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PREM 19/952



Relations with Argentina.

Position of the Falkland Islands,  
their rehabilitation and future.

Shackleton Report and follow-up.

PART 34

ARGENTINA

Part 1: September 1979.

Part 34: May 1983

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>3.5.83</del>		<del>26.8.83</del>					
<del>4.5.83</del>		<del>11.9.83</del>					
<del>5.5.83</del>		<del>12.9.83</del>					
<del>10.5.83</del>		<del>15.9.83</del>					
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PREM 19/9/52



PART 34 ends:-

FCO to AJC 16.9.83

PART 35 begins:-

WR to FCO 19.9.83









*Prime Minister*  
*It seems sensible to*  
*make this arrangement.*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*A.J.C. 16.9*

16 September 1983

*Dear John,*

Falklands: Search and Rescue Operations in the Vicinity of the  
Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ)

We and the MOD have been considering the possibility of dangerous misunderstandings between ourselves and the Argentines in the event of Search and Rescue (SAR) operations being necessary in sea areas within and along the perimeter of the FIPZ.

The scope for these was illustrated in July. An Argentine search aircraft, probably looking for an Argentine fishing vessel in difficulty, made an incursion into the FIPZ to a depth of 40 miles on 24 July, and Phantoms were scrambled to intercept. The aircraft left the FIPZ before contact could be made.

We and the MOD agree that it is necessary to establish some working arrangement to minimize the risks, in particular the risk of loss of life because of lack of co-ordination with the Argentine rescue authorities. The primary purpose of any working arrangement must be to prevent misunderstanding and to ensure the swiftest possible action to rescue the crews of ships and aircraft in distress. On the other hand we need to be careful to minimize the risk of the Argentines exploiting any arrangement (eg by claiming an SAR emergency as a reason for future incursions into the FIPZ).

The Foreign Secretary does not believe this is an appropriate subject for any sort of negotiation with the Argentine authorities. He takes the view, and MOD Ministers agree, that we should be able to achieve our objectives, both political and humanitarian, by telling the Argentines, via the Swiss, of the action we propose to take to inform the Argentine coastguard authorities by radio of our SAR measures in the event of an emergency within the Protection Zone. We should tell the Argentines at the same time the channel through which we would expect the Argentines to contact us direct in the event of a similar emergency.

/The only





The only quick and reliable method would be for the Argentines to send a telex message, over commercial channels, using a codeword, to the MOD here, who would then inform CBFFI, to enable him to establish contact with the Rescue Co-ordination Centre in Comodoro Rivadavia. This would mean direct contact with the Argentine military authorities, but the Foreign Secretary thinks that any objections can be easily dealt with, given that lives may be at stake. Even if the Argentines do not respond to a Note on these lines we send via the Swiss, we will always be able to refer to it publicly if there is a subsequent confrontation.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



bc Mr. Mount BM



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

16 September 1983

*Dear Loullan,*

EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA: BOOKS

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Channon's minute on this subject and has also seen the minute of 9 September from the Secretary of State for Education and Science, the minute of the same date by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 15 September.

Mrs. Thatcher has noted that the Argentines are operating their ban on our imports selectively, admitting those products and articles which they judge it to be in their national interest to import. She also notes that the present embargo on books causes no difficulty to Argentina but only to British individuals and institutions. She therefore considers that we should follow the course described in paragraph 6 of Mr. Channon's minute, namely widening the present waiver for newspapers and magazines to include books. She hopes that it will be possible to defend effectively the maintenance of the embargo in the cases described in paragraph 7 of his minute.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Kerr (HM Treasury), Alex Galloway (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), Imogen Wilde (Department of Education and Science), Mrs. Mary Brown (Minister for the Arts' Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*John Kerr  
Alex Galloway*

Jonathan Rees, Esq.,  
Department of Trade and Industry





PM/83/68

PRIME MINISTEREmbargo on Imports from Argentina: Books

1. I have seen the minutes addressed to you by Paul Channon and Arthur Cockfield about the embargo on books from Argentina. with 1002
2. This is a very difficult decision but on balance I agree with Arthur. To permit the import of newspapers and periodicals, while banning scientific journals and other books will not be easy to defend particularly once the House is back. I have little doubt that the volume of academic criticism will rise. (We have for example received letters from Hugh Thomas on behalf of St Anthony's, Oxford, from the Cambridge University Library, the Scott Polar Research Institute and many others).
3. Paragraph 6 of Paul Channon's minute points out that the present waiver for newspapers and magazines could be widened quite easily to include books. This would bring no significant benefit to Argentina. Exclusion of the material in question causes no difficulty to Argentina but only to British individuals and institutions. And it would not make us less restrictive than Argentina. Similar material sent from Britain to Argentina is, at least in some instances, admitted (for example material about Antarctica). While our ban on imports is all but total, the Argentines operate a selective ban, admitting those products and articles which they judge it in the national interest to import.
4. I do not therefore believe that to make a special exception in this case would be portrayed as weakening under pressure: on the contrary, it would enhance the public reasonableness of our position and deprive potential critics of our general policy towards Argentina of an argument.
5. I am sending copies of this to the recipients of Paul Channon's minute.

  
 (GEOFFREY HOWE)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 September, 1983

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Argentina  
Relations  
Pt 34

SEP 5 1983

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9 4



PRIME MINISTER

EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA: BOOKS

You minuted earlier that you agreed with Mr. Channon that ~~would~~ <sup>we</sup> should not exempt books from our embargo. I have not yet conveyed your decision to departments because I knew that the Foreign Secretary wanted to send you his views. These are now attached.

Sir Geoffrey Howe points out that Argentina operates not a total but a selective ban on our imports, admitting those things which they judge it in the national interest to import. Apparently, Argentina does admit some books.

I think the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is right when he says that the volume of criticism of our embargo on books will rise. There has been quite a lot of comment in the press already. Yesterday there was a letter from an M.P. (Mr. Canavan) about it.

I wonder, therefore, whether you would wish to reconsider. Not only Sir Geoffrey Howe but Lord Cockfield and Sir Keith Joseph advocate exempting books from the embargo.

A.S.C.

*Then I will give  
the importance of this  
particular material.  
I thought their ban  
was actually total.  
not*

15 September, 1983





②

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone ~~01-9307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

14th September 1983

Dear Tim,

Prime Minister

A.J.C. 16.  
9

FOOD SUPPLIES FOR THE FALKLANDS

In his letter of 26th August Willie Rickett said that the Prime Minister had asked whether some of the vegetables needed by UK forces could be grown in the Falkland Islands.

We do, in fact, try to make the maximum use of local resources on the Islands and the possibility of growing vegetables has been investigated, in conjunction with the FCO and MAFF. Unfortunately, as the Prime Minister will be aware, the growing season on the Falklands is short, high winds are prevalent and there is a lack of fresh water. Our investigations have shown that, for these reasons, it is not possible to produce either the quantity or quality of fresh produce required to feed the garrison without considerable expenditure on greenhouses, windbreaks and irrigation systems. We have also looked at the possibility of Hydroponics (growing in an artificial water environment) as an alternative method of production but, although we could produce what is required in this way, the capital cost is extremely high and the system is manpower intensive. Taking all these points together we have concluded with regret that there is no economic alternative to supply from outside the Islands.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (FCO) and to Robert Lowson (MAFF).

Yours ever


Neil Evans

(N H R EVANS)  
Private Secretary



Argentina  
Relations PK-34

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2600 OF 14 SEPTEMBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR PS/SOFS: DUL (POL): AUS D STAFF AND DS11)

MIPT: MR HESELTINE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ:  
BELIZE AND THE FALKLANDS

1. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS MEETING WITH MR HESELTINE, SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD ONE REQUEST: PLEASE HANG ON IN BELIZE. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT WE WERE ONLY THERE NOW BECAUSE OF THE U.S. REQUEST TO US TO STAY. HE HAD A COUNTER REQUEST: WE HOPED THAT THE US WOULD NOT SELL ARMS TO ARGENTINA. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HELD OFF CERTIFICATION. BUT IF THE ARGENTINIANS HAD A REASONABLE ELECTION AND A DECENT GOVERNMENT EMERGED FROM IT, THIS WOULD POSE A PROBLEM. HE COULD PROMISE THAT THERE WOULD BE VERY CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH US. MR HESELTINE SAID THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH THE ARGENTINIANS REFUSING TO DECLARE AN END TO HOSTILITIES, A RESUMPTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN PARLIAMENT.

WRIGHT

LIMITED

MCAD

FID

DEFENCE D

PUSD

NEWS D

NAD

INFO D

PLANNING STAFF

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR WHITNEY

PS/PUS

MR WRIGHT

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

MR CARTLEDGE

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 September, 1983

N. A. J. R.

A. J. C. 12.  
9

Dear John,

Falklands Debate at the Next General Assembly

I am sorry to find that I still owe you a reply to your letter of 1 August.

There is no danger of the United States voting in favour of the Argentine draft resolution while the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary are in America as the vote cannot be held before the second half of October.

You asked for a note of the position on Mayotte. We concluded last year that we could tax the French with the Mayotte parallel. We raised the subject with them on several occasions at official level and Mr Pym raised it with Cheysson at an informal meeting of Community Foreign Ministers at Hesselet on 16/17 October 1982. We consider that we should use it again this year.

In a plebiscite in the Comoro Islands in 1974 a majority of the population voted to become independent, but a majority of the Mahorais voted to remain French. The French therefore detached Mayotte from the newly-independent State and gave it a special status of Collectivité Territoriale. Although the French do have contacts with the Comorians about Mayotte, these are not about sovereignty. Indeed the French have consistently refused to negotiate on sovereignty.

The French line is that their hands are tied by Article 53 of the Constitution of the French Republic, the last clause of which reads:

'No cession, exchange, or acquisition of territory is valid without the consent of the populations concerned'.

We have assembled a number of French statements about the 'sacred right' to self-determination, and about the secondary significance of geographical location by comparison with this principle, which we think will be useful in dealing with the French on this question.

France's Community partners always abstain on the annual Mayotte resolution and we shall be making use of this point also, as we did last year. But the Mayotte resolutions include an explicit 'reaffirmation' of Comorian sovereignty over Mayotte which our partners would regard as providing a justification

/for





for abstention which is absent in the Falklands case.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



Argentina  
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On reflection the P.N. took  
a different position. See my  
letter. M 24.  
9

PRIME MINISTER

EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA: BOOKS

I think you should see the attached papers now since this problem has already given rise to press comment. But your colleagues may well be sending in comments this week.

Mr. Channon's minute explains the problem: our ban on imports from Argentina exempts newspapers and journalists but has prevented a number of books being sent to eg learned societies, libraries and academic bodies who have begun to complain.

Mr. Channon concludes that we cannot make an exception for books because there would then be pressure to extend the waiver to records, video tapes etc., etc.

Lord Cockfield, who has a special interest in the matter as past President of the International Statistical Institute, argues in his minute that it ought to be possible to exempt from the ban transactions which are not trading transactions.

Do you wish to express a view now - or await further comments from colleagues?

A.S.C.

The essential point is that we only operate a ban because the Argentines do. We should like to resume normal trading relations - but it must be

two-way.

after Mr. Channon's  
view  
not

12 September 1983

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AScds  
 No doubt  
 here will be  
 comments for  
 colleagues.

PRIME MINISTER

### EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA: BOOKS

A problem has developed about the administration of our ban on imports from Argentina, concerning books.

2 Since the invasion of the Falklands we have operated a general embargo on imports from Argentina with only trivial exceptions, including a waiver for newspapers and journals - to enable correspondents to send dispatches at the time of the crisis and to enable us to keep in touch with current affairs in Argentina - and to a very limited extent for non-commercial postal packets of small value.

3 Recently more systematic checking by Customs of the parcel post has led to the impounding of quite a lot of books being sent to this country in this way. This has produced a large number of complaints from learned societies, libraries (including the Bodleian and the British Library), academic bodies and others, such as the International Statistical Institute. This body held its annual conference in Buenos Aires in 1981. Copies of the proceedings addressed to British participants and libraries are now being held up.

4 Arthur Cockfield, as Past President of the Royal Statistical Society, has a special interest in the International Statistical Institute case, and has expressed concern over our position. Keith Joseph and Grey Gowrie have also expressed their concern.

5 There has been a certain amount of Press comment, including an article in last Sunday's Observer, (attached) drawing attention to the apparent absurdity of operating an embargo which has adverse effects on the UK. Interference with the free flow of ideas is an emotive subject. Pressure is building up for us to make a special exception for books. The idea has also spread that Customs are burning the seized books, which is untrue but which has caused some worry.

6 It would of course be possible to make a special exception in this case. Technically we could do this quite easily by widening the present waiver for newspapers and magazines to include books, not including trade advertising material or imports for re-sale. This would deal with most (although not all) of the present protests; it would not give any significant benefit to Argentina; and it would remove a legitimate

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grievance in this country.

7 But if we were to give way to pressure and make a special exception for books it would be extremely difficult to defend our maintenance of the embargo, in other cases of equal or greater substance. The pressures to extend the waiver to records and video tapes, for example, would be very great and we could expect strong pressures on behalf of laboratories who are precluded from importing samples for analysis (thus providing a valuable export service); from the wool textile industry who cannot import wool tops unavailable elsewhere; and a host of others. There is also the certainty that such a move would be picked up in Argentina. It might be misrepresented as a weakening of our general stance.

8 On balance Cecil Parkinson and I believe it would be wrong to change this difficult line. Subject to your views and those of other colleagues, I suggest we maintain the existing policy.

9 I am sending copies of this minute to Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson, Arthur Cockfield, Keith Joseph, Grey Gowrie and Sir Robert Armstrong.

P.C.

PAUL CHANNON  
September 1983



# Why Britain may burn books it has banned

A VIOLENT storm is about to break over the head of Mr Paul Channon, MP, because he is banning books.

He is the Minister for Trade at the Department of Trade and Industry, under Mr Cecil Parkinson, the Secretary of State, who may also need to field a few thunderbolts.

At Dover, in the customs parcel depot, books sent from Argentina are piling up that the Department of Trade will not allow into the country, under its 'total embargo' on trade with Argentina.

The British Library has had 60 parcels of books seized. The Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge has also had books seized. So have the University of Essex, the University of St Andrews, and the Institute for Latin American Studies at London University, among many others. All these books are liable to be destroyed, the Customs and Excise Department told me last week. They might be burned.

The total ban on all imports from Argentina came into effect on 7 April 1982. It followed a Cabinet decision and was introduced in the form of a statutory instrument signed by the then Minister for Trade,

**MICHAEL DAVIE**

## notebook

Mr Peter Rees, Mr Channon's predecessor. The key phrase ran: 'Nothing in this licence shall authorise the importation of any goods which have been exported from Argentina.' 'Any goods' included books.

Goods for which the Department of Trade refuses to issue an import licence become, after 28 days, 'forfeiture to the Crown.'

Until recently the ban does not seem to have been very rigorously applied.

Mr Harry Fairhurst, a librarian for 35 years, runs the Standing Conference of National and University Libraries in London, a registered charity, whose purpose is to further the cause of all the university and national libraries who form its members.

The book-banning has come to a head, he says, only in the past three months. The British Library had some problems before that, but it is only since the early summer that the Standing Conference has star-

ted getting a flood of protests and complaints from its members.

Dr A. Matheson, the keeper of the printed books in the National Library of Scotland received a consignment of books from Argentina last March, but another package in July was seized.

When the books started piling up, librarians, institutes and scholars made private representations to Ministers and Department of Trade civil servants.

These got nowhere. Here is a typical example of such exchanges.

On 24 June, the acting director of the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge, Dr T. E. Armstrong, wrote to the International Trade Policy Division of the DoT.

He enclosed an invoice for books that had been prevented from reaching the institute. The books, he pointed out, concerned issues of sovereignty

in the Falklands and Antarctica.

'As a department of the faculty of geography and geology in the University of Cambridge,' he wrote, 'responsible for teaching and research in the polar regions, it is the duty of the library at the Scott Polar Research Institute to acquire or publish material relevant to the Falkland Islands, their dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory whether published in the UK or elsewhere.'

'In addition to our responsibility to this University of Cambridge, there is a responsibility at national level both to the Ministry of Defence, from whom we receive an annual grant-in-aid of £20,000 and to the polar research section of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who rely on our library and information services for their own research purposes.'

If the books he listed were lost to the library, the gap would in all probability never be filled. Such books went rapidly out of print.

He 'begged' the International Trade Policy Division to relent.

It did not. The reply, from S. L. Hodge, said it was the Government's aim to maintain a total embargo on all Argentine goods. Argentina was discriminating against British firms, despite undertakings not to do so. 'Any shift in our position would send entirely the wrong signals to the Argentinians' and hinder British efforts to get the reciprocal lifting of all remaining sanctions. The licence was refused.


Others tried to get the policy changed, working quietly 'within the system.' Now frustrated, they are ready for public row.

The Standing Conference of National and University Libraries wrote to three Ministers Lord Gowrie, in charge of art and libraries; Sir Keith Joseph the Minister of Education, and Mr Channon. 'All the replies were in concert: no dice 'Censorship' is now the word being used by Mr Fairhurst.

A Treasury Minister, M

CONT'D





Trade Minister Paul Channon faces a book-ban storm, and Argentina's oil congress stand is bare.

Barney Hayhoe, said in a written answer to a parliamentary question on 29 July that, yes, books sent from Argentina to libraries in the UK, including the Bodleian, were being held up by HM Customs and Excise. The 'importation' of the 'goods concerned' was prohibited.


But the answer was buried and little noticed. Then last month the alert *Times Literary Supplement* printed a sharp comment. Ringing round the great libraries, the institutes of Latin American studies, scholars, professional organisations, and booksellers, I have encountered uniform hostility shading into incredulity about the ban.

To begin with, there is a general sense of shock, even shame, that it should be a British Government not a dictatorship that is applying such a ban. Second, it is everywhere pointed out that there is an absurd anomaly in government policy. Books are banned, but newspapers and periodicals are not. The tortured government explanation is that newspapers and periodicals reflect current Argentine thinking, whereas books do not. Books, you see, are 'commodities.'

'We should not be denied information of any kind,' says one very important person in the library world, who did not wish to be named. 'Even if the Argentines are to remain our enemies for life, the need for knowledge of Argentina is

increased rather than diminished.'

Government policy is based on the notion that the more trade pressure is kept on Argentina here, the more likely it is that they will do what we want. Hence the confiscation of the 4,000 Argentine brochures brought in for the World Petroleum Congress at the Barbican in London last week. But no one I spoke to can see why books should be lumped in the same category.



**4,000 brochures seized.**

It is not only current political books that have been seized. The Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics has just been informed that five volumes of 'Foreign Trade Statistics of Argentina, 1979' have become forfeitures.

Mr Harold Blakemore, an adviser to Lloyds Bank as well as a London University academic, says the customs have seized a book sent to the journal he co-edits which is a scholarly history of Buenos Aires containing contributions by British scholars. Thus

British scholars are prevented from reading the work of other British scholars.

Mr John May, a director of May and May Ltd, a second-hand and antiquarian bookseller in Salisbury says he has had a consignment of 25 books on the history of music seized by the customs at Dover. The books were published in Buenos Aires between 1923 and 1981. Mr May has been in touch with HM Customs. He understands the books are 'likely to be destroyed.'

His bookshop imports and exports scholarly music books all round the world. He wonders what other countries will think when they hear that a British Government is seizing such books and threatening to destroy them. 'There are very, very few parallels in modern times,' he says, for such a policy. This is a total seizure and threat to destroy any books from a particular country.

'Suppose a bookseller in Argentina sends me a rare book on music published in England a hundred years ago. That would be seized and threatened with destruction. I fought in the last war against tyranny. I never thought to see anything like this in Britain. Mrs Thatcher has been saying she hopes to be compared to Churchill. I don't think he'd have done this. It's, a wicked business, disturbing and distressing.'

Absurdities abound. The librarian of the Institute of Latin American Studies at

London University, Mrs Travis, said: 'At the height of the Falklands crisis the Foreign Office were ringing us for information, hoping we had books that they hadn't. Now they're stopping the same books from coming in.'

At the Dover customs parcel depot, a helpful Mr Darler, who is in charge there, conceded that 'a considerable number' of book parcels had been seized, and were now Crown property. He was awaiting instructions on how to dispose of them.

I asked Mr England at Customs and Excise headquarters what the Commissioners of Customs had in mind. He stressed that the books did not present any special problem. 'We treat them as perfectly ordinary goods, like textiles.' They would be disposed of. They could be pulped. Or burned? Mr England paused, possibly remembering something about book-burning, but he went nobly ahead. 'Could be.'

Mr Paul Channon could not immediately say, when I called him, why newspapers and periodicals were allowed in but not books. He was, he said, 'unbriefed.'

Mr Channon promised me a statement after he was briefed. When it came, it merely repeated the Government's position. Yet only two months ago—as the people I spoke to unfailingly reminded me—Mr Channon was the Minister in charge of libraries.



slp

PRIME MINISTER

I have seen the copy of Paul Channon's minute to you about book imports from Argentina.

Recognising the difficulties summarised in his paragraph 7, on the other hand we shall get quite disproportionate odium from the book element of the embargo.

If the proposal in paragraph 6 of his minute is adopted, we would not be breaching the trade embargo but allowing books for libraries and the like to come in.

I am sending copies of this to Paul Channon and to the other recipients of his minute.

14  
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Argentina relations Pt 34

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Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster

AJC 05/

PRIME MINISTER

EMBARGO ON IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA: BOOKS

with TF/ASC?

Paul Channon sent me a copy of his minute to you on this point.

So far as the "Proceedings" of the International Statistical Institute are concerned, this is not a commercial transaction, no payment is made to anyone in the Argentine: and even the members' subscriptions are paid to the Netherlands. It seems to me to be extraordinarily difficult to defend a situation where we permit commercial transactions by way of import of newspapers and periodicals and ban scientific journals.

I can well understand the need to maintain the integrity of the ban on trading transaction. But I would not myself take the view that exempting from the ban transactions which were not trading transactions would cause either difficulty or embarrassment.

I am copying this to the recipients of Paul Channon's minute.


A.C.

A C

9 September 1983



-9 SEP 1983





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PP WASHINGTON

PP OTTAWA

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PM F C O 091100Z SEP 83

TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 436 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, EC POSTS, CANBERRA, OTTAWA, HELSINKI, REYKJAVIK, OSLO, STOCKHOLM, ANKARA, TOKYO

FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: REPLY TO SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER OF 20 JULY

1. MINISTERS HAVE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD REPLY TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S LETTER OF 20 JULY IN THE TERMS OF MIFT. THEY HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT, TO FORESTALL ANOTHER ROUND OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE BEFORE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WRITES HIS REPORT FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OUR REPLY SHOULD NOT BE DELIVERED TO HIM BEFORE MID-SEPTEMBER. WE ARE CONTENT TO LEAVE THE PRECISE TIMING TO YOU.
2. AS REGARDS POSSIBLE PUBLICATION, SUCH EXCHANGES SHOULD OF COURSE PROPERLY REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PUBLISHES HIS REPORT. ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINES HAVE MADE THEIR OWN REPLY PUBLIC IN BUENOS AIRES, WE DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD TAKE ANY SUCH INITIATIVE WITH OURS. WE PROPOSE THAT, WHEN YOU HAND THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD NOT OBJECT IF HE CHOSE TO PUBLISH OUR REPLY IN FULL, AND WOULD CERTAINLY WISH HIM TO DO SO IF HE INTENDS TO PUBLISH THE ARGENTINE REPLY.
3. COPY ADDRESSEES SHOULD FOR THE TIME BEING TREAT THE TEXT IN MIFT AS BEING STRICTLY FOR THEIR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, LATER TO BECOME A QUARRY OF POINTS TO BE MADE LOCALLY AS THE DEBATE

10N



CONFIDENTIAL

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ON THE FALKLANDS IN THE UNGA APPROACHES.

HOWE

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

FID

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 437 OF 9 SEPTEMBER

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(416)  
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MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS: REPLY TO SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER OF 20 JULY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

BEGINS

7

1. I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO YOUR LETTER OF 20 JULY SEEKING THE VIEWS OF MY GOVERNMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN ORDER TO ASSIST YOU IN THE PREPARATION OF A REPORT TO THE 38TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT, I WISH TO STATE THE FOLLOWING.

2. ARGENTINA'S INVASION IN 1982, ITS RESORT TO FORCE IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER, IS NOT AN EVENT WHICH HAS FADED INTO HISTORY. THAT ACT OF AGGRESSION HAS CONSEQUENCES WHICH MUST BE RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS WELL AS BY THE PRESENT ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT AND THEIR SUCCESSORS. BY COMPELLING US, IN EXERCISE OF THE INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE RECOGNISED IN ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER, TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION TO DEFEND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND THEIR PEOPLE, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CAUSED A TRAGIC LOSS OF LIFE ON BOTH SIDES. THEY ALSO CAUSED WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION ON THE ISLANDS, OF WHICH THE EFFECTS STILL REMAIN, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS BY THE ISLANDERS AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PROGRAMME FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THE ISLANDS, AND FOR THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.



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3. MOREOVER, IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY BORNE IN MIND THAT ARGENTINA RESORTED TO FORCE WHILE A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION ABOUT THE MATTERS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN US WAS UNDER WAY. THE INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TOOK PLACE ONLY ONE MONTH AFTER A ROUND OF TALKS WHICH WAS CHARACTERISED IN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS 'CORDIAL AND POSITIVE'. THESE FACTS HAVE INEVITABLY DAMAGED ARGENTINE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD AND CAST DOUBT ON ARGENTINA'S GOOD FAITH IN CALLING FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.
4. THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES SET GREAT STORE BY THEIR 'EXPRESSED INTENTION', REFLECTED IN THE PREAMBLE TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 37/9, NOT TO RENEW HOSTILITIES. THEY HAVE ALSO PROFESSED THEIR COMMITMENT TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE MATTERS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN US. THIS IS CYNICAL: THE EVENTS OF 1982 DEMONSTRATED ALL TOO VIVIDLY THAT ARGENTINE PROTESTATIONS OF GOOD INTENT NEED TO BE REGARDED AT THE LEAST WITH CAUTION. EVEN NOW, DESPITE THEIR PROFESSIONS OF PEACEFUL INTENT, THE ARGENTINE ATTITUDE, AS REFLECTED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND INCIDENTS SUCH AS THE INCURSION ON 5 AUGUST BY A MILITARY AIRCRAFT INTO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROTECTION ZONE, REMAINS MENACING.
5. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS THE INHERENT RIGHT AND INDEED THE DUTY TO DEFEND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ITS PEOPLE AGAINST ANY RENEWED ATTACK.
6. WE HAVE THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO CONSTRUCT A NEW AIRFIELD IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CAPABLE OF ACCEPTING WIDE-BODIED JETS, WHICH WILL MAKE IT EASIER TO SECURE THE DEFENCE OF THE ISLANDS THE EVENT OF FURTHER AGGRESSION. TALK OF THIS AIRFIELD AS A 'NATO BASE' IS MANIFEST NONSENSE. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW AIRFIELD IS ALSO ESSENTIAL FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS' COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY LORD SHACKLETON IN 1976 AS WELL AS IN 1982.
7. YOUR EXCELLENCY EXPRESSES THE CONVICTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EARLY INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS NO SIGN THAT FOR ARGENTINA THIS WOULD MEAN ANYTHING OTHER THAN DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AGAINST



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THE MANIFEST WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. IN VIEW OF THIS, AND OF THE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES ALREADY DESCRIBED, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDER THAT IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO CALL ON US TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS, STILL LESS TO SUGGEST AN EARLY INITIATION OF THEM. THIS WAS OUR VIEW OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 37/9, AND NOTHING THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE HAS GIVEN GROUNDS FOR CHANGING IT.

8. DESPITE HAVING BEEN THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IN 1982, AND IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN AND SUPPORTED SEVERAL INITIATIVES AIMED AT REDUCING TENSION AND AT RESTORING THE MORE NORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ARGENTINA WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. MY GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE IMF PROGRAMME AIMED AT RESCUING ARGENTINA FROM ITS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. BUT EVEN IN THIS PROCESS, THE ARGENTINES HAVE UNFORTUNATELY BEEN RELUCTANT TO MEET OBLIGATIONS WHICH THEY HAD KNOWINGLY ACCEPTED OR TO CARRY OUT UNDERTAKINGS WHICH THEY VOLUNTARILY ENTERED INTO.

9. THE PEOPLE OF ARGENTINA ARE APPROACHING THE DATE OF ELECTIONS WHICH SHOULD GIVE THEM A FREELY-ELECTED CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE MOVES TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA AND HOPES THAT THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE WILL, OVER A LASTING PERIOD, LIVE UNDER DEMOCRATIC RULE AND ENJOY THE FULL HUMAN RIGHTS TO WHICH ALL PEOPLES ARE ENTITLED. EVEN SO, A NEW GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA WILL INHERIT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS PREDECESSORS' DECISIONS. SO WE MUST LOOK TO ARGENTINA TO RESPOND TO OUR INITIATIVES AND TO DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY THAT IT IS TURNING ITS BACK ON AGGRESSION AND RENOUNCING THE USE OF FORCE. ARGENTINA MUST ALSO RECOGNISE THE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES OF ITS AGGRESSION IN 1982 AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS' RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY UNDER A GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. THIS IS THE WAY FORWARD, RATHER THAN A POSTURE OF STERILE CONFRONTATION MARKED BY EVASION OF CLEAR UNDERTAKINGS, AND BY HYPOCRITICAL CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

HOWE

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

7 September 1983

FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Thank you for your letter of 5 September summarising recent developments in the handling of the Falklands question in the United Nations and enclosing the text of a draft reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 20 July.

BF

The Prime Minister has noted these papers and agrees with the proposed reply to the Secretary-General.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HCC



cc Sir AP

Prime MinisterAgree to the proposed Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

reply to the UNSecretary-General aboutthe Falklands (attached)? 5 September, 1983

A-J.C. 5/9.

Yes no

Dear John,

Falklands at the United Nations

The Prime Minister may wish to have an account of recent developments in the handling of the Falklands question in the United Nations.

The UN Secretary-General called on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 31 August. Sir Geoffrey Howe said that he found the Secretary-General's call for an early resumption of negotiations disappointing and made it clear that, in the foreseeable circumstances, negotiations were not practicable. The Argentines could not approach negotiations with clean hands. The Falkland Islanders still felt shattered by their experience of an invasion. The way forward was to build trust. But the Argentines had not even renounced the use of force to pursue their objectives. The Secretary-General maintained in reply that in referring to the desirability of early negotiations, he was only executing his mandate from the General Assembly. He doubted whether any progress could be expected as long as the Argentines were engaged in their electoral process.

We now need to reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 20 July (I enclose a copy). I enclose a draft of the reply the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary intends to instruct our Permanent Representative in New York to make. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that, to forestall another round of this correspondence, we should not deliver this before the middle of this month.

Meanwhile the Falklands have been discussed by the Committee of 24. On 31 August two Falkland Island Councillors, Mr Tony Blake and Mr John Cheek, appeared before the Committee. They delivered effective and convincing statements describing developments in the Islands since the invasion and re-affirming their support for British policy, in particular on defence matters. The Venezuelans then tabled in the Committee a draft Resolution, based largely on last year's General Assembly Resolution 37/9, and very similar to a draft Resolution for this year's General Assembly which the Argentines are already promoting. Adoption of the Resolution by consensus would have been damaging, and we lobbied in order to ensure it would be voted on. As the composition of the Committee of 24 is so unfavourable to us, the vote (19-0-5) is much as we expected, although we had hoped that Fiji, which abstained





with Australia, Norway, Sierra Leone, and Trinidad and Tobago, might have voted against the Resolution as they did in the General Assembly last year. We are not members of the Committee.

We have meanwhile sent replies to two other Argentine letters to the Secretary-General criticising our refusal to negotiate and portraying our decision to construct a new airfield in the Falkland Islands as a threat to stability in the South Atlantic. Our replies dealt firmly with these points in standard terms. We also propose shortly to instruct our Mission in New York to reply to a further Argentine letter about the incursions into the Falkland Islands Protection Zone in early August.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



**DRAFT:** minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

**TYPE:** Draft/Final 1+

**FROM:**

Sir J Thomson

Reference

**DEPARTMENT:**

**TEL. NO:**

*KUHAMBY*

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

**TO:**

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

HE Sr Javier Perez de Cuellar  
 Secretary-General  
 UNITED NATIONS

Copies to:

**PRIVACY MARKING**

**SUBJECT:**

.....In Confidence

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 20 July seeking the views of my Government on the problem of the Falkland Islands in order to assist you in the preparation of a report to the 38th Session of the General Assembly. On the instructions of my Government, I wish to state the following.

**CAVEAT**.....

Argentina's invasion in 1982, its resort to force in flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, is not an event which has faded into history. That act of aggression has consequences which must be recognised by the international community as well as by the present Argentine Government and their successors. By compelling us, in exercise of the inherent right to self-defence recognised in Article 51 of the Charter, to take military action to defend the Falkland Islands and their people, the Argentine Government caused a tragic loss of life on both sides. They also caused widespread

Enclosures—flag(s).....



destruction on the Islands, of which the effects still remain, despite substantial efforts by the Islanders and the British Government.

Moreover, it should be clearly borne in mind that Argentina resorted to force while a process of negotiation about the matters in dispute between us was under way. The invasion of the Falkland Islands took place only one month after a round of talks which was characterised in a joint communique as 'cordial and positive'. These facts have inevitably damaged Argentine credibility in the eyes of the world and cast doubt on Argentina's good faith in calling for a resumption of negotiations.

The Argentine authorities set great store by their 'expressed intention', reflected in the preamble to General Assembly Resolution 37/9, not to renew hostilities. They have also professed their commitment to a peaceful solution to the matters in dispute between us. This is cynical: the events of 1982 demonstrated all too vividly that Argentine protestations of good intent need to be regarded at the least with caution. Even now, despite their professions of peaceful intent, the Argentine attitude, as reflected in public statements and incidents such as the incursion on 5 August by a military aircraft into the Falkland Islands Protection Zone, remains menacing.

The United Kingdom has the inherent right and indeed the duty to defend the Falkland Islands and its people against any renewed attack.



We have therefore considered it necessary to construct a new airfield in the Falkland Islands capable of accepting wide-bodied jets, which will make it easier to secure the defence of the Islands in the event of further aggression. Talk of this airfield as a 'NATO base' is manifest nonsense. The construction of the new airfield is also essential for the improvement of the Falkland Islanders' communications with the rest of the world, in accordance with the recommendations made by Lord Shackleton in 1976 as well as in 1982.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Your Excellency expresses the conviction that there should be an early initiation of negotiations. There is no sign that for Argentina this would mean anything other than discussion of the transfer of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands against the manifest wishes of the Islanders. In view of this, and of the other circumstances already described, my Government consider that it is not reasonable to call on us to enter into negotiations, still less to suggest an early initiation of them. This was our view of General Assembly Resolution 37/9, and nothing that has happened since has given grounds for changing it.

Despite having been the victim of aggression in 1982, and in the face of the continuing hostile attitude of the Argentine authorities, the British Government has taken and supported several initiatives aimed at reducing

/tension



tension and at restoring the more normal relationship with Argentina which is necessary for the establishment of mutual confidence. My Government supported the IMF programme aimed at rescuing Argentina from its economic difficulties. But even in this process, the Argentines have unfortunately been reluctant to meet obligations which they had knowingly accepted or to carry out undertakings which they voluntarily entered into.

The people of Argentina are approaching the date of elections which should give them a freely-elected civilian government. The British Government welcomes the moves towards the restoration of democracy in Argentina and hopes that the Argentine people will, over a lasting period, live under democratic rule and enjoy the full human rights to which all peoples are entitled. Even so a new government in Argentina will inherit the consequences of its predecessors' decisions. So we must look to Argentina to respond to our initiatives and to demonstrate convincingly that it is turning its back on aggression and renouncing the profound consequences of its aggression in 1982 and acknowledge the Falkland Islanders' right to live in peace and security under a government of their own choosing. This is the way forward, rather than a posture of sterile confrontation marked by evasion of clear undertakings, and by hypocritical calls for negotiations.



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*Argentina*

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 769 OF 1 SEPTEMBER  
INFO ROUTINE OSLO CANBERRA SUVA PORT OF SPAIN FREETOWN  
PORT STANLEY  
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 764: COMMITTEE OF 24: FALKLANDS DEBATE.

1. THE VENEZUELAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS DULY PUT TO THE VOTE AND ADOPTED BY 19-0-5 (FIJI, AUSTRALIA, NORWAY, SIERRA LEONE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO). CONGO WAS ABSENT.

2. PROCEEDINGS OPENED WITH A FURTHER EFFECTIVE STATEMENT BY CHEEK, COMMENTING ON REMARKS MADE BY ROSEE YESTERDAY. MY RIGHT OF REPLY (COPY TO DEPARTMENT WHEN VERBATIM ISSUES) PROMPTED A FURTHER INTERVENTION BY THE ARGENTINE ON THE LINES OF HIS STATEMENT YESTERDAY. A POOR STATEMENT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE FROM FIJI, MODERATE ONES FROM AUSTRALIA AND NORWAY. IVORY COAST, TANZANIA, CHINA AND MALI ALSO SPOKE. I INTERVENED BRIEFLY AT THE END OF THE DEBATE TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE OUTCOME. THIS PROMPTED A SILLY INTERVENTION BY CUBA, CONCERNING MY POINT OF ORDER YESTERDAY.

3. FOR A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS SEE MIFT (SAVING TO INFORMATION ADDRESSEES).

COMMENT

4. IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT FIJI DID NOT VOTE AGAINST, PARTICULARLY AFTER RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO FROM BOLE (CANBERRA TELNO 447). WE SHALL NEED TO WORK HARD ON THEM BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO BRING THEM BACK INTO LINE. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN DUE COURSE TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT FROM SUVA OF THE OBVIOUS HEART-SEARCHING THAT WENT INTO THE FIJIAN DECISION.

5. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT ADVANTAGE THE ARGENTINES AND VENEZUELANES SAW IN SUBMITTING A DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME. THE AUSTRALIANS AND NORWEGIANS ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED. PERHAPS THERE WAS SOME ELEMENT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. OR THEY MAY HAVE HOPED FOR A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION, BUT THAT WAS UNREALISTIC. THEY SECURED A (WE HOPE TEMPORARY) MOVE TO ABSTENTION BY FIJI, BUT FOUR COUNTRIES THAT ABSTAINED ON RESOLUTION 37/9 FIRMED UP THEIR POSITIONS IN ADVANCE OF THIS YEAR'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE DEBATE PROVIDED US WITH A PLATFORM TO MAKE AN EXTENSIVE AND EARLY DEFENCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN A COMMITTEE WHICH, DESPITE TODAY'S VOTE, IS PERHAPS MORE RECEPTIVE TO SUCH ARGUMENTS THAN THE GENERAL

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ASSEMBLY ITSELF. THE ARGENTINES ADVANCED NO NEW ARGUMENTS. I DOUBT IF THEIR ACCUSATIONS OF 'MILITARISATION' OF THE ISLANDS CARRIED MUCH WEIGHT. THEY LOST ON POINTS AND THE NET RESULT WAS NOT BAD FOR US.

THOMSON

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MR URE  
MR ADAMS



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TELEGRAM NUMBER 770 OF 1 SEPTEMBER  
INFO SAVING OSLO, CANBERRA, SUVA, PORT OF SPAIN, FREETOWN, PORT  
STANLEY, WASHINGTON

MIPT: COMMITTEE OF 24: FALKLANDS DEBATE

1. FOLLOWING IS MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF PROCEEDINGS ON 1 SEPTEMBER.

2. THE SESSION OPENED WITH VENEZUELA INTRODUCING THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION AND CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE VOTE. CHILE INTERVENED TO PROTEST THAT NOT ALL DELEGATIONS WERE PRESENT. THE CHAIRMAN RULED THAT THE VOTE BE POSTPONED UNTIL LATER IN THE MORNING.

3. CHEEK MADE A FURTHER STATEMENT, COMMENTING ON ROSEE'S INTERVENTION YESTERDAY. HE SAID THERE WAS NO WISH ON THE PART OF THE FRG TO PREVENT PRO-ARGENTINE VIEWS BEING HEARD IN THE ISLANDS: HE WOULD GLADLY CIRCULATE COPIES OF ROSEE'S STATEMENT ON HIS RETURN. ON THE LACK OF PROSPECTS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, HE SAID HE HIMSELF WAS THE SON OF A SHEPHERD AND HAD RISEN TO A POSITION OF SOME PROMINENCE. HE DENIED THAT 70 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WERE FIC OR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.

4. IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO THE ARGENTINE I SAID THE COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ARGENTINE AND UK STATEMENTS. ARGENTINA HAD BEEN CONCERNED WITH LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: WE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMITTEE OF 24 FOR NON-SELF GOVERNING PEOPLES. I REPEATED THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH HAD INVADDED THE FALKLANDS AFTER A FRUITFUL SESSION OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS LAST YEAR. NOTHING COULD CHANGE THAT. ARGENTINA HAD QUITE SIMPLY CUT SHORT NEGOTIATIONS. T HAD STRUCK ME AS ODD THAT THE ACCUSATIONS OF MILITARISM HAD COME FROM ARGENTINA. IT WAS PALPABLY RIDICULOUS TO SPEAK OF A NATO BASE IN THE ISLANDS. NATO'S OPERATIONS WERE CONFINED TO THE NORTHERN HEMISPHERE. I DEPLORED THIS ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE AN EAST-WEST DIMENSION INTO THE DISPUTE. THIS ONLY EXACERBATED THE PROBLEM. AS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS THIS CAME POORLY FROM A GOVERNMENT THAT HAD NOT RATIFIED THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO. I REBUTTED THE SUGGESTION THAT SOUTH GEORGIA AND THE SANDWICH ISLANDS WERE IN ANY WAY PART OF THE DISPUTE. I ASKED WHETHER THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WAS INALIENABLE. DID THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION? WAS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY? DID THE COMMITTEE HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO UPHOLD THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION? CLEARLY, THE ANSWER TO ALL THESE QUESTIONS WAS YES.

15. THE



5. THE ARGENTINE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE EXERCISING HIS RIGHT OF REPLY SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION WAS SUPPORTED BY CONCRETE FACTS RATHER THAN PERSONAL OPINIONS: IT WAS NOT MERELY HIS OPINION THAT A MILITARY BASE EXISTED ON THE FALKLANDS IT WAS INCONTESTABLE. SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD EMPHASISED ON THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FALKLANDS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. AS FOR CLAIMING SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE ISLANDERS, THIS DID NOT STAND UP TO ANALYSIS. MY STATEMENT HAD EVADED TWO ASPECTS: THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD VIOLATED CHARTER OBLIGATIONS BY REFUSING TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS (SIC): AND WE HAD REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SEVERAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON THE FALKLANDS. OUR POLICIES ENDANGERED PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA. THE COMMITTEE OF 24 WAS FULLY COMPETENT TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY ONE OF DECOLONISATION. BRITISH EFFORTS TO 'TRAMPLE UNDERFOOT' EFFORTS AIMED AT DECOLONISATION WOULD NOT SUCCEED.

6. FIJI SAID THAT THEY HAD EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST YEAR. THEY FAVOURED NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THEY ACCEPTED THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY UNDER ARTICLE 73 AND RESOLUTION 1514. THEY RECOGNIZED INTERESTS OF THE INHABITANTS WERE PARAMOUNT. THEY REGRETTED THAT THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE VENEZUELAN DRAFT RESOLUTION DID NOT COVER THIS POINT ADEQUATELY. THE DRAFT ALSO TALKED ONLY OF A SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE AND THERE WAS NOT EXPLICIT GUARANTEES THAT THE RIGHTS AND WISHES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS WOULD BE RESPECTED. THEY WOULD ABSTAIN.

7. AUSTRALIA SAID THEY OPPOSED ANY ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS BY MILITARY MEANS. THEY CONDEMNED LAST YEAR'S INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS. THEY SUPPORTED THE RIGHT OF THE ISLANDERS TO BE CONSULTED ABOUT THEIR FUTURE. THEY CONSIDERED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION DEFICIENT IN THAT IT SKIRTED OVER THE EVENTS OF 1982 AND CONTAINED EXTREMELY VAGUE LANGUAGE CONCERNING THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. THEY REGRETTED THAT THE CLIMATE FOR A RESUMPTION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UK WAS UNFAVOURABLE. BUT THEY NEVERTHE- LESS HOPED THAT SUCH CONTACTS COULD BE RESUMED IN TIME. THEY WOULD ALSO ABSTAIN.

8. NORWAY SPOKE ON SIMILAR LINES. THEY SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REGRETTED ARGENTINA RESORT TO FORCE LAST YEAR. ONE COULD NOT PROCEED AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE RESOLUTION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE ISLANDERS. BUT IT WAS WRONG TO DESCRIBE THE DISPUTE AS ONE OF SOVEREIGNTY ALONE. THEY CONSIDERED THERE WAS SCOPE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN A VARIETY OF FIELDS EG TRADE AND FINANCE. THEY HOPED THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS IN THESE AREAS MIGHT LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF FULL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THEY TOO WOULD ABSTAIN.



9. IVORY COAST SAID THAT LAST YEAR'S CONFLICT WAS A "PAINFUL ILLUSTRATION OF ALL THAT INCOMPREHENSION AND INTOLERANCE" CAN PRODUCE. IT HAD BEEN A POINTLESS CONFLICT. IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. FOR THE IVORY COAST THE NOTION OF DIALOGUE WAS A "RELIGION". A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF A DISPUTE THROUGH NEGOTIATION WAS OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE SO THEY WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR. HOWEVER THEY WERE AWARE OF THE INADEQUACIES OF THE TEXT. IN THEIR VIEW THE FALKLANDS WAS A NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORY WHICH HAD A POPULATION AND WAS ENTITLED TO SELF-DETERMINATION. THOSE WHO ARGUED OTHERWISE SHOULD LOGICALLY SEEK TO TRANSFER THE ITEM TO A DIFFERENT FORUM.

10. THE VOTE WAS THEN CALLED. SPEAKING IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE TANZANIA SAID SHE SUPPORTED THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY HOPED THAT UK AND ARGENTINA WOULD SOON NORMALISE RELATIONS. CHINA SAID THAT ALMOST A YEAR HAD PASSED SINCE RESOLUTION 37/9 HAD CALLED FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATION. THE NAM SUMMIT IN DELHI HAD SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS. CHINA SUPPORTED THIS. THEY REGRETTED THAT DESPITE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT YET STARTED. MALI SAID THEIR DELEGATION HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR OF RESOLUTION 37/9. THEY CONSIDERED THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES FUNDAMENTAL. THEY CALLED FOR AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

11. ARGENTINA SPOKE BRIEFLY TO THANK THE COMMITTEE FOR VOTING FOR THE RESOLUTION. THE VOTE HAD BEEN AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES ENshrined IN GA RESOLUTION 37/9.

12. I INTERVENED AGAIN TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE OUTCOME. COMMITTEE MEMBERS PROBABLY FELT IN THEIR HEARTS THAT THEY HAD DONE LESS THAN THEY SHOULD HAVE DONE. SOME EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE HAD COMPLETELY NEGLECTED THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE: SOME HAD CALLED FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS FORGETTING THAT IT WAS ARGENTINA WHICH HAD BROKEN THEM OFF IN THE FIRST PLACE. IT HAD EVEN BEEN SUGGESTED THAT WE FAVOURED A MILITARY SOLUTION: I POINTED OUT THAT 4,000 TROOPS ON THE ISLANDS WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THE 10,000 ARGENTINE TROOPS THAT HAD INVADED LAST YEAR.



13. CUBA COMPLETED THE DAY'S PROCEEDINGS WITH A SILLY INTERVENTION:  
I HAD SAID THEIR POINT OF ORDER YESTERDAY WAS THE LONGEST I HAD  
HEARD. BUT OUR COLONISATION OF THE ISLANDS HAD GONE ON FAR LONGER  
THAN THAT AND WAS OF MUCH GREATER SIGNIFICANCE. OUR COMPLAINTS  
ABOUT THE RESOLUTION WERE UNJUSTIFIED. WE WOULD DO WELL TO CONVEY  
TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THEY SUPPORTED ARGENTINA'S POSITION.  
THE SITUATION IN THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS WAS 'ANACHRONISTIC'.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES EXCEPT WASHINGTON

THOMSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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PS/MR. RIFKIND

PS/PUS

SIR. J. BULLARD

SIR. J. LEAHY

MR. WRIGHT

MR. GIFFARD

MR. URE

MR. ADAMS





Argentina

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 August, 1983

Food Supplies for the Falklands

BF/

The Prime Minister has seen your Secretary of State's minute of 16 August. She is content with the arrangements that he proposes. She has, however, asked whether some of the vegetables needed by UK forces can be grown in the islands. I should be grateful for your advice on this.

I am copying this to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Robert Lawson (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).

W. F. S. RICKETT

N. H. R. Evans, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

SL





Prime Minister  
Do you agree to these  
arrangements?

MO 5/21

PRIME MINISTER

Yes - but surely  
some of the vegetables  
can be grown in  
the islands?  
not

WFSM  
19/8

FOOD SUPPLIES FOR THE FALKLANDS

P7 33  
Following the controversy about the proportion of imported food being issued to our forces in the Falkland Islands, I wrote to you on 3rd March (MO 5/21) detailing the general pattern of our food supply arrangements, from which I concluded that the balance between UK and imported supplies was not out of line with the economy as a whole. I also mentioned that our purchases were normally the subject of competition amongst UK firms.

2. By using two ration ships, each rotating with the other as a transport vessel and a local storage vessel, we have been able to supply the garrison with a very good diet including a high proportion of fresh vegetables, meat and fruit. There is no doubt, however, that we could improve the quality and provide more variety if it were not necessary to ship all the food for 8000 miles. We have therefore been looking at possibilities of obtaining food from sources closer to the Islands. At the same time, the FCO has been pressing us to arrange supply contracts with firms in South America as part of their efforts to improve our relations with that continent and to set up commercial links between South America and the Falklands. The South Atlantic Island Development Corporation (SAID), a South African company which already arranges supplies for St Helena and Tristan da Cunha, has also been pressing us to contract with them for supplies.





3. Taking all these considerations together, coupled with the undertakings we have given to UK firms following the Parliamentary pressure that they will be given the opportunity to compete, we have concluded that the best way forward is to insert notices in the appropriate UK trade journals and the EEC Journal asking interested firms to send us details of their capability to deliver supplies for the Falklands. The FCO will arrange for the embassies in South America to bring this to the notice of likely suppliers. The foodstuffs involved are listed at Annex A.

4. We do not, of course, know what replies we shall get nor whether any firm arrangements will ensue. Nevertheless it is possible that attractive responses may come from South America (though not of course from Argentina where our embargo continues) or possibly South Africa and the appearance of the notices could re-ignite the controversy about imported food. Given the acknowledged need to improve supplies, the geographical position of the Falklands and the relatively modest purchases involved, I believe we can rebut any criticisms but you will wish to be aware of what is proposed.

5. I am copying this minute to Geoffrey Howe and Michael Jopling.

*WJH*

Ministry of Defence  
16th August 1983





ANNEX A

Potatoes

Onions

Cabbage

Cauliflower

Carrots

Turnip/Swede

Lettuce

Cucumber

Tomato

Apples

Oranges

Grapefruit

Eggs

Milk UHT long life







C O N F I D E N T I A L

12356 - 1

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 633

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 171455Z AUG 83

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 384 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY, BIS BUENOS AIRES,  
WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 680 (NOT TO ALL) : FALKLANDS

MIPT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPLY TO ARGENTINE LETTERS OF 28 JUNE  
AND 16 JULY.

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, TO STATE  
THE FOLLOWING IN RESPONSE TO THE LETTERS DATED 28 JUNE AND  
16 JULY 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARGENTINA  
(A/38.287 SEMI-COLON S/15849 AND A/38/301) ON THE SUBJECT OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REJECTS THE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE BRITISH  
AUTHORITIES ARE BENT ON MAINTAINING A CLIMATE OF CONFRONTATION,  
AS INDEED IT REJECTS THE ARGENTINE REFERENCES TO QUOTE  
MILITARISING UNQUOTE THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. FAR FROM SEEKING  
CONFRONTATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS TAKEN INITIATIVES TOWARDS  
THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, TO  
WHICH ARGENTINA HAS INADEQUATELY RESPONDED. AS WAS POINTED OUT  
IN MY LETTER OF 18 MAY, ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO DECLARE A  
DEFINITIVE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND TO RENOUNCE THE FUTURE  
USE OF FORCE CANNOT BUT CARRY THE IMPLICATION THAT IT MAY BE

1

C O N F I D E N T I A L



THE INTENTION OF ARGENTINA TO RESUME ACTIVE HOSTILITIES. AND RECENT INCURSIONS INTO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROTECTION ZONE BY ARGENTINE MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS BY UNAUTHORISED CIVILIAN VESSELS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE CONTINUING NEED FOR MEASURES TO ENSURE THE DEFENCES OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO DEFEND THE POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AGAINST FURTHER HOSTILE ACTION BY ARGENTINA. THE UNITED KINGDOM REMAINS DETERMINED TO FULFIL THAT DUTY. THE DECISION TO CONSTRUCT THE NEW AIRFIELD ON THE ISLANDS IS A NECESSARY PART OF THIS POLICY. THE ARGENTINE LETTER OF 16 JULY SUGGESTS THAT SOUTH AFRICA WILL BE USED AS A QUOTE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BASE UNQUOTE. THIS IS FALSE. THE CHOICE OF CAPE TOWN BY THE CONTRACTORS AS A TRANSIT POINT FOR THEIR CIVILIAN WORKFORCE WAS DECIDED BY THE CONTRACTORS, WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF EITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OR OF SOUTH AFRICA. THE DECISION RELATED ONLY TO THE CONTRACTORS' CIVILIAN WORKFORCE AND NOT (NOT) TO EQUIPMENT OR CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL FOR THE AIRFIELD. ALL CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS WILL BE TRANSPORTED DIRECT FROM BRITAIN BY SEA. NO MILITARY OR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL WILL TRAVEL VIA CAPE TOWN.

THE LETTER OF 16 JULY ALSO CLAIMS THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM INTENDS TO CONSTRUCT IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS MILITARY FACILITIES ON A SCALE ABOVE THAT REQUIRED TO MEET THE PRESENT THREAT TO THE ISLANDS. THIS IS ABSURD. THE NATURE OF THE THREAT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IS UNFORTUNATELY VERY PLAIN. THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL MAINTAIN THE DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS NECESSARY TO MEET IT.

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESOLUTION 37/9 IS WELL KNOWN. THIS RESOLUTION FAILED TO GIVE EXPRESS RECOGNITION TO THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO SELF-DETERMINATION, AND APPEARED TO SUGGEST THAT THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS SHOULD BE CHANGED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE MANIFEST WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS. THE REFERENCES IN THE ARGENTINE LETTER OF 28 JUNE TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE WAY OF LIFE AND TRADITIONS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS AND THE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF THEIR INTERESTS ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR RECOGNITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. THE ARGENTINE LETTER'S OFFENSIVE REFERENCES TO QUOTE ILLEGAL COLONIAL PRESENCE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF BRITISH COLONIALISM UNQUOTE OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT REMAINS THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT PREFERRED BY THE INHABITANTS WHO HAVE RECENTLY EXPERIENCED THE ARGENTINE ALTERNATIVE. THE UNITED KINGDOM, FOR ITS PART, WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR FREELY AND CLEARLY EXPRESSED WISHES.

ENDS

WHITNEY

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

FID

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

<sup>9</sup>  
CONFIDENTIAL



Falklands (VIN)  
m

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12355 - 1

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

PP WASHINGTON

GRS 170

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 171340Z AUG 83

TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 383 OF 17 AUGUST

INFO PRIORITY CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY, BIS BUENOS AIRES,  
WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 680 (NOT TO ALL) : FALKLANDS

1. MIFT CONTAINS TEXT OF PROPOSED JOINT REPLY TO ARGENTINE LETTERS OF 28 JUNE AND 16 JULY. IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION (AND WE NOTED YOUR OWN DOUBTS ABOUT PUTTING TOO MUCH WEIGHT ON ARGUMENTS BASED ON QUOTE SELF-DETERMINATION UNQUOTE), PLEASE TRANSMIT THIS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEFORE COMMITTEE OF 24 DISCUSS THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. YOU SHOULD ASK THAT IT BE GIVEN THE SAME CIRCULATION AS THE ARGENTINE LETTERS.

2. WE WILL INSTRUCT YOU IN DUE COURSE HOW TO REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER OF 20 JULY, AND, WHEN WE HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR PROMISED DRAFT, TO THE ARGENTINE COMMUNICATION OF 10 AUGUST TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AS OUR LETTER IN REPLY TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS NOT FOR EARLY PUBLICATION, WE DO NOT (NOT) SEE THE NEED FOR IT TO BE SENT IN BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF 24'S DISCUSSION.

WHITNEY

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FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FID

FALKLAND ISLANDS

CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

HL

11 August 1983

Thank you for your letter of 9 August about relations with Argentina for which the Prime Minister was very grateful. Mrs. Thatcher noted the position as regards next-of-kin visits to the Falklands and agreed that you should resume action on 15 August on the conditions set out in your letter.

Tim Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

00 LA PAZ

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

~~30~~ 36 TYPISTS

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR WHITNEY  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
~~PS/MR RAYSON~~  
 SIR J. BULLARD  
~~SIR J. BULLARD~~  
~~MR WRIGHT~~  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
~~MR ADAMS~~ MR STREETON  
~~MR EVANS~~ MR THOMAS  
 MR UEE  
~~MR [unclear]~~  
 HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/SAMD  
 HD/FID  
~~HD/DEFENSE DEPT~~  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OF  
 DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR [unclear]~~ IAT ) DOT  
 MR A FORNAM

MR FREELAND - LEGAL ADVISORS

RESIDENT CLERK

*Paul Martin*

*[Handwritten initials]*



GRS 260  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM SANTIAGO 092200Z AUG 83  
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 09 AUGUST  
 INFO IMMEDIATE ALL LATIN AMERICAN POSTS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

FALKLANDS AT THE UNGA

1. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM BUENOS AIRES ON 5 AUGUST, CHILE HAS INFORMED ARGENTINA THAT IT WILL CO-SPONSOR THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION AT THE UN THIS YEAR URGING BRITAIN TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS NEWS WAS LATER CONFIRMED PUBLICLY BY THE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER AS WELL AS THEIR EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES.
2. DURING A TALK I HAD TODAY WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY (LAGOS), I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THIS NEWS SHOULD REACH



2. DURING A TALK I HAD TODAY WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY (LAGOS), I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THIS NEWS SHOULD REACH US BY WAY OF A PRESS LEAK FROM BUENOS AIRES. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THE LEAK CAME FROM THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND APOLOGISED

HE HAD INTENDED TO TELL US OF THEIR DECISION THIS WEEK. I THEN ASKED WHAT EXACTLY CHILE HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT. LAST YEAR THEY AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE RESOLUTION OMITTED AT LEAST SOME OF THE MORE OBJECTIONABLE ARGENTINE POLEMICS. LAGOS REPLIED THAT IN SUBSTANCE THE RESOLUTION THEY HAD AGREED TO CO-SPONSOR WAS THE SAME AS LAST YEAR. HE GAVE ME THE TEXT A COPY OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING HERE 11 AUGUST (TO FCO AND UKMIS ONLY).

3. LAGOS ADDED THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE ARGENTINES FOR SEVERAL WEEKS TO AGREE TO CO-SPONSOR THE RESOLUTION THIS YEAR. LAGOS CLAIMED THAT ALL OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES (BAR NICARAGUA) HAD ALREADY AGREED TO THIS AND SAID THAT CHILE COULD NOT STAND OUT ALONE AGAINST THE CLAIMS OF LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY. HE ASSURED ME, HOWEVER, THAT THE CHILEAN SPEECH ON THE SUBJECT IN NEW YORK WOULD AS LAST YEAR MAKE CLEAR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHILEAN AND THE ARGENTINE POSITIONS.

4. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPELL OUT TO LAGOS THE ARGUMENTS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 143 TO ABIDJAN OF 11 OCTOBER, 1982 ET AL.

HICKMAN

NNNN

SENT AT /RECD AT 092255ZP L N //HGH



SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

8 August 1983

The Prime Minister has seen Port Stanley telegram No. 447 of 2 August about the Argentine next-of-kin visit as well as JIC Report 83(1A)15. She has commented that we must not go ahead with the arrangements for the Argentine next-of-kin visit until we can be sure that the threat to which the JIC Report refers proves to be ill-founded. I should be grateful therefore if you could hold up such arrangements for the visit as are in train until the end of this week unless further intelligence is received.

Tim Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET



IS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLIARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LOED N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR ~~GILMORE~~ Cartledge

ED/PUSD (2)  
ED/SAMD  
ED/FID  
~~ED/DEFENCE DEPT~~  
ED/NEWS DEPT  
ED/EEB  
ED/ECD(E)  
ED/UND  
ED/PLANNING STAFF

83(1A)15

ADVANCE COPY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF-MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR G ROBERTS~~, IAT ) DOT  
MR A FORNAM

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

*Handwritten notes:*  
No! must check with...  
whether...  
sic report...  
out to...  
will forward

GRS 160  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM PORT STANLEY 022040Z AUG 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGAM NUMBER 447 OF 2 AUGUST

ARGENTINE NEXT-OF-KIN VISIT

1. THE PROPOSAL THAT HMG SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE ON ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN VISIT THROUGH THE SWISS AUTHORITIES WAS AGREED UNANIMOUSLY BY COUNCILLORS TODAY (2 AUGUST). IN PARTICULAR THEY ACCEPTED THAT WE NEED NOT INSIST ON THE COURTESY FLAG BEING FLOWN (BUT THAT RED CROSS FLAG MUST): THAT SMALL, CAREFULLY CHOSEN, POOL OF JOURNALISTS BE EMBARKED; AND THAT IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES COULD BE WAIVED.

*Handwritten note:*  
that no further steps should be taken to facilitate the next of kin visits until time proves that correct sic reports are shown to be unfounded 2/8

2. COUNCILLORS HOPED THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT THE COMMITTEE OF 24 WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE USE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS VALUE OF THIS PROPOSAL. THERE WAS SOME CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA MIGHT INSIST ON PROPOSAL BEING KEPT CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MOMENT., BUT COUNCILLORS HOPED THAT, SHOULD ARGENTINA TRY TO MAKE PROPAGANDA GAINS AT THE UN, HMG'S PROPOSAL WOULD THEN BE PUBLICISED UNDERLINING THAT ISLAND COUNCILLORS HAD AGREED IT ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

HUNT



m

CONFIDENTIAL

9885 - 1

OO BUENOS AIRES (VIA BERNE)

GRS 595

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 051746Z AUG 83

TO IMMEDIATE BIS BUENOS AIRES

TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 05 AUGUST 1983

AND TO INFO EC POSTS, UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON,

UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 659, ARGENTINA: COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

1. WE ARE SORRY THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT IMF DEVELOPMENTS. YOU SPOKE WELL, AND IN FUTURE CONTACTS WITH EC COLLEAGUES MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING.
2. ARGENTINA HAS TWICE ENTERED INTO A COMMITMENT TO REMOVE FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON BRITISH COMPANIES. IN SEPTEMBER 1982, WE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL LIFTING OF SUCH RESTRICTIONS. WE IMMEDIATELY FULFILLED OUR UNDERTAKINGS: ARGENTINA HAS ONLY PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED ITS PART OF THE AGREEMENT. THEN AS PART OF THE STANDBY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE IMF CONCLUDED IN JANUARY, ARGENTINA WAS REQUIRED TO REMOVE REMAINING DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS BY 31 JULY. FAILURE TO COMPLY MEANS THAT ARGENTINA IS UNABLE TO MAKE FURTHER DRAWINGS FROM THE IMF, AND THEREBY ALSO PUTS AT RISK THE 1.5 BILLION DOLLAR MEDIUM-TERM LOAN BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE COMMERCIAL BANKS. WHILE RESTRICTIONS ON BANKS HAVE IN PRACTICE BEEN LIFTED FOLLOWING ENACTMENT OF LAW 22820, ARGENTINA HAS MAINTAINED RESTRICTIONS AGAINST BRITISH NON-BANKING COMPANIES.
3. WE ESTIMATE THAT ABOUT EIGHTY BRITISH COMPANIES ARE AFFECTED. THE SUMS INVOLVED ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE IMPORTANT FOR THE COMPANIES CONCERNED THAN FOR ARGENTINA ITSELF. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH THE AMOUNTS MAY BE SMALL, THIS MERELY POINTS TO THE EASE WITH WHICH ARGENTINA COULD REMOVE THE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS.
4. ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ITS COMMITMENT TO THE IMF REPRESENTS A VIOLATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL IMF PRINCIPLE AND A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE POLITICAL FACTORS INTO THE

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WORK OF THE IMF. IT IS NOT, REPEAT NOT, A TECHNICAL BREACH OF A PARTICULAR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE TARGET, AND THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR GRANTING ARGENTINA A WAIVER.

5. THE IMF STAFF ARE WELL-PLACED TO ASSESS THE DANGER THAT A DEBT CRISIS IN ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. BUT THEY ARE TAKING A VERY FIRM STAND ON THE MATTER OF IMF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FUND SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ALL MEMBERS BECAUSE OF THE FUND'S CENTRAL ROLE IN DEALING WITH DEBT PROBLEMS. IT IS PERFECTLY WITHIN THE POWER OF THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO REMOVE THE RETAINING RESTRICTIONS, AS THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED BY REMOVING IN PRACTICE THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE BANKS.

6. THE ARGENTINES HAVE ALSO ALLEGED THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN REMOVING THE REMAINING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST BRITISH COMPANIES. BUT THE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS AGAINST BRITISH BANKS DEMONSTRATES THAT, IF THERE ARE ANY POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES, THEY CAN BE OVERCOME WHEN IT SUITS THE JUNTA. TO ARGUE THAT THE POLITICAL RISK OF REMOVING RESTRICTIONS AGAINST COMPANIES IS GREATER THAN THAT OF ECONOMIC COLLAPSE IS CLEARLY NONSENSE.

7. SHOULD THE ARGENTINES RAISE THE COMPLETELY SEPARATE QUESTION OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS (AND THEY HAVE REFERRED ELSEWHERE TO OUR REFUSAL OF AN EXPORT LICENCE FOR A FLIGHT SIMULATOR), YOU MAY WISH TO REMIND EC COLLEAGUES THAT SINCE OCTOBER 1982, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE COMMISSION HAVE REPEATEDLY INVITED THE ARGENTINES TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MUTUAL LIFTING OF REMAINING ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA. THE OFFER WAS REPEATED AS RECENTLY AS EARLY JULY BY THE GREEKS. BUT THE ARGENTINES HAVE REFUSED TO AGREE TO SUCH DISCUSSIONS. IT IS THE ARGENTINES WHO ARE BEING INTRANSIGENT IN THIS MATTER.

8. WE ARE REPEATING YOUR TUR TO EC POSTS.

RAISON

DISTRIBUTION  
MONETARY  
ERD  
FID  
NEWS DEPT  
PUSD

COPIES TO  
MR LAVELLE TREASURY  
MR CRAWFORD BANK OF ENGLAND  
MR OWEN OTS/DTI

<sup>2</sup>  
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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Room 1103 Ashdown House 123 Victoria Street SW1E 6RB

Telex 8813148

Telegrams Advantage London SW1

Telephone Direct Line 01-212 5902

Switchboard 01-212 7676

From the  
Minister of State  
Norman Lamont MP

The Rt Hon Patrick Jenkin MP  
Secretary of State for the  
Environment  
2 Marsham Street  
London SW1

*DL*  
*8/4*  
5 August 1983

*Dear Patrick*

FALKLAND ISLANDS STRATEGIC AIRFIELD: PLANT AND VEHICLES

*in box*  
In Cecil Parkinson's absence I am replying to your letter of 2 August.

You will already know that we agree with the line you propose. I should just like to add my appreciation of your prompt action in averting a potentially highly embarrassing outcome.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Howe, Nigel Lawson and Michael Heseltine.

NORMAN LAMONT

*Norman*

*Norman*



Argentine  
Relations 1834





Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

4 August 1983

The Rt Hon Patrick Jenkin MP  
Secretary of State for the Environment

A large, cursive handwritten signature, likely of Patrick Jenkin.

Handwritten initials, possibly 'J/S', in the right margin.

FALKLAND ISLANDS STRATEGIC AIRFIELD: PLANT AND VEHICLES

I was grateful to you for sending me a copy of your letter of 2 August about the BL sub-contract. I have since obtained a copy of the letter from Cecil Parkinson to which you were replying, and have been considering how to respond to your request for an agreed decision.

77M  
w box

I have however been told today that you in fact settled the matter, in BL's favour, on 2 August, and that the contract was signed that day. That seems unfortunate, both procedurally and on policy grounds. Since the tender still fell a long way short of the competition, favouring BL means imposing an additional charge on Michael Heseltine's budget. And if our purchasing policy is not to waste money on 'Buy British' regardless of cost, value for money considerations should not be lightly over-ridden.

That said, I recognise that the pressures for the decision taken were strong, and it is of course now water over the dam. But given the need to hold down public expenditure, I hope that we shall in future cases revert to the policy of leaving the main contractor for a project to make his own commercial decisions on sub-contracts in accordance with the conditions of his contract. And when departures from that policy have to be considered, I hope that all those concerned will be consulted in due time.

Copies of this letter go to the other recipients of yours of 2 August.

A large, cursive handwritten signature, likely of Nigel Lawson.

NIGEL LAWSON



ARGENTINA: Relations: Pt 34

5 AUG 1983

1983  
AUG 5  
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 August 1983

*A*  
*4/8.*

*Dear Private Secretary,*

Falkland Islands: Strategic Airfield: Plant and Vehicles

Thank you for copying to us Mr Jenkin's letter of <sup>*in box*</sup> 2 August to Mr Parkinson about the airfield contractors' purchase of transport vehicles.

We agree that the reduced British Leyland bid should be accepted if at all possible. We also agree that it is only sensible for the contractors to go ahead with the purchase of dump trucks from Volvo and excavators from Caterpillar, though were it not for the decision in favour of British Leyland even this would have generated difficulties in Parliament and the press.

*Yours sincerely*  
*J. E. Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

J Ballard Esq  
PS/Secretary of State  
for the Environment


CONFIDENTIAL

CC: PS/No 10  
PS/Chancellor of the Exchequer  
PS/SOS of Defence  
PS/SoS Trade & Industry



Argentina  
Relations # 34

4 AUG 1963







Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 August 1983

WBM  
~~Prime Minister~~

Dear Willie,

Dr  
 4/15  
 1/8

Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister may wish to be aware of the attached leaflet, one of a series published by an organisation called "ECOROPA". As the leaflet acknowledges, it is largely the work of Tam Dalyell MP. The full title of the organisation is "European Group for Ecological Action" and it seems to be based in France. We do not know what sort of circulation the leaflet is getting, nor whether it is confined solely to this country.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
 Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq  
 10 Downing Street



# FALKLANDS WAR

## The Disturbing Truth

It is with deep regret and in the face of considerable pressure that we publish this leaflet. As the facts over the Falklands war have gradually become known, we have been forced to conclude that it was ordered by Mrs. Thatcher for base political reasons; that it was completely unnecessary since alternatives existed; that it involved nuclear weapons; that news of it was manipulated; that it has left us dangerously over-committed financially and militarily and that it has not deterred Argentinian intentions toward the Falklands.

The war cost 255 British lives, with a further 770 seriously wounded (and over 800 Argentinians were killed). These casualties will have been incurred to the best of ends if, as a result of the truth being published, Parliament never again permits our political leaders to commit such an unforgivable folly. The Falklands war has been the subject of a sustained propaganda campaign in which Mrs. Thatcher has sought to present herself as having saved Britain from humiliation inflicted by a fascist dictator. The reality is tragically different.

Through a series of questions and answers we attempt to put the record straight. This is not an apology for the Argentinians: the behaviour of the military junta was inexcusable from start to finish. Those who have acted irresponsibly stand accused. It is for the reader and the British public to decide who is guilty and what must now be done. The evidence is clear and simple.

Q.1. What led to the Argentine invasion?

A. The belief, instilled into successive generations of Argentinian school children, that the 'Malvinas' were an integral part of their country, which had been snatched by British piracy in 1833. In 1910, so uncertain was the British Foreign Office about Britain's claim that it asked the Foreign Office lawyers to make a report. The view was

expressed that our claim was doubtful - so doubtful that successive British governments never dared to go to the International Court at The Hague. From the mid-1960s until April 1982, successive British governments conducted negotiations - presumably in good faith - but lacking any determination to succeed. By planning to invade, Galtieri not only thought he could bring negotiations to a head, but could do so when he desperately needed to divert public attention from trade union upheaval, inflation, the growing clamour over the 'Disappeared Ones' and the mothers in the Plaza de Mayo.

Q.2. Did we receive warning that an invasion was intended?

A. Yes. M16 performed superbly - though their task was not difficult in the environment of 100,000 Anglo-Argentines and 17,000 British passport-holders. Argentina's decision to invade was made on January 12, 1982, and the British agents were told, in the expectation that they would pass the information to London. This they did - and the SAS were informed that they were going to the Falklands in February, 1982. According to the Franks Committee, on March 3, 1982, Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires sent an urgent telegram giving warning of precisely the military action suggested by the Joint Intelligence Committee in Whitehall (Franks, paragraph 95). Admittedly, the senior Foreign Office official did comment: "He's only an emotional Welshman - not too much notice should be taken of him!" But Mrs. Thatcher, in her own handwriting (Franks, paragraphs 147 - 152) did scribble on it: "We must have contingency plans". How can a person who wrote that, if she has any respect for the truth, tell the Commons (October 26, 1982) that the Falklands crisis came "out of the blue" on Wednesday, March 31?

Q.3. What attempts were made to bring about a diplomatic solution prior to the invasion?

A. Seriously, none. The Argentinians were allowed to interpret British actions (such as the withdrawal of HMS Endurance) and American messages (through General Walters, Jean Kirkpatrick, Jose Sorsano and others) as a nod and a wink to get the problem solved by a *fait accompli*.

In international affairs it is generally acceptable to compromise by shifting from a hard position to a soft position. It is wholly unacceptable and totally irresponsible to give the impression of taking a soft position, and then instead, adopting an ultra hard one.

Q.4. Could the war have been avoided?

A. Almost certainly. It is 'the quarrel of two bald men fighting over a comb'. Prior to the Argentinian invasion, the British Foreign Secretary should have gone to Buenos Aires and sought an acceptable lease-back arrangement, which would have avoided the conflict. If this proved unacceptable, Britain could have sought assurance that (a) those Falklanders who wished to leave be given compensation, (b) those who want to stay be given the same rights as the Welsh-speaking Patagonian communities, and (c) the work of the British Antarctic Survey and the Scott Polar Research Institute would be guaranteed.

These assurances would almost certainly have been

given. Yet even if this process of negotiation was thought unacceptable to Britain, the matter should have been placed in the hands of the United Nations, in which case the Argentine invasion would then have met with world-wide opposition - including that of Latin America. We have it on good authority that the Peruvian peace plan was acceptable to the junta - until the sinking of the *Belgrano*.

Q.5. Who took the decision to engage in war?

A. Margaret Thatcher.

*"When you've spent half your political life dealing with humdrum issues like the environment.....it's exciting to have a real crisis on your hands."* (Margaret Thatcher on May 14, 1982, during the Falklands campaign).

Q.6. Was Parliament consulted in advance?

A. In advance, no. The imprimature of Parliament was required for the despatch of the task force and in a truncated three-hour debate on Saturday, April 3, in which the most vigorous dissenters were not called by the Speaker, and in which Labour and SDP leaders revealed their ignorance of Latin America, the majority of an emotional House of Commons sent the task force on its way - few MPs imagining that it would get beyond the Western Approaches. The shadow Foreign Secretary, Denis Healey, was in the United States, and it is still far from clear what discussion took place between Government ministers and the Shadow Defence Secretary.

*"She has become a complete dictator, ordering war without consulting Parliament, and she is dragging the masses, shouting and cheering behind her"* (A Message from the Falklands, Penguin, £1.95).

Q.7. What military/diplomatic advice was given?

A. Air Chief Marshal, Sir Michael Beetham, Chief of the Air Staff, expressed grave reservations, particularly about the shortage of air cover in the face of land-based Argentinian aircraft. The Army also had reservations largely for the same reasons. But the Navy, particularly in the person of Sir Henry Leach (since the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Lewin, was in New Zealand) were exceedingly anxious to send a task force - because they wanted to provide a justification for their surface ships, then under dire threat through Treasury defence cuts.

The considered and long-held Foreign Office view was that "Fortress Falklands", as they have termed it over 15 years, was unsustainable in the event of a serious Argentine attack.

Q.8. What use did we make of the UN?

A. The skill of Sir Anthony Parsons and the contacts and goodwill he had fostered during his time in New York, were cleverly used to give a cloak of respectability to the sending of the task force, by getting what amounted to the neutralisation of the Security Council. The Government made cynical and selective use of UN Resolution 502: Mrs. Thatcher's initial and sanctimonious endorsement of it, was followed by her deliberately ignoring it since it called for the withdrawal of *all* forces. Privately, Secretary General Perez de Quellar was to observe that the Falklands were a problem which, with a little goodwill, could be



Q.9. Why was the General Belgrano sunk?

A. There is strong reason to believe that on the morning of Sunday, May 2, 1982, the British Prime Minister, at Chequers, was faced with a compromise in the form of the Peruvian peace plan, endorsed by the UN, which most of the world, and the Labour opposition, expected her - and Argentina - to accept. Seemingly, she thought that were she to do so, and hold the task force back, she would be discredited in the eyes of most of the right-wing Tories, and that she would be unable to capitalise on the wave of euphoria that she had set in train. We therefore believe that, for the sake of her own position, behind the back of her Foreign Secretary (who was in the US), without consulting our UN representatives to our American allies whose hemispheric relations were bound to be dangerously affected, in the clear knowledge that Argentina had ordered withdrawal of marine and land forces, Mrs. Thatcher ordered a massacre so as to make peace impossible.

When the *Belgrano* (an antique ex-US cruiser, a survivor of Pearl Harbour, and due to become a floating museum in 1983) was torpedoed, she was 59 miles outside the total exclusion zone and steaming away from it. She was stated to present a major threat to the task force. In reality she was never such a threat and photographs revealed that she was not, as had been claimed, carrying Exocets. Her escorts, however, were - but to have sunk one of them would have caused far fewer casualties and thus might have still allowed a peaceful settlement.

Already that weekend three operations had been launched against Stanley airfield. The stated intention was to crater the runway. But, in reality, not just H.E. bombs, but cluster bombs and air-burst shells were used, entirely ineffective against the runway but causing many casualties - as intended.

Q.10. Is it true that nuclear weapons were taken to the South Atlantic?

A. Yes, both from Gibraltar and the RFA Fort Austin, on carriers, destroyers and frigates and from Portsmouth, - though after a major row some, not all, of the nuclear weapons were withdrawn before the fleet reached Ascension Island. Efforts to retrieve nuclear depth-bombs from the graves of Sheffield and Coventry have been only partially successful, and attempts to find nuclear-bombs from the two 'downed' Sea King helicopters have been unsuccessful.

Q.11. Who authorised this?

A. According to Keith Speed, sacked Navy Minister, he would have been extremely surprised and angry if the fleet had not taken nuclear weapons. On March 28, the crew of the RFA Fort Austin were told by the barmaids of Gibraltar that they were going to the South Atlantic and not back to the UK as they anticipated after 5½ months in the sweltering Persian Gulf. Since the Prime Minister says that the Falklands crisis came "out of the blue" three days later and since the fleet with nuclear weapons sailed two days

earlier, how come that the barmaids of Gibraltar had better information on the destination of the fleet carrying nuclear weapons than she in Downing Street?

If Mrs. Thatcher did not know that nuclear weapons were being moved to a theatre of war, vast ramifications follow for the control of nuclear weapons. If she did know - as we believe - no less vast consequences follow.

Q.12. Under what circumstances would these have been used?

A. Conceivably, if Britain has lost *Invincible* or *Hermes* and was facing defeat. There were contingency plans for nuclear attacks on the Argentine mainland. Nuclear weapons would have been necessary since Britain lacked the capability for collective conventional attack. Britain, as a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has clearly and unforgivably infringed the Treaty by taking nuclear weapons to the South Atlantic.

*"What is happening here is barbaric and totally unnecessary."* (A Message from the Falklands, Penguin, £1.95)

Q.13. Did the Argentinians have any such weapons?

A. Some reports suggest that Argentina may have had and would have used them in response. They will certainly be available for use in the second Falklands War.

Q.14. Why did we have no adequate defence against Exocet?

A. Because it is extremely difficult to counter air-launched missiles from aircraft that are out of range of ships' defences. In the second Falklands war, with the new Exocets bought from France since 1982, with the Gabriel missiles bought from Israel and fitted to the newly acquired A4 Skyhawks, the results could be still more devastating.

Q.15. Is it true that many of the Argentine weapons were supplied by Britain?

A. Alas, yes. Forty British companies were involved. Crucial Exocet guidance parts came from Bepi of Galashiels, £50 million worth of Argentine ammunition from a firm in Mrs. Thatcher's home town of Grantham (which she sponsored as a candidate for the Queen's Award for Industry prize in 1982), and a mass of high technology has gone to the Argentine military from British Aerospace, Hawker Siddeley, Rolls-Royce and many other big names of British industry. For further details of Britain's part in promoting the arms trade, see Ecoropa leaflet no. 9.

*"The picture that Nott and his cronies are giving is not true. The Argentinian air force has the latest attack aircraft and missiles, which we just do not have."* A Message from the Falklands, Penguin, £1.95)

Q.16. Did our allies really support us?

A. Leading newspapers in France, Germany and Italy were amazed and contemptuous of the British reaction - a response that has deepened as the facts have become known. Governments that had reacted against the invasion became increasingly critical and their support was largely cosmetic. The French, for example, never recalled the technical team who taught the Argentinians how to marry an Exocet to the wing of an aircraft. The Germans carried on completing the Argentinian frigates (for which Rolls-Royce supplied the engines). The Canadians carried on supplying uranium

Q.17. Was it an easy victory?

A. No, although our forces did all - and more - than could possibly have been expected of them. If the German-made bombs that hit our ships had exploded, we would have lost nine more. If the torpedo which struck *Invincible* had exploded, the task force would have been in terrible difficulty. The 'Canberra' and other ships were sitting targets for crucial hours during the landings. The troops' guns immediately before the surrender of Stanley were down to 20 rounds a gun. The task force, which comprised over 70% of our sea fighting capability and which carried a significant part of our best assault troops, came exceedingly near to disaster. Of course risks are taken in war, but the task force had been irresponsibly committed to a task for which it lacked the air cover and, in the event, was saved not only by the gallantry and efficiency of the services, but by luck. Without this luck, Britain would have suffered a military catastrophe.

*".....and above all, the tragedy, and horror of the British lives that have been lost which have been spent quite willingly by Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Nott to make up for the political ineptitude and pig-headedness of the Government."* (A Message from the Falklands, Penguin, £1.95)

Q.18. Who actually suffered as a result of the war?

A. Not the Prime Minister, whose war it was, and whose Government's popularity soared. Not the military junta who largely reside in retirement writing their memoirs. Not the politicians on the benches of the House of Commons who despatched the task force. The people who lost were the British and Argentinian parents, widows and children of those who will never return, and those who did return but are dreadfully maimed. And the 1,800 Falkland islanders whose land is mined, who still have absolutely no long-term security and who continue to be treated by Whitehall as junior colonials.

When in due course, negotiations cede sovereignty to the Argentine the huge post-invasion investment made by Britain will fall straight into the Argentine pocket.

*"The place I wanted to bring my children up has been spoilt, spoilt by this invasion. The life-style I came down here to find is gone. It's gone forever."* (An islander in Eyewitness Falklands by Robert Fox.)

Q.19. What is the cost of the war?

A. To date £3,800,000,000 - about £160 per household in Britain. The cost of keeping the forces on full alert, in the face of low-intensity Argentine operations, is mind boggling. This money will have to be found by the British taxpayer.

Q.20. How vulnerable are the Falklands now?

A. Against direct invasion probably not very vulnerable, if an £800,000,000 airport is built, and hugely expensive diversionary runways are constructed. Against bee-sting attack, taking out one or two ships, or against delayed - action mines, very vulnerable indeed. The Argentines have



*carte blanche* for a war of financial attrition.

Q.21. Have the Argentine any weapons left?

A. Helped by international loans, to which Britain contributes, Argentina has more than replaced her armament, mostly from Britain's 'allies' including the US, and her services have learned many lessons. As the military establishment chillingly put it: "We have a dept to cancel."

Q.22. What did the Franks Committee conclude?

A. They took nothing after April 2, 1982, into consideration. Their conclusions that no blame attached to the Government up to that time was inconsistent with facts in the body of the report.

Q.23. What about the Falkland Islanders and their future?

A. Their fragile life-style has gone for ever. In the absence of negotiation about sovereignty, they live under the shadow of a second Malvinas/Falklands war. A peace treaty has not been signed. With up to 25 per cent of our naval capability tied down in their defence, it grows daily more obvious that this intolerable expense will only be sustained until Mrs. Thatcher's personal future, for whatever reason, is no longer directly tied to this untenable situation.

*"Their attitude to the British is a mixture of continued deep distrust, disappointment and a sullen acceptance of the military, the realities of the new occupying army amongst them. Six weeks have passed since liberation and the Falklands people - as distinct from the Falklands establishment - are profoundly dissillusioned."*  
(Simon Winchester of the *Sunday Times*. The Falklands War.)

Q.24. What can I do about it?

A. Publishing the truth is but the first step: it falls to the readers to act upon it. Here are some suggestions:

1. Buy as many leaflets as you can afford and spread them around - see below for Hints on Easy Leafleting and Order Form.

2. Write, in your own words, to your MP and say what you think about it. His or her address is - The House of Commons, London, SW1A 0AA. If you don't know his/her name, address it to 'The Member for.....(name of town or borough.) Send a copy to your local paper.

The Questions in this leaflet were posed by Ecoropa and were answered by Tam Dalyell, MP, formerly chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party Foreign Affairs Group (1974-76) and opposition spokesman on Science until being sacked by Michael Foot in 1982 for his courageous and outspoken views on the Falklands war. He was called to give evidence before the Franks Enquiry into the Falklands in October 1982. He has written *One Man's Falklands* published by Woolf at £1.95. The information he gives has been corroborated by many others.

#### Hints on Easy Leafleting

Leaflets are most effective if given personally, especially to people known to the leafleter: your place of work, if you are lucky enough still to have one, is a good place to start. Then local shops, pubs, clubs and bus stops: canteen notice boards, cafes and launderettes,

At the railway station give them to people so that they can read them as they travel. You can knock on doors in your village or street. Keep a pile handy for people who come to your door. If you have some left over apart from sending them to friends or enclosing them with other payments, cards etc., you can put them through letter-boxes, leave them in the library (by arrangement with the librarian) or the doctor's surgery - most doctors will co-operate.

#### Order Form

Leaflet no. 11 - Falklands War - The Disturbing Truth  
100 Leaflets - £2.85                      200 Leaflets - £3.95  
500 Leaflets - £8.50                      1,000 Leaflets - £15.00

All prices include postage and packing.

If you can spare more than the amount shown, it will enable us to send leaflets to those who cannot afford them. Or if you wish to support the Campaign but are unable to distribute leaflets, these can be given to others to distribute.

Other Ecoropa Information Sheets, prices as above:

- No. 5. Nuclear War - The Facts You Should Know  
No. 6. Atomic Energy and Nuclear Weapons - The Intimate Connection  
No. 7. Nuclear Power - The Facts They Don't Want You To Know  
No. 8. Defending Britain Without The Bomb  
No. 9. Britain and the Arms Trade  
No. 10. Chemical and Biological Warfare

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CONFIDENTIAL



*Imp  
Argentina*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 August 1983

FALKLANDS DEBATE AT THE NEXT GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

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Thank you for your letter of 27 July about the Falklands Debate at the next General Assembly. The Prime Minister has noted the position and has commented that she hopes that the United States will not vote in favour of the Argentine draft resolution while either the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or she is there.

*B.F.1*  
Mrs. Thatcher has also asked to be reminded of the position on Mayotte and I should be grateful if you could provide a note on this.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL





File

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 August 1983

RAF FLIGHTS VIA BRAZIL

Thank you for your letter of 29 July about RAF flights via Brazil. This is just to record that the Prime Minister has noted the position set out in your letter.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number) <i>952</i>	
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9 AND TO MODUK (DS8), ACAS (OPS)  
10 INFO PRIORITY MONTEVIDEO, CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY  
11 YOUR TELNOS 259 AND 264: FALKLANDS: LANDBRIDGE  
12 1. Many thanks for your continuing efforts to retain  
13 facilities in Brazil for RAF Hercules aircraft.  
14 2. FCO and MOD Ministers have carefully considered Delio's  
15 suggestions for further diversions. Strictly for your own  
16 information they are regarded as too quote unconventional unquote  
17 for comfort. In our view the risks of a regular arrangement  
18 for subterfuge emergencies, against the current background of  
19 political sensitivities generated by Argentine pressure, would  
20 be considerable. Discovery would be probable and would  
21 jeopardise the prospects for the full resumption of staging  
22 arrangements which we still hope may prove feasible after the  
23 Argentine elections. Public disclosure of contrived  
24 emergencies would also complicate the arrangements for real  
25 emergencies which must at all costs be preserved. This is the

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	IMMEDIATE	Page 2
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1 <<<<  
2 most important consideration from the MOD viewpoint.  
3 3. We would, however, like to keep in reserve the option of  
4 quote planned emergencies unquote from time to time. When the  
5 schedules for airbridge in flight refuelling are put out for  
6 considerable periods by bad weather or non-availability of  
7 tankers, it may occasionally be desirable to send a quote catch  
8 up unquote flight via Brazil. The MOD envisage this happening  
9 less frequently than landings for genuine emergencies, which have  
10 been running at just under one a month. This occasional  
11 arrangement would carry significantly fewer risks than a  
12 regular programme of subterfuge emergencies. It would also keep  
13 the door open for a fuller resumption of staging arrangements  
14 in due course.  
15 4. Please seek an early opportunity to speak to Delio,  
16 reflecting these decisions. We leave to you the tactics of not  
17 appearing ungrateful in our response to Delio's scheme for  
18 keeping the landings going. You should say that his efforts  
19 on our behalf are greatly appreciated in London. You might then  
20 say that, in following up the suggestions Delio made to you on  
21 12 July, we would not propose for the present to use Brazilian  
22 airfields for other than genuine operational emergencies, except  
23 very occasionally when real logistic necessity makes a flight of  
24 this sort particularly valuable.  
25 5. Please emphasise to Delio that we have taken careful note  
26 of what he said about publicity. All flights landing in Brazil  
27 will be described by us as emergencies. If crews are approached  
28 by the press in Brazil or elsewhere, they should invariably say  
29 that the landing was the result of an emergency diversion, the  
30 nature of the emergency being a matter which cannot be discussed.  
31 Supplementary questions are to be referred to the Brazilian  
32 authorities or to you as appropriate. In particular, questions  
33 about whether the aircraft has been or will be searched should  
34 be passed, without comment, to the Brazilian authorities.

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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 Passengers are to be briefed before landing on the need to avoid  
 the press if possible, and, if not, to refer all questions to  
 the captain of the aircraft.  
 6. We agree that you should say nothing further to Itamaraty.

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ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION

Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),  
Aware that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible  
with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065  
(XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973,  
31/49 of 1 December 1976 and 37/9 of 4 November 1983,

Recalling also Security Council Resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April  
1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General on his  
mission of good offices,

Regretting the lack of progress in the implementation of General  
Assembly Resolution 37/9,

Aware of the interest of the international community in that  
the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Northern Ireland resume their negotiations in order  
to find as soon as possible a peaceful and just solution to the  
sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland  
Islands (Malvinas), thereby eradicating a cause for grave  
concern to the Latin American region,

Taking into account the existence of a de facto cessation of  
hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention  
of the parties not to renew them,

Reaffirming also the principles of the Charter of the United  
Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in inter-  
national relations and the peaceful settlement of international  
disputes,

Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the  
interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)  
in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions  
2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII):

1. Reiterates its request to the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);
2. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 37/9;
3. Requests the Secretary-General on the basis of the present resolution to continue his renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above and to take necessary measures to that end;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;
5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled 'Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)'.





General Assembly

Distr.  
GENERAL

A/RES/37/9  
9 November 1982

Thirty-seventh session  
Agenda item 135

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/37/L.3/Rev.1)]

37/9. Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Aware that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Recalling its resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,

Recalling also Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,

Taking into account the existence of a de facto cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the expressed intention of the parties not to renew them,

Reaffirming the need for the parties to take due account of the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII),

Reaffirming also the principles of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes,



1. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to assist the parties in complying with the request made in paragraph 1 above and to take the necessary measures to that end;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)".

55th plenary meeting  
4 November 1982



27 JUL 1988

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4 5 6 7 8 9  
10





Prime Minister



To note how the F/C.O. propose to handle the Falklands debate at this year's UNGA.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

A.D.C. 27/7

27 July 1983

I hope the U.S. will note vote in favour of such a resolution while with the F.S. and are not there.

Dear John,

Falklands Debate at the Next General Assembly

The Argentines have begun their preparations for the next round in the United Nations General Assembly. The Italians have given us the text of a draft resolution they have received from the Argentines. I enclose a copy.

Apart from the seventh preambular paragraph the draft is a minimal updating of last year's resolution, of which I also enclose a copy for comparison. It takes note of the report the Secretary-General will have presented as mandated by the Assembly, regrets the absence of any progress and calls upon him to continue his mission.

The minimum Argentine aim will be to achieve at least the 90 votes they got last year and preferably to register a significant increase. While they must have been tempted to go for a tougher resolution more directly critical of our refusal to negotiate they have evidently recognised that this could cost them support and have set their sights quite low. We shall need to be on the watch for a switch to tougher tactics at a later stage but this seems unlikely now that they have begun to show the text around.

We must recognise that, with the further lapse of time since the Argentine use of force, a number of the countries who were willing to abstain last year are likely to be inclined to vote in favour of what will be seen as a comparatively moderate draft and some of those who cast negative votes will shift to abstentions. Argentina will no doubt try to attract more non-aligned support by representing the construction of the airfield as a NATO ploy and the use of Cape Town by the contractors as evidence of some sinister understanding with South Africa. We have briefed posts to deal with any such propoganda; to continue to put over our position on negotiations; and to explain that the possible advent of a democratic government in Argentina does not of itself portend any change of heart about the future of the Islands or any greater respect for the wishes of the Islanders. In general the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

/thinks





thinks that we should work hard to secure the best result possible, without appearing to attach excessive importance to these votes at the United Nations, which are likely to be an annual event for many years to come.

The most disappointing feature of last year's vote was of course the American decision to vote in favour. For broad reasons of policy towards Latin America, the Americans are likely to want to do the same this year and it would indeed be difficult for them to shift their position on a text similar to last year's. When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary raised the matter with Mr Shultz on 14 July, he referred to its sensitivity for the United States and would say only that the US would consult us closely and would do nothing we did not know about in advance. Sir Geoffrey Howe thinks that it is important not to use up credit with the Americans unproductively, but believes that we should press them hard to ensure that they do not vote for anything worse than last year. Such pressure could cause the Americans to secure the removal of the present seventh preambular paragraph. We could also point out that the expression of regret at the lack of progress so far is in effect a criticism of us and that American support for it would be inconsistent with their assurance to us last year that they did not favour the setting of a timetable for negotiations.

We shall also need to work hard on our European partners who continue to be worried about their relations with Latin America. We are urging them to take the line with the Latin Americans that as a matter of principle they cannot be expected to vote diametrically opposite to us (though one partner, Greece, of course did so last year). It would be a major setback for us in UN terms if we lost the European votes, and would give much more comfort to Argentina than the acquisition of some extra Third World support. We are asking Community posts to take all appropriate opportunities to remind our partners that we rely on them to stand firm.

We shall as usual be pressed by our partners to say how we see the way ahead. We shall emphasise our willingness to normalise relations, our responsible attitude in the IMF, etc. On the dispute itself, we propose to continue to emphasise that what is needed is a complete change of heart in Argentina, which positive votes for the Argentine draft resolution at the UN can only set back; and to draw attention to the failure of Argentina to accept a cessation of hostilities, renounce the use of force or accept the rights of the Islanders, as well as to continuing bellicose Argentine statements. We shall of course avoid suggesting that there are any circumstances in

/which we

*Remind me  
of the  
points  
over  
Argente*





which we would be prepared to negotiate sovereignty. Where it is likely to be productive (which is more likely to be in the Third World than in Europe) we shall emphasise that Argentina needs to accept the applicability of the principle of self-determination.

*You ever*  
*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

29 July 1983

Sporting Policy Towards Argentina: Polo

Thank you for your letter of 26 July to John Coles. In the light of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's advice, the Prime Minister agrees that we should stick to the guidelines set out in February in the letter from Mr. Macfarlane to the Chairman of the Sports Council.

I am copying this to Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and Warwick Smith (Department of the Environment).

W. F. S. RICKETT

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Room 11.01 Ashdown House 123 Victoria Street SW1E 6RB

Telex 8813148  
Telegrams Advantage London SW1  
Telephone Direct Line 01-212 3301  
Switchboard 01-212 7676

Prime Minister ②  
A.J.C. 27/7

JU219

Secretary of State for Trade & Industry

The Rt Hon Patrick Jenkin MP  
Secretary of State for the Environment  
Department of the Environment  
2 Marsham Street  
London SW1

Note  
I have told Mr Jenkin's office  
of the PM's views. They have  
persuaded ~~the~~ the consortium  
to defer 27 July 1983  
completion of the contract.  
WR  
29/7

Dear Patrick,

FALKLAND ISLANDS CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

attached  
You wrote to me on 16 June about Leyland Vehicle Ltd's possible involvement in the Falklands Airfield contract.

2 I have heard today that LVL have been informed that they will not be awarded the vehicle supply contract for this project, which will instead go to one of two German companies, M.A.N. or Magirus Deutz, the second of which is controlled by Fiat. I need hardly stress the damaging repercussions this could have, especially given the adverse publicity that there has been in other cases where foreign companies have secured Falklands-related business. I therefore believe that LVL should be given an opportunity to improve their bid so as at least to reduce the differential between them and the German companies (who, we have reason to believe, are offering to sell at distress prices). The vehicle supply contract is only a small part of the main contract, and given the risk of adverse publicity I believe that a modest price differential would be acceptable.

3 I am told that the consortium intend to award the contract tomorrow (27 July). I do not think this allows enough time for adequate consideration of the issues, and in the light of your promise to consult me before decisions were taken on foreign sourcing, I hope you will ensure that finalisation of the contract is deferred for a few days at the very least. We shall, meanwhile, be encouraging LVL to see what can be done in the way of improving their offer.

4 I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister and Geoffrey Howe.

Jenkin  
Leech



27 JUL 1983





CONFIDENTIAL

GR 700  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 280900Z  
FM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 272331Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 272 OF 27 JULY 1983

*N. Schuler*  

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*NR 28/7*

IMF: ARGENTINA - FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

1. TEIJEIRO (ARGENTINE ED) CAME TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON AT HIS REQUEST. HE SAID HE HAD NO SPECIAL MESSAGE FROM HIS AUTHORITIES BUT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS AND WANTED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS. HE MENTIONED THAT HE KNEW OF CONTACTS BETWEEN HIS AUTHORITIES AND THE US (MOTLEY, STATE DEPARTMENT - SEE MY TELNO 266) AND HOPED SOMETHING WOULD DEVELOP.
  
2. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FINANCIAL SITUATION WAS DETERIOATING IN BUENOS AIRES. THE UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE HAD FALLEN SIGNIFICANTLY FROM 11 TO 14 PESOS PER DOLLAR. PRICES OF GOVERNMENT EXTERNAL BONDS WERE FALLING. THE PUBLIC SEEMED TO BE BECOMING AWARE THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE BANKS. IF IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THE BANKS' DELAY IN SIGNING THE LOAN AGREEMENT WAS CONNECTED WITH THE IMF, THERE WOULD BE A REAL DANGER THAT QUOTE EVERYTHING WOULD FALL APART UNQUOTE. SO FAR THE RESULTS UNDER THE PROGRAMME IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND EVEN INFLATION HAD BEEN QUOTE GOOD, BUT IF THINGS BEGAN TO DETERIORATE, QUOTE IRRATIONAL PEOPLE UNQUOTE WOULD COME TO THE FORE IN ARGENTINA. THERE WERE PLENTY OF PEOPLE WHO WANTED TO GO THE ISOLATION ROUTE, ARGUING THAT THE ECONOMY WAS SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD AND ENERGY AND COULD SELL TO THE RUSSIANS. SUCH AN ANTI-INTERNATIONALIST DEVELOPMENT COULD BE VERY BAD JUST BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. IF A NEW GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER ON A TIDE OF ISOLATIONIST FEELING, IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH THE FUND. DEL SOLAR AND WEHBE HAD ATTEMPTED EVERYTHING POSSIBLE BUT THEIR POSITION WAS WEAKENING DAILY.
  
3. WHEN I ASKED WHY THE ECONOMIC AUTHORITIES COULD NOT USE THE LEVERAGE IMPLICIT IN THE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION TO PERSUADE THE MILITARY TO THINK AGAIN, TEIJEIRO SAID THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TIME AND IN ANY CASE THE MILITARY WERE NOT UNIFIED. THERE WAS NO POLITICAL FOCUS IN THE COUNTRY AT THE MOMENT: THE ESSENTIAL THING WAS TO GET TO ELECTIONS WITHOUT AN UPSET. THERE WERE PROBABLY NOW ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE FUND'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DELAY BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. THE PRESIDENT WAS WELL AWARE OF THE SITUATION BUT WAS TOO EXHAUSTED TO ACT.

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/4.



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4. TEIJEIRO AGAIN MADE THE POINTS HE HAD MADE TO ME PREVIOUSLY, TO THE EFFECT THAT A SOLUTION WOULD BE EASIER TO ACHIEVE IF THE ISSUE COULD BE STAVED OFF UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION. THE MILITARY WOULD BE IN A WEAK POSITION AT THAT STAGE AND IT COULD BE ARGUED TOO THAT THEY HAD THEMSELVES CHANGED THE LAW AND PREPARED THE WAY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RELAXATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS WITHOUT GOING PUBLIC. I AGAIN EXPRESSED SCEPTICISM AND EMPHASISED TO HIM THAT MY AUTHORITIES HAD UNDERGONE (EG IN THE DEBATE ON THE IMA BILL) GREAT POLITICAL CRITICISM FOR SANCTIONING THE FUND'S AND BRITISH BANKING INVOLVEMENT WITH ARGENTINA. ARGENTINA MUST HOLD TO ITS COMMITMENTS.

5. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD SEEK A WAIVER BEFORE THE RECESS, TEIJEIRO SAID HE WAS NOT SURE. REJECTION OF THE ARGENTINE POSITION IN A BOARD DISCUSSION WOULD PRECIPITATE A SEVERE CRISIS (THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE COULD FORESEE FAILURE OF A WAIVER REQUEST). BUT IF THERE WERE NO BOARD MEETING, IT WOULD FAIRLY SOON BECOME KNOWN THAT THE NEXT FUND DRAWING WAS OVERDUE AND WITH THE BANKS CONTINUING TO DELAY THEIR LOAN, THE SAME GENERAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD ENSURE IN TIME.

6. TEIJEIRO MENTIONED THAT IF THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE SOLVED BEFORE THE RECESS, HIS AUTHORITIES' PROPOSAL TO ENABLE FOREIGN FIRMS TO TRANSFER DIVIDENDS ETC AT THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE AFTER 15 AUGUST WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. HE ALSO SAID IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN THE INTENTION TO EXTEND EQUAL TREATMENT TO BRITISH NON-BANKERS AFTER 15 AUGUST: HE THOUGHT THAT THE LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THIS LAY WITH THE ORIGINAL STATUTE, LAW 22591, WHICH APPLIED EQUALLY TO BONEX OR CASH TRANSACTIONS.

8. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/CHANCELLOR, PS/EST, LITTLER AND LAVELLE (HMT), GILCHRIST AND LOEHNIS (BANK OF ENGLAND) AND APPELYARD (ERD).

WICKS

[ADVANCED AS REQUESTED]

MONETARY  
ERD  
FID  
MR GIFFARD  
MR URE



CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*In the light of these explanations, agree that we should still to prevent policy on sporting contacts with Argentina as at X below.*

26 July, 1983

*A.C. 26.7*

*Yes MB*

*Dear John,*

Sporting Policy Towards Argentina: Polo

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has had a word with the Prime Minister about the questions that have arisen out of the possibility of Argentine polo players coming to Britain in 1984 (your letter of 13 July).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that, if we were to seek to prevent Argentine polo players from entering Britain, we would be open to charges of inconsistency. This would be so whether they came as individuals or as a team (although, as far as we are aware, there is no question of the latter). Our present guidelines, as set out in February in a letter from the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department of Environment to the Chairman of the Sports Council (copy enclosed) make clear that the Government no longer considers it necessary or appropriate to prevent sporting contacts with Argentina, while not of course encouraging them and being ready to consider particular cases on an individual basis. These guidelines flowed from our decision last August (my letter of 19 August to Tim Flesher and his reply of 25 August) not to obstruct participation by an Argentine team in the world cycling championships. It was agreed then that our sporting policy towards Argentina should be the same as towards any other country except South Africa, which is covered by the Gleneagles agreement. On the basis of this policy, which I understand the Department of the Environment wish to maintain, Argentine tennis players have competed at Wimbledon, and two Argentines have played football regularly for Tottenham Hotspur. We are not aware of any problems having resulted from this. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary acknowledges that polo may be particularly sensitive, not least because of its royal connections, but believes that it would be difficult to find grounds for discriminating between polo players and other sportsmen that would stand up in public.

*Sport, Apr 83 - Sporting Relations with Argentina*

*X.*

This is particularly significant in the light of the probability that we would face questioning on our position on the Gleneagles agreement if we were to exclude Argentine polo players coming here as individuals. Although Government policy is firmly to discourage sporting contacts with South

/Africa





Africa, it has, at the same time, been made clear that the Government cannot prevent individual South African sportsmen from entering Britain; nor would we wish to take powers to do so. If we were to find some means of excluding individual Argentines, we could soon face calls from other countries, particularly members of the Commonwealth, to institute similar measures against all South African sportsmen. Our action could also be misunderstood in Latin America, where we have taken pains to put over our wish to develop a more normal relationship with Argentina.

Sir Geoffrey Howe also believes that it would be very difficult in practice to exclude the polo players. We could only do so by refusing to issue visas. In order to do this, we should need to know the names of the players in advance. This would entail approaches to the polo organisations interested in inviting Argentines. Even this would not necessarily catch people who secure visas in some other capacity who went on to play polo. Moreover, even if we knew the names of the prospective visitors, the Home Secretary could only refuse the issue of visas on the grounds that to allow entry 'would not be conducive to the public good'. This sanction is only rarely used, and we and the Home Office cannot easily envisage the necessary considerations applying to polo players.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary continues to believe, therefore, that our response to enquiries from polo bodies should be limited to a reiteration of the policy already explained to the Sports Council, and that we should make it clear that the decision on whether to invite Argentines must rest with the organising bodies themselves. Among these are bodies in the polo world whose events are often attended by The Queen and other members of the Royal Family (the Prince of Wales is often a participant). We must continue to keep carefully in mind the need to avoid embarrassment to the Royal Family,

*Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under  
FOI Exemption. P Wayland  
22 January 2013*

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (Home Office) and Warwick Smith (Department of the Environment).

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary







Argentina  
Relations 134



SUBJECT

cc: Mr. [unclear]



## 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 July 1983

Falklands: Call by the Civil Commissioner

When Sir Rex Hunt called on the Prime Minister this afternoon, the question arose of the proposed visit to the Falkland Islands by Argentine next-of-kin. Mrs. Thatcher said that she considered that this visit must take place. It would of course be necessary to consult the Islanders and persuade them that it was in everybody's interests to get the visit over. Until we did so, we should be open to criticism.

Sir Rex Hunt said that he might have difficulty in persuading some of the Councillors that the visit should go ahead. For the majority of Islanders, the priority was for Argentina to take back the bodies of its dead. But the more reasonable Councillors and Islanders would accept a visit which was clearly humanitarian. The stand taken by HMG against the earlier proposal for a visit canvassed by Mr. Destefanis was helpful in that respect.

Sir Rex Hunt said that there could well be difficulties about the flag to be flown on the vessel concerned. The Islanders might well wish the courtesy flag to be flown. The Prime Minister commented that it was necessary to be realistic. What would happen if we made this a requirement and the vessel then arrived without the courtesy flag? Sir Rex Hunt said that he would do his best to sell the idea that a Red Cross flag would be sufficient. He reiterated that he was sure that the Islanders would accept a visit which was on a genuinely humanitarian basis. There might of course be some difficulty in determining the bona fides of the next-of-kin.

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

25 July, 1983

IMF/Argentina: US Attitudes

The Prime Minister has seen Washington Telegram No. 2065 which casts some doubt on whether the United States will support us in discussion at the the IMF Board of Argentina's discriminatory restrictions against the United Kingdom.

Mrs. Thatcher has commented that if American support is really in doubt she ought, at the right time, to send a sharp message to President Reagan. She would be grateful if the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could let her have a recommendation on this point in due course.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

J. Kerr, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister  
for your meeting



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Int, Desk  
23/7/83

London SW1A 2AH

22 July 1983

Dear John

Falklands: Call by the Civil Commissioner

Sir Rex Hunt is to call on the Prime Minister at 3.30 p.m. on Monday 25 July. He is also calling on Sir Geoffrey Howe; and on other Ministers and officials. The Prime Minister may wish to glance at the general brief which has been provided.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, who will have seen Sir Rex immediately before the Prime Minister, will have concentrated on the importance of obtaining the concurrence of his Councillors as the first step in the plan to organise a once-and-for-all Argentine Next-of-Kin visit, on the lines agreed in OD(EM) on 6 July. I also attach a copy of a draft policy statement, based on the decisions in OD(EM), which Sir Geoffrey Howe proposes to give to the Civil Commissioner for this purpose (it remains subject to amendment, though Sir G Howe is generally content with the line). It would be helpful if the Prime Minister could emphasise to Sir R Hunt the importance of getting this message across.

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

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SIR REX HUNT'S CALLS ON MINISTERS: JULY 1983

POINTS TO MAKE

Argentine Next of Kin

1. The Government wish the Civil Commissioner to speak firmly to the Islanders in order to persuade them to accept an Argentine visit. We hope Councillors can be summoned very soon after the Civil Commissioner's return, and told that discussion with them is the British Government's first step in seeking to set up a generally acceptable visit. The statement of HMG's policy [submitted separately] should be read to them, and their concurrence requested.
2. If necessary it should be stressed to the Islanders that, now that we have had our own visit, and shown that we are prepared to turn away an unacceptable Argentine group, humanitarian principles require us and the Islanders to make serious efforts to arrange a suitably-prepared visit.
3. It is most important that consultation of Councillors (and the early exchanges with the Swiss and the Argentines themselves) should remain strictly confidential.

UK/Argentine Relations

4. The Prime Minister gave the latest statement of the Government's policy in the House of Commons on 14 July, when she said: 'I see no prospect in entering into negotiations with Argentina at present, and I have no intention of negotiating sovereignty.'
5. The Argentines continue to insist that any talks must be about sovereignty, and the modalities of its transfer. A new

/civilian



civilian Government might possibly adopt different priorities, but this is not very likely.

6. Meanwhile, we are asking our Allies and partners to stress to the Argentines that they must set aside the question of sovereignty. Argentina must indicate that she is prepared to renounce the use of force, and turn her mind to such subjects as trade, or air services, where there is some chance of making progress towards more normal bilateral relations.

#### Falklands At The UN

7. We expect a difficult time in the United Nations this year. The first hurdle will be the Committee of 24. Glad that as the Civil Commissioner proposed, Councillors Cheek and Blake will attend: they did well last year.

8. The Argentines are circulating a draft resolution for the General Assembly which makes only the minimum of changes from the resolution adopted last year. It will be difficult to avoid erosion of support for our position.

#### New Airport: Transit Through South Africa

9. We all need to reiterate at appropriate opportunities that the proposed use of Cape Town for transit of airfield construction workforce applies only to civilian personnel; is purely private commercial arrangement by civilian contractor; and does not affect HMG's hopes for establishment of links with South American mainland in longer-term.

#### Hercules Staging Flights via Brazil

10. Following press leaks at the Paris Air Show, which led to intense Argentine pressure on the Brazilians, only genuine emergency diversions to Brazil are contemplated in the immediate future. Hope this will improve shortly.

/Links Between



Links Between the Islands and the South American Mainland

11. It is our declared policy that these should develop naturally. Unlikely that the airfield project will offer many opportunities in its early stages. Particularly important, therefore, to make full use of other possibilities. Grateful if Falkland Islands Government could keep this very much in mind.

Ministerial Visits

12. The Secretary of State for Defence is planning to visit the Islands in the autumn. Lady Young would be glad to come in the first half of January.

Constitution

13.

(a) We should be interested to know how soon you think the Select Committee on the Constitution will produce its report. Will its recommendations be very far reaching?

(b) How soon do you think it would be reasonable to consult the Islanders on their future relationship with the UK in more general terms?

Civil/Military Relations

14. We understand that civil/military relations have generally been good, especially in the more remote locations, but that there have been certain difficulties in Stanley, notably over civilian use of north-bound airbridge flights. Important that relations between yourself and the Military Commissioner should be harmonious; please do not hesitate to report difficulties to us.

/Strategic Airfield



Strategic Airfield

15. The work force at its peak will number 1,400. Do you envisage serious problems with the Islander population?

Mines

16. We have been pleased to see that the latest map issued by the Royal Engineers indicates a further area cleared of mines. To what extent is the Islanders' way of life now affected by the continuing presence of the mines? Is there an absolute requirement for them all, in so far as this may be practicable, to be lifted?

Development

17. How does the Civil Commissioner view the prospects for generating a more dynamic approach to economic development among the Islanders? Has Sir Rex Hunt suggestions as to how the Islanders can be persuaded to appreciate the long-term potential of projects for the diversification of their economy, eg, the fisheries joint venture?

Immigration

18. Recent press reports about the Wilton and Bowman (fish-and-chip) families and about the ODA teacher have created the impression that the Islanders are against immigrants, yet any development project in the Islands will depend on immigration. I am not seeking to apportion blame but I would welcome your comments on Islander attitude to immigration.

Depopulation

19. Is there a risk that the presence of the Armed Forces and large capital projects may so distort the Islanders' traditional way of life that they will leave in substantial numbers?



ESSENTIAL FACTS

Possible Argentine Next of Kin Visit

1 The points to make reflect the decisions in OD(EM) of 6 July, and have been the subject of a separate submission and letter to No 10 Downing Street.

Falklands at the UN

2 Councillors Cheek and Blake travelled to New York last year to appear before the Committee of 24 and the Fourth Committee. They were subjected to hostile questioning which they handled well. The Civil Commissioner recommended that they should appear again; we agreed. It is likely that the Falklands will be discussed in the Committee of 24 towards the end of August.

3 The Civil Commissioner will probably not be aware that the Argentines are already circulating a draft text of a General Assembly Resolution. We obtained this from the Italians. It is clear that the Argentines aim to achieve more votes by tabling a draft which is only minimally changed from the text approved by the General Assembly last year. They probably judge that their international image has been dented in recent months by the publication of the Junta's final report on the 'disappeared', and that to seek more ambitious improvements on last year's text might rebound to their disadvantage.

New Airport: Transit through South Africa

4 The Government's decision to construct a new airfield at Mount Pleasant was announced in the Commons by the Defence Secretary on 27 June. The fact that the contractor planned to use Cape Town as a transit point for the civilian workforce (UK to Cape Town by air, onwards to the Falklands by sea) emerged during a press conference immediately afterwards, and has attracted some criticism. This is unlikely to be echoed

/in



in the Islands, where there may be some who would indeed welcome the establishment of links with South Africa for purely practical reasons. Such ideas do not reflect HMG's preference for links with South America and should be discouraged.

#### Links Between the Islands and the South American Mainland

5 Trade and transport links between the Islands and the South American mainland - regarded as most desirable by Lord Shackleton and ourselves - are proving difficult to establish. It was decided that potential contractors for the construction of the new airfield should not use South American countries for the transit of their workforce, because of the risk of disruption for political reasons under pressure from Argentina. The Ministry of Defence will shortly issue a call for bids for the supply of food-stuffs for the garrison: we shall encourage South American companies to respond to this. But, especially following the decision to use Cape Town as the staging point for the airfield workforce, there will be competition from South African companies. The few South American companies who have already expressed interest in business with the Islands - they are for the most part Chilean - have been unable to make progress because of the absence of proposals from the Islands themselves.

#### Constitution

6 A Select Committee of the Island Councils have been considering a range of constitutional reforms. These are a re-arrangement of existing measures rather than a wholesale reconstruction of the system of government. The Chairman of the Select Committee told the Prime Minister during her visit to the Islands in January that their report would be ready in July. This timetable has now slipped. The first draft report was considered by an official Cabinet committee and Mr Cranley Onslow wrote a commentary to the Select Committee. They have expressed their thanks and appreciation for this and account will be taken of it in the revised draft of their final report. This is likely to opt for:

/(a)



- (a) the continuation of the two council system with the Executive Council being elected from the Legislative Council, the membership of which would be increased to 8 (4 members each for Stanley and the Camp);
- (b) the abolition of nominated members;
- (c) the retention of ex officio members with the possible addition of the Attorney-General.

Civil/Military Relations

7 For the most part, fears of discord between the Islanders and the military have proved groundless, especially in the outlying settlements. In Stanley, where life as a whole is more subject to tension and rumour, the competition for facilities (eg the hospital and the port) has generated more discord. Sir Rex Hunt and the previous Military Commissioner, General Sir David Thorne, worked very closely together and established a basis of mutual confidence that did much to alleviate the problems. Although Sir Rex and the present Military Commissioner, General Keith Spacie, have not been in the Islands together for long enough to develop a similar relationship, we hope that they will achieve this. The need for it has been borne out by a military ruling, in Sir R Hunt's absence, which for a time made it virtually impossible for civilians to obtain places on airbridge flights from Stanley.

Economic Diversification

8 An exploratory fishing survey is required to enable the Falkland Islands Government to obtain any substantial and lasting benefit from the fish stocks in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands. The (Japanese) Taiyo Fishing Company have proposed that they should conduct a fishing survey as a member of a joint venture company which would include the Falkland Islands Government. The latter are suspicious and are slow to recognise the long-term advantages of their association with

/this



this commercial venture. Nor do they seem to appreciate that this could be an all-important major first step towards the diversification of the Islands economy.

Immigration

9 The Wilton and Bowman families went out to Port Stanley in a blaze of publicity, as the first immigrants, to buy a local store and to run a mobile fish and chip bar. Neither of these projects got off the ground and the Island Councils referred a further project to open a bar/restaurant for more information. The Wiltons and Bowmans have now returned to the UK.

10 Miss Geraldine Bennett, an ODA teacher, returned to this country complaining that she had met with nothing but unfriendliness and a lack of co-operation from the Islanders. We understand from the ODA that the real basis for her complaint was a fundamental disagreement about teaching policy with the Falkland Islands Director of Education.

11 The Falkland Islands Company have offered 50 acre plots for sale at £1,000 each. This is very much a personal initiative by Mr Needham, the Chairman of the Coalite Group, and is designed to encourage the immigration of men with the manual skills which are badly lacking in the Islands and wives trained as teachers or nurses, who would use their small holdings to supplement their income. The scheme has not been well received in the Islands where it is interpreted as a means of artificially increasing the price of land.



CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

VISIT TO THE CEMETERY AT DARWIN BY ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN

CAVEAT.....

1. The British Government's ultimate objective is to return to Argentina all the bodies of Argentine servicemen buried in the Falkland Islands. We shall continue to make clear to the Argentine authorities our willingness to facilitate such an operation.

2. In the meantime, the British Government have decided that, on humanitarian grounds, it would be right to permit a visit to the cemetery at Darwin by close relatives of those Argentine soldiers and airmen who died in the Falklands, subject to conditions designed to rule out an Argentine propaganda exercise and to assure good order and safety. The British Government have given the most careful thought to the position of the Falkland Islanders and are confident that they will agree that a single, properly-prepared visit is desirable on practical as well as humanitarian grounds. International opinion, and domestic opinion in Britain, looks to the Government to arrange an Argentine visit, following the successful visit by British next-of-

Enclosures—flag(s).....



kin and the action taken to prevent Destefanis' unacceptable expedition from reaching the Islands. DSR 11C

3. The Argentine Government have indicated, in their communiqué of 29 April and in a Note to the Swiss Government, that they are studying possibilities for such a visit. They envisage that the group should be made up exclusively of close relatives of those buried in the Falklands. The British Government believe that the next step should be to arrange, through the Swiss, for the official involvement of the Argentine Government. This should help us to achieve our aims of arranging a single, once-and-for-all visit and of precluding further attempts by private organisations or individuals. (Destefanis is not a close relative of any fallen servicemen and we consider that his past actions disqualify him from any participation in a visit by Argentine next of kin. But he continues publicly to state his intention of arranging a visit.)

4. The British Government intend to ask the Swiss Government to inform the Argentine authorities that HMG remain prepared in principle to permit a single, genuine, humanitarian visit to the Islands, subject to the following conditions:-

- a) the visit should be supervised by the ICRC;
- b) we should need the ICRC's assurance that they are entirely satisfied that the visit is of a humanitarian nature;
- c) the ship should be inspected by the ICRC before it sails and an ICRC representative should be embarked;
- d) we should need to know in advance the names of the next of kin, who should be close relatives of



Argentine servicemen killed on the Falkland Islands. By close relatives we mean solely parents, wives, fiancées, sons and daughters. We could not accept relatives of those lost at sea. The names should be verified by the Red Cross and we should wish to get the list in advance of the visit; on the basis that there are 233 servicemen buried on the Falklands, and a further small number whose bodies have not been found, the party should number a maximum of about 500. All relatives should wear civilian clothes;

e) we should require to know the name of the vessel and the flag under which it is sailing; it should not be Argentine nor should any members of the crew: the ship should also fly the Red Cross flag;

f) the ship's intended route must be known and approved by us;

g) the dates of any visit must be agreed with HMG in advance. We have in mind some time during the next Falklands summer;

h) facilities for the press and cameramen on the vessel to be strictly limited to a small 'pool';

i) the Argentine party should be accommodated on their own vessel, which should come to an agreed rendez-vous. They would be escorted to and from the cemetery at Darwin in the course of a single day.

HMG envisage the Swiss inviting the Argentines to make practical proposals conforming to these conditions, which would be for consideration both by the British authorities and the ICRC.



5. The British Government have decided that, on this exceptional humanitarian occasion, it is both necessary and appropriate that the vessel should fly the Red Cross flag; <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ <sup>in those circumstances</sup> that we should not insist on the courtesy flag.

*Not would the Argentine need of. km require visas, or*

6. It is essential until further notice that any discussion of a possible Argentine visit should remain strictly confidential. A leak of the terms of our approach before they are put to the Argentines would damage the prospects for an outcome acceptable to all concerned, not least the Falkland Islanders.

*any other  
immigration  
document.*



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DESKBY 250900Z

FM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 230010Z

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELNO 264 OF 22 JULY 1993.

*R. Scholer.*  
*AR 25/7.*

IMF: ARGENTINA - FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

1. PROMISE (AUSTRALIAN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR) SOUGHT ME OUT TODAY TO TELL ME THAT HIS AUTHORITIES HAD TOLD HIM TO SUPPORT THE UK POSITION ON THE ARGENTINE DISCRIMINATORY PAYMENTS RESTRICTIONS. NEW ZEALAND, WHICH IS WITHIN HIS CONSTITUENCY, TOOK THE SAME VIEW BUT HAD ADDED THE GLOSS THAT THEY HOPED THE MATTER COULD BE SETTLED WITHOUT COMING TO THE IMF BOARD.
2. AT THE EC DIRECTORS LUNCH TODAY, POLAK (NETHERLANDS) INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY HIS AUTHORITIES THAT HE WOULD BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT THE UK IN RESISTING A WAIVER. LASKE (GERMANY) SAID QUOTE WE SHARE YOUR VIEW UNQUOTE AND BELIEVED HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD SUPPORT THE UK POSITION.
3. CASEY (IRISH ALTERNATE ED FOR THE CANADIAN CONSTITUENCY) HAS TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM TEIJEIRO (ARGENTINIAN ALTERNATE ED) TODAY THAT THE LATTER STILL DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO REQUEST A WAIVER, BUT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD DO SO AT SOME STAGE.
4. ERB (UNITED STATES) REPORTED IN A MEETING OF 65 DIRECTORS THIS EVENING THAT TEIJEIRO HAD TODAY TOLD HIM THAT THE BANKS ARE NOW MAKING CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINES THAT THEY WILL NOT PROVIDE THE NEW MONEY UNTIL ARGENTINA HAS REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THIS WAS NEWS TO ARGENTINA. BUT IF IT WAS, IT WAS FURTHER REASON FOR THEM TO ACT QUICKLY TO REMOVE THE DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS. I ALSO SAID IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A WORRYING DEVELOPMENT.
5. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO LAVELLE (TREASURY), GILCHRIST (BANK OF ENGLAND), AND APPELYARD (ERD).

WICKS

MONETARY

FID

ERD

MR GIFFARD

MR URE

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PS  
LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
MR WRIGHT  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR UEE  
MR ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Cartledge

ED/PUSD (2)  
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~~ED/DEFENCE DEPT~~  
ED/NEWS DEPT  
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PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND )  
MR LITTLER ) TREASURY

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR J ROBERTS, IAT~~ ) DOT  
MR A FORTNAM )

RESIDENT CLERK

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DESKBY 220900Z  
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 211931Z JUL 83  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 609 OF 21 JULY 1983  
INFO PRIORITY BIS BUENOS AIRES, PORT STANLEY

MIPT: THE FALKLANDS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER TO ME DATED 20 JULY:

EXCELLENCY,

WITH REFERENCE TO MY LETTER OF 16 DECEMBER 1982, I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN ITS RESOLUTION A/37/9 OF 9 NOVEMBER 1982, ASKED ME TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN COMPLYING WITH THE ASSEMBLY'S REQUEST THAT THEY "RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO FIND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)". THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REQUESTED FURTHER THAT I SUBMIT A REPORT TO ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.



~~THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE RESOLUTION.~~

AS YOUR EXCELLENCY IS AWARE, I DESIRE TO BE OF EVERY  
ASSISTANCE IN FACILITATING A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) WHICH WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR  
ENDURING PEACE IN THE AREA. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT ONLY THROUGH  
AN EARLY INITIATION OF A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION CAN MEANINGFUL  
PROGRESS BE MADE TOWARDS A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

I WOULD APPRECIATE AN EXPRESSION OF HER MAJESTY'S  
GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THIS MATTER TO ASSIST ME IN THE PREPARATION  
OF THE REPORT WHICH HAS BEEN REQUESTED OF ME.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST  
CONSIDERATION.

JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR

ENDS

MARGETSON

NNNN



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ECLIPSE  
FM WASHINGTON 212015Z  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2065 OF 21 JULY 1983  
INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL IMF/IBRD

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Prime Minister <sup>(2)</sup>

If this is so  
I shall have to  
send a very  
sharp  
message. MB

Very unwelcome straws in the  
wind.

MLS 22/3

IMF/ARGENTINA: US ATTITUDES

1. I HAVE BEEN REFLECTING ON THE REPORTS FROM UKDEL IMF AND OUR POSTS ABROAD ON THE EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR OUR VIEW THAT ARGENTINA MUST LIFT ITS DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS AGAINST US IN ACCORDANCE WITH IMF CONDITIONS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICANS WILL BE CRUCIAL IN SHAPING THE VIEW OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BOARD.

2. I AM SURE THAT YOU DO NOT TAKE AMERICAN BACKING FOR GRANTED. ALTHOUGH SECRETARY REGAN SEEMED REASONABLY SOUND WHEN YOU DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH HIM AT BREAKFAST LAST WEEK, MCNAMAR, WHO MAKES THE RUNNING, SEEMED TO ME TO BE LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE. I WAS STRUCK BY SHULTZ'S MUCH MORE ENIGMATIC REACTION (OUR TELNO 1983). THIS SUGGESTS TO ME THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE YET TO TAKE A FINAL DECISION AND WILL DELAY DOING SO FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THE CHOICES FACING THEM ARE FAR FROM SIMPLE. ON ONE HAND, THEY ENTIRELY ACCEPT OUR VIEW THAT ARGENTINA OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE IMF CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO FLOUT THE RULES AND PRACTICES OF THE FUND. HOWEVER THERE ARE FEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY NOT LIFT THE DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS EVEN IF A WAIVER IS REFUSED THUS DENYING THEMSELVES FURTHER IMF FUNDS. THE AMERICANS ARE THEREFORE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF THE ARGENTINES OPTING INSTEAD FOR A MORATORIUM ON INTEREST AND CAPITAL WHICH COULD LEAD TO WIDESPREAD ECONOMIC DISRUPTION IN ARGENTINA AND SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DETECTED NO SIGN THAT THE PRIVATE BANKING SECTOR IS SO FAR CONCERNED ABOUT THIS RISK, THE ADMINISTRATION IS LIKELY TO COME UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THAT QUARTER TO SUPPORT THE GRANTING OF A WAIVER IF THE BANKERS THINK THAT THE ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE A FULL MORATORIUM. IN ADDITION, OTHERS SUCH AS MRS KIRKPATRICK, WILL ARGUE THAT THE US CANNOT AFFORD TO ALIENATE ARGENTINA AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN THE COUNTRY IS MOVING TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.

3. WE SHALL THEREFORE HAVE TO CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY TO ARGUE OUR CASE WITH THE AMERICANS. YOUR OWN VISIT HERE HAS BROUGHT HOME TO THEM THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE REGARD THE ISSUE, AND THE ECONOMIC SECRETARY'S VISIT HERE NEXT WEEK WILL OFFER A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR REINFORCING THAT MESSAGE. MAYBE THE AMERICANS WILL STAND BY THE COMMITMENTS THEY HAVE ALREADY GIVEN US, PARTICULARLY IF WE KEEP HAMMERING HOME THE MESSAGE. ON TIMING, THE ARGENTINES NEED TO OBTAIN A WAIVER BY ABOUT 20 AUGUST IF THEY ARE TO RECEIVE A FURTHER TRANCHE UNDER THE EXISTING PROGRAMME ON THE TIMETABLE ORIGINALLY PLANNED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE WHEN EXACTLY THEY

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/will



WILL JUDGE THE SITUATION RIPE FOR GOING TO THE BOARD AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WILL DELAY BEYOND 20 AUGUST IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SORT OF PRESSURES REFERRED TO ABOVE TO BUILD UP ON THE AMERICANS, THE FUND MANAGEMENT AND OURSELVES. BUT MY READING OF THE US POSITION, WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE UK EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IS THAT WE WOULD BE WISE TO CONSIDER WHAT OPTIONS WE HAVE IF WE CANNOT KEEP THE AMERICANS ON BOARD. THEY RATTED ON US AT THE U.N. LAST AUTUMN WHEN THEY DECIDED THAT THEIR WIDER INTERESTS REQUIRED THEM TO VOTE WITH THE ARGENTINES AND I WOULD'NT PUT IT PAST THEM TO DO SO AGAIN IN THIS CONTEXT.

WRIGHT

MONETARY  
FID  
NAD  
ERD  
MR GIFFARD  
MR URG



**SECRET** cc MOD

HL

Argentina

16

19 July 1983

Falklands: RAF Flights via Brazil

BFP  
1  
The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 18 July about our arrangements with the Brazilian authorities for RAF flights via Brazil to Port Stanley. She would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could keep her informed about further developments.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

JOHN COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**SECRET**





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>952</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Fall to Coles dated 18 July 1983</i>	
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FM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 172145Z JUL 83  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 254 OF 17 JULY

*Dr. whole*  
*To see, esp. last para.*

*A 10.7*

IMF : ARGENTINA--FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

1. I HAD DISCUSSIONS ON FRIDAY WITH THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, DALE (DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR) AND WHITTOME (DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT), AND WITH A GROUP OF G10 COLLEAGUES (ERB (UNITED STATES), HIRAO (JAPAN), DE MAULDE (FRANCE), LASKE (GERMANY), POLAK (NETHERLANDS), CASEY (IRELAND REPRESENTING CANADA), GOMEL (ITALY), COENE (BELGIUM) TVEDT (NORDICS) AND MORRELL (NEW ZEALAND)).

MEETING WITH MANAGING DIRECTOR

2. THE MD REMAINS FIRM IN HIS SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION THAT THE DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS MUST BE REMOVED BEFORE ARGENTINA CAN MAKE FURTHER DRAWINGS FROM THE FUND. DALE REPORTED THAT TEIJEIRO (ARGENTINE ALTERNATE DIRECTOR) WAS CONSIDERING SEEKING APPROVAL FOR A WAIVER WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RETENTION OF THE RESTRICTIONS FOR A FURTHER 6 MONTHS (BUT WHICH WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) COMMIT ARGENTINA TO REMOVE THEM WITHIN THAT PERIOD). THE STAFF HAVE PROVISIONALLY RESERVED AUGUST 1 FOR A BOARD DISCUSSION IF (UNDERLINE LAST WORD) THE ARGENTINES PROPOSE SUCH A WAIVER. DALE'S VIEW IS THAT, ON PRESENT INDICATIONS, THE ARGENTINES WOULD NOT SECURE THE NECESSARY BOARD MAJORITY FOR THE WAIVER. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS ALSO TEIJEIRO'S ASSESSMENT, THOUGH THE LATTER STILL HAD TO COMPLETE HIS DISCUSSIONS. DALE WAS AWARE THAT THE ARGENTINES WERE LINKING THEIR RETENTION OF THE DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS WITH THE EXCLUSION OF THEIR SHIPS FROM THE EXCLUSION ZONE. HE SAID THAT THE IMF WOULD NOT ACKNOWLEDGE SUCH A LINK BUT WE OUGHT TO BE READY TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON WHETHER THE EXCLUSION ZONE ARRANGEMENTS WERE OPERATED IN A NON-DISCRIMINATORY WAY BETWEEN NATIONS.

MEETING WITH G10

3. EARLIER ON FRIDAY MORNING I CALLED A MEETING OF G10 COLLEAGUES TO EXPLAIN TO THEM OUR POSITION ON THE EXCLUSION ZONE (YOUR TELNO 217) STRESSING THAT THIS WAS OF COURSE NOT A FUND ISSUE AND THAT I WAS ONLY RESPONDING TO COLLEAGUES' EARLIER QUERIES. I STRESSED IN PARTICULAR THAT THE U.K. HAD NOT IMPOSED A COMMERCIAL RESTRICTION ON ARGENTINA. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE COMMENT. NO-ONE SUGGESTED THAT OUR OPERATION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE WAS UNREASONABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

4. AS FOR OTHER ASPECTS, MY COLLEAGUES WERE VERY UNCERTAIN WHEN AND HOW FAR THE ARGENTINES WOULD PRESS THE MATTER OF A WAIVER. LASKE (GERMANY) SAID THAT TEIJEIRO HAD NOT ASKED FOR GERMAN SUPPORT FOR A WAIVER IN SO MANY WORDS, BUT SUCH A MESSAGE COULD BE READ BETWEEN THE LINES. TVEDT (NORDICS ETC) ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH A COMMITMENT TO ELIMINATE THE RESTRICTIONS BY, SAY, 31 DECEMBER. I SAID NO: WE HAD FULFILLED OUR PART OF THE BARGAIN AND WE WANTED THE ARGENTINES TO MEET THEIR'S. THE WORDING IN THE LETTER FROM DEL SOLAR

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*/AND*



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AND WEHBE WAS VERY NON-COMMITTAL AND I QUOTED THE RELEVANT PASSAGE. I ALSO REFERRED TO STRONG PARLIAMENTARY CRITICISM IN LONDON OF THE PARTICIPATION BY BRITISH BANKS IN THE LOAN TO ARGENTINA. HAD OUR NPS BEEN AWARE OF THE CONTINUING DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY IF NOT MORE CRITICAL OF U.K. SUPPORT FOR FUND ASSISTANCE.

5. DE MAULDE (FRANCE) ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD NOT OFFER A FACE-SAVING DEVICE. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHAT SUCH A DEVICE WOULD AMOUNT TO OR WHAT IT WOULD ACHIEVE. CASEY (FOR JOYCE, CANADA) ASKED WHAT MCNAMAR'S MEDIATION IN LONDON AMOUNTED TO (HE HAD EVIDENTLY

PICKED THIS UP FROM TEIJEIRO, WHO HAS BEEN TELLING PEOPLE THAT MCNAMAR IS IN LONDON NOW). ERB (US) JUMPED IN QUICKLY TO SAY THAT MCNAMAR WAS NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF MEDIATION. HIS AUTHORITIES WERE MERELY OFFERING A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION. I SAID THAT IN ANY CASE MCNAMAR, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, HAD NOT VISITED LONDON. MAKING A COMMENT WHICH IS IN SEVERAL COLLEAGUES' MINDS, TVEDT OBSERVED THAT IF THE ARGENTINES DID NOT OBTAIN THE WAIVER IT WOULD JEOPARDISE THE WHOLE SEQUENCE OF MOVES LEADING TO AGREEMENT WITH THE BANKS, ELIMINATION OF ARREARS, AND RELEASE OF THE NEXT FUND DRAWING. I SAID THAT MATTERS NEED NOT COME TO THAT: THE ARGENTINES COULD RECTIFY THE SITUATION THROUGH MINIMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION AND WE HOPED THEY WOULD. FUND MANAGEMENT WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE POSSIBLE CHAIN OF EVENTS BUT THEY HAD NEVERTHELESS NOT PROPOSED A WAIVER: THIS WAS INDICATIVE OF WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF THE RESTRICTIONS.

6. LASKE ASKED, AS HE HAD DONE AT MY PREVIOUS MEETING ON ARGENTINA, WHETHER WE INSISTED THAT THE DISCRIMINATORY LAWS HAD TO BE REPEALED OR WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH AN END TO THE PRACTICE. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT WOULD RELAY THE QUESTION BACK. (IN MY VIEW, WE MAY HAVE SOMETHING TACTICALLY TO GAIN BY ALLOWING OTHER DIRECTORS TO THINK AT THIS STAGE THAT WE ARE UNYIELDING ON THIS POINT EVEN THOUGH THOSE FAMILIAR WITH THE FUND WILL KNOW THAT IT IS REALLY WITH PRACTICE THAT THE FUND ARE CONCERNED).

ASSESSMENT

7. YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE MY ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION AS IT APPEARS FROM HERE. IT IS THAT PROVIDED THE MANAGING DIRECTOR REMAINS FIRM, AS I THINK HE WILL, THAT HE WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY ARGENTINE PROPOSAL FOR A WAIVER, PROVIDED THAT THE U.S. MAINTAIN THE POSITION WHICH THEY DESCRIBED TO YOU AT SECRETARY REGAN'S BREAKFAST ON JULY 14, AND PROVIDED THAT THE FRENCH, ITALIANS AND JAPANESE AT WORST ABSTAIN, THE EXECUTIVE BOARD WOULD NOT GRANT ARGENTINA A WAIVER. MY FIRM RECOMMENDATION IS THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN OUR LINE. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE PRUDENT TO CONSIDER THE OPTIONS IN CASE IT APPEARS IN THE EVENT THAT THE BOARD WILL NOT SUPPORT US.

WICKS  
MONETARY  
ERD  
FID



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GRS..140

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FM U K MISSION NEW YORK 142230Z JULY'83  
TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO.578 OF 14 JULY 1983.

YOUR TELNO.325 : THE FALKLANDS.

1. I SPOKE IMMEDIATELY TO DE SOTO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS.

2. DE SOTO TOOK NOTE. HE SAID THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS AWARE THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEW OVER WHETHER OR NOT HE STILL HAD A MANDATE UNDER SCR 505. BUT WE COULD BE SURE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD PRESENT A REPORT AND THAT IT WOULD BE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT WOULD NECESSARILY BE SHORT. DE SOTO DID NOT DISCLOSE WHETHER THE REPORT WOULD BE COUCHED IN TERMS OF SCR 505, GA RESOLUTION 37/9, OR BOTH

MARGETSON

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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OO LIMA  
GRS 229  
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FM FCO 141430Z JUL 83  
TO IMMEDIATE LIMA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 127 OF 14 JULY  
POSSIBLE PRIVATE VISIT BY MR TAM DALYELL MP

*dead in hell.*

1. \* ~~~~~ \*
- TAM DALYELL MADE ASSIDUOUS EFFORTS TO CULTIVATE DELGADO, THE PERUVIAN PARLIAMENTARY CLERK, DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT CATEGORY 2 VISIT IN ORDER TO ENLIST HIS HELP IN PLANNING A PRIVATE VISIT TO LIMA.
2. THE STORY IS NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR, BUT IT APPEARS THAT DALYELL SAID HE BELIEVED HE HAD IMPORTANT NEW EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS THESIS THAT THE GOVERNMENT ORDERED THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO IN ORDER TO SCUPPER THE PERUVIAN PEACE PROPOSALS BUT THAT HE COULD ONLY CONFIRM IT BY GOING TO LIMA HIMSELF. HE APPARENTLY HOPED TO GAIN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT WHILE HE WAS THERE. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, HE MADE IT CLEAR HE DID NOT WISH THE EMBASSY TO KNOW OF HIS PROPOSED VISIT. DELGADO IS BELIEVED TO HAVE RESPONDED IN PART FAVOURABLY, BUT SINCE HIS NOT RETURNING DIRECT TO LIMA (HE IS APPARENTLY STOPPING OFF IN MIAMI FOR A WHILE) HE MAY NOT BE IN A POSITION TO HELP EVEN IF HE IS GENUINELY DISPOSED TO DO SO.
3. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE NOTHING IN THIS, YOU WILL WISH TO KNOW OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNANNOUNCED VISIT BY DALYELL. IF WE LEARN ANYTHING FURTHER, PARTICULARLY ABOUT TIMING, WHICH IN PRINCIPLE SEEMS UNLIKELY TO BE BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY RECESS ON 22 JULY, WE SHALL TELEGRAPH AGAIN.

HOWE

\* ~ \* Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)

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*W. Wayland*  
*22 January 2013*

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FILE

67

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

13 July, 1983

@

ARGENTINA: POLO

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 12 July.

The Prime Minister has minuted that she is strongly against Argentine polo players coming to this country. She believes that the spectators at any polo matches involving Argentine players would also be hostile to their presence. Members of the Royal Family could be put in an acutely embarrassing position.

A. J. COLE

R. Bone, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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FILE

kw

Argentine Relations

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 July, 1983

Q

ARGENTINE NEXT-OF-KIN: MESSAGE FROM DESTEFANIS TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 12 July. She agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that no reply should be sent to Destefanis's message. Mrs Thatcher has noted the contents of the rest of your letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office).

A. J. COLES

B.J.P. Fall, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-~~929 7022~~ 218 6312

*MP questions - CF*

MO 5/21.

13th July 1983

*My JBH*

*Dear Nick*

TAM DALYELL AND THE GENERAL BELGRANO

Thank you for your letter to Jane Ridley of 12th July, attaching the draft of your proposed reply to Mr Tam Dalyell, concerning the points raised during Business Questions on 7th July.

We are perfectly content for you to reply as drafted, and I am sending a copy of this letter to Willie Rickett and John Holmes.

*Yours Sincerely.*

*Harry Kentish*

(H KENTISH)  
Parliamentary Clerk

N P M Huxtable Esq



Argentina relations

\* JUL 1983

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OO BRASILIA  
GRS 427  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 121743Z JUL 83  
TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 173 OF 12 JULY

*mt*

*head in bell.*

LAND BRIDGE

1. THE BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON GIFFARD AT HIS OWN REQUEST ON 12 JULY. HE SAID THAT HE RECALLED YOUR REMARKING AT LUNCH AT YOUR HOUSE WHILE GIFFARD WAS STAYING WITH YOU THAT YOU DID NOT THINK THE LANDINGS BY RAF AIRCRAFT IN BRAZIL WOULD CAUSE THE ARGENTINES SERIOUS PROBLEMS. HE HAD NOT COMMENTED AT THE TIME (THOUGH YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT IN FACT HE DID) BUT HE WANTED IT TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE LANDINGS HAD CAUSED SERIOUS PROBLEMS. IT WAS NOT SO MUCH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AS THE POLITICIANS.
2. IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE ELECTIONS THIS SORT OF QUESTION WAS INEVITABLY OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM. HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS CONSEQUENTLY ALSO A DELICATE MATTER FOR THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE AND THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTS WHICH WAS REPORTED BY THE PRESS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE HAD INDEED DONE SO. PRESIDENT FIGVEIREDO WHILE RESERVING BRAZIL'S RIGHTS IN SUCH MATTERS HAD ASSURED THE ARGENTINE PRESIDENT THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF PROVIDING SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR OUR FORCES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THEY WOULD NOT OF COURSE REFUSE LANDINGS IN EMERGENCIES.
3. THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT SAY THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, THOUGH IT SEEMS QUITE PROBABLE THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO RAISE THE MATTER. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION HE MADE THE POINTS THAT PRE-PLANNED FLIGHTS COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS EMERGENCIES, AND THAT IT WOULD BE NORMAL FOR EMERGENCY FACILITIES TO BE REQUESTED THROUGH ITAMARATY.
4. GIFFARD SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT FLIGHTS WERE AUTHORISED BY THE AERONAUTICAL AUTHORITIES ON A CASE-BY-CASE

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BASIS, ON EITHER SIDE, IE. FOR BRAZILIAN FLIGHTS TO THIS COUNTRY AS WELL AS FOR RAF AIRCRAFT PASSING THROUGH BRAZILIAN AIRPORTS. THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT PRESS HIS POINTS BUT ASKED FOR RECOGNITION THAT THE PATTERN AND THE FREQUENCIES OF FLIGHTS COULD BOTH CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR BRAZIL. GIFFARD ACKNOWLEDGED THIS.

5. THE AMBASSADOR MADE NO PRECISE REQUESTS. GIFFARD WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT WE COULD STICK TO OUR PLANS TO RESUME OCCASIONAL FLIGHTS AFTER AN INTERVAL. YOU MAY CONSIDER THAT THIS CALL WAS INTENDED TO CONVEY PRIMARILY THAT IPAMARATY ARE WATCHING THE SITUATION VERY CAREFULLY. BUT YOU MAY ALSO AGREE THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE WISE TO SEEK ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THEIR VIEWS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH DELIO AND TO RECEIVING FROM YOU IN DUE COURSE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THE PROSPECT FOR A RESUMPTION OF FLIGHTS.

HOWE

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cc Sir/AP  
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(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 July 1983

Prime Minister

To note.

Don John

A.S.C. 12/7

Argentine Next-of-Kin: Message from Destefanis to the Prime Minister

Destefanis sent a telex message to the Prime Minister on 6 July via the Embassy in Washington, asking for re-consideration of the Home Secretary's decision to deny him a visa to enter this country. I enclose a summary translation of his message.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks no reply should be sent. Destefanis's message is, as usual, in offensive and polemical terms. There is no requirement to give the reasons for a decision of this type by the Home Secretary, and no right of appeal.

As Sir Geoffrey Howe pointed out at the meeting of OD(EM) on 6 July, Destefanis has been in contact by telephone with Mr Tam Dalyell MP, and there have been other recent reports to confirm our earlier impression that Mr Dalyell might be in league with Destefanis. This makes the question of Destefanis's visa and of a possible Argentine next-of-kin visit more likely to become the subject of Parliamentary and press interest in the next few weeks.

We must be careful to ensure that our handling of Destefanis does not cut across our main purpose of trying to set up a properly-organised visit. As agreed in OD(EM) on 6 July, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will first arrange for the Falkland Islanders to be consulted. Sir Geoffrey Howe believes that the Civil Commissioner must put the matter to them personally. Sir Rex Hunt is at present in this country on leave and will be suitably briefed on the lines agreed at OD(EM). He will be returning to the Falkland Islands on 29 July having had a meeting with the Prime Minister on 26 July and with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary the previous day. We hope he will be able rapidly to report the Island Councillors' agreement to our proposed arrangements. The next step will be for the Swiss to put our conditions to the Argentine authorities.

/Ministers have

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Ministers have agreed that, during these first stages of our plan, all exchanges should remain confidential. This might seem likely to inhibit us somewhat if Mr Dalyell and his friends try to put us under pressure about Destefanis. But we already have an interim public line which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks more than adequate. The British Interests Section in Buenos Aires, in informing Destefanis of the Home Secretary's decision, referred to our readiness in principle to permit a properly-organised visit to the Islands by Argentine next of kin, said that we had noted what the Argentine Government said publicly about this possibility in their communique of 29 April, and emphasised that we would not wish Destefanis to be involved in any plans for a visit that might take shape. This should enable us to deal comprehensively in the next few weeks with the press and Parliament, to whom we would if necessary also confirm that Destefanis's message to the Prime Minister has been received. Indeed, such a statement could even help the evolution of a properly-organised visit by indicating, without compromising any of our confidential negotiations, that we had the Argentines' position - together with other factors - under active consideration.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office).

*Answer*  
*[Signature]*

(B J P Fall)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street






INFORMAL SUMMARY TRANSLATION OF TELEX MESSAGE SENT IN SPANISH TO HM EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, ON 6 JULY 1983, FROM OSVALDO DESTEFANIS, FOR ONWARD TRANSMISSION TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The Home Office has recommended that I be refused a visa to enter your country. My visit to the UK would have been to agree with your Government the conditions under which the 522 families of those lost in the Falklands conflict would be able to visit the graves at Port Darwin. You had told Parliament that there would be no objection to a relatives visit for purely humanitarian reasons.

The ICRC has made known to your Government that our journey was precisely for humanitarian reasons: it is difficult to understand why the Home Office should recommend that I be denied the visa which I need to agree the conditions for a strictly humanitarian visit, saying that my visit would not be conducive to the public good. I believe it would be conducive to the public good to work to avoid a confrontation like that which has caused the death of hundreds of Argentines and Britons caused by the negative attitude of British Governments to negotiations on the Falklands.

To demonstrate my good faith, I propose appearing before Parliament to discuss publicly the conditions with which the hundreds of relatives would need to comply and so that your Government and your people can understand clearly that this is an absolutely humanitarian and totally apolitical matter. It would be inhuman on your part to deny us a right recognised by a large segment of the British people and by the Anglican Church. Demonstrate before the eyes of the world your great spirit and do not look for political intentions in our sorrow.





ARGENTINA - Relations  
A34



egbt



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I am strongly  
 against Argentine polo players coming to  
 this country. So would be the crowd at any matches.  
 He could put Rugby in an  
 a quality endangering position  
 Argentina: Polo not  
 Prime Minister  
 Contact with the  
 approval?  
 A.S.C. 12/7.

12 July 1983

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thinks the Prime Minister should be aware of approaches which we have received about the possibility of Argentine polo players coming to Britain in 1984. Some of these approaches have favoured such visits, while others have been against.

Lady Young's views were first sought informally by Sir Anthony Kershaw MP, on behalf of a constituent. Our reply reflected the Government's guidelines given in February by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment to the Chairman of the Sports Council on links with Argentina in any sport: Sir Anthony was told that the Government no longer considers it necessary or appropriate to discourage such contacts, but that this relaxation did not extend to the active encouragement of contacts, especially full-scale tours, and that we would only be prepared to accept the Argentines as individual players rather than as a national flag-carrying team.

We have since received further approaches which indicate considerable disagreement within the polo fraternity on the desirability of accepting a visit by Argentine players. Opponents of the idea express concern that members of the Royal Family would become involved, either in prize-giving ceremonies, or, in the case of the Prince of Wales, as participants. \*

Nigel Dempster of the Daily Mail has speculated on the potential problems on 22 June; and the fact that Prince Charles has an Argentine groom could also be brought into the controversy. \*

/The

\* ~ \* Passage deleted and closed, 40 years,  
 under FOI Exemption. CWayland  
 22 January 2013





The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is content with the advice which has already been given to Sir A Kershaw. He also considers that we should avoid becoming embroiled in the controversy within the polo-playing world and that, having stated our policy in principle on sporting links with Argentina, we should make it clear that it is for the organising bodies themselves to decide whether or not to invite Argentine players. We would retain the role of issuing visas, but sportsmen are among the categories for whom visas can be authorised without reference to London.

*Paragraph deleted and closed. 40 years,  
under FOI Exemption.*

*M. Wayland*

*22 January 2013*

*Yours ever,  
R B Bone*

12 July 1983

*91* (R B Bone)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St





**With the Compliments  
of the  
Lord Privy Seal**

A handwritten signature or set of initials in dark ink, appearing to be 'V. H.' or similar, located to the right of the printed text.





Privy Council Office  
Whitehall  
LONDON  
SW1A 2AT

*Dear Jane*

12 July 1983

TAM DALYELL AND THE GENERAL BELGRANO

We spoke last week about Mr Dalyell's use of Business Questions on 31 May to pursue with the Lord Privy Seal his interest in the sinking of the Belgrano. You kindly sent us some briefing on this question.

In the event, Mr Dalyell did not revert to his previous line but adopted a new tack when he raised the subject again with the Lord Privy Seal on 7 July (col 417). Mr Biffen undertook to be in touch. We have, therefore, prepared the attached draft reply to Mr Dalyell which I think reflects the tenor of your Department's advice. I should be glad to know if you and John Holmes, to whom I am copying this letter, are content.

A copy of this letter goes also to Willie Rickett for information.

*yours ever*  
*N P M Huxtable*

N P M Huxtable  
Private Secretary

Jane Ridley  
Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON SW1



DRAFT LETTER FROM THE LORD PRIVY SEAL TO TAM DALYELL MP

You raised during Business Questions last Thursday a number of points concerning the sinking of the 'General Belgrano' which you first put to me in the course of Business Questions the preceding week.

I have now had an opportunity to draw your remarks to the attention of the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary. They consider that the matters raised by you have been dealt with pretty well exhaustively in the House, largely in response to Questions and Debates which you have yourself generated. I do not think, therefore, that there is anything I can usefully add to what was said by Cranley Onslow in the course of the Adjournment Debate on 12 May and by Peter Blaker in reply to your Written Question on 29 November last year.



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OO UDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON  
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TO IMMEDIATE UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 215 OF 11 JULY  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 246: IMF/ARGENTINA

1. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE THIS WEEKEND FOR MCNAMAR TO CALL ON ME TODAY. IN THE EVENT MCNAMAR WAS RECALLED TO WASHINGTON TO HELP THE ADMINISTRATION TO PILOT THE IMF QUOTA INCREASE BILL THROUGH CONGRESS. INSTEAD HIS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, KEVIN COYNE, CALLED ON LITTLER THIS MORNING TO REPORT WHAT MCNAMAR HAD INTENDED TO SAY. APPELYARD (ERD, FCO) WAS ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING.
2. COYNE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE US ADMINISTRATION ON THE FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ISSUE. THEY HAD CONFIRMED THAT ARGENTINA WOULD SEEK A WAIVER ON THIS ASPECT OF THE IMF PROGRAMME, PROBABLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANOTHER WAIVER ON THE PAYMENT OF ARREARS. THE ARGENTINES HAD ASKED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT. A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN WITHIN THE US ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT THE UK'S CASE. HENCE THE US WOULD ARGUE AGAINST GRANTING A WAIVER AT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING, WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE AROUND 12 AUGUST. THE ARGENTINES HAD BEEN TOLD OF THIS DECISION.
3. AFTER RECEIVING THIS INFORMATION THE ARGENTINES HAD MADE A FURTHER APPROACH TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. THEY HAD ARGUED THAT THEY WERE LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE. ARGENTINA HAD POLITICAL PROBLEMS OVER LIFTING THE RESTRICTIONS. THEY HAD TAKEN SOME TOUGH DECISIONS ON THE BANKING SIDE AND ON THEIR BANKRUPTCY LAWS. BUT LIFTING THE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE MUCH MORE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE COMING ELECTIONS. BOTH THE GOVERNOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN THE US HAD DROPPED HINTS THAT ARGENTINA WAS LOOKING FOR SOME KIND OF GESTURE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM WHICH WOULD

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ENABLE THE IMF ISSUE TO BE WRAPPED UP IN A LARGER EXCHANGE OF CONCESSIONS. THEY HAD GONE ON TO HINT THAT ARGENTINA MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME KIND OF STATEMENT THAT HOSTILITIES HAD CEASED AND THAT THE RESTRICTIONS HAD BEEN LIFTED, WHICH WOULD THEN BE MATCHED BY SOME CONCESSION (PERHAPS OVER FISHING IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROTECTION ZONE) BY THE UNITED KINGDOM.

4. COYNE REPEATED THAT IN PUTTING FORWARD THESE IDEAS HE WAS SIMPLY PASSING ON WHAT THE ARGENTINES HAD SAID. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH CASE. IN ANY EVENT BRITAIN'S CASE IN THE IMF WAS LOGICALLY UNANSWERABLE THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CHANGING THE US DECISION, BUT HE WONDERED IF THERE WAS SOME KIND OF FLEXIBILITY AVAILABLE.

5. IN REPLY LITTLER WELCOMED THE US DECISION AND AGREED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ARGUMENTS WERE UNANSWERABLE. ARGENTINA WAS IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF IMF LAW AND PRACTICE. THIS WAS NOT A BILATERAL UK/ARGENTINA ISSUE. FAILURE TO INSIST ON FULL COMPLIANCE WITH IMF PRINCIPLES WOULD BE DAMAGING TO THE IMF. LITTLER WAS NOT EMPOWERED TO TALK ABOUT LARGER POLITICAL ISSUES SUCH AS A STATEMENT OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND MOVES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROTECTION ZONE. BUT TYING THESE MAJOR PROBLEMS TO THE IMF ISSUE WOULD NOT WORK.

HOWE

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MR GIFFARD

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MR LOEHNIS, BANK OF ENGLAND



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OO WASHINGTON  
GRS 1098  
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FM FCO 110900Z JUL 83  
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1140

Mr. Schola

To see.

A.S.C. 11/7

AND TO IMMEDIATE TOKYO, PARIS, BONN, STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, OTTAWA, ROME, OSLO, VIENNA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, LUXEMBOURG

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON, UKREP BRUSSELS

IMF/ARGENTINA: FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

1. THE DEADLINE OF 31 JULY BY WHICH ARGENTINA COMMITTED ITSELF UNDER THE IMF PROGRAMME TO REMOVE DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST UK BANKS AND COMPANIES IS APPROACHING. WE SHOULD LIKE TO ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH YOU ARE ACREDITED ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL IMF ISSUES INVOLVED AND WILL TAKE A FIRM LINE IN DEFENCE OF IMF LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IF THIS ISSUE COMES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.
2. PLEASE TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO APPROACH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVELS ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 3-10 BELOW. BACKGROUND MATERIAL, WHICH SUPPLEMENTS MY GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 76 OF 16 JUNE, IS IN PARAGRAPHS 11-15 BELOW.

LINE TO TAKE

3. ARGENTINA AND THE UK REACHED AGREEMENT IN SEPTEMBER LAST YEAR ON THE MUTUAL LIFTING OF FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS IMPLEMENTED ITS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENTS IN FULL. ARGENTINA HAS ONLY PARTIALLY FULFILLED ITS COMMITMENTS.
4. WHEN THE IMF PROGRAMME (A STANDBY ARRANGEMENT) WAS AGREED ON 24 JANUARY THIS YEAR, ARGENTINA WAS COMMITTED AT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING TO REMOVE DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST UK BANKS AND COMPANIES BY 31 JULY AT THE LATEST. ARGENTINA HAS NOT SO FAR COMPLIED AND HAS THEREFORE NOT MET THE CRITERIA UNDER THE PROGRAMME. ARGENTINA WILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE TO MAKE FURTHER DRAWINGS ON THE FUND PROGRAMME AFTER 31 JULY UNLESS THE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS ARE REMOVED.

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5. ARGENTINA'S COMMITMENT WAS RECORDED IN THE MANAGING DIRECTOR'S SUMMING UP OF THE DISCUSSION (IMF BUFF PAPER 83/32), AND WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY ALL THE COUNTRIES AT THE MEETING.
6. SINCE THEN ARGENTINA HAS INTRODUCED LAW 22820 (SEE GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 76) WHICH MODIFIED LAW 22591 SO AS TO ALLOW RESTRICTIONS AGAINST UK BANKS AND FIRMS TO BE LIFTED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE AUTHORITIES. ARGENTINA HAS IN PRACTICE LIFTED RESTRICTIONS AGAINST BANKS BUT HAS DELIBERATELY RETAINED THE DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS AGAINST UK NON-BANKING COMPANIES. THE AIM OF THIS MANOEUVRE WAS OBVIOUSLY TO ENCOURAGE BRITISH BANKS TO SIGN THE DOLLARS 1.5 BILLION COMMERCIAL LOAN AGREEMENT CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION WHILE LEAVING THE OTHER RESTRICTIONS UNCHANGED. IT SHOWS THAT ARGENTINA IS PREPARED TO TAKE ACTION WHEN IT IS IN ITS OWN INTERESTS.
7. THIS IS NOT A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM THOUGH THE UK IS OF COURSE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. ARGENTINA IS IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF A FUNDAMENTAL IMF PRINCIPLE (NON-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A FELLOW MEMBER) AND OF CLEAR COMMITMENTS MADE TO OBTAIN IMF FUNDS UNDER AN IMF PROGRAMME.
8. ARGENTINA IS BRINGING POLITICS INTO THE IMF BY MAINTAINING THE RESTRICTIONS FOR PURELY POLITICAL REASONS ARGENTINA'S EFFORTS TO EXTRACT POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM IN ENTIRELY UNRELATED AREAS IS A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION OF THIS AIM.
9. THE IMF'S MANAGING DIRECTOR AND STAFF ARE IN NO DOUBT ABOUT ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO HONOUR ITS COMMITMENTS AND TO MEET THE PROGRAMME CRITERIA. THEY HAVE MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE ARGENTINES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS.
10. IF ARGENTINA REQUESTS A WAIVER FROM THIS ASPECT OF THE PROGRAMME, MEMBER STATES SHOULD STAND FIRMLY BY IMF PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE BY INSISTING THAT ARGENTINA FULFILS ITS OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS BEFORE FURTHER IMF DRAWINGS CAN BE MADE. THIS IS NOT A TECHNICAL BREACH OF A PARTICULAR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE TARGET: IT IS A BASIC MATTER OF IMF DOCTRINE. FAILURE TO INSIST ON FULL COMPLIANCE WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO THE IMF IN ITS FUTURE OPERATIONS. ARGENTINA HAS HAD AMPLE TIME TO TAKE

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ACTION AND AMPLE WARNINGS FROM THE IMF STAFF.

BACKGROUND

11. THE UK EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR HAS TAKEN STEPS IN WASHINGTON TO KEEP HIS PRINCIPAL COLLEAGUES POSTED ON ARGENTINA'S FAILURE TO REMOVE THE RESTRICTIONS. WE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED REGULAR EVIDENCE TO THE IMF STAFF OF ARGENTINA'S NON-COMPLIANCE. THE IMF MANAGING DIRECTOR AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN COMMENDABLY FIRM AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVES ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT UNLESS THE RESTRICTIONS ARE REMOVED BY 31 JULY THE REVIEW OF ARGENTINA'S PERFORMANCE, WHICH MUST BE DISCUSSED AND APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD IF ARGENTINA IS TO MAKE ANY FURTHER DRAWINGS, CANNOT GO AHEAD.

12. THE NEXT TACTICAL MOVES ARE STILL NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. THE IMF STAFF ARE LIKELY SOON TO CIRCULATE A STAFF PAPER ON THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM WHICH WILL POINT OUT THAT THE DISCRIMINATIONS REMAIN. THE IMF MIGHT THEN DECIDE TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNTIL THE RESTRICTIONS ARE LIFTED, THUS PREVENTING ARGENTINA FROM MAKING FURTHER DRAWINGS AFTER 31 JULY IN THE ABSENCE OF EXECUTIVE BOARD APPROVAL OF ITS PERFORMANCE. IN THAT CASE ARGENTINA MAY REQUEST A WAIVER FROM THIS ASPECT OF THE PROGRAMME. ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO CALL FOR AN EXECUTIVE BOARD MEETING TO DISCUSS THIS. AT PRESENT THIS LOOKS LIKE THE MOST LIKELY CONTEXT IN WHICH THE ISSUE WILL BE PRESENTED.

13. FROM THE UK STANDPOINT, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT A MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES AT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD SHOULD STAND FIRMLY BY IMF PRINCIPLES BY REFUSING A WAIVER AND INSISTING THAT ARGENTINA ABIDE BY IMF PRINCIPLES UNDER THE IMF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT. THERE IS NO RECENT PRECEDENT FOR THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TAKING A FORMAL VOTE, WHICH INVOLVES WRITTEN PROCEDURES, BUT THE MANAGING DIRECTOR'S SUMMING UP AT THE END EMBODIES THE DECISIONS TAKEN AND REFLECTS THE SENSE OF THE DISCUSSION. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT G10 COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR SHOULD SPEAK OUT CLEARLY AND FIRMLY AT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD.

14. IN APPROACHING GOVERNMENTS, THE MAIN POINTS TO GET ACROSS ARE THOSE IN PARAGRAPHS 7-10, IE THAT ARGENTINA IS IN BREACH OF IMF PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENTS TO THE IMF, THAT THIS IS NOT A



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BILATERAL UK/ARGENTINA ISSUE AND THAT IT IS ARGENTINA WHICH IS BRINGING POLITICS INTO THE IMF. ARGENTINA MAY WELL TRY TO PLACE THE ISSUE IN THE FALKLANDS CONTEXT AND SUGGEST THAT THE UK MUST MAKE CONCESSIONS ELSEWHERE (EG IN THE FALKLAND ISLAND PROTECTION ZONE). THIS IDEA SHOULD BE SCOTCHED STRAIGHTAWAY.

L5. SOME COUNTRIES MAY ARGUE THAT THE RISKS TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF AN ARGENTINE DEFAULT IF THE IMF PROGRAMME IS SUSPENDED OUTWEIGH THE NEED TO STICK TO IMF PRINCIPLES. THE ANSWER IS THAT ALL THAT ARGENTINA IS REQUIRED TO DO IS TO TAKE SOME RELATIVELY LIMITED FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TO END DISCRIMINATION. PRESSURE SHOULD BE PUT ON ARGENTINA TO DO THIS RATHER THAN ON FINDING WAYS OF ENABLING ARGENTINA TO ESCAPE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS OWN ACTIONS.

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FM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 082345Z  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELNO 246 OF 8 JULY 1983.

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*Dr. Helsen*  
*[Signature]*

A.S.C. 11/7

YOUR TELNO 211

IMF: ARGENTINA -- FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

1. OUR ASSESSMENT OF YOUR POINTS (A)-(G) IS AS FOLLOWS.

(A) DALE (DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR) HAS CLEARED THE PAPER. HE EXPECTS THAT IT WILL BE OUT LATER TODAY AND CERTAINLY IN DIRECTORS' OFFICES BY MONDAY. THE PAPER IS MAINLY ABOUT THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM, BUT THERE IS SOME FAIRLY BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE WITH RESPECT TO OTHER CRITERIA. DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS ARE MENTIONED TOWARDS THE END, BUT THE PAPER DEALS MAINLY WITH PROGRESS TOWARDS ELIMINATING NON-DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS, WHICH IS LAGGING A LITTLE BEHIND SCHEDULE. DALE SAYS THAT THE ARGENTINES ARE ASKING FOR A WAIVER ON ARREARS (UNDERLINE LAST TWO WORDS), SPECIFICALLY TIED TO THE DELAY IN RELEASING THE COMMERCIAL BANKS' MEDIUM-TERM LOAN. HE CONFIRMS THAT NO DECISION IS PROPOSED AS YET.

(B) WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL FORCE A BOARD DISCUSSION OF THE DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS, PROBABLY BY REQUESTING A WAIVER. OUR GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL SAY THAT THEY HAVE MADE BEST EFFORTS TO REMOVE THE DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS, THAT A MAJOR RELAXATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED FOR BANKS AT THEIR CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL COST, THAT THE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS ARE ECONOMICALLY UNIMPORTANT ALTHOUGH POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT TO THEM, AND THAT DENIAL OF THE WAIVER WOULD RUIN THE ADJUSTMENT EFFORT IN ARGENTINA AND ARGENTINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE FUND. THEY MAY ALSO INVOKE THE OBSCURITY OF PRECISELY WHAT THEIR OBLIGATIONS ARE AFTER THE JANUARY BOARD DISCUSSION. THE DISCUSSION IS LIKELY TO BE IN THE LAST WEEK OF JULY OR THE FIRST OF AUGUST. IF THE PAPER IS DATED TODAY, AND THE FOUR-WEEK RULE FOR CONSIDERATION IS OBSERVED, THE DISCUSSION COULD BE AT THE END OF JULY BUT THE BOARD TIMETABLE IS VERY CONGESTED THEN. IT MAY SLIP INTO THE FIRST WEEK IN AUGUST. HOWEVER, THE ARGENTINES MAY SEEK TO REDUCE THE PERIOD FOR CONSIDERATION IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DRAW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE END OF JULY. IN ANY EVENT WE SHOULD BE READY FOR AN EARLIER DISCUSSION THAN THE LAST WEEK OF JULY. YOU MAY THEREFORE THINK THAT EARLY LOBBYING IN CAPITALS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED, EVEN IF WE HAVE TO TAKE FOLLOW-UP ACTION LATER.

(C) THE ARGENTINES HAVE TODAY STARTED TO LOBBY HARD IN THE FUND. TEIJEIRO (ARGENTINE ALTERNATE DIRECTOR) IS TALKING TO THE GERMANS, AUSTRALIANS, FRENCH AND CANADIANS AND WILL PROBABLY BE TALKING TO OTHERS. DIRECTORS ARE LIKELY SIMPLY TO TAKE NOTE AND REPORT TO CAPITALS. WE HAVE NOT HEARD OF LOBBYING IN CAPITALS.

(D) WE HAVE DETECTED NO WEAKENING ON THE PART OF THE STAFF. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR IS CURRENTLY IN EUROPE. BANK OF ENGLAND OFFICIALS WILL NO DOUBT SEE HIM IN BASLE AND YOU MAY WISH THEM TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHECK HIS LATEST THINKING ON ARGENTINA.

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(E)



## CONFIDENTIAL

(E) G10 ATTITUDES ARE STILL UNPREDICTABLE. EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS HERE ARE BEING VERY RESERVED. POLICY WILL BE MADE IN CAPITALS. ONLY TVEDT (NORDICS) HAS TOLD US THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT US IN THE BOARD. THOUGH THE US HAS EXPRESSED FIRM SUPPORT SO FAR, WE CANNOT ASSUME ITS CONTINUANCE. THEY WILL HAVE TO WEIGH THEIR TRADITIONAL STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE FUND AND FOR THE UK, AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARGENTINE DEBT "DEFAULT" WITH POSSIBLE DOMINO EFFECTS, THE AVOIDANCE OF ECONOMIC DISRUPTION IN ARGENTINA DURING THE SENSITIVE RUN-UP TO THIS AUTUMN'S ELECTIONS AND, MORE GENERALLY, THEIR FEAR OF PUSHING THE ARGENTINES TOWARDS THE SOVIET CAMP. THE ATTITUDES OF COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE G10 MAY WELL BE DETERMINED BY THEIR WIDER POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE UK. WE KNOW OF NO CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST SO FAR BECAUSE THE ISSUE HAS HARDLY SURFACED PUBLICLY HERE. WHEN IT DOES, THE PRESSURES ON CONGRESS ARE LIKELY TO BE THE SAME AS THOSE ON THE ADMINISTRATION.

(F) I CERTAINLY RECOMMEND A STRONG LOBBYING EFFORT IN G10 CAPITALS SINCE DIRECTORS WILL BE ACTING UNDER FIRM INSTRUCTIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH DELEGATIONS HERE. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE FAIRLY SOLID G10 SUPPORT WHICH WE WOULD NEED TO CARRY THE BOARD. OTHER CAPITALS FOR PARALLEL ACTION ARE CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, THE MAJOR SCANDINAVIAN CAPITALS, VIENNA, AND PERHAPS DELHI AND THE MAJOR CAPITALS IN THE ANGLOPHONE AFRICAN CONSTITUENCIES. WE WILL ADVISE LATER ON AN APPROACH IN RIYADH AFTER I HAVE SPOKEN TO NIMATALLAH (SAUDI EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR) WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM LEAVE. BUT AS SEEN FROM HERE, THERE SEEMS NOTHING TO BE LOST BY WIDE LOBBYING. (YOU MIGHT WARN OTTAWA THAT JOYCE (CANADIAN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR) TOLD ME THAT HE HAS INFORMED HIS TREASURY OF THE MATTER, BUT IS UNSURE WHETHER HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY HAVE BEEN CONSULTED).

(G) I SUGGEST THAT WHEN YOU COME HERE NEXT WEEK, YOU SEEK TO ASCERTAIN THE DEPTH OF US SUPPORT IF THE GOING GETS ROUGH AND THE ARGENTINES THREATEN DEFAULT, AND US WILLINGNESS TO LOBBY ACTIVELY ON OUR BEHALF.

2. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO APPELYARD (ERD), LAVELLE (TREASURY) AND GILCHRIST (BANK OF ENGLAND).

WICKS

ADVANCED AS REQUESTED

MONETARY  
ERD  
FID  
MR GIFFARD  
MR VRE

2  
CONFIDENTIAL



2AS 300  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CFM BERNE 070920Z  
FM BIS BUENOS AIRES  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 602 OF 06 JULY

INFO PRIORITY MOD MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO BRASILIA CARACAS  
UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY

PRESS SUMMARY

1. ALL PAPERS TODAY HEADLINE THE RESIGNATION OF THE TUCUMAN GOVERNOR, GENERAL LUIS ANTONIO MERLO, AFTER HIS CONTROVERSIAL CONDUCT IN A CONFRONTATION WITH LOCAL POLICE DEMONSTRATING ON SUNDAY FOR HIGHER WAGES. POLICE UNREST HAS CONTINUED AND THE ARMY HAS MOVED IN TO PATROL THE PROVINCE.
2. GENERAL CRISTINO NICOLAIDES YESTERDAY PRESIDED OVER A MEETING OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND. THE GENERALS REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO QUOTE INSTALL A STABLE, AUTHENTICALLY REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM UNQUOTE AND CALLED FOR THE PROMULGATION OF AMNESTY AND ANTI-TERRORIST LAWS QUOTE AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME UNQUOTE. A DRAFT AMNESTY LAW IS UNDER STUDY, BUT HAS ALLEGEDLY BEEN DELAYED BECAUSE OF QUOTE ETHICAL UNQUOTE OBJECTIONS FROM CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES.
3. PROMINENT COVERAGE IS AGAIN GIVEN TO THE QUESTION OF STOP-OVERS IN BRAZIL BY BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT. THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE HAS CRITICIZED THE BRAZILIAN POSITION AND STATED THAT THE LANDINGS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS A PRECEDENT FOR THE ROUTINE PROVISION OF FACILITIES TO THE UK. BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAMIRO SARAIVA GUERREIRO HAS PROMISED STRICTER CONTROL OF FUTURE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR EMERGENCY STOP-OVERS. THERE IS SPECULATION THAT BRAZIL MAY RESTRICT THE SUPPLY OF FUEL TO THE BRITISH PLANES SO AS TO ENSURE THEIR IMMEDIATE RETURN TO ASCENSION ISLAND.
4. SEVERAL PAPERS ATTRIBUTE TO HM AMBASSADOR IN LIMA A STATEMENT THAT THE UK HAS NOT SOLD HMS HERMES TO CHILE AND THAT NO DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN HELD ON THE SUBJECT. THE POPULAR NATIONALIST DAILY "CRONICA" REPORTS CHILEAN PRESS CRITICISM OF ARGENTINE PROPOSALS TO BUILD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE.
5. THE EPISCOPAL SOCIAL PASTORAL COMMISSION AND THE TWO FACTIONS OF THE CGT AGREED YESTERDAY TO COOPERATE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF QUOTE SOCIAL PEACE, THE REVERSAL OF THE UNJUST SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION UNQUOTE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF DEMOCRACY.
6. TEACHERS, COURT OFFICIALS AND BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE DOCTORS HAVE TODAY INITIATED STRIKE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF WAGE DEMANDS. THE CONFEDERATION OF STATE WORKERS' UNIONS (CGT-E) HAS CONFIRMED ITS PLANNED STRIKE FOR 13 AND 14 JULY.

17. CENTRIST



7. CENTRIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCISCO MANRIQUE HAS FILED A SLANDER SUIT AGAINST EX-GENERAL RAMON CAMPS FOR HAVING IMPLIED HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MONTONEROS. A SUPPOSED WITNESS TO THE SHOOTOUT IN WHICH LEFT-WING PERONIST MILITANT OSVALDO CAMBIASO AND MONTONERO LEADER EDUARDO PEREIRA ROSSI WERE KILLED , YESTERDAY FAILED TO APPEAR IN COURT.

JACKSON-HOULTON

POWELL-JONES

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FCO

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FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

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PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
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SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
~~MR JEE~~  
MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/SAMD  
HD/FID  
~~HD/DEFENCE DEPT~~  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

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MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF. MOD  
PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )  
SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
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MR A TITCHENER )  
MR C T ROBERTS, IAT ) DOT  
MR A FORTNAM

~~RESERVE CLERK~~

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(FM BERNE 070845Z )

nt

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 600 OF 06 JULY  
INFO IMMEDIATE CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY  
INFOROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON BRASILIA MONTEVIDEO  
SANTIAGO

OSVALDO DESTEFANIS  
OUR TELNO 584 OF 30 JUNE

1. TODAY'S 'LA PRENSA' CARRIES A NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS  
AGENCY REPORT ON THE LATEST STATEMENTS FROM OSVALDO DESTEFANIS  
(TEXT AND TRANSLATION BY BAG TO FCO). THESE HAVE NOT YET  
APPEARED IN OTHER PAPERS. THE ARTICLE CONFIRMS THAT DESTEFANIS'  
VISA APPLICATION HAS BEEN REFUSED BY THE HOME SECRETARY FOR  
REASONS OF QUOTE THE PUBLIC GOOD UNQUOTE.



REASONS OF QUOTE THE PUBLIC GOOD UNQUOTE.

2. ACCORDING TO DESTEFANIS, TAM DALYELL PROMISED DURING THEIR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST WEEK TO SOUND OUT MP'S VIEWS ON THE PROPOSED FALKLANDS VISIT BY ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN. HE EXPLAINED THAT MR DALYELL WOULD THEREBY ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT THERE EXISTS A CONCENSUS IN FAVOUR OF THE VOYAGE, AND THAT QUOTE HE HIS PERFECTLY AWARE THAT OUR MOTIVES ARE SOLELY HUMANITARIAN UNQUOTE.

3. DESTEFANIS ALSO EMPHASISED THAT VARIOUS BRITISH NEWSPAPERS SUPPORT HIS POSITION. HE CITED THE "TIMES" EDITORIAL OF 4 MAY WHICH SUGGESTED THAT HMG SHOULD OFFER HIM DIRECT ASSISTANCE AND MIGHT PROVIDE HIM WITH A BRITISH CARGO VESSEL TO TRANSPORT THE ARGENTINE RELATIVES TO THE ISLANDS.

JACKSON-HOULSTON

POWELL-JONES

NNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 070955 ZTWPM




Argentina

Prime Directive

The crucial point of timing is when we approach the Argentines - it may then become public.

So we do it in July or September?

  $\frac{6}{7}$



PRIME MINISTER

Argentine Next-of-Kin Visit

There is one point which I believe OD(EM) will need to discuss but which is not brought out in the attached papers.

If the committee decides that we should try to arrange an Argentine next-of-kin visit to the Falklands, do we approach the Falkland Islanders before or after the initial approach to the Argentines via the Swiss?

I can see arguments both ways. But there must be some danger that if we approach the Argentine Government first, this will leak and the Islanders will be upset that they were not consulted first. You may wish to put this point to the committee.

A.J.C.

5 July 1983



Ref: B06815

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Argentine Next of Kin Visit to the Falklands  
(OD(EM)(83) 3)

## BACKGROUND

Flag A

When you saw the letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary dated 24th June about action to promote a visit to the Falklands by Argentine next of kin, you asked for a discussion in OD(EM) on the basis of a detailed paper. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has now circulated a note (OD(EM)(83) 3) covering a paper by officials.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes that the Government should now take an initiative via the Swiss with the Argentine Government to propose a next of kin visit on clearly specified conditions, which are set out in paragraph 23 of the officials' paper. In presenting these to the Argentines, the Swiss would not indicate that any of them were negotiable. While it would be a condition that the ship transporting the relatives should not be Argentine and should fly the Red Cross flag, we would not make it a pre-condition that it should fly the Union flag as a courtesy flag: flying the courtesy flag is not mandatory under international law.

3. Account has thus been taken of the point you made on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary's letter that the approach to the Argentines then proposed appeared to some extent to leave the terms of the visit open for negotiation. It is now recommended that the basic conditions should be set out without any advance indication that they might be negotiable. The paper also explains why officials favour making our approach through the Swiss, about which you also expressed some doubt.

4. The Home Secretary, the Attorney General, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Second Legal Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr John Freeland, have been invited.

See my  
separate  
minutes.

A.J.C.  $\frac{5}{7}$



HANDLING

5. You should invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to introduce his paper. Points to be addressed in the subsequent discussion are -

- a. Should we continue to rest on the statement made on 28th March, that we have no objection in principle to a next of kin visit provided that it is organised and supervised by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and is purely humanitarian in nature; or has the time come to go further and seek actively to promote such a visit in the next Falklands summer?
- b. If it is in our interests to promote a visit, for the sake of our international standing on the wider Falklands question and in order to strengthen our hand in refusing further "private enterprise" arrangements, should we make a formal proposal to the Argentines through the Swiss or make our intentions known in some other way, eg by making a public statement in Parliament, leaving the Argentines to take up the running if they wish?
- c. Whatever the form of the approach, what are the conditions on which we should insist? Obviously we could not permit the use of an Argentine ship: should we, as the paper recommends, rule out a British ship? Are there any other countries whose ships we would wish to rule out, and could we accept a ship from any Latin American country?
- d. Are we prepared to allow press representatives to sail and, if so, would we wish to exercise any control over their composition and numbers?
- e. Are we prepared not to insist upon the courtesy flag, and could we sell this to the islanders?
- f. Should we be prepared, as we were with Destefanis, to waive the normal immigration formalities?
- g. Should any approach to the Argentines be confidential or should there be a public announcement?



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7. You will wish to ask the Defence Secretary whether the garrison would find any difficulty in coping with a visit organised on the proposed lines.

CONCLUSION

8. Subject to the discussion, you may wish to guide the Sub-Committee
- a. to agree the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals;
  - b. to decide whether the initiative should be taken in confidence or announced publicly;
  - c. to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to report to the Sub-Committee on the reactions of the Argentine Government, the ICRC and the islanders when they have been obtained.

*David Goodall*

5th July 1983

A D S GOODALL



GRS 275

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Prime Minister

*The Foreign Secretary plans to let you have this weekend advice on the handling of the Falklands at this year's U.N. General Assembly.*

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM ROME 041400Z JUL  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO. 316  
OF 04 JULY 1983  
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

*ms*

*A.J.C. 5/2*

TELECON CULSHAW/LAMONT: FALKLANDS AT THE U N

1. THE M F A LATIN AMERICAN DEPARTMENT TODAY GAVE US IN CONFIDENCE A COPY OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OF ARGENTINA'S DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS. THIS TEXT WAS HANDED TO BOTTAI LAST WEEK BY LISTRE, THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN ROME. ACCORDING TO THE M F A DEPARTMENT, LISTRE DID NOT ADD ANYTHING OF SUBSTANCE ORALLY.
  2. THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
    - QUOTE
    - 1 - REITERATES ITS REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO FIND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE RELATING TO THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLAND (MALVINAS).
    - 2 - TAKES NOTE OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 37/9.
    - 3 - REQUEST THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION TO CONTINUE HIS RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN COMPLYING WITH THE REQUEST MADE IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE AND TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO THAT END.
    - 4 - REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-NINTH SESSION ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.
    - 5 - DECIDES TO INCLUDE IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF ITS THIRTY-NINTH SESSION THE ITEM ENTITLED "QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)" UNQUOTE.
  3. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS IN TODAY'S BAG. FCO PLEASE COPY TO OTHER POSTS AS NECESSARY.
- SIMPSON-ORLEBAR

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he k.



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 July 1983

ARGENTINA : LOANS

The Prime Minister discussed briefly with the Chancellor on Saturday telegram number 572 from Buenos Aires of 27 June, where it is said that the rejection by the Argentinians of the RTZ and Shell requests to allow dividends to be remitted to the United Kingdom confirms the fears that Law 22.820 was little more than window-dressing for the benefit of foreign creditor banks, and that even BOSLA may lose its present privileges after the medium-term loan is secured.

The Prime Minister and the Chancellor agreed that, if these restrictions remained in place we would need, if it came to this, to vote against any further disbursement of the IMF loan; and that, in the same situation, we would need to ask our banks to withdraw from the medium-term commercial loan.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Fall (FCO) and John Bartlett (Bank of England).

M. C. SCHOLAR

J. Kerr, Esq.,  
H.M. Treasury.

CONFIDENTIAL



**RESTRICTED**

HL

4 July 1983

Thank you for your letter of 1 July about the return of the Wilton and Bowman families to the UK from the Falkland Islands.

The Prime Minister has noted this information and has commented that it is a sorry story.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**RESTRICTED**

NR



IMMEDIATE

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NEWS

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OO FCO

GRS 580

RESTRICTED

FROM PORT STANLEY 011300Z JUL 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 406 OF 1 JULY

YOUR TELNO 370: THE WILTONS AND THE BOWMANS

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND

1. THE PARTNERS' APPLICATION FOR GOVERNMENT FINANCE APPARENTLY RESULTED FROM AN UNSOLICITED COMMENT BY A PWD EMPLOYEE THAT THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH COMPONENT PARTS LEFT OVER FROM THE BREWSTER CONTRACT TO BUILD TWO OR MORE COMPLETE HOUSES. IT SEEMS THAT THE PARTNERS ASSUMED THAT THESE MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM FORTHWITH AT LITTLE OR NO COST. IN FACT, THE COMPONENTS ARE THE PROPERTY OF HMG UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CONTRACT IS COMPLETED, WHEN THEY BECOME THE PROPERTY OF FIG.

2. CONSEQUENTLY, EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (NOT SFC AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED) REFERRED THE LOAN APPLICATION BACK FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE COST INCLUDING FREIGHT AND AVAILABILITY OF BREWSTER HOUSING AND PROJECTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF THE PARTNERS' PROPOSED ENTERPRISE. THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PARTNERS DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER FORMALLY WITH BREWSTERS' LOCAL MANAGER. MR RENDELL'S APPLICATION WAS FOR FINANCE FOR THE PURCHASE OF AN EXISTING AND FLOURISHING BUSINESS, THE MALVINA (NOW HARRIER) GUEST HOUSE. THE FREEHOLD OF THE PROPERTY ALONE REPRESENTED ADEQUATE SECURITY FOR THE LOAN, WHICH WAS APPROVED.



3. IT IS UNDERSTANDING IS THAT MR WILTON CAME TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF A LOCAL GENERAL STORE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY DECIDED THAT THE PREMISES WERE NOT SUITABLE FOR HIS INTENDED PURPOSE AND SOUGHT ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION. HE WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY SUITABLE PREMISES - THERE IS A SEVERE SHORTAGE OF ACCOMMODATION, BOTH RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL, IN STANLEY - AND HE AND MR DOWMAN, HIS PARTNER, THEN CONSIDERED ACQUIRING TWO PREFABRICATED BUILDINGS FROM THE CONTRACTOR ENGAGED IN ERECTING 54 HOUSES AS PART OF HMG'S REHABILITATION PROGRAMME AND HAVING THEM ERECTED ON A SITE TO BE DECIDED UPON AS A RESTAURANT/PUBLIC HOUSE.

4. THE PARTNERS' APPLICATION FOR A GOVERNMENT LOAN FOR THIS PURPOSE WAS CONSIDERED BY EXCO BUT WAS REFERRED BACK FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE AVAILABILITY AND COST, INCLUDING COST OF SHIPMENT, OF THE BUILDINGS, AND PROJECTIONS ON THE VIABILITY OF THE PROPOSED ENTERPRISE. THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING: IN FACT FIG HAD NO FURTHER COMMUNICATION ON THIS MATTER FROM MR WILTON OR MR BOWMAN BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE.

5. FIG NATURALLY REGRETS THAT MR WILTON AND MR BOWMAN'S ORIGINAL PLANS DID NOT COME TO FRUITION AND THAT THEY FELT COMPELLED TO RETURN TO BRITAIN. IT IS A PITY THAT THEY DID NOT SEEK APPROPRIATE ADVICE BEFORE EMBARKING ON THEIR VENTURE. FIG AND FIGO STRONGLY ADVISE THAT ANYONE PLANNING TO SET UP A BUSINESS REQUIRING A SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT IN THE FALKLANDS SHOULD PAY AN EXPLORATORY VISIT BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF.

6. IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ON MR RENDELL'S LOAN, PLEASE REPLY TO THE EFFECT THAT IT IS NOT FIG'S POLICY TO DIVULGE DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT LOANS., WHICH ARE DECIDED UPON IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE APPLICANT REGARDING HIS FINANCIAL STANTING, AVAILAILE COLLATERAL AND THE PROJECTED VIABILITY OF THE ENTERPRISE. FIG'S FINANCES FOR THIS PURPOSE ARE VERY LIMITED AND ONLY THOSE APPLICATIONS WHICH SATISFY THE MOST DEMANDING CRITERIA CAN BE MET.

7. WE ARE UNABLE TO TRACE ANY RECORD OF HAVING ASKED FOR PASSAGES FOR WILTONS AND GRATEFUL YOU DELETE QUOTE AT THE REQUEST OF FIG UNQUOTE IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR.

8. GRATEFUL YOU COPY MY TEL 397 AND THIS ONE TO ADRIAN MONK, FIGO.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 July, 1983

Prime Minister

A.S.C. 1/7.

Dear Sir,

Thurston -  
a sorry story  
MF

Return of the Wilton and Bowman Families to the UK from the  
the Falkland Islands

You will have seen Port Stanley telegram number 397 of 24 June recording the return of the Wilton and Bowman families to this country having failed in their projects to establish a bar/restaurant and a fish and chip van in the Falklands. The two families are due back on 3 July; we know that ITN plan to interview them after they have arrived.

ITN allege that the Wiltons claim not to have been properly briefed by the FCO before leaving for the Falklands. But we have heard separately that Mr Wilton's main attack is likely to be on the Falkland Islands Government for their treatment of his case.

The FCO's involvement has been limited to arranging passages for the two families and to putting them in touch with the Government Freight Agents over the shipment of the mobile snack bar. We were not consulted about the advisability of the two initiatives. The Wilton family's first contacts appear to have been with the Falkland Islands Office (the London office established by the Falkland Islands Association before the Falkland Islands Government Office (FIGO) opened) and with Mr Des Peck, the owner of the Philomel store in Port Stanley.

As you will have seen from the telegram, Mr Wilton applied to the Standing Finance Committee of the Falkland Islands Government for a loan (£20,000) to finance the establishment of a bar/restaurant. The application was referred back for more detailed information. We understand however that Mr Wilton will claim that he was simply told that he could re-apply. He is especially bitter about this as a similar application made by a Falkland Islands Government employee, a Mr Michael Rendall, was approved. Port Stanley telno 406 (enclosed) gives further background.



RESTRICTED



If, when the Wiltons return, their case is taken up in the media, we will draw on the points above as appropriate in response to criticisms of HMG.

*Yours ever*

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 June 1983

Prime Minister

Yes  
Dear John, would you like to see  
Sir Rex Hunt?  
A.J.C. 30/6.

Civil Commissioner: Falkland Islands

You asked me to let you know when Sir Rex Hunt would next be in London during his leave. He now plans to be here for consultations during the week beginning 25 July prior to returning to Port Stanley. Perhaps you could let me know whether the Prime Minister would like to see him.

Yours ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



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1 July 1983

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EC Emergency Aid to Argentina

Thank you for your letter of 28 June.  
The Prime Minister has noted the position.

I am copying this letter to Richard  
Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



file

da

1 July 1983

Thank you for your letter of 30 June about Sir Rex Hunt's leave plans. The Prime Minister would like to see him. Perhaps our diary secretaries could be in touch about a date.

A J COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

ME





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 June 1983

SINKING OF THE BELGRANO

As I told you on the telephone earlier this morning, the Prime Minister agrees that, if pressed on the timing of the decision to sink the Belgrano, Lady Young may use the language in your letter of 27 June.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NR





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 June, 1983

Dear John,

Prime Minister

To note.

EC Emergency Aid to Argentina

A.J.C. 24/6.

You may wish to be aware of an EC proposal to give emergency aid to Argentina.

The League of Red Cross Societies launched an appeal on 26 May for SFf. 2,205,200 for shelter, food, water purification equipment and transport in response to the prolonged flooding which has affected several provinces of Argentina since the end of last year. The Commission have told us informally that they intend to contribute 250,000 ecu (£142,000) through the League and asked for our views.

The situation has now become a great deal more serious than it was when we declined to make a bilateral contribution to an earlier appeal in January. We do not normally oppose Commission proposals for emergency aid. If we did so in this case we could well be criticised at home and abroad for playing politics with human suffering. Conversely, we see no significant risk that our acquiescence in EC aid will be interpreted as any kind of political signal by the Argentines or others. Ministers have therefore agreed that we should apply strictly humanitarian criteria to this request, and we have told the Commission that we have no objection to this proposal.

I am copying this letter to Richard Hatfield in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street





Prime Minister

Agree that Lady Young  
should speak as at X  
if pressed in the House of Lords?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 June, 1983

A.J.C. 22/6.

Dear John,

Yes m

Sinking of the Belgrano: PQ by Lord Hatch of Lusby

Lady Young will be answering a Starred Question in the House of Lords tomorrow (28 June) from Lord Hatch of Lusby about the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the 'General Belgrano'. The text of the question and the proposed answer is attached. The answer deliberately does not address specifically the question of the timing of the decision to sink the Belgrano, but if Lady Young is pressed on this point, the Ministry of Defence have recommended that she reply in the following terms:

X /

'The change in the rules of engagement to permit an attack on the Belgrano outside the Total Exclusion Zone was agreed earlier in the day on 2 May, and the actual attack took place at 1857 GMT'.

The Ministry of Defence believe that such a line would be consistent with what has already been said publicly, but in view of the sensitivity of this subject, I should be grateful for your confirmation that the Prime Minister would be content for Lady Young to use it in case of need.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Your ever  
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street



House of Lords

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

ORAL ANSWER on 28 June 1983

Text of Question

Please submit :-  
a draft Answer & background  
& supplementary notes  
to Parliamentary Unit

②

before NOON  
FRIDAY 24 JUNE

The Lord Hatch of Lusby - To ask Her Majesty's Government what were the times and dates of the receipt by the then Foreign Secretary of the Peruvian-American peace proposals in May 1982; of the communication of those proposals by the Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister; and of the decision to torpedo the "General Belgrano".

My Lords, the first intimation that the Government had of the existence of any proposals from the President of Peru came in a series of conversations between Mr Pym and Mr Haig in Washington on 2 May. After necessary clarification of Mr Haig's ideas, Mr Pym telegraphed a report to London at just after five o'clock in the afternoon Washington time - that is, 2215 GMT. The attack on the General Belgrano took place over three hours before that.



27 JUN 1963

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*c. Ho*

*Surf*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 June 1983

*Dear John,*

FALKLANDS: ARGENTINE NEXT-OF-KIN

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 24 June containing the advice of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about action to promote a visit to the Falklands by Argentine next-of-kin.

Mrs. Thatcher would like this matter to be discussed at OD(EM) on the basis of a detailed paper.

She has commented that the proposed approach to the Argentines would appear to some extent to leave the terms of the visit open for negotiation (e.g. the invitation to the Argentines to state their views on the possibility of the party travelling in a non-Argentine vessel). She is inclined to think that we should state in full the basic conditions which, in our view, must be met. Nor, at this stage, do I think that the Prime Minister is entirely convinced that an approach to the Argentines through the Swiss is the best way to proceed.

I should be grateful if Richard Hatfield, to whom I am copying this letter, could arrange for a meeting of OD(EM) as soon as possible and if, in conjunction with the MOD, you could prepare a suitable paper. I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other Members of OD(EM).

*Yours ever*

*John Gles.*

J.E. Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*Surf*



GRS 150

CONFIDENTIAL

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(FM BERNE 281330Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 572 OF 27 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY BANK OF ENGLAND DOT WASHINGTON UKDEL INF/IBRD  
WASHINGTON UKREP BRUSSELES UKMIS NEW YORK

*Then we must not talk  
control the medium-term loan to an  
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Did you please*

ARGENTINA: COMMERCIAL RELATIONS - OUR TELNO 496 OF 7 JUNE

1. SO FAR, THERE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN ONLY ONE SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION UNDER LAW 22.820, WHICH PERMITS THE LIFTING IN INDIVIDUAL CASES OF THE COMMERCIAL RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED UPON BRITISH ENTREPRISES IN ARGENTINA.

2. BOLSA HAS BEEN TOLD BY THE CENTRAL BANK THAT IT WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMIT DIVIDENDS TO THE UK. HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL RTZ SUBSIDIARY AND SHELL THAT THEIR SIMILAR REQUESTS HAVE BEEN REJECTED, ALLEGEDLY DUE TO AIR FORCE PRESSURE. OTHER BRITISH FIRMS ALSO SEEM TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED. IN ADDITION, AN APPLICATION BY SHELL FOR EXEMPTION FROM ALL SANCTIONS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COMPANY IS DUTCH-OWNED HAS BEEN TURNED DOWN.

3. THIS INFORMATION LARGELY CONFIRMS OUR FEARS THAT LAW 22.820 WAS LITTLE MORE THAN WINDOW-DRESSING FOR THE BENEFIT OF FOREIGN CREDITOR BANKS WITH WHOM ARGENTINA IS NEGOTIATING THE 1.5 BILLION DOLLAR MEDIUM TERM LOAN. WE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT AFTER THE LOAN IS SECURED, EVEN BOLSA MAY LOSE ITS PRESENT PRIVILEGES.

JACKSON-HOULSTON

POWELL-JONES

HONGTARY  
ERD  
RID

CONFIDENTIAL



cc RJ



Prime Minister

You will wish to consider Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
whether it is really right to  
approve Argentina via the Swiss  
about this before any approval  
is made to the Islanders.

London SW1A 2AH

24 June 1983

Discuss with Foreign Secretary at your  
weekly meeting?

A.S.C. 24/6.

Dear John,

We need to work  
this out much more  
than the enclosed letter  
has done. No more

Falklands: Argentine Next-of-Kin This leaves the terms  
of the visit for  
refinement.

In my letter of 17 June about Destefanis' visa  
application, I said that the Foreign and Commonwealth  
Secretary would be putting forward recommendations about  
the possibility of a fresh initiative for a properly-  
organised visit to the Falklands by Argentine next-of-kin.

Sir Geoffrey Howe is in favour of action to promote  
a suitably-prepared Argentine visit. He considers this  
desirable both on humanitarian grounds, and in terms of  
domestic and international opinion. We have so far gained  
a certain amount of credit through our treatment of the  
Argentine dead, which has been in marked contrast to the  
callous disregard shown for them by their own Government.  
Events showed our suspicions of Destefanis to be wholly  
justified, and he himself emerged from the episode at  
the end of April widely discredited. Meanwhile, however,  
the Argentines have shown no disposition to remove their  
dead from the Islands, as we would wish them to.

We have a few months available to us now in which  
to make plans for a visit in the next Falklands spring or  
summer that would be acceptable to the Islanders and to  
public opinion in Britain, as well as to the ICRC and  
the international community in general. The Foreign and  
Commonwealth Secretary considers that, if we do not, we  
would stand to lose the ground internationally which  
our record so far has earned us. A well-managed visit, on  
the other hand, would be helpful to us internationally, not  
least at the United Nations. In both contexts it will be  
remembered that we have had our own, highly successful,  
next-of-kin visit.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes we  
should take and retain the initiative in working out  
arrangements. He is satisfied that the events of April

/and





- 2 -

and May showed the conditions relayed to Destefanis by the ICRC to be the right basis for a visit. Your letter of 4 May suggested that the fresh initiative should be with the ICRC themselves. While Sir Geoffrey Howe certainly sees advantage in the ICRC retaining the role set out for them in our earlier conditions, he doubts whether they would welcome being asked to make the running at this stage. More appropriate, in our view, would be an approach to the Argentine Government. Their Note to the Swiss Government, and their published communique, both of 29 April, indicated that they were studying the possibilities of a visit for close relatives. We have a clear opening, without committing ourselves to anything, to enter into a dialogue with the Argentines through the Swiss. The Destefanis episode showed that we are unlikely to be able to achieve a satisfactory arrangement with any non-Governmental body in Argentina. The present moment may be particularly timely: you may have seen from a recent telegram from Buenos Aires (enclosed) that a senior Argentine official, in expressing the hope that we would not grant Destefanis a visa, said that the Argentines were thinking in terms of planning on a Government-to-Government basis.

We would therefore propose to ask the Swiss to make a preliminary approach to the Argentines in the following terms:

- (a) The British Government have noted the line taken by the Argentine Government on 29 April, and would be interested to have further details of Argentine thinking. In particular, HMG have noted the Argentine stipulation that the visit should be for close relatives only, which accords with British thinking (and would, we assume, exclude Destefanis).
- (b) The other British conditions for an Argentine visit remain basically those put to the ICRC and relayed by them to Destefanis in March. We would envisage the ICRC playing a central role in any further arrangements.
- (c) We would wish specifically to retain the condition that the Argentine party should travel in a non-Argentine vessel. This should fly the Red Cross flag. We believe that a vessel from a neutral nation, such as Uruguay, offers the most promising prospects. We should be grateful to learn of Argentine thinking on this aspect.

/I





I should add, in amplification of (c) above, that we have considered the use of a British vessel but concluded that quite apart from its likely unacceptability in Argentine eyes, the cost of chartering a vessel (£6 - 700,000) could not be justified. (The MOD tell us that they see great difficulties about use of a Royal Navy ship). As far as flags are concerned, while the Islanders would no doubt much prefer any vessel used to fly a British courtesy flag, to insist on this in our first approach could cause the initiative to break down at the outset. A Uruguayan flag may in any case be acceptable or the Red Cross flag alone may do.

We must continue to take account of the feelings of the Falkland Islanders. They should have been reassured by our firm handling of Destefanis and may be more disposed to accept a properly-prepared trip in three to four months' time. But, while we would of course remain in close contact with Sir Rex Hunt as plans develop, we see no need to consult the Islanders about the first, provisional approach to the Argentines.

It would be most important that there should be no leak of the substance of the proposed initial approach. At this stage we would only propose, in public and to the Islanders, to say that our readiness in principle to accept a properly-prepared visit still stands and that we have noted the Argentine authorities' public statement that they were still considering the possibilities for this. But careful thought will need to be given to public presentation of our position once we have made the initial contact, in the light of the Argentine response, to ensure that we get all the credit for any progress and none of the blame for any failure.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries of the other members of OD (EM).

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
Number 10 Downing Street



PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR WHITNEY  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 MR EVANS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE

HD/PUSD (2)  
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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)

PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFFI  
 DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR C J ROBERTS, IAT~~ ) DOT  
 MR A FORNAM )

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GRS 100

CONFIDENTIAL

(FM BERNE 201010Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (AT REQUEST OF BERNE)

TELNO 533 OF 17 JUNE

OUR TELNO 500 : DESTEFANIS

1. OUR SWISS COLLEAGUES ADVISE US THAT AT LUNCH ON 16 JUNE, GENERAL CERDA, UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, TOLD ICRC OFFICIALS THAT HE HOPED BRITAIN WOULD NOT GRANT DESTEFANIS A VISA BECAUSE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WISH TO DEAL WITH ANY PLANNED VISITS TO THE FALKLANDS ON A GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT BASIS. THIS SUBJECT AROSE DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION OVER PRIVATE INITIATIVES TO VISIT THE ISLANDS.

JOY  
 POWELL-JONES

NNNNN



Argentina relations P+3L

24 JUN 1983





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FROM PORT STANLEY 241420Z JUN 83

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 397 OF 24 JUNE

THE WILTONS AND BOWMANS

1. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE WILTONS LEFT THE UK IN FEBRUARY IN A BLAZE OF PUBLICITY AND WERE DESCRIBED AS THE FIRST NEW IMMIGRANTS. THEY WERE LATER JOINED BY THE BOWMANS, THEIR BUSINESS PARTNERS. THEY ARE ALL RETURNING TO UK ON THE UGANDA WHICH DEPARTED 23 JUNE, SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED.
2. IT HAS BEEN AN UNHAPPY SAGA. THE WILTONS HAD NOT, AS HAD BEEN IMPLIED, BOUGHT THE PHILOMEL STORE SIGHT UNSEEN AND, AFTER TAKING ONE LOOK, DECIDED IT WAS NOT UP TO THEIR REQUIREMENTS. THE PRICE WAS TOO HIGH AND THE PREMISES TOO SMALL FOR THEIR INTENDED PURPOSE, A BAR/RESTAURANT. HOWEVER, AFTER MAKING UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS OVER SOME WEEKS TO FIND ALTERNATIVE COMMERCIAL PREMISES THEY APPARENTLY RECONSIDERED THE PHILOMEL STORE BUT AT THE LAST MOMENT AGAIN REJECTED IT.
3. THEIR FINAL THROW WAS A SCHEME TO PURCHASE TWO BREWSTER HOUSES AND JOIN THEM TOGETHER AS A RESTAURANT/PUB TO BE CALLED THE THATCHER INN. THE PARTNERSHIP SUBMITTED AN APPLICATION FOR A SUBSTANTAIL LOAN FROM FIG. THIS WAS CONSIDERED BY THE SFC WHO REFERRED IT BACK FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON COSTINGS AND AVAILABILITY OF BREWSTER HOUSES. THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING AND THE NEXT WE HEARD WAS THAT THE PARTNERSHIP HAD BOOKED THEIR PASSAGES HOME.
4. THERE MAY WELL BE ADVERSE PUBLICITY WHEN THEY ARRIVE IN UK BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT:
  - A) THE WILTONS DID NOT SEEK ADVICE FROM ANYONE HERE WHO WAS QUALIFIED TO GIVE IT BEFORE COMING.
  - B) HAD THEY DONE SO, WE WOULD HAVE ADVISED THEM THAT THE PHILOMEL STORE WAS, AS THEY FOUND OUT TOO LATE, UNSUITABLE FOR THEIR PURPOSE AS WELL AS TOO EXPENSIVE. (THE OWNER, DES PECK, HAS BEEN TRYING TO SELL IT FOR YEARS AT AN INFLATED PRICE).
  - C) ONCE HERE, THE CHIEF SECRETARY, DEVELOPMENT OFFICER AND OTHERS GAVE ALL THE ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE THEY PROPERLY COULD.
  - D) THE FISH AND CHIP VAN THE PARTNERSHIP IMPORTED IS UP FOR SALE. ITS CONDITION IS DEPLORABLE AND WE DOUBT WHETHER THE BOARD OF HEALTH WOULD HAVE PASSED IT AS FIT FOR SERVICE.

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E) THE WILTON FAMILY HAVE BEEN BOARDING WITH DES PECK SINCE ARRIVING AND HAVE APPARENTLY MADE NO ATTEMPT TO PAY. PECK IS CONSIDERING LEGAL ACTION.

F) THERE IS APPARENTLY A CONTAINER LOAD OF BAR EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE EN ROUTE., THE PARTNERS HAVE LEFT INSTRUCTIONS THAT IT SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE UK.

5. THIS RATHER SORRY STORY REINFORCES OUR VIEW THAT ANYONE PLANNING TO SET UP A BUSINESS REQUIRING A SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT IN THE FALKLANDS SHOULD PAY AN EXPLORATORY VISIT BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF.

BAKER

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

FID

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

2

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



cc HO  
MOD  
CO

tel

Argentina

**10 DOWNING STREET**

*From the Private Secretary*

24 June 1983

Falklands: Destefanis

Thank you for your letter of 17 June.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter, together with Hugh Taylor's letter of 21 June.

Mrs. Thatcher agrees that Destefanis should be refused a visa on the grounds that his entry into the UK would not be conducive to the public good. She however agrees that we should say that we are ready to allow a properly organised visit and will be in touch with the ICRC about this.

I am copying this letter to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



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DESKBY 240900Z

FM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 232320Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 232 OF 23 JUNE

INF: ARGENTINA - FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

YOUR TELNO 186 OF 21 JUNE

1. I HAVE TAKEN THE ACTION REQUESTED IN TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. I CALLED A MEETING THIS MORNING OF MY G7 COLLEAGUES AND A FEW OTHER DIRECTORS. A FULL LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING IS ERB (US), LASKE (GERMANY), LE LORIER (FRANCE), YAMASHITA (JAPAN), LOVATO (ITALY ETC), JOYCE (CANADA ETC), SCHNEIDER (AUSTRIA, REPRESENTING THE BELGIAN CONSTITUENCY), POLAK (NETHERLANDS ETC), TVEDT (NORWAY, REPRESENTING THE SCANDINAVIANS) AND MORRELL (NEW ZEALAND, REPRESENTING THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUENCY).
2. I TOOK THEM THROUGH DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE TORONTO MEETINGS LAST SEPTEMBER AND SAID THAT REMOVAL OF THE DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR COMPLETION OF THE REVIEW DUE BY 31 JULY. LAW 22820 REPRESENTED ON A PARTIAL AND PREPARATORY AMENDMENT TO LAW 22591. BRITISH COMPANIES WERE STILL UNABLE TO USE THE CHANNELS FOR REMITTING DIVIDENDS ETC AVAILABLE TO OTHER FOREIGN FIRMS, ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTOOD THAT CERTAIN BRITISH BANKS MIGHT NOW BE PERMITTED TO REMIT DIVIDEND PAYMENTS. SO LONG AS THE PROVISIONS OF THIS LAW REMAINED IN EFFECT, ARGENTINA WOULD NOT HAVE FULFILLED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE FUND UNDER THE STANDBY.
3. I ASKED FOR THESE VIEWS TO BE PASSED BACK TO QUOTE COMMUNITY, G10 AND MAJOR COMMONWEALTH CAPITALS UNQUOTE.
4. THERE WERE ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS. ERB ASKED WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE DELAYS WERE NOW BEING EXPERIENCED IN RELATIONS TO REMITTANCES BY BRITISH COMPANIES. I SAID ALL WE KNEW ON THIS WAS THAT ARGENTINE OFFICIALS HAD SAID THAT CERTAIN BANKS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REMIT PAYMENTS. JOYCE ASKED WHETHER LAW 22820 SPECIFIED SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR BANKS. I SAID THAT ALL LAW 22820 DID WAS PASS GENERAL DISCRETION TO THE SUPERVISORY COMMISSION. LASKE ASKED WHETHER A CESSATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS IN PRACTICE, WHILE LEAVING THE LAW IN PLACE, WOULD SATISFY ARGENTINA'S COMMITMENT TO THE FUND. LE LORIER AND POLAK SAID THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD. I SAID I COULD NOT JUDGE THIS, BUT THERE SHOULD BE FULL REMOVAL OF THE LAWS THEMSELVES. (THIS MAY ALSO BE A POINT THAT WILL SOON EXERCISE THE FUND STAFF AND THE MANAGING DIRECTOR MAY SEEK VIEWS ON IT WHEN HE VISITS LONDON NEXT WEEK.)

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5. I HAVE PASSED COPIES OF MY REMARKS AND OF LONDON'S TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF LAW 22591 AS AMENDED BY LAW 22820 ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS TO ALL WHO ATTENDED. SCHNEIDER SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE REPORTING TO VIENNA AS WELL AS BRUSSELS AND LUXEMBOURG.

6. FCO PLEASE ADVANCE TO CAREY, LITTLER AND LAVELLE (HMT), GILCHRIST (BANK OF ENGLAND) AND APPLEYARD (ERD).

~~WICKS~~

MONETARY  
ERD  
FID  
MR GIFFARD  
MR URG

(ADVANCED AS REQUESTED)



SECRET

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

14



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

21 June 1983

Dear John,

The Home Secretary has seen John Holmes' letter of 17 June about De Stefanis.

He agrees with the proposal that if De Stefanis continues to press his application he should be excluded on the Home Secretary's personal certification that De Stefanis' entry to the United Kingdom would not be conducive to the public good. He accepts the arguments put forward for following this course in the fourth paragraph of John Holmes' letter. The fact that De Stefanis has been used and encouraged in his activities by elements in Argentine Naval Intelligence who are anxious to cause as much embarrassment for HMG as possible is certainly, in the Home Secretary's view, an additional factor contributing to the personal unacceptability of De Stefanis, although these contacts would not in themselves amount to a justification for exclusion on security grounds. (While it is our policy to refuse admission to identified hostile intelligence officers, both the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been careful not to apply that policy to those on the fringe of intelligence activities. Indeed we understand that the Security Service raised no objections to De Stefanis coming here.)

There would be no appeal against the Home Secretary's decision and the refusal notice given to De Stefanis would say only that the Home Secretary had refused his application on the ground that his exclusion would be conducive to the public good: it would not give reasons. FCO and Home Office officials would need to co-ordinate the public presentation of the decision to refuse based, as John Holmes says, on our readiness to allow a properly-organized visit to the Falklands and the personal unacceptability of De Stefanis in this context in view of his past activities.

We understand from FCO that De Stefanis may in fact be returning to Argentina. Even if he does return there we do not think that we could regard his application as having lapsed since it was made in Buenos Aires in the first place. However, it does not seem necessary to issue the refusal notice to him unless he raises the question of his application with us again, whether in Europe or in Argentina.

A copy of this letter goes to John Holmes (FCO), Richard Mottram (MOD), and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely  
Hugh Taylor

H H TAYLOR

A J Coles, Esq

SECRET



ARGENTINA: Relations Pt 34

21 JUN 1963





SECRET


cc Mr. Jackling

MR. COLES

13

DESTEFANIS VISA APPLICATION

I have seen a copy of John Holmes' letter to you of 27<sup>th</sup> June. I agree with the FCO recommendation. My first instinct, some weeks ago, was to leave the decision until after the election and then turn Destefanis down. I realise that there will be some criticism in this country if we do so. But the alternative would be to give a media field-day to a thoroughly discredited and undesirable person representing a thoroughly undesirable organisation. I see no reason why we should abet such a manifestation.



A.D. PARSONS  
21 June 1983

SECRET



21 June 1983

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 15 June and its enclosure about the South Atlantic Fund.

AJC

D.O. Arnold-Forster, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

6





Prime Minister

The Home Secretary agrees with  
the Foreign Secretary. Sir A. Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Parsons also agrees. London SW1A 2AH

2. Agree that

(a) Destefanis should be refused a visa  
on the ground that his entry into the U.K. would not be conducive to the public good? 17 June 1983

(b) we should say that we are ready to allow a properly-organised visit and will be in touch with the ICRC about this.

Dear John,

A.J.C. 21/6

Falklands: Argentine Next-of-Kin: Destefanis's Visa Application

It was agreed that our decision on whether to grant the visa application which Destefanis lodged on 30 May should be taken after the General Election. Destefanis has meanwhile turned up in Europe and has been pestering our Embassies in Paris and Rome. They have stuck to the line that the normal processing period for visa referrals was 3 - 4 weeks. This timing means that we should announce our decision sometime between 20 and 27 June.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be putting forward recommendations about a possible fresh initiative for a properly-organised visit to the Falklands by Argentine next-of-kin (my letter of 23 May and your reply of 24 May). But we need to decide before then whether or not to grant Destefanis a visa.

Paragraph deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4)

Wayland

22 January 2013

Nevertheless, and although Destefanis emerged from the April episode with his public reputation considerably battered, including in Argentina itself, there may still be a tendency for the press to make no distinction between our policy towards Destefanis and our position in principle on the possibility of an Argentine next-of-kin visit. If we keep Destefanis out of Britain, he will no doubt do what he can to whip up these feelings. But the impact should not be very great. If we let him in, Destefanis's cause is likely to be taken up by Mr Tam Dalyell and others in the business of making trouble for us on the Falklands, as over the Belgrano. The public impact





could be correspondingly greater.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view is therefore that on balance we should turn down Destefanis's request for a visa. I understand that this might be done by means of a personal certification by the Home Secretary that his exclusion would be conducive to the public good. Sir G Howe realizes that visa refusals of this kind are not made lightly, and that the Home Secretary will need to consider this very carefully, but believes that the evidence against Destefanis is such that it is justifiable in this case. On timing, Sir G Howe believes that we should be in no rush to give Destefanis a decision on his visa, provided we respect the original deadline given to him. If he goes back to Argentina before a decision, so much the better.

Presentation will clearly be all-important. If we refuse Destefanis a visa, this should concentrate on the distinction between our readiness to allow a serious and properly-organised visit, as we have long made clear, and the personal unacceptability of Destefanis (and his organisation) playing any role in this in view of his record (we could if necessary reveal that Destefanis has close links with the Argentine navy and naval intelligence). It would be helpful if we could also say that we are in the process of considering how best to take forward the question of a proper visit and will be in touch with the ICRC about this.

I am copying this to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office), Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever*  
*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
 Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
 10 Downing Street



Argentina Relations  
Pt 34



1963





FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39

PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
PS/MR WHITNEY  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (4)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
MR LITTLER )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFFICE  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR C J ROBERTS~~, IAT ) DOT  
MR A FORTNAM )

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/SAMD  
HD/FID  
~~HD/DEFENCE DEPT~~  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
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HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

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IMMEDIATE

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(FM BERNE 201010Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (AT REQUEST OF BERNE)

TELNO 533 OF 17 JUNE

OUR TELNO 500 : DESTEFANIS

1. OUR SWISS COLLEAGUES ADVISE US THAT AT LUNCH ON 16 JUNE, GENERAL CERDA, UNDER-SECRETARY AT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY, TOLD ICRC OFFICIALS THAT HE HOPED BRITAIN WOULD NOT GRANT DESTEFANIS A VISA BECAUSE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WISH TO DEAL WITH ANY PLANNED VISITS TO THE FALKLANDS ON A GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT BASIS. THIS SUBJECT AROSE DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION OVER PRIVATE INITIATIVES TO VISIT THE ISLANDS.

JOY  
POWELL-JONES

NNNNN





2 MARSHAM STREET  
LONDON SW1P 3EB  
01-212 3434

My ref: J/PSO/12835/83

Your ref:

16 June 1983

Dear Cecil,

In my previous capacity, I wrote to Tom King on 31 May about British Leyland's possible involvement in the Falklands Airfield project. I thought you would wish to know what was happening.

As I said, David Andrews has written to Tom about this and I am enclosing a copy of my reply. I have asked PSA officials to keep me in touch with the consortia's proposals for the purchase of plant and vehicles. If in due course there is any question of foreign supply I will consult you before final decisions are taken.

Copies of this letter go to Michael Heseltine and to Geoffrey Howe.

*Yours*  
*Pat*

PATRICK JENKIN

The Rt Hon Cecil Parkinson MP

2  
CONFIDENTIAL





2 MARSHAM STREET  
LONDON SW1P 3EB

01-212 3444

My ref:K/ST/PSO/42859/83

Your ref:

16 June 1983

Dear David

Thank you for your letter of 23 May to Tom King about construction projects in the Falkland Islands.

I can assure you that the Property Services Agency is required to give reasonable preference within our international obligations to United Kingdom suppliers and manufacturers in connection with construction work in the Falklands, as elsewhere.

You will appreciate that a major contract with a construction consortium will leave a whole range of sub-contract details to the consortium and this will include construction plant and vehicles. However, we do know that particularly on a project of this scale it would be normal for the consortium to want all vehicles to be from the same manufacturer so that spares can be interchangeable and only one manufacturer's repair team need be on site; and I hope this will not inhibit you.

Equally, because the consortia are looking for a complete offer, with all the appropriate back-up, it should help to rule out distress offers of the kind to which you refer. In addition, our contract documents require the winning consortium to declare any proposed use of non-British products, and we shall therefore be able to keep an eye on the situation and make sure that British producers are given the right opportunities to compete.

Yours ever  
Patrick Jenkin

PATRICK JENKIN

David Andrews Esq CBE



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DESKBY 170900Z

FM UKDEL IMF/IBRD WASHINGTON 162330Z JUN 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 229 OF 16 JUNE

*W. Scholar.**AR 17/16*

YOUR TELNOS 174, 180 AND 181

IMF: ARGENTINA--FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

1. DURING A ROUTINE CALL ON THE MANAGING DIRECTOR THIS AFTERNOON, I ASKED ABOUT HIS VIEWS ON THE OUTSTANDING ARGENTINE FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS, AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 174, AND PARAS 2-3 OF TELNO 180, AS AMPLIFIED BY TELNO 181.
2. THE MD, QUOTING FROM HIS BRIEF, SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BRITISH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WERE NOW ALLOWED TO REPATRIATE MONIES AND THIS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED TO LLOYDS AND BARCLAYS. BUT HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO DENY BRITISH INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL FIRMS SIMILAR FACILITIES. THE FUND STAFF UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS INTENDED AS A MEANS OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE U K TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE.
3. LAROSIERE THEN SAID THAT THE LIFTING OF THE RESTRICTIONS FROM THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT NOT ALL OF THE EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS HAD GONE. HE WOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR TO MR DEL SOLAR WHEN HE SAW HIM IN WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY, JUNE 24 WHEN HE WOULD PRESS HIM VERY HARD TO REMOVE THE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS.
4. THE MD THEN SAID THAT PROCEDURALLY, THE NEXT STEP WITHIN THE FUND WOULD BE FOR HIS STAFF TO SUBMIT TO HIM A PAPER ON THE STATE OF THE PROGRAM IN EARLY JULY. UNLESS THE ARGENTINES REMOVED THE REMAINING FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS, IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT HE COULD NOT EASILY DISTRIBUTE A PAPER TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD ON THE PROGRAM.
5. WE NEXT DISCUSSED WHAT MIGHT THEN ENSUE. THE REVIEW, CALLED FOR UNDER THE ARRANGEMENT, WOULD NOT BE COMPLETED AND THE NEXT DRAWING COULD NOT BE MADE. THIS WOULD CALL INTO QUESTION, TO SAY THE LEAST, THE PROVISION OF FURTHER PRIVATE BANK LENDING TO ARGENTINA. THE MD DID NOT KNOW HIS REACTION IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD PLAY EVERYTHING QUOTE LEGALISTICALLY UNQUOTE. IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD ACT IRRATIONALLY IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES BY DECLARING SOME SORT OF DEFAULT, BUT HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY. THEY MIGHT TRY TO INVOKE THE FUND DECISION NO. 144(52/51 )  
OF AUGUST 14, 1952, WHICH PERMITS MEMBERS TO IMPOSE PAYMENTS RESTRICTIONS FOR SECURITY REASONS. THE MD SAID THAT THIS DECISION WAS AN UNSATISFACTORY ONE, BUT IT HAD BEEN INVOKED BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE CASE OF IRAN AND VIETNAM. I SAID THAT THESE WERE

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QUITE DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND NO ONE COULD ARGUE THAT THE ARGENTINIAN FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH NATIONAL SECURITY. LAROSIERE WAS INCLINED TO AGREE BUT SAID THAT IF THE DECISION WAS INVOKED, ITS APPLICATION WOULD NEED TO BE DECIDED BY THE EXECUTIVE BOARD. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD LOSE THE ARGUMENT THERE.

6. MY ASSESSMENT OF THE MANAGING DIRECTOR'S POSITION IS THAT HE IS STILL COMMENDABLY SOUND AND INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO REGARD THE OUTSTANDING FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FUND PROGRAM AND PRACTICE. HE EXPLICITLY CONFIRMED THAT THE CONTINUED DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-BANK COMPANIES IS REGARDED BY THE STAFF AS AN UNACCEPTABLE EXCHANGE RESTRICTION. HE IS, HOWEVER, CLEARLY UNEASY THAT THE CONTINUENCE OF THE RESTRICTIONS WOULD JEOPARDISE THE CONTINUENCE OF THE ARGENTINE FUND PROGRAM. HE GAVE ME NO INDICATION THAT THIS WOULD ALTER HIS ATTITUDE.

7. THE MD SAID THAT HE WOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT HAPPENS AT HIS MEETING WITH DEL SOLAR ON JUNE 24.

8. F C O PLEASE ADVANCE TO LITTLER AND LAVELLE (TREASURY), LOEHNIS (BANK OF ENGLAND) AND APPELYARD (ERD).

WICKS

ADVANCED AS REQUESTED

MONETARY  
FID  
ERD  
MR GIFFARD  
MR URE

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ADVANCE ADDRESSEES

2  
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From: Mr D O Arnold-Forster  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2452 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR THE ARMED FORCES

D/US of S(AF)DGT 13/2/6

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

15 June 1983

Dear John,

I attach the latest record of payments made by the  
South Atlantic Fund since 28 April.

Yours Ever,

*David*

Private Secretary

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C. 16/6





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number) <i>952</i>	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Enclosure to letter from Arnold-Forster to Coles dated 15 June 1983.</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>22 January 2013</i> <i>C Wayland</i>
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UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE 151015Z )

M BIS BUENOS AIRES 141355Z

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 520 OF 14 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY MOD MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO BRASILIA CARACAS  
WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK CIVILC OMISSIONER PORT STANLEY

PRESS SUMMARY

1. PROMINENCE IS TODAY GIVEN TO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS FROM HIGH LEVEL JUDICIAL SOURCES THAT A FEDERAL JUDGE HAS ORDERED THE ARREST OF FORMER JUNTA MEMBER ADMIRAL EMILIO MASSERA IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF FERNANDO BRANCA, AN ALLEGED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE. MASSERA, HOWEVER IS PRESENTLY OUT OF THE COUNTRY AND MAY NOT RETURN UNTIL HIS LEGAL SITUATION HAS BEEN CLARIFIED. HE HAS ALREADY MADE DECLARATIONS AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING ON THE BRANCA CASE LAST OCTOBER.
2. ACCORDING TO "LA NACION" THE ARGENTINE MFA TODAY BEGAN PREPARATIONS FOR PRESENTATION OF THE MALVINAS CASE TO THE UNGA AND THE OAS. APPARENTLY, ONE OF THE POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT BIGNONE WILL TRAVEL TO NEW YORK IN SEPTEMBER TO SPEAK AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
3. AT A CEREMONY YESTERDAY TO MARK THE DEPARTURE OF THE NAVY TRAINING FRIGATE "LIBERTAD", NAVY COMMANDER RUBEN FRANCO CALLED ON ARGENTINES QUOTE NOT TO YIELD BEFORE ANY POWER WHICH OPPOSES THE RECOVERY OR DEFENCE OF THOSE TERRITORIES WHICH LEGITIMATELY BELONG TO US UNQUOTE. TODAY, VARIOUS UNOFFICIAL CEREMONIES ARE BEING ORGANISED TO COMMEMORATE THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE ARGENTINE SURRENDER ON THE FALKLANDS.
4. PRESIDENT BIGNONE IS REPORTED TO HAVE APPROVED THE GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR STATE WAGE INCREASES FOR THE NEXT QUARTER BUT SHOULD TAKE A DEFINITE DECISION ON THE MATTER TODAY. ACCORDING TO ECONOMY MINISTRY SOURCES THE GOVERNMENT IS PROPOSING AN INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE TO 1,100 PESOS IN REPLY TO STATE WORKERS UNION (CGTE) DEMAND FOR 1,300 PESOS. MEANWHILE, THE CGT-RA HAVE CONDEMNED PRESENT SALARY LEVELS AS BELOW SUBSISTENCE LEVEL AND THE CGT-AZOPARDO ARE DEMANDING A MINIMUM SALARY OF 1,350 PESOS.
5. THE LEFT-WING PERONIST DAILY "LA VOZ" WAS YESTERDAY RAIDED BY POLICE REPORTEDLY INVESTIGATING UNSPECIFIED QUOTE ECONOMIC CRIMES UNQUOTE. NO ARRESTS WERE MADE AND THE PAPER APPEARED NORMALLY TODAY. THE PAPER'S DIRECTOR SPECULATED THAT THE RAID WAS CONNECTED TO THE JUNTA'S ALLEGATIONS LAST MONTH THAT IT IS MONTONERO-FINANCED.



6. YESTERDAY'S JUSTICIALIST PARTY MEETING WHEN THE PARTY'S PRESIDENTIAL TICKET SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WAS POSTPONED BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF JOURNALISTS AT THE SECRET RENDEZ-VOUS.
7. THE EXECUTIVE YESTERDAY LIFTED RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED DURING THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT ON THE REMITTANCE ABROAD OF DIVIDENDS AND CAPITAL BY FOREIGN COMPANIES. THIS DOES NOT HOWEVER AFFECT CURRENT LEGISLATION AGAINST BRITISH COMPANIES.

JOY

POWELL-JONES

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1983

Pine Mustar

Dear John,

Argentina: Attempt by Senor Destefanis to visit the United Kingdom

You may have seen from BISBA telno 460 that Destefanis applied on 30 May to the British Interests Section for a visa to visit this country, with the object of seeing the British authorities in order to obtain permission for a next-of-kin visit to the Falklands. The Buenos Aires correspondent of The Times has reported that Destefanis also plans to visit Rome, Madrid and Paris to build up support for his case.

In applying for the visa, Destefanis said that he would like to pick up his visa in Paris in time to enter this country on 9 June. He was told that the normal processing period for visa referrals is 3 - 4 weeks (ie 20 - 27 June).

Destefanis's presence in this country at the time of the Election could only be unhelpful. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes we should stick to the normal timing for visa referrals and ensure that, if Destefanis comes to Britain after all, it is not until comfortably after the General Election. A decision whether to grant him a visa is best taken after the election.

We have told posts likely to be approached by Destefanis that they should tell him that the visa is receiving normal attention but that no decision can be expected for some weeks. Both the FCO and Home Office press departments could take the same line if necessary.

I am copying this to Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office).

Yours ever  
  
 (J E Holmes)  
 Private Secretary



EPS200  
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(FM BERNE 310900Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 460 OF 30 MAY  
AND TO IMMEDIATE MVD

FOR FID AND MVD

YOUR TELNO 88 : OSVALDO DESTEFANIS

A/N LODGED FOLLOWING VAF WITH US TODAY :

- 1- DESTEFANIS, OSVALDO BARTOLOME LUIS
  - 2- ARGENTINE
  - 3- 11/12/1942 BUENOS AIRES
  - 7- MARRIED
  - 10-ELECTRONIC TECHNICIAN
  - 13-USD 2000
  - 14-2 JUNE '83-EXPECTS TO ENTER UK 9 JUNE FROM PARIS
- NO REFERENCES

A/N SAID REASON FOR JOURNEY WAS TO CONTACT BRITISH AUTHORITIES TO TRY AND OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR RELATIVES OF ARGENTINE DEAD TO VISIT WAR GRAVES ON FALKLAND ISLANDS. HE PROPOSES TO STAY AS LONG AS IS NECESSARY TO CONTACT BRITISH AUTHORITIES. A/N ASKED FOR VISA DECISION TO BE FORWARDED TO PARIS WHERE HE WILL CALL BEFORE 9 JUNE. HE WAS TOLD THAT DECISIONS ON VISA REFERRALS ARE CURRENTLY TAKING 3 TO 4 WEEKS.

2. HE REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A BRIEF INTERVIEW WITH ME DURING WHICH HE EXPLAINED HE WISHES TO ORGANISE A VISIT OF ARGENTINE NEXT OF KIN TO THE FALKLANDS THIS TIME WITH MINIMAL PUBLICITY AND FOR PURELY HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. HE HAD NO LINKS WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY AUTHORITIES BUT REPRESENTED OVER 400 NEXT OF KIN, ABOUT 80 O/O OF WHOM DID NOT WANT THEIR DEAD RETURNED TO ARGENTINA. HE CARRIED A COPY OF THE MAGAZINE GENTE IN WHICH HE POINTED OUT TO ME AND DISPUTED THE MINISTER OF STATE MR ONSLOW'S ASSERTION THAT HMG HAD HAD NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH DESTEFANIS AND SAID HE HAD LETTERS FROM THE RED CROSS TO PROVE THE CONTRARY. HE STRESSED HE WAS WORKING THIS TIME WITH MAXIMUM DISCRETION AND WAS NOT PUBLICISING HIS PROPOSED TRIP TO EUROPE.

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3. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD FORWARD HIS VISA APPLICATION IMMEDIATELY BUT AUTHORITY WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM LONDON AND I COULD NOT ANTICIPATE THE RESULT, THOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING AFTER HIS PREVIOUS ATTEMPT TO VISIT THE ISLANDS THAT HMG WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE APPLICATION VERY CAREFULLY. IN REPLY HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS AVOIDING PUBLICITY, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DO SO IF A VISA WERE REFUSED. I REPLIED THAT I WAS SURE HMG WOULD GIVE FULL CONSIDERATION TO HIS CASE.

JOY

UNQUOTE

POWELL-JONES

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Sub

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

31 May 1983

Thank you for your letter of 27 May covering briefing on Mr. Paul Foot's article about the sinking of the General Belgrano. The Prime Minister saw and noted this.

F. E. R. BUTLER

Miss Jane Ridley,  
Ministry of Defence.



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Prime Minister  
Press line at ~~Flag A.~~  
Paul Foot's article at ~~Flag B.~~  
FERB

27.5



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB  
Telephone 01-~~938 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

27th May 1983

Dear Robin,

GENERAL BELGRANO: MR PAUL FOOT

In an interview reproduced in a book on the Falklands campaign, "Our Falklands War" by Geoffrey Underwood, published last week, Commander Wreford-Brown is reported as saying that HMS CONQUEROR sighted the GENERAL BELGRANO visually early in the afternoon on 1st May last year.

In his statement on the BELGRANO affair to the House of Commons on 4th May last year (attached), the Defence Secretary stated that "the next day, 2nd May, at 8p.m. London time, one of our submarines detected the Argentinian cruiser...". The Falklands White Paper of last December also states that the GENERAL BELGRANO was detected on 2nd May (extract attached).

Mr Paul Foot, who has lately been showing an interest in the BELGRANO affair and has written articles for both the New Statesman and Daily Mirror, has drawn attention to this apparent discrepancy. I attach a copy of his article from yesterday's Daily Mirror. He implies that the Ministry has avoided stating that the cruiser was detected on 1st May as this would, as he sees it, have cast doubt on our repeated assertions that the BELGRANO posed a threat. This of course follows continued accusations that the cruiser was sunk for non-military reasons.

We believe that the Sunday Times are thinking of pursuing this further on Sunday and other papers may become interested. We therefore need to have a press line and I attach, for your information, what we propose. It is easy to show that in the Commons statement "detected" clearly means "attacked". We have since repeated that 8p.m. London time on 2nd May was the time of HMS CONQUEROR's torpedo attack on the BELGRANO. Similarly, the press line suggests that the word "detected" in the White Paper should not be taken to mean "located for the first time". The third paragraph of the press line stresses yet again the serious military nature of the threat.

Yours ever,

*Jane Ridley*  
(J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

R Butler Esq



## Falkland Islands

4.7 pm

**The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott):** With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement about recent naval engagements in the South Atlantic, following the operation conducted by our forces to repossess the British sovereign territory of South Georgia.

In the House on 7 April I announced that our first naval action would be to deny the Argentine forces on the Falklands the means of sea reinforcement and resupply from the mainland. British submarines have achieved that objective. With the arrival of our task force on 30 April our next move was to stop reinforcement and resupply from the air, as well as by sea. Since the passing of resolution 502 the Argentines, instead of withdrawing, had continuously reinforced the islands. We gave two days' prior warning to the Argentine Government of the imposition of this total exclusion zone, and our task force is now enforcing it.

The task force was despatched to the South Atlantic with the support of the House and, I believe, of the country. Since its arrival in these waters our overriding duty has been to protect our task force against attack by Argentine forces.

We made it very clear to the Argentine Government and to the United Nations more than a week ago, on 23 April, that the Government would exercise their rights of self-defence to the full, including the use of force under article 51 of the United Nations charter if this proved necessary to protect our fleet.

I shall now describe the military sequence of events. Air attacks by Vulcan and Sea Harrier aircraft against Port Stanley airfield were launched early on 1 May. The runway was cratered and rendered unusable by transport aircraft from the Argentine mainland. A further sortie was made today to render the airstrip unusable for light supply, communications and ground attack aircraft operating within the Falkland Islands themselves. The other main airfield on East Falkland at Goose Green has also effectively been put out of action.

On 1 May the Argentines launched attacks on our ships, during most of the daylight hours. The attacks by Argentine Mirage and Canberra aircraft operating from the mainland were repulsed by British Sea Harriers. Had our Sea Harriers failed to repulse the attacks on the task force, our ships could have been severely damaged or sunk. In fact, one Argentine Canberra and one Mirage were shot down and others were damaged. We believe that another Mirage was brought down by Argentine anti-aircraft fire. One of our frigates suffered splinter damage as a result of the air attacks and there was one British casualty whose condition is now satisfactory. All our aircraft returned safely. On the same day our forces located and attacked what was believed to be an Argentine submarine which was clearly in a position to torpedo our ships. It is not known whether the submarine was hit.

The prolonged air attack on our ships, the presence of an Argentine submarine close by, and all other information available to us, left us in no doubt of the dangers to our task force from hostile action.

The next day, 2 May, at 8 pm London time, one of our submarines detected the Argentine cruiser, "General Belgrano", escorted by two destroyers. This heavily armed surface attack group was close to the total exclusion zone

and was closing on elements of our task force, which was only hours away. We knew that the cruiser itself has substantial fire power, provided by 15 6in guns, with a range of 13 miles, and Seacat anti-aircraft missiles. Together with its escorting destroyers, which we believe were equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 20 miles, the threat to the task force was such that the task force commander could ignore it only at his peril.

The House will know that the attack by our submarine involved the capital ship only and not its escorting destroyers, so that they should have been able to go to the assistance of the damaged cruiser. We do not know whether they did so, but, in so doing, they would not have been engaged.

On 3 May, at about 4 am London time, a Sea King helicopter keeping watch against submarine attack around the task force was fired on by an Argentine ocean-going patrol craft. This vessel was then attacked and sunk by a Lynx helicopter. A second Lynx then came under attack from another Argentine vessel, which was itself attacked and damaged.

It must be a matter of deep concern to the House that there has been loss of life from these engagements including the sinking of the "General Belgrano", but our first duty must be the protection of our own ships and men. There may be further attacks on our forces and they must be allowed to act in self-defence. We cannot deny them that right. Nor must we forget that military action began by an attack on British marines and the forceable seizure of British territory. The way of stopping the fighting forthwith is for the Argentines to withdraw their garrison from the Falkland Islands in compliance with the United Nations resolution 502.

**Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East):** The right hon. Gentleman rightly said in his press conference last night that his policy was and would always be to use minimum force under strict political control to achieve a diplomatic solution. I confess that it is not always easy to achieve that in the stress of battle. Nevertheless, on the evidence that he has just given, it seems that he has successfully achieved that objective, first, in the reoccupation of South Georgia; secondly, in the attacks on the airfields and military facilities on the Falkland Islands; and, thirdly, in the actions that he has just described within the total exclusion zone.

I shall address my questions entirely to the action against the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano". The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government were concerned about the loss of life that had occurred. I understand that the action took place 36 miles outside the total exclusion zone. Although it appears now that there have not been 1,000 lives lost, as we feared earlier, the number must run into many hundreds. As I said in questions to the Foreign Secretary after his statement, the loss of life is already causing great concern among our friends and allies all over the world.

Almost two days after the event it should be possible for the Secretary of State to give the House more details than were in his statement. It is in both his and the Government's interest to do so if widespread international concern about the incident is to be allayed.

First, will the right hon. Gentleman say how far the Argentine ships were from the task force? He said that they were hours away. I hope that he will forgive me for saying



[Mr. Denis Healey]

that that phrase is far too ambiguous and uncertain. It makes a big difference whether they were 50, 100 or 300 miles away. Any of those distances could be described as "hours away".

Secondly, what were the two escorting destroyers? Were they by any chance the type 42 frigate that Britain sold to the Argentine?

Thirdly, if the attack was necessary to protect our forces, could not action have been taken to cripple rather than to sink the cruiser? With respect, if the Government have pledged themselves to the minimum use of force, they must issue instructions that ensure that minimum force is used. I accept that it is not easy for submarines that were designed for global war against a great power to exercise the use of minimum force in a police action against a minor power. There remains the question whether it was possible to cripple the cruiser rather than to sink it, as was done to the submarine off South Georgia. That question deserves to be answered.

Finally, can the right hon. Gentleman explain why the Press Association reported earlier today that the "General Belgrano" had fired first and then later withdrew that statement as not being true?

I ask these questions in no carping spirit. If it is indeed the Government's intention at all times to use minimum force to achieve a political solution, they must avoid risking the lives of half of the population of the Falkland Islands in a single engagement.

**Mr. Nott:** The right hon. Gentleman is correct. I said at a press conference yesterday that it was our policy to use minimum force. The task force remains under the political control of the Government. It operates within a political framework. Nevertheless, in exercising minimum force it must bear in mind the overriding need not to endanger itself—our own men and our own ships.

We believe that the action took place just outside—about 35 miles—the total exclusion zone. However, as I said in my statement, the cruiser and the escorting destroyers were only hours' steaming time away. [HON. MEMBERS: "How many hours?"] The right hon. Gentleman asked for the precise distance. I cannot give it, as I am not prepared to reveal the position of our task force. Nor can I give full details of the exact composition of the Argentine forces operating against us. The right hon. Gentleman will know, because he, too, has been Secretary of State for Defence, that communications are not necessarily received instantly by a submarine. It sometimes takes time for communications to be made, for reasons that have to do with the natural concealment of the submarine, but the group was hours away from our task force.

Only two torpedoes were fired at the cruiser. It is impossible to say whether that would have crippled the cruiser—that could not be predicted—but, having fired its torpedoes, the submarine clearly could not remain in the area without endangering itself. Therefore, in accordance with normal procedures, it fired the two torpedoes and then left the area. I have not heard of a report by Reuters or the Press Association about who fired first, but I can tell the House that in this case, due to the serious threat that the group of Argentine naval vessels posed to our task force, our submarine was ordered to fire some torpedoes at the cruiser.

**Mr. Healey:** With great respect, the right hon. Gentleman's answer about the distance between the task force and the Argentine forces is inadequate. First, the action took place nearly two days ago. No one could assume that our task force would still be in the position in which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, it was identified by the Argentine destroyers at that time.

Secondly, those of us who have had the right hon. Gentleman's and my experience in these matters know of the difficulties of communication with submarines. But I did not ask where the submarine was. I asked where the task force was. The task force is a surface force in continuous communication with the Ministry of Defence in London, as we know from the hourly press reports from correspondents aboard some of the ships.

**Mr. Nott:** I realise that the right hon. Gentleman asked where our task force was, but that is not information that I think it would be prudent to give to the House. As he will know, the task force is within the region of the Falkland Islands, around the area of the total exclusion zone, but I cannot be asked to give precise nautical miles in a case of this kind.

Several Hon. Members rose—

**Mr. Speaker:** Order, I propose to allow 20 minutes on this statement and then to move on to a personal statement.

**Mr. David Steel** (Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles): I join in the congratulations extended to our forces on the success of the operation so far.

Will the Secretary of State confirm that the military policy remains as described by the Prime Minister in the debate last Thursday as being measured and controlled? The right hon. Gentleman presumably accepts that if the scale of loss of life already suffered by the Argentines were repeated against us in retaliation it would quickly equal the total population of the Falkland Islands. Will he therefore tell us whether there is a general directive to the fleet commander that all action must be taken only if it is totally unavoidable?

**Mr. Nott:** I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his remarks about the skill of our men with the task force.

The right hon. Gentleman is quite right. The action of our fleet in the South Atlantic must at all times be measured and controlled. I wholly agree with him on that. I am sure that he will accept from me, however, that in the conditions in which our forces find themselves—repeated air attacks had been launched on them the previous day, we have reason to believe that there is a submarine or perhaps two operating in the area, and the Argentines themselves announced that they had sunk HMS "Exeter", brought down 11 of our aircraft and severely damaged HMS "Hermes", all of which is clear evidence that the orders of the Argentine fleet are to sink our ships—we must do nothing that endangers our task force, which went there and is there with, I believe, the consent of the majority of Members of the House.

**Sir John Eden** (Bournemouth, West): Is it not absolutely clear that, despite all the efforts of British Ministers, there can be no negotiated settlement unless the Argentines agree to withdraw, and that if they do not repossession of the islands by military means is unavoidable? As it seems that the Argentines have so far rejected every opportunity to come to the negotiating table, will my right hon. Friend ensure that the British task

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force does not have to hang around for too long in inhospitable waters, but that any necessary military action to repossess our territory is taken with expedition and speed?

**Mr. Nott:** My right hon. Friend is correct. We require a negotiated settlement—a long-term peaceful solution to the problem—but that must come after withdrawal of the Argentine forces in accordance with resolution 502.

As my right hon. Friend says, the Argentines have so far rejected every opportunity to withdraw. I should not like to go into detail about the military options, such as repossession, that are open to us, but the best way of avoiding any further loss of life is for the Argentines not to challenge the total exclusion zone and not to pose a threat to our ships and men. The right way to ensure that there is no further loss of life is for the Argentines to withdraw their garrison from the Falkland Islands in accordance with resolution 502.

**Mr. Jack Ashley** (Stoke-on-Trent, South): Will the Secretary of State assure the House that he fully appreciates that the massive support that we have from the United States and Europe is conditional upon avoiding huge losses of life, British or Argentine? Is he aware that there is now a real danger that we shall lose the support of our friends and allies?

**Mr. Nott:** I fully agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the support that we have so far received is based to a large extent on the belief that we shall not use more force than is necessary to persuade the Argentines to withdraw from the Falkland Islands. We are attempting to use the minimum force to achieve our objectives. I know that the right hon. Gentleman will agree with me, however, that nothing that we do or say to our forces must put them in peril. We have no choice but to take as our overriding duty the protection of our own ships and men.

**Mr. Jim Spicer** (Dorset, West): Does my right hon. Friend accept that most people in this country and certainly in the House will welcome his last statement? Is he aware that, above all, given the power, range and accuracy of the weaponry possessed by both the Argentine navy and air force, the House and the country would consider it a dereliction of duty if we did not take such action as was necessary to stop any attack?

**Mr. Nott:** The cruiser, although elderly, with its two destroyer escorts, posed a very considerable threat to our task force. All were heavily armed and the Exocet missile carried by the destroyer escorts is a potent and dangerous weapon for use against our task force. With a submarine in that area, we could not allow the Argentine group to go on threatening our ships and men, as it would have done if we had simply ignored it.

**Dr. John Gilbert** (Dudley, East): Is the Secretary of State aware that the Seacat missile on the "General Belgrano" would be of no significance in surface-to-surface engagements and that the dangerous armament—the Sea Dart or the Exocet—was with the destroyer escort? How does he propose to refute the suggestion that the attack was not aimed at using the minimum force to achieve the maximum military advantage, but that, on the contrary, it was aimed at producing the maximum casualties and psychological shock to the Argentines?

**Mr. Nott:** Obviously, I reject that charge utterly. On the specific points raised by the right hon. Gentleman, Seacat is not a surface-to-surface missile, and I never suggested that it was, but the Belgrano had 15 6in guns, which were a very considerable threat and have a very considerable range. What he said about the destroyers is, of course, correct as well.

**Mr. Keith Speed** (Ashford): It is correct that the guns are radar-controlled, that the cruiser carried substantial armour and that these ships would have been a significant threat to our task force had they been allowed to get through. Can my right hon. Friend tell us anything about the reports that the cruiser was afloat for some considerable time before it sank?

**Mr. Nott:** I cannot confirm the latter point. I understand that a report was issued by the Argentines initially that the cruiser was only damaged—that her propeller-shaft was damaged. If the evidence that we have had from Argentine sources is to be believed, the cruiser was crippled in the initial torpedo attack and did not sink immediately. But we cannot confirm that evidence. It comes from the Argentines.

**Mr. A. E. P. Duffy** (Sheffield, Attercliffe): The Secretary of State admits that the Exocet missiles on the destroyers represent a potent threat to the task force. Would not he and the Prime Minister have better met their stated objective of preserving the task force with minimum force if the submarine, if it had to be deployed, had confined its attention to the destroyers?

**Mr. Nott:** Had one of the destroyers been torpedoed instead of the cruiser and men had lost their lives, the House would have been just as deeply concerned about the loss of human life from the destroyer as about the loss of human life from the cruiser.

**Mr. John Roper** (Farnworth): Will the right hon. Gentleman accept that we share his view that ensuring the safety of our forces is the highest priority? Is he satisfied that the supply vessels and the troop carriers travelling between this country and the South Atlantic have adequate protection from Argentine surprise attacks?

**Mr. Nott:** I am very conscious of the need to provide adequate protection for the supply vessels and for troop reinforcements. It is, of course, a very important matter.

**Mr. Julian Critchley** (Aldershot): What will be the effect of the Falkland Islands affair on the future allocation of resources to defence?

**Mr. Nott:** With respect to my hon. Friend, I do not think that this is quite the moment to discuss that issue.

**Mr. George Foulkes** (South Ayrshire): Will the Secretary of State correct the statement by the Prime Minister and confirm that not all Members of the House supported the sending of the task force? Will he accept that it is reasonable for us all to believe that it has always been the intention of the Government to achieve a solution to this problem by military means, unless he can tell us, apart from putting forward one unacceptable precondition and a willingness to listen to other peoples ideas, what specific proposals for a peaceful solution have been put forward on the initiative of the Government?

**Mr. Nott:** The Foreign Secretary devoted a large part of his statement to that latter matter. The House generally,



[Mr. Nott]

I believe, supported the sending of the task force, although I am not for one moment claiming that every Member of the House did so. In the early stages of this affair, after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, we had great difficulty in protecting HMS "Endurance" from the Argentines. It was only skill and to some extent good luck that prevented our losing a considerable number of the Royal Marines on HMS "Endurance" at the outset of this affair. When the Argentines first attacked Port Stanley they heavily mortared the marine barracks, believing that the Royal Marines were there. To suggest that we fired the first shot or that we are responsible for the hostilities—I know that the hon. Gentleman did not suggest this, but it is being suggested in some quarters—is a travesty of the truth.

**Mr. Robert Atkins** (Preston, North): Does my right hon. Friend begin to agree with the remarks attributed to Air Chief Marshal "Bomber" Harris yesterday, or the day before, when he suggested that too much publicity was given to the nitty-gritty of strategic and tactical decisions taken by the people on the high seas facing difficulties in protecting our interests and our troops? If he does agree, what steps does he think can be taken to rebut some of the nonsensical remarks by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite?

**Mr. Nott:** It would be of assistance to us if retired Service officers and others would not speculate so widely on all the military options that are open to us. It would also, naturally, be of help to us if the BBC and other media could have rather fewer programmes of this kind, because we are talking about lives, and the lives of our own Service men, and at the moment some of these programmes go rather too far.

**Mr. William Hamilton** (Fife, Central): Will the Minister confirm what the Prime Minister said earlier this afternoon, namely, that the decision to launch the torpedoes was a political decision—in other words, it was made by either the Prime Minister or the right hon. Gentleman, or both of them together? Or was it made by the admiral on the spot? It is extremely important that the country should know who is making decisions to kill in the South Atlantic.

**Mr. Nott:** Throughout this affair we have kept close control of the rules of engagement that go to the task force, and that must be obvious. The overall political control remains with the Government and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was, of course, confirming that. That must be the case. We did not fire the first shot, and the day before the "General Belgrano" was sunk there was launched upon our ships a substantial and dangerous air attack. It was only because of the superior skill and the better aircraft that we have available that our ships were not sunk the day before. I hope that the country understands that very clearly. We cannot allow Argentine naval or air assets to be left free to attack and sink our ships.

**Mr. Michael Latham** (Melton): Did my right hon. Friend note last weekend the difference between the military dictatorship of Argentina telling lies to its people about alleged losses of British personnel and ships and their subsequent jamming of the BBC, and his duty to

respond fully and truthfully in the House, as he has been doing this afternoon, in our democracy? Will he assure the world and the country that any figures given by his Ministry of losses will be absolutely true?

**Mr. Nott:** We will do our utmost, given the distances and the problem of immediate communications, to publish nothing but facts. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. A great deal of propaganda and misinformation have been put out by Buenos Aires. There was no great sense of outrage when they announced that they had sunk HMS "Exeter", shot down 11 of our aircraft and severely damaged the "Hermes". Indeed, this was put out from Buenos Aires with great pleasure before we were able to deny it. There does not seem to be any predisposition on their part to hide the fact that they have been attempting to sink our ships and shoot down our aircraft.

**Mr. Healey:** May I ask the right hon. Gentleman once more if he can give us more details about the distance between the opposing forces, because this is critical in establishing the necessity to attack the cruiser in self-defence? The right hon. Gentleman told the House a moment ago that the Argentine ships were closing on elements of our task force, so presumably they knew where it was, and, since two of them survived, presumably the Argentine Government knows. The Soviet Government certainly knows, because it has three spy satellites over the area. Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us where the task force was 40 hours ago?

**Mr. Nott:** I have noted that the right hon. Gentleman thinks that the Soviets know where our task force is. I rather doubt that that is the case. The "General Belgrano" was sunk about 30 miles south of the exclusion zone. I repeat that I cannot tell the right hon. Gentleman where our task force was then or where it is now. With respect to the right hon. Gentleman's natural wish to know how close the forces were, given the delay in communications that can arise between London and a submarine, the fact that I have told him and the House that this group was only hours of steaming time away surely gives him sufficient information to appreciate that these ships were a threat to our fleet.

**Mr. Alex Pollock** (Moray and Nairn): Does my right hon. Friend recall that at the start of the crisis the Government were criticised severely in several parts of the House for failing to anticipate the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina? Does he agree that it is ironic that some of those same elements should now be criticising the Government for meeting the threat on the high seas and thereby protecting the lives of our Service men?

**Mr. Nott:** I have noted my hon. Friend's point, and I rather agree with it.

**Mr. Dick Douglas** (Dunfermline): Will the right hon. Gentleman concede that no one in the House in his senses wants to see the conflict escalate? Both sides have proved in crude terms that they can inflict substantial damage upon the other. I do not ask him to give the exact position that was under threat by the "General Belgrano" and the two destroyers, but will he say whether our forces were within or outside the 200-mile exclusion zone?

**Mr. Nott:** It would be so easy for me to give the hon. Gentleman the answer, but I am sure that it would be wrong for me to do so.

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**Mr. Michael Colvin** (Bristol, North-West): Does my right hon. Friend agree that our attacks on the Falkland Islands airports will have caused heavy casualties among Argentine troops? It is these wounded Argentines and the other Argentines who need evacuation from the Falkland Islands, not the Falkland Islanders. Does he therefore agree that it might be worth while offering to the United Nations for its use the hospital ship "Uganda" to carry out this evacuation of wounded Argentines and any other Argentines who wish to leave? This may well provide the breakthrough in the negotiating position, where there is currently a stalemate. It would be an act of magnanimity and it might enable the Argentine people at home to see the real picture of what is happening on the Falkland Islands, rather than the counterfeit picture.

**Mr. Nott:** I assure my hon. Friend that if, for example, the Red Cross wants safe passage to collect Argentine wounded, we shall make sure that it has it. If we can recover wounded ourselves, we shall do so. We shall provide them with hospital and medical facilities in our ships. That would be part of the Royal Navy's normal conduct of affairs. However, there is sometimes a problem. For instance, in the case of the "General Belgrano", if we had attempted rescue ourselves we would have been within easy range of Argentine land-air attack. If we are to perform this humane function, we must do so without hazarding our own forces.

## Personal Statement

4.43 pm

**Mr. Bruce Douglas-Mann** (Mitcham and Morden): With your leave, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a personal statement.

I have already given notice to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that at the conclusion of today's business I wish to be appointed Steward and Bailiff of the Manor of Northstead—in other words, forthwith to resign my seat in the House. It is also my intention, however, as soon as the appointment has been effected, to relinquish it with a view to contesting a by-election in the constituency of Mitcham and Morden, which will result from my resignation. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South (Mr. Cocks), the Opposition Chief Whip, has agreed that he will move the writ for that by-election next Tuesday, 11 May so that the by-election can take place on 3 June. I am grateful to him for that.

The House will understand that a Member in my position has no control over the timing of a subsequent by-election. It may well wish in due course to consider whether that situation is satisfactory.

As most hon. Members will know, I announced on 10 December that I was leaving the Labour Party and joining the Social Democrats. I said then that it was my intention to resign from the House and to contest a by-election. This is not the occasion to discuss the reasons for my decision to leave the Party to which I belonged for over 30 years. However, I should like briefly to place on record the reasons why I have felt it right to seek the endorsement of my constituents for my decision. I do not wish the action that I am taking to establish any precedent—  
[*Interruption.*]

**Mr. Speaker:** Order. I remind the House that it is customary to hear a personal statement in silence.

**Mr. Douglas-Mann:**—for other Members who may find that they can no longer support the policies adopted by the party under whose label they were elected. That would be to raise the party above the individual conscience and judgment of a Member of Parliament, whereas I think that it is the judgement of each individual Member of Parliament on what is in the public interest that should always be paramount.

There are many precedents of Members who have crossed the Floor of the House without resigning. Perhaps the late Sir Winston Churchill is the most famous example. Whether or not one accepts that such a fundamental change as crossing the Floor of the House involves an obligation to seek re-election, I believe that there is none upon hon. Members who consider that their views have not changed fundamentally but who personally feel that their parties have adopted a radically different position since the last general election. That is the position of my colleagues in the SDP.

My position is different, because I have given specific assurances to the Mitcham and Morden constituency Labour Party, which I have repeated at public meetings, that if ever I were to leave the Labour Party I should resign my seat and contest a by-election. That pledge was first given when my loyalty to the Labour Party was questioned following my criticism in the House of mass picketing at Grunwick in 1977. It has been repeated at public meetings. I do not think it necessary to adduce reasons for keeping one's promises, other than that one has made them.



## From South Georgia to San Carlos

109. The first action at sea took place off South Georgia when on 25 April the Argentine submarine *Santa Fé* was attacked on the surface some five miles from the main harbour at Grytviken. She was badly damaged and subsequently beached. The same day the Island was repossessed by Royal Marines and Special Forces (which comprise the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) of the Royal Marines (RM)). On 1 May a Vulcan followed by Sea Harriers carried out their first attacks on the Falklands, and the first Argentine aircraft were shot down. The carrier group made a major demonstration of force, simulating an amphibious landing off Port Stanley which successfully drew the Argentines and revealed some of their defensive positions.

110. On 2 May HMS *Conqueror* detected the Argentine cruiser, *General Belgrano*, accompanied by two destroyers, sailing near to the total exclusion zone. Other Argentine ships were also thought to be probing our defences to the north of the zone. The *Belgrano*, and her escorts armed with Exocet missiles, posed a clear threat to the ships of the task force. She was therefore attacked and sunk by torpedoes. Thereafter major Argentine warships remained within 12 miles of the Argentine coast and took no further part in the Campaign. Argentine submarines continued to pose a serious threat, but no task force ships were successfully attacked.

111. The task force suffered its first major loss on 4 May. HMS *Sheffield*, while on forward radar picket duty, was hit by an Exocet missile launched from an Argentine Super Etendard aircraft. The missile hit fuel tanks amidships and serious fires started, which filled the central section of the ship with acrid smoke. After nearly four hours, with the fires increasing in intensity, the Captain gave orders to abandon ship. 20 members of her crew died.

112. By mid-May the task force had accomplished two of its main tasks: the movement of the troops safely to the South Atlantic and the establishment of control of the seas around the Islands. The rôle of the carriers, HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible*, was crucial at this and subsequent stages in providing air defence and the means of attacking enemy ships and ground positions, while their helicopters provided constant anti-submarine protection.

113. It was now necessary to put land forces ashore in sufficient strength to repossess the Islands. San Carlos was chosen as the site for the amphibious landing because it offered a good anchorage which could be protected against submarine attack and was an area known to be lightly defended by the enemy and difficult for him to reinforce rapidly. The low hills surrounding the inlet afforded good protection against the risk of Exocet attack. Men of the SAS and the SBS had for some time been reconnoitring East and West Falkland. Taking advantage of the intelligence they had gained, and under cover of a Naval bombardment, the SAS carried out a daring night raid on Pebble Island on 15 May. They destroyed 11 Argentine aircraft on the ground.

114. On 20 May the main amphibious force moved towards San Carlos Water, taking advantage of an overcast sky and poor visibility, and keeping strict radio silence. Meanwhile Special Forces mounted a series of diversionary raids at various points around East Falkland. Under cover of Naval gunfire,



# PAUL FOOT



# report

# BELGRANO The missing day in May



SAILORS' RETURN: Conqueror comes home.

THE more we hear about the sinking of the General Belgrano, the more the mystery about it grows.

Take this quotation from John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, on May 4 last year in the House of Commons.

"The next day—May 2—at 8p.m. London time, one of our submarines detected the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano..."

Not much doubt about that, is there? The cruiser was detected on May 2 at 8p.m. Now Mr. Nott, as he then was, was masterminding a war at the time and he may have got a bit flustered about the facts. But he wasn't at all flustered seven months later when he proudly presented to the House of Commons a Defence White Paper entitled: *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons*.

Paragraph 110. of the White Paper starts: "On May 2, HMS Conqueror detected the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano."

There we are again, in the cold light of peace, the cruiser was detected on May 2. No doubt about it.

This week a book lands on my desk. It is called *Our Falklands War*, is written by Geoffrey Underwood, a West Country journalist, and is published by Maritime Books.

Mr. Underwood had a face-to-face interview with the commander of HMS Conqueror, another West Countryman, Chris Wreford-Brown.

Commander Wreford-Brown is quoted as saying: "We were asked to look for and find the General Belgrano group. It was reported to consist of a cruiser and escorts. We located her on our passive sonar and sighted her visually early on the afternoon of May 1."

May 1! But didn't Nott and his Ministry say, twice, that it was May 2?



CMDR. WREFORD-BROWN and JOHN NOTT: Conflicting stories of the Belgrano sighting.

Commander Wreford-Brown went on: "We took up a position eastern and followed the General Belgrano for over 30 hours. We reported that we were in contact with her... We had instructions to attack if she went inside the Total Exclusion Zone."

## Sink

But then, on May 2, when the Belgrano was 50 miles out of the exclusion zone and steaming away from the Falklands towards her home port, Commander Wreford-Brown got an order from the Commander-in-Chief



of the Fleet at Northwood, Middlesex, to sink the cruiser. He promptly did so.

Why the discrepancy in the dates?

Could it be that Mr Nott and his Ministry were rather embarrassed to admit that the cruiser, which they insisted posed such a terrible threat to the Task Force 300 miles away, had in fact been shadowed for 30 hours before it was sunk?

Could it be that they knew perfectly well that the cruiser was not a threat at all, but was sunk anyway, for quite different reasons?



... OR THE 13 PER CENT NORM

If unemployment is not below three million in five years, then I'm not worth re-electing.

Norman Tebbit, Minister for Unemployment, talking to Brian Hayes on the LBC, last Tuesday.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 May 1983

Falklands: Argentine Next-of-Kin

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 23 May about the possibility of a fresh initiative for a properly organised visit to the Falklands by Argentine next-of-kin. She agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that consideration of this must wait until after the Election.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 May 1983

Headstones for the Graves of Scots Guardsmen

Thank you for your letter of 23 May. The Prime Minister has noted that the Scots Guards' requirements for headstones were not received by the DOE until 17 May. She has further noted that temporary wooden crosses should be in place within the next few days.

A. J. COLES

Nick Evans, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL





MO 5/21

Prime Minister

*This answers the  
questions you asked.*

*A.J.C. 13/5*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~230 7922~~ 218 2111/3

23rd May 1983

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter of today's date, requesting further information for the Prime Minister on this subject.

The Scots Guards' requirements for headstones were not received by the DOE until 17th May. The reason for the delay was that the Scots Guards initially overlooked the fact that the onus lay with them to initiate action. Once this had been realised, it took some time to consult the next-of-kin about the inscriptions they wanted on the headstones. The Scots Guards did not press the relatives for quick responses to their enquiries for details in order to allow time for full discussion within families and to avoid causing any extra distress to those involved.

Instructions for the graves to be marked with temporary wooden crosses, pending the erection of headstones, were issued on Friday, and these should be in place within the next few days.

The Prime Minister may wish to know that press interest in this subject results from an approach to the Glasgow newspapers by the mother of one of the dead Guardsmen. She did not contact either the Regiment or the Guardsman's widow before making the approach. I gather that the Scots Guards have spoken to the widow, who did not share her mother-in-law's concern over the delay. She has since discussed the matter with her mother-in-law, with the result that both ladies are now believed to be content. We are therefore hoping to avoid further public comment, but the Scots Guards accept that they could be criticised for the initial delay and are sorry that established procedures were not followed as quickly or effectively as they might have been.


*Yours ever  
N H R Evans*

(N H R EVANS)

A J Coles Esq



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
ATTN: BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1



23 MAY 1983

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

23 May, 1983

Graves of Scots Guardsmen

You wrote to Michael Scholar on 20 May.

The Prime Minister has minuted that she does not find the situation regarding the headstones for the graves of Scots Guardsmen satisfactory. She does not see why the Government should incur criticism for delay on the part of the Scots Guards in forwarding their requirements to the DoE. She would be grateful to know the precise date on which these details reached the DoE.

The Prime Minister has also asked whether it would not be possible for the graves to be marked temporarily with wooden crosses.

As this matter may continue to be the subject of public comment, I should be grateful for further advice as soon as possible today.

A. J. COLES

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N. H. R. Evans, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL





Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 May 1983

Para. 1 reflects something  
you said to me - but  
you may agree that any initiative  
should now wait until after the  
election.

A.J.C.  $\frac{23}{5}$

Yes not

Dear John,

Falklands: Argentine Next-of-Kin

Thank you for your letter of 4 May about the possibility of a fresh initiative for a properly-organised visit to the Falklands by Argentine next-of-kin.

Mr Pym thinks that consideration of this must wait until after the election. Preliminary thinking here is that, while we should keep up our efforts to persuade the Argentines to take back their dead, there are advantages in taking the initiative to promote a properly organised next-of-kin visit and that we should seek to retain full ICRC involvement. One possibility would be to maintain all our conditions but perhaps offer a British ship at British cost to take an acceptable group to the islands. The practicalities of this, including the likely reaction of the Falkland Islanders, are being explored. But no decisions are needed at this stage.

Meanwhile, we need to keep the ICRC in play, without stirring them up. We therefore propose to round off our exchanges with them about Destefanis by assuring them that our original offer of a properly-organised visit remains on the table; saying that we have noted what the Argentine Government communique of 29 April (copy enclosed) said about the possibility of a visit of close relatives; and asking whether the ICRC would be prepared in principle to involve themselves in any future visit as they did for the Destefanis proposal. We would also make the first two of these points to the Swiss and the Brazilians as the two protecting powers. If asked about this our public line would be that, since the Destefanis episode, we remained in contact with the ICRC and the two protecting powers; that we still want the Argentines to take back their dead; but that we had left the ICRC and the protecting powers in no doubt of our continuing willingness in principle to accept a properly-prepared visit.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
John Holmes  
(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



ARGENTINA: Relations -

98 34.





UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF ARGENTINE COMMUNIQUE OF  
29 APRIL 1983

PREAMBLE

In view of the fact that it is one year since the start of active hostilities in the South Atlantic conflict, and

considering that it is therefore right to pay the Argentine nation's tribute and homage to those who died defending our national sovereignty, the Military Committee therefore resolves:-

Article 1 - to pay homage at 1700 hours [2000 hrs GMT] on 2 May 1983 - at the place where the Argentine Navy cruiser 'General Belgrano' sank - to all civilian and military combatants killed in the operations conducted in the South Atlantic, detaching for this purpose one surface vessel of the Argentine Navy and one aircraft of the Argentine Air Force to drop floral wreaths on behalf of the three Armed Services.

Article 2 - to continue to analyse the possibilities and feasibility of undertaking a journey to the Malvinas Islands, to pay homage to those who fell for the Fatherland and are buried in this corner of our territory.

Article 3 - to direct that the groups going on this journey should be made up exclusively of direct relatives of those who died in the South Atlantic operations.

Article 4 - to organize and carry out the action following from the above directions, according to humanitarian criteria, bearing in mind that the action must be within the framework of the current norms of international law and endeavouring to ensure that it does not affect the diplomatic measures which the country is undertaking internationally.

Article 5 - consequent upon the contents of the above articles, it is established:

(A) Faced with the insensitive and intransigent attitude of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which fails to understand the feelings of the relatives of those Argentines at rest in the Malvinas Islands, and aware that the unavoidable responsibility of the national authorities is to watch over the safety of all their citizens, to forbid any activity which does not conform to the stipulations of the present Resolution.

/(B)



(B) to put at the disposal of those relatives who wish to be present at the ceremony on 2 May the ship 'Lago Lacar', to accompany the units of the Argentine Armed Forces who will pay homage in the manner described in Article 1.


(C) to settle all expenses involved in the fulfilment of the present Resolution; these will be paid for by the State.

Article 6 - The National Directorate of the Official Registrar desires that this Resolution be promulgated, fulfilled and passed to the Archives.



ARGENTINA: Relations

PA 34







MO 5/21

Prime Minister

MCS 20/5

✓ AJC  
WSPR  
DW  
BS

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-880-7000 218 2111/3

*This would do -  
I do not see why I should like the name for the Scots Guards if they were taken for war. When requirements were previously made the details had to be sent to DOE? Can the Government be asked to expedite the requirements?*

20th May 1983

Dear Michael,

You asked for advice on a question raised at the Prime Minister's Press Conference this morning, about the delay in providing headstones for the graves of Scots Guardsmen, whose bodies were repatriated from the Falkland Islands for reburial in this country.

All the burial arrangements, including the erection of headstones, for bodies brought back from the Falklands, are provided at public expense by the Ministry of Defence. The headstones are being made and erected, on our behalf, by the Department of the Environment. Inscriptions are being produced on the basis of the wishes of the next of kin, which were forwarded direct to DOE by the units and regiments concerned.

As the Prime Minister indicated, it is normal practice for headstones not to be erected for some months after burial, to allow for subsidence and settling. This often takes six months or more, and, as the repatriation and reburial of Falklands victims took place last November, one would not have expected headstones to be erected much before now. So far as we have been able to ascertain, none is yet in position, although one is apparently ready to be transported to the grave, and others, notably for the Parachute Regiment, are expected to be available shortly. Unfortunately there has been an additional delay in the case of the Scots Guards, who have only recently forwarded their requirements to the DOE. Although we have asked DOE to expedite the requirement as much as possible, I understand that there is little prospect of delivery within the next few months.

*only one?*

Should the subject be raised with the Prime Minister again, she might wish to take the line that she understands that it is normal practice to wait some months before erecting headstones because of the settling process; that the preparations of headstones takes some time because of the skilled work needed on them; that the headstones of those repatriated from the Falkland Islands are being provided by the Government, and that they will be erected as soon as possible. If pressed on whether the Scots Guards' headstones will be available later than the others, the Prime Minister might wish to accept that some delays have occurred, but to say that every effort will be made to have them ready as soon as possible.





The MOD press desk has already received enquiries from the Glasgow Herald and the Glasgow Evening Times on the subject, and has taken the line above, though without any reference to particular delays for the Scots Guards. The other two units most involved are the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Marines; although none of their headstones has been erected yet, we are not aware of any complaints.

*Yas ever*

*Nich Evans*

(N H R. EVANS)



PS  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/MR ONSLOW  
 PS/MR RIFKIND  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR J BULLARD  
 SIR I SINCLAIR  
 MR GIFFARD  
 MR WRIGHT  
 MR ADAMS  
 LORD N G LENNOX  
 MR EVANS  
 MR URE  
 MR GILLMORE



PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)  
 PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF. MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
 MISS M E CUND ) TREASURY  
 MR LITTLER. )

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
 MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
 DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR C U ROBERTS~~, IAT ) DOT  
 MR A FORTNAM

HD/PUSD (2)  
 HD/SAMD  
 HD/FID  
 HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
 HD/NEWS DEPT  
 HD/ERD  
 HD/ECD(E)  
 HD/UND  
 HD/PLANNING STAFF

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

**IMMEDIATE**

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(FM BERNE 200940Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 426 OF 19 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE MOD

INFO PRIORITY MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO BRASILIA CARACAS WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY

PRESS SUMMARY

1. THE SHOOTING OF THE PERONIST MILITANT OSVALDO CAMBIASO AND MONTONERO LEADER EDUARDO ROSSI AGAIN DOMINATES THE HEADLINES. THREE POLICEMEN INVOLVED HAVE BEEN DETAINED FOR QUESTIONING BY THE JUDICIARY, BUT A POLICE SPOKESMAN HAS INSISTED THAT THIS IS ROUTINE. INTERIOR MINISTER LLAMIL RESTON HAS CONFIRMED THE OFFICIAL VERSION OF EVENTS, DESPITE A GROWING WAVE OF PROTEST FROM POLITICAL, UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS. THREATS HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST PERONIST VICENTE SAADI AND HIS NEWSPAPER "LA VOZ", THE MOST OUTSPOKEN CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ALLEGED COMPLICITY.

2., ALL PAPERS REPORT YESTERDAY'S SPEECH BY THE MFA DIRECTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, ATILIO MOLteni, BEFORE THE ORGANISATION FOR PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (OPANAL).



FOR PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (OPANAL).  
MOLTENI DENOUNCED THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BRITISH SHIPS  
DURING THE FALKLANDS FIGHTING AS A THREAT TO THE WHOLE SUBCONTINENT  
AND A CONTEMPTUOUS VIOLATION OF THE TLAHELCO TREATY.

3. WIDE COVERAGE IS ALSO GIVEN TO YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT FOR TALKS WITH ARGENTINA, SINCE SHE HAS NOT FORMALLY DECLARED A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, AND THAT WHEN ANY ARE HELD THEY WILL CONCERN COMMERCIAL QUESTIONS. THE PRESS HIGHLIGHT THE PRIME MINISTER'S DECLARATION THAT THE UK WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH ARGENTINA ON FALKLANDS SOVEREIGNTY. FOREIGN MINISTER AGUIRRE LANARI HAS MEANWHILE COMMENTED THAT HIS COUNTRY MUST NOT DROP HER GUARD AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS HER CASE IN ALL INTERNATIONAL FORA.

4. A GROUP OF ARGENTINES LIVING IN THE SOUTH HAS REQUESTED FROM THE GOVERNOR OF TIERRA DEL FUEGO PERMISSION AND MEANS TO CELEBRATE NATIONAL DAY (25 MAY) ON THE DISPUTED ISLANDS IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL. THE CHILEAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES HAS CLAIMED TO BE CONFIDENT THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE BEAGLE DISPUTE CAN BE ACHIEVED BY PAPAL MEDIATION. HE DISMISSED RUMOURS OF AN ALLEGED ARMS RACE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE AND DESCRIBED THE STATIONING OF TROOPS IN THE SOUTH OF HIS COUNTRY AS QUOTE ROUTINE EXERCISES UNQUOTE.

5. TRANSPORT, FUEL AND PUBLIC UTILITIES TARIFFS ARE LIKELY TO BE INCREASED BY BETWEEN 9 AND 14 PER CENT FROM NEXT WEEKEND. THE RETAIL AND WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES ARE EXPECTED TO RISE IN MAY BY 6.5 PER CENT AND 8 PER CENT RESPECTIVELY.

6. FRANCE'S ROVING AMBASSADOR FOR LATIN AMERICA, ANTOINE BLANCA, HAS SAID THAT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN PARIS AND BUENOS AIRES IS CONDITIONAL ON PROGRESS IN ARGENTINA'S DEMOCRATIZATION. HE REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER FRANCE WOULD MAINTAIN ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA.

7. PRESIDENT BIGNONE WILL TODAY FLY OVER THE FLOODED NORTHERN PROVINCES, WHERE THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

8. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN NO PROGRESS ON DEBT RENEGOTIATION: A CENTRAL BANK OFFICIAL IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID A POLITICAL DECISION IS NEEDED, PARTICULARLY OVER EASING SANCTIONS AGAINST BRITAIN.

JOY  
POWELL-JONES



GRS 293

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM SANTIAGO 191555Z MAY 83

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 551 OF 19 MAY

TIMES STORY : PINOCHET'S RETIREMENT

1. WE HAVE HEARD CONFIDENTIALLY (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT THE TIMES' STRINGER HERE (FLORENCIA VARAS) FILED A STORY LATE LAST NIGHT CONCERNING, INTER ALIA, MOVES BY PRESIDENT PINOCHET TO ENGINEER HIS RETIREMENT.

2 THE STORY COMPRISES AN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL GUSTAVO LEIGH (FORMER HEAD OF THE AIR FORCE AND MEMBER OF THE JUNTA, DISMISSED BY PINOCHET IN 1978) IN WHICH HE EVALUATES THE IMPORTANCE OF 11 MAY AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS. VARAS THEN SAYS THAT ACCORDING TO "CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES", PINOCHET HAS ASKED THE CHILEAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES (SERGIO ONOFRE JARPA) TO PUT OUT FEELERS TO LEADERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN CHILE AND TOP-RANKING OFFICERS ABOUT THE TERMS ON WHICH PINOCHET MIGHT RETIRE WITHOUT, ONE ASSUMES, FACING PROSECUTION. (JARPA, A FORMER SENATOR AND MEMBER OF THE RIGHT-WING NATIONALIST PARTY, WOULD BE A CREDIBLE INTERMEDIARY).

3. VARAS IS A FAIRLY RELIABLE AND RESPONSIBLE JOURNALIST. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HER "CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES" ARE LARGELY, IF NOT ENTIRELY, BASED ON HER RECENT LONG INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL LEIGH. VARAS RECHECKED WITH LEIGH BEFORE FILING HER STORY.

4. IN EARLY FEBRUARY, PINOCHET'S LONG STAY AT AN ARMY SUMMER HOUSE OCCASIONED RUMOURS THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO RETIRE. NOTHING MORE HAS BEEN HEARD OF SUCH RUMOURS UNTIL NOW. LEIGH IS UNDERSTOOD TO REMAIN POPULAR WITH THE ARMED FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE AIR FORCE, AND TO HAVE GOOD CONTACTS WITH CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. HIS VERSION MAY BE TRUE SEMI CLN OR IT MAY REPRESENT AN ATTEMPT BY THE AIR FORCE TO UNDERMINE PINOCHET SEMI CLN OR THERE MAY BE SOME OTHER EXPLANATION. BY A CURIOUS COINCIDENCE A MEMBER OF THE CANADIAN EMBASSY ASKED US ON 18 MAY IF WE HAD ANY VIEWS ON LEIGH'S POSITION AT THE MOMENT. IT SEEMS FAIR TO SAY THAT RUMOURS OF PINOCHET'S PREMATURE RESIGNATION OR HIS REMOVAL ARE GAINING CURRENCY SEMI CLN THEY REMAIN UNSUBSTANTIATED.

HICKMAN

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

STANDARD  
S AM D  
FID  
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL



13 May 1983

Falkland Islands: Education

Thank you for your letter of 10 May. The Prime Minister has read with interest the summary of recommendations made by the ODA's educational adviser relating to the education system in the Falkland Islands. She hopes that the recommendations will be considered, and action taken, as quickly as possible.

JOHN COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

This is a useful piece of work. The controversy could continue during the election campaign. A.S.C. 4/5.

12 May 1983

Dear John,

The Peruvian Proposals and the General Belgrano

As you will be aware, the allegation that the Belgrano was attacked in order to sabotage Peruvian peace proposals which were on the point of success has gained greater currency recently, notably from a Newsnight special devoted to the story and a piece by Paul Foot in the Daily Mirror. This has stimulated us into looking into the timing of the various events carefully. I enclose a copy of a chronology. I have not enclosed copies of the relevant documents referred to in it but these are of course available if you should wish to see them. The main point is that knowledge of the Peruvian proposals did not reach London until long after the decision to allow an attack on the Belgrano and some hours after the actual attack itself. It is also clear that claims that Mr Pym knew about the Peruvian proposals on 1 May, as stated for example by the former Peruvian Foreign Minister to Newsnight, are incorrect, although Mr Haig may of course for his own reasons have been giving the Peruvians a misleading impression of British acquiescence.

In the light of what the chronology reveals, we have prepared a line on which Ministers might draw if and when this allegation is raised with them, as it might be in the coming weeks. This is obviously too long for use as it stands. Mr Pym believes that the three points which need to be made in response to any allegations are:

- i) The Belgrano was sunk solely for military reasons. The threat was real.
- ii) News of the US/Peruvian proposals only reached London after the attack on the Belgrano. Investigations have shown conclusively that the first intimation we had of the existence of any such proposals was in a vague outline given to Mr Pym by Mr Haig in Washington on 2 May.
- iii) The charge is in any case absurd because the record shows quite clearly how hard we tried both before and after the Belgrano incident to reach a negotiated settlement.

/The first





The first opportunity to use some or all of this line may come in the House this afternoon, when Mr Tam Dalyell has a question down for answer during FCO Questions which would provide him with an opportunity to raise the Belgrano if he wishes. Mr Onslow will speak on the lines above if he does so.

I am copying this to Richard Mottram (Defence), Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office), Tony Rawsthorne (Home Office) and K Long (Duchy of Lancaster).

*Yours ever*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street





## THE US/PERUVIAN PROPOSALS AND THE BELGRANO SINKING

CHRONOLOGY

- A 1 May: HM Ambassador, Lima, calls on the Peruvian Foreign Minister on the morning of 1 May. The latter asks if there is any way the Peruvians could help break the diplomatic deadlock. But he gives no indication that any specific proposals had been formulated or conveyed to either the Argentines or the Americans (Lima telno 134 - sent 011840Z)
- 1 May: Mr Pym arrives in Washington on the evening of 1 May and dines privately at the British Embassy. There is nothing on file to indicate that Mr Haig contacted Mr Pym on the evening of 1 May about the US/Peruvian proposals.
- 2 May: FCO informed at 1230Z that ODSA at Chequers had that morning agreed to relax the Rules of Engagement to enable the Task Force to engage Argentine warships outside the TEZ. Minuting suggests that Mr Pym was not informed of this decision until after his meeting with Mr Haig on 2 May, although he had previously been consulted on the principle of a relaxation of ROE (Mr Wright's minute of 2 May).
- B 2 May: Mr Pym meets Mr Haig for a two-hour discussion on the morning of 2 May (Washington time). Discussion begins at 1330Z.
- C 2 May: Reporting telegram is Washington telno 1566 - sent 022215Z with a deskby London of 030700Z. Mr Haig outlines 'a possible diplomatic solution which had originated in a Peruvian initiative, but had been modified by the Americans in the light of their knowledge of our position'. Mr Haig states that President Belaunde had discussed this 7-point plan with General Galtieri the previous night (1 May) and the Americans had since heard from Costa Mendez that 'Argentina might be able to accept something like them'.
- D

/Mr Pym



Mr Pym responds that 'it might well be that something on these lines could prove useful at the appropriate time'. But further pressure was needed on the Argentines before they were likely to agree to our basic requirements. Mr Haig agrees that 'it was too early to bring any greater precision to the discussions'.

E 2 May: General Belgrano hit by torpedoes at 1900Z.  
MOD Press Statement of 2 May.

2 May: Before leaving Washington for New York on the afternoon of 2 May (Washington time), Mr Pym is telephoned by Mr Haig who presses him on the US/Peruvian proposals. There is no record on file of this conversation. But at Mr Pym's request, Sir N Henderson speaks to Mr Haig to emphasise that it was 'too sudden for us to be negotiating new proposals. You [Mr Pym] did not want to be rushed. You had not consulted London about them'.

F Washington telno 1569 - sent 022300Z

2 May: HM Ambassador, Lima, reports that at a press conference at 1800 hours (Peruvian time) on 2 May, President Belaunde stated that Mr Haig had telephoned him 'last night' (1 May) to put to him a 7-point plan. There was as yet no agreement on it but the Argentines were considering it and he hoped to make an announcement later that night (2 May) or the next morning (3 May).

G Lima telno 139 - sent 030144Z

2 May: Peruvian Foreign Minister calls in HM Ambassador at 1830 hours on 2 May (Peruvian time) and states that after their previous conversation on the morning of 1 May, he had, on President Belaunde's instructions, telephoned Costa Mendez to press on him a new formula. This had also been discussed between President Belaunde and Mr Haig and modified as a result of these discussions into a 7-point formula. Dr Arias Stella claims that the formula 'had the approval of Costa Mendez; that General Galtieri had told President Belaunde that he was 'well disposed' towards it but that he had his 'Senate' to consult

/and



and convince ..... The Military Junta was meeting even at this moment to consider the terms and a reply was expected hourly. Dr Arias said that he had reason to believe that Mr Haig's proposals had been conveyed with the knowledge or at least (sic) the consent of Mr Pym'.

H Lima telno 137 - sent 030103Z

2 May: In response to Lima telnos 137 and 139 (which reached New York late on 2 May after Mr Pym's arrival there), Washington telnos 1566 and 1569 are repeated to Lima and HM Ambassador is instructed to contact the Peruvian Foreign Minister urgently to ensure that no announcement is made in Lima which implies British acceptance of the 7-point formula or that it had been formally presented to the British Government. Mr Pym's position on the proposals is confirmed as that set out in Washington telnos 1566 and 1569. Mr Wallace is also given discretion to tell the Peruvians of the basic British requirements for a settlement.

I UKMIS New York telno 4 - sent 030501Z

3 May: HM Ambassador, Lima, calls on Peruvian Foreign Minister at 0630 hours (Peruvian time) to carry out these instructions. He is informed that 'late last night the Argentine military Junta had rejected the Peruvian proposals quote as a result of the torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser unquote'. Dr Arias adds that the Argentines had not entirely closed the door but needed more time to review any proposals in the light of the most recent developments on the naval front.

J Lima telno 141 - sent 031340Z

3 May: Mr Haig tells Sir N Henderson that he had spoken to the Peruvian President at 0100 hours (Washington time), who had 'complained bitterly that British action had torpedoed the chances of peace'.

K Washington telno 1574 - sent 032012Z

/3 May:





3 May: Mr Haig subsequently tells Sir N Henderson that he had spoken again to President Belaunde, who had said that the Argentine Generals, Iglesias and Moya, had arrived in Lima and that he believed that the 'Argentinians would accept the seven proposals'.

L Washington telno 1575 - sent 032135Z

4 May: First consideration of US/Peruvian proposals in ODSA, following Mr Pym's return from New York on 3 May.





(4)

But it should also be clear that the charge is in any event manifestly unfounded. The Government had from the outset been making enormous efforts to reach a peaceful solution in cooperation with Mr Haig but had met only prevarication and intransigence from Argentina. Mr Haig acknowledged this when he took Britain's side on 30 April, following the failure of his own efforts. The Government nevertheless continued to cooperate fully with peace efforts, first on the US/Peruvian proposals - which were in effect a framework for an agreement and which were accepted as such in a modified form by the UK on 6 May - only to meet rejection from Argentina once again; and later through the UN Secretary General, culminating in the much more detailed British peace proposal of 17 May, subsequently published and widely recognised as reasonable, which was also turned down by Argentina. Against this background it is clear that Britain was actively pursuing a negotiated peace both before and after the attack on the Belgrano on 2 May.





(X)

As the Government have made clear on several occasions, the General Belgrano was attacked solely for military reasons, because she posed a threat to ships of the Task Force. The Falklands were at that time of course under Argentine occupation, following unprovoked Argentine aggression, and the threat to British naval vessels from air and sea was very real.

The proposition that she was attacked in order to sabotage Peruvian-sponsored peace efforts is absurd. A thorough investigation has shown that news of the US/Peruvian proposals only reached London after the attack on the Belgrano. The first intimation we had of the existence of any such proposals came in a series of conversations between Mr Haig and Mr Pym in Washington on 2 May. After Mr Haig outlined elements of a framework for a diplomatic solution these were explored first by Mr Pym and later, after Mr Pym's departure for New York, by Sir N Henderson. Mr Pym and Sir N Henderson made clear to Mr Haig throughout that, following the failure of Mr Haig's own detailed efforts because of the Argentine attitude, we did not wish to be rushed into hasty consideration of these framework elements and would wish to consult the Government in London before giving any reaction. The result of these conversations was telegraphed to London at 2215 GMT, over three hours after the attack on the Belgrano took place.

It is therefore absolutely clear that Ministers in London had no knowledge of any new proposals before the Belgrano was attacked and were acting solely on the basis of the military threat they saw.

/But



1983





Prime Minister

See the recommendation on  
page 2 of the report.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

May I say that you welcome  
these in general and hope action  
will be taken as quickly as possible?

10 May 1983

A.J.C.  $\frac{12}{5}$ 

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Educationsee Pt 32  
attached

Following earlier correspondence, you wrote to me on 14 February confirming that the Prime Minister would be interested to see the recommendations made by the ODA's Education Adviser before the next steps were discussed with the Falkland Islands Government.

I now attach a copy of the report. It is lengthy, but it is a readable document looking with care at a number of issues which will have been brought to the Prime Minister's attention during her visit. She was particularly concerned about camp education, and it may therefore be sufficient for her to look through the summary on page 2 and the primary/camp education section, pages 10 - 16.

The report as a whole seems to us to offer a clear and coherent analysis of the deficiencies of the present system, together with sensible proposals for realistic improvement. The financial implications will have to be considered with care, because the Shackleton report and the consequent ministerial decisions on development did not specifically allocate money for new educational capital investment, whilst Mr Francis's report makes a strong case for a new school complex.

The diagnosis of the problems is not new, but previous reports have fallen on stony ground owing to local reluctance to create expatriate posts and lack of finance for new investment. This report is made at a more propitious time, and it would be difficult for either London or Port Stanley to ignore the recommendations.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



ARGENTINA : Relations . Pt 34.



REPORT ON A VISIT TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 8-31 MARCH 1983  
 BY Mr M D FRANCIS, EDUCATION ADVISER, ODA

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1. Introduction and Acknowledgements

1.1. The terms of reference for this, my first visit to the Falkland Islands, were extremely broad. I was required to familiarise myself with all the problems confronting the education authorities, assess the extent to which the war and its aftermath has damaged the system and make recommendations on a priority basis for an effective and efficient system with effect from 1984. In particular I was asked to consider (a) existing staff complements within Stanley, physical accommodation and teaching materials (b) hostel accommodation in Stanley (c) the Camp Education system (d) future training requirements in the UK, and (d) vocational training for adults.

1.2. To these ends, a very full programme of visits and meetings was arranged by the Superintendent of Education. I was able to hold detailed discussions on a collective and on an individual basis with teaching staff in Stanley in the junior and senior schools and in the Camp Education Department. I met with teachers, parents and farm managers in seven camp settlements during an eight-day camp tour, with representatives of Government, the Military and the private sector in Stanley, and with members of the Education sub-committee of LEGCO. Throughout I was greeted with the utmost consideration and wish to place on record my appreciation and gratitude for the welcome and generous hospitality I received everywhere I went. I must, however, pay particular tribute to Mr John Fowler, the Education Superintendent, for his stamina, patience and forbearance as he accompanied me, and for his advice and willingness to accede to every request. I should also like to thank HE the Civil Commissioner and the Chief Secretary for their own hospitality and for making possible my tour of the islands.



## 2. Summary of Main Conclusions and Recommendations

2.1. The education system has recovered remarkably well from the disruption caused by the war and in most respects is back to what it was (para 3.4). It is heavily dependent on staff from overseas and is likely to remain so for some time (para 4.9).

2.2. The primary school in Stanley is well equipped and well staffed and is offering education of a commendable standard (para 5.1).

2.3. In contrast, education for Camp children in both large settlements and isolated farms is seriously deficient (para 6 and 7). After considering a range of factors influencing educational provision in Camp I conclude that there is no single way of effecting an improvement. I recommend a multi-faceted, flexible approach with the following main provisions:

a. a new framework for Camp education, the redeployment of some staff and experiments with alternative forms of organisation (para 9.1.1-9.1.6);

b. the recruitment of qualified teachers for Camp schools (para 9.1.3 and 9.1.7);

c. attractive, extensive boarding facilities in Stanley (para 10.3);

d. extended use of radio and correspondence materials (para 10.1-10.2);

e. closer integration of Camp schools with Stanley school (para 9.1.2, 10.4-10.5);

f. the gradual incorporation of farm schools into a unified system (para 9.1.7).

2.4. The highest priority should be given to a new Hostel in Stanley. The Brewster site is acceptable for this and I recommend that Sullivan House be incorporated in it (para 11).

IN CONFIDENCE



2.5. The facilities at the secondary school are inadequate for the expected enrolment and for effective modern education. I recommend that the Hostel site should be planned to incorporate a full new secondary school and that its phased development should be completed in time for the 1986 school year (para 13.1-13.8). The resulting complex should be planned, staffed and run as a boarding school, with day pupils, and should be seen as a Community resource (para 13.8, 17.2, 22.4).

2.6. As a matter of priority I recommend that new science and workshop facilities should be included in phase 1 of the hostel/school building programme (para 13.6).

2.7. I recommend a full review of the secondary curriculum (para 14.1-14.3) with the following main ingredients:

- a. more attention to scientific and technical subjects (para 13.3, 16)
- b. greater consideration for the needs of less able pupils (para 15.1 and 15.5)
- c. careful attention to the place and number of external examinations (para 15)
- d. reconsideration of the organisational pattern of the school (para 15.3, 16.5)
- e. reassessment of staffing needs and equipment (para 17, 20).

2.8. The existing arrangements for Advanced Level work are satisfactory for the present (para 18).

2.9. In most cases, current demand for training places is satisfied by existing offers but I recommend that discussions should continue on ways of improving farm training (para 22). Other Adult education needs are largely unidentified (para 22.4).



## SECTION A - THE BACKGROUND TO EDUCATION IN THE FALKLANDS

### 3. Education since the Falklands War

3.1. The Framework of the system of education which existed prior to 1982 and which has been reintroduced since the liberation of the islands has been described in earlier reports, notably those of Bell (1973), Pickard (1976) and Griffiths (1978). Briefly, Stanley, the only major centre of population, has a full primary school and, since the closure of the boarding school in Darwin, the only secondary school in the islands. Outside Stanley, in Camp, schooling is provided either in settlement schools with a full-time teacher or by travelling teachers visiting outlying areas on a regular basis. A boarding hostel in Stanley permits Camp children to take advantage of the Stanley schools and a Camp Education Department provides advice and materials to all Camp schools. The education Ordinance requires attendance at a recognised school between the ages of 5 and 15.

3.2. The whole system was seriously disrupted by the Argentine invasion. Schools were closed to pupils for about four months and were occupied by troops; and many expatriate teachers, on whom Stanley schools rely heavily, returned to UK. Inevitably property was damaged and stock was lost. In the past six months however the Education Department has taken commendable strides in recovery and in terms of premises, staffing and attendance the situation is virtually back to what it was. All Camp schools are working again and with the pending appointment of two more travelling teachers staffing for both settlements and outlying areas is up to strength.

3.3. In Stanley the last British troops had vacated teaching premises in both junior and senior schools by February 15 1983 and Stanley House was taken over once again as a temporary hostel. Boarding places were offered immediately to all who had been enrolled prior to April 2 last year, except for those who wished to remain in lodgings in town and those who had by now passed leaving age. A few children preferred to remain in Camp for the time being and some additional offers of places were made, but Stanley House will not take in its full complement of pupils - about 50 - until the new house parents arrive. The temporary hostel, including the additional mobile houses, will be able to cater for those with the greatest boarding need but even when full it is too



small to provide accommodation for all who might want to enter or who have reached the appropriate age to do so.

3.4. With the arrival in February of seven new teachers from UK, staffing for both the junior and senior schools is also up to establishment. The reoccupied school buildings have quickly taken on the appearance of busy and efficient learning areas, but the Drill Hall and town Gymnasium, which are used for a number of different school activities, are still occupied by British troops and restrict teaching, particularly in physical education. Outwardly therefore the school system has recovered remarkably well and great credit is due to the Superintendent, teaching staff and everyone else involved in this difficult exercise.

3.5. The one outstanding area of concern is teachers' housing. No suitable accommodation was available on arrival for any of the new staff, some of whom had been forced to travel without their families. Pressure to find accommodation is particularly acute in Stanley. The problem for the new teachers is not that no houses were available, for they had been warned of this, but that the intensity of the shortage makes it difficult to see when, if ever, demand will be met. Fear that the situation may continue indefinitely is affecting attitudes to the Falkland Islands in general and Stanley and school in particular. The particularly disagreeable conditions under which the new teachers live, and their concern for the future, have recently been drawn to the attention of Government officials and it is in the interests of the children's education that this unfortunate predicament should be resolved as quickly as possible.

#### 4. Factors Influencing Educational Provision

4.1. Education cannot be assessed or improved in isolation. Since it is part of the infrastructure of a society it influences and in turn is influenced by a wide range of factors outside its immediate environs. As background to the specific description and analysis of educational provision brief mention is made of some of these factors.

4.2. Dominating people's thoughts and conversation is, not unnaturally, the War. Many are still trying to cope with effects of the violent disruption



of their way of life and the frightening experiences under occupation. The British troops stand as visible proof of their liberation and are welcome new neighbours. Yet the presence of troops in streets, shops and homes also acts as an unavoidable symbol of a past that cannot be forgotten and of a future which is uncertain. The changes that appear so obvious and necessary to the visiting outsider may be met with understandable fear and suspicion by a resident. The war has left deep psychological wounds as well as physical ones, and these are now compounded by a sometimes grudging realisation that things cannot be the same again and by fear of what the future holds both in terms of national security and in terms of social and economic change.

4.3. So far the Government appears to have adopted two different policies in the redistribution of land. In Green Patch the subdivision of the large farm included the dismemberment of the former settlement, and although some of the farmers are planning to co-operate in certain activities, the community is now intentionally more scattered than it was. By contrast, in Fox Bay East an attempt will be made to promote the development of a new village on land specially reserved for this purpose by Government. Although some of the new owner-farmers will reside on their farms, it is expected that at least two of the new farms will be run from the settlement, and there are plans for small local industries to be established in the village and for a member of the GTU (FIARDU) to be based there. The new Development Officer, Mr John Reid, is enthusiastic about the village concept and feels that if it is successful it is likely to be tried at San Carlos, and perhaps other places. The 'Green Patch' policy accentuates the problems of providing adequate education while the 'Fox Bay' policy opened up possibilities of a large enough community to support a school on traditional lines. It is encouraging that the Development Officer is concerned to include education provision within the range of considerations about land distribution policy.

4.4. The demand for education would clearly increase if there were substantial immigration to the islands. So far there are no clear trends, either with respect to numbers or location, beyond a belief that people will come. There will soon be an increase in the number of military officers in continuity posts, which carry entitlement to take families to the Falklands, but the total is still very small and this move is not expected to substantially affect the demand for local schooling. Labour gangs on building projects will be unaccompanied, but the siting of some major developments which could affect



population distribution, like the new strategic airfield, is still undecided. At the other end of the scale, one can only guess at the rate of emigration, but so far the rate has been scarcely a trickle. With such a small overall population, fluctuation up or down can cause serious problems for educational provision. In the long term it seems wise to anticipate a small but steady increase.

4.5. Alongside this should be placed the considerable amount of mobility. The policy of encouraging owner-occupiers on small farms in place of tenants on large farms will introduce a degree of stability but the practice in the past has been for families to move regularly between farms and between Camp and Stanley, following employment prospects. In Fox Bay West for example, all 10 houses with families in them have seen a change of occupant in the last three years; at San Carlos only one of the 10 children attending the school was on the farm three years ago. A group of 8 or 9 children on one settlement, perhaps justifying a full-time teacher, can within a few months be reduced to one or two. The problems for education in such circumstances are enormous.

4.6. That communication is difficult in the Falklands is well known, but it has to be experienced to be appreciated. At present there are no roads outside Stanley and land travel is difficult and time-consuming at the best of times. The new road to Darwin will open up a small part of the islands and lead to a slight redistribution of population; and movement between Fox Bay East and Fox Bay West would be eased by an all-weather track. For most settlements the only realistic method of travel is by air. Services will improve when the two "Islander" aircraft become operational but visits by the "Beaver" are often infrequent and the fares are high relative to wage levels. Even a major settlement can go three weeks without seeing the "Beaver". Letters, correspondence work and teaching materials sent out by the Camp Education Department can therefore take days or even weeks to reach a destination less than 50 miles away. The Government runs a radio telephone service but receivers exist only in the farm managers' houses. Most homes have their own VHF 2 metre sets, which make possible much better contact but without repeater stations their range is limited. Without substantial improvement in all aspects of internal communication, Camp education stands little chance of improving.

4.7. Parental attitudes to education vary as they do everywhere else. With sheep-farming remaining the major industry, a few parents see formal



education as having little value or relevance to employment. Many more however look to education to offer opportunities to their children they themselves never had, and for some of these improvement in education is a key factor in determining continuing commitment to the islands. More significant than the readiness with which children are exposed to formal schooling is the general perception of what schooling is all about. The major, if not only, criterion of success has become GCE 'O' level passes. This view is particularly damaging because it sets goals that very few actually attain and consequently breeds disenchantment in pupils and parents alike. Further, the long established social hierarchy, especially in the Camp areas, has tended to discourage and stifle the very qualities of initiative, critical appraisal and free expression of opinion on which so much modern educational practice depends. Parents in the Falkland Islands have much less access to public debate about education than is taken for granted in Britain and the Education Department has a delicate task in promoting a fuller appreciation of its objectives and in seeking popular support for changes it may wish to introduce.

4.8. Education is expensive and good education is more expensive than poor education. The Education Department is already the second largest consumer of public funds, but there is scarcely an improvement that can be suggested which does not have financial implications. Further the size of the local population and its scattered nature makes it inevitable that education should have low teacher-pupil ratios and high per capita costs. Camp education cannot be as cost effective as education in Stanley without becoming totally centralised and for the secondary school to offer even a minimum education for the modern world needs specialist staff and specialist features which are expensive. There are clear signs of financial restriction in the amount and quality of the education currently offered, and it is regrettable that the updated Shackleton Report, regarded by many as providing the blueprint and framework for development expenditure, is noticeably silent on education. Yet in many respects education is the key to a development that gathers momentum from within and a considerable injection of funds will be needed if improvements are to be made.

4.9. The Education Department is heavily dependant upon OSAS staff. Excluding travelling teachers, only six out of 23 Government staff are locally appointed and one of those is the wife of a TCO. There are no local teachers in training

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at the moment and the low examination results make it unrealistic to expect anything more than a trickle of people going into education. For many years to come the majority of teachers to maintain, expand and improve the system will have to come from overseas, and the system will continue to suffer from high staff turnover, with its attendant problems, and long periods of absence on overseas leave. The Heads of the junior school and the Camp Education Department are local appointees, but the problems will continue to be particularly acute at the secondary level.

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## SECTION B. PRIMARY AND CAMP EDUCATION

### 5. Primary Education in Stanley

5.1. The primary school in Stanley, catering for children aged 4½ to 11+ is immediately recognisable as a well organised and well managed modern school. In March 1983 it had an enrolment of 106 and a staff of seven qualified teachers including the Head, one highly experienced local teacher, and one non-teaching assistant. Four of the staff were supported by OSAS. The two infant classes that occupy a separate block in the playground are vertically grouped and the other four classes are largely year-based. There are 19 children in each infant class and an average of 16 in the other classes. The staffing is sufficiently generous for two teachers to be engaged primarily in remedial work, one of them occupying a special room. The classrooms are more than adequate for the numbers, imaginative use has been made of corridors and verandahs, and there is a hall which is also used at present by the senior school. The school is well-equipped and its teaching philosophy is a judicious mixture of class-based work and individual group work, with a strong emphasis on basic skills. I was impressed by the atmosphere in the school, and by the professionalism of all the staff.

5.2. A number of the children come from the Camp and live in the hostel, and an attempt has been made to ease the transition at 11+ by arranging for older pupils to spend one half-day each week in the senior school. Neither the junior nor the senior school have games facilities adjoining the school, and the junior playground needs resurfacing with something other than loose gravel. There are scarcely any links at present with Camp schools, Camp teachers or the Camp Education Department, apart from welcoming new travelling teachers for a two-week orientation course and this is frequently curtailed by delays in appointment.

### 6. Primary Education in Camp

6.1. It is customary to describe primary education as having two components, Stanley and Camp. This simple geographical distinction alerts one to the substantial differences in educational facilities between the town and the rest of the islands but it blurs some crucial distinctions within the Camp system itself which are related largely to the terms of the teachers' employment. In large settlements the farm has assumed responsibility for recruiting and

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employing a teacher for the children of its employees and has provided some kind of schoolroom with Government being responsible for furniture and materials. Often the job is linked with that of book-keeper or storekeeper. Small settlements, in contrast, are no longer able to pay for their own teacher but rely on the Government-employed travelling teacher to visit as regularly as possible. As circumstances change, particular settlements slide between the categories. Within the last year, for example, Walker Creek has lost its full-time farm teacher and now relies on travelling teacher visits while San Carlos has appointed its own teacher. Goose Green, which has a full-time teacher on OSAS terms, is the exception and strictly fits neither category. For the rest, despite the fluidity, the distinction is helpful partly because it provides an immediate measure of how often a child in any settlement meets a teacher and partly because it indicates the degree of Governmental control and the hurdles to be overcome in seeking change.

## 6.2. Settlement Teachers

6.2.1. In March 1983 the settlements at North Arm, Pebble Island, Hill Cove, Goose Green, Fitzroy, San Carlos and Port Stephens employed their own teacher. Port Howard was awaiting the arrival of a newly appointed teacher and a young soldier was teaching mornings only at Fox Bay East. The size of these settlement schools varied from 4 to 15 and there were 76 children altogether. Their ages ranged from 4 to 15 but only 11 of them had reached senior school age.

6.2.2. With the exception of Mr Clarke at Goose Green the teachers at large settlements were either wives of farm employees or members of the farm staff in their own right. They were paid by the farm, lived in a farm house and shared in the common farm supplies. Two were certificated teachers, four had substantial teaching experience and two were young and unqualified but, as I saw for myself, technically quite capable. The teacher awaited at Fox Bay West is also qualified and there were some hopes of arranging things so that she could work at Fox Bay East as well. I visited the school on six of these farms. All comprised one room, in varying states of untidiness and dilapidation, furniture was often broken and materials and books were old and scarce. Reports suggest that one or two other settlements are better than this and the accommodation at Goose Green is admittedly temporary until the new Darwin school is built.



### 6.3. Travelling Teachers

6.3.1. Apart from the large settlements, another 14 farms and isolated residences with a total of 33 children aged between 5 and 13 were being looked after by five travelling teachers. The five were all very young, usually having just left school, and were untrained for teaching. Four of them were local and all had been appointed since July 1982. I was unable to discuss their position with any of them, nor did I see the circumstances under which they work. I can therefore only report the theory of the plan behind their work; that they reside with the family for up to two weeks while teaching the children, leave work to be done and then move away to another farm. The schedule provided by the Camp Education Department indicated that each travelling teacher had three stops in his/her beat but none taught more than 11 children altogether.

### 6.4. Camp Education Department

6.4.1. The Camp Education Department (confusingly called a Department rather than a Unit or a Section) is inadequately housed in two buildings in the playground of the senior school. One is a Portakabin which they expect to lose at any time. The Department consists of the five travelling teachers plus four qualified staff, three of them OSAS, who operate from the Stanley office. The materials and advisory service supplied to all Camp schools includes individually prepared worksheets, correspondence materials, project boxes and a radio/telephone link each weekday evening from 5-5.30pm. In recent months the Department has been absorbed in getting the Camp system working again, and staff members have made only infrequent field visits themselves. During my stay, the four advisory members were allocated geographical areas in an attempt to increase contact between Camp schools and a particular adviser. This is a welcome arrangement which should bring some considerable improvement but it is regrettable that the qualified teachers do not have more opportunity to teach in Camp schools.

## 7. Contrast Between Stanley and Camp Education

7.1. The contrast between Camp education and the junior school in Stanley could hardly be more marked. One has experienced, qualified teachers, working with a range of modern materials and equipment, in attractive stimulating classrooms, in year-based classes and with special facilities and staff



available for remedial teaching. The other has largely unqualified staff, often extremely young and inexperienced, working with old and limited resources and dependent upon unreliable transport for replacements, frequently in depressing unattractive settings, attempting to cover the whole range of ages and abilities in one group and cut off from other teachers and other children except for the occasional radio contact or visitor. The physical, emotional and mental strain experienced by travelling teachers makes it an extremely difficult and arduous task, but under present arrangements it is entrusted for largely financial reasons to those least likely to be able to cope with it. No-one survives the course for long.

7.2. The contrast is made especially poignant when seen through the eyes of a child in an isolated outhouse or of a travelling teacher. The child has the company and attention of a teacher for two weeks in eight if he is lucky, 10 or 12 if he is unlucky. He is then left with work to get on with, but, deprived of immediate reinforcement by an ever-present teacher and the rivalry and stimulation from other children of his age, he quickly loses interest, and lacking motivation or encouragement makes little progress. The teacher is unlikely to be sensitive to his problems and lacking knowledge and experience finds it difficult to provide what is wanted. The travelling teacher, for her part, has no real home and no base of her own to retreat to for relaxation and mental refreshment. She lives close to the family and children she teaches, moves away just as she begins to get settled and is unlikely to find any companions of her own age for her leisure hours. She has to try to remember details about a number of children in quite different circumstances, cope with learning difficulties over at least six years of schooling that she scarcely understands herself, has few reference materials to turn to and no sage to consult unless she dares to expose herself to the whole population of the islands on the radio-telephone which in any case is in the 'big house' and not where she is living. There is no future in her job.

7.3. The feeling is growing that the injustices of Camp education are doing irrevocable harm to the Colony. Camp gets less than its due share of services, particularly when related to income generation and level of taxes and those who complain about the neglect of Camp education, and who call for Government to accept and fulfil its responsibilities, have much on their side. In fairness however, it must be emphasised that the dissatisfaction with Camp education



has been voiced for many years and is apparent both in earlier reports and in Education Sub-Committee minutes. The problem, even given the will-power, is to know what kinds of action are both possible and acceptable.

## 8. The Improvement of Primary Education

8.1. Given the situation that has been described, there is no one acceptable remedy for Camp education. In theory the problem could be solved in one of three ways: by posting a teacher permanently to each settlement or outhouse with school-age children; or by requiring all children of school-age to board somewhere in order to attend a school with a full-time teacher; or by decreeing that all children unable to attend a regular day school will be taught only by radio and correspondence. The first is unrealistic, the second and third are unacceptable socially and educationally. In any case they are not solutions at all because the security of the environment and direct contact with a teacher are crucial elements in a child's education.

8.2. Consequently, the problems can only be tackled by a multi-faceted exploratory approach, using a variety of methods as dictated by the particular circumstances of each settlement and each child. In the tension created by constantly changing demands, and possibly by failures, the support of the administration is crucial. Similarly, the Education Department must seek to gain the approval of the population by every means at its disposal - FIBS radio programmes, letters and direct contact between staff and parents. What is needed for Camp education - and for secondary education also - is a new impetus and a new framework within which to operate and I recommend the deliberate cultivation of popular support, without which the best of intentions will perish.

## 9. A New Framework for Primary Education

9.1. First, and fundamentally, I recommend a reform of the organisation and deployment of all those engaged in primary education in order to blur the current rather rigid distinctions between Camp teachers and Stanley School teachers, and between Camp advisers and travelling teachers. In detail, I make the following recommendations:-

9.1.1. All those employed by Government in primary education should be regarded as belonging to the Primary Division within the Education Department. As soon as space becomes available the present Camp Education Unit's office, store,



workshop and studio should be relocated on the same site as the Stanley School, and certain items of equipment and the staffroom should be held in common.

9.1.2. Within the Division, staff should be allocated to the Stanley school or to the Camp Education Unit, but this allocation should be neither rigid nor permanent. Interchange of staff and pupils should be not only possible but a common occurrence. Staff from the primary school might spend a term in Camp and pupils from Camp might spend a week or two in Stanley. All members of the Division should visit Camp schools at regular intervals.

9.1.3. The Camp Education Unit should consist not of four qualified advisers at the centre and five unqualified travelling teachers at the periphery but of a single professional team of nine who plan and execute a systematic programme for Camp children, using the whole range of teaching media. If possible, all should be qualified teachers, but as a minimum six should be qualified and three should be regarded as teachers' assistants (not assistant teachers).

9.1.4. Within the team, some but not necessarily all should take on a modified form of the travelling teachers' role. Others might be based out of Stanley running a school or a group of schools; another might be responsible for setting up stimulating learning environments; another for correspondence work, and so on. The teachers' assistants should work with and for the teachers. For example they might undertake administrative duties such as duplicating correspondence materials, checking and making-up project boxes to agreed specifications; they might supervise pupils working on correspondence sheets and broadcast lessons or organise non-academic activities. It might be possible to establish constellations of remote schools round a settlement school staffed perhaps by a qualified couple and a teachers' assistant, eg in Fox Bay East village, and I urge that this be explored.

9.1.5. All members of the Camp Education Unit should have a base which they regard as home, but not all these bases should be in Stanley.

9.1.6. Since the Stanley school is very generously staffed I recommend that the established post held by Mr Ian Townsend should be retained on his departure in May but reallocated to the Camp Education Unit and that a sixth qualified and experienced teacher also be recruited. The recent success in recruiting travelling teachers suggests it may be possible to fill the remaining positions

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with newly qualified personnel working on basically 'volunteer' terms and this should be vigorously followed up. With teachers working on contract and with a reduction in the social strain of constantly being visitors in someone's house, it is hoped staff will stay longer and therefore introduce some much-needed continuity. This redistribution of positions and personnel should make scarcely any difference to the overall salary bill, but is potentially extremely advantageous to Camp education. If the twin aims of linking each child with a small team of teachers and considerably shortening the intervals between meeting a teacher face to face are to be realised, there will however be increased travelling costs.

9.1.7. The existing cooperation between Government and farms with large settlements should be recognised as a genuine partnership in education and be developed so that within the partnership settlement schools can be fully incorporated into the system. The existence of farm schools is a welcome initiative and benefits both sides; the farms because it is believed the existence of a full-time teacher helps to attract and retain farm workers, the Government because it eases the financial burden. Similarly, it is in the interests of both constantly to review the terms of the partnership. The recent legislative proposal to raise the Government subsidy to recognised schools to £2,000 irrespective of the numbers of pupils should be viewed as cementing a system of shared responsibility rather than as Government baling out farm schools, but it does nevertheless ease farm worries and increases Government's commitment. Farms should be encouraged to release teachers from extra duties to concentrate on their teaching and to seek the active assistance of the Education Department in recruiting qualified staff as vacancies arise. The increased salary bill resulting from this will require Government to increase its subsidy until it takes over salaries altogether on a common scale, leaving farms to continue to provide school buildings and housing. A dramatic increase in the salary paid to a settlement teacher would upset the long established hierarchy of employees' wages, but discussions on this matter suggested this obstacle was not insuperable.

#### 10. Teaching Methods

The redeployment of staff engaged in primary education should be undertaken in conjunction with a number of other developments and recommendations as follows:-

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## 10.1. Use of Radio

10.1.1. The proposal to introduce a 2-metre service for education is commended. The deficiencies of the R/T which is heavily used during the day by farms, the air service and the medical department have already been noted. A request has been made to the Falkland Islands Appeal for one Repeater Station to be placed on Mt. Maria and for a receiving set comprising beam aerial, transceiver, 12v battery and battery charger to be supplied to each recognised school, and it is expected the request will meet with a favourable response. Maintenance and replacement costs will be included either in the Appeal request or in the Education Department estimates. The 2 metre system would be available on an agreed band all day and transmitting capabilities would hopefully extend throughout the islands. Communication would be possible not just between teacher and adviser, but also between teacher and teacher, pupil and teacher and pupil and pupil. Radio programmes, presently rare because of reception difficulties on FIBS, would also become possible. Although there are certain operational difficulties, particularly where there is no resident teacher, the system has enormous potential not just for education but also for Camp life in general.

## 10.2. Correspondence Materials

10.2.1. There is a long and unfortunate history in the production of distance learning materials for the Falklands and the Camp Education Department has recently been endeavouring to write new materials of its own. The task is specialised and very time-consuming and I make two recommendations. First, a specialist in correspondence education for young children should be recruited to join the Camp team for a period of two years to develop correspondence materials on a selective basis. Secondly, every assistance should be given to the attempt to acquire correspondence materials from New Zealand. If suitable materials from another country can be adapted for the Falklands - and islanders feel a natural cultural, geographical and economic affinity with New Zealand - the chances of progress in this area are far greater than having to start from scratch. Since Camp schools already possess and make use of audio cassette recorders, the extended use of tapes should be considered in addition to printed material.

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### 10.3. Boarding Opportunities for Primary Pupils

10.3.1. The saga of the Stanley Hostel has clearly had a detrimental effect on parental attitudes to boarding education and the significance for Camp education of a large and attractive school hostel cannot be overstressed. Given that development it should be possible to persuade parents to send their children to Stanley by secondary age at the latest, and the age-range and the numbers for which the Camp Education Department has to cater will be considerably reduced.

10.3.2. I further recommend that a number of experiments be undertaken with different patterns of boarding. A strong case can be made for Camp children to begin boarding before they are 11 on the grounds that the longer they are out the less equipped they will be to take advantage of what the school has to offer. There have been cases of children from Camp finding it difficult to adjust to the crowded school, the ordered routine and the whole social order. Further, the Stanley schools offer greater opportunity for remedial attention. For this reason, the planning of the hostel should include provision for children from 8 or 9 onwards; and opportunities should also be offered for occasional boarding of a few weeks at a time. There have been a few instances already and the junior school staff see no great difficulty in accepting children on this basis. Out of Stanley, it may be possible in some areas, eg Green Patch, to try out a system of weekly boarding and in others for children to join a settlement school for a period while staying with friends or relatives. The aims throughout are partly educational, to assist their learning, and partly social, to offer the opportunity to benefit from the company of a wider circle of children.

### 10.4. Common Curriculum

10.4.1. Implied in the recommendations about structure is a recommendation for closer cooperation on curriculum matters. In practice farms have always accepted a degree of central direction and the Education Department has attempted to exercise some control over standards by the supply of materials and in-service training for teachers. However, to raise the quality of Camp education a greater degree of curriculum advice is required and closer liaison between the Stanley school and Camp schools.



## 10.5. In-Service Training

10.5.1. I recommend that efforts continue to try to raise the calibre of those presently recruited as travelling teachers and to involve local prospects in the teacher assistant programme. The Camp Education Department could, for example, offer valuable experience and temporary employment to pupils waiting to go to Rye for sixth form study. Some valuable in-service courses have been run in the past with help from UK staff, but regrettably such intensive courses have had less effect on Camp education because of high staff turnover. I agree with the Education Superintendent's argument that for the moment it is not the advice of outside consultants that is most needed but a regular programme of in-service education and exposure to modern approaches that can best be obtained by spending a period of time in Stanley school. The staggering of Camp and Stanley terms which exists already and the exchange possibilities permit this kind of in-service education. In the circumstances I recommend that neither the Brighton Link nor anything like it be resuscitated on a formal basis, but that informal links with schools and colleges in Britain be established and maintained for specific purposes as circumstances demand and personal contacts permit.

## 10.6. Use of Videos and Computers

10.6.1. There has been a lot of interest recently in the use of videos in education as their general popularity has increased, and requests have been received for substantial pieces of video and Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) equipment. The Camp Education Department already possesses facilities for making simple films - I viewed one on camp education - and an arrangement has been negotiated with Bulmershe College, Reading and the Independent Television Companies Association (ITCA) for certain off-air recordings of educational programmes. There is no doubt that a growing library of tapes would do much to ameliorate the disadvantages which Falkland Islanders must inevitably experience because of their limited environmental and cultural background. However, despite these attractions, the use of video and CCTV is still extremely limited within the general context of the Falklands. The Bulmershe link should be developed but I do not regard the use of videos as having high priority and do not recommend any further investment in this area for the moment. The same applies also to the use of computers in education. A few sets have been purchased and others have been received as gifts but there is no immediate demand for further investment and the sets are only now



coming into use as an extra-curricular activity.

10.7. Pre-School Education

10.7.1. It is becoming a commonplace that to raise the standards in education you must start at the pre-school stage, and the ambitions of the Camp Education Department in this area are very laudable. However, for the moment I recommend that they should not engage in pre-school education activities until education through the compulsory years is on a firmer footing.

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## SECTION C. BOARDING ACCOMMODATION

### 11. The Stanley Hostel

11.1. For children from the Camp area, the boarding hostel in Stanley is both the means whereby attendance at secondary school is possible and the bridge between primary and secondary schooling. I have already recommended (in paragraphs 10.3.1 and 10.3.2) that all children of secondary school age should be expected to attend school in Stanley and that boarding places should be available also for younger children from about the age of 8 or 9. On this basis, in November 1982, 87 children would have qualified for entry, and to allow for expansion and some occasional boarding I agree with the Superintendent's recommendation that accommodation needs to be provided for up to 100 children.

11.2. The present temporary hostel - Stanley House - even with mobile homes cannot accommodate this number, and the controversial buildings previously put up as a hostel are now used by BFFI. A school hostel is more than a place where children eat and sleep; it is a place where children live for up to 14 weeks at a time. It must therefore incorporate not only the standard functional buildings but also accommodation for supervisory staff and facilities for study and leisure inside and for play outside. It is imperative for Camp education in the long term that a hostel be provided which is adequate in size and attractive enough in design, facilities and life to make children want to enter.

11.3. The site now being considered for the Hostel - a large area of land bounded by Sullivan House to the north and the racecourse to the south - offers considerable potential in this respect and the two contractor's buildings currently on site provide an acceptable nucleus. Provided Mr Shelley, the Architectural Adviser, considers these buildings sufficiently robust to serve as a home for children, I recommend that the hostel be built on this site incorporating the Brewster buildings, and Mr Fowler has submitted a detailed schedule for it. Mr Broderick (Head of PWD), has confirmed that the road originally planned to go through the site can be rerouted.

11.4. The one outstanding matter on which a decision is required in principle concerns Sullivan House, the present home of the Chief Secretary. Sullivan House

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is a large attractive residence, with a magnificent view over the harbour and sizeable grounds. It stands between the Brewster buildings and the harbour road, and the debate is whether it should be included in the Hostel plans. By courtesy of Mrs Baker, the present occupant, and in the company of Mr Fowler and Mr Shelley, whose visit to the Falklands happily coincided with mine, I was able to look over Stanley House and to consider its suitability.

11.5. There are three major arguments in favour of including Sullivan House and its grounds:

a. With only slight adaption, the house immediately provides a three-bedroomed flat upstairs for staff, and leisure and study spaces downstairs for children.

b. The grounds and gardens offer immediate scope for certain extra-curricular activities desirable in the full boarding situation and also ready-made facilities for incorporation into a new workshop and rural science laboratory which are also desperately needed.

c. Space that would otherwise have to be used for (a) and (b) would be left on the Brewster site for other developments and for sports and games. To provide the same facilities without Sullivan House would probably require land currently taken up by the racecourse.

11.6. There are also three major arguments against incorporating Sullivan House:

a. Its value as a property for investment in this way is questioned by those who point to the need for substantial renovation and maintenance now, and the likely increase in both in the near future.

b. There is no suitable alternative accommodation available for the Chief Secretary.

c. There are landscaping difficulties in satisfactorily linking Sullivan House with the existing Brewster buildings.

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11.7. From an educational point of view the arguments in favour of including Sullivan House are by far the stronger. The immediacy of the provision together with the potential for education of the grounds and gardens far outweigh the landscaping problems which presumably can be overcome. Others must assess the strength of the first objection, and although the second reflects the acute shortage of quality housing in Stanley I consider it preferable in the long run to build a new house for the Chief Secretary than to impair the existing possibilities for the Hostel. In any case, with the prospect of a boarding hostel for up to 100 children right outside its windows, Sullivan House ceases to be the attractive residential property it was. I therefore recommend that Sullivan House should become an integral part of the Stanley Hostel and that decisions to this effect be taken quickly to allow planning and building to commence in time for opening before the next school year. I also recommend that the detailed planning should take into account the possibility of a whole new senior building being built on this site, the case for which is argued in paragraphs 13.1 to 13.7.

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## SECTION D. SECONDARY EDUCATION

### 12. Stanley and Camp

12.1. For a variety of reasons, a few parents have always retained their children in Camp throughout their years of compulsory education, and have not allowed them to go to Stanley. This practice has imposed an enormous strain on the Camp Education Department and inevitably has resulted in an impoverished education for those children. I have already recommended in paragraph 9.3.1. that this practice should be strongly discouraged and further recommend that if parents persist their children should be taught through radio and correspondence only. The remaining discussion of secondary education is concerned with the school in Stanley.

### 13. Secondary School Buildings

13.1. The present secondary school buildings leave a great deal to be desired. The large wooden construction which forms the main part of the school has serious deficiencies. All four general purpose classrooms have a central supporting pillar, which is an irritation now and with larger numbers could seriously obstruct learning and lead to substantial discipline problems. There is only one entrance point, access to two of the classrooms can only be obtained through other rooms and the uncovered wooden floors are extremely noisy. Because rooms and classes vary considerably in size it is impossible to designate any of the rooms as specialist areas and such equipment as the school possesses cannot be used efficiently. A small area has to be squeezed out of the room housing the school library to serve as a fifth classroom.

13.2. In addition there are three smaller buildings. One, which in fact was the original school, comprises a small uncomfortable staffroom, an inadequate store and a rather bare art room. The second consists of the science laboratory and craft workshop, both of which are totally inadequate. The science laboratory is very small and cramped, and for practical work should take no more than 12 pupils with safety. Yet one class has 27 pupils. It lacks storage space, has no preparation room and is sparsely equipped. Time alone would seriously impair the science programme possible in a school with only one laboratory, even if it were up to standard. The craft workshop is also far too small. In neither area is there an alternative exit. The third building, little

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more than a garden shed, serves as the Headmaster's office. The school has nowhere for staff to work or prepare teaching materials. The playground is small and dangerous; it has been torn to pieces by military vehicles and is enclosed on all sides. To the east are the temporary buildings used by the Camp Education Department and to the west are the "Portashowers" used by the military who still live in the adjoining parish hall to the north. Both are within the playground boundaries and take up valuable space. No facilities exist for physical education beyond walking to a nearby field and there are no school showers or changing rooms. The overriding impression is very depressing.

13.3. The significance of the problems in relation to the teaching of science and crafts is that the school is seriously deficient in those very facilities that are most critical for the islands' long-term future, both in terms of specialist knowledge and in terms of general education. These deficiencies have been acknowledged for a number of years and the reports of successive Advisers have drawn attention to them. For a variety of reasons, nothing has been done. The most recent proposal was to take-over the ESRO buildings for workshops and to extend the science laboratory into the existing craft room, but this came to nothing when the ESRO building was burnt down at the end of the War.

13.4. The expected school enrolment and proposed organisational pattern reinforces the assessment. At the start of the 1983 academic year the school had 92 pupils arranged into six classes - one for each year 1 to 5 and an additional class in Year 3. Because many of the pupils in S3 in 1982 were too young to leave during their fourth year when pupils usually reach their 15th birthday they were retained in S3 and combined with the group coming up in two streamed classes. This in turn created a gap at Year 4 where classes have traditionally been streamed into two forms. Year 5 consists largely of pupils staying on beyond leaving age to take GCE examinations, but because of the decision about Year 3 there will be no Year 5 in 1984. The Head intends to retain streaming at Year 3 and consequently from 1985 onwards there will be seven classes. Without any allowance for immigration, the number of children expected to enter Year 1 in 1986 will be higher than in the past and may in fact require two classes, making the total eight. The present school does not have this number of suitable teaching spaces.

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13.5. It is possible to posit ways of overcoming these problems. By more imaginative and flexible time - tabling the numbers using the laboratory at any one time could be reduced and the craft programme could be broadened. When the town Gymnasium is vacated by troops the PE programme can be expanded; additional teaching spaces might be found in other buildings eg the Parish Hall or Youth Club; perhaps the Cathedral could be used for assemblies; the largest room in the school could be divided into two, and so on. But this is temporary patching and serves mainly to accentuate the general unsuitability of the existing buildings. The inadequacy of the present site even for formal teaching, the serious gaps in science and craft provision and the rising number of classes combine in my view to urge not just a few more teaching spaces or minor adjustments to existing property but plans for a completely new school.

13.6. In this regard, the site and plans for the Hostel, including Sullivan House, take on a new dimension. The first priority for secondary education is undoubtedly adequate hostel accommodation, but close to it comes the need for better science and workshop facilities, and the proposed site for the hostel could accommodate these as well. I therefore recommend that consideration be given to including the building of one science laboratory and one workshop within the plans for the hostel for the 1984 school year, especially if Sullivan House is included. As a corollary I recommend that the existing science and crafts rooms should be combined to form the second laboratory and that the Art Room be converted into a Home Economics Centre. Both proposals have been made many times. The advice of specialists in laboratory and workshop design should be sought and detailed discussions held with the Superintendent and school staff. The hostel laboratory should probably be for Biology and Rural Science making use of the gardens and hothouse at Sullivan House, leaving the other one for Physics, Chemistry and General Science.

13.7. If these recommendations were adopted, a large part of the secondary school would then be on the hostel site. Just as the concept of hostel includes study and leisure facilities and staff accommodation, so the concept of laboratory includes preparation room, staffroom and additional cloakroom facilities. Only the general purpose teaching rooms, the domestic science room and storage and administration spaces would need to be added for a whole new secondary school to have been provided, and I recommend that this final

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step be taken as soon as possible and be ready at the latest for the 1986 school year. The move divides neatly into three phases; phase 1 - hostel; phase 2 - science laboratory and workshop; phase 3 - general classrooms and administration. However the phasing should be compressed into the shortest time possible in order to avoid long periods of almost constant building and the complexities of organising a school on a split site. I recommend that outline plans be prepared immediately for the whole school to permit the site to be used to the greatest effect, and that they be registered with the town planner, if he be appointed, so that plans for the school can be included in broader plans for the whole community.

13.8. There are a number of advantages in this proposal, apart from the obvious one of meeting the physical needs of the school. First, by planning the hostel as part of the school, consideration can be taken of the broader demands of the school, reducing duplication and allowing for some elements to serve a dual role; the dining hall might double as a general assembly hall, study rooms might be used as teaching areas. Second, it would serve to further the integration of the hostel, and therefore Camp children, into the mainstream of the Stanley school. Third, hostel extra-curricular activities would become school activities and would be available for all, particularly at weekends when the need for something to do is felt by hostel and town child alike. Fourth, there would be a desirable merging of hostel and school staff duties. Fifth, games facilities would be held in common for school lessons and for hostel use. In short, I am suggesting another conceptual shift. In place of a school and a separate hostel, I recommend the concept of a boarding school that takes some day pupils, and in time logic would require that the primary education division should be seen as the school's junior department. One of the implications of such a shift would be that appointment to the teaching staff of the school would carry contractual obligations beyond classroom teaching and this would assist the merging of extra-curricular activities and boarding duties. A boarding school of this nature should also be considered a general community asset and resource, offering its specialist facilities for public use, arranging evening classes and generally encouraging both greater participation by the community and greater accessibility to education. Related developments in Stanley, eg for the Public Library and Sports Centre, should be planned in the light of the plans for the secondary school.



13.9. Ultimately the present secondary school buildings would become vacant. Although it is a premium site and might well be sought for other developments, I recommend that it might be retained for education. It is not possible at this stage to be definite about its future use, but a number of possibilities immediately come to mind. First, I have already suggested that the Camp Education Department should have permanent buildings within the primary school grounds and any rearrangement of primary facilities should take this into account. In some respects the main secondary building would be ideal for an infant school. Alternatively it may become preferable to think in terms of a middle school, particularly if numbers increase substantially, to take pressure off both the infant and secondary ends and the buildings could be suitably adapted to this end as well. Yet again, accommodation for primary education might be rearranged to make permanent space available for a nursery school.

#### 14. The Secondary School Curriculum

14.1. It is difficult for a small school to offer at secondary level the same range of subjects as offered by large schools or to be as cost-effective. There is a minimum below which it is not possible to go, both in the interest of pupils' general education and of their future lives and employment. Consequently, a small school must examine its aims and objectives carefully, not once but regularly, and must be clear how its subject and course offerings together relate to them. The school had no updated statement to show me, though the Headmaster did produce one while I was there, and did not appear to have considered in any depth the kind of education most appropriate to national and individual needs in the context of the Falklands. There were some extenuating circumstances. Apart from very properly concentrating on getting the school working again after the War, the school has a new Headmaster and five of the nine staff members arrived only in February. Nevertheless it is disturbing that individual staff are discussing new examinations, changes in syllabus content and different teaching arrangements without the framework provided by such a policy statement.

14.2. A variety of additional considerations increase the demand for a full curriculum review. It is likely that the law will be changed to require pupils to continue at school till the end of the academic year in which they are 15, rather than leave immediately on their 15th birthday as at present, but little



thought seems to have gone into preparing a suitable programme for them beyond an assumption about more external examinations. Further, the War and its aftermath have placed the Falkland Islands in a new developmental situation; the possibility of a new school and improved facilities offer the opportunity of overcoming constraining physical shortcomings; and the new influx of staff will bring new enthusiasms.

14.3. It is of the highest importance that dialogue be initiated about curriculum renewal in its broadest sense, embracing aims and objectives, subject and course content, teaching arrangements and examinations and I recommend that action be taken to this effect. New staff should see their brief about their own subject in this broader context and a wide range of opinion should be canvassed. Further it is distressing to find the same calls for a less academic curriculum for non-academic pupils, for more attention to technical and craft subjects, and closer relations with local employers recurring in various reports and resolutions but with little action resulting. A review of curriculum is pointless if it is not accompanied by a determination and a willingness to act.

#### 15. Examinations

15.1. I consider examinations first because so much hangs on the approach taken to them. The Stanley school programme is orientated to examination courses, particularly 'O' level syllabuses, and the effect of this orientation permeates through to junior forms and is the prime reason for the streaming now introduced in Form 3. However, there are sound reasons for suggesting the emphasis is misplaced. Although pupils should be encouraged to attain the highest standard of which they are capable, the GCE results to date have been poor, and so few have passed in any significant way that it is questionable whether the policy of having a large GCE stream is appropriate. Roughly 50 per cent of the intake has taken GCE 'O' level English but only about half of those have obtained a grade of A, B or C. Numbers taking other subjects have been very small. In 1981 six pupils sat examinations in Geography, Human Biology and Mathematics but between them achieved only seven grades of A, B or C. In 1982 the score for the same subjects was four passes from four pupils. In 1981 the number of grades of A, B and C obtained by 15 candidates and 29 subject entries was 13; in 1982, 17 candidates obtained 16 pass grades



in 32 subject entries. It would appear that many pupils are being set unrealistic objectives.

15.2. Because of this there is a strong interest in the school in CSE examinations and some of the new staff were recruited specifically to introduce CSE courses. This is a welcome development offering both a more appropriate examination within the capabilities of more pupils and an opportunity for more locally relevant course content, and I recommend it be given every encouragement. It is likely that as negotiations proceed with CSE boards - negotiations interrupted by the War - the need will arise for a representative to travel to the Falklands to advise at first hand on procedures and examination arrangements, and I recommend that any request to meet the costs of such a visit should be viewed favourably. But even at this early stage too easy and too rigid a distinction is emerging between the GCE stream and the CSE stream. Both are single subject examinations and it is unlikely that every candidate will fit totally into GCE or CSE. I also view with some disquiet the move to commence examination work in year 3, a move embarked upon in order to permit children to take external examinations earlier than children in Britain because of the earlier leaving age in the Falklands. It reduces the time for non-examination work and magnifies the examination influence.

15.3. I recommend that in the curriculum review serious consideration be given to altering the shape of the school programme. In order to take account of pupils' varying abilities streaming as currently practised should be abolished and all should study for the CSE examinations. Remedial classes should be provided for those for whom CSE sets too high a standard and a special advanced class for the few for whom GCE is considered appropriate. In all classes a move towards more individualised instruction would be welcome. Some staff are already considering taking as much of their CSE content as possible from the GCE syllabus and this facilitates moving 'up' to GCE just as much as moving 'down' to CSE which seems currently in favour. Further, I recommend that the school should not continue in its attempts to push children at 15+ through what is basically a 16+ examination, even though the minimum age condition is likely to be withdrawn. Instead, children who wish to take external examinations should stay on into year 5 or consideration might be given to changing the school year from February-December to September-July, but with vacation periods remaining as at present. There are strong local arguments for sitting



GCE examinations in June rather than in January, provided Boards permit, and this is also the time when CSE examinations are traditionally taken. With either of these solutions no examination work would commence until year 4. The effect of these proposals for most children would be to raise the school leaving age.

15.4. The number of different examinations taken by the school is surprising. I recommend that if at all possible only one GCE Board should be used instead of the two at present (London and Cambridge) and that RSA examinations be withdrawn as CSE is introduced.

15.5. Through all the discussion about examinations the needs of the non-academic pupil should not be overlooked. It may well be that the most significant education for some Falkland Islanders does not involve formal examinations at all. Recommendations for a more adequate curriculum for such pupils have been made before and I repeat them. As with all such changes, the population needs to be sensitised to any shifts in examination policy. CSE in particular is relatively unknown.

#### 16. The Balance of the Curriculum

16.1. Given the shape of the school's facilities, the curriculum is weighted towards those subjects that do not require specialist accommodation. All pupils take English, Mathematics, History and Geography, but only one science course is offered and technical and practical subjects for boys and girls have inadequate allocations.

16.2. The courses in English, Mathematics, History and Geography conform to a fairly similar pattern. A common course is being developed for the first two years and then separate GCE and CSE courses from year 3. RSA examinations have also been taken in English and Mathematics. A new GCE syllabus with a new Board has been adopted in History and a whole new school programme for History and Geography is being worked out. Lack of the range of reprographic facilities restricts teaching and individualised working in all these subjects.

16.3. The science programme is severely restricted by having only a single small laboratory. There are only two benches and amongst major items of equipment there are only two balances, four microscopes and an aquarium.



The Nuffield Combined Science Course is followed successfully for the first two years and the decision has been taken to transfer from Human Biology to Biology from Form 3. It is hoped the new staff member will be able to teach a little physics. No chemistry is taught as such.

16.4. The limited craft facilities have already been mentioned. The workshop has only five woodwork benches, and teaching is generally confined to simple skills and model making. No external examinations are taken in craft subjects. Two part-time teachers take a little typing and sewing.

16.5. I recommend that all period allocations be reviewed, particularly to permit greater attention to scientific and technical and craft subjects. Opinions vary on how far the school should directly be involved in agricultural education, but a good case can be made for a science course specifically related to the rural environment, once practical work becomes possible, and the present weak rural science course should be rewritten. Woodwork and technical drawing should have appropriate facilities and consideration should be given to including subjects like motor mechanics in some form. The parentcraft course is an interesting development and more thorough courses should be available in commercial studies and domestic science. I commend the attempt to forge links with the PWD and recommend that further efforts be made to link school with work. In the circumstances the Art periods and the General periods should be withdrawn but room may be found for Art and also for Music as extra-curricular activities when staffing is available. More time should be given to PE.

16.6. The one major area of the standard curriculum lacking in the Falkland Islands is study of a foreign language. In the past attempts have been made to introduce the teaching of Spanish and specialist teachers were supplied by Argentina. In the present circumstances this has become an exceedingly sensitive subject and since a decision to teach any particular language has substantial implications for staffing and for books and materials, I recommend that no decision on foreign language teaching should be taken for the moment.

## 17. Staffing

17.1. In March 1983 the school had nine full-time members of staff, including specialist teachers for English, Mathematics, Geography, History, Science

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and Woodwork. Eight of the nine are OSAS officers and considerable flexibility on all sides will be needed when agreeing overseas leave. An additional position is shared by the two part-time teachers. Although some teachers are asked to teach outside their main subjects, teaching loads with this kind of teacher - pupil ratio are held within manageable proportions and time is available for curriculum development.

17.2. In terms of staffing, the school has more science time available than it can use, but lacks specialist teachers for vocational, technical and commercial subjects (other than typing), home economics (other than sewing) and foreign languages. The problems will become even more apparent as the curriculum is broadened and careful manpower planning will be needed. As far as possible firm commitment to a new facility should be accompanied by the recruitment of the specialist teacher so that he can participate in the detailed planning. Within the spirit of the community school, evening classes both for general interest and for examinations could perhaps be counted as part of the teaching load.

17.3. With a largely new staff there is no immediate need for in-service courses taken by outside consultants but advice may well be sought on curriculum planning. In view of the composition of the school and the suggested boarding school concept it is important that all secondary school staff should make regular visits to Camp.

#### 18. Advanced Level Courses

18.1. I see no strong arguments for departing from current practice over 'A' level courses. The school will not be in a position to offer such courses for some time and although I heard some rumours about the Thomas Peacocke School at Rye no alternatives were suggested. On the contrary, the Superintendent was highly influenced on his visit there by the care with which Falkland Islanders had been looked after and the way the school had made every effort to make up for deficiencies in their knowledge. Unfortunately, 'A' level results have generally been poor but the reasons are complex and probably have as much to do with teaching received in Stanley as they do with teaching in Rye. The scheme allows for two pupils per year but four girls have been nominated to go this year to make up for missing last year.



## SECTION E. ADULT EDUCATION AND GENERAL MATTERS

### 19. Administration of Education

19.1. The Education Department may appear top heavy with so few pupils - three Heads plus a Superintendent - but since all the Heads teach the situation is not what it appears. The activities of the Department are sufficiently far-reaching for overall direction to be needed in policy, finance and administration; yet each section also requires someone with specific responsibility. My recommendations for the Primary Division and for the boarding school do not necessarily imply a new hierarchy but changes may become desirable in the future.

19.2. Currently, secretarial assistance for the whole Department rests with one typist/secretary in the Superintendent's office and the establishment allows for an additional half-time assistant. The work load in the Superintendent's office varies and the secretary is well able at present to take on work from the schools. But the remoteness and inevitable delays have an inhibiting effect on teachers' output and what they ask to be done, and the position will need to be reviewed if the new hostel/secondary school complex develops.

### 20. Books and Equipment

20.1. I recommend that the present Book Presentation Programme (BPP) allocation of £5,000 should be maintained. In the past the money has been well used and it will take a little time to identify major needs from the War and the implications of any new directions. Major investment in equipment will be needed for any new science laboratory or workshop and should be included in the initial costing of those buildings, and reprographic facilities need to be reviewed. I recommend that books and equipment be included in the proposed curriculum review.

### 21. The Education Ordinance

21.1. The brief but helpful discussion I held with the Attorney General about compulsory schooling in Camp revealed a number of deficiencies in the law as it stands and some places where closer definition and some tightening up are desirable. It appears, for example, that neither the Civil Commissioner



nor the Education Department has any formal power to impose standards in settlement schools, other than the bargaining power of the increased subsidy. It is in the interests of a unified education system that these matters be tidied up, and I recommend that as time permits the Education Ordinance be reviewed.

## 22. Vocation Training and Adult Education

22.1. I was asked to make some preliminary enquiries about vocational training and adult education needs, which are of obvious significance also to considerations about the secondary curriculum and to the use that might be made of educational facilities. Unfortunately I was unable to get very far. The tables from the 1980 census showing distribution of population by occupation demonstrate how small the numbers are in any particular field and the relatively small number of jobs for which formal training is possible. This impression was confirmed in visits to representatives of Government and the major employers, and by the list of occupations of recent leavers which was supplied by the secondary school. The result on the whole appears to be that most needs are satisfactorily met by current scholarship offers. The mechanical superintendent of the Plant and Transport Authority (PATA) has followed up the offer from Redhill Technical College by enquiring about mechanical engineering courses but his organisation can take only one new apprentice each year. In addition there are a few students in Britain on technical and agricultural courses and Pitmans have recently offered up to three secretarial scholarships per year. It is also expected that the Development Agency when established will have the power to establish training programmes and will take the initiative in doing so.

22.2. The one area where there was any agreement about training courses was in farming. Considerable concern was expressed by farm managers about shortage of labour in certain areas and about the need for all new entrants to be better qualified; this was confirmed by the representative of the Sheep Owners Association. Although the number of entrants taken each year is still small, there would probably be enough to justify some kind of training programme. Something less ambitious than a full Farm Institute or model farm seems to be possible, in which students acquire the range of skills for sheep farming and perhaps for other kinds of farming also, eg dairy, by learning under guided practice on the job. One attractive idea is to try to build this sort of activity into the new village at Fox Bay East with an instructor/manager working in association with the various enterprises and the



Development Agency. Although the Grasslands Trials Unit (GTU) is about to take on a stronger advisory role, the Director was reluctant to extend this to training, feeling it was too far away from his research brief, but perhaps an official attachment might still be the best way forward. I recommend that the Education Superintendent, and farm managers and the Development Agency continue to explore the possibilities. They concern a matter of some significance for the future of the Falklands but the training required is scarcely at a level to be sought abroad, at least initially.

22.3. As far as most school leavers are concerned, my enquiries were unsuccessful largely because the major employers of labour appeared to have no future plans worked out. The proposed change in the school leaving arrangements will however require firms and departments to identify their needs on a six-month or annual basis, and this will give both employers and pupils greater choice and stimulate more organised induction programmes.

22.4 Adult Education in the Falklands could take one of two forms: some kind of updating or retraining, and leisure. The former remains more a dream in the eyes of visitors than an upsurge of demand, but clearly courses could, if needed, be provided in the secondary school or in the farm 'institute'. On the leisure side similarly the school could participate eg in computers. The popularity of videos links the two forms, and a circulating library of tapes would be warmly welcomed, preferably organised through the Public library. In short, adult education remains an area of great potential but few needs have focused as yet. At some later date it might be wise to seek the specialist advice of experts in technical and vocational training, and in adult education.



APPENDIX A:

SCHOOL TERMS 1983 (BASED ON DEPARTMENTAL CIRCULAR)

Stanley Schools

1st Term      28 February - 18 May ( Start delayed because of 150th Celebrations)  
2nd Term      9 June - 31 August  
3rd Term      22 September - 21 December

There are no half-term holidays.

Settlement Schools

Settlement schools may make alterations to the above dates to suit the farm's convenience, in consultation with the Superintendent of Education, provided there is no change in the total number of days worked.

Recognised Camp Teachers

Tuition shall take place except during the following periods:

- (a) 19 December 1983 - 6 January 1984
- (b) 150th Celebrations Week: 21 - 25 February
- (c) Good Friday: 1 April
- (d) One week to coincide with Traditional May Ball week
- (e) Liberation Day: 14 June
- (f) 15 - 19 August
- (g) Battle of the Falklands Day: 8 December



APPENDIX B:

ENROLMENT PROJECTIONS FOR STANLEY

The figures below are substantially those produced by the Education Department in November 1982, amended to take account of the new arrangements at Form 4(S4). Internal changes in the schools and family mobility combine to make these figures differ slightly from the actual position in March 1983, and because of the fluidity they should be regarded as general indications only. The analysis is based on actual numbers of children in the Islands at the time, and no allowance has been made for possible population changes.

		<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	
Senior	Form S5	10	-	(20)	(22)	(30)	
	S4	6	26	25	33	27	
	S3	26	25	33	27	27	
	S2	25	33	27	27	37	
	S1	33	27	27	37	18	
<hr/>							
Junior	J4	27	27	37	18	27	
	J3	27	37	18	27	31	
<hr/>							
							Hostel entry point
Infant	J2	17	10	14	9	10	
	J1	10	14	9	10	5	
	IE	14	9	10	5	15	
	I2	9	10	5	15	9	
	I1	10	5	15	9	12	

- Notes.
1. The figures assume entry to Stanley schools when each Camp child reaches the age to enter Junior 3 and that each child will take up the place available.
  2. The figures for S5 are tentative depending on how many stay at school beyond leaving age to take examinations. In line with recommendations in the text, it is assumed that by 1986 most children will enter Form 5.
  3. The empty year at S5 in 1984 arises from the rearrangement of classes at the beginning of the 1983 academic year.



## APPENDIX C:

## CHILDREN IN CAMP SCHOOLS SITUATION AT 3 MARCH 1983

<u>Settlement</u>	<u>Taught in camp</u>	<u>Resident or Travelling Teacher</u>	<u>In Stanley</u>
Fitzroy	4	R	3
Goose Green	16	R	6
Walker Creek	3	T	-
North Arm	7	R	2
Murrel Farm	1	T	-
Long Island	1	T	1
Green Patch	2	T	5
Teal Inlet	2	T	1
Douglas Station	-	-	1
Newhouse	-	-	1
Salvador	3	T	1
Rincon Grande	1	T	-
Hope Cottage	2	T	-
Speedwell Island	1	T	-
Port Louis	3	T	-
Sea Lion Island	1	T	-
Port San Carlos	2	T	3
San Carlos	10	R	-
Port Howard	13	R	-
Fox Bay East	4	Military	1
Fox Bay West	7	T	1
Port Stephens	8	R	-
Chartres	-	-	2
Dunnose Head	2	T	-
Roy Cove	-	-	1
Hill Cove	8	R	3
Main Point	-	-	1
Golding Island	2	T	-
Pebble Island	7	R	1
Dunbar	-	-	1
Carcass Island	-	-	2



## APPENDIX D:

## EDUCATION STAFF: MARCH 1983

	<u>Post/Subject</u>	<u>Date 1st Appointment</u>	<u>Contract/Permanent</u>	<u>Leave End/mid</u>	<u>Comments</u>
<u>Administration</u>					
J A T Fowler	Superintendent	12. 8.76	C	Nov 83	EC
<u>Secondary School</u>					
J P Baylis	Headmaster/Craft	24. 1.78	C	April 84	EC
Mrs P D Felton	Science	23. 7.80	C	Feb 84	EC
J Mahoney	Maths	7. 7.81	C	July 83	EC
Mrs J E Cheek	English	26. 7.82	P	July 87	
S R de Prato	Geography	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
Miss P A Hands	Science	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
M R Laing	English	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
Miss G M E Bennett	General subjects	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
J P Sherwood	History	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
<u>Primary School</u>					
D S Evans	Headmaster	12.11.80	P	Nov 83	
Mrs J Stewart	Junior	8.11.78	P		leave depends on husband
Mrs J Mahoney	Infant	7. 7.81	C	July 83	EC
I Townsend	Junior	29. 8.79	C	May 83	EC
Mrs T H Davies	Junior	28. 2.83	P prob	July 83	dependant on husband's leave
Mrs N J Capron	Infant	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
N J Capron	Junior	5. 1.83	C	July 84	MT Assuming 3 year tour
Mrs M Rendell	Junior	11.10.82	P	Oct 87	but may accompany husband April 84
<u>Camp Education</u>					
Mrs A Chater	Head	( 5. 1.81 (31. 1.64	P	Jan 84	
P D Felton		23. 7.80	C	Feb 84	EC
C G Davies		11.10.82	C	April 84	MT Three year tour
Mrs P Clasper		11.10.82	C	Nov 84	EC
A Clarke	Goose Green	8. 9.81	C	May 83	MT Three year tour
<u>Travelling Teachers</u>					
S T Buckett	Very young, untrained, local.				
Miss K Patric	Young, untrained, local.				
Miss A Smith	Very young, untrained, local.				
G Felton	Young, untrained, local.				
S Eagle	Recruited from Britain. Available only till August. Very young.				
<u>Other Posts on Establishment</u>					
Miss M Betts	Non-teaching assistant; taking up one assistant teacher post.				
Two part-time teachers for needlework and typing, taking up one assistant teacher post					
Two remaining assistant teacher posts; recommended merged for 1 additional staff in Camp Education.					

/Resident.....



Resident Teachers, Employed by Farms

San Carlos: Mr Tom Melchionne. Young American. Soon to leave.  
Port Howard: Miss Suzanne McCormick, Young local. Soon to leave.  
Hill Cove: Mr Eddie Chandler. Experienced.  
Fitzroy: Mrs T Simpson. Qualified teacher, Wife of FIC employee  
North Arm: Mr Philip Hatton. Very experienced. Many years in Islands.  
Pebble Island: Mrs Rosemary Wilkinson. Unqualified but with some college  
education. Family moved to P.I to run farm after liberation.  
Port Stephens: Mr Tony Alazia. Local, fairly inexperienced.  
Fox Bay West: Miss Julie Carroll. Qualified expat. (awaiting arrival).  
Fox Bay East: Military  
(Goose Green: OSAS post, see above).



PROGRAMME

Wednesday	9 March		Arrived Stanley 19.30.
Thursday	10 March	am) ) ) pm)	Discussions with Mr J Fowler, Superintendent of Education, and introductory meetings with Heads of Junior School, Secondary School and Camp Education.
		EVENING	Attended public meeting addressed by Mr Terry Peck, LEGCO member.
Friday	11 March	am	Meeting with Mrs A Chater, Head of Camp Education Department. Call on HM Civil Commissioner, Sir Rex Hunt. Call on the Chief Secretary, Mr F E Baker.
		pm	Meeting with members of Camp Education Dept.
Saturday	12 March	am	Meeting with Mr J Baylis, Headmaster, Secondary School.
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs Chater
Sunday	13 March		Day spent with Mr & Mrs Fowler.
Monday	14 March	am am-pm	Depart on Camp Tour accompanied by Mr J Fowler. Flight to Green Patch. Rest of day spent in discussions with farmers in Green Patch Mr & Mrs T Philips, Mr N Watson, Mr R Newman
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs Philips.
Tuesday	15 March	am	Flight to San Carlos. Toured settlement and school, met settlement teacher.
		pm	Flight to Port Howard. Toured settlement and school, met settlement teacher. Discussions and dinner with Mr & Mrs R Lee.
		EVENING	
Wednesday	16 March	am	Flight to Hill Cove. Day spent in the school and in discussions with farm workers, and with Mr & Mrs T Blake.
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs Blake.
Thursday	17 March	am	Flight to Fox Bay East, via Chartres. Visit school and held discussions with Mrs Cockwell, former teacher.
		pm	By courtesy of the army, taken to Fox Bay East. Discussions with families.
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs Cockwell.
Friday	18 March	am	Flight to Goose Green.
		pm	Visit school and met settlement teacher, Mr A Clarke. Discussions with farm families.
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs B Hardcastle.

/Saturday



Saturday	19 March	am	Discussions with Mr Brooke Hardcastle in Darwin.
		pm	Further discussions with Goose Green families. Lunch with Mr & Mrs E Goss.
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs Finlaysan in Darwin.
Sunday	20 March		Lunch as guest of 1st Hampshire Battalion
		pm	Further meetings in Goose Green.
		EVENING	Dinner with Mr & Mrs Hardcastle.
Monday	21 March	am	Delayed flight to Stanley, including unscheduled 1 hour stop at Fitzroy.
		pm	Arranging Stanley programme.
		EVENING	Meeting with Mr J Fowler and Mr J Shelley - ODA Architectural Adviser - about Stanley Hostel.
Tuesday	22 March	am	Inspected secondary school buildings with Mr Shelley and Mr Baylis. Meeting with Mr J Reid, Development Officer. Meeting with Major I Jones RAEC.
		pm	Looked round Brewster site, including existing buildings. Meeting with Dr J Ferguson, GTU. Tour of Sullivan House with Mrs Baker, Mr Shelley and Mr Fowler.
		EVENING	Social evening with secondary school staff at home of Mr & Mrs Baylis.
Wednesday	23 March	am	Visited Stanley Junior School, meeting with Head and staff. Meeting with Mr J Brodrick Head PWD.
		pm	Brief further visit to secondary school. Accompanied Mrs Chater on her Camp Education R/T session.
		EVENING	Supper in Stanley Hostel, met many of the children.
Thursday	24 March	am	Meeting with Mr M Gaiger, Attorney General. Meeting with Secretary, Sheep Owners Association. Meeting with Manager FIC. Meeting with Major Weld and Col. J Black at BFFI
		pm	Visit to Stanley Public Library.
		EVENING	Further discussions with Mr Shelley and Mr Fowler about hostel and secondary school.
Friday	25 March	am	Brief call to Law Secretariat for information. Brief meeting with Mr P Summers, Establishments officer. Meeting with Mr R Bucket, PATA



		pm	Rounding-up discussions with Mr Fowler on Camp and Primary Education.
		EVENING	Meeting with members of Education Sub-Committee (at Mr Fowler's house). The Hon Messrs J E Cheek, A T Blake, T J Peck, R E Binnie.
Saturday	26 March	am	Further meeting with Sec. School staff at their request. Interviewed Miss Janet Robertson, on behalf of Atlantic College. Meeting with Dr Alison Bleaney, SMO.
		pm	Free
Sunday	27 March		Lunch with Mr & Mrs F E Baker.
		EVENING	Rounding-up discussions with Mr Fowler on secondary education.
Monday	28 March	am	Discussions with individual members of Sec. School staff.
		pm	Reporting session with Civil Commissioner.
Tuesday	29 March	am	Further discussions with Sec. School staff and headmaster. Lunch with the Civil Commissioner
		pm	15.30 Depart for Stanley Airport.



DISTRIBUTION

Mr R A Browning	1
Mr M A Pattison	1
Mr D Lawless	2
Mr N D Bailey	1
Mr W D Maniece	4
Mr R G Pettitt	1
Mr D J Church	1
Mrs V E Beckett Sutherland (Perm.Rep.UNESCO)	1
Mr W A Dodd	1
Mr P G Scopes	1
Mr R S Newberry (British Council)	5
Mr B Vale (British Council-STED)	2
H E Civil Commissioner, Falkland Islands	3
File LCP 59/570/03	1
ODA Library	1



10 MAY 1983







je r

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

10 May 1983

Thank you for your letter of 4 May about Bermuda's contribution to the South Atlantic Fund.

I can confirm that at the beginning of August 1982 this office received from the Premier of Bermuda a cheque for £122,608.76. I acknowledged receipt of the cheque on 12 August and the Prime Minister wrote to Mr. Swan on 24 August. The cheque was despatched to the South Atlantic Fund immediately upon receipt and I have confirmed that it was received by the Fund.

TIMOTHY FLESHER

Mr Larry T. Dennis

WR



Tim,

Relevant letters on this subject  
are flagged up.

I have spoken to MOD who  
have confirmed that South Atlantic  
Fund received the cheque on  
31<sup>st</sup> August 1982.

Steve

£122,608-76

10/5/83





The National Archives

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Larry T. Dennis, B. Sc., C.A.  
 Government Auditor AUD:102

*Audit Department*  
*Government Administration Building*  
*Hamilton 5-24, Bermuda*

CIF.  
~~63~~  
 papers  
 psc

Telephone: 809 (29) 5-5151

A

May 4, 1983

Timothy Flesher, Esq.  
 Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
 10 Downing Street  
 London SW1  
 England

+ psc check  
 with South  
 Atlantic fund  
 nothing got  
 the money!

Dear Mr Flesher,

re: Bermuda's Contribution to the  
 South Atlantic Fund

In connection with the audit of the above as at March 31, 1983 please confirm direct to the Government Auditor, Government Administration Building, Hamilton 5-24, Bermuda, the following:

1. Funds totalling £122,866.51 were received from Bermuda by your Government on behalf of the South Atlantic Fund.
2. These funds have been conveyed to the Trustees of the Fund.

Your kind attention to this matter would be appreciated.

Yours respectfully,

Larry T. Dennis, C.A.  
 Government Auditor

LTD:em



Argentina Relations



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. [Name] [Address]  
[City] [State] [Zip]

Dear Mr. [Name]:

I am pleased to inform you that the [Organization] is currently [Action]. We are [Action] to [Action] and [Action] to [Action].

Our [Organization] is committed to [Action] and [Action]. We are [Action] to [Action] and [Action] to [Action].

We are [Action] to [Action] and [Action] to [Action]. We are [Action] to [Action] and [Action] to [Action].

Sincerely,  
[Name]  
[Title]



CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 800  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FROM ROME 041645Z MAY 83  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 217 OF 4 MAY 83  
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING EC POSTS, BERNE, MODUK

MY TELNOS 198 AND 207/8 (NOT TO ALL): ITALY/ARGENTINA  
DESAPARECIDOS

1. THE ARGENTINE JUNTA'S ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT DESAPARECIDOS LAST WEEK PROVOKED A STRONG REACTION IN ITALY. PRESIDENT PERTINI SENT A MESSAGE IN HIS NAME AND THAT OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE DENOUNCING THE 'APPALLING CYNICISM' OF THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH PLACED THOSE RESPONSIBLE 'OUTSIDE CIVILISED HUMAN SOCIETY'. THE MFA TERMED THE POSITION OF THE ARGENTINE JUNTA UNACCEPTABLE, ADDING THAT IT COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A RESPONSE TO REPEATED ITALIAN REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ITALIANS SINCE 1976. THE MFA NOTE ALSO ASKED HOW THE COMMUNIQUE COULD BE RECONCILED WITH ARGENTINE UNDERTAKINGS TO THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO SOLVE THE DESAPARECIDOS PROBLEM. THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES WAS INSTRUCTED TO PROTEST ON THESE LINES, AND ALSO TO CALL FOR A MEETING OF EC AMBASSADORS THERE TO COORDINATE REACTIONS. COLOMBO HIMSELF, INTERVIEWED IN BAGHDAD DURING HIS MIDDLE EAST TOUR, EXPRESSED HIS ANGER AND AMAZEMENT AND CALLED ON THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN ITSELF BETTER ON THE SPECIFIC CASES RAISED BY ITALY.

2. THE ITALIAN PRESS REPORTED ALL THIS AT LENGTH, WITH BACKGROUND FEATURE ARTICLES. ALL THE MAJOR PARTIES PRODUCED STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ARGENTINE COMMUNIQUE.

3. TODAY'S ITALIAN NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR IN ROME HAS, ON INSTRUCTIONS, MADE A FORMAL PROTEST TO THE MFA ABOUT PERTINI'S MESSAGE TO THE JUNTA AND 'REJECTED IT COMPLETELY', ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT REPRESENTS A HARMFUL INTERFERENCE IN ARGENTINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN REPLY PERTINI HAS SENT A FURTHER MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BIGNONE ARGUING THAT (A) HE HAD A RIGHT TO PROTEST BECAUSE THERE WERE ITALIANS AMONG THE VICTIMS, (B) ARGENTINA AS A MEMBER OF THE UN, AND ITS RULERS HAD TO ANSWER TO THE WORLD FOR EVERY VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, (C) THE FACT THAT OTHER HEADS OF STATE HAD NOT PROTESTED AS HE HAD WAS THEIR BUSINESS, (D) IT WAS HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY BIGNONE, AS AN HONEST MAN AND UPRIGHT OFFICER, SHOULD WISH TO DEFEND OFFICERS WHO HAD DISHONoured THEIR UNIFORM. THIS FIRM STAND IS LIKELY TO WIN PERTINI CONSIDERABLE CREDIT IN THE EYES OF THE ITALIAN PUBLIC.

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4. THIS EXCHANGE MUST HAVE DONE SOME DAMAGE TO RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND ARGENTINA, ALTHOUGH SO FAR THE HARSHTEST WORDS HAVE COME FROM THE PRESIDENT RATHER THAN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. NO PARTY, LEAST OF ALL IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN, WILL WISH TO SUGGEST IN PUBLIC THAT ITALY SHOULD TAKE A SOFTER LINE. WE MAY THEREFORE EXPECT ITALY TO REMAIN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE COUNTRIES PROTESTING AT THE ARGENTINE ANNOUNCEMENT, AND PERHAPS TO PURSUE FURTHER COLOMBO'S IDEA OF CONSULTING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING NON-EC ONES THAT ALSO HAVE MISSING NATIONALS. THERE IS MUCH SPECULATION THAT THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES MAY BE RECALLED, OR THAT THE ARGENTINES MAY SEEK HIS RECALL. THE MFA HAVE DECLINED TO BE DRAWN.

### FALKLANDS

5. THE ITALIAN PRESS PICKED UP RUMOURS FROM BUENOS AIRES THAT THE ITALIAN AMBASSADORS IN LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES HAVE RECENTLY URGED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE. THE MFA HAVE THEREFORE CONFIRMED THIS BUT WITHOUT GIVING DETAILS, STRESSING THAT IT WAS WRONG TO INTERPRET THIS MOVE AS AN OFFER OF ITALIAN MEDIATION. WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE DEPARTMENT THAT IN RESPONSE TO ANY PRESS ENQUIRIES HERE WE SHALL SAY ONLY THAT THE FALKLANDS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE COURSE OF NORMAL CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST.

6. IN TALKING TO THE MFA, WE SHALL STICK TO THE LINE TAKEN BY MR ONSLOW AND BY GIFFARD ON 14, AND 28 APRIL RESPECTIVELY. COLOMBO'S SCOPE FOR PROMOTING COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS MAY BE REDUCED BY THE FRESH PUBLICITY OVER THE DESAPARECIDOS ISSUE AND BY THE PROBABLE IMMINENCE OF THE GENERAL ELECTION HERE. WE KNOW HOWEVER THAT MFA OFFICIALS ARE STILL WORKING ON POSSIBLE WAYS TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND WHATEVER CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT EMERGES IN ARGENTINA, AND OUR RESPONSE TO CAGIATI'S DEMARCHE WILL THEREFORE NEED TO EXPLAIN CAREFULLY WHY IT IS NOT FOR HMG TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. A DETAILED NOTE OF THE EFFORTS WE HAVE ALREADY MADE TO NORMALISE RELATIONS WOULD HELP, TOGETHER WITH ALL THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE OF ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE (ESPECIALLY THAT WHICH RELATES TO THE POLITICAL PARTIES RATHER THAN THE JUNTA).

2  
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/ DESTEFANIS



CONFIDENTIAL

DESTEFANIS

7. THE ITALIAN PRESS HAVE REPORTED WITH LITTLE COMMENT THE JUNTA'S WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT FOR DESTEFANIS AND HIS OWN CHANGE OF PLAN.

8. FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

BRIDGES

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

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3

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

4 May 1983

Argentine Next of Kin

The Prime Minister has asked that, once the present episode relating to Destefanis is over, consideration should be given to a fresh initiative with the International Red Cross to promote a properly organised visit to the Falklands by the Argentine next of kin. I do not think that the Prime Minister would wish to be formally committed to this idea at the moment but she would be most grateful for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views on the desirability and timing of such an initiative and the practical arrangements which we should envisage.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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file da  
bc Sir A. Parsons  
Bf





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10 DOWNING STREET

John ✓

Andrew Heath in  
Cabinet office (assessment  
staff) has asked if  
he may have a copy  
of the attached transcript.

Are you content?

Peter

3/5

~~Peter~~

I think he must ask Mr.  
Lamont - the F/C.O.  
have a copy. A.S.C. 3/5.





Ad 3  
5  
f.a.

10 DOWNING STREET

Michael

Attached is a transcript of  
the telephone conversation  
with Senior Desbafanis and  
Mr Lambert in the F.C.O.

The call took approx 40 min  
and was in part inaudible.

If you wish to listen to  
the tape to check accuracy  
it is held on the duty desk  
desk

July

3/5



CONVERSATION BETWEEN SENOR DESTAFANIS AND AN FCO OFFICIAL ON  
MONDAY 2 MAY 1983

---

Mr. Lamont from the Foreign Office asked for the message to be passed to him as the line was very unclear.

After failing to make audible contact with Senor Destafanis on the ship the interpreter said she would pass everything that Mr. Lamont said to Senor Destafanis and vice versa.

Interpreter: Is that OK?

Mr. Lamont: OK

Interpreter: Mr. Destafanis wants to speak with Margaret Thatcher. Can he please speak with her? because Mr. Destafanis is on a ship. He wants to speak with a human - will you do that please?

Mr. Lamont: Well I am a human. I am in the Foreign Office and I deal with this question. So if you give me the message then I can deal with it.

Interpreter: All right. Mr. D. wants to know who are you and what is your occupation.

Mr. Lamont: Well I am in the Foreign Office and I am responsible for this question.

Interpreter: You are who?

Mr. Lamont: I am the official responsible for this question within the Foreign Office.

Lot of repetition and the interpreter wants to clarify who Mr. Lamont really is. Another unsuccessful attempt to make contact with Mr. Destafanis on board the ship. Mr. D. was again inaudible and the interpreter again offered to relay the conversation.



Interpreter: Mr. D says we tried to deal with Mrs. Thatcher but since she can't speak we try to tell you the message. . . .

Mr. Lamont we have 47 mothers on this ship who need to get to Port Darwin. If we have a . . . authorise to get there and the mothers to try to be there to see where their sons got death - is that possible?

Mr. Lamont: Well, Mr. D. knows that . . .

Interpreter: Sorry I can't hear you.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. D knows that the British Government have made it clear that if a visit is organised and supervised by the Red Cross, organised and supervised by the Red Cross, and it is purely humanitarian in nature, then the British Government has made it clear . . .

Interpreter: Mr. Lamont, Mr. D says that if you people authorise to get to the islands then everything will be OK because Mr. D will be responsible for this authorising of Mrs. Thatcher.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. D will be responsible for what? Could you repeat that?

Interpreter: OK. The Red Cross . . . the band of the Red Cross will be up. Mr. D - he will be responsible for everything that happens. He needs your authorisation to get to the islands. If that would be possible. He will be responsible and everything will be OK. He already heard what you said. He will be responsible and everything will be OK if you will tell him that that will be OK to get to the islands.

Mr. Lamont: What, no, I cannot do that. We made it clear . . .

Interpreter: Everything will be OK. We are human people. There are mothers here who want to see everything that happened. Do you hear me what I am trying to tell you?

Mr. Lamont: We have made it clear that we do not object to a visit by relatives of (interrupted)



Mr. Lamont: We have made it clear that we have no objection

Interpreter: (interrupting) You made a deal?

Mr. Lamont: . . . that we have no objection to the visit, provided that the visit was organised and supervised by the Red Cross.

Interpreter: You mean you have everything already cleared by the Red Cross?

Mr. Lamont: No. We have no objection if a visit was organised and supervised by the Red Cross. We put certain conditions to the Red Cross and Senor D knows these conditions.

Interpreter: I tried to repeat what you said. That everything was clear, that everything was organised by the Red Cross.

Mr. Lamont: No. No. We made clear that a visit, that if a visit was organised by the Red Cross and was purely humanitarian in nature then we would have had no objection.

Interpreter: But I don't understand what you mean. Was it made by the Red Cross - the visit?

Mr. Lamont: Senor D was in touch with the Red Cross.

Interpreter says she can't hear him and that communications are bad.

Mr. Lamont: Senor D was in touch with the Red Cross about the visit.

Interpreter: Is it possible to visit the islands?

Mr. Lamont: We said that if the visit was organised and supervised by the Red Cross then we have no objections to a visit but Senor D refused to accept the conditions of the Red Cross.

Interpreter: . . . organised by the Red Cross. It doesn't matter if the Red Cross band will be up or not, it has to be organised by the Red Cross - right?

Is that what you are trying to say to me?



Mr. Lamont: That's correct.

Interpreter: OK please hold on. We can hear nothing at all with London. Mr. D says that he will call tomorrow and he needs to know since Margaret Thatcher is a mother we need please to speak with a human mother and understand us because we need to speak with her. Mr. D needs to speak with her. If she doesn't want to speak with us please tell us she doesn't want to speak with us at all and we will cut this off. Please can you tell me that?

Mr. Lamont: You can tell Mr. D . . .

Interpreter: If she doesn't want to speak with us we will call tomorrow. We will try to connect this all right. We will try to do all our best.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. D knows very well the position of the British Government.

Interpreter: Sorry I didn't hear you.

Mr. Lamont: Mr. D knows very well the position we have taken, that the British Government have taken.

Interpreter: You mean she will refuse to speak with Mr. D?

Mr. Lamont: That's not what I said. Mr. D knows the position of the British Government on his visit.

Interpreter: . . . he wants to speak with her directly. In a moment he wants to try to speak with her. Just like a human person. We understand that you are human and you can understand us but please we need to speak with her just like a human person, . . . just like a human woman nothing else.

Mr. Lamont: Well I think the situation is well known. The Prime Minister has made it clear that we would not object to a visit that was organised and supervised by the Red Cross and was purely humanitarian. Mr. D refused to accept the conditions which would allow that.



Interpreter: What I want to tell you . . . he wants to know what happens if she wants to speak with him or she refused to speak with him. That's what he wants to know. So he'll call back tomorrow . . .

Mr. Lamont: I cannot commit the Prime Minister on that question. I am trying to indicate that Mr. D knows very well the position of the British Government, of the willingness to accept a visit that was organised by the Red Cross but Senor D refused to accept the conditions which were conveyed to him. And that is the position of the British Government.

Interpreter: OK you want me to tell Mr. D that its not possible to visit because he wont, he will not accept the Red Cross organisers?

Mr. Lamont: That's right.

Interpreter: Hold on. OK we are going to try to cut up this communication. Can you tell me how you spell your last name?

Mr. Lamont: Its Lamont (spells it)

Interpreter: And your first name?

Mr. Lamont: I think that will do. I think Lamont is enough. That is enough I think.

Interpreter: You think that is enough?

Mr. Lamont: Yes that will find me.

Interpreter: Well Mr D will try to cut up this communication. We will try to call you tomorrow to reach Mrs. Thatcher.

Mr. Lamont: Now can you tell me are you phoning from his organisation, from the centre.

Interpreter carries on her conversation: . . . let me say this to you, all us are human and we try to see if these people, these mothers in the ship try to see the island. Try to be human , tell



Mrs. Thatcher to be human for a moment and think about all this that has happened and Mr. D will try to speak with her tomorrow and we will see what happens tomorrow.

Mr. Lamont: OK as I have said we have all along said that we would not object to a visit by relatives of Argentine servicemen provided that it was organised by the Red Cross and was purely humanitarian.

Interpreter: All right I will retell/already (inaudible) him that and he will try to speak tomorrow OK if that will be possible.

Mr. Lamont: Right you are.

Interpreter: Is that OK?

Mr. Lamont: OK.

Interpreter: Yes we'll call tomorrow

Mr. Lamont: Right.

Interpreter: OK. I have nothing more to tell to you. I'll have to go now.

Mr. Lamont: Goodnight



File

089  
Argentina

3 May 1983

Thank you for your letter of 28 April enclosing the latest record of payments made by the South Atlantic Fund. The Prime Minister has noted its contents.

420013

D. O. Arnold-Forster, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.



CONFIDENTIAL

File

3 May 1983

Thank you for your letter of 28 April enclosing a copy of the signal containing instructions to CBFFI about the handling of the proposed visit to the Falkland Islands by Senor Destefanis. The Prime Minister saw these papers over the weekend and noted their contents.

J. COLES

N. H. R. Evans, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL



ATC



10 DOWNING STREET

John Holmes has asked  
for a copy of the  
transcript of last evening's  
conversation with the  
Argentinian next of kin  
ship.

Agree?

Mark

Yes.

A.T.C. 3/5.

Mark

3/5/83



Argentina



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

The Larco Lacar has been located and is being kept under surveillance. Ministry of Defence have information that the vessel is heading for Porto del Carda which is 600 miles south of Buenos Aires. Due to bad weather the vessel will be unable to reach the Falkland Islands Protection Zone before 2400 hours on 3 May.

Duty Clerk

2 May 1983





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FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (ADVANCES)

39 M. J. J. J.

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/PUS  
SIR J BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR ADAMS  
LORD N G LENNOX  
MR EVANS  
MR URE  
MR GILLMORE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST. (3)  
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE  
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF. MOD

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
MISS M E CUND )  
MR LITTLER. ) TREASURY

SIR R ARMSTRONG )  
MR A D S GOODALL ) CABINET OFF  
DIO )

MR M A PATTISON, FID, ODA

MR A TITCHENER )  
~~MR C U ROBERTS~~, IAT ) DOT  
MR A FORTNAM

RESIDENT CLERK *SSWT*

HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/SAMD  
HD/FID  
HD/DEFENCE DEPT  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(E)  
HD/UND  
HD/PLANNING STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

(FM BERNE 011915Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES 012000Z

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 340 OF 01 MAY

AND TO FLASH MOD CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO SANTIAGO CARACAS BRASILIA UKMIS  
NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKREP BRUSSELS

FALKLANDS : ARGENTINE NEXT-OF-KIN VISIT : THE JUNTA INTERVENE

1. THE JUNTA'S LAST-MINUTE DECISION TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESTEFANIS' EXPEDITION MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO MOUNTING PRESSURES, BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND AMONGST THE THREE ARMED FORCES, AGAINST THIS SO-CALLED PRIVATE INITIATIVE. ONLY HOURS BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S COMMUNIQUE, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, VIVOT, WAS INSISTING TO A COLLEAGUE THAT THE VISIT WAS PURELY PRIVATE.

FLASH

ADVANCE COPY



... COLLEAGUE THAT THE VISIT WAS PURELY PRIVATE.  
SATURDAY'S PRESS HERE SUGGESTED THERE WAS AN INTENSIVE DEBATE BETWEEN ARMY AND AIR-FORCE CHIEFS OPPOSING AND NAVY FAVOURING THE DESTEFANIS INITIATIVE. BRITISH RESOLUTE STATEMENTS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE TIPPED THE BALANCE SINCE THE JUNTA MAY WELL HAVE BEEN HOPING TO THE END FOR A BRITISH CLIMBDOWN. AT LEAST THE ITALIAN, BRASILIAN AND EVEN PERUVIAN AMBASSADORS HERE ARE KNOWN TO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR GOVERNMENTS' CONCERN TO THE MFA OVER THE VOYAGE. OTHERS MAY HAVE DONE SO TOO.

2. DESTEFANIS WAS NOT PLEASED TO HAVE "HIS" SHIP COMMANDEERED BY THE JUNTA, AND SAID SO TO THE PRESS WHICH EXPECTED ON SATURDAY THAT HE WOULD BE EXCLUDED ON GROUNDS OF TOO DISTANT A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FALLEN. BUT, IN SPITE OF THIS APPARENT PROHIBITION BY THE JUNTA, HE WAS REPORTED TO ME TO BE QUITE UNRUFFLED AND IN COMMAND ON BOARD ON SHIP'S DEPARTURE AT 1800Z THE SAME DAY. OTHER SOURCES INDICATE A NUMBER OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WERE ABOARD AND "CLARIN" HAS PUBLISHED THE NAMES OF SEVEN UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE, ADDITIONAL TO THE 52 CREW, 50 PASSENGERS, DOCTOR, PRIEST AND SIX JOURNALISTS (INCLUDING JOHN ARDEN OF BBCTV) WHO IT SAID WERE AUTHORISED TO TRAVEL. IT WILL BE UNWISE TO RELAX UNTIL ALL ARE SAFELY BACK IN PORT, SINCE DESTEFANIS, APART FROM CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE FROM THE NAVY, APPERS TO ENJOY SOME DEGREE OF PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY OF ACTION, PERHAPS BY VIRTUE OF HIS LINKS WITH THE SAME PROTECTING SOURCE.

3. THIS BELATED ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY THE JUNTA AND PROHIBITION OF ANY ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE PROTECTION ZONE LIFTS THE THREAT OF EARLY AAA OR 2 APRIL COMMANDO ACTION AGAINST THE BRITISH "EMBASSY" AND COMMUNITY LEADERS HERE BUT SECURITY MEASURES AND ENHANCED VIGILANCE WILL BE MAINTAINED.

JOY  
POWELL-JONES

NNNNN



DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT FOR RELEASE BY FCO

Senor Destafanis attempted to speak by telephone this evening to the Prime Minister. The call was taken by an FCO official.

Senor Destafanis who apparently was speaking from on board the "Lago Lacar" was inaudible but conveyed his message through an intermediary in Buenos Aires. He made clear he was seeking authorisation to proceed to the Falkland Islands. He said that he proposed to fly the Red Cross flag and that he would assume responsibility for the enterprise.

The FCO official replied that the British Government had all along made it clear that they had no objection to a visit to the Falkland Islands by relatives of Argentine servicemen who died during the hostilities there provided that the visit was organised and supervised by the ICRC and was purely humanitarian in nature. The conditions which we specified to the ICRC and which they relayed to Senor Destafanis were those necessary to ensure this. That remained our position. As Senor Destafanis had refused to accept these conditions there could be no question of the British Government allowing his group to the Falkland Islands.



DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT FOR RELEASE BY FCO

A telephone call apparently from Senor Destafanis was received this evening by the Prime Minister's Office to speak to the Prime Minister. It is standard practice to put incoming calls to the appropriate Duty Officer. In this case the call was taken by an official in the Falkland Islands Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Senor Destafanis who apparently was speaking from on board the "Lago Lacar" was inaudible but conveyed his message through an intermediary in Buenos Aires. He made clear he was seeking authorisation to proceed to the Falkland Islands. He said that he proposed to fly the Red Cross flag and that he would assume responsibility for the enterprise.

*In reply the F.C.O official drew on the F.C.O statement  
of 28/4 which stated*

*Statement  
never  
issued*





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>952</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>DIS Daily Intrep No 5 dated 2 April 1983</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>22 January 2013 C. Wayland</i>
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MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



PART 33 ends:-

Berne tel: 900 r 30/4/83

PART 34 begins:-

Daily Intrep No 5 undated.

2.4.83



