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PREM 19/946

SECRET

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PART 2

Confidential Filing

UK/Zimbabwe Relations
Internal Situation
Aid to Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe/S. Africa Relations

ZIMBABWE

Part 1: May 1980

Part 2: Nov 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~23.11.81~~		~~19.10.82~~					
~~27.11.81~~		~~1.11.82~~					
~~18.1.82~~		~~8.11.82~~					
~~19.2.82~~		~~10.11.82~~					
~~1.3.82~~		~~19.11.82~~					
~~4.3.82~~		~~25.11.82~~					
~~4.3.82~~		~~30.11.82~~					
~~9.6.82~~							
~~27.7.82~~							
~~30.7.82~~							
~~2.8.82~~		— ends —					
~~6.8.82~~							
~~9.8.82~~							
~~6.9.82~~							
~~21.9.82~~							
~~25.9.82~~							
~~18.10.82~~							

PREM 19/946

PART 2 ends:-

AJC to MOD of 30/11/82

PART 3 begins:-

Harare tel: 694 of 1/12/82

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(82) 6th Conclusions, Minute 2	18.2.82
CC(82) 8th Conclusions, Minute 3	4.3.82
CC(82) 40th Conclusions, Minute 2	29.7.82
JIC(82)(N) 106	14.10.82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed C Wayland Date 4 December 2012

PREM Records Team

file Mr
Zimbabwe.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 November 1982

ZIMBABWE

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 24 November setting out the position on our military aid to Zimbabwe. Mrs. Thatcher has also seen Brian Fall's letter of 26 November conveying the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this matter.

The Prime Minister agrees (with some reluctance) that 12 extra personnel should be provided so that BMATT can complete its training of Army Instructors by June next year).

She also agrees that now is not the time to provide SAS training or RAF technical personnel.

The Prime Minister notes that Mr. Pym is still considering Mr. Nott's suggestion that we should not in present circumstances proceed with the sale of six RAF Hunter aircraft and ground equipment.

Finally, the Prime Minister hopes that the general review of our policy towards Zimbabwe can be carried out as quickly as possible.

I am copying this letter to Brian Fall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

(1)

PRIME MINISTER

ZIMBABWE

Your questions underneath.

The latest estimate is that the Air Force detainees will be brought to trial in February/March.

When Mr. Nott raised with Mr. Mugabe the question of the torture allegations, Mugabe took the line that so far as he was aware, there had been no mistreatment. But if he was misinformed, this was sure to be established when the cases came to court. When Vice-President Bush raised the matter with him more recently, Mr. Mugabe stressed that the judicial process would take its course and if the courts found that statements had been extracted by torture, they would rule them inadmissible.

Incidentally, I understand that Mr. Stuttaford, in a private court action, obtained compensation of $18,000 for mistreatment while in prison.

Are you prepared to agree, as the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary suggest, that 12 extra personnel are provided to BMATT so that the training of Zimbabwe National Army instructors can be completed by June 1983?

Reluctantly - yes

A.J.C.

29 November 1982

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

2% @ 131/29

Hd CASD, POSD (2), News Dept, Info Dept, Consular Dept, PS, PS/Mr. Hurd, PS/Mr. Onslow, PS/Ld Belstead ~~Sir A. Buttrick~~ Sir. A. Leahy PS/PUS PS/Mr Duroing (2)

00 FCO

RR PRETORIA

RR WASHINGTON

GR 435
UNCLASSIFIED
FM HARARE 291330Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 686 OF 29 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE PRETORIA AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 670: IAN SMITH

X13

1. THE BULAWAYO CHRONICLE ON 27 NOVEMBER PUBLISHED THE FULL TEXT OF SMITH'S INTERVIEW IN THE US WITH THE WASHINGTON TIMES, DESCRIBED AS A 'RELATIVELY CONSERVATIVE DAILY OWNED BY THE MOONIES', UNDER THE HEADLINE 'SAVE RHODESIA, SMITH ASKS THE FREE WORLD'. THE CHRONICLE ARTICLE FOLLOWS STATEMENTS BY SMITH TO THE ZIMBABWEAN NEWS AGENCY THAT REPORTS OF WHAT HE HAD SAID IN AMERICA WERE A LIE AND A DISTORTION. FOLLOWING IS THE ABRIDGED TEXT:

BEGINS

THE FREE WORLD MUST HELP RESTORE SANITY IN ZIMBABWE RATHER THAN ASSIST IT TO BECOME A MARXIST DICTATORSHIP, THE FORMER RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER, MR IAN SMITH, SAID .....''WE CAN HOLD ON, WE CAN SAVE THIS WONDERFUL COUNTRY'' (QUOTING SMITH).....

ASKED WHY HE DID NOT REFER TO ZIMBABWE BY NAME, HE SAID: ''YOU WANT ME TO DO THAT. OK, OFFICIALLY AND LEGALLY ITS ZIMBABWE AND I'VE ACCEPTED IT''.

''BUT IN MY HEART UNTIL I DIE IT WILL BE RHODESIA. IT MUST BE''.

MR SMITH SAID PREMIER MR ROBERT MUGABE, HAD REALISED WHEN HE CAME TO POWER THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE WHITES IN THE COUNTRY. IN THE FIRST YEAR THINGS HAD GONE WELL AND MOST OF THE MINISTERS BEHAVED THEMSELVES.

''BUT THEN THE GOT REALLY GET IN'' MR SMITH SAID

POWER THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE WHITES IN THE COUNTRY. IN THE FIRST YEAR THINGS HAD GONE WELL AND MOST OF THE MINISTERS BEHAVED THEMSELVES.

''BUT THEN THE ROT REALLY SET IN'' MR SMITH SAID.

WHITES WHO HAD THE EXPERTISE AND THE SKILLS TO MAKE THE COUNTRY RUN WERE LEAVING BECAUSE LIFE HAD BEEN MADE UNBEARABLE FOR THEM.

EDUCATION, HEALTH SERVICES AND THE ECONOMY WERE BREAKING DOWN, TAXATION WAS EXCESSIVE, THE LAW AND ORDER SITUATION WAS BAD, HE SAID. THE MEDIA HAD BEEN TAKEN OVER BY THE GOVERNMENT.

MR SMITH WAS ASKED WHETHER HIS OWN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN GUILTY OF DETENTIONS AND TORTURES HE COMPLAINED OF NOW.

HE SAID THE MUGABE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED THEY WERE USING THE SAME EMERGENCY POWERS USED BY THE SMITH GOVERNMENT.

''BUT OF COURSE, WE WERE USING THEM WHEN WE WERE AT WAR, EXACTLY THE SAME AS OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE DONE, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN.''

''AND WE HAVE NEVER CONDONED TORTURE'' MR SMITH SAID.

MR MUGABE HAD INHERITED A WONDERFUL ECONOMY WHICH WAS NOW RUNNING DOWN. HE HAD SPENT MONEY LIKE WATER.

''HE HAS 57 MINISTERS, I'M TOLD - MORE MINISTERS THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD - ALL DRIVING AROUND IN THEIR MERCEDES BENZES. EVERYBODY IS A COMRADE AND EVERY COMRADE IS ENTITLED TO A JOB''.

MR SMITH SAID: ''THERE IS THE DANGER OF THE FREE WORLD FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF AIDING AND ABETTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-PARTY MARXIST DICTATORSHIP IN A COUNTRY WHICH SHOULD BE PART OF THE FREE WORLD.''

ENDS.

ELAM

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 135
CONFIDENTIAL
FM HARARE 261450Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 682 OF 26 NOVEMBER.

No 10?

MT

MY TELNO 681 : I D SMITH.

1. TODAY'S HERALD REPORTS ANDERSON, AS LEADER OF THE INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, SAYING THAT THE WHITE COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE REPORTED CRITICISMS OF ZIMBABWE MADE IN THE UNITED STATES BY MR IAN SMITH. ANDERSON SAID SMITH HAD RAISED ACRIMONY AND SUSPICION AMONG THE RACES WHEN COMMUNICATION, COOPERATION AND POSITIVE SUGGESTIONS WERE NEEDED.

2. ANDERSON HAS SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED CRITICISING SMITH IN THE PAST, EVEN SINCE THE SPLIT, AND IT IS PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY THAT HE MADE THE STATEMENT AFTER THE NEWS OF THE ''PRIVATE VIEW'' HAD BEEN MADE PUBLIC HERE. BUT ACTUALLY THAT INCIDENT HAS HAD SURPRISINGLY LITTLE IMPACT HERE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, AND INDEED WADMAN (MY TELNO 678) DESCRIBED IT TO US AS ''A STORM IN A TEACUP''.

ELAM

LIMITED
CAFD
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NEWS D
INFO D
CONS D
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR SQUIRE

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

Please see Mr. Nott's views (attached).

Agree that

(a) 12 extra personnel should be provided to BMATT

(b) we should not provide SAS training or RAF technical personnel — Agreed not

(c) we should carry out the general review you have requested as quickly as possible? — Agreed not

A. J. C. 26/11

FM

CONFIDENTIAL

(1).

When are the Air Force deliveries to start? What did Nyerere say about the Hunter alleg. deals?

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 November 1982

Dear John,

Mr Pym has seen Richard Mottram's letter to me of 24 November about outstanding proposals for military sales and assistance to Zimbabwe.

Mr Pym endorses Mr Nott's comments about the importance of BMATT's training programme, both for internal security within Zimbabwe and for the morale of the white community. He fully supports Mr Nott's recommendation that 12 extra personnel should be provided so that BMATT can complete the intensive training of army instructors by June next year, and hopes that this can go ahead without delay. (This will not in any way prejudice the general review of policy on which we shall be submitting papers shortly: the provision of extra personnel now would actually make it easier for us to make substantial reductions thereafter if that is what is decided.)

Pending the general review, Mr Pym agrees with Mr Nott's conclusion that now is not the time to agree to provide SAS training or RAF technical personnel.

Mr Pym is still considering Mr Nott's suggestion that we should not in present circumstances proceed with the arrangements for the sale of 6 RAF Hunter aircraft and ground equipment on commercial terms. Mr Pym appreciates Mr Nott's concern about possible domestic criticism, but has asked to see an analysis of the implications of such a decision for our political and commercial interests in Zimbabwe. We shall give you our views very soon.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and to Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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Bembabino Vs
Relation

GR 510

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 251200Z

FM HARARE 251005Z NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 674 OF 25 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA AND WASHINGTON

Zimbabwe

MY TELNO 670 : I D SMITH

1. I CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE THIS MORNING.

2. I TOLD MUBAKO THAT I WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE IMPACT IN BRITAIN - AND ELSEWHERE - OF THE NEWS THAT MR IAN SMITH HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO PEREMPTORY RETENTION AND INTERROGATION BY THE POLICE ON WHAT WOULD APPEAR TO THE WORLD TO BE THE FLIMSIEST OF EXCUSES. THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT'S TREATMENT OF MR SMITH HAD BEEN A TOUCHSTONE OF ITS POLICY OF POST-INDEPENDENCE RECONCILIATION. THAT POLICY WAS THE ESSENTIAL FOUNDATION ON WHICH OUR SUPPORT, IN TERMS OF AID AND ALL OTHER MATTERS, ALONG WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE WEST AS A WHOLE, HAD BEEN BASED. RECONCILIATION HAD BEEN THE KEYNOTE OF MR MUGABE'S POST-ELECTION ADDRESS TO THE NATION IN APRIL 1980, AND THE WEST'S RESPONSE WAS A PRIZE THAT ZIMBABWE COULD SIMPLY NOT AFFORD TO RELINQUISH. I REMINDED MUBAKO OF THE OVERNIGHT DETENTION OF GARFIELD TODD BY THE POLICE IN JANUARY 1980, ON SPURIOUS CHARGES LEVELLED BY SINISTERLY MOTIVATED INFORMERS. THE GRAVE EMBARRASSMENT THAT HAD CAUSED THE GOVERNOR AT THAT DIFFICULT BUT FAST-MOVING TIME WAS TRIVIAL COMPARED WITH THE IMPACT TODAY, IN MUCH EASIER CIRCUMSTANCES, OF THE TREATMENT METED OUT TO MR SMITH.

3. I WENT ON TO WARN MUBAKO OF THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE OF DETAINEES IN THE THORNHILL CASE. NO CONVICTION OBTAINED ON THE BASIS OF CONFESSIONS BELIEVED TO BE EXTRACTED BY TORTURE COULD EVER COMMAND RESPECT. WORSE, NO GOVERNMENT COULD AFFORD TO IDENTIFY ITS REAL ENEMIES BY SUCH A MEANS. THE SECURITY OF THE STATE ITSELF WAS THEREBY THREATENED, SINCE THE REAL TRUTH COULD NEVER BE KNOWN.

4. I CONCLUDED WITH THE ISSUE OF SUMMARY DETENTIONS FOR FIREARMS OFFENCES. THESE WERE CREATING JUSTIFIED ALARM AMONG THE FARMING COMMUNITY, THE VERY CORNERSTONE OF ZIMBABWE'S ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. MOST SUCH OFFENCES WERE TRIVIAL. OFFENCES DESERVING FINES SHOULD ATTRACT FINES, NOT DETENTION. TO TRANSLATE MINOR FIREARMS OFFENCES FROM THE REALM OF THE FIREARMS ACT TO THAT OF STATE SECURITY UNDER THE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS WAS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIABLE. THERE WERE MORE ACTIVE WHITE FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE TODAY, TO OUR ASTONISHMENT, THAN THERE HAD BEEN AT INDEPENDENCE. NO SINGLE ELEMENT IN THE COMMUNITY WAS MORE ESSENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL THAN THE EFFICIENT COMMERCIAL FARMER.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. MUBAKO

5. MUBAKO THANKED ME FOR RAISING THESE ISSUES. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT LAY BEHIND THE INCIDENT INVOLVING MR SMITH. BUT HE WOULD SPEAK TO THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER TODAY, ALSO TO THE MINISTERS FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND STATE SECURITY, AND TELL THEM WHAT I HAD SAID, AT THE SAME TIME EXPRESSING HIS OWN CONCERN AT THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS.

6. IF, AS WE BELIEVE, USHEWOKUNZE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCIDENT AND MNANGAGWA, ENRAGED BY IT, RESPONSIBLE FOR OVER-RULING USHEWOKUNZE'S ORDER AND HAVING THE PEOPLE CONCERNED RELEASED, WHAT MUBAKO SAYS TO MUZENDA AND MNANGAGWA AT LEAST WILL NOT FALL ON DEAF EARS. AND THE ISSUE WILL LOOM LARGE IN THEIR BRIEFING OF MUGABE ON HIS RETURN.

ELAM

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CONS D
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR. SQUIRE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

Zimbabwe

B/F

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 November 1982

ZIMBABWE

Thank you for your letter of 22 November. The Prime Minister has noted the points made about the Zimbabwe media, about detainees and about contacts with Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo, but has commented that she does not find the picture conveyed very reassuring.

With regard to the last of these subjects, the Prime Minister notes that the High Commission maintain "normal contacts" with members of the Republican Front and ZAPU. Mrs. Thatcher would be grateful for more details of what these contacts involve.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 946 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: Letter from Mottram to Fall dated 24 November 1982	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	4 December 2012 CWayland
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John

(2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

22 November 1982

Not a necessary letter - indeed a very casual one. Note

Prime Minister

To note.

A.J.C.D. 22/11.

Dear John.

Zimbabwe

Thank you for your letter of 16 November enclosing your note of the Prime Minister's recent conversation with Mr Ian Smith. We are preparing advice (in consultation with MOD) on our general policy towards Zimbabwe and on our military assistance, but you may find it helpful to have comments now on the other points in your letter.

Zimbabwe Media

In the early days after independence, when the media, particularly radio, were taken over by extreme ZANU radicals, there was some truth in the charge that there was regular abuse of Western countries. But the extremists have since been weeded out and coverage of international affairs is now much more even-handed. There are occasional snipes at Britain, eg on Northern Ireland; but British events also attract favourable publicity (eg the very full coverage of Princess Anne's visit there earlier this month). Coverage of the Falkland Islands was not wholly sympathetic, but the Zimbabweans did make some effort to remain impartial. ! The media tend to adopt orthodox third world/non-aligned positions on most international issues, but direct Communist efforts to influence the media have met with little success. The press, radio and TV rely overwhelmingly on Reuters, the BBC and other Western sources for their coverage of international affairs.

Detainees

There has been little change in the position of the Air Force detainees for some weeks, but there has been some movement in the case of some of the remaining civilian detainees. I attach a revised note which summarises the present position on all detainees. Since the Secretary of State for Defence's representations to Mugabe in September, the High Commission has followed up strongly with the Home Affairs Minister Dr Ushewokunze. Both Commander BMATT and the CGS, during his October visit, spoke strongly to Mugabe about proper behaviour on the military side. There is evidence that the Zimbabwean military hierarchy are conscious of the need to improve army discipline and behaviour, and the work of BMATT makes an important contribution to this end.

We arranged for Vice President Bush to be briefed to raise this question on his official visit to Harare from 16-18 November. We have since learnt that the Vice President

/took

took a tough line in private discussions with Mr Mugabe and his Ministers on the rule of law and on human rights, with particular reference to the alleged torture of the detained Zimbabwean Air Force personnel. He had pressed for a speedy, open trial. Although the Zimbabweans were sensitive to this criticism, the Americans had been assured in return that the defendants would be given a proper Court hearing, with one senior interlocutor adding that the Government would be perfectly willing to accept a Court verdict dismissing the case against the defendants on the grounds that statements had been obtained from them under duress.

Contacts with Mr Smith and Mr Nkomo

There is no question of the High Commissioner avoiding meetings with Mr Smith and Mr Nkomo as a matter of policy. Although the Zimbabwe Government might be suspicious of too close a relationship (as you know, they regard Mr Smith as one of the least constructive of the Republican Front members of Parliament and they dismissed Mr Nkomo from the Government last February following the discovery of arms caches on land belonging to his party), the High Commission maintain normal contacts with members of the Republican Front and ZAPU and there is no reason of principle why these should not include Mr Smith and Mr Nkomo. But there are practical difficulties. Mr Smith has not proved easy to catch when contacts were offered (eg invitations to Queen's Birthday Receptions and our attempts to arrange a meeting with Lord Carrington during the latter's visit to Salisbury last March); and it is less easy to maintain contact with Mr Nkomo now that he spends nearly all his time in Bulawayo. We shall however be asking the High Commissioner, who is at present on a duty visit to Zambia and Malawi, to look again on his return at the question of contacts with Mr Smith in particular in the light of the points he raised with the Prime Minister.

what are 'normal' contacts?

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

(B J P Fall)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

ZIMBABWE: DETAINEES

1. Over 30 whites (and numerous blacks) have been detained under Zimbabwe's emergency power regulations (which were inherited from UDI) during the past year. Twenty of the detainees have been released.

2. The white detainees fall into two main categories: those suspected of political offences, and Air Force personnel suspected of sabotage at Thornhill Air Base. In several cases South African complicity is suspected. A third category are people detained for usually minor firearms offences.

3. As well as several blacks, some of the white AFZ officers and a white civilian MP, Mr Stuttaford (acquitted and released on 10 October) are believed to have been tortured or ill-treated in some way.

4. British Ministers have on several occasions raised the question of detainees with Zimbabwean ministers and pressed that they should be brought to trial without delay. During his visit in September, Mr Nott told Mr Mugabe of our concern about reports of torture against the Air Force personnel. The British High Commission subsequently repeated our concern to the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Ushewokunze.

5. The position of the Air Force personnel has improved in the last few weeks. Torture has stopped and several officers have been released. There is no evidence that the witch hunt against Air Force officers is continuing. The seven officers still detained have now appeared before a magistrate, indicating that the judicial process has started. Although the Air Force detainees seem unlikely to come to trial much before early February 1983, this is by no means unusual for the Zimbabwean legal system. Physically the detainees are said to be in reasonable shape: but there is inevitably mental strain. There is no reason to believe that the conditions in which they are being held are any worse than those for other prisoners (but since we do not have consular access we have to rely on second-hand reports). On 12 November two of the lawyers representing some of the detainees were arrested and charged before magistrates under the Law and Order Maintenance Act on two counts: making 'subversive' statements likely to bring authorities into disrepute: and with contempt of court. The charges arise from allegations by the lawyers during a recent press conference that their clients had been tortured. A police request for travel documents to be confiscated was refused and the lawyers

/continue

continue to hold their passports. One of them, Hartmann, is a mono-UK national. The lawyers are themselves legally represented and have been remanded on sureties of Z Dollars 5,000 each until 26 November. This may be extended.

7. As for the civilian detainees, all have access to legal representation and receive visits from their families. A group of four (the Bertrand case) were tried and convicted (as it happens by a white judge) in May 1982 of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage. They are no longer detainees but are serving prison sentences. Their appeals are to be heard at the end of November. We have consular access to Stephen Bertrand (a mono-British citizen) and have been allowed a visit to his father (a dual).

8. The trial of another mono-British citizen, Hartlebury, accused of spying for South Africa, began in camera on 15 November. We have had regular consular access to Hartlebury, who is in good health.

9. The maltreatment of detainees is a blot on Mugabe's record. On the whole, however, the Zimbabwe Government's record on human rights has been reasonably satisfactory: and the courts have maintained a high level of integrity.

Zimbabwe, Relations, Pt 2

ZIMBABWE

PS

RESTRICTED

GR 485
RESTRICTED
FM HARARE 191130Z NOV 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 657 OF 19 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, PRETOPIA.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT.

1. THE US AMBASSADOR TOLD CONTACT GROUP COLLEAGUES YESTERDAY EVENING THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAD GONE EXTREMELY WELL. BUSH HAD LEFT WITH POSITIVE IMPRESSION OF THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE QUALITY OF THE MINISTERS HE HAD MET, NOTABLY THE PRIME MINISTER (WITH WHOM HE SPENT SEVERAL HOURS IN ALL, COUNTING TWO DINNERS).

2. AT THE CONCLUDING DINNER MUGABE PPOPOSED AN EXTEMPORE TOAST TO US/ZIMBABWE RELATIONS IN SUCH WARM TERMS THAT EVEN THE HARDEST HEADED OF THE VISITING TEAM FOUND IT MOVING. IN ALL, THE ATMOSPHERICS WERE EXCELLENT (DESPITE THE DISGRACEFUL INEPTITUDE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN CHEF DE PROTOCOL, WHO NEARLY RUINED EVERYTHING). PRESS COVERAGE WAS FULL, FRIENDLY AND WELCOMING, THOUGH REPORTING OF MUGABE'S PUBLIC SPEECHES INEVITABLY HIGH-LIGHTED HIS STATEMENTS ON APARTHEID, SOUTH AFRICAN INTRANSIGENCE ON NAMIBIA AND ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILISE ZIMBABWE.

3. THE VISIT HAD LARGELY BEEN A MATTER OF FAMILIARISATION FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND NOTHING MUCH ZMERGED FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THAT WAS NEW.

DETAILED POINTS:

HOSTAGES.

4. MUGABE WAS AT PAINS TO ASSURE BUSH OF THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE AND DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO FIND THE HOSTAGES AND SECURE THEIR RELEASE.

HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. MUGABE STRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND SAID WITH REGARD TO PRESENT DETAINEES THAT THE JUDICIAL PROCESS WOULD TAKE ITS COURSE AND THAT IF THE COURTS FOUND THAT CONFESSIONS HAD BEEN EXTRACTED BY TORTURE THEY WOULD RULE THEM INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. THAT WAS THE COURTS' BUSINESS. THE LAWYERS HAD ACTED IMPROPERLY IN MAKING THEIR ACCUSATIONS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE.

RESTRICTED

/ NAMIBIA.

NAMIBIA.

6. MUGABE REGRETTED THE LACK OF RECENT PROGRESS BUT HE MADE NO CRITICISM OF THE CONTACT GROUP AND HIS TONE AND PHRASING WERE POSITIVE. HE SAID US INSISTENCE ON PARALLEL PROGRESS ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA HAD CREATED AN UNFORTUNATE LINKAGE BETWEEN AN ISSUE WHICH HE FELT COULD NOW BE RESOLVED, NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE, AND A MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT WOULD TAKE LONGER AND WHICH THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE UP BILATERALLY WITH THE ANGOLANS. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE WAS A RIGHT OF PRINCIPLE THAT SHOULD NOT BE NEGATED OR DELAYED BECAUSE OF THE ISSUES OF CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

7. BUSH SAID A SETTLEMENT REQUIRED AN INCENTIVE FOR EVERY PARTY - PROGRESS ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WAS ESSENTIAL FOR SUCCESS. THE UNITED STATES WAS SENSITIVE TO ANGOLAN INTERNAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND HAD NO INTEREST IN PREJUDICING THEM.

SOUTH AFRICA.

8. IN RESPONSE TO MUGABE'S REMARKS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN DESTABILISATION AND ZIMBABWE'S NEED FOR AMERICAN HELP WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, BUSH EMPHASISED THE UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT TO ZIMBABWE'S SUCCESS AND TO STABILITY IN THE REGION, SAYING THAT ONE COUNTRY SHOULD NOT TRY TO DESTABILISE ANOTHER.

I D SMITH.

9. MUGABE CRITICISED REMARKS MADE BY MR IAN SMITH ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

ELAM

FCO
C AF D

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS220
CONFIDENTIAL
FM PRETORIA 181530Z NOV 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 1030 OF 18 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK LUANDA LAGOS AND HARARE
INFO SAVING TO DAKAR

MIPT (NOT TO ALL)

1. CROCKER TOLD THE FIVE THAT MUGABE HAD COMPLAINED TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN DESTABILISATION OF HER NEIGHBOURS. THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST SUCH COMPLAINT. BUT THE ZIMBABWEANS HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE A SHRED OF HARD EVIDENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIVITY IN ZIMBABWE WHICH COULD BE USED VIS A VIS THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

2. FRASURE TOLD REID PRIVATELY THAT BUSH HAD TAKEN UP WITH MUGABE THE REPORTED TORTURE OF SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE ZIMBABWE AIR FORCE AFTER THE SABOTAGE AT THORNHILL AIR BASE. THE AMERICANS WERE CONFIDENT THAT THIS HAD MADE A DEEP IMPRESSION.

3. FRASURE ALSO SAID THAT THE FIRST HOUR OF YESTERDAY'S TALKS HAD BEEN TAKEN UP BY A SIMULATED TIRADE BY PIK BOTHAT AGAINST BUSH FOR SAYING IN HARARE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WISHED TO SEE THE END OF SOUTH AFRICAN OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA. THIS WAS SMOOTHED OVER IN PUBLIC AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WHERE PIK BOTHA SAID THAT WHAT BUSH MEANT WAS THAT THE AMERICANS WANTED TO SEE NAMIBIA ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE - AN OBJECTIVE WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT SHARED.

4. ANOTHER HOUR OF THE TALKS HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE WORLD SCENE IN THE LIGHT OF BREZHNEV'S DEATH. THE AMERICANS HAD EXPECTED A FURTHER REPEAT PIK BOTHA'S '' AFRICA IS DYING'' SPEECH, BUT THEY HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.

5. CROCKER TOLD THE FIVE THAT THE CAPE VERDE MINISTERS WHOM BUSH HAD SEEN HAD STRESSED THAT DOS SANTOS FERVENTLY DESIRED A CUBAN WITHDRAWAN FROM ANGOLA.

FCO PASS SAVING TO DAKAR

FERGUSSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

NAMIBIA
STANDARD

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OADS	ERD
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NAD	
MCAD	CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

cc MOD
CO

HL

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

16 November 1982

Dear Brian,

Zimbabwe

Mr. Ian Smith paid a private call on the Prime Minister this afternoon. I enclose a note of the main points he made.

The Prime Minister told me afterwards that she was concerned about the developing situation in Zimbabwe. The reports which reached her from many quarters were now difficult to ignore. She thought it desirable that a more vigorous attempt should be made to establish the facts and to make these known more widely.

Mrs. Thatcher would be grateful for advice on three points arising from her meeting with Mr. Smith:

(a) How far is it the case that the United Kingdom and other Western countries are the subject of daily abuse on radio and television in Zimbabwe?

(b) What is the latest situation on the detainees? (I appreciate that you provided a brief for the meeting with Mr. Smith but I think it would be useful if the facts could be summarised again.)

(c) Is it the case that the British High Commissioner, as a matter of policy, avoids meetings with Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo and, if so, should this practice not be changed?

The Prime Minister has also reiterated her view that, the light of the reports of torture in Zimbabwe, we must reassess our military aid (my letter of 18 October refers).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to consider, with the Secretary of State for Defence, how this can best be carried forward. It may be that, in addition to the specific points on which the Prime Minister has asked for briefing, it would be desirable for Mrs. Thatcher to receive a general paper on our policy towards Zimbabwe. In the light of that, the Prime Minister may wish to consider having a discussion in OD.

/ I should

I should emphasise that we have asked Mr. Smith to keep the fact of his call on the Prime Minister to himself. We are initiating no publicity.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

John Coles

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Master

Subject

NOTE OF A CALL BY MR. IAN SMITH ON THE PRIME MINISTER AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON TUESDAY 16 NOVEMBER 1982

Mr. Ian Smith called on the Prime Minister today in her room at the House. He was accompanied by the Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P. Mr. Gow and I were also present.

Most of the talking was done by Mr. Smith. He said that he was grateful to the Prime Minister for making time for him. It was important that she should be briefed on the latest situation in Zimbabwe. It was possible that she was not receiving full information. He had just returned from the United States where his interlocutors were taken aback by his description of what was going on in Zimbabwe.

He was concerned that the free world, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, were falling into the trap of aiding and abetting the establishment of a one-party Communist state. Things in Zimbabwe seemed to be going in that direction, apparently with the concurrence of the free world. The Government of Zimbabwe openly admitted that their philosophy was Communist and that they had embarked upon establishing a one-party state.

They had taken over the communications media. None of their opponents had access to radio or television. He himself had no access at all and Mr. Nkomo complained equally strongly. The programmes were remarkably slanted.

The Government was nationalising industry. For a year they had existed on the fat inherited from the pre-independence government. Now they were living day-by-day on hand-outs from the free world. They had renewed the state of emergency which was not justified by the security situation but was simply a means of circumventing the Constitution and the Declaration of Rights. Arbitrary arrests were carried out. Complaints to the police were met with the answer that they had no power to intervene. The cases of Stuttaford, the York brothers and the imprisoned airforce officers

/ were

were well known. Stuttaford had been incarcerated for ten months on a ludicrous charge of planning a coup. Three men who had given evidence on his behalf had been re-arrested. There was no doubt that Stuttaford and the airforce officers were tortured. There was medical evidence to substantiate this. One visitor who had seen the airforce personnel had said that three of them would have committed suicide had they been able to do so. He (Mr. Smith) was convinced, as were many other people, that the airmen had had no intention of carrying out a coup. It was incomprehensible that they would have blown up their own aircraft.

To begin with, he had got on well with Mr. Mugabe and had told his own supporters to co-operate with him and try to make the Lancaster House agreement work. Relations for a year or so after independence had been relatively good. Then Mugabe had started to talk publicly about a one-party state. Mr. Arthur Bottomley had expressed his concern about this publicly at a Parliamentary Conference. Soon after that Mr. Smith had told Mugabe that he would have to dissociate himself from the idea of a one-party state which was harming Zimbabwe and turning investment away. Mugabe had been annoyed and had never spoken to Mr. Smith since. Mr. Nkomo saw Mugabe very rarely. Mugabe had then offered posts in the Government to some of the members of Mr. Smith's party, on condition that they broke away from him.

There was a good deal of intimidation. Some of his people had been told by blacks that it would be better for their health if they severed links with his office.

He had asked some of Mugabe's Ministers why they continued to make provocative statements about the free world, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, when these countries were the only ones which were helping Zimbabwe. The reply had been that Mr. Smith was old-fashioned. Western representatives never put questions of this kind. Recently, Zimbabwe had received a new soft loan of $27 million from the United States.

/ In response

In response to a question from the Prime Minister Mr. Smith said that abuse of the United States and the United Kingdom on radio and television was a virtually daily occurence. The tide did now seem to be turning. More and more blacks were becoming disenchanted. People were complaining that the economic situation was worse than during the time of economic sanctions - and there was no political freedom. At an earlier stage, he had wondered whether Mr. Mugabe was aware of the behaviour of some of his Ministers. But he had now reached the conclusion that Mugabe did know what was going on and condoned it. It was important to realise that Mugabe took his orders from the Central Committee and there was no way in which he could disagree with it.

The regime was now bankrupt. They could not fulfil their promises. The payment of civil servants' salaries had been long delayed. He appreciated that the West could not indulge in crude blackmail. But it should be possible tactfully to point out to the Zimbabwe Government that they must accept certain obligations. It should be made plain to them that certain practices and human rights abuse should be stopped. Zimbabwe should not be helped with Western money to join the Communist world. An effort must be made to arrest the process, otherwise the country would be lost.

Mr. Smith said that he had only seen the British High Commissioner once. Nkomo similarly had little contact with him. The United States Ambassador also appeared to avoid the Opposition. How could these representatives provide their Governments with information about the views of the whites if they did not speak to him - or the views of the Matabele if they did not speak to Nkomo? Free world Ambassadors ought to meet leaders of the political parties on a regular basis. This would help them to resist Mugabe's attempts to despatch them to oblivion. He had heard from the United States that Vice President Bush intended to see him and Mr. Nkomo if and when he visited Zimbabwe. Other Americans had said the same. The Soviet Union was now moving in. It had an Embassy in Harare which was growing fast. It was strongly backing SWAPO. The Russians had already secured Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique and had Zambia pretty well under

/ their

their thumb. If they took Zimbabwe, Botswana and Nambia would follow.

A. S. C.

16 November 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 November, 1982

Dear John,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Ian Smith: 16 November 1982

As requested I attach a brief for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Smith.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

MR IAN SMITH'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: TUESDAY 16 NOVEMBER 1982

POINTS TO MAKE [ALL DEFENSIVE]

Air Force Detainees

1. Concerned about torture allegations. But essentially an internal matter for Zimbabwe to be decided through the Zimbabwean courts. Most of the detainees are Zimbabwean citizens. We therefore have no formal authority to intervene. The Zimbabweans have been left in no doubt about our concern that detainees should be treated fairly and humanely, and be brought to trial soon. Mr Nott made point clear to Mr Mugabe. We made formal protest about ill-treatment of one mono-British Air Force detainee (now released). Air Force detainees now within judicial process. Impressed by the high level of integrity maintained by Zimbabwean courts. Charges against lawyers representing some of the detainees not a helpful development, but the lawyers have been released on bail.

Detainees/Military Assistance

2. Our military assistance to Zimbabwe determined in the light of our national interests viewed as a whole. No decisions have been taken on the size and scope of our future military aid for Zimbabwe. [If pressed: the cutting off of military aid most unlikely to help the case of the detainees.]

Detainees/Development Aid

3. Purpose of our development aid to assist Zimbabwe's economic development and thereby help stability. [If pressed: to attempt to use aid as a means of applying political pressure on Zimbabwe Government would almost certainly prove counter-productive.]

/ 4.

Blocked Funds

4. Unrealistic to expect Zimbabwe Government to relax exchange controls and release blocked funds in the present recession. Zimbabweans have repeatedly said they will relax the controls when they can afford to do so. We have regularly reminded Zimbabwe of our concern at the hardship the exchange controls are causing in some cases, but our influence in this area is very limited.

Aid/Blocked Funds

5. Withholding aid would not help to solve the problems of individuals affected by the present exchange control regulations. [If raised: We are prevented under the Overseas Aid Act from making payment of aid funds direct to individuals.]

One Party State

6. Zimbabwe is an independent country. It is for the Zimbabweans themselves to decide what political system they want. There are provisions in the Lancaster House Constitution for amending the constitution. Mugabe has repeatedly said that he will not introduce one-party system unconstitutionally.

Dual Nationality

7. Again internal Zimbabwean matter. The Bill amending the constitutional provision on dual nationality is not unconstitutional. Zimbabwe Government have stated that no-one would be forced to give up their British nationality or be discriminated against in any way.

MR IAN SMITH'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER: 16 NOVEMBER 1982

ESSENTIAL FACTS

The Republican Front (RF)

1. Ian Smith remains President and leader of the Republican (formerly Rhodesian) Front (RF) and a member of the House of Assembly. The RF took all 20 white roll seats in the independence elections but quickly divided into two camps: vigorous opponents and those prepared to cooperate with the Mugabe Government. An attempt by this latter group to form an alternative 'Democratic Party'failed but earlier this year nine RF MPs broke away to form an unofficial independent group led by Anderson, now one of Mugabe's Ministers of State.

2. The RF is no longer a political force but no effective white leader has emerged to take Ian Smith's place. The whites in general seem to realise that they have no political role as a community and have become apathetic. In the recent white bye-election in Bulawayo (caused by the expulsion of Mr Denis Walker from Parliament following his absence for six months) only 29% of those eligible to vote did so and only 16% voted for the successful RF candidate).

Internal Situation

3. Since independence the Zimbabwe Government's achievements have been impressive; an amalgamated army, a high degree of reconciliation and a burst of economic growth. In recent months,

/ however

however, the underlying problems have re-asserted themselves. Relations between Mugabe's ZANU and Nkomo's ZAPU have deteriorated markedly following the latter's dismissal earlier this year, and although some rapprochement has been achieved recently, deep tensions remain and could quickly worsen if imprisoned ZAPU leaders are brought to trial or Nkomo is arrested (though this possibility seems to have receeded somewhat). The Army's cohesion is fragile and a substantial number of ZAPU deserters are engaged in banditry in Matabeleland, Nkomo's tribal base. It is too early to say whether the authorities can successfully contain the situation. Brutality by the security forces (present under Smith) has become increasingly visible and for the first time directed against some whites (e.g. the Air Force officers detained in connection with the attack on Thornhill airbase in July). The economy has been hit by the recession. White confidence is again shaky.

4. Mugabe's role remains crucial. A great deal depends upon his willingness to reassert the policies of reconciliation which brought his Government so much initial success and international goodwill.

White Community

5. White morale has fluctuated widely since independence. Mugabe has often been at pains to reassure the whites of their role in Zimbabwean society and in April appointed three more white ministers to his Government. However, detentions without trial, reports of torture

/ of

of Air Force officers, murder of white farmers in Matabeleland, the proposed removal of the right of dual citizenship, and the erratic and vindictive behaviour of the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Ushewokunze, have done little to maintain white confidence. The rate of white emigration has remained steady at about 1,500 a month, but is far from an exodus. Less than a quarter of the white population at independence has departed.

One-Party State

6. Public references to the one party state have continued, but in somewhat lower key. Mugabe undoubtedly favours a one-party system, because he considers multi-party politics divisive in the Zimbabwe context. But he has repeatedly said that he will not introduce constitutional change unconstitutionally.

7. The Zimbabwe constitution provides for the right to form (and belong to) political parties for a period of 10 years. This provision cannot be changed before then except by a unanimous vote of Parliament. The constitution also provides for separate representation in 20 white roll constituencies. This provision cannot be changed for a period of 7 years except by unanimous vote.

Detainees

8. Over 30 whites (and numerous blacks) have been detained under Zimbabwe's emergency power regulations (which were inherited from UDI) during the past year. Twenty of the detainees have been released.

9. The white detainees fall into two categories: those suspected of political offences, and Air Force personnel suspected of sabotage at Thornhill air base. In several cases South African complicity is suspected. As well as several blacks, some of the white AFZ officers and a white civilian MP, Mr Stuttaford (acquitted and released on 10 October) are believed to have been tortured or ill-treated in some way. British ministers have on several occasions raised the question of detainees with Zimbabwean ministers and pressed that they should be brought to trial without delay. During his visit in September, Mr Nott told Mr Mugabe of our concern about reports of torture against the Air Force personnel.

10. The position of the Air Force personnel has improved in the last few weeks. Torture has stopped and several officers have been released. There is no evidence that the witch hunt against Air Force officers is continuing. The seven officers still detained have now appeared before a magistrate indicating that the judicial process has started. Although the Air Force detainees seem unlikely to come to trial much before early February 1983, this is by no means unusual for the Zimbabwean legal system.

11. On 12 November two of the lawyers representing some of the detainees were arrested and charged before magistrates under the Law and Order Maintenance Act on two counts: making 'subversive' statements likely to bring authorities into disrepute; and with contempt of court. The charges arise from allegations by the

/ lawyers

lawyers during a recent press conference that their clients had been tortured. A police request for travel documents to be confiscated was refused and the lawyers continue to hold their passports. One of them, Hartmann, is a mono-UK national. The lawyers are themselves legally represented and have been remanded on bail of Z$5,000 each until 26 November. This may be extended.

12. As for the civilian detainees, all have access to legal representation and receive visits from their families. A group of four (the Bertrand case) were tried and convicted (as it happens by a white judge) in May 1982 of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage and are now serving prison sentences.

13. The maltreatment of detainees is all the more disappointing after the initial success of Mugabe's policy of reconciliation. By and large, however, the Zimbabwe Government's record on human rights has been satisfactory; and the courts have maintained a high level of integrity.

Dual Nationality

14. The Zimbabwe Government recently introduced a bill which would abolish the right for Zimbabweans to hold dual nationality as provided for in the constitution. However, the constitution may be amended provided there is a two-thirds affirmative vote in the Senate and affirmative vote by 70 members of the House of Assembly. If the present proposals become law, those who

/ presently

presently hold British nationality in Zimbabwe will still be permitted to do so. The Zimbabwe Government has stated that individuals will not be penalised if they opt for non-Zimbabwean citizenship. Moreover, should an individual renounce his British citizenship in order to acquire Zimbabwean citizenship, he may, under the British Nationality Act, reclaim it as of right.

Blocked Funds

15. Since independence, the Zimbabwe Government have been forced by balance of payments difficulties to maintain their strict exchange controls, inherited from UDI. Some relaxations have been made (eg. current income may now be remitted to the UK) but in other respects the controls have been tightened (eg. restrictions on the export of personal and household effects). The Zimbabwe Government have assured us that the restrictions are maintained through economic necessity rather than as a matter of principle and that they will relax the controls as soon as financial circumstances permit. These are matters of internal economic policy over which we have no influence. We have, however, taken every opportunity to point out the difficulties which the controls are causing, particularly for elderly emigrants and people on low fixed incomes.

Central African Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 November 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 November, 1982

Dear John,

Agreed.
AR 12/11

Call by Mr I Smith on 16 November

As requested, we shall be letting you have a short brief on Monday for Mr Smith's call the following day.

We think it might be advisable to decide on a line to take if news of the call becomes public and to brief the High Commissioner in Harare accordingly. I enclose a draft telegram, on which I should be grateful for comments.

Yours ever,

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
RESTRICTED	IMMEDIATE

ZCZC
GRS
RESTRICTED

FM FCO 121700Z NOVEMBER 82
TO IMMEDIATE HARARE
TELEGRAM NUMBER

CALL ON PRIME MINISTER BY IAN SMITH

1. You should know that the Prime Minister has agreed to a request from Ian Smith to call on her on 16 November. We shall initiate no publicity. If asked we shall take the line that it is normal practice for the Prime Minister to receive from time to time leaders from friendly countries of political parties whether in the Government or Opposition. If pressed we shall add that there is no significance about the timing of this call. You should take a similar line in answer to any local enquiries.

PYM
NNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept: PRIVATE OFFICE	Distribution: CAFD, SIR J LEAHY, MR SQUIRE, PS/PUS, PS/MR ONSLOW, PS/NO 10, NEWS DEPT
Drafted by (Block capitals): R B BONE		
Telephone number		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

C.F. Papers

RM

c. FCO
N. Wimbertons MP.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 November 1982

Dear Mr. Walker.

Thank you for your letter of 22 October. I was most interested to hear your views about Zimbabwe when we met recently.

We were indeed aware that the Zimbabwe Government had introduced a draft bill relating to dual citizenship. During the Lancaster House negotiations we were concerned that those living in Zimbabwe who held British nationality should not be deprived of that right when the country became independent. This was reflected in the Zimbabwe Constitution, which was drawn up during those negotiations. However, as I am sure you are already aware, this section of the Constitution may be amended provided that there is a two thirds affirmative vote in the Senate and an affirmative vote by 70 members of the House of Assembly. As you say, even if the present proposals become law, those who presently hold British nationality in Zimbabwe will still be free to do so. The Zimbabwe Government has stated that individuals will not be penalised if they opt for non-Zimbabwe citizenship.

As regards the other point raised in your letter, Zimbabwe's exchange controls, like other aspects of her economic policies, are essentially an internal matter. However, the Zimbabwean authorities have assured us that the restrictions are maintained through necessity, given their severe shortage of foreign currency, and not as a matter of principle. They have also said that the restrictions will be relaxed as soon as financial circumstances permit. I do not believe that linking British aid to a relaxation in Zimbabwe's exchange controls would be helpful. Indeed I think it would be counter-

productive.

Yours

productive. To make our aid conditional in this way would simply deprive the Zimbabwe Government of valuable foreign exchange which is helping them to develop the economy and which in turn will help them to meet their financial obligations.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

W.D. Walker, Esq.,

CF Papers

RM

c. FCO

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 November 1982

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 26 October, enclosing one from Mr. Denis Walker to whom I shall be replying separately. You will by now have received my letter of 1 November with my comments on the question of detainees.

You also raise the matter of exchange controls. Such controls are not, of course, unique to Zimbabwe. Many other countries, whose foreign exchange earnings have been severely affected by the world recession, have had to impose similar restrictions. The application of exchange controls is essentially an internal matter. We are not, therefore in a position to intervene formally with the Zimbabweans, any more than we would welcome foreign intervention in our own economic policies. However, we do not under-estimate the very real difficulties which these restrictions sometimes cause people, and we have urged the Zimbabweans to relax their exchange controls as soon as possible. But until their overall foreign exchange position improves, the Zimbabweans have little room to be more flexible.

I do not believe that linking British aid to a relaxation of Zimbabwe's exchange controls would help. To make our aid conditional in this way would simply deprive the Zimbabwean Government of valuable foreign exchange which is helping them to restore the economy, and which in turn will help them to meet their financial obligations in due course.

Yours ever

Margaret

Nicholas R. Winterton, Esq., M.P.,

8-up

Zimbabwe

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 November, 1982

Dear Robert, pl type WR

Thank you for your letter of ~~29~~ October enclosing copies of correspondence to the Prime Minister from Nicholas Winterton MP and the Zimbabwe MP, Mr Denis Walker. As you know, the Prime Minister wrote to Nicholas Winter on ~~1~~ November about other aspects of their discussion on 19 October.

// I enclose draft replies to Mr Winterton and Mr Walker as requested. These are largely self-explanatory, but it may be helpful if I set out the background to the Zimbabwe Government's draft Bill on citizenship. The purpose of the Bill, which was introduced in May, is two-fold:

(a) to repeal Section 8 of the Constitution, which relates to the holding of dual citizenship;

(b) to repeal Section 9 of the Constitution, which concerns the powers of parliament in relation to citizenship.

It is an enabling Bill and does not of itself do away with dual citizenship. That would require a new Act which, we understand, is still being drafted. However, the Bill has inevitably aroused considerable apprehension amongst the white community and our High Commission in Harare have received a number of enquiries from whites about the implications of the Bill for their citizenship status.

The Zimbabwe Government is aware of the potential impact of the Bill on white morale and, during a debate in the House of Assembly in August, the Minister for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs sought to offer some assurances. He pointed out that many other major countries only permit mono-citizenship and he said that the Bill would not infringe the rights of individuals; that the Government did not intend to act against Government employees who did not possess Zimbabwe citizenship; and that non-possession of Zimbabwe citizenship would not be to the detriment of people who intended to live and work there.

/As

As the enclosed draft reply to Mr Walker makes clear, the Zimbabwe Government is within its rights to seek to amend the Constitution in this way, provided that it can muster sufficient votes in both chambers of Parliament.

Yours ever,

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

W Rickett Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

DSR 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime MInister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: Nicholas Winterton Esq MP
House of Commons

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 26 October, enclosing one from Mr Denis Walker to whom I shall be replying separately. You will by now have received my letter of 1 November with my comments on the question of detainees.

You also raise the matter of exchange controls. Such controls are not, of course, unique to Zimbabwe. Many other countries, whose foreign exchange earnings have been severely affected by the world recession, have had to impose similar restrictions. The application of exchange controls is essentially an internal matter. We are not therefore in a position to intervene formally with the Zimbabweans, any more than we would welcome foreign intervention in our own economic policies. However, we do not underestimate the very real difficulties which these restrictions sometimes cause people, and we have urged the Zimbabweans to relax their exchange controls as soon as possible. But until their overall foreign exchange position improves, the Zimbabwean have little room to be more flexible.

/I

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I do not believe that linking British aid to a relaxation of Zimbabwe's exchange controls would help. To make our aid conditional in this way would simply deprive the Zimbabwean Government of valuable foreign exchange which is helping them to restore the economy, and which in turn will help them to meet their financial obligations in due course.

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~ XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

W D Walker Esq
6 St Nicholas Close
Tingrith
MILTON KEYNES
Bucks MK17 9EL

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 22 October. I was most interested to hear your views about Zimbabwe when we met recently.

We were indeed aware that the Zimbabwe Government had introduced a draft bill relating to dual citizenship. During the Lancaster House negotiations we were concerned that those living in Zimbabwe who held British nationality should not be deprived of that right when the country became independent. This was reflected in the Zimbabwe Constitution, which was drawn up during those negotiations. However, as I am sure you are already aware, this section of the Constitution may be amended provided there is a two thirds affirmative vote in the Senate and an affirmative vote by 70 members of the House of Assembly. As you say, even if the present proposals become law, those who presently hold British nationality in Zimbabwe will still be free to do so. The Zimbabwe Government has stated that individuals will not be penalised if they opt for non-Zimbabwe citizenship.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/As regards

As regards the other point raised in your letter, Zimbabwe's exchange controls, like other aspects of her economic policies, are essentially an internal matter. However, the Zimbabwean authorities have assured us that the restrictions are maintained through necessity, given their severe shortage of foreign currency, and not as a matter of principle. They have also said that the restrictions will be relaxed as soon as financial circumstances permit. I do not believe that linking British aid to a relaxation in Zimbabwe's exchange controls would be helpful. Indeed I think it would be counter-productive. To make our aid conditional in this way would simply deprive the Zimbabwe Government of valuable foreign exchange which is helping them to develop the economy and which in turn will help them to meet their financial obligations.

Zimbabwe file LPO

cFCO const

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 November 1982

Dear Nicholas,

I was glad to have had the opportunity to talk with you and Mr. and Mrs. Denis Walker on 19 October about Zimbabwe. One of the matters foremost in Mr. Walker's mind was detainees, which I said I would look into further. As you know, we remain concerned about detentions without trial wherever they occur and the point was again impressed upon the Zimbabwe Government during John Nott's visit to Harare last month. John particularly mentioned our concern about recent allegations of torture of detainees and the widely reported brutality by some units of the Zimbabwe Army against civilians.

As I am sure you will appreciate, these are essentially Zimbabwean internal matters involving mainly Zimbabwean citizens or dual nationals. Our detailed knowledge of the situation is therefore incomplete. However, according to our records, the present position on detainees is somewhat different from that shown in the list which Mr. Walker left with us.

/As far as

NS

As far as white detainees are concerned, for example, all of the Zimbabwe Air Force personnel listed as being possibly still in detention were released in September. This includes the one mono-British citizen who had been detained in connection with the Thornhill sabotage, Sgt. Lochran. Neither we nor our High Commission in Harare have any record of Mr. Colin English or Mr. John Moore. Mr. Walker has omitted Flt. Lt. Barrington-Lloyd from his list of officers still in detention.

Of the former Zimbabwe CIO members (accused of spying for South Africa) Mr. Harper-Ronald was released shortly after his detention.

Again according to our records, there have been 33 whites detained under the Emergency Regulations since Independence. These include the 13 Air Force personnel. Of the total of 33 detainees, nineteen (including six Air Force personnel) have been released. Four (the Bertrand case) have been tried and convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage. This leaves the seven Air Force officers who have now appeared before magistrates and been remanded in custody; the two CIO officers, Evans and Hartlebury, who we understand have been indicted for trial in the High Court on 8 November; and Mr. Torok, a Zimbabwean citizen who is charged with possessing arms of war and awaiting trial.

Our information on the number of black Zimbabweans currently being detained without trial is limited; a number were certainly

/detained in

detained in connection with the Thornhill sabotage; others are being held in connection with the attack on Mr. Mugabe's residence last June, and there have been reports of up to 50 people being detained following the discovery of arms caches on ZAPU property last February. These include the two ex-ZIPRA officers of the Zimbabwe Army, Musuku and Dabengwa, who are included in Mr. Walker's list. Their trial is expected to start in mid-January. We are also aware that Mr. Malumisa and the two Madhlelas were detained following the aquittal of Mr. Stuttaford on 14 October.

We know of only one recent statement by the Zimbabwe Government on the total number of people currently in detention, when the Minister of State for Defence is reported to have said that 425 people had been detained during the course of the Government's anti-dissident operations in Matabeleland. Dissident violence (almost certainly perpetrated by ex-ZIPRA bandits or deserters from the Zimbabwe National Army) has been responsible for the murder of a number of white farmers as well as black civilians; and these dissidents were also responsible for the kidnapping of the six tourists, including two Britons, last July, for whom the search by the security authorities continues.

Yours ever

Margaret

Nicholas Winterton, Esq., M.P.

N. WINTERTON, MP
(Mr. Denis Walker)

12/11

FILE

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1982

I enclose a copy of a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Nicholas Winterton M.P., with which he encloses one from Mr. Denis Walker about the problems facing whites in Zimbabwe.

I should be grateful if you could provide draft replies for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Winterton and Mr. Walker, to reach us by 12 November. Mr. Walker's letter was enclosed in a sealed envelope, so it is not clear whether Mr. Winterton is aware of its contents, though I would imagine he is aware of its general thrust.

W. F. S. RICKETT

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Ro

de

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 October 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 26 October, with which you enclosed one from Mr. Denis Walker. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

W. F. S. RICKETT

Nicholas Winterton, Esq., M.P.

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 29 October 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 22 October, which was forwarded to this office by Mr. Nicholas Winterton M.P. Your letter is receiving attention and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

T.W.F.S. RICKETT

W.D. Walker, Esq.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 October 1982

Prime Minister:

If you agree, a draft letter to Nicholas Winterton is attached for your signature

29/10

Dear John,

Zimbabwe

Thank you for your letter of 19 October recording the Prime Minister's conversation that afternoon with Mr Nicholas Winterton MP and Mr and Mrs Denis Walker. As you say, there are some differences between the list of detainees in Zimbabwe provided by Mr Walker and that enclosed with my letter of 18 October.

I enclose a revised list of white detainees in which we have differentiated between Zimbabwe Air Force detainees and civilians, and also included an additional column on those detainees who have been tried and convicted (by a white judge). These people are now serving prison sentences of between four and ten years. For the sake of completeness, we have added the names of two men (Mansfield and Phelps) who were detained under the emergency regulations but quickly released and a further detainee, Mrs Y M Temple, a dual national employed in the intelligence branch of the Zimbabwe Army, who was arrested on 24 October for reasons not yet known to us, but released into her son's care on 26 October.

Of the 33 detainees in our list, 19 have been released, and 4 have been tried and convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage. This leaves the 7 Air Force officers who have now appeared before magistrates and remanded in custody; the two CIO officers, Evans and Hartlebury * [redacted] * and Mr Torok, a Zimbabwean citizen who is charged with possessing arms of war and is awaiting trial. The one mono-British citizen still in detention is Hartlebury, to whom we have regular consular access. He is reported to be fit and in reasonable spirits.

/Given the

~ Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).

O.Wayland.

4 December 2012

Given the initial success of Mr Mugabe's policy of reconciliation, the continuing use of emergency powers and reports of maltreatment of detainees in some cases are all the more disturbing. However, the Zimbabwe Government's record on human rights has, on the whole, been not too bad by African standards. Moreover, there is good evidence to show that the judiciary is maintaining its integrity. The black judge in the cases of both Mr Stuttaford and the York brothers, in particular, has shown high standards of competence and impartiality in conducting their trial.

We think it would be useful to let Mr Winterton have an up-to-date statement of our understanding of the present position on detainees and I enclose a draft letter accordingly.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~telegram/despatch/minute~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
The Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Nicholas Winterton, Esq, MP
House of Commons
LONDON SW1

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

I was glad to have had the opportunity to talk with you and Mr and Mrs Denis Walker on 19 October about Zimbabwe. One of the matters foremost in Mr Walker's mind was detainees, which I said I would look into further. As you know, we remain concerned about detentions without trial wherever they occur and the point was again impressed upon the Zimbabwe Government during John Nott's visit to Harare last month. John particularly mentioned our concern about recent allegations of torture of detainees and the widely reported brutality by some units of the Zimbabwe Army against civilians.

As I am sure you will appreciate, these are essentially Zimbabwean internal matters involving mainly Zimbabwean citizens or dual nationals. Our detailed knoweledge of the situation is therefore incomplete. However, according to our records, the present position on detainees is somewhat different from that shown in the list which Mr Walker left with us.

As far as white detainees are concerned, for example, all of the Zimbabwe Air Force personnel listed as being possibly still in detention were released in September. This includes the one mono-British citizen who had been detained in connection with the Thornhill sabotage, Sgt. Lochran. Neither we nor our High Commission in Harare have any record of Mr Colin English or Mr John Moore. Mr Walker has omitted Flt. Lt. Barrington-Lloyd

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/from...

from his list of officers still in detention.

Of the former Zimbabwe CIO members (accused of spying for South Africa) Mr Harper-Ronald was released shortly after his detention.

Again according to our records, there have been 33 whites detained under the Emergency Regulations since Independence. These include the 13 Air Force personnel. Of the total of 33 detainees, nineteen (including six Air Force personnel) have been released. Four (the Bertrand case) have been tried and convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism and sabotage. This leaves the seven Air Force officers who have now appeared before magistrates and been remanded in custody; the two CIO officers, Evans and Hartlebury, who we understand have been indicted for trial in the High Court on 8 November; and Mr Torok, a Zimbabwean citizen who is charged with possessing arms of war and awaiting trial.

Our information on the number of black Zimbabweans currently being detained without trial is limited; a number were certainly detained in connection with the Thornhill sabotage; others are being held in connection with the attack on Mr Mugabe's residence last June, and there have been reports of up to 50 people being detained following the discovery of arms caches on ZAPU property last February. These include the two ex-ZIPRA officers of the Zimbabwe Army, Musuku and Dabengwa, who are included in Mr Walker's list. Their trial is expected to start in mid-January. We are also aware that Mr Malumisa and the two Madhlelas were detained following the acquittal of Mr Stuttaford on 14 October.

We know of only one recent statement by the Zimbabwe Government on the total number of people currently in detention, when the Minister of State for Defence is reported to have said that 425 people had been detained during the course of the Government's anti-dissident operations in Matabeleland. Dissident violence (almost certainly perpetrated by ex-ZIPRA bandits or deserters from the

 /Zimbabwe...

Zimbabwe National Army) has been responsible for the murder of a number of white farmers as well as black civilians; and these dissidents were also responsible for the kidnapping of the six tourists, including two Britons, last July, for whom the search by the security authorities continues.

Zimbabwe, Relations, Pt 2

WHITE DETAINEES IN ZIMBABWE

Name	Nationality	Still Detained	Released	Convicted	Allegations of mal-treatment or torture
A.ZIMBABWE AIR FORCE					
Air Vice Marshal H C S Slatter	Zimbabwean ? Dual	✓			✓
Air Commodore P V Pile	Dual	✓			✓
Wing Commander P R Briscoe	Zimbabwean	✓			✓
Wing Commander J R Cox	Dual	✓			✓
Flt Lieutenant N J T Lewis Walker	Zimbabwean ? Dual	✓			
Flt Lieutenant Barrington Lloyd	Dual	✓			✓
Flt Lieutenant N A Weir	Dual	✓			✓
Squadron Leader J A Connolly	Dual		✓		
Warrant Officer D F Rautenbach	Zimbabwean		✓		
Master Technician Forrester	Zimbabwean ? Dual		✓		
Sergeant K Hinton	Dual		✓		
Sergeant Loots	Zimbabwean ? Dual		✓		
Sergeant Lochran	Mono British		✓		✓

/ B. CIVILIANS

Name	Nationality	Still Detained	Released	Convicted	Allegations of mal-treatment or torture
B. CIVILIANS E W Stuttaford	Zimbabwean		✓		✓
Stephen Bertrand	Mono British			✓	
Francis Bertrand	Zimbabwean			✓	
Mrs R Bertrand	Dual		✓		
P E Hartlebury	Mono British	✓			
A York	Dual		✓		
N York	Dual		✓		
V S Radmore	Dual			✓	
Mrs T G Radmore	Dual		✓		
W Hipson	Mono British		✓		
J A McDowall	Mono British		✓		
C Evans	Dual	✓			
A R Cauvin	Dual			✓	
S J Griffin	Dual		✓		
J Ramsey	Mono British		✓		
S Torok	Zimbabwean	✓			
C Bickle	? Zimbabwean		✓		
D Mansfield	Mono British		✓		
J Phelps	Dual		✓		/cont.

Name	Nationality	Still Detained	Released	Convicted	Allegations of mal-treatment or torture
Mrs Y M Temple	Dual		✓		

GR 290
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HARARE 281450Z OCT 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 610 OF 28 OCTOBER.
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, CANBERRA.

MR

MY TELNO 606 : KIDNAPPED TOURISTS.

1. REUTERS HERE HAVE PICKED UP REPORTS FROM MATABELELAND THAT VARYING NUMBERS OF WHITES, ASSUMED TO BE THE HOSTAGES, WERE SEEN ON 4 CONSECUTIVE DAYS LAST WEEK IN THE LUPANE AND NKAYI AREAS. THE WHITES WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN SEEN WITH DISSIDENTS, TO HAVE HAD THEIR FACES BLACKED, AND TO HAVE BEEN CARRYING WEAPONS. THE SOURCE APPEARS TO BE SOMEONE IN THE DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION IN THE AREA.

2. WE KNOW FROM YESTERDAY'S BRIEFING BY STANNARD THAT THEIR STORY IS A VERSION OF THE REPORTS IN PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 576, WITH SOME INACCURACIES, NOTABLY AS TO TIMING.

3. WE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THESE REPORTS BUT HAVE INDICATED IN CONFIDENCE (REUTERS HERE ARE RELIABLE) THAT WE BELIEVE THEY ARE ECHOES OF EARLIER ONES ABOUT WHICH WE HAD BEEN BRIEFED, AND TO WHICH THE AMERICAN RELATIVE BALDWIN WAS PRESUMABLY ALLUDING WHEN HE SPOKE TO THE PRESS IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY.

4. REUTERS ARE STILL UNDECIDED WHETHER TO RUN THE STORY, BUT ARE INCLINED NOT TO. HOWEVER, WITH SO MANY OTHER JOURNALISTS IN TOWN COVERING PRINCESS ANNE'S VISIT, THE STORY MAY LEAK ELSEWHERE. YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO WARN THE BRITISH FAMILIES SO AS TO AVOID UNDUE HOPES. WE HAVE ALERTED THE AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN MISSIONS HERE.

5. STANNARD HAD NOTHING NEW TO OFFER AT YESTERDAY'S BRIEFING WHICH THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO HANDLE THE CONTROL RISKS ISSUE. ON THAT WE BELIEVE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CALM LOCAL MISGIVINGS AND ENSURE THAT CONTROL RISKS GET ENOUGH INFORMATION TO BE ABLE TO REASSURE THE FAMILIES AND A FRIENDLY ENOUGH HEARING TO BE ABLE TO MAKE ANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF WHICH THEY MAY BE CAPABLE.

BYATT
LIMITED
MAED
CAFD
CONSD
NEWSD
DEFD
PUSD
PS
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/PUS
MR EVANS
SIR J. LEAHY
MR ADAMS
MR SQUIRE
MR GILLMORE
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN:
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)

cc IG
R27

26th October 1982 NRW/cmh

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Margaret,

I enclose a letter to you from Mr Denis Walker whom you were kind enough to meet with his wife last week.

The situation in Zimbabwe is desperately serious, and I hope it is possible for you to investigate, through the appropriate Government Department, the plight of those who are detained without charge or trial. The position of many white Zimbabweans financially is desperate, and I do hope that it will be possible to tie the granting of further financial assistance to Zimbabwe to conditions which will enable those who wish to leave Zimbabwe to come out with their household belongings and a reasonable percentage of their capital, to enable them to settle in another country without too much difficulty.

I look forward to hearing from you in due course.

Yours ever
Nicholas

6 St. Nicholas Close,
Tingrith, Milton Keynes, Bucks.
Telephone: Toddington 3178
MK17 9EL

22nd October, 1982.

Rt. Hon Mrs. Margaret Thatcher MP
10, Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.

Dear Prime Minister,

I would like to express how grateful my wife and I are and most honoured that in spite of the many national responsibilities that we know demand so much of your time, you were generous enough to give time to seeing us concerning the many problems facing our country Zimbabwe. We were most appreciative of your quick understanding of the situation and we sincerely believe that from your obvious interest, and concern, that only good can emanate from our meeting for the people of Zimbabwe.

Although we covered a very wide range of subjects, I did omit to mention that legislation is in the pipeline to remove the status of dual citizenship. This of course is quite contrary to the stand that for many years has been made by Britain concerning all former members of the Empire who now form the Commonwealth of nations. It is also contrary to the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement. Once the legislation becomes law, it is certain that a large number of the present population holding dual citizenship will opt to retain their British nationality.

I know that there are continued requests for financial aid by Zimbabwe. It has occurred to me that one of the ways the British Government could help particularly British subjects economically trapped in Zimbabwe, many of whom feel they are no longer wanted by the Zimbabwe Government, is for any future aid to be conditional on the lifting of restrictions relative to personal and household belongings together with a more reasonable cash amount above the $1000

2/...

permitted per family at present.

Reiterating our most sincere thanks and appreciation.

Yours sincerely,

W.D. Walker

ZIMBABWE cc FCO MOD

CF thank you AD 19/10

10 DOWNING STREET

Alan - FCO record is confidential - still not for CF? Kay 20/10.

From the Private Secretary

19 October 1982

Thank you for your letter of 29 September to the Prime Minister about the detention of Zimbabwean Air Force personnel. I have been asked to reply.

The Prime Minister is aware of allegations that some of those detained in connection with the sabotage attack at Thornhill airbase last July have been tortured. A number of them, including a British national, Sergeant Lochran, have now been released. The British High Commission have made a formal protest to the Zimbabwean authorities about the ill-treatment of Sergeant Lochran. Those still held are either Zimbabwean citizens or dual nationals. The British Government therefore have no formal authority to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwe Government have been left in no doubt about our concern that detainees, wherever they are held, should be treated humanely and fairly.

During his visit to Harare on 25 September, the Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, raised the question of the detainees. He said that whilst HMG recognise that this is essentially an internal matter for Zimbabwe, we are concerned about allegations that some of those detained have been ill-treated. He was given to understand that the detainees would be brought to trial soon, and we understand that several of them have since been remanded after appearing before a magistrate.

I would like to assure you that our High Commission in Harare will continue to keep a close watch on developments in this case, which we very much hope will be satisfactorily resolved.

A. J. COLES

Councillor Julian de Lisle

CM

SUBJECT

Zimbabwe

a master file

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

19 October 1982

ZIMBABWE

The Prime Minister had a talk this afternoon in the House of Commons with Mr. Nicholas Winterton, M.P., who had requested the meeting and who brought with him Mr. Denis Walker, the Republic Front MP, and Mrs. Walker.

Mr. Walker said that he did not feel that he could return to Zimbabwe since he would almost certainly be arrested. He explained that he had originally gone to Zimbabwe as a missionary and to become much involved with the steps taken to bring Rhodesia to independence. For example, he had visited the United States and Canada with some of Mr. Mugabe's supporters to present the new Zimbabwe to North American opinion. It had been hoped that the Lancaster House Agreement would lead to a free, democratic society in that country. But things had changed when Mugabe had decided to opt for a one-party State. One result of this move had been that politicians who had not favoured it had drifted towards Mr. Walker's own Party. This had led to suspicions of their motives. He described in some detail the case of Mr. Wally Stuttaford who had been arrested for 10 months, had been tortured and had been recently released. Three brave Africans had withstood torture and refused to give fake evidence against Mr. Stuttaford After the latter's trial, all three were again detained. Stuttaford, who was afraid of being arrested again, had now gone into hiding.

There were now some 400 people in detention, a majority of whom were blacks (this was the Zimbabwe Government's own figure). Fear had spread through the country. People were afraid to speak openly. Newspapers were censored. The latest shocking incident had been the seizure of the matron at the Queen Elizabeth Children's Home; she had been released after a few days bearing evidence of torture, including cigarette burns. Recently he had heard of two white people who had, allegedly, been killed by Matabele tribesmen. Knowing the Matabele as he did, he found it difficult to believe this. It looked as though there was a plot to turn the Matabele against the whites.

He believed that the West should make it very clear to Mugabe that he had signed the Lancaster House Agreement and must stick to it. Asked by the Prime Minister whether the exodus of whites had yet assumed considerable proportions, Mr. Walker said that it had not.

/One problem was

One problem was that white emigrants were not allowed to take their possessions with them. He did not claim that life for most people in Salisbury was difficult - but when anybody got into trouble with the authorities there was no legal protection. Mr. Winterton suggested that, in view of Mugabe's desire for increased aid, the British Government could exercise more influence over him than any other Government. He himself had written to the Zimbabwe High Commissioner in London but had received no acknowledgement, let alone a substantive response. Mr. Walker said that he believed that a number of black people had been liquidated but he did not know how many. He handed the Prime Minister the enclosed paper about persons in detention.

The Prime Minister said that we would make further enquiries. We must try to get at the facts and expose them. She would ensure that these things were examined.

The list provided by Mr. Walker does not altogether coincide with the list enclosed with your letter of 18 October. It would be helpful if the Department could consider the information contained in it and provide further advice for the Prime Minister. Should your examination suggest that a letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Winterton would be useful, I should be grateful if you could provide a draft.

I should stress that this meeting took place on a confidential basis. I should be grateful if knowledge of it was not revealed.

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office..

18th October, 1982.

MONWADISA MALUMISA

ANTHONY MADHLELA

NEPHAT MADHLELA

The above three were arrested on 10th December,1981 and released on the 24th July, 1982, after being coerced to give false evidence in the concerning Mr. Wally Stuttaford M.P., who was also arrested on the 10th December. Although all three men had withstood torture and duress, they still refused to give fake evidence against Mr. Stuttaford. Immediately after the trial, all three were re-detained.

A Zimbabwe Government statement two weeks ago claimed that there were now 435 people in detention. Under the Emergency Powers, they are being held without charge and trial.

The following are only a few of the names of persons known. The majority of the detainees are persons whose names have not been disclosed.

Airforce Personnel

Air Vice-Marshall Hugh Slatter

Wing Commander Peter Briscoe

Air Commadore Philip Pile

Julian Lewis-Walker

Cox John

Weir Neville

Persons who may still be in detention

Neville Forrester
Colin English
John Moore
Kevin Hinton
Peter Loots
David Rautenbach
Conolly

It is known that a number of black Airforce personnel with others, were also arrested.

Former C.I.O. Members - April, 1982

Evans

Hartlebury

Harper-Ronald

Others who are known to be in detention

Musa Mhlonga - 26th March,1982

Demisa Debengwa - March, 1982

Lookout Musuku - March, 1982

Thomas Chinhengo

Moore Gatsi

Cephas Dube - 8th April, 1982

Advance Ntombeni - 8th April, 1982.

Peter Carlsson - farmer Lower Gwelo - murdered 30/9/82, believed by 4 National Army men

Gino Forgiarini - Manager of Shangani Saw Mills - murdered 4/10/82, believed by two National Army men.

CONFIDENTIAL

Zimbabwe

No. B

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 October 1982

Zimbabwe: Prospects for Stability

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend JIC(82)(N)106.

Mrs Thatcher has commented that in view of the reports of torture in Zimbabwe we shall soon need to reassess our military aid.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 October 1982

Dear John

Zimbabwe

I enclose, as requested, a briefing note for the Prime Minister for her meeting with an MP tomorrow.

Yours ever

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

ZIMBABWE

INTERNAL SITUATION

ZANU/ZAPU Relations

1. Relations between ZANU (Mugabe) and ZAPU (Nkomo) have deteriorated since the finding of arms caches on ZAPU land in February and the subsequent dismissal of Nkomo from the Government and the imprisonment of some ZAPU leaders. Nevertheless, some ZAPU Ministers have remained within the Government.

2. Tensions seem to have relaxed somewhat since late August. Public anti-ZAPU rhetoric by ZANU leaders has largely died away and there have been fewer references to the creation of a one-party state. Some ZANU Ministers appear to have restored working relationships with Nkomo and the possibility of the latter's detention, which once seemed a real risk, has receded. This softening of ZANU attitudes may have been due in part to the firm line condemning dissident violence which Nkomo has been taking in public speeches. It may also reflect a recognition among some ZANU Ministers, possibly including Mugabe, that their tactics towards ZAPU had served only to alienate the Ndebele people and to consolidate the support ZAPU enjoyed in Matabeleland.

3. Some form of political accommodation between ZANU and ZAPU may be emerging. On the other hand, ZANU may renew pressure on Nkomo once the aim of eradicating dissidents has been achieved.

Security Situation

4. The security situation in much of Zimbabwe is generally good, but since the beginning of this year there has been a

/ steady

steady increase of dissident violence in Matabeleland, Nkomo's political base.

5. ZANU/ZAPU tensions have placed renewed strain on the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA). From late February ZAPU soldiers began deserting from the ZNA in increasing numbers. Some of these, usually operating in small groups, have turned to banditry, generally bus and store robberies, in which a number of civilians, both black and white, have been killed. The Zimbabwean authorities remain convinced (although we have no evidence to support this) that from an early stage there was central planning and direction of the dissident violence by senior members of ZAPU. By the middle of the year the number of dissidents was estimated at 800/1300. In addition to banditry, ZAPU are also believed to have been responsible for the attack on Mugabe's residence in Harare in June and for the kidnapping in July of six white tourists, including two Britons, who, despite an intensive and sustained search by the Zimbabwe security forces, are still missing.

6. There are, however, recent signs of improvement in the security situation in Matabeleland. Incidents of dissidence dropped considerably in September. It remains to be seen whether this improvement will be sustained. The key will be ZANU's willingness to bring about some degree to rapprochement with Nkomo and ZAPU.

DETAINEES

7. About 30 whites (and numerous blacks) have been detained under Zimbabwe's emergency regulations (which were inherited from UDI) during the past year. A list of white detainees is attached at Annex A. Of the 30, 15 of these have been released.

8. The white detainees fall into two groups: those suspected of political offences, and Air Force personnel suspected of sabotage at Thornhill air base. In several cases South African complicity is suspected. As well as several blacks, some of the white AFZ officers and a white civilian (Stuttaford) are believed to have been tortured or ill-treated in some way.

9. All but a very few of the detainees, including the AFZ officers,

~ Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4). DMWayland 4 December 2012

are Zimbabwean citizens or dual nationals. The only mono-British citizen currently in detention without charge is Philip Hartlebury, a former member of Mr Mugabe's intelligence staff, who is accused * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * of spying for South Africa. Our High Commission makes regular consular visits to Hartlebury who is reputed to be fit and in reasonable spirits.

10. In the case of another British citizen, Sergeant Lochran (one of the AFZ detainees) the British High Commission has made a formal protest to the Zimbabwean authorities about his ill-treatment. Sergeant Lochran was released on 16 September and is now back in Britain.

11. In the case of Zimbabwean or dual citizens HMG has no formal right to intervene or demand consular access. However, British Ministers have on several occasions raised the question of detainees with Zimbabwean Ministers and pressed that they should be brought to trial without delay. During his visit in September, Mr Nott told Mr Mugabe of our concern about reports of torture against the AFZ personnel.

12. The position of the AFZ detainees has improved in the last two weeks. It is possible that Mr Nott's representations combined with his provisional offer of assistance to the AFZ had some part in this.

13. We know that torture of AFZ detainees has now ceased and several of the officers have been released. There is no evidence that the witch hunt against AFZ officers is continuing. Seven of the officers have now appeared before magistrates, indicating that the judicial process has started. Although the AFZ detainees seem unlikely to come to trial much before early February 1983, this is by no means unusual or excessive for the Zimbabwean legal system. Lawyers acting for two of the detainees have told the High Commission that there are no real grounds for complaint or concern at this stage although they intend to press the authorities to make haste. The High Commission's legal informant has said that most of the detainees are beginning to recover from their ordeal, although the condition of Flight Lt. Lloyd is causing some concern.

14. As for the civilian detainees, all have access to legal representation and receive visits from their families.

Mr Stuttaford

15. On 14 October, the former Republican Front MP, Mr Stuttaford, was acquitted of charges of plotting against the State and released after 10 months detention. British Ministers had on several occasions specifically raised Mr Stuttaford's case with the Zimbabwean authorities.

16. In a civil law suit held in camera whilst he was in detention, Mr Stuttaford is reported to have successfully won damages for $18,000 against the Minister of State for Security and intelligence officers for illtreatment at the hands of investigators.

17. In July, Mr Stuttaford lost his seat in the House of Assembly on the constitutional grounds that he had been in preventive detention for over six months.

Yorks

18. Another controversial case was that of the York brothers who, after successive detentions, were finally released after Mugabe's personal intervention.

19. The maltreatment of detainees is all the more disappointing after the initial success of Mugabe's policy of reconciliation and reconstruction. By and large, however, the Zimbabwe Government's record on human rights has been satisfactory; and the courts have maintained a high level of integrity.

ANNEX A

Sheet 1

Name	Still Detained	Released	Allegations of maltreatment or torture	Nationality
Air Vice Marshal H C S Slatter	✓		✓	Zimbabwean ? Dual
Air Commodore P V Pile	✓		✓	Dual
Wing Commander P R Briscoe	✓		✓	Zimbabwean
Wing Commander J R Cox	✓		✓	Dual
Flt Lieutenant N J T Lewis Walker	✓			Zimbabwean ? Dual
Flt Lieutenant Barrington Lloyd	✓		✓	Dual
Flt Lieutenant N A Weir	✓			Dual
Squadron Leader J A Connolly		✓		Dual
Warrant Officer D F Rautenbach		✓		Zimbabwean
Master Technician Forrester		✓		Zimbabwean ? Dual
Sergeant K Hinton		✓		Dual
Sergeant Loots		✓		Zimbabwean ? Dual
Sergeant J Lochran		✓	✓	Mono British
E W Stuttaford		✓	✓	Zimbabwean
*Stephen Bertrand		✓		Mono British
Francis Bertrand	✓			Zimbabwean
Mrs R Bertrand		✓		Dual
P E Hartlebury	✓			Mono British
A York		✓		Dual
N York		✓		Dual
V S Radmore	✓			Dual

*Serving a prison sentence following conviction of plotting to commit sabotage.

cont'd...

Sheet 2

Name	Still Detained	Released	Allegations of maltreatment or torture	Nationality
Mrs T G Radmore		✓		Dual
W Hipson		✓		Mono British
J A McDowall		✓		Mono British
C Evans	✓			Dual
A R Cauvin	✓			Dual
S J Griffin	✓			Dual
J Ramsay		✓		Mono British
S Torok	✓			Zimbabwean
C Bickle	✓			? Zimbabwean

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe
vb

18 October 1982

Kidnapped Tourists in Zimbabwe

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 15 October, the contents of which she has noted.

AJC

R.B. Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 946 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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(2)

GR

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 October 1982

Prime Minister

To see.

A.J.C. 25/10

Dear John,

Zimbabwe

In your letter of 11 October you asked for an account of the latest situation with regard to the Zimbabwean Air Force detainees.

Mr Nott spoke to Mr Mugabe on Saturday 25 September, about the allegations of torture and brutality by the Zimbabwean security authorities towards the detainees. He drew attention to the effect that these allegations were having on public and parliamentary opinion in this country and the difficulties this might cause for HMG over the provision of assistance to the Zimbabwean Armed Forces. Mr Mugabe denied that there had been any maltreatment of detainees or that statements had been obtained under duress. But he said the truth would be established when the cases came to court.

Despite Mr Mugabe's denial the High Commission believe that the torture allegations are true. This is supported by the findings of a white Zimbabwean doctor who examined Air Vice Marshal Slatter and Wing Commander Briscoe. We have heard * ~~~~~~~ *that Mugabe has now seen an authoritative medical report of the torture, but it is not clear whether he was aware of this when he met Mr Nott.

The High Commission in Harare reported on 11 October that the seven whom we believe to have been tortured have now appeared before magistrates and are on remand. Several other detainees have been released. The detainees are unlikely to come to trial much before early February. According to one of the defence lawyers, the Zimbabwean Attorney General intends to indict the detainees by mid-November, principally on charges under the Law and Order Maintenance Act. A delay of four months in bringing cases to trial is not unusual or excessive in the Zimbabwean legal system. The lawyer acting for Air Vice Marshal Slatter and Air Cdr Pile has told the High Commission that there are no real grounds for complaint at this stage although he intends to press the Attorney General to make haste. Meanwhile, the detainees continue to be remanded about once a fortnight but bail has been denied.

/The High

~ Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).
D Wayland
4 December 2012

The High Commission's legal informant has said that some of the detainees are beginning to recover from their ordeal. Air Vice Marshal Slatter and Wg Cds Briscoe were said to be in quite high spirits. The condition of Flight Lt Lloyd however is causing concern.

The High Commission are, of course, continuing to monitor the situation closely.

I enclose copies of the record of Mr Nott's conversation with Mr Mugabe on 25 September and of the letter Mr Nott subsequently sent. The passage in the draft letter to Councillor de Lisle has been cleared with Mr Nott's office.

A copy of this letter and its enclosures goes to Richard Mottram (MOD).

Yours ever,

Roger Bone

(R B Bone)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

copied to Consulars. AFZ BMATT
FCO.

RECORD OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE

1. The Secretary of State called on Mr Mugabe at his residence in Harare at 8.30am on Saturday 25 September. He was accompanied by the High Commissioner and the Commander of BMATT; the Zimbabwean Minister of State for Defence, Dr Sekeramayi, joined Mr Mugabe after the meeting had begun.

2. During the initial courtesies Mr Mugabe asked about the Prime Minister's visit to China, of which he had heard on the BBC World Service that morning. He also inquired about the Falkland Islands and commented that the situation there was "how much better than before".

3. Mr Nott said that he was impressed by what had been achieved in Zimbabwe in amalgamating three armies into one and was glad that BMATT had been able to play a part in this. He said that HMG were ready to continue to provide help over military and perhaps air force training insofar as they could. He commented that the latest suggestion by the Zimbabwe Army Commander - that BMATT should run a series of courses for Zimbabwean instructors - sounded sensible. Mr Mugabe said that he was 'extremely' pleased with the help which BMATT had provided and certainly hoped that it would continue. He had noted General Nhongo's proposal for training instructors: it was alright, but it would be necessary to ensure also that BMATT had the ability to follow up training in the units [possibly a reference to keeping BMATT training coordinators attached to Brigade Headquarters as at present]. Above all, he hoped that BMATT would be kept at a strength sufficient to provide an influence throughout the army. He asked what the current strength was and indicated satisfaction with the reply of "about 90".

4. Turning to the air force, Mr Mugabe said that he was dumbfounded by the sabotage of aircraft at the Thornhill base. He knew there had been disloyal elements in the air force at independence, but he could not understand how those who still remain could have acted as they did. However it was clear from their statements that, although there had been South African backing, senior air force officers had been involved. Mr Nott said that there was considerable concern in Britain over the allegations which have

/appeared

appeared recently that air force officers had been tortured during interrogation. There was also concern about allegations of brutal behaviour by the army towards civilians. Public and parliamentary reactions in Britain could make real difficulties for us in the context of our involvement with military and police training and efforts to provide help for the air force. Mr Mugabe replied emphatically that there had been no mistreatment of prisoners and no duress had been applied to the air force officers under interrogation; their statements were made voluntarily. When one read the statements they were so detailed and so similar as to make clear that they must be both true and given voluntarily.

5. Mr Nott said that he was glad to hear what Mr Mugabe had said. It would help him in dealing with questions in Britain, but he repeated that concern there was widespread. Mr Byatt said that most of the air force officers under interrogation were Zimbabwe citizens but one, Flt Sgt Lochran, was a mono UK citizen. Sgt Lochran had now been cleared of suspicion and released but he thought Mr Mugabe should know that Lochran had reported to the High Commission that, in the course of his interrogation, Lochran had been threatened by his interrogators with physical violence to "make him confess". This might be relevant to the cases of the other suspects. Mr Mugabe repeated that there had been no mistreatment of prisoners but went on to say that, if his police had misinformed him on this point, then the fact was sure to be established when the cases of the air force officers came to court. He then asked whether, if it were established that the air force officers had been guilty of sabotage but had also been subjected to torture, opinion in Britain would be more concerned about the torture or the sabotage which caused it. He appeared to be surprised by Mr Nott's reply that the torture would cause more concern because opinion in Britain would regard sabotage as a matter to be dealt with by a court and by punishment inflicted by a court. He repeated that public concern in Britain about torture could make real difficulties for HMG over assistance to the Zimbabwe armed forces, and he therefore hoped that the allegations could be swiftly resolved.

6. As to the sabotage, Mr Nott said, we were discussing with the Zimbabwe air force and Ministry of Defence how we might be able to help over the provision of 6 Hunter aircraft to replace those destroyed. This might be done either by sale or by lease. Dr Sekeramayi interjected that the terms offered seemed very generous, but that sale might be more economic for Zimbabwe since the

/aircraft

aircraft would be needed for at least 4 years). Providing personnel would be much more difficult. The RAF, because of its other commitments, had few to spare. They might be able to find a dozen or so to help initially with maintaining the Hunter aircraft, but more than that would be impossible. For other technical personnel, therefore, he hoped that a solution might emerge from the discussions which he understood were going on on the commercial side with IMS and Airwork. Mr Mugabe said that he was most grateful for our readiness to help and agreed that discussions over lease or sale of Hunter's should continue.

7. In conclusion, Mr Nott thanked Mr Mugabe for receiving him on a Saturday morning and said that he hoped that the CGS, who was due to visit Zimbabwe in a week's time, would be able to have discussions in more detail.

30 September 1982

25th September 1982

On my departure, I wanted to write and thank you for your courtesy in seeing me this morning on my short visit to Zimbabwe. I was also grateful for the opportunity to meet your Minister of State - and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.

I was so glad to hear about your satisfaction with the work being carried out by BMATT. We are, of course, happy to discuss changes to the arrangements which would benefit your Armed Forces.

In our talks, I told you that I might be asked on my return about recent allegations in the British press of maltreatment of Air Force detainees. I will be very much assisted in responding to any questions on this subject by your re-assurance that Air Force detainees will be brought to trial soon. This will establish the facts publicly and help to allay concern in Great Britain.

I regret that I have not been able on this visit to spend more time in Zimbabwe. But, even in my short stay, I have been able to see something of the progress Zimbabwe has made under your Government.

John Nott

The Hon R G Mugabe

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Councillor Julian de Lisle
Leicestershire County Hall
Glenfield
Leicester LE3 8BR

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 29 September to the Prime Minister about the detention of Zimbabwean Air Force personnel. I have been asked to reply.

The Prime Minister is aware of allegations that some of those detained in connection with the sabotage attack at Thornhill airbase last July have been tortured. A number of them, including a British national, Sergeant Lochran, have now been released. The British High Commission have made a formal protest to the Zimbabwean authorities about the ill-treatment of ~~Sgt~~ Sergeant Lochran. Those still held are either Zimbabwean citizens or dual nationals. The British Government therefore have no formal authority to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwe Government have been left in no doubt about our concern that detainees, wherever they are held, should be treated humanely and fairly.

During his visit to Harare on 25 September, the Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, raised the question of the detainees. He said that whilst

/HMG

Type pl.
A.S.C. 19/10.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

HMG recognises that this is essentially an internal matter for Zimbabwe, we are concerned about allegations that some of those detained have been ill-treated. He was given to understand that the detainees would be brought to trial soon, and we understand that several of them have since been remanded after appearing before a magistrate.

I would like to assure you that our High Commission in Harare will continue to keep a close watch on developments in this case, which we very much hope will be satisfactorily resolved.

A. J. C. 12/6

The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 946 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: letter from Bone to Coles dated 15 October 1982, with enclosures	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	4 December 2012 C Wayland
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NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)

(2)

14th October 1982 NRW/cmh

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister

According to the press, Mr. Stuttaford has finally been released. We will get the facts before your meeting with Mr. Winterton.

A.J.C. 15/10.

Dear Margaret,

Further to my letter dated 12th October, I have now been advised by Mr Denis Walker, the Republic Front MP currently in this country with his family, that his colleague, Mr Wally Stuttaford, who has been detained without charge or trial in Zimbabwe since 10th December last year, was finally brought to trial, acquitted and then immediately re-arrested.

This is certainly hardly the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement, and I believe confirms the need for Mr Walker to meet you personally to discuss the situation currently developing in Zimbabwe.

Yours ever
Nicholas

Since dictating this letter, your Private Secretary has telephoned to indicate that you are prepared to meet Mr Walker and his wife, together with myself, in your room at the House of Commons on Tuesday, 19th October, at 3.45 p.m. I am very pleased that this meeting has been arranged.

10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

When you have fixed a time, please return to me and I shall commission briefing.

A.J.C. 14/10.

JC

TUE 19 OCT
15.45 at
HC
He will get
Mr Walker
CS.
14/10.

18/10

10 DOWNING STREET

I have asked the F.C.O. to provide a brief by Monday night.

A.J.C. 13/10

MS

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)

①.

12th October 1982 NRW/cmh

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Prime Minister

Do you want to see Mr. Winterton and Mr. Walker? Yes

Would you like a brief on the present situation in Zimbabwe? Yes

Dear Margaret,

A.D.C. 14/10.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr Denis Walker who is a duly elected Republic Front MP in Zimbabwe.

Unfortunately he cannot return to his country to carry out his Parliamentary duties for fear of being arrested on unspecified charges. He is currently in the United Kingdom with his wife and son, as he holds a British passport, and the contents of his letter are self-explanatory.

I would very much like you to meet Mr Walker in my presence privately, so that he could, in total confidence, describe the problems of Zimbabwe as he sees it today, with specific reference to the detention of Mr Wally Stuttaford, another Republic Front Member of Parliament, and others. I do emphasise that the meeting would be a totally private one, and all discussions which took place would be entirely confidential. I do ask you to give this request very urgent and sympathetic consideration. Mr Walker does not wish to see the Foreign Secretary or a Minister within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as he does not believe that such a meeting could be beneficial or advantageous in any way, and sadly I share his view. I hope you will not forget that our Government was responsible for the Lancaster House Agreement which laid down firm guidelines for basic human and democratic rights, and these have been consistently violated since independence. Surely, like Pontius Pilate we cannot wash our hands of the whole matter, and I do believe that you personally should be advised, at first hand by a Rhodesian MP, as to the situation in that sad country.

I look forward to your reply, and hope that a meeting can be arranged after Parliament has re-assembled.

Yours sincerely

Nicholas

6, St. Nicolas Close,
Tingrith,
Milton Keynes, Beds. MK17 9EL.
6th October, 1982.

Mr. N.R. Winterton M.P.
Whitehall Farm,
Newbold Astbury,
Congleton, Cheshire.

Dear Nicholas,

As you can see from the above address, I am now in the U.K. I have decided that I cannot let the situation concerning my country Zimbabwe and the people like Wally Stuttaford become a forgotten issue.

I was as much responsible as anyone in the Rhodesian Parliament for the passage of the Lancaster House Agreement. I gave an assurance to thousands of people in Zimbabwe on the strength of the safeguards in that agreement. I was one of the Members of Parliament who spent weeks selling it to the electorate. They were given the assurance that their future democratic rights would be safe-guarded, that their property and liberty would be secure.

As you know, I am British by birth and because of this, I am unable to simply forget the assurances we gave to so many people in Zimbabwe. For I consider if I were to give up now, it would not only be a betrayal of my personal integrity, but also a betrayal of the high British principles which gained in years passed the respect for Britain throughout the world. To give up now, would be to betray a trust encumberant upon us from the very day that we told so many that all would be well for their future.

Nicolas, I feel that I already owe so much to you. You have championed this cause for me over these many months. Please forgive me for troubling you further, but do you think you could through whatever means you have at your disposal, arrange for me to meet our Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher. I feel that if only I could spend a short time with her, having witnessed her natural compassion and burning desire for justice and fair play, she would understand more fully the plight of my friend and colleague, Mr. Wally Stuttaford and others who are being held without trial in Zimbabwe.

Wally has now been in prison since the 10th December last year. I know that as far back as last February, we were all assured by Mr. Mugabe that he would soon be brought to trial. It is now clear that this information was only to mislead and was not a genuine endeavour to bring the matter forward in a just manner.

I have been told my a member of Amnesty International that it is understood that over 200 political prisoners are now being held in Zimbabwe without trial. It is clear that the situation is not improving.

My wife and son, Jill and Trevor are here with me in the U.K. I did write to the authorities in Harare about my returning so that I could take up my seat in Parliament and carry out my parliamentary duties without hindrance, but they replied saying they would not discuss the matter. Therefore it became clear we were unable to return to Zimbabwe without dire consequences.

As a family we have lost everything. I never thought at the time of the Lancaster House Agreement it would come to this. Many say to us that we are fortunate because we are alive and free and still have each other. There is truth in this. The trauma of these past months have seemed like a nightmare that never ends. Because of our misfortune, we are constantly mindful of those who have lost their liberty and are separated from their loved ones. It is for this added reason that we feel that we must go on trying to help.

Any assistance you can give will be deeply appreciated.

My very best wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,

Dennis

W.D. WALKER

FILE

de

18/10

Julian de LISLE

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October 1982

Zimbabwe

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Councillor Julian de Lisle about Air Vice Marshal Slatter and others who are detained in Zimbabwe.

I should be grateful for a draft reply for my signature on behalf of the Prime Minister by 18 October. I should also be grateful if you could let me have an account of the latest situation with regard to these detainees.

A. J. COLES

Roger Bone, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

11 October 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge your letter of 29 September. This is receiving attention and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

Councillor Julian de Lisle

Zimbabwe

1 October 1982

Thank you for your letter of 27 September enclosing a draft reply to Mr. Mugabe's letter of 9 September. The Prime Minister has now signed the draft which is enclosed. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its transmission.

Tim Flesher

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CC FCO

DS6

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T 187/82

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

1 October 1982

cc Master Ops

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 9 September about your visit to Britain. We, too, felt that this was a most valuable event which further reinforced the close links between our countries. I appreciate your kind remarks about our aid programme.

I agree with you that it is most important to achieve an early solution to the Namibia problem. As you know, we are continuing our efforts in conjunction with our partners in the Five. We have been encouraged by recent progress on issues relating to Security Council Resolution 435. We hope that other outstanding problems will soon be resolved in order to open the way for implementation of the UN Plan.

We regard stability and security in the countries of your region as a major objective. Zimbabwe's independence was an important step in this direction; a successful outcome in Namibia would be another. Stability and security can only be maintained on the basis of mutual respect by all countries for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and an effective working relationship, particularly in the economic field. We make every effort to ensure that the South African Government are well aware of our deep concern at any activities which are in breach of these principles.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

HL

The Hon. R.G. Mugabe

30/9-82
CITIZEN

New security force causing alarm among Whites

Zimbabwe launches its own Gestapo

By AIDA PARKER

FIRST positive information about the torture methods used by Zipolis, Zimbabwe's dreaded new Gestapo-type secret police force established to handle recalcitrant Whites, has been supplied to The Citizen by impeccable sources in Matabeleland.

The victim was Mrs Grace Cauvin, matron of the Queen Elizabeth Children's Home in Bulawayo and stepmother of Allen Cauvin (21) who was sentenced to four years imprisonment in May this year for being in possession of weapons of war.

On the night of Tuesday, August 24, four Black men, claiming to be police, arrived first at the Morningside home of Mr Pat Cauvin, father of Allen Cauvin, arresting him and leaving his five-year-old son in the care of a domestic servant.

Then, travelling in an unmarked car, the men went to the Queen Elizabeth Children's Home where they forced their way into Mrs Cauvin's flat. Without explanation, they tore the place apart, tipping contents of drawers and cupboards on to the floor.

They then dragged the panicstricken Mrs Cauvin out of her flat. Her screams attracted the attention of a coloured kitchen supervisor, Mrs Abrahams. Before being punched in the face, Mrs Cauvin called out to Mrs Abrahams to tell a friend she had been arrested.

Dr HERBERT USHEWOKUNZE, Zimbabwe's anti-White Minister of Home Affairs . . . formed Zipolis to deal with recalcitrant Whites.

Mrs Abrahams phoned the friend, saying Mrs Cauvin had been removed by four men dressed in civilian clothing but wearing combat caps, presumably police. Immediate inquiries were made from a senior police officer who said he knew nothing of any such arrest.

The following day Mrs Cauvin's friend was told that neither the police nor the Central Intelligence Organisation knew anything about the arrest and would, consequently, treat it as a case of abduction.

But, later that day, it was established that both Mr and Mrs Cauvin were being held at Stops Camp, Bulawayo. The friend was told that they had been taken there "by a new organisation called Zipolis."

Zipolis was formed about eight weeks on the direct orders of the fanatically anti-White Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Herbert Ushewokunze, to "deal with Whites who have not yet fully accepted Black rule."

Theoretically, Zipolis in the Matabeleland area is answerable to the chief of police of Matabeleland Province. In this case, that officer knew nothing of the arrests until inquiries had revealed that the Cauvins were being held at Stops Camp.

It appears that the only reason Mr and Mrs Cauvin, who are divorced, were arrested was because of their relationship with Allen.

They were freed from what is now admitted to be illegal detention on the morning of August 30. A friend of Mrs Cauvin who saw her immediately after release declared herself to be "horrified at the pitiful state she was in."

Both hands and both feet were heavily bandaged to cover extensive cigarette burns apparently inflicted while she was under interrogation. In addition, her face and much of her upper body was badly bruised, with eyes and mouth badly swollen.

She was described as "most distraught". She said: "I will never, never forget what they have done to me."

Mrs Cauvin is now believed to be in Britain. The whereabouts of her former husband are unknown.

According to Press reports, Zimpolis is made up of about 300 hand-picked members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, under the command of a Sergeant Masawe.

The activites of this new force are causing widespread alarm among Zimbabwe's White community. The number of Whites currently being held by Zipolis cannot be established.

LEICESTERSHIRE  County Hall Glenfield Leicester LE3 8RA Leicester 871313 (STD 0533)

29th September, 1982

Dear Mrs Thatcher

I have been asked to draw your attention to the plight of certain British Subjects who have been detained in Zimbabwe, following an attack on Thornhill airfield in that country by persons unknown.

The persons involved are:-

1. Air Vice Marshal Slatter (No. 2 in the Zimbabwe Airforce ("AFZ")
2. Air Commodore Pile (No. 3 in the AFZ and President of the Board of Inquiry into the Thornhill attack)
3. Group Captain Jones (CO of Thornhill)
4. Wing Commander Briscoe (Member of the Board of Inquiry into the Thornhill attack)
5. Wing Commander Cox (CO of the Air Force Regiment - local equivalent of the RAF Regiment and responsible for the security of Thornhill
6. Mr. Lloyd (Junior officer)
7. Mr. Ware (Junior officer)
8. Sergeant Lochran (Technician)

and possibly a further 12 or more Other Ranks. It is understood that Group Captain Jones and Sergeant Lochran have now been released.

I have also been asked to make the following points to you, relating to this matter.

1. It is most unlikely that any of the detained men were involved in the attack at Thornhill. There is no apparent motive for such involvement.
2. Air Commodore Pile, Wing Commander Cox and Sergeant Lochran are British citizens although Pile and Cox have Zimbabwe passports as well as British ones. It is probable that some other detained men are also British.
3. The Officers and ORs have all been detained for over a month in disgusting conditions and there is evidence that some of them have been tortured. Until recently they have been denied access to lawyers and contact with their families.
4. The Mugabe regime was installed under the auspices of the British Government which continues to supply the regime with aid.

cont'd...

The House of Commons,
London. SW1

Clearly this is no matter for this County Council, nonetheless, I see it as very important and I would be most grateful if, in the interests of these unfortunate people, you could please make representations to the Foreign Office and take any other appropriate action as you see fit.

Yours sincerely,

JULIAN de LISLE. C.C.

2

Prime Minister Zimbabwe

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~930 7822~~ 218 2111/3

MO 25/2/23/2

28th September 1982

Dear Francis,

MALTREATMENT OF AIR FORCE DETAINEES IN ZIMBABWE

When he was in Harare last Saturday, the Defence Secretary raised with both Mr Mugabe and Dr Sekeramayi, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office, the question of maltreatment of Air Force detainees. He was given the assurance that the detainees will be brought to trial soon (though he is extremely sceptical that this will prove to be the case).

Mr Nott felt he should record his concern over this problem and did so by incorporating the point in the attached letter to Mr Mugabe, which was delivered yesterday.

Records of his discussions in Harare will follow shortly.

I am copying this letter and its attachment to John Coles (No 10).

Yours ever,

Richard Mottram

(R C MOTTRAM)

F N Richards Esq

25th September 1982

On my departure, I wanted to write and thank you for your courtesy in seeing me this morning on my short visit to Zimbabwe. I was also grateful for the opportunity to meet your Minister of State - and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.

I was so glad to hear about your satisfaction with the work being carried out by BMATT. We are, of course, happy to discuss changes to the arrangements which would benefit your Armed Forces.

In our talks, I told you that I might be asked on my return about recent allegations in the British press of maltreatment of Air Force detainees. I will be very much assisted in responding to any questions on this subject by your re-assurance that Air Force detainees will be brought to trial soon. This will establish the facts publicly and help to allay concern in Great Britain.

I regret that I have not been able on this visit to spend more time in Zimbabwe. But, even in my short stay, I have been able to see something of the progress Zimbabwe has made under your Government.

John Nott

The Hon R G Mugabe

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

27 September 1982

Type pl.

Dear John, O/R

Thank you for your letter of 21 September enclosing a copy of Mr Mugabe's letter of 9 September to the Prime Minister. I enclose a draft reply.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~Minute/letter/Telegram/Despatch/Note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

TO: The Rt Hon R G Mugabe
Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 9 September about your visit to Britain. We, too, felt that this was a most valuable event while ~~experience and~~ a further reinforce~~ment~~d ~~of~~ the close links between our countries. I appreciate your kind remarks about our aid programme. ~~to Zimbabwe.~~

I agree with you that it is most ~~vitally~~ important to achieve an early solution to the Namibia problem. As you know, we are continuing our efforts in conjunction with our partners in the Five. We have been encouraged by recent progress on issues relating to Security Council Resolution 435, ~~and~~ We hope that other outstanding problems will soon be resolved in order to open the way for implementation of the UN Plan.

We regard stability and security in the countries of your region as a major objective. Zimbabwe's independence was an important step in this direction; ~~and~~ a successful outcome ~~of the~~ in Namibia ~~issue~~ would be another. Stability and security can only be maintained on the basis of mutual

/ respect

Enclosures—flag(s).....

respect by all countries for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and an effective working relationship, particularly in the economic field.

~~I should like to assure you that we~~ We make every effort to ensure that the South African Government are well aware of our deep concern at any activities which are in breach of these principles.

WR 26/9

Zimbabwe

21 September 1982

The Prime Minister has received a letter from the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe, a copy of which is attached.

I should be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Mugabe by Monday, 27 September.

(TIM FLESHER)

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

T174A/82

PRIME MINISTER

HARARE

Master Ops

9 September, 1982.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No. T174A/82

Prime Minister:
We are drafting a draft reply
TB
21/9.

The Right Honourable Mrs M. Thatcher,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to write to thank you, your Government and the People of the United Kingdom for the warm welcome and hospitality accorded to my delegation during our first official visit to the United Kingdom earlier this year.

I wish also, on behalf of my Government and the People of Zimbabwe, to express our gratitude to your Government for agreeing to continue to provide us with both technical and financial assistance. My visit gave us a good opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to strengthening the ties between us and to exchange views and ideas on other matters of mutual and international concern. I found it to be a most rewarding experience.

Finally, I urge you to continue your efforts within the Contact Group to bring about a just and speedy conclusion to the search for Namibian independence. South Africa's intransigence and stalling tactics on this matter should not be allowed to delay any further that territory's transition to independence in accordance with the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978.

Further, as you well know, South Africa has embarked on a policy of destabilising its neighbouring states through the mechanisms of sabotage, support for dissident groups and outright invasion. We would hope you would exert your influence with the regime in Pretoria, urging it to desist from these hostile and unprovoked acts of wanton aggression.

Please accept, dear Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

Yours sincerely,

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
10 SEP 1982
ZIMBABWE

R.G. MUGABE
Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

RGM/b.c.

DWF G 153

LEO 389/06

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

00 FCO

RR MOD

RR WASHINGTON

RR PRETORIA

RR LUSAKA

RR GABORONE

VZCZCFDG CON
SPE
ROU
061535Z SEP 82
FROM COMMCEN HSP
TO MODUK

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY
SIC

Zimbabwe
18/7/6

No 10 Downing St,
Duty Cabinet Office
Office)
Hd's NAED, Consular Dept,
CAED, News Dept, SAED,
Defence Dept, POSD (2),
PS/Mr. Onslow, PS/Mr. Ritchie,
PS/PUS, Mr. Adams
Sir. T. Lechy, Mr. White,
RC

["MIPT" not yet rec'd]

x16

GR 185
CONFIDENTIAL
FM HARARE 061535Z SEP 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 509 OF 6 SEPTEMBER
INFO ROUTINE MODUK (DS11) WASHINGTON PRETORIA LUSAKA AND GABORONE.

M I P T: KIDNAPPED TOURISTS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT

BEGINS
FROM ZIPRA FORCES, ZAPU
ADDRESSED TO JOSHUA NKOMO.

WE ARE DECLARING THAT WE ARE NO MORE COMMANDERS. WHY ARE YOU SUPPORTING MUGABE THE PUPPET AND NOT RETURNING DABENGWA AND OTHER COMMANDERS WHO ARE IN JAIL? WHY ARE YOU CAMPAIGNING THAT THE TOURISTS BE RETURNED BEFORE OUR OTHER DEMANDS ARE MET? WE WANT DABENGWA AND MASUKU FROM YOU NOW, JOSHUA, BECAUSE YOU ARE THE ONE WHO CAUSED THEM TO BE ARRESTED. (THE REASON FOR THIS YOU KNOW. YOU TOLD US AT GWAI. YOU ARE AFRAID OF BEING ARRESTED.) THIS MEANS THAT YOU WANT TO BE A FRIEND OF PUPPET MUGABE, THE ONE YOU WERE SAYING WAS A DOG. THIS IS THE LAST WARNING UNTIL MASUKU AND OTHER COMMANDERS ARE FREED. TO US, ZIPRA FORCES ZAPU MILITARY WING, YOU ARE OUR ENEMY NUMBER 1.
WE SHALL PROVE IT BY ACTION. (DO YOU REMEMBER SAYING A MAN KEEPS A CLUB?) WE WILL MEET AT THE UNKNOWN CAPTALISM, ZIMBABWE. DOWN WITH THE PUPPET MUGABE. DOWN WITH ZANU PF. THE WAR MUST BE PREPARED FOR (SIGNED) ZIPRA FORMATION (FIDEL CASTRO, MAJESTO AND OTHERS)

WE HAVE THE TOURISTS TOO UNTIL OUR DEMANDS (B) ARE MET.

ENDS.

The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 946 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: Letter from Flesher to Richards dated 9 August 1982	
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NOTE FOR PRESS OFFICERS [DEFENSIVE]

ZIMBABWE: ABDUCTION OF BRITISH TOURISTS

LINE TO TAKE

We have kept in close touch with the Zimbabwean authorities at the highest levels throughout and will continue to do so. We are keeping the families of the two British captives fully informed of the situation.

SUPPLEMENTARIES (if asked)

1. Are BMATT+ involved?

The Zimbabwean National Army have been actively searching for the abductors and their captives. Given the role that BMATT has played in the establishment and training of the Zimbabwean National Army, they have been taking a very close interest in the situation and the Commander (Major-General) has been in an excellent position to offer advice.

2. Has BMATT involvement been reduced?

There is no question of any reduction in the effort to find the hostages. The precise contribution BMATT makes will vary according to the stage which the search reaches and the tactics being employed by the Zimbabwean authorities. (Cannot comment on Zimbabwe tactics which matter for Zimbabwe). We are fully satisfied that the Zimbabwe authorities are doing everything necessary. BMATT will continue to keep very

---

+BMATT: British Military Advisory and Training Team
(BMATT Commander is Maj. Gen Shortis)
Current strength is 70, from a peak of 160 in 1980.

closely in touch.

3. Any requests for further UK assistance?

Of course we would consider any request put to us by the Zimbabweans, but I cannot say more in reply to a hypothetical question.

4. Have SAS/BMATT members returned to the UK and will they go back to Zimbabwe?

You will know that the MOD as a matter of course never comment on SAS deployments. BMATT personnel are of course constantly being replaced.

The National Archives

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Extract/Item details: Letter from Arnold-Forster to Coles dated 6 August 1982 (folio 9)	
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Zimbabwe

GR 430

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM HARARE 051525Z AUG 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 438 OF 05 AUGUST

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS6)

PRIORITY WASHINGTON

ROUTINE GABORONE, PRETORIA AND LUSAKA

MY TELNO 429: KIDNAPPED TOURISTS

1. MY US AND AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUES AND I SAW JOSHUA NKOMO IN BULAWAYO THIS MORNING AND DREW A VIRTUAL BLANK.

2. WE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE TWO (NOT WELL PUBLICISED) STATEMENTS OF CONDEMNATION WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE: EXPLAINED OUR VIEW THAT MORE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN APPEALS SHOULD BE MADE, IN ADDITION TO THE POLICE AND MILITARY SEARCHES: TOLD HIM OF THE RELEVANT PARTS OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH MUGABE (TUR): AND URGED THAT HE TAKE UP THE OFFER OF RADIO FACILITIES TO MAKE A FURTHER WIDELY BROADCAST APPEAL AND TO DISSOCIATE ZAPU CLEARLY FROM THE KIDNAPPING.

3. NKOMO EXPRESSED HIS SHOCK AND GREAT SADNESS AT THE KIDNAPPING AND THE DEATHS OF THE 3 BRITISH TOURISTS IN INYANGA. HE SAID THAT PUBLIC APPEALS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE FROM THE START. HE BLAMED THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT REPORTING HIS FIRST APPEAL ON RADIO. OF COURSE ZAPU WAS NOT BEHIND THE KIDNAPPING OR OTHER BANDITRY. HIS MEETING WITH MUGABE HAD BEEN UNSATISFACTORY: HE HAD OFFERED A COOPERATIVE APPROACH AND MUGABE'S REACTION HAD BEEN ''YOUR PEOPLE ARE DOING IT, YOU STOP THEM.'' HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD OUR APPROACH, BUT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD APPROACH HIM DIRECTLY ''NOT THROUGH DIPLOMATS''. HE COULD NOT ACT INDEPENDENTLY ON A NATIONAL MATTER OF THIS KIND NOR COULD HE SPEAK AS LEADER OF ZAPU ABOUT SOMETHING WHICH WAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PARTY. HE WAS, HOWEVER, VERY READY TO JOIN ''AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN'' IN PUBLICLY SUPPORTING APPEALS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE KIDNAPPERS TO RELEASE THEIR HOSTAGES. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE MWW SUCH APPEALS FROM THE START.

4. THIS WAS A LONG AND REPETITIVE DISCUSSION. IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT NKOMO'S OVERRIDING PRE-OCCUPATION IS THAT, IF HE WERE TO ACT AS WE URGED, THIS MIGHT BE SEIZED UPON AS INDICATING ZAPU CONTROL OVER DISSIDENCE AND PERHAPS AS A PRETEXT FOR HIS DETENTION. WE ARGUED AT LENGTH AND DID OUR BEST TO GET HIM TO SEE THAT HE RUNS AT LEAST AS MUCH RISK OF GUILT BY ASSOCIATION BY REMAINING SILENT. I MADE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO HIM TO CONSIDER ALSO THE WIDER SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MAIN PARTIES, BOTH OF WHICH WERE DETERIORATING. I SAID THAT, IF DISASTER WERE TO BE AVERTED, ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE MATTERS. I URGED HIM TO CONSIDER THE ADVANTAGES FOR ZAPU IN DOING SO: A FORTHRIGHT STAND OVER THE KIDNAPPING COULD BE A FIRST STEP TO REBUILDING OTHER BRIDGES. ALL OF THIS NKOMO REJECTED POLITELY BUT FIRMLY AND ALMOST FRANTICALLY.

5. IT REMAINS POSSIBLE THAT HE MAY THINK IT OVER. IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THE LINE TAKEN PUBLICLY (MY TELNO 418) AND PRIVATELY (MY TUR) BY MUGABE IS NOT SUCH AS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR NKOMO TO ACT AS WE WISH. THE AMERICAN, AUSTRALIAN AND I ARE SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TO PROBE, WITHOUT MUCH HOPE, WHETHER THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF NARRROWING THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES SUFFICIENTLY TO GET THE RIGHT KIND OF MESSAGES GOING OUT OVER THE DOMESTIC RADIO.

BYATT
BT

LIMITED
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NEWS D
S AF D
DEF D
PUSD
PS
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS
LORD BRIDGES
SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR EVANS
MR ADAMS
MR WHITE
MR SQUIRE
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

COPIES TO:-

MR CLEMENTS ASSESSMENT STAFF
CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL
FM HARARE 040839Z AUG 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 OF 4 AUGUST
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS6)
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, GABORONE, PRETORIA, LUSAKA.

MY TELNO 425 : KIDNAPPED TOURISTS

1. DESPITE PARA 7 OF TUR, MUGABE RECEIVED MY US AND AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUES AND ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF ALL THREE, I SAID THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS REMAINED DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF THE HOSTAGES AND WOULD BE GLAD THAT WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM. I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE STRENUOUS EFFORTS BEING MADE BY THE SECURITY FORCES AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTY OF LOCATING THE HOSTAGES. IF THERE WERE ANY ADDITIONAL WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENTS COULD HELP THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO DO SO. WE HAD 3 SUGGESTIONS AS TO POSSIBLE FURTHER MEASURES, SOME OF WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AT MUGABE'S MEETING WITH NKOMO. THEY WERE:

I) THAT, EVEN THOUGH RESPONSE WAS UNLIKELY, FINANCIAL REWARDS MIGHT BE OFFERED FOR INFORMATION LEADING TO RECOVERY OF THE HOSTAGES ALIVE:

II) THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDER FINDING JUNIOR EX-ZIPRA COMMANDERS, WHO HAD OPERATED IN THE SEARCH AREA DURING THE LIBERATION WAR, TO ADVISE AND ASSIST THE POLICE ENQUIRIES IN THE AREA:

III) THAT THE ZAPU OR EX-ZIPRA LEADERSHIP BE URGED TO MAKE MORE PUBLIC AND EMPHATIC DENUNCIATIONS AND APPEALS FOR SAFE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES.

2. MUGABE ASKED US TO CONVEY TO OUR GOVERNMENTS HIS SHOCK, HORROR AND DEEP REGRET AT WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE SAID THE FIRST PRIORITY NOW WAS TO LOCATE THE HOSTAGES, DEAD OR ALIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SECURITY FORCES HAD BEEN DECOYED AWAY FROM THE RIGHT TRACK BY THE LOCAL INHABITANTS, WHO MADE COMMON CAUSE WITH THE DISSIDENTS DESPITE HALF-HEARTED STATEMENTS BY NKOMO. HE ASSURED US THAT THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT REST UNTIL THEY HAD ''A DEFINITE CLUE'' ABOUT THE HOSTAGES AND WOULD DEPLOY MORE FORCES TO NEIGHBOURING AREAS SUCH AS NKAI AND LUPANE TO THE NORTH IN CASE THE KIDNAPPERS HAD SLIPPED THROUGH THE PRESENT CORDON.

3. HE THOUGHT A FINANCIAL REWARD WORTH TRYING. LOWER RANKING ZIPRA LEADERS TENDED TO BACK THE DISSIDENTS NOT THE GOVERNMENT AND HE DOUBTED IF THEY WOULD HELP. BUT A MORE ACTIVE LINE BY THE ZAPU LEADERSHIP WOULD BE USEFUL. HE HAD ASKED NKOMO AT THEIR MEETING YESTERDAY TO CONSIDER THIS BOTH IN RELATION TO THE KIDNAPPING AND BANDITRY IN GENERAL. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER NKOMO WOULD ACT: ''YOU CAN NEVER DEPEND ON HIM''. THIS LED TO A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING (SEE MY TELNO 430). BUT HE DID NOT DESPAIR THAT NKOMO MIGHT COME IN TIME TO MAKE MORE VIGOROUS DENIALS.

4. IN ANSWER TO MY SUGGESTION HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF THE 3 OF US WERE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH NKOMO OURSELVES (WE HAVE NOW ARRANGED TO DO SO IN BULAWAYO TOMORROW MORNING) AND HE AGREED THAT IF NKOMO AND OTHER SENIOR ZAPU LEADERS WERE PREPARED TO MAKE STATEMENTS APPEALING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, THESE COULD BE CARRIED ON RADIO IN ENGLISH AND THE LOCAL LANGUAGE.

5. HE CONCLUDED BY REPEATING HIS REGRET AND ASSURING US THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO RECOVER THE HOSTAGES. HE ASKED ME PARTICULARLY TO CONVEY HIS CONDOLENCES OVER THE TRAGIC NEWS OF THE DEATH OF THE 3 BRITISH TOURISTS AT INYANGA. WHEN DEPARTING FOR THE OAU MEETING IN TRIPOLI THIS MORNING HE COMMENTED TO ME THAT HE HOPED FOR BETTER NEWS OF THE HOSTAGES BY THE TIME OF HIS RETURN.

BYATT
BT

SIR J LEAHY
MR WRIGHT
MR EVANS
MR WHITE
MR SQUIRE
CABINET OFFICE

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NEWS D
S AF D
DEF D
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PS
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/PUS

The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES PREM 19 PIECE/ITEM 946 (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 August 1982

Type letter pl.

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 30 July enclosing one from Mr Topping to the Prime Minister about the kidnapping of his brother-in-law in Zimbabwe. As requested, I attach a draft reply from you to Mr Topping.

Let me first say that Mr Topping by now appears fully content with the degree of contact with the Department, and has expressed on the telephone appreciation for all the help he has received.

The telegram from our High Commission in Harare with the first report of the kidnapping was received at 1.00 pm on Saturday 24 July: unfortunately this did not allow sufficient time to inform next-of-kin before the BBC 1 o'clock news. The Duty Officer spoke to Mr Topping that afternoon, but in the absence of any further significant developments at that early stage, 'Encounter Overland', the tour organisers, acted as the general liaison point with the next-of-kin. By 27 July the Department decided that it would be better to institute a system of daily contact with the next-of-kin, even when we had nothing new to report. We subsequently kept this up on a regular basis. When, however, a member of the Department spoke to Mr Topping on 31 July, he said that in future he and his wife would be content for us to contact them only if there is anything of substance to pass on. This is where matters stand at present.

Yours ever,

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

DSR 1 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/~~telegram~~/~~despatch~~/~~note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PS/Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

Reference

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Enclosures—flag(s).....

TO:

G Topping Esq
17 Firbank
Euxton
Chorley
Lancashire PR7 6HP

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 27 July about the kidnapping of your brother-in-law in Zimbabwe. She understands how distressing this ~~must~~ is ~~be~~ for you and other members of the family and you have her warmest sympathy.

I am sorry that you feel the Foreign and Commonwealth Office failed to keep you sufficiently informed about developments. It is most unfortunate that you should have first learned of this incident from the radio. But, ~~as I hope you will agree, it was essential for~~ the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had to check the facts with the British High Commission in Harare before contacting the relatives. This inevitably took a little longer, but I understand that you were given as much information as they had on the afternoon of Saturday 24 July. Over the next two days, in the absence of any significant developments the FCO kept in contact with 'Encounter Overland', supplying them with information to pass on to the families.

As the situation has developed, a member of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Godson) has been in regular touch with you and your wife in order to keep you up-to-date. We have done this rather than contact Mrs Hodgson direct on the suggestion of Mrs Topping, who has said that she would herself prefer to pass on any information to your mother-in-law.

We are in close touch with the Zimbabwe Government at the highest levels, and some of our own people are in the search area. I can assure you that we are doing our best to secure the release of the six. Meanwhile, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will continue to keep you and Mrs Topping informed.

MR 3/3

FILE

RW

10 DOWNING STREET

cc: FCO

From the Private Secretary

3 August, 1982

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 27 July about the kidnapping of your brother-in-law in Zimbabwe. She understands how distressing this situation is for you and other members of the family and you have her warmest sympathy.

I am sorry that you feel the Foreign and Commonwealth Office failed to keep you sufficiently informed about developments. It is most unfortunate that you should have first learned of this incident from the radio. But the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had to check the facts with the British High Commission in Harare before contacting the relatives. This inevitably took a little longer, but I understand that you were given as much information as they had on the afternoon of Saturday, 24 July. Over the next two days, in the absence of any significant developments the FCO kept in contact with 'Encounter Overland', supplying them with information to pass on to the families.

As the situation has developed, a member of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Godson) has been in regular touch with you and your wife in order to keep you up-to-date. We have done this rather than contact Mrs Hodgson direct on the suggestion of Mrs Topping, who has said that she would herself prefer to pass on any information to your mother-in-law.

We are in close touch with the Zimbabwe Government at the highest levels, and some of our own people are in the search area. I can assure you that we are doing our best to secure the release of the six. Meanwhile, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will continue to keep you and Mrs Topping informed.

A. J. COLES

G Topping, Esq.,

SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 August 1982

The reports of bodies of 2 white tourists discovered yesterday?
MT

I have asked the F.C.O. to deal, in their next letter, both with the hostages and the entirely separate question of the dead tourist.
MT 4/8

Dear John,

Zimbabwe: Kidnapped Tourists

Last Friday's reports that the hostages had probably been killed have now proved false. You will wish to know the latest information that we have from Zimbabwe.

The Zimbabwe forces continue to search an area near Bulawayo; but there has been no definite intelligence on the whereabouts of the terrorist group and their hostages since the trail went cold on 25 July. However, cooordination of operations now seems to be much improved and the Minister in charge is reported to have taken a grip of the situation.

The present operation is likely to be called off on 3 August if no contact is established by then. Activity would then concentrate on gathering intelligence on which to base future search operations.

If the terrorists are found to have crossed into Botswana, it is possible that the government of Zimbabwe would ask permission from the government of Botswana for Zimbabwean forces to go after them. We have warned our High Commissioners in Gaborone and Harare that, in such a case, a specific request would be required from the Batswana

Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).
O Wayland
4 December 2012

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET

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PRIME MINISTER

Michael Latham rang on behalf of his constituent, a Mr. Jones, whose son and daughter are amongst the three tourists missing in Zimbabwe reported in The Telegraph yesterday (not those taken hostage). Mr. Latham wished you to know of his great concern. I undertook that we would keep closely in touch with the Foreign Office on developments in the case, and in particular to ensure that everything possible was being done. I understand, however, that the three tourists involved have been missing for well over two weeks now.

Timothy Flesher

1 August 1982

Prime Minister.

AW
30 vii

3

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

30 July 1982

Dear John,

Zimbabwe: Kidnapped Tourists

You will have seen various press reports suggesting that either all or some of the tourists kidnapped by Zimbabwe terrorists have been killed. The latest information we have from Major Lamb, * ~~~~~~~~~~ * is as follows.

The Zimbabwean forces came upon six of the terrorist band yesterday. In a fire fight, five of the terrorists were killed and one severely wounded. During the course of the latter's interrogation he said that 'six graves for white bodies' were dug on 29 July and gave vague indications of the area. The Zimbabweans launched a search operation for the site during the course of today, but found no evidence to corroborate the story of the hostages' deaths. The search has now been called off until first light tomorrow.

Major Lamb's feeling is that the story is, unfortunately, likely to prove true. The circumstantial evidence the terrorist gave regarding hearing shots and digging graves appears only too likely. We understand that the Zimbabweans will be issuing a press release this evening which will confirm that they have received information which points towards the fact that the hostages have been killed, but goes on to add that they have been unable to find the physical evidence to support this.

The reason that the press have been able to produce stories so rapidly is due to the fact that media representatives are inside the Zimbabwean army search headquarters and we understand that the army are communicating by radio en clair.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

~ Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4).
CWayland
4 December 2012

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

Zimbabwe

file

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 July 1982

Zimbabwe: Kidnapped Tourists

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 29 July.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

File

da

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 July 1982

BOF

Zimbabwe

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Mr. G. Topping concerning Mrs. Ella Hodgson's son who is one of the British citizens at present held by terrorists in Zimbabwe.

I should like to send a reply on behalf of the Prime Minister very early next week and should be grateful for a draft during the course of Monday if possible. You will note that Mr. Topping complains that Mrs. Hodgson has received no information from the FCO about the situation. You may think it would be a good idea for her to be telephoned immediately.

A. J. COLES

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 July 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 27 July. This is receiving attention and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

A. J. COLES

G. Topping, Esq.

The National Archives

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129

17 FIRBANK
EUXTON
CHORLEY
LANCS
PR7 6HP
27.7.82

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

I am writing on behalf of my wife's mother, Mrs Ella Hodgson, whose son is one of the British captured by the rebels in Zimbabwe. I am sure that after your own recent experience, you will be aware that this is a very harrowing time for both my wife and her mother.

My mother-in-law first heard of her son's capture on the 1-00 PM news on Saturday - a terrible shock for a 70 year old. Surely the initial contact should have been made through the Foreign Office prior to the release of names to the press.

Secondly, we have had no contact whatsoever from the Foreign Office in spite of my request to them to be kept fully informed of the situation. We have of course, sought information from elsewhere, the local M.P. and the travel company involved, but this tends to be opinion rather than fact and I am sure that you are only too well aware of the inaccuracies which abound in media reporting. As far as we are aware, the F.O. may be sat on their backsides playing cards. I am sure that they are not; but it would be reassuring to know what is being done to help the unfortunate men and to establish some regular contact with them.

I would be grateful if you would ensure that this is done and that the maximum assistance and pressure is applied to the situation.

Yours Sincerely. Mr G. Topping (G. TOPPING)

The National Archives

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Zimbabwe JR

CF

FCO letter below is "Restricted".

file cc: FCO Corbt.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

9 June 1982

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for your letter of 26 May enclosing one from Mr. Denis Walker.

We are indeed aware of the case of the York brothers who, like Mr. Stuttaford, are Zimbabwe nationals. But as I explained in my letter to you of 4 May, we are not in a position to make formal representations on their behalf. Nevertheless, despite Mr. Walker's evident doubts, I can assure you that the British Government is concerned about people being detained for prolonged periods without trial, and the Zimbabweans are well aware of our concern.

I note, incidentally, that the general question of detainees was not raised during Mr. Mugabe's meeting with the Anglo/Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group. However, you will probably know that at a later stage in his visit Mr. Mugabe repeated assurances that those currently detained will either be released or brought to trial, and I am sure he must know of the importance which you and other colleagues attach to this matter.

Yours ever

Margaret

Nicholas Winterton, Esq., MP.

JR

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type for PM pl
submit with this letter.
cc 10.
MAP 8/11.

8 June, 1982

Dear Mike,

Thank you for your letter of 28 May enclosing correspondence from Nicholas Winterton, MP about Zimbabwe.

I enclose a draft reply to Mr Winterton from the Prime Minister. A copy of the Prime Minister's earlier letter, to which Mr Walker refers, is also enclosed.

Our understanding of the York case is much as Mr Walker has described it. The parents-in-law of one of the brothers have been in touch with our High Commission in Harare and also called on Central African Department to explain the background to the case. They accept completely that, because the Yorks are Zimbabwe nationals, we cannot intervene.

As you know, the Stuttaford case was not raised during Mr Mugabe's visit. We have, however, avoided saying so in the draft reply to Mr Winterton since he would then be likely to question the true extent of the Government's concern about Stuttaford's detention.

The meeting in the Grand Committee Room to which Mr Winterton refers was that of the Anglo/Zimbabwe Parliamentary Group. FCO Ministers drew attention to this gathering in advance for the benefit of one or two MP's (notably Sir B Braine and Mr Tom King) who have been in regular correspondence with us about detainees in Zimbabwe. But none of them chose to use the opportunity to raise the subject directly with Mr Mugabe.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~/letter/~~teleletter/despatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO: Nicholas Winterton Esq, MP
House of Commons

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 26 May enclosing one from Mr Denis Walker.

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Enclosures—flag(s).....

HL

28 May 1982

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge your letter of 26 May.

I will place your letter before the Prime Minister and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

M A PATTISON

N.R. Winterton, Esq., M.P.

HL

N. WINTERTON MP
(Dennis Walker)

10/6

28 May 1982

I enclose a further letter from Mr. Nicholas Winterton, M.P. about Zimbabwe. I should be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister's signature by Thursday 10 June.

M A PATTISON

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

cc IG. R 28

NICHOLAS R. WINTERTON, M.P.
(Macclesfield)

26th May 1982 NRW/cmh

Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Margaret,

I enclose correspondence which I have received from Mr Denis Walker, and would ask you to let me have a response which I could forward to him.

I remain concerned about the situation which is developing in Zimbabwe, not least the detention of Mr Wally Stuttaford MP and others by Mr Mugabe's government.

I must tell you that I attended the meeting which Mr Mugabe addressed in the Grand Committee Room last Wednesday, and my concern for what is happening in his country was made more acute by what he said. I am aware that he met you and Foreign Office Ministers, and I am wondering whether any request was made to him for Mr Stuttaford to be brought to trial without delay, although if the Yorks' case is anything to go by, being found innocent in Zimbabwe currently is no guarantee of freedom.

I would be obliged if you would comment on the contents of the letter from the Zimbabwe Member of Parliament who, fearing imprisonment, dare not return to his own country. I look forward to an early response.

Yours ever

Nicholas

P.O. Box 362,
GERMISTON,
Transvaal,
South Africa.
17th May, 1982.

Nicholas R. Winterton, M.P.
Room 15,
Second Floor,
Norman Shaw North Building,
Victoria Embankment,
LONDON SW1.

Dear Nicholas,

Thank you for the copy letter you have received from the Prime Minister.

I wonder if you are aware of the circumstances surrounding the York brothers who have been held in detention since the 28th January 1982, for allegedly possessing arms of war. Early this month they were brought to trial as indicated by the Prime Minister's letter and found not guilty, and walked out of court free men.

The next day they they were again picked up by the Police and detained indefinitely underthe Emergency Powers.

I understand that Robert Mugabe is coming to Europe on 24th of this month and I have heard today that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is preparing to see him again. If it is true that the Foreign Office is still taking a close interest in developments in Zimbabwe, and that it is believed that the British opinion is still of value there, I believe it is high time that somebody spoke out loud and clear in total disapproval of what is going on in respect to the holding of innocent people in custody without trial.

In respect to the Yorks court case, quoting from the Chronicle, 5th May, 1982:

"The Magistrate said there were serious inconsistencies in the Police witnesses as to what transpired during the interrogation. The probabilities favoured the defence rather than the State. The State has failed to prove its case and accordingly, this statement will not be admitted as evidence". He also said there was no evidence that the accused were involved in the burial of arms or the knowledge that they were there, etc".

I would be most grateful if you would bring this latest development to the attention of the Prime Minister. I want you to know that people I have met very recently from Zimbabwe do not believe that without the matter being taken up strongly from outside of Zimbabwe, that Wally Stuttaford will ever again be a free man and certainly this latest developmentsurrounding the York brothers confirms that view.

Have you yet been able to raise the matter on the adjournment? I hope this latest information will be of assistance to you should it arrive in time. Thank you for your concern and interest. I look forward to hearing from you in due course.

Yours sincerely,

Denis

W.D. Walker, M.P.

CAPD (84)

N Godson
Q.A.H.6/5

10 DOWNING STREET

JS 015/1

4 May, 1982

THE PRIME MINISTER

TN

(75)

Dear Nicholas.

Thank you for your letter of 15 April enclosing one from Father Lewis asking the British Government to intercede on behalf of Mr Stuttaford who is detained in Zimbabwe.

I fully understand and sympathise with your and Father Lewis' concern about Mr Stuttaford. It is indeed an unfortunate case. As I explained in answer to a Question from Patrick Wall on 2 March (Col.86), Mr Stuttaford is a Zimbabwean citizen and as such we have no authority to intervene on his behalf. We understand that Mr Stuttaford has access to a lawyer and that he has also been visited by his wife and family.

Of course we continue to take a close interest in developments in Zimbabwe and I believe that our opinions are still valued there. It was in this spirit that Peter Carrington took the opportunity of his visit in February to mention to Zimbabwean ministers the concern which is felt in this country and elsewhere about the detention without trial of Mr Stuttaford and others in Zimbabwe. As I told you in my letter of 10 March, Mr Mugabe has subsequently given assurances that all those detained will either be released or brought to trial as soon as possible. It is encouraging to know that a number of whites who were arrested at about the same time as Mr Stuttaford have since appeared in court. Naturally we hope that his case will soon be resolved too.

Yours ever

Margaret

Nicholas Winterton, Esq, M.P.,

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 80
CONFIDENTIAL
FM SALISBURY 030740Z MAR 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 131 OF 3 MARCH.

YOUR TELNO 128 : SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT.

1. MUGABE DID NOT RESPONE DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S MENTION OF STUTTAFORD NOR DID HE GIVE ANY EXPLICIT ASSURANCE THAT DETAINED WHITES WOULD SOON BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. IN FACT WE UNDERSTAND STUTTAOFRD IS TO APPEAR IN COURT IN MID-MARCH AND SEVERAL OF THE BERTRAND GROUP (OUR TELNO 103) APPEARED BEFORE A COURT FOR INDICTMENT ON 24 FEBRUARY.

BYATT

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

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CABINET OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

Zimbabwe

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 March 1982

Zimbabwe

John Hoskyns, the Head of the Policy Unit here, had lunch on 25 February with the Zimbabwe M.P., Mr. Dennis Walker. I enclose a copy of a minute which Hoskyns sent to the Prime Minister afterwards and which Mrs. Thatcher believes that Lord Carrington would wish to see.

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2.

26 February 1982
Policy Unit

PRIME MINISTER

Please let Peter Lampitt have a copy of this note

LUNCH WITH DENNIS WALKER, MP (ZIMBABWE)

I was asked to lunch via a mutual friend, with Dennis Walker yesterday. As agreed with John Coles, I simply let him talk and this note summarises the main points he made. Many are probably too obvious to be worth repeating, but, as I am an amateur on Zimbabwe, I have tried to record everything that seemed interesting.

1. Walker struck me as a very calm, sensible, tolerant and level-headed man. My instinct was to trust both his word and his judgment. He is very unlikely to return to Zimbabwe as the odds are he would be imprisoned without trial. He finds his position particularly sad as he was probably involved more closely in working with the black community than any other white MP in Zimbabwe and had worked hard (eg in a tour of Canada) to persuade external opinion that the Lancaster House constitution under Mugabe would work out successfully. He tried to get the "dedication clause" reinstated in the constitution after it had fallen by the wayside at Lancaster House. He was unsuccessful but Government MPs were split in the vote, many of them not making themselves available. Walker expects everything he owns to be confiscated. He and his wife left the country with two suitcases; she is now in South Africa.

2. Mr Stuttaford, about whom Dennis Walker wrote to you earlier this month, had been attending Walker's meetings with black politicians who were concerned about the threat of a one-party state (in order to ensure that Walker himself could not be subsequently misrepresented). Stuttaford was initially interrogated by two whites and one black, and signed a statement which, like the interrogation, demonstrated that there was no case against him. He was then interrogated by two black interrogators and that was when the violence started. Walker got this from Stuttaford's attorney, who is also his own attorney.

3. The effect of the Stuttaford case was to warn property-owners in Zimbabwe off having anything to do with politics. "Once you call someone an enemy of the state, you can do anything you like to them".

4. Walker feels that Mugabe underestimates the reaction within Zimbabwe against the idea of a one-party state. Hence the appeals by black MPs to Walker to take action. Walker's view, on balance, is that Mugabe is not carrying out some unscrupulous political strategy which he had intended all along. He thinks that Mugabe is oversensitive to the threats of a coup (while being insensitive to public opinion on the one-party state, as mentioned). Walker himself has heard of no rumours of a coup.

5. As regards the findings of arms caches on Nkomo's farms, Walker notes that these were found by "political people", not the police or security forces. "There are arms caches everywhere in a country that's been at war for 7 years. Many farmers must have buried arms against the danger of future trouble and it is known that only a small proportion of the guerrilla arms were returned."

6. While Walker tends to exonerate Nkomo from planning a coup, he does, on the other hand, say that there have been moves from among the Ndebele themselves (ie Nkomo's natural supporters) for the removal of Nkomo.

7. Walker fears that the Lancaster House safeguards are becoming non-operative and that the country is on the road to a Marxist dictatorship. This will being rapid economic disintegration, the gradual breakdown of social cohesion, law and order, and thus - as always in such situations - "great hardship for ordinary people". Mugabe is heavily influenced by President Kim of North Korea. "Hardly a week goes by without MPs being circulated with papers emanating from North Korea." There were even some amongst Mugabe's associates who favoured a Cambodian-style de-urbanisation, but Mugabe was too moderate and sensible (or had been at that time, just after the elections) to consider such nonsense.

8. Walker stressed that Lancaster House was not a private agreement but a publicly-agreed constitution. He feels that Mugabe can be brought back to it through pressure from the West, on which Zimbabwe is so dependent economically.

9. Walker says that not all the black Ministers in Mugabe's Government are by any means extremist. In particular, the Speaker and the Education Minister were in his view moderate and sensible men.

10. Walker was planning to go onto the States on Sunday, but is now going to be staying on for a couple more days. He very much hopes to be able to talk directly with Peter Carrington on his return in the middle of next week.

JOHN HOSKYNS

Prime Minister

GR 1050

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FM SALISBURY 261630Z FEB 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 118 OF 26 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE CAPE TOWN, WASHINGTON, NAIROBI AND DOT (CREDA)

SAVING BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

1/3

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT : OFFICIAL TALKS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD JUST OVER AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH MUGABE ON 25 FEBRUARY, AND SEPARATE TALKS WITH MANGWENDE (FOREIGN AFFAIRS) AND CHIDZERO (FINANCE AND ECONOMY). A MEETING OVER LUNCH WITH LEADERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY WAS A HELPFUL PRELIMINARY TO THE TALKS WITH MUGABE AND CHIDZERO.

ZIMBABWE INTERNAL.

2. LORD CARRINGTON TOOK ADVANTAGE OF HIS TALK WITH MUGABE TO SPEAK FRANKLY OF THE NEGATIVE IMPRESSION OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ZIMBABWE WHICH WAS GAINING GROUND ABROAD. THE BAD PRESS WAS NOT CONFINED EITHER TO BRITAIN OR TO PAPERS WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT ILL-DISPOSED. THERE WAS A GROWING FEELING THAT WHITES IN ZIMBABWE HAD SOME REASON TO BE APPREHENSIVE (LORD CARRINGTON MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN THIS CONTEXT TO THE STUTTAFORD CASE SPEECHES BY ZIMBABWE MINISTERS ABOUT NATIONALISATION AND A ONE PARTY STATE AND TO THE SECURITY SITUATION). THERE WAS A NEED FOR REASSURANCE. AND, WHILE WE AS FRIENDS OF ZIMBABWE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD, THIS REASSURANCE COULD ONLY COME FROM MUGABE HIMSELF. IN THAT CONTEXT, HIS MEETING WITH BUSINESSMEN LAST WEEK HAD BEEN USEFUL.

3. MUGABE TOOK THIS WELL. HE APPEARED IN PARTICULAR TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE WITH ''THE WHITE MAN IN THE STREET'' WHO DID NOT HAVE THE ACCESS TO MINISTERS ENJOYED BY LEADERS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, AND HE DID NOT DEMUR WHEN LORD CARRINGTON POINTED TO THE UNHELPFUL IMPACT OF CERTAIN MINISTERIAL SPEECHES.

4. CHIDZERO, DURING A BRIEF TETE A TETE WITH LORD CARRINGTON, WELCOMED THE FACT THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO MUGABE AS HE DID. AND MUGABE SUBSEQUENTLY (OVER LUNCH ON 26 FEBRUARY) TOLD LORD CARRINGTON THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE ANOTHER MEETING WITH WHITE LEADERS.

5. IN BRIEFING ON INTERNAL SECURITY, MUGABE SOUGHT TO DISPEL ANY IDEA OF CRISIS. THERE WAS A PROBLEM, THE POLICE WERE INVESTIGATING, AND THE MATTER WOULD COME TO COURT IF THE EVIDENCE WAS SUCH AS TO JUSTIFY PROSECUTIONS. MUGABE IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THIS

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/WOULD

WOULD PROVE TO BE THE CASE AS FAR AN NKOMO WAS CONCERNED, BUT WAS CAREFUL TO LEAVE HIS OPTIONS OPEN. (IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH LORD CARRINGTON OVER LUNCH, MUGABE ADDED THAT NKOMO WOULD BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL IF THAT WAS THE WAYHTHE EVIDENCE POINTED. HE DID NOT ANTICIPATE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY OVER THE REACTIONS AND THOUGHT THAT THE ARMY WOULD HOLD.) MEMBERS OF ZAPU WHO WERE NOT IMPLICATED WOULD NOT BE PENALISED, AND HE HOPED THAT ZAPU WOULD AGREE THAT THOSE OF ITS MEMBERS WHO WISHED TO ACCEPT POSTS IN THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO SO, BUT SUCH PEOPLE WOULD NOW HAVE TO HOLD OFFICE AS HIS (MUGABE'S) APPOINTEES, NOT AS ZAPU PARTY NOMINEES.

6. FOR THE REST, MUGABES MAIN PREOCCUPATION WAS WITH LAND RESETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO RESETTLE SOME 160000 FAMILIES OVER THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS (A FIGURE WHICH CHIDZERO LATER IMPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT UNREALISTIC). THIS WOULD REQUIRE MUCH MORE MONEY. WHAT WE HAD OFFERED WOULD SOON BE EXHAUSTED. SECTION 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION WAS ALSO LIKELY TO CAUSE DIFFICULTY. LORD CARRINGTON MADE CLEAR THE LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP FINANCIALLY, AND RECALLED THAT SECTION 16 HAD BEEN NECESSARY PRECISELY BECAUSE OF FEARS THAT LAND WOULD BE COMPULSORILY ACQUIRED FOR RESETTLEMENT. MUGABE ALSO COMPLAINED, WITHOUT PRESSING THE POINTS THAT OUR PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING LAND RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS WERE TOO CUMBERSOME AND TOO CONSERVATIVE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

7. MANGWENDE BEGAN WITH A PREDICTABLE ATTACK ON SOUTH AFRICAN ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILISE ZIMBABWE. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED WHAT WE HAD DONE BOTH DIRECTLY AND THROUGH THE AMERICANS TO EXPLAIN TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THAT A STABLE ZIMBABWE UNDER MUGABE WAS BETTER FOR THEM THAN ANY CONCEIVABLE ALTERNATIVE. HE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY CROCKER (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 165 TO FCO) AND REPEATED THEM TO MUGABE. MUGABE NOTED WITH APPROVAL THE ACTION TAKEN WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS, BUT EXPRESSED HIS DISLIKE FOR BILATERAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION: THE LAW AND CONSTITUTION OF ZIMBABWE SHOULD BE ENOUGH, AND THERE COULD IF NECESSARY BE AGREEMENTS WITH PARTICULAR ENTERPRISES.

8. DISCUSSIONS OF NAMIBIA WITH MANGWENDE FAILED EITHER TO REMOVE OR TO CLARIFY HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE VOTING FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE CONTACT GROUP. IT WAS AGREED THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD PURSUE. LORD CARRINGTON EMPHASISED TO MANGWENDE AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO MUGABE THE DANGERS OF EAST/WEST POLARISATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. MUGABE READILY AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE DISASTEROUS.

BILATERALS.

9. MANGWENDE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WAS GENERALLY EXTREMELY HAPPY WITH RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN: THERE WAS GENUINE FRIENDSHIP, BMATT IN PARTICULAR HAD DONE A WONDERFUL JOB AND FRANK MILL'S

/HELP

HELP IN SETTING UP THE MFA HAD ALSO BEEN MUCH APPRECIATED. WHETHER OR NOT MANGWENDE HIMSELF SINCERELY SUBSCRIBES TO THESE SENTIMENTS, THEY ACCURATELY REFLECT THE WAY WHICH THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT HANDLED THE VISIT. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT ZIMBABWE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS US FOR MORE AID (ESPECIALLY FOR RESETTLEMENT), BUT IT WAS CLEAR ALSO THAT WE ARE RECOGNISED TO HAVE MADE A MAJOR EFFORT.

10. LORD CARRINGTON WAS ABLE TO EMPHASISE OUR INTEREST IN THE EARLY SIGNATURE OF THE DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO AN AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT PROTECTION. THE FORMER WAS SIGNED ON 26 FEBRUARY. THE LATTER WILL BE DIFFICULT, GIVEN MUGABE'S ATTITUDE. CHIDZERO HAD CLEARLY HOISTED IN THE NEED FOR SOMETHING TO BOOST INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, BUT IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD FIND AN AGREEMENT CONFINED TO NEW INVESTMENT MUCH EASIER TO SELL TO THE ZIMBABWE CABINET AND THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT ACCEPT THIS (AND THUS ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT).

11. LORD CARRINGTON RAISED MAJOR TRADE PROJECTS WITH CHIDZERO AND MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO :
(I) THE EARTH SATELLITE STATION.
(II) THE SUGAR ENTHANOL PROJECT AND
(III) RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION.
HE WAS TOLD THAT FINANCING WOULD BE THE KEY TO (I), THAT A DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN SOON ON (II) (BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD YET TO DECIDE HOW FAR IF AT ALL IT WANTED TO BE INVOLVED) AND THAT (III) WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE RAILWAY AUTHORITIES BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED TO GOVERNMENT.

12. LORD CARRINGTON PRESSED FOR AN EARLY DECISION ON OUR REQUEST TO HAVE THE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION MOVED TO SALISBURY.

FCO PASS SAVING BONN, PARIS, OTTAWA AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

BYATT

FCO | WH
CAFD

COPIES TO:
CRE, D.O.T.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED
[PASSED] AS REQUESTED

Zimbabwe

GR 575

CONFIDENTIAL

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DESKBY 220900Z

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 192258Z FEB 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 19 FEBRUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE SALISBURY ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND CAPE TOWN.

FROM ALLINSON

ZIMBABWE.

1. CROCKER DISCUSSED ZIMBABWE WITH ME THIS MORNING (19 FEBRUARY) IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO SALISBURY NEXT WEEK. HE EMPHASISED THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WERE MAKING IT MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO CONVINCE OTHER DEPARTMENTS IN THE US GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS CONGRESS AND BUSINESS, OF THE NEED TO SUPPORT ZIMBABWE. MOREOVER, US RELATIONS WITH ZIMBABWE WERE HAMPERED BY MISTRUST ON THE ZIMBABWEAN SIDE. FOR EXAMPLE, AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT ON INSURANCE FOR US BUSINESS WITH ZIMBABWE UNDER NEGOTIATION FOR TEN MONTHS AND ON THE VERGE OF BEING SIGNED HAD BEEN PUT ASIDE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE US HAD BEEN SEEKING TO INTERFERE IN ZIMBABWE'S CONDUCT OF ITS AFFAIRS AT THE UN AS A RESULT OF AN INTERVENTION BY MANGWENDE AT A CABINET MEETING.

2. CROCKER SAID THAT IF THE COURSE OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH MUGABE PRESENTED A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY, THE US WOULD FIND IT VERY HELPFUL IF YOU WERE ABLE TO MAKE TWO POINTS TO MUGABE. FIRST, THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THOSE AMERICANS WHO WISHED TO SUPPORT ZIMBABWE IF THEY COULD BE GIVEN MORE AMMUNITION TO HELP THEM CONVINCE US PUBLIC OPINION THAT THIS WAS THE RIGHT COURSE, EG SIGNATURE OF THE INSURANCE AGREEMENT, INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND SO ON. SECOND, THE US WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE MUGABE TO BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE COMMUNICATED VERY STRONGLY TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS THEIR SUPPORT FOR MUGABE, THE FACT THAT ZIMBABWE WAS IN A CLASS BY ITSELF IN TERMS OF IMPORTANCE, THAT IT COULD SUCCEED GIVEN THE RIGHT HELP AND IN EFFECT HAD TOLD THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOT TO DO ANYTHING TO DESTABILISE ZIMBABWE. CROCKER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD BEEN GIVING THE SOUTH AFRICANS A SIMILAR MESSAGE. THE RESULT HAD BEEN GOOD: THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD LOANED LOCOMOTOVES, ROLLED OVER A LOAN AND AGREED TO TALK ABOUT RENEWING THE TRADE PREFERENCE ARRANGEMENT. BUT MUGABE DID NOT SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS STRIVING TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT LOOKING FOR PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS WHICH COULD INDEED BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND CAUSE THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO BACK OFF, BUT THEY WOULD LIKE TO FEEL MORE CONFIDENT THAT MUGABE APPRECIATED WHAT THEY WERE DOING.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. CROCKER SAID HE COULD ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT A ONE PARTY STATE MIGHT ACTUALLY BE HELPFUL FOR ZIMBABWE'S DEVELOPMENT. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER IT COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AGREEMENT AND WITHOUT A BREACH OF PUBLIC COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE A VERY BAD EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION AND WHICH MIGHT REFLECT ADVERSELY ON THE NAMIBIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE AMERICANS ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE ECONOMIC COURSE BEING ADOPTED BY THE ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT AND UNSURE WHETHER THE RIGHT PRIORITIES WOULD BE ADOPTED IN TRIMMING EXPENDITURE TO WHAT WAS AVAILABLE. WOULD ENOUGH BE DONE TO KEEP BUSINESS ALIVE OR WOULD TOO MUCH EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON MEETING PARTY DEMANDS?

5. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT CROCKER'S REQUEST TO YOU, BUT POINTED OUT THAT IN VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS IT WAS HARD TO PREDICT HOW OUR DISCUSSIONS MIGHT GO.

PARSONS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

SOUTHERN AFRICA STANDARD

S AF D
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ECD
ES & SD
CABINET OFFICE

Zimbabwe

PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY
SIR A ACLAND
~~SIR L ALLINSON~~
LORD N G LENNOX
MR GILLMORE
HD/S AF D
HD/C AF D
HD/UND
HD/DEFENCE D
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
HD/NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

MR COLLINS DOT
MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE
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ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

[Typists stay S.V.P.]

OO FCO DESKBY 181600Z

GR 660
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY FCO 181600Z
FM SALISBURY 181430Z FEB 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 090 OF 18 FEBRUARY.
AND TO PRIROTY MODUK (FOR DI4, DS11, AND DMO)
INFO PRIORITY CAPE TOWN, PRETORIA, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, LILONGWE (DEVDIV).

MY TELNO 089 : GOVERNMENT CHANGES.

1. A CABINET RESHUFFLE HAS BEEN LONG EXPECTED. THE DISMISSAL OF THE ZAPU MINISTERS MEANT THAT IT COULD BE DELAYED NO LONGER. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE CHANGES EVIDENTLY SURPRISED THE ZANU MINISTERS CONCERNED, WHO WERE PRESENT AT MUGABE'S PRESS CONFERENCE, MUGABE MUST HAVE DECIDED ON THE MAIN ONES EVEN BEFORE THE ROW WITH ZAPU BLEW UP. DISREGARDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE ZAPU MINISTERS, THE POLITICAL AND TRIBAL BALANCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS FUNAMENTALLY THE SAME AS BEFORE. BUT THEIR GENERAL EFFECT IS TO STRENGTHEN MUGABE'S PERSONAL AUTHORITY OVER THE GOVERNMENT

REMAINS FUNAMENTALLY THE SAME AS BEFORE. BUT THEIR GENERAL EFFECT IS TO STRENGTHEN MUGABE'S PERSONAL AUTHORITY OVER THE GOVERNEMENT.

2. AS REGARDS THE MAJOR CHANGES, CHIDZERO'S INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY OVER ECONOMIC AFFAIRS SHOULD RESULT IN BETTER CO-ORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICY, AND AVOIDANCE IN FUTURE OF BETISES SUCH AS THE RESTRICTIONS NKALA INTRODUCED ON EXPORTS OF PERSONAL EFFECTS. SEKERAMAYI'S MOVE FROM LANDS IS A LOSS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE LWND RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME. HE HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT, DECISIVE AND RELIABLE MINISTER WITH WHOM TO DO BUSINESS. THE NEW MINISTER MAHACHI (HIS FORMER DEPUTY) IS MUCH LESS INTELLIGENT AND WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH, DESPITE HIS SUPERFICIAL AFFABILITY. HE ALSO HARBOURS POPULIST TENDENCIES WHICH COULD GIVE DIFFICULTY OVER EG ACCELERATED RE-SETTLEMENT. SEKERAMAYI SHOULD HOWEVER BE AN ASSET IN HIS NEW POST, WHICH WAS DOUBTLESS CREATED TO RELIEVE MUGABE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOST ROUTINE MILITARY MATTERS, AND WILL BE GOOD NEWS FOR BMATT PROVIDED IT DOES NOT REDUCE THEIR ACCESS TO MUGABE HIMSELF. HOVE'S MOVE COMES AS NO SURPRISE: MUGABE WAS DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PERFORMANCE AT HOME AFFAIRS. IT IS SAD, THOUGH NOT REALLY SURPRISING, THAT MUGABE HAS NOT APPOINTED ANOTHER WHITE TO SUCCEED DAVID SMITH AT TRADE AND COMMERCE. HOVE HAS A DEGREE IN COMMERCE, BUT NO PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE, AND HIS TRACK-RECORD AT HOME AFFAIRS IS NOT ENCOURAGING. NKALA'S NEW FUNCTIONS ARE UNCLEAR AND IT LOOKS AS IF HE HAS BEEN DOWN-GRADED. BUT HE HAD BEEN HEARD TO SAY THAT HE WAS UNHAPPY GRAPPLING WITH FINANCE. WE THINK HIS MAIN BRIEF WILL BE TO CRACK DOWN ON FIDDLING IN GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES CONTRACTS. ZVOBGO'S TRANSLATION FROM THE POWERFUL AND IMPORTANT MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING TO A NEW MINISTRY OF LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS MUST BE INTERPRETED AS A DEMOTION. BUT HE IS LIKELY TO EXPLOIT TO THE FULL ANY POLITICAL SCOPE WHICH HIS NEW JOB PROVIDES IN THE CONTEXT OF MOVES TOWARDS A ONE PARTY STATE. MUBAKO (MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS) IS LIKELY TO BE ECLIPSED. MUNYARADZI IS QUITE IMPRESSIVE BUT HAD LITTLE SCOPE AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE AND HE MIGHT BE A GOOD MINISTER OF HEALTH. (HE IS A SURGEON AND HIS WIFE A SENIOR HOSPITAL SISTER).

3. THE ONE REALLY EXTRAORDINARY AND WORRYING NEW APPOINTMENT IS THAT OF USHEWOKUNZE AS MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS. ALTHOUGH HIS RETURN TO THE GOVERNMENT WAS WIDELY EXPECTED (MUGABE IS SAID TO BE FOND OF HIM) THE APPOINTMENT TO THIS POST OF A MAN NAMED IN COURT NOT LONG AGO IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULARLY GRISLY SERIES OF MURDERS OF WHITE FARMERS NEAR FORT VICTORIA SEEMS ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE. MUGABE'S MOTIVE MAY BE TO SHAKE UP THE POLICE WHOM HE DISTRUSTS. THE EFFECT HOWEVER IS LIKELY

GRISLY ~~SERIES OF MURDERS OF WHITE FARMERS NEAR FORT VICTORIA~~ ~~SEEMS ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE~~. MUGABE'S MOTIVE MAY BE TO SHAKE UP THE POLICE WHOM HE DISTRUSTS. THE EFFECT HOWEVER IS LIKELY TO BE A SHOCK TO THE MORALE OF THE REMAINING WHITES IN THE POLICE FORCE, AND OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, AND POSSIBLY A STEEP DECLINE IN POLICE EFFICIENCY. A SURPRISING APPOINTMENT AT A TIME WHEN THE ARMY'S LOYALTIES MAY BE UNDER STRAIN. BUT WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT MUGABE FELT OBLIGED TO MAKE IT IN TERMS, FOR EXAMPLE, OF SATISFYING RADICAL PARTY OPINION.

4. THE REMAINING GOVERNMENT CHANGES ARE UNIMPORTANT. MASANGO (TRANSPORT) IS PLEASANT BUT UNTRIED. MUMBENGEGWI WAS UNIMPRESSIVE AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE FAME IN HIS NEW JOB AS MINISTER FOR WATER RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT. MRS CHITEPO IS NO POLITICAL HEAVYWEIGHT BUT QUITE A GOOD ADMINISTRATOR.

5. CONTRARY TO EXPECTATION, MANGWENDE WAS DISAPPOINTINGLY NOT MOVED FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THE POSITION OF SHAMUYARIRA (WHO WAS THOUGHT TO BE A POSSIBLE CONTENDER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) HAS NOT BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED BY LOSING TOURISM AND GAINING POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS.

6. THE NEW MINISTRIES SEEM LIKELY TO CAUSE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFUSION, AT LEAST INITIALLY. FOR EXAMPLE ZVOBGO, MUBAKO AND THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL SPEAKER (MNTASA) LEGAL / CONSTITUTIONAL/ PARLIAMENTARY FIELD, AND NKALA SEEMS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN DEMARCATION DISPUTES WITH MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

7. THERE MAY BE FURTHER CHANGES IF OTHER ZAPU MINISTERS ELECT TO LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT.

BYATT
BT

NNNN

DB 181532Z

[SOUTHERN AFRICA] [ADVANCE COPIES] IG 17

PS
PS/~~SIR T GHIMOUR~~ LPS
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
MR DAY
SIR A ACLAND
SIR L ALLINSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MR ~~P H MOBERLY~~ GILLMORE
HD/S AF D
HD/C AF D
HD/UND
HD/DEFENCE D
MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RM K200A
HD/NEWS D
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~
Typists

MR. COLLINS DOT.
MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE
NO 10. DOWNING STREET

GR 830
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 181530Z
FM SALISBURY 181345Z FEB 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 088 OF 18 FEBRUARY
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DI4, DS11 AND DMO), CAPETOWN, LUSAKA AND PRIORITY PRETORIA MAPUTO LILONGWE AND WASHINGTON.

MY IPT: ZANU/ZAPU CRISIS

1. THE DISMISSAL OF NKOMO AND HIS 3 SENIOR COLLEAGUES FROM THE GOVERNMENT IS A MOST UNWELCOME PRELUDE TO YOUR VISIT TO ZIMBABWE IN A WEEK'S TIME. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WITH ANY CERTAINTY WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE. MUGABE IS CLEARLY TRYING TO LIMIT THEM: STRESSING THAT ZAPU AS A PARTY IS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS BLAMEWORTHY AND THAT ITS SENIOR MEMBERS NOT MENTIONED AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY HAD ''NOTHING TO FEAR''.

2. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ZANU HAVE, SINCE THEIR 3-DAY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, BEEN DETERMINED TO

~~2. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT ZANU HAVE, SINCE THEIR 3-DAY CENTRAL~~ COMMITTEE MEETING AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, BEEN DETERMINED TO PRESS HARDER ON ZAPU AND SPEED PROGRESS TOWARDS A ONE-PARTY STATE, PREFERABLY BY ABSORPTION OF ZAPU. MUGABE, PERHAPS SO AS NOT TO BE OVERTAKEN WITHIN THE PARTY, SEEMS IF ANYTHING TO HAVE SET THE NEW PACE HIMSELF SINCE HIS RETURN FROM LONDON. APPARENTLY NKOMO REACTED ADVERSELY, TELLING MUGABE IN EARLY FEBRUARY THAT HE WOULD NOT PURSUE TALKS ABOUT UNITING THE PARTIES WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED TO MAKE HARSH PUBLIC SPEECHES. THE DISCOVERY OF THE MAIN ARMS CACHES ON ZAPU FARMS NEAR BULAWAYO CAME ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MUGABE, WHO WE BELIEVE OFTEN RECEIVES HIGHLY COLOURED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT FROM HIS PARTY MACHINE, REALLY BELIEVED THAT SOME CONSPIRACY WAS AFOOT. MORE LIKELY, HE AND HIS SENIOR PARTY ADVISERS, PARTLY MOTIVATED BY LONG-STANDING PERSONAL AND POLITICAL ANIMOSITIES, SAW AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCREDIT NKOMO AND SPLIT ZAPU, AND SEIZED IT.

3. THEY MAY YET SUCCEED. WE KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN MUCH DISSATISFACTION WITH NKOMO'S LEADERSHIP WITHIN ZAPU OVER THE PAST YEAR. ~~8?75~~ DOT A NEW LEADERSHIP WILL NOT NECESSARILY BRING ZANU'S OBJECTIVE OF A ONE-PARTY STATE ANY NEARER: ZAPU CRITICISM OF NKOMO HAS TENDED TO BE THAT HE WAS TOO COOPERATIVE TOWARDS ZANU. APPARENTLY THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT INTENTION IS NOT TO BAN ZAPU OR DETAIN NKOMO, BUT TO LEAVE HIM AND THE OTHER DISMISSED MINISTERS AT LIBERTY UNTIL THEY CAN BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL ON CRIMINAL CHARGES. THEY WILL HOPE MEANWHILE TO KEEP OTHER ZAPU AND EX-ZIPRA OFFICE HOLDERS IN PLACE (THE SWEETS OF OFFICE MAY HELP), THEREBY STRAINING THE COHESION OF ZAPU AND REDUCING NKOMO'S STANDING AND INFLUENCE. ONCE NKOMO IS OUT OF THE WAY THEY MAY HOPE TO RESUME WITH A SUCCESSOR NEGOTIATIONS TO MERGE ZANU ANDVZAPU. BUT THEY MAY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNEARTH EVIDENCE ADEQUATE TO SECURE CONVICTION FOR ANY DRAMATIC OFFENCE SUCH AS TREASON. ~~5-, -17855-)~~ THEN HOSPITAL OR CONVICTION FOR SOME MORE OR LESS TECHNICAL OFFENCE WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING FOR THEM: PRESSURE FOR DETENTION COULD THEREFORE BUILD UP LATER. ZANU MAY ALSO UNDERESTIMATE NKOMO'S INFLUENCE WITH THE ORDINARY PEOPLE IN MATABELELAND, WHO, I UNDERSTAND, GREET HIM ALMOST AS A ROYAL PERSONAGE.

4. AT ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM THINGS COULD GO AS ZANU APPEAR TO HOPE, AT THE OTHER THERE COULD BE A PROGRESSIVE WITHDRAWAL OF ZAPU AND ZIPRA MEN FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY MAKING MATABELELAND VIRTUALLY UNGOVERNABLE AND PERHAPS SUBJECT TO SMALL SCALE GUERILLA ACTIVITY, AND PULLING THE AMALGAMATED ARMY APART LEAVING THE GOVERNMENT WITH LITTLE BUT THE FIFTH BRIGADE WHICH THE NORTH KOREANS ARE TRAINING (AND WHICH WE BELIEVE IS STILL NOT IN A STATE

KOREANS ARE TRAINING (AND WHICH WE BELIEVE IS STILL NOT IN A STATE TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY).

5. MY GUESS IS THAT THINGS WILL MUDDLE ALONG BETWEEN THESE TWO EXTREMES, AND PROBABLY NEARER TO THE FIRST THAN THE SECOND AN EARLY INDICATOR WILL BE WHETHER THE TWO REMAINING ZAPU CABINET MINISTERS RESIGN, AS NKOMO HAS IMPLIED THEY SHOULD (AND AS I EXPECT THEY MAY), AND WHETHER THE SENIOR EX-ZIPRA ARMY OFFICERS DO LIKEWISE (AT THE MOMENT, DESPITE MUTTERED THREATS LAST WEEK, THEY SEEM TO BE STAYING PUT: THEY ARE FOR THE MOMENT LEADERLESS SINCE GENERAL MASUKU IS IN JAPAN DISCUSSING PURCHASE OF ARMY VEHICLES).

6. ANOTHER INDICATOR WILL BE POPULAR REACTION TO THE NEWS OF NKOMO'S DISMISSAL. LITTLE IS VISIBLE IN SALISBURY SO FAR: A BRISK MIDDAY SHOWER SEEMS TO HAVE PUT PAID TO NOT VERY ENERGETIC EFFORTS TO MARSHALL A ZANU CROWD. NO NEWS OF ANY DRAMATIC REACTION IN BULAWAYO YET. GENERAL SHORTISS (BMATT) IS BY CHANCE THERE TODAY ON AN INTRODUCTORY VISIT, AND REPORTS THAT THE SITUATION THERE IS CALM. HE RETURNS TOMORROW NIGHT AND I SHALL REPORT OVER THE WEEKEND IF HE HAS ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT TO ADD.

7. I SUSPECT THAT IN ANY CASE WE ARE AT THE END OF A PHASE IN ZIMBABWE'S POLITICAL LIFE. I DO NOT EXPECT MUGABE TO CHANGE HIS BASIC POLICIES. BUT HE AND ZANU NOW CLEARLY FEEL STRONG ENOUGH TO INSIST THAT ''RECONCILIATION'' MUST BE MORE ON THEIR TERMS. IF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS PROVE THEM TO BE RIGHT, THEY WILL WANT TO SPEED UP THE PACE OF CHANGE. THAT WOULD NOT HELP WHITE MORALE. ON THE OTHER HAND THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE MIGHT BE ALTERED, IF AT ALL, IN WAYS OF WHICH WE WOULD APPROVE: A SUCCESSFUL SHOWDOWN WITH NKOMO AND ZAPU WOULD SO STRENGTHEN MUGABE'S POLITICAL POSITION THAT HE MIGHT FEEL BETTER ABLE TO PURSUE PRAGMATIC POLICIES.

BYATT

CCN: PARA 3. LINE K

LINE3 YEAR. BUT A NEW LEADERSHIP....

LINE 15: CONVICTION FOR ANY DRAMATIC OFFENCE SUCH AS TREASON. THEN ACQUITTAL OR CONVICTION FOR SOME.....

PARA 5.

LINE 2: EXTREMES, AND PROBABLY NEARER TO THE FIRST THAN THE SECOND AN EARLY INDICATOR WILL.....

NNNN

FILE

Zimbabwe.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 January 1982

Letter from the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

Thank you for your letter of 15 January on the subject of British aid for land resettlement in Zimbabwe and assistance for Zimbabwe students. I enclose a reply from the Prime Minister to Mr. Mugabe and would be grateful if you would arrange for its delivery.

A. J. COLES

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FILE

JR

SUBJECT

cc FCO

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 10/82

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

18 January 1982

cc. Master set

Dear Mr. Mugabe.

I was very sorry to miss you on your recent visit to London. I look forward to your visit in May and I very much hope that your wife will by then be well enough to accompany you.

I know that Lord Carrington was very pleased to have the opportunity of a discussion with you last week; and I understand that he was able to go over in some detail with you the points which you raised in your letter to me of 15 December. I know that land resettlement is a top priority for you. As I said in my earlier letter, this is why we have undertaken to provide thirty million pounds to meet almost 50 per cent of the cost of the targets you had set at the highly successful Donors Conference last March. As you will appreciate, we cannot embark on further commitments when so little (only one-and-a-half million pounds sterling) of the thirty million pounds already allocated to resettlement has been spent. I know you want to get on with spending the rest of this money effectively and we will continue to do everything we can to assist in this objective. As your Government itself recognised at the Conference, no single donor can provide all Zimbabwe's needs. It is essential that all donor countries should play their part.

On students, I have one point to add to my earlier letter. Your Ministry of Economic Planning has now formally requested that we use £1.7 million of the £75 million pledged at

/Independence

Independence to support, over the next three years, some 50-70 Zimbabwe students at present in Britain. I am happy to tell you that we can accept this request.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Honourable R.G. Mugabe

Prime Minister.

If you are content with this answer, you may care to sign the letter back to Mr Mugabe.

MTW
15/1/82.

3.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 January 1982

Dear John,

Letter from the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

Under cover of your note of 29 December you forwarded a letter from Mr Mugabe to the Prime Minister repeating the request he made at the CHOGM for more British aid for land resettlement and assistance for Zimbabwe students. This was in reply to the Prime Minister's letter of 2 November (copy enclosed).

In coming back again on the question of land resettlement, Mr Mugabe is reiterating his contention that Britain has not offered to do enough in this area and implicitly that it remains a British responsibility to provide funds to solve the land problem. Both publicly and privately we have always emphasised that we do not accept such a responsibility.

The British aid currently on offer to the Zimbabwe Government for resettlement amounts to £30 million: this represents almost 50% of the cost of the programme put forward by the Zimbabwe Government at the Donors Conference last year. So far only some £1.5m of our £30 million has been claimed by the Zimbabweans. This was pointed out to Mr Mugabe by Lord Carrington when they met last week. It may well have been the first time he had been told this.

Mr Mugabe's repeated insistence on the urgency and extent of the problem reflects increasing pressure on him to satisfy African demands for land. The Zimbabwe Government has not been able to implement the original schemes as quickly as it would have wished, largely because they require very careful planning and implementation. This has resulted in a growing squatter problem which the Zimbabwe Government are tackling through a separate 'accelerated' scheme of their own in which we are not involved. The danger is that the Zimbabwe Government will have to widen the original scheme, to become a much more extensive and expensive operation. In these circumstances it is important that we maintain the line that land resettlement cannot be an exclusively British responsibility.

With regard to the question of financial support for Zimbabwe students, we can now tell Mr Mugabe that we have a formal request from the Zimbabwe Ministry of Economic Planning for £1.7 million of the £75 million aid pledged at Independence to be used for further training awards. We are content to accept this proposal.

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq

10 Downing St

Please type for PM's Box

PSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

TO:

Your Reference

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:
DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO HON R G MUGABE, PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE

I was very sorry to miss you on your recent visit to London. I look forward to your visit in May and I very much hope that your wife will by then be well enough to accompany you.

I know that Lord Carrington was very pleased to have the opportunity of a discussion with you last week; and I understand that he was able to go over in some detail with you the points which you raised in your letter to me of 15 December. I know that land resettlement is a top priority for you. As I said in my earlier letter, this is why we have undertaken to provide thirty million pounds to meet almost 50% of the cost of the targets you had set at the highly successful Donors Conference last March. As you will appreciate, we cannot embark on further commitments when so little (only one and a half million pounds sterling) of the thirty million pounds already allocated to resettlement has been spent. I know you want to get on with spending the rest of this money effectively and we will continue to do everything we can to assist in this objective. As your Government itself recognised at the Conference, no single donor can provide all Zimbabwe's needs. It is essential that all donor countries should play their part.

/On

Enclosures—flag(s).....

On students, I have one point to add to my earlier letter. Your Ministry of Economic Planning has now formally requested that we use £1.7 million of the £75 million pledged at Independence to support, over the next three years, some 50-70 Zimbabwe students at present in Britain. I am happy to tell you that we can accept this request.

Mr. Sands Smith

for onward transmission
3.11.81

cc also: PS/Mr Mates
PS/Mr Luce
Mr Day
Mr Lynch OBE

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 November 1981

Rhodesia

My dear Prime Minister,

I was delighted to have the opportunity for such a good talk while we were in Melbourne. As a result of our conversation I have every confidence that the difficulties that you face - formidable though some of them may be - will be successfully overcome. As you know, over the year and a half since independence we have endeavoured to give you all the assistance within our power, not only as far as the economy is concerned with our development aid programme, but also in dealing with the first of the problems you mentioned to me, the integration of the Army.

I promised to look into two particular questions you raised with me, progress on land resettlement and fees for students from Zimbabwe in the United Kingdom. On the first of these, you asked if we could not increase the allocation of £20 million for land transfer and resettlement which formed part of the total offer of development aid which we made at the time of independence. I realise how important this is to you. It was for this reason that at the Aid Donors' Conference in Salisbury last March Lord Soames made a further commitment of £10 million to a second land resettlement scheme. We understood that, together with the first scheme, this constituted the full extent of the Zimbabwe Government's plans in this extremely important sphere for the next three years. I hope you will consider that a total of £30 million, representing almost 50 per cent of the estimated total cost of land resettlement schemes over the first few years of independence, is a generous response, especially in view of the limitations on our development aid expenditure which have regrettably had to be made for the time being as part of our general economic strategy. Moreover, I understand that there might be some limit to the speed at which land resettlement can be accomplished.

/ I am

I am of course aware, not least from my conversations in Melbourne, that our decision to charge full fees to many overseas students has caused disquiet, especially in Commonwealth countries. We have carefully considered whether we could not make some exceptions to our present rules, but I fear that any relaxation would inevitably become widespread and would undermine the basis of what we believe to be a necessary policy. However, in certain respects, Zimbabwe is already more favoured than others. We have financed very large numbers of Zimbabwean students over the years from our aid programme (in fact, the training allocation for Zimbabwe has been the largest of all) and we are continuing to do so, albeit on a lesser scale. At the Aid Donors' Conference in Salisbury in March, Lord Soames announced an addition of £5 million for Zimbabwean students in Britain who would qualify for tertiary education, either in the United Kingdom or at the University of Salisbury, and he also indicated to your Minister of Education that your Government could, if they wished, use some of the British aid announced at independence to finance additional students to pass to higher level studies.

I hope you will agree that the very substantial assistance that we have already offered will make a significant contribution in both the highly important areas which you mentioned to me. The assistance we have pledged ourselves to provide to Zimbabwe immediately makes this one of our biggest aid programmes in Africa and demonstrates the importance we attach to helping Zimbabwe in the early years of independence.

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher

The Hon. R. G. Mugabe

file

Zimbabwe

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

29 December 1981

You will recall that in the margins of the CHOGM, Mr. Mugabe raised with the Prime Minister the questions of aid for land resettlement and fees for Zimbabwe students in the UK. The Prime Minister replied to Mr. Mugabe following the Conference in a letter dated 2 November.

Mr. Mugabe has now written again repeating his plea for urgent aid (attached). I should be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send by 14 January.

W. F. S. RICKETT

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

T.176A/81

SUBJECT

Copied to Master/Ops sets.

PRIME MINISTER

SALISBURY

15 December, 1981.

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T.176A/81

Dear Prime Minister,

(T.153/81) - Pt 1

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd November, 1981.

I too recall the very important and useful discussion we had in Melbourne during the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, the main part of which was focused on our requirements for further external assistance in relation to our immediate post-war reconstruction and development programmes. As I indicated to you on that occasion, it is my Government's very strong belief that the United Kingdom can, and should, do more to render the necessary assistance to us particularly in regard to our land purchase and resettlement programme and financial support to Zimbabwean students studying in the United Kingdom.

Whilst we naturally are very appreciative of the aid we have to date received from Her Majesty's Government, I must, however, emphasise again that our requirements are most urgent indeed and that the assistance so far received from the United Kingdom and other friendly countries regrettably falls short of these requirements. The land purchase and resettlement programme in particular is one concerning which we feel Britain should be more understanding and helpful. Needless to

say that our own people, the bulk of whom are peasants whose "traditionally" meagre resources were wiped out during the war, do not have the means to acquire the land they need for settlement and agricultural purposes. It is in light of this stark fact that I was impelled to speak to you in the manner I did in Melbourne. If the situation has changed at all in the last two months it is in respect of its having become more critical and urgent.

With warm regards,

Yours sincerely,



R.G. Mugabe.
Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

The Rt. Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London.

RGM/gm.

Alan - really not for CF?
see record of talks with President Mubarak.
Kay 26/11

Zimbabwe

jd

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

23 November 1981

Dear Julian

Thank you for your letters of 12 and 19 November about South Africa and the Middle East. I am, as always, most grateful to you for letting me have the benefit of your views.

signed

MT

The Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.

jfh

Top

c. B. Ingham

Zimbabwe

23 November 1981

REPLY TO HOUSE OF COMMONS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE'S REPORT ON AID TO ZIMBABWE

Thank you for your letter of 19 November. I confirm that we have no objection to the publication arrangements you propose.

M. A. PATTISON

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1981

MODBA Yes
Content? Mrs
MAP 20/11

Dear Mike,

Reply to House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee's Report on Aid to Zimbabwe

I am writing to seek agreement to publication of the Government's reply to the above Report (HC 117).

// I enclose a note on the Report and the aid programme to which it relates. The proposed reply, which incorporates the Report's recommendations within the narrative, is annexed to this note. The Report, published on 30 September, concludes that Britain has a commendable record in providing aid to Zimbabwe. The reply accepts certain of the Report's recommendations - largely concerning practical measures to improve the flows of aid - and comments upon them all, correcting errors and misapprehensions as appropriate.

The Report was not controversial and attracted little publicity. The reply is likely to have a similar response. Indeed it is likely to be overshadowed by the publication of the Government's response to the Foreign Affairs Committee's two reports "The British North America Acts: the Role of Parliament" (HC 42 and 295) (ie the Canadian Constitution controversy) which is currently expected to appear in the first week of December. Accordingly we are asking HMSO to publish the reply as a Command Paper on 1 December, as early that week as is reasonable and as close as possible to the standard two months target for replies to Select Committee reports.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to the Press Secretary, 10 Downing Street, and to the Private Secretaries to the Leader of the House of Commons, the Paymaster General, the Government Chief Whip in the House of Commons, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary to the Cabinet.

/Subject to

Subject to any comments by the recipients, I should be grateful for your agreement, as soon as possible, to publication as proposed.

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M A Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

NOTE ON THE 6TH REPORT OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SESSION 1980 - 81.

THE ROLE OF BRITISH AID IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ZIMBABWE

£75 million of British development aid was announced at the time of Zimbabwe's independence (18 April 1980) for commitment over a 3 year period. Further aid totalling £15 million was announced at the ZIMCORD Conference in March 1981. In addition the United Kingdom Government is providing some £8 million towards the cost of railway electrification and some £14 million to enable Zimbabwe students being financed by Britain at the time of independence to complete their existing courses.

The Sub Committee decided in July 1980 to investigate aid and development relating to Zimbabwe. It is one of an infrequent series of inquiries looking at the performance of British aid programmes in specific countries. In this case the general interest in Zimbabwe's progress since independence on 18 April 1980 was clearly relevant. As the report says:

> "The present inquiry is different from those which preceded it in that there is no past programme to evaluate. Indeed, major decisions about the aid programme in Zimbabwe were still being taken during the course of our investigations. This was, rather, an inquiry which sought mainly to look forward and to "investigate the role of British aid in the economic development of Zimbabwe." At the same time Your Committee have been acutely conscious of the turbulent history of Zimbabwe, and have sought to examine the implications it has had for future possibilities of regional development in Southern Africa as a whole."

SIXTH REPORT FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE SESSION 1980/81
ZIMBABWE: THE ROLE OF BRITISH AID IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ZIMBABWE

Observations By the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs

(Marginal References are to the Relevant Paragraphs in the Select Committee Report)

1. The Government welcomes the Report published on 30 September and is grateful to the Committee for its detailed investigation.

The British Aid Programme

Para 65 2. The Government is pleased to note the Committee's conclusion that Britain has a commendable record in providing aid to Zimbabwe. However, the Government does not consider it appropriate to use the proposals made in 1977 as a yardstick for the measurement of the present programme. The Zimbabwe Development Fund initiative, which brought little response, lapsed with the rest of the Anglo-American plan: this was made clear during the course of the Lancaster House discussions. The fact that our aid programme to Zimbabwe is one of the biggest British aid programmes in Africa demonstrates in itself the importance which the Government attach to support to enable Zimbabwe to realise its potential in the early years of Independence and stand on its own feet.

3. The Committee comments that Britain can hardly be expected to pledge more aid immediately but welcomes the assurance given by
Para 115 Lord Soames at the Donors Conference in March that we will consider how things look at the end of the present 3-year commitment period. The Committee adds that while it is obvious that the whole burden cannot fall to Britain we should continue to assist Zimbabwe well after the expiry of the present 3-year commitment period. Our own hope, and no doubt that of the Zimbabwe Government, is that Zimbabwe will not require long-term support in the form of aid from the international community. Indeed, it is our expectation that sound government and stability coupled with the international aid now available will go a very long way in putting the Zimbabwe economy on a sound and equable

/footing

footing. We shall monitor the developments and, in accordance with Lord Soames' statement, reconsider the position in 1983 when we shall look at Zimbabwe's progress, the overall limits of the British Aid Programme and the competing claims on its financial and manpower resources.

The International Response

4. We sought to play a full role both before and during the Donors Conference in encouraging Western donors to take part and to respond generously to Zimbabwe's requirements. As the Committee says the Conference was a success. At the closing session of the Conference the Minister of Economic Planning and Development said that the Zimbabwe Government was gratified with the results. The President said that from all indications the Conference had been a resounding
Para 49 success. It is true that the full sum required for projects in the area covered by the Conference agenda was not achieved but the Minister of Economic Planning and Development pointed out that many statements were made at the Conference which promised support but did not give figures. He said that the Zimbabwe Government estimated that when these statements had been followed up they would achieve the full target of Z$1.2 billion.

5. Since the Conference aid donors have been working with the Zimbabwe Government to turn pledges into confirmed projects. Such action cannot be taken over night, even if assistance is provided in drawing up proposals. Nonetheless, we believe good progress is being made and that with continued efficiency in administration the Zimbabwe Government will be able to employ the aid available to it in the implementation of projects in priority areas for development during the 3-year plan period for which assistance was sought at the Donors Conference.

6. The Government made it clear at the Lancaster House Conference that it stood ready to assist in mobilising international aid for Zimbabwe if the Zimbabwe Government so wished. We have fulfilled that undertaking, and we believe that donors responded generously at the
Para 116 Zimcord Conference in March. The Zimbabwe Government has not indicated to us any dissatisfaction with the level of assistance being provided by particular donors nor has it asked for any UK support in seeking increases in particular aid donors' pledges. If it were to do so, however, we would consider what help we could usefully provide.

/Land Resettlement

Land Resettlement

7. As the Committee records in its Report the documentation prepared for the Zimcord Conference shows that the Zimbabwe Government
aras 44-45 intends to tackle the problem of overcrowding in the former Tribal Trust Lands through a series of measures: dryland resettlement, the development of irrigated agriculture, urban growth centres in rural areas, the up-grading of the former Tribal Trust Lands through a series of Intensive Rural Development Areas (IRDAs) and the general expansion of employment opportunities in the country.

8. The Dryland Resettlement Programme has probably attracted the greatest attention, though the Donors Conference documentation indicates that the Zimbabwe Government intends to spend a greater sum on the development of irrigated agriculture during its 3-year plan period. Dryland Resettlement plans cover two programmes: the first is well under way and it is to this programme that the British Government is contributing £20 million. The second Resettlement Programme is due to start in 1982/83 and Lord Soames announced at the Donors Conference that the Government would provide an additional £10million for this programme. The Zimbabwe Government's policy is not to buy land for resettlement on a subsistence basis but to give settlers an income of about Z$400 per annum above subsistence needs. As the
Paras 38 & 72 Committee recognises, such a highly complex operation requires very careful planning, and the fact that the Zimbabwe Government is determined to make wise decisions has meant that the programme has had to proceed perhaps more slowly than was originally expected. We note
Paras 41-42 that the Committee takes the view that very large-scale resettlement does not seem to be a practical possibility within the immediate future, and that although present plans may fall short of political expectations they are "substantial by any international standards".

9. The Zimbabwe Government has worked swiftly to get the Dryland Resettlement programme started and was able to establish the first settlers in time for the sowing season last Autumn. Since then detailed procedures have been carefully worked out and further individual schemes within the overall programme have been launched. There have inevitably been some teething problems but these are now being tackled as the programme moves towards the beginning of the second crop year.

/10.

10. The EDF has committed itself to financing development costs under the first Resettlement Programme and a number of Governments are now engaged in discussing with the Zimbabwe Government their participation in particular projects. Some of these Governments have been prepared to meet the cost of land purchase but the money they can make available would be in the form of soft loans and the Zimbabwe Government has
Para 73 indicated that it is only prepared to accept grant money for this purpose.

Para 15 11. The Committee says that it was left in no doubt that there is a belief in Zimbabwe that Britain has a particular responsibility in the area of land resettlement, and that in successive talks and negotiations about independence British Government representatives accepted to some extent that the purchase of European land and the payment of compensation of farmers could be a British responsibility. The Government wishes to emphasise that at both the Lancaster House Conference and in discussions with the Zimbabwe Government since Independence it has been at pains to make it perfectly clear that while it recognises the importance of extending land ownership and is willing to help in this area the costs are beyond the capacity of any individual donor country. The Zimbabwe Government itself in the preface to the Zimcord Documentation said that its assessment of the resource requirements for post-war recovery and land resettlement and rural/agricultural development and technical assistance was that these were "enormous and well beyond the capacity of Zimbabwe and/or a single donor."

Para 20 12. The Committee accepts that no specific sum for land resettlement was mentioned at the Lancaster House Conference and that no undertaking
Para 64 was made, but concludes that the 1977 Anglo-American plan led to expectations that land purchase and resettlement could have been
Para 67 interpreted to fall within the provisions of the proposed Zimbabwe Development Fund. As already stated, it was made clear at the Lancaster House Conference that the ZDF proposal lapsed with the 1977 Anglo-American initiative. Sums now available from aid donors are in excess of the target set by the Zimbabwe Government for the Zimcord Conference, and even though some of this money will be directed to areas other than those geared to reducing population pressure on the formal Tribal Trust Lands such money will reduce the burden of the Zimbabwe Government and make it easier to find finance for resettlement and other schemes aimed at overcoming overcrowding problems and providing greater opportunities.

Para 112

13. The Committee concludes that Britain should continue to be fully associated with the Zimbabwe Government's plans for land transfer and

Para 118

recommends that the British Government should be prepared to make more funds available for land purchase as and when the Zimbabwe Government brings forward plans for further resettlement. We are already meeting half the costs of Zimbabwe's first Resettlement Programme and will contribute £10 million towards the further programme which has yet to be started; by any token these are substantial contributions. We cannot commit ourselves to do more: others must play a part either directly or indirectly, and indeed they are now doing so.

Para 118

14. The Committee also recommends that the Government should try to persuade other Governments, and particularly the Government of the United States of America, to provide funds for land purchase. As mentioned in paragraph 10 above, some governments have shown readiness to help in this area and we hope that they and others will see what they can do to provide grants for land purchase.

15. The Government cannot accept the Committee's recommendations that together with the Government of Zimbabwe we should look at the possibility

Para 119

of devoting more of the funds allocated to resettlement to land purchase alone, leaving other donors to cover development costs. The present arrangement is agreed with the Zimbabwe Government and is working well. For all resettlement projects where we agree to provide finance we have an involvement both in land purchase and in initial development. If we were only involved in land purchase we could not expect to have the same voice on development matters where we believe we have a useful contribution to make. While at present therefore we have a balanced involvement in individual projects, under the Committee's proposal we

Para 72

would not be involved in what the Committee calls the very complex operation of planning and implementing resettlement, which is essential to the success of the individual schemes, the overall programme, and the well-being of the settlers. In these circumstances we think it right to continue to participate as we are doing at present.

Para 120

16. The Committee's allied recommendation is that we should relax the requirement that British funds spent on land should be met with an equal financial provision from the Zimbabwe Government. In fact, we are not insisting that the other half of land purchase costs should be met in full by the Zimbabwe Government, and we are content for this to be covered in part, or indeed in total by other donors. However, the British Government attaches importance to the present arrangement under which the UK contribution is balanced between land purchase costs and development costs. As already stated the concept of sharing in both operations has found favour with the Zinbabwe Government.

The Commonwealth Development Corporation and Agricultural Expertise

Para 117

17. The Government notes the Committee's recommendation that high priority in allocation of resources be given to the existing expertise at the disposal of the UK Government, particularly in the CDC, for the development of large scale and smallholder agricultural schemes.

18. The Government agrees that the CDC provides a valuable source of expertise in the priority area of agricultural development and particularly smallholder settlement. The extent to which this expertise can be made available in Zimbabwe will depend, among other things, on the overall level of resources available to the Corporation and the scope it sees there for suitable investment opportunities; but the Government hopes that, within the resources available to it, the Corporation will be able to play a full and constructive part in agricultural development in Zimbabwe.

19. More generally, should the Zimbabwe Government request advice, or assistance through the provision of expertise, in either the development of large scale or small scale agricultural schemes we should be very willing to see how we could help.

Technical Cooperation

20. The Government recognises Zimbabwe's short term needs for assistance in the form of technical and professional personnel until the country is able to increase the output of its training institutions. We believe that Britain is well placed to help in this area and with

the agreement of the Zimbabwe Government we have earmarked some £12m of the £75m UK aid pledge made at the time of independence for the provision of technical cooperation personnel and consultancies. The Government cannot accept the Committee's statement that
Para 121 Britain's contribution in this field is small and a matter for concern; nor that there is a need for an increased proportion of British
Para 63 aid to be spent on technical cooperation. It seems from Table 5 of the Committee's report that their view on this point stems from a misinterpretation of the intended allocation of the £75 million aid pledge: Annex A to this paper provides clarification. A substantial programme is getting under way and we have now agreed to provide over 50 long term technical cooperation officers as well as short term visits and consultancies. We are very willing to consider other requests that the Zimbabwe Government may wish to put to us. In looking at such requests we shall be anxious to ensure that posts are in areas of clear importance to Zimbabwe's economic development and that there is a training role so that Zimbabweans are able to take over when our technical cooperation personnel complete their assignments.

Public Administration

Para 122 21. The Government recognises the importance to Zimbabwe of sound public administration. One of the first British advisory missions requested at the time of independence was concerned with the development of the public service, and we have made it clear since then that this is an area where we are willing to help if invited to do so by the Zimbabwe Government. We also stand ready to assist the Zimbabwe Government in the preparation of projects and applications for funds to present to aid donors.

Assistance in the Field of Education

Para 112 22. We acknowledge that assistance in the field of Education could make
Para 89 a major contribution to Zimbabwe's development. As the Committee has noted the Zimbabwe Government itself is already engaged in recruiting teachers from abroad and indeed is obtaining teachers from Britain without the need for recourse to aid resources.

23. The Committee comments that the overall provision for education in the aid pledge by Britain to Zimbabwe remains small and is a matter for concern. However of the £12 million allocated for reconstruction some £1.5 million is allocated to school rebuilding and to this must be added the £23 million for training awards for Zimbabweans:-

£14 million for completion of pre-Independence courses
£2 million for those completing intermediate courses in 1980 and going on to higher level studies
£5 million for those completing intermediate courses in 1981 and going on to higher level studies
£2 million for completely new training awards since Independence.

The Government cannot accept that these are small sums.

Para 82

24. The number of Zimbabwean students at present being financed under the UK aid programme is 1,500 this is made up as follows:-

385 continuing on UK courses commenced before Independence
513 students at the University of Zimbabwe
186 students in third countries
147 students who completed intermediate courses in 1980 and who have proceeded to higher level courses
220 students who completed intermediate courses in 1981 and who are currently being found places on higher level courses
49 new training awards where training has commences since Independence.

The training allocation for Zimbabwe has been the largest of all our training allocations.

Para 88

25. On the question of money for higher level studies for those of the 869 students who completed their intermediate courses this year the Committee notes with satisfaction the announcement by Lord Soames of the provision of an additional £5 million but the Committee adds that this falls far short of the sum estimated to be necessary for financing all these students. The Government would point out that not all of these students have been able to obtain adequate qualifications to go on to higher level studies, that certain of these students would not wish to pursue courses to which the Zimbabwe Government would accord

priority, and that the Zimbabwe Government has been told that if it accords the provision of finance sufficient priority further money can be made available from within the remaining unallocated balance of the £75 million Independence aid pledge.

Library Development and the British Council

Paras 92 & 123 26. The British Council has now appointed a Librarian to its Office in Salisbury to be supported by four locally-engaged staff. The Council intends to develop its library facilities including works of reference, films and textbooks with particular attention to material for secondary school students at O and A levels. The Council proposes to make available from its own resources £12,000 in 1981/82 for the purchase of books and £3,500 annually for periodicals. ODA has increased substantially, to £50,000, the amount of money available under the Books Presentation Programme in 1981/82 for the supply of books to various institutions in Zimbabwe and hopes to be able to increase the allocation in the following year.

27. The report by the Library Specialist who visited Zimbabwe during 1981 under British Council auspices has been presented to the Zimbabwe authorities. Decisions on the implementation of recommendations in the report are for the Zimbabwe Government. Any proposals that maybe put to ODA for assistance to national library development in Zimbabwe will be considered.

The British Voluntary Agencies

Para 95 28. The Government share the Committee's admiration for the work of the British voluntary agencies in Zimbabwe and recognise that they played an important role under the Rhodesian regime, and have a continuing role particularly in assisting in re-establishing facilities in the rural areas. Like the Committee, we are pleased that the British voluntary agencies are fully aware of the need to work closely with the Zimbabwe Government.

Para 128 29. An evaluation of the ODA co-financing scheme with the British voluntary organisations is at present taking place. The team undertaking this are visiting projects overseas and also holding discussions with voluntary

organisations in the UK. In considering any revision of the administrative details of the scheme it will be necessary for the team to bear in mind the need to ensure that public money is adequately accounted for.

Para 129

30. The £500,000 made available for co-financing voluntary organisation projects in Zimbabwe was in addition to ODAs global co-financing scheme. As this special fund has been fully utilised agencies seeking support for projects in Zimbabwe will now have to apply under the global scheme which, in common with all parts of the Aid Programme, is under financial constraints. Alternatively, it is open to the Government of Zimbabwe to seek UK Government support from the overall aid already pledged for Zimbabwe.

Volunteers

31. The Committee is anxious, that further time should not be lost in setting up a volunteer programme. It suggests as an emergency measure the sharing of the franchise between two volunteer agencies.

The Catholic Institute for International Relations, the society to which the British Volunteer Programme has allocated responsibility for Zimbabwe, now has a co-ordinator in the field and three volunteers are in post. Other positions are being filled and funds are expected to be available for the modest and selective programme being planned by CIIR and the Zimbabwe authorities in education, health and some technical areas.

32. The extent and the adequacy of the programme identified by CIIR will be examined by the British Volunteer Programme Committee shortly, when they consider the report they commissioned by the society's investigator. Any need for a sharing of the franchise can then be considered. While the Government of Zimbabwe has not yet adopted a final policy on the extent of the use of volunteers, in education it is looking to the BVP to provide volunteer teachers for the new Rural Secondary Schools, and other selected schools, in technical and vocational subjects; it is expecting to fill gaps in general teaching by its own recruitment and its intensive training programme, with manpower help from the Australian Government, and the Canadian volunteer programme. Should a scheme for

Para 101

for using volunteers for general classroom teaching eventually materialise, it would compete with other claims on limited resources available for the Volunteer Programme as a whole.

Paras 102-104 and 130

33. In noting that Zimbabwe is at present suffering from a shortage of skilled technical personnel and artisans in many areas, and particularly in the public sector, the Committee says that it considersthere might be an unconventional role here for volunteers. It recommends that we should initiate discussions with the Zimbabwe Government, the appropriate professional organisations, trade unions in both countries and the British Volunteer Programme with a view to exploring Zimbabwe's needs and wishes in this area.

34. The Government will be discussing this proposal with the British Volunteer Programme in the first instance. Many volunteers are, in fact, recruited for their technical skills, but the scheme the Committee has in mind could be an extensive one and any role which the volunteer programme could play would have to be highly selective.

35. Depending on the outcome of the discussions with the British Volunteer Programme and others the question will be followed up with the Zimbabwe Government to whom we would indicate what could be done if this type of assistance was welcomed.

Ratification of Zimbabwe's accession to Lome II

Para 131

36. The Government has consistently urged its European Community partners to ratify quickly the agreement on the accession of Zimbabwe to the Second Lome Convention. However the constitutional requirements of some Member States result in lengthy ratification procedures. Those Member States which have not yet ratified the agreement have undertaken to do so by the end of 1981. The Community as a whole will then be able to conclude the agreement, thus bringing it into force.

European Investment Bank Operations in Zimbabwe

Para 132

37. The Government agrees that financial profitability should not be given undue weight in choosing projects for EIB support. However the Bank's normal selection criteria go much wider than this. Financing decisions are based on sound economic appraisal and take account of

the individual development circumstances of each recipient. In Article 22 Committee discussions the UK has consistently been concerned to ensure that EIB projects should make the maximum possible contribution to the economic and social development of recipients, and the Government will continue to pursue this policy in its dealings with the EIB. The UK would prefer subsidised EIB loans to ACP countries to be made in the first instance to the government of the recipient country, to be on-lent by the government to the ultimate borrower at an appropriate rate of interest. This view, however, runs counter to EIB policies and was not accepted during the negotiation of the Second Lome Convention. If requested by the Government of Zimbabwe the UK would consider providing technical cooperation for the identification and appraisal of projects for submission to the EIB.

Move of BDDSA to Salisbury

Paras 106 and 124

38. We agree in principle that BDDSA should move from Lilongwe to Salisbury, subject to the availability of funds for the financing of the move. Financial pressures, however, and the competing demands for new works overseas have required a careful and detailed examination of the BDDSA proposal. This is now complete and, subject to final consideration of the details and the agreement of the Zimbabwe authorities, the aim is to start moving the Division early next year.

British High Commission Accommodation in Salisbury

Para 107-125

39. Since the Foreign Affairs Committee's visit there have been staff reductions and a consequent redistribution of accommodation. This will continue to be kept under review bearing in mind the Committee's recommendations.

Local Language Ability

Paras 109, 126 and 127

40. The Government does not consider that it is essential for UK-based High Commission staff to be fluent in the two main local languages. However as the High Commissioner stated in his evidence to the Committee some of his staff have been learning one of the local languages, and there is a locally engaged member of the staff in the aid section with fluency in one of the main languages and a good knowledge of the other.

41. We do not see a need for the appointment of one or two persons fluent in Shona and Sindebele to assist the High Commission and the Development Division in its involvement with the land resettlement programmes as resettlement work on the ground is carried out by the Zimbabwe Government, and the main involvement of the High Commission and the Development Division is with central Zimbabwe Ministries and the interministerial committee which controls the programme (whose proceedings are conducted in English).

British Independence Aid Pledge of £75 million

Allocations	£ thousands
Refugees	1,000
Post War Reconstruction	12,000
Land Resettlement Programme	20,000
Programme Loan	10,000
Joint funding with the Voluntary agencies	500
British Contribution to the European Development Fund in respect of Zimbabwe	2,000
Technical Cooperation	12,000
Training awards	4,000
	61,500

FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SW1W 9AA
TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

Confidential

19th November, 1981.

Dear Margaret,

I was in Cairo at the weekend with Bill Mclean and Robert Cranborne. We went at the invitation of the Foreign Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali. His invitation apparently followed a speech I made on 5th November in the foreign affairs section of the debate on the Address.

We had very cordial and full talks first with President Husni Mubarak whom I knew only slightly and later with the Foreign Minister whom I have known for some time. As the whole problem of the Middle East is very much on the agenda, I have thought it right to let you have fairly detailed records of these talks based on notes taken by Bill McLean and Robert Cranborne at the time. We had a short but helpful meeting with our Ambassador Michael Weir and paid a courtesy call on the Empress Farah of Iran who is an old friend of mine.

Our visit received extensive coverage on Cairo television and in their press. This went well beyond the intrinsic interest of anything I had to say. It probably indicates the importance the Egyptian Government attach to demonstrating to their public that they have friends in Europe who share their broad approach to the Middle East problem. It may also be their way of signalling to other countries where they stand.

The broad if necessarily tentative conclusions which I reached at the end of our visit are as follows; and here I would stress that they are purely my interpretation of what was said to us the record of which is attached.

1. The Egyptians attach paramount importance to securing the final withdrawal of the Israelis from the Sinai by April 25th 1982. They believe the Israelis to be firmly committed to this withdrawal but recognise that there are sections of Israeli public opinion which would like to go back on the agreement or postpone its fulfilment ~~and perhaps over-estimate their importance.~~ They would welcome our participation in the Sinai multinational force and see some positive merits in Prince Fahad's plan. They are, however, very anxious to avoid any initiatives or declarations which could be seen as superceding Camp David and might thus interfere with the withdrawal process e.g. by incurring an Israeli veto on the composition of the multi national force.

2. The Egyptians do not expect to get a detailed agreement on autonomy for the West Bank or Gaza before April 1982. They hope, however, to have constructed a framework which would enable Palestinian representatives to emerge in the occupied territories. It would then be for these representatives and the Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement, to take over the business of negotiations with Israel. The Egyptians would

continue to give their support but would no longer play a primary role. Other Arab countries must resort to negotiation as they had done rather than confrontation.

3. The Egyptians believe the Saudis will mend their fences with Egypt progressively. At the moment there is a truce in the war of words. Once the Sinai phase of Camp David is completed they believe the Saudi position will come much closer to their own. They and other Arabs will have to accept that negotiation pays and confrontation does not.

4. They accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination. But they do not believe that the moderates in the PLO can decide PLO policy so long as the Syrians remain in the Lebanon and thus have the main body of the PLO under their physical control and so indirectly that of Moscow. Accordingly they see two possibilities of achieving a settlement. One would be by bringing the Soviets into the peacemaking process. To this, they, and I imagine the USA would be strongly opposed. The other would be to secure the withdrawal of the Syrians from the Lebanon and some disarmament of the PLO with a consequent change of regime in Damascus.

5. Resistance to Soviet Imperialism remains their prime objective and they see close cooperation with the United States as the best way of organising it. They are indeed impatient to see the United States build up extensive military stockpiles and servicing facilities in Egypt itself as well as within the general area of the Gulf.

6. I am always sceptical of assessments of personalities. Sadat, after all, was Nasser's man until Nasser died and Sadat overthrew his policies. I do not know President Husni Mubarak at all well. He struck me, however, as more down to earth and more concerned with the practical problems of reorganising the Egyptian economy and administration than either of his predecessors. There was certainly little of the wideranging and perhaps unrealistic geopolitical vision which characterised my conversations with Sadat or for that matter Nasser. Internal pressures may lead the new President - as they so often have in the past - to seek an external role. If so, my guess would be that he would seek it in the Nile Valley, the Red Sea and North Africa more than in the Asian Middle East. But this can only be a guess. "Dissimulation" as Disraeli wrote (apologies for coded language!) is the secret of oriental policy."

In conculsion I would venture to suggest that we should consider paying more attention to Egypt than we have done in the recent past and put the Palestinian problem on the backburner at least until April 1982. It may prove easier to solve once the success of Sadat's policies where Egypt is concerned have been established beyond doubt.

Yours ever,

Julian.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

P.S. ....

P.S.

As the records of the talks are rather long I have sidelined what seem to be the more significant sections.

I am copying this letter to Peter Carrington and to John Nott.

Confidential

Note of a talk with Major General Kamal Hassan Ali at the Foreign Ministry, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 1.30 p.m.

Present:

The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Major General Kamal Hassan Ali

The Minister's Private Secretary

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
Colonel Neil McLean
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

After recalling earlier conversations and expressing regret over the murder of President Sadat, Mr. Amery wondered whether it was not the Arab world that was isolated from Egypt rather than the other way round? The Minister agreed warmly and quoted with approval a leading article which had just appeared in Al Madina, a Saudi owned paper, published in Kuwait, which had ~~agreed~~ argued: "peace with Israel is inevitable". The Minister thought many of the Arab states were now drawing closer to the Egyptian position. The war of words in the press and on the radio had practically stopped. The peace process would continue to grow.

The Minister welcomed the proposal for a European contribution to the multi-national force in Sinai and thought the Fahad plan was encouraging in its implicit recognition of Israel. But the Europeans must be careful not to create difficulties which might upset Israel and slow down or even stop the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

He was frankly worried about Israel which he described as suffering from "unlimited suspicion". He had noted press reports of the possible formation of a coalition Government in Israel and recalled that the Israelis only went in for coalitions when they faced some grave national difficulty. He thought ~~the~~ a coalition government might mean one or 3 things.

1. A decision to evict Israeli settlements in Sinai by force. This might involve bloodshed.

2. A decision not to withdraw from Sinai by April 1982. He

thought this unlikely but as a soldier had to take account of the worst case.

3. A political preparation for an attack on South Lebanon with the object of ejecting the Syrians and breaking up the PLO military organisation.

The Minister repeated his view that he thought it unlikely that Israel would postpone their withdrawal. Israel had made a pact to withdraw from Sinai not only with Egypt but with the rest of the world. An attack on the PLO and Syrians in South Lebanon would be more understandable. It would be a preemptive bid, rather in the style of 1967, to knock out the increasing strength of the PLO and the Syrian presence in the Bekkaa Valley. It would be a limited war. The Israelis would not go as far as Damascus. But if they were successful, which he seemed to assume, this would probably lead to the fall of the Assad Government and the end of the Alawite supremacy in Syria.

If Israel adopted the third course, Egypt would not interfere. Indeed its non intervention would be Egypt's first test of its commitment to the Camp David agreement. Egypt would keep faith with Israel.

The Minister then turned to the autonomy talks. These had been very disappointing. The initiative in raising the talks to ministerial level had come from the Israeli side. In the event the Israelis had had nothing new to propose. Presumably they had failed to reach agreement in their own cabinet before the meeting.

There were important differences between Israel and Egypt about the concept of autonomy.

1. The first concerned the structure of the representative body. This was important because the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were an educated people and such a people had to have representative government. Egypt wanted to see about 100 representatives who would elect a council of 13 to 17 members ~~into the administration~~. as an administrative body.

2. The Egyptians wanted autonomy to be based on the whole area of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis wanted it based on the population as distinct from the land. Of the (?)100,000 hectares in question, about one third was state land, mostly mountainous and rocky and partly settled by Israelis already. The second third belonged to Palestinians who had emigrated or to the WAKF. The final third belonged to existing inhabitants. In the Israeli view autonomy only applied to them.

3. There was the problem of Jerusalem. Of its 400,000 inhabitants, 115,000 were Arabs. In the Egyptian view these should also be represented in the autonomous institutions. Israel disagreed.

Egypt could not compromise with Israel on these three points (i.e. the size of the representative body, its constituency, and Jerusalem).

Egypt's objective however, was to establish a framework within which further negotiations could take place after the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. Thereafter Egypt's responsibility must diminish. It would be up to the Palestinians and Jordanians to discuss ~~the details~~ with Israel the issues of internal security, foreign affairs and defence which were separate subjects to any rights secured under autonomy. This would involve simultaneous recognition between Israel and the Palestinians and so, presumably, the PLO.

The PLO, however, was severely fragmented. The larger part, as much as 80%, was moderate. The others owed allegiance to more extreme Arab states. The question was would the activist tail wag the dog? The moderate bulk of the PLO depended on Syria and thus on the Soviets, because their main body and armed forces were situated in the Lebanon which was under Syrian control. They could do nothing without Syrian and so Soviet approval.

The Foreign Minister regarded the PLO as an essential ingredient in any settlement. He believed that the problem

 The Israelis could not help withdrawing in the end. If they

should be solved within 2-3 years. ~~If Israel~~ tried to absorb Gaza and the West Bank there would be more ARabs than Jews in Israel. This prospect would oblige Israel to be as flexible as Egypt had been.

But there was one cause for concern. Prince Saud bin Faisal had made an offer to the Russians to approve Prince Fahad's plan and join in discussing it. The Soviets unexpectedly had said "yes". This could be interpreted in one of two ways. Perhaps the SAudis were nodding in Moscow's direction to obtain Libyan and Syrian support at the Arab Summit. Alternatively the Soviets were trying to get in on the act by the back door. The question was, who was pulling whose leg? If it were a purely tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Saudis there would be no harm. But the Minister did not want to see the Soviets brought back into the Middle East.

The conversation then turned to Chad. The Minister was not convinced that the Libyans had in fact withdrawn. He thought they would probably try and stay in the uranium rich northern province. They might, however, have withdrawn from the capital in order to secure the arms deal they were negotiating with the French. Ghadaffi had unbounded ambitions but his support for the Polisario was not an expression of Libyan expansionism but came purely from a desire to destroy King Hassan of Morocco.

Turning to the Horn of Africa the Minister said that although the Ethiopian regime was a Soviet puppet they were now fairly quiet in their relations with the Sudan. They had not tried to stir up the South Sudanese. Eritrea was also quiet. There was still a problem between Ethiopia and Somalia but President Ziad Barre had proved himself a great survivor.

Looking across the Red Sea the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating steadily and could be a danger to the Saudis unless they developed a more positive policy. The Americans understood this but had so many points of relative friction with

the Saudis that they hesitated to press them where the Yemen was concerned.

In conclusion the Minister expressed the view that the American military capability in the area would develop quite rapidly once they had established effective stockpiles and servicing arrangements in Egypt.

Con fidential

Note of a meeting with President Husni Mubarak at the Presidential Palace, Cairo on Sunday, 15th November, 1981 at 11.30 p.m.

Present:

President Husni Mubarak

The Rt.Hon. Julian Amery, M.P.
Colonel Neil McLean
Viscount Cranborne, M.P.

After an initial exchange of courtesies, the President explained that he had just received Khalid Mohieddin, the left wing leader. Mohieddin had come to protest against martial law and the restrictions on the press and to explain his opposition to certain aspects of Camp David. The President had told him that martial law was necessary particularly for his sake. Without it the Fundamentalists would "break your neck first of all because they look on you as a Communist". The President went on to say that he did not regard Mohieddin as a Communist but that he had contacts with the Soviets and was indeed pro-Soviet. He had made it clear to him that he would not allow anyone to act as a channel for foreign propaganda. He was not going to sit on his hands and allow the Soviets to come back and dominate Egypt. The President added that on Camp David he had told Mohieddin that there was no other way in which the Sinai could have been recovered. It could not have been done by war. So why was Mohieddin complaining? What would he have done? Mohieddin apparently agreed but said that he could not say so publicly since he had opposed Camp David in public from the beginning.

The President went on to say that the autumn had been a time of great trouble for Egypt but now things were much quieter and the universities were open again. A number of people had been arrested and were awaiting interrogation. When this was completed the Government could decide what further steps to take. But as at present advised, he did not think that foreign powers had been directly involved in President Sadat's assasination.

Mr. Amery asked whether relations with Saudi Arabia were improving. The President replied that he had good unofficial

contacts with the Saudis and had received private messages of condolence after the murder of President Sadat. Mr. Amery recalled that President Sadat had told him that Egypt could make friends with the Saudis whenever it wanted to. Had the time come? The President said that he preferred to move slowly. The essential thing was to complete the Camp David agreements and not give the Israelis any reason to go back on or postpone their withdrawal from the Sinai. Both Mr. Begin and Mr. Peres had assured him that they would stick to the Agreement and he believed them. "War has been erased from the Israeli/Egyptian vocabulary" Nevertheless, there were voices raised in Israel urging at least postponement of withdrawal.

The President went on to speak of the autonomy talks. He did not expect to reach a detailed agreement by April 25th 1982 but he hoped there might, by then, be a framework within which more detailed negotiations with Israel could be carried on by Palestinians and Jordanians, hopefully with Saudi encouragement. Egypt would naturally do what it could to help. But the Egyptians could not be expected to assume the main responsibility. This must be left to the parties directly concerned. The Egyptians could not be expected to fight other Arab states battles for them. When the Israelis had bombed the Bagdad reactor some Arab Governments had called on Egypt to take action against Israel. But what had they done themselves? All Iraq had done had been to refer the question to the UN! So why should Egypt fight Iraq's battles for her?

The President went on to talk about the PLO. This was a mixture of different groups divided into a pro-Syrian, pro-Iraqi and pro-Libyan faction - and all paid for by the moderate Arab states! The PLO could only follow a united line of policy if its three backers were in agreement. Of the three Syria was the most important because it had physical control of the main PLO bases in South Lebanon.

The President doubted whether the PLO leaders were really very keen on peace with Israel. If a Palestinian state were

established, financial contributions from Saudi Arabia would go to the new State and not to individual leaders, to the detriment of their Swiss Bank accounts. The President did not regard the Fahad proposals as a serious or effective plan but rather as a possible starting point for talks. The Venice initiative too had some merit. But the PLO could only negotiate seriously if the Syrians, and so the Russians, gave them the green light.

Mr. Amery mentioned that Lord Carrington was trying hard to involve the PLO in the peace process. The President commented "God help him", this in a tone that conveyed exasperation rather than benison. For his part he was inclined to doubt whether the Palestinian question would be settled for "50 years". But that, he added, was a purely private view. He went on to say that he had been told, also privately, by "a senior member of the Saudi ARabian Royal family" that the Saudis were not really all that interested in a settlement for the Palestinians. They would agree to terms with Israel if a solution could be found for Jerusalem. He believed this view was shared by other Saudis and perhaps some of the Gulf rulers.

Turning to Syria, the President doubted whether the Syrians really wanted a settlement of the Palestinian problem as this would end their chances of extracting money from the rich Arab states. The Golan Heights were worthless land but provided a reason for keeping the Syrian army on the alert and so for extracting money from the Saudis. Golan was really "a furnished flat for which the rich Arabs pay the rent".

The President expanded at some length on the mercenary character of the Syrians. He claimed that earlier this year Prince Abdullah of Saudi ARabia had paid the Syrians $500 million just to withdraw from the Jordan border which they had never really intended to attack. They had apparently even mentioned the sum of $16 billion as their price for pulling out of Lebanon!

Nevertheless, after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, Hafiz Assad could be in a tight corner. Assad's Government had pursued a policy of confrontation with Israel. Egypt had opted instead for negotiation. All Sinai would shortly be in Egyptian hands. The Syrian people would begin to realise the mistakes of what was anyway a very unpopular and minority government. This might well prove fatal to Assad's regime.

Colonel McLean asked what sort of regime would follow? The President thought that on balance it would be another pro-Soviet regime. If it were an anti Russian regime this would be a great defeat for the Russians, too great perhaps for them to accept, though obviously desirable.

Turning to Jordan the President said that King Hussein could expect a great deal of trouble from the Palestinians. Nevertheless, after the return of Sinai, King Hussein must be associated with the next phase of talks about the West Bank. But it would be very difficult to pin King Hussein down. "He is very clever but you can never catch him. Even when you have him in your grasp he slips out". He accompanied this remark with a graphic gesture as of one trying to grip an eel.

The President then turned to Libya. He thought that President Ghadaffi was experiencing some difficulty at home because of a shortage of liquid cash. He had, however, received private assurances from Ghadaffi that Libya would not attack Egypt. Ghadaffi had also sent him a private message, just after President Sadat's murder, but the timing of it had been in such contrast with Ghadaffi's public statements as to be "impolite". Anyway he did not want to negotiate with Libya "while this madman is at the helm". When Mr. Amery remarked that it would be constructive if Egypt had access to Libya's oil resources, the President smiled appreciatively but said "Yes, but that is something we cannot discuss".

The President discounted reports of concentrations of Libyan troops on the Chad/Sudan border. The country was too inhospitable

to sustain the presence of an army for long. He also thought the reports of fighting between the troops of the Chad Defence Minister and the Chad Foreign Minister were false. They might have been invented to give the Libyans an excuse to return to Chad should Ghadaffi later wish to do so.

On the subject of the Soviet stockpile of arms in Libya, the President said that this stockpile was indeed substantial. Ghadaffi had bought the arms at a time when he believed the Americans were stockpiling arms in Israel. He had planned himself to establish a parallel stockpile for a pan Arab war against Israel. The President, however, predicted that Libya would find that there was a desperate shortage of spare parts. He had had some experience of Soviet methods when commanding the Egyptian air force. He had found, then, that there were not even spare tyres or engines for Russian supplied Migs. It was the classic Russian technique for keeping control of weapons they supplied.

He personally had a poor opinion of the Libyan armed forces "We gave them a good drubbing when we bombed Tobruk in 1977 and destroyed the airport facilities and some aeroplanes on the ground". He believed some Russian advisers had also been among the casualties.

Mr. Amery asked how the President saw the outlook in Iran. He thought the opposition to Khomeini strong but very divided. There was not much hope of doing anything until a strong man arose inside the country, probably from the armed forces. His own guess was that the Soviets would strike next in Poland which would be "very bad for Europe" but he himself was more seriously concerned about Iran. It was the Middle Eastern country most vulnerable to Soviet expansion.

Colonel McLean asked about the situation in Yemen. Here the President was very critical of the Saudis for having no positive policy. He spoke with disapproval of a Saudi prince

who had told him that the Saudis had no quarrel with Aden and this at a time when the Russians were building a major new airfield and expanding their naval facilities. He thought the situation in North Yemen was deteriorating seriously and that this could be disastrous for the Saudis.

Mr. Amery said how much he had been encouraged by President Reagan's general approach to the international situation. The President agreed warmly. He found the Americans reacted much faster than they had under President Carter who had been rather slow. He liked General Haig very much. In particular he was grateful to the Americans for their swift reaction to the murder of President Sadat. He was very pleased with the "Bright Star" manoeuvres which had just started, though he had not yet had any detailed report about them.

Strategically he thought it essential that there should be an American presence in the area of the Gulf and judged that Masqira could serve very well for this purpose. He was, however, doubtful about the present American military capability in the area. But this could be greatly improved once they began to establish stockpiles of war materials in Egypt and facilities for servicing weapons. He did not want American bases on Egyptian soil but would give them all facilities.

He welcomed the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia as evidence of American determination to defend Western oil supplies. He could not understand why the Israelis had made such a fuss about the AWACS planes. As an air force officer he knew that they would remain under effective American control with American technicians on board and on ground installations. If the Saudis had not bought them the Americans would have stationed them there anyway. The only difference was that the Saudis had paid $10 billion for what they could have had for free!

FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

112, EATON SQUARE,
SW1W 9AA
TEL: 01-235 1543
01-235 7409

Prime Minister

12th November, 1981.

Dear Margaret,

R16

I was in South Africa in the second part of October and had talks with Ministers in Pretoria as well as businessmen and others in Johannesburg.

I put down below a few thoughts on some of the main issues in Southern Africa.

Namibia

South AFrican Ministers appreciate that the Reagan administration is the most friendly American Government they are likely to find. They will accordingly cooperate sincerely with Washington, though that doesn't mean that they won't fight their own corner hard.

The Namibia issue is not simple as you will know. Agreeing constitutional principles is almost as difficult as agreeing a detailed constitution. In what they ~~ask~~ call "Phase II", the administrative problems - status of Civil Servants, relations with UN, provision for law and order etc. - bristle with difficulties. I should be surprised if the timetable for "independence" could be completed even in theory, before the early summer of 1983. And, of course, the local SWA parties may prove difficult and can count on a good deal of support within the Nationalist Party itself.

Basically this is a tougher problem than Rhodesia. The FCO wanted to get rid of the Rhodesia problem. The South Africans don't really want to get rid of Namibia and will try to avoid doing so until it seems a reasonably safe proposition.

Then there is the question of how to enforce constitutional safeguards even if they are agreed. A lot here will depend on the wider context under which Independence comes about. To risk a SWAPO victory in SWA while neighbouring Angola remains a one-party state, virtually occupied by the Soviets and Cubans, could be very dangerous for South AFrican and indeed Western interests. Short of a South AFrican reconquest of the territory, there would be little to stop a SWAPO Government calling in Cubans or other Soviet allies from Angola.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets and Cubans were withdrawn from Angola, if, moreover, the Angolan Oppostion parties - UNITA and FNLA - were recognised in some form or other a SWAPO victory in Namibia would not present much of a danger to South AFrican or to other interests generally and any subsequent SWAPO regime could be controlled or contained.

This issue, of course goes beyond the remit of the 5 power Contact Group and will be mainly for discussion between Washington and Pretoria. I suspect however, that in practice, progress over Namibia may well depend, as far as Pretoria is concerned, on how far we can move towards the decolonisation of Angola. It is, to say the least, a little odd to insist on free elections in Namibia and the withdrawal of "foreign" troops when Angola has never had elections of any kind and is occupied by Warsaw Pact and Cuban forces.

For my own part, I think it would be to our advantage to link the two questions of Namibia and Angola. If we could get the Soviets out of Angola militarily and politically, this would be a great gain. If we cannot, it might well be better to let Namibia go on as it is.

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

I did not go to Zimbabwe but discussed the situation with both South AFricans and Rhodesians like Harold Hawkins and Peter Walls. Their general impression was pretty pessimistic. The whites have been leaving to and through South Africa in even larger numbers than the published figures suggest. The farmers of course have to stay because they cannot liquidate their assets and many older people choose to stay. The main drain is among the under 50s, particularly technicians, skilled workers and civil servants. The effect on the economic and administrative infrastructure is already visible.

This process seems likely to continue as the Mugabe regime adopts policies and strikes attitudes increasingly unfriendly to the whites. Nkomo and his friends are equally unhappy at the prospect of a one party state. Muzorewa and Sithole may already be in personal danger. The advent of North Korean arms and instructors has inevitably increased the sense of uncertainty.

I don't believe the South Africans are deliberately seeking to destabilise Zimbabwe. But they could do so and have made it plain that they will not tolerate any practical support for the African National Congress. They are prepared for everyday cooperation but on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect. Theyare not prepared to accept alleged internal political pressures on Mugabe as justifying unfriendly rhetoric or gestures.

How Zimbabwe will develop may well turn on how the Namibia problem is solved. If it is accompanied by the Soviet/Cuban withdrawal from Angola the prognosis could be hopeful. Otherwise a steady deterioration seems more likely.

General

The South AFrican economy remains very strong and its growth rate impressive. Notable growth areas, I was told, are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Phillipines. Trade with Black Africa continues to grow, and increasingly openly.

Inspite of many previous disappointments the South Africans seem convinced that their rapprochment with the United States is for real, because dictated by genuine strategic and economic considerations.

Discussions about internal reforms continue but are bogged down at the moment by the boycott of the Coloured and Asian councils by their community leaders. The Prime Minister is also under growing pressure from his breakaway right. But he, Pik Botha, and General Malan make up a strong team.

Looking ahead I have a hunch that South Africa may move away from the Westminster type to a more presidential system. This would enable the President to nominate ministers and officials from other races without undermining the basic structure of white supremacy.

Ted Heath's speech in South AFrica was coldly received, so I was told by half a dozen people who heard it. The more sophisticated assessed it as directed to Social Democrat and Liberal opinion in Britain. Ministers resented that he had been their guest the day before but gave no indication of what he was going to say. Even opponents of the Government regretted his demand for "one may one vote". Coming from a former Tory PM it was bound to give the impression that the much lesser but still substantial reforms now under discussion would earn South AFrica no good will abroad.

Yours ever

Julian.

Julian Amery

The Rt.Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

PS. Sorry for the delay in sending this letter but I had to go to Poland between drafting and signing it.

PART 1 ends:-

2.11.87

PART 2 begins:-

12.11.87

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

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