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PART 8

MT

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, 23-29 NOVEMBER 1983 : NEW DELHI

POLICY.

S 809

COMMONWEALTH

PART 1: MARCH 1979.

PART 8: MARCH 1984.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~1.3.84.~~							
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TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
OD(84) 9th Meeting	25/07/1984

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. Gray Date 17/6/2013

PREM Records Team

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons – First Special Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee – Session 1983-84 - The Economic and Political Security of Small States, published by HMSO 4 July 1984.

Signed S. Gray Date 17/6/2013

PREM Records Team

cc AC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 August 1984

Dmb 17/8

Dear David

COMMONWEALTH STUDY ON THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF SMALL STATES

In his minute of 18 July on the security of small states, Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he hoped to steer the Commonwealth study commissioned at last year's Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi in a helpful direction, and that he had provided Mr Ramphal with an analytical paper with this end in mind. I now enclose for the record a circular letter from Mr Ramphal to Heads of Government with which he encloses a background memorandum for the high-level Consultative Group which he has established to assist the study. Sir Anthony Parsons is a member of the Group.

The next stage in consideration of HM's policy on this issue will be the submission to you by 13 September (Colin Budd's letter of 3 August to Charles Powell) of the FCO/MOD paper which OD commissioned at their meeting on 25 July.

Copies of this letter go to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office) and Richard Mottram (MOD).

yours ever

Stewart Eldon

S G Eldon
PS/Baroness Young

David Barclay Esq
10 Downing Street
Whitehall

OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL
MARLBOROUGH HOUSE · PALL MALL · LONDON SW1Y 5HX

Circular Letter No.59/84 30 July 1984

I should be grateful if you could bring the following message to the attention of your Head of Government.

BEGINS

Commonwealth Study on the Special Needs of Small States

You will recall that Heads of Government at the New Delhi Meeting mandated me to undertake a study of the special needs of small states "drawing as necessary on the resources and experiences of Commonwealth countries". To this end I have constituted a Group of distinguished and suitably experienced Commonwealth personalities to assist me in this exercise, to which you and your colleagues ascribed great importance. I attach for your information a copy of the background Memorandum prepared by the Secretariat for the first meeting of the Group.

As you will note from the Memorandum, the Group's mandate is a relatively broad one encompassing all those factors - strategic, economic, social - that impact on small states security. Its membership, being drawn from a wide range of Commonwealth countries and a variety of individual skills and experience, is very well equipped to handle all aspects of the study.

The timing and programme we envisage for the Group's work is set out in the Memorandum. The Group had its first meeting in London here in Marlborough House last week, from 18 to 20 July, and all of those involved thought that it got off to a useful and promising start. The work of the Group will continue over the next twelve months, meeting on at least two more occasions the next being in the second week of February 1985. It is hoped that the Group's Report will be finalised for the Heads of Government Meeting in the Bahamas in late 1985.

Apart from the meetings of the Group itself the Group agreed that three regional colloquia (in Africa, the Caribbean and the South Pacific) should be convened. The colloquia will bring together participants from governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations and academic institutions, to give the Group the benefit of a more detailed insight into the issues as they are perceived in each region. We are proceeding with the first colloquium in Wellington, New Zealand, from 13 to 14 August, at which we anticipate comprehensive representation from the South Pacific region.

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The New Delhi initiative has already aroused a great deal of interest both within and beyond the Commonwealth, as it is perceived to be a timely and constructive initiative in an international climate that has become increasingly conscious of the special needs of small states. I know that individual Commonwealth leaders have an especially keen interest in the outcome of the study; I hope therefore that the Group can count on your Government's support and co-operation.

With deep respect,

Shridath S. Ramphal

ENDS

With kind regards,



Shridath S. Ramphal

COMMONWEALTH STUDY ON THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF SMALL STATES

Memorandum by the Secretariat

This initial background paper has been prepared for consideration at the first meeting of the Consultative Group primarily in order to suggest a conceptual framework which might assist members in interpreting and carrying out the mandate agreed by Commonwealth Heads of Government at their New Delhi Meeting last November. Proposals for procedure of work are set out in a separate section at the end of the paper.

I CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Background

2. The Commonwealth has been actively concerned with the special needs of its smaller member states for a number of years:

- in 1977, Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting in Barbados noted the special characteristics of small island economies, particularly their fragile nature, extreme dependence on exports and imports, high dependence on capital inflows and in some cases the lack of natural resources. They urged the international community to adopt a more flexible and realistic approach to the requirements of these countries and special measures to assist them.

- in 1978, at their first regional meeting Heads of Government from Asia and the Pacific asked the Secretary-General to seek support for Commonwealth-wide programmes to counteract the particular difficulties that beset the growing number of small members, particularly the island developing countries, as well as of certain other specially disadvantaged states.

- in 1979, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka endorsed a Secretariat programme designed to assist these countries in overcoming "the disadvantages of small size, isolation and scarce resources which severely limit the capacity of such countries to achieve their development objectives or to pursue their national interests in a wider international context".

- in 1981, the importance of this programme was reaffirmed at the Melbourne Heads of Government Meeting and since that time it has been steadily expanded on a pragmatic basis so that a small states' perspective has been taken into account in the work of all the Secretariat's functional Divisions.*

- in 1983, Commonwealth Heads of Government at New Delhi, acknowledging the attention given by the Commonwealth to the special needs of small states in the context of economic development, called for consideration of those needs on an even wider basis including that of national security.

3. The Commonwealth's current programmes for its small member states reflect these policy mandates. They have to date centred on measures to enhance their developmental capacities in a variety of fields. Wherever feasible, efforts have also been made to help them to ensure that their individual interests are duly taken into account by the international community. The question of the special needs of small states in the area of national security did not become an issue for consideration until

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* An outline summary of related divisional projects is given at Annex C.

the last Heads of Government Meeting, held at the end of November 1983 in New Delhi. Events in Grenada only a few weeks before served to underscore the essential vulnerability of small states to security threats and led Heads of Government to discuss, for the first time, the importance of the question both for the states and regions concerned and for the international community, and the possibility of the Commonwealth providing assistance in this sphere.

The New Delhi Mandate

4. The agreement on the study appears at paragraph 11 of the Delhi Communique in the section dealing with Grenada:

> "Time and again in their discussions, Commonwealth leaders were recalled to the special needs of small states, not only in the Caribbean but elsewhere in the Commonwealth. They recognised that the Commonwealth itself had given some attention to these needs in the context of economic development but felt that the matter deserved consideration on a wider basis, including that of national security. Recalling the particular dangers faced in the past by small Commonwealth countries, they requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study, drawing as necessary on the resources and experience of Commonwealth countries, of the special needs of such states consonant with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity that they shared with all nations."

5. Additionally, in their Goa Declaration on International Security, Commonwealth leaders included a separate paragraph expressing their particular concern

> "at the vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference in their affairs".
>
> The paragraph continues: "These countries are members of the international community which must respect their independence and, at the very least, has a moral obligation to provide effectively for their territorial integrity. We have separately agreed on an urgent study of these issues. Additionally, however, we will play our part in helping the international community to make an appropriate response to the UN Secretary-General's call for a strengthening of collective security in keeping with the Charter."

6. Accordingly, what Heads of Government requested at New Delhi is a study of the special needs of small states on a basis wide enough to include economic development, while emphasising national security. As envisaged, those needs would be studied on a basis which:

- is consistent with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity which small states share with others;
- takes account of particular dangers faced in the past by small Commonwealth countries;
- acknowledges the particular concern of the Commonwealth at the vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference in their affairs; and
- recognises the obligation of the international community to respect their independence and provide effectively for their territorial integrity.

The stated intention of Commonwealth leaders to supplement the study by helping the international community to make an appropriate response to the UN Secretary-General's call for a strengthening of collective security in keeping with the Charter must inevitably be relevant to the study itself.

General Modus Operandi

7. The New Delhi Communique requested the Secretary-General to undertake the study "drawing as necessary on the resources and experience of Commonwealth countries". In pursuance of this mandate, the Secretary-General has established a Consultative Group comprising 14 highly qualified individuals serving in their personal capacities. They are drawn both from small states that fall within the scope of the actual study and larger member countries. A list of the members of the Group is at Annex A.

8. It is proposed that the Consultative Group on the Special Needs of Small States (CGSNSS) should hold four meetings between mid-1984 and the next Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) which will be convened in the Bahamas in November/ December 1985. The Group's Report will be issued to CHOGM 1985 by the Secretary-General.

9. In order to ensure that the study achieves a sufficient coverage not only of the policy issues involved but also of the particular interests of small member states, it is envisaged that the Group, assisted by the Secretariat, will have the benefit of machinery for receiving views, through the arrangements indicated below in the section on Procedure.

Scope of the Study

10. In the light of the requirements of the New Delhi mandate the Group will be expected, inter alia, to give special consideration to:

(a) the principal factors - political, economic, legal and social - contributing to the special needs of small states;

(b) the range of potential threats to the security of small states, both internal and external, and their special vulnerability to external attack and interference in their affairs;

(c) the range of possible supportive, preventive and protective measures that might be adopted consonant with the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity of small states;

(d) the special needs of small states for economic development in the context of national security, taking account of Commonwealth work to date;

(e) the practical (including the financial) implications of responding effectively to the special needs of small states;

(f) the obligations of the international community in these matters and how they might be discharged;

(g) the relevance of a strengthening of collective security in keeping with the UN Charter.

Criteria for the selection of small states

11. Since the mid-sixties there has been a growing awareness of the special problems facing small states as they enter the international community. This has led to a recognition of the need for special types of assistance to them in different spheres. In approaching the question of how best to respond to these needs, various formulations have been adopted to clarify the concept of small states, and a number of categories have been established; for example, "small island", "mini" and "micro" states. What all such states have in common is an extremely small population; and such scarce human resources becomes a serious disadvantage when, as is often the case, it exists in combination with such other special disadvantages as restricted usable land area, geographical and/or geopolitical isolation, and limited natural resources.

12. It might be thought advisable to follow accepted Commonwealth practice with regard to the definition of a small state. On this basis, the focus of the study would be on states with a population of 1 million or less. Almost half the members of the Commonwealth have populations of less than half a million and a quarter have populations under 200,000.

Of particular concern will be the "mini" and "micro" island states, whose peculiar needs will require special attention. At the other end, the study should not exclude states only slightly above 1 million which, because of particular geo-political circumstances, are generally considered to be vulnerable, or otherwise specially disadvantaged, countries.

13. There are 29 member states with populations of 1 million or less: 11 in the Caribbean, 8 in the South Pacific, 4 in Africa, 3 in the Indian Ocean, 2 in the Mediterranean, 1 in Asia. In addition, Jamaica (population over 2 million) and Papua New Guinea (population over 3 million) might be included because of integral links to their respective regions. The total list of countries thus encompassed by the study, together with their population statistics, is set out in Annex B.

Dimensions of the Problem

14. Since the special needs of small states involves a complex network of intermeshing issues, the most important task of the Group at its first meeting might be to agree on the parameters and structure of the study. To assist the Group, an indicative outline of the key factors which would seem to be implied by the Scope of the Study proposed in paragraph 10 is set out below as a basis for discussion. A separate paper will be made available to the Group setting out the Commonwealth's work on the special needs of small states in the context of economic development and drawing attention to further areas in which the Commonwealth may encourage a further response to these needs.

Outline of key factors relating to national security needs

15. For convenience, these factors have been arranged under separate subject heads.

A. General characteristics contributing to the special needs of small states in the area of national security

16. The most fundamental characteristic underlying the national security needs of small states is their vulnerability to external intervention - their defencelessness. This arises from a combination of causes: the absence of a functioning international system of collective security; the absence of bilateral defence agreements between the larger countries and the multitude of small countries that have now become independent states, due either to the unwillingness on the part of larger countries or to reluctance by at least some of the small states to enter such agreements; their limited capacity, because of lack of human and economic resources, to develop sufficiently effective safeguards of their own to deter most external security threats; and the fact that their very smallness makes then an easy prey to all types of external intervention, the isolated island states being at particular risk in this respect.

B. Special risk factors in individual states

17. It is obvious that some of the small Commonwealth countries will be exposed to a greater national security risk than others. This again is due to a variety of causes, mainly arising from special geo-political circumstances such as: a strategic location in relation to the East-West power struggle; possession of valuable natural resources which other countries, or even private organisations, might seek to exploit for their own benefit; existence of historical claims to their territory; and the presence of substantial numbers of refugees or political dissidents from other countries.

18. In addition to such extrinsic factors, individual small states could find themselves at risk because of a prevailing state of domestic instability. It is often the case that acts of external interference in states, both large and small, are triggered by an internal situation which a neighbouring country may genuinely perceive as constituting a threat to its own security or alternatively may cynically use as pretext for direct intervention.

19. Conditions of political instability can develop in all states, but as already implied, when they occur in one of the small states they render it an easy victim for intervention. The chief sources of such potential internal unrest include: widespread disaffection resulting from economic deprivation and/or perceptions of unfair political disadvantage; influxes of refugees or migrant workers which may cause resentment in the local population especially if the economic burden of their presence becomes too great; emergence of specific secessionist groups, sometimes ethnically based; power struggles between different groups, focussing on rivalry for political leadership or on the promotion of a particular ideology; military coups ostensibly launched for the purpose of restoring order in the country and/or probity in government.

C. Possible forms of external intervention

20. All small states can be said to be potential victims of any of the possible forms of external intervention. If the objective is to achieve a rapid take-over of a small state, and there is no fear of effective sanctions from within the international community, then an actual military invasion may become a feasible option. Depending on the circumstances, such an intervention could be initiated directly by foreign governments, or alternatively by mercenaries acting on their behalf or for externally-based indigenous dissident groups

as well as other external interests. However, more covert types of interference and dominance are possible - carried out through non-military methods. These include economic and external pressure and political destabilisation effected through various forms of subversion including espionage.

21. In addition, external interference in small states may also be effected at the private level, through the profit-making activities of multinational organisations or of smaller companies engaged in illicit operations such as drugs, gambling and smuggling. Small states, particularly the island ones, are moreover peculiarly susceptible to modern forms of piracy and highjacking.

D. Indications of a new attitude to the problem

22. The increasing number of attacks on small states in recent years has led them actively to explore the possibilities of international co-operation on measures to counteract their special vulnerability. This change of attitude is being matched by a growing recognition among other states that the international community as a whole has a pressing need as well as an obligation to provide some means of helping small states to maintain their security with independence and territorial integrity. The decision by Commonwealth Heads of Government to launch the present study - and the widespread interest already aroused - is itself an expression of the new thinking that has started to emerge among both groups of states.

23. A most important aspect of this matter is the question of collective security. At New Delhi Commonwealth leaders highlighted this in declaring their intention to help the international community to respond in an appropriate way to

the UN Secretary-General's call for a strengthening of collective security in keeping with the Charter. They did so in the particular context of their stated concern at the vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference in their affairs. In essence, the issue is fulfilment of the potential of the Charter.

E. Possible approaches to promoting security of small states

24. Taking into account established security practice among states, together with the peculiar characteristics of the small states' problems, the following measures might be envisaged:

(i) innovative strategies aimed at preventing the development of internal threats to national security:

(ii) the promotion of greater self-reliance by orientating the training and logistic requirements of domestic forces more specifically towards meeting contemporary security needs - e.g. by providing para-military training for police forces; by improving capacity to police off-shore waters and exclusive economic zones;

(iii) the establishment of mutually supportive defence arrangements among small states within regions;

(iv) appropriate bilateral or multilateral agreements between small states and other countries;

(v) special multilateral security arrangements under the umbrella of international agencies like the Commonwealth, OAU, OAS, etc.;

(vi) special security arrangements under the aegis of the UN;

(vii) reinforcing measures such as the participation of small states in regional arms control arrangements, regional security conferences, zones of peace and nuclear weapon free zone arrangements.

F. Underlying issues of concern

25. Each of the measures suggested under E above would, of course, carry certain practical implications, not just for the small Commonwealth states themselves, but also for some

of the larger member states as well as the various intergovernmental organisations that might agree to contribute to overcoming the security problems of small states. It is only prudent to recognise that there may be obstacles to their implementation, perhaps in the form of financial constraints or of political/social resistance, while the possibility of legal difficulties also cannot be overlooked. All these factors will necessarily have to be taken into consideration as part of the study.

26. Another concern to be borne in mind is suggested by the reference in the Delhi Communique to the study of the special needs of small states "consonant with the right to sovereignty" and in the Goa Declaration to the principle of respect for their independence. Thus it would be desirable that great care is taken, both in the conduct of the study and in the nature of the recommendations offered, not to diminish the concept of the inviolable sovereignty of small states as independent members of the Commonwealth and the wider international community. In particular, it would seem essential to avoid making any recommendations which would require or sanction unsolicited external interference in their domestic affairs, or would detract in any other way from recognition of their sovereign equality with other states.

27. It would seem to be of overriding importance that in all approaches to the question of the special needs of small states in the area of national security, that the Group should avoid two traps that lie in the path of new approaches. The first is the dilution or downgrading of the status of small states as equal member states of the international community and, of course, of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth leaders were insistent that the national security of small states should not be bought at the price of diminished sovereignty. This is not to say that small states might not, in keeping with others, benefit from worldwide arrangements

that, for example, enhance collective security; but the Commonwealth study must not be a basis for anything in the nature of second class status for small states. The second trap is that of hegemony. The Group will want to be careful in its approaches to enhancing the national security of small states to avoid giving cover to hegemonistic arrangements which imply security at the price of sovereignty. Small states for the most part have just won their independence from colonialism, and security needs are real and special. But to offer to meet them by a return to a new type of colonialism or a new form of dependency is no part of the purpose of the study.

28. An examination of the economic needs of small states would address one of the factors directly relevant to that of national security, namely the equation between poverty and defencelessness. The issues are, in fact, more interlinked than might appear superficially. And while the study will draw upon work already done in the Commonwealth in the economic domain and so focus more particularly on special needs in the area of security, the opportunity should not be lost to establish the linkages and to point new directions for meeting the special economic needs of small states. In fact, meeting those needs may well be one of the significant ways in strengthening their national security.

II PROCEDURE OF WORK

Meetings of the Group

29. As indicated under General Modus Operandi, it is proposed that the Group will hold four meetings between June/July 1984 and the next CHOGM scheduled for November/December 1985. All the meetings will be convened in London and will each be of three days duration. They will take place at appropriately

spaced intervals throughout the 18-month period tentatively as follows: first meeting July 1984, second meeting October 1984, third meeting February/March 1985, fourth meeting June/July 1985 when the Group will adopt its report. The Secretariat's International Affairs Division (IAD) will provide the principal back-up services, with the Director of IAD (Hugh Craft) assuming the role of the Secretary to the Group.

Mechanisms for the consultative process

30. Important to the success of the study will be the capacity of the Group to draw widely and substantively on the views of Commonwealth governments, international organisations and agencies, as well as to tap the work of individuals, academics, etc., with established interests in the subject. In order to achieve this end, the following mechanisms designed to facilitate the consultative process are being proposed, and it is hoped these individual members of the Group will be able to participate as appropriate:

- submissions from member governments;
- consultations with experts and relevant inter-governmental organisations, international and national NGOs, including academic institutions;
- three regional colloquia at mixed governmental and non-governmental level, possibly in the form of seminars and study groups, to be held respectively in the Caribbean, the Pacific and Africa;
- ad hoc working groups, mainly London-based, to facilitate dialogue on specific issues;
- commissioned studies as determined by the Group.

Discussion on the study at Senior Officials Meeting

31. It is hoped that the subject of the security of small Commonwealth states will be made an agenda item at the forthcoming biennial meeting of Senior Officials (SOM) due to be held in Barbados in December 1984. In that event, the Secretariat would wish to prepare an interim report on the work of the Group which could serve as a basis for discussion by officials.

CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF SMALL STATES

Mr Telford Georges - Chairman
Chief Justice of the Bahamas

Mr Henry de B Forde MP
Barbados

The Hon Fathulla Jameel
Minister of External Affairs
Republic of Maldives

H E Mr Natarajan Krishnan
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of India to the UN

Ms Elisabeth Mann Borgese
(Canada)

Dr Edgar Mizzi
(Malta)

Mr Lebang Mpotokwane
Secretary, President's Office
Botswana

Dr Robert O'Neill
Director
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
(Australia)

H E Mr Olara Otunnu
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Uganda to the UN

Sir Anthony Parsons
(Britain)

Mr Geoff Pearson
Department of External Affairs
Canada

Mr Lloyd Searwar
Foreign Affairs Officer
Caribbean Community Secretariat
Guyana

Mr Ata Teaotai
Cabinet Secretary
Office of the President
Kiribati

Mr Taneila H Tufui
Secretary to Government
Tonga

LIST OF SMALL STATES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

	Population *
CARIBBEAN	
Antigua & Barbuda	100,000
Bahamas	241,000
Barbados	300,000
Belize	145,000
Dominica	83,000
Grenada	111,000
Guyana	793,600
St. Kitts-Nevis	50,000
St. Lucia	124,000
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	107,000
Trinidad & Tobago	1,168,000
Jamaica	2,188,000
SOUTH PACIFIC	
Fiji	630,000
Kiribati	59,000
Nauru	7,000
Solomon Islands	229,000
Tonga	98,000
Tuvalu	8,000
Vanuatu	117,000
Western Samoa	157,000
Papua New Guinea	3,100,000
AFRICA	
Botswana	800,000
Gambia	603,000
Lesotho	1,341,000
Swaziland	557,000
INDIAN OCEAN	
Maldives	154,000
Mauritius	958,000
Seychelles	66,000
MEDITERRANEAN	
Cyprus	620,000
Malta	343,000
ASIA	
Brunei	220,000

* Source: The Commonwealth Fact Book, 1983

EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL, 1983

Specially disadvantaged countries

As nearly half the countries in the Commonwealth have less than half a million people each and a quarter under 200,000, Commonwealth leaders at their Lusaka meeting in 1979 endorsed a special Secretariat programme to assist island developing and other specially disadvantaged member countries in overcoming the particular difficulties caused by the combination of smallness, isolation, and limited human and natural resources. This programme, whose importance was emphasised at Melbourne, has been expanded on a pragmatic basis over the past two years.

The Secretariat has sought to ensure that all its developmental work takes account of the special needs of these countries. Several new activities tailored to their requirements have also been undertaken. Expanded support by the CFTC is reflected in the allocation of 36 per cent of its total programme expenditure in 1981-2 to activities benefitting this group of countries; an important component of these activities is the training of key government officials.

An increasing range of projects in such fields as export market development, agriculture and food production, education, industry, law, and health as well as projects to assist women to improve their contribution to development, have been features of the programme. Regional workshops and seminars conducted in the Caribbean, the Pacific and Africa have promoted training in key areas of professional and technological need. The recent creation of a Human Resource Development Group within the Secretariat has enhanced its capacity to adopt a more integrated, multi-disciplinary approach in responding to the needs of these countries, particularly for a larger supply of trained manpower. A director with special responsibilities for activity in this area has been appointed within the group.

Recognising the importance to small island states of the resources of the sea within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), the Secretariat has, through the CFTC's Technical Assistance Group and General Technical Assistance

Programme, provided assistance in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, in negotiating contracts with foreign fishing fleets and in establishing or maintaining surveillance within their EEZs. Consultancy assistance has also been provided on a variety of technical issues in the fisheries field. An information and training programme on EEZ management prepared by the Secretariat's Food Production and Rural Development Division is now being considered by the FAO. The Industrial Development Unit has registered significant success in facilitating investment, technology transfers, procurement of capital goods and production for over 40 industrial enterprises, while industrial opportunities have been identified through feasibility studies for another 100 projects.

The Legal Division has accorded special importance to responding to requests for smaller jurisdictions and has provided Secretariat assistance in support of regional proposals for the establishment of legal units to serve the smaller island states in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Activities in the field of public administration include workshops designed for small states in both the Pacific and the Caribbean on the development, writing and use of case studies, a workshop on public service training in small Caribbean states and another to improve the skills of decision-makers in the choice of technology. Projects in the field of education have included a conference on innovation in technical and vocational education and training, a training course in booklet production, and a study of the special problems of education in small states.

The Secretariat has also convened meetings to consider development problems confronting small countries in such fields as agriculture, industry, transport and tourism. A meeting convened in 1982 enabled key officials of small countries to discuss aspects of development support and internal adjustment with representatives of multilateral financial institutions. In addition, the Secretariat has circulated reports on developments in the Law of the Sea negotiations as well as periodic reports on selected international economic negotiations and a monthly newsletter on developments in capital markets. A manual on project planning for small economies has also been provided to governments.

Many of the objectives of the Secretariat's programmes have been woven into the work of the CHOGRM groups on energy, trade, industry and agriculture and incorporated in national and regional programmes being carried out by member countries.

The Secretariat has also participated in two special projects designed to benefit CHOGRM island states. The CFTC provided consultants to assist the establishment within the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation of a Pacific Regional Advisory Service and financed the post of head of the service. The second project stems from an offer by the Australian Government in Melbourne to fund common office facilities in New York for CHOGRM island states wishing to take advantage of them to maintain Permanent Missions to the United Nations.

The Secretariat was asked to establish these facilities. Accommodation has been leased in a building close to UN Headquarters. It has five two-room suites plus a conference room and space for four or five common service staff, including a chief administrative officer and an archivist. By June 1983, Western Samoa had set up office in these premises and three other countries - Maldives, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu - had indicated their intention to do so. The office is expected to be fully operational well before the 1983 session of the UN General Assembly.

Commonwealth : CHOGM Pt 8.

cc PS

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

PS. CDP
3/P.

3 August 1984

Dear Charles,

Security of Small States

Thank you for your letter of 27 July. We agree that it would make sense for the new FCO/MOD paper to be available to Ministers before the 1 October Seminar and we shall aim to forward it to you by 13 September as you suggest. MOD agree, and we are already in touch with them about the drafting.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

Commonwealth pt 8

CHOGM

- 3 AUG 1984

FCE OLH

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 July 1984

SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

When this subject was discussed by Ministers on Wednesday, it was agreed that a further and fuller paper would be prepared by the FCO and the Ministry of Defence.

As you know, the Prime Minister is intending to hold a Seminar on 1 October which will deal with some aspects of this same problem. It will be helpful if the revised paper could be available in good time before that Seminar since it will provide useful background for it. But further formal consideration by Ministers is better deferred until after the Seminar so that the results of it can be taken into account in the decisions reached by Ministers.

Given the Prime Minister's absence from the country from 14 to 27 September, this points to the revised paper being available by 13 September if possible.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

C D POWELL

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Security of Small States

The Prime Minister has noted and exclaimed upon your minute of 25 July reporting that the Ministry of Defence were consulted at official level about the FCO paper on this subject.

The Prime Minister remains of the view that further work is needed to prepare a more comprehensive paper. It would be helpful if this could be available before the proposed seminar on 1 October, but better if further OD discussion of it could be postponed until after the seminar.

C.D. POWELL

26 July 1984

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

109/13

CONFIDENTIAL

cc PS

NBPM
CDP
25/7

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

25 July 1984

Dear Charles

THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

The Chief Secretary has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute of 18 July and your note to Len Appleyard on 20 July.

with CP?

Without wishing to pre-empt discussion of the Foreign Secretary's general policy proposals, he has noted that decisions on funding new initiatives in the Caribbean or elsewhere should await the Public Expenditure Survey where they can be weighed against other claims on resources both within the field of foreign affairs and elsewhere.

Copies of this go to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Richard Hatfield.

Yours sincerely

John Gieve

JOHN GIEVE
Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Pt 8

CHOGM

Prime Minister

CDP 25/7

Ref. A084/2147

MR POWELL

Security of Small States

I understand that it is not true that the Ministry of Defence were not consulted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum on security of small states was being prepared. The Ministry of Defence were consulted at official level twice, and at that level expressed agreement with the paper.

2. Nor is it true that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were unaware of the work being done by the Chiefs of Staff. That work related to "out of NATO area" commitments and activities, notably in the Gulf and the Caribbean. It covered some but by no means all of the ground covered in the memorandum on security of small states; and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office believed that there was nothing in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum which was inconsistent with the work done or the conclusions reached by the Chiefs of Staff.

3. None of this makes the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum a good or adequate paper. But the charge that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office failed to consult the Ministry of Defence seems to be unfounded; if there was failure of consultation, it appears that the division of the Ministry of Defence which was consulted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office did not consult either the Chiefs of Staff organisation or the Secretary of State.

RTA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

25 July 1984

Prime Minister
I agree with Mr. Cartledge that the paper could do with more work. You might say that the whole exercise might be drawn together after your seminar on 1 October.
CDP 24/7

B.06810

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD: Security of Small States

BACKGROUND

FLAG A

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/84/125) dated 18 July sets out his views on the important issue of how the security of small states may best be promoted. His objective is to seek agreement both on the broad lines of policy to be adopted by the United Kingdom and on the general approach to be taken in connection with the study commissioned at last November's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting into the security problems of small states. He also proposes a modest increase in related expenditure, which he suggests should be settled with the Chief Secretary in the course of the forthcoming Public Expenditure Survey discussions.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper provides a very broad survey of the threat which small states face and of the means available to help others to combat it. Much of the non-controversial material in the minute is also contained in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum on "The Economic and Political Security of Small States" which was published on 19 July by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. A copy of this Memorandum, which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had expected to be published later in the year, is attached. The Memorandum does not, of course, address the specific points on which Ministerial decisions are now sought.

FLAG B

3. The published Memorandum states that the Government strongly supports the Commonwealth Secretary-General's study into the security problems of small states. It indicates that HMG will continue to fulfil its direct responsibilities for the security of the United Kingdom's remaining Dependent Territories. So far as independent small states are concerned it indicates that the Government's key objective is to encourage measures which are designed to achieve prevention rather than cure through a number of bilateral means, including the maintenance of a diplomatic presence in small states, increased technical assistance primarily through the provision of skilled manpower or training of local armed and police forces, and the pursuit of active information on cultural policies. It indicates that the Government will encourage greater regional co-operation and consult a range of other Governments with a view to agreeing a common approach.

4. The main additional points which are set out in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute circulated for OD discussion relate to -

(a) the question of security assistance and guarantees where the promotion of the security of small states through bilateral security guarantees is not favoured, emphasising the importance of further steps to improve the United Kingdom's out-of-area intervention capability (paragraph 11);

(b) the identification of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and our major European NATO partners, in addition to the United States, as the other Governments to be consulted about establishing a common approach (recommendations at paragraph 17(a) and (e));

(c) the resource implications of increased support for members of the East Caribbean Reciprocal Security System (recommendation at paragraph 17(d).

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster are unable to attend the meeting. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be represented by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Young). The Chancellor of the Exchequer will be represented by the Economic Secretary (Mr Stewart). The Minister for Overseas Development (Mr Timothy Raison) and the Chief of the Defence Staff have also been invited to attend.

HANDLING

6. You should invite the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to introduce the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute. You may then wish to structure the discussion along the following lines -

(a) The Threat to Small States
This is treated in very general terms in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute although there is a fuller discussion of the nature of the threat in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the attached Foreign and Commonwealth Office Memorandum for the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Should OD not be provided with a more systematic description of the perceived threat to the individual small states which are covered by the paper, together with an assessment of the measures available to assist countering these particular threats and the degree of British interest involved in each case? A more detailed study on these lines would perhaps provide a surer foundation for the United Kingdom input to the

Commonwealth Secretary-General's study, for the proposed approach to NATO allies and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and for the judgements about allocation of resources at the next Public Expenditure Survey round. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office might be invited to comment.

(b) Measures to Promote the Security of Small States

In its discussion of measures to promote the security of small states the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute does not distinguish between those states which are still British Dependent Territories and those which have attained independence. Would it not be useful to give separate consideration to these two categories, since in the case of British Dependent Territories the United Kingdom faces fewer constraints in taking any necessary action against the threat of subversion? The policy objectives set out in paragraph 5 of the paper appear mainly applicable to independent small states. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office might be invited to comment.

(c) Security

Is it the view of the Committee that bilateral security guarantees are inappropriate, except where our vital interests are at stake? Are the presently planned out-of-area intervention improvements sufficient? Warship visits are given a specific mention in paragraph 11 of the minute but we plan to reduce force levels from 56 to 50 destroyers and frigates during the 1980s. The Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff should be invited to give their views.

(d) Resource Implications

The paper highlights the need for more expenditure in relation to the Caribbean without indicating the criteria

now used for the allocation of available funds globally. In considering further work on priorities in relation to the threat and British interests, the Committee might welcome a fuller analysis of resource aspects. The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Minister for Overseas Development and the Economic Secretary, Treasury, might be invited to comment.

CONCLUSION

7. You could guide the Committee in the light of discussion to agree with the general recommendations set out in paragraph 17 of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute, many of which already underlie the policy published in the attached Memorandum. However, on the basis that if the problem is worth addressing it is worth addressing thoroughly, you could call for a more systematic examination of the situation of the small states in question, setting out the nature of the threat in each case, possible ways of combating this, and the degree of United Kingdom interest in the states concerned. This could lead to the establishment of more precise policy aims and to a better analysis of associated resource implications. Following further consideration by the Committee, the United Kingdom might then have more of substance to contribute in the proposed approach to NATO allies and Commonwealth partners on the way in which the use of available resources could be better co-ordinated.

Brian Cartledge

B G Cartledge

24 July 1984

FILE

RM

cc: P.C

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 July, 1984

BRITISH CEMETERY IN GOA

Thank you for your letter of 20 July. The Prime Minister was very grateful to know of the action taken to provide official support for the maintenance of the British Cemetery in Goa. She has commented that she hopes that it will be kept nicely from now on.

(C.D. Powell)

P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

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OUPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 July 1984

Dear Len,

THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

The Prime Minister has so far been able to consider only briefly the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (PM/84/125) on the security of small states.

The Prime Minister thinks that the minute is a useful basis for a discussion in OD. I will be grateful if arrangements for this can be set in hand. I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to members of OD and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

C.D. Powell

C.D. Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

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CDP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

CDP 20/7

Thank you very much - I hope it will be kept nicely now. MT

20 July, 1984

Dear Charles,

British Cemetery in Goa

Following her visit to Goa during the CHOGM last November, the Prime Minister received an appeal by the custodian of the British cemetery in Goa for official support for the cemetery's maintenance. When arrangements were made in 1949 for the upkeep of other British cemeteries in India, Goa was not covered because it was not then part of India.

The Prime Minister agreed that the Goa cemetery should now receive support. Legal difficulties connected with the terms of the original grant for the upkeep of our cemeteries in India have been resolved. The Prime Minister may wish to know that the High Commission has now made arrangements to send an annual cheque to the custodian of the cemetery through the Secretary to the Lieutenant Governor of Goa.

The Director of Archives, Archaelogy and Museums in Goa has sent the High Commission the attached copy of an article about the cemetery, with a request from the author, Dr Shirodkar, that it should be passed to the Prime Minister. The High Commissioner has already written to Dr Shirodkar thanking him on behalf of the Prime Minister. No further acknowledgement is therefore necessary.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

BRITISH CEMETERY IN GOA

— Dr. P. P. Shirodkar

At the fag end of the last decade of the 18th century when Napoleon Bonaparte was shooting himself into prominence like a meteor on the horizon of Europe securing victory after victory for France, the British had made a severe dent in the French footholds in India leading to their retreat.

Contrary to the expectations, in the post-French Revolution period Great Britain succeeded in occupying all the French settlements alongwith a few Dutch footholds in India. Colombo as well as all the other Dutch fortifications fell into the hands of Great Britain on February 16, 1796[1]. Only exceptions were the Portuguese settlements in Goa, Daman and Diu which probably remained safe on account of the long-standing Luso-British alliance which Great Britain felt always tilted towards it.

True, French had lost all their settlements in the Indian sub-continent. Nevertheless, they could still exercise their authority in certain areas. It may be pointed out here that Monsignor Raymond had been instrumental in organising a contingent of troops in Hyderabad at the instance of French Government and Perron had been engaged by Sindhias to discipline their troops[2]. The loss of their settlements had not perturbed the French much as they were drawing a lot of confidence from their occupation of the Isle of France (Mauritius) since 1721 and Bourbon since 1664 in Indian Ocean. The signing of Treaties of alliance with Tipu Sultan had emboldened them further to cherish the dream of reoccupying their lost territories in India. Only two main factors which were coming in their way were the blockade of Europe by the Emperor in Berlin and a free sway of Great Britain over the Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, indomitable Napoleon tried to put into effect a formidable plan to conquer in 1798 Egypt first and from there to launch massive attack against India. And as per the French strategy, Goa was the most suitable territory on the western coast from where they could envisage a major thrust on British possessions with the help of Tipu Sultan. According to French plans, the port of Goa alongwith the entire territory would go to Tipu Sultan and Bombay subsequent to its capture would go to France[3].

When the news reached Bombay from Bassora that a French fleet of 26 ships and 14 frigates were proceeding through Suez Canal to India,

Sir Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay rushed to Goa a garrison of 1000 Europeans of rank and file in seven ships commanded by Col. William Clarke, which arrived in Goa on 6th September 1799 and disembarked on the following day. These troops drawn from H.M's 75th, 77th and 84th Regiments were allowed to enter Goa with all due cordiality and a most distinguished attention from the Governor and Captain - General of Goa, Sr. Francisco Antonio de Veiga Cabral[4].

During their occupation of Goa for about 14 years i. e. from 1799 to 1813, the British had constructed several edifices and barracks in Aguada fortress area, at Gaspar Dias and Mormugao but no remains of those exist now as most of them were demolished in 1848 by the Portuguese. Of the two cemeteries, one near Cabo still exists and the other at Sinquerim, is almost extinct with no signs of any tombs whatsoever. As for the cemetery of Cabo, it is fairly in good condition and has withstood vagaries of nature and time.

Though the exact date of the construction of the Cabo cemetery is not known, it can be presumably deduced that it was constructed somewhere around 1802 and it served the purpose of British garrisons stationed at Fort Mormugao, Cabo and at times Fort Aguada. Mr. J. Gerson D'Cunha mentioned about one of the travellers, Mr. W. Walker, who described the cemetery in the year 1855 thus: "I visited the burial ground at Cabo, built and used by the British force of 10000 men when they held possession of the seaboard point of Goa, to prevent the French entering India by this route in 1805. The massive laterite stone wall which surrounds it is as perfect as the day it was built the laterite in this neighbourhood being the best I have anywhere seen, but the lofty arched entrance gates have long been despoiled of every particle of wood. The burial ground is used for rice cultivation and the very tomb stones are worn down from the sharpening of native tools on them; where not cultivated, it is overgrown with high rank grass said to be alive with deadly *cobra de capello*. If it be true, as I have heard, that the Collector of Belgaum allows an annual sum to keep in order, I can assure him that not a pice worth of care it bestowed on it ..."[5].

There is a corroborative evidence to prove what Mr. W. Walker had stated. In a letter of the Ecclesiastical Department Bombay Castle dated 19th May 1869 a request was made to the Governor-General of the Portuguese India, Sr. J. F. Pestana to set the cemetery right. It will not be out of place here to quote this interesting letter extensively. It read thus: — "The Protestant Chaplain of the Concan has represented to the Venerable Archdeacon of Bombay, that he had been informed

from Goa of the desecration of graves of certain persons of our community buried in that place. Accordingly, the Archdeacon communicated with the gentleman who had reported the matter from Goa and received reply to the effect that the burial ground which lies between Fort Cabo and Panjim is enclosed by a good permanent wall, but has no gates; hence the Natives are making use of the ground for cultivating rice. The tombs of British Officers buried there are going to ruin, though from appearances they must have cost considerable to erect. To put the ground in decent condition and gates as well as a short road to it from the highway will cost Rs. 1000, certainly not more. It can be kept in order for say 10 to 15 Rs. per month".

"This communication leaves no room to doubt that the burial ground is in unprotected state. I therefore request that Your Excellency will have the goodness to cause such necessary repairs as may be required to be executed to future protection. Any expense which Your Government may be put to on this account will be duly repaid on Your Excellency indicating the amount and to whom it should be paid". [6]

It is apparent that the Portuguese Government conceded the request from the British. This can be discerned from what J. Gerson da Cunha said about it within a decade.

The said English cemetery as described by J. Gerson da Cunha in 1878 consisted of an oblong area about 180 yards long by 145 yards broad, walled all around. Its gate with some architectural attention had massive teak wood doors. The key of this door was in the hands of the chaplain in the neighbouring old Convent which was subsequently reduced to the summer residence with a chapel attached to it. There was a gate--keeper who looked after the cemetery and was paid by the English Government Rs. 6 a month. To the right of the gate let into the wall was a 2-feet square slab, all the letters being worn out except H. M.'s ... The whole area was studded with tombs 41 in number, 8 of which had a four-sided wall around. Interspersed among the tombs were 13 trees, ... 6 mango, 6 cashew-nut, and 1 jack-fruit tree. [7]

Today, the cemetery is in pretty good condition with all the four walls intact. Only the plaster of some parts of the gate has fallen down. The old wooden gate is no more there. But instead it has a strong metallic gate which is in fairly good condition. It was repaired by the British Consul in the year 1949. Out of six mango trees during the time of J. Gerson da Cunha only two have survived along with a few wild trees on the burial ground. The burial site with the serene

outlook has 47 tombs. Most of them are in good condition. Some of them are in a mutilated condition and a few others are in the state of crumbling. The remaining sepulchral relics numbering about 56 gravestones are of laterite. There is a well-built dry well inside the cemetery. The cemetery gives a marvellous look from the road to Cabo.

The documentation of the existing epitaphs of the 15 tombs reminds one of the high esteem the living ones held their deceased kith and kin. The remaining tombs do not give the idea of the interred persons. However, all the tombs are clearly numbered. The earliest burial according to the tomb-plates was on 19th December 1808. But there is a possibility that many more must have been buried earlier leaving no eulogy plates. The latest burial was traced to be of 10th August 1912. The following are the inscriptions indicating the tributes, obituaries and provenance: —

TOMB NO. 29

MARGARET REEL
Died: 19-12-1808
SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF
MARGERET REEL wife of
JOHN WILLIAM REEL
CONDUCTOR in the
Honble. Company's Service
Who departed this Life
The 19th of December 1808
She was a Virtuous Wife
An Affectionate Mother
and a Faithful and Sincere
FRIEND

UNNUMBERED TOMB

Sacred to the memory of
SUSANNA JAND POULTON
wife of Capt. POULTON
(illegible) M.N.I.
who departed this life
Sept. 5th 1826
Aged 23 years

TOMB NO. 40

Sacred to the Memory of
Captain James Grahan
of the 7th Regt. Bombay N. I.
who died on Board of the Lady East
off Veegarlas on his passage to
England on the 11th April A. O. 1829
Aged 44 years

TOMB NO. 39

THEODOSIA DORCAS
Died 22-9-1838
Sacred to the Memory of the Beloved
DORCAS, beloved wife of Capt. E. MESSMER
39. M.N.I. who departed this life on
Twenty second Sept. 1832.
Dedicated by all who knew her

TOMB NO. 43

SOPHIE OSORIO D'ALBUQUERQUE
Born April 20, 1872
Died 6th August, 1874.

TOMB NO. 44

ARTHUR PASCOELLIS
Born December 13th 1866
Died May 9th 1876

TOMB NO. 41

Sacred to the Memory of
HUGO BALDWIN, MAJOR
Born June 12th 1819
Died Feb. the 7th 1881
Consecrated by his beloved wife
MARY FRANCES MAJOR

TOMB NO. 19 (with a cross)

In Memory of
LOUISA ANN
The Beloved wife of HENRY BARRON
Assistant Foreman W.I.P. Railway
Died at Mormugao on the
21 Feb. 1884
Aged 40 years
Rev. III 21st Verse
ISALAH XXVI 7 RP VERSE

TOMB NO. 10

Sacred to the Memory of
EMMA HARRIET
The Beloved wife of RICHARD
O. BRAT WATTE who departed this
life on the 6th March 1884.
Aged 34 yrs. 2 months and 6 days.
Her end was peace.
Erected by her sorrowing husband
In token of Affectionate Regret.

UNNUMBERED TOMB (Cross)

In Memory of ANN the
beloved wife of THOMAS MANKIN
Died April 20th 1885
Aged 45 years.

TOMB NO. 36

In Most Fond and Loving
Remembrance of
JOHN GRANT
Aged 30
By His Sorrowing
wife
Remember me O MY GOD &
Spare me according to the
Greatness of Thy Mercy
8-7-1886

TOMB NO. 56

Will you give rest
My Times are in Thy hands
GEORGE HOLLAND ERSKINE
Born 19th Dec. 1858.
Died 25th Sept. 1886

TOMB NO. 54

In Fond Remembrance of
ADA MARGARET, The Beloved wife of
T. R. SOCKETT
(Both of Tranmero Cheshire, England)
who departed this life
May 3rd 1893 at Mormugao, Goa, India
Aged 33 yrs. and 11 months.
She has gone the grave hath received her
«It was Jesus that called her away,
She has gone to the Lord who Redeemed her from
Night to the Splendour of Day»

UNNUMBERED TOMB

THOMAS J. B. KENNEDY
Born in Pottsville Pa
U. S. A. Nov. 28 1840
Died in Mormugao,
Goa on Nov. 10, 1905

TOMB NO. 55

Sacred to the Memory of
HENRY WILLIAM MAYNE
who was an employee of the
MADRAS SOUTHERN MARATHA RAILWAY
for many years.
Died on the 10th August 1912
Gone but not forgotten
Erected by his daughter

Besides this cemetery, which has attained an historic importance today, in its vicinity were the barracks and hospital of the British troops at the Cabo, the residencial area of the Lt. Governor of Goa. But they were demolished by the then Portuguese Governor, Sr. Jose Ferreira Pestana and preesntly no vestiges whatsoever are existing there.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. A letter dt. 16th Feb. 1796 by Geo Patrick Major, Officer Commanding the Bombay Detachment, Colombo to Rajah of Cochin Read **Kerala Archives Newsletter**, vol. III, April 1978, Directorate of Archives, Trivandrum, Kerala, p. 22.
2. Dodwell H. W. (Ed) **The Cambridge History of India — British India**, 1847-1858 V, Cambridge University Press, 1929, p. 326.
3. Hammick Murray (Ed) **"History of Mysoor"** by Lt. Colonel Mark Wilkes, Government Branch Press, Mysore 1932, II, p. 640.
4. For details read the author's two articles **British Occupation of Goa in Colloquium**, Vol. I No. 1, 1978 and Vol. II No. 1, 1979, a journal of the Goa Institute for Historical and Cultural Research, Panaji. See also **Ingleses em Goa ou Occupação de Goa pelas tropas Britanicas** by J. B. Amancio Gracias (Tipografia Rangel, Bastora, Goa, 1934).
5. See **The English and their Monuments at Goa** in The Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay 1878, Vol. XIII, pp. 127-128.
6. See **Estrangeiros**, No. 13, HAG, fl. 326.
7. See No. 5 above pp. 126-127.

* I am indebted to Shri Bonifacio Dias, Asstt. Research Officer, Goa Gazetteer Department for helping me to copy the epitaphs.

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cc/c ①

A

Prime Minister
Relevant to your talk with Sir A. Parsons tomorrow.
Agree to OD discussion?
CDP 19/7.

PM/84/125

PRIME MINISTER

Yes

The Security of Small States

1. At last November's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) you were instrumental in persuading your colleagues to commission a study into the security problems of small states. By defusing the sharp differences of opinion within the Commonwealth which had been caused by Grenada, the agreement to launch this study met a pressing political need at the time. But it also marked a recognition that crises in very small states can have far reaching implications, not only for the stability of the region concerned but also for wider Western interests.

2. The Commonwealth study is still at an early stage and will not be completed until next year's CHOGM in the Bahamas. The best outcome from HMG's point of view would be agreement on some guidelines on which a coherent Western and Commonwealth approach could be based and as a result of which countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand assumed greater responsibility. Insofar as is possible I shall steer the study in this direction, and have already provided the Secretary General with a paper analysing the nature of the problem and suggesting ways in which it might be tackled. Sir Anthony Parsons' agreement to serve on the Secretary General's consultative group will help. In the meantime, we need our own policy. As a basis for discussion in OD, this minute sets out my views on the broad outlines of our general approach and makes certain recommendations for action especially in relation to small Caribbean states.

The Problem

3. HMG is of course responsible for the defence and security

/of

of our remaining dependencies. Our determination to carry out these responsibilities was well demonstrated over the Falkland Islands and no one need doubt our resolution on this score. The problem arises as little states - and our remaining dependencies are all small - come to independence, nominally sovereign, but effectively without the capacity to deter external threats or to cope successfully with determined efforts to subvert their government and way of life. With our allies and partners in the Commonwealth we need to develop policies which will increase the security and democratic values of existing independent small states and provide a more secure international environment for our remaining dependencies as they come to independence.

4. Where the United Kingdom - and our allies - have obvious strategic interests - the Gulf is an example - HMG already have some defence arrangements in place. In the context of small states, work undertaken in my Department has focussed on parts of the world where the UK's strategic interest is either less direct (such as the Caribbean or the Indian Ocean) or of little importance (such as in the South Pacific), but where a crisis can affect HMG's wider interests adversely, either because: first, the interests of our allies - especially the United States - are involved (which can have repercussions for the Alliance as a whole); or, because the UK can be held to have certain residual responsibilities; or both. Because of its importance to the United States, and because of our commitment to Belize, we shall need to be especially vigilant in the Caribbean and concentrate a major portion of our efforts there.

HMG's Policy

5. I do not believe that we should base our policy on the assumption that we would take pre-emptive military action to prevent aggression against or internal subversion of a small state. Our policy objectives therefore have to be:

/(a)

(a) to prevent crises occurring rather than to intervene in the event or apply cures afterwards, and to do so primarily by helping small states to help themselves;

(b) to promote the growth of cooperative arrangements on a regional basis which will create a sense of local solidarity and a climate of confidence;

(c) gradually to diminish the extent of HMG's residual responsibilities and public expectations of us by sharing responsibility with allies and partners so that certain of them eg Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific, Canada as well as the US in the Caribbean, and possibly some of our Western European friends in the Indian Ocean, assume more of a leading role.

Measures to Promote the Security of Small States

6. The more effective preventative measures are, the less are the chances of having to face the awkward choices with which Grenada confronted the Allies. There is a range of possible policy instruments available to HMG. Essentially these comprise:

British Diplomatic Presence

7. Maintenance of a diplomatic presence in small states is important. A British presence in itself acts as a stabilising element locally and is indispensable to being properly informed about local conditions. It also increases the effectiveness of our cooperation with friends and allies, especially the Americans. Broadly speaking I do not think present levels of representation in small states need to be increased, except in a very limited number of places, but they ought not to be reduced further.

Civilian Assistance

8. Most of the small states considered here already receive generous British aid if calculated in per capita terms. I do not consider that we should spend a higher proportion of our

/capital

capital aid programme on them (although there are one or two instances where short-term increases would be justified in support of particularly important capital projects). But little states are frequently short of high quality civil servants because their own best people emigrate. I do believe therefore that technical assistance in the form of education and training of local personnel and the provision of skilled manpower can make a significant contribution to political stability and thus to internal security, and that we should be prepared to increase our effort in this area in response to need.

Security Assistance

9. The same applies to the training of armed and police forces. In 1983/4, we spent about £4 million on support for the armed and police forces of the small states in the Caribbean, South Pacific and Indian Ocean. There is a case for doing more, especially in the Caribbean. It is hard to oversetimate the dividend in political stability to be obtained from the existence of honest, loyal and well-disciplined armed forces and civil police. I am therefore reviewing my own department's arrangements for such assistance with a view to determining whether the level and management of resources devoted to it is right.

Information Policy

10. Information and cultural policies are important tools in the preservation of democratic values. We also need to use them effectively to protect and promote British interests and gain support for HMG's policies. For a variety of reasons, not less the existence of a substantial West Indian population in the UK, this is especially relevant in the Caribbean. I think the BBC Caribbean service, cut a number of years ago, ought to be revived and I am reviewing our information effort overall in the Caribbean as well as the possible reopening of

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the British Council there. We must ensure that a good standard of English is maintained.

Security Guarantees

11. The most direct means of promoting the security of small states would be to offer them bilateral security guarantees. But against other much greater priorities, and given that our vital interests are not at stake, such a policy would not be justified for the UK. Nonetheless, the steps being taken to improve our out-of-area intervention capability increase our freedom of manoeuvre and our ability to cooperate out-of-area with our allies as well as raise the level of deterrence generally. And, as many small states are also islands, I attach importance to visits by Royal Navy ships. These are a highly visible demonstration of our continuing interest both to governments and populations, as well as to our allies - especially the Americans - and to our foes.

Multilateral Means of Promoting Security: Regional Cooperation

12. Historically most experiments with political federations between ex-colonies have not had happy endings. It seems doubtful that these little states are yet ready to resume ties that they earlier broke. A large number of small states are, however, envincing more interest in the benefits to be had from closer cooperation with neighbours. I think that the key to increasing the security of small states lies in encouraging them to cooperate still further. So far as our own support is concerned, I am exploring ways of increasing our assistance to the members of the Regional Security System in the East Caribbean. This would involve more military training and improving their ability to police coastal waters - not least against the drug traffic, which is a source of particular concern to the Americans. We should also encourage the Australians and New Zealanders to step up their support for

/the

the security of the South Pacific states.

The benefits of support for small states

13. The United States of course has the major responsibility for security in the Caribbean, and we are seeking to harmonise more effectively our own assistance to Caribbean states with that of the Americans. They recognise this and have made it clear that they are keen to ensure that their - very considerable - assistance is efficiently dovetailed with what we ourselves and allies like the Canadians are able to do in the area. This is a welcome development. I am convinced that a disposition on our part to be helpful to the Americans in the Caribbean (and Belize) will pay dividends in Anglo-American relations well beyond the costs. As we know the Americans feel, with some justice, that out of the area the Europeans leave too much to them. Without doubt this is one of the main causes of friction in transatlantic relations. In the Caribbean itself, a more active policy on our part will help convince public opinion locally as well as in this country that the security as well as the welfare of the area remains of concern to us.

14. The need to improve the security of the small states in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean is less urgent. But there is a common Western interest in the long term stability and pro-Western alignment of those areas. It is therefore right that we should encourage our Western partners to provide more security-related assistance and to promote greater regional cooperation there. As in the Caribbean, the climate of confidence created by cooperation on a regional basis in security matters will not only increase deterrence against outside threats but will also, along with other measures,

/help

help steady the nerve and the resolution of these small governments domestically. We must, of course, recognise that were it to come to an actual intervention to forestall a coup, even when undertaken by small friendly neighbours at the invitation of the threatened government, there will be controversy, a consideration which reinforces the importance of HMG pursuing a sufficiently active preventative policy.

The United Nations

15. The UN Secretary General has advocated a more pre-emptive UN role in the event of potential crises. Laudable as this may be, the likelihood of the UN making an effective contribution must be slight given that policy would first have to be agreed in the Security Council. In general, we should give such ideas a fair wind without laying any great store by them.

Resource Implications

16. If we want to pursue an effective preventative policy in relation to the issues raised by the existence of small states, expenditure is involved. The tools are all available and the extra sum involved need only be small. The measures I have identified so far relate to the Caribbean as the priority area. These would cost a total of £2.8 million in 1985/86, £1.9 million in 1986/87 and £1 million a year thereafter, most of which would be devoted to the increased support for members of the East Caribbean Regional SEcurity System outlined in paragraph 12. A proportion of this expenditure I can absorb. I have made additional bids for the military training, BBC and British Council elements of my proposals in this year's PES round (totalling £1.8 million, £1.3 million and £0.8 million in the three PES years), since

/ in order

in order to find the resources elsewhere in my votes, sacrifices which I consider highly undesirable would have to be made. The Treasury have expressed the view that this is the sort of marginal adjustment of priorities which should be financed from within existing programmes. If you and our OD colleagues agree with what I propose on the policy side, the question of finance can be settled with the Chief Secretary in the PES discussions. I believe that such modest expenditure now could save us a great deal of money later on.

Recommendations

17. In view of the various points outlined above, I recommend that:

(a) we should actively participate in the Commonwealth study with the aim of ensuring that it establishes clear guidelines for a coherent approach to the security of small states and thereby encourages larger Commonwealth countries (notably Australia, New Zealand and Canada) to assume greater responsibility;

(b) we should ourselves pursue the policy outlined in this minute, which aims at prevention rather than cure, helping the small states to help themselves, promoting the growth of regional co-operation, and gradually diminishing HMG's residual global responsibilities in respect of them;

(c) we should be especially vigilant about the Caribbean given its importance to the United States and the serious side effects which crises in that region can have;

(d) We should agree that a number of different policy instruments should be exploited to this end, notably the provision of more technical and security related assistance, together with the maintenance of an adequate diplomatic presence and an effective information and cultural effort. These measures would involve the modest increase in expenditure outlined in paragraph 15;

/(e)

(e) we should ensure that other suitable allies and partners are closely involved in the welfare of small states and in particular we should take the initiative in approaching our major NATO allies, and Australia and New Zealand, on a bilateral basis with a view to agreeing a coordinated approach.

18. I am copying this minute to our OD colleagues and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
18 July 1984

COMMONWEALTH
CHOGM
India

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 June 1984

THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

Thank you for your letter of 12 June to John Coles conveying comments on the points made by the Prime Minister on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 21 May.

The Prime Minister has noted these comments. She agrees that there should now be an OD discussion on the basis of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute. You will wish to have the item included on an appropriate agenda.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office),

Charles Powell

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Security of Small States

You will recall the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 21 May (Flag A) which set out his thinking on this problem, and suggested a discussion in OD.

You had various comments which I put to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in my letter of 30 May (Flag B).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have considered these comments and the attached letter is the result (Flag C).

I think the best course now would be to include this subject on a suitable OD agenda. This would have the incidental advantage of a preliminary discussion of the question which is to be considered at your seminar at Chequers in the autumn.

Agree that there should be an OD discussion on the basis of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute at Flag A?

A. & C.

Yes MT

13 June, 1984.

C

cc PC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 June 1984

Dear John,

The Security of Small States

In your letter of 30 May you asked for comments on the points made by the Prime Minister in response to the Foreign Secretary's minute of 21 May before putting to her again the possibility of discussion in OD. I take the Prime Minister's points in turn.

The Prime Minister doubted whether it was accurate in paragraph 4 of the minute to describe Britain's strategic interest in some areas covered in the minute as 'virtually non-existent'. She also felt that the wording came close to implying that Britain should have intervened militarily in Grenada. Paragraph 4 sought to differentiate between, on the one hand, small states in areas of direct and vital strategic interest to the UK such as the Gulf (where we have specific undertakings to consult with the smaller states in time of need) and, on the other, small states in areas which are either of less direct strategic importance to the United Kingdom (such as the Caribbean) or which are, in strategic terms, of little importance to Britain (such as the South Pacific). HMG has (with the exception of Belize) no consultative defence arrangements with the small independent states of the Caribbean, Indian Ocean or South Pacific (although we do of course have residual responsibilities for the seven remaining dependent territories in those areas). But this does not let us off the hook politically because we have historical links with the states concerned and because the interests of our allies are directly involved. Because of the United States, both considerations weigh especially heavily in the Caribbean. Flowing from this there is no implication intended that such considerations would have compelled - or even justified - British intervention in Grenada. Simply that, as Grenada showed, the Caribbean is a sensitive area about which HMG needs to be especially vigilant.

/In

In referring in paragraph 9 to the desirability of establishing both 'understanding of and sympathy for' Britain, Sir Geoffrey Howe had in mind that support for HMG's policies were less likely to be forthcoming in the absence of sympathetic appreciation of Britain's position and interests.

The reinstatement of the BBC Caribbean Service would involve additional expenditure of about £200,000 a year. Under the BBC's Licence and Agreement, the Foeign Secretary is, after consultation with the Corporation, able to lay down where the External Services should direct their broadcasts. In this instance, the BBC do in fact want to re-establish their Caribbean service, which was cut in 1977, but have been unable to do so for lack of funds.

The Prime Minister doubts the statement that the appetite for separation among the small states of the Eastern Caribbean is undiminished. Clearly this is a matter of judgement. Sir Geoffrey Howe would agree that the leaders of these small states are, especially after Grenada, more aware than previously of their vulnerability and that they are showing some signs of wishing to co-operate over security matters. But the jealousies that the others feel for Barbados, which has taken the lead, are making this a far from easy matter and there is certainly no evidence that these little states wish to return to the status quo ante of a constitutional link-up, even though this would be in their interest.

The Prime Minister commented on paragraph 12 that 'we ought to work out more carefully how we are going to tackle subversion and takeovers from within'. A good deal of work has already been done on the specific means at our disposal for combatting subversion within small states. Work is also in progress on the wider principles involved. as requested in your letter of 1 June. This is a difficult and complex point to which there are no easy answers. Sir Geoffrey believes that the question of how far British policy should go on this aspect wold form an important part of Ministerial discussion either in OD or at the meeting which the Prime Minister has in mind for September.

Finally, the Prime Minister suggested that the finance for the measures outlined in the minute should come from the FCO's contingency provision. The expenditure proposals outlined in paragraph 14 of the minute, if agreed, will not begin until 1985-86. The level of the FCO's contingency provision for that financial year is not yet known and, if it is as low as this year's (£1.3 million), will not be big enough to accommodate the proposed expenditure. In any case, the contingency provision is intended for genuinely unforeseen demands. It is not

/however

however proposed that all the expenditure should come out of additional PES provisions. A proportion - about a third - can, it is hoped, be accommodated within planned FCO/ODA ceilings.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

B

FILE

Gcc: SPC

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 May, 1984

The Security of Small States

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 21 May. She has made a number of comments.

With regard to paragraph 4, Mrs. Thatcher has questioned whether it is accurate to describe the UK strategic interest in some of the areas listed as "virtually non-existent". She has also observed, with reference to the rest of the paragraph, that the wording comes close to implying that Britain should have intervened militarily in Grenada. I believe it is the statement "all these factors were involved in the Grenada crisis" which conveys this implication to the Prime Minister.

In paragraph 9, Mrs. Thatcher has questioned whether an appropriate aim of HMG's policies is to gain "sympathy" for as distinct from understanding of Britain. She has also asked whether the suggestion that the BBC Caribbean Service should be revived implies more expenditure - and has further asked whether we have the power to direct such a revival.

With regard to the first sentence of paragraph 11, the Prime Minister has commented that she doubts whether the appetite among small states in the East Caribbean for separatism is undiminished.

Mrs. Thatcher has commented on the last sentence of paragraph 12 as follows:

> "We ought to work out more carefully how we are going to tackle subversion and takeovers from within."

Finally, on paragraph 14, the Prime Minister has minuted that she believes that the additional sums suggested

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SAHAAH

NK

to finance the measures outlined in the paper should come out of the FCO's contingency provision. She believes that there are too many bids to be accommodated at the moment and has observed that she has already agreed that the British council should have more money.

BH

I should be grateful for comments on the above points in due course, following which I will put again to the Prime Minister the question of a possible discussion of the paper in OD.

P. F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SAHAAH

CCPC (4)

A

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

Agree to discuss these issues in OD?

A.J.C. 23/5.

PM/84/83

See comments as in text

mb

PRIME MINISTER

The Security of Small States

1. At last November's Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) you were instrumental in persuading your colleagues to commission a study into the security problems of small states. By defusing the sharp differences of opinion within the Commonwealth which had been caused by Grenada, the agreement to launch this study met a pressing politicial need at the time. But it also marked a recognition that crises in very small states can have far reaching implications, not only for the stability of the region concerned but also for wider Western interests. The little states concerned are struggling to be - or to remain - democratic and this government needs to put its policy towards small states squarely in the context of the obligation of the Western allies to defend and promote democratic values internationally.

/2.

2. The Commonwealth study will not be completed until next year's CHOGM in the Bahamas. The best outcome from HMG's point of view would be agreement on some guidelines on which a coherent Western and Commonwealth approach could be based and as a result of which countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand assumed greater responsibility. Insofar as is possible I shall steer the study in this direction, and have already provided the Secretary General with a paper analysing the nature of the problem and suggesting ways in which it might be tackled. It will help if, as is likely, Sir Anthony Parsons agrees to serve on the Secretary General's study group. In the meantime, we need our own policy. This minute sets out my own views and the considerations on which I intend to base my evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee who have just begun their enquiry into microstates.

The problem

3. HMG is of course responsible for the defence and security of our remaining dependencies. Our determination to carry out these responsibilities was well demonstrated over the Falkland Islands and no one need doubt our

/resolution

resolution on this score. The problem arises as little states - and our remaining dependencies are all small - come to independence, nominally sovereign, but effectively without the capacity to deter external threats or to cope successfully with determined efforts to subvert their government and way of life. With our allies and partners in the Commonwealth we need to develop policies which will increase the security of existing independent small states and provide a more secure internal environment for our remaining dependencies as they come to independence - an aspect to which the Foreign Affairs Committee is likely to pay particular attention.

4. Where the United Kingdom - and our allies - have obvious strategic interests - the Gulf is an example - HMG already have some defence arrangements in place. In the context of small states, work undertaken in my Department has focussed on parts of the world, (the Caribbean, and the islands of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific) where the UK's strategic interest is less direct or virtually non-existent but where a crisis can affect HMG's interests adversely, either because: first, the interests of our allies - especially the United States -

/are involved

are involved (which can have repercussions for the Alliance as a whole), or, because the UK can be held to have certain residual responsibilities; or both. All these factors were involved in the Grenada crisis, and one can think of other countries, where this could be true again. Because of its importance to the United States, and because of our commitment to Belize, we shall need to be especially vigilant in the Caribbean.

?? This seems to go close to saying that we should have gone into Grenada.

HMG's policy

5. I do not believe that we should base our policy on the assumption that we would take preemptive military action to prevent aggression against or internal subversion of a small state. Our policy objectives therefore have to be:

(a) to prevent crises occurring rather than to intervene in the event or apply cures afterwards, and to do so primarily by helping small states to help themselves;

(b) to promote the growth of cooperative arrangements on a regional basis which will create a sense of local solidarity and a climate of confidence;

/(c)

(c) gradually to diminish the extent of HMG's residual responsibilities and public expectations of us by sharing responsibility with allies and partners so that certain of them eg Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific, Canada as well as the US in the Caribbean and possibly some of our Western European friends in the Indian Ocean assume more of a leading role.

Measures to promote the security of small states

6. We have looked at a range of possible policy instruments. Essentially these comprise:

British Diplomatic presence

7. Maintenance of a diplomatic presence in small states is important. A British presence in itself acts as a stabilising element locally and is indispensable to being properly informed about local conditions. Broadly speaking I do not think present levels of representation need to be increased in small states, except in a limited number of places, but I should be reluctant to see them reduced any further.

/Technical Assistance

Technical assistance

8. Most of the small states considered here already receive generous British aid if calculated in per capita terms. I do not consider that we should spend a higher proportion of our capital aid programme on them (although there may be one or two instances where short-term increases would be justified in support of particularly important capital projects). But little states are frequently short of high quality civil servants because their own best people emigrate. I do believe therefore that technical assistance in the form of training local personnel and the provision of skilled manpower can make a significant contribution to political stability and thus to internal security, and that we should be prepared to increase our effort in this area in response to need. This particularly applies to the training of armed and police forces. It is hard to overestimate the dividend in political stability to be obtained from the existence of honest, loyal and well-disciplined armed forces and civil police. I am reviewing my own department's arrangements for such assistance with a view to determining whether the level and management of resources devoted to it is right.

/Information Policy

Information policy

9. Information and cultural policies are important tools in the preservation of democratic values. We also need to use them effectively to gain support for HMG's policies and understanding of and sympathy for Britain as a country. For a variety of reasons, not least the existence of a substantial West Indian population in the UK, this is especially relevant in the Caribbean. I think the BBC Caribbean service, cut a number of years ago, ought to be revived and I am reviewing our information effort overall in the Caribbean as well as the possible reopening of the British Council there. We must ensure that a good standard of English is maintained.

?

More expenditure? How we power to decide this?

Security Guarantees

10. The most direct means of promoting the security of small states would be to offer them bilateral security guarantees. But against other much greater priorities, and given that our vital interests are not at stake, such a policy would not be justified for the UK. Nonetheless, the steps being taken to improve our out-of-area

/intervention

intervention capability increase our freedom of manoeuvre and our ability to cooperate out-of-area with our allies as well as raising the level of deterrence generally.

Multilateral:

Regional Cooperation

11. Historically most experiments with federations have not had happy endings and for the foreseeable future the appetite among small states for separatism appears undiminished. They are, however, evincing more interest in the benefits to be had from closer cooperation with neighbours. We should encourage this as well as moves towards regional economic integration. Cooperation over security should also be fostered. A regional security system (RSS) was established in the East Caribbean early last year. I think that the key to increasing the security of these islands lies in encouraging them to cooperate still further, and I am therefore proposing ways to increase our support to them. This would involve more military training and improving their ability to police coastal waters - not least against the drug traffic, which is as you know a source of concern to President Reagan.

Not in the East Caribbean

/12.

12. The United States of course has the major responsibility for security in the Caribbean, but this sort of action on our part will, I know, be a welcome concrete sign to the Administration of our continuing interest and support for their policies as well as helping convince public opinion locally and in this country that the security as well as the welfare of the Caribbean remains of concern to us. The climate of confidence created by cooperation on a regional basis in security matters will not only increase deterrence against outside threats, but will also, along with other measures, help steady the nerve and the resolution of these small governments domestically. [We must, of course, recognise that were it to come to an actual intervention to forestall a coup, even when undertaken by small friendly neighbours at the invitation of the threatened government, there will be controversy, a consideration which reinforces the importance of HMG pursuing a sufficiently active preventive policy.]

We ought to work out more carefully how we are going to handle subversion & the overs from within.

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13. The UN Secretary General has advocated a more preemptive UN role in the event of potential crises. Laudable as this may be, the likelihood of the UN making an effective contribution must be slight given that policy would first have to be agreed in the Security Council. In general, we should give such ideas a fair wind without laying any great store by them.

Resource implications

14. If we want to pursue a somewhat more active policy in relation to the issues raised by the existence of small states, expenditure is involved. It need not be large. The measures I have identified so far and outlined in this paper, all of which relate to the Caribbean as the priority area, would cost a total of £2.8 million in the first year, £1.9 million in the second and £900,000 each year thereafter. I have made bids for additional funds to cover the bulk of this expenditure in this year's PES round. The measures are in themselves modest and cheap by comparison with the potential costs of either

No - this must come out of F.O. contingency - we have too many bids and I have already pointed that the British Council should have more not

/preemptive

preemptive military intervention or sudden, violent political upheavals which result in the installation of regimes which are either unfriendly or unstable or both.

Next Steps

15. When you have been able to consider the issues raised in this minute, it might be useful if we were to have a short discussion in OD to agree on the policy we should adopt. In addition to continuing to help the Commonwealth study, we might then approach our major NATO allies as well as Australia and New Zealand on a bilateral basis with a view to agreeing a common approach.

(GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 May 1984

Hold until PM has seen revised text. cc PC

revised letter sent →

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Agree to discuss these issues in OD?

A.J.C. 21/5

PM/84/83

PRIME MINISTER

The Security of Small States

1. At last November's Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) you were instrumental in persuading your colleagues to commission a study into the security problems of small states. By defusing the sharp differences of opinion within the Commonwealth which had been caused by Grenada, the agreement to launch this study met a pressing politicial need at the time. But it also marked a recognition that crises in very small states can have far reaching implications, not only for the stability of the region concerned but also for wider Western interests. The little states concerned are struggling to be - or to remain - democratic and this government needs to put its policy towards small states squarely in the context of the obligation of the Western allies to defend and promote democratic values internationally.

Please see attached Communique p.8 para 11

/2.

2. The Commonwealth study will not be completed until next year's CHOGM in the Bahamas. The best outcome from HMG's point of view would be agreement on some guidelines on which a coherent Western and Commonwealth approach could be based and as a result of which countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand assumed greater responsibility. Insofar as is possible I shall steer the study in this direction, and have already provided the Secretary General with a paper analysing the nature of the problem and suggesting ways in which it might be tackled. It will help if, as is likely, Sir Anthony Parsons agrees to serve on the Secretary General's study group. ~~will also be helpful~~. In the meantime, we need our own policy. This minute sets out my own views and the considerations on which I intend to base my evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee who have just begun their enquiry into microstates.

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/intervention

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Multilateral:

Regional Cooperation

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/The United Nations

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Resource implications

14. If we want to pursue a somewhat more active policy in relation to the issues raised by the existence of small states, expenditure is involved. It need not be large. The measures I have identified so far and outlined in this paper, all of which relate to the Caribbean as the priority area, would cost a total of £2.8 million in the first year, £1.9 million in the second and £900,000 each year thereafter. I have made bids for additional funds to cover the bulk of this expenditure in this year's PES round. The measures are in themselves modest and cheap by comparison with the potential costs of either

/preemptive

preemptive military intervention or sudden, violent political upheavals which result in the installation of regimes which are either unfriendly or unstable or both.

Next steps

15. When you have been able to consider the issues raised in this minute, it might be useful if we were to have a short discussion in OD to agree on the policy we should adopt. In addition to continuing to help the Commonwealth study, we might then approach our major NATO allies as well as Australia and New Zealand on a bilateral basis with a view to agreeing a common approach.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

21 May 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

cc BHC DELHI.

file RM

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

26 March, 1984.

Dear Mr. Kanjimull,

I am writing to tell you how delighted I am with the beautiful ring which my husband bought for me from you at the end of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi.

Thank you also for arranging the magnificent exhibition of jewellery for me at the Residence of the British High Commissioner. It contained so many beautiful pieces and I will always remember it.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

Mr. Kanjimull.

File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

26 March, 1984.

Many thanks for your letter of 14 March. The Prime Minister was delighted to write a letter to Mr. Kanjimull, which I am enclosing with this one with a copy for you. Please would you be kind enough to arrange for it to be delivered.

E.E.R. BUTLER

Lady Wade-Gery

Grams:
"ROYAL"

By Appointments to

Phones:
Offi : 42073
46300
Res : 619301
615061

H.I.M. The late King Emperor George V
H.E. The Lord Louis Mountbatten Ex. Gov.-Gen. of India
Patronised by: H. E. Shrimati VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT

Kanjimull & Sons

Jewellers

ANTIQUE MOGHUL & RAJPUT PERIOD JEWELLERY.
MODERN JEWELLERY & LOOSE STONES ETC.

SCINDIA HOUSE, NEW DELHI, INDIA

Prime Minister 3
Letter attached to Mr. Kanjimal if you agree.

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION
NEW DELHI, INDIA

FERB
23.3

March 14, 1984

Dear Robin,

Do you remember that during your visit here in November, a firm of very old fashioned jewellers called Kanjimal arranged a small exhibition of antique jewellery in this house? Mr Thatcher bought the Prime Minister a (?) Topaz ring, and the firm also presented her with some enamel ornament, I think an elephant or a peacock.

The firm, which is an old one, greatly treasures letters from clients, many of which go back to the days of Lord Minto, Lord Curzon etc. Others are quite modern, from Jacqueline Onassis etc. Mr Kanjimal would very greatly appreciate a letter of thanks from the Prime Minister to add to what is in fact a mini-exhibition of British-Indian history. He reminded me, very nicely, that he had never had a letter about the little antique jewellry exhibition.

Do you think it would be possible for the PM to send such a letter? It would be a kindness. I enclose their card, which may help remind you.

With love from

Sahy.

Robin Butler, Esq.
No 10 Downing Street
London

PART 7 ends:-

Commonwealth Circular Letter 5/84 + Communique

PART 8 begins:-

FERB to Sir William Heseltine 1/3.

The National Archives

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
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