

PREM 19/940

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SECRET

Part 1

Confidential Filing

Visits by Secretary General of UN,
Mr Waldheim.

UNITED NATIONS

May 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
23.5.79							
6.6.79							
26.6.79							
12.7.79							
13.7.79							
21.12.79							
23.4.80							
30.4.80							
20.5.80							
22.5.80							
24.5.80							
29.7.81							
8.5.81							
13.5.81							
12.5.82							
26.82							

PREM 19/1/80
940

● PART 1 ends:-

Waldheim to Pm 13.5.81

PART 2 begins:-

Fco to AJe 7.5.82.



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

CFCO

2

United Nations

Prime Minister

[Handwritten signature]

20v

13 May 1981

Dear Prime Minister, *mt*

On my return to New York, I should like to express my sincere gratitude for the cordial welcome extended to me during my visit to London.

It was most kind of you to find time for a meeting in your very busy schedule and I was, as always, particularly pleased to be able to have an exchange of views with you on matters of mutual concern. I found our discussions extremely useful and I greatly appreciated the encouragement you gave me in my efforts to find solutions to the many serious problems facing the international community at this time.

May I take this opportunity to thank you again for the strong support which you personally and your Government are so consistently lending to the United Nations.

With my renewed thanks and warmest good wishes,

yours sincerely

Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Waldheim

Her Excellency
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
L o n d o n

DISTAFF LIBER



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 May 1981

Call by Dr. Waldheim

I enclose a copy of the record of the conversation between the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the United Nations at the House of Commons yesterday.

M. OD. E. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Master
+ individual
Subject
files
extracts

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON TUESDAY 12 MAY 1981 AT 1530 HOURS

Present:-

Prime Minister	Dr. Waldheim
Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP	Mr. Perez de Cuellar
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	Mr. Mautner-Markhof
Mr. N.C.R. Williams	

Northern Ireland

Arising out of a discussion of Prime Minister's question time, which he had just witnessed, Dr. Waldheim asked whether there was hope of progress on Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister was pessimistic. She emphasised the essential role that British troops were playing in preventing a civil war that would engulf the Republic as well as Northern Ireland. She noted that the present Government in the Republic were being unprecedentedly helpful over cross-Border security co-operation.

East/West Relations

Dr. Waldheim described the talks he had had with Mr. Brezhnev during his recent visit to Moscow. Brezhnev had seemed fit and mentally alert (more so than in 1977) and had spoken fluently. He had emphasised the Soviet desire for dialogue with the United States while expressing resentment of provocative American statements and the abandonment of positions taken by the previous Administration. Dr. Waldheim had told Mr. Brezhnev that President Reagan had told him that he was interested in a dialogue but was gravely concerned about Soviet expansionism. Mr. Brezhnev had "exploded" at the word 'expansionism'.

/Afghanistan

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- 2 -

Afghanistan

Dr. Waldheim said that Mr. Brezhnev had welcomed the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices and the mission of Mr. Perez de Cuellar. The Russians had also accepted that the United Nations should participate in regional talks on the problem, whereas they had previously insisted that the UN could only be an observer. It remained to be seen what this would mean in practice. It was far from certain that the Russians were interested in moving forward. When the Prime Minister expressed reservations about allowing the puppet regime to participate in talks, Dr. Waldheim said that in Soviet eyes Karmal was expendable. Mr. Hurd drew attention to the importance of adhering to the principles of the General Assembly's Resolution, including the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Dr. Waldheim replied that there was no prospect of withdrawal without negotiations. He added that even the Pakistanis now saw some merit in ambiguity about the relationship between current diplomatic activity and the Resolution. In response to a question about the position of Pakistan generally, Dr. Waldheim said that Mr. Shahi had been greatly impressed by the offers of assistance he had now received from the United States but was anxious to avoid giving the impression of alliance with the Americans, thus prejudicing Pakistan's position in the Non-Aligned and Islamic Movements.

Iraq/Iran

Dr. Waldheim said that no solution was in sight. Both sides, and indeed the world at large, had grown accustomed to the war and neither would contemplate concessions. He had seen Mr. Palme in Geneva the previous day. Mr. Palme would be visiting the area again later in May.

Lebanon

The Prime Minister doubted whether the Israelis would actually take action against the Syrian missiles. Dr. Waldheim thought that there was no prospect of the Syrians removing them without concessions from Israel. He did not exclude rash action by Mr. Begin, whose toughness was evidently popular in Israel. The Russians were being active and were not interested in provoking a war.

CONFIDENTIAL/Cambodia

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cambodia

Dr. Waldheim said that in accordance with his obligations under the General Assembly's Resolution, he would now be convening an international conference. It would be boycotted by Vietnam and her friends and he did not expect much to come of it. ASEAN thought the conference might adjourn after a general debate, but remain formally in being. On his return to New York he would be sending a note to all Member States asking them if they would wish to participate.

Namibia

The Prime Minister noted that Mr. Pik Botha would be visiting Washington soon. She regretted the rapid move to voting during the recent Security Council meeting. The reaction to the Western vetoes in Africa had however been fairly calm. Dr. Waldheim said he had done his best to encourage the Africans to compromise. They were however very suspicious of the attitude of the Five, especially of the Americans, to Resolution 435. It was necessary now for the Five to put a 'chapeau' on 435 to complete it by reference to the need to protect minorities and human rights. The Prime Minister noted that the need for co-ordination among the Five made Namibia more difficult to handle than Zimbabwe.

Middle East

Discussing the impressions she had gained during her tour of the Gulf, the Prime Minister noted the high quality of many of the present generation of Gulf rulers. They had been remarkably successful in developing their own countries and were playing their part in helping the rest of the world. It was to be hoped that there would be no big oil price increases during the next two years, though political developments might change this. There was a danger that Iran might lash out at the weak Gulf States. The Syria/Israel conflict might escalate. The rich Arab States were generous and had sometimes been able to buy peace. But they looked to us to do something. Could we persuade the PLO to abandon its formal position that Israel must be abolished? Dr. Waldheim said that Arafat felt that this was his only card and must not be played lightly. It was clear that the Middle Eastern countries

/welcomed

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

welcomed activity on the part of the European Community. The Prime Minister noted that only the Americans could bring about a settlement. European activity had initially been useful as a way of filling a vacuum. It was now necessary to put some flesh on the bare bones of the Venice ideas. The question of the right of Palestinians to return needed examination. This was a matter of grave interest to many Gulf States, where immigrants greatly outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants.


South Lebanon

Dr. Waldheim said that UNIFIL must not be withdrawn, despite the anxieties of the troop contributors.

Cyprus

In a brief reference to Cyprus, Dr. Waldheim mentioned the need for another diplomatic effort in July.

The meeting ended at 1615 hours.



13 May 1981

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COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

Type for signature
13 May 1981

Amel

Dear Michael

I enclose a draft record of yesterday's call by the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prime Minister. I take it that you will wish to issue this, with any amendments you think desirable, from No 10 in the usual way.

Yours ever
Nigel

N C R Williams
United Nations Dept

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

RECORD OF CONVERSATION

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/telegram/dispatch/note~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 12 MAY 1981 AT 3.30 PM

CAVEAT.....

Present

Prime Minister

Mr Waldheim

Hon Douglas Hurd MP

Mr Perez de Cuellar

^{M.O.D.}
Mr Alexander

Mr Mautner-Markhof

^{NCR}
Mr Williams

Northern Ireland

1. Arising out of a discussion of Prime Minister's question time, which he had just witnessed, Mr Waldheim asked whether there was hope of progress on Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister was pessimistic. She emphasized the essential role that British troops were playing in preventing a civil war that would engulf the Republic as well as Northern Ireland. She noted that the present Government in the Republic were being unprecedentedly helpful over cross-Border security cooperation.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/East/West Relations

East/West Relations

2. Mr Waldheim described the talks he had had with Mr Brezhnev during his recent visit to Moscow. Brezhnev had seemed fit and mentally alert ^{(more so than in 1977) & had spoken} ~~and spoke~~ fluently. He had emphasised the Soviet desire for dialogue with the United States while expressing resentment of provocative American statements and the abandonment of positions taken by the previous Administration. Mr Waldheim had told Mr Brezhnev that President Reagan had told him that he was interested in a dialogue but was gravely concerned about Soviet expansionism. Mr Brezhnev had exploded at the word 'expansionism'.

Afghanistan

3. Mr Waldheim said that Mr Brezhnev had welcomed the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices and the mission of Mr Perez de Cuellar. The Russians had also accepted that the United Nations should participate in regional talks on the problem, whereas they had previously insisted that the UN could only be an observer. It remained to be seen what this would mean in practice. It was far from certain that the Russians were interested in moving forward. When the Prime Minister expressed reservations about allowing the puppet régime to participate in talks, Mr Waldheim said that ^(in Soviet eyes) Karmal was expendable. Mr Hurd drew attention to the importance of adhering to the principles of the General Assembly's Resolution, including/withdrawal of Soviet /troops.

troops. Mr Waldheim replied that there was no prospect of withdrawal without negotiations. He added that even the Pakistanis now saw some merit in ambiguity about the relationship between current diplomatic activity and the Resolution. In response to a question about the position of Pakistan generally, Mr Waldheim said that Mr Shahi had been greatly impressed by the offers of assistance he had now received from the United States but was anxious to avoid giving the impression of alliance with the Americans, thus prejudicing Pakistan's position in the Non-Aligned and Islamic Movements.

Iraq/Iran

4. Mr Waldhiem said that no solution was in sight. Both sides, and indeed the world at large, had grown accustomed to the war and neither would contemplate concessions. He had seen Mr Palme in Geneva the previous day. Mr Palme would be visiting the area again later in May.

Lebanon

5. The Prime Minister doubted whether the Israelis would actually take action against the Syrian missiles. Mr Waldheim thought that there was no prospect of the Syrians removing them without concessions from Israel. He did not exclude rash action by Mr Begin, whose toughness was evidently popular in Israel. The Russians were being active and were not interested in provoking a war.

/Cambodia

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Middle East

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quality of many of the present generation of Gulf rulers. They had been remarkably successful in developing their own countries and were playing their part in helping the rest of the world. It was to be hoped that there would be no big oil price increases during the next two years, though political developments might change this. There was a danger that Iran might lash out at the weak Gulf States. The Syria/Israel conflict might escalate. The rich Arab States were generous and had sometimes been able to buy peace. But they looked to us to do something. Could we persuade the PLO to abandon its formal position that Israel must be abolished? Mr Waldheim said that Arafat felt that this was his only card and must not be played lightly. It was clear that the Middle Eastern countries welcomed activity on the part of the European Community. The Prime Minister noted that only the Americans could bring about a settlement. European activity had initially been useful as a way of filling a vacuum. It was now necessary to put some flesh on the bare bones of the Venice ideas. The question of the right of Palestinians to return needed examination. This was a matter of grave interest to many Gulf States, where immigrants greatly outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants.

South Lebanon

9. Mr Waldheim said that UNIFIL must not be withdrawn, despite the anxieties of the troop contributors.

Cyprus

10. In a brief reference to Cyprus, Mr Waldheim mentioned

the need for another diplomatic effort in July.

11. The meeting ended at 4.15 pm.

Am



UN

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 May 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit of the UN Secretary General

I attach two sets of the briefs for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Waldheim at 1545 on 12 May.

The Prime Minister may wish to concentrate on Afghanistan and Cambodia. Mr Waldheim's present travels have taken him to Washington, Moscow, Belgrade, Lisbon and Geneva. The main purpose of his call on the Prime Minister is to discuss his visit to the Soviet Union. He may also wish to take the opportunity to sound out the Prime Minister's attitude to his seeking a third term.

The Prime Minister last met Mr Waldheim on 28 February in New York. She also corresponded with him in January on the succession to Brian Urquhart. We do not think the Prime Minister need revert to the subject on this occasion, as Waldheim will not have anything further to say (and Urquhart has not indicated that he is about to retire).

Yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



VISIT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 MAY 1981

POINTS TO MAKE

Afghanistan

1. We attach great importance to the basic principles of the 20 November UNGA Resolution:
 - (a) immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops;
 - (b) right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government, and to return to their traditional neutral and non-aligned status;
 - (c) creation of the necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return in safety and honour.
2. Have the Russians shown any flexibility? Must maintain pressure on them to move towards a political settlement in accordance with the UNGA Resolution.
3. No future in a dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would merely give status to the Karmal Regime. Pakistan has maintained its insistence that any talks should involve Iran, and also be held under the auspices of the UN. These conditions are important. Pressure should not be put on Pakistan to deviate from them.
4. How does Waldheim see UN actively continuing after departure of his present special representative?

/Cambodia

Cambodia

5. Hope Essaafi's mission was useful. Glad Cambodian conference is to go ahead in accordance with UNGA resolution.

6. Too early to hope for breakthrough and Vietnamese still seem to believe they can win total victory. But necessary for ASEAN to maintain diplomatic momentum, and demonstrate to Vietnam that the world will not accept occupation of Cambodia as fait accompli.

7. Vietnam and friends might attend in the event (they eventually turned up for 1979 Geneva Refugees Conference). If they do stay away they will be seen to flout wishes of overwhelming majority of UN and non-aligned member states. Preparations should leave options open.

Lebanon

8. Very concerned and have kept in touch with those principally involved to urge restraint.

9. Guardedly optimistic about the negotiations in Beirut. But the new Israeli/Syrian angle is potentially dangerous. US best placed to mediate.

10. Difficult to see role for the UN given Arab opposition. But prepared to help if necessary.

South Lebanon

11. We remain concerned at the continuing cycle of violence in South Lebanon which is of particular concern coinciding as it does with the troubles in the North.

/Cyprus

Cyprus

12. Congratulations on keeping talks going on regular basis. Impressed by energy and ingenuity of UN representative in Cyprus (Gobbi). July/October may provide opportunity for progress. Elections in Cyprus will be over: 'window' before UN General Assembly debate and Greek elections.

13. Talks seem likely to lose credibility if no major new initiative in July. UN intentions? What sort of proposals might UN present: overall solution or interim?

14. Might be best to suggest range, or limits, within which parties should negotiate details. Need to persuade Turks to make a realistic offer on territory.

15. To succeed, any proposals will need all-out backing from New York: parties will not give ground easily, although Turkmen has taken reasonably encouraging line in recent conversations.

16. UN likely to need outside help. We will do what we can.

Namibia

17. Pik Botha visits Washington 14 May. Haig will try to discover what South Africa require to make final commitment to implementation. Senior officials of the Five will then meet in Washington in late May to flesh out the proposals outlined in the Rome communiqué.

Iran/Iraq War: Mr Olaf Palme's Mission as UN Secretary-General's Special Representative

18. Fully support the efforts of Olaf Palme.

/Mexico Summit



Mexico Summit and Global Negotiations (if raised)

19. We hope for informality and flexibility at Mexico, and that the absence of elaborate preliminaries will make for a free and constructive exchange of views. Any link with the Global Negotiations should be very informal.

Elections for Secretary-General (if raised)

20. What are Waldheim's own wishes? We should be glad if he carried on.

The Succession to Mr Urquhart

21. Glad to know that Waldheim will look to us to provide Urquhart's successor.

Miss Joan Anstee

22. Hope Secretary-General will support Miss Anstee for post of Executive Director, World Food Programme. She deserves the promotion.



VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 MAY 1981

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Afghanistan

1. Visit of Waldheim's representative, Peres de Cuellar to Islamabad and Kabul in week of 13 April was exploratory. He has reported (optimistically in our view) that he is satisfied that he has 'started the negotiating process'. He has listed the following 'positive points':

- (a) He was warmly received in Kabul as well as Islamabad:
- (b) Both sides were interested in finding a political solution:
- (c) Both sides were prepared to accept an active role for the UN:
- (d) Both considered his visit as the first step in a continuing process.

2. The visit did not however suggest that the Karmal regime (or the Russians) were prepared to make new concessions. de Cuellar avoided the earlier areas of disagreement. Karmal may be trying to use the initiative to set up bilateral talks of the sort which Pakistan has already rejected. de Cuellar has not yet talked to the Iranians; there is no sign that they are willing to take part in negotiations. Hitherto they have insisted that the Resistance should be represented in any discussion of Afghanistan.

3. The Russians have so far shown no willingness to make concessions over Afghanistan. Brezhnev's proposal at the

/ Party



Party Congress (23 February) that the international aspects of the Afghan situation should be discussed in the context of security in the Persian Gulf is an attempt to distract attention from the need for a political solution, and to establish a Soviet droit de regard in the Gulf area.

4. de Cuellar will apparently be leaving the UN to return to the Peruvian Foreign Ministry at the end of May.

Cambodia

5. Mr Waldheim has until recently resisted efforts by ASEAN to get him to summon the Conference called for by the General Assembly.

6. However, following a further demonstration of the broad support enjoyed by ASEAN when Cambodia was discussed at the New Delhi Non-aligned meeting, Waldheim sent Essaafi (a Tunisian Under Secretary-General), to make a tour of the region as his Special Representative. In the light (presumably) of Essaafi's report (which should have confirmed both Vietnamese intransigence and ASEAN insistence on a Conference) Waldheim informed ASEAN on 22 April in New York that he was now prepared to call a Conference, and asked for their suggestions on place, time, agenda and attendance.

7. ASEAN Foreign Ministers are expected to decide to ask for the Conference to be convened in Vienna in July when they meet in Jakarta on 8-9 May. They may also decide who they want to be invited, but are likely to need more time to consider the formulation of the agenda and what results to aim for.

8. (NOT FOR USE) Waldheim expects Vietnam and the Soviet Union to stick to their declared intention to boycott any such Conference, and fears it is doomed to failure. He has

/been



been encouraged in this pessimism by doubts expressed to him privately by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who remains nevertheless committed to the ASEAN proposition that, having secured a massive UNGA vote in favour of an early Conference, they cannot just drop it in the face of Vietnamese intransigence. The Secretary-General has also evidently formed the impression that the Ten have their own doubts. He may have derived this from the cautious reception given by the Ten to ASEAN's rather hectic and uncoordinated lobbying for pressure from their friends on the Secretary-General. But these reservations were more tactical than substantive; the Ten's policy remains to support ASEAN's efforts to get UNGA Resolution 35/6 implemented. There may well be an early joint EC statement to confirm this and (incidentally) correct any misunderstanding.

9. ASEAN's case (which we accept) for going ahead with a Conference attended by a wide range of non-aligned and Western countries is that it would serve to

- a) keep the diplomatic initiative in ASEAN hands;
- b) demonstrate Vietnamese isolation;
- c) remind world opinion of the growing Soviet role in SE Asia;
- d) encourage the Cambodian resistance groups to combine their efforts behind some kind of broad resistance front.

If skilfully handled it could also pave the way for further action at the UN which would step up the pressure on Vietnam, eg by starting to work out a full transition plan for restoring an independent and autonomous Cambodia. The rival Vietnamese proposal for a regional Conference is no more than a manoeuvre designed to entangle ASEAN in a process whose object would be to confirm the status quo in Cambodia.

/ 10.



10. On the ground in Cambodia the stalemate continues. The Vietnamese appear to have decided to settle for a mainly defensive role during the current dry season, concentrating on 'protecting' the main populated areas and lines of communication. But there is no sign as yet that they feel under the kind of pressure that might force concessions over Cambodia.

Lebanon

11. The fighting has mostly died away including, since the Israeli attack on the Syrian helicopters on 28 April, that on the Sannin ridge in Central Lebanon. The negotiations in Beirut are continuing with Khaddam making a further visit from there 3-5 May and planning another from 9-10 May.

12. The most pressing problem is the Israeli/Syrian dimension. The Israelis had told the Americans that they would attack Syrian SAM sites in the Beq'a'a unless these were removed by midnight on 4 May. They have now extended this deadline indefinitely to allow the US to mediate with the Syrians. Mr Phillip Habib (an American of Lebanese origin and former State Department Under-Secretary) left for Israel, Lebanon and Syria on 7 May. He is likely to ask the Syrians for an immediate freeze on activities in the Baq'a'a and Sannin, a withdrawal from Sannin (this is one of the subjects being negotiated in Beirut the most likely solution being the takeover of positions there by the Lebanese army), and a withdrawal of Syrian SAM missiles from the Baq'a'a. The Syrians will not easily agree on the latter point. If they do they will have to save face and are likely to press the US for Israeli undertakings not to intervene in Central Lebanon. These will not be easy for the

/Americans



Americans to get.

13. We do not believe either the Syrians or the Israelis want further escalation. But pride is now engaged on both sides. If the Israelis engage the SAM missiles we believe that the Syrians would be bound to react. The signs are that this would unite the Arabs behind them.

14. We have spoken to both the Israelis and Syrians urging restraint in the wake of the Israeli attack on Syrian helicopters. We have also kept in touch with the Kuwaitis (whose proposal for a round table conference remains on the table) and to the Russians (who said most of the right things but avoided saying they were urging restraint on the Syrians). The Saudis have told the Americans privately that they have sent an emissary to Beirut.

15. The French continue to speak of action in the UN. But no initiative has been taken following the abortive Security Council discussion before Easter. The Arabs and Lebanese continue to insist this is an Arab not international problem.

South Lebanon

16. The two weeks up to 4 May saw greatly increased fighting in the South with frequent Israeli air raids on Palestinian positions and Palestinian rocket attacks on Northern Israel. The Israelis told the UN that if the PLO did not cease firing rockets into Israel the Israelis would be compelled to take drastic measures. Urquhart sent a restraining message to Arafat while telling the Israelis that in his view PLO rocketing must be regarded as a response to Israeli raids. All

/was quiet



was quiet on 5 May but the IDF have been building up their capacity to mount ground attacks into South Lebanon and are now capable of mounting incursions of up to brigade strength at very short notice.

Cyprus

17. UN has done well to re-establish intercommunal talks on regular basis. Gobbi energetic and imaginative. Atmosphere reasonable, but both sides inflexible. UN has tried without success idea of interim arrangement, whereby Greeks trade reopening of Nicosia airport (and thereby partial lifting of economic embargo on Turks) for Varosha (Greek Famagusta, held by Turks).

18. Talks now formally going slow because of elections in both communities (May/June). UN considering ideas for more comprehensive package. (Any final solution would have to involve loose regional federation, with Greeks conceding on constitution, Turks on territory).

19. Possible 'window of opportunity' in summer: elections out of way, talks proceeding on regular basis, Turkish military government with freer hand than predecessors. Ankara and Athens both claim to favour determined effort then. Turkmen told Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 5 May that he hoped for more substantial negotiations after elections, and thought the Turkish Cypriots would be able to make some territorial adjustments in return for real constitutional concessions. 'Window' will not last long. Greek Cypriots will want traditional propaganda feast at UNGA unless talks make progress. Papandreou advance in Greek elections could strengthen Greek

/Cypriots hardliners;



Cypriots hardliners; possible Turkish steps to democracy in 1982. Real threat of talks breaking down if no initiative launched.

20. [Not for disclosure] Waldheim's representative in Nicosia working on detailed proposals, but Secretariat uncertain about way forward. Americans favour active support of UN in partnership with UK, if possible, France and Germany. But not yet clear whether US are prepared to push the Turks sufficiently for concessions, or merely want a public relations plus with Greek Lobby at home. Possibilities for joint 'push' under discussion in knowledge that UN unlikely to overcome intransigence of parties without help from major Western powers.

Namibia

21. On 30 April, after a 10 day debate in the Security Council, UK, France and US vetoed 4 draft resolutions, tabled by the Africa Group, which sought to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa (including an oil and new arms embargo). This was the first time the Security Council had voted on (and UK had vetoed) sanctions against South Africa since November 1977. The Africa Group intend to reintroduce the vetoed resolutions in the General Assembly under the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure, though the latest indications are that this move will be postponed until after the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in Nairobi in June.

22. The Foreign Ministers of the Five met in Rome to discuss Namibia, 3 May. They issued a joint communique, which instructs senior officials to meet to develop proposals, including constitutional arrangements, to increase the confidence of the parties by strengthening the UN Plan and enhance the prospects

/of achieving



of achieving a settlement. The officials will meet in Washington in late May.

23. [NOT TO BE REVEALED] South Africa has long been concerned at the apparent partiality of the UN. In particular South Africa has condemned the General Assembly, which recognises SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. In the past, the Five have argued that the Security Council, which endorsed the UN Plan and would supervise the elections in Namibia, has remained impartial. However, the refusal of the Security Council to hear the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (whilst allowing SWAPO to speak) in the recent Debate (21-30 April) has undermined this argument. As the US to some extent shares South Africa's view of the UN, the next steps in the negotiations will probably be kept away from New York. The Five intend to develop proposals, on which they hope to secure the agreement of the Front Line States, the Namibian Internal Parties and South Africa, before submitting them to the Security Council for endorsement. The UN Secretariat will not therefore be as closely involved as they have been in the past in the actual process of negotiation. The indications are that Waldheim himself recognises this.

Iran/Iraq War: Mr Olaf Palme's Mission as UN Secretary-General's Special Representative

24. Palme was appointed by Waldheim last October. He has paid two visits to the area and appears to have been well received by both sides.

25. He has concentrated much of his efforts so far in obtaining the agreement of the belligerents to a temporary

/ceasefire



ceasefire to allow ships trapped in the Shatt Al Arab waterway to be evacuated. He has obtained agreement in principle but major difficulty still to be resolved is the costs of the operation. Iran insists on sharing costs. Iraq wants to pay for everything, thus tacitly forcing recognition of their responsibility for the waterway.

26. Palme is preparing for his third visit later this month. It will come in the wake of recent visits by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Good Office Committee of the Islamic Conference. Their attempts at mediation have not so far produced any breakthrough. This time round, Palme will be seeking again to establish a basis for a negotiated settlement of the dispute. As the key issue is sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab, on which neither side appears ready to compromise, he is pursuing the idea of shared sovereignty.

27. [Not to be disclosed] Palme is spending the afternoon of 12 May with us. At his request, the MOD gave him a briefing on 12 December 1980 on the military situation in the Iran/Iraq war. He is coming for a further briefing and will be calling on Mr Hurd. We also hope to give him such information as we have on precedents for shared sovereignty.

Mexico Summit and Global Negotiations (If raised)

28. There is no need to raise this subject but Waldheim may do so. We believe that it was he who prompted Chancellor Kreisky and President Lopez Portillo to launch the Mexico Summit. Arrangements for the meeting, (structure of discussion, agenda etc) will be discussed by Foreign Ministers on 1/2 August. Meanwhile

/Special Envoys



Special Envoys of Austria and Mexico will visit London soon for talks with officials.

29. Conditions for US attendance (postponement until the Autumn and exclusion of Cuba) have been met by cosponsors. But President Reagan, who has not formally committed himself, may yet decline in the (unlikely) event that President Brezhnev decides to participate. There will be no observers, although it was earlier proposed that Waldheim himself would assist in that capacity.

30. The Americans have made it clear that they are not prepared to contribute to further discussion of the Global Negotiations until after the Mexico Summit (22/23 October). Meetings on 5/6 May called by President of the General Assembly, Baron von Wechmar, proved inconclusive. Final decision by Wechmar not expected until June, but further preparations without the Americans now seem increasingly unlikely. The developing countries have said in the past that they would not proceed without the United States and the feeling of Community Member States is against continuing without US participation. If the Global Negotiations take place, substantive discussions would not begin before early 1982.

Elections for Secretary-General (If raised)

31. Mr Waldheim's second term expires on 31 December. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The election is likely to take place in December. Waldheim has not yet announced

/his candidacy



his candidacy for a third term of office but he is likely to stand, unless strongly challenged and unsure of support from major powers.

32. There are a number of other candidates in the wings but none have overwhelming support. The likelihood is that most UN members would acquiesce in a further term for Waldheim. The attitude of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council is crucial; the Russians and Americans are likely to prefer a further term for Waldheim rather than risking a change. This is also our view, despite Waldheim's mediocre record, particularly his poor management of the Secretariat.

The Succession to Mr Urquhart

33. Urquhart's post as Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs is uniquely important in the UN. Strong British interest that his post should be retained for the UK when Urquhart retires, possibly 1983. In an exchange of letters with Waldheim in January 1981, Prime Minister made clear our wish to provide Urquhart's successor. The response was positive.

Miss Joan Anstee

34. Miss Anstee is an Assistant Secretary-General at UN HQ in New York. She is not happy in her present job, and in any case deserves promotion to Under Secretary-General. We do not want her to be promoted at UN HQ, as this would make it more difficult to replace Brian Urquhart with a UK national when he eventually retires. She is not suitable for that post.

35. The Executive Director of the World Food Programme is appointed jointly by Waldheim and the Director-General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. The last incumbent, Mr Vogel,

/died on 30 April



died on 30 April after a long illness.

36. Sir A Parsons spoke to the Secretary-General on Miss Anstee's behalf on 17 March, when it seemed clear that Vogel could not resume his duties. Waldheim reacted positively. A push by Ministers now could do the trick.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE SW1

8 May 1981

RESTRICTED

United Nations



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

5 May 1981

fs

Dear Michael,

And

Visit by UN Secretary-General

Please refer to Michael Alexander's letter of 29 April.

Mr Waldheim has confirmed that he will be delighted to accept the Prime Minister's invitation for talks at 3.45 pm on Tuesday 12 May, for which he was most grateful. Mr Waldheim has changed his travel plans and will now arrive from Geneva on the morning of the same day. Lord Carrington will give him lunch.

yours ever


Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

RESTRICTED

- 6 MAY 1981



Mrs Stephens.

the appt is on earlier consultation on 45 minutes (my letter of 29/4 refers). Is the still ok?

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GRS 180

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DESKBY FCO 020830Z

DESKBY ROME 031115Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 012129Z MAY 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 422 DATED 1 MAY 81

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME, ROUTINE UKMIS GENEVA

Mrs Stephens.

M. Alexander

15.45-16.15 on Tuesday 12 May at the ho.

YOUR TELNO 208: PROPOSED VISIT OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. WALDHEIM IS MOST GRATEFUL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR OFFERING TO SEE HIM ON 12 MAY. HE HAS CHANGED HIS PLANS AND WILL NOW VISIT GENEVA BETWEEN LISBON AND LONDON. HE PLANS TO ARRIVE IN LONDON ON TUESDAY MORNING, UNLESS YOU ADVISE THAT INDUSTRIAL ACTION BY THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS WOULD PUT HIS APPOINTMENTS WITH YOURSELF AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT RISK. IN THAT CASE, HE WOULD ARRIVE IN LONDON ON MONDAY EVENING BUT WOULD PREFER IF POSSIBLE TO WAIT UNTIL TUESDAY MORNING. GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO HIM ON THIS. HE WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO KNOW THE TIME OF HIS CALL ON YOU. IS AN OFFICIAL LUNCH PLANNED OR CAN HE MAKE HIS OWN ARRANGEMENTS?

cf. 615.

2. WALDHEIM HAS TOLD ME THAT HE HAS NO PARTICULAR SUBJECTS TO RAISE WITH YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT HE WILL WISH TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE ON HIS EFFORTS ON CAMBODIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

PARSONS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

LIMITED

- UND
- EESD
- NAD
- P & C D
- SECURITY D
- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/MR BLAKER
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/PUS
- SIR A ACLAND
- MR BULLARD
- MR DAY
- MR FERGUSSON
- MR GOODISON
- MR URE

Visit will have to be. Cf. 615.

La Mrs

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UN

29 April 1981

BF 6.5.8

Visit of the UN Secretary-General

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 28 April about Mr. Waldheim. Unfortunately it will not be possible for the Prime Minister to see Mr. Waldheim at Chequers on 10 May as she already has private engagements that afternoon. She would be prepared to see Mr. Waldheim on the afternoon of Tuesday 12 May at 1545 for 45 minutes. I should be grateful if you could let me know as soon as possible whether Mr. Waldheim will be taking this offer up. The Prime Minister's diary is very crowded.

MODBA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

58

Reply sent. *And*



~~Prime Minister~~

(1)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Could you bear to have
Waldheim to tea at Chequers
on 10 May?

28 April 1981

And 28/4

Not very convenient.

*We have a lip luncheon party
for Carol on her last weekend,
and for D.I.'s birthday. What*

Visit of the United Nations Secretary-General

Mr Waldheim will be visiting Moscow and one or two other European capitals at the beginning of May. On his way back to New York he will be arriving at Heathrow (from Lisbon) at 13.40 on Sunday 10 May and has offered to stay until 11 or 12 May if the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington would like to be briefed on his discussions with the Russians.

*about -
the 12 May*

*the Press Conference will
be held on*

Waldheim will have discussed both Afghanistan and Cambodia with the Russians and Lord Carrington thinks it would be useful to debrief him on these subjects and take the opportunity to administer any correctives that may be necessary. As the Anglo/German consultations will be taking place on 11 and 12 May at Chequers, we told Waldheim that the Prime Minister unfortunately could not receive him on those dates, but that Lord Carrington would like to meet him on the afternoon of 10 May. While accepting the reasons Waldheim has said that he is naturally disappointed that he will not be seeing the Prime Minister. (We believe that he is anxious to balance his reception in the Soviet Union with meetings at a comparable level in Western and non-aligned countries).

*of the
Carrington
and*

Since the Soviet point of view will almost certainly have been put over by Brezhnev himself, Lord Carrington considers it would be valuable if our point of view could in fact be put over by the Prime Minister. Waldheim is sensitive about his position, and responds well to high-level treatment. And although the Prime Minister has recently seen him in Washington, it will be interesting to discuss his contacts with the Russians.

Lord Carrington therefore wonders whether the Prime Minister might wish to invite Mr Waldheim to Chequers on the afternoon of Sunday 10 May, perhaps for tea: and would

/of course

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of course be ready to attend himself (he is due to return at lunchtime from a meeting of Foreign Ministers in the Netherlands).

yours ever
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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28 APR 1987

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U.N.

(2)

Prime Minister

Paul

for

124/5

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GBXX CO CHBX 181

GENEVE 181/172 23 2044 PAGE 1/50

HER EXCELLENCY THE RT HON MARGARET THATCHER M.P. PRIME
MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
LONDONS W1

P.O. INTERNATIONAL
TELEGRAPHS, LONDON
24 MAY 1980
EC3/SW1 AREA OFFICE
ST BOTOLPHS
ENQUIRIES DIAL 01-836
1222 Ext 2068

MAY 24 00 37 '80

MSC4446 MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER I WISH TO THANK YOU
MOST WARMLY FOR ALL YOUR KINDNESS AND HOSPITALITY DURING
OUR VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM I GREATLY APPRECIATED
THE OPPORTUNITY

LFS1200

ms

COL MSC4446

JAD19096 HER EXCELLENCY THE RT PAGE 2/50

TO TALK WITH YOU AT LENGTH ON THE MANY PROBLEMS
WHICH PREOCCUPY US AND IT WAS MOST VALUABLE FOR ME
TO KNOW YOUR VIEWS ESPECIALLY CONCERNING POSSIBLE
FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION MAY I SAY ONCE
AGAIN HOW GRATEFUL I AM FOR YOUR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT
IN SO MANY OF OUR

JAD19096 HER EXCELLENCY THE RT PAGE 3/50


ENDEAVOURS I LOOK FORWARD TO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH
WITH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT MY WIFE AND I PARTICULARLY
APPRECIATED THE DELIGHTFUL DINNER YOU GAVE FOR US AND THE
THOUGHTFULNESS WITH WHICH YOU HAD BROUGHT TOGETHER SO
MANY OLD FRIENDS IT WAS A CHARMING AND
WARMHEARTED EVENING WHICH WE SHALL

JAD19096 HER EXCELLENCY THE RT PAGE 4/22

LONG REMEMBER WE EXTEND TO YOU AND MR THATCHER OUR
WARMEST THANKS AND GOOD WISHES

YOUR SINCERELY

KURT WALDHEIM SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS



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^{h.w.F.}
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RH

United
Nations

22 May, 1980

Visit of UN Secretary-General

I enclose a record of the Prime Minister's discussion with the Secretary-General of the UN, Dr Kurt Waldheim, which took place here on Tuesday, 20 May.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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SECRETARY-GENERAL

IMCO

LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL

Telegrams: INMARCOR-LONDON, W.1
Telex: 23588

101-104 PICCADILLY,
LONDON, W1V 0AE

Telephone: 01-499 9040

Ref: CPS/vpm

21 May 1980

R23P
Mr
Mr
Prime Minister
Mr - 23/5
Dear Prime Minister,

My wife and I are most grateful to yourself and Mr. Denis Thatcher for the privilege of being included among your guests at the Dinner yesterday evening in honour of Dr. and Mrs. Kurt Waldheim. This was an extremely pleasant and memorable occasion for us.

I feel very grateful also for your kind interest in the activities of this Organization, which is the only Specialized Agency of the United Nations system dedicated solely to maritime affairs. This Organization, ever since its inception, has been nurtured by the United Kingdom Government and we have continuously received very generous and powerful support. In recent years, the membership of the Organization has grown rapidly. It now totals 117 states, covering practically all countries with maritime interests. British maritime expertise has been of the greatest help in the development of global safety and pollution prevention standards and the generosity of the Government in providing host country facilities has always greatly assisted our work. We are very much looking forward to moving to our new Headquarters premises as soon as they are ready. The Organization is most happy to have its Headquarters in London, the focal point of the world's maritime activities. For all these reasons we feel greatly beholden to Her Majesty's Government. Your interest in our work will be a source of inspiration and we shall continue our endeavours to promote worldwide co-operation among Governments in order to enhance the safety of world shipping and to prevent the pollution of the sea from ships.

With renewed thanks and expressions of profound regards and respects,

Yours sincerely,

C.P. SRIVASTAVA
Secretary-General

The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, S.W.1.

223/5

Prime Minister (2)

Am



**UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND**

3 WHITEHALL COURT LONDON SW1 A/2 EL 01-930 2931/2

21 MAY 1980 ^{F.4} Am

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

Thank you for welcoming Christine and myself
to Downing Street yesterday evening.

MB

It was good of you to invite UNA Leaders
to the Reception where they enjoyed meeting
Dr Waldheim and other UN or Government Leaders.

I was moved by your solicitude for
our President, Lord Noel Baker, as he was leaving.

Be assured of our critical support
and uncritical prayers.

Yours sincerely,

David J. Harding

REVD DAVID J. HARDING
DIRECTOR U.K. UNA.

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SUBJECT

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY, 20 MAY 1980, AT 1630 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister
Sir Donald Maitland
Sir Anthony Parsons
Sir Antony Acland
Mr Peter Marshall
Mr Simpson-Orlebar
Mr Alexander
Mr Anson

Dr Kurt Waldheim
Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
Mr Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

1. In welcoming Dr Waldheim, the Prime Minister recalled that much of their discussion in July last year had been about Indo-China. She suggested that on this occasion, they might concentrate on Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East.

Iran

2. Dr Waldheim said he had wanted to resume direct talks with Iran. It was necessary to revive the negotiating process in order to avoid another military effort: such efforts would not solve the problem. He had telephoned Mr Bani Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh from New York and talked to the latter in Belgrade. Mr Qotbzadeh was very receptive but wanted the Commission to present its report. When the Iranian Parliament convened, it could act on the basis of this report. Dr Waldheim had explained that the Commission could not present its report until the second part of its mandate had been fulfilled. The plan had been that the Commission would see the hostages and obtain their transfer out of the US Embassy compound to the authority of the Iranian Government, along with the 3 hostages in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; after that, they would have been sent back to the United States. The plan had failed because the Ayatollah had not supported Mr Bani Sadr.

3. Dr Waldheim had explained that, if the Iranians wanted a report, the Commission would have to return to Iran; he had suggested he should first send a confidential emissary to prepare for their return and had chosen the Syrian member, Mr Adib Daoudi (a Sunni) in whom both sides had confidence. Mr Qotbzadeh had now said in public that Mr Daoudi

/should

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should visit Iran only to deal with the report, not to discuss the hostages issue.

4. Dr Waldheim realised he had to protect himself against criticism from the radicals by not appearing too conciliatory and did not intend to make an issue of this unless it was exploited against him. In reality, it had been agreed that Mr Daoudi could prepare the ground in private with Messrs Bani Sadr and Qotbzadeh and with Ayatollah Beheshti. He had kept closely in touch with Mr. Muskie and agreed the text of his statement with him. Mr. Qotbzadeh had assured him the hostages were fit and healthy; some were still in the compound. But he was afraid of what would happen if even one of them were to come to harm.

5. The Prime Minister assumed that Beheshti was now dominating Khomeini. Dr. Waldheim agreed that the Ayatollah's religious entourage were making the decisions. He would be giving Mr. Daoudi his instructions in Geneva on Saturday and sending a personal message to Beheshti, pleading for his co-operation. After his own experience of Tehran he did not expect too much from this initiative, but it was another effort to break the ice. If no concessions were promised, such as an offer to reassemble the hostages in Tehran under the Iranian Government's authority he would think twice about sending the Commission back.

6. The Prime Minister said that, as a Parliamentarian, she would be surprised if the Majles' first act were to order the release of the hostages. This did not ring true. She would expect them to begin with something very nationalistic. Since Beheshti controlled over 50% of the seats, a decision of the Majles was unlikely to be helpful. What incentive was there for the Iranians to give up the hostages, apart from recovering international respectability? Was this a high priority? The UK had bought no Iranian oil since the beginning of April. BP and Shell had declined to buy at the new price of \$35 per barrel, provided the Federal Republic and Japan did the same. Iran could find alternative markets in Eastern Europe, but this gave them no hard currency. This was hurting most of all. Sanctions were being applied on arms, spare parts and future contracts - this was all the British Parliament would accept - and we were quietly doing quite a bit financially. Sanctions would not

release the hostages, but solidarity with the United States was important for us. She had no intention of criticising the Americans for their rescue operation. But if the Americans attempted military action, e.g. any mining of the Straits or a blockade, they would not keep the support of Europe, because of the repercussions elsewhere. But it was hard to criticise without offering an alternative. She agreed that Mr. Daoudi should not go to Tehran unless he could do a proper job. It might be easier to solve the problem if it could be forgotten for 6 months. The wives of the hostages, who had visited her 24 hours before the rescue attempt, were a stabilizing force. Their attitude was very sensible. They were prepared to wait, rather than jeopardise their husbands' lives.

7. Dr. Waldheim said that, so long as the power struggle continued in Iran, he expected no solution before the late summer, or even later. Agreeing, the Prime Minister considered the prospect of the internal disintegration of Iran very worrying. The siege of the Iranian Embassy in London had highlighted the bad deal which Arabistan was getting from Khomeini. This fertile ground for subversion was being exploited by Iraq. The hostages might be regarded as a unifying factor: this was one reason why they continued to be held. Hatred unified. We must continue with our diplomatic initiatives, but not so as to court a rebuff. Unless we were seen to be active, the pressures on President Carter to take military action would increase.

8. Sir A. Parsons commented that, in speaking to audiences all over the United States, he had in general encountered an eagerness to settle the affair quietly and peacefully. The pressures in Washington were self-induced. Dr. Waldheim agreed: the American people understood the difficulties and saw that military operations could not solve the problem. If Mr. Daoudi reported no change in the Iranian position, he agreed that the Commission should not go back. The Prime Minister said it would then be necessary to think of something else. Sir D. Maitland commented that the Red Cross and others had played a role, but the Commission looked the best bet. Dr. Waldheim said that Archbishop Capucci and Mr. MacBride had tried, but the latter's idea of a Nuremberg-style tribunal would not solve the problem. He had been disappointed to hear that Mr. MacBride was now being invited by Mr. Bani Sadr, along with other leftist representatives, to a meeting on 2-5 June.

/This was

This was likely to end up with a resolution accusing the US and would produce no results.

Afghanistan

9. The Prime Minister said the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought the Russians might be looking for a way out, possibly seeking to withdraw their troops, provided they could leave behind a regime which would be their puppet. She took the more cynical view that the Russians would remain for a very long time. They were bringing in their families. All their activity was designed to get us to accept the present situation. They disliked criticism, however: we should continue to stress with the non-aligned that the Afghan people had the right to choose their own destiny but that they would never be allowed to do so by the Russians. The best hope was that Afghanistan might become another Finland, not that they had very much in common historically. The Chinese were glad to think that the Russians were bleeding to death in Afghanistan and Cambodia: these great haemorrhages might suit China, but we took a different view. The Russians wanted us to go to Madrid; if we did, she would want to be pretty outspoken.

10. Sir A. Acland suggested that the new proposals did not represent anything very new. They talked about the frontiers with Pakistan and Iran, but said nothing about the Afghan/Soviet or Chinese frontiers. Sir D. Maitland thought it was astute of the Russians to suggest that they would get out if only the Afghan/Pakistan frontier could be controlled: neither Britain nor Pakistan had ever been able to control the mountainous tribal area, where people could come and go. There had been a disquieting reference in Mr. Gromyko's talk with Lord Carrington in Vienna to the social changes that would be needed in Afghanistan, but there were some points on which it was worth seeking clarification. We should maintain the pressure, but ask some questions. The Prime Minister said we could test the seriousness of the Soviet position by asking if they were ready to name a date for withdrawal. Sir A. Acland suggested the answer might be that certain conditions must be fulfilled first. The Prime Minister noted that the Russians had annexed one state about every 10 years; more frequently if you counted those taken over by proxy. It was only a question of time before they marched into another.

/Dr. Waldheim

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

11. Dr. Waldheim shared the Prime Minister's view. He was convinced the Russians would not leave so long as there was no solid Afghan Government to support their policy. The occupation was a firm decision of the Politburo, as had been the invasion of Czechoslovakia. When he had asked Mr. Gromyko to explain the latest proposals, Mr. Gromyko had said there were 1/2 million Afghans in Pakistan supported by the Western powers and that so long as this new aggression was being prepared, there was no reason for the Russians to withdraw. The Prime Minister thought it an astounding proposition that Afghans could not return to Afghanistan, except for those of whom Mr. Gromyko approved. She was disturbed that the action being taken was largely confined to diplomacy. The Germans and French were keeping up their trade contacts. Despite American efforts on wheat, this was still getting through to the Soviet Union. The UK had not had much success in reducing the supply of technology. The Olympics would not be real but, apart from words and condemnation in the UN, little else had been done. The Russians must be seen to be isolated. If people said we must talk, the last card would have gone. Dr. Waldheim was encouraged by developments at the UN on both Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The non-aligned, under Yugoslav leadership, had switched positions. The Prime Minister said this was the most important thing which had happened. Cuba's chairmanship of the non-aligned movement had been wholly frustrated, nowhere more so than at the UN. This should be kept up. The picture would change if nothing was done and Afghanistan and Pakistan were allowed to fall.

/Middle East

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Middle East

12. Dr Waldheim thought it his duty as Secretary-General to say he was very worried about the situation in the Middle East. The autonomy talks had collapsed. The Americans were paralysed, the Europeans hesitant. In the vacuum, many things could happen. The radical Arabs could make trouble. The Israelis were not cooperative. Major Haddad, supplied by the Israelis, was bombing UNIFIL's headquarters and killing Irish soldiers. Now was the moment for Europe to play a constructive role. He heard a lot of talk in the media about a European initiative. One option was to seek to amend Security Council Resolution 242 so as to give the Palestinians their political rights, i.e. self-determination. If this was not feasible - and a US veto would seem certain before the Presidential election - the Arabs would ask for a Special Session of the General Assembly. Mr Arafat might wait if a European initiative was in prospect, otherwise he would call for a Special Session in June or July. There would be a tough resolution, which could be opposed by the United States, but which if not too radical might get some other Western votes.

13. The Prime Minister said that at Luxembourg the Nine had decided not to discuss the options until 26 May, by which time they had thought the Camp David process would be exhausted. They were to discuss the problem at the Venice Summit, but it now looked as though the process might still be alive at the point; she was doubtful about action which would cut across the Americans. She questioned what was meant by self-determination for the Palestinians. There was no such animal in constitutional law. What were they to determine? Did their land really belong to Jordan? There were many Palestinians in Syria and the Lebanon: where were they to go? King Hussein had indicated he might be ready for some loose federation of the West Bank with Jordan: would they still be Jordanian citizens?

14. Mr Urquhart said there were no real answers to these questions. No-one had discussed with the inhabitants what all this meant. The Israelis and Palestinians, dealing only through intermediaries, had a nightmare view of each other. They could never discuss the future, only the past. There was the prior question of recognition. The Palestinians had inched forward on this. Mr Arafat was more reasonable

in private contacts that he was in public. Sir A Parsons believed that only two powers, the UK and Pakistan, had ever recognised Jordan's title to the West Bank. The only way to answer the Prime Minister's questions was for someone to talk to all the parties.


15 Mr Urquhart suggested that some half-governmental/half-unofficial enterprise might break down the barriers. The Prime Minister asked if Europe could work this out? Sir D Maitland suggested that in the present vacuum only Europe could be active, not to achieve dramatic results, but to keep discussion going. The Prime Minister thought that something more was required: exactitude. Sir D Maitland said we could draw up a questionnaire and put it to the Israelis, the Egyptians and the PLO. Agreeing, Sir A Parsons pointed out that none of the studies of the options since 1967 had been written as a result of consultation with the parties. Europe could talk to all the parties; a questionnaire could help to provide the exactitude the Prime Minister was seeking. To mount a resolution at the UN this year would be a waste of time; inevitably, the Americans would veto.

16 Dr Waldheim believed that no concrete solution was possible before November. Meanwhile, there should be a revival of talks in one way or another.

The Prime Minister believed that the vacuum would extend beyond November. Both sides in the Presidential election would be courting the Jewish vote; there would be a year's delay.

Namibia

17 Dr Waldheim said he was doing his best to deal constructively with South Africa. Mr Botha's reply was not too constructive. The Prime Minister said it could have been worse. The best thing we could give South Africa was time. They had absorbed Mr Mugabe's election and were reassessing their own future. Mr Waldheim hoped the process would not take too long. The Africans were already talking about sanctions and a return to the Security Council. The Prime Minister urged that this should be resisted.



22 May, 1980

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note~~
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

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Reference

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 20 MAY 1980, AT 1630 HOURS

CAVEAT.....

Present

The Prime Minister
 Sir Donald Maitland
 Sir Anthony Parsons
 Sir Antony Acland
 Mr. Peter Marshall
 Mr Simpson-Orlebar
 Mr Alexander
 Mr Anson

Mr Kurt Waldheim
 Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
 Mr Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

1. In welcoming Mr Waldheim, the Prime Minister recalled that much of their discussion in July last year had been about Indo-China. She suggested that on this occasion, they might concentrate on Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East.

Iran

2. Mr Waldheim said he had wanted to resume direct talks with Iran; it was necessary to revive the negotiating process in order to avoid another military effort: such efforts would not solve the /problem.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

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25
Mr Alexander
No 10
type as amended.
21/5
20/5
Paul

problem. He had telephoned Mr Bani Sadr and Mr Qotbzadeh from New York and talked to the latter in Belgrade. Mr Qotbzadeh was very receptive but wanted the Commission to present its report. When the Iranian Parliament convened, it could act on the basis of this report. Mr Waldheim had explained that the Commission could not present its report until the second part of its mandate had been fulfilled. The plan had been that the Commission would see the hostages and obtain their transfer out of the US Embassy compound to the authority of the Iranian Government, along with the 3 hostages in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ^{after that,} they would have been ~~tried~~ ~~and then~~ sent back to the United States. The plan had ^{failed} ~~not worked out~~ because the Ayatollah had not supported Mr Bani Sadr. ^{3.} Mr Waldheim had explained that, if the Iranians wanted a report, the Commission would have to return to Iran; he had suggested he should first send a confidential emissary to prepare for their return and had chosen the Syrian member, Mr Adib Daoudi (a Sunni) in whom both sides had confidence. Mr Qotbzadeh had now said in public that Mr Daoudi should visit Iran only to deal with the report, not to discuss the hostages issue.

4. Mr Waldheim realised he had to protect himself against criticism from the radicals by not appearing too conciliatory and did not intend to make an issue of this unless it was exploited against him. In reality, it had been agreed that Mr Daoudi could prepare the ground in private with Messrs Bani Sadr and Qotbzadeh and ^{with} Ayatollah Beheshti. He had kept closely in touch with Mr Muskie and agreed the text of his statement with him. Mr Qotbzadeh had assured him the hostages were ^{fit} ~~sound~~ and healthy; some were still in the compound.

But he was afraid of what would happen if even one of them were to come to harm.

15. The Prime Minister assumed that Beheshti was *now* dominating Khomeini, ~~now~~. Mr Waldheim agreed that the Ayatollah's religious entourage were making the decisions. He would be giving Mr ~~Daudi~~²⁴ his instructions in Geneva on Saturday and sending a personal message to Beheshti, pleading for his cooperation. After his own experience of Tehran he did not expect too much from this initiative, but it was another effort to break the ice. If no concessions were promised, such as an offer to reassemble the hostages in Tehran under the Iranian ~~(some were still in the compound)~~ Government's authority, he would think twice about sending the Commission back.

6. The Prime Minister said that, as a Parliamentarian, she would be surprised if the Majles' first act were to order the release of the hostages. This did not ring true. She would expect the ~~in~~ first act to begin with something very nationalistic. Since Beheshti controlled over 50% of the seats, a decision of the Majles was unlikely to be helpful. What incentive was there for the Iranians to give up the hostages, apart from recovering international respectability? Was this a high priority? The UK had bought no Iranian oil since the beginning of April. BP and Shell had declined to buy at the new price of \$35 per barrel, provided the Federal Republic and Japan did the same. Iran could find ~~some~~ alternative markets in Eastern Europe, but this gave them no

hard currency. This was hurting most of all. Sanctions were being applied on arms, spare parts and future contracts - this was all the British Parliament would accept - and we were quietly doing quite a bit financially. Sanctions would not release the hostages, but solidarity with the United States was important for us. She had no intention of criticising the Americans for their rescue operation. ^(Military action) ~~Military~~ ^{But if the Americans attempted} ~~action had a different definition.~~ ^{Any mining of the Straits or a blockade,} ^{they} ~~would not help~~ ^{to keep the supplies of} Europe, because of the repercussions elsewhere. But it was hard to criticise without offering an alternative. She agreed that Mr Daudi should not go to Tehran unless he could do a proper job. It might be easier to solve the problem if ^{it} ~~he~~ could be forgotten for 6 months. The wives of the hostages, who had visited her 24 hours before the rescue attempt, were a stabilizing force. Their attitude was very sensible. They were prepared to wait, rather than jeopardise their husbands' lives.

7. Mr Waldheim said that, so long as the power struggle continued in Iran, he expected no solution before the late summer, or even later. ^{Agreeing,} ~~The~~ Prime Minister considered ^{in prospect of the} the internal disintegration of Iran very worrying. The ^{ie} ~~seige~~ of the Iranian Embassy in London had highlighted the bad deal which Arabistan was getting from Khomeini. This fertile ground for subversion

/was

^{Explosives}
 was being ~~aided~~ by Iraq. The hostages might be regarded as a unifying factor: this was one reason why they continued to be held. Hatred unified. We must continue with our diplomatic initiatives, but not so as to court a rebuff. ~~Our secondary objective in doing so was that,~~ Unless we were seen to be active, the pressures ^{to take} urging military action on President Carter would increase. ⁸ Sir A Parsons commented that, ^{Speaking to audiences all over} in ~~his travels round~~ the United States, ~~all his audiences had been ready~~ ^{he had a general conviction on eagerness} to settle the affair quietly and peacefully. The pressures in Washington were self-induced. Mr Waldheim agreed: the American people understood the difficulties and saw that military operations could not solve the problem. If Mr Daudi ^{ou} reported no change in the Iranian position, he agreed that the Commission should not go back. The Prime Minister said it would then be necessary to think of something else. Sir D Maitland commented that the Red Cross and others had played a role, but the Commission looked the best bet. Mr Waldheim said ^{that Archbishop Capucci and} Mr MacBride had tried, but ^{the latter's} ~~his~~ idea of a Nuremberg-style tribunal would not solve the problem. He had been disappointed to hear that ^{Mr MacBride} ~~he~~ was now being invited by Mr Bani Sadr, along with ~~some~~ ^{representatives} other leftist ~~people~~, to a meeting on 2-5 June. This was likely to end up with a resolution accusing the US and would produce no results.

/Afghanistan

Afghanistan

9. The Prime Minister said the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary thought the Russians might be looking for a way out, possibly seeking to withdraw their troops, provided they could leave behind a régime which would be their puppet. She took the more cynical view that the Russians would remain for a very long time. They were bringing in their families. All their activity was designed to get us to accept the present situation. They disliked criticism, however: we should continue to stress ^{with} ~~that~~ the non-aligned ^{that} ~~(supported)~~ the Afghan people ^{had the} ~~'s~~ right to choose their own destiny, ^{but} ~~something~~ which they would never get ^{be allowed to do so by} ~~from~~ the Russians.

~~Lord Carrington thought the new Kabul proposals might not be so far apart from our ideas for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, and we ~~must~~ look at ~~these~~ to see if there was any ~~likelihood of withdrawal~~.~~

The best hope ~~she saw~~ was that Afghanistan might become another Finland, not that they had very much in common historically. The Chinese were glad to think that the Russians were bleeding to death in Afghanistan and Cambodia: these great haemorrhages might suit China, but we took a different view. ^{that should} ~~The Russians wanted~~ us to go to Madrid; if we did, she would want to be pretty outspoken.

10. Sir A Acland suggested ^{to represent anything very new,} ~~the new proposals did not add a great deal.~~ They talked about the frontiers with Pakistan and Iran, but said nothing about the Afghan/Soviet or Chinese frontiers. Sir D Maitland thought it was astute of the Russians to suggest that they would get out if only the Afghan/Pakistan frontier

could be controlled: neither Britain nor Pakistan had ever been able to control the mountainous tribal area, where people could come and go. There had been a disquieting reference in Mr Gromyko's talk with Lord Carrington in Vienna to the social changes that would be needed in Afghanistan, but there were some points on which it was worth seeking clarification. We should maintain the pressure, but ask some questions. The Prime Minister said we could test the seriousness of the Soviet position by asking if they were ready to name a date for withdrawal. Sir A Acland suggested the answer might be that certain conditions must be fulfilled first. The Prime Minister noted that the Russians had annexed one state about every 10 years; more frequently if you counted those taken over by proxy. It was only a question of time before they marched into another. ~~Pakistan would be a tricky case - a régime which knew nothing about democracy.~~

17. Mr Waldheim shared the Prime Minister's view. He was convinced the Russians would not leave so long as there was no solid Afghan Government to support their policy. The occupation was a firm decision of the Polit ^{buro,} ~~Bureau,~~ ^{as had been the mission of} ~~like~~ Czechoslovakia. When he had asked Mr Gromyko to explain the latest proposals, ~~he~~ ^{Mr Gromyko} had ^{said} ~~complained~~ there were 1/2 million Afghans in Pakistan supported by the Western powers ^{and said that,} so long as this new aggression was being prepared, there was no reason for the Russians to withdraw. The Prime Minister ^{an} thought it/astounding proposition that Afghans could

not return to Afghanistan, except for those of whom Mr Gromyko approved. She was disturbed that the action being taken was largely confined to diplomacy. The Germans and French were keeping up their trade contacts. Despite American efforts on wheat, this was still getting through to the Soviet Union. The UK had not had much success in reducing the supply of technology. The Olympics would not be real, but, apart from words and condemnation in the UN, little ^{else} had been done. The Russians must be seen to be isolated. If people said we must talk, the last card would have gone. Mr Waldheim was encouraged by developments at the UN on both Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The non-aligned, under Yugoslav leadership, had switched positions. The Prime Minister said this was the ^{most important} ~~biggest~~ thing which had happened. Cuba's ~~Chairmanship~~ of the non-aligned movement had been wholly frustrated, nowhere more so than at the UN. This should be kept up. ~~But~~ The picture would change if nothing was done ^{and} ~~about~~ Afghanistan and Pakistan were ^{allowed} to fall.

Middle East

12. Mr Waldheim thought it his duty as Secretary-General to say he was very worried about the situation in the Middle East. The autonomy talks had collapsed. The Americans were paralysed, the Europeans hesitant. In the vacuum, many things could happen. The radical Arabs could make trouble. The Israelis were not cooperative. Major Haddad, supplied by the Israelis, was bombing UNIFIL's headquarters and killing

Irish soldiers. Now was the moment for Europe to play a constructive role. He *heard* a lot of talk in the media about a European initiative. One option was to seek to amend Security Council Resolution 242 so as to give the Palestinians their political rights, i.e. self-determination. If this was not feasible - and ^a ~~the~~ US veto would seem certain before the Presidential election - the Arabs would ask for a Special Session of the General Assembly. Mr Arafat might wait ^{if} ~~for~~ a European initiative, ^{there was respect,} ~~but~~ otherwise *he would* call for a Special Session in June or July. There would be a ^{rough} ~~drastic~~ Resolution, ^{which would be} ~~opposed~~ by the United States, ^{but} ~~which~~ if not too radical might get some other Western votes.

13. The Prime Minister said that at Luxembourg the Nine had decided not to discuss the options until 26 May, by which time they had thought the Camp David process would be exhausted. They were to discuss ^(if the problems) ~~at~~ the Venice Summit, but ^{if now looked as though} ~~the process~~ might still be alive ^{at} ~~the point;~~ ^{she was doubtful about} ~~any~~ ^{which would} ~~cutting~~ across the Americans. She questioned what was meant by self-determination for the Palestinians. There was no such animal in constitutional law. What were they to determine? Did their land really belong to Jordan? There were many Palestinians in Syria and the Lebanon: ~~where~~ were they to go? King Hussein had indicated he might be ready for some loose federation of the West Bank with Jordan: would they still be Jordanian citizens? ^{14.} Mr Urquhart said there were no real answers to these questions. No-one had discussed with

the inhabitants what all this meant. The Israelis and Palestinians, dealing only through intermediaries, had a nightmare view of each other. They could never discuss the future, only the past. There was the prior question of recognition. The Palestinians had inched forward on this. Mr Arafat was more reasonable in private contacts than he was in public. Sir A Parsons believed that only two powers, the UK and Pakistan, ^{had ever} ~~did~~ recognise ^{fit to} Jordan's ~~occupation of~~ the West Bank. The only way to answer the Prime Ministers's questions was for someone to talk to all the parties. ¹⁵ Mr Urquhart suggested that some half-governmental/half-unofficial enterprise might break down the barriers. The Prime Minister asked if Europe could work this out? Sir D Maitland suggested that in the present vacuum only Europe could be active, not to achieve dramatic results, but to keep discussion going. The Prime Minister thought that something more was required: exactitude. Sir D Maitland said we could draw up a questionnaire and put it to the Israelis, the Egyptians and the PLO. Agreeing, Sir A Parsons pointed out that none of the studies of the options since 1967 had been written as a result of consultation with the parties. Europe could talk to all the parties; a questionnaire could ^{help to} provide the exactitude the Prime Minister was seeking. To mount a ~~Resolution~~ at the UN this year would be a waste of time; inevitably, the Americans would veto.

¹⁶ Mr Waldheim believed that no concrete solution ~~could~~ ^{was} ~~be~~ possible before November. Meanwhile, there should be a revival of talks in one way or another.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Prime Minister believed that the vacuum would extend beyond November. Both sides in the Presidential election would be courting the Jewish vote; there would be a year's delay.

Namibia

18. Mr Waldheim said he was doing his best to deal constructively with South Africa. Mr Botha's reply was not too constructive. The Prime Minister said it could have been worse. The best thing we could give South Africa was time. They had absorbed Mr Mugabe's ^{own} and were reassessing their/future. Mr Waldheim hoped the process would not take too long. The Africans were already talking about sanctions and a return to the Security Council. The Prime Minister urged that this ~~sh~~ould be resisted.

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21 MAY 1980

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN FOR THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MR KURT WALDHEIM, AND MRS WALDHEIM,
20-23 MAY 1980

The Secretary General and Mrs Waldheim will visit the United Kingdom as Guests of Her Majesty's Government from Tuesday 20 May to Friday 23 May. During his stay the Secretary-General will be seeing Her Majesty The Queen and will have official talks with the Prime Minister.

1. PROGRAMME

Details of the programme are shown at Annex 1.

2. COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION

Details of the official suite are shown at Annex 2.

3. ARRIVAL ARRANGEMENTS

a) The Secretary-General and his party will arrive by flight BA 623 from Geneva at 1315 hours on Tuesday 20 May, at London Heathrow Airport, Terminal 1 (the de Havilland VIP suite).

b) They will be welcomed by:

The Lord Trefgarne, Lord-in-Waiting

and by Sir Anthony Parsons, KCMG, MVO MC, Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN

and by Mr P H R Marshall, CMG, Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN and other International Organisations at Geneva, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government

Mr Colin Taylor, Acting Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund and a Special Facilities Officer of British Airports Authority will also welcome the Secretary-General.

c) Mr B Urquhart, the Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, will be arriving separately on Monday 19 May by flight BA 176 at 0940 hours. He will be given help-through facilities.

For arrival details see Annex 3.

4. TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS

a) Cars for those in the official suite will be provided by the Government Hospitality Fund. For seating arrangements see Annex 7.

b) Mr B Urquhart will be met on arrival at Heathrow by a car provided by the UN Information Centre.

c) Government Hospitality Fund will provide a car to be at the disposal of Mrs Waldheim throughout the visit.

d) Cars for Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr Marshall will be provided by Government Hospitality Fund

e) Arrangements for transporting luggage to the hotel will be made by Government Hospitality Fund.

5. ACCOMMODATION

a) All members of the official suite will stay at Claridges, Brook St, W1. Government Hospitality Fund will be responsible for the hotel costs of those in the official suite.

b) An unofficial member of the party, Miss Elizabeth Friedel (Secretary), will also stay at Claridges. The UN Information Centre

will be responsible for her hotel costs.

c) Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr Marshall will also stay at Claridges from the evening of 19 May onwards. Their hotel costs will be the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Personnel Services Dept.

6. AUDIENCE OF THE QUEEN

The Queen will give an Audience to Mr and Mrs Waldheim at 1200 hours on Wednesday 21 May. (See Annex 1, pages 8 and 9.)

7. TALKS, DINNER AND RECEPTION AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET

a) The Secretary-General will see the Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP, for talks at 1630 on Tuesday 20 May. (See Annex 4.)

b) The Prime Minister and Mr D Thatcher will host a dinner that evening (1930 for 2000) in honour of the Secretary-General and his wife at 10 Downing Street.

c) This will be followed by a reception (2145) at No 10 Downing St.

8. TALKS AND LUNCH WITH LORD CARRINGTON

a) The Secretary-General will call on The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Rt Hon Lord Carrington KCMG MC, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Wednesday 21 May at 1030 hours. (See Annex 5.)

b) Lord Carrington will host a lunch for the Secretary-General at 1 Carlton Gardens on Wednesday 21 May (1230 for 1245).

c) Lady Carrington will host a lunch for Mrs Waldheim at Lord Carrington's residence 32A Dvington Square SW3 on Wednesday

21 May, at 1.00 for 1.15 pm.

9. THEATRE EVENING HOSTED BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND LADY CAROLINE GILMOUR

The Lord Privy Seal, The Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour, Bt MP, and Lady Caroline Gilmour, will host a theatre evening at 7.30 pm on Wednesday 21 May at the Aldwych Theatre. The performance of 'The Merry Wives of Windsor' by The Royal Shakespeare Company will be followed by supper at 1 Carlton Gardens.

10. VISIT TO KEELE UNIVERSITY

a) The Secretary-General and Mrs Waldheim will visit Keele University on Thursday 22 May where the Secretary-General will receive an honorary degree.

b) The Chancellor of Keele University, Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret, will accompany Mr and Mrs Waldheim to Keele in an HS125 aircraft.

c) Other members of Mr Waldheim's party will travel to Keele by train.

For details see Annex 6.

11. SECURITY

a) A member of Special Branch will accompany Mr Waldheim throughout the visit

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

b) Detective Sergeant Matthew Dwyer and Detective Sergeant Peter Lyons of Scotland Yard Special Branch will be in charge of the personal protection arrangements for the Secretary-General

c) From Shawbury airport to Keele University and the reverse journey to Shawbury from Keele a motorcycle escort will be provided.

12. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS

a) Arrival at Heathrow

The Secretary-General will not make any statement on arrival.

b) Photocall at No 10 Downing Street.

There will be a photocall on arrival at No 10 at 1630 on Tuesday 20 May both outside the door and in the front entrance hall. No special passes will be required.

c) There will be a press conference arranged by the UN Information Office from 1600-1630 hours on Wednesday 21 May at the Vickers Cinema, Millbank Tower. Mr Denis Healy, News Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office will liaise on press arrangements for the visit.

d) For press arrangements at Keele see Annex 6a.

13. DEPARTURE DETAILS

These are not yet known.

14. USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

UN Information Centre629 6411

Claridges01-629 8860

Heathrow Airport Special
Facilities759 7146

de Havilland VIP Lounge 759 7707
Government Hospitality Fund (Mr M Snell) 214 8142
UN Dept, FCO 233 4637
Protocol and Conference Dept, FCO 233 5016

15. ADMINISTRATION

Any enquiries about these arrangements should be addressed
to Miss C A Joynes, Protocol & Conference Department, (tel 233 5016)

C A Joynes (Miss)
Inward Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

15 May 1980

PROGRAMME

Tuesday, 20 May

1315 hours Arrive London Heathrow Airport by Flight BA621
De Havilland Suite, Terminal 1

Met by Lord-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen,
The Lord Trefgarne

1330 hours Leave the Airport by car
(approx)

1415 hours Arrive Claridge's,
(approx) Brook Street, W.1

Quiet luncheon at the hotel

1615 hours Leave the hotel

1630 hours Arrive 10 Downing Street

Photocall

Call on the Prime Minister,
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

1730 hours Leave 10 Downing Street and return to Claridge's
(approx)

1915 hours Leave Claridge's

1930 hours Arrive No. 10 Downing Street

/1930

Tuesday, 20 May (cont'd)

1930 hours Dinner given by Her Majesty's Government
 for
2000 hours Hosts: The Prime Minister
 and Mr. Denis Thatcher

Dress: Black Tie

2145 hours Reception given by Her Majesty's Government
 to
2315 hours Hosts: The Prime Minister
 and Mr. Denis Thatcher

Dress: Black Tie

Return to Claridge's

Wednesday, 21 May

1015 hours Leave Claridge's

1030 hours Arrive Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
 Ambassadors' Entrance, S.W.1

Call on the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

1123 hours Mrs. Waldheim leaves Claridge's

1138 hours Mrs. Waldheim arrives Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Ambassadors' Waiting Room

1140 hours H.E. The Secretary-General and Mrs. Waldheim
leave the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1150 hours Arrive Buckingham Palace

The car will enter by North Centre Gate, where the

Wednesday, 21 May (cont'd)

1150 hours
(cont'd)

police will direct the car to the Grand Entrance
of Buckingham Palace,
where H.E. The Secretary-General and Mrs. Waldheim
will be met by
Lady-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen,
Lady Susan Hussey
and by Equerry-in-Waiting to Her Majesty The Queen,
Lieutenant-Colonel Blair Stewart-Wilson

Audience of Her Majesty The Queen

1230 hours

Leave Buckingham Palace

1240 hours

Arrive 1, Carlton Gardens

Mrs. Waldheim will attend a separate luncheon
hosted by the Lady Carrington at her Residence

1230 hours
for
1245 hours

Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government
Host: The Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs,
The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

1415 hours

Leave 1, Carlton Gardens

1430 hours

Arrive Overseas Development Administration,
Eland House, Stag Place, S.W.1

Call on Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs and Minister for Overseas Development,
Mr. Neil Marten, M.P.

/1500

Wednesday, 21 May (cont'd)

1500 hours Leave Overseas Development Administration

1510 hours Arrive Houses of Parliament,,
St. Stephen's Entrance, Central Lobby

Met by the Opposition Spokesman on Foreign Affairs,
The Rt. Hon. Peter Shore, M.P.

followed by discussions

1540 hours Leave the Houses of Parliament
(approx)

1555 hours Arrive Millbank Tower,
Vickers Cinema, Millbank, S.W.1

1600 hours Press Conference

1630 hours Leave Millbank Tower and return to Claridge's

1645 hours Members of the United Nations Association will
call on H.E. The Secretary-General at Claridge's

1845 hours Leave Claridge's

1900 hours Arrive Aldwych Theatre,
Aldwych, W.C.2

Met by the Deputy London Manager for the
Royal Shakespeare Company,
Mr. Sama Swaminathan

1930 hours Attend a performance by the Royal Shakespeare
Company of "The Merry Wives of Windsor"

Thursday, 22 May (cont'd)

1300 hours H.E. The Secretary-General accompanied by
Her Royal Highness The Princess Margaret
proceed to Keele Hall

1302 hours Arrive Keele Hall

Received by the Pro-Chancellor,
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Rochester and
Lady Rochester
and by the Deputy Vice-Chancellor,
Professor Martin Harrison and
Mrs. Harrison

Luncheon in the Old Library

1412 hours Leave Keele Hall for the Chancellor's Building
(approx)

1427 Her Royal Highness The Princess Margaret will
leave Keele Hall for the Chancellor's Building

1430 hours Photocall in the Senior Common Room of the
(approx) Chancellor's Building

1443 hours Procession from the Senior Common Room to the
(approx) Foundation Year Lecture Theatre

1445 hours Degree Ceremony

The Chancellor of the University,
Her Royal Highness The Princess Margaret will
confer an Honorary Degree on H.E. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations

Thursday, 22 May (cont'd)

1455 hours H.E. The Secretary-General will give his
Address

1545 hours Return procession to the Chancellor's Building
(approx)

1600 hours Leave the University of Keele by car
(approx) accompanied by
Her Royal Highness The Princess Margaret

1645 hours Arrive Royal Air Force Station, Shawbury
(approx)

1655 hours Depart by Special Aircraft for Royal Air Force
(approx) Station, Northolt

1740 hours Arrive RAF Northolt
(approx)

Leave RAF Northolt by car for Claridge's

No official engagements

Friday, 23 May

Departure

Details to be announced

OFFICIAL DELEGATION

Mr Kurt Waldheim,	Secretary-General of the UN
Mrs E Waldheim	
Mr Brian E Urquhart	Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
Mr Albert Rohan	Director, Executive Office of the Secretary General
Mr Neil P Breen	Personal Aide to the Secretary General

UNOFFICIAL PARTY

Mr Michael P Popovic	Director, United Nations Information Centre, London (in the protocol order he comes after Mr Rohan)
Miss Elizabeth Friedel	Secretary

UK ACCOMPANYING PARTY

Sir Anthony Parsons KCMG MVO MC	Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN (excluding trip to Keele)
Mr P H R Marshall CMG	Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN and other International Organisations at Geneva (excluding trip to Keele)
Mr Robert Swann	Government Hospitality Fund escort
Det Sgt Matthew Dwyer	Special Branch
Det Sgt Peter Lyons	" "

ARRIVAL ARRANGEMENTS

Tuesday 20 May

- 1135 hours Officials leave from Central London
- 1215 The Lord Trefgarne leaves from the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (car provided by GHF)
Ambassadors' Entrance
- 1200 The same car picks up Sir Anthony Parsons
and Mr P H R Marshall from Claridges.
- 1220 hours Officials arrive at London Heathrow Airport,
Terminal 1, de Havilland VIP suite
- 1245 The Lord Trefgarne, Sir Anthony Parsons and
Mr Marshall arrive at the de Havilland VIP suite.
The aircraft carrying the Secretary-
General and his party arrives from Geneva
- 1315 Doors open
- The greeting party going out to the aircraft
will consist of the following and all others
will remain in the suite:
- The Lord Trefgarne, Lord-in-Waiting
Mr M Popovic, Acting Director, UN Information Centre
Sir Anthony Parsons KCMG, MVO, MC Permanent
Representative of the UK to the UN
Mr P H R Marshall CMG, Permanent Representative
of the UK to the UN and other International
Organisations at Geneva

Special Facilities Officer, British Airports
Authority

Mr C Taylor, Government Hospitality Fund

Mr Robert Swann, GHF escort

Mr Popovic will board the aircraft and
accompany the Secretary General and
Mrs Waldheim down the disembarkation steps.
The Lord Trefgarne will be the first to greet
the Secretary-General followed by other members
of the greeting party.

Mr Popovic will introduce members of the
official suite as they disembark.

Proceed to the de Havilland VIP suite.

Refreshments will be available.

1330 hours approx The Lord Trefgarne, Sir Anthony Parsons and
Mr Marshall will accompany the Secretary-General
and Mrs Waldheim to their car.

The Lord Trefgarne will travel in the
car with the Secretary-General
to Claridges.

Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr Marshall will travel
in the car with Mrs Waldheim to Claridges

1415 hours approx Arrive at Claridges.

TUESDAY 20 MAY

TALKS AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET

United Nations Delegation

H E The Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Mr Kurt Waldheim

Mr Brian E Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political
Affairs

Mr Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

(Mr Neil P Breen, Personal Aide to the Secretary-General, will stay
in the waiting room)

United Kingdom (to be confirmed)

The Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP

The Lord Privy Seal, The Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP

or/The Hon Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs

Sir Anthony Parsons KCMG MVO MC, Permanent Representative of the
UK to the UN

Mr P H R Marshall, CMG, Permanent Representative of the UK to
the UN and other international organisations at Geneva.

WEDNESDAY 21 MAY

TALKS WITH LORD CARRINGTON

United Nations Delegation

H E The Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Mr Kurt Waldheim

Mr Brian E Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political
Affairs

Mr Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Mr Michael P Popovic, Director, United Nations Information Centre,
London

(Mr Neil P Breen, Personal Aide to the Secretary-General, will stay
in the Ambassador's waiting room)

United Kingdom (to be confirmed)

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, KCMG, MC, Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

The Hon Douglas Hurd, CBE, MP, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs

Sir Michael Palliser, GCMG, Permanent Under-Secretary of State and
Head of the Diplomatic Service

Sir Anthony Parsons, KCMG, MVO, MC, Permanent Representative of the
UK to the UN

Mr M K O Simpson-Orlebar, Head of United Nations Department, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office

(A) PLANE PARTY

Party going to Keele in the HS125 (8-seater):

- 1) Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret
- 2) The Lord Napier and Ettrick
- 3) Lady-in-Waiting
- 4) Detective for Princess Margaret
- 5) The UN Secretary General, Mr Kurt Waldheim
- 6) Mrs E Waldheim
- 7) Mr N P Breen, Personal Aide to the Secretary General
- 8) Mr Robert Swann, Government Hospitality Fund escort

Security

A member of Special Branch will accompany the Secretary General to Northolt, and another member of the police will meet him on arrival at Shawbury airport. There will be a motorcycle escort from Shawbury to Keele University, and for the return journey from Keele University to Shawbury airport. Transport will be provided by Keele University.

(B) TRAIN PARTY

The party going to Keele by train consists of the following:

Mr Brian E Urquhart,	Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs
Mr Albert Rohan	Director Executive Office of the Secretary General
Mr Michael P Popovic	Director United Nations Information Centre, London
Mr Denis Healy	News Dept, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Miss Christine Joynes	Protocol and Conference Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TIMINGArrival at Keele

0940

Mr Urquhart, Mr Rohan and
Mr Popovic leave Claridges
(car provided by GHF)

0950 Arrive Euston Platform 7
0955 Train departs
1151 Arrive Stoke-on-Trent
Party transfer into cars
provided by Keele University
1211 Arrive at the Clock House, University of Keele

Departure from Keele

1550 Leave Keele in cars provided by Keele
University
1605 Arrive Stoke-on-Trent station,
Transfer into train
1617 Train leaves
1816 Arrive Euston

NOTE

Mr D Healy and Miss C Joynes will meet up with Mr Urquhart, Mr Rohan and Mr Popovic at the entrance to platform 7.

Seats have been reserved in Carriage A (seats 7 and facing, 8, and 9 back and facing)

At Stoke-on-Trent station the party will be met by two cars provided by Keele University:

A blue Audi registration number J TU 386N,
(chauffeur Mr S Ludwig) for Mr Urquhart, Mr Rohan
and Mr Popovic.

A blue Ford Estate car, registration number DLG705N (chauffeur
Mr D Roberts) for Mr D Healy and Miss Joynes.

At Keele Hall the Deputy Vice Chancellor, Professor
M Harrison, and Mrs Harrison, will welcome Mr Urquhart,
Mr Rohan and Mr Popovic.

The Vice-Chancellor's Senior Assistant, Mr Pargitor, and the Vice-Chancellor's Secretary, Mrs Deane, will welcome Mr Healy and Miss Joynes.

Mr Urquhart, Mr Rohan and Mr Popovic will lunch with the Royal party in the Old Library.

Mr Healy and Miss Joynes will lunch in an ante-room in Keele Hall.

The whole party will attend the degree ceremony, which is expected to finish by 3.30 pm. If time permits tea will be served.

The same cars as for the arrival from Stoke-on-Trent station will be waiting at the rear of the Chancellor's Building at 3.50 pm to take the train party to the station in order to catch the 1617 train.



NEWS RELEASE

From THE UNIVERSITY OF KEELE

Tel: Newcastle 621111

VISIT OF THE CHANCELLOR H.R.H. THE PRINCESS MARGARET
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF KEELE ON 22 MAY, 1980

P R E S S A R R A N G E M E N T S

1. ROTA PRESS PARTY

The composition of the ROTA press party will be decided and notified to those concerned by the Clarence House Press Secretary in consultation with the Newspaper Publishers' Association (National newspaper and Agency Photographers), the Newspaper Society (Provincial newspaper reporters and photographers), the B.B.C. (Sound Radio and T.V.), and the I.B.A.

Applications for ROTA passes should now be made through the normal channels.

Members of this special Press party will be in possession of Clarence House passes and will have freedom of movement, as indicated in the attached programme and subject to direction by the University representatives. They are under obligation to make available to other Press representatives on request copy or copies of photographs obtained while accompanying the Royal visitor.

2. NON-ROTA PRESS

Newspapers, freelances, radio and television organisations not included in the ROTA Press party have been provided with official facilities as detailed in the programme which follows these notes.

APPLICATIONS FOR NON-ROTA PRESS PASSES FOR THE VISIT ON 22 MAY SHOULD BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THE UNIVERSITY INFORMATION OFFICER, MRS. MEG BROOME, ON THE FORM ATTACHED TO THIS PROGRAMME.

3. TELEPHONE

Press representatives are requested to make their own arrangements for telephoning.

Public telephones are available at the University of Keele in the Sports Centre, the Chancellor's Building and in the Walter Moberly Hall.

PRESS PROGRAMME

- 10.55 am approx The Royal Party and Dr Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations leave London by air.
(Dr Waldheim will be accompanied by Mrs Waldheim and Mr Neil Breen (personal aide).
- 11.45 am approx The Royal Party and Dr Waldheim arrive at Shawbury RAF Station and are received by Group Captain I Horrocks, Commanding Officer, RAF Station, Shawbury and the Chief Constable of Staffordshire Mr C H Kelly, QPM, DL, LLB. Press enquiries concerning the arrangements at Shawbury, RAF Station to Flight Lieutenant D Ransom, Press Liaison Officer. (Tel. 0939-250351 Ext 291).
- 11.50 am approx The Royal Party and Dr Waldheim leave by car for the University of Keele via:

A53 via Hodnet, Wollerton, Tern Hill, Market Drayton by-pass, Loggerheads, Baldwins Gate to Whitmore (Mainwaring Arms) then via Three Mile Lane to the Keele Village entrance to the University.
- 12.30 pm Press representatives ROTA and NON ROTA, rendez-vous with Mrs Meg Broome, Information Officer in the Walter Moberly Hall, University of Keele.

NOTE As car parking may be difficult ROTA and NON-ROTA Press should be prepared to show their passes and be directed to a car park.
- 12.35 pm approx The Royal Party and Dr Waldheim's party arrive at the Clock House University of Keele and are welcomed by The Vice-Chancellor, Dr David Harrison and Mrs Harrison. THERE WILL BE NO PRESS FACILITIES AT THE CLOCK HOUSE
- 12.40 pm approx Press representatives, ROTA and NON-ROTA, will be escorted by University representatives to the foot of the stone steps in Keele Hall courtyard; No press facilities inside Keele Hall.
- 12.55 pm approx Dr Waldheim and his party leave the Clock House for Keele Hall.



12.57 pm

Dr Waldheim and his party arrive at Keele Hall (entrance by the stone steps) and are received by:

The Pro-Chancellor, The Rt. Hon. the Lord Rochester and Lady Rochester.

The Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Professor Martin Harrison and Mrs Harrison.

Dr Waldheim and his party are escorted into the Great Hall, of Keele Hall.

1.00 pm approx

The Royal Party leaves the Clock House for Keele Hall accompanied by the Vice-Chancellor and Mrs Harrison.

1.02 pm approx

The Royal Party arrives at Keele Hall, entrance by the stone steps, and proceeds to the Great Hall for a private luncheon party.

The luncheon guests include:

The Pro-Chancellor, The Rt. Hon. The Lord Rochester and Lady Rochester.

The Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Professor M Harrison and Mrs Harrison.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr Kurt Waldheim and Mrs Waldheim.

Mr Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary-General responsible for special political affairs.

Mr Albert Rohan, Executive Director of the Secretary-General's office.

Mr Michael Popovic, Acting Director, United Nations, London.

Mr Neil Breen, personal aide to Dr Waldheim.

The Registrar, Mr J F N Hodgkinson, OBE., and Mrs Hodgkinson.

The Chairman of Staffordshire County Council, Councillor A Ward and Mrs Ward.

Member of Council, Mr J A Done and Mrs Done.

Professor W A C Stewart, immediate past Vice-Chancellor, and Mrs Stewart.

Professor A H James (Head of the Department of International Relations), and Mrs James.

More follows/.....

Professor G N Brown, (Director of the Institute of Education), and Mrs Brown.

END OF PRESS FACILITIES AT KEELE HALL

1.05 pm
approx

A buffet lunch will be available for ROTA and NON-ROTA press representatives in the Information Office, Walter Moberly Hall.

There are no facilities for telephoning in Keele Hall.

ROTA and NON ROTA press joining the party after lunch should rendez-vous in the Information Office, WM Hall, not later than 1.35 pm.

1.45 pm
approx

ROTA photographers will be escorted to the Chancellor's Building and will have an opportunity to see the balcony where they will be positioned.

1.55 pm

ROTA reporters and NON-ROTA photographers and reporters will be escorted by University representatives to the Chancellor's Building.

NON-ROTA reporters will remain outside the Chancellor's Building until HRH has arrived.

There will be no facilities for NON-ROTA PHOTOGRAPHERS inside the Chancellor's Building.

ROTA reporters will be allocated seats for the Degree Ceremony and Address in the balcony of the Foundation Year Lecture Theatre. If necessary, NON-ROTA reporters will be allocated seats in an adjacent lecture theatre (either 25 or 26), linked by closed circuit television. If sufficient seats are available they may be allocated seats in the balcony.

More follows/.....

ROTA press photographers, cameramen and reporters will be escorted by University representatives to the Senior Common Room, Chancellor's Building.

- 2.12 pm approx Dr Waldheim's party leaves Keele Hall for the Chancellor's Building where Dr Waldheim will robe for the Degree Ceremony.
- 2.14 pm approx Dr Waldheim arrives at the Chancellor's Building extension and will leave the car at the corner of the Psychology Department entrance to the Chancellor's Building and walk to the main entrance.
- 2.15 pm approx Dr Waldheim enters the Chancellor's Building to robe for the Degree Ceremony.

- 2.18 pm approx Dr Waldheim enters the Senior Common Room accompanied by Professor A M James, Head of the Department of International Relations, who will present the following final-year International Relations students.

ROTA press photographers and cameramen will have an opportunity to take photographs of Dr Waldheim.

Mr David J Hooke, from Mow Cop, Stoke-on-Trent.

Miss Helen Kyriacou from Wembley, Middlesex, and

Miss Marilena Tafferello from Accra, Ghana.

- 2.29 pm approx HRH arrives at the Chancellor's Building Extension, leaving the car at the corner of the Psychology Department entrance and will walk to the main entrance of the Chancellor's Building.

- 2.31 pm approx HRH enters the Chancellor's Building and moves to the Senior Common Room for photographs with Dr Waldheim.

ROTA photographers and cameramen will be permitted limited movement in order to take photographs.

- 2.32 pm approx

NON-ROTA reporters will be escorted to their seats.

More follows/.....

2.39 pm
approx

ROTA press will be escorted from the Senior Common Room upstairs to reserved seats on the right hand side of the balcony of the FY Lecture Theatre.

No photographs can be permitted from the main hall on the ground floor.

ROTA photographers and cameramen will require telephoto lens at least 105 mm.

2.43 pm
approx

The Procession enters the Foundation Year Lecture Theatre as follows and take seats on the platform:

Professor Alan M James

Dr Kurt Waldheim

The Vice-Chancellor, Dr David Harrison

The Pro-Chancellor, The Lord Rochester

The Chancellor

2.54 pm
approx

DEGREE CEREMONY

The Chancellor will declare the Congregation open.

HRH, as Chancellor of the University will confer the following Honorary Degree.

D.Univ. Dr Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(Professor Alan James, Head of the Department of International Relations will deliver the Oration before the degree is conferred).

If the Chancellor addresses the Congregation NO PHOTOGRAPHS should be taken during the speech.

ROTA photographers and cameramen may leave the balcony after the conferment of the degree on Dr Waldheim by the Chancellor.

Those remaining for Dr Waldheim's Address may not leave until he has finished speaking.

More follows/.....

2.55 pm approx The Chanoellor will declare the Congregation closed and will invite Dr Waldheim to give his Address.

2.55 - 3.45 pm approx Dr Waldheim will deliver his Address.

NO PHOTOGRAPHS SHOULD BE TAKEN DURING THE ADDRESS.

3.45 pm approx The Procession will leave the Foundation Year Lecture Theatre.

3.45 pm approx The Chancellor proceeds to room 35 to derobe.

3.48 - 4.00 pm approx The Chancellor and Dr Waldheim leave the Chancellor's Building and depart from the Chancellor's Building car-park for the RAF Station, Shawbury, via:

END OF PRESS FACILITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY


the ring road to Keele Village gates, Three Mile Lane, (Mainwaring Arms), Whitmore to Baldwins Gate, Loggerheads, Market Drayton by-pass, Tern Hill, Hodnet via A53 to Shawbury.

4.45 pm approx The Royal Party and Dr Waldheim's party arrive at the RAF Station, Shawbury.

Press enquiries concerning the arrangements at Shawbury, RAF Station to Flight Lieutenant D Ransom, Press Liaison Officer, (Tel. 0939-250351 Ext 291)

4.50 pm approx The Royal Party leaves Shawbury airfield for London.

ISSUED FOR, AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, CLARENCE HOUSE, BY THE UNIVERSITY OF KEELE. (Tel. Newcastle (0782) 621111 Ext 489).



VISIT OF THE CHANCELLOR, H.R.H. THE PRINCESS MARGARET
TO THE UNIVERSITY OF KEELE ON THURSDAY, 22 MAY, 1980

Name of Newspaper or organisation

Address

Please supply:-

	FOR REPORTERS	FOR PHOTOGRAPHERS
NON-ROTA Press passes to fixed positions as detailed in the University of Keele Press Programme outside Keele Hall and at the Chancellor's Building, on 22 May, 1980.		

PLEASE COMPLETE AND RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO:-

Mrs. Meg Broome,
Information Officer,
University of Keele,
KEELE,
Staffordshire.
ST5 5BG

Tel: (0782) 621111 ext 489

Tuesday 20 May

MOTOR CAR ARRANGEMENTS

From London Heathrow Airport to Claridges

(4 Daimlers)

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General

The Lord Trefgarne

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mrs Waldheim

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr P H R Marshall

Mr Neil P Breen (front seat)

Car No 3

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan, Director

Mr Michael P Popovic

Mr Colin Taylor

Miss E Friedel (jump seat)

Tuesday 20 May

FROM CLARIDGES TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET FOR TALKS WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER AND RETURN TO CLARIDGES

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr P H R Marshall

Tuesday 20 May

FROM CLARIDGES TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET FOR DINNER HOSTED
BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR D THATCHER, AND RETURN TO CLARIDGES

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mrs Waldheim

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

Mr Neil P Breen

Car No 3

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr P H R Marshall

Mrs Marshall

Wednesday 21 May

FROM CLARIDGES TO THE FCO FOR TALKS WITH LORD CARRINGTON

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No's 2 & 3

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

Sir Anthony Parsons

Car No 4 Depart Claridges 11.20 for FCO (Ambassadors Entrance)

Mrs Waldheim

Miss Joynes

Tuesday 21 May

FROM THE FCO TO BUCKINGHAM PALACE FOR THE AUDIENCE WITH THE QUEEN,
AND ON TO 1 CARLTON GARDENS FOR LUNCH HOSTED BY LORD CARRINGTON

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mrs E Waldheim

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 4 from 1 Carlton Gardens at 12.30 to 23A Ovington Square SW3

Mrs Waldheim

Miss Joynes

Car No 4 will return to Claridges after lunch with Mrs Waldheim

Wednesday 21 May

FROM THE FCO TO CLARIDGES FOLLOWING TALKS WITH LORD CARRINGTON
AND THEN TO 1 CARLTON GARDENS

Car Nos 2 & 3

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

Mr P H R Marshall

Alternatively party may go direct to 1 Carlton Gardens.

Wednesday 21 May

FROM 1 CARLTON GARDENS TO THE ODA (FOLLOWING) LUNCH HOSTED
BY LORD CARRINGTON

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

Car No 3

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr P H R Marshall

Wednesday 21 May

FROM THE ODA TO THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT FOR MEETING WITH THE
RT HON PETER SHORE MP

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

NOTE Car No 3 returns with Sir Anthony Parsons and Mr Marshall
to Claridges and later to Press Conference, if required.

Wednesday 21 May

FROM THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT TO MILLBANK TOWER, FOR THE
PRESS CONFERENCE, AND RETURN TO CLARIDGES

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

Wednesday 21 May

FROM CLARIDGES TO THE ALDWYCH THEATRE (EVENING HOSTED BY
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND LADY CAROLINE GILMOUR)

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mrs Waldheim

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Neil P Breen

ANNEX 7 (k)

Wednesday 21 May

FROM THE ALDWYCH THEATRE TO 1 CARLTON GARDENS, FOR SUPPER PARTY
HOSTED BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND LADY CAROLINE GILMOUR

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

The Lord Privy Seal, The Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour MP

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mrs Waldheim

Lady Caroline Gilmour

Mr Neil Breen (front seat)

Car No 3

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal

Wednesday 21 May

FROM 1 CARLTON GARDENS FOLLOWING THEATRE SUPPER TO CLARIDGES

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mrs E Waldheim

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

Car No 2

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Neil P Breen

Thursday 22 May

CLARIDGES TO NORTHOLT (FOR TRIP TO KEELE) AND NORTHOLT TO CLARIDGES.

Car No 1

H.E. The Secretary-General of the UN

Mrs E Waldheim

Mr Neil P Breen

Mr Robert Swann

Special Branch (front seat)

ANNEX 7 (n)

Thursday 22 May

CLARIDGES TO EUSTON (FOR TRIP TO KEELE) AND RETURN FROM EUSTON
TO CLARIDGES

Car No 2

Mr Brian E Urquhart

Mr Albert Rohan

Mr Michael P Popovic

NOTE Departure from Claridges will be at 0925 hours, arriving
Euston by 0940. The train leaves at 0955 from platform 7.

Mr D Healy and Miss C Joynes will make their own way to Euston;
They will meet the party at the entrance to platform 7.

Special Branch will make their own way to Keele.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Buckingham Palace

Private Secretary to The Queen (2)
Private Secretary to The Princess Margaret (2)

No 10 Downing Street

Private Secretary (2)
Press Office (2)

UN Information Centre

Mr Popovic (6)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Private Secretary (2)
PS to the LPS (2)
PS to The Hon Douglas Hurd MP (2)
PS to The Lord Trefgarne (2)
PS to the PUS (1)
Mr J L Bullard (1)
Lord Nicholas Gordon Lennox (1)
Mr R M Evans (1)

Sir Anthony Parsons c/o UN Dept, Mr McGinley (1)
Mr P H R Marshall c/o UN Dept, Mr McGinley (1)

Head of UN Dept (1)
UN Dept (Mr McGinley (6)
News Dept (6)
Security Dept (1)
Resident Clerk (1)
Protocol & Conference Dept (6)

GHF (6)
Special Branch (3)
Queen's Flight (1)

King Lushan



REVISED

United Nations

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE DINNER AND RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND MRS. WALDHEIM ON TUESDAY, 20 MAY 1980 AT 7.30 PM FOR 8.00 PM BLACK TIE

The Prime Minister
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim
and Mrs. Waldheim

Mr. Brian Urquhart

Under Secretary General

Mr. Albert Rohan

Director, Executive Office
of the Secretary General

HM Government

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington
and Lady Carrington

The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
and Lady Soames

The Hon. Douglas Hurd, MP

Mr. Neil Marten, MP
and Mrs. Marten

Conservative MPs

Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke, MP

Leader of Visiting Parliamentary
Delegation to the 34th UN General
Assembly

Mr. Robert Rhodes James, MP
and Mrs. Rhodes James

Member of the Secretary General's
staff 1973-76.

Labour MPs

The Rt. Hon. Michael Foot, MP
and Mrs. Foot

The Rt. Hon. Peter Shore, MP
and Dr. Shore

Liberal MPs

Mr. Russell Johnston, MP
and Mrs. Johnston

Representatives of UN Organisations in the United Kingdom

Mr. Chandrika Prasad Srivastava
and Mrs. Srivastava

Secretary General, IMCO

Mr. Michael Popovic

Acting Director, United Nations
Information Centre

UK Representatives to UN Bodies

The Baroness Trumpington
and Mr. W.A. Barker

UK Representative, UN Status of
Women Commission

The Baroness Young
and Dr. Young

leading UK Delegation to World
Conference on the UN Decade for
Women

Others with UN Interests

Mr. C. Brocklebank-Fowler, MP
and Mrs. Brocklebank-Fowler

Chairman of the UN Parliamentary
Group

Professor John Ferguson
and Mrs. Ferguson

Chairman, General Council of the
United Nations Association

The Reverend David Harding
and Mrs. Harding

Director, United Nations Associat-
ion

Professor Rosalyn Higgins
and The Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins, MP

Professor of International Law
and expert in UN affairs

Mr. Sidney Bailey
and Mrs. Bailey

Author and expert in UN affairs

Others

The Lord Blake
and Lady Blake

Mr. Ivor Richard

Formerly UK Permanent Representat-
ive to the United Nations
(1974-79)

Sir Keith Unwin
and Lady Unwin

UK Member, UN Commission on Human
Rights 1970-78

Sir David Orr
and Lady Orr

Chairman, Unilever Ltd.

His Excellency the Italian Ambassador
and Signora Cagiati

EEC Presidency

The Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson
and Mrs. Richardson

Governor of the Bank of England

Press

Mr. Jon Lander
and Mrs. Lander

Associate Editor, Now!

Officials

Sir Anthony Parsons

Permanent Representative to the
UK Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Peter Marshall
and Mrs. Marshall

Permanent Representative to the
United Nations in Geneva

Sir Antony Acland
and Lady Acland

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

10 Downing Street

Mr. Ian Gow, MP
and Mrs. Gow

Mr. Oliver
and Mrs. Whitmore

Mr. David Wolfson
and Mrs. Wolfson

Mr. Bernard Ingham

Mr. Michael Alexander
and Mrs. Alexander

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT SEATING PLAN - DINNER
20 MAY 1980

THE PRIME MINISTER

HE Mr. KURT WALDHEIM

Mr. Brian Urquhart

The Lady Carrington

MR. [REDACTED]
Mrs. Waldheim

HE The Ambassador of the Italian Republic

The Lady Soames

Signora Cagiati	The Hon. Douglas Hurd	Mr. Neil Martin	Mr. Chandrika Prasad Srivastava
The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames	Mr. Albert Rohan	The Baroness Trumpington	The Baroness Young
The Lady Blake	Mrs. Srivastava	Rt. Hon. Michael Foot	Mr. Michael Popovic
Rt. Hon. Gordon Richardson	Rt. Hon. Peter Shore	Professor Rosalyn Higgins	Mrs. Marten
Lady Unwin	Mrs. Foot	Lord Blake	Sir Anthony Parsons
Rt. Hon. Terence Higgins	Mr. Russell Johnston	Mrs. Richardson	Mr. Ivor Richard
Mrs. Gow	Lady Orr	Sir Keith Unwin	Dr. Shore
Sir. Anthony Acland	The Reverend D. Harding	Lady Acland	Mr. Peter Marshall
Mrs. Marshall	Mrs. Brocklebank-Fowler	Mr. W.A. Barker	Mrs. Johnston
Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke	Dr. G.T. Young	Mrs. Harding	Sir David Orr
Mrs. Lander	Mrs. Bailey	Mr. Ian Gow	Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler
Mr. Robert Rhodes James	Professor John Ferguson	Mrs. Rhodes James	Mrs. Ferguson
Mrs. Alexander	Mr. David Wolfson	Mr. Sidney Bailey	Mr. Jon Lander
Mr. Bernard Ingham		Mr. Michael Alexander	Mrs. Wolfson

ENTRANCE

12-18

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE RECEPTION TO BE GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND MRS. WALDHEIM
ON TUESDAY, 20 MAY 1980 FROM 9.45 PM TO 11.15 PM BLACK TIE

Mr. Ben Whitaker
and Mrs. Whitaker UK Member United Nations Human
Rights nominated Sub-Commission

Sir Maurice Hodgson
and Lady Hodgson Chairman, ICI

Mr. Christopher Mayhew
and Mrs. Mayhew

United Nations Parliamentary Group

Mr. Julian Ridsdale, MP
and Mrs. Ridsdale

The Rt. Hon. Peter Archer, MP
and Mrs. Archer

Mr. Alan ...

?? Mr. Clement Freud, MP
and Mrs. Freud

Mr. Stan Newens, MP
and Mrs. ...

Mr. Bowen Wells, MP
and Mrs. Wells

Representatives of UN Organisations

United Nations Association

Mr. Basil Hembry
and Mrs. Hembry Chairman, Eastern Region

Mr. Julian Eccles Youth Coordinator, UK UNA

Mr. Eric Price Holmes Chairman, London Region, President
of the United Nations Association

Mrs. Myriel Davies Regional Officer, London Region

Mr. W. Davies
and Mrs. ... Welsh National Council, UNA

Mr. Marshall Harris
and Mrs. Harris Scottish Regional Officer

?? Dr. Donald Hughes
and Mrs. Hughes Chairman, Economic and Social
Affairs Committee

Miss Janet ...

Mr. Gordon Evans Chairman of Westminster Branch

Mrs. Leah Levin Human Rights Expert

Lt.-Col. Denis Bult-Francis	Director, UNICEF
Mr. Wesley-Gryk	UNHCR
Miss Margaret Quass	Council for Education in World Citizenship
Sir Lesley Kirkley and Lady Kirkley	Chairman, UK Standing Conference on Refugees
Sir Andrew Stark and Lady Stark	Former Under-Secretary General UN
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh	Executive Chairman, British Red Cross
Mrs. Ruth Winston-Fox	Co-Chairman, Women's National Commission
Mr. Martin Ennals and Mrs. Ennals	Director General, Amnesty International
Mr. W.P. Sieghart and Mrs. Sieghart	Chairman, Executive Committee Justice
?? Mr. T. Sargant and Mrs. Sargant	Justice
The Baroness Lockwood and Lt.-Colonel Cedric Hall	Chairman, Equal Opportunities Commission
Mr. Martin Wright and Mrs. Wright	Director, Howard League for Penal Reform
Mr. A.B. McNulty and ? Mrs. McNulty	Director, British Institute of Human Rights
Mr. David Watt and Mrs. Watt	Director, Chatham House
The Rt. Hon. Lord Noel-Baker	Member, British Delegation to UN General Assembly 1946-47
Mr. A.H.M. Hillis and Mrs. Hillis	UK Member, International Civil Service Commission
Dr. D.A. Davies and Mrs. Davies	Former Secretary-General, World Meteorological Organisation
Mr. N.A. Sims and Mrs. Sims	Lecturer in International Relations London School of Economics
<u>Journalists</u>	
Mr. P. Keatley and Mrs. Keatley	The Guardian
Mr. David Palmer and Mrs. Palmer	Foreign Editor, Financial Times
Mr. Frank Giles and Lady Catherine Giles	Sunday Times

With Special Interests in the United Nations

Professor J. Fawcett and Mrs. Fawcett	Former Legal Adviser, FCO
Sir Alexander MacFarquhar and Lady MacFarquhar	Former UN Under Secretary
Colonel P. Montgomery and Mrs. M. Chambers	Secretary, Anti-Slavery Society
Sir Frederick Mason and Lady Maston	Former UK Representative, Geneva and member of International Narcotics Control Board
Mr. C.P.H.T. Isolani and Mrs. Isolani	Information Officer, UN University
The Lord Gladwyn	Former Chairman, UN Parliamentary Group and UK Permanent Represent- ative to the UN
Baroness Gaitskell	Former Parliamentary Delegate, UK Delegation to UN General Assembly
Mr. Neil E.	UN Committee on Human Rights
The Rt. Hon. Lord Caradon and Lady Caradon	Former UK Permanent Representative to the UN
Lord Boston of Faversham and Lady Boston of Faversham	Former Parliamentary delegate member of UK Delegation to UN General Assembly
Mr. Evan Luard	Former Parliamentary Under Secre- tary of State, FCO, responsible for UN questions. Writer on UN affairs
Professor Richard Jolly and Mrs. Jolly	Director, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex
Miss M.M. Sibthorp	Director, David Davies Memorial Institute
The Hon. David Montagu and Mrs. Montagu	
<u>Members of Parliament</u>	
The Rt. Hon. Ronald Bell, MP and Mrs. Bell	
Sir William Clark, MP and Lady Clark	
Mr. Carol Mather, MP and Mrs. Mather	

Mr. Paul Marland, MP
and Mrs. Marland

The Hon. Alan Clark, MP
and Mrs. Clark

Sir Nicholas Bonsor, MP
and Lady Bonsor

Officials

Lord Nicholas Gordon-Lennox
and Lady Nicholas Gordon-Lennox

Assistant Under Secretary
FCO

Mr. R.M. Evans
and Mrs. Evans

" " "

Lady Sinclair

Sir Ian Sinclair, Legal
Adviser, FCO, abroad

Mr. D.L. Pearson

Overseas Development
Administration

Mr. M.K.O. Simpson-Orlebar
and Mrs. Simpson-Orlebar

Head, United Nations
Department, FCO

Mr. R.W.H. du Boulay
and Mrs. du Boulay

Head, Protocol and
Conference Department, FCO
United Nations Department

Mrs. Sue Wiseman
10 Downing Street

Mr. Mike Pattison
and Mrs. Pattison

Mr. Charles Anson

Mr. Neil Breen

UN Secretary-General's Party

Miss Friedel

" " " "

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 May 1980

Dear Michael,

Official Visit by the United Nations Secretary-General, 20-23 May 1980

Further to my letter of 16 May, enclosing briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Waldheim at 4.30pm tomorrow (Tuesday), I now enclose supplementary briefing on Indo-China (Brief No 6) and Afghanistan (Brief No 3), together with an additional brief on Cuban refugees (Brief No 13), in case the subject comes up in the course of discussions. The Prime Minister may also wish to be aware of Mr Waldheim's talks with President Giscard (Paris Telno 444 attached). *with briefing annexed to file*

I shall be letting you have supplementary briefing on Namibia tomorrow morning.

Mr & Mrs Waldheim will now arrive at Heathrow at 13.10 tomorrow from Geneva. I attach two copies of the printed programme.

*yours ever
P Lever*

pp (P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 May 1980

Dear Michael,

Official visit by the United
Nations Secretary-General,
20-23 May 1980

I set in folder attached to file

/ I attach two sets of briefs for the
Prime Minister's meeting with Mr Waldheim from
4.30 pm on Tuesday, 20 May. These may need
to be supplemented in the light of
developments between now and 20 May.


Yours ever
Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

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16 MAY 1980



VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: 20-23 MAY 1980

LIST OF BRIEFS

1. Steering Brief
2. Role of Secretary-General
3. UN Institutions:
 - a) Assaults on the Constitution
 - b) UN Secretariat
 - c) Finance and Budget
4. Iran
5. Afghanistan
6. Indo-China
7. Middle East
 - a) Arab/Israel
 - b) Lebanon
8. Southern Africa
 - a) Namibia
 - b) South Africa
9. Cyprus
10. North/South
11. The Falklands
12. Belize

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FM PARIS 161635Z MAY 80.

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 444 OF 16 MAY 1980.

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING TEHRAN

VISIT TO FRANCE BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. DURING HIS BRIEF VISIT TO PARIS, MR WALDHEIM HAD TALKS WITH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, M FRANCOIS-PONCET, ON THE EVENING OF 13 MAY AND WAS RECEIVED TO LUNCH BY PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 14 MAY. ACCORDING TO THE QUAI AND THE ELYSEE, THE CONVERSATION ON BOTH OCCASIONS WAS LIMITED TO A GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON. THE ONLY SUBJECT WHICH THE FRENCH HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL WAS IRAN, WHERE THEY HOPED TO PERSUADE WALDHEIM TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE AGAIN. THEY SAID THAT WALDHEIM SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DO SO.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEHRAN.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

JAMES

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FILES

WED

UND

MED

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

SIR A. ACLAND

LORD N.G. LENNOX

SIR D. MAITLAND

MR J.C. MOBERLY

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF

MR WALDHEIM'S VISIT

1. Mr Waldheim is to call on the Prime Minister for about an hour from 1630 on 20 May and be entertained by her at dinner that evening. He will call on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for an hour at 1030 on 21 May, followed later (with Mr Waldheim's Audience of The Queen intervening) by a working lunch. He will have a separate talk with the Minister for Overseas Development but no longer, as originally proposed, with the Secretary of State for Energy (who will be abroad: Mr Waldheim may wish to cover energy during his meeting with Lord Carrington).
2. Personality Notes on Mr Waldheim and his party are attached, as are his programme and essential facts on the United Nations (Annexes A, B and C).
3. Mr Waldheim will arrive in London from Geneva, where he has family and UN business. He was previously in Vienna for the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. After leaving London, Mr Waldheim will address a UN ministerial level meeting on humanitarian aid to Indo-China, to be held in Geneva on 26/27 May.

/AGENDA

AGENDA

4. There is no formal Agenda for the meetings with the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Mr Waldheim will want a tour d'horizon of the international political and economic scene with the Prime Minister; this would touch on major issues active at the UN, including Iran, Afghanistan, Middle East, Indo-China, Southern Africa, Cyprus and North/South. Briefs are provided on these issues; they are summarised in paras 7-20 below. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be able to pursue these and other issues in more detail at his subsequent meeting. A list of briefs is at Annex D.

UK OBJECTIVES

5. (a) To reinforce the good UK working relationship with the Secretary-General;
- (b) to bring home to Mr Waldheim UK concern at Third World efforts to change the balance of UN institutions;
- (c) to reinforce our interest in obtaining satisfactory UK representation in the UN Secretariat;
- (d) to ascertain Mr Waldheim's intentions in respect of Iran/hostages;
- (e) to explain UK/Nine's proposals for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, and to seek Mr Waldheim's views on a possible UN role;
- (f) to encourage greater interest by Mr Waldheim in achieving a political solution in Indo-China;
- (g) to persuade Mr Waldheim to consult front line states and South Africa before preparing his reply to Mr Botha on Namibia.

MR WALDHEIM'S PROBABLE OBJECTIVES

6. (a) to ascertain our thinking on the international situation; and particularly UK/EC intentions with regard to a UN initiative on the Middle East;

- (b) to reinforce his credentials with an eye to the 1981 elections to the Secretary-Generalship;
- (c) to seek assurances regarding the level of UK voluntary contributions to UN bodies.

RESUMÉ OF MAJOR BRIEFS

Role of Secretary-General (Brief No 2)

7. We should express appreciation of Mr Waldheim's achievements, but not commit ourselves over the 1981 elections: Mr Waldheim is clearly out to seek election for a third 5-year term, but at this stage no-one has formally declared himself a candidate.

UN Institutions (Brief No 3)

8. Assaults on the Constitution. We are concerned by efforts by the developing country majority to change the balance of UN institutions, to the detriment of Western interests and the effectiveness of the UN: eg proposed enlargement of the Security Council; // attacks on the veto; // allocation of Secretariat jobs by nationality rather than competence; // attempts to revise the method of assessing financial contributions; increased politicisation of technical bodies.

9. British representation in the UN Secretariat; succession to Mr Urquhart. Although we cannot complain about the numbers of Britons in the Secretariat, our overall representation is unbalanced and patchy. The most senior Briton is Mr Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary-General for special political affairs and the key figure in UN peacekeeping operations, who will accompany Mr Waldheim to the UK. Mr Waldheim should be reminded of the importance we attach to effective UK representation in the Secretariat and - subject to last minute advice from Sir A Parsons who will be seeing Mr Urquhart on the evening of 19 May - of our interest in the succession to Mr Urquhart when he retires.

10. Finance. We should commend and encourage Mr Waldheim's efforts to achieve restraint in the UN's budget; and reassure him that reduction in UK contributions to UN development and humanitarian programmes arises from financial stringency, not lack of confidence.

Iran (Brief No 4)

11. The UN may well offer the best prospects for negotiating the release of the hostages. Does Mr Waldheim plan to revive his Commission or take any further initiatives?

Afghanistan (Brief No 5)

12. It would be worth giving Mr Waldheim a further explanation of the UK/Nine proposals on Afghanistan. We hope that the concept will be supported by Islamic and non-aligned countries. Does Mr Waldheim expect further UN involvement?

Indo-China (Brief No 6)

13. International relief has made major strides, but instability and warfare continue to threaten Thailand. Mr Waldheim is unwilling to take further political or humanitarian initiatives. We would like him to show greater interest in achieving a political solution.

Middle East (Brief No 7)

14. Arab/Israel. Mr Waldheim will be interested in our ideas, including a possible Security Council resolution to supplement Resolution 242. UN could be a useful forum to promote progress to a settlement, but credibility undermined by too many one-sided resolutions.

15. Lebanon. The troop contributors are deeply concerned about the situation. UK proposing a more active role for the Nine: useful to ascertain Mr Waldheim's reaction.

Southern Africa (Brief No 8)

16. Namibia. How does Mr Waldheim assess the South African reply on the demilitarised zone (DMZ) proposal? We think it constructive, in respect both of the UN Secretariat's negotiations and possible proceedings in the Security Council.

17. South Africa. Hope that Mr Waldheim will join in persuading the Africans and others to encourage present moves towards peaceful change in South Africa: which is best achieved by persuasion rather than ostracism.

Cyprus (Brief No 9)

18. Intercommunal talks. Latest reports indicate UN determination to reconvene the stalled intercommunal talks by June, with or without prior agreement of the parties; we wish to strengthen Mr Waldheim's resolve.

19. On UNFICYP, we expect a serious review from the Secretariat, either leading to substantial reductions in the force, or showing convincingly why they are impossible.

North/South (Brief No 10)

20. Afghanistan and Iran have underlined the need for sound North/South relations. UK has constructive approach to proposed global negotiations. We look for useful discussions on energy in the negotiations, but are openminded whether a permanent UN energy forum will be needed afterwards (a favoured project of Mr Waldheim's). What are his views on the proposal for a limited Summit?

Other issues

21. Defensive briefs are provided on the Falklands (Brief No 11) and Belize (Brief No 12).

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 MAY 1980

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PERSONALITY NOTES

WALDHEIM, KURT

Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Austrian. Born 1918. Military service with German army 1938-42 (medical discharge after service on Eastern front). Graduated from University of Vienna as Doctor of Jurisprudence 1944 (but prefers to be addressed as 'Mr' rather than 'Dr'). Austrian Diplomatic Service 1945-68; Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 1968-70; Permanent Representative to the UN 1970-72. Elected UN Secretary-General in 1972; re-elected 1977. Term expires December 1981.

Although his outlook has broadened in recent years, Waldheim's values and perceptions remain those of old style Austrian diplomacy; he is fundamentally decent, disciplined and somewhat paternalistic. He retains a strong belief in the provisions of the UN Charter and is staunch in defence of the authority and prestige of the UN and the office of the Secretary-General.

He works long hours but is not regarded as a good manager of business or staff. He has a painstaking approach to problems and is cautious about taking initiatives which might court unpopularity. Not an outstanding Secretary-General, but has succeeded in maintaining the authority of the United Nations

/and has

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and has been more active than is frequently recognised through quiet diplomacy and use of the Secretary-General's 'good offices'. Though aware that when first elected the UK had reservations about his candidacy, he trusts and likes Britain.

Speaks English, French and Italian. Interests are horses and the UN. Autobiography ('The Challenge of Peace') recently published.

MRS WALDHEIM

Elizabeth Charlotte. Austrian. Born 1922. She met Mr Waldheim when studying law, and worked at the Civil Court 1943-45. Married 1944 and accompanied Mr Waldheim on postings to Paris, Ottawa and New York. She is active in social work; interests include art, antiques, education, needlework and music. Enjoys political conversation. Excellent English.

Three children - Liselotte, Gerhardt and Christa. (Gerhardt and his family were resident in England last year while he attended a banking course).

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URQUHART, BRIAN EDWARD

Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

British. Born 1919. Educated at Christ Church, Oxford. Has made his career in the UN which he joined in 1945. He was Personal Assistant to the first Secretary-General from 1946-49. He subsequently held various posts in the Secretariat, mostly on the Secretary-General's staff as well as undertaking special missions to the Congo where he served as UN representative, Katanga, from 1961-62. Author of a biography on Hammarskjold published in 1972.

One of the outstanding international civil servants of his generation. A unique modest and thoroughly good man. He is the first to have risen through the ranks to the level of Under Secretary-General (and, given the fact that senior appointments in the Secretariat are increasingly made on the basis of national secondments, he is likely to be the last). He made his name by the way he restored some order out of the chaos of the UN's peacekeeping operation in the Congo in 1961. Since then he has concentrated on the UN's peacekeeping role, notably in the Middle East and Cyprus. Urquhart has loyally served all his Secretaries-General and they have come to rely on his judgement and good sense. Urquhart's influence upon the UN has been pervasive and for the good. His political sense is thoroughly realistic. After a generation at the UN, he remains devoted to its ideals and retains an impartial approach to his job. His influence and refusal to be brow-beaten have often made him the object of hostility and suspicion on the part of the Russians and jealousy on the part of the second-rate. None of this seems to bother him unduly.

Urquhart's office is, on the political side, the cutting edge of the Secretariat. It runs the various UN peacekeeping operations and advises the Secretary-General on the use of his 'good offices' in relation to areas of international tension and conflict.

He speaks French and German. His second wife, Sidney, is American.

(See also Brief no.3 (UK representation in the Secretariat) on the succession to Urquhart).



ROHAN, Albert

D.2. Director of the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General.

Austrian. Born 1936. Secondary education and further studies in Austria, France and Belgium. Service with the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963 - 1977 (including service in London from 1968 - 1975). Took up present UN appointment in 1977.

An efficient and punctilious operator; inclined to formality. Speaks excellent French and English. An accomplished bridge player.

RESTRICTED

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: 20 - 23 MAY 1980

OUTLINE PROGRAMME

Tuesday 20 May

AM	Arrival at London Heathrow
1630 - 1730	Call on the Prime Minister
1930 for 2000	Dinner at No 10 Downing Street hosted by the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher
2145	Reception at No 10 Downing Street

Wednesday 21 May

1030	Call on Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
1200	Audience of The Queen [Mr and Mrs Waldheim]
1230	Working lunch hosted by Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary [Lunch for Mrs Waldheim hosted by Lady Carrington]
1430	Call on the Minister for Overseas Development
1510	Meeting with the Rt Hon Peter Shore MP
1600	Press Conference
1645	Meeting with UN Association
1930	Theatre/supper party hosted by the Lord Privy Seal

/Thursday 22 May

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Thursday, 22 May

Visit to Keele University to receive
an honorary degree from Chancellor,
Princess Margaret.

Evening

Private engagement (arranged by
Lord Weidenfeld).

Friday, 23 May

AM

Departure


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VISIT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL, MAY 1980

ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

1. 152 member states.
2. UN regular budget for 1980 and 1981 about \$1247 million *per annum*.
UK assessed contribution 4.46% = £32.9 million in 1979. Additional
UK contribution to UN funds and agencies in 1979 £65.2 million.
3. Under the UN Charter, the principal organs are:-
 - a) The General Assembly, comprising all UN members and meeting in regular session from September to December each year. Emergency or special sessions may also be held.
 - b) The Security Council. 15 members. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UK has permanent membership under the Charter).
 - c) The Economic and Social Council. 54 members. Concerned with economic, social, cultural, health and related matters and human rights. (UK has consistently secured re-election).
 - d) The Trusteeship Council. 5 members. Concerned with trust territories of which only the US trust territory of the Pacific remains (UK is a member under the Charter).
 - e) The International Court of Justice. The principal judicial organ.
 - f) The Secretariat.
4. Under provision for a Secretariat, the Charter provides for a Secretary-General (to be appointed by the General Assembly on

/the recommendation



the recommendation of the Security Council) and such staff as the organisation may require. Headquarters staff now number about 5,700, worldwide UN staff about 18,300.

5. There are in addition a number of intergovernmental agencies related to the UN by special agreements. They include the International Labour Organisation, The Food and Agriculture Organisation, The World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation is the only specialised agency based in London.

6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 2: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

POINTS TO MAKE

MR WALDHEIM'S ACHIEVEMENTS

1. Welcome the initiatives you have taken eg the meeting on Indo-Chinese refugees (Geneva, July 1979; called in response to the Prime Minister's proposal) and your visit to Tehran (January 1980).

FUTURE ROLE

2. Understand limitations on your freedom of action. We shall support constructive use of your office. Any new areas of concern?

ELECTIONS TO THE SECRETARY GENERALSHIP (if raised by Mr Waldheim)

3. Thank you for telling us your intentions.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL: 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 2: ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ESSENTIAL FACTS

CAREER AND PERSONALITY

1. See biographical note (Annex A to Steering Brief).

MR WALDHEIM'S ACHIEVEMENTS

2. Mr Waldheim sensitive to criticism that he does not play a more active role. Under Article 99 of the UN Charter, 'the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'. Mr Waldheim last year used this Charter provision (over Iran); more usually relies on 'good offices'. Has done more in this field than he is generally given credit for. In addition to Iran and Cambodia, record includes initiatives over Korea, despatch of enquiry missions to examine human rights in Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, and intervention to secure release of French hostages held by the Polisario Front in Western Sahara.

ELECTIONS TO SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP

3. Mr Waldheim's second five-year term as Secretary-General expires in December 1981. He is expected to stand for a third term, though he has not publicly announced this and is unlikely to seek UK support at this stage. Strongest likely competitors: Ambassador Salim A Salim of Tanzania, current President of the General Assembly, and Mr Sonny Ramphal, Commonwealth Secretary-General. Mr Waldheim appears already somewhat obsessed by the prospects of a fight for re-election; this may affect his judgement as well as his workload.

/4.

INCIDENTS AT HEATHROW AND SALISBURY

4. Mr Waldheim also sensitive about his personal dignity and that of his office. Last month he travelled via London to Salisbury for Zimbabwe's independence ceremonies. All the passengers on his flight to Salisbury, which included 117 VIPs (37 delegations), were subjected at London Airport to body searches at the request of the airline, who were understandably taking special security precautions (the search turned up 4 undeclared firearms). In Salisbury Mr Waldheim was also unhappy with the arrangements, which were inevitably a bit rough and ready and which put the Secretary-General (who is not in protocol terms a Head of State or Government) in second place after the many Heads of State or Government present. He made a vigorous complaint to Sir A Parsons, but appears to have been mollified by a written expression of regret from Lord Carrington.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 MAY 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980
BRIEF NO.3(a): UN INSTITUTIONS: ASSAULTS ON THE CONSTITUTION

POINTS TO MAKE

ATTACKS ON THE CHARTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE UN

1. We are concerned at continuing Third World efforts to erode the Charter and the established structure of the United Nations, eg

- pressures for Security Council enlargement
- threats to upset agreement on the allocation of seats on other UN bodies
- attacks on the Permanent Members' right of veto
- pressures to fill Secretariat posts on the basis of nationality rather than competence
- attempts to revise the method of assessing financial contributions.

2. We are receptive to the legitimate interests of Third World countries, but this must be a two-way process. Western countries, who are the major contributors to the UN budget (71%), can only be alienated by attempts to force through significant changes in the UN structure by majority vote rather than consensus.

POLITICISATION OF UN BODIES

3. We deplore the way certain UN bodies are used to pursue political and propaganda campaigns unrelated to the business in hand. This brings the UN into disrepute and wastes time and money.

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VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(a): UN INSTITUTIONS: ASSAULTS ON THE CONSTITUTION

ESSENTIAL FACTS

ATTACKS ON THE CHARTER AND STRUCTURE OF THE UN

1. Third World countries are pressing for changes in the structure, organisation and business of the UN, to reflect their numerical majority. Moves during the last two General Assemblies included:

- an Indian proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council;
- a Jamaican/Argentinian proposal for the enlargement of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
- a Libyan proposal to abolish the veto.

All of these involve attempts to amend the Charter of the UN. There have also been

- a Third World resolution forcing through a change in the composition of a UN body;
- attacks on fundamental financial principles;
- attempts to change the composition of the Secretariat.

2. Taken together, these proposals have serious implications for Western interests at the UN; given our permanent membership of the Security Council, they have a direct bearing on UK interests.

/POLITICISATION OF UN BODIES

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POLITICISATION OF UN BODIES

3. Third World priorities are economic development, Southern Africa and the Middle East. UN agendas, debates and resolutions reflect these. In some bodies this emphasis is legitimate; in others, like the specialised agencies, the introduction of political issues inhibits productive work (eg attempts to focus on health conditions of West Bank Palestinians in the World Health Assembly). The Russians and their allies are always ready to stir the pot.

4. See Briefs 3(b) and (c) for further material on Third World attacks on Western levels of representation in the Secretariat and Western rates of assessed contributions to the UN budget.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1
15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(b): UN INSTITUTIONS: UN SECRETARIAT

POINTS TO MAKE

BRITISH REPRESENTATION

1. Attach importance to UK continuing to be well represented; so-called 'over-representation' surely reflects quality/ability of British subjects who have sought employment with UN.
2. British contingent in Secretariat now rather old. Hope more promising young Britons will be recruited into junior professional grades. What about competitive examination, as just organised with the French?
3. Hope UK under-representation in some important departments will be remedied, eg Administration and Management; Political and Security Council Affairs.

SUCCESSION TO MR BRIAN URQUHART(a member of Mr Waldheim's party)


[Subject to last-minute advice from Sir A Parsons. Only suitable for communication to Mr Waldheim in tête-à-tête conversation, not overheard by other members of the Secretariat.]

4. Do not know Mr Urquhart's personal plans. Hope he will stay as long as possible, but that a Briton will succeed him when he retires. Our historical experience qualifies us well for the role he fills.

ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE COMPOSITION OF SECRETARIAT

5. Disturbed by recent attacks on contribution factor, as prime factor used to determine 'desirable ranges' for level of each country's representation in the Secretariat. Oppose radical alteration of existing criteria based on long-standing consensus. Understand Western position explained in recent joint démarche.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(b): UN INSTITUTIONS: UN SECRETARIAT

ESSENTIAL FACTS

BRITISH REPRESENTATION

1. UK national interest requires good spread of able British officials at all levels of UN Secretariat. Pace Article 100 of UN Charter, which proscribes attempts to influence the Secretary-General or his staff, we should be prepared to do so in some cases. Senior appointments nearly always involve political battles, which Waldheim accepts.

2. Particular difficulties for UK:
 - 1) British 'over-representation' in Secretariat as a whole;
 - 2) concentration of UK nationals in comparatively unimportant posts;
 - 3) increasing age of British contingent; many entered UN in its early days;
 - 4) low calibre of some UK nationals in the Secretariat;
 - 5) good candidates deterred by difficulty of getting in, Secretariat's bad reputation, etc.

3. Prime long term need is to ensure that more able young Britons enter Secretariat at or near the bottom of the ladder.

/SUCCESSION

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SUCCESSION TO MR BRIAN URQUHART

4. Mr Urquhart's post as Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs uniquely important. His personal standing helps UK influence on political direction of UN and redounds to our credit throughout the organisation. Strong British interest that post should be retained for UK when Urquhart retires, probably 1984/85.

5. No British subject now in the UN system with right qualities to succeed Urquhart: a nominee from outside therefore required. Urquhart confirms this should be someone with background in administration; politician would not be right. Trawl now under way.

6. We may need in due course to lean heavily on Secretary-General. At this stage, only necessary to remind Waldheim of UK interest (Mr Callaghan mentioned it to him in 1977), in such a way as not to embarrass Urquhart.

ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE COMPOSITION OF SECRETARIAT

7. UK, like some other developed countries, 'over-represented' in terms of 'desirable ranges' ie guidelines prepared by Secretariat for level of each country's representation (UK 'desirable range' 72-98: actual number of staff in 1979 - 129). These guidelines being transformed into rigid quotas: against Article 101 of UN Charter, which requires Secretary-General to employ most suitable candidate.

8. At 34th General Assembly, Trinidad led challenge to the formula on which 'desirable ranges' calculated (equation based on size of contribution to UN budget, membership of UN,

/population

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population - weighted in that order of importance). Result was one-sided resolution (34/219) - which 33 developed countries of East and West voted against - calling for studies of how contribution factor could be reduced in importance, membership factor increased. This could reduce 'desirable ranges' of major contributors, including UK, in favour of developing countries; virtually impossible for UK nationals to get jobs with UN for years to come.

9. Permanent representatives of US, UK, France, FRG, Japan made joint démarche to Secretary-General on 8 May with following points:

- (a) Resolution 34/219 opposed by 33 Member States, which together contribute nearly 90% of the UN budget;
- (b) Distribution of places in Secretariat should continue to rest on consensus. Secretary-General should therefore propose compromise solution at 35th UNGA;
- (c) Secretary-General should look for other solutions eg more places for all Member States.

SOVIET PRESSURES ON SECRETARIAT

10. All Soviet nationals in Secretariat are there to promote Soviet interests; many also involved in intelligence work. Particular Soviet pressure in personnel field; most notorious case that of Mr Dneprovsky appointed head of Personnel Department in Geneva in 1978, despite UK/US protests to the Secretary-General that he was known intelligence officer. Pending further analysis and consultation with friendly Governments, general approach to Mr Waldheim by Ministers probably inadvisable at this stage.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1

15 May 1980.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(c): UN INSTITUTIONS: FINANCE AND BUDGET

POINTS TO MAKE

PROGRAMME BUDGET 1980-1981

1. Concerned to see real growth restrained. Commend your efforts to achieve restraint. Keep it up.

GENERAL

2. We would like to see zero real growth in budgets of UN bodies over next 5 years.
3. New or expanded UN programmes should be funded from more efficient redeployment of existing resources.
4. The budgets of Specialised Agencies should not be allowed to grow without control.

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN REGULAR BUDGET

5. Cannot support any suggestion to amend method of calculating assessments which would jeopardise continuing application of fundamental principle of capacity to pay. [Defensive: Reduction of UK assessment in new scale irrelevant.]

USE OF THE REGULAR BUDGET

6. UN Regular Budget should be used solely to finance administrative expenses of the Organisation which benefit all members. Other activities best met from voluntary contributions.

UK CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN AID SYSTEM (Defensive)

7. Britain among major contributors to UN development system. Unfortunately have to reduce our efforts, due to public expenditure constraints. Cannot promise increasing level of support yet.

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VISIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON,
20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO.3(c): UN INSTITUTIONS: UN FINANCE AND BUDGET

ESSENTIAL FACTS

PROGRAMME BUDGET 1980-81

1. Following calls for restraint from major contributors, proposed 1980-81 Programme Budget showed substantially lower rate of real growth than in previous years. However, large additional expenditures approved during 34th General Assembly, mostly by majority vote of developing countries: not offset by elimination of obsolete and ineffective programmes.

2. We and other major Western contributors, including US, abstained in the vote on the budget as a whole. Would have voted against had we had necessary minimum company.

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS

3. Under new scale of assessments for 1980-82, UK's assessed contribution reduced from 4.52% in 1978/79 to 4.46% in 1980/82. UK 6th largest contributor, paying £32.9m. in 1979 assessed contributions (and £65.2m in voluntary contributions).

4. General Assembly called for study of means of 'increasing fairness and equity of scale of assessments'. Intention to overturn fundamental criterion (applied since 1946) of relative capacity to pay, measured by net national income. System sought by OPEC countries would cause UK to pay more than our fair share.

/USE OF THE REGULAR BUDGET

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USE OF THE REGULAR BUDGET

5. UK voted against Section 24 (Technical Assistance) of the Budget at 34th General Assembly.

AID

6. UN system^a/major channel of economic aid to Third World: programmes financed predominantly by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). British aid programme gives voluntary financial support to UNDP, other UN economic/humanitarian programmes. In 1978/79 UK contributed £60m to UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO Research. 1980/81 figure likely to be about £45m following public expenditure constraints, change in emphasis of UK aid policy.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SW1
15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON ON 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 4: IRAN

POINTS TO MAKE

MR WALDHEIM'S INITIATIVES

1. Appreciate Mr Waldheim's efforts to resolve hostage problem: personal mission to Tehran in January; UN Commission in Tehran 23 February to 10 March.

FUTURE UN ACTION

2. Must keep up the pressure on Iran. We understand Mr Waldheim discussed revival of the UN Commission with Qotbzadeh in Belgrade. We would support any such moves which could well hold out the best prospects of resolving the matter. What are Mr Waldheim's intentions about this? What are his views on its chances of success?

ICJ JUDGEMENT

3. ICJ final judgement on Iran expected 15 May. Likely to condemn Iranian action. We do not know what United States intends as next step. How does Mr Waldheim view chances of a return to the Security Council?

HOSTAGES

4. Now dispersed. We wish to find out where they are held and will press for regular visits. International Committee of the Red Cross may be best means of achieving this.

MOOD IN IRAN

5. There are indications that many leading Iranians now wish to find a way out, without too much loss of face. This seems therefore a particularly opportune time to reactivate the UN Commission, although a final decision must probably still await the Majles.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SANCTIONS

6. Our sanctions, together with the Nine, and Japan, are intended

/to



- 2 -

to continue to bring pressure against Iran in support of the United States, but balancing this with a wish not to alienate those in Iran who want to get the hostages released.

IRANIAN ELECTIONS

7. Second round of elections held on 7 May. So far Islamic Republican Party has gained about half the seats. More results expected. Too soon to judge exact composition of Parliament. Timing on convening Assembly now put at 28 May.

NEW IRANIAN CABINET

8. Bani Sadr planned to appoint a Prime Minister and a new Cabinet in advance of Assembly convening. But decision deferred. Issue now referred to Revolutionary Council.



VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON ON 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 4: IRAN

ESSENTIAL FACTS

HOSTAGES [Not to be divulged to Mr Waldheim]

1. Series of meetings between EC Ambassadors in Tehran on 11-12 May with Qotbzadeh, Bani Sadr and other leading politicians, who seem committed to resolving problem. Have put forward three ideas, all linked to preparing a report which would persuade the Majles to make a favourable decision:

- (a) Revival of UN Commission of Enquiry;
- (b) Seminar of Non-Aligned, European Parliament delegation, and other organisations in Tehran. This meeting now postponed from original 15-17 May timing;
- (c) Message from Khomeini to the Majles being drafted by Bani Sadr and Khomeini's son.

It is important these ideas should not be divulged at this stage. If they become known, they may kill any chances of success.

FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 May 1980


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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN
POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan. We continue to see the proposal for a neutral and non-aligned status as the best prospect for achieving this. We put it forward; the Islamic Conference now seem to be taking it forward.
2. The Cubans may have been embarrassed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in that it impeded them from exploiting the Chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement and may have cost them their Security Council seat. But we do not believe that they have any real freedom of action. Before Malmierca, the Cuban Foreign Minister, began his rounds of visits, he went first to Moscow. The Cubans have been silent about this particular trip but it was no doubt to obtain instructions.
3. The Afghan 5-Point Plan on 17 April was also presumably drafted by the Russians. It makes no mention of Russian withdrawal.
4. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the countries of the region dismiss Cuban efforts. The Islamic countries will look to their own Conference, not to Castro, nor is Mrs Gandhi likely to tolerate Cuban interference.
5. We hope that Islamic and non-aligned countries will support the proposal for neutral and non-aligned status.
6. Does Mr Waldheim expect further UN involvement?

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Further UN involvement would be one option for the furtherance of neutral and non-aligned status proposals. But the Soviet Union is unlikely to welcome a return to the UN and we have deliberately kept options open. We can see that if it is agreed that there should be international observers at Afghan frontiers as part of a settlement, a UN team of observers might be required.
2. The Prime Minister and Secretary of State will need no more briefing on this subject with which they are thoroughly conversant other than any information available about the outcome of the Islamic Conference, 14-18 May. A separate note will be submitted as soon as a report is received.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
13 MAY 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980 BBRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN
POINTS TO MAKE

1. The Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan.
2. Kabul proposals announced on 14 May
 - (a) amplify Kabul proposals made on 17 April but their main intent still seems to be to obtain international recognition for Babrak Karmal regime and confirmation of status quo.
 - (b) They allocate role to Karmal out of scale with degree of support he enjoys (1 million refugees).
 - (c) They say nothing about Afghan frontier with Soviet Union.
 - (d) also silent about China.
 - (e) 'Guarantees' of non-interference from Pakistan neglects difficulty of controlling frontier with Afghanistan. Minor incidents could enable Soviets to argue 'guarantees' had not been met and, therefore, provide pretext not to withdraw troops.
3. The Warsaw Pact proposal is no advancement. Indeed on Afghanistan the formula is that initially used with us by Lunkov.
4. Timing of announcement was a tactical ploy with Vienna and Islamic Conference in mind. All should stand firm in their demands for Soviet withdrawal and refusal to have dealings with Karmal regime.
5. However, willingness of Soviet Union to contemplate political solution is to be welcomed. So is willingness to talk about a Non Aligned Afghanistan (but this must be genuine).
6. Outcome of Islamic Conference must be taken into account as we consider how to advance pressure for acceptable political settlement.
7. Does Mr Waldheim expect further UN involvement?

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY -GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 5: AFGHANISTAN
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Further UN involvement would be one option for the furtherance of neutral and non-aligned status proposals. At Vienna, when interviewed on leaving, Lord Carrington said he would have thought the United Nations was the forum to talk about peace.

2. But the Soviet Union is unlikely to welcome a return to the UN and we have deliberately kept options open. We can see that if it is agreed that there should be international observers at Afghan frontiers as part of a settlement, a UN team of observers might be required.

3. If Kabul proposals of 14 May appear from summary accounts including TASS report to propose:

- (a) Talks with Iran and Pakistan to normalise relations, and to secure undertakings not to permit armed acts from the territory of one against the other:
- (b) Afghan refugees invited home under an amnesty and offered rehabilitation, their return to be facilitated by the Government of Pakistan and discussions to be held about those not willing to return:
- (c) The US and USSR to give guarantees that no interference or subversive activities against Afghanistan will take place:
- (d) The Government of Afghanistan to ask for the withdrawal of Russian troops when relations with neighbours normalised and 'external interference' has ceased:
- (e) Talks about peace in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The timing of this revamping of the Afghan proposals clearly owes much to the Islamic Conference and to the Muskie/Gromyko meeting.

4. The 17 April Kabul 5 Point Plan was:

- (1) To hold bilateral talks between Afghanistan and Iran

/and

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and between Afghanistan and Pakistan in a move to discuss matters concerning the normalisation of Afghanistan's relations with Iran and Pakistan.

- (2) To hold a conference, without any pre-conditions, to discuss the normalisation of situation in the region and work out a treaty for peace and security and co-operation between the countries of the region.
- (3) To hold talks by the countries of the region on matters pertaining to reduction of military expenditure, limitation of arms and armed forces under a respective international guarantee for the security of the countries of the region.
- (4) To hold talks to take measures for relaxation of tension and elimination of lack of confidence in the activities carried by the mass media of the countries of the region and creation of a desirable atmosphere of confidence and mutual understanding.
- (5) To hold advisory talks between the countries of the Indian Ocean region and Persian Gulf on renewal of talks about turning the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf into a region of peace under international guarantee and reduction of military presence of other countries.

5. Main differences are therefore (c) and (d).

6. Vienna telno 177 gives an account of the Secretary of State's meeting with Mr Gromyko in Vienna (attached).

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
19 MAY 1980

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 17 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON MOSCOW BONN PARIS ROME UKDEL NATO
UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD PEKING
AND KABUL

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY:

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH MR GROMYKO

1. LORD CARRINGTON MET MR GROMYKO FOR JUST OVER AN HOUR THIS M MORNING. HE BEGAN BY ASKING GROMYKO ABOUT SOVIET IDEAS ON CSCE AND THE MADRID MEETING. THE SOVIET UNION HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS ON CBM'S AND DISARMAMENT WHICH WERE NOT DISSIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE FRENCH. PERHAPS WE COULD ALL MAKE A STEP FORWARD ON THIS BASIS, THOUGH PROGRESS WOULD ALSO BE NEEDED ON OTHER BASKETS. HE AGREED WITH THE SOVIET VIEW THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED AT MADRID UNLESS SOMETHING USEFUL SEEMED LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING. GROMYKO SAID THAT MADRID MUST BE WELL PREPARED, AND HELD IN A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT WOULD GIVE AS GOOD AS SHE GOT IF OTHERS USED THE MEETING FOR DEMAGOGIC DECLARATIONS, AS HAD HAPPENED IN BELGRADE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED

WHAT IT CALLED A CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT, BUT COULD CONCEIVE OF A TWO STAGE MEETING, THE FIRST ON CBM'S AND MILITARY DETENTE AND THE SECOND ON DISARMAMENT. MADRID MIGHT GIVE LIFE TO THIS IDEA, THOUGH HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMETHING CONCRETE BEING PUT FORWARD AT MADRID ITSELF. IF NOT, A MANDATE COULD BE GIVEN BY THE MADRID MEETING TO AN ENSUING CONFERENCE. SUCH A CONFERENCE COULD INJECT SOME WARM AIR INTO THE ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT MADRID WOULD BE LESS WARM IF A SOLUTION WERE NOT FOUND OVER AFGHANISTAN. THE HISTORICAL BACK-
-GROUND SHOWED THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS A NATURAL BUFFER STATE, AND THAT THE ONLY ANSWER TO THAT COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS WAS TO ENSURE THAT NO POWER EXERCISED INFLUENCE THERE TO THE DETRIMENT OF OTHERS. BUT THERE WAS NOW A REVIVAL OF FEARS IN THE WEST AND ESPECIALLY THE US (BRITAIN WAS SELF SUFFICIENT) ABOUT OIL AND THE GULF. HENCE OUR PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AND NON-
-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD NOT BEEN BADLY RECEIVED IN THE THIRD WORLD. WE HAD ALSO LOOKED CAREFULLY AT THE RECENT AFGHAN PROPOSALS TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD BE BUILT ON. THERE SEEMED TO BE A GERM OF AN IDEA IN ALL THIS. A NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN, WITH GUARANTEES OF NON-INTERFERENCE, MIGHT SUIT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WEST.

13. GROMYKO

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3. GROMYKO DISMISSED WESTERN OPEN QUOTES PROPAGANDA CLOSE QUOTES OVER SOVIET AMBITIONS IN OIL PRODUCING AREAS AS OPEN QUOTES SHEER NONSENSE CLOSE QUOTES. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NO INTENTION OF AFFECTING THE OIL INTERESTS TO THE US, BRITAIN OR ANYONE ELSE IN THAT AREA, THOUGH EVERYONE WAS ENTITLED TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO SEE IRAN AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. IF BRITISH NEUTRALITY PROPOSALS MEANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN, (AND THERE SEEMED TO BE A STRONG DOSE OF THIS IN THEM) THEY WERE UNACCEPTABLE. BUT IF WE MEANT RESPECT FOR THE PRESENT INDEPENDENT REGIME, THAT WAS A DIFFERENT MATTER.

4. LORD CARRINGTON WELCOMED AND TOOK NOTE OF GROMYKO'S ASSURANCES ON THE GULF AREA. YET THE SCALE OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN HAD AROUSED CONCERN. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER WE ACCEPTED THE PRESENT AFGHAN LEADERSHIP, OR WHETHER WE WANTED TO CHANGE IT? LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THE BABRAK REGIME ONLY EXISTED BECAUSE OF SOVIET SUPPORT. IF IT WERE SHOWN THAT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES WANTED IT, THAT WAS FINE, THOUGH A MILLION REFUGEES SEEMED TO HAVE VOTED WITH THEIR FEET. GROMYKO SAID THAT WE COULD BELIEVE WHAT WE WANTED. BUT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN WITH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES ON NON-INTERFERENCE. THIS WOULD CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS. WE WOULD THEN SEE THAT THE AFGHANS COULD MANAGE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT SOVIET TROOPS WERE FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN, OR INTERFERING THERE IN ANY WAY. BUT THERE MUST BE POLITICAL GUARANTEES ON NON INTERVENTION BEFORE THEY COULD BE WITHDRAWN. LORD CARRINGTON AGREED THAT ALL OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE MUST STOP. BUT AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW TROOPS MUST BE REACHED AT THE SAME TIME. WE WOULD OBJECT TO CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE CONTINUED.

5. GROMYKO REPEATED THAT THERE MUST BE PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN, AND ALSO BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN (THOUGH THERE WERE LESS ARMED INTRUSIONS FROM IRAN) ON THE CESSATION OF ALL INTERFERENCE. SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE APPROPRIATE POLITICAL GUARANTEES. THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT OPPOSED TO OTHER STATES TAKING PART IN SUCH GUARANTEES, IF THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED CONSIDERED THIS NECESSARY. HE KNEW THE PAKISTANIS HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THEIR FRONTIER WITH AFGHANISTAN, AND THIS PROBLEM MUST ALSO BE RESOLVED. WE MUST GET IT INTO OUR HEADS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DEFINITELY WITHDRAW ONCE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD HOWEVER BE A PROCESS IN ITSELF, AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED AS QUICKLY AS THE SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. BUT THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL TOO WAS OPEN TO NEGOTIATION, AND COULD BE RAISED

/BY

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BY PAKISTAN IN TALKS WITH AFGHANISTAN. A NON-ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN WOULD SUIT THE SOVIET UNION. MUSKIE HAD NOT OBJECTED TO IT, AND IT SHOULD SUIT US TOO. WE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE PAKISTAN LEADERSHIP THE NEED FOR TALKS WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS NO WAY TO SETTLE THE SITUATION IN THE REGION WITHOUT SUCH DISCUSSIONS.

6. LORD CARRINGTON SAID THAT A GUARANTEE OF NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS HAD TO GO HAND IN HAND. IT MIGHT TAKE TIME TO WITHDRAW, BUT THE DECISION TO DO SO COULD BE TAKEN IN A FEW SECONDS. SOME PEOPLE MIGHT BE SUSPICIOUS IF THERE WERE A DELAY BETWEEN THE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THE AFGHANS MUST BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE WHO THEY WANTED TO GOVERN THEM AND THERE SHOULD BE NO SOVIET INTERFERENCE EITHER THROUGH TROOPS OR POLITICAL ADVISERS. WE WANTED A TRULY NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN.

7. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT SOVIET FORCES HAD ENTERED AFGHANISTAN BY REQUEST UNDER AN AGREEMENT WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT, AND COULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN BY AGREEMENT WITH THAT GOVERNMENT, AND NOT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN. BUT BOTH THE SOVIET AND AFGHAN GOVERNMENTS HAD SAID THAT THE TROOPS WOULD GO FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT WITH POLITICAL GUARANTEES, LORD CARRINGTON SURELY HAD NO DOUBTS IN HIS OWN MIND: WHY THEREFORE WAS HE MAKING DIFFICULTIES?

8. IN A BRIEF PRIVATE EXCHANGE AT THE END OF THE MEETING, LORD CARRINGTON TOLD GROMYKO THAT OUR POSITIONS MIGHT NOT BE AS FAR APART AS THEY SEEMED, THOUGH SIMULTANEITY WAS IMPORTANT. GROMYKO AGREED THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN TOUCH.

9. THE ONLY OTHER SUBJECT RAISED WAS THE PROPOSED MEMORIAL IN LONDON TO THE OPEN QUOTES VICTIMS OF YALTA CLOSE QUOTES. GROMYKO AFFECTED AMAZEMENT THAT HMG SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN A PROJECT OF THIS NATURE, GIVEN THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD PARTICIPATED AT YALTA. HE GATHERED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF HAD AGREED TO ITS ERECTION. HE COULD ONLY REGARD THIS AS A HOSTILE ACT, OF WHICH DUE ACCOUNT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN. LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVEMENT WAS LIMITED TO THE DECISION NOT TO WITHHOLD PERMISSION FOR THE MEMORIAL TO BE ERECTED ON CROWN LAND. SOME OF HIS FELLOW COUNTRYMEN INTERPRETED HISTORY RATHER DIFFERENTLY FROM MR GROMYKO.

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6 : INDO-CHINA

POINTS TO MAKE

CAMBODIA: POLITICAL

1. Progress on emergency relief encouraging, but still no signs of political solution. Scope for personal moves in exploring prospects for Vietnamese withdrawal. At present the prospect is of open-ended conflict in Cambodia (which China for one would seem to welcome) and years more suffering for the Cambodians.

CAMBODIA: RELIEF CONFERENCE

2. Doubt whether Geneva meeting (26 - 27 May) will achieve much. Sir R Jackson doing well but co-ordination of agencies difficult, and operation a political minefield. UK hope to announce further pledge, which with share of EC pledge, is about \$10 million.

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

3. Impartial or international Chairman preferable.
4. [Supplementary Point to make will be necessary if Lord Carrington is directly approached.]

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 May 1980

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VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6 : INDO-CHINA

ESSENTIAL FACTS

CAMBODIA: POLITICAL

1. [Not for use] Mr Waldheim has been reluctant to involve himself in South East Asian problems since calling and chairing the Geneva Refugees meeting last July and getting the Cambodia relief operation under way last November. This probably reflects his absorption by Iran and Afghanistan, sensitivity to African complaints that too much is being done for South East Asian refugees, and Soviet refusal to co-operate in any 'peace keeping' initiatives such as the Thai call for UN observers or 'safe havens' for refugees. The fighting in Cambodia is now stalemated, but with Vietnamese troops in effective control of nearly all Cambodia. Time is on their side, but a solution on Vietnamese terms (ie international acceptance of their puppet regime, perhaps with some cosmetic adjustments) could set a very undesirable precedent, eg for Afghanistan. Anyway China would not stand for this.

2. [Can be freely used] The EC-ASEAN Political Statement of 7 March made clear our view that Cambodia was essentially a political problem. In spite of his understandable reluctance to involve himself in further humanitarian initiatives, Mr Waldheim should keep the need for a political solution in mind. He cancelled a visit to Hanoi and Bangkok in January. It might be useful to reinstate it now.

CAMBODIA: RELIEF CONFERENCE

3. We see the real requirement of the Geneva meeting on 26 and 27 May as to reassure Thailand. The Thais might react badly (repatriations etc) if the world appears to ignore their interests. This is a general interest: but Thailand's need is as much moral
/and political

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2.

and political as a real need for further relief assistance, whether financial or in acceptance of refugees. Our judgement is that Sir Robert Jackson has these operational aspects well in hand.

4. The meeting is badly thought through by ASEAN and poorly prepared, but it should be able to achieve that result without unduly complicating the relief situation. But with luck, and probable additional relief pledges, the meeting should succeed in giving the Thais the necessary boost to their morale for a further period.

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

5. [Not for use] A particular problem is that Mr Waldheim, by having the meeting called under ECOSOC rules of procedure, has ruled himself out as chairman. ASEAN have approached at least one prospective EEC Foreign Minister unsuccessfully (M Francois Poncet) and we understand they are now on the point of asking Lord Carrington.

6. [Can be used freely] The Nine consider that Western Chairmanship would give the meeting an inappropriately political slant, and make it even more unlikely to produce necessary improvements in distribution and management inside Cambodia.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

15 May 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6: INDO-CHINA

SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS TO MAKE

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

1. Conference ought to have an independent chairman of acknowledged international stature. ASEAN Heads of Mission asked Lord Carrington to accept chair, told that in our view not in best interests of conference and its sponsors (would give occasion a partisan character).
2. Hope Mr Waldheim will reconsider his position, and allow himself to be drafted, if, as seems likely, ASEANS fail to find an acceptable participant.
3. If not, can Mr Waldheim suggest other candidates from United Nations system? Chairman of General Assembly? or of ECOSOC?
4. [If raised] Operative paragraph 3 of ECOSOC Resolution ("to the extent relevant and applicable") is clearly designed to allow the meeting to adopt other procedures where appropriate (and in any case the meeting is master of its own procedures).

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

19 May 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 6: INDO-CHINA

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENEVA MEETING CHAIRMANSHIP

1. ECOSOC resolution calling Geneva meeting specifies (operative paragraph 3).

'Decides further that, to the extent relevant and applicable the proceedings.... shall be governed by the Rules of Procedure for United Nations Pledging Conferences (...)'

Rule 5 provides that 'the Conference shall elect a President.... from among the representatives (sc. of States)'

Any Conference can of course vary or suspend its procedures and this set of Rules is in no way binding on the meeting.

2. Mr Waldheim has indicated that this formulation (suggested by his Secretariat) rules him out as a possible Chairman. This reflects his notorious unwillingness to continue to take the leading role in meetings which raise funds for South East Asian refugees (for which the Africans have criticised him).

3. The ASEAN states have subsequently approached Mr Francois-Poncet, who has evidently refused, and we believe that the ASEAN Heads of Mission in London will ask for Lord Carrington to do so when they call on Mr Blaker on 20 May. The US Embassy has already lobbied in support.

4. Other 'international' figures might be the General Assembly President Salim (Tanzania, and a prospective rival of Mr Waldheim for Secretary General) or the ECOSOC Chairman, Mavrommatis (Cyprus). A third alternative might be Mr Waldheim's 'Special Representative for Co-ordinating Humanitarian Relief for the Kampuchean People', Sir Robert Jackson (an Australian) although he might not be prestigious enough in ASEAN eyes.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 7 (a) MIDDLE EAST: ARAB/ISRAEL

Points to Make


1. See no future in autonomy talks. Situation too dangerous to leave alone. Europe could fill the gap, at least until 1981.
2. UN could be valuable forum for peace efforts, but credibility destroyed by too many one-sided resolutions.
3. Nevertheless a new Security Council resolution supplementing 242 among options. Could provide a better basis for peace efforts.
4. If a new resolution were passed, would the Secretary General see any possibility of attempting mediation under his auspices on the basis of it?

Essential Facts

1. The Americans appear to have concluded that they must keep the autonomy talks going after 26 May. Begin and Sadat share this view. Nevertheless there is no present reason to suppose that the gap between the position of Israel and Egypt can be bridged. We have made clear that Europe may be able to help maintain the momentum of peace efforts in a US election year.
2. Two Arab/Israel issues have recently come before the Security Council:

(i) Palestinian rights: an Arab draft resolution calling for the establishment of an independent state and containing vague language about assuring the security of all states in the area was vetoed by the US on 30 April. We and the other three West European members of the Council abstained on grounds of timing, without considering the substance. There is a general awareness of our interest in the possibility of a new resolution supplementing 242 by associating its principles with Palestinian political rights, but we have not revealed our thinking in any detail except, informally, to other members of the Nine. A new resolution is only one of a number of options to be considered by the Nine. There are problems about the US attitude: they may be inclined to veto any resolution, no matter how well drafted, in an election year. Our hope would be to trade a US abstention on the resolution for PLO commitment to its terms. If a resolution were passed, one possibility would be for the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative, on the lines of the Jarring initiative, to explore the possibilities for new negotiations on its basis.

(ii) Expulsion from the West Bank: On 8 May the Security Council passed a resolution calling on Israel to readmit three West Bank notables expelled following the terrorist incident in Hebron when six Israelis were killed. We voted in favour of it. The three were not accused of complicity in the incident and the expulsions were carried out without regard to established procedures and international law. Efforts by the three to return to the West Bank have been prevented by the Israeli authorities. Jordan and the PLO are pressing for further UN action to force



the Israelis to reverse their decision but have not specified what they have in mind.

3. Mr Waldheim has taken an active interest in the Middle East and has been quick to criticize Israel on several occasions, eg. over settlements. He showed interest last year in the possibility of a new UN-sponsored peace conference with all parties, including both superpowers present, but did not pursue the idea in the face of lack of enthusiasm from the parties with whom he discussed it.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

15 May 1980

BRIEF NO. 7b

VISIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO. 7b: LEBANON

Points to MakeUNIFIL

1. Fully support UNIFIL. Collapse could affect stability of region as a whole. Deplore the continuing harassment of the force.
2. As long as Haddad receives support and shelter from Israel little hope of UNIFIL performing effectively. Could a deal be agreed which would involve Palestinian withdrawal to north of the Litani in return for Israeli withdrawal of support for Haddad?
3. Do not wish to cut across action by troop contributors or the Secretary-General. Can the Nine help with mediation?
4. What are the prospects for the renewal of UNIFIL mandate in June?

[If raised] APPEAL FOR FUNDS FOR SUSPENSE ACCOUNT

5. We are considering the Secretary-General's appeal and hope to be able to reply shortly.

VISIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO. 7b: LEBANON

Essential Facts

1. The attacks on UNIFIL by the Israeli-backed Haddad militia have had a serious effect on UNIFIL's morale. The Dublin meeting of UNIFIL contributors resulted in an exhortatory statement but little more.
2. UNIFIL has performed a valuable stabilising role in the South and we fully support its presence. At present the force of about 6,000 is composed of units of about battalion strength from Netherlands, Ireland, Senegal, Fiji, Nigeria, Norway, Nepal and Ghana with a French logistic unit and Italian helicopter unit. UNIFIL is however unable to fulfil its mandate while the Israelis and Haddad prevent it deploying up to the border. The mandate is due for renewal on 19 June. The Nepalese have notified their intention to pull out and others have threatened to do so.
3. We would welcome any steps which would enable UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate and lead to the ultimate and complete restoration of the Lebanon Government's authority in the area. We may, therefore, propose to the Nine that they should be more active in attempts to mediate between Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians. The objective would be a trade off which would allow the Lebanese Army to deploy in Tyre, and obtain withdrawal of Palestinian armed elements north of the Litani River in return for Israeli agreement to ditch Haddad. The chances of success cannot be rated high. We would have little to lose and much to gain.
4. The Secretary-General discussed Lebanon with the Lord Privy Seal on 16 April. The record of the meeting is attached.

NENAD

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON WEDNESDAY 16 APRIL AT 10AM

Present:

Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour Bt MP

Hon Douglas Hurd CBE MP

Mr Murray

Mr J Moberly

Mr Simpson-Orlebar

Mr Wickstead

Mr Kurt Waldheim,
UN Secretary-General

Mr Abdulrahim Farah, USG for
Special Political Affairs

Mr Michael Popovic, Acting DG
UN Information Centre, London

UNIFIL

Mr Waldheim said the situation in Lebanon was very serious. The way UNIFIL was being treated by Major Haddad, supported by the Israelis, was humiliating and dangerous. The Irish incident had been highly embarrassing. The UN HQ had been almost completely destroyed, along with their four Italian helicopters. How could he accept this? In the informal consultations of the Security Council last Sunday (c.f. UKMis New York telno 599), he had warned that he would be obliged to propose either the Force's withdrawal that it should be authorised to use its arms in a more convincing way: the troops must be able to stop themselves from being taken prisoner. Mr Hurd asked whether Mr Waldheim wanted the Security Council's Resolution to give him a direct mandate to change the rules. Mr Waldheim said that was not the problem. Under the present Police operation, UNIFIL could already use its arms in 'self-defence'; Chapter 7 enforcement operation on the Korea model was out of the question. The problem was that the Haddad forces were much better equipped: they had artillery, tanks and rockets. Given the impossibility of reaching agreement in the Council and the complication of the US Presidential election, the only answer might be for him to authorise the Force internally to acquire more effective weapons, perhaps artillery and even tanks. Sir Ian

/Gilmour

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Gilmour said that UNIFIL was composed of infantry units: would not this mean that different troops would be needed? Mr Waldheim said he would have to discuss all this with the troop contributors. He was aware of the dangers of attempting to change the whole structure, but how long would the troop contributors put up with the present situation?

2. Mr Waldheim said he had asked the Americans to speak to Mr Begin about the attacks on UNIFIL. He had written himself to Mr Begin, receiving an evasive reply. Sir Ian Gilmour asked whether the Israelis wanted to get rid of UNIFIL. Mr Waldheim was not sure: the Israelis wanted a shield. They accused UNIFIL of cooperating with the PLO. This was not true, though some infiltration was inevitable. He did not think there were more than 300-500 Palestinians within the UN area. On the whole, they were cooperative, especially Arafat. The latter was not responsible for the last attack on the Israeli kibbutz. There were indications that the terrorists might have mounted this attack from inside Israel via the shore, and not come through the UN lines. Mr Hurd asked whether the UN could not site their HQ outside Haddad territory. He had talked to General Erskine about this. Mr Waldheim said they had tried hard to find another site, without success. Sir Ian Gilmour asked about the chances of the Lebanese army doing more. Mr Waldheim said the UN were trying to replace some Irish troops with regular Lebanese forces, but the latter preferred to operate under the UN umbrella.

Arab/Israel

3. Mr Waldheim said that the Lebanese problem could only be solved within the context of a general agreement on the Middle East. There were no illusions in Washington about an imminent breakthrough on this. He welcomed the role of the Nine. Sir Ian Gilmour said that if the Europeans did not do something in the UN or

/elsewhere

elsewhere before the US elections, there would be more Arab activity in the UN. Mr Waldheim said the possibilities were for some addition to Resolution 242, or for some kind of conference; the Arabs wanted this to be under the UN umbrella. President Sad had told him he was not against an international conference; on the other hand, the Syrian member of his 5-man Commission on Iran had told him the Arabs would be in favour of a conference, but without the Egyptians being present. Sir Ian Gilmour said Israel would not attend any gathering outside the Camp David framework. They were trying to gain time and building up their settlements. Mr Waldheim thought it would be a long process. We should have to await developments after the US elections and in Israel.

Iran

4. Sir Ian Gilmour said the Nine were in consultation on President Carter's requests. We had grave doubts about whether these would succeed, but the need to preserve solidarity was very important. We must be seen to do something. Mr Waldheim said the problem, which he had experienced personally, was that we were all negotiating with people who lacked power. There could be no progress until we convinced Khomeini.

Afghanistan

5. Mr Waldheim was worried by the reactions of the media and certain governments. He was reminded of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when he had been Austrian Foreign Minister and there were fears that Soviet tanks would drive for Yugoslavia and the warm Mediterranean ports. He was convinced the Russians would not start an open war against Pakistan. If they wanted to reach the Gulf or Indian Ocean, they had other means. We should try to calm the hysteria. Sir Ian Gilmour expressed surprise at the reference to hysteria. He thought there was almost too much apathy. The Russians might not be about to invade Pakistan, but

/their

their occupation of Afghanistan was serious enough. Mr Hurd said our problem lay in keeping the facts before public opinion. There might be no imminent danger of an attack on Pakistan or Iran, but there might be opportunities and the temptation to make use of them in the coming weeks. Mr Waldheim protested that he was aware of the dangers. The question was how to stop it. No-one today wanted a nuclear war. He was in favour of a conference to negotiate the future of Afghanistan. Lord Carrington's proposal for a neutral Afghanistan was excellent: Afghanistan had always been a buffer zone. He had discussed the idea with the Russians who did not want it in the form proposed. He doubted whether the Indian proposal for a regional conference would have much of a better chance. Mrs Gandhi had asked him to tell President Zia that she wanted good relations, this being the best way to keep the big powers out. Sir Ian Gilmour said we, too, had talked to the Russians. They had certainly not embraced our proposal, but neither had they rejected it. Mr Murray suggested there were two pointers. Not only was Afghanistan traditionally a buffer zone, but it had declared its neutrality ^{around} on ten occasions since 1914. Even after the 1978 revolution, Taragi had said Afghanistan was a neutral and non-aligned state. We were not therefore asking for anything new. Secondly, the proposal was becoming more and more interesting for the non-aligned and Islamic states. There had been a very good conversation when the Lord Privy Seal received Mr Chatty.

6. Mr Waldheim said that Mr Kreisky had discussed with him the idea of a 'control commission' composed of non-aligned and neutral Western countries acceptable to the Russians (eg Algeria and Sweden), which should undertake the monitoring of foreign infiltration in exchange for a Soviet undertaking to withdraw within six months. Mr Murray recalled Mr Kreisky's similar suggestion, at last July's Geneva meeting on Indo-China, of a neutral body for Cambodia,

/which

which the Swedes had refused to support. Mr Waldheim said we would have to see if the Russians wanted a face-saver on these lines.

Namibia

7. Offering his congratulations on the Rhodesian outcome, Mr Waldheim asked what effect this might have on Namibia. The UN Mission's report was not very encouraging. Sir Ian Gilmour said we wanted to slow things down as much as possible to allow the South Africans to get used to a Mugabe-led Zimbabwe. We should aim to avoid presenting them with stark choices, but there was impatience elsewhere. Mr Waldheim said it had been explained to the South Africans that the UNTAG operation ought to start in the first half of June for climatic reasons. He needed their answer by then. The South Africans had simply taken note. They accepted the concept of the DMZ but wanted clarification on the selected locations and no SWAPO bases in Namibia. It ought to be possible to find a solution, but there was a chicken and egg situation. The South Africans should be influenced by Mr Mugabe's statesmanship. If the present initiative failed, the solution would take a long time.

North/South

8. Mr Waldheim said that President Lopez Portillo and Mr Kreisky were discussing the idea of a limited and informal summit gathering, on the Manley model, before or after the General Assembly Special Session. It would be linked to the Brandt Report.

9. The meeting ended at 10.45 am.

/Distribution

Distribution

PS

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/PUS

PS/Sir D Maitland

Sir A Acland

Mr Bullard

Mr Murray

Mr J Moberly

Mr Fergusson

Lord N Gordon Lennox

UND to enter

NENAD

MED

SAD

EESD

SAfD

FRD

Chanceries: UKMis New York

UKMis Geneva

Beirut

Tel Aviv

Cairo

Washington

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 8: SOUTHERN AFRICA

POINTS TO MAKE

A NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICAN REPLY OF 12 MAY TO MR WALDHEIM ON DEMILITARISED ZONE

- 1 Five and UN should build on the several positive elements of the reply. Area of disagreement narrowed. What is left should be negotiable given Front Line flexibility.

MR WALDHEIM'S RESPONSE TO SOUTH AFRICA

- 2 Five and Secretariat must work together on UN response. Essential for prior clearance with Front Line and SWAPO, and above all with South Africans. Must respond to South African demand for UN to treat all parties equally: ie (a) assurances of UN impartiality and (b) suspension of UN publicity and funding for SWAPO. Neither UN nor South African Administrator-General should help either side after cease-fire.

B SOUTH AFRICA

- 3 Keep doors open to South Africans to encourage Mr P W Botha's moves towards peaceful change. Best achieved by persuasion rather than ostracism. Would welcome any restraining influence by Mr Waldheim on Africans and others.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 8: SOUTHERN AFRICA

ESSENTIAL FACTS [May be drawn on freely]

A Namibia

South African reply of 12 May to Mr Waldheim on demilitarised zone

1 Reply contains following new and positive points:

- a) outstanding problems are few and negotiable;
- b) precise arrangements for monitoring SWAPO outside Namibia no longer a problem;
- c) promise to implement if specified problems solved - for the first time.

Mr Waldheim's response to South Africa

2 We have urged our partners in the Five and the Secretariat not to rush the response and to make it as detailed and constructive as possible by discussing the issues fully with the Front Line States and SWAPO. We want preparation to be slow and careful in order to make sure, if possible, that it will have sufficient meat to enable the South Africans to go ahead. There are signs that both our partners and the Secretariat are more sceptical than we are about whether the South Africans will ever be brought to an agreement. They suspect the South Africans of wishing ^{only} to buy time and avoid a confrontation at the UN over sanctions.

/Mr



- 3 Mr Waldheim pays great attention to African opinion. The first reaction of African representatives in New York is favourable. They are concerned that negotiations should not be strung out indefinitely, but have so far resisted pressure for a Security Council debate.

UN support for SWAPO

- 4 The South Africans have asked Mr Waldheim to "refrain from giving effect to recognition by the General Assembly of SWAPO as 'sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia'" and to cut off funds voted for SWAPO by the Assembly eg for its office in New York. We have suggested to the Five and the Secretariat ways in which South Africa might be met half way by informal suspension of some UN activity on SWAPO's behalf. It will not be possible for Mr Waldheim to set aside UN resolutions unilaterally, it will have to be done with African agreement which would not be forthcoming if South Africa is not seen to be committed to early implementation.

Role of the Five

- 5 Mr Waldheim (and the Africans) are likely to call on the Five to continue their activities and to obtain South African agreement to implementation.

B South Africa

Internal Politics

- 6 There are still doubts about how firmly Mr P W Botha remains committed to his programme of reform. Nevertheless some recent developments give grounds for cautious optimism:

/a)

- a) following the recent coloured schools boycott Mr P W Botha publicly committed himself to the long-term goal of equal education for all races;
- b) the Government has accepted the interim report of the Schlebusch Commission which proposed the setting up of a Presidential Council consisting of coloured, whites, Indians and Chinese and a separate Consultative Committee for blacks.

Mr Botha has survived the threat of an extreme right-wing backlash in the recent Fauresmith by-election but still has to tread carefully for fear of the right wing within his own party.

James Mange

- 7 The UN has expressed interest in James Mange, a member of the ANC condemned to death for treason in South Africa. He has been granted leave to appeal. We therefore consider that it would be premature to decide at this stage whether to make any representations on his behalf.

South Africa's Nuclear intentions

- 8 Mr Waldheim will report soon on the US satellite recording of possible nuclear event on 22 September 1979. South Africa or Israel possible culprit if test took place. HMG has said it has no evidence to offer. Absence of usual corroborative evidence suggests no explosion took place. US Government takes similar view on examination of data so far available. Report should reflect these conclusions. Unsubstantiated criticism of South Africa may prejudice French/US efforts to persuade South Africa to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty. Slight progress recently on this point.

"/UK

UN Arms Embargo

- 9 UK fully committed to meet obligations under the mandatory arms embargo. Pressure to extend embargo and work of Committee misplaced. Should concentrate on more effective examination of well documented allegations of breaches.

Sanctions

- 10 Hope question of sanctions not arise in Security Council. Will not persuade South Africa to be more cooperative on Namibia or press ahead with internal reforms. Sanctions cause further isolation of South Africa: rule out peaceful progress and reassert position of hardline right-wingers within the country, not rule out sanctions under all circumstances (eg another Soweto). We have told US, France and South Africa that they should not count on us acting alone over Namibia. Sanctions against Iran a different issue. To meet short term problem and limited objective of freeing US hostages.

Apartheid at the UN

- 11 HMG opposed to apartheid. Sympathises with constructive criticism of apartheid regime. Violent language of resolutions prevents UK voting for them. Brings UN into disrepute.

15 May 1980

Southern African Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 9: CYPRUS

ESSENTIAL FACTS

CYPRUS PROBLEM: INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. Following Denktash/Kyprianou agreement in May 79, intercommunal talks resumed in June, and promptly adjourned because of Turkish Cypriot insistence on prior clarification of concepts of "bizonality" and "security" (ie de facto Turkish Cypriot autonomy). Strongly pro Greek Cypriot UNGA resolution on which West abstained, (November 79), provided for establishment of (thoroughly unhelpful) UNGA committee if no progress soon. UN have since been sucked into prolonged pre-negotiation of scenario for resumption of talks, enabling both sides, especially Turkish Cypriots, to stall indefinitely. We want talks resumed to consider practical confidence building measures, and Lord Privy Seal, in message following his recent visit to Cyprus, has urged Waldheim to be bolder.

UNFICYP

2. UN force present since 1964. De facto partition of island relatively stable since 1974. UK contribute largest contingent (£6 million per year), which Treasury seek to reduce. We consequently sought a review of UNFICYP by all troop contributors aimed at cost reductions; Secretariat have countered with undertaking to carry out their own review in consultation with us. Given reluctance of other troop contributors to argue the point, we have accepted this; but are convinced scope for reductions exists without destabilising island if UN will resist military and other vested interests.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 9: CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

CYPRUS PROBLEM

1. Further pre-negotiation seems pointless; sooner or later, it would seem better simply to summon the parties to resume the talks, in effect daring them to refuse.

2. But judgement is for you; you know we support your efforts fully.

UN FORCE (UNFICYP)

3. Your review must be rigorous. We must have from it either substantial savings or really convincing reasons why these are impossible.

VISIT OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LONDON 20-23 MAY

BRIEF NO 10: NORTH/SOUTH MATTERS
POINTS TO MAKE

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF LDCS

1. Recognise serious economic problems of LDCs.
2. Responsibility of each country to adjust to higher oil prices and to reduce inflation.
3. But some of the poorest are bound to need help. Western effort already considerable.
4. Need for practical consideration of real problem - not ritual discussion of draft resolution.

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

5. Global Negotiations must not cut across the competence of existing institutions, especially IMF/IBRD.
6. Energy the key to LDCs medium term economic future. Hope for serious discussion. Open minded about permanent UN energy body.

BRANDT COMMISSION REPORT

7. Study nearing completion. Full Parliamentary debate promised for early June.
8. Notable success in drawing attention to problem of Third World. Welcome stress on mutual benefits.

NORTH/SOUTH SUMMIT

9. Interesting idea. Need careful preparation. Spring 81 would be better than this summer.
10. If Summit takes place, UK would wish to attend. What is Mr Waldheim's latest information?

BRIEF NO 10: NORTH/SOUTH MATTERS
ESSENTIAL FACTS

11. Relations between North and South have assumed a new importance since Afghanistan.
12. 1980 current account deficit of LDCs expected to be about \$70 bn. Likely to worsen and persist.
13. Global Negotiations due to start January 81 and last about eight months. They will cover major issues in the fields of energy, raw materials, trade, development, money and finance. They will be formally launched by Special Session of General Assembly in August. Preparations underway in Committee of Whole (COW). Still at an early stage but difficulties over agenda and procedure seem likely.
14. Brandt Report will be discussed by Ministers next week. Foreign Secretary has recommended positive tone but selective approach to substance.
15. Proposals for a North/South Summit making some progress. Mexican President Portillo and Chancellor Kreisky have been working for an 18 nation Summit in August 1980. They are now thought to prefer early 1981. Waldheim believed to favour the idea but cannot take active role as it would be invidious for him to be involved in selecting participants.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
15 MAY 1980



VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 11 : FALKLAND ISLANDS (DEFENSIVE)
ESSENTIAL FACTS

Talks with the Argentines

1. Mr Ridley met the Argentine Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Comodoro Cavandoli, on 28/29 April in New York.
2. First exchanges under the Conservative Government. Exploratory. Both now reporting to own Governments. Hope to continue exchanges.

Informing the United Nations Secretary-General

3. The UK and Argentine missions in New York will separately send copy of Communique (attached) to Mr Waldheim, under short covering letters to notify him of the meeting. This is standard practice.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
8 MAY 1980

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN NEW YORK AFTER ANGLO/ARGENTINE TALKS

In accordance with separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on April 15th 1980 by the Argentine and UK Governments, a Ministerial meeting was held in New York on 28 and 29 April to discuss the Falkland Islands question and related issues in the South Atlantic within the negotiating framework referred to in relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

The British and Argentine delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and Comodoro Carlos R Cavandoli, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires.

The discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit.

The two Governments intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges.

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VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO LONDON : 20 - 23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 12

BELIZE

POINTS TO MAKE (DEFENSIVE)

1. It was announced by News Department on 15 May that: " The Minister of State at the FCO, The Hon Nicholas Ridley MP, with a team of officials, will meet Senor Castillo Valdez, Foreign Minister of Guatemala, and a team of Guatemalan officials in Bermuda on 19 May to reopen negotiations over the Crown Colony of Belize. The aim of these talks is to achieve a settlement which will clear the way for early and secure independence for Belize".

2. Mr Waldheim may ask about progress made at these talks. As the negotiations will be concurrent with his visit to London, their outcome will not be known before his departure.

VISIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, 20-23 MAY 1980

BRIEF NO 13: CUBAN REFUGEES

POINTS TO MAKE

GENERAL

1. Exodus has become flood, posing great humanitarian problems especially for the US.

BRITISH ROLE

2. Have joined with US and Costa Rica in Ad Hoc Group with aim of persuading Cuban government to organise departure of its citizens in orderly and humane manner. Also working for support by European Community. We want unnecessary suffering to cease.

ROLE FOR UN?

3. May at some stage be role for UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). What does he think?

CUBAN REFUGEES TO UK?

4. We may take a small number.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

GENERAL

1. Nearly 50,000 Cubans have already reached Florida in small boats. President Carter has declared this must stop and that the US is ready to organise an air and sea lift of Cuban refugees who are qualified to enter the US or other countries as soon as Castro allows them to be screened and processed in Cuba in a legal and orderly way.

BRITISH ACTION

2. Mr Ridley represented UK at meeting of Ad Hoc Group in Bermuda on 18 May. US and Costa Rica pressed for joint demarche to Cuban government as soon as possible, "not later than Tuesday morning (20 May)". Mr Ridley replied we hoped to carry our European partners with us in this exercise. He hoped it would be discussed on 20 May by Political Directors and undertook to do what he could to get a speedy and positive decision. Meanwhile, EC Ambassadors in Havana have reported doubts whether Cuba would be willing to receive representatives of the Ad Hoc Group as envisaged by the Americans ^{and} have advanced the counter recommendation that an approach should be made by the EC to the UNHCR and to the UN Commission of Human Rights - but the latter will not meet in early future.

ROLE FOR UN

3. Support by us for any initiative at UN may lead to pressure to take more refugees than we want (and to make financial contribution).

CUBAN REFUGEES TO UK

4. We do not expect to take more than 100. We have announced we would consider sympathetically applications from Cuban refugees from the Peruvian Embassy who have reached country of first asylum and who have ties or other connections making the UK the natural country of resettlement.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

*Agreed letter -
telephone asked
for Head of UN
Dept to come as
note taker. Cf. 915.*

16 May 1980

Dear Michael,

Visit of the UN Secretary-General: Dinner and Meeting with the
the Prime Minister: 20 May

Your letter of 30 April asked about speeches at the Prime Minister's dinner on Tuesday, 20 May. We have discussed this with UKMIS New York, and they have agreed with the Secretary-General's office that 'impromptu' toasts would be a suitable arrangement. On this basis, I understand that you do not want any notes, but the Prime Minister may wish to have in mind for any remarks the title of Mr Waldheim's recently published book 'The Challenge of Peace'.

Mr Waldheim is also meeting the Prime Minister at 4.30 pm that afternoon. We shall send you briefs by Friday evening, 16 May. They will include a Steering Brief together with briefs on UN institutional questions and issues active at the United Nations. We assume that the Prime Minister's meeting will mainly provide an opportunity for a tour d'horizon of the international political and economic scene and some discussion of major topics, while Lord Carrington's meeting and working lunch the following day will offer the opportunity for more detailed follow-up. Mr Waldheim will be calling separately on Mr Marten to discuss development questions; ODA will brief separately for this meeting.

We suggest that the Prime Minister might be accompanied by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir A Parsons and Mr Marshall. If the Prime Minister is agreeable, Mr Waldheim will be accompanied by Mr Urquhart (UN Under-Secretary General) and Mr Rohan (Deputy Executive Assistance).

I attach a copy of the programme for Mr Waldheim's visit. Arrival and departure times remain subject to change.

*yours ever
Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND MRS WALDHEIM

20-23 MAY 1980

Outline Programme

Tuesday, 20 May

AM	Arrival at London Heathrow.
1630 -1730	Call on the Prime Minister.
1930 for 2000	Dinner at No 10 Downing Street, hosted by the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher.
2145	Reception at No 10 Downing Street.

Wednesday, 21 May

1030	Call on Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.
1200	Audience of The Queen [Mr and Mrs Waldheim].
1230	Working lunch hosted by Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. [Lunch for Mrs Waldheim hosted by Lady Carrington.]
1430	Call on the Minister for Overseas Development.
1510	Meeting with the Rt Hon Peter Shore MP.
1600	Press conference.
1645	Meeting with UN Association.
1930	Theatre/supper party hosted by the Lord Privy Seal.

/Thursday, 22 May

Thursday, 22 May

Visit to Keele University to receive an honorary degree.

Evening

Private engagement (arranged by Lord Weidenfeld).

Friday, 23 May

AM

Departure.

1
2
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12

Thursday, 2 May

Visit to University to receive an
honorary degree.

16 MAY 1980

Private communication
with the author.

Friday, 3 May

Departure.

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UN
Hobbs

BF 13.5.80

30 April 1980

VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

I should be grateful if you would enquire whether Mr. Waldheim would expect to exchange speeches with the Prime Minister at the end of his dinner here next month. If, as I fear, the answer is in the affirmative, I should be grateful if you could let me have a draft for a short speech by close of play on Tuesday 13 May.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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ABO

File

ds

Sue Goodchild

30 April 1980

Visit of the UN Secretary-General

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 25 April and has agreed to hold a reception for an additional 50-60 guests after the dinner which she is giving for Mr. Waldheim on the evening of Tuesday 20 May. The reception will be at 9.45 p.m. We shall be in touch with you about a guest list.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You have agreed to hold a reception after your dinner for Dr Waldheim next month.

I suggest that the dinner guests be invited at 7.30 for 8.00 pm & the reception guests at 9.45 pm (- 11.15 pm). Agree? Yes

Paul ok

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

25 April 1980

Would you be prepared to
consider the idea at A? It would not
be easy to do well here but should be
honourable.

①

Dear Michael,

Paul 25/4

Agreed
ms

Official Visit of the UN Secretary-General to London:
20-23 May 1980

We sent you on 23 April a suggested guest list for the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher's dinner for Mr & Mrs Waldheim on Tuesday 20 May.

A. /

The further entertainment at present proposed for Mr Waldheim includes a small theatre party, to be hosted by the Lord Privy Seal, and a working lunch with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. But Lord Carrington has also been considering ways of enabling a wider circle of people with UN interests to meet Mr Waldheim, and he wonders if Mrs Thatcher would consider the idea of following her dinner on 20 May with a reception for some 50 to 60 additional guests (to include any of the reserves on the enclosed list who are not invited to the dinner). The purpose would be to offer some recognition of the work undertaken by non-governmental organisations and individuals in support of the United Nations, and to demonstrate the Government's continuing commitment to the United Nations and its activities (despite recent reductions in British contributions to UN bodies).

As regards Mr Waldheim's call on the Prime Minister on 20 May at 16.30, we do not yet know whether he will have any specific points to raise. Subject to this, we propose to provide general briefing on current international issues.

Yours etc

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL



SUGGESTED GUEST LIST FOR THE DINNER TO BE HOSTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER MP, AND MR DENNIS THATCHER, IN HONOUR OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MRS WALDHEIM, AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET, SW1, ON 20 MAY 1980 AT 8.00pm FOR 8.15pm

HOSTS

The Prime Minister and Mr Dennis Thatcher

MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY

The Secretary-General Mr Kurt Waldheim and Mrs Waldheim

Mr Brian Urquhart MBE Under Secretary-General

/Un-named Under Secretary-General/

Mr Albert Rohan Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Right Honourable William Whitelaw CH MC DL MP Secretary of State for the Home Department and Mrs Whitelaw House of Commons, SW1

The Right Honourable Lord Hailsham PC CH FRS DL The Lord Chancellor House of Lords, SW1

The Right Honourable Lord Carrington PC KCMG MC Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Lady Carrington Foreign and Commonwealth Office SW1

The Right Honourable Lord Soames PC GCMG GCVO CBE and Lady Soames Foreign and Commonwealth Office SW1

The Honourable Douglas Hurd MP Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign and Commonwealth Office SW1

The Right Honourable David Howell MP Secretary of State for Energy and Mrs Howell Thames House South Millbank SW1 Tel: 01 211 3000

Mr Neil Marten MP Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Minister for Overseas Development and Mrs Marten Overseas Development Administration, SW1



OTHER PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES

The Right Honourable Michael Foot MP House of Commons, SW1
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party
and Mrs Foot

The Right Honourable Peter Shore MP House of Commons, SW1
Opposition Front Bench Spokes-
man on Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs
and Dr Shore

THE LIBERAL PARTY

The Right Honourable David Steel MP House of Commons, SW1
Leader of the Liberal Party
and Mrs Steel

REPRESENTATIVES OF UN ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK

Mr Chandrika Prasad Scrivastava 101-104 Piccadilly, W1
Secretary-General, IMCO
and Mrs Srivastava Tel: 499 9040

Mr Michael Popovic 14 Stratford Place
Acting Director, United London W1N 9AF
Nations Information Centre Tel: 629 6411
London
and Mrs Popovic

UK REPRESENTATIVES TO UN BODIES

The Baroness Trumpington c/o House of Lords, SW1
UK Representative, UN Status Home tel: 435 2518
of Women Commission
and Mr Barker

The Baroness Young c/o House of Lords, SW1
Minister of State for Education
and Science, leading UK Delegation
to World Conference on the UN
Decade for Women
and Mr Young



OTHERS WITH UN INTERESTS

Mr C Brocklebank-Fowler MP
Chairman of the UN Parliamentary
Group
and Mrs Brocklebank-Fowler

Long Cottage, Flitcham, near
Kings Lynn, Norfolk
Tel: Hillington 255

Professor John Ferguson
Chairman, General Council
of the United Nations Association
and Mrs Ferguson

The Selly Oak Colleges
Birmingham 29
Tel: 021 472 4231

Mr Peter Ustinov CBE
Goodwill Ambassador for
UNICEF
and Mrs Ustinov

11 Rue de Silly
92100 Boulogne, France

The Reverend D Harding
Director, United Nations
Association
and Mrs Harding

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Tel: 01 930 2931

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and the Right Honourable Terence
Higgins MP
Professor of International Law
and expert in UN Affairs

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Mr Sidney Bailey
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19 Deansway, N2
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Kt CMG QC
Commonwealth Secretary-General
and Mrs Ramphal

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Chairman, United Africa Co
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Tel: 353 7474



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Editor, The Economist
and Mrs Knight

25 St James Street, SW1A 1HG
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Ambassador of Italy
and Signora Cagiati
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Governor of the Bank of England
and Mrs Richardson

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Permanent Representative to
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c/o United Nations Dept
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SW1

Mr Peter Marshall CMG
Permanent Representative to
the UK Mission to United
Nations in Geneva
and Mrs Marshall

c/o United Nations Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SW1

Sir Antony Acland KCVO CMG
Deputy Under-Secretary of
State in charge of UN Affairs
and Lady Acland

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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and Lady Barber

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QC
UKREP Council of Europe
Steering Committee on Human
Rights
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UK Member, UN Commission
on Human Rights, 1970-78
and Lady Unwin

Wildacres, Fleet, Hants
Tel: Fleet 7590

Dr Janet Cockroft
and Mr Cockroft

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Halifax

Mr B Whitaker
UK Member, UN Human Rights
Sub-Commission
and Mrs Whitaker

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QC MP
Leader of Visiting Parliamentary
Delegation to the 34th UN
General Assembly
and Mrs Fletcher-Cooke

c/o House of Commons

Mr Ivor Richard QC
Formerly UK Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations (1974-79)
and Mrs Richard

205 Ashley Gardens
Emery Hill Street, SW1

file originated with
Sue Goodchild Sue Goodchild
United Nations



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
SW1

23 April 1980

Dear Michael,

I attach below a suggested guest list for the Dinner to be hosted the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher on Tuesday 20 May, in honour of the UN Secretary-General and Mrs Waldheim.

Yours etc

(P Lever)
Private Secretary



SUGGESTED GUEST LIST FOR THE DINNER TO BE HOSTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE MRS MARGARET THATCHER MP, AND MR DENNIS THATCHER, IN HONOUR OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MRS WALDHEIM, AT NO 10 DOWNING STREET, SW1, ON 20 MAY 1980 AT 8.00pm FOR 8.15pm

HOSTS

The Prime Minister and Mr Dennis Thatcher

MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PARTY

The Secretary-General Mr Kurt Waldheim and Mrs Waldheim

Mr Brian Urquhart MBE

Under Secretary-General

/Un-named Under Secretary-General/

Mr Albert Rohan

Director, Executive Office
of the Secretary-General

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Right Honourable William
Whitelaw CH MC DL MP
Secretary of State for the
Home Department
and Mrs Whitelaw

House of Commons, SW1

The Right Honourable Lord Hailsham
PC CH FRS DL
The Lord Chancellor

House of Lords, SW1

The Right Honourable Lord
Carrington PC KCMG MC
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
and Lady Carrington

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SW1

The Right Honourable Lord Soames
PC GCMG GCVO CBE
and Lady Soames

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SW1

The Honourable Douglas Hurd MP
Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
SW1

The Right Honourable David Howell MP
Secretary of State for Energy
and Mrs Howell

Thames House South
Millbank SW1
Tel: 01 211 3000

Mr Neil Marten MP
Minister of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
and Minister for Overseas Develop-
ment
and Mrs Marten

Overseas Development
Administration, SW1



OTHER PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES

The Right Honourable Michael Foot MP House of Commons, SW1
Deputy Leader of the Labour Party
and Mrs Foot

The Right Honourable Peter House of Commons, SW1
Shore MP
Opposition Front Bench Spokes-
man on Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs
and Dr Shore

THE LIBERAL PARTY

The Right Honourable David Steel MP House of Commons, SW1
Leader of the Liberal Party
and Mrs Steel

REPRESENTATIVES OF UN ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK

Mr Chandrika Prasad Scrivastava 101-104 Piccadilly, W1
Secretary-General, IMCO Tel: 499 9040
and Mrs Srivastava

Mr Michael Popovic 14 Stratford Place
Acting Director, United London W1N 9AF
Nations Information Centre Tel: 629 6411
London
and Mrs Popovic

UK REPRESENTATIVES TO UN BODIES

The Baroness Trumpington c/o House of Lords, SW1
UK Representative, UN Status Home tel: 435 2518
of Women Commission
and Mr Barker

The Baroness Young c/o House of Lords, SW1
Minister of State for Education
and Science, leading UK Delegation
to World Conference on the UN
Decade for Women
and Mr Young



OTHERS WITH UN INTERESTS

Mr C Brocklebank-Fowler MP
Chairman of the UN Parliamentary
Group
and Mrs Brocklebank-Fowler

Long Cottage, Flitcham, near
Kings Lynn, Norfolk
Tel: Hillington 255

Professor John Ferguson
Chairman, General Council
of the United Nations Association
and Mrs Ferguson

The Selly Oak Colleges
Birmingham 29
Tel: 021 472 4231

Mr Peter Ustinov CBE
Goodwill Ambassador for
UNICEF
and Mrs Ustinov

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The Reverend D Harding
Director, United Nations
Association
and Mrs Harding

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8 Savile Park
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Mr B Whitaker
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Mr Charles Fletcher-Cooke
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and Mrs Fletcher-Cooke

c/o House of Commons

Mr Ivor Richard QC
Formerly UK Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations (1974-79)
and Mrs Richard

205 Ashley Gardens
Emery Hill Street, SW1



10 DOWNING STREET

Caroline

Revised
confirmed
28.10.14

Please would you ring
Christine Joyner,

Prof + Conf Fco about
the length of the Am's
meeting with Dr. Waldheim
on 20 May. I said it
looked like 1 hr. i.e. 16:30 →
17:30.

would you please confirm
this.

Tessa

10-4-80



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 December 1979

Prime Minister: You would offer Dr Waldheim dinner on 20th May.

Paul 13/12/79

Agreed

Dear Michael,

Official Visit by the UN Secretary-General to London: 1980

The correspondence about Dr Waldheim's visit to London in July this year rests with Bryan Cartledge's letter of 13 July to Stephen Wall. This was originally to have been an official visit, but because of problems over the Prime Minister's timetable was later classed as a working visit, with the proviso that an official visit would be arranged at some future date. Cartledge reported the Prime Minister's approval to the suggestion that Dr Waldheim should be invited to pay an official visit to London in 1980 (his letter of 26 June).

From tentative enquiries it appears that the latter half of May would be the best period for the visit; I understand that the Prime Minister's diary is at present free for the week beginning 19 May.

Bearing in mind that Government Hospitality Fund regulations require an official visit to be not less than two nights' stay, Lord Carrington suggests the visit take place from Tuesday 20 - Thursday 22 May. (This is sufficiently clear of the holiday weekend at the end of that week).

The Secretary-General last paid an official visit to London in August 1977, as part of a round of visits to the permanent members of the Security Council marking his second term of office. On that occasion he was the guest of the then Prime Minister at dinner. Lord Carrington hopes that the Prime Minister would agree to host a lunch or dinner for Dr Waldheim (who is likely to be accompanied by his wife) on the forthcoming visit.

I should be grateful to know whether the proposed dates are acceptable. Lord Carrington will then instruct Sir A Parsons to confirm them with the Secretary-General.

We have suggested in briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to the UK this week that she might wish to confirm the invitation to Dr Waldheim, without necessarily specifying dates or other details; these would be worked out separately if time does not permit agreement among all concerned before the call on Dr Waldheim on 18 December.

CLOSED UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT 2000

*Yours own
Paul*

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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2. MODBA
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JS



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 December 1979

BF 18/4/80

OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO LONDON: 1980

You wrote to me on 17 December on this subject. The Prime Minister would be prepared to offer Dr. Waldheim dinner here at No. 10 on Tuesday, 20 May.

No doubt you will be in touch with me nearer the time about any talks, and consequent briefing associated with the Secretary-General's visit. I should, in any case, be grateful to receive a guest list by close of play on Friday, 18 April.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

gr

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

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PRIORITE HER EXCELLENCY THE RT.HON. MARGARET THATCHER
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 10 DOWNING STREET LONDON, W.1

MAP0909-7. I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY SINCERE APPRECIATION
FOR THE KINDNESS AND HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO ME DURING MY VISIT
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM. I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU MANY PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL CONCERN
AND I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE FRANKNESS AND SINCERITY WITH

COLL 10 W.1 MAP0909-7.

CUB0668 PRIORITE PAGE 2/37

WHICH

YOU EXPRESSED YOUR VIEWS.

I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR FUTURE CO-OPERATION AND I EXTEND TO YOU
ALL MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR MOST CHALLENGING TASK.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

KURT WALDHEIM

SECRETARY-GENERAL

UNITED NATIONS

WESTERN UNION INTERNATIONAL INC.

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FUE

United Nations

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

13 July 1979

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL,
DR. WALDHEIM, AT 10 DOWNING STREET AT 1700, 12 JULY 1979

As you know, Dr. Kurt Waldheim called on the Prime Minister at No. 10 on 12 July at 1700 in the course of his working visit to London. Dr. Waldheim was accompanied by Mr. Brian Urquhart, Mr. Buffum and Mr. Rohan. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir Anthony Parsons were present at the meeting, which lasted for just over an hour.

I enclose a note of the Prime Minister's discussion with Dr. Waldheim. I should be grateful if you would ensure that it is given a suitably restricted distribution, confined to Ministers and senior officials directly concerned with the substance of the matters discussed.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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cc Maats Set
Vietnam (Refugees)
Energy (Policy)
Middle East (situation)
Rhodesia (Situation)

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY GENERAL, DR. KURT WALDHEIM, AT 10 DOWNING STREET, ON
THURSDAY 12 JULY 1979 AT 1700 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister

Dr. Kurt Waldheim

The Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary

Mr. Brian Urquhart (Under-Secretary
General for Special Political
Affairs)

Sir Anthony Parsons

Mr. W.B. Buffum (Under-Secretary
General for Political and General
Assembly Affairs)

Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Mr. A. Rohan (Deputy Executive
Assistant to the Secretary General)

* * * * *

Refugees from Indochina

After welcoming Dr. Waldheim, the Prime Minister raised the problem of Vietnamese refugees and stressed that the British Government's objective was not only to achieve progress over their resettlement but also to put a stop to the enforced exodus at its source. The Prime Minister said that the United States had succeeded in holding communism at bay in Vietnam over a long period, for which she had received scant thanks: the exodus from communism was now beginning. The only source of effective pressure on Vietnam was the Soviet Union but, the Prime Minister said, her conversation with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow had shown not only that the Russians had no intention of exerting pressure on the Vietnamese but that, on the contrary, they supported the Vietnamese policy. A major operation was in progress in South East Asia designed to destabilise the region. The Chinese were already unpopular in the area, because they were successful; this was being deliberately exploited. For these reasons, the British Government had not hesitated to pillory Vietnam in Parliament. Lord Carrington told the Prime Minister that he had already warned Dr. Waldheim that he would have some unpleasant things to say about Vietnam at the forthcoming Geneva meeting; he knew that Dr. Waldheim did not altogether approve but he did not think that he would stand in the way. The Prime Minister said that it was essential that the West should demonstrate that it stood for certain values.

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Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that he was very well aware of her preoccupation with the refugee problem and shared her deep concern. He had deliberately stressed the humanitarian aspect of the problem for consideration in Geneva, since if the argument became too political before the meeting took place Vietnam might refuse to attend it and the meeting would degenerate into a shouting match instead of doing anything to help the refugees themselves. A political debate on the refugee problem would simply lead to sterile confrontation. Dr. Waldheim said that there could be no doubt that the Vietnamese Government was deliberately forcing the refugees to leave: he had raised the matter repeatedly, both with Mr. Pham Van Dong and with the Vietnamese Ambassador at the United Nations. The Vietnamese argued that the refugees were leaving voluntarily and retorted with counter-accusations that a propaganda campaign was being waged against them. He had suggested to Mr. Pham Van Dong that Vietnam should arrange for a phased and orderly departure of the refugees, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner. Despite his representations, the Vietnamese were continuing to behave exactly as before. The Vietnamese Ambassador was now pleading that his Government could not completely control the long Vietnamese coastline and that the Chinese were deliberately exacerbating the problem. Dr. Waldheim said that he had pointed out to the Vietnamese that they were rapidly losing the widespread international sympathy, for example in Scandinavia, which their country had previously enjoyed.

The Prime Minister commented that, meanwhile, Vietnam was continuing to confiscate the wealth and possessions of those whom they were throwing out and was shooting ^{at} them as they left. This was a question not of a shouting match but of sheer barbarism. It should be pilloried publicly: this could produce an effect, as the Belgrade meeting to review the CSCE had produced an effect on the East Europeans, who witnessed the pillorying of the Soviet Union in that forum. It was essential that the United Nations should be seen to stand for something and to condemn barbarism.

Dr. Waldheim explained that, under the United Nations Charter, the Secretary General had no authority to convene a conference such as that which was about to take place in Geneva. He had nevertheless

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/ gone ahead

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gone ahead out of respect for the Prime Minister and in the belief that her objective was to promote a humanitarian solution of the refugee problem. He had decided to break the United Nations rules of procedure, since he knew that if he had adhered to them by taking the matter first to the Security Council, the discussion would have been long and contentious. For the reasons he had explained to the Prime Minister, he had throughout stressed the humanitarian aspect of the meeting and had done his best to invite a representative selection of countries. Despite all his efforts, he was already coming under fire, for example, from the Chinese for not inviting Kampuchea. The Prime Minister said that attacks should not concern one if the policies were right. The fact was that Vietnam was pursuing a policy of barbarism, under the protection of the Soviet veto in the Security Council. Under the same protection, a number of developments which the UN had been established to prevent were gathering momentum, such as the spread of Soviet subversion through the use of proxies. The Prime Minister told Dr. Waldheim that she was very grateful to him for convening the Geneva meeting and congratulated him on his decision to bypass the rules of procedure. She was nevertheless very concerned by a number of current trends affecting the UN, such as the growing number of small islands, especially in the Caribbean, which were being taken over by Cuban or other communist influence and, despite their small size, commanded a vote in the General Assembly. Although the UN had been designed to protect freedom, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the organisation to fulfil this objective.

Dr. Waldheim said that the UN was indeed handicapped by some of the shortcomings in its Charter and also by the behaviour of some Western Governments, who, for example, voted for political reasons in favour of help for the third world but then voted against providing money for it. Too many UN members were ambiguous in their approach to the world's problems: they were keen to win political credit but reluctant to pay the price. Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Soviet Union was just as concerned as the West about the problems of the UN, but the Soviet Union nevertheless continued to vote against the UN budget.

/ Dr. Waldheim

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Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that he would do everything possible to make the Geneva meeting on refugees a success and hoped that positive results could be achieved; his concern was to avoid a political conference, which could not produce results. He was certain that many delegates would nevertheless speak their mind about Vietnam and he himself proposed to include a reference to Vietnam's responsibility for the situation in his opening statement to the meeting. The Prime Minister, referring to the United Nations as a whole, said that every procedural device should be employed in order to put the Western point of view across and the Western objective should be to perpetuate the values which the West stood for, rather than tolerating perpetual retreat in the face of barbarism and tyranny. Referring to the problems which the refugee situation had created for Hong Kong, the Prime Minister said that Hong Kong constituted a remarkable tribute to the free world and to what the Chinese could achieve when they were free.

Dr. Waldheim gave the Prime Minister an account of the separate but related problem of the 160,000 refugees from Kampuchea who had crossed the border into Thailand and whom the Thais, despite an undertaking to the contrary which General Kriangsak had given him, were forcibly repatriating into Kampuchea. This policy had resulted in a very large number of deaths. The Thais had now said that they would suspend their repatriation policy provided the international community would assist them, with money, in housing and caring for the Kampuchean refugees. Dr. Waldheim mentioned the two islands, in Indonesia and the Philippines, which were being used as processing centres, but agreed with Lord Carrington that these were being used only for refugees who already had a new destination to go to.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the OPEC countries, with their great financial resources which would now be further increased by the rise in oil prices, should be persuaded to make a direct contribution to solving the refugee problem. Dr. Waldheim told the Prime Minister that OPEC would be represented at the Geneva meeting, as would be Latin America.

/ Tokyo Economic Summit

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Tokyo Economic Summit

Dr. Waldheim asked the Prime Minister if she had derived any encouragement from the Economic Summit Meeting in Tokyo. The Prime Minister said that the meeting had simply re-affirmed the basic truth that if demand and supply were out of balance the price mechanism had to be adjusted so that balance could be restored. The European participants had already agreed that the demand for oil had to be depressed, but that this could not be done by Europe alone. It was agreed at Tokyo that if it could be demonstrated to Saudi Arabia that, by depressing demand, the shortfall in the supply of oil to the West was only, say, 5 per cent, Saudi Arabia might agree to increase her output sufficiently to fill that gap. As Sheikh Khalifa had told her in Bahrain on her way back to London, the Arabs had no desire to hurt the West since this hurt their own interests as well.

Lord Carrington commented that all the Tokyo participants had chosen the base line for their restriction of demand which happened to suit them best.

The Prime Minister went on to say that most economic problems had their origin in political problems. The Middle East was a prime example of this: the first great oil shortage had sprung from the conflict between Israel and Egypt and the new shortage had resulted from the internal political problems of Iran. A major success in Tokyo had been agreement on the importance of developing new sources of energy supply, especially nuclear power. There had also been agreement on the need to improve communication with the OPEC countries and to make them feel that they were being included in the political dialogue. In the last resort, however, the problem of oil could only be solved through a solution to the political problems of the Middle East. The West was at present witnessing the creation by the Soviet Union of a belt of instability across Africa and Asia. A settlement which could restore stability to the Middle East would be a great prize.

Middle East

/ Lord Carrington

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Middle East

Lord Carrington asked Dr. Waldheim whether he had it in mind to take any new initiative on the Middle East. Dr. Waldheim said that he fully shared the Prime Minister's view of the situation: without a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, there could be no solution to the West's economic problems. For this reason, he had proposed that a preparatory conference should be held, under UN auspices, one purpose of which would be to re-involve the Arab states and the Soviet Union in the negotiating process. He had recently discussed this question with President Ceausescu of Romania, who agreed with him that a new international conference offered the only hope of progress. The first step would be to take soundings among the Arabs and then to organise a conference in which both they and the PLO could take part. There would be little hope of progress, however, if the Israelis maintained their present policy on new settlements on the West Bank. To his surprise, Mr. Gromyko had told him recently that the Soviet Union no longer wished to return to Geneva; this had indeed been a Soviet objective before the Camp David Agreement, but to go back to Geneva now would, in the Soviet view, imply approval, or at least recognition, of the bilateral treaties. Dr. Waldheim commented that the Russians were very adept at hiding behind the positions of the Arab extremists.

Lord Carrington asked Dr. Waldheim whether he would wait for the Camp David process to run into the sand before launching his own initiative, or whether he set a time limit to it. Dr. Waldheim said that he proposed to make it clear, when he spoke at the Conference of the OAU, that it was important to begin consultations with the Arabs on how to move forward.

Sir Anthony Parsons expressed the view that Geneva was now tainted by history, as well as bedevilled by the problem of Paléstinian representation. What was now needed was a fresh resolution in the Security Council which would formally establish the rights of the Palestinians but not in terms which would inevitably attract a United States veto. The Camp David process could then be allowed to continue until Mr. Strauss was obliged to admit that no further progress could be made. The problem

/ could then

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could then go back to the Security Council so that the Secretary General could be given a new mandate. Dr. Waldheim said that he agreed with Sir Anthony Parsons' comments about Geneva: if he waited too long to launch his initiative, however, President Sadat would find himself in serious difficulties. He remained convinced, that an international conference offered the only way forward. The Prime Minister said that a new Security Council resolution could perhaps go a bit further than Resolution 242 on the question of the international identity of the Palestinians; but the difficulty lay in securing the cooperation of Mr. Begin.

Southern Africa

Dr. Waldheim asked the Prime Minister for her view of the situation in South Africa. The Prime Minister expressed the view that if they were not constantly being put in the public stocks, the South Africans might move faster than anybody expected. South African industry was a dynamo in promoting Africanisation. The Nationalist Party had recently been defeated in a by-election. The Prime Minister said that the best catalyst for further progress in Southern Africa would be a settlement in Rhodesia. The West should constantly bear in mind the strategic position which South Africa occupied, across the West's life-lines for oil and raw materials.

Dr. Waldheim said that negotiations with South Africa over Namibia had been very difficult, despite the help which the Group of Five had given. He thought that the British Government might now be in the best position of the Five to resume the effort; it was important to pick up the loose ends and try to put a settlement package together again.

Turning to Rhodesia, Dr. Waldheim said that President Kaunda had kept him informed of his contacts with the Prime Minister. Dr. Waldheim expressed the view that Bishop Muzorewa's Government should be regarded as a transitional stage towards a final settlement in Rhodesia.

/ The Prime Minister

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The Prime Minister said that it should be constantly borne in mind that Rhodesia had recently conducted elections on the basis of one person, one vote in which the people had been able to choose between four different political parties. The elections had produced a black president, a black Prime Minister, a black majority in the Cabinet and a black majority in the Parliament. This was a colossal advance. The situation in Rhodesia now was infinitely closer to democracy than the situation which existed in many of the countries most critical of Bishop Muzorewa's regime. If the UK were now to go too far in pressing for changes in the constitution, this might upset the white population and the Rhodesian economy could collapse. President Kaunda, for example, had turned out too many whites and the result was that he was now unable to feed his people. Rhodesia could be self-sufficient in food and could also help her neighbours. Bishop Muzorewa had expressed the view that it was essential to encourage the whites to remain so that the economy could be efficiently run in the interests of the black population. The Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa had done everything which had been asked of him: he had been advised to work for a substantial turn out in the elections and he had achieved this. The present constitutional position was not perfect, but few constitutions were.

Dr. Waldheim said that it would be possible to help Bishop Muzorewa by means of new elections to be held under international supervision. He thought that Rhodesia's problems could be solved if the Muzorewa Government were regarded as transitional. The Prime Minister recalled that Rhodesia's last elections had been assessed by observers both from the UK and Australia. The many representatives of the media who had been in Rhodesia at the time had found no defects in the electoral procedures. The conflict in Rhodesia now was not between black and white but between black and black. It was essential that the internal settlement should not be upset: it should be built upon. Joshua Nkomo had made it very clear to Mr. Callaghan's envoy, Mr. Cledwyn Hughes, that he intended to achieve his aims by force.

/Dr. Waldheim

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- 9 -

Dr. Waldheim said that he feared that if no solution could be found soon, there would simply be an endless guerilla war. The Prime Minister said that the British Government would do everything possible to achieve an acceptable settlement: but the UK would have to take others along with her. Lord Carrington agreed and said that recognition by the UK alone would not be much help to Rhodesia. It was essential to chart a middle course between changes which would be acceptable to international opinion and changes which could be accepted by the white population. It was certainly necessary to give Bishop Muzorewa reassurance: but it was also important to convince him of the necessity for changes to the constitution. The Prime Minister said that too radical changes might bring the whole structure down. One way of achieving a better Parliamentary balance would be to add more black members instead of reducing the number of white members.

Concluding the discussion, the Prime Minister said that she greatly looked forward to Dr. Waldheim's official visit to the UK later in the year. The meeting ended at 1810.

Gen.

12 July 1979

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United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL covering SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH



12 July 1979



Dear Bryan,

Call by the UN Secretary-General:
Namibia

I enclose a revised brief on Namibia which has been prepared for Lord Carrington's talk with Dr Waldheim this afternoon.


*Yours ever,
Stephe*

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL covering SECRET

12 JUL 1979




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PS

VISIT OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL: NAMIBIA: SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1. I submit a supplementary brief for the Secretary of State, to be read with the brief which I submitted to Mr Williams on 9 July.
2. I suggest that the same briefs might serve for Mr Luce's discussion tomorrow with Mr Ahtisaari.



B L Barder
Southern African Department

12 July 1979

cc:

PS/LPS

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/Mr Luce

PS/PUS

Sir A Duff

Sir A Parsons

Mr Williams

Sir J Murray

Mr Simpson Orlebar

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VISIT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We have not yet sent a message to the South Africans about the appointment of Sir James Murray as the Five's envoy. Until we have done so, and the South Africans have replied, we cannot make any public announcement.
2. Meanwhile we should be grateful if the information about Sir J Murray and the Five's intentions could be kept strictly confidential.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The Five have agreed, through the New York Contact Group, on Sir J Murray's brief for the talks with the South Africans. This concentrates on the issues of bases and monitoring, but allows room for discussion of other matters such as how to restore South African and Western confidence. No final decisions have been taken so far on timing. The Contact Group have drafted a message to go to the South Africans and a public announcement to be made when the South Africans have replied, but these have not yet been approved by the Five.

Not to be Revealed

2. The Americans have now proposed that the message about Sir J Murray to the South Africans should be delayed until their current secret talks with the Angolans have finished (possibly at the weekend or early next week) and their outcome has been considered by the Five. They think that these talks, being conducted in Luanda by Ambassador McHenry, may require a change in the instructions for Sir J Murray; they do not want Sir J Murray's mission to be announced while they are still talking to the Angolans, for fear of prejudicing those talks; and they fear that the South Africans may make harmful use of the information once a message is sent.

3. We are pressing the Americans not to insist on such a long delay. We think they should tell the Angolans now about Sir J Murray, and let the message go to the South Africans by this weekend. The South Africans already have wind of Sir J Murray's appointment and we have told members of both Dr Waldheim's staff and Mr Ahtisaari's. We accept that

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Sir J Murray should not go to New York until the message has gone to the South Africans, but we do not wish to defer his move to New York until after his own mission has been publicly announced.

4. An additional complication is that Dr Waldheim and Mr Ahtisaari are going to Luanda at the weekend to talk to the Angolans. They may well hear about the secret talks between the Americans and the Angolans. If so, this news might leak and come to the ears of the South Africans. They will become very suspicious if they think the Five are plotting something with Angola before the next round of talks with the South Africans.

5. It is essential that nothing should be said to Dr Waldheim or Mr Ahtisaari, or to any member of their staff, about the American talks with the Angolans. The Americans attach the utmost importance to secrecy.

SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 July 1979

Dear Bryan

*p.c. JW
1979*

UN Secretary-General's Call on the Prime
Minister on 12 July

As mentioned in my letter of 6 July, I now enclose a brief on Indo-China for Dr Waldheim's call on the Prime Minister tomorrow.

For ever,
Stephe

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES
POINTS TO MAKE
UK COMMITMENT

1. Say in confidence UK will announce in Geneva 10,000 more places, meeting UNHCR's indicative figure. Present plans are to take all from Hong Kong. Not possible to take all this number by end of year, but recognise urgency. Will also announce further contribution of £5 million to General Programme, but earmarked for Indo-China refugees.

HONG KONG

2. Expect Hong Kong will also accept indicative figures of 10,000 but local decision not yet final. Hong Kong has spent £5.8 million so far in 1979 and expects to spend £18.3 million in second half.

GENEVA MEETING

3. Meeting in Geneva 20/21 July not the sort of wide-ranging conference we originally envisaged. We realise Waldheim's difficulty. Equally he must recognise that our concern goes beyond the humanitarian aspects. Others will feel the same. Vietnam is bound to be criticised.

4. We will participate fully in the Geneva meeting, aiming to make it a success. But a long series of speeches in a two-day meeting followed only by a summing-up by Waldheim is not an encouraging prospect.

5. The meeting may well carry on at least until 22 July. If discussion even of Waldheim's list of humanitarian aspects (and there will be others, eg. acquiring an island for large-scale processing/settlement, financial help for settlement in Latin America) is to be effective, much hard work will be needed behind scenes. Working groups?

UNHCR/VIETNAM AGREEMENT

6. General view is that Vietnamese/UNHCR "seven-point plan" is totally inadequate. Risk of distracting meeting from essential problems if we concentrate on it. But is there something in point No 1 on which the meeting might build? Evidently not, if mass expulsions continue.

USSR

7. Regret Waldheim did not invite Russians and East Europeans. What is latest position? It has given them an easy way out rather than a hard choice in Moscow. How do we get them to acknowledge a humanitarian interest - at least by contributing to UNHCR?

/ FURTHER

FURTHER ACTION

8. We still believe Vietnam's appalling and disruptive behaviour must be brought to notice. Depending on the outcome of the Geneva meeting, there may well be a need for political action eg. by recourse to the Security Council.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

POLITICAL CONTENT

1. Mr Hartling (UNHCR) and Mr Buffum (UN Under Secretary General in charge of arrangements) report Waldheim's worry over statements which stray beyond humanitarian issues. The danger is that Waldheim, by upholding his terms of reference, would appear to defend Vietnam (Waldheim's press statement of ^{30 June} attached).

WORKING GROUPS

2. Buffum is against formal working groups, as restricting Waldheim's freedom to sum up as he wishes.

UNHCR-VIETNAM AGREEMENT (THE SEVEN POINT PLAN)

3. This agreement (text attached) is designed to match potential Vietnamese emigrants still in Vietnam with places already on offer in resettlement countries and covers at present 20,000 to 30,000 family reunion cases. The Vietnamese claim that this agreement is proof of a full cooperation with UNHCR, but it does nothing to stem the flow of boat refugees. Point 1 refers to "other humanitarian cases" which is at the moment an empty phrase, but might be extended to include more.

4. (Not for Use) HM Ambassador Hanoi has reported in confidence that the Vietnamese Prime Minister may have taken a decision to stop "illegal" emigration.

MR HURD'S MEETING

5. Mr Hurd called on Dr Waldheim on 4 July: record attached.

HONG KONG

6. UNHCR's figure for Hong Kong is 10,000 over 12 months. The Governor will have to consult his Executive Council before agreeing to take this number but does not anticipate difficulties.

AGENDA

7. According to Dr Waldheim's formal note, the meeting is "to deal with all humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem, including asylum and the related question of rescue at sea, safe and orderly departure and durable solutions. It is the hope that Governments will be prepared to announce at the meeting specific contributions to the UNHCR programme, including significant increases in resettlement opportunities and funds."

South East Asian Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
11 July 1979

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GPS 163

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS GENEVA 011925Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 250 OF 01 JULY 1979

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, HONG KONG, KUALA LUMPUR.

UN CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO PRESS ON
30 JUNE:

BEGINS: AFTER EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED I HAVE DECIDED TO CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS. THIS MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA ON JULY 20 AND 21. I EXPECT THAT THIS MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. I WISH TO STRESS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE MEETING SHOULD DEAL WITH ALL HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE TRAGEDY IN INDO-CHINA. I SHALL INVITE TO THIS MEETING THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY REFUGEE PROBLEMS AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF PROSPECTIVE DONOR COUNTRIES, THAT IS DONOR COUNTRIES AS FAR AS MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE CONCERNED AND ALSO PROSPECTIVE COUNTRIES OF FINAL ASYLUM.

AS I SAID IN THE PAST A CAREFUL PREPARATION OF THIS MEETING IS NECESSARY. THEREFORE I WAS IN CONTACT WITH A GREAT NUMBER OF GOVERNMENTS AND OF COURSE WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES BEFORE DECIDING ON HOLDING SUCH A MEETING, AND ON THE DATE. I HOPE THAT THE TIME BETWEEN NOW AND THE CONFERENCE WILL BE USED BY ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED TO PREPARE THEMSELVES SO THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE A SUCCESS. IN OTHER WORDS THE MEETING SHOULD MAKE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO A POSITIVE SOLUTION TO THIS GREAT HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM. ENDS.

MURRAY

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SIR A PARSONS
MR. CORTAZZI
MR. MURRAY
MR. STRATTON

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
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FM UKMIS GENEVA 271510Z JUNE 79

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 184 OF 7/6/79

INFO WASHINGTON HONG KONG BANGKOK MANILA KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE
JAKARTA INFO SAVING HANOI

MIPT

TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES CONCERNING THE DEPARTURE OF PERSONS FROM
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, CONCLUDED ON 30 MAY 1979

"* FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS HELD IN HANOI BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND A
DELEGATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEES (UNHCR) FROM FEBRUARY 26 TO MARCH 5 AND FROM MAY 2 TO
MAY 30, 1979, IT IS AGREED THAT UNHCR WILL FACILITATE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JANUARY 12 ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE
GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE OF PERSONS WHO WISH TO
LEAVE VIET NAM FOR COUNTRIES OF NEW RESIDENCE.

REGARDING THE PROGRAMME TO IMPLEMENT SUCH ORDERLY DEPARTURE, IT
IS UNDERSTOOD THAT:

1. AUTHORIZED EXIT OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO WISH TO LEAVE VIET NAM AND
SETTLE IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES - FAMILY REUNION AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN
CASES - WILL BE CARRIED OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO THE
MAXIMUM EXTENT. THE NUMBER OF SUCH PEOPLE WILL DEPEND BOTH ON THE
VOLUME OF APPLICATIONS FOR EXIT FROM VIET NAM AND ON RECEIVING
COUNTRIES' ABILITY TO ISSUE ENTRY VISAS.

2. THE SELECTION OF THOSE PEOPLE AUTHORIZED TO GO ABROAD UNDER THIS
PROGRAMME WILL, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE
LISTS PREPARED BY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE LISTS PREPARED
BY THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES. THOSE PERSONS WHOSE NAMES APPEAR ON
BOTH LISTS WILL QUALIFY FOR EXIT. AS FOR THOSE PERSONS WHOSE
NAMES APPEAR ON ONLY ONE LIST, THEIR CASES WILL BE SUBJECT TO
DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN UNHCR AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OR THE
GOVERNMENTS OF THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES, AS APPROPRIATE.

/3. UNHCR

3. UNHCR WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR THIS PROGRAMME AMONGST POTENTIAL RECEIVING COUNTRIES.

4. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND UNHCR WILL EACH APPOINT PERSONNEL WHO WILL CLOSELY CO-OPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAMME.

5. THIS PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO OPERATE IN HANOI AND HO CHI MINH CITY AND, AS NECESSARY, TO GO TO OTHER PLACES TO PROMOTE EXIT OPERATIONS.

6. EXIT OPERATIONS WILL BE EFFECTED AT REGULAR INTERVALS BY APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORT.

7. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL, SUBJECT TO RELEVANT VIETNAMESE LAWS, PROVIDE UNHCR AND THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES WITH EVERY FACILITY TO IMPLEMENT THIS PROGRAMME.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO HANOI

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

MURRAY

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PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS¹
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR LEAHY
MR MURRAY

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(MR WOODFIELD HOME OFFICE
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(MR BIRT
(MR HILLARY HOME OFFICE
LUNAR HOUSE CROYDON
MR V MCGEE FAO ODA

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 050910Z JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 05 JULY 1979

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG, CANBERRA,
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, HANOI, PEKING.YOUR TELNO 131: INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES: MR HURD'S CALL ON
DR WALDHEIM

1. MR HURD CALLED ON WALDHEIM ON 4 JULY AND HANDED OVER THE TEXTS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TWO MESSAGES (YOUR TELNOS 129 AND 130).
2. WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE HAD TRIED VERY HARD TO RESPOND TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S WISH FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. AS SECRETARY GENERAL HE DID NOT HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ACT ON HIS OWN TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE. BUT OUT OF A DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL HE HAD TAKEN THE UNPRECEDENTED STEP OF CALLING A MEETING ON THE BASIS OF HIS PERSONAL INVITATION AND OUTSIDE NORMAL UN PROCEDURES TO DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS. HE HOPED THAT DISCUSSION AT THE MEETING COULD BE CONFINED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE SOME REFERENCE TO VIETNAM'S ROLE BUT HE WANTED TO AVOID THE CONFERENCE DETERIORATING INTO A POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WHICH COULD INVOLVE HIM IN CONTROVERSY AND BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE HOPED GOVERNMENTS WOULD BEAR HIS PERSONAL POSITION IN MIND.
3. HE PROPOSED TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT EXPLAINING THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THEN INVITE STATEMENTS FROM GOVERNMENTS (NO MORE THAN 10 MINUTES EACH) WHICH IT WAS HOPED WOULD INCLUDE NEW OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE. MR HURD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF WALDHEIM TAKING THE CHAIR AND WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE WOULD DO SO FOR THE MORNING SESSION OF THE FIRST DAY AND THEN HAND OVER TO HARTLING FOR THE AFTERNOON SESSION IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THE UNHCR'S INVOLVEMENT. HE WOULD RETURN TO THE CHAIR THE FOLLOWING MORNING. WHEN NOT IN THE CHAIR HE WOULD BE ON HAND IF ANY DISPUTE AROSE. AT THE CLOSE HE WOULD SUM UP. (SINCE IT WAS NOT A PROPER UN CONFERENCE THERE COULD BE NO RESOLUTIONS). THE MEETING WOULD BE IN PUBLIC.

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4. MR HURD SAID THAT WE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ATTEND. THEY SHOULD BE EDGED INTO TAKING SOME RESPONSIBILITY. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN APPROACHED THROUGH UNDER SECRETARY-GENERAL SYTENKO IN NEW YORK TO SEE WHETHER THEY WOULD ACCEPT IF INVITED. THEY HAD SUPPORTED THE VIETNAMESE VIEW THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE SOLELY CONCERNED WITH HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, BUT HAD SO FAR GIVEN NO CLEAR-CUT ANSWERS. THE CHINESE, WHO UNLIKE THE RUSSIANS WERE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD OF UNHCR, HAD ALREADY BEEN INVITED. THEY HAD NOT YET ANSWERED BUT IT HAD SAID THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE MEETING MUST BE TO CONDEMN VIETNAM.

5. MR HURD SAID THAT WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING WHOM WE WOULD SEND TO THE MEETING AND HOW TO RESPOND TO MR HARTLING'S QUESTIONNAIRE.

6. ON ATTENDANCE WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE JAPANESE, THAIS AND MALAYSIANS WERE SENDING CABINET MINISTERS AND THERE WAS TALK OF THE US SENDING MONDALE OR VANCE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

MURRAY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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SIR A PARSONS
MR CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY
MR STRATTON

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

You may like to have
these additional briefs
by you when you see

London SW1A 2AH

11 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

Dr Waldheim but there is no need to
wade through them all. *JSW*

Visit of the UN Secretary-General: 12 July

As promised in my letter of 6 July submitting briefs for the Prime Minister's use in talking to Mr Waldheim on Thursday, I enclose copies of the briefs prepared for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's talk with him.

We understand from the UN Information Centre that Mr Waldheim is expecting to discuss Namibia, Middle East, and Cyprus with Lord Carrington. Lord Carrington will also wish to raise the issue of refugees and we know that Dr Waldheim expects to discuss the Geneva Conference with the Prime Minister. We have added defensive briefs on certain other subjects which might arise.

*For ever,
Stephen*

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street



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11 JUL 1979

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CALL BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON SECRETARY OF STATE:
12 July

LIST OF BRIEFS

- 1 Namibia
- 2 Middle East
- 3 Cyprus
- 4 North/South (including aid cuts and energy)
(defensive)
- 5 Law of the Sea (defensive)
- 6 Reform of General Assembly procedures (defensive)
- 7 Peacekeeping (defensive)
- 8 Personality note on Dr Waldheim

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO: 1: NAMIBIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Five trying to break the impasse by appointing an envoy to negotiate with the South Africans, and perhaps if necessary thereafter with SWAPO and the Front Line States. Plan to announce this before OAU summit..
2. Partners wanted a British envoy. He will work to a joint brief.
3. African patience running out. Hope Dr Waldheim will urge participants in Monrovia to accept that implementation still possible, that UK at one with the Five.
4. Sanctions would be folly while hope of agreement remains.
5. Best hope of solution may still be SWAPO giving up claim to bases inside Namibia and South Africans dropping insistence on UNTAG monitoring outside. But other variants may need discussion.
6. Would you ask the Angolans when in Luanda next week whether they could contemplate giving details of how they will ensure observance of the agreement by SWAPO forces in Angola?

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Essential Facts

[May be mentioned as necessary]

1. The Five may be ready to announce the name of the envoy at about the time of Dr Waldheim's visit.
2. The Five agree that he should talk first to P W Botha and South African Government officials. The Five will then decide whether there is a need for him to talk to the internal parties, the Front Line, SWAPO, Mr Ahtisaari (Dr Waldheim's Special Representative for Namibia) and others. The envoy will consult the New York Contact Group before going to South Africa.

[Not to be revealed]

3. The Five may ask the Secretary of State to put particular points to Dr Waldheim. If so, the Department will provide a supplementary brief.
4. Dr Waldheim may be sensitive about suggestions that "amendments" or "alternatives" will be needed to paras 11-12 of his Report of 26 February on bases and monitoring. To avoid this the Five hope to present whatever compromises might be worked out as voluntary, thus not requiring any formal change in the Waldheim Report.
5. Mudge (DTA) has privately offered to a member of the Embassy in Pretoria to seek Pik Botha's agreement to a compromise involving (a) no SWAPO bases inside Namibia and (b) no UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO outside provided that Angola and Zambia explain how they will do the monitoring themselves. It is too early to tell Dr Waldheim of this but he might be urged to begin exploring Angolan attitudes to such a deal when he goes to Luanda.

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 2: MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Concerned about Israeli policy, particularly on settlements and South Lebanon. But success in the autonomy negotiations would bring a comprehensive settlement nearer. Would like a return to multilateral negotiations eventually, but difficult to see how this can be brought about. Would Dr Waldheim be prepared to revive his proposal for a conference of all the parties if necessary?

2. Middle East likely to be troublesome at the UN in the near future. Concerned that peace efforts should not be undermined and that UN role, while helping to keep up pressure on Israel, should be constructive. Extreme resolutions will not help the peace process, the Arab cause or the UN's reputation.

3. Could be a case for a new Security Council resolution giving more concrete expression to Palestinian rights.

UN forces in Sinai

4. What are the prospects for use of UN forces to supervise Israeli withdrawal, which we support as in line with UN views and peacekeeping role? If UNEF is ruled out by Soviet opposition, UNTSO would be an acceptable substitute.

Question of Palestine

5. Hope discussion will be constructive when it resumes. Could not accept condemnation of the treaty or call for sanctions against Israel.

Israeli settlements

6. A strong resolution acceptable to all would help to keep up the pressure on Israel, but danger of an unacceptable call for sanctions.

Lebanon/UNIFIL

7. Appreciate UNIFIL's efforts and will continue to urge Israel to cooperate and rein in Haddad. Risks of Israeli-Syrian clash remain high. But little scope for effective action beyond established diplomatic

SS IAL FACTS (May be used unless indicated)
 (No for use)

1. Dr Waldheim has taken a generally negative view of Camp David and the peace treaty. He has expressed doubts about their compatibility with UN decisions and their ability to lead on to wider peace. He favours a return to multilateral negotiations but has not so far produced new proposals or renewed the call he made after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 for a conference of all the parties under UN auspices.

UN FORCES IN SINAI

2. The Arabs have called on the Secretary-General not to allow the UN to be involved in any way and the Russians have made clear they will oppose any attempt to use UNEF (which would need to be redeployed) to supervise Israeli withdrawal. They would apparently prefer UNEF to be folded up without a formal debate, since they are unwilling to be seen to be publicly opposing peacekeeping machinery in the Middle East. There have been hints that they would not necessarily oppose use of UNTSO.

3. The UK will be President of the Security Council when the UNEF mandate is due for renewal (24 July). The Secretary-General's report will be issued shortly. We do not yet know what it will contain, but it is likely to steer a carefully neutral course.

QUESTION OF PALESTINE

4. At Arab request, a Security Council debate was formally opened on 29 June and then adjourned until the end of July or the beginning of August. The Arab representative on the Security Council is apparently hoping to negotiate a resolution which others, including the Americans, will be able either to accept or abstain on. However, the PLO representative in New York had told us previously that the intention was to introduce a resolution similar to that vetoed by the Americans in January 1976 and, following the expected further US veto, then to call

either for a special session or an emergency session of the General Assembly. They would try at such a session to get a resolution adopted condemning the Egypt/Israel treaty and calling for sanctions against Israel. The Security Council debate, when it resumes, is likely to prove difficult for the West whatever Arab tactics.

[Not for use]

5. The Egyptians have told us that the Americans are considering again a resolution which would reaffirm 242 and go on to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. This might produce from the PLO a statement in debate recognising Israel's existence. It would be important not to tamper with the text of 242 since this might provoke Israel to withdraw acceptance of it. But in addition to it is worth consideration.

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

6. The three-member Investigating Commission established in March and led by Portugal is expected to report back in mid-July. Their report will almost certainly come out strongly against Israeli policy. A strongly-worded resolution unanimously accepted would reinforce the international pressure on Israel. The Commission's report will however give further ammunition for those calling for action against Israel, possibly under Chapter VII. We are not prepared to support sanctions against Israel.

LEBANON

7. Although the mandate of UNIFIL has recently been renewed for six months, further clashes in the South could bring the issue back to the Security Council. If there are further Syrian/Israeli clashes over Lebanon following that of 27 June, the Syrians may also ask for a meeting. But there is little more the Security Council can do in the Lebanese context but continue to condemn Israeli obstruction and urge further diplomatic pressure on Israel.

GPS 260

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UKMIS GENEVA 051010Z
TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 261 OF 05 JULY 79
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST : MR HURD'S CALL ON WALDHEIM ON 4 JULY
MY 2 IPTS (NOT TO ALL)

1. WALDHEIM SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD REFUSED TO AGREE TO A RENEWAL OF THE UNEF MANDATE DESPITE CARTER'S INTERVENTION WITH BREZHNEV AT VIENNA. THEY WANTED, HOWEVER TO AVOID USING THEIR VETO IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEIR TACTICS, WHICH WERE BEING COORDINATED WITH THE SYRIANS, APPEARED TO BE TO MANOEUVRE THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO A POSITION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO INFORM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT NO AGREEMENT OR RENEWAL HAD BEEN REACHED. WALDHEIM WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO MAKE A STATEMENT INFORMING THE COUNCIL THAT HE HAD NO OPTION BUT TO TERMINATE THE UNEF OPERATION.

2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY OPTICAL SINCE UNEF WAS NOT NOW NEEDED TO KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT CARE ABOUT UNEF'S WITHDRAWAL AND HAD PROPOSED THE ALTERNATIVE OF COMBINED FRONTIER PATROLS TO EGYPT. BUT THIS WAS EMBARRASSING TO THE EGYPTIANS WHO DESPERATELY WANTED THE UMBRELLA TO CONTINUE. WALDHEIM EXPECTED SADAT TO PURSUE THE MATTER IN MONROVIA WHEN HE SAW HIM THERE IN TEN DAYS TIME.

3. THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING EVASIVE OVER THEIR ATTITUDE TO THE CONTINUATION OF UNTSO'S OBSERVER ROLE, BUT HAD SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY TOOK THE SAME LINE AS WITH UNEF. WALDHEIM COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD NEED FRESH AUTHORITY IF UNTSO OBSERVERS WERE BEING USED TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT.

MURRAY

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ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

RESTRICTED

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 3 ; CYPRUS

POINTS TO MAKE

INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. Congratulate Waldheim on skill and determination at Nicosia meeting on 18/19 May when Kyprianou and Denktash finally agreed on a basis for resumed negotiations. How does he see prospects?
2. Talks off to a sticky start. Fragility of Ecevit Government evidently a factor. Doubts over animus negotiandi.
3. UK giving UN general support; close touch in Nicosia and New York. But UN should retain the lead. Interference by outsiders with little leverage unlikely to be decisive. UN strength in reluctance of both sides to be blamed for breakdown.

UNFICYP

4. UK agreed to maintain contribution to December 1979. Costs £10m p.a. Pressures for reduction, especially if talks fail.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Intercommunal Talks

1. Kyprianou/Denktash meeting with Waldheim on 18/19 May. Waldheim pushed them into 10-point agreement on resumption of negotiation.
2. Talks resumed on 15 June, adjourned by UN when near deadlock over Turkish demand for Greek Cypriot commitments on "bizonality" and "security". UN searching for a formula. Ecevit tottering and vulnerable to accusations of a sell-out on Cyprus. May ease up now Turkish Parliament in recess.
3. UK and others (including Nine) supporting UN but reluctant to undertake specific suicide missions at this early stage.

UNFICYP

4. Mandate just renewed. Canadians restless. Threat of withdrawal provides some leverage on Greek Cypriots but none at all on Turks.

UN Team

5. The principal UN officials involved:

Perez de Cuellar (Peru)	- Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs
Galindo Pohl (El Salvador)	- Waldheim's Special Representative in Cyprus
Gorgé (Switzerland)	- Deputy to Galindo Pohl

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 4 : NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE, INCLUDING ENERGY AND UK AID

POINTS TO MAKE

NORTH/SOUTH GENERAL

1. Oil price rises hit non-oil developing countries worst of all. And they make an adequate response from us more difficult. North/South relations can hardly prosper in this situation.

TOKYO SUMMIT

2. Our most important preoccupation now is to get the world economy on the right course again. The energy measures agreed at Tokyo are a vital first step. We are limiting our imports, seeking more orderly arrangements on the oil market, and hastening our work on conservation and alternative energy sources. This is not a task for the West alone. OPEC countries have important responsibilities. So do COMECON countries whose contribution to the North/South Dialogue has been inadequate so far.

UNCTAD V

3. UNCTAD in Manila made some modest advances. Agreement on the need to avoid protectionism was made. There was a welcome absence of rancour. More dramatic results were hardly to be expected against current difficult economic background.

NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

4. This is not the time for grand designs. The negotiations on a new IDS for the 1980s and beyond will be a test of the good sense of all concerned. The targets it contains must be realistic and coherent.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

5. The COW has still not fulfilled its promise. We support Chairman Stoltenberg's effort to make it a forum for informed discussion between developed and developing countries of world economic problems.

/THE

THE UN AND ENERGY

6. We favour producer consumer contacts about oil supply and demand. European Council and Tokyo Summit have said so. But we are cautious about using the UN as a forum for these contacts. We need to keep away from a bloc to bloc confrontation between developed and developing countries with energy as a bargaining lever. This was tried at the CIEC and was why it ground to a halt.

UK ATTITUDE

7. Main task of HMG is to put UK economic house in order. We shall encourage trade with and investment in the developing countries. And we shall maintain a substantial aid programme, though it cannot be exempt from public expenditure cuts which go right across the board.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

TOKYO SUMMIT

1. The Declaration is annexed.

WORLD ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

2. Preliminary calculations indicate that the new OPEC prices of \$20-23.50 (with Saudi Arabian light at \$18) will:
 - (a) add about \$20 billion to OECD oil import bill; and over \$5 billion to non-OECD oil import bill;
 - (b) increase inflation in OECD countries by 0.75% after one year;
 - (c) reduce growth in industrial world by 0.5-0.75% after one year;
 - (d) increase OECD current account deficit by over 10 billion over a full year (of which \$5 billion might fall to US);
 - (e) add over \$20 billion to OPEC revenues.
3. We do not yet have a similar estimate for the increase in the deficit of the non-oil LDCs though it could be well in excess of \$40 billion as compared with \$32 billion in 1978. This burden, which will be unequally shared, will be a heavy one for some developing countries to bear.

UNCTAD V

4. UNCTAD V met in Manila from 3 May to 3 June. Consensus results were adopted on a number of matters including protectionism, commodities, resource transfers, the least developed, the UN Liner Code, technology transfer and economic co-operation between developed countries (ECDC). The G77 forced through some other resolutions on, eg civil aviation, a study of a new Complementary Financing Facility, for which the Germans voted, international monetary reform and bulk shipping. Various other questions on which no agreement was reached were remitted for further consideration in UNCTAD or other international bodies, eg the outcome of the MTNs, GSP, debt etc. But there was no breakdown and little rancour. Group B displayed a useful degree of unity: G77 were divided between the various regional groups and

above all, over the oil issue which the OPEC countries refused to have discussed.

NEW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

5. The next major North/South argument will be over the International Development Strategy for the 1980s and beyond (due to be adopted by a special session of the UN General Assembly in 1980). The LDCs will want specific targets for economic and social sectors and by implication concessions from the developed countries in pursuit of the NIEO. We shall emphasise the need for flexibility and the shared responsibilities of both developed and developing countries.

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

6. Set up by the UN General Assembly in 1977 as a forum for discussion of the whole range of North/South issues. Depressing tendency so far to get into ritualistic confrontations over competing texts. Two meetings in 1978 under Algerian Chairman were not a success. Things have improved under State Secretary Stoltenberg of Norway. The next meeting takes place from 10-14 September to review the results of UNCTAD. Level of UK representation not yet fixed but will be appropriately senior.

THE UN AND ENERGY

7. UK has welcomed proposed Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy in 1981. European Council has also given a cautious welcome to Mexican President's proposals for discussion of energy in UN. Our main concern is to avoid energy being used as a bargaining lever of other North/South issues. We are opposed to any suggestions of a new CIEC format because this would recreate a link between energy and other North/South problems. Energy discussions should focus solely on energy matters. See paragraph 10 below.

UK AID

8. The UK Aid Programme in 1979/80 will be higher in both cash and real terms than the Programme for 1978/79, even after the £50 million

reduction. As a percentage of GNP we will be well above FRG, Japan and USA. We continue to support a substantial replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA6) and a general capital increase of the World Bank.

COMECON AID

9. COMECON ODA amounts to only 0.1% of GNP compared with the DAC (OECD) average of 0.33%. The developing countries are becoming increasingly critical of this poor performance.

DR WALDHEIM'S POSITION

10. Dr Waldheim has from time to time suggested a wider role for the UN in co-ordinating energy discussions. He reverted to his idea of an energy institute in his opening address to the Economic and Social Council in Geneva on 4 July, with support from the Italians.

FINANCIAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5 JULY 1979

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 5: UN LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

POINTS TO MAKE [Defensive]

1. Conference has achieved much. But greater realism from the G77 and the land-based producers is necessary over deep seabed mining. Their present financial demands for access to deep seabed minerals are too high.
2. Like others, we hope to arrive at signature of generally agreed Convention next year. But would not want that objective to be reached at expense of legitimate national interests.

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 5: UN LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Eighth session of conference resumes in New York on 19 July-24 August. During first part of session (Geneva 19 March-27 April) Dr Waldheim sent a message calling for every effort to conclude negotiations (in progress since 1974).
2. There is substantial agreement on all subjects except deep seabed mining. Main problem here is G77 insistence, based partly on the interests of competing land-based producers, on exorbitant financial terms in contracts for mining, and unacceptably high financial contribution from industrial countries to the proposed UN mining "Enterprise".
3. Procedure allows for agreement to be reached by consensus. But there is a possibility that the G77 will try to force through a seabed text which is not generally acceptable, simply in order to meet the objective of signature of a Convention at Caracas in early 1980.

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 6: REFORM OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES

POINTS TO MAKE (defensive)

1 Agree that the General Assembly's work should be better organised. The Secretary-General's recent report is a useful compilation of proposals.

2 The UK joined other delegations in New York to study the question. We shall continue to work for practical measures to promote efficiency. Worth trying, but not optimistic that much will happen.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS (may be used as necessary)

- 1 With an increase in the number of delegations and in agenda items, successive General Assemblies have become increasingly unmanageable. The 1978 General Assembly, an organisational shambles, overran its time into January 1979.
- 2 An informal working group of delegates from all regional groups, meeting under the Chairmanship of the Canadian Permanent Representative (the "Barton Group"), produced an informal paper on UN procedures. The UK played an active part. In parallel, the Secretary-General has reported to the General Assembly on rationalisation of its procedures and organisation. There is much common ground in their suggestions for reform, covering the role of the General Committee, reduction and rationalisation of the agenda, organisation of work, documentation, budgetary questions, conduct of meetings and presiding officers.
- 3 Interested delegations in New York will consider the Secretary-General's report and hope to agree on proposals which might, if the will for compromise exists, be implemented at the next General Assembly (September to December in New York).

United Nations Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

6 July 1979

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 7: PEACEKEEPING

POINTS TO MAKE (defensive)

1 Support UN's peacekeeping and peacemaking roles.
We are part of UNFICYP and give logistic support to UNIFIL.

2 Not yet possible to complete studies of what detailed British policies might be. /If asked whether HMG will confirm Dr Owen's commitment of September 1978/. Too early to decide in detail how we shall support peacekeeping. /If pressed/ we must see how to reconcile it with our national defence capability, and with our public expenditure cuts.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

1 In his speech to the General Assembly of 27 September 1978, Dr Owen made a revised offer of UK support for UN peacekeeping, which included the offer of a battalion or marine commando group for up to six months at seven days' notice. A decision on whether to modify this commitment or let it stand may hinge on competing pressures on our defence forces (eg reinforcing Hong Kong) and on public expenditure levels (FCO would have to pay, at least initially).

2 This offer replaced an (unpublished) commitment of September 1973, made direct to the Secretary-General, for a brigade unit with logistic support (ie up to 5,000 men). This in turn replaced a commitment, announced in the House of Commons by Mr Stewart in 1965, of provision of logistic support for a UN peacekeeping force of up to six battalions.

3 There are UN peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, Sinai, Golan Heights and Lebanon, and peacekeeping observer missions on the Israeli borders and Kashmir.

4 The UK is a major contributor to UNFICYP in Cyprus - a battalion, logistic support for the entire force and a major financial contribution. The UK also supports UNIFIL in the Lebanon through provision of logistic support from the sovereign base areas in Cyprus, and provided transport and equipment for the Fijian and Nepalese contingents.

United Nations Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Department

6 July 1979

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WALDHEIM, KURT

Secretary-General of the United Nations

Austrian. Born 1918. University of Vienna (Doctor of Jurisprudence).

Austrian Diplomatic Service 1945-64. Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs 1968-70. Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations 1971-72. Elected Secretary-General of the United Nations 1972 and re-elected in 1976 (second term expires 1981).

Mr Waldheim is a painstaking and cautious man who sees his role primarily as a conciliator. He is touchy about the authority and prestige of the UN and appreciates recognition of his unique position in world politics. He has sought, with some success, to promote the wider involvement of the UN in issues of international peace and security as well as economic and social development.

Although he was aware when first elected that the UK had reservations about his candidature, he trusts and likes Britain and his relations with the UK Mission have been consistently good and helpful.

Married, two children (one son living in London).
Interests - horses and the UN.

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

1. 151 member states.
2. UN regular budget for 1978 and 1979 about \$986 million. UK assessed contribution 4.5 %; £9 million in 1978. Additional UK contribution to UN funds and agencies in 1978 £72 million.
3. Under the UN Charter, the principal organs are:-
 - a) The General Assembly, comprising all UN members and meeting in regular session from September to December each year. Emergency or special sessions may also be held.
 - b) The Security Council. 15 members. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UK has permanent membership under the Charter).
 - c) The Economic and Social Council. 54 members. Concerned with economic, social, cultural, health, and related matters and human rights. (UK has consistently secured re-election).
 - d) The Trusteeship Council. 5 members. Concerned with trust territories of which only the US trust territory of the Pacific remains (UK is a member under the Charter).
 - e) The International Court of Justice. The principal judicial organ.
 - f) The Secretariat.

4. Under provision for a Secretariat, the Charter provides for a Secretary-General (to be appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council) and such staff as the organisation may require. Headquarters staff now number about 5,700, worldwide UN staff about 18,300.

5. There are in addition a number of intergovernmental agencies related to the UN by special agreements. They include the International Labour Organisation, The Food and Agriculture Organisation, The World Health Organisation and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation is the only specialised agency based in London.

6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

SW
10/7

6 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

UN Secretary-General's Call on the Prime Minister: 12 July

I enclose a steering brief, and briefs on Rhodesia and the Middle East, for the Prime Minister's use when Dr Waldheim calls on her at 1700 hours for an hour on 12 July. A brief on Indo-China will follow as soon as consultations on policy, at present under way among Ministers, are complete.

As you know, Dr Waldheim will be seeing the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary before he calls on Mrs Thatcher.

Those accompanying Dr Waldheim on his visit to London include two Under-Secretaries-General (Mr Brian Urquhart, British, and Mr Buffum, American) and Mr Rohan, Director of the Secretary-General's executive office, the equivalent of Private Secretary. All of these, together with Mr Popovic who heads the UN Information Centre in London, will attend Dr Waldheim's discussions with Lord Carrington. We recommend the same for the Prime Minister, although Mr Popovic could be dropped if numbers were important. If you needed to cut the party down still further, we think you would have to exclude both Mr Urquhart and Mr Buffum, rather than attempting to choose between them. But both have come to London from elsewhere especially for the purpose of attending Dr Waldheim's talks with British Ministers. Perhaps you would let me know by telephone what you decide so that we can let the UN Information Centre know, since they are responsible for the visit arrangements.

✓ You may wish to include Sir Anthony Parsons. It would be useful for him to attend if the Prime Minister agrees.

Yours ever,
Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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VISIT BY UNITED NATIONS' SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 1: STEERING BRIEF

DR WALDHEIM'S VISIT

1. Dr Waldheim is to call on Mrs Thatcher for an hour from 1700 hours on 12 July following a call on Lord Carrington. Personality notes on Dr Waldheim and his party are attached, together with essential facts on the UN.
2. Dr Waldheim - who is conscious of his status - would have liked this to have been an official visit [with hospitality from the Prime Minister and possibly some kind of contact with HM The Queen] but accepted a deferment, making this a working visit. He arrives in London on 11 July and leaves on the morning of 13 July. He has no public engagements in London, but is likely to give interviews to the press and media. Dr and Mrs Waldheim will be the guests of Lord and Lady Carrington to a private supper on the evening of 12 July.
3. Dr Waldheim comes to London from a week in Geneva for organisational meetings and the opening of the summer session of the Economic and Social Council, followed by visits to Hungary and Romania. After leaving London he will pay a one-day visit to Madrid followed by an official visit to Angola and the opening of the OAU 16th Assembly in Liberia. He will then return to Geneva for the Conference on Indo-China Refugees.

AGENDA

4. There is no formal agenda for the meeting. Indo-China refugees, Rhodesia and the Middle East are automatic subjects. Dr Waldheim will also be interested in the Prime Minister's views on the Tokyo Summit and likely follow-up, particularly on the energy question. (Two years ago, Dr Waldheim submitted proposals to the General Assembly for some kind of UN energy body; he persists despite a general lack of enthusiasm among governments.) Briefs are attached on Rhodesia and the Middle East. A brief on Indo-China refugees will follow in the light of Ministerial decisions.



UK OBJECTIVES

- 5 a) To form a good working relationship with the UN Secretary-General;
- b) On Indo-China refugees, to enlist Dr Waldheim's aid in taking steps which might serve to obtain more resettlement places, and which might put pressure on Vietnam to change the repressive policies which cause the exodus; →
- c) On Rhodesia, to re-assure Dr Waldheim that the Government are making a serious attempt to win the widest possible international acceptance of the basis on which Rhodesia is brought to legal independence; →
- d) If the Middle East is raised, to urge Dr Waldheim - notwithstanding his own misgivings about Camp David - to use his influence to encourage constructive attitudes in the UN on the Middle East.

DR WALDHEIM'S PROBABLE OBJECTIVES

- 6 a) To exchange views on the international situation; to hear at first hand about the Tokyo Conference;
- b) On Indo-China refugees, to receive a significant offer of resettlement places and financial assistance; to know HMG's likely stand at the Geneva Conference;
- c) On Rhodesia, to argue the dangers of major confrontation over Rhodesia in the UN, and to dissuade UK from lifting sanctions without the concurrence of the Security Council.

RESUME OF BRIEFS

Rhodesia (Brief No 2)

- 7 An opportunity to explain policies including our view of the election, and to re-assure Dr Waldheim about the sincerity of our intentions. He may be concerned about a confrontation at the UN if the UK does not renew sanctions in November and is accused by other UN members of breaking its obligations under the Charter.

Middle East (Brief No 3)

- 8 The Security Council will shortly be considering whether UN forces should be used to supervise implementation of the peace treaty, Israeli settlements and the question of Palestine. We want the UN to take a constructive stand which will keep up pressure on Israel to review unacceptable policies, but to avoid extreme and unhelpful resolutions.

Refugees (Brief No 4)

- 9 To follow

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 July 1979



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WALDHEIM, KURT (DR)

Secretary-General of the United Nations

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Although he was aware when first elected that the UK had reservations about his candidature, he trusts and likes Britain and his relations with the UK Mission have been consistently good and helpful.

Married, two children (one son living in London). Interests - horses and the UN.

URQUHART, BRIAN EDWARD

Under Secretary-General, Special Political Affairs

British. Born 1919. Educated Christ Church, Oxford University.

Almost certainly the longest serving UN official. Has made his career in the UN which he joined in 1945. Personal Assistant to the first Secretary General from 1946-49. Posts included special missions to the Congo where he served as UN representative, Katanga, from 1961-2. Author of an outstanding biography of Hammarskjold published in 1972.

One of the outstanding international civil servants of his generation. Straight, trustworthy and modest. He remains devoted to UN ideals. His political sense is thoroughly realistic. Has never allowed close relations with successive UK Permanent Representatives to influence his impartiality.

The office of Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs covers UN peacekeeping forces and missions and special political missions, reporting to the Secretary-General.

BUFFUM, WILLIAM BURNSIDE

Under Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs

American. Born 1912. Educated Oneonta State Teachers' College, University of Pittsburgh, Oxford and Harvard Universities.

US Army 1943-46. US Foreign Service 1949-75 (including Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN 1967-70).

A shrewd, able and well disposed official who avoids the limelight.

ROHAN, ALBERT

Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General and Director
of his Executive Office.

On secondment from the Austrian Diplomatic Service.

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

ESSENTIAL FACTS: UNITED NATIONS

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6. The UN is represented in London by the UN Information Centre headed by Mr Michael Popovic (British).

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VISIT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

BRIEF NO 2 : RHODESIA

POINTS TO MAKE

1. We wish to work with other members of the international community. The Government's aim is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance.
2. We do not accept the views of those who seek to ignore the results of an election in which for the first time the entire adult population of Rhodesia were able to vote. Bishop Muzorewa has shown that he enjoys extensive popular support.
3. We are engaged in consultations with Commonwealth and other African leaders and with Bishop Muzorewa. There is a feeling that a solution will have to stem from the UK, as the legal authority. We intend to carry out our constitutional responsibility.

UN Role

4. The United Kingdom will have full regard to its obligations under Security Council resolutions. But it is our constitutional responsibility to decide the proper basis for independence.

Sanctions

5. Our objective is to bring Rhodesia to legal independence with wide international acceptance. The lifting of sanctions would follow naturally from this. If we cannot do so, a difficult situation will be created: there is unlikely to be a majority in Parliament for the continuance of sanctions in November.

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VISIT BY UN SECRETARY GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

Brief No : RHODESIA

BACKGROUND

1. Dr Waldheim will be concerned about the situation later in the year in the Security Council and General Assembly over Rhodesia, if the United Kingdom grants legal independence and lifts sanctions while other UN members adhere to the position laid down in previous Security Council Resolutions.

UK's International Obligations

2. If legal independence were granted to Rhodesia by an Act of Parliament this year, we would argue that the Chapter VII basis for the imposition of sanctions, which stemmed from the threat to the peace arising from the continuance of the illegal regime, had fallen away. The reaction in the Security Council would depend on how far we had managed to obtain the acquiescence of the Front Line States; if they were prepared to go along with us we should have little trouble from representatives of Third World countries. But if we were going against their wishes, we could expect fairly solid opposition from all but our fellow Western members of the Council. Our position would be defensible in international law, but would be challenged strongly at the United Nations by countries taking a different view.

3. If we failed to find a satisfactory basis for granting Rhodesia legal independence in the next few months and Parliament does not renew Section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 (which would lapse on 16 November) we should be in a more difficult situation. The consequential falling away of our sanctions controls would put us unarguably in breach of our treaty obligations under the UN Charter; and this would be particularly embarrassing to us as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. (There is a limited precedent in that the US Administration legalised the import of chrome from Rhodesia for a period in breach of sanctions, but this is not comparable to the lifting of all sanctions controls.) But by November it is possible that the US Congress will have forced the US Administration to lift sanctions

/and

and we and the Americans may thus find ourselves in similar positions.

Security Council

A 4. The UK (and US) have abstained on two Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia this year. Resolution 445, adopted on 8 March, declared that the elections to be held in Rhodesia in April were null and void and urged all States to refrain from sending observers to them. In his explanation of vote, the UK Representative said that we could not accept language which sought to circumscribe the functioning of our Parliamentary democracy, and that the British Parliament could not be fettered in any way as to how it might decide to inform itself about the situation in Rhodesia.

B 5. Resolution 448, adopted on 30 April, condemned the Rhodesian elections as being "aimed at retaining and extending a racist minority rule and at preventing the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority rule" and reaffirmed that their results were null and void. It called on all States not to accord recognition to any organ established as a result of the Rhodesian elections. In explaining the UK's abstention, the UK Representative repeated that the British Government had to preserve Parliament's freedom of action over Rhodesia and said that the UK did not regard the Resolution's recommendations as binding.

6. Resolution 445 requested the UN Sanctions Committee to report on measures for strengthening and widening sanctions against Rhodesia. This report was completed at the beginning of May and is due to be considered by the Security Council. However no arrangements have yet been made for a debate. Having pushed two Resolutions through the Security Council condemning the internal settlement, the African group at the United Nations may prefer to wait for the UK (or US) to take specific action over Rhodesia before they initiate a further debate. Their tactics may be discussed at the OAU Summit in Monrovia (16 - 19 July).

/UN General Assembly

UN General Assembly

7. Rhodesia is certain to be considered in the forthcoming Session of the UN General Assembly. In 1978, as in previous years, the General Assembly adopted two Resolutions on Rhodesia, dealing with political issues and sanctions respectively. The United Kingdom abstained on both Resolutions. Having joined in a consensus on the "political" Resolution in 1977, the UK could not support it in 1978 : the Resolution repeated provisions in Security Council Resolution 423 (1978) which precluded any recognition of an internal settlement and contained unacceptable references to "the Leadership of the Patriotic Front" of the people of Zimbabwe, and condemnation of Western countries. The sanctions Resolution inter alia condemned the supply of petroleum to Rhodesia by oil companies of the UK and other countries, and deplored "the complicity of successive UK Governments in the violation of UN sanctions by British oil companies".

Possible UN Role in a Rhodesian Settlement

8. Dr Waldheim may be interested to know whether a UN role has been one of the questions discussed in the United Kingdom's consultations with African Governments and the Patriotic Front. The Anglo-American proposals of 1977 envisaged a UN presence, including a UN Force, during a transitional period in Rhodesia. On the basis of these proposals, the UN Security Council authorised the Secretary General to appoint a representative (General Prem Chand) to work with Lord Carver.

Rhodesia Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
5 July 1979

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Distr.
GENERAL

S/PV.445 (1979)
8 March 1979

ANNEX E

RESOLUTION 445 (1979)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2122nd meeting
on 8 March 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular resolutions 253 (1968), 403 (1977), 411 (1977), 423 (1978), 424 (1978) and 437 (1978),

Taking note of the statement of the African Group contained in document S/13084,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Angola and Zambia,

Having also heard the statement of the representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe,

Gravely concerned over the indiscriminate military operations by the illegal régime and the extension of its premeditated and provocative acts of aggression not only against neighbouring independent countries, but also against non-contiguous States, resulting in wanton killings of refugees and civilian populations,

Indignant at the continued executions by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia of persons sentenced under repressive laws,

Reaffirming that the existence of the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of aggression against neighbouring independent States constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

79-05968

Gravely concerned over the moves within certain States to send missions to observe the so-called elections in April 1979 organized by the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of according it some legitimacy and thereby eventually lifting sanctions,

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 423 (1978), particularly its provisions declaring as illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement under the auspices of the illegal régime and calling upon all States not to accord any recognition to such a settlement,

Bearing in mind the responsibility of every Member State to adhere scrupulously to Security Council resolutions and decisions, and their responsibility to ensure that institutions and citizens under their jurisdiction observe the same,

1. Strongly condemns the recent armed invasions perpetrated by the illegal racist minority régime in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia against the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Zambia, which constitute a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries;

2. Commends the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Zambia and other front-line States for their support of the people of Zimbabwe in their just and legitimate struggle for the attainment of freedom and independence and for their scrupulous restraint in the face of serious provocations by the Southern Rhodesian rebels;

3. Requests all States to give immediate and substantial material assistance to enable the Governments of the front-line States to strengthen their defence capability in order to safeguard effectively their sovereignty and territorial integrity;

4. Requests the Administering Power to take all necessary measures to prevent further illegal executions in Southern Rhodesia;

5. Condemns all attempts and manoeuvres by the illegal régime, including its so-called elections of April 1979, aimed at retaining and extending a racist minority rule and at preventing the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority rule;

6. Declares any elections held under the auspices of the illegal racist régime and the results thereof null and void and that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member State to any representatives or organ established by that process;

7. Urges all States to refrain from sending observers to these elections and to take appropriate action to discourage organizations and institutions within their respective areas of jurisdiction from doing so;

8. Requests the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to meet immediately to consider measures for strengthening and widening the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and to submit its proposals not later than 23 March 1979;

9. Decides to meet, not later than 27 March 1979, to consider the report envisaged in paragraph 8.

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Mr. Huvv
Rhodesia, Rep
Pr
Russ
Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/448 (1979)
30 April 1979

RESOLUTION 448 (1979)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2143rd meeting
on 30 April 1979

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular resolutions 253 (1968), 403 (1977), 411 (1977), 423 (1978), 437 (1978) and 445 (1979) reaffirming the illegality of the Smith régime,

Having heard the statement of the Chairman of the African Group,

Having also heard the statement of the representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe,

Reaffirming Security Council resolution 445 (1979), particularly its provision declaring any elections held under the auspices of the illegal racist régime and the results thereof null and void and that no recognition will be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member State to any representative or organ established by that process,

Gravely concerned that the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia proceeded with the holding of sham elections in the territory in utter defiance of the United Nations,

Convinced that these so-called elections did not constitute a genuine exercise of the right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and national independence and were designed to perpetuate white racist minority rule,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the responsibility of every Member State to adhere scrupulously to Security Council resolutions and decisions, and their responsibility to ensure that institutions and citizens under their jurisdiction observe the same,

79-11861

/...

1. Strongly condemns all attempts and manoeuvres by the illegal régime, including the so-called elections of April 1979 aimed at retaining and extending a racist minority rule and at preventing the accession of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority-rule;
 2. Reaffirms the so-called elections, held under the auspices of the illegal racist régime, and the results thereof, as null and void;
 3. Reiterates its call to all States not to accord recognition to any representative of or organ established by that process and to observe strictly the mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.
-

VISIT BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 12 JULY 1979

MIDDLE EAST

Points to Make

- 1 Israel's behaviour over settlements and South Lebanon threatens the autonomy negotiations.

- 2 Need for UN to take up firm but not extreme positions on these issues. Strongly-worded resolutions to which the Nine and the US can subscribe will have more effect on Israeli opinion than resolutions calling for sanctions which will inevitably be vetoed.

- 3 If no progress in autonomy negotiations, may need to consider fresh UN resolution on nature of a comprehensive settlement, giving more weight to Palestinian rights.

- 4 Hope also that Secretary-General will be prepared to revive his proposal for a conference of all the parties under UN auspices, if necessary.

- 5 Britain will support use of UN forces to supervise Israel's withdrawal from Sinai.

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Background

1. Dr Waldheim has taken a generally negative view of Camp David and the Egypt/Israel peace treaty. He has expressed doubts about their compatibility with UN decisions and their ability to lead on to wider peace. He favours multilateral negotiations but has not so far produced new proposals or renewed the call he made after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 for a conference under UN auspices. It is difficult to see how such a conference could be convened at present. But if the autonomy negotiations break down or falter, there could be a scope for a multilateral initiative in which the Secretary-General could well have a role.

2. If the autonomy negotiations flag, there may be a call for a new Security Council resolution spelling out the requirements for a comprehensive settlement. This might endorse 242 but be more explicit about the need for a settlement to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. It would be hard to negotiate a text acceptable to all sides; and there would be a risk that Israel might withdraw her acceptance of 242. But it could restore Arab faith in Western intentions. The idea should be kept in reserve.

3. The peace treaty itself has not so far been specifically discussed at the UN. However it calls for supervision of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which would need to be redeployed for this purpose. The Arabs have called on the Secretary-General not to allow UN involvement in the treaty, and the Russians have said they will oppose use of UNEF, whose mandate is due for renewal on 24 July (when the UK has the Security Council Presidency).

Use of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) has been suggested as an alternative. This might be acceptable to the Russians. The Secretary-General has so far said he cannot use either force without the authority of the Security Council. It is not clear whether he himself favours use of UN forces.

4. Several sessions of the US/Egypt/Israel autonomy negotiations have now been held. While the fundamental disagreements have not yet been tackled and the prospects of success remain poor, the atmosphere has been reasonably constructive so far. The US chief negotiator, Mr Robert Strauss, is paying his first visit to the area in early July and Mr Begin and President Sadat are to meet again on 10 July.

5. Israeli settlements will be discussed in the Security Council in mid-July when an Investigating Commission set up in March reports back. Its report is bound to be severely critical of Israel. A strongly-worded resolution could probably be accepted by all Security Council members, but the Arabs may go further and demand sanctions against Israel. Neither we nor the Americans could accept this. There could also be a call for sanctions if and when the question of Palestine is brought back to the Security Council in the year.

U.N.

26 June 1979

Visit to London by Dr. Waldheim

Thank you for your letter of 25 June about the arrangements which have been made for Dr. Waldheim's visit to London on 12 July and its designation as a "working visit".

The Prime Minister is content with these arrangements and with the suggestion that Dr. Waldheim should be invited to pay an official visit to London sometime next year.

BGC

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KAD.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 June 1979

1. Min Hedges ✓
2. Prime Minister

Content with this arrangement?

BU
2/2
Yes no

Dear Bryan,

Visit to London by Dr Waldheim

Thank you for your letter of ~~6~~ June telling us that the Prime Minister agreed that the UN Secretary-General should be invited as the Government's official guest and that she would receive him on 12 July at 1700.

We subsequently received UKMis New York telno 578 (copy enclosed) suggesting that Dr Waldheim hoped he could be invited for a meal. Your office told us that the Prime Minister's diary was already so full that she would not be able to give Dr Waldheim a meal on this occasion. We therefore asked the Mission in New York to explain this to Dr Waldheim's office and to ask whether, in these circumstances, he would prefer that next month's visit should be classed as a working visit, in which case we would hope to arrange an official visit at some future date.

U Dr Waldheim has accepted this suggestion and said he hopes that an official visit might be arranged for next year. Lord Carrington regards this as a satisfactory outcome. He himself proposes to have a meeting with Dr Waldheim at 15.30 on 12 July following which, if the Prime Minister wishes, he would accompany Dr Waldheim to his call on her. Lord Carrington will entertain Dr and Mrs Waldheim that evening; they would depart for Africa on the following morning.


That is the sum of the official programme for the Secretary-General. He may have one or two unofficial engagements during the morning of 12 July, eg with the UN Association.

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

25 JUN 1979



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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 082178Z JUN 79
TO PRIORITY F C O
TEL NO 578 OF 8 JUNE

(67)

JUN 26 1979	
TO COPY	
BY	
FILED	

Notes - h.j. 11/6

FOLLOWING ~~PERSONAL~~ FOR REITH, UND
TELECON REITH/BYATT: VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. WE HAVE TOLD WALDHEIM'S OFFICE ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED FOR 12 JULY. THEY HAD IN FACT ALREADY HEARD FROM UNIC LONDON. THEY SAY THAT WALDHEIM IS VERY PLEASED AND, UNLESS THERE ARE THINGS WE WISH HIM TO DO, WOULD NOT MIND A FREE MORNING.

2. THEY SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS ONE POINT WHICH GIVES HIM CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IF THE VISIT IS TO BE AN OFFICIAL ONE (WE SAID WE WERE NOT YET SURE, BUT THOUGHT THAT SUCH WAS THE INTENTION). IT IS APPARENTLY THE PRACTICE THAT, WHEN ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO A MEMBER STATE, HOWEVER SHORT, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RECEIVES HOSPITALITY FROM THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. HIS OFFICE REMINDED US THAT, ON HIS LAST VISIT TO LONDON, HE HAD LUNCH WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DINNER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HE DOES NOT WISH NEXT MONTH'S VISIT TO LOOK "LESS IMPORTANT". HE VERY MUCH HOPES THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO FIT IN A MEAL, EITHER LUNCH OR DINNER, WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. HIS OFFICE SAY THAT, SINCE HE WILL BE TRAVELLING IN HIS OWN AIRCRAFT, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, THOUGH DIFFICULT, FOR HIM TO EXTEND HIS VISIT UNTIL AFTER LUNCH ON FRIDAY 13 JULY.

3. PLEASE ASCERTAIN AND LET US KNOW HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THIS SOUNDING.

RICHARD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES
UND
P & CD
to
PS/LPS
PS/VR, und
PS/PUS
SIR A PARSONS
SIR A DUFF
MR. CORTAZZI
MR MURRAY

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

BF United Nations VLB

6/7/79



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 June 1979

Visit to London by Dr. Waldheim

Thank you for your letter of 1 June about Dr. Waldheim's forthcoming visit to London.

The Prime Minister agrees that Dr. Waldheim should be invited as the Government's official guest and she would be glad to receive him on 12 July at 1700, probably in the House of Commons, for one hour.

I should be grateful if briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with Dr. Waldheim could reach me not later than 1800 on Friday 6 July.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRD



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1979

Prime Minister

1700

Dear Bryan

Would you agree to see Dr. Waldheim for, say, an hour on 12 July? It would be a good opportunity to discuss Cyprus. Best
A friend and
4/6

Visit to London by UN Secretary-General

You asked for advice on UKMis New York telno 509 (enclosed), which reports that the Secretary-General of the United Nations would like to visit London at an early opportunity to meet the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Dr Waldheim proposes 29 June or 12 July, with a preference for the latter.

Lord Carrington thinks there would be advantage in early discussions with Dr Waldheim and that it would be appropriate to invite him as an official guest of the Government. 29 June is ruled out by the Tokyo Summit; Thursday, 12 July, however, looks more promising. Lord Carrington suggests the Prime Minister might receive Dr Waldheim for a call in the late afternoon; this need not last more than 40 minutes.

Lord Carrington would himself propose to have a longer talk with Dr Waldheim earlier on in the afternoon and to give a dinner for him the same evening.

I am copying this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Stephen

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

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GPS120

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 240018Z MAY 79
TO PRIORITY F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 509 OF 23 MAY

FW advice
to follow.

PA. GYW
24/5

VISIT TO LONDON BY UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. WALDHEIM'S OFFICE TELEPHONED THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD LIKE TO TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO MEET YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER. HE IS DUE TO ATTEND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL SESSION, OPENING IN GENEVA ON 4 JULY, VISIT "A COUPLE OF EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES", AND THEN GO TO MONROVIA FOR THE OPENING OF THE OAU SUMMIT. HE COULD SPEND 29 JUNE OR 12 JULY IN LONDON IN THE COURSE OF THIS PROGRAMME. HIS PREFERENCE WOULD BE 12 JULY.

2. WE WERE ASKED WHETHER SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND WHETHER EITHER DATE WOULD BE CONVENIENT.

3. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THIS POST, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE HELPFUL IF YOU WERE ABLE TO RECEIVE WALDHEIM. IF THE CRITERIA PERMIT, HE MIGHT BE ASKED TO BE A GUEST OF HMG, AS ON HIS VISIT IN 1977.

4. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WHAT REPLY WE SHOULD GIVE.

MANSFIELD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

FILES

UND

NAD

EESD

WAD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HIRD

PS/PUS

SIR A PARSONS

MR LEAHY

MR BUTLER

MR BULLARD

MR FERGUSSON

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