to Ministers for decision, it is hoped at the spring NPG.

8. As for shorter range forces, the report confirms the conclusion reached in May that some restructuring would be necessary to help ensure the overall balance and effectiveness of NATO's theatre nuclear forces (TNF). The report also stresses the

urgent need to implement the Montebello decisions irrespective of an INF agreement. Of these the development and deployment of a stand-off weapon for NATO's DCA, and a follow-on to Lance, are seen as especially critical.

UK Position

9. Your letter to President Reagan of 28th April established the broad lines of our national position, listing amongst the essential conditions of an INF double zero agreement, assignment of SLCM and additional F111 to SACEUR, modernisation of NATO's DCA capability and deployment of a powerful successor to Lance.

10. We have pursued these conditions throughout the preparation of the report and the final version is fully consistent with them, though at US instigation it sets out two strategic options - SLBMs, and US-based bombers. Neither of these meet the politico/military requirement which is essentially for longer range theatre based forces. On the other hand both would provide an effective military capability, and to the extent that the military requirements could not be met by other means, there might be scope for their supplementing the DCA and SLCM adjustments. We have therefore pursued in the HLG the line, which is now reflected in the report, that SLBMs and US-based bombers though unattractive should not be excluded from consideration altogether, provided that proper emphasis is given to DCA and SLCM. In the case of SLBMs we have however indicated that in the foreseeable future national circumstances would almost certainly preclude the incorporation of UK missiles in selective employment planning.

11. So far we have been able to pursue our objectives in this exercise without specific commitment either to additional DCA deployments in the UK, or to develop and deploy a new stand off weapon, or to procure the Lance successor once that is available, though our general line (para 10 above) will no doubt have been

taken in NATO as at least an indirect indication of willingness to do all these things. However, during the next phase of the exercise after the Monterey NPG, we shall need to be much clearer about our intentions; indeed we may need to lead the way if we are to secure commitments from any of our European allies. We shall need to discuss at the meeting of MISC 7 scheduled for 17th November the defence programme implications which arise.

Public Presentation

12. Since there are to be no substantive decisions on this work at Monterey, I do not foresee major difficulties of public presentation. The press will of course be looking for stories about NATO planning to "compensate" for Pershing and Cruise and "circumvent" the INF treaty. It will be important that the Alliance respond robustly to any such suggestions whilst at the same time acknowledging that we have the implications of an INF agreement under review, and making it quite clear that we shall continue to take whatever steps are necessary, consistent with our arms control obligations, to maintain our ability to implement the strategy of flexible response.

13. One issue which is likely to arise in this context is whether the published stockpile figure of 4600 warheads will be reduced by the number of Pershing II and GLCMs eliminated under the INF treaty. There are differences of opinion in NATO as to how far we should go in answering such a question. On the one hand, from a military point of view, there is no direct relationship between the elimination of Soviet INF missiles and NATO's warhead requirements. Moreover the treaty is not about overall stockpile size and will not impose limits on either side. Prudence therefore argues for not fixing a new warhead ceiling until NATO's total GNR requirements have been reassessed. On the other hand if Ministers are unable to give a categoric denial in response to suggestions that Pershing and Cruise warheads are being replaced in a different

guise, there will be accusations of treaty circumvention which in turn could jeopardize the very force posture adjustments the military authorities need. It is important that the military authorities be given a chance to express their views at Monterey before we reach a conclusion on this sensitive issue.

14. My provisional view, in advance of hearing at Monterey NATO's military view, is that provided we are prepared to say in public that we are fully committed to the INF agreement, that we are in the business of reducing (ie making net reductions in) the number of nuclear weapons in Europe, and that in this we are being faithful to longstanding Alliance policy to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons required for deterrence, we do not need to go further. Subject to military advice, it would be useful to get across the idea that the net reductions should be roughly of the order of the number of GLCM and PIIs removed; but we must be careful not to impose on ourselves, in advance of the necessary analysis, an arbitrary, rigid constraint which would not apply in any way to the Soviet Union.

15. I am sending a copy of this note to the Foreign Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

G.Y.

Ministry of Defence
30 October 1987

CePC 26

Reflects what FS said in Cabinet 29/1.

PM/87/061

PRIME MINISTER

GLCM Related Activities Following the signature of an INF Treaty

1. I have read the Defence Secretary's minute of 22 October and the paper enclosed. I have also seen Mr Powell's letter of 26 October, giving your comments.

2. I agree that the pressure should be kept on the Russians for as long as the INF negotiations continue. We should therefore continue our preparations at Molesworth. It now seems that Shultz's visit to Moscow may not greatly affect the likely timetable for signature of an INF Treaty.

3. The best position for the UK would be to have one flight of missiles deployed at Molesworth before signature. This may prove possible if, as seems likely, the INF Treaty is not signed before December. But I would foresee serious political difficulty, both domestically and internationally, in undertaking new deployments after signature. I am therefore attracted by George Younger's idea of what amounts to a de facto freeze on deployments from, or from shortly after, INF signature.

/4.

4. We are normally very resistant to proposals for moratoria or freezes, since the Russians often put them forward as substitutes for verifiable reductions. But the circumstances of this case are very different, and some kind of freeze would make political sense. We would however need to be careful to do this in a way which did not create an undesirable precedent. A negotiated moratorium, however carefully constructed, could have this effect. A unilateral moratorium would be preferable. It would then be up to the Russians to exercise equivalent restraint, or risk a resumption of NATO deployments and trouble over ratification in the US Senate.

5. The drawdown schedule now envisaged should enable us to withdraw at least one flight of missiles very early. It would be most satisfactory if these were withdrawn from Molesworth as this would ease our inspection obligations. But I agree that we should show willing to maintain some GLCM flights at Greenham Common until the final phase. As agreed in Moscow by the US and Russians all such flights would be eliminatd within 3 years. The FRG have now asked if we could consider retention of up to 3 flights (48 missiles). I think this, too, would be acceptable for the short period in question. It appears that the same request has been put to the Italians.

6. I accept that normal training activity should continue until all missiles have been removed.

/7.

7. I am copying this minute to the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Defence, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
29 October 1987

DEFENCE

ARMS

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PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT WEST POINT, 28 OCTOBER

1. IN A SPEECH ON 28 OCTOBER AT THE WEST POINT MILITARY ACADEMY, THE PRESIDENT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PASSAGES:
(A) ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE EFFORTS. QUOTE DURING THE YEARS OF THESE (ARMS CONTROL) NEGOTIATIONS, NEW REALITIES HAVE COME INTO PLAY - NEW REALITIES THAT PRESENT NEW OPPORTUNITIES. IN PARTICULAR, IN RECENT YEARS WE HAVE SEEN THE EMERGENCE AMONG SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES OF A WILLINGNESS, EVEN AN EAGERNESS, TO SEEK A LARGER, MORE CLOSELY-COORDINATED ROLE FOR WESTERN EUROPE IN PROVIDING ITS OWN DEFENSE. WE AMERICANS WELCOME THIS. FOR THESE FOUR DECADES, NATO HAS IN EFFECT REPRESENTED AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN A NUMBER OF PARTNERS AND ONE VERY SENIOR PARTNER. YET TODAY, OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE RISEN FROM THE RUINS OF WAR TO VITALITY, PROSPERITY, AND GROWING UNITY AS A CONTINENT. AND SO I WOULD SUBMIT THAT NOW THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BECOME MORE AND MORE AMONG EQUALS, INDEED, AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN CONTINENTS. IN THE WORDS OF FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER, THE TIME HAS COME FOR OUR COUNTRY, '' ... TO ... WELCOME A EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN DEFENSE, WHICH IN THE END IS BOUND TO SPUR ATLANTIC COOPERATION.'' UNQUOTE
(B) ON INF. QUOTE SOME HAVE ARGUED THAT WHEN THE INF MISSILES HAVE BEEN REMOVED, OUR COMMITMENT TO EUROPE WILL HAVE BEEN WEAKENED. YET, THIS IS SIMPLY UNTRUE. WE MAINTAIN OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, ENSURING THAT THE ALLIANCE IS CAPABLE OF BLOCKING AGGRESSION AT ANY LEVEL. IN EUROPE ITSELF, WE WILL RETAIN A LARGE FORCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF MANY TYPES, INCLUDING GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS -- AND AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AND IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, WE HAVE AGREED THAT FURTHER NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS CAN TAKE PLACE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE BALANCE OF CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. UNQUOTE
(C) ON START/DEFENCE AND SPACE. QUOTE MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN REACHING ACCORD ON OUR PROPOSAL OF CUTTING STRATEGIC

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ARSENALS IN HALF. THE SOVIETS MUST, HOWEVER, STOP HOLDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS HOSTAGE TO MEASURES THAT WOULD CRIPPLE OUR SDI -- PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SOVIETS AREA ALREADY SPENDING BILLIONS ON A STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM OF THEIR OWN. UNQUOTE

2. THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON US/SOVIET SUMMIT PROSPECTS ARE BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

JENKINS

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MAIN 172

EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS
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MY TELNO 1434: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: FURTHER COMMENTS

1. FOLLOWING A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH MY US COLLEAGUE (WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD PLEASE BE CLOSELY PROTECTED) AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE SHEVARDNADZE PRESS CONFERENCE (MY TELNO 1441) AND OF VORONTSOV'S BRIEFING TO EC HEADS OF MISSION (MY TELNO 1449) I OFFER THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE OUTCOME OF SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

2. THE AMERICANS HERE SHARE THE UP-BEAT SHEVARDNADZE/VORONTSOV VIEW OF THE PROGRESS MADE DURING SHULTZ'S TALKS HERE AND ARE ALL THE MORE SURPRISED, THEREFORE, THAT THE VISIT FAILED TO PRODUCE FIRM DATES FOR A SUMMIT. ACCORDING TO MATLOCK, THE SHULTZ/GORBACHEV EXCHANGES RAN INTO DIFFICULTY ONLY AT THE POINT AT WHICH SHULTZ WAS SPECULATING ON THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT. SHULTZ INSTANCED THE SIGNATURE OF AN INF/SRINF AGREEMENT, THE DISCUSSION OF ''OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES'', FORMAL OCCASIONS WHICH WOULD SYMBOLIZE US/SOVIET UNDERSTANDING, MEETINGS WITH A WIDE RANGE OF PROMINENT AMERICANS AND A TRAVEL PROGRAMME FROM WHICH GORBACHEV COULD EXPECT TO DERIVE VERY FAVOURABLE PUBLICITY. GORBACHEV ASKED WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THE AGENDA AGREED DURING SHULTZ'S PREVIOUS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN APRIL: WHAT WOULD BE READY FOR DISCUSSION AT THE SUMMIT CONCERNING STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND SPACE? SHULTZ REPLIED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ''PREPARE SOMETHING'' FOR SIGNATURE (IN MOSCOW) IN THE SPRING OF 1988, WHILE CARLUCCI COMMENTED THAT A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT WOULD PRESENT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE US ADMINISTRATION. GORBACHEV THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT WHETHER THE TANGIBLE RESULTS OF A SUMMIT, SO FAR AS THEY COULD YET BE DISCERNED, WOULD REPRESENT ''A GAIN OR A LOSS''. HE WANTED TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY DATES BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR (SHULTZ POINTED OUT THAT THE SECOND HALF OF DECEMBER WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN) BUT HE HAD TO THINK NOT JUST AS A HUMAN BEING BUT AS A POLITICIAN.

3. DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS, SENIOR SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SENDING STRONG SIGNALS TO MATLOCK AND HIS STAFF TO THE EFFECT THAT SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD NOT GONE AS THEY HAD PLANNED OR EXPECTED: THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOT TAKE IT TOO TRAGICALLY, SHOULD REMAIN OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SUMMIT PROSPECTS AND SHOULD AWAIT THE LETTER WHICH GORBACHEV WOULD SOON BE SENDING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. MEANWHILE, THE RUSSIANS HOPED THAT NOTHING WOULD BE SAID IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD ''BOX THEM IN''.

4. MATLOCK'S PERSONAL VIEW IS THAT A START AGREEMENT IS CERTAINLY WITHIN REACH (IF A MIXING DEAL COULD BE DONE ON THE SLBM SUB-CEILING) AND THAT EVEN AN AGREEMENT ON ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL COULD BE ENVISAGED IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND OF FUDGING ''STRICT OBSERVANCE''. WHY, THEN, IS GORBACHEV HESITATING?

5. MY OWN (NECESSARILY SPECULATIVE) VIEW, FROM WHICH MATLOCK DOES NOT DISSENT, IS THAT THERE IS A DIVISION IN THE POLITBURO OVER THE PRICE WHICH GORBACHEV SHOULD DEMAND FOR A WASHINGTON SUMMIT. SHEVARDNADZE AND HIS OFFICIALS APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF AN EARLY SUMMIT, BOTH IN TERMS OF GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC STANDING AND OF SOVIET PRESTIGE INTERNATIONALLY, WOULD BE SUCH AS TO MAKE A MEETING WORTHWHILE EVEN IF ALL SOVIET OBJECTIVES (INCLUDING PUTTING A BRAKE ON THE SDI) CANNOT BE REALISED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE MFA CAMP MAY ARGUE THAT THE SDI IS LIKELY TO RUN INTO THE SAND IN ANY CASE ONCE REAGAN LEAVES THE WHITE HOUSE AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD LOSE VERY LITTLE BY BEING MORE FLEXIBLE NOW. I THINK IT LIKELY THAT GORBACHEV HIMSELF SHARES THIS VIEW - HE NEEDS AN INTERNATIONAL SUCCESS - BUT THAT HE CANNOT COUNT ON THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE POLITBURO.

6. IN RETROSPECT, IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT THE POLITBURO COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED ON 16 OCTOBER, WHICH HEARD SHEVARNDADZE'S REPORT ON HIS VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA, DID NOT INCLUDE ''APPROVAL'' OF SHEVARDNADZE'S TALKS WITH SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON, MERELY ''NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION'' OF WORK ON AN INF AGREEMENT. THE POLITBURO DID, HOWEVER, ''APPROVE'' SHEVARDNADZE'S WORK IN NEW YORK AS LEADER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE UNGA. PRAVDA'S REPORT OF SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV (MY TELNO 1431) MADE A POSITIVE REFERENCE TO SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW IN APRIL BUT NONE TO SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THE POLITBURO IS

STRONGLY RUMOURED TO HAVE MET ON SUNDAY, 25 OCTOBER, AND IF SO WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE DISCUSSED SHULTZ'S LATEST VISIT: BUT NO COMMUNIQUE OF SUCH A MEETING HAS BEEN ISSUED - A FURTHER POSSIBLE POINTER TO DISAGREEMENTS. THE MORE CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS (GROMYKO, LIGACHEV, CHEBRIKOV AND PERHAPS ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE YAKOVLEV, WHO DEEPLY DISTRUSTS THE AMERICANS) MAY ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT TO STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS UNTIL THE SDI HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY CAPPED FOR A DECADE: AND THAT IF ANY LOOPHOLE IS LEFT FOR THE AMERICANS TO WRIGGLE OUT OF THE ABMT, THEY WILL SEIZE IT. THEY MAY CONSIDER THAT SHEVARDNADZE DID TOO LITTLE IN WASHINGTON TO TIE THE AMERICANS DOWN TO SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS FOR A SUMMIT.

7. GIVEN THE CURRENTLY CRITICAL STAGE WHICH ''PERESTROIKA'' HAS REACHED, GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE TO HEED SUCH VIEWS EVEN IF HE REGARDS THEM AS OVER-CAUTIOUS. (HE MAY ALSO FEEL CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITY, TETE-A-TETE, TO BOUNCE PRESIDENT REAGAN INTO A SATISFACTORY UNDERTAKING EVEN IF IT IS NOT SEWN UP IN ADVANCE). GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE MAY YET WIN THE ARGUMENT, THUS OPENING THE WAY FOR A SUMMIT BEFORE MID-DECEMBER. BUT GORBACHEV HAS TO GUARD HIS BACK. HE IS UNLIKELY, THEREFORE, TO RISK GOING TO WASHINGTON WITHOUT A UNANIMOUS MANDATE FROM THE POLITBURO: AS OF NOW, THIS WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE FIRM LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND STRICT ABMT OBSERVANCE.

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MY TELNO 1441: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: EC BRIEFING BY VORONTSOV

SUMMARY

A DETERMINEDLY UP-BEAT BRIEFING OF EC HEADS OF MISSION (THE FIRST SUCH OCCASION HERE) ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF SHULTZ'S VISIT. HEAVY EMPHASIS ON WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED ON INF: PUZZLED REGET OVER U S FAILURE TO PRODUCE A CONSTRUCTIVE REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSALS ON ABMT. POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT THIS YEAR BY NO MEANS WRITTEN OFF, IF ONLY THE AMERICANS WOULD BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO SOVIET CONCERNS ON SPACE.

DETAIL

2. FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VORONTSOV INVITED EC HEADS OF MISSION IN MOSCOW TO LUNCH ON 27 OCTOBER, AT SHORT NOTICE, IN ORDER TO BE BRIEFED BY HIM ON SECRETARY SHULTZ'S TALKS IN MOSCOW ON 22-23 OCTOBER. VORONTSOV BEGAN BY EXPLAINING THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO BRIEF US HIMSELF, NOT LEAST IN VIEW OF OUR OUTSTANDING INVITATION TO HIM TO LUNCH WITH US: BUT THAT HE HAD JUST LEFT FOR THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN PRAGUE AND HAD ASKED VORONTSOV TO DEPUTIZE FOR HIM. (VERY ELEGANT, BUT IMPROBABLE).

INF

3. VORONTSOV DESCRIBED THE MOSCOW TALKS AS A ''PRODUCTIVE WORKING MEETING'' DURING WHICH MORE PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN SOME AREAS THAN EITHER SIDE HAD EXPECTED. THE PERSHING 1A PROBLEM, FOR EXAMPLE, UNRESOLVED DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER, HAD BEEN SETTLED TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH SIDES. OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE VERIFICATION OF AN INF AGREEMENT, AND TO INSPECTIONS, HAD ALSO BEEN RESOLVED IN PRINCIPLE AND AGREEMENT ONLY HAD TO BE TRANSLATED INTO TREATY LANGUAGE. THE TWO SIDES HAD EXCHANGED LISTS OF THEIR INF INVENTORIES AS OF 1 NOVEMBER, DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN DEPLOYED AND AS YET UNDEPLOYED LAUNCHERS

AND WARHEADS. AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE NUMBER OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS PER YEAR FOR WHICH THE TREATY WOULD PROVIDE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROVIDED THE AMERICANS WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL WHICH SHOULD HELP THEM WITH THEIR PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SS20S AND SS25S. THE DETAILED MODALITIES OF INSPECTIONS HAD BEEN AGREED. AS A RESULT, A TREATY, WITH PROTOCOLS, RUNNING TO ABOUT 200 PAGES WAS IN PLACE AND COULD BE FINALISED WITHIN 2-3 WEEKS. THIS WAS NO MEAN ACHIEVEMENT.

4. WHEN ASKED WHY GORBACHEV HAD THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO PROPOSE A MORATORIUM, FROM 1 NOVEMBER, ON THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF INF IF THE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT WAS SO CLOSE, VORONTSOV SAID THAT IT MADE LITTLE SENSE TO CONTINUE THE COSTLY PRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD PRIOR TO SIGNATURE, HOWEVER SHORT. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MIGHT VERY WELL DECIDE TO STOP PRODUCTION IN ANY CASE AFTER 1 NOVEMBER. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION VORONTSOV CONFIRMED THAT THE PHASED RADAR ARRAY ''IN SCOTLAND'' REFERRED TO BY GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE, AT WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE INVITED TO SUSPEND WORK AS THE RUSSIANS WERE DOING AT KRASNOYARSK, MEANT FYLINGDALES: I OFFERED GEOGRAPHICAL CLARIFICATION.

START/SDI

5. THE TALKS ON START AND SPACE ISSUES, VORONTSOV SAID, HAD BEEN MORE DIFFICULT: BUT EVEN HERE SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN REGISTERED AS A RESULT OF GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS ON SUB-CEILINGS. THE AMERICANS WANTED A CEILING OF 4,800 WARHEADS ON ICBMS AND THE ADJUSTED SOVIET FIGURES OF 3,000 FOR LAND-BASED ICBMS AND 1,800-2,000 FOR SLBMS VIRTUALLY MET THIS REQUIREMENT. IN GENEVA, THE DELEGATIONS WERE NOW WORKING ON A SINGLE UNIFIED DRAFT TEXT OF A TREATY, ALBEIT STILL REPLETE WITH SQUARE BRACKETS. THE INF NEGOTIATION HAD GREATLY ASSISTED WORK IN GENEVA ON THE VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION PROVISIONS OF A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TREATY. ALL THIS WAS ON THE CREDIT SIDE AND REPRESENTED PROGRESS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

6. THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK, HOWEVER, WAS ISSUES CONCERNING OUTER SPACE. IN WASHINGTON, SHEVARDNADZE HAD OFFERED THE AMERICANS A CHOICE BETWEEN STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE ABMT FOR 10 YEARS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, AGREEMENT ON A LIST OF DEVICES WHICH COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN OUTER SPACE. SHULTZ HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM NO U S RESPONSE TO THESE PROPOSALS, MERELY ASKING A FEW SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS. THE U S RESPONSE, AND AN INDICATION OF WASHINGTON'S PREFERENCE AS BETWEEN THE TWO VARIANTS PUT FORWARD BY SHEVARDNADZE,

WAS NOW AWAITED. WARNING VOICES IN WASHINGTON WERE SAYING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN ''WOULD NOT BACK OFF SDI''. THIS WAS NOT THE POINT: THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE SDI - IF THE AMERICANS WANTED TO BUILD THIS ''UNPROMISING THING'' THAT WAS THEIR BUSINESS - BUT ABOUT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ABMT. THE AMERICANS HAD ASKED FOR A DEFINITION OF ''STRICT OBSERVANCE'' OF THE ABMT: THE SOVIET REPLY WAS THAT ''STRICT OBSERVANCE'' MEANT EXACTLY WHAT IT SAID - THE ABMT HAD, IN FACT, BEEN STRICTLY OBSERVED UNTIL 1983 WHEN PLANS FOR SDI HAD FIRST EMERGED. THIS ISSUE, SAID VORONTSOV, HAD CONSTITUTED THE ONLY HITCH IN TALKS WHICH IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS HAD BEEN CREATIVE AND PROMISING.

SUMMIT

7. VORONTSOV STRESSED THAT PESSIMISM IN THE WESTERN MEDIA ABOUT SUMMIT PROSPECTS, FOLLOWING SHULTZ'S VISIT, WAS QUITE UNJUSTIFIED. ONLY THE ABMT ISSUE REMAINED TO BE SETTLED. GORBACHEV HAD EMPHASISED TO SHULTZ THAT HE WANTED TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES THIS YEAR BUT HE HAD TO BE SURE OF THE AGENDA. THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE QUITE CONTENT WITH SHULTZ'S SUGGESTION THAT AGREEMENT ON ''KEY PROVISIONS'' OF A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE U S AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH WORK THERE COULD BE ACCELERATED.

8. IN QUESTION TIME, I COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED BY A DEGREE OF PESSIMISM IN WESTERN COMMENTARIES ON THE SHULTZ VISIT IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL EXPECTATION THAT IT WOULD HAVE PRODUCED FIRM DATES FOR A SUMMIT: SOME COMMENTATORS TOOK THE VIEW THAT GORBACHEV HAD IN EFFECT RAISED THE PRICE OF AN EARLY MEETING. VORONTSOV REPLIED THAT AGREEMENT ON ''KEY PROVISIONS'' OF A START AGREEMENT HAD ALWAYS BEEN UNDERSTOOD TO BE A NECESSARY INGREDIENT OF A SUMMIT MEETING AND THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A PRICE HAVING BEEN RAISED. THE SOVIET SIDE HOPED THAT SHULTZ AND HIS DELEGATION HAD INTERPRETED CORRECTLY THE SIGNALS WHICH THEY HAD BEEN GIVEN IN MOSCOW OF SOVIET ABMT CONCERNS: THEY WOULD WAIT CALMLY FOR THE U S RESPONSE. WHEN I SUBSEQUENTLY SPECULATED THAT, RATHER THAN BEING DISAPPOINTED, WORLD OPINION MIGHT IN FACT BE WELL SATISFIED WITH A SUMMIT WHICH SAW THE SIGNATURE OF AN INF/SRINF AGREEMENT PLUS A SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE GULF, MIDDLE EAST, AFGHANISTAN AND A RANGE OF OTHER ISSUES, VORONTSOV ALLOWED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE A SUMMIT MEETING WITH PRE-AGREEMENT ON ''KEY PROVISIONS'' AND SPACE ISSUES: BUT THAT CARE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THAT CASE TO LOWER IN ADVANCE, THE EXPECTATIONS OF WORLD OPINION. VORONTSOV SUBSEQUENTLY SAID THAT US ABROGATION OF

THE ABMT (IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT) WOULD AUTOMATICALLY ELIMINATE THE PROSPECT OF 50 PER CENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS: THIS WAS A PITY BUT INEVITABLE.

COMMENT

8. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF VORONTSOV'S BRIEFING (THE FIRST WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN TO EC HEADS OF MISSION AS A GROUP) WAS CLEARLY TO BUILD ON THE THEME OF SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESS CONFERENCE (MY TELS NOS 1441 AND 1442), NAMELY THAT SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW HAD BEEN A SUCCESS, THAT WESTERN PESSIMISM ABOUT SUMMIT PROSPECTS WAS UNJUSTIFIED AND THAT ALL WOULD BE WELL IF ONLY THE AMERICANS WOULD BE A LITTLE MORE REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ABOUT THE SPACE ISSUE. IT WAS A FLUENT AND GOOD-HUMOURED PERFORMANCE. VORONTSOV AVOIDED ANY DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE AMERICANS, EXPRESSING ONLY GENTLE DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THEIR ATTITUDE ON THE ABMT QUESTION. THIS IS ALL OF A PIECE WITH THE SIGNALS CURRENTLY BEING PUT OUT BY OTHER SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, ON WHICH I AM COMMENTING IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL).

9. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL) FOR VORONTSOV'S COMMENTS ON THE GULF AND IRAN/IRAQ.

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PRIME MINISTER

GLCM RELATED ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF AN IMF TREATY

I have seen George Younger's minute to you of 22 October.

I am content with his proposals. In particular I hope that it will prove possible to achieve a moratorium on new deployments between signature and ratification. Politically, it would clearly be awkward to handle an enormous build up at Molesworth at a time when public opinion will be expecting just the opposite. Maintaining two flights at Greenham Common will be an irritant, particularly if the peirod is as long as 5 years, but I would regard this as reasonable if Molesworth is shut at the very beginning of phase 1 and if the arrangements for both phases are equitable as between basing countries.

I am copying this to Willie Whitelaw, Geoffrey Howe, George Younger and Sir Robert Armstrong.

N.L.

N.L.
27 October 1987

DEFENCE : Arms Control PT13

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10 DOWNING STREET

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From the Private Secretary

26 October 1987

GLCM Related Activities following the signature of an INF Treaty

The Prime Minister has considered the Defence Secretary's minute of 22 October covering a paper on the implications of the INF Treaty negotiations for deployments of GLCM in the United Kingdom.

The timing of an INF agreement must be rather more uncertain following the failure of US and Soviet negotiators at the end of last week to agree on the date for a Summit. If there is a delay in signature, the deployments planned for Molesworth in December will presumably go ahead. Equally, given Secretary Shultz's prediction that an agreement could essentially be complete in two to three weeks, we could face a situation in which agreement is known to have been reached (but not signed) yet deployments of GLCMs continue. There has also been a new moratorium proposal from Mr. Gorbachev. Assuming none of this affects the Defence Secretary's recommendation, the Prime Minister would agree:

- we should encourage the Americans to think in terms of a time-limited moratorium on new deployments from shortly after the signature of an INF agreement. But she would not want us to pursue this publicly at this stage in a way which would make the Americans' negotiating hand more difficult to play in the closing stages;

- we should be ready to accept retention of GLCMs at Greenham Common into the second phase of a reductions programme.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C.D. POWELL

John Howe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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MY THREE IPTS: SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCOW

COMMENT

1. ON PAST FORM PRAVDA'S ACCOUNT PROBABLY CONVEYS FAIRLY ACCURATELY THE FLAVOUR OF THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT. FOR THE AMERICAN POSITION WE SHALL HAVE TO AWAIT BRIEFING HERE AND ELSEWHERE, AND I MAY BE ABLE TO OFFER FURTHER REFLECTIONS NEXT WEEK. BUT A NUMBER OF IMMEDIATE POINTS STAND OUT:

(A) THE TONE OF THE GORBACHEV/SHULTZ DISCUSSION IS NOT WARM TOWARDS THE AMERICANS. APART FROM GORBACHEV'S NEGATIVE POSITION (THOUGH PARTIALLY CAMOUFLAGED) ON THE SUMMIT, HE ISSUED A DIRCECT WARNING ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND MORE WIDELY, OF AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF. HIS REMARKS ON THIS ARE DISTINCTLY SHARPER THAN THE MOST RECENT SOVIET COMMENT, WHICH I HAVE REPORTED SEPARATELY. HE ALSO WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO DELIVER A HOMILY ON THE ATTITUDES OF THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, USING AS A PEG A ROUTINE DOCUMENT OF THE KIND THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS HABITUALLY PUT OUT AT VARIOUS LEVELS. ALL OF THIS SUGGESTS THAT GORBACHEV IS PARTICULARLY KEEN NOT TO BE SEEN TO BE RUNNING AFTER THE AMERICANS AT THE MOMENT. THERE MAY BE INTERNAL REASONS FOR THIS.

(B) HE MAY ALSO HAVE CALCULATED THAT, WITH REAGAN'S TIME IN THE WHITE HOUSE RUNNING OUT, HE COULD NOW PUSH UP THE PRICE OF A SUMMIT. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD NOT, OF ITSELF, BE ENOUGH FOR THE RUSSIANS. HOWEVER, BY INSISTING THAT AT A WASHINGTON SUMMIT AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO BE REACHED ON THE KEY PROVISIONS OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND SPACE, GORBACHEV HAS SET A STIFF TARGET. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS DANGLED THE CARROT,

IN EXPLICIT TERMS, OF SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS DURING A RETURN VISIT BY RONALD REAGAN TO THE SOVIET UNION.

(C) THE RUSSIANS LEFT IT TO SHULTZ TO ANNOUNCE AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT AGREEMENT ON A SUMMIT HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE. GORBACHEV HAS CAST HIS OWN POSITION IN A POSITIVE LIGHT BY STATING THAT 1 1/2 MONTHS MIGHT BE ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE WHAT HE HAS STIPULATED. BUT HIS PHRASE THAT THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A SUMMIT, AS THEY NOW APPEAR, HAD PUT HIM ON HIS GUARD (USING A RUSSIAN WORD WITH OVERTONES OF SETTING A TRAP) MAY BE REVEALING. WHILE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO AND SYMBOLISED EAST/WEST STABILITY ALLOWING HIM TO CONCENTRATE ON PERESTROIKA, WOULD BE HELPFUL TO GORBACHEV, HE WOULD BE TAKING A CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISK IN GOING TO WASHINGTON AT THIS JUNCTURE WITHOUT THE ASSURANCE OF ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS DEMONSTRABLY FAVOURABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS (EG A CAP ON THE SDI).

(D) IN TERMS OF PRESENTATION TO AN INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE, GORBACHEV HAS RETAINED THE INITIATIVE BY DECLARING A UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON WORK ON THE KRASNOYARSK PHASED ARRAY RADAR, AND SUGGESTING THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD TAKE A RECIPROCAL STEP OVER THEIR INSTALLATION ''IN SCOTLAND'' (PRESUMABLY FYLINGDALES). HIS PROPOSED BILATERAL MORATORIUM FROM 1 NOVEMBER ON THE PRODUCTION, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE WEAPONS WILL ALSO PLAY WELL INTERNATIONALLY.

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THE HAGUE (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

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MIPT: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: NAC DISCUSSION: 24 OCTOBER

SUMMARY
1. SHORT NAC DISCUSSION STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF US APPROACH. AGREEMENT ON NEED FOR STEADINESS AND CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC HANDLING. RAIMOND HINTS THAT ONE OPTION NOW OPEN IS A SPRING SUMMIT WITH A PACKAGE OF INF TREATY PLUS START AND SPACE/DEFENCE OUTLINE AGREEMENTS.

DETAIL
2. SEE MIPT FOR DETAIL OF SHULTZ BRIEFING.

3. OPENING THE DISCUSSION ANDREOTTI (ITALY) ARGUED FOR A DISPLAY OF FIRMNESS AND CONFIDENCE BY THE ALLIANCE. THE 1979 TWIN TRACK DECISION HAD PAID OFF AND HE STILL HOPED 1987 WOULD BRING THE SIGNING OF THE INF TREATY. THAT WOULD BE A MAJOR POLITICAL SUCCESS FOR THE WEST, NOTWITHSTANDING THE RECOGNITION THAT THERE WERE SOME MILITARY DOUBTS. THE INF TREATY WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS, AND BE THE BEST POSSIBLE CLIMATE FOR NEW AGREEMENTS COVERING START (WHICH MIGHT BE CLOSER THAN WE DARED TO HOPE), A GLOBAL CW BAN AND CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS. IN ALL THESE AREAS AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS.

4. GENSCHER (FRG) EXPRESSED PARTICULAR GRATITUDE TO SHULTZ FOR HAVING RAISED THE POSITION OF SOVIET CITIZENS WHO WISHED TO EMIGRATE. HE REGARDED THE FURTHER PROGRESS ON INF AND START WITH GREAT SATISFACTION, PARTICULARLY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE LATTER BY SPRING 1988. ON INF, HE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CONFIRMATION FROM SHULTZ THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SIGN A TREATY EVEN IF THERE WAS NO SUMMIT. GENSCHER EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING LINKAGE BETWEEN INF AND START/SPACE AND DEFENCE. SHULTZ REPEATED US WILLINGNESS TO SIGN THE INF TREATY IN THE APPROPRIATE FORUM AND TO START THE RATIFICATION PROCESS IMMEDIATELY, ON WHICH SHULTZ EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE. SHULTZ ADDED THAT

EUROPEAN LEADERS SHOULD SPEAK OUT IN FAVOUR OF THE INF TREATY AGAINST SELF-APPOINTED SPOKESMEN FOR EUROPE IN THE US QUOTE SOME SPEAKING WITH HEAVY ACCENTS UNQUOTE.

5. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) PRAISED SHULTZ'S REMARKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHICH VINDICATED THE ALLIANCE STAND ON THE HELSINKI PROCESS. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY A HUMAN RIGHTS PRICE FOR PROGRESS IN SECURITY TALKS. HE SHARED SHULTZ'S VIEW ON IRAN/IRAQ. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS AT STAKE. HE STRONGLY SUPPORTED CONTINUING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION NOT LINKED TO A SUMMIT AND SINGLED OUT CW AS AN AREA FOR ADDITIONAL ATTENTION. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN GENEVA NOT TO MAKE UNACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION DEMANDS, AND THE WEST SHOULD TAKE CARE THAT THE BETTER NOT BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD (ON WHICH SHULTZ ADDED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WOULD COME IF THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFICATION REGIME TURNED OUT TO BE VERY SMALL INDEED).

6. YOU EXPRESSED YOUR GRATITUDE FOR THE CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE ALLIES. YOU UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF SEEING THE MOSCOW MEETING AS A FURTHER PROOF THAT THE ALLIANCE APPROACH WAS THE CORRECT ONE. YOU ALSO URGED THE EUROPEANS TO SPEAK OUT IN FAVOUR OF THE INF DEAL. YOU POINTED TO DISCONTINUITIES IN SOVIET POLICY AND STATEMENTS FOR EXAMPLE BETWEEN GORBACHEV, SHEVARDNADZE, VORONTSOV AND OTHERS AND QUESTIONED WHETHER ON THE ONE HAND SHEVARDNADZE WAS ABLE TO DELIVER ALL THAT HE HAD PROMISED, AND ON THE OTHER WHETHER GORBACHEV HIMSELF MIGHT NOT BE ENCOUNTERING HIS OWN DIFFICULTIES. THE IMPORTANT MESSAGE FOR ALLIANCE LEADERS TO CONVEY AT THIS MOMENT WAS THE FIRM AND STEADY COMMITMENT TO THEIR PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES. OBSTACLE AFTER OBSTACLE HAD BEEN SURMOUNTED TO GET WITHIN REACH OF AN INF AGREEMENT. NOW THE SOVIETS HAD ERECTED A NEW OBSTACLE BUT IT WAS AN OBSTACLE OF THEIR OWN MAKING AND DID NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF THE US SIGNING AN INF TREATY. SHULTZ ENDORSED THESE REMARKS.

7. STOLTENBERG (NORWAY) SUPPORTED THE SHULTZ APPROACH TO THE INF AGREEMENT BUT WARNED THAT PUBLIC OPINION WAS ALREADY SPECULATING THAT THE INF DEAL HAD COME UNSTUCK. THIS IMPRESSION NEEDED TO BE CORRECTED.

8. CLARK (CANADA) EMPHASISED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FAILURE YET TO AGREE A SUMMIT DATE AND THE PROGRESS MADE ON THE INF TREATY. IT WAS THE SOVIET LEADERS WHO HAD REINTROUDCED SPACE AND DEFENCE AS AN OBSTACLE TO A SUMMIT. THE MEETING SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A STEP BACK ON A SUMMIT BUT A STEP FORWARD ON INF. SHULTZ AGREED, BUT EMPHASISED THAT IN HIS OWN PRESS BRIEFINGS HE HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO MAKE CLEAR THAT GORBACHEV IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES HAD NOT BEEN COMFORTABLE WITH THE POSITION REACHED ON SPACE AND DEFENCE IN RELATION TO A SUMMIT, AND HAD THEREFORE NOT QUITE BEEN PREPARED TO SET A DATE. THE DEGREE OF LINKAGE SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE OVER-EMPHASISED IN ALLIANCE STATEMENTS.

9. RAIMOND (FRANCE) TOOK A DIFFERENT LINE. HE STRESSED THAT A NUMBER OF OPTIONS WERE NOW OPEN TO THE ALLIANCE INCLUDING AN INF AGREEMENT WITHOUT A SUMMIT, TWO SUMMITS IN THIS AUTUMN AND SPRING 1988 OR A SUMMIT NEXT YEAR WITH THE INF TREATY PLUS OUTLINE AGREEMENT ON START AND SPACE DEFENCE AS A PACKAGE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE PUBLIC BE REMINDED THAT NOTHING COULD NOW BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DIFFERENT OPTIONS. HE TOO BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV HAD ACTED OUT OF STRENGTH NOT WEAKNESS IN REINTRODUCING HIS DEMANDS ON SPACE AND DEFENCE. RAIMOND CONCLUDED

BY URGING HIS COLLEAGUES TO LOOK BEYOND THE DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS TO A BROAD ALLIANCE APPRECIATION OF EAST WEST RELATIONS, AND THEIR FUTURE STRATEGY FOR ARMS CONTROL.

10. HERMANSSON (ICELAND) PRESSED FOR THE INF TREATY TO BE SIGNED WITH OR WITHOUT A SUMMIT. HE SPOKE OF NORTHERN PERCEPTIONS THAT SDI HAD ONCE AGAIN PROVED AN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS ON EAST WEST RELATIONS, AND AT NORTHERN UNHAPPINES AT GORBACHEV'S ABILITY TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AS IN HIS MURMANSK SPEECH.

11. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ (SPAIN) SPECULATED THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT HAVE FACED INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN HIS APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. NEVERTHELESS THE WEST MUST PERSEVERE. THE INF TREATY WOULD BE A HISTORIC STEP WHICH WOULD NOT WEAKEN EUROPE. IN PUBLIC THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE PATIENT AND WORK ACTIVELY FOR PROGRESS.

12. PINHEIRO (PORTUGAL) SPOKE ON THE SAME LINES, ADDING A WORD OF APPROVAL FOR THE CAREFUL US ATTITUDE TO VERIFICATION.

13. ELLEMANN-JENSEN (DENMARK), GEORGIOU (GREECE), AND POOS (LUXEMBOURG) ALSO SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO BE ACTIVE IN DEFENCE OF THE INF AGREEMENT. OLCAY (TURKEY) CONFINED HIMSELF TO EXPRESSING CONTINUED CONFIDENCE IN THE US APPROACH. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) DID NOT SPEAK.

ALEXANDER

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[illegible] SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
ADVANCE 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS	1
[ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]	
PS	1
PS/MRS CHALKER	1
PS/MR MELLOR	1
PS/PUS	1
SIR J FRETWELL	1
MR BOYD	1
MR RATFORD	1
MR FALL	1
MR FEARN	1
HD/SEC POL D	1
HD/ACDD	1
HD/SOVIET	1
HD/DEFENCE	1
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.	1
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD	1
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD	1
DACU MOD	1
CDI MOD	1
RESIDENT CLERK	1

ADVANCE COPY



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FFFF PART ONE OF TWO
OO FCOLN WASHI MOSCO PARIS BONNN THHAG MODAD
PP ANKAR ATHEN BREMB COPEN LISBO LUXEM MADRI OSLOO OTTAW REYKJ
PP ROMEE VIDEL VICSE TOKYO CANBE PEKIN GEDIS
FM BRNAT TO FCOLN
241355Z OCT
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 324
OF 241355Z OCTOBER 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, TOKYO, CANBERRA, PEKING
INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

PART ONE OF TWO

THE HAGUE (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

SIC EMA/EMC/EME
MODUK FOR DACU

SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: NAC BRIEFING: 24 OCTOBER

SUMMARY

1. INF TREATY ESSENTIALLY AGREED. FORMULA FOUND TO SOLVE GERMAN P1A PROBLEM. REMAINING ISSUES (LARGELY VERIFICATION) SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOLUTION IN 2-3 WEEKS, ACCORDING TO SHEVARDNADZE. IMPORTANT FOR WEST NOT TO CREATE LINKAGE BETWEEN A SUMMIT AND SIGNATURE OF INF TREATY. ALLIANCE SHOULD MAINTAIN ITS COLLECTIVE COURSE.

2. TARGET OF SPRING FOR START AGREEMENT, BUT DIFFERENCES OVER SUB-LIMITS REMAIN AS WELL AS SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES OVER VERIFICATION.

3. USEFUL DISCUSSION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BUT SHULTZ CONCERNED ABOUT PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. SHULTZ REFUSED SOVIET SUGGESTIONS OF BILATERAL CONSULTATION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE SNF INTO CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. SOME LIMITED PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. VIGOROUS EXCHANGE ON CENTRAL AMERICA. SOME INDICATION OF SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT SECURITY COUNCIL WILL NEED TO FOLLOW UP RESOLUTION 598 VIGOROUSLY IF UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL. SHULTZ POINTS TO PRACTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES IN SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR UN NAVAL FORCE IN GULF.

DETAIL

5. WELCOMING SHULTZ, LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT SINCE THE INF NEGOTATIONS BEGAN THERE HAD BEEN 56 CONSULTATION MEETINGS, 7 OF THEM AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL. SHULTZ RECALLED PREVIOUS STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL ALLIES (EG. AT THE DECEMBER 1984 MEETING BEFORE TALKS ON SPACE WITH GROMYKO) ABOUT THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE ALLIANCE'S STRENGTH, NOT TO BE THROWN OFF BALANCE BY SOVIET TACTICS AND TO REMAIN PATIENT. HE REPEATED AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE'S APPROACH OF DEFENCE AND DIALOGUE SMICLN WESTERN SOLIDARITY WOULD BE

ESSENTIAL FOR DETERRING WAR AND IMPROVING EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

6. SHULTZ RECALLED THAT AT THE WASHINGTON MEETING, AT SHEVARDNADZE'S SUGGESTION, THEY HAD PUT OUT A STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE A SUMMIT IN THE AUTUMN FOR SIGNATURE OF AN INF TREATY, THE DATE TO BE SET DURING THEIR MOSCOW MEETING. DURING HIS 4.1/2 HOURS TALK WITH GORBACHEV ON 23 OCTOBER SHULTZ THOUGHT THAT GORBACHEV SHARED HIS AND SHEVARDNADZE'S BELIEF THAT WORK ON INF WAS PRACTICALLY DONE. BUT GORBACHEV ALSO FELT THAT AN INF TREATY AS SUCH WOULD NOT OFFER ENOUGH AS A SUMMIT AGENDA. HE WANTED A VISIT, BUT WOULD NOT BE COMFORTABLE WITH IT UNLESS THERE WERE ALSO AGREEMENT ON ABM AND SPACE DEFENCE ISSUES. GORBACHEV HAD SAID HE WOULD WRITE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. SHULTZ STRESSED TO THE NAC THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTEMPLATE NO OUTCOME ON DEFENCE AND SPACE THAT WOULD PREVENT VIGOROUS RESEARCH ON A DEFENCE PROGRAMME TO SHOW HOW THE US AND ITS ALLIES COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. IT HAD BEEN LEFT WITH GORBACHEV THAT THE INVITATION REMAINED OPEN, AND GORBACHEV HAD SAID HE BY NO MEANS RULED OUT A SUMMIT THIS YEAR. SHULTZ HAD SAID THE AMERICAN POSITION WAS THAT A SUMMIT COULD BE AN IMPORTANT EVENT AND COULD HELP BUSINESS ALONG. THEY WOULD THEREFORE WELCOME A WELL PREPARED SUMMIT LIKELY TO BRING RESULTS WHEN THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY. BUT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT IF AN AUTUMN SUMMIT WAS TO BE ARRANGED.

HUMAN RIGHTS

7. SHULTZ SAID THIS WAS TOP OF THE AGENDA SMICLN IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO ALLIANCE VALUES. HALF OF HIS FIRST SESSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON 22 OCTOBER HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THIS HAD BEEN FOLLOWED UP BY A WORKING GROUP MEETING. SHULTZ HAD MET A GROUP OF SEPARATED SPOUSES, REFUSENIKS ETC. THE CASE OF ONE SEPARATED SPOUSE HAD BEEN SETTLED DURING THE VISIT AND ANOTHER SPOUSE HAD BEEN GIVEN ASSURANCES. SHULTZ'S VISIT TO ISRAEL HAD GIVEN HIM INSIGHTS INTO THE PROBLEM OF THE RIGHT OF ALL SOVIET CITIZENS TO EMIGRATE. (SHULTZ LOOKED ACROSS TO GENSCHER AT THIS POINT.) HE HAD CHECKED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD MEANT WHAT HE SAID IN SOUTH AMERICA THAT ALL SOVIET CITIZENS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE COULD DO SO. SHEVARDNADZE HAD INDICATED THAT JEWISH EMIGRATION THIS YEAR MIGHT BE IN THE RANGE OF 12-13 THOUSAND. THIS COMPARED BADLY WITH THE 51 THOUSAND SOVIET JEWS WHO HAD LEFT IN 1979. BUT SINCE SO FAR ONLY 8 HUNDRED PER MONTH HAD LEFT IN 1987 THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MARKED INCREASE IN COMING WEEKS IF SHEVARDNADZE'S FIGURE WAS TO BE REACHED. SHEVARDNADZE HAD RAISED THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. SHULTZ HAD GONE THROUGH THE AMERICAN CRITERIA WITH HIM, STRESSING THE NEED FOR ACTION, NOT WORDS. SHEVARDNADZE INDICATED THAT IF THERE WERE NO CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW IT WOULD BE NO TRAGEDY FOR THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE IT.

REGIONAL ISSUES

8. THERE HAD BEEN A FULL EVENING OF DISCUSSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE, AND ALSO DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV. THE MAIN ITEM WAS A VIGOROUS EXCHANGE ON CENTRAL AMERICA (NO DETAILS GIVEN). THE OTHER MAIN SUBJECT HAD BEEN IRAN/IRAQ WHERE (THOUGH SHULTZ DID NOT WISH TO BE TOO CATEGORIC) HE HAD FOUND SHEVARDNADZE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NEED TO MAKE A FIRM AND UNIFIED FOLLOW-UP TO RESOLUTION 598 IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD LAID ITS REPUTATION ON THE LINE, AND IS STANDING COULD ONLY SUFFER IF IT ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE PLAYED ALONG. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD LIVE UP TO ITS WORDS OF SUPPORT FOR THE UN. SHEVARDNADZE HAD SUGGESTED THAT A GROUP BE

CONVENED TO PLAN A UN NAVAL FORCE. SHULTZ HAD QUESTIONED THIS ON PRACTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL GROUNDS. IF IT WAS INTENDED AS A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE, THIS WOULD DEPEND ON MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE BY IRAN AND IRAQ OF 598. IF IT WERE NOT FOR PEACE-KEEPING WOULD IT BE A MILITARY FORCE DEALING WITH HOSTILITIES? WOULD ITS ROLE BE TO ENFORCE 598, OR TO MOUNT A BLOCKADE? WOULD IT SEEK TO END THE WAR BY CUTTING OFF ALL IRANIAN OIL EXPORTS? SHEVARDNADZE INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT THINKING ON THOSE LINES. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE QUOTE DOMINANT UNQUOTE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF, TO WHICH SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT US VESSELS MADE UP ONLY 1/3 OF THE TOTAL.
9. THERE HAD BEEN A BETTER DISCUSSION THAN BEFORE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY DID NOT HAVE MUCH DISCUSSION ABOUT AFGHANISTAN SINCE THIS HAS BEEN FULLY COVERED AT THEIR WASHINGTON MEETING. SHULTZ HAD TOUCHED ON CAMBODIA AND KOREA. IN ADDITION, THERE HAD BEEN A FULL EXCHANGE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AMONG EXPERTS, AND THERE MIGHT BE AN ARMACOST-VORONTSOV IN NOVEMBER ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

BILATERAL ISSUES
10. DISCUSSION SEEMS TO HAVE CENTRED ROUND THE SECURITY AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

ARMS CONTROL
11. THERE HAD BEEN WORKING GROUPS ON INF, START, SPACE DEFENCE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL.

NUCLEAR TESTS.
12. SHULTZ RECALLED THAT AT WASHINGTON THEY HAD AGREED TO START TALKS WITH THE AIM OF IMPROVING VERIFICATION SO THAT EXISTING AGREEMENTS COULD BE MOVED TOWARDS RATIFICATION AND OF NEGOTIATING FURTHER LIMITS ON TESTING AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHULTZ SAID THAT TALKS ON TESTING WOULD GO BEYOND THE 150 KILO TONNE THRESHHOLD AND WOULD MAKE PROGRESS TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE WAS SUCCESS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. TALKS WOULD BEGIN ON 9 NOVEMBER IN GENEVA.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS
13. THERE HAD BEEN USEFUL AND SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. THEY HAD AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY AGENDA: MAINTAINING SECURITY DURING THE DESTRUCTION PHASE SMICLN PROTECTING SENSITIVE COMMERCIAL INFORMATION DURING INSPECTIONS SMICLN AND STRENGTHENING VERIFICATION IN THE LIGHT OF TECHNICAL ADVANCES, (SHULTZ WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED HERE ABOUT PROLIFERATION). HE WELCOMED THE AGREEMENT ON MANDATORY CHALLENGE WITH NO RIGHTS OF REFUSAL OF INSPECTION. THEY AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF DATA. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE MORE HE LEARNED OF THIS SUBJECT THE MORE IMPORANT HE FELT IT TO GET TO GRIPS WITH IT. BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT, IN THAT NOT EVEN THE MOST SEVERE VERIFICATION REGIME COULD GIVE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE.

CONVENTIONAL
14. SHEVARDNADZE HAD PRESSED FOR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE, BUT SHULTZ HAD DECLINED TO SET UP A NEW CHANNEL ADDITIONAL TO VIENNA AND BYPASSING ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. HE HAD RESISTED SOVIET EFFORTS TO ENSURE DISCUSSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS OR OTHER CONVENTIONAL FORA. HE WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT TRY TO LIMIT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDIRECTLY, VIA DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS.

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15. SHULTZ RECALLED THAT THIS WAS THE AGREEMENT SOUGHT BY THE ALLIANCE SINCE 1979. THE MATTER HAD BEEN RESOLVED IN PRINCIPLE IN WASHINGTON. GORBACHEV HAD SUGGESTED THAT SINCE AGREEMENT WAS CLOSE, BOTH SIDES SHOULD STOP DEPLOYMENT WITH EFFECT FROM 1 NOVEMBER SMICLN HE HAD MENTIONED THIS ONLY ONCE, BUT IT WAS A TYPICAL PLOY INDICATING THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE PROBING ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO THE END. THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON PHASING AND INSPECTION. ON PHASING, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT ALL LRINF MISSILES AND THEIR RE-ENTRY VEHICLES SHOULD BE ELIMINATED IN 3 YEARS. ALL SRINF MISSILES AND THEIR RE-ENTRY VEHICLES SHOULD BE ELIMIATED IN NO MORE THAN 18 MONTHS, OR WITHIN 12 MONTHS IF TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE. IN ADDITION, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE INF MISSILE ELIMINATION PROGRAMME SHOULD BE COMPLETED NO LESS THAN 15 DAYS BEFORE THE SET DATE. DURING THOSE 15 DAYS, THE US-GERMAN PERSHING 1A CO-OPERATIVE PROGRAMME WOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END BY DECISION OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. THE P1A WARHEADS WOULD THEN BECOME EXCLUSIVELY AMERICAN PROPERTY, WOULD BE TREATED AS OTHER US WARHEADS SUBJECT TO THE INF AGREEMENT AND WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE US. SHULTZ SAID THAT THIS PROCEDURE MET CHANCELLOR KOHL'S CONDITIONS. IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, AND THE MATTER WAS SETTLED.

16. THERE HAD BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE AND IN THE INF WORKING GROUP. SOME DIFFERENCES REMAINED, OTHERS HAD BEEN NARROWED AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS WOULD WORK THROUGH THE REMAINING ISSUES, REPORTING BACK WEEKLY TO THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE US WOULD QUOTE HANG IN THERE UNQUOTE. SHEVARDNADZE'S ESTIMATE WAS TWO TO THREE WEEKS MORE TO EACH AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINING ISSUES. SHULTZ EMPHAISED TO THE NAC HOWEVER THAT QUOTE THOUGH VIRTUALLY THERE UNQUOTE THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF A SIGNING CEREMONY THAT SOON: IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME THEREAFTER FOR THE TEXT TO BE COMPLETED.

17. THE US HAD NOT YET TABLED FULL PROPOSALS ON ON-SITE INSPECTION OF BASES AND SUSPECT SITES, BUT WOULD PROBABLY DO SO NEXT WEEK. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THEY WANTED THE RIGHT TO 15 INSPECTIONS PER YEAR FOR 10 YEARS AFTER THE ELIMINATION PERIOD. AFTER THE GORBACHEV MEETING, THE RUSSIANS HAD YESTERDAY AFTERNOON PROPOSED 10 INSPECTIONS PER YEAR FOR THE FIRST 5 YEARS, WITH 2 OR 3 PER YEAR DURING THE FOLLOWING 5. ON DESTRUCTION, THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT FOR THE FIRST 6 MONTHS OF THE TREATY THERE WOULD BE THE RIGHT TO DESTROY A LIMITED NUMBER OF MISSILES BY LAUNCHING THEM. THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT THIS SHOULD APPLY TO 20-25 PERCENT OF THE FORCE SMICLN THE AMERICANS WERE STILL CONSIDERING THIS. LAUNCHING MISSILES WAS ONE WAY OF TESTING THEM, AS WELL AS OF DESTROYING THEM SMICLN AND THE AMERICANS WANTED TESTING STOPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

18. THEY HAD NOW AGREED TO EXCHANGE DATA. THIS WOULD BE A KEY TEST OF SOVIET SERIOUSNESS.

START

19. GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT HE SHARED THE US VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING A START AGREEMENT, AND BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT NEXT SPRING COULD BE SET AS A TARGET (GORBACHEV SPOKE IN THIS CONTEXT OF A SPRING SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, PRECEEDED BY A WASHINGTON SUMMIT THIS AUTUMN). BOTH SIDES WERE WORKING ON A SINGLE JOINT TEXT WITH BRACKETS AND SHULTZ STRESSED THE PROGRESS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE SINCE SALT IN EXPANDING THE START CONCEPT TO COVER WARHEADS AND THROWWEIGHT AS WELL AS LAUNCHER NUMBERS.

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OO FCOLN WASHI MOSCO PARIS BONNN THHAG MODAD
PP ANKAR ATHEN BREMB COPEN LISBO LUXEM MADRI OSLOO OTTAW
PP ROMEE VIDEL VICSE TOKYO CANBE PEKIN GEDIS
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM UKDEL NATO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 324
OF 241519Z OCTOBER 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, MODUK
INFO PRIORITY OTHER NATO POSTS, TOKYO, CANBERRA, PEKING
INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK

PART TWO OF TWO

THE HAGUE (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

SIC EMA/EMC/EME
MODUK FOR DACU

20. GORBACHEV PROPOSED NEW SUB LIMITS OF OF 3,000-3,300 WARHEADS ON ICBMS, 1800-2000 WARHEADS ON SLBMS, AND 800-900 WARHEADS ON ALCMS, BUILDING UPON THE PREVIOUS SOVIET IDEAS OF 50 PER CENT CUTS IN EACH LEG OF THE TRIAD. THE US HAD REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL AS UNACCEPTABLE ON ALL COUNTS. IT DID NOT PROVIDE FREEDOM TO MIX IN THE DIRECTION OF THE MORE STABILISED SYSTEMS. IT WOULD MEAN THE US INCREASING ICBM NUMBERS BY APPROXIMATELY 1000 TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ICBM LIMIT. THE US WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE (BY APPROXIMATELY TWO THIRDS) SLBM NUMBERS AND REDUCE THE SSBN FORCE TO FIVE OR SIX BOATS (CERTAINLY LESS THAN TEN) WHICH WOULD BE TO SOVIET ADVANTAGE. FINALLY THE US ALCM FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED EVEN FURTHER THAN THE US COMPRIMISE PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS SHULTZ CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS PROMISING. IT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AS REFLECTING THE DESIRED SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE UNDER A 50 PER CENT CUTS REGIME. IF THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO MORE FLEXIBILITY OF THE MIX THEN THE US DESIRED FORCE STRUCTURE COULD FIT INTO THESE NUMBERS (THE SOVIET ICBM PLUS SLBM TOTAL WAS AT THE BOTTOM END OF THE RANGE ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE US, THE ICBM SUB-LIMIT WAS THE TOP END OF THE US PROPOSAL, AND THE ALCM NUMBER WAS ONLY A LITTLE BELOW THE US FIGURE). OVERALL THEREFORE SHULTZ CONCLUDED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT A 50 PER CENT CUTS DEAL BY NEXT SPRING SINCE THE INGREDIENTS WERE NOW BROADLY ALL THERE.
21. VERIFICATION WOULD HOWEVER REMAIN AN EXCRUCIATINGLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM. THE US TEAM HAD TRIED BUT FAILED TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET SIDE ON DETAILED DISCUSSIONS, IN ORDER PARTICULARLY TO TACKLE THE MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF VERIFYING NON ZERO LIMITS, WHICH HAD BEEN AVOIDED IN THE GLOBAL ZERO ZERO INF AGREEMENT. THE US HAD ALSO UNSUCCESSFULLY PRESSED THE SOVIETS TO SAY HOW THEY WOULD PROPOSE VERIFYING NON ZERO LEVELS OF MOBILE IBCMS ON WHICH THE US STILL FELT A TOTAL BAN TO BE THE ONLY FEASIBLE SOLUTION.

DEFENCE AND SPACE

22. EACH SIDE HAD ELABORATED THEIR EXISTING POSITIONS. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT US AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES WERE DIVERGENT. THE FOCUS OF DETAILED DISCUSSION HAD BEEN ON THE PERIOD OF NON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT, DURING WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO TRY TO RESTRICT THE SCOPE OF US RESEARCH. ONE POSITIVE SIGN HAD HOWEVER BEEN THE REAPPEARANCE OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW SOME TESTING IN SPACE, ON WHICH EARLIER SHULTZ SHEVARDNADZE AGREEMENT HAD PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO FOLLOW UP IN GENEVA.

CONCLUSION

23. CONCLUDING HIS LONG PRESENTATION, SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN MOSCOW IN ALL THE AREAS UNDER DISCUSSION. THIS WAS A TESTIMONY TO THE WISDOM OF THE ALLIANCE APPROACH. THE INF AGREEMENT WAS ALMOST THERE AND PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON START. THE TACTICAL PROBLEMS OVER THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE PLAYED DOWN. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SUMMIT ISSUE HAD DOMINATED THIS NAC.

24. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT CREATE LINKAGE IN THE PUBLIC MIND BETWEEN THE INF AGREEMENT AND THE SUMMIT. STEADFASTNESS BY THE ALLIES HAD FORCED THE SOVIET UNION TO ABANDON ITS OWN LINKAGE, AND WE SHOULD NOT NOW REINTRODUCE IT IN ANOTHER FORM. LIKEWISE, HE URGED COLLEAGUES TO BE CAUTIOUS IN HOW THEY DESCRIBED GORBACHEV'S FAILURE TO AGREE ON A SUMMIT. IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO IMPALE GORBACHEV ON A HOOK SINCE THE SOVIET LEADER HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED A SDI LINKAGE WITH THE SUMMIT. IT WAS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT SHEVARDNADZE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HAD SAID THAT LACK OF AGREEMENT ON A SUMMIT DATE DID NOT PREVENT AN INF TREATY BEING SIGNED ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT ALTER WHO WOULD SIGN IT. THE PUBLIC MESSAGE WAS THEREFORE THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD KEEP RIGHT ON ITS PRESENT COURSE. THE MOTTO FOR NATO SHOULD BE QUOTE STEADY AS YOU GO UNQUOTE

25. SEE MIFT FOR NAC DISCUSSION.

ALEXANDER

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ADVANCE 17

HD/UND /
HD/DEFENCE DEPT /
HD/NAD /
HD/ACDD /
HD/SOVIET DEPT /
HD/SEC POL D /
PS /
PS/MRS CHALKER /
PS/MR MELLOR /
PS/PUS /
SIR J FRETWELL /
MR BOYD /
MR RATFORD /
MR FALL /

MR FEARN /
MR POWELL Nº10 DOWNING ST /
RESIDENT CLERK /

23

PRIME MINISTER

WHAT HAPPENS TO CRUISE MISSILES IN THE UK AFTER AN INF TREATY?

You will want to consider the attached note which deals with what should happen to Cruise missiles in the United Kingdom after an INF Treaty is signed.

There are two separate problems:

- should we continue with additional deployments as already planned, after signature of the INF agreement but before ratification and entry into force?

- at what point in phased reductions should the Cruise missiles from the United Kingdom be removed?

The first problem is complex. On present plans the build up of Cruise missiles and warheads at Molesworth will go ahead from December this year and into the first half of next year. There are quite good reasons to go ahead with this even after signature of an agreement, in case there are any hiccups between signature and ratification/entry into force. On the other hand, it could cause a lot of unease here to see signature of the Treaty followed immediately by deployment of a lot more missiles. And it is quite clear that several other countries are going to ask the Americans for a moratorium on further deployments from the moment of signature. The Americans' own views are not entirely clear. The Defence Secretary agrees that we should join those recommending a moratorium on activating new Cruise missile flights from shortly after Treaty signature, with the proviso that it should be a time limited moratorium. Agree? Yes mt

When it comes to phasing out of Cruise and Pershing II missiles, the Americans' preference would be to get rid of those in the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Belgium first and keep those in Germany and Italy until the second phase. Not surprisingly, the Germans and Italians are not too keen on

this and want reductions to be spread evenly among basing countries. The implication of this is that we should have to keep some at least of our Cruise missiles at Greenham Common until the second phase of reductions. This could mean for two or three years after entry into force of the agreement. Again the Defence Secretary is content with this. Agree?

Yes

CDP

CHARLES POWELL

23 October 1987

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PRIME MINISTER

GLCM RELATED ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF AN INF TREATY

1. I attach a paper, prepared by my officials in consultation with Foreign & Commonwealth Office colleagues, which looks at the implications of the INF treaty process for GLCM deployments. Two main issues are addressed. The first is whether or not to proceed with the activation of Molesworth as the second UK GLCM base after treaty signature, which could well be in late November, through to the point of treaty ratification, which could be several months later, and entry into force shortly thereafter. The second is the phasing of missile withdrawals in the subsequent rundown period.

2. My own view on the former is that we could minimise our problems by encouraging the Americans to think in terms of announcing a time limited moratorium on activating new GLCM flights shortly after treaty signature. On rundown, I agree in principle to the outline US proposals and do not see any disadvantage to us in retaining two GLCM flights at Greenham Common until the end of the drawdown phase if it helps the Germans and Italians politically. I assume in all this that deployment activity should continue until signature and that normal training activity should continue until all missiles are removed.

3. I should be happy to discuss this if you wish.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord President, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

G.H.

Ministry of Defence

22nd October 1987

SECRET

GLCM RELATED ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF AN INF TREATY

Introduction

1. The increasing likelihood that an INF treaty will be signed at a Summit, expected in late November, has stimulated discussion within NATO in recent weeks on the implications of the treaty process for GLCM deployments over the next few years. There are three phases to consider: the period leading up to the signing of a treaty; the interim period, which could last several months, between signing, ratification and the treaty entering into force; and the actual drawdown period which will extend over at least 3, if not 5 years. The main issues considered in this paper are the scheduled activation of the second UK GLCM base at Molesworth, which mainly affects the second phase, and the proposed rundown programme for the final phase.

Current Deployment Plan

2. The current plan for the build up at Molesworth envisages that the first of the 4 GLCM flights (each of 16 missiles) scheduled for deployment there will have achieved an initial operational capability by the end of December. The remaining flights will be formed next year, starting with the second one in March. Two convoys of equipment and support vehicles, including some transporter erector launchers and missile bodies, have already gone into Molesworth. The next major road delivery is expected later this month and there will be a further delivery of missile bodies next month. So far, no actual warheads for the Molesworth flights have been despatched to the UK. Warheads are expected to arrive at Alconbury in early December and to stay in store there until nuclear certification at Molesworth is completed in the third week in December. Delivery by helicopter to Molesworth is planned towards the end of December.

First Phase

3. In the first phase, although any movements in and round Molesworth close to signature could attract criticism and require careful public handling, it has so far been assumed that normal activity, including equipment deliveries, will continue up to the time of signature. It should be noted that the sensitive issue of the delivery of nuclear warheads is unlikely to arise in this period unless the date of the Summit is delayed.

4. The US Authorities recently proposed that GLCM deliveries be accelerated in the period before signature to get as much into place as possible. They have, however, apparently now realised that there would be severe practical and political difficulties to be overcome here and have abandoned the idea.

Second Phase

5. There are potentially more serious problems in the second, post signature phase. The current timetables look set to create a particularly unfortunate conjunction in public handling terms between the probable date for treaty signature and warhead deliveries and flight activation. The difficulty does not end there. Throughout the first half of 1988 there will be a continuous stream of activity related to the formation of the next 3 flights. The question of outstanding deliveries is not, of course, peculiar to this country. Two out of 3 GLCM flights remain to be delivered to Belgium, end 87/early 88, and 1 out of 7 to Italy in the same time frame. The FRG is expecting to receive 3 more flights over the next 12 months. There have been no cruise missile deployments to the Netherlands so far; the first deliveries are scheduled for next summer.

6. In discussions in NATO, US officials have emphasised that the United States attaches importance to basing countries' maintaining the deployment timetable through the second phase until the treaty enters into force. (This is likely to be shortly after ratification). One argument is that if there was any suggestion that the basing countries were not continuing deployments this could complicate ratification in the United States, since it could be interpreted by Congress as pre-empting ratification. The main argument, however, is that a demonstration of continued Alliance resolve is necessary to keep up the pressure on the Russians and to guard against unforeseen delays or difficulties after signature, either from outside events or from the US ratification process itself which could, for example, result in further negotiating demands or conditions. There is also the military consideration that it is highly desirable in deterrence terms to demonstrate maximum target coverage and the highest operational capability for as long as possible. There are the further points that pressing on with deployments would give the Americans a higher starting number, nearer to the one the Russians will be reducing from, and would be a prudent precaution against failure of a treaty to enter into force. In short, until the agreement is signed, sealed and delivered, there could be hiccups, and the prospect of having to restart a process we had stopped is not a comfortable one. However, it should be noted that while some senior US officials are advocating holding to the current delivery schedules, it is not certain this viewpoint is fully supported throughout the US Administration.

7. While these arguments carry considerable weight, they have to be balanced against the difficulties of continuing deployments in terms of the effect on public perceptions and in the context of managing the domestic nuclear debate. We could expect widespread puzzlement and dismay over the activation of the second GLCM base at this time and over what would appear, in all logic, to be nugatory effort and expenditure. No doubt some would also accuse

us of bad faith and the Soviet Union would echo and stimulate this. There would be the possibility of an increased level of anti nuclear demonstrations. It would, of course, be quite possible to deploy arguments in public to justify HMG's position, and to emphasise the basic legitimacy of deployments and our full commitment to the obligations and schedule of reductions set out in the Treaty. We are in any case going to have to defend the retention of missiles and training deployments at Greenham Common for some time after signature, though this, of course, is a different order of problem.

8. The situation is further complicated by the European dimension referred to in paragraph 6 above. The Belgian Prime Minister is already on record as saying that if an INF treaty is signed before the end of the year, he would wish there to be a six month moratorium on new deployments. For their part, the Dutch have made it clear that there should be no deployments to the Netherlands post treaty signature. An added complication here is the Dutch worry that deployment would seriously affect the extent to which the Netherlands could in future contribute to NATO's nuclear capabilities. Two nuclear tasks (the F-16 strike role and the Orion anti submarine capability) are due to be dropped when the cruise missiles are deployed. It is reckoned that if GLCMs are actually deployed there this would make it extremely difficult, in political terms, to reinstate the two discarded nuclear tasks post ratification and missile removal. We have a very considerable interest in supporting any measures which would encourage the Netherlands to retain the F16 and Orion nuclear roles.

9. On balance, it would seem that the best solution would be to indicate to the Americans our concern about proceeding with deployment after signature and to try to encourage a consensus with them and the other basing countries around the notion of a moratorium. If we were successful, we would not only avoid the very difficult public handling problems which will inevitably arise with deployments to Molesworth, but would not have to face the prospect of damaging disagreement among the European basing countries over the way ahead. The arguments for pressing on with deployments are essentially related to the dynamics of negotiation, and as a hedge against uncertainty. They are not conclusive. Nor is it yet clear what direction any US/USSR discussion of the post signature modalities will take. One possibility would be a joint declaration on cessation of deployments. Another option would be a unilateral US decision to suspend flight activation at some stage post signature. The advantage of the latter would be that it could be tailored to requirements. For instance, the Congressional argument could, perhaps, be partly finessed by declaring a temporary moratorium; another useful variation from our point of view would be a moratorium which began post signature but after scheduled delivery of warheads to Molesworth. This would allow us to get one fully opertional flight into place, which, on the assumption

that Molesworth is well up the queue for early missile removal, (which seems to be the present case) would have some subsequent presentational advantages. While not perfect in public handling terms, the establishment of one flight could be explained as the completion of a process which had already begun. Such a freeze would suit the Dutch; but the Belgian deployments and probably an FRG flight would presumably have to be slipped discreetly to the right to qualify under the moratorium. As to the military case against a freeze, it is worth noting that even if a moratorium was declared on treaty signature, two thirds of the projected GLCM force and all the Pershing IIs would already be in the field, representing a powerful deterrent force.

Third Phase

10. The original US preference for the rundown phase was to maximise the target coverage and military effectiveness of the GLCM and PII units and adopt a sequential country by country withdrawal. Not surprisingly, this was strongly opposed by the majority of the European basing countries on the grounds that it would be almost impossible to manage in political terms.

11. Since then, the Americans have suggested a variety of alternatives which include an element of across-the-board reduction to make the drawdown more politically acceptable and equitable. The latest proposal envisages a two phase rundown where all the GLCM flights from the UK, Germany and Belgium and just over half those from Italy and a token number of German PIIs are taken out within the first 2 years, leaving most of the FRG PIIs and 3 flights of GLCMs in Italy for the second phase. Again, not unexpectedly, there is German opposition to this and Italian disquiet. We have been asked by the Americans if the two phase approach is acceptable to us and furthermore whether we might be prepared to maintain 1 or 2 GLCM flights into the second phase to reduce the appearance of FRG/Italian singularisation.

12. Our best response on phasing might be to say that we are content to work with this framework but that its final acceptability will depend on the detailed reductions schedule worked out within it. On this, we await precise US proposals. In assessing their acceptability, we are likely to be particularly concerned to ensure that politically significant reductions are made early in Phase I, that all equipment is withdrawn from Molesworth at the very beginning of Phase I, and that arrangements for both Phases I and II should be generally equitable as between basing countries as well as being as robust as possible in terms of a continued deterrent. We are particularly anxious to get Molesworth (where we will have something to give up, even if it is only missile bodies) closed as quickly as possible to reap the political benefits and to ease verification problems.

13. On an extended operational capability, we could say that this is acceptable as long as we are in Italian and German company and that the Phase II burden is reasonably equitably shared between the three countries. Indeed, there is perhaps advantage in NATO terms in all three major basing countries continuing to share the burden until the end. Such a response also seems likely to help solve the PII problem, since retention of a couple of flights of GLCMs at Greenham Common into Phase II should allow larger reductions of PII in Phase I.

Conclusions

14. In summary, the build up towards the activation of Molesworth of the second UK GLCM base will continue up to treaty signature. Thereafter, and until the treaty enters into force, there is a potential conflict between the evident US desire to carry on with deployments and our own wish to avoid difficult domestic presentational problems and a state of disarray with some of our European neighbours. The best solution would appear to be to encourage the Americans to think in terms of a moratorium on deployments at some point shortly after signature.

15. Subject to seeing more detailed plans we can accept the concept of two phase rundown, as long as Molesworth remains near the top of the list for withdrawals; we would not, in principle, object to running two flights on at Greenham into Phase Two.

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CW: US POLICY
SUMMARY
1. US CW POLICY UNDER REVIEW. PAPERS STILL IN PREPARATION AT WORKING LEVEL. THREE MAIN POLICY OPTIONS. STRONG UNDERCURRENT OF OPINION IN FAVOUR OF STOPPING SHORT, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, OF A GLOBAL BAN. EQUALLY, AWARENESS OF NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF VIEWS OF CONGRESS AND CLOSE ALLIES, AS WELL AS SOVIET PRESSURE. CONSULTATIONS WITH CLOSE ALLIES BEFORE US/SOVIET SUMMIT UNDER CONSIDERATION. MEANWHILE UNCHANGED BRIEF FOR SHULTZ IN MOSCOW.
DETAIL
2. SINCE THE TABLING OF THE US DRAFT CW TREATY (CD 500) IN 1984, THE STRENGTH OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO A GLOBAL CW BAN HAS OFTEN BEEN IN DOUBT. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARTICLE X, CONCERN ABOUT CW PROLIFERATION, THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING ALIVE THE BINARY PROGRAMME, AND THE SCALE OF SOVIET CW ACTIVITY HAVE ALL SERVED TO KEEP THE DEBATE ABOUT US POLICY WELL FUELED. UNTIL RECENTLY, WITH THE CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION IN GENEVA CLEARLY A DISTANT PROSPECT, THE STRENGTH OF THE US COMMITMENT HAS NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY TESTED. BUT WITH THIS YEAR'S RAPID SOVIET MOVES TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF CD500, WE MAY NOW BE MOVING CLOSER TO THE CRUNCH.
3. THE PENTAGON HAVE LONG BEEN THE STANDARD BEARERS OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OPPOSITION TO A GLOBAL BAN AND WERE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE TABLING OF CD500 IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEIR MOST RECENT CAMPAIGN FOR A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN US POLICY (AN OSD PROPOSAL FOR STOCKPILES AND CONTINUED PRODUCTION UNDER A TREATY REGIME) WAS HALTED IN JULY WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF THE STATUS QUO. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, THEIR BASIC THEME - THAT A GLOBAL BAN ON THE BASIS OF CD500 OR INDEED ANY OTHER DOCUMENT ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA WOULD NOT BE IN THE US OR WESTERN SECURITY INTEREST - HAS BEGUN TO WIN ACCEPTANCE THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION.
4. THE PENTAGON'S POINT OF VIEW IS WELL KNOWN TO US. THEY ARE

DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE CONTINUED PROLIFERATION OF CW IN COUNTRIES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CD, AND BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT DETERRENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF MINIMISING THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT NOVEL AGENTS AND ABOUT THE POTENTIAL CW PRODUCTION CAPABILITY OF THE CIVILIAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY. THEY SEE A GROWING SOVIET CW THREAT, AT A TIME WHEN A MAJOR COMPONENT (BIGEYE) OF THE US BINARY PROGRAMME IS IN TECHNICAL AND OTHER DIFFICULTY. ABOVE ALL, THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT NO CONVENTION COULD BE SUFFICIENTLY VERIFIABLE TO ENSURE DETECTION OR DETERRENCE OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT NON-COMPLIANCE.

5. NONE OF THESE CONCERNS IS NEW. NOR HAVE ANY OF THEM BEEN EXCLUSIVELY CONFINED TO THE PENTAGON: WE KNOW THAT SHULTZ HIMSELF HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN WORRIED BY THE PROLIFERATION AND VERIFICATION PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR, CONCERNS THAT HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU. BUT WHAT IS NEW ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION HERE IS THAT WORRY ABOUT PRESENT US AND WESTERN CW POLICY IS NO LONGER AT THE PERIPHERY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S THINKING BUT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO THE FORE BY THE RAPID SOVIET ACCEPTANCE THIS YEAR OF LARGE PARTS OF THE US AND WESTERN POSITIONS.

6. THE CW INTER-AGENCY WORKING GROUP HAS THEREFORE BEEN EXAMINING POLICY OPTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR A REVIEW OF US POLICY AT TOP LEVELS. THREE BASIC OPTIONS ARE IN PLAY:

(A) THE STATUS QUO:

(B) US/SOVIET (PERHAPS LATER MULTILATERAL) CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (BUILDING ON THOSE ALREADY UNDER DISCUSSION) THAT WOULD EFFECTIVELY POSTPONE A CONVENTION, AT LEAST FOR A SHORT PERIOD:

(C) REDUCTIONS TO PARITY AT A LOWER LEVEL. THE VARIANT OF THIS OPTION THAT WE ARE TOLD OF MOST FREQUENTLY WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTIONS TO PARITY BY, SAY, THE EIGHTH YEAR AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CONVENTION. THERE WOULD THEN BE A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION, DURING WHICH SIGNATORY STATES COULD ASSESS THE WISDOM OF REDUCING TO ZERO AND (IT IS THOUGHT) PROBABLY DECIDE AGAINST. THIS OPTION WOULD BE PRESENTED AS A MODIFICATION WITHIN AN UNCHANGED BASIC POLICY FRAMEWORK OF CONTINUING TO SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL BAN.

THE SECOND TWO OPTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT VARIATIONS AND ADDITIONS.

7. INTER-AGENCY DISCUSSION OF THESE OPTIONS HAS SO FAR BEEN REMARKABLY FREE OF THE POLARISATION AND DISSENSION THAT HAS CHARACTERISED PREVIOUS REVIEWS OF CW POLICY. INDEED, THERE NOW APPEARS TO BE PRECIOUS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE APPROACHES OF STATE, OSD AND THE NSC, WITH ALL THREE MOVING TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE

OF THE NEED FOR A SHIFT IN US POLICY, PROBABLY TOWARDS OPTION 6(C) ABOVE. THERE IS MORE RESISTANCE TO A POLICY CHANGE AT WORKING LEVELS IN ACDA, BUT SENIOR ACDA OFFICIALS ARE CLEARLY NOW THINKING ALONG THE SAME LINES AS THE OTHER AGENCIES. THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION (WITH CLOSE ALLIES AND CONGRESS) BEFORE ANY SHIFT IN US POLICY IS UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED, AS IS THE NEED FOR ANY SHIFT TO BE PRESENTED WITH ENORMOUS CARE. EVEN THE PENTAGON ACCEPT THAT ANY PRECIPITATE UNILATERAL MOVE BY THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD RISK FRACTURING THE FRAGILE BASIS OF SUPPORT THAT THE BINARY PROGRAMME CURRENTLY ENJOYS, AND PRESENT THE RUSSIANS WITH A POTENT PROPAGANDA WEAPON.

8. THERE IS STILL SOME WAY TO GO BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATION REACHES A CONCLUSION ON WHETHER A CHANGE OF POLICY, AND THEREFORE CONSULTATION, IS REQUIRED. OUR BEST GUESS, BASED PRIMARILY ON DISCUSSIONS WITH NSC STAFF, IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERNAL REVIEW WILL BE COMPLETED SOMETIME BETWEEN SHULTZ'S PRESENT VISIT TO MOSCOW AND ANY SUBSEQUENT US/SOVIET SUMMIT. SHULTZ'S BRIEF FOR MOSCOW IS MEANWHILE TO RESIST EXPECTED SOVIET PRESSURE FOR SIGNIFICANT NEW MOVES ADDITIONAL RECIPROCAL VISITS TO CW FACILITIES REMAIN A POSSIBILITY FOR LATER THIS YEAR).

9. IF THE ADMINISTRATION DOES DECIDE TO CHANGE DIRECTION AND PULL BACK FROM A GLOBAL BAN, CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND CLOSE ALLIES (AND INDEED VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH, WHO TABLED CD500 AND HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CAPITAL RIDING ON A GLOBAL BAN) WILL BE FAR FROM STRAIGHTFORWARD. INDEED, THE PROSPECT OF THE DIFFICULTIES LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED MAY IN THE END CAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION TO DRAW BACK FROM ANY CHANGE OF DIRECTION. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE FUNDING HAS NOT BEEN A PROBLEM FOR THE BIGEYE PROGRAMME THIS YEAR (AS IT WAS IN 1986), THE PROSPECT OF FURTHER DEFENCE BUDGET CUTS ALREADY HAS THE CW COMMUNITY HERE WORRIED, AND THERE IS OF COURSE THE CLEAR RISK THAT ANY APPARENT LESSENING OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO A GLOBAL CW BAN COULD JEOPARDISE THE WHOLE BINARY PROGRAMME AND DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND MOST OF ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES.

10. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE ON CW, SAYING THAT THEY CAN NOW ACCEPT CD500 PRETTY MUCH AS IT STANDS. THEIR MAIN TARGET SEEMS LIKELY TO BE THE BINARY PROGRAMME, BUT THEY MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF US/EUROPEAN DIFFERENCES ON THE PROSPECT OF A GLOBAL BAN. THEY ARE UNLIKELY THEREFORE TO BE BOUGHT OFF BY CBMS ALONE. THE ADMINISTRATION KNOW THIS, AND THE REAL POLICY CHOICE IS THEREFORE PROBABLY BETWEEN THE STATUS QUO AND REDUCTIONS TO PARITY AT LOWER LEVELS, PRESENTED AS THE PENULTIMATE STEP ON THE WAY TO A GLOBAL BAN (IE OPTIONS 6(A) AND (C) ABOVE). SUBJECT TO DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING SHULTZ'S PRESENT VISIT TO MOSCOW,

WE MAY NEED TO CONSIDER EARLY BILATERAL UK/US DISCUSSIONS ON CW POLICY, PARTICULARLY IF A CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION POLICY REALLY LOOKS AS IF IT MAY NOW FINALLY EMERGE.

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL): MY MEETING WITH SHULTZ ON 20 OCTOBER:
OTHER DISARMAMENT ISSUES

A. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

1. I EMPHASISED THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE WESTERN POSITION IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, AND RECOGNISED THAT SOME WAS BEING MADE. SHULTZ NOTED WITHOUT COMMENT.

B. CW

2. I UNDERLINED THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO THE EVIDENT (TO US) DISPARITY BETWEEN WHAT GORBACHEV HAD SAID IN PRAGUE ABOUT SOVIET CW CAPABILITIES AND WHAT WE KNEW OF THE REAL PICTURE. THIS RAISED IMPORTANT QUESTIONS ABOUT DEALING WITH GORBACHEV IN THE CW CONTEXT AND MORE WIDELY. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE WRONG TO CONCLUDE THAT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE TO OUR BASIC APPROACH WAS NEEDED, BUT WE WERE STILL CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS AND WOULD WISH TO KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS BOTH ON THIS AND ON THE SPECIFICS OF FUTURE WORK ON THE CW CONVENTION.

3. SHULTZ AGREED BOTH ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ISSUES AND ON THE DESIRABILITY OF OUR KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH. MRS RIDGWAY NOTED THE IDEA OF A BILATERAL CONSULTATION ON CW AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL. ON THE CONVENTION, SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE BASIC QUESTION AS WHETHER WE WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITH A CONVENTION PROVIDING FOR A LOT OF INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION THAN WITH NO AGREEMENT AT ALL: OR WOULD THE BEST INSURANCE BE A SYSTEM OF DETERRENCE, WITH 'UNDERSTOOD AND IDENTIFIED STOCKPILES'? HE SAW SOME ATTRACTION IN THAT IDEA, BUT THE PROBLEM WAS THAT IT WOULD LEGITIMISE PROLIFERATION AND PERHAPS 'GIVE THE GAME AWAY'. THESE ISSUES WERE UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON. MRS RIDGWAY ADDED THAT THEY REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE EFFORT IN GENEVA AND WERE TRYING TO FIND SOME MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE OBSTACLES THAT

HAVE BEEN MENTIONED: COULD A GLOBAL BAN PERHAPS BE REACHED BY STAGES?

4. SHULTZ CONFIRMED THAT THERE WOULD BE A CW WORKING GROUP IN MOSCOW. THE AMERICANS WOULD HOPE TO NURSE THINGS ALONG AND KEEP THEM FROM COMING TO A HEAD.

C. NON-PROLIFERATION

5. I UNDERLINED THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SUB-CONTINENT. PAKISTAN WAS THE KEY AND I HAD SPOKEN BOTH TO THEM AND TO THE INDIANS IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS. BUT IT WAS NOT EASY TO SEE A WAY THROUGH.

6. SHULTZ AND I AGREED THAT THE PAKISTANIS MIGHT BE ALL THE MORE LIKELY TO PRESS AHEAD IF US AID WERE WITHDRAWN, AND THAT NOW WAS CERTAINLY NOT THE TIME TO LET UP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION OVER AFGHANISTAN. SHULTZ SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST PROSPECT, IF AN INF AND START AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED IN THE REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE, WOULD BE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE TO TALK TO BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND TO TRY TO PERSUADE THEM TO PLAY THEIR PART IN THE LIGHT OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE SUPER POWERS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS MESSAGE SHOULD PRIMARILY BE DIRECTED AT INDIA.

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MY MEETING WITH SHULTZ ON 20 OCTOBER: INF, START, SDI

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ, SUPPORTED BY MRS RIDGWAY, NITZE AND KAMPELMAN, BRIEFS ON PROSPECTS FOR MOSCOW VISIT. I FLAG SOME POLITICALLY SENSITIVE POINTS. SEE ALSO MIFTS FOR OTHER DISARMAMENT AND NATO ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. SHULTZ WILL HAVE TWO DAYS IN MOSCOW. PREVIOUS PATTERN OF WORKING GROUPS WILL BE MAINTAINED. AMERICANS ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO A WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TO A CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION ON REGIONAL ISSUES (WHICH NEED TO DISCUSS IRAN/IRAQ, THE GULF AND RESOLUTION 598 SHOULD IN ANY CASE MAKE INEVITABLE). ON NST ISSUES, HOPE HAD BEEN THAT INF WOULD NOT REQUIRE MUCH IF ANY TOP LEVEL ATTENTION SO THAT PRINCIPALS COULD CONCENTRATE ON START. THAT REMAINED THE US AIM, BUT INF ISSUES WERE NOT AS FAR FORWARD AS THEY HAD HOPED.

3. FOLLOWING ARE INDIVIDUAL POINTS OF NOTE:

(I) ON P1AS NITZE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT (OR NO LONGER) SEEKING TO BACK-OFF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN WASHINGTON: 'WE HAVE BROUGHT THEM BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE':

(II) SOME PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON VERIFICATION, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS HAD BEEN HOPED. KAMPELMAN THOUGHT THAT MORE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN WORKING LEVEL NEGOTIATION IN MOSCOW:

(III) ON START SHULTZ EMPHASISED HOW MUCH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK. ON SUB-LIMITS HE EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR RESTRICTIONS ON BALLISTIC MISSILES: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BALLISTIC AND OTHER MISSILES WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENT KINDS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. ON MOBILES, THE BALL WAS IN THE

SOVIET COURT: THEY HAD MADE NO REAL RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE TO THEM TO COME UP WITH ANSWERS TO THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS:

(IV) THE SDI/ABM TREATY QUESTION WAS DESCRIBED BY SHULTZ AS 'NOT CLOSE TO BEING RESOLVED' DESPITE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION. HE ADDED THAT THE INTERNAL DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES WAS HURTING THE US NEGOTIATING EFFORT:

(V) ON SLCMS, NITZE RECALLED THE DIFFICULTIES ON VERIFICATION, AGREED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH OUTSIDE THE 6000 LIMIT AND REPEATED THE SUGGESTION OF MUTUAL DECLARATIONS ON INTENDED DEPLOYMENTS WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD PUT FORWARD AT REYKJAVIK:

(VI) NITZE CONFIRMED SOVIET CONCERN AT THE AMERICAN DEMAND FOR NON-TESTING OF NEW TYPES OF HEAVY ICBMS.

4. I BROUGHT UP THE QUESTIONS OF ADJUSTMENTS AND THE TIMING OF DEPLOYMENTS. ON THE FORMER, WE CLEARLY SAW THE NEED AND PERCEIVED PARTICULAR MERIT IN SLCMS AND DCA'S BUT THE QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFULLY HANDLED IF WE WERE NOT TO PROVOKE ACCUSATIONS OF SEEKING TO CIRCUMVENT THE TREATY. ON DEPLOYMENT WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS UNTIL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, BUT THIS TOO WAS A POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AREA AND DEPLOYMENTS WOULD HAVE TO STOP AT SOME POINT. SHULTZ RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE IDEAL PATTERN OF CONTINUING DEPLOYMENT UP TO THE MOMENT WHEN THE PHASING OUT PROCESS STARTED. MRS RIDGWAY MADE CLEAR AMERICAN AWARENESS OF THE POINT THAT TOO MUCH PRESSURE FOR DEPLOYMENT ON THE DUTCH MIGHT PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AS FAR AS THE TWO OTHER NUCLEAR TASKS WERE CONCERNED, AND ADDED THAT SHE THOUGHT THAT BOTH THE DUTCH AND BELGIANS WERE SUCCEEDING IN PLAYING THIS QUESTION DOWN AS A HIGH PROFILE PUBLIC ISSUE. IT WAS AGREED THAT EXPERTS SHOULD PRESS ON WITH THEIR WORK SO THAT MINISTERS COULD TAKE EARLY DECISIONS.

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19 October 1987

The Rt. Hon. George Younger MP
Secretary of State for Defence

CDT - Lisa

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Thank you for your minute of 9 September.

I remain of the view that we would not carry conviction if we tried to argue that arms control meant more, rather than less, spending on arms.

I doubt if we can carry this further in isolation but I do think we need to have a discussion of the UK position on conventional arms control before NATO determines its position for the initial talks with the Warsaw Pact. As background to such a discussion we will need a realistic assessment of the conventional balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

I am copying to the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Howe, other members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

NIGEL LAWSON

DEFENCE

ARMS CONTROL

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INF, START, MEETING WITH KARPOV

SUMMARY

1. KARPOV, IN LONDON FOR MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TALKS, CALLS SEPARATELY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN GENEVA NST. HIGHLIGHTS DIFFERENCES WITH US OVER TIMESCALE FOR ELIMINATION OF PIA WARHEADS. TOUCHES ON VERIFICATION POINTS WITHOUT SUGGESTING ANY INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES. ON START KARPOV EMPHASISED NEED TO INCLUDE SLCMS IN THE AGREEMENT BUT OUTSIDE 6000 WARHEADS LIMIT. ON SUB-LIMITS, CLAIMED US SEEKING TO ELIMINATE ENTIRE CLASS OF SOVIET HEAVY ICBMS.

DETAIL

2. KARPOV ACCOMPANIED BY GVENTSADZE (SOVIET EMBASSY) AND THREE OTHER OFFICIALS CALLED ON FALL AT HIS INVITATION TO TOUCH BASE ON CURRENT ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

3. INF

KARPOV BEGAN BY DESCRIBING A NEW DIFFICULTY WHICH THREATENED TO REOPEN THE AGREEMENT ON US-OWNED WARHEADS ON PIAS REACHED AT THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. IN THE SOVIET VIEW THE US HAD AGREED TO ELIMINATE THE PIA WARHEADS IN THE SAME WAY AND 'IN THE SAME TIME FRAME' AS US AND SOVIET WARHEADS IN THE TREATY. KARPOV IMPLIED THAT GLITMAN WAS NOW GOING BACK ON WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED.

4. FALL MADE CLEAR THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS VERY DIFFERENT. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN WASHINGTON THAT WHEN THE US/FRG PATTERN OF COOPERATION ON P1AS CAME TO END, THE US-OWNED WARHEADS WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE SAME WAY AS OTHER WARHEADS. IT WAS TOTALLY IMPLAUSIBLE, GIVEN CHANCELLOR KOHL'S STATEMENT AND THE FIRM POSITION OF THE ALLIES ON THIS POINT, THAT THE US WOULD HAVE AGREED TO DESTROY THE P1A

WARHEADS IN ANY OTHER TIMEFRAME.

5. KARPOV SAID IT WAS UP TO THE FRG AND US TO WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. AGREEMENT ON THIS WAS VITAL TO THE WHOLE AGREEMENT.

6. FALL, SEEKING FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET POSITION, ASKED WHETHER THEY WERE REALLY SEEKING DESTRUCTION OF P1A WARHEADS DURING THE PATTERN OF US/FRG COOPERATION. KARPOV DENIED THIS, APPARENTLY ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PATTERN F COOPERATION COULD BE ENDED SUFFICIENTLY WITHIN THE FIVE YEARS TO ALLOW FOR THE WARHEADS ALSO TO BE DESTROYED WITHIN THIS PERIOD (AND NOT ONE DAY BEYOND IT).

7. FALL ASKED ABOUT US/SOVIET PROGRESS ON PHASING OF ELIMINATION. KARPOV CONFIRMED THAT EXPERTS WERE MEETING TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICAL FEASABILITY OF DIFFERENT PERIODS OF ELIMINATION OF MISSILES. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES WERE IMPORTANT. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR MAKING ALL MISSILES NON-OPERATIONAL WITHIN SIX MONTHS WITH WARHEADS SEPARATED HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE US. KARPOV ADDED THAT DISCUSSIONS WERE CONTINUING, BUT DID NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT THIS WOULD BE A SOVIET STICKING POINT.

8. VERIFICATION. KARPOV CONCENTRATED HIS REMARKS ON DIFFERENCES WITH THE US ON THE SCOPE AND CONCEPT OF MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AREAS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US WAS SEEKING TO LIMIT INSPECTION TO THE OPERATIONAL FACILITIES AND INDEED TO PRODUCE A REGIME WHERE SOVIET TERRITORY WOULD BE OPEN TO INSPECTION AND US TERRITORY NOT. HE REHEARSED WITHOUT ANY GREAT CONVICTION, THE ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUDING DEPLOYMENT AREAS.

9. FALL AND GRIFFITHS (MOD) REPORTED ON THE BASIS OF THE US PROPOSALS.

10. COMMENT. KARPOV DID NOT MENTION A SOVIET RIGHT TO MATCH US-OWNED WARHEADS ON P1AS. NOR DID HE ARGUE THAT THEY SHOULD BE TREATED FOR TIMETABLE PURPOSES AS SRINF, OR SUBJECT TO THE SOVIET CORRALLING/DEMATING PROPOSALS. ON VERIFICATION HE DID NOT SUGGEST A SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION OF US OR BASING COUNTRY MILITARY FACILITIES BEYOND DEPLOYMENT AREAS.

11. START

KARPOV SAID THE NEGOTIATORS HAD NOW AGREED A ROUGH JOINT TEXT THOUGH A GREAT DEAL REMAINED TO BE DONE. THE MAIN PROBLEMS WERE SLCMS AND THE COMPOSITION OF RESIDUAL FORCES. ON SLCMS, HE CLAIMED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED AT REYKJAVIK TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE START AGREEMENT BUT HE ADDED THE LEVEL OF THE RUSSIANS WERE PROPOSING OF 400 MISSILES OF OVER 600 KM RANGE ON EACH SIDE WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THE 6000 WARHEAD LIMIT UNDER START. THESE MISSILES SHOULD BE DEPLOYED ON TWO CLASSES OF

SUBMARINE TO EASE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.
12. FALL SAID OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN REYKJAVIK WAS DIFFERENT. THE US HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF SLCMS ONLY OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE START AGREEMENT.
13. ON SUBLIMITS, KARPOV CLAIMED THAT THE EFFECT OF US PROPOSALS ON SUBLIMITS AND OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS WAS TO ELIMINATE THE ENTIRE CLASS OF SOVIET HEAVY ICBMS. THIS WOULD REMAIN TRUE EVEN IF THE US DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON BANNING MOBILE ICBMS.
14. FALL SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION, WHICH INCLUDED A SEPARATE SUBLIMIT ON HEAVY ICBMS.
15. A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SDI, WHICH ADDED NOTHING TO WHAT WE KNOW OF THE SOVIET POSITION.

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MY TELNO 2129: INF
SUMMARY
1. A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN GENEVA WITH THE RUSSIANS INSISTING ON A RIGHT TO MATCH THE GERMAN PIA FORCE WHILE IT REMAINS OPERATIONAL.
DETAIL
2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US TODAY THAT A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM HAS ARISEN IN GENEVA DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS CONCERNING THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE GERMAN PIAS. SOVIET NEGOTIATORS, EMPHASISING THAT THEY WERE SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, HAVE NOW SAID THAT THE INF TREATY REDUCTIONS SCHEDULE MUST INCORPORATE A SOVIET RIGHT TO MAINTAIN SOVIET RVS TO MATCH PIA RVS AS LONG AS THE PIAS REMAIN OPERATIONAL. HAVING BEEN ASKED BY GLITMAN TO SEEK CONFIRMATION FROM MOSCOW THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE IN FACT VALID, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM SAID ON 8 OCTOBER THAT SUCH CONFIRMATION HAD BEEN SOUGHT FROM MOSCOW, AND RECEIVED.
3. THE ADMINISTRATION REGARD THIS SOVIET POSITION AS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE AGREEMENT ON THE HANDLING OF PIA RVS REACHED DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST MONTH. UNDER THAT AGREEMENT, US PIA RVS WOULD BE DISMANTLED ONLY WHEN THE US/FRG PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION CEASED (IE WHEN THE PIA MISSILES WERE DISMANTLED) WHICH, UNDER THE KOHL FORMULA, WOULD NOT HAPPEN UNTIL ALL US AND SOVIET SYSTEMS HAD BEEN DISMANTLED. THE NEW SOVIET POSITION WOULD THEREFORE INVOLVE A DIFFERENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (SOVIET SYSTEMS WOULD REMAIN OPERATIONAL AFTER ALL US SYSTEMS HAD BEEN DESTROYED) AND BREACH THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUDING THE PIAS FROM THE INF AGREEMENT.
4. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE NOT YET SURE HOW SERIOUS A DEVELOPMENT THIS MAY BE. BUT THE SOVIET REPETITION OF THEIR POSITION, AFTER CHECKING WITH MOSCOW, HAS CAUSED CONCERN THAT

THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE AGREEMENT MAY BE UNRAVELING IN A VERY IMPORTANT RESPECT. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT IT LOOKS AS IF THIS DEVELOPMENT MAY HAVE LEAKED, WHICH WILL OF COURSE MAKE IT FAR HARDER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO HANDLE IT IN A LOW KEY, AS THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED.

5. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HOLMES IS LIKELY TO BE INFORMING SCG REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POSITION IN A MESSAGE THIS EVENING.

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US/SOVIET RELATIONS: ARMS CONTROL - STATE OF PLAY

1. IN CASE IT MAY ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED FROM WASHINGTON, I SUMMARISE BELOW THE ACCOUNT GIVEN TO ME (AND MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES) ON 30 SEPTEMBER BY MY US COLLEAGUE (WHOSE CONFIDENCE SHOULD, PLEASE, BE CLOSELY PROTECTED) OF THE STATE OF PLAY ON US/SOVIET EXCHANGES ON ARMS CONTROL FOLLOWING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

INF

2. MATLOCK SAID THAT THERE WAS NOW A VERY SIGNIFICANT ACCELERATION OF WORK BY THE US AND SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA: GOOD PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AND AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE TEXT OF SEVERAL OF THE BASIC ARTICLES OF AN INF TREATY ALTHOUGH A GOOD DEAL OF WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE ON VERIFICATION. AT PRESENT, IT SEEMED UNLIKELY THAT ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS ON AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD REMAIN UNRESOLVED BY THE TIME OF SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (22-23 OCTOBER).

START/SDI

3. THE RUSSIANS HAVE APPARENTLY BACKED AWAY FROM THEIR MOST RECENT DRAFT OF A STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS TREATY, SUGGESTING INSTEAD THAT THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON ONE OF THE TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES PUT FORWARD BY SHEVARDNADZE DURING HIS TALKS WITH SHULTZ IN WASHINGTON. THESE WERE:

I) 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PLUS A COMMITMENT TO NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT FOR A LIMITED PERIOD (5 OR 7 YEARS) TOGETHER WITH AGREEMENT ON LISTS OF SDI-TYPE WEAPONS OR COMPONENTS, AND PERFORMANCE THRESHOLDS, WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY IN SPACE: OR -

II) A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS OVER A

PERIOD OF 10 YEARS, COMBINED WITH STRICT OBSERVANCE BY BOTH SIDES OVER THE SAME PERIOD OF THE ABMT IN ITS ''RESTRICTIVE'' INTERPRETATION.

MATLOCK'S VIEW WAS THAT ALTERNATIVE (II) WAS THE MORE LIKELY TO RUN SINCE THE LISTS OF PROHIBITIONS IN (I) WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL DETAIL INVOLVED WOULD MAKE MINISTERS THE PRISONERS OF THEIR SCIENTIFIC ADVISERS.

4. THE WASHINGTON TALKS HAD SHOWN SOME MOVEMENT BY THE RUSSIANS TOWARDS US POSITIONS, E.G. THE SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT NO SINGLE LEG OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR MORE THAN 60 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL STRATEGIC ARSENAL ALLOWED TO BOTH SIDES. THE AMERICANS, HOWEVER, WOULD IN MATLOCK'S VIEW REMAIN VERY RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT A 60 PER CENT SUB-CEILING ON SLBMS SINCE, IN VIEW OF THE DOUBTS SURROUNDING THE LONG-TERM FUTURE OF GROUND-BASED ICBMS THEY MIGHT WELL WISH TO RETAIN THE OPTION OF INCREASING THE SLBM ELEMENT WELL BEYOND 60 PER CENT OF THE TOTAL. IT HAD BEEN MADE VERY CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE CRUCIAL STATISTIC IN THE US POSITION WAS THE FIGURE OF 4,800 AS THE LIMIT ON WARHEADS ON ALL STRATEGIC MISSILES, BOTH LAND AND SEA-BASED. THESE ISSUES - SUB-CEILINGS AND THE OVERALL CEILING ON STRATEGIC WARHEADS - WERE LIKELY TO DOMINATE SHULTZ'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE LATER THIS MONTH, ASSUMING THAT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS STRIKE NO MAJOR ROCKS IN THE INTERIM.

5. MATLOCK TENTATIVELY ATTRIBUTED SIGNS OF GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY OF START/SDI NOT ONLY TO GORBACHEV'S EVIDENT NEED FOR A FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROSPECT OF ECONOMIC GOOD NEWS BUT ALSO TO THE FACT THAT VISITING US CONGRESSMEN HAVE IMPRESSED UPON THE RUSSIANS THEIR VIEW THAT CONGRESS MIGHT NOT BE WILLING TO RATIFY AN INF TREATY UNLESS THE SUBSEQUENT CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS REDUCTIONS IS SEEN TO BE VIRTUALLY ASSURED.

ABMT

6. MATLOCK SAID THAT DURING THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC) IN GENEVA THE RUSSIANS ARE STILL OBJECTING TO THE MODERNISATION OF THE US RADAR INSTALLATION AT THULE, APPARENTLY - IN MATLOCK'S VIEW - TO BALANCE CONTINUING US OBJECTIONS TO THE SOVIET RADAR ARRAY AT KRASNOYARSK. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE RUSSIANS HAVE STOPPED RAISING FYLINGDALES: AND THEY ARE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO ADMIT, AT LEAST IN PRIVATE, THAT THE KRASNOYARSK ARRAY WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE ABMT IF IT WERE TO

BE MADE OPERATIONAL.

THE SUMMIT

7. SHEVARDNADZE'S INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE POLITBURO APPARENTLY PREVENTED HIM FROM AGREEING TO ANY MENTION, IN THE OFFICIAL JOINT STATEMENT AT THE END OF HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON, OF THE VENUE FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS WARNED HIM THAT THEY WOULD MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR TO THE MEDIA THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE A SUMMIT IT WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON. SHEVARDNADZE READILY ADMITTED TO SHULTZ THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NO ALTERNATIVE VENUE IN MIND. ON TIMING, MATLOCK'S BEST GUESS AT PRESENT IS 28 NOVEMBER - 2 DECEMBER: FOR US DOMESTIC REASONS, IT COULD NOT TAKE PLACE LATER THAN 7 DECEMBER.

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MIPT SCG, BRUSSELS 24, SEPTEMBER

TEXT OF SCG PRESS STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE THE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP (SCG) MET TODAY UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF AMBASSADOR H. ALLEN HOLMES. THE GROUP REVIEWED THE PROGRESS TO DATE IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, WARMLY WELCOMED THE POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED BY THE U.S. DURING THE SEPTEMBER 15-17 MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE.

THE SCG NOTED WITH APPROVAL THAT ON SEPTEMBER 14 THE U.S. TABLED IN GENEVA BOTH ITS NEW DRAFT TREATY, WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE ALL U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES BETWEEN THE RANGES OF 500 AND 5500 KILOMETERS, AND A DRAFT INSPECTION PROTOCOL CALLING FOR A STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME. THE GROUP EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. ACTION AND REAFFIRMED THAT THE POSITIONS INCORPORATED IN THESE DOCUMENTS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LONG-STANDING ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES.

THE GROUP RECALLED THAT ARMS CONTROL IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATO'S SECURITY POLICY AND EXPRESSED AGAIN ITS CONVICTION THAT EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CAN LEAD TO A MORE STABLE AND SECURE BALANCE OF FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE GROUP UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION TO ELIMINATE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCES AND THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

NOTING THAT THE MEETINGS BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD RESOLVED QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, THE GROUP NONETHELESS WAS COGNIZANT THAT CONSIDERABLE WORK STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE ON THE REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES AND VERIFICATION. THE GROUP STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF

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CONTINUED ALLIANCE UNITY AND SOLIDARITY IN ASSISTING THE UNITED STATES IN ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE INF AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF ITS SEPTEMBER 14 PROPOSALS. UNQUOTE

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

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE: 22 SEPTEMBER: ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. REVIEW OF WHITHER AFTER INF. SHEVARDNADZE REGARDS PROGRESS IN START AND SDI AS POSSIBLE BEFORE A SUMMIT. AGREEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, BUT DISAGREEMENT ON THE INCLUSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. RUSSIANS ANXIOUS TO PRESS AHEAD ON CW.

DETAIL

2. SHEVARDNADZE NOTED THAT AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON INF HAD BEEN REACHED. HE HAD ALSO NOTED THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THAT DEVELOPMENT, THOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT NOT EVERYONE IN THE UK APPROVED. NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT THAT A MAJORITY IN EUROPE APPROVED OF THE DEAL. A GOOD START HAD BEEN MADE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FORGE AHEAD ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OFFERED CONGRATULATIONS ON HIS SUCCESSFUL WORK WITH SHULTZ. THE INF AGREEMENT WAS A VERY HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENT: WE MAINTAINED OUR SUPPORT FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT ON STRATEGIC, CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER THE MORE PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE MORE IMPORTANT PROGRESS BECAME ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH COULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. WE WANTED AGREEMENT FROM VIENNA ON A MANDATE FOR TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL CUTS FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. WE ALSO PLACED GREAT IMPORTANCE ON A WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN.

4. SHEVARDNADZE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN REACHING THE INF AGREEMENT. THE NEXT STAGE WOULD BE DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ABMT. HE WOULD ADDRESS THESE ISSUES IN HIS MEETING WITH SHULTZ IN MOSCOW IN THE SECOND HALF OF OCTOBER.

HE DID NOT RULE OUT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOLID PROGRESS TO REPORT TO THEIR LEADERS BEFORE THE SUMMIT, SO THAT THE LATTER WOULD BE MORE THAN JUST A FORMAL CEREMONY TO MARK THE INF AGREEMENT. IN HIS VIEW PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. PROGRESS ON START SHOULD NOT BE DIRECTLY LINKED TO PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, BUT COULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL. HE AGREED THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS WERE CRUCIAL: THEY SHOULD INCLUDE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE TALKS ON THE MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE. THERE WERE SOME COMMON POINTS IN THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS AND COMPROMISE SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE EUROPEAN PROCESS WAS THE RIGHT FORUM: HE HOPED THAT THE VIENNA TALKS COULD BE CROWNED WITH AN IMPORTANT SUCCESS AND THAT THEIR CONCLUSION COULD BE MARKED BY THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. IT WAS TIME FOR PRACTICAL ACTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT ENTER INTO THE QUESTION UNTIL IMBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAD BEEN REMOVED. HE AGREED THAT PROGRESS ON STRATEGIC ARMS COULD TAKE PLACE IN PARALLEL WITH PROGRESS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THE IDEAS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PUT FORWARD ON PREDICTABILITY MIGHT HELP ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE SIDE.

6. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHEVARDNADZE BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION, CULMINATING IN THE MOST RECENT SOVIET PROPOSALS. AFTER TALKING TO BOTH SHULTZ AND GENSCHER, HE BELIEVED THAT THE MAIN OBSTACLES HAD BEEN REMOVED. IF THE UK STILL MAINTAINED THE POSITION IT HAD ADVANCED WHEN HE HAD VISITED LONDON, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS. BUT HE WAS A LITTLE WORRIED ABOUT THE U S POSITION, WHERE THE BINARY WEAPONS FACTOR WAS PLAYING A ROLE. HE DID NOT ENTIRELY UNDERSTAND THE FRENCH POSITION. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UK AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN SOME RESPECTS THE SOVIET VERIFICATION PROPOSALS WENT FURTHER THAN OURS. WE SHOULD INSTRUCT OUR DELEGATIONS TO INTENSIFY THEIR WORK: 1988 MIGHT SEE THE COMPLETION OF A CONVENTION.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS: THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WERE BEING GROUND DOWN. NEVERTHELESS CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS PERHAPS THE FIELD IN WHICH TOTAL SATISFACTION ON VERIFICATION WAS MOST DIFFICULT. CONFIDENCE THEREFORE HAD THE GREATEST PART TO PLAY. BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENCE, IT MIGHT NOT BE EASY TO MAKE THE FINAL LEAP. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THERE WAS NOW A GOOD LINE UP IN FAVOUR OF A

CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFICATION, BUT THOUGHT A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE.

8. SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A MEETING OF ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS, PERHAPS WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, POSSIBLY DURING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION HAD SOME NEW IDEAS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT WELL BE USEFUL.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

AMERICAN BRIEFING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS (PLUS JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA), 21 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. UPBEAT BRIEFING FROM PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ. GENERAL APPROBATION FROM ASSEMBLED COMPANY.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A SHORT INTRODUCTION STRESSING THE NEED FOR PATIENCE AND HARD WORK. THE U S WERE ASKING FOR GLASNOST ON BERLIN, AFGHANISTAN AND SOVIET MILITARY BUDGETS. THE INF DEAL HAD GIVEN THE WEST MORE THAN THE SOVIETS, BUT HAD LEFT A HUGE NUCLEAR ARSENAL UNTOUCHED. MORE DETAILED WORK WAS NEEDED ON THE VERIFICATION SIDE.

3. THE RUSSIANS HAD SHOWN MORE FLEXIBILITY ON START, BUT THEY RETAINED AN UNACCEPTABLE LINK TO SDI. THE AMERICANS WERE WELL AWARE OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. THEY WOULD NOT DO ANTHING TO ENTRENCH THAT.

4. HE HAD DETECTED NO MOVEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN. THERE HAD HOWEVER BEEN MOVEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT THERE REMAINED MUCH MORE TO BE DONE. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR MORE COOPERATION FROM THE SOVIET SIDE IN GETTING IRAN TO END THE SENSELESS WAR WITH IRAQ.

5. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM THE TURK, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, BUT THAT THEY WOULD COME UP WHEN ''BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE DISCUSSED''. (SHULTZ LATER CONFIRMED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GOT THIS WRONG. WHAT HE REALLY HAD IN MIND WAS THE RELEVANT PASSAGE FROM THE REYKJAVIK NAC COMMUNIQUE).

6. SHULTZ THEN TOOK OVER THE MEETING. HE STRESSED THE INTIMACY OF THE TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE. A GREAT DEAL OF DETAILED WORK HAD BEEN DONE IN SEPARATE EXPERT MEETINGS.

7. THEY HAD TALKED FOR ONE AND A HALF HOURS ON AFGHANISTAN: THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN INFORMAL AND RELAXED. HE HAD AN OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO MOVE BUT COULD NOT FIND AN ACCEPTABLE WAY OF DOING SO.

8. HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN COVERED EXTENSIVELY: THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN NO INHIBITIONS AND HAD BEEN GLAD TO GO THROUGH LISTS AND CATEGORIES. THEY HAD ALSO BEEN READY TO DISCUSS THEIR OWN LEGAL SYSTEM.

9. THERE HAD BEEN TWO AND A HALF TO THREE HOURS ON REGIONAL ISSUES, BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN NEARLY ENOUGH TO COVER THE FIELD. RUSSIAN WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SUCH ISSUES WAS NOW SO MUCH GREATER THAT THERE WAS NEVER SUFFICIENT TIME.

10. THE TALKS HAD NATURALLY CONCENTRATED ON INF, AND ALL PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN SETTLED. THERE WERE SOME DETAILS OUTSTANDING, IN PARTICULAR:

(I) THE QUESTION OF PHASING,

(II) THE QUESTION OF DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN THE WARHEADS, WHICH WAS A GENUINE PROBLEM,

(III) THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL: THERE WOULD BE ONSIGHT VERIFICATION, BUT DETAILS OF THE PROTOCOL HAD YET TO BE SORTED OUT,

(IV) BASING COUNTRY PROBLEMS: WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT SOME THINGS REMAINED TO BE SORTED OUT.

HE THOUGHT THREE WEEKS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO FINISH WORK ON THESE PROBLEMS: HENCE THE PROPOSAL FOR A FURTHER MEETING IN ABOUT FOUR WEEKS, ROUND ABOUT THE 20TH OCTOBER. EVERYTHING WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED BY THEN.

11. THE DEAL WAS A REAL TRIUMPH FOR THE COUNTRIES ASSEMBLED AT THE MEETING. WE HAD BEEN THROUGH A SOVIET WALK-OUT, DEPLOYMENT, AND THE VARIOUS TWISTS AND TURNS SINCE THE RUSSIANS HAD RETURNED TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. BUT WE HAD ENDED UP WITH WHAT WE HAD SET OUT TO GET. WE SHOULD ALL TAKE CREDIT FOR IT.

12. ON STRATEGIC ARMS, THE DISCUSSION WAS MAINLY USEFUL FOR WHAT BOTH SIDES HAD TOLD EACH OTHER ABOUT THEIR OWN WORRIES. THERE HAD

BEEN NO REAL MOVEMENT, BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED THAT EACH OF THE THREE LEGS OF THE TRIAD SHOULD BE EQUAL TO 60 PER CENT OF THE WHOLE, IE 3,600. THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION HAD BEEN 3,300, SO THE DIFFERENCE WAS NOT GREAT. THE RUSSIANS HAD SUGGESTED A LIMIT OF HEAVY MISSILES AT 1,544: IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO DEFINE IT AS WARHEADS AT 1,540. THE FOLLOWING WERE AGREED:

(I) TOTAL WARHEADS AT 6,000,

(II) MISSILES AT 1,600,

(III) HEAVY MISSILE WARHEADS AT 1,540

(IV) BOMBER COUNTING RULE: BOMBERS WITH ALCMS, EACH ALCM TO COUNT AS ONE BOMBER.

MOST OF THIS HAD COME OUT AT REYKJAVIK.

13. ON SDI, THE RUSSIANS HAD SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REGIME OF PREDICTABILITY. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CHANGES WHICH HAD OCCURRED SINCE 1972, INCLUDING THE EXPLOSION IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS SINCE THEN. THEY PROPOSED LENGTHENING THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL UNTIL 1994. THEY HAD PROPOSED OPENING LABORATORIES AND EXCHANGING INFORMATION. THAT WAS NOT AGREED. THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR AGREEMENTS ON PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES OR A 15 YEAR PERIOD OF STRICT COMPLIANCE. THE U S WOULD PUSH ON: BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS WERE OF FIRST IMPORTANCE. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH HARDER TO VERIFY PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND NUMBERS.

14. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SOME HEADWAY HAD BEEN MADE ON THE DISCLOSURE AND CHECKING OF STOCKS, BUT IT WAS EXTREMELY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO SUCH THING AS COMPLETE VERIFICATION.

15. THERE HAD BEEN NOTHING VERY NEW ON CTBT OR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

16. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION PRODUCED GENERAL APPROBATION. SHULTZ URGED THE EUROPEANS TO ACCLAIM THE DEAL PUBLICLY, SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO IMPRESSION THAT EUROPE DID NOT LIKE IT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO HEAD OFF TWO TYPES OF CRITICISM: FIRST, OBJECTIONS ABOUT POTENTIAL DECOUPLING: AND SECOND, ARGUMENTS OF THE ROGERS KIND. LORD CARRINGTON THOUGHT THE SECOND WAS THE MORE SERIOUS NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE MORE WE TRIED TO REFUTE IT THE MORE

VISIBLE IT BECAME. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT IT WAS COUPLING AND UNITY THAT HAD ACHIEVED THE DEAL. ANDREOTTI AGREED: HE SAID MOST OF THE CRITICISM CAME FROM THOSE WHO WANTED EVERYTHING TO BE AGREED AT THE SAME TIME, OR FROM THOSE LIKE KISSINGER, WHO WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED TO HAVE ACHIEVED THE SAME DEAL. ITALY WAS READY TO ACCEPT ANY INSPECTION THAT MIGHT BE NEEDED.

17. VAN DEN BROEK SAID THE DUTCH HAD NO PROBLEM ABOUT INSPECTION OR SOVEREIGNTY. HE ASKED WHEN DEPLOYMENT MIGHT CEASE. SHULTZ SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO EASE UP UNTIL THE TREATY WAS SIGNED. THEN THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR DISCUSSION.

18. THE JAPANESE WARMLY WELCOMED THE DEAL, ESPECIALLY FOR ITS GLOBALITY. JAPAN MUCH APPRECIATED THE SOLIDARITY OF HER EUROPEAN FRIENDS ON THIS POINT. THIS WAS ECHOED BY AUSTRALIA.

19. RAIMOND ALSO WELCOMED THE DEAL. IT WOULD NOW BE NECESSARY TO PUT THE SOVIET UNION TO THE TEST ON START.

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From the Private Secretary

22 September 1987

Thank you for your letter of 17 September conveying a message to the Prime Minister about the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The contents of the message have been carefully considered. As I am sure you know, there have been further exchanges on this matter in Cape Town where our Ambassador and your Minister for Energy, Mr. Steyn, have been discussing the question.

(C.D. POWELL)

His Excellency Mr. P.R. Killen

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 September 1987

Dear Charles,

South Africa : Non-Proliferation Treaty

Thank you for your letter of 17 September asking for a draft reply to the South African Ambassador's letter conveying a message about South Africa, the IAEA and the NPT.

We replied to Cape Town Telno 435 saying that the proposed South African message would not, in our view, do the trick (FCO Telno 128) and this was conveyed to the South African Government on 18 September (Cape Town Telno 438). You will have seen from Cape Town Telno 440 that the South Africans are now circulating a revised message to western delegations at the IAEA General Conference. As the situation is continuing to develop in Cape Town and the message in Mr Killen's letter has already been overtaken, we think your reply should simply thank Mr Killen and not make any substantive comments. I enclose such a draft.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence), Stephen Haddrill (Department of Energy) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

DSP[redacted] (Revised Sept 85)

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TO:
His Excellency Mr P R Killen
Ambassador
Embassy of South Africa
South Africa House
Trafalgar Square
WC2N 5DP

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SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 17 September conveying a message to the Prime Minister about the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The contents of the message have been carefully considered. As I am sure you know, there have ben further exchanges on this matter in Cape Town where our Ambassador and your Minister for Energy, Mr Steyn, have been discussing the question.

CDN

Defence - Arms Control

Pt 13.

Defence Arms Control with CDP.

Following is a transcript of President Reagan's statement today, September 18, at the end of the U.S.-Soviet talks in Washington. President Reagan's statement:

"Secretary Shultz has reported to me on the results of his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. As you know, the talks covered arms reduction, regional conflicts, human rights and bilateral issues. Although we have serious differences in many areas the tone of the talks was frank, constructive, and notable progress was made. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have issued a joint statement which I believe you all have now and I am pleased to note that agreement in principal was reached to conclude an INF treaty. They'll meet again in Moscow next month to continue their efforts to work out the details of a summit between me and General Secretary Gorbachev later this fall. I want to congratulate Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and their delegations for their outstanding efforts over the past three days. The Secretary is going to take your questions...."

Next followed a cacophony of questioning from the press. The President took some questions before handing over to Secretary Shultz. Following is a transcript of the exchange between the President and the press:

Q. What caused the breakthrough?

A. Well, I'll tell you, I think that the best one to answer that and who is going to take your questions is the Secretary.

Q. Inaudible questions...

A. I was going to ask Andrea in to interpret for me but I did hear -- I heard that phrase about the shooting and the Secretary has already launched a protest.

Q. You are in too much of hurry, sir...

A. I don't know of anything in my life I waited over six years for. I spoke about this INF treaty in pretty much the same basis that it's finally been agreed on now, certainly four or five years ago.

Q. Let him answer the question about the shooting of an American...

A. I told you that the Secretary has already launched a protest.

Q. What about the evil empire...why now are you ready to make a deal with them?

A. Oh, I don't think its still lily white.

Q. What about the fact that the senate has just voted to restrict SDI testing? How do you view that in terms of what's happening now between the U.S. and Soviets and how does that affect the negotiations for how to solve strategic weapons?

A. You just spoiled my day. (Laughter.) No, I think that foolish things are being attempted when members of the Congress start to get into where they can interfere with what we're trying to negotiate and the progress that we've made. But listen --

Q. Are you hoping to ask Mr. Gorbachev to the ranch for Thanksgiving?

A. I'm afraid to say anything about a specific date because there's still a tendency then to think that I've killed that date if I mention it.

Q. Mr. President, you didn't say whether or not the summit would be in the United States. It will be I assume?

A. Where else?

Q. Has there been progress on strategic weapons, on sublimits on the big missiles, and is there some possibility on SDI?

A. These are questions that I think he (pointing to Shultz) can speak specifically to because of the long hours of meetings and I must say to all of the people who have been on our team here, as well as their team: they really have gone beyond the call of duty with the hours that they put in.

Q. Inaudible question.

A. I think you'll find that out from him (makes way for Shultz).

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INF AGREEMENT: FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY

1. GENERAL AGREEMENT HERE THAT INF AGREEMENT IS AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT. BUT IT MUST BE SEEN AS A FIRST STEP ONLY. CLAIM THAT FRG DECISION ON P1AS WAS DECISIVE IN MAKING AN AGREEMENT POSSIBLE.

DETAIL

2. IN AN INTERVIEW IN ''DIE WELT'' ON 21 SEPTEMBER, GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN OST CLAIMS THAT THE DECISION BY CHANCELLOR KOHL TO SCRAP THE 72 P1AS HAD MADE A CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE BREAKTHROUGH TOWARDS THIS ''HISTORIC AGREEMENT''. KOHL'S GOAL OF ATTAINING PEACE THROUGH FEWER WEAPONS HAD COME A ''GOOD BIT CLOSER''.

3. THE CHANCELLOR, OST SAID, CONTINUED TO INSIST ON NEGOTIATIONS ON MISSILES OF UNDER 500 KM RANGE. THE EXISTING IMBALANCE WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IN GENEVA SHOULD ALSO NOW INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS TO AGREE ON A GLOBAL BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, BUT THIS MUST BE CONDITIONAL ON DISARMAMENT IN THE CONVENTIONAL SPHERE. MOSCOW MUST REALLY SHOW ITS READINESS TO DISARM IN THIS AREA.

4. ACCORDING TO OST, THE PRESENT AGREEMENT HAD COME ABOUT BECAUSE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE. THE USA COULD RELY ON THE DETERMINATION AND SUPPORT OF THEIR PARTNERS IN THE ALLIANCE.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ALSO EMPHASISED THE PART PLAYED BY THE FRG, STRESSING THAT THIS WAS JUST THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS OTHER AGREEMENTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO GERMANY. HE CALLED ON CSCE MEMBERS NOT TO NEGLECT ANY AREA OF CO-OPERATION IN VIENNA AND NOT TO DELAY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

6. WHILE WELCOMING THIS AS AN HISTORIC AGREEMENT MANY PRESS EDITORIALS ECHO THE VIEW THAT THIS IS JUST THE ''BEGINNING OF THE BEGINNING''. PRESS REPORTS ALSO NOTE THAT EVEN AFTER DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES IN THE 500-5000 KM RANGE, THE SUPERPOWERS WILL STILL

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POSSESS HUGE ARSENALS OF WEAPONS. AND THE FRG IS NOW FACED WITH THE DILEMMA OF WHETHER TO GO FOR THE ''THIRD ZERO OPTION'' (BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS), OR MODERNISATION. THE FIRST OPTION WOULD MAKE THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS EVEN MORE SERIOUS: THE SECOND WOULD CREATE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. ONE COMMENT IS THAT THE AGREEMENT HERALDS A CHANGE IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE, WHICH DEFENCE EXPERTS BELIEVE WILL AFFECT THE CREDIBILITY OF FUTURE EFFORTS TO REARM.

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

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OUR TELNO 1973 : SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING
SUMMARY
1. THREE DAYS OF INTENSIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE MEETINGS. WITH THE REMOVAL OF THE LAST SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO AN INF TREATY, THE TWO SIDES COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A SUMMIT HERE IN THE LATE AUTUMN. SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS START ISSUES SERIOUSLY, BUT NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT ON DEFENCE AND SPACE. FULL DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: BUT REGIONAL ISSUES PUSHED INTO THE BACKGROUND.
DETAIL
2. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY ACCOMPANIED BY NITZE AND GLITMAN BRIEFED WESTERN EMBASSIES LATE ON 18 SEPTEMBER. IN THREE INTENSIVE DAYS OF TALKS, THE TWO SIDES HAD COVERED ALL ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP IN DETAIL. IN ORDER TO DO SO, THE MEETING HAD QUICKLY BROKEN DOWN INTO WORKING GROUPS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BILATERAL ISSUES AND ARMS CONTROL (THE LATTER DIVIDED FURTHER INTO SUB-GROUPS ON GENEVA NST ISSUES, CW, NUCLEAR TESTING AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL).
3. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE STILL DIGESTING THE RESULTS OF ALL THIS ACTIVITY. BUT THEY ARE EVIDENTLY PLEASED WITH THE WAY THIS WEEK'S MEETINGS HAVE GONE. MRS RIDGWAY EMPHASISED THAT THE TONE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN SERIOUS AND NON-POLEMICAL THROUGHOUT. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE TONE OF PUBLIC COMMENTS BY ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN WHICH HAVE TENDED TO BE POSITIVE EVEN ON ISSUES WHERE NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WAS MADE.
4. THE MAIN POINTS FROM AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY'S BRIEFING WERE AS FOLLOWS.
SUMMIT
5. THIS ISSUE HAD NOT DOMINATED THE DISCUSSIONS: INDEED IT WAS NOT RAISED AT ALL UNTIL THE DRAFTING OF THE JOINT STATEMENT. AT THAT STAGE BOTH SIDES MADE CLEAR THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT A COMMITMENT TO A SUMMIT IN THE LATE AUTUMN IN THE US. BUT NO DATES WERE YET UNDER DISCUSSION.

ARMS CONTROL
6. FOR A DETAILED ROUND-UP OF THE OUTCOME ON EACH ISSUE SEE MIFT. THE CENTRE PIECE WAS INF. GLITMAN SAID THAT A SOLUTION TO THE NEW SOVIET DEMAND FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (WHICH WAS AT ODDS WITH THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION IN GENEVA) HAD BEEN FOUND WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY. THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT FOR A REFERENCE IN THE TREATY TO THE DESTRUCTION OF P1A WARHEADS HAD PROVED MORE DIFFICULT. SINCE CHANCELLOR KOHL'S STATEMENT, THE US CONSIDERED THAT THE P1A ISSUE WAS CLOSED. IN OPENING EXCHANGES ON 15 SEPTEMBER, THE RUSSIANS HAD MAINTAINED THEIR DEMAND FOR A REFERENCE IN THE TREATY TO THE ELIMINATION OF P1A WARHEADS. IN A VERY ROUGH SESSION THE AMERICANS HAD REFUSED. BUT THEY HAD EVENTUALLY AGREED TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET POINT BY GIVING THEM TWO ASSURANCES: THAT THE US WOULD DO NOTHING WITH THE P1A WARHEADS AS LONG AS A PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION WITH THE FRG CONTINUED: BUT THAT WHEN THAT PROGRAMME ENDED THE WARHEADS WOULD BECOME SUBJECT TO THE INF TREATY AND WOULD BE DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY. THE PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE ELIMINATION OF WARHEADS WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WARHEADS COVERED BY PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY. GLITMAN COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A VERY GOOD OUTCOME FOR NATO.
7. GLITMAN EMPHASISED THAT THE NEGOTIATORS STILL HAD AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF WORK TO DO IN GENEVA, PARTICULARLY ON VERIFICATION.
8. ON START MRS RIDGWAY SAID THAT IN THE RUN-UP TO THIS WEEK'S MEETINGS THE US HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY DID NOT WANT THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS TO FOCUS ENTIRELY ON INF. THE US BELIEVED THAT A START TREATY COULD STILL BE REACHED DURING THIS ADMINISTRATION IF BOTH SIDES WERE PREPARED TO PUT THEIR SHOULDERS TO THE WHEEL. IN THIS WEEK'S DISCUSSIONS, THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAINED. IT WAS AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND THAT THE TWO SIDES

AGREED TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO THE NEED FOR AN INTENSIVE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A START TREATY (BUT GLITMAN ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD HINTED PRIVATELY IN GENEVA THAT THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO STAFF DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON START IN PARALLEL WITH INF).

9. ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, NITZE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE POSITIONS OF EITHER SIDE.

HUMAN RIGHTS

10. DISCUSSION OF THIS TOOK UP AT LEAST ONE THIRD OF THE TIME ON THE FIRST DAY. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TALKED IN DETAIL ABOUT THE CHANGES WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THE US SIDE HANDED OVER LISTS OF INDIVIDUAL CASES AND THESE WERE FURTHER DISCUSSED IN THE WORKING GROUP. THE RUSSIANS APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR A REGULAR CHANNEL FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES IN FUTURE. ALTHOUGH NO INDIVIDUAL CASES HAD BEEN RESOLVED, THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN WORTHWHILE.

11. SHEVARDNADZE REFERRED TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, BUT INTERESTINGLY DID NOT PRESS THIS HARD.

REGIONAL ISSUES

12. DISCUSSED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 SEPTEMBER. IN VIEW OF THE INTENSIVE SERIES OF REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS AT EXPERT LEVEL OVER RECENT MONTHS, DISCUSSIONS THIS WEEK CONCENTRATED ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ (THE RUSSIANS ALSO TOUCHED ON NICARAGUA AT A LATER STAGE).

13. ON AFGHANISTAN THERE WAS A FULL EXCHANGE BUT NO NEW POSITIONS EMERGED. MRS RIDGWAY COMMENTED THAT SHE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE CANDOUR WITH WHICH THE TWO PRINCIPALS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.

14. THE DISCUSSION ON IRAN/IRAQ TOOK PLACE WHILE THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS BRIEFING THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO DRAW OPERATIONAL CONCLUSIONS. THE RUSSIANS REPEATED THAT THEY DID NOT OPPOSE IN PRINCIPLE AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION, BUT WANTED TO SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. IT WAS LEFT THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD STAY IN TOUCH IN DEVELOPING THEIR RESPONSE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE LIGHT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT.

BILATERAL ISSUES

14. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A PROGRAMME OF WORK WITH SOME 15 ITEMS COVERING ALL AREAS OF CONCERN TO THE TWO SIDES.

ACLAND

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION 21

ADVANCE 21

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS

SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/NAD
HD/SEC POL D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET
HD/DEFENCE

MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD
DACU MOD
CDI MOD
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

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OF 190116Z SEPTEMBER 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, UKDIS GENEVA
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MIPT: SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING, 15-17 SEPTEMBER: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT TO SIGN AN INF TREATY AT A US/SOVIET SUMMIT THIS AUTUMN. INF WARHEAD DESTRUCTION ISSUE RESOLVED, INCLUDING FOR P1A WARHEADS, BUT NO TIME FOR PROGRESS ON PHASING AND VERIFICATION.

2. SOME SOVIET MOVEMENT IN START BUT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT IN DEFENCE AND SPACE.

3. JOINT STATEMENT ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS ON US TERMS. NO MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL OR CW.

DETAIL

4. WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL DURING SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT.

INF

5. INF WAS THE DOMINANT SUBJECT AT BOTH THE MAIN SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETINGS AND IN THE NITZE/KARPOV NST WORKING GROUP. THE ISSUE (ONLY RECENTLY RAISED BY THE RUSSIANS) OF RV DISMANTLEMENT/DESTRUCTION WAS A MAJOR TOPIC, AND MUCH TIME WAS SPENT ON THE HANDLING OF DISMANTLEMENT/DESTRUCTION OF P1A RVS (THERE WERE CONTACTS WITH KOHL'S OFFICE DURING DISCUSSION OF P1AS). GLITMAN TOLD ALLIED AMBASSADORS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ASKED THE RUSSIANS HOW THEY RECONCILED THEIR GENEVA POSITION (WHICH WAS CLOSE TO THE PREFERRED US APPROACH) WITH THEIR NEW DEMAND FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF WARHEADS. THE RUSSIANS HAD EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT THEIR NEW POSITION WAS A FLEXIBLE ONE. AGREEMENT WAS THEN RAPIDLY REACHED THAT, FOR GLCMS, P2S AND SOVIET SYSTEMS, SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND OTHER SENSITIVE ITEMS, INCLUDING GUIDANCE PACKAGES, WILL BE REMOVED FROM RVS AS MISSILES ARE DISMANTLED/DESTROYED, AND THE REMAINING PARTS OF THE RVS THEN DESTROYED. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW THE PRECISE DETAILS, THERE WILL BE INSPECTION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF RVS MINUS SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND GUIDANCE

PACKAGES. THIS PROCEDURE WILL APPLY ALSO TO P1A RVS, BUT ONLY AFTER THE P1AS HAVE BEEN DISMANTLED, AT WHICH POINT THE US/FRG PROGRAMME OF COOPERATION WILL CEASE TO EXIST AND THE RVS WILL THEREFORE NO LONGER BE A PART OF IT. IN THIS WAY, THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUDING ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF COOPERATION FROM US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WILL HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED (AND WILL BE MADE EXPLICIT IN THE ELIMINATION PROTOCOL).

6. OFFICIALS ARE NOT SURE WHY THE RUSSIANS WERE SO CONCERNED ABOUT RV DISMANTLEMENT/DESTRUCTION BUT GRATIFIED THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WAS FOUND SO QUICKLY. AGREEMENT ON THE DESTRUCTION/DISMANTLEMENT OF RVS IS A NEW DEVELOPMENT AND WILL HAVE PRECEDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE START CONTEXT.

7. NO ADVANCES WERE MADE ON PHASING ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE REDUCTIONS SCHEDULE SHOULD BE AGREED ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS. THE US PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR SRINF REDUCTIONS/ DESTRUCTION OVER ONE YEAR AND LRINF REDUCTIONS/DESTRUCTION IN TWO OR THREE PHASES OVER THREE YEARS WITH US/SOVIET WARHEAD EQUALITY AT THE END OF THE PENULTIMATE PHASE. THE SOVIET PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR TWO YEARS (SRINF) AND FIVE YEARS (LRINF), WITH ALL SYSTEMS TO BE INOPERABLE WITHIN ONE YEAR. EXPERTS WILL NOW EXAMINE THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT POSSIBLE DESTRUCTION SCHEDULES. GLITMAN TOLD ALLIED AMBASSADORS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD LAID MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE DIFFICULTY OF HANDLING AND DESTROYING THE SOLID FUEL FROM SS20 BOOSTERS. THEY HAD PROPOSED LAUNCHING THE MISSILES AS A MEANS OF DESTROYING THEM. THE US HAD REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE IF IT INVOLVED FIRING THE MISSILES TO THEIR FULL RANGE. BUT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF LAUNCHING FOR SHORT FLIGHTS, PROVIDED THERE WAS NO TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION (IE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT TAKING THE OPPORTUNTIY TO AQUIRE FLIGHT TEST DATA). US AND SOVIET EXPERTS WILL MEET IN GENEVA SOON TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF DESTRUCTION.

8. COMMENT: IN SPITE OF THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE AGREEMENT THAT THE PHASING ISSUE IS A TECHNICAL ONE, SOME OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS STILL ROOM FOR SERIOUS US/SOVIET DISAGREEMENT ON WHEN P2S WILL BE ELIMINATED: THE US PREFERENCE IS TO LEAVE THEM UNTIL THE END OF THE REDUCTIONS SCHEDULE.

9. THERE WAS NO DETAILED DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION. THE SOVIET TEAM SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL EXAMINING THE REVISED TREATY PROVISIONS AND INSPECTION PROTOCOL TABLED BY THE US IN GENEVA ON 14 SEPTEMBER.

START

10. THERE WAS SOME SOVIET MOVEMENT ON SUB-LIMITS WITH SHEVARDNADZE REVERTING TO THE 1985 SOVIET 60 PERCENT FORCE

CONCENTRATION RULE PROPOSAL (IE THAT NO MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF THE PERMITTED 6000 WEAPONS COULD BE CARRIED ON ANY ONE LEG OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD). THIS WOULD LIMIT ICBM RVS TO 3600, CLOSE TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A 3300 LIMIT. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO SAID THAT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO HALVE THEIR HEAVY ICBM FORCE COULD BE CALCULATED IN RVS RATHER THAN MISSILES AT A TOTAL OF 1540 RVS (IE 10 RVS FOR EACH OF THE 154 MISSILES OF WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD PREVIOUSLY SPOKEN). IN ADDITION, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD ACCEPT A COMMITMENT NOT SUBSEQUENTLY TO MOVE BEYOND THE 1540 CEILING. ON THE OTHER HAND, SHEVARDNADZE WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A SUB-LIMIT OF 1650 FOR RVS ON PERMITTED ICBMS EXCEPT SILO-BASED LIGHT OR MEDIUM ICBMS WITH 6 RVS OR LESS. NOR WAS HE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A SUB-LIMIT OF 4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE RVS ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT A SUB-LIMIT HIGHER THAN 4800 (BUT BELOW 6000) WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS. SHULTZ MAINTAINED EXISTING US POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE POSITION THAT THE 3300 SUB-LIMIT SHOULD APPLY ONLY TO ICBM RVS AND NOT TO SLBM RVS OR BOMBER WEAPONS.

11. NO PROGRESS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON OTHER START ISSUES, INCLUDING SLCMS AND MOBILE MISSILES.

12. SHEVARDNADZE MAINTAINED THE SOVIET POSITION THAT A START AGREEMENT WAS ONLY POSSIBLE IN THE CONTEXT OF A DEFENCE AND SPACE AGREEMENT (SEE BELOW).

DEFENCE AND SPACE

13. THE SOVIET TEAM TABLED A NEW LIST OF EQUIPMENT OF WHICH THE TESTING IN SPACE WOULD BE PROHIBITED DURING ANY PERIOD OF ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL. THIS CONTAINED MORE DETAILED TECHNICAL PARAMETERS THAN THE SOVIET LIST TABLED IN GENEVA IN JULY. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED THE NEW LIST AS ILLUSTRATIVE. HE ALSO SAID (AND HAS SINCE REPEATED AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE) THAT, IF THE US DID NOT FAVOUR A LIST APPROACH, THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR AN ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD OF A MINIMUM OF 10 YEARS COUPLED WITH STRICT OBSERVANCE DURING THAT PERIOD OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY. THE ABMT WOULD ALSO SUBSEQUENTLY REMAIN IN PLACE UNLESS THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO REPLACE IT WITH A NEW REGIME.

14. SHULTZ STUCK TO EXISTING ADMINISTRATION POSITIONS (ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL THROUGH 1994, BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT FULLY JUSTIFIABLE, UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS PERMITTED/PROHIBITED STRATEGIC DEFENCE ACTIVITIES, AND BOTH SIDES FREE TO DEPLOY STRATEGIC DEFENCES AFTER 1994 UNLESS AGREED OTHERWISE).

NUCLEAR TESTING

15. THERE WAS LITTLE TECHNICAL DISCUSSION IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING

WORKING GROUP: THE MAIN FOCUS WAS ON THE AGENDA FOR THE NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THE DRAFTING OF THE JOINT STATEMENT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 1969. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE WELL-PLEASED WITH THE STATEMENT, WHICH MAINTAINS PREVIOUS US POSITIONS WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF EARLIER US INSISTENCE THAT THE TTBT AND PNET SHOULD ACTUALLY BE RATIFIED BEFORE PHASE TWO OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (ON INTERMEDIATE CONSTRAINTS) COULD BEGIN.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

16. IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP (CHAIRED BY LEDOGAR AND GRINIEVSKY) LEDOGAR SPOKE TO A LARGELY DEFENSIVE BRIEF, EMPHASISING HIS INABILITY TO NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIANCE. GRINIEVSKY CONCENTRATED ON THREE MAJOR ISSUES: TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (WHERE HE SOUGHT A COMMITMENT TO THEIR INCLUSION QUOTE AT A LATER STAGE UNQUOTE): DOCTRINE (WHERE HE MADE MUCH OF DEFENSIVE DEFENCE AND SUFFICIENCY, AND STATED A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS QUOTE ANYTIME, ANYWHERE UNQUOTE): AND DUAL CAPABLE SYSTEMS (WHERE HE DEFINED THE TALKS IN TERMS OF QUOTE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS INCLUDING DUAL CAPABLE EQUIPMENT BASED ON LAND UNQUOTE). GRINIEVSKY ALSO MADE MUCH OF THE NATO COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATIONS QUOTE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CSCE PROCESS UNQUOTE.

17. DISCUSSION OF MBFR WAS DESULTORY, WITH GRINIEVSKY REPEATING STANDARD SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 1985.

CW

18. A CW WORKING GROUP WAS CHAIRED BY HOLMES AND NAZARKIN. THERE WERE NO NEW PROPOSALS BY EITHER SIDE. NAZARKIN PRESSED HARD FOR FASTER PROGRESS IN GENEVA. THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTED THE LONGSTANDING US REQUIREMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A VERIFIED BILATERAL US/SOVIET DATA EXCHANGE PRIOR TO SIGNATURE OF A CW CONVENTION, THOUGH THE PRECISE TERMS OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE ARE UNCLEAR. DISCUSSION WAS OTHERWISE LARGELY DOMINATED BY EXCHANGES ON THE PROBLEMS POSED BY CW PRODUCTION AND STOCKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

ACLAND

ADVANCE 21

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
HD/NAD
HD/SEC POL D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET
HD/DEFENCE
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD
DACU MOD
CDI MOD
RESIDENT CLERK



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OF 180001Z SEPTEMBER 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDIS GENEVA, MODUK

SIC
SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING, 15-17 SEPTEMBER: NUCLEAR TESTING
1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMEN ANNOUNCED JOINTLY THIS AFTERNOON THAT US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING WOULD BEGIN BEFORE 1 DECEMBER. TEXT OF JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE:
THE US AND SOVIET SIDES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN BEFORE DECEMBER 1 1987 FULL-SCALE, STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SINGLE FORUM.

IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SIDES, AS THE FIRST STEP, WILL AGREE UPON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE US-USSR THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974, AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY OF 1976, AND PROCEED TO NEGOTIATING FURTHER INTERMEDIATE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT PROCESS.

THIS PROCESS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD PURSUE AS THE FIRST PRIORITY THE GOAL OF REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ULTIMATELY THEIR ELIMINATION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ELABORATION OF IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE US-USSR TREATIES OF 1974 AND 1976, THE SIDES INTEND TO DESIGN AND CONDUCT JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES. THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL, TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE, BE USED IN FURTHER NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATION AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE REACHED.
UNQUOTE.
2. THE STATEMENT WAS MADE WHILE SHULTZ'S FINAL MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE (WHICH RAN FOR SEVERAL HOURS BEYOND THE SCHEDULED FINISHING TIME OF 12.30) WAS STILL IN SESSION. A MORE COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT ON THE THREE DAYS OF TALKS MAY BE MADE LATER TONIGHT BUT MAY NOW BE POSTPONED UNTIL 18 SEPTEMBER.

ACLAND

ADVANCE 21

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS
PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
HD/NAD
HD/SEC POL D
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET
HD/DEFENCE
MR POWELL NO.10 DOWNING ST.
MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) MOD
D.NUC (POL) SY MOD
DACU MOD
CDI MOD
RESIDENT CLERK

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELNO 1287
OF 180730Z SEPTEMBER 87
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, OTHER NATO POSTS
INFO ROUTINE OTHER CSCE POSTS

Re full text is in your box.
CDP 18/9.

GORBACHEV ON THE UN AND ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS PUBLISH LENGTHY ARTICLE BY GORBACHEV PRINCIPALLY ON ''NEW THINKING'' AND THE ROLE OF THE UN, BUT WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. ARTICLE CONTAINS LITTLE THAT IS NEW. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET CENTRAL PRESS PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE BY GORBACHEV ON 17 SEPTEMBER GIVING 'THE THOUGHTS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP' ON THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. IT IS AN EXTENDED PLUG FOR THE WARSAW PACT'S PROPOSED ''COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY'', AND URGES THE STRENGTHENING OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE UN'S WORK. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS.

ARMS CONTROL

3. THE FIRST SECTION OF THE ARTICLE DEALS WITH ARMS CONTROL. GORBACHEV SAYS THAT LITTLE THAT IS NEW OR ORIGINAL, BUT THERE IS A MARKEDLY LOW KEY TREATMENT OF SDI AND NO INSISTENCE OF ''STRENGTHENING'' THE ABM TREATY. THE WESTERN AGENDA TO MOVE FROM INF TO START IS TACITLY ACCEPTED WITH NO REFERENCE TO BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE MAKES THE FIRST REALLY POSITIVE SOVIET STATEMENT ABOUT CHANCELLOR KOHL'S OFFER TO REMOVE THE PERSHING 1AS, SAYING THAT THIS IS A STEP FACILITATING AN INF AGREEMENT. GORBACHEV SAYS THAT HE BELIEVES THE INF TREATY CAN BE CONCLUDED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR AND GOES ON TO DESCRIBE THE INF AGREEMENT AS 'A FINE PRELUDE TO A BREAKTHROUGH AT TALKS ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN CONDITIONS OF THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE ABM TREATY'. HE SAYS THAT WITH JOINT EFFORT AN ACCORD ON START 'COULD BECOME A REALITY AS EARLY AS THE FIRST HALF OF NEXT YEAR'.

4. TURNING TO CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT, GORBACHEV SAYS THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO AGREE ON A MECHANISM FOR MAINTAINING PEACE AT REDUCED LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. ALTHOUGH HE DENIES THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAS SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, HE SAYS THAT IF A DISBALANCE EXISTS THEN IT SHOULD BE REMOVED. ON FUTURE MOVES TO STRENGTHEN MILITARY TRUST HE SAYS THAT WITHIN TWO OR THREE YEARS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO COMPARE DEFENCE SPENDING OF THE TWO ALLIANCES AND THAT ACCORDS ON 'DEFENSIVE STRATEGY', AND 'MILITARY SUFFICIENCY' ARE POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONTEXT HE TALKS OF THE CREATION OF DEMILITARISED ZONES BETWEEN POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. HE ALSO SAYS WE SHOULD WORK FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF MILITARY BLOCS AND LIQUIDATION OF BASES ON FOREIGN TERRITORY.

REGIONAL SECURITY

5. GORBACHEV OPENS THE SECTION ON REGIONAL SECURITY BY ARGUING THAT THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD INTO NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES UNDERMINES THE VERY IDEA OF SECURITY. SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE. THE ABOLITION OF THE ''HYPOCRISY'' OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE ''A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS THE GENUINE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, TOWARDS THEIR EQUALITY AND THEIR EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY''. THE ARTICLE THEN CONCENTRATES ON THE WAYS IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS COULD PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN REDUCING REGIONAL CONFLICT. AMONG THE SPECULATIVE IDEAS GORBACHEV PUTS FORWARD OR ENDORSES ARE:- A UN MULTILATERAL CENTRE FOR LESSENING THE DANGER OF WAR: HOT LINES BETWEEN THE UN HEADQUARTERS, CAPITALS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT: EXTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OR AGREEMENTS TO LESSEN TENSION AND MONITORING OF AREAS OF CONFLICT: AND THE WIDER USE OF UN OBSERVERS AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES. GORBACHEV ALSO SAYS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERS MIGHT TAKE ON THE ROLE OF GUARANTORS OF REGIONAL SECURITY.

ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL SECURITY

6. IN A DISCURSIVE SECTION GORBACHEV PUTS FORWARD SOME VAGUE PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH THE ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. HE SAYS THAT ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST OF NATIONS IS LIKELY TO MAKE 'THE NEW WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER' HARD TO ACHIEVE. HE PUTS FORWARD SUGGESTIONS IN THE INTERIM FOR LIMITING DEBT REPAYMENT BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. HE REPEATS HIS PROPOSAL TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER STATES SHOULD DISCUSS

THIS AT A HIGH LEVEL. GORBACHEV ALSO PROPOSES A UN PROGRAMME FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND ECOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS.

HUMAN RIGHTS

7. THE SECTION OF THE ARTICLE DEALING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS BEGINS WITH STANDARD SOVIET STATEMENTS THAT NO-ONE SHOULD TALK ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE HANGING ONTO WEAPONS OF NUCLEAR MASS DESTRUCTION AND EXOTIC WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE, AND BEFORE POVERTY, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS ARE ELIMINATED. THE CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS HE PUTS FORWARD ARE FOR MUCH CLOSER BUREAUCRATIC COORDINATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMANITARIAN CONTACTS. HE SUPPORTS THE 'NEW WORLD INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ORDER', AND RECOMMENDS THE DRAWING UP OF INTERNATIONAL CRITERIA FOR ISSUES SUCH AS FAMILY REUNIFICATION, CONTACTS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND ORGANISATIONS, AND VISA REGULATIONS. HE ALSO ENCOURAGES STATES TO JOIN UNESCO CONVENTIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE PREVENTION OF ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL PROPERTY. HE SUPPORTS GREATER COOPERATION WITHIN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION TO COMBAT DISEASES SUCH AS AIDS, AND DRUG ADDICTION AND ALCOHOLISM.

COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF SECURITY

8. THE FINAL SUBSTANTIVE SECTION OF THE ARTICLE DEALS WITH THE MECHANISMS BY WHICH THE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COULD BE CREATED WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK. GORBACHEV TALKS IN UNSPECIFIC TERMS ABOUT INCREASING THE POWERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF MAKING MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF THE POWER THE COUNCIL ALREADY HAS. HE SAYS IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HOLD MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOT JUST IN NEW YORK, BUT ALSO IN REGIONS OF TENSION AND ON A REGULAR BASIS IN THE CAPITALS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBER STATES. HE CALLS FOR GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS. HE REPEATS A POINT MADE BY PETROVSKIY EARLIER THIS MONTH THAT DECISIONS TAKEN BY CONSENSUS IN THE UN SHOULD HAVE ENHANCED FORCE BOTH MORALLY AND POLITICALLY. THERE IS A CALL FOR A WORLD COUNCIL OF INTELLECTUALS WHICH ''COULD SERIOUSLY ENRICH THE SPIRITUAL AND ETHICAL POTENTIAL OF CONTEMPORARY WORLD POLITICS''. HE CONCLUDES BY RITUAL SUPPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

9. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

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MY TELNO 1287: GORBACHEV ON THE UN AND ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. AN UNORIGINAL PERFORMANCE WITH A MIXTURE OF ESSENTIALLY PROPAGANDISTIC SUGGESTIONS. SOME POSSIBLE NUANCES ON ARMS CONTROL. THE WHOLE THING LOOKS LIKE A SPEECH WHICH GORBACHEV MIGHT HAVE MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

DETAIL

2. AS THE MFA SPOKESMAN MADE CLEAR GORBACHEV HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY MADE A MAJOR PRONOUNCEMENT IN THE FORM OF AN ARTICLE. COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW AGREE THAT IT AMOUNTS TO A SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FROM A DISTANCE DESIGNED BOTH TO FLATTER THE UN AND THE THIRD WORLD AND TO REINFORCE GORBACHEV'S OWN POSITION AS FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINATOR.

3. IT IS UNUSUAL FOR A MAJOR PRONOUNCEMENT BY GORBACHEV TO OFFER SO FEW NEW ELEMENTS. HE DOES NOT EVEN ADD ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT TO THE EXISTING CONCEPT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF PEACE AND SECURITY. IT SEEMS TO REMAIN A MIXTURE OF GOOD INTENTIONS DRESSED UP IN POSITIVE SOUNDING LANGUAGE, COUPLED WITH A WISH TO APPEAR FLEXIBLE AS REGARDS THE IDEAS OF OTHERS AND PERHAPS ANXIOUS TO SET FUTURE CHANGES IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WIDER CONTEXT OF 'OUR COMMON HOME THE PLANET EARTH', AND THEREBY TO REDUCE THE IMPRESSION OF SOVIET MOVEMENT UNDER OUTSIDE PRESSURE. THE PLUG FOR THE MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE IS NOTABLY LOW KEY.

4. THE REFERENCES TO STRENGTHENING THE ROLE AND POWERS OF THE UN AND TO UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES MAY PROVE HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE, BUT THEY ARE HARDLY SPECIFIC.

5. ON ARMS CONTROL GORBACHEV WAS FAIRLY POSITIVE, AND BY LEAVING

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OUT BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS TACITLY ACCEPTED THE WESTERN AGENDA. SDI SCARCELY GETS A MENTION. WHETHER THIS PRESAGES ANY MOVE ON LINKAGE WILL RAPIDLY BECOME APPARENT AT GENEVA.
EQUALLY THE TONING DOWN OF EARLIER DEMANDS TO STRENGTHEN THE ABM TREATY MUST SOON EITHER BE CONFIRMED OR SHOWN TO BE WINDOW DRESSING. FOLLOWING THE INITIAL GRUDGING SOVIET REACTION TO CHANCELLOR KOHL'S PIA CONCESSION, THE GERMANS TELL US THAT THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED A HIGH LEVEL ENDORESEMENT OF IT.
THEY SEE SUCH AN ENDORESEMENT NOW AS REVEALING THAT POLICY IS MADE SO CLOSE TO THE TOP THAT IN GORBACHEV'S ABSENCE ON HOLIDAY NO SHIFT COULD BE MADE. I THINK IT EQUALLY LIKELY THAT, CAUGHT UNAWARES BY CHANCELLOR KOHL, IT SUITED THE SOVIET LEADERS TO KEEP ALIVE THE IDEA THAT THEY WERE NOT YET SATISFIED OVER THE FUTURE OF THE PIAS.

MARSHALL

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From the Private Secretary

17 September 1987

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

I enclose a copy of a letter from the South African Embassy conveying a message to the Prime Minister, presumably from President Botha, about the possibility of South Africa signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The text is virtually identical to that in Cape Town tel. no. 435. I should be grateful for a draft reply.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence), Stephen Haddrill (Department of Energy) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. POWELL)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ccpc

South African Embassy
LONDON WC2N 5DP

17 September 1987

Mr C D Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1A 2AL

Dear Mr Powell

I have been requested to convey the following message to the Prime Minister:

> The Republic of South Africa is prepared to commence negotiations with each of the nuclear weapons states on the possibility of signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time the Republic of South Africa will consider including in the negotiations safeguards on its installations subject to NPT conditions. The nature of these negotiations will depend on the outcome of the forthcoming 31st General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency to be held in Vienna from 22 September 1987.

Your co-operation in having this message brought to the attention of the Prime Minister is appreciated.

Yours sincerely

Ray Killen.

P R Killen
AMBASSADOR



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TELNO 435
OF 170810Z SEPTEMBER 87
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MY TELNO 423: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IAEA

SUMMARY

1. THE SAG HAS DECIDED TO INITIATE DISCUSSION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNING THE NPT.

DETAIL

2. I SPOKE AGAIN THIS MORNING TO STEYN, THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CABINET, TO ASK HIM WHETHER, AS WE HAD SUGGESTED (MY TUR), HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE THE STATE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING STATEMENT ABOUT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

3. STEYN SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MALAN YESTERDAY. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO SEND A NOTE IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO CERTAIN OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT:

''THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IS PREPARED TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EACH OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SIGNING THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME THE RSA WILL CONSIDER INCLUDING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS SAFEGUARDS ON ITS INSTALLATIONS SUBJECT TO THE NPT CONDITIONS. THE NATURE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF THE 31ST GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE IAEA TO BE HELD IN VIENNA AS FROM 22 SEPTEMBER''.

RENWICK

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A useful step forward.

MY TELNO 423: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IAEA

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
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Telephone 01-~~930 7022~~ 218 2112

Prime Minister
Re Chiefs of Staff are content with the INF verification proposals. But they are not 'foolproof' or 'water-tight'.
CDP 10/9

MO 7/1E

16th September 1987

Dear Charles

You asked in your letter to Lyn Parker of 9th September for confirmation that the Chiefs of Staff are reasonably content with the new verification proposals put forward by the United States.

The simplified verification regime consequent on the move to 'global double zero' retains those elements which the Chiefs of Staff regard as being most important: observed destruction together with mandatory on-site inspection for verification of a detailed data exchange and of declared facilities. However, challenge inspection, which is regarded as a deterrent to cheating, has been restricted to the most obvious suspect facilities. This is acceptable. Indeed, there could be uncomfortable security implications in reciprocal far-reaching challenge inspections, and this consideration has played a significant part in the framing of the US proposals.

Although the verification regime remains comprehensive and intrusive it is not foolproof. Much will depend on the initial data exchange and the extent to which Soviet figures agree with US and UK intelligence estimates. As intelligence assessments show that a significant number of missiles have been produced but are unaccounted for there is no reason to believe that these figures will tally. Even if there is close accord with Soviet figures there is sufficient uncertainty in our estimates of production and storage for it to remain possible that a clandestine stockpile could exist undetected by intelligence means.

But the Soviet Union cannot be certain of the effectiveness of Western intelligence capabilities. Furthermore, the retention of a clandestine force in a deployed and operationally effective state would soon be revealed by NTMs; and even the retention of a covert force on a care and maintenance basis would run some risk of detection while requiring some months to work up to operational status. On balance, the military benefits to the Soviet Union would not seem to

Charles Powell Esq
No 10 Downing Street

be worth the political risks, particularly when the gap left by the withdrawal of INF forces could be filled by adapting systems that legitimately remain.

In these circumstances, the Chiefs of Staff believe that the US proposals are acceptable, assuming that the data exchange between the two Powers is satisfactory, but would hope that they lose none of their stringency during further negotiation.

A more detailed appreciation of the question of Soviet compliance with an INF verification regime will shortly be forthcoming from the JIC.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Lyn Parker (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Yours ever

Derek Ball

(D C J BALL)
Private Secretary

DEFENCE – Arms Control PL-B



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MO 7/1V

11 September 1987

CDP 11/9

Dear Charles,

SLCMs FOR SACEUR

Thank you for your letter of ~~2nd~~ 4th September, which caused a certain frisson here because we had not hitherto seen the Prime Minister's letter to Cap Weinberger. We agree that Mr Weinberger's response is helpful.

I am copying this letter to Tony Galsworthy in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to Trevor Woolley in the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,

John Howe.

(J F HOWE)
Private Secretary

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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MIPT: NAC MEETING ON 10 SEPTEMBER: INF

SUMMARY

1. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IN INF BUT THREE MAIN ISSUES LEFT (LINKAGE OF P1A WARHEADS TO TREATY, PHASING AND VERIFICATION). MUCH WORK STILL TO BE DONE ON DETAILS. GLITMAN DECLINES TO SPECULATE ON DETAILED TIMESCALE FOR COMPLETION OF TREATY. INF NOT EXPECTED TO BE MAIN FOCUS OF SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.

DETAIL

2. NITZE SAID THAT AT NEXT WEEK'S MEETING, SHULTZ WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLETING AN INF TREATY WITH EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS AND WOULD RE-EMPHASISE THE US REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE ON THIRD PARTY SYSTEMS OR ON EXISTING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WITH ALLIES. SHULTZ WOULD, HOWEVER, CONFIRM THAT WERE THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES TO ELIMINATE THEIR P1A MISSILES IN LINE WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL'S RECENT STATEMENT, THE US WOULD THEN QUOTE WITHDRAW UNQUOTE ITS WARHEADS. SHULTZ WOULD ALSO REAFFIRM US SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE POSITION ON SNF AS SET OUT IN THE REYKJAVIK COMMUNIQUE AND WOULD EMPHASISE THAT NATO MUST RETAIN A QUOTE ROBUST, MODERN AND SURVIVABLE UNQUOTE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. NITZE ADDED THAT SINCE THE US WISH TO RETAIN THE FOCUS OF DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON INF IN GENEVA, SHULTZ WAS NOT EXPECTED TO MAKE INF A FOCAL POINT OF HIS TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE BUT WOULD CONCENTRATE MORE ON START ISSUES.

3. GLITMAN SAID THAT ALL THE MAJOR OBJECTIVES THE ALLIANCE HAD SET ITSELF IN THIS AREA IN 1979 HAD NOW BEEN MET OR EXCEEDED. HOWEVER AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL DETAIL REMAINED TO BE ELABORATED AND THREE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED: SOVIET INSISTENCE ON LINKING P1A WARHEADS WITH AN INF TREATY, THE PHASING OF THE ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS AND THE NATURE OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME.

4. ON THE P1A ISSUE, OBUKHOV WAS NOW UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO INSIST THAT REMOVAL OF P1A WARHEADS BE PART OF ANY INF TREATY. AS OF THIS MORNING HE HAD NOT YET INTRODUCED THE REQUIREMENT IN PLENARY BUT MIGHT DO SO LATER TODAY. ANY SUCH LINKAGE REMAINED TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US. TO AGREE TO IT WOULD BE TO SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. ALLIANCE SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY WOULD BE NEEDED IN RESISTING QUOTE A CLASSIC CASE OF OVER NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE.

5. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WERE ALSO NOW INSISTING THAT ALL WARHEADS AFFECTED BY THE INF AGREEMENT BE DESTROYED. IN GLITMAN'S VIEW THIS WAS A BOGUS ISSUE. THE DRAFT SOVIET TREATY TALKED ONLY OF ELIMINATING MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS WHILE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR THE PHASING OF ELIMINATION REQUIRED WARHEADS TO BE REMOVED AND QUOTE TURNED OVER FOR USE BY APPROPRIATE ENTERPRISES" UNQUOTE. NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR PUBLIC RHETORIC, THE SOVIET UNION WAS NO MORE PREPARED TO LET US SCIENTISTS SCRUTINISE THE DISMANTLING OF ITS WARHEADS THAN THE US WOULD BE. SOVIET PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS PORTRAYING THEMSELVES AS SEEKING A STRICTER REGIME (HERE AND ON VERIFICATION) THAN THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTERED.

6. ON PHASING, GLITMAN OUTLINED THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 28 JULY (REMOVAL OF ALL WARHEADS WITHIN 12 MONTHS AND OF REMAINDER OF SYSTEMS OVER THE FOLLOWING FOUR YEARS). THE US WAS STILL CONSIDERING THE DETAILS OF ITS RESPONSE BUT, BECAUSE OF VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES, COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PROPOSALS BASED SIMPLY ON THE REMOVAL OF WARHEADS. THE US WAS ALSO INSISTING ON ITS RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE MIX OF US SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD REMAIN DURING THE ELIMINATION PERIOD. SUBSEQUENTLY, GLITMAN ADDED THAT, IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SEEMED AMENABLE TO THE IDEA OF A THREE YEAR RATHER THAN A FIVE YEAR PERIOD OF ELIMINATION.

7. ON VERIFICATION (THE QUOTE MOST DAUNTING UNQUOTE OF THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES), GLITMAN REPORTED THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER AREA WHERE SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND THEIR POSITION IN GENEVA WERE AT VARIANCE. DESPITE THE HARD LINE BEING TAKEN PUBLICLY, THE GENEVA NEGOTATIORS HAD BEEN PRESSING FOR DETAILS OF THE SIMPLIFIED VERIFICATION PROCEDURES PROPOSED BY THE US IN THE CONTEXT OF A DOUBLE-GLOBAL ZERO AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET POSITION ON VERIFICATION GENERALLY REMAINED HAZY IN A NUMBER OF AREAS. GLITMAN WAS STILL NOT CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD ACCEPT THE STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME REQUIRED BY THE US. THE RUSSIANS KNEW THAT THEIR REQUIREMENT TO INSPECT ANY US BASE IN ANY OTHER COUNTRY WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY HAVE LINKS WITH AN INF SYSTEM WAS UNJUSTIFIABLE AND

UNATTAINABLE BUT WERE STILL PURSUING IT.

8. CONCLUDING HIS REPORT, GLITMAN STRESSED AGAIN THE AMOUNT OF DETAILED WORK STILL TO BE COMPLETED. IN PARTICULAR THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL HAD NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED OR TABLED, EXCHANGES OF DETAILED INFORMATION FOR THE DATA EXCHANGE MOU HAD NOT YET BEGUN AND A DRAFT JOINT TREATY TEXT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CHANGES RESULTING FROM AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL DOUBLE-ZERO HAD NOT YET BEEN DRAWN UP. THE DETAIL HAD TO BE RIGHT: FAILURE TO GET IT RIGHT WOULD, AMONG OTHER THINGS, PROBABLY RESULT IN NON-RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE. GLITMAN DECLINED TO SPECULATE ON HOW LONG ALL THIS WOULD TAKE.

COMMENT

9. FOLLOWING THE COUNCIL SESSION, I HAD AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH NITZE, GLITMAN AND CARRINGTON FROM WHICH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED:

(A) NEITHER NITZE NOR GLITMAN TAKE KARPOV'S PRONOUNCEMENTS (EG DIE ZEIT AND IN TODAY'S GUARDINA) TOO SERIOUSLY. THEY INCLINE TO THINK THAT HE IS TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE CAN (OR COULD) ACHIEVE MORE FOR THE SOVIET SIDE THAN OTHERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO DO. NITZE THINKS THERE MAY WELL BE DISAGREEMENTS IN MOSCOW EG AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TIME PRESSURES ARE WORKING IN SOVIET FAVOUR. BUT HE ASSESSES KARPOV HIMSELF AS MORE OF A NUISANCE THAN ANYTHING ELSE.

(B) GLITMAN ACCEPTS THAT, WHILE THE WARHEADS ISSUE MAY BE BOGUS (SEE PARA 4 ABOVE), IT WILL HAVE TO BE TREATED SERIOUSLY. US VIEWS OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYING, AND THEREFORE OF AGREEING TO, WARHEAD DESTRUCTION WILL HAVE TO BE EXPLAINED CAREFULLY AND PUBLICLY, THIS SAID, HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT IF THE RUSSIANS PERSIST IN THE ATTEMPT TO TURN THE WARHEADS ISSUE (EITHER DESTRUCTION OR INCLUSION OF LANGUAGE ON THE P1A WARHEADS IN THE GENEVA TEXTS) INTO A QUOTE DEAL BUSTER UNQUOTE THEY WILL BE MAKING A MAJOR ERROR. GLITMAN SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD OBUKHOV YESTERDAY QUOTE YOU WILL LOSE ON THIS ONE UNQUOTE. GLITMAN AND I AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER TO HAVE OSTENTATIOUSLY CONGRATULATED THEMSELVES ON CHANCELLOR KOHL'S QUOTE ACCEPTANCE OF OUR ARGUMENTS UNQUOTE.

(C) DESPITE HIS SLIGHTLY DOWN-BEAT PRESENTATION THIS MORNING, GLITMAN RECOGNISES THAT HE IS ON THE LAST LAP AND THAT IT IS VERY WIDELY ASSUMED THE INF NEGOTIATION WILL SUCCEED. HE HIMSELF DOES NOT TAKE SUCCESS FOR GRANTED BUT OBVIOUSLY EXPECTS IT: QUOTE WE SHOULD GET THERE UNQUOTE.

(D) THERE IS GENUINE UNCERTAINTY (AND SOME DISAGREEMENT) WITHIN THE AMERICAN CAMP AS TO WHAT SHEVARDNADZE WILL HAVE TO SAY ON ARMS CONTROL NEXT WEEK.

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ALEXANDER

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INF: KARPOV INTERVIEW

SUMMARY
1. KARPOV PLAYS-UP OUTSTANDING DIFFICULTIES IN GENEVA ON INF DOUBLE-ZERO.

DETAIL
2. IN AN INTERVIEW IN TODAY'S DIE ZEIT WITH CHRISTOPH BERTRAM, KARPOV LISTS A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING HURDLES IN GENEVA.

3. HE SAYS THE US DEMAND THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE PERSHING 1B, NOT FOR THEIR OWN MILITARY USE, BUT FOR CONCEIVABLE TRANSFER TO THE FRG. CHALLENGED ON WHETHER THIS IS THE OFFICIAL US POSITION, KARPOV INSISTS THAT THE US DELEGATION IN GENEVA ARE MAINTAINING THIS POINT EVEN AFTER KOHL'S DECLARATION ON P1A AND WASHINGTON'S SUBSEQUENT ASSURANCES ON WITHDRAWING THE WARHEADS FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. KARPOV SAYS KOHL ONLY SPOKE OF GIVING UP THE P1A AND DID NOT SAY THAT THE GERMANS RENOUNCED ALL WEAPONS IN THAT RANGE (I.E. EVEN DEPLOYMENT OF NEW ONES). KOHL'S STATEMENT WAS THEREFORE ONLY A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, AND INSUFFICIENT UNTIL THE US POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CHANGED. KARPOV THEN QUIBBLED (UNCONVINCINGLY) ON WHETHER KOHL'S STATEMENT REPRESENTED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION OR NOT.

4. ON VERIFICATION, KARPOV SAID THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT MORE INTRUSIVE MEASURES THAN THE AMERICANS NOW WANTED. THE LATEST AMERICAN PROPOSALS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT TO VERIFY THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS BEING OBSERVED. THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL MEASURES WERE ESSENTIAL:

A) ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE PRODUCTION BAN, INCLUDING INSIDE FACTORIES:
B) ON-SITE INSPECTION THAT MISSILES AND WARHEADS WERE INDEED DESTROYED AS AGREED: THIS MEANT PERMANENT ON-SITE INSPECTION. FROM

THE MOMENT THE TREATY CAME INTO FORCE THERE SHOULD BE ON-SITE CONTROL OF THE DISMANTLEMENT AND REMOVAL OF ALL THE WARHEADS ON THE INF MISSILES IN QUESTION.
C) THIS ON-SITE INSPECTION SHOULD NOT HAVE A TIME LIMIT (I.E. EXPIRY WHEN ALL THE MISSILES IN QUESTION HAD BEEN DESTROYED). THE US DELEGATION HAD SAID THAT INSPECTION ON US AND SOVIET TERRITORY WAS ALSO TIME-LIMITED: THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.
D) THE SOVIET UNION WANTED ADDITIONAL INSPECTION VERIFICATION IN COUNTRIES WITHOUT US MISSILES AT PRESENT, BUT WHERE THERE WERE US BASES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR THE TRANSPORT OR STORAGE OF MISSILES, WARHEADS OR LAUNCHING FACILITIES. KARPOV DID NOT DENY THAT THIS INCLUDED US BASES IN E.G. JAPAN AND GUAM.

BULLARD

YYYY

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CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

CDP 10/ix.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

1. I have seen your minute of ~~6th~~ August commenting on Sir Geoffrey Howe's minute to me of ~~30th~~ July.

2. No one disputes the need for serious attempts at conventional arms control aiming at security at lower force levels. But your minute suggests that I need to add another note of caution to those in my minute of 16th July. I do not believe there is any prospect that a possible US-USSR INF deal, or imminent developments in conventional arms control, will reduce in any way the need for our planned expenditure on conventional or nuclear forces. Rather the reverse: maintaining the policies of deterrence and flexible response in the wake of zero INF is more calculated to increase rather than diminish the requirements which our Defence budget has to meet.

3. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

G.Y.

Ministry of Defence
9th September 1987

DEFENCE : Arms Control PT13

SECRET

D 92 CGR
a Sir PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 September 1987

Dear Lyn.

INF VERIFICATION: LATEST U.S. PROPOSALS

Thank you for your letter of 8 September about the new American proposals for verification of an INF Treaty. The Prime Minister has read these closely, but has not made any comment. I would be grateful, however, if John Howe could confirm that the Chiefs of Staff are reasonably content.

BF

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence).

Yours sincerely,

Charles Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 September 1987

Prime Minister
This is important. So far as I can judge, the proposals seem strict enough. But you will want to note that the right of challenge inspection has been curtailed (although the Russians may ask for more). Subject to confirmation that the Chiefs of Staff are content, agree? CDP 8/9

Dear Charles,

INF Verification : Latest US proposals

Following the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the global elimination of LRINF and SRINF missiles, the US delegation in Geneva has recently presented modified outline proposals for the verification of an INF Treaty. The US authorities have also circulated to us and to the other four European Basing Countries revised drafts of the Inspection Protocol and Basing Country Agreement. At the same time they have indicated that they can accept a procedure, to which we have attached importance for domestic political reasons, whereby the rights granted to Russian inspectors to conduct inspections in the European Basing Countries would be enshrined in a bilateral exchange of notes between each Basing Country and the Soviet Union.

We have all along argued that a simpler verification regime would be possible if the Russians accepted the global elimination of LRINF and SRINF missiles: indeed we adduced as an important reason why global elimination was desirable the fact that it is easier to verify the total absence of a class of missile than to monitor the maintenance of particular residual levels and locations.

The new American proposals reflect this. They envisage a short transitional period for the total elimination of the missiles - one year for SRINF and three for LRINF; and a ban on the modernisation, production and flight testing of all the systems involved. Verification during the transitional period would be ensured, in addition to national technical means, by provisions for initial detailed exchanges of data and baseline inspections to verify this data; on site inspection of the destruction and dismantlement of the missiles and a quota of on-site inspections of declared sites. In addition both during the transitional period and for a specified period after elimination has been achieved (the Americans have spoken of 5 - 10 years) there would be a provision for short notice inspections of certain categories of "suspect" sites in the United States and the Soviet Union. By "suspect" sites the Americans have principally in mind ICBM-related facilities.

/The

SECRET

The major differences between the new proposals and those which the Americans put forward last year are the abandonment of the requirement for permanent monitoring of production/assembly facilities (on the grounds that production/assembly will no longer take place at all); and the absence of any right to challenge inspection of suspect (as opposed to declared) sites in the Basing Countries. The latter change would affect considerably the scope of our obligation to grant access to Soviet inspectors to the United Kingdom. We would probably have two declared facilities (at Greenham Common and Molesworth) and none of the other 70 or so US-operated facilities in Britain would be liable to inspection. This is welcome: it would avoid giving the Russians the opportunity to roam over certain sensitive US installations here.

Two questions arise in relation to these new American proposals: their negotiability and their effectiveness. As regards the former, it seems unlikely that the Russians will readily accept such reduced access to Basing Countries and that they will demand the right to conduct challenge inspections of, for example, US military air fields in Western Europe where Cruise missiles might be hidden: but the scope for discussion will only become clear once the details are tabled.

As regards the effectiveness of the proposed regime, it follows from the move to global zero that the more complex and intrusive arrangements designed to monitor the continued existence of INF systems and support facilities could fall away without damage. The more limited role for challenge inspection is more significant, but it continues to cover the most obvious suspect sites, and the utility of more wide-reaching rights of access for providing greater assurance of compliance would in practice be limited. It is therefore the view of FCO and MOD officials that the revised proposals would not fundamentally affect the effectiveness of verification. We have long recognised that no regime could offer a total guarantee of compliance; but the risk of the Russians retaining a deployed and militarily-significant INF capability is low. In any case such a capability would most likely be detected by National Technical Means.

On the detailed provisions for Inspections, the US are continuing to consult the Basing Countries closely. A meeting of officials will take place in Washington on 9 September. American acceptance of the principle of a direct exchange of notes between the Basing Countries and the Soviet Union

/has

has cleared the way for settling the final details of the US regime before it is presented to the Russians. One or two technical details still remain to be resolved, for example, in relation to the Immunities and Privileges to be accorded to Inspectors and aircrew, and over the safeguarding of our direct power to expel Soviet inspectors for any unacceptable behaviour whilst in UK territory. Officials hope to be able to resolve these points on 9 September. If they do so, the Americans plan to table the full text of the Inspection Protocol in Geneva on the following day.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD).

Yours ever,

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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cc PF

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 September 1987

Prime Minister
You will wish to note. CDP 4/9.

Dear Charles,

The Stockholm Agreement: Inspection Provisions

The Prime Minister may wish to know that the Foreign and Defence Secretaries have decided that we should conduct an inspection of a Soviet military exercise in the GDR next week under the on-site inspection provisions of the Stockholm Agreement.

The exercise in question takes place from 6-12 September in the Juterborg/Cottbus area of the GDR and involves 13,500 Soviet and 500 East German troops. Our request will be transmitted to the GDR authorities simultaneously through their Embassy in London and in East Berlin early next week. Under the terms of the Stockholm Agreement the "receiving" state is obliged to accede to the request within 24 hours (there is in practice no right of refusal) and to permit entry to the inspectors within 36 hours of the request being made. The inspection itself will be conducted both on land and from the air and will last anything up to 48 hours. We shall be fielding an inspection team of 4 servicemen.

Our principal reason for requesting an inspection at this time is to ensure that the inspection provisions of the Stockholm Document (which the UK played a major part in drafting) become a regular and routine part of the implementation of the Stockholm regime. The Stockholm Document is the first international security agreement to include a provision for verification through on-site inspection; and there is a strong Western interest in ensuring that this provision which has been widely heralded as the chief gain in the Document for the West is effectively exploited.

I am copying this letter to John Howe in the Ministry of Defence.

Yours ever,

Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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MY TELNO 1867: INF: VERIFICATION
SUMMARY
1. NUNN LINKS INF RATIFICATION AND ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION. ADMINISTRATION LOOKING AT WAYS TO HEAD OFF CRITICISM OF VERIFICATION PACKAGE. DRAFT AGENDA FOR 9 SEPTEMBER MEETING.
DETAIL
2. SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF A WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE ON 25 AUGUST CLAIMING THAT THE US INF VERIFICATION PACKAGE HAD BEEN WATERED DOWN TO AN ALARMING DEGREE, THE QUESTION OF THE RATIFICATION OF AN INF TREATY BACKED BY SUCH A VERIFICATION PACKAGE HAS BECOME AN INCREASINGLY LIVE ISSUE. THE PRESS HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE NEW SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE US PROPOSALS, CHARACTERISING THEM AS REALISTIC AND NEGOTIABLE. BUT PROMINENT POLITICIANS, REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS ALIKE, HAVE JOINED WITH FORMER STATESMEN SUCH AS KISSINGER TO WARN THAT AN INF TREATY BACKED BY THIS PACKAGE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO PASS THROUGH THE SENATE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. NOW SENATOR NUNN, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HAS WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT THREATENING TO IMPEDE EARLY RATIFICATION OF ANY INF AGREEMENT UNLESS THE ADMINISTRATION AGREES TO ABIDE BY THE ''NARROW'' INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY. EXTRACTS FROM THE LETTER WERE PUBLISHED HERE ON 3 SEPTEMBER. (COPY BY BAG TO THE DEPARTMENT).
3. THE ADMINISTRATION IS TAKING THE CURRENT POLITICAL DEBATE ON INF VERY SERIOUSLY. THAT MUCH IS CLEAR FROM THE EFFORTS WHICH ARE NOW BEING MADE TO REPACKAGE THE SIMPLIFIED VERIFICATION PROPOSALS IN SUCH A WAY TO MAKE THEM APPEAR MORE RIGOROUS. IN PARTICULAR, OFFICIALS ARE CONSIDERING TWO OPTIONS, WHICH COMPRISE WHAT ARE TERMED ''CLOSE-DOWN'' INSPECTIONS (ON DECLARED FACILITIES) FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF DISMANTLEMENT (DESTRUCTION) AND FURTHER SUSPECT-SITE INSPECTIONS ON DECLARED FACILITIES WHERE THE NATURE OF FINAL CONVERSION ALLOWS FOR CONTINUED DOUBTS ABOUT COMPLIANCE (EG CONVERSION OF SS-20 FACILITIES TO SS-25S). IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT BOTH ARE ALREADY INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSED REGIME.

NEVERTHELESS THE FACT THAT THESE COSMETIC CHANGES MIGHT INFLUENCE THE CURRENT DEBATE IS CAUSING THE ADMINISTRATION TO EXAMINE THEM CLOSELY.

4. THE NUNN INTERVENTION, CLEARLY AIMED AT FORESTALLING ANY ATTEMPT BY WEINBERGER TO REKINDLE THE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION DEBATE (OUR TELNO 1798) IS HEAVY-HANDED. HE IS ALREADY IN AN EXCEEDINGLY STRONG POSITION ON ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION' AND DOES NOT APPEAR IN NEED OF FURTHER LEVERAGE. THE CREATION OF A LINK BETWEEN INF RATIFICATION AND ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION WHILST JUSTIFIABLE IN THE NARROW TERMS OF THE WAY SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT WAS SOUGHT FOR THE ABM TREATY IN 1972, AND THE SUBSEQUENT CAMPAIGN FOR REINTERPRETATION, MAY WELL GIVE HIM ADDITIONAL REASSURANCE. BUT IT HARDLY ENHANCES HIS WIDER REPUTATION.

5. MEANWHILE THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOW GEARING UP FOR THE 9 SEPTEMBER MEETING. THEY HAVE INFORMALLY PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING AGENDA TO US, AND HAVE ASKED FOR COMMENTS:

10.00	MEETING OPENS. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.
11.30	LUNCH (EARLY BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES WITH CONFERENCE FACILITIES)
13.00	PROTOCOL. BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT.
ONWARDS	EXCHANGE OF NOTES.

THEIR INTENTION IS TO WRAP UP ALL ISSUES SO AS TO ALLOW GLITMAN TO TABLE ON 10 SEPTEMBER. FAILURE TO TABLE BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK BEGINNING 7 SEPTEMBER WOULD, OF COURSE, SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE PLANNING FOR THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING HERE FROM 15-17 SEPTEMBER.

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From the Private Secretary

2 September 1987

I enclose a copy of Secretary Weinberger's reply to the Prime Minister's letter to him of 20 July following up her visit to Washington. I should be grateful to know in due course whether you have any comments. It seems much what we wanted.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Tony Galsworthy (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

John Howe, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

SECRET

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

20 July 1987

THE PRIME MINISTER

Dear Cap.

Thank you very much for coming to our Embassy on Friday for a talk. As always it was a pleasure to listen to you and to find how close our thinking is. I was particularly grateful to you and to the President for agreeing in principle to assign some SLCMs to SACEUR on a flexible basis. I am sure that this is vital to maintaining NATO's strength and the United States commitment to defend Europe with nuclear weapons, in the wake of an INF agreement.

Warm regards,

Yours ever

Margaret

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger.

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Prime Minister
You will not to
note x on
page 3, 3rd in
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 658
OF 271145Z AUGUST 87
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: INF: GERMAN PERSHING 1AS

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF KOHL'S STATEMENT ON 26 AUGUST.

BEGINS
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE CURRENT US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA HAS BEEN KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER LEFT ANY DOUBT ABOUT THE FACT THAT IT DESIRES A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN MY GOVERNMENT DECLARATION TO THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG ON THIS ISSUE I STATED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EVEYTHING IN ITS POWER TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH A SUCCESS.

TO A SUCCESS WHICH, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL, WOULD LEAD TO WEAPONS BEING DISMANTLED. AS I ALSO STATED IN MY GOVERNMENT DECLARATION OF 18 MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS LINKED THE CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT SUCH A SUCCESS ''WOULD ALSO GIVE AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE FOR OTHER NEGOTIATING AREAS''.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT, BY ADOPTING A FIRM, PREDICTABLE AND RSOLUTE POSITION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF DISCUSSIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, IT CAN CLAIM TO HAVE MADE A NOT INCONSIDERABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE FACT THAT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA NOW APPEARS WITHIN REACH.

AS FAR AS THE GERMAN P1A MISSILE SYSTEMS WITH THEIR NUCLEAR WARHEADS, WHICH ARE UNDER EXCLUSIVE AMERICAN CONTROL, ARE CONCERNED, THESE WERE NEVER AND CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE SOVIET UNION KNEW FROM THE VERY OUTSET THAT THEE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WERE RESTRICTED TO SOVIET AND AMERICAN LAND-BASED NUCLEAR FORCES.

THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR THE INCLUSION OF PERSHING 1A MISSILES IN THE

GENEVA TALKS IS THUS UNFOUNDED AND REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO ERECT AN ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT.

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNING COALITION WAS CONFIRMED IN THE GOVERNMENT DECISION OF 1 JUNE 1987 AND IN THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION OF 3 (SIC) JUNE OF THIS YEAR. IT CORRESPONDS TO THE UNEQUIVOCAL NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE USA IN GENEVA WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY ALL THE PARTNERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND WAS MOST RECENTLY ENDORSED AT THE SPRING MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS IN REYKJAVIK IN JUNE.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REMAINS DETERMINED TO MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES WITH A RANGE OF 500 TO 5,500 KM.

THE GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW ENTERED A DECISIVE PHASE. IT IS THEREFORE SELF-EVIDENT TO ME THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC MUST DO ALL IT CAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I WANT TO HELP THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN GENEVA ON THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF ALL INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES,

IF IN PARTICULAR THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS OF VERIFICATION CAN BE RESOLVED TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED,

IF THIS INF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CONTRACTING PARTIES HAS BEEN RATIFIED AND HAS ENTERED INTO FORCE, AND

FINALLY, IF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES COMPLY WITH THE AGREED TIMETABLE FOR ELIMINATING THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS,

THEN I AM PREPARED TO DECLARE TODAY THAT WITH THE FINAL ELIMINATION OF ALL SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES THE PERSHING 1A MISSILES WILL NOT BE MODERNISED BUT SCRAPPED.

IN THIS CONNECTION I CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION AND HER PARTNERS TO RENOUNCE THE CURRENT MODERNISATION OF MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 500 KM. WE EXPECT IN PARTICULAR THE SUPPORT OF POLAND, THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHICH HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN, ESPECIALLY IN RECENT WEEKS, ABOUT THE P1AS. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL NOW ALSO TAKE SERIOUSLY OUR CONCERNS REGARDING THE SCUD-B MISSILES STATIONED IN

THEIR COUNTRIES, WHICH THREATEN ABOVE ALL THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND REMOVE THIS THREAT.

I AM THEREFORE LOOKING FOR TO GIVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THIS INITIATIVE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HER PARTNERS.

IN THE CONNECTION, I REPEAT MY EMPHATIC CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. THE EXISTING IMBALANCE IN FORCES WITH A RANGE OF 0 TO 500KM IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO TOLERATE. AS I STATED ON 4 JUNE, WE WILL NOT AND CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH A SITUATION IN THE LONG TERM.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC CONTINUES TO EXPECT SERIOUS EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE SUPER-POWERS TO TRANSLATE INTO PRACTICE THEIR BASIC AGREEMENT ON A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC ARSENALS. OUR COUNTRY REMAINS THREATENED TO A CONSIDERABLE EXENT BY THESE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

FURTHERMORE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT APPEALS TO ALL NEGOTIATING PARTNERS AT THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TO CONTINUE THEIR ENDEAVOURS TO ACHIEVE A CONVENTION ON THE WORLDWIDE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

ONLY IF STEPS TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IN THE FIELD OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES ARE PLACED IN SUCH AN OVERALL CONTEXT OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL WILL OUR SECURITY REALLY BE INCREASED AND PEACE STRENGTHENED.

EQUALLY INDISPENSABLE IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT A LOWER LEVEL IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

WILLIAMS

YYYY

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OF 271445Z AUGUST 87
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MY TELNO 656: INF: GERMAN PERSHING 1AS

SUMMARY

1. THIS WAS A DECISION PERSONALLY IMPOSED BY KOHL. WIDESPREAD SUPPORT IN THE PRESS. [But not in our press!]

DETAIL

2. UNDER THE FRG BASIC LAW, THE CHANCELLOR IS EMPOWERED TO LAY DOWN GENERAL POLICY GUIDELINES FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. AT IS PRESS CONFERENCE KOHL DECLARED THAT THE DECISION WAS HIS OWN, MADE IN EXERCISE OF THIS POWER. HE MUST HAVE INFORMED THE CABINET AT ITS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING MEETING BUT EVIDENTLY DID NOT SEEK ITS ENDORSEMENT. IT NOW APPPEARS THAT HE CONSULTED CDU PARTY LEADERS SUCH AS GEISSLER (SECRETARY-GENERAL), AND THE RIGHT-WING LEADER OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, DREGGER. WOERNER IS IN ALASKA BUT MAY NEVERTHELESS HAVE BEEN CONSULTED. GENSCHER IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN INFORMED ON 25 AUGUST. BUT THE CSU WERE NOT (NOT) CONSULTED AND ARE MOST RESENTFUL. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THEY WILL PLAY THEIR HAND IN THE DEBATE ON 2 SEPTEMBER BUT WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT KOHL WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE HIS DECISION STICK.

3. INTERNATIONALLY, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY PREPARATORY CONTACTS EXCEPT KOHL'S MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON (WASHINGTON TELNO 1812), WHICH IS REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS. THE FMOD TELL US THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR NOTIFICATION/CONSULTATION ON MILITARY CHANNELS WITH THE ALLIANCE/SHAPE, DESPITE THE NORMAL ALLIANCE PROCEDURE WHEREBY CONSULTATIONS WOULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON MODERNISATION OR NOT OF AN ALLIANCE NUCLEAR SYSTEM. FMOD SAY THAT IF THE FOUR KOHL CONDITIONS ARE MET BY 1991/1992 (THIS FIGURE WAS WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH NOT USED IN KOHL'S STATEMENT ITSELF) THEN IN PRACTICE THE HLG WOULD BE FACED WITH ONE NEW FACT AGAINST WHICH TO ADVISE ON THE NECESSARY STRUCTURE OF THE ALLIANCE'S THEATRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.

4. TODAY'S PRESS COMMENT IS ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORTIVE OF KOHL'S DECISION, ON BOTH RIGHT AND LEFT WING. IT IS NOTED THAT KOHL HAS TAKEN THE WIND FROM THE OPPOSITION'S SAILS. THERE IS WIDESPREAD

COMMENT THAT NO-ONE SHOULD NOW CHARGE THE GERMANS WITH BLOCKING DISARMAMENT. KOHL PERSONALLY SEEMS TO HAVE GAINED SOME BROWNIE POINTS FOR HAVING TAKEN THIS DECISIVE LEAD ON P1AS. SEVERAL PAPERS NOTE THAT STRAUSS HAS YET TO PRONOUNCE.

5. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH KOHL HIMSELF STATED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD CREATED AN ARTIFICIAL HURDLE OUT OF THE P1A, NONE OF TODAY'S PRESS COMMENT (SURPRISINGLY) CRITICISES KOHL FOR HAVING GIVEN INTO THIS PRESSURE, AND FOR HAVING THEREBY ENCOURAGED THE RUSSIANS TO CONTINUE PLAYING ON GERMAN POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PERHAPS THIS IS BECAUSE THE P1AS WERE WIDELY RECOGNISED AS NEARING THE END OF THEIR USEFUL LIFE ANYWAY.

6. VERBATIM TEXT OF KOHL'S STATEMENT IN MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

WILLIAMS

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BONN TELNO 656: INF: PERSHING 1A'S
SUMMARY
1. ADMINISTRATION REACTION TO KOHL PRESS CONFERENCE.
DETAIL
2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY CHANCELLOR KOHL ON 26 AUGUST THAT HE WAS READY TO RENOUNCE PERSHING 1A'S IF A SATISFACTORY INF AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED AND IMPLEMENTED DID NOT COME AS A COMPLETE SURPRISE TO THE ADMINISTRATION. A LETTER FROM CHANCELLOR KOHL TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS DELIVERED LATE ON 25 AUGUST AND KOHL ALSO TELEPHONED CARLUCCI. KOHL ATTEMPTED TO GAIN US SUPPORT FOR A REFERENCE, TO THE DECISION HAVING BEEN MADE IN THE LIGHT OF US/FRG CONSULTATIONS: AND FOR THE PASSAGE ON SOVIET MODERNISATION UNDER 500KMS/SCUD (PARA 3 OF TUR). HE WAS DENIED SATISFACTION ON BOTH COUNTS THOUGH HE WAS GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION WOULD BE MEASURED AND GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE.
3. PRESIDENT REAGAN PROVIDED SUCH A REACTION IN HIS SPEECH IN CALIFORNIA ON 26 AUGUST (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM), SAYING THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD REMOVED ''EVEN THIS ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE.'' IN A PRESS BRIEFING PRIOR TO THAT SPEECH, CARLUCCI REVEALED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE OFFER, STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ''ABSOLUTELY NO PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED STATES'', AND WENT ON TO CHARACTERISE PROSPECTS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT AS NOW BEING ''VERY PROMISING.''
4. THE KOHL OFFER WAS HANDLED LESS ADROITLY AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS CONFERENCE, WHERE QUESTIONS FOCUSSED ON THE OWNERSHIP, THE CONTROL AND THE EVENTUAL FATE OF THE PIA WARHEADS. THAT SAID, THE PIA QUESTION IS MUCH LESS SENSITIVECC DOMESTICALLY THAN THAT OF VERIFICATION, AND THE KOHL OFFER WILL BE GENERALLY INTERPRETED HERE AS GIVING FURTHER MOMENTUM TO THE INF TALKS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.

ACLAND

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INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW

MODUK FOR DACU
SIC C2A
MY TELNO 646: INF: GEMAN PERSHING 1AS

SUMMARY
1. KOHL INDICATES READINESS TO RENOUNCE PERSHING 1AS IF A SATISFACTORY INF AGREEMENT IS CONCLUDED AND IMPLEMENTED.

DETAIL
2. KOHL GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY, IMMEDIATELY AFTER CABINET. HE SAID THAT THE GERMAN P1AS HAD NEVER BEEN, AND COULD NOT BE, THE OBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. SOVIET CALLS FOR THE CONTRARY WERE AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE TO AN INF AGREEMENT. AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW AT A DECISIVE STAGE IT WAS SELF-EVIDENT THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A BREAKTHROUGH. KOHL SAID HE WAS READY TO RENOUNCE MODERNISATION OF P1A, AND INDEED DO AWAY WITH THE MISSILES, PROVIDED THAT:
A) THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION CONFIRMED AGREEMENT IN GENEVA ON GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF INF MISSILES:
B) THE OUTSTANDING VERIFICATION QUESTIONS WERE SETTLED TO EVERYONE'S SATISFACTION:
C) THE INF AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED AND ENTERED IN TO FORCE: AND
D) THE TREATY PARTNERS COMPLIED WITH THE AGREED TIME FRAME (NOT SPECIFIED) FOR REMOVAL OF THEIR WEAPONS.

3. KOHL ALSO CHALLENGED THE SOVIET UNION TO RENOUNCE THEIR CURRENT MODERNISATION OF MISSILES UNDER 500KMS AND IN PARTICULAR HE CALLED FOR SUPPORT FROM POLAND, GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO SECURE REDUCITON OF THE SOVIET SCUD B MISSILES.

4. GENSCHER (FDP) DECLARED HIMSELF ''HIGHLY PLEASED'' WITH THE DISARMAMENT POLICY LINE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT. MISCHNICK (FDP PARLIAMENTARY PARTY LEADER) EXPRESSED SUPPORT. EHMKE (SPD SPOKESMAN) SAID THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTED LIMITED PROGRESS, BUT

THAT THERE WERE STILL QUESTION MARKS OVER KOHL'S CONDITIONS, AND THE SPECIAL BUNDESTAG SESSION CALLED FOR NEXT WEEK WAS STILL NECESSARY. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER ALL CDU/CSU SPOKESMEN WOULD SUPPORT KOHL'S LINE.

5. A CSU SPOKESMAN HAD SAID EARLIER TODAY THAT THE CSU WERE NOT PREPARED TO RENOUNCE THE 72 P1AS. THESE WERE A NECESSARY SECURITY, AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN UP FOR NOTHING IN ADVANCE OF BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND SNF DISARMAMENT TALKS.

COMMENT

6. AS YOU KNOW, IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME THAT THERE IS LITTLE EXPECTATION HERE THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD ACTUALLY GO THROUGH WITH MODERNISATION, AND IT WAS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PERSHINGS WOULD WITHER ON ON THE VINE ANYWAY BY ABOUT 1991. THERE WERE SOME WHO HOPED TO OBTAIN A QUID PRO QUO FOR RENOUNCING THEM. THEY WILL NOT BE SATISFIED WITH PARA 3 AND IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT KOHL HAS FULLY SQUARED HIS RIGHT. BUT HIS ANNOUNCEMENT NOW MAKES EXCELLENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL SENSE WITH LAND ELECTIONS ON 13 SEPTEMBER (AND THE SPECIAL BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON 2 SEPTEMBER). WHETHER THE AMERICANS, WHO APPEARED ONLY RECENTLY (MY TELNO 634) TO BE TRYING TO STIFFEN THE GERMANS, HAVE CHANGED THEIR POSITION IN THE LAST DAY OR SO IS NOT CLEAR. KOHL'S ANNOUNCEMENT CAREFULLY PRESERVES THE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE THAT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS CAN ONLY DEAL WITH MISSILES OWNED BY THE SUPER-POWERS.

WILLIAMS

YYYY

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ADDITIONAL 24

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVISERS

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ORIGINAL FILED ON IRAQ: IRAN RELATIONS PT 7

10 (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

26 August 1987

Dear Charles

CDP 27/8

Mr Gorbachev's reply to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 8 August to the Resident Clerk, enclosing Mr Gorbachev's reply to the Prime Minister's two recent messages. The Prime Minister may like to have some comments (reflecting the Foreign Secretary's views) on Mr Gorbachev's message.

It covers the range of nuclear arms control issues. He first deals with the prospects for an INF agreement, outlining outstanding differences in familiar terms. His hope that the UK will speak up in favour of an INF agreement looks rhetorical in the light of the Prime Minister's message and our well-known public position on this. The Prime Minister's message did not deal with the question of the FRG Pershing IAs, of which Mr Gorbachev is now making a great deal. But we do not believe it is necessary for the Prime Minister to respond on this point at present. The Soviet Union can be in no doubt about the Alliance's view on this issue; it seems best to continue to let the US, as the negotiator, put that view to the Russians.

The claim in the strategic and space section that the Soviet Union has been making the concessions and that it is now for the US to respond is specious; so too probably is the hope that the Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting in mid-September will be able to find a practical way out of the difficulties. That would be the opportunity for the two sides to make progress if the Russians really want a strategic arms control agreement. But their good intentions in this area are not yet proven. The message contains no new detail on the outstanding areas of difficulty, particularly sub-limits.

In the defence and space area, Mr Gorbachev implicitly invites the Prime Minister to revert to him with more detail of her ideas on predictability as a means of resolving the outstanding issues. Up to now we have had little evidence that he has given the Prime Minister's ideas the consideration he promised at their meeting in March/April. The US have picked up these ideas at least in part in their proposal for an annual

SECRET

data exchange as a confidence building measure. The current Soviet proposal, for a list of permissible and impermissible activities in space, would be unacceptable to (at least some parts of) the US Administration. If the Prime Minister is to respond to Mr Gorbachev on this point it will be important to seek to move the Russians away from this and any other ideas which we know would be unacceptable to the US. We are giving thought to possible ways of achieving this, and of how any further British ideas might best be put forward. We shall let you have a recommendation on this shortly.

On the Gulf, of course, events have moved on a lot. Mr Gorbachev has sent a full reply to the Prime Minister's message of 5 August. The Soviet Union, like China, is trying to avoid having to declare itself for or against an arms embargo against Iran and to string out discussions in New York. The Russians have exploited Iran's isolation from the US, UK and France to improve their own standing in Tehran. To some extent they have made common cause with the Iranians against the US naval presence in the Gulf, with their proposal for the withdrawal of non-littoral foreign forces. In short, while declaring themselves (probably genuinely) in favour of an early political settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict, they are also using current opportunities to bolster their own position in the region at Western, and especially US, expense. Mr Gorbachev's claim that the Soviet Union is "taking all measures to prevent an escalation of the conflict, to stabilise the situation" is disingenuous.

Mr Gorbachev has accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to a further meeting, but without committing himself to visiting the UK next year. The Foreign Secretary may be able to gauge his intentions when he visits Moscow.

We are pursuing, through our Embassy in Moscow, the idea of a visit by Mr Aganbegyan in the autumn.

I am copying this letter to Ian Andrews (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Prime Minister
A helpful
response

24 AUG 1987

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
Whitehall
London SW1
England

Dear Prime Minister:

Thank you for your recent letter. I believe, as you do, that in the event of an INF agreement SLCMs contributing support to SACEUR on a flexible, "as available" basis will form a key part of NATO's overall required force adjustments. I am pleased with the progress that NATO's High Level Group is making in defining this and other elements of a post-INF agreement force adjustment package. I look forward to discussing this subject with you as it takes more concrete form in the months ahead.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X44190

PM TOURS: Washington June 87

SECRET UK EYES A

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Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-270 3000

CDP
7/P

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

I have seen your response of 30 July to George Younger's minute of 16 July.

I endorse what you say. Clearly there is no practical prospect of NATO raising its spending on conventional defence in order to eliminate the Warsaw Pact conventional superiority. Nor would we carry much political conviction if we attempted to argue that reductions in nuclear weapons, as a result of arms control, must entail increased spending on more expensive conventional arms. The future must therefore lie in serious attempts at conventional arms control, aiming as ever for mutual security at lower levels of forces. I agree this requires serious proposals from NATO to maintain our public credibility.

I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, George Younger, other members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

N.L.

N.L.
6 August 1987

DEFENCE

ARMS CONTROL

PT 13

8

ADVANCE COPIES 20

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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19.11.8

SECRET
~~FM WASHINGTON~~
TO DESKBY 040800Z FCO
TELNO 1669
OF 032315Z AUGUST 87
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, BONN, MODUK

SIC
MODUK FOR DACU
INF: PERSHING 1AS
SUMMARY

1. OBUKHOV AND KAMPELMAN PUBLICLY SPEAK OF COMPROMISE ON P1AS, MUCH TO DISMAY OF STATE DEPARTMENT.

DETAIL

2. INTEREST HERE IN THE PERSHING 1A ISSUE HAS BEEN FURTHER HEIGHTENED BY REMARKS MADE BY OBUKHOV AND GLITMAN ON THE NBC NEWS PROGRAMME QUOTE MEET THE PRESS UNQUOTE ON 2 AUGUST. OBUKHOV (UNUSUALLY) SPOKE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING A COMPROMISE WHEREBY THE P1AS AND THEIR US WARHEADS WOULD REMAIN IN THE FRG, BUT WOULD NOT BE REPLACED ONCE OBSOLETE. KAMPELMAN, IN A SEPARATE INTERVIEW, ON THE SAME PROGRAMME, SAID THAT SUCH A COMPROMISE WAS QUOTE OBVIOUSLY AN OPTION WE'VE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE.

3. ON 3 AUGUST, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WAS AT PAINS TO REINTERPRET KAMPELMAN'S REMARKS. KAMPELMAN, HE SAID, WAS QUOTE INDICATING ..... THAT THIS A POINT OF SOVIET CONCERN, IT IS SOMETHING THAT THE SOVIETS RAISED WITH US, AND AS ALWAYS, WE LISTENED TO WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY UNQUOTE. THE SPOKESMAN REFUSED TO DESCRIBE THE POSSIBLE COMPROMISE AS AN QUOTE OPTION UNQUOTE, AND SAID THAT KAMPELMAN HAD, ELSEWHERE IN THE INTERVIEW, SPOKEN OF THE STATUS OF P1AS IN TERMS OF THE STANDARD STATE DEPARTMENT LINE.

4. PRIVATELY, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE DISMAYED AT KAMPELMAN'S REMARKS, WHICH THEY SEE AS TENDING TO UNDERCUT THE HARD LINE THEY HAVE TAKEN IN GENEVA AND COMPLICATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH BONN. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT KAMPELMAN SAID, STATE HAVE ASSURED US THAT NO REPEAT NO SUCH DEAL HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE RUSSIANS, EITHER IN GENEVA OR ELSEWHERE.

CROWE

YYYY

ORWBAN 3415

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GRS 250

CONFIDENTIAL
FM BONN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 587
OF 031630Z AUGUST 87
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON

MODUK FOR DACU

YOUR TELNO 1206 TO WASHINGTON: INF/PERSHING 1AS

1. HOLIK TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE CONSIDERABLE PLAY WITH THEIR P1A DEMAND BUT BELIEVED THAT PROVIDED THE AMERICANS DID NOT FALTER THEY WOULD IN THE END BACK DOWN. IF THE AMERICANS DID FALTER, THIS WOULD CREATE A DIFFICULT SITUATION HERE AND THERE WOULD BE A BRUISING BATTLE WITH STRAUSS IN PARTICULAR.

2. ASKED TO COMMENT ON GERMAN RADIO REPORTS THAT KAMPELMAN HAS ADMITTED THAT NON-MODERNISATION COULD BE A WAY OUT OF THE DIFFICULTY AND THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THIS WITH THE RUSSIANS, HOLIK TOOK THE LINE THT NON-MODERNISATION COULD NOT BE A SUBJECT FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE FINANCIALLY AS WELL AS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT NOW THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE RULED OUT CONVERTING P11S.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS OF A POSSIBLE INTEREST IN GETTING SOMETHING OUT OF THE RUSSIANS IN EXCHANGE IF GROUND HAS TO BE GIVEN OVER THE P1AS. AN FMOD SPOKESMAN HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SUGGESTING THAT THESE COULD BE A USEFUL CARD IN SECURING CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS (THOUGH THE PRESS HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT THIS WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH NATO'S POSITION ON THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY MANDATE). DURING A TV INTERVIEW ON 31 JULY, TELTSCHIK DREW ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET MISSILE INVENTORY IN THE RANGE 150 TO 500 AND APPEARED TO SUGGEST THAT THE P1AS COULD BE TRADED AGAINST A REDUCTION IN THIS CATEGORY. BUT

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN QUICK TO DENY THAT THE FRG WAS PROPOSING ANY DEAL ON THESE LINES AND TO REAFFIRM THAT THE P1AS ARE NOT FOR DISCUSSION IN GENEVA.

WILLIAMS

YYYY

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MODUK FOR DACU

START

SUMMARY

1. SOVIET DRAFT START TREATY TABLED ON 31 JULY. NO MAJOR SURPRISES, TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION ASIDE. FORMAT ENCOURAGES HOPES THAT WORKING GROUPS CAN BEGIN JOINT DRAFTING. UPBEAT STATE DEPARTMENT REACTION.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE GENEVA NST AT LAST MADE GOOD THEIR PREDICTIONS OF THE PAST THREE MONTHS AND TABLED A DRAFT START TREATY ON 31 JULY. THE TEXT CONTAINS NO MOVEMENT FORWARD ON THE KEY PROBLEM ISSUES OF SUBLIMITS, THROWWEIGHT, SLCMS, ALCMS, RE-ENTRY VEHICLE (RV) COUNTING RULES AND MOBILE ICBMS. HOWEVER, ON TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION, THEY HAVE SHIFTED TACK BY PROPOSING A BLANKET BAN ON DATA DENIAL IN TERMS SIMILAR TO THOSE USED IN PREVIOUS US DRAFTS.

3. THE INITIAL REACTION OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAS BEEN POSITIVE. THEY SEE THE NEW DRAFT TREATY AS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD, THOUGH MORE IN TERMS OF ITS FORMAT THAN ITS SUBSTANCE. IN PARTICULAR THEY ARE GRATIFIED THAT US TERMINOLOGY HAS BEEN USED EXTENSIVELY, AND THAT MANY MINOR US PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED. THE NEW DRAFT, COUPLED WITH THE US/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF START WORKING GROUPS IN GENEVA A FEW WEEKS AGO, HAS GIVEN RISE TO EXPECTATIONS THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL NOW BE ABLE TO GET DOWN TO DRAFTING A JOINT TEXT. THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 31 JULY REFLECTED THESE SENTIMENTS IN WELCOMING THE TEXT (SEE MIFT). THE SPOKESMAN WENT ON TO ECHO THE LEHMAN LINE THAT THE TWO SIDES "CAN COMPLETE A START TREATY RAPIDLY, PERHAPS EVEN THIS YEAR" BEFORE CRITICISING THE CONTINUED SOVIET START/SPACE LINKAGE. HOWEVER OFFICIALS IN STATE AND ACDA PRIVATELY DISCOUNT SUCH TALK OF AN EARLY START AGREEMENT AS BEING OVERLY AMBITIOUS.

CROWE

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FCS/87/168

EDD 30/7.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Conventional Arms Control

1. Thank you for your minute of 16 July about the prospects for, and possible risks involved in, conventional arms control.

2. I accept of course that a bad conventional arms control agreement would be damaging to our security. And I share your concern that in elaborating Western proposals and deciding how to react to proposals from the Soviet Union the military implications for both our national forces and the capabilities of the Alliance as a whole must be rigorously studied. We must ensure that before we advocate or accept anything the consequences are thought through.

3. I am as sceptical as anyone about whether Mr Gorbachev will eventually, despite his protestations, be prepared to accept the kind of heavily asymmetrical conventional reductions which would be necessary in Europe to enhance our security. But I am convinced that we must put him to the test by making serious and substantial proposals of our own.

4. If we fail to do this we risk damaging the public credibility of both the arms control and defence aspects of our security policy. We have been laying particular stress on the need to redress conventional imbalances in Europe. We have cited them as a principal reason for establishing priorities for arms control in Europe post-INF which focus

on the conventional rather than the nuclear field (other than START). We will have difficulty in sustaining this line over the coming months unless we can point to serious proposals of our own.

5. Experience over the past few years has shown that the best way to maintain public support for the necessary level of spending on defence is to be seen to be serious about searching for limitations on military capabilities which are compatible with our security. This applies on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, the existence of serious Western proposals for conventional arms control should reduce the pressure for unilateral US troops withdrawals from Europe. And here, in Europe, where the bulk of defence expenditure is in the conventional area, we need to show that the Warsaw Pact threat creates a real requirement for the level of conventional forces which we and our Allies maintain; and that we have made serious efforts to constrain Warsaw Pact capabilities.

6. I am glad therefore that you agree that we should aim to have by the end of this year substantial proposals which we could eventually present in the new "conventional stability" negotiation, assuming that it takes place. I hope that the ideas which FCO officials have put informally to the MOD (and which, I understand, the Chiefs of Staff have accepted as a basis for further work) will contribute to our input to the Alliance's deliberations. I agree with you that we should beware of raising unrealistic public expectations; but equally we must not allow the Soviet Union to occupy the high ground. It is now over a year since the Alliance issued its Declaration at Halifax calling for a new approach to conventional arms control. Since then, procedural issues have unfortunately tended to dominate NATO's discussions. But these have now been resolved, and we need to accelerate the substantive work.

7. You refer in paragraph 2 of your minute to the precariousness of our current position. We should certainly not allow our security to be eroded. But I see no reason to expect that, in the absence of progress through arms control, things will get any better. The trend in our defence budget and those of most of our Allies is one of retrenchment, not real growth. At the same time the cost of defence equipment continues to rise exponentially; and many of our European Allies, notably the Germans, will face grave demographic problems in the 1990s. Meanwhile Soviet and Warsaw Pact military programmes and expenditure continue unabated.

8. The chances of improving conventional stability in Europe through an arms control agreement may not be high. But I am convinced that we have both political and budgetary incentives to make the effort.

9. I am sending copies of this minute to the recipients of yours.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
30 July 1987

DEFENCE

ARMS CONTROL

PT 13



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SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

CDP
28/7.

28 July 1987

Dear Charles,

INF

The Soviet agreement to global zero/zero, while helpful in itself, has focussed attention on the problem of the PIAs. The Foreign Secretary considers that it would be helpful for the Embassy in Washington and other interested posts to have up to date guidance on the lines of the enclosed draft telegram.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to John Howe (MOD).

Yours ever,

Hugh Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

SECRET

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	SECRET		IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
TC
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TO
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FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELNO
OF 271730Z JULY 87
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INFO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE, UKDIS GENEVA, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

INF

1. It is no doubt still too early to reach a definitive assessment of the prospects for an INF agreement in the light of the latest Soviet move, but the following preliminary reactions may be helpful.

2. The positive Soviet response to Western pressure to accept zero/zero on a global basis opens the way to an agreement which will be both better from our point of view and in important respects easier to negotiate than one leaving a hundred warheads, and associated systems and infrastructure, in the United States and Soviet Asia. At the same time, the PIA issue is brought into sharper focus by the conditions set out by the Soviet negotiators (though not made explicit by Gorbachev in his public announcement of the move).

/// // / 3. The American response (my telno 1186 to Washington) rules out the most cost-effective way of "modernising" the PIAs (by substituting PIBs converted from PIIs), but otherwise concedes nothing to Soviet demands. We assume that there is an element of

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		Catchword: negotiating	
File number	Dept: AUSS	Drafted by (Block capitals): B J P FALL	Telephone no: 2183
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XY48 (REV)

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification	Caveat	Precedence
	SECRET		IMMEDIATE

negotiating fat in the US position (which would leave open the possibility not only of modernisation in other ways, but also of transfer to the FRG of additional warheads) but we think it none the worse for that. We see no reason to conclude that the Soviet Union has said its last word on the subject (although the present inflexible line may well be played hard both within and without the conference room, as Moscow seeks to assess what the market - and Alliance cohesion - will bear).

4. At the end of the day we do not think that any of the parties principally involved (the Americans, the Germans and the Soviet Union) will want to see an INF agreement of the kind now envisaged frustrated by the PIA issue. We accept that there may have to be changes in the current American (and, indeed, Allied) position. There will be much scope for brinkmanship, and it will take cool heads - and further intervention at the political level - to resolve the issue satisfactorily.

5. We shall have two considerations especially in mind:

(i) the question is particularly difficult for the Germans, as the internal debate over zero/zero SRINF and its aftermath have made clear. It will require careful handling, in close cooperation between Washington and Bonn. We see our role as supporting their efforts to find a satisfactory solution, but would not wish to take the lead in advocating any particular formula. In particular, we do not want either to undermine the American negotiating position, or to appear to be putting pressure on the FRG semi colon

(ii) the robust American attitude makes good tactical sense at this stage, and we have been taking a similar line in contacts with the Russians. But the Americans are presumably giving thought to possible compromises, and the Russians may be much more concerned to inhibit or prevent the modernisation than to secure the elimination of the PIAs. If a solution along these lines were acceptable to the Americans and Germans we would not

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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wish to oppose it on substance, but we have a vital interest in maintaining the distinction between the PIAs and third party systems proper (ie ours and the French). The independent nuclear deterrents operating under UK and French national control are entirely different from the hybrid US/~~UK and French~~ FRG arrangement for the PIAs. But the Russians and some pressure groups in the West would no doubt try to use any deal on the PIAs to argue for early negotiations on the UK and French deterrents. We would therefore expect to be consulted in good time about the form and, indeed, the precise language of any proposal for dealing with the PIAs. We would have to look especially closely at any proposal for a deal forming an integral part of the INF agreement.

6. Please draw on this material as appropriate with reliable contacts.

HOWE

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UK/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY 1230 25/7

4

TOKYO

SECRET

Prime Minister
This is how the Americans propose to respond today to the Soviet offer.
CPR.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE SCG REPS AND CTHER HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (Tokyo and Canberra) FCLLCWING MESSAGE FROM SCG CHAIRMAN H ALLEN HOLMES. USNATO MAY ALSO SHARE INFORMATION WITH APPROPRIATE NATO OFFICIALS.

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

AS YCU HAVE BEEN INFORMED, SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ON 22 JULY AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA ON 23 JULY HAVE ANNOUNCED ACCEPTANCE OF DOUBLE GLOBAL ZERO FOR SRINF AND LRINF MISSILES. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATOR EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR NEW POSITION WAS INTRODUCED UNDER DIRECT INSTRUCTION FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE.

COINCIDENT WITH THEIR FORMAL ZERO-ZERO PROPOSALS IN GENEVA, THE SOVIETS IDENTIFIED A SERIES OF "ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES" WHICH THEY REQUIRE THE US TO REMOVE. THESE REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE: ELIMINATION OF ANY RIGHT TO

CONVERT INF MISSILE SYSTEMS TO OTHER MILITARY PURPOSES; NO TRANSFER OF INF MISSILES TO SEABASED MISSILE SYSTEMS; ELIMINATION OF US PROVISIONS TO PERMIT NEW TYPES OF INF MISSILES; REVISION OF US PROPOSED PHASING FOR REDUCTIONS OF INF SYSTEMS WHICH THE SOVIETS CLAIM IS UNEQUAL; AND SIMPLIFICATION OF US PROPOSALS FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES.

THE SOVIETS ALSO REASSERTED THEIR WELL KNOWN POSITION CONCERNING THE ELIMINATION OF US WARHEADS DEPLOYED IN SUPPCRT OF GERMAN PERSHING IA MISSILES. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN IMMEDIATELY NOTED THAT INCLUSION OF THESE WARHEADS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

THE UNITED STATES ANTICIPATES RESPONDING TC THE SOVIET

SECRET

PROPOSAL IN GENEVA ON 27 JULY. WE WILL MAKE OFFICIAL THE INFORMAL RESPONSE WE MADE TO SOVIET NEGOTIATORS ON 20 JUNE AFTER COLONEL GENERAL CHERVOV INITIALLY SIGNALED SOVIET RECEPTIVITY TO GLOBAL ZERO. THEREFORE, WE WILL PROPOSE THAT:

IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO

-- GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF AND SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS;
-- INCLUSION OF THE ELIMINATION OF SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS AS AN INTEGRAL AND BINDING PART OF THE INF AGREEMENT;
-- STRICT AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS;
-- APPLICATION OF THE INF TREATY ONLY TO THE LRINF AND SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS OF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION;

THEN THE US WILL AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING

-- DESTRUCTION AND DISMANTLEMENT OF US LRINF AND SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS;
-- NO CONVERSION OF US LRINF AND SRINF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS;
-- CONSEQUENTLY, NO TRANSFER OF ANY EXISTING US LRINF OR SRINF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS, I.E. THOSE ACTUALLY IN THE US FORCE TO ANY THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING THE FRG.

CONCERNING THE FRG PERSHING IAS, AMBASSADOR GLITMAN WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THESE SYSTEMS ARE NOT ON THE TABLE; THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY LIMITS, DIRECT OR INDIRECT ON THESE SYSTEMS; AND THAT THE US INTENDS TO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN OF COOPERATION WITH THE FRG REGARDING THE PERSHING MISSILE SYSTEMS.

REGARDING VERIFICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT WITH GLOBAL ZERO FOR SRINF AND LRINF THERE CAN BE SIGNIFICANT

SIMPLIFICATION OF THE VERIFICATION REGIME. WE ARE STUDYING THIS ISSUE CAREFULLY AND ANTICIPATE REVISING OUR PROPOSAL SOON.

SINCERELY,

H. ALLEN HOLMES

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS — MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P) }
SIR J FRETWELL — D. Nuc (POL) SY } MOD
MR BOYD, — DACU }
CDI }
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

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

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MY TELNOS 1063, 1064 AND 1065: UK/SOVIET TALKS ON ARMS CONTROL: CALL ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BESSMERTNYKH

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MAIN POINTS OF YESTERDAY'S TALKS WITH KARPOV AND GRINEVSKY. BESSMERTNYKH EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN ~~GENEVA~~ Washington ON STATE OF PLAY IN US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS AND WELCOMED THE FACT THAT UK/SOVIET EXCHANGES IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT FIELD WERE BECOMING MORE FREQUENT AND DETAILED.

DETAIL

2. FALL AND I HAD JUST OVER AN HOUR WITH BESSMERTNYKH AND KARPOV, WITHOUT INTERPRETATION. BESSMERTNYKH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID IN WASHINGTON IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WERE SLOWING THINGS DOWN. HE DESCRIBED HER REPLY ON THIS POINT AS ''A GOOD STATEMENT AT A CRUCIAL MOMENT'', CLEARLY IMPLYING THEREBY A HELPFUL INFLUENCE ON THE RECENT SOVIET MOVE. FALL CONFIRMED OUR WELCOME FOR THE MOVE TO GLOBAL ZERO-ZERO, WHICH SHOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATORS' TASK EASIER ON VERIFICATION AND IN FINDING SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAD ARISEN OVER CONVERSION.

3. BESSMERTNYKH EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE US WOULD NOW RECIPROCATE AND REMOVE ''ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES''. HE DEVOTED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE P1A PROBLEM WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS PRESENTING POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, MORAL AND HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SOVIET UNION. FALL EMPHASISED THAT, ALTHOUGH

DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SOVIET UNION. FALL EMPHASISED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE P1A WAS NOT A THIRD PARTY SYSTEM IN THE ESTABLISHED SENSE, THERE WERE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED ON THE WESTERN SIDE. HE REBUTTED A SUGGESTION FROM BESSMERTNYKH THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION HAD EMERGED ONLY RECENTLY AND BEEN IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES ON GERMANY AND OTHER ALLIES. HE NOTED THAT BESSMERTNYKH HAD NOT SOUGHT TO ARGUE THAT THE P1AS CONSTITUTED AN UNACCEPTABLE STRATEGIC OR MILITARY THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES. WE WERE CONVINCED THAT THEY DID NOT. WE WERE NOT SEEKING TO LEAVE OPEN A PATH FOR CIRCUMVENTION AND, IF ONE LOOKED AT THE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD REMAIN IN EUROPE AFTER SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF AN IMF AGREEMENT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE WARSAW PACT WAS IN NO WAY DISADVANTAGED. FURTHER DISCUSSION TOOK MATTERS NO FURTHER FORWARD THOUGH FALL WAS ABLE TO ENCOURAGE A TENDENCY IN BESSMERTNYKH TO FOCUS ON QUESTIONS OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION RATHER THAN QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE. BESSMERTNYKH CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS NOT THE ONLY DIFFICULT ISSUE REMAINING.

4. ON START AND SDI BESSMERTNYKH TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON POINTS PREVIOUSLY RAISED BY KARPOV. THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT ACROSS THE BOARD, BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE MOVEMENT ALSO ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. ON THE SDI, THE SOVIETS HAD MADE A DETAILED ANALYSIS AND WERE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH THE REAL PROBLEM FROM THE SURROUNDING HYPE. THERE WOULD BE A BUSY SUMMER IN GENEVA, HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE ''GETTING BACK ON THE TRACK OF POLITICAL CONTACTS'' AND ASSESSED THE OVERALL PROSPECTS AS BRIGHTER THAN FOR SOME TIME.

5. ON THE CONVENTIONAL TALKS, FALL TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERLINE THE FIRMNESS OF THE NATO POSITION ON THE EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO EXPRESS THE STRONG HOPE THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD NOT (NOT) BE SUCH AS TO LEAD US INTO A BLIND ALLEY ON THE SENSITIVE QUESTION OF LINKAGE WITH THE CSCE. BESSMERTNYKH DID NOT TAKE UP EITHER POINT DIRECTLY, THOUGH HE ASKED IN A MORE GENERAL CONTEXT FOR AN EXPLANATION OF OUR THINKING ON REMAINING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. FALL GAVE A GENERAL EXPLANATION OF ALLIANCE THINKING ON THE ''COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT'' AND UNDERLINED THE PRIORITIES AGREED AT CAMP DAVID AND ENDORSED BY THE NAC IN DECEMBER 1986.

6. MEETING CONCLUDED WITH BESSMERTNYKH ENDORSING THE VALUE OF REGULAR BILATERAL CONTACTS COVERING FULL RANGE OF DISARMAMENT QEUSTIONS, INCLUDING NST CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL.

CARTLEDGE

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MOSCOW TELNOS 1057 AND 1066: GORBACHEV ON INF: FRG REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. POSITIVE RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S AGREEMENT TO GLOBAL ZERO INF. PRESS THINK PIAS MAY HAVE TO GO.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV'S READINESS TO ACCEPT GLOBAL DOUBLE ZERO HAS BEEN GREATLY WELCOMED HERE. GENSCHER SAID IT WAS A SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD, MAKING THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION EASIER TO SOLVE. HE HAD URGED THE CASE FOR GLOBAL DOUBLE ZERO ON SHEVARDNADZE DURING VON WEIZSAECKER'S VISIT. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN OST SAID THAT CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT AS AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH ADDING THAT IT WOSGRPRF XU

YY(15173:74856 9% %483,@' -,@ -))83' 8,
-'8-. THE CHANCELLOR BELIEVED THAT THE CHANCE OF AN AGREEMENT BEING REACHED BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR HAD INCREASED. OPPOSITION PARTIES ALSO WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

3. PUBLIC ATTENTION IS NOW FOCUSSING MORE SHARPLY ON THE PIAS. OST SAID THE US HAD RIGHTLY REJECTED THE INCLUSION OF PIAS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CLEAR POSITION WAS SUPPORTED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. HAUSSMANN (FDP SECRETARY-GENERAL) SAID (AMBIGUOUSLY) THAT THE INF AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT AND WOULD NOT FAIL BECAUSE OF PIAS. OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN HAVE CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO CLING TO PIAS.

4. MOST PRESS COMMENT TENDS IN THE SAME DIRECTION. AN HISTORIC CHANCE WOULD BE LOST IF THE AGREEMENT FAILED OVER PIAS. IT WAS ILLOGICAL TO KEEP THESE MISSILES, AND IF THE US WERE TO CHANGE ITS STANCE IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, BONN COULD HARDLY HOLD OUT. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PREPARE TO COMPROMISE.

WILLIAMS

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UK/SOVIET TALKS ON ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. SOVIET PRESENTATION OF NEW POSITIONS TO BE TABLED TODAY IN GENEVA NUCLEAR/SPACE TALKS (NST). NO HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL MEETING ENVISAGED, NEGOTIATORS TO CONTINUE WORK IN GENEVA THROUGHOUT AUGUST.

2. ACCEPTANCE OF GLOBAL INF ELIMINATION IF FIVE CONDITIONS MET, INCLUDING ELIMINATION OF US WARHEADS ON PERSHING 1A. NO SHIFT ON PHASING OF REDUCTIONS. ENQUIRY ABOUT NATURE OF UK PARTICIPATION IN VERIFICATION.

3. NEW SOVIET MOVES IN STRATEGIC ARMS, WITH DRAFT TREATY TO BE TABLED. CONTINUED RESISTENCE TO SUB-LIMITS BEYOND 50% CUTS ACROSS BOARD, ACCUSATION OF US BACK-SLIDING.

4. ON SPACE/DEFENCE NEW TEN-YEAR DRAFT AGREEMENT ON OBSERVING ABM TREATY AND (WITHOUT DIRECT LEGAL REFERENCE TO THAT) ON SPECIFIED DEVICES NOT TO BE PLACED IN SPACE, INCLUDING FOR TESTING PURPOSES.

5. UK WELCOMED SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, RE-EMPHASISED

5. UK WELCOMED SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, RE-EMPHASISED WESTERN POSITION ON P1A, UNDERLINED CONSTRAINTS ON INF VERIFICATION ON UK TERRITORY, CONTESTED SOVIET VIEW ON START SUB/LIMITS.

6. AGREEMENT ON VALUE OF UK/SOVIET DIALOGUE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, TO BE PURSUED. ALSO AGREEMENT ON NEED TO PURSUE US/SOVIET TALKS ON NUCLEAR TESTING, BUT UK RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOVIET LINKAGE, THERE AND IN CD, WITH CTBT OBJECTIVE.

DETAIL

7. FCO/MOD AND SOVIET TEAMS (LED BY FALL AND KARPOV RESPECTIVELY) HELD A FULL DAY'S TALKS ON ARMS CONTROL HERE TODAY. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TIMELY IN THE LIGHT OF GORBACHEV'S ACCEPTANCE YESTERDAY OF GLOBAL INF ZERO, AND OF THE NEW SOVIET MOVES TO BE TABLED TODAY IN GENEVA ON WHICH WE WERE BRIEFED. THE TALKS ALSO COVERED NUCLEAR TESTING AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (SEE MIFT), AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY). FALL IS TO SEE BESSMERTNYKH TOMORROW.

INF

8. KARPOV INTRODUCED THE NEW SOVIET NST POSITION BY ASCRIBING IT TO THE SOVIET WISH TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY ASIAN COUNTRIES. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW READY TO ACCEPT THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF ALL LRINF AND SRINF DOWN TO 500KM. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE TOLD IN GENEVA TODAY (AND KARPOV IS GIVING A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS AFTERNOON, WHICH MAY GO OVER SOME OF THE SAME GROUND) THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCORPORATE FIVE OTHER CONDITIONS:

(I) THE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OF THE MISSILES TO BE ELIMINATED IE A BAN ON CONVERSION OF PERSHING II INTO SRINF OR OF NUCLEAR SRINF INTO CONVENTIONAL VERSIONS.

(II) A BAN ON THE TRANSFER TO THE FRG OR OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE MISSILES TO BE ELIMINATED.

(III) A BAN ON THE PRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES IN THE 500/5500KM RANGE.

(IV) COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION FOR ALL THESE PROCESSES.

(V) ELIMINATION OF WARHEADS IN ADDITION TO MISSILES, INCLUDING US WARHEADS ON P1AS.

9. FALL SAID THAT OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE GORBACHEV MOVE WAS POSITIVE. GLOBAL ELIMINATION WOULD HELP TO RESOLVE A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. WE WERE READY TO ASSIST WITH THE VERIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES AT US-OPERATED FACILITIES IN THE UK. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE NATO AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE P1A. KARPOV RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO THE GERMANS KEEPING THEIR MISSILES, AND NO SOVIET INTENTION TO INTRODUCE THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THEY ELIMINATED ALL THEIR SRINF MISSILES AND WARHEADS WHILE THE US KEPT 72 WARHEADS AND, WITH GERMAN HELP, RETAINED SOME CAPABILITY IN THIS ARE[illegible]

SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THEY ELIMINATED ALL THEIR SRINF MISSILES AND WARHEADS WHILE THE US KEPT 72 WARHEADS AND, WITH GERMAN HELP, RETAINED SOME CAPABILITY IN THIS AREA.

10. NOTING THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CONCERN WARHEADS BUT MISSILES, FALL SUGGESTED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS STUCK TO THIS POSITION THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD STILL FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE, INCLUDING ALL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS STILL DEPLOYED IN EUROPE, DEMONSTRATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT BE AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE EXCLUSION OF THE P1A SHOULD NOT BE A MILITARY PROBLEM FOR THEM. WHILE THE WEST WAS NOT MAKING A CASE FOR P1A TO BE TREATED AS A THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEM IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE, THE TRADITIONAL US/FRG COOPERATION ON THIS SYSTEM DID NOT PROVIDE A CHANNEL FOR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

11. ON THE PHASING OF REDUCTIONS OVER FIVE YEARS, KARPOV STUCK TO THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION (EQUAL PERCENTAGE CUTS IN TWO TRANCHES, LEAVING 600/200 WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE HALF-WAY THROUGH THE PROCESS). IN RESPONSE TO FALL'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR FURTHER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, KARPOV SAID THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CIRCUMVENTION (THROUGH FRG MISSILES) WAS ELIMINATED. HE SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE AGREED WITH THE US, WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE THREAT FROM INF MISSILES BEFORE THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD (EG BY TAKING THEM OFF COMBAT DUTY STATUS, OR BY REMOVING THEIR WARHEADS).

12. TURNING TO VERIFICATION KARPOV EMPHASISED THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR EQUALITY OF TREATMENT. THE MONITORING OF THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS SHOULD BE DONE BY ROUTINE INSPECTION MEASURES, WITH CHALLENGE INSPECTION PLAYING A ROLE IN ENSURING THE CONTINUED ABSENCE THEREAFTER OF MISSILES AND WARHEADS. FALL NOTED THAT WE WERE READY TO COOPERATE IN APPROPRIATE WAYS TO ENSURE THAT US-OPERATED FACILITIES ON OUR TERRITORY WERE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION WHEN NECESSARY. KARPOV COULD SEE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITING INSPECTION TO ''US-ARMED'' ELEMENTS WITHIN THE UK DESIGNATED DEPLOYMENT AREA (DDA). HOW WAS THE SOVIET UNION TO VERIFY THE DESTRUCTION OF LAUNCH FACILITIES OUTSIDE THE MAIN OPERATING BASE (MOB) ITSELF? FALL REPEATED THAT THE INF AGREEMENT ONLY BORE ON THE PARTIES IE THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. THAT WAS THE REASON WHY VERIFICATION SHOULD ONLY COVER US-OPERATED FACILITIES IN THE UK.

13. KARPOV THEN ENQUIRED ABOUT THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WE ENVISAGED FOR OUR OWN PARTICIPATION IN THE VERIFICATION REGIME. WOULD IT BE A DIRECT US/UK AGREEMENT, WOULD IT INCORPORATE THE US AND ALL BASING COUNTRIES, AND WOULD THE SOVIET UNION BE A PARTY TO THAT AGREEMENT? FALL NOTED THAT WE HAD NOT YET COMPLETED OUR CONSIDERATION OF THESE ISSUES, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE US AND OTHER ALLIES. THERE WOULD CLEARLY NEED TO BE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND UK. NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN ON WHETHER IT SHOULD BE A SINGLE AGREEMENT, OR MULTILATERAL, INCLUDING OTHER ALLIES TO WHOM SEPARATE DETAILED ANNEXES MIGHT APPLY. NO CONCLUSION HAD BEEN REACHED ON WHETHER SOMTHING FURTHER MIGHT BE REQUIRED, INVOLVING THE SOVIET UNION. HE WISHED TO UNDERLINE THAT, WHATEVER WAS DONE WITH THE BASING COUNTRIES,

UNDERLINE THAT, WHATEVER WAS DONE WITH THE BASING COUNTRIES, THE FUNDAMENTAL TEXTS WOULD REMAIN THE TREATY ITSELF AND THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL, WHICH WE EXPECTED TO BE VERY DETAILED.

14. RESPONDING TO FALL'S QUESTION ABOUT THE NEXT STEPS, AND WHETHER THERE WOULD BE A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS, KARPOV SAID THAT THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS NOW MADE IT POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE AND SUBMIT A TREATY TO THE RESPECTIVE LEADERSHIPS. THE SOVIET PREFERENCE WAS THEREFORE FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS TO FOCUS ON THE DRAFT TEXTS, WORKING THROUGH AUGUST AND AIMING TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS 'WITHIN THE NECESSARY TIME-FRAME'. MUCH DEPENDED ON THE US APPROACH. THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING TO MANY OF THE US OBSTACLES NOW TO DISAPPEAR. THERE WAS THEREFORE NO NEED FOR A POLITICAL IMPULSE FROM ABOVE. THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS FROM NOW ON SHOULD OCCUR IN GENEVA. FALL COMMENTED THAT UK POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT IN DOUBT. A FURTHER POLITICAL IMPETUS MIGHT STILL BE NEEDED IN DUE COURSE.

START

15. KARPOV THEN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GIVING AN IMPULSE TO THE OTHER GENEVA GROUPS, REFLECTING 'PERESTROIKA' IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS AN UNNECESSARY STAGNATION IN BOTH THE STRATEGIC ARMS AND SPACE/DEFENCE GROUPS. THEY HOPED TO PRODUCE AN OVERALL BREAKTHROUGH IN THE NST. (AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, KARPOV SAID THAT HE BECAME MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS THE MORE HE LEARNED OF THE US POSITION IN BOTH START AND SPACE/DEFENCE).

16. APART FROM CONFIRMING THE INTENTION TO TABLE A SOVIET DRAFT START TREATY, KARPOV WAS RELUCTANT TO GO INTO DETAIL. THE MAIN EXCHANGE CENTRES ON THE ISSUE OF SUB-LIMITS, WITH KARPOV DEFENDING THE PRESENT SOVIET POSITION IE THE AGREED OVERALL LAUNCHER (1600) AND WARHEAD (6000) CEILINGS, COUPLED ONLY WITH A 50% CUT ACROSS THE BOARD ON RELEVANT SYSTEMS INCLUDING HEAVY MISSILES (IE SS18). IN RESPONSE TO FALL'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR MORE SPECIFICITY WITHIN SUCH AN AGREEMENT, KARPOV DID NOT EXCLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, HE CRITICISED US ATTEMPTS TO TURN SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES INTO A MIRRORY-IMAGE OF THEIR OWN - SUBMARINES SUITED THE AMERICANS BETTER, WHEREAS MOBILE LAND-BASED MISSILES WERE THE SOVIET PREFERENCE.

17. KARPOV CLAIMED, QUOTING FOUR SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, THAT THE US WERE BACK-SLIDING FROM PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS: THEIR DEMAND TO TREAT BACKFIRE NOW AS STRATEGIC RANGE SEMICOLON THEIR CHANGING OF ASPECTS OF THE SALT II COUNTING RULES SEMICOLON THEIR REJECTION OF 600KM AS THE RANGE CEILING ON NON-STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES SEMICOLON AND THEIR OPPOSTION TO ANY CONCRETE LIMITS ON SLCM. FALL RECOGNISED THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE CRUISE MISSILE RANGE ISSUE, BUT QUESTIONED KARPOV'S ASSESSMENT OF THE OTHER POINTS.

SPACE/DEFENCE

18. KARPOV THEN EXPLAINED THE LATEST SOVIET MOVES ON SPACE/DEFENCE. THEY ENVISAGED AN AGREEMENT IN TWO PARTS: A COMMITMENT TO OBSERVING THE ABM TREATY FOR TEN YEARS WITHIN THE NARROW INTERPRETATION SEMICOLON AND

INTERPRETATION SEMICOLON AND AN AGREEMENT ON PARTICULAR DEVICES (THESE WOULD BE LISTED) WHICH COULD NOT BE PLACED IN SPACE OVER THAT PERIOD, INCLUDING FOR TESTING PURPOSES. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM FALL, HE IMPLIED THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE ANY DIRECT LEGAL CONNECTION TO THE ABM TREATY ITSELF, OR PURPORT TO PROVIDE A FORMAL INTERPRETATION OF IT.

19. NOTING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PREVIOUSLY SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN THE STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES ON BOTH SIDES, A PROPOSAL ALREADY TAKEN UP BY THE US IN GENEVA, FALL THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE ALSO NOW READY TO BUILD UPON THIS. WE LOOKED FORWARD TO SWIFTER PROGRESS NOW AT GENEVA , ON THE BASIS ON THE US DRAFT TREATY AND THE NEW SOVIET MATERIAL.

20. MOMENTUM IN THE START AREA COULD HELP TO STIMULATE PROGRESS ON SPACE/DEFENCE. BUT AN UNDULY TIGHT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO WAS UNNECESSARY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE LIKELY TIME-SCALE OF PROGRESS IN STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH. HE NOTED THE IMPORTANT US ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT NEGOTIATIONS. KARPOV DISAGREED ON THE LINKAGE POINT. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US CLEARLY WANTED A FREE HAND TO DEPLOY THE FULL SDI POST-1994, AND SOUGHT SOVIET BLESSING FOR THAT. THEY WERE ALSO TRYING TO DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY BEFORE DEPLOYMENT BY 1994. SUCH MOVES WERE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY, LET ALONE A BASIS FOR A NEW AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENDORSE IT.

21. KARPOV THEN CRITICISED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE UK DUAL ROLE. THE PRIME MINISTER SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE SHE ATTACHED TO THE ABM TREATY AND ITS OBSERVANCE. BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE UK PARTICIPATED DIRECTLY IN THE SDI PROGRAMME WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY. FALL DISAGREED. NEITHER STRATEGIC RESEARCH NOR UK PARTICIPATION IN IT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TREATY. WE WERE NOT, OF COURSE, PARTIES TO THE TREATY. BUT WE WERE SATISFIED THAT OUR ACTIONS DID NOT INVOLVE ANY BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATIONS.

22. SEE MIFT FOR CW AND NUCLEAR TESTING.

CARTLEDGE

CCN PARA 10.
FALL SUGGESTED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS STUCK TO THIS POSITION THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD STILL FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE, INCLUDING ALL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS STILL DEPLOYED.....

CCN PARA 15.
THEY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS AN UNNECESSARY STAGNATION IN BOTH THE STRATEGIC ARMS AND SPACE/DEFENCE GROUPS.

YYYY
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

MXHPAN 2344

3

ADVANCE COPIES 18 ~~20~~ DESKBY 240800Z

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/Mrs CHALKER
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS
SIR J FRETWELL
~~MR BOYD~~
~~MR RATFORD~~
~~MR FALL~~
MR FEARN
MR GILLMORE
HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT
HD/NAD
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
D. NUC (POL) SY
DACU
CDI
MOD

SENT 24 JUL 1987

[PLEASE ADD HD/NAD TO EAST/WEST DIST]

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

19.11.E

232030Z JUL
GRS 620

SECRET

SECRET
FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 240800Z FCO
TELNO 1580
OF 232030Z JULY 87
AND TO DESKBY 240800OZ COPENHAGEN, DESKBY 240800Z MOSCOW
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL NATO
BRUSSELS, BONN, PARIS, ROME, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, MODUK

COPENHAGEN FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY, MOSCOW FOR FALL,
MODUK FOR DACU

MOSCOW TELNO 1057: INF

SUMMARY

1. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF DOUBLE ZERO INF CONFIRMED IN GENEVA. OBUKHOV CITES PLAS AS MAIN OBSTACLE TO AGREEMENT, BUT PRIVATELY ASSURES GLITMAN THAT WORK ON OTHER INF ISSUES CAN PRESS AHEAD. ADMINISTRATION WORK ON VERIFICATION PROTOCOL CONTINUES. MINISTERIAL MESSAGE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. PRE-EMPTION TO OUR ADVANTAGE.

DETAIL

2. THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF, AS OUTLINED BY GORBACHEV IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH ''MERDEKA'' ON 21 JULY, WAS FORMALLY CONFIRMED AT THE GENEVA NUCLEAR/SPACE TALKS (NST) ON 23 JULY. THE PLENARY PRESENTATION WAS ON THE LINES OF GORBACHEV'S WRITTEN RESPONSE IN TUR. HOWEVER OBUKHOV, IN HIS CUSTOMARY PRE-PLENARY HEAD OF DELEGATION MEETING WITH GLITMAN WENT INTO GREATER DETAIL ON THE SOVIET APPROACH. ACCORDING TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OBUKHOV SAID THAT PLAS WERE THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A DOUBLE ZERO INF AGREEMENT. THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR WARHEADS WAS A POINT OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE USSR, AND MIGHT WELL HAVE TO BE ''REFERRED TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL FOR SOLUTION''. NEVERTHELESS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS COULD MAKE USEFUL PROGRESS IN DISMANTLING THE FOLLOWING ''ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES ERECTED BY THE US'':

A. PHASING
B. CONVERSION
C. VERIFICATION.

C. VERIFICATION.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT INSTRUCTIONS GIVING GLITMAN A FAIR DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH PHASING AND CONVERSION ARE EXPECTED TO ISSUE SHORTLY.

3. THE PROSPECT OF MOVEMENT ONCE MORE IN GENEVA AFTER A LENGTHY HIATUS IS LIKELY TO INVIGORATE THE INTER-AGENCY DEBATE ON THE US VERIFICATION PROTOCOL. AN ANODYNE TEXT ON SAFETY AND SECURITY IS SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY TO BASING COUNTRY CAPITALS ON 24 JULY. THE ANNEX ON PRIVELEGES AND IMMUNITIES AWAITS FINAL CLEARANCE FROM SENIOR OSD OFFICIALS. THE DRAFT PAPER ON DEFINITIONS/LISTS OF ''INSPECTABLE' SITES HAS NOW BEEN PRODUCED BY THE JCS AND IS UNDER DISCUSSION. AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF DOUBLE ZERO WILL NECESSITATE SOME CHANGES TO THE PROTOCOL AND BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT. BUT US OFFICIALS ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED IN SHORT TIME AND THAT ALL TEXTS, INCLUDING REVISED VERSIONS OF THE PROTOCOL/BCA WILL BE DELIVERED TO CAPITALS BY 27 JULY.

4. THE UK PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE RUSSIANS CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBJECT OF HEATED DEBATE AT OFFICIAL LEVEL. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APPROACH TO FCO MINISTERS IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION, WITH THE TIDE TURNING IN FAVOUR OF A SHULTZ MESSAGE TO YOU. THE PROPONENTS OF SUCH A MESSAGE ARE PUSHING FOR IT TO HAVE TWO MAIN STRANDS:

i. CLEAR OPPOSITION TO OUR PROPOSAL

ii. A SUGGESTION THAT SHOULD EARLY AGREEMENT ON LINKAGE NOT PROVE POSSIBLE WE AND OTHER BASING COUNTRIES MIGHT GIVE THE US THE GO AHEAD TO TABLE A CLEANED UP VERIFICATION PROTOCOL PENDING THE RESOLUTION (AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL) OF THE LINKAGE ISSUE.

5. WE BELEIVE A DRAFT MESSAGE COULD BE SUBMITTED TO SCHULTZ AT ANY TIME. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE SHULTZ HAS NOT SO FAR FOCUSSED ON THE ISSUE, THE INITIATIVE FOR SUCH A MESSAGE HAVING COME FROM OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE AGREE THAT THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN BEATING ADMINISTRATION OPPONENTS OF OUR PROPOSAL TO THE PUNCH BY MEANS OF A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO SHULTZ, ON THE LINES OF THAT CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 136 TO COPENHAGEN.

CROWE

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ORWBAN 3160

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SECRET

ADVANCE COPIES 20 [WRITERS]

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/LORD GLENARTHUR MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET
PS/MR MELLOR
PS/PUS MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)
SIR J FRETWELL D. NUC (POL) SY
MR BOYD, DACU
CDI MOD
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN

HD/DEFENCE DEPT
HD/ACDD
HD/SOVIET DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK [PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST]

19.11.E

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SENT
23 JUL 1987

UNCLASSIFIED
FM MOSCOW
TO DESKBY 230800Z FCO
TELNO 1057
OF 230700Z JULY 87
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDIS GENEVA, NATO POSTS, TOKYO
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, MANILA, JAKARTA, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

GORBACHEV ON INF IN ASIA

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV TELLS INDONESIAN JOURNALIST THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO ELIMINATE INF IN ASIA, AND SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, ON THE BASIS OF A GLOBAL ZERO WITH THE USA. HE DE-LINKS THIS FROM THE US NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN KOREA, PHILIPPINES AND DIEGO GARCIA (NO REFERENCE TO JAPAN). SEPARATE PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT REDUCTIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS ON NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE PACIFIC.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV RECEIVED THE EDITOR OF THE INDONESIAN NEWSPAPER ''MERDEKA'' ON 21 JULY, TO HAND OVER REPLIES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS. A VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW AND THE WRITTEN REPLY APPEARS IN PRAVDA OF 23 JULY.

3. IN A WRITTEN ANSWER TO A GENERAL QUESTION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC SINCE GORBACHEV'S VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH IN JULY 1986, GORBACHEV SAID THAT ASIAN COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF IN ASIA AS BEING IN THEIR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TOOK A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE TO THOSE WISHES. ''AND NOW I CAN INFORM

IN PRAVDA OF 23 JULY.

3. IN A WRITTEN ANSWER TO A GENERAL QUESTION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC SINCE GORBACHEV'S VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH IN JULY 1986, GORBACHEV SAID THAT ASIAN COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF IN ASIA AS BEING IN THEIR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TOOK A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE TO THOSE WISHES. ''AND NOW I CAN INFORM YOU THAT THE SOVIET UNION, MOVING TOWARDS THE POSITION OF THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THEIR CONCERN, IS READY TO MOVE TO THE ELIMINATION OF ALL ITS INF MISSILES, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE ASIAN PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, IE TO REMOVE THE QUESTION OF MAINTAINING THE 100 INF WARHEADS NOW BEING DISCUSSED IN GENEVA WITH THE AMERICANS. THIS IS ON THE CONDITION OF COURSE THAT THE USA DOES THE SAME. SHORTER RANGE MISSILES WILL ALSO BE ELIMINATED. IN OTHER WORDS WE WILL PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPT OF THE ''GLOBAL DOUBLE ZERO''. WE WILL NOT LINK THE PRESENT INITIATIVE TO THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES OR DIEGO GARCIA. NONETHELESS WE HOPE THIS WOULD AT LEAST NOT INCREASE''.

4. ASKED ABOUT SPECIFIC MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSION IN THE REGION GORBACHEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR ARMED AIRCRAFT IN THE ASIAN PART OF THE USSR IF THE USA WOULD AGREE NOT TO DEPLOY IN THE AREA NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ABLE TO REACH SOVIET TERRITORY.

5. GORBACHEV ALSO REFERRED TO HIS PROPOSAL AT VLADIVOSTOK TO REDUCE NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE PACIFIC. THE DANGER OF CONFLICT AROSE THROUGH THE PROXIMITY OF THE FLEETS. HE THEREFORE NOW PROPOSED THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED TO LIMIT THE AREAS IN WHICH NAVAL VESSELS CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD OPERATE IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEY DID NOT COME NEARER TO THE SHORE LINE OF THE OTHER SIDE THAN THE RANGE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THEY CARRIED. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE AN AGREEMENT ON LIMITING ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITY, BOTH SEA AND AIRBORNE. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT INCREASED TRUST WOULD BE GENERATED BY LIMITING THE SIZE OF NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS AND IN NEIGHBOURING SEAS AND KEEPING THESE DOWN TO ONE OR TWO MAJOR EXERCISES INCLUDING NAVAL AVIATION PER YEAR. THESE WOULD BE ANNOUNCED IN ADVANCE. THERE WOULD BE A MUTUAL AGREEMENT NOT TO CARRY OUT EXERCISES IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND ADJACENT AREAS AND ON THE NON-USE OF WEAPONS DURING EXERCISES IN TRADITIONAL SEA ROUTES. THIS 'MODEL' COULD BE TRIED OUT IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE PACIFIC WHERE THERE WERE FEW 'DRAMATIS PERSONAE'. IT COULD THEN BE EXTENDED TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

6. GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW ALSO COVERED ASIAN SECURITY, THE INDIAN OCEAN AND SPECIFIC REGIONAL ISSUES WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY.

7. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

CARTLEDGE

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The National Archives

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

attach

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

I was very encouraged to read your report to the Prime Minister on the progress made at the Reykjavik North Atlantic Council on conventional arms control. As you rightly say, had matters gone wrong the effects could have been extremely damaging to the Alliance; and while there is of course still a danger that the concordat will dissolve we do seem now to have a prospect of real progress on the preparation of a mandate. This is welcome: there is no doubt that politically we need to be seen to be active in tackling the problems of conventional arms control, particularly since we have ourselves properly emphasised the relevance of the conventional imbalance to our approach to further nuclear reductions.

2. As we proceed further down the path to new negotiations on conventional arms control I must, however, sound a note of caution. The Chiefs of Staff recently considered a paper, prepared in conjunction with your officials, on what our military aims in conventional arms control should be. The principles set out in the paper will I trust be of value in setting the agenda for substantive discussions. But their discussion brought into sharp focus their concerns, which I share, over the risks implicit in the process. Even though we believe that Gorbachev has economic reasons for wanting 'genuine' reductions we will enter the discussion against a

background of severe conventional military imbalance, and a possible diminution in NATO's capacity for nuclear escalation at the theatre level. It is therefore very important that, faced with a negotiator of Mr Gorbachev's astuteness, we do not permit public expectation to be raised too high or allow the pressure of negotiations to lead us down a path that would diminish our security. Our current position in the conventional arena is already too precarious for us to be able to afford the risk of further erosion.

3. The assessment of the security impact of specific reductions on both sides is a complex business that will require careful discussion with the military staffs of the Alliance and of close allies. In addition there are national issues that we will need to address. These include both specific concerns over the security of the NORTHAG area, where our role is pivotal, and the general impact of consequent British reductions on our overall force capabilities, bearing in mind that, unlike MBFR, these negotiations would imply the disbandment of any British contribution. Any disbandment would clearly raise the greatest difficulty while we have under-resourced obligations (such as Northern Ireland). The removal by the Warsaw Pact of units to the east of the Urals is not the same as disbandment and we should not accept that it is.

4. My officials are initiating work on these matters and will need, in conjunction with yours, to continue informal discussions with close allies. We will need also to co-ordinate such work with that

on the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which is being developed under NAC auspices. We should aim to have, by the end of this year, substantive options that are consistent with our security needs, acceptable to the major Allies, and offer some prospect of negotiability. I believe that we also need to impress on our Allies that they should not seek early or easy solutions to the complex military situations that will be involved; and that we should not allow ourselves to be hustled by a barrage of Soviet initiatives. At the same time I believe that we will need to avoid raising public expectations of early results, and to get across the complexity and importance of the issues involved.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister, the other members of OD and Sir Robert Armstrong.

G.G.

Ministry of Defence

16 July 1987

DGFENCG : Arms Control PT12

GRS 2500

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO FLASH FCO
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OF 151330Z JULY 87
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL CSCE
INFO PRIORITY VIENNA, UKDEL MBFR VIENNA, MOSCOW, MODUK

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MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON: ARMS CONTROL
SUMMARY
1. INF MOVING AHEAD BUT OTHER NEGOTIATIONS IN THE DOLDRUMS WITH TIME RUNNING OUT FOR RESULTS DURING THE PRESIDENT'S TERM. SOME POINTS THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT MAKE.
DETAIL
2. BEFORE THE VISIT BY YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO MOSCOW IN MARCH, I REPORTED (MY TELNO 654) THAT ARMS CONTROL STOCK WAS ON THE RISE IN WASHINGTON. SINCE THEN, INF SHARES HAVE MOVED AHEAD WELL BUT OTHER STOCK IN THE ARMS CONTROL SECTOR HAVE DRIFTED. AND, AS WITH THE DOW JONES INDEX, THERE IS DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER FURTHER EARLY ADVANCES ARE POSSIBLE OR WHETHER THE MARKET MAY FOR THE MOMENT HAVE RUN OUT OF STEAM.
3. ON ONE SIDE OF THE ARGUMENT ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT, FOLLOWING NATO ACCEPTANCE AT REYKJAVIK OF A ZERO-ZERO SRINF SOLUTION, AN INF AGREEMENT AND A US/SOVIET SUMMIT TO GO WITH IT ARE NOW DEFINITELY IN PROSPECT (THE APPARENT RECENT SOVIET GO-SLOW IN GENEVA NOTWITHSTANDING): THAT THE PROSPECT OF AN INF AGREEMENT WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE AND THE APPETITE ON BOTH SIDES FOR MORE RAPID PROGRESS IN CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS CONTROL: AND THAT EVEN A START AGREEMENT (OR PERHAPS THE FRAMEWORK FOR ONE) CAN STILL BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE PRESIDENT'S TERM. ON THE OTHER SIDE ARE THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE OBSTACLES TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT (NOTABLY EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS AND SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE GERMAN P1A PROBLEM) ARE STILL FORMIDABLE: THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND DOUBTS ABOUT A CW BAN WILL ONLY BE RESOLVED VERY SLOWLY, IF AT ALL: THAT THE PRESIDENT LACKS BOTH THE WILL AND, NOW, THE TIME TO AGREE AN SDI PACKAGE WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT MIGHT UNBLOCK THE WAY TO A START AGREEMENT: AND THAT THE INCENTIVE AND PRESSURE FOR HIM TO MAKE NEW MOVES IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS ARE IN FACT REDUCED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS ON INF.
4. A RELATED ARGUMENT ABOUT WHETHER FURTHER ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS IS IN FACT DESIRABLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WESTERN SECURITY ALSO CONTINUES, AS IT HAS THROUGHOUT THE PRESIDENT'S TWO ADMINISTRATIONS.
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5. VERIFICATION AND THE GERMAN P1A PROBLEM ARE SEEN AS THE MAIN OUTSTANDING INF ISSUES. ON VERIFICATION, A DRAFT INSPECTION PROTOCOL HAS STILL TO BE TABLED BY THE US IN GENEVA AND A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE US POSITION (NOTABLY WHETHER SOME SENSITIVE FACILITIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE VERIFICATION REGIME, AND HOW LARGE INSPECTION QUOTAS SHOULD BE) HAVE BEEN LEFT UNDECIDED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PROCEEDED WITH BASING COUNTRIES ON HOW THE INSPECTION REGIME SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THEIR TERRITORIES. ON THE GERMAN PERSHING 1AS, THERE IS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT HERE THAT THEY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS: ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS FEAR THAT A DAMAGING PRECEDENT, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR MANY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN EUROPE, WOULD HAVE BEEN SET IF DUAL-KEY SYSTEMS OPERATED UNDER ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF COOPERATION WERE ONCE INCLUDED IN THE US/SOVIET EQUATION. IT IS ALSO HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT CONGRESS WOULD ACCEPT SUCH AN APPROACH. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOR THE US TO HAVE, BUT NOT TO EXERCISE, A RIGHT TO MATCH A NUMBER OF SOVIET SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE IN FACT BEING PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN TO BALANCE THE GERMAN P1AS. BUT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF SUCH A SOLUTION TO THE RUSSIANS (AND TO CONGRESS) MUST BE IN DOUBT. SOME OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BACK DOWN ON THIS ISSUE. BUT MOST HOPE PRIVATELY THAT THE GERMANS WILL OFFER A WAY OUT BY DECIDING AGAINST MODERNISATION OF THE P1AS. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THEY FADED AWAY DURING THE REDUCTIONS PERIOD ESTABLISHED BY THE INF TREATY. BUT THE ADMINISTRATION ARE DETERMINED NOT TO PRESS THE GERMANS IN THIS DIRECTION BUT TO LEAVE THEM TO REACH THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS.

6. THE LEAK OF THE INFORMAL CHERVOV/GLITMAN CONVERSATIONS IN GENEVA ABOUT A POSSIBLE DEAL UNDER WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT GLOBAL LRINF ELIMINATION IN EXCHANGE FOR US AGREEMENT NOT TO CONVERT P2S OR GLCMS HAS STIMULATED GREATER AWARENESS HERE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF ELIMINATING THE REMAINING 100 LRINF WARHEADS ON BOTH SIDES. ONE ADVANTAGE NOW EMERGING MORE CLEARLY IS THAT SENATE CONSENT TO RATIFICATION WOULD BE EASIER TO OBTAIN IN THIS CASE THAN IN THE CASE OF A TREATY THAT PERMITTED THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP 100 SS20 WARHEADS IN SOVIET ASIA AND THE SS20 INFRASTRUCTURE THAT WOULD GO WITH IT.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

7. THE DIFFICULTY OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE FRENCH HAS DOMINATED THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE: THE FRANCO-US UNDERSTANDING AT REYKJAVIK ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CSCE AND THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS IS SEEN BY MOST HERE AS NO MORE THAN A TEMPORARY TRUCE. ONE EFFECT OF THE DISPUTE HAS BEEN TO DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY FROM WORK ON THE SUBSTANCE OF POSSIBLE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS.

8. THIS IS WORRYING SINCE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL HAS MEANWHILE BEEN MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARDS THE TOP OF THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA AS PERCEIVED BY IMPORTANT CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC FIGURES: THE QUOTE FIREBREAK UNQUOTE DEBATE DURING ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE SRINF ZERO-ZERO OPTION HAS BEEN WIDELY UNDERSTOOD HERE AS MEANING THAT CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL SHOULD COME NEXT, AND

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THERE

THERE ARE SIGNS (EG FROM SENATOR NUNN'S OFFICE) THAT THE SENATE MAY PRESS FOR A WESTERN CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL TO BE ON THE TABLE BEFORE AN INF TREATY IS RATIFIED. THERE IS THEREFORE A RISK OF CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION (PERHAPS COUPLED WITH RENEWED PRESSURE FOR US TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE) FOR AN EARLY NEW WESTERN OR, IF NECESSARY, US INITIATIVE. TO FORESTALL THIS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM OF ADMINISTRATION WORK, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER ALLIES, ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. UK IDEAS FOR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COUPLED WITH TANK CEILINGS HAVE FOUND SOME SUPPORTERS HERE AT WORKING LEVEL.

CW

9. STRONG DOD OPPOSITION TO A GLOBAL CW BAN (ON GROUNDS OF UNVERIFIABILITY) PERSIST AND ARE SHARED BY SOME IN OTHER AGENCIES. BUT OTHERS STILL ARGUE THAT A STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME BASED ON A REFINEMENT OF UK IDEAS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION WOULD ENSURE TIMELY DETECTION OF ANY MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT SOVIET CHEATING (AS OPPOSED TO SMALL-SCALE CHEATING THAT WOULD POSE NO MILITARY THREAT). THE NET RESULT IS A STAND-OFF WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION WITH AGREEMENT ONLY ON ONE POINT: THAT GETTING THE BINARY CW PROGRAMME FUNDED AND UNDERWAY SHOULD BE THE US PRIORITY THIS YEAR. THERE IS THEREFORE NO GREAT IMPETUS FROM ANY QUARTER FOR EARLY PROGRESS IN THE CD IN GENEVA.

START/SDI

10. IF THE START NEGOTIATIONS ARE LOOKED AT IN A VACUUM, US AND SOVIET POSITIONS APPEAR QUITE CLOSE. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STILL IMPORTANT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT (NOTABLY ON SUB-LIMITS AND SLCMS), THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION INCLUDING AGGREGATE CEILINGS ON DELIVERY VEHICLES AND WEAPONS AND (THOUGH THERE IS SOME SOVIET BACKSLIDING) COUNTING RULES FOR BOMBER WEAPONS. THE US DRAFT TREATY ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA CONTAINS NO PROVISION FOR REDUCTIONS BEYOND 50 PERCENT EG FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES.

11. BUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A START AGREEMENT AND A DEFENCE AND SPACE AGREEMENT REMAINS THE STICKING POINT AND THE LONG-STANDING KEY QUESTION (ARE THERE CONSTRAINTS ON SDI WHICH BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE RUSSIANS CAN ACCEPT?) REMAINS SUBSTANTIVELY UNADDRESSED.

12. THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEAS ON PREDICTABILITY HAVE, TO A LIMITED EXTENT, BEEN BUILT INTO THE US POSITION IN GENEVA IN THE SHAPE OF A US PROPOSAL FOR AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF PROGRAMMATIC DATA ON STRATEGIC DEFENCES. AND THERE ARE STILL THOSE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION (NOTABLY NITZE AND KAMPELMAN) WHO WISH TO GO FURTHER. THEY BELIEVE THAT A SERIOUS EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO WORK OUT WITH THE RUSSIANS NEW UNDERSTANDINGS, OUTSIDE THE ABM TREATY, ON THE PACE AND SCALE OF DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS. THESE WOULD DO LITTLE MORE THAN CODIFY LIMITATIONS THAT TECHNOLOGY WILL ANYWAY IMPOSE, BUT WOULD PROVIDE SOME REASSURANCE AND PREDICTABILITY. SUCH AN AGREED REGIME WOULD ACCOMPANY A COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. BUT WEINBERGER AND ADELMAN REMAIN FIERCELY OPPOSED TO

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BATTLE..

ANY SUCH DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS, AND SHULTZ IS NOT DOING BATTLE ON THE NITZE/KAMPELMAN SIDE, PERHAPS IN THE BELIEF THAT THE PRESIDENT REMAINS IMMOVABLE ON THIS ISSUE. MEANWHILE, TIME IS FAST RUNNING OUT AND THE NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE ON THE RUSSIANS PROVIDED BY THE SDI MAY BE DECLINING: IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE PRESIDENT NO LONGER HAS THE POLITICAL STRENGTH TO FORCE THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY WITHOUT PROVOKING THE DEMOCRATICALLY CONTROLLED CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE IN FAVOUR OF THE NARROW INTERPRETATION AND/OR TO IMPOSE SAVAGE CUTS ON SDI FUNDING. THE DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT'S SCEPTICISM ABOUT SDI (INCLUDING IN THE JCS) IS ALSO NOW EMERGING MORE CLEARLY.

13. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, A MAIN TASK FOR THE PRIME MINISTER DURING HER VISIT HERE ON 17 JULY MAY BE TO PRESS THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE RENEWED EFFORTS TO ADVANCE THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA: BUT, ABOVE ALL, TO DO SO IN A WAY THAT ENHANCES WESTERN SECURITY RATHER THAN UNDERMINES IT. THIS AMOUNTS TO PRESSING HIM TO CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID II AGENDA AND NEITHER TO GIVE UP NOR BE LURED ON TO OTHER GROUND.

14. PARTICULAR POINTS THAT MIGHT BE MADE TO THE PRESIDENT WITH THIS IN MIND ARE THESE:

(A) NATO'S DETERRENT STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE MUST BE MAINTAINED. IT IS THE BEST, AND ONLY, STRATEGY WE HAVE AND REQUIRES AN EFFECTIVE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. MAINTAINING IT WILL REQUIRE INF ADJUSTMENTS (NOTABLY MAKING SLCMS AVAILABLE TO SACEUR AND THE DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE OF ADDITIONAL DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT) AND MODERNISATION OF THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR STOCKPILE (MONTEBELLO IMPLEMENTATION AND, ESPECIALLY, DEPLOYMENT OF A POWERFUL FOLLOW-ON TO LANCE). IT ALSO REQUIRES DETERMINED RESISTANCE TO FURTHER SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO DENUCLEARISE EUROPE AND TO UNDERMINE THE US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT BY CUTTING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT:

(B) ON INF, IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN STEADY PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE REMAINING 100 LRINF WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE AND, GIVEN ITS IMPORTANCE AS A PRECEDENT IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS, TO ACCEPT A STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME (THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT ALSO MENTION THE POLITICAL NEED FOR VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS TO INCLUDE A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN BASING COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION):

(C) THE US IS RIGHT TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THEIR CW BINARY PROGRAMME, WHICH CREATES LEVERAGE ON THE RUSSIANS. BUT REDUCING THE SOVIET CW THREAT AND CURBING CW PROLIFERATION BY MEANS OF A GLOBAL CW BAN SHOULD REMAIN A HIGH PRIORITY. ANY OTHER OBJECTIVE IS UNSUSTAINABLE POLITICALLY. IMPORTANT EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE BILATERALLY TO REFINE UK IDEAS FOR SOLVING THE ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. THESE SHOULD CONTINUE:

(D) THE WEST RISKS BEING OUTMANOEUVRED BY THE RUSSIANS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. WORK ON SUBSTANTIVE WESTERN PROPOSALS SHOULD BE ACCELERATED SO THAT WE ARE NOT CAUGHT OFF-GUARD BY FURTHER SOVIET MOVES OR BY CONGRESSIONAL OR

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[OTHER

OTHER PRESSURES FOR RAPID INITIATIVES OR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS.
A UNITED APPROACH IS VITAL:

(E) A 50 PERCENT START AGREEMENT IS A CAMP DAVID PRIORITY AND WOULD BE A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT. HAS THE TIME NOW COME FOR A NEW ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE RUSSIANS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE AND TIMETABLE OF THE SDI PROGRAMMES OF BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A SENSE OF SECURITY AND PREDICTABILITY?
HAS THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT FURTHER ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEAS ON THIS? A NEW INITIATIVE ON THESE LINES WOULD COMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED ABMT NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. IT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT INVOLVE KILLING OR MAIMING THE SDI, WHICH SHOULD OF COURSE GO AHEAD.

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