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PREM 19/1075

PART 4

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FILING

Internal Situation

Israeli / Lebanese Hostilities

UK / Lebanese relations

LEBANONPart 1: July 1979Part 4: SEPTEMBER 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
8/9/83		3/11/83					
9.9.83		4.11.83					
10.9.83		14.11.83					
11.9.83		31.10.83					
12.9.83		PART 4 ENDS					
15.9.83							
16.9.83							
20.9.83							
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27.10.83							
28.10.83							
31.10.83							
1.11.83							

PREM 19/1075

PART 4 ends:-

Washington Tel 3238 31.10.83

PART 5 begins:-

Tehran Tel 588 1.11.83

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

[illegible]

Signed J. Gray

Date 6/2/2013

PREM Records Team

GRS 240
UNCLASSIFIED
FM WASHINGTON 312336Z OCT 83
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3238 OF 31 OCTOBER
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV
MY TELNO 3214: LEBANON

Prime Minister.

*This continued talk of
retaliation is disturbing. I
have asked that the Foreign
Secretary since it is cabinet
the week. A-J.C. 1/11*

1. IN A NETWORK TV INTERVIEW ON 30 OCTOBER DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM SAID THAT THERE WAS STILL NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS ON THE MNF ON 23 OCTOBER. BUT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SO FAR AVAILABLE POINTED TO QUOTE RATHER DEEP UNQUOTE IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT. THE SYRIANS MUST HAVE BEEN COGNISANT OF WHAT WAS GOING ON. AS FOR RETALIATION, THE ADMINISTRATION WERE CONTINUING TO LOOK AT ALL THE OPTIONS.

2. IT WAS ALSO REPORTED OVER THE WEEKEND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN TOLD A GROUP OF JEWISH-AMERICANS PRIVATELY LAST WEEK THAT THE U S QUOTE HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THIS HORRENDOUS ACT INVOLVED IRANIAN TERRORISTS AND THEY WERE FACILITATED IN THEIR ENTRY AND IN THE PROVISION OF THE MUNITIONS BY THE SYRIANS UNQUOTE.

3. ASKED IN A SEPARATE TV INTERVIEW FOR HIS VIEW OF POSSIBLE US/ISRAELI OFFENSIVE ACTION IN RETALIATION FOR THE ATTACKS, THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER EMPHASISED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED THE IDF TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR INDUCEMENT TO THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW ALSO. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT THE U S TO TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, BUT WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN WHAT THE U S WISHED TO DO IN AN EAST/WEST CONTEXT.

WRIGHT

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THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 October 1983

Dear John,

AS 1.
11

h.a.

I enclose the original of a letter from King Hussein to the Prime Minister. You will already have seen the text of the King's letter and enclosures in Amman telnos 473, 474 and 475.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

Peter Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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*I have told the F.C.O. that
I think the message needs
to be much more lucid.
They will look at it again.*

London SW1A 2AH

A.J.C. 21/10

31 October 1983

Dear John,

Lebanon: Message from President Reagan

Thank you for your letter of 27 October. I
enclose a new draft message to President Reagan.

Since we submitted the original draft, there have
been two new developments: King Hussein has shown us a
copy of his personal message to President Reagan which
puts forward the idea of a timetable for withdrawal of
Foreign forces from Lebanon (I enclose a copy of ease
of reference). Secondly, at the meeting of the
Foreign Ministers of the four MNF contributors in Paris
on 27 October, Sir Geoffrey Howe sketched out a version
of the same idea.

Sir Geoffrey thinks that this would be a good
opportunity to put a slightly fuller version of the same
ideas to the Americans, and the reply to President Reagan
is drafted accordingly.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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DSR II (Revised)

MESSAGE

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

President Reagan

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SUBJECT:

Lebanon/MNF

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

1. Thank you for your message of 24 October. As you know, I entirely agree that we cannot let the outrageous attacks on the Multinational Force deflect us from our task. We must continue our efforts to enable the legitimate government of Lebanon to pursue a peaceful solution in the reconciliation talks.

2. As agreed in the meeting which Geoffrey Howe and George Shultz attended in Paris, we shall be putting what pressure we can on all participants in the Geneva talks. If a more broadly-based Lebanese government can be constructed, that will be a major step forward.

3. As Geoffrey Howe also mentioned in Paris, we have been giving some thought to the longer-term. We need to agree on a strategy which, *guides promoting reconciliation* ~~as well as efforts to push the reconciliation along~~, also embraces the withdrawal of foreign forces, including eventually the MNF. King Hussein, who as ever is willing to do all he can to help, has suggested that one tactic might be to negotiate a

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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/framework

framework for the phased withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces to pave the way for a reunited Lebanon, with the MNF itself pulling out once a government of national unity has established its authority. These elements could form a package.

4. I do not underestimate the difficulties of negotiating such a framework. But there is certainly some scope for using the withdrawal of the MNF as a lever, with the offer of a co-ordinated programme of reconstruction aid as an additional incentive. The Israelis have hinted clearly that they would not necessarily insist on the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian forces provided their own minimum security requirements could be met. While I put no faith in Syrian assurances, they have repeatedly stated their readiness to withdraw after the departure of Israeli forces, and they might find themselves under pressure in the new circumstances to do so. We should put them to the test. Full implementation of the Israel/Lebanon agreement is obviously a difficulty for them, as it will be for any more broadly based Lebanese government likely to emerge as a result of the Geneva negotiations. It seems sensible to leave that aspect on one side for the time being and concentrate on the security arrangements which Israel reasonably demands for her northern border.

5. These are only preliminary thoughts. I know that your people have already worked long and hard on the Lebanon problem and there are no easy answers. But I

think that this is the right time, whether or not the Geneva talks get underway, to look in more detail at the kind of package which might attract all the leading players and which would allow eventually for the reunification of Lebanon and the withdrawal of our forces.

GRS 650

SECRET

UN EYES ALPHA

DESKBY 261830Z OCT 83

SECRET

FROM AMMAN 261530Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 474 OF 26 OCT 83

MIPT: LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 25 OCTOBER
FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

BEGINS.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT.

YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SUGGEST, SIR, THAT YOU
VALUED MY COUNSEL. I FOUND IT MY DUTY AS A LONG TIME
FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES AND YOUR GOOD SELF, TO WRITE
TO YOU AT THIS MOST OMINOUS TIME IN THE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE
EAST AND THE WORLD. I DO SO AS AN ARAB WHO HAS LIVED
MOST OF HIS LIFE IN THE CENTRE OF EVENTS IN THIS AREA.
I DO SO AS A FREE MAN, A SOLDIER AND A FATHER OF A SOLDIER.
I WRITE TO YOU IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MOST RECENT OUTRAGE
PERPETRATED IN BEIRUT WHICH CLAIMED THE LIVES OF MANY
YOUNG AMERICAN AND FRENCH SOLDIERS—MEMBERS OF THE MULTI-
NATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE.

MY MESSAGE IS THAT, IF THE ARRIVAL OF THAT FORCE ON LEBANESE
SOIL WAS A BLUFF, THEN THE BLUFF HAS BEEN CALLED. IT LEAVES
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS AND, INDEED,
THE FREE WORLD, THE CHOICE OF EITHER WITHDRAWING URGENTLY
FROM LEBANON, AND, BY IMPLICATION, LEAVING THE MIDDLE EAST TO
WHATEVER ITS FUTURE DESTINY OR TAKING THE ALTERNATIVE COURSE—
IF YOU HAVE THE RESOLVE AND THE MEANS—OF CALLING FOR AN URGENT
TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM
ALL SOVEREIGN LEBANESE SOIL.

THE SAID WITHDRAWALS MUST BE OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN ALPHABETICAL
ORDER AND WITHIN A REASONABLE LIMITED TIME-FRAME. THIS CALL
MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A DEMAND THAT ALL FACTIONS IN THE LEBANON
MEET URGENTLY TO RESOLVE ALL THE LEBANESE CAUSES OF PAST,
PRESENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE CONFLICTS. REPRESENTATIVES OF ANY
FACTION WHO ABSTAIN FROM ATTENDING A FINAL CONFERENCE OF LEBANESE
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WOULD BEAR THE HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES
TOWARDS THEIR FACTIONS AND COMMUNITIES IN REGARD TO THEIR
RIGHTS FOR ALL TIMES TO COME.

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THE CONFERENCE, MUST TRULY AIM AT CREATING A JUST, FREE LEBANON, WHERE THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF ALL LEBANESE ARE SAFEGUARDED TOGETHER WITH THEIR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL LEBANESE SOIL. NATIONAL LEBANESE RECONCILIATION MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED AND NO FURTHER PROCRASTINATION IS EITHER POSSIBLE OR ACCEPTABLE. IF THE LEBANESE, FREE OF ALL EXTERNAL INFLUENCES, ARE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO ACCOMPLISH NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, THEN THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WILL WITHDRAW ONCE THIS HAS BECOME APPARENT. ALTERNATIVELY, IT WOULD WITHDRAW ONCE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION HAS ATTAINED.

FINALLY, THE NATIONS REPRESENTED IN THE MULTI-NATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE SHOULD ACT WITHOUT RESERVATION AGAINST ANY EXTERNAL POWER WHICH REFUSES TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM ALL SOVEREIGN LEBANESE SOIL WITHIN THE SET TIME FRAME. THEY SHOULD THEN EXPECT THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S TOTAL COLLABORATION AND SUPPORT TOWARDS ACHIEVING THESE ENDS.

IF I SEE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR YOU, SIR, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OR YOUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS IN SERVING THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND THE WORLD, THE EROSION OF YOUR NATION'S CREDIBILITY AND STATURE AND THE INTERESTS OF SO MANY SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE ANY FURTHER. EVEN ASSUMING A REMEDY IS POSSIBLE BEYOND THIS POINT EACH PASSING DAY MAKES THE DANGERS AND THE PRICE MORE COSTLY.

IF AM SIR,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND, HUSSEIN.

ENDS.

URWICK

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
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ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
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MR JAMES

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SIR P MOORE
BUCKINGHAM PALACE

²
SECRET

Lebanon : Internal Lit. 174

GRS 280

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FM WASHINGTON 292220Z OCT 83.

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3214 OF 29 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV

LEBANON

1. WHEN I CALLED ON EAGLEBURGER TODAY I UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR BEING CONSULTED ON ANY PLANS THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE FORMING TO RETALIATE FOR LAST SUNDAY'S ATTACK ON THE MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT. I REMINDED HIM THAT THERE WERE BRITISH TROOPS ON THE GROUND IN THE LEBANON AND THAT THEY COULD GET CAUGHT UP IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY U S RETALIATION. I POINTED OUT THAT BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY INTEREST IN THIS WOULD BE INTENSE.

2. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTING US AND WOULD ENSURE THAT DAM, WHO WOULD BE OVERSEEING MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS IN HIS ABSENCE IN ISRAEL NEXT WEEK WITH MURPHY, WAS AWARE OF THIS DISCUSSION. HE SAID HE HIMSELF HAD NO IDEA WHAT PLANS IF ANY MIGHT BE SHAPING UP, BUT HE HAD NOTED REFERENCES IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THURSDAY TO SOME FORM OF RETRIBUTION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLANS AND THAT THE U S COULD NOT BE HELD ANSWERABLE FOR THEM IN ANY WAY.

3. EAGLEBURGER SAID HIS OWN VISIT TO ISRAEL WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH PLANS FOR RETALIATION, NOR WOULD IT RESULT IN ANY SURPRISES. HIS AIM WAS TO CARRY FORWARD A DIALOGUE WITH KIMCHE WHICH HAD BEGUN EARLIER THIS YEAR. HE HOPED TO INJECT A MORE INTIMATE NOTE INTO U S-ISRAELI POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS THAT HAD BEEN ABSENT IN RECENT MONTHS. THEY WOULD FOCUS ON A WHOLE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES, NOT JUST ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS.

WRIGHT

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FM WASHINGTON 282207Z OCT 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO 3190 OF 28 OCT
INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT TEL AVIV

LEBANON: MNF

1. ADMIRAL HOWE TOLD MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE HERE LATER TODAY THAT A REINFORCED US RIFLE COMPANY IS TO BE SENT TO BEIRUT TO JOIN THE US ELEMENT OF THE MNF. THIS WILL RAISE THE TOTAL COMPLEMENT FROM 1600 TO 1800. PART OF THE INTENTION IS TO COMPLETE THE REPLACEMENT OF US MARINES KILLED IN LAST SUNDAY'S BOMBING AND PART IS TO BOOST MORALE AFTER THE SHOCKS OF THE LAST WEEK. IT ALSO FOLLOWED FROM THE CONCLUSIONS OF GENERAL KELLY'S SURVEY OF SECURITY (WHICH IMPLIES THAT ONE OF THE AIMS IS TO DEAL WITH SNIPERS) ADMIRAL HOWE SAID THAT THE REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANY WOULD REMAIN THERE UNTIL THE REGULAR REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED. THESE WERE THE US MARINES WHO HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO GRENADA AND THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED IN LEBANON WITHIN A FEW WEEKS.

2. GIVEN THIS RATHER CONVOLUTED EXPLANATION, THOMAS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE WITH HOWE THE RUMOURS DOING THE ROUNDS AMONG THE WASHINGTON PRESS CORPS YESTERDAY AND TODAY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EARLY RETALIATION BY THE US. THIS SPECULATION HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN SPARKED OFF BY A BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR JOURNALISTS WHICH SHULTZ HAD GIVEN EARLIER THIS WEEK AND BY THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE NATION LAST NIGHT. COULD WE ASSUME THAT THE DESPATCH OF THE REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANY TO BEIRUT WAS UNRELATED TO THESE RUMOURS? HOWE ASSURED THOMAS THAT WE COULD. HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY PLAN FOR RETALIATION. HE SAID THAT OPTIONS WERE OBVIOUSLY BEING DISCUSSED BUT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. AT PRESENT THEY WERE CONCENTRATING RATHER ON WORKING ON INTELLIGENCE LEADS.

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/3. THOMAS

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3. THOMAS SAID THAT HE COULD NOT EMPHASISE TOO STRONGLY THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPER CONSULTATION WITH US IF THE AMERICANS REACHED THE POINT OF SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING RETALIATION. THE UK FORCE IN THE MNF WAS A SMALL ONE BUT IT WOULD BE AS EXPOSED AS ANY OTHER IN THE EVENT OF AN AMERICAN MILITARY ACT OF REPRISAL IN LEBANON OR SYRIA, IF THIS WAS WHAT THEY WERE CONTEMPLATING. EQUALLY OUR INTERESTS COULD BE AFFECTED IF THEIR POTENTIAL TARGET WAS ELSEWHERE. A REPETITION OF THE EXPERIENCE OVER GRENADA WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES.

4. THE SAME POINTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO SEITZ (SHULTZ'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY).

WRIGHT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED
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ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JAMES

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BUCKINGHAM PALACE

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BF

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1983

Dear John,

Await draft reply.

A.S.C. $\frac{n}{10}$

/ The attached letter from President Mubarak of Egypt to the Prime Minister was received by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office this morning (the text has already been telegraphed from Cairo). The Department concerned are at present drafting a reply to be forwarded shortly.

Yours ever,

Peter Ricketts

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

"T" message attached



EMBASSY
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT

26, SOUTH STREET, LONDON, W.1.
TELEPHONE: 01-499 2401

The Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to enclose herewith the text of the message received from His Excellency Mr. Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

H.A.S.



27th October 1983.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 0AA

Ref: MM/779



EMBASSY
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT

26, SOUTH STREET, LONDON, W.1.
TELEPHONE: 01-499 2401

Subjed - "Matter
Ops -

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T. 169/83.

27th October, 1983.

Dear Prime Minister,

I deem it necessary to write to you expressing our view-point with regard to the grave situation in the Middle East, following the despicable crime that was directed against members of the French and American contingents in the M.F.O. in Lebanon a few days ago.

Egypt has condemned that act whose victims have been serving a noble cause and performing a great mission, at the request of the legitimate government of Lebanon.

It is yet another example of the violence and turmoil that the Middle East is living, and will continue to live through, until we achieve a comprehensive peace in the entire region.

The prevailing sentiment is today one of condemnation and dismay vis-a-vis such cowardly act. It is our duty to transform this sentiment into a power for construction and positivism. It is therefore necessary to spare no effort to generate a new momentum for peace in the Middle East. In this context we strongly believe that the Reagan initiative must be revived without delay, and the occupation of Lebanon should be terminated at the earliest possible date.



EMBASSY
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF
EGYPT

26, SOUTH STREET, LONDON, W.1.
TELEPHONE: 01-499 2401

Currently I am contacting a number of influential Arab Leaders with a view to remedying the situation as follows :-

FIRST : Looking with us for ways and means for preventing the recurrence of such acts.

SECOND : Discussing various approaches for reactivating the efforts to attract new participants to it.

THIRD : Isolating the advocates of violence and terrorism in the region and helping the Lebanese Government boost its security's capabilities.

I am confident that you will support Egypt's action in that direction and will continue to play your constructive and positive role to bring about a comprehensive , just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

With best wishes and warmest regards.

Sincerely,
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher , FRS , MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

28 OCT 1983



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DLK

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 October 1983

Middle East

The Prime Minister has seen Cairo telegrams numbers 448 and 449. As you know, the latter contains the text of a message to the Prime Minister from President Mubarak.

BA Mrs Thatcher has indicated that she wishes to reply quickly to the President's letter. I should be grateful for an early draft.


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P.F. Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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GRS 1290

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FM F C O 271630Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 544 27 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON. ROME BEIRUT

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, DAMASCUS CAIRO TEL AVIV JEDDA AMMAN UKMIS
GENEVA.

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO

LEBANON MEETING OF MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS 27 OCTOBER

1. A TWO HOUR DISCUSSION PRODUCED A USEFUL PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF THE COMMITMENT OF THE MNF PARTNERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULD USE OUR LEVERAGE TO PRESS ALL THE FACTIONS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS OUTSIDE LEBANON TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS IN GENEVA. COUPLED WITH RECOGNITION THAT ANY HINT OF A THREAT TO PULL OUT OUR FORCES WOULD JEOPARDISE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO COORDINATE AID TO LEBANON AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH DISCREETLY IN GENEVA OVER CONTACTS WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS BUT NO APPETITE FOR JOINT DEMARCHES AND NO WILLINGNESS TO SET UP ANY MORE FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR PLANNING FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON. THERE WAS GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT LEBANON SHOULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE WIDER PEACE PROCESS.

(TEXT FROM PARIS)

MNF SECURITY

2. SHULTZ SAID THAT ALL THE MNF CONTINGENTS WOULD NEED TO IMPROVE THEIR PHYSICAL SECURITY AT THE COST OF SOME OF THE NORMALITY THEY WERE TRYING TO PROMOTE. THERE WAS AGREEMENT WITH HIS SUGGESTION THAT CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD EXCHANGE AS MUCH INTELLIGENCE AS POSSIBLE AND COORDINATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BUT SHULTZ STRESSED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE SECURITY WAS TO

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KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF POLITICAL STABILITY WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN FORCES. HE WAS EMPHATIC THAT IN THE MEANTIME FOR THE MNF TO CAVE IN UNDER TERRORIST ATTACK WOULD DO GREAT HARM TO LEBANON THE MODERATE ARAB COUNTRIES AND THE INTERESTS OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS.

GENEVA TALKS ON RECONCILIATION.

3. BOTH ANDREOTTI AND I EMPHASISED THAT FAILURE AT GENEVA WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO JUSTIFY THE RETENTION OF OUR TROOPS IN LEBANON. I URGED THAT WE SHOULD USE THIS CARD TO PUT PRESSURE ON GEMAYEL TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. ONCE THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS WAS UNDER WAY IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE A FRAMEWORK FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN STAGES WHICH WOULD IN TURN PAVE THE WAY FOR A UNITED LEBANON. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO KEEP UP PRESSURE ON ALL THE FACTIONS IN GENEVA CARE HOWEVER WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO STRIKE A BALANCE IN CASE THOSE WHO HAD NO INTEREST IN SUCCESS AT GENEVA CONCLUDED THAT THEY COULD DRIVE THE MNF OUT BY WRECKING THE TALKS.

ISRAEL/SYRIA

4. ALL THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE NEED TO SQUARE UP TO THE SYRIAN PROBLEM AND TO MEET SYRIAN CONCERNS. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT OUR AIM SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. WE SHOULD MAINTAIN SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE CONTACTS TO SECURE AT LEAST AN AMBER LIGHT FROM ASAD BEFORE WE COULD HOPE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN LEBANON. SHULTZ TOOK THE LINE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO MAKE ASAD THINK TWICE ABOUT WHAT HE COULD ACHIEVE BY BEING OBSTRUCTIVE IN LEBANON WAS TO BUILD UP A BALANCE OF FORCES. I WITH SUPPORT FROM CHEYSSON SAID THAT WE HAD TO RECOGNISE WHETHER WE LIKED IT OR NOT THAT BOTH SYRIA AND ISRAEL HAD INTERESTS IN LEBANON HAVING IN MIND MURPHY'S COMMENTS TO MR LUCE ON THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT (WASHINGTON TELNO 3132) I SAID THAT ONE WAY OF RECOGNISING SYRIA'S INTEREST WAS TO WORK FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IT WAS A FACT THAT THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT WAS NOW FROZEN AND COULD NOT BE USED AS A BARGAINING CHIP.

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INSTEAD WE SHOULD LOOK FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A COMPONENT WHICH WOULD INCREASE ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

5. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE VALUE OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS THAT IT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE EXISTING ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL WAS UNDER DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL. WITH THE RETURN OF PLO ELEMENTS TO BEIRUT THE MOOD IN ISRAEL WAS CHANGING IF ONE RESULT OF GENEVA WAS THE ABROGATION OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT SHULTZ EXPECTED A HARDENING OF ISRAELI ATTITUDES ON WITHDRAWAL. HE HOPED THEREFORE THAT NO ONE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE TO ABANDON THE AGREEMENT. THE US WHICH WAS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT COULD NOT RENOUNCE IT AND SILENCE WAS PERHAPS THE BEST COURSE.

6. CHEYSSON SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS BE TOLD PRIVATELY THAT THEIR GAME OF PLAYING OFF THE LEBANESE FACTIONS AGAINST EACH OTHER WAS TOO CLEVER AND HAD GONE TOO FAR. SHULTZ AGREED THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE URGED TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO A BROADENED LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

ARAB/ISRAEL

7. ON THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS SHULTZ WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO STRESS HIS INTENTION TO KEEP WORKING AWAY AT THE WEST BANK PROBLEM. THE FACTS ON THE GROUNDS WERE CHANGING RAPIDLY AND HE WANTED TO BRING THEM TO THE ? ARAFAT'S PROBLEMS MEANT AT THE LEAST A RE-SHUFFLE OF THE PACK. HE HOPED THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT WOULD GIVE HUSSEIN GREATER SUPPORT IT S DANGEROUS HOWEVER TO OVER-ESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF SAUDI INFLUENCE OVER THE SYRIANS WHO COULD BE MOVED BY INCENTIVES BUT NOT THREATS. THERE WAS A PARALLEL HERE WITH US RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL THE US NEEDED A SUFFICIENTLY WARM RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL TO BE ABLE TO REASON WITH HER.

RETALIATION

8. I RAISED THIS AND URGED CAUTION A GENERAL RETALIATION IN RESPONSE TO ACTIONS BY TERRORISTS WAS VERY RISKY. CHEYSSON SUPPORTED ME, DOUBTING WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PINPOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMB ATTACKS EVEN IF THE SERVICES OF ONE COUNTRY KNEW OF THE OPERATION AND POSSIBLY PARTICIPATED IN IT. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE MAKING

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THE MOST CAREFUL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF THE ATTACKS BUT FAILURE TO RETALIATE WOULD ENCOURAGE THE GROUP WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT TO BE RESPONSIBLE TO THINK THAT THEY COULD GET AWAY WITH FURTHER OUTRAGES. REFERRING TO THE DEMARCHES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AMBASSADORS IN DAMASCUS (DAMASCUS TELNO 327) ABOUT WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE APPARENTLY UNAWARE SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD NO GROUNDS FOR CONCERN BUT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO TELL THEM SO.

OBSERVERS.

9. ANDREOTTI REPORTED THAT THERE WAS STILL DISAGREEMENT WITHIN LEBANON ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS. AS A MINIMUM THE ITALIANS REQUIRED THE ENDORSEMENT OF JUMBLATT THE SHIAS AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IF THEY WERE TO TAKE PART CRAXI HAD AGREED WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MINIMUM UN UMBRELLA WOULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS AND A SYSTEM OF REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ANDREOTTI WAS WORRIED THAT IF THE OBSERVERS WERE BROKEN UP INTO SMALL GROUPS THEY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS. SHULTZ COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS AND SYRIANS WOULD ONLY ACQUIESCE IN GREATER UN INVOLVEMENT IF THEY THOUGHT IT COULD BE USED AS A WAY OF LEVERING OUT THE MNF.

AID.

10. SHULTZ EXPRESSED INTEREST IN REMARKS BY CRAXIL IN WASHINGTON ABOUT AID FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LEBANON. (ROME TELNO 523). THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE FUNDS. AS I AND CHEYSSON HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT COMMITTING ADDITIONAL MONEY WE AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN TRYING TO CO-ORDINATE OUR EXISTING AID PROGRAMMES TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT. A BIZARRE SUGGESTION BY ANDREOTTI TO RE-BUILD QUNEITRA AS A GESTURE TO THE SYRIANS WAS FIRMLY SQUASHED BY SHULTZ. MNF CO-ORDINATION.

11. MY PROPOSAL THAT OFFICIALS MIGHT GET TOGETHER ON A MORE REGULAR BASIS WAS REACTED TO VERY CAUTIOUSLY BY CHEYSSON IN PARTICULAR. HE SUGGESTED ANOTHER DISCUSSION IN THE MARGINS OF THE DECEMBER NATO COUNCIL MEETING BUT WAS OPPOSED TO ANY FORMAL STRUCTURE FOR CO-

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ORDINATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOUR SHOULD DISCREETLY COMPARE NOTES IN GENEVA BUT THAT CARE WOULD BE TAKEN NOT TO APPEAR TO BE ACTING JOINTLY AS A GROUP CH COUNTRY WOULD CONDUCT ITS OWN CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES. FAIRBANKS WOULD BE IN GENEVA WITH A SMALL STAFF FROM 31 OCTOBER AND A MEETING WOULD BE HELD EARLY NEXT WEEK TO WHICH THE EUROPEANS WOULD SEND REPRESENTATIVES.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED
NENAD
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DEFENCE DEPT
PUSD
NEWS DEPT
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NAD
WED
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ECD(E)
FINANCE DEPT
PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JAMES

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FM CAIRO 271245Z OCT 83
DESKBY 271400Z FCO
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 449 OF 27 OCTOBER

CONFIDENTIAL

We must decide very soon how to respond
MS

MIPT FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

CAIRO, 27 OCTOBER 1983.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

WE DEEM IT NECESSARY TO WRITE TO YOU TO EXPRESS OUR VIEW POINT WITH REGARD TO THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOLLOWING THE DESPICABLE CRIME THAT WAS DIRECTED AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN CONTINGENTS IN THE MFO IN LEBANON FEW DAYS AGO.

EGYPT HAS CONDEMNED THAT ACT WHOSE VICTIMS HAD BEEN SERVING A NOBLE CAUSE AND PERFORMING A GREAT MISSION AT THE REQUEST OF THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

IT IS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE VIOLENCE AND TURMOIL THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IS LIVING AND WILL CONTINUE TO LIVE THROUGH UNTIL WE ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE ENTIRE REGION.

THE PREVAILING SENTIMENT IS TODAY ONE OF CONDEMNATION AND DISMAY VERSUS SUCH COWARDLY ACTS. IT IS OUR DUTY TO TRANSFORM THIS SENTIMENT INTO A POWER FOR CONSTRUCTION AND POSITIVISM. IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO GENERATE A NEW MOMENTUM FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN THIS CONTEXT WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE MUST BE REVIVED WITHOUT DELAY AND THE OCCUPATION OF LEBANON SHOULD BE TERMINATED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

CURRENTLY, I AM CONTACTING A NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL ARAB LEADERS WITH A VIEW TO URGING THEM TO COOPERATE WITH US IN REMEDYING THE SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:

- FIRST: : LOOKING WITH US FOR WAYS AND MEANS FOR PREVENTING THE REOCCURRENCE OF SUCH ACTS.
- SECOND : DISCUSSING VARIOUS APPROACHES FOR REACTIVATING THE PEACE PROCESS AND INFUSING FRESH BLOOD IN OUR EFFORTS TO ATTRACT NEW PARTICIPANTS TO IT.
- THIRD : ISOLATING THE ADVOCATES OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN THE REGION AND HELPING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BOOST ITS SECURITY CAPABILITIES.

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/1 AM

CONFIDENTIAL

I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL SUPPORT EGYPT'S ACTION IN THAT DIRECTION AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE AND POSITIVE ROLE TO BRING ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND LASTING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

WITH BEST WISHES AND WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK

WEIR

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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DEFENCE DEPT

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PROTOCOL DEPT

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PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR MACINNES

MR ADAMS

MR JAMES

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IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON.
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NENAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

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RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 271240Z OCT

DESKBY 271400Z FCO

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 448 OF 27 OCTOBER

INFO PARIS, ROME, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV,
WASHINGTON, UKMS NEW YORK, MODUK.

YOUR TELNO 534 TO PARIS: LEBANON

1. THE EGYPTIANS ARE MOUNTING AN AMBITIOUS DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO CAPITALISE ON THE EMOTIONS AROUSED BY THE BEIRUT BOMBINGS WITH A VIEW TO REACTIVATING THE PEACE PROCESS THROUGH THE REAGAN INITIATIVE OR SOME VARIANT OF IT. AS A FIRST STEP PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS SENDING MESSAGES TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS. TEST OF MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER IS IN MFT (NOT REPEATED). HE IS ALSO SENDING EMISSARIES TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. KAMAL HASSAN ALI LEFT YESTERDAY FOR BAGHDAD AND AMMAN, AND BOUTROS GHALI GOES TO LEBANON TOMORROW TO SEE GEMAYEL. THE SUDANESE VICE PRESIDENT OMAR AL TAIB AND SULTAN QABOOS' ENVOY OMAR ZAWAWY ARE ALSO VISITING CAIRO, ACCORDING TO THE PRESS IN THE SAME CONNECTION. THE WHOLE STORY IS PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S NEWSPAPERS.

2. IN HANDING ME MUBARAK'S MESSAGE TODAY BOUTROS GHALDI EXPLAINED THAT THIS EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN MOTIVATED BY CONCERN THAT THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE US WOULD MANAGE TO EXPLOIT THE BEIRUT BOMBINGS TO BRING ABOUT A CLOSER ALIGNMENT BETWEEN US POLICIES AND ISRAEL'S (HE CITED THE ISRAELIS' PROPOGANDA USE OF THEIR OFFER TO TREAT THE AMERICAN CASUALTIES IN ISRAELI HOSPITALS), WHICH WOULD FINALLY EXTINGUISH ANY HOPE OF REVIVING THE PEACE PROCESS. THEY WERE ALSO EXTREMELY APPREHENSIVE LEST THE US SHOULD BE TEMPTED TO RETALIATE AGAINST WHOEVER THEY DEEMED RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS. MORE POSITIVELY, EGYPT BELIEVED THAT INTERNATIONAL SHOCK AT THE BOMBINGS MIGHT BRING IT HOME TO PEOPLE THAT THE WIDER MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO FESTER SIMPLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. IN RELATION TO THE GULF WAR, AS DISTINCT FROM THE PALESTINE QUESTION, IT MIGHT ALSO BRING ABOUT A RALLYING OF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, OUT OF FEAR THAT THE BEIRUT ATROCITIES MIGHT BECOME THE PATTERN FOR A SERIES OF IRANIAN-SPONSORED ATTEMPTS TO CREATE DISORDER WORLDWIDE.

3. BOUTROS GHALDI SAID THE EGYPTIANS HAD NO SPECIFIC IDEAS ABOUT HOW THE AMERICANS MIGHT GO ABOUT REACTIVATING REAGAN, BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT ARAFAT IN HIS PRESENT POSITION OF WEAKNESS MIGHT NOW BE MORE READY TO CONSIDER JOINING IN WITH KING HUSSEIN. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER ARAFAT WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING THE PLO ALONG WITH HIM, BUT BOUTROS THOUGHT HE AT LEAST STILL HAD SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT ON THE WEST BANK. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY COULD BE FOR THE AMERICANS TO APPOINT AS MACFARLANE'S SUCCESSOR A FIGURE OF INTERNATIONAL REPUTE, SUCH AS CY VANCE, WHOSE MERE APPEARANCE ON THE SCENE MIGHT IMPART A NEW MOMENTUM (CF THE KISSINGER ASSIGNMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA). BOUTROS ADMITTED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE LIKELY TO BE AS OBSTRUCTIVE AS BEFORE, BUT DID NOT SEE WHY THEY SHOULD BE HANDED A VETO IN ADVANCE. HE ASKED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS WOULD REGARD THE ABANDONMENT OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT AS A LIKELY CONDITION FOR PROGRESS ON EITHER LEBANON OR THE PEACE PROCESS, AND HE REPLIED THAT EGYPT WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER DECISION THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ~~WAS~~ ^{COULD} MIGHT TAKE.

ON THE SUBJECT. THE MAIN OBJECT OF HIS OWN VISIT TO LEBANON WOULD BE TO URGE GEMAYEL TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN THE RUN UP TO THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS. AS REGARDS IRAQ, BOUTROS SAID THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE URGING BOTH THE IRAQIS AND THE AMERICANS TO CONSIDER AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

4. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR TUR, HE SAID THAT EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON LEBANON APPEARED TO BE VERY CLOSE TO OUR OWN THOUGH HE

VIEWS ON LEBANON APPEARED TO BE VERY CLOSE TO OUR OWN, THOUGH HE WAS MORE SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REACTIVATING THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE OTHER CURRENT PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION. BOUTROS STRESSED THAT EGYPT WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO HAVE OUR EARLY REACTIONS, AND HE HIMSELF WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF WE COULD TELL HIM ANYTHING ABOUT TODAY'S MEETING OF THE 4 FOREIGN MINISTERS IN PARIS, BEFORE HIS OWN DEPARTURE FOR BEIRUT FIRST THING TOMORROW.

5. HE WOULD GUESS THAT THE MAIN EGYPTIAN MOTIVE IN ALL THIS WAS INDEED AS STATED (WITH SURPRISING FRANKNESS) BY BOUTROS GHALDI, NAMELY FEAR THAT THE AMERICANS MAY BE TEMPTED TO JOIN FORCES WITH THE ISRAELIS IN SOME FORM OF RETALIATION IN LEBANON. THE LIKELY ARAB REACTION WOULD PLACE EGYPT IN AN EVEN MORE ACUTE DILEMMA THAN THOSE SHE HAS HAD TO FACE SO FAR. A SECONDARY MOTIVE WILL BE TO USE THE OCCASION TO DRAW CLOSER TO THE OTHER MODERATE ARABS.

WEHR

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THAT EGYPT WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER DECISION THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT TAKE ON THE SUBJECT. THE MAIN OBJECT OF HIS OWN VISIT TO LEBANON

LEBANON/MNF: SITREP 1000Z 27 OCTOBER

1. Tension in Beirut has continued to be high with Lebanese intelligence reports of plans for attacks similar to those on 23 October. Embassy Beirut was evacuated for a few hours on the morning of 25 October.
2. Latest casualty figures for bomb attacks: Americans: 219 dead, 112 wounded; French: 51 dead, 15 wounded, 50 missing.
3. General Sir Frank Kitson, Commander UK Land Forces, visited Beirut on 25 October. His report is not yet available but does not contain any recommendation for major changes in BRITFORLEB's role.
4. Responsibility for the attacks is still not clear, but an extremist Lebanese Shia group with direct Iranian support in the planning and supply of explosives remains the favourite candidate. Two groups have claimed responsibility: the 'Free Islamic Revolutionary Movement' (unknown previously) and the 'Islamic Holy War Organisation', which also claimed responsibility for the attack on the US Embassy in April 1983. Iran and Syria have denied any involvement.
5. The ceasefire continues to hold with minor violations. BRITFORLEB continues to provide guard for meetings of the ceasefire committee to appreciation of all. Greeks/Italians apparently still intend to deploy 400 observers each to monitor ceasefire. Details under discussion. Italians have told us they do not expect a final decision until after the start of the reconciliation talks in Geneva on 31 October.
6. President Mitterrand (24 October) and Vice President Bush (26 October) have both visited Beirut and have reaffirmed their commitment to the MNF. The Italians have taken a similar line. Americans see main aim of meeting of MNF Foreign Ministers in Paris today (27 October) to demonstrate that the MNF will not be

intimidated into a precipitate withdrawal and to exchange ideas about how to push the reconciliation process along. They have made clear to President Gemayel that urgent progress must be made and that MNF support is not a blank cheque for continuing Maronite supremacy. We plan to put some new ideas to the meeting on working out a strategy for Lebanon aimed at the honourable withdrawal of the MNF at the earliest opportunity. The French Prime Minister, M. Mauroy has suggested a new UN force for Lebanon, eventually to replace the MNF. This does not seem practical at present, given the strong Soviet/Syrian opposition to UN observers, let alone a UN force in central Lebanon, and the probable reluctance of troop contributors.

7. The Syrian MFA presented European MNF Ambassadors with a note on 26 October alleging a US/Israeli plan for military action in Lebanon. We do not take the allegation seriously, though it may reflect genuine Syrian alarm at the possibility of US retaliation.

Near East and North Africa Department
27 October 1983



Br 10 v

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 October 1983

LEBANON: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN

Thank you for your letter of 25 October. The Prime Minister was doubtful about sending the reply to President Reagan's message which you recommended because she considered that the first paragraph did not accurately describe the role of the Multi National Force. The second paragraph is, of course, now out of date. I should be grateful if you could let me have a revised draft reply.

A.R.

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Subject

cc Master
Ops.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T166A/83



THE ROYAL PALACE
Amman Jordan

26 October 1983

Dear Prime Minister,

On 19 October 1983 I sent to our mutual friend, President Ronald Reagan, a highly sensitive personal letter. I wrote yesterday to the President on the subject of Lebanon and this entire area's present critical situation and its future, if not our world's. I discussed the content with both Her Majesty's Ambassador, Mr. Alan Urwick, and the French Ambassador to the Hashemite Court.

In the spirit of friendship and confidence which happily exists between us, I am sending you personal copies of these two letters.

With my highest esteem and warmest wishes.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London S W 1
England

Amman, 25 October, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

You were kind enough to suggest, Sir, that you valued my counsel. I find it my duty as a long time friend of the United States and your good self, to write to you at this most ominous time in the history of the Middle East and the world. I do so as an Arab who has lived most of his life in the centre of events in this area. I do so as a free man, a soldier and a father of a soldier. I write to you in the aftermath of the most recent outrage perpetrated in Beirut which claimed the lives of many young American and French soldiers - members of the Multi-National Peace Keeping Force.

My message is, that if the arrival of that Force on Lebanese soil was a bluff, then the bluff has been called. It leaves the United States and its European partners and, indeed, the free world, the choice of either withdrawing urgently from Lebanon, and, by implication, leaving the Middle East to whatever is its destiny or taking the alternative course - if you have the resolve and the means - of calling for an urgent, total and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from all sovereign Lebanese soil.

The said withdrawals must be of Israel and Syria in alphabetical order and within a reasonable limited time frame. This call must be accompanied by a demand that all factions in the Lebanon meet urgently to resolve all the Lebanese causes of past, present and possible future conflicts. Representatives of any faction who abstain from attending a final conference of Lebanese national reconciliation would bear the historic responsibilities towards their factions and communities in regard to their rights, for all times to come.

....


The conference, must thus aim at creating a just, free Lebanon, where the rights and dignity of all Lebanese are safeguarded together with their national sovereignty over all Lebanese soil. National Lebanese reconciliation must be accomplished and no further procrastination is either possible or acceptable. If the Lebanese, free of all external influences, are unwilling or unable to accomplish national reconciliation, then the Multi-National Force will withdraw once this has become apparent. Alternatively, it would withdraw once national reconciliation is attained.

Finally, the nations represented in the Multi-National Peace Keeping Force should act without reservation against any external power which refuses to withdraw its forces from all sovereign Lebanese soil within the set time frame. They should then expect the world community's total collaboration and support towards achieving these ends.

I see no other alternatives for you, Sir, your Government and people or your European partners in serving the cause of freedom and the world. The erosion of your nation's credibility and stature and the interests of so many should not be permitted to continue any further. Even assuming a remedy is possible beyond this point each passing day makes the dangers and the price more costly.

I am, Sir,

Your sincere friend,



The Honourable President Reagan
The White House
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.



The Royal Palace
Amman Jordan

19 October 1983

Dear Mr. President,

It has been a while since I wrote you, Sir,
on subjects of mutual concern.

I am following with great anxiety all the developments on the Lebanese scene which relate to our common goal of establishing the sovereignty of the Lebanese Government over all Lebanese territories. We must emphasise the independence of that bereaved country through the attainment of the total withdrawal of all foreign forces and minimise the negative inputs of external influences on the domestic scene in that country. The efforts at achieving Lebanese national reconciliation to freeze, if not totally resolve, differences amongst the different communities there, are attempts with which we have been involved to the best of our ability. The success of these efforts may well provide the last chance of averting the total disintegration of the Lebanon, with the untold complications and inherent dangers to the area as a whole, if we were ever to witness such a tragic end.

Mr. President, much has happened since I wrote you on 10 April appraising you, with deep regret, of my inability to proceed on the course we discussed during our meeting of December last. We availed ourselves of the opportunity which your peace plan of 1 September 1982 afforded all concerned in the Arab Israeli problem, the root cause of Middle East instability and the major threat to peace, both in the area and possibly the world. I explained then, the reasons for the failure of our best efforts to secure Palestinian participation and Arab support, reasons that resulted primarily from the Israeli rejection of your plan. The Israelis, as is well known, responded to your proposal by intensifying

...settlement



19 October 1983

settlement activities and increasing repression in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Israel procrastinated on the subject of its unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon, together with other forces there, prior to the projected date of the beginning of 1983. Furthermore, the massacres at Sabra and Shatila all but destroyed American credibility in the area. The United States was unable to envisage a Soviet role in the search for peace. Together with the United States' refusal to accept the P.L.O. as a principle negotiating partner in the proposed peace process, the United States insisted that the P.L.O. accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognise Israel's right to exist as prior conditions to any official United States P.L.O. dialogue.

All these factors, and others of which you are aware, obliged me to state to you my inability to move further, despite my most vigorous attempts, to successfully eliminate the differences at that time between the Arab Fez Summit proposals for peace, and the American Peace Plan outlined by you, Mr. President, on 1 September 1982.

We have noted since then, with deep concern, the beginnings of the implementation of the Syrian Government's plan to bring the P.L.O. totally under its control. The Government of Jordan made it clear that it regarded Syrian moves in that connection as serious, in that they undermined the legitimacy of the P.L.O.'s representation of the Palestinian people, as adopted by the Arab Summit at Rabat, Morocco in 1974.

Events in Lebanon have been the focal point of the international Community's interest in recent months, with the execution of the Syrian Governments' plans to recreate the P.L.O. as a totally subjugated instrument of its will, if not its contractual allies or others, passing without much notice.

... Mr. President



19 October 1983

Mr. President, I do not know if it is the United States' policy objective to give the Government of Syria the ability to add the Palestinian card to that of the Lebanon, which it appears to have secured to a major degree. However, I feel very strongly that this subject requires that we both seek the clearest understanding of our respective personal, as well as governmental and national positions.

The P.L.O. has been recognised by us as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people since 1974. We in Jordan have upheld this policy to the point of freezing constitutional parliamentary life since the Rabat decision on Palestinian representation.

We believe that the final steps are imminent in transforming the P.L.O. into a Syrian surrogate. We therefore feel strongly that we will not be able to deal with the P.L.O. if it is to fall under Syrian control. A serious crisis is predictable in our relations with Syria and their re-created P.L.O.

In the light of many developments, but most particularly after an intolerably long period of Jordan's existence without democratic parliamentary life, we are now most seriously considering the recall of the Jordanian Parliament into session. We feel unable to continue to bear responsibility at this crucial time in its absence. The Jordanian Parliament, as you well know, represents the East and occupied West Bank. Owing to the continued Israeli occupation of those territories since 1967, the old Parliamentary Assembly can, however, within the constitution, appoint representatives from the West Bank to fill vacancies, caused by the lapse of time, from West Bank constituencies. Elections could be held in the East Bank of Jordan to fill vacant positions and parliamentary democratic life would ensue.

... In the



19 October 1983

In the following period I hope that the concept of future relations between both Palestine and Jordan could be formulated in the most acceptable and exemplary framework to represent a commitment by all, which would be ratified through the exercise of a free plebiscite, once occupation is at an end. In other words, through the exercise of the legitimate and sacred right of self determination, Palestine may incorporate the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. None of this however, and according to Jordanian constitution, would infringe upon the rights of Palestinians in a final settlement of the Palestinian, Arab Israeli conflict, nor would Jordan infringe on the rights of Palestinians to be involved in any peace process leading to that end.

However, in this new context of direct Jordanian involvement with the fate of the Occupied Territories, it becomes vital that we receive your commitment in unequivocal terms. It is vital to us to know in no uncertain terms that you, Sir, the Administration and the American Nation are committed to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 as we both formulated it in 1967 and that the United States acts immediately to buttress Jordan's capabilities to meet all challenges, not after the fact, but immediately.

Obviously all this presupposes that your Government recognises that the occupied West Bank is occupied Jordanian territory and that what applied to occupied Egyptian territories, applies to these territories in their entirety and without exception.

I need not remind you, Sir, of our commitment to the cause of establishing a just and durable Middle East peace. We are committed to the Palestinian cause and the rights of all parties to the conflict to live in peace and security, once a just, honourable peace is achieved.

... I have

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19 October 1983

I have chosen to write to you Sir, this personal letter on these highly sensitive matters at this critical juncture, and in absolute confidence.

With my highest esteem and sincerest wishes.

Your sincere friend,
[Signature]

The Honourable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C.
United States of America

CONFIDENTIAL

①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 October 1983

Dear John

Prime Minister.

Agree message?

A.F.C. 25/10

Lebanon: Message from President Reagan

✓ Thank you for your letter of
24 October.

/a / The Foreign Secretary believes
that President Reagan's message of
24 October to the Prime Minister calls
for a brief reply. I attach a draft in the
form of/telegram to Washington.
Sir Geoffrey does not think that the
reply need go into the substantive issues,
which can be addressed at the meeting of
MNF Foreign Ministers.

Yours ever,

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

P F Ricketts

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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LEBANON
1st 2nd PK4

MR. COLES *25/10*

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister.

THE LEBANON

I was interested to see that, in the House of Commons and House of Lords yesterday, there was no serious ground-swell in favour of an immediate withdrawal of the British contingent from the MNF. In fact, those speakers who know something about the Middle East, were all in favour of our staying for the time being. This is obviously right. The European component of the MNF, if not the whole force, must stay or go together. Personally, I pray for a lull which will enable withdrawal with honour to take place.

Equally, pending progress or the lack of it in the forthcoming political negotiations between the Lebanese parties, there is no question of redefining the role of the MNF, as so many anxious critics would like us to do. It is not a practical possibility. However, although the role of the force may be difficult to define, there are positive elements to which we could draw more attention in public:-

i. There is no doubt that the mass of peaceful citizens of Beirut who are not involved in factional fighting would regard with great dismay the withdrawal of the MNF. It provides them with some sense of security without which they would regard a total civil war in and around Beirut as inevitable.

ii. The Palestinians in the refugee camps in South Beirut and those Palestinians scattered throughout the area would be horrified at the withdrawal of MNF protection and might well flee (probably ending up in Jordan). They would see themselves exposed to further massacres such as those which happened last year. Lord McNair made this good point in the House of Lords debate yesterday.

iii. It is probable that, without the deterrent of the MNF, the Lebanese Army might have collapsed in the recent fighting, thus bringing about a total civil war, not confined to the Chouf.

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In the light of the above, it is facile to argue that, just because the circumstances which led to the introduction of the MNF have changed, the force is now rudderless and meaningless.

In the immediate future, there are important points which we must bear in mind:-

i. We must maintain the impartiality which our contingent (and the Italians) has so far preserved. We are fulfilling the useful function of guarding the Security Committee talks and have managed to keep on good terms with all the factions, notably the Druze. We must avoid being drawn into activity directed against any of the factions.


ii. We should counsel the Americans against presenting the situation in apocalyptic East/West terms, such as those employed in Reagan's recent pronouncements. Atrocities have been endemic to the Lebanese civil war in the last eight or nine years. There have been Palestinian massacres of Christians, Phalangist massacres of Palestinians, the Iraqi Embassy demolished as the American Embassy was some months ago, etc etc. Tens of thousands of people have been slaughtered. Frightful though the events of the weekend were, they fell within the murderous pattern which has followed the collapse of the Lebanese National Pact - nothing to do with the Cold War.

iii. I have little doubt in my mind that the atrocities were committed by a Shi'ite group. We shall almost certainly never know whether eg the Iranian Government connived at their action or even promoted it. However, national feeling in the United States will be so strong that the Americans are bound to look for an outside power against which to retaliate. The same might be true of the French. The Iranian Government is the most likely target, since both France and the United States have written off their relations with Iran. We should avoid being dragged into any such fruitless confrontation. We should not forget the contortions we had to endure to satisfy American public opinion over the hostages in Iran.

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← It is obviously in our interest to do everything possible to generate rapid progress in the Geneva negotiations, if and when they get under way. The Americans are not participants, but they will probably have a senior official in Geneva to keep in touch with the Lebanese players behind the scenes. I wonder if the other MNF participants, including ourselves, should not consider doing the same. We have had excellent personal relations with most, if not all, the Lebanese concerned over many years. We and the Italians are in a better position to act as backstairs advisers than the Americans or the French, both of whom are too closely identified with the Maronites. There is no doubt that, if the MNF were a UN force, someone like Brian Urquhart would be present (although not at the meetings) to fulfil such a role.



A.D. PARSONS
25 October 1983

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GR 700

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FM WASHINGTON 260001Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3132 OF 25 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,
DAMASCUS, MODUK.

LEBANON

1. MURPHY TOLD MR LUCE TODAY THAT SHULTZ'S OBJECTIVES AT THE MEETING OF MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 27 OCTOBER WOULD BE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MNF WAS NOT GOING TO CUT AND RUN AND TO CONSIDER WHAT MORE COULD BE DONE TO ENCOURAGE THE LEBANESE FACTIONS TO WORK URGENTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

2. THE AMERICANS HAVE NO CLEAR VIEW OF HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE BUT ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY NEW IDEAS. THEY HAVE IMPRESSED ON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THAT THE ATTACKS ON THE MNF ON 23 OCTOBER MAKE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IMPERATIVE AND THAT THE US FORCES ARE IN LEBANON TO SUPPORT GEMAYEL AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT NOT (NOT) MARONITE SUPREMACY OR THE PHALANGE. THERE ARE NO US BLANK CHEQUES.

3. MURPHY SAID THAT SHULTZ MIGHT BE ABLE TO TELL HIS COLLEAGUES ON 27 OCTOBER ABOUT THE APPOINTMENT OF A MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATOR TO SUCCEED MCFARLANE. IT HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHETHER HIS BRIEF SHOULD BE THE MIDDLE EAST, LIKE HABIB'S AND MCFARLANE'S, OR CONFINED TO LEBANON. FAIRBANKS WOULD IN ANY CASE BE IN GENEVA FOR THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS ON 31 OCTOBER. THERE WAS NO (NO) MENTION OF A EUROPEAN NEGOTIATOR FROM AN MNF CONTRIBUTOR GOVERNMENT.

4. MURPHY DISMISSED MR LUCE'S SUGGESTION THAT THE LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT WAS DEAD. IT WAS FROZEN AND SHOULD BE ABANDONED ONLY FOR A HIGH PRICE. THERE WAS NO OTHER GUARANTEE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS A FANTASY TO SUPPOSE THAT THE US WOULD LEAN ON THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW OTHERWISE. BUT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HANDLE THE DEMAND OF THE SYRIANS AND THEIR ALLIES THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SCRAPPED. THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS COULD WELL BREAK DOWN AT THE OUTSET OVER THIS ISSUE.

5. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE SEARCHING FOR A ROLE IN LEBANON. THEY WERE WORRIED BY THE ARAB, ESPECIALLY SYRIAN, PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI WEAKNESS. THEY DID NOT REJECT IDEAS FOR EXTENDING A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH BUT WERE EMPHATIC THAT THEIRS COULD BE THE ONLY ARMY. THEY HAD NO CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: THEIR RESPONSE WAS THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD TALK TO THEM.

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6. MURPHY SAID THAT THE AMERICANS SHARED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE DELAY IN GETTING OBSERVERS IN PLACE TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE. THE LEBANESE AND THE SECURITY COMMITTEE WERE DRAGGING THEIR FEET. THE GREEKS WERE WAVERING AND UNABLE TO PROVIDE AS MANY AS THE 400 OBSERVERS FOR WHICH THEY HAD BEEN ASKED. HE HOPED TO HEAR MORE ABOUT THE ITALIAN POSITION FROM ANDREOTTI ON 27 OCTOBER.

7. MURPHY THOUGHT THAT IRANIAN-BACKED SHIA GROUPS WERE PROBABLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK ON THE MARINES, THOUGH THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT CONCLUSIVE. THE ADMINISTRATION WERE DETERMINED TO RESPOND ONCE RESPONSIBILITY WAS ESTABLISHED. BUT THEIR ACTION WOULD NOT BE HALF-BAKED OR UNWARRANTED. MR LUCE HOPED THAT DESPITE THEIR UNDERSTANDABLE ANGER AND FRUSTRATION THE US WOULD NOT REACT IN THE GULF: THAT COULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS. THAT THE PROBLEM WAS UNDER CLOSE STUDY. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS HOW MUCH IMPACT US ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ WOULD HAVE ON DAMASCUS OVER LEBANON. THE US WERE WELL AWARE OF THE DANGERS IN THE GULF AND WOULD MAKE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN POLICY THERE JUST TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE SYRIANS. THE LATTER WERE HOWEVER NERVOUS: US/IRAQ RELATIONS COULD PROVE TO BE AN INTERESTING PRESSURE-POINT.

8. DAM MENTIONED SEPARATELY THAT SHULTZ WOULD WANT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF YOUR MEETING ON 27 OCTOBER TO DISCUSS IRAN/IRAQ.

WRIGHT

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PROTOCOL DEPT
PS

PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR MACINNES
MR ADAMS
MR JAMES

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FM AMMAN 251105Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 466 OF 25 OCTOBER 1983

REPEATED IMMEDIATE TO MOD (DI4), BEIRUT, UKMIS NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON.

PRIORITY TO CAIRO, DAMASCUS, PARIS, ROME AND TEL AVIV.

ROUTINE TO TEHRAN.

LEBANON

1. WHEN AT THE AIRPORT SEEING OFF QUEEN NOOR THIS MORNING,
KING HUSSEIN CALLED THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND MYSELF ASIDE
TO SPEAK ABOUT LEBANON.

2. THE KING BEGAN BY EXPRESSING HIS GRIEF AT THE CALUALTIES
INCURRED IN THE FRENCH CONTINGENT AND EXPRESSED HIS
ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S DECISION TO VISIT
LEBANON AT ONCE. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT:

(A) HE SAW NOTHING BUT DIFFICULTIES AHEAD FOR LEBANON AND
THE WEST UNLESS SOME DRASTIC ACTION WERE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY.
AS THE KING SAW IT, THE ONLY REALISTIC COURSE OPEN TO THE
PARTICIPANTS IN THE MNF WAS TO CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF
ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, SAY
BY THE END OF THE YEAR, AND TO PUT THEIR FULL WEIGHT BEHIND
SECURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES FROM
LEBANESE TERRITORY USING WHATEVER PRESSURE MIGHT BE NECESSARY
TO ACHIEVE THIS. THE KING THOUGHT THAT THE MNF PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW THEIR CONTIGENTS WHEN, OR
IMMEDIATELY AFTER, THE OTHER FOREIGN FORCES LEFT LEBANON
SEMI COLON

(B) THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD CALL AN IMMEDIATE
CONFERENCE OF ALL THE LEBANESE FACTIONS WITH THE AIM OF
ACHIEVING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON THE FUTURE OF LEBANON,
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT ANYONE FAILING TO ATTEND THIS
CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE NO SAY IN DECIDING THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE.
THE KING WAS EMPHATIC THAT THE LEBANON-ISRAELI TREATY, WHICH
HAD BEEN IMPOSED ON THE LEBANESE, WOULD HAVE TO BE DROPPED.

3. THE ALTERNATIVES TO PROCEEDING ON THESE LINES WERE, AS
THE KING SAW THEM, GRIM. THERE WOULD BE FURTHER ATTACKS ON
THE FORCES OF THE MNF AND WITH THE INEVITABLE CASUALTIES THE
PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL PARTICULARLY ON THE AMERICANS WOULD
GROW, LEADING ULTIMATELY TO THE HUMILIATION OF THE WEST,
WITH ALL THE WIDER CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGION THAT THIS
IMPLIED. THE RUSSIANS WERE WAITING IN THE WINGS TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF SUCH A SITUATION. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE,
IN THE KING'S VIEW, THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD ACT
QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY ON THE LINES HE HAD SUGGESTED.

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/4. AFTER

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4. AFTER THANKING THE KING FOR HIS MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY, MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE REFERRED TO A POSSIBLE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE MNF, AND WE BOTH UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE KING'S VIEWS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS IMMEDIATELY. THE FOREGOING HAS BEEN DRAFTED WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WHO WILL BE REPORTING IN IDENTICAL TERMS.

5. I SAW THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER EARLIER THIS MORNING IN CONNECTION WITH MR LUCE'S VISIT AND HE SPOKE TO ME IN VERY SIMILAR TERMS TO THE KING, SHOWING THAT THE KING'S VIEWS REFLECT A RECENT REVIEW OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM WITH HIS ADVISERS. QASEM PARTICULARLY STRESSED THAT HALF AND HALF SOLUTIONS, SUCH AS REINFORCEMENT OF THE MNF CONTINGENTS OR US WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR COMMAND POST TO A NAVAL VESSEL OFF-SHORE, WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS THE WORST OF ALL WORLDS AND ENSURE THAT THEY WERE INCREASINGLY SUCKED INTO A LEBANESE CIVIL WAR. QASEM FOUND IT EXTRAORDINARY THAT THE AMERICANS, KNOWING WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BLOWING UP THEIR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, HAD TAKEN NO ACTION AGAINST THEM. WHEN I SAID TO QASEM THAT I BELIEVED THE AMERICANS PROBABLY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IRANIAN GROUPS OPERATING IN LEBANON WERE DOING SO INDEPENDENTLY OR ON ORDERS FROM OTHERS, QASEM EXPRESSED DISBELIEF AND CLAIMED THERE WAS SURELY NO DOUBT THAT THE SYRIANS WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

URWICK

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16
: MNF

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
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MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NENAD
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ED/Defence...

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Mr. Wright...

Mr. Carthage...

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PP MOSCOW

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 251500Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1138 OF 25 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS,
INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JEDDA, AMMAN, MOSCOW

WASHINGTON TELNO 3088 (NOT TO MOSCOW): LEBANON

1. I ASKED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URQUHART ON 24 OCTOBER WHETHER THEY HAD RECEIVED ANY FRESH REQUESTS FOR FURTHER UN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON FOLLOWING THE BOMB ATTACKS. EACH SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED NO SUCH REQUESTS. HOWEVER, SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND IN CONFIDENCE URQUHART SAID THAT US OFFICIALS INCLUDING MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH HIM. HE WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US HAD LOST ITS WAY IN RELATION TO LEBANON AND WAS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE MISSION OF THE MNF. NEITHER HE NOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD IT IN MIND TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THE UN COULD PROVIDE AN OBSERVER GROUP ON A SCALE AND WITH A MANDATE

THOMSON AND WAS
UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE MISSION OF THE MNF. NEITHER HE NOR THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL HAD IT IN MIND TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF
THE UN COULD PROVIDE AN OBSERVER GROUP ON A SCALE AND WITH A MANDATE
WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MNF. HOWEVER IT WOULD
NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE A DECISION TO THIS
EFFECT UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN A PREVIOUS BEHIND THE SCENES UNDER-
STANDING AT A HIGH LEVEL BETWEEN AT LEAST THE US AND SYRIA AND
THE SOVIET UNION. SHORT OF THIS IT WOULD BE USELESS TO HOLD A DEBATE
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. URQUHART ADDED THAT THE MNF CASUALTIES
WOULD HAVE A DISCOURAGING EFFECT ON POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS OF
OBSERVERS.

2. CHANCE CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
SUGGEST THAT URQUHART'S PERSONAL VIEWS ARE FAIRLY WIDELY HELD.
HE HAS REITERATED THEM TO ME THIS MORNING THOUGH MAKING IT CLEAR
THAT THE CHANCES OF CONSTRUCTIVE BEHIND THE SCENES UNDERSTANDING
WOULD DIMINISH WITH ACCUSATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND SYRIA WERE
BEHIND THE BEIRUT BOMBINGS.

THOMSON

NNNN

NI6473 3 XXX 122

BRITISH GENERAL FLIES TO BEIRUT

THE UK LAND FORCES COMMANDER, GENERAL SIR FRANK KITSON, FLIES INTO BEIRUT THIS MORNING TO REVIEW THE SECURITY OF BRITISH TROOPS IN THE WAKE OF SUNDAY'S SUICIDE BOMB ATTACK.

FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE ANNOUNCING THE TRIP YESTERDAY IN THE COMMONS, ADDED THERE WAS NO PRESENT INTENTION OF CHANGING THE SIZE AND ROLE OF THE 100-MAN BRITISH PRESENCE.

BUT FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON FRENCH AND AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE "IT IS PLAINLY SOMETHING WHICH WILL NOW HAVE TO BE RECONSIDERED BY ALL THOSE CONTRIBUTING TO THE FORCE", HE SAID.

SIR GEOFFREY STRESSED: "WE CONDEMN WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS HIDEOUS ATTACK".

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BRITISH COMMANDER FLIES IN TO ALERT

A SENIOR BRITISH GENERAL FLEW INTO A MAJOR SECURITY ALERT TODAY WHEN HE PAID A VISIT TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTINGENT IN THE LEBANON PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

GENERAL SIR FRANK KITSON, UK LAND FORCES COMMANDER, HAD TO MAKE A LAST-MINUTE DIVERSION IN HIS HELICOPTER AWAY FROM THE US MARINE BASE AT BEIRUT AIRPORT AS AMERICAN TROOPS RESPONDED TO INFORMATION THAT AN EXPLOSIVES-LADEN LORRY WAS CLOSE.

IT WAS A SIMILARLY-LOADED LORRY THAT DEVASTATED THE MARINES BASE AT THE WEEKEND.

SIR FRANK IS ON A BRIEF VISIT TO BEIRUT AND HAD INTENDED PAYING HIS RESPECTS TO THE US COMMANDER BEFORE GOING ON TO THE BRITISH BASE OUTSIDE THE CITY.

"HOWEVER, THE MARINES WENT TO THEIR HIGHEST ALERT STATE WHEN THE TIP CAME IN AND THE GENERAL HAD TO DIVERT TO THE CARRIER IWO JIMA OFFSHORE TO REFUEL" MAJOR DAVID SPACKMAN OF THE BRITISH PEACEKEEPING UNIT SAID.

HE EVENTUALLY LANDED ABOUT 20 MINUTES LATER WHEN THE ALL-CLEAR WAS GIVEN AND DROVE WITH AN ESCORT OF BRITISH SCOUT CARS TO THEIR BASE AT HADATH.

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251340 OCT 83

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
ZCZC	1	ZCZC	
GRS	2	GRS	
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL	
CAVEATS	4		
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PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON	
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER	
	9	REPEATED INFORMATION IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS	
	10	PRIORITY TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, TUNIS, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK	
	11	LEBANON/MNF: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN	
	12	1. US Embassy delivered the following message to the Prime	
	13	Minister from President Reagan today, 24 October: begins -	
	14	Dear Margaret, There is no doubt that the perpetrators of the	
	15	latest bombings in <u>Beirut</u> have attempted once more to undermine	
	16	our collective will and sense of purpose as we work to support the	
	17	legitimate government of Lebanon in its efforts to secure a more	
	18	stable and peaceful future.	
	19	Despite our sorrow at the great loss of life, I want to assure	
	20	you that the United States remains <u>firmly committed</u> . The United	
///	21	States will not be dissuaded by acts of violence committed by	
//	22	those who are seeking to prevent <u>Lebanese political reconciliation</u>	
/	23	and the restoration of <u>Lebanese sovereignty</u> over territory at	
	24	present controlled by foreign forces.	
	25	Our common goals are still attainable: we believe that we can	
NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword achieve
File number		Dept NENAD	Distribution Lebanon MNF
Drafted by (Block capitals) E G M CHAPLIN			
Telephone number 233 4856			
Authorised for despatch			
Comcen reference		Time of despatch	

Prime Minister

See overleaf.

APR 25/8

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

		Classification and Caveats		Page
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achieve them if we stand united and work closely together in the face of these new provocations.

I believe that our Foreign Ministers should meet to discuss matters concerning the MNF. I have asked Secretary Shultz to call his counterparts in the MNF governments to see if a meeting time and place can be arranged promptly. Sincerely,

Ron.

ENDS

2. Please pass the following reply from the Prime Minister:

BEGINS

Dear Ron, Thank you for your message of 24 October.

3. I entirely agree that we should not let the outrageous attacks on the Multinational Force deflect us from our efforts to help restore peace and stability in Lebanon. We have said so publicly.

4. Geoffrey Howe is ready to attend a meeting of MNF Foreign Ministers as soon as one can be arranged. I understand that plans are now being made for a meeting in Paris on 27 October.

5. We need to consider not only the future of the MNF but also how we can push forward the process of reconciliation, which is the only basis for long-term stability in that country.

ENDS

HOWE

NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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This was not the original

with best wishes

Yours ever

Regard.

[Signature]

Lebanon

4.12 pm

The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Geoffrey Howe): Early in the morning of 23 October, in carefully co-ordinated attacks, two huge bombs exploded in premises in Beirut occupied by United States and French units of the multinational force. At least 160 United States marines and 34 French troops were killed.

The whole House will wish to join me in expressing our deepest sympathy to the United States and France and to the families of all those who lost their lives in this tragedy. We condemn without qualification those responsible for this hideous act.

We have offered all possible help in the evacuation and treatment of casualties, both on the spot and in RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. We are in the closest touch with our partners in the multinational force and with the Lebanese Government.

The safety of our troops is naturally uppermost in our minds at this time. The commander-in-chief, United Kingdom land forces, General Kitson, is going to Beirut to consider on the spot what may need to be done.

I should like to pay tribute to the coolness and courage of our troops in difficult and dangerous circumstances. The staff of our embassy in Beirut is also to be commended.

The contributors to the MNF want one thing—the restoration of the Lebanese Government's authority and the independence of the Lebanon. Without the presence of the MNF contingents, it is very doubtful whether the fragile ceasefire which was agreed on 26 September would have come about. Our own contingent, at the request of all of the parties concerned, has been providing a guard for the meetings of the security committee set up to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire.

National reconciliation talks are to open in Geneva on the 31st of this month. In the light of this latest tragedy, it is now all the more important for all parties in Lebanon to get together urgently to settle their differences by negotiation.

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): I Join the right hon. and learned Gentleman in condemning the bombing and express our sympathy for the families of those who were killed or injured. I also welcome the help that British forces gave to casualties.

The horror and shock caused by an incident is still fresh in our minds and that is not the best time to take new decisions which might have long-term consequences. I hope that the Foreign Secretary agrees that the desire for revenge is not a good counsellor, especially when responsibility for the atrocities is obscure. Reprisals which are taken in the heat of anger can inflict suffering on the innocent and make existing circumstances even more difficult.

Can the Foreign Secretary confirm that a great deal of circumstantial evidence suggests that the bombings might be connected with the war in the Gulf, which has already caused up to one thousand times as many deaths as yesterday's bombings in Beirut? Can he confirm a report of a western initiative in the Security Council and that the Soviet Government are prepared to acquiesce to an end to the Gulf war? The Opposition would warmly welcome

such an initiative as the first sign of contact between Russia and the United States which might reduce the risk of their being dragged into direct confrontation against their will.

Yesterday's tragic events are bound to increase already widespread doubts about the role and purpose of the multinational force. It is quite clear that it has not kept the peace although it might, as the Foreign Secretary said, have contributed to the recent ceasefire. However, I must remind the Foreign Secretary that that is the 179th ceasefire in a civil war that has already lasted nearly 10 years.

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the multinational force has not restored the authority of the Lebanese Government even in Beirut—the only area in which they have the authority to act—as the Shia Muslims have established a no-go area in West Beirut whence the bombings appear to have been launched?

It appears that almost any action taken by the multinational force is regarded by one group or another as hostile to it. Therefore, the only real role of that force is to act as sitting ducks for terrorist attack.

We want a successful outcome to the talks on national reconciliation as much as the Foreign Secretary. However, I hope that the Foreign Secretary agrees that those talks can succeed only if the Gemayel Government are prepared to modify the 1943 constitution to give the 60 per cent. Muslim majority in Lebanon a fairer share of power. The Gemayel Government will have no incentive to make those concessions as long as we say, as the Prime Minister did in her joint press conference with President Mitterand last week, that the multinational force will stay until a government of national reconciliation is established. That is especially so as the multinational force has taken the side of the Gemayel Government in the civil war more than once.

I hope that the Foreign Secretary can assure us at the very least that there will be no increase in the British contingent. I hope that he can confirm what the Minister of State said on television yesterday—that the Government are reconsidering the wisdom of continuing to contribute to the multinational force. According to Mr. Cheysson yesterday, the French Government are reconsidering the French role.

I hope that the Foreign Secretary will keep the House regularly informed of developments as I believe that the House is now as sceptical as the United States Congress about the wisdom of continuing to make a contribution in existing circumstances.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The right hon. Member for Leeds, East, (Mr. Healey) concluded by emphasising the wisdom of continuing to make a contribution in present circumstances. He was right to do that as the initial contribution and establishment of the force was supported by Opposition parties.

Mr. Healey: The right hon. and learned Gentleman must have misunderstood me. I said the exact opposite. I said that there is growing doubt about the wisdom of continuing to make a contribution. I did not say that I supported such a continuation without conditions.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I was making no such misunderstanding. I was saying that the right hon. Gentleman concluded by dealing with the wisdom of continuing to make a contribution. I was merely reminding

him and the House that the establishment of the force and a British contingent's participation in it was accepted on both sides of the House. It was a difficult decision and it has remained so. The force is there to enhance the prospect of restoring the authority of the Government in an independent sovereign Lebanon on the basis of conciliation between the various groups in that country. The force cannot be expected to remain there indefinitely, but it will stay for so long as it plays a useful part in promoting the peace process. As I said in my initial answer, it is important for the Government of the Lebanon and all the factions and groups in that country to understand the urgent need for them to settle their differences by a process of conciliation, which means changes on all sides. At present, there is no intention to change the role or size of the force but, clearly, all those countries contributing to the multinational force will now need to reconsider that matter.

Everyone would have wished the force to have established a durable ceasefire, but to have established this breathing space and an opportunity for conciliation to be taken a stage further is at least a step forward. The tragedy of yesterday is a measure of the price that the dozen countries, not only European countries, which are deploying more than 10,000 troops in various groups in the area, are prepared to pay to promote peace there. They are paying a heavy price for doing that. I reiterate the hope that those in the Lebanon who are directly involved, will move with a sense of urgency to settle their differences in the light of the sacrifices being made by the rest of the world on their behalf.

Mr. Healey: Will the Foreign Secretary confirm my interpretation of his concluding remarks, which is that the Government are not giving those involved in the talks a blank cheque to continue indefinitely, as the Prime Minister suggested last week? Will he confirm that if rapid progress is not made towards a durable settlement, he will consult with the other Governments contributing to the multinational force with a view to withdrawing it?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: We are in close consultation with the other Governments. I spent the weekend with the Foreign Secretaries of the European contributors to the multinational force and with the Foreign Secretaries of those countries which intend to contribute to the new observer force that may be sent to the Lebanon. I shall certainly keep in touch with those countries, and keep the House closely informed.

Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I know that the House is interested in this important subject, but right hon. and hon. Members should ask short questions, as we have a big day ahead of us.

Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion): Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that whatever doubts there may originally have been about contributing to the peacekeeping force, a withdrawal on Britain's part today would be seen as a capitulation to terrorism? Does he further agree that without the multinational peacekeeping force we would be faced with a Syrian-Soviet occupation of the Lebanon, which could not conceivably be in the interests of the West or of world peace?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: As my right hon. Friend suggested, a Syrian-Soviet occupation of the Lebanon

would be neither a sensible nor an attractive prospect for the West or world peace. That is one reason why we wish to see established an independent sovereign Lebanon without the intrusion of foreign forces and with the respect of neighbouring states. I also agree with my right hon. Friend that today is not the right time to question our presence in the multinational force, nor to reach a conclusion such as he suggested.

Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South): What useful result do the Government think will be achieved by the stationing in the Lebanon of 97 British troops?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The 97 British troops form part of a much larger force that contains three other national contributors. Their presence on behalf of the United Kingdom, together with representatives of 11 other nations, represents peoples committed to the process of recreating peaceful conditions in which an independent sovereign Lebanese Government can survive. If that were to happen, if our presence were to prevent from happening events such as those referred to by my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) and if it were to prevent the outbreak of the sort of slaughter that we have seen so often in other parts of the world, it would be a useful result.

Sir Anthony Kershaw (Stroud): While recognising that we should not break with our allies at this time, will my right hon. and learned Friend take steps to dispel the impression that he is in favour of withdrawing our troops from Belize—where they are safely and efficiently doing a most important job—but wishes them to remain in the Lebanon, where they are manifestly doing no good and may be doing harm at considerable danger to themselves?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I say nothing about the first matter, which does not arise out of my statement. I do not accept my hon. Friend's conclusion that our troops in Lebanon are doing no good, but considerable harm.

Mr. Roy Hughes (Newport, East): Does not this incident illustrate yet again that in that region we should be pursuing a policy far more independent of American policy? Why does not the Foreign Secretary encourage a joint United States and Soviet Union initiative, leading to a Geneva conference to which all parties to the Palestinian and the Lebanon disputes could be invited?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I would welcome a spread of the areas in which the Soviet Union was willing to play its part in contributing to the process of peacekeeping in other parts of the world. I take the opportunity to answer the point raised by the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) in relation to Iraq, which arises on this question. There is no reason at present to conclude, although the facts are not certain, that there is a link between this incident and the war between Iraq and Iran in the Gulf. It remains a possibility, but it is certain that initiatives may be undertaken soon in the United Nations with a view to securing a conclusion that may lay the foundations for an end to the war in the Gulf. If such a resolution were to pass the Security Council, it would need the concurrence of the Soviet Union, and that remains to be seen. The passing of such a resolution would not bring about an end to the war, but it is being considered closely by the Government and by several other countries.

Mr. Robert Atkins (South Ribble): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that several hon. and noble Members of both Houses recently visited Cyprus and saw at first hand the support work carried out by British forces in Cyprus for the MNF in Lebanon? Will he convey to his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State our favourable impressions of the work that they do and the support that they give so well? Will he comment on the emphasis that that gives to the importance of Cyprus in relation to the conflict in the middle east?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I take note of what my hon. Friend says and welcome his tribute to the role played and the work carried out by Her Majesty's forces. I hope very much that that will go out as the general view of hon. Members on both sides of the House, thus contributing to the support that the troops need for their difficult task.

Mr. Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber): May I associate the Liberal party with the sympathy expressed for the French and American soldiers in what was without doubt, as the Secretary of State said, a most hideous crime? I congratulate the Secretary of State on retaining a presence in Beirut that has been careful, low-key but nevertheless supportive of a peaceful solution. I ask him not to wash his hands of the matter hastily. He must make an assessment of the value of what our troops are doing, but he must not do that without the most careful consultation with the other forces involved. I hope that he will do that.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I am grateful for what the hon. Gentleman said.

Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson (New Forest): Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the most important factor in Lebanese politics is the complex confessional structure of the country? Can he explain how he believes that foreign army patrols will help the Lebanese Government to resolve those problems, and will he tell the House why we are supporting this Lebanese Government rather than any other?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: This Lebanese Government was elected under the constitution — [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] The President of the Lebanese Government was elected by an overwhelming majority of the Lebanese Parliament, in which all Lebanese groups are represented. I ask my hon. Friend to bear it in mind that in such matters it is not for the House or for any group to invent or to design new Governments or new Government institutions. We must start with the institutions that exist. We are there in response to an invitation offered by the Lebanese Government, and it is right that we moved in on that basis for the purpose that I have described.

Mr. Andrew Faulds (Warley, East): As United States policy is notable for its partisanship in the middle east generally—that is to understate it—and as the United States fleet has already heavily attacked one of the parties to the internal disagreement in the Lebanon, does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman think it advisable to tell the President and his business cronies, who do not have a clue about these matters, to get out of the middle east altogether?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The hon. Gentleman takes a characteristically eccentric and unhelpful view of the basis of the American role in the area. The United States is in

the area because of its conclusion that its presence contributes to the prospect of a peaceful solution to the difficult problems there.

Mr. John Stokes (Halesowen and Stourbridge): Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that unfortunately it may be a long time indeed before there is either a political or military solution in the Lebanon? That being so, would it not be wise to move our troops, if possible along with other troops there, to safer locations, as they are bound to be there for a long time?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I understand my hon. Friend's point that, inevitably, risk is involved in the deployment of troops in these circumstances. That is why we wish to see a conclusion to the uncertainty as soon as possible. However, were the troops to be removed altogether, they would not contribute to the role that they have so far performed. As I have already said, it is right for those involved in the Lebanon to recognise the need to proceed with the utmost urgency towards a resolution of this problem.

Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich): Does the Secretary of State agree that it would be unwise for the British contingent to be seen to be taking sides in the internal and increasingly bloody politics of the Lebanon? Will he continue to resist calls for its removal while it is able to make a positive and helpful contribution towards bringing the parties together in the search for national reconciliation?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: It is, of course, right to take account of the extent to which it can make a positive and helpful contribution. It is on that basis that the troops went, and remain, there. I emphasise that the British troops are taking no sides in this conflict. One reason underlining that fact is the role that they are at present playing at the invitation of all the parties concerned. That is a plain recognition of their independence.

Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd (Morecambe and Lunesdale): Will my right hon. and learned Friend deny the suggestions that we are involved in the Lebanon because we are subservient to American foreign policy? Will he confirm that our presence there, rightly or wrongly, was a response to requests by the Lebanese Government, whom we wish to help, as a friendly but frail Government, to bring that country forward after years of turmoil and horror?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I confirm what my hon. Friend has said and remind him that among the different contingents of troops at present playing a peace-keeping role in the Lebanon there are representatives of countries in Africa and outside western Europe, who plainly would not be there at the behest of the American Government. There are contingents in Lebanon trying to play their part in different ways in promoting the peace process, and it would be quite wrong to conclude that we are there in any sense as a lackey of the United States Government.

Mr. Stuart Bell (Middlesbrough): A family of constituents whose son is at present in Beirut have expressed great concern at the situation in Lebanon. I am sure that they will note that a senior representative is shortly to visit Beirut. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give an assurance that there has already been an urgent review of security at the base and of the

accommodation of our contingent with a view to preventing the sort of kamikaze attack that was yesterday perpetrated in Beirut?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I well understand the hon. Gentleman expressing his concern on behalf of the family of one of those serving in the present difficult situation in Beirut. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has been concerned with the question he raised. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence recently visited the Lebanon as did the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office in recent weeks. As a result of all their assessments and the assessment now being undertaken by the officer commanding United Kingdom forces, the very questions raised by the hon. Gentleman have been considered and will be reconsidered in the light of the latest report.

Mr. Cyril D. Townsend (Bexleyheath): While a responsible Government will wish to review the presence of British troops in the Lebanon on a day-to-day basis, would not this be the worst possible moment unilaterally to withdraw our contingent from the multinational force? Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that, beyond the complexities of the political theme in the Lebanon, lies a real risk of conflict between the big powers and, therefore, any contribution which Britain can make towards helping the Lebanese Government to secure a peaceful settlement is warmly to be welcomed? Although he will look at the Lebanon on a day-to-day basis, will he also keep at the back of his mind the need for Europe to point the way to a wider settlement of the middle east dispute?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I shall certainly consider my hon. Friend's last point. That question is not only in my mind but in the minds of the other Foreign Ministers of the Ten. I entirely agree that even if it were under consideration, today, at a time when the forces of other countries have suffered such a severe blow, would be quite the wrong moment to consider unilateral withdrawal.

Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West): Will the Secretary of State confirm that the British presence in the multinational force was not debated in this House and that, unlike the United States Congress, we have not been asked to pronounce upon it? What is his view of the criticism of the presence of the United States in the Lebanon by such distinguished people as Dr. Kissinger and the fact that there is resistance to the United States entrenching its position in the Lebanon?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: I have no doubt that the opinions expressed inside and outside Congress are as diverse as those in this House. I understand that my opposite number, Secretary of State George Shultz, will in the next day or two engage in just such an exchange as this in Congress.

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North): Will my right hon. and learned Friend tell the Americans in the

nicest possible way that their policies in the middle east are likely to be more successful if they do not take one side in a cross-factional conflict, that President Gemayel was put in place by Members of Parliament elected some 12 years ago—before Lord Wilson's last Administration—and several civil wars ago, and that he has completely destroyed his credibility within the Lebanon by fighting alongside the Fascist forces of the Phalange, the people who perpetrated the massacres in Sabra and Chatila? Will he also remind the Americans that Syria is there, is likely to remain there and should be taken account of?

Sir Geoffrey Howe: It is right that we should all take account of the presence, interest and role of Syria and the Syrian Government, because they have legitimate security concerns of which we should all take account. However, the differences that exist within the Lebanon are in the last resort to be settled by the Lebanese themselves. Whatever may be said by my hon. Friend, we cannot create a constitutional framework other than that which exists for such differences to be solved. I have no doubt that the American and every other Government concerned try as best they may to reach an honest conclusion as to the objective road to follow. That is the purpose of us all.

Mr. David Young (Bolton, South-East): I was a member of the recent delegation to Cyprus, and one soldier, recently arrived from the Lebanon, asked me "As a soldier my job is to serve where I am sent, but will you as a politician tell me what I am doing in the Lebanon anyway?". Are we putting 97 men there to follow the cause of peace or are they there as pawns in a fight which some hon. Members see as a battle between the West and the East? If we put men there, it is our duty to ensure that they are impartial and not in support of one regime or another.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: Of course it is right that they should be seen to be present impartially. That is the case that I have made this afternoon, and that is widely accepted in the House. They are there to serve the cause of peace. Unfortunately in today's world such service requires soldiers from many countries to serve in some most unattractive and remarkable situations, but that is the purpose of their presence there.

Mr. Ernie Ross (Dundee, West): Before these questions end, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman dissociate himself from President Reagan's comment that he intends to seek revenge? Revenge has dominated Lebanese politics since the inception of that country, and if that is the policy that the United States Administration intend to pursue there is little hope of peace in the Lebanon this week, next week or at any time in the future.

Sir Geoffrey Howe: The United States has explained the purpose of its presence there—to further the cause of peace and to promote the prospect of an established, strong and independent Lebanon.



cc MOD
LPO
CO

tu

10 DOWNING STREET

24 October 1983

From the Private Secretary

Lebanon

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has received from President Reagan.

I should be grateful for your advice on whether a reply is necessary and, if so, for a suitable draft.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), Janet Lewis-Jones (Lord President's Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

JE

US Declassified

PS

Prirerchins
24/10



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

Mr. Coler
PM has seen
RRB
24.10

CC MASTER
OPS

October 24, 1983

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 159/83**

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed message
to you from President Reagan, which was received at
the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

John J. Louis, Jr.
Ambassador

Enclosure:

CONFIDENTIAL

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M. P.,
Prime Minister,
Downing Street,
London.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 24, 1983

Dear Margaret:

There is no doubt that the perpetrators of the latest bombings in Beirut have attempted once more to undermine our collective will and sense of purpose as we work to support the legitimate government of Lebanon in its efforts to secure a more stable and peaceful future.

Despite our sorrow at the great loss of life, I want to assure you that the United States remains firmly committed to our joint search for peace and stability in Lebanon. The United States will not be dissuaded by acts of violence committed by those who are seeking to prevent Lebanese political reconciliation and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over territory at present controlled by foreign forces.

Our common goals are still attainable; we believe that we can achieve them if we stand united and work closely together in the face of these new provocations.

I believe that our Foreign Ministers should meet to discuss matters concerning the MNF. I have asked Secretary Shultz to call his counterparts in the MNF governments to see if a meeting time and place can be arranged promptly.

Sincerely,

/s/

Ron

CONFIDENTIAL

TO BE CHECKED
AGAINST DELIVERY

STF

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY ON THE
ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON

Early in the morning of 23 October, in carefully co-ordinated attacks, two huge bombs exploded in premises in Beirut occupied by United States and French units of the Multinational force. At least 160 United States marines and 34 French troops were killed.

The whole House will wish to join me in expressing our deepest sympathy to the United States and France and to the families of all those who lost their lives in this tragedy. We condemn without qualification those responsible for this hideous act.

We have offered all possible help in the evacuation and treatment of casualties, both on the spot and in RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. We are in the closest touch with our partners in the Multinational Force and with the Lebanese Government.

The safety of our troops is naturally uppermost in our minds at this time. The Commander-in-Chief, UK Land Forces, General Kitson is going to Beirut to consider on the spot what may need to be done.

I would like to pay tribute to the coolness and courage of our troops in difficult and dangerous circumstances. The

staff of our Embassy in Beirut is also to be commended.

The contributors to the MNF want one thing: the restoration of the Lebanese government's authority and the independence of the Lebanon. Without the presence of the MNF contingents it is very doubtful whether the fragile ceasefire, agreed on 26 September, would have come about. Our own contingent, at the request of all the parties concerned, has been providing a guard for the meetings of the Security Committee set up to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire.

National reconciliation talks are to open in Geneva on 31 October. In the light of this latest tragedy, it is now all the more important for all parties in Lebanon to get together urgently to settle their differences by negotiation.

Back to Typists after action

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/MR WCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
ED/NENAD
ED/ED
ED/UND

NO 10 DOWNING STREET
CABINET OFFICE D10

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RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 240830Z

FROM WASHINGTON 230200Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3088 OF 23 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, TEHRAN, UKMIS NEW YORK
PRIORITY CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JEDDA AND AMMAN.

FCO TELNO 435 TO BEIRUT: LEBANON: U. S. MARINES

THE U.S. MARINES HAVE SUFFERED, AT THE LATEST COUNT, AT LEAST 146 KILLED IN THE BOMB ATTACK ON ITS HEADQUARTERS, IN LEBANON THIS MORNING - THE LARGEST NUMBER OF CASUALTIES IN A SINGLE INCIDENT IN ITS HISTORY OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS. AS THE MEDICAL AND NEXT OF KIN RECORDS WERE DESTROYED IN THE EXPLOSION, THEY ARE HAVING THE UTMOST DIFFICULTY IN CONTACTING THE FAMILIES.

2. AS WE ARE REPORTING ON OTHER CHANNELS THE AMERICANS THINK THAT THE EVIDENCE (CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INTELLIGENCE) POINTS TO IRANIAN GROUPS OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH EXTREMIST ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE SHIA. THEY DO NOT THINK THE SYRIANS WERE INVOLVED.

3. THE PRESIDENT RETURNED IMMEDIATELY FROM GEORGIA AND MADE A STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON, REAFFIRMING AMERICAN RESOLVE TO KEEP THE U.S. MARINES IN LEBANON TO FULFILL THEIR MISSION. A RESTRICTED N S C MEETING WAS HELD THIS MORNING AND A FURTHER EXTENDED ONE THIS AFTERNOON. THE DECISIONS SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST. THE KILLED AND WOUNDED ARE TO BE REPLACED AT ONCE

~~MODEST. THE KILLED AND WOUNDED ARE TO BE REPLACED AT ONCE~~
(FRESH TROOPS ARE BEING EMBARKED THIS EVENING FROM SOUTH CAROLINA TO GO BY AIR TO BEIRUT), BUT THERE IS NO INTENTION AT THIS STAGE TO INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF U.S. TROOPS ASHORE. THE MARINE COMMANDANT GENERAL P.X. KELLY, IS ALSO FLYING TO BEIRUT TO LOOK INTO THE WHOLE SECURITY QUESTION.

4. URGENT CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO WAYS TO RE-LOCATE THE MARINES ALREADY THERE IN MORE SECURE OR MORE DEFENSIBLE POSITIONS. ONE POSSIBILITY WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED IS THE TRANSFER OF THE MARINE HEADQUARTERS GROUP TO U.S. NAVAL VESSELS OFF SHORE. OTHER OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION ARE DISPERSAL OF THE TROOPS ON SHORE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF BUNKERS FOR THOSE WHO ARE PARTICULARLY EXPOSED. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM REMAINS TO CONTROL THE AIRPORT. THE NSC HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING INTER ALIA WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE IRANAINS. THEIR SENSE OF OUTRAGE HAS BEEN INCREASED BY CONTINUED SNIPING AT RESCUE WORKERS TRYING TO RETRIEVE BODIES FROM THE RUINS.

5. EAGLEBURGER, WHO WAS PRESENT AT THIS AFTERNOON'S NSC MEETING, TOLD MINISTER TONIGHT THAT THE ONLY OTHER DECISION OF IMPORTANCE WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SEND MESSAGES TO MRS THATCHER AND OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE MNF. AS OF 0200Z THIS EVENING THE TEXT HAD NOT BEEN FINALISED, BUT EAGLEBURGER THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE SENT OVERNIGHT AND WOULD CONTAIN A SUGGESTION FOR A MEETING OF THE FOUR MNF FOREIGN MINISTERS THIS WEEK. SHULTZ HAD SPOKEN TODAY TO CHEYSSON, BUT HAD IN EFFECT EXCHANGED NOTHING BEYOND CONDOLENCES. SHULTZ HAD CANCELLED A VISIT TO MEXICO AND EL SALVADOR WHICH HAD BEEN DUE TO START TOMORROW SO AS TO BE PRESENT IN WASHINGTON DURING THE NEXT FEW CRITICAL DAYS.

6. IT IS TOO SOON YET TO JUDGE WHAT EFFECTS THESE TRAGIC EVENTS (A DESCRIPTION WELL BORNE OUT BY THIS EVENING'S TV COVERAGE) MAY HAVE ON THE CONGRESSIONAL AND NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN FAVOUR OF KEEPING THE MARINES IN THE LEBANON. IN SEPARATE INTERVIEWS EARLIER TODAY SENATOR BIDEN (DEMOCRAT) URGED THE ADMINISTRATION TO TAKE TIME TO REFLECT AND TO TAKE NO HASTY DECISION TO PULL ITS MARINES OUT. SENATOR NUNN (DEMOCRAT) SAID THAT THE IMMEDIATE TASKS WERE TO RESTORE THE MARINE CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT TO ITS FULL COMPLEMENT AND TO IMPROVE ITS PROTECTION. BUT, NUNN ARGUED, THE MARINES' MISSION AS AT PRESENT DEFINED WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND SENATOR GLENN AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES HAVE ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF THE LACK OF DEFINITION OF THE MISSION, WHILE USUALLY STOPPING SHORT OF A CALL TO PULL THEM OUT. ON THE REPUBLICAN SIDE, SENATOR HOWARD BAKER (REPUBLICAN LEADER IN THE SENATE) WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SENT A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT THIS MORNING REHEARSING HIS OWN MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE DECISION TO INVOLVE THE US MARINES IN THE LEBANON IN THE FIRST PLACE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT (PROBABLY SHULTZ HIMSELF) WILL BE BRIEFING THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND SPEAKER O'NEILL TOMORROW WITH THE AIM OF TRYING TO HOLD CONGRESSIONAL OPINION FIRM.

WRIGHT



10 DOWNING STREET

For immediate despatch
to 1) Pres. Reagan

+

2) Pres. M. Hernandez.

Thanks.

July Clerk
23/10

1140.

CC MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T. 158/83

00 231205Z OCT 83

PARIS FROM LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL 0035

BT

FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO IMMEDIATE PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

TELEGRAM NUMBER GOVERNMENTAL 0035 OF 23 OCTOBER 1983

WE HAVE ALL BEEN SHOCKED AT THE NEWS OF THE BARBAROUS ATTACK
ON YOUR SOLDIERS IN LEBANON. PLEASE ACCEPT MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY,
FOR YOU AND FOR THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS. FRANCE HAS MADE A
GREAT SACRIFICE FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

BT

US Declassified

CL MASTER
OPS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 157/83

CAB/WHITE 001/23

OO WHITE HOUSE
GR 100A

CONFIDENTIAL
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO IMMEDIATE WHITEHOUSE
TELEGRAM NUMBER MISC 239 OF 23 OCTOBER 1983

FROM PRIME MINISTER,
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I AM HORRIFIED AT THE NEWS OF THE BARBAROUS ATTACK ON YOUR MARINES IN LEBANON. PLEASE ACCEPT THE DEEPEST SYMPATHY OF ALL OF US HERE FOR YOU AND FOR THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS. THEY GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR PEACE.

I WAS DISTRESSED TO HEAR OF THE INCIDENT ON THE GOLF COURSE. AS USUAL, OF COURSE, YOU RESPONDED MAGNIFICENTLY.

NNNN

SENT AT 1202Z DAB

Told Duty Clerk
1130 723/40.
671

PRIME MINISTER

Agree the attached messages to
President Reagan and President Mitterrand?

DUTY CLERK
23 October 1983

- Despatched at
1140 by Cab. off.
 - 'Immediate'
- PE 23/10

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I am horrified at the news of the barbarous attack on your marines in Lebanon. Please accept the deepest sympathy of all of us here for you and for the families of the victims. They gave their lives for peace.

→ Margaret Thatcher

I was very distressed to hear of the incident on the 30th June yesterday. Please
Droux. You responded magnificently.

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

We have all been shocked at the news of the barbarous attack on your soldiers in Lebanon. Please accept my deepest sympathy, for you and for the families of the victims. France has made a great sacrifice for the cause of peace.

Raymond Barthelemy

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

We have all been shocked at the news of the barbarous attack on your soldiers in Lebanon. Please accept my deepest sympathy, for you and for the families of the victims. France has made a great sacrifice for the cause of peace.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRESIDENT REAGAN

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

I am horrified at the news of the barbarous attack on your Marines in Lebanon. Please accept the deepest sympathy of all of us here for you and for the families of the victims. They gave their lives for peace. *I was distressed to hear*

I was distressed to hear of the incident on the golf course. As usual, of course, you responded magnificently.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

PS (6)
PS/MR LUCE
FC/FUS

SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON.

~~MR J BULLARD~~ MR JAMES

ED/NEWAD

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RESIDENT CLERK

GR 75

RESTRICTED

FM BEIRUT 211300Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 594 OF 21 OCTOBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, ATHENS,
PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA,
MODUK

SAVING BRITFORLED

MY TELNO 591: LEBANON INTERNAL

1. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED TODAY (21 OCTOBER) THAT
THE SWISS AUTHORITIES HAVE ACCEPTED THEIR REQUEST FOR THE
RECONCILIATION DIALOGUE TO TAKE PLACE IN SWITZERLAND. THE MFA
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL TOLD US TODAY THAT NO DECISION HAS
BEEN TAKEN ON TIMING BUT THE GOVERNMENT ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE
TALKS, IN GENEVA, CAN START "SOON".

PALMER

BT

with
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SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
~~MR EBERTON~~
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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 200300Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 3039 OF 19 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, PRIORITY

UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, ROME, JEDDA AND CAIRO

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE : LEBANON.

1. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 19 OCTOBER PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS QUESTIONED PERSISTENTLY ABOUT U S OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON, THE ROLE OF THE MARINES AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO PROTECT THEM

2. HE SAID THAT U S OBJECTIVES REMAINED THE SAME. THE HAZARDS HAD BEEN KNOWN WHEN THE U S JOINED THE MNF AND HE DEEPLY REGRETTED THE LOSS OF AMERICAN LIVES. EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WAS BEING DONE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE MARINES. RECENT CASUALTIES HAD BEEN THE VICTIMS OF SNIPER FIRE BY RADICAL ELEMENTS FROM RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS WHICH COULD NOT BE SHELLED. THE U S HAD RESPONDED TO SHELLING

~~OF COURSE THE SYRIANS COULD NOT BE SHELLED. THE U S HAD RESPONDED TO SHELLING~~
WHICH COULD NOT BE SHELLED. THE U S HAD RESPONDED TO SHELLING
FROM THE HILLS WITH NAVAL GUNFIRE. THE MARINES WOULD CONTINUE TO
CARRY OUT THEIR MISSION.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT GREAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN LEBANON.
BEIRUT WAS NO LONGER BEING SHELLED, THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE, A
GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN CREATED AND REPRESENTATIVES ELECTED TO
PARLIAMENT (SIC), THE ISRAELIS HAD WITHDRAWN TO THE AWALI AND
ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION OF PERMANENTLY WITHDRAWING. THE MNF
HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED TO TRY TO BRING SOME STABILITY TO LEBANON. THE
LEBANESE ARMY, CREATED BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT, WITH U S HELP IN
SUPPLIES AND TRAINING, WAS A FINE ARMY. THE MISSION WAS TO HELP THE
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ITS FORCES TAKE OVER ITS OWN COUNTRY AND
SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. EARLIER SOME 10,000
PLO PERSONNEL HAD SUCCESSFULLY BEEN OUSTED FROM THE COUNTRY.

4. THE PRESIDENT STOOD BY THE GOALS OF HIS INITIATIVE LAST YEAR.
IT AIMED AT STRAIGHTENING OUT THE LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH BEGAN
WITH THE NORTHERN BORDER OF ISRAEL BEING VIOLATED BY TERRORIST
GROUPS AND INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING KILLED. NOW THERE
WAS A LEBANON/ISRAEL AGREEMENT. THE U S WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO
PESUADE SYRIA NOT TO BE A ROADBLOCK. THEIR AIM WAS TO WORK WITH
MODERATE ARABS TO BRING ABOUT THE KIND OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL WHICH
SADAT HAD MADE, FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF CAMP DAVID AND SCR 242 AND 338.
BUT IT ALL HINGED ON THE RESOLUTION OF LEBANON.

5. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS THE PRESIDENT ACCUSED THE SYRIANS,
AIDED BY 7000 SOVIET ADVISERS AND TECHNICIANS, OF CONTRIBUTING
TO DISORDER AND TROUBLE IN LEBANON IN PURSUIT OF THEIR GOAL OF
A GREATER SYRIA. IF THEY HOPED TO WEAR HIM DOWN THEY WOULD BE
DISAPPOINTED. THE U S WOULD CONTINUE ITS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WITH
ARAB SUPPORT. THEY WOULD NOT ALLOW THE SYRIANS TO DESTROY PEACE AND
ORDER IN THAT TROUBLED COUNTRY.

WRIGHT

NNNN

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

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PS/PUS
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MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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FM BEIRUT 141110Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 579 OF 14 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, TUNIS, ATHENS,
PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK

SAVING TO BRITFORLEB

MY TELNO 575 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON

1. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TOOK PLACE AT THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH BUILDING IN BEIRUT ON 13 OCTOBER. IT LASTED 7 HOURS. THE LEADERS OF ALL THE RIVAL FACTIONS WERE REPRESENTED EXCEPT FRANGIEH, KARAME AND RAYMOND EDDE (HE HAS REFUSED TO TAKE PART ON THE GROUNDS THAT RECONCILIATION TALKS WOULD DO NOTHING TO END THE DEADLOCK OVER THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON).

2. THE MEETING REACHED AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA FOR THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON 20 OCTOBER (VENUE STILL NOT DECIDED). NO DETAILS HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC. THE AGREEMENT IS HAILED TODAY BY ALL SECTIONS OF LEBANESE OPINION AS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.

3. THE ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEBANESE MFA, KHALIL MEKKAWI, WHO REPRESENTED THE GOVERNMENT AT THE TALKS, TOLD US TODAY

THAT THE AGENDA CONSISTS OF 10 POINTS, COINED DELIBERATELY IN VERY GENERAL TERMS, WHICH ENCOMPASS THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES FACING LEBANON. THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE.

4. MEANWHILE, THE AMAL AND PSP PARTICIPANTS DECIDED ABRUPTLY ON 13 OCTOBER, FOLLOWING THAT DAY'S SESSION, TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CEASEFIRE COMMITTEE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. PUBLICLY THEY HAVE SAID ONLY THAT THE MOVE IS IN PROTEST AGAINST CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE CEASEFIRE IS BEING APPLIED. (BEIRUT GOSSIP SUGGESTS THAT THE ARMY COMMANDER HAS DECIDED TO STOP THE PAY OF DRUZE SOLDIERS WHO HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TAKE LEAVE INDEFINITELY FOLLOWING PRESSURE FROM JUMBLATT TO DESERT.) THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT YET CONCLUDED ITS WORK ON A MANDATE FOR THE GREEK AND ITALIAN OBSERVERS. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD ME ON 13 OCTOBER THAT HE HAD HAD NO GUIDANCE FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ON ANY DETAILS OF THEIR DUTIES (WHETHER THE OBSERVERS SHOULD BE MOBILE OR STATIC, ARMED OR UNARMED ETC).

PALMER

BT

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-~~932 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

7th October 1983

Prime Minister

ms

A. J. C. 7/10/

Dear John

LEBANON

Thank you for your letter of 3rd October about BRITFORLEB's role in providing a presence at further meetings of the Security Committee in Beirut.

The Defence Secretary agrees that this has been a thoroughly worthwhile task for BRITFORLEB, and one which has undoubtedly gained us a great deal of good-will from all the parties concerned. From a military point of view, provided that the task remains at the present level and that there is no increase in the risk to our personnel, its continuation will not represent an unacceptable demand on BRITFORLEB's resources. We should not, however, be able to take on a much expanded task, such as providing a 24 hour guard on the venue for the meeting, since we have neither the resources nor the right mix of personnel for this.

There is undoubtedly a risk that the longer the talks go on, the political benefits of our continuing with this task will diminish, and may even start to rebound on us. We agree that we need to keep a close eye on the way the talks develop, and be prepared to withdraw BRITFORLEB from this role if they look like breaking down, although it would clearly be important to avoid any blame for such a breakdown being attached to us. For this reason Mr Heseltine would not wish to see BRITFORLEB given authority to continue the task for more than two or three days ahead (and subject to daily review in the event of any significant change in circumstances).

The Defence Secretary agrees that there would now be advantage in involving some of the other MNF contingents in this role (the Italians seem to be the most likely to be acceptable to the Druze). Should the suggestion for a 24 hour guard become a formal request, this would present an opportunity to put this idea to the Lebanese. Since a round-the-clock presence would be beyond our own resources, we would have to suggest that others should be involved. Similarly

J E Holmes Esq



BRITFORLEB involvement in arrangements for meetings of the National Reconciliation Council could clearly put a strain on our limited resources, and there would be strong practical as well as political reasons to involve others.

Mr Heseltine believes that, should these requests not emerge soon, we should consider other ways of making the point to the Lebanese that we should welcome the involvement of other MNF contingents, provided that this can be done without suggesting that we are trying to shed our own role - and thereby losing us the credit we have gained and possibly putting at risk the talks themselves. He would be happy to be guided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the best way of carrying this forward.


I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10).

Yours ever

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

7 OCT 1983



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PS/MR WCE

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGBERTON

SIR J BULLARD

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*Mr J. Thomson is trying to
get enough votes for a Security
Council resolution on observers - which
the Soviet Union will either have to
let through or veto.*

A-2C-4/10.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 032240Z OCT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 986 OF 3 OCTOBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, ROME, DAMASCUS, JEDDA.

ROUTINE AMMAN, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 983: LEBANON

1. AT MY OWN REQUEST I CALLED ON MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE THIS AFTERNOON. I SAID I WAS NOT DISSATISFIED WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS REPORTED IN MY T.U.R., THOUGH I HAD HOPED THAT PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP THERE IN FAVOUR OF UN COVER FOR THE OBSERVERS AS SHAH NAWAZ HAD DONE SEVERAL TIMES IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION. THE RIGHT COURSE IN MY OPINION WAS TO CONTINUE TO MOBILIZE THE NON-ALIGNED ON THE COUNCIL SO AS TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS THAT IF THEY CONTINUED TO OPPOSE UN COVER THEY WOULD NEED TO EXERCISE A SOVIET VETO. I BELIEVED THE SOVIETS WOULD BE VERY RELUCTANT TO DO THIS, THOUGH OF COURSE THEY WOULD DO SO IF THEIR RELATIONS WITH DAMASCUS DEPENDED UPON IT. DE NANTEUIL AGREED. THE SOVIETS WERE OPPOSED BOTH IN PRINCIPLE AND BECAUSE OF THE SYRIANS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ARGUING THEM ROUND AS M. CHEYSSON HAD NAIVELY BELIEVED. BUT THEY MIGHT MOVE WHEN THEY SAW

CHEYSSON HAD NAIVELY BELIEVED. BUT THEY MIGHT MOVE WHEN THEY SAW THE VOTES WERE AGAINST THEM.

2. I SAID WE SHARED A COMMON ANALYSIS. IF WE LET THINGS DRIFT WE WOULD LOSE THE NON-ALIGNED. ACCORDINGLY THERE NEEDED TO BE A WESTERN-LED CAUCUS IN THE COUNCIL TO MOBILISE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR A UN OBSERVER FORCE. I PROPOSED THAT M. DE NANTEUIL SHOULD LEAD THIS. I SAID THAT I HAD AN OPEN MIND ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO INCLUDE THE AMERICANS. THEY WERE READY TO TAKE A LOW PROFILE AND IT MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE WITH THE NON-ALIGNED TO OMIT THEM. WE SHOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO KEEP THEM CLOSELY INFORMED AND THE BEST THING MIGHT BE TO HAVE A SEPARATE MNF CONTRIBUTORS GROUP INCLUDING THE ITALIANS. WE SHOULD OMIT THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SO AS TO PRESERVE HIS IMPARTIALITY IN THE PRESIDENCY. WE COULD DO THIS READILY SINCE WE KNEW THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS WITH US. M. DE NANTEUIL SAID WE COULD RELY ON TOGO AND ZAIRE. THAT BEING SO WE AGREED THAT WE NEEDED A MINIMUM OF TWO VOTES FROM PAKISTAN, MALTA AND GUYANA. I BELIEVED WE COULD ACHIEVE THIS IF WE ACTED QUICKLY. GUYANA HAD ASSURED ME THAT ONCE FREE OF THE PRESIDENCY HE WOULD SUPPORT.

3. DE NANTEUIL'S ONLY QUESTION WAS WHETHER I HAD CONSULTED ANYONE ELSE. WHEN I TOLD HIM 'NO' HE SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY RECOMMEND THE SCHEME TO PARIS AND HOPED TO HAVE AN ANSWER BY TOMORROW MORNING.

4. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED AS PROPOSED. I WOULD EXPECT TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH VIEW AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TO INCLUDE THE AMERICANS FORMALLY IN THE STEERING GROUP. ON THE BASIS OF A CONVERSATION WITH HER ON FRIDAY I AM PRETTY CONFIDENT THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WOULD NOT TAKE IT AMISS IF SHE WERE OMITTED.

WE WOULD OF COURSE KEEP HER CLOSELY INFORMED. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY PRECISELY WHAT THE OUTCOME MIGHT BE. I INTEND TO RECOMMEND AS A FIRST STEP THAT WE SHOULD BACK A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN M.I.F.T. WHICH I HAPPEN TO KNOW IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. DELEGATION. BUT IF NECESSARY WE CAN GO FOR SOME ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM, SUCH AS AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

THOMSON

NNNN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

The Foreign Secretary thinks that we should not carry out alone the task of guarding the Security Committee talks - but should instead seek to rotate the task with other MNF contributors.

3 October, 1983

A-7 C. $\frac{3}{12}$

Dear Richard

Lebanon

As you know we have authorised the Commander of BRITFORLEB to provide a presence at the first few meetings of the Security Committee set up to implement the ceasefire in Beirut. The Foreign Secretary is however concerned that we should think through carefully our involvement in the longer term, particularly given that we could be taking on an open-ended commitment.

The first three meetings of the Security Committee have passed off without incident. Our Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut reports that BRITFORLEB's presence at the meetings of the Security Committee continues to attract favourable comment and publicity from all the parties. There is no doubt that BRITFORLEB has made an indispensable contribution to the vital task of consolidating the ceasefire and starting the process of reconciliation. The good-will which we have earned will increase our influence over the parties and should mitigate the risks to BRITFORLEB if there is a further outbreak of fighting. Sir Geoffrey has noted that the Ministry of Defence do not disagree with the judgement of the Commander of BRITFORLEB that the additional risk of carrying out this task is acceptable, and that he wishes to continue what the Lebanese and his men regard as a vitally important task.

There is no doubt that as time drags on the political benefit to us of this task will diminish. And the risks are likely to increase, particularly if the talks go badly. As long as all parties are involved in the talks and reasonably content, the chances of an attack on the meeting place are reasonably small. But difficulties could arise if one party withdraws or factions within one party begin to criticise the conduct of the talks. There is also a risk that BRITFORLEB will be associated by the Lebanese with any breakdown in the ceasefire talks, with a consequent increase in danger to our troops. Moreover we must have in mind, that, having agreed to this extension of BRITFORLEB's role, it will be harder for us to resist future Lebanese demands that BRITFORLEB operate elsewhere outside the Beirut area.

In these circumstances, the Foreign Secretary thinks that we should continue to afford the protection requested of us, but that we should now seek to rotate the task among some or all of the other MNF contingents (the Americans are in practice unlikely to be acceptable). I understand that there is now a suggestion

/that

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that a 24-hour watch is required. This gives us a good peg. If a firm Lebanese request is made the Foreign Secretary considers that we should reply that this is beyond our capacity, but that we would be glad to approach others (Italians, French or Lebanese Internal Security Forces) to share the job with us. This applies even more obviously to any request to us to provide security for the political (national reconciliation) committee established under the ceasefire.

The Foreign Secretary would be happy to discuss this soon if Mr Heseltine wishes.


I am copying this to John Coles (No 10).

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

Richard Mottram Esq
Private Secretary
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 478 OF 30 SEP 83

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HD-NEWS DEPT
PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR CARLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR SMITH
CABINET OFFICE
NO. 10 DS

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY), NICOSIA

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DS 11) CBFC AND ATHENS

YRTEL U/N DTG 281630Z SEP 83

ITALIAN USE OF AKROTIRI

1. THANK YOU FOR THESE INSTRUCTIONS. I CALLED ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE MFA ON SEPTEMBER 29 AND SPOKE ACCORDINGLY. I SAID THAT OUR OFFER OF THE USE OF AKROTIRI STILL STOOD, BUT IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES HAD CHANGED SOMEWHAT. WE HAD A JOINT INTEREST IN NOT DOING ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE AT VARIANCE WITH THE COMMITMENT TO DE-ESCALATION IN LEBANON, NOR DID WE WANT TO SHOW LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE CEASEFIRE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW MORE ABOUT ITALIAN VIEWS AND INTENTIONS.

2. MALFATTI SAID THAT HE BELIEVED CURRENT POLICY HERE TO BE THAT THE F104S WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED TO AKROTIRI SO LONG AS THE TRUCE HELD. BUT HE WOULD CONFIRM THIS WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

3. MALFATTI TELEPHONED TODAY TO SAY THAT SPADOLINI AGREES THAT THIS IS THE CURRENT POSITION. BUT IF HOSTILITIES START AGAIN IN LEBANON, HE BELIEVED ITALY WOULD WISH TO DEPLOY THEIR AIRCRAFT, IN WHICH CASE THEY WOULD CONTACT US AGAIN.

4. NEITHER HE NOR I MENTIONED THE PROBLEM OF STAGING THROUGH GREEK TERRITORY (ATHENS TELNO 473) BUT THIS MAY HAVE A BEARING ON THE ITALIAN ATTITUDE.

BRIDGES

DWF GF 12/30

LHC NR 317/30

OO FCO

OO WASHINGTON

OO NICOSIA

PP PARIS

PP MODUK

PP CBFC

PP ATHENS

PUS

cc: Mr Coles
Private Secretary (without
enclosure)

LEBANON

- /
1. I attach a copy of the instructions on which Mr Thomas took action with Eagleburger on 21 September. He read out the three points to be made to the Americans and described the demarches we proposed to make to others.
 2. The security arrangements committee met this morning in Khalde. It comprises representatives of the Lebanese Army (a colonel), the Lebanese Forces, PSP and Amal. This committee does not include Syrian, Saudi or US representatives. We do not yet have a report of its discussion. The UK contingent in the MNF provided a guard for the building in which the meeting was held and have been asked to do likewise for the next meeting tomorrow morning (29 September). PSP and Amal have threatened to stay away if this is not done.
 3. Invitations to the national reconciliation talks have not yet been issued. The agenda and venue remain to be agreed. The participants will be President Gemayel, accompanied by one of his ministers and the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, the National Salvation Front (Karame, Frangieh and Jumblatt), the Lebanese Front (Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun), Amal (Berri) and three independent Lebanese politicians - Saeb Salam (Sunni), Osseiran (Shiite) and Raymond Edde (Maronite). Saudi and Syrian representatives will also attend.

AF Goulty

28 September 1983

A F Goulty

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 September 1983

STAFF - IN CONFIDENCE

PERSONAL FOR MR. FALL

Sir Antony Acland informed me that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had approved the recommendation of the No. 1 Selection Board that Miers should be appointed Ambassador in Beirut. The Prime Minister has noted this.

John Coles

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SC

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES ~~14~~ 15

per

PS LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS

~~SIR J LEAHY~~

MR EBERTON.

~~SIR J BELLARD~~ MR CARTWRIGHT

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FM DAMASCUS 271100Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 278 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEWYORK, ROME, PARIS, BEIRUT,
JEDDA.

MY TELNO 277 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 884

LEBANON:

1. I CALLED ON HEAD OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF MFA ON 27 SEPTEMBER TO DEAL WITH A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A RUN DOWN OF SYRIAN VIEWS OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.
2. HADDAD EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BUT SOME PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE. HE REGARDED FADI FREMS STATEMENT THAT THE LEBANESE FORCES RETAINED THE RIGHT NOT TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME OF THE CONGRESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AS OMINOUS. HE WAS CONCERNED IN ANY CASE THAT THE BASIC CONDITION FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN LEBANON, AN ANNULMENT OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT (FREEZING IT WAS DEFINATELY NOT

ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT (FREEZING IT WAS DEFINATELY NOT ENOUGH) WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE AMERICANS, AND HENCE BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW IT WAS INAPPLICABLE.

3. HADDAD SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD HAD SECRET MEETINGS WITH THE NSF LEADERSHIP AT WHICH THEY HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE SYRIANS WERE FED UP WITH LEBANON AND DID NOT WISH TO SPEND ANOTHER LIFE OR ANOTHER PIASTRE THERE. THE NSF WERE ENTIRELY FREE TO MAKE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS THEY LIKED WITH THE OTHER PARTIES IN LEBANON PROVIDED ONLY THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA. THEY COULD GO ON CUTTING EACH OTHERS THROATS IF THEY WANTED TO. HE INSISTED THAT SYRIAN POLICY WAS THAT ALL NON LEBANESE FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM LEBANON. ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD LEAVE AT ONCE AND UNCONDITIONALLY HE COULD GIVE THE MOST SOLEMN GUARANTEE THAT IF THIS TOOK PLACE THE SYRIANS WOULD THEN LEAVE. BUT ISRAELI DEPARTURE MUST OF COURSE INCLUDE THE GIVING UP OF THE CRYPTO-ISRAELI SAAD HADDAD ENCLAVE. THE MNF SHOULD ALSO LEAVE. THE SYRIANS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE U S CONTINGENT HAD ASSISTED THE LAF TO BREAK INTO WEST BEIRUT AND THEY AND THE FRENCH HAD FALLEN FOR PHALANGE BOMBARDMENT OF THEIR POSITIONS AND GOT INVOLVED IN FACTIONAL FIGHTING.

4. ON MORE PRECISE POINTS HE POINTED OUT THAT

A) THE OBSERVERS WOULD COME FROM NEUTRAL COUNTRIES WHICH MEANT THAT CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF WERE RULED OUT. SOME WOULD BE FROM UNTSO AND UNIFIL AND OTHERS MIGHT BE FOR INSTANCE FROM INDIA. IN HIS VIEW BY FAR THE BEST FRAMEWORK WOULD BE A UNITED NATIONS ONE AND HE THOUGHT THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE MIGHT BE SOUGHT.

B) THE CEASEFIRE INVOLVED MAINTAINANCE OF ALL FORCES WHERE THEY WERE, INCLUDING LEBANESE FORCES ELEMENTS STILL IN THE SHOUF.

C) THE VENUE FOR THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE WAS UNDECIDED. A SITE IN BEIRUT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR NSF. THE PRESSURES WOULD BE TOO GREAT. THEY HAD SUGGESTED TUNIS. THE PRESENT FAVOURITE WAS SAUDI ARABIA WHICH SEEMED TO THE SYRIANS A GOOD IDEA. THEY HAVE HOWEVER NO DESIDERATA THEMSELVES ON THIS SUBJECT AND WERE QUITE RELAXED.

D) THE AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE WAS EQUALLY OBSCURE. THE ONLY CLEAR POINT WAS THAT THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT ANNULMENT MUST BE THE FIRST ITEM. ONCE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN MADE IT SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A WIDER AGREEMENT ON OTHER POINTS GIVEN TIME AND GOOD WILL.

4. MARWAN HAMADE TOLD THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN THE LAST 24 HRS THAT IT WOULD QUITE CLEARLY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNSCRAMBLE THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF LEBANON QUICKLY AND AT ONCE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO

PROBLEM OF LEBANON QUICKLY AND AT ONCE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROCEED ISSUE BY ISSUE AND THE DISCUSSIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE LENGTHY.

5. COMMENT. HADDAD ALTERNATED BETWEEN SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND SPEAKING WITH SOME AUTHORITY. HE IS NOT RENOWNED FOR BEING IN THE PICTURE. HIS INFORMATION ON OBSERVERS SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH SOME RESERVE BUT ON POINTS 3(C) AND (D) HE APPEARED CONFIDENT.

MARSHALL

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OO WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 271340Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 523 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, ROME PARIS, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, MODUK.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

FCO TELNO 518: LEBANON: MNF

1. FURTHER TO OUR TUR, THE DEFENCE SECRETARY HAS NOW BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT A POSSIBLE BRITISH ROLE IN A NEW UN FORCE IN THE LEBANON AND HAS ASKED THAT HIS VIEWS SHOULD BE PASSED TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY.
2. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY ASSUMES THAT A UN FORCE WOULD REPLACE THE MNF AND NOT COMPLEMENT IT. HE BELIEVES THAT WE CANNOT JUDGE AT THIS STAGE THE MILITARY RISKS INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A UN FORCE SINCE THIS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WAS CREATED, ITS ROLE, COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND SO ON. FROM A POLITICAL VIEW, SHOULD THE MNF BE WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED BY A SUBSTANTIAL UN PRESENCE, THE ABSENCE OF ANY UK PARTICIPATION WOULD LEND CREDENCE TO THE IDEA THAT WE WERE IN THE LEBANON IN THE MNF SIMPLY AT THE BEHEST OF THE AMERICANS. MOREOVER, WERE THERE REALISTIC PROSPECTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO LASTING STABILITY IN THE LEBANON, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT ON MERITS FOR US TO PLAY NO PART IN THIS PROCESS.
3. THE DEFENCE SECRETARY THEREFORE BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE ADOPT A NEGATIVE APPROACH AND SHOULD ACTIVELY SEEK TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBLE ROLE AND COMPOSITION OF A UN FORCE. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, CREATE ANY EXAGGERATED EXPECTATION ABOUT THE SCALE OF ANY BRITISH CONTRIBUTION, WHICH COULD NOT

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SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED THAT WHICH WE MAKE TO THE MNF AT PRESENT
AND MIGHT HAVE A DIFFERENT COMPOSITION.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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FM F C O 271130Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 520 OF 27 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JEDDA.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

YOUR TELNO 901: LEBANON: MNF

1. BEIRUT WILL BE TELEGRAPHING UPDATED SITREP. THERE IS SOME CONFUSION ABOUT DETAILS OF CEASEFIRE TERMS: ARAB PRESS IN LONDON FOR EXAMPLE HAS SOME DETAILS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, LEBANESE ARMY AND LEBANESE FORCES WHICH DO NOT APPEAR IN OFFICIAL TEXT QUOTED IN PARA 2 OF BEIRUT TELNO 539. OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IS RESIGNATION OF WAZZAN AND GOVERNMENT ON 26 SEPTEMBER. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS IS AN UNWRITTEN PART OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT OR AT WAZZAN'S OWN INITIATIVE.
2. STATE OF PLAY ON JOINT STATEMENT IS AS IN PARA 2(A) OF OUR TELNO 495.
3. ONLY CHANGE TO POINTS FOR DISCUSSION LISTED IN OUR TELNO 495 CONCERNS CEASEFIRE OBSERVERS. SEE UKMIS TELNO 889. SYRIANS CLEARLY DO NOT REGARD THEMSELVES AS RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANISING OBSERVERS. THE SECURITY COMMITTEE WHICH IS REPORTED TO BE MEETING TODAY IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE MATTERS FURTHER. WE SHARE URQUHART'S CONCERN THAT CEASEFIRE WILL UNRAVEL IF OBSERVERS ARE NOT PUT IN PLACE PROMPTLY. THE AMERICANS APPEAR EQUALLY AT A LOSS ABOUT HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS. SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER OFFERING OUR HELP IN PRESSING SYRIAN AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS ON THIS POINT EG. IN SECRETARY OF STATE'S BILATERAL WITH KHADDAM WHICH COULD BE PRECEDED BY APPROACHES IN BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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cc HONG KONG: Future
b67

FM FCO 261045Z SEP 83

TO FLASH OTTAWA

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 284 OF 26 SEPTEMBER

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

FOLLOWING FOR PS/PRIME MINISTER

OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS 25/26 SEPTEMBER: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. FOLLOWING IS A REPORT ON OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTURE FROM THE UK.

UNDERLINE THE NEXT WORD.

LEBANON: THE SYRIANS AND THE SAUDIS ANNOUNCED ON 25 SEPTEMBER THAT A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN AGREED. FIGHTING IN BEIRUT CONTINUED IN TO THE EVENING OF 25 SEPTEMBER, BUT REPORTS ON THE MORNING OF 26 SEPTEMBER ARE THAT THE CEASEFIRE IS HOLDING. WE ARE SAYING THAT WE WARMLY WELCOME THE CEASEFIRE: THAT WE SHALL BE CONSULTING OUR PARTNERS IN THE MNF ON THE NEXT STEPS: AND THAT WE HOPE THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY THE CEASEFIRE WILL BE USED TO GOOD EFFECT.

FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MNF COUNTRIES WILL BE CONSIDERING IN NEW YORK THE TEXT OF A JOINT STATEMENT. THE US CONTINUES TO LOOK TO THE UK TO CO-ORDINATE THIS EXERCISE. WE SHALL BE CIRCULATING A REVISED TEXT IN THE COURSE OF THE MORNING. WE HOPE FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL ALSO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF OBSERVERS AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE MNF.

UNDERLINE THE NEXT WORD.

HONG KONG: FOLLOWING THE LATEST ROUND OF TALKS MARKETS IN HONG KONG HAVE CONTINUED TO REACT BADLY. THIS WAS FURTHER AFFECTED BY ADVANCE RUMOURS ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SIR P CRADOCK'S FORTHCOMING NEW APPOINTMENT. REUTERS IN PEKING PUT OUT A STORY SAYING THAT THE BRITISH EMBASSY WOULD BE MAKING AN IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT LATER TODAY. IN HONG KONG LOCAL MARKETS REACTED BY SPECULATING THAT THERE WOULD BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE FUTURE. THE GOVERNOR, AFTER DISCUSSION WITH MR LUCE, RECOMMENDED THAT, IN ORDER TO COOL SPECULATION, AT LEAST THE SECTION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT DEALING WITH SIR P CRADOCK'S APPOINTMENT AS DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARY WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR HONG KONG SHOULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH THE NO 10 DUTY PRIVATE

SECRETARY, AUTHORITY FOR THIS WAS GIVEN AND HONG KONG RELEASED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT 0730 GMT: QUOTE SIR P CRADOCK WILL BE RETIRING FROM THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE AT THE END OF THE YEAR. THEREAFTER HE WILL BE TAKING UP A SPECIAL APPOINTMENT IN THE FCO AS DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG UNQUOTE. BECAUSE OF THIS THE RELEASE OF THE FULL ANNOUNCEMENT IN LONDON, INCLUDING SIR P CRADOCK'S APPOINTMENT AS SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WAS ALSO BROUGHT FORWARD TO 0900Z.

UNDERLINE THE NEXT WORD.


ZIMBABWE: MUGABE POLITELY DECLINED, ON GROUNDS OF TIREDNESS, AN OFFER BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO CALL ON HIM AT GATWICK DURING A STOPOVER ON 24 SEPTEMBER. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON RETURN TO HARARE HE DENOUNCED THE UK FOR MEDDLING IN ZIMBABWE'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OVER THE SIX AIR FORCE OFFICERS AND ACCUSED US OF LOBBYING IRELAND, US AND CANADA TO RAISE THE CASE WITH HIM.

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 MR ADAMS
 M James

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MR GOODALL

SIR R ARMSTRONG

CABINET OFF.

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[DIBY: 261300Z]

15/20 to Downing St
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DESKBY FIRST CONTACT UKMIS NEW YORK

FM BEIRUT 261100Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 539 OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY),
 PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, JEDDA.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 881: LEBANON.

1. THE CEASEFIRE APPEARS TO BE HOLDING. DA HAS BEEN TOLD BY THE LEBANESE ARMY THAT IT IS, AND SINCE EARLY THIS MORNING COMMANDER BRINTFORLEB HAS OBSERVED NOTHING BUT OCCASIONAL OUTBURSTS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE NEAR HIS HEADQUARTERS.

2. THE LOCAL PRESS HAS PUBLISHED THE OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT. THE MAIN POINTS ARE:

(A) CEASEFIRE IN PLACE ON ALL FRONTS THROUGHOUT LEBANON. NEUTRAL OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE CEASEFIRE IN THE AREAS OF CONFRONTATION. ALL LEBANESE DISPLACED SINCE 1975 TO BE HELPED TO RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES. ADOPTION OF PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR PROVIDING RELIEF AND.

(B) FORMATION OF A CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE ARMY, THE LEBANESE FRONT, THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT AND AMAL.

(C) THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON TO CALL FOR AN URGENT MEETING TO START A NATIONAL DIALOGUE. PARTICIPANTS TO BE FRANJIH, KARAME

(C) THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON TO CALL FOR AN URGENT MEETING TO START A NATIONAL DIALOGUE. PARTICIPANTS TO BE FRANJIH, KARAME AND JUMBLATT (NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT), CHAMOUN AND PIERRE GEMAYEL (LEBANESE FRONT), BERRI (AMAL) AND SAEB SALAM, OSSEIRAN AND RAYMOND EDDE (INDEPENDENTS).

(D) IN ADDITION TO THE HEAD OF STATE, THE LEBANESE OFFICIAL DELEGATION TO COMPRISE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA ALSO TO ATTEND.

3. THERE IS NO FIRM NEWS HERE ON CEASEFIRE OBSERVERS. WHEN HE MADE HIS DEMARCHE ON 25 SEPTEMBER, THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WAS ASKED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MFA ONCE AGAIN TO PROVIDE OBSERVERS FROM THE ITALIAN MNF CONTINGENT.

4. THE CEASEFIRE HAS COME AS AN OVERWHELMING RELIEF TO PEOPLE HERE OF ALL POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSUASIONS. THE LAST OBSTACLES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS (WASHINGTON TELNOS 2740 AND 2759) APPEAR TO HAVE CONVINCED THE LEBANESE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN LEBANON AND SYRIA AND NOT BETWEEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND LEBANESE POLITICAL FACTIONS ALLIED TO SYRIA. THESE LAST ARE SEEN HERE AS HAVING TAKEN MORE AND MORE OF A BACK SEAT. PACE THE SYRIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER (DAMASCUS TELNO 273), SYRIAN PROTESTATIONS OF INNOCENCE CARRY LITTLE CONVICTION HERE. INDEED, NABIH BERRI, THE LEADER OF BEIRUT AMAL AND A SUPPOSED ALLY OF JUMBLATT, IS REPORTED IN YESTERDAY'S (25 SEPTEMBER) PRESS AS SAYING THAT A ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE IN WHICH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE WERE NOT REPRESENTED WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

PALMER

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1983

NRPM

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26/9

Dear John,

Sale of Hunters to Lebanon

The Foreign Secretary has seen Mr Heseltine's minute of 23 September to the Prime Minister about the Lebanese request for the supply of five Hunter aircraft.

Sir Geoffrey agrees with Mr Heseltine that the arguments are finely balanced and shares his assessment of the arguments in favour of supply. As to the argument against meeting the Lebanese request, our latest information is that President Gemayel and his adversaries, as well as the Syrian Government, are very close to agreeing the terms of a ceasefire. At this critical time Sir Geoffrey thinks that we should take care that our overall posture in Lebanon does not give the wrong signal either to President Gemayel or his adversaries. We are already pursuing a high profile policy through the involvement of our MNF contingent and the RAF Buccaneer support based in Cyprus. We have also supplied the Lebanese airforce with ammunition for their remaining stock of Hunters, so far without attracting publicity. At the same time we have formulated with our French and Italian partners a programme of diplomatic action intended among other things to bring about a visible de-escalation following a ceasefire. Agreement now to supply replacement Hunters might serve to diminish the impact of the message which we wish to convey to President Gemayel that he must negotiate seriously with his opponents.

Sir Geoffrey is very conscious of the risk of increasing the threat to our own forces. He therefore agrees that the balance of argument is at present against meeting the Lebanese request, at least for the time being, particularly given that the Lebanese have not returned to the charge. He therefore sees merit in Mr Heseltine's proposal that we should not respond to the Lebanese unless they raise the matter again and that we should then prevaricate pending a ministerial discussion.

/I am

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I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Holmes


(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Lebanon: Int. Ser.
Pt 4

2. SEP 1983



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FM WASHINGTON 231958Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 2740 OF 23 SEPT 83

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT MODUK UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS ROME

GOVERNOR HONG KONG (FOR PS/MR LUCE)

PRIORITY DAMASCUS AMMAN JEDDA TEL AVIV CAIRO.

MY TELNO 2719 : LEBANON

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US AT 231800Z THAT FURTHER PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS BUT THAT A NEW SYRIAN DEMAND IS NOW BLOCKING AGREEMENT.

2. BOTH THE LEBANESE AND SYRIANS HAVE NOW AGREED THAT THE NATIONAL UNITY TALKS SHOULD COMPRISE THOSE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 (III) OF MY TUR WITH THE ADDITION OF ADEL OSSEIRAN AND MOUNIR ABU FADIL. THE FORMER WAS ADDED BY THE LEBANESE, THE LATTER BY THE SYRIANS.

3. THE VENUE FOR THESE TALKS HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED. BUT IT HAS

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BEEN AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, TO DETERMINE THE AGENDA FOR THE TALKS AND MADE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM TO BE HELD. IT SEEMS THAT PRINCE BANDAR WILL HAVE SOME ROLE IN ORGANISING THIS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE.

4. THE SYRIANS HAVE, HOWEVER, JUST PRODUCED A NEW REQUIREMENT THAT GEMAYEL'S STATEMENT ANNOUNCING THE TALKS SHOULD INCLUDE A WRITTEN COMMITMENT IN ADVANCE, ON BEHALF OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, TO ACCEPT WHATEVER MAY BE DECIDED AT THEM. THE LEBANESE HAVE REJECTED THIS, PARTLY BECAUSE IT IS A NEW DEMAND AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY THINK IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. IT IS NOT SUGGESTED THAT OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS MAKE A SIMILAR COMMITMENT. MCFARLANE IS NOT AT PRESENT DISPOSED TO PRESS THE LEBANESE TO CONCEDE THIS POINT. HARIRI IS TRYING TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO DROP IT. MCFARLANE IS IN BEIRUT AND BANDAR IN JEDDA.

5. THE STATE DEPARTMENT POINT OUT THAT THE SYRIAN REQUIREMENT WOULD HAVE LITTLE PRACTICAL EFFECT SINCE DECISIONS AT THE NATIONAL UNITY TALKS WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY CONSENSUS AND GEMAYEL HIMSELF AND THE LEBANESE FORCES REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE ABLE TO BLOCK ANY PROPOSALS TOO FAVOURABLE TO THE SYRIANS. EVEN IF THIS POINT CAN BE RESOLVED, THEY ARE NOT CONFIDENT THAT A CEASEFIRE WILL BE AGREED. THEY NOTE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE SEEMED EQUALLY CLOSE TO SUCCESS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE LAST WEEK OR SO ONLY TO BE FRUSTRATED BY A NEW DEMAND FROM ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER OR THE REOPENING OF A POINT PREVIOUSLY AGREED. BUT THEY HOPE THAT THE CONTINUED MILITARY STALEMATE AT SUQ EL GHARB WILL DISCOURAGE BOTH SIDES FROM PROLONGING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE HOPE OF MAKING MILITARY GAINS.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 September 1983

A-J.C. 2/4
p.a.

Dear John,

Lebanon

The Secretary of State for Defence minuted to the Prime Minister today about the Lebanon. This is to confirm what I told you on the telephone, that the Foreign Secretary agrees that we should approve this French request as a one-off operation, and that Mr Heseltine should telephone his French opposite number today. Clearly there is some cumulative risk in terms of our relations with the Cypriots if we agree to a series of similar requests from either the French or other MNF contributors. We must consider each case on its merits and in the light of all the political circumstances at the time. Meanwhile, we agree with the Defence Secretary's view in his minute of 16 September that we should discourage the Americans from putting in requests to use Akrotiri unless absolutely essential. While doing all that we can to help our Allies, we must also keep a careful watch on our own longer term interests in the Cyprus Bases and therefore the Cypriot reaction to what happens there.

We will be writing separately on the question of selling Hunter aircraft to the Lebanon.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary


A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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23 SEP 1983



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

23 September, 1983

The Lebanon

I have brought to the Prime Minister's attention the matters raised in your Secretary of State's minute of 23 September.

I explained to the Prime Minister that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed with Mr. Heseltine that we should inform the French Government that our facilities at Akrotiri may be used for the purpose described in paragraph 2 of the minute. Mrs. Thatcher is content with this.

As regards the sale of Hunter aircraft to the Lebanon, the Prime Minister has noted that the Secretary of State for Defence believes that the balance of argument at present is against meeting the Lebanese request.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

E. J. DOLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence

SECRET



MO 3/7/4

PRIME MINISTER

LEBANON

1. We discussed at Cabinet yesterday two issues arising from our participation in the Multi-National Force (MNF) in the Lebanon - the French request to make use of RAF Akrotiri, and the request from the Lebanese to purchase RAF Hawker Hunter aircraft. We need to reach a view on these soon. They are, of course, separate issues.

The French Request

2. When I was in Paris on Wednesday for the trilateral meeting, M. Hernu raised with me in general terms the use of facilities at Akrotiri to change over members of the French MNF contingent. We asked for further details. I understand from the French Embassy this morning that the request is for 25 sorties of Transall aircraft in 5 trips on 25th September to carry material - mainly ordnance we assume - for the French MNF contingent. Permission is only sought for the aircraft to land at Akrotiri. The material would be transported by French helicopters to a French amphibious landing ship - the Ouragan. They have asked for our agreement today.

3. In view of our earlier willingness to permit the Americans to undertake a similar operation albeit on a smaller scale at RAF Akrotiri and given our agreement to permit the Italians to deploy combat aircraft there, I do not believe that the French would understand it if we were to refuse this



comparatively modest request. In reaching this judgement I do not make light of the possible adverse reaction of the Cyprus Government. This clearly is a problem with which we will have to contend. Nevertheless, I believe it important, at this critical stage in developments in Lebanon, to help a fellow MNF contributor. Moreover President Mitterand's Government have taken a very positive line on Western defence and I have established - in my two meetings with him - a good relationship with M. Hernu. If we turn down a request made personally by him, there will inevitably be adverse consequences.

4. I therefore believe we should accede to the French request. I have already explained to M. Hernu our difficulties with the Cyprus Government and the need to proceed cautiously with limited assistance. We should not offer a blank cheque for future help nor will they expect one. To have the maximum impact on the French, I would hope we can agree this request quickly today and I would then propose to speak personally to M. Hernu.

Sale of Hunter Aircraft to Lebanon

5. The question of the possible sale to Lebanon of Hunter aircraft is, in my view, much more finely balanced. The Lebanese Government are already aware from negotiations earlier this year that there were no Hunter aircraft available of the Mark 9 type they are now requesting. However, they probably know that Mark 6A aircraft are available, which would do the job as well. It is of interest that since making their request about a week ago, they have not pressed us for an answer. We have, of course, already provided them with a good deal of the ordnance for their existing Hunters which formed part of the same request.



6. Willingness to meet the request would be consistent with our policy of support for the Lebanese Government and would enable us to continue in our longstanding role as supplier to the small Lebanese Air Force. Conversely, refusal to supply would no doubt be seen both by the Lebanese and the Americans as a weakening of our commitment. A further argument in favour of supply would be that it would help assuage Lebanese disappointment at our decision to refuse them use of RAF Akrotiri except in emergencies. Perhaps the strongest argument is that if the Lebanese have inadequate air capability of their own it will lead to increased pressure on the Americans to use their own air or sea support openly on behalf of the Lebanese. This would be a much greater escalation by the MNF than supplying the Lebanese with their own capability.

7. Against this, we need to weigh the argument that we should be involved in a quantitative escalation on the side of the Lebanese Government which might not help the cause of establishing a cease-fire, and the particular - and most important - issue of whether we should be adding to the risks to our own contingent and their supporting aircraft. We have considered up until now that the supply of the aircraft would not significantly increase these risks. The position on air defences in the area is, however, confused and we cannot rule out the possibility that stepping up the air war in Lebanon could lead to enhanced air defences being brought in by the Syrians, thereby posing a greater threat to our aircraft should they be required to act in support of BRITFORLEB. More immediately the Druze might shell our ground contingent in protest against the enhanced air power of the LAF.

8. My own view is that the balance of argument at present is against meeting the Lebanese request. I propose, however, to proceed with checking of the aircraft by the RAF so that we could respond quickly to the Lebanese request, should circumstances change and we conclude that it would be in our interests to help. There is little likelihood of this preparatory work becoming known. We would not respond to the Lebanese unless they raise the matter again, in which case we would prevaricate pending a Ministerial discussion.

SECRET



9. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

WJH

Ministry of Defence
23rd September 1983

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 218 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 83

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, MODUK, CBFC (ACTIONED), COSBAA
INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO
AND UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL 215: ITALIAN REQUEST TO USE AKROTIRI

1. I EXPLAINED THE REASON FOR OUR DECISION TO
VENIAMIN THIS MORNING IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR TEL 161.
HE SAID THAT HE REGARDED IT AS A WRONG DECISION, TAKEN
ON GROUNDS OF POLITICAL CONVENIENCE RATHER THAN ANY REAL
MILITARY NECESSITY. IT COULD COMPLICATE OUR USE OF THE
BASES IN POTENTIALLY MORE IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES. HE
FORESAW SOME UNPLEASANT EXCHANGES WHICH WOULD NOT BE
GOOD FOR EITHER BRITISH OR ITALIAN RELATIONS WITH CYPRUS.
AS WE KNEW THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT WE
HAD THE RIGHT TO ACCORD USE OF THE BASES TO OTHER COUNTRIES.
(I COUNTERED THIS BY SAYING THAT THE PRESENT DECISION
WOULD NOT ALTER OUR HITHERTO CONSISTENT POLICY OF AVOIDING
EMBARRASSMENT TO THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT FROM OUR EXERCISE
OF OUR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS IN THE BASES.) VENIAMIN ALSO
HINTED THAT THE DECISION MIGHT JEOPARDIZE CONTINUED
ITALIAN USE OF LARNACA FOR SUPPLYING THEIR MNF CONTINGENT.

2. MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE HAS RECEIVED PARALLEL
INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL SEE VENIAMIN LATER TODAY.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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~~SIR J BULLARD~~ MR. JAMES.
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2719 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, MODUK, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BANDAR SERI
BEGAWAN (FOR PS/MR LUCE), ROME.

PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, CAIRO.

LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. IN THE US VIEW THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN INFLEXIBLE IN THE
CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE GEMAYEL HAS CONCEDED A NUMBER
OF POINTS OF SUBSTANCE. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON FOUR
MAIN POINTS. THE ISSUES STILL IN DISPUTE ARE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
REPRESENTATION AT THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS AND THE
VENUE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT FORESEE NO CHANGE IN THE BASIC MISSION
OF THE MNF. THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAS APPROVED
A RESOLUTION AUTHORISING THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE MARINES
IN LEBANON FOR 18 MONTHS.

DETAIL

IN LEBANON FOR 18 MONTHS.

DETAIL

2. AT TODAY'S MEETING OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS PELLETREAU SAID THAT EAGLEBURGER HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS YESTERDAY THAT THE EUROPEANS BELIEVED THAT GEMAYEL WAS BEING INFLEXIBLE AND EVEN NOT NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. THIS WAS NOT THE AMERICAN IMPRESSION; THEY WERE ENCOURAGING GEMAYEL IN THE DIRECTION OF A GENUINE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION TO WHICH HE REMAINED FULLY COMMITTED. PELLETREAU GAVE US IN CONFIDENCE THE FOLLOWING MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. HE ARGUED THAT THE SYRIANS, NOT GEMAYEL, WERE BEING INFLEXIBLE. THE QUOTE CONCESSIONS UNQUOTE THEY HAD MADE HAD BEEN NO MORE THAN BACKING AWAY FROM UNTENABLE INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS WHICH HAD BEEN EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THE SAUDIS AND THE US. THE SYRIANS HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, DROPPED THEIR DEMANDS THAT GEMAYEL SHOULD ATTEND THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LEBANESE FORCES RATHER THAN AS PRESIDENT; THAT THE LAF SHOULD BE TREATED IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY AS THE VARIOUS MILITIAS; THAT THE LAF SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM ALL ITS POSITIONS IN WEST BEIRUT, THE ALEY DISTRICT AND THE CHOUF; AND THAT THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI AGREEMENT SHOULD BE OFFICIALLY REPUDIATED.

4. GEMAYEL, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD ALREADY CONCEDED A GOOD DEAL. HE REMAINED WILLING TO ENTER A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE AIM OF FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE LEADERS OF THE DIFFERENT COMMUNAL GROUPS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING NABIH BARRI AND JUMBLATT OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE. HE HAD WITHDRAWN HIS DEMAND THAT THE LAF SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO DEPLY IMMEDIATELY INTO THE CHOUF. THOUGH GEMAYEL WAS UNWILLING TO CONCEDE THAT THERE SHOULD BE AREAS COMPLETELY OUTSIDE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTROL, HE HAD AGREED THAT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR QUOTE GOVERNMENT FORCES UNQUOTE TO ENTER THE CHOUF ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE WOULD BE THE ISF. HE WAS NO LONGER ASKING THAT THE DRUZE SHOULD DISARM. ALTHOUGH THE VENUE FOR THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TALKS HAD NOT BEEN AGREED, GEMAYEL WAS NOT NOW INSISTING ON BAABDA. HE HAD AGREED THAT RAYMOND EDDE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AND THAT KAMAL EL ASAAD, WAZZAN, TUEINI AND SKAFF SHOULD NOT. FINALLY, GEMAYEL HAD DROPPED HIS REQUIREMENT FOR AN AGREED PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WOULD SERVE AS A GUARANTEE FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL LEBANON.

~~AGREED PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WOULD SERVE AS A GUARANTEE FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL LEBANON.~~

5. PELLETREAU SAID THAT THE LATEST DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINED FOUR POINTS WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL CONCERNED:-

- I) A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE SUPERVISED BY NEUTRAL OBSERVERS;
- II) THE FORMATION OF A SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE COMPRISING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LAF, THE LF, THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, AND AMAL.
- III) A CALL BY GEMAYEL FOR NATIONAL UNITY TALKS TO INCLUDE THE NSF (FRANGIEH, KARAME AND JUMBLATT) THE LF (PIERRE GEMAYEL AND CAMILLE CHAMOUN), AMAL (NABIH BARRI), SAEB SALAM AND RAYMOND EDDE.
- IV) SYRIAN AND SAUDI REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ATTEND THESE TALKS.

6. THIS LEFT 2 POINTS STILL AT ISSUE THE COMPOSITION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION AND THE VENUE. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS GEMAYEL HAD AGREED (PLEASE PROTECT) TO DROP THE SPEAKER AND THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT WAS CONTINUING TO INSIST THAT HE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF PARLIAMENT AND THE CABINET. MCFARLANE HAD PUT THIS TODAY TO KHADDAM WHO HAD ARGUED THAT THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT HAD NEITHER A COHERENT VIEW NOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY MAKING AND THAT THE CABINET HAD NO INDEPENDENT STATUS BUT WAS MERELY THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUMENT. THE SYRIAN VIEW WAS THAT GEMAYEL, AS PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE, SHOULD CHAIR THE TALKS ALONE. ONE VENUE THE LEBANESE POSITION WAS THAT THE TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN AN AREA OF LEBANON UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL OR IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE SYRIANS WERE PROPOSING ANYWHERE IN LEBANON OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OR TUNIS. AFTER TWO MEETINGS WITH KHADDAM TODAY, MCFARLANE WAS NOW RETURNING TO BEIRUT TO REPORT TO GEMAYEL.

7. ON NEUTRAL OBSERVERS, PELLETREAU SAID THAT THE PLAN WAS TO USE THE 50 UNTSO OBSERVERS NOW IN BEIRUT, SUPPLEMENTED BY A FURTHER 50 FROM UNTSO ELSEWHERE IN MIDDLE EAST. HE CLAIMED THAT THE UN SECRETARIAT AND GENERAL ERSKINE CONSIDERED THAT THEY HAD THE AUTHORITY TO USE OBSERVERS FOR THIS PURPOSE, THOUGH NOT TO EXPAND THEIR NUMBER. HE KNEW THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE EXAMINING OTHER OPTIONS AS WELL.

(COMMENT: PELLETREAU SEEMED TO BE UNAWARE OF URQUHART'S VIEWS

WERE EXAMINING OTHER OPTIONS AS WELL.

(COMMENT: PELLETREAU SEEMED TO BE UNAWARE OF URQUHART'S VIEWS ON THIS - UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 860).

8. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS PELLETREAU SAID THAT FORMING A MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT WOULD BE THE MAIN ITEM ON THE AGENDA FOR THE NATIONAL UNITY TALKS. THE BASIS FOR A REVISION OF THE QUOTE NATIONAL CONVENANT UNQUOTE MIGHT ALSO BE DISCUSSED BUT SO FAR-REACHING A MOVE WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE WIDER CONSULTATIONS. MCFARLANE HAD NOT BEEN IN RECENT CONTACT WITH KATA'IB LEADERS. BUT THE AMERICAN IMPRESSION WAS THAT, FOLLOWING THE MAULING OF THE LF AT BHAMDOUN, THE KATA'IB WERE FEELING QUITE VULNERABLE AND WORRIED ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF ANOTHER FRONT BEING OPENED IN THE MOUNTAINS AGAINST THEM. THEY MIGHT THEREFORE BE IN A SLIGHTLY MORE ACCOMMODATING MOOD.

9. ASKED ABOUT US OPTIONS IF THE CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BE BROUGHT TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION, PELLETREAU SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUING IN ROUGHLY THE CURRENT MODE. THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE BASIC MISSION OF THE MNF. IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO ADD THE SELF DEFENCE ELEMENT BUT IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW, THIS HAD BEEN STRETCHED AS FAR AS IT COULD AND SHOULD BE. IT HAD BEEN REASONABLE TO INCLUDE SOUQ EL GHARB IN THE QUOTE SELF-DEFENCE POSTURE UNQUOTE BUT THIS DID NOT AMOUNT TO DEFENDING THE LAF WHEREVER IT FOUND ITSELF. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THAT US WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE LAF WAS LIMITED TO A VERY SPECIFIC AREA.

MILITARY SITUATION

10. PELLETREAU SAID THAT A FURTHER MINOR ATTACK ON THE LAF AT SOUQ EL GHARB TODAY HAD BEEN REPULSED. LAF MORALE REMAINED HIGH. SEVEN FRENCH SOLDIERS HAD BEEN INJURED IN TWO INCIDENTS IN BEIRUT AND IN RETALIATION FRENCH AIRCRAFT HAD ATTACKED ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN THE HILLS. FOUR TRUCKS LOADED WITH AMMUNITION IN THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT'S MOTOR POOL HAD EXPLODED IN A SEPARATE ATTACK; NO CASUALTIES HAD BEEN REPORTED. THERE HAD BEEN SOME FIRING TO DAY IN THE SHIAH AREA OF WEST BEIRUT.

11. PELLETREAU NOTED INDICATIONS THAT SOME DRUZE WERE BEGINNING TO RESENT SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN INTRANSIGENCE IN CONTINUING TO FIGHT AT THEIR EXPENSE, THOUGH IT WAS TOO SOON TO DESCRIBE THIS AS A TREND. OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SUGGESTED THAT SOME PALESTINIANS WANTED TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT IN ORDER TO OPEN THE WAY TO WEST BEIRUT AND TO REESTABLISH THEIR FORMER ALLIANCE WITH LEBANESE LEFTISTS. THESE PALESTINIANS HOPED THAT THEIR

WAY TO WEST BEIRUT AND TO REESTABLISH THEIR FORMER ALLIANCE WITH LEBANESE LEFTISTS. THESE PALESTINIANS HOPED THAT THEIR LEBANESE ALLIES WOULD PRESS FOR THE LEGITIMISATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON.

WAR POWERS ACT

12. BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS STARTED HEARINGS ON 21 SEPTEMBER ON THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTION TO AUTHORISE DEPLOYMENT OF US MARINES IN LEBANON FOR A FURTHER 18 MONTHS WITHOUT FORMAL INVOCATION OF THE WAR POWERS ACT (MY TELNO 2687). AS EXPECTED SOME DEMOCRATS ARE SEEKING TO AMEND OR DELAY THIS RESOLUTION. THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY VOTED BY 10 TO 16 TO CUT OFF FUNDING FOR THE MARINES IN LEBANON ON 1 DECEMBER UNLESS THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES BY THEN THAT THEIR DEPLOYMENT IS GOVERNED BY THE WAR POWERS ACT. THIS PLOY HAS ANGERED THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP IN THE HOUSE, PARTICULARLY CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI WHO REGARDS THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE ACTION AS AN INTRUSION INTO THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS OWN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THAT COMMITTEE APPROVED THE COMPROMISE RESOLUTION TODAY BY 30 VOTES TO 6. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THIS VOTE AND REMAIN OPTIMISTIC THAT THE RESOLUTION WILL PASS BOTH HOUSES IN THE COURSE OF NEXT WEEK.

WRIGHT

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 September 1983

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Prime Minister

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LWZ
24/9Dear Richard,
Cyprus and Lebanon

Mr Heseltine's minute of 16 September to Sir Geoffrey Howe about Italian use of Akrotiri (already dealt with separately) referred also to a request from the Lebanese to move aircraft to the SBAs.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agrees with the response to the Lebanese request proposed by Mr Heseltine. It would be extremely difficult to restrict the Lebanese to "parking" their aircraft at Akrotiri without their becoming involved in operational missions. We have no interest in the Sovereign Base Areas being drawn more deeply into the Lebanese conflict than is absolutely necessary. In addition, to accede to the Lebanese request might increase the risk of direct retaliation by the Druze and their allies against BRITFORLEB.

We propose therefore that you should tell the Lebanese that, whilst Akrotiri remains available in case of genuine emergency, they should not look to it merely because the security of their own airstrips is threatened. We cannot allow Akrotiri to become more directly involved in the fighting than it already is in support of elements of the Multi National Force. To do so would be to associate the Bases with the conflict in a manner which would cause us great difficulty with other governments because we would be regarded as providing direct operational support to the Lebanese Air Force. It could also call into question the role of our contingent in the MNF and reduce the effectiveness of our contribution to the search for a negotiated solution.

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I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and
to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

J E Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

Richard Mottram Esq
Ministry of Defence

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LEBANON : Int Ext

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21 SEP 1983

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 479 OF 21 SEPTEMBER
FOLLOWING FOR COLES, PRIME MINISTERS PARTY: LEBANON:
SITUATION REPORT

1. LITTLE CHANGE IN MILITARY SITUATION. AFTER RELATIVE CALM YESTERDAY (20 SEPTEMBER) US NAVY AGAIN BOMBARDED DRUZE POSITIONS OVER NIGHT IN RESPONSE TO SHELLING OF US AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE. THERE HAS BEEN A FURTHER ATTACK THIS MORNING BY DRUZE AND THEIR ALLIES ON SOUQ-EL-GHARB WHICH LEBANESE ARMY HAS APPARENTLY CONTAINED. NO INCIDENTS INVOLVING OTHER MNF CONTINGENTS. PRESS HAVE REPORTED PRESENCE OF US MARINES IN SOUQ-EL-GHARB. THIS IS AN AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON TEAM (8-10 MEN). AMERICANS EXPLAINED TO US EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT TEAM'S DEPLOYMENT TO SOUQ-EL-GHARB WAS NECESSARY TO DIRECT FIRING FROM US ARTILLERY AND SHIP/AIRCRAFT MORE DIRECTLY. AMERICANS CLAIMED THAT TEAM WAS NOT REPEAT NOT PART OF MNF CONTINGENT WHOSE DEPLOYMENT DID NOT THEREFORE REPRESENT EXTENSION OF MNF ROLE.
2. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION YET OF REPORTS THAT PRINCE BANDAR'S EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE HAVE FAILED. ADDITIONAL STICKING POINT APPEARS TO BE WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANESE SIDE.
3. SUBJECT TO ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S AGREEMENT, EXPECTED SHORTLY, PROGRAMME OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION BY EUROPEAN MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD GET UNDERWAY TODAY, STARTING WITH AMERICANS, WHOM FRENCH HAVE AGREED SHOULD BE INFORMED A LITTLE IN ADVANCE OF APPROACHES IN OTHER CAPITALS.

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FM WASHINGTON 202344Z

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2687 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO BEIRUT, MODUK, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA,
PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 2644: LEBANON: WAR POWERS ACT

1. THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE NOW REACHED AGREEMENT WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON THE TERMS OF A RESOLUTION WHICH IS BEING INTRODUCED IN THE SENATE BY SENATOR BAKER, THE MAJORITY LEADER, AND IN THE HOUSE BY CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI.
2. THE RESOLUTION FINDS THAT ARTICLE 4 (A) (1) OF THE WAR POWERS ACT APPLIES TO THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THAT CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORISATION UNDER ARTICLE 5 (B) OF THE MARINES' CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT IS THEREFORE REQUIRED. THE RESOLUTION AUTHORISES SUCH DEPLOYMENT FOR 18 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF ITS ENACTMENT. THE AUTHORISATION IS LIMITED TO A CONTINUATION OF THE EXISTING ROLE OF THE US CONTINGENT IN THE MNF AS DEFINED IN THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND AS LIMITED BY THE LEBANESE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ACT WHICH REQUIRES A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION IN THE SIZE OR ROLE OF THE US CONTINGENT TO HAVE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. THE RESOLUTION REAFFIRMS THE POLICY OBJECTIVES OF RESTORING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON AND SECURING THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.
3. IT IS APPARENTLY UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING THIS AGREEMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL IF NECESSARY MAINTAIN AFTER THE 18 MONTHS HAVE ELAPSED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS POWER TO CONTINUE TO DEPLY US FORCES IN LEBANON INDEPENDENTLY OF THIS CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORISATION. THE PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO MAKE THIS CLEAR WHEN HE SIGNS THE RESOLUTION. IT THUS REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO BUY TIME AT THE EXPENSE OF LEAVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION UNRESOLVED.

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4. REPUBLICAN STAFFERS EXPECT THE RESOLUTION TO BE PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK THOUGH THERE IS STILL A POSSIBILITY THAT DEMOCRATS IN THE SENATE WILL SEEK TO DELAY OR AMEND IT.

WRIGHT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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PS/MR LUCE
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SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON
MR ADAMS

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 3222 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE CICC GERMANY (FOR COLES PRIME MINISTERS' PARTY).

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY/FOREIGN SECRETARY.

SUPPLY OF HUNTERS TO LEBANON.
YOUR TEL NO. 503.

1. IN THE LIGHT OF THE POINTS IN YOUR TEL. UNDER REFERENCE, THE
SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THE
OFFER OF 5 MARK 6A AIRCRAFT TO THE LEBANESE.

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I told Mr. Holmes on 21
September that the S.R. wished
no action to be taken until
she had had a word with
the FCS on Thursday.

M 24.
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DESK BY 201530Z UKREP BRUSSELS
TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)
TELEGRAM NUMBER 503 OF 20 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE (DESKBY 201530Z) CICC GERMANY (FOR COLES IN PRIME
MINISTER'S PARTY FROM PS/FOREIGN SECRETARY)
SUPPLY OF HUNTERS TO LEBANON

1. THERE HAVE BEEN FEW RECENT SUPPLIES TO LEBANESE AIRFORCE
WHICH HAS BEEN LARGELY DEFUNCT SINCE 1975/76 CIVIL WAR. FRANCE
HAVE SUPPLIED SOME HELICOPTERS. US ARE ABOUT TO SUPPLY 500LB BOMBS.
2. ALL MNF CONTRIBUTORS
HAVE BEEN KEEN TO RESUPPLY LEBANESE ARMY. ALMOST ALL EQUIPMENT
RECENTLY PROVIDED HAS COME FROM AMERICANS WHO HAVE IN EFFECT
MET ALL ARMY'S LAND-BASED REQUIREMENTS. SUPPLIES HAVE
INCLUDED TANKS 155MM HOWITZERS AND SHELLS, ARMoured PERSONNEL

PAGE 2 RBDWCR 5073 C O N F I D E N T I A L UK COMMS ONLY
CARRIERS AND LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION. FRENCH HAVE
SUPPLIED ANTI-TANK MISSILES AND SMALL ARMS. JORDANIANS HAVE
SUPPLIED TANKS AND ARMoured CARS.
3. LEBANESE AIRFORCE HAS HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON THE FIGHTING SO
FAR, AND THEIR ACTIVITY HAS TO DATE BROUGHT NO SYRIAN RESPONSE.
MAIN IMPORTANCE FROM LEBANESE POINT OF VIEW HAS BEEN TO BOOST ARMY'S
MORALE. AS FAR AS SYRIAN/DRUZE ARE CONCERNED, HUNTERS POSE
LESSER THREAT THAN RAF BUCCANEERS. ASSUMING THAT SUPPLY OF
FIVE HUNTERS WOULD BECOME KNOWN OUR VIEW, SHARED BY MOD IS
THAT THIS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE RISK TO
OUR CONTINGENT (THE HAGUE TELNO 260) ON THE OTHER HAND, A
DECISION NOT TO SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE HARD TO JUSTIFY TO
LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.
4. MR LUCE, WHEN CONSULTED BY EGSTON ON 19 SEPTEMBER IN A
PRELIMINARY WAY, AGREED WITH THE FOREGOING (HE HAS NOW LEFT FOR
THE FAR EAST).

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FM ROME 201345Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 451 OF 20 SEP 83

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MODUK
BRITFORLEB CBFC AND BEIRUT

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO AND PARIS

YRTELNO 256: ITALIAN USE OF RAF AKROTIRI

1. I GAVE YOUR ANSWER TO ANDREOTTI IMMEDIATELY YOUR TELEGRAM
ARRIVED. HE CAME OUT OF A JOINT MEETING OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND DEFENCE COMMITTEES IN THE SENATE TO RECEIVE ME. I SPOKE
AS INSTRUCTED AND UNDERTOOK TO WRITE A CONFIRMING LETTER
THIS AFTERNOON.

2. ANDREOTTI WAS GRATEFUL. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD VIEWS
ABOUT THE FORM OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNICATION TO THE CYPRIOTS:
SHOULD IT BE INFORMAL OR INCORPORATED IN A WRITTEN NOTE? I SAID
THAT THIS WAS FOR THE ITALIANS TO JUDGE, BUT MY PERSONAL PRE-
FERENCE WOULD BE FOR THE MORE INFORMAL COMMUNICATION.

3. WE WILL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE ITALIANS AND
WILL REPORT FURTHER AS SOON AS WE HEAR HOW THEY GET ON.

BRIDGES

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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SIR J LEAHY

MR WRIGHT

MR CARTLEDGE

MR EGERTON

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FM THE HAGUE 200030Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 20 SEPTEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PRIVATE OFFICE AND DS 11) AND UKREP
BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

YOUR TELNO 113: ITALIAN REQUEST TO USE AKROTIRI.

FOR PS TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY FROM COLES.

THE PRIME MINISTER IS CONTENT WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
DEFENCE.

MANSFIELD

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR JAMES
MR CARTLEDGE

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MOD, DS11.
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG,
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FM THE HAGUE 200030Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 200830Z FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 260 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 200830Z BRUSSELS

FOLLOWING FOR PS TO THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY FROM
COLES.

LEBANON: SUPPLY OF HUNTER AIRCRAFT

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SEEN FCO TELEGRAM NO. 119 OF 19 SEPTEMBER.
SHE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE VIEWS OF THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARY. IN PARTICULAR, SHE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR HIS ASSESSMENT
OF WHETHER OUR SUPPLY OF FIVE MARK 6A AIRCRAFT TO THE LEBANESE
WOULD BE LIKELY TO LEAD THOSE OPPOSING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO
TAKE RETALIATORY STEPS AGAINST THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE MULTI-
NATIONAL FORCE.

MANSFIELD

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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PS/PUS

MR EGERTON

MR CARTLEDGE

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PS/MR HESELTINE, MOD

SIR R ARMSTRONG, CAB OFFICE.

DS 11, MOD.

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FM FCO 201710Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE CICC GERMANY

TELEGRAM NUMBER 201710Z OF 20 SEPTEMBER

FOLLOWING FOR COLES, PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY: LEBANON: SITUATION REPORT.

1. ON 19 SEPTEMBER THERE WAS HEAVY FIGHTING AROUND SOUK-EL-GHARB WHICH DRUZE MILITIA AND THEN OTHERS ENTERED. AT ONE POINT THE LEBANESE ARMY APPEARED LIKELY TO BE DRIVEN OUT OF THE TOWN. UNDER THE REVISED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPROVED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, THE US INTERVENED TO SUPPORT THE LAF WITH NAVAL SHELLING OF TARGETS IN THE SOUK-EL-GHARB AREA. OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN SOME FIGHTING TODAY, THE SITUATION IS MUCH QUIETER. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED AND THE LEBANESE ARMY HAVE MAINTAINED THEIR POSITIONS IN SOUK-EL-GHARB. HOWEVER, OUR CHARGE IN BEIRUT IS NOT HOPEFUL THAT THE LAF WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD SOUK-EL-GHARB INDEFINITELY, AND ITS LOSS DESPITE AMERICAN INTERVENTION COULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THE COHESION OF THE LAF AND FOR US INFLUENCE THERE, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE LIMITATIONS OF US POWER.
2. EFFORTS, MAINLY BY THE SAUDIS, TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE CONTINUE BUT NEITHER WE, NOR APPARENTLY THE AMERICANS, ARE CLEAR WHETHER AGREEMENT IS IMMINENT, AS LEBANESE REPORTS YESTERDAY AND TODAY SUGGESTED. ALTHOUGH THE AREA OF DISAGREEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE NARROWED, THE MAIN STICKING POINT IS SYRIAN AND DRUZE INSISTENCE THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY IS NOT DEPLOYED IN THE SHOUF. PRINCE BANDAR HAS RETURNED TO DAMASCUS AND MCFARLANE TODAY FLEW TO LARNACA, PRESUMABLY TO CONVEY THE LATEST SYRIAN TEXT TO THE LEBANESE.
3. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 16 SEPTEMBER TALKS CONTINUED ON 19 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN BRITISH, FRENCH AND ITALIAN OFFICIALS ON A PROGRAMME OF DIPLOMATIC ACTION BY THE THREE EUROPEAN MNF

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CONTRIBUTORS. THIS INVOLVES PARALLEL APPROACHES TO THE AMERICANS AND THE LEBANESE TO STRESS THAT THERE IS NO ADVANTAGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION OF SYRIA, THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF IS INTENDED AS A SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE RECONCILIATION, AND THAT A CEASEFIRE AND THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SOME VISIBLE DE-ESCALATION. THE PROGRAMME ALSO ENVISAGES JOINT REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL AND TO SYRIA URGING THEM TO RESTRAIN THEIR FRIENDS IN LEBANON AND STRESSING THE MERITS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION WE WOULD EXPLORE WITH THE SAUDIS AND THE LEAGUE A BROADER ARAB CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE DISCUSSIONS TODAY BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND CHEYSSON IN BRUSSELS, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, SUBJECT TO FINAL ITALIAN CONSENT ON HOW TO PROCEED, INCLUDING ON KEEPING THE US INFORMED. ACTION IS LIKELY TO BE TAKEN BY THE THREE IN CAPITALS ON 21 SEPTEMBER.

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DD 201700Z NICOSIA

DD 201700Z ROME

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DESKBY 201700Z NICOSIA AND ROME

FM FCO 201550Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 162 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1983

AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 201700Z ROME

INFO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY),

BEIRUT, MODUK, CBFC

ITALIAN USE OF AKROTIRI: PRESS LINE

1. WE AND MOD WILL DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL ON THE RECORD
AS NECESSARY:

OA) THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT TO THE MULTI NATIONAL FORCE IN
BEIRUT AT PRESENT DEPENDS UPON DEFENSIVE AIR COVER PROVIDED BY
OTHER NATIONAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF. THE ITALIANS WOULD
OBVIOUSLY PREFER TO BE ABLE TO CALL UPON THEIR OWN AIRCRAFT
SHOULD THE NEED ARISE. THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND OF COURSE THE
AMERICAN CONTINGENTS ALL ALREADY HAVE THE FACILITY. FOLLOWING A
REQUEST FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, MINISTERS HAVE AGREED TO
THE DEPLOYMENT TO RAF AKROTIRI OF UP TO SIX ITALIAN AIR FORCE
F104 AIRCRAFT. THIS SHOULD FULLY SATISFY THE ITALIAN REQUIREMENT.
BOTH THE ITALIAN AND CYPRUS GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE
DECISION.

(B) WE HAVE AGREED TO THIS REQUEST IN THE LIGHT OF THE CLEAR
NEED OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ITS
CONTINGENT IN THE MULTI NATIONAL FORCE IN THE LEBANON WITH
DEFENSIVE AIR COVER. ALL OTHER CONTINGENTS ALREADY HAVE AIR
COVER. IT IS CLEARLY RIGHT FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS THAT THE
ITALIANS TOO SHOULD HAVE ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE COVER.

(C) THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE DEPLOYED (UP TO SIX) WILL BE
THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE FURTHER PROTECTION WHICH THE
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS NECESSARY FOR ITS CONTINGENT.

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(D) THE ROLE OF THE AIRCRAFT IS ENTIRELY FOR THE SELF-DEFENCE OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT. THERE ARE NO PLANS TO USE THEM IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES.

(E) (IF PRESSED) QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MILITARY USE OF THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS ARE ENTIRELY A MATTER FOR HMG. (IF PRESSED) THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS DEPLOYMENT AS A MATTER OF COURTESY. (IF ASKED ABOUT THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT'S REACTION) THAT IS FOR THEM TO SAY.

(F) THERE ARE NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO DEPLOY FURTHER AIRCRAFT TO RAF AKROTIRI.

2. WE SHALL ALSO DRAW AS REQUIRED ON THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARIES:

Q. HOW MANY AIRCRAFT?

A. UP TO SIX

Q. WHEN TO ARRIVE?

A. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

Q. HOW LONG TO STAY?

A. AS LONG AS AGREED TO BE NECESSARY.

Q. UNDER WHOSE CONTROL?

A. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q. CONSTRAINTS PLACED ON USE?

A. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO A REQUEST TO DEPLOY THE AIRCRAFT FOR THE SELF DEFENCE OF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT OF THE MNF. NO QUESTION OF SUPPORTING LAF

Q. WHY NOT CONTINUE TO USE AMERICAN/BRITISH/FRENCH AIR COVER?

A. MATTER FOR ITALIANS TO DECIDE. BUT CLEARLY MORE DESIRABLE FOR THEM TO HAVE NATIONAL COVER FOR NATIONAL CONTINGENT IN SAME WAY AS OTHER CONTINGENTS.

3. WE SHALL ALSO SAY UNATTRIBUTALY IF NECESSARY THAT THERE IS A CLEAR POLITICAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ITS CONTINGENT WITH A LEVEL OF PROTECTION COMPARABLE TO THAT ALREADY AVAILABLE TO OTHER CONTINGENTS. THE ITALIANS HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL TO THE UK IS ASSISTING THE RECENT RAPID DEPLOYMENT TO AKROTIRI OF RAF AIRCRAFT (CHINOOKS AND BUCCANEERS).

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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FM BEIRUT 200950Z SEP 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 525 OF 20 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, MODUK DS13, D14 AND DEFENCE SALES

YOUR TELNO 375: HUNTERS FOR LEBANON

1. WE RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE MOD TO PROVIDE THEM WITH TWO HUNTER AIRCRAFT EARLY IN 1983. THE PROVISION OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS INVESTIGATED BY DEFENCE SALES. THE RAF DOES NOT ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION WISH TO PART WITH ANY OF ITS HUNTERS. OTHER SOURCES EG SINGAPORE HAVE ALSO DRAWN A BLANK. WE HAVE SO INFORMED THE LEBANESE.

2. ON 15 SEPTEMBER THE LEBANESE REPEATED TO ADA THEIR URGENT NEED OF HUNTER MARK 9 OR TRAINER T66 DUAL SEAT. (MARK 6 IS UN-ACCEPTABLE AS IT HAS TOO LONG A TAKE OFF FOR THE SHORT EMERGENCY STRIP CURRENTLY BEING USED AND HAS, THEY SAY, AN UNDERPOWERED ENGINE.)

3. WE HAVE PASSED THE LATEST REQUEST TO DEFENCE SALES BUT WITHOUT HOPE OF SUCCESS.

4. DANNY CHAMOUN TELEPHONED ME LAST WEEK ASKING WHETHER WE COULD SUPPLY. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE PASSING SUCH REQUESTS TO MOD DEFENCE SALES. CHAMOUN IS TRYING TO IMPROVE HIS POSITION IN THE CHRISTIAN POLITICAL HIERARCHY, HAVING DOUBTLESS ASSESSED THAT THAT OF THE PHALANGISTS WILL SUFFER FOLLOWING DEFEATS OF THE LEBANESE FORCES IN THE SHOUF. CHAMOUN ALSO, I UNDERSTAND, DABBLES IN THE ARMS TRADE AND WOULD EXPECT TO BENEFIT FINANCIALLY AS WELL FROM ANY SALE OF HUNTERS TO LEBANON.

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THIS TELEGRAM
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ZZ UKREP BRUSSELS

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FM FCO 200900Z SEP 83

TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PRIVATE SECY)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 501 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, PRIORITY WASHINGTON, TUNIS, TEL AVIV,
ROUTINE ATHENS, BONN, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG,

LEBANON MNF: MEETING WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ITALIANS

1. PROGRAMME FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION. ROME TELNOS 448 AND 449

RECORD OUTCOME OPOFFICIAL DISCUSSION AD REFERENDUM ON 19

SEPTEMBER. THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS APPROVED THE

PROGRAMME. THERE ARE FOUR POINTS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION:

A) OBSERVERS: UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 842 POINTS OUT SOME OF THE
DIFFICULTIES ABOUT CHEYSSON'S IDEAS. DEPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS
OUTSIDE BEIRUT CAN ONLY FOLLOW A CEASEFIRE, AND SECRETARY-GENERAL
WOULD NEED SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION TO ACT OUTSIDE BEIRUT OR TO INCREASE THE NUMBER
ABOVE 50 AS LONG AS RUSSIANS MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT POSITION.
FIFTY ARE PROBABLY NOT ENOUGH TO DEPLOY ON ALL THREE MAIN ROUTES
OUT OF BEIRUT. CHEYSSON'S POSITION MAY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY
LEBANESE REQUEST FOR FRENCH AND ITALIAN OBSERVERS FOLLOWING A CEASE-
FIRE IN THE SHOUF (ROME TELNO 450, NOW REPEATED TO YOU).

RECOMMENDATION: SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD INVITE CHEYSSON TO
EXPLAIN HOW HIS IDEAS ABOUT THE BETTER USE OF OBSERVERS IN
BEIRUT COULD BE PRESENTED NOW, AND ARGUE THAT THEIR USE OUTSIDE
BEIRUT IS REGRETTABLY BLOCKED AT PRESENT BY LACK OF A CEASEFIRE AND
SOVIET OBSTRUCTION IN NEW YORK.

B) PUBLIC STATEMENT: FRENCH IDEA. WE SUGGESTED AIM SHOULD BE
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT (NOT
PHALANGE AGAINST ADVERSARIES), AND THAT BEST TIME FOR STATEMENT
WOULD BE AFTER A CEASEFIRE.

RECOMMENDATION: WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

REPEAT TIMING POINT AND SUGGEST FRENCH COULD DRAFT A STATEMENT FOR

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UK AND ITALIAN COMMENTS.

C) THE US ANGLE: CHEYSSON HAS TAKEN UMBRAGE AT SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD GET US ON BOARD FOR PROPOSED ACTION BY THE THREE (PARIS TELNO 839). ITALIAN VIEW IS THAT US SHOULD BE INFORMED. US HAVE SHOWN SCANT REGARD FOR OUR CLEAR RESERVATIONS ABOUT MILITARY ESCALATION AT SUQ AL-GHARB. WASHINGTON TELNO 2654 SETS OUT LIKELY US VIEWS. BUT LITTLE SERIOUS US OBJECTION LIKELY NOW THAT CHEYSSON PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF MNF PRESENCE HAS BEEN DILUTED TO SOME VISIBLE DE-ESCALATION AFTER A CEASEFIRE. RECOMMENDATION: ARGUE THAT WITH US IN LEAD IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (WHATEVER WE MAY THINK OF THEIR TACTICS), IT IS REASONABLE FOR THEM TO EXPECT OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO KEEP THEM IN TOUCH ABOUT PROPOSED ACTION, IF ONLY TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE NOT CUTTING ACROSS SOME PLANNED US MOVE. THREE SHOULD THEREFORE JOINTLY INFORM REPEAT INFORM US OF PROPOSED ACTION AND LISTEN TO, IF NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT US COMMENTS. THE OPERATION OF INFORMING THEM COULD PERHAPS BE COMBINED WITH THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO THEM BY THE THREE IN WASHINGTON (SEE BELOW).

D) PROCEDURE: APART FROM HOW TO APPROACH AMERICANS, DECISION NEEDED ON WHO SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN OTHER CAPITALS. A POSSIBLE DIVISION OF LABOUR WOULD BE (A) FRENCH: SAUDIS, ISRAELIS, UN. (B) ITALIANS: LEBANESE, SYRIANS, (C) UK: US AND ARAB LEAGUE. AGREE WITH FRENCH THAT DEMARCHE IN WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT SHOULD BE A RROIS. IT SHOULD BE LEFT TO POSTS ELSEWHERE WHETHER A JOINT OR SEPARATE DEMARCHES WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE, AND WHO SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. TEL AVIV TELNO 234 EXPRESSES THE VIEW THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO BRUSH ASIDE CALLS FOR A COMPLETE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. MR MOBERLY HAS SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO USE POINTS (B) AND (C) ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICANS IN OUR APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS AND OTHERS AS WELL: THIS IS SENSIBLE, BUT DOES NOT CALL FOR FORMAL REVISION OF THE TEXT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO SUGGEST THAT THE DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELIS SHOULD CALL FOR ISRAEL TO AFFIRM HER WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW, BUT THAT INSTRUCTIONS MIGHT GIVE AMBASSADORS AT TEL AVIV SOME FLEXIBILITY ON HOW THE POINT

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IS MADE.

3. SITUATION REPORT: SEE WASHINGTON TELNO 2673.
ON 19 SEPTEMBER THERE WAS HEAVY FIGHTING AROUND SUQ AL GHARB
WHICH DRUZE MILITIA AND THEN OTHERS HAVE ENTERED.

AT ONE POINT THE LEBANESE ARMY APPEARED LIKELY TO
BE DRIVEN OUT OF THE TOWN. THE US INTERVENED TO SUPPORT THE
LAF WITH NAVAL SHELLING. PRINCE BANDAR RETURNED TO DAMASCUS
BUT THERE IS NO (NO) CONFIRMATION OF LEBANESE REPORTS THAT A CEASE-
FIRE IS IMMINENT, ALTHOUGH OUR CHARGE AT DAMASCUS HAS REPORTED BY
PHONE THAT RUMOURS OF A CEASEFIRE ARE STRONG THERE.

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FM FCO 201149Z SEP 83

TO FLASH ROME

TELEGRAM NUMBER 256 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, CBFC

MY TELS NO 250 AND 251: ITALIAN REQUEST TO USE RAF AKROTIRI

1. MINISTERS HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE ITALIAN REQUEST. THE DECISION IS A DIFFICULT ONE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE LATEST INFORMATION ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT (NICOSIA TELS NUMBER 206 AND 207). NEVERTHELESS MINISTERS ARE IMPRESSED BY THE NEED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP A FELLOW CONTRIBUTOR TO THE MNF AND A NATO ALLY IN WHAT IS CLEARLY A STRONG HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL NEED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE AIR COVER FOR THEIR MNF CONTINGENT. FURTHERMORE, WE CAN SEE NO ALTERNATIVE WAY IN WHICH THE ITALIANS COULD OBTAIN AIR COVER WHICH THEY WOULD FIND SATISFACTORY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED TO AGREE TO THE ITALIAN REQUEST SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS (SEE BELOW).

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM ANDREOTTI URGENTLY OF THIS DECISION. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE BEEN ANXIOUS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP THE ITALIANS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COVER FOR THEIR FORCES. BUT THEY SHOULD REALISE THAT OUR DECISION HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY ONE AND COULD PROVE COSTLY BOTH FOR OURSELVES AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN CYPRUS. THEY WILL KNOW THAT THE CYPRIOTS (WITH THE APPROVAL OF KYPRIANOU) HAVE NOW SAID THAT THEY ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF AKROTIRI BY THE ITALIANS AND WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISAGREEMENT PUBLICLY IF WE GAVE

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PERMISSION. WE HAVE NO TREATY OBLIGATION TO CONSULT THE CYPRIOTS ON USE OF THE SBAS. BUT POLITICAL COMMONSENSE DICTATES THAT WE SHOULD KEEP TO A MINIMUM ANY DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN US OVER USE OF THE BASES. WE LOOK TO THE ITALIANS TO EXPLAIN AT THE HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVEL (IE PRIME MINISTER OR FOREIGN MINISTER) THE ABSOLUTE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN NECESSITY FOR THEIR MNF CONTINGENT IN THE LEBANON TO HAVE ACCESS TO AIR SUPPORT. THEY SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE CYPRIOTS THE LIMITED NATURE OF THEIR PRESENCE AND SEEK THEIR UNDERSTANDING. BUT THEY SHOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT PUBLIC CRITICISM OF ITALIAN USE OF AKROTIRI FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD NOT BE COMPREHENSIBLE TO ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION AND WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE AN EFFECT ON CYPRIOT/ITALIAN RELATIONS.

3. YOU SHOULD TELL THE ITALIANS THAT OUR AGREEMENT TO THE STATIONING OF 4-6 F104S AT AKROTIRI IS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME RESTRAINTS AS OUR OWN AIRCRAFT, IE THEY WILL ONLY BE USED IN DIRECT DEFENCE OF THE ITALIAN MNF CONTINGENT WITH THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF COVER JUDGED NECESSARY: THEY WILL NOT BE USED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES.
4. FINALLY, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT DETAILS CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT AND THE STATIONING OF AIRCRAFT AT AKROTIRI SHOULD BE SORTED OUT THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.
5. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW HOW MANY AIRCRAFT WILL BE STATIONED AND THE TIMING OF ANY ITALIAN ANNOUNCEMENT.

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FM FCO 201205Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE NICOSIA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 161 OF 20 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO,
UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK, CBFC

YOUR TELS NO 206 AND 207 AND MY TELNO 256 TO ROME: ITALIAN
REQUEST TO USE RAF AKROTIRI

1. YOU SHOULD SEEK AN URGENT APPOINTMENT WITH ROLANDIS TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THE MINISTERIAL DECISION ON THE ITALIAN REQUEST TO STATION AIRCRAFT AT AKROTIRI IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT.
2. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT CYPRIOT VIEWS. BUT WE HAVE ALSO HAD TO CONSIDER THE IMPERATIVE HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL NEED FOR THE ITALIANS TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE COVER FOR THEIR MNF CONTINGENT DURING THIS DIFFICULT STAGE OF THE LEBANESE CONFLICT. THE ITALIANS THEMSELVES WILL DOUBTLESS BE MAKING THESE CONSIDERATIONS CLEAR TO THE CYPRIOTS.
3. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT TO THE MNF, LIKE OUR OWN, IS IN LEBANON PURELY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IT IS NO PART OF ITS MANDATE TO GET INVOLVED IN INTERNAL FIGHTING IN THE LEBANON. WE AND OTHER EUROPEAN MNF CONTRIBUTORS ARE DOING ALL WE CAN IN SUPPORT OF US/SAUDI EFFORTS TO SECURE A CEASEFIRE AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE ITALIANS, LIKE US, WILL ONLY USE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE AND, EVEN THEN, WILL RESPOND WITH THE MINIMUM DETERRENT NECESSARY.
4. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT I HAVE HAD IN MIND MY CONVERSATION WITH ROLANDIS IN MADRID. (MY TELNO 142, NOT TO ALL). I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CYPRIOT CONCERNS ABOUT THE ISLAND GETTING DRAGGED

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INTO THE LEBANON CONFLICT. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE PURELY DEFENSIVE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY BOTH OUR OWN AND THE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT AT AKROTIRI NEED NOT ADD TO CYPRIOT CONCERNS. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT I HOPE THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT WILL NOT FIND IT NECESSARY TO TAKE ISSUE PUBLICLY WITH THE STATIONING OF ITALIAN AIRCRAFT.

5. IF NECESSARY YOU SHOULD REFUTE ANY SUGGESTION THAT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS, EITHER TREATY OR OTHERWISE, ON NON-BRITISH MILITARY USE OF THE SBAS.

6. WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ON THE PRESS LINE WE PROPOSE TO TAKE WHEN THE NEWS BREAKS.

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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FM FCO 191830Z SEP

TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 119 OF 19 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE (FOR MR COLES PRIME MINISTERS PARTY)

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY

LEBANON: SUPPLY OF HUNTER AIRCRAFT

1. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE AN URGENT REQUEST FOR THE SUPPLY OF FIVE MARK 9 HUNTER AIRCRAFT. THE ONLY MARK 9 HUNTERS READY TO FLY ARE THOSE USED AND REQUIRED BY THE RAF. FIVE OTHER MARK 9 HUNTERS ARE EAR-MARKED FOR ZIMBABWE WHICH HAS NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION ON WHETHER TO BUY THEM. IN ADDITION THERE ARE FIVE OLDER MARK 6A HUNTERS WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM THE RAF. THESE COULD BE READY FOR SHIPMENT WITHIN 2-3 WEEKS AT A COST OF ABOUT POUNDS 200,000 EACH.
2. LEBANON'S SMALL AIR FORCE WAS EQUIPPED MANY YEARS AGO WITH HUNTERS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DISCUSSED AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY A WIDE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT RECENTLY, THE LEBANESE HAVE MADE ONLY FEW PURCHASES, RELYING INSTEAD ON THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS. OVER THE WEEKEND FCO AND MOD MINISTERS AGREED TO THE URGENT SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION FOR THE EXISTING HUNTER FORCE.
3. AT AN OFFICE MEETING TODAY MR LUCE CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD OFFER FIVE MARK 6A AIRCRAFT TO THE LEBANESE ON NORMAL COMMERCIAL TERMS. IF THE LEBANESE WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN MARK 9 AIRCRAFT WE SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT NONE ARE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE AND CONSEQUENTLY CONSIDERATION OF A REQUEST FOR THEM WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. IN ANY CASE MR LUCE DID NOT FAVOUR DIVERTING AIRCRAFT EAR-MARKED FOR ZIMBABWE. HE TOOK THE VIEW THAT WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY MARK 6A AIRCRAFT WAS CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE AUTHORITY OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT THROUGH OUR MNF CONTRIBUTION AND OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY EQUIPMENT TO THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES.

IT WOULD ALSO HELP ASSUAGE LEBANESE DISAPPOINTMENT

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AT OUR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OVER THE LEBANESE REQUEST TO USE AKROTIRI FOR THEIR HUNTERS. REFUSAL WOULD BE CORRESPONDINGLY DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO THE LEBANESE.

4. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT SECRETARY OF STATE AGREES WITH THE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION.

HOWE

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON
MR ADAMS

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SIR R ARMSTRONG } CABINET OFFICE
MR GOODALL
MOD DS11

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FCO HAG 020/109

DD 191830Z THE HAGUE

GRS 774

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 191830Z

FM FCO 191800Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 19 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PRIVATE OFFICE AND DS11), UKREP BRUSSELS
(FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY).

FOLLOWING FOR COLES FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY/FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

ITALIAN REQUEST TO USE AKROTIRI

1. AS YOU KNOW, WHEN CRAXI AND ANDREOTTI WERE HERE ON
16 SEPTEMBER THEY FORMALLY REQUESTED OUR PERMISSION TO STATION
4-6 F104'S AT AKROTIRI TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTINGENT WITH THE
MNF. THEY SAID AT THE TIME THAT THEY HAD CONSULTED THE CYPRUS
GOVERNMENT INFORMALLY AND THAT THE LATTER HAD RAISED NO
OBJECTION. THE ITALIANS HAVE RETURNED TO THE CHARGE IN LONDON
TODAY.
2. WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING URGENTLY HOW TO RESPOND TO THE
ITALIAN REQUEST. AS YOU ARE AWARE, AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR OVER
THE WEEKEND WAS THAT THE CYPRIOTS TOLD US THAT THEY HAD REVERSED THE
VIEW THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TO THE ITALIANS. (THE ITALIANS ARE
AWARE OF THIS REVERSAL)
THIS HAS NOW BEEN CONFIRMED BY KYPRIANOU AND ROLANDIS. THE
CYPRIOTS NOW SAY THAT, IF WE ACCEPT THE ITALIAN REQUEST, THEY
WOULD HAVE TO EXPRESS PUBLICLY THEIR DISAGREEMENT BECAUSE OF (A)
THEIR ANXIETY NOT TO GET EMBROILED IN INTER-ARAB QUARRELS: AND (B)
THEIR UNHAPPINESS ABOUT ACQUIESCING IN THE USE OF AKROTIRI BY
NON-BRITISH FORCES, WHICH OVERRODE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF ITALIAN
POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS WITH WHICH OTHERWISE THEY SYMPATHISED.

Handwritten: Neg sent.

Handwritten: 18/9

3. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY DISCUSSED OUR RESPONSE TO THE ITALIAN REQUEST WITH MR HESELTINE THIS AFTERNOON. IT IS A DIFFICULT DECISION. THERE ARE COSTS EITHER WAY. THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT HAVE NOW MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WILL OBJECT PUBLICLY TO USE OF AKROTIRI BY THE ITALIANS. THERE ARE THOSE IN CYPRUS, PARTICULARLY THE SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNIST PARTY WITH WHICH KYPRIANOU HAS AN ELECTORAL ALLIANCE, WHO WILL MAKE THE MOST OF SUCH AN OPEN DISAGREEMENT TO FURTHER THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE BASES. UNWELCOME ATTENTION WILL BE FOCUSSED ON THE SBAS AND OUR ACTIVITIES THERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REQUEST FOR HELP COMES FROM A FELLOW CONTRIBUTOR TO THE MNF AND A NATO ALLY (ALTHOUGH WE SHALL NOT OF COURSE BE PLAYING UP THE LATTER POINT WITH THE CYPRIOTS). THERE IS NO TREATY RESTRICTION ON HOW WE ^{USE} SBAS AND WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO ACT SO AS TO IMPLY THE CONTRARY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO VISUALISE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH A BETTER CASE COULD BE MADE FOR USE OF THE SBAS BY NONE BRITISH FORCES. THE ITALIANS HAVE VERY STRONG HUMANITARIAN REASONS FOR THEIR REQUEST. WE OURSELVES HAVE STATIONED BUCCANEERS AT AKROTIRI. IT IS DIFFICULT TO REFUSE A REQUEST FOR SIMILAR FACILITIES FROM THE ITALIANS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ITALY COULD BE OUTRAGED IF THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT, ALONE AMONGST CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MNF, HAD NO NATIONAL AIR COVER OF ITS OWN BECAUSE WE HAD REFUSED PERMISSION TO USE ONE OF OUR BASES, PARTICULARLY IF THE ITALIANS COULD BE SAID TO HAVE SUFFERED CASUALTIES AS A RESULT. NOR DO WE THINK THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO MEET THEIR NEEDS IN ANOTHER WAY.

4. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND MR HESELTINE TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE DIFFICULTIES LIKELY TO BE CREATED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE CYPRIOTS WERE OUTWEIGHED BY THE IMPORTANCE OF HELPING AN ALLY AND BEING SEEN TO DO SO. SUBJECT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S VIEW THEY CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD AGREE TO MEET THE ITALIAN REQUEST. IN DOING SO WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ITALIAN AIRCRAFT ARE TO USE AKROTIRI ONLY FOR THE DIRECT DEFENCE OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT IN ITS PRESENT ROLE. WE SHOULD ALSO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO LIMIT THE RISKS OF AN OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUE. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE CYPRIOTS THE STRICTLY LIMITED ROLE OF THE MNF AND THAT IT HAS NO MANDATE TO GET INVOLVED IN INTERNAL FIGHTING IN THE LEBANON. BOTH OUR CONTINGENT AND THE ITALIAN ONE WOULD ONLY USE FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE. WE WOULD ALSO STRESS THE HUMANITARIAN AND PEACEKEEPING ASPECTS. MR STANLEY IS AT PRESENT VISITING THE BRITISH CONTINGENT TO THE MNF AND ABOUT TO RETURN THROUGH CYPRUS. THE MOD ARE SEEING WHETHER HE CAN REMAIN IN CYPRUS FOR AN EXTRA DAY SO THAT HE CAN PERSONALLY EXPLAIN OUR DECISION AND THE REASONS FOR IT TO CYPRIOT MINISTERS.

5. IN ADDITION WE SHOULD PROPOSE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE ITALIANS THAT THIS HAS BEEN A DIFFICULT AND POTENTIALLY COSTLY DECISION FOR US, AND THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO EXPLAIN TO THE CYPRIOTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THE LIMITED ROLE OF THEIR MNF CONTINGENT: THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF PROVIDING AIR COVER: AND THE PURELY DEFENSIVE WAY IN WHICH THEIR F104S WILL BE USED. WE HOPE TO THE ITALIANS WILL THEN BE ABLE TO LIMIT THE CYPRIOT REACTION.

6. IF THE PRIME MINISTER IS CONTENT, WE PROPOSE TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TOMORROW MORNING TO ROME AND NICOSIA.

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PS/TO. NO. 10. DOWNING STREET.

FM WASHINGTON 171645Z SEP 83
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2651 OF 17 SEPTEMBER

INFO PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, BEIRUT, MODUK, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV,
BRITFORLEB AND JEDDA

LEBANON: REAGAN'S DILEMMA.

SUMMARY

1. THE DANGER OF BEING SUCKED INTO THE MIDDLE EAST QUAGMIRE IS NOT THE ONLY SLIPPERY SLOPE FACING THE PRESIDENT. THERE IS ALSO THE DANGER OF BEING OUT-FACED BY THE SYRIANS AND UNDERCUT BY CONGRESS WHICH LEAD TO THE EQUALLY SLIPPERY SLOPE AND EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE RESULT OF A MAJOR DEFEAT FOR HIS FOREIGN POLICY WITH ALL THAT THAT ENTAILS FOR HIS FUTURE. IN FACT THE AREA OF MANOEUVRE BEING TRODDEN BY MCFARLANE IS ABOUT THE ONLY BIT OF REASONABLY FIRM GROUND IN SIGHT.
2. THE INCREASING SHAMBLES IN THE LEBANON WILL FACE PRESIDENT REAGAN WITH SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS OVER COMING WEEKS. IN THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE US MARINES WENT IN A YEAR AGO, IT IS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THEM TO WITHDRAW. BUT THE RISKS OF STAYING ON ARE HIGH.
3. IF THE LATEST INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ARE CORRECT, THE MOST LIKELY EVENTUAL OUTCOME SEEMS TO BE SOME SORT OF PARCELLING UP OF THE LEBANON, FOLLOWING AN UNEASY CEASE FIRE, WITH THE EAST DOMINATED BY SYRIA, THE SOUTH BY ISRAEL, AND WITH A LEBANESE COALITION GOVERNMENT OF SOME SORT, UNDER GEMAYEL OR POSSIBLY SOMEONE ELSE, EXERCISING AT BEST PARTIAL CONTROL FROM BEIRUT. THIS WOULD BE A LONG WAY FROM THE STATED OBJECTIVE OF US FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE LEBANON UNDER AMIN GEMAYEL.
4. IN PRACTICE IT MIGHT NOT BE ALL THAT DIFFERENT FROM THE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THE LEBANON HAS HAD SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH. IF IT LED TO A MORE OR LESS STABLE BALANCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY, AND BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, THIS KIND OF DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE SWALLOWED BY THE AMERICANS AS A PIS ALLER.
5. BUT IT IS OPTIMISTIC TO THINK THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT COULD BE ARRIVED AT QUICKLY, OR THAT IT COULD RESULT IN A SECURE AND TIDY LEBANON. THIS LEAVES OPEN THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE ROLE FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, BOTH PENDING A CEASE-FIRE AND AFTERWARDS. WOULD ASAD SETTLE FOR A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF THE KIND THAT WOULD ASK THE PRESENT MNF TO STAY? IN WHICH CASE, FOR HOW LONG AND ON WHAT TERMS? OR MAY DISCUSSION AT THE UN EVENTUALLY LEAD TO SOME KIND OF INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM, WHETHER A FORCE OR OBSERVERS, WHICH COULD ULTIMATELY REPLACE THE MNF? FROM YESTERDAY'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK (UKMIS TELEGRAM NO 841) IT DOES NOT MUCH LOOK LIKE IT. OR WOULD PART OF SYRIA'S PRICE FOR ALLOWING A CEASE FIRE AND A SETTLEMENT BE A THE UNCEREMONIOUS DEPARTURE OF THE MNF? IN WHICH CASE, COULD THE AMERICANS ACCEPTED THAT?

/6.

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6. THE IMMEDIATE DANGER THAT FACES THE AMERICANS IS OF GETTING DRAWN OR PROVOKED, INTO DIRECT CONFLICT WITH A MUSLIM FORCE. PERHAPS THE THREAT OF AMERICAN AIR AND NAVAL INVOLVEMENT (NOT TO MENTION THE APPEARANCE OF THE BUCCANEERS) HAS BEEN ENOUGH TO GIVE EVERYONE CONCERNED PAUSE. GRANTED, THE AMERICANS THINK THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE IRANIAN TROOPS IN LEBANON HAVE HAD A SHOT AT PROVOKING THEM INTO COUNTER-ACTION. BUT THEY ARE NOT UNDER SYRIA'S CONTROL. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE DRUZE ARE BEING CAREFUL. THE SYRIANS ARE ALSO BEING CAREFUL TO AVOID EXPOSING THEMSELVES DIRECTLY. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO SIGN THAT THE RUSSIANS, DESPITE THEIR PREDICTABLY OBSTRUCTIVE TACTICS IN NEW YORK, ARE TRYING TO STIR THINGS UP ACTIVELY: ON THE CONTRARY, THE AMERICANS THINK THEY MAY BE URGING CAUTION ON ASAD, BEARING IN MIND THE AWKWARD CHOICES THAT WOULD FACE THEM ON THE GROUND IN THE EVENT OF A SYRIAN/US SHOOT-OUT. SO FOR THE MOMENT THE POSITION MAY BE HELD.

7. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE MANY WAYS IN WHICH THE AMERICANS COULD BE RAPIDLY SUCKED INTO MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. IF THAT SHOULD HAPPEN, THE REACTION OF CONGRESS WOULD BE UNCERTAIN. I THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE ON THE WAR POWERS ACT (MY TELEGRAM NO 2644) CONGRESS WOULD TRY TO PULL THE US MARINES OUT AT ONCE. THEY CAN SEE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THAT AS WELL AS ANYONE ELSE. BUT IF CASUALTIES BEGAN TO MOUNT, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PUBLIC PRESSURE WOULD MOUNT WITH THEM TO PUT A STOP TO AMERICAN BOYS BEING KILLED AGAIN IN SOMEONE ELSE'S CIVIL WAR. WITHDRAWAL IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR US FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR THE PRESIDENT. THERE WOULD BE A SEVERE LOSS OF CONFIDENCE AMONG AMERICANS ALLIES IN THE REGION AND OUTSIDE. ASAD WOULD HAVE WON AND WOULD BE IN THE ASCENDANT AMONG ARAB LEADERS. THE PLO WOULD NO DOUBT CREEP BACK UNDER HIS SKIRTS. THERE WOULD BE UGLY CHARGES AND COUNTER CHARGES BETWEEN TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON ABOUT WHOSE FAULT IT HAD ALL BEEN. AND THE ISRAELIS WOULD NO DOUBT BE MORE EDGY THAN EVER FACING A RENEWED THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY IN THE NORTH AND HAVING LOST 518 LIVES IN THE LEBANON FOR NOTHING. THE SCENE WOULD BE SET FOR A FRESH OUTBREAK OF TROUBLE BEFORE VERY LONG.

8. THE PROSPECTS MUST THEREFORE LOOK PRETTY GLOOMY TO THE PRESIDENT. WITH GEMAYEL'S AUTHORITY STEADILY SLIPPING AWAY, ASAD SEEMS TO HOLD A DISCONCERTINGLY LARGE PROPORTION OF THE CARDS. HIS FIRST STATED OBJECTIVE WAS TO SECURE THE ANNULMENT OF THE ISRAELI/LEBANESE AGREEMENT. THIS HAS IN PRACTICE ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED. HIS NEXT AIM IS NO DOUBT TO CLIP GEMAYEL'S WINGS SO AS TO BRING HIM UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL OR EVEN PERHAPS TO REPLACE HIM WITH A MORE ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE. THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES ARE NOT SURE WHAT ASAD'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS HE MAY STILL BE PLAYING FOR THE WHOLE OF LEBANON. HE MAY SETTLE FOR LESS. ONE THING IS CERTAIN: HE MUST BE WATCHING THE DEBATE IN WASHINGTON ON THE WAR POWERS ACT WITH FACINATION TO SEE HOW HAMSTRUNG HIS AMERICAN ADVERSARY IS GOING TO BE. THERE IS CERTAINLY NO LOGICAL REASON WHY HE SHOULD FEEL THE TIME HAS COME YET TO MAKE ULTIMATE CONCERSSIONS. /9.

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9. THE AMERICANS TOO ARE BEGINNING TO THINK PRIVATELY ABOUT POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO GEMAYEL. THERE IS NO HINT OF THIS IN PUBLIC AND THE PRESIDENT IS STILL FIRMLY COMMITTED TO HIM. BUT AMIN GEMAYEL WAS NO ONE'S FIRST CHOICE: HE EMERGED AS A RESULT OF HIS BROTHER'S ASSASSINATION. AN IF HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY OF HOLDING THE RING BETWEEN LEBANON'S WARRING FACTIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THERE MAY COME A TIME FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO HAVE A TRY. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO SMILE ON ANY CANDIDATE THAT ASAD MIGHT FAVOUR. BUT IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT A COMPROMISE MIGHT BE FOUND IN THE CONTEXT OF A POLITICAL DEAL IN WHICH, LEBANESE STYLE, THERE WILL BE VICTORS AND NO VANGUISHED. BEYOND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES OVER THE PAST YEAR. THEY HAVE FOUGHT WELL AND MAINTAINED THEIR COHESION DESPITE THEIR MIXED CONFESSIONAL MAKEUP. THERE HAS LATELY BEEN A GLINT IN ONE OR TWO EYES IN WASHINGTON

ABOUT THE PROS AND CONS OF A LEBANESE PRESIDENT DRAWN FROM A MILITARY BACKGROUND.

10. SO NONE OF THE OPTIONS FACING THE PRESIDENT IS PLEASANT. NOR IS THE PICTURE CLEAR ENOUGH TO ENABLE HIM TO DECIDE ON ANY PARTICULAR COURSE, OTHER THAN TO HANG ON AND HOPE. THIS IS TANTAMOUNT TO MUDDLING THROUGH AND IT SITS ILL WITH THE AMERICAN TEMPERAMENT. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE LOOKING BEFORE LONG FOR AN OBJECTIVE IN THE LEBANON THAT CAN BE SPELT OUT TO CONGRESS AND ULTIMATELY ACHIEVED. WITHOUT THIS, HE MUST FEAR THAT HAVING COME INTO OFFICE ON THE PROMISE OF RESTORING AMERICA'S GREATNESS, HE WILL HAVE LITTLE TO SHOW FOR ALL HIS EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT HUMILIATION AND DEFEAT. IT WILL NOT HELP HIM MUCH IN THE EYES OF AMERICAN VOTERS THAT THE FAULT FOR THIS LAY MORE WITH BEGIN THAN HIMSELF.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

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ECD	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
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SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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FM BEIRUT 161000Z SEP 83

TO FLASH F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 516 OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1983

AND TO FLASH MODUK

INFO FLASH AHQ CYPRUS, CBFC, NICOSIA.

MODUK FOR D511

LEBANON/CYPRUS: HUNTER AIRCRAFT.

1. WE HAVE CONFIRMATION FROM AHQ CYPRUS THAT TWO LEBANESE AIRFORCE HUNTER AIRCRAFT AND A PUMA HELICOPTER LANDED AT RAF AKROTIRI EARLY 16 SEP.
2. ONE HUNTER HAS A DAMAGED NOSE WHEEL AND THE OTHER ONE WAS SHORT OF FUEL BUT IS SERVICEABLE. THEY MAY HAVE TAKEN PART IN A HUNTER ATTACK THAT WAS CARRIED OUT EARLY 16 SEP IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN THE MOUNTAINS EAST OF BEIRUT.
3. THE PUMA HAS LEFT AKROTIRI FOR LEBANON. WE HAVE ASKED AHQ CYPRUS TO HOLD THE HUNTERS AT AKROTIRI UNTIL THEY RECEIVE YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.
4. US AMBASSADOR HAS, ON INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTED THE CHARGE THAT WE ALLOW THE AIRCRAFT TO TAKE OFF FOR AKROTIRI AND RETURN TO LEBANON.
5. IF THE HUNTERS LEAVE AKROTIRI THE LEBANESE WOULD CERTAINLY WISH THEM TO RETURN TO A TEMPORARY AIRSTRIP NEAR BYBLOS WHICH THEY OCCUPIED ON 16 SEP. THEY MIGHT WELL THEN CARRY OUT FURTHER OPERATIONAL SORTIES.
6. WE HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT ANOTHER PUMA HAS FLOWN TO AKROTIRI TO REPAIR THE DAMAGED AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE OFFICIALLY REQUESTED THE LEBANON NOT TO MAKE ANY MORE UNAUTHORISED FLIGHTS THERE.

PALMER

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*head in bull.**Flt confirm this. No need to put to pm.*

1-5. W/L 2/9
I all want they have now been given permission to return
mb

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister
For your information
Paul
DGC

16 September 1983

MS

Dear John,

Lebanon

As you know, Mr Luce visited Beirut on 14 September. He had meetings with President Gemayel, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and visited our MNF contingent and the Embassy. The Prime Minister may like to have a summary of his main impressions, contained in the attached note.

As you know, the Foreign Secretary discussed today with the Italian Foreign Minister what the European MNF contributors might do in support of US and Saudi efforts. The enclosed telegrams to Rome set out our ideas. The Foreign Secretary subsequently spoke to M. Cheysson by telephone. He had not yet seen our paper, but had a paper of his own which he was sending us in return. He said that it was similarly aimed at creating a joint position of the three European contributors. We will be comparing notes with the French over the weekend.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Lebanon Today

The Lebanese are remarkably resilient after 8 years of strife, but are now more tired and despondent than ever. The government is sincere in its efforts to establish a ceasefire and start a dialogue with Syria's Lebanese allies, but is relying heavily on US and Saudi assistance and is not yet ready to make the concessions that will be necessary for a negotiated settlement of the present crisis. The army is holding together well and is making a determined stand at Suq-al-Gharb and in three main sectors. But they are opposed by considerable forces (6,000 including 3,000 Palestinians according to the Lebanese) and are unlikely to be able to hold the line for more than a short time.

Our MNF contingent is greatly valued by the Lebanese Government. BRITFORLEB provides tactical support to the Lebanese Army and considerable psychological support to the Government and people. Their praises were sung by everyone Mr Luce met from President Gemayel down. Participation in the MNF has brought us some influence and goodwill, principally inside the Lebanon but also in the Middle East and among our traditional friends.

The Prospects

It is difficult to be optimistic. Syria is the key. There appears to be little to stop Syria getting what she wants: a Lebanese government under her tutelage. The only question is how far she will pursue her bargaining by military means (i.e. by providing all the necessary support to her allies in Lebanon) in order to achieve her political objectives.

The worst case military scenario Mr Luce heard described in Beirut would have the Druze and their allies over-running Suq-al-Gharb and moving to cut the coast road south of Beirut. They might thereafter be tempted to push into the suburbs of

southern Beirut

southern Beirut, though the need for them to do so in order to bring about a collapse of confidence in Beirut itself would be doubtful. The LAF and Lebanese forces (Phalange) are likely to continue to resist even then. But Syria would be in a commanding position to impose her will.

A political solution forged in any 'national reconciliation' dialogue would presumably produce a new Lebanese 'government of national unity' more openly attuned to Syrian interests. Whether Gemayel and the Phalangists could stomach that is an open question. Gemayel spoke openly of fear for his life if he was to concede too much to the Syrians.

The other possibility is that the position will hold roughly as it is now, with or without a ceasefire. In any event, most of Lebanon will probably remain partitioned. The choice will lie between a two-way split, with the north under Syria's thumb and the south under Israeli control; and a three-way divide in which the above would be supplemented by an embryo Lebanese government in the Beirut area.

Consequences for the MNF and British/Western Interests

The consequences of the worst case scenario outlined above would clearly be very difficult for the MNF. The fall of Suq-al-Gharb would make life more uncomfortable but not necessarily untenable for BRITFORLEB. We do not share the US view of the town's significance and Mr Luce has stressed to the Minister at the US Embassy today the dangers of escalation. US intervention in support of the LAF would increase the prospects of the West being drawn into an apparent conflict with the Arab world and would certainly make military retaliation on the MNF collectively more likely. If the Lebanese government and LAF crumbled, the MNF would have little choice but to withdraw

/in dangerous

in dangerous and probably humiliating circumstances. The evacuation of civilians would probably also be necessary.

A new Lebanese government under Syrian tutelage would no doubt ask the MNF to leave: we would not in any case want to stay in those circumstances.

We clearly need to keep the presence of our MNF contingent under constant review. A decision to withdraw would need to be carefully presented, but the consequences for our wider interests in the Arab world need not be very serious. We could point out that we have done more than any single Arab State by way of providing practical support for the Lebanese Government, and that our presence gave Lebanon a breathing space in which to find a political solution. We are hardly to blame if the opportunity turns out to have been squandered.

Overall, the prospects are for the continued partition of Lebanon in one form or another. This carries with it the high risk of future Israeli/Syrian clashes in Lebanon with unpredictable consequences for the rest of the Middle East and for our interests there.

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Control

Precedence Despatch

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IMMEDIATE

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1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
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6 FM FCO 161650Z SEP
7 TO IMMEDIATE ROME
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS
10 PRIORITY EC POSTS, PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, DAMASCUS,
11 TUNIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
12 LEBANON
13 1. I told the Italian Foreign Minister today 16 September that,
14 following our useful meeting with Cheysson in Athens, at which it
15 was clear that the three of us were very much in agreement about
16 Lebanon and the MNF, and following also Mr Luce's visit to Beirut
17 which had confirmed our own assessments, I wanted to propose a
18 coordinated programme of diplomatic approaches aimed at helping
19 a peace settlement to evolve. Andreotti welcomed the idea, and
20 I gave him a piece of paper in the form of a a draft COREU with
21 detailed proposals. An amended version of the paper, worked out
22 jointly with the Italian Political Director, is in MIFT.
23 2. Andreotti argued that the French would have nothing to do
24 with this idea if it was put out by COREU on the political
25 cooperation net, and I subsequently agreed with him that it might

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK		Catchword be
File number	Dept NENAD	Distribution	
Drafted by (Block capitals) R O Miles		ME Standard	
Telephone number 233 6048			
Authorised for despatch <i>Oliver Miles</i>			
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats
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2 be better to go for action by the three European MNF contributors,
3 and not to try to carry the others with us.

4 3. Bullard subsequently gave the text in MIFT to the French
5 Ambassador. He explained that I was inclined to accept
6 Andreotti's proposal of limiting action to the three, and
7 therefore asked de Margerie to ignore the first paragraph.

8 de Margerie asked one or two questions of detail, but said that
9 in general the proposal seemed to be compatible with what he
10 knew of his Government's position. He would let us have French
11 comments as soon as possible: Bullard has since spoken by
12 telephone to Andreani to alert him: [I was not able to reach
13 Cheysson as I should have liked to do.]

14 4. Copy addressees should treat this telegram as being for
15 their own information only at this stage.

16

17 HOWE

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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

Priority/Immediacy/Deskkey

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1 ZCZC
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7 TO IMMEDIATE ROME
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER
9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE PARIS
10 PRIORITY EC POSTS, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, DAMASCUS, TUNIS,
11 WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW
12 MIPT : **LEBANON : DRAFT COREU**

13 1. Following their talks in London today, and ~~following~~ *after*
14 consultation with France, the Foreign Ministers of Italy and
15 the United Kingdom, recalling their conversations with
16 M Cheysson in Athens on 12 September, are instructing their
17 Ambassadors in the capitals concerned:
18 a) to make approaches in the terms of paragraph 2 below;
19 b) to ^{delay} ~~day~~ doing so until tomorrow, 17 September, so as to
20 permit partners to associate themselves with these approaches
21 if they so wish.

/// 22 2. The following are the lines on which the two/three
// 23 Ambassadors will speak to the various parties, taking as a
/ 24 basis the seven points adopted by Foreign Ministers of the
25 Ten in Athens on 12 September:

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK		Catchword To the
File number	Dept NENAD	<i>M.E. Standard</i>	
Drafted by (Block capitals) RO Miles			
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Authorised for despatch <i>JN 16/9</i>			
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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2 To the Americans:

3 a) Syria's objectives are not necessarily incompatible
4 in all respects with the interests of the West.

5 b) The presence of the MNF is based on the assumption that
6 the Lebanese Government enjoys the support of the great
7 majority of the people. President Gemayel must have the
8 confidence to negotiate, but not the over-confidence to refuse
9 concessions.

10 c) Italy the UK and France intend to maintain their military
11 commitment at their respective present levels. They are concerned
12 that deeper involvement of any part of the MNF, for example
13 at Suq el-Gharb, could lead to escalation.

14 To the Lebanese:

15 a) We will continue our support within present limits.

16 b) We believe there must be internal reconciliation, even if
17 some legitimate objectives (eg full deployment of the Lebanese
18 Army) have to be renounced for the time being. Progress may be
19 gradual, but efforts should be sustained.

20 To Israel:

21 a) Israel should withdraw fully, to create the conditions
22 for Syrian withdrawal and Lebanese internal reconciliation.

23 b) Israel should press her friends in the Phalange and the
24 Lebanese Druze to accept a political compromise, and should cut
25 off military assistance and supplies to them.

26 To the Saudis:

27 a) Appreciation and backing for Saudi mediation efforts, with
28 the offer of practical help in these.

29 b) Explore the idea of an Arab contribution to a peace
30 force for Lebanon in due course.

/// 31 To Syria:

// 32 a) Syrian interests would be best served by a political
/ 33 settlement, providing a basis for the withdrawal of all foreign
34

NNNN ends
telegram

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Catchword

forces

bases

XY 48 A

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats	Page
	CONFIDENTIAL	3

<<<<

1 <<<<

2 forces (not however excluding the possibility of UN observers).

3 b) Syria should moderate the political demands of her Lebanese
4 clients, and cut off military assistance and supplies to them.

5 c) Syrian forces should draw back, especially from confron-
6 tation with Israeli forces.

7 To the Arab League (Klibi):

8 What are the prospects for an Arab peace force?

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10 HOWE

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Catchword

XY 48 A

16 SEP 1983



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16
ADVANCE COPY



PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EGERTON
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/LED
HD/UND

IMMEDIATE

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

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PUSD (2)

NEWS D

RESIDENT CLERK

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DAMASCUS 160920Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 263 OF 16 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MODUK (DI4), PARIS, ROME,
AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA

MIFT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYRIAN STATEMENT

"IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION THAT IT IS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH IS MAKING THE SITUATION IN LEBANON MORE COMPLICATED AND MORE EXPLOSIVE ON BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEVELS. IT (THE US) HAS STARTED TO BEHAVE AS IF LEBANON HAS BECOME ONE OF ITS PROTECTORATES. THE SITUATION HAS BECOME CRITICAL NOW THAT ITS SOLDIERS ARE INTERVENING IN MILITARY MATTERS AND THEIR ORDERS FROM WASHINGTON ARE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON ON THE PRETEXT OF SELF DEFENCE. AT THE SAME TIME US ENVOYS AND DIPLOMATS CONTINUALLY INTERFERE IN MAJOR AND MINOR MATTERS CONCERNED WITH LEBANESE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THEY HAVE TAKEN DECISIONS WHICH THREATEN LEBANESE ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONTRARY TO

~~THREATEN LEBANESE ARAB AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS~~ CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF ALL THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE SMALL SECT WHICH IS REPRESENTED BY THE KATAEB PARTY.

RESULTING FROM THIS AND ACCOMPANYING IT ARE INTENSIFIED AMERICAN AND KATAEB EFFORTS TO HEIGHTEN TENSION IN ORDER TO FRUSTRATE ANY ARAB EFFORTS AIMED AT BRINGING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON AND INITIATING A NATIONAL DIALOGUE.

THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION TO THE DANGERS OF DIRECT AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON AND AT THE SAME TIME WARNS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS NEW AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT, ~~HE~~ WHICH THREATEN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION AND THE WORLD. (SYRIA) APPEALS TO THE ARAB MASSES AND HER PROGRESSIVE NATIONALIST FORCES TO RISE UP AND PREPARE THEMSELVES TO CONFRONT THIS AMERICAN ATTACK AND FOIL IT.

THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC REITERATES HER LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO DEFEND HERSELF IF HER FORCES ARE EXPOSED TO ANY AGGRESSION AND ALSO REITERATES THAT SHE STANDS STRONGLY ALONG SIDE THE BROTHERLY LEBANESE PEOPLE AND ITS NATIONAL FORCES. THE MASSING OF AMERICAN FLEETS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WILL NOT INTIMIDATE SYRIA. ON THE CONTRARY, IT INCREASES OUR RESOLVE TO CHALLENGE THE AGGRESSORS, ARMED WITH OUR PEOPLE, OUR ARMY, OUR PROFOUND BELIEF IN THE JUSTICE OF OUR CAUSE, THE SUPPORT OF THE ARAB MASSES AND THE BACKING OF FORCES OF WORLD LIBERATION EVERYWHERE''

MARSHALL

BT

NNNN



MO 3/7/4

*Prime Minister**A.S.C. 16/9*FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY*MS*CYPRUS AND THE LEBANON*with A.S.C. 15/9*

I have seen your Private Secretary's letter of 15th September and we discussed it on the telephone this morning. Since you wrote there have been three major developments: the emergency landing by two Lebanese Hunters at RAF Akrotiri; a request by the Lebanese to land further aircraft at Akrotiri to avoid their being damaged on the ground in the Lebanon; and a formal request from the Italians to station aircraft at Akrotiri for possible operational use in the Lebanon.

2. To deal first with the Italian request I am, as I told you this morning, very much aware of the importance of our facilities in Cyprus and the need not to put our relations with the Cypriot Government or the long-term future of the SBAs at risk. On the other hand I attach very considerable weight to the fact that the Italians are our partners in the MNF whose forces are facing exactly the same unpleasant and dangerous conditions as BRITFORLEB. It is also the case that they have already been very helpful to us in terms of rapidly agreeing overflying rights for our aircraft en route to Cyprus; and that we have wider NATO interests at stake for example over the EH 101 helicopter and GLCM basing. I feel that in the circumstances a refusal to help the Italians simply would not be understood in Rome - nor would it be easily understood by us if a British request was refused in similar circumstances. Also I am not persuaded that agreement to this request is likely to be the "thin end of the wedge"; the US and France already have carriers off the Lebanon and therefore do not need to use Cyprus as an operational



base. While the Cyprus Government may be sensitive on this issue, our position is a defensible one, and it seems most unlikely that temporary use of Akrotiri by the Italians in the unique circumstances of the deployment of the MNF in Lebanon will have a long term effect on our relations with the Cypriots.

3. In this connection you told me that, in the course of conversations this morning, the Italians had said that their contacts with the Cypriot Government indicated that the Cypriots would in fact raise no objections to the use by Italian aircraft of the Sovereign Base Areas. You indicated that the FCO were checking whether this was the case and I made the point that the longer we take over any favourable decision the less credit we shall obtain for it. I would therefore hope that, if the response from Cyprus bears out the Italian interpretation, we could pass a favourable response to the Italians before the weekend. Even if Cypriot attitudes turn out to be less positive I believe that we should still agree the Italian request.

4. On the other hand the request from the Lebanese Government is in a somewhat different category. We allowed the two Hunters to land in an emergency; they are now being repaired and will be allowed to leave (with instructions not to mount an operational attack) as soon as possible. We would, on humanitarian grounds, clearly have to accede to any further requests of this kind. But I do not think we should allow the Lebanese unrestricted use of Akrotiri. If we did so the alternatives would be either simply to allow them to park the aircraft for the duration of the hostilities (which could face us with difficult security problems and would probably be unacceptable to the Lebanese) or to permit them to fly in and out whenever the situation on the ground became dangerous. In the latter case, even if we stipulated that no operational missions could be flown from Akrotiri, it would be difficult to distinguish between a direct operation mounted from Cyprus and a flight to a strip in Lebanon followed by an attack mission. This would be seen as associating us



very closely with the internal Lebanese conflict, and for this reason I believe that we should turn down the Lebanese request.

5. Finally on the question of assistance to the Americans, I agree the line proposed in the penultimate paragraph of your Private Secretary's letter. I would be very much opposed to the US using the SBAs for the supply of arms and ammunition to the Lebanese army.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

W. J. G.

Ministry of Defence
16th September 1983

16 SEP 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 780

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 151704Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2611 OF 15 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/S OF S), NICOSIA (FOR PS/MR LUCE)
AND BEIRUT

head in full

LEBANON/MNF

1. NOW THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE HAS VISITED WASHINGTON AND MR LUCE BEIRUT, YOU WILL NO DOUBT BE TAKING STOCK OF THE SITUATION.

mt

2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON, MR HESELTINE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH BOTH WEINBERGER AND SHULTZ AND WITH BOTH THE SENATE AND HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES. HE WAS ABLE THEREFORE TO OBTAIN A PRETTY COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE OVERALL MOOD IN THIS CITY OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING THE SITUATION. I BELIEVE HE WILL HAVE FOUND IT REASONABLY REASSURING. SHULTZ IS NOT A MAN TO HOLD ALARMIST VIEWS OR TAKE UNCONSIDERED ACTION. HAVING SHUTTLED IN HIS TIME IN THE MIDDLE EAST HE HAS A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND A PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE MAIN ACTORS. HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS BUT A JUST SENSE OF THE AMERICAN AND WESTERN INTEREST. WEINBERGER, THOUGH APT TO BE HAWKISH WHERE THE RUSSIANS AND AMERICAN DEFENCES ARE CONCERNED, WAS ANYTHING BUT HAWKISH ON THE LEBANON/MNF. AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 2581, HE SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT DEEPER INVOLVEMENT IMPLIED IN ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE MNF SHOULD TEAM UP WITH THE LAF TO TAKE ON THE PLO AND SYRIANS. BOTH THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE ARE BY AND LARGE SUPPORTIVE OF THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE LEBANON AND OF THE MARINES IN THE MNF, BUT DESIROUS OF GETTING A HOLD ON THE WHITE HOUSE THROUGH THE WAR POWERS ACT. THE ISRAELIS ARE SEEN, TO BE AT PRESENT IN LIMBO, BUT UNPREDICTABLE AS TO THE FUTURE.

3. IT IS ALSO RELEVANT THAT IN HIS REACTION TO THE FIRST ACUTE CRISIS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE KOREAN AIRLINE SHOOTDOWN, THE PRESIDENT, DESPITE HIS REPUTATION FOR HAWKISH RHETORIC, PROVED IN ACTION TO BE FIRM, RESTRAINED AND PROPORTIONATE AND CONTINUES TO BE SO DESPITE THE ANGER OF HIS NATURAL CONSTITUENCY. HE HAS LEARNED A GREAT DEAL WHILE IN OFFICE, NOT LEAST ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS OF U S POWER. HE IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CONCERNS THAT U S FORCES SHOULD NOT BE SUCKED INTO SITUATIONS WHERE THEY ARE PROPPING UP WEAK FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OVER WHICH THE U S HAS NO CONTROL.

4. MOREOVER WHILE THE U S IS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH HAS BOTH THE CLOUT AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO TRY TO LEAD THE EFFORT TO STABILISE THE LEBANON, IT DOES NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY OF WISDOM OR INFORMATION AND RECOGNISES THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE SUCH A MONOPOLY.

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/ AS DEMONSTRATED

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AS DEMONSTRATED BY ITS ACTIONS OVER THIS PAST WEEKEND, IT BOTH SEEKS ADVICE AND ACTS ON IT. IT IS TRUE THAT AMERICANS TEND TO OVERDRAW AND OVERREACT: IT IS IN THEIR NATURE AND WE MUST NOT EXPECT THEM TO ACT OUT OF CHARACTER. LIVING AMONG THEM AS I DO, I ADD THE APPROPRIATE DISCOUNTS TO THE ADVICE I OFFER YOU. IN THIS CASE, THEY WERE REACTING TO A PROPOSAL FROM THE FIELD: MCFARLANE, UNDER STRESS, ASKED FOR MORE THAN THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO GRANT. THE RELAXATION OF THE U S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WAS LIMITED TO THE DEFENCE OF A POSITION THE AMERICANS REGARD AS CRUCIAL TO THE SECURITY OF THEIR OWN MNF CONTINGENT, AS WELL AS TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE LEBANESE ARMY. IT WAS TO MEET YOUR POINT THAT THE MODIFICATION OF THE ROES WAS LIMITED TO AIR AND SEA AND DID NOT AFFECT THE LAND. IT IS REASSURING THAT THOSE ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT SHOULD NOW BE CLEARLY AWARE THAT THE REACTION IN WASHINGTON WAS CAUTIOUS AND THAT THERE IS REAL RELUCTANCE HERE, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON, TO SEE ANY GENERAL EXTENSION OF THE ROLE OF THE MNF.

5. SUBJECT OF COURSE TO THE VIEWS OF MR HESELTINE AND MR LUCE, I SEE NO NEED FOR ANOTHER MESSAGE FROM YOU TO SHULTZ AT THIS STAGE. YOUR PREOCCUPATIONS HAVE BEEN REGISTERED. YOUR ADVICE OVER THE WEEKEND WAS ACCEPTED. I AM, OF COURSE, AVAILABLE TO FEED IN ANY FRESH IDEAS OR INSIGHTS ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS AT ANY TIME.

WRIGHT

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
LIMITED

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON

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SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR GOODALL) CABINET OFFICE

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CG/AP 8



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

15 September 1983

For Richard,

Cyprus and the Lebanon

There are signs that, as the situation in the Lebanon deteriorates, we may be faced with formal requests by our allies and fellow contributors to the multinational force to use the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus in support of their forces. As you will know, the Italians have made some informal enquiries about the possible basing of Italian military aircraft at Akrotiri to provide support for Italian forces in the Lebanon. The Americans have also been exploring the possibility that Akrotiri might be used as a staging post for transporting equipment and ammunition to the Lebanon. This letter sets out some of the considerations which need to be borne in mind in considering any request of this nature.

The 1960 Treaty of Establishment which established the Republic of Cyprus and by which we retained the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) allows us free use of the SBAs as military bases without legal constraint. The Bases, and other sites in Cyprus which we are able to use, serve a useful military purpose.

The trouble-free operation of the Bases depends upon the cooperation of the Cyprus Government. Cyprus is of course determinedly non-aligned. Despite opposition to a continued British presence on the island by the electorally important Communist Party in Cyprus, relations with the Cyprus Government over the running of the Bases are good. That this is the case is to a large extent due to our policy of maintaining a low-profile over our use of the Bases and our efforts to take account of Cypriot sensitivities wherever practicable. We have been careful not to dedicate the Bases for NATO use.

Foreign military use of the SBAs has been very limited in the past. The only exception is that American U2 aircraft have operated from Akrotiri for many years in performing a reconnaissance role over the Middle East. This has been done with the knowledge and consent of the Cyprus Government.

/Aircraft



THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

Aircraft from foreign air forces have occasionally been permitted to use Akrotiri as a staging point. But foreign combat aircraft have never been stationed at Akrotiri. The basing of foreign military aircraft there in readiness for action over the Lebanon would represent a very significant departure from previous practice.

The sensitivity of the Cyprus Government about foreign military use of the SBAs was demonstrated on 7 September when the Cyprus Foreign Minister mentioned to the Foreign Secretary the use of the SBAs by the Americans in support of their forces in the Lebanon. Mr Rolandis said that he had been under pressure to object to this use of the SBAs by the Americans but had resisted. Despite the carefully low key approach his remarks were a clear warning of Cypriot sensitivities. Rolandis plainly implied that the Cypriots were worried by what they saw as the prospect of the island being dragged into the Middle East conflict through use of the SBAs. Our own use of the SBAs, including the stationing of 6 Buccaneers there, has already aroused considerable press interest. So far Cypriot press coverage gives the impression of a general grudging acceptance of our action, except for the Communists who have used the opportunity to denounce our presence in the Bases and who are to organise a demonstration on 16 September. In view of their non-aligned status, the Cypriots would undoubtedly be very concerned about greater use by NATO allies of facilities on the island.

If faced with a formal request from any of our allies, we would clearly need to consider each one on its merits, bearing in mind the foregoing considerations and the situation in the Lebanon at the time. Clearly we would wish to be as helpful as possible to Allies and fellow contributors to the MNF. But against this we must also give full weight to Cypriot sensitivities. Our long-term interests in the SBAs, are not worth putting at risk, unless vital interests are at stake. There is also a risk that agreeing to one request (e.g. from the Italians) would be all too likely to prove to be the thin end of the wedge. We have already had a low level request from the Lebanese to move some of their Hawker aircraft to Akrotiri.

I understand that this problem was raised briefly in Cabinet this morning. The Foreign Secretary has looked very carefully at all the aspects. Despite wishing to be as helpful as possible to the Italians, he has concluded that we would have to turn down any formal request to station aircraft at Akrotiri for operational use in the Lebanon. If we can, it would be best to ensure that they do not make a formal request which we then have to reject. In either case the Foreign Secretary believes that we should soften the blow

/by offering

S E C R E T




by offering to examine alternative ways in which the Italians could be sure of adequate air support for their contingent. We might be able to provide help ourselves and the Americans have already offered their support to other MNF contingents.

Use of Akrotiri by the Italians may well come up when Sr Craxi has talks with the Prime Minister on 16 September, and the Foreign Secretary will be having a separate meeting with Sr Andreotti before that. Sir Geoffrey considers that if the Italians then make a formal request to use Akrotiri we should frankly outline the difficulties and be strongly discouraging. So as not to reject a formal request outright we should agree to examine it urgently but without holding out hopes of a favourable decision. At the same time we should suggest that we both look in detail at the alternatives. We will prepare briefing accordingly.

There is a distinction between the Italian idea of basing aircraft at Akrotiri and possible further use of the SBAs by the Americans purely for staging purposes. The Americans appear to have in mind the use of Akrotiri for the re-supply of arms and ammunition not only for American forces but also, possibly, for the Lebanese Army. There may be occasions when such use of the SBAs is vital in the interest of the MNF and the Western position in the Lebanon. In such cases the Foreign Secretary believes we should be prepared to agree to limited use of the SBAs, taking care to explain the situation to the Cypriots. But we must make sure that such use of the SBAs is exceptional and that requests do not proliferate. This means ensuring in advance that the Americans understand Cypriot sensitivities and discouraging them from making any request except when it is absolutely essential to use the SBAs and no viable alternative exists.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10) and PS/ Sir Robert Armstrong (Cabinet Office).


(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

PS/Secretary of State for Defence

S E C R E T

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GR 700

DESKBY 150900Z

CONFIDENTIAL

FM NICOSIA 150740Z

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY FCO

TELEGRAM NO 203 OF 15 SEPTEMBER 83.

AND IMMEDIATE BUDAPEST (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) AND WASHINGTON.

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, MODUK.

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO, JEDDA, TEL AVIV AND TUNIS.

FROM PS/MR LUCE.

MR LUCE'S VISIT TO LEBANON : MEETING WITH MACFARLANE. (CORRECTED VERSION).

1. MR LUCE HAD AN HOUR THIS MORNING WITH MACFARLANE. FAIRBANKS WAS ALSO PRESENT. MACFARLANE WAS TIRED BUT LEVEL HEADED. HIS ANALYSIS WAS REFRESHINGLY CLOSE TO OURS. HIS SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY CONTINUES, BUT WITHOUT GREAT EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS.

DETAIL.

2. MEDIATION. MACFARLANE WAS PREOCCUPIED BY SAUDI MEDIATION EFFORTS, WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD COME TO A HEAD WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS. HE DESCRIBED THE MAIN INGREDIENTS OF THE PACKAGE AS A CEASEFIRE, AND THE SETTING UP OF A LEBANESE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE SYRIANS HAD ADDED A THIRD ELEMENT : THAT THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES (LAF) SHOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED IN THE CHOUF AND SHOULD REMAIN NEUTRAL BETWEEN GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT AND THE WARING FACTIONS. THIS WAS A STICKING POINT FOR THE LEBANESE. HE WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO DAMASCUS LATER TODAY TO CLARIFY THE US POSITION AND TO SEE IF HE COULD RIDE THE SYRIANS OFF THIS POSITION. HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC.

3. SAUDI ROLE.

MACFARLANE SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD PLAYED A MOST HELPFUL ROLE. HOWEVER THEY WERE INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS, AND WERE THREATENING TO BREAK OFF THEIR MEDIATION EFFORT AND LAY THE BLAME PUBLICLY AT SYRIA'S DOOR UNLESS THE SYRIANS SHOWED GREATER FLEXIBILITY. THEY DID NOT WANT TO LET SYRIA'S CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB WORLD GO UNCHALLENGED. THEY HAD BEEN STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF GEMAYEL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. SYRIA

CONFIDENTIAL

4. SYRIA MACFARLANE SAID THAT SYRIA WOULD DRIVE THE HARDEST POSSIBLE BARGAIN WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THEIR OBJECTIVE REMAINED TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM A DOMINANT VOICE IN THE FUTURE OF LEBANESE AFFAIRS. THEIR ORIGINAL PLAN TO IMPOSE THEIR AUTHORITY BY MILITARY MEANS HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MODIFIED IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF A GOOD PERFORMANCE BY THE LAF AND INCREASED MNF ACTIVITY. A FURTHER OFFENSIVE AGAINST SUQAL GHARB WAS PROBABLY IMMINENT, BUT IF THIS FAILED THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO SETTLE FOR A CEASEFIRE PACKAGE (THOUGH THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A SUBVERSIVE ROLE). THE U.S. WISHED TO PROMOTE A CONSTRUCTION DIALOGUE WITH THE SYRIANS, AND HAD MADE CLEAR TO ASSAD THAT THEY RECOGNISED THAT SYRIA HAD LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS IN LEBANON. THEY HAD HAD SOME USEFUL EXCHANGES WITH ASSAD. (FAIRBANKS, HOWEVER INJECTED A PLEA THAT WE SHOULD HELP THE WORLD TO SEE THAT SYRIA WAS NOT THE ONLY VOICE IN THE ARAB WORLD : HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SYRIA ISOLATED).

5. MNF.

MACFARLANE REFERRED TO EARLIER DISCUSSIONS ABOUT POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE MNF. HE DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE AMERICANS UNILATERAL DECISION TO WIDEN THEIR DEFINITION OF SELF DEFENCE TO INCLUDE THE DEFENCE OF SUQ AL GHARB, OVER WHICH SUPPORT OF THE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS WOULD BE WELCOME BUT WAS NOT EXPECTED, AND THE DESIRABILITY OF ALL CONTRIBUTORS BEING READY TO DEFEND OTHER MNF PARTIES WHO CAME UNDER DIRECT ATTACK. MR LUCE MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD VERY GREAT RESERVATIONS ABOUT WIDENING THE ROLE OF THE MNF, WHICH COULD PROVE TO BE A DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT. THE QUESTION OF SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF A DIRECT ATTACK, HOWEVER, WAS DIFFERENT. ANY REQUEST WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS, BUT IN PRINCIPLE WE WOULD TAKE A FAVOURABLE APPROACH. HE WARNED STRONGLY AGAINST THE DANGERS OF ALLOWING OURSELVES TO BECOME SUCKED INTO A CONFLICT WHICH COULD THEN BE PROTRAYED BY THE SYRIANS AND THEIR ALLIES AS THE WEST FIGHTING THE ARABS. MACFARLANE APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS.

6. OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES.

MACFARLANE SAID THAT THE WILLINGNESS OF OTHER ARABS TO BECOME INVOLVED DEPENDED CRUCIALLY ON THE SAUDI ATTITUDE. THE JORDANIANS IN PARTICULAR WERE MOVING TOWARDS CLOSER INVOLVEMENT. THE ISRAELIS WERE UNPREDICTABLE AND THEREFORE DANGEROUS. THEY NOW HAD A WEAK GOVERNMENT AND DECISIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF NARROW DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS RATHER THAN THEIR WIDER SECURITY INTEREST. MACFARLANE BELIEVED THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW FURTHER. THE UN ROLE WAS LIKELY TO BE LIMITED TO DESPATCHING AN OBSERVER FORCE. A CHANGE IN UNIFIL'S MANDATE, THOUGH IN PRINCIPLE DESIRABLE, WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. A SUGGESTION BY KLIMB FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE TO PROMOTE A SAUDI/ALGERIAN DETERRENT FORCE MIGHT BE WORTH PURSUING, THOUGH THE LEBANESE AND SAUDIS WERE VERY COOL ABOUT THE IDEA AND IT WOULD CONTRAVENE THE TERMS OF THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT.

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7. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.
WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE SITUATION. THEY HAD NO FIRM STRATEGY YET FOR DIALOGUE OR RECONCILIATION. MACFLARLANE SAID HE HAD STRESSED TO GEMAYEL THE NEED TO BE SERIOUS ABOUT CONSTRUCTION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. HE BELIEVED THAT SUSTAINED WESTERN PRESSURE WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS. HE THOUGHT THAT GEMAYEL HIMSELF WAS COMMITTED TO A SETTLEMENT, BUT HE WAS NOT A STRONG PERSONALITY AND THOSE AROUND HIM (ESPECIALLY HIS FATHER AND HIS WIFE) WERE OPPOSED TO ANY COMPROMISE.

8. COMMENT.
MACFARLANE APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED AWAY FROM SOME OF THE WILDER IDEAS. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE, MR LUCE IS NOT ALTOGETHER CONVINCED THAT WE NEED SEND A FURTHER FORMAL MESSAGE TO THE AMERICANS AT THIS STAGE. HE WOULD LIKE TO CONSIDER FURTHER ON HIS RETURN TO LONDON. HE BELIEVES IT WOULD HOWEVER BE HELPFUL IF THE DEFENCE SECRETARY COULD USE HIS CALLS IN WASHINGTON TO STRESS TO THE AMERICANS THE DANGERS WE SEE IN BEING DRAWN INTO A CONFLICT WHICH COULD BE PROTRAYED AS THE WEST FIGHTING THE ARABS.

WILBERFORCE.

BT

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON

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PS/TO. NO. 10. DOWNING STREET.

TO RBDWDF/FCO LONDON

RBDWDFG/BUDAPEST

RBDWW/WASHINGTON

RBDWDFG/BEIRUT

RBDWDF/PARIS

RBDWDFG/ROME

RBDWDF/UKMIS NEW YORK

RBDWDFG/DAMASCUS

RBDWC/MODUK

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SIC

DESKBY BUDAPEST 0830 LOCAL (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

DESKBY WASHINGTON 142200Z (FOR PS/MR HESELTINE)

FROM PS/MR LUCE, MR LUCE'S VISIT TO LEBANON

1. MR LUCE HAD MEETINGS THIS MORNING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ALSO HAD AN HOUR WITH MACFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS (SEE MIFT), VISITED THE UK MNF CONTINGENT, AND MET REPRESENTATIVES OF VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS.
2. THE LEBANESE WERE CLEARLY DELIGHTED WITH THE VISIT AND GRATEFUL FOR WHAT WE ARE DOING. BUT THEY ARE NOT YET PERSUADED OF THE NEED TO DO A DEAL WITH THE SYRIANS AND THEIR LEBANESE ALLIES, AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASK FOR INCREASED UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MNF. MR LUCE WAS ROBUST ON THE LATTER DETAIL.
3. ALL MR LUCE'S LEBANESE INTERLOCUTORS MADE CLEAR THEIR PLEASURE AT HIS VISIT. THEY EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE THAT THEY ATTACHED TO CONTINUING BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF, WHICH THEY DESCRIBED AS IMPORTANT AS MUCH FOR THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL GESTURE IT PROVIDED AS FOR ITS POSITION ON THE GROUND. IT WAS NOT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS INTENTION THAT THE MNF SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING, WHICH WAS BETTER LEFT TO THE LAF. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ASKED HOWEVER WHETHER WE WOULD BE WILLING TO WIDEN THE ROLE OF OUR CONTINGENT, BOTH BY INCREASING ITS SIZE AND WIDENING THE SCOPE OF ITS DEPLOYMENT.
4. MR LUCE SAID THAT WE WERE GLAD TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF, WHICH WE WOULD MAINTAIN AS LONG AS IT HAD A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY. THE BUCCANEERS FURTHER EMPHASISED OUR COMMITMENT. HOWEVER, OUR RESOURCES WERE LIMITED AND IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR US TO DO MORE. WE WOULD KEEP PATROLLING AREAS UNDER REVIEW: SMALL CHANGES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATION IN THE PRESENT PATTERN OF PATROLLING WAS NOT BEING CONSIDERED. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ACCEPTED THAT THERE WERE LIMITS TO WHAT WE COULD DO.
5. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH STRESSED THAT THEY BELIEVED THE PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO PEACE IN THE LEBANON WAS

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INTERFERENCE BY OUTSIDE FORCES. THEY ACCEPTED THAT CHANGES TO THE WAY IN WHICH LEBANON HAD TRADITIONALLY BEEN GOVERNED WERE NECESSARY: BUT THE VARIOUS LEBANESE COMMUNITIES, LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES, WOULD SOON BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH A MODUS VIVENDI. THE SYRIANS AND THE ISRAELIS (PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS EQUALLY SCATHING ABOUT BOTH) CONSPIRED IN THEIR DIFFERENT WAYS TO EXACERBATE DIVISIONS AND KEEP LEBANON WEAK. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF REBUILDING CONSENSUS IN A COUNTRY IN WHICH HE ONLY CONTROLLED 10 PER CENT OF THE TERRITORY. HE BELIEVED SYRIA'S AIM WAS TO REDUCE LEBANON TO VASSAL STATUS. HE COULD NEVER AGREE TO THIS. HE WOULD BE KILLED IF HE DID.

6. IN ADDITION TO ASKING THAT BRITAIN EXTEND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF, PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ASKED MR LUCE TO HELP THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONFLICT IN LEBANON WAS NOT AN INTERNAL AFFAIR (HE TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO RECENT FRENCH REFERENCES TO A 'CIVIL WAR'); AND TO HELP BRING PRESSURE FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. HE HAD WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT ASSAD FORMALLY ASKING THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE. THEIR RESPONSE HAD BEEN TO STEP UP THE BATTLE IN THE CHOUF. STRONG WESTERN PRESSURE WAS NEEDED TO BACK UP THE SUPPORT THEY WERE ALREADY RECEIVING FROM MODERATE ARABS (ESPECIALLY THE SAUDIS). MR LUCE SAID WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WOULD HAVE NOTICED THE RECENT STATEMENT BY THE TEN. BUT OUR INFLUENCE WAS LIMITED.

7. MR LUCE LEFT HIS INTERLOCUTORS IN NO DOUBT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR A STRONG AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON. BUT HE ALSO EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. HE RECEIVED NO DIRECT RESPONSE ON THE LATTER. THE GENERAL TENOR OF THE DISCUSSIONS LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE LEBANESE RECOGNISED THAT SOME HARD CHOICES WOULD HAVE TO BE FACED. BUT IT WAS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, WHO WAS LOOKING TENSE AND SHOWING SIGNS OF STRAIN, WAS YET READY TO MAKE ANY FIRM MOVES.

8. THE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT ENDED WITH GEMAYEL ASKING MR LUCE TO PASS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MRS THATCHER, THANKING HER FOR HER CLOSE INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON WHICH WAS NOW BATTLING TO UPHOLD THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY AGAINST LONG ODDS

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From the Private Secretary

15 September 1983

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 12 September about the situation in the Lebanon.

A. J. COLES

N.H.R. Evans, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SECRET

Prime Minisr

MR. COLES ✓

A.T.C. 16/7

CC: BELIZE: Dispute with Guatemala
Pt 3

JIC 15 SEPTEMBER 1983

We had an interesting morning with more than usually lively discussion.

LEBANON

The Committee approved a factual report of the situation on the ground. There was a second, more analytical paper trying to look to the future. I challenged some of its basic concepts and it was eventually withdrawn for further consideration. I spoke on the lines of paras 4-7 of the attached note which I had prepared in advance of the meeting in order to clear my own mind. The paper will reflect these views.

BELIZE

This paper has been prepared in advance of next week's OD meeting. The argumentation points inexorably to the conclusion that we cannot at present afford to announce a date for the withdrawal of the garrison. All the parties would oppose such a move and the new Guatemalan Government is as yet untested. The Americans in particular would regard our withdrawal as an unfriendly act in the present phase of their tackling of the Central American crisis.

I accept this with reluctance. I do not think that we should resign ourselves to an indefinite stay in Belize simply for the sake of the Americans and the other parties concerned. I remain of the view that an announcement of withdrawal of the British garrison would have what I call the "Gulf effect". That is to say, it would concentrate the minds of all concerned on the necessity to make adequate arrangements for Belizean security and integrity without the British. For example, Price would be more disposed to make the territorial concessions necessary to secure a settlement of the dispute. The Americans would realise that they would have to exercise irresistible pressure on the Guatemalans to do nothing stupid after our withdrawal, and to make provision to shore up Belizean political and economic security. The Mexicans and other Central Americans would realise that they would have themselves to make an effort with the Guatemalans to restrain them, also with Price to persuade him to accommodate minimal Guatemalan requirements. I realise that the time is not ripe for so dramatic a move, but we

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/must not lose

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must not lose sight of the possibility and, whenever the garrison is due to be renewed, we must look very carefully at the situation in the area to see whether or not the time has come.

HONG KONG


There is a useful piece, bringing us up to date on Chinese attitudes. It tells us nothing that we do not know already, but it is evident that the JIC continues to concentrate on this issue.

THE PHILIPPINES

The paper on the Philippines points a finger at Mrs. Marcos for responsibility for the assassination of Aquino and also to the likelihood that she will eventually succeed her husband. I am glad that I am not a Philippino. /

CENTRAL AMERICA

Two papers are in preparation in advance of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington. One deals with US options in Central America, the other with Warsaw Pact arms supplies to the region. They would have come forward today but there was considerable argument about the first paper which was sent back for further consideration.



A.D. PARSONS
15 September 1983

SECRET

LEBANON

1. It looks as though a military stalemate may be developing. The Druze are in virtual control of their heartland in the Chouf, but they have been unable to break the Lebanese Army position at Suq el Gharb or to occupy the surrounded Christian town of Deir el Qamar. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Phalange are equally unable to relieve the situation on the Beirut/Damascus Road or to enter the Chouf.
2. The Druze have more or less gained their objective of autonomy in their own region. The danger is that they are being pushed by the Syrians to secure wider objectives. In the words of David Hirst, The Guardian Middle East correspondent, "the Syrians are now imposing Palestinians on the Druze for their own reasons". He adds that "the Palestinians want to come back to Beirut, and Syria wants to come back too, with a powerful backstage influence exerted through them". The Syrians are able to blackmail the Druze with the threat of cutting off military supplies if they do not pursue Syrian objectives which are beyond what the Druze themselves require.
3. On the other side, Gemayel is unable to free himself from the taint of identification of the Government with the Phalange. Externally he leans almost exclusively on the Americans. The more the Americans support Gemayel by escalating their rules of engagement, the less likely the latter is to make concessions in the interests of "national reconciliation".
4. We are talking about "national reconciliation" within a very limited geographical area. Seventy-five percent of the Lebanon is now occupied either by the Syrians or by the Israelis. Neither has any intention of withdrawing. Hence, the most the Government can expect to achieve is some kind of accommodation which would enable them to control Beirut and its environs plus the area immediately to the South and South East as well as the Christian enclave to the North (see map).
5. To achieve this, Gemayel must detach the Druze, and the Shi'ite Militia in and around West Beirut, from their Syrian/Libyan/Iranian backers by appealing to their Lebanese interests. This would mean conceding virtual autonomy to the Druze with no Lebanese Armed

/Forces presence

Forces presence in the Chouf plus a larger share of the Governmental cake. He would also have to give the Shia a far larger share of government than they have had hitherto. Gemayel's Maronite backers, ferociously parochial as always, would resist such concessions. But, apart from the Phalange Gemayel has no support and nowhere to turn: thus, the Americans could screw him if they really set their minds to it.

6. I see no other alternative to a continuation and dangerous escalation of the present conflict. The more the Druzes allow themselves to be driven by the Syrians and Palestinians, the more the Americans will be obliged to back Gemayel in his present stand; and so on.

7. If a very limited national reconciliation could be achieved on the lines set out above - and I recognise all the difficulties involved - the immediate crisis would pass and the world could get down to the protracted task of trying to extend Lebanese Government authority to the areas now occupied by Syria and Israel - this will take years, possibly decades, not months.

14 September 1983





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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2598 OF 14 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/S OF SN DUS (POL), AUS D STAFF, DS).

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, ROME, PARIS, BRITFORLEB, JEDDA.

MY TELNO 2581: LEBANON/MNF

1. WHEN THE DEFENCE SECRETARY SAW HIM THIS AFTERNOON, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN THE LEBANON WAS VERY TOUGH. THE IDEA OF GETTING INVOLVED IN THE COMMUNAL FIGHTING THERE HAD NO APPEAL. BUT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT SOME NON-LEBANESE ELEMENTS WERE ALSO INVOLVED - PALESTINIAN AND SOME IRANIANS - UNDER SYRIAN DIRECTION.

2. MR HESELTINE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY GLIMMER OF HOPE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE FOLLOWING EVENTS ON THE GROUND, RATHER THAN VICE VERSA.

THE SYRIANS WERE TRYING TO BRING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOWN, OR UNDER THEIR CONTROL. EACH TIME AGREEMENT SEEMED CLOSE, THE SYRIANS HARDENED THEIR POSITION. THE KILLING IN LEBANON DID NOT SEEM TO MATTER TO ASAD. BUT IT DID TO OTHERS, AND WE HAD TO TRY TO STOP IT.

3. ON THE SAUDI ROLE, SHULTZ SAID THAT PRINCE BANDAR HAD BEEN VERY ACTIVE, ACTING DIRECTLY ON BEHALF OF KING FAHD. THEY HAD TALKED 'SOME TURKEY' TO THE SYRIANS, NOT IN TERMS OF WITHOLDING EXISTING FINANCIAL SUPPORT, BUT OF DECLINING SYRIAN REQUESTS TO INCREASE IT. THERE HAD, HOWEVER, TO BE SOME RESISTANCE ON THE GROUND.

4. MR HESELTINE ASKED ABOUT THE PRECISE IMPORT OF THE NEW US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. OUR OWN WERE RESTRICTED TO ACTION BY THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN SELF-DEFENCE. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD GONE SLIGHTLY FURTHER. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BASE THEMSELVES ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF DEFENCE. AS A RESULT OF THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AT THE WEEKEND, HOWEVER AS EAGLEBERGER HAD EXPLAINED TO ME, THE AMERICANS HAD DECIDED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY'S DEFENCE OF SOUQ AL GHARB WAS VITAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE US CONTINGENT IN THE MNF. THE TERRAIN WAS SUCH THAT IF THAT POSITION WERE LOST TO HOSTILE FORCES, THEY WOULD BE SHOOTING DOWN DIRECTLY ON THE US MARINES AND THE AIRPORT. THE MARINE COMMANDER HAD THEREFORE BEEN GIVEN AUTHORITY TO CALL FOR ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT TO HELP DEFEND THAT POSITION, IF THAT WERE NECESSARY. SO FAR IT HAD NOT BEEN NECESSARY AS THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD BEEN ABLE TO DEFEND IT. THE AMERICANS WOULD ALSO DEFEND THEIR COMMAND POST IN THE US RESIDENCE. ONE BRIGHT SPOT IN THE SITUATION WAS THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD BEEN PERFORMING QUITE WELL, NOT ONLY MILITARILY BUT ALSO IN SHOWING SENSITIVITY IN DEALING WITH THE DIFFERENT CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. EVEN THE FRENCH HAD BEEN IMPRESSED.

5. MR HESELTINE ASKED IF SHULTZ FELT THERE WAS ANY ALTERNATIVE TO PROCEEDING ON A DAY BY DAY BASIS, HOPING THE SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE. SHULTZ SAID THAT IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD STABILISE THE SITUATION, THEY WOULD REGAIN CONFIDENCE AND THE SYRIANS WOULD REALISE THAT THEY WERE ENCOUNTERING SOME RESISTANCE. UNTIL THE LAST FEW DAYS THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED NONE. THE ISRAELIS HAD INSISTED ON WITHDRAWING FROM THE CHOUF KNOWING WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE. THEY WERE NOW FINDING THE PLO COMING STRAIGHT BACK. THIS

WOULD BE. THEY WERE NOW FINDING THE PLO COMING STRAIGHT BACK. THIS WAS SERIOUS FOR THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, SINCE GETTING THE PLO OUT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN THE PURPOSE OF THEIR INTERVENTION. THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD LOST THEIR WILL HAD BEEN ONE OF THE FACTORS MAKING THE SYRIANS MORE INTRANSIGENT. BUT AS THE PLO MOVED BACK THE ISRAELIS WERE STARTING TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE INTEREST, WITH OVERFLIGHTS AND PATROLS NORTH OF THE AWALI RIVER YESTERDAY.

6. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT THIS WAS 'NOT A SITUATION TO GIVE UP ON'. THERE WAS EXCELLENT COORDINATION BETWEEN MNF CONTINGENTS ON THE GROUND. THERE MUST BE VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE CONTRIBUTORS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND IN CAPITALS. I INTERJECTED THAT THE FLOW OF INFORMATION WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING HERE HAD BEEN EXCELLENT.

7. MR HESELTINE ASKED ABOUT PRESS COMMENT SUGGESTING THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NEVER HAVE GOT INVOLVED. HOW MUCH PRESSURE WAS THERE TO GET OUT? SHULTZ SAID THAT SOME OF THE PRESS WERE SAYING THAT THE US SHOULD NEVER HAVE GONE IN: BUT NONE WERE NOW FOR TURNING TAIL AND RUNNING. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS STILL IN PLACE AND ASKING FOR SUPPORT: THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD GO ON DEFENDING THEMSELVES, BUT NOT GETTING DRAWN INTO THE CONFESSIONAL FIGHTING. ADMIRAL HOWE (DIRECTOR FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS) SAID THAT, TESTIFYING YESTERDAY TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, HE HAD FOUND THAT GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE US MARINE PRESENCE. THE ONLY ARGUMENT HAD BEEN ABOUT WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT.

8. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT SEEMED PRETTY FIRMLY COMMITTED. SHULTZ SAID THAT HE WAS. THE US HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO TRY TO HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TRY TO SAVE THEIR COUNTRY: AND A GOOD DEAL OF THEIR OWN PRESTIGE WAS NOW ON THE LINE. MR HESELTINE ASKED IF IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE US WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED IN DIRECT SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY BEYOND THE DEFENCE OF SOUQ AL GHARB. SHULTZ SAID THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. BUT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE LEBANON WAS GOING TO BE OF WIDER IMPORTANCE. IF THE OUTCOME WAS A PRO-WESTERN GOVERNMENT WITH INEVITABLY, A GREAT DEAL OF SYRIAN INFLUENCE OVER MUCH OF LEBANON - AND SOME MODUS VIVENDI WITH ISRAEL, THAT WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY. IF, HOWEVER, THE SYRIANS SUCCEEDED IN FORCING OUT THE MULTI NATIONAL FORCE, DISLODGING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, DENOUNCING THE AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND GETTING THE PLO BACK IN FORCE, THIS WOULD HAVE A VERY BAD EFFECT ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST GENERALLY. HOW LONG THE

ISRAELIS WOULD REMAIN ALOOF FROM SUCH A SITUATION, HE DID NOT KNOW.


9. MR HESELTINE NOTED THAT ANY DIRECT SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD ENTAIL LENGTHY AND COSTLY OPERATIONS. SHULTZ DISMISSED THE IDEA OF ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSERT LEBANESE ARMY RULE WITH US SUPPORT. BUT IF THINGS WENT WRONG, THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION WERE REAL. THE ISRAELIS WOULD START TAKING A MUCH MORE DIRECT INTEREST AND, IF THEY LOST PLANES, WOULD BE LIKELY TO ATTACK THE SAM SITES, MR HESELTINE SAID THAT THESE ANXIETIES WERE FULLY SHARED BY HIS COLLEAGUES.

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TO FLASH WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1497 OF 13 SEPTEMBER,

INFO FLASH TROOPS DHEKELIA (FOR PS/MR LUCE), BUDAPEST (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, ROME, PARIS AND BRITFORLEB.

MY TELNO 1483 AND YOUR TELNO 2568(NOT TO ALL): LEBANON/MNF

1. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN MINISTERS' POSITION ON BRITFORLEB'S RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) OR THOSE OF THE BUCCANEER STRIKE AIRCRAFT ON STANDBY AT CYPRUS TO PROTECT OUR FORCE. ACCORDINGLY, IF EAGLEBURGER REVERTS TO HIS REQUEST, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE UNWILLING TO CHANGE THE ROE. IN ANY CASE, WE NOTE FROM WHAT MCFARLANE SAID ON 12 SEPTEMBER (BEIRUT TELNO 505) THAT HE SEEMS NO LONGER TO BE ASKING FOR THIS, AT LEAST AT PRESENT.
2. WE APPRECIATE THE ADVICE IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR, BUT WE ARE JUST AS CONCERNED AS THE FRENCH ARE AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW US POSITION.
3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION OUR CONCERN IS INCREASED BY THE TONE OF MCFARLANE'S REPORT OF 11 SEPTEMBER, WHICH THE US EMBASSY HAVE SHOWN US IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT). THE DETAILS GIVEN IN HIS REPORT WERE FACTUALLY UNSOUND AND THE ARGUMENTS OVER DRAWN. THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATION WAS FOR UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION BY THE US, AND THIS, IT IS SOME RELIEF TO NOTE, WAS REJECTED. BUT HE SUCCEEDED IN BOUNCING WASHINGTON ON A SUNDAY AFTERNOON INTO TAKING AN EXAGGERATED VIEW OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SUQ AL-GHARB, WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION REPORTED IN YOUR TELNO 2553. AFTER ALL, SUQ AL-GHARB WAS ONLY TAKEN FROM THE DRUZE BY THE LAF LAST WEEK.
4. SIMILAR SITUATIONS MAY RECUR AND MINISTERS HERE COULD COME UNDER PRESSURE AT HIGH-LEVEL FROM THE AMERICANS TO TAKE FAR-REACHING DECISIONS, AT NO NOTICE AND WITHOUT INDEPENDENT INFORMATION, WHICH WE WOULD REGARD AS POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY UNWISE, BUT WHERE IT WILL BE VERY UNCOMFORTABLE TO REFUSE AN URGENT AND PRESSING REQUEST.

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5. ONE WAY TO GET OUR CONCERN ACROSS MAY BE BY A FURTHER MINISTERIAL (OR PRIME MINISTERIAL) MESSAGE. THIS COULD FOLLOW THE REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE OF 10 SEPTEMBER (MY TELNO 1478), OR COULD BE CONSEQUENTIAL TO MR LUCE'S REPORT OF HIS VISIT TO BEIRUT ON 14 SEPTEMBER. WE HAVE TOLD THE US EMBASSY HERE THAT MR LUCE IS VERY KEEN TO MEET MCFARLANE AND HOPE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE, IF NOT IN BEIRUT, THEN IN CYPRUS OR EVEN AT SEA.

6. SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH CONCERN US IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE MUST ALSO BE OF CONCERN TO THE AMERICANS, AND WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO EXPLORE THEM. FOR EXAMPLE:

- A) IF THE UK WERE TO TAKE PART IN AIRSTRIKES ON THE LINES PROPOSED ON 11 SEPTEMBER, THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE MNF WOULD BE CHANGED, AND IT COULD BE MUCH MORE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. PRESENT THINKING IS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY, FOR PURELY MILITARY REASONS, EITHER TO WITHDRAW IT OR (AS NO DOUBT THE US WISH) TO REINFORCE IT. ITS ROLE AS A NON-PARTICIPANT IN THE FIGHTING WOULD NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE. THE POSITION OF THE US AND OTHER COUNTINGENTS IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT, IN THAT THEY ARE LARGE ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE A CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCE, BUT WE WONDER IF THE NSC AND WHITE HOUSE HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH THE IMPLICATION EVEN FOR THEM (AS OPPOSED TO STATE DEPT AT DESK LEVEL).
- B) WE SEE A CONSIDERABLE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRESENT ROLE OF THE MNF (WHICH IS TO SUPPORT THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT) AND A ROLE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THEM IN GIVING ACTIVE MILITARY SUPPORT. FOR EXAMPLE, ONCE THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT HAS MILITARY SUPPORT, WHAT IS THE INCENTIVE FOR IT TO COMPROMISE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT?
- C) HOW WOULD THE MNF FOLLOW UP ACTION AS RECOMMENDED BY MCFARLANE ON 11 SEPTEMBER? ONCE THE ACTION AT SUQ AL-GHARB WAS COMPLETE, WHAT WOULD BE THE NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THEIR POLITICAL RATIONALE? IN SHORT, WHAT IS THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE BEYOND PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF A PARTICULAR POSITION DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO THE MNF?

- D) THE CONCERN ABOUT POLARISATION OF THE ARAB WORLD MENTIONED IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MESSAGE APPLIES EVEN MORE STRONGLY TO HIGHER-PROFILE MILITARY ACTION BY THE MNF. POLARISATION AT THE ARAB/INTERNATIONAL LEVEL WOULD CAUSE THE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO DEADLOCK. SYRIA WOULD THEN BE FAVOURABLY PLACED TO AWAIT THE COLLAPSE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.
- E) THAT SITUATION WOULD BE THE END OF WHAT WE SEE AS THE BEST HOPE FOR AN END TO THE CRISIS, AN ARAB/LEBANESE POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD OFFER SOMETHING TO EVERYONE BUT DEMAND PAINFUL CONCESSIONS (NO VICTOR AND NO VANQUISHED). WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE IF LEBANON IS TO SURVIVE. (WE EXCLUDE AS POINTLESS THE SURVIVAL OF A PUPPET CHRISTIAN REGIME IN THE GREATER BEIRUT AREA PROPPED UP BY THE US).
- F) MCFARLANE'S LATEST REQUEST FOR 'MUTUAL SUPPORT' (BEIRUT TELNO 505) ALSO RAISES PROBLEMS IN THE NEW SITUATION. IT WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD BE COMMITTED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO SUPPORTING THE US CONTINGENT IF THEY CAME UNDER FIRE FOLLOWING ACTION UNDER THE MODIFIED ROE. IN EFFECT, WE WOULD BE INVOLVED IN ACTION UNDER THE MODIFIED ROE OURSELVES, THUS NEGATING THE TERMS OF OUR CLEARLY DEFINED AND LIMITED PRESENT RULES.
7. WE SHOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER THE AMERICANS SEE ANY USEFUL CONTRIBUTION WHICH WE COULD MAKE AT PRESENT ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. MR LUCE WILL OF COURSE BE TALKING TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, BUT WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSIDERING WHETHER WE COULD DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS OR OTHER MODERATE ARABS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE SYRAINS, THOUGH WE SEE LITTLE SCOPE AT PRESENT. WE ARE AS USUAL NOT WELL PLACED TO SPEAK TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT HAVE BEEN WONDERING WHETHER THERE IS ANY WAY TO PERSUADE THEM
- A) TO MOVE FURTHER TOWARDS FULL WITHDRAWAL
- B) TO URGE POLITICAL RESTRAINT ON THEIR FRIENDS IN THE PHALANGE.
8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO COMMENT FROM BUDAPEST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WASHINGTON HAVE MEETINGS DURING THE DAY (US TIME) WHICH WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACT ON THE ABOVE.

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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2581 OF 13 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BUDAPEST(PS/SOFS), TROOPS DHEKELIA(FOR PS/MR LUCE),
BEIRUT, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, ROME, PARIS, BRITFORLED

YOUR TELNO 1497: LEBANON/MNF

1. LEBANON AND THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WERE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH
BY MR HESELTINE AND MR WEINBERGER THIS MORNING. WEINBERGER SEEMED
TO TAKE A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE PROSPECTS IN LEBANON OVERALL.
BUT HE SAID IN TERMS: "IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD THE US GET
ITSELF INTO A POSITION WHERE US FORCES AND THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD
BE LINED UP AGAINST SYRIA AND THE PLO". MR HESELTINE TOOK NOTE,
BUT DREW ATTENTION TO THE RISK THAT THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE
COULD END UP STAYING IN LEBANON WITHOUT ANY CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT IT
WAS SUPPOSED TO DO.

2. WEINBERGER AND HIS OFFICIALS SEEMED TO THINK THE POSITION
ON THE GROUND marginally better than it had been, AND THAT THE
LEBANESE ARMY WAS ACQUITTING ITSELF WELL. THEY SHOWED INTEREST

~~2. WEINBERGER AND HIS OFFICIALS SEEMED TO THINK THE POSITION~~
~~ON THE GROUND marginally better than it had been, and that the~~
LEBANESE ARMY WAS ACQUITTING ITSELF WELL. THEY SHOWED UNCERTAINTY,
HOWEVER, ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND FOR
ANY PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION.

3. MR HESELTINE'S MEETING TOMORROW WITH SHULTZ WILL AFFORD AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULLER DISCUSSION OF THE POINTS IN YOUR TUR.

4. SEE MIFT.

WRIGHT

NNNN

MT

INT QSL ZZ K

TKS

MONFO 015/14



MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 16

PS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR EBERTON
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/VED
HD/UND

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CABINET OFFICE D10

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FM WASHINGTON 132329Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2582 OF 13 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE TROOPS DHEKELIA (FOR PS/MR LUCE) BUDAPEST (FOR
PRIVATE SECRETARY) BEIRUT

PRIORITY DAMASCUS ROME PARIS TEL AVIV JEDDA BRITFORLEB UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 1497 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON/MNF

1. RAPHEL AND MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD MNF CONTRIBUTORS THIS
EVENING THAT POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL HELD UP BY THE SYRIAN
REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE LAF ANY ROLE IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
CHOUF.

BANDAR HAD RETURNED TO DAMASCUS TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT
TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT SOME COMPROMISE FORMULA ON THIS
ISSUE. MCFARLANE HAD MEANWHILE GONE BACK TO BEIRUT. BUT, AT
LEAST, ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING JUMBLATT, WERE STILL INTERESTED
IN DISCUSSING A SOLUTION.

2. THE LAF HAD FOUGHT OFF FURTHER DRUZE ATTACKS ON THEIR POSITIONS
IN ARRAYA, SUQ ELGHARB AND QABR CHMOUN. THIS LINE WAS OF CRUCIAL
IMPORTANCE: IF THE DRUZE CONTROLLED THE RIDGE THEY WOULD BE WITHIN
EASY RANGE OF THE AIRPORT AND WELLPLACED TO LINK UP WITH AMAL IN
SOUTH BEIRUT. THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE IDF WITHDRAWAL IN THAT THE DRUZE NOW SEEMED PREPARED
TO PRESS FORWARD RATHER THAN REMAIN IN STATIC POSITIONS AND THERE
WAS EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT ON THEIR SIDE. HENCE THE U S
DECISION TO ENGAGE IN MORE AGGRESSIVE SELF DEFENCE. BUT THIS DID

~~DECISION TO ENGAGE IN MORE AGGRESSIVE SELF DEFENCE. BUT THIS DID~~
NOT CHANGE THEIR CONTINGENT'S BASIC MANDATE. MCFARLANE HAD BRIEFED
GEMAYEL ON THE NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT
BE INFORMED.

3. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE ADDITIONAL
DEPLOYMENTS BY MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
WHICH INCREASED THE EFFECTIVENESS AND CREDIBILITY OF THE MNF. THE
AMERICANS HAD NO PLANS TO WITHDRAW ANY OF THEIR FORCES AT PRESENT
IN THE REGION. THEY WERE PREPARED IF ASKED TO RESPOND TO ATTACKS
ON ANY OF THE MNF CONTINGENTS. THIS WOULD HELP TO INCREASE LOCAL
PERCEPTION OF THE MNF AS A UNITED INTERNATIONAL FORCE. THEY HOPED
THAT OTHER CONTRIBUTORS WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILI-
TIES FOR GREATER COORDINATION AND MUTUAL SUPPORT. THE FRENCH
EMBASSY SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD US THEAT CHEYSSON HAS TURNED DOWN THE
OFFER OF US ASSISTANCE: IF THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WERE ATTACKED THE
FRENCH WOULD DEFEND IT WITH ALL NECESSARY FORCE.

4. WE DESCRIBED YOUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
REVISED US RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (PARA 6 OF TUR). IN REPLY RAPHEL
CLAIMED THAT THEY DID NOT REPRESENT ANY MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENT BUT
A MINOR AND NATURAL EXTENSION OF THE BASIC ROLE OF THE MNF. HE
STRESSED THAT THE REVISED ROES APPLIED ONLY TO SUQ EL GHARB AND ONLY
IN THE EVENT THAT THE MNF WERE DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THE
IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF THE LAF THERE. THE AMERICANS WERE REASONABLY
CONFIDENT THAT THE LAF COULD DEFEND ITS PRESENT POSITIONS ON THE
RIDGE UNLESS THERE WERE EXTENSIVE NON-LEBANESE INTERVENTION AGAINST
THEM. THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON LEBANESE FORCES HAD PLAYED A
SIGNIFICANT PART IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO EXTEND THE ROES.

5. RAPHEL SAID THAT THE REVISED ROES WERE INTENDED ONLY TO TRY
TO BUY SOME MORE TIME FOR EFFORTS AT INTERNAL POLITICAL
RECONCILIATION TO SUCCEED. THERE WAS NO LONG TERM POLITICAL
OBJECTIVE. GEMAYEL NOW ACCEPTED THE INEVITABILITY AND DESIRABILITY
OF BROADENING HIS POLITICAL BASE AND OF DEALING WITH HIS
FAMILIES TRADITIONAL OPPONENTS. HE WAS MORE LIKELY TO NEGOTIATE
CONSTRUCTIVELY IF HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT HIS CAPITAL WAS NOT
ABOUT TO BE OVERRUN. AS FOR MODERATE ARAB REACTIONS, RAPHEL
CLAIMED THAT THE SAUDIS HAS INDICATED TO THE US THAT THEY WOULD
HAVE NO OBJECTION IF THE MNF WERE A LITTLE MORE AGGRESSIVE IN ITS
OWN DEFENSE AND IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. (THIS WAS
GREETED WITH POLITE SCEPTICISM ALL ROUND).

* 6. RAPHEL TOOK THE POINT ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT BE RAISED *
BY THE REQUEST FOR "MUTUAL SUPPORT". THE AMERICANS WERE NOT
SUGGESTING THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY OVER OTHER CONTINGENTS
NOR THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COMMITMENT TO AUTOMATIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR
ACTIVITIES FROM OTHER CONTINGENTS. AUTHORITY WOULD REMAIN WITH
THE NATIONAL CONTINGENT COMMANDERS WHO MIGHT CALL IN ON HELP FROM
THEIR COLLEAGUES IF NECESSARY.

7. NONE OF THE OTHERS HAD A REPORT OF TODAY'S COORDINATION MEETING
IN BEIRUT (BEIRUT TELNO 507) OR VIEWS ON GEMAYEL'S SUGGESTIONS FOR
REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE MNF. RAPHEL COMMENTED THAT THE US HAD
NO PLANS AT PRESENT TO INCREASE THE SIZE OR ROLE OF THEIR CONTINGENT.

8. WE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE ON
THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT (PARA 7 OF TUR) RAPHEL SUGGESTED THAT WE AND

~~8. WE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT (PARA 7 OF TUR) RAPHEL SUGGESTED THAT WE AND THE FRENCH COULD HELP TO MOBILISE SUPPORT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR TUEINI'S DRAFT RESOLUTION (UKMIS TELNO 812) MCFARLANE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL: IT CONTAINED A NUMBER OF GOOD POINTS AND THE PROVISION OF UNTSO OBSERVERS WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO JUMBLATT. RAPHEL SAW NO NEED FOR FURTHER ACTION WITH THE SAUDIS WHO WERE STILL "VERY MUCH ENGAGED", NOR MUCH POSSIBILITY OF OUR BEING ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE SYRIANS. AS FOR THE ISRAELIS THEY SEEMED ANXIOUS TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES. THE AMERICANS HAD ASKED THEM TO URGE BOTH THE PHALANGISTS AND DRUZE TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND THE ISRAELIS MAINTAINED THAT THEY WERE DOING SO. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF ANY ISRAELI INTEREST IN FURTHER WITHDRAWALS AT THIS STAGE.~~

9. ADMIRAL HOWE LOOKED IN DURING THE MEETING TO SAY THAT SHULTZ HAD BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY REACTIONS ON THE HILL TO HIS BRIEFING TODAY. THERE HAD BEEN FULL SUPPORT, EVEN FROM LIBERAL DEMOCRATS IN THE SENATE, FOR MAINTAINING THE US CONTINGENT IN LEBANON. THE ONLY QUARREL HAD BEEN ON THE TECHNICAL LEGAL ISSUE OF THE WAR POWERS ACT. BUT HOWE WAS SATISFIED THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SENATORS TODAY WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY AND FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT.

10. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE FICTION THAT THE MARINES ARE NOT IN A COMBAT SITUATION AND THAT THEY ARE THEREFORE NOT REQUIRED TO INVOKE THE PROVISIONS OF THE WAR POWERS ACT (WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN LEBANON FOR MORE THAN 60 DAYS). SENATOR MATHIAS HAS, HOWEVER, INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION APPROVING THE MARINE PRESENCE IN LEBANON FOR A PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS. A HOUSE STAFFER HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE THAT CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI (CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE) IS DRAFTING A RESOLUTION TO APPROVE THE MARINES CONTINUED PRESENCE IN LEBANON FOR 18MONTHS, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS INCLUDING THE SUBMISSION OF REGULAR REPORTS TO CONGRESS. THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGE OF TAKING THE ISSUE OUT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

WRIGHT

CCN READ GROUPS AS 1100 ✓

AND IN PARA 6. FIRST LINE READ LAST WORD AS RAISED RPT ✓
WHICH MIGHT B EEEE BE RAISED ETC TKS

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Prime Minister

GR 310

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FM DAMASCUS 131040Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 252 OF 13 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, MODUK (DI4B), BRITFORLEB.

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEWYORK, PARIS, ROME, JEDDA, CAIRO, AMMAN,
TEL AVIV.

To note. This article may be a
Syrian warning to us.

A.J.C. 14/9.

LEBANON: SYRIAN COMMENT ON BRITISH INVOLVEMENT

1. THE SYRIAN NEWSPAPER TISHREEN, IN A FRONT PAGE NEWS ARTICLE ON 13 SEPTEMBER, DISCUSSED THE BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON. THE ARTICLE TALKED OF EXTENSIVE ANGLO/AMERICAN CO-ORDINATION, CITING THE VISIT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO WASHINGTON AND MR LUCE'S TO BEIRUT IN EVIDENCE. THE LATTER WAS SEEN BY TISHREEN AS "PERHAPS" BEING DESIGNED IN ORDER "TO GIVE THE BRITISH CONTINGENT OF THE MNF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT THE KATAEB ARMY IN ITS CRIMINAL WAR AGAINST THE LEBANESE NATIONAL FORCES".

2. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO REPORT THAT UNNAMED OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT "DO NOT RULE OUT FURTHER BRITISH INTERVENTION AND INCREASING EMBROILMENT IN THE BLOODY EVENTS IN LEBANON". THE OVERFLIGHT OF THE BUCCANEERS WAS "IN ORDER TO RECONNOITRE NATIONALIST POSITIONS IN THE MOUNTAIN AND THE CHOUF AND TO PASS THE INFORMATION TO THE KATAEB ARMY".

COMMENT

3. IN SYRIAN PARLANCE, THE "KATAEB ARMY" IMPLIES THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, RATHER THAN THE KATAEB MILITIA. BUT WHATEVER THE EFFECTS IN BEIRUT, THE DEMONSTRATION BY THE BUCCANEERS HAS RAISED THE PROFILE OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON IN SYRIAN EYES. THE ARTICLE WAS PROBABLY OFFICIALLY INSPIRED AND COULD WELL REFLECT A MOVE TOWARDS AN OFFICIAL SYRIAN INTERPRETATION THAT THE BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE MNF SHOULD NOW BE /CONSIDERED

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CONSIDERED IN THE SAME WAY AS THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT. A SIGNAL THAT THIS POINT HAD BEEN REACHED WOULD BE A DIRECT IDENTIFICATION WITH THE PHALANGE AND ISRAEL. IN SUCH A CASE, WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS, IT WOULD NOT EXCLUDE SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE EITHER IN SHELLING OF BRITISH POSITIONS BY THE OPPOSITION FORCES OR EVEN IN DIRECT ATTACK.

4. ALREADY MUCH PROMINENCE IS BEING GIVEN TO STATEMENTS BY NSF SPOKESMEN SUGGESTING THAT THE MNF HAS OUTLIVED ITS WELCOME.

CCN: PARA 3 LINE 12 FIRST WORD ACQUIESCENCE
MARSHALL
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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
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Lee H.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 September 1983

LEBANON

Thank you for your letter of 12 September, the contents of which have been noted by the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter to Nick Evans (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLLETT

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GR 475

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FM ATHENS 121450Z SEP 83

TO FLASH FCO.,

TELNO 428 OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1983.,

REPEATED AS FLASH INFO TO UKMIS NEW YORK.,

REPEATED AS IMMEDIATE INFO TO WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT.,

REPEATED AS PRIORITY INFO TO PARIS AND ROME.

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

LEBANON/MNF.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD A BRIEF MEETING TODAY WITH CHEYSSON AND ANDREOTTI IN THE MARGINS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING OF THE TEN TO DISCUSS THE LATEST AMERICAN APPROACH (WASHINGTON TELNO 2553) ABOUT THE THREAT TO THE MNF.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DREW ON THINKING IN LONDON REPORTED TO ME BY HOLMES. SUK AL GHARB WAS STILL HOLDING OUT AND APPARENTLY IN NO IMMEDIATE DANGER. IF IT WERE TO FALL, THE CONSEQUENCES MIGHT BE LESS SERIOUS THAN THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED. IT WOULD NOT OPEN THE MAIN ROUTE TO BEIRUT. IT WAS IN ANY CASE ON THE EDGE OF THE DRUZE AREA. BUT IT WAS ONLY 5 KILOMETRES FROM HQ BRITFORLEB. WE WERE NOT DISPOSED TO CHANGE THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AS SUGGESTED BY THE UNITED STATES. (INDEED, WE WERE LOOKING AT THEM AGAIN TO ENSURE THAT THEY WERE TIGHTLY DRAWN AND CONTAINED NO AMBIGUITIES). BUT THE POLITICAL ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE MNF WAS THERE IN SUPPORT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD ALL GIVE SOME CONTINGENCY THOUGHT TO THE MNF'S SITUATION IF THE POSITION OF THAT GOVERNMENT WERE ITSELF TO CHANGE.
3. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT THE ITALIANS TOO WERE CLOSELY TIED TO THE PRESENT MANDATE. THE LAW ADOPTED BY THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT TO PERMIT THE DESPATCH OF AN ITALIAN CONTINGENT TO THE MNF HAD SPECIFIED "THE AREA OF BEIRUT". HE WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LARGE NUMBER OF LEBANESE OF VARIOUS FAITHS SAID TO BE ABANDONING THEIR TOWNS AND VILLAGES, THE CHANGES IN THE POPULATION MOSAIC WHICH THESE MOVEMENTS WERE CREATING, AND THE SITUATION OF THE MNF IN THE MIDDLE OF ALL THIS.
4. CHEYSSON (WHO HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY SHULTZ DURING THE NIGHT) SAID THAT FRANCE SHARED THE BRITISH CONCERN "WORD FOR WORD". THEY HAD BEGUN TO CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS, BUT IN TOTAL SECRECY. ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THEY THOUGHT THAT UN OBSERVERS IN THE SHOUF COULD BE USEFUL WAS THAT THIS "WOULD BE A GOOD PRECEDENT" IF FRANCE OR OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD WANT TO PROPOSE A REDUCTION IN ITS MANDATE - "OR, TO SPEAK BLUNTLY, ITS WITHDRAWAL". THE FRENCH HAD APPROACHED A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF UN OBSERVERS IN THE SHOUF, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION WHICH

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/HAD

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HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETELY NEGATIVE. THEY HAD ALSO SPOKEN TO THE SYRIANS, WHO HAD IN EFFECT TOLD THEM NOT TO WORRY. CHEYSSON BELIEVED, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT BE SURE THAT, IF THE OTHER THREE CONTRIBUTORS DECLINED TO GO ALONG WITH THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS, THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT MAKE A SYSTEMATIC CHANGE IN POLICY, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT MOUNT INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS.

5. FCO PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

R H O D E S

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-886-7622 218 2111/3

MO 3/7/4

Prime Minister

12th September 1983

To note.

A.J.C. - 13/9

ms

Dear John,

The Prime Minister will wish to be aware that the Defence Secretary held a meeting this evening to review the position of BRITFORLEB in the light of developments over the weekend and the current advice of the Chiefs of Staff. I gather that John Holmes is writing to you separately to cover the political side.

It was noted that a message had been received from the Americans seeking British support for direct MNF action to help the Lebanese Army counter a Druze offensive around the village of Suq al-Gharb. This followed a report from Mr McFarlane that the loss of this position would open the way into Beirut for Druze, Palestinian, Iranian and Libyan forces backed by Syria and that everything possible should be done to hold it. In discussion it was noted that our own assessment was that Suq al-Gharb did not have the strategic significance implied by the US request. Lebanese forces in the area had fought well over the weekend and were currently holding their ground. The US request implied a significant extension of the current MNF mandate and agreement to it would carry the risk that we would be sucked into a wider involvement outside Beirut in direct support of the Lebanese Army. The vulnerability of our contingent would be increased and it would be likely that, in these circumstances, it would be necessary to withdraw BRITFORLEB into the US stockade. It was therefore concluded that the military advice would be that we should not agree to extend the MNF area of operations as proposed by the Americans.

Nevertheless it was necessary to continue to review the current deployment and structure of BRITFORLEB and the options for reinforcement. At present the advice of the Chiefs of Staff was that there was no need to alter the structure or deployment of the force or its rules of engagement. As to the reinforcement options, in the event of a significant deterioration in the situation it would still be possible to accelerate the INVINCIBLE group. It was also noted that HMS HERMES, with 40 Commando Group embarked, was due to

A J Coles Esq



sail to the Eastern Mediterranean on 14th September in order to take part in the routine NATO exercise DISPLAY DETERMINATION. She would be available in the area, in the normal course of events, on 26th September and this could be brought forward to 21st if required. In addition, the SPEARHEAD Battalion could be deployed complete to Akrotiri within 4 days, with onward movement to Beirut taking a further 24 hours. A lower key measure would be to send one of the two frigates currently in the Mediterranean to a station off Lebanon. The ship would be able to supply communications and, if necessary, gunfire support to the MNF and such a deployment would be welcome to the Americans. In the light of the discussion, and taking account of the current military situation and the discussions at Chequers, my Secretary of State concluded that no action should be taken at present to accelerate any of these possible deployment options. They should nevertheless continue to remain under review in the light of the situation as it develops.

13 ✓ As to the BUCCANEER deployment it was reported that the sorties over the weekend had been successful in their primary purpose of producing a show of strength over Beirut. However, there had been some problems in establishing satisfactory links between the aircraft and their forward air control. These links would be necessary to direct the aircraft on to targets identified by the MNF in attack operations under the rules of engagement agreed last Friday. As I informed you on the telephone earlier this evening, it was therefore decided to carry out a further sortie by two aircraft over Beirut tomorrow, at a time to be decided by the local Commanders.

I am sending a copy of this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Mich Evans

(N H R EVANS)
Private Secretary



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

A. J. C. ¹²/₉

12 September 1983

M

Dear John,

Lebanon

As the Prime Minister will be aware, Mr McFarlane reported on 11 September in alarming terms on the military situation around the village of Suq al-Gharb, which is a Druze village on the western edge of the Druze stronghold in the Shouf mountains East and South of Beirut. He recommended that immediate US military action was needed if the village was not to fall to a combination of Palestinian, Iranian and Libyan forces backed by Syria; in that case there was a possibility that these forces would stream down into Beirut and overrun the Lebanese President's Palace and the US Embassy.

We obtained assessments urgently from our Embassy and the British contingent in the MNF. These were less alarming. It is clear that there was a fierce battle on Saturday night, but the Lebanese 8th brigade fought back and recovered positions they had lost, then and during a further round of fighting on Sunday night. The Lebanese brigade might of course still be overrun but this is not imminent; nor would it in our view have the military and political consequences originally suggested by Mr McFarlane. (Mr McFarlane himself has now passed on to us the Lebanese Chief of Staff's view that the Lebanese Army can hold the position at least for another round or two of fighting.) Beirut telno 505 enclosed.

On receipt of Mr McFarlane's report, the Americans again asked us to delay the naval task force with HMS Invincible in the Eastern Mediterranean for a while. They also proposed that we should alter the rules of engagement of the MNF to permit supporting action around Suq al-Gharb. They told us that the President had decided that in certain circumstances (set out in Washington telno 2553 enclosed) US forces would act to support the Lebanese. In reply Washington have been instructed to say that we are not prepared to detain the Invincible.

We have not been pressed further today on the question of rules of engagement, but if necessary the Embassy will draw on Athens telno 428, also enclosed, which makes clear that neither Sir G Howe nor his Italian and French colleagues see grounds to broaden the mandate in present circumstances. We have been in close touch with the Ministry of Defence today. We are agreed

/that there



that there is at present no requirement to amend BRITFORLEB's orders or rules of engagement. We shall be considering tomorrow the terms of the formal reply we need to give to the Americans.

Mr Luce leaves on 13 September for Cyprus and will be in Beirut on 14 September. This will give him an opportunity to see the situation on the ground and to discuss it with the Lebanese authorities. He will be urging them to make every effort to clinch a political deal which could lead to a ceasefire. On this the latest situation as reported to us by Mr McFarlane is that negotiations between the Arab and Lebanese parties continue, though the chances of success are obscure. Mr McFarlane himself was due to make another visit to Jedda and Damascus this afternoon.

There have been informal consultations today in the Security Council, where the Lebanese mission are working for a resolution calling for a ceasefire, humanitarian action with the ICRC to deal with some of the urgent problems of civilian populations caught up in the fighting, the introduction of UN observers into the Shouf, and the extension to the Shouf of the activities of a UN force. We regard the last point as unrealistic, at least in present circumstances, but should be able to support a resolution containing the other points, if one emerges.

I am copying this letter to Nick Evans (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

John Holmes

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~MR. EMBERTON~~

MR. EMBERTON.

~~MR. EMBERTON~~ MR. JAMES.

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FM WASHINGTON 122230Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2563 OF 12 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BEIRUT, BRITFORLEB, PARIS, ROME, CBFC,

DAMASCUS, BUDAPEST (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

PRIORITY TEL AVIV, JEDDA, UKNIS NEW YORK.

BEIRUT TELNO 502 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON: SITREP

POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS. THE MAIN CURRENT PROBLEM IS SYRIAN INSISTENCE THAT ANY AGREEMENT SHOULD EXPLICITLY RULE OUT LAF DEPLOYMENT IN THE CHOUF. GENAYEL IS WILLING TO ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FORCES, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS MEANS THE ISF RATHER THAN LAF, BUT THE SYRIANS APPEAR DETERMINED TO HUMILIATE HIM. MCFARLANE IS IN JEDDA FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH PRINCE BANDAR AND MAY GO ON TO DAMASCUS TOMORROW.

MILITARY SITUATION

2. THE LAF BROKE UP LAST NIGHT'S ATTACK ON THEIR POSITIONS AT SUC EL GHARB WITH EFFECTIVE USE OF ARTILLERY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT

~~MILITARY SITUATION~~

~~2. THE LAF BROKE UP LAST NIGHT'S ATTACK ON THEIR POSITIONS AT~~
SUC EL GHARB WITH EFFECTIVE USE OF ARTILLERY. THE STATE DEPARTMENT
HAVE EVIDENCE OF PALESTINIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHTING BUT ARE
~~SCEPTICAL OF REPORTS OF DIRECT SYRIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT.~~
THEY BELIEVE THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING THE DRUZE WITH
WEAPONS, INTELLIGENCE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT: THERE MAY ALSO BE A FEW
SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, OBSERVERS AND DRUZE VOLUNTEERS WITH
THE PSP MILITIA. THERE IS EVIDENCE OF PFLP, DFLP AND SA'ICA
PERSONNEL FIGHTING WITH THE DRUZE IN THE CHOUF. THE STATE DEPARTMENT
CANNOT CONFIRM REPORTS OF LIBYAN AND IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT AT SUC EL
GHARB, THOUGH IRANIANS HAVE BEEN SEEN MOVING TOWARDS THE AREA FROM
THE BEKA'A. THE AMERICANS SUSPECT THAT SOME IRANIANS MAY NOW BE
IN THE METH.

3. AN ICRC CONVOY WITH FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARRIVED IN DEIR EL
QAMAR TODAY UNDER DRUZE ESCORT. THE AMERICANS STILL BELIEVE IT
WOULD BE USEFUL FOR MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT IN
BEIRUT STRESSING HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS (MY TELNO 2531). NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A LIMITED CEASEFIRE SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ABANDONED NOW THAT THE
LAF ARE IN CONTROL OF QABR CHAMOUN: THE AMERICANS ARE NOW
CONCENTRATING ON SUPPORTING THE ICRC'S RELIEF EFFORTS AT DEIR EL
QAMAR.

4. THE AMERICANS HAVE REPORTS OF FIGHTING BETWEEN THE KATA'IB AND
THE MURABITOUN IN THE KHARQUB AREA.

WRIGHT

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GRS 300
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM TEL AVIV 121130Z SEPT 83

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 227 OF 12 SEPT 83

INFO PRIORITY BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.
INFO PARIS AND ROME.

TEL AVIV TEL NO 222 : ISRAEL/LEBANON

1. IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THEIR WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWALI, THE ISRAELIS WERE INCLINED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT THEY COULD NOW OBSERVE EVENTS NORTH OF THEIR DEFENSIVE LINE WITH SOME DETACHMENT. BUT THEIR CONCERN HAS GROWN WITH THE INCREASING EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN AND PALESTINIAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE DRUZE. IN RESPONSE, THE IDF IS NOW MAKING LIMITED PATROLS NORTH OF THE AWALI RIVER.

2. THE ISRAELIS ARE PARTICULARLY WORRIED AT THE POSSIBLE RETURN OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES TO THE AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF, AND PERHAPS EVEN TO BEIRUT, ON THE BACKS OF THE DRUZE AND SHIA MILITIAS. SUCH A RETURN WOULD BE VERY EMBARRASSING TO AN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WHICH FOUGHT SO HARD TO ACHIEVE THEIR REMOVAL. BUT DESPITE EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT A RETURN WOULD MEET A FIRM RESPONSE, THE ISRAELIS ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED AGAIN IN THE FIGHTING NORTH OF THE AWALI. (THEY ARE ALSO INHIBITED BY THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE SUPPORT OF THEIR OWN DRUZE POPULATION). IN SEVERAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS, THE ISRAELIS HAVE STRESSED THAT THEY HAVE NOT SET ANY "RED LINES" IN THE CHOUF, AND IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT, WHILE CLAIMING TO HAVE RECEIVED DRUZE ASSURANCES THAT THE PLO WILL BE KEPT OUT OF THE CHOUF, THERE IS NOW TALK HERE OF A "WORST CASE" WHEREBY THE IDF WOULD BE ONCE AGAIN IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE PLO BUT THE SECURITY OF NORTHERN ISRAEL WOULD BE PRESERVED BY THE SOUTHERN LEBANON BUFFER. ALTHOUGH IT IS STRESSED THAT THIS SCENARIO HAS YET TO BE REACHED, ISRAELI POLICY IS LOOKING MORE AND MORE LIKE A DAMAGE-LIMITATION EXERCISE.

3. THE PRESENT FIGHTING WILL HAVE DONE NOTHING TO ENCOURAGE THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE FURTHER WITHDRAWALS. IN HIS MORE FLEXIBLE RECENT STATEMENTS, ARENS LINKED SUCH MOVES NOT WITH SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL BUT WITH THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO PREVENT HOSTILE FORCES FROM ENTERING THE VACATED AREAS. THE VIEW HERE IS THAT THE LAF HAVE YET TO PROVE THEIR ABILITY, QUITE APART FROM NOT BEING LEFT TO FILL ANY VACATED AREA BY THEMSELVES.

MOBERLY

MIDDLE EAST

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DESKBY FIRST CONTACT WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK

FM BEIRUT 121250Z SEP 83

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 505 OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO FLASH ATHENS(FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, ROME, PARIS,
NICOSIA, MODUK, BRITFORLEB AND CBFC

MY TELNO 502: LEBANON

1. MCFARLANE SAW REPRESENTATIVES OF MNF CONTRIBUTORS AT NOON
TODAY (12 SEPTEMBER).

2. HE EXPLAINED THE MODIFICATION TO THE US MARINE COMMANDER'S RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT AS IN PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 2553 - WHICH I HAD
NOT SEEN BEFORE THE MEETING. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THIS DECISION
HAD BEEN TAKEN FOLLOWING HIS AND THE US GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THE ARMY, IF SUBJECTED TO
CONTINUOUS ATTACKS OF THIS NATURE BY OUTSIDERS, WOULD OVER A TIME
LOSE TO SYRIA AND HER SURROGATES UNLESS THEY HAD OUTSIDE HELP. HE
HAD SEEN TANNOUS, WHO THOUGHT THAT THE POSITION IN SOUQ AL GHARB
COULD BE MAINTAINED IF ATTACKED A THIRD AND POSSIBLY A FOURTH TIME,
BUT HE COULD NOT VOUCH FOR THE WALL HOLDING THEREAFTER. THE UNITED
STATES' MOVE WAS A SIGNAL TO SYRIA THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
WERE NOT WILLING TO ALLOW SYRIA TO UP THE ANTE. I DREW MCFARLANE'S
ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS (PARA 1(G) OF YOUR
TELNO 1479 TO WASHINGTON). MCFARLANE SHARED OUR DOUBTS ABOUT
ARAB STAYING POWER, BUT SAID THAT HIS BEST GUESS WAS THAT
FOR THE LIMITED CHANGE ENVISAGED SAUDI ARABIA WOULD REMAIN ON
BOARD.

3. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED US TO CONSIDER WHETHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS
MIGHT AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES THAT IF ATTACKED THEY WOULD ASSIST
EACH OTHER IN RESPONDING TO THOSE ATTACKS - IE A SYSTEM OF MUTUAL
SUPPORT. HE SAID IT WAS NOT (NOT) HIS INTENTION AT THIS STAGE
THAT OTHER CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD ACT AS IN PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON
TELNO 2553, ALTHOUGH HE PERSONALLY WOULD WELCOME IT IF WE DID.
I SAID THAT YOU WERE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING THE MATTER. HE ACCEPTED
THAT IF A SYSTEM OF MUTUAL SUPPORT TO RESPOND TO ATTACKS WERE
INSTITUTED, THE SYRIANS MIGHT REGARD OTHER MNF CONTINGENTS AS
BEING ASSOCIATED WITH ANY "INITIATIVE" ATTACK BY THE UNITED
STATES ON SOUQ AL GHARB. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HIS
PRIME MINISTER HAD ALREADY PROPOSED SOMETHING SIMILAR.

4. MEANWHILE, SAID MCFARLANE, THE INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE WOULD CONTINUE. THE MAIN STICKING POINT IN NEGOTIATIONS WAS CURRENTLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN THE SHOUF. SYRIA WANTED THE ARMY TO WITHDRAW BEFORE A CEASEFIRE AND TO BE REPLACED IN THE WHOLE AREA BY INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES. BANDAR BIN SULTAN WAS RETURNING TO DAMASCUS WITH THREE POSSIBLE COMPROMISE FORMULAE TO GET ROUND THIS PROBLEM. (THESE INCLUDED THE FORMATION OF AN IMMEDIATE COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE HOW THE ARMY MIGHT BE DEPLOYED ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS AND A PROPOSAL THAT THE ISSUE BE AVOIDED ALTOGETHER - THERE SHOULD BE A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE WITH NO MOVEMENT OF FORCES UNTIL AFTER RECONCILIATION TALKS HAD GOT GOING.) MCFARLANE DID NOT ASSESS THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS WITH THE SYRIANS AS BEING VERY HIGH. HE HIMSELF PLANNED TO GO TO DAMASCUS, MAYBE THIS AFTERNOON, INTER ALIA TO EXPLAIN THE US GOVERNMENT'S POSITION (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE).

5. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT THE LEBANESE HAVE CIRCULATED AT THE UNITED NATIONS A DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH, INTER ALIA, CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN LEBANON AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN OBSERVERS IN THE SHOUF TO MONITOR IT. IT HAS HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PROVISIONS AS WELL AS A PROVISION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDED TO SUPPORT THAT RESOLUTION.

PALMER
BT

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FROM: R O MILES NENAD
DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1983

Mr Egerton
PS/Mr Luce

cc: Private Secretary

f.a.
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LEBANON: US REPORTING

1. It is worth reading two State Department telegrams from Beirut, copies of which have been given me in strict confidence by Mr Hooper of the US Embassy.

2. The first, dated 10 September, reports that Prince Bandar and another Arab emissary were leaving on Saturday night for Damascus carrying President Gemayel's latest response to the Syrian/Saudi proposals for a negotiated settlement of the Lebanese problem. The US Ambassador in Damascus was to alert the Syrian Foreign Minister and Jumblatt and offer US support. The US Ambassador comments that, if arrangements for meeting in Damascus went smoothly, there could be a ceasefire as of Sunday morning. If the meetings were delayed, this would produce a corresponding delay in the ceasefire.

3. The second telegram, sent on 11 September, is the one which caused such alarm in Washington, and not surprisingly so. It purports to be the collective recommendation of Special Ambassadors MacFarlane and Fairbanks, US Ambassador Dillon and * ~~~~~

* The recommendation is that 'US forces support the LAF in its defense of Suq al-Gharb with fire support to include Tac Air. Other MNF forces would be most welcome if the US decision is taken, but not at the loss of delay past tonight'.

4. The first thing to note is that this recommendation was turned down in Washington. Washington's first move seems to have been to consult MNF partners, and the eventual decision was against immediate intervention.

5. That said, I find the telegram an alarming document. I think that the four co-authors misrepresented the situation to a serious extent, and draw attention in particular to the following:

- a) The scene is set by a comparison of the fall of Suq al-Gharb to the fall of Capitol Hill, on the grounds that Suq al-Gharb is only 5 kms from the Presidential Palace. This is a gross distortion. Suq al-Gharb is separated from Beirut by mountainous terrain through which there are only a few small roads, providing strong defensive positions. Moreover, Suq al-Gharb (which is a Druze village) was in the hands of the Druze until it was taken from them by the LAF last week.
- b) The telegram states that the attacking force enjoys greater strength and resupply capabilities than the defenders, as well as unlimited fire support, and

/suggests ...

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suggests that shortage of ammunition and morale are a serious problem for the defenders. None of these points are corroborated from our own reporting and most are contradicted.

- c) The suggestion that no Lebanese were involved in the attacking force is linked with reports that 'the battle was savage and included axe fighting and brutal hand to hand combat'. Unfortunately those familiar with Lebanon recognise only too easily the characteristics of Lebanese fighting methods.
 - d) The telegram suggests that we may be at a turning point, leading in a matter of days to 'a Syrian take-over of this country North of the Awali'. This ignores the very considerable forces of the Christians and others opposed to Syrian influence, which have registered military successes as well as set-backs in the last few days.
 - e) Finally, the detailed information in the Flash situation report in Beirut telno 500, which concluded that the cohesion of the Lebanese brigade at Suq al-Gharb and of the Lebanese Army in general was not in jeopardy, was provided to our Assistant Defence Attaché by his US colleague. (The same impressions were subsequently confirmed by Colonel Roberts of BRITFORLEB, when he had visited the Lebanese Commander in Chief and the Bridge Headquarters.)
6. Comment: the situation in Lebanon is dangerous and fast moving and I do not think we should underestimate the difficulty of making sensible reports and recommendations. Nevertheless taken with the other reports from MacFarlane which I have seen in the last week or so, the second of these two telegrams does suggest that he is allowing himself to become flapped.

(dictated by Mr Miles
and signed in his
absence)



R O Miles

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: REVISED
- AGREEMENTS PROPOSAL CARRIED TO DAMASCUS

REF: (WA) DAMASCUS 7151 NOTAL; (B) DAMASCUS 7152 NOTAL;
- (C) DAMASCUS 7154 NOTAL

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. RAFIO HARIRI, WHO BROUGHT THE LATEST SYRIAN/SAUDI VERSION OF THE AGREEMENT PROPOSAL TO BEIRUT THIS AFTERNOON, HAS JUST DEPARTED FOR DAMASCUS VIA LARNACA CARRYING A REDRAFT OF THE AGREEMENT APPROVED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISERS FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THEMSELVES AND WITH AMES, MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS.

3. HARIRI LEFT FOR LARNACA VIA U.S. HELICOPTER AT 2000Z SEPTEMBER 10 AND WILL PROCEED TO DAMASCUS ON HIS OWN AIRCRAFT. HE WILL ARRIVE IN DOWNTOWN DAMASCUS ABOUT 2230Z (0130 DAMASCUS TIME SEPTEMBER 11), CONTACT AMP. PAGANELLI, AND ATTEMPT TO SEE KHADDAM AND JUMBLATT TO OBTAIN THEIR APPROVAL OF THE LEBANESE REDRAFT. IF HE IS SUCCESSFUL IN SEEING KHADDAM AND JUMBLATT AT THAT HOUR AND CAN OBTAIN THEIR APPROVAL, WE COULD HAVE A

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CEASE-FIRE DECLARED AS OF 0500Z SEPTEMBER 11. IF HE CANNOT SEE THEM UNJ L MORNING, THIS WILL PRODUCE A CORRESPONDING DELAY IN THE CEASE-FIRE.

4. FOR AMB. PAGANELLI: PER REFTEL C, WE ASSUME THAT HARIRI AND BANDAR WILL GET THROUGH IN LAFNACA TO COORDINATE POSITIONS AND RETURN TO DAMASCUS SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER. PLEASE GET IN TOUCH WITH KHADDAM AND JUMBLATT TO ALERT THEM TO THE RETURN OF HARIRI AND BANDAR WITH THE LEBANESE RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN/SAUDI AGREEMENT PROPOSAL. IN DOING SO, YOU SHOULD FOR ASS THAT THE USG IS CONVINCED THAT THE PACKAGE MERITS THE URGENT AGREEMENT OF BOTH THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND OF JUMBLATT. THE USG WILL DEMONSTRATE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO HELPING OBTAIN THE CONTEMPLATED INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS (SEPTTEL NCTAL).

5. FYI, THE TEXT OF THE LEBANESE REDRAFT FOLLOWS (BANDAR AND HARIRI SHOULD BE THE ONE TO COMMUNICATE IT TO THE SYRIANS

BEGIN TEXT

BASED ON TALKS AND CONTACTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE ARAB CAPITALS BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, AND RIYADH CONCERNING THE CREATION OF A COMMON CONCEPT TO SEEK THE MOST APPROPRIATE SOLUTION TO SAVE THE DETERIORATING SITUATION ON THE LEBANESE SCENE,

AND BEING KEEN TO STEM THE BLOODSHED, STOP THE FIGHTING, AND CONSIDER PEACE THROUGHOUT THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC AS A PRELIMINARY STEP TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WHICH WOULD BE THE PERMANENT BASIS FOR AMICAL CO-EXISTENCE AMONG THE LEBANESE PEOPLE IN A STRONG, COHERENT RELATIONSHIP AND WOULD BE A GUARANTEE FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OVER ALL THE TERRITORY OF LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN DECIDED:

1.) AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE THROUGHOUT LEBANESE TERRITORY AND ON ALL AXES AND POINTS OF CONTACT; NEUTRAL OBSERVERS TO SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE AREAS OF FIGHTING; THE RETURN OF THE LEBANESE REFUGEES FROM 1975 TO THE PRESENT TO THEIR HOMES TO BE GUARANTEED, AS WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS.

2.) A COMMITTEE WILL BE FORMED IMMEDIATELY TO SET ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ENTRY OF THE FORCES OF THE LEGAL AUTHORITY SUPPORTED BY THE U.N. AND/OLLTHE MNF TO REPLACE ALL THE FORCES THAT ARE PRESENT ON THE SCENE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE CITIZENS OF ALL DENOMINATIONS, AS WELL AS THEIR PROPERTY.

3.) THE PRESIDENT OF LEBANON TO CALL FOR AN URGENT, COMPREHENSIVE MEETING TO BEGIN THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE IMMEDIATELY; EACH OF THE FOLLOWING WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE MEETING:

-- SPEAKER KAMIL AL-AS'AD, PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

-- THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (MESSRS. FRANJIYYA, KARAMI, JUMBLATT).

--THE LEBANESE FRONT (MESSRS. SHAM'UN, PIERRE GEMAYEL)

-- THE AMAL ORGANIZATION (MR. NABIH BARRI)

-- LIKEWISE, MESSRS. SA'IB SALAM, GHASSAN TUENI, AND JOSEPH SKAFF.

4.) A DELEGATION FROM BOTH FRATERNAL SYRIA AND FRATERNAL SAUDI ARABIA TO ATTEND.

END TEXT.

6. PLEASE NOTE: THE FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL, INELEGANT TRANSLATION THAT HAS GONE THROUGH SEVERAL VERSIONS. IT SHOULD NOT RUMET BECOME DEFINITIVE. WE WILL TRANSMIT A PROPER TRANSLATION ONCE THE FINAL ARABIC TEXT IS AGREED. DILLON

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: STRATEGIC ESCALATION
OF THE BATTLE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
3. ADDRESSEES ARE AWARE OF INTENSE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO ACHIEVE CEASEFIRE AND SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL DIALOGUE TOWARD POLITICAL SOLUTION IN LEBANON. OTHER REPORTING HAS DISCUSSED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THESE EFFORTS INVOLVE GOOD FAITH EFFORT OR SIMPLY A DELAYING TACTIC BY SYRIA WHILE IT IMPROVES ITS POSITION THROUGH SURROGATES ON THE GROUND. EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD DURING NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 10 GIVE FIRM EVIDENCE OF THE LATTER AND MORE IMPORTANTLY HAVE CONSTITUTED SERIOUS THREAT OF DECISIVE MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT WITHIN 24 HOURS. LET US BE CLEAR: LAST NIGHT'S BATTLE WAS WAGED (AT SUQ-AL-GHARB) WITHIN FIVE KILOMETERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE (AND OUR RESIDENCE IN YARZE). FOR THOSE AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THIS WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE ENEMY BEING ON THE ATTACK ON CAPITOL HILL. A SECOND ATTACK AGAINST THE SAME LAF UNIT IS EXPECTED THIS EVENING. LOSSES SUFFERED LAST EVENING IN PERSONNEL, AMMUNITION (WE BELIEVE THEY ARE DOWN TO A DAY AND A HALF OF REMAINING 155MM AMMUNITION) AND MORALE RAISE SERIOUS POSSIBILITY THAT EMENY BRIGADE, WHICH ENJOYS GREATER STRENGTH, RESUPPLY CAPABILITY, AND UNLIMITED FIRE SUPPORT COULD BREAK THROUGH AND PENETRATE THE BEIRUT PERIMETER. IN SHORT, TONIGHT WE COULD BE BEHIND ENEMY LINES.
4. FACED WITH THIS THREAT WHICH PROBABLY CANNOT BE CONTAINED

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BY THE LEBANESE ARMY FOR MUCH LONGER WE MUST DECIDE WHETHER THE US WILL, BY WITHHOLDING DIRECT SUPPORT, ALLOW THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE NEW ELEMENT WHICH SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY ADDRESSED IN OUR CALCULUS IS THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME THE THREAT APPEARS TO BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY FOREIGN. SPECIFICALLY, THE ATTACK LAST EVENING IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY A PLA BRIGADE. IT IS COMPRISED OF PALESTINIAN SOLDIERS COMMANDED BY SYRIAN OFFICERS AND DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY THE SARG. IN SHORT IF TRUE THIS REPRESENTS FOREIGN AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON.

5. OUR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AS AMPLIFIED BY NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE APPROVED SEPTEMBER 10 ALLOW THE USE OF US MILITARY FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE. IN CONSIDERING THE THREAT NOW POSED TO AMERICANS (THE MNF, OTHER US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BEIRUT AND THE US DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE), WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT TO WAIT UNTIL AN ATTACK IS AT OUR DOORSTEP BEFORE RESPONDING WOULD BE TOO LATE. THIS REQUIRES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT ON THE SCENE TO BE ABLE TO DEAL IN A TIMELY FASHION WITH A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER. IN MY JUDGMENT THAT DANGER TO AMERICANS WOULD EXIST IF SYRIAN-SUPPORTED FORCES

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CAPTURE SUQ-AL-GHARB. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS WITHIN OUR CURRENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, IN MY JUDGMENT, TO TAKE ACTION TO PREVENT SUCH A LOSS FROM OCCURRING. TO STATE CLEARLY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT I AM SAYING, I AM RECOMMENDING THAT US FORCES SUPPORT THE LAF IN ITS DEFENSE OF SUQ-AL-GHARB WITH FIRE SUPPORT TO INCLUDE TAC AIR. OTHER MNF FORCES WOULD BE MOST WELCOME IF THE US DECISION IS TAKEN, BUT NOT AT THE COST OF DELAY PAST TONIGHT.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND, AS WE HAVE STRESSED IN RECENT WEEKS, THAT THIS IS NOT A PURELY CIVIL CONFLICT. THIS REALITY WAS UNDERSCORED IN LAST NIGHT'S ACTION BY THE FACT THAT THERE WERE APPARENTLY NO LEBANESE INVOLVED IN THE ATTACKING GROUND FORCES. THE FORCE IS REPORTED TO BE COMPRISED OF A PLA BRIGADE AND IRANIAN ELEMENTS. THE BATTLE WAS SAVAGE AND INCLUDED AXE FIGHTING AND BRUTAL HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT. I DO NOT SAY THIS TO BE MELODRAMATIC BUT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GOL MAY BE THREATENED WITH IMPENDING TAKEOVER BY SURROGATE FOREIGN FORCES. I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTY OF TAKING SUCH A DECISION IN A CLIMATE OF PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL IGNORANCE SUCH AS EXISTS IN THE US TODAY. THE FACT IS, HOWEVER, THAT WE MAY WELL BE AT A TURNING POINT WHICH WILL LEAD IN A MATTER OF DAYS TO A SYRIAN TAKEOVER OF THIS COUNTRY NORTH OF THE AWALI. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS SITUATION BE CONSIDERED BY THE NSC AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR HOURS SO AS TO FACILITATE THE NECESSARY PLANNING AND COORDINATION IF NEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE APPROVED. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF WE DO NOT ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE AND THE ATTACK TAKES PLACE, WE MUST BE READY TO CARRY-OUT AN IMMEDIATE EVACUATION. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT TONIGHT'S ATTACK WILL BE CONTAINED, THAT SYRIA WILL DISCONTINUE ITS SUPPORT AND THAT A CEASEFIRE CAN BE ESTABLISHED. THAT SEEMS UNLIKELY TO ME. EVEN IF WE GET BY TONIGHT, UNLESS WE SEE A CHANGE IN SYRIAN POLICY THE SURVIVAL OF THIS GOVERNMENT IS MEASURED IN DAYS. I SEND THIS CABLE WITH THE EMBARRASSMENT BORNE OF DEALING WITH PEOPLE WHO EXAGGERATE. THE INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING LAST NIGHT'S BATTLE MAY BE INFLATED AND THUS NOTHING MAY HAPPEN TONIGHT. STILL IT IS OUR COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT (MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS/DILLON/~~~~~) THAT THE BALANCE OF FORCES (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SYRIAN SURROGATES AND SYRIAN SUPPLIES) IS LOPSIDEDLY AGAINST THE GOL AND THAT ABSENT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE GOL CANNOT PREVAIL ALONE. THE USE OF U.S. TAC AIR AND FIRE SUPPORT WOULD NOT "WIN THE WAR", BUT COULD PROVIDE THE MUSCLE NEEDED TO GET THE SYRIANS TO BARGAIN SERIOUSLY. BECAUSE THE FORCES EMPLOYED ARE STILL SURROGATES AND NOT DIRECT SARG ARMY, THEY HAVE RETAINED A MEASURE OF DENIABILITY AND HENCE CAN STILL AGREE POLITICALLY WITHOUT A TOTAL LOSS OF FACE. AS YOU KNOW, I AM NOT GIVEN TO HAND WRINGING AND I AM FULLY CONSCIOUS THAT THE COMPETING DEMANDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE MAY HAVE LED US TO A DECISION TO CUT OUR LOSSES. IF SO, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THAT, SO AS TO DEAL IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE GOL AND PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF AMERICANS. DILLON

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BEIRUT 10051

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PRIME MINISTER

This is just to warn you that the
Buccaneers will probably do another
demonstration over the Lebanon tomorrow.
This is because there was a technical
problem during the first demonstration
(when they arrived) which the military
wish to clear up. I do not know the
precise timing but it is likely to be
early tomorrow morning.

A.J.C.

mt

12 September 1983

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Lebanon

The FCO told me at 1000 p.m. that during today the Americans have become very concerned about the situation in the Lebanon. They have been particularly disturbed by what they describe as a defeat for part of the Lebanese army in an engagement which involved, on the other side, some Palestinian forces. We are trying to find out more about this engagement and our Embassy in Beirut has been asked for a full report - there are some indications that it might not have been as serious as the Americans are suggesting.

The National Security Council has met once today already. It is to meet again at about 1100 p.m. our time and we are told that when the meeting is over the President will make a statement. It is not clear what he will say but there have been hints suggesting that the American contingent may be authorised to take offensive action in certain circumstances (we know no more than this). There is no reason to think that Mr. McFarlane's recommendations (discussed at Chequers on Friday) have been accepted in Washington and the French have made it plain that they are firmly opposed to such an approach.

I have asked the Foreign Office to instruct Sir Oliver Wright to try to discover urgently what the President intends to say. This may be difficult because this is presumably what the National Security Council will discuss at 1100 p.m. Sir Oliver will also be told that if he discovers that the proposed statement is likely to involve any significant extension of the mandate for the American contingent or anything else which might be difficult or embarrassing for us he should request prior discussion among the force contributors.

Richard Luce, who is handling this matter in the FCO, has considered whether to recommend that you should ring President Reagan. But he advised against this, largely because we lack sufficient facts at present and because it would be difficult

/ anyway

anyway to get hold of the President. The Americans are of course well aware of our views. Following the Chequers meeting on Friday the Foreign Secretary sent a message to Mr. Shultz making it clear that in our view there was only a role for the MNF so long as there was a credible government and functioning Lebanese armed forces in the Lebanon.

I do not think that there is anything more we can do. It may well be that the President's statement will not involve any new departure. But I thought you should know the present situation.

JOHN COLES

11 September 1983

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DESKBY 120700Z
FM WASHINGTON 120143Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2553 OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1983

LEBANON/MNF: TELECONS WRIGHT/EGERTON

1. EAGLEBURGER HAS JUST RUNG TO TELL ME THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED THIS MORNING THAT THE OCCUPATION OF THE DOMINANT TERRAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE SUQ AL GHARB BY HOSTILE FORCES WOULD ENDANGER THE POSITIONS OF THE U.S. MARINES. THEREFORE A SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE OF THE AREA BY THE LAF IS VITAL TO THE SAFETY OF U.S. PRESENCE.

2. THEREFORE, IF AND WHEN THE U.S. ZONE COMMANDER CONSIDERES THAT THE SUQ AL GHARB IS IN DANGER OF FALLING AS A RESULT OF ATTACKS INVOLVING NON-LEBANESE FORCES, AND IF REQUESTED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, THE U.S. WILL OFFER ASSISTANCE TO THE LAF IN DEFENCE OF THE SUQ AL GHARB. SUCH ASSISTANCE MAY INCLUDE NAVAL SURFACE SUPPORT AND, IF DEEMED NECESSARY, TACTICAL AIR STRIKES. IT WILL NOT (R) NOT INVOLVE GROUND FORCES.

3. SO MUCH FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION-EAGLEBURGER WENT ON TO SAY THAT, ACCORDING TO THEIR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, SUQ AL GHARB WAS NOT UNDER IMMEDIATE THREAT. HE EMPHASSED THAT YOUR CONCERNS, WHICH I HAD TRANSMITTED TO HIM EARLIER IN THE EVENING, HAD HAD A MARKED EFFECT ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, PARTICULARLY IN SETTING STRICT LIMITS TO U.S. CURRENT OBJECTIVES. HE ADDED THAT THE DECISION WOULD NOT BE PUBLICISED AND WAS BEING HELD VERY CLOSELY WITHIN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND HOPED THAT WE WOULD DO THE SAME. THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS, HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CONGRESS, SO LEAKS MIGHT OCCUR, BUT EVEN WITH THE CONGRESS THEY WOULD AVOID THE LEAKAGE OF THE DECISION TO THE LAF.

SECRET

14.

SECRET

4. EAGLEBURGER REPEATED THE REQUEST ALREADY RECEIVED THAT INVINCIBLE AND HER ACCOMPANYING TASK FORCE NOW ENTERING THE MEDITERRANEAN EN ROUTE FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN, SHOULD SPEND SOME TIME IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. BATTLESHIP NEW JERSEY, NOW OFF THE NICARAGUAN PACIFIC COAST, WOULD TRANSIT THE PANAMA CANAL EN ROUTE FOR THE ATLANTIC. SHE HAD NO ORDERS TO ENTER THE MEDITERRANEAN BUT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF NECESSARY.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

WRIGHT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)
LIMITED.

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PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON

COPIES TO

SIR A PARSONS NO 10 DOWNING ST
MOD DS11

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SECRET

PS (6)

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

~~MR J. LEAHY~~

MR EBERTON.

~~MR J. BULLARD~~ Mr. Jones

HD/NENAD

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ADVANCE COPY

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FM WASHINGTON 111630Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2550 OF 11 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK BEIRUT BRITFORLEB PARIS ROME CBFC DAMASCUS

PRIORITY TEL AVIV JEDDA AMMAN CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNO 2546: LEBANON: SITREP

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US THIS MORNING OF A HEAVY ATTACK LAST NIGHT ON THE LAF AT SUQ EL GHARB BY ELEMENTS OF THE PLA AND IRANIANS FROM THE BAALBEK AREA. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE PSP MILITIA HAD BEEN INVOLVED. THE LAF HAD HELD THEIR POSITIONS BUT ONE LAF BATTALION HAD BEEN SEVERELY MAULED AND WAS NO LONGER AN EFFECTIVE UNIT.
2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY CCOUNCIL IS NOW (1530Z) MEETING TO CONSIDER HOW TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF THIS FIGHTING.
3. THE SITUATION AT DEIR EL QAMAR HAS BECOME MORE TENSE. THE ICRC HAVE SUSPENDED THEIR RELIEF EFFORTS AND ARE NOT RETURNING TO THE VILLAGE FOR THE TIME BEING BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING HOSTILITY OF THE DRUZE MILITIA. THE ATTITUDE OF JUMBALATT AND THE LOCAL PSP COMMANDER (TAWFIQ BARAKAT) HAS HARDENED: THEY ARE MAKING LAF WITHDRAWAL FROM SUQ EL GHARB AN PRECONDITION FOR EVEN A LIMITED CEASEFIRE.
4. BANDAR IS STILL IN DAMASCUS, BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE LESS CONFIDENT THAN THEY WERE YESTERDAY ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF ACHIEVING ANYTHING. MCFARLANE INTERPRETS THE PLA/IRANIAN ATTACK ON SUQ EL GHARB AS INDICATING THAT THE SYRIANS ARE NOT NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH.
5. BEIRUT HAS REMAINED QUIET THOUGH THERE ARE REPORTS OF SOME SHELLING OF THE MARINES POSITIONS THIS MORNING.

WRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 101445Z SEPT 1983

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1477 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

INFOOPRIORITY PARIS, ROME

LEBANON/MNF.

1. MY IFT CONTAINS A MESSAGE TO SHULTZ WHICH I SHOULD BE
GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE
SHULTZ MAY BE IN RABAT, HAVING GONE ON THERE FROM MADRID.

HOWE

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PS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J BULLARD

MR EGERTON

COPIES TO

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OO WASHINGTON

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FM FCO 101450Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1478 OF 10 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, ROME

LEBANON/MNF

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

BEGINS. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE AN IDEA OF HOW OUR THOUGHTS ARE DEVELOPING HERE ON THE FUTURE OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT, HOW TO TRY TO HANDLE SYRIA, AND RELATED QUESTIONS. I AM SORRY I HAD TO MISS THE MEETING ON 8 SEPTEMBER WHICH COVERED THIS GROUND AND THAT WE HAD NO OTHER CHANCE TO TALK ABOUT IT IN MADRID.

WHILE THE PRESENT FIGHTING CONTINUES IN LEBANON WE WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO SEE OUR MNF CONTINGENT MOVE INTO ANY PART OF THE SHOUF, EVEN THE FOOTHILLS. WE DO NOT (NOT) ACCEPT THAT THE MNF DETACHMENTS HAVE NO ROLE AT PRESENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THEIR PRESENCE AT THIS CRITICAL TIME IS BOTH A USEFUL GESTURE OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND INHIBITS THE ANTI-GOVERNMENTAL FACTIONS TO SOME EXTENT. THUS THEY DO SOMETHING TO CURB THE TENDENCY TO ALL-OUT CIVIL WAR. BY THE TIME YOU GET THIS MESSAGE, WE SHALL HAVE BUCCANEER STRIKE AIRCRAFT IN PLACE IN CYPRUS TO GIVE OUR TROOPS PROTECTION SHOULD THEY BE FIRED ON BY ANY ENEMY. I AGREE WITH YOUR VIEW THAT IT IS DESIRABLE THAT PEOPLE ROUND AND ABOUT BEIRUT SHOULD NOTE THAT WE INTEND TO PROTECT OUR CONTINGENTS AS FAR AS IS POSSIBLE.

ON THE OTHER HAND I THINK WE SHOULD COMPARE NOTES URGENTLY WITH MNF PARTNERS ON WHAT SHOULD BE OUR REACTION IF THE LAF DID DISINTEGRATE AND THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT BECOMES UNABLE TO CARRY OUT ANY OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF OFFICE. WE SEE THIS SIMPLY AS A PART OF SENSIBLE CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON WHAT ARE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CONTINUANCE OF THE MNF IN LEBANON BECOMES

CONFIDENTIAL

17119 - 1

POINTLESS. PERHAPS I SHOULD ADD THAT BECAUSE OF OTHER COMMITMENT WE CANNOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF OUR PRESENT FORCE.

AS REGARDS SYRIA, I FIND IT PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO MAKE ANY CONVINCING ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN AIMS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT MUST BE EXTRAORDINARILY FRUSTRATING TO DEAL WITH PEOPLE LIKE ASAD AND FIND THAT THE TERMS OF EVERY PEACE FORMULA ARE CHANGED BY DAMASCUS EVEN AS THEY APPEAR ON THE POINT OF BEING AGREED. BUT I THINK THAT ONLY A POLITICAL DEAL WHICH SYRIA CAN PRESENT AS MEETING HER INTERESTS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF LEBANON, HAS ANY CHANCE OF STICKING. IT MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE. IN ANY CASE, I BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD NEED TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY ABOUT ANY PUBLIC MOVE WHICH APPEARED TO PILLORY SYRIA FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS OR, IN PARTICULAR, THREATEN HER WITH FORCE. ANY SUCH THREAT WOULD RISK POLARISING THE ARAB WORLD AROUND SYRIA.

RICHARD LUCE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO LEBANON ABOUT 14 SEPTEMBER TO SEE OUR TROOPS, VISIT THE EMBASSY AND HAVE TALKS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL.

THIS WILL BE A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ALSO OF OUR CONCERN THAT TIME MAY NOT BE ON ITS SIDE.

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FM WASHINGTON 101630Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2546 OF 10 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK BEIRUT BRITFORLEB PARIS ROME

PRIORITY DAMASCUS TEL AVIV JEDDA CBFC AMMAN CAIRO UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 2531: LEBANON

1. MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD US TODAY THAT AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE A LITTLE CLOSER AS A RESULT OF PRINCE BANDAR'S FURTHER TALKS IN DAMASCUS ON THE SAUDI 4 - POINT PLAN. THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUE WAS THE ROLE OF THE LAF IN SUPERVISING ANY SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CHOUF. A VENUE FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEADERS HAD YET TO BE AGREED. MCFARLANE HOPES TO SEE BANDAR SHORTLY IN EITHER LARNACA OR BEIRUT.
2. THE AMERICANS WERE STILL TRYING IN BOTH DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO A LOCAL CEASEFIRE IN QABR CHAMOUN AND DEIR EL QAMAR. THE ICRC HAD SENT MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO DEIR EL QAMAR BUT THE DRUZE WERE NOT ALLOWING FOOD INTO THE VILLAGE WHILE QABR CHAMOUN REMAINED UNDER ATTACK. THE AMERICANS NOW ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE 20,000 - 25,000 CHRISTIANS IN DEIR EL QAMAR.
3. BEIRUT HAD AGAIN BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET. THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN US MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF REPORTED MASSACRES OF CHRISTIANS AT BIREH (NORTH OF DEIR EL QAMAR) AND MAGDEL BAROUK.
4. MACK SAID THAT CRAXI HAD SUGGESTED TO THE US AMBASSADOR IN ROME THAT IF THE MNF SUSTAINED ANY MORE CASUALTIES IT SHOULD RESPOND AS A JOINT FORCE. THIS SEEMED A SENSIBLE IDEA, BUT MACK DID NOT KNOW WHAT ADDITIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN BEIRUT TO IMPLEMENT IT.

WRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM NO. 2545 OF 10 SEPTEMBER FROM WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 2531: LEBANON

1. Mack (State Department) told us today that an agreement might be a little closer as a result of Prince Bandar's further talks in Damascus on the Saudi 4-point plan. The main outstanding issue was the role of the LAF in supervising any security arrangements in the Chouf. A venue for the meeting between Gemayel and other leaders had yet to be agreed. Mcfarlane hopes to see Bandar shortly in either Larnaca or Beirut.
2. The Americans were still trying in both Damascus and Beirut to secure agreement to a local ceasefire in Qabr Chamoun and Deir El Qamar. The ICRC had sent medical supplies to Deir El Qamar but the Druze were not allowing food into the village while Qabr Chamoun remained under attack. The Americans now estimate that there are 20,000 - 25,000 Christians in Deir El Qamar.
3. Beirut had again been relatively quiet. There had been no change in US military deployments. The State Department have no confirmation of reported massacres of Christians at Bireh (North of Deir El Qamar) and Magdel Barouk.
4. Mack said that Craxi had suggested to the US Ambassador in Rome that if the MNF sustained any more casualties it should respond as a joint force. This seemed a sensible idea, but Mack did not know what additional command and control arrangements would be required in Beirut to implement it.

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FM BEIRUT 101230Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 496 OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE CBFC, BRITFORLEB

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, NICOSIA.

YOUR TELNO 368: PROTECTION FOR BRITISH CONTINGENT IN THE MNF.

1. I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY ON 10 SEPTEMBER TO THE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY ADVISER.

2. DR HADDAD SAID THAT A SORTIE FOR THE PURPOSES DESCRIBED WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. HIS VIEW WAS THAT IT WOULD TEND TO FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN THE REVERSE. HE WOULD INFORM THE PRESIDENT AND THE ARMY COMMANDER IMMEDIATELY.



3. COMMANDER BRITFORLEB IS INFORMING THE LEBANESE ARMY AND OTHER MNF COMMANDERS.

4. IF THERE IS ANY CHANGE, I WILL INFORM YOU AND CBFC BY FLASH TELEGRAM.

5. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE RESIDENT CLERK WOULD INFORM MOD AND THE NEPAD DUTY OFFICER OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS TELEGRAM.

PALMER

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Chequers 10/9

PS (6)

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR J LEAHY

MR EGERTON

~~SIR J BULLARD~~ MR JAMES.

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FM BEIRUT 101315Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 499 OF 10 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, DAMASCUS, MODUK,
BRITFORLEB

PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME, MOSCOW.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 799, 800 AND 801: LEBANON.

1. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND DOES NOT (REPEAT NOT) SEEM TO BE DETERIORATING FAST (CF PARA 8 OF THIRD TUR).
2. THERE IS A NOTE OF SLIGHT OPTIMISM IN TODAY'S (10 SEPTEMBER) LOCAL PRESS REPORTING OF THE PRESENT SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN BEIRUT, CYPRUS AND DAMASCUS.
3. AS THE ADA'S REPORTING OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS HAS SUGGESTED, THE BATTLE LINES IN THE SHOUF HAVE BECOME MORE CLEARLY DRAWN. IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE LEBANESE FORCES (KATA'IB) AND THE DRUZE, THE LATTER HAVE THE UPPER HAND. THE LEBANESE FORCES ARE MAKING SOME PROGRESS ONLY IN THE SECTOR KFARMATTA, ABEY AND QABB SHAMOUN. ON OTHER MAIN FRONTS THEY HAVE EITHER STAGNATED

IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE LEBANESE FORCES (KATAIB) AND THE DRUZE, THE LATTER HAVE THE UPPER HAND. THE LEBANESE FORCES ARE MAKING SOME PROGRESS ONLY IN THE SECTOR KFARMATTA, ABAY AND QABR SHAMOUN. ON OTHER MAIN FRONTS THEY HAVE EITHER EVACUATED OR BEEN OVERRUN.

4. THE LEBANESE ARMY HAVE DEPLOYED INTO POSITIONS IN THE FOOTHILLS SURROUNDING BEIRUT FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE PSP AND THEIR ALLIES TO DISLODGE THEM. THEY COULD MOVE, I THINK, WITH EASE FURTHER INTO THE HILLS IN THE VICINITY OF ARAMOUN/QABR SHAMOUN, BUT THEY APPEAR CURRENTLY NOT TO BE ENTERING DRUZE VILLAGES AS A MATTER OF POLICY.

5. THE WELL-PUBLICISED PRONOUNCEMENT ON 9 SEPTEMBER BY WALID JUMBLATT FROM DAMASCUS THAT THE REFUGEES IN DEIR AL QAMR WILL NOT BE BOMBARDED AND THE NEWS THAT AN ICRC CONVOY HAS REACHED THE BELEAGUED TOWN HAVE BROUGHT SOME RELIEF IN THAT SECTOR.

6. ON THE MILITARY FRONT, THINGS SEEM TO BE MOVING TOWARDS A STALEMATE, AT LEAST SO FAR AS THE LAF AND THE PSP (AND ALLIES) ARE CONCERNED. GIVEN CURRENT ACTIVITY ON THE NEGOTIATING FRONT, THE POLITICAL SITUATION APPEARS TO BE CATCHING UP WITH THE MILITARY. IF THERE IS A CEASEFIRE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, MY GUESS IS THAT IT WILL BE BECAUSE THE SYRIANS AND THEIR ALLIES HAVE CALCULATED THAT THEY HAVE MORE TO GAIN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE THAN ON THE BATTLE FIELD. I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF CARRIER-BORNE FORCES OFF THE LEBANESE COAST, AND THE THREAT BY MNF CONTRIBUTORS TO USE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AGAINST THEIR POSITIONS IF ATTACKED, ARE HAVING SOME EFFECT. THE PROSPECTS FOR A CEASEFIRE LOOK SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN THEY DID ONLY TWO DAYS AGO.

PALMER

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A.S.C. $\frac{12}{9}$

h.a.

Nicky ✓

This is the agreed
set of Rules of Engagement
which you may like to
have to hand.

[No legal advisers are content]
They have been sent to
Cyprus etc.

~~I'll probably give you a
ring in the morning to
let you know how things
go.~~

~~He's hoping for a quiet night!~~
Theresa Robertson

10 September 1983

Security Classification ----- 15 spaces ----->

SECRET

MOD Form 140

Message Instructions ----- 15 spaces ----->

Precedences

ACTION

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INFO

ROUTINE

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SEP 83

FROM

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BRITFORLEB

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I9E

1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. THE FOLLOWING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY HMG AND ARE IN FORCE NOW FOR YOUR USE IN AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOR BRITFORLEB.

A. ROE 1. PURPOSE. A NON FIRING SHOW OF STRENGTH OVER BEIRUT. AMPLIFICATION. THIS SHOWS A BRITISH AIR PRESENCE. IT CAN HAVE AN ELEMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE. IT WILL EXERCISE OUR COMMAND, COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, WHICH INVOLVE TASKING OF THE AIRCRAFT BY CBF CYPRUS, FORWARD AIR CONTROL BY BRITFORLEB, AND COORDINATION WITH US FORCES. NO OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN BY OUR AIRCRAFT ON THIS MISSION. TO BE CARRIED OUT BY BUCCANEER AIRCRAFT, WHICH MAY BE

Special Distribution
See note 9

File Reference

DRAFTER'S NAME
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Extension

Branch

RELEASING OFFICER'S
SignaturePage1.....
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classified message?
(Answer YES or No in box)Grade/
RankName
(Block letters)

PRECEDENCE—
Action Info

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DATE—TIME—GROUP

MOD FORM 140A
(continuation sheet)

IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

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ACCOMPANIED BY AIR DEFENCE PHANTOM AIRCRAFT IF THE SITUATION SO DEMANDS.

THIS WILL BE EXECUTED ON SUN 11 SEP, SEE SEPARATE SIGNAL.

B. ROE 2. PURPOSE. REACTION TO ATTACK ON BRITISH FORCES LEBANON
WHEN UNDER FIRE.

AMPLIFICATION. COMBRITFORLEB IS EMPOWERED TO CALL FOR AND DIRECT
BUCCANEER AIRCRAFT IN REACTION TO AN ARTILLERY ATTACK IF HIS POSITION
HAS BEEN HIT. HE WILL MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THE AIRCRAFT ARE REQUESTED
FOR A SHOW OF STRENGTH OR FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. AIRCRAFT MAY BE DIRECTED
TO ATTACK ANY HOSTILE GUN POSITIONS KNOWN TO COMBRITFORLEB THROUGH UK OR
MNF OR US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. LASER DESIGNATED BOMBS WILL BE USED
TO MINIMISE DAMAGE IN LOCALITY OF TARGET.

AIR ATTACKS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH US FORCES.

C. ROE 3. PURPOSE. IMMEDIATE DEFENCE OF BRITISH FORCE LEBANON
WHEN UNDER DIRECT ATTACK.

AMPLIFICATION. COMBRITFORLEB IS EMPOWERED TO CALL FOR AND DIRECT
BUCCANEER AIRCRAFT IF HIS POSITION IS UNDER ATTACK OR IMMINENT THREAT
OF ATTACK FROM ENEMY FORCES AND HIS OWN WEAPONS ARE NOT ABLE TO
NEUTRALISE THIS ATTACK.

AIRCRAFT MAY BE DIRECTED TO ATTACK TARGETS VISIBLE TO COMBRITFORLEB
FORCES AND WHICH ARE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ATTACK ON COMBRITFORLEB.

AIR ATTACKS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH US FORCES.

D. ROE 4. PURPOSE. ASSISTANCE TO OPERATION BY THE MNF AS A WHOLE.

AMPLIFICATION. COMBRITFORLEB MAY REQUEST BUCCANEER AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK
POSITIONS KNOWN TO BE HOSTILE TO MNF FORCES. THIS ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN
AT THE REQUEST OF MNF AMBASSADORS AND IS TO BE EXECUTED IN CONJUNCTION

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PRECEDENCE— Action / Info	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DATE—TIME—GROUP	MOD FORM 140A (continuation sheet)
IMMEDIATE / IMMEDIATE	SECRET		

WITH US FORCES (WHO WILL CARRY OUT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN ALL THE MNF PARTICIPANTS). LASER DESIGNATED BOMBS ARE TO BE USED TO MINIMISE DAMAGE IN THE LOCALITY OF THE TARGETS.

2. ACTIONS UNDER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 1 (ONE) 2 (TWO) AND 4 (FOUR) NEED MINISTERIAL APPROVAL. SEE DIRECTIVE BEING PASSED SEPARATELY SPECIFYING CHAIN OF COMMAND AND PROCEDURES. RULE OF ENGAGEMENT 3 (THREE) CAN BE USED NOW ON CBF CYPRUS AUTHORITY.

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See note 9

File Reference

DRAFTER'S NAME
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LT COL J M A NURTON

Extension

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J M A NURTON

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM WHICH IS ATTACHED BELOW

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM WASHINGTON TO FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2532 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

MIPT: LEBANON

1. Following is text of the State Department Statement:

Begins

During the recent, bitter and tragic factional fighting that has erupted between Christian and Druze militias in Lebanon, innocent civilian lives are needlessly being taken in terrible acts of vengeance. Druze and Christian alike have fallen victim and are equally threatened.

We condemn the senseless loss of life. It can only serve to aggravate the bitterness and hatred that already exists. Lebanon has endured too much bloodshed through the many years of fighting. Further bloodshed can in no way serve the cause of peace and national harmony and is a blight on humanity.

The United States calls for an immediate cease-fire and we appeal to all those involved in the fighting to respect human life and alleviate the suffering that war has brought. Nothing good can come of indiscriminate killing, regardless of its perpetrators or its victims. Lebanon owes it to itself to turn a new page in its tragic history so that peace and human decency can prevail.

Ends.

Refused
10/9

MR WICE
PS/PUS
SIR J LEECH
MR EVERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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FM WASHINGTON 092111Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2532 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, ROUTINE MOSCOW, BRITFORLID, PARIS, POPE,
UNIS, NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, AMMAN AND CAIRO

MIPT : LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT:


BEGINS

DURING THE RECENT, BITTER AND TRAGIC FACTIONAL FIGHTING
THAT HAS ERUPTED BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND DRUZE MILITIAS IN LEBANON,
INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES ARE NEEDLESSLY BEING TAKEN IN TERRIBLE ACTS
OF VENGEANCE. DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN ALIKE HAVE FALLEN VICTIM AND ARE
EQUALLY THREATENED.

WE CONDEMN THE SENSELESS LOSS OF LIFE. IT CAN ONLY SERVE TO
AGGRAVATE THE BITTERNESS AND HATRED THAT ALREADY EXISTS. LEBANON HAS
ENDURED TOO MUCH BLOODSHED THROUGH THE MANY YEARS OF FIGHTING.
FURTHER BLOODSHED CAN IN NO WAY SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND NATIONAL
HARMONY AND IS A BLIGHT ON HUMANITY.

THE UNITED STATES CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND WE APPEAL
TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING TO RESPECT HUMAN LIFE AND
ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING THAT WAR HAS BROUGHT. NOTHING GOOD CAN COME
OF INDISCRIMINATE KILLING, REGARDLESS OF ITS PERPETRATORS OR ITS
VICTIMS. LEBANON OWES IT TO ITSELF TO TURN A NEW PAGE IN ITS TRAGIC
HISTORY SO THAT PEACE AND HUMAN DECENCY CAN PREVAIL.
ENDS

*Lebanon
Feb 1983
rt 4*



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MR ~~EBERTON~~
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FM WASHINGTON 092111Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2532 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, ROUTINE MODUK, BRITFORLEB, PARIS, ROME,
UKMIS, NEW YORK, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, AMMAN AND CAIRO

MIPT : LEBANON

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT:

BEGINS

DURING THE RECENT, BITTER AND TRAGIC FACTIONAL FIGHTING THAT HAS ERUPTED BETWEEN CHRISTIAN AND DRUZE MILITIAS IN LEBANON, INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES ARE NEEDLESSLY BEING TAKEN IN TERRIBLE ACTS OF VENGEANCE. DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN ALIKE HAVE FALLEN VICTIM AND ARE EQUALLY THREATENED.

WE CONDEMN THE SENSELESS LOSS OF LIFE. IT CAN ONLY SERVE TO AGGRAVATE THE BITTERNESS AND HATRED THAT ALREADY EXISTS. LEBANON HAS ENDURED TOO MUCH BLOODSHED THROUGH THE MANY YEARS OF FIGHTING. FURTHER BLOODSHED CAN IN NO WAY SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND NATIONAL HARMONY AND IS A BLIGHT ON HUMANITY.

THE UNITED STATES CALLS FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND WE APPEAL TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING TO RESPECT HUMAN LIFE AND ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING THAT WAR HAS BROUGHT. NOTHING GOOD CAN COME OF INDISCRIMINATE KILLING, REGARDLESS OF ITS PERPETRATORS OR ITS VICTIMS. LEBANON OWES IT TO ITSELF TO TURN A NEW PAGE IN ITS TRAGIC HISTORY SO THAT PEACE AND HUMAN DECENCY CAN PREVAIL.

ENDS

WRIGHT

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FM WASHINGTON 092114Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2531 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BEIRUT, BRITFORLEB, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW
YORK, PRIORITY DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, AMMAN AND CAIRO

LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. MCFARLANE IS MEETING PRINCE BANDAR AND WADIE HADDAD IN LARNACA TO
PURSUE THE SAUDI SETTLEMENT PLAN. SEPARATE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A
LIMITED CEASEFIRE IN QABR CHAMOUN AND DEIR EL QAMAR. STATE
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CALLS FOR A IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE.

2. A QUIETER DAY IN BEIRUT. CAUTIOUS LAF ADVANCE IN FOOTHILLS
OF THE CHOUF. LF ATTACK ON QABR CHAMOUN. THE DRUZE ARE BESIEGING
DEIR EL QAMAR. MORE EVIDENCE OF PALESTINIAN INVOLVEMENT WITH THE
DRUZE. ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS NORTH OF THE AWWALI RIVER.
NO CHANGE IN ROLE OF U S MARINES.

DETAIL

3. PELLETREAU BRIEFED MNF CONTRIBUTORS THIS AFTERNOON. MCFARLANE WAS STILL WORKING ON THE SAUDI PLAN WHICH HAD FULL U S SUPPORT. HE WAS MEETING HADDAD AND PRINCE BANDAR IN LARNACA TO STUDY THE LATEST SYRIAN AND DRUZE ATTITUDES. PELLETREAU THOUGHT THAT EVEN THE SYRIANS WANTED THIS EFFORT TO SUCCEED THOUGH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT STILL SUSPECTED THEM OF PLAYING FOR TIME IN THE HOPE THAT THEIR ALLIES WOULD IMPROVE THEIR POSITION IN THE CURRENT FIGHTING.

4. PELLETREAU SAID THAT THE SYRIANS AND DRUZE HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE ENTRY OF THE LAF INTO THE CHOUF BUT THERE WERE STILL PROBLEMS OVER TIMING AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS. IT WAS NOW ENVISAGED THAT SYRIAN AND SAUDI REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD ATTEND THE MEETING BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS, THUS UNDERLINING THE ARAB NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD NO OBJECTION AND THE AMERICANS SAW ADVANTAGE IN INVOLVING THE SYRIANS CONSTRUCTIVELY. THE SYRIANS AND DRUZE WERE HOWEVER TRYING TO LIMIT ATTENDANCE ON THE CHRISTIAN SIDE, ARGUING THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND PHALANGE WERE ONE AND THE SAME. VENUE WAS ALSO A PROBLEM: LARNACA OR JEDDA WERE POSSIBILITIES. IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS THE SYRIANS HAD NOT BROUGHT UP THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT: THEY PROBABLY ASSUMED THAT ANY NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO IMPLEMENT IT. THE AMERICANS HAD WARNED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT NOT TO DISCARD IT: IT REPRESENTED THE ONLY ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO LEAVE LEBANON.

5. PELLETREAU UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS WERE INVOLVED IN PARALLEL EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF MCFARLANE'S. THE ITALIAN SAID THAT JUMBLATT HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE CRAXI'S INVITATION TO ROME THIS WEEKEND. THE FRENCHMAN WOULD NOT BE DRAWN: HE HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE REPORTED PRESENCE IN PARIS OF JUMBLATT'S AIDE, MARWAN HAMADE.

6. PELLETREAU SAID THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN DEIR EL QAMAR AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER MASSACRES. THEY HAD APPEALED FOR AMERICAN HELP. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE ISSUING A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MIFT) CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. HE SUGGESTED THAT A FURTHER STATEMENT ON THE SAME GENERAL LINES MIGHT BE ISSUED JOINTLY BY MNF CONTRIBUTORS, PREFERABLY IN BEIRUT IN ORDER TO HAVE THE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE PARTIES. AMBASSADOR DILLON WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS SOON WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN BEIRUT.

7. THE AMERICANS WERE CONVEYING TO JUMBLATT A THREE POINT PROPOSAL

THE AMERICANS WILL BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT ACTIONS GOING BEYOND DEFENCE OF THE MNF. CERTAINLY PELLETREAU GAVE NO HINT TODAY THAT HE SAW A NEED FOR GREATER PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS ON THE LINES SUGGESTED BY MCFARLANE (BEIRUT TELNO 489). THE FRENCH EMBASSY HAVE TOLD US THAT PARIS IS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION.

WRIGHT

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3. PELLETREAU BRIEFED MNF CONTRIBUTORS THIS AFTERNOON. MCFARLANE WAS STILL WORKING ON THE SAUDI PLAN WHICH HAD FULL U S SUPPORT. HE WAS MEETING HADDAD AND PRINCE BANDAR IN LARNACA TO STUDY THE LATEST SYRIAN AND DRUZE ATTITUDES. PELLETREAU THOUGHT THAT EVEN THE SYRIANS WANTED THIS EFFORT TO SUCCEED THOUGH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT STILL SUSPECTED THEM OF PLAYING FOR TIME IN THE HOPE THAT THEIR ALLIES WOULD IMPROVE THEIR POSITION IN THE CURRENT FIGHTING.

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7. THE AMERICANS WERE CONVEYING TO JUMBLATT A THREE POINT PROPOSAL

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 529 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, ROME, WASHINGTON AND MODUK

YOUR TELNO 261 (NOT REPEATED) : LEBANON/MNF

1. AT ANDREOTTI'S SUGGESTION THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE 4 MNF CONTRIBUTOR COUNTRIES TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF THEIR PRESENCE HERE FOR THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE TO MEET FOR AN HOUR ON 8 SEPTEMBER TO COMPARE NOTES ABOUT LEBANON. BULLARD REPRESENTED YOU.

2. CHEYSSON AND SHULTZ WERE FULL OF PRAISE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEBANESE ARMY IN BEIRUT. BUT THIS WAS SEEN AS THE ONLY RAY OF LIGHT IN A SOMBRE PICTURE. CHEYSSON DESCRIBED HOW THE FRENCH HQ HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY SHELLLED BY 2 155 MM GUNS FROM POSITIONS IN SYRIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORY, AND HOW THE SHELLING HAD CEASED WITHIN MINUTES OF HIS TELEPHONING KHADDAM, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD SAID HE COULD NOT IMAGINE HOW THE GUNS CAME TO BE THERE.

3. ANDREOTTI MENTIONED THE LEBANESE REQUEST TO THE MNF TO HELP EVACUATE STRANDED CHRISTIANS IN DEIR AL QAMR (BEIRUT TELNO 484). BULLARD SUGGESTED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO DOUBT LIKE TO SEE THE MNF AND PERHAPS UNIFIL TOO MOVE INTO THE SHOUF, BUT THAT THE MNF HAD BETTER STICK TO ITS MANDATE, ITS AREA AND ITS ROLE. OTHERS AGREED.

4. SHULTZ THEN SAID THAT IF NOT GOING BEYOND THE MANDATE WAS ONE SIDE OF THE COIN, THE OTHER WAS CARRYING THAT MANDATE OUT. THE MNF SHOULD NOT ONLY HELP THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES BUT ALSO DEFEND ITSELF. THE US WAS MORE AND MORE INCLINED TO FIRE BACK WHEN FIRED ON. WE SHOULD SHOW 'THE PEOPLE SURROUNDING BEIRUT' THAT OUR MEN WOULD PROTECT THEMSELVES AND NOT MERELY ALLOW ARTILLERY TO TAKE FREE SHOTS AT THEM. SHULTZ MENTIONED RECENT US PRECAUTIONARY MOVES (USS EISENHOWER, 2000 MARINES) AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN WHAT OTHER CONTRIBUTORS MIGHT BE DOING ON THESE LINES.

5. BULLARD SAID THAT THE BRITISH CONTINGENT WAS PERHAPS IN A SPECIAL POSITION, BEING SMALLER AND EQUIPPED FOR MAINLY RECONNAISSANCE, A ROLE WHICH IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BECOME VERY DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT. (ANDREOTTI INTERJECTED THAT HE WISHED THE BRITISH CONTINGENT COULD BE INCREASED.) WE WERE THERE ON TWO POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS: THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS PLAYING A NATIONAL AND NOT A SECTARIAN ROLE, AND THAT ITS PEACE EFFORTS WERE CONTINUING. HE HOPED THAT THESE WERE STILL VALID.

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6. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE US HAD BEEN URGING JEMAYEL TO BROADEN THE BASE OF HIS GOVERNMENT. (ANDREOTTI SAID THAT JEMAYEL HAD OFFERED TO DO SO: JUMBLATT'S JOURNEY TO ROME WAS IN THIS CONNEXION.) BUT THERE WERE 2 PROBLEMS: THE DIFFERENCES IN THE SHOUF, AND SYRIA'S EFFORTS TO REPLACE OR CHANGE THE JEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. JEMAYEL WAS SINCERE IN WHAT HE SAID ABOUT NATIONAL UNITY, AND HE HAD THE ARMED FORCES TO HELP HIM. BUT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WITH ITS CONFESSIONAL COMPOSITION WAS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ON THE SHOUF.

7. SHULTZ FEARED THAT THE PASSAGE OF TIME WAS NOT HELPING. THE ISRAELIS DID NOT WANT A PARTITIONED LEBANON. GIVEN ANY KIND OF REASONABLE CONDITIONS, THEY WOULD WITHDRAW. BUT IF THEY SAW SIGNS OF A "SYRIA-PLO LEBANON" TAKING SHAPE THEY WOULD "TAKE STEPS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES", WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A GREATER ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH THAN WAS DESIRABLE. THERE WAS A DANGEROUS IMPRESSION IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT ISRAEL WAS ON THE RETREAT IN LEBANON. ISRAEL COULD EASILY BECOME AGGRESSIVE AGAIN, AND THE ARABS WERE WRONG TO DISCOUNT HER POWER. THE US WAS DOING WHAT IT COULD TO KEEP ISRAEL COOL, AND THIS WAS PART OF MACFARLANE'S FUNCTION. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THAT THIS DESCRIPTION OF THE ARAB MOOD WAS PERHAPS MORE TRUE OF SYRIA THAN OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES, WHO SIMPLY FELT HELPLESS.

8. AS IF SUMMING UP, SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE WERE THINGS THE MNF COULD AND MUST CONTINUE TO DO, BUT THE URGENT TASK OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS "TO CONSTRUCT SOME RECONCILIATIONS OF THE INTERNAL TENSIONS". MEANWHILE THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS SHOULD NOT FLINCH.

9. ANDREOTTI SAID THAT THE ITALIAN CONTINGENT WOULD CERTAINLY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE COST OF 300 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR WAS A STRAIN ON A DEFENCE BUDGET ALREADY STRETCHED. HE HAD SOUGHT TO PERSUADE THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER TO PROVIDE SOME TROOPS, BUT THE LATTER HAD EXCLUDED ANY POSSIBILITY OF JOINING A NON-UN FORCE.

10. SHULTZ SPECULATED ABOUT A JAPANESE CONTINGENT, BUT THOUGHT THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE SOUGHT IN A PERIOD OF RELATIVE STABILITY SUCH AS THE PRESENT WAS NOT.

11. BULLARD SAID THAT BRITAIN VALUED THE BRIEFINGS FOR MNF CONTRIBUTOR EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON. WITH EVENTS MOVING FAST IT WAS A GROUP THAT COULD NOT MEET TOO OFTEN.

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12. IT WAS AGREED TO TELL THE PRESS SIMPLY THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS
HAD TAKEN THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AND COMPARE NOTES.

FCO PLEASE REPEAT ELSEWHERE AS NECESSARY.

PARSONS

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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cc FCO

JR

cc Master



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 September 1983

LEBANON: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR BUCCANEER AIRCRAFT

There was a brief meeting at Chequers this afternoon to consider the Rules of Engagement for the Buccaneer aircraft which have been despatched to Cyprus to provide support for the British contingent in the Multi National Force. The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by the Defence Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Pattie, Mr. Stanley, Mr. Luce and officials.

Draft Rules of Engagement, circulated by the Ministry of Defence, were considered and amended in the light of the discussion, and approved.

BF | I should be grateful if you could arrange for a copy of the approved version to be sent to me, Brian Fall and Richard Hatfield, to both of whom I am copying this letter.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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SUBJECT

CC Master
of

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 September 1983

Dear Brian,

LEBANON

At the beginning of this afternoon's meeting at Chequers to consider our strategy in the Middle East, there was some discussion of the current situation in the Lebanon and the position of the British contingent in the Multi National Force. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr. Luce, Mr. Pattie, Mr. Stanley, the Chief of the Defence Staff and officials were present.

The Prime Minister stated that the Rules of Engagement for the Buccaneers which had been sent to Cyprus to provide support for the British contingent had just been approved in a smaller meeting. It was now necessary to consider broader questions relating to the future and purpose of the MNF. It was desirable that any change in policy on the MNF should be agreed by all the contributing countries. But we had an obligation to consider the circumstances in which we would judge that it was wise to withdraw the Force.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave an account of the latest situation in the Lebanon, based on recent telegrams. France and Italy were content to keep their contingents in the Lebanon in support of the Lebanese Government. The United States were strongly opposed to withdrawal of the Force, though they appeared to agree that it could not take over the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Mr. MacFarlane, the US negotiator now in the area, had told our representative in Beirut, together with representatives of the other contributors, that he would recommend to President Reagan that the latter should identify Syria as the main obstacle to progress and support this statement with a clear warning to the Syrians that they might encounter American action if they persisted in their present policy. Another American source had asked us whether it would be possible to position HMS Invincible off the Lebanese coast. It appeared that a number of ideas were current in Washington but it was not at all clear how much support they had in the higher reaches of the Administration. In particular, Sir Oliver Wright had reported that he would expect the US Administration to be very

/ cautious

cautious in their attitude to any recommendations made by Mr. MacFarlane, as described above. We needed to give Sir Oliver and other British representatives clear instructions on our attitude to the current situation.

The Prime Minister said that we should make it plain that we were not prepared to despatch HMS Invincible to the area. Nor were we prepared to increase the British contingent as the Italians had suggested. Similarly, we could not agree to an extension of the mandate of the MNF whose function at present was to support the Lebanese Government in the area of Greater Beirut. The proposed recommendations of Mr. MacFarlane were alarming and it was to be hoped that they would not be accepted by the US Administration. If necessary, we should have to make our position ~~to~~ them plain. We should also attempt to check any US tendency to regard Syrian actions as inspired by the Soviet Union.

If the credibility of the Lebanese Government collapsed and the Lebanese Armed Forces were not able to carry out their role, the conditions for the maintenance of the MNF would have disappeared. The present situation was very dangerous and we had to note that there was now a significant increase in the American forces off Beirut. It was desirable to begin discussing with the other contributors the circumstances under which it might become necessary to bring the role of the MNF to an end.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was some danger of causing difficulty in our relations with the Arab countries if it became known that we were suggesting the departure of the MNF. The Prime Minister observed that this danger could be averted by putting the proposition in the positive rather than in the negative sense, i.e. that so long as the Lebanese Government and its Armed Forces remained credible, the MNF should continue to carry out its functions. But it was clearly necessary, particularly given the apparent attitude of the other contributors, that we should begin to inject the thought that there were circumstances in which the Force should leave the Lebanon.

The Chief of the Defence Staff said that we had never expected the British contingent to perform a military role. It had deliberately been kept small and everything possible was being done to give it the protection which it might need. But there was the wider concern that the MNF might get sucked into the current fighting. Given the Soviet involvement in Syria and the American military build-up, the ingredients of a serious situation were present.

The Prime Minister concluded the meeting by asking the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to send an up-to-date statement of our attitude to HM Ambassador in Washington and other representatives who needed to be aware of it. She also asked Sir Geoffrey Howe to consider sending a message to Mr. Shultz explaining our current thinking.

/ I am copying

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- 3 -

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Col.

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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File
CC FCO

cc Master



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

8 September 1983

Dear Richard,

Lebanon: Multi-National Force

The Prime Minister held a meeting at Chequers this afternoon at which the situation in the Lebanon and in particular the position of the British contingent in the Multi-National Force were discussed. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Chief of the Defence Staff, Sir Antony Acland, Sir Clive Whitmore, Mr. Blelloch and Sir Anthony Parsons were present.

The Prime Minister observed that the role of the Multi-National Force in the present situation was unclear. She did not believe that we could leave British soldiers for long in an exposed position without a clear aim and instructions. The Chief of the Defence Staff said that the force had never had a significant military task but it had been helpful in showing our interest in the area and demonstrated our solidarity with the United States. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the effective role of the force had been to provide support for the Lebanese Government. A meeting of the contributors was taking place in Madrid today and the outcome could be expected to be known within a few hours. He believed that we should try to act in cooperation with other participants in the force and consider whether a changed role was possible or desirable. The United States had shown no sign of wishing to remove their contingent. So long as there was a credible government in the Lebanon with a chance of improving its position, the Multi-National Force probably ought to remain. But it might be that events were now moving in the opposite direction.

The Defence Secretary said that the French and the Americans had made it plain that they would retaliate if there was further firing upon their own contingents. At present we ourselves had no capacity to retaliate and had issued no similar warning. The Chief of the Defence Staff stated that it would be possible to send six Buccaneer aircraft to Akrotiri. They could be in position there by the morning of 10 September. This would be an escalatory step. The Prime Minister said that in her view it would be a natural precaution, particularly since the United States and France already had the capability to protect their own people.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Foreign Minister for Cyprus had told him yesterday in Madrid that the

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Government of Cyprus had declined to allow the United States to use Larnaca for purposes connected with the Lebanon. So it was possible that if we despatched Buccaneers to Cyprus there would be enquiries from the Cypriot Government as to their purpose. It was pointed out, on the other hand, that Buccaneers frequently went to Cyprus and it might well be that the Cypriots would not be able to sustain any objection to their presence.

The Chief of the Defence Staff said that there were two subsidiary ideas - that we should send out weapons for the Phantoms which were already in Cyprus and that we should speed up the arrival of HMS INVINCIBLE which could be off the coast of the Lebanon next Monday (but its aircraft were not really suitable for the purpose). The Prime Minister expressed the view that the arrival of HMS INVINCIBLE would be more escalatory than Buccaneers. This would be an over-reaction. Sir Clive Whitmore observed that another possibility was to ask the Americans to provide, temporarily, protection for our contingent.

Following further discussion the Prime Minister stated that it was agreed that:

- (a) The Buccaneers should be despatched as soon as possible and it was hoped that they could arrive well before Saturday morning.
- (b) We should meanwhile ask the Americans to provide protection.
- (c) The MOD would issue, at the time they judged appropriate, a statement to the effect that the Buccaneers were on a routine training mission and would also be available for the protection of the British contingent.
- (d) As regards other matters, we should await a report on the meeting in Madrid of the force contributors.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

*Yours ever
John Colan.*

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

S E C R E T

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PS/MR LUCE
PS/FUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SPERTON
SIR J BULLARD
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 2509 OF 8 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS ROME UENIS NEW YORK MADRID BRITFORLES MADRID
(FOR SIR J BULLARD)

INFO PRIORITY BHMAN CAIRO DAMASCUS TEL AVIV JEDDA TUNIS.

BEIRUT TELS 805 484 - 486 (NOT TO MADRID); LEBANON

1. PELLETREAU BRIEFED US IN GENERAL TERMS THIS MORNING.
HE WAS NOT CALLING A FORMAL MEETING OF MWF CONTRIBUTORS HERE BECAUSE
SMULTZ INTENDED TO BRIEF AND CONSULT HIS MWF COLLEAGUES IN MADRID
TODAY OR TOMORROW.

POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

2. PELLETREAU SAID THAT THE SAUDIS HAD NOW RESUMED THEIR MEDIATION
EFFORTS. YESTERDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN A PURELY TACTICAL MOVE
TO ELICIT SOME MOVEMENT FROM THE SYRIANS. IT HAD WORKED: ASAD HAD
TRIED TO CALL KING FAHD IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER.

3. MCFARLANE HAD WORKED OUT A FRAMEWORK FOR AGREEMENT AND WAS NOW
CONSULTING GENAVEL. THERE WERE STILL PROBLEMS OVER THE VENUE FOR A
MEETING OF LEBANESE LEADERS AND WHO SHOULD ATTEND AS WELL AS SOME
DIFFICULTY OVER THE TIMING OF THE VARIOUS MOVES ENVISAGED.
PELLETREAU SUSPECTED THAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT BE CALCULATING THAT
THEIR BROZE ALLIES COULD IMPROVE THEIR POSITION ON THE GROUND IF
THEY WERE GIVEN A LITTLE MORE TIME.

4. PELLETREAU THOUGHT THAT THEINI HAD NO CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS FROM
HIS GOVERNMENT. HIS ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY (UENIS
TELNO 782) REFLECTED THE MOOD OF DESPERATION IN BEIRUT WHEN HE
HAD LEFT. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S MORALE HAD SINCE IMPROVED.
THEINI WOULD BE SEEING MRS KIRKPATRICK TODAY. THE AMERICANS HAD
NO VERY CLEAR ADVICE TO OFFER: THE PROPOSAL FOR A UN FORCE
WHISTLED WITH DIFFICULTIES BUT SOME CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION AT THE UN
MIGHT BE HELPFUL. THEY DID NOT FAVOUR A SUGGESTION APPARENTLY

MIGHT BE HELPFUL. THEY DID NOT FAVOUR A SUGGESTION APPARENTLY
MOTIVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD VISIT A
MILITARY SITUATION

5. THERE HAD BEEN FURTHER DRUZE SHELLING OF DEIR EL QAMAR TODAY.
ICRC REPRESENTATIVES HAD ARRIVED IN THE VILLAGE AND WERE
RECOMMENDING EVACUATION OF THE CHRISTIAN REFUGEES FROM THE
SURROUNDING VILLAGES NOW CONTROLLED BY THE DRUZE. THEY HAVE
ESTABLISHED GOOD CONTACTS WITH LOCAL DRUZE LEADERS AND ARE TRYING
TO ARRANGE A LOCAL CEASEFIRE. THE AMERICANS ARE TAKING SUPPORTING
ACTION WITH JUMBLATT. AN ICRC CONVOY OF 10 TRUCKS OF RELIEF
SUPPLIES, WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD HELP TO LAND NEAR DAMOUR, HAD
REACHED DEIR EL QAMAR. THE AMERICANS THOUGHT IT BEST THAT THE
ICRC SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ORGANISING ANY EVACUATION. THIS
WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS WAS A CIVILIAN AND HUMANITARIAN
OPERATION. THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE
ICRC. THE US MARINES CONTINGENT IN THE MNF ALREADY HAD DISCRETION
TO HELP ANY CLEARLY HUMANITARIAN OPERATION. DECISIONS ON THIS
WOULD THEREFORE BE TAKEN LOCALLY BY MCFARLANE.

6. THERE HAD BEEN SOME SHELLING OF US MARINE POSITIONS TODAY.
THE MARINES HAD REPLIED WITH SIX ARTILLERY ROUNDS AND A US NAVAL
SHIP HAD FIRED FOUR ROUNDS AT A DRUZE ARTILLERY BATTERY WHICH HAD
APPARENTLY BEEN DESTROYED. THE LAF HAD NOW CLOSED OFF CHOUDEIFAY
FROM TWO SIDES.

7. PELLETREAU VOLUNTEERED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SEND-
ING THE LAF "MASSIVE" SUPPLIES, INCLUDING AMMUNITION, VIA EGYPT.
ADDITIONAL MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION
BUT PELLETREAU WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON DETAILS, NOR ON WHAT REPLY
THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO MAKE TO DR SALEM'S SOUNDINGS
YESTERDAY.

WRIGHT

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Some of this has been
overlaid by our discussions
today but it is worth
reading as background to our
discussion of the Middle East
tomorrow.

8 September, 1983

Dear John,

A.J.C. 8/9

unfaxed to
Chequers on
8/9

Lebanon: Multinational Force

There have been a number of developments in Lebanon since my letter to you of 30 August. It is in our view still too early to judge the outcome of the present fighting in the Shouf and therefore to take new decisions on the future of our contingent with the Multinational Force. But the Prime Minister may nevertheless find helpful an interim assessment. I understand that she would like to discuss this on Friday afternoon at Chequers as part of the discussions on the Middle East.

As expected, Israel's partial withdrawal of her forces from the Shouf mountains on 3-4 September has been followed by fierce fighting between the Druze (Muslim) and Christian militias in the area. At present the Druze seem to be gaining the upper hand in the fighting. If they succeed in expelling the Christian militias from what they consider to be Druze territory, they may be more willing to enter negotiations for a political agreement; but only if the Syrians allow them to do so. Meanwhile the fighting has been fuelled by unconfirmed reports of massacres of both Christian and Druze civilians. The Lebanese Army, still pre-occupied with reinforcing their authority in West Beirut, have so far made only limited efforts to move into areas vacated by Israel. But they have succeeded in occupying and holding the key Khalde junction south of Beirut airport, despite Druze resistance. There is no sign yet of the Army disintegrating on confessional lines, as some had predicted, though reports of active collusion between the Army and Christian militias, if confirmed, will strain the loyalties of Muslim soldiers. But its ability to move much further outside Beirut in the absence of a political agreement is very doubtful.

On the political side the Lebanese Government continues to pursue negotiations for a political solution with US and Saudi help. Mr McFarlane returned to Beirut on 5 September and visited Damascus on 6 September. He is returning to Beirut to brief President Gemayel today, having (according to the Americans) made some progress in Damascus towards securing an agreement acceptable to the Syrians. The main elements would be a ceasefire and early meetings between Gemayel and other confessional leaders in Lebanon, probably on neutral ground. But with President Gemayel constrained by the demands of his own Christian faction and with heavy Syrian pressure on the Druze apparently aimed at bringing down the Gemayel Government

/and



and forcing the abrogation of the Israel/Lebanon Agreement, the chances of success may not be as good as the Americans hope. We will be discussing with the Americans ways in which we and other MNF contributors might be able to support their efforts, perhaps by démarches to President Gemayel urging him to be flexible, and to moderate Arabs to encourage their support for President Gemayel in the face of Syrian calls for an Arab boycott of Lebanon, as well as conceivably further approaches to the Syrians.

Elements of the Multinational Force have again come under fire in the last few days. The US contingent have lost three killed and five wounded and have responded with fire against Druze artillery. The Italian HQ was hit on 4 September, causing one minor casualty. A similar attack on the French HQ resulted in at least three dead on 6 September. The French responded by threatening airstrikes on Druze positions and speaking very firmly to the Syrians. This threat seems to have been effective for the moment. It remains difficult to be sure how far these incidents are deliberate. Of the various contingents, the Americans are most likely to be a deliberate target, because of extreme Syrian hostility to them and their presence in Lebanon.

Although BRITFORLEB has had to restrict its patrolling, it is clear that its presence, like that of the other MNF contingents, continues to be of great importance to the Lebanese Government as evidence of Western support. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that our contingent is still performing a useful political role, even if its exact role and mandate on the ground is increasingly difficult to define. You may have seen the recent US assessment (Washington telnos 2480 and 2487: / copies enclosed) that there is no practical alternative to maintaining the MNF in its present role of helping the Lebanese Government protect Beirut, broaden the base of its political support and resume the process of expanding central government control over the country. There is no sign that either the French or the Italians, both of whom have of course far larger contingents than us, and have suffered losses, are thinking seriously of withdrawal at the moment.

Clearly we will have to reconsider the position if for example the Lebanese Government or Army start to act in an unacceptable, sectarian way and lose all prospect of support from the Muslim population, or if the presence of the MNF obviously becomes part of the problem rather than an aid to the problem's eventual solution. Despite the apparently slightly easier situation overnight, the position could deteriorate quickly, particularly if the Lebanese government/army begins to disintegrate. It would be clearly unacceptable for the MNF to be left stranded in a civil war, with no government left to support. But we have not reached that stage yet.



Another possibility which is beginning to be canvassed, eg by the Italians and in New York by the Lebanese, is the possibility of a large UN peacekeeping force to replace the MNF. It is too soon to judge how far this idea will run. Much will depend on the Soviet attitude (they might like to see the MNF, in particular the Americans out). We would be likely to be asked to provide a contingent to a UN force. But in any case a UN force could not realistically go in without a ceasefire and political agreement made. And negotiations on its establishment would inevitably take a good deal of time.

Neither we nor MOD are attracted by the tentative American ideas for wider military action to signal support for the Lebanese Government (para 2 of Washington telnos 2487), though there may be some public or Parliamentary pressure to provide the means to retaliate if our contingent comes under attack. President Reagan decided on 7 September that no expansion in the role or size of the US contingent was required at present. Meanwhile, as you know, the Ministry of Defence have various contingency plans for the emergency evacuation for BRITFORLEB if need be. If evacuation proves necessary Sir Geoffrey Howe considers that we should do all we can to act in concert with other MNF contributors. A unilateral withdrawal would undo much of the good BRITFORLEB has achieved (not least with the Americans).

We are in close and constant touch with the other MNF contributors, in Washington and Beirut, as well as through our Embassies in Paris and Rome. But the time has clearly come to move this dialogue onto a higher level. Depending on discussion at Chequers one possibility is a message from Sir Geoffrey Howe to the foreign Ministers of other MNF contributors expressing concern about the MNF's lack of mandate, the need to clarify its present and future role, and to be ready to identify the circumstances in which the MNF would have no further purpose and should be withdrawn. The feasibility and desirability of a UN force in the greater Beirut area might also be raised.

The staff at our Embassy in Beirut are so far safe. The Embassy are advising British subjects who have no overriding reason for remaining in Lebanon to leave the country temporarily and a small number of non-essential staff have today been removed out of Beirut to Cyprus, with some officers who are near the end of their tours and some dependents returning to London.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

PS: Since signing this we have heard that the Americans have called a meeting of MNF contributors in Madrid this afternoon to take stock (we will be represented by Sir J Bullard). We will report on its outcome. (J E Holmes) Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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SEP 1985



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FM WASHINGTON 082358Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2519 OF 8 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/SOFS, PS/MR STANLEY, PD/DUS(P), AUS(D STAFF))

PRIORITY PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, BRITFOR LEB, MADRID(FOR BULLARD), DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, CAIRO.

MIPT: LEBANON: MNF

1. PRESENT US THINKING IS THAT THEY MUST STAY WITH IT IN BEIRUT. THEY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH AND OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO DO THE SAME. DISENGAGEMENT WOULD BE CALAMITOUS FOR THE LEBANON. THEY WILL GO ON TRYING TO PATCH UP SOME KIND OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND THE DRUZE.
2. THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO REALISE THAT A CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF THE MNF WOULD BE LIKELY TO EXPOSE THEM TO GREATER RISKS. THEY AGREE THAT THEY MUST NOT ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER THE ROLE OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. THEY ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF PROTECTING MORE EFFECTIVELY THEIR EXISTING POSITIONS. THEY SEE THE NAVAL PRESENCE OFF BEIRUT AS A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THE SYRIANS AND A DETERRENT TO ATTACKS ON THE FORCE. ALTHOUGH ADMIRAL HOWE'S APPROACH IN MY TUR WAS A PERSONAL ONE, IT IS LIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED UP. THE AMERICANS WILL BE HOPING THAT WE MAY AGREE IN SOME WAY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.
3. BEYOND THAT, THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT HAVE VERY CLEAR IDEAS. THE EVOLUTION OF US POLICY WILL DEPEND ON EVENTS IN THE LEBANON. SO FAR SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE HAS BEEN HOLDINGUP WELL HERE. THIS SITUATION COULD CHANGE IF THE AMERICANS FOUND THEMSELVES OBLIGED TO TAKE CONTINUING CASUALTIES WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO DO MUCH ABOUT IT.
4. IN EXPRESSING IDEAS ABOUT TRYING TO INTIMIDATE THE SYRIANS, MCFARLANE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY. WE WOULD EXPECT THE ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT ACTIONS GOING BEYOND WHAT COULD PLAUSIBLY BE PRESENTED AS IN DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN FORCES OR OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MNF.

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WED	MR THOMAS
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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 082238Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TEL NO 792 OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1983

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKDEL MADRID BEIRUT BRITFORLEB

MODUK

INFO PRIORITY TEL AVIV DAMASCUS AMMAN CAIRO JEDDA PARIS
ROME

YOUR TELNO 434: LEBANON

1. WHEN I SAW THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS MORNING I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY DRAMATICALLY BAD AND COULD GET STILL WORSE. THE SG SAID THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION BUT FELT THAT IN A SITUATION WHICH RESEMBLED CIVIL WAR THERE WAS NOT MUCH BASIS FOR EITHER HIMSELF OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO INTERVENE. IN ANY CASE HE WAS IN THE DARK ABOUT WHAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING. HE WAS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE IN ANY WAY HE COULD AND FELT THAT HE SHOULD BE INITIATING CONSULTATIONS FIRST WITH THE RUSSIANS, THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS AND THE SYRIANS. BUT HE WOULD HATE TO DUPLICATE OR INTERFERE WITH SOMETHING THAT MCFARLANE WAS ALREADY DOING. I SAID THAT I SHOULD BE GLAD TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH HIM NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS IN LEBANON THOUGH, PERSONALLY SPEAKING, I COULD SEE NO VALUE IN A COUNCIL MEETING.

2. UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL URGUHART, WHOM I SAW ON THE WAY IN, SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM THE AMERICANS THAT MCFARLANE HAD SEEN KHADDAM IN DAMASCUS WHO HAD SAID THAT HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A CEASEFIRE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, WHICH INCLUDED A BALANCE IN BEIRUT, AN AGREEMENT WITH THE DRUZE, THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOME PHALANGIST POSITIONS AND INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION EXCLUDING SAEB SALAM AND GHASSAN TUENI, WERE UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO GEMAYEL. HIS INFORMATION AT THAT STAGE WAS THAT THE SAUDIS HAD GIVEN UP THEIR MEDIATION EFFORT, THOUGH I HAVE SINCE SEEN WASHINGTON TEL NO 2509. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT BY ATTACKING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FOR INVOKING THE SYRIAN THREAT THE ISRAELIS SEEMED TO BE PLAYING THE SYRIAN GAME.

3. I AM SEEING TUENI TOMORROW MORNING AND MRS KIRKPATRICK HAS CALLED A MEETING OF MNF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WITH HIM, ALSO TOMORROW MORNING. HE TOLD THE FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THIS MORNING THAT IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE HE WOULD COME TO THE COUNCIL TO SEE WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON DEPLOYING UN TROOPS INTO THE CHOUF TO MAINTAIN THAT CEASEFIRE.

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4. THIS SUBJECT WAS RAISED AT THE LUNCH WHICH THE THEN GAVE TODAY FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE LATTER SAID THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE LEBANESE WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE KOREAN AIRLINER. THE AMBASSADORS OF THE TEN APPEARED TO CONCUR. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID HE WAS CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH THE AMERICANS AND REPORTED THAT PRINCE BANDAR WAS AGAIN IN PLAY.

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FM WASHINGTON 082357Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2518 OF 8 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/S OF S, PS/MR STANLEY, PS/DUS (P)
 AUS (D STAFF)) PARIS, ROME, BEIRUT, BRITFORLEB, MADRID (FOR BULLARD)
 PRIORITY DAMSCUS, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN AND CAIRO

MY TELNO 2497 (NOT TO ALL): LEBANON : MNF

1. WHEN THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR THE ARMED FORCES CALLED TODAY ON ADMIRAL HOWE (DIRECTOR, POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAU, STATE DEPARTMENT) HOW SAID THAT THERE WAS STILL NO FIRM U S POSITION ON HOW TO REACT TO THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE LEBANON. THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION TO BELIEVE THAT A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE ROLE OF THE MNF WAS DESIRABLE OR THAT THE SIZE OF THE U S CONTINGENT ON-SHORE SHOULD BE EXPANDED. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO ALLOW TIME FOR MCFARLANE'S DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO HAVE AN EFFECT. HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN DEFENCE OF THEIR CONTINGENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MNF. HOWE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTY OF DEALING WITH FIRE SOME OF WHICH WAS COMING FROM HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS. HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED HERE TO THE INCREASED U S AND FRENCH NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, WHICH HE SAW AS A WAY OF IMPRESSING THE SYRIANS AND DETERRING ATTACKS ON THE MNF.

2. HOWE WENT ON TO PUT TO THE MINISTER OF STATE A PERSONAL REQUEST THAT HMG SHOULD BEGIN THINKING ABOUT HOLDING UP OFF BEIRUT, FOR A WHILE, THE RN TASK FORCE HEADED FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN: OR OTHERWISE ENHANCING OUR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA IN ADDITION TO THE U S AND FRENCH CARRIERS ALREADY THERE. THIS WOULD SEND A CLEAR SIGNAL TO THE SYRIANS AND ENCOURAGE THE STABILISATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE LEBANON. HOWE ADDED THAT FRENCH VIEWS ON HOW TO REACT TO THE SITUATION SEEMED TO BE VERY CLOSE TO THOSE HELD IN WASHINGTON.

3. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH ME, AT WHICH MY FRENCH AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES WERE ALSO PRESENT, EAGLEBURGER CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD VERY SHORTLY BE CONSIDERING THE AUTHORISATION OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE U S CONTINGENT OF THE MNF TO DEFEND THEMSELVES MORE EFFECTIVELY. HE ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATION WITH OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS ABOUT THIS. EAGLEBURGER COMMENTED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE MNF WAS NOW IN A MUCH MORE DISAGREEABLE POSITION THAN IT HAD BEEN EARLIER, IT WAS REASONABLE TO SAY THAT, IF THE MNF HAD NOT BEEN ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON, THERE WOULD PROBABLY BY NOW BE NO LEBANON. AS FAR AS THE WAR POWERS ACT WAS CONCERNED, PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS INDICATED THAT THERE WAS MORE SUPPORT IN CONGRESS FOR THE U S CONTRIBUTION TO THE MNF THAN THE ADMINISTRATION HAD ORIGINALLY EXPECTED.

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4. WE HAVE SINCE SOUNDED A MEMBER OF THE NSC STAFF ABOUT THE U S ASSESSMENT OF THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE. DUR SAID THAT THE SYRIANS WERE SENDING MIXED SIGNALS: THEY WERE DETERMINED TO GET THEIR OWN WAY IN LEBANON BUT ALSO SEEMED INTERESTED IN A CEASEFIRE. THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THEM. LEBANESE AND SYRIAN CONDITIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT WERE NOT COMPATIBLE: BUT THERE WAS STILL A CHANCE THAT MCFARLANE'S AND BANDAR'S EFFORTS WOULD SUCCEED. DUR MADE NO MENTION OF THE IDEAS OUTLINED IN PARAS 6 AND 7 OF BEIRUT TELNO 489.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT

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AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

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Distribution:-

[TEXT]

Protection for British Contingent in MNF

In view of the present situation in Lebanon, Ministers have decided to send six Bucaneers to Cyprus as soon as possible. They will probably arrive in the course of tomorrow 9 September. When they have arrived it will be announced that the Bucaneers have been sent to Cyprus on a training mission and that they will also be available to provide the necessary protection for the British contingent to the MNF.

Copies to:-

Please tell the Americans at the appropriate level both in Beirut and Washington (in the State Department and Pentagon as necessary) of this decision. At the same time Beirut, in consultation with Brit for Leb, should ask the American Ambassador if American forces can in the short intervening period provide air or artillery protective cover for the British contingent should this

/be

be necessary. If it is judged desirable to make
as request also to the State Department and
Pentagon Washington should act appropriately.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 September 1983

BRITFORLEB - OPTIONS FOR
EMERGENCY WITHDRAWAL

The Prime Minister has noted the contents
of your letter of 2 September.

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

SC

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FM WASHINGTON 062350Z SEP 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2487 OF 6 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE BEIRUT, PARIS, ROME, MODUK (DUS (P) AND DS 11),

UKDEL MADRID (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

LEBANON: MNF

1. DURING THE COURSE OF A DISCUSSION TODAY WITH STEWART AND LEGGE (MOD) HOWE AND RAPHEL (POLITICO-MILITARY BUREAU, STATE DEPARTMENT) GAVE AN INDICATION IN CONFIDENCE OF THE WAY THEIR THINKING IS NOW MOVING ON THE FUTURE OF THE IMF. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT YET AN AGREED US POSITION, THEY INDICATED THAT SHULTZ MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS SOME OF THEIR IDEAS WITH YOU AND THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN MADRID.

2. THEY STRESSED THAT THERE WAS STILL WIDESPREAD SUPPORT HERE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE MNF IN ITS PRESENT ROLE AND THAT A PULL-OUT OF THE US MARINES WAS NOT UNDER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. NOR WAS AN INCREASE IN THE US CONTINGENT OR AN EXPANSION OF ITS ROLE CO CONTEMPLATED AT PRESENT. IT MIGHT HOWEVER BE NECESSARY TO SIGNAL, PARTICULARLY TO THE SYRIANS, CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS MIGHT BE DONE BY:

- I) A SHOW OF NAVAL FORCE OFF BEIRUT BY ALL THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS. RAPHEL SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE UK TASK GROUP CURRENTLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THIS CONTEXT:
- II) A CONCERTED ATTEMPT TO TAKE OUT SYRIAN ARTILLERY IN THE EVENT OF DIRECT ATTACKS ON MNF POSITIONS:
- III) OVERT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE CHOUF.

CONSULTATION WITH THE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS WOULD OF COURSE BE ESSENTIAL. IT EMERGED THAT RAPHEL HAD NOT THOUGHT THROUGH WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IF THESE ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE NAVAL ENHANCEMENT, FAILED TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULTS.

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3. THE ADMINISTRATION ARE CLEARLY TAKING A FRESH LOOK AT THE ROLE OF THE MNF AND REVIEWING THEIR OPTIONS. THIS RETHINK HAS BEEN PROMPTED BY THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE CHOUF, GROWING CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN STIMULATED BY THE DEATHS OF THE US MARINES, AND BY THE PLIGHT OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. MUCH WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE RECEIVED NO REPORT FROM MCFARLANE IN DAMASCUS BUT BELIEVE THAT PRINCE BANDAR HAS TOLD THE SYRIANS OF GEMAYEL'S AGREEMENT TO THE SAUDI FORMULA (BEIRUT TELNO 474). MEANWHILE THE PREVAILING VIEW HERE IS STILL THAT THERE IS NO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE TO MAINTAINING THE MNF IN ITS PRESENT ROLE.

WRIGHT

MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN LEBANON (MNF)

LIMITED

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PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR J BULLARD
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR CARTLEDGE
MR EGERTON
MR STREETON

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SIR A PARSONS NO 10 DOWNING ST
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FM WASHINGTON 061800Z SEPT 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2480 OF 6 SEPTEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, BRITFORLEB, UKMIS NEW YORK,
PRIORITY AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TUNIS, TEL AVIV, PARIS, ROME

BEIRUT TELNO 474: LEBANON

1. MACK (STATE DEPARTMENT) BRIEFED M N F CONTRIBUTORS THIS MORNING. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT WERE STILL IN PROGRESS (HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON DETAILS). MCFARLANE WAS IN DAMASCUS TO TALK TO THE SYRIANS BUT NOT JUMBLATT. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVED THAT JUMBLATT WANTED AN AGREEMENT BUT WAS AFRAID OF THE SYRIANS. TUENI WAS EN ROUTE TO NEW YORK, APPARENTLY TO SEEK SECURITY COUNCIL SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES: THE AMERICANS DID NOT KNOW MORE PRECISELY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.

2. ON THE MILITARY SITUATION, MACK SAID THAT AT LEAST 12 ROCKET SHELLS HAD HIT U.S. MARINE POSITIONS AROUND THE AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 0100 LOCAL TIME THIS MORNING. THIS HAD BEEN FOLLOWED BY SPORADIC ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE. TWO MARINES HAD BEEN KILLED. THE FIRE HAD COME FROM A HEAVILY POPULATED AREA, APPARENTLY UNDER DRUZE CONTROL, EAST OF ALEY. COBRA GUNSHIPS FROM IWO JIMA HAD BEEN IN THE AIR BUT HAD NOT ENGAGED TARGETS FOR FEAR OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. MACK SAID THAT IT WAS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT THE MARINES HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY TARGETTED: THE FIRING MAY HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT THE L A F SUPPLY ROUTE TO KHALDE.

3. MACK SAID THAT BHAMDOWN WAS NOW UNDER DRUZE CONTROLE. THE LEBANESE FORCES HAD WITHDRAWN TAKING WITH THEM A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION. THERE WERE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF P L O AND SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT.

4. THERE WERE CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT THE ALLEGED MASSACRE OF DRUZE AT KAHR MATTA. THE L A F WERE HOLDING HIGH GROUND AROUND THE VILLAGE. THE LEBANESE FORCES SEEMED TO HAVE GOT THE BETTER OF THE FIGHTING. THE AMERICANS WERE SUPPORTING RED CROSS EFFORTS TO DEPLOY MONITORS INTO THE AREA TO ENCOURAGE RESPECT FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. THEY HAD ALSO CONVEYED TO JUMBLATT A L A F ASSURANCE THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY ATTACK ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN KAHR MATTA: JUMBLATT HAD REJECTED THAT ASSURANCE AND CLAIMED THAT THE L A F WERE COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH THE LEBANESE FORCES.

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/5. MACK

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5. MACK SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE M N F WAS ESSENTIAL TO HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PROTECT ITS CAPITAL, TO BROADEN THE BASE OF ITS POLITICAL SUPPORT AND TO RESUME THE PROCESS OF EXPANDING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY. THERE WERE NO (NO) PLANS TO CHANGE THE ROLE OR THE SIZE OF THE U.S. CONTINGENT NOR ITS AREA OF DEPLOYMENT. MACK ASSURED US THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT TAKE ANY SUCH ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH THEIR M N F PARTNERS. THEY WERE CONTINUING TO MONITOR THE SITUATION CLOSELY AND HAD ADDITIONAL FORCES IN POSITION SHOULD THEY BE REQUIRED.

WRIGHT

MIDDLE EAST

STANDARD

NEVAD	MAED
MED	ESSD
NAD	ERD
SAD	ESID
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
ECN	MR EGERTON
WED	MR THOMAS
HID	
SEC D	CABINET OFFICE

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PART 3. ends:-

ASC to FCO. 5/9/83.

PART 4 begins:-

Washington tel 2480 6.9.83

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