

PREM 19/1166

10/11/01

SECRET.

MT
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PART ONE

Confidential Filing

The appointment of Eduardo dos Santos as President
Internal Situation

ANGOLA

Part 1

October 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
16.10.79		3.6.81		13.12.83			
9.11.79		14.8.81		14.12.83			
18.3.1980		18.8.81		5.1.84			
25.3.80		14.8.81		20.1.84			
5.4.80		21.8.81		24.1.84			
18.4.80		1.9.81		25.1.84			
2.5.80		2.9.81		2.2.84			
17.6.80		16.9.81		24.2.84			
17.6.80		1.12.81		27.2.84			
16.6.80		3.12.81		1.3.84			
17.6.80		9.12.81		2.5.84			
1.7.80		31.7.82		8.3.84			
22.8.80		24.8.82		12.3.84			
9.1.81		31.8.82		22.3.84			
20.1.81		6.2.83					
18.3.81		10.2.83					
		11.2.83					
		14.2.83					
		9.8.83					
		25.11.83					

PREM 19/11/66

● PART _____ | _____ ends:-

CC(84) 12th Item 2 22.3.84

PART _____ 2 _____ begins:-

FCO to AJC 3.4.84



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 March, 1984

see Murdo,

A.S.C. $\frac{16}{3}$

Angola: UNITA's British Hostages

f-a.

I enclose a revised version of the note for use by the Chief Whip in dealing with any enquiries he receives from back-benchers. It has been amended to reflect the comments in John Coles's letter of 12 March as well as the two comments by the Chief Whip passed by telephone. The Prime Minister's question about future policy towards UNITA is one on which the Foreign Secretary had in any case commissioned urgent study, and Sir Geoffrey may wish to minute separately in due course. Meanwhile, the line in the revised supplementaries would seem right.

I am copying this to John Coles and to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD.

[Handwritten signature]
 (R B Bone)
Private Secretary

Murdo MacLean Esq
 Chief Whip's Office

ANGOLA: UNITA'S BRITISH HOSTAGES

Background

1. This could well be a long saga. In accordance with their usual practice, UNITA are likely to force march the hostages (17 Britons, though UNITA may be counting a wife as a Portuguese) to UNITA's southern base, roughly 1,000 kms away. The march will take many weeks.
2. In previous cases affecting hostages from other Western countries, it has usually not been possible to obtain firm news about them until their arrival at the safe base.
3. Although UNITA are likely to take reasonable care of the hostages, the conditions will be hard and sometimes dangerous (there were casualties among the Czechoslovakians). However, we have heard from a reliable source that all are in good health at present.
4. We have had some indications that, once the hostages have arrived at the UNITA base, UNITA will try to impose conditions for their release. A Lisbon spokesman for UNITA has said, for example, that they will demand the removal of British technicians from the diamond mines. We have the impression UNITA have not reached a final decision on their demands.

Action by the Government

5. The Government's established policy in cases of hostage-taking is to do everything possible to resolve the problem without loss of innocent life, but not to bargain for their release or give way to the captors' demands. We have ratified and passed into British law the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1980.

6. The Government have asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to confirm the identity of the hostages and seek their early release. This has been the standard procedure with UNITA's previous Western hostages. We have sought and obtained assurances from the Angolan Government that they will do nothing to put the safety of the hostages in jeopardy.

7. The Government are actively considering what further steps to take. At this early stage we are concentrating on bringing home to UNITA that the Government have a firm policy of not bargaining for hostages, and that the taking of British hostages is having a harmful effect on Savimbi's standing even among those who would otherwise sympathise with his goals.

Action by MPs

8. It would be helpful if those MPs with their own lines to Savimbi could impress these points on him. He should be made to realise that his action has been linked in the public mind with instances of hostage-taking both in Britain and in other parts of the world which have aroused the deepest emotions; that the image of his movement in this country, even among his sympathisers, is being badly tarnished; and that it is all the more important to reverse this unfavourable trend at the present significant juncture in developments affecting the security of Angola and southern Africa generally (South African disengagement and intensification of negotiations for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and Namibian independence).

Supplementary Points

9. Why only use the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a channel?

This is an established channel between Western Governments and UNITA in hostage situations. It has proved effective in the past. Neither Ministers nor FCO officials have direct contact with UNITA. However there are a number of additional channels (including South Africa) which we shall make use of if we

think necessary.

10. If Savimbi releases hostages unconditionally will HMG give him greater public support?

If Savimbi wishes to restore what support he previously had among sympathisers in this country and build on that in the future, then he should release as soon as possible and without conditions. (On contact with UNITA see 9 above).

[If pressed]

11. HMG cannot support insurgency against a government we recognise. Also quite wrong to "'reward'" hostage-taker.

Angora: Int. Sit 10/79

11 6 1984

11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1984



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

cc: Ld Chanc.
 AMT
 LPS
 Ld Pres.
 MOD
 Ch/Secy of Home.
 12 March 1984
 DTI
 CO
 Chief Whip

cc: Sir P. Craddock

See Loger,

ANGOLA: UNITA's BRITISH HOSTAGES

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 9 March and the enclosed draft note for use by the Chief Whip to deal with any enquiries which he receives from Backbenchers.

While she is generally content with the note, the Prime Minister has commented on one or two specific points. Paragraph (vii) implies that Savimbi's standing with Parliamentary and public opinion in this country is high (but that it is being damaged). The implication of paragraph (viii) is that if Savimbi releases the hostages the image of his movement in the United Kingdom will be restored. Would not those MPs who had spoken to him in this sense then expect HMG to give more public support to Savimbi than they have hitherto done? And would we be inclined to give such support?

You may care to reflect on these points and perhaps adjust the note before the Chief Whip makes use of it.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD and the Chief Whip.

Yours ever

R. Bone.

Roger Bone, Esq.,
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GCPC
①

PM/84/47

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister
Are you content with the line
to me with backbenchers?

I think it has A.S.C. 2/3.
a no. of inconsistencies - but tent.
not

Angola: UNITA's British Hostages

1. This problem is likely to drag on for a considerable time. The hostages may well be force-marched for some 1,000 kms before reaching a UNITA safe area, and the rainy season will make the going slow. Experience suggests that we may have very little firm news during that period. The ICRC have told us that release may take 3 - 6 months to achieve.

2. Once they arrive in a safe area, UNITA may seek to impose conditions for release. A spokesman has already called for the withdrawal of all British personnel from the diamond mines. I am considering carefully how we can best play our hand within our general policy of not acceding to demands from hostage-takers. We shall also have to weigh our wish to free the hostages as soon as possible against the wider interests we have at stake in Angola, especially in the export field, and in the negotiations for Cuban troop withdrawal and a Namibia settlement.

3. There is likely to be a good deal of Parliamentary and public pressure to secure speedy release. I have prepared the attached draft note which the Chief Whip might use to deal with any enquiries he receives from back-benchers. I should be grateful for your comments on it.

/4. I am

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4. I am copying this minute to colleagues on OD and to the Chief Whip.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'G. Howe', written in a cursive style.

GEOFFREY HOWE

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
9 March 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: Angola: UNITA's British Hostages

.....In Confidence

Background

CAVEAT.....

(i) This could well be a long saga. In accordance with their usual practice, UNITA are likely to ^{take} ~~pro-~~ parade-march the hostages (17 Britons including a Portuguese-born woman) to UNITA's southern base, roughly 1,000 kms away. The march will take many weeks.

(ii) In previous cases affecting hostages from other Western countries, it has usually not been possible to obtain firm news about them until their arrival at the safe base.

(iii) Although UNITA are likely to take reasonable care of the hostages, the conditions will be hard and sometimes dangerous. (there were casualties among the Czechoslovakians). However, we have heard from a reliable source that all are in good health at present.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

(iv) We have had some indications that, once the hostages have arrived at the UNITA base, UNITA will try to impose conditions for their release. A Lisbon spokesman for UNITA has said, for example, that they will demand the removal of British technicians from

the diamond mines. We have the impression UNITA have not reached a final decision on their demands.

Action by the Government

(v) The Government's established policy in cases of hostage-taking is to do everything possible to resolve the problem without loss of innocent life, but not to bargain for their release or give away to the captors' demands. We have ratified and passed into British law the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1980.

(vi) The Government have asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to confirm the identity of the hostages and seek their early release. This has been the standard procedure with UNITA's previous Western hostages. We have sought and obtained assurances from the Angolan Government that they will do nothing to put the safety of the hostages in jeopardy.

(vii) The Government are actively considering what further steps to take. At this early stage we are concentrating on bringing home to UNITA that the Government have a firm policy of not bargaining for hostages, and that the taking of British hostages is having a harmful effect on Savimbi's standing with Parliamentary and public opinion in this country.

Action by MPs

(viii) It would be helpful if those MPs with their own lines to Savimbi could impress these points on him. He

*The implication
being that this
is high. In
some instances it is -
very high*

should be made to realise that his action has been linked in the public mind with instances of hostage-taking both in Britain and in other parts of the world which have aroused the deepest emotions; that the image of his movement in this country is being badly tarnished; and that it is all the more important to reverse this unfavourable trend at the present significant juncture in developments affecting the security of Angola and southern Africa generally (South African disengagement and intensification of negotiations for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and Namibian independence).

Supplementary Points

(i) Why only use the ICRC as a channel?

This is an established channel between Western Governments and UNITA in hostage situations. It has proved effective in the past. Neither Ministers nor FCO officials have direct contact with UNITA. However there are a number of additional channels (including South Africa) which we shall make use of if we think necessary. *and the U.S.?*

(ii) Parallel between contact with UNITA and SWAPO.

For some years we have been willing to have contact with representatives of all the parties involved in Namibia, not only SWAPO but others, too. In the case of Namibia, we are dealing with a country which has no recognised Government. In the case of Angola, there is a Government with which we have diplomatic relations.

*He does
seem to, usually
are we going to
make him or
improve his image?*

SUBJECT cc master
of

TOP COPY

(137)

CONFIDENTIAL

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RR WASHINGTON

GRS 256

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 021200Z MAR 84

TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 281 OF 02 MARCH 1984

INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON LUSAKA KINSHASA

MIPT: (NOT TO ALL) RELEASE OF BRITISH PRISONERS

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR HUMANITARIAN ACT IN RELEASING THE 7 BRITISH PRISONERS. THEIR RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

2. MAY I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY ALSO TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE OVER THE BRITISH AND OTHER HOSTAGES SEIZED BY THE REBELS IN THE NORTH OF ANGOLA. I VALUE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL TAKE NO ACTION WHICH MIGHT ENDANGER THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES. I AM, OF COURSE, MUCH CONCERNED FOR THEIR SAFETY.

3. I SHOULD LIKE TO STRESS OUR READINESS TO HELP IN ANY WE CAN IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE REGION. WE HAVE FOLLOWED, WITH GROWING SATISFACTION, THE MOVES IN WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE TO CONSOLIDATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA. WE HAVE LONG REGARDED THIS AS AN ESSENTIAL STEP TOWARDS WIDER STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE RECENTLY MET MR NUJOMA AND URGED RESTRAINT AT THIS CRITICAL TIME, POINTING OUT WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR SWAPO. I RECOGNISE THAT ALL THOSE INVOLVED STILL FACE DIFFICULT DECISIONS BUT I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD ON THE NEW OPPORTUNITY WHICH NOW SEEMS TO EXIST FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

HOWE

LIMITED

CAFD

NEWS D

CONS D

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

LORD N GORDON-LENNOX

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 36 A / 84

(136)

JCA	383/1
- 5 MAR 1984	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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X

2 March 1984

ANGOLA: RELEASE OF BRITISH MERCENARY PRISONERS

Thank you for your letter of 1 March.

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister agrees that the message from herself to President Dos Santos should be despatched (we also agreed on the telephone that the second paragraph should end with the words "much concerned for their safety").

APPROVED

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RM

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Please can you agree the attached
draft message to President
Dos Santos?

[Handwritten signature]

Duty Clerk

1 March 1984



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 March, 1984

Don't know

Open draft

ms

Angola: Release of British Mercenary Prisoners

The arrangements for the release of the seven British ex-mercenaries from Luanda have on the whole gone well. So far as the media and Parliament are concerned, HMG have emerged with some credit, and there has so far been little or no criticism of the Angolan Government.

The Prime Minister sent a letter of thanks to President Dos Santos on 25 January after first learning of his decision to release the men by the end of February. However, given the time that has elapsed since then, it would seem appropriate for a further short message to be sent now that the release has taken place. Our Ambassador in Luanda has recommended that such a message would be well received. This would also provide an opportunity for an expression of concern at the highest level about the fate of the British hostages seized by UNITA, as well as a further word of encouragement over the negotiations on Namibia and Cuban withdrawal.

In delivering the Prime Minister's message we would instruct our Ambassador to make sure that President Dos Santos realises we kept to our various undertakings as regards the arrangements for receiving the prisoners. Angolan Ministers have expressed disappointment that there has been so much publicity. As you know, the Angolans are highly sensitive on this point: Sr Do Nascimento raised the matter with the Prime Minister in December. In fact, partly owing to the newspaper strike, there has been much less coverage than we expected. Our Ambassador has largely been able to satisfy Angolan Ministers of our good faith over this. However, the influential Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs has said that he assumes that HM Government would be sending a message of thanks to President Dos Santos and recommended that Mr Goulding should deliver it personally in order to explain the steps taken to limit adverse publicity. Our Ambassador will be instructed to make clear that we consider the Angolans have nothing to complain about in this respect.

I should be grateful to know whether the Prime Minister would be content for a message to be conveyed. I enclose a draft, which I shall be showing in parallel to Sir Geoffrey Howe in tonight's box.

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

R B Bone
(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

CAVEAT.....

I am grateful to Your Excellency for your humanitarian act in releasing the 7 British prisoners. Their release at this time is a clear demonstration of the constructive relationship which exists between our two governments.

May I take this opportunity also to express my gratitude to Your Excellency for your Government's assistance over the British and other hostages seized by the rebels in the north of Angola. I value your Government's assurance that they will take no action which might endanger the safety of the hostages. I am, of course, much concerned ^{to} ~~about~~ their ~~safety~~.

I should like to stress our readiness to help in any way we can in the search for a solution to the problems of the region. We have followed, with growing satisfaction, the moves in which your Government has played a central rôle to consolidate the withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola. We have long

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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regarded this as an essential step towards wider stability and confidence. Sir Geoffrey Howe recently met ~~with~~ Mr Nujoma and urged restraint at this critical time, pointing out what is at stake for SWAPO. I recognise that all those involved still face difficult decisions but I hope that it will be possible to build on the new opportunity which now seems to exist for progress towards a Namibia settlement.





file

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 February, 1984

ANGOLA:BRITISH PRISONERS

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend your letter of 24 February.

Mrs. Thatcher has approved, on a contingency basis, the message from herself to President dos Santos. But I take it that you have concluded that such a message is not essential. Perhaps we can be in touch again if you do see a need for it.

A. J. COLES

P. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

JK



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

Please agree the draft contingency message to President Dos Santos at Flag A.

Thank you.

Yes

Duty clerk

Duty Clerk

25 February, 1984.

John

Message not sent.

Duty Clerk

Letter B.F./C.O.

*27.
2*

f.a.

26.2.84



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 February 1984

✓
Dear John,

Angola: British Prisoners

UNITA have claimed that they have taken 16 British personnel hostage during an attack yesterday on one of the diamond mines. The Angolan authorities seem convinced that this is the case. I enclose a summary prepared by the Department here of the action which we are taking to establish the facts and to attempt to secure the safety both of any Britons who have been seized by UNITA and the remaining British mining personnel in the region.

I also enclose copies of HM Ambassador Luanda's telegram nos 253 and 263. As you will see, the Angolans do not seem to have made a connexion as yet between the taking of these hostages and the release of the British prisoners which is due to take place on 27 February. If they did make such a connexion, the prisoners' release could be jeopardised. In that case, we might wish to recommend at short notice that the Prime Minister send a message to President Dos Santos. I enclose a draft message on a contingency basis; we will be in touch over the weekend if the Ambassador considers that such a message is essential.

We have also considered whether we should urgently approach Savimbi. However, there is no prospect of our persuading him to free his hostages in time to remove any threat which may develop to the early release of the ex-mercenaries. Indeed, if Dos Santos learned of an approach by us to Savimbi, the early release of our ex-mercenaries would be further jeopardised. We have, therefore, concluded that it would be right to accord top priority to persuading Dos Santos to go ahead with the early release of the ex-mercenaries if this seemed to be in danger. As soon as that is achieved, we can consider whether we should make an approach to Savimbi (direct or indirect) over his hostages. It is unlikely, meanwhile, that Savimbi would deliberately seek to harm his Western prisoners.

As the F.C.S knows

/Copies

hours are in touch

with Savimbi - if difficulties

arise, perhaps

should contact

COVERING SECRET

Edward and the team. We can have a word next week. not

COVERING SECRET



Copies of these papers are being submitted in parallel to the Foreign Secretary.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING SECRET

ANGOLA: BRITISH PRISONERS

The following action has already been taken or is in hand:

Action by DTC

1. There are about 200 British personnel in the diamond mining area. DTC have a staged evacuation plan, and the necessary logistics for it. They are activating the first two phases as soon as possible: evacuation of all women from the region to Luanda (there are no children), and concentration of personnel from out-lying mines into Andrade and Dundo (several hundred kms from the place of attack). Mr Dawe, senior Director DTC, is likely to go to Luanda early next week.
2. DTC are informing all next of kin.

Action by Angolans

3. Angolan forces are assisting in the most urgent evacuation of expatriates. They are planning to retake the mine and pursue the UNITA forces.

Action by HMG

4.
 - i) Our Embassy in Luanda has been in touch with the Minister of State Security who appears to be doing his best to keep them informed (though his information is incomplete). The Embassy formally asked that no military action be taken which might threaten the lives or safety of the British hostages and received a positive assurance. Our Embassy will urge the Angolan authorities to take whatever additional measures are necessary to ensure the safety of the remaining British citizens in the region.
 - ii) Our Consul is going to Dundo this afternoon.
 - iii) In London FCO officials are in regular contact with DTC and the other British firms: we all seem to be pulling in the same direction.
 - iv) Our friends have been in covert contact with the UNITA representative in London to try to establish the facts
 - v) UKMIS Geneva is being instructed to approach the ICRC to ask their help (as we did in the case of the British missionaries).

.....

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

~~H1/CAS~~
H1/SAS

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LUANDA 240815Z FEB 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 253 OF 24 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

(X1)

MY TELMO 227 : RELEASE OF BRITISH PRISONERS

1. IF IT IS TRUE THAT UNITA HAVE TAKEN BRITISH HOSTAGES AT CAFUNFO (MY TELNOS 249 AND 252 - NOT TO PARIS) AND IF THEY ANNOUNCE THEIR READINESS TO EXCHANGE THEM FOR THE MERCENARIES (BOTH OF WHICH, I FEAR, ARE LIKELY) THERE IS A DANGER THAT DOS SANTOS WILL CHANGE HIS MIND ABOUT RELEASING OUR PRISONERS ON 27 FEBRUARY.
2. VENANCIO DA MOURA PROMISED TO TELEPHONE ME YESTERDAY AS SOON AS HE RECEIVED CONFIRMATION OF THAT DATE FROM THE PRESIDENT. HE DID NOT DO SO. I SHALL PURSUE HIM TODAY AND, IF IT TURNS OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT IS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS, I SHALL TRY TO SEE DOS SANTOS HIMSELF TO PERSUADE HIM THAT IT IS IN ANGOLA'S OWN INTERESTS TO GET OUR PRISONERS OUT QUICKLY AND NOT TO ALLOW UNITA TO DICTATE ITS POLICY.

FCO PSE PASS

GOULDING

NNNN

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

copy

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 241730Z

FM LUANDA 241415Z FEB 84

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 263 OF 24 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 241730 PARIS

YOUR TELNO 217: RELEASE OF BRITISH PRISONERS

1. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 253. VENANCIO DA MOURA SAID THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD STILL NOT CONFIRMED RELEASE ON 27 FEBRUARY. HE HOPED TO GET A DECISION FROM HIM TOMORROW MORNING (SATURDAY) AND WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ACCEPT. DA MOURA DID NOT SEEM AWARE OF DEVELOPMENTS AT CAFUNFO AND HE DID NOT OF COURSE MENTION THEM.
2. AS REGARDS INFORMING THE FAMILIES AND THE MPS, I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL BE FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE PROPOSED BY DA MOURA ON 2 FEBRUARY (MY TELNO 141, PARA 6) AND THAT WHAT THE FAMILIES RECEIVE ON MONDAY MORNING WILL BE AN INITIAL WARNING THAT IT LOOKS AS THOUGH RELEASE IS IMMINENT, BUT THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID LAST MINUTE HITCHES THEY MUST SAY NOTHING TO THE PRESS, AND THAT THEY WILL NOT BE TOLD DEFINITELY THAT THE MEN HAVE BEEN RELEASED UNTIL TUESDAY MORNING.
3. I WILL REPORT BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM AFTER I HAVE BEEN TO THE PRISON. BUT I WILL NOT BE SURPRISED IF, IN THE EVENT, A SUNDAY VISIT PROVES TOO DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE AND I DO NOT SEE THE MEN UNTIL MONDAY MORNING.
4. THERE HAS BEEN A REGRETTABLE MIX-UP OVER THE TICKETS. DA MOURA IS BUYING TICKETS FOR THE LUANDA-PARIS LEG ONLY. COULD PARIS THEREFORE OBTAIN TICKETS AND MAKE BOOKINGS FOR THE PARIS-LONDON LEG?
FCO PSE PASS

GOULDING

NNNL G--8357'

DRAFT CONTINGENCY MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

I am most concerned to hear that the rebel forces have attacked the diamond mine at Cafunfo and seized a number of hostages, including some British prisoners. Please accept my sympathy for the loss of life which the Angolan forces have suffered in this attack. I am grateful to Your Excellency's Government for all they are doing, and I am sure will continue to do, to protect the British citizens in the region.

I very much hope that this unfortunate development will not in any way delay the release of the British prisoners held by the Angolan Government, which I understand was planned within the next few days. Indeed their earliest release would be the clearest demonstration to the world of the constructive relationship which exists between our two Governments in the face of the many difficulties confronting us. I give Your Excellency my assurance that the British Government will, if Your Excellency so wishes, state publicly that the decision by the Angolan Government to exercise clemency and release the prisoners arises out of the development of our bilateral relations; and that it was taken and conveyed to us some time before the attack on the diamond mine.

CONFIDENTIAL

4



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister.

London SW1A 2AH

To note.

A.J.C. 2/2

2 February 1984

John John,

A.J.C. 6/2

f-a.

Angola: The Prime Minister's Messages to President
Dos Santos

Correspondence on this subject rests with my letter of 24 January. On 30 January our Ambassador in Luanda delivered the Prime Minister's messages to President Dos Santos. I attach Luanda telno 115 of 30 January which reports the meeting.

As you will see the President reaffirmed that the British mercenary prisoners would be released very soon. Our Embassy is now discussing practical arrangements with the Angolan authorities on the basis of a target date for release of 13 or 16 February (possibly earlier). There is a public relations problem in that the ex-mercenaries are likely to be critical at the failure of HMG to secure their release sooner. We are considering separately how best to handle this.

On the main message, President Dos Santos asked Mr Goulding to convey to the Prime Minister his satisfaction with its "rich content". He was grateful for the Prime Minister's concern about the situation in southern Angola, and he shared the Prime Minister's desire to strengthen our bilateral relations.

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esa
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TOP COPY

FM LUANDA 301415Z JAN 84
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 115 OF 30 JANUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY CAPE TOWN PRETORIA PARIS BONN
OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNOS 89 TO 91 (NOT TO ALL): PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGES TO
PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE DELIVERED ON 30 JANUARY. DOS SANTOS CONFIRMS THAT THE MERCENARIES WILL BE RELEASED VERY SHORTLY. HE SPEAKS WARMLY ABOUT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE EXPRESSES SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE CHANCES OF THE 31 JANUARY TRUCE HOLDING BUT SAYS THAT SWAPO WILL OBSERVE IT.

DETAIL

2. I WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS FOR 15 MINUTES THIS MORNING (30 JANUARY). WE WERE ALONE. I HANDED OVER BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGES, EXPLAINING WHY SHE HAD WISHED TO TREAT THE MERCENARIES SEPARATELY.
3. ON THE MERCENARIES, PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS REAFFIRMED WHAT HE HAD SAID ON 4 JANUARY. THE LAWYERS WERE STILL WORKING ON THE DETAILS BUT THE PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED VERY SOON. I SAID THAT, AS REQUESTED BY LOPO, WE HAD KEPT THE MATTER CONFIDENTIAL AND HAD NOT EVEN INFORMED THE PRISONERS' FAMILIES. IT WAS PERHAPS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL OF US THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE UNDUE PUBLICITY ABOUT THEIR RELEASE. WAS IT HIS INTENTION TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT OR TO LET THEM GO QUIETLY? DOS SANTOS SAID THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE ISSUES HIS LAWYERS WERE STUDYING. HE HAD INSTRUCTED VENANCIO DA MOURA TO DISCUSS WITH ME DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRISONERS' HANDOVER AND TRAVEL. DA MOURA HAD BEEN BUSY WITH THE TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS BUT WOULD SEE ME IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. I EXPRESSED WARM THANKS.
4. AS REGARDS THE PRIME MINISTER'S MAIN MESSAGE, DOS SANTOS ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO MRS THATCHER HIS SATISFACTION WITH ITS QUOTE RICH CONTENT UNQUOTE. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA; AND HE SHARED HER DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. PROGRESS HAD BEEN SLOW ON THESE AT ONE TIME BUT THAT WAS A THING OF THE PAST. LOPO'S VISIT HAD BEEN A GREAT SUCCESS. HE HAD IDENTIFIED VARIOUS PROJECTS TO STRENGTHEN OUR ECONOMIC COOPERATION. ANGOLA WAS SINCERE IN HER DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH ALL COUNTRIES IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEMS. ANGOLA RESPECTED OTHER COUNTRY'S QUOTE POLITICAL OPIONS UNQUOTE: ALL THAT SHE ASKED WAS THAT THEY SHOULD RESPECT HERS.
5. I SAID THAT THE BOTB MSSION WAS THE NEXT EVENT IN THE BILATERAL CALENDAR. WOULD DOS SANTOS GIVE LORD JELLCOE AN AUDIENCE? DOS SANTOS SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER THIS: IN PRINCIPLE HE WOULD LIKE TO, IF HIS DIARY PERMITTED.

CONFIDENTIAL

16

6. TURNING TO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN PART OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE, HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN DRAFTED BEFORE THE CAPE VERDE MEETING. YOU HAD BEEN PLEASED THAT THAT MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE AND HOPED THAT THE TRUCE WOULD TAKE HOLD TOMORROW. DOS SANTOS ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD. HE SAID THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A GOOD CHANCE OF ITS DOING SO. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED SO BUT WAS NOT VERY CONFIDENT. HE SAID WE HOPED THAT THE TRUCE WOULD LEAD ON TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE SADF (QUOTE LET'S HOPE SO UNQUOTE, HE SAID, WITHOUT MUCH CONVICTION) AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 (QUOTE LET'S HOPE SO UNQUOTE, AGAIN, WITH EVEN LESS CONVICTION). BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL SIDES SHOULD EXERCISE MILITARY RESTRAINT AND THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED REACTIONS TO MINOR BREACHES OF THE TRUCE IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS. SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN AN EXCUSE TO CALL THE TRUCE OFF. DOS SANTOS SAID THAT SWAPO UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION. THEY WOULD OBSERVE THE TRUCE. NUJOMA HAD MADE A STATEMENT IN LUSAKA YESTERDAY ACCEPTING IT. SWAPO AFTER ALL WERE THE PRINCIPAL INTERESTED PARTY.

7. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF OUR ABSTENTION ON SCR 546.

COMMENT

8. DOS SANTOS WAS VERY FRIENDLY. HE ADMITTED THAT HE WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE EFFECTS OF THE TORRENTIAL RAINS WHICH AGAIN DEVASTATED LUANDA THIS WEEKEND AND HE DID NOT ENCOURAGE A LONG CONVERSATION. BUT HE WAS EVIDENTLY VERY PLEASED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S MAIN MESSAGE AND, ON THE BILATERAL FRONT, HIS REMARKS COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN WARMER. HE CLEARLY REMAINS DETERMINED TO RELEASE THE MERCENARIES, POSSIBLY AS SOON AS THIS COMING WEEKEND, AS INDICATED BY DA MOURA IN CAPE VERDE (YOUR TELNO 102).

9. HE WAS LESS REASSURING ON SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA. INsofar as ONE CAN JUDGE FROM A FEW MINUTES' CONVERSATION, HE SEEMS READY TO GIVE THE TRUCE A TRY BUT DOUBTS SOUTH AFRICA'S GOOD FAITH. AND HIS REMARKS ABOUT SWAPO SUGGEST THAT HE ASSUMES THAT THEY WILL REGARD THE TRUCE AS BEING IN THEIR INTEREST AND DISCOUNTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS FOR BREAKING IT. THIS IS NOT REASSURING, GIVEN NUJOMA'S ABSENCE IN LUSAKA AND THE INDICATIONS WE AND OTHERS HAVE RECEIVED IN RECENT DAYS THAT SWAPO ARE WORRIED ABOUT WHAT THE ANGOLANS ARE UP TO.
FCO PSE PASS ALL

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
SIR J LEAHY

MRS QUIRE

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Angora Int Sit Oct 79



- 2 Feb 1984

Jo Rom

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subject
CC Ops
Master



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 January 1984

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T15/84**

Dear Mr. President-

I have read with interest and sympathy the letter of 8 December, which Your Excellency conveyed to me by His Excellency the Minister of Planning, as well as Your Excellency's later letter of 30 December. I am grateful to you for sharing your views with me in this way. I warmly reciprocate Your Excellency's comments about the importance of maintaining and developing the relations between our two countries. I share your conviction that opportunities exist for further deepening our friendship and economic co-operation. My Government is ready to work wholeheartedly with Your Excellency's Government to this end.

In this regard my Government welcomed the visits to the United Kingdom last year by His Excellency the Minister for External Relations and His Excellency the Minister of Planning, and appreciated the cordial reception given in Angola to our Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The recent visit to the United Kingdom by representatives of the Angolan oil industry, and the planned visit next month to Angola by Lord Jellicoe, Chairman of the British Overseas Trade Board, are further examples of our strengthening bilateral ties.

I fully share Your Excellency's anxieties about the conflict in Southern Angola and your wish to re-establish conditions of peace and stability. We were glad to support the UN Security Council's Resolution No. 545, which was adopted in December last year and which

/ called for

called for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. We have naturally viewed with deep concern the recent South African Military operations in your country. We have in public strongly deplored these attacks on Angolan sovereignty and territorial integrity. I wish Your Excellency to know that my Government has also raised the issue direct with the South African Government and urged the speedy withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory.

I note that the South African Government has said that it has pulled back the forces which were engaged in the recent operations. I have also noted the diplomatic proposals, particularly your own offer of a truce, which are on the table. My Government has made clear to the South African Government, as well as to the United Nations Secretary-General and other interested Governments, our strong desire that everything should be done to bring these developments to a positive conclusion. It seems to me that we have reached a very significant stage in the search for a solution. The opportunities need to be seized. My Government will continue to help in any way possible.

Yours sincerely
Raymond Dhalke

His Excellency President Jose Eduardo dos Santos



Joe BSM
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Master.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 January 1984

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T14184

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my pleasure at learning from Her Majesty's Ambassador Your Excellency's decision to exercise an act of clemency in the near future for the British mercenary prisoners. This humanitarian gesture will be deeply appreciated not only by the relatives of the men concerned but also widely among British parliamentarians and public.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency President Jose Eduardo dos Santos

✓

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 January 1984

Please type both letters.

A.S.C. 24/1

John Jones,

Messages from President Dos Santos to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 20 January. As you requested, the substance of the Prime Minister's message to President Dos Santos on the question of the British mercenary prisoners has been incorporated in a separate message. As you agreed with Peter Ricketts, both messages have been despatched by telegram: and our Ambassador in Luanda has sought a call on the President.

It was agreed that we would follow up with signed versions. I enclose copies of both texts.

*Yours
R B Bone*

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS (1)

I have read with interest and sympathy the letter of 8 December, which Your Excellency conveyed to me by His Excellency the Minister of Planning, as well as Your Excellency's later letter of 30 December. I am grateful to you for sharing your views with me in this way. I warmly reciprocate Your Excellency's comments about the importance of maintaining and developing the relations between our two countries. I share your conviction that opportunities exist for further deepening our friendship and economic co-operation. My Government is ready to work wholeheartedly with Your Excellency's Government to this end.

In this regard my Government welcomed the visits to the United Kingdom last year by His Excellency the Minister for External Relations and His Excellency the Minister of Planning, and appreciated the cordial reception given in Angola to our Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The recent visit to the United Kingdom by representatives of the Angolan oil industry, and the planned visit next month to Angola by Lord Jellicoe, Chairman of the British Overseas Trade Board, are further examples of our strengthening bilateral ties.

X I fully share Your Excellency's anxieties about the conflict in Southern Angola and your wish to re-establish conditions of peace and stability. We were glad to support the UN Security Council's Resolution No. 545, which was adopted in December last year and which called for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. We have naturally viewed with deep concern the recent South African Military operations in your country. We have in public strongly deplored these attacks on Angolan sovereignty and territorial integrity. I wish Your Excellency to know that my Government has also raised the issue direct with the South African Government and urged the speedy withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory.

/I note



- 2 -


I note that the South African Government has said that it has pulled back the forces which were engaged in the recent operations. I have also noted the diplomatic proposals, particularly your own offer of a truce, which are on the table. My Government has made clear to the South African Government, as well as to the United Nations Secretary-General and other interested Governments, our strong desire that everything should be done to bring these developments to a positive conclusion. It seems to me that we have reached a very significant stage in the search for a solution. The opportunities need to be seized. My Government will continue to help in any way possible.



TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS (2)

I wish to take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my pleasure at learning from Her Majesty's Ambassador Your Excellency's decision to exercise an act of clemency in the near future for the British mercenary prisoners. This humanitarian gesture will be deeply appreciated not only by the relatives of the men concerned but also widely among British parliamentarians and public.

2^o JAN 1984



CC MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 15/84

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FM F CO 201700Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 20 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. BEGINS:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST AND SYMPATHY THE LETTER OF 8 DECEMBER WHICH YOUR EXCELLENCY CONVEYED TO ME BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER OF PLANNING, AS WELL AS YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LATER LETTER OF 30 DECEMBER. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR SHARING YOUR VIEWS WITH ME IN THIS WAY. I WARMLY RECIPROCATE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I SHARE YOUR CONVICTION THAT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR FURTHER DEEPENING OUR FRIENDSHIP AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. MY GOVERNMENT IS READY TO WORK WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY'S GOVERNMENT TO THIS END.

IN THIS REGARD MY GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE VISITS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM LAST YEAR BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER OF PLANNING, AND APPRECIATED THE CORDIAL RECEPTION GIVEN IN ANGOLA TO OUR MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS. THE RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ANGOLAN OIL INDUSTRY, AND THE PLANNED VISIT NEXT MONTH TO ANGOLA BY LORD JELLCOE, CHAIRMAN OF THE BRITISH OVERSEAS TRADE BOARD, ARE FURTHER EXAMPLES OF OUR STRENGTHENING BILATERAL TIES.

I FULLY SHARE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S ANXIETIES ABOUT THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA AND YOUR WISH TO RE-ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF PEACE AND STABILITY. WE WERE GLAD TO SUPPORT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION NO 545, WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR AND WHICH CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA. WE HAVE NATURALLY VIEWED WITH DEEP CONCERN THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN YOUR COUNTRY. WE HAVE IN PUBLIC STRONGLY DEPLORED THESE ATTACKS ON ANGOLAN SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I WISH YOUR

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EXCELLENCY TO KNOW THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO RAISED THE ISSUE DIRECT WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND URGED THE SPEEDY WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLAN TERRITORY.

I NOTE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS SAID THAT IT HAS PULLED BACK THE FORCES WHICH WERE ENGAGED IN THE RECENT OPERATIONS. I HAVE ALSO NOTED THE DIPLOMATIC PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY YOUR OWN OFFER OF A TRUCE, WHICH ARE ON THE TABLE. MY GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS, OUR STRONG DESIRE THAT EVERYTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO BRING THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO A POSITIVE CONCLUSION. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE HAVE REACHED A VERY SIGNIFICANT STAGE IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. THE OPPORTUNITIES NEED TO BE SEIZED. MY GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE.
ENDS.

HOWE

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OPS.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T14/84.

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FM FCO 201700Z JAN 84

TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 90 OF 20 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

BEGINS:

I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY
MY PLEASURE AT LEARNING FROM HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR
YOUR EXCELLENCY'S DECISION TO EXERCISE AN ACT OF CLEMENCY IN THE
NEAR FUTURE FOR THE BRITISH MERCENARY PRISONERS. THIS
HUMANITARIAN GESTURE WILL BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED NOT ONLY BY THE
RELATIVES OF THE MEN CONCERNED BUT ALSO WIDELY AMONG BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARIANS AND PUBLIC.

ENDS.

HOWE

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

20 January 1984

Messages from President Dos Santos to the Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter of 19 January.

The Prime Minister agrees that a message on the lines of that enclosed with your letter should be conveyed from her to President Dos Santos. But, since she undertook to the Angolan Minister of Planning that her reply to the President's letter of 8 December would not mention the mercenaries, she would like the substance of the final paragraph of your proposed text to be incorporated in a separate message which HM Ambassador in Luanda could deliver or not deliver according to his best judgment at the time.

We agreed that you would consider a suitable text for the second message. Both would then be despatched by telegram and we would follow up with signed versions. I should be grateful if you could let me have the draft of the second message as soon as possible.

BR

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

885

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Prime Minister.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

If you agree with the message to President Dos Santos, we will telegraph it and follow up with a signed version.

19 January 1984

Dear John,

Agree message?

A.F.C. 49/1

Yes but - As I promised not to mention the mercenaries - could this point be put in a separate letter so

Messages from President Dos Santos to the Prime Minister

During his call on the Prime Minister on 14 December, Sr Do Nascimento, the Angolan Minister of Planning, delivered a letter from President Dos Santos. He also conveyed an oral message from the President about the release of the British ex-mercenary prisoners in Angola.

That our Ambassador could deliver the separate letter or not - all to his latest advice not

We have delayed submitting a formal reply in order to avoid coinciding with the contentious Security Council debates on Angola/Namibia. The prospects for some progress over Namibia seem now to have improved and this would be a favourable moment for the reply to be sent.

In the meantime, President Dos Santos sent a further letter to the Prime Minister on 30 December, which seeks our assistance in ensuring respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola. I enclose the original, together with a copy of Luanda telegram number 917 containing an unofficial translation. Similar letters were sent to a number of other Heads of Government. On 4 January, the President confirmed orally to our Ambassador that the British mercenary prisoners will be released by the end of February. The President asked that this be conveyed to the Prime Minister.

I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Dos Santos. The Prime Minister's message will be important in persuading President Dos Santos to keep to his undertaking to release the British prisoners despite our abstention over Security Council Resolution 546 (on the South African attack into Angola). If his reaction to the message is positive our Ambassador may be able to obtain from him a firm date for release. The message also provides an opportunity to assist the United States in their discussions with Angola (to take place on 20 January) to prepare the ground for the disengagement of South African forces from Southern Angola which could lead on to an agreement over Cuban withdrawal. The draft message is therefore rather longer

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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and the explanation of our policy more detailed than would otherwise have been the case. Our Ambassador in Luanda has confirmed that he believes it strikes the right note to influence President Dos Santos in the Direction we wish.

The draft message includes a specific reference to the release of the British prisoners. Although the Prime Minister told Sr Do Nascimento that she would not mention the prisoners in her reply to the President's first letter, the subsequent confirmation by President Dos Santos that he would release them marks a major development and it would look strange to him if the letter contained no reference to this.

The draft does not contain a specific reference to our abstention on Security Council Resolution 546. Our Ambassador in Luanda considers that it would be better not to raise this point of contention. Mr Goulding will respond orally if President Dos Santos himself raises it.

I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content for this message to be conveyed. Our Ambassador has asked for instructions as soon as possible. It would be as well to act before there is another round in the Security Council and while President Dos Santos is studying the results of the meeting with the Americans. It would, therefore, be most useful if you could let me have a response by telephone.

Tom
we,
PP. (R B Bone)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

.....In Confidence

BEGINS.

CAVEAT.....

I have read with interest and sympathy the letter of 8 December which Your Excellency conveyed to me by His Excellency the Minister of Planning, as well as Your Excellency's later letter of 30 December. I am grateful to you for sharing your views with me in this way. I warmly reciprocate Your Excellency's comments about the importance of maintaining and developing the relations between our two countries. I share your conviction that opportunities exist for further deepening our friendship and economic co-operation. My Government is ready to work wholeheartedly with Your Excellency's Government to this end.

In this regard my Government welcomed the visits to the United Kingdom last year by His Excellency the Minister for External Relations and His Excellency the Minister for Planning, and appreciated the cordial reception given in Angola to our Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The recent visit to the United Kingdom by representatives of the Angolan oil

Enclosures—flag(s).....

industry, and the planned visit next month to Angola by Lord Jellicoe, Chairman of the British Overseas Trade Board, are further examples of our strengthening bilateral ties.

I fully share Your Excellency's anxieties about the conflict in Southern Angola and your wish to re-establish conditions of peace and stability. We were glad to support the UN Security Council's Resolution No 545, which was adopted in December last year and which called for the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola. We have naturally viewed with deep concern the recent South African military operations in your country. We have in public strongly deplored these attacks on Angolan sovereignty and territorial integrity. I wish Your Excellency to know that my Government has also raised the issue direct with the South African Government and urged the speedy withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory.

I note that the South African Government has said that it [REDACTED] has pulled back the forces which were engaged in the recent operations. I have also noted the diplomatic proposals, particularly your own offer of a truce, which are on the table. ^{The initial} ~~my~~ Government has made clear to the South African Government, as well as to the United Nations Secretary-General and other interested governments, our strong desire that everything should be done to bring these developments to a positive conclusion. It seems to me that we have reached a very significant stage in the search for a solution. The opportunities need to be seized. My Government will continue to help in any way possible.

I wish to take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my pleasure at learning from Her Majesty's Ambassador Your Excellency's decision to exercise an act of clemency^{in the near future} for the British mercenary prisoners. This humanitarian gesture will be deeply appreciated not only by the relatives of the men concerned but also widely among British parliamentarians and public.

Ends.

British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions

LEC MASTER OPS

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T4184

NNNN

05 JAN 1984/1343
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GBXX CY ANXX 108
LUANDA 108/104 5 1129

1) copy to Mr. Bone (FCO).
2) f.a.
A.J.C. 6/1

ETAT
HE MARGARET THATCHER
PRIMER MINISTER OF THE BRITANIC GOVERNMENT
LONDON SW1

THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY SO KINDLY ADDRESSED TO ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE EIGHT ANNIVERSARY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA I WISH TO EXPRESS MY

SINCERE THANKS FOR THIS GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP AND OF SYMPATHY TOWARDS THE ANGOLAN PEOLPE AND THEI STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING PLEASE ACCEPT YOUR EXCELLENCY OUR BEST WISHES FOR PROSPERITY AND PROGRESS FOR THE PEOLPE OF

JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS
PRESIDENT OF THE WORKRS' PARTY PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

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Telegram
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British TELECOM
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PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T234183
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LUANDA 311300Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 917 OF 31 DECEMBER
INFO PRIORITY CAPETOWN PRETORIA WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA
UKMIS NEW YORK

Mr Leites
The original letter has now arrived (attached). May we discuss pl. how to handle it.
cell after
ORSA
subject Angola
Int Sit Oct 79

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA

1. I WAS SUMMONED TODAY (31 DECEMBER) BY VENANCIO DE MOURA (VICE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS) TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE DATED 30 DECEMBER FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS TO THE PRIME MINISTER. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION: BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO CONVEY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY INFORMATION ABOUT THE NEW ACTS OF ARMED AGGRESSION CARRIED OUT SINCE 14 DECEMBER BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA FROM THE AREAS OF OUR TERRITORY WHICH THEY ALREADY OCCUPY SINCE AUGUST 1981 AND FROM ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED NAMIBIA.

I REQUEST YOUR EXCELLENCY TO MAKE THE NECESSARY EFFORTS TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, IN ORDER TO AVOID AGGRAVATION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH COULD BE UNFORESEEABLE.

ENDS

2. DA MOURA SAID THAT THE MESSAGE WAS MEANT TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACKS SINCE 14 DECEMBER. THIS WOULD BE READY OVERT HE WEEKEND. SIMILAR MESSAGES HAD BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE AND THE FRG AND DOS SANTOS WAS CONSIDERING SOME COMMUNICATIN TO THE FLS PRESIDENTS TOO.

3. DA MOURA DID NOT SAY (AND I DID NOT ASK) WHETHER DOS SNTOS HAD ANY SPECIFIC QUOTE EFFORTS UNQUOTE IN MIND. BUT HE DID SAY THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PLEASED BY OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND HAD NOTICED THAT WE HAD INCURRED CRITICISM FROM PIK BOTHA.

4. I WILL COMMENT NEXT WEEK ON THIS MESSAGE AND ON THE CURRENT ANGOLAN ATTITUDE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN DISENGAGEMENT OFFER.
FCO PLEASE PASS

GOULDING

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WED
MR SQUIRE
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Presidente da República

Tenho a honra de levar ao conhecimento de Vossa Excelência a informação relativa aos novos actos de agressão armada levados a cabo pelas Forças Armadas Sul-Africanas, desde o dia 14 de Dezembro do corrente ano contra a soberania da República Popular de Angola, a partir das áreas que já ocupa no nosso Território, desde Agosto de 1981, e da Namíbia ilegalmente ocupada.

Peço a Vossa Excelência que faça diligências necessárias no sentido de assegurar o respeito da soberania e integridade territorial da República Popular de Angola, evitando-se dessa forma o agravamento da situação militar, cujas consequências poderão ser imprevisíveis.

A

SUA EXCELENCIA MARGARETH THATCHER
CHEFE DO GOVERNO DO REINO UNIDO


L O N D R E S

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Presidente da República 2.

Queira aceitar Excelência, os protestos da Minha
Mais Alta Consideração.-

O PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA
E CHEFE DO GOVERNO DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA,



-JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS-

Luanda, aos 30 de Dezembro de 1983.-

GRÁ-BRETANHA

CRONOLOGIA DAS ACÇÕES DA AGRESSÃO SUL-AFRICANA CONTRA A
A REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA DESDE 12 À 29/12/83

- 12/12/83 - Forças Sul-Africanas atacaram as nossas forças na área de Quiteve resultando 15 camaradas desaparecidos.
- Concentração de Forças Sul-Africanas e até uma Brigada reforçada em Xangongo.
- 14/12/83 - Quatro Colunas do Exército Sul-Africanas composta de até uma Brigada reforçada avançaram em direcção a nossa Unidade estacionada em Mulondo registando-se violentos combates, ao mesmo tempo que a aviação Sul-Africana sobrevoava Cuvelay, Mulondo e Naulila por diversas ocasiões.
- às 18H50 a artilharia Sul-Africana abriu fogo contra as nossas unidades em Mulondo.
- 15/12/83 - Aviões Sul-Africanos sobrevoaram as localidades de Mucope, Cahama, Mulondo, N'giva e Xangongo.
- 17/12/83 - Dezassete aviões Sul-Africanos de tipo mirage, realizaram golpes massivos contra as Unidades em Mulondo ocasionando vários mortos e feridos e a destruição da técnica militar.
- A aviação e a artilharia Sul-Africana bombardearam as nossas tropas em Cahama registando-se vários mortos e feridos e técnica militar destruída.
- 18/12/83 - Aviões Sul-Africanos realizaram voos de reconhecimento sobre a localidade de Caiundo a 190 Kms. da Fronteira Sul na Província de Kuando Kubango.
- Das 9 horas às 17 horas avião Sul-Africana de tipo mirage e bucanieer bombardearam a vila de Caiundo registando-se a destruição de casas, incluindo a escola e hospital da Vila, bem como a morte de centenas de populares.
 - Das 16H2 às 16H27 o inimigo Sul-Africano utilizando a artilharia reativa realizou fogo contra as nossas posições em Mulondo.
 - Registou-se a concentração de um grupo de Artilharia de até 140mm e de viaturas brindadas na direcção de Chicusse e um outro grupo de Artilharia na direcção de Covalango.
- 19/12/83 - A aviação Sul-Africana sobrevoou em distintas ocasiões as posições de Mulondo, Cuvelay, N'Giva, Kiteve, Evale, Mucope e Mupa.
- Às 10 horas quatro aviões Sul-Africanos realizaram três bombardeamentos sobre Caiundo, tendo sido atingido um avião Impala pelo fogo da nossa artilharia Ante-Aérea.
 - Das 10H7 às 16H41 avião Sul-Africana realizou, em distintas ocasiões, voos de reconhecimento nas áreas a norte de Catequero, Sudeste de Chitado, a Sul de Cuvelay, Ebundo, a Sul de Cahama, Mulondo, Kiteve, Nehone, Ionde e Xangongo.
 - Às 16H27 o exército Sul-Africana voltou a atacar Mulondo com fogo de Artilharia de canhão 155mm e 140mm.

- 20/12/83 - Forças terrestres Sul-Africanas fustigaram com fogo de artilharia uma posição das nossas tropas em Cahama, ao mesmo tempo que movimentava reforços a partir de Kiteve e Otchinjau em direcção a esse Município.
- Às nossas tropas respondendo com bravura aos ataques dos racistas puzeram fora de combate duas viaturas blindadas do inimigo.
- No período da manhã avião Sul-Africana bombardeou a localidade de Bimbe a 55 Kms. de Caiundo.
 - Às 9H36 quatro aviões roquetearam as posições da Unidade de Mulondo e às 17H5 a sua artilharia iniciou a preparação artilheira contra a mesma posição.
 - As emboscadas do inimigo no trajecto Tchibemba-Cahama foram localizadas e desmanteladas pelo fogo da nossa artilharia, havendo mortos e feridos do inimigo que foram evacuados de helicopeteros.
- 21/12/83 - O inimigo que se retirava na direcção Sul de Cahama foi golpeado pelo fogo da nossa artilharia, tendo ainda accionado duas minas do que resultou 6 viaturas destruídas, mortos e feridos que foram evacuados pelo helicopeteros.
- Durante o dia o inimigo realizou reconhecimento aéreo com 26 aviões a Sul, Este e Oeste de Cahama.
- 22/12/83 - Pelas 6 horas a avião Sul-Africana bombardeou indiscriminadamente Cassinga ocupando-a em seguida com a utilização de tropas Heleo-transportada.
- Das 15H54 às 16H39 registaram-se 4 violações aéreas Sul-Africanas ao nosso espaço aéreo no total de 7 aviões que sobrevoaram as áreas de Xangongo, Mupa, Cuvelay, Baía dos Tigres e Mulondo, com a maior incidência sobre esta última onde às 15H55 seis aviões realizaram fogo com roquetes ao mesmo tempo que a sua artilharia realizava uma forte preparação artilheira.
 - Em resposta, a nossa artilharia Ante-Aérea abriu fogo e atingiu um avião Sul-Africana.
 - Das 21H15 às 02 da manhã duas colunas Sul-Africanas movimentaram-se nas direcções do campo de manobras da Cahama e na área de Chicusse realizando fogo de artilharia para a protecção do avanço das suas unidades de infantaria que se aproximaram do bordo dianteiro das nossas unidades até 5 Kms.
 - Durante os bombardeamentos da avião e da artilharia Sul-Africana sobre Cahama a nossa artilharia Ante-Aérea abriu fogo e atingiu um avião e a nossa artilharia terrestre pois fora de combate 4 viaturas blindadas do inimigo.
 - Durante a tentativa do ataque e a ocupação da Vila de Caiundo as tropas terrestres Sul-Africanas apoiadas pela avião foram repelidas pela pronta resposta das nossas tropas tendo deixado no terreno o seguinte:
 - 6 mortos
 - 13 Metralhadoras ligeiras
 - 3 " MK-21
 - 4 Estações de Rádio Rakal 921/
 - 1 Estação de rádio Rakal 352

- 3 lanças Roquetes
 - 1 Morteiro 60mm
 - 18 Carregadores de FN
 - 1 Viatura Hunimog
 - 1 Aparelho de observação nocturna
 - Muchilas e outros equipamentos militares
 - Vários mapas de Angola
 - Documentos vários. Incluindo a identificação dos mortos.
 - 1 Soldado Namibiano pertencente ao exército Sul-Africano de nome PETER CANJENJE feito prisioneiro.
- 23/12/83 - Das 12hoaras às 15H26 foram localizados 24 aviões vôo Sul-Africanos que sobrevoaram as áreas de Cahama, Bimbe, a Oeste de Catequero, Mucoque, Naulila, Este de Humbe, Uia e Otchinjau, utilizando uma altura variável entre os 6.000 mts aos 7.000 mts.
- 24/12/83 - Avião Sul-Africana bombardeou as Vilas de Cahama, Cassinga, Cuvelay e Mulondo.
- Durante a noite cerca das 23 horas até a 5 horas artilharia Sul-Africana fez preparação artilheira sobre Cahama.
- 25/12/83 - Aviação racista na composição de 12 aviões bombardeou a Sede do Município da Cahama tendo sido abatidos 2 aviões mirage pela nossa defesa anti-aérea.
- 26/12/83 - As nossas tropas travaram violentos combates contra as forças terrestres e aéreas dos invasores Sul-Africanos nas áreas de Cahama e Cuvelay.
- A Aviação Sul-Africana em composição de 12 aviões bombardeou a povoação de Cuvelay provocando alguns mortos e feridos. Em resposta a nossa artilharia anti-aérea abateu 3 aviões do inimigo.
- 27/12/83 - A aviação racista na composição de 15 aviões sobrevoou e bombardeou a povoação de Caiundo causando vários mortos e feridos entre a população.
- Oito aviões inimigos bombardearam o Município da Cahama a partir de grande altitude tendo causado vários mortos e feridos entre a população civil,
- 28/12/83 - A aviação Sul-Africana prosseguiu com as suas acções de reconhecimento, bombardeamento e realização de fogo de artilharia contra as localidades de Cahama, Cuvelay, Chicusse e Dossama.
- Das 5H52 às 15H05 registaram-se 14 objectivos aéreos em composição de 36 aviões que sobrevoaram fundamentalmente as regiões de Cuvelay, Mulondo, Cahama, Xangongo, Cassinga e Mupa com a velocidade de 800 a 900 Kms por hora e uma altura de até 9 Kms.
- 29/12/83 - Pelas 5H15 dois aviões Sul-Africanos sobrevoaram Quihita.
- Pelas oito e vinte três aviões Sul-Africanos bombardearam uma localidade à 16 Kms. do Lobango tendo a registar-se a morte e ferimentos entre a população civil.

LUANDA, AOS 30 DE DEZEMBRO DE 1983.0

CONFIDENTIAL

cc MASTER SET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 December 1983

Dear Sir,

Call by the Angolan Minister of Planning
on the Prime Minister

I enclose a record of the conversation which took place here today between the Prime Minister and the Angolan Minister of Planning. I also enclose a copy of the message from President Dos Santos to the Prime Minister which Senor Nascimento delivered.

Yours ever

R.B. Bone

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

54

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE ANGOLAN
MINISTER OF PLANNING AT 1630 HOURS ON WEDNESDAY 14 DECEMBER 1983
AT 10 DOWNING STREET

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. A.J. Coles

Senor Nascimento
Senor Luis de Almeida

* * * * *

Sr. Nascimento said that he wished to convey the greetings of President Dos Santos to the Prime Minister. He wished also to transmit a message from his President about the problems of Southern Africa as well as the problems facing Angola and the question of our bilateral relations. In addition, he had been asked to convey an oral message.

The Prime Minister read the message from President Dos Santos and asked Sr Nascimento to convey her thanks to the President - she would reply fully in writing.

Sr Nascimento said that he was most grateful to the Prime Minister for receiving him. His visit to the United Kingdom had been very successful and there were good prospects for developing relations.

With regard to Namibia, Angola appreciated Britain's position on Southern African questions. President Dos Santos would like the United Kingdom to bring its influence to bear not only on South Africa but also on the United States Government so that peaceful solutions might be found for Southern Africa. Angola could not accept any link between the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

His Government had had many discussions with the United States about Namibia but had not made much progress. However, a few days ago a message had been received from the US Government via Mozambique that the Americans were willing to resume discussions with Angola. There was no obstacles from the Angolan side.

/ Angola was .

Angola was also ready to hold direct discussions with South Africa. But such discussions must be properly prepared so as not to disappoint expectations. In that context, he wished to inform the Prime Minister that the Portuguese Government had been trying to organise meetings between the Angolan and South African governments. But this had been an unfortunate initiative, not least because the Angolan Government had first been informed of it through the press. The Portuguese had been trying to promote a summit but such meetings needed the most careful preparation. The Angolan Government did not agree with the Portuguese initiative.

The Prime Minister asked whether President Dos Santos' position was that he would be prepared to meet the South African Prime Minister if such a meeting was properly prepared. Sr Nascimento replied that such meetings were not intended for the moment - until they had been properly prepared by other meetings. The recent meeting between President Kaunda and Mr. Botha had shown the pointlessness of unprepared events of this kind.

Sr Nascimento then raised the question of the British mercenaries in prison in Angola. President Dos Santos had asked him to say that he was ready to use his power of clemency and would do so very soon. Clemency would be exercised in the case of the British prisoners in connection with a simultaneous exercise of clemency in respect of other prisoners. All this would need preparation. Angola needed to take account of certain OAU and UN resolutions about mercenaries. The President asked that Britain should help Angola to find peaceful solutions in its region. He also sought the British Government's assistance to prevent the continuation of anti-Angolan activities in the United Kingdom. This would favour the development of bilateral relations.

The Prime Minister said that she wished to be clear about the President's message. As she understood it, he had decided to exercise clemency. This would happen very soon. It would be part of a package involving other prisoners. Our bilateral relations would be assisted if we could bring influence to bear against anti-Angolan activities in the UK.

She was not sure what these activities were but Britain was a free society. Anti-Thatcher activities were not uncommon. We could not suppress organisations within our free society provided they conducted themselves within the law. We might not approve of the activities in question but we could not deal with them unless the law was infringed.

She was very grateful for the President's oral message and would like Sr Nascimento to convey her warm thanks to him. How would the Angolans wish this matter to be handled from the point of view of public relations?

Sr Nascimento said that he had suggested to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary earlier in the day that the issue should be kept private. The Prime Minister stated that nothing would be said to our press in advance though, of course, when the prisoners were released there was bound to be publicity. She wondered what the likely timescale for release was. Sr Nascimento said that he believed it would happen in not more than a month.

Sr de Almeida then said that Angola wished to open an Embassy in the United Kingdom. But it would not do so until the British Government closed the offices of groups opposed to the Angolan Government such as UNITA. France and Belgium had already taken action of this kind. The Prime Minister said that she had to explain that the British Government did not have the power in law to close such offices. We of course had no relations with them. We would very much like Angola to establish an Embassy here. She did not believe that a country like Angola, with its great size and promising future, should be put off by the activities of a few individuals in London.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that when she replied to the President's letter, she would thank him for the oral message conveyed by Sr Nascimento and say how welcome it was. Her reply would contain no specific reference to the prisoners.

The conversation ended at 1710.

A.J.C.



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Presidente da República

Excelência,

O Ministro do Plano da República Popular de Angola efectuará uma visita oficial ao Reino Unido da Grande Bretanha no período de 12 à 14 de Dezembro e confieilhe a missão de lhe fazer a entrega desta mensagem.

Aproveito a oportunidade para confirmar que recebi as mensagens que teve a amabilidade de me enviar, seja através do vosso Embaixador actual como do seu antecessor.

A compreensão mútua e a ampliação progressiva que se tem verificado nas relações bilaterais de amizade e cooperação económica, mostram que há de facto um desejo comum dos nossos Governos respectivos de situar a cooperação e o intercâmbio comercial acima das diferenças ideológicas, desde que ela seja justa e útil ao desenvolvimento dos nossos países.

À

SUA EXCELÊNCIA MARGARETH THATCHER

PRIMEIRO MINISTRO DO REINO UNIDO DA GRANDE BRETANHA


L O N D R E S

Asseguro à Vossa Excelência que o meu Governo está interessado em manter e desenvolver, na base do princípio da coexistência pacífica entre Estados e da interdependência económica lógica entre as Nações, relações económicas e financeiras entre Empresas e Instituições de Angola e da Grande Bretanha. Neste âmbito o nosso Ministro do Plano tem mandato para explorar todas as possibilidades de um relacionamento estável e frutuoso com o vosso País e desejo por isso que a sua visita seja coroada de êxito.

Ao manifestar-lhe a nossa intenção temos presente na nossa memória que embora Angola tenha grandes recursos naturais ela está situada na África Austral, uma das zonas de tensão do Mundo, onde desejamos que a Paz e a estabilidade se reestabeleçam respeitando a vontade política e os direitos dos que foram ou continuam a ser oprimidos pelo colonialismo e pelo apartheid. A Paz é necessária para todos, mas não pode ser desligada da justiça social. Por essa razão temos considerado urgente a solução do problema da Namíbia na base da Resolução 435 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, como primeiro passo importante para o desanuviamento de tensão na África Austral. O Governo da República Popular de Angola acolheu com grande satisfação as últimas declarações do Governo da Grande Bretanha, sobre o não relacionamento da descolonização da Namíbia com a retirada das forças cubanas de Angola e gostaria que Vossa Excelência usasse da sua influência junto dos outros Países membros do Grupo de Contacto Ocidental para a Namíbia para assumir a mesma posição e convencer a África do Sul a indicar o sistema eleitoral e a data para o início da implementação da Resolução 435/78 do Conselho de Segurança da ONU. Penso também que a Senhora Primeiro Ministro pode tentar convencer

o Governo Sul-Africano de que a sua política de desestabilização militar contra os países vizinhos através de grupos subversivos armados aumenta apenas a desgraça daqueles que sempre foram pobres, mas não pode alterar o mapa político actual. A "UNITA" e o "MNR" não têm futuro em Angola e em Moçambique, respectivamente. É necessário encarar o Governo legítimo de Angola com espírito realista, ele é apesar da sua juventude um Governo independente que pratica uma política coerente de princípios, baseada na defesa dos interesses do Povo Angolano tomado como um todo.

No quadro do estreitamento das relações de amizade entre os nossos Povos que pretendemos e em resposta ao seu último apelo para um gesto de clemência a favor dos cidadãos britânicos condenados a pena de prisão maior em Angola em 1976 o Camarada Lopo do Nascimento, Ministro do Plano leva a incumbência de lhe transmitir uma mensagem verbal. Peço-lhe que acredite em tudo quanto ele disser em meu nome sobretudo quando lhe transmitir os sentimentos de amizade do Povo Angolano para com o Povo do Reino Unido, os meus votos de saúde e bem-estar pessoal para Vossa Excelência e os protestos da minha elevada Consideração.



- JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS -
PRESIDENTE DO MPLA - PARTIDO DO TRABALHO
PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Luanda, aos 8 de Dezembro de 1983.



REPUBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA
GABINETE DO PRESIDENTE

TO
HER EXCELLENCY MRS. MARGARETH THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
L O N D O N

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

The Minister for Planning of the People's Republic of Angola will be officially visiting the United Kingdom from the 12th to the 14th of December, and I have personally entrusted him with this message to deliver to Your Excellency.

I avail myself of this opportunity to acknowledge reception of the messages You were so kind as to send me, through your present Ambassador as well as his predecessors.

Mutual understanding and progressive growth that have been part of our bilateral relations of friendship and of economic cooperation are ample proof that there really exists a common wish on the part of our respective Governments to overcome our ideological differences, placing cooperation and commercial exchanges over and above this all, whenever it is judged useful and fair to the development of our two countries.

I wish to reassure Your Excellency that my Government is interested in maintaining and developing economic and financial relations between Angolan and British Enterprises and Institutions basing ourselves on the principle of peaceful cooperation

.../...



REPUBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

2.

GABINETE DO PRESIDENTE

between States, and logical economic interdependence between Nations. It is in this context that our Minister for Planning has been empowered to explore all possible avenues of stable and fruitful relationship with your Country and I wish that visit be crowned with success.

While manifesting these intentions to you, we must also remember that Angola, although despoising of a great wealth of natural resources, is situated in Southern Africa, a zone of tensions where we can only wish for the re-establishment of peace and stability, respecting as always the political will and rights of those who were, and continue to be oppressed by colonialism and apartheid. Peace is necessary to all, but cannot in any way be separated from social justice. For this reason, we have considered as urgent the solution of the Namibian problem based on the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 435, as first important step for clearing up tensions in Southern Africa. The Government of the People's Republic of Angola has received with great satisfaction, the latest declarations of the British Government on the question of decolonization of Namibia, as not being related in any way with the withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola; I would greatly appreciate it if Your Excellency would exert all Your influence with other member countries of the Western Contact Group on Namibia, so as they assume the same position and convince South Africa to indicate the electoral system as well as the initial date for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 435/78. I also think that Your Excellency might be able to convince the South African Government that its' politics of military destabilization against neighboring countries through armed subversive groups can only increase the misery of those who have always been poor, but cannot alter the present political map. "UNITA and the "MNR"



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

3.

GABINETE DO PRESIDENTE

have no future at all in both Angola and Mozambique respectively. One must face the legitimate Government of Angola in a realistic spirit and despite her youth, she is an independent Government who practices a coherent political line of principles based on defending the interests of the Angolan People as a whole.

On the basis of trying to narrow the gaps in the relations of friendship between our people, and in response to Your last appeal for a gesture of clemency towards the British citizens condemned to a maximum prison sentence in Angola in 1976, our Minister for Planning Comrade Lopo do Nascimento has been mandated to transmit You a verbal message. I pray You will accept all that he will say in my name, especially when he will convey the feelings of friendship of the Angolan People with the People of Great Britain, as well as my best wishes for good health and personal well-being to Your Excellency and the assurances of my Highest Consideration.

JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS
PRESIDENT OF THE MPLA - WORKER'S PARTY
PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 December 1983

John Taylor

Possible Call by Sr Nascimento, Angolan
Minister of Planning, on the Prime Minister,
14 December 1983

I enclose a short brief on the lines
we agreed.

John Taylor
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



CALL BY ANGOLAN MINISTER OF PLANNING ON THE PRIME MINISTER -
14 DECEMBER 1983

STEERING BRIEF

1. This brief is for contingency purposes. A call on the Prime Minister will only be recommended if it is clear from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's discussions on 14 December that it might tip the balance on the release of the British prisoners.

2. It is recommended that the Prime Minister should make the following two main points:

- i) concern for the release of the British prisoners;
- ii) need for the Angolans to respond to the US wish for detailed negotiations in the search for a Namibia settlement.

The Prime Minister might also emphasise the importance we attach to increased trade with Angola.

3. Sr Nascimento's visit follows that to the UK in February this year of the Angolan Foreign Minister, Sr Paulo Jorge (he called on the Prime Minister), and Mr Rifkind's visit to Angola in November.

4. Sr Do Nascimento, a former Prime Minister, is one of the ablest of the Angolan Ministers and has in the past been one of the most influential. He is carrying a letter to the Prime Minister from President Dos Santos. He has told our Ambassador that the President had told him to deliver the letter personally.



Our Ambassador has been told that a summons to President Dos Santos is imminent, which suggests that the prisoner issue has reached a critical point. Sr Do Nascimento has indicated only that the letter was about Namibia and the British ex-mercenary prisoners in detention in Luanda. He said it contained ideas which President Dos Santos hoped the Prime Minister would study.

5. He is likely to be accompanied by Sr Luis de Almeida, Angolan Ambassador to France, who was also present for Sr Paulo Jorge's call.

CALL BY ANGOLAN MINISTER OF PLANNING ON THE PRIME MINISTER:

14 DECEMBER 1983

LINE TO TAKE

A) BRITISH EX-MERCENARY PRISONERS IN ANGOLA

Main Arguments

- i) Cannot disguise great disappointment at lack of progress on their release; we face increasing public and Parliamentary pressure, particularly since hopes raised by Sr Jorge's statement that he hoped "'opportune moment'" could be found this year; difficult for public and Parliament to understand why release (a humanitarian gesture) linked to progress on Namibia.
- ii) Domestic pressure might make it difficult to resist future offers of exchange of prisoners Savimbi might make. I know you appreciate our position. But where do we go from here? We also understand pressures on Angolan Government but it could be in their interests (vis a vis UNITA's hostage taking) to release them.
- iii) It is unrealistic to make other demands on us. We had understood that the Angolans approved our consistent position that this is a bilateral policy. Our case rests on humanitarian and equity grounds. We would if the prisoners are released, do our best with the South Africans to obtain release of the Czechs (although we could not of course give a commitment that we would succeed). The prior release of our men would enable the Angolans to avoid any appearance of a deal with UNITA. With the same reservation, we would be prepared to approach the South Africans about the release of Angolan prisoners.

/iv)

iv) (If raised). Public and Parliamentary pressure on the question of the prisoners precludes us from signing a General Cooperation Agreement at present time. If the problem could be solved, General Cooperation Agreement could be signed, and door opened to progress on all bilateral fields.

B) NAMIBIA/SOUTH AFRICA

- i) Our vote on Security Council Resolution 539 makes clear our rejection of linkage. Cubans a sovereign matter for Angolans. But fact is that a settlement depends on this being addressed. Time running out. Urgent need ~~to begin~~^{for} serious negotiations with US.
- ii) We have called for South African withdrawal from Southern Angola as essential first step. Is this your major priority?
- iii) We have urged South Africa to be flexible. Mr Rifkind's visit to Pretoria; Mr Botha's visit to London.
- iv) French have not withdrawn from Contact Group, nor sought its dissolution. CG has done vital work in the past; could do so again. Important that it remains in being.



With the compliments of

CENTRAL AFRICA DEPARTMENT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

ADVANCE COPY

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IMMEDIATE

Hd/CAFD
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Hd/PUSD
Hd/EEED
PS
PS/M. Riffkind
PS/PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr Squire

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LUANDA 130825Z DEC 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 832 OF 13 DECEMBER

No 10.

BRITISH MERCENARIES

1. I SAW VENANCIO DA MOURA YESTERDAY (12 DECEMBER). HE WAS DUE TO HAVE YET ANOTHER MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT LATER IN THE DAY (THIS CAUTIOUS WORRYING AT A PROBLEM IS TYPICAL OF THE WAY DOS SANTOS TAKES DECISIONS). DA MOURA AGAIN WENT OVER THE GROUND COVERED IN RECENT MEETINGS AND I MADE THE POINTS IN YOUR TELNO 565. I HAVE SINCE GIVEN HIM A PIECE OF PAPER SETTING OUT RECENT MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES, DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS DURING 1983 AND OUR POSITION ON A POSSIBLE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS.


2. AFTER HE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT, DA MOURA TOLD ME THAT I SHOULD EXPECT TO BE SUMMONED BY DOS SANTOS, PROBABLY BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR THE LUSOPHONE SUMMIT IN BISSAU. HE WANTED TO HEAR FROM ME AT FIRST HAND WHAT I HAD BEEN SAYING TO JORGE AND DA MOURA.

3. THE SUMMONS TO THE PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO COME AT SHORT NOTICE. PLEASE THEREFORE LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT IS IN DOS SANTOS' LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND WHETHER YOU WISH ME TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

GOULDING

ANGOLA: Int Sat Oct 79

LUK 508
GRS 250
FDW G268/23



PP DELHI
PP LAGOS
PP PRETORIA
PP LUSAKA
PP HARARE
PP DAR ES SALAAM

GPS

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM FCO 231318Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY NEW DELHI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 863 OF 23 NOVEMBER

AND TO (FOR T BURN CHOQM DEL), LAGOS, PRETORIA, LUSAKA, HARARE,
DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPT
WAS RECEIVED FROM LISBON TELEGRAM NO 215 OF 22 NOVEMBER.
INFO LUANDA

ANGOLA : COMMONWEALTH CONGRSS AND CUBAN TROOPS

1. THE ANGOLAN EMBASSY HAS SENT US A COMMUNIQUE DENOUNCING PLANS TO INTRODUCE A PROPOSAL AT THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH MEETING ON THE REPLACEMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA BY A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE COMMUNIQUE DECLARES THAT ANGOLA WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL, AND SAYS THAT PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO GRADUALLY WITHDRAW CUBAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION.

2. THE COMMUNIQUE REITERATES THE FOUR CONDITIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS:

- A) WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA,
- B) AN END TO SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST ANGOLA,
- C) AN END TO SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT TO UNITA,
- D) APPLICATION OF UNSCR 435.

3. THE COMMUNIQUE IS ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT OF THE MPLA AND DATED 18 NOVEMBER.

HOWE

NNNN

cc720

Am

Key
Have you got a
file for this?
AJ 11/8



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 August 1983

Dear Jim,

Thank you for sending me your letter of 26 July about your visit to Dr. Savimbi in Angola. I read your account with interest.

UNITA is obviously going to be a significant factor in the Angolan internal situation for some time. I therefore found particularly useful your comments on Savimbi's own personality and objectives. You will not expect me to comment item by item, but there are some general observations I would make.

I fully agree with you that it is difficult to evaluate with any kind of certainty the real extent of Dr. Savimbi's control in Angola. UNITA is able to inflict considerable disruption on the economy but, so far, unable to occupy the main cities or to establish any administrative structures outside a limited area in its heartland.

The British Government's relations are of course with the MPLA Government. It is the MPLA who have a decisive influence on such questions as the level of British trade and well-being of the British community; and it is with the MPLA that the US Government is conducting negotiations for a Cuban withdrawal which would open the way to a Namibian settlement.

/ My final

My final comment concerns your reference to the British personnel working in the diamond mines in Northern Angola. These people, who I understand are all unarmed, are engaged in commercial employment. I am sure that you would agree that, if they were harmed, there is bound to be strong public reaction in this country against those concerned.

Yours ever
Margaret

Sir James S.R. Scott-Hopkins, M.E.P.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 August 1983

Dear John,

Angola: UNITA

As requested, I enclose a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the letter from Sir James Scott-Hopkins of 26/July.

My letter of 29/July on the call by Mr Tiny Rowland gave a general commentary on the points raised by Sir James Scott-Hopkins. The attached notes give a more detailed background. Our own information supports some of his account, especially as regards Savimbi's impressive personality and the high level of UNITA discipline and efficiency. We would differ on the following main points:

- i) Sir James over-estimates, in our view, the degree of Savimbi's control: UNITA is essentially a guerrilla movement, and while it seriously disrupts the economy it has not been able to take the main towns or set up an administration outside its heartland.
 - ii) He over-estimates also Savimbi's prospects for winning power: as my earlier letter stated, our best estimate at present is that he is unlikely to succeed at least in the short term.
 - iii) He greatly under-estimates the degree of South African support for UNITA: their assistance, both in military equipment and operational co-operation, plays an important part in UNITA's successes.
 - iv) We would not share his confidence in Savimbi's assurances that if he came to power he would accept a mixed economy and maintain hostility towards SWAPO: he has supped with a wide variety of devils in the past, and his future policies are largely unpredictable, though we would expect him to continue to be anti-Soviet.
- /v) We would



- v) We would not accept that "the best chance of achieving stability in Southern Africa lies with Savimbi's UNITA". On the contrary, at least in the short term, it is a major obstacle to a Namibia settlement and the prospects that would give for drawing Angola into the Western orbit. Furthermore even if Savimbi won power, civil war would continue for some time and both the West and the Soviet bloc could well be sucked further into providing assistance.

I do not think you would want me to comment on points of detail. However you may wish to know that Angola does not export diamonds to Russia (which is itself an exporter of diamonds). Angola sells its diamonds through the Diamond Trading Company (a de Beers subsidiary) in London.

Yours ever

John Hides

for

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street



BACKGROUND

Prospects for UNITA

1. UNITA has recently considerably increased its area of operation. With an estimated 15,000 armed trained men, it now has a good deal of freedom of action in large parts of the country and has some of the main supply links in a strangle. It may well be able to extend its guerrilla operation. We can no longer dismiss out of hand the possibility that it may eventually win power.
2. Such a development is unlikely in the near future. UNITA would at present stand little chance of success in attacks on the main urban centres. It is not strong enough to topple the MPLA unless its outside support were to be much increased or the Soviet Union/Cuba were to withdraw their support from the MPLA. Neither seems likely to happen. Indeed should the existence of the MPLA regime seem in danger the Soviet Union might well decide to take whatever steps were necessary to save it.
3. A Namibia settlement would bring new elements of uncertainty but would be unlikely to favour Savimbi. His current successes rely heavily on South African military support. He could probably continue guerrilla operations for some years even if South African support were cut off, though possibly on a reducing scale. But the MPLA show every sign of insisting on keeping sufficient Cuban troops to maintain at least the present balance.
4. The most probable prospect therefore is a continuing stalemate, with the MPLA retaining power in the main cities, but with UNITA continuing to inflict considerable disruption on the economy while being unable to replace the civil administration outside its tribal heartland. This judgement is shared by the US whose latest assessment is that Savimbi



will be able to do no more than control up to 45% of the country. The US believe that leading South African military and security officials privately accept this view. There is evidence that Savimbi himself does not believe he can gain sole power and is aiming at a place in a Government of national reconciliation.

5. Some form of reconciliation would be the best solution for Angola and probably for the West. This will be difficult to achieve. In the short term it is unlikely that any compromise will be possible which includes Savimbi in a position of power. No MPLA leader would wish to share power with such a formidable figure. What might eventually become possible is an MPLA reconciliation with some of Savimbi's lieutenants, perhaps combined with a degree of regional autonomy.

US Attitude

6. The US do not recognise the MPLA Government in Luanda, and have had contacts with Savimbi in the past. They plan to resume these shortly at a junior official level. Their main aim is to counteract South African influence on Savimbi hostile to US efforts to negotiate with the MPLA an agreement on Cuban withdrawal, thus opening the way to a Namibia settlement.

Dr Savimbi

7. Dr Savimbi has had something of a chequered past. Son of a prominent Ovimbundu family, Savimbi went to Portugal in 1958 as a member of a group of students supported by the Protestant United Church of Christ. He left Lisbon in 1960 (allegedly because of badgering by the Political Police) and went to Fribourg University and then to the University of Lausanne. In 1962 he was appointed Foreign Minister in Holden Roberto's Government in exile. Having fallen out with Roberto, he resigned in July 1964.



8. Savimbi subsequently consorted with Malcolm X, and visited China, North Korea and North Vietnam. He returned via Eastern Europe to Algiers where he consulted Che Guevara. He sent a group of his supporters for military training in China. Discussed with MPLA leaders possibility of joining that party. 1966 launched UNITA. China continued aid to UNITA late 60s and early 70s. In 1975 joined in Transitional Government, but by end of year obtained South African backing in civil war.

9. A personality of considerable charisma, attractive to several African leaders until he began increasingly to accept South African support. Finds it difficult to collaborate with others unless he is in command. In his guerrilla struggle against the MPLA, Savimbi appears to have adopted an increasingly anti-Communist and pro-mixed economy stance. He has also become progressively anti-Portuguese, and probably anti-white and anti-Catholic. Savimbi's past history, however, suggests that he is an opportunist who deals where he can obtain the best bargain.

UNITA/SWAPO

10. Mainly because of tribal (Ovimbundu) connections with SWAPO, Savimbi's UNITA played an early role in training and arming SWAPO. A formal renunciation of its alliance with SWAPO was declared in June 1974. Dr Savimbi has on several occasions said that UNITA has no quarrel with SWAPO. However, in more recent times, probably under South African pressure, he has adopted a hostile stance against SWAPO within Angola.

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO: Sir James S R Scott-Hopkins MEP
2 Queen Anne's Gate
LONDON SW1H 9AA

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for sending me your letter of 26 July about your visit to Dr Savimbi in Angola. I read your account with interest.

CAVEAT.....

UNITA is obviously going to be a significant factor in the Angolan internal situation for some time. I therefore found particularly useful your comments on Savimbi's own personality and objectives. You will not expect me to comment item by item, ^{but} There are some general observations I would make.

I fully agree with you that it is difficult to evaluate with any kind of certainty the real extent of Dr Savimbi's control in Angola. However one thing is clear: UNITA remains essentially a guerrilla movement, with all the strengths and weaknesses of such a body. It is able to inflict considerable disruption on the economy but, so far at least, unable to occupy the main cities or to establish any administrative structures outside a limited area in its heartland. The picture is therefore similar to guerrilla insurgencies in several other countries of the world.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

The British Government's relations are of course with the MPLA Government. It is the MPLA who have a decisive influence on such questions as the level of British trade and well-being of the British community; and it is with the MPLA that the US Government is conducting negotiations for a Cuban withdrawal which would open the way to a Namibian settlement.

My final comment concerns your reference to the British personnel working in the diamond mines in Northern Angola. These people, who I understand are all unarmed, are engaged in commercial employment. I am sure that you would agree that, if they were harmed, there would bound to be strong public reaction in this country against those concerned.

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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

29 July 1983

Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'M' or 'W'.

Jan T. [unclear]

Angola: Call by Mr Tiny Roland: 1 August

Mr Tiny Rowland has told us that he will wish to give the Prime Minister the most up-to-date information he can on Savimbi's prospects and intentions. He may have just returned from a visit to Savimbi.

Mr Rowland is an old supporter of Savimbi and has invested a good deal of assistance in him. He has long claimed that Savimbi would shortly take over power in Angola and that it was in HMG's interests to establish contact with him. He will no doubt take this line again with the Prime Minister.

Sir Geoffrey Howe has put in hand a study of the possibility that Savimbi might win control of Angola and the implications for our policy. He considers that a Savimbi victory cannot be dismissed out of hand. He has noted the US view (which, incidentally, the Ivory Coast Foreign Minister seemed to share) that Savimbi is most unlikely to be able to topple the MPLA in present circumstances; and that neither South Africa nor Savimbi himself expect this to happen soon. His preliminary view is that the present stalemate will continue, with the MPLA retaining power in the main cities; but with UNITA continuing to inflict considerable disruption on the economy, while being unable to supplement the civil administration outside its tribal heartland. The best hope for Angola is reconciliation between the two parties. This seems to be Savimbi's aim and Washington's long-term goal. However the main obstacle to reconciliation is Savimbi himself: no MPLA leader would be prepared to share a pond with such a big fish. The prospects for reconciliation in the short-term are therefore poor.

/This means



This means that we shall have to continue to deal with an MPLA Government at least for some time. They will have a decisive say over the release of our prisoners, our trade prospects, and a Namibia solution. At present Savimbi only influences events in a negative sense: by making a Namibia settlement more difficult and the MPLA regime more dependent on the Soviet bloc.

Mr Rowland has used the argument that when Savimbi came to power in Angola there would be a good prospect that, if we now played our cards well, Britain could have the leading role in the economic development of Angola. This is a theoretical possibility, but it would be unwise to put much money on Savimbi's words about the way in which he would run the economy if ever securely in power. Moreover, Savimbi's past history (he worked closely at one stage with Communist China) suggests that he is an opportunist who deals where he can obtain the best bargain. In any case gratitude would dictate first pickings for South Africa. Furthermore we should have plenty of opportunity to prove our friendship once he came into power: civil war would be likely to continue and he would, alas, probably be dependent on heavy Western support.

Against this background Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that we should certainly not close our eyes to the possibility that the balance of power could at some stage shift in Savimbi's favour. It is improbable but not impossible for example that sooner or later the Soviet Union and Cuba might decide to cut their losses and leave the MPLA to its fate. We must be ready to react if this looked like becoming a real possibility. Meanwhile, we should continue:

- (i) to work to convert the MPLA to genuine non-alignment. There is a real prospect that they can be turned round if a Namibia settlement enables them to reduce their dependence on the Soviet bloc and develop their economy with Western help;
- (ii) to work for an eventual reconciliation between MPLA and UNITA. There is little the UK can do itself. The main role will have to be played by Washington (and they acknowledge this) and black African States. When the time is ripe we should be ready to encourage them to do so;
- (iii) meanwhile to maintain our policy of neutrality towards UNITA, with no official contact but also no hostile comment;
- (iv) however we need to watch the situation closely in case Savimbi's prospects should significantly improve.

/I attach



/
/ I attach notes on the British ex-mercenaries and on
/ British mining personnel in Angola in case Mr Rowland
/ also raises these subjects. I also attach recent telegrams
from HMA Luanda.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR T ROWLAND: 1 AUGUST

ANGOLA: BRITISH MERCENARY PRISONERS

1. Seven British mercenaries were sentenced in Luanda in June 1976 to periods of imprisonment ranging from 16 - 30 years. despite many high level bilateral representations (including the Prime Minister and Mr Pym to Sr Jorge, the Angolan Foreign Minister, in February) there is still no sign of the Angolans agreeing to releasing them by a humanitarian act of clemency.
2. During his visit to London, Sr Jorge said that he hoped an "opportune moment" for the men's release could occur this year. President Dos Santos faces opposition in the Political Bureau to releasing the British prisoners. The Angolans have told us that he is looking for development on the Namibia question as a possible "opportune moment".
3. In March this year, UNITA offered to exchange some Czechoslovak hostages for the seven British prisoners. The Angolan Government have made it clear that they intend to keep the question of the Czechoslovak hostages and that of the British prisoners separate.
4. We have therefore continued to concentrate on reaching a bilateral agreement with the Angolan Government. We have not discussed their offer with UNITA. We have instructed our new Ambassador, Mr Goulding, to explore the possibility of obtaining agreement with the Angolans on a package deal under which they would give a firm date for the release of the prisoners in exchange for a visit by a junior FCO Minister to sign a general agreement on co-operation (which we want for trade reasons) together with a public repudiation of the practice of exchanging hostages.

/5. A very



5. A very recent development is a report that, under pressure from the Czechoslovak Government, the Angolan Government are considering either a direct exchange of some UNITA prisoners for the Czechoslovaks, or a unilateral amnesty for the UNITA prisoners. We have instructed HM Ambassador to make clear to the Angolan Government at the highest level the serious reaction in this country should the British prisoners not be included in any such deal.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

29 July 1983

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY MR T ROWLAND: 1 AUGUST

ANGOLA: UNITA THREAT TO BRITISH PERSONNEL IN DIAMOND INDUSTRY

1. During a recent visit by Sir James Scott-Hopkins (Member of European Parliament) and three colleagues to Dr Savimbi in UNITA-held territory in Southern Angola, Savimbi said that he had 3,000 UNITA troops in readiness to attack the diamond mines in Lunda Norte province. Savimbi also said that the "50 British mining police" would be treated as mercenaries if captured. There are in fact 16 British, employed (unarmed) in supervisory duties at the sorting houses, and approximately 160 other British in management and technical positions.

2. Although Savimbi's threats may be no more than an exercise in propaganda aimed at further embarrassing the Angolan Government, we are taking them seriously. We can not rule out the possibility of such an attempt succeeding. We are in close touch with Defence Systems International who employ the supervisors, and with the other firms concerned. Our Embassy in Luanda raised the matter with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on 25 July. Da Moura confirmed that the Angolan Government would ensure the safety of British people in Lunda Norte in every possible way, but added that the Angolan Government could not of course guarantee absolute safety.

3. FCO officials in conversation with Mr Rowland have already pointed out that if UNITA did harm British subjects, as had been threatened, it would obviously seriously harm their image in this country. Mr Rowland may have passed this thought on to Savimbi.

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FM LUANDA 271635Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 460 OF 27 JULY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PRETORIA LUSAKA KINSHASA

INFO SAVING PARIS BONN OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK HAVANA MOSCOW

NAIROBI ADDIS ABABA LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO HARARE GABORONE

YOUR TELNO 326:UNITA

1. THE REQUESTED ASSESSMENT IS IN MY THREE IFTS. THE FIRST ATTEMPTS TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AT PRESENT. THE SECOND ASSESSES UNITA'S CHANCES OF EITHER DRIVING THE MPLA FROM POWER OR FORCING THEM TO SHARE POWER, ON VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR THE TWO SIDES. THE THIRD CONSIDERS WHETHER A UNITA VICTORY WOULD SERVE BRITISH INTERESTS.
2. IN ORDER TO AVOID MAKING MY IFTS EVEN LONGER (AND TREADING ON COLLEAGUES' TERRITORY), I HAVE NOT ADDRESSED A NUMBER OF OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH COULD BE RELEVANT. FOR INSTANCE, HOW FAR DOES SAVIMBI ACT AT SOUTH AFRICAN BEHEST? HOW FAR HAS THE RECENT INCREASE IN HIS ACTIVITY BEEN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO BLOCK A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE AMERICANS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS (BY SO FRIGHTENING THE LATTER THAT THEY COULD NOT ENVISAGE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL)? WHO WOULD PROVIDE SAVIMBI WITH THE TRAINED ADMINISTRATORS HE WOULD NEED TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY (HE HAS FEW AT PRESENT)? HOW WOULD THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS REACT TO A FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE MPLA'S POSITION? AND SO ON.
3. I HAVE ALSO FOREBORNE TO MAKE THE OBVIOUS POINTS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES A CHANGE IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS UNITA WOULD HAVE FOR OUR BILATERAL CONCERNS HERE (TRADE, BRITISH COMMUNITY, MERCENARIES ETC).

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PS/MR RIFKIND

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

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GRS 1074
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 461 OF 27 JULY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PRETORIA, LUSAKA AND KINSHASA.

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, HAVANA, MOSCOW,
NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUSAKA, HARARE AND GABORONE.

DAR ES SALAAM

MIPT: UNITA: WHAT IS THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH?

1. WE HAVE NO RELIABLE MEANS HERE OF ASSESSING THE SIZE AND CAPABILITY OF UNITA'S FORCES. BUT MOST OF THE ESTIMATES WE HAVE SEEN GAVE SAVIMBI 10,000 OR MORE ARMD MEN IN THE FIELD. HE IS KNOWN TO RECEIVE MONEY, ARMS, TRAINING, SUPPLIES (ESPECIALLY POL AND FOOD) AND TRANSPORT FROM THE SADF, PERHAPS ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE (SEE FOR INSTANCE THE CZECH ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON ALTO CATUMBELA IN MY TELNO 428 - NOT TO ALL). HE ALSO BENEFITS FROM SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROL OF THE AIR OVER SOUTHERN ANGOLA WHERE HIS HQ ARE LOCATED. RECENT SABOTAGE OPERATIONS INDICATE THAT UNITA HAS ACCESS TO EXPERT DEMOLITION SKILLS. INDIVIDUALS OR EVEN UNITS FROM THE SADF ARE SAID TO OPERATE WITH UNITA FROM TIME TO TIME. ALL VISITORS TO SAVIMBI EXPRESS ADMIRATION FOR UNITA'S EFFICIENCY AND DISCIPLINE.
2. WE HAVE NO HARD FIGURES EITHER FOR THE FORCES DEPLOYED AGAINST UNITA. THEY WILL BE DRAWN FROM THE ANGOLAN ARMY (FAPLA), TOTALLING BETWEEN 35 AND 40,000: AN ESTIMATED 20 TO 25,000 CUBAN TROOPS: AND A FEW THOUSAND KATANGESE DISSIDENTS. IN ADDITION THERE IS A HOME GUARD (THE ODP) , WHO ARE CLAIMED TO NUMBER HALF A MILLION OR MORE, BUT THEY ARE OF DOUBTFUL EFFECTIVENESS (AND LOYALTY). MOST OF THESE FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE CUBANS, ARE IN STATIC LOCATIONS, WITH FEW SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS, THOUGH THE MPLA ARE TAKING STEPS TO IMPROVE FAPLA'S ANTI-GUERILLA CAPABILITY. FAPLA ARE INCREASINGLY STRETCHED. THEIR UNITS VARY IN QUALITY. SOME ARE SAID TO BE GOOD: BUT MANY ARE POORLY TRAINED AND SUPPLIED, THEIR MORALE IS LOW AND THERE ARE FREQUENT STORIES OF DESERTION TO UNITA.
3. EVEN IF THE GOVERNMENTS FORCES MATCHED THE STANDARD OF UNITA'S THEIR NUMBERS FALL WELL SHORT OF THE RATIO REQUIRED FOR CONTROL, LET ALONE DEFEAT, OF A GUERILLA CAMPAIGN. MOREOVER GEOGRAPHY HELPS UNITA. LARGE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY ARE WELL SUITED TO GUERILLA ACTIVITIES AND THE DISTANCES ARE IMMENSE. THE AREAS IN WHICH UNITA HAS BEEN ACTIVE DURING THE LAST 18 MONTHS ARE TWICE THE SIZE OF THE IBERIAN PENINSULA. EXCEPT FOR THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, THEY ARE SPARSELY POPULATED AND THERE ARE FEW ROADS.
4. SAVIMBI HAS EXPLOITED THESE ADVANTAGES WITH SKILL. HE SEEMS TO BE ABLE TO MOVE SEVERAL HUNDRED MEN AT A TIME IN THE EASTERN HALF OF ANGOLA AND IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. HIS FORCES THREATEN THE COAST ROAD FROM NGUNZA TO LOBITO AND ROAD AND RAIL COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE COAST INLAND TO MALANJE AND HUAMBO. THE BENGUELA RAILWAY HAS LONG BEEN UNUSABLE EAST OF HUAMBO. HUAMBO ITSELF IS MORE OR LESS UNDER SIEGE. UNITA (PROBABLY WITH SADF HELP)

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HAS

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HAS MOUNTED EFFECTIVE ATTACKS AGAINST BRIDGES, DAMS AND POWER STATIONS. THEY REGULARLY KIDNAP FOREIGNERS AND EXTRACT PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FROM THEM. THIS HAS CAUSED THE WITHDRAWAL OF MANY FOREIGN AID WORKERS FROM THE MORE EXPOSED AREAS. ALL THIS CREATES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE EFFECTIVENESS, CREDIBILITY AND MORALE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA AND HAS INTENSIFIED THE TRENDS TOWARDS CORRUPTION AND A BRAIN-DRAIN.

5. BUT SAVIMBI'S CLAIM TO QUOTE CONTROL UNQUOTE A THIRD OR MORE OF THE COUNTRY NEEDS QUALIFICATION. MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE TOWNS HAS BECOME MORE DANGEROUS IN MANY PROVINCES THAN IT WAS A YEAR AGO. THERE ARE LARGE, SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS IN THE EAST OF THE COUNTRY WHERE GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL HAVE TO TRAVEL IN ARMED CONVOYS. THIS IS ALSO TRUE OF SOME PARTS OF THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. BUT UNITA STILL DOES NOT OCCUPY, NOR HAS EVER ATTACKED ANY OF THE 18 PROVINCIAL CAPITALS: ALL ARE HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT EXCEPT FOR ONDJIVA (CUNENE) WHICH IS OCCUPIED BY THE SADF. THE FEW TOWNS WHICH UNITA HAS ATTACKED SUCCESSFULLY HAVE BEEN ABANDONED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT UNITA HAS ESTABLISHED ANY ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES EXCEPT IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF SAVIMBI'S HEADQUARTERS, WHICH REMAIN AT MAVINGA IN THE REMOTE AND UNPOPULATED SOUTH EAST OF THE COUNTRY.

6. THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA THUS RESEMBLES GUERILLA INSURGENCIES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. MIFT CONSIDERS WHETHER SAVIMBI'S PARTIAL CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE CAN WIN HIM CONTROL OF (OR A SHARE IN) THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

GOULDING

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, HAVANA, MOSCOW,
NAIROBI, ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, MAPUTO, LUSAKA, HARARE AND GABORONE,
AND DAR-ES-SALAAM.

MY TWO IPTS: UNITA: CAN SAVIMBI WIN?

1. IT IS THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF MY COLLEAGUES (WHICH I SHARE) THAT, AS LONG AS CUBAN COMBAT FORCES REMAIN IN ANGOLA, UNITA COULD NOT TAKE AND HOLD LUANDA EVEN IF THE SADF WERE TO INTERVENE ON THE SAME SCALE AS IN 1975. TALK OF A UNITA GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA IS THREFORE UNREALISTIC.
2. COULD UNITA SEIZE KUITO, HUAMBO OR BENGUELA/LOBITO AND PROCLAIM A RIVAL GOVERNMENT THERE? THIS POSSIBILITY IS SAID TO WORRY THE MPLA. BUT I THINK IT VERY UNLIKELY. UNITA'S SKILLS ARE GEURRILLA SKILLS: THEY DO NOT YET HAVE THE NUMBERS OR THE EQUIPMENT TO FIGHT THEIR WAY INTO A LARGE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL AND WITHSTAND THE INEVITABLE FAPLA AND CUBAN COUNTER-ATTACK. SAVIMBI'S CARE SO FAR TO AVOID ATTACKS ON MAJOR TOWNS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. BUT ONE CANNOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT SUCCEED IN ESTABLISHING HIMSELF IN A MORE REMOTE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL (EG LUENA OR SAURIMO).
3. ANOTHER SCENARIO (WHICH IS SAID TO WORRY THE MPLA) IS THAT THE SADF MIGHT SEIZE MOCAMEDES AND LUBANGO AND INSTAL SAVIMBI THERE AS AN ANGOLA HADDAD. BUT THEY ARE VERY HEAVILY DEFENDED (BY CUBANS AS WILL AS FAPLA) AND IT IS ANYWAY DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD SUIT SAVIMBI'S POLITICAL PURPOSES.
4. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CUBAN FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THERE HAD BEEN A REDUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR UNITA. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR THEN WOULD BE THE SUPPORT WHICH SAVIMBI COULD MUSTER AMONGST HIS FELLOW OVIMBUNDU AND AMONGST THE REST OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE. AGAIN WE LACK HARD FACTS.

SAVIMBI HAS GREAT CHARISMA AND IS SAID TO BE IN EFFECT THE TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN OF THE OVIMBUNDU (WHO ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 35 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION). BUT MOST VISITORS TO THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS THINK THAT, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA IS INEFFECTIVE AND UNPOPULAR, THE PEOPLE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS ARE MORE DESIROUS OF AN END TO THE WAR AND THE INCREASINGLY BRUTAL REPRISALS BY BOTH SIDES THAN OF VICTORY FOR SAVIMBI.

5. OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS THERE IS LITTLE TRIBAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA, THOUGH THERE IS AN OVIMBUNDU ELEMENT ROUND THE KEY CITY OF MALANJE, WHICH IS ONE OF THE MAIN AREAS OF CURRENT UNITA ACTIVITY (RAISING FEARS OF AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A CORRIDOR BETWEEN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AND EX-FNLA SUPPORTERS IN THE NORTH). SAVIMBI BENEFITS TO SOME EXTENT FROM THE GENERAL APATHY AND DEMORALISATION WHICH RESULT FROM THE MPLA'S FAILURE EVEN TO PROVIDE THE BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE. IF THERE WAS TO BE A GENERAL COLLAPSE OF FAPLA, UNITA COULD CUT THROUGH QUICKLY TO LUANDA AND INSTAL THEMSELVES THERE. BUT OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS WOULD WORK AGAINST THEM: THE KIMBUNDU PEOPLE WHO INHABIT THE LUANDA REGION HAVE NO LOVE FOR THE OVIMBUNDU: THERE IS WIDE DISTRUST OF SAVIMBI'S PERSONAL AMBITIONS: AND MANY IN THE MPLA, FAPLA AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LITERALLY FIGHTING FOR THEIR LIVES, ESPECIALLY THE MESTICOS. I WOULD EXPECT THAT, EVEN WITHUT CUBAN COMBAT FORCES AND WITH SOME CONTINUING SADF SUPPORT, UNITA WOULD ENCOUNTER TOO MUCH RESISTANCE TO BE ABLE TO SEIZE LUANDA AND HOLD IT. AND WOULD THE RUSSIANS AND THE CUBANS , AFTER ALL THEIR INVESTMENTS IN ANGOLA, ALLOW THE MPLA TO GO UNDER?

6. SAVIMBI'S PRESENT TACTICS OF DESTROYING ECONOMIC TARGETS, INTERRUPTING FOOD SUPPLIES AND SPREADING UNCERTAINTY AND FEAR ARE ACHIEVING MUCH SUCCESS IN AGGRAVATING AN ALREADY SERIOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION AND UNDERMINING THE MPLA'S CREDIBILITY AS A GOVERNMENT. BUT HE COULD DO MORE. A FEW WELL-PLACED CHARGES COULD INTERRUPT LUANDA'S WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES. SABOTAGE OF THE CABINDA OIL INTALLATIONS COULD DRASTICALLY CUT FOREIGN EXCHANGE RECEIPTS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER UNITA'S FAILURE SO FAR TO ATTACK THESE VITAL TARGETS IS BECAUSE THEY ARE TOO DIFFICULT OR BECAUSE OF DELIBERATE RESTRAINT (ON THEIR PART OR THE SOUTH AFRICANS'). ATTACKS ON THEM,

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AND ON SOME KEY TARGETS IN LUANDA, COULD PROVOKE CHAOS HERE. BUT FOR THE REASONS IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT UNITA WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THAT CHAOS TO DRIVE THE MPLA FROM POWER.

7. IF UNITA ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH FOR THAT, COULD THEY NEVERTHELESS FORCE THE MPLA TO SHARE POWER WITH THEM? WE HEAR RUMOURS OF MPLA OVERTURES TO UNITA. BUT IT HAS TO BE REMEMBERED THAT THE CONSTITUTION

OF ANGOLA IS THAT OF A ONE-PARTY MARXIST STATE. NO ROLE IS PERMITTED FOR ANY PARTY OTHER THAN THE MPLA. A FORMAL COALITION WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE MPLA SAY PRIVATELY THAT ONCE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION CEASED THEY WOULD OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITA PERSONALITIES, ALWAYS EXCLUDING SAVIMBI HIMSELF, AND WOULD RESOLVE THE UNITA PROBLEM IN AN ANGOLAN WAY. THEY ARE IMPRECISE ABOUT WHAT THIS WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE. THERE HAS BEEN MENTION OF SOME FORM OF REGIONAL AUTONOMY FOR THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AND/OR OF THE ADMISSION OF SENIOR UNITA PEOPLE TO THE MPLA. BUT THIS OF COURSE WOULD FALL FAR SHORT OF WHAT SAVIMBI WANTS, NAMELY A SHARE IN GOVERNMENT IN HIS OWN RIGHT. THE MPLA WILL NEVER CONCEDE HIM THAT, HOWEVER MUCH HE MEANWHILE UNDERMINES THEIR ABILITY TO GOVERN. EVEN IF THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IS REPLACED BY A MORE FLEXIBLE GROUP, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE SAVIMBI HIMSELF.

8. THIS ANALYSIS LEADS TO THE SAD CONCLUSION THAT ANGOLA CONTINUES TO BE TORN APART BY A STRUGGLE WHICH NEITHER OF THE CONTESTANTS CAN WIN. SAVIMBI CANNOT ESTABLISH A UNITA GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA OR OBLIGE THE MPLA TO SHARE POWER WITH HIM. AND THE MPLA CANNOT GOVERN ANGOLA EFFECTIVELY WHILE SAVIMBI MAINTAINS THE PRESENT LEVEL OF INSURGENCY AND ECONOMIC SABOTAGE.

9. THERE ARE THREE WAYS IN WHICH ANGOLA MIGHT IN THEORY ESCAPE FROM THIS ORDEAL:

(A) UNITA COULD BECOME STRONG ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. FOR THE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE, I BELIEVE THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH EXTERNAL INTERVENTION ON A MAJOR SCALE. THIS WOULD BRING THE CUBANS BACK AND CREATE A MIRROR IMAGE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION - AN INSURGENT MPLA TRYING

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TO UNSEAT A FOREIGN SUPPORTED UNITA GOVERNMENT.

(B) FOLLOWING A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA, UNITA COULD BE CUT OFF FROM FOREIGN SUPPORT ON THE PRESENT SCALE AND INSURGENCY IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS WOULD GRADUALLY DECLINE TO THE POINT WHERE IT DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO GOVERN (CF THE DEMISE OF THE FNLA/COMIRA SINCE 1976). MPLA SPOKESMEN SAY THAT THIS IS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN ONCE THE SADF HAD WITHDRAWN FROM CUNENE PROVINCE AND NAMIBIA. BUT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE SCALE OF UNITA'S RECENT ACTIVITIES IS CAUSING THEM DOUBTS. I SHARE THOSE DOUBTS: UNITA MUST BE ASSUMED TO HAVE STOCK-PILED ARMS AND SUPPLIES: IT WOULD BE A TOUGHER NUT THAT THE FNLA AND, EX-HYPOTHESE, THE MPLA WOULD NOT HAVE CUBAN HELP IN CRACKING IT.

(C) THE MARXIST RIGOUR OF THE ANGOLAN CONSTITUTION (AND THE MPLA STATUTES) COULD BE CIRCUMVENTED AND SOME AFRICAN MODUS VIVENDI BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA, I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS COULD INCLUDE SAVIMBI: HE IS TOO LARGE A PERSONALITY TO ABSORB AND THE MPLA HATE HIM TOO MUCH FOR (AS THEY SEE IT) BRINGING THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN IN OCTOBER 1975. BUT IF HE WAS EVER REMOVED FRM THE SCENE (WHICH WOULD ANYWAY SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE UNITA'S EFFECTIVENESS), IF THERE WAS A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND IF THEREAFTER THE SOUTH AFRICANS ABJURED THE TEMPTATION TO USE OVIMBUNDU SEPARATISM TO DESTABILISE THE GOVERNMENT IN LUANDA, THE AFRICAN MODUS VIVENDI WOULD BE A POSSIBILITY. THOSE, HOWEVER, ARE BIG IFS AND FOR THE TIME BEING I SEE LITTLE HOPE OF ANY ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUATION AND POSSIBLY DETERIORATION OF THE PRESENT VERY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION.

10. MEANWHILE MIFT CONSIDERS THE SENSITIVE QUESTION OF WHETHER BRITISH INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY UNITA'S COMING TO POWER.
PCO PLEASE PASS ALL.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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PS/ MR RIFKIND

SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 463 OF 27 JULY

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INFO SAVING PARIS BONN OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK HAVANA MOSCOW

NAIROBI ADDIS ABABA LAGOS DAR ES SALAAM HARARE MAPUTO GABORONE

MY 3 IPTS: UNITA: WOULD ITS VICTORY SERVE BRITISH INTERESTS?

1. THE MAJOR BRITISH INTEREST IN ANGOLA IS TO PREVENT THE RUSSIANS TURNING IT INTO A SECURE POLITICAL AND MILITARY BASE FROM WHICH TO PURSUE THEIR OBJECTIVES ELSEWHERE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: OR (TO PUT THE POINT MORE POSITIVELY) TO SHOW THE ANGOLANS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS, ABOVE ALL THROUGH A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA, THAT THEIR INTERESTS LIE IN COOPERATION WITH THE WEST, NOT THE EAST. A SECOND, AND IMPORTANT, INTEREST IS TO ESTABLISH A CLOSE COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANGOLA SO THAT THE U K CAN BENEFIT WHEN PEACE EVENTUALLY PERMITS REALISATION OF ANGOLA'S CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL. A THIRD INTEREST IS TO PROTECT THE 500-STRONG BRITISH COMMUNITY HERE. THE FIRST AND SECOND INTERESTS INTERACT BECAUSE ECONOMIC COOPERATION IS ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAYS WE AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE OF LOOSENING ANGOLA'S TIES WITH THE SOVIET BLOC.

2. OUR INTEREST IN LIMITING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA SUFFERED A MAJOR SET BACK WITH THE MPLA VICTORY IN 1975/76. BUT THAT SUCCESS HAS NOT BORNE FRUIT FOR THE RUSSIANS, IN SPITE OF A MAJOR INVESTMENT OF RESOURCES AND PRESTIGE. THEIR MPLA PROTEGES HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING THEMSELVES AS THE UNCHALLENGED GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THE RUSSIANS HAVE NOT OBTAINED THE NAVAL BASE THEY WANT. THE ANGOLANS ARE NOT PAYING THEIR DEBTS. WESTERN MULTI-NATIONALS RUN THEIR OIL AND DIAMOND PRODUCTION. THEY SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARDS ACCESSION TO LOME AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE IMF/IBRD. THEY ARE TAKING THE WESTERN, NOT THE SOVIET, PATH TOWARDS A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. THEY MAKE NO SECRET OF THEIR DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WEST GENERALLY AND TO KEEP OUT OF EAST-WEST CROSSFIRE.

3. ON THE FACE OF IT, OUR ANTI-SOVIET INTEREST WOULD BE FURTHER PROMOTED IF UNITA CAME TO POWER. THAT WOULD BE A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR THE RUSSIANS. SAVIMBI HAS OFTEN CHANGED TACK - FIRST HE WAS THE FNLA'S FOREIGN MINISTER, THEN A BLACK POWER/MAOIST CRUSADER AGAINST WHITE IMPERIALISM, THEN THE WOOER OF THE WHITES IN ANGOLA AFTER THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION AND FINALLY THE ALLY OF SOUTH AFRICA. BUT HE HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN HIS HOSTILITY TO THE RUSSIANS (AND SINCE 1975 THE CUBANS) AND HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO DENY THEM ANY ROLE IN ANGOLA.

4. IF MIPT IS CORRECT, HOWEVER, UNITA COULD ONLY COME TO POWER IN LUANDA WITH MAJOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT. AT PRESENT MOST OF SAVIMBI'S SUPPORT COMES FROM SOUTH AFRICA (SEE MY SECOND IPT). NO WESTERN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS HIM OVERTLY, THOUGH THE AMERICANS BELIEVE HE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST A SLICE OF THE PIE IN ANGOLA AND HE HAS RICH AND INFLUENTIAL FRIENDS IN A NUMBER OF WESTERN COUNTRIES.

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IN AFRICA, ONLY MOROCCO GIVES UNITA OPEN SUPPORT, THOUGH ZAIRE CONNIVES AT COMMUNICATIONS WITH, AND PERHAPS SUPPLIES TO, UNITA THROUGH ITS TERRITORY AND THERE MAY BE CLANDESTINE HELP FROM OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

5. A UNITA GOVERNMENT WHICH CAME TO POWER AS A RESULT OF INCREASED SUPPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND /OR THE WEST WOULD BE DAMNED IN AFRICAN EYES. THIS MAY BE ILLOGICAL, GIVEN EARLIER SOVIET/CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE MPLA, BUT IT IS A FACT OF LIFE. IT WAS SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN OCTOBER 1975 WHICH TURNED THE AFRICAN TIDE IN THE MPLA'S FAVOUR. IN SPITE OF THE MPLA'S FAILURES SINCE, I BELIEVE THAT WESTERN INTERVENTION WOULD RALLY ALL AFRICA TO THEM, THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA WOULD CONTINUE AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS DEFENDER OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY, WOULD HAVE HAD ITS INFLUENCE STRENGTHENED, NOT WEAKENED.

6. I CONCLUDE THAT THE CONTINUATION IN POWER OF THE MPLA, FOR ALL ITS FAULTS, OFFERS US THE BETTER PROSPECT OF REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ANGOLA. IT WILL BE A GREATER VICTORY TO CONVERT THE MPLA TO REAL NON-ALIGNMENT THAN TO INSTAL A UNITA GOVERNMENT. THERE IS A REAL PROSPECT THAT THE MPLA CAN BE TURNED ROUND (INDEED THAT PROCESS IS ALREADY UNDER WAY SEE PARA 2 ABOVE). BUT TO REALISE THIS PROSPECT WE NEED, ABOVE ALL, A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE ANGOLANS TO REDUCE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE RUSSIANS AND CUBANS AND TO DEVELOP THEIR ECONOMY WITH WESTERN HELP. IF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT CONTINUES TO ELUDE US, IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN ANGOLA. BUT I STILL THINK THAT CONTINUATION OF OUR PRESENT POLICY WOULD BE BETTER THAN PURSUING A WILL O' THE WISP OF A UNITA VICTORY.
FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

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
SIR J LEAHY

MR SQUIRE

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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Sir
JAMES S.R. SCOTT-HOPKINS
Member of the
European Parliament

Prime Minister
He has copied this to the
Foreign Secretary who will be
providing comment and a draft
reply.
A.F.C. 27/7

2 QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AA
01-222 1720
01-222 1729

mt

26th July 1983

Dear Margaret,

I have just returned from a visit to Dr. Savimbi in Angola. I was invited to go there together with three other M.E.Ps (one from France - d'Ormesson; Germany - Brock; Belgium - Beyer de Ryck). Originally Lord Chalfont was invited but did not reply.

The first intention was to try to use the four M.E.Ps as intermediaries in negotiations regarding the seven British mercenaries held by the M.P.L.A. and the twenty Czechs held by Unita. I persuaded my three colleagues - after talking to Geoffrey Howe - that this role was quite impossible. Therefore the visit, if it was to proceed, would be purely fact-finding. They agreed without hesitation.

The journey to Angola was from Geneva to Kinshasha, thence by a small two-engined 'plane into a Bush airstrip inside Angola. I was asked to keep the route secret. The flight from Kinshasha took four hours as the approach into Angola had to be from Botswana. From the Bush airstrip the journey by lorry across the Bush took 8½ hours to Unita's operational H.Q. It was quite the most hideous 300 kms. that I have ever travelled.

I should say here that on our arrival at Kinshasha we (the four M.E.Ps) were joined by a Paris-Match photographer and two French journalists. No word of this had been made known previously.

(I mention all these rather tedious journey details to emphasise the point that it was not a journey lightly undertaken but with a serious objective - though I doubt I would have gone if I had known about the journalists prior to leaving).

My impressions of Dr. Savimbi and his organisation and operational ability are as follows:-

- 1) He has an impressive personality. He was trained in guerilla operations and ideology a little in Moscow and for two years in China (I believe at the same time as Mugabe). He has imported all the well-tried tech-

niques of indoctrination into all his training and instruction cadres. He now is fervently anti-Communist and anti-Russia/Cuba.

- 11) He undoubtedly has a well-trying, well-armed force of what he calls "regular troops". The formations fight in uniform and, allowing for his exaggerated figure, number I guess between 3,000 and 5,000.
- 111) Beyond that he claims to control about 10,000 to 12,000 Guerillas whom he arms and directs. _____
- 1V) It appears to me that the command structure was sound and working. One striking fact was his communication set-up, operating captured radios and monitoring both Cuban and M.P.L.A. radio messages.
- V) The repair workshops were fairly efficient in restoring to working order captured weaponry of various types ranging from SAM 7's and sophisticated guns to simple rifles and mortars.

He gives the impression that these were the majority of his armaments. I very much doubt it as I saw a fair amount of N.A.T.O. weaponry and ammunition. I suspect a sizeable flow comes in either through South Africa, Botswana or Zaire, though I have no proof, except that the small 'plane that took us was loaded with ammunition on both journeys from Zaire.

- V1) Unita operates without the use of money of any kind, either for the military Guerillas or the civilian population in the villages. For the civilians a barter system operates; they grow the produce (be it vegetable or animal) and in return they receive clothes, hardware and items such as tobacco. For the military and Guerillas they receive clothes and food for their services.

Dr. Savimbi believes that they go into battle for patriotic reasons. I think it is the indoctrination which appears to mesmorise them. Certainly the recruits that I saw training were in that state, but I must admit efficient.

- V11) It is difficult to evaluate with any kind of certainty what is the real extent of his control of Angola. If I were to judge from the many maps in the Unita control H.Q. I would say that about a third of the country, that of the south-east, is under his direct control with absolutely no Cuban or M.P.L.A. pressure at all.

Further, about a third is under his Guerilla control, that being the central land mass extending up to the north-east, including the two railway lines which are non-operational. This entails bottling up the Cuban and M.P.L.A. troops in the towns and controlling by ambush and short sharp attacks any incursions or supply convoys in the countryside. The South African Army are controlling a small area deep down in the south-west.

The problem that I found was that the maps that I studied at Savimbi's H.Q. and those that I saw six months earlier at the South African Army H.Q. in the operational zone on the Angolan/Namibian border, did not match.

Of course a lot can happen in six months of guerilla warfare, but I suspect that the Cuban and East German control is greater than Unita is prepared to admit, though it is true that Unita did capture briefly the main town and centre of administration in central Angola a week or so before my arrival. Equipment and prisoners confirmed this.

- V111) Unita's future military plans, as far as can be disentangled from their propoganda, are a drive to the north-east up to the Zaire border, in order to capture and hold the diamond mines in that area to bring in much-needed funds.

It was during this part of the briefing by Savimbi that the news of the fifty British subjects emerged. They have been recruited recently by the M.P.L.A. using De Beers as agents to slow down the extent of smuggling, mainly by the Cubans. The export of diamonds to Russia is one of the important sources of income for the M.P.L.A. Unita's concern is that whilst quite confident that they can militarily take the area, they have no wish to have any confrontation with the British. Hence his request to me to attempt to get them removed.

It is true that this may well be all propoganda on Savimbi's part, probably it is in part. I came away convinced that there was almost certainly going to be quite a lot of fighting in the area, most possibly guerilla action. Savimbi claims to have 3,000 troops in the vicinity. I doubt that, but undoubtedly he has

infiltrated a largish guerilla force into the area. These British could well get caught in that kind of action.


Overall I believe that militarily Unita has made sizeable gains in recent months and seem poised for further expansion. For instance, their base supply camp near the bush airstrip was groaning with military hardware and ammunition. (They certainly were not dummies or mock-ups).

- 1X) Unita's future politically is easier to define. A typical African form of democracy entailing in the end a one-party State, benevolently perhaps, administering a mixed economy. Savimbi himself wishes a negotiation with the M.P.L.A. as soon as they have ejected the Cubans and East Germans. After negotiations he wishes to form a Government of National Reconciliation with, presumably, himself as President. Then to instal a mixed economy, which would guarantee private investment, but with the State owning the main assets (mineral).
- X) I raised with him the question of his present a future relations with SWAPO and Namibia. He accepted that he had helped train and arm SWAPO during the late 70's but because of a sequence of events, such as the South African Army raids into Angola on SWAPO bases and subsequent attacks by SWAPO units on several of his outposts (as SWAPO believed he had helped the South African Army intelligence, which he probably had). He has now turned against them and seems to be attacking their military bases whenever he believes they might cause a further South African raid. I think I believed him on this as the South Africans had told me six months previously that he had withdrawn his support of SWAPO in Angola (probably in return for logistical support by South Africa). I suspect that should he become in full control of Angola he will neutralise SWAPOs Angolan bases. The last thing he would want would be a SWAPO-controlled Namibia.

Finally I believe that there is a strong possibility that Savimbi and his Unita will make the progress they claim to be able to do and force the M.P.L.A. to the negotiating table. I was impressed by the quality of the men Savimbi has recruited around him, both from a military point of view and administratively. They are all left-wing, but very very able. Their organisation outside Angola surprised me,

both in its strength and size. It operates here in the U.K. and in France, Germany and the U.S.A. as well as many African States.

I think that the best chance of achieving stability in Southern Africa lies with Savimbi's Unita. There is one post-script I should add, namely that a U.S.A. delegation is about to visit Savimbi, comprising Congressmen and businessmen.

Yours ever,


The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
10, Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

c.c. The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 14 FEBRUARY

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VISIT OF ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. WHEN I GREETED PAULO JORGE AT THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING ON RETURN FROM LONDON HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE SATISFACTION WITH THE VISIT. IT HAD BEEN VERY FRUITFUL AND POSITIVE AND (IN HIS WORDS) WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE HAD VERY MUCH ENJOYED HIS MEETINGS WITH YOU AND WITH MR ONSLOW. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN THE HONOUR OF A LONG DISCUSSION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. (HE EMPHASISED WITH PLEASURE THAT IT HAD LASTED AN HOUR).
2. JORGE WAS DELIGHTED WITH THE EXCELLENT PROGRAMME AND MENTIONED ALL THE ENGAGEMENTS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS AS WELL AS THE MUSICAL AND THE RECEPTION WITH BUSINESSMEN. HE HAS ASKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR A LIST OF ALL WHO ATTENDED THE LATTER. HE SAID THAT WE COULD EXPECT MUCH FOLOW - UP WORK WITH THE OFFICE OF THE S-OF-S FOR COOPERATION.
3. JORGE WAS INTERESTED TO HEAR ABOUT MEDIA COVERAGE IN ANGOLA OF HIS VISIT. I EXPLAINED THAT NEWSPAPER, RADIO AND TV HAD COVERED IT PROMINENTLY EACH DAY BUT SO FAR WITHOUT PICTURES. GRATEFUL IF NEWS DEPT COULD LET US KNOW WHEN WE CAN EXPECT PHOTOS / TV RECORDINGS. HAVE BBC AND ITV BEEN IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH ANGOLAN TV?
4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTED WITH SOME AMUSEMENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNALISTS AT PRESS CONFERENCE. HE SAID WRYLY THAT BRITISH NEWSPAPER REPORTING HAD CONCENTRATED ON THE MERCENARIES.

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SIR. J. LEAHY
MR. SQUIRE

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Angola

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 February 1983

cc MASTER

Dear Roger,

Call by the Foreign Minister of Angola

The above called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. I enclose a copy of the record of the conversation and also of the message from the President of Angola to the Prime Minister which Mr. Jorge handed over in the course of the discussion.

Yours ever

John G. ...

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN
MINISTER OF ANGOLA AT 1445 HOURS ON FRIDAY 11 NOVEMBER 1983

Present: Prime Minister
Mr. Kennedy
Mr. Coles

Mr. Jorge
HE Mr. Luis De Almeida

* * * * *

Mr. Jorge said that he had just come from a very cordial lunch with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary with whom he had had a most interesting exchange of views. The Prime Minister enquired after the health of the President of Angola. She was grateful to Mr. Dos Santos for receiving Mr. Kennedy recently.

At this point Mr. Jorge handed over a message from the President of Angola about the situation in Southern Africa. The Prime Minister read the message and stated that we were doing our best to encourage a negotiated settlement in Namibia.

Mr. Jorge said that he attached particular importance to his first visit to the United Kingdom. He wanted to see how the bilateral relationship with Britain could be improved. The Angolan Government believed that the United Kingdom could play an important role in its efforts for national re-construction, particularly in the fields of industry, agriculture, energy and fish. He hoped that a general agreement could be drawn up on co-operation between the two governments and providing for a Mixed Commission. He had already had very fruitful meetings with British Ministers. Discussions had concentrated on the situation in Southern Africa, especially Namibia. The Angolan people were suffering from the continuous aggression committed by the Pretorian regime. Many Angolan lives had been lost. The effect of this situation on the economy was very serious. He had raised with other Ministers the possibility of the United Kingdom, as a gesture of solidarity, giving emergency aid to the Angolan

/ Government

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Government following a recent attack on a major dam which had provided electricity for three provinces. The generators and transformers had been completely destroyed.

Reverting to Namibia, Angola's position was based on United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 435. But new elements had been introduced by the United States, especially the American insistence on linking a Namibian settlement with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. Alone among the five-power Contact Group, the United States was insisting on this linkage.

The Prime Minister said that she believed that South Africa, in addition to the United States, was insisting on such a link. Mr. Jorge replied to the effect that South Africa had told the Angolans that the presence of Cuban troops was a matter for the United States and not for them. Angola had stated very clearly that once a cease-fire had been established in Namibia and the process of Namibian independence was moving forward, they would consider laying down a new programme for the withdrawal of Cuban forces. The Angolan President had said publicly that it was not the intention that Cubans should remain for ever. Angola would fulfil its undertakings but it could not do so until it had assurances that it would not be attacked by South Africa.

The Prime Minister said that she understood the Foreign Minister to be saying that the Cubans were in Angola solely to protect the country against external attack. Thus, if Angola could be certain that there would be no such attacks, then the Cubans would withdraw. Mr. Jorge confirmed that this was the Angolan position. The United States should allow Angola, as a sovereign country, to take its own decisions on the question of the Cuban presence. But he could give an assurance that Cuban withdrawal would take place in due course.

The Prime Minister asked what the role of the Cuban troops was. Mr. Jorge replied that the Cubans were training the Angolan army. If South Africa embarked on new aggressive moves, the Cubans would fight alongside the Angolans. He found it

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/ curious

D.R.
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curious that many people worried about the Cuban presence in Angola but said nothing about the South African occupation of part of Angola.

The Prime Minister said that we were playing our role within the Contact Group. Progress was slower than she had expected. At the time of the last Commonwealth Conference in Melbourne there was an expectation of a settlement within a year. Mr. Kennedy explained that the formal negotiations were largely completed. The main outstanding item was South African agreement to a date for a cease-fire. Mr. Jorge said that two alternatives had been put forward for a voting system. Both were acceptable to SWAPO. It was the American position that was blocking progress on the general issue.

Mr. Kennedy said that the Americans were pressing Angola to lay down now a detailed timetable for Cuban withdrawal. The Angolan position was that it would institute a timetable when there was concrete evidence of withdrawal. Mr. Jorge said that the Angolans could not accept the American demand. It was necessary to remember who the aggressor was. More than 10,000 Angolans had been killed. This was a high price to pay for the problem of Namibia which was not an Angolan matter but a problem for the international community. He could not understand how the independence of Namibia could be subordinated to the presence of Cubans in Angola. What moral basis was there for this American argument when the United States had troops all over the world? Why did the United States not show concern about the presence of French troops in various independent African countries?

The Prime Minister said that she was glad to have this first hand account of the Angolan position. She appreciated the strength of Angolan feeling. We should continue to be energetic members of the Contact Group. She would be interested to hear an account of the economic situation in Angola.

Mr. Jorge said that the situation was very serious. Angola's basic exports were oil, diamonds and coffee - but the world

CONFIDENTIAL

/ prices

CONFIDENTIAL

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prices of all three were down and production costs, particularly of diamonds, were high. Angola was rich in natural resources and was interested in securing United Kingdom participation in their exploitation. Investment and the inflow of modern technology were deterred by the current political and military situation in Angola.

Because of the serious economic situation, the Angolan Government was unable to give the people the essentials which they needed. There would be a discussion next week in the Central Committee of an emergency plan to cope with food and other problems. There was a great need for training of skilled personnel and the Angolans attempted to insert a special provision covering this in all aid programmes with foreign countries.

The Prime Minister recalled that she had sent to the President of Angola a message about the seven British citizens detained in Angolan prisons. We did not condone their mercenary activities. But they had been in prison for seven years. Other mercenaries who had been sentenced at a similar time had since been released. There was much Parliamentary and public interest in this matter and she would certainly be pressed about a solution in Parliament next week. She would be grateful if the Foreign Minister would convey these views to the President of Angola and say that she had listened carefully to Mr. Jorge's exposition of Angola's economic problems and that we should do what we could to help.

Mr. Jorge said that he had discussed this matter with the President before he left. The Angolan Government recognised that the British Government was making a serious effort to solve the problem of the mercenaries. Furthermore, the Angolan Government was very sensitive to the importance of the issue and to the feelings of the relatives of the mercenaries. We should find an appropriate moment that would enable the Angolan Head of State to exercise his prerogative of mercy. The Angolan public also had an interest in this matter - the mercenaries had killed Angolans. It was therefore necessary to act cautiously. But he

/ hoped

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hoped that perhaps in the course of 1983 the right moment would occur. The position of the American mercenaries who had been released was different - they had been part of an exchange involving Angolans from South Africa. Mr. Kennedy pointed out that the Angolans had also released some Portuguese mercenaries, not as part of an exchange.

Mr. Jorge repeated that he was sensitive to the wishes of the British Government. It was possible that his report of his visit to the United Kingdom would lead to further discussion of this matter. The problem was to find the right time for the exercise of mercy. But he was optimistic that the time would come.

The discussion ended at 1545.

A. J. C.

11 February 1983

CONFIDENTIAL



HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Visit of
His Excellency
Senhor Paulo Teixeira Jorge
Minister of External Relations
of the People's Republic of Angola

10 to 13 FEBRUARY 1983

His Excellency Senhor Paulo Teixeira Jorge, Minister of External Relations of the People's Republic of Angola, will be accompanied by:

Ambassador Luis De Almeida,
Ambassador of the People's Republic of Angola at Paris

Senhor Augusto Prata,
Director of the Department of Western Countries, Ministry of
External Relations

Senhor Florenico Almeida,
Director of the Department of Western Countries in the Secretariat of
State for Cooperation

Senhora Paula Rodrigues,
Private Secretary

In attendance:

Group Captain Anthony O'Neill—*Government Hospitality*

The visitors will stay at:

The Sheraton Park Tower
101 Knightsbridge, S.W.1

Programme

THURSDAY, 10 FEBRUARY

- 0930 hrs Arrive London Heathrow Airport by Flight BA 303 from Paris
Hounslow Suite
- Met by the Special Representative of the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Sir John Stow
- 0945 Leave the Airport by car
- 1030 Arrive Sheraton Park Tower
101 Knightsbridge, S.W.1
- 1130 Leave the hotel
- 1140 Arrive Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ambassadors' Entrance
- 1145 Call on the Minister of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Mr. Cranley Onslow, M.P.
- 1245 Leave Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- 1245 Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government
for
1300 Host: Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Mr. Cranley Onslow, M.P.
Lancaster House, St. James's, S.W.1
- 1440 Leave Lancaster House
(approx)
- 1500 Arrive House of Commons
Members' Entrance
- Attend Prime Minister's Question Time
- 1515 Call on the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
The Rt. Hon. Cecil Parkinson, M.P.

Continued on next page

THURSDAY, 10 FEBRUARY (Contd.)

1545 hrs Leave House of Commons

1555 Arrive Overseas Development Administration,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Eland House, Stag Place, S.W.1

1600 Call on the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs and Minister for Overseas Development,
The Rt. Hon. Timothy Raison, M.P.

Leave Overseas Development Administration

Arrive at the hotel

1745 Leave the hotel

1805 Arrive Admiralty House
Whitehall, S.W.1

1800 Supper given by Her Majesty's Government
for
1815 Host: The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, M.P.
Dress: Lounge Suit

1925 Leave Admiralty House

1930 Arrive New London Theatre
Parker Street, W.C.2

1945 Attend a performance of "Cats"

2215 Leave New London Theatre
(approx)

2230 Arrive at the hotel
(approx)

FRIDAY, 11 FEBRUARY

0925 hrs Leave the hotel

0940 Arrive Department of Trade
1 Victoria Street, S.W.1

0945 Call on the Minister of State for Trade and Minister
for Consumer Affairs,
Dr. Gerard Vaughan, M.P.

1030 Leave Department of Trade

1040 Arrive at the hotel

1140 Leave the hotel

1200 Arrive 1 Carlton Gardens

Talks with the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, M.P.

1300 Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government
for
1315 Host: The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, M.P.
1 Carlton Gardens, S.W.1

1430 Leave Carlton Gardens
(approx)

1445 Arrive at the hotel
(approx)

1500 Press Conference
Sheraton Park Tower

1915 Leave the hotel

1930 Arrive Royal Horseguards' Hotel
Whitehall Court, S.W.1

1930 Dinner given by the Tropical African Advisory Group
for
2000 Mr. Gordon Wilson
Dress: Lounge Suit

SATURDAY, 12 FEBRUARY

- 1000 hrs The Permanent Angolan Representative to the International Coffee Organisation, Mr. J. R. de Sousa Webba, will call on His Excellency the Minister at the hotel
- 1115 Leave the hotel
- 1245 Arrive Balliol College
Porter's Lodge, Broad Street, Oxford
- 1245 Luncheon
for Host: The Master of Balliol College,
1300 Dr. Anthony Kenny
Old Senior Common Room
- 1430 Leave Balliol College
(approx)
- 1600 Arrive at the hotel
(approx)
No official engagements

SUNDAY, 13 FEBRUARY

Departure details to be announced

The Special Representative of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Edwin Arrowsmith, will bid farewell

DIRECTORY

<i>Government Hospitality</i> 2 Carlton Gardens, S.W.1	01-214 8142
<i>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</i> Protocol and Conference Department	01-273 3585
Central African Department	01-233 5725
Ambassadors' Entrance	01-233 3160
<i>London Heathrow Airport</i> Hounslow Suite	01-759 4321 ext. 4337
<i>Sheraton Park Tower</i> 101 Knightsbridge, S.W.1	01-235 8050
<i>Lancaster House</i> St. James's, S.W.1	01-839 3488
<i>House of Commons</i>	01-219 3000
<i>Overseas Development Administration</i> Foreign and Commonwealth Office Eland House, Stag Place, S.W.1	01-213 3000
<i>New London Theatre</i> Parker Street, W.C.2	01-242 9802
<i>Admiralty House</i> Whitehall, S.W.1	01-218 3659
<i>Department of Trade</i> 1 Victoria Street, S.W.1	01-215 7877
<i>1 Carlton Gardens, S.W.1</i>	01-214 6352
<i>Royal Horseguards' Hotel</i> Whitehall Court, S.W.1	01-839 3400
<i>Balliol College</i> Broad Street, Oxford	0865-249 601

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY SENHOR PAULO TEIXERIA JORGE
MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
10-13 February 1983

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS (amendment to the Programme)

The following appointment will take place in the House of Commons

1525 Talks with The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP

ARRIVAL

His Excellency Senhor Paulo Teixeira Jorge will arrive at 0930 hours on British Airways flight 303 at LHR (Hounslow Suite).

As soon as the aircraft has come to a standstill, a member of the British Airports Authority will escort the Greeting Party to the bottom of the aircraft steps. When the Minister has alighted the Special Representative of the Secretary of State, Sir John Stow, will greet the Minister and introduce the following in order:-

Senhor Herminio Escorcio, Chairman of the Angolan National Oil Company

Miss Maureen Lawrence, Deputy Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund

Group Captain O'Neill, Government Hospitality Fund Escort Officer.

The party will then proceed to the VIP Suite.


Transport

The car plan throughout the programme will be as follows:-

1. HE The Minister
Ambassador De Almeida
Mr Kennedy
Special Branch Officer
2. Senhor Prata
Senhor Almeida
Senhora Rodrigues
Group Captain O'Neill

The Official Suite will accompany the Minister throughout the programme.

8 February 1983


Miss Anne Hutchison
Protocol and Conference Department

DISTRIBUTION

No 10 Downing Street

PS to the Prime Minister
Press Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PS
PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
Sir J Leahy
Mr W Squire
Mr Varcoe, SAfD
Central African Department (7)
News Department (2)
Colonel Durrant (4)
Miss D F Lothian
Protocol and Conference Department (6)
Resident Clerks
Head of Consular Department

Government Hospitality Fund

Brigadier J A C Cowan
Miss M Lawrence
Mr J Watt (2)

ODA

Mrs J Laurence, CSAD

Department of Trade

Mr B Steiner, OT5

ECGD

Miss J West,
Aldermanbury House
London EC2

Civil Service Medical Advisory Service

Dr Semmence

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

If you see him, there is a chance (no more) that we shall be able to persuade Angola to release the British mercenaries.

London SW1A 2AH

If you do not, the chances will be much reduced.

10 February, 1983

*John**Would you see him for 30 minutes on Friday?**A.S.C. 10/2**K-a**14/2*Visit by Paulo Jorge, Angolan Foreign Minister

The Prime Minister agreed, following my letter of 4 February, to send a message to President dos Santos of Angola to reinforce HM Ambassador's approach to the President over clemency for the British prisoners in Luanda. HM Ambassador was able to deliver the message to the President yesterday afternoon.

The President informed HM Ambassador that he would send a reply to the Prime Minister by hand of his Foreign Minister, Sr Paulo Jorge (who arrived this morning). As he left Luanda Sr Jorge said that he would be grateful if the Prime Minister could receive him briefly so that he can personally hand over the message.

In Mr Pym's view, there are two reasons in particular for acceding to Jorge's request:-

(i) The imprisonment of the seven British mercenaries is the most pressing problem we have in our relations with the Angolans. There is, as you know, considerable Parliamentary interest in them. Unlike the Americans, who managed to arrange for the release of two US prisoners in November last year in an exchange arrangement, we have not so far been successful in our efforts to persuade the Angolans to exercise clemency. The best chance we have is by following up the message which Mr Kennedy has delivered. We do not know the contents of the President's reply, and there is of course no way of being sure that Dos Santos is about to change his mind. But he is the man who will have to take the decision, whether now or later; and it will be important that we maintain access to him and seek to influence him. If Paulo Jorge's request to deliver the message personally is turned down, this will be very much more difficult and the prospects of persuading the Angolans to let the UK prisoners out will be reduced.

(ii) There is another important reason for maintaining good access to President dos Santos. Mr Kennedy has so far been able to act as a valuable means of contact with the Angolans for the Americans as well as ourselves in the wider context of the negotiations about Namibia; and we know that this is very much appreciated in Washington.



For both of these reasons Mr Pym believes there is a strong case in favour of the Prime Minister making a gesture to President dos Santos by offering Paulo Jorge a short call, and we should be very grateful to know whether this would be possible at some time tomorrow (he leaves London on 12 February).

/ I enclose a background note on the British prisoners, and on the Namibian issue, with our suggestions for a line to take on both.

You are
R B Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

Angela: Gehend 5th

JORGE, PAULO TEIXEIRA

Member of MPLA Central Committee and Peoples Assembly (November 1980). Minister of External Relations.

Born 1930.

Mulatto. Catholic.

Comes from a long established Portuguese/Angolan family from Benguela. Educated in Angola and Paris where he graduated in Chemistry and Engineering. Reputedly impressed a French chemical manufacturer in whose factory he had a temporary job to such an extent that he was offered the succession as Managing Director, but he declined.

By 1966 was already playing a leading part in the MPLA, then based in Brazzaville. Spent time as an MPLA representative also in Cairo, Algiers and Cuba. Subsequently MPLA Director of Information and Propaganda. Played a part in attempts to work out a form of unity between MPLA and FNLA under OAU auspices and signed agreement with FNLA Kinshasa in 1972.

1972-74 Fought in the bush war – Eastern Front. Associated increasingly with Agostinho Neto and became his Political Counsellor and later part of a four-man Presidential 'cabinet' at Independence.

November 1976 Appointed Minister of External Relations.

December 1977 Appointed Supplementary member of MPLA Central Committee.

December 1978 – MPLA Secretary for Cooperation (ie Overseas Assistance).

March 1981

September 1979 Appointed full member of MPLA Central Committee.

Speaks fluent French, Spanish, English and good Russian and some German.

Recreations include table tennis at which he is a skilled player.

Energetic, liked and respected by his staff (which remains tiny relative to the work-load), an able Minister by any standard. His cast of thought is Marxist and dialectic; his actual political position less easily defined. He has played a significant part in widening Angola's international contacts. But his views often appeared more radical than those of President Neto. Sessions with him can be tough, but invariably urbane and businesslike. He has been heard to regret his almost white colour. Undoubtedly this tells against advancement to the top of the Party which his ability could otherwise earn for him: it may also explain some of his more radical statements. He seems to have regular access to dos Santos, but his Ministry seems to be playing a less prominent role under the new President.

His wife is a Cuban, trained as an architect. They have two children.

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CALL BY ANGOLAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS ON THE PRIME
MINISTER: 11 FEBRUARY

BRITISH PRISONERS IN ANGOLA

LINE TO TAKE

Main Arguments

- (i) Grateful that following my message, your President was able to receive HM Ambassador to discuss this case.
- (ii) Do not condone. But in prison nearly seven years.
- (iii) New situation created by release of Portuguese mercenaries (worse crimes) and Americans (some in same group as British).
- (iv) Imprisonment real obstacle to improvement of UK/
Angolan relations: intense Parliamentary concern (as Senhor Paulo Jorge has heard during visit).
- (v) HMG deplore British citizens as mercenaries.

Other Arguments

- (vi) Fought for FNLA which now virtually defunct (not UNITA).
- (vii) Good behaviour in prison.
- (viii) Repeated high level appeals by HMG for act of clemency.

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CALL BY ANGOLAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS ON THE PRIME MINISTER:
11 FEBRUARY

BRITISH PRISONERS IN ANGOLA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. HM Ambassador, Mr Kennedy, was instructed to request an audience with President dos Santos at the end of last November to make further representations for clemency for the prisoners. The audience took place on Wednesday 9 February. Mr Kennedy delivered a message from the Prime Minister. Sr Jorge is to bring a reply from the President.

Background

2. Seven British and two American mercenaries, all of whom had fought for Holden Roberto's FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) in the north of Angola, were sentenced in Luanda on 28 June 1976 to different periods of imprisonment for 'the crime of being mercenaries'. A further three British mercenaries and an American were condemned to death and executed:

British

Constituent of:

Costas Georgiu	Executed	
Andrew McKenzie	Executed	
Derek Barker	Executed	
Kevin Marchant	30 years	Mr Cecil Parkinson
Michael Wiseman	30 years	Sir Derek Walker-Smith
John Lawlor	24 years	? Mr Julian Critchley
Colin Evans	24 years	Mr David Ginsburg
Cecil Fortuin	24 years	Mr W Homewood
John Nammock	16 years	Sir B Rhys Williams
Malcolm McIntyre	16 years	Mr Harvey Proctor /American

American

Daniel Gearhart	Executed
Gustabo Grillo	30 years
Gary Acker	16 years

3. Many high level representations have been made to the Angolan Government for the release of the British prisoners on humanitarian grounds, eg by Lord Carrington to Sr Paulo Jorge, the Angolan Foreign Minister, in November 1980 and by Mr Luce to President dos Santos in mid-June 1981.

4. Since May last year, our request for clemency for the prisoners has been buttressed by the fact that, following President Eanes' visit to Angola, three Portuguese prisoners were released. According to Mr Kennedy, they had been sentenced for more serious crimes than the British prisoners.

5. In November last year, as a result of long and complicated negotiations involving the USA, the Soviet Union, South Africa, Angola, UNITA and the International Committee of the Red Cross, a prisoner exchange took place in Lusaka. The two Americans, Grillo and Acker, were included in the exchange and are now back in America. Mr Kennedy was instructed to request an audience with President dos Santos and the Secretary of State sent a supporting message to Sr Jorge.

6. [Not for use]: The men were tried under the Angolan criminal code, based on Portuguese (Roman) law, and assuming guilt unless innocence can be established. HMG's conclusion at the time was

/ that

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- 3 -

that, in the sense in which we would understand the term, this was not a fair trial, given that there was no presumption of innocence and that much of the evidence was of a prejudicial nature; but it was in accordance with the Angolan system.

Central African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10 February 1983

RESTRICTED

CALL BY ANGOLAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS ON PRIME MINISTER:
11 FEBRUARY

NAMIBIA

LINE TO TAKE

British Commitment

1. We remain committed to an early Namibia settlement and are concerned about the delay. Within the Five and with the South Africans and Americans we have energetically pursued this. Willing to put ideas to Americans.

Cuban Withdrawal

2. We do not regard agreement for the withdrawal of Cuban troops as a pre-condition for Namibia's independence, and recognise that this is purely a decision for your Government. But we accept the political reality that South Africa and the United States do require such an agreement before implementation of UN Plan.

Angolan Security Concerns

3. We understand the importance of meeting Angolan security concerns. So do Americans. If you were to put specific ideas to them, I believe they would respond flexibly.

Angolan/South African Dialogue

4. Dialogue begun at Cape Verde is encouraging: welcome any move towards ceasefire and South African withdrawal from Southern Angola. But in our view to be stable any ceasefire must lead on to a wider settlement and implementation of UN Plan.

CALL BY ANGOLAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS ON PRIME MINISTER:
11 FEBRUARY

NAMIBIA

ESSENTIAL FACTS (NOT FOR USE)

US/Angola

1. So far no substantive change in the Angolan position on Cuban withdrawal. Before implementation of the UN Plan the US need agreement on a phased plan for Cuban withdrawal; the Angolans refuse to make any advance commitment or to agree to more than token withdrawal in last stages of UN Plan. Americans are unwilling to offer incentives until the Angolans start seriously negotiating on phased withdrawal.

Angola/South Africa


2. Bilateral discussion at Cape Verde last December dealt with South African proposals for a ceasefire followed by disengagement of South African and Cuban/SWAPO forces in Southern Angola. Both sides seem keen to continue, but date and place of next meeting not yet fixed.

3. Although we detect no give in the Angolan position on Cubans at present, a South African agreement to withdraw from Southern Angola could encourage Luanda to move on the Cuban issue.

4. A bilateral arrangement dealing with border issues and SWAPO as an interim alternative to, rather than a step towards, an early Namibia settlement might tempt both sides, (especially South Africa) but it would be unstable and unlikely to stick.

Southern African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
10 February 1983

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cc Master
Ops



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
GABINETE DO MINISTRO

TRANSLATION

Luanda, 9 February 1983

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T13^B183

Your Excellency,

COMRADE PAULO TEIXEIRA JORGE, a Member of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Workers' Party and Minister of External Relations of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, is visiting your country within the framework of the development of bilateral relations between our two countries and our desire to deepen the relations of friendship between our Peoples and States.

In addition to bilateral matters that Comrade Paulo Teixeira Jorge will discuss with the appropriate bodies of the British Government, he will take this opportunity to inform Your Excellency of the serious situation prevailing in Southern Africa, especially the persistent occupation of part of Angolan territory by the army of the racist South African regime, the impasse reached in the process of negotiations on the implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia's Independence and the Pretoria regime's aggressive policy against independent countries in the region.

HER EXCELLENCY MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN

L O N D O N



REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES
GABINETE DO MINISTRO

2.

Please give full credence to everything he tells you in my name and that of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, particularly when, expressing the feelings of the Angolan People, I extend my sincere good wishes for your good health and personal well-being and the assurances of my Highest Consideration.

- JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS -

PRESIDENT OF THE MPLA - WORKERS' PARTY

PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA



PRIMEIRO MINISTRO'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T13183

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Presidente da República

Luanda, aos 9 de Fevereiro de 1983

Excelência,

No quadro do desenvolvimento das relações bilaterais entre os nossos dois países e em que desejamos aprofundar os laços de amizade e cooperação entre os nossos Povos e Estados, visita o vosso País, o CAMARADA PAULO TEIXEIRA JORGE, Membro do Comité Central do MPLA - Partido do Trabalho e Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Governo da República Popular de Angola.

O Camarada Paulo Teixeira Jorge, além das questões bilaterais que tratará com as entidades competentes do Governo Britânico, aproveitará esta oportunidade para informar a Vossa Excelência sobre a grave situação que prevalece na África Austral, nomeadamente, a persistente ocupação de parte do território Angolano pelo exército do regime

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
SUA EXCELÊNCIA MARGARET THATCHER

PRIMEIRO MINISTRO DO REINO UNIDO DA GRÃ-BRETANHA

L O N D R E S

racista da África do Sul, o impasse que verifica no processo de negociações para a implementação do Plano da ONU para a Independência da Namíbia e a política agressiva do regime de Pretória contra os países independentes da região.

Peço que acredite em tudo quanto lhe disser em meu nome e no do Governo da República Popular de Angola, particularmente quando, ao manifestar os sentimentos do Povo Angolano lhe exprimir os melhores votos de saúde e de bem estar pessoal e os protestos da minha mais Alta Consideração.-



- JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS -

PRESIDENTE DO MPLA - PARTIDO DO TRABALHO
PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

PS

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

~~SIR L ALLINSON~~ MR SQUIRE

MR ADAMS

MR GILLMORE

HD/SAFD

HD/CAFD

HD/UND

HD/DEF D

HD/NEWS D

MR FREELAND LAGAL ADV. ^{WH. 216.} ~~Rm. K200A~~

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

D.R. Ford,

MR COLLINS D O T

MR A J S GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

~~PS/No.10~~ DOWNING STREET


RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUANDA 091645Z FEBRUARY 1983

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 94 OF 9 FEBRUARY



PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. I WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS THIS AFTERNOON. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND MADE THE REPRESENTATIONS IN THE TERMS INSTRUCTED SOLICITING THE RELEASE OF THE BRITISH PRISONERS. I LEFT WITH THE PRESIDENT A 'BOUT DE PAPIER' WHICH SET OUT THE REPRESENTATIONS.

2. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S CORDIAL AND HELPFUL MESSAGE. HE THANKED ME FOR MY EXPOSITION OF THE GROUNDS ON WHICH WE REQUESTED HIM TO EXERCISE AN ACT OF CLEMENCY ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH PRISONERS. HE WOULD INSTRUCT MINISTER PAULO JORGE TO CONVEY HIS REPLY.

3. THE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED AND WELCOMED THIS FACT. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD CONCLUDE A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER COULD DISCUSS WITH HMG THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT DURING HIS VISIT AND COULD AGREE UPON A DATE AND PLACE FOR THE FORMAL SIGNATURE.

4. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS SAID THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED AT THE TENSE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE WAS NOW PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. HE WAS LESS HOPEFUL THAN HE HAD BEEN SIX MONTHS AGO. THE

~~LESS HOPEFUL THAN HE HAD BEEN SIX MONTHS AGO.~~ THE REPEATED INSISTENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON A TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL TO BE DRAWN UP IN ADVANCE OF AN AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIA HAD BROUGHT THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A TOTAL STALEMATE. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD MADE COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO THE UNITED STATES BUT HAD RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED STATES NO REPLY TO THESE PROPOSALS.

5. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO EXERCISE AN ACT OF CLEMENCY IN FAVOUR OF THE BRITISH PRISONERS AND DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING SO NOW BUT HE HAD HOPED THAT SUCH AN ACT COULD HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF GREATER PROGRESS ON THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM. THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WERE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM SOUTH AFRICA. MERCENARIES, SOME OF RHODESIA ORIGIN, WERE SERVING WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES. HE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MISUNDERSTANDING THAT MIGHT ARISE AMONGST ANGOLANS IF HE DID NOT CHOOSE THE RIGHT MOMENT FOR RELEASING THE PRISONERS. THE RELEASE OF THE TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS HAD BEEN MADE ON A DIFFERENT LEVEL BECAUSE THAT HAD FORMED PART OF AN EXCHANGE INVOLVING SOVIET PRISONERS. BUT HE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WOULD HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT A GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED AND THERE HAD BEEN CRITICISM WITHIN THE MPLA LEADERSHIP FOR THE FACT THAT THE EXCHANGE HAD BROUGHT ABOUT NO IMPROVEMENT. HE EXPLAINED THESE POINTS ONLY SO THAT I SHOULD UNDERSTAND HIS POSITION. HE PROMISED TO CONVEY HIS REPLY THROUGH PAULO JORGE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE VISIT OF PAULO JORGE TO BRITAIN WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS.

6. I THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR AGREEING TO RECEIVE ME AND UNDERTAKING TO CONSIDER OUR REPRESENTATIONS. I EXPLAINED FRANKLY THE EMBARRASSMENT WHICH THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE BRITISH PRISONERS ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS CAUSED YOU AND MY GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT BRITAIN COULD HAVE BUT DID NOT DEMAND TO BE INCLUDED IN THE EXCHANGE OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET PRISONERS LAST YEAR. WE HAD RELIED INSTEAD UPON THE JUSTICE AND GENEROSITY OF THE PRESIDENT. WE SHOULD BE PLACED IN A VERY DIFFICULT DILEMMA IF IT SEEMED TO BRITISH MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, TO THE FAMILIES OF THE PRISONERS AND TO THE BRITISH PUBLIC THAT THIS RELIANCE HAD BEEN MISPLACED. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULTY WHICH YOU FACED AND REPEATED THAT OUR REPRESENTATIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

SUBJECT

T 1001/82

SERIAL NO. PERSONAL MESSAGE
MINISTER'S

cc Master
ops

CONFIDENTIAL

22 - 1

GRS 181
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 061813Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 72 OF 6 FEBRUARY

YOUR TELNO 72: PRISONERS

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I KNOW THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS IN THE MIDST OF DIFFICULT
AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AFFECTING THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY
OF ANGOLA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS. AS I SAID IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU
LAST JULY, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL DO ALL IT CAN TO
BRING ABOUT AN END OF TENSION AND BLOODSHED IN THE REGION.

I WELCOME THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON OF SR PAULO
JORGE, YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER. THIS WILL ENABLE FURTHER FRANK
DISCUSSION OF THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES.

I HOPE THE VISIT WILL ALSO LEAD TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN
OUR ALREADY FRIENDLY BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN THAT CONTEXT, YOU
WILL BE AWARE OF THE CONCERN IN THIS COUNTRY AT THE CONTINUED
DETENTION OF THE SEVEN BRITISH MERCENARIES.

I KNOW THAT HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR HAS SOUGHT AN AUDIENCE
OF YOU: I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY THE
REPRESENTATIONS HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE.

MARGARET THATCHER.

ENDS

PYM
LIMITED
CAFD
PS
PS/MRONSLW
SIR J LEAHY
MR SQUIRE

1
CONFIDENTIAL

E9 FEB 1961

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9 8 7 2
6 5 4 3

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Respatched to fco
17.45 hrs 6/2

We spoke earlier.

I should be grateful if you would despatch the attached message, approved by the Prime Minister, to Luanda as soon as possible.

Thank you.

Mal Kerr

Duty Clerk

6 February, 1983.

File No. _____
Department _____
Drafted by _____
(Block Capitals) _____
Tel. Extn. _____

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBY _____ Z

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched

(Date) _____
(Time) _____ Z

POSTBY _____ Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) _____ Z(G.M.T.)
(Security Class.) _____
(Codeword) _____
(Restrictive Prefix) _____
(Caveat/
Privacy Marking) _____
(Deskby) _____ Z

TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA
(precedence) (post) Tel. No. _____ of _____

AND TO (precedence/post) _____

AND SAVING TO _____

REPEATED TO (for info) _____

SAVING TO (for info) _____

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Your Tel No 72: PRISONERS

Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to the President as soon as possible.

Begins:

Dear Mr. President,

I know that your Government is in the midst of difficult and serious negotiations affecting the security and prosperity of Angola and its neighbours. As I said in my message to you last July, the British Government will do all it can to bring about an end of tension and bloodshed in the region.

I welcome the forthcoming visit to London of Sir Paulo Jorge, your Foreign Minister. This will /

plea to:-

enable further frank discussion of these important issues.

I hope the visit will also lead to further progress in our already friendly bilateral relations. In that context, you will be aware of the concern in this country at the continued detention of the seven British mercenaries.

I know that Her Majesty's Ambassador has sought an audience of you; I hope that you will consider sympathetically the representations he has been instructed to make.

Margaret Thatcher.

Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PS (6)
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
~~SIR J ALLISON~~ MR SQUIRE
MR ADAMS
MR GILLMORE
HD/SAFD
HD/CAFD
HD/UND
HD/DEF D
HD/NEWS D
MR FREELAND LAGAL ADV. Rm.K200A

DR FORD
MR ~~CONRAD~~ D O T
MR A J S GOODALL
CABINET OFFICE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

IMMEDIATE

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL
FM LUANDA 091200Z FEB 83
DECKBY 070230Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 82 OF 5 FEBRUARY

PAULO JORGE VISIT

1. PAULO JORGE WILL BE HOPING TO OBTAIN AN AFFIRMATION OF BRITISH SUPPORT FOR ANGOLAN SOVEREIGNTY AND A CONDEMNATION OF THE AGGRESSION AND ATTEMPTED SUBVERSION OF WHICH SHE IS THE VICTIM. HE IS LIKELY TO DEPLORE U S DEMANDS FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND TO SEEK A MORE EXPLICIT FORMULATION OF THE BRITISH POSITION ON LINKAGE THAN WE HAVE SO FAR GIVEN. HE MAY APPEAL FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT AND POSITIVE BRITISH POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND REGRET WHAT ANGOLA PERCEIVES AS A READINESS ON BRITAIN'S PART TO FOLLOW PASSIVELY IN THE WAKE OF THE U S.
2. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO PAULO JORGE IN THE COURSE OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS (AS WELL AS PRESSING HOME THE CASE OF THE PRISONERS):-
 - (1) THE FIRST VISIT TO BRITAIN BY AN ANGOLAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS IS A LANDMARK IN OUR RELATIONS
 - (2) EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIFIC CASE OF THE BRITISH EX-MERCENARIES THERE ARE NO SERIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS
 - (3) BRITAIN UNEQUIVOCALLY RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RPA. WE DEPLORE THE EXTERNAL AGGRESSION WHICH ANGOLA HAS SUFFERED IN RECENT YEARS AND REGARD THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF A PORTION OF ANGOLAN TERRITORY BY THE ARMED FORCES OF ANOTHER COUNTRY AS ILLEGAL AND UNJUSTIFIED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF ANGOLA ARE MATTERS FOR ANGOLANS ALONE TO DECIDE AND WE DEPLORE THE INVOLVEMENT BY ANY FOREIGN POWERS IN ACTS OF SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSION AGAINST ANGOLA
 - (4) BRITAIN'S SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA IS POSITIVE AND UNQUALIFIED. WITHIN THE CONTACT GROUP AND IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA WE HAVE PURSUED WITH ENERGY AND CONSISTENCY THE GOAL OF EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435
 - (5) SINCE "LINKAGE" HAS BECOME SOMETHING OF A TEST WORD IN CURRENT POLITICAL VOCABULARY WE WISH TO MAKE OUR POSITION ON IT CLEAR AND BEYOND DOUBT. IT IS BRITAIN'S WISH TO SEE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENT AND ANGOLA SECURE AND AT PEACE WITH HER NEIGHBOURS. BRITAIN DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT NAMIBIA'S INDEPENDENCE SHOULD BE MADE CONDITIONAL UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA OR UPON ANY OTHER EXTERNAL FACTOR. BUT THAT INDEPENDENCE CANNOT BE SECURED WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RSA. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA IS SERIOUS IN INSISTING UPON AN AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES BEFORE IT IS WILLING TO IMPLEMENT SCR 435. WE HAVE NEVER CONDONED THAT POSITION BUT WE BELIEVE THAT EXISTS. IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS ABANDON OR MODIFY THIS DEMAND AND PROCEED TO IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435 WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY OR CONDITION WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED
 - (6) BRITAIN REGARDED THE JOINT ANGOLA/CUBA COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 4 1982 AS AN IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT. BRITAIN DOES NOT DOUBT THE SINCERITY OF ANGOLA'S ASSURANCE THAT CUBAN TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN ANGOLA ONLY SO LONG AS THE EXTERNAL THREAT TO HER SECURITY REQUIRES THEIR PRESENCE. WE WELCOME THAT ASSURANCE.
 - (7) BRITAIN HAS WELCOMED ALSO THE RESUMPTION OF HIGH-LEVEL DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RPA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RSA. WE HOPE THAT THE TALKS LEAD TO EARLY AGREEMENT UPON MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

MENT OF THE RGA. WE HOPE THAT THE TALKS LEAD TO EARLY AGREEMENT UPON MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA.

(3) HMG HAS A HIGH REGARD FOR THE STATESMANSHIP AND COURAGE OF PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS AND HOPE THAT PAULO JORGE WILL CARRY MESSAGE TO HIM. IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE SPECIFIC WAYS IN WHICH BRITAIN COULD HELP TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON NAMIBIA AND ON REGIONAL PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WE HOPE THAT MR PAULO JORGE WILL SAY SO.

(3) BRITAIN IS AN ALLY AND FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES BUT ANGOLA WOULD BE QUITE WRONG TO THINK THAT IN THE FORMULATION OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY EITHER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA OR ELSEWHERE BRITAIN FOLLOWS PASSIVELY THE LEAD OF THE U.S. WE HAVE WORKED TO MAINTAIN THE COHESION AND PURPOSE OF THE CONTACT GROUP. WE HAVE CONSTANTLY ENDEAVOURED TO BRING HOME TO THE U.S. THE REALITIES OF ANGOLA'S POLITICAL SITUATION. IN THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THERE HAVE BEEN TIMES WHEN THIS ROLE HAS BEEN IMPORTANT.

(10) HMG AS A MAJOR MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WELCOMES ANGOLA'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS FOR LOME III AND REGARDS THIS AS AN IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL STRAND TO UK/ANGOLA RELATIONS.

(11) HMG APPRECIATED ANGOLA'S CAREFUL STANCE WHICH SHE ADOPTED DURING THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT, NOTWITHSTANDING HER CLOSE TIES WITH CUBA AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE NAM.

(12) HMG WOULD WELCOME THE EARLY ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ANGOLAN EMBASSY IN LONDON.

3. YOU WILL WISH TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION AND THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE PROMISED VISIT BY MINISTER DO NASCIMENTO.

4. YOU WILL RECALL THAT PAULO JORGE INVITED YOUR PREDECESSOR TO VISIT ANGOLA BEFORE HE WAS INVITED TO LONDON. YOU MAY WISH TO THANK HIM FOR THIS QUOTE WAIVER OF PROTOCOL UNQUOTE. PAULO JORGE WILL PROBABLY RENEW THE INVITATION AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FEEL ABLE TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE. ANGOLA HAS RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT BRITAIN IS LESS INTERESTED IN HER THAN OUR EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURS ARE. IN CONTRAST TO THE HIGH LEVEL AND CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH THERE HAS BEEN NO BRITISH MINISTER IN ANGOLA SINCE JUNE 1991 EVEN THOUGH SEVERAL MINISTERS HAVE VISITED NEIGHBOURING ZIMBABWE. A VISIT BY YOU WOULD REMOVE THESE MISAPPREHENSIONS.

5. PAULO JORGE MAY RAISE QUESTION OF DEFENCE SALES TO ANGOLA (SEE MY RECENT TELEGRAMS).

6. THE QUESTION OF UNITA MAY BE RAISED. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE HAVE EXPRESSED UNEASE OVER UNITA'S "ACTIVITIES" IN LONDON. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS. WE ASSUME THAT THERE IS NO THREAT TO PAULO JORGE'S PERSONAL SECURITY BUT SPECIAL BRANCH MAY WISH TO CHECK THAT POINT. WE HOPE THAT ANY ATTEMPTS BY PRO-SAVIMBI MEMBERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY CAN BE DISCOURAGED FROM SOURING THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE VISIT OR FROM GETTING ACROSS A DISTORTED VIEW OF THE ANGOLAN POLITICAL SITUATION TO THE BRITISH MEDIA.

KENNEDY

NNNN

Prime Minister



If you agree to send this Foreign and Commonwealth Office message, would the duty clerk be told over the weekend please?

London SW1A 2AH

4 February 1983

(I do not think you need commit yourself to seeing the Angolan Foreign Minister).

Dear John,

A.J.C. 1/2

Agree - please let duty clerk know if not

Our Ambassador in Luanda has been waiting for some weeks for an audience with the President of Angola to press for the release of seven British ex-mercenaries who have been imprisoned in Luanda since 1976. There has, as you know, been growing Parliamentary concern at their continued detention ever since the release at the end of last year (in a general exchange of prisoners) of Americans sentenced at the same time and on the same charges as them.

Our Ambassador has reported that his chances of seeing the President in the next few days will be greatly strengthened if he could convey a message from the Prime Minister. Mr Pym would see considerable value in this. In Parliamentary terms, it would be helpful to have the meeting out of the way by 9 February, when Mr Harvey Proctor MP, who has an imprisoned mercenary among his constituents, has a question on Angola down for oral answer. It would also help to set the scene for the visit of the Angolan Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge, who will be in London from 10-13 February. We will certainly be taking up the question of the mercenaries with Sr Jorge, but would not want this to overshadow the visit, given the need to keep open our lines to the Angolans on the (ultimately much more important) question of Namibia, and in view of the useful trade prospects that could follow from a general settlement in the region.

I would be grateful if the Prime Minister's agreement to send a message along the lines of the attached draft could be sought as soon as possible. The Resident Clerk will be ready to despatch this over the weekend if the Prime Minister is content.

If the message issues, there is a chance that a reply from President dos Santos will be sent back via Sr Jorge. If this proves to be so, it would be helpful to know whether the Prime Minister would be willing to receive him briefly, preferably on Friday 11 February, to take delivery of it.

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq,
10 Downing Street.

OUT TELEGRAM

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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PRE/ADD
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6 FM FCO 041950Z FEBRUARY 83
7 TO IMMEDIATE LUANDA
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

9
10 YOUR TELNO 72: PRISONERS

11 1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister
12 to the President as soon as possible.

13 Begins:

14 Dear M. ^ePresident,

15 I know that your Government is in the midst of difficult
16 and serious negotiations affecting the security and prosperity
17 of Angola and its neighbours. As I said in my message to you
18 last July, the British Government will do all it can to bring
19 about an end of tension and bloodshed in the region.

///
//
/

21 I welcome the forthcoming visit to London of
22 Sir Paulo Jorge, your Foreign Minister. This will enable
23 further frank discussion of these ^{important} ~~international~~ issues.

25 I hope the visit will also lead to further progress in our

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword already
File number	Dept P. OFFICE	Distribution
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		
Telephone number 233-464L		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Page 2
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
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1 <<<<
2 already ~~warm and~~ friendly bilateral relations. In that
3 context, you will be aware of the concern in this country at the
4 continued detention of the seven British mercenaries.
5 I know that Her Majesty's Ambassador has sought an audience of
6 you; I hope that you will consider sympathetically the
7 representations he has been instructed to make.

Margaret Thatcher
Ends.

8
9
10 ~~2. For your own information only, if the President sends a~~
11 ~~personal reply back with Jorge, the Prime Minister is in~~
12 ~~principle ready to see him for a few minutes to receive the~~
13 ~~message.~~

14
15 PYM
16 NNNN



///

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34

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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RESTRICTED

FM LUANDA 041520Z FEB 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 78 OF 4 FEBRUARY
AND TO DOT

VISIT OF ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER.
CALL ON MINISTER FOR TRADE.

1. STEINER HAS RECENTLY VISITED ANGOLA AND OT5 HAVE A DETAILED PICTURE OF COMMERCIAL SITUATION IN ANGOLA.
2. THE GENERAL BACKGROUND IS A DISAPPOINTING COMMERCIAL PERFORMANCE BY BRITAIN AN ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT MARKET. THE LANDROVER ASSEMBLY OPERATION AND THE DIAMOND TRADING COMPANY'S MANAGEMENT OF ANGOLA'S DIAMOND INDUSTRY HAVE ENCOUNTERED ACUTE DIFFICULTIES. NO BRITISH COMPANY HAS SECURED A DIRECT STAKE IN ANGOLA'S EXPANDING OIL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION INDUSTRY. OUR MARKET SHARE HAS BEEN FALLING IN COMPARISON WITH THAT OF LEADING COMPETITORS NOTABLY FRANCE.
3. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING EFFORTS TO ARREST AND REVERSE THIS TREND AND THE VISIT OF PAULO JORGE CAN MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS. HE SHOULD BE REMINDED OF THE SEMINAR ON ANGOLA HELD IN 1982, THE ARTICLE IN TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND THE FORTHCOMING OIL SEMINAR AND THE FORTHCOMING BAE. WE SHOULD TELL HIM OF THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO AN EARLY VISIT BY DO NASCIMENTO. I RECOMMEND THE MINISTER HAND TO JORGE A LETTER TO DELIVER TO NASCIMENTO STRESSING HOPE HE WILL VISIT SOON AND MENTIONING MIXED COMMISSION/ MINISTERIAL DOT VISIT TO ANGOLA ETC. ETC.
4. I RECOMMEND THAT WE EMPHASISE OUR EAGERNESS TO DEVELOP CLOSER COMMERCIAL COOPERATION THROUGH THE AGENCY OF THE MIXED COMMISSION AND BY DIRECT CONTACT INDUSTRY TO INDUSTRY. WE SHOULD BRIEFLY REVIEW THE AREAS OF BRITISH INDUSTRY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WHICH WE HAVE ESPECIAL STRENGTH OR WHICH ARE ESPECIALLY RELEVANT TO ANGOLA'S NEEDS INCLUDING CONSULTANCIES.
5. WE SHOULD PUT IN A PLAY FOR PROJECTS OF SPECIAL VALUE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION SUCH AS BROWN AND ROOT FABRICATION YARD, BOOKER COFFEE PROPOSALS, TATE AND LYLE SUGAR PROJECT, HAWKER SIDDLEY GENERATING EQUIPMENT PROGRAMME, BAE 146, IAL BID FOR AIRPORT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AT LUANDA, THE MALANGE RAILWAY PROJECT. WE SHOULD ALSO (WITH MOD GUIDANCE) STRESS OUR WILLINGNESS TO DO MORE IN DEFENCE SALES AND ASK FOR HIS VIEWS. FOLLOW UP BETWEEN TWO MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE COULD BE SUGGESTED. SEE ALSO OUR TEL 75.
6. WE SHOULD HAMMER THE POINT THAT WE CANNOT HELP IF WE ARE NOT GIVEN THE INFORMATION AND THAT SOMETIMES IT SEEMS TO REQUIRE AN EFFORT OF INVESTIGATION TO IDENTIFY WHAT ANGOLA'S ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES ARE IN SPECIFIC TERMS. WE HOPE THAT THE MIXED COMMISSION WILL BRING A GREAT IMPROVEMENT. WE EXPECT EQUAL TREATMENT WITH OUR COMPETITORS AND SHOULD ASK FOR AN ASSURANCE THAT WE SHALL RECEIVE THIS. WE MIGHT QUOTE THE CASE OF IAL WHERE WE WERE TOLD BY OFFICIALS THAT IAL WAS THE FAVOURED COMPANY BUT THAT A DIRECTIVE HAD BEEN ISSUED TO INTRODUCE COMPANIES OF

RESTRICTED

/ OTHER

RESTRICTED

OTHER NATIONALITY FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

7. JORGE COMES FROM BENGUELA. HE MAY HAVE A SPECIAL INTEREST IN MATTERS SUCH AS BENGUELA RAILWAY AND EMERGENCY ELECTRICITY SUPPLY FOR BENGUELA LOBITO AREA.

8. I PRESUME THAT SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF MORE IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL FIRMS INTERESTED IN ANGOLA WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET PAULO JORGE AT ONE OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. LORD JELlicoe OF T AND L, SIR ROBIN HOOPER OF TANKS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF SHELL, BROWN AND ROOT, JARDINE GLANVILLE HARBERT UK, IAL, BRITISH AEROSPACE, BRITOL, BP, HAWKER SIDDELEY POWER PLANT, BOOKERS, FREDERICK PARKER, ICI PHARMACEUTICALS AND THE LEADING BANKS EG LLOYDS AND MERCHANT BANKS SUCH AS MORGAN GRENFELL, HULL BLYTHE INCHCAPE AND BLACKWOOD HODGE COULD BE CONSIDERED.

9. WE MIGHT MAKE SPECIAL MENTION OF OUR FINANCIAL EXPERTISE AND OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH BANCO NACIONAL DE ANGOLA. THE BANK OF ENGLAND MIGHT ALSO BE INVITED.

KENNEDY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA

STANDARD
CAF D
OADS
MCAD
UND
NAD
WED
ECD
ES & SD
TRED

MR SQUIRE
MR THOMAS
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO:
D.O.T.

2
RESTRICTED



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

31 August 1982

Thank you for your letter of 26 August about Namibia and Angola.

The Prime Minister agrees that no further letter to President Dos Santos is now needed. She agrees with your assessment that the American belief in a breakthrough may be premature. It seems to the Prime Minister that the gap is still very wide. Angola does not appear to be considering a Cuban withdrawal until after Namibian independence (other than a token gesture before), and even afterwards there is no timescale. The United States on the other hand is seeking Cuban withdrawal in parallel with progress towards Namibian independence and completion at virtually the same time.

Timothy Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

↗



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*If seems to me that the gap is very wide. People will not withdraw the Cuban troops until there is no hard line proposed...
 Namibia will not withdraw until there is no hard line proposed...
 The U.S. wants 26/8 Namibia with descent and complete withdrawal of troops. Mrs Thatcher with descent and complete withdrawal of troops. Mrs Thatcher with descent and complete withdrawal of troops.*

Dear Tim,

Namibia and Cuba/Angola

You will have seen the reports from Luanda on the meeting between our Charge d'Affaires and the Angolan President on 24 August, when President Dos Santos asked for a message to be transmitted to the Prime Minister in reply to Mrs Thatcher's letter of 23 July. You will also have seen President Machel's claim to have played a central part in helping along the US/Angolan negotiations on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. (I enclose copies of Luanda telnos 411 - 413 and Maputo telno 265.)

It is clear that the Angolans are at last addressing the issues seriously; the Americans think they have achieved a breakthrough, but this may be premature. It is not yet possible to say whether the final Angolan position will be sufficiently forthcoming to meet the minimum American criteria as to what the South Africans - and President Reagan - will accept. Mr Pym has accordingly concluded that a further message from the Prime Minister to President Dos Santos would not be appropriate at this stage; but we have instructed our Charge d'Affaires in Luanda to convey the Prime Minister's thanks for President Dos Santos's message and for his Government's helpful attitude in these negotiations. We are taking a similar line with President Machel, who appears to have used his influence with Dos Santos in a helpful way.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

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DESKBY 241800Z
FM LUANDA 241510Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 24 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MAPUTO

ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/CUBA: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS SUMMONED ME TODAY FOR 45 MINUTES ALONE EXCEPT FOR AN INTERPRETER.
2. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL RETURN TO DELIVER IT. HE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO TRANSMIT THE REPLY TO MR KENNEDY BUT IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY HAD SUMMONED ME.
3. HE COMMENTED ON NEW YORK. INDICATIONS THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT ONLY TWO MAIN ISSUES REMAINED: THE ELECTION SYSTEM AND DATE FOR A CEASEFIRE. ALL OTHERS HAD BEEN AGREED WITH SOUTH AFRICA ACCORDING TO THE CONTACT GROUP. THIS WAS POSITIVE NEWS. BUT ACCORDING TO INDICATIONS RECEIVED DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION WOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITHOUT A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA. IN THAT CONTEXT THE ANGOLANS HAD HAD RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR WISNER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THIS IN MAPUTO THE DAY BEFORE WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL. BECAUSE MACHEL HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM THE U S AND BRITAIN ABOUT THE CUBAN PRESENCE HE WOULD ALSO BE CONTACTING HEADS OF U S AND BRITISH MISSIONS IN MAPUTO. ON THE CUBAN ISSUE ANGOLA'S STAND WAS VERY CLEAR AND HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE HAD BROUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.
4. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS WISHED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
5. ANGOLA DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY AN ISSUE WAS BEING MADE OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS. WHY HAD IT BEEN TRANSPOSED INTO A PROBLEM? IN ANGOLA'S VIEW THERE NEVER HAD BEEN A PROBLEM. ANGOLA HAD NEVER SAID THAT THE CUBANS WOULD NEVER LEAVE. THE CUBANS THEMSELVES HAD ALSO NEVER SAID THAT. FOR ANGOLA THE ISSUE HAD NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM BECAUSE THEY HAD NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN PEACE. WHENEVER ANGOLA HAD INTENDED TO REDUCE CUBAN FORCES SOUTH AFRICA HAD INTENSIFIED MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS HAD HAPPENED IN 1976 IN PRESIDENT NETO'S TIME WHEN THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD INTENSIFIED AGGRESSION WHEN HE WAS TALKING TO CASTRO. IN 1980 AFTER A PROGRAMME OF WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH CUBA SOUTH AFRICA HAD ATTACKED LUBANGO.
7. IN THIS STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS ANGOLA OF COURSE LACKED CONFIDENCE BECAUSE OF SUCH PAST ATTACKS. WHO COULD ASSURE ANGOLA TODAY AGAINST ATTACK?
8. ANGOLA OBSERVED THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT HAD ADVANCED TO SUCH A STAGE THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. ANGOLA WAS READY TO GIVE HER FULLEST CONTRIBUTION, EG AS REGARDS SWAPO AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 435. IF THIS HAPPENED A NEW SITUATION WOULD BE REACHED.

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9. THE ANGOLANS HAD SAID TO THE RECENT U S DELEGATION THAT UNDER THE NEW CONDITIONS DURING PHASE III ANGOLA COULD CONSIDER MAKING A FIRST WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS, EG WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN NAMIBIA WERE REDUCED TO 1500 AND THE OTHERS HAD WITHDRAWN SOUTH OF THE ORANGE RIVER. AS REGARDS THE REMAINDER OF CUBAN TROOPS THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION. THERE WOULD BE U N TROOPS IN NAMIBIA AND A COMPLICATED SITUATION: ANGOLA DID NOT KNOW HOW THE SITUATION WOULD DEVELOP ALTHOUGH THEY WANTED EVERYTHING TONO GO WELL.

10. SECONDLY THEY HAD DISCUSSED WALVIS BAY WITH THE AMERICANS. ANGOLA ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE A SOUTH AFRICAN ENCLAVE POST INDEPENDENCE BUT WANTED TO BE SURE THAT NO FORCES FROM THERE WOULD ATTACK ANGOLA. THE FACT WAS THAT WITHIN NAMIBIA THERE WOULD STILL BE THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS POST INDEPENDENCE.

11. A THIRD FACTOR EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN THAT AFTER INDEPENDENCE THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ONLY BE STRONG POLITICALLY. AS A NEW GOVERNMENT THEY WOULD HAVE NO ARMED FORCES, POLICE, SECURITY FORCES OR BORDER POLICE AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO ACHIEVE THEM.

12. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS ANGOLA WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINDER OF CUBAN TROOPS WHICH ACTED AS A DETERRENT. AFTER INDEPENDENCE NAMIBIA WOULD ESTABLISH NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA AND A MODUS VIVENDI WOULD BE CREATED WITH REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICA.

13. THIS WAS THE WAY THAT THE ANGOLANS LOOKED AT THE ISSUE. THERE WAS NO LACK OF GOODWILL BUT A WISH TO SAFEGUARD ANGOLA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGRESSION. AS REGARDS INTERNAL PROBLEMS THESE WOULD BE SOLVED WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

14. IF THERE WAS EXTERNAL AGRESSION ANGOLA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DEFEND HERSELF. IF BRITAIN WAS ATTACKED BY FOREIGN FORCES SHE COULD CALL ON HER FRIENDS IN NATO. FEW COUNTRIES COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES. IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE WE HAD HAD AT LEAST THE POLITICAL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. ANGOLA LIVED IN FRIENDSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES: THEY HAD CALLED ON THEIR FRIENDS TO GUARANTEE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. ANGOLA WAS NOT ALIGNED AND RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND CUBA WERE ON THE BASIS OF TWO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. ANGOLA WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. ANGOLA HAD ASKED FOR EXTERNAL MILITARY SUPPORT IN 1975 BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICA HAD INVADED, AN EXTERNAL FORCE. WITHOUT EXTERNAL AGRESSION AND INTERFERENCE ANGOLA COULD SOLVE HER PROBLEMS.

15. TO SUM UP ANGOLA AND CUBA THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD DISCUSS THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS WHEN THE SITUATION WAS FAVOURABLE. THEY COULD OBSERVE THE SITUATION EVOLVING GRADUALLY. AS SOON AS THE FIRST REDUCTION HAD TAKEN PLACE CUBA AND ANGOLA COULD ESTABLISH A NEW CALENDAR. THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO REAFFIRM THAT THE IDEA OF A CALENDAR HAD ALREADY BEEN THERE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ANGOLA HAD NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO FULFIL THE PROGRAMME BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL FORCES.

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16. AFTER DELIVERING THIS ORAL MESSAGE THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THE MESSAGE FROM THE U S STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED BEFORE THE WISNER VISIT (WASHINGTON TELNO 022 TO LUANDA) AND ASKED THAT WE TRANSMIT A REPLY. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

17. I PROMISED TO TRANSMIT THESE MESSAGES URGENTLY. I APOLOGISED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT ABAILABLE PERSONALLY. NEVERTHELESS THE PRESIDENT COULD REST ASSURED THAT OUR FULLEST EFFORTS WERE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND PEACE. THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL RETURN WERE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT.

18. I SAID IT WAS NOT OUR ROLE TO INTERFERE IN THE COMPLEX AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND THE UNITED STATES. AS THE AMBASSADOR HAD SAID HOWEVER WE WERE GOOD FRIENDS WITH ANGOLA AND WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS OUR DUTY TO HELP THE AMERICANS SEE THE REALITIES OF ANGOLA'S REQUIREMENTS AND ALSO TO PROVIDE WHATEVER COMMENTS AND INSIGHTS THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO THE PARTIES. IT SEEMED TO US THERE WERE DEFINITE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA (AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES) WHICH HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD. OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT SOME AGREEMENT WAS NEEDED ON THE CUBAN ISSUE IF NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WAS TO BE ACHIEVED.

19. I ALSO REFERRED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENT ON RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS IN SOUTH ANGOLA. WE HAD CONDEMNED THIS VIOLENCE AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE AND MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT NO PARTY SHOULD TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE PERIOD BEFORE A CEASE-FIRE: RATHER THEY SHOULD OBSERVE RESTRAINT. WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS UP TO AT PRESENT IN THE SOUTH BUT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN LIMITED AND INTENDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES, EG VIS A VIS SWAPO, RATHER THAN A PRECURSOR TO A MAJOR OPERATION.

20. I ASKED THE PRESIDENT WHETHER HE WAS OPTIMISTIC. HE SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC BUT HAD OBSERVED AN ENGAGEMENT ON ALL SIDES INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA, SOMETHING WHICH HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE PAST. SO WE WERE PERHAPS NEARER A SETTLEMENT THAN BEFORE.

21. SEE COMMENT IN SECOND IFT.

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Luanda message to
US in P21

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DESKBY 241800Z
FM LUANDA 241530Z AUG 62
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 412 OF 24 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT

US/ANGOLA: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS REFERRED TO THE MESSAGE FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED THROUGH THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO AMBASSADOR WISNER'S VISIT (WASHINGTON TELNO 022 TO LUANDA) WHICH INCLUDED REFERENCE TO CBI. HE SAID ANGOLA HAD MORE OR LESS AGREED THE ITEMS RELATING TO THE CBI WITH THE U S BUT THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHIC PARALLELS. THE U S DELEGATION HAD SUGGESTED AS A COMPROMISE THE LINE OF DEFENCE OF MOCAMEDES AS THE POINT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AND PLAN SWAPO FORCES WITHIN ANGOLA. THE PRESIDENT WISHED ME TO CONVEY TO THE U S GOVERNMENT THAT HE ACCEPTED THE MOCAMEDES LINE OF DEFENCE AS A COMPROMISE SOLUTION.
2. THE PRESIDENT ALSO WISHED ME TO CONVEY THAT HE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MEETING OF MILITARY OFFICIALS IN CAPE VERDE TO FINALISE DETAILS OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE PERIOD OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION.
3. GRATEFUL WASHINGTON INFORM THE STATE DEPARTMENT. I DID NOT ASK ABOUT TIMING OR PRACTICAL DETAILS AS REGARDS CAPE VERDE. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE CAPE VERDE AMBASSADOR DELIVERED A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY FROM PRESIDENT PEREIRA OF CAPE VERDE.

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Luanda: Comment
on Dos Santos
interview

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DESKBY 241800Z
FM LUANDA 241512Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 413 OF 24 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MAPUTO

MY TELNO 411: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS:COMMENT

1. I DID NOT ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ADDRESSED ORALLY WITHOUT NOTES TO THE PRIME MINISTER WERE ALSO INTENDED FOR THE AMERICANS AS A FOLLOW UP TO THE WISNER VISIT. I ASSUME FROM THE CONTEXT (IE EXPLAINING WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS) THAT IT WAS NOT BUT WISNER MAY GIVE A CLEARER INDICATION OF NEXT STEPS WHEN BRIEFING THE CONTACT GROUP.
 2. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE HAD MADE AN IMPACT. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A FURTHER ENCOURAGING REPLY.
 3. PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTRODUCTORY HISTORICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ANGOLAN POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO HIS DISCOVERY THAT WE HAD LOBBIED MACHEL. NEVERTHELESS DOS SANTOS WAS IN GOOD HUMOUR AND VERY RELAXED AND REASONABLE EVEN CHUCKLING AT SOME POINTS WHEN DESCRIBING THE COINCIDENCES BETWEEN ATTEMPTS AT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS.
 4. THE EXACT SCENARIO AS PAINTED IN PARA 15 OF T U R WAS NOT CLEAR BUT EVEN TO SAY THAT ANGOLA WOULD CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL OF SOME CUBANS WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD REACHED 1500 STRONG WITHIN NAMIBIA IS A REAL ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMS AN APPEAL TO US TO UNDERSTAND ANGOLA'S WORRIES AND THE LIMITS TO THE CONCESSIONS SHE CAN REASONABLY MAKE.
 5. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSIDER WHATEVER BRIEFING THE AMERICANS HAVE GIVEN IN LONDON AND WASHINGTON BEFORE DECIDING THE LINE TO TAKE WITH THE AMERICANS. ON THE FACE OF IT THIS IS REAL PROGRESS AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM NOT TO PUSH TOO MUCH FURTHER.
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FM MAPUTO 241330Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 265 OF 24 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND LUANDA
INFO PRIORITY OTTAWA, DAR ES SALAAM, PARIS, BONN, PRETORIA,
LUSAKA, GABORONE AND HARARE.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 253(NOT TO ALL): NAMIBIA.

1. I WAS CALLED TODAY TO SEE PRESIDENT MACHEL WHO TOLD ME THAT PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS HAD ARRIVED IN MAPUTO EARLIER THAN EXPECTED (PARA 2 OF MY TUR) AND THAT HE HAD HAD A LONG DISCUSSION BOTH TETE A TETE AND ALSO WITH HIS DELEGATION. AS HE HAD PROMISED ME HE HAD PERSUADED DOS SANTOS THAT IT WAS VITALLY NECESSARY TO REMOVE ANY OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435. THE ANGOLANS' FIRST REACTION WAS THAT THEY HAD NO REASON WHATSOEVER TO TRUST THE U S GOVERNMENT, WHO WERE THE CLOSEST ALLIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS , WHO WERE GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SAVIMBI AND UNITA, AND ABOVE ALL WHO HAD VETOED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION OF ANGOLA. HOWEVER, THEY HAD ACCEPTED MACHEL'S ADVICE AND WERE NOW READY TO ACCEPT THE PROCEDURES SET OUT IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER. THEY WOULD WRITE TO HIM GIVING THE GUARANTEES OF A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA HINTED AT IN HIS LETTER. THEY WERE PREPARED TO TEST THE GOOD FAITH OF THE U S GOVERNMENT AND OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE R S A . THE ANGOLANS AND MOZAMBICANS BELIEVE THAT IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO PROCEED INTO STAGE 3 OF THE PROCESS UNDER SCR 435.

2. COMMENT: MACHEL WAS AT HIS MOST JOVIAL. HE PRAISED HMG FOR THE FRANKNESS OF THE APPROACH WHICH WE HAD MADE TO HIM. THIS IN COMPARISON WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER WHICH HAD SIMPLY DESCRIBED THE SITUATION WITHOUT ASKING, AS WE HAD DONE , FOR HIS (MACHEL'S) HELP. HE PRAISED ME FULSOMELY FOR THE CLARITY OF MY EXPOSITION AND YOU SIR, FOR YOUR INITIATIVE. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IN A STATE OF EUPHORIA OVER HIS SUCCESS WITH THE ANGOLANS (ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT HE WAS BATTERING AT AN OPEN DOOR) AND CLEARLY FEELS THT

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HE HAS BROUGHT OFF A MAJOR COUP. I BELIEVE THAT HE HAS DELIVERED
A REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO THE U S CHARGE BUT
I DO NOT YET KNOW THE CONTENTS.

3. IF WHAT HE HAS TOLD ME IS TRUE , AND IF THE ANGOLANS DO NOT
HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD SEND A MESSAGE OF
THANKS TO PRESIDENT MACHEL FOR HIS INTERVENTION.

F C O PLEASE PASS ALL

STEWART

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

Repetition to.....LUANDA.....
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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COMMUNICATIONS

UNITED STATES

NAMIBIA: ADVANCE COPIES 13

Angola

PS
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PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY

MR A J S GOODALL CABINET OFFICE
PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

~~SIR J ALLINSON~~
MR. SQUARE

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HD/PUSD

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FM LUANDA 241512Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 413 OF 24 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MAPUTO

MY TELNO 411: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS:COMMENT

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- FCO PLEASE PASS

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MR A J S GOODALL CABINET OFFICE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

PS
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

~~SIR L ALLISON~~

MR SQUIRE

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MIPT

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MR A J S GOODALL CABINET OFFICE

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET

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PS/PJS

SIR J LEAHY

SIR J ALLINSON

MR SCURIE

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FM LUANDA 241510Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 411 OF 24 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MAPUTO

ANGOLA/NAMIBIA/CUBA: PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

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3. HE COMMENTED ON NEW YORK. INDICATIONS THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT ONLY TWO MAIN ISSUES REMAINED: THE ELECTION SYSTEM AND DATE FOR A CEASEFIRE. ALL OTHERS HAD BEEN AGREED WITH SOUTH AFRICA ACCORDING TO THE CONTACT GROUP. THIS WAS POSITIVE NEWS. BUT ACCORDING TO INDICATIONS RECEIVED DISCUSSIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION WOULD NOT GO FORWARD WITHOUT A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA. IN THAT CONTEXT THE ANGOLANS HAD HAD RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR WISNER AND THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THIS IN MAPUTO THE DAY BEFORE WITH PRESIDENT MACHEL. BECAUSE MACHEL HAD RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM THE U S AND BRITAIN ABOUT THE CUBAN PRESENCE HE WOULD ALSO BE CONTACTING HEADS OF U S AND BRITISH

CUBAN PRESENCE HE WOULD ALSO BE CONTACTING HEADS OF U S AND BRITISH MISSIONS IN MAPUTO. ON THE CUBAN ISSUE ANGOLA'S STAND WAS VERY CLEAR AND HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THE AMBASSADOR WHEN HE HAD BROUGHT THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE.

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8. ANGOLA OBSERVED THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT HAD ADVANCED TO SUCH A STAGE THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. ANGOLA WAS READY TO GIVE HER FULLEST CONTRIBUTION, EG AS REGARDS SWAPO AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 435. IF THIS HAPPENED A NEW SITUATION WOULD BE REACHED.

9. THE ANGOLANS HAD SAID TO THE RECENT U S DELEGATION THAT UNDER THE NEW CONDITIONS DURING PHASE III ANGOLA COULD CONSIDER MAKING A FIRST WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS, EG WHEN SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN NAMIBIA WERE REDUCED TO 1500 AND THE OTHERS HAD WITHDRAWN SOUTH OF THE ORANGE RIVER. AS REGARDS THE REMAINDER OF CUBAN TROOPS THAT WOULD DEPEND ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION. THERE WOULD BE U N TROOPS IN NAMIBIA AND A COMPLICATED SITUATION: ANGOLA DID NOT KNOW HOW THE SITUATION WOULD DEVELOP ALTHOUGH THEY WANTED EVERYTHING TO GO WELL.

10. SECONDLY THEY HAD DISCUSSED WALVIS BAY WITH THE AMERICANS. ANGOLA ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE A SOUTH AFRICAN ENCLAVE POST INDEPENDENCE BUT WANTED TO BE SURE THAT NO FORCES FROM THERE WOULD ATTACK ANGOLA. THE FACT WAS THAT WITHIN NAMIBIA THERE WOULD STILL BE THE PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS POST INDEPENDENCE.

11. A THIRD FACTOR EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN THAT AFTER INDEPENDENCE THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD ONLY BE STRONG POLITICALLY. AS A NEW GOVERNMENT THEY WOULD HAVE NO ARMED FORCES, POLICE, SECURITY FORCES OR BORDER POLICE AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO ACHIEVE THEM.

SECURITY FORCES OR BORDER POLICE AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO ACHIEVE THEM.

12. FOR OBVIOUS REASONS ANGOLA WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE REMAINDER OF CUBAN TROOPS WHICH ACTED AS A DETERRENT. AFTER INDEPENDENCE NAMIBIA WOULD ESTABLISH NORMAL RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA AND A MODUS VIVENDI WOULD BE CREATED WITH REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICA.

13. THIS WAS THE WAY THAT THE ANGOLANS LOOKED AT THE ISSUE. THERE WAS NO LACK OF GOODWILL BUT A WISH TO SAFEGUARD ANGOLA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY AGAINST EXTERNAL AGRESSION. AS REGARDS INTERNAL PROBLEMS THESE WOULD BE SOLVED WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

14. IF THERE WAS EXTERNAL AGRESSION ANGOLA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DEFEND HERSELF. IF BRITAIN WAS ATTACKED BY FOREIGN FORCES SHE COULD CALL ON HER FRIENDS IN NATO. FEW COUNTRIES COULD DEFEND THEMSELVES. IN THE FALKLANDS ISSUE WE HAD HAD AT LEAST THE POLITICAL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. ANGOLA LIVED IN FRIENDSHIP WITH OTHER COUNTRIES: THEY HAD CALLED ON THEIR FRIENDS TO GUARANTEE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. ANGOLA WAS NOT ALIGNED AND RELATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND CUBA WERE ON THE BASIS OF TWO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. ANGOLA WAS NOT A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. ANGOLA HAD ASKED FOR EXTERNAL MILITARY SUPPORT IN 1975 BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICA HAD INVADED, AN EXTERNAL FORCE. WITHOUT EXTERNAL AGRESSION AND INTERFERENCE ANGOLA COULD SOLVE HER PROBLEMS.

15. TO SUM UP ANGOLA AND CUBA THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD DISCUSS THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS WHEN THE SITUATION WAS FAVOURABLE. THEY COULD OBSERVE THE SITUATION EVOLVING GRADUALLY. AS SOON AS THE FIRST REDUCTION HAD TAKEN PLACE CUBA AND ANGOLA COULD ESTABLISH A NEW CALENDAR. THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO REAFFIRM THAT THE IDEA OF A CALENDAR HAD ALREADY BEEN THERE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ANGOLA HAD NEVER BEEN ALLOWED TO FULFIL THE PROGRAMME BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL FORCES.

16. AFTER DELIVERING THIS ORAL MESSAGE THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO THE MESSAGE FROM THE U S STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED BEFORE THE WISNER VISIT (WASHINGTON TELNO 022 TO LUANDA) AND ASKED THAT WE TRANSMIT A REPLY. SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

17. I PROMISED TO TRANSMIT THESE MESSAGES URGENTLY. I APOLOGISED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS NOT ABAILABLE PERSONALLY. NEVERTHELESS THE PRESIDENT COULD REST ASSURED THAT OUR FULLEST EFFORTS WERE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND PEACE. THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SPECIAL RETURN WERE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT.

18. I SAID IT WAS NOT OUR ROLE TO INTERFERE IN THE COMPLEX AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ANGOLA AND THE UNITED STATES. AS THE AMBASSADOR HAD SAID HOWEVER WE WERE GOOD FRIENDS WITH ANGOLA AND WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE UNITED

THE AMBASSADOR HAD SAID HOWEVER WE WERE GOOD FRIENDS WITH ANGOLA AND WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS OUR DUTY TO HELP THE AMERICANS SEE THE REALITIES OF ANGOLA'S REQUIREMENTS AND ALSO TO PROVIDE WHATEVER COMMENTS AND INSIGHTS THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO THE PARTIES. IT SEEMED TO US THERE WERE DEFINITE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA (AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES) WHICH HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD. OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT SOME AGREEMENT WAS NEEDED ON THE CUBAN ISSUE IF NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WAS TO BE ACHIEVED.

19. I ALSO REFERRED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE STATEMENT ON RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS IN SOUTH ANGOLA. WE HAD CONDEMNED THIS VIOLENCE AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE AND MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THAT NO PARTY SHOULD TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE PERIOD BEFORE A CEASE-FIRE; RATHER THEY SHOULD OBSERVE RESTRAINT. WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS UP TO AT PRESENT IN THE SOUTH BUT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN LIMITED AND INTENDED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES, EG VIS A VIS SWAPO, RATHER THAN A PRECURSOR TO A MAJOR OPERATION.

20. I ASKED THE PRESIDENT WHETHER HE WAS OPTIMISTIC. HE SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC BUT HAD OBSERVED AN ENGAGEMENT ON ALL SIDES INCLUDING SOUTH AFRICA, SOMETHING WHICH HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE PAST. SO WE WERE PERHAPS NEARER A SETTLEMENT THAN BEFORE.

21. SEE COMMENT IN SECOND IFT.

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AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA

US-ANGOLAN BILATERAL TALKS

I HAVE TRIED THIS WEEK TO URGE UPON PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS THE IMPORTANCE OF REACHING AN EARLY AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND TO GET SOME FEEL FOR THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NEGOTIATIONS AMONGST OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ANGOLAN LEADERSHIP. AS WELL AS THE PRESIDENT I HAVE SPOKEN TO LARA, NASCIMENTO AND DA MOURA. LARA IS THE LEADING IDEOLOGICAL HARDLINER IN THE MPLA AND NASCIMENTO A KEY MINISTER. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME IMPRESSIONS AND COMMENTS:

1. I BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS ACCEPTS THAT THERE MUST BE EARLY AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IF THE NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT IS TO GO FORWARD AND IS ANXIOUS TO REACH ONE.
2. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES IMPELLING THE ANGOLANS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT ARE AS STRONG AS EVER.
3. DESPITE THEIR DESPERATE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT THE ANGOLANS ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF THEIR VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION. THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO ANY TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHICH IN THEIR VIEW SERIOUSLY WEAKENS THEIR EXTERNAL SECURITY OR ENDANGERS THE SURVIVAL OF THE MPLA GOVERNMENT.
4. IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPLICIT WESTERN GUARANTEES AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ATTACK I SEE NO POSSIBILITY WHATEVER OF PERSUADING THE ANGOLANS TO AGREE TO A PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN AND CUBAN FORCES WITHIN THE PERIOD OF IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 435. EVEN WITH GUARANTEES SUCH A TIMETABLE WOULD NOT BE EASY TO SELL
5. THE ANGOLANS SEEM ADAMANT THAT UNITA MUST BE EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY INSIST THAT SOUTH AFRICA MUST AGREE TO CEASE ALL ASSISTANCE TO UNITA. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS IN INITIATING SERIOUS QUOTE RECONCILIATION UNQUOTE TALKS YET SEEM PREPARED TO ADMIT AT LEAST IMPLICITLY THE RELEVANCE OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE TO THE UNITA PROBLEM.
6. IF THE AMERICANS WOULD AGREE TO THE ANGOLANS RETAINING A CUBAN RESERVE FORCE OF MODEST SIZE FOR A PERIOD AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS IN NAMIBIA THEY MIGHT (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE ANGOLANS TO AGREE TO PARTIAL (BUT SUBSTANTIAL) WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES WITHIN THE IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD.
7. THE IDEA OF FRANCE (OR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRY) ACTING AS A SURETY FOR ANY ANGOLAN UNDERTAKINGS OF WITHDRAWAL SEEMS TO ME WORTH PURSUING.
8. THE AMERICANS AND ANGOLANS APPEAR TO HAVE COME AWAY FROM THE SECOND ROUND OF WALTERS TALKS EQUALLY DISAPPOINTED AND DISSATISFIED.
9. THERE IS A STRONG CASE FOR AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS BUT THE ANGOLANS WILL EXPECT A SIGNIFICANT QUOTE IMPROVEMENT UNQUOTE IN THE U S PROPOSALS ON TIMETABLING.

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10. THERE MIGHT BE ADVANTAGE IN THE U S IN THE NEXT ROUND NAMING A DATE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

11. THE U S NEED TO THINK HARD ABOUT HOW TO MEET THE ANGOLAN FEARS ON SECURITY. SOME TENTATIVE IDEAS:

(A) COULD THE US GIVE SOME KIND OF GENERAL, PERHAPS PRIVATE, ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL USE THEIR BEST ENDEAVOURS TO SEE THAT ALL PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOUTH AFRICANS RESPECT ANY COMMITMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS ENTERED INTO? A FORM OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RECOGNITION OF ANGOLA'S SOVEREIGNTY (UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 1169) IS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY. BUT SOME KIND OF EXTERNAL ASSURANCE FOR ANGOLA'S SECURITY FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE CUBAN LEGIONS COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON ANGOLA'S RESPONSE TO REVISED PROPOSALS.

(B) WOULD IT BE WORTHWHILE ENCOURAGING THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO ENTER INTO SECRET BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE ANGOLANS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING ON AVOIDING BOTH CROSS-BORDER AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION FOLLOWING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE?

(C) THE U S MIGHT OFFER SOME SYMBOLIC GESTURE TO COINCIDE WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE THEY COULD OFFER TO FINANCE AND CONSTRUCT THE BRIDGE OVER THE CUNENE AT XANGONGO WHICH HAS BEEN TWICE DESTROYED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THIS MIGHT HAVE SENTIMENTAL APPEAL - QUOTE A BRIDGE OF PEACE UNQUOTE ETC.

12. IF THE AMERICANS DECIDE THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS ARE TO BE THE QUOTE BIG PUSH UNQUOTE FOR FINAL AGREEMENT I WOULD THINK (THOUGH THIS IS OBVIOUSLY NOT OUR BUSINESS) THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGE IN DR CROCKER REJOINING THE TEAM. GENERAL WALTERS HAS DONE A FIRST CLASS JOB IN RESTORING A BADLY NEEDED ELEMENT OF TRUST IN U S INTENTIONS BUT IN THE FINAL ROUNDS DR CROCKER'S NEGOTIATING SKILLS AND AUTHORITY WOULD BE IMPORTANT FACTORS.

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INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN WASHINGTON

ANGOLA

1. MY CONVERSATION WITH PAULO JORGE THIS MORNING WAS A SAD, EVEN MOVING, OCCASION.
2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR OUR STATEMENT ON THE REPORT PUT OUT BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON THE MILITARY OPERATION CARRIED OUT IN ANGOLA LAST MONTH.
3. THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE ANGOLAN AUTHORITIES KNOW THAT THE ATTACK ON THE LUANDA REFINERY WAS A COMMANDO RAID LAUNCHED BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THEY HAD IN THEIR POSSESSION CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, MUCH OF WHICH THEY HAD NOT PUBLICLY REVEALED.
4. PAULO JORGE WENT ON TO TALK IN A GENERAL AND DISCURSIVE WAY ABOUT THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH HE FACED. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT DISGUISE FROM ME THAT ANGOLA WAS NOW IN A VERY SERIOUS ECONOMIC SITUATION. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE NOW BENT UPON THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF ANGOLA. HE HAD BEEN GIVING THE MATTER MUCH THOUGHT AND WAS DRIVEN TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SOUTH AFRICA COULD NOT PURSUE TO SUCH LENGTHS SO EXTREME A POLICY WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM SOME OTHER SOURCE AND HE WAS NOW CONVINCED THAT WASHINGTON WAS FUNDAMENTALLY HOSTILE TO ANGOLA. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY BUT THE CONCLUSION WAS INEVITABLE. ANGOLA KNEW THAT THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED UNITA BUT HAD IT BEEN NECESSARY TO RECEIVE SAVIMBI LAST WEEK BY SO MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE US GOVERNMENT? HE FOUND IT HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY ANGOLA SHOULD BE THE CENTRE OF SO MUCH EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT HER MINERAL WEALTH JUSTIFIED THIS INTERVENTION.
5. I LIMITED MY COMMENTS TO A REMINDER THAT YOU HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THIS SUMMER BRITAIN'S SYMPATHY FOR ANGOLA IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL ATTACK AND THAT OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAD MADE SIMILAR EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY. I SAID THAT I HOPED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD NOT LOSE ALL CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS PLAYING A CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. I SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES BEING MOTIVATED BY INTEREST IN ANGOLA'S MINERAL WEALTH. THE UNITED STATES WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMINANT POLITICAL PRESENCE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SEEMED SOMETIMES TO BE ACQUIRING. PAULO JORGE COULD NOT SEE WHY IT WAS MORE ACCEPTABLE THAT WESTERN NATIONS SHOULD HAVE A DOMINANT INFLUENCE THAN EASTERN NATIONS. I SAID THAT WHILST WE RESPECTED THE RIGHT OF EVERY COUNTRY TO DEVELOP ITS OWN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IT WAS PART OF OUR CONVICTION THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES IN KIND BETWEEN THE INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE INFLUENCE WHICH THE SOVIET UNION EXERCISED. THE ONE PERMITTED A DEGREE OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE WHICH WE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SECOND ALLOWED.

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6. PAULO JORGE SAID TO ME THAT HE WAS STILL PONDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REFINERY RAID AND WHAT HE BELIEVED TO BE THE DIRECTION OF UNITED STATES POLICY AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY TOWARDS ANGOLA. HE WARNED ME THAT AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS ANALYSIS HE MIGHT BE FORCED TO TAKE UP ATTITUDES WHICH I WOULD REGARD AS HARD.

7. PAULO JORGE IS OBVIOUSLY A WORRIED MAN AND THIS GOVERNMENT IS IN SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE ANGOLANS WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES EVEN MORE FIRMLY TO THE SOVIET UNION. I BELIEVE THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE PLACING IN JEOPARDY OUR NAMIBIA STRATEGY. AS I READ HIM PAULO JORGE IS COMING ROUND TO THE VIEW THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S AIM IS THE FORCIBLE OVERTHROW OF THE MPLA GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SECRETLY SANCTIONED THAT POLICY. FROM THIS HE INFERS THAT WHILST FOUR OF THE MEMBERS OF THE FIVE ARE IN GOOD FAITH THE REAL PURPOSE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OF THE UNITED STATES IS SIMPLY TO USE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO BUY TIME WHILST THE PROCESS OF DESTABILISATION IS PRESSED TO ITS CONCLUSION.

8. IF THESE DANGERS ARE TO BE MINIMISED SOME SORT OF SIGNAL THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT APPROVE OF VIOLENT ATTACK UPON ANGOLA WOULD BE HELPFUL. THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT AT THEIR LUSAKA MEETING PRESIDENT KAUNDA WILL URGE DOS SANTOS NOT TO LOSE HEART AND WILL RECALL THAT IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE ZIMBABWE SETTLEMENT ZAMBIA WAS SUBJECTED TO EXCEPTIONALLY VIOLENT ATTACK FROM RHODESIA. NEVERTHELESS I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NOW A DANGER THAT THE ANGOLANS WILL DECIDE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS THEIR IMPLACABLE ENEMY WITH WHOM IT IS POINTLESS TO NEGOTIATE, WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE FIVE.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 563 OF 1 DECEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK CAPE TOWN PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK LUSAKA
DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE SALISBURY LAGOS KINSHASA WASHINGTON
INFO SAVING LISBON

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REFINERY

1. A SENIOR EXPATRIATE EXECUTIVE AT THE REFINERY TOLD ME THAT THE ATTACK WAS CAREFULLY PREPARED AND ORGANISED. THE RAIDING PARTY HAD DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAY-OUT OF THE REFINERY AND PROBABLY ENTERED WHEN THE NIGHT SHIFT WAS CHANGING AT 2300 HOURS ON SUNDAY.
2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT ROCKETS FIRED FROM BAZOOKA TYPE WEAPONS MAY HAVE BEEN USED AGAINST SOME OF THE TANKS AND THAT IN ONE CASE THE ROCKET PENETRATED THE TANK BUT DID NOT EXPLODE THE CONTENTS. THE FUEL LEAKED FROM THE TANK AND WAS IGNITED AS IT SPREAD OUT. THE RAID IS BELIEVED TO HAVE ABORTED PARTIALLY WHEN ONE OF THE RAIDERS SLIPPED AND DETONATED THE CHARGES HE AND POSSIBLY OTHER COMPANIONS WERE CARRYING. THREE FEET WERE IDENTIFIED AND THEREFORE IT IS BELIEVED THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE RAIDERS WERE KILLED. BEFORE THIS MISHAP TINED CHARGES HAD ALREADY BEEN PLACED AGAINST A NUMBER OF TANKS AND THESE SUBSEQUENTLY DETONATED. HAD THE ACCIDENT NOT OCCURRED THE REFINERY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN TOTALLY DESTROYED. THIS RESULT WOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED HAD THE RAIDERS KNOCKED OUT THE WAZER PUMPING STATION.
3. THE ATTACK IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY SOME PANIC AND MANY OF THE ANGOLAN REFINERY STAFF FLED. LAST NIGHT IN SPITE OF DANGER OF A FOLLOW-UP RAID TO FINISH OFF REFINERY AND NEARBY

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INSTALLATIONS NO ADDITIONAL GUARDS HAD BEEN PLACED ON THE REFINERY OR THE PIPELINE TO THE NEARBY KWANZA FIELD. COMPLAINTS WERE MADE TO FAPLA BY EXPATRIATE MANAGEMENT. (THIS IN SPITE OF VISIT OF PRESIDENT EARLIER IN DAY AND VISITS BY A SUCCESSION OF MOST SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS.)

4. AMONG THE EXPLOSIVES WHICH WERE NOT DETONATED ONE IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE MAIN SUPPLY PIPE TO THE TANKER INSTALLATION IN THE HARBOUR. THE DESTRUCTION OF THIS FACILITY WOULD HAVE BROUGHT REFINING OPERATIONS TO A HALT FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD.

5. DURING LAST NIGHT (30 NOVEMBER /1 DECEMBER) SOME OIL CONTINUED TO ENTER THE REFINERY FROM THE KWANZA FIELD BECAUSE VALVES HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY CLOSED. THIS OIL BEGAN TO FEED THE FIRE AND ANOTHER STORAGE TANK EXPLODED IN EARLY HOURS OF THIS MORNING AS A RESULT OF HEAT. ALL IS NOW BELIEVED TO BE UNDER CONTROL.

6. YOU MAY RECALL THAT IN BOOK FIRE POWER BY EX MERCENARY A PLAN FOR ATTACKING LUANDA REFINERY FROM THE HARBOUR WAS DISCUSSED.

7. ALTHOUGH NOT REPORTED IN TODAY'S JORNAL DE ANGOLA LOY ALLEGED THAT QUOTE NORTH AMERICAN IMPERIALISM UNQUOTE SHARED WITH SOUTH AFRICA RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK.

8. THIS COMMANDO RAID CAME VERY CLOSE TO PLUNGING ANGOLA INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS AND LOY WAS RIGHT IN IMPLYING THAT IF IT HAD SUCCEEDED IT MIGHT WELL HAVE LED TO THE TOTAL DESTABILISATION OF THE COUNTRY.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 741 OF 16 SEPTEMBER

RPTD INFO ROUTINE LUANDA, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, WASHINGTON,
UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAPETOWN.

MS

LUANDA TELNO 412 TO FCO: AFRICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ANGOLA

1. THE TANZANIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER HERE (PLEASE PROTECT) IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE LAGOS MEETING OF FRONT LINE STATES FOCUSED LARGELY ON THE QUESTION OF AFRICAN MILITARY AID. IF WAS FELT THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL WAS LEFT IN OAU HANDS IT WOULD COME TO NOTHING. ANGOLA SHOULD, THEREFORE, SEEK BILATERAL OFFERS OF MILITARY SUPPORT FROM OAU MEMBERS. ALGERIA AND LIBYA WERE TWO POSSIBLE SOURCES OF TROOPS. ONE OF THE (UNIDENTIFIED) MINISTERS PRESENT IN LAGOS HAD SINCE TRAVELLED TO ALGIERS.

2. THE FATE OF THE CUBANS UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WAS NOT APPARENTLY RESOLVED. SOME OF THE FLS REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DANGER THAT THEIR FORCES MIGHT BE CONTAMINATED BY SERVING ALONGSIDE CUBAN TROOPS.

3. MY TELNO 703 (NOT TO ALL). MY MEETING WITH AUDU DID NOT TAKE PLACE ON 15 SEPTEMBER BUT I HQQE TO SEE HIM THIS WEEK.

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AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CAPETOWN LAGOS TRIPOLI
ALGIERS
INFO MAPUTO GABORONE SALISBURY LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA/U S

1. I SAW MORAIS, MINISTER FOR PETROLEUM AT 4.00PM THIS AFTERNOON. HE ASKED IF YOU COULD ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN PAULO JORGE AND MR HAIG IN WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK WHILST FORMER IS IN U S FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I PROMISED TO CONVEY REQUEST.

2. I WOULD SEE VALUABLE POSSIBILITIES IN A MEETING BETWEEN ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND U S SECRETARY OF STATE AND RECOMMEND THAT YOU URGE MR HAIG TO AGREE. THE FACT THAT THE REQUEST HAS COME FROM ANGOLANS AND AT THIS POINT IN TIME (AFTER VETO AND WITH SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS STILL IN CUNENE) IS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT. IF U S REJECT THE APPROACH POSITION OF PRO-WESTERN AND POTENTIALLY PRO-U S MODERATES WITHIN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE WEAKENED.

3. AT ONE P M THIS AFTERNOON PAULO JORGE BROADCAST A STATEMENT ON IMPORTANT DECISIONS TAKEN BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (WHICH HAS BEEN IN ALMOST CONTINUOUS SESSION). THE STATEMENT DENOUNCED THE U S VETO AND SAID THAT IN CONSEQUENCE THE CONDITIONS FOR AN INVOCATION OF CHAPTER 51 HAD NOW BEEN FULFILLED. MORAIS TOLD ME THAT WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO SEEK HELP FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AND THAT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS DELEGATIONS WOULD LEAVE FOR NIGERIA, LIBYA, AND ALGERIA TO SOLICIT ASSISTANCE. (WHICH I UNDERSTAND TO MEAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE). MORAIS DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE WOULD BE AN INTERVAL BETWEEN THE PROCUREMENT OF ANY SUCH OFFERS AND THEIR ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION.

4. MORAIS GAVE IMPRESSION THAT ANGOLANS THOUGH DISAPPOINTED BY OUR ABSTENTION APPRECIATED THE REASONS FOR IT. SO FOR CRITICISM OF UNITED KINGDOM HAS BEEN RELATIVELY MUTED. I STRESS TO MORAIS IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE UNITY OF THE FIVE AND MOMENTUM IN THE NEGOTIATIONS: THERE COULD BE NO SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE ONLY THEY COULD EXERCISE THE REQUISITE INFLUENCE WITH SOUTH AFRICA. MORAIS SAID HE FULLY APPRECIATED THIS AND AGAIN ASKED IF YOU WOULD HELP ARRANGE THE MEETING WITH MR HAIG. /5. I

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5. I ASKED IF THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAD ANY STATEMENT TO MAKE ON SOUTH AFRICAN CLAIMS TO HAVE CAPTURED ONE RUSSIAN WARRANT OFFICER AND TO HAVE KILLED TWO OTHER SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICERS. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST PART WAS QUOTE NOT TRUE UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT THESE REPORTS WERE BOUND TO MAKE AN IMPACT UPON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION ESPECIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES BUT THAT IT WOULD BE FUTILE TO DENY THEM IF THEY WERE IN FACT TRUE. MORAIS SAID THAT HE WOULD CHECK THE POSITION AND SEE IF A STATEMENT COULD NOT BE ISSUED ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE.

6. IF MR HAIG IS WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO MEET MR JORGE MESSAGE COULD BE CONVEYED THROUGH ANGOLAN DELEGATION AT U N.

7. I ASKED MORAIS WHETHER THE REQUEST FOR A MEETING WITH MR HAIG WAS MADE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HE CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS.

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Lord Carrington telephoned the Prime Minister twice yesterday, 31 August. The main purpose of his calls was to seek the Prime Minister's agreement to the UK line in the debate on the UN Resolution on Angola. But he also touched on the question of how we should react to the US decision on Enhanced Radiation Warheads.

On Angola, Lord Carrington said that we had hoped that the UN Resolution would be drafted in unacceptable terms, since this would enable the US, the UK, and France to veto it without any qualms. However, he had learned from Sir Anthony Parsons that the French had successfully removed from the draft the clause calling for mandatory sanctions against South Africa. On this basis, the French were proposing to vote for the Resolution. Two other members of the Contact Group of Five, the FRG and Canada, would join them in voting for the Resolution. The problem for the UK was that the redrafted Resolution contained a passage in paragraph 3 which described the South African military action as a flagrant violation of Angola's sovereignty and a breach of international peace and security. FCO lawyers advised that the adoption of such a Resolution would require the UN to make proposals to deal with the "breach of international peace and security". Moreover, paragraph 4 of the redrafted Resolution demanded the immediate withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.

Lord Carrington said that it was his considered view, and also that of Sir Anthony Parsons, that the UK should abstain from the vote on the Resolution, thereby leaving the US to veto it alone. We would explain our abstention on the basis that South Africa was already withdrawing her troops, and that it would be wrong for the UN to vote on this issue until the real facts were known. Lord Carrington said that he did not feel the Americans would be too distressed to be isolated in this way, and he would send a personal message to Secretary Haig explaining the UK's position. There was another reason for

/our abstention.

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our abstention. If we were to veto the Resolution with the US, then the Contact Group of Five would be completely split, and could well disintegrate. To abstain would allow the UK to play the role of middle-man between the US and the French, FRG and Canadians.

The Prime Minister accepted Lord Carrington's advice and agreed that the UK should abstain in the vote on the Resolution.

On the US decision on neutron warheads, the Prime Minister said that she had seen Lord Carrington's recent minute to Mr. Nott urging that the UK should not take a high profile in supporting the American decision. She said that the UK should not put any difficulties in the way of the Americans, and should certainly take a line that was no less robust than that taken by Mr. Callaghan when President Carter took decisions on neutron weapons. She felt that she would have to support the American decision in the House of Commons, or if she were interviewed by foreign press (for instance, if French television were to interview her before the Anglo/French Summit). Lord Carrington said that the position of the FRG on this issue was crucial. The weapons would have to be deployed - and used - on German soil. Chancellor Schmidt was in a very difficult domestic, political position. We should do nothing that would make his position even more difficult. In his view, the Prime Minister should not say that the Americans went about their decision on ERW in the right way; the US had not consulted its allies, it had only given them some hours' notice of its decision. Lord Carrington agreed to find suitable words for the Prime Minister to use which would not offend the FRG.

WFSN

1 September 1981

D/B 317630Z

[SOUTHERN AFRICA] [ADVANCE COPIES]

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PS/SIR I GILMOUR (3)
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY

MR COLLINS DOT.
MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10. DOWNING STREET

~~SIR A AGLAND~~
~~Mr Goodson~~
SIR L ALLINSON

IMMEDIATE

LORD N G LENNOX
MR P H MOBERLY

ED/S AF D
ED/C AF D
ED/UND
ED/DEFENCE D

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
ED/NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

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DESKBY FCO 311630Z AUGUST 1981

DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 311700Z AUGUST 1981

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 311600Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169 OF 31 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, WASHINGTON, BONN, OTTAWA, LUANDA

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 781: ANGOLA / SOUTH AFRICA: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A JUDGEMENT AS SEEN FROM HERE, OF THE RECENT SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION IN ANGOLA, AND AN EVALUATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN MOTIVATION.

2. I DO NOT THINK THE RECENT ACTION CAN POSSIBLY BE DESCRIBED AS HOT PURSUIT. NOR DO I THINK THAT THE OPERATION WAS A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE IN THE SENSE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE SEEKING TO FRUSTRATE AN IMMINENT SWAPO ATTACK. THE SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK WAS CLEARLY PLANNED WELL IN ADVANCE, WAS ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE, AND INVOLVED A DEEP PENETRATION OF ANGOLAN TERRITORY. THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEM TO HAVE REASONED THAT A DEEP, HARD BLOW AGAINST SWAPO WOULD WEAKEN SWAPO'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.

I have spoken to FCO accordingly.

fn

Please note the recommendation in para 3. I will read read that para before talking about the SWA

THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEM TO HAVE REASONED THAT A DEEP, HARD BLOW AGAINST SWAPO WOULD WEAKEN SWAPO'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. AT THE SAME TIME THE BALANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO ME SUGGESTS THAT A MAIN SOUTH AFRICAN OBJECTIVE WAS TO KNOCK OUT ADVANCED NEW ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD HAVE DENIED THE SOUTH AFRICANS THEIR PRESENT ABILITY TO OVERFLY ANGOLA SAFELY AT WILL. A SUBSIDIARY OBJECTIVE MAY HAVE BEEN THE DESTRUCTION OF SWAPO'S LOGISTIC INFRA-STRUCTURE, IN PARTICULAR THEIR SUPPLY OF LANDMINES WHICH WERE SUSPECTED TO BE IN FAPLA STORAGE FACILITIES. IF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HAD RECOMMENDED THAT THE OPERATION WAS A MATTER OF MILITARY NECESSITY, NO OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WOULD HAVE STOOD IN ITS WAY. IN SHORT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS LAUNCHED A MAJOR ATTACK ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE TO SECURE ADVANTAGE FOR THEMSELVES IN WHAT THEY CLAIM WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION TO BE A DEFENSIVE WAR.

3. IF WE DECIDE IN THE END TO ABSTAIN ON (OR EVEN VOTE FOR) A RESOLUTION WHICH THE AMERICANS VETO, I RECOMMEND THAT, QUITE APART FROM OUR PUBLIC EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN NEW YORK, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER A CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PIK BOTHA DESIGNED TO PRESERVE GOODWILL AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION, BEARING IN MIND IN PARTICULAR THE MATIMBA POWER STATION CONTRACT. IF YOU WOULD FIND THIS SUGGESTION HELPFUL, EVEN ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS, I SHOULD BE PLEASED TO TELEGRAPH A DRAFT ON RECEIPT OF A TELEPHONE CALL.

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FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 280130Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 765 OF 27 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAPE TOWN, PARIS, LUANDA,
PRIORITY BONN AND OTTAWA.

MY TELNO 763: ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA - SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. A FURTHER LETTER FROM DOS SANTOS TO WALDHEIM HAS BEEN RECEIVED TODAY (27 AUGUST) REQUESTING AN URGENT MEETING OF THE COUNCIL (COPY BY FACSIMILE TO FULLER - CAFD). (TO CONSTITUTE A PROPER REQUEST IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL BUT THIS IS A TECHNICALITY WHICH CAN BE CORRECTED).
2. IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD A FORMAL MEETING TOMORROW AT 1900Z WHEN FIGUEIREDO WILL ADDRESS THE COUNCIL. WE SPOKE TO HIM BRIEFLY ON HIS ARRIVAL. HE WANTS FROM THE COUNCIL RAPID AGREEMENT ON CONDEMNATION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION AND A CALL FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL IN ANY ATTAINABLE FORM (RESOLUTION, PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OR WHATEVER).
3. THIS IS LIKELY RAPIDLY TO SPLIT THE COUNCIL 14-1, AS IN THE WRANGLE OVER THE ANC LETTER (MY TELNO 766). WE SEE NO PROSPECT OF THE US AGREEING TO ANYTHING THAT WOULD SATISFY MOST OTHER MEMBERS. INDEED AN EXPERIENCED MEMBER OF THE US MISSION (PLEASE PROTECT) CONFIDED IN US HIS CONCERN: WASHINGTON WAS ENTERING THIS DEBATE ON QUOTE AN EXTREME COURSE. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IN THEIR EYES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT IS THAT ONE SIDE IS BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE.

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PS/MR LUCE

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MR GOODISON
SIR L. ALLINSON
LORD N. & LENOX

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Fm HAVANA 271630Z AUG 81

TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 195 OF 27 AUGUST,
AND INFO TO LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CAPETOWN

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA

1.. TODAY'S GRANMA PUBLISHES A MESSAGE OF 25 AUGUST FROM
PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS ADDRESSED TO FIDEL CASTRO IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE NON ALIGNED MOVEMENT. THIS DESCRIBES
THE LATEST SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS INTO ANGOLA AS A LARGE SCALE
INVASION WHICH "COULD PROVOKE A WAR OF UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES".
NOTING THAT ANGOLA MAY BE FORCED TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, THE MESSAGE APPEALS TO CASTRO TO
SET IN HAND MEASURES WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WITH
RELEVANT ORGANISATIONS TO PUT AN END TO SOUTH AFRICAN ACTS OF
AGGRESSION.

2.. SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL CUBAN COMMENT.

THOMAS

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FM FCO 271155Z AUGUST 1981

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1266 OF 27 AUGUST

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, CAPETOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA

MY TELNO 1260: NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

1. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION I HAVE NOW RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM HAIG DESCRIBING WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SECOND TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH PIK BOTHA:

'I HAVE RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM SAG FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA TODAY IN WHICH HE PROVIDED NEW INFORMATION ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA. BOTHA INDICATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONE MAJOR ENCOUNTER DURING WHICH SADF FORCES ENGAGED BRIEFLY WITH MPLA UNITS BEFORE THE LATTER WITHDREW FROM THE ACTION. HE STATED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ENGAGE SWAPO UNITS ENCLUSIVELY AND THAT EFFORTS HAD BEEN MADE TO AVOID ENGAGEMENT WITH THE MPLA. BOTHA ALSO INDICATED THAT THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF SOME SOVIET ADVISERS AND FAMILIES IN THE AREA AND THAT THE SAG WOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THEIR REGARD.

BOTHA WENT ON TO INDICATE THAT THE SADF HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO PURSUE THEIR OPERATION NORTH TO LUBANGO. HE SAID THAT THE SADF HAS BEEN PRESSING FOR AUTHORITY TO UNDERTAKE THIS ACTION, BUT THAT THE SAG HAD CALLED IT OFF AFTER SPEAKING WITH ME YESTERDAY. HE UNDERSCORED THAT THIS CHANGE WAS A DIRECT RESULT OF MY REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM THAT THE CONTACT GROUP NEEDED TO RETAIN ITS CREDIBILITY AT THIS DELICATE JUNCTURE IN THE NAMIBIA

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BOTHA FURTHER INDICATED THAT A SOPHISTICATED AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATION AND A SUBSTANTIAL STOCK OF WEAPONRY HAD BEEN SEIZED. MOST OF IT WOULD BE DESTROYED. FINALLY, BOTHA WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT THE SAG HAD HAD A FEELER FROM THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT INDICATING A DESIRE FOR CONTACT. I MADE NO COMMENT ON THIS, BUT IT IS CLEAR THE SAG IS READY FOR EITHER DIRECT CONTACT OR INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ANGOLANS, POSSIBLY THROUGH ONE OR MORE OF US.

I THANKED BOTHA FOR THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND INDICATED TO HIM THAT I WOULD BE PASSING IT TO MY ALLIED COUNTERPARTS. WE CAN REVIEW FURTHER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE EVENTS AS WELL AS THE OAU MINISTERIAL MISSION AND THE UN SPECIAL SESSION.''

CARRINGTON

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FM LUANDA 270905Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 355 OF 27 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN

Prime Minister
Angola
The latest batch of telegrams from Angola, S. Africa, our mission to the UN, as well as a report of a conversation between Lord Carrington and Mr Haig.

MS

L/M
27/8

ANGOLA / SOUTH AFRICA: MY TELNO 353

1. IF THE INVITATION TO VISIT CUNENE PROVINCE, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED, IS CONFIRMED I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR PERMISSION TO ACCEPT. THE INVITATION MAY BE IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST WHICH I MADE. ON MONDAY, BEFORE WE RECEIVED NEWS OF THE MAJOR SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATION, I DISCUSSED WITH OLGA LIMA, DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE PROBLEM OF GIVING ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IN THE FACE OF THE WELTER OF CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS WHICH HAD FOLLOWED EARLIER INCURSIONS. I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF HER MINISTRY COULD ARRANGE FOR AMBASSADORS OCCASIONALLY TO VISIT REGION AND SEE THE EXTENT OF THE PENETRATION AND OF THE DAMAGE INFLICTED IN ANGOLA. SO LONG AS WE WERE RESTRICTED TO LUANDA OUR ABILITY TO REPORT WAS ALSO RESTRICTED. I ASSURED HER THAT THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC BRITISH INTEREST IN THIS BUT SUGGESTED THAT HER MINISTER MIGHT CONSIDER INVITING THE AMBASSADORS OF THE THREE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE FIVE REPRESENTED IN ANGOLA TO TOUR THE SOUTHERN AREA. HE HAS DONE EXACTLY THAT.

2. AN INTERESTING ASPECT OF MY CONVERSATION WITH MORAIS AND OF THE BRIEFING BY DA MOURA WAS THE CARE WHICH EACH MINISTER TOOK TO EMPHASISE THAT F A P L A FORCES ALONE HAD BEEN IN ACTION AGAINST THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY AND THAT NO CUBANS HAD BEEN INVOLVED. ALTHOUGH THE REMARKS ON THE REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 51 REPORTED IN PARA 4 OF MY T U R WERE SOMEWHAT SELF CONTRADICTORY DA MOURA'S GENERAL INTENTION WAS CLEARLY TO ARGUE THAT THE QUOTE CUBAN BOGEY UNQUOTE COULD NOT REASONABLY BE INVOKED TO JUSTIFY THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION. FIGUEIREDO ALSO TOLD ME THAT IT WAS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATION BY REFERENCE TO S W A P O TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. THE U S - I THINK UNFORTUNATELY- APPEAR TO HAVE ALLUDED TO BOTH THESE POINTS IN THEIR STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE RAID.

3. DA MOURA WAS VERY CORDIAL THROUGHOUT THE MEETING AND BOTH HE AND MORAIS ARE NO DOUBT MODERATES AND GENERALLY PRO-WESTERN. BUT I THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEN TO RESPOND TO THE INITIATIVES WHICH THE MODERATES TAKE.

4. AN EARLY REPLY TO PARA 1 WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

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FM LUANDA 270815Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 354 OF 27 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

ANGOLA/SECURITY COUNCIL

I MET FIGUEIREDO, ANGOLA'S AMBASSADOR TO THE U N, AT LUANDA AIRPORT
LAST NIGHT. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD BY HIS VICE MINISTER THAT
ANGOLA WAS CALLING FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID
THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT ANGOLA SHOULD CALL FOR A MEETING
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EARLY IMPROVEMENT OF
THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.

KENNEDY

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SIR L ALLINSON

MR R WADE-GERY CABINET OFFICE

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 271420Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 27 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, OTTAWA, BONN, LUANDA

YOUR TELNO 81: SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA

1. AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCH TODAY FOR MR HEATH, ALSO ATTENDED BY PIK BOTHA, GENERAL MALAN, HORWOOD AND FOURIE, SOUTH AFRICAN OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA WERE NOT MENTIONED. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RELAXED AND THER WAS NO SIGN OF ANY ANXIETY OR TENSION.

2. BEFORE LUNCH PIK BOTHA TOLD ME THAT HE TOOK EXCEPTION TO OUR STATEMENT YESTERDAY (26 AUGUST) AND ASKED ME TO CONFIRM (WHICH I DID) THAT I HAD REPORTED THAT HE HAD TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT CRITICISM FROM US. HE SAID HE MIGHT CALL ME IN LATER FOR A FURTHER TALK. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TELEGRAPHING A LETTER TO WALDHEIM THIS AFTERNOON.

REID

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DESKBY 262000Z

FM FCO 261738Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1260 OF 26 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY PARIS BONN OTTAWA CAPETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA.

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA.

1. I SPOKE TO HAIG BY TELEPHONE ON 26 AUGUST, AT HIS REQUEST. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS (REMAINDER OF SENTENCE UNDERLINED) STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION.
2. HAIG SAID PIK BOTHA HAD TELEPHONED HIM ABOUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION INTO ANGOLA. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD PUT OUT A MILDLY CRITICAL STATEMENT WITH AN UNCONTENTIOUS REFERENCE TO FOREIGN FORCES. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE FIVE TO STAY TOGETHER IN THEIR REACTIONS. I TOLD HIM OF OUR OWN STATEMENT.
3. ON NAMIBIA, HAIG SAID THAT HE EXPECTED GENSCHER'S REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE ON 26 OR 27 AUGUST. I EXPRESSED CONCERN AT THE POSITION OF THE FIVE: THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WAS IMMINENT AND THERE WOULD BE LITTLE FOR THE FIVE TO SAY UNLESS SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. IT WOULD HELP IF THE US COULD UNFREEZE THE LETTER TO SOUTH AFRICA WHICH HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY OFFICIALS. MR HAIG SAID THAT THE US COULD DO SO QUICKLY (BY IMPLICATION, IF US CONCERNS WERE MET).
4. MR HAIG SAID HE HAD BEEN CONFUSED THAT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS HAD ACTED IN PARIS AS IF THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT IN MONTEBELLO. HENCE HIS QUOTE NASTY MESSAGE UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT EVERYONE HAD AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EXPLICIT LINKAGE BUT THAT THE TWO ISSUES WOULD BE HANDLED IN PARALLEL AND THAT THE FIVE SHOULD RUSH FORWARD ON THE SECOND ISSUE WITH THERE CONTACTS IN AFRICA. HAIG SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT HOW EAGLEBURGER HAD UNDERSTOOD THE PARIS MEETING.
5. HAIG ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT SOME OF THE REPLIES HE HAD RECEIVED TO HIS MESSAGE, THOUGH THE BRITISH ONE WAS FINE. BUT HE DECLINED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC.

CARRINGTON

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 262300Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 763 DATED 26 AUGUST 81

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, CAPE TOWN, PARIS, LUANDA,
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, SALISBURY,
BONN, OTTAWA, LAGOS.

LUANDA TELNO 353: ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA - SECURITY COUNCIL

1. WE SENT BY FACSIMILE TO FULLER (CAFD) TODAY DOS SANTOS'S
LETTER TO WALDHEIM. IT DOES NOT ASK IN TERMS FOR A MEETING OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT THERE IS A GROWING FEELING HERE,
EXPRESSED TO US MOST RECENTLY TODAY BY MASHINGAIDZE (ZIMBABWE,
CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE AFRICAN GROUP), THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL
IS FIDDLING WHILE ROME BURNS. (THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEEN
MEETING IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE AND IN GROUPS
ABOUT THE WORDING OF AN APPEAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE
PRESIDENT ABOUT THE DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED ON 19 AUGUST ON
THREE ANC MEMBERS. THESE MEETINGS HAVE SO FAR BEEN INCONCLUSIVE
AND EXASPERATING FOR ALL.)

2. THE ANGOLAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (FIGUEIREDO) IS
REPORTED TO BE RETURNING TO NEW YORK TONIGHT (26 AUGUST)
AND TOMORROW WALDHEIM IS RETURNING EARLY FROM EUROPE.
MANY OF THE MAIN AFRICAN ACTORS WILL BE HERE NEXT WEEK
FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION.

PARSONS

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FM LUANDA 261800Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 353 OF 26 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CAPETOWN

PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE SALISBURY BONN PARIS

OTTAWA LAGOS KINSHASA LISBON

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA

1. THE VICE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, VENANCIO DA MOURA, SUMMONED THE AMBASSADORS OF THE THREE THIS AFTERNOON.
2. DA MOURA SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO BRIEF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE DIRECTLY AND EXPLICITLY ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA SO THAT WE COULD MAKE CLEAR TO OUR GOVERNMENT WHAT WAS HAPPENING. FOLLOWING EVENTS WHICH HAD BEEN DESCRIBED BY THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE COMMUNIQUES IN JUNE AND JULY HE HAD CONVENED A MEETING OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS TO EXPLAIN TO THEM THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION. THERE HAD BEEN A DISPOSITION IN SOME SECTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS AND IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES EVEN AFTER THAT MEETING TO UNDER-ESTIMATE THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND SOME TENDENCY TO BELIEVE SOUTH AFRICAN CLAIMS THAT THE REPORTS WERE QUOTE ANGOLAN PROPAGANDA UNQUOTE. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST THREE DAYS HAD DEMONSTRATED THE TRUTHFULNESS OF ANGOLA'S STATEMENTS.
3. ANGOLA HAD BEEN INVADED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA VIEWED THIS ACT OF AGGRESSION COULD BE SEEN IN THE FACT THAT THE CHIEF OF STATE HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO SEND MESSAGES REQUESTING POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE O A U, THE U N, AND OTHERS. HE WAS NOW ASKING US TO TRANSMIT A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO OUR GOVERNMENTS. HE WANTED US TO INFORM OUR GOVERNMENTS THAT ANGOLA WAS NOW GOING TO CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DEAL WITH THE INVASION OF SOUTHERN ANGOLA BY SOUTH AFRICA.
4. THERE HAD BEEN SPECULATION ON ANGOLA'S PREVIOUS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE U N CHARTER AND WHETHER THIS INDICATED AN INTENTION TO REQUEST INTERVENTION BY A QUOTE THIRD FORCE UNQUOTE. IT SHOULD NOW BE CLEAR THAT THE ONLY INTERVENTION HAD BEEN BY A SECOND FORCE, I.E. BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES ASSISTED BY REBELS AND MERCENARIES. NO OTHER FORCES WERE INVOLVED AND F A P L A ALONE WAS ENGAGING THE ENEMY IN ACTION. ANGOLA'S ONLY AIM WAS PEACE. SHE WANTED COOPERATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE FIVE BUT WITHOUT PEACE THAT COOPERATION WOULD BE COMPROMISED.
5. THE VICE MINISTER SAID THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO INVITE THE THREE AMBASSADORS TO VISIT THE SOUTHERN REGION AND TO ACCOMPANY THEM PERSONALLY IN ORDER THAT THEY COULD SEE FOR THEMSELVES THE REALITY AND EXTENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION. THE ONLY PROBLEM WAS THE DIFFICULTY OF GUARANTEEING THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF THE VISITORS. THE MINISTER WENT ON TO SUMMARISE THE LATEST NEWS FROM THE FRONT.

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6. MORE THAN 10 (TEN) BATTALIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY WERE NOW IN THE PROVINCE OF CUNENE. ONDJIVA WAS SURROUNDED AND UNDER INTENSIVE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT. THE MUNICIPALITY OF XANGONGO HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND OCCUPIED BY SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY UNITS. DOZENS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TANKS AND ARMoured VEHICLES, SUPPORTED BY HELICOPTERS AND SOME TWO GROUPS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY WERE ADVANCING TOWARDS ONDJIVA.

7. CASUALTIES HAD BEEN SUFFERED BY BOTH SIDES IN THE EXTENSIVE FIGHTING WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE YESTERDAY BUT ACTUAL FIGURES HAD NOT YET BEEN RELEASED BY THE ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

8. IN HIS CONCLUDING WORDS OF THANKS, THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT HE WAS CORRECT IN PRESUMING THAT FRANCE WAS STILL A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF FIVE. MY COLLEAGUE ASSURED HIM THAT THIS WAS SO. THE MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION AT THIS.

9. I ECHOED THE THANKS OF MY COLLEAGUES AND SAID THAT YOU WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THIS FIRST-HAND INFORMATION. I REFERED TO THE STATEMENT WHICH SIR IAN GILMOUR HAD MADE ON 7 AUGUST AND ASSURED THE MINISTER THAT YOU WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION. I HAD NOT AT THE TIME RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 81 TO CAPETOWN.) I HAVE THIS EVENING DELIVERED TO DA MOURA A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE NEWS DEPARTMENT STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THAT TELEGRAM.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

KENNEDY

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FM LUANDA 261320Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 351 OF 26 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN CAPETOWN
PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE SALISBURY KINSHASA
LAGOS

M I P T: ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION

1. MORAIS AGAIN REPEATED THAT IT HAD BEEN ANGOLA'S INTENTION TO RUN DOWN THE CUBAN PRESENCE AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMITTED. THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN SOME REDUCTION AND HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE NOW LESS THAN 18,000 (EIGHTEEN THOUSAND) CUBAN TROOPS IN THE COUNTRY. THIS INTENTION COULD OBVIOUSLY BE FRUSTRATED BY THE KIND OF SA MILITARY INTERVENTION NOW TAKING PLACE.
2. ALTHOUGH THE ANGOLANS ARE CLEARLY DRAMATISING THE SITUATION THE SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BOTH FOR PROSPECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAY BE PART OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTION.
3. WHILST THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE US SECRETARY OF STATE YESTERDAY (WASHINGTON TELNO 2506) IS HELPFUL, THE US WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE THEIR OWN POSITION VIS A VIS THE ANGOLANS IF THEY COULD ALSO GIVE SOME PUBLIC INDICATION THAT THEY DEPLORE THE RAID. IN OUR OPINION THEY DO VERY MUCH NEED TO IMPROVE THAT POSITION. A FORTHRIGHT PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD ALSO HELP TO PRESERVE THE FIVE AGAINST THE INCREASING CENTRIFUGAL PRESSURES.
4. IF NIGERIAN OR OTHER ADDITIONAL FOREIGN TROOPS WERE TO ARRIVE IN ANGOLA THE ABILITY OF THE US TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION AND TO ACHIEVE THEIR STATED NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES WOULD BE WEAKENED.
5. I HOPE THAT WE CAN SIMILARLY DEPLORE THE RAID IN STRONG TERMS. THIS WOULD ASSIST OUR POSITION HERE AND IN THE UN IN ADVANCE OF THE SPECIAL DEBATE. BEST OF ALL WOULD BE A STRONG AND UNEQUIVOCAL JOINT DECLARATION BY THE FIVE. WHILST THE ANGOLANS BELIEVE THAT THEIR EFFORTS IN RECENT WEEKS TO ALERT

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INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION TO THE SCALE OF THE THREAT WHICH THEY FACE FROM SOUTH AFRICA HAVE MET WITH SOME SUCCESS THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE RESPONSE OF THE FIVE AS A WHOLE AND THE US IN PARTICULAR, ALTHOUGH THE HELPFULNESS OF THE LORD PRIVY SEAL'S STATEMENT OF 7 AUGUST HAS BEEN RECOGNISED.

6. IN CONSIDERING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ANGOLANS MAY EXAGGERATE AND DRAMATISE THE SCALE OF SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT THEY OPERATE WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND PROBABLY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ACCURATELY AND QUICKLY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OBJECTIVES. MY GUESS IS THAT THEY KNOW THAT THE PRESENT OPERATION, THOUGH ON A MAJOR SCALE, IS STILL LIMITED IN ITS OBJECTIVES BUT THAT THEY ARE GENUINELY DISTURBED AT THE SA MILITARY BUILD-UP ON THE ANGOLA/NAMIBIA BORDER.
FCO PASS ALL

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FM BONN 261615Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

PS/PRIME MINISTER

TELEGRAM NUMBER 637 OF 26 AUGUST

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INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON OTTAWA PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK CAPE TOWN LUANDA

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA: FRG VIEWS

1. WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY THIS AFTERNOON TO TACKLE VERGAU (HEAD OF EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT) ABOUT THE WAY AHEAD ON NAMIBIA.

2. VERGAU SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HERR GENSCHER TO AGREE TO THE SORT OF LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NAMIBIA INITIATIVE AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA THAT THE AMERICANS CURRENTLY SEEMED TO ENVISAGE. BUT HE INDICATED, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT HIS MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO GO A GOOD WAY TOWARDS THE US POSITION IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE FIVE. THE FRG WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ALONG THE LINES ENVISAGED IN CHEYSSON'S MESSAGE TO HAIG (MY TELNO 612) AND MIGHT SUGGEST THAT THESE CONTACTS SHOULD BE COORDINATED IN THE NEW YORK (OR WASHINGTON) CONTACT GROUP. THEY MIGHT ALSO BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A SET OF COMMON TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN CONTACTS WITH AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS PROVIDED THAT THESE DID NOT ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE WITH THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER GENSCHER WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE A COMMON LINE OF THE SORT ENVISAGED IN YOUR TELNO 1206 TO WASHINGTON AND COMMENTED THAT IF THE AMERICANS INSISTED ON THIS SOME SUITABLY AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO COVER THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE AND THE PARALLELISM BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PLAN.

3. VERGAU SAID THAT A REVISED DRAFT REPLY TO HAIG'S MESSAGES HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO HERR GENSCHER YESTERDAY. IT HAD NOT YET BEEN APPROVED BUT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ISSUE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS. IT DID NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF LINKAGE BUT PICKED UP THE RECOGNITION IN HAIG'S SECOND MESSAGE THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A PRECONDITION FOR A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE CONTACT GROUP NEXT MONTH. VERGAU COMMENTED THAT GENSCHER WAS LIKELY TO RAISE NAMIBIA WITH HAIG DURING THE LATTER'S VISIT HERE ON 13/14 SEPTEMBER (BONN TELNO 624).

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FM PRETORIA 261535Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER SIC U2J 960 OF 26 AUGUST 1981.

AND TO PRIORITY FCO, LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAPE TOWN EMBASSY.

FOR DI4 FROM DA.

SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA.

MILITARY ATTACHES WERE BRIEFED ABOUT CURRENT SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA. BRIEFING WAS SKETCHY BUT FOLLOWING POINT WERE MADE:

1. MAJOR PART OF CURRENT OPERATION WAS AGAINST SWAPO NORTH WESTERN FRONT HQ SITUATED 5 MILES SOUTH OF XANGONGO (1645S 1458E). FAPLA GARRISON AT XANGONGO WAS WARNED BY AIR DROPPED LEAFLETS NOT TO INTERFERE BUT HAD IGNORED THE WARNING AND A THREE HOUR SKIRMISH BETWEEN SADF AND FAPLA DEVELOPED IN THE AFTERNOON OF 24 AUG. FAPLA EVENTUALLY WITHDREW AND THE SADF HAD MOPPED UP THE SWAPO HQ CAPTURING 200 TONS OF ARMAMENTS AND 2 TANKS. ALL SADF TROOPS HAD NOW WITHDRAWN FROM THE VICINITY OF XANGONGO AND WERE NOW CARRYING OUT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER FORCES TO THE EAST OF THE RIVER. THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT THESE OPERATIONS EXTENDED ACROSS THE SWAPO NORTH AND NORTH EASTERN FRONTS OPPOSITE OWAMBO TO A DEPTH OF APPROX 70 KMS.
2. TOTAL NUMBER OF SADF TROOPS INVOLVED WAS SAID TO BE APPROX 4,500 ROUGHLY THE SAME AS IN SMOKESHELL.
3. SADF AIRSTRIKES HAD BEEN LAUNCHED TO TAKE OUT RADAR STATIONS AT CAHAMA AND CHIBEMBA ON THE ROAD FROM XANGONGO TO LUBANGO WHICH THREATENED SAAF AIR OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES. IT WAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT A SA6 MISSILE SITE WAS IN AN ADVANCED STAGE OF PREPARATION AT CHIBEMBA.

COMMENT

I BELIEVE THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE AIR OPERATIONS IN S ANGOLA AS WITNESSED BY THE TEMPORARY CLOSURE OF AIRFIELDS IN N NAMIBIA TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC AND TOTAL ABSENCE OF FLIGHTS FROM WATERKLOOF THIS WEEK, WHICH LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT SIZABLE ELEMENTS OF THE MIRAGE, BUCCANEER AND CANBERRA SQNS NORMALLY BASED THERE ARE DETACHED TO NAMIBIA.

4. SPOKESMAN JUSTIFIED ATTACK ON XANGONGO AS NECESSARY BECAUSE SWAPO INCIDENTS IN OWAMBA HAD BEEN ORGANISED FROM THERE FOLLOWING SADF SUCCESSES AGAINST THE SWAPO HQ'S IN THE NORTHERN AND NORTH EASTERN FRONTS.

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5. SPOKEMAN SAID CLAIMS THAT SADF GROUND FORCES HAD PENETRATED HUNDREDS OF KILOMETRES WERE NONSENSE AND NO TROOPS HAD MOVED NORTH OR WEST OF XANGONGO.

6. SPOKESMAN ESTIMATED THAT THE OPERATION WHICH COMMENCED ON THE 24 AUG WOULD NOT LAST LONGER THAN FIVE DAYS.

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FM CAPETOWN EMBASSY 261520Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 153 OF 26 AUGUST

AND TO MODUK (DI 4)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA

INFO ROUTINE PATIS BONN OTTAWA LAGOS

MY TELNO 151 (NOT TO LAGOS) : SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA

1. THE PRIME MINISTER, P W BOTHA, MADE A STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY THIS AFTERNOON (26 AUGUST) ON CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACTIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA. HE BEGAN BY MAKING FOUR POINTS, AS FOLLOWS.

A) SOUTH AFRICA HAD CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO COOPERATE WITH HER NEIGHBOURS TO PROMOTE PEACEFUL ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND STABILITY. AT THE SAME TIME, SOUTH AFRICA HAD WARNED THESE COUNTRIES NOT TO SHELTER COMMUNIST-SUPPORTED TERRORISTS ACTING AGAINST NAMIBIA AND THE REPUBLIC NOR TO LET THEM OPERATE FROM THEIR TERRITORY

B) THE STORM OF ACCUSATIONS COMING FROM ANGOLA ABOUT A LARGE SCALE INVASION WERE NOT ONLY EXAGGERATED BUT ALSO AN ABSURD MISREPRESENTATION OF THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS.

C) THE SOUTH-WEST AFRICAN TERRITORY FORCE, SUPPORTED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE, WAS CONSISTENTLY ACTIVE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM AND PROTECTING THE LOCAL POPULATION, PARTICULARLY IN OVAMBOLAND. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT ABLE TO SIT ON HER SIDE OF THE BORDER WAITING FOR TERRORISTS TO INFILTRATE THE TERRITORY TO MURDER AND INTIMIDATE PEOPLE AND PLANT MINES. FURTHER, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD NOT DESIST FROM FOLLOW-UP OPERATIONS IF THE ANARCHISTS FLED OVER THE BORDER.

D) THE SO-CALLED INVASION REFERED TO BY ANGOLA WAS JUST ONE OF THESE OPERATIONS AND WOULD HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT INCIDENT IF THE ANGOLANS HAD NOT INTERVENED. THE SECURITY FORCES WERE HOWEVER READY FOR SUCH INTERVENTION AND HAD DEFENDED THEMSELVES WITH GOOD RESULTS, AT THE SAME TIME SUCCEEDING IN WIPING OUT VARIOUS TERRORIST POSITIONS AND STORAGE BUILDINGS.

2. P W BOTHA CONTINUED THAT HE TRUSTED THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW PAY ATTENTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S REQUEST THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INTERVENTION AS WELL AS TO SOUTH AFRICAN IDEALS OF LIVING IN PEACE WITH HER NEIGHBOURS, AND WOULD CEASE TO GET INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS WHICH WERE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THEM, BUT AGAINST TERRORISM. SOUTH AFRICA HOPED THAT ANGOLA WOULD ALSO RESPOND TO HER REQUESTS TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

/PW BOTHA

P W BOTHA TRUSTED ALSO THAT THE ANGOLANS WOULD NOT USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO LAY BLAME FOR EVERYTHING DONE BY ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS UNITA AT SOUTH AFRICA'S DOOR. SOUTH AFRICA WAS PERFECTLY AWARE THAT THE UN WAS HOLDING A SPECIAL SESSION ON 3 SEPTEMBER AND IT WAS CLEAR THAT THAT DATE HAD A SERIOUS INFLUENCE ON THE INTENSITY OF REPORTING AND ACCUSATION FROM ANGOLA. THE PRESENT ANGOLAN OVER-REACTION WAS ALSO ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE FLOOD OF ACCUSATIONS MADE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA IN THE LAST FORTNIGHT. SOUTH AFRICA WAS CLEARLY STILL THE EASY SCAPE-GOAT FOR ANGOLA'S INABILITY TO PUT ITS HOUSE IN ORDER.
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FM LUANDA 261135Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 350 OF 26 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS BONN CAPETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY
KINSHASA LAGOS NAIROBI

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Prime Minister 2
These are the reports from
Luanda, Cape Town, &
Washington on Angola.
Also attached is the PLO's
statement of the UK position

LN
26/8

MS

ANGOLA: SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION

1. MORAIS (MINISTER FOR PETROLEUM) DISCUSSED WITH ME AT HIS INVITATION SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA.
2. MINISTER SAID THAT VERY HEAVY FIGHTING HAD TAKEN PLACE YESTERDAY BETWEEN CAHAMA AND CHIBEMBA. HE WAS AWAITING DETAILS FROM MINISTER FOR DEFENCE BUT EXPECTED F A P L A CASUALTIES TO BE HEAVY.
3. ANGOLAN AIR-FORCE HAD NOT BEEN ENGAGED. THEY WERE NOT GOING TO BE USED IN PRESENT ACTION BECAUSE ANGOLAN PILOTS WERE NOT YET READY FOR COMBAT.
4. ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAD INSTRUCTED THAT CUBAN UNITS SHOULD NOT INTERVENE IN PRESENT ENGAGEMENT.
5. MOBILISATION CARRIED OUT YESTERDAY MEANT CALL-UP OF ANGOLAN MILITIA AS WELL AS REGULAR F A P L A UNITS. SO FAR AS MORAIS KNEW THERE WERE NO MAJOR S W A P O CAMPS IN AREA OF PRESENT ACTION. HE THOUGHT SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTION MUST BE, IN PART, POLITICAL.
6. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS HAD RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM PRESIDENT SHAGARI OFFERING ASSISTANCE OF NIGERIAN TROOPS. MORAIS THOUGHT THAT DOS SANTOS WOULD ACCEPT THIS OFFER.
7. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS HAD NOT YET SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES OF THREE OR DIPLOMATIC CORPS AS A WHOLE FOR SITUATION BRIEFING BUT DA MOURA WOULD BE DOING SO.
8. MEANWHILE DOS SANTOS HAS SENT MESSAGES TO MOI AND CASTRO IN CAPACITIES AS PRESIDENTS OF O A U AND N A M OUTLINING EVENTS IN MY TELNO 347 (NOT TO ALL) AND ASKING THEIR EFFORTS TO HALT CURRENT AGGRESSION AND QUOTE THE IMMINENT MAJOR INVASION UNQUOTE. DA MOURA HAS ALSO SENT MESSAGE TO WALDHEIM OUTLINING EVENTS IN MY TELNO 347 STATING QUOTE THE ANGOLAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE WILL FORMULATE THE PRESENTATION OF THE COMPLAINT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNQUOTE. HE ASKS WALDHEIM TO CIRCULATE THIS AS OFFICIAL DOCUMENT.
9. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

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FM FCO 261150Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE CAPETOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 81 OF 26 AUG

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN PARIS WASHINGTON OTTAWA LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK

PRIORITY LUSAKA SALISBURY GABORONE MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS

YOUR TELNO 148 : SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA

1. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE RECORD AT 1130Z TODAY:

'WE CANNOT CONFIRM PRECISE DETAILS OF REPORTS OF THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA. BUT IT IS EVIDENT THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAVE ESCALATED IN THE LAST TWO DAYS AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN

A SUBSTANTIAL SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION INTO ANGOLA.

'WE HAVE REPEATEDLY CONDEMNED VIOLENCE IN THE REGION FROM WHICHEVER QUARTER IT COMES. SIR IAN GILMOUR SPOKE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR ON 7 AUGUST OF OUR CONCERN AT THE ESCALATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA. WE WHOLLY DEPLORE THE LATEST SOUTH AFRICAN ACTION, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH COULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS FOR STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE TRUST THAT THE CURRENT ACTION WILL BE TERMINATED AND SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY FROM ANGOLA.'

2. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL ALSO CONFIRM THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR CALLED AT THE FCO THIS MORNING AND WAS INFORMED OF THE STATEMENT.

3. IF ASKED, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL ADD THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION CAN ONLY FURTHER COMPLICATE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE A PEACEFUL

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SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM.

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PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A ACLAND

SIR L ALLINSON

MR GOODISON

CABINET OFFICE

[SOUTHERN AFRICA] [ADVANCE COPIES]

15/8

PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY
SIR A ACLAND
SIR L ALLINSON
LORD N G LENNOX
~~MR P H MOREBY~~
HD/S AF D
HD/C AF D
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HD/DEFENCE D
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
HD/NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

MR. COLLINS. DOT,
MR R L WADE-GERY
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FM LUANDA 261500Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 352 OF 26 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE CAPETOWN WASHINGTON PARIS

IMMEDIATE
ADVANCE COPY

CAPETOWN TELNO 148 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 2506:

SOUTH AFRICA / ANGOLA

1. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE UNDERSTANDS FROM THEIR MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA THAT ALTHOUGH SOUTH AFRICAN GROUND FORCES HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN HEAVY FIGHTING AND HAVE TAKEN CASUALTIES THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF PRESENT OPERATION HAS BEEN TO KNOCK OUT RADAR STATIONS BY AERIAL BOMBARDMENT. HOWEVER, CARE HAS BEEN TAKEN NOT TO ATTACK SOME SITES AROUND LUBANGO WHICH SOUTH AFRICANS BELIEVE ARE MANNED BY CUBANS. THIS SEEMS TO US A MORE CONVINCING EXPLANATION THAN THAT WHICH AMERICANS CLAIM PIK BOTHA OFFERED TO MR HAIG.

2. THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANGOLAN QUOTE MOBILISATION UNQUOTE. THIS IS NOT THE TOTAL MOBILISATION OF ALL RESERVES AS IN EUROPEAN SENSE. EVEN MORALS, TO WHOM I REFERRED THIS MORNING WAS NOT CLEAR ON THIS POINT.

MOBILISATION OF ALL RESERVES AS IN EUROPEAN SENSE. EVEN MORAIS,
TO WHOM I SPOKE THIS MORNING WAS NOT CLEAR ON THE POINT. WHEN I
ASKED HIM HOW MANY ADDITIONAL MEN WOULD BE CALLED TO ARMS AS A
RESULT OF MOBILISING MILITIA HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW BUT
THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE QUOTE ABOUT 100,000 UNQUOTE.

FCO PLEASE PASS ALL

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FM LUANDA 260940Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 349 OF 26 AUG

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON
PRIORITY LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY KINSHASA
LAGOS BONN OTTAWA PARIS

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION.

1. ANGOLAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON EVENING OF
25 AUGUST RECALLING ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL ON LEAVE INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY TO BARRACKS WITHIN 48 HOURS. THOSE INSIDE
COUNTRY SHOULD REPORT TO NEAREST ANGOLAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.
THOSE OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY SHOULD REPORT TO NEAREST ANGOLAN EMBASSY.

2. ALL COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS BETWEEN LUANDA AND LUSANGO HAVE BEEN

SUSPENDED.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 26 AUGUST

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI 4)

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS BONN OTTAWA

PRIORITY LUSAKA SALISBURY GABORONE

ROUTINE MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LAGOS

SOUTH AFRICA/ANGOLA

1. PIK BOTHA SPOKE TO ME AT A RECEPTION YESTERDAY EVENING (25 AUGUST) ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA. AT THE TIME I WAS AWARE OF WHAT MIGHT BE HAPPENING ONLY FROM A TELEPHONE CALL FROM A LONDON NEWSPAPER SEEKING FURTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WE COULD NOT OF COURSE GIVE, ON A REPORT BY ANGOP. PIK BOTHA, WHO WAS IN A GREAT STATE, BEGAN BY COMPLAINING THAT THE BRITISH PRESS WERE HARASSING HIM (EVIDENTLY THEY TRIED HIM AFTER FAILING WITH US). HE DID NOT SAY HOW HE HAD REPLIED TO THE PRESS ENQUIRIES BUT HE SAID WE OUGHT TO KNOW THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES HAD HAD TO GO IN BECAUSE THE OTHER SIDE WERE ARMING THEMSELVES WITH SOME NEW AND DEADLY WEAPONRY WHICH POSED A MAJOR THREAT. THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD NOT PERMIT THIS. THEIR FORCES WOULD GO IN, DO WHAT THEY HAD TO DO AND THEN COME OUT. I ASKED IF I WOULD BE RIGHT TO RELATE THIS TO RECENT REPORTED COMMENTS BY GENERAL LLOYD ABOUT THE INSTALLATION OF ADVANCED SAM GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES. THIS BRIEFLY SILENCED PIK BOTHA AND HE DID NOT REPLY TO MY QUESTION. HE SAID THAT WHAT WAS GOING ON WAS A LIMITED OPERATION. WHEN I SAID THAT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU WHAT HE HAD SAID, HE SAID QUOTE AND TELL PETER THAT IF HE COMPLAINS I WON'T HAVE IT, I WON'T HAVE IT. THESE PEOPLE ARE BLOODY MURDERERS. THEY WANT TO KILL INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN. WE HAVE GOT TO STOP THEM UNQUOTE.

2. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT NEED TO TELL PIK BOTHA HOW NEWS OF THE OPERATION WOULD BE RECEIVED IN NEW YORK AND THE CONSEQUENCES THAT IT MIGHT HAVE JUST BEFORE THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE REPLIED BY TELLING ME IN FORCEFUL, COLOURFUL AND BITTER LANGUAGE JUST WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. PIK BOTHA THEN SAID THAT WE WOULD MAKE A GREAT MISTAKE IN IGNORING SAVIMBI. HE WAS GAINING GROUND AGAINST THE MPLA AND WAS A FORCE WHO MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. HE SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD NOT ABANDON HIM.

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4. COMMENT. PIK BOTHA'S ADMISSION THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE IN FACT TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN WHAT MAY BE A MAJOR OPERATION (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE) IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE OFFICIAL LINE HERE (SEE MIFT) THAT THIS IS A NORMAL FOLLOW-UP OPERATION. HE WOULD REGARD WHAT HE SAID TO ME, ALTHOUGH DELIVERED AT TREBLE FORTISSIMO AT A NOISY FUNCTION AND THUS PROBABLY OVERHEARD BY VARIOUS PEOPLE, AS BEING PRIVILEGED. I SUBMIT THAT GREAT CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN ANY USE THAT IS MADE OF IT.

5. I EXPECT TO SEE PIK BOTHA TOMORROW AT A LUNCH WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER IS GIVING FOR MR HEATH. IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT YOU WISH ME TO SAY TO PIK BOTHA (OR EVEN THE PRIME MINISTER, THOUGH I WOULD MUCH PREFER TO SPEAK TO PIK BOTHA WHOM I KNOW WELL) GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS DESKBY 270900Z AT THE LATEST.

6. CANADIAVUN AMBASSADOR HAS JUST CALLED A MEETING OF THE CAPE TOWN FIVE. SINCE I ASSUME THAT WE SHALL NOT (NOT) WANT TO KEEP THE INFORMATION IN THIS TELEGRAM FROM OUR PARTNERS, AND WILL IN ANY CASE SHARE IT WITH THEM EG IN CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK, I PROPOSE TO GIVE COLLEAGUES THE GIST OF PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.

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FM WASHINGTON 250905Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2506 OF 25 AUGUST 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA, CAPETOWN, ROUTINE PARIS,
BONN AND OTTAWA.

TELECON FULLER/CRABBE: ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA. mb

1. THE AMERICANS RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE TODAY THAT ANGOLAN ALLEGATIONS OF A RENEWED SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK ARE BASED ON FACT. A SUBSTANTIAL SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSION INTO ANGOLA HAS TAKEN PLACE.

2. HAIG HAS JUST SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO PIK BOTHA, WHO CONFIRMED THAT THE MILITARY OPERATION HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO A SWAPO BUILDUP IN THE BORDER AREAS. PIK BOTHA CLAIMED THAT THE OPERATION HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR ABOUT 2 DAYS, THAT IT HAD ACCOMPLISHED ITS OBJECTIVES AND THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE NOW MOPPING UP AND RETURNING TO NAMIBIA. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT MAGNUS MALAN HAD TAKEN COMMAND OF THE OPERATION FROM WINDHOEK.

3. HAIG SAID THAT THE U.S. DEPLORED THE RAID AND THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY UNHELPFUL IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. THE AMERICANS HOPED THAT THE OPERATION WOULD INDEED BE TERMINATED PROMPTLY.

4. THE AMERICANS SIMULTANEOUSLY SUMMONED THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHARGE IN WASHINGTON TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THIS LATEST INCURSION. THE CHARGE CLAIMED TO BE UNBRIEFED.

5. THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO US BY A STATE DEPT OFFICIAL IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT): IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE INFORMING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE IN WASHINGTON UNTIL HAIG HAS SPOKEN DIRECTLY TO THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS.

6. THIS SHARP U.S. RESPONSE IS ENCOURAGING, ALTHOUGH IT IS A SIGN OF THE TIMES THAT HAIG SHOULD HAVE CHOSEN TO ACT BILATERALLY RATHER THAN A CINQ.
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FM LUANDA 251415Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 348 OF 25 AUGUST

INFO ROUTINE CAPETOWN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON

ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA

1. JORNAL DE ANGOLA TODAY PUBLISHES TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO THE U N SECRETARY GENERAL FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS. THE MESSAGE REFERS TO THE S A G ATTACKS ON ANGOLA AND THAT A FORCE MORE THAN 45,000 STRONG OF S A TROOPS, MERCENARIES AND REBELS IS CONCENTRATED ALONG THE NAMIBIA/ANGOLA BORDER WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF OCCUPYING PART OF ANGOLA. THIS GRAVE PROVOCATION IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE IN THE REGION AND TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

2. THIS GRAVE SITUATION COULD LEAD TO A WAR WITH UNFORSEEABLE CONSEQUENCES AND QUOTE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, AS A SOVEREIGN STATE AND A MEMBER OF THE U N, COULD BE FORCED TO HAVE RECOURSE TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER TO DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

THUS I ASK YOUR EXCELLENCY TO USE THE POWERS CONFERRED ON YOU BY THE U N CHARTER TO PUT AN END TO THE SUCCESSIVE ACTS OF AGGRESSION OF WHICH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA IS VICTIM AND TO PUT A STOP TO THE IMMINENT AND MAJOR INVASION WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED AGAINST MY COUNTRY. UNQUOTE.

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MR DAY
SIR L. ALLINSON
T. G. GOODISON
CABINET OFFICE

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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 220930Z AUG 81
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 22 AUGUST
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS OTTAWA LUANDA
INFO SAVING LUSAKA DAR ES SALAAM MAPUTO GABORONE LAGOS

NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

1. ANSWERING QUESTIONS AT A LUNCH FOR FOREIGN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS IN PRETORIA ON 21 AUGUST, PIK BOTHA SAID QUOTE WE DO NOT SAY THAT WE PUT IT AS AN ABSOLUTE CONDITION THAT THE CUBANS SHOULD LEAVE ANGOLA BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY IMPLEMENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT PLAN UNQUOTE. NONETHELESS QUOTE IT IS THE CUBAN PRESENCE WHICH IS MAKING IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO MAKE PROGRESS WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT WHATEVER SOLUTION THERE MIGHT BE FOR NAMIBIA UNQUOTE.
2. PIK BOTHA ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE THIRTY THOUSAND CUBANS IN ANGOLA AS WELL AS TWO THOUSAND EAST GERMANS. HE SAID THAT THE NAMIBIAN INTERNAL PARTIES FEARED THAT IF SWAPO LOST INTERNATIONALLY-SUPERVISED ELECTIONS THEY WOULD CONTINUE THE WAR WITH CUBAN SUPPORT. THE INTERNAL PARTIES THEREFORE NEEDED GUARANTEES. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT A VOTE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT MAKE A SOLUTION ANY EASIER. THE INTERNAL PARTIES WOULD SEE THAT AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF UN INTOLERANCE.
3. PIK BOTHA SAID THAT A TIME-SCALE OF EIGHTEEN MONTHS TO TWO YEARS FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNISED INDEPENDENCE SETTLEMENT FOR NAMIBIA WAS REASONABLE PROVIDED THAT ALL WENT WELL AND AGREEMENTS WERE HONOURED. QUOTE IT IS THE END RESULT WHICH IS IMPORTANT, NOT THE TIME FACTOR UNQUOTE.

FCO PSE PASS ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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FM WASHINGTON 212329Z AUG 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 2486 OF 21 AUG 81
INFO LISBON BONN PARIS OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA CAPETOWN.

YOUR TELNOS 75 AND 76 TO LISBON : ANGOLA

1. WE DESCRIBED THE PORTUGUESE APPROACH TO FRASURE (SOUTHERN AFRICAN AFFAIRS) AND MCELHANY (INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS). BOTH CLAIMED THAT THE PORTUGUESE HAD APPROACHED THE US IN LISBON OVER A MONTH AGO; HOWEVER THE SCHEME WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED THEN WAS ESSENTIALLY A RESOLUTION OF THE ANGOLAN QUESTION PRIOR TO A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. THIS HAD SEEMED UNREALISTIC EVEN TO THE AMERICANS, AND ACCORDINGLY THE SUGGESTION HAD BEEN POLITELY NOTED AND NO FURTHER ACTION TAKEN.

2. CHET CROCKER HAS NOW BEEN INFORMED OF THE LATEST PORTUGUESE APPROACH TO US, AND TAKES THE VIEW THAT THEIR PROPOSALS NEED NO (NO) URGENT ACTION. IN PRINCIPLE HE IS WILLING TO DISCUSS A COMMON RESPONSE BY THE FIVE, BUT PROBABLY NOT UNTIL THE FUTURE OF CONTACT GROUP MEETINGS HAS BEEN RESOLVED; THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO REGARD THE FIVE'S CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY AS EFFECTIVELY IN SUSPENSE PENDING THEIR CONSIDERATION OF OUR REPLIES TO HAIG'S MESSAGES.

3. U S OFFICIALS ARE GENERALLY SCEPTICAL OF THE VALUE OF THE PORTUGUESE IDEAS AND OF THEIR REAL INFLUENCE WITH THE ANGOLANS. THE MOST THEY ARE PREPARED TO CONCEDE IS THAT IT COULD BE WORTHWHILE TO CONSIDER THESE SUGGESTIONS IF AND WHEN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS STARTS MOVING AGAIN.

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FM FCO 191730Z AUGUST 81

TO PRIORITY LUANDA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 238 OF 19 AUG

REPEATED TO INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CAPETOWN, BONN, PARIS,

OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, LISBON.

SAVING INFO TO LAGOS, SALISBURY, MAPUTO, DAR-ES-SALAAM, LUSAKA,

GABORONE

YOUR TELNO 326: US/ANGOLA/CUBA

1. THANK YOU FOR THIS MOST HELPFUL ANALYSIS.
2. WE SUSPECT THAT THE ANGOLANS' OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITION IN ANY TALKS WITH THE US WOULD BE MUCH AS DESCRIBED IN YOUR PARA 3. IT WOULD BE REASONABLE FOR THEM TO SEEK FROM THE US A COMMITMENT TO RECOGNISE THE MPLA GOVERNMENT. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA WOULD ALSO BE IMPLICIT IN ANY AGREEMENT SINCE THIS WOULD DEPEND ON A PARALLEL AGREEMENT ON A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT (SEE PARA 3 BELOW). THE QUESTION OF UNITA PRESENTS PARTICULAR PROBLEMS. IT WOULD IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO ENTER ANY FORMAL AND SPECIFIC AGREEMENT TO 'DITCH SAVIMBI'. THE ANGOLANS BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN HANDLE UNITA ONCE NAMIBIA IS SETTLED AND SUPPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICA HAS CEASED (CF OLGA LIMA'S REMARKS REPORTED IN YOUR TELNO 270). THE MOST THEY COULD REASONABLY DEMAND WOULD BE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT GIVE PHYSICAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND WOULD PERHAPS GIVE SOME FORM OF COMMITMENT TO REIN IN THE SOUTH AFRICANS. BUT THE AMERICANS SEE THE THREAT OF POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR UNITA AS USEFUL LEVERAGE WITH MPLA; AND THEY WILL BE RELUCTANT TO PROMISE TO CONTROL THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS BEING BEYOND THEIR CAPACITY. THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL IN ANY EVENT FIND IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT (BUT NOT NECESSARILY IMPOSSIBLE) TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR UNITA ONCE THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM NAMIBIA. BUT THEY TOO WILL NOT WANT TO BE SEEN TO BE LETTING SAVIMBI DOWN.

3. WE AGREE THAT THE TIMETABLE FOR THE CUBANS' WITHDRAWAL (YOUR PARA 6) WILL RAISE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS FOR BOTH THE ANGOLANS AND THE AMERICANS. THE AMERICANS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SETTLE ON THE BASIS OF A VAGUE PROMISE THAT THE CUBANS WILL BE WITHDRAWN BY PHASES AFTER NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME PRECISE FORMULA GEARED TO THE TIMETABLE FOR THE NAMIBIAN TRANSITION PERIOD. THE ANGOLANS SHOULD AT LEAST BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF A FIRST BATCH OF CUBANS AT THE MOMENT OF CEASEFIRE IN NAMIBIA SINCE FROM THAT DATE THE SOUTH AFRICANS WILL BE UNABLE TO MOUNT ATTACKS FROM NAMIBIA (UNDER SCR 435 SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE CONFINED TO BASE FROM THE CEASEFIRE DAY AND REDUCED TO 1,500 MEN WITHIN 12 WEEKS: AND THERE WILL BE A UN MILITARY PRESENCE TO MONITOR OBSERVANCE OF THIS): SO THE ANGOLANS' MILITARY NEED FOR CUBAN SUPPORT SHOULD FALL AWAY SHARPLY FROM THE START, NOT JUST WHEN A SWAPO GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED.
4. WE ALSO AGREE THAT ANY APPROACH BY THE AMERICANS WILL NEED TO MAKE EVERY ALLOWANCE FOR THE ANGOLANS' DEEP-ROOTED DISTRUST OF THEM. BUT THAT DISTRUST IS MUTUAL. THE REPUBLICANS TOO BEAR SCARS FROM THE 1975 DEBACLE. DESPITE ALL THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FACT THAT THERE ARE PRIZES FOR THEM TO BE GAINED FROM CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS: AND SERIOUS PENALTIES FOR FAILURE - THE INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM (GIVEN CURRENT US POLICIES) AND SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS ON ANGOLA WITH THE CONSEQUENT ENTRENCHMENT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.
5. SUBJECT TO WASHINGTON'S VIEWS, WE SUSPECT THAT ANY FORMAL ATTEMPT TO GIVE THE AMERICANS DETAILED ADVICE ON THEIR LINE TO TAKE WITH THE ANGOLANS WOULD BE LIABLE TO FALL ON DEAF EARS WHILE CURRENT DIFFERENCES IN THE FIVE PERSIST (AND PERHAPS TO ERODE OUR POTENTIAL INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS LATER). BUT WASHINGTON HAVE DISCRETION TO DRAW IN GENERAL TERMS IN ANY INFORMAL CONTACTS ON YOUR ASSESSMENT OF ANGOLAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO TAKE PARTICULAR CARE ON THE QUESTION OF UNITA AND SAVIMBI.

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FM LUANDA 181000Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 18 AUGUST
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CAPETOWN BONN PARIS OTTAWA
INFO SAVING LAGOS LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY GABORONE

U S : ANGOLA

1. ANGOLANS HAVE GONE TO EXCEPTIONAL LENGTHS TO ACCOMMODATE THE PARTY OF VISITING U S CONGRESSMEN. VISITORS SPENT FIVE HOURS YESTERDAY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH VENANCIO DA MOURA, VICE MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, ARE VISITING HUILA PROVINCE (OFTEN CLAIMED AS QUOTE U N I T A COUNTRY UNQUOTE) TODAY, AND EXPECT TO BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS THIS EVENING.
2. MINISTER FOR PETROLEUM, MORAIS, YESTERDAY EVENING HOSTED A RECEPTION. BEFORE THE CONGRESSMEN ARRIVED MORAIS SENT FOR ME AND ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT VISIT OF DELEGATION IMPORTANT. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TOOK EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH THE U S . MORAIS THEN IMMEDIATELY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE CUBANS. HE SAID THAT THE CUBANS WERE QUOTE NO PROBLEM UNQUOTE. CUBAN TROOPS WOULD LEAVE ONCE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND THE THREAT OF SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACK REMOVED. THEY HAD ONLY COME TO DEFEND ANGOLA AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION AND ANGOLA WOULD NOT WISH TO RETAIN THEIR SERVICES WHEN THEY WERE NO LONGER REQUIRED. THEIR MAINTENANCE COSTS WERE A SIZEABLE BURDEN ON THE ANGOLAN BUDGET. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET ADVISERS IN ANGOLA WOULD AGREE THAT THE CUBANS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN EVEN IF A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. MORAIS SAID QUOTE YES, CERTAINLY. WHY NOT? UNQUOTE I SAID TO MORAIS THAT IF THIS WAS THE CONSIDERED POSITION OF THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT THEN I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF A FORMAL ASSURANCE ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL COULD BE CONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US.
3. I UNDERSTAND THAT VENANCIO DA MOURA MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS TO THE CONGRESSMEN I.E. THAT THE CUBAN MILITARY WOULD LEAVE ONCE THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION HAD BEEN SETTLED AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN THREAT REMOVED.
4. I DISCUSSED WITH THE LEADER OF THE CONGRESSMEN HOW THEY MIGHT APPROACH THE QUESTION OF THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT . THEY WILL TRY TO OBTAIN FROM DOS SANTOS A STATEMENT ON THE RECORD WHICH THEY CAN TAKE BACK WITH THEM TO THE US SECRETARY OF STATE.
FCO PASS AND SAVING TO LAGOS LUSAKA MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY GABORONE

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FM FCO 171700Z AUGUST 81
TO PRIORITY LISBON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 075 OF 17 AUGUST 1981
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, LUANDA, CAPETOWN, BONN,
PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM CAFD
ANGOLA

1. PORTUGUESE CHARGE (MACEDO) CALLED ON THE DEPARTMENT ON INSTRUCTIONS THIS MORNING.
2. MACEDO SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY THE IMPASSE OVER NAMIBIA. THIS WAS THE RESULT OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTRANSIGENCE AND HAD NOT BEEN ASSISTED BY CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES IN THE US POSITION. THE SITUATION IN THE REGION WAS DETERIORATING WITH THE INCREASE IN FIGHTING OVER THE NAMIBIA/ANGOLA BORDER. UNITA REMAINED EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH NOT A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT'S SURVIVAL. ESCALATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE REGION WAS NOT IN WESTERN INTERESTS AND WOULD SERVE ONLY TO REINFORCE CUBAN/SOVIET INFLUENCE. THE PORTUGUESE STILL BELIEVED THAT A QUICK SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM WOULD LEAD TO THE SOLUTION OF OTHER DIFFICULTIES IN THE REGION.
3. THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THEY NOW HAD SOME ROLE TO PLAY GIVEN ITS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES AND ANGOLA. THEY WISHED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO BUILD ON THE COMMON GROUND THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES RATHER THAN TO ACT AS A CHANNEL FOR TRANSMITTING IRRECONCILABLE VIEWS. NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT PROCEED ON FOLLOWING BASIS:
 - (A) A COMMON REAFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR SCR 435:
 - (B) RESPECT FOR ANGOLA'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO SETTLE THEIR OWN

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INTERNAL PROBLEMS:

(C) RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES, WHEREBY THE SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD LIMIT MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA AND REDUCE SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND THE ANGOLANS WOULD GIVE A COMMITMENT FOR THE GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS AS IMPROVEMENTS IN THEIR SECURITY SITUATION PERMITTED, AND WOULD PROMISE TO REDUCE SUPPORT FOR SWAPO.

4. IT WAS CLEAR THAT VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THAT THEY NOW NEEDED URGENT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST. THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PROFESSIONAL HELP TO ANGOLA.

5. MACEDO SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY OUTLINED THEIR PROPOSAL TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS, THE ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE US AND WERE IN THE PROCESS OF INFORMING OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE.

6. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS APPROACH TO MINISTERS. WE SAID THAT WE AGREED WITH THE PORTUGUESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND OF THE RISKS TO WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE REGION ARISING FROM THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA. WE ASKED TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS' AND THE ANGOLANS' REACTIONS TO THE PORTUGUESE APPROACH. WE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE FACT THAT THE PORTUGUESE HAD SELECTED PAULO JORGE AS INTERLOCUTOR (HE HAD ALWAYS APPEARED TO US TO BE ONE OF THE MORE DOCTRINAIRE MARXIST MEMBERS OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT AND DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH.)

7. PLEASE SEE COMMENTS IN MIFT.

CARRINGTON

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 612 OF 17 AUG

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON ROUTINE OTTAWA LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK CAPE TOWN

BONN TELNO 607 AND YOUR TELNO 1216 TO WASHINGTON: ANGOLA

1. WE HAVE BEEN SHOWN IN STRICT CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) A COPY OF THE GERMAN TRANSLATION OF CHEYSSON'S MESSAGE TO HAIG (PARA 2 OF OUR TUR). THE LANGUAGE IS DIFFICULT AND IN SOME PLACES AMBIGUOUS AND, IN VIEW OF PARA 2(C) BELOW, IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT COULD BE READ AS RULING OUT A COMMON DIPLOMATIC LINE ON THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. CHEYSSON SEEMS TO ACCEPT, HOWEVER, THAT IT SHOULD BE PURSUED IN PARALLEL WITH THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS BUT WITHOUT A TEXT LAYING DOWN A COMMON APPROACH.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS OF CHEYSSON'S MESSAGE:

(A) HAIG'S (FIRST) MESSAGE HAD EXACTLY CONFIRMED THE LINE AGREED IN MONTEBELLO.

(B) CONTRARY TO THE IMPRESSION GIVEN AT THE PARIS MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS IT NOW SEEMED THAT URGENCY WAS NECESSARY IN APPROACHING AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHO WERE INTERESTED IN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA. FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO THIS AND

HE (CHEYSSON) HAD ALREADY HAD SOME CONTACTS IN THIS SENSE WHICH HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING.

(C) HE (CHEYSSON) DID NOT CONSIDER AS OPPORTUNE A COMMON TEXT, WHICH LAID DOWN A COMMON APPROACH (TO THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL) OR EVEN GAVE ONE OF THE FIVE THE TASK OF NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF THE REST. ANY MEASURES TAKEN SHOULD BE PARALLEL, WITH EACH OF THE FIVE TAKING ACTION IN AREAS IN WHICH THEIR EFFORTS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE.

(D) HE (CHEYSSON) CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES OF NAMIBIAN NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT WAS IMPORTANT. SUCH GUARANTEES SHOULD BE OF INTEREST NOT ONLY TO SWAPO AND OTHER NAMIBIAN MOVEMENTS BUT ALSO TO THE ANGOLANS.

(E) IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO APPROACH THE RUSSIANS AT THIS TIME ALTHOUGH HE (CHEYSSON) RECOGNISED THAT THE US MIGHT HAVE OTHER VIEWS, ESPECIALLY ON MATTERS AFFECTING CUBA. IT WAS NOTICEABLE THAT ANGOLA AND CUBA HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE THEME OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL TO OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. THIS WAS PRECIPITATE BUT REINFORCED HIS VIEW THAT NO FORMAL CONNECTION OR MUTUAL DEPENDANCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE WORK OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND THE COMMON DESIRE TO ENABLE THE CUBANS TO WITHDRAW FROM ANGOLA, EVEN IF BOTH THESE TRACKS HAD TO BE PURSUED IN PARALLEL.

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3. THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT CHEYSSON'S MESSAGE HAS BEEN COPIED TO ALL HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE FIVE. WE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO DISABUSE THEM OF THIS: AND IT IS THEREFORE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD NOT BECOME KNOWN THAT WE HAVE HAD A SIGHT OF THE TEXT.

4. HERR GENSCHER HAS NOT YET APPROVED A REPLY TO HAIG'S MESSAGES. PFEFFER TOLD ME ON 14 AUGUST THAT A DRAFT HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO HIM DESIGNED TO AVOID INFLAMING THE SITUATION. BUT THE FINAL DECISION ON THE TERMS OF THE REPLY WOULD BE GENSCHER'S ALONE AND THAT HE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY TAKE OFFICIALS' ADVICE.

TAYLOR

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FM LUANDA 171505Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON CAPETOWN BONN PARIS OTTAWA UKMIS NEW YORK
LISBON

INFO SAVING LAGOS SALISBURY MAPUTO DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA GABORONE

CUBAN WITHDRAWAL: US/ANGOLA TALKS 

1. THE U.S. MAY NOT WANT ADVICE FROM US ON THE LINE THEY SHOULD TAKE IN BILATERAL TALKS WITH ANGOLANS BUT IN CASE WE DO GET AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THAT LINE IT MAY BE HELPFUL IF WE INDICATE WHAT SEEM TO US IN LUANDA SOME PROBABLE ANGOLAN POSITIONS AND THE SORT OF RESPONSES LIKELY TO BE DEMANDED FROM THE AMERICANS.
2. AS THEY REPEATEDLY MAKE CLEAR THE ANGOLANS SEE THE CUBANS NOT AS A PROBLEM BUT AS A RESPONSE TO A PROBLEM, THAT OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION. IF THE U.S. APPROACH IS TO STAND ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS WITH DOS SANTOS AND HIS MEN IT MUST, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, ADDRESS THAT CENTRAL PROBLEM AND INDICATE FROM THE START THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATES THE LEGITIMACY AND, FOR THE ANGOLANS, THE PRIMACY OF THAT CONCERN.
3. I WOULD EXPECT THE ANGOLANS TO DEMAND AS THE PRICE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL SOME FAIRLY SPECIFIC ASSURANCES ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:
 - A) THE U.S. WILL ACCEPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. THIS MEANS NOT ONLY DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION BUT RECOGNITION THAT THE MARXIST MPLA IS THE LEGITIMATE PARTY IN POWER, AND A WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO FULL POLITICAL, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA.
 - B) THE U.S. WILL ESCHEW AND WILL INSIST UPON THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ABANDONING ALL MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA AND OTHER DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS WITHIN ANGOLA. (THE DITCHING OF SAVIMBI IS BOUND TO BE PART OF THE ANGOLAN BOTTOM LINE.)
 - C) THE U.S. WILL RECOGNISE THAT JUST AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA WILL SATISFY A MAJOR DEMAND OF SOUTH AFRICA IN MATTERS OF DEFENCE SO ANGOLA WILL REQUIRE A CORRESPONDING ASSURANCE AGAINST THE THREAT OF ATTACK FROM SOUTH AFRICA.
4. THE THIRD REQUIREMENT COULD BE A MAJOR THEME IN THE TALKS. A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND POSSIBLY NEUTRAL NAMIBIA WOULD IN ITSELF CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL, PERHAPS EVEN SUFFICIENT, ASSURANCE. ANGOLANS HAVE SAID BEFORE THAT WITH A FREE NAMIBIA AND THE KALAHARI DESERT THEY WOULD FEEL WELL PROTECTED. BUT OTHER AND ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES COULD BE CONSIDERED, INCLUDING A TACIT AGREEMENT ON DEFENCE MATTERS REACHED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE ANGOLANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS: THE POSSIBLE PROVISION IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY THE US ; PERHAPS EVEN THE DEVELOPMENT, WITH U.S. BLESSING, OF REGIONAL DEFENCE AGREEMENTS WITH NEIGHBOURING AFRICAN STATES.

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5. THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ANGOLAN SUSCEPTIBILITIES IS A POINT WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY STRESSED TO MR HAIG (YOUR TELNO 1205 TO WASHINGTON) . CURRENT ANGOLAN MISTRUST OF U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS SUCH THAT THE GENERAL MANNER OF THE U.S. DEMARCHE WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT. THE AMERICANS HAVE SOME STRONG CARDS TO PLAY BUT THE ANGOLANS WILL BE WARY OF THE QUOTE ARROGANCE OF POWER UNQUOTE SYNDROME. THEY NEED AND WANT PEACE WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT. THEY NEED AND WANT A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE U.S. BUT THEY ARE ALSO, AND WITH GOOD REASON, VERY AFRAID OF SOUTH AFRICA AND VERY AFRAID THAT THE U.S. IS MOVING TOWARDS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT COUNTRY AKIN TO THAT ALREADY ESTABLISHED WITH ISRAEL. THEY HAVE TO BE PERSUADED THAT THE U.S. WANTS A NEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM AND NOT MERELY A REPLAY OF THE GEOPOLITICAL MATCH WHICH THE U.S. LOST IN 1975.

6. THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO MAKE FULL ALLOWANCE FOR THE EXTRAORDINARY DIFFICULTIES UNDER WHICH THIS FRAGILE GOVERNMENT LABOURS. THEY HAVE NEVER KNOWN NORMALCY. THEY HAVE NEVER GOVERNED WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE CUBANS. EVEN IF WE TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD - AS I THINK WE SHOULD - AND ACCEPT THE READINESS TO DISPENSE WITH THE CUBAN FORCES ONCE THE EXTERNAL THREAT IS REMOVED IT WOULD STILL BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THEM TO THROW AWAY THE CRUTCH AND WALK, I.E. THE WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE TO BE PHASED OVER A REASONABLE PERIOD IF INTERNAL STABILITY IS NOT TO BE THREATENED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO EVOKE SOVIET OBSTRUCTION WHICH MUST BE COUNTED A POSSIBILITY IN SPITE OF SUCH ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY AS THAT REPORTED IN MY TELNO 327 (UNLESS OF COURSE SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE IS SECURED AS PART OF A WIDER DEAL).

7. I APPRECIATE THAT MUCH OF THIS MAY BE INDIGESTIBLE IN WASHINGTON BUT CAN SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF THE QUOTE-PARALLEL-UNQUOTE STRATEGY SUCCEEDING UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO ADOPT TOWARDS THE ANGOLANS A REASONABLY SYMPATHETIC LINE.
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FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 150845Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 126 OF 15 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FCO TELNO 1202 TO WASHINGTON: ANGOLA

1. I THINK THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE AN IMPORTANT POINT IN ARGUING (LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS, IN THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT, COULD REPRESENT THE QUOTE LOSS UNQUOTE OF NAMIBIA AS BEING OFFSET AGAINST THE DEPARTURE OF THE CUBANS (IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW IF THIS WERE A POINT WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE MADE TO THE AMERICANS). WHAT IS AT ISSUE IS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS. A CAST IRON ASSURANCE OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A WEIGHTY, POSSIBLY EVEN A CLINCHING, ARGUMENT IN PERSUADING P W BOTHA TO ACQUIESCE IN A SWAPO VICTORY: AND IN GETTING HIS CABINET AND CAUCUS TO DO THE SAME. IT WOULD ALSO BE A POWERFUL ARGUMENT WITH THE DTA AND SWA NATIONAL PARTY WHO HAVE REGULARLY EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT A SWAPO VICTORY WOULD RESULT THEN OR LATER IN THE CUBANS COMING INTO NAMIBIA: THEIR PARTICULAR FEAR IS THAT A SWAPO GOVERNMENT WOULD SOON GET INTO DIFFICULTIES, AND THEN CALL IN THE CUBANS TO HELP THEM OUT.

2. IT IS ALSO WORTH EMPHASISING THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IN ITS FULL HISTORICAL CONTEXT. THEY HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN THE HUMILIATION WHICH THEY SUFFERED IN 1975/76 WHEN THEIR INVADING COLUMN WAS TURNED BACK SOUTH OF LUANDA, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE INTERVENTION OF THE NEWLY ARRIVED CUBANS, P W BOTHA, WHO WAS MINISTER OF DEFENCE AT THE TIME, WAS HEAVILY INVOLVED AND IS LIKELY TO REGARD IT AS A MOST DESIRABLE PRIZE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS. WE MUST HOPE THAT HE WOULD NOT FEEL TEMPTED TO USE THE PRESENT NEGOTIATION TO SECURE THAT OBJECTIVE, AND THEN DRAG HIS FEET OVER AN ELECTION IN NAMIBIA.

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FM FCO 141130Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1216 OF 14 AUGUST
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, LUANDA, UKMIS NEW YORK

FROM ALLINSON

YOUR TELNO 2418: ANGOLA

1. THANK YOU FOR ALL THESE VALUABLE EFFORTS WITH THE AMERICANS. I SPOKE SIMILARLY YESTERDAY TO LANNON WALKER (STATE DEPARTMENT), HOLL (AUSWAERTIGES AMT, BONN - SEE BONN TELNO 607) AND GRENIER, MINISTER AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY, AND BARDER SPOKE TO DAHAN AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY. WE URGED ALL OF THEM NOT TO ALLOW CURRENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN US TO PUT AT RISK THE FUTURE WORK OF THE FIVE AND NOT TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT LIKELY TO HAVE THAT EFFECT: NOT TO REACT TOO HASTILY TO THE TONE AND LANGUAGE OF SOME RECENT MESSAGES, ESPECIALLY WHEN SO MANY OF THE MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS MAINLY CONCERNED ARE ON HOLIDAY: AND TO SEE WHETHER WE COULD NOT AGREE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF THE LANGUAGE SUGGESTED IN FCO TELNO 1206 OR SOMETHING LIKE IT. IN BRIEF OUR MESSAGE TO EVERYONE WAS TO COOL IT.

2. ALL SEEMED REASONABLY RECEPTIVE TO THIS APPROACH AND PROMISED TO CONSIDER OUR REDRAFT CAREFULLY. DAHAN (WHO SAID HE HAD NOT YET SEEN THE SECOND MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG IN FCO TELNO 1210 OR THE UK REDRAFT IN FCO TELNO 1206) WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON THE NATURE OF M. CHEYSSON'S REPLY TO MR HAIG'S FIRST MESSAGE (SEE PARA 2 OF BONN TELNO 607), BUT LANNON WALKER SURPRISED ME BY SAYING THAT CHEYSSON HAD TELEPHONED MR HAIG FROM WHEREVER HE IS ON HOLIDAY AND HAD BEEN 'GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE'.

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3. WE REMAIN MUCH CONCERNED BY CONTINUING INDICATIONS THAT THE AMERICANS CONTEMPLATE PULLING OUT (EG PARA 8 OF YTUR) AND OF CANADIAN AND (ESPECIALLY) FRENCH AND FRG INCLINATIONS TO REFUSE TO COME TO ANY COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES WITH THE AMERICANS (FCO TELNO 294 TO OTTAWA AND BONN TELNO 607).
4. IN REINFORCING OUR REQUESTS TO PARTNERS FOR TIME FOR CALM REFLECTION ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US, PLEASE DRAW ON THE FOREGOING AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
- A) WE STILL DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON THE ISSUE OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE ALL AGREE THAT THIS IS A DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE. WE SHOULD SURELY ALL BE ABLE TO AGREE WITH THE 'BOTTON LINE' AMERICAN FORMULATION THAT 'CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WOULD FACILITATE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT'. IT IS A STATEMENT OF FACT. WHERE WE DIFFER IS ON TACTICS. BUT THE FOUR WOULD BE ILL-ADVISED TO OBJECT TO THE AMERICANS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY WITH THE ANGOLANS ON A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE FIRM AND EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE IS NO FORMAL LINKAGE WITH THE NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IS NOT STATED TO BE A PRE-CONDITION OF FURTHER PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA. THAT THERE IS AN IMPLICIT LINK BETWEEN THE TWO, IE A SOLUTION OF EITHER ISSUE WOULD FACILITATE THE SOLUTION OF THE OTHER, IS AGAIN A STATEMENT OF FACT (CROCKER'S 'EMPIRICAL CONNECTION').
- B) WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE BREAK-UP OF THE FIVE WOULD RESULT IN INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS FOR ALL OF US, IN OUR DEALINGS NOT ONLY WITH AFRICA BUT ALSO WITH THE THIRD WORLD IN GENERAL. THE SOLE BENEFICIARIES WOULD BE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE RUSSIANS. IT WOULD ALSO MEAN INDEFINITE PROLONGATION OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM WITH CONSEQUENT INCREASED INSTABILITY IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RUSSIANS AND THEIR FRIENDS.

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FM FCO 121703Z AUG 81
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1212 OF 13 AUGUST 1981.
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, CAPE TOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK,
LUANDA.

MY TELS NOS 1202-1206: ANGOLA

1. WE HAVE TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY TEXT OF FURTHER MESSAGE FROM MR HAIG TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, DELIVERED BY U S EMBASSY ON 13 AUGUST.
2. PLEASE TELL MR HAIG'S OFFICE THAT -
 - A) I SHALL BRING HIS FURTHER MESSAGE AND ITS PREDECESSOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ATTENTION ON HIS RETURN:
 - B) WE ARE A LITTLE PUZZLED BY THE RECEIPT OF TWO SIMILAR BUT APPARENTLY UNCONNECTED MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT IN SO SHORT A TIME:
 - C) MEANWHILE THE SECRETARY WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY REPLY TO HIS EARLIER MESSAGE THAT WE REGARD THE CURRENT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FIVE AS TACTICAL RATHER THAN FUNDAMENTAL, AND CERTAINLY NOT AS CONSTITUTING AN OBSTACLE TO CONTINUED JOINT EFFORTS BY THE FIVE IN PURSUIT OF OUR AGREED OBJECTIVES, BOTH IN NAMIBIA AND IN ANGOLA:
 - D) WE HAVE ALREADY TRANSMITTED TO YOU AND OUR OTHER PARTNERS IN THE FIVE A SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE PAPER CONTAINING THE LINE WHICH WE WOULD TAKE WITH THE ANGOLANS IN SUPPORT OF YOUR BILATERAL APPROACH TO THEM ON THE CUBAN ISSUE. WE HOPE THAT THIS REDRAFT WILL MEET YOUR POINTS AND PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO OUR OTHER PARTNERS ALSO. IT IS NOT INTENDED IN ANY WAY TO DISGUISE OR PAPER OVER THE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS AND TACTICS BETWEEN US, BUT RATHER TO DEFINE

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COMMON GROUND AS A BASIS FOR FUTURE ACTION.

E) SHOULD OUR REDRAFT MEET WITH YOUR AND OTHERS' AGREEMENT, WE COULD ALL MOVE ON TO THE NEXT STEPS AS SET OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE. IF HOWEVER YOU OR OTHERS HAVE CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH OUR DRAFT, WE AGREE THAT OUR OFFICIALS SHOULD MEET SOON TO TRY TO RESOLVE THEM.

3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, WE REGARD THE TONE OF BOTH MESSAGES, THE SENDING OF TWO LONG MESSAGES WITHIN A FEW DAYS (NEITHER CONTAINING ANY REFERENCE TO THE OTHER), AND THE SCARCELY VEILED THREATS OF AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL UNLESS THEIR PARTNERS TOE THE LINE, AS SOMEWHAT ILL-JUDGED, ASSUMING THAT THE AMERICANS GENUINELY WANT THE FIVE TO STAY IN BUSINESS. WE ALREADY HAVE INDICATIONS OF FRENCH GERMAN AND CANADIAN RESENTMENT OF THE FIRST MESSAGE. I HOPE YOU MAY FIND SOME WAY OF CONVEYING THIS THOUGHT TACTFULLY TO THE AMERICANS, PERHAPS VIA CROCKER.

GILMOUR

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FM BONN 131445Z AUG 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 607 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS

INFO ROUTINE OTTAWA LUANDA UKMIS NEW YORK CAPE TOWN

YOUR TELNO 1204 TO WASHINGTON: ANGOLA

1. WE SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO HOLL (ACTING HEAD OF THE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT). IT PROVED NECESSARY TO USE THE DISCRETION GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT (TELECON ELDON/FULLER) TO GIVE HIM ON A PERSONAL BASIS SOMETHING OF THE BACKGROUND TO OUR DECISION TO GIVE THE REVISED DRAFT TO THE AMERICANS.

2. HOLL REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON WHETHER THE REVISED DRAFT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HERR GENSCHER. HE (GENSCHER) WAS ON HOLIDAY AND NOT YET FULLY INFORMED OF THE US DEMARCHE (WHICH WAS MADE HERE AT STATE SECRETARY LEVEL ON 11 AUGUST). THE SITUATION WAS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A MESSAGE WHICH CHEYSSON HAD SENT YESTERDAY TO HAIG (WHICH, WE UNDERSTAND FROM ANOTHER CONTACT IN THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT, INDICATED THAT FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT A COMMON DIPLOMATIC LINE ON THE PROBLEM OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL), AND THE LATTER'S SECOND MESSAGE TO HIS FOUR COLLEAGUES. HERR GENSCHER WOULD HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN MAINTAINING THE HARD LINE THAT HE PUT FORWARD AT MONTEBELLO - TO WHICH THE FRENCH POSITION NOW SEEMED CLOSE - AND THE SOFTER TACTICS FAVOURED BY THE UK. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT HE WOULD DECIDE.

3. HILLER (DESK OFFICER FOR ANGOLA) SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT HIS MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY RECONCILE HIMSELF TO ACCEPTING SOMETHING ON THE LINES OF OUR REVISED DRAFT. BUT WE CLEARLY CANNOT YET RELY ON THIS.

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FM FCO 131600Z AUGUST 81
TO FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1210 OF 13 AUGUST 1981.
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, CAPE TOWN, UKMIS NEW YORK, LUANDA.
TELCON FULLER/CRABBIE:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECOND MESSAGE FROM
MR HAIG TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, RECEIVED TODAY:

'DEAR PETER, I WANTED YOU TO KNOW HOW CONCERNED I AM ABOUT THE
DRIFT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA SINCE THE
OTTAWA SUMMIT. I CAME AWAY FROM OTTAWA CONVINCED THAT WE WERE OF
A COMMON MIND THAT THERE ARE SEPARATE BUT MUTUALLY REINFORCING
TRACKS ON NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA. IT WAS, AT OTTAWA, AND REMAINS
TODAY OUR VIEW THAT:

(A) OUR NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS, AS A CONTACT GROUP, WITH THE SOUTH
AFRICANS AND ULTIMATELY WITH THE FRONT LINE AND SWAPO MUST, THE
USG RECOGNIZES, PROCEED WITHOUT ANY FORMAL LINKAGE TO CUBAN
WITHDRAWAL. IN SUM, CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA CANNOT BE
ESTABLISHED AS A 'PRECONDITION' TO A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

(B) NONETHELESS, THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A SETTLEMENT IN
NAMIBIA AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, AS THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES HAVE
SAID.

(C) INDEED, GIVEN SOUTH AFRICAN NEEDS FOR A STABLE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT, AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED TO A SETTLEMENT
WITHOUT ASSURANCE THAT THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WILL END,
A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL MUST BE A COROLLARY TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT
IN NAMIBIA.

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAD REACHED COMMON AGREEMENT AT OTTAWA
ON A FORMULA SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THAT OUTLINED ABOVE, I
BELIEVED WE COULD RELATIVELY EASILY AGREE TO A PROCEDURE THAT

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WOULD INCLUDE:

(I) A LETTER FROM THE CONTACT GROUP TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS CONCERNING THE INTEGRITY OF 435 AND A TIME FRAME FOR IMPLEMENTATION. THE DRAFTS WE SENT YOU ON THIS AND YOUR INITIAL REACTION INDICATE THAT WE COULD QUICKLY AGREE ON A FINAL TEXT:

(II) AN EXPERTS LEVEL MEETING IN LATE AUGUST TO BEGIN DRAFTING A SET OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, THUS MOVING TOWARD THE CULMINATION OF PHASE ONE OF THE NAMIBIA PROCESS:

(III) FURTHER BILATERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE US AND SOUTH AFRICA DESIGNED TO ASSURE THAT THEY REMAIN ON THE AGREED TRACK: AND

(IV) US WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE A FIRST SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT WITH THE ANGOLANS AND WITH THIRD PARTIES INCLUDING THE FRONT LINE AIMED AT OPENING A DIALOGUE ON THE CUBAN ISSUE, AND THUS ACTIVATING THE SECOND TRACK.

I WAS, THEREFORE, DISTURBED TO LEARN FROM EAGLEBURGER THAT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING IN PARIS REVEALED THAT WE DO NOT YET HAVE COMMON AGREEMENT ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE WITHOUT WHICH THE USG CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE PROCEED FURTHER, I.E., THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIA QUESTION. THUS, SO FAR AS I AM ABLE TO DISCERN, THE CONTACT GROUP REMAINS DEEPLY DIVIDED ON AN ISSUE OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA, ANGOLA, AND THE FRONT LINE STATES. FRANKLY, I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT THIS ISSUE BE SETTLED: WE MUST EITHER REACH AGREEMENT AMONG OURSELVES ON THE CRITICAL QUESTION BEFORE US OR DECIDE IF THERE IS, IN FACT, ANY MERIT IN CONTINUING OUR WORK AS A CONTACT GROUP. WITHOUT SOLID AGREEMENT FIRST ON FUNDAMENTALS WE RISK FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AMONG FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AS WELL AS FAILURE IN NAMIBIA. THE MINIMAL PROFIT TO BE GAINED NOW BY TRYING TO PAPER OVER OR OBFUSCATE OUR DIFFERENCES IS SIMPLY NOT WORTH THAT LONGER TERM COST.

UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I SEE NO BENEFIT TO BE GAINED - AND SOME COST TO BE INCURRED - BY MOVING AHEAD ON ANY OF THE OTHER WORK THE CONTACT GROUP HAD UNDERWAY OR CONTEMPLATED. I DO NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, BELIEVE IT WISE TO PROCEED WITH OUR LETTER TO THE

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SAG SO LONG AS WE REMAIN FAR APART ON FUNDAMENTALS, SINCE WE WILL ONLY BE CONTRIBUTING TO LATER MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE SAG AND OPENING OURSELVES TO CHARGES OF BAD FAITH.

LET US, THEN, RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES. CAN WE AGREE ON THE RELATIONSHIP - I DO NOT SAY LINKAGE - BETWEEN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN TROOPS FROM ANGOLA? CAN WE AGREE THAT WE WILL ALL FOLLOW A SIMILAR LINE WHEN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH SWAPO, ANGOLA, THE FRONT LINE STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND CUBA? IF WE CAN, THEN WE SHOULD PLAN ON A POLITICAL DIRECTORS' MEETING SOON TO WORK OUT DETAILED AGREEMENT ON HOW WE CAN, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, USE OUR INFLUENCE ON THE VARIOUS RELEVANT PARTIES TO BRING ABOUT THE OUTCOME WE SEEK. WE SHOULD, AS WELL, THEN RETURN OUR AFRICAN EXPERTS TO CONSIDERATION OF OUR LETTER TO THE SAG, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, THE ISSUE OF HOW WE HANDLE THE NAMIBIA QUESTION AT THE UNGA, ETC. IF WE CANNOT AGREE, THEN WE OUGHT TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO BREAK THAT NEWS TO THE PARTIES AND OUR PUBLICS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU SOON.

SINCERELY, AL.''

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2418 OF 13 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE TO PARIS BONN OTTAWA PRIORITY CAPE TOWN UKMIS NEW YORK
AND LUANDA

YOUR TELNOS 1202 TO 1206: ANGOLA.

1. I SPOKE TO EAGLEBURGER TODAY AND LEFT HIM AN AIDE MEMOIRE BASED ON YOUR TELNO 1205 (I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 1212). I EMPHASIZED THAT WE SUPPORTED THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND WOULD GIVE THEM DIPLOMATIC BACKING FOR THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ANGOLANS LEADING TO THE POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS: OUR DIFFERENCES WERE ESSENTIALLY ABOUT TACTICS.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID IT HAD SEEMED TO HIM IN PARIS THAT THERE WAS A DIVERGENCE ON SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS AS MUCH AS ON TACTICS. HAIG AND HE WERE WORRIED THAT THE FIVE WERE FAILING TO AGREE ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE, I.E. THAT ALTHOUGH CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA WAS NOT A PRE-CONDITION FOR A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT, THE PARALLEL NEGOTIATING TRACKS MUST EVENTUALLY CROSS. WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE FIVE TO AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON THE U S FORMULATION THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD FACILITATE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT? HAIG INSISTED THAT HE WOULD NOT PROCEED WITH CONTACTS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, ANGOLANS AND ALL THE OTHER PARTIES ONLY TO FIND DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE FIVE ON THE FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH

3. I REPLIED THAT OUR FORMULATION IN YOUR TELNO 1206 (A COPY OF WHICH I GAVE HIM) WAS DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO OBTAIN COMMON AGREEMENT AMONG THE FIVE. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE WOULD NEED TO THINK ABOUT THIS AND DISCUSS IT WITH HAIG. BUT AT FIRST SIGHT HE THOUGHT THAT THE TEXT DID INDEED COME CLOSER TO MEETING THE AMERICANS' MAIN CONCERN THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DAY-LIGHT BETWEEN THE U S AND ITS PARTNERS IN THE FIVE WHEN THE TIME CAME TO DISCUSS WITH THE ANGOLANS THE QUESTION OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. HE ALSO EXPRESSED INITIAL SATISFACTION WITH PARA 5 OF YOUR TELNO 1205 WHICH SEEMED TO HIM TO GET IT JUST RIGHT

4. EAGLEBURGER SAID HE WOULD IDEALLY LIKE TO KEEP THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AT ARMS LENGTH FROM SOUTHERN AFRICAN QUESTIONS BUT THAT HE WOULD PLAY ALONG IF THIS WAS NECESSARY TO SATISFY GERMAN AND FRENCH SENSITIVITY THAT THE ANGOLAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE HANDLED SEPARATELY FROM THE CONTACT GROUP'S DISCUSSIONS ON NAMIBIA. HE SUGGESTED THAT AT THEIR NEXT MEETING IN WASHINGTON THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS MIGHT CONSIDER HOW TO ORCHESTRATE THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE MADE BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TOWARDS REACHING THE AGREED OBJECTIVES ON ANGOLA (E.G. WHO SHOULD TALK TO WHOM).

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5. I SAID THAT MY CALL CONSISTED A REPLY TO HAIG'S ORAL MESSAGE OF 10 AUGUST, ALTHOUGH MY COMMENTS ALSO COVERED MOST OF THE POINTS CONTAINED IN HIS SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 1210). EAGLEBURGER WRYLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME CONFUSION MIGHT HAVE ARISEN FROM THE TWO SIMILAR MESSAGES, BUT HE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THE REASONS FOR THIS. I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 1212 AND WILL SPEAK TO HIM AGAIN ALONG THE LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 2A TO 2E. WE WILL ALSO GENTLY INSERT YOUR THOUGHTS ABOUT THE ILL-JUDGED NATURE OF THE AMERICAN MESSAGES AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL TOMORROW.

6. EAGLEBURGER UNDERTOOK TO GIVE THE AIDE MEMOIRE AND OUR PROPOSED REDRAFT OF THE LINE FOR USE WITH THE ANGOLANS TO HAIG THIS EVENING

7. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, STOESSEL TOLD US THAT HAIG WAS DETERMINED TO CLEAR THE AIR BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. HAIG (AND STOESSEL) THOUGHT THAT OFFICIALS MIGHT NOT BE REFLECTING IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT HAD BEEN REACHED BY MINISTERS ON OVERALL OBJECTIVES AT THE OTTAWA SUMMIT. HE SPECIFICALLY THOUGHT THAT CHEYSSON ACCEPTED THE AMERICAN APPROACH BUT THAT THIS HAD NOT FILTERED DOWN TO OFFICIAL LEVEL. WE REPLIED THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS NOT TO BREAK UP THE FIVE THOUGH OVER-HASTY ACTION: IT OFFERED BOTH US AND THE AFRICANS THE ONLY PEACEFUL COURSE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT

8. OUR CONTACTS WITH THESE AND OTHER OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT INDICATE THAT THERE IS NOW A STRONG CURRENT RUNNING IN FAVOUR OF PULLING OUT OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS ALTOGETHER UNLESS THERE IS SOME MOVEMENT BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TOWARDS U S INSISTENCE ON ASSOCIATING THE ANGOLAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS. OUR REPLY SEEMS TO HAVE ENCOURAGE EAGLEBURGER: BUT THE AMERICANS ARE OBVIOUSLY WORRIED THAT OUR PARTNERS MAY NOT SHOW SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY.

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FM LUANDA 121506Z AUG 81
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 319 OF 12 AUGUST
AND TO PRIORITY CAPETOWN

Prime Minister

MP 13/11/81

mt

CAPETOWN TELNOS 110, 112 AND 115
ANGOLA/SADF

1. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HAVE ONLY NOW DISCOVERED EXISTENCE OF ANGOLAN SAMS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA OR IDENTIFIED RADAR INSTALLATIONS FOR FIRST TIME IN COURSE OF OPERATION CARNATION.

2. SOME WELL-INFORMED DIPLOMATS IN LUANDA BELIEVE THAT ANGOLANS DECIDED AFTER RAID ON LUBANGO AREA IN 1979 TO DEVELOP A MORE EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM AND REQUESTED AND OBTAINED SAMS FROM THEIR RUSSIAN FRIENDS, THEY BELIEVE THAT WORK ON THE SAM SITES IN THE MOCAMEDES AREA STARTED EARLY IN 1980. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF REPORTS IN THAT YEAR OF DELIVERY OF SAMS TO THE MOCAMEDES AREA (SEE LUANDA TELNOS 236 OF 6 JUNE AND 267 OF 1 JULY 1980).

3. SAAF CARRY OUT REGULAR OVERFLIGHTS OVER THE AREA IN QUESTION AND IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT SA INTELLIGENCE HAS PRECISE INFORMATION REGARDING SAM INSTALLATIONS AND RADAR STATIONS. I PRESUME THAT AMERICANS ARE ALSO WELL INFORMED ON THE SUBJECT.

4. BEFORE SPECULATING FURTHER ON REASONS FOR GENERAL LLOYD'S PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND ITS PROBABLE CONNECTION WITH THE DIPLOMATIC AND MEDIA CAMPAIGN WHICH THE ANGOLANS HAVE BEEN MOUNTING ON THE SUBJECT OF SOUTH AFRICA MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IT WOULD BE VERY ~~HELPFUL~~ HELPFUL TO HAVE SOME GUIDANCE ON THE PRESENT STATE OF OUR AND SOUTH AFRICAN KNOWLEDGE OF ANGOLA'S SOUTHERN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO ME IF YOU COULD REPEAT ANY SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON THE SUBJECT SENT TO THIS POST EARLIER THAN JUNE OF THIS YEAR.

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FM LUANDA 040810Z AUG 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 4 AUGUST

AND TO PRIORITY CAPETOWN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LAGOS

YOUR TELNO 051 TO CAPETOWN PARA 10

SADF OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA/LINKAGE

1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO HARD INFORMATION ON ANGOLAN CLAIMS AND SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTER-CLAIMS ON MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO TAKE SERIOUSLY ANGOLAN PROTESTATIONS IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE INTENSITY OF THE FEELINGS WHICH THEY REFLECT. REPORTS SUGGEST THAT SADF ARE IN VIRTUAL CONTROL OF LARGE AREAS OF CUNENE AND CUANDO-CUBANGO PROVINCE. THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN LAYING MUCH STRESS ON THE THREAT WHICH THESE OPERATIONS POSE TO THE STABILITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY. PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS MADE MUCH OF THIS IN A SPEECH ON AUGUST 2 (SEE MIFT). HE PAID TRIBUTE TO CUBA AND THE USSR FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA'S DEFENCE FORCES.

2. THE SAG MAY BELIEVE, WITH SOME JUSTIFICATION, THAT TOUGH MILITARY TACTICS QUOTE-SOFTEN UP-UNQUOTE THE ANGOLANS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON NAMIBIA AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ANGOLANS BADLY NEED AND GENUINELY WANT A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. BUT MILITARY OCCUPATION OF ANGOLAN TERRITORY BY SOUTH AFRICA PRESENTS THE ANGOLANS WITH A THREAT WHICH THEY CANNOT EVADE. THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO FIGHT. IF THEY WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS WERE FAILING OR THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE STEPPING UP THEIR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS THE PRESSURES ON THE MPLA GOVERNMENT TO MOUNT A MORE VIGOUROUS MILITARY RESPONSE WOULD BE GREAT. THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE TO GO INTO THESE ENGAGEMENTS KNOWING, ON PRESENT STRENGTHS, THAT THEY WILL LOSE, IS NOT ONE WITH WHICH WE CAN SAFELY EXPECT THEM TO LIVE INDEFINITELY.

3. IF THE ANGOLANS SEE A THREAT OF QUOTE-THE UNDECLARED WAR-UNQUOTE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA ESCALATING THERE MUST BE AT LEAST SOME DANGER OF THEM TURNING TO THE SOVIETS AND CUBA FOR INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY WOULD CLAIM THAT THIS COURSE HAD BEEN FORCED UPON THEM BY SOUTH AFRICA AND THE U.S.. THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVEN ENCOURAGE SUCH AN INITIATIVE. IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO BEGIN DELIVERING INCREASED CONSIGNMENTS OF MILITARY HARDWARE TO ANGOLA AT THIS POINT IN TIME WE COULD BE IN A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION INDEED.

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4. NOTWITHSTANDING OUR LACK OF FIRM INTELLIGENCE ON MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA THERE IS IN MY VIEW A CASE FOR PERSUADING THE AMERICANS TO URGE THE SAG TO MODERATE THEIR QUOTE-HOT PURSUIT-UNQUOTE OPERATIONS AND TO EVACUATE ANY BORDER AREAS WHICH THEIR FORCES MAY BE OCCUPYING ON A MORE PERMANENT BASIS AT LEAST DURING THIS PERIOD OF THE NAMIBIA INITIATIVE.

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FM PARIS 311535Z JUL 81

TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 31 JULY 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, BONN, WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPE TOWN.

INFO PRIORITY LUANDA, SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, DAR ES SALAAM, NAIROBI, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM ALLINSON.

PARIS TELNO 658 TO FCO (REPEATED TO YOU): **ANGOLA**

1. AFTER TODAY'S MEETING OF NAMIBIA CONTACT GROUP IN PARIS CROCKER TOLD ME GENERAL HAIG WAS LIKELY IN MARGIN OF CANCUN MEETING TO MENTION PROBLEM OF CUBANS.
2. AT THE MEETING IN OUR DISCUSSION OF US PAPER (PARAS 2 AND 3 OF TUR) CANADIANS AND GERMANS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICANS INFORMING ANGOLANS FRANKLY BUT SEPARATELY FROM OUTSET OF RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS ON NAMIBIA BY FIVE ABOUT UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERN REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF CUBANS.
3. GERMANS ON MR GENSCHER'S INSTRUCTIONS EMPHASISED THAT THERE MUST NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE ANY LINKAGE WITH NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATION. ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE ASKED TO COMMIT SUICIDE. AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE BETTER PLACED THAN FIVE TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION WITH UNITA. BUT GERMANY COULD NOT OPPOSE THE UNITED STATES OR OTHERS USING ANY LEVERAGE THEY MIGHT HAVE TO SECURE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SO LONG AS THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF JOINT EFFORT BY FIVE.
4. CANADIANS SPOKE SIMILARLY AND QUESTIONED CROCKER'S INTERPRETATION OF MONTEBELLO DISCUSSION AS CONSTITUTING CHARTER FOR ACTION BY ALL FIVE IN CONCERT. BUT BOTH CANADIANS AND GERMANS ENDORSED COMMON OBJECTIVE OF SECURING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.
5. FRENCH SAID MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED WITH ANGOLA WHEN FIVE WERE FURTHER ADVANCED ON NAMIBIA; THE RIGHT MOMENT COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED YET. EACH OF THE FIVE SHOULD MAKE OTHER COUNTRIES AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES IMPOSED BY CUBAN PRESENCE.
6. FOR UK I SAID NAMIBIAN SOLUTION WOULD HELP TO SECURE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE HAD AS RESULT OF PRESSURE OVER A PERIOD ALREADY GOT ANGOLANS TO SAY PUBLICLY THAT THEY WISHED TO RUN DOWN CUBAN PRESENCE AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH WEST. THE BEST COURSE MIGHT BE FOR THE US TO ACT DIRECTLY WITH ANGOLANS, KEEPING REST OF THE FIVE INFORMED OF THEIR PROGRESS. THE OTHER FOUR WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT SUPPORTING ACTION MIGHT BE OPEN TO THEM.

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7. CROCKER INDICATED THAT HE HAD HOPED WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO AGREE A PACKAGE OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND POSSIBLY MILITARY INDUCEMENTS FOR ANGOLA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NAMIBIA GROUP MEETING. HE MADE IT VERY PLAIN THAT US DID NOT BELIEVE A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED FOR THE NEXT FIVE TO FIFTEEN YEARS UNLESS PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON THE CUBAN PROBLEM. AND IF THE ATTEMPT FAILED ON THAT SCORE THE US WOULD NOT BLAME SOUTH AFRICA, NOR BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON HER IN CONSEQUENCE. THE US LOOKED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FIVE TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT IN WHATEVER WAYS WERE FOUND TO BE APPROPRIATE WHILST ACCEPTING THAT IT WAS NOT A MATTER IN WHICH THE NAMIBIAN CONTACT GROUP SHOULD ENGAGE ITSELF. HOWEVER THE US DID COUNT ON THE OTHER FOUR FOR SUPPORT. IF THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS NOT RESOLVED CONFLICT WOULD SPREAD IN THE AREA WITH VERY GRAVE DANGERS FOR US ALL.

8. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SEPARATE NATURE OF THE NAMIBIAN AND ANGOLAN NEGOTIATIONS IT WAS AGREED THAT WHILE A LETTER SHOULD BE SENT BY THE FIVE TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS SEEKING CONFIRMATION OF THE BASIS OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, THE AMERICANS WOULD TAKE SEPARATE ACTION WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS ABOUT THE CUBAN ISSUE.

9. CROCKER TOLD ME HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE PROGRESS MADE AT THE MEETING WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD CLEARED THE AIR. HOWEVER IT APPEARED TO OUR SIDE THAT THE GERMANS AND CANADIANS SHOWED LITTLE DISPOSITION TO GIVE WAY AND THAT MR HAIG IS LIKELY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THEM TO GIVE MORE THAN LIP SERVICE SUPPORT TO THE EFFORT TO MOVE THE ANGOLANS. TO THE DEGREE THAT AMERICANS ARE WILLING, AS INDICATED BY CROCKER TO SEEK INDUCEMENTS TO ENCOURAGE THE ANGOLANS TO RESPOND FIRMLY AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC AND OTHER ASSISTANCE, A SHOMEWHAT MORE FAVOURABLE GERMAN AND CANADIAN RESPONSE MAY BE POSSIBLE. THE SUBJECT WILL BE TAKEN UP AGAIN AT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING ON 4 AUGUST.

10. CROCKER ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE AMERICANS WILL SEEK A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN UNITA AND THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVED THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED ESPECIALLY IF OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE PERSUADED TO PLAY A LEADING PART IN SEEKING IT. THE GENERAL FEELING OF THE REST OF US WAS THAT WHILST ELEMENTS OF UNITA MIGHT BE ACCEPTED IT WAS HARD TO ENVISAGE A PLACE FOR SAVIMBI.

11. SEE MIFT.

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FM LUANDA 031325Z JUN 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 215 OF 3 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY LISBON, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FULLER (CAFD) LETTER OF 8 MAY TO SHAKESPEARE (JUST RECEIVED):
PORTUGUESE VIEWS ON ANGOLA

1. WHILE I AGREE WITH PORTUGUESE VIEW THAT ONE CANNOT JUST ACCEPT AT FACE VALUE ANGOLAN STATEMENTS THAT CUBAN TROOPS WILL GO FOLLOWING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT, I HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT REMAINDER OF PORTUGUESE ARGUMENT.

2. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO SUGGEST CUBAN CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE ESSENTIAL TO ANY PART OF THE ANGOLAN ECONOMY. IT IS FOUNDED ON OIL, DIAMONDS AND COFFEE, IN NONE OF THESE IS CUBAN INVOLVEMENT EVIDENT, NOR IS CUBA LIKELY TO BE IN A POSITION TO OFFER USEFUL HELP. CUBANS DO MAKE A POSITIVE AND IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, MEDICINE AND EDUCATION. BUT EVEN HERE CUBAN DEPARTURE WOULD NOT PROVE FATAL. MY CONTACTS AT WORKING LEVEL WITHIN MINISTRIES CERTAINLY DO NOT SUPPORT VAZ PEREIRA'S ASSERTION THAT CUBANS QUOTE-RUN-UNQUOTE THE ANGOLAN ADMINISTRATION.

3. CUBAN WITHDRAWAL OF FIGHTING TROOPS MAY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS. APART FROM POSSIBLE USE (REPORTED BY OVERLEY OF STATE DEPARTMENT DURING CROCKER VISIT) OF CUBAN TROOPS IN OFFENSIVE AGAINST UNITA EARLIER THIS YEAR, MY UNDERSTANDING REMAINS THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST BOTH UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICA IS UNDERTAKEN BY ANGOLAN FORCES, ALBEIT WITH LOGISTIC SUPPORT FROM CUBANS, SOVIETS AND EAST GERMANS. NEVERTHELESS IT IS ARGUABLE THAT SIMPLE PRESENCE OF CUBANS IS ENOUGH TO DAMP DOWN WOULD BE INTERNAL CONVULSIONS. THE MEMORY REMAINS OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT DURING ATTEMPTED COUP IN 1977.

4. HOWEVER MY READING OF ANGOLAN THINKING SUGGESTS THAT GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT IT CAN CONTAIN THIS THREAT WITHOUT AID OF CUBAN COMBAT FORCES. IF IT DID NOT IT IS UNLIKELY PAULO JORGE WOULD HAVE

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PUBLICLY REPEATED HIS REMARKS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL. THE ANGOLANS HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN SLOW TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT HAVE, EQUALLY CONSISTENTLY, SATISFIED THEIR OWN SENSE OF WHAT IS RIGHT BY STANDING BY THOSE STATEMENTS.

5. PERHAPS THE GREATER DANGER IS THAT THE CUBANS, OF THEIR OWN VOLITION OR AT SOVIET INSTIGATION, REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH ANGOLAN REQUESTS TO WITHDRAW. ANGOLA COULD NOT USE FORCE TO MAKE THEM DO SO BUT DOES HAVE A FINANCIAL WEAPON. ALTHOUGH ESTIMATES OF COST VARY, IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THAT CUBAN PRESENCE IS PAID FOR BY ANGOLA. EVEN TAKING A LOW ESTIMATE OF THE PER CAPITA COST THE TOTAL IS A SIGNIFICANT OUTLAY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, WHICH I DOUBT CUBA COULD FIND FROM ITS OWN RESOURCES. THE QUESTIONS, SHOULD THIS SITUATION ARISE, ARE WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD SEE THE EXTRA FOREIGN EXCHANGE BURDEN FALLING ON IT AS A GOOD INVESTMENT AND WHERE ANGOLA WOULD TURN.

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THOMPSON

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FM PRETORIA 181415Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK

TELEGRAM NUMBER SIC U2J 885 OF 18 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE FCO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND LUANDA

INFO SAVING LUSAKA, GABORONE, SALISBURY, DAR ES SALAAM, MAPUTO
AND LAGOS

FROM DA.

mb

SADF RAID INTO ANGOLA.

1. SADF HAVE JUST ADMITTED TO A DEEP STRIKE INTO ANGOLA IN THE VICINITY OF LUBANGO (FORMERLY SA DA BANDEIRA (1455S 1330E) YESTERDAY 17 MAR 81. THE STRIKE WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN AGAINST A TRAINING CAMP. THE ANNOUNCEMENT SPECIFICALLY STATED IT WAS NOT AIMED AT THE RAIL LINK.

2. NO DETAILS ARE GIVEN BUT THE FACT THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE AND THAT ALL SADF ELEMENTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE RETURNED SAFELY TO SWA/NAMIBIA IS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT GROUND TROOPS WERE USED.

3. GENERAL VILJOEN, CHIEF OF THE SADF, IN WHOSE NAME THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE SAID THAT THE ATTACK FOLLOWED "MURDERS AND DEEDS OF TERROR PERPETRATED AGAINST INNOCENT INHABITANTS OF SWA/NAMIBIA" AND THAT "THE RSA HAD REPEATEDLY WARNED THAT ALL TERRORIST BASES WOULD BE LOCATED AND ATTACKED, EVEN IF IT SHOULD BE IN A NEIGHBOURING COUNTRY. THESE COUNTRIES SHOULD THEREFORE EXPECT SUCH ACTION".

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

LEAHY

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 16A/81

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GENERAL MANAGER
LONDON TELEGRAMS
30 JAN 1981
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Prime Minister

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ETAT

H.E MARGARET THATCHER PRIME MINISTER OF THE BRITANIC
GOVERNMENT
LONDONSW1

IN THE NAME OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND IN MY OWN NAME I WISH
TO THANK YOU AND RETURN THE GOOD WISHES EXPRESSED IN
THE MESSAGE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WAS

LBG490 FLB7789 ETAT H.E MARGARET THATCHER PAGE2/50

KIND ENOUGH TO ADDRESS US ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW
YEAR WE HOPE THAT DURING THIS NEW YEAR WE WILL DEVELOP EVEN
MORE THE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE INTEREST FOR THE HAPPINESS AND
PROGRESS OF OUR PEOPLES I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO

LBG490 FLB7789 ETAT H.E MARGARET THATCHER PAGE3/36

WISH YOUR EXCELLENCY THE BEST OF HEALTH PERSONAL WELL BEING
AND TO EXPRESS THE FEELINGS OF OUR HIGHEST CONSIDERATIOJ STOP
JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS PRESIDENT OF THE MPLA-WORKERS PARTY
PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

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Angola

9 January 1981

Angola: Visit of Savimbi

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 2 January about a possible visit to this country by Mr. Jonas Savimbi.

MODBA

G.G.H. Walden, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

(2)



Both Hugh Thomas & I am

now have had contacts with Foreign and Commonwealth Officere Savimbi in the recent past. However London SW1A 2AH

I am not aware of any suggestion that

you should meet him later this month. 2 January 1981

You will wish to be aware of how Campton's views: that Namibian

Dear Michael, Savimbi is particularly important just now.

Angola: Visit of Savimbi

Ph: 6/1

We have heard unofficially that Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA guerilla movement in Angola, is planning to pass through London in the second half of January on his way to Washington, and that he may ask to be received by the Prime Minister.

Our consistent policy has been that no official recognition or contact should be made with Savimbi, and that he should not be seen by British Ministers or officials. Any gesture by HMG towards Savimbi at the present time would:

- a. be viewed by the Angolans as a change of policy, damage our bilateral relations with them and add a further complication to the negotiations for a settlement of Namibia
- b. encourage the Angolans to seek further military assistance from Communist countries;
- c. endanger the important Western stake in Angolan oil and diamonds and adversely affect the prospects for increased British trade; and
- d. lessen the chances of clemency for the British mercenaries held in prison since 1976.

The Angolan Government are highly sensitive to any suggestion that Savimbi is winning support from Western countries. You will recall that President dos Santos sent a personal message to the Prime Minister last May - and when Sir Michael Palliser was visiting Luanda in December, an Angolan Minister complained specifically about the activities of UNITA representatives in London.

UNITA's supporters claim that the Reagan Administration will reverse present US policy and support UNITA. Whatever may have been said by members of the Reagan team during the Presidential Election, there is no indication that the new Administration will in fact alter course or that they have focussed on the details of this issue.

/Savimbi



Savimbi has of course some vocal supporters in this country, and he paid two private visits to London last year. But he was not seen by Ministers or officials on those occasions, and it is essential that we maintain this line. We therefore strongly advise that if Savimbi does ask to see the Prime Minister, the answer should be firmly negative.

For ever
ggh

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

GRS 535

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Angola
Prime Minister
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FM LUANDA 221505Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 337 OF 22 AUGUST 1980

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE SALISBURY MAPUTO LUSAKA
WASHINGTON OTTAWA PARIS BONN

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(attached)

1. THIS ARTICLE TOGETHER WITH A FURTHER FRONT PAGE PIECE IN TODAY'S JORNAL DE ANGOLA, IS PART OF A NOW SUSTAINED MEDIA CAMPAIGN. TODAY'S PIECE IS ANTI-WEST IN GENERAL BUT SAVIMBI'S INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC IS AGAIN SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED.

2. SO FAR THE CAMPAIGN IS ONLY IN THE MEDIA. IT DOES NOT REFLECT A CHANGE IN POLICY BY THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT. INDEED IT IS NOTICEABLE THAT THE ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER VENANCIO DA MOURA, (PAULO JORGE IS ON HOLIDAY) WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO BE FRIENDLY TO ME RECENTLY AND TOLD MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE ON 21 AUGUST THAT ANGOLA WANTED TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE FIVE. THE SWAPO LEADERSHIP TOO HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY FRIENDLY OF LATE.

3. I BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT THE CAMPAIGN DOES REFLECT THE START OF A CHANGE OF MOOD AMONGST THE ANGOLAN LEADERSHIP, WHOSE BLESSING THE CAMPAIGN MUST HAVE. IN MY VIEW THEY ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EXASPERATED AND DISILLUSIONED. ANGOLA, UNDER BOTH PRESIDENTS NETO AND DOS SANTOS, HAS STEADFASTLY HELD TO THE UN PROCESS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA. PRESIDENT NETO PUT FORWARD THE DMZ PROPOSAL, PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS, WHEN ANNOUNCING THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION IN JULY, SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMED ANGOLAN COMMITMENT TO SC 435 AND, IT IS FIRMLY BELIEVED HERE, STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO ALLOW CUBAN TROOPS TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE INVASION.

4. NONE OF THIS CAN HAVE BEEN WELCOME TO THE SOVIETS BUT IT WAS ALL IN LINE WITH OUR HOPES OF ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IN ANGOLAN EYES ALL THEY HAVE HAD IN RETURN IS CONTINUED ATTACKS BY SOUTH AFRICA/UNITA (IN THEIR EYES THE TWO ARE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL), SOUTH AFRICAN DELAY IN REPLYING TO WALDHEIM, WITHOUT TO THEM ADEQUATE PRESSURE FROM THE WEST ON SOUTH AFRICA TO SPEED UP THE REPLY AND INFLUENCE ITS CONTENT, AND ACTS BY MEMBERS OF THE FIVE WHICH, IN ANGOLAN EYES, DO NOT DEMONSTRATE AN APPRECIATION OF ANGOLAN EFFORTS, INDEED ARE APPARENTLY HOSTILE (SAVIMBI IN LONDON, CLARKE AMENDMENT, ROBERTO IN PARIS).

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5. IF, AS IS THOUGHT (YOUR TEL NO 202 OF 19 AUGUST) THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY TO WALDHEIM IS SOON FORTHCOMING AND IF IT CAN BE SEEN TO BE POSITIVE, THEN I THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE PRESS WILL DROP THE SUBJECT. IF HOWEVER THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY IS NEGATIVE OR, IN ANGOLAN EYESN JUST FURTHER PREVARICATION, I FEAR WE MAY THEN SEE A CHANGE IN POLICY HERE. TO THE ANGOLANS THERE MAY SEEM LITTLE POINT IN PURSUING A COURSE WHICH SEEMS TO BE GOING NOWHERE AND DURING WHICH THEY ARE SUBJECT TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. THERE IS THEREFORE THE DANGER THAT THEY WILL CEASE OR REDUCE COOPERATION WITH THE FIVE AND LISTEN MORE CLOSELY TO THE SOVIET VOICE. THIS CHANGE MAY EXTEND BEYOND NAMIBIA TO ENCOMPASS OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WHICH HAVE SP FAR BEEN KEPT QUITE SEPARATE BY THE ANGOLANS.

6. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANYTHING WE CAN USEFULLY DO BEFORE THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT HELPFUL WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR THE ANGOLAN EXPECTATION THAT THE FIVE WILL TAKE STRONG ACTION. AS THE LAST LINE OF TODAYS ARTICLE HAS IT QUOTE-IT IS ALREADY TIME TO REFLECT-UNQUOTE.

FCC PLEASE PASS ALL AND ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

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GRS 455

UNCLASSIFIED
FM LUANDA 221407Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 336 OF 22 AUGUST 1987
INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE SALISBURY MAPUTO LUSAKA
WASHINGTON OTTAWA PARIS BONN

FOLLOWING IS FREE TRANSLATION OF BROADCAST BY ANGOLA RADIO ON 23
AUGUST.

BEGINS: WHILE THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM CONTINUES TO SHAKE WESTERN
EUROPE, LEAVING THE GOVERNMENTS UNABLE TO PROVIDE JOBS FOR MILLIONS
OF THEIR CITIZENS, THE REGENERATE SAVIMBI HAS FOUND AN EASY WAY
OF GETTING FUNDS, DEVELOPING HIS NOSTALGIC DREAM OF THE QUOTE
FUTURE OF ANGOLA UNQUOTE, WHICH GREATLY INTERESTS IMPERIALISM.
BUT IT SEEMS TO US THAT IN JULY SOME DIFFERENCES APPEARED BETWEEN
SAVIMBI AND HIS ILLUSTRIOUS PATRONS WHICH CAUSED, ACCORDING TO HIS
OWN WORDS, THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE BRITISH
CONSERVATIVE PARTY (THE PARTY IN POWER) TO CALL HIM URGENTLY TO
LONDON. IT IS IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS PUBLIC SUPPORT THAT THE MOST
REACTIONARY WESTERN GROUPS, HIS NATURAL ALLIES, CONTINUE TO GIVE
HIM ALL POSSIBLE PUBLICITY, WELCOMING HIM INTO THE STUDIOS OF THE
BBC TO MAKE ALL SORTS OF CONJECTURES AND SPECULATION ABOUT ANGOLA,
WHERE HE CLAIMS TO CONTROL QUOTE A MAJOR PART UNQUOTE OF THE
COUNTRY.

SAVIMBI'S LANGUAGE CONTINUES TO BE WORN OUT AND WITHOUT ATTRACTION.
NOW HE IS MAKING SENSATIONAL DECLARATIONS TO THE PRESS, SAYING
THAT WESTERN EUROPE IS MOVING TOWARDS MORE CONCRETE HELP FOR HIS
PUPPET ORGANISATION. AND IN TRUTH THE SPEED WITH WHICH SOME
BOURGEOIS MEDIA HAVE ANSWERED THE PUBLICISED PROPAGANDA APPEALS
OF THE UNITA PUPPET GROUPS, SHOWS US CLEARLY THEIR COLLUSION WITH
THE UNITA PUPPETS, IN THE TERMS OF THE IMPERIALIST PLAN TO
DESTABILISE ANGOLA.

IT IS MORE THAN CLEAR THAT THE SURVIVAL OF THE SAVIMBI GROUP IS
DUE TO THE DIVERSE SUPPORT GIVEN BY THE BIG MONOPOLIES WHICH
MAKE UP THE EUROPEAN BOURGEOISIE. THIS IS VERY CLEAR IN THE
DECLARATIONS MADE BY SAVIMBI TO THE BBC, WHEN HE CLAIMED THAT DURING
HIS STAY IN LONDON HE HAD CONTACTS WITH BRITISH PERSONALITIES (SIC)
WHICH WERE QUITE FRUITFUL.

IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD HERE THAT, IN REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICAN
HOSTILITIES AGAINST ANGOLA AND IN THE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE
PROCESS, THE BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENTS ARE HUNTING WITH THE HOUNDS AND
RUNNING WITH THE HARE. AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW, LONDON HAS NOT
DENIED THE CLAIMS OF SAVIMBI IN THE NEWSPAPER 'TEMPO', AS TO
THE OBJECTIVES OF HIS VISIT TO THAT EUROPEAN COUNTRY. /IN

IN REALITY, FOR CERTAIN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS UNITA REMAINS THE LAST ALTERNATIVE FOR THE NEOCOLONIALISM AND DESTABILISATION OF ANGOLA, SINCE THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IS MAKING CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS, DESPITE THE UNDECLARED WAR WAGED AGAINST US BY SOUTH AFRICA. EQUALLY BECAUSE THE SUCCESSES OF THE REVOLUTION ARE INCREASINGLY IRREVERSIBLE, THAT SMASHES THE HOPES OF IMPERIALISM OVER THE DOMINATION OF ANGOLA.

THE TRUTH IS THAT, TO THE ENEMY, ANGOLANS WILL NOT CEDE A FOOT OF LAND. THE KNOWN DESIRES OF THE RENEGADE SAVIMBI, WITH HIS KNOWN WESTERN SUPPORTERS, WILL BE OF LITTLE USE IN THE FACE OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP IN A SOCIALIST WAY AND TO SUPPORT THOSE PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHO ARE STILL STRUGGLING. ENDS

2. SEE MIFT

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL AND ALL SAVING

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PS/MR LUCE

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MR DAY

SIR L ALLINSON

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HD/NEWS D

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

ms

GRS 352

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUANDA 011512Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 268 OF 1 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK PRETORIA LUSAKA

INFO SAVING DAR ES SALAAM SALISBURY LAGOS GABORONE WASHINGTON

LISBON PARIS BONN OTTAWA FREETOWN ADDIS ABABA

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 267 OF 1 JULY

SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS INTO ANGOLA

1. WE TALKED YESTERDAY WITH A YOUNG IRISH COUPLE WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING AT A CATHOLIC MISSION HOSPITAL IN CUNENE PROVINCE NOT FAR FROM XANGONCO. THEY SAY THAT SOUTH AFRICAN AIRCRAFT HAD OVERFLOWN THE HOSPITAL ON MOST DAYS SINCE THEY ARRIVED LAST OCTOBER. AUDIBLE EXPLOSIONS IN THE AREA IN THE PAST MONTH CAUSED INMATES TO FLEE INTO THE BUSH ON MANY OCCASIONS WHERE SOME HAD DIED FOR WANT OF ATTENTION. RECENTLY A LORRY BRINGING RICE TO THE HOSPITAL HAD BEEN STRAFED CLOSE BY AND THE DRIVER FIRED ON AS HE FLED. MANY LOCAL INHABITANTS HAD ABANDONED THEIR HOUSES AND TAKEN TO THE BUSH. THE HOSPITAL DEALT WITH FAFLA WOUNDED AND THE INCREASING NUMBER OF THOSE INJURED IN COLLISIONS BETWEEN VEHICLES DRIVING EAST AT NIGHT WITHOUT LIGHTS. SWAPO PERSONNEL WERE NOT

INCREASING NUMBER OF THOSE INJURED IN COLLISIONS BETWEEN VEHICLES DRIVING FAST AT NIGHT WITHOUT LIGHTS. SWAPO PERSONNEL WERE NOT TREATED BY THE HOSPITAL. THEY HAD THEIR OWN FACILITIES.

2. THE COUPLE TRAVELLED BY ROAD FROM XANGANGO TO LUBANGO ON 29 JUNE. SOUTH OF LUBANGO THEY PASSED COLUMNS OF MILITARY TRANSPORT CARRYING CUBANS SOUTHWARD. THEY HAD NOTED A NUMBER (UNSPECIFIED) OF TANKS.

3. THEY COMMENTED ON NUMBERS OF RUSSIANS AND EAST GERMANS SEEN AT LUBANGO WHERE THEY SPENT THE NIGHT BEFORE FLYING ON 30 JUNE TO LUANDA.

4. THEY BELIEVED XANGANGO HAD BEEN BOMBED DURING 29 JUNE AND BELIEVED ANGOLAN REPORTS THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WERE STILL IN PARTS OF CUNENE PROVINCE. AFRICAN PEOPLE IN THEIR AREA BELIEVED THAT UNITA BANDS HAD COME INTO CUNENE WITH SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES. IN RECENT DAYS SOUTH AFRICAN AIR FORCE HAD BEEN DROPPING LEAFLETS IN PORTUGUESE TELLING POPULACE THEY HAD NOTHING TO FEAR AND THAT QUOTE UNITA WOULD NOT CUT THEIR THROATS UNQUOTE. COUPLE WERE INCLINED TO DOUBT ANY LARGE SCALE UNITA ENTRY INTO CUNENE PROVINCE. SWAPO MILITANTS IN UNIFORM HAD APPEARED MORE NUMEROUS THAN FAPLA IN THEIR IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURHOOD. NEAR DROUGHT OVER PAST YEAR WAS ADDING TO HUNGER AND GENERAL CONFUSION.

5. IN INTEREST OF REMAINING HOSPITAL STAFF AND COUPLE PLEASE PROTECT SOURCE.

FCC PLEASE PASS TO ALL AND ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 272230Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 940 OF 27 JUNE 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA PRETORIA

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO

INFO ROUTINE LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE SALISBURY FREETOWN DAR ES
SALAAM

INFO SAVING ADDIS ABABA

MIPT: SECURITY COUNCIL - ANGOLA

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT:

I VIVIDLY RECALL THE MOVING STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA WHEN THE COUNCIL MET LAST NOVEMBER IN SIMILARLY SAD CIRCUMSTANCES, AND I KNOW NONE OF US HERE COULD FAIL TO HAVE BEEN MOVED AGAIN, AND VERY DEEPLY, BY AMBASSADOR FIGUEIREDO'S STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY DESCRIBING THE BLOODSHED, DESTRUCTION AND MISERY WHICH HIS COUNTRY HAVE SUFFERED. WE PROFOUNDLY REGRET THE LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY IN ANGOLA. WE CANNOT IN ANY WAY CONDONE THE ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES. WE CONDEMN THE RESORT TO VIOLENCE.

AMBASSADOR FIGUEIREDO SPOKE OF THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF PREVIOUS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN PREVENTING ATTACKS UPON HIS COUNTRY. I FULLY UNDERSTAND WHAT HE MEANS. NO-ONE COULD FAIL TO SYMPATHISE WITH HIS DEEP FRUSTRATION AND STRONG FEELINGS.

BUT WE, WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE FRONT LINE STATES, ARE DOING EVERYTHING WE CAN TO CUT OUT THE PROBLEM AT ITS ROOTS. I AM SPEAKING OF WHAT WE HOPE AND BELIEVE TO BE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM WHICH WILL BRING THAT COUNTRY TO INDEPENDENCE AND PEACE. I AM, I HOPE, NO FOOLISH OPTIMIST, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT THE SETTLEMENT WHICH WE ALL DESIRE MAY BE WITHIN OUR GRASP. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WROTE A WEEK AGO TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA IN TERMS WHICH REFLECTED THE VIEWS PUT TO HIM BY THE FRONT LINE STATES AND SWAPO AND WHICH WE HOPE WILL CONSTITUTE A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. MY GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH THE FOUR OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WHICH ORIGINATED THE SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS FOR NAMIBIA, SUPPORT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HAVE INFORMED THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT OF THAT SUPPORT. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO HELP SECURE THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435. A SETTLEMENT IN NAMIBIA REMAINS OUR TOP PRIORITY. THE BLOODSHED IN ANGOLA SERVES ONLY TO MAKE US REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS THAT GOAL.

TURNING FINALLY TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL, MY DELEGATION REGRETS THAT WE CANNOT SUPPORT IT POSITIVELY. WE AGREE WITH MANY OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN IT AND WITH ITS MAIN THRUST. BUT IT STILL CONTAINS LANGUAGE IN CERTAIN OF THE /THRUST

THRUST. BUT IT STILL CONTAINS LANGUAGE IN CERTAIN OF THE
PREAMBULAR AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS WHICH WE CANNOT ACCEPT.
WE ARE GRATEFUL TO THE CO-SPONSORS FOR CONSULTING WITH US SO
FULLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO REACH CONSENSUS. WE FELT THAT WE WERE
VERY CLOSE TO AGREEMENT AND REGRET THAT IN THE END THIS DID
NOT PROVE POSSIBLE. DESPITE THE LANGUAGE OF CERTAIN PASSAGES
THE RESOLUTION, IF ADOPTED, WOULD NOT IN OUR VIEW AMOUNT TO A
DETERMINATION IN THE TECHNICAL SENSE OF CHAPTER VII OF THE
CHARTER.

F C O PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ADDIS ABABA

PARSONS

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DESKBY LUANDA 280700Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 272229Z JUN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 939 OF 27 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA PRETORIA

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS LISBON OSLO

INFO ROUTINE LUSAKA MAPUTO GABORONE SALISBURY FREETOWN DAR ES SALAAM

INFO SAVING TO ADDIS ABABA

YOUR TEL NO 482: SECURITY COUNCIL - ANGOLA

1. THANK YOU FOR THESE MOST HELPFUL INSTRUCTIONS.

2. MCHENRY WAS OUT OF TOWN TODAY LECTURING. AS A RESULT THE AMERICANS WERE QUITE RELAXED ABOUT A TRIPLE ABSTENTION. THE FRENCH TOO APPEARED TO HAVE FLEXIBLE INSTRUCTIONS. THERE WAS SOME DESULTORY NEGOTIATION DURING THE DAY WITH THE AFRICAN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AT THEIR REQUEST IN WHICH WE AND THE AMERICANS SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT. BUT THE AFRICANS CAME BACK TO CLAIM THAT THE ANGOLANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY OF THEM, ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT THAT ZAMBIA, SPURRED ON BY THE SOVIET UNION, WAS REALLY MAKING THE RUNNING. WE, THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS SAID THAT IN THAT CASE WE WOULD ABSTAIN.

3. A LETTER FROM PIK BOTHA TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WAS CIRCULATED JUST BEFORE THE RESUMPTION OF THE DEBATE. THIS WAS IN PREDICTABLE TERMS AND CLAIMED THAT ONLY A "SMALL COMBAT TEAM WITH SOME AIR SUPPORT" HAD BEEN IN ACTION AGAINST SWAPO. ALLEGATIONS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY WERE "UNFOUNDED". WITHDRAWAL OF THE COMBAT TEAM WOULD BE "COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO".

4. THE RESOLUTION WAS THUS ADOPTED THIS EVENING AS SCR 475-12-0-3, TEXT AS IN MY TEL NO 936. THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IS IN MIFT. THE OTHER TWO WESTERN PERMANENT MEMBERS SPOKE ON SIMILAR LINES, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS WERE MORE SHARPLY CRITICAL OF SOUTH AFRICA.

FCO PLSE PASS SAVING TO ADDIS ABABA

PARSONS

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~~SIR I GILMOUR~~

~~MR DAY~~

SIR L. A. L. LUSON

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MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 261604Z JUNE 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 922 DATED 26 JUNE 80

INFO IMMEDIATE LUANDA, PRETORIA, WASHINGTON

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, LISBON, OSLO,

INFO ROUTINE LUSAKA, MAPUTO, GABORONE, SALISBURY, FREETOWN,

DAR ES SALAAM

SECURITY COUNCIL: ANGOLA

1. THE ANGOLANS HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESS FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A RESULT OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA IN THE PERIOD 23-25 JUNE.

2. THEY ARE SAYING IN THE CORRIDORS THAT DURING THAT PERIOD THERE WAS ONE SOUTH AFRICAN MOTORIZED INFANTRY DIVISION, TWO BATTALIONS OF PARATROOPERS AND ONE COMPANY OF ARMoured CARS IN ANGOLA. THE ACTION SEEMS TO HAVE CENTRED IN SOUTH CUMENE. THE ANGOLANS CLAIM THAT THE RAID HAS LEFT 370 PEOPLE DEAD (MOST OF THEM OLD MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN) AND 255 WOUNDED WITH DESTRUCTION OF VEHICLES, BRIDGES, HOUSES AND LIVESTOCK AND MINING OF ROADS. 17 FAPLA HAVE DIED.

BRIDGES, HOUSES AND LIVESTOCK AND MINING OF ROADS. 17 FAPLA HAVE
DIED.

3. THE ANGOLANS HAVE NOT YET CONCERTED TACTICS WITH OTHER AFRICANS,
BUT ARE DETERMINED TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION. THEIR INITIAL
AIM WAS FOR THE DEBATE TO START THIS AFTERNOON (26 JUNE) OR,
FAILING THAT, TOMORROW.

PARSONS

NNNR

OK??

Subject

Angola

T 130/80

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 130/80

GRS 240
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 172110Z JUN 80
TO PRIORITY LUANDA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 151 OF 17 JUNE
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, CAPETOWN, LUSAKA
INFO SAVING LAGOS, GABORONE, MAPUTO, WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS,
BRUSSELS

MY TELNO 136: ANGOLAN EMISSARY.

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS:

BEGINS:
QUOTE

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE, WHICH WAS CONVEYED TO ME BY
YOUR AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS, SR VAN DUNEM, ON 27 MAY. I, AND LORD
CARRINGTON, WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING WITH HIM THE
PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE STRENGTHENING OF BILATERAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE ZIMBABWE NEGOTIATIONS HAS GIVEN
RENEWED HOPE THAT PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS CAN BE FOUND EVEN TO THE MOST
INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERN-
MENT, IN ASSOCIATION WITH THEIR WESTERN PARTNERS, WILL CONTINUE
THEIR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA MAY SOON BECOME
FREE AND INDEPENDENT THROUGH ELECTIONS UNDER UNITED NATIONS
SUPERVISION.

I HOPE THAT, FOLLOWING THE LUSAKA SUMMIT MEETING OF THE FRONT
LINE STATES, THE CURRENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THESE STATES, DR
WALDHEIM AND THE WESTERN FIVE WILL RESULT IN PROGRESS TOWARDS
SECURING AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PLAN
FOR NAMIBIA.

UNQUOTE
ENDS.

2. CLEMENCY FOR BRITISH MERCENARIES:

IN THE LIGHT OF YOUR DISTRESS TELNO 23 OF 13 JUNE, WE AGREE THAT
YOU SHOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF CLEMENCY ORALLY, LEAVING A
SPEAKING NOTE AT YOUR DISCRETION.

CARRINGTON [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

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Angela

17 June 1980

Message to President dos Santos

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 12 June covering a draft message to President dos Santos. The Prime Minister is content with the text you propose except that she would wish to omit the final sentence of the penultimate paragraph. The first half of that sentence is already implicit in the first paragraph and the second half, in the Prime Minister's view, protests too much.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SP

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

1,



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 June 1980

Dear Michael,

PRIME MINISTER
Agree attached draft?

Would you please refer to your letter of 27 May about the call on the Prime Minister paid by the Angolan Ambassador at Brussels, Sr van Dunem, on that day.

MAD
12/
VI

We consider that it would be appropriate to send a written reply to the message from President dos Santos, which Sr van Dunem left with the Prime Minister. I attach a draft.

yours ever
Roderic

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

12 JUN 1950



File No.
 Department CAfD
 Drafted by
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 Tel. Extn. 233 4176

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[TEXT]

My telno. 136: ANGOLAN EMISSARY

1. Please deliver the following message, by the most appropriate and expeditious means, from the Prime Minister to President dos Santos:

Begins:

'Thank you for your personal message, which was conveyed to me by your Ambassador in Brussels, Sr van Dunem, on 27 May. I, and Lord Carrington, welcomed the opportunity of discussing with him the problems of southern Africa and the strengthening of bilateral relations between our countries.

The successful outcome of the Zimbabwe negotiations has given renewed hope that peaceful solutions can be found

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even to the most intractable problems. It is in this spirit that the British Government, in association with their Western partners, will continue their efforts to ensure that the people of Namibia may soon become free and independent through elections under United Nations supervision. (At the same time, Mr President, I wish to assure you that the aim of the British Government is to improve the relations between our two countries, and that there is no question of Britain giving any support to groups in armed rebellion against your Government.)

I hope that, following the Lusaka Summit Meeting of the Front Line States, the current consultations between these states, Dr Waldheim and the Western Five will result in progress towards securing ~~South African~~ agreement to implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia'.
Ends.

2. As you know, the Prime Minister raised with Sr van Dunem the question of clemency for the British mercenaries. We have not felt it appropriate to revert to this in the Prime Ministerial message. In delivering this message you should however take the opportunity to refer to the Prime Minister's remarks to Sr van Dunem and to enquire whether

Unless we were asked about this, please do not include it. ref.

CONFIDENTIAL /this

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

this matter has yet been given further consideration.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 May 1980

 JS
 Subject file
 Dunem visit -
 May 80
ANGOLAN EMMISARY

The Angolan Ambassador at Brussels, Sr. van Dunem, called on the Prime Minister as arranged this afternoon. I enclose the Portuguese language text and a copy of the English language text of the message from President dos Santos which he left with the Prime Minister. (dated 14-5-80)

In handing over the message, Sr. van Dunem apologised for the postponement of his previous appointment. President dos Santos had wished to wait until the situation was a little clearer before having his message delivered. Angolan territory was being repeatedly bombed by the South Africans, most recently on 21 May when there had been 200 Angolan casualties. The Angolan Government wished to work for peace and security in the region. They regarded expenditure on the purchase of weapons as a waste of money which they could ill afford to spare. So long as the threat to Angola persisted, the Angolan Government had no option but to ask "their Cuban and Russian friends" to remain in the country. This was a pity.

The Prime Minister asked Sr. van Dunem whether he thought the Cubans would leave if the Namibian problem was resolved. Sr. van Dunem said that he was sure they would go. They had come into the country in order to help repel an invasion. Like anyone else, the Angolans would prefer to live their own lives. Nobody liked to have other people on their own land. The Angolans had chosen a Socialist system but they sought good relations with everyone. They were anxious, for instance, that their trade should resume its natural pattern, i.e. that it should be principally with Western nations.

Sr. van Dunem said that President dos Santos was confident that British pressure on South Africa would be highly effective in securing an improvement in the situation in the area. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, he said that he was delivering similar, but not identical, messages from President dos Santos to the Heads of Governments in Bonn and Brussels. The Prime Minister said she might well wish to discuss President dos Santos' message, once she had studied it, with

/Chancellor

Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Martens. There might be an occasion to do so at the European Council Meeting in Venice.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned by what she heard about the health of the British mercenaries at present in prison in Angola. She knew that HM Ambassador had raised the question with the Angolan Foreign Minister recently. She also knew that the men had been properly sentenced and had served only part of their terms. However, she wondered whether President dos Santos had yet come to any conclusion as to whether or not clemency would be extended to the mercenaries. She did not wish to press the point, but would be grateful if Sr. van Dunem could tell President dos Santos that she had raised it. Sr. van Dunem said that he would convey the message to the President.

MA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.III.AA/80

REPÚBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

Presidente da República

*Subject file - Dumen Vint
May '80*

In the interest of safeguarding peace, the common action in favour of the liberation of the still oppressed peoples in our Continent, and World peace, I have the honour of sending to Your Excellency, my delegate whose purpose is to contribute to the strengthening of relations and to inform you of important views related to the actual situation which prevails in the Southern Part of our Continent.

On the other hand we notice with concern, that a new plot is being prepared against our Country along our Southern border. This plot is directly engineered by the racist regime of South Africa in on declared war against the people's Republic of Angola. UNITA- the docile puppet of South Africa is armed, provided with munitions, infiltrated into our Country and supplied with massive logistic by support by the South African Army in order to massacre the unarmed civil population, wreck vital economic sectors for our Country's development.

In this context, Your Excellency, the realization of a policy of economic co-operation and the establishment of fraternal relationships between the Souverain Countries is adversed affected by the continued support given to puppet groups in the service of enemies against peoples aiming peace and progress.

HIS EXCELLENCY
MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF UNITED KING-DOM
L O N D O N

The People's Republic of Angola, faithful to its fundamental principles will continue to practise a policy of good neighbourhood of non aggression, non interference in the internal affairs of other countries and of peaceful coexistence in absolute respect to the O.A.U., U.N. and of the Non-Aligned Movement's Charters.

Due to the critical situation which prevails in this part of our Continent, I am sure Your Excellency will not remain without contributing once more in finding the most correct way to achieve peace and defence for the peoples namely those who are still under racist and colonialist domination.

I wish to you, Your Excellency, my thanks in receiving my Delegate, who is encharged with the task of explaining to you questions which worry us.

Accept, Your Excellency, the feelings of my highest consideration.

JOSÉ EDUARDO DOS SANTOS
PRESIDENT OF THE MPLA-WORKER'S PARTY AND OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

LUANDA, 14TH MAI 1980

Angola

FILE

DS



cc. Foreign Pol: Newsletter from
Crozier: March 80.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

3 May 1980

Dear Brian,

Just a line to thank you for the report
which you sent me recently about activities
in Zaire related to Angola. Like so much of
what you send me, I found the report most
interesting.

Yours
Margaret

Brian Crozier, Esq.

RH



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 April 1980

(2)

*I will instruct myself
MS.*

Dear Michael,

Bonnie Minister

*The attached report was forwarded to you by
Ronai Cozier. I thought you would want to see it
together with an FCO commentary.*

Angola

Thank you for sending me, under cover of your letter of 18 April, a report about plans to destabilise Angola.

And

We doubt whether there is any substance in the report. Although it is dated 19 February 1980, we have received no corroboration of its contents (which are inherently unlikely) from any source.

It is claimed that camps have been established in Zaire to train Angolan dissidents for operations against the MPLA government. It is difficult to see what Zaire would gain from permitting such activities. President Mobutu and President dos Santos of Angola agreed in October 1979 that they would not permit hostile activities directed against each other. In accordance with this agreement, Holden Roberto (leader of FNLA) was expelled from Zaire and the ex-Katangese gendarmes, who had been responsible for the invasions of Shaba in 1977 and 1978, were withdrawn by the Angolan Government from the frontier region. The threat to Zaire's stability from Angola is far greater than any counter threat which Zaire could mount; and Mobutu would be extremely foolish to risk provoking Angola in the way suggested. Belgium, France and China do have teams of military officers in Zaire, engaged in training Zairean armed forces units; and these training teams may have given rise to the report.

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

The suggestion that Holden Roberto is receiving substantial backing from the French Government also seems doubtful. The consensus of opinion (including Savimbi) is that Roberto's FNLA movement is defunct. The report may be a piece of propaganda by sympathisers of Roberto, to attract support for him by associating him with Savimbi.

If we receive any information which leads us to modify these conclusions, I shall of course let you know,

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

OK.

Angola /

file

18 April 1980

GF 27.4.80

I enclose a copy of a report which has been forwarded to the Prime Minister by Brian Crozier about plans being made in Zaire to destabilise Angola. Before submitting it to the Prime Minister, I would be grateful for any comments which you may have on the assertions made in the report. They are relevant to the paper of whose preparation you informed me in your letter of 1 April about policy towards the Soviet Union.

I should be grateful if knowledge that I have forwarded this report to you could be limited to the smallest possible number of people.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

George Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GF

SECRET

26 March 80

Message dated 19 February 1980. Original in French. Translation follows.

Training camps for Angolans have been set up in various parts of Zaire. Courses in sabotage, assassination and destabilisation, or in the event of a direct conflict between Zaire and Angola, for which Zaire is preparing.

2. One of the camps is run by a mission of 10 American officers, the commandant of which is John Oliver STENNIS. Another is run by a French Colonel Jacques Lemarchand.

There are no Zaire citizens among the recruits, and the instructors are all American or French.

3. A third camp is to be established before the end of February, under the direction of a Belgian Captain Charles Levallois, accompanied by 15 Belgian officers. There is a fourth camp, run by a Chinese, with the unofficial rank of Colonel, Chen Yi; with him are 12 officers-instructors, all Chinese. Training is given for tanks, parachute-drops, guerrilla war, etc.

4. There is no proof of coordination between the four camps, but it is almost certain that the Western ones are all coordinated.

5.

It has a substantial budget and a team of specialists to help Savimbi on the diplomatic level (approaches to certain Western, Arab or African governments etc.), logistics (certain types of armaments, including arms of Soviet or East European origin), and financial (loans, sent regularly but carefully controlled by a financial specialist to make sure the money is not used by Savimbi for personal expenditure). For Savimbi himself, there is a personal account in the Union de Banques Suisses in Lausanne, where every month a transfer of \$50,000 is made, plus expenses.

6. A special section of the French SDECE has been set up to deal with FNLA refugees, who are arriving in Paris in large numbers. They are greeted by a special office of the Paris Préfecture and are sent on to the special section of the SPN.

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are sent on to the special section of the SDECE, where the most reliable people are selected. Decent lodgings and adequate wages are provided, both for them and for their families where necessary. A special military programme is on offer, "to save Angola from communist domination".

7. Holden Roberto, who has a residence visa for six months and is living in Neuilly in a SDECE house, is in charge of the general supervision of these , whom he intends to send later to Gabon, Zaire and other places, for operations of sabotage, assassination, bomb attempts and so forth, not only in various cities where there are representatives of the Angolan government.

8 For the time being, Holden Roberto does not have the same American help that Savimbi gets. However, he has put up a plan which has been accepted by the French , and which consists of trying to mobilise help from the Arab, African , Asian and South American governments in an attempt to overthrow the Luanda regime, His plans include the following:

- A trip to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco , Pakistan, to collect new funds.
- Sadat invited him to set up a military training camp in Egypt.

- Prince Fahd, with the backing of King Hassan of Morocco. invited him to visit him in Riyadh .

- A personal counsellor of President Bourguiba , Allala Luoititi , has invited him to Tunis.

- He is talking of establishing a strategic, and possibly even a tactical alliance with Savimbi on the basis of a minimum political and military programme.

- For April 1980, there is a project of Holden Roberto's to call a conference of all serious opposition elements in Angola and set up a Popular Liberation Committee for Angola. These moves for national unity has the backing not only of the Americans , French, Portuguese, but also of various Arab, Africa and Asian governments . The

conference will probably be held in Switzerland, but no firm decision has yet been taken.

- Also part of the plan is to, request the intervention of France to persuade friendly African governments to provide ^{official but} discreet aid. He has been expelled from Dakar and Abidjan, but this would not prevent him from coming back under some suitable disguise.

- Roberto met Senghor of Senegal in Paris about three weeks ago. Senghor promised to help if Roberto became more serious (plus sérieux) with his programme. But it is clear that Senghor prefers Savimbi.

9. Roberto is therefore trying to reorganise and strengthen his activities in Portugal. He is slightly envious of the considerable aid Savimbi himself gets from that country, from Morocco, the US, etc. and would like an equal share of whatever aid is forthcoming. He is aware that the American role is more effective and complains of the lack of the right kind of assistance from USA.

10. On 16 February, Roberto sent a delegation of three to Washington to try and make the right contacts and to prepare his own trip to the United States. He is being helped by certain religious organisations in USA. This mission is still in the US at this moment.

11. Right-wing political and military groups in Portugal have promised Savimbi all possible aid to overthrow the MPLA government in Luanda. Apparently the new Portuguese government is in agreement with this strategy, although it will try not to arouse too much anger in Luanda.

12. Here are the terms of the agreement, concluded in Lisbon between Savimbi and the official Portuguese representative who is a colonel by rank, who uses the name of Colonel Porto although that is not his name, for aid to UNITA. That is the training of three groups of partisans of Savimbi in Portugal, each one consisting of 300 men. These men must be hand-picked by Savimbi himself. Their lodging and food expenses and so forth will be found by Colonel Porto. The campaign to raise funds to help Savimbi which the big industries and

private enterprises of Portugal would contribute. There is talk of a budget of 135 million escudos for the year 1980, of which one-fifth has already been found in the past three months. Next they would send high Portugese officers who are now in retirement from the army to Savimbi's camps in Angola and to Namibia to supervise the training of troops and military operations against Angola. A liaison would also be set up between the Portugese on one side and the US and France on the other side. Various efforts would be made in West Germany to gain West German assistance as well for Savimbi. All necessary facilities, including corruption and pressure to give Savimbi access to press, radio and television in Portugal and to launch the paper in Portuguese, French and English to be published in Lisbon to combat the MPLA and to support Savimbi.

Finally to buy Savimbi a special plane that would allow him to travel securely with secure pilots. This is supposed to be a Mystere 20.

Note. The informant is a Frenchman of leftish views, whose reliability has been tested over a period of some years. The original document was shown to Bernard by the German contact who distributes a regular service to selected people. This one is considered too sensitive for distribution. Bernard was not allowed to take a copy, but instead taped a quick translation.

MX

GRS 750
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FM LUANDA 051937Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 140 OF 5 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAPETOWN

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, SALISBURY, LUSAKA, MAPUTO,
DAR ES SALAAM, GABOFONE, OTTAWA AND HAVANA.

ZIMBABWE/NAMIBIA: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. I WAS CALLED AT TWO HOURS NOTICE THIS MORNING (5 APRIL) TO SEE PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS. HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO RECEIVE ME AND TO EXTEND A PERSONAL WELCOME. HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN RELATION TO SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

2. ZIMBABWE

THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WANTED TO QUOTE-MANIFEST ITS SATISFACTION. THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS HAD BEEN FAIR AND REFLECTED THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE-UNQUOTE. HE HAD ALREADY SENT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO ROBERT MUGABE AND TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (NO MENTION OF NKOMO BY NAME). NOW HE WANTED TO QUOTE-CONGRATULATE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE JUST SOLUTION THEY HAD BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CONSOLIDATE ZIMBABWE'S INDEPENDENCE AFTER THE LONG STRUGGLE AND ANGOLA WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH THE NEW COUNTRY-UNQUOTE. PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE.

3. NAMIBIA

ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT REMAINED CONCERNED AND PREOCCUPIED OVER NAMIBIA. THEY WELCOMED DR WALDHEIM'S LATEST STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EARLY APPLICATION OF SC 435. DOS SANTOS SAID HE QUOTE-COULD SEE NO CONFLICT BETWEEN SC 435 AND THE DEMILITARISED ZONE PROPOSED BY ANGOLA AND ELABORATED BY THE FIVE AND THE SECRETARIAT-UNQUOTE. THE DMZ, FIRST DISCUSSED AT LUANDA, WAS QUOTE-NOT AN OBJECTIVE IN ITSELF, BUT A MEANS OF SUPPORT-UNQUOTE. THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD CAST DOUBT ON THE GUARANTEES OFFERED BY ANGOLA AGAINST SWAPO INFILTRATION INTO NAMIBIA. BUT SOUTH AFRICAN DOUBTS WERE NOT QUOTE-VALID-UNQUOTE. THE DMZ AND UNTAG PATROLLING ON THE ANGOLAN SIDE WOULD PROVIDE A GUARANTEE. FULL ANGOLAN COOPERATION AND FACILITIES FOR UNTAG PATROLS IN THE ANGOLAN DMZ HAD BEEN OFFERED DURING TECHNICAL TALKS WITH GENERAL PREM CHAND (MY TELNO 051 OF 11 FEBRUARY).

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4. PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE--THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS PROVIDING AN OBSTACLE TO ESTABLISHING A DMZ--UNQUOTE. THE CUBANS WERE PRESENT ONLY AT ANGOLAN REQUEST AND QUOTE--TO HELP US AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. IT IS ANGOLANS WHO FIGHT NOW AGAINST INCURSIONS BY SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AND UNITA BANDS NOT CUBANS--UNQUOTE. NOTHING HAD YET BEEN SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT THIS DECISION BUT QUOTE--WE CAN ASSURE THE DMZ WITH OUR OWN HANDS. WE GUARANTEE THAT THE UN PROCESS WILL NOT BE UPSET BY INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH, THE PROBLEM LIES IN NAMIBIA--UNQUOTE. I PROBED ABOUT SUGGESTIONS THAT THERE HAD BEEN A GENERAL WITHDRAWAL NORTHWARDS OF CUBAN MILITARY DETACHMENTS. PRESIDENT SIMPLY REPEATED QUOTE-- THERE WILL BE NO CUBANS IN OUR DMZ--UNQUOTE.

5. DOS SANTOS ENDED BY AN EARNEST RE--AFFIRMATION OF HIS WISH TO WORK FOR APPLICATION OF THE UN PLAN AND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. ANGOLA HAD NO AMBITIONS BEYOND HER BORDERS AND PLENTY TO DO WITHIN THEM TO ACHIEVE UNITY AND RECONSTRUCTION. IN VIEW OF SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN ZIMBABWE HE HOPED THE FIVE WOULD CONTINUE TO QUOTE-- EXERCISE THEIR ROLE AND TO WORK UPON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT TO CONVINCE THEM TO GO FORWARD--UNQUOTE. FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE CALLING THE THREE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

6. I THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS MESSAGE CONCERNING ZIMBABWE, ASSURED HIM THIS WOULD BE TRANSMITTED AND ASKED IF ANY DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN ABOUT ATTENDANCE AT ZIMBABWE'S INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. I WAS ASKED TO TELEPHONE PRESIDENT'S CHEF DE CABINET ON 7 APRIL.

7. TURNING TO NAMIBIA I TOLD PRESIDENT OF DR VILJOEN'S PRIVATE VISIT TO LONDON AND REASONS FOR HIS RECEPTION BY MINISTERS AND SPOKE ON LINES OF YOUR TELNO 271 OF 3 APRIL TO UKMIS NEW YORK. DOS SANTOS LISTENED WITH INTEREST AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD REASONS FOR VILJOEN'S RECEPTION AND HOPED YOUR MEETING WOULD HELP TOWARDS A MORE FORTHCOMING SAG REPLY TO THE UN ON THE DMZ. I SAID YOU HAD PRESSED THE POINT THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. AT SAME TIME WE WERE URGING QUOTE--REASONABLE PATIENCE--UNQUOTE BY THE FLS AND HOPED HE WOULD FEEL ABLE TO INSTRUCT THE ANGOLAN REPRESENTATIVE AT NEW YORK IN THIS SENSE. I GOT NO POSITIVE ASSURANCE, BUT A NOD AND ADMISSION THAT RHODESIAN ELECTION RESULT AND INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE NATIONAL PARTY (QUOTE--QUITE BAD--UNQUOTE) COMPLICATED AND SLOWED SAG'S RESPONSE. IT WAS NECESSARY SOMEHOW TO CREATE GREATER CONFIDENCE.

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8. I TOLD DOS SANTOS THAT PRESIDENT NETO HAD USED A SIMILAR PHRASE WITH ME LAST AUGUST (MY TELNO 309 OF 8 AUGUST 1979). I UNDERSTOOD THAT POSSIBILITY OF VISITS BY STAFF OF PROPOSED UN LIAISON OFFICE AT LUANDA TO SWAPO CAMPS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED. SPEAKING PERSONALLY I THOUGHT ANYTHING THE ANGOLAN SIDE COULD DO TO ASSURE THIS SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT. PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD BEAR THIS IN MIND. I THANKED HIM FOR CALLING ME AND HOPED I MIGHT ASK TO SEE HIM AGAIN IF MATTERS OF IMPORTANCE AROSE. DOS SANTOS SAID I SHOULD FEEL FREE TO ASK.

9. COMMENT TO FOLLOW.

FCC PLEASE PASS ALL AND ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES

BYATT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Angola

27 March 1980

With your agreement, I forwarded to the Foreign Office a copy of your note to me of 28 February and its enclosure about your talks with Jonas Savimbi. You may be interested to see the Foreign Office's comments, of which I enclose an abstract.

M O'D B A

Professor Hugh Thomas

RESTRICTED



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 March 1980

Dear Michael,

The situation in Angola

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 18 March, a note of a conversation between Professor Hugh Thomas and Dr Jonas Savimbi. As Professor Thomas has taken the trouble to send you this note, you may like to have the department's comments.

Savimbi stated that UNITA controlled two Angolan provinces and had established an administrative infrastructure in those provinces. This contrasts with Mr Patrick Cosgrave's assertion in the 'Times' of 4 February that Savimbi controlled "two thirds" of Angola. There are 17 provinces in Angola, and Moxico and Cuando Cubango are the most sparsely populated ones. It is moreover difficult to reconcile Savimbi's claim to have the entire infrastructure of a state in those provinces with his admission that he does not control either the main roads or the larger towns.

We were interested to see Savimbi's estimate of Cuban strength in Angola. Our own estimates are substantially lower; we believe that there are about 19,000 military and 6,000 civilian personnel from Cuba in Angola. We have no evidence of any current disagreement between the Russians and the Cubans on future policy towards Angola; the present tensions in Luanda appear to arise more from a struggle for power between black Angolans and those of mixed descent.

Savimbi has referred on other occasions to the plans for a meeting between him and Neto before the latter's death, and to his poor opinion of dos Santos. Although it is true that dos Santos studied chemical engineering in the Soviet Union and married a Russian woman, our information is that he has, for some time, been separated or divorced from her. We believe it is too early to judge whether dos Santos is moving Angola towards a closer association with the Soviet Union; despite fears that he would prove less helpful than Neto on Namibia, the policy of dos Santos has so far not diverged discernibly from that of his predecessor.

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It is clear that the Angolan Government and UNITA have reached a military stalemate, and neither is at present in a position to defeat the other decisively. This implies that there will eventually have to be a political settlement, and Savimbi has on other occasions declared himself in favour of a negotiated solution. Meanwhile, Savimbi's efforts to drum up support in Western countries seem likely to increase Angolan suspicion of the West, and could result in the strengthening, rather than reduction, of the Cuban presence in Angola.

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London

RESTRICTED

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Angola.
File 10

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1980

THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA

I enclose a note, forwarded to me somewhat belatedly, of a conversation which took place last month between Professor Hugh Thomas and Mr. Jonas Savimbi of the UNITA Movement in Angola. I doubt that there is much in this note that will not already be familiar to the Department. But it may be of some interest.

Professor Thomas knows that I am sending you a copy of this note.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R. M. J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc



File B

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 March 1980

Further to your note of 13 March,
I enclose a copy of your record of your
talk with Mr. Savimbi!

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Professor Hugh Thomas.

8

Centre for Policy Studies

8 Wilfred Street · London SW1E 6PL · Telephone 01-828 1176 Cables: Centrepol London

Submit with file,

Paul

March 13, 1980

Dear Michael,

Please do send a copy of my note about Savumbi to the Foreign Office. wd. you mind sending a copy to me too, since I forgot to have one made!

Yours ever

Hugh

Michael Alexander Esq

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File

WAP

Prof. Hugh THOMAS
Mr. Savimbi

7 March 1980

I should have acknowledged earlier your manuscript note to me of 28 February covering an account of your conversation with Mr. Savimbi on 17 February, which has been read with much interest here. Would you mind if I sent it over to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office?

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Professor Hugh Thomas

BK

Centre for Policy Studies

8 Wilfred Street · London SW1E 6PL · Telephone 01-828 1176 Cables: Centrepol London

Private

Feb 28, 1980

Dear Michael

I thought I shd. let you have a brief note on a talk I had last week with Jonas Savimbi. I don't suppose for a minute he told me anything that he did not tell others. I have not passed on the contents of this note to anyone else & I have no copy of it.

Yours ever
Hugh.

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Private

29 Ladbroke Grove
London W11 3BB
01-727 2288

A talk with Jonas Savimbi, London, February 17, 1980

I had a talk with Jonas Savimbi at the Metropole Hotel, Edgware Road, at breakfast-time on Sunday February 17. Most of the time there was no one else present, though for part of the time his London representative Tony Fernandes was there too. I saw Savimbi on the suggestion of Hugh Fraser but I did so in my capacity as the historian of Cuba.

Savimbi said that UNITA controlled two Angolan provinces, Moxico and Cuando Cubango, though the main roads were in the hands of the Cubans. So were the larger towns. UNITA, he said, had the entire infrastructure of a state in those provinces, including schools and hospitals.

He estimated the Cubans in Angola at 34,000, of whom 28,000 are soldiers, 6,000 civilians. The Cubans in Angola had been white to begin with; now they are mostly black. Many black Cubans had been in touch with him. He thought that there were some signs of disputes between Russia & Cuba as to how proceed in Angola. The coup in May 1977 (in which the Cubans apparently protected Neto's regime) was a sign of that.

He thought that had Neto lived, he (Savimbi) would have been able to make an arrangement

/with

him. He had arranged to meet Neto in Dakar in December 1979; but he had died. Savimbi spoke of Neto as being essentially an Angolan patriot! at least in the making.

He had no time for Eduardo Santos whom he claimed to be unpopular. Russian educated, with a Russian wife. It was no surprise to him that the Russians had been allowed by Santos to begin work on an ~~satellite~~ for observatory for satellites at the southern Angolan town of Mossademes: Neto had always opposed that. Santos had also reinstated several pro Soviet ministers whom Neto had dismissed.

He thought the East German advisers were concentrated on help to SWAPO in the south except though, the East Germans were running the Angolan cryptography, & that had made things more difficult for UNITA.

Savimbi hoped that when Rhodesia is properly settled — he was optimistic — he could get some help from the West, particularly from us. He wd. like help to be given to him publicly, to impress other Africans. He said that it was "Ok to help the Afghan rebels if the aim is to tie down the Russians & prevent them from doing the same elsewhere. But they will never leave". He hoped to be allowed to appear here publicly in April or so, & perhaps give interviews.

Savimbi seemed to me to be quick, well-informed generally, resourceful and not at all bitter about 1975. His English is fluent. He appeared to me more like a good general than a politician. We had no talk about his political ideals. Perhaps that "dog in the night time" indicates something. I would not venture to say. Hugh Thomas Feb. 28, 1980



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 November 1979

ANGOLA

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Santos of Angola. It does not, I think, call for any further action.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Angola
JS

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T136/79T

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LUANDA 92/87 7 1705 PAGE 1/50

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TELEGRAPHS LONDON

- 7 NOV 1979
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1222 Ext 2068

ETATPRIORITE

A SUA EXCELENCIA MARGARET THATCHER PRIMEIRO MINISTRO
DO REINO DA GRA BRETANHA E IRLANDA DO NORTE
LONDONS W1

NESTA HORA DE LUTO E DE DOR PARA O POVO ANGOLANO DETERMINADO A
CONTINUAR A OBRA DO NOSSO QUERIDO E SAUDOSO PRESIDENTE AGRADECO
SENSIBILIZADO A VOSSA MENSAGEM DE FELICITACOES POR OCASIAO
DA

LBH547 FLB6467 ETATPRIORITE A SUA PAGE2/37

MINHA ELEICAO PARA PRESIDENTE DO MPLA PARTIDO DO TRABALHO
E DA REPUBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA STOP
ACEITE PROTESTOS DE ELEVADA CONSIDERACAO

JOSE EDUARDO DOS SANTOS PRESIDENTE DO MPLA PARTIDO
DO TRABALHO PRESIDENTE DA REPUBLICA POPULAR DE ANGOLA

cc/Marter
Ops

16.10.79

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT
DOS SANTOS

I send you my congratulations and best wishes on your assuming office as President. I look forward to the strengthening of relations between Britain and Angola in the years ahead.

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. ...T120A/79T

Angola



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 October 1979

Angola

We spoke last night on the telephone about the draft message of congratulations from the Prime Minister to President Dos Santos of Angola enclosed with your letter to me of 12 October. We agreed that the word 'friendly' should be deleted from the text.

M. O. D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ASO

①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

*Prime Minister
Agree to it?*

12 October 1979

Dear Michael,

Angola

see Report, Sept 79, Neto

You will recall (my letter of 11 September) that the Prime Minister agreed to send a message of condolence on the death of President Neto of Angola. The Acting President, Senhor Eduardo Dos Santos, took office as President of Angola on 20 September.

Dos Santos was born in 1942 and at 37 is one of the youngest African Heads of State. He was appointed Foreign Minister of Angola on independence in 1975, and later became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning. As one of the late President Neto's closest supporters and collaborators, he seems likely to continue Neto's moves towards a rapprochement with the West.

Technically, the appointment of Dos Santos is subject to confirmation by a Party Congress next year; but it is expected that this will be automatic, and many Western Heads of State and/or Government, including the Presidents of France, Germany and Italy and the Sovereigns of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, have sent congratulatory messages.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary therefore considers it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to send a congratulatory message. I enclose a draft telegram which we might send to HM Ambassador, Luanda.

*Not that message -!
Send a message see above
not*

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

File No.
Department CAfD
Drafted by SANKEY
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn 233 4176

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(TEXT)

PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS

1. Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to the President:

'I send you my congratulations and best wishes on your assuming office as President. I look forward to the strengthening of ^{wilkinson contacts?} ~~friendly~~ relations between Britain and Angola in the years ahead'.

Copies to:-

??

12 OCT 1979

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