

PREM 19/1759



# East/West Relations

## FOREIGN POLICY

Part 1: July 1979

Part 6: December 1985

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>1/12/85</del>		<del>23.9.86</del>					
<del>4/12/85</del>		<del>24.9.86</del>					
<del>11/12/85</del>		<del>30.9.86</del>					
<del>13.12.85</del>		<del>2.10.86</del>					
<del>2.1.86</del>		<del>3.10.86</del>					
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<del>6.2.86</del>		<del>9.10.86</del>					
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<del>19.9.86</del>							



PART 6 ends:-

Washington Tel No 2768 30/10

PART 7 begins:-

Bonn Tel No 923 3/11







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FM WASHI TO FCOLN  
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IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY  
P. No 10. D.A.

SECRET  
PERSONAL  
DEDIP  
FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 2734  
OF 282200Z OCTOBER 86

MS

MY TELNO 2703: REYKJAVIK AFTERMATH

1. AT A VERY SMALL DINNER - JUST 10 PEOPLE - GIVEN BY THE REAGANS (FOR PRINCESS ALEXANDRA) ON 27 OCTOBER, I WAS ABLE TO TALK ALONE WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR A QUARTER OF AN HOUR, MAINLY ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, AND TO MAKE SOME OF THE KEY POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 1822.
2. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD BRITISH AND EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMBALANCE IN NON-NUCLEAR FORCES. AS THE LEVEL OF BALLISTIC MISSILES MOVED BELOW THE 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT BALANCE WAS ALSO ACHIEVED IN CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. I SAID THAT WE SAW THE NUCLEAR SHIELD (AND ITS BALLISTIC MISSILE COMPONENT) AS ESSENTIAL FOR OUR DEFENCE, AND ASKED THE PRESIDENT WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE ABANDONMENT OF IT SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON ACHIEVING BALANCE IN THE OTHER CATEGORIES OF ARMAMENTS, CHEMICAL AND PARTICULARLY CONVENTIONAL. FOR US IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO OUR SECURITY. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE AGREED. HE THEN WENT ON TO ARGUE THE SHULTZ THESIS THAT THE BALANCE OF POPULATION AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH MEANT THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES COULD ENHANCE THEIR CONVENTIONAL EFFORT, AND THAT A CLEAR INDICATION OF DETERMINATION TO DO SO WOULD BE A POWERFUL LEVER IN FORCING THE SOVIET UNION TO NEGOTIATE DOWNWARDS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT GORBACHEV WAS UNDER SERIOUS ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND KNEW THAT HE MUST REDUCE THE RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE MILITARY SECTOR.
3. THE PRESIDENT IS ENCOURAGED BY THE MOOD THAT HE HAS FOUND AMONG THE YOUNG ON THE CAMPUSES DURING HIS CAMPAIGNING IN THE MID-TERM ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY AND DEDICATION. REFERENCE TO THE GOOD WORK OF THE US ARMED FORCES PRODUCED STANDING OVATIONS. THE YOUNGER GENERATION ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORTED SDI. THE COUNTRY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A BIGGER EFFORT IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS FIELD. I ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM GAVE THEM THE ADVANTAGE IN THIS RESPECT. EUROPEAN LEGISLATURES WOULD NOT EASILY, FOR EXAMPLE, REINTRODUCE CONSCRIPTION OR VOTE INCREASED DEFENCE BUDGETS. THE SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN TANKS, ARTILLERY, AIRCRAFT, AND MEN UNDER ARMS WAS OVERWHELMING. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THEY MUST COME DOWN, BUT IF NECESSARY THE NATO ALLIANCE SHOULD ALSO MOVE UP. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE DEVOTING A VERY SMALL PROPORTION OF THEIR GDP TO DEFENCE.
4. THE PRESIDENT OBVIOUSLY FELT THAT THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE HAD ESTABLISHED WITH GORBACHEV AT GENEVA HAD NOT BEEN WHOLLY DISSIPATED AT REYKJAVIK. HE BELIEVES THAT HE CAN STILL DO BUSINESS WITH GORBACHEV.
5. THE PRESIDENT

GH  
LEAVING AT AN EARLY HOUR TO VISIT THREE MORE STATES ON 28 OCTOBER. HE SAID THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE QUOTE NIP AND TUCK UNQUOTE, BUT TOOK COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT ONE DEMOCRAT SENATOR (ZORINSKY: NEBRASKA) HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD IF NECESSARY DEFECT TO THE REPUBLICANS, AND THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD HAVE A CASTING VOTE IN THE EVENT OF A TIE.  
COMMENT

6. THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE RECOGNITION THAT THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF ABOLISHING BALLISTIC MISSILES (PARA 2 ABOVE) IS ENCOURAGING, UP TO A POINT. BUT HE HAS NOT YET SAID THIS IN PUBLIC, IN ANY OF HIS CURRENT PLETHORA OF SPEECHES AND PRESS CONFERENCES. SO THERE IS STILL MUCH WORK TO BE DONE. (I SHALL SEE POINDEXTER LATER TODAY, AND WEINBERGER ON 3 NOVEMBER.)
7. WHAT IS DISCOURAGING IS THAT HE SHOULD PRODUCE THE SHULTZ LINE THAT THE REMEDY FOR THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE LIES IN NATO'S HANDS. HIS OPTIMISM ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY TO THE US PUBLIC OF FURTHER INCREASES IN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (PARA 3 ABOVE) FLIES IN THE FACE OF ALL THE EVIDENCE OF THE 99TH CONGRESS. REBUILDING US DEFENCE FORCES WAS A KEY ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FIRST REAGAN TERM, BUT THE TIDE TURNED IN 1985, AND FUNDS VOTED FOR THE CURRENT YEAR (FY87) REPRESENT A DECLINE IN REAL TERMS. AND I SUSPECT THAT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE WOULD POSE FOR THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE SEEN BY THE PRESIDENT AS A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED, RATHER THAN A STARK POLITICAL FACT. ALL THIS IS SOMETHING TO BE DISCUSSED FURTHER AT CAMP DAVID.
8. GIVEN HIS PERENNIAL OPTIMISM, IT WAS STRIKING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RATHER DOWNBEAT ABOUT THE ELECTORAL PROSPECTS FOR 4 NOVEMBER. GEORGE BUSH WAS IF ANYTHING RATHER MORE CAUTIOUS WHEN I SAW HIM ON 26 OCTOBER. I SUSPECT THEY ARE RIGHT; SEE MY LETTER OF 23 OCTOBER TO GILLMORE. THE RISK OF THE REPUBLICANS LOSING CONTROL OF THE SENATE IS CLEARLY VERY REAL.
9. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF (A) AN ADVANCE COPY OF THIS TELEGRAM COULD BE SENT TO NO 10, AND (B) ITS CIRCULATION COULD OTHERWISE BE STRICTLY LIMITED. I HOPE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE REMARKS TO ME CAN BE RESPECTED AND NOT (NOT) REQUESTED.

ACLAND

YYYY  
ORWBAN 7382

NNNN



GRS 600

SECRET

SECRET

31

DEDIP

PERSONAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2768

OF 302200Z OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)  
MOD UK (FOR PS/SOFS, DUS(P), ACDS (POL-NUC), DACU)  
MY TELNO 2703: POST-REYKJAVIK ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS  
SUMMARY

1. UNSATISFACTORY DISCUSSION WITH POINDEXTER

DETAIL

2. I HAD AN HOUR WITH POINDEXTER ON 28 OCTOBER, AND TOOK HIM THROUGH ALL THE ARGUMENTS IN YOUR TELNO 1822.
3. POINDEXTER MAINTAINED FIRST THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY AKHROMEYEV AT REYKJAVIK. THEY HAD HAD A LONG TALK ON THE FIRST MORNING OF THE SUMMIT, FROM WHICH POINDEXTER HAD DRAWN THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RUSSIANS GENUINELY WANTED REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND A PERIOD OF STABILITY. IN POINDEXTER'S VIEW THIS REFLECTED ECONOMIC PRESSURES. OF COURSE IF THE SOVIET REGIME HAD TO FIND THE MONEY FOR CONTINUED REARMAMENT, THEY WOULD FIND IT; BUT IT SEEMED THAT THEY WOULD PREFER NOT TO DO SO. MANPOWER WAS ALSO A PROBLEM, FOR DEMOGRAPHIC REASONS. POINDEXTER'S CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE SOVIET INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL WAS GENUINE.
4. THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST WAS OF COURSE EQUALLY GENUINE. AND NO-ONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SURPRISED AT THE REYKJAVIK EVIDENCE OF HIS WISH TO ELIMINATE BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE ORIGINAL MARCH 1983 RATIONALE FOR SDI HAD BEEN TO RENDER BALLISTIC MISSILES OBSOLETE. BUT THE US WAS NOT PROPOSING THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS: BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE, AND THE JCS HAD BEEN COMMISSIONED TO UNDERTAKE A NEW STUDY EXPLORING JUST THAT. THE JCS HAD OF COURSE AGREED IN JULY TO THE INCLUSION IN THE PRESIDENT'S 25 JULY MESSAGE OF THE REFERENCE TO ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES, AN IDEA FIRST PROPOSED BY WEINBERGER IN JUNE, BUT NEITHER THEN NOR SINCE HAD THERE BEEN A FULL JCS STUDY ON THE LINES NOW COMMISSIONED. THE 10 YEAR TIMESPAN WAS OF COURSE NEW.
5. POINDEXTER DUCKED MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NEED TO MAKE RECTIFYING THE CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL IMBALANCES A CONDITION FOR ABOLISHING BALLISTIC MISSILES. HE ARGUED THAT ABOLITION WOULD OF ITSELF GREATLY REDUCE THE SOVIET CW THREAT, AND PARTIALLY REDUCE THE SOVIET CONVENTIONAL PROPONDERANCE, FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES OF ALL RANGES, WITH CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL AS WELL AS NUCLEAR

-1-

SECRET - DEDIP

/WARHEADS,



# SECRET

WARHEADS, WOULD GO. SECONDLY, THE US WAS NOT PROPOSING THE ELIMINATION OF AIR-BREATHING NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OR NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. THIRDLY, THE US WOULD ONLY AGREE NOW TO ELIMINATE BALLISTIC MISSILES IF THE RUSSIANS HAD CORRESPONDINGLY AGREED THAT THE US WOULD BE FREE TO DEPLOY SDI AFTER THE 10 YEAR PERIOD ENVISAGED FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. WHEN I QUERIED WHETHER ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD EVEN THEN SEEM PRUDENT UNLESS THE US WERE CERTAIN THAT SDI WOULD PROVIDE A COMPLETE DEFENCE, POINDEXTER PRODUCED THE SHULTZ QUOTE INSURANCE POLICY UNQUOTE ARGUMENT, IE THAT, WITH US/SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILES ABOLISHED, THE REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE AGAINST THIRD PARTIES/TERRORISTS/SOVIET CHEATING WOULD BE VERY MUCH LOWER THAN THE PRESENT SDI REQUIREMENT. HE MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS ALREADY VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT SDI WOULD PRODUCE ENOUGH TO MEET THAT LOWER REQUIREMENT.

6. I LEFT POINDEXTER IN NO DOUBT THAT WE SAW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONVENTIONAL BALANCE AS THE KEY, AND THAT WE WISHED TO BE FULLY CONSULTED ABOUT NEW US THINKING. BUT HIS ANSWER WAS NO MORE THAN THE MECHANISTIC ONE THAT THE JCS HAD STARTED THEIR NEW ANALYSIS. THEY WOULD BE ASSESSING THE PRESENT RELATIVE STRENGTH, AND LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, OF SOVIET AIR DEFENCE (WHERE THE RUSSIANS CERTAINLY HAD THE WORLD'S MOST SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS) AND US STRATEGIC NON-BALLISTIC OFFENSIVE PROGRAMMES (WHERE STEALTH TECHNOLOGY UNDOUBTEDLY PUT THE US FAR AHEAD). THEIR CONCLUSIONS WOULD CERTAINLY BE VERY IMPORTANT.

## COMMENT

7. THIS WAS AN UNSATISFACTORY DISCUSSION. I FOUND POINDEXTER EVASIVE, OFFERING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEMED CONFUSED, AND ON OCCASION CONTRADICTORY.

8. SEE MIFT FOR A REVIEW OF THE MAIN POINTS BEING PUT TO US BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ABOUT THE ABOLITION PROPOSAL.

ACLAND  
ORWBAN 7470

LIMITED.

Hd. ACDD.  
Hd. DEFENCE DEPT.  
Hd. SOVIET DEPT.  
Hd. PLANNING STAFF.  
Hd. NAD.  
Hd. NEWS DEPT.  
PS.  
PS/Mr. RENTON.  
PS/PUS.  
Mr. THOMAS.  
Mr. GOODALL.  
Mr. GILLMORE.  
Mr. HOUSTON.

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
MR. C. POWELL, N° 10 DOWNING ST.

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**A** The National Archives

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US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS | EAST WEST US | SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR ~~WATSON~~ DAUNT  
MR FEARN

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
S. NPS }  
DACU }  
CSI }

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HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D  
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TELNO 1246  
OF 231140Z OCTOBER 86  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MODUK

MODUK FOR DACU

MIPT: GORBACHEV'S TV ADDRESS: COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. A FIRM, AT TIMES ANGRY, BUT NOT VERY POLISHED SPEECH OCCASIONED BY US EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS BUT DIRECTED AT THE POST-REYKJAVIK SITUATION. NO NEW IDEAS. GORBACHEV EXPOSES AMERICAN CONFUSION OVER WHETHER AGREED STRATEGIC CUTS INCLUDED ALL, OR ONLY BALLISTIC, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADDRESSED. SOVIET SCORN FOR THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND REAGAN. THE IMPLICATION THAT FURTHER SUMMIT UNLIKELY AND FOCUS GRADUALLY TURNING TOWARDS THE POST-REAGAN ERA. GENERAL OBJECTIVE - TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE PUSHED AROUND.

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV FOCUSED HEAVILY ON THE REYKJAVIK OUTCOME, AND IN DOING SO REPEATED MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD SAID BOTH IN REYKJAVIK AND ON SOVIET TELEVISION ON 14 OCTOBER, HIS MAIN MOTIVE FOR MAKING ANOTHER TV APPEARANCE SO SOON WAS CLEARLY TO RESPOND TO THE AMERICAN EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC STAFF. BOTH FOR HIS INTERNATIONAL, AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE FOR HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION, WHILST EXERCISING GREAT RESTRAINT IN THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE, WAS NOT GOING TO BE KICKED AROUND.

3. THE SPEECH WAS LESS POLISHED THAN THE REYKJAVIK PRESS CONFERENCE OR HIS TV ADDRESS ON 14 OCTOBER. GORBACHEV CLEARLY INTENDED HIS ANGER TO SHOW. BUT HIS DELIVERY WAS NOT FLUENT AND DESPITE THE FIRM TONE HE SEEMED AT TIMES UNEASY. THE SPEECH WAS CLEARLY RECORDED BEFORE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOVIET COUNTER-EXPULSIONS AND OTHER MEASURES AS GORBACHEV REFERRED TO THEM IN THE FUTURE TENSE. BUT BY THE TIME THE SPEECH WAS BROADCAST THE MEASURES HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE PUBLIC. (MY TELNO 1243).

4. IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR A GENERAL SECRETARY TO APPEAR SO FREQUENTLY ON TELEVISION AND EVEN MORE SO FOR HIM TO COVER SO MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND SEVERAL TIMES. SINCE HE HAD SO LITTLE NEW TO SAY, I BELIEVE HE RISKS OVER-EXPOSURE IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC.



HE HAD SO LITTLE NEW TO SAY, I BELIEVE HE RISKS OVER-EXPOSURE IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC.

5. THE ARMS CONTROL PART OF THE SPEECH CONTAINS LITTLE NEW. IT IS INTERESTING THAT GORBACHEV HAS NOW BEEN STUNG INTO ASSERTING PUBLICLY THAT REAGAN HAD INDEED AGREED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING ALL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 15 OF THE ABMT IS ALSO A NEW BUT NOT VERY SIGNIFICANT ARGUMENT AGAINST US WITHDRAWAL.

GORBACHEV ALSO INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO UNSPECIFIED WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS WHO FAVOUR THE RETENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEREBY REVEALING THAT THE "MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" ON WHOM, AS BEFORE, MUCH OF THE BLAME IS PLACED, ARE NOT ALONE IN THEIR CONCERN.

6. THE PASSAGE ABOUT FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IS ALSO INTERESTING, PERHAPS AS A FORETASTE OF THE CAMPAIGN ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WEST FORESHADOWED IN GORBACHEV'S TALK WITH THE DANISH PRIME MINISTER (MY TELNO 1240). IT IS SURPRISING THAT GORBACHEV WAS PREPARED PUBLICLY TO ADMIT TO JAMMING THE VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS, AND TO OFFER TO END THE JAMMING AGAINST A CONDITION WHICH COULD, IF REAGAN WISHED, QUITE EASILY BE MET. THE ARGUMENT ABOUT NEEDING A TRANSMITTER CLOSE TO OR IN THE US TO REACH AMERICANS ON MEDIUM WAVE SCARCELY APPLIES TO SOVIET BROADCASTS TO THE UK NOR, THEREFORE, TO SOVIET JAMMING OF THE BBC RUSSIAN SERVICE. IT MAY BE WORTH CONSIDERING CALLING WHAT AMOUNTS TO A SOVIET BLUFF.

7. THE SPEECH CONTAINS A NUMBER OF CONTRADICTIONARY SIGNALS. ON THE ONE HAND, GORBACHEV EXPRESSES FAIRLY OPEN CONTEMPT FOR THE US ADMINISTRATION AND REAGAN PERSONALLY ("IT IS HARD FOR THE CURRENT US ADMINISTRATION TO LEARN LESSONS", "WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT IS THIS?", "QUITE AN UNATTRACTIVE PICTURE IS EMERGING OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF A GREAT COUNTRY"). ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SPEECH OPENS WITH A REFERENCE TO THE "HIGHER LEVEL" OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH REYKJAVIK HAD CREATED AND THE RAISING OF THE DIALOGUE TO A "NEW LEVEL", AND ENDS WITH A FIRMLY EMPHASISED RE-STATEMENT OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE NOT BEING WITHDRAWN. GORBACHEV SEEMS TO HAVE WISHED TO SIGNAL TO THE DOMESTIC AND WIDER PUBLIC THAT THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED READY TO NEGOTIATE, AND *Resolve* IN THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, BUT THAT THESE WERE NOW INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY AS WAS ALSO BY IMPLICATION A FURTHER SUMMIT, AND THAT IT MIGHT PROVE NECESSARY TO LOOK BEYOND REAGAN. HOWEVER, THE WAY AHEAD WAS NOT TOUCHED ON AT ALL AND THE SPEECH LEFT A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS HANGING IN THE AIR.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

HXHPAN 5914

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ADVANCE COPIES

18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS EAST WEST US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR ~~W~~ DAUNT  
MR FEARN

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
B. NPS }  
DACU }  
CSI }

HD/DEFENCE D  
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
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US/SOVIET RELATIONS: TELEVISION ADDRESS BY GORBACHEV



SUMMARY

1. IN AN ADDRESS ON SOVIET TELEVISION ON 23 OCTOBER GORBACHEV REPEATED MUCH OF HIS EARLIER ANALYSIS OF REYKJAVIK. HE CITED IN PARTICULAR THE US ATTITUDE TO SDI AND THE POST-REYKJAVIK EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ADJUST HIS PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF REYKJAVIK AND INSISTED THAT HIS PACKAGE OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

DETAIL

2. THE MAJOR PART OF GORBACHEV'S 50 MINUTE ADDRESS WAS TAKEN UP WITH A REPETITION OF THE POINTS MADE IN HIS TELEVISION ADDRESS ON 14 OCTOBER (MY TELNO 1206), WITH A MORE SUSTAINED ATTACK ON SDI. HE SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING 'WE HAVE RISEN TO A HIGHER LEVEL, NOT ONLY IN ANALYSING THE SITUATION, BUT ALSO IN DETERMINING THE OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT..... IT IS THE COMMON VIEW THAT THE MEETING HAS RAISED BOTH THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE AND THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AS A WHOLE TO A NEW LEVEL'. HE ADDED: 'THE ROUTE TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS WAS OUTLINED THERE. BUT THE PERIOD SINCE REYKJAVIK HAS DEMONSTRATED SOMETHING DIFFERENT'.

3. ON SDI, HE REFERRED TO THE AMERICAN ARGUMENTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS AFRAID OF IT, THAT IT HAD BROUGHT THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE, THAT IT WOULD SAVE AMERICA FROM THE SOVIET THREAT AND THAT IT WOULD GIVE THE US A GREAT TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD. HE MADE THE FAMILIAR CRITICISM THAT CONTINUATION OF THE PROGRAMME WOULD DRAW THE WORLD TO A NEW STAGE OF THE ARMS RACE AND WOULD DE-STABILISE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. 'IF THE PRESIDENT COUNTS ON SDI..... IT IS IN VAIN. THE SYSTEM WILL ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF ALL MISSILES ARE ELIMINATED BUT THEN WHY IS AN ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE NECESSARY AT ALL?' 'SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE AMERICA TO GIVE UP THE DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING. WE ARE URGING THE US ADMINISTRATION TO LOOK FOR INVULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION ..... ALONG THE PATH OF A COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE CREATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE ANY WARS - BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL'.



EXCLUDE ANY WARS - BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL

4. GORBACHEV ALSO SAID THAT THE US POSITION AT REYKJAVIK ON SDI RAN  
COUNTER TO THE ABM TREATY. ARTICLE 15 ALLOWED FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM  
THE TREATY BUT ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, NAMELY IF  
"EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE PUT (A PARTY'S) SUPREME INTERESTS  
UNDER THREAT". "THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AND THERE  
ARE NONE NOW..... THE ELIMINATION ON NINTAR WEAPONS, IF STARTED,  
WOULD MAKE THE EMERGENCE OF SUCH EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS STILL LESS  
PROBABLE". ARTICLE 13 OF THE ABM TREATY ENVISAGED THAT THE SIDES  
SHOULD "CONSIDER AS NECESSARY POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER  
INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THE TREATY". THE US, ON THE  
CONTRARY, WERE ATTEMPTING TO DEVALUE IT. GORBACHEV COMMENTED: "IT  
IS HARD FOR THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION TO LEARN LESSONS".

5. AFTER REYKJAVIK THE US HAD RECENTLY TAKEN ACTIONS "WHICH  
FROM A NORMAL HUMAN POINT OF VIEW LOOK SIMPLY WILD AFTER SUCH AN  
IMPORTANT MEETING". GORBACHEV REFERRED TO THE EXPULSION OF 55  
SOVIET MEMBERS OF STAFF FROM THE US. "WE WILL OF COURSE ADOPT  
MEASURES IN RESPONSE, VERY TOUGH MEASURES, SO TO SAY, ON AN EQUAL  
FOOTING. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING SUCH AN OUTRAGE.....  
WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT IS IT, WHAT CAN ONE EXPECT FROM IT ON OTHER  
MATTERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE? WHAT ARE THE LIMITS OF THE  
UNPREDICTABILITY OF ITS ACTIONS? NOT ONLY DOES IT HAVE NO  
CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS ON KEY QUESTIONS OF DISARMAMENT BUT IT DOES  
NOT EVEN HAVE A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE ATMOSPHERE ESSENTIAL FOR  
NORMAL CONTINUATION OF THE DIALOGUE..... QUITE AN UNATTRACTIVE  
PORTRAIT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF A GREAT COUNTRY IS EMERGING.....  
EITHER THE PRESIDENT CANNOT DEAL WITH AN ENTOURAGE WHICH LITERALLY  
BREATHES HATRED FOR THE SOVIET UNION..... OR ELSE HE HIMSELF WANTS  
THAT. IN ANY CASE THERE ARE NO CONSTRAINTS ON THE HAWKS IN THE  
WHITE HOUSE....."

6. GORBACHEV CONTINUED WITH AN ATTACK ON THE US CONCEPT OF FREEDOM  
OF INFORMATION, AND THE PRESENTATION OF REYKJAVIK. PRESIDENT  
REAGAN HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE US RECOGNISED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND  
THE RIGHT TO LISTEN TO ANY POINT OF VIEW, BUT THE FACT WAS THAT  
THE NOVOSTI ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE  
AND SPEECHES WERE NOW HELD IN US CUSTOMS. IN ADDITION, BY  
COMPARISON WITH AMERICAN FILMS IN THE SOVIET UNION, HARDLY ANY  
SOVIET FILMS WERE SHOWN IN THE US, AND THE RATIO OF PUBLISHED  
RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN BOOKS IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY WAS RESPECTIVELY  
20:1. ON RADIO INFORMATION, GORBACHEV HAD SUGGESTED TO REAGAN  
"WE WILL GIVE UP JAMMING VOA IF YOU ALLOW US THE POSSIBILITY OF  
SETTING UP RADIO BROADCASTS FOR THE US, EITHER ON YOUR TERRITORY  
OR NEARBY". THE PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED TO CONSIDER THIS.

7. THE US HAD DISTORTED THE OUTCOME OF REYKJAVIK. WHILE SHULTZ  
HAD SAID THAT THE PROPOSED DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT IN REYKJAVIK  
COVERED ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ASSISTANTS  
HAD SAID THAT ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES WERE INVOLVED, LEAVING OUT  
BOMBERS AND ALL CRUISE MISSILES. "WITH ALL RESPONSIBILITY AS A  
PARTICIPANT IN THE TALKS I SAY: THE PRESIDENT - ALBEIT WITHOUT  
PARTICULAR ENTHUSIASM - GAVE HIS AGREEMENT THAT ALL STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, AND NOT ONLY CERTAIN OF THEM, WOULD BE DESTROYED.  
THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED PRECISELY OVER 10 YEARS, IN TWO STAGES."  
THE DISCUSSION ON NUCLEAR TESTING HAD ALSO BEEN DISTORTED. THE  
SOVIET UNION HAD NOT AGREED TO THE US UNILATERAL APPROACH, "NOR  
COULD IT HAVE".

8. SOME VOICES IN WESTERN EUROPE WERE NOW MAINTAINING THAT IT WAS  
DIFFICULT TO PART WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. "POLICY MAKERS" IN THE  
WEST CLAIMED THAT THE DIFFICULTIES AT REYKJAVIK RESULTED FROM THE  
PACKAGE NATURE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. "ALL OUR PROPOSALS MADE  
IN REYKJAVIK ARE OBJECTIVELY CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS. OUR CONCESSIONS ARE ALSO PART OF THE PACKAGE.  
NO PACKAGE, NO CONCESSIONS". GORBACHEV CONCLUDED: "THE SOVIET  
UNION HAS DEPLOYED MAXIMUM GOOD-WILL IN ITS PROPOSALS. WE ARE NOT  
WITHDRAWING THESE PROPOSALS, WE ARE NOT WITHDRAWING THEM (EXCLAM)  
EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THEIR BASIS AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT  
REMAINS IN FORCE".

CARTLEDGE

*To Mr. Barkley  
right*



ADVANCE COPIES

18

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS / EAST WEST US / SOVIET RELATIONS

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR ~~W~~ DAUNT  
MR FEARN

MR POWELL, ~~NO 10 DOWNING ST~~  
MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
B. NPS(=)  
DACU  
CSI

HD/DEFENCE D  
HD/ACDD  
HD/SOVIET D  
HO NAD  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

[HD/NAD SHOULD BE ADDED  
ON EAST WEST DIST.]

15.1.85

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 230830Z FCO  
TELNO 1243

IMMEDIATE

OF 230745Z OCTOBER 86  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

EXPULSION OF US DIPLOMATS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND MEASURES  
TO RESTRICT US EMBASSY ACTIVITIES


SUMMARY

1. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE LATE ON 22 OCTOBER, MFA SPOKESMAN GERASIMOV ANNOUNCED THAT 5 MORE US DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL (FOUR FROM MOSCOW, ONE FROM LENINGRAD) WERE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA. IN ADDITION ALL LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF WERE TO BE WITHDRAWN, AND OTHER MEASURES INTRODUCED TO LIMIT THE NUMBERS COMING TO THE EMBASSY AND CONSULATE. NUMERICAL EQUIVALENCE WAS TO BE ESTABLISHED, WITH SOVIET DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE USA.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS STATEMENT GERASIMOV DESCRIBED THE EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM WASHINGTON AND SAN FRANCISCO AS THE "LATEST ANTI-SOVIET ACTION", "WITHOUT ANY GROUNDS" AND "OPPORTUNIST AND PROVOCATIVE". HE SAID THAT THE "DISCRIMINATION" HAD BEGUN SOME YEARS AGO WHEN THE US HAD APPLIED A QUOTA. THE UN EXPULSIONS IN SEPTEMBER WERE COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE UN HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, AND HAD BEEN CALCULATED TO UNDERMINE THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETINGS. SOVIET COUNTER-MEASURES, ABOUT WHICH THE US HAD BEEN WARNED HAD BEEN PREPARED, BUT HAD NOT THEN BEEN IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING.

3. IN ANSWER TO THE US CLAIM THAT LESS PEOPLE WERE EMPLOYED IN US MISSIONS THAN SOVIET ONES GERASIMOV POINTED OUT THAT THE AMERICANS HAD LOCAL EMPLOYEES: THUS THE TOTAL NUMBER IN THE US EMBASSY AND CONSULATE IN LENINGRAD WAS 460, AS AGAINST ABOUT 300 FOR THE RUSSIANS IN WASHINGTON AND SAN FRANCISCO. BESIDES THIS, THE AMERICANS BROUGHT IN EACH YEAR UP TO 500 SHORT-TERM PERSONNEL FOR UP TO ONE YEAR ASSIGNMENTS. "WE HAVE NOW DECIDED TO ELIMINATE THIS INEQUALITY".





THIS INEQUALITY''.

4. GERASIMOV THEN SET OUT THE FOLLOWING COUNTERMEASURES:

I) BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUING USE OF US MISSIONS FOR UNPERMITTED ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION THE FOLLOWING WERE DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA AND HAD TO LEAVE BY 1 NOVEMBER:

CAPT. THOMAS HOLME (NAVAL ATTACHE)  
COL. RICHARD NAAB (MILITARY ATTACHE)  
MICHAEL MORGAN (2ND SECRETARY)  
MICHAEL MATERA (3RD SECRETARY)  
DANIEL GROSSMAN (VICE-CONSUL, LENINGRAD)

II) THE NUMBER OF US PERSONNEL ON TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENTS (UP TO ONE YEAR) WAS TO BE BROUGHT STRICTLY INTO LINE WITH THE NUMBER OF RUSSIANS IN THE SAME CATEGORY.

III) US OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE SOVIET UNION WERE AT NO POINT TO EXCEED THE NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN THE US.

IV) THE NUMBER OF US CITIZENS ENTERING THE SOVIET UNION AS GUESTS OF THE US AMBASSADOR OR OF EMBASSY AND CONSULATE EMPLOYEES WAS TO BE ''SHARPLY CONSTRAINED''. EVERY YEAR 200 AMERICANS ENTERED BY THIS METHOD AND ''IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER'' WERE PUT TO WORK IN THE US MISSIONS.

V) THE US EMBASSY AND CONSULATE WERE TO BE DEPRIVED OF ALL THEIR LOCAL EMPLOYEES - ABOUT 260. AT THE SAME TIME THEY WERE FORBIDDEN TO TAKE ON EMPLOYEES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.

5. GERASIMOV SAID THAT ''FULL NUMERICAL BALANCE'' WOULD THUS BE ESTABLISHED. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DEMAND STRICT RECIPROCITY AND EQUALITY FROM THE US. IF THE US CONTINUED TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST SOVIET PERSONNEL ''ADEQUATE ADDITIONAL MEASURES'' WOULD BE TAKEN. GERASIMOV ENDED BY SAYING THAT THIS ''PROVOCATIVE STEP'' HAD BEEN TAKEN AT A MOMENT WHEN, AFTER REYKJAVIK, ''ENCOURAGING TENDENCIES'' WERE EMERGING IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, AND PROSPECTS OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND FOR DECISIONS IN THE MAIN ISSUES OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS WERE IMPROVING. THOSE IN THE US WHO DID NOT WANT SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT HAD RESORTED TO THE TIME HONORED PLOY OF ''PROVOCATION AND POLITICAL SABOTAGE''.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 5905

NNNN



PRIME MINISTER

Reuters report that the Americans are going to expel 55 (repeat 55) Soviet diplomats in retaliation for the Soviets expulsion of five Americans.

I have asked Charlie Price whether this is true. He is checking.

CHARLES

21 October 1986

PS Charlie Price has now confirmed this information though says that the right figure is 69. The Americans are apparently achieving this by putting exactly the same ceiling on Soviet staff in Washington and San Francisco as exists for American staff in Moscow and Leningrad



GRS 800

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 211630Z F C O

TELNO 1235

OF 211345Z OCTOBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

*A very important message  
COP.*

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CALLED ON SHEVARDNADZE ON 20 OCTOBER TO CONVEY SHULTZ'S PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD MEET IN VIENNA ON 5/6 NOVEMBER. AMIABLE BUT REVEALING RETROSPECT ON REYKJAVIK. LOW-KEY EXCHANGE ON EXPULSIONS. ATMOSPHERE GOOD.

DETAIL

*presumably no longer!*

2. MY US COLLEAGUE HAS GIVEN ME (AND THE FRENCH AND FRG AMBASSADORS) AN ACCOUNT OF HIS CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE (AT HIS OWN REQUEST) ON 20 OCTOBER. HARTMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CONVEY TO SHEVARDNADZE SECRETARY SHULTZ'S HOPE THAT THEY COULD MEET IN VIENNA TO DISCUSS FOLLOW-UP TO REYKJAVIK. IN PRINCIPLE, SHEVARDNADZE WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF A MEETING: THERE MAY BE LOGISTIC DIFFICULTIES - SHULTZ CANNOT ARRIVE IN VIENNA UNTIL 5 NOVEMBER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAS TO DEPART FOR MOSCOW ON 6 NOVEMBER - BUT THESE ARE CERTAIN TO BE SURMOUNTED.

3. HARTMAN TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SHULTZ BELIEVED THAT REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE DURING THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, TWO SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT:-

A) SDI.

IN REYKJAVIK, THE US DELEGATION HAD BEEN GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT BY "LABORATORY RESEARCH" THE RUSSIANS HAD IN MIND RESEARCH WITHIN THE CONFINES OF FOUR WALLS AND A ROOF. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SINCE INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE A BROADER DEFINITION OF RESEARCH AND TESTING ON EARTH, WHILE REMAINING ADAMANT ON RESEARCH OR TESTING IN SPACE. THE US INTERPRETATION OF THE ABMT NEVERTHELESS REMAINED THAT, EVEN ON A "RESTRICTIVE" INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY, IT PERMITTED THE TESTING IN SPACE OF "CONCEPTS" OR "COMPONENTS" ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT PERMIT THE TESTING IN SPACE OF COMPLETE ABM WEAPONS SYSTEMS. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, ANY ABM-RELATED TESTING IN SPACE CONSTITUTED A

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*VIOLATION*



# CONFIDENTIAL

VIOLATION OF THE ABMT. HE SAID THAT HE WAS NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE DIFFERENCES WITH SHULTZ AND THEY COULD BE EXPLORED IN MORE DETAIL BY THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA. HARTMAN CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT THE SOVIET POSITION MIGHT NOT BE TOTALLY INFLEXIBLE.

## B) STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS

HARTMAN EXPLAINED THE US POSITION ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS REDUCTIONS OVER 10 YEARS, NAMELY THAT DURING THE FIRST 5-YEAR PERIOD STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL CATEGORIES SHOULD BE REDUCED BY 50% BUT THAT IN THE SECOND 5-YEAR PERIOD THIS REDUCTION WOULD APPLY ONLY TO BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS WAS NOT ONLY THAT, SINCE THE PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS WAS RELATED TO A 10 YEAR COMMITMENT TO NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABMT, THE REDUCTIONS SHOULD AFFECT THOSE WEAPONS (IE BALLISTIC MISSILES) TO WHICH THE ABMT WAS RELEVANT; BUT ALSO THAT, BEFORE MOVING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO DEAL WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND CW, IN VIEW OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN BOTH CATEGORIES. SHEVARDNADZE MAINTAINED THAT IN REYKJAVIK THE AMERICANS HAD AGREED THAT THE REDUCTIONS PROCESS SHOULD APPLY TO ALL CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS DURING THE WHOLE 10-YEAR PERIOD (HARTMAN - PLEASE PROTECT - HAS TOLD ME THAT AT SOME POINT DURING THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS PRESIDENT REAGAN DID IN FACT SPEAK IN TERMS WHICH WERE OPEN TO THIS INTERPRETATION, ALTHOUGH THE US POSITION WAS REDEFINED IN A PAPER HANDED TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE END OF THE TALKS). SHEVARDNADZE NEVERTHELESS ALLOWED THAT THESE DIFFERENCES, TOO, SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA. HE ALSO AGREED THAT THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH HARTMAN HAD RAISED WAS LEGITIMATE, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ADVANCED REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS IN BOTH AREAS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS VAGUE ON LINKAGE. HE CATALOGUED SOVIET "CONCESSIONS" AT REYKJAVIK - ON UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS, ON SOVIET INF REDUCTIONS IN ASIA, AND IN AGREEING TO TALKS ON SRNF - BUT MADE NO REFERENCE WHATSOEVER TO NUCLEAR TESTS.

Yep  
another  
version

But this  
is much  
better

AK.



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4. ON US AND SOVIET EXPULSIONS, HARTMAN TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT HE HOPED THAT THE PROCESS WOULD STOP SHORT OF A POINT AT WHICH HE WOULD BE LEFT WITHOUT ADVISERS IN HIS EMBASSY. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THE EXPULSION OF 5 US STAFF FROM MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD WAS THE 'MINIMUM RESPONSE' WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE TO THE US ACTION IN SEEKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF 25 MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET UN MISSION. (HARTMAN MENTIONED, IN PARENTHESIS, THAT AT REYKJAVIK SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD SHULTZ THAT SOME OF THE SOVIET STAFF EXPELLED FROM NEW YORK WERE 'PEOPLE ON WHOM HE DEPENDED', THE IMPLICATION BEING THAT SOME OF THE EXPELLEES HAD A DUAL KGB/MFA FUNCTION AND THAT THE US ACTION CONSEQUENTLY HURT NOT ONLY THE KGB BUT THE MFA AS WELL.)

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 5863

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

SOVIET DEPT.  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
ACDD  
CRD  
NEWS DEPT.  
INFO DEPT.  
ECD(E)  
FED  
NED  
POD  
PUSD  
CSCE UNIT  
PROTOCOL DEPT. ESSD  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON

PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR GILLMORE  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR FEARN  
MR LONG  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR BARRINGTON  
MR WINCHESTER  
MR RENWICK

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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2667

OF 181915Z OCTOBER 86

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW,

MIPT: REYKJAVIK

1. I HAD QUITE A LONG PRIVATE TALK WITH SHULTZ ON 16 OCTOBER. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WHAT FOLLOWS IS NOT (NOT) ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF AMERICAN VIEWS.
2. I SAID THAT THE COMBINATION OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL INFERIORITY AND THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS/AGREEMENTS FOR ELIMINATING LRINF IN EUROPE AND ABOLISHING BALLISTIC MISSILES AND/OR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A 10 YEAR PERIOD WAS A SOMEWHAT WORRYING PROSPECT. SHULTZ DREW A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND THE LABOUR PARTY'S DEFENCE PLATFORM. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY WAS TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS ON A MULTILATERAL, BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE BASIS. THE LABOUR PARTY'S POLICY, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS FOR THE UNILATERAL ABOLITION OF THE UK NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE UK. WHEN I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR HMG TO DEFEND UK TRIDENT, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WAS QUOTE A LONG WAY DOWN THE ROAD UNQUOTE.
3. SHULTZ RUMINATED PHILOSOPHICALLY ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDES. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD AN INSTINCTIVE VISION OF THE FUTURE. HE MIGHT OR HE MIGHT NOT BE RIGHT ABOUT SDI. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, HE WAS PROBABLY RIGHT ABOUT THE MOOD OF YOUNGER PEOPLE, WHO WOULD BE INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO TOLERATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A REAL EFFORT THEREFORE HAD TO BE MADE TO GET RID OF THEM IF POLITICAL PRESSURES ON WESTERN LEADERS WERE NOT TO BECOME EXTREMELY HARD TO HANDLE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REALLY ABANDON ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE OTHER COUNTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE CHINA, CONTINUED TO POSSESS THEM.
4. ON SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE, SHULTZ QUESTIONED WHETHER IN THE LONGER TERM OUR FEARS ABOUT THIS WERE WHOLLY JUSTIFIED. IN TERMS OF POPULATION, THE ALLIANCE WAS LARGER THAN THE WARSAW PACT AND IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH, NATO WAS FAR AHEAD AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REMAIN SO. HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT ALLIED MILITARY STAFFS EXAGGERATED THE EXTENT OF THE WARSAW PACT ADVANTAGE. I SAID THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE POPULATION AND ECONOMIC FACTORS, IT WAS FAR EASIER FOR A TOTALITARIAN STATE TO KEEP A HUGE FORCE UNDER ARMS THAN IT WAS FOR THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. SHULTZ HAS SUBSEQUENTLY FLOATED PUBLICLY HIS IDEAS (DESCRIBED ABOVE) ABOUT THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE.

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5. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING HAD BEEN ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE NEGOTIATIONS HE HAD EVER PARTICIPATED IN. GORBACHEV HAD KEPT PUTTING ON THE TABLE PROPOSALS THAT COINCIDED WITH US VIEWS. IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN A QUESTION OF REELING THEM IN AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. GORBACHEV HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT SEVERAL TIMES THAT ONLY THE TWO OF THEM COULD MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS; PROFESSIONAL NEGOTIATORS WERE TOO RIGID AND GOT BOGGED DOWN IN DETAIL. SHULTZ DID NOT DISSENT FROM MY POINT THAT THE RIGHT COMBINATION MIGHT BE MORE FREQUENT HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS TO GIVE REAL IMPETUS TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TOGETHER WITH DETAILED DISCUSSION BY EXPERTS TO SORT OUT PROPOSALS AND TO ENSURE THAT IMPORTANT SECURITY INTERESTS WERE NOT BEING JEOPARDISED.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 2667

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

SOVIET DEPT.  
DEFENCE DEPT.  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
PLANNING STAFF

EED

NAD

WED

ACDD

CRD

NEWS DEPT.

INFO DEPT.

ECD(E)

FED

NED

POD

PUSD

CSCE UNIT

PROTOCOL DEPT. ESDD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR GODDALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR GILLMORE  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR FEARN  
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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2666

OF 181900Z OCTOBER 86

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW,  
INFO SAVING OTHER NATO POSTS, UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK*ms*

MY TELNO 2640 : REYKJAVIK

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT LAUNCHES SDI AS CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ISSUE. DEMOCRATS UNCERTAIN HOW TO RESPOND. POLLS SHOW SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE ISSUE AT REYKJAVIK.
2. PRIVATE US/SOVIET CONTACTS CONTINUE IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE.

DETAIL

3. THE PRESIDENT HAS MOVED QUICKLY TO MAKE A CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION ISSUE OUT OF SDI AND HIS DEFENCE OF IT AT REYKJAVIK. AT A FUNDRAISER FOR A REPUBLICAN SENATE CANDIDATE IN BALTIMORE ON 15 OCTOBER, REAGAN INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING HIGH-PROFILE DEFENCE OF SDI:

QUOTE

48 HOURS AFTER WE CAME HOME FROM REYKJAVIK, SOME ON CAPITOL HILL WERE ALREADY PROMISING TO TAKE A MEAT AXE AND CHOP UP AMERICA'S DEFENCE INITIATIVE, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT MR GORBACHEV IS HOPING THE CONGRESS WILL DO. LET ME STATE IT PLAINLY. IT WOULD BE A TERRIBLE TRAGEDY FOR THIS COUNTRY AND FOR OUR CHILDREN'S FUTURE IF THOSE ON CAPITOL HILL OPPOSED TO SDI ARE ALLOWED TO HAND OVER TO THE SOVIET UNION FREE OF CHARGE WHAT WE REFUSED TO HAND OVER ACROSS THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN REYKJAVIK. SDI IS AMERICA'S INSURANCE POLICY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BEGIN LIVING UP TO THE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THAT THEY AGREED TO. SDI IS ONE OF THE CHIEF REASONS THE SOVIETS WENT TO THE SUMMIT, AND ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS THEY WILL COME BACK AGAIN. SDI IS A KEY TO A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. DON'T LET LIBERALS IN CONGRESS THROW IT AWAY ... TODAY I URGE THE VOTERS OF MARYLAND AND THE VOTERS OF THIS NATION TO ASK EACH OF THEIR CANDIDATES THIS QUESTION: WHERE DO YOU STAND ON DEFENDING AMERICA? WHERE DO YOU STAND ON SDI?

UNQUOTE

THE WHITE HOUSE ARE SAYING THAT THIS WILL BE A CENTRAL THEME OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN SPEECHES FOR REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES IN THE TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS.

4. THIS HIGHLY CHARGED DEFENCE OF SDI CLEARLY REFLECTS A JUDGEMENT IN THE WHITE HOUSE THAT THERE IS ELECTORAL MILEAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN BUILDING UP THE SDI AS A MAJOR CAMPAIGN ISSUE AND ASSOCIATING IT WITH THE NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENCE. THE VERY TIGHT (AND IMPORTANT) RACE FOR CONTROL OF THE SENATE NO DOUBT EXPLAINS THE STRATEGY, AND THE EVIDENCE FROM THE POLLS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THIS (AND OTHER) ISSUES AT REYKJAVIK HAS NO DOUBT PROVED TOO STRONG A TEMPTATION FOR THE WHITE HOUSE POLITICAL ADVISERS.

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5. THIS AGGRESSIVE POLITICISATION OF THE ISSUE BY THE PRESIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE CAUGHT THE DEMOCRATS OFF GUARD. THERE IS CLEARLY SOME RESENTMENT THAT, THE DEMOCRATS HAVING CLOSED RANKS BEHIND THE PRESIDENT BEFORE AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOW BE TURNING THE SDI QUESTION INTO AN ELECTION ISSUE. SPEAKER O'NEILL ON 16 OCTOBER ACCUSED THE PRESIDENT OF TRAMPLING ON THE BIPARTISAN SPIRIT OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT WITH HIS REMARKS IN BALTIMORE. THE DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE, DESPITE SOME SHARPENING OF THE RHETORIC ON THEIR SIDE TOO, HAS SO FAR GENERALLY BEEN UNCERTAIN, NO DOUBT REFLECTING A JUDGEMENT THAT A FULL FRONTAL ATTACK ON SDI AND THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF IT AT REYKJAVIK WILL BE HARD TO PULL OFF WITHOUT THE DEMOCRATS OPENING THEMSELVES UP TO THE TRADITIONAL CHARGE THAT THEY ARE SOFT ON DEFENCE.

6. SOME SENIOR DEMOCRATIC FIGURES HAVE NEVERTHELESS TRIED TO CAST DOUBT ON THE COMPETENCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT AND TO QUESTION HIS COMMITMENT TO SDI. SENATOR NUNN (D-GEORGIA), FOR EXAMPLE, HAS REVEALED THAT THE PRESIDENT TOLD SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN ON 14 OCTOBER THAT HE HAD PROPOSED TO GORBACHEV THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS OPPOSED TO ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES. NUNN SAID THAT THERE HAD TO BE GENUINE DOUBT ABOUT WHAT HAD IN FACT BEEN PROPOSED AT REYKJAVIK AND THAT A FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW WAS QUOTE IMPERATIVE UNQUOTE. NUNN HAS ALSO CRITICISED THE PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO CONSULT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WHO WERE NOT QUOTE ASKED TO STUDY THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR A TOTAL ELIMINATION IN 10 YEARS OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES, LET ALONE TO CONSIDER THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS UNQUOTE. NUNN'S ATTACK APPEARS TO HAVE PROMPTED AN UNSCHEDULED MEETING ON 17 OCTOBER BETWEEN SHULTZ AND THE JOINT CHIEFS BUT A NUMBER OF SENATORS ARE REPORTED TO BE TRYING TO ARRANGE AN EARLY HEARING AT WHICH THE JOINT CHIEFS WOULD BE ASKED TO ASSESS THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PROPOSALS. THE MORE GENERAL CRITICISM OF LACK OR PREPAREDNESS ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS TEAM FOR THE REYKJAVIK MEETING IS ALSO EMERGING IN THE PRESS AND IN DEMOCRATIC CIRCLES.

7. NUNN AND A NUMBER OF OTHER SENIOR DEMOCRATIC FIGURES HAVE ALSO CONTINUED TO CAST DOUBT ON THE WISDOM OF ALLOWING SDI TO BECOME THE OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND TO CRITICISE THE PRESIDENT FOR MISSED OPPORTUNITIES AT REYKJAVIK.

8. THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED ON 15 OCTOBER AND HAVE CONFIRMED SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS MADE AT REYKJAVIK REMAIN ON THE TABLE AND THAT THE DOOR IS STILL FIRMLY OPEN. AT START, INF AND DEFENCE/SPACE PLENARY SESSIONS ON 15 AND 16 OCTOBER, THE RUSSIANS TABLED PROPOSALS BASED VERY CLOSELY ON GORBACHEV'S TELEVISION ADDRESS ON 14 OCTOBER. THE AMERICANS ALSO PLAN TO TABLE IN GENEVA US PROPOSALS MADE AT REYKJAVIK AND THE US VERSION OF WHAT WAS AGREED THERE. IN ADDITION THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON SHULTZ ON 14 OCTOBER TO CONFIRM PRIVATELY THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS SDI ISSUES FURTHER AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER EARLY US/SOVIET CONTACTS AT A SENIOR LEVEL.

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COMMENT

9. IT WAS PERHAPS INEVITABLE THAT THE WHITE HOUSE SHOULD HAVE DECIDED TO EXTRACT WHATEVER ELECTORAL MILEAGE THEY CAN FROM THE SDI AND THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF IT AT REYKJAVIK, PARTICULARLY GIVEN INDICATIONS THAT FEELINGS ON LOCAL AND ECONOMIC ELECTION ISSUES MAY BE MOVING SLIGHTLY IN THE DEMOCRATS FAVOUR. POLLS SINCE REYKJAVIK SHOWING BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PERFORMANCE THERE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE ENCOURAGED THIS. THIS CARRIES THE OBVIOUS DANGER THAT HIS HIGH-PROFILE DEFENCE OF SDI WILL RESULT IN THE PRESIDENT BECOMING MORE AND MORE DEEPLY DUG IN BEHIND THE SDI AND THAT THIS WILL FURTHER COMPLICATE THE PROCESS OF FINDING COMMON GROUND WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE LEVEL OF RHETORIC IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. BUT IT IS AT LEAST ENCOURAGING THAT US/SOVIET CONTACTS, IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE, ARE CONTINUING AND APPEAR TO REFLECT A WILLINGNESS ON BOTH SIDES TO TAKE THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS FORWARD IN REASONABLY SHORT ORDER.
10. THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG DEFENCE OF SDI NO DOUBT ALSO REFLECTS HIS CONTINUING DEEP PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE CONCEPT AND TO A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD - SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

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REYKJAVIK: PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 17 OCTOBER REPORTS REGAN AS HAVING SAID ON 16 OCTOBER THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER A PRIVATE ACCOUNT ON THE TELEPHONE OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT.

2. REGAN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GENERALLY GIVEN AN OPTIMISTIC REPORT AND HAD TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE REYKJAVIK MEETING HAD CLEARED THE WAY FOR AN AGREEMENT ON INF DESPITE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON LINKAGE. THE PRESIDENT HAD NOTED THAT UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. REGAN SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ~~VERY SUPPORTIVE~~ ABOUT EVENTS IN REYKJAVIK AND HAD WANTED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THEM.

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Report No. 0001213/23931

Transmitted on BBC R.4

"International Assignment"

Length 5'20"

Date 17th October 1986

Time 10am

Short Title Reykavik Summit

*Prime Minister  
Lord Carrington*

Christopher Lee: But before we get into our discussion I would like you to hear some thoughts from Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary General, who hasn't until now said anything at any length on the Reykavik Summit.

*commitments  
on  
Reykjavik  
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I was talking to him earlier this week after a visit to NATO of the American Secretary of State, George Shultz. I wondered what sort of reception had he had?

Lord Carrington: It was rather an upbeat reaction really which I hadn't altogether expected, but the reaction was, you know, how incredibly far they'd come in a very short time. We didn't really think that they were going to <sup>do serious negotiations with</sup> Reykavik, and they get within a comparatively short distance of reaching a very comprehensive outline agreement - obviously it had to be outline- isn't it incredible that they got so far? That was much more the reaction than what a pity they couldn't clinch it because of the SDR? Then it's been pretty public what the position of both sides was and how near they were to agreement on a number of these issues, merely because they didn't happen to sign a piece of paper at Reykavik, those positions are not going to disappear. It really would have been extraordinary if they'd reached an agreement there on so wide a base.

Do you remember the twin-track decision about deploying Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe which caused all that problem, and the Soviet Union absolutely refused to negotiate about the SS-20s at all. Well what have they done in Reykavik? They have said that they will go down to 100 warheads, all in Asia, with no warheads at all in Europe.



Report No. 23931Continuation 1

C. Lee: Just touch on INF. And it's really I suppose being the devil's advocate, but you could argue that an INF agreement, which brought levels down to zero, wasn't a very good idea, because part of their deployment was a political decision which demonstrated the American commitment to Europe, and so that you actually get rid of them and then somebody says - Well how can we be reassured in some other way that the Americans remain committed?

Lord Carrington: If that is an argument it's a bit late for anybody to deploy it because in 1979 when the twin-track decision was reached, the other bit of the twin, I mean, you deploy the missiles but the other bit was - well we won't deploy them if you, the Soviet Union, get rid of all your SS-20s. So I mean, that was always in '79, that was the zero option there. I think what is important, on the INF talks, is that we should have regard to the balance of the shorter range nuclear missiles, of which the Soviet Union, as of now, have a very great preponderance over NATO. But I do think curiously enough, one of the things that has been overlooked, because people are obsessed with nuclear weapons, understandably, because people are very frightened of them, but one should never overlook the problem of the conventional disparity between the Warsaw Pact, and the North Atlantic Alliance and if one really is visualising a situation in which nuclear weapons disappear, that makes it much more important than ever to reduce the disparity - to eliminate the disparity in the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

C. Lee: I mean, this would suggest that you've got to negotiate on twin-levels, on twin-tracks, that you've got to say - Right you can't have an INF



Report No. 23931Continuation 2

agreement unless we have a conventional weapon agreement as well - is that right?

Lord Carrington: Well I think..you see, what is going to happen is that in November, when the Security Conference starts in Vienna, there will, I hope, be a forum there in which conventional disarmament will be discussed, but I mean there must be a linkage of some sort, whether it has to be, you know, exact, probably not. But I think you will find that a lot of the European countries would feel distinctly uneasy if nuclear weapons disappeared from the .. it's rather odd in a way, because there's so much dispute about nuclear weapons, but I think they would feel distinctly uneasy if nuclear weapons disappeared entirely from Europe, and we were faced with the three to one, four to one superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional matters. People are inclined to say that conventional war is acceptable. Well it wasn't and isn't!

C. Lee: You're almost suggesting that the way we look at arms control negotiations is perhaps an obsolescent way of looking at it in as much as we tend to think it's just the Americans and the Russians and can they make big cuts in numbers, but perhaps we've got to widen those negotiations. I mean why have an agreement that doesn't..a negotiation rather, that doesn't include, let's say, France and the United Kingdom, within those negotiations?

Lord Carrington: Well I suppose, you see, to begin with the idea was to exclude the British and the French, because it was obviously going to be extremely complicated, and after all even though the nuclear capacity of the French and the British has grown latterly, it is pretty small compared with the two super powers, and I think the idea was - and I think it's probably true - that it's much easier to negotiate



Report No. 23931Continuation 3

à deux than it is à quatre. I mean, sooner or later I suppose, if all this comes about, there will have to be some sort of negotiation with the French and the British, and the Chinese.

C. Lee: Where do we go from here do you think, in terms of the whole of NATO wanting the two sides to get together again. How much political pressure do you think will be exerted upon the Americans, because we can't exert a great deal on the Soviet Union?

Lord Carrington: I don't think you need to exert political pressure on the Americans. I mean, I have absolutely no doubt that the Americans want to get agreement...everything that happened at Reykavik showed that they did. I think that there is going to be a movement rather quicker than I'd supposed when the talks ended without the signature and agreement.

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INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW

REYKJAVIK: KARPOV'S VISIT TO BONN

SUMMARY

1. KARPOV WAS IN BONN YESTERDAY FOR TALKS WITH GENSCHER AND RUTH: KAMPELMAN TODAY.

DETAIL

2. ON INF LINKAGE TO SDI. KARPOV SAID CLEARLY THAT HE COULD ENVISAGE A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CARRY ON WHERE REYKJAVIK LEFT OFF. HE SAID THE SAME PUBLICLY (EG TO THE SPD). HIS FORM OF WORDS LEFT OPEN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN REACHING AGREEMENT ON INF AND IMPLEMENTING THAT AGREEMENT, BUT KARPOV HIMSELF DID NOT DRAW ONE. HOWEVER AUSWAERTIGES AMT SEE KARPOV'S COMMENT AS NOW OVERTAKEN BY AN ON THE RECORD STATEMENT IN MOSCOW TODAY, APPARENTLY RE-CREATING SUCH A LINK. AUSWAERTIGES AMT RECALL SIMILAR CONFUSION OVER LINKAGE LAST JANUARY WHEN KWITSINSKI SEEMED NOT TO BE IN STEP WITH MOSCOW.

3. ON SRINF, GERMAN UNDERSTANDING FROM US SOURCES (EG KAMPELMAN TODAY) WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD AGREED TO A FREEZE AT PRESENT LEVEL FOR SOVIET SYSTEMS WITH A US RIGHT TO MATCH. KARPOV HOWEVER HAD SPOKEN OF A 'MUTUAL FREEZE', IE OMITTING THE RIGHT TO MATCH AND BY IMPLICATION REQUIRING A FREEZE OF US SYSTEMS AT THE CURRENT LEVEL (IE. A TOTAL IMBALANCE, WHICH THE GERMANS AGREE IS QUITE UNACCEPTABLE). KARPOV HAD AGREED THAT THERE WAS A COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER ON SRINF (AFTER 6 MONTHS), AND HAD USED THE PHRASE 'SYSTEMS BELOW 1,000 KM'. WHEN CHALLENGED WHETHER THIS MEANT SRINF IN THE RANGE 125-1,000, KARPOV HAD SAID NO, FROM 0-1,000. IT REMAINED UNCLEAR WHAT SYSTEMS KARPOV INCLUDED IN HIS 'MUTUAL FREEZE'.

4. ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND THE LINK TO SDI, KARPOV SAID BOTH SIDES WERE AGREED ON A TEN-YEAR PERIOD. HE REITERATED THE SOVIET CONDITION THAT ONLY LABORATORY TESTING BE PERMITTED FOR SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS DURING THAT PERIOD. BUT HE DECLINED TO ANSWER A QUESTION WHETHER THAT REPRESENTED THE EXISTING SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, OR A CHANGE. AS TO THE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO BE CUT DURING THIS PERIOD, KARPOV SAID THERE WAS NO DISPUTE THAT DURING THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN ALL THREE ELEMENTS OF THE NUCLEAR TRIAD. FOR THE SECOND FIVE YEARS, KARPOV SAID THE AGREEMENT IN REYKJAVIK HAD BEEN THAT ALL STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD BE INCLUDED. KAMPELMAN HOWEVER HAD REITERATED TODAY THAT THE US PROPOSAL WAS ONLY FOR 'BALLISTIC' (NO REFERENCE TO STRATEGIC) SYSTEMS, AND WITHOUT AIR-BREATHING SYSTEMS.

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5. GERMANS ASKED KARPOV WHY THE SOVIET UNION WERE SO WORRIED IF THE UNITED STATES HAD A "SHIELD" AGAINST A NON-EXISTENT "SWORD", IE FOLLOWING THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD WHEN ALL SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. SURPRISINGLY, KARPOV HAD NOT (NOT) SAID THIS WAS BECAUSE SDI WAS AN OFFENSIVE SYSTEM CAPABLE OF GROUND ATTACK. KARPOV HAD MENTIONED TWO DANGERS:

- (A) DURING THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, DURING WHICH THERE WOULD BE PROGRESSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE REDUCTION AND THE US WOULD BE PREPARING (BUT NOT YET DEPLOYING) A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM, THE US MIGHT "MIS-CALCULATE", THINKING THEY WERE PROTECTED BEFORE THEY WERE, AT A TIME WHEN SOME NUCLEAR MISSILES STILL REMAINED AVAILABLE. IN SHORT, A DESTABILISING TRANSITION PERIOD.
- (B) AFTER TEN YEARS, THE US, WITH A DEFENSIVE SHIELD IN PLACE, MIGHT DENOUNCE THE EARLIER AGREEMENT AND START TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAIN. THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO THE SAME, BUT WOULD THEN BE AT A DISADVANTAGE, NOT HAVING A DEFENSIVE SHIELD IN PLACE. (THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, WHO SEE SOME FORCE IN THIS, CALL IT THE SOVIET INSURANCE POLICY).

6. KARPOV DID NOT MENTION THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS, AND WAS NOT ASKED.

7. KAMPELMAN HAD LITTLE NEW TO ADD TODAY, EXCEPT GRAPHIC DETAIL ABOUT HOW THE LAST PHASE OF REYKJAVIK NEGOTIATIONS WAS PLAYED. HE HAD STRESSED US FEARS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT RETAIN ITS VETO OVER SDI DEPLOYMENT AT THE END OF THE TEN-YEAR PERIOD. IT WAS ONLY IN THE VERY LAST SESSION THAT GORBACHEV HAD INTRODUCED THE LABORATORY-ONLY CRITERION.

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
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YOUR TELNO 1767 TO WASHINGTON: REYKJAVIK: INF/SDI LINKAGE

1. TUR REPORTS KARPOV AS SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT INTRODUCED ANY NEW LINKAGE IN REYKJAVIK. HE APPEARS TO HAVE SPELT THIS OUT EVEN MORE CLEARLY IN BONN.

2. THE SIGNALS IN MOSCOW ARE RATHER DIFFERENT.

(A) GORBACHEV IN HIS TV ADDRESS (MY TELNO 1206) SAID THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR IN REYKJAVIK THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS CONSTITUTED AN INDIVISIBLE PACKAGE (PARAGRAPH 10 OF MY TUR).

(B) PRAVDA OF 16 OCTOBER REPORTING PRESIDENT ALFONSIN'S TALK WITH GORBACHEV ON 15 OCTOBER REPORTED GORBACHEV AS SAYING 'THE PLATFORM WHICH WE PUT FORWARD OF NEW PROPOSALS WHICH ARE INSEPARABLE FROM ONE ANOTHER, NONE OF WHICH WE ARE INTENDING TO WITHDRAW, PERMITS A MORE ACTIVE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS'.

3. HOWEVER IN THE SAME EDITION OF PRAVDA THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BUCHAREST IS PUBLISHED. THIS CONTAINS A PASSAGE WHICH READS 'ALL EFFORTS MUST BE APPLIED TO CONCLUDE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AN AGREEMENT ON THE ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE WHICH WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP ALONG THE ROAD TOWARDS THE COMPLETE LIBERATION OF THE CONTINENT FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS'.

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REYKJAVIK MEETING: NON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. LITTLE TIME SPENT ON REGIONAL ISSUES. SOME SIGNS OF GREATER SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS.

DETAIL

2. MRS RIDGWAY GAVE MR RENTON AN ACCOUNT ON 15 OCTOBER OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HAVE ALSO HAD A FURTHER BRIEFING FROM SIMONS (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AT STATE). BOTH US OFFICIALS WERE AT REYKJAVIK.

3. THE MAIN POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A) REGIONAL ISSUES. PRESIDENT REAGAN RAISED THIS WITH GORBACHEV ONLY IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, STRESSING THAT SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN THE THIRD WORLD MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE US/SOVIET RELATIONS. THERE WAS SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUP. ON AFGHANISTAN, THE RUSSIANS HAD BARELY MENTIONED THEIR WITHDRAWAL INITIATIVE. THE US HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THIS TOKEN WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND THEREFORE MADE NO CONTRIBUTION TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, CENTRAL AMERICA AND CAMBODIA WERE TOUCHED ON IN PREDICTABLE TERMS.

B) HUMAN RIGHTS. DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV AT SOME LENGTH, INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL CASES. THE PRESIDENT HANDED OVER, AND GORBACHEV ACCEPTED, A PACKAGE OF MATERIAL INCLUDING A LIST OF NAMES, A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN CATEGORIES OF CONCERN TO THE US; AND DATA ON JEWISH EMIGRATION INTENDED TO COUNTER THE SOVIET ASSERTION THAT ALL JEWS WHO WISHED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALREADY DONE SO. THERE WAS FURTHER DISCUSSION IN THE WORKING GROUP FROM WHICH IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE CONSIDERING SERIOUSLY THE EARLIER US PROPOSAL (OUR TELNO 2435) OF SOME PERMANENT US/SOVIET MECHANISM (QUOTE A HUMANITARIAN REVIEW COMMITTEE UNQUOTE) TO CONSIDER INDIVIDUAL CASES. THE RUSSIANS ALSO AGREED TO LANGUAGE FOR THE ABORTIVE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT REFERRING TO QUOTE HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES UNQUOTE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PUBLIC REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN A JOINT TEXT.

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C) BILATERAL ISSUES. THE PRESIDENT AND GORBACHEV HAD AGREED A WORK PROGRAMME INCLUDING DATES FOR FURTHER MEETINGS ON A RANGE OF RELATIVELY MINOR TOPICS. THE FIRST SERIES OF MEETINGS (PROBABLY IN NOVEMBER) WERE LIKELY TO BE ON COOPERATION IN MARITIME TRANSPORT AND SAFETY; AND IN CIVIL SPACE PROJECTS.

D) NEXT STEPS. IN ADDITION TO THE ARMS CONTROL FOLLOW-UP IN GENEVA, A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING AT THE VIENNA CSCE MEETING WAS VERY LIKELY BUT NOT YET FIXED.

11 4. SIMONS ADDED SOME IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS. GORBACHEV CAME TO REYKJAVIK WITH A SINGLE DOCUMENT CONTAINING ALL THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS. HE TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS HAD BEEN AGREED BY ALL ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. (IN THAT CONNECTION IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT AKHROMEYEV (NOT KARPOV) HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO LEAD THE SOVIET SIDE IN THE ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP). GORBACHEV UNVEILED ALL THE PROPOSALS ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS EARLY ON, AND KEPT BACK HIS DEMANDS ON SDI UNTIL THE SECOND DAY. HE THEREFORE ENGINEERED THE DRAMA OF THE CLOSING STAGES. SIMONS BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR FAILURE, BUT THAT THEY HAD NOT SOUGHT IT: HE DID NOT THINK THAT GORBACHEV HAD SET OUT TO TRAP THE PRESIDENT.

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MY TELNO 1209 : REYKJAVIK MEETING

1. IN THE ACCOUNT WHICH MY US COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) GAVE ME (AND MY FRG AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES) ON 15 OCTOBER OF THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS, THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN COVERED IN BRIEFINGS ELSEWHERE:

(I) INF.

GORBACHEV HAD ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST THE US PREFERENCE FOR A GLOBAL ZERO-OPTION RATHER THAN A EUROPEAN ZERO ONLY: HE INSISTED ON A SOVIET QUOTA IN ASIA. REAGAN OPPOSED THIS, OFFERING AS AN ALTERNATIVE EQUAL GLOBAL LIMITS AT A LEVEL HIGHER THAN 100 WARHEADS PER SIDE. AN ELEMENT IN THE FINAL COMPROMISE (ZERO IN EUROPE, 100 IN SOVIET ASIA AND THE CONTINENTAL US RESPECTIVELY) WAS THAT THE SOVIET ASIAN QUOTA WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN THE SOVIET FAR EAST BUT IN THE (APPROX) NOVOSIBIRSK LONGITUDE. IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE US QUOTA COULD OR COULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN ALASKA.

(II) SRNF.

THE SOVIET SIDE EVENTUALLY, AFTER LONG ARGUMENT, ACCEPTED THE US PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON EXISTING SRNF COMBINED WITH THE US RIGHT TO BUILD UP TO SOVIET SRNF LEVELS IF TALKS ON THE ISSUE DID NOT ACHIEVE A REDUCTION.

(III) VERIFICATION.

ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES - PARTICULARLY GORBACHEV - SPOKE IN RINGING TERMS OF THE NEED FOR AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE UNCONTESTABLY VERIFIABLE, THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF DETAIL, EG ON HOW THE DESTRUCTION RATHER THAN CONCEALMENT OF WITHDRAWN SS20S WOULD BE VERIFIED.

(IV) SDI.

REAGAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO GORBACHEV THAT IF, OVER THE 10 YEAR PERIOD, STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ELIMINATED, AN SDI FOR

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THE SUCCEEDING PERIOD WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT NOW ENVISAGED: IT WOULD SIMPLY BE AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST THE ACQUISITION OF MISSILES BY A MAVERICK THIRD COUNTRY, GORBACHEV HAD BEEN UNIMPRESSED. AGAINST REAGAN'S OFFER OF A 10-YEAR COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABMT WHILE MAINTAINING THE "RESTRICTIVE" INTERPRETATION OF IT, GORBACHEV HAD STUCK OUT FOR A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY.

V) CTB.

GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE US POSITION ON CTB, - I.E. THAT FOR SO LONG AS THERE WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TESTING WOULD BE NEEDED - HE NEVERTHELESS SAW THE LOGIC OF IT. HE ARGUED THAT ANY NECESSARY TESTING COULD BE CONDUCTED IN LABORATORIES, BY COMPUTERS ETC. REAGAN HAD OFFERED A DEAL WHEREBY THE US WOULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO RATIFY THE TTB AND PNE TREATIES, SUBJECT TO A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION ON VERIFICATION MEASURES: AND A SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF TESTS CONDUCTED ANNUALLY, LINKED TO THE PROGRESSIVE REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC INVENTORIES, AND/OR A FURTHER REDUCTION IN TEST THRESHOLDS. THE EXCHANGE ENDED INCONCLUSIVELY.

VI) HUMAN RIGHTS.

TO THE SURPRISE OF THE US TEAM, THE RUSSIAN (SHISHLIN) TASKED WITH DRAFTING A COMMUNIQUE (WHICH NEVER EMERGED) AGREED TO INCLUDE IN THE DRAFT A REFERENCE TO SOVIET AGREEMENT TO REGULAR DISCUSSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN "AND HUMAN RIGHTS" MATTERS.

CARTLEDGE

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ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 860

OF 151400Z OCTOBER 86

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

MY TELNO 858: REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: GERMAN VIEWS

1. TELTSCHIK'S COMMENT TO ME THIS MORNING WAS THAT PERHAPS IT WAS JUST AS WELL THAT THE MEETING IN REYJAVIK HAD BROKEN UP WHEN IT DID. THE TWO LEADERS HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF SIGNING AGREEMENTS WHOSE CONSEQUENCES COULD NOT BE FORESEEN. AS IT WAS, THE EUROPEAN ALLIES AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES SEEMED LIKELY TO BE STUCK WITH THE THEORETICAL OBJECTIVE OF A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WITH A ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION ON INF (ADMITTEDLY WITH 100 MISSILES STATIONED OUTSIDE EUROPE ON EACH SIDE) AND WITH THE CONCEPT OF 50 PERCENT CUTS IN EACH DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS BELONGING TO THE SUPERPOWERS. POLITICALLY, OF COURSE, A FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT IN REYKJAVIK WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY WELCOME JUST NOW IN BONN, BUT FROM THE PROFESSIONAL POINT OF VIEW A PAUSE FOR REFLECTION WAS NO BAD THING, AND IT LOOKED AS IF THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE HAVING SIMILAR THOUGHTS.

2. TELTSCHIK CRITICISED THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC IN THE FRG FOR OVER-REACTING AS USUAL. THIS APPLIED PARTICULARLY TO THE SPD: IT HAD BEEN LUDICROUS OF EHMKE TO DESCRIBE REYKJAVIK AS A BLACK DAY FOR HUMANITY, NOR WOULD THIS ATTITUDE HELP HIS PARTY. BUT THE MOOD SEEMED TO HAVE STEADIED DOWN NOW.

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF REYKJAVIK WOULD BE THE MAIN POINT FOR KOHL'S TALKS WITH REAGAN IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. THE GERMAN SIDE HAD RECEIVED THE USUAL REQUEST NOT TO OVERBURDEN THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION-SPAN: TELTSCHIK COMMENTED RUEFULLY THAT THIS WAS THE SAME PRESIDENT WHO HAD NEGOTIATED FOR ELEVEN HOURS WITH GORBACHEV, WHICH UNDERLINED HIS POINT IN PARA ABOVE.

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Ps/LADY Young  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
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[LORD WALLACE OF COSLANY.]

Health authorities, because financial resources are not available for them to improve the service?

**Baroness Trumpington:** My Lords, I have nothing to add to the fact that it is for health authorities locally to make the best use of the funds available to them in deciding where their priorities lie. As a rheumatism sufferer, I have a personal wish to see good care from doctors wherever there is a need. It is my belief that the health authorities have so provided.

**Baroness Masham of Ilton:** My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that some of the health districts without rheumatologists are those which cover rural areas? It is impossible for patients to reach hospitals to obtain treatment. Will she therefore emphasise that districts should do more in the important field of rheumatology?

**Baroness Trumpington:** My Lords, if the noble Baroness has any particular cases I hope that she will write to me and draw them to my attention. The government cannot plan in detail how local services are to be provided; that is for health authorities. In the last resort, the need for additional medical staff, as opposed, say, to more physiotherapists, can only be judged locally.

### Reykjavik Summit

3.5 p.m.

**The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young):** My Lords, I should like to make a statement about the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 11th–12th October. Since that meeting, the United Kingdom in common with our other NATO allies, has received a full briefing in Brussels on the outcome of the meeting from the US Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister and I also saw the chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva nuclear and space talks, Mr. Karpov, in London on 14th October.

The Reykjavik meeting was not originally designed as a forum for the conclusion of major arms control agreements. That both sides used it to get so close to the goal is proof of the value of the meeting and of their commitment to progress. We warmly welcome the extent of agreement that did prove possible on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on substantial reductions in strategic weapons, and on nuclear testing. At the same time, we regret the Soviet step backwards, at least in Reykjavik, in making all arms control agreements, including one on INF, dependent on further constraints on the United States SDI research programme.

Arms control is not the only important element in East-West relations. We applaud President Reagan's determination to press the Soviet Union for progress in resolving regional issues; and for better respect for human rights, without which it will not be possible to build confidence between East and West.

The United States record on consultations with the allies has been praiseworthy. The unity of the Atlantic

alliance has been a major factor in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, and in impelling it so far down the road towards arms control agreements. It is already clear from the meeting in NATO on 13th October that our unity will not be affected by the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting.

Her Majesty's Government support the United States in its continuing efforts to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union and in East-West relations by seeking progress in humanitarian questions and regional issues and by reaching balanced and verifiable agreements on arms control. The Reykjavik meeting was only one step in the long road towards these goals. The proposals made there remain on the table. And we are encouraged by the apparent determination on both sides to build on the progress already made. Together with the United States and our other allies, we shall seek to maintain the momentum that has been generated at Reykjavik.

**Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos:** My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Baroness for making that Statement on the summit meeting, in which this country and the whole world are deeply involved and acutely interested. As the noble Baroness has implied, we had been told that the Reykjavik summit was to be a preparatory meeting, paving the way to a later Washington conference. As it developed, however, it became plain that it was far more than that, and that far-reaching proposals of a most encouraging kind were on the table. For example, it now appears—the noble Baroness will perhaps confirm this—that the two leaders had agreed before the conclusion of the summit on Sunday to cut INF by 100 per cent. in Europe and by 80 per cent. in Soviet Asia, to cut strategic weapons by 50 per cent., and to work towards a comprehensive test ban treaty. This was remarkable progress, or appeared to be so, in a short space of time, and it raised our hopes considerably.

This is why the news of failure, when it came through on Sunday evening, was so profound a disappointment to us and to everyone else. It seemed then that a glorious and historic chance had been missed. It is, however, just as well that we have this Statement today and that we did not have it over the past two days, as the mood seems to have changed once again from one of despair to one of modest hope. Let us hope that we are not grasping at straws. But both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev now appear to be saying that Reykjavik was not a failure. Mr. Gorbachev said yesterday that they must not slam the door, while President Reagan said that he was anxious to try again.

Can the noble Baroness confirm that this was also the sense of Mr. Karpov's remarks to the Prime Minister at a meeting at which the noble Baroness, I understand, was herself present? Would she not agree that after what was, if I may so describe it, a seemingly paradoxical conference, the situation is now fluid and that the clear objective of Her Majesty's Government should now be to work strenuously for some constructive outcome? We obviously need a full debate in this House on the implications of the summit. This will become available to us, one hopes, in the debate on the Address in three weeks' time. However, can the noble Baroness deal now with two or three questions?



figure that I have given today noble Lords will see that industry has moved considerably in advance of the legal requirements.

### NHS Rheumatology Consultancy Service

2.59 p.m.

**Lord Bottomley:** My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps are being taken to increase the number of consultant rheumatologists employed in the National Health Service.

**The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Baroness Trumpington):** My Lords, if I may, I should like to answer the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Bottomley, from a rather different point of view. The Government wish to see improvements in services to patients, including rheumatology services, and have laid down broad priorities for these improvements. It is for health authorities to plan in detail what services to provide and what staff they need to provide them. The Government are satisfied that there are sufficient numbers training in rheumatology to meet the likely requirements for consultant staff.

**Lord Bottomley:** My Lords, is the Minister aware that there are 20 million sufferers from rheumatism in the country? It is estimated that 65 million working days are lost as a result of this illness, which is damaging to the economy. Is the Minister further aware that in some districts there are no consultant rheumatologists, and in other areas there is a great shortage? Last week at the Conservative Party Conference the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security said that it was hoped to increase the number of hip operations carried out in the country from 38,000 to 50,000 in 1990. Unless there is an increase in the number of rheumatologists and the Minister can give an assurance on this, certainly the Minister will not meet that target.

**Baroness Trumpington:** My Lords, we are concerned at the evidence of inequalities in the provision of rheumatology services. Some regions have recognised the need to improve services and are actively planning to do so. We are following that up through the regional review machinery. In answer to the second part of the noble Lord's question, hip operations are performed by orthopaedic surgeons and not rheumatologists.

**Baroness Masham of Ilton:** My Lords, how many health districts do not have a rheumatologist? Is the Minister aware that in the past few years so much emphasis has been put on health districts getting the mentally ill and the mentally handicapped out of long-stay hospitals that the physically disabled, who include those with rheumatic diseases—as the noble Lord, Lord Bottomley, said, there are many people in this country with those diseases—have gone a long way down the list of health priorities?

**Baroness Trumpington:** My Lords, it is simply not possible to have a consultant in every specialty in every district. In some districts, a rheumatology service can be provided in other ways; for instance, by a general physician with a special interest in rheumatology. As I said in my original Answer, it is for health authorities to plan in detail what services to provide and what staff they need to provide them.

**Lord Winstanley:** My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that the log-jam in rheumatology in certain hospitals arises not only from the shortage of consultant rheumatologists but from a shortage of consultant radiologists, without whose services the proper practice of rheumatology is impossible? In that connection, is the noble Baroness aware that consultant radiologists do not have to talk very much to patients, which means that they can easily leave Britain to practise in the EC at higher salaries, which is what many of them are in fact now doing? Finally, does the noble Baroness accept that however many consultant rheumatologists she is able to appoint, that will not solve the problem unless radiological services are adequate?

**Baroness Trumpington:** My Lords, I take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Winstanley, said about radiologists in the context of the Question, though I think he will agree that the subject of radiology is for another day. The Government's policy on medical manpower is to increase the proportion of medical care provided by fully trained doctors, and to relate the number of training grade posts to the career opportunities expected to arise.

**Lord Ennals:** My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that I am surprised to hear her say that she is satisfied that there will be sufficient consultant radiologists in the years ahead as the population steadily ages and the demands upon rheumatology services steadily increase? As she did not answer the question put by the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, about the number of districts which did not have a rheumatologist, does the Minister accept from me that there are substantial parts of the country where there are no rheumatologists available to provide a service for elderly people? To say that the service can be provided by other means, means that one is taking a consultant away from a task that he is already performing. Will the Minister answer the question about what the Government are doing?

**Baroness Trumpington:** My Lords, I have a table of consultant rheumatology posts. I shall gladly place a copy of it in the Library. There are now 24 more consultants in that speciality than there were in 1979—an increase of nearly 12 per cent. Health authorities' forward plans suggest that that rate of expansion may be maintained or even increased. I think the noble Lord will agree that I answered other questions as they were asked.

**Lord Wallace of Coslany:** My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that it is no good talking about employing more consultants if the consultants are not given back-up staff? Is she further aware that it is no good referring the solution of the problem to district



First, will the Government undertake to press for some of the Reykjavik proposals to be transferred to Geneva for early detailed discussion? And is this not the view of our European NATO partners? Did Mr. Karpov tell the Prime Minister that agreement may be reached on medium-range missiles independently of the SDI argument, which seems to have stultified the summit at the end of the talks?

Secondly, on this crucial SDI problem, the United States and British spokesmen constantly refer to the Soviet strategic defence initiative. Is there clear evidence that Russia is working on its own SDI? And if this is true, why is it not brought on to the conference table? Why does not the United States, and indeed why do not the rest of us, press the Soviet Union to make disclosures in the same manner that the United States has disclosed some details on this subject? Thirdly, the Statement refers to other matters. Can the noble Baroness say whether there were any specific undertakings on the question of human rights and Afghanistan?

Fourthly, what are the present prospects for a meeting in Washington? As I said previously, the objective seemed to be a preliminary meeting in Reykjavik, followed by a fuller meeting in Washington. Is it still intended that this meeting should be held? Finally, can the noble Baroness say whether the Prime Minister herself is now intending, as has been reported, to visit Washington for a discussion with the President? If she does so, what will be the main objectives of the visit?

I conclude by expressing general relief that the door is not closed and that, mercifully, there does not appear to be any bitterness but rather a desire for some progress on both sides.

**Lord Kennet:** My Lords, we endorse what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn. I have certain further questions to put. The House will remember that in December 1984 the Prime Minister and the United States President agreed on the famous Reagan-Thatcher four points, the second of which said:

"SDI related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiations".

Subsequently, the Prime Minister has said:

"Great democracies must give a lead in keeping their treaties".

In refusing to admit discussion of his freedom to test and deploy SDI, President Reagan is of course announcing his intention either to breach or, more likely and more legally, to denounce the ABM treaty. In Reykjavik, Mr. Gorbachev agreed to 50 per cent. reductions of all kinds of strategic weapons on both sides; to the zero option in European intermediate-range weapons; to a freeze and agreement on negotiations for short-range nuclear weapons; to a balance at a lower level of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Asia; and to freedom for Britain and France to increase their nuclear forces in the meantime, which is completely new. He agreed on proper negotiations to settle regional and humanitarian issues.

If the Government are now to back Mr. Reagan's belief that SDI testing in space is worth all this together, will they now spell out what they see as its apparently overwhelming benefits for Europe, for

NATO and for the world? I am asking about SDI research and deployment in space, not about "lab" research or improved air defences in Europe, which are different matters. After all, the Government regularly cite Soviet advances in strategic defence as justification for Trident's enhanced capabilities compared to Polaris and as a condition of British participation in disarmament. This argument is unanswerable. It is correct. Is this argument not valid in other mouths, even Mr. Gorbachev's?

In view of all these things, will the Government not agree that we must now quickly develop a proper European foreign and defence policy that could allow us to be present at negotiations which affect our very existence?

3.15 p.m.

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, I should like to thank both the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for their reception of this Statement. Both have asked a number of specific questions, to which I shall try to respond.

First, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, for the point that he made that the meeting at Reykjavik should not be regarded as a failure. We do not do so. Indeed, my honourable friend Mr. Renton, who was at the meeting in Brussels, made the point immediately that we were encouraged by what has been achieved but that we see this as just one step on a long road to detailed but very important arms control negotiations and progress towards disarmament. I think that he was quite right to say that we now had hope in this regard.

The noble Lord asked me a number of detailed questions about the next steps. We see these as building upon what has been achieved at Reykjavik. Indeed, we believe it is important that the negotiations at the nuclear and space talks in Geneva should continue so that there can be further progress towards agreements. The noble Lord asked what Mr. Karpov had said in the course of his talks in London on these matters. As the noble Lord, I am sure, will understand, it would not be appropriate for me to go into detail on this matter. But the position on INF is that the Russians agreed at the Geneva summit that a deal on INF could and should be negotiated without reference to strategic weapons or to space issues. We noted what Mr. Karpov said on the subject at his press conference yesterday. In the light of our discussions with him yesterday we hope that the Russians will confirm at the negotiating table the commitment to a separate agreement. This is what we have agreed.

The noble Lord asked me whether there was any evidence of Soviet work on some kind of defence initiative. As he may know there has been a Soviet research programme since the 1960s. Anti-ballistic missile defences around Moscow are the only type in existence in the world and are being upgraded. Indeed, the Russians have the only operational anti-satellite weapons in existence. There has been an extensive programme on ballistic missile defence-related technologies, including high powered lasers, kinetic energy and particle beam weapons and heavy lift space launchers.



[BARONESS YOUNG.]

The noble Lord also asked me about regional issues. I can confirm to him that, although it is clear from Reykjavik that most of the time was spent on arms control matters, nevertheless, the United States Government pressed the Soviet Union for progress in resolving regional issues and for a better respect for human rights. On the point which he made about Afghanistan, I can confirm that the most helpful mood by the Soviet Union would be a rapid and complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Finally, the noble Lord asked me about the possibility of a Washington summit. So far the prospects for a further summit are not clear but we very much hope that Mr. Gorbachev will pick up the outstanding invitation to visit the United States this year.

With regard to my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, as the noble Lord probably would expect, I am not in a position to comment on her travel plans. But, as he will know, we are in constant touch with our American allies on this as on very many other issues.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked me two quite specific points about the American strategic defence initiative and the ABM treaty. Perhaps I can confirm to him, as President Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, that SDI research is consistent with the present treaty obligations, including the ABM treaty. He recently reaffirmed that SDI will be conducted in conformity with a strict interpretation of the treaty. The Government have repeatedly made it clear that we regard the treaty as an important element in preserving international peace and stability and want to see it reaffirmed and strengthened. Any suspicion of violations should be pursued according to the mechanisms provided in the treaty.

**Lord Zuckerman:** My Lords, the noble Baroness explained to your Lordships' House exactly how it is possible to reconcile the statement made by the President to the American people the night before last declaring his right to develop, test and deploy against missiles, with the assurances given to the Prime Minister at the beginning of last year about nothing being done which would be in defiance of the 1972 ABM treaty. One must bear in mind that at that time we were dealing only with a strict interpretation, whereas what the President said in his address on the television related to what is now known as a broad interpretation, or, according to Gerard Smith who negotiated the treaty, a new treaty.

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, will have heard the answer I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on a somewhat similar point on this matter. Perhaps I could say further that the United States have made clear over an extended period that the Russians have no veto over the deployment of SDI. But President Reagan invited the Russians, should strategic defences prove to be feasible, to move to a more defence-orientated world, and any deployment should thus be co-operative. Meanwhile, President Reagan made clear that SDI continues to be conducted in accordance with the ABM treaty. But we are not prepared to see the treaty

rewritten to constrain the United States research while letting the Soviet activities run free.

**Lord Renton:** My Lords, was anything discussed or agreed at this meeting about inspection?

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, on this matter of inspections, particularly with regard to nuclear testing, the position is that despite Soviet propaganda in the run up to the Reykjavik meeting, we understand that nuclear testing was not a major issue at Reykjavik. But we have long believed that progress must be sought in areas where it is most likely, and the first step would be to seek the verification necessary to ratify both the threshold test ban and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaties of the 1970s. We therefore welcome the extent of the Reykjavik agreement to work for that.

We also welcome President Reagan's offer in an UNGA speech now confirmed at Reykjavik, and accepted by Mr. Gorbachev, to negotiate on further constraints on testing on the way to an ultimate goal of a comprehensive test ban. We believe that this practical step by step approach is consistent with our views.

**Lord Brockway:** My Lords, I propose to take advantage of the Standing Orders which allow questions to be put and some comments to be made. May I first thank the noble Baroness not only for her preliminary Statement but for the answers which she has given to points which have been raised. On the whole, I think that most of us would regard what she has said as hopeful.

All of us must have been shocked when the summit meeting in Iceland broke down. At first it was the greatest disappointment of my political life. The situation is now more hopeful. I think that both sides are a little ashamed of themselves.

The American Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, has made an extraordinary statement about the potential agreements which would be reached. My first question to the Minister is: do the Government support those potential agreements? What he said was so astonishingly broad in scope that I think it should be recorded:

"The talks saw the potential for a set of a genuinely significant agreement with intermediate nuclear forces and potentially the elimination of all ballistic missiles".

Mr. Shultz said that the talk came close:

"to a breathtaking deal to cut strategic arms in half, the elimination of all intermediate nuclear arms leaving only 100 in Asia and 100 in the United States, and a pretty fair measure of agreement for working towards a nuclear test ban treaty".

I think the House will agree that those quite astonishing agreements make it intolerable and unforgivable that there should not be a renewed effort to reach agreement. Both sides are now seeking new talks.

**Several noble Lords:** Order!

**Lord Brockway:** President Reagan has made a strong appeal to Mr. Gorbachev to move towards another summit. Mr. Gorbachev's speech envoy Viktor Karpov has said that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreement independently of

political parallel agreement on SDI. In view of those facts, I beg the Government to use their influence to secure a renewed summit.

3.30 p.m.

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, views the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting as hopeful. As I indicated very early on in responding to the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, we believe that there has been some good news that has come from Reykjavik and that we must build on what has been said.

As I indicated in an answer to an earlier Question, we hope now that the negotiations which have come so far on various limitations on arms, shall be continued. That is the wish and hope of Her Majesty's Government.

**Lord Nugent of Guildford:** My Lords, can my noble friend tell me how it is that considerations of humanitarian matters are connected up with these very intricate and important matters of defence, especially as Soviet Russia is in breach of the Helsinki Agreement in this respect? How is it that these humanitarian considerations are brought into this as bargaining counters?

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, I think what is very important in all these humanitarian concerns is that if progress can be made on these, these would be not only right in themselves for the individuals concerned, but they would be confidence-building measures between both the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course, we hope that progress will be made on these issues of human rights.

**Lord Gladwyn:** My Lords, I have three very short questions to put to the Government. In the first place, is it not rather odd that in spite of an unparalleled propaganda campaign, the President is facing widespread criticism in the United States, whereas in this country, where nuclear arms limitation means so much, many people, (including it would seem our own Prime Minister) are seemingly finding excuses for his insistence on the full operation of his, as I think, absurd star wars programme, even imputing blame to Mr. Gorbachev for, as it were, being too clever by half.

We must all hope, along with the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, that progress—preferably owing to pressure applied by the European Members of NATO—will be forthcoming in Geneva. But now, more especially following on what the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, has said, and failing some suitable compromise on SDI, should we not, unfortunately, contemplate the situation arising from the complete collapse of detente and the triumph of the tough guys on both sides of the Iron Curtain who are as we know, opposed to all forms of arms limitation? Are the Government really confident that the Icelandic Humpty Dumpty can now be put together again?

My third short question is: when are we going to have a full debate on this very important subject? It is obviously very unsatisfactory to discuss it by question and answer as the result of a Statement.

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, one point which has become very clear about the Reykjavik Summit is that some of the immediate reactions to it have not been the same as the reactions which are now apparent two days later. I think one must make one's judgments about the matter as time proceeds. However, as a consequence of this, I think there is every reason for us to be hopeful. That is not just wishful thinking. This is ground for believing, as I indicated in earlier answers to the point raised, that the Russians, too, wish to see the progress continued.

The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, went on once again to be highly critical of the Americans and their SDI programme. Perhaps I may just say to the noble Lord on the point about whether or not—and I believe that this is what underlay his question—it was worth preventing some of the arms control agreements for the sake of SDI, that the fact is, that the SDI research programme is investigating the feasibility of strategic defences. No one knows whether or not they will work. The discussions at Reykjavik were about managing the period until it was clear whether or not strategic defences would be possible. President Reagan has spoken on SDI being the insurance policy of the United States and the Alliance. Whether this insurance policy will be necessary at some future stage cannot be answered now. Therefore, SDI, particularly in the light of the Soviet Union's own activities should not be abandoned now. Perhaps I may also make clear that the United States is not prepared to see the ABM Treaty rewritten to constrain its research while letting the Soviet Union's research continue.

**Lord Chalfont:** My Lords, is the Minister aware that not all of us were shocked by the result of the Reykjavik meeting, because not all of us were terribly surprised by it?

May I also ask the Minister a question? It may go to the root of this matter and it may run across the general tenor of the remarks which have been made in your Lordships' House this afternoon. Are we not in grave danger of making the mistake of regarding nuclear arms control, and nuclear disarmament in a vacuum? There are very many other things which are important in this confrontation. Would not the Minister agree that one of the reasons for the great build up of arms on either side, is the tension that exists between the two sides in this equation? Arms are not the cause of tension, they are the result of tension.

Perhaps I may also ask the Minister whether she would not agree that it would be very foolish indeed to consider nuclear arms control in isolation from conventional arms control, in which the Soviet Union has an overwhelming superiority and in total isolation from the matters of human rights and the rest of the Soviet Union's foreign policy? Would it not be wiser to examine all these things very carefully and in conjunction with each other, and not in the context of some hastily arranged and ill-prepared conference at Reykjavik? Would it not be wiser to look at conventional arms control, conventional disarmament and the whole context of the Soviet Union's foreign policy including its expansionist policies all over the world before we start to tinker ill-advisedly with the balance of nuclear power.



**Baroness Young:** The noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, has made a number of really very important points. I should like to start by saying to him that on repeated occasions the Government have made clear that nuclear disarmament and the production of conventional weapons are inextricably linked in the search for general and complete disarmament. This of course remains the Government's ultimate objective.

However, nuclear weapons will continue to have a role to play in our security for the foreseeable future. I also share the noble Lord's view that it is very important not to forget not only the conventional weapons, but also the area of human rights which was raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Nugent. As I said then, it is important not only for the sake of those unfortunate people concerned, but also because it will build confidence between both the United States and the Soviet Union, and we would like to see progress made.

Of course there are many other issues of a political nature about which the West could talk to the Soviet Union. In that connection I should like to say that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made clear to Mr. Gorbachev that she looks forward to visiting the Soviet Union in the first half of next year and that the Reykjavik outcome does not affect that situation. The dates, of course, are still to be discussed.

**Lord Molloy:** My Lords, does the noble Baroness agree that there are some aspects of the success following Reykjavik which must cause grave and bitter disappointment to those who are determined somehow or other to find no joy in the ultimate possibility of the great nuclear powers of the world coming to some agreement on disarmament? Will the noble Baroness agree that one of the fundamental features—the linchpin to the whole talks—could well be the total acceptability on both sides of verification, both on tests and on manoeuvres, in either the Warsaw or NATO blocs, and that that is something for which we should be grateful?

Will it now be possible for our Government to send a message to the governments of both the Soviet Union and the United States of America saying how much we welcome the endeavours which have been made towards achievement and what has been achieved, and how much we warmly welcome the statement of both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev that this is not the end, that further discussions will take place and that we warmly applaud these ideals?

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, I point out to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, that I think that the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Reykjavik Summit are now quite clear both to the United States' Government and to the Soviet Union.

**Lord Mayhew:** My Lords, will the noble Baroness explain a little more fully her two references to aspects of the ABM Treaty which are restraining on the Americans but not on the Russians? What did the noble Baroness mean by that?

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, what I said was that President Reagan has made clear that SDI continues to

be conducted in accordance with the ABM Treaty, but the United States is not prepared to see the treaty rewritten—that is to say, in a way which would constrain the United States research while letting Soviet research and activities run free.

**Viscount Eccles:** My Lords, is it not certain that if the Russians did not think that SDI would work, they would never have gone to Reykjavik and would never have made all these proposals?

**Baroness Young:** My Lords, I think that there may be much in what my noble friend has said.

### London Docklands Railway (City Extension) Bill

**The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare):** My Lords, I beg to move the Motion that stands in my name on the Order Paper. The purpose of this Motion is to allow the Select Committee to hear evidence from people other than the promoters of the Bill and those who petitioned against it. Your Lordships will remember that last July the House agreed to an Instruction to the Select Committee to have regard to the consequences of the Bill on the South-East Region and on the City of London in particular. It is on those points that the committee wishes to have the opportunity of sharing other evidence. My Lords, I beg to move.

Moved, That the Select Committee to whom the Bill is committed may hear evidence other than that tendered by the parties entitled to be heard—(*The Chairman of Committees.*)

**Lord Taylor of Blackburn:** My Lords, although I do not offer any objection to this request, I should like to ask the Chairman of Committees two questions. First, how many people have made requests, other than the petitioners, to give evidence before the committee? Secondly, what notice has been given to other people who thought that they were not entitled to this privilege?

**The Chairman of Committees:** My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord's first question is that a letter was written from those MPs who represent the area which is covered by the Bill. Also a letter has been received on behalf of the Docklands Consultative Committee. Therefore, two sets of people have taken the initiative of writing in and asking to be heard. Other people have not done so, despite the fact that the Select Committee has been set up, and everybody was duly informed that it was being set up, to consider the matter.

**Lord Taylor of Blackburn:** My Lords, will the Chairman of Committees clarify the point? I take it that there are three people involved: two MPs and the chairman of a consultative committee or a people's committee in that area?


**The Chairman of Committees:** Yes, my Lords, that is correct. Two MPs are being heard, with Mr. Fred Jones on behalf of the Docklands Consultative Committee.



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MY TELSNOs 1205 AND 1206: REYKJAVIK MEETING: GORBACHEV'S TELEVISION STATEMENT

COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. AN IMPRESSIVE, CONFIDENT, NON-POLEMICAL (THOUGH CRITICAL) PERFORMANCE DESIGNED TO SHOW THE EXTENT OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO SECURE AGREEMENT AT REYKJAVIK. A FACTUALLY ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH NEVERTHELESS MISREPRESENTED SOVIET CONCESSIONS TO US POSITIONS AS SOVIET INITIATIVES. GORBACHEV'S PRESENTATION SUGGESTS A GENUINE ATTEMPT AT REYKJAVIK TO PULL OFF AN AGREEMENT. BY LEAVING THE DOORS OPEN HE IMPLIES THAT AGREEMENT CAN YET BE POSSIBLE. ECONOMIC CONCERNS WERE PROBABLY A DEFENSIVELY SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN SOVIET DETERMINATION BUT THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR A MAJOR SUCCESS FROM A WASHINGTON SUMMIT MAY BE THE KEY. GORBACHEV EAGER TO DEMONSTRATE WIDE LEADERSHIP SUPPORT FOR HIS STRATEGY AND TACTICS. EVIDENT SOVIET DESIRE TO BUILD ON REYKJAVIK BUT GORBACHEV UNSPECIFIC ON WHAT HAPPENS NEXT. NO SUGGESTION THAT THE MOOD HAS SHIFTED TO LOOKING BEYOND REAGAN FOR AN ARMS CONTROL DEAL.

DETAIL

PRESENTATION AND IMPACT

2. GORBACHEV'S AIM WAS CLEARLY TO GIVE A MEASURED, STATESMANLIKE ASSESSMENT OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT DEMONSTRATING BY AN EFFECTIVE



2. GORBACHEV'S AIM WAS CLEARLY TO GIVE A MEASURED, STATESMANLIKE ASSESSMENT OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT DEMONSTRATING, BY AN EFFECTIVE BLOW-BY-BLOW ACCOUNT, THE RESPONSIBLE AND FLEXIBLE SOVIET APPROACH, SHOWING HOW CLOSE THE MEETING CAME TO AGREEMENT, PLACING THE BLAME FOR THE LACK OF SUCCESS ON US INTRANSIGENCE, BUT LEAVING DOORS FIRMLY OPEN. DESPITE A NUMBER OF TELLING POINTS CRITICAL OF THE US POSITION AT REYKJAVIK, GORBACHEV'S TONE WAS SURPRISINGLY NON-POLEMICAL. HE WAS CAREFUL NOT TO ATTACK REAGAN TOO DIRECTLY.

3. THE STATEMENT WAS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO MATCH REAGAN'S OWN TV ADDRESS. ADDRESSED TO BOTH AN INTERNATIONAL AND A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, INCLUDING BOTH SPECIALISTS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC, IT INEVITABLY FELL BETWEEN TWO STOOLS. FOR THE DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, IT WAS PERHAPS TOO LONG AND TOO DETAILED, PARTICULARLY FOR THOSE WHO HAD ALREADY SAT THROUGH GORBACHEV'S REYKJAVIK PRESS CONFERENCE. THE INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE MAY WELL HAVE MISSED SOME DOMESTIC NUANCES, MOSTLY CONCERNED WITH THE ECONOMY (SEE BELOW). GORBACHEV WAS CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TO FORESTALL ANY POTENTIAL CRITICISM OF HIS HAVING BEEN READY TO GIVE TOO MUCH AWAY BY EMPHASISING AT THE OUTSET OF HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WENT TO REYKJAVIK WITH A POSITION AND EVEN WITH A PAPER APPROVED BY THE POLITBURO, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT AND THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE.

3. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV READ MOST OF HIS STATEMENT, AND DESPITE THE OCCASIONALLY AWKWARD PAUSE AND STUMBLE, HIS PERFORMANCE WAS IMPRESSIVE, CONFIDENT AND FIRM. I THINK IT WILL HAVE SERVED HIS PURPOSE WELL.

DID GORBACHEV TELL THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AT REYKJAVIK ?

4. ACCORDING TO MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE US DELEGATION, GORBACHEV'S ACCOUNT OF THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WAS GENERALLY ACCURATE APART FROM HIS CONSISTENT MISREPRESENTATION OF SOVIET CONCESSIONS FOR LONG-STANDING U S POSITIONS (E.G. 50% STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS) AS SOVIET INITIATIVES. HIS ALLEGATION THAT REAGAN HAD DONE THE SAME IN REVERSE WAS BRAZEN BUT WILL BE BELIEVED BY THE SOVIET PEOPLE.

DOES GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT SHED LIGHT ON SOVIET AIMS AT REYKJAVIK ?

5. GORBACHEV'S CAREFUL, FACTUAL AND LARGELY NON-POLEMICAL PRESENTATION REINFORCES MY VIEW (MY TELNO 1195) THAT HE WENT TO REYKJAVIK WITH THE FIRM INTENTION OF MAKING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO SECURE THE BASIS FOR A PACKAGE OF AGREEMENTS, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THE ODDS WERE AGAINST IT. THE ACCOUNT WHICH MY US COLLEAGUE HAS GIVEN ME (AND MY FRENCH AND FRG COLLEAGUES) OF THE ATMOSPHERICS OF THE RYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS FURTHER STRENGTHENS THIS INTERPRETATION. GORBACHEV'S TEAM, AND MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV IN PARTICULAR, WERE UNUSUALLY BUSINESSLIKE IN THEIR APPROACH, GENUINELY CONCERNED TO ENLARGE AREAS OF AGREEMENT THROUGH COMPROMISE AND (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ARBATOV) UNINTERESTED IN SCORING PROPAGANDA POINTS.



EXCEPTION OF ARBATOV) UNINTERESTED IN SCORING PROPAGANDA POINTS. IN THE VERY SMALL NUMBER OF HOURS WHICH THE DELEGATIONS HAD AT THEIR DISPOSAL, A REMARKABLE DEGREE OF PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF SOME PROBLEMS, E.G. THAT OF WHETHER A STRATEGIC BOMBER SHOULD BE COUNTED AS ONE WARHEAD OR WHETHER THE COMPONENTS OF ITS PAYLOAD SHOULD BE COUNTED SEPARATELY, WHICH HAVE BEEN BONES OF CONTENTION AT GENEVA SINCE THE NST NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. SOVIET AGREEMENT TO 50% CUTS IN EACH LEG OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD, THUS CATCHING THE 'HEAVIES', WAS ALSO A SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT GORBACHEV WAS AIMING ONLY AT A PROPAGANDA VICTORY.

6. DESPITE THE REAL PROSPECT, AS GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED IN HIS SPEECH, OF A HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH IN ARMS CONTROL AND EVEN OF PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR TESTS, HE NEVERTHELESS FELT OBLIGED TO FOREGO IT SIMPLY BECAUSE HE COULD NOT SECURE AN UNDERTAKING FROM REAGAN TO CONFINE SDI RESEARCH TO THE LABORATORY FOR TEN YEARS. WHY? THERE ARE, I THINK, THREE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RENEWED (OR MORE ACCURATELY NEWLY PROMINENT) SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH THE SDI. THEY ARE, IN ASCENDING ORDER OF PROBABILITY:-

#### I) ECONOMIC

THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE REACHED A CRUCIAL DECISION-POINT ON THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO A RESPONSE TO THE SDI IF THE US PROGRAMME CANNOT BE CONSTRAINED. GORBACHEV'S REFERENCES TO THE FUTILITY OF BELIEVING THAT THE ARMS RACE COULD BRING THE SOVIET ECONOMY TO ITS KNEES MAY BE SIGNIFICANT; AND HIS REFERENCE TO THE US DESIRE TO FOMENT DOMESTIC DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS CERTAINLY REVEALING. ECONOMIC CONCERNS ARE UPPERMOST IN GORBACHEV'S MIND (CF. THE APPARENTLY IRRELEVANT ECONOMIC POSTSCRIPT TO HIS SPEECH) AND REYKJAVIK MAY HAVE BEEN HIS MOST DESPERATE (BUT NOT NECESSARILY FINAL) ATTEMPT TO AVOID THE DRAIN ON RESOURCES WHICH A RESPONSE TO SDI WOULD INVOLVE.

#### II) MILITARY

GORBACHEV AND HIS MILITARY ADVISERS MAY GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THE SDI IS DESIGNED TO HAVE AN OFFENSIVE, AS WELL AS A DEFENSIVE, CAPABILITY AGAINST WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO FORESEEABLE PROTECTION. THE SOVIET MILITARY MAY BE ALARMED AT THE SPEED WITH WHICH SDI RESEARCH APPEARS TO BE PROGRESSING; THEY MAY BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH CONCESSIONS IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FIELDS WHICH THEY HAVE HITHERTO OPPOSED IN ORDER TO STAVE OFF THE GREATER THREAT. (A MORE ARCAIC VARIATION ON THE MILITARY EXPLANATION COULD BE THAT SOVIET RESEARCHERS ARE THEMSELVES WITHIN SIGHT OF A BREAKTHROUGH AND WISH U S SCIENTISTS TO BE CONSTRAINED WHILE THE SOVIET PROGRAMME FORGES AHEAD.)

#### III) POLITICAL.

GORBACHEV'S POLITBURO COLLEAGUES, AND PERHAPS GORBACHEV HIMSELF, MAY BE PROFOUNDLY APPREHENSIVE OF THE POLITICAL RISKS IN HIS PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO THE US. THEY MAY BELIEVE THAT IN PROPAGANDA



MAY BE PROFOUNDLY APPREHENSIVE OF THE POLITICAL RISKS IN HIS PROSPECTIVE VISIT TO THE US. THEY MAY BELIEVE THAT, IN PROPAGANDA TERMS, HE IS ON A HIDING TO NOTHING UNLESS HE CAN BRING BACK NOT MERELY A SATISFACTORY SUMMIT OUTCOME BUT A SENSATIONAL ONE, IE. THE PACKAGE FOR WHICH HE ATTEMPTED TO PREPARE THE GROUND AT REYKJAVIK. GORBACHEV'S MOTIVES MAY BE A MIXTURE OF ALL THREE ELEMENTS -

(I) AND (II) ARE CLEARLY LINKED - BUT I WOULD ATTACH THE GREATEST WEIGHT TO (III).

7. THE RESTORATION OF GROMYKO'S ORIGINAL INF/SDI LINKAGE MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON REAGAN TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON SDI BUT ALSO TO INCREASE THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE SDI IN WESTERN EUROPE, WHERE IT COULD NOW BE SEEN AS THE SOLE OBSTACLE TO AN INF ZERO SOLUTION. THIS COULD BACKFIRE, HOWEVER, GIVEN THE LACK OF LOGIC IN THE LINKAGE.

WHAT NEXT ?

6. ALL THE INDICATIONS, BOTH IN THE POLITBURO COMMUNIQUE (MY TELNO 1205) AND IN GORBACHEV'S SPEECH ARE THAT GORBACHEV WISHES IN DUE COURSE TO BUILD ON PEYKJAVIK RATHER THAN RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

KARPOV'S REMARKS IN LONDON (YOUR TELNO 1767 TO WASHINGTON) CONFIRM THIS. GORBACHEV NEVERTHELESS SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE TIMING OF ANY FURTHER MOVE OR OF A FUTURE SUMMIT. IT MAY WELL BE THAT HE HAS NOT YET DESPAIRED OF ENCOURAGING OR PRESSURING REAGAN INTO SUFFICIENT MOVEMENT ON SDI TO MEET SOVIET CONCERNS. I WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THE DIALOGUE TO CONTINUE, NOT ONLY AT GENEVA BUT ALSO, FOR EXAMPLE, IN VIENNA WHERE SHULTZ IS LIKELY (IN MY US COLLEAGUE'S VIEW) TO MEET SHEVARDNADZE WHEN HE GOES THERE ON 5 NOVEMBER.

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REYKJAVIK MEETING: POLITBURO COMMUNIQUE

1. A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE POLITBURO WAS HELD YESTERDAY, 14 OCTOBER, TO CONSIDER THE RESULTS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING.
2. THE COMMUNIQUE STATED THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL EVENT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BEEN HONEST, OPEN AND REALISTIC. IT HAD PUT FORWARD NEW COMPROMISE PROPOSALS WHICH FULLY TOOK ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN CONCERNS AND MADE POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND THE ELIMINATION OF MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE.
3. UNFORTUNATELY, IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO CONVERT THE ACCORD WHICH HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN REACHED ON THESE QUESTIONS INTO BINDING AGREEMENTS. THE SOLE REASON FOR THIS WAS THE STUBBORN UNWILLINGNESS

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WHICH HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN REACHED ON THESE QUESTIONS INTO BINDING AGREEMENTS. THE SOLE REASON FOR THIS WAS THE STUBBORN UNWILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR REACHING THESE AGREEMENTS BY MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THE ABM REGIME AND ACCEPTING CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS WHICH WERE IDENTICAL FOR BOTH SIDES. SUCH BEHAVIOUR REINFORCED DOUBTS ABOUT WASHINGTON'S STATEMENTS THAT THE SDI PROGRAMME WAS EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL.

4. THE POLITBURO, HAVING APPROVED GORBACHEV'S ACTIVITY AT THE MEETING, NOTED THAT A 'QUALITATIVELY NEW SITUATION' HAD BEEN CREATED IN THE STRUGGLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THE POLITBURO EMPHASISED 'THE NEED TO CONTINUE CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING AT GENEVA, ON THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PLATFORM PUT FORWARD BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT REYKJAVIK. IT WOULD BE A FATAL STEP TO LET SLIP THE HISTORIC CHANCE FOR A CARDINAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE.'

5. THE POLITBURO APPROVED 'SPECIFIC FOREIGN POLICY MEASURES AIMED AT IMPLEMENTING THIS PRINCIPLED LINE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESULTS OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING.'

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STATEMENT TO HOUSE OF LORDS, 15 OCTOBER

My Lords, I should like to make a statement about the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 11-12 October. Since that meeting, the United Kingdom, in common with our other NATO Allies, has received a full briefing in Brussels on the outcome of the meeting from the US Secretary of State, Mr Shultz. My right honourable Friend, the Prime Minister and I also saw the chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, Mr Karpov, in London on 14 October.

The Reykjavik meeting was not originally designed as a forum for the conclusion of major arms control agreements. That both sides used it to get so close to that goal is proof of the value of the meeting and of their commitment to progress. We warmly welcome the extent of agreement that did prove possible on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on substantial reductions in strategic weapons, and on nuclear testing. At the same time, we regret the Soviet step backwards, at least in Reykjavik, in making all arms control agreements, including one on INF, dependent on further constraints on the United States SDI research programme.

Arms control is not the only important element in East/West relations. We applaud President Reagan's determination to press the Soviet Union for progress in resolving regional issues; and for better respect for human rights, without which it will not be possible to build confidence between East and West.

My Lords, the United States' record on consultations with the Allies has been praiseworthy. The unity of the Atlantic Alliance has been a major factor in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, and in impelling it so far down the road towards arms control agreements. It is already clear from the meeting in NATO on 13 October that our unity will not be affected by the outcome of the

/Reykjavik



Reykjavik meeting.

My Lords, Her Majesty's Government support the US in its continuing efforts to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union and in East/West relations; by seeking progress in humanitarian questions and regional issues; and by reaching balanced and verifiable agreements on arms control. The Reykjavik meeting was only one step in the long road towards these goals. The proposals made there remain on the table. And we are encouraged by the apparent determination on both sides to build on the progress already made. Together with the US and our other Allies we will seek to maintain the momentum that has been generated at Reykjavik.



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REYKJAVIK MEETING: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TELEVISION ADDRESS  
SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A FAIRLY UP-BEAT ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING, STRESSING THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE, BUT ADAMANT THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE UP SDI.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A 20 MINUTE ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON THE EVENING OF 13 OCTOBER. HE BEGAN BY SUMMARISING WHAT HAD OCCURRED: 'WE PROPOSED THE MOST SWEEPING AND GENEROUS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL IN HISTORY. WE OFFERED THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SOVIET AND AMERICAN, FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH BY 1996. WHILE WE PARTED COMPANY WITH THIS AMERICAN OFFER STILL ON THE TABLE, WE'RE CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE TO AGREEMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO A SAFER WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS.'

ARMS CONTROL

3. IN A SHORT HISTORICAL SECTION, THE PRESIDENT OUTLINED THE PURPOSE OF THE ABM TREATY, AND POINTED TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS: 'FOR SOME YEARS NOW, WE'VE BEEN AWARE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE DEVELOPING A NATIONWIDE DEFENSE. THEY HAVE INSTALLED A LARGE MODERN RADAR AT KRASNOYARSK, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS A CRITICAL PART OF A RADAR SYSTEM DESIGNED TO PROVIDE RADAR GUIDANCE FOR ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES PROTECTING THE ENTIRE NATION. NOW THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY.' THE POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION WAS UNCIVILISED. HE HAD THEREFORE ASKED US SCIENTISTS TO STUDY WHETHER THERE WAS A PRACTICAL WAY TO DESTROY NUCLEAR MISSILES AFTER THEIR LAUNCH BUT BEFORE THEY COULD REACH THEIR TARGETS. 'OUR SCIENTISTS ARE CONVINCED IT IS PRACTICAL AND THAT SEVERAL YEARS DOWN THE ROAD WE CAN HAVE SUCH A SYSTEM READY TO DEPLOY ... SDI IS A NON-NUCLEAR DEFENCE.'

4. THE PRESIDENT THEN SUMMARISED THE DISCUSSIONS IN REYKJAVIK. THE TWO SIDES SEEMED TO BE IN AGREEMENT ON DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN INF MISSILES IN EUROPE AND ASIA, AND SEEMED WILLING TO FIND A WAY TO REDUCE, EVEN TO ZERO, STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES. ON SDI 'I OFFERED A PROPOSAL THAT WE CONTINUE OUR PRESENT RESEARCH AND, IF AND

/WHEN



WHEN WE REACHED THE STAGE OF TESTING, WE WOULD SIGN NOW A TREATY THAT WOULD PERMIT SOVIET OBSERVATION OF SUCH TESTS: AND, IF THE PROGRAM WAS PRACTICAL, WE WOULD BOTH ELIMINATE OUR OFFENSIVE MISSILES: AND THEN WE WOULD SHARE THE BENEFITS OF ADVANCED DEFENSES. I EXPLAINED THAT, EVEN THOUGH WE WOULD HAVE DONE AWAY WITH OUR OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, HAVING THE DEFENSE WOULD PROTECT AGAINST CHEATING OR THE POSSIBILITY OF A MADMAN SOMETIME DECIDING TO CREATE NUCLEAR MISSILES."

5. THE REPORT BY THE TWO TEAMS FOLLOWING OVERNIGHT DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP HAD BEEN MOST PROMISING: "THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED FOR A TEN YEAR DELAY IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF SDI PROGRAMMES. WE PROPOSED A TEN YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH WE BEGAN WITH THE REDUCTION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS: BOMBERS, AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND THE WEAPONS THEY CARRY. THEY WOULD BE REDUCED 50 PERCENT IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS. DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WE WOULD CONTINUE BY ELIMINATING ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF ALL RANGES. AND DURING THAT TIME, WE WOULD PROCEED WITH RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF SDI, ALL DONE IN CONFORMITY WITH ABM PROVISIONS. AT THE TEN YEAR POINT, WITH ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES ELIMINATED, WE COULD PROCEED TO DEPLOY ADVANCED DEFENSES, AT THE SAME TIME PERMITTING THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE. AND HERE THE DEBATE BEGAN. THE GENERAL SECRETARY WANTED WORDING THAT IN EFFECT WOULD HAVE KEPT US FROM DEVELOPING THE SDI FOR THE ENTIRE TEN YEARS. IN EFFECT, HE WAS KILLING SDI. AND UNLESS I AGREED, ALL THAT WORK TOWARD ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD GO DOWN THE DRAIN, CANCELLED. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD PLEDGED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOT TO TRADE AWAY SDI."

6. A WAY FORWARD COULD STILL BE FOUND: "THE DOOR IS OPEN, AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN ELIMINATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT IS WITHIN REACH. WE MADE PROGRESS IN ICELAND." SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE NOW MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: NOT JUST TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL, BUT TOWARDS ARMS REDUCTION.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS

7. ANOTHER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES DISCUSSED WAS THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING BREACHES OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS. ORLOV HAD BEEN IMPRISONED FOR POINTING OUT SUCH VIOLATIONS. "I MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT SEEK TO EXPLOIT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE MATTERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROPAGANDA. BUT I ALSO MADE IT PLAIN ONCE AGAIN THAT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION IS INDISPENSABLE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES: FOR A GOVERNMENT THAT WILL BREAK FAITH WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP FAITH WITH FOREIGN POWERS."

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

8. A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS THE EXTENSION OF FREEDOM. THE US WAS COMMITTED TO THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: THAT IS WHY THEY SUPPORTED FREEDOM FIGHTERS. THIS SUBJECT LAY AT THE HEART OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US. SUMMIT MEETINGS COULD NOT MAKE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FORGET WHAT SOVIET ACTIONS HAD MEANT FOR



THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. UNTIL SOVIET POLICIES CHANGED, "WE WILL MAKE SURE THAT OUR FRIENDS IN THESE AREAS HAVE THE SUPPORT THEY NEED."

BILATERAL ISSUES

9. THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS OF FURTHER MOVEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES. THE US REMAINED COMMITTED TO PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PROGRAMMES THAT WOULD INVOLVE THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY CITIZENS FROM BOTH COUNTRIES.

SUMMIT PROSPECTS

10. SOME MIGHT BE ASKING: WHY NOT GIVE UP SDI FOR THE AGREEMENTS ON OFFER AT REYKJAVIK? THE ANSWER WAS SIMPLE. "SDI IS AMERICA'S INSURANCE POLICY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD KEEP THE COMMITMENTS MADE AT REYKJAVIK." THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTOOD THIS: THEY HAD LONG BEEN DEVELOPING THEIR OWN SDI." WHAT MR GORBACHEV WAS DEMANDING AT REYKJAVIK WAS THAT THE US AGREE TO A NEW VERSION OF THE ABM TREATY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY VIOLATED. I TOLD HIM WE DON'T MAKE THOSE KINDS OF DEALS IN THE US."

11. THE US PREFERRED NO AGREEMENT TO A BAD AGREEMENT.

GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN NO INDICATION OF WHEN OR WHETHER HE PLANNED TO COME TO THE US AS AGREED AT GENEVA. BUT THE INVITATION STOOD. THE US CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL. BUT THAT WAS A DECISION FOR THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE. WHATEVER THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS, "I AM ULTIMATELY HOPEFUL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT." THE CURRENT SUMMIT PROCESS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF PREVIOUS DECADES, BECAUSE THE US WAS NOW DEALING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. "WE NOW HAVE IT WITHIN OUR GRASP TO MOVE SPEEDILY WITH THE SOVIETS TOWARD EVEN MORE BREAKTHROUGHS." US IDEAS REMAINED ON THE TABLE, AND THEIR NEGOTIATORS WERE HEADING BACK TO GENEVA. SO THERE WAS GOOD REASON FOR HOPE.

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REYKJAVIK: INITIAL GERMAN REACTIONS

1. AFTER AN INITIALLY DEPRESSED REACTION IN BONN, GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO STRESS THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF REYKJAVIK: 'THE DOOR IS NOT CLOSED'.

DETAIL

2. ON 13 OCTOBER FEDERAL SPOKESMAN OST SAID REYKJAVIK HAD TAKEN NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL A LONG WAY FORWARD, PARTICULARLY ON INF AND TEXT BAN. BOTH SIDES SHOULD NOW BUILD ON THE REYKJAVIK RESULTS, AND REAGAN AND GORBACHEV SHOULD MEET AGAIN TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. SCHAUEBLE, MINISTER IN CHARGE OF THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, REFUSED, IN AN INTERVIEW TODAY, TO ACCEPT THE WORD 'SETBACK'. THE WAY FORWARD NOW WAS IN GENEVA. SCHAUEBLE CRITICISED GORBACHEV'S MOVE ON SDI LINKAGE AS AN UNREASONABLE TACTICAL MANOEUVRE DESIGNED TO HOLD UP PROGRESS. HE SAID THE US SIDE HAD SHOWN GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN ALL AREAS.

3. RUTH'S VIEW IS THAT IMPORTANT PROGRESS WAS MADE AT REYKJAVIK. HE DOES NOT THINK THAT GORBACHEV HAS YET NECESSARILY EXCLUDED A WASHINGTON SUMMIT. HE WAS HAPPY THAT GENSCHER HAD BEEN ABLE TO GIVE A DECISIVE LEAD IN RALLYING THE ALLIES BEHIND THE AMERICANS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

4. ONE OF OUR CONTACTS IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE DESCRIBED THE MOVES MADE BY REAGAN AS 'BREATH TAKING'. THE IMPLICATION OF REAGAN'S START AND INF OFFERS HAD FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, AND FOR THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NONE OF WHICH ISSUES HAD YET BEEN PROPERLY ADDRESSED IN THE ALLIANCE.

5. ON INF, INITIAL PRIVATE COMMENTS FROM THE MILITARY ARE NEGATIVE ABOUT ZERO LRINF IN EUROPE. THIS PROPOSAL MADE VERY RIGOROUS CONTROLS ON SRINF ALL THE MORE NECESSARY. ONE SUGGESTION IS THAT KOHL WILL BE ADVISED TO MAKE A PITCH ON SRINF AGAIN NEXT WEEK IN WASHINGTON. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ON THE OTHER HAND ARE CONTENT TO REST ON THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY REAGAN ON SRINF. THE 'BINDING COMMITMENT' TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF AFTER SIX MONTHS PROVISIONALLY AGREED AT REYKJAVIK WOULD IN THEIR VIEW BE SUFFICIENT. AUSWAERTIGES AMT SAY THE ABSENCE OF PRECISION ON SRINF RANGE IS NOT A PROBLEM BECAUSE GORBACHEV AGREED THAT MISSILES 'UP TO 1000 KMS' (LOWER LIMITS UNSPECIFIED) WOULD BE COVERED. WE SHALL PURSUE THIS FURTHER WITH THE FEDERAL MOD.

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6. AUSWAERTIGES AMT ALSO SEE AS POSITIVE POINTS THE PROGRESS TOWARDS VERIFICATION OF INF, REVERSION TO 50 PER CENT CUTS ON START AND THE MOVEMENT BY BOTH SIDES ON TESTING. THESE MOVES NOW NEEDED TO BE FORMALISED AT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATING TABLES.

7. DESPITE THE PUBLIC SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICANS, REYKJAVIK MAY WELL REOPEN DEBATE IN THE COALITION ON THE OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE LINK AND THE LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH PERMITTED UNDER THE ABM TREATY. SPD SPOKESMEN HAVE BEEN STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT FOR ALLOWING SDI TO FRUSTRATE A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

8. TODAY'S PRESS CARRIES RATHER MORE UP-BEAT ASSESSMENT OF REYKJAVIK, FOLLOWING YESTERDAY'S NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THAN WAS THE CASE YESTERDAY, WHEN THE LEITMOTIF WAS 'FAILURE'.

9. GENSCHER IS TO GIVE A FORMAL GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON 16 OCTOBER (FOLLOWING TOMORROW'S CABINET). I AM SEEING TELTSCHIK TOMORROW. KOHL LEAVES FOR WASHINGTON ON 20 OCTOBER, ACCOMPANIED BY WOERNER AND GENSCHER. I SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN LATER IN THE WEEK.

BULLARD

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OUR TELNO 2619 (NOT TO ALL): REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: US REACTIONS  
SUMMARY

1. GENERAL CONGRESS/PRESS REACTIONS SPLIT ALONG PARTY LINES. BREAKDOWN IN REYKJAVIK POSSIBLY A SMALL NEGATIVE FACTOR FOR THE REPUBLICANS ON 4 NOVEMBER. WIDESPREAD CONCERN AMONG THE EXPERTS AT THE US PROPOSAL FOR MUTUAL ABOLITION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES. GENERAL EXPECTATION OF A SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE TO SPLIT NATO ON SDI.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION (MY TUR) REFLECTED A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO PLAY UP THE ACHIEVEMENTS SO NEARLY REGISTERED IN REYKJAVIK. THE UPBEAT TONE, AND REPEATED REFERENCES TO PROGRESS MADE, WAS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE DEPARTURE STATEMENTS AT REYKJAVIK (MY TELS NOS 2614/6). THE CHANGE OF TONE HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY EXTENSIVE POINDEXTER PRESS BRIEFINGS (SEE SEPARATE TEL) ON THE START AND INF PROVISIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN REYKJAVIK.

3. THE PRESS, AND PUBLIC OPINION, HAS NOT YET FULLY DIGESTED THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS, AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S CHANGE OF EMPHASIS. BUT MR RENTON'S REFERENCE IN BRUSSELS TO THE QUOTE SERIOUS PROPOSALS WHICH EMERGED UNQUOTE IN REYKJAVIK HAS BEEN WIDELY NOTED, AND CERTAIN BROAD THEMES OF COMMENT ARE ALREADY EMERGING.

4. FIRST, ON THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WAS RIGHT TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT A MORE RESTRICTIVE REDEFINITION OF THE ABMT, WHICH WOULD HAVE AFFECTED SDI, AS THE PRICE FOR SATISFACTORY OUTLINE AGREEMENTS ON START AND INF, US OPINION DIVIDES ON PARTY LINES. REPUBLICAN SPOKESMEN SUPPORT HIM, LUGAR ARGUING THAT GORBACHEV'S TACTICS WERE A QUOTE TRAP TO PUT THE US IN PERPETUAL JEOPARDY OF THE REMAINING ICBMS UNQUOTE AND NOTING THAT QUOTE THE PRESIDENT DID NOT BLINK UNQUOTE, AND

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ACTED PROPERLY TO PRESERVE US SECURITY. KEMP THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT'S CONDUCT MAGNIFICENT, AND NOTED WITH APPROVAL THAT QUOTE THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO MOVING FORWARD ON SDI, AND HAS A EQUAL COMMITMENT TO OFFENSIVE ARMS REDUCTIONS, BUT NOT ONE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER UNQUOTE. RIGHT-WING COLUMNISTS ARE EQUALLY SUPPORTIVE: GEORGE WILL SEES REYKJAVIK AS QUOTE THE PRESIDENT'S FINEST HOUR UNQUOTE.

5. ON THE DEMOCRAT SIDE NUNN THOUGHT THAT THE OUTCOME SHOWED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S MAJOR PRIORITY WAS TO PROTECT SDI, EVEN AT THE EXPENSE OF GIVING UP THE PROSPECT OF DEEP CUTS IN SOVIET OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THERE HAD BEEN A CHANCE TO QUOTE EXCHANGE A RESEARCH-TYPE BLUEPRINT, OR AT LEAST RESTRICTIONS ON IT, FOR SOVIET MISSILES THAT ARE ALREADY DEPLOYED AND THREATEN OUR NATION UNQUOTE: IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MISSED. HART SAID THAT QUOTE UNREASONABLE ATTACHMENT TO A SPECULATIVE SPACE-BASED DEFENSIVE SYSTEM UNQUOTE IS BLOCKING REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL, QUOTE THE ADMINISTRATION APPARENTLY NEVER INTENDED TO USE SDI AS A BARGAINING CHIP, AS THEY HAVE SO OFTEN ALLEGED UNQUOTE.

6. THIS DIVISION WAS PREDICTABLE: HARDER TO PREDICT ARE THE EFFECTS OF REYKJAVIK ON MID-TERM ELECTION PROSPECTS. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT A DEAL IN REYKJAVIK WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR ELECTORAL PLUS FOR THE REPUBLICANS IN THE COUNTRY AT LARGE (WHATEVER TROUBLE IT MIGHT HAVE CAUSED THE PRESIDENT WITH THE RIGHT WING FRINGE). IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE BREAKDOWN IN REYKJAVIK WILL CONSTITUTE A COMPARABLE PLUS FOR THE DEMOCRATS, FOR THERE MAY BE A GENERAL INCLINATION TO RALLY ROUND THE PRESIDENT (AND HIS TELEVISED ADDRESS WAS WELL CALCULATED TO ENCOURAGE THIS). THERE PROBABLY IS SOME NET GAIN TO THE DEMOCRATS, BUT ECONOMIC FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO HAVE GREATER WEIGHT ON 4 NOVEMBER.

7. A SUB-THEME IN COMMENTS ON THE SUMMIT IS WIDESPREAD PUZZLEMENT AT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR THE MUTUAL ABOLITION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN 10 YEARS. BRZEZINSKI HAS DESCRIBED THIS AS MAKING EUROPE SAFE FOR SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK: NUNN HAS SAID THAT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN HEART ATTACKS AMONG US ARMY AND AIR FORCE GENERALS IF GORBACHEV HAD ACCEPTED IT. THE WASHINGTON POST FINDS THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL STARTLING: THE WALL STREET JOURNAL LAUGHABLE.

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8. THE PRESS ARE HOWEVER UNANIMOUS IN NOW EXPECTING A SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE DESIGNED TO PIN THE BLAME FOR ACROSS THE BOARD FAILURE IN REYKJAVIK ON THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SDI. KARPOV'S WEST EUROPEAN VISITS ARE SEEN AS THE LIKELY FIRST STAGE IN THE OFFENSIVE. THE PRESS NOTE THAT THERE IS LITTLE WESTERN EUROPEAN ENTHUSIASM FOR SDI, BUT THEY ALSO NOTE THAT ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES AT NATO ON 13 OCTOBER WERE NOT INCLINED TO BLAME THE PRESIDENT FOR DIGGING IN ON SDI.

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
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From the Private Secretary

14 October 1986

*Dear Colin,*

## PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN

My letter of 13 October recorded the principal points of the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with President Reagan about the US/Soviet summit in Reykjavik. It omitted a number of points which struck me as particularly sensitive. I record these below. I think that the Prime Minister would wish them to be seen only by the Foreign Secretary on return, the Defence Secretary and Sir Patrick Wright.

In the course of the conversation the President spoke dismissively of the ABM Treaty, in terms which suggested that he saw it principally as an obstacle. When you came to think of it, he said, the concept of a Treaty under which two governments undertook to deprive their people of the right to be defended was an extraordinary one.

The President also showed deep distrust of Soviet motives. Their attempt to freeze US research into strategic defence was a cover for them "to go ahead like crazy with their own missile defence plans".

When the Prime Minister repeatedly stressed the importance of nuclear deterrence in the face of the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, the President's responses were rather vague. "We've dealt with that for a long time and believe we can cope .... The Russians don't want war, they want victory by using the threat of nuclear war .... I think we could have a strategy to meet that." He showed no sign of backing down from his concept of eliminating nuclear weapons within ten years, indeed showed considerable pride in it.

The President strongly commended to the Prime Minister a new book by the author of 'Red October' called (I think) 'Red Storm Rising'. It gave an excellent picture of the Soviet Union's intentions and strategy. He had clearly been much impressed by the book.

*Yours sincerely,  
Charles Powell*

CHARLES POWELL

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

14 October 1986

I enclose a copy of my note of the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr. Karpov this morning. I should be grateful if you could handle it on a very restricted basis and not send it as such to Washington. (Since our Embassy will not themselves have a copy it will be invidious if the State Department were to be in the possession of one.)

I enjoyed seeing you this morning.

(Charles Powell)

His Excellency The Honourable Charles Price II

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10 DOWNING STREET  
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14 October 1986

From the Private Secretary

Dear Colin,

**PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. KARPOV**

The Prime Minister met Mr. Karpov, the Chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva disarmament talks, for one and a half hours this morning. Mr. Karpov was accompanied by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires and an interpreter.

Introduction

Mr. Karpov said that he had come on Mr. Gorbachev's personal instructions. Mr. Gorbachev had asked him to convey warmest regards and best wishes to the Prime Minister for her birthday, and to brief her on the outcome of the Reykjavik summit. He hoped that their talk could be in the spirit of the informal and confidential exchanges which had been established between the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Karpov said that Mr. Gorbachev was looking forward to seeing the Prime Minister in Moscow early next year. The Prime Minister said that it would soon be necessary to discuss dates.

Reductions in Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Karpov said that the Soviet side had gone to Reykjavik in the hope of achieving concrete results. They had tabled specific proposals which could have served as the basis for Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Washington. An historic agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons had been within grasp. The Soviet Union had been prepared to make major concessions to secure such an agreement. For instance, they had proposed 50% reductions in ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while leaving aside the US Forward-Based Systems. These would be regarded as non-central systems, to be dealt with in subsequent negotiations. The Soviet approach was based on preserving parity but at lower levels of offensive weapons. But they would also have been prepared to go beyond that stage to the elimination of strategic offensive weapons on both sides in ten years.

The Prime Minister agreed that reductions had to be balanced. But it was not just a question of achieving balance in particular areas. It was important to take account of the

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overall balance of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons which would be established if deep reductions in offensive strategic weapons were achieved. The Soviet Union enjoyed a heavy preponderance in chemical and conventional weapons which posed a threat to Europe. Nuclear weapons were an essential part of our defence against that threat. She was therefore sceptical whether complete elimination of nuclear weapons was a feasible or desirable objective, although she supported the goal of deep reductions. Mr. Karpov said that the question was how to secure balance while excluding the possibility of nuclear war. The Prime Minister said that it was not just nuclear war which should be excluded but also conventional war. Nuclear weapons had helped prevent conventional war in Europe.

#### Role of Third Country Forces

Mr. Karpov said that the Soviet Union could not regard British, French and Chinese nuclear forces, all of which were targetted on the Soviet Union, as irrelevant to the overall nuclear balance. However they were prepared to exclude British and French systems from the INF negotiations. But if the Soviet Union and the United States were to reduce their strategic nuclear forces by 50%, the role and significance of third country forces would increase and they would need to be taken into account in further negotiations. The Prime Minister said that British nuclear weapons would still be a tiny proportion of those which remained available to the Soviet Union. They would remain essential for our national defence. But we had spelled out in terms which would be familiar to the Soviet side the conditions in which we might envisage the inclusion of our forces in future negotiations. That remained the position.

#### Strategic Defence Initiative

The Prime Minister invited Mr. Karpov to explain why the Soviet Union continued to pursue the unrealistic goal of persuading the United States to renounce the SDI. Mr. Karpov said that the SDI would in essence mean that the United States would be in a position of immunity from attack by ballistic missiles. This might lead it to resort to actions which would not be contemplated while it remained under threat from nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union therefore saw strategic defence as dangerous and destabilising. It gave an illusion of security which could push the United States to risk confrontation. President Reagan himself had recognised in a statement of March 1983 that the SDI might be interpreted as a preparation for the achievement of a first-strike capability. The Soviet Union recognised, however, that President Reagan was committed politically to SDI. They had not, therefore, proposed that the United States should renounce the SDI programme, only that research and testing should be confined to the laboratory. They had also proposed that neither side should test or deploy elements of an SDI system in space for a period of ten years. Because there were differences between the United States and the Soviet Union over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side had also proposed



clarification of those aspects of the Treaty which dealt with space-based systems. The Soviet Union had made a major concession by accepting the fact of the SDI. Far from asking President Reagan to renounce it, they had only proposed that the boundaries within which it could be pursued should be clearly defined. They were not actually fore-closing the possibility of deploying a strategic defence system after ten years. (He said this in English, not through the interpreter.)

The Prime Minister acknowledged that the SDI could be seen as disturbing the balance. That was why it was important that activity on strategic defence should be conducted within the ABM Treaty, why that Treaty should be maintained and the period of notice for withdrawal from it extended so as to provide greater predictability. She had emphasised to both President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev the importance of strict observance of existing arms control treaties, both the ABM Treaty and SALT II. However it was completely unrealistic to expect the United States to give up the option of deploying a strategic defence system. After all the Soviet Union had already deployed the only existing defence system in the form of GALOSH and was itself doing research into space-based systems. There was also evidence that the Soviet Union was conducting activities in breach of the ABM Treaty. She acknowledged that there were differences in interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but these would not be solved by trying to rewrite the Treaty in a way which would permit the Soviet Union to continue its research while constraining the United States. She did not wish to get into the details of interpretation of the Treaty. But it was clearly established that no strategic defence system could be deployed except by negotiation under the terms of the Treaty. Mr. Karpov challenged this: it was clear that the United States' view was that if they decided that deployment of a strategic defence system was justified, they had the right to decide unilaterally to deploy it.

#### The Way Forward

The Prime Minister said that she had been very disturbed by Soviet tactics at Reykjavik in making agreement on any aspect of arms control dependent on acceptance of Soviet conditions on SDI. This was a throwback to a position which the Soviet Union had already abandoned at the time of the Geneva Summit. Mr. Gorbachev must have known before going to Reykjavik that there was no chance of President Reagan accepting this, in which case one was bound to question Soviet motives in going to the meeting. Did it remain the Soviet position that further negotiations on START and INF could not be taken forward or brought to a conclusion without simultaneous agreement on strategic defence? If so, the outlook was sombre indeed and the Soviet Union would bear a heavy responsibility.

Mr. Karpov said that the United States was well aware that the Soviet Union regarded SDI as a destabilising element in Soviet/American relations and a brake on progress towards



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
reduction in nuclear weapons. This had been made clear repeatedly and publicly.

The Prime Minister noted that Mr. Karpov had not answered her specific question. But it seemed clear to her that the Reykjavik meeting had suffered from inadequate preparation which could have led to some misunderstandings. There remained a good deal of ground for negotiation. Mr. Karpov agreed: negotiations should not stop. The Prime Minister said that she would like the meeting to convey a positive message. The press should be told that the message from her discussions with Mr. Karpov was that there were grounds for further negotiations. Both sides agreed that a way forward must be found. Mr. Karpov accepted this. The United States and the Soviet Union need to ponder and search for a way out of the present situation.

The meeting ended at 1045. I enclose a transcript of the remarks made to the press by Mr. Karpov on leaving No.10 and the note issued by our press office.

A final word: this record reduces to order what was an exceptionally lively, indeed excitable, discussion which moved rapidly from one subject to another and back again. It also eliminates repetition: for instance, the Prime Minister challenged Mr. Karpov again and again on why the Soviet Union had made all agreement at Reykjavik dependent on acceptance of their terms on SDI, and on the implications of this position for further negotiations. So while this letter is an accurate record of what was said, it does not adequately convey the flavour of the meeting.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,  


(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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JRWACS

To: PS/Lady Young

From: M Pakenham

Date: 14 October 1986

cc: PS/Mr Renton  
PS/PUS  
Mr Derek Thomas  
Mr Goodall  
PRU ✓  
Soviet Dept  
NAD  
Planning Staff  
Def Dept  
News Dept  
Assessments Staff,  
Cabinet Office  
Mr Mallaby,  
Cabinet Office  
Mr Griffiths,  
DACU, MOD

REYKJAVIK : STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS

1. I submit a draft statement for Lady Young to use in the House of Lords on 15 October. On delivery we would make it available to posts overseas. It has been agreed with Soviet Department and MoD officials.

*M Pakenham*

M Pakenham  
Arms Control and Disarmament  
Department



JRWACO

## REYKJAVIK MEETING:

## DRAFT STATEMENT TO HOUSE OF LORDS, 15 OCTOBER

My Lords, I should like to make a statement about the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 11-12 October. Since that meeting, the United Kingdom, in common with our other NATO Allies, has received a full briefing in Brussels on the outcome of the meeting from the US Secretary of State, Mr Shultz. My right honourable Friend, the Prime Minister and I saw the chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks here on 14 October.

It should be remembered that the Reykjavik meeting was not originally designed as a forum for the conclusion of major arms control agreements. The fact that both sides were prepared to consider proposals to that end should therefore be seen, not as evidence of some sort of failure, but as proof of the validity of the process and of their commitment to real progress. We warmly welcome the extent of agreement that did prove possible, on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on substantial reductions in strategic weapons. <sup>We welcome</sup> The proposals discussed at the Reykjavik meeting remain on the table. # We believe it imperative that both sides return to the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, determined to build on the progress made at Reykjavik and to finalise agreements on a range of measures in the arms



control arena. We are encouraged by their stated determination to do so. Together with the US and our other Allies we will seek to maintain the momentum that has been generated at Reykjavik.

It is clear from the outcome of the Meeting that agreement could not be reached because of the attitude adopted by the Soviet Union to the US Strategic Defence Initiative research programme. In the Government's view it is a serious step backwards to make all arms control agreements dependent on the abandonment of a research programme consistent with the ABM Treaty. In particular, we regret the recoupling of INF to this demand, following earlier Soviet acceptance that an INF agreement could be reached separately.

Arms control is not the only important element in East/West relations. We applaud President Reagan's determination to press the Soviet Union for progress in resolving regional issues; and for better respect for human rights, without which it will not be possible to build confidence between East and West.

My Lords, the United States' record on consultations with the Allies has been praiseworthy. The unity of the Atlantic Alliance has been a major factor in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table, and in impelling it so far down the road towards arms control agreements. It is already clear from the meeting in NATO on 13 October that our unity will not be affected by the outcome of the



Reykjavik meeting.

My Lords, Her Majesty's Government support the US in its continuing efforts to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union and in East/West relations; by seeking progress in humanitarian questions and regional issues; and by reaching balanced and verifiable agreements on arms control. The Reykjavik meeting was only one step in the long road towards these goals.

References: A UKDel NATO telno 283: Shultz's briefing of the NAC, 13 October.



## SUPPLEMENTARIES

HMG agree with President Reagan's view of nuclear free world?

As the Government has made clear on repeated occasions, nuclear disarmament and reductions of conventional weapons are inextricably linked in the search for general and complete disarmament. This remains the Government's ultimate objective. But nuclear weapons will continue to have a role to play in our security for the foreseeable future.

Not worth preventing arms control agreements for sake of SDI?

SDI research programme is investigating feasibility of strategic defences. No-one knows whether they will work. Discussions at Reykjavik were about managing the period until it was clear whether or not strategic defences would be possible. President Reagan has spoken on SDI being the insurance policy of the US and the Alliance. Whether this insurance will be necessary at some future stage cannot be answered now. So SDI, particularly in light of Soviet Union's own activities, should ~~be~~ not be abandoned now.

President Reagan determined to deploy SDI come what may?

US made clear over extended period that Russians have no veto over deployment of SDI. But he invited the



Russians, should strategic defences be feasible, to move to a more defence-oriented world. Any deployment should thus be cooperative. Meanwhile President Reagan made clear that SDI continues to be conducted in accordance with the ABM Treaty. But not prepared to see Treaty rewritten, to constrain US research while letting Soviet activities run free.

#### **US turned Summit into failure?**

Summit not a failure. In any case US making constructive proposals, Soviet Union created impasse by reverting to position of a year ago.

#### **Position of third country forces?**

Welcome Mr Gorbachev's confirmation [in press conference] that third country systems not part of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, dropping of Soviet demand for a ban on their increase and modernisation. Note he said "let them be increased and further improved."

#### **Testing**

Despite Soviet propaganda to run-up to Reykjavik meeting nuclear testing not a major issue at Reykjavik. But US has made clear the approach it wants to adopt. We have long agreed that progress could be sought in areas where it is most likely to be made. The first step is to seek the verification improvement necessary to secure verification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Welcome Reagan's offer in UNGA speech to consider further constraints on testing in



parallel with offensive force cuts.

#### What elements of proposal still on table?-

Progress was made at Reykjavik on both strategic and intermediate nuclear systems. We hope it will be possible to build on this progress.

#### Chemical Weapons

Not discussed at Reykjavik. Trust Soviet Union will respond to new UK proposal in Geneva CD negotiations.

#### What about human rights

- Note Secretary Shultz's reference to agreement on a "satisfactory manner of addressing...humanitarian concerns". Hope this will lead to improved Soviet performance on human rights.

- HMG and Western partners will work hard at Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting to maintain pressure for improvement by Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Europe.

#### Release of Griov/Ratushinskaya?

- Much welcome release which HMG has pressed for. But must not forget the many remaining political prisoners and Soviet citizens whose wish to emigrate is being frustrated.

#### CSCE role in East/West relations?



- Vienna important opportunity to demonstrate role which all European States - not just Superpowers - have to play in East/West relations. Test of resolve of all parties to keep East/West relations on an even keel.

**Will you raise case of X?**

- Share your concern. Cannot commit ourselves in advance to raising particular cases on specific occasions, but Parliamentary (and public) concerns fully taken into account when considering these issues.

**Regional questions?**

- Note Secretary Shultz's reference and agreement on a "satisfactory manner of addressing regional issues". Have no detail of discussion, but both sides recognise need for continuing dialogue on regional problems. Most helpful move would be rapid and complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

**Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan?**

- Look for rapid withdrawal of all Soviet troops, as called for in successive UN resolutions.
- Limited withdrawal of six regiments a very small step forward: only 5% of Soviet forces: over 110,000 will remain.
- (If necessary) Possible that some troops to be withdrawn only moved into Afghanistan recently.

**Prime Minister's visit**



Prime Minister has made clear to Mr Gorbachev she looks forward to visiting Soviet Union in first half of next year. Reykjavik outcome does not affect this. Dates yet to be discussed.

JRWACT



PRESS OFFICE BULLETIN

date: <sup>file</sup> <sup>celc</sup>

14/10/86

NO

CALL BY MR KARPOV

Mr Viktor Karpov, accompanied by the Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Guerman Gventsadze called this morning on the Prime Minister as a personal emissary from Mr Gorbachev.

Mr Karpov gave the Prime Minister a full account of the Reykjavic meeting from the Soviet point of view. It was agreed that no details of their discussion would be disclosed. But both sides agreed it was vital to find a way forward and that there were grounds for further negotiations.

Mr Karpov said that Mr Gorbachev was looking forward to meeting the Prime Minister in Moscow next year.

*checked* The meeting lasted just under 90 minutes.

*checked* The Prime Minister was accompanied by <sup>an official</sup> ~~Mr Charles Powell~~.

*Not done*

Mr Karpov isto give a press conference at the Soviet Embassy at 17.30 hours this evening. ]

MH



**TUESDAY 14 OCTOBER: MR KARPOV'S WORDS TO WAITING PRESS IN  
DOWNING STREET FOLLOWING MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER**

**VK:** ...I informed the British Prime Minister about the result of the Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan and expressed our opinion about why the meeting failed to produce results that would mean a movement forward. Complicated, yes, but very important issues for nuclear disarmament and we agreed that there should be searched for a way out of this situation and we agreed that needs effort on both sides.

**QUESTIONER:** What is the possible way out - will the two Leaders meet again ?

**VK:** I think that the result of the Reykjavik meeting should be pondered on by both sides - and it takes some time.

**QUESTIONER:** Geneva or where sir ?

**VK:** Geneva, yes

**Q:** Was Mrs Thatcher sympathetic to your view ?

**VK:** We had a discussion, of course not all views are coinciding and I invite you all to our press conference at our Embassy at 5.30 pm. Thank You.



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MODUK SIC A3A  
PRKING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE

MIPT: REYKJAVIK MEETING: SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. FOLLOWING IS SHULTZ'S OPENING STATEMENT:  
"I'VE JUST SPENT TWO FULL, INTENSIVE DAYS WATCHING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ENGAGE WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT TOGETHER. THE PRESIDENT'S PERFORMANCE WAS MAGNIFICENT, AND I HAVE NEVER BEEN SO PROUD OF MY PRESIDENT AS I HAVE BEEN IN THESE SESSIONS, AND PARTICULARLY THIS AFTERNOON.

DURING THE COURSE OF THESE TWO DAYS, EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS WERE REACHED TO REDUCE, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, STRATEGIC ARMS IN HALF; TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES; ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T FINALLY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH IT, PROBABLY TO WORK OUT SOMETHING SATISFACTORY ABOUT NUCLEAR TESTING; SATISFACTORY A MANNER OF ADDRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS, AND A VARIETY OF BILATERAL MATTERS; AND A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF HEADWAY IN THE ISSUES IN SPACE AND DEFENSE INVOLVING THE ABM TREATY. THROUGHOUT ALL OF THIS, THE PRESIDENT WAS CONSTRUCTIVE IN REACHING OUT AND USING HIS CREATIVITY AND INGENUITY TO FIND THESE VERY SWEEPING AND SUBSTANTIAL AND IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS.

IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR A LONG TIME, AND IT WAS CERTAINLY CLEAR TODAY, AND PARTICULARLY THIS AFTERNOON, THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIET LEADER ATTACHES TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE, AND I THINK IT WAS QUITE APPARENT THAT A KEY REASON WHY IT WAS POSSIBLE TO REACH SUCH SWEEPING POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS WAS THE VERY FACT OF SDIS VIGOROUS PRESENCE.

IN SEEKING TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES, THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO AGREE TO A TEN YEAR PERIOD OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, WHICH IS PERMITTED BY THE ABM TREATY, AND OF COURSE AFTER WHICH WE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPLOY IF WE CHOSE. HOWEVER, AS THE AGREEMENT THAT WE HAVE



DEPLOY IF WE CHOSE. HOWEVER, AS THE "AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN" SAID, DURING THIS TEN YEAR PERIOD, IN EFFECT, ALL OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD BE ELIMINATED SO THAT AT THE END OF THE PERIOD THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENCE WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED IN WHAT WAS NEEDED AND WOULD BE IN THE NATURE OF AN INSURANCE POLICY, INSURANCE AGAINST CHEATING, INSURANCE AGAINST SOMEBODY GETTING HOLD OF THESE WEAPONS. SO IT WOULD MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE SHIELD FOR THE UNITED STATES, FOR OUR ALLIES, FOR THE FREE WORLD.

AS WE CAME MORE AND MORE DOWN TO THE FINAL STAGES, IT BECAME MORE AND MORE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S OBJECTIVE WAS EFFECTIVELY TO KILL OFF THE SDI PROGRAMME, AND TO DO SO BY SEEKING A CHANGE, DESCRIBED BY THEM AS STRENGTHENING, BUT A CHANGE IN THE ABM TREATY THAT WOULD SO CONSTRAIN RESEARCH PERMITTED UNDER IT THAT THE PROGRAMME WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROCEED AT ALL FORCEFULLY.

THE PRESIDENT, HARD AS HE HAD WORKED FOR THIS EXTRAORDINARY RANGE AND IMPORTANCE OF AGREEMENTS, SIMPLY WOULD NOT TURN AWAY FROM THE BASIC SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, OUR ALLIES AND THE FREE WORLD BY ABANDONING THIS ESSENTIAL DEFENSIVE PROGRAMME. HE HAD TO BEAR IN MIND, AND DID BEAR IN MIND, THAT NOT ONLY IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE PROGRAMME A KEY REASON WHY WE WERE ABLE POTENTIALLY TO REACH THESE AGREEMENTS, BUT UNDOUBTEDLY ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND POTENTIAL WOULD BE THE KIND OF PROGRAMME YOU NEED IN THE PICTURE TO ASSURE YOURSELF THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY CARRIED OUT.

AND SO, IN THE END, WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE, THE PRESIDENT, HAVING WORKED SO HARD, CREATIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY, FOR THESE POTENTIALLY TREMENDOUS ACHIEVEMENTS, SIMPLY HAD TO REFUSE TO COMPROMISE THE SECURITY OF THE US, OF OUR ALLIES AND FREEDOM BY ABANDONING THE SHIELD THAT IS HELD IN FRONT OF FREEDOM. SO, IN THE END, WE ARE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED AT THIS OUTCOME, ALTHOUGH I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE HOW EFFECTIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY AND HARD THE PRESIDENT WORKED, AND HOW MUCH HE ACHIEVED POTENTIALLY, HOW READY HE WAS TO GO ABSOLUTELY THE LAST, NOT JUST THE LAST MILE, BUT AS YOU CAN SEE FROM WHAT I'VE TOLD YOU, QUITE A LONG DISTANCE TO TRY TO BRING INTO BEING THESE POTENTIALLY VERY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENTS. BUT, HE COULD NOT ALLOW THE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT TO BE DESTROYED IN THE PROCESS, AND HE WOULD NOT DO SO."

2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, SHULTZ ADDED THE FOLLOWING:

A) ABM TREATY. THE CHANGE SOUGHT BY THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE CONFINED RESEARCH, TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT TO THE LABORATORY:

B) AGREED LANGUAGE. THE ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP (IE NITZE, ROWNY, PERLE, ADELMAN, KAMPELMAN, LINNARD, AND KARPOV, VELIKHOV, AKROMEYEV ETAL) HAD AGREED, DURING THE NIGHT OF 11/12 OCTOBER ON LANGUAGE FOR A JOINT STATEMENT ON START.

ON INF, NO SPECIFIC LANGUAGE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT, BUT IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION ON 12 OCTOBER QUOTE WE WERE ABLE TO FIND WHAT I THINK COULD BE A VERY FINE AGREEMENT UNQUOTE. AGREED LANGUAGE ON THAT "WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TOO DIFFICULT".

C) HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SECOND WORKING GROUP (IE RIDGWAY, HARTMAN, MATLOCK AND BESSMERTNYK, ARBATOV ETC) HAD ALSO AGREED LANGUAGE. THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTED SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL SETTING OUT US VIEWS, INCLUDING LISTS OF PEOPLE WHO HAD INDICATED THEY WISHED TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION "PERHAPS AT SOME POINT THERE IS A PROSPECT OF SETTING UP SOME KIND OF SYSTEMATIC BASIS" FOR DISCUSSING HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS.

D) SUMMIT. NO AGREEMENT ON A DATE FOR A SUMMIT IN THE US, AND NO PROSPECT OF ONE TAKING PLACE IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

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
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PEKING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE  
MIPT: REYKJAVIK MEETING

1. FOLLOWING IS THE SUBSTANTIVE PASSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT ON DEPARTURE FROM KEFLAVIK ON 12 OCTOBER:  
"THE TALKS WE JUST CONCLUDED WERE HARD AND TOUGH, AND YET I HAVE TO SAY EXTREMELY USEFUL. WE SPOKE ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS. AND OF COURSE, MR GORBACHEV AND I WERE FRANK ABOUT OUR DISAGREEMENTS. WE HAD TO BE. IN SEVERAL CRITICAL AREAS WE MADE MORE PROGRESS THAN WE ANTICIPATED WHEN WE CAME TO ICELAND. WE MOVED TOWARD AGREEMENT ON DRASTICALLY REDUCED NUMBERS OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN BOTH EUROPE AND ASIA. WE APPROACHED AGREEMENT ON SHARPLY REDUCED STRATEGIC ARSENALS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. WE MADE PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR TESTING.

BUT THERE REMAINED AT THE END OF OUR TALKS ONE AREA OF DISAGREEMENT. WHILE BOTH SIDES SEEK REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF



BY THERE REMAINED AT THE END OF OUR TALKS ONE AREA OF  
DISAGREEMENT. WHILE BOTH SIDES SEEK REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF  
NUCLEAR MISSILES AND WARHEADS THREATENING THE WORLD, THE SOVIET  
UNION INSISTED THAT WE SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD DENY TO ME  
AND TO FUTURE PRESIDENTS FOR TEN YEARS THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP,  
TEST AND DEPLOY A DEFENCE AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILES FOR THE  
PEOPLE OF THE FREE WORLD. THIS WE COULD NOT AND WILL NOT DO.

SO, LATE THIS AFTERNOON I MADE TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY  
AN ENTIRELY NEW PROPOSAL: A TEN YEAR DELAY IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF  
SDI IN EXCHANGE FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL BALLISTIC  
MISSILES FROM THE RESPECTIVE ARSENALS OF BOTH NATIONS. SO LONG  
AS BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION PROVE THEIR GOOD  
FAITH BY DESTROYING NUCLEAR MISSILES YEAR BY YEAR, WE WOULD NOT  
DEPLOY SDI. THE GENERAL SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER OUR  
OFFER, BUT ONLY IF WE RESTRICTED ALL WORK ON SDI TO LABORATORY  
RESEARCH, WHICH WOULD HAVE KILLED OUR DEFENSIVE SHIELD.

WE CAME TO ICELAND TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, AND  
THOUGH WE PUT ON THE TABLE THE MOST FAR-REACHING ARMS CONTROL  
PROPOSAL IN HISTORY, THE GENERAL SECRETARY REJECTED IT. HOWEVER,  
WE MADE GREAT STRIDES IN ICELAND IN RESOLVING MOST OF OUR  
DIFFERENCES, AND WE'RE GOING TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT."

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MIPT: REYKJAVIK MEETING: REGAN'S COMMENTS TO THE PRESS  
1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF  
REGAN'S COMMENTS TO THE PRESS ON DEPARTURE FROM REYKJAVIK:  
A) "THE PRESIDENT HAD PROMISED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT HE  
WOULD NOT GIVE AWAY SDI, NOR TRADE IT AWAY. HE DID NOT TRADE IT  
AWAY. THE PRESIDENT STOOD FIRM. SDI IS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS  
THAT WE'RE HERE. IT'S QUITE OBVIOUS THIS IS ONE OF THE THINGS  
THAT THE SOVIETS FEAR, OUR GETTING SDI. THAT IS OUR STRONG CARD.  
WE SHOULDN'T GIVE IT AWAY".  
B) "THERE'S STILL A CHANCE TO GET OTHER AGREEMENTS. BUT IN  
THE MEANTIME, SUPPOSE THERE HAD BEEN CHEATING, OR SUPPOSE SOME  
OTHER COUNTRY DEVELOPED THESE WEAPONS. SDI IS A SHIELD  
AGAINST ALL OF THESE WEAPONS THAT MIGHT COME IN THE HANDS OF  
OTHER PEOPLE".



OTHER PEOPLE .

C) PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS THE ONE THAT VOLUNTEERED THAT WE WOULD GIVE UP ALL OF THESE WEAPONS. WE MADE THE PROPOSITION, NOT THE SOVIETS. WE SAID TO THE SOVIETS, WE WILL DO AWAY WITH ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS-NUCLEAR BOMBS, NUCLEAR SHELLS FOR FIELD ACTIVITY. EVERYTHING WAS ON THE TABLE.

WE'LL GIVE IT AWAY IF YOU WILL AGREE TO LET US CONTINUE OUR SEARCH FOR THIS DEFENSE. AND FOR 10 YEARS WE WON'T DEPLOY THAT SYSTEM. AND YET THEY REFUSED TO DO IT''.

D) ''THERE WILL NOT BE ANOTHER SUMMIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THAT I CAN SEE AT THIS TIME. THE SOVIETS ARE THE ONES WHO REFUSE TO MAKE THE DEAL. IT SHOWS THEM UP FOR WHAT THEY ARE. THE SOVIETS FINALLY SHOWED THEIR HAND''.

E) ''THE PRESIDENT DIDN'T REFUSE TO TRADE. THE SOVIETS REFUSED THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO DO AWAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY INSISTED UPON GETTING EVERYTHING. THEY WOULDN'T GIVE UP ANYTHING''.

F) (IN RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV'S COMMENT THAT THE SITUATION IS DETERIORATING) ''NATURALLY THAT'S WHAT HE'S GOING TO SAY. ALL HE HAD TO DO TO GET THIS ENTIRE AGREEMENT AND PUT THE WORLD AT PEACE WAS TO SAY, YES, YOU CAN CONTINUE YOUR RESEARCH, AS LONG AS YOU DON'T DEPLOY FOR 10 YEARS. AND IN THE MEANTIME WE'LL TALK ABOUT IT. AND HE ABSOLUTELY REFUSED TO DO THAT''.

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REYKJAVIK MEETING

1. MY THREE IFTS CONTAIN:
  - A) EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DEPARTURE STATEMENT AT KEFLAVIK;
  - B) SHULTZ'S PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT IN REYKJAVIK, AND EXTRACTS FROM HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS;
  - C) COMMENTS TO THE PRESS BY WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF REGAN.
2. THE PRESIDENT, APPARENTLY RELAXED AND EBULLIENT, SPOKE FROM A PREPARED TEXT. SHULTZ, WHO LOOKED TIRED AND DESPONDENT, DID NOT, ALTHOUGH HE HAD EVIDENTLY THOUGHT CAREFULLY ABOUT HIS STATEMENT. REGAN'S REMARKS WERE IMPROMPTU.
3. THE US MEDIA ARE BAFFLED BY THE BREAKDOWN OF TALKS. INFORMAL ADMINISTRATION BRIEFING EARLIER TODAY HAD LED THEM TO BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE; THEY HAD SEEN THE EXTRA SESSION ON 12 OCTOBER AS AN ENCOURAGING SIGN. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO GET MUCH MORE GUIDANCE IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS; ADMINISTRATION BRIEFERS WILL NOT WANT TO PREEMPT THE PRESIDENT, WHO ADDRESSES THE NATION AT 2000 LOCAL TIME ON 13 OCTOBER.
4. NO REPORTS OF THE REYKJAVIK DISCUSSIONS HAVE AS YET BEEN RECEIVED IN STATE. THE AUTHORITATIVE US ACCOUNT WILL BE GIVEN BY SHULTZ IN HIS BRIEFING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 13 OCTOBER.
5. ADVANCE COPIES TO PS/PUS, GOODALL, PAKENHAM, MALLABY (CABINET OFFICE), DUS (P) (MOD), AND POWELL (NO 10).

ACLAND



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PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I attach some points which you might make in speaking to President Reagan, assuming we can arrange a telephone call. If not, they could be embodied in a message.

*fixed for 6.00pm*

*CDP*

Charles Powell

13 October 1986

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POINTS TO MAKE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. Congratulations on your bold and resolute performance throughout what must have been very demanding meetings with Gorbachev.
2. Impressed by the amount of progress you did make towards agreement on INF, START and in other areas. I know that George Shultz is giving a full account to NATO today. I look forward to hearing details.
3. I share your disappointment that it was not possible to reach agreed conclusions. But you did all you could. No doubt at all in my mind that the blame for the deadlock rests with the Soviet Union. By making everything depend upon your accepting their demands on SDI in full, they condemned the meeting to failure. I shall make clear to Gorbachev's emissary, whom I am seeing tomorrow, that this is my view.
4. How you present the outcome in your television address will be very important in handling this issue in Europe. It is clearly the Soviet aim to sow dissension in the Alliance. We must not let them succeed. But there is a risk that some of the weaker brethren will fall for the Soviet line that you were being unreasonable, and that only the SDI is blocking agreement.
5. I hope therefore you will be able to emphasise the following points:
  - (a) the fact that the Soviet Union wanted to make agreement on everything turn on acceptance of their terms on SDI; *They also do not mean*
  - (b) the extent to which this was a reversal of their earlier position that separate agreements would be possible, at least on INF;

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(c) the doubt which this all or nothing approach casts on their commitment to a successful outcome at Reykjavik;

(d) the reasonableness of the offer you made to extend the period of notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to 10 years. This would give the Russians plenty of reassurance that there would be no sudden break-out to deployment of the SDI;

*from  
6 mths*

(e) the blatant way in which the Soviet Union is trying to make propoganda out of this and divide the European allies from the US;

(f) your readiness to continue talking on all the issues which were raised at Reykjavik, all of which are important in their own right. If the Russians want to walk away from further discussions, they have no-one to blame but themselves.

6. The only point which has seriously worried me is your reference to eliminating all nuclear weapons within ten years. This of course would have very far-reaching implications for the Alliance's strategy based on nuclear deterrence, and would make my political position here very difficult. I hope that you will not stress this idea in your address on television — or at least not at a specific time-scale.

7. I think emphasis on these points rather than on the arguments for pursuing the SDI itself would help get your case across in Europe and hold the Alliance together.

8. I understand our people are discussing the possibility of my coming over to have a talk with you on the morning of 15 November. I hope we can go firm on this.

*perhaps  
at Camp David*

DG2BKU



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PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH KARPOV

You are to see Karpov together with the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires tomorrow morning. He goes on afterwards to a separate meeting with Lady Young and officials.

The folder contains:

- analysis of the outcome of Reykjavik meeting;
- points to make;
- telegram on Shultz briefing;
- telegram from Moscow.

I strongly commend the two telegrams. Bryan Cartledge assesses that Gorbachev was probably not playing for a break-down and that the outcome may damage his personal standing in the Soviet Union: the second time he has had an unsuccessful meeting with Reagan.

You will want to let Karpov know right at the beginning that you have had a personal briefing from President Reagan. Shultz has briefed the Alliance. If the Soviet Union hoped to open up and exploit differences between the United States and Europe, they will be disappointed. We shall not be separated and there was impressive unity at yesterday's NATO briefing.

You might then ask him to give his account of what happened at Reykjavik.

Thereafter you will want to make clear that in our view the Soviet Union bears the responsibility for the failure to reach agreement. By making agreement on all issues dependent on acceptance of their terms on SDI, they doomed the meeting to failure. You hope that Mr. Karpov will be able to convince you that this was not the Soviet intention and it was not a 'set-up'.

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The best way to do so would be to continue the negotiations on the individual sectors, and work for agreement on INF and other areas where the Reykjavik discussions showed that agreement was possible. If the Russians now walk away from further talks in Geneva or elsewhere they will carry a very heavy responsibility.

You might go on to ask for a detailed account of the Soviet position on SDI and how the Soviet Union's own extensive research programme fits with their attempt to re-write the terms of the ABM Treaty. You cannot understand the Soviet obsession that SDI is an offensive system: President Reagan has made quite clear that its sole purpose and rationale is defensive.

Finally you will want to make clear that you remain ready to continue to discuss these matters with Mr. Gorbachev and look forward to taking up his invitation next year.

After the meeting we shall want to be able to say to the press that you saw Karpov as Gorbachev's emissary and heard his account of Reykjavik: that you left him in no doubt that we saw the Soviet Union as responsible for the deadlock in Reykjavik: that you urged the Russians to continue negotiations to build on the progress which has been made: and that you warned against attempts to divide the Alliance.

CDP

Charles Powell

13 October 1986

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1986

*Dear Charles*

US/Soviet Reykjavik Meeting: Call by Mr Karpov

Mr Viktor Karpov, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks and of the Soviet MFA Arms Control Directorate, will make a short call on the Prime Minister at 0915 tomorrow. He will be accompanied by the Soviet Charge d'Affaires, Mr Gventsadze, and an interpreter. He will go on to a further meeting with Lady Young and FCO officials (at about 0945).

/ I enclose some points to make and questions to put to Mr Karpov, together with our immediate assessment of what happened at Reykjavik; the reasons for the breakdown; and what next?

/ Mr Shultz briefed NATO Ministers earlier today (UKDEL NATO telno 283 - enclosed). I understand from Mr Renton that this was a most impressive performance.

I am copying this letter and enclosures to John Howe (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

*R N Culshaw*

(R N Culshaw)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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## US/SOVIET REYKJAVIK MEETING: PROVISIONAL ASSESSMENT

What happened at Reykjavik?

1. The picture emerging is as follows. In Secretary Shultz's words, "extremely important potential agreements were reached" in the following areas:-

- to reduce strategic arms by half, leading to their complete elimination <sup>(maybe even</sup> /within 10 years). The arms control working group virtually agreed language on this for a joint statement.

- on INF, zero/zero in Europe with 100 Soviet missiles in Asia and 100 US missiles on American soil; and a freeze on SRINF followed by negotiations on their removal. Gorbachev confirmed that the Russians had dropped their demand for a ban on the increase and modernisation of British and French nuclear forces ("let them be increased and further improved") though they constituted a "major potential" and an "organic part of NATO's nuclear potential".

- "progress in the area of nuclear testing" (Reagan);

- "a satisfactory manner of addressing regional issues, humanitarian concerns and a variety of bilateral matters." (Shultz). Language was agreed in these areas.

2. In the final session, Reagan offered a ten-year delay in SDI deployment in exchange for <sup>an agreement to work for</sup> the complete elimination of all US and Soviet ballistic missiles. (Shultz added "all offensive strategic arms", and Regan "all nuclear weapons - bombs, shells".) He insisted that the US should do research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty", but Gorbachev insisted that "the treaty should be strictly observed with no testing outside the laboratory".





Reasons for the breakdown

3. It is clear that Gorbachev chose to make SDI, and the specific question of whether the ABM Treaty permitted anything more than laboratory research, the sticking point. In effect he reverted to the Soviet position of a year ago, linking the possibility of reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear forces to this constraint on SDI.

4. In the lead-up to Reykjavik Soviet propaganda had focussed on nuclear testing and INF, on which an interim agreement was expected. Gorbachev himself had spoken of a need for headway on 2 or 3 issues if the Washington Summit was to take place, but had laid down no prior condition relating to SDI. It was always to be expected that Gorbachev would play "the SDI card" at some stage. What was surprising was the vigour with which he played it yesterday, in effect bringing the arms control process to a halt. The measure of agreement (as yet undefined) on such sweeping terms for INF and START was undoubtedly linked in this overall Soviet strategy.

5. It is possible that Gorbachev set out deliberately to provoke a breakdown. He may have decided some weeks ago that there was no chance of getting what he wanted on SDI at the Washington Summit; and that the outcome would be therefore unacceptably negative from his point-of-view, whatever was agreed on eg INF. He therefore was prepared to give the US side at Reykjavik much of what they sought in other areas, but always intending to cut off the process by re-inserting the SDI spanner before a Summit proper became inevitable. Such a strategy would also help to preserve his public relations position, by contrasting the "great potential achievements" with the "single sticking-point". But it seems as likely that he genuinely hoped to persuade the President to make concessions that would, in effect,



kill off the SDI. On this hypothesis, he went to Reykjavik determined to avoid an unproductive Washington Summit (in SDI terms), but still not wholly certain that the President would not give enough ground. When the latter did not occur, he implemented the fall-back strategy. He used the US readiness to negotiate sweeping agreements in INF and START in an attempt to apply leverage on SDI, but found the President's resolve to preserve his SDI programme unaffected. He may have thought the President's desire for agreement at a Washington Summit offered greater leverage than would be available at any future date.

??

6. In terms of public relations, the Soviet Union are well-placed. Gorbachev took the initiative in proposing the Reykjavik meeting and (at least in public) kept it. The Soviet position on human rights was eased by the release of Orlov, Ratushinskaya and others; the limited withdrawal from Afghanistan was timed to follow the meeting; Raisa Gorbachev and an active Soviet briefing team kept the media's attention in Reykjavik; and the Russians are now sending Karpov and other emissaries to NATO capitals. It will therefore be all the more necessary to establish quickly and publicly the unreasonableness of the Soviet position of making agreements across the board depend on wholesale acceptance of their position on SDI.

What now?

7. There is now little prospect of a summit in the US taking place in next few months. The prospect of a Moscow summit in 1987 has correspondingly receded. But it is strongly in our interests that the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks should continue; and neither side has suggested they be interrupted. Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would not withdraw its proposals. Moreover he left the door open to "new" thinking on the US side. At his press conference he said it was necessary for the President and



for him to consider further the whole situation and "to come back again and attempt to settle this divide between us". The US position is unlikely to develop further before the Congressional elections.

8. The principal danger now is that the Alliance will not be able to rally round the US on the issue in dispute - SDI. The need for Alliance consultation and solidarity will be greater than ever.

9. The impact of the failure both on our allies (eg Kohl facing elections in January) and on the UK domestic debate will be unhelpful. Expectations of an interim agreement on INF, vindicating NATO's dual-track strategy, have been dashed. The Soviet Union will maintain its propaganda on nuclear testing and will once more step up its campaign against SDI, in the hope of bringing European pressure to bear on the US. It will be important to avoid public recriminations or pressures such as will serve Soviet purposes without influencing the US in the direction we want.

10. The details and significance of President Reagan's last offer to eliminate US and Soviet ballistic missiles (or all strategic offensive forces?) are unclear. In particular, we shall need to know how far it was linked to a specific time-table eg 10 years, in a way that his earlier offer to Gorbachev to extend the ABMT was not. If so, it would offer a potentially serious hostage to fortune, and cast doubt on the basic strategy of the Alliance. Neither we nor the French would have endorsed such a proposal. The double danger here is that the idea will acquire authority as an element in the arms control negotiations and that the Alliance will be divided on it.



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11. Future US policy in relation to the SALT restraints is also now in serious doubt. The President will have less pressing reasons for delaying ALCM deployments if these exceeded SALT II limits than he would have had in the immediate context of a Washington Summit. Perle and others will correspondingly be in a better position to urge a "full response" to Soviet violations.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
13 October 1986

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PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR KARPOV: 14 OCTOBER 1986

POINTS TO MAKE

- Already had full briefing from US. Interested in Soviet perspective.
- While disappointing that President and General Secretary did not reach agreement on [any of] key issues clear that made considerable progress. Note that Soviet Union not ruled out possibility of further summit. Also remember Gorbachev's comment to Rude Pravo that "The 'all or nothing' approach [to Summits] is alien to us".
- But considerable step backwards for Soviet Union if insist that agreement on all issues dependent on their demands on SDI. Contrast with earlier Soviet agreement in principle to separate INF agreement.
- If this was intention in going to Reykjavik, then forced to conclude that designed to bring about failure of that meeting. Soviet side will have to shoulder responsibility accordingly.
- Task now to see how to build on what achieved (eg on INF and START). Would be wrong for either side to walk away from Geneva talks, or from continuing discussion on issues where agreement seemed possible. Gorbachev has said Soviet proposals remain on table. Need to demonstrate seriousness of commitment on this.
- President Reagan's standing and commitment offer best chance of agreements in next 10, let alone next 2 years.
- Why did Soviet Union make SDI all-or-nothing issue? Should be clear by now President would not give up SDI. US seeking to






engage Soviet Union in discussion on offensive/defensive relationship. But does not mean that ABM Treaty can be rewritten. What about Soviet Union's own research into strategic defences? Now look for serious and detailed Soviet response.

- How do Soviet Union see way forward: further negotiations in Geneva NST; more expert-level contacts to follow up earlier Moscow/Washington meetings; prospects for another Shultz/Shevardnadze meeting?
- Does Soviet Union agree that progress still possible in other arms control issues, eg CW, measures on testing less than CTB Treaty?
- What progress registered on human rights and regional questions? They also have an effect on confidence. In former case, need is to advance from release of prominent individuals to action to improve lot of whole categories (Jews, religious believers, would-be emigrants etc).
- In latter case, most important move would be rapid and complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
- Can assure Gorbachev that HMG still interested in pursuing dialogue, including at highest level. But Alliance will not respond to attempts to destroy cohesion. Will work together with other Allies including US to continue arms control process.



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PEKING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY  
MODUK (FOR DACU)

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: NAC BRIEFING BY SHULTZ

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ BRIEFS THE COUNCIL ON THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: DESPITE THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE MOMENT THE MEETING SHOULD NOT BE CRITICISED AS A FAILURE. A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, ESPECIALLY ON STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE FORCES WHICH THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE. THE US HAD MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO MEET GORBACHEV'S CONCERN ON SDI, BUT COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT AGREE TO CHANGES TO THE ABM TREATY DESIGNED TO CRIPPLE THE PROGRAMME. THE US WAS PREPARED TO FACE UP TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WARM ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS. NEED TO AVOID TALK OF A FAILURE AND FOR VIGOROUS FOLLOW-UP ACROSS THE BOARD ON ARMS CONTROL.

DETAIL

2. OPENING HIS COMPREHENSIVE DEBRIEF, SHULTZ SAID THAT BENEATH THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE MOMENT WAS A POSITIVE SENSE THAT POSSIBILITIES HAD BEEN OPENED UP FOR FAR-REACHING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE THESE, THE KEY TO PROGRESS WOULD BE THE COMBINATION OF ALLIED STRENGTH, COHESION, AND REASONABLENESS.

3. THE SUMMIT HAD BEGUN WITH A SHORT MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY, AFTER WHICH BOTH SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT. ALTHOUGH MOST TIME HAD BEEN SPENT ON ARMS CONTROL OTHER ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAD FEATURED STRONGLY. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD BEEN READY TO ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY THEIR PREPAREDNESS TO CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES (AS OPPOSED TO INDIVIDUAL HUMANITARIAN CASES).

4. ON THE FIRST DAY BOTH SIDES HAD TABLED PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL (THE SOVIET PAPER CAME FIRST) AND IN THE AFTERNOON GORBACHEV AND THE

ANCE COPY

FLASH

Ps/PUS  
Mr Sood  
Mr Thomas.

Sor D.  
ACDD

Ps/no 10 Downing St. ✓  
Mr MALABY, CAB. OFFICE  
ASSESSMENTS STAFF,  
CABINET OFFICE

MS



4. ON THE FIRST DAY BOTH SIDES HAD <sup>SHULTZ'S</sup> ARMS CONTROL (THE SOVIET PAPER CAME FIRST) AND IN THE AFTERNOON GORBACHEV AND THE PRESIDENT HAD HAD A FORTHRIGHT EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON INF, START, NUCLEAR TESTING, SPACE AND STRATEGIC DEFENCE. THE OUTCOME OF THIS WAS THAT IN THE STRATEGIC AREA BOTH SIDES AGREED ON FINDING A WAY OF ACHIEVING 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS BY CAREFUL CATEGORISATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC FORCES, AND TAKING 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN EACH. THIS WOULD RECOGNISE THE HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES IN EACH SIDES FORCE STRUCTURE. OVER NIGHT THE ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUP CAME VERY CLOSE TO AGREEING A JOINT STATEMENT ON THIS.

5. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON SOME KEY INF ISSUES OVER NIGHT, AND DISCUSSIONS CONTINUED IN THE MORNING WITH GORBACHEV APPARENTLY FREQUENTLY EMPHASISING THE THIRD COUNTRY FORCE ISSUE. HOWEVER BY THE END OF THE SECOND MORNING THE OUTLINE OF AN AGREEMENT EMERGED, THE MAIN FEATURES OF WHICH WERE A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 100 WARHEADS, WITH SOVIET MISSILES IN ASIA ONLY AND US MISSILES IN THE US (BUT APPARENTLY INCLUDING ALASKA), LIMITS ON SRINF AT THE PRESENT LEVEL ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN THESE SYSTEMS. SHULTZ STRESSED THAT MANY FEATURES OF THIS AGREEMENT WERE NOT WRITTEN DOWN AND SO MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE DISPUTED.

6. ON VERIFICATION GORBACHEV HAD APPEARED ALMOST TO COMPETE WITH THE PRESIDENT IN HIS DESIRE FOR A STRONG VERIFICATION REGIME. THE US HAD PUT FORWARD THEIR PROPOSALS ON INF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING ON SITE OBSERVATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF SYSTEMS AND ON SITE MONITORING OF REMAINING INVENTORIES, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN RESISTED BY THE RUSSIANS. (ALTHOUGH SHULTZ WAS CAREFUL TO SAY THAT AGREEMENT WAS NOT SECURED.) THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO AGREED THAT SUCH A TREATY WOULD LAST UNTIL OVERTAKEN BY A SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT.

7. ON TESTING SHULTZ ASSESSED THAT GORBACHEV WAS UNDER PRESURE FROM HIS OWN MILITARY TO RESUME TESTING BUT WANTED TO EXTRACT A PRICE FOR ENDING THE MORATORIUM. THE PRESIDENT WAS WILLING TO HELP BY SEEKING AGREEMENT ON MEASURES OF VERIFICATION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO RATIFICATION OF THE PNE AND THRESHOLD TREATIES. FAILING THIS THE US WOULD RATIFY ANYWAY, RESERVING ITS POSITION UNTIL SATISFIED ON VERIFICATION. THE US COULD ALSO AGREE TO TALKS ON STEP BY STEP REDUCTIONS IN TESTS IN PARALLEL WITH REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS.

8. ON SPACE AND STRATEGIC DEFENCES SHULTZ BEGAN BY SUMMARISING THE TWO SIDES RESPECTIVE POSITIONS BEFORE THE REYKJAVIK MEETING. ON THE FIRST DAY FORTHRIGHT EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY MADE NO PROGRESS, AND DURING SUBSEQUENT TALKS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS SHEVARDNADZE HAD LAID GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR A 10 YEAR SUSPENSION OF THE ABM TREATY WITHDRAWAL PROVISION. SHULTZ HAD NO AUTHORITY TO AGREE, BUT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY AND WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PARTICIPATION THE US PUT TOGETHER AN ENTIRELY NEW PROPOSAL. THIS INVOLVED AN INITIAL PERIOD OF 5 YEARS DURING WHICH THERE WOULD BE 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND SDI ACTIVITY WOULD BE LIMITED TO PERMITTED RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING UNDER THE ABM TREATY. DURING THE FOLLOWING 5 YEARS PROVIDED BOTH SIDES WOULD CONTINUE FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE SAME PACE, THE SAME RESTRICTION ON STRATEGIC DEFENCES WOULD APPLY. THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE WHOLE PROPOSAL BUT DID APPARENTLY ACCEPT THE PROVISION RELATING TO THE FIRST 5 YEARS.



... BUT DID APPARENTLY ACCEPT THE PROVISION RELATING TO THE FIRST 5 YEARS.

9. AT THIS POINT HOWEVER THE SOVIET SIDE MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WISHED TO CHANGE (UNDER THE GUISE OF CLARIFICATION) THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY RELATING TO THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN PERMITTED AND UNPERMITTED RESEARCH. THE EFFECT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RESTRICT SDI ACTIVITY TO WHAT COULD BE DONE WITHIN A LABORATORY (WHILE PERMITTING THE FULL RANGE OF ACTIVITY ON QUOTE TRADITIONAL UNQUOTE ABM COMPONENTS - SUCH AS THE SYSTEM ROUND MOSCOW). THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT AGREE TO A CRIPPLING OF THE SDI PROGRAMME IN THIS WAY. HE COULD NOT DENY HIMSELF OR FUTURE PRESIDENTS THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP THE MEANS OF DEFENCE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. BY INSISTING ON SUCH CHANGES, GORBACHEV WAS WALKING AWAY FROM POTENTIALLY HISTORIC AGREEMENTS, BUT COULD NOT BE PERSUADED.

10. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF CONCERN AMONG THE ALLIES ABOUT THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US HOWEVER WAS PREPARED TO FACE UP TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS, AND IT WOULD BE WRONG TO UNDERESTIMATE THE PRESIDENT'S OWN STRENGTH OF PURPOSE, AND HIS INSTINCTS FOR THE FUTURE AND THE CONCERNS OF YOUNG PEOPLE. CLEARLY THE US WOULD TAKE NO UNILATERAL STEPS, NOR WAS THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTICS MISSILES A PRACTICAL PROPOSITION WITHOUT THE FURTHER PARTICIPATION OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA.

11. IN SUMMARY SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE WOULD NO DOUBT BE CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE US FOR AGREEING TO A SUMMIT WITH INADEQUATE GUARANTEES ABOUT THE OUTCOME. BUT THE MEETING HAD NOT BEEN A FAILURE DESPITE THE LACK OF SPECTACULAR SUCCESS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN. THE US WOULD PRESS ON WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAKING PROGRESS BUILDING ON THE CREATIVE EFFORT AT REYKJAVIK. THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD THERE WOULD NOT DISAPPEAR.

12. ALL WHO SPOKE SUBSEQUENTLY EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND OF SECRETARY SHULTZ. THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION TO CRITICISE THE AMERICANS, AND AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS WRONG TO CHARACTERISE THE MEETING AS A FAILURE, AS MUCH OF THE PRESS HAD ALREADY DONE. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO LAY BLAME ON THE US SIDE, AND TO TRY TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE. EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE NEED TO FOLLOW-UP THE PROGRESS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN REYKJAVIK IN THE APPROPRIATE NEGOTIATING FORA.

13. SHULTZ MADE A NUMBER OF FURTHER POINTS IN ANSWER TO DETAILED QUESTIONS. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE RUSSIANS HAD REESTABLISHED A LINK BETWEEN INF AGREEMENT AND SDI, BUT THE US TEAM IN GENEVA WOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT INF QUOTE STOOD ALONE UNQUOTE. ON INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY SHULTZ SAID THE PROBLEM WAS LESS ONE OF DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS THAN OF A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE RADICAL CHANGE. THE 2 SIDES HAD NOT COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DETAILS OF ANY SRINF NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING AN LRINF AGREEMENT, SUCH AS THE RANGES TO BE INCLUDED ETC. THE US WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AS WELL, BUT BELIEVED STRONGLY THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED. NO DATE WAS SET FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AND SHULTZ PERSONALLY BELIEVED IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN 1986, EVEN THOUGH QUOTE HE NEVER SAID NEVER UNQUOTE. FINALLY BOTH HE AND THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT



WAS MOST UNLIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN 1986 EVEN THOUGH QUOTE HE NEVER SAID NEVER UNQUOTE. FINALLY BOTH HE AND THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT THE US AND ALLIED INTEREST WOULD BE SERVED BY BEING AS CANDID AS POSSIBLE IN PUBLIC ABOUT WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AT THE SUMMIT IN REYKJAVIK.

14. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

ALEXANDER

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REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: PRELIMINARY VIEW FROM MOSCOW

SUMMARY

1. GORBACHEV'S REYKJAVIK PRESS CONFERENCE CARRIED LIVE ON SOVIET TELEVISION BUT NO OFFICIAL COMMENT SO FAR.

2. GORBACHEV PUT AN UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH PRICE - SEVERE SDI CONSTRAINT - ON AGREEMENT IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL AREAS (AND HENCE ON AN EARLY SUMMIT) WHICH HE MUST HAVE KNOWN REAGAN WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO PAY. SDI AND THE US "MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" NOW SPOT-LIT AS SOLE OBSTACLES TO MAJOR AGREEMENTS WHICH APPARENT SOVIET CONCESSIONS HAVE IN THEORY MADE POSSIBLE. IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS PROBABLE PROPAGANDA THEME EFFECTIVE, GORBACHEV WILL HAVE TO SHOW WILLINGNESS TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE OPEN.

DETAIL

3. ALTHOUGH SOVIET TELEVISION CARRIED GORBACHEV'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON 12 OCTOBER LIVE, THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO OFFICIAL PUBLIC COMMENT AND THE LOGISTICS OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL MEDIA IN ANY CASE PRECLUDED THIS. THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ARE THEREFORE SPECULATIVE AND SUBJECT TO CORRECTION WHEN THE OFFICIAL LINE EMERGES, PERHAPS LATER TODAY (13 OCTOBER).

4. SEEN FROM MOSCOW, THE SURPRISES FROM REYKJAVIK ARE THAT GORBACHEV WAS APPARENTLY PREPARED TO CONCEDE SO MUCH IN EVERY ARMS CONTROL AREA EXCEPT THE SDI; BUT THAT HE SET SUCH A HIGH PRICE, NAMELY THE VIRTUAL FREEZING OF THE SDI, ON THE TRANSLATION OF CONCESSIONS INTO AGREEMENTS AND CONSEQUENTLY ON HIS READINESS TO ATTEND A FULLSCALE SUMMIT IN THE US. GORBACHEV MUST HAVE KNOWN THAT HIS CHANCES OF PRESSURING REAGAN INTO BACKING AWAY FROM THE SDI IN REYKJAVIK WERE MINIMAL. BUT, ALTHOUGH (AS WE HAVE REPORTED) THE SDI HAS NOT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA, SUCCESS IN CONSTRAINING IT IS EVIDENTLY STILL THE CONDITION WHICH THE POLITBURO HAS SET UPON CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARDS STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE REDUCTIONS; AND THE CRITERION BY WHICH IT JUDGES A "PRODUCTIVE" SUMMIT ASSUMING THAT



CRITERION BY WHICH IT JUDGES A "PRODUCTIVE" SUMMIT. GORBACHEV WAS NOT AIMING SIMPLY AT PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE (HE MAY HAVE ACHIEVED THIS) THE CONCLUSION MUST BE THAT HE DOES NOT SEE HIMSELF AS UNDER COMPELLING PRESSURE (EG ECONOMIC) TO SECURE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS (OTHER THAN ON SDI) FOR THEIR OWN SAKE; AND /OR THAT - DESPITE THE SCEPTICISM OF SOME EMINENT SOVIET, AS US, SCIENTISTS - THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS STILL MORE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SDI THAT HAS LATELY BEEN APPARENT.

5. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP APPEARS, AT REYKJAVIK, TO HAVE THROWN VERY SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT INTO THE SCALES AGAINST THE SDI. THE BROAD PRINCIPLE OF ABMT OBSERVANCE FOR AT LEAST 10 YEARS NOW SEEMS TO BE ESTABLISHED (ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISION OF SDI DEPLOYMENT EVENT AFTER AN ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS LEAVES ROOM FOR CLARIFICATION). THE OFFER OF DEEP, IE 50%, CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS REMAINS ON THE TABLE, APPARENTLY COMBINED WITH SOME SOVIET MOVEMENT ON SUB-CEILINGS. AN AGREEMENT ON INF INVOLVING NO THIRD-COUNTRY CONSTRAINTS APPEARS TO BE ON OFFER (WHATEVER RESERVATIONS WE - AND PERHAPS THE JAPANESE - MAY HAVE ON A EUROPEAN ZERO-OPTION). THERE WAS EVIDENTLY SOME MOVEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTING. THE SDI SUDDENLY LOOKS - AS GORBACHEV EVIDENTLY INTENDS IT TO - VERY EXPENSIVE AND NOT SIMPLY IN TERMS OF DOLLARS.

6. THE APPARENT EXTENT OF SOVIET MOVEMENT ON NON-SDI ISSUES, AND GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC COMMITMENT NOT TO WITHDRAW HIS PROPOSALS, MAKES IT UNLIKELY, IN MY VIEW, THAT HE WENT TO REYKJAVIK SIMPLY IN ORDER TO SET REAGAN UP, IN PROPAGANDA TERMS. HE MAY HAVE BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST A SLENDER CHANCE OF SCOOPING THE POOL AND LAYING THE BASIS FOR WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN, FOR HIM, A TRIUMPHANT SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON. IF, AS WAS MORE PROBABLE, HE FAILED TO BRING THIS OFF HE WOULD AT LEAST HAVE CAPTURED THE PROPAGANDA HIGH GROUND AND PUT THE US "MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX" IN THE DOCK. THIS GAME-PLAN MUST, I THINK, HAVE BEEN ENDORSED BY THE POLITBURO BEFORE GORBACHEV LEFT FOR REYKJAVIK AND POSSIBLY EVEN BEFORE HE PROPOSED THE MEETING. I DO NOT, THEREFORE, SEE REYKJAVIK'S NEGATIVE OUTCOME AS LIKELY TO DAMAGE GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL STANDING WHERE IT MATTERS. HIS PUBLIC IMAGE IN THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, MAY BE SOMEWHAT TARNISHED - AT LEAST IN THE SHORT-TERM - BY THE FACT THAT HE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS SECOND MEETING WITH REAGAN EMPTY-HANDED, DESPITE HIS SELF-PROCLAIMED CONCESSIONS. THIS COULD REINFORCE GRASS-ROOTS VIEWS THAT IN DEALING WITH THE AMERICANS IT DOES NOT PAY TO BE REASONABLE OR TO TURN THE OTHER CHEEK.

7. IF GORBACHEV DOES LOSE ANY GROUND AT HOME IN THIS WAY, HOWEVER, I WOULD EXPECT HIM TO RECAPTURE IT QUICKLY WITH AN ENERGETIC PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DESIGNED BOTH TO REINFORCE THE SOVIET UNION'S IMAGE AS THE LEADING FORCE FOR PEACE, AND FOR FREEDOM FROM NUCLEAR TERROR ON EARTH OR IN SPACE, AND TO MOBILIZE WESTERN OPINION AGAINST THE SDI AS, APPARENTLY, THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO THE GREATEST BREAKTHROUGH IN ARMS CONTROL FOR DECADES (THIS WILL DOUBTLESS BE KARPOV'S MAIN OBJECTIVE IN LONDON, AND OTHER SOVIET EMISSARIES TO OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS). SUCH A CAMPAIGN WILL HAVE TO BE MATCHED BY A CONTINUING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TALK AT GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE; IT WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING FOR GORBACHEV NOW TO PUT UP THE SHUTTERS ON EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. IN THE LONG TERM, REYKJAVIK MAY PROVE TO HAVE BEEN VALUABLE.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 5666

NNNN



SECRET

DEDIP

FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 130800Z F C O

TELNO 2617

OF 130250Z OCTOBER 86

AND TO DESKBY 130700Z UKDEL NATO

INFO DESKBY 130400Z PEKING

PEKING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SECRETARY OF STATE

MY TELNOS 2613/6 : REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

1. BEFORE TOMORROW'S NAC DISCUSSION WITH SHULTZ MR RENTON MIGHT WELCOME SOME PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THESE TEXTS. THE FOLLOWING IS ONLY AN IN-HOUSE ASSESSMENT, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY ARE NOW EN ROUTE HOME: ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE OFFERING NO COMMENT WHATSOEVER, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE: AND ALL CONCERNED ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN TIGHTLIPPED UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S TELEVISED ADDRESS TO THE NATION, AT 140001Z.

2. BUT SOME CONCLUSIONS SEEM INESCAPABLE, VIZ :-

A) THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS IS A SET-BACK FOR THE PRESIDENT, IF ONLY BECAUSE THERE IS NOW NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT HERE ON WHICH HE HAD SET SUCH STORE.

B) THE RUSSIANS CHOSE TO PRESS HARDEST IN THE AREA IN WHICH HE WAS KNOWN TO BE LEAST WILLING TO GIVE GROUND, I.E. TIGHTER SDI CONSTRAINTS.

C) THE PRESIDENT OFFERED TO EXTEND THE ABM TREATY FOR 10 YEARS (CF HIS JULY OFFER OF SEVEN AND A HALF, AND THE GORBACHEV SEPTEMBER COUNTER-PROPOSAL OF QUOTE UP TO 15 UNQUOTE YEARS), BUT HE COULD NOT SWALLOW SOVIET INSISTENCE ON ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR SUPER-RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF PERMISSIBLE SDI TESTING.

D) AN OUTLINE INF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, OR HEADS OF AGREEMENT, WAS OBTAINABLE: BUT GORBACHEV MADE IT CONDITIONAL ON US CONCESSIONS ON SDI CONSTRAINTS, A LINKAGE THAT WAS ORIGINALLY PART OF THEIR GENEVA NST POSITION, BUT HAD BEEN DROPPED LONG SINCE.

E) IN AN (APPARENTLY FAIRLY FULL) DISCUSSION OF START NUMBERS - WITH THE SOVIET SIDE REVERTING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS (CF THE PRESIDENT'S JULY OFFER OF 30 PERCENT) - THE PRESIDENT'S DREAM OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD SURFACED IN THE FORM OF A US PROPOSAL FOR 100 PERCENT REDUCTIONS, WITHIN 10 YEARS, IN SOME STRATEGIC SYSTEMS (QUERY OR ALL SUCH SYSTEMS: SEE SHULTZ'S REMARKS IN MY TELNO 2615), POSSIBLY EXTENDING ALSO TO INF/SRNF (SEE REGAN'S REMARKS, IN MY TELNO 2616). GORBACHEV - PERHAPS FORTUNATELY - LINKED ACCEPTANCE EVEN OF THIS TO THE SDI CONSTRAINTS WHICH THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BUY.

F) THE GENEVA PROCESS IS AS A RESULT LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY STALLED.



3. ALL THIS GIVES GROUND FOR SERIOUS CONCERN, WHICH WILL NO DOUBT EMERGE IN THE NAC DISCUSSION. IT LOOKS, AT FIRST SIGHT, AS IF GORBACHEV CHOSE TO PLAY FOR A BREAK-DOWN ON THE GROUND WHICH IS MOST LIKELY TO BE DISRUPTIVE OF NATO. GIVEN EUROPEAN DOUBTS ABOUT SDI, THERE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE MILEAGE IN A SOVIET PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE ON THE THEME THAT DEALS CAN BE STRUCK ACROSS THE BOARD IF ONLY THE PRESIDENT WOULD DROP HIS DESTABILIZING SDI PROGRAMME. AND THE APPARENT TRANSLATION OF THE IDEAL OF AN EVENTUAL NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD INTO A CONCRETE MEDIUM-TERM OFFER, WITH NO ADVANCE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION, IS BOUND TO CAUSE CONSIDERABLE DISQUIET.

4. A POSSIBLE THEME FOR MR RENTON IN THE NAC DISCUSSION MIGHT THEREFORE BE THAT:-

- A) THE SOVIET AIM CLEARLY IS TO SOW DISSENSION IN THE ALLIANCE. THEY MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUCCEED.
- B) IF AN ACCEPTABLE INF DEAL (QUERY AND PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR TEST VERIFICATION) IS OBTAINABLE, IT WOULD BE QUITE WRONG FOR THE RUSSIANS TO RECREATE THE ILLOGICAL LINK TO SPACE-DEFENCE ISSUES WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY DROPPED.
- C) IF THE RUSSIANS NOW WALK AWAY FROM THE GENEVA NEGOTIATING TABLE, OR REFUSE TO DO SERIOUS BUSINESS THERE, THAT WOULD BE VERY REGRETTABLE. BUT THEY WOULD HAVE NO-ONE BUT THEMSELVES TO BLAME. THE ALLIANCE WANTS TO DO BUSINESS.

5. A PARTICULARLY WORRYING ASPECT OF THE BREAKDOWN IN REYKJAVIK IS THAT THERE MUST NOW BE A STRONG CHANCE OF THE PRESIDENT PAINTING HIMSELF FURTHER INTO THE SDI CORNER. HIS KEFLAVIK STATEMENT, AND THE SHULTZ AND REGAN REMARKS, SHOW THAT THIS PROCESS HAS ALREADY STARTED: IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN FAILURE TO AGREE ON ANYTHING, HE HAS TO PLAY UP SDI, AND HOW DAMAGING REAL CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE. THE PROCESS IS LIKELY TO BE TAKEN QUITE A LOT FURTHER IN HIS TELEVISED ADDRESS ON 13 OCTOBER. MR RENTON MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER WARNING SHULTZ, IN PLENARY SESSION OR IN THE CORRIDORS, THAT PROBLEMS OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT WILL NOT BE DIMINISHED BY OVERSELLING SDI, AND SUGGESTING THAT THE BEST PRESIDENTIAL PRESENTATION MIGHT BE ALONG THE LINES OF PARA 4 ABOVE.

6. WE OBVIOUSLY NEED AN EARLY AND AUTHORITATIVE US EXPLANATION OF THE NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD PROPOSAL (PARA 2E ABOVE). IF SHULTZ DOES NOT PROVIDE ONE TO THE NAC, WE SHALL CHASE HERE.

7. ADVANCE COPIES TO PS/PUS, GOODALL, PAKENHAM AND POWELL (NO 10).

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 2617

NNNN



(20)

MR TIM RENTON ON WORLD AT ONE, MONDAY 13 OCTOBER 1986

Q. What is your reaction to the failure of the Summit?

A. I don't agree with your description that it ended in failure, at all. I think it would have been a failure for President Reagan not to try. Obviously the Western World and we in the United Kingdom would like to have seen a positive result, but what I think is surprising is that President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev did get so far in discussing so many important details. A lot of serious proposals have emerged notably about the reduction in strategic missiles and the possible elimination of all the medium range missiles. I hope that these thoughts, this material that has been brought to the surface will now be worked on and developed when negotiations resume in Geneva and I trust that will be very soon.

Q. What was the mood and tone of the meeting of the Allies with Mr Shultz this morning?

A. First, very great thanks to Mr Shultz for coming so quickly from Iceland to brief us all. He spent nearly three hours with us explaining the detail of what had happened in Iceland and then answering questions. Second, an absolute determination to build on the substantive ideas that emerged from Iceland to see that the momentum is kept up because this is an extremely long and laborious road. The prize in sight is very great indeed but the detail is very difficult and what we have all got to do now is to work even more on the detail to ensure that we win the prize.

Q. What is the answer to the allegations here in Europe that a deal on Euro missiles which would have been of immense benefit to Western Europe has been thrown out of the window because President Reagan insists upon pursuing the SDI which very few people in Europe believe in?

A. That's a bit upside-down frankly. The Russians agreed at a previous Summit that a deal on intermediate weapons that are the medium-range weapons could and should be negotiated without



reference to a further or other deal on strategic weapons and space defence with which they are connected. The intermediate weapons deal may well have been in sight but the Russians unfortunately went back on this previous agreement of theirs. They have moved the goal post and they have now said that there couldn't be an intermediate weapons deal without also a deal on strategic and space defence at the same time. That is what we have got to go on arguing about in Geneva to see that the Russians go back to their previous position. It is frankly quite illogical to connect these issues.



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1986

CDP  
13/10

Dear Charles,

Reykjavik Summit

As I believe you know, we have had a couple of additional thoughts about points which the Prime Minister could usefully make to the President. I enclose an amended version of the note I sent across earlier today, with the additional passages underlined.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing St

SECRET



DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DS2ABD

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

President Reagan

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

## PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

I have read the first reports from Iceland, including your own statement, and look forward to hearing what George Shultz has to tell us today in Brussels. But I thought you might find an initial reaction helpful.

First, I want to congratulate you on getting so close to a new range of agreements. You spoke yesterday of the great strides you had made in resolving most of the differences.)

I know that the final outcome of Reykjavik will therefore have been a disappointment to you, and one I fully share. For the moment you have been denied an historic achievement, by a combination of Soviet inflexibility and their error in over-playing their hand.

Enclosures flag(s) .....

I do understand the sense of frustration you must feel at Soviet tactics, in trying to paint you into a corner over the SDI. On this, I continue to see the research programme, as we have always agreed, as permissible and



justifiable. I strongly welcome what you have said about it continuing within the terms of the ABM Treaty. I do feel, as I have suggested before, that there is some room for further discussion, perhaps at the technical level, about the precise ways in which this work on both sides is to continue.

That said, the most important thing now is that in the immediate aftermath of this set-back we should not burn our boats, nor let Gorbachev burn his. Of course he will try to split the Allies on the issue of the SDI, and to demolish the European support which you have always enjoyed in the past for your own positions at Geneva. It is absolutely crucial, in my mind, that he should not succeed in this. Equally, he must be prevented from being carried away by his own rhetoric, and breaking off the negotiations.

For that reason I was glad to hear you say that for your part you will continue your effort to reach agreements. I hope we can keep Western eyes firmly fixed on this, the proper target. Far from letting the chances of such agreements become more difficult in future, we should use your Reykjavik meeting as evidence of the real progress that can be made, once artificial obstacles are cleared away.

I heard George Shultz speak of agreements of potentially great significance and of progress in humanitarian and regional issues. This encouraged me to see the Reykjavik



outline in a more positive spirit. I am sure that is the right approach. And I am confident that in your own comments later today you will, as always, put the emphasis on the positive.

As for the details of your discussions, the Russians are sending Karpov to see me tomorrow. You can be sure he will not get an easy ride in London! I will press him hard to explain the Soviet position, and the step backward they appear to have taken. I find it almost incredible that, after agreeing last November that there could be a separate INF Agreement - and formally confirming that in January - that Gorbachev should now be making everything dependent on the Russians getting their way on SDI. Apart from pursuing the details of the SDI exchanges, I shall be particularly interested to hear what you and Gorbachev had to say on eliminating strategic forces.

I must tell you frankly that the first reports of a prospective agreement to eliminate all long-range nuclear missiles within ten years caused me considerable concern. I do not want to give you a considered view until I have had a chance to think about the details. But I very much hope that in immediate comments your Administration will not become committed to an outcome <sup>in</sup> consistent with the strategy of the Alliance since its inception. This could cause even more difficulties for Western unity than the fuss to be expected over the SDI.

As we have often discussed in the past, my own view is that nuclear deterrence must remain part of our strategic existence for the foreseeable future. Of course the level of nuclear arms can and should come down. But a nuclear-free world within a decade (which some of the reports from Reykjavik seemed to suggest as the aim) is quite a different matter.

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It is of great importance that any statements about the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons should not commit us to a precise time-scale. I hope there will be proper time for reflection and consultation with your Allies about all this before firm decisions are taken.

I must mention one other point. I recognise that you will shortly be facing some tough decisions on modernising your strategic forces. When we exchanged views on the subject in May, I urged you to continue your policy of interim restraint. I must repeat that advice now. Nothing could be more damaging to the cause of Western unity, or to your leadership of the free world than a decision in the next few weeks, for whatever reason, that deliberately breached the previously observed force limits.

I started this note with a sense of disappointment. But I finish it with a sense of encouragement. If we all stick together; if we do not allow Gorbachev and others in the Soviet Union and elsewhere to break our nerve and our determination; if we continue to pursue arms control along the lines we have discussed in the past; I remain confident that within the next few months we shall be able to move once more towards the sort of results which you and I are both so eager to see.



SECRET

file SKW 26

meeting record

SUBJECT CC MASTER



self C  
blind copy J O Kerr  
(HM Embassy Washington)

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

13 October 1986

From the Private Secretary

Dear Col.

**PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN**

President Reagan telephoned the Prime Minister this evening to discuss the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting.

The President said that he and Mr. Gorbachev had discussed the whole range of current issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, including human rights, regional problems and bilateral issues. But Gorbachev had made no secret of his desire to focus as much as possible on arms control. The first day's sessions had been largely fruitless ("we went on hassling all day with no takers"). But he and Gorbachev had agreed to turn over their notes to officials, to see whether any agreements could be defined.

Amplifying this general picture, the President said that INF had appeared not to present major difficulties. He had made clear that the United States could not accept the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations and Gorbachev had come to accept this. The President stressed that he had also insisted that limits on INF must apply globally.

The President continued that the major difficulty had arisen over SDI. He had made clear to Gorbachev from the outset that the United States was going to proceed with permitted research under the terms of the ABM Treaty. He acknowledged that there were differences of interpretation about what was and was not permitted by the Treaty. He had himself spoken to those who had taken part in negotiation of the Treaty. They had assured him that research and testing were allowed. He had pointed out to Gorbachev that the Soviet Union was not well placed to talk of the ABM Treaty as though it were the Ten Commandments since it was clearly acting in breach of the Treaty's provisions over Krasnoyarsk. Gorbachev had not attempted to rebut this.

The President said that, in recognition of Soviet concerns, he had put forward a radical proposal under which

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the United States would guarantee not to deploy a strategic defence system for ten years in return for an undertaking to eliminate all US and Soviet nuclear weapons over that same period. He had also offered a binding commitment to share a defence system with the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev seemed to doubt whether the United States would in the event live up to this. He had continued to demand unacceptable restrictions on SDI research and testing, tighter even than the present ABM Treaty required, and had allowed this demand to stand in the way of an agreement which would effectively have abolished nuclear weapons. The President added that he had made quite clear in advance of the Reykjavik meeting that he would not be prepared to renounce the SDI.

The Prime Minister said that she thought that the President had performed marvellously at Reykjavik. It was important to demonstrate clearly to public opinion in the West that the Soviet Union had been responsible for the deadlock by making agreement on any aspect of arms control dependent on acceptance of their conditions on SDI. This had been a major step backwards, reverting to a position which pre-dated the Geneva Summit. Indeed she was now inclined to wonder whether they had not deliberately set up the meeting in order to engineer a breakdown over strategic defence, in the hope that this would divide Europe from the United States. She had been gratified to hear that Secretary Shultz's briefing of NATO had been well received and that Alliance solidarity was being maintained. She hoped that the President would stress in his address to the American people the United States' willingness to continue negotiations on the areas where progress had been registered at Reykjavik. This would put the Soviet Union on the spot. If they turned their back on further discussions, they would have only themselves to blame.

The Prime Minister continued that the President's proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years caused her considerable concern. Given the great imbalance in conventional forces in Europe in the Soviet Union's favour, nuclear weapons would remain essential to our defence. It would be unsettling to opinion in Europe to speculate on the possibility of getting rid of nuclear weapons within a relatively short time-scale. She hoped that the President would not emphasise this aspect. The proposal which he had described would need careful examination within NATO. The President acknowledged the Prime Minister's concern but commented that the United States believed that the problem of the conventional imbalance could be managed. He thought that a strategy could be devised to meet the challenge. The Prime Minister repeated her view that it was important not to undermine public support for nuclear weapons as an essential element in the West's defences.

The Prime Minister said that she would welcome a fuller talk with the President soon. She understood that their officials were discussing a possible meeting on 15 November, which would allow them both to go over these issues in some detail. The President said that he had told his people that



SECRET

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he very much wanted such a meeting.

This record is particularly sensitive and should be given only a very limited distribution.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely,*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "C. D. Powell". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the closing "Yours sincerely,".

(C. D. POWELL)

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO MAKE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

1. Congratulations on your bold and resolute performance throughout what must have been very demanding meetings with Gorbachev.
2. Impressed by the amount of progress you did make towards agreement on INF, START and in other areas. I know that George Shultz is giving a full account to NATO today. I look forward to hearing details.
3. I share your disappointment that it was not possible to reach agreed conclusions. But you did all you could. No doubt at all in my mind that the blame for the deadlock rests with the Soviet Union. By making everything depend upon your accepting their demands on SDI in full, they condemned the meeting to failure. I shall make clear to Gorbachev's emissary, whom I am seeing tomorrow, that this is my view.
4. How you present the outcome in your television address will be very important in handling this issue in Europe. It is clearly the Soviet aim to sow dissension in the Alliance. We must not let them succeed. But there is a risk that some of the weaker brethren will fall for the Soviet line that you were being unreasonable, and that only the SDI is blocking agreement.
5. I hope therefore you will be able to emphasise the following points:
  - (a) the fact that the Soviet Union wanted to make agreement on everything turn on acceptance of their terms on SDI;
  - (b) the extent to which this was a reversal of their earlier position that separate agreements would be possible, at least on INF;

CONFIDENTIAL



- (c) the doubt which this all or nothing approach casts on their commitment to a successful outcome at Reykjavik;
  - (d) the reasonableness of the offer you made to extend the period of notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to 10 years. This would give the Russians plenty of reassurance that there would be no sudden break-out to deployment of the SDI;
  - (e) the blatant way in which the Soviet Union is trying to make propaganda out of this and divide the European allies from the US;
  - (f) your readiness to continue talking on all the issues which were raised at Reykjavik, all of which are important in their own right. If the Russians want to walk away from further discussions, they have no-one to blame but themselves.
6. The only point which has seriously worried me is your reference to eliminating all nuclear weapons within ten years. This of course would have very far-reaching implications for the Alliance's strategy based on nuclear deterrence, and would make my political position here very difficult. I hope that you will not stress this idea in your address on television.
7. I think emphasis on these points rather than on the arguments for pursuing the SDI itself would help get your case across in Europe and hold the Alliance together.
8. I understand our people are discussing the possibility of my coming over to have a talk with you on the morning of 15 November. I hope we can go firm on this.

DG2BKU



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1986

See 27

over taken

CD  
13/10

Dear Charles,

Reykjavik Summit

/ I enclose a draft text for use with the President. It is designed to encourage him to continue his efforts to reach concrete agreements over the next few months; to avoid going so far in his public statements about the SDI that he makes that possibility more difficult; to register concern about the reported US offer on eliminating all nuclear weapons; to inject the need to stick to SALT constraints, which will now become politically live again; to underline the importance of maintaining Allied unity; and to deny Gorbachev the easy propaganda points for which he may now be looking, both in this country and elsewhere.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
No 10 Downing St

SECRET



DSR (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DS 2ABD

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

President Reagan

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

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I know that the final outcome of Reykjavik will therefore have been a disappointment to you, and one I fully share. For the moment you have been denied an historic achievement, by a combination of Soviet inflexibility and their error in over-playing their hand.

Enclosures flag(s) .....

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justifiable. I strongly welcome what you have said about it continuing within the terms of the ABM Treaty. I do feel, as I have suggested before, that there is some room for further discussion, perhaps at the technical level, about the precise ways in which this work on both sides is to continue.

That said, the most important thing now is that in the immediate aftermath of this set-back we should not burn our boats, nor let Gorbachev burn his. Of course he will try to split the Allies on the issue of the SDI, and to demolish the European support which you have always enjoyed in the past for your own positions at Geneva. It is absolutely crucial, in my mind, that he should not succeed in this. Equally, he must be prevented from being carried away by his own rhetoric, and breaking off the negotiations.

For that reason I was glad to hear you say that for your part you will continue your effort to reach agreements. I hope we can keep Western eyes firmly fixed on this, the proper target. Far from letting the chances of such agreements become more difficult in future, we should use your Reykjavik meeting as evidence of the real progress that can be made, once artificial obstacles are cleared away.

I heard George Shultz speak of agreements of potentially great significance and of progress in humanitarian and regional issues. This encouraged me to see the Reykjavik



outline in a more positive spirit. I am sure that is the right approach. And I am confident that in your own comments later today you will, as always, put the emphasis on the positive.

As for the details of your discussions, the Russians are sending Karpov to see me tomorrow. You can be sure he will not get an easy ride in London! I will press him hard to explain the Soviet position, [ Apart from pursuing the details of the SDI exchanges, I shall be particularly interested to hear what you and Gorbachev had to say on eliminating strategic forces.

and the step backward they appear to have taken.

I must tell you frankly that the first reports of a prospective agreement to eliminate all long-range nuclear missiles within ten years caused me considerable concern. I do not want to give you a considered view until I have had a chance to think about the details. But I very much hope that in immediate comments your Administration will not become committed to an outcome inconsistent with the strategy of the Alliance since its inception. This could cause even more difficulties for Western unity than the fuss to be expected over the SDI.

As we have often discussed in the past, my own view is that nuclear deterrence must remain part of our strategic existence for the foreseeable future. Of course the level of nuclear arms can and should come down. But a nuclear-free world within a decade (which some of the reports from Reykjavik seemed to suggest as the aim) is




quite a different matter. We have to tread with the greatest care in this area. I hope there will be proper time for reflection and consultation with your Allies, before the United States is committed to such a far-reaching and novel position.

I must mention one other point. I recognise that you will shortly be facing some tough decisions on modernising your strategic forces. When we exchanged views on the subject in May, I urged you to continue your policy of interim restraint. I must repeat that advice now. Nothing could be more damaging to the cause of Western unity, or to your leadership of the free world than a decision in the next few weeks, for whatever reason, that deliberately breached the previously observed force limits.

I started this note with a sense of disappointment. But I finish it with a sense of encouragement. If we all stick together; if we do not allow Gorbachev and others in the Soviet Union and elsewhere to break our nerve and our determination; if we continue to pursue arms control along the lines we have discussed in the past; I remain confident that within the next few months we shall be able to move once more towards the sort of results which you and I are both so eager to see.







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DG28NS



cc: P.C.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

13 October 1986

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

I enclose a note with points which the No. 10 spokesman will use with the press this morning in commenting on the outcome of the US/Soviet Summit in Reykjavik. The Prime Minister particularly wishes to stress the point that the Soviet Union took a considerable step backwards in making agreement on all other issues dependent upon acceptance of their demands on the Strategic Defence Initiative. If this was their intention in going to Reykjavik, it was clearly designed to bring about the failure of the meeting and they must take the blame for that. She proposes to make this point to Mr. Karpov tomorrow.

The Prime Minister intends to try to speak to President Reagan on the telephone later today to try to influence what he says in his television broadcast on the outcome of the Summit. As I told you earlier this morning, it would be helpful to have a short note which could be the basis for her to speak to the President or, failing that, to send as a message. Could this please reach me by lunchtime today.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Charles Powell

Colin Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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5



## US/SOVIET SUMMIT

Points for No. 10 spokesmen to make.

1. Considered reaction must await briefing by Secretary Shultz in North Atlantic Council and bilateral contacts. The Prime Minister will be seeing an emissary from Mr. Gorbachev tomorrow.
2. What is surprising is not that President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed to reach complete agreement, but that they appear to have been able to make so much progress. Reykjavik was never billed as a meeting where agreements would be reached.
3. That they were able to make substantial progress is the result of the firmness and unity of the Alliance. It is important that this should be maintained in the present situation. The Russian aim is clearly to sow dissension in the Alliance.
4. It is disappointing that the Russians have not agreed a date for a further Summit. But they have not ruled one out.
5. The task now will be to see whether it is possible to build on what has been achieved. It would be highly irresponsible of the Soviet Union to walk away from talks and from continuing discussions on the issues on which agreement appears to be close.
6. We regard it as a step backward by the Russians to make agreement on all other issues dependent upon acceptance of their demands on SDI. At the Geneva Summit they accepted that an INF agreement could be separate.
7. The Government's position on the SDI remains one of support for SDI research within the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Americans cannot be expected to renounce pursuit of strategic defence.



8. The result of the Reykjavik meeting does not affect either way the likelihood of the Prime Minister paying visits to Washington and Mosocw in due course.



PRIME MINISTER

US SOVIET SUMMIT

has seen  
EDP  
13/4

I attach some telegrams from Washington.

We need line for Bernard to start to use with the press. I attach a draft of some points we could make.

I think there is a strong case for you, during the day, to telephone President Reagan. My worry is that he will use his television appearance this evening to point himself further into the corner on SDI, rather than by emphasising the extent of agreement reached on other arms control issues and the need to press ahead with negotiations on them. Alternatively we could do a very quick message (or both).

Agree?

EDP

CHARLES POWELL

13 October 1986

VC2AMN



## US/SOVIET SUMMIT

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6. We regard it as a step backward by the Russians to make agreement on all other issues dependent upon acceptance of their demands on SDI.
7. The Government's position on the SDI remains one of support for SDI research within the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Americans cannot be expected to renounce pursuit of strategic defence.



8. We shall wait with interest to see whether the Opposition adopt their usual knee-jerk reaction of blaming the Americans.

9. The result of the Reykjavik meeting does not affect either way the likelihood of the Prime Minister paying visits to Washington and Mosocw in due course.



PRIME MINISTER

see  
CDP 12/x

US - SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK

I was telephoned shortly after 1600 today to be given a report on the state of play in the Reykjavik meeting, strictly for your personal information. This was before the additional session of the talks which is now in progress. The essence was that a "tentative deal" was being discussed on INF which would involve zero-zero in Europe with 100 medium range weapons in Asia and 100 in the United States. Short range systems would be frozen and there would be follow-on negotiations about them. The Soviet Union would not seek any concession for French and British systems: indeed they would be left out of account altogether. This deal would be part of a package which would also cover START and other areas. Teams would be set up to work out detailed arrangements which would be incorporated in the form of a treaty or some other agreement which would be signed at a subsequent meeting. It was stressed more than once that this was still all tentative. My impression is that the Americans fear that there will be some sort of leak and wanted to be sure that we heard first from them of the way negotiations are going.

C. D. POWELL

12 October 1986



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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

12 October 1986

**US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK**

This is to confirm my conversation with the Resident Clerk over the weekend in which I said that the Prime Minister would be willing to receive Mr. Karpov on Tuesday 14 October at 0915. She would prefer Mr. Karpov to come with the Soviet Ambassador and an interpreter (if necessary) only.

I should also be grateful for the appropriate briefing, by Monday evening.

C. D. POWELL

C. R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth office.



Phoned CDP 12/10.

PRIME MINISTER

REYKJAVIK MEETING

The Russians have been in touch to say that Mr Gorbachev wants to send a personal emissary to London to brief you (and others) on the outcome of the Reykjavik meeting. The emissary will be Karpov, who is the chief Soviet negotiator at Geneva. He would come on Tuesday 14 October.

I think you should agree to see Karpov, who could subsequently also brief FCO Ministers and officials. There might be some slight presentational awkwardness vis-a-vis the Americans who are not - or not yet - sending personal emissaries, although George Shultz will brief a meeting of NATO Ministers, and there will no doubt be messages. I think this is manageable, but have warned the Americans of the Soviet offer in case they want to adjust their plans.

Tuesday is a bad day in the diary but I think it is important enough to find half an hour. - *it's much longer than that*

Agree to see Mr Karpov?

*Yes*

Charles Powell  
12 October 1986



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M I P T: REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING  
SUMMARY

1. IN A CONFIDENT AND ELOQUENT PERFORMANCE, GORBACHEV CONFIRMED SCHULTZ' REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETING IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. HE SET OUT THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SOVIET PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL, EMPHASIZING SOVIET INITIATIVE AND CONCESSIONS, AND SAID REAGAN'S POSITION ON SDI RESEARCH COULD NOT IN SANITY BE ACCEPTED. HE LEFT HIS PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE AND CALLED FOR A PERIOD OF REFLECTION.

DETAIL

2. GORBACHEV BEGAN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE BY UNDERLINING SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN AT GENEVA, INSTANCING THE EXTENSION OF THE TEST MORATORIUM, THE PROPOSALS FOR ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE END OF THE CENTURY AND REDUCING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE. BUT THE HOPES FOR PROGRESS AFTER THE FIRST SUMMIT HAD NOT BEEN SUSTAINED. THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS HAD REACHED AN IMPASSE. THE US HAD FAILED TO APPRECIATE GROWING WORLD CONCERN OVER THE DANGERS OF A NEW ARMS RACE. THE SOVIET MOTIVE IN PROPOSING THE REYKJAVIK MEETING HAD BEEN TO CHANGE THIS COURSE OF EVENTS BY GIVING A NEW IMPULSE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THE SOVIET UNION HAD COME TO THE MEETING WITH MAJOR PROPOSALS WHICH COULD SOON HAVE AVERTED THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. HE HAD PROPOSED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THEY ISSUE BINDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THREE DRAFT AGREEMENTS FOR SIGNATURE IN WASHINGTON:

(1) AN IMMEDIATE 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS LEADING TO THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION BY THE END OF THE CENTURY, APPLYING EQUALLY TO LAND-BASED, SUBMARINE- AND AIRCRAFT - LAUNCHED MISSILES. IN THIS THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE SERIOUS CONCESSIONS OVER WHAT CONSTITUTED STRATEGIC ARMS. THE US HAD AGREED.

(2) ON INF, A RETURN TO THE PRESIDENT'S ZERO OPTION APPLICABLE TO EUROPE, A CEILING OF 100 SOVIET MISSILES IN ASIA AGAINST 100 US MISSILES ON AMERICAN SOIL AND A FREEZE ON SRINF FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS ON THEIR REMOVAL. THIS AGAIN HAD BEEN AGREED AND INVOLVED MAJOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS, INCLUDING DROPPING THEIR DEMAND FOR A BAN ON THE INCREASE OR MODERNISATION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES.

(3) FINALLY, IN RETURN FOR SUCH DEEP CUTS, THE SOVIET UNION, /SHOULD WHILE IN FAVOUR OF ASSURED VERIFICATION, REQUIRED THAT BOTH SIDES



SHOULD HAVE A GUARANTEE THAT THE OTHER WOULD NOT SEEK A MILITARY ADVANTAGE. THEY HAD THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THE ABM TREATY SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED: NEITHER SIDE WOULD WITHDRAW FOR 10 YEARS AND THE TREATY SHOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED WITH NO TESTING PERMITTED OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY.

4. GORBACHEV COMMENTED THAT AT THIS POINT THE REAL FIGHT BEGAN WITH REAGAN INSISTING ON RETAINING THE RIGHT TO CARRY ON SDI RESEARCH OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY AND EVEN IN SPACE. ONLY A MADMAN COULD HAVE ACCEPTED SUCH A PROPOSITION.

5. HE CONCLUDED THAT AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY HAD BEEN MISSED. HE NOW UNDERSTOOD THAT U S POLICY WAS GOVERNED BY THE WISHES OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT FREE TO TAKE THE DECISIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. HE GORBACHEV HAD NOT BEEN SETTING CONDITIONS FOR A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, BUT EXPRESSING THE NEED FOR IT TO ACHIEVE TANGIBLE RESULTS. FOR THE FUTURE IT WAS NECESSARY TO ACCEPT THE REALITIES, REFLECT ON THE SITUATION AS IT HAD EVOLVED AND TRY TO OVERCOME THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT WITHDRAW ITS PROPOSALS OR ABANDON THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. WORLD OPINION SHOULD MAKE ITSELF FELT. HE URGED THE OPENING OF DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON ENDING NUCLEAR TESTING.

CHAPMAN

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ARMS CONTROL TALKS



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MODUK (FOR DACU)

REYKJAVIK MEETING: NAC BRIEFING BY NITZE AND RIDGWAY: OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND EAST/WEST ISSUES

## SUMMARY

1. HUMAN RIGHTS WILL HEAD US AGENDA. BUT AMERICANS WILL ALSO RAISE CW, CTB, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND BILATERAL MATTERS.

## DETAIL

## HUMAN RIGHTS

2. RIDGWAY SAID THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WOULD BE ONE OF THE MAIN ISSUES AT REYKJAVIK. SINCE THE LAST SUMMIT, THE US HAD CONCENTRATED ON QUIET DIPLOMACY AND THE RUSSIANS HAD APPEARED WILLING TO MEET US CONCERNS. BUT THE PRESENT POSITION, PARTICULARLY REGARDING JEWISH EMIGRATION, WAS QUOTE DISMAL UNQUOTE, AND THE CLIMATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM QUOTE QUITE BAD UNQUOTE: IT HAD INDEED DETERIORATED SINCE GENEVA, RESULTING IN INCREASING AMERICAN CONCERN. THE DANILOFF AFFAIR HAD REMINDED AMERICANS THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES PERSISTED AS SOURCES OF MISTRUST AND TENSION. RIDGWAY EMPHASISED THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO HIGHLIGHT HUMAN RIGHTS: HE WAS PARTICULARLY EXERCISED OVER DIVIDED FAMILY CASES.

3. SMITH (CANADA) SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN SURPRISINGLY RELAXED IN OTTAWA OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. HE HAD EVEN SPOKEN OF THE PROSPECT OF MODIFYING SOVIET LAW TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. RIDGWAY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IN SOME RESPECTS THERE HAD BEEN CHANGES, BUT STRESSED THAT THE US WAS LOOKING FOR SUSTAINED LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENT.

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS

4. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE US PLANNED TO TOUCH ON CW ONLY BRIEFLY. US/SOVIET BILATERAL SESSIONS AT THE CD HAD REVEALED SOME SOVIET FLEXIBILITY. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION HAD YET TO BE RESOLVED. RIDGWAY ACKNOWLEDGED VARYING INTRA-ALLIANCE VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. BUT ALL ACCEPTED THE NEED FOR A STRONG VERIFICATION REGIME. I SAID THAT SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE LATEST UK PROPOSAL HAD BEEN RELATIVELY ENCOURAGING. DID THE US INTEND TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS FURTHER ON THIS? RIDGWAY DID NOT RESPOND.

5. ON CW PROLIFERATION, RIDGWAY SAID THERE WAS LIKELY TO BE A REVIEW OF THE TWO RECENT EXPERT MEETINGS. THE RUSSIANS NOW APPEARED TO RECOGNISE US CONCERN ON THIS ISSUE.

/NUCLEAR

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## NUCLEAR TESTING

6. RIDGWAY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, GIVEN GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE, IT WAS BOUND TO FEATURE. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT A CTB WAS NOT ON THE CARDS. THEY WERE NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGED BY THE TWO EXPERT MEETINGS HELD IN JULY AND SEPTEMBER. IN REYKJAVIK, THE US WOULD STRESS THEIR PRACTICAL, STEP-BY-STEP, APPROACH. PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO BE REALISTIC. RIDGWAY ADDED IN PARENTHESIS THAT A US TEAM WOULD SHORTLY VISIT NATO HQ AND CAPITALS TO BRIEF ON US TESTING POLICY. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE SEEKING ALLIES' VIEWS BEFORE IT LEFT ON HOW BEST TO PRESENT THE BRIEFING.

7. SEVERAL PERM REPS URGED PROGRESS ON TESTING. CURIEN (FRANCE) STRESSED FRENCH AGREEMENT WITH THE US POSITION ON CTB BUT WARNED THAT THE RATIFICATION OF PNET AND TTBT COULD PROVE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO FRANCE. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S UNGA SPEECH PROVIDED A REALISTIC BASIS FOR PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. WE HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PICK UP THE PROSPECT OF RATIFICATION OF THE OUTSTANDING TREATIES.

## REGIONAL/BILATERAL ISSUES

8. RIDGWAY SAID THAT, TIME PERMITTING, A NUMBER OF REGIONAL ISSUES - AFGHANISTAN, THE MIDDLE EST, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PARTICULAR - WERE LIKELY TO COME UP. THE RUSSIANS MIGHT SEEK TO PUBLICISE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL OF SIX REGIMENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN. BUT EVEN IF THIS PROVED GENUINE, IT WOULD NOT LIMIT SOVIET MILITARY ACTION. THE US CONTINUED TO INSIST ON THE PROMPT AND COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. MEANWHILE, THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF ACTIVITY ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS SINCE THE LAST SUMMIT. BUT THE TWO LEADERS WOULD PROBABLY DO NO MORE THAN NOTE PROGRESS.

ALEXANDER

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(Repetition to Reykjavik  
referred to a final decision,  
repeated as requested to other posts.)

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YOUR TELNO 177: REYKJAVIK MEETING: NAC BRIEFING BY NITZE AND  
RIDGWAY: NUCLEAR AND SPACE ISSUES

SUMMARY

1. NITZE REVIEWS CURRENT STATUS OF NST TALKS IN STANDARD TERMS. NO BREAKTHROUGH EXPECTED IN REYKJAVIK. US WILL TABLE INF VERIFICATION PACKAGE.

DETAIL

2. NITZE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS, INCLUDING THE EXPERTS' EXCHANGES IN AUGUST AND OCTOBER, IN STANDARD TERMS. ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONVERGENCE, VIEWS CONTINUED TO DIFFER ON THE PERMITTED LEVELS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUB-LIMITS, THE AGGREGATE COMPOSITION OF FORCES (ESPECIALLY THE SOVIET DESIRE TO INCLUDE SRAMS AND FREE FALL BOMBS), MOBILE MISSILES, VERIFICATION, THROW-WEIGHT, SLCMS, AND LINKAGE TO SPACE AND DEFENCE. ON INF, THE US HAD TABLED THEIR NEW PROPOSAL ON 18 SEPTEMBER, BUT NITZE HAD NO MORE TO REPORT. HE DID HOWEVER SAY, ON SRINF, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD INDICATED SOME INTEREST IN CONSTRAINTS ON THE SCALEBOARD BUT NOT THE SS-23. SUMMARISING THE POSITION ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, NITZE SAID THAT THE US HAD TOLD THE



POSITION ON DEFENCE AND SPACE, NITZE SAID THAT THE US HAD TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY, THEY WERE NOW READY TO SIGN A TREATY REQUIRING ANY SIDE WHICH WISHED TO DEPLOY A NEW DEFENSIVE SYSTEM AFTER 1991 TO OFFER A PLAN FOR SHARING THE BENEFITS OF SUCH A SYSTEM ON CONDITION THAT MEASURES WERE AGREED TO ELIMINATE BALLISTIC MISSILES. HE WAS FIRM THAT THE US SAW NO NEED FOR CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS TO THE ABM TREATY. THE TREATY AND NEGOTIATING RECORD WERE FULLY ADEQUATE.

4. MOST PERM REPS' INTERVENTIONS WERE DIRECTED AT INF. FULCI (ITALY) AND OLCAY (TURKEY) BOTH CONFIRMED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' SUPPORT FOR THE US GLOBAL APPROACH. THEY, TOGETHER WITH ZU RANTZAU (FRG), ALSO HOPED THAT AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO SR-INF NEGOTIATIONS.

5. I ASKED WHETHER THE US HAD YET REACHED A CLEAR POSITION ON VERIFICATION. IF SO, HAD THIS BEEN PUT TO THE RUSSIANS? NITZE CONFIRMED THAT WASHINGTON NOW HAD AN AGREED POSITION: THE US PROPOSED TO PRESENT THIS AT REYKJAVIK. SMITH (CANADA) ASKED WHETHER THE US SAW A NEED FOR A CHALLENGE INSPECTION MEASURE. NITZE SAID THAT THEIR MAIN CONCERN ON VERIFICATION CENTRED AROUND CONTINUING DATA EXCHANGE, INSPECTIONS TO RATIFY INITIAL DECLARATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION OF EXCESS WEAPONS AND COMPONENTS, AND CONTINUOUS ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF SPECIFIC SITES. HE BELIEVED THAT WHILE THE RUSSIANS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT INSPECTION TEAMS WHICH QUOTE ROAMED THE COUNTRY UNQUOTE, THEY MIGHT SEE SPECIFIC ON-SITE INSPECTION AS LESS OF A PROBLEM. GIVEN SUCH A REGIME, HE SAW NO NEED FOR A CHALLENGE INSPECTION MEASURE WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT, IN ANY CASE, ACCEPT.

6. ZU RANTZAU ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD AGREE THAT AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL A FINAL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. NITZE SAID THAT THEY DID NOT YET ACCEPT THIS.

7. CURIEN (FRANCE) CAUTIONED AGAINST UNDERESTIMATING THE RISKS INVOLVED IN REACHING AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT SEE THIS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS QUOTE DE-NUCLEARISATION UNQUOTE. THE PRINCIPLE OF GLOBALITY AND THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES NEEDED EMPHASIS. WHILE RECOGNISING THAT INF OFFERED THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR EARLY AGREEMENT, I ALSO STRESSED THAT EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES REMAINED A CONDITION FOR ALLIANCE ACCEPTANCE OF INF REDUCTIONS. NITZE ASSURED THE COUNCIL THAT THIS POSITION HAD BEEN MADE VERY CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DROP REFERENCES TO THIRD PARTY FORCES HAD BEEN ONE OF THE GREAT MOVES FORWARD.

ALEXANDER



US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM UKDEL NATO  
 TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
 TELNO 275  
 OF 091726Z OCTOBER  
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS  
 INFO PRIORITY UKDIS GENEVA IN NEW YORK, MODUK, OTHER NATO POSTS

SIC EME  
 MODUK (FOR DACU)

YOUR TELNO 177: REYKJAVIK: NAC BRIEFING BY NITZE AND RIDGWAY

## SUMMARY

1. US TEAM SEEK TO DAMPEN EXPECTATIONS OVER REYKJAVIK. NO BREAKTHROUGHS EXPECTED. STATED AIM TO PROVIDE IMPETUS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, LEADING TO FULL SUMMIT. NO SURPRISES ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ISSUES.

## DETAIL

2. NITZE AND RIDGWAY BRIEFED THE NAC THIS MORNING ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE QUOTE PRE-SUMMIT UNQUOTE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK, AND ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 4 OCTOBER DECISIONS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. MY FOUR BIFTS COVER THE DISCUSSION ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ISSUES, OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND EAST/WEST ISSUES, AND RIDGWAY'S STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

3. RIDGWAY AND NITZE SOUGHT TO DAMPEN EXPECTATIONS OF ANY BREAKTHROUGH AT REYKJAVIK, WHICH CONSTITUTED NO MORE THAN A MEETING TO PREPARE THE FULL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. THE US HOPED IT WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPETUS TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND IDENTIFY BROAD ISSUES FOR



AN IMPETUS TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND IDENTIFY BROAD ISSUES FOR FURTHER WORK. THE TWO MAIN ITEMS ON THE AGENDA WOULD BE ARMS CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS. BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN AN INTENSE DIALOGUE ON THESE ISSUES SINCE BESSMERTNYKH'S VISIT IN JULY, AND RIDGWAY HOPED THAT THIS WOULD PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR EXCHANGES IN REYKJAVIK.

4. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION, THE SECRETARY GENERAL POINTED OUT THAT THE WESTERN PRESS APPEARED TO HAVE EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS FOR REYKJAVIK. THEY WERE REPORTING RUSSIAN SUGGESTIONS THAT IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS THERE WOULD BE NO WASHINGTON SUMMIT. SMITH (CANADA) ADDED THAT GORBACHEV'S PRIVATE MESSAGE TO MULRONEY APPEARED TO CONFIRM THIS. RIDGWAY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RECENT PRESS REPORT ACCURATELY REFLECTED SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THESE MIGHT BE DESIGNED TO ALLOW GORBACHEV AN ESCAPE ROUTE IN CASE HE DECIDED NOT TO GO TO WASHINGTON, THE IMAGE BEING BUILT UP BEING THAT OF AN INTRANSIGENT US, CONCERNED TO KILL THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE. BUT SHE DID NOT BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS COULD BRING THIS OFF. MOREOVER, THE ATTRACTION FOR THEM OF A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW NEXT YEAR, THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, QUOTE MIGHT GET US THROUGH UNQUOTE.

5. ZU RANTZAU (FRG) ASKED IF THE ANTICIPATED IMPETUS FROM REYKJAVIK MIGHT LEAD TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS BEING GIVEN QUOTE MARCHING ORDERS UNQUOTE TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT BY THE FULL SUMMIT. NITZE REPLIED THAT IF THE RUSSIANS SHOWED FLEXIBILITY SUCH AN OUTCOME WAS POSSIBLE. BUT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF IT EVENTUATED.

6. THE NETHERLANDS PERM REP ASKED HOW THE MEETINGS AT REYKJAVIK WOULD BE STRUCTURED. RIDGWAY SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT MEETINGS SHOULD BE INFORMAL AND MOST WOULD PROBABLY BE ONE ON ONE. BUT EXPERTS MIGHT WELL DISCUSS THE MAIN ISSUES IN THE MARGINS OF PLENARIES WHICH WOULD THEMSELVES BE CONFINED TO VERY SMALL NUMBERS.

ALEXANDER

YYYY

UBLNAN 1025

NNNN




SECRET

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

9 October 1986

**US/SOVIET PRE-SUMMIT**

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan, which was delivered by the United States Embassy this morning about the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik. It contains a number of comments about the President's approach to the meeting and the areas on which he proposes to concentrate in his discussions with Mr. Gorbachev. The message has clearly crossed with that from the Prime Minister (as recognised in the last paragraph) but suggests nonetheless that the main points of concern to us will be covered in Reykjavik.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office). It should receive only a very limited distribution.

(C.D. POWELL)

R.N. Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office


SECRET

JB.



D10

ccpc



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

October 9, 1986

CDP  
9/11x

Dear Prime Minister:

Enclosed is a letter which the President <sup>(re Iceland)</sup> has asked that we deliver to you as soon as possible.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Charles H. Price, II".

Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosure: SECRET

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
Number 10 Downing Street,  
London, SW1.



SUBJECT  
cc ops  
master

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 184A/86

Prime Minister  
This crossed with your  
message. It is generally  
October 8, 1986  
reaffirming about the  
subjects to be discussed,  
but gives away little

Dear Margaret:

On the eve of my departure to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland, I wanted to share my thoughts on the discussions ahead. My objective in Reykjavik is to increase the likelihood that the coming summit in the United States will be productive. I expect our meetings to be private and businesslike. I do not anticipate any formal agreements. To enhance the atmosphere for serious dialogue, we have suggested a press blackout during the actual meetings.

on substance  
CDD  
9/x.

First, allow me to emphasize my continuing commitment to managing differences in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I plan to identify issues with reasonable prospects of solutions and hope to accelerate our efforts to resolve them. I will engage the Soviets in substantive discussion on all four parts of the agenda: human rights, arms reductions, regional issues, and bilateral matters.

Continuing Western solidarity is essential for achieving further progress. The consultation session in New York was very useful to me. I have asked Assistant Secretary Ridgway and Ambassador Nitze to meet with the North Atlantic Council on October 9. Secretary Shultz will brief the Council in Brussels on October 13, following the Reykjavik meeting.

The Daniloff affair demonstrated once again how basic differences over human rights and the freedom of the individual remain a serious barrier to improvements in East-West relations. In my view, the Soviets could implement human rights improvements at little or no cost to them. Among other areas, we need to see progress on Jewish emigration and divided families. I will make it clear to the General Secretary that progress on human rights is seriously lagging and hope that you will make this same point at every opportunity.

US Declassified

SECRET



SECRET

-2-

In the last few months, some progress has been made on arms control and I hope to build on this. As you may recall, my letter to General Secretary Gorbachev of July 25 spelled out my views on the relationship between strategic offense and defense. The U.S. seeks, as a matter of highest priority, significant and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive weapons, and we have also proposed a way to move to greater future reliance for deterrence on strategic defense, rather than offense. I outlined this approach publicly in my recent speech to the UN.

The Soviets recently have emphasized INF as an area for near-term progress. We have made some headway in INF, but several significant differences remain. My objective at Reykjavik is to test whether the Soviets are ready to work constructively toward our mutually-agreed goal of an interim INF agreement. I remain acutely aware of your special interests in this area.

The Soviets have, as well, emphasized the issue of nuclear testing. I will repeat to Gorbachev that the U.S. seeks a practical step-by-step process for limiting nuclear tests. The first step must be to achieve necessary improvements in the verification procedures of the existing threshold treaties, which will permit us to move forward on ratification. Progress is possible if Mr. Gorbachev does not insist on the "all or nothing" approach which has characterized his public posture thus far.

Regional issues will also be high on my agenda. I will stress that the tensions generated by Soviet expansionism undermine the basis for constructive steps in other areas. We seek a rapid, complete Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. We are also deeply concerned about the Soviet role in other regional conflicts, such as in Central America. Unless and until Soviet policies change, we will have to sustain our efforts to counter them. At the same time, I will assure Mr. Gorbachev that the U.S. is prepared for constructive joint steps on regional questions when Soviet policies permit.

SECRET



SECRET

-3-

Since last year's summit, there has been a good deal of activity in bilateral matters, such as cultural exchanges. We have expanded contacts among our young people, our educators, our artists, and our scientists. I plan to review this quiet but important aspect of our relations and to look for ways to expand these important activities.

The deep and abiding differences between the West and the Soviet Union will not be resolved at Reykjavik. I do, however, go prepared for serious exchanges in all four areas of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. There is only a short time remaining before the meeting, but I would welcome any thoughts you may have. As I have often noted, your counsel and support are a key element of my approach to these important meetings.

I have just received your thoughtful comments, and will keep them very much in mind in Reykjavik. I will be back in touch after the meeting.

Sincerely,


/s/

Ronald Reagan

SECRET



SECRET



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The ties and growing interdependence between the West and the Soviet Union will not be reserved at Khrushchev. I do, however, do prepared for serious exchanges in all four areas of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. There is only a short time remaining before the meeting, but I would welcome any thoughts you may have. As I have often noted, your counsel and support are a key element of my approach to these important meetings.

I have just received your thoughtful comments, and will send them very much in mind to Khrushchev. I will be back in touch after the meeting.

Sincerely,

(s)

Richard Goodwin

SECRET



GRS 150

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BONN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 841

OF 081740Z OCTOBER 86

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, MODUK FOR DACU

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: KOHL'S MESSAGES

SUMMARY

1. KOHL HAS NOW WRITTEN TO REAGAN AND SENT A MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV.

DETAIL

2. RUTH (AUSWAERTIGES AMT) GAVE TODAY THE OUTLINE OF KOHL'S LETTER TO REAGAN AND MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE JUST ISSUED.

3. TO REAGAN, KOHL SUPPORTED THE US POSITION ON LRINF, AND INCLUDED A PITCH ON SRINF (SEE ARTHUR'S TELELETTER OF 7 OCTOBER TO ACDD). THE LETTER TOUCHED ON TEST BAN (WELCOMING THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH) AND CW (URGING PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE BRITISH PROPOSAL ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION). HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AS WELL, AND ASKED REAGAN TO PRESS GORBACHEV FOR A SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS IN MBFR.

4. TO GORBACHEV, KOHL MADE THE SAME POINT ABOUT CW. HE ALSO URGED THE SOVIET UNION TO MOVE FORWARD ON OFFENSIVE/DEFENSIVE LINKAGE ON THE BASIS OF THE MOST RECENT US PROPOSALS.

BULLARD

YYYY

BPLNAN 2340

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

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PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
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MR WINCHESTER  
MR RENWICK

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File

22

CABWTE 001/06  
O 061233Z OCT 86  
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO THE WHITEHOUSE

BT

S E C R E T

FOR JOHN POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING IN REYKJAVIK.

BEGINS

DEAR RON,

YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SAY THAT YOU WOULD BE SEEKING MY VIEWS ON YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH MR. GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK. SINCE I SHALL BE AWAY FROM LONDON THIS WEEK ATTENDING OUR ANNUAL PARTY CONFERENCE, I THOUGHT THAT I WOULD LET YOU HAVE MY THOUGHTS STRAIGHTAWAY.

I AM SURE YOU WERE RIGHT TO TAKE UP GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING. HE CLEARLY FEELS THE NEED TO FORM A FIRST-HAND PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED AT A SUMMIT. ONLY YOU CAN GIVE HIM THAT. AND HAVING HANDLED HIM SO SKILFULLY IN GENEVA, YOU HAVE ESTABLISHED A VERY STRONG POSITION FOR DEALING WITH HIM IN FUTURE.

ALTHOUGH WE MUST NOT LOOK AT RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION JUST IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL, IT SEEMS INEVITABLE THAT THE ISSUES OF ARMS REDUCTIONS AND NUCLEAR TESTS WILL TAKE UP A GREAT DEAL OF THE TIME AT YOUR MEETING. I AM PUZZLED WHY GORBACHEV IS PRESSING SO HARD FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY WHEN HE MUST KNOW THAT HE IS NOT GOING TO ACHIEVE IT, GIVEN YOUR POSITION. BUT HE WILL WANT TO REGISTER AT LEAST SOME PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR TESTING IF HE IS NOT TO LOSE FACE. I HOPE THEREFORE THAT YOU WILL FOLLOW UP WHAT YOU SAID IN YOUR SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS A FORTNIGHT AGO: THAT IS, PRESS FOR RATIFICATION OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATIES, WHILE BEING PREPARED TO LOOK AT FURTHER LIMITS ON TESTING IN PARALLEL WITH CUTS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES.

INF SEEMS TO OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT FOR AGREEMENT ON ARMS REDUCTIONS. SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ELIMINATE ALL REFERENCE TO BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IS A GREAT STEP FORWARD AND, OF COURSE, A CONDITION FOR OUR ENDORSING ANY AGREEMENT. WHEN IT COMES TO THE CEILING FOR US AND SOVIET LRINF IN EUROPE, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON ANY EQUAL CEILING IN EUROPE, ALWAYS PROVIDED THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND THE ASIAN CEILING IS NOT EXCESSIVE, AND THAT OTHER ALLIANCE CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT PROVISIO ON SRINF, ARE MET.

MY VIEWS ON THE HANDLING OF THE ABM TREATY, AND THE LINK WITH THE SDI, REMAIN AS IN MY MESSAGE OF LAST FEBRUARY. THE KEY IS TO PROVIDE THE RUSSIANS WITH REASSURANCE THAT THERE WILL BE NO SUDDEN BREAK-OUT FROM THE RESEARCH STAGE, WHILE PRESERVING YOUR RIGHT TO CONDUCT RESEARCH WITHIN THE ABM TREATY. THE PROPOSALS WHICH YOU PUT TO GORBACHEV IN YOUR MESSAGE OF LAST JULY WERE HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT. IN THIS NEXT PHASE, I EXPECT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO NARROW THE GAP ON THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF NOTICE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TREATY. I WOULD SUGGEST YOU CONCENTRATE ON TRYING TO REFINE YOUR RESPECTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS ON WHAT THE ABM TREATY DOES AND DOES NOT ALLOW IN THE WAY OF RESEARCH.

ON START, I COULD SUPPORT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE LINES PROPOSED BY YOUR NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA LAST MONTH. BUT I HOPE THE OBJECTIVE OF EVEN GREATER REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC FORCES WILL NOT BE LOST.

I KNOW THAT YOU NEVER LET ANY MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADERS PASS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS. YOU HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL IN SECURING THE RELEASE OF SHARANSKY AND ORLOV. BUT I DO HOPE YOU WILL BRING HOME TO GORBACHEV THAT RELEASING A FEW INDIVIDUALS IS NOT NEARLY ENOUGH.

I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PROPOSE TO RAISE SOME REGIONAL ISSUES. THE MUJAHEDIN IN AFGHANISTAN ARE COMING UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE, AND I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD OUT. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL AGAIN BRING STRONG PRESSURE ON GORBACHEV FOR EARLY SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE NEED A FRESH EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE ONCE YOUR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS ARE OUT OF THE WAY. IT SEEMS TO ME INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION (BUT NO SOVIET VETO OVER NEGOTIATIONS AT IT). THE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SEEM SET ON THIS. YOU WILL WANT TO URGE ON GORBACHEV THE NEED FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND TO REPAIR ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. YOU MIGHT ALSO RAISE WITH HIM THE NEED TO STEM THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR STAUNCH SUPPORT IN OPPOSING PUNITIVE SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. I WAS DISMAYED BY THE SENATE VOTE, BUT YOU DID EVERYTHING YOU COULD TO MAKE REASON PREVAIL.

I SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR THIS MEETING. YOU HAVE OUR ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

MARGARET

ENDS

NNNN



File

covering SECRET



slw  
21A  
alp  
CDD

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

5 October 1986

Dear Resident Clerk

**US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK:  
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN**

Colin Budd wrote to me on 3 October enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik. I enclose a revised version with which the Prime Minister would be content. I should be grateful if you could ensure that those concerned see it early tomorrow morning and let me have any comments by 1130 on Monday 6 October so that the Prime Minister can approve it finally before she departs for Bournemouth.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Resident Clerk in the Ministry of Defence and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*

*Suzanne Reinholdt Webb*

pp (C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

covering SECRET

slw



SECRET

FOLLOWING FOR JOHN POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

Following is text of a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming meeting in Reykjavik.

BEGINS

Dear Ron,

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London this week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

Although we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am puzzled why Gorbachev is pressing so hard for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when he must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will want to register at least some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while being prepared to look at further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces.

SECRET



INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our endorsing any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, including the important proviso on SRINF, are met.

My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from the research stage, while preserving your right to conduct research within

the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July were helpful in this respect. In this next phase, I expect you should be able to narrow the gap on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty. I would suggest you concentrate on trying to refine your respective understandings on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research.

On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

I know that you never let any meeting with Soviet leaders pass without reference to human rights. You have been very successful in securing the release of Sharansky and Orlov. But I do hope you will bring home to Gorbachev that releasing a few individuals is not nearly enough.

I understand that you propose to raise some regional issues. The mujahedin in Afghanistan are coming under increasing pressure, and I am increasingly concerned about



their ability to hold out. I hope that you will again bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

In the Middle East, we need a fresh effort to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. It seems to me increasingly likely that there will have to be an international conference with Soviet participation (but no Soviet veto over negotiations at it). The moderate Arab governments seem set on this. You will want to urge on Gorbachev the need for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role and to repair its relations with Israel. You might also raise with him the need to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.


I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret



SECRET



Handwritten notes: "jk", "e pg", and "21" in red ink.

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 October 1986

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I enclose the Prime Minister's message to President Reagan, in the form which the Prime Minister has approved it. I have despatched it on the direct link to the White House but the Prime Minister agrees that you may, in this case, send a copy to the Embassy in Washington.

(CHARLES POWELL)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



SECRET

0-061233<sup>2</sup>

Via WHITEHOUSE

EDP  
6/11

~~Following~~ FOR JOHN POINDEXTER FROM CHARLES POWELL

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SECRET



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Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret

ENDS

CD  
B/x



GRS 950

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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FM WASHINGTON

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2538

OF 041946Z OCTOBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS

SIC MODUK FOR PS/SOFS, DUSP, DACU

MY TELNO 2478 AND MOSCOW TELNO 1152: PROSPECTS FOR REYKJAVIK  
SUMMARY

1. WHAT CAN THE RUSSIANS REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO GET AT REYKJAVIK? ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT ON THE ABMT LOOKS VERY UNLIKELY. AGREEMENT ON INF IS NOT YET RIPE, THOUGH FURTHER IMPETUS FROM THE TOP COULD BE PRODUCTIVE THIS WINTER. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, THE US POSITION IS NOW MORE NUANCE, AND SOME PROGRESS POSSIBLE, IF THE RUSSIANS ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW ON-SITE THRESHOLD VERIFICATION. BUT THE US WILL NOT GO FOR A MORATORIUM.

DETAIL

2. ALTHOUGH THE US ARE DETERMINED TO COVER THE WHOLE AGENDA (INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES) IN REYKJAVIK, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CORE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WILL BE ON ARMS CONTROL. IF ONLY BECAUSE GORBACHEV WILL INSIST (MOSCOW TUR). THE ASSUMPTION HERE IS THAT THE AREAS IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WILL PRESS HARDEST IN PRIVATE, AND MAKE THE MOST OF IN PUBLIC, ARE THE ABM TREATY, INF, AND NUCLEAR TESTING.

3. ON THE ABM TREATY, THE SOVIET DEMAND WILL PRESUMABLY BE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACCEPT ITS EXTENSION FOR UP TO 15 YEARS (AND PERHAPS ALSO THE CODIFICATION OF THE VERY RESTRICTIVE SOVIET INTERPRETATION). THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF THE PRESIDENT AGREEING: TO DO SO WOULD BE TO GO VERY MUCH FURTHER ON SDI CONSTRAINTS THEN HE HAS SO FAR BEEN PREPARED (EG IN THE 25 JULY LETTER) TO GO. HOW FAR HE IN THE END GOES, EG AT A MOSCOW SUMMIT NEXT YEAR, WILL PARTLY DEPEND ON WHETHER A START DEAL HAS BY THEN COME TO THE BOIL. SINCE START IS NOT NOW BUBBLING, IT WOULD SELF-EVIDENTLY BE BAD NEGOTIATING TACTICS TO GIVE MORE SDI GROUND IN REYKJAVIK. THE RUSSIANS WILL PRESUMABLY REALISE THIS: IF THEY PLAY UP THE ABMT IN REYKJAVIK IT WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS, OR BECAUSE THEY HAVE DECIDED TO CALL OFF FURTHER SUMMITRY: ABMT MOVES THIS MONTH CANNOT BE THEIR LITMUS TEST IN DECIDING WHETHER A NOVEMBER/DECEMBER SUMMIT HERE MAKES SENSE.

4. ON INF THE POSITION IS MORE COMPLEX. THE OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE FUTURE DEAL ARE NOW CLEARER, BUT DETAILED NEGOTIATION IS STILL REQUIRED ON AT LEAST FIVE ISSUES - VIZ ASIAN NUMBERS, DURATION, THE SOVIET WISH TO HAVE A SAY IN THE GLCM/PERSHING MIX IN WESTERN EUROPE, COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, AND VERIFICATION.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

THE



# CONFIDENTIAL

THE FIRST THREE ARE IN THEORY CAPABLE OF INSTANT SOLUTION AT A SUMMIT: BUT THE LAST TWO ARE NOT, AND THE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS HAVE AS YET BARELY BEEN ADDRESSED IN GENEVA. THE RUSSIANS MAY OF COURSE WANT TO TAKE BOTH AT A GALLOP, IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE INTRA-ALLIANCE PROBLEMS OVER SRINF, AND MINIMISE INTRUSIVE US INSPECTION OF DESTRUCTION, NON-PRODUCTION, AND NON-DEPLOYMENT OF LRINF. BUT THEY MUST KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT IS UNLIKELY TO FALL FOR THIS: THE MOST THEY CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT THEREFORE IS THAT BOTH SIDES WILL AGREE TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, WITH A VIEW TO HAVING AT LEAST HEADS OF AGREEMENT TO INITIAL AT A WINTER SUMMIT HERE.

5. SIR B CARTLEDGE POINTS OUT THAT NUCLEAR TESTING MAY BE THE KEY LITMUS ISSUE FOR GORBACHEV. I AGREE, BUT I DON'T AGREE WITH HIS CHARACTERISATION OF THE US POSITION AS QUOTE COMPLETELY HARD UNQUOTE. IN HIS UNGA SPEECH (MY TELNO 2434) THE PRESIDENT PUT FORWARD THE FOLLOWING THREE PROPOSALS, CULLED FROM THE 25 JULY MESSAGE:

- (A) QUOTE JUST AS ELIMINATING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS OUR LONG TERM GOAL, SO TOO IS A TOTAL BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING. BUT THE REALITY IS THAT FOR NOW WE STILL MUST RELY ON THESE WEAPONS FOR THE DETERRENCE OF WAR UNQUOTE. (IE NUCLEAR TESTING WILL BE REQUIRED AS LONG AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE.)
- (B) BUT QUOTE WE ARE READY TO MOVE FORWARD ON RATIFICATION OF THE TTBT AND THE PNET, ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON IMPORTANT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES UNQUOTE ON WHICH THE US HAD TABLED NEW IDEAS.
- (C) QUOTE ON RATIFICATION OF THOSE TREATIES, AND IN ASSOCIATION WITH A PROGRAMME TO REDUCE AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPLEMENT A STEP-BY-STEP PARALLEL PROGRAMME OF LIMITING AND ULTIMATELY ENDING NUCLEAR TESTING UNQUOTE.

6. (A) AND (B) ARE NOT NEW, BUT (C) IS. (A) MEANS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AGAIN ON NOTICE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PREPARED TO EMULATE THEIR MORATORIA AND SO MOVE TO A DE FACTO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. BUT THEY HAVE KNOWN THAT ALL ALONG. ON (B) THE BALL IS IN THE SOVIET COURT. DURING THE RECENT EXPERT LEVEL TALKS IN GENEVA (BAND'S TELELETTER OF 2 OCTOBER TO PAKENHAM) THE US SIDE HAVE EXPLAINED THE TECHNIQUES WHICH THEY BELIEVE WOULD ENSURE SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 150 KT THRESHOLD IN THE TTBT: THE RUSSIANS THOUGH READY TO ENGAGE IN DETAILED TECHNICAL EXCHANGES CLEARLY HAD POLITICAL INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION ONLY OF A BAN, NOT OF A THRESHOLD. THE US PRIVATE SECTOR SCIENTISTS NOW AT THE SOVIET TEST SITE ARE TO BE THROWN OUT IF SOVIET TESTING RESUMES. THE AMERICANS HAVE INVITED THE RUSSIANS TO MONITOR THEIR TESTS, THE RUSSIANS ALLOW MONITORING ONLY OF THE TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF TESTS, THE WESTERN PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET MORATORIA COULD PERHAPS HAVE TURNED THE SPOTLIGHT MORE EFFECTIVELY ON THIS FLAW IN THE SOVIET CASE: BUT IT WOULD BE RASH FOR GORBACHEV TO ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT DO SO IF HE TURNS UP THE HEAT IN REYKJAVIK.

CONFIDENTIAL -2-

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# CONFIDENTIAL

7. THE MOST INTERESTING ELEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S POSITION IS HOWEVER (C), WHICH WAS ANATHEMA IN EVERY AGENCY HERE UNTIL THE SPRING, AND IS STILL HOTLY CONTESTED BY THE PENTAGON AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. THERE IS AS YET NO BLUEPRINT HERE FOR A QUOTE STEP BY STEP PROGRAMME UNQUOTE OF DIMINISHING THRESHOLD LEVELS, OR QUOTAS OR TESTS: BUT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD BACK SUCH A PROGRAMME MEANS THAT ONE WILL HAVE TO BE DEVISED (OF THE STAR WARS SPEECH IN 1983). IF THE REAL GORBACHEV LITMUS TEST IS AN QUOTE ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE ON TESTING, HE COULD PICK UP THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. BUT IT IS OF COURSE CONTINGENT ON AGREEMENT ON ADEQUATE THRESHOLD VERIFICATION, AND IT IS THE HARD SOVIET LINE - CTB OR NOTHING - WHICH AT PRESENT BLOCKS THAT.

8. OUR INSTINCT IS THAT FOR THE PRESIDENT AGREEMENT ON THE DATE AND AGENDA FOR THE REAL SUMMIT REMAINS THE TEST OF SUCCESS AT REYKJAVIK. BUT HE WILL BE RELUCTANT TO PAY AN ARMS CONTROL PRICE TO SECURE IT. AND HIS RELUCTANCE WILL BE ENHANCED BY THE RIGHT WING REACTIONS HERE TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT REYKJAVIK, THE RIGHT MAINTAIN THAT HE CAVED IN TO SOVIET BLACKMAIL ON DANILOFF, AND AS A RESULT LEFT HIMSELF VULNERABLE TO MORE BLACKMAIL IN REYKJAVIK. NOT, I THINK, AN ACCURATE CHARACTERISATION, BUT ONE THE WHITE HOUSE WILL CERTAINLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 6313

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ARMS CONTROL TALKS

3

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MODUK (PERSONAL FOR PS/S OF S) DUS (P) AND HEAD OF DACU  
MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

'MY DEAR GENERAL SECRETARY  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING  
WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN REYKJAVIK. I VERY MUCH WELCOME  
THE FACT THAT YOU ARE COMING TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A  
SUMMIT, WHICH I HOPE WILL BE HELD BEFORE THE END OF THIS  
YEAR. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH  
AGREEMENTS THEN ON REDUCTIONS IN ARMS, AS WELL AS TO  
REGISTER PROGRESS ON REGIONAL DISPUTES AND HUMAN RIGHTS  
PROBLEMS.

I SEND YOU BEST WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE MEETING.  
YOURS SINCERELY  
MARGARET THATCHER'

HOWE  
OCMIAN 6540

LIMITED  
SOVIET DEPARTMENT                   MR THOMAS  
ACDD                                   CHIEF CLERK  
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT                 MR GOODALL  
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT                MR FERGUSSON  
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SUBJECT  
MASTER  
OPS

L06 ART

181



PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T181/86

Filed on FOREIGN POL East/West Relations P16

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 October, 1986.

My dear General Secretary

Thank you for your message about your forthcoming meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik. I very much welcome the fact that you are coming together to prepare for a Summit, which I hope will be held before the end of this year. I believe that it should be possible to reach agreements then on reductions in arms, as well as to register progress on regional disputes and human rights problems.

I send you best wishes for the success of the meeting.

Yours sincerely

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency Mr. M. S. Gorbachev.

lu



Not faxed to Chequers

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8/6

20

cepc

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I have recast the message on the lines you suggested and shortened it.

Content for it to issue?

C.D.P

(C. D. POWELL)

4 October 1986



SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Following in text of a personal message from the British Minister to President Reagan about the following meeting in Reykjavik

Following for John Poirdekker from Charles Powell

Dear Ron

It should be grateful if you would pass the following message in Reykjavik

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London <sup>it is</sup> next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

Although we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am puzzled why Gorbachev is pressing so hard for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when he must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will <sup>want</sup> ~~need~~ to register <sup>at least</sup> some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while <sup>being prepared to look at</sup> ~~proposing~~ further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces.

INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our <sup>endorsing</sup> ~~accepting~~ any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any ~~equal~~ ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, <sup>including the important proviso</sup> ~~above all~~ on SRINF, are met.

SECRET



My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from <sup>the</sup> research <sup>stage</sup> to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the ~~hitherto~~ <sup>restrictive</sup> ~~accepted~~ interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July were very helpful in this respect. In this next phase, I would suggest you concentrate on trying to <sup>refine your respective understandings</sup> reach agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, <sup>I expect you should be able to narrow the gap</sup> and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.

On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

I know that you never let any meeting with Soviet leaders pass without reference to human rights. You have been very successful in securing the release of Sharansky and Orlov. But I do hope you will bring home to Gorbachev that releasing a few individuals is not nearly enough.

I understand that you propose to raise some regional issues. The mujahedin in Afghanistan are coming under increasing pressure, and I am increasingly concerned about their ability to hold out. I hope that you will again bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

In the Middle East, we need a fresh effort to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. It seems to me increasingly likely that there will have to be an international conference with Soviet participation (but no Soviet veto over negotiations at it). The moderate Arab governments seem set on this. You will want to urge on Gorbachev the need for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role and to repair its relations with Israel. You might also raise with him the need



SECRET

- 3 -

to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret

SL2AJP

SECRET



SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S

subject: master  
ops.

19  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

Dear Ron,

SERIAL No. T182/86.....

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

Although we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am puzzled why Gorbachev is pressing so hard for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when he must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will need to register some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while proposing further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces.

INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our accepting any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, above all on SRINF, are met.

SECRET



My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from research to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the hitherto accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July were very helpful in this respect. In this next phase, I would suggest you concentrate on trying to reach agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.

On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

I know that you never let any meeting with Soviet leaders pass without reference to human rights. You have been very successful in securing the release of Sharansky and Orlov. But I do hope you will bring home to Gorbachev that releasing a few individuals is not nearly enough.

I understand that you propose to raise some regional issues. The mujahedin in Afghanistan are coming under increasing pressure, and I am increasingly concerned about their ability to hold out. I hope that you will again bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

In the Middle East, we need a fresh effort to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. It seems to me increasingly likely that there will have to be an international conference with Soviet participation (but no Soviet veto over negotiations at it). The moderate Arab governments seem set on this. You will want to urge on Gorbachev the need for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role and to repair its relations with Israel. You might also raise with him the need



to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret



PRIME MINISTER


CDD  
6/4

US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I have recast the message on the lines you suggested and shortened it.

Content for it to issue?

C.D.P

Yes   

---

(C. D. POWELL)

4 October 1986



SECRET

19  
TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S

subject: master  
Ops.

PERSONAL MESSAGE

Dear Ron,

SERIAL No. T182/86

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

Although we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am puzzled why Gorbachev is pressing so hard for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty when he must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will need to register some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while proposing further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces.

INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement on arms reductions. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our accepting any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we would accept an agreement based on any equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, above all on SRINF, are met.

SECRET



My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from research to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the hitherto accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July were very helpful in this respect. In this next phase, I would suggest you concentrate on trying to reach agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.

On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

I know that you never let any meeting with Soviet leaders pass without reference to human rights. You have been very successful in securing the release of Sharansky and Orlov. But I do hope you will bring home to Gorbachev that releasing a few individuals is not nearly enough.

I understand that you propose to raise some regional issues. The mujahedin in Afghanistan are coming under increasing pressure, and I am increasingly concerned about their ability to hold out. I hope that you will again bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

In the Middle East, we need a fresh effort to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. It seems to me increasingly likely that there will have to be an international conference with Soviet participation (but no Soviet veto over negotiations at it). The moderate Arab governments seem set on this. You will want to urge on Gorbachev the need for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role and to repair its relations with Israel. You might also raise with him the need



to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

Thank you for your staunch support in opposing punitive sanctions against South Africa. I was dismayed by the Senate vote, but you did everything you could to make reason prevail.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret



PRIME MINISTER


C.D.P.  
6/4

US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I have recast the message on the lines you suggested and shortened it.

Content for it to issue?

C.D.P.

Yes   

---

(C. D. POWELL)

4 October 1986



SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Ron,

You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

(*you deal with arms reductions as in p. 2*)  
① *Although* We must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control. *[*One matter which I hope you will cover with him is human rights. I had a long talk recently with Mr. Sharansky. The sort of treatment which people like him, thousands of them, still receive in the Soviet Union is utterly appalling. You have *been very successful in* ~~done well~~ to secure the release of Sharansky and Orloff, with the prospect perhaps of others to follow. But I *do* hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the point that releasing a few individuals is not enough. *[*The Soviet Union simply cannot expect to be treated like other countries while it continues to treat its own citizens in this way.*]* You will also, I am sure, leave Gorbachev in no doubt that the US and the UK - and I hope other countries - will take a very firm line on the issue of human rights at the Vienna CSCE meeting in November. *]*

I imagine that you will raise some regional issues. ~~The three that come to my mind are Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa.~~ On Afghanistan I am worried by signs that the mujahedin are coming under increasing pressure, with growing doubts about their ability to hold out. I hope therefore that you continue to bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.

SECRET



In the Middle East, I believe that we shall have fresh opportunity to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. There appears to be growing acceptance that an international conference could offer a way forward. Even the moderate Arab countries see a Soviet presence at such a conference as vital, although the Russians must not be allowed to block negotiations between the countries directly concerned at it. I hope you will press Gorbachev to fulfil the requirements for Soviet participation, particularly in terms of relations with Israel. Also that you will raise with him the need to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

In Southern Africa, I remain very worried by the scale of Soviet military aid to and involvement in Angola. I hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the concern with which we in the West view this.

*Talk to P.!* ~~But~~ it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am rather puzzled why Gorbachev is adopting such a high profile on the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will need to register some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while proposing further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces. Readiness to move here may make him more forthcoming in other arms control areas.

Of these, INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement. Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our accepting any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we will accept an agreement based on any



equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, above all on SRINF, are met. I know that this latter point is of particular concern to Helmut Kohl.

My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as I put them to you in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from research to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the hitherto accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July and your clear statement of the link between offensive and defensive forces were very helpful in this respect. Clearly this remains a very difficult issue for the Soviet Union. But I believe the approach which you have charted can succeed. In this next phase, I would suggest you work towards agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.

On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

Finally it would be very welcome if you would encourage Gorbachev to respond to the British proposals on challenge inspection, as part of the arrangements for verifying a ban on chemical weapons.

I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret



PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET MEETING IN REYKJAVIK: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

The President said that he would be seeking your views on his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik next weekend. Since you will be away at the Party Conference, you may like to consider sending a message now.

The attached letter from the Foreign Office sets out the various points which the Foreign and Defence Secretaries believe you might cover in the message. There is also the text of a message itself. It is workmanlike. But I think the President's eyes may glaze a bit. I have therefore done an alternative draft in a rather more relaxed style.

C D P

It is still very long. However we have to remember that this is NOT the Summit.

C D POWELL

3 October 1986

I would deal with it in a different order

(1) Although we must not look at relations with the USSR in terms of arms control, it seems inevitable that arms reduction & nuclear tests... etc [Suggest you leave out chemical weapons]

(2) I know that you never let any meeting pass without reference to human rights etc.

SL2AJ0

(3) Should you consider any regional issues

On Afghanistan

On the Middle East

SECRET

leave Angola out

Suggest we then thank him for his staunch support against S. A. - [Suggest] & send vote etc etc



SECRET

TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dear Ron,

① You were kind enough to say that you would be seeking my views on your forthcoming meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. Since I shall be away from London next week attending our annual party conference, I thought that I would let you have my thoughts straightaway.

② I am sure you were right to take up Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting. He clearly feels the need to form a first-hand personal assessment of what might be achieved at a Summit. Only you can give him that. And having handled him so skilfully in Geneva, you have established a very strong position for dealing with him in future.

~~(Use deal with arms reduction as in p. 2)~~  
③ ~~Although~~ we must not look at relations with the Soviet Union just in terms of arms control. ~~One matter which I hope you will cover with him is human rights. I had a long talk recently with Mr. Sharansky. The sort of treatment which people like him, thousands of them, still receive in the Soviet Union is utterly appalling. You have done well to secure the release of Sharansky and Orloff, with the prospect perhaps of others to follow. But I hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the point that releasing a few individuals is not enough. The Soviet Union simply cannot expect to be treated like other countries while it continues to treat its own citizens in this way.)~~ You will also, I am sure, leave Gorbachev in no doubt that the US and the UK - and I hope other countries - will take a very firm line on the issue of human rights at the Vienna CSCE meeting in November. ~~✓~~

~~undecided~~ ~~propose to~~  
④ I imagine that you will raise some regional issues. ~~The three that come to my mind are Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa.~~ ~~On~~ Afghanistan I am worried by signs that the mujahedin are coming under increasing pressure, ~~with~~ ~~ad at this~~ growing doubts about their ability to hold out. I hope therefore that you ~~will again~~ ~~to~~ bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.



It seems to me increasingly likely that we will have to be an international - 2 - effort with Soviet participation (but to veto over program). You may want the moderate Arab govts. see govts. seen at an int'l. conf. on the Middle East. We need a fresh effort. Gorbachev

In the Middle East, I believe that we shall have fresh opportunity to make progress on the Arab/Israel dispute once your congressional elections are out of the way. There appears to be growing acceptance that an international conference could offer a way forward. Even the moderate Arab countries see a Soviet presence at such a conference as vital, although the Russians must not be allowed to block negotiations between the countries directly concerned at it. I hope you will press Gorbachev to fulfil the requirements for Soviet participation, particularly in terms of relations with Israel. Also that you will raise with him the need to stem the flow of arms to Iran.

You could urge Gorbachev to put Soviet relations with Israel on a footing which allows you to participate in an international effort

In Southern Africa, I remain very worried by the scale of Soviet military aid to and involvement in Angola. I hope you will bring home to Gorbachev the concern with which we in the West view this.

3 <sup>Value to P. 1</sup> ~~that~~ it seems inevitable that the issues of arms reductions and nuclear tests will take up a great deal of the time at your meeting. I am rather puzzled why Gorbachev is adopting such a high profile on the issue of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. <sup>pressing so pressing so hard for which he</sup> He must know that he is not going to achieve it, given your position. But he will need to register some progress in the area of nuclear testing if he is not to lose face. I hope therefore that you will follow up what you said in your speech to the United Nations a fortnight ago: that is, press for ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, while proposing further limits on testing in parallel with cuts in offensive forces. ~~Readiness to move here may make him more forthcoming in other arms control areas.~~

4 ~~Of these~~, INF seems to offer the best prospect for agreement. <sup>on arms reductions</sup> Soviet willingness to eliminate all reference to British and French forces is a great step forward and, of course, a condition for our accepting any agreement. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I want you to know that we will accept an agreement based on any



equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and the Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that other Alliance conditions, above all on SRINF, are met. ~~I know that this latter point is of particular concern to Helmut Kohl.~~

5 My views on the handling of the ABM Treaty, and the link with the SDI, remain as ~~I put them to you~~ in my message of last February. The key is to provide the Russians with reassurance that there will be no sudden break-out from research to deployment, while preserving your right to conduct research within the hitherto accepted interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The proposals which you put to Gorbachev in your message of last July and ~~your clear statement of the link between offensive and defensive forces~~ were very helpful in this respect. ~~Clearly this remains a very difficult issue for the Soviet Union. But I believe the approach which you have charted can succeed.~~ In this next phase, I would suggest you ~~work towards agreement on what the ABM Treaty does and does not allow in the way of research, and on the length of the period of notice for withdrawal from the Treaty.~~ *concentrate on trying to reach*

6 On START, I could support an interim agreement on the lines proposed by your negotiators in Geneva last month. But I hope the objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces will not be lost.

Finally it would be very welcome if you would encourage Gorbachev to respond to the British proposals on challenge inspection, as part of the arrangements for verifying a ban on chemical weapons.

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With warm regards,

Margaret



SECRET

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*been very successful in*

*undisputed*  
④ I imagine that you will *propose to* raise some regional issues. ~~The three that come to my mind are Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa.~~ *ad at this*  
*will again*  
On Afghanistan I am worried by signs that the mujahedin are coming under increasing pressure, with growing doubts about their ability to hold out. I hope therefore that you continue to bring strong pressure on Gorbachev for early Soviet withdrawal.



It seems to me increasingly likely that we will have to be an international - 2 - effort with Soviet participation (but no veto over program). ~~You may want the moderate Arab governments to take an initiative on this. We may want to bring we need a fresh effort Gorbachev~~

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*Handwritten notes:*  
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10 I send you my very best wishes for this meeting. You have our absolute confidence and trust.

With warm regards,

Margaret



# Confidential

GRS 300

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO 2520

OF 030018Z OCTOBER 86

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK

MODUK FOR DACU

YOUR TELNO 781: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER DETAILS OF THE US APPROACH TO REYKJAVIK.

DETAIL

2. WE BRIEFED STATE ON 2 OCTOBER ON THE MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. STATE COMMENTED THAT GORBACHEV'S DEFINITION OF THE TASKS FOR REYKJAVIK (QUOTE INDICATING STEPS FOR THE SWIFT ELABORATION AT THE LEVEL OF RESPONSIBLE ORGANISATIONS OF DRAFT DOCUMENTS UNQUOTE) WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE US VIEW THAT THE MEETING SHOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO WORK IN HAND, BUT SHOULD NOT ITSELF INVOLVE NEGOTIATION ON TEXTS.

4. STATE ADDED THE FOLLOWING ON PREPARATIONS FOR REYKJAVIK:

A) THERE WAS AS YET NO AGREED AGENDA. THE RUSSIANS (AS GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE TO US MAKES CLEAR) WERE FOCUSSED ON ARMS CONTROL. PRESIDENT REAGAN INTENDED TO BEGIN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS. HE WISHED TO LEAVE GORBACHEV IN NO DOUBT THAT PROGRESS IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS DEPENDED ON GREATER SOVIET RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS. HE WOULD REFER TO DANILOFF, AND TO JEWISH EMIGRATION. AS WELL AS THE KEY ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, THE US ALSO INTENDED TO COVER REGIONAL ISSUES (STATE NOTE WITH INTEREST THAT SHEVARDNADZE INDICATED IN OTTAWA ON 1 OCTOBER THAT AFGHANISTAN COULD BE DISCUSSED): AND BILATERAL POINTS, INCLUDING THE UN EXPULSIONS (ON WHICH SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL).

B) JOINT STATEMENT: THE ADMINISTRATION ARE DOING NO (NO) DRAFTING THEMSELVES BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A SOVIET TEXT (NO SIGN OF ONE YET).

# Confidential



C) THE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK WILL BE A LOGISTICAL NIGHTMARE. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND THE US ACCEPTANCE OF IT WERE HELD VERY CLOSELY INDEED ON THE US SIDE: UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT, ONLY THE WHITE HOUSE AND SHULTZ'S PARTY IN NEW YORK WERE IN THE PICTURE. STATE ARE THEREFORE FACING THE FORMIDABLE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF ARRANGING THE MEETING FROM SCRATCH IN 12 DAYS.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 6761

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
RES D  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
ACDD  
CRD  
NEWS D  
INFO D  
ECD (E)  
FED  
NED  
POD  
PUSD  
CSCE UNIT  
PROTOCOL D  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON

MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR FEARN  
MR LONG  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR BARRINGTON  
MR WINCHESTER  
MR RENWICK

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

2

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010  
CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister  
CDP 3/2  
cc 2  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 October 1986

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Reykjavik Meeting

You will wish to know that our Embassy in Reykjavik have been asked, on a contingency basis, whether HM Ambassador's Residence could be used between 8 and 13 October to house the President, the Secretary of State or the National Security Adviser plus appropriate staff. (There is at present an interval in Reykjavik between our former Ambassador's departure and his successor's arrival; but the new Ambassador will travel to Reykjavik to be there for the meeting - and will stay with the Head of Chancery.) The Americans will probably be making a formal request this morning. We are instructing our Embassy to agree full-heartedly to such a request, provided that no extra expenditure accrues to HMG and that the Residence is not used for press facilities.

Yours ever,


Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL







S E C R E T

CCPC  
16



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 October 1986

CS  
4/2

Dear Charles,

US-Soviet Meeting in Reykjavik:  
Message to President Reagan

(earlier  
today)

Please replace the paragraph at the top of the third page of my letter of 3 October with the following version:

<sup>with PM</sup>  
"The INF field contains at present the best prospect for an agreement (though not at Reykjavik). The main problem for us at present is the possibility that the Russians and Americans might settle on a long-range warhead ceiling for Europe of 100. In practice, we and the Americans think that this figure is likely to go up. But even if it did not, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries believe (as now do the Germans) that the approach in the present draft is correct. While like our European allies they both recognise the military arguments in terms of a higher ceiling, above all they are concerned at the possibility of HMG being placed in the position of being seen to be blocking US, Soviet and FRG (and no doubt other allied) agreement on low numbers for INF in Europe. This would be especially damaging when we originally supported the zero-zero solution, and have supported the US search for equal ceilings at any level."

I am copying this letter to John Howe (MOD) and to Christopher Mallaby (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

S E C R E T



SECRET

17

CCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Dear Charles,

US-Soviet Meeting in Reykjavik:  
Message to President Reagan

As <sup>at trap</sup> requested, I enclose a draft message for the Prime Minister to send the President, which has been agreed with the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary has asked me to make the following additional comments.

Although Mr Shevardnadze has acknowledged that regional and bilateral questions will also be discussed, we believe that Mr Gorbachev will seek to focus the meeting almost exclusively on arms control, and especially on the INF agreement, the ABM Treaty issues, and his demand for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. President Reagan will seek to cover a wider spectrum: not only arms control but regional conflict, human rights and the expansion of bilateral contacts. In preparing advice for him, we need to avoid the impression that it is unbalanced in the direction of arms control. Nonetheless, that is our own main interest in the Reykjavik meeting.

therefore

We recommend that the message to the President should start with a substantive but relatively short reference both to human rights and to regional conflicts. The President will need no urging to take up human rights questions with Mr Gorbachev. The draft therefore simply welcomes Orlov's release, refers to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, and offers the President encouragement.

Among regional questions, the only areas which we think it would be useful to take up are Iran/Iraq and Arab/Israel. The Iran/Iraq war was a major subject of the US/Soviet talks on the Middle East held in Stockholm in June. The two sides identified a common interest in avoiding further escalation of the conflict, and if possible bringing it to a negotiated conclusion. Then and since the Americans have been trying to involve the Russians in stemming the flow of Soviet-made arms to Iran via third countries. When Mr Shultz saw


/Mr Shevardnadze

SECRET



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SECRET



Mr Shevardnadze in New York on 19/20 September, the latter said the Russians planned to issue a statement on the Gulf war and invited the US to do likewise; but this idea does not seem to have been pursued.

Since July the Russians have been promoting the idea of a preparatory meeting for an international conference on Arab/Israel, involving the Permanent Members of the Security Council. This has attracted a good deal of Arab support. Although we know the Jordanians have private doubts about a preparatory meeting, they continue to regard Soviet participation in a conference as essential. The Israelis are looking for concessions from the Russians on diplomatic relations and Jewish emigration in return for a Soviet role. US misgivings stem from a belief that renewed Soviet involvement in the peace process would enhance the Soviet voice in the region at their own expense.

The bulk of the message however would dwell on arms control issues. On the latter, we must obviously avoid a catalogue of all the outstanding problems. Instead, the draft focuses largely on the Geneva nuclear space talks (NST). In START the main point to register is our support for an average 30% reduction in offensive forces, on the grounds that we should settle for the maximum we can get while keeping as our longer-term target the possibility of even greater cuts (ie in the 50% range). We believe that there is a British interest in encouraging movement which is already visible in US positions in other areas (such as SLCMs and mobile ICBMs); but on this occasion we must avoid over-loading the circuit. Unless you have strong feelings on these or other details, we would propose therefore to omit them this time around.

The ABM Treaty (and its relationship with SDI) remains in our view at the core of a really historic arms control agreement between the superpowers. In the past, and notably in her message to the President of 11 February (attached), the Prime Minister has suggested ways in which the Treaty can be strengthened while preserving his long-term vision of strategic defence. On this occasion, we believe that we need do not more than reiterate that message briefly. However, post-Reykjavik and in the run up to a subsequent Summit proper, it may well be necessary to spell out in greater detail the way in which we believe the Treaty and related issues should be handled.

/The INF

SECRET





SECRET

The INF field contains at present the best prospect for an agreement (though not at Reykjavik). The main problem for us at present is the possibility that the Russians and Americans might settle on a long-term warhead ceiling for Europe of 100. In practice, we and the Americans think that this figure is likely to go up. But even if it did not, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries believe (as now do the Germans) that the approach in the present draft is correct. While they both recognise the military arguments in terms of a higher ceiling, above all they are concerned at the possibility of HMG being placed in the position of being seen to be blocking US, Soviet and FRG (and no doubt Allies) agreement on low numbers for INF in Europe. This would be especially damaging when we originally supported the zero-zero solution, and have supported the US search for equal ceilings at any level.

like our  
European  
allies

Of other arms control issues, we expect Mr Gorbachev to press a CTBT. Our Embassy in Moscow takes the view that even an interim INF agreement would not compensate for a failure by Mr Gorbachev to bring back from a Summit even a modest advance on nuclear testing; and that if he gets no hint from the President at Reykjavik that he can achieve this, he will back away from a Washington date later this year. We here are not yet convinced that some achievement in testing is such a sine qua non for Mr Gorbachev. A modest move by the Americans might even be more embarrassing for him than the present stalemate. But the solution is in his own hands: to accept US verification proposals which would allow for the speedy ratification of the two outstanding treaties, and then to follow up the President's hint of further flexibility which he gave in his UNGA speech last week. We do not however discount the possibility that, if the INF signs at Reykjavik look bad, Mr Gorbachev may seek to exploit the US position on testing as an excuse for his failure to go to Washington.

We have included in the draft message a passage in square brackets on chemical weapons. It would be most valuable to get the President to endorse the British position on challenge inspection to Mr Gorbachev, especially when the Russians themselves have been making encouraging noises about it to the US in New York and Washington. This would represent a real step forward. However, the Prime Minister will wish to make her own judgement on whether it would overload an already fairly full circuit. It seems more probable at this stage that any progress on CW at the US-Soviet meeting is likely to come in the area of non-proliferation, where both sides have already established a measure of agreement. Such progress would only have real significance if it implied action against CW violators, ie a significant impact on such countries as Iraq.

/We have

SECRET





SECRET

We have also considered including elements in the draft message on conventional arms control and on the SALT II limits. On the former, we have nothing substantive to say; our own ideas for an initiative on conventional arms control (about which the Foreign Secretary minuted the Prime Minister on 30 September) have yet to be put to close Allies. SALT II remains a key issue. But we assess that the risk, already diminishing for technical reasons, of the President implementing his May decision to break out of the Treaty constraints in November has now decreased further because of the momentum towards a Summit. We therefore believe that it should not be raised now with him, but that our powder should be kept dry for use in case the threat once more increases.

I have already sent you an interim reply to Mr Gorbachev's letter to the Prime Minister of 30 September. The Foreign Secretary believes that a substantive response should be delayed until after the Reykjavik meeting. It would then be possible either to pick up the pieces if the process appeared to be breaking down; or to urge Mr Gorbachev to greater efforts if genuine Summit "negotiations" (to quote from his own letter) were then in prospect.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Christopher Mallaby (Cabinet Office)

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

SECRET



SECRET



DSR (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DS2AAG

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Copies to:

Top Secret

President Reagan

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

SUBJECT:

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT .....

I am delighted to pick up your invitation to provide an input to your preparations for the Reykjavik meeting. You need no reminding of the importance we all attach to success there, and to a full-scale Summit in Washington later this year. Our best wishes go with you and Nancy for Reykjavik and beyond. I am delighted also to know that we can help with the facilities of our Ambassador's Residence there.

You will have a full agenda, and will clearly want to strike the right balance between arms control issues on the one hand and the other items for discussion, such as human rights, regional issues and your bilateral relations. On the second set of issues, I very much welcomed the release of Yuri Orlov after all these years.

Enclosures flag(s) .....

SECRET



And I know you will again impress on Mr Gorbachev the importance of improving the Soviet record of human rights across the board if there is to be a lasting improvement of East/West relations. The Vienna CSCE meeting will give us a further chance to press for progress. You know that you have my wholehearted support in this.

On regional questions, my impression is that you may be able to bring the Russians to acknowledge a common interest in putting an end to the Iran/Iraq conflict. I know you have also been trying to involve them in stemming the flow of arms to Iran. These might be fruitful areas to explore with Mr Gorbachev. Your meeting will also be an opportunity to explore the possibilities for a more constructive Soviet role in the Arab/Israel dispute.

That said, I expect that as in Geneva last year you will find a large amount of your time in Reykjavik devoted to arms control. For his part, Mr Gorbachev evidently intends to focus on the INF, ABM Treaty and nuclear testing areas. I see much advantage in tackling the first of these in depth.



I have been encouraged by the recent progress in the INF talks. The Soviet approach, not least in dropping the references to British and French forces - as we always thought they would - now shows signs of real seriousness. I hope that your talks [this/next] weekend will help to nail down the terms of an eventual agreement. It would be a major achievement for all of us if you could bring it off, in the face of all the difficulties we have overcome together in the past five years. And it would be a sign-post to even greater achievements further down the same road.

I know that in your Reykjavik talks you will be sticking to the essential elements of the negotiating position worked out with your Allies, including the terms we have already agreed for appropriate constraints on shorter-range systems. When it comes to the ceiling for US and Soviet LRINF in Europe, I recognise that the numbers now being discussed may well increase, as a function of the ceiling on Soviet forces in Asia. In deciding where the final balance of advantage lies, we shall have to weigh the political gains of low numbers against our continuing strategic desiderata. If the numbers do go up, that may well ease the dilemma. For our part I want you to know that we will welcome an agreement based on any equal ceiling in Europe, always provided that the difference between this and Asian ceiling is not excessive, and that the other Alliance conditions are met.



On the ABM Treaty, and the link with SDI, I set out my views in some detail in my message to you of 11 February. I still see this approach as the right way ahead. You know the importance I attach to the US continuing the research programme within the restrictive interpretation of the Treaty. And I warmly welcome your clear statement of the integral link between offensive and defensive forces, which featured in your July message to Mr Gorbachev and which you have now made public in your UN speech. I was also very pleased to see your proposal for a significant extension of the Treaty withdrawal period, to which the Russians now seem to be responding in a positive sense.

All these points address the key issue of reassurance which I stressed in my February message and in our earlier exchanges. Given that the gaps between your own position and that of Mr Gorbachev may now be beginning to narrow, I hope that in your next round of discussions you may be able to work towards an agreement on refining your respective understandings of what the Treaty does and does not allow in the way of specific research. I continue to see this as a key element if progress is to be made not only on strategic defences but on strategic arms reductions too.



On the latter, I have noted the encouraging progress that has been made in a number of areas. I will not now dwell on detailed British views. But I should like to register my support for an interim START agreement along the lines your negotiators outlined in Geneva last month, while of course not losing sight of the ultimate objective of even greater reductions in strategic forces.

On the last of Mr Gorbachev's targets, nuclear testing, we must expect him to continue to press for a comprehensive ban. Frankly I find it surprising that he should have devoted so much time and propaganda energy to this objective when he must know that its achievement is precluded by your present position. But we should certainly not allow him to get off the Washington Summit hook by claiming a total absence of US flexibility on nuclear testing.

For that reason I welcome what you said two weeks ago to the UN, which seemed to me very much in line with the ideas we outlined to you some 18 months ago. I am sure it is right to go for ratification of the outstanding treaties. I will also be interested to see if the Russians pick up the idea of a subsequent programme of further limits on testing, in parallel with other cuts in offensive forces. For our part, I continue to see much merit in this practical, step-by-step strategy which is consistent with the overall Western approach to arms control.



[Finally, on chemical weapons, I welcome the news of some progress in the worrying area of proliferation, with particular reference to the Middle East. But our main aim must remain a total ban on these dreadful weapons, accompanied with adequate verification. Recent Soviet movement in this field provides some hope that they are beginning to address the issue seriously, although it is not yet enough to let us predict a break-through. I am glad that you have already had the opportunity in Washington to discuss with the Russians the British proposal on challenge inspection; and that you seem to have received an encouraging reaction from them. If the chance arises in Reykjavik, I believe it would be useful to press them once more to respond to our proposals, and to demonstrate the seriousness of their own approach to a total ban.]



GRS 330

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*P1. 24*

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FM PARIS  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELNO 981  
OF 031541Z OCTOBER 86  
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT: FRENCH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. GUARDED REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING IN ICELAND. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE NERVOUS OF US CONCESSIONS ON INF.

DETAIL

2. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REYKJAVIK MEETING WAS ADEQUATELY ANALYSED AND COMMENTED ON IN THE FRENCH PRESS, BUT WITH LITTLE ORIGINALITY. EDITORIALS EXPRESS SOME SURPRISE AT THIS OUTCOME OF THE DANILOFF AFFAIR, BUT ARGUE THAT IT SUITS BOTH REAGAN AND GORBACHEV TO BE SEEN TO BE TALKING FOR DOMESTIC REASONS - IN REAGAN'S CASE, THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS, IN GORBACHEV'S, THE NEED TO REINFORCE HIS PERSONAL STANDING AND ANSWER HIS INTERNAL CRITICS. THE RESOLUTION OF THE DANILOFF AFFAIR COMES IN FOR SOME CRITICISM, BOTH FROM THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT REAGAN WAS OUT-MANOEUVRED AND FROM THOSE WHO QUESTION THE MORALITY OF BARGAINING OVER THE EXCHANGE OF A SPY FOR A HOSTAGE. NONE OF THE COMMENTATORS EXPECTS ANY SPECIFIC RESULT TO EMERGE FROM REYKJAVIK: IT IS SEEN AS ATTRACTIVE TO BOTH SIDES TO MEET WITH LOW EXPECTATIONS AND THIS LOW RISKS. BUT THE PRESS IS IN NO DOUBT OF REAGAN'S ENTHUSIASM FOR HOSTING A FULLY-FLEDGED SUMMIT IN DECEMBER/JANUARY AND OF GORBACHEV'S NEED TO BRING HOME SOME CONCRETE RESULT IF ONE IS HELD.

3. REACTIONS FROM QUAI OFFICIALS ARE ON THE WHOLE SIMILAR TO THE ABOVE. THE FRENCH HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR SOVIET MESSAGE TO THAT IN YOUR TELNO 781 TO MOSCOW, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO COMPARE TEXTS.

4. A NOTEWORTHY OMISSION FROM COMMENT SO FAR HAS BEEN THE PERENNIAL FRENCH FEAR OF THE SUPERPOWERS DOING DEALS OVER THE HEADS OF THE

**CONFIDENTIAL** | EUROPEANS



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EUROPEANS. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE PUS WAS ABLE TO GAUGE AT HIS TALKS  
HERE YESTERDAY, WITHIN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THERE IS CONTINUING  
CONCERN THAT AN INF AGREEMENT COULD GIVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES IF  
SEPARATED FROM THE WIDER PICTURE AND THAT VIGILANCE OVER FRENCH AND  
BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES WILL BE MORE THAN EVER NECESSARY. THEY ARE  
KEEN TO REMAIN IN VERY CLOSE CONTACT WITH US OVER LOBBYING THE  
AMERICANS ON THIS SUBJECT.

FRETWELL

YYYY

FCO PASS SAVING WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN

PCLNAN 3417

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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
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10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

3 October, 1986.

**US/SOVIET RELATIONS**

BT // Thank you for your letter of 2 October enclosing a draft reply. I enclose a revised version which the Prime Minister has signed. I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Moscow for delivery this afternoon.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*h*



MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MR GORBACHEV

Thank you for your message about your forthcoming meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik. I welcome this meeting as a constructive development and a step towards the Summit in the United States which we all want to see. I also regard it as a token of the wish on both the US and Soviet sides for a full Summit, as agreed in Geneva, with the aim of making real progress towards arms reductions, the solution of regional disputes and human rights' problems and the improvement of East/West relations.

With best wishes,

LOB AST

and hope  
that it will  
turn out  
to be  
an  
important  
step  
towards  
a  
Summit  
later  
in the  
year

I very much welcome this meeting  
and hope that you are coming  
together to prepare for a summit,  
which I hope will be held before  
the end of this year. I believe that  
it should be possible to reach  
real agreements on  
reductions in arms, as well as  
on regional disputes and human rights problems.  
I should like to express my best wishes for the success of  
the meeting.

MJ2CKU



CONFIDENTIAL

*SPC* (1)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 October 1986

Dear Charles,

*Terrible message  
a little better  
please*

*Prime Minister  
Agreed to  
attached reply to  
Mr. Gorbachev,  
as amended?*

*CD  
L/X.*

US/Soviet Relations

Further to my letter of 30 September, you requested a short draft interim reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Gorbachev. This is enclosed. A suggested substantive reply will follow in due course, once the Prime Minister has heard from President Reagan about his intentions over the Reykjavik Summit.

Monday 6 and Tuesday 7 October are public holidays in the Soviet Union. We should like therefore to instruct Sir Bryan Cartledge to deliver the reply before the weekend.

*Yours ever,*

*Colin Budd*

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/teletype/dep/XXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM  
PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
HE Mr M S Gorbachev

Your Reference

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SUBJECT:

Thank you

.....In Confidence

~~Many thanks~~ for your message about your forthcoming meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik. I welcome this meeting as a constructive development and a step towards the Summit in the United States which we all want to see. I <sup>also</sup> regard it as a token of the wish on both the US and Soviet sides for a full Summit, as agreed in Geneva, with the aim of making <sup>real</sup> ~~genuine~~ progress in <sup>towards</sup> ~~East/West~~ relations and <sup>reductions</sup> ~~arms~~ control.

CAVEAT.....

the solution of regional disputes and human rights problems and the improvement of East/West relations.

With best wishes,

OICU

Enclosures-flag(s).....



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 October 1986

The joint report  
what the President  
said in advance of  
the PM. NBM

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Relations: Pre-Summit Meeting

COB  
7X1

The United States Embassy have passed on to us the attached letter and message from Mr Shultz to the Foreign Secretary.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

Covering SECRET



SECRET

September 30, 1986

Dear Geoffrey:

As you know from the announcement made in Washington on September 30, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed to meet in Reykjavik on October 11 and 12. This meeting will allow the two leaders a chance to discuss, in a private and informal setting, the agenda for the General Secretary's trip to the United States.

Mr. Gorbachev proposed this meeting to make concrete preparations for his trip to the United States, and not as a substitute for that visit, which was agreed at the Geneva Summit last year.

President Reagan believes this meeting provides an important opportunity to make clear to General Secretary Gorbachev that we believe progress in U.S.-Soviet relations is possible, and we remain committed to achieving it. The President also considers it important that the General Secretary suggested holding the meeting on the soil of a member of the NATO Alliance.

As in the past -- as exemplified most recently in his meeting with you last week in New York -- the President will be seeking the counsel of your Government on the substantive issues which may arise in the Reykjavik and any subsequent meetings.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

/s/

George P. Shultz

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## ANNOUNCEMENT OF REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING

OCTOBER 11-12, 1986

AT 10:00 A.M. WASHINGTON TIME ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, THE PRESIDENT MADE THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT (NOTE: PRESIDENT USED FIRST PERSON IN ACTUAL ANNOUNCEMENT):

BEGIN TEXT:

IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL MEET OCTOBER 11-12, 1986, IN REYKJAVIK, ICELAND. THE MEETING WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND ACCEPTED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS AGREED TO AT GENEVA IN NOVEMBER, 1985. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION APPRECIATE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND TO MAKE THIS MEETING IN REYKJAVIK POSSIBLE. END TEXT.

### TALKING POINTS

-- THE MEETING WILL BE A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION TO REVIEW THE AGENDA FOR GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

-- MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THE MEETING, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR HIS MEETINGS IN THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED MR. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL SINCE HE WISHED TO STRESS HIS COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

-- WE CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE. WE ARE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND TO MAKE THEIR FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR THE MEETING.

-- THE UPCOMING MEETING DOES NOT IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN U.S. SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED TO OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

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-2-

-- THE PRESIDENT WILL, OF COURSE, ADDRESS THE KEY ISSUES ACROSS THE RANGE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGENDA: REGIONAL CONFLICTS, ARMS CONTROL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EXPANSION OF CONTACTS.

-- SINCE THIS WILL BE A PREPARATORY MEETING, NO AGREEMENTS ARE EXPECTED.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED AS WE PREPARE FOR THE MEETING, AND WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT ON THE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

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OF 011600Z OCTOBER 86

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INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MODUK

*MT*

WASHINGTON TELNO 2487 : US/SOVIET RELATIONS: PREPARATORY SUMMIT

## SUMMARY

1. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT HAVE INCREASED THE RISKS INHERENT IN A VISIT BY GORBACHEV TO THE USA. GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A PREPARATORY SUMMIT IN REYKJAVIK PROBABLY DESIGNED TO ENABLE HIM TO ESTABLISH FOR HIMSELF THAT THE RISKS ARE WORTH TAKING.

## DETAIL

2. EVEN AT THE TIME OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE VISIT TO THE US BY GORBACHEV, WHICH WAS THEN AGREED IN PRINCIPLE FOR 1986, WOULD INVOLVE A DEGREE OF RISK FOR HIM. THE INSUBSTANTIAL OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA MEETING COULD, TAKING PLACE AS IT DID ON NEUTRAL GROUND, BE REPRESENTED TO SOVIET OPINION AS A DRAW OR EVEN A SUCCESS: A SIMILAR OR ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE SIGNIFICANT OUTCOME FROM A MEETING ON AMERICAN GROUND WOULD DEFINITELY BE SEEN AS A DEFEAT. HENCE, IN PART, GORBACHEV'S CONSTANT EMPHASIS SINCE GENEVA ON THE NEED FOR A PRODUCTIVE SECOND SUMMIT. THE ERRATIC COURSE OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS THIS YEAR, CULMINATING IN ZAKHAROV/DANILOFF AND THE UN EXPULSIONS, HAS FURTHER RAISED THE STAKES. THERE MAY WELL BE THOSE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF REPEATED US SLIGHTS AND CUSSEDNESS, THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU SHOULD NOT BE DRAWN INTO ALL THE RAZMATAZ AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF A VISIT TO WASHINGTON UNTIL THE AMERICANS HAVE EARNED IT BY A PERIOD OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

3. GORBACHEV HIMSELF NEVERTHELESS STILL WANTS TO GO (MY TELNO 1124, PARA 6). BUT IT IS NOW EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO SECURE A CAST-IRON ASSURANCE THAT, IF HE DOES, HE WILL BE ABLE TO BRING BACK A SUFFICIENTLY IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE OF AGREEMENTS, FAVOURABLE TO SOVIET AS WELL AS TO US INTERESTS, TO DISARM HIS ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL CRITICS. HE SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SUCH AN ASSURANCE CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED FROM DIRECT TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: ANY PROSPECTIVE PACKAGE WHICH MIGHT EMERGE FROM EXCHANGES BETWEEN SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE COULD, GORBACHEV DOUBTLESS BELIEVES (PERHAPS ON DOBRYNIN'S ADVICE) BE UNDERMINED AND UNRAVELLED BY WEINBERGER AND HIS ALLIES BEFORE BEING GIVEN FINAL PRESIDENTIAL BLESSING. GORBACHEV'S NATURAL INSTINCT IS IN ANY CASE TO SEE FOR HIMSELF IF POSSIBLE, AND TO FORM HIS OWN ASSESSMENTS.

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4. SHEVERDNADZE'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK ON 30 SEPTEMBER (AS PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON 1 OCTOBER) WAS SKILFUL IN ITS TACTICS AS WELL AS IN ITS PRESENTATION. HIS CONFIDENT REFERENCES TO GORBACHEV'S FORTHCOMING US VISIT, AS IF THIS WERE A FOREGONE CONCLUSION, SHOULD NOT IN MY VIEW BE TAKEN AT THEIR FACE VALUE. MOREOVER, HIS STATEMENT THAT "THERE IS NO PROGRESS" IN THE MAIN AREAS OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS IS NOT, JUDGING BY US BRIEFINGS ON CURRENT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, JUSTIFIED. THE INTENTION IS EVIDENTLY TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH GORBACHEV CAN CLAIM THE CREDIT FOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME FROM REYKJAVIK BUT, EQUALLY, PLACE THE BLAME ON THE AMERICANS IF HE DOES NOT SECURE THE DEGREE OF ASSURANCE OF A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT WHICH HE NEEDS IN ORDER TO GO AHEAD WITH HIS US TRIP. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF SHEVARDNADZE'S DETERMINED OPTIMISM, GORBACHEV WOULD BE ABLE TO SAY THAT IT WAS US RELUCTANCE TO GO THE EXTRA MILE AT REYKJAVIK WHICH HAD OBLIGED HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT THE CONDITIONS DID NOT YET EXIST FOR A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT.

5. IT SEEMS CLEAR BOTH FROM SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARKS AND FROM THE ACCOUNT WHICH MY US COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS GIVEN ME (AND MY FRG AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES) OF THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, THAT ONE OF THESE CONDITIONS WILL STILL HAVE TO BE THE PROSPECT OF AT LEAST MODEST PROGRESS TOWARDS A LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR TESTS. THE RUSSIANS ARE CONTINUING TO PAINT THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER ON THE NUCLEAR TEST ISSUE AND EVEN AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT WOULD NOT COMPENSATE FOR FAILURE BY GORBACHEV TO BRING BACK FROM A SUMMIT EVEN A MODEST ADVANCE ON TESTING. ONE OF HIS MAIN OBJECTIVES AT REYKJAVIK WILL BE TO ASSESS HIS CHANCES OF SECURING THIS: IF THE US POSITION REMAINS COMPLETELY HARD I WOULD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SUMMIT COULD SLIP INTO NEXT YEAR. PARTLY FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS, HOWEVER, GORBACHEV'S FIRM PREFERENCE WILL BE TO AVOID SUCH A POSTPONEMENT IF POSSIBLE: HE WILL WISH TO APPEAR AT THE NEXT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM (WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE LATER THIS MONTH AND IS EXPECTED TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL POLICIES AND POSSIBLY LEADERSHIP CHANGES) WITH A CONSTRUCTIVE REYKJAVIK MEETING BEHIND HIM AND THE FIRM PROSPECT OF A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT AHEAD.

CARTLEDGE

MXHPAN 5470.

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FM WASHINGTON

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OF 012300Z OCTOBER 86

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MODUK FOR DACU

OUR TELNO 2487: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. INITIAL PRESS VERDICT ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS REASONABLY POSITIVE, WITH SPOTLIGHT SHIFTING FROM DANILOFF TO REYKJAVIK. ADMINISTRATION STILL HOPING FOR A SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT BEFORE THE NEW YEAR.

DETAIL

2. THE DANILOFF DEAL COMES IN FOR SOME PREDICTABLE CRITICISM IN THE US 1 OCTOBER PRESS. MAIN COMPLAINTS ARE THAT (A) FOR ALL THE WINDOW-DRESSING, THE ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTED THE EXCHANGE OF A SPY FOR AN INNOCENT US JOURNALIST AND (A) THEY GOT LESS IN RETURN THAN DID PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS (EG CARTER IN 1979 GOT OUT FIVE DISSIDENTS AS PART OF A DEAL INVOLVING RELEASE OF A US BUSINESSMAN). BUT UNLIKE THE UPROAR WHICH GREETED THE INITIAL RELEASE OF DANILOFF AND ZACHAROV TO THEIR AMBASSADORS, THE LATEST SNIPING IS CONFINED LARGELY TO THE RIGHT. THE NEW YORK TIMES LEADER THIS MORNING SUMS UP THE MORE WIDESPREAD VIEW HERE: QUOTE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RELEASE MEET - JUST BARELY - AMERICA'S CONDITION THAT DANILOFF NOT BE TAINTED IN A STRAIGHT SWAP UNQUOTE.

3. IN ANY CASE THE REYKJAVIK MEETING IS ALREADY REPLACING THE DANILOFF AFFAIR AS THE MAIN FOCUS OF MEDIA ATTENTION. THE ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED BY BOTH SIDES ON THE HILL, WHERE, AS EXPECTED, THE ADMINISTRATION ARE USING IT IN ARGUING AGAINST THE HOUSE AMENDMENTS TO THE DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS BILL (OUR TUR, PARA 3), AND, LESS CONVINCINGLY, SENATE PLANS TO OVER-RIDE THE VETO OF THE SOUTH AFRICA SANCTIONS BILL (OUR TELNO 2494).

4. BUT THE REYKJAVIK MEETING HAS NOT BEEN UNIVERSALLY WELCOMED. ONE SCHOOL (EG KISSINGER AND SCOWCROFT) ARGUE THAT IN AGREEING TO MEET GORBACHEV THREE WEEKS BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT HAS PUT HIMSELF IN A POSITION WHERE HE CANNOT AFFORD FAILURE, AND HAS THEREBY WEAKENED HIS BARGAINING POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. OTHERS, ON THE DEMOCRAT SIDE, SEE A HINT OF IMPROPRIETY IN HOLDING SUCH AN EVENT DURING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN: THIS LINE OF CRITICISM MAY STRENGTHEN IF REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE SPOKESMEN CONTINUE TO CLAIM THAT REYKJAVIK WILL PLAY WELL ON 4 NOVEMBER. FROM THE RIGHT, ANNOYANCE AT THE SMALL

**Confidential**

(Print)



-2-

# Confidential

PRINT OF THE DANILOFF/ZACHAROV DEAL IS COUPLED WITH CONCERN ABOUT SUMMITRY, AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON SOVIET ATTITUDES: KEMP'S VERDICT IS THAT THE DEAL IS QUOTE A TERRIBLE PRECEDENT THE SOVIETS WON THIS ROUND AND THAT'S THE WRONG KIND OF ENVIRONMENT UNQUOTE FOR A SUMMIT.

3. BUT ON BALANCE REACTIONS HAVE BEEN AS POSITIVE AS THE ADMINISTRATION COULD HAVE EXPECTED. AND THE PRESS HAVE NOTED THE FAVOURABLE WESTERN EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT REYKJAVIK.

5. ADMINISTRATION BRIEFERS ARE CONTINUING TO STRESS THE PREPARATORY NATURE OF THE EXERCISE: NOT A SUMMIT BUT A PRE-SUMMIT. AND MATLOCK IN NSC AND RIDWAY IN STATE HAVE BRIEFED THEIR TEAMS THAT A LATE NOVEMBER/EARLY DECEMBER SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT REMAINS THE AIM, AND ONE THAT THEY BOTH EXPECT WILL BE ACHIEVED.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWDAN 6720

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# Confidential





## 10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

30 September 1986

## US/SOVIET PRE-SUMMIT

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan about the meeting he will have with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik on 11/12 October, which arrived during the course of last night. I showed it to the Foreign Secretary first thing this morning.

Clearly we shall need to give thought straight away to the advice which the Prime Minister should offer the President, probably in the form of a personal message. Given that the Prime Minister leaves for the Party Conference in Bournemouth on 6 October, we shall need a draft for her box next weekend.

Meanwhile I should be grateful if you would delay action on my letter of yesterday about the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, until we know more about the date of a Summit.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

(C. D. POWELL)

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



GRS 1000

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FM WASHINGTON  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 2487  
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SIC MODUK FOR PS/SOFS, DUS(P), DACU

MY TELNO 2478: US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. REYKJAVIK MEETING: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT THAT THERE IS NO MORE IN IT THAN MEETS THE EYE.

DETAIL

2. THE PROPOSAL FOR AN EARLY, PRE-SUMMIT, MEETING FIRST SURFACED, IN GENERAL TERMS, IN THE GORBACHEV MESSAGE WHICH SHEVARDNADZE DELIVERED HERE ON 19 SEPTEMBER. IT WAS APPARENTLY MADE CONCRETE IN SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK. SPECIFICALLY, THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED A MEETING OF PRINCIPALS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS ONLY, AND INDICATED THAT THE PURPOSE SHOULD BE TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A FULL SUMMIT.

3. NSC SOURCES TELL US THAT THE PRESIDENT'S IMMEDIATE REACTIONS WERE POSITIVE. PROVIDED THAT THE DANILOFF OBSTACLE COULD BE CLEARED AWAY FIRST, AND PROVIDED THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE PREPARATORY TO, RATHER THAN A SUBSTITUTE FOR, A 1986 SUMMIT IN THE UNITED STATES, AS AGREED IN GENEVA LAST NOVEMBER, HE THOUGHT THE PROPOSAL A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE.

4. OUR CONTACTS SUGGEST THAT THE PRINCIPAL US AIM AT REYKJAVIK WILL BE TO SCREW DOWN AGREEMENT ON A DATE (IN LATE NOVEMBER/ DECEMBER) AND AN AGENDA FOR A SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT HERE. NO-ONE BELIEVES THAT A SUBSTANTIVE NST QUOTE ACHIEVEMENT UNQUOTE WILL BE READY FOR REYKJAVIK. AND THE GENERAL VIEW IS THAT AGREEMENTS ON MINOR ISSUES (EG RISK REDUCTION CENTRES, A JOINT STATEMENT ON CW NON-PROLIFERATION, AND POSSIBLY SOMETHING ON THRESHOLD TEST BAN VERIFICATION), WHICH MIGHT BE GOT READY IN TIME FOR A SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT, AND SOME OF WHICH (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT VERIFICATION) COULD CONCEIVABLY BE BROUGHT FORWARD FOR REYKJAVIK, WOULD BE SEEN AS OUT-OF-SCALE THEN: THEY MIGHT MAKE GOOD ICING FOR A SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT CAKE, BUT WOULD LOOK STRANGE WITH NO CAKE. THERE IS SO FAR NO SIGN WHATSOEVER EITHER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NST TEAM TO COOK SOMETHING UP BY 11 OCTOBER, OR OF HOT LINE, CW, OR NUCLEAR TESTING EXPERTS BEING DESPATCHED POST-HASTE TO BERNE OR GENEVA TO NEGOTIATE TEXTS WHICH WOULD BE AGREED AD REFERENDUM TO REYKJAVIK.

SHULTZ HAS SAID THAT REGIONAL, BILATERAL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WILL ALSO BE COVERED AT REYKJAVIK, SO THE DISCUSSION WILL NOT ONLY BE ON ARMS CONTROL. BUT WE SEE NO SIGNS OF SUDDEN NEW ACTIVITY IN THESE AREAS EITHER.

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5. THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION HERE OF SOVIET MOTIVES IN PROPOSING THE PRE-SUMMIT SUMMIT. THE HARD LINE (EG PENTAGON) VIEW IS THAT SUCH A MANOEUVRE WAS TO BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THE STANDARD SOVIET NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUE OF AGREEING NOTHING (EVEN A SUMMIT DATE) UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT, WHILST TRYING TO EXTRACT A PRICE FOR IT. THE PENTAGON ASSUME THAT THE PRICE ASKED WILL BE IN ONE OF THE THREE AREAS APPARENTLY COVERED BY THE LATEST GORBACHEV LETTER NUCLEAR TEST-BANS, INF, AND THE ABM TREATY. OTHERS (EG IN STATE) ARGUE THAT THE SOVIET MOTIVE MAY BE A COMBINATION OF GENUINE UNCERTAINTY (EG IN THE LIGHT OF US DOMESTIC REACTIONS TO THE DANILOFF AFFAIR) ABOUT WHETHER THE PRESIDENT IS STILL IN THE GENEVA NOVEMBER 1985 MOOD, AND THEREFORE WHETHER A REAL SUMMIT IS LIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE, AND THE TACTICAL APPRECIATION THAT IT IS IMPORTANT (VIS-A-VIS WESTERN EUROPE) FOR MOSCOW TO APPEAR TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SECURE A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT, OR TO CONTRIVE ITS POSTPONEMENT/CANCELLATION IN A FORM FOR WHICH MOSCOW CANNOT BE BLAMED. WHAT SEEMS CLEAR IS THAT THE PRESIDENT AT ONCE SAW THE PROPOSAL AS ONE WHICH COULD NOT BE REJECTED.

6. NSC SOURCES TELL US THAT THERE IS NO CURRENT PLAN FOR ANY FORMAL ALLIANCE CONSULTATION EXERCISE BEFORE REYKJAVIK. THEY SEE NO NEED FOR ONE, GIVEN THE PREPARATORY, PRE-SUMMIT, NATURE OF THE EVENT ITSELF. AND IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THEY SEE NO TIME FOR ONE. BUT THEY ARE ALREADY CONSIDERING WHAT FORM OF CONSULTATION IMMEDIATELY AFTER REYKJAVIK (PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES/EMISSARIES TO CAPITALS/REINFORCED NAC) MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE.

COMMENT

7. OUR INSTINCT IS TO TAKE AT FACE VALUE WHAT OUR CONTACTS TELL US. WE SHALL OF COURSE BE ALERT FOR ANY INDICATIONS OF NEW PRE-REYKJAVIK IMPETUS BEING APPLIED TO ANY PART OF THE ARMS CONTROL OR WIDER AGENDA: FOR TEXTS BEING WORKED UP: OR FOR DEALS BEING PRE-COOKED. BUT THERE ARE AT PRESENT NO SUCH SIGNS. THE DANILOFF/ZAKHAROV AFFAIR HAS MONOPOLISED HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION TO EAST/WEST ISSUES IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. AND WE BELIEVE THAT NOTHING SIGNIFICANT HAS HAPPENED IN GENEVA WHILE SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE WERE TALKING DANILOFF HERE AND IN NEW YORK.

8. AND ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO SEARCH FOR HIDDEN MOTIVES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S WELCOME FOR THE IDEA. FIRST, HE WANTS HIS SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT THIS WINTER, AND IF HE NOW HAS FIRST TO GO TO ICELAND TO GET IT, THAT PRICE AT LEAST IS WORTH PAYING. SECOND, IF THERE WERE TO BE NO SUBSTANTIVE SUMMIT, HE TOO WOULD WISH TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FAULT WAS NOT HIS. THIRD, BY PLAYING A WHOLLY NEW CARD. HE MAY HOPE TO DIVERT THE PRESS FROM TOO CLOSE A SCRUTINY OF THE DETAILS OF THE DANILOFF/ZAKHAROV DEAL, AND SO AVOID ANOTHER OUTBURST FROM THE RIGHT AT A DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET EQUIVALENCE AND/OR THE PARTIAL CLIMBDOWN ON UN EXPULSIONS. FINALLY, VIS-A-VIS THE LEFT, IE DEMOCRATS ON THE HILL, THE NEW CARD WILL CERTAINLY BE USED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOUSE'S AMENDMENTS TO THE DEFENCE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, WHICH WOULD BAN ALMOST ALL 1987 NUCLEAR

2

CONFIDENTIAL

/TESTS



TESTS, ALL EXPENDITURE ON PROGRAMMES WHICH WOULD EXCEED SALT II LIMITS, ALL CW MODERNISATION, AND ALL ASAT TESTS, AND CUT BACK SDI FUNDS. THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ALREADY ARGUING THAT THE AMENDMENTS MUST BE STRUCK OUT IF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATORS WERE NOT TO BE UNDERMINED: THE ARGUMENT NOW WILL BE THAT THE PRESIDENT MUST NOT BE SENT TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH HIS POSITION ALREADY WEAKENED.

ACLAND

YYYY

ORWBAN 6693

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

SOVIET D	PS/MR RENTON
DEFENCE D	PS/MR EGGAR
RES D	PS/PUS
PLANNING STAFF	MR DEREK THOMAS
EED	CHIEF CLERK
NAD	MR GOODALL
WED	MR FERGUSSON
ACDD	
CRD	MR RATFORD
NEWS D	MR DAUNT
INFO D	MR FEARN
ECD (E)	MR LONG
FED	MR BRAITHWAITE
NED	MR BARRINGTON
POD	MR WINCHESTER
PUSD	MR RENWICK
CSCE UNIT	
PROTOCOL D	
PS	
PS/LADY YOUNG	

3

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 September 1986

CDP  
1/K.

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Relations

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires, Mr Gventsadze, called on Mr Derek Thomas this afternoon and delivered an oral message from Mr Gorbachev to the Prime Minister. I enclose an unofficial translation. Gventsadze described the message as a personal one and said that Mr Gorbachev would hope that Mrs Thatcher would reply.

Derek Thomas undertook to pass the message on at once. He welcomed Mr Gorbachev's promptness in getting his views to us, and said that he expected that the Prime Minister would indeed reply in due course. He added that she would welcome the forthcoming meeting between the President and the General Secretary and hope that it would produce concrete results.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF SPEAKING NOTE GIVEN TO FCO  
POLITICAL DIRECTOR BY SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON 30  
SEPTEMBER 1986

It has just been announced that, by agreement, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M S Gorbachev, and the President of the USA, R Reagan, will meet on 11-12 October 1986 in Reykjavik (Iceland). On the instruction of M S Gorbachev we would wish to inform you of the motives leading to this step and the background to the achievement of this agreement.

The proposal for an early confidential meeting - either in Iceland or in London - was put forward by M S Gorbachev in his personal message to R Reagan in reply to the latter's letter of 25 July. This message was recently handed over in Washington to the President of the USA by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, E A Shevardnadze. This proposal arose from the fact that, having analysed the course of the negotiations in Geneva and the content of Reagan's letter (mentioned above), the Soviet leadership came to the conclusion that the whole process of Soviet-American dialogue was in need of a serious impulse. At present the negotiations are practically marking time, creating only the appearance of constructive work. It was also taken into account that



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the overwhelming majority of responsible State leaders of East and West, the majority of governments and the world public are insistently coming out in favour of the holding of a Soviet/American Summit meeting.

This proposal of ours does not mean that the visit of M S Gorbachev to the United States, on which there was agreement at the Geneva meeting, is being cancelled. But in order that it should be useful, a certain confidence is necessary that this visit will produce results.

Our initiative was intensively discussed in the contacts between E A Shevardnadze and G Shultz in Washington and New York and, despite all the complicating circumstances, which were not created by our side, it led to the agreement which has now been made known.

The short but substantive meeting has the task, in our opinion, of indicating steps for the swift elaboration at the level of responsible organisations of draft documents on 2-3 key questions of disarmament, which could become the subject of negotiations at the Soviet/American Summit meeting in Washington.

The agreement reached reflects, in our view, the evident interest everywhere in the world, including from your side, that the meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the USA should not simply take place but should lead to substantive agreements on the most important directions for lessening the nuclear threat.



We hope that your country, to the extent of its possibilities, will facilitate the fruitful course of Soviet/American Summit dialogue and the general amelioration of the world political climate.



DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Private Secretary

Reference (2)

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

Your Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:

Copies to:

Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

*Prime Minister  
This is Mr.  
Gorbachev's message  
to you.  
CM*

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

SUBJECT:

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

CAVEAT .....

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Enclosures flag(s) .....



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SEPTEMBER 1986

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the whole process of Soviet-American dialogue was in need  
of a serious impulse. At present the negotiations are  
practically marking time, creating only the appearance of  
constructive work. It was also taken into account that



We hope that your country, to the extent of its possibilities, will facilitate the fruitful course of Soviet/American Summit dialogue and the general amelioration of the world political climate.



SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T178186

13

CABWTE001

O 301140Z SEP 86  
FM CABINET OFFICE  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
BT  
S E C R E T  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

DEAR RON

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT YOUR FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. I SEE THIS AS A VERY POSITIVE STEP AND SHALL WELCOME IT PUBLICLY AS SOON AS AN ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING MORE DETAILS OF WHAT YOU PROPOSE TO DISCUSS AND HOW THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO AFFECT THE TIMING OF GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, AND WILL THEN LET YOU HAVE MY THOUGHTS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

ALTHOUGH I DON'T YET HAVE FULL DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO SECURE MR. DANILOFF'S RELEASE, I CONGRATULATE YOU ON RESOLVING THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

MARGARET.

BT

NNNN

SENT 30/1214Z DRF

RGRG MATE RCVD MSG FBFB QSL AT 1213Z AND WILL DELIVER KKK



SUBJECT CC MASTER  
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T177186

Duty Clerk

NO 10

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
ZEM

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE EYES ONLY WHO2651

DEAR MARGARET

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW WITHOUT DELAY THAT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET IN REYKJAVIK OCTOBER 11 AND 12 TO REVIEW IN A PRIVATE AND INFORMAL SESSION THE AGENDA FOR HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

MR. GORBACHEV PROPOSED THIS MEETING NOT TO TAKE THE PLACE OF HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETINGS HERE. I FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ME TO AGREE TO THE MEETING, IN ORDER TO STRESS MY COMMITMENT TO REAL PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I ALSO CONSIDER IT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT THAT MR. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED HOLDING THE MEETING ON THE SOIL OF A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

THE MEETING WILL BE ANNOUNCED AROUND 1000 WASHINGTON TIME ON SEPTEMBER 30, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS INFORMATION IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

AS I PREPARE FOR THIS MEETING, I SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR COUNSEL ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

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**US Declassified**

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GRS 1400

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK

TO DESKBY 241800Z FCO

TELNO 908

OF 241640Z SEPTEMBER 1986

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STOCKHOLM

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN

ms 12

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH SHEVARDNADZE, 23 SEPTEMBER

SUMMARY

1. A BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION WHICH COVERED A LOT OF GROUND IN ONE HOUR. SHEVARDNADZE DETERMINEDLY GENERAL AND FULLY ON TOP OF THE SUBJECTS. NO NEW INSIGHT INTO DANILOFF OR PROSPECTS FOR SUMMIT.

DETAIL

BILATERAL

2. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED HIS USEFUL JULY VISIT TO BRITAIN, ON WHICH HE HAD REPORTED FULLY TO GORBACHEV. IT WAS GOOD THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW NEXT SPRING. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED, ADDING THAT MR RENTON ALSO HOPED TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION EARLY IN 1987. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO NOTED THE FORTHCOMING SUPREME SOVIET VISIT TO BRITAIN, AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN EXPERTS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, MOST RECENTLY ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE LOOKED FORWARD TO EXPERT TALKS ON TERRORISM.

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3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED THE PROBLEM OF VISA APPLICATIONS FOR UNACCEPTABLE APPOINTMENTS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY AND TRADE DELEGATION IN LONDON. WE MATCHED OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO SAFEGUARDING OUR SECURITY WITH A SINCERE WISH FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. CANDIDLY, SOME OF THOSE NOW BEING PROPOSED DID NOT MEET OUR CRITERIA AND HE HOPED SHEVARDNADZE WOULD ASK HIS PEOPLE TO LOOK AGAIN AT THOSE PROBLEM CASES. SHEVARDNADZE DID NOT RESPOND UNTIL LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, WHEN HE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY DIFFICULTY. (HE SEEMED AT FIRST TO MISUNDERSTAND, THINKING THAT OUR OBJECTION WAS TO PEOPLE ALREADY SERVING IN LONDON, BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE CLARIFIED THIS). IF WE HAD DATA ABOUT SPECIFIC NEW APPLICANTS, THEN WE SHOULD GIVE IT TO THE RUSSIANS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPEATED HIS HOPE THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND ADDED THAT PEOPLE FROM THE MFA WERE USUALLY ACCEPTABLE.

CDE

4. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED DISCUSSION OF CDE IN LONDON IN JULY. SINCE THEN JOINT EFFORTS HAD LED TO A MAJOR POLITICAL SUCCESS, THE RESULTS OF WHICH WOULD BE FELT BY ALL NATIONS. THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY SATISFIED, AND WOULD NOT NOW WISH TO DISPUTE WITH US WHO SHOULD TAKE THE CREDIT FOR THE OUTCOME. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THE SIMILARITY OF HIS AND SHEVARDNADZE'S REMARKS ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE UNGA.

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5. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT GOOD GROUND-WORK HAD ALSO BEEN LAYED FOR VIENNA. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THERE WAS A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION NEXT YEAR. DIFFICULT QUESTIONS REMAINED, INCLUDING INSPECTIONS, BUT THE BRITISH PROPOSAL ON CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS CONTAINED MANY ELEMENTS WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION, AND COULD BE THE BASIS OF A SOLUTION. HE HAD SAID THE SAME TO SHULTZ.

6. IN REPLY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OBSERVED THAT EACH OF THE THREE CSCE BASKETS WAS IMPORTANT. REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL WAS AS IMPORTANT FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR COUNTRY'S DEFENCE AS IT WAS FOR THOSE DEALING SPECIFICALLY WITH ARMS CONTROL. NEITHER SIDE'S MILITARY COULD GUARANTEE SECURITY UNLESS THERE WERE SOME LIMITS ON THE RESOURCES WHICH THE OTHER SIDE WERE ABLE TO DEDICATE TO DEFENCE.

### TESTING

7. SHEVARDNADZE HOPED THAT COMMON GROUND MIGHT ALSO BE REACHED ON A TEST BAN. MOST STATES FAVOURED THIS, ALTHOUGH HE KNEW THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN OBJECTIONS. THERE WAS NOW NO TECHNICAL PROBLEM ABOUT VERIFYING A CESSATION OF TESTING: BRITAIN SHOULD REFLECT FURTHER ABOUT THIS. THE RUSSIANS WERE CONTENT TO RESUME TRILATERAL OR BILATERAL TALKS WHENEVER WE WISHED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM WAS A GENUINE ONE, AS THE TIME SPENT ON THIS ISSUE AT STOCKHOLM AND IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTEXT DEMONSTRATED. SHEVARDNADZE ARGUED THAT THESE CASES WERE DIFFERENT, AND RECALLED THE REFERENCE IN HIS UNGA SPEECH TO THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AT SEMIPALATINSK. THE THRESHOLD WAS OPEN TO DISCUSSION BUT THE NON-EXISTENCE OF TESTS WAS STRAIGHTFORWARD TO VERIFY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT A STEP BY STEP APPROACH WAS BEST, STARTING WITH RATIFICATION OF PNET AND TTBT.

### TERRORISM

8. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT BRITISH AND SOVIET APPROACHES WERE SIMILAR, AND HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO BILATERAL MEETINGS BETWEEN EXPERTS TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL MEASURES. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO AVOID UNSUBSTANTIATED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUAL STATES OR GROUPS. EVIDENCE WAS REQUIRED, AND HE HAD SAID THIS TO SHULTZ. HE HELD NO BRIEF FOR GADHAFI, BUT NOTED THAT GADHAFI HAD OFFERED AT HARARE TO SUBMIT TO TRIAL FOR ALLEGED LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. AS FOR PREVENTIVE MEASURES, THE RUSSIANS WOULD COOPERATE IF SPECIFIC INFORMATION WERE MADE AVAILABLE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNDERLINED THE SERIOUSNESS OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: WE IN BRITAIN HAD HAD EXPERIENCE OF THE LIBYAN VARIETY. IT WAS RIGHT TO AVOID HASTY ACCUSATIONS, BUT WE HAD GOOD EVIDENCE OF LIBYA SUPPLYING THE IRA WITH WEAPONS, AND GADHAFI WAS PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING IRAISH TERRORISM. SHEVARDNADZE RETREATED INTO A COMPARISON BETWEEN GADHAFI'S SUPPORT OF THE IRA AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARDS NICARAGUA AND ANGOLA.

CONFIDENTIAL 2

(EAST)



EAST/WEST

**CONFIDENTIAL**

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THAT WHILE PROGRESS BEGAN TO LOOK POSSIBLE ON THE ARMS CONTROL AGENDA, THE DANILOFF CASE HOWEVER CREATED A DIFFICULTY WHICH THE RUSSIANS SHOULD REMOVE. IT MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO IMPEDE THAT PROGRESS. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT WE EVIDENTLY DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE CASE. WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED HIM ABOUT IT RATHER THAN AUTOMATICALLY BELIEVING THE AMERICAN VERSION. EVIDENCE WOULD BE PRODUCED AT DANILOFF'S TRIAL, AND HE WOULD BE CONVICTED ACCORDING TO SOVIET LAW. THE TWELVE WOULD THEN REGRET THEIR DEMARCHE. WHY DID WE IMAGINE THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE BEGUN SUCH PROCEEDINGS, IF THEY LACKED ADEQUATE EVIDENCE? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE FIRMLY IN REPLY, REFUSING TO BE DRAWN ON TO THIS TERRAIN, BUT BRINGING OUT DANILOFF'S BACKGROUND AND THE FACT THAT MRS DANILOFF WAS BRITISH. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE ZAKHAROV CASE HAD BEEN A SET UP. IT HAD BEEN A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO RAISE THESE ISSUES IN HIS UNGA SPEECH, WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT THEM. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED TWO OR THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, BUT REAGAN WAS MORE INTERESTED IN PROPAGANDA. SHEVARDNADZE WOULD NOT USE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO REBUT AMERICAN ACCUSATIONS, BUT HAD INSTEAD MET SHULTZ AGAIN ON 23 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS THE MATTER PRIVATELY. HE HOPED WE WOULD URGE THE AMERICANS TO REMOVE THESE IMPEDIMENTS TO A SUMMIT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE WHOLE WORLD WISHED THE AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS NOT TO LET PROGRESS TOWARDS A SUMMIT BE STALEMATED BY THESE DIFFICULTIES.

10. SHEVARDNADZE REFERRED TO THE EXPULSION OF THE 25 SOVIET DIPLOMATS FROM THE UN. HE FOUND THE TIMING, ONE DAY BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL, EXPLICABLE ONLY AS AN ATTEMPT BY ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN AMERICA TO THWART AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE AMERICANS KNEW THAT THE RUSSIANS RESPONDED IN KIND TO SUCH EXPULSIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED THAT SIMILAR QUESTIONS ABOUT TIMING HAD BEEN RAISED IN RELATION TO DANILOFF.

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RECALLED HIS PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, INCLUDING IRINA RATUSHINSKAYA (ABOUT WHOM THERE WAS A PREDICTABLE EXCHANGE). ANOTHER CATEGORY OF IMPORTANCE WAS PERSONAL REUNION AND FAMILY CASES, INCLUDING LAPTEV. HE HANDED OVER A BOUT DE PAPIER SETTING OUT THE FACTS OF THE CASE (TEXT FOLLOWS BY MUFAX TO FCO) MAKING THE POINT THAT IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHY LAPTEV COULD NOT BE ALLOWED OUT TO JOIN HIS WIFE. IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE THIS NOW, AND AVOID A PUBLIC CAMPAIGN BY LAPTEV'S WIFE. SHEVARDNADZE ACCEPTED THE PIECE OF PAPER AND WROTE ON IT AN INSTRUCTION THAT A REPLY BE PRODUCED.

**CONFIDENTIAL 3**

FALKLANDS FISH

112



# CONFIDENTIAL

12. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT SEEN AN OFFICIAL COPY OF THE SOVIET/ARGENTINE AGREEMENT, ITS TEXT SEEMED TO INCLUDE FALKLANDS WATERS, WHICH WOULD MAKE IT UNACCEPTABLE TO US. SHEVARDNADZE STUDIED HIS BRIEF VERY CAREFULLY, AND THEN SAID THAT SOVIET AGENCIES HAD ASSURED HIM THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT AFFECT LEGITIMATE BRITISH INTERESTS AND WAS AN AGREEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. THERE WAS THEREFORE NO REASON FOR BRITAIN TO BE CONCERNED. AS FOR TRANSMITTING THE TEXT TO US, THIS COULD NOT BE DONE UNTIL IT WAS PUBLISHED, AND ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF ARGENTINA. HE HAD LOOKED CAREFULLY INTO THIS MATTER. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES CLEARLY SAW THE AGREEMENT AS APPLYING TO THEIR ECONOMIC ZONE, INCLUDING WATERS AROUND THE FALKLANDS. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD NO INTEREST IN COMPLICATING THEIR RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN: HE WOULD LOOK AGAIN AT THE NUANCES OF THE AGREEMENT AND GIVE A MORE DETAILED ANSWER LATER.

THOMSON

YYYY

NFLNAN 5014

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
LIMITED

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
RES D  
PLANNING STAFF  
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CSCE UNIT  
PROTOCOL D  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG

SCO  
MVO  
UNO  
FIO

PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
CHIEF CLERK  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR FEARN  
MR LONG  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
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OF 241230Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON

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UKMIS NEW YORK FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY

MODUK FOR DACU

US/SOVIET RELATIONS: GORBACHEV'S APPROACH MARCH TO A SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. WITH A SUMMIT NOW A 'REAL PROSPECT' (SHEVARDNADZE'S UNGA SPEECH), ASSUMING THAT A DANILOFF DEAL IS MADE, GORBACHEV CAN LOOK FORWARD TO PRODUCING MORE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS FROM IT THAN HE ACHIEVED AT GENEVA AND THAN HE HIMSELF HAS SINCE PUBLICLY STIPULATED. HE NEEDS THIS OUTCOME TO VINDICATE HIS POLICY OF DIALOGUE AND ALSO TO STRENGTHEN HIS DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY. THE POTENTIAL FLAW IN THE AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY BE ON OFFER COULD PROVIDE FURTHER AMMUNITION FOR THOSE OPPOSED TO HIS INTERNAL POLICIES. BUT THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE SEES THE POTENTIAL GAINS AS OUTWEIGHING THE RISKS AND THAT HE WILL NOW PRESS AHEAD WITH SUMMIT PREPARATIONS.

DETAIL

2. SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, GORBACHEV HAS SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM IN THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE, ON ALL FRONTS, AND TO RIDE OUT THE RECURRENT SQUALLS WHICH HE COULD HAVE ALLOWED TO BLOW HIM OFF COURSE. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT PAUSE IN HIS PUBLIC APPROACH MARCH TO A SUMMIT OCCURRED AFTER THE BLACK SEA NAVAL INCIDENTS AND THE US BOMBING OF LIBYA. BUT HE HAS REACTED WITH REMARKABLE RESTRAINT BOTH TO US SCORN FOR HISTORICAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS AND, MORE RECENTLY, TO THE EXPULSION OF 25 DIPLOMATS FROM THE SOVIET UN MISSION. DESPITE MOUNTING EVIDENCE BOTH OF OPPOSITION TO HIS DOMESTIC POLICIES AND OF CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING TOO SOFT ON THE US, GORBACHEV HAS LOWERED, RATHER THAN RAISED, HIS SUMMIT DESIDERATA DOWN TO HIS CURRENT INSISTENCE ON 'VISIBLE PROGRESS IN SOLVING ONE OR TWO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES'. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO SECURE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND FROM WHICH HE CAN BLAME THE AMERICANS IF A SUMMIT DOES NOT MATERIALIZE IN 1986. BUT THE BREAKING OF THE LOG-JAM IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, NOW BEING FOLLOWED UP IN GENEVA, PRESUMABLY OWES SOMETHING TO SOVIET CONCESSIONS SEMICOLON AND EVEN

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BEFORE A POSITIVE CDE OUTCOME IN STOCKHOLM GAVE A FURTHER BOOST TO GORBACHEV'S POLICY OF DIALOGUE, SHEVARDNADZE HAD TAKEN TO WASHINGTON WHAT MUST BE ONE OF THE MOST CONCILIATORY BRIEFS EVER CARRIED BY A SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER. SO FAR, SO GOOD: BUT GORBACHEV MUST BE WELL AWARE OF THE POLITICAL RISKS TO WHICH HE WOULD BE EXPOSED IF HIS PERSISTENT MODERATION WERE EITHER TO MEET WITH A MAJOR REBUFF OR SIMPLY FAIL TO PRODUCE SOME POSITIVE RESULT IN TERMS OF SOVIET INTERESTS.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT WE KNOW SO FAR OF SHEVARDNADZE'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON, THE MAXIMUM OUTCOME WHICH GORBACHEV CAN EXPECT A SUMMIT TO PRODUCE WOULD APPARENTLY CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING INGREDIENTS:-

- AND INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INF (100 WARHEAD PER SIDE QFZHU EUROPE WITHIN A GLOBAL LIMIT OF 200),
- THE REGISTRATION OF SOME PROGRESS ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS (EG OVERALL REDUCTIONS OF 30%, SUB-CEILINGS TO BE AGREED LATER),
- AGREEMENT TO WORK ON STRENGTHENING THE ABM TREATY AND PERHAPS A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO RESPECT IT MEANWHILE,
- AGREEMENT ON 'NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES',
- AGREEMENT ON CW NON-PROLIFERATION AND, POSSIBLY, AN OUTLINE AGREEMENT ON A CW BAN,
- PROGRESS TOWARDS US RATIFICATION OF THE TTB AND PNE TREATIES, AND PERHAPS AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE WORK ON A POSSIBLE CTB.

4. BY COMPARISON WITH THE GENEVA SUMMIT, THIS WOULD - EVEN IF THE LIST OF AGREEMENTS WERE IN THE EVENT TO TURN OUT TO BE A LITTLE SHORTER - ADD UP TO AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD STILL BE LIKELY TO EMBODY FEATURES WHICH COULD EXPOSE GORBACHEV TO THE CHARGE THAT HE HAD COME OFF SECOND BEST IN AREAS WHICH HE HIMSELF HAS LONG INSISTED TO BE CRUCIAL, NAMELY:-

- US REFUSAL (PRESUMABLY) TO AGREE TO THE ELIMINATION OF PERSHING MISS FROM THEIR INF QUOTA, WHICH WOULD THUS CONTINUE TO INCLUDE WHAT THE RUSSIANS CONTEND ARE FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS AND WHICH THEY HAVE ALWAYS PROFESSED TO REGARD AS THE GREATEST THREAT,
- US DETERMINATION TO PURSUE SDI RESEARCH, TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS,
- A HIGH AND POSSIBLY UNACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION PRICE-TAG ATTACHED TO RATIFICATION OF THE TTB AND PNE TREATIES,
- AN UNYIELDING US ATTITUDE ON THE TEST MORATORIUM.

5. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE JOKERS IN THE PACK:-

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- MOST OBVIOUSLY, DANILOFF: CURRENT ATMOSPHERICS INDICATE THAT A DEAL WILL BE DONE, BUT BOTH (APPARENTLY) US PUBLIC OPINION AND THE KGB ARE RATHER UNPREDICTABLE QUANTITIES.
- THE THREAT OF US BREAK-OUT FROM SALT II: COMMISSIONING OF THE 131ST B52 AROUND SUMMIT TIME WOULD PUT GORBACHEV IN A DIFFICULTY,
- THE RELENTLESS OPERATION OF MURPHY'S LAW IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

6. THE EVIDENCE SO FAR IS THAT, DESPITE ALL THIS, GORBACHEV BELIEVES THAT THE RISKS ARE WORTH TAKING. HE NEEDS A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT, BOTH TO ENHANCE HIS DOMESTIC CREDIBILITY AND GRASS-ROOTS SUPPORT AT A TIME WHEN HIS INTERNAL POLICIES ARE EVIDENTALLY AROUSING OPPOSITION SEMICOLON AND TO CREATE A MORE FAVOURABLE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF 8,534, -) 43%94.. IF A WASHINGTON SUMMIT WERE TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS FOR FOURTEEN AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD THEN BE SIGNED DURING THE RETURN MATCH IN MOSCOW, SO MUCH THE BETTER. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV MAY AVOID COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC DATES FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT UNTIL HE HAS SLIGHTLY FIRMER GUARANTEES OF THE OUTCOME, HE IS UNLIKELY TO FAVOUR A SIGNIFICANT DELAY DURING WHICH HIS DOMESTIC CRITICS COULD CONSOLIDATE AND THE RISK OF SOME ADVENTITIOUS TURBULENCE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS INCREASE.

CARTLEDGE

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INFO D	MR FEARN
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FED	MR BRAITHWAITE
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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF NATO MINISTERS

## INTRODUCTION.

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SHULTZ BRIEFED MINISTERS OF NATO COUNTRIES, PLUS AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND CARRINGTON, FOR AN HOUR ON 22 SEPT. NORWAY WAS REPRESENTED BY THEIR STATE SECRETARY, TURKEY BY THEIR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. NO OFFICIALS WERE PRESENT. THIS ACCOUNT IS BASED ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OWN NOTES.

2. REAGAN BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE MEETING AS A KEY COMPONENT IN ALLIANCE UNITY, AS WELL AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THAT UNITY. HE THEN ASKED SHULTZ TO BRIEF IN DETAIL ON THE TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE.

3. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE MEETINGS WITH SHEVARDNADZE HAD LASTED 14 HOURS. THE KEY HAD BEEN TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DANILOFF CASE AND OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE ONE HOUR WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO DANILOFF: THIS HAD SOME IMPACT ON SHEVARDNADZE, BECAUSE AT THE START OF THE NEXT SESSION HE HAD SAID QUOTE HE (REAGAN) IS VERY WORKED UP, ISN'T HE? UNQUOTE TO WHICH SHULTZ HAD REPLIED QUOTE YES, AND NOT JUST HIM UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS HAD HAD THREE OBJECTIVES:

(1) TO STRESS THAT DANILOFF POINT:

(2) TO EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS ON THE GENEVA AGENDA, AND AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SECURING SUCH PROGRESS:

(3) TO REVIEW IN DETAIL ALL THE OTHER ISSUES.

THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO LEFT SHEVARDNADZE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING JEWISH IMMIGRATION FROM THE USSR. BUT MOST OF THE TIME IN PLENARY HAD BEEN SPENT ON ARMS CONTROL. SHULTZ DESCRIBED SHEVARDNADZE AS A STRAIGHTFORWARD, EFFECTIVE INTERLOCUTOR: AUTHORITATIVE: AND INCREASINGLY AT EASE WITH THE AGENDA.



#### 4. ARMS CONTROL.

THE AMERICANS DETECTED SOME SHIFTS IN THE SOVIET POSITION, AS FOLLOWS:

- (1) ON ABM, SHEVARDNADZE SPOKE FOR THE FIRST TIME OF QUOTE UP TO UNQUOTE 15 YEARS, WHICH SHULTZ TOOK TO INDICATE SOME WILLINGNESS TO TALK OF FIGURES LOWER THAN 15.
- (2) ON INF, SHEVARDNADZE SAID QUOTE SOMETHING MIGHT BE WORKED OUT UNQUOTE, WHICH AGAIN SEEMED TO SIGNIFY POSSIBLE MOVEMENT. THE RUSSIANS ALSO INDICATED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE DURATION OF AN INF DEAL (WITHOUT GOING INTO ANY DETAIL).
- (3) SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES. THE AMERICANS PUT THE IDEA OF A FREEZE, WITHOUT ELICITING ANY REAL RESPONSE. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE WAS RECOGNISED BY THE US.
- (4) START. THERE WAS SOME MOVEMENT. AT LEAST THE RUSSIANS WERE TALKING MORE ABOUT WARHEADS AND UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF ICBMS. BUT THEY DID NOT YET SEEM READY TO MAKE A DECISIVE MOVE. THE AMERICANS TRIED TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE QUOTE FIRST STRIKE POTENTIAL OF SDI UNQUOTE BY STRESSING THEIR WISH TO ELIMINATE ICBMS ALTOGETHER.
- (5) TESTING. THE AMERICANS MADE PLAIN THE CLARITY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE APPROACH DESCRIBED IN REAGAN'S SPEECH. THE RUSSIANS RETURNED TO THEIR EMPHATIC SEARCH FOR AN EXTENDED MORATORIUM.
- (6) NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO BEGIN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS.
- (7) CDE. SHULTZ CONCLUDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE WEST HAD NOT GOT ALL IT WANTED, A GOOD DEAL HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.
- (8) CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO HAVE MOVED A BIT ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION, AND THERE WAS A QUOTE SOMEWHAT KIND UNQUOTE REFERENCE BY SHEVARDNADZE TO THE BRITISH PROPOSAL. THERE MIGHT BE SOME SCOPE FOR PROGRESS, BUT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN DRAWING SHEVARDNADZE OUT.
- (9) MBFR. SHULTZ PRESSED SHEVARDNADZE ON THE RUSSIAN FAILURE TO RESPOND TO THE US MOVE, AND ON THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD MADE OVER VERIFICATION. SHEVARDNADZE HAD IN MIND THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE NEXT STAGE: A SECOND CDE, AN EXTENDED MBFR, AND A TOTALLY NEW FORUM. THE AMERICANS HAD EXPRESSED NO CHOICE, BUT SAW THE KEY OBJECTIVE (WHICH SHULTZ SAID SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER IN THE ALLIANCE) AS BEING DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES (IE EXCLUDING THE NEUTRALS). IN THIS CONTEXT THE HALIFAX WORK HAD BEEN AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE USEFUL. HE DID NOT THINK WE WOULD BE WISE TO LET THE SOVIET UNION WIND UP MBFR.

#### 5. TERRORISM.

THERE WAS SLIGHTLY MORE INTEREST IN THIS THAN BEFORE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT SHEVARDNADZE WAS VERY DISMISSIVE OF THE LIBYAN ROLE, SPEAKING OF QUOTE US FANTASIES UNQUOTE. IN REPLY SHULTZ GAVE DETAILED AMERICAN EVIDENCE ABOUT LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT AND SUGGESTED



## 5. TERRORISM.

THERE WAS SLIGHTLY MORE INTEREST IN THIS THAN BEFORE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT SHEVARDNADZE WAS VERY DISMISSIVE OF THE LIBYAN ROLE, SPEAKING OF QUOTE US FANTASIES UNQUOTE. IN REPLY SHULTZ GAVE DETAILED AMERICAN EVIDENCE ABOUT LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT, AND SUGGESTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD ASK OTHER WESTERN MINISTERS FOR THEIR EVIDENCE. SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT ALSO ASK WHY THE EUROPEANS HAD EXPELLED MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAUX. THE SIGNS OF INTEREST ON THE SOVIET SIDE RELATED PARTICULARLY TO HIJACKING.

## 6. IRAN/IRAQ.

SHULTZ SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE GOING TO MAKE A STATEMENT, PERHAPS IN SHEVARDNADZE'S SPEECH TO UNGA ON 23 SEPTEMBER. THE WEST SHOULD CONSIDER ITS RESPONSE.

## 7. SUMMIT.

SHULTZ SAID THAT IT WAS STILL DIFFICULT TO GET ON TO DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC DATES FOR A SUMMIT. IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THIS AS LONG AS THE DANILOFF CASE WAS NOT RESOLVED. THE AMERICANS WERE READY FOR FURTHER MEETINGS, BUT THE BALL WAS IN THE SOVIET COURT.

8. SHULTZ CONCLUDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION, OPPORTUNITIES EXISTED, BUT A QUOTE GREAT CLOUD STILL STOOD IN THE WAY UNQUOTE.

## 9. DISCUSSION.

GENSCHER EXPRESSED THANKS FOR THIS PROMPT ACCOUNT OF THE SHEVARDNADZE VISIT. HE POINTED TO THE BENEFITS OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AT HALIFAX AND AT CDE. WAS HE RIGHT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NOW HOPEFUL OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE US ON INF? SHULTZ REPLIED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO BE CLEAR HOW MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON INF. BUT SOME NECESSARY ITEMS, INCLUDING MISSILES IN ASIA, HAD BEEN ADMITTED TO THE AGENDA (PRESIDENT REAGAN THEN EXPLAINED WHY HE THOUGHT THIS ASIA POINT IMPORTANT). AND THE TWO RECENT EXPERT MEETINGS SHOWED GREATER SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MAKE BRISK PROGRESS.

10. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS FROM VAN DEN BROEK, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR A MINIMUM FREEZE ON SHORT-RANGE WEAPONS. AS FOR THE FUTURE OF MBFR, THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO WIND IT UP BUT THE AMERICANS HAD NOT ACCEPTED THAT. INSTEAD THE AMERICANS HAD STRESSED THE NEED FOR A SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE WEST'S LATEST OFFER. RAIMOND COMMENTED THAT CARE WAS NEEDED ABOUT THE FORUM FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL: THERE WAS ADVANTAGE IN HAVING IT TIED TO CSCE AND INVOLVING THE NEUTRALS. SHEVARDNADZE WAS GLAD THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF INF IN ASIA HAD BEEN



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KURANARI WAS GLAD THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF INF IN ASIA HAD BEEN  
RECOGNISED.

11. CONCLUSION.

FINALLY, REAGAN UNDERLINED AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DANILOFF  
CASE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ALL PRESENT FULLY UNDERSTOOD  
THE AMERICAN POSITION. HE ADMIRED AND RESPECTED US TENACITY ON THE  
MAIN OBJECTIVES AND THEIR SKILL IN KEEPING THE TWO ISSUES DISTINCT.  
SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO CONDEMN  
SOVIET BEHAVIOUR OVER DANILOFF. (IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, A  
SENTENCE ABOUT DANILOFF HAS BEEN INSERTED INTO THE PRESIDENCY  
SPEECH FOR DELIVERY ON 23 SEPTEMBER.)

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Repetition to *Richard Nixon*  
referred to Departmental Decision,  
repeated as inserted in other parts.



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OUR TELNO 2411: US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

SUMMARY.

1. LENGTHY SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSIONS, OVER-SHADOWED BY HAND POUNDING, AND NO PROGRESS, ON DANILOFF. BUT SOME OPTIMISM ON POTENTIAL SUMMIT ISSUES, PARTICULARLY INF. FURTHER GORBACHEV MESSAGE DELIVERED.

DETAIL.

2. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD 14 HOURS OF TALKS ON 19/20 SEPTEMBER. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO SAW THE PRESIDENT ON 19 SEPTEMBER, AND HANDED OVER GORBACHEV'S REPLY, LARGELY ON ARMS CONTROL, TO THE PRESIDENT'S JULY MESSAGE. SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCES WERE HELD LATE ON 20 SEPTEMBER: TEXT OF SHULTZ'S OPENING REMARKS IN NIFT, SHEVARDNADZE'S FOLLOW BY FAX TO FCO AND UKMIS.

3. ADMINISTRATION CONTACTS ARE RELUCTANT TO COMMENT SUBSTANTIVELY TODAY, WHILE THE WHITE HOUSE/NSC DECIDE HOW THE PRESIDENT SHOULD PRESENT THE TALKS AT HIS BRIEFING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK ON 22 SEPTEMBER. (AND THE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE IS SO FAR BEING KEPT VERY CLOSE E.G. NO-ONE IN DOD HAS YET SEEN IT.) THE FOLLOWING FIRST IMPRESSIONS WILL THEREFORE REQUIRE REVIEW OVER THE NEXT WEEK.

4. WHAT IS CLEAR, FROM ALL OUR CONTACTS AND FROM OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATION BRIEFING, IS THAT THE TALKS, WHILE NOT LIMITED TO THE DANILOFF CASE (AS THE RIGHT HERE HAD DEMANDED), WERE OVERSHADOWED BY IT. IT TOOK UP ALL OF SHULTZ'S FIRST, TETE-A-TETE, SESSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE, AND WAS THE ONLY SUBJECT DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC LINE- REPEATED BY SHULTZ ON TELEVISION TODAY- IS THAT, THOUGH LITTLE PROGRESS WAS MADE, THE RUSSIONS MUST NOW BE IN DO DOUBT OF THE STRENGTH OF FELLING HERE, OR THAT SUMMIT PROSPECTS WILL REMAIN CLOUDED WHILE DANILOFF REMAINS IN MOSCOW. STATE CONFIRM PRIVATELY THAT SHULTZ HANDED OVER A LIST OF POTENTIAL SOVIET EMIGRES (TUR), BUT SAY THAT SHEVARDNADZE CLEARLY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE. SHULTZ WAS THEREFORE INTERESTED THAT SHEVARDNADZE SUGGESTED A FURTHER MEETING IN NEW YORK THIS WEEK, AND SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THERE WOULD BE SUCH A MEETING: SHULTZ HAD TOLD HIM THAT A MEETING WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF SHEVARDNADZE HAD SOMETHING NEW TO SAY ON DANILOFF.

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5. ARMS CONTROL, AND PARTICULARLY THE NST, ISSUES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE SECOND MAIN SUBJECT, WITH KARPOV PLAYING A KEY ROLE IN THE SOVIET TEAM. WE HAVE NOT YET PICKED UP ANY EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET MOVE IN THE TALKS ON SPACE/DEFENCE OR START ISSUES (THOUGH THERE IS SOME SPECULATION HERE THAT THE GORBACHEV LETTER MAY HAVE IMPLIED WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE SOVIET DEMAND FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE ABM TREATY'S WITHDRAWAL PERIOD TO LESS THAN 15 YEARS.) BUT ON INF BOTH SIDES SEEM TO HAVE NOTED THAT SOME CONVERGENCE WAS TAKING PLACE, E.G. IN THE NITZE/KARPOV SESSION ON 5/6 SEPTEMBER. THE RUSSIANS RE-STATED THEIR PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS OF LRINF WARHEADS IN EUROPE TO 100 ON EACH SIDE, THOUGH STRESSING THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OF SHORT DURATION: THEY NOTED, BUT DID NOT ACCEPT (OR, WE UNDERSTAND, DEFINITELY REJECT), THE US COUNTERPROPOSAL FOR ADDITIONAL CONCURRENT LIMITS, ALSO OF 100, ON SOVIET WARHEADS IN ASIA AND US WARHEADS IN THE CONTINENTAL US, INCLUDING ALASKA. (THE COUNTER-PROPOSAL HAS, INCIDENTALLY, NOW LEAKED TO THE NEW YORK TIMES.) WE ARE TOLD THAT IT WAS AGAIN APPARENT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE NO LONGER RAISING THE ISSUE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INF AGREEMENT (OF SHORT DURATION): BUT WHETHER THEY SAID SO EXPLICITLY IS NOT YET CLEAR TO US (AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE SHEVARDNADZE SAID ONLY THAT THE QUOTE MODERNISATION UNQUOTE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES NEED NOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN A US/SOVIET INF AGREEMENT.)

6. THE TALKS ALSO COVERED NON-NST ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, INCLUDING SOVIET TEST-BAN DEMANDS, LAST MINUTE STOCKHOLM CDE PROBLEMS, CW, AND NON-PROLIFERATION. BOTH SIDES/NOTED GOOD PROGRESS ON RISK REDUCTION CENTRES, AND ON CW NON-PROLIFERATION. ACCORDING TO AN (UNHAPPY) OSD SOURCE, THE RUSSIANS GAVE A QUOTE RINGING ENDORSEMENT UNQUOTE OF THE UK IDEAS FOR CHALLENGE INSPECTION VERIFICATION OF A GLOBAL CW BAN AND ARGUED THAT THEY PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A DEAL. (WE HAVE OF COURSE BRIEFED ON NAZARKINS TALKS IN LONDON: YOUR TEL NO 1629.)

7. ON OTHER POINTS:-

(A) SUMMIT DATES WERE NOT DISCUSSED. SHULTZ SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THAT "IT IS DIFFICULT TO THINK OF A FRUITFUL SUMMIT" UNLESS THE DANILOFF CASE IS RESOLVED. SHEVARDNADZE'S PUBLIC LINE HAS OF COURSE BEEN THAT THE WORLD NEEDS A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT, THAT THE US AND SOVIET PEOPLES WANT IT, AND THAT THE ONUS IS ON THE US ADMINISTRATION TO ENSURE THAT IT HAPPENS, AND IS PRODUCTIVE. BUT SHEVARDNADZE HAS ALSO IMPLIED (LIKE TASS, BUT APPARENTLY UNLIKE PRAVDA) THAT HIS TALKS WENT REASONABLY WELL.

(B) UN EXPULSIONS. SHEVANDNADZE TOOK A VERY HARD LINE: QUOTE WE WILL RESPOND, OF COURSE UNQUOTE. SHULTZ COMMENTED QUOTE THE PRESIDENTS POWDER IS DRY UNQUOTE.

(C) REGIONAL ISSUES. WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION, BUT APPARENTLY NO SIGNS OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET MOVEMENT.

(D) HUMAN RIGHTS. SHULTZ PRESSED HARD ON JEWISH EMIGRATION: NO SHEVARDNADZE EXPULSION.

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8. COMMENT.

THE ADMINISTRATION WERE DETERMINED TO DEMONSTRATE, TO THE US DOMESTIC AUDIENCE, THAT THERE CANNOT BE BUSINESS AS USUAL WHILE DANILOFF IS UNDER THREAT. BUT THEY HAVE IN FACT RUN THROUGH THE FULL AGENDA THIS WEEK-END. BUT FOR THE DANILOFF CASE, PROSPECTS FOR A LATE AUTUMN SUMMIT (?WITH AN INF AGREEMENT, AND QUOTE ACHIEVEMENTS UNQUOTE ON RISK REDUCTION CENTRES AND CW NON-PROLIFERATION) WOULD LOOK QUITE GOOD. BUT DANILOFF REMAINS A MAJOR ROADBLOCK, AS THE SCENE SWITCHES TO NEW YORK.

9. SEE MIFT.

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ORWBAN 6470

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
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MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR FEARN  
MR LONG  
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2411

OF 192250Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

OUR TELNO 2405: US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

1. SHEVARDNADZE HAD TWO AND A HALF HOURS OF TALKS WITH SHULTZ ON THE MORNING OF 19 SEPTEMBER, WITH ONLY INTERPRETERS PRESENT. SHULTZ THEN TELEPHONED THE PRESIDENT, WHO AGREED TO MEET SHEVARDNADZE IN ORDER (AS THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN PUT IT) TO CONVEY THE STRENGTH OF HIS FEELINGS ABOUT DANILOFF. THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT LASTED ABOUT 45 MINUTES: SHEVARDNADZE DELIVERED A LETTER FROM GORBACHEV. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE MET AGAIN IN THE AFTERNOON, WITH DELEGATIONS. TWO FURTHER SESSIONS ARE PLANNED FOR 20 SEPTEMBER.

2. NOTHING HAS YET EMERGED ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGES BEYOND THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ BOTH LED OFF WITH DANILOFF. BUT WE KNOW THAT SHULTZ WAS INTENDING TO HAND SHEVARDNADZE A LIST OF POTENTIAL SOVIET EMIGRES IN RETURN FOR WHOSE RELEASE THE US MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RELEASE ZACHAROV (THE RELEASE OF DANILOFF WOULD BE PART OF THE ARRANGEMENT, PRESENTED AS ENTIRELY SEPERATE).

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

15 September 1986

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Reagan about the proposed briefing of Allied Foreign Ministers in New York on 22 September.

Charles Powell

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

September 15, 1986

copy  
②  
Prime Minister

COP  
1576.

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the attached message to you from President Reagan, which was received at the Embassy this morning.

The President had originally hoped to host a working luncheon for the Allied foreign ministers. However, to avoid a conflict with a luncheon hosted by the UN Secretary General, he has decided instead to invite foreign ministers to a meeting.

The meeting will take place from 12 - 1:00 p.m. in New York on September 22. We will provide the details on venue at a later time. This meeting will be for principals only.

The White House plans to announce later today that the President will be attending the United Nations General Assembly.

Sincerely,




Charles H. Price, II  
Ambassador

Enclosure:

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street,  
London, S.W. 1.





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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 163/86

September 15, 1986

Dear Margaret:

As part of our preparations for the meeting I hope to have with General Secretary Gorbachev later this year, I want to ensure we remain in close touch and that I have the benefit of your views on the key East-West issues. A constructive outcome, as events last year so clearly demonstrated, will depend heavily on intensive consultations and the maintenance of allied unity.

I look forward to continuing our direct dialogue on these issues as events unfold. In addition, I believe we should take advantage of all opportunities to intensify the process. Many allied Foreign Ministers will be in New York in late September to attend the United National General Assembly. I would like to take that opportunity to meet on September 22. I hope Geoffrey Howe will be able to participate. This will provide Secretary Shultz and me an opportunity to report on the September 19-20 meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I also wish to discuss the prospects for a U.S.-Soviet summit and to hear your Government's assessment and views.

I hope Geoffrey will be able to participate in this discussion.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ronald Reagan

US Declassified

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
SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

September 12, 1950

Dear Mr. [Name]:

As part of our preparation for the meeting I hope to have with General Secretary Gorbachev later this year, I want to assure you remain in close touch and that I have the benefit of your views on the key East-West issues. A constructive exchange of views between the two governments will be an essential part of the preparation for the meeting and the management of the meeting.

I look forward to continuing our discussions in the near future. In addition, I would like to have your views on the process of the United Nations. I would like to take that opportunity to discuss with you the progress of the United Nations. I would like to take that opportunity to discuss with you the progress of the United Nations. I would like to take that opportunity to discuss with you the progress of the United Nations.



I hope Gorbachev will be able to participate in this discussion.

Sincerely yours,  
[Signature]

US Declassified

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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2313

OF 101530Z SEPTEMBER 86

AND TO PRIORITY VIENNA

AND TO ROUTINE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POSTS, MOSCOW

AND SAVING OTHER CSCE POSTS

VISIT OF SECRETARY OF STATE: EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. EXCHANGES OVER DINNER ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS FOCUSED ON DANILOFF, WHICH WAS CLEARLY AT THE TOP OF SHULTZ'S MIND, AND ON CSCE/CDE QUESTIONS. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL.

2. ON DANILOFF, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN A HOSTAGE AFTER ONE OF THEIR SPIES HAD BEEN CAUGHT RED-HANDED. HE REMARKED ON HOW LITTLE THE US STILL KNEW ABOUT THE WAY THE SOVIET REGIME OPERATED. HE GAVE NO HINT OF WHAT FURTHER STEPS THE US MIGHT TAKE TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR DANILOFF'S RELEASE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE FULLY RECOGNISED THAT THE DETENTION OF DANILOFF SERIOUSLY COMPLICATED US/SOVIET RELATIONS. DESPITE THIS HE HOPED THAT THE US WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO PURSUE THEIR DIALOGUE ACROSS THE BOARD WITH THE RUSSIANS.

3. ON CDE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT, DESPITE THE DANILOFF AFFAIR, HE HOPED THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE PURSUED. A RESULT WOULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE US WANTED AN AGREEMENT. HE BELIEVED THAT ONE WAS NOW WITHIN REACH IF THE NEGOTIATION COULD BE CONCLUDED.

4. SHULTZ MADE PLAIN HIS DISPLEASURE THAT THE DATE CHOSEN FOR THE START OF THE CSCE VIENNA MEETING COINCIDED WITH THAT OF THE US MID-TERM ELECTIONS. HE WAS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO VIENNA. IN REPLY THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE CRUCIAL ROLE THE US HAD TO PLAY IN THE CSCE PROCESS, AND THOMAS POINTED OUT THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT MISSING THE FIRST DAY AND ARRIVING LATE, SINCE IT WOULD INEVITABLY TAKE SEVERAL DAYS FOR ALL THE MINISTERS TO SAY THEIR PIECE.

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/ FCO



FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, BELGRADE, BERNE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST  
EAST BERLIN, HELSINKI, HOLY SEE, NICOSIA, OSLO, OTTAWA PRAGUE,  
REYKJAVIK, SOFIA, STOCKHOLM, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL STOCKHOLM UKDEL  
STRASBOURG, UKDEL VIENNA, UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW  
YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS, VALLETTA, WARSAW.

ORWBAN 6185

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
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GRS 1270

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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 2314

OF 101545Z SEPTEMBER 86

AND TO PRIORITY MODUK

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH WEINBERGER: 9 SEPTEMBER  
SUMMARY

1. A DISTURBING INSIGHT INTO RIGHT-WING ATTITUDES ON ARMS CONTROL.

DETAIL

2. WITH WEINBERGER THE SECRETARY OF STATE RAISED GLENN/TRAFICANT, ARGENTINA, AND LIBYA, AND ON ALL THREE RECEIVED REASSURING ANSWERS. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD FIGHT BOTH AMENDMENTS ON THE HILL: THE PENTAGON WOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST PRESSURES ELSEWHERE IN WASHINGTON FOR RENEWED US ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA: AND ABSOLUTE PROOF OF LIBYAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY RENEWED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY REPETITION OF THE APRIL RAID. WEINBERGER CONFIRMED IN TERMS THAT THE US AS YET SAW NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF A LIBYAN HAND BEHIND THE KARACHI HI-JACKING.

3. THE BULK OF THE DISCUSSION WAS HOWEVER ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY ARMS CONTROL: AND WAS NOT AT ALL REASSURING. WEINBERGER MAINTAINED THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT WANTED DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND A GLOBAL ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME ON INF, THERE WAS NO SIGN - EG IN THE KARPOV/NITZE TALKS IN MOSCOW IN AUGUST AND IN WASHINGTON ON 5/6 SEPTEMBER - THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO DO BUSINESS. PROBABLY THE SOVIET HOPE WAS THAT CONGRESS WOULD, BY UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES, OBVIATE THE NEED FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS. MOREOVER THE DANILOFF CASE MEANT THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO STRIKE DEALS, EVEN IF THE NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS IMPROVED. THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUGGEST THAT GORBACHEV FELT COMMITTED TO A SUMMIT.

4. PRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE LATEST KARPOV/NITZE TALKS, WEINBERGER (AND PERLE) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD IN FACT BEEN A NEW PROPOSAL ON INF (MY TELNO 2295). BUT THEY DISMISSED IT AS MINOR AND INSIGNIFICANT. THE RUSSIANS HAD INDICATED THAT THEY ENVISAGED ONLY A SHORT-TERM INTERIM AGREEMENT: THEY HAD REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIET INF WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE UNDER ITS TERMS WOULD HAVE TO BE DESTROYED, RATHER THAN STOCK-PILED: THEY HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS SRINF: AND KARPOV HAD DECLINED TO AGREE TO ANY JOINT STATEMENT OF THE POSITION REACHED. ONLY UNDER FURTHER PRESSURE DID WEINBERGER ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE US TEAM HAD INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN RESPECT OF EUROPE (100 LRINF WARHEADS ON EACH SIDE) MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IF THERE WERE A SIMILAR CEILING, ALSO OF 100, ON EACH SIDE'S RELEVANT WARHEADS NOT IN EUROPE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE PERSONALLY DID NOT REGARD THIS AS SATISFACTORY: HE ARGUED THAT IT MIGHT JUST BE ACCEPTABLE AS AN INTERIM STAGE EN ROUTE TO A GLOBAL ZERO/ZERO SOLUTION.

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5. ON START, PERLE ARGUED THAT NO PROGRESS WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN MADE IN THE KARPOV/NITZE TALKS. THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL CLINGING TO THEIR DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND THEIR PROPOSAL FOR CEILINGS ON NUMBERS OF QUOTE NUCLEAR CHARGES UNQUOTE INCLUDED GRAVITY BOMBS. MOREOVER THEY WERE ARGUING FOR TIGHT LIMITS ON SLCMS, WHICH THEY MUST KNOW POSED PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FOR THE US, GIVEN THE LARGE USN INVENTORY OF CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED DEFENSIVE MISSILES.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIES OF CONTINUING US OBSERVANCE OF THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, AND ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DISCUSSION, IN THE NITZE/KARPOV TALKS, OF THE EXTENSION OF THE ABMT WITHDRAWAL PERIOD, OR THE CODIFICATION OF THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. WEINBERGER AND PERLE BRIDLED AT THIS, STATING IN TERMS THAT THERE COULD BE NO SUCH DISCUSSION, OR CODIFICATION. THE SDI PROGRAMME, WHICH WAS GOING WELL, WAS CURRENTLY BEING CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION, AND THIS HAD THEREFORE NOT SO FAR POSED A PROBLEM. BUT NEGOTIATED CONSTRAINTS ON SDI WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE.

7. ON CW, WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE US WANTED A TOTAL BAN, WHICH WOULD BE TOTALLY VERIFIABLE: WITHOUT ONE THE US STOCKPILE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME WOULD HAVE TO GO AHEAD, THOUGH CONGRESS WAS MAKING DIFFICULTIES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS IN THE US DRAFT TREATY HAD PROVED UNNEGOTIABLE, AND COMMENDED THE ALTERNATIVE UK TEXT. PERLE THOUGHT THAT OUR ANALYSIS HAD BEEN THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT BUY IT EITHER, AND WEINBERGER NOTED THAT THEY HAD NOT SO FAR DONE SO. HE HAD DETECTED NO SIGN OF ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT IN GENEVA (AND HE CLEARLY EXPECTED NONE).

8. ON CDE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGESTED THAT A USEFUL INSPECTION REGIME MIGHT NOW BE OBTAINABLE, AND THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT, IN THE END-GAME, NOT TO LET THE BEST BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD. ALLIED COORDINATION HAD BEEN, AND MUST REMAIN, GOOD. WE MUST AVOID A REPETITION OF BERNE. WEINBERGER INDICATED ASSENT, BUT PERLE COMMENTED, WITH SOME SATISFACTION, THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONCLUDE A DEAL ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IF DANILOFF WERE STILL BEING HELD IN MOSCOW.  
COMMENT

9. THIS WAS A STANDARD OSD PERFORMANCE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS STRUCK BY SUCH A VIVID ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEMS SHULTZ FACES IN MAINTAINING A CONSTRUCTIVE US ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING POSITION. IT CAME OUT VERY CLEARLY THAT WEINBERGER IS NOT YET RECONCILED TO THE CONCESSIONS (NO SDI DEPLOYMENT FOR AT LEAST SEVEN AND A HALF YEARS, AND INTERIM OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS REDUCTIONS OF LESS THAN 50 PER CENT) OFFERED IN THE PRESIDENT'S JULY MESSAGE (MY TELNO 2249) AND HE IS CLEARLY NO LESS UNEASY AT THE SIGNS OF MOVEMENT ON INF.

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FCO PASS SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE,  
LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, UKDEL VIENNA,  
UKDEL STOCKHOLM.

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ORWBAN 6185

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Jp.0214

Mr Powell


Daniloff

Moscow telegram No.1065 (attached).

I am inclined to agree with the Ambassador that the best explanation is a Soviet miscalculation of the likely US reaction. However the initial arrest happened, the decision to charge Daniloff formally could not have been taken without top political clearance, particularly given Reagan's message on Daniloff's innocence. We have therefore to ask why Gorbachev would approve such a course. The creation of a pretext for avoiding a fruitless summit is conceivable but unlikely. As the Ambassador says, there is other material to hand and a conclusion now that a worthwhile summit is unrealisable would be premature. I am not attracted to the idea of factions within the leadership; in any case Gorbachev must have given the final approval.

2. We are therefore driven back on the theory that all the Russians were doing by preferring charges was seeking an exact equivalence with the Zakharov case, calculating that a swap would be possible, but, as often before, fatally misreading Administration and Congressional response. A failure of political feel and imagination.

3. A summit is now in jeopardy. The next question is whether Gorbachev can make a concession over the case. It will not be easy, but should not be excluded. He will not want the summit to fail on this side-issue. If it is to founder he would wish it to do so on wider and more propaganda-worthy grounds. He might even be able to extract publicity value from a concession. "Daniloff of course was a spy and caught red-handed. But in the wider interests of world peace I am prepared to overlook the matter". Whether something along these lines happens will be a good measure of Gorbachev's ascendancy in the Politburo.

  
PERCY CRADOCK

10 September 1986

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 091600Z F C O

TELNO 1065

OF 091430Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

WASHINGTON FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 1062 (NOT TO ALL) : DANILOFF : COMMENT

SUMMARY

1. EVEN IF THE KGB BELIEVED DANILOFF GUILTY, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE SEEN THE DAMAGE THE AFFAIR WOULD DO TO THEIR PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN IMAGE AND TO SUMMIT PROSPECTS. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED THAT INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE HIGHER PRIORITY. THE INFLUENCE OF THE KGB SHOWN TO REMAIN STRONG. THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL HAVE MISCALCULATED. PAUCITY OF LADDERS TO CLIMB DOWN. POSSIBLE ACTION BY BRITAIN.

DETAIL

2. NOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS WRITTEN TO GORBACHEV AND MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET ACTION THE ARREST AND CHARGING OF DANILOFF HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT.

3. IF THE KGB BELIEVE, AND HAVE TOLD GORBACHEV, THAT THEY HAVE CAUGHT A GENUINE AMERICAN SPY THE ARREST TAKES ON A LESS EXTRAORDINARY ASPECT. BUT THE COINCIDENCE WITH THE ZAKHAROV CASE SUGGESTS THAT WHAT THE KGB DID WAS SIMPLY TO FRAME THE MOST PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATE. IN EITHER CASE QUESTIONS ARISE BOTH OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND OF THE STANDING OF THE KGB AND THE SECURITY ORGANS IN GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA.

4. MOST WESTERN OBSERVERS HERE ACCEPT THAT DANILOFF IS INNOCENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS CRUDE SOVIET ACTION WILL DAMAGE THE SOVIET IMAGE AND CREDIBILITY AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE PUTTING THE FINAL TOUCHES TO THEIR WORLD WIDE PEACE INITIATIVES, IN THE LEAD UP TO A POTENTIAL SUMMIT AND TO THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING. EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD TRADE DANILOFF FOR ZAKHAROV, THE AFFAIR COULD STILL HARDLY FAIL TO CAST A STRONG SHADOW OVER SUMMIT PREPARATIONS. THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT HAVE EXPECTED SUCH A SHARP AMERICAN REACTION, PARTICULARLY IF THE KGB REALLY THOUGHT IT WAS A FAIR COP. BUT THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THE RUSSIANS, HAVING DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET ANYTHING WORTHWHILE FROM A SUMMIT WERE CONTENT TO GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO STRICT SECURITY VIGILANCE, A CONSTANT HALLMARK OF THE GORBACHEV ERA, EVEN

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IF THIS JEOPARDISED THE POLITICAL PROCESS LEADING TO A SUMMIT. THOSE IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY WHO OPPOSED THE LATEST NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM EXTENSION MAY HAVE BEEN REASSURED TO SEE THAT SECURITY WAS STILL INDEED PLACED FIRST. THERE ARE EVEN SOME HERE WHO SEE THIS AS A DELIBERATE SOVIET PLOY TO AVERT A FRUITLESS SUMMIT AND PLACE THE BLAME ON THE AMERICANS. I DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALREADY PREPARED THE PROPAGANDA GROUND IN THE EVENT THAT 'US MILITARISM' MAKES A SUMMIT IMPOSSIBLE. THEY DID NOT NEED TO RISK DISCREDIT THROUGH GRABBING DANILOFF.

5. AS TO THE ROLE OF THE KGB, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE INITIAL ARREST WAS AUTHORISED WITHIN THE KGB, THE DECISION TO CHARGE DANILOFF MUST HAVE HAD FULL POLITICAL CLEARANCE. THE DECISION TO ESCALATE THE AFFAIR, WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL COSTS NOTED ABOVE, DOES HOWEVER SUGGEST THAT THE KGB ARE STILL A VERY POWERFUL VOICE IN THE COUNSELS AROUND GORBACHEV.

6. MY TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT THE KGB MISCALCULATED THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN REACTION AND THAT BEFORE THIS HAD BECOME APPARENT THEY HAD PERSUADED THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TO BACK THEM IN A CLASSIC TIT FOR TAT ATTEMPT TO SECURE ZAKHAROV. NOW THAT THIS HAS MISFIRED THE LEADERSHIP ARE FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING THEIR SELF-INFLICTED WOUND FROM BEING VIEWED AS THE CAUSE OF A POSSIBLE POSTPONEMENT OR CANCELLATION OF THE SUMMIT. THEIR IMMEDIATE REACTION HAS BEEN TO ARGUE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING EXAGGERATED PROTESTS IN ORDER TO DISGUISE THEIR OWN INFLEXIBILITY ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. BUT THIS IS PRETTY THIN BEER.

## THE BRITISH ROLE

7. WE HAVE MADE SEVERAL ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION ABOUT MRS DANILOFF'S PROBLEM AND ARE NOW SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE CONSULAR DIRECTORATE IN THE MFA. BUT THIS IS NEITHER MRS DANILOFF'S FIRST PRIORITY, NOR THAT OF THE RUSSIANS. IF THE TEMPERATURE CAN BE LOWERED SUCH A RELATIVELY MINOR PROBLEM CAN SURELY BE RESOLVED. NOW THAT DANILOFF IS CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE THE RUSSIANS DO NOT NEED AN EXTRA STICK TO BEAT HIM. NOR IS THE CUSTOMS CASE A STRONG ENOUGH LADDER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO USE IN ORDER TO CLIMB DOWN FROM AN ESPIONAGE CHARGE.

8. WE HAVE THEREFORE AGAIN CONSIDERED WITH THE AMERICANS WHAT OTHER USEFUL ACTION WE COULD TAKE. WE BOTH CONTINUE TO THINK THAT AN APPROACH FROM THIS EMBASSY TO THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT BASED ON OUR HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS FOR MRS DANILOFF AS A BRITISH NATIONAL WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT AND WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THE AMERICANS TELL US HOWEVER THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS INSTRUCTED ITS EMBASSIES IN ALLIED COUNTRIES TO LOBBY IN SUPPORT OF DANILOFF AND TO URGE THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED TO RAISE THE CASE WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE DO NOT KNOW IN WHAT TERMS THE AMERICANS WILL BE APPROACHING YOU AND WHAT SORT OF ACTION THEY ENVISAGE. TO MAKE ANY IMPACT AN APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS WOULD, I BELIEVE, NEED TO BE IN THE NAME OF MINISTERS. YOU WILL NO DOUBT ALSO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER THIS IS A FIELD IN WHICH JOINT ACTION BY THE TWELVE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

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9. MEANWHILE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WILL BE PRESENTED WHEN O'KEEFFE AND SUMMERSCALE ARE IN MOSCOW AT THE END OF THE WEEK TO DISCUSS THE CSCE VIENNA CONFERENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN IDEAL FRAMEWORK SINCE BOTH HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND THE POSITION OF JOURNALISTS ARE EXPLICIT ELEMENTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS. I ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE INCLUSION OF A FIRM DEMARCHE ON DANILOFF IN THE BRIEF FOR THE MEETING ON FRIDAY 12 SEPTEMBER. IT COULD TAKE THE LINE THAT AN ACT SUCH AS THE ARREST OF DANILOFF IS NOT ONLY OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT, BUT IS LIKELY TO GIVE THE OPPOSITE SIGNAL ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE VIENNA MEETING TO THAT WHICH THE RUSSIANS NO DOUBT INTEND. WE COULD GO ON TO URGE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEEK AN URGENT WAY OF RESOLVING THE MATTER.

MARSHALL

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MXHPAN 5015

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FM WASHINGTON

TO DESKBY 091700Z FCO

TELNO 2296

OF 091650Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW

*mt*

## DANILOFF

1. PRESIDENT REGAN SPOKE PUBLICLY ABOUT THE DANILOFF AFFAIR FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 8 SEPTEMBER. HE DESCRIBED THE CONTINUING DETENTION OF DANILOFF AS AN OUTRAGE AND AS A "VIOLATION OF THE STANDARDS OF CIVILISED INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR". HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST NOW BE AWARE OF HOW SERIOUS THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE IF HE WERE NOT SET FREE. HE CALLED ON THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO ACT RESPONSIBLY AND QUICKLY, FAILING WHICH "THERE WOULD BE NO WAY TO PREVENT THIS INCIDENT FROM BECOMING A MAJOR OBSTACLE IN RELATIONS". ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN HAD MADE CLEAR OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS THAT US OFFICIALS HAD RAISED THE DANILOFF AFFAIR IN EVERY APPROPRIATE US/SOVIET BILATERAL CONTACT, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SHULTZ SAW KARPOV'S TEAM, HERE FOR THE WEEK-END ARMS CONTROL TALKS (MY TELNO 2295), STRESSED TO THEM THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH HE VIEWED THE SOVIET TREATMENT OF DANILOFF, AND WARNED THAT IF THE MATTER WAS STILL UNRESOLVED AT THE TIME OF SHEVARDNADZE'S MEETINGS HERE (18/19 SEPTEMBER), IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY DOMINATE THESE MEETINGS.

3. STATE ALSO CONFIRM TO US PRIVATELY THAT THEY STILL DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF ZAKHAROV AND DANILOFF TO THE CUSTODY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE AMBASSADORS, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT DANILOFF WOULD THEN BE FREE TO LEAVE THE USSR. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE, HOWEVER, ADAMANT THAT THERE REMAINS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF A ONE FOR ONE SWAP. THE AMERICANS HAD HOPED TO AVOID AN ESCALATION OF TENSION IN THIS AFFAIR, BUT THE PRESSURES - INCLUDING BOTH IN THE MEDIA AND IN CONGRESS - HAD BUILT, AND THE STATEMENT BY REAGAN FULLY REFLECTED THE EXTENT OF AMERICAN SERIOUSNESS. THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING COULD IN FACT BECOME VULNERABLE IF THE PRESSURES BUILT FURTHER.

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4. STATE TELL US THAT THE US DELEGATION AT NATO WOULD BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO RAISE THE DANILOFF AFFAIR, AND SPECIFICALLY TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE ALLIES MIGHT EXPRESS A SHARED INTEREST IN DANILOFF'S EARLY RELEASE.

ACLAND

ORWBAN 6129

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 091600Z F C O

TELNO 1065

OF 091430Z SEPTEMBER 86

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

WASHINGTON FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

MY TELNO 1062 (NOT TO ALL) : **DANILOFF** : COMMENT *no*

SUMMARY

1. EVEN IF THE KGB BELIEVED DANILOFF GUILTY, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST HAVE SEEN THE DAMAGE THE AFFAIR WOULD DO TO THEIR PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN IMAGE AND TO SUMMIT PROSPECTS. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED THAT INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE HIGHER PRIORITY. THE INFLUENCE OF THE KGB SHOWN TO REMAIN STRONG. THE RUSSIANS MAY WELL HAVE MISCALCULATED. PAUCITY OF LADDERS TO CLIMB DOWN. POSSIBLE ACTION BY BRITAIN.

DETAIL

2. NOW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS WRITTEN TO GORBACHEV AND MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT STRONGLY CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET ACTION THE ARREST AND CHARGING OF DANILOFF HAS BECOME AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUMMIT.

3. IF THE KGB BELIEVE, AND HAVE TOLD GORBACHEV, THAT THEY HAVE CAUGHT A GENUINE AMERICAN SPY THE ARREST TAKES ON A LESS EXTRAORDINARY ASPECT. BUT THE COINCIDENCE WITH THE ZAKHAROV CASE SUGGESTS THAT WHAT THE KGB DID WAS SIMPLY TO FRAME THE MOST PLAUSIBLE CANDIDATE. IN EITHER CASE QUESTIONS ARISE BOTH OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND OF THE STANDING OF THE KGB AND THE SECURITY ORGANS IN GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA.

4. MOST WESTERN OBSERVERS HERE ACCEPT THAT DANILOFF IS INNOCENT AND BELIEVE THAT THIS CRUDE SOVIET ACTION WILL DAMAGE THE SOVIET IMAGE AND CREDIBILITY AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE PUTTING THE FINAL TOUCHES TO THEIR WORLD WIDE PEACE INITIATIVES, IN THE LEAD UP TO A POTENTIAL SUMMIT AND TO THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING. EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD TRADE DANILOFF FOR ZAKHAROV, THE AFFAIR COULD STILL HARDLY FAIL TO CAST A STRONG SHADOW OVER SUMMIT PREPARATIONS. THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT HAVE EXPECTED SUCH A SHARP AMERICAN REACTION, PARTICULARLY IF THE KGB REALLY THOUGHT IT WAS A FAIR COP. BUT THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THE RUSSIANS, HAVING DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET ANYTHING WORTHWHILE FROM A SUMMIT WERE CONTENT TO GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO STRICT SECURITY VIGILANCE, A CONSTANT HALLMARK OF THE GORBACHEV ERA, EVEN

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IF THIS JEOPARDISED THE POLITICAL PROCESS LEADING TO A SUMMIT. THOSE IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY WHO OPPOSED THE LATEST NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM EXTENSION MAY HAVE BEEN REASSURED TO SEE THAT SECURITY WAS STILL INDEED PLACED FIRST. THERE ARE EVEN SOME HERE WHO SEE THIS AS A DELIBERATE SOVIET PLOY TO AVERT A FRUITLESS SUMMIT AND PLACE THE BLAME ON THE AMERICANS. I DO NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. THE RUSSIANS HAVE ALREADY PREPARED THE PROPAGANDA GROUND IN THE EVENT THAT 'US MILITARISM' MAKES A SUMMIT IMPOSSIBLE. THEY DID NOT NEED TO RISK DISCREDIT THROUGH GRABBING DANILOFF.

5. AS TO THE ROLE OF THE KGB, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE INITIAL ARREST WAS AUTHORISED WITHIN THE KGB, THE DECISION TO CHARGE DANILOFF MUST HAVE HAD FULL POLITICAL CLEARANCE. THE DECISION TO ESCALATE THE AFFAIR, WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL COSTS NOTED ABOVE, DOES HOWEVER SUGGEST THAT THE KGB ARE STILL A VERY POWERFUL VOICE IN THE COUNSELS AROUND GORBACHEV.

6. MY TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ARE THAT THE KGB MISCALCULATED THE STRENGTH OF AMERICAN REACTION AND THAT BEFORE THIS HAD BECOME APPARENT THEY HAD PERSUADED THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TO BACK THEM IN A CLASSIC TIT FOR TAT ATTEMPT TO SECURE ZAKHAROV. NOW THAT THIS HAS MISFIRED THE LEADERSHIP ARE FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING THEIR SELF-INFLICTED WOUND FROM BEING VIEWED AS THE CAUSE OF A POSSIBLE POSTPONEMENT OR CANCELLATION OF THE SUMMIT. THEIR IMMEDIATE REACTION HAS BEEN TO ARGUE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING EXAGGERATED PROTESTS IN ORDER TO DISGUISE THEIR OWN INFLEXIBILITY ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. BUT THIS IS PRETTY THIN BEER.

## THE BRITISH ROLE

7. WE HAVE MADE SEVERAL ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION ABOUT MRS DANILOFF'S PROBLEM AND ARE NOW SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE CONSULAR DIRECTORATE IN THE MFA. BUT THIS IS NEITHER MRS DANILOFF'S FIRST PRIORITY, NOR THAT OF THE RUSSIANS. IF THE TEMPERATURE CAN BE LOWERED SUCH A RELATIVELY MINOR PROBLEM CAN SURELY BE RESOLVED. NOW THAT DANILOFF IS CHARGED WITH ESPIONAGE THE RUSSIANS DO NOT NEED AN EXTRA STICK TO BEAT HIM. NOR IS THE CUSTOMS CASE A STRONG ENOUGH LADDER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO USE IN ORDER TO CLIMB DOWN FROM AN ESPIONAGE CHARGE.

8. WE HAVE THEREFORE AGAIN CONSIDERED WITH THE AMERICANS WHAT OTHER USEFUL ACTION WE COULD TAKE. WE BOTH CONTINUE TO THINK THAT AN APPROACH FROM THIS EMBASSY TO THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT BASED ON OUR HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS FOR MRS DANILOFF AS A BRITISH NATIONAL WOULD HAVE LITTLE IMPACT AND WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THE AMERICANS TELL US HOWEVER THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS INSTRUCTED ITS EMBASSIES IN ALLIED COUNTRIES TO LOBBY IN SUPPORT OF DANILOFF AND TO URGE THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY ARE ACCREDITED TO RAISE THE CASE WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE DO NOT KNOW IN WHAT TERMS THE AMERICANS WILL BE APPROACHING YOU AND WHAT SORT OF ACTION THEY ENVISAGE. TO MAKE ANY IMPACT AN APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS WOULD, I BELIEVE, NEED TO BE IN THE NAME OF MINISTERS. YOU WILL NO DOUBT ALSO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER THIS IS A FIELD IN WHICH JOINT ACTION BY THE TWELVE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

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9. MEANWHILE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO TAKE THE MATTER UP WILL BE PRESENTED WHEN O'KEEFFE AND SUMMERSCALE ARE IN MOSCOW AT THE END OF THE WEEK TO DISCUSS THE CSCE VIENNA CONFERENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS. THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE AN IDEAL FRAMEWORK SINCE BOTH HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND THE POSITION OF JOURNALISTS ARE EXPLICIT ELEMENTS IN THE CSCE PROCESS. I ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE INCLUSION OF A FIRM DEMARCHE ON DANILOFF IN THE BRIEF FOR THE MEETING ON FRIDAY 12 SEPTEMBER. IT COULD TAKE THE LINE THAT AN ACT SUCH AS THE ARREST OF DANILOFF IS NOT ONLY OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT, BUT IS LIKELY TO GIVE THE OPPOSITE SIGNAL ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE VIENNA MEETING TO THAT WHICH THE RUSSIANS NO DOUBT INTEND. WE COULD GO ON TO URGE THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEEK AN URGENT WAY OF RESOLVING THE MATTER.

MARSHALL

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MXHPAN 5015

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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GRS 40

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TELNO 955  
OF 050730Z AUGUST 86  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING

1. PRAVDA OF 5 AUGUST ANNOUNCES THAT 'IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN REACHED' SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE WOULD MEET ON 19/20 SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON.

MARSHALL

YYYY

MXHPAN 4263

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THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED



*file*

*092472*  
*(Back up)*  
*10*



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 July 1986

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

The American Ambassador told me today that from 'material he had seen' he thought it quite likely that the US/Soviet Summit would be in November, possibly quite soon after the Congressional elections (4 November). We would want to bear this in mind in planning dates for a possible visit by the Prime Minister.


The Ambassador was anxious not to be quoted on this. I should be grateful if you could treat the information with discretion, unless you hear it from elsewhere.

Charles Powell

R. N. Culshaw, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



**A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>1759</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

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eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 1759

OF 022240Z JULY 86

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, UKDIS VIENNA, UKDEL CDE

INFO ROUTINE WARSAW

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. STATE CONFIRM THAT DESPITE RECENT COMMENTS BY PETROVSKY IN MOSCOW, THERE IS NO PROGRESS ON FIXING A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.

DETAILS

2. THERE HAS BEEN A FLURRY OF PRESS INTEREST. HERE IN COMMENTS APPARENTLY MADE BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER PETROVSKY AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW ON 1 JULY. PETROVSKY IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID QUOTE WE HAVE PROPOSED TO THE US TO SET IN MOTION THE PREPARATORY MECHANISMS UNQUOTE FOR A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING.

3. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN PLAYING DOWN SPECULATION THAT SOMETHING IS AFOOT WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON 2 JULY SAID QUOTE NO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING HAS BEEN SCHEDULED, NOR HAVE THE SOVIETS PROPOSED DATES FOR ONE UNQUOTE. STATE HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROPOSAL FROM THE RUSSIANS ON A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. THEY ASSUME PETROVSKY'S REFERENCE TO SETTING IN MOTION PREPARATORY MECHANISMS REFERRED TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DELIVERED LAST WEEK, WHICH INCLUDED A PASSAGE ABOUT FOCUSING EFFORTS ON EXPERT LEVEL DISCUSSIONS, AND MAINTAINING CONTACT THROUGH EMBASSIES (UKDEL NATO TELNO 217). STATE ADD THAT DUBININ SAW SHULTZ THIS MORNING, BUT HAD NOTHING TO OFFER ON DATES FOR A FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

4. ON GORBACHEV'S SPEECH IN WARSAW, A STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN COMMENTED ON 2 JULY AS FOLLOWS : QUOTE WE SEE NOTHING IN THIS SPEECH WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. GORBACHEV'S ATTEMPTS TO PRESSURE THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH APPEALS TO CONGRESS, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE ALLIES, UNFORTUNATELY SOUNDS LIKE PAST SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN CONCESSIONS THROUGH PROPAGANDA TACTICS RATHER THAN THROUGH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT UNQUOTE. THE PRESS HERE ARE SPECULATING THAT THE RECENT COMMENTS BY GORBACHEV AND PETROVSKY TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HOLDING OF A

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SUMMIT DEPENDS ON MORE RESPONSIBLE US ATTITUDES ARE AN ATTEMPT  
TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE AMERICANS TO COME UP WITH AN EARLY  
POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET GENEVA PROPOSALS. STATE  
ARE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THIS.

WRIGHT

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 1672

OF 242200Z JUNE 86

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA, UKMIS VIENNA

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL STOCKHOLM, BONN, PARIS

US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. A FURTHER POSITIVE GORBACHEV MESSAGE, APPARENTLY NO PROGRESS ON SUMMIT DATES. A REAGAN PRESS INTERVIEW MAINTAINS THE GLASSBORO CONCILIATORY LINE.

DETAIL

2. THE NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, DUBININ, PRESENTING HIS CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON 23 JUNE, HANDED OVER A MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV IN THE COURSE OF A MEETING, WHICH THE WHITE HOUSE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE CORDIAL AND BUSINESS-LIKE UNQUOTE.

3. STATE TELL US IN CONFIDENCE THAT GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE CONTAINS NO SURPRISES. IT APPARENTLY REVIEWS SOVIET POLICIES IN FAMILIAR TERMS AND REAFFIRMS GORBACHEV'S INTEREST IN MAKING PROGRESS IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND IN HOLDING A SUMMIT. IT HINTS THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD PRESS AHEAD WITH WORK IN EXISTING FRAMEWORK, BUT DOES NOT PICK UP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUGGESTION OF A SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN EUROPE BEFORE THE SUMMER BREAK, OR PROPOSE A DATE FOR A SUMMIT.

4. EARLIER IN THE DAY, PRESIDENT REAGAN COVERED US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE QUOTE LOS ANGELES TIMES UNQUOTE. MIFT CONTAINS KEY EXCERPTS: FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG. THE PRESIDENT'S MAIN AIM SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN TO MAINTAIN THE MORE POSITIVE TONE SET IN HIS GLASSBORO SPEECH, AND TO AVOID BEING PINNED DOWN ON THE SALT CONSTRAINTS ISSUE OR ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS AT

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GENEVA. THE MOST INTERESTING FEATURE IS IMPLICIT WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRAINTS ON POST-RESEARCH ASPECTS OF SDI IN RETURN FOR REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. ALTHOUGH THE INTERVIEW ALSO CONTAINS STANDARD VISIONARY LANGUAGE ABOUT SDI, THESE COMMENTS ARE A BIG ADVANCE ON PREVIOUS PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS THAT SDI COULD NEVER BE A BARGAINING CHIP.

5. SEE MIFT.

WRIGHT

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 35

OF 121656Z JUN 86

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL CDE STOCKHOLM, MODUK

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BUDAPEST TELS 129 AND 130: WARSAW PACT SUMMIT  
SUMMARY

1. THE BUDAPEST APPEAL APPEARS MORE RELATED TO IMPRESSING PUBLIC OPINION THAN TO ACHIEVING ARMS CONTROL. THE EAST AIMS TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCOMMODATE WESTERN POSITIONS. IF OUR INTEREST IS PRIMARILY IN THE PROCESS OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE THERE MAY BE NO REASON TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF A NEW NEGOTIATION. BUT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO TRY TO MAKE AGREEMENT IN MBFR A PRE-CONDITION FOR MOVEMENT TO THE LARGER FORUM.

DETAIL

2. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE A FIRST REACTION FROM THIS POST TO THE DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE REF TELS.

3. AS THE PRESS ACCOUNTS HAVE MADE CLEAR, GORBACHEV HAS BEEN AT LEAST PARTLY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS RENEWED ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PUBLIC INITIATIVE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD. ALTHOUGH THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AN ENCOURAGING DEGREE OF SCEPTICISM IN SOME REPORTING, THE WARSAW PACT HAVE GIVEN AN IMPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO PRESS FORWARDS TOWARDS AN AMBITIOUS AND WIDE RANGING AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE. INsofar AS THE OFFER IS SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE AND INsofar AS THE ALLIANCE HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS CONCEPT, THERE IS PRESUMABLY NO QUESTION OF OUR QUOTE REJECTING UNQUOTE THE BUDAPEST APPEAL.

4. THE APPEAL, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE FOLLOW UP TO THE HALIFAX STATEMENT, IS CLEARLY GOING TO RESULT IN A GOOD DEAL OF ACTIVITY IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE. THIS IS AN AREA WHICH HAS BEEN RELATIVELY NEGLECTED IN RECENT YEARS. THE INCREASED ATTENTION NOW LIKELY TO BE FOCUSED ON IT IS, NO DOUBT, TO BE WELCOMED. MOREOVER THE PROCESS OF EAST/WEST DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION IS ARGUABLY IN ITSELF DESIRABLE.

5. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BUDAPEST APPEAL HAS NOT BROUGHT EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION, AND STILL LESS ON THE REDUCTION, OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE ANY CLOSER. ON THE CONTRARY. A FIRST READING OF THE BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS REVEALS NOTHING HELPFUL REGARDING THE PROBLEMS WHICH IN FACT DIVIDE THE TWO SIDES. IT ALSO CONTAINS A GOOD DEAL WHICH, IN MY VIEW, IS CALCULATED TO MAKE AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT.

*Michael Alexander's  
views on the  
latest Soviet  
proposals on  
conventional  
arms.  
CDN*

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6. 13 YEARS OF LARGELY FUTILE MBFR NEGOTIATION HAVE SERVED EFFECTIVELY TO DISQUALIFY THIS FORUM AS A LOCUS FOR EYE-CATCHING INITIATIVES. HOWEVER IT HAS PRODUCED A FEW USEFUL RESULTS. BOTH SIDES HAVE, FOR INSTANCE, AGREED THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD HAVE TO BE ASYMMETRIC. THEY HAVE AGREED, ON THE DESIRABILITY OF ACHIEVING PARITY AT A SPECIFIC LEVEL. THEY HAVE, IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, REACHED A POSITION WHERE ALL THE UNDERGROWTH HAD BEEN CLEARED OUT OF THE WAY. WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON (EASTERN) FRAMEWORK. THE TWO SIDES ARE FACE TO FACE WITH THE REAL ISSUES. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SAY THAT THERE IS MUCH PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT. BUT THE WEST VERY DEFINITELY HOLDS THE INITIATIVE AND HAS (OR HAD UNTIL YESTERDAY) THE ABILITY, IF IT WERE TO CHOOSE TO USE IT, TO DECIDE WHERE TO GO NEXT.

7. SINCE FEBRUARY 20 LAST, ALL THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DID NOT ENJOY THIS SITUATION AND THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME. GORBACHEV'S 18 APRIL STATEMENT POINTED FIRMLY IN THIS DIRECTION. THE BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS CONFIRM IT AND CONTAIN THE OUTLINE OF THE NEW RULES AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW. THEY INCLUDE:

- A) EFFECTIVE ABANDONMENT OF THE EAST'S OWN IDEA OF A MODEST, TIME-LIMITED, FIRST-PHASE AGREEMENT AND RETURN TO GRANDIOSE SCHEMES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT SEMICOLON
- B) ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW FORUM OR THE EXPANSION OF THE PRESENT MBFR FORUM TO INCLUDE EG THE NNA SEMICOLON
- C) THE EXPANSION OF THE AREA OF NEGOTIATION QUOTE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS UNQUOTE: AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE,
- D) THE ABANDONMENT OF THE IDEA OF ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS AND OF INITIAL US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS SEMICOLON
- E) THE INCLUSION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE EQUATION SEMICOLON
- F) THE ACCORDING OF ADDITIONAL PROMINENCE TO THE TACTICAL AIR FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES.

8. EACH OF THESE POINTS INVOLVES ADDING TO THE COMPLICATIONS OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATION OR RE-OPENING POINTS WHICH HAD BEEN LEFT ON ONE SIDE AS THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATION NARROWED. EACH IS GOING TO NECESSITATE PROLONGED ARGUMENT AND TO CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTY FOR THE WEST, NOT LEAST IN TERMS OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT.

9. NOR IS THERE ANY SIGN AT ALL IN THE BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS OF WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE EAST TO COMPROMISE ON THE TWO MAJOR STICKING POINTS LEFT IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATION. THE ARMAMENTS QUESTION IS GIVEN AS MUCH PROMINENCE AS EVER AND MORE THAN IT RECEIVED HERE DURING LAST WINTER. THE INTRINSIC DIFFICULTIES OF NEGOTIATING LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS, WHICH SOME STATEMENTS HERE IN RECENT MONTHS HAD SUGGESTED THE EAST HAD BEGUN TO RECOGNISE, HAVE BEEN IGNORED. EQUALLY LITTLE EVIDENCE IS OFFERED OF FRESH THINKING ON VERIFICATION. THE FORMULA REGARDING ON SITE INSPECTIONS (QUOTE IF NECESSARY UNQUOTE) GIVES NOTHING AWAY. AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BASED ON QUOTE TOTAL TROOP STRENGTHS UNQUOTE IS USELESS FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. THERE IS (STRIKINGLY, BUT PRESUMABLY

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ACCIDENTALLY) NO REFERENCE TO A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT FOLLOWING THE REDUCTIONS PHASE. WHAT IS OFFERED IS NOT THE OBSERVATION OF REMAINING FORCE LEVELS BUT THE QUOTE OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF TROOPS REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS UNQUOTE. IT IS NOT IN ANY CASE VERY LIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ACCEPT A VERIFICATION REGIME ON ITS OWN SOIL WHICH IT WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS EVEN WHEN ITS TERRITORY WAS EFFECTIVELY EXCLUDED.

10. TO TRY TO SOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES BLOCKING A NEGOTIATION BY DOUBLING THE SCOPE OF THAT NEGOTIATION IS RARELY SUCCESSFUL. (IS THE MBFR AREA REALLY THE QUOTE WRONG UNQUOTE AREA?) IT IS THEREFORE HARD TO AVOID SEEING REFLECTED IN THE BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS A SOVIET DECISION, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, TO QUOTE TRAVEL HOPEFULLY RATHER THAN TO ARRIVE UNQUOTE WHERE CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ARE CONCERNED. THAT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE AN UNDERSTANDABLE OBJECTIVE. THERE ARE MANY ON THE WESTERN SIDE WHO SHARE IT. BUT IF THIS IS TO BE THE POLICY OF HMG (AS IT MAY WELL BE, FOR INSTANCE, OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT) I HOPE WE CAN BE CLEAR ABOUT IT SINCE IT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS THE WAY WE PLAY THE HAND. IF WE ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS OF EAST/WEST DISCUSSION - AND PERHAPS IN GRADUALLY EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF CBMS - THERE IS NO REASON TO MAKE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF A NEW NEGOTIATION. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP HEADLINE CATCHING PROPOSALS TO FEED INTO IT.

11. I SHOULD ADD THAT WHILE IT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE WORTH MAKING ONE FURTHER EFFORT TO CAPITALISE WITH OUR OWN PUBLICS ON THE WESTERN ADVANTAGE IN THE PRESENT MBFR FORUM, I SEE NO REAL POSSIBILITY OF OUR USING THIS NEGOTIATION AS A STEPPING-STONE OR STAGING POST ON THE WAY TO THE LARGER NEGOTIATION. ASSUMING WE STICK TO BROADLY OUR PRESENT POSITION, AGREEMENT HERE COULD ONLY BE MADE POSSIBLE BY ONE OR MORE SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET CONCESSIONS. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGN WHATEVER TO DATE OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MAKE SUCH MOVES. IT IS CONCEIVABLE, IF UNLIKELY, THAT PROLONGED WESTERN PRESSURE, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, ON THE EASTERN SIDE MIGHT HAVE PRODUCED SOMETHING HERE. BUT POST-HALIFAX AND POST-BUDAPEST THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE NO INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO GIVE GROUND. THEY HAVE A LARGER GAME IN THE OFFING AND PRECEDENTS SET HERE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE UNHELPFUL TO THEM THERE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT SEEMS IMPLAUSIBLE TO ARGUE - AS THE GERMANS ARE INCLINED TO DO - THAT WE SHOULD MAKE SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT IN VIENNA A CONDITION FOR MOVEMENT TO THE LARGER FORUM. THE EAST WOULD CERTAINLY CALCULATE THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD DRIVE US OFF SUCH A POSITION RATHER RAPIDLY.

ALEXANDER

## EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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TELNO 719

OF 101230Z JUNE 86

INFO GUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 696 (NOT TO ALL).

CALL ON ZAGLADIN: EAST/WEST RELATIONS

1. FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION OF PARLIAMENTARY VISITS I ASKED ZAGLADIN (DEPUTY HEAD, INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU) HOW Y NOW SAW THE PROSPECTS FOR A SECOND US/SOVIET SUMMIT. ZAGLADIN RESPONDED BY ASKING ME HOW I SAW PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT STATEMENT ON THE SALT 2 TREATY. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, WHETHER RATIFIED OR NOT, AND WISHED TO RESTORE THEIR CREDIBILITY BEFORE ENTERING INTO NEW ONES. SO FAR AS THE UK WAS CONCERNED WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD IN THE EVENT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SALT 2 TREATY TO SURVIVE BUT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE US JUDGEMENT OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE: THE DOOR HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED AND WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE.

2. ZAGLADIN SAID THAT THREE THINGS PUZZLED HIM. FIRSTLY, WHETHER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION ON SALT 2 HAD BEEN HIS OWN OR WHETHER IT WAS THE RESULT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES. SECONDLY, THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD APPARENTLY TAKEN THE DECISION WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH HIS ALLIES (I DID NOT RISE TO THIS). AND, THIRDLY, WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN ACCUSED THE SOVIET UNION OF VIOLATING SALT 2 WHEN EVEN HIS OWN GENERALS APPEARED TO TAKE A DIFFERENT VIEW. THE SOVIET UNION NEVERTHELESS REMAINED READY TO DISCUSS ALL AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL, FROM A TEST BAN TO THE SS25S, WITH THE AMERICANS: BUT THE AMERICANS, IT SEEMED, WERE NOT WILLING.

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3. WHEN I ASKED ZAGLADIN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE AREAS IN WHICH, AS GORBACHEV APPEARED TO WISH, AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED IN ADVANCE OF A SUMMIT AND SIGNED AT IT, ZAGLADIN FIRST MENTIONED A TEST BAN. I DREW ZAGLADIN'S ATTENTION TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TO DISCUSS THE TECHNICALITIES OF TESTS AND VERIFICATION: THIS MIGHT OFFER A WAY FORWARD (THE EQUIVALENT COMMITTEE ON CV HAD MADE A LITTLE PROGRESS) TOWARDS ENSURING THAT A CTB WOULD IN PRINCIPLE BE VERIFIABLE. ZAGLADIN SAID THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE AND SEEMED INTERESTED IN THE IDEA. I SAID THAT, IF HE WISHED, I COULD PROVIDE HIM WITH DETAILS (WHEN THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD, WHO SUPPORTED IT ETC.): ZAGLADIN SAID THAT HE WOULD WELCOME THIS. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO USE THIS AS A WAY OF CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT I MIGHT SAY TO ZAGLADIN OR INCORPORATE IN A LETTER TO HIM.

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**EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS**

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
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INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, MODUK (FOR DACU)

MY TELNO 1477: GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS: NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS  
SUMMARY

1. FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOVIET ABMT NO-WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL OF 27 MAY. TWO FURTHER SOVIET PROPOSALS ON 3 JUNE: FOR A BAN ON ASATS AND A BAN ON THE OFFENSIVE USE OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE 27 MAY AND 3 JUNE PROPOSALS ARE LINKED: SUCH LINKAGE WOULD BE BAD NEWS.

2. BUT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS STILL CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. AND WEINBERGER QUIETER IN PUBLIC, FOLLOWING WHITE HOUSE DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS EARLIER COMMENTS.

DETAIL:

3. WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 29 MAY AS WELL AS INFORMATION ABOUT TWO ADDITIONAL SOVIET PROPOSALS MADE ON 3 JUNE.

4. THE PROPOSAL OF 29 MAY WAS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A SOVIET STATEMENT TO A PLENARY SESSION OF THE DEFENCE AND SPACE GROUP IN GENEVA (SUCH STATEMENTS, INCLUDING THIS ONE, ARE HANDED OVER IN WRITING). THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED A COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR QUOTE AN EXTENDED PERIOD UNQUOTE. 15 OR 20 YEAR PERIODS WERE GIVEN AS ILLUSTRATIONS OF WHAT QUOTE EXTENDED UNQUOTE COULD BE TAKEN TO MEAN. THE RUSSIANS ALSO SAID THAT A NO-WITHDRAWAL COMMITMENT COULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF ACCOMPANIED BY AGREED DEFINITIONS OF TERMS RELATED TO THE ABM TREATY. THE PROPOSAL INCLUDED DEFINITIONS OF QUOTE COMPONENT UNQUOTE, QUOTE DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE, AND QUOTE PROTOTYPE UNQUOTE (AND PERHAPS ALSO QUOTE MODEL UNQUOTE).



TREATY. THE PROPOSAL INCLUDED DEFINITIONS OF QUOTE COMPONENT UNQUOTE, QUOTE DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE, AND QUOTE PROTOTYPE UNQUOTE (AND PERHAPS ALSO QUOTE MODEL UNQUOTE). WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN THESE DEFINITIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ARE STILL BEING STUDIED BY US EXPERTS. WE GATHER THAT THEY ARE UNCLEAR BUT THAT IT LOOKS AS IF THE EFFECT OF THEIR ADOPTION WOULD BE TO BRING THE TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES UNDER THE CENTRAL PROHIBITIONS OF THE ABM TREATY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOTYPES (WHICH WOULD BE PROHIBITED) WOULD BE THE FIREBREAK BETWEEN PERMITTED RESEARCH AND OTHER PROHIBITED ACTIVITY.

5. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL APPARENTLY INDICATED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. BUT IT ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE DRAWN A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESEARCH CONDUCTED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE RESEARCH FACILITIES, AND TO HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED A POSSIBLE REQUIREMENT FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION TO MONITOR INSIDE RESEARCH (THIS REINFORCES THE IMPLICATION OF THE NO-WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL AND ACCOMPANYING DEFINITIONS THAT AT LEAST SOME KINDS OF RESEARCH WOULD BE PERMITTED). THE RUSSIANS SAID THAT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS MUST APPLY TO PRIVATE US FIRMS AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT-OWNED FACILITIES, AND TO FOREIGN ORGANISATIONS AND FIRMS INVOLVED IN SDI-RELATED WORK.

6. THE RUSSIANS PRESENTED THEIR PROPOSALS AS A RESPONSE TO US OBJECTIONS TO EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A BAN ON SPACE-STRIKE ARMS.

7. THE SOVIET INDICATION THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROPOSAL WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WAS APPARENTLY MADE IN A POST-PLenary SESSION (IE NOT IN WRITING). WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS SAID THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THE NO-WITHDRAWAL PROPOSAL WOULD QUOTE IN ITSELF BE SUFFICIENT

UNQUOTE FOR AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED ON 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN (UNDEFINED) OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

8. IN A FURTHER DEVELOPMENT SINCE 27 MAY, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA MADE TWO FURTHER PROPOSALS IN PLENARY SESSION ON 3 JUNE:

- (A) A PROPOSAL TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON A BAN ON ASAT SYSTEMS SEMI-COLON AND
- (B) A PROPOSAL TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS ON A BAN ON THE OFFENSIVE USES OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. THIS PROPOSED BAN APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DEFINED AS A BAN ON SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF ATTACKING TARGETS ON EARTH AND IN THE ATMOSPHERE (IE EXCLUDING ALL GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS, AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS CAPABLE ONLY OF ATTACKING TARGETS IN SPACE.

9. IN POST-PLenary SESSION ON 3 JUNE, THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS REFUSED, DESPITE REQUESTS FROM THE US NEGOTIATORS, (A) TO SAY WHETHER THE TWO NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS WERE LINKED TO THE PROPOSAL OF 27 MAY (IE WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON ANY ONE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WITHOUT AGREEMENT BEING REACHED ON OTHERS SEMI-COLON AND (B) TO CONFIRM THAT US ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL OF 27 MAY (AND ONE OR BOTH OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS OF 3 JUNE QUERY) WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AS SUGGESTED BY THE RUSSIANS ON 27 MAY.

COMMENT

10. THE 3 JUNE DEVELOPMENTS ARE OF COURSE DISAPPOINTING TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS ENCOURAGED BY THE 27 MAY SOVIET MOVE. A PARTICULAR WORRY IS THE SOVIET FAILURE TO CONFIRM ON 3 JUNE THE 27 MAY INDICATION (PARA 7 ABOVE) OF LINKED MOVEMENT TO



MOVE. A PARTICULAR WORRY IS THE SOVIET FAILURE TO CONFIRM ON 3 JUNE THE 27 MAY INDICATION (PARA 7 ABOVE) OF LINKED MOVEMENT TO DEEP REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS. SINCE THE TWO NEW 3 JUNE PROPOSALS (PARA 8 ABOVE) ARE NOT OF COURSE INHERENTLY ATTRACTIVE HERE, THERE IS AN ADDITIONAL WORRY THAT THEY MAY INDEED PROVE TO BE ADDITIONAL PARTS OF THE SOVIET ASKING PRICE FOR SUCH MOVEMENT. BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE NOT TOO DISCOURAGED, AND THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM HAS BEEN GIVEN A FREE HAND TO EXPLORE THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND DISCUSS THE DEFINITIONS OF ABM TREATY-RELATED TERMS OFFERED BY THE RUSSIANS ON 27 MAY. HOWEVER, KARPOV RETURNED TO MOSCOW FOR CONSULTATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 3 JUNE PLENARY SESSION, AND IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL BE ABLE TO OFFER MUCH CLARIFICATION OF THEIR PROPOSALS UNTIL HIS RETURN.

11. THE NEW SOVIET 3 JUNE PROPOSALS HAVE NOT YET LEAKED HERE, DESPITE THE OPPORTUNITY THEY WOULD SEEM TO OFFER TO DOD OFFICIALS AND OTHERS TO ARGUE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AGAIN BACK-TRACKING AND DEMONSTRATING LACK OF SERIOUSNESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THAT THIS TEMPTATION HAS SO FAR BEEN RESISTED MAY REFLECT WHITE HOUSE DISSATISFACTION WITH WEINBERGER'S IMMEDIATE PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE SOVIET MOVE OF 27 MAY (MY TUR). THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 5 JUNE QUOTED A SENIOR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL AS SAYING THAT THE SOVIET 27 MAY PROPOSAL REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, THAT KAMPELMAN HAD BEEN GIVEN A LOT OF RUNNING ROOM TO EXPLORE IT AND THAT WEINBERGER'S REJECTION OF IT HAD BEEN QUOTE HASTY UNQUOTE. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OFFICIAL IN QUESTION WAS REGAN, AND WE HAVE HEARD THAT HE ALSO COMPLAINED PERSONALLY TO WEINBERGER. REGAN IS MUCH INVOLVED, WITH CASEY AND MEESE, IN A CURRENT GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO STOP LEAKS, BUT IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT SOME-ONE SO CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT (AND SOME-ONE NOT NOTED FOR ENTHUSIASM FOR ARMS CONTROL) SHOULD, LIKE THE STATE DEPARTMENT, FIND THE 27 MAY PROPOSAL POTENTIALLY INTERESTING.

12. UNLESS/UNTIL THE 3 JUNE PROPOSALS LEAK, CLEARLY WE SHOULD NOT REVEAL THEM IN PUBLIC, AND NEED TO BE FAIRLY GUARDED WITH NATO/EC COLLEAGUES. BUT THE US WILL PRESUMABLY BRIEF IN NATO QUITE SOON. MEANWHILE, KAMPELMAN MAY VOLUNTEER SOME DETAILS IN LONDON ON 9 JUNE.

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TELNO 1461

OF 302130Z MAY 86

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MODUK

INVITATION TO SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER TO VISIT THE US.

1. THE PENTAGON ANNOUNCED ON 29 MAY THAT WEINBERGER HAD INVITED SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER SOKOLOV TO VISIT THE US THIS YEAR TO DISCUSS QUOTE THE WIDE GULF ON ISSUES RELATED TO EACH OTHER'S MILITARY FORCES, DOCTRINE AND INTENTIONS UNQUOTE. THE PENTAGON ALSO SAID THAT, IF SOKOLOV ACCEPTED THE INVITATION AND THE VISIT WAS SUCCESSFUL, IT COULD BE FOLLOWED BY MEETINGS BETWEEN SENIOR US AND SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE PENTAGON ADDED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR ANY WEINBERGER/SOKOLOV MEETING TO TAKE PLACE DURING A FUTURE US/SOVIET SUMMIT.

WRIGHT

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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SIR W HARDING  
MR RATFORD  
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FF MOSCOW

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 660

OF 290500Z MAY 86

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

US/SOVIET RELATIONS: PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV.

SUMMARY

1. IN A LARGELY ATMOSPHERIC LETTER TO GORBACHEV, PRESIDENT REAGAN RENEWS HIS CALL FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS ANOTHER SUMMIT AND SUGGESTS THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS IN EUROPE IF THIS WOULD SUIT SHEVARDNADZE BETTER THAN WASHINGTON.

DETAIL

2. THE US CHARGE (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS GIVEN MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES, AND ME, A SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LATEST LETTER TO GORBACHEV WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN MOSCOW ON 24 MAY. (THIS IS THE LETTER REFERRED TO BY GORBACHEV DURING HIS MEETING WITH LORD WHITELAW ON 26 MAY - MY TELNO 648).

3. THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS TO CONVEY HIS PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS. AFTER EXPRESSING HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAD CONDUCTED THEMSELVES IN THE CHERNOBYL EPISODE AND OFFERING HIS CONDOLENCES TO THOSE WHO HAD SUFFERED FROM IT, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WELCOMED GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAD ARISEN FOLLOWING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: HE REGRETTED SOVIET MISINTERPRETATION OF US MOTIVES IN COMMENTING ON THE ACCIDENT BUT ALLOWED THAT THIS WAS ALL TOO CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

4. PRESIDENT REAGAN RECALLED THE US PROPOSAL FOR AN EARLY SECOND SUMMIT, WHICH HAD BEEN IN KEEPING WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT GENEVA TO ACCELERATE THE US/SOVIET DIALOGUE. IN THE ABSENCE OF A DIRECT SOVIET RESPONSE HE HAD TRIED TO CONVEY VIA DOBRYNIN, DURING THE LATTER'S FAREWELL VISIT, HIS VIEWS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, INF AND THE LIMITATION OF FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITIES. HE HAD OFFERED DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EXPERTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND VERIFICATION. HE REGRETTED THAT SIX MONTHS HAD EFFECTIVELY BEEN LOST IN THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE SOVIET REACTION. HE AGREED THAT IT

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WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN AN APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE: THE ATMOSPHERE COULD BE AFFECTED FOR GOOD OR ILL BY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE TWO LEADERS: IN HIS, HE WOULD REAFFIRM HIS COMMITMENT TO MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS.

5. PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCLUDED BY PROPOSING THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD NOW MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: AND THAT IF IT SUITED SHEVARDNADZE BETTER TO MEET SHULTZ IN EUROPE RATHER THAN IN WASHINGTON, A EUROPEAN VENUE - THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED HELSINKI - WOULD BE ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

CARTLEDGE

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US/SOVIET RELATIONS

SUMMARY

1. STATE BELIEVE GORBACHEV IN BITTER MOOD OVER WESTERN HANDLING OF CHERNOBYL ISSUE. ADMINISTRATION AVOIDING POLEMICS AND WORKING TO PUT RELATIONSHIP BACK ONTO CONSTRUCTIVE PATH.

DETAIL

2. IN TALKS WITH LLEWELLYN SMITH TODAY, PALMER (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, STATE) SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED BRUISED AND RESENTFUL OVER WHAT THEY SAW AS US (AND WESTERN) ATTEMPTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR DIFFICULTIES OVER CHERNOBYL. ARMAND HAMMER, WHO HAD SEEN GORBACHEV ON 16 MAY (MOSCOW TELNO 593), HAD FOUND HIM "BOILING MAD". GORBACHEV SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY STUNG BY THE TOKYO SUMMIT TEXT ON CHERNOBYL. HAMMER HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD NOT READ IT, AND URGED HIM TO DO SO. PALMER ADDED THAT BESSMERTNYK (NOW DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH THE US) HAD BEEN IN SIMILAR MOOD DURING A VISIT HERE 10 DAYS AGO.

3. PALMER MAINTAINED THAT ALL CONCERNED IN THE ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING SHULTZ AND THE PRESIDENT, AGREED THAT US POLICY MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT SOVIET FEELING OF VULNERABILITY. THE US WISHED TO MAKE A FURTHER EFFORT TO PUT THE PRESENT STRAINS BEHIND THEM AND GET THE RELATIONSHIP BACK ON COURSE. THE PRESIDENT HAD WRITTEN TO GORBACHEV TWICE IN THE LAST 6 WEEKS. STATE WERE NOW PREPARING A FURTHER OFFER OF COOPERATION POST-CHERNOBYL. THIS WOULD GIVE GORBACHEV CREDIT FOR THE POSITIVE PROPOSALS IN HIS SPEECH OF 14 MAY, AND SUGGEST MERGING THEM WITH THOSE FROM TOKYO.

4. ON HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS, PALMER SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD TOLD US AMBASSADOR HARTMAN THAT IT WAS STILL TOO SOON TO REARRANGE HIS MEETING WITH SHULTZ. PALMER WAS CONCERNED THAT IF THERE WERE NO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING UNTIL THE TRADITIONAL ENCOUNTER IN THE MARGINS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN LATE SEPTEMBER, THERE WOULD THEN BE VERY LITTLE TIME TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONCRETE RESULTS FROM A SUMMIT IN DECEMBER. AS FOR WHAT THE RUSSIANS NOW REGARD AS SUFFICIENT CONCRETE RESULTS, PALMER SAID THAT THEY WERE IN EFFECT INVITING THE AMERICANS TO SELECT THE AREAS. HE ADDED THAT US PRIORITIES REMAINED AGREEMENT ON THE KEY ELEMENTS OF START AND INF REDUCTIONS AGREEMENTS. THE

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/ADMINISTRATION



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ADMINISTRATION WERE PUZZLED AS TO WHY GORBACHEV HAD GIVEN SUCH PROMINENCE TO NUCLEAR TESTING SINCE IT MUST HAVE BEEN CLEAR TO HIM THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF A DEAL WITH THE US ON THIS ISSUE.

5. THOMAS (DAS EUROPE) ALSO SAID THAT TIME WOULD SOON RUN OUT FOR SETTING UP A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT FOR DECEMBER WHICH WOULD OPEN UP THE PROSPECT OF AN ARMS CONTROL DEAL WITHIN THE LIFETIME OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. ANYTHING THE UK COULD DO TO GET THIS ACROSS TO THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE USEFUL.

6. COMMENT: PALMER HABITUALLY SHOWS MORE CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET SENSITIVITIES THAN DO MOST OTHERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION. HIS ASSESSMENT OF GORBACHEV'S MOOD POST-CHERNOBYL IS INTERESTING, BUT SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES MAY BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT IT THAN HE IS.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS  
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UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MOSCOW  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 593  
OF 161310Z MAY 86  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, BONN.

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GORBACHEV MEETING WITH HAMMER AND GALE ON 15 MAY

SUMMARY

1. PRAVDA REPORTED ON 16 MAY THAT GORBACHEV, ACCOMPANIED BY DOBRYNIN, MET ARMAND HAMMER AND DR GALE ON 15 MAY. GORBACHEV EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THEIR HELP FOLLOWING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT BUT ACCUSED OFFICIAL WASHINGTON OF EXPLOITING THE ACCIDENT TO DISCREDIT THE SOVIET UNION. WHEN HAMMER RAISED THE SUMMIT, GORBACHEV SAID THAT IT NEEDED TO PRODUCE A PRACTICAL RESULT FOR WHICH A CORRESPONDING IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WAS REQUIRED. BUT THE ATMOSPHERE HAD WORSENEDED FOLLOWING WASHINGTON'S ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN OVER CHERNOBYL.

DETAIL

2. AFTER EXPRESSING GRATITUDE FOR HAMMER AND GALE'S 'NOBLE ACTION' - AN EXAMPLE OF HOW US/SOVIET RELATIONS SHOULD BE BUILT - GORBACHEV DESCRIBED THE BEHAVIOUR OF 'OFFICIAL WASHINGTON' AS 'A DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT'. HE REFERRED TO SPECULATION ABOUT THE ACCIDENT AND UNFORGIVEABLE ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE INCIDENT TO DISCREDIT THE WHOLE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND SOW DISTRUST TOWARDS ITS PEACE INITIATIVES. HE HOPED THAT PEOPLE WOULD DRAW THE CONCLUSION FROM THE TRAGEDY THAT IT WAS NECESSARY ABOVE ALL TO INCREASE EFFORTS AGAINST NUCLEAR TESTING AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ENSURE RELIABLE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY.

3. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN THE AREA OF THE ACCIDENT HAD BEEN BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND THAT PEOPLE WERE WORKING HEROICALLY. 'THE ENTIRE POTENTIAL OF SOVIET SCIENCE' WAS ENGAGED TO ELIMINATE THE AFTERMATH. THE PRIORITY WAS TO HELP PEOPLE SUFFERING FROM THE ACCIDENT AND FOR THE SOVIET STATE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROTECT AND RESTORE PUBLIC HEALTH AND MAKE UP FOR THE DAMAGE SUFFERED. DR GALE PRAISED THE WORK OF HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUES AND EMPHASISED THAT THE WORLD SHOULD REALISE THE HELPLESSNESS OF MEDICINE IF NUCLEAR WAR WERE TO BREAK OUT.

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4. ON THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT (RAISED BY HAMMER) GORBACHEV CONFIRMED HIS "AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO A NEW MEETING" REPEATING THAT TWO SIMPLE THINGS WERE NECESSARY: A READINESS FOR IT TO BEAR TANGIBLE AND PARCTICAL RESULTS "IF ONLY IN ONE OR TWO MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE WHOLE WORLD", AND A "CORRESPONDING POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE". THE MEETING COULD NOT BE HELD ACCORDING TO AN AMERICAN SCENARIO, NOR ACCORDING TO A SOVIET ONE. A COMMON PLATFORM ORIENTATED TOWARDS A CONCRETE RESULT MUST BE SOUGHT. AS FOR THE ATMOSPHERE THIS HAD WORSENERD FURTHER AS A RESULT OF WASHINGTON'S MALICIOUS ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN OVER CHERNOBYL.

5. THE HAMMER/GALE PRESS CONFERENE IS ALSO REPORTED, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE GALE'S REFERENCE TO THE INEVITABILITY OF FURTHER DEATHS.

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ME S HARBISON }  
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TELNO 568

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## US/SOVIET HIGH LEVEL CONSULTATIONS

1. US AMBASSADOR, HARTMAN, WHO LEFT FOR CONSULTATIONS AND A MONTH'S LEAVE ON 10 MAY CALLED ON SHEVARDNADZE ON 8 MAY AT HIS OWN REQUEST TO REVIEW BILATERAL RELATIONS AND FORTHCOMING CONTACTS.

2. THE CALL ONLY MATERIALISED AT THE LAST MINUTE AND TOOK PLACE AT ABOUT 6 PM. HARTMAN HAD ALSO ASKED TO SEE DOBRYNIN, PARTLY FOR A SIMILAR REVIEW OF RELATIONS AND PARTLY TO TEST ACCESS TO DOBRYNIN IN HIS NEW ROLE AND TO EXPLORE DOBRYNIN'S FOREIGN POLICY MAKING FUNCTIONS. DOBRYNIN'S REPLY HAD BEEN TO SUGGEST TETE A TETE DINNER WITH HARTMAN PLUS WIVES. THIS TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE BUT THE US CHARGE WAS UNABLE TO BRIEF US ON THE OUTCOME AS HARTMAN HAD NOT DIVULGED MORE BEFORE DEPARTURE THAN TO SAY THAT DOBRYNIN HIMSELF WAS NOT YET COMPLETELY CLEAR AS TO HOW HIS ROLE WOULD EVOLVE.

3. HARTMAN'S CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE HAD COVERED CHERNOBYL AND THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE. ON CHERNOBYL HARTMAN HAD REPEATED US EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND OFFERS OF HELP. HE HAD STRESSED THAT SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT THE WEST AND PARTICULARLY THE US, WERE ORCHESTRATING A CAMPAIGN TO BLACKEN THE SOVIET UNION OVER CHERNOBYL WERE NONSENSE. IF SOVIET ADVISERS WERE MAKING SUCH ASSERTIONS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THIS WAS DAMAGING. ADVISERS SHOULD OFFER A MORE REALISTIC AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OR BE REPLACED. SHEVARDNADZE HAD REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD DECIDED NOT TO GO PUBLIC IMMEDIATELY ON CHERNOBYL AS THE SITUATION HAD BEEN CONFUSED AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAD NOT IMMEDIATELY ASSESSED THE VERY SERIOUS POTENTIAL OF THE ACCIDENT.

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4. ON THE US/SOVIET EXCHANGES SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED DIALOGUE BUT THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT YET RIGHT FOR A MEETING BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SHULTZ. MORE TIME HAD TO PASS BUT THIS MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE 'AT SOME TIME'. NO SPECIFIC LINK WAS MADE BETWEEN DELAY IN FIXING A SHEVARDNADZE/SHULTZ MEETING AND THE US ATTACK ON LIBYA, BUT THERE WAS A CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT THIS REMAINED THE REASON. IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT IN THE DISCUSSION SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT EVEN IF THE AMERICANS DID HAVE PROOF OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM IT STILL WOULD NOT HAVE JUSTIFIED THE ATTACK.

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OF 292110Z APRIL 86

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US/SOVIET WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS

SUMMARY

1. TECHNICAL EXCHANGES CONTINUE IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS DESPITE THE HIATUS IN POLITICAL CONTACTS.

DETAIL

2. 'WASHINGTON POST' ON 27 APRIL REPORTED THAT A SOVIET TEAM WAS HERE LAST WEEK TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF UPGRADING THE HOTLINE: THAT THERE WAS TO BE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES SHORTLY: AND THAT THE NEXT SET OF TALKS ON REGIONAL ISSUES (LATIN AMERICA) ARE DUE TO BE HELD IN MOSCOW IN MAY.

3. STATE CONFIRM THAT THIS IS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT. WORKING LEVEL CONTACTS ARE CONTINUING IN A RANGE OF FIELDS. WORK ON UPGRADING THE HOTLINE HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR MORE THAN A YEAR AND HAS NOT BEEN INTERRUPTED. THE FIRST SESSION OF EXPLORATORY TALKS ON RISK REDUCTION CENTRES WILL BE HELD IN GENEVA ON 5-6 MAY. THE RUSSIANS HAVE RECENTLY CONFIRMED THAT THEY WANT THESE TO GO AHEAD, ALTHOUGH STATE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIET THINKING ON WHAT SUCH CENTRES MIGHT DO HAS NOT ADVANCED VERY FAR.

4. WE UNDERSTAND THAT TALKS ON LATIN AMERICA ARE INDEED PLANNED FOR LATE MAY.

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TELNO 884

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INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL VIENNA,  
INFO PRIORITY UKDEL STOCKHOLM, UKDIS GENEVA  
INFO ROUTINE EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE, WARSAW, BUDAPEST, SOFIA,  
INFO ROUTINE BUCHAREST, BELGRADE, UKMIS NEW YORK, TOKYO,  
INFO ROUTINE ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE,  
INFO ROUTINE LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK

MY TELNO 858: US-SOVIET RELATIONS  
SUMMARY

1. UP-BEAT US BRIEFING ON CONTACTS WITH DOBRYNIN. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE DATES: 14-16 MAY. NO DATE YET FOR SUMMIT, BUT SUMMER NOT YET RULED OUT. US OFFERS DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR TESTING. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, US PROPOSE MAY TALKS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. DETAIL
2. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY (ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS) BRIEFED NATO AMBASSADORS ON 9 APRIL ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING YESTERDAY WITH DOBRYNIN. SHE SAID THAT DOBRYNIN HAD SPENT ANOTHER TWO HOURS ON 9 APRIL WITH SHULTZ, AND THAT THE TWO MIGHT MEET AGAIN ON 11 APRIL. US-SOVIET POLITICAL DIALOGUE
3. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE US BELIEVED THAT MOMENTUM HAD BEEN RESTORED TO THE US-SOVIET DIALOGUE FOLLOWING THE DOBRYNIN MEETINGS. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE US INVITATION TO GORBACHEV TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN THE SUMMER, BUT THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD MEET ON 14-16 MAY (NOT NECESSARILY FOR THE FULL THREE DAYS), TO PREPARE FOR THE SUMMIT, INCLUDING AGENDA. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE SUMMIT HAD TO BE SUBSTANTIVE AND CAREFULLY PREPARED. SHE IMPLIED THAT A QUOTE INDICATION UNQUOTE OF WHAT MIGHT EMERGE WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE FINAL AGREEMENT ON DATES. BUT JUNE/JULY WAS STILL A POSSIBILITY, THOUGH ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS A DATE BEFORE LATE JULY NOW LOOKED UNLIKELY.
4. THE DOBRYNIN TALKS HAD COVERED ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
- ARMS CONTROL
5. THE US SIDE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY AWAITED SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE US NOVEMBER AND FEBRUARY PROPOSALS. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE LAST ROUND IN GENEVA HAD MADE NO HEADWAY. THE US SIDE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT AN INF AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. SHULTZ HAD SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOW GET DOWN TO NARROWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS. THE US SIDE HAD OFFERED A DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR TESTING WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE US SIDE WOULD AWAIT A RESPONSE IN PRINCIPLE BEFORE GETTING DOWN TO THE SPECIFICS. IF THE RESPONSE WAS FAVOURABLE, THE NEW DISCUSSION WOULD PUBLICLY BE A SEPARATE ONE, TO BE REVIEWED AT THE SUMMIT.
- REGIONAL ISSUES

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6. RIDGWAY SAID THAT THE PLANNED EXPERT-LEVEL MEETINGS WERE GOING AHEAD. SHULTZ WANTED TO CONCENTRATE WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON ONE OR TWO REGIONAL ISSUES, AND HAD SUGGESTED TO DOBRYNIN THAT AFGHANISTAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA WERE PRIME CANDIDATES. THE US HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR LIBYA, EG SUPPLY OF SA5S, AND HAD CALLED ON THE SOVIET UNION TO GET THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU OUT OF THE SOVIET SECTOR OF BERLIN.

DOBRYNIN HAD DECLINED TO GIVE A DIRECT ANSWER.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES

7. THE AMERICANS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED SOME POSITIVE HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (EG THE RELEASE OF SHCHARANSKY), BUT WERE GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE RECENT SOVIET PERFORMANCE, EG OVER JEWISH EMIGRATION. SOME PROGRESS ON BILATERAL ISSUES (CONSULATES, AVIATION, EXCHANGES) WAS NOTED.

WRIGHT

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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**US/SOVIET RELATIONS: SUMMIT PROSPECTS**

1. MY US COLLEAGUE, HARTMAN, HAS GIVEN ME (AND THE FRENCH AND FRG AMBASSADORS) AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT US/SOVIET CONTACTS WHICH THROWS SOME LIGHT ON THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH TO THE SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP AND TO A PROSPECTIVE SUMMIT MEETING. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HARTMAN'S CONFIDENCE COULD BE PROTECTED.

**HARTMAN'S CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE**

2. HARTMAN HAD TOLD ME ON 2 APRIL THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT MONTHS, HE WAS BEING DEMIED THE URGENT CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE WHICH HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK IN ORDER TO EXPRESS GROWING US IMPATIENCE WITH THE ABSENCE OF A SOVIET RESPONSE ON POSSIBLE SUMMIT DATES. ON 3 APRIL, HE WAS TOLD THAT SHEVARDNADZE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECEIVE HIM UNTIL 8 APRIL, I.E. AFTER DOBRYNIN'S DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON TO MAKE HIS FAREWELL CALLS AND TAKE LEAVE OF THE PRESIDENT. SINCE THE PURPOSE OF HARTMAN'S CALL WAS TO MAKE US DISPLEASURE KNOWN BEFORE DOBRYNIN SET OFF FOR WASHINGTON, HARTMAN WAS AUTHORIZED TO TAKE A STRONG LINE AND TO SAY THAT IF SHEVARDNADZE COULD NOT RECEIVE HIM AT ONCE SHULTZ WOULD CANCEL HIS FAREWELL LUNCH FOR DOBRYNIN. DOBRYNIN'S OTHER ENGAGEMENTS IN WASHINGTON WOULD ALSO SUFFER. THIS DID THE TRICK AND HARTMAN WAS TOLD THAT HE COULD CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE AT 2130 ON 3 APRIL.

3. HARTMAN OPENED WITH A GENERAL EXPRESSION OF US DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITH THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET SIDE TO RESPOND TO AMERICAN SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE TIMING OF THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON. THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS ALSO UNHAPPY WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY SOVIET REACTION, DURING THE LAST GENEVA ROUND, TO US PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS AND FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF ON A GLOBAL BASIS. HARTMAN EXPRESSED US CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT, IN THE CDE, THE SOVIET POSITION ON CBMS SEEMED TO BE MOVING BACKWARDS; AND OVER THE NEGATIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE CURRENT EASTERN POSITION IN THE MBFR TALKS IN VIENNA. SHEVARDNADZE,

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STRESSING THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY REVIEWED IN DETAIL ALL CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS IN THE VARIOUS EAST/WEST NEGOTIATING FORA, RESPONDED WITH A SIMILAR CATALOGUE OF SOVIET CONCERNS: THE ABSENCE OF A US REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LATEST PROPOSALS ON AN INF AGREEMENT AND ON NUCLEAR TESTING, UNACCEPTABLE OPERATIONS BY THE US NAVY IN THE BLACK SEA, UNWARRANTED US MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN NEW YORK, THE US ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE LIBYA - AND THEREBY TEST SOVIET METTLE - IN THE GULF OF SIRTE AND THE SHARPER LEVEL OF RHETORIC EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON. THAT SAID, SHEVARDNADZE CONFIRMED THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EUROPE TO DISCUSS A NUCLEAR TEST BAN WAS NOT INTENDED TO REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT ON A SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT DOBRYNIN WOULD BE TAKING WITH HIM TO WASHINGTON PROPOSALS CONCERNING PREPARATORY MEETINGS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND SECRETARY SHULTZ PRIOR TO A SUMMIT SEMICOLON AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET VIEW OF 'WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY' FOR A SUMMIT MEETING. HE SUGGESTED THAT HARTMAN SHOULD CALL ON HIM AGAIN AFTER DOBRYNIN'S RETURN TO MOSCOW FOR A FURTHER DISCUSSION.

CALL ON GORBACHEV BY US CONGRESSMEN

4. ON 4 APRIL, GORBACHEV RECEIVED CONGRESSMEN FASCELL (D) (CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE) AND BROOMFIELD (R) (MY TELNO 389). LIKE HARTMAN'S CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE, THIS MEETING TOO WAS PRECEDED BY A CONTRETEMPS. THE CONGRESSMEN WERE INFORMED ON THE EVE OF THE CALL THAT ONLY TWO PEOPLE, THE CONGRESSMEN THEMSELVES, WOULD BE PERMITTED TO SEE GORBACHEV, I.E. THAT HARTMAN WOULD BE EXCLUDED. FASCELL AND BROOMFIELD RESPONDED ROBUSTLY AND SAID THAT IN THIS CASE THERE WOULD BE NO MEETING. HARTMAN AND THEIR CHIEF AIDE ACCOMPANIED THE CONGRESSMEN TO THE KREMLIN WHERE THEY WERE AGAIN INFORMED THAT ONLY THE CONGRESSMEN WOULD BE RECEIVED. HARTMAN THEREUPON SENT WORD TO CHERNYAEV (GORBACHEV'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER) THAT, IF THE SOVIET SIDE MAINTAINED THIS POSITION, DOBRYNIN WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN WASHINGTON. ONCE AGAIN THIS FIRM RESPONSE WAS SUCCESSFUL AND AFTER GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAD BEEN CONSULTED, BOTH HARTMAN AND THE CONGRESSIONAL AIDE WERE ADMITTED. (THESE TWO EPISODES ARE INSTRUCTIVE).

5. THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV LASTED FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS: NEITHER SIDE SPOKE FROM PREPARED TEXTS. GORBACHEV BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION WAS THAT OF WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT EACH OTHER: THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UNITED STATES AS IT WAS BUT THE REVERSE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE THE CASE. FASCELL REPLIED THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY WHICH WORRIED AMERICANS, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ACCEPTED THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RIGHT



OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES AS THEY WISHED, EVEN IF AMERICANS FOUND THE SOVIET SYSTEM UNCONGENIAL. GORBACHEV THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG SURVEY OF ALL THE PROPOSALS WHICH HE HAD ADVANCED SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, INCLUDING THE "CONCESSION" OF OFFERING TO EXCLUDE UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS (APART FROM A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT) FROM AN INF NEGOTIATION - IN ITS NEGATIVE RESPONSE THE US WAS HIDING BEHIND THE WEST EUROPEANS AND THE JAPANESE. THIS CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET APPROACH CONTRASTED WITH THE BLACK SEA NAVAL INCIDENTS, THE "CHALLENGE" WHICH THE US HAD TRIED TO MAKE TO THE SOVIET UNION BY "TESTING THE LIBYANS" AND THE REVIVAL OF "EVIL EMPIRE" RHETORIC. ALL THIS WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE IF IT EMANATED ONLY FROM WEIMBERGER AS PART OF AN ENDEAVOUR TO WIN THE APPROVAL OF CONGRESS FOR MILITARY EXPENDITURE: BUT IT DID NOT, AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED. THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT, NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN UP THE SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING, GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WANTED A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN BUT IT HAD TO BE A PRODUCTIVE ONE WHICH RESULTED IN DECISIONS. TIMING WAS NOT IMPORTANT AND IF IT TOOK 9 OR 11 MONTHS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A PROSPECT, THIS WOULD NOT MATTER. THE SOVIET UNION WAS SETTING NO PRE-CONDITIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE US MIGHT PUT FORWARD.

6. AFTER HALF AN HOUR ON HUMAN RIGHTS, IN WHICH THE CONGRESSMEN DID MOST OF THE TALKING AND MADE A STRONG BID TO BE ALLOWED TO MEET SAKHAROV, GORBACHEV (HAVING HEARD THEM OUT REASONABLY CALMLY) RETURNED TO WHAT HE CALLED "SERIOUS MATTERS". HE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT GO TO THE UNITED STATES WHILE THE CURRENTLY HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE PERSISTED. SECONDLY, HE REPEATED, A SUMMIT MEETING WOULD HAVE TO PRODUCE RESULTS (BY IMPLICATION IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL). FASCELL ASKED WHY THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INVITATION TO MONITOR ON SITE A US NUCLEAR TEST. GORBACHEV ASKED IN RETURN WHY "THE TWO PROPOSALS COULD NOT BE COMBINED". HIS MEANING WAS UNCLEAR BUT HARTMAN ASSUMES THAT GORBACHEV HAD IN MIND SOVIET



ACCEPTANCE OF A VISIT TO NEVADA, PROVIDED THE US WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS EITHER ON A TESTING MORATORIUM OR ON A CTB. FASCELL AND BROOMFIELD TRIED TO IMPRESS UPON GORBACHEV THAT NEITHER THE NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE NOR THE SDI (WHICH INTERESTINGLY, GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAD NOT ONCE MENTIONED) WOULD GENERATE ANY DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE ON PRESIDENT REAGAN. FASCELL, SPEAKING AS A DEMOCRAT, SAID THAT GORBACHEV SHOULD REALISE THAT REAGAN WAS THE MOST POPULAR PRESIDENT SINCE ROOSEVELT AND IT WAS IN GORBACHEV'S INTERESTS TO DEAL WITH A PRESIDENT WHO COULD GET AGREEMENTS THROUGH CONGRESS.

7. SEE MIFT.

CARTLEDGE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS  
LIMITED PS  
ACDD PS/LADY YOUNG  
DEFENCE D  
SOVIET D PS/MR RENTON  
NEWS D PS/PUS  
NAD MR DEREK THOMAS  
EED MR GOODALL  
WED MR RATFORD  
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 680

OF 192355Z MARCH 86

AND TO PRIORITY MOSCOW, STOCKHOLM, UKDEL NATO

STOCKHOLM TELNO 82

SHULTZ MEETING WITH RYZHKOV: 15 MARCH

1. PALMER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN STATE, HAS TOLD US THAT SHULTZ WAS IMPRESSED WITH RYZHKOV AT THEIR MEETING IN STOCKHOLM. RYZHKOV HAD ON THE WHOLE AVOIDED POLEMICS, HAD ARGUED COGENTLY, AND HAD CONVEYED AN IMPRESSION OF ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE BUT IN A NON-AGGRESSIVE WAY. WHILE HE WAS CLEARLY NOT AN EXPERT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HE HAD HANDLED HIS BRIEF WELL. HE WAS A MUCH MORE FORMIDABLE INTERLOCUTOR THAN SHEVERDNADZE.
2. RYZHKOV HAD OPENED WITH A BRIEF REMINDER OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUMMIT LAST AUTUMN AND AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET THAT LITTLE HAD HAPPENED SINCE. SHULTZ HAD REPLIED WITH A LONG PRESENTATION, WELCOMING PROGRESS IN CERTAIN AREAS, MENTIONING IN PARTICULAR AIR SERVICES, CULTURAL LINKS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. SHULTZ HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE US CONTINUED TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS, WHILE REGRETTING THAT THE TALKS ON AFRICA (WITH VASEV) HAD BEEN INSUBSTANTIAL. BUT ALL THIS HAD BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY LACK OF PROGRESS AT GENEVA, UNWILLINGNESS OF THE RUSSIANS TO REACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO AMERICAN INF PROPOSALS, AND LACK OF ANY RESPONSE TO THE NOVEMBER START PROPOSALS. SHULTZ REGRETTED THAT SHEVERDNADZE HAD NOT SO FAR AGREED A DATE FOR THEIR MEETING. THERE WAS MUCH TO DISCUSS.
3. RYZHKOV IN REPLY HAD UNDERLINED THE DISAPPOINTMENT IN MOSCOW AT THE US RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET 15 JANUARY PROPOSALS. THE LATTER HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF A CAREFUL AND PAINSTAKING REASSESSMENT IN MOSCOW FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT. THE US RESPONSE HAD NOT BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE, AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOW UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE NEXT STEP. RYZHKOV HAD THEN LAUNCHED INTO A PREDICTABLE REMINDER OF THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON TESTING AND HAD ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS GENUINELY INTENDED TO CONTINUE NUCLEAR TESTS. ACCORDING TO PALMER, RYZHKOV LOOKED GENUINELY SURPRISED WHEN SHULTZ SIMPLY SAID

- 1 -  
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YES



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YES. MALTSEV HAD INTERVENED WITH A PARTICULARLY DISOBLIGING AND INACCURATE TECHNICAL DEFENCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, QUOTING SWEDISH EXPERT COMMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET CASE.

4. SHULTZ THEN ASKED WHETHER HE SHOULD REPORT TO REAGAN THAT ANOTHER SUMMIT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION UNLESS THE AMERICANS SIGNED UP FOR A TESTING MORATORIUM. RYZHKOV WAS CAREFUL TO DEMUR, QUOTING GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO ANOTHER SUMMIT IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE PARTY CONGRESS, EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT CLOSING DOORS, OF BEHAVING RESPONSIBLY, AND OF THE NEED TO 'KEEP ON WORKING'. HE GAVE NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, OF WHEN A FURTHER SUMMIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ASSESSMENT IS THAT WHILE THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A FURTHER SUMMIT, THE RUSSIANS APPEARED GENUINELY UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW TO APPROACH IT OR WHAT IT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE. IN STATE'S VIEW, GORBACHEV IS SHOWING PREDICTABLE SIGNS OF EDCINESS ABOUT A MEETING WHICH IS NOT PRECEDED BY CAREFUL, PAINSTAKING PREPARATION AT OFFICIAL LEVEL. THE NEXT STAGE, ACCORDING TO PALMER, WAS LIKELY TO BE TALKS WITH DOBRYNIN WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON EARLY NEXT MONTH. THE AMERICANS HOPE THAT HE WILL, AT THE VERY LEAST, COME ARMED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR A SHULTZ/SHEVERDNADZE MEETING.

WRIGHT

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

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EED  
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NED  
PUSD  
PROTOCOL D

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PS/LADY YOUNG  
  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

CHIEF CLERK  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
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TIMING OF US/SOVIET SUMMIT

SUMMARY

1. PRESS REPORTS OF US IMPATIENCE AT SOVIET DELAY IN AGREEING A SUMMIT DATE ARE EXAGGERATED.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS PRESSED BY JOURNALISTS ON 5 MARCH ON THE TIMING OF THE NEXT SUMMIT. ONE OF HIS REPLIES WAS THAT IF A 1986 SUMMIT DID NOT TAKE PLACE QUOTE THERE WON'T BE A 1987 SUMMIT IN MOSCOW UNQUOTE. THIS HAS BEEN PLAYED UP IN THE PRESS HERE AS EVIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S GROWING IMPATIENCE WITH THE SOVIET FAILURE TO FIRM UP THE DATES FOR A SUMMIT THIS YEAR.

3. LATER IN THE DAY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN MADE PLAIN THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE POSITION. THE US HAD OFFERED A MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE OR JULY. THEY WERE STILL IN DISCUSSION WITH THE RUSSIANS AND NO FORMAL REPLY HAD BEEN RECEIVED. THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS MEANT SIMPLY THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON: IF NOT IN 1986, THEN IN 1987.

4. OUR CONTACTS IN STATE CONFIRM THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO RECENT NEWS FROM THE RUSSIANS ON DATES. WITH THE PARTY CONGRESS OUT OF THE WAY, THEY ARE EXPECTING TO HEAR SOMETHING NEXT WEEK.

COMMENT

5. IF THE SILENCE LASTS MUCH LONGER THAN THAT, WE WOULD EXPECT THE LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION FRUSTRATION, STILL LOW AT PRESENT, TO BEGIN TO RISE. THE WHITE HOUSE, NSC AND STATE DEPARTMENT STILL HOPE FOR A SUMMIT HERE BEFORE END-JULY, BUT THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO GORBACHEV ON INF SHOW THAT THERE IS STILL NO QUESTION OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY A PRICE FOR IT, BY SUCCUMBING TO SOVIET PRESSURE FOR ADVANCE CONCESSIONS.

WRIGHT

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS  
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SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES D  
INFO D  
PUSD  
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PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR O'NEILL


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Extract details:  <i>Appleyard to Powell dated 6 February 1986 with attachments</i>	
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Use black or blue pen to complete form.

Use the card for one piece or for each extract removed from a different place within a piece.

Enter the department and series,  
eg. HO 405, J 82.

Enter the piece and item references, .  
eg. 28, 1079, 84/1, 107/3


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


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YOUR TELNO 83, GORBACHEV PROPOSALS ON ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. INITIAL REACTIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION DIFFER WIDELY. STATE'S GENERALLY POSITIVE, PARTICULARLY ON THE DROPPING OF SOVIET DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS; THE PENTAGON'S MUCH MORE RESERVED. WHITE HOUSE LIKELY TO SIDE WITH STATE. A CASE FOR AN EARLY INDICATION HERE OF OUR REACTION TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR UK FORCES?

DETAIL

2. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE YET TO SORT THROUGH THE DETAIL OF GORBACHEV'S NEW PROPOSALS. BUT THE INITIAL REACTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS IS POSITIVE. MOST BELIEVE THAT MORE THAN PROPAGANDA IS INVOLVED. THEY POINT OUT THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS CONTAINS SOMETHING OF POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN EVERY MAJOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION EXCEPT START AND SPACE/DEFENCE:VIZ,

(A) INF

MOST STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE DEFINITELY DROPPED THEIR QUOTE EQUAL SECURITY UNQUOTE DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS. THIS IS REGARDED AS THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE ELEMENT IN THE NEW PACKAGE. THE RUSSIANS ARE THOUGHT FINALLY TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF US/SOVIET EQUALITY IN THE INF TOTALS THAT COUNT, IE MISSILES AND THEIR WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE; AND THE ABSENCE OF EVEN A FREEZE ON SS20S IN SOVIET ASIA IS NOT SEEN AS DETRACTING FROM THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONCESSION ON BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS,

(B) CW

THE APPARENT ACCEPTANCE OF VERIFICATION AND ON-SITE INSPECTION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES IS WELCOMED,

(C) MBFR

THE CONCESSION ON PERMANENT EXIT AND ENTRY POINTS IS NOTED, BUT THERE IS CONCERN HERE AT THE PROSPECT OF AN EXTENDED AND DIFFICULT WRANGLE OVER VERIFICATION,

(D) CDE

THE DROPPING OF NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS REGARDED AS IMPORTANT, AND LIKELY TO ENSURE THAT A PHASE I CDE AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE QUOTE HER OF



THE DROPPING OF NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS REGARDED AS IMPORTANT, AND LIKELY TO ENSURE THAT A PHASE I CDE AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE THE VIENNA MEETING.

3. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE QUOTE WEB OF PRECONDITIONS UNQUOTE AND LINKAGES, PARTICULARLY ON SDI, IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, SOME HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT IN PRACTICE PROVE FLEXIBLE. BUT OTHERS SAY THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR THAT PROGRESS ON AN INF AGREEMENT AS ENVISAGED IN THE NEW PROPOSALS IS CONTINGENT ON PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS, AND THAT IF THE US WERE INSTEAD STILL TO WANT A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT OF THE SORT ENVISAGED IN THE SOVIET AUTUMN PROPOSALS (IE INVOLVING COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS).

4. THE VIEW FROM THE PENTAGON IS VERY DIFFERENT. OSD BELIEVE THAT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED FOR PROPAGANDA EFFECT ON THE EUROPEAN LEFT AND ON CONGRESS, AND SEE THREE PARTICULAR DANGERS: VIZ:

(A) FIRST, THE RUSSIANS ARE, BY PICKING UP REAGAN RHETORIC ABOUT THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ENCOURAGING A PROCESS IN THE WEST THAT MIGHT UNDERMINE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE,

(B) SECOND, BY APPARENTLY MAKING THE ATTRACTIVE QUOTE ZERO-ZERO UNQUOTE OPTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SS20'S, GLCMS, AND PERSHING'S FROM EUROPE CONDITIONAL ON A FREEZE ON UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, THE RUSSIANS MAY HOPE TO FOMENT DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO UK AND FRENCH MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES, AND SOW DISSENT BETWEEN THE UK/FRANCE ON THE ONE HAND AND OTHER ALLIES, AND ALLIED (EG US) PUBLIC OPINION, ON THE OTHER,

(C) THIRDLY, OSD (FOR THE FIRST TIME) SHOW SIGNS OF DOUBTING WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S RESOLVE TO ACCEPT NO NEW CONSTRAINTS IN SDI WILL HOLD, GIVEN THE LIKELY EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESSIONAL, PUBLIC AND ALLIED INTEREST IN THE NEW GORBACHEV PROPOSALS.

5. INTER-AGENCY DEBATE IS ONLY STARTING, BUT OUR HUNCH IS THAT THIS TIME STATE'S VIEWS ARE LIKELY TO CUT MORE ICE THAN OSD'S IN THE WHITE HOUSE. THAT ALSO SEEMS TO BE OSD'S SUSPICION. THE QUOTE YES BUT UNQUOTE INITIAL REACTION FROM THE WHITE HOUSE (MY TELNO 115) WAS PERHAPS INDICATIVE. ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED A MUCH MORE SCEPTICAL RESPONSE IN REAGAN'S FIRST TERM: A SEA-CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE. (PERLE HAS COMMENTED TO US PRIVATELY THAT GORBACHEV'S PROPOSALS ARE DANGEROUS PROPAGANDA MADE TWICE AS DANGEROUS BY THAT WHITE HOUSE REACTION.) HOWEVER WE REACT PUBLICLY TO THE GORBACHEV OFFER, OSD HOPE THAT WE WILL INDICATE PRIVATELY TO THE ADMINISTRATION AT A HIGH LEVEL OUR REACTIONS TO ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR NUCLEAR FORCES.

COMMENT

6. THE OSD FEARS THAT THE EVENTUAL ADMINISTRATION REACTION MAY BE EXCESSIVELY FORTHCOMING ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED (PERHAPS FOR EFFECT). STATE'S REACTIONS DON'T SEEM STARRY-EYED, AND THE ONLY FORMAL WHITE HOUSE REACTION SO FAR, THOUGH NOT TO OSD'S TASTE, WAS BALANCED, CAUTIOUS AND SENSIBLE. BUT GORBAATHEV'S SKILFULL PRESENTATION DOES CONTAIN A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS WHICH ARE CALCULATED TO APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT. IN SOME CASES, THIS IS GOOD NEWS FOR US: BUT OSD'S RISK (B) SHOULD PERHAPS BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, AND KEPT IN MIND AS A MORE CONSIDERED UK ASSESSMENT IS PREPARED, FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE AMERICANS. IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL AGAIN TO POINT OUT AT A HIGH LEVEL THAT THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD, IN THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE CONTEXT, BE DISTINCTLY BAD NEWS, AND THAT TO ENCOURAGE THE BELIEF THAT IT IS A FEASIBLE/DESIRABLE AIM IS TO RISK WEAKENING ALLIED RESOLVE.

WRIGHT

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INFO PRIORITY BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, MODUK (FOR DACU) *mo*

MIPT: US/SOVIET NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS: US  
APPROACH TO GENEVA ROUND IV

1. THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS (ISSUED ON 14 JANUARY) TO THE  
US NEGOTIATORS FOR GENEVA ROUND IV INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING DETAILED  
POINTS (THE LIST MAY NOT BE FULLY COMPREHENSIVE):

(A) START, US NEGOTIATORS WERE INSTRUCTED TO:

(1) MAKE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE US ARE PROPOSING A BAN  
ON THE MODERNISATION OF EXISTING HEAVY MISSILES AS WELL AS ON NEW  
HEAVY MISSILES (THIS IS THE POINT WHICH DIFFERENTIATES THIS ASPECT  
OF THE NOVEMBER PROPOSAL FROM EARLIER US PROPOSALS). US NEGOTIATORS  
ARE ALSO TO EXPLAIN THAT THE PROPOSED BAN ON NEW TYPES OF HEAVY  
MISSILE WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF A BAN ON FLIGHT TESTING (THE  
NEGOTIATORS HAVE NO INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT FORM THE PROPOSED BAN ON  
MODERNISATION OF EXISTING HEAVY MISSILES SHOULD TAKE),

(B) SEEK A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A 50 PCNT REDUCTION  
IN MAXIMUM THROW-WEIGHT. IN DOING THIS, US NEGOTIATORS WILL ATTEMPT  
TO BUILD ON THE CLAIM MADE BY THE RUSSIANS WHEN PRESENTING THEIR  
OWN PROPOSALS IN SEPTEMBER THAT THOSE PROPOSALS COULD RESULT IN A  
50 PCNT REDUCTION IN SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT,

(C) INITIATE A DISCUSSION OF COUNTING RULES. NO SPECIFIC US  
APPROACH HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE PRESIDENT BUT MANY OF OUR CONTACTS  
BELIEVE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE LOOKING FOR AGREEMENT TO  
COUNT NEW SYSTEMS (AS IN SALT) AS CARRYING THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF  
RVS WITH WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN TESTED. FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS,  
HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOME HERE MAY PREFER TO SEEK AGREEMENT  
ON DISCRETE COUNTING RULES, SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM. THE US NEGOTIATING  
TEAM IS EMPOWERED TO INITIATE A DISCUSSION OF ALCM COUNTING RULES  
IN THIS CONTEXT.

*Implications for us*

(B) DEFENCE/SPACE

THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT NEW ELEMENTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S  
INSTRUCTIONS. THE US TEAM IN GENEVA IS INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN  
PRESSURE FOR FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY, AND TO TRY TO  
ADVANCE THE DIALOGUE ON THE OFFENSE/DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP AND  
ON POSSIBLE TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS. THE US TEAM WILL ALSO  
CONTINUE TO EXPLAIN THE SDI PROGRAMME AND GIVE GREATER DEFINITION  
TO THE "OPEN LABORATORIES" IDEA BY PROPOSING MUTUAL BRIEFINGS ON  
RESPECTIVE STRATEGIC DEFENCE RESEARCH PROGRAMMES  
AND RECIPROCAL VISITS TO THE LABORATORIES INVOLVED.

(C) INF

(1) THE MAIN ISSUE NOW PARTLY RESOLVED BY THE PRESIDENT IS THE  
MATTER OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN SS20S IN RANGE OF EUROPE AND THOSE  
ELSEWHERE. OUR UNDERSTANDING (SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THE ACCOUNT  
GIVEN BY US REPRESENTATIVES AT THE SCG MEETING ON 14 JANUARY -

*URDE*



UKDEL NATO TELNO 10 REFERS) IS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM IN GENEVA SHOULD TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT THE US PROPOSES A DEMARCATION LINE WHICH WOULD PLACE 270 OF THE 441 SS20 LAUNCHERS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED QUOTE WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE UNQUOTE AND 171 IN SOVIET ASIA. BUT THERE IS NO DECISION ON THE PRECISE WAY IN WHICH SUCH A DEMARCATION LINE SHOULD BE DEFINED (LONGITUDINAL DEFINITIONS OR BASE-SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS ARE AMONG THE POSSIBILITIES UNDER DISCUSSION). US NEGOTIATORS ARE INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO PRESENT THIS DECISION AS A US CONCESSION AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS CONTINGENT ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF QUOTE PROPORTIONAL UNQUOTE REDUCTIONS IN SS20S IN SOVIET ASIA,

(II) THE US NEGOTIATING TEAM IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUE TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPAL OF WARHEAD EQUALITY AS WELL AS LAUNCHER EQUALITY AND THAT, UNDER THE PRESENT US PROPOSAL, THIS WOULD INVOLVE EQUALITY IN THE 420-450 WARHEAD RANGE. (THIS ASPECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONFIRMS THAT THERE IS ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF GLCM/P2 MIXES WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION IS READY TO ACCEPT AND THAT THE US POSITION IS NOT TO ACCEPT A NUMBER OF P2S LESS THAN 36).

(III) US NEGOTIATORS WILL TELL THE RUSSIANS THAT MODERNISATION OF SYSTEMS COVERED BY AN INF AGREEMENT WOULD BE PERMITTED (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS NO DECISION ON WHETHER TO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GLCMS ALTHOUGH THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ANY SOVIET GLCMS ACCEPTED IN THIS WAY WOULD HAVE TO COUNT UNDER THE OVERALL LRINF CEILING).

2. THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONTAIN NO DECISIONS ON HOW TO HANDLE VERIFICATION MATTERS IN GENEVA, THIS SEEMS CERTAIN TO BE A SUBJECT OF HEATED INTER-AGENCY DEBATE HERE OVER THE COMING WEEKS. THE KEY POINT FOR DECISION IS WHETHER THE US SHOULD SOON ADVANCE IN GENEVA DETAILED VERIFICATION PROPOSALS (OSD'S AND ACDA'S PREFERENCE), EITHER AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ANY DRAFT START OR INF TREATIES TABLED, OR IN THE FORM OF A DETAILED VERIFICATION ANNEX, OR WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SEARCH FOR AGREEMENTS ON REDUCTIONS AND TURN TO VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AT A LATER STAGE (STATE'S PREFERENCE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT TRYING TO ADDRESS THE FULL RANGE OF VERIFICATION PROBLEMS IN GENEVA NOW WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR SLOW PROGRESS). DECISIONS ON WHETHER OR NOT THE US SHOULD TABLE DRAFT INF AND START TREATIES IN GENEVA (AS GLITMAN IN PARTICULAR WOULD LIKE TO DO) MAY BE DELAYED UNTIL THIS BROADER VERIFICATION DEBATE IS RESOLVED.

WRIGHT

**US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS**

LIMITED  
ACDD  
DEFENCE D  
SOVIET D  
NEWS D  
NAD  
EED  
WED  
PLANNING STAFF  
RES D  
INFO D  
PUSD  
NED

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MRS CHALKER  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR RATFORD  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
MR O'NEILL

**ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
ARMS CONTROL TALKS**

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FM WASHINGTON

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 03

OF 022300Z JANUARY 86

AND TO INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 3414: FUTURE US/SOVIET MEETINGS

1. QUOTING STATE DEPARTMENT AND WHITE HOUSE SOURCES, THE US PRESS ON 1 JANUARY REPORTED THAT DOBRYNIN HAD SUGGESTED INFORMALLY TO THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THE NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT MIGHT BEST BE HELD NOT IN JUNE BUT IN SEPTEMBER. JUNE MIGHT BE TOO SOON TO PERMIT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON KEY ISSUES, ESPECIALLY ARMS CONTROL. THE REPORTS NOTED IF THE SUMMIT WERE POSTPONED UNTIL SEPTEMBER, THE FIRST SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE PREPARATORY MEETING WOULD PROBABLY BE SIMILARLY POSTPONED UNTIL THE SPRING.

2. IN COMMENTING PUBLICLY, ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN HAVE CONFINED THEMSELVES TO SAYING THAT DATES FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT ARE THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUING DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSION. BUT PALMER (EUR/STATE) HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE REPORTS OF DOBRYNIN'S DEMARCHE ARE CORRECT (THOUGH IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE HAD FIRM INSTRUCTIONS CLEARED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND THEREFORE WHETHER IT REPRESENTED THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE US PROPOSAL OF JUNE). AND, AS RIDGEWAY HAD TOLD US (JENKINS' TELELETTER OF 27 DECEMBER TO THOMAS) THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT YET AGREED TO THE US PROPOSAL OF LATE JANUARY FOR THE FIRST SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING, AND WERE HINTING THAT MARCH MIGHT BE BETTER.

4. THE REPORTS HOWEVER APPEAR TO BE MISLEADING IN IMPLYING THAT THE ONLY SUMMIT OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION ARE JUNE AND SEPTEMBER, AND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NOW WILLINGLY SETTLE FOR SEPTEMBER. WE UNDERSTAND (A) THAT (TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM) SHULTZ OPPOSES, AND WOULD WISH TO MINIMISE, ANY SLIPPAGE, AND (B) THAT THIS IS ALSO THE WHITE HOUSE POSITION (NO DOUBT BECAUSE SEPTEMBER WILL BE BUSY DOMESTICALLY, WITH CONGRESS WINDING UP BEFORE THE MID-TERM ELECTIONS, AND AWKWARD BUDGETARY/FISCAL DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN). PALMER'S HUNCH IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL TRY VERY HARD TO SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO DATES NO LATER THAN JULY.

WRIGHT

EAST WEST &amp; US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
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PLANNING STAFF  
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PUSD

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR SAMUEL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

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GRS 1800

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM UKDEL NATO  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 333

OF 131200Z DECEMBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR SEC(NATO/UK)(P), DUS(P), CDEC)  
AND TO PRIORITY ANKARA, ATHENS, BRUSSELS, BONN, COPENHAGEN,  
AND TO PRIORITY THE HAGUE, LISBON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO OTTAWA, PARIS  
AND TO PRIORITY REYKJAVIK, ROME, WASHINGTON, MADRID, UKDEL VIENNA  
AND TO PRIORITY MOSCOW  
AND TO ROUTINE UKDEL CDE STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK, EAST BERLIN  
AND TO ROUTINE PRAGUE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, SOFIA, WARSAW, TOKYO

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE: DECEMBER 1985

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION IN BRUSSELS ON  
12 AND 13 DECEMBER 1985. MINISTERS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS  
SINCE OUR MEETING IN LISBON IN JUNE. THEY DEMONSTRATE THE VALIDITY  
OF OUR POLICY - REAFFIRMED IN THE WASHINGTON STATEMENT - OF  
PRESERVING PEACE IN FREEDOM THROUGH ADEQUATE MILITARY STRENGTH AND  
POLITICAL SOLIDARITY AND, ON THAT BASIS, PURSUING A MORE STABLE AND  
CO-OPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST.

2. WE WELCOME RECENT HIGH LEVEL EAST-WEST CONTACTS, NOTABLY THE  
MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV,  
WHICH MARKS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A REALISTIC  
AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE EAST. WE HOPE  
THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO IMPROVED RELATIONS, MORE EXTENSIVE CONTACTS,  
INCLUDING REGULAR HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, AND BROAD CO-OPERATION ON THE  
FULL RANGE OF EAST-WEST QUESTIONS. WE SHALL ALL PLAY OUR FULL PART  
IN MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS. WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS  
ALLIES TO JOIN US IN THIS ENDEAVOUR.

3. MEANWHILE, THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP OF SOVIET NUCLEAR AND  
CONVENTIONAL ARMS REMAINS A MAJOR ALLIED CONCERN. WE DO NOT SEEK  
MILITARY SUPERIORITY. BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO SAFEGUARD OUR  
SECURITY BY MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES.  
OUR STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE HAS PROVED ITS WORTH IN PRESERVING PEACE,  
AND REMAINS FULLY VALID.

THE CLOSE AND PERMANENT LINK BETWEEN NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN  
ALLIES, WHICH HAS KEPT THE PEACE FOR 36 YEARS, REMAINS THE BASIS OF  
OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY. ALLIANCE COHESION WILL CONTINUE TO BE

/ENSURED



ENSURED THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ON ALL MATTERS AFFECTING OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND SECURITY. THE VALUE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS HAS AGAIN BEEN CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED IN RECENT MONTHS.

4. WE ARE COMMITTED TO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. THIS MUST BE BASED ON THE CRITERIA OF STRENGTHENED STABILITY, EQUITABLE AND SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

5. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ON THEIR STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND ON DEFENCE AND SPACE SYSTEMS. THESE AIM TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TERMINATE IT ON EARTH, LIMIT AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS AND STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT U S EFFORTS IN ALL THREE AREAS OF NEGOTIATION. WE WELCOME THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO ACCELERATE WORK AT GENEVA, IN PARTICULAR IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS COMMON GROUND, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ARMS, APPROPRIATELY APPLIED.

THE ALLIES CONCERNED ENDORSE THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS ON U.S. AND SOVIET INF SYSTEMS RECENTLY TABLED IN GENEVA BY THE U.S., AND SUPPORT THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. THEY REITERATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MODIFY, HALT, REVERSE, OR DISPENSE WITH LONGER RANGE INF (LRINF) DEPLOYMENT AS PART OF AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO DEPLOY LRINF MISSILES ON SCHEDULE (1).

6. THE ALLIES PARTICIPATING IN THE VIENNA MBFR NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSED ON 5 DECEMBER 1985 A VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT FOR US/SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, FOLLOWED BY A COLLECTIVE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT OF THREE YEARS ON U S AND SOVIET AND NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES. THE PROPOSAL EMBODIES ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHICH OPEN THE WAY TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIABLE FORCE LEVELS AND WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT'S PROVISIONS. IT RESPONDS TO AN EARLIER EASTERN PROPOSAL AND REPRESENTS AN IMAGINATIVE ATTEMPT TO BREAK A LONG-STANDING DEAD-LOCK.

7. WE REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT WE SEEK AN EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE CONVENTION ON A GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF SUCH WEAPONS AND ON THE DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKPILES. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO ACCELERATE THEIR EFFORTS TO THIS END.

8. WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVELY ALL PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND



THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE NOTE WITH REGRET THAT THE OTTAWA MEETING ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BUDAPEST CULTURAL FORUM, ALTHOUGH USEFUL IN THEMSELVES, REVEALED PERSISTING DEFICIENCIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE DOCUMENTS, AND WERE UNABLE TO REACH COMMON CONCLUSIONS.

AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE (CDE), AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE CSCE PROCESS, WE ARE ACTIVELY WORKING FOR EARLY AGREEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD EMBODY A SUBSTANTIAL SET OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES, COVERING THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE EXISTING DUTY OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

ALL PARTICIPATING STATES REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT ON ITS 10TH ANNIVERSARY. WE SEEK TO PROMOTE GENUINE AND BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS, INCLUDING THOSE CONCERNED WITH RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND THOSE RELATING TO CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO MEANINGFUL RESULTS AT THE FORTHCOMING BERNE MEETING ON HUMAN CONTACTS. THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING WILL REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

9. THE MAINTENANCE OF A CALM SITUATION IN AND AROUND BERLIN, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE CITY, REMAINS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ARE ESSENTIAL TO THIS END. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SUPPORT ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE PROSPERITY AND VIABILITY OF THE CITY. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FURTHER TO DEVELOP INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND TO THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE OF A DIVIDED GERMANY, PARTICULARLY THE BERLINERS.

10. WE URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO END THE UNACCEPTABLE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, NOW APPROACHING ITS SEVENTH YEAR, TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS, AND AGREE TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION RESTORING AFGHANISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED STATUS.

WE EMPHASISE THE CONTINUING NEED IN POLAND FOR GENUINE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY AND FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.



WE, FOR OUR PART, RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES. WE WILL REMAIN VIGILANT AND WILL CONSULT ON EVENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA WHICH MIGHT THREATEN OUR COMMON SECURITY.

11. WE STRONGLY CONDEMN TERRORISM AND WILL CONTINUE TO WORK TO ELIMINATE THIS THREAT. WE INVITE ALL STATES TO JOIN US IN THIS RESOLVE.

12. WE HAVE EXAMINED WAYS OF ENHANCING ARMAMENTS CO-OPERATION AMONG ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS CO-OPERATION REFLECTS OUR CONTINUING CONCERN FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. IN THE LIGHT OF OUR EXAMINATION, WE HAVE DECIDED TO IMPLEMENT A STRATEGY AIMED AT IMPROVING CO-OPERATION. THIS SHOULD GIVE A FRESH BOOST TO THE WORK BEING DONE IN THIS FIELD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND LEAD IN A SHORT TIME TO SPECIFIC CO-OPERATIVE PROGRAMMES ENCOMPASSING BOTH ITS EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN MEMBERS.

13. IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, WE REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMMES FOR LESS FAVOURED PARTNERS AND REMAIN COMMITTED TO PROMOTING THE STABILITY AND WELL-BEING OF OUR COMMUNITY OF FREE NATIONS.

14. THE SPRING 1986 MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN MINISTERIAL SESSION WILL BE HELD IN HALIFAX, CANADA, IN MAY.

(1) DENMARK AND GREECE RESERVE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE INF PART OF THIS PARAGRAPH.

THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SPAIN RESERVES HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE.

GRAHAM

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

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SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
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PLANNING STAFF  
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PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR SAMUEL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

4.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

3



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

*Le V*  
*copy L03 ARX*  
*13 December 1985*

UNITED STATES POSITION ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND SDI

Thank you for your letter of 9 December analysing Mr. McFarlane's briefing at Chequers on 24 November.

The Prime Minister thinks that we should allow for the possibility that the United States may have included some negotiating fat in the Geneva proposals. They may have proposed a total ban on mobile missiles in the belief that this would give them a peg on which to hang a full statement of their concerns about the difficulty of verification and the possibility of mirving. She also suspects that the United States might not ultimately insist on a 50 per cent cut in throw weight, a ban on the upgrading of the SS-18 or a ban on Soviet GCLMs.

The Prime Minister has asked me to emphasise most strongly that no hint of the interpretation in the previous paragraph should reach United States officials. Further enquiries about the Administration's intentions and positions should carefully avoid any risk on that score. The Prime Minister also points out that the United States negotiating position would be seriously undermined if knowledge of the possible existence of negotiating leeway on these important aspects were to leak. The only officials to see this letter should therefore be the senior official concerned in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CHARLES POWELL

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



To use  
an

LOBARX

Draft letter from Mr Powell to

L V Appleyard Esq, FCO

Copies: R C Mottram Esq, MoD  
M C Stark Esq, Cabinet Office

United States Position on Nuclear Arms Control  
and SDI

Thank you for your letter of 9 December analysing Mr McFarlane's briefing at Chequers on 24 November.

2. The Prime Minister thinks, <sup>but we should</sup> ~~judging from~~ ~~contacts with senior members of the Administration,~~ <sup>allow for the possibility</sup> (that the United States may ~~possibly~~ have included some negotiating fat in the Geneva proposals. They may have proposed a total ban on mobile missiles in the belief that this would give them a peg on which to hang a full statement of their concerns about the difficulty of verification and the possibility of mirving. <sup>She also</sup> ~~It may also be that~~ <sup>suspects that</sup> the United States <sup>might</sup> ~~would~~ not ultimately insist on a 50 per cent cut in throw weight, a ban on the upgrading of the SS-18 or a ban on Soviet GCLMs.

Mr Powell

Sir R. Armstrong  
has seen  
this

L. Malabar  
XU

3. The Prime Minister has asked me to emphasise most strongly that no hint of the interpretation



in the previous paragraph should reach United States officials. Further enquiries about the Administration's intentions and positions should carefully avoid any risk on that score. The Prime Minister also points out that the United States negotiating position would be seriously undermined if knowledge of the possible existence of negotiating leeway on these important aspects were to leak, ~~and that~~ <sup>officials</sup> the only ~~people~~ to see this letter, ~~apart from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary,~~ should therefore be the senior <sup>one official</sup> ~~official~~ concerned in the <sup>Foreign & Commonwealth</sup> ~~two~~ Departments, <sup>Christopher</sup> and ~~Sir Robert Armstrong and Mr Mallaby in~~ <sup>Office, the Ministry of Defence and</sup> the Cabinet Office.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

CM



US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR RENTON  
 PS/PUS  
 MR DEREK THOMAS  
 MR GOODALL  
 MR SAMUEL  
 MR ~~WILSON~~ DAUNT  
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST

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RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

SECRET

FM UKDEL NATO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 323

OF 111642Z DECEMBER 85

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DNPS AND DACU)

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, MOSCOW, BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY THE HAGUE

INFO SAVING OSLO, ANKARA

SCG MEETING: 11 DECEMBER

## SUMMARY

1. CAUTIOUS ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR INF IN NEXT ROUND AT GENEVA. FULL SUPPORT FOR US PROPOSALS Tabled ON 1 NOVEMBER. REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIANCE POLICY ON THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES; THE LINE SHOULD BE THAT THE QUESTION DID NOT ARISE UNTIL AFTER INF/START AGREEMENT. DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF LATEST US PROPOSALS.

## DETAIL

2. GLITMAN (CHIEF US INF NEGOTIATOR) WAS GENERALLY CAUTIOUS IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY PROGRESS ON INF IN ROUND 4 (WHICH BEGINS ON 16 JANUARY) AT GENEVA. HE SAID IT WAS PREMATURE TO CONCLUDE ON THE BASIS OF THE REFERENCE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT AT THE SUMMIT TO A SEPARATE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT A BREAKTHROUGH WAS IMMINENT. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO REACT POSITIVELY TO THE LATEST US PROPOSALS MIGHT ONLY BECOME APPARENT AFTER THE CPSU CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. HE ALSO EXPECTED THEM TO REVERT TO A FIRM LINKAGE BETWEEN INF/START AND SDI. PERSONAL VIEW OF HOLMES (US CHAIRMAN) WAS THAT NEGOTIATING PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE BUT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INF AGREEMENT IN ISOLATION WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

3. THERE WAS PROLONGED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS. THE GROUP AGREED THAT GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE IN HIS SUPREME



SOVIET SPEECH ON 27 NOVEMBER TO THE QUOTE STUMBLING BLOCK UNQUOTE REPRESENTED BY UK AND FRENCH FORCES MEANT THAT THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WERE LIKELY TO FOCUS ON THIS. IT COULD NOT BE ASSUMED THAT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT ALSO IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF A SEQUENTIAL APPROACH INVOLVING US/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON US-SOVIET LRINF LIMITATIONS/REDUCTIONS BEFORE THE QUESTION OF UK, FRENCH (AND CHINESE) SYSTEMS WAS ADDRESSED.

4. THE NORWEGIAN PRESSED FOR QUOTE CONTINGENCY PLANS UNQUOTE FOR BRINGING IN THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. DAUNT (UK) RECAPITULATED AT EACH OF THE MEETINGS THE BASIS FOR BRITISH POLICY AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR REJECTING SOVIET CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS USING THE ISSUE OF UK/FRENCH FORCES AS A SMOKE SCREEN. NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE ONLY TASK IN GENEVA WAS TO ACHIEVE SIZEABLE REDUCTIONS IN THE SUPER POWER STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE ARSENALS. IN THE MEANTIME THE UK WOULD NOT GO BEYOND ITS EXISTING POSITION. DAUNT WARNED AGAINST FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF DISCUSSING IN ADVANCE OF A US/SOVIET AGREEMENT HOW UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE HANDLED. THE GROUP WELCOMED HIS OFFER TO CIRCULATE A SHORT PAPER SUMMARISING THE ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUDING THIRD COUNTRY FORCES.

5. THERE WAS FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE CURRENT ALLIANCE POSITION OF EXCLUDING UK AND FRENCH FORCES REMAINED VALID. A TENTATIVE ITALIAN SUGGESTION THAT NATO SHOULD EXAMINE WAYS OF HELPING THE RUSSIANS TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR UNCOMPROMISING POSITION WAS FIRMLY REJECTED.

6. HOLMES FULLY AGREED WITH THE BRITISH POSITION. THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO REJECT AT GENEVA SOVIET DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION. THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT THE QUESTION OF UK/FRENCH FORCES WAS IRRELEVANT AND THEY WOULD REFUSE IN THESE BILATERAL TALKS TO NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF OTHER ALLIES. TO INDICATE THAT NATO WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. IT WOULD UNDERMINE AMERICAN EFFORTS TO GET EQUAL AND GLOBAL LIMITS ON US AND SOVIET LRINF. THE BEST SITUATION WOULD BE TO DEFER THE ISSUE UNTIL AFTER AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT AND A START AGREEMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT QUOTE INTERIM UNQUOTE MIGHT IN PRACTICE TURN OUT TO BE FAIRLY PERMANENT.

7. THE DUTCH STRESSED THAT NATO'S INF PROPOSALS SHOULD BE CREDIBLE IN PUBLIC PRESENTATIONAL TERMS. GLITMAN POINTED OUT THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A LIMIT OF 140 LAUNCHERS IN EUROPE ON EACH SIDE DID NOT REPRESENT A FREEZE ON US DEPLOYMENTS. THE RESULTING MIX OF PERSHING III AND GLCM UNDER THE 420-450 WARHEAD LIMIT WOULD INVOLVE A REDISTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENT MIX. (ALL 108 PERSHING III ARE ALREADY DEPLOYED IN THE FRG). HE ADDED THAT UNDER ITS GLOBAL ENTITLEMENT THE US WOULD NOT BE OBLIGED TO DESTROY ANY PIIIS REMOVED FROM EUROPE.

8. THE FRG EXPRESSED CONCERN BOTH ABOUT THE NUMBER OF PIIIS WHICH MIGHT REMAIN AND THE US INTENTION TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO CONVERT PII TO SHORTER RANGE PIB. GLITMAN AGREED ON THE SENSITIVITY OF THESE POINTS. ON PIB THE US WOULD FOR THE MOMENT REFER ONLY TO A RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SHORTER RANGE INF (SRINF) DEPLOYMENTS, WITHOUT BEING MORE PRECISE. THEY HAD NOT MENTIONED TO THE RUSSIANS THE POSSIBLE CONVERSION OF PII.



9. THE US SOUGHT ALLIES' VIEWS ON PROVISIONS IN A NEW DRAFT INF TREATY RELATING TO LRINF MODERNISATION. IT WAS AGREED TO PROVIDE VIEWS IN WRITING. DAUNT GAVE A PRELIMINARY VIEW THAT, SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY DEVELOPING AN SS20 REPLACEMENT AND SINCE THERE WERE CURRENTLY NO SUCH PLANS ON THE NATO SIDE, CONSTRAINTS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS (RANGE, PAYLOAD, ETC) OF ANY REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY.

10. THE US EXPLAINED THAT THE DEFINITION OF THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION BETWEEN SS20S IN RANGE OF NATO EUROPE AND THOSE BASED IN ASIA WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. THREE OPTIONS WERE FEASIBLE. THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR A DEMARCATION LINE JUST WEST OF NOVOSIBIRSK. THIS WOULD BE CLOSE TO AN EARLIER SOVIET SUGGESTION OF A LINE ON THE 80 DEGREE EAST LONGITUDE. BUT SINCE NOVOSIBIRSK IS OVER 200 KM EAST FROM THE 80 DEGREE LINE, THE US PROPOSAL WOULD PREVENT CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SS20 BASES, OR THE MOVING OF OTHER SS20 LAUNCHERS, EAST OF THE URALS IN SOVIET ASIA WHERE THEY COULD THREATEN NATO FLANKS, ESPECIALLY NORWAY AND TURKEY.

11. THERE WAS ALSO DISCUSSION OF CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF WITHIN RANGE OF EUROPE. ANY CONSTRAINTS SHOULD SEEK TO LIMIT SOVIET NUMBERS TO THOSE DEPLOYED AT A SPECIFIC DATE, PROBABLY END 1985, AND TO PRESERVE A US RIGHT TO DEPLOY EQUIVALENT NUMBERS. THE SUBJECT WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN MORE DETAIL AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

12. FINALLY, RUTH PRESSED FOR THE DETAILS OF CURRENT NATO DEPLOYMENTS (108 P.II AND 32 GLCM LAUNCHERS) TO BE MADE PUBLIC. HE ALSO PRESSED FOR THE EAST/WEST SPLIT OF SS20S TO BE REVEALED IN PUBLIC ONCE THE ISSUE OF GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE HAD BEEN SETTLED. HOLMES ACCEPTED THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE FIRST POINT, BUT REMAINED NON-COMMITTAL ON THE SECOND.

GRAHAM

YYYY

FCO PASS SAVING OSLO, ANKARA

UBLNAN 0277

NNNN

THAT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUBSTANCE OF AN INTERIM THE SUBSEQUENT  
NEGOTIATIONS WERE DIRECTLY TO LOGS OF THIS. IT COULD NOT BE ASSUMED  
BELIEVED BY UK AND OTHER FORCES WERE THAT THE SOVIET  
SOCIETY SPEECH ON 21 NOVEMBER TO THE WHOLE COUNCILING BLOCK PROBLE  
SARIE IS. THE GROUP WOULD THAT CONDUCTORS BELIEVED IN HIS SUBSINE  
3. THERE WAS PROLONGED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF THIS COMBINA





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

bc PC  
11 December 1985

**MESSAGE TO MR. GORBACHEV**

BF1

The Foreign Secretary told the Prime Minister this morning that he agreed on reflection that the earlier draft message to Mr. Gorbachev had not contained sufficient substance to be worth sending. He continued to believe, however, that a message would be worthwhile and would give further thought to the substance of this with a view to letting the Prime Minister have a draft.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

JKW



Prime Minister

1

ms



This letter says:

(a) that justifying the SDI by Foreign and Commonwealth Office reference to Soviet mobile MIRVs is not a very good argument and contradicts earlier US statements. London SW1A 2AH

9 December 1985

(b) that the complete ban on mobile MIRVs proposed by the US could weaken their deterrent; and  
(c) we had better find out pretty quickly what Dear Charles, they are up to.

I agree with (a) which you have already said to the

Mr McFarlane's Briefing to the Prime Minister  
23 November : SDI

Americans: but I don't think they are so naive or blind to

their own interests as

(b) suggests.

We must refrain from teaching grandmothers to

tuck eggs.

CDP

9/12.

Thank you for your letter of 24 November about Mr McFarlane's briefing at Chequers on 24 November. The Foreign Secretary has asked me to draw your attention to one element of the briefing which he found of particular interest.

In reporting on the Geneva discussions on deterrence, Mr McFarlane stated that the point of greatest concern to the US was the Soviet introduction of mobile mirrored systems. He then reported that the President had justified the SDI to Mr Gorbachev in terms of three basic reasons:

- (i) the need to counter Soviet development of mobile mirrored systems, which would force the US to move to strategic defence unless agreed and verifiable reductions in them could be achieved;
- (ii) the need to provide against the impressive Soviet research programme into BMD; and
- (iii) the need to take account of the possible proliferation of third country systems.

Of these reasons, the second - the argument for a prudent hedge - is of course familiar, and a major element in the Government's support for the US research programme. Arguably, the Gorbachev offer to throw open Soviet laboratories to inspection if an agreement to ban research is reached could resolve this problem. But it seems unlikely that the Russians will follow through on this offer in a way the West will find acceptable.

The third reason - protection against third party systems - carries certain implications for ourselves, should the Soviet Union decide to invoke such a justification for its own activity. This third argument was the one advanced by President Nixon at the time of the signature of the ABM Treaty, in order to justify US limited deployments of BMD and continued research. In that context, President Nixon referred to the threat from China. Since then, the possibility of threats from other third parties over the longer term has perhaps become more real. Nonetheless, the question still arises whether, on this justification alone, the balance of overall advantage favours the acceleration of strategic defence research programmes on both sides.

/ The most





The most interesting point, however, is Mr McFarlane's citation of the threat from Soviet mobile mirrored systems as a prime justification for the SDI. You will be aware, from earlier discussions with senior US officials and with the President himself, that this argument appears to have emerged rather recently on the US side, and to have had a particular attraction for Mr McFarlane himself. At the Camp David talks last year, at the Prime Minister's debriefing after the January meeting, in her discussions with the President in Bonn and with Mr Shultz in London in June, and in her talks with Mr Weinberger in Washington in July, no reference was made to the mobile mirrored threat as integrally linked to the need to pursue the SDI. Nor has this argument been advanced at lower levels.

The case for such a justification appears to have been put to us by Mr McFarlane in his private discussion with the Prime Minister on 28 September, when he briefed her on the President's talks with Mr Shevardnadze in Washington earlier that week. At that time, Mr McFarlane stated that the President had emphasised the threat in the US perception of the new Soviet offensive systems, "above all through the decision to introduce mobile mirvs". The US, for public opinion reasons, could not match the Soviet Union in building new offensive systems, and had therefore been forced back on strategic defence. At the time, the Prime Minister commented that this was a new and not a very good argument for the SDI. If the Russians offered not to introduce mobile mirvs, the United States, she continued, would have no justification for proceeding with the SDI. In the view of the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister's comment in September remains valid in the aftermath of the Geneva Summit. This is particularly the case now that the Americans themselves have called, as part of their latest detailed proposals in the Geneva negotiations, for a total ban on all mobile ICBMs, whether mirrored or not.

Mr McFarlane's argument should also be examined against the background of the development of US strategic thinking over the past few years. During the 1970s, US Administrations favoured a mobile mirrored ICBM of their own (the MX). The project foundered on Congressional doubts about the proposed basing mode, and the overall need for this type of ICBM. The President established in 1982 a Commission on Strategic Forces, chaired by General Scowcroft, to review the options. The Commission's Report noted that "a more stable structure of ICBM deployments would exist if both sides moved towards more survivable methods of basing ... the need to keep open the option for different types of mobile basing suggests a missile of small size ... deployment of a small single warhead ICBM in hardened mobile launchers is of particular interest because it could permit deployment in peacetime in limited areas such as military reservations."

/ The President





The President endorsed the Report, which was interpreted (notably in Congress) as approval for the concept of a new, single-warhead, mobile land-based system. However, the Commission also proposed basing the MX in fixed silos. This was endorsed by the President, and accepted by Congress. In other words, mobile (but not mirrored mobile) systems were approved in principle, while the deployment of the non-mobile MX was endorsed as a stop-gap measure. These steps all followed the release of the Commission's Report in April 1983, one month after the President had launched the SDI. At that time, therefore, the US view appears to have supported both mobile systems and the development of strategic defences.

Mr McFarlane's recent statements (echoed by Mr Richard Perle in recent testimony to the Senate) appear to rest on the premise that the US will not, because of domestic opposition, be able to deploy any mobile systems; but that the Russians will, in a manner the US (despite their success in verifying accurately the number of mobile SS20s) not be able to verify. The mirroring of mobile ICBMs adds an extra danger. It is worth noting that of the two mobile Soviet ICBMs, only the SS24 is mirrored; the SS25 (of which the US complain in the context of contraventions of the SALT II constraints) is at present a single warhead mobile system of the type endorsed by the Scowcroft Commission.

The US proposal to ban all mobile systems has a wider significance. If it were accepted by the Russians (which is unlikely), it could have the effect of removing the ICBM leg from the US strategic triad, since the growing vulnerability of fixed silos to counter-force attack would make their further deployment increasingly difficult to justify. This in turn could damage the effectiveness of the US deterrent force, by removing the main advantages associated with land-based missiles (speed of delivery, high accuracy, and swift and dependable communications). At the same time, the threat to sea-based forces could increase, especially if the overall levels of warheads were reduced as a result of the Geneva talks. Fewer SLBMs would mean fewer submarine platforms, thus increasing the attractiveness to the Soviet Union of finding a solution to the ASW problem, and perhaps the chances of their doing so.

Given Mr McFarlane's argument in the SDI context about the mobile mirrored threat, the potential relevance of this to the new US proposal at Geneva that all mobile ICBMs should be banned, and the wider strategic importance of the above points, the Foreign Secretary believes that we should take the opportunity to explore with the US their current thinking on both elements.

/ I am ...



S E C R E T



I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram  
(MOD) and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office)

*Yours,*

*L V Appleyard*  
(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

S E C R E T



GRS 200

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FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 1592

OF 090940Z DECEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE : WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY : BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO.

POST GENEVA SUMMIT US/SOVIET ACTIVITY

1. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAVE TOLD US OF THE FOLLOWING.

A. AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (UN-NAMED) ABOUT IN ANY CASE TO LEAVE HIS POST IS BEING APPOINTED TO COORDINATE THE GENEVA FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES ACROSS THE BOARD. HE WILL START WORK VERY SOON.

B. THE RUSSIANS HAD ASKED THE AMERICANS AT THE END OF LAST WEEK WHEN THEY WOULD BE READY TO RESUME CONTACTS AND PURSUE FOLLOW-UP. THE ANSWER HAD BEEN THAT THEY NEEDED A WEEK OR TWO MORE AND WOULD CONTACT THEM AS SOON AS THEY WERE READY.

C. COMMERCE SECRETARY, BALDRIDGE, WHO ARRIVED IN MOSCOW THIS WEEKEND, IS BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM REAGAN TO GORBACHEV WHICH WILL INTER ALIA TOUCH ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

D. THE NEXT SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IS EXPECTED TO BE IN WASHINGTON IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY. SHEVARDNADZE HAS AN ASIAN TOUR PLANNED AND TIMING IS TIGHT BUT THE US EMBASSY MAINTAIN THAT THIS IS THE TARGET TIMING.

CARTLEDGE

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR RENTON  
PS/MR EGGAR  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR SAMUEL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

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GRS 450

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 041800Z FCO

TELNO 1585

OF 041655Z DECEMBER 85

INFO PRIORTIY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA

MIPT (NOT TO ALL)

CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE: EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. AFTER GIVING HIS REACTIONS TO YOUR MESSAGE OUTLINING OUR FUTURE BILATERAL AGENDA AND TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS AND FOR HIS OWN VISIT TO LONDON, SHEVARDNADZE VOLUNTEERED SOME COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET VIEW OF GENEVA FOLLOW-UP: AND ALSO PUT A QUESTION ON CTB.

DETAIL

POST-GENEVA

2. THE GENEVA MEETING HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT LANDMARK. THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD OF COURSE BEEN REALISTIC IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS, AND HAD HARBOURED NO ILLUSIONS THAT ONE MEETING COULD SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS OR IN EAST/WEST AFFAIRS. NONETHELESS, DESPITE THE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS, A BEGINNING HAD BEEN MADE TO AN IMPORTANT JOURNEY AND IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. AS HE HAD YESTERDAY TOLD MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD IMMEDIATELY EMBARKED, AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING, ON ITS PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT WHICH WOULD BE NO LESS COMPLICATED OR IMPORTANT. THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN GENEVA "WOULD NOT RETURN TO GENEVA EMPTY-HANDED" IN THE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. IN THIS THE EUROPEAN POWERS, PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR STATES, SHOULD NOT BE "LEFT ON ONE SIDE". THERE WERE SOME MATTERS IN WESTERN ATTITUDE WHICH WERE NOT CLEAR TO HIM. THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART HAD ANNOUNCED A UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING, HAD HALTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS20S IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE AND HAD EVEN PROPOSED THE DISMANTLING OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE SYSTEMS. THE WESTERN RESPONSE WAS TO CONTINUE INF DEPLOYMENT. "THAT WOULD NOT DO". IF IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND TO EUROPEAN SECURITY BOTH SIDES MUST ASSIST IN CREATING THE RIGHT BACKGROUND. THE SOVIET UNION FAVOURED A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM EVEN THOUGH IT RECOGNISED THAT THE COURSE OF US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DETERMINE THE OVERALL SITUATION. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE AND USEFUL IF PETROVSKY OR OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS COULD HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH US AT THE WORKING LEVEL AS WE HAD PROPOSED.

/CTB

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CTB

3. FINALLY, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT ONE QUESTION TO ME: HE DID NOT SEEK AN IMMEDIATE REPLY BUT WOULD LIKE ME TO REPORT IT TO YOU FOR CONSIDERATION. HE WOULD LIKE A STRAIGHT ANSWER - "YES OR NO" - ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS ATTITUDE TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE TRILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A CTB WHICH BEEN BROKEN OFF AT A LATE STAGE WHEN ALMOST COMPLETED. NOW, AFTER THE FIRST GENEVA MEETING AND WITH A VIEW TO THE NEXT PHASE IT SEEMED RIGHT TO RESUME THOSE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS A MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF DETENT, AS REGARDS SPECIFIC BARRIERS TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND WITH REGARD ALSO TO SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE COULD CONSULT AT ALL APPROPRIATE LEVELS EVEN BEFORE HIS VISIT TO LONDON. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS REMARKS TO YOU.

CARTLEDGE

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MR LONG

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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 041800Z FCOLN

TELNO 1584

OF 041700Z DECEMBER 85

MY TELNO 1554 : CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE

## SUMMARY

1. FIRST CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE: GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND REASONABLY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR 1986 BILATERAL AGENDA. DATES FOR HIL VISIT TO LONDON TO BE DISCUSSED IN JANUARY: GENERAL APPROVAL FOR SUGGESTED ROUNDS OF OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS. EMPHASIS ON SERIOUSNESS OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS ALREADY IN TRAIN FOR NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT. REQUEST FOR A STRAIGHT ANSWER FROM HMG ON WHETHER WE FAVOURED A RESUMED CTB NEGOTIATION OR NOT: THIS WAS RELEVANT TO THE NEXT SUMMIT.

## DETAIL

2. MY FIRST CALL ON SHEVARDNADZE TOOK PLACE ON 4 DECEMBER AND LASTED FOR FIFTY MINUTES. SHEVARDNADZE WAS RELAXED AND AT TIMES JOVIAL. AFTER THE EXCHANGES OF COURTESIES APPROPRIATE TO A FIRST CALL I RECALLED THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV AT CHEQUERS AND IN MOSCOW AND THEIR RECENT EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. I SAID THAT THESE EXCHANGES HAD LAID A GOOD FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD A DEVELOPING DIALOGUE AND THEN CONVEYED YOUR ORAL MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO. 1058, AS UPDATED IN YOUR TELNO. 1152).

3. I SAID THAT YOU HAD INSTRUCTED ME TO MENTION THE LIST OF FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES WHICH YOU HAD SENT TO SHEVARDNADZE IN HELSINKI ON 1 AUGUST AND TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT EARLY PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THEM. (THERE WAS NO ADVERSE REACTION FROM SHEVARDNADZE, WHO SIMPLY NODDED). I THEN SAID THAT I LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH THE MFA VERY EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR POSSIBLE DATES FOR SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO LONDON. I EMPHASISED THE STRENGTH OF YOUR HOPE THAT THIS VISIT COULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS AT THE END OF FEBRUARY 1986. I WOULD ALSO WISH TO DISCUSS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE OTHER BILATERAL EVENTS PROPOSED IN YOUR MESSAGE: I HAD ASKED FOR A CALL ON ACADEMICIAN MARCHUK TO DISCUSS MR WALKER'S POSSIBLE VISIT IN THE SPRING, AND I COULD ALREADY PUT FORWARD THE SUGGESTION THAT THE PROPOSED OFFICIAL CONSULTATIONS ON BILATERAL ISSUES MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN LONDON ON 20/21 JANUARY. ALL THESE DETAILED EXCHANGES WITH HIS DEPARTMENT WOULD BE GREATLY HELPED IF SHEVARDNADZE COULD GIVE THE BILATERAL AGENDA WHICH YOU HAD OUTLINED HIS GENERAL ENDORSEMENT AND APPROVAL. IT WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE TO ME AND TO MINISTERS IN LONDON TO HEAR SHEVARDNADZE'S OWN VIEW OF THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF UK/SOVIET RELATIONS AND OF THE AGENDA FOR THEM WHICH WE HAD PUT FORWARD.



4. SHEVARDNADZE THANKED ME FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND WISHED ME WELL IN MY MISSION HERE. IT WAS EASY TO DESTROY BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT A MORE COMPLICATED TASK TO CONSTRUCT THEM. HE, TOO, HOPED THAT OUR COOPERATION WOULD NOW DEVELOP. IN THIS WE COULD DRAW ON THE GOOD FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH GORBACHEV, AS CONTINUED IN THEIR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE. WE COULD "TAKE SOMETHING FROM THEIR ARSENAL". DESPITE REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US THE FACT THAT A DIALOGUE WAS THUS IN PROGRESS WAS ENCOURAGING.

5. RECALLING HIS OWN MEETINGS WITH YOU, HE SAID THE FIRST HAD GONE WELL, AND HAD FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED HIM: BUT THE SECOND WAS, FRANKLY, "BAD". THE REASONS WERE WELL KNOWN, HE WOULD NOT RAKE OVER THEM BUT "WOULD LET BYGONES BE BYGONES". HE WAS DISPOSED TO INTERPRET THE SPIRIT OF THE MESSAGE WHICH I HAD JUST CONVEYED AS INDICATING THAT YOU TOO RAGDRROD THE NEW YORK MEETING AS AN EXCEPTION

6. THERE WAS MUCH WHICH HE LIKED IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH TO OUR RELATIONS WHICH I HAD SET OUT. IT WOULD NOW BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. IN GENERAL, IT SEEMED TO HIM REASONABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE PREPARATORY OFFICIAL LEVEL MEETINGS. HE AGREED WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD DISCUSS REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND INDEED PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD AIM TO "SYSTEMATISE" OUR CONSULTATIONS COVERING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS AT THE WORKING LEVEL IN ORDER TO ACCUMULATE A CERTAIN PROGRESS ON THESE MATTERS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF OFFICIALS COULD DRAW UP A LIST OF THESE ISSUES AND GO ON TO CONSIDER THE MODALITIES OF BILATERAL EXCHANGES ON THEM. SUSLOV INTERJECTED THAT A DRAFT WAS ALREADY IN PREPARATION.

7. AS TO HIS VISIT TO LONDON, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOW "RIPENING" AND WE WERE "GETTING CLOSER TO IT". THE PRINCIPLE WAS AGREED AND DATES COULD BE CONSIDERED AND AGREED THROUGH THE USUAL CHANNELS AFTER THE CPSU CONGRESS: BUT BEFORE THE VISIT TOOK PLACE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE ACHIEVED A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN OUR RELATIONS SO THAT YOU AND HE COULD GIVE A FURTHER IMPETUS TO WORK ALREADY IN PROGRESS.

8. MIFT SUMMARISES SHEVARDNADZE'S COMMENTS ON THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE GENEVA SUMMIT AND THE QUESTION WHICH HE ASKED ME TO PUT TO YOU ABOUT A RESUMED TRILATERAL CTB NEGOTIATION. HIS REMARK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POWERS, BRITAIN AND FRANCE, COULD NOT BE "LEFT ON ONE SIDE" IN THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE ON SECURITY MATTERS PROMPTED ME TO SAY THAT, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD MAKE SENSE FOR HIS VISIT TO LONDON TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE NEXT US/SOVIET SUMMIT SO THAT HIS EXCHANGES WITH YOU ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS COULD FORM PART OF THE PREPARATORY PROCESS. IF HE ACCEPTED THIS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO GET DOWN TO THE DISCUSSION OF DATES IN /JANUARY

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JANUARY 1986 RATHER THAN WAITING UNTIL AFTER THE PARTY CONGRESS. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED AND SAID THAT DATES COULD INDEED BE DISCUSSED IN JANUARY. (IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT DATES IN MARCH/APRIL/MAY MIGHT BE FEASIBLE FROM YOUR POINT OF VIEW).

9. SEE MIFT.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

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MR GOODALL  
MR FERGUSSON  
SIR W HARDING  
MR SAMUEL  
MR DAUNT  
MR DAVID THOMAS  
MR LONG

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Private Secretary

Draft Declaration on East-West Relations

Tiresome meeting between Political Directors lasting the whole morning. The Presidency had produced an adequate text relating primarily to the Geneva meeting. The French wanted to turn this into more of a new statement of European concerns and interests. Result is something of a compromise between these two approaches but it comes out as a positive statement about the meeting at Geneva and contains no points that damage British interests.

/ Text as it stands at the end of the morning is attached. English translation at present in preparation. Main merit is that it is quite short and positive.

Only disappointing points of difficulty relate to square brackets in paragraphs 3 and 4. Both are Irish reservations. Assuming Ministers find the rest of the text acceptable, no need for us to enter the lists. The text is better with the passages in square brackets included, but we could live without them. Others will make the point (and it is valid) that, if the Irish cannot accept such general clauses as these in a common declaration by the Twelve, there is little point in including Article 8 in the EPC Treaty.

Prime Minister

*[Handwritten signature]*

2 December 1985

This is rubbish.

(D M D Thomas)

cc: Mr Powell  
Mr Ingham  
Mr Meyer

It implies an equivalence between the United States & the Soviet Union: it fails to give support to the US: and it fraudulently singles out Gorbachev's visit to Paris as a significant event. I should veto it. CD2/Kic

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1. Les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement réunis à Luxembourg les 2 et 3 décembre 1985 en Conseil Européen <sup>ont exprimé leur</sup> ~~se sont réjouis du bon~~ <sup>grande satisfaction au sujet de</sup> déroulement de la rencontre qui a eu lieu à Genève du 19 au 21 novembre entre <sup>le Président, le Secrétaire Général</sup> ~~M. Reagan et~~ Gorbatchov et qu'ils avaient appelé de leurs vœux.

Roughly  
to which  
- they had  
given their  
support

2. Ils espèrent qu'après la visite de M. Gorbatchov à Paris et le sommet de Genève, un processus est maintenant amorcé qui permettra d'améliorer la situation internationale, et d'éliminer les obstacles qui empêchent de progresser dans la voie d'un dialogue renoué. <sup>dans tous les domaines.</sup>

qui inclura  
d'autres  
rencontres  
au plus haut  
niveau et

3. The Twelve noted in particular the reaffirmation of the joint Soviet/American declaration of 8 January 1985 concerning the working out of effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, putting an end to that on earth and limiting and reducing nuclear armaments, and strengthening strategic stability. They hope that the two countries will reach reasonable and balanced compromises in all these different areas, with a view to facilitating reductions in their nuclear weapons, [including INF weapons] to the lowest possible level, with due regard for the security of European countries.

4. As to the CSCE, the Twelve, while regretting certain disappointments at Ottawa and Budapest, will continue to work for positive results in all aspects of the process, in particular at Stockholm and Berne, with a view to achieving a balanced outcome at the Vienna Conference in November 1986.

<sup>[et tout en veillant au maintien des conditions de leur sécurité]</sup>  
5. Conformément à leur attitude constante, les Douze réaffirment leur propre détermination de déployer tous leurs efforts pour contribuer à une plus grande stabilité dans les relations Est-Ouest ainsi qu'à une coopération large et approfondie avec tous les pays d'Europe orientale.



Draft declaration by the European Council  
of 2/3 December 1985 on East-West relations

The Heads of State and Government, meeting at the European Council in Luxembourg on 2 and 3 December 1985, expressed their satisfaction at the much-awaited meeting between President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachov in Geneva from 19 to 21 November.

They hope that, after Mr Gorbachov's visit to Paris and the Geneva summit, a process has now begun which will include further meetings at the highest level and will lead to an improvement in the international situation and the elimination of the obstacles impeding progress towards a fresh dialogue in all fields.

The Twelve have noted in particular the reaffirmation of the joint Soviet-American declaration of 8 January 1985 concerning the elaboration of effective agreements aiming at preventing an arms race in space, terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. They hope that these two countries will reach reasonable and balanced compromises in all these fields in order to allow a reduction of their nuclear arms (medium-range weapons included) at the lowest possible level with due regard to the security of the European countries.

~~They also~~ attach a high importance to the disarmament work under way in the multilateral fora.

As ~~to~~ the CSCE, the Twelve will, despite certain disappointments, continue to work for positive results in all aspects of the process, in particular at the Conference of Stockholm and at the Berne meeting, with a view to achieving a balanced outcome at the Vienna Conference, beginning in November 1986.



Consistent with the attitude they have consistently adopted (and whilst taking care to maintain the conditions for their security), the Twelve reaffirm their own determination to make every effort to contribute to greater stability in East-West relations and to wide-ranging and far-reaching cooperation with all the countries of Eastern Europe.



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CPW

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 December 1985

**US/SOVIET SUMMIT**

Thank you for your letter of 29 November enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Gorbachev.

The Prime Minister considered the draft over the weekend and also an alternative one presented to her, but commented that there was not enough new to say of substance at present to warrant a message. She has therefore decided not to write to Mr. Gorbachev for the time being.

(C. D. POWELL)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PART 5 ends:-

FCO to CAP 29/11/85

PART 6 begins:-

CAP to FCO 1/12/85



