

Confidential Filip

The question of <sup>and his election</sup> ~~the~~ Waldheim  
stay in ~~an~~ <sup>for</sup> a third term as  
UN Secretary General

UNITED  
NATIONS

May 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>6-5-81</del>							
<del>15-8-81</del>							
<del>26-10-81</del>							
<del>28-10-81</del>							
<del>29-10-81</del>							
<del>2-11-81</del>							
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<del>14-12-81</del>							
<del>21-12-81</del>							
<del>26-12-81</del>							
<del>25-1-82</del>							
8-2-82							

PREM 19/9/81

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

### Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
CC(81)41st Cons Min 2	17.12.81

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed R. Porman

Date 31 Oct. 2012

**PREM Records Team**



*United Nations* (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

8 February 1982

*Prime Minister*

*To see.*

*A.S.C. 1/2*

Dear John,

*A.S.C. 10/2*

Election of UN Secretary-General: Messages

*p.a.*

You wrote on 21 December to Roderic Lyne enclosing a letter from the Prime Minister to the outgoing UN Secretary-General.

Dr Waldheim has now replied, in a letter dated 29 January and transmitted via our Permanent Mission in New York. I enclose this reply.


*Yours ever,*

*John Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

8 FEB 1982



*Dr. Kurt Waldheim*

29 January 1982

*Dear Prime Minister,*

I should like to thank you most sincerely for your thoughtful letter of 21 December 1981.

May I take this opportunity to express, for my part, my sincere gratitude to you personally and to the members of your Government for the help and support you have given me in my challenging task. I also wanted at this time to tell you that I indeed deeply appreciated the kind words of recognition you found for my work.

Let me also say again how much I valued our meetings and the constructive and cordial exchanges of views we had on those occasions. This has greatly encouraged me in my efforts to promote peace and better international understanding.

My wife joins me in sending you and your family our warmest good wishes for your personal well-being and success in all your future endeavours.

With kind personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Kurt Waldheim*

Her Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland



*aw*

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 January 1982

*Prime Minister*

*A.J.C. 26. 1*

*f.a. Add. 1/2*

*Dear John,*

Message from the new Secretary-General of the UN

You will recall that in December the Prime Minister wrote to Mr Perez de Cuellar congratulating him on his appointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I enclose Mr Perez de Cuellar's reply, received through our Mission in New York.

*yours etc*  
*Rodric Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

8 January 1982

Excellency,

I should like to thank you most sincerely for your kind message on my appointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I deeply appreciate your good wishes for the unique and challenging task entrusted to me. The confidence and support expressed in this regard by the Member States of the United Nations will indeed be a constant source of strength and encouragement for my endeavours in the service of the international community. In this connexion, I look forward to our close and constructive co-operation in the strengthening of peace and the promotion of greater understanding among the nations of the world.

With my best wishes for your personal well-being and for the prosperity of the people of the United Kingdom, please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Javier Pérez de Cuéllar', written in a cursive style.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Her Excellency  
The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher M.P.  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
London

010



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Prime Minister  
to see. You wrote to him  
earlier and no further letter is  
necessary.

④  
UN

26 December 1981

A.G.C.

H.A.  
M.G.

Excellency,

As I am about to leave office after having served as Secretary-General of the United Nations for the past ten years, I want to thank you most sincerely for the kind co-operation you have consistently extended to me.

As you know, the support of Member States has been of the utmost importance to me in my endeavours. In this regard, our constructive collaboration and the valuable assistance which you personally and your Government have given me have always been a source of strength and encouragement. I have highly valued the opportunities I have had to meet with you and the very cordial and helpful exchanges of views we had on those occasions.

I am confident that the excellent relations prevailing between the United Nations and your country will be maintained and further strengthened under my successor. You may be sure that I shall continue to follow with interest and commitment the efforts of the world community to promote peace and international understanding.

May I take this opportunity to send you my warmest good wishes for your personal well-being and success in the discharge of your important responsibilities.

With kind personal regards,


Yours sincerely,

Kurt Waldheim

Her Excellency  
The Rt.Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP  
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland



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NO. 1000000



*United Nations*

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

21 December 1981

Election of UN Secretary-General: Messages

My letter of 17 December promised that a signed letter from the Prime Minister to Dr. Waldheim would follow.

I now enclose a signed letter and would be grateful if you would arrange for it to be delivered.

A. J. COLES

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



VB

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

21 December 1981

*Dear Mr. Waldheim.*

At the end of your distinguished period of office as Secretary-General of the United Nations I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the British Government and the people of Britain, to express to you our warm thanks for your untiring efforts on behalf of the United Nations over the last 10 years. Throughout a period of great political difficulty and rapid change, you have defended the rule of international law and upheld the provisions of the Charter. You have worked with the greatest devotion to duty for the peaceful settlement of many intractable disputes. And you have enjoyed through this long and immensely difficult period the confidence and respect of the international community. All this represents a remarkable achievement for which you deserve the congratulations and thanks of the Member States and their governments.

Please accept my very best wishes for your future.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Raymond Whelan*

His Excellency Dr. Kurt Waldheim, G.C.M.G.

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21 DEC 1981	
DESK OF	OFFICE
INDEX	FILE
CONFIDENTIAL	

41668 - 1

TOP COPY

OO UKMIS NEW YORK  
GRS 177

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM FCO 171700Z DEC 81  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 899 OF 17 DECEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY LIMA

329

MY TELNO 888 : NEW SECRETARY-GENERAL : MESSAGES

1. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED TO THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR WHICH YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DELIVER IF IT SHOULD BECOME APPROPRIATE, EG IF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS SEND MESSAGES.

'ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, I SEND WARM CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION TO THE POST OF SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

YOUR ELECTION IS A FITTING TRIBUTE TO THE OUTSTANDING QUALITIES YOU HAVE SHOWN IN MANY YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. THERE HAS SADLY BEEN NO DIMINUTION IN THE NUMBER OF DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE UNITED NATIONS. I ASSURE YOU OF THE WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR YOUR EFFORTS IN DEALING WITH THEM. AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BRITAIN LOOKS FORWARD TO WORKING IN CLOSE HARMONY WITH YOU.

WITH BEST WISHES  
MARGARET THATCHER''

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

LIMITED

UND

S AM D

NEWS D

SAD

PS

PS/LPS

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

SIR A ACLAND

MR BULLARD

MR GOODISON

LORD N G LENNOX

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

17 December 1981

Election of UN Secretary-General: Messages

Thank you for your letter of 15 December. The Prime Minister has approved:

- 13/14
- (a) the message to the Prime Minister of Peru as drafted;
  - (b) the message to Mr. Perez de Cuellar, though the third sentence should stop at the words "the United Nations". The next sentence should begin "I assure you".
  - (c) the message to Mr. Waldheim.

✓ The procedure you propose for handling these messages is also acceptable. A signed letter from the Prime Minister to Mr. Waldheim will follow.

ASE

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

010

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 December 1981

Prime Minister

Yes  
not

Agree the 3 messages attached?

A.F.C. 16/12

Dear John,

Election of UN Secretary-General:  
Messages

The Prime Minister of Peru has sent Mrs Thatcher a telex thanking us for our support in the election of Mr Perez de Cuellar as Secretary-General of the United Nations. We recommend that the Prime Minister should reply to this message, and I enclose a draft. If agreed, we will telegraph this reply to HM Embassy, Lima, for delivery to Mr Elias.

Lord Carrington will be sending a message to Mr Perez de Cuellar as soon as the General Assembly have confirmed his appointment, and will take the opportunity to invite the new Secretary-General to visit London fairly soon during his period of office. We would see advantage in giving Sir A Parsons discretion also to deliver a message from the Prime Minister if he judges it appropriate to do so (eg if the Heads of Government of other Permanent Members send messages). A draft is enclosed accordingly.


When Mr Waldheim's term of office expires at the end of the year it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister, as well as Lord Carrington, to send him a message of appreciation. A text is suggested in the third enclosed draft. If agreed, it will be held until 31 December and handed over, together with that from Lord Carrington, by the Permanent Representative in New York on that day. On this occasion I think that a signed copy, dated 31 December, would be appreciated (in confirmation of the telegraphic text).

Yours  
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

John Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

16 DEC 1981



MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
OF PERU

Dear Prime Minister

Thank you for your message about the Security Council's decision to recommend Mr Perez de Cuellar as the new Secretary General of the United Nations. We are delighted at the success of Mr Perez de Cuellar, who has already given outstanding service to the United Nations. We have every confidence that, as Secretary General, he will carry out his important and ~~d~~ difficult task with distinction and impartiality. His election is indeed a credit to Peru.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

MARGARET THATCHER

*M.*




DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR PEREZ DE  
CUELLAR

On behalf of the British Government and the people of the United Kingdom, I send warm congratulations on your election to the post of Secretary General of the United Nations.

Your election is a fitting tribute to the outstanding qualities you have shown in many years of diplomatic activity. There has sadly been no diminution in the number of difficult and dangerous problems confronting the United Nations, ~~and I would~~ assure you of the wholehearted support of the British Government for your efforts in dealing with them. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council, Britain looks forward to working in close harmony with you.

With best wishes.

MARGARET THATCHER



MESSAGE FROM THE <sup>PRIME</sup>~~PRIME~~ MINISTER TO MR WALDHEIM

Dear Mr Waldheim/Dear Kurt (as appropriate)

At the end of your distinguished period of office as Secretary-General of the United Nations I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the British Government and the people of Britain, to express to you our warm thanks for your untiring efforts on behalf of the United Nations over the last 10 years. Throughout a period of great political difficulty and rapid change, you have defended the rule of international law and upheld the provisions of the Charter. You have worked with the greatest devotion to duty for the peaceful settlement of many intractable disputes. And you have enjoyed through this long and immensely difficult period the confidence and respect of the international community. All this represents a remarkable achievement for which you deserve the congratulations and thanks of the Member States and their governments.

Please accept my very best wishes for your future.

Yours sincerley  
 MARGARET THATCHER

Prime Minister  
 H. delete  
 as appropriate

100 26.  
 12

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 175A/81

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM LIMA, 11TH DECEMBER 1981

TO THE RT. HONORABLE  
MRS. MARGARET THATCHER

*cc Thatcher sec  
ops*

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

WE ARE HAPPY AND GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN THE ELECTION FOR AMBASSADOR JAVIER PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS. WE ARE HONORED AS A NATION AND THANKS TO YOUR FRIENDLY SUPPORT, WE INTERPRET THIS EVENT AS REPRESENTATIVE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF PERU.

VERY CORDIALLY,

MANUEL ULLOA ELIAS  
PRIME MINISTER AND  
MINISTER OF ECONOMY, FINANCE AND COMMERCE

LIMITED  
UND  
S AM D  
CCD  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR A ACLAND  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR DAY  
MR GOODISON

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

11 December 1981

UN Secretary General

You wrote to me on 10 December about the course of action which Sir Anthony Parsons proposed to take in the next stage of this election. In a separate letter you propose a draft reply to the message which the Prime Minister had received from the President of Guyana concerning the candidature of Mr. Ramphal.

As I told you earlier on the telephone, the Prime Minister is content for Sir Anthony Parsons to proceed as he recommends (on the assumption that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is also content). The Prime Minister has also approved the draft reply to the President of Guyana.

*ALC*

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 120021Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1536 OF 11 DECEMBER

INFO SAVING TO VIENNA, DAR ES SALAAM, MEXICO CITY, WASHINGTON, PARIS,  
 UKMIS GENEVA, QUITO, PANAMA CITY, BUENOS AIRES, LIMA, GEORGETOWN,  
 PORT LOUIS, MANILA.

MIPT: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. THE COUNCIL MET IN RESTRICTED INFORMAL SESSION THIS MORNING,  
 WITHOUT SECRETARIAT, INTERPRETERS OR MICROPHONES. OTUNNU WAS ABLE  
 TO PROCEED STRAIGHT TO THE INFORMAL SOUNDINGS.

2. ONE PIECE OF PAPER, HEADED QUOTE DISCOURAGEMENT OF CANDIDATES  
 UNQUOTE WAS HANDED TO EACH OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND ANOTHER  
 PIECE OF PAPER, HEADED QUOTE ENCOURAGEMENT FOR CANDIDATES UNQUOTE,  
 TO ALL FIFTEEN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. AFTER THESE HAD BEEN MARKED  
 AND COLLECTED, OTUNNU ANNOUNCED THE RESULTS TO THE COUNCIL. THE  
 QUOTE DISCOURAGEMENT UNQUOTE VOTES RECEIVED BY THE CANDIDATES AS  
 FOLLOWS:

SADRUDDIN	1
ROSEMENA MONROY	4
ILLUECA	4
ORTIZ DE ROSAS	2
PEREZ DE CUELLAR	-
QUIJANO-CABALLERO	4
RAMPHAL	3
RAMPHUL	4
SALAS	4

IT WAS EASY TO WORK OUT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DISCOURAGED EVERYONE  
 EXCEPT PEREZ DE CUELLAR, THE CHINESE HAD DISCOURAGED NO ONE, THE  
 FRENCH HAD DISCOURAGED EVERYONE EXCEPT SADRUDDIN AND PEREZ DE  
 CUELLAR, THE AMERICANS EVERYONE EXCEPT SADRUDDIN, ORTIZ DE ROSAS  
 AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND WE EVERYONE EXCEPT THOSE THREE AND  
 RAMPHAL.

3. THE RESULTS OF THE QUOTE ENCOURAGEMENT UNQUOTE EXERCISE WERE AS  
 FOLLOWS:

SADRUDDIN	9
ROSEMENA MONROY	2
ILLUECA	6
ORTIZ DE ROSAS	7

PEREZ DE CUELLAR	8
QUIJANO-CABALLERO	0
RAMPHAL	4
RAMPHUL	0
SALAS	3

4. THE INFORMAL MEETING WAS THEN ADJOURNED WHILE OTUNNU COMMUNICATED THESE RESULTS TO THE CANDIDATES. HE HAD TOLD ME BEFOREHAND THAT EACH CANDIDATE WOULD BE TOLD ONLY THE RESULT HE HAD ACHIEVED: OTUNNU WOULD DECLINE TO REVEAL HOW OTHER CANDIDATES HAD FARED. ILLUECA AND RAMPHUL DECIDED TO WITHDRAW AT THIS STAGE. OTUNNU THEN PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO FORMAL BALLOTING ON THE REMAINING SEVEN, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH QUIJANO-CABALLERO AND SALAS. HE URGED THE COUNCIL THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESS ON: IF WE DELAYED THERE WOULD BE A WAVE OF SPECULATION ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE INFORMAL SOUNDINGS. IN SPITE OF MISGIVINGS ON THE PART OF DORR (IRELAND) THIS WAS AGREED.

5. THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST (AND FINAL) BALLOT WERE AS FOLLOWS (P M = PERMANENT MEMBER):

	YES	NO	ABSTENTION
SADRUDDIN			
PM'S	4	1	-
NON PM'S	5	1	4
TOTAL	9	2	4
AROSEMENA-MONROY			
PM'S	-	3	2
NON PM'S	1	5	4
TOTAL	1	8	6
ORTIZ DE ROSAS			
PM'S	2	1	2
NON PM'S	4	2	4
TOTAL	6	3	6
PEREZ DE CUELLAR			
PM'S	4	-	1
NON PM'S	6	1	3
TOTAL	10	1	4
QUIJANO-CABALLERO			
PM'S	-	3	2
NON PM'S	-	7	3
TOTAL	-	10	5

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RAMPHAL			
PM'S	1	1	3
NON PM'S	3	2	5
TOTAL	4	3	8
SALAS			
PM'S	1	3	1
NON PM'S	2	5	3
TOTAL	3	8	4

6. PEREZ DE CUELLAR THUS WON IN THE FIRST BALLOT (17TH IN THE SERIES OVERALL). THE COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY A RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT HE BE APPOINTED SECRETARY GENERAL FOR FIVE YEARS FROM 1 JANUARY 1982.

7. SEE MIFT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL EXCEPT WASHINGTON.

PARSONS

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UND  
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MCAD  
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NAD  
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PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR DAY  
SIR A ACLAND  
MR GOODISON

COPIES TO:  
MR BERMAN LEGAL ADVS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1981

*Dear John,*

UN Secretary General Elections: Message to  
Prime Minister from President of Guyana

Thank you for your letter of 10 December enclosing the text of a telegram to the Prime Minister from the President of Guyana. When President Burnham raised this with the Prime Minister on 10 November, the Prime Minister simply took note.

The Prime Minister could reply in the following terms:

'Dear President Burnham,

Thank you for your message about the elections in the UN Security Council for a successor to Mr Waldheim. We have worked closely with Sonny Ramphal during his time as Commonwealth Secretary General, and as you say this record speaks for itself.

It was kind of you to write to me about this important matter.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely

Margaret Thatcher'

If agreed, we will telegraph this reply to Georgetown for delivery to President Burnham. Given that the balloting is due to resume on 11 December, it would be useful if this acknowledgement could be despatched from London tomorrow morning.

*yours ever*  
*R M J Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DEC 1981



CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 December 1981

*Dear John,*

UN Secretary General

/ I attach Sir Anthony Parsons's telegram No 510 of today's date.

We shall be consulting the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary about this telegram overnight, and are recommending that he should endorse the course of action proposed by Sir Anthony Parsons. Inter alia, this would mean that Sir Anthony Parsons would be ready if necessary to cast a veto against the four candidates listed in paragraph 7(c) of the telegram.

I should be grateful if you could let me know on the morning of 11 December if the Prime Minister has any objections to the line which, subject to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's views, we propose to take in New York.

*yours etc*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing St

CONFIDENTIAL

CO UKDEL NATO DESKBY 101600Z

1100

DEDIP  
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 101600Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 101530Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1510 DATED 10 DECEMBER 81

AND TO UKDEL NATO

H D O N D

YOUR TELNO 853 AND MY TELNO 1508: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. IN THE ROUND OF ACTIVITY WHICH IS TO BEGIN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW MORNING (11 DECEMBER), WE SHOULD, I SUGGEST, HAVE TWO PARALLEL OBJECTIVES. THE FIRST IS TO TRY TO ENSURE THAT THIS ROUND PRODUCES AGREEMENT IN THE COUNCIL ON A RECOMMENDATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IF WE DO NOT DO SO, THERE WILL BE AN INCREASED RISK THAT THE COUNCIL WILL DRIFT INTO TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF WALDHEIM OR SOME OTHER STOP-GAP ARRANGEMENT AND/OR THAT THERE WILL BE A DAMAGING CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY. THERE WOULD ALSO BE THE RISK THAT CASTANEDA WOULD ENTER THE CONTEST, WITH THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BRING US (THOUGH MRS KIRKPATRICK TOLD ME YESTERDAY IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT THE US WOULD VETO HIM IF HE CAME TO THE VOTE; SHE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO SEEK MY COMPANY IN DOING SO),
2. OUR SECOND, AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT, OBJECTIVE IS OF COURSE TO TRY TO ENSURE THE ELECTION OF THE BEST POSSIBLE SECRETARY GENERAL, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF UK AND WESTERN INTERESTS. OF THE NINE CANDIDATES WE NOW HAVE, FOUR ARE BUFFOONS AND NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. YOU ALREADY HAVE MY VIEWS ON ILLUECA AND RAMPHUL. FROM WHAT LITTLE WE CAN LEARN HERE BOTH AROSEMENA-MONROY AND QUIJANO-CABALLERO FALL INTO THE GROTESQUE/BUFFOON CATEGORY. OF THE REMAINING FIVE, IT HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED IN EARLIER CORRESPONDENCE THAT SADRUDDIN, PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND ORTIZ DE ROSAS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE SECRETARIES GENERAL, IN THAT ORDER OF PREFERENCE.

3. THAT LEAVES RAMPHAL AND SALAS. MY OWN VIEW ON RAMPHAL IS THAT HE WOULD BE AS COMPETENT A SECRETARY GENERAL AS WE CAN EXPECT TO GET, THOUGH NOT ONE WITH WHOM WE WOULD ALWAYS FIND IT COMFORTABLE TO LIVE: I NOTE FROM WILLIAMS' TELELETTER UN 010/6 9 DECEMBER THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES YOU MIGHT BE PREPARED TO VOTE FOR HIM. AS FOR SALAS, HE IS A SMOOTH AND PLAUSIBLE OPERATOR IN THE UN CONTEXT. HE IS HIGHLY AMERICANISED, GOOD AT PUBLIC RELATIONS AND AT FUND RAISING, BUT NOT TO BE TRUSTED, FROM WHAT LITTLE I HAVE SEEN AND HEARD OF HIM. I RATHER DOUBT WHETHER HE WOULD COMMAND THE RESPECT THE JOB REQUIRES AND I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE HIS CANDIDACY. BUT IF (WHICH I THINK VERY UNLIKELY) HE WERE THE ONLY ONE OF THE PRESENT CANDIDATES WHO SEEMED LIKELY TO OBTAIN NINE VOTES AND ESCAPE THE VETO, ACCEPTING HIM AS SECRETARY GENERAL MIGHT BE A LESSER EVIL THAN FAILING TO PRODUCE A RESULT AT ALL (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE).

4. THE FIRST STAGE IN THE COUNCIL'S CONSIDERATION OF THESE NINE CANDIDATES WILL BE THE INFORMAL SOUNDINGS AT TOMORROW MORNING'S MEETING. THE SCENARIO FOR THESE WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM THAT ON WHICH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WERE BASED, IN THAT I SHALL HAVE TO MARK TWO PAPERS, ONE INDICATING THOSE CANDIDATES WE WOULD "ENCOURAGE", IE VOTE FOR IN A FORMAL BALLOT, AND THE OTHER INDICATING THOSE WE WOULD "DISCOURAGE", IE VOTE AGAINST. I THINK WE MUST ASSUME THAT INTERESTED OBSERVERS WILL BE ABLE TO WORK OUT AFTER THE EVENT WHICH OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS "DISCOURAGED" WHICH CANDIDATES BUT WE CAN BE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT OUR MARKS ON THE OTHER PAPER WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL.

5. AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND I RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD "DISCOURAGE" ALL FOUR BUFFOONS. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT I SHOULD "ENCOURAGE" BOTH OUR PREFERRED CANDIDATES (SADRUDDIN, PEREZ DE CUELLAR). GIVEN OUR PREFERENCE FOR THE FIRST TWO NAMED OVER ORTIZ-DE-ROSAS AND OUR DOUBTS ABOUT RAMPHAL, I PROPOSE THAT I SHOULD NOT "ENCOURAGE" THEM AND THAT I SHOULD SIMILARLY ABSTAIN ON SALAS.

6. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE COUNCIL WILL PROCEED TO FORMAL VOTING TOMORROW (YOUR TELNO 863). CTUNNU DID NOT LAY DOWN ANY PRECISE TIMETABLE FOR THE DAY'S PROCEEDINGS. HE IS HOWEVER VERY KEEN THAT WE SHOULD START FORMAL VOTING ON FRIDAY AND IS MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR INSTANT CONSULTATION OF THE CANDIDATES AFTER THE INFORMAL SOUNDINGS. WE MAY THEREFORE BE VOTING ON FRIDAY AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS FOR THAT EVENTUALITY.

7. FOR THE PURPOSES OF FORMAL BALLOTING, I SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD DIVIDE THE CANDIDATES INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

A. OUR PREFERRED CANDIDATES: SADRUDDIN AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN THAT ORDER:

B CANDIDATES WHOM WE COULD TOLERATE AS SECRETARY GENERAL BUT WHO ARE NOT OUR PREFERRED CHOICE: ORTIZ DE ROSAS, RAMPHAL AND SALAS, IN THAT ORDER:

C CANDIDATES WHO WOULD BE INTOLERABLE AS SECRETARY GENERAL AND WHOM IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE FOR US, AS A PERMANENT MEMBER, NOT TO VOTE AGAINST: ILLUECA, RAMPHUL, ARESMENA-MONROY, QUIJANO-CABALLERO. WE HAVE A REPUTATION HERE FOR SERIOUSNESS, MORE SO THAN THE FRENCH. IF WE WERE KNOWN TO HAVE ABSTAINED ON SUCH CANDIDATES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY WOULD NOT GET NINE VOTES, A LOT OF PEOPLE HERE WOULD SNEER AT US FOR GOING TO SUCH A LENGTH TO SAFEGUARD BILATERAL INTERESTS.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT IN THE FIRST BALLOT I SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF CATEGORY A, ABSTAIN ON CATEGORY B AND VOTE AGAINST CATEGORY C (ASSUMING OF COURSE THAT THEY DO NOT DECIDE TO DROP OUT AFTER THE INFORMAL SCOUNDINGS). I HAVE CONSIDERED RECOMMENDING THAT IN THE FIRST ROUND I SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF BOTH CATEGORY A AND CATEGORY B. THERE ARE TWO ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THIS COURSE: FIRST, IT WOULD ENABLE US TO RETAIN FULL TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY UNTIL WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO TAKE A FIRST READING OF THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE CANDIDATES AND IN PARTICULAR WHETHER ANY OF THEM WAS BEING VETOED; SECONDLY, IT WOULD ENABLE US TO SAY AFTERWARDS TO ANY CANDIDATES FROM WHOM IT MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO HAVE WITHHELD SUPPORT (EG ORTIZ DE ROSAS, RAMPHAL) THAT WE HAD VOTED FOR THEM AT THE BEGINNING AND HAD ONLY SWITCHED TO AN ABSTENTION WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THEY WERE NOT GOING TO WIN. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DANGER OF THIS COURSE IS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WITH ANY ACCURACY HOW MANY VOTES THE VARIOUS CANDIDATES WILL GET ON THE FIRST ROUND AND THAT WE MIGHT BE INSTRUMENTAL IN LETTING IN ONE OF OUR CATEGORY B CANDIDATES ON THE FIRST ROUND. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND AS ABOVE. TO PUT IT PLAINLY, WE WOULD KICK OURSELVES IF WE PROVIDED THE NINTH VOTE (WITH NO VETO) FOR RAMPHAL ON THE FIRST ROUND WITH SADRUDDIN AND/OR PEREZ DE CUELLAR GETTING EIGHT VOTES AND NO VETO, THUS HAVING AN EXCELLENT CHANCE AFTER ANOTHER ROUND OR TWO.

9. ASSUMING THAT THE FIRST ROUND DOES NOT PRODUCE A CLEAR RESULT, I HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE TIME TO CONSULT YOU BEFORE WE PROCEED TO SECOND AND SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS. BUT IF NOT, I RECOMMEND THAT I BE INSTRUCTED TO WORK FOR A RESULT IN WHICH ONE OF OUR CATEGORY A OR CATEGORY B CANDIDATES IS RECOMMENDED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR APPOINTMENT, IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF PREFERENCE: SADRUDDIN, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, ORTIZ DE ROSAS, RAMPHAL, SALAS. THIS WILL MEAN GIVING ME TACTICAL DISCRETION TO SWITCH FROM VOTES IN FAVOUR TO ABSTENTIONS ON VARIOUS OF THE CANDIDATES AS THE RACE DEVELOPS.

10. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS TOLD ME THAT THEIR PREFERRED CANDIDATES ARE SADRUDDIN AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN THAT ORDER. HE THINKS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN PARIS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO VOTE FOR ORTIZ DE ROSAS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REASONS. HE HAS NOT VOUCHSAFED ANY VIEWS ABOUT RAMPHAL. MRS KIRKPATRICK ALSO PUTS SADRUDDIN AT THE TOP OF HER LIST BUT WOULD PUT ORTIZ DE ROSAS AHEAD OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

11. FCO AND UKDEL NATO: PLEASE DISTRIBUTE THIS TELEGRAM ONLY TO PRIVATE SECRETARY, PS/MR HURD, PS/PUS, SIR A ACLAND, GOODISON AND WILLIAMS, UND.

PARSONS

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12. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS TOLD ME THAT THEIR PREFERRED CANDIDATES ARE SADRUDDIN AND PEREZ DE CUELLAR IN THAT ORDER. HE THINKS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN PARIS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO VOTE FOR ORTIZ DE ROSAS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS REASONS. HE HAS NOT VOUCHSAFED ANY VIEWS ABOUT RAMPHAL. MRS KIRKPATRICK ALSO PUTS SADRUDDIN AT THE TOP OF HER LIST BUT WOULD PUT ORTIZ DE ROSAS AHEAD OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR.

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PARSONS

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Private Secretary

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## ELECTION OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The informal soundings on possible third candidacies have just been completed in the Security Council with the following results:

	Members 'encouraging' candidate	Permanent Members 'discouraging'
Sadruddin	9 (UK)	1 (USSR)
Perez de Cuellar	8 (UK)	0
Ortiz	7	2 (F, USSR)
Ramphal	4	3 (F, US, USSR)
Salas	3	4
Illueca	6	4
Ramphal	0	4
Arosemena	2	4
Quijano	0	4

} all but China

2. The President is now consulting each candidate and hopes to proceed with the formal voting in half an hour or so.

*N C R Williams*

N C R Williams  
United Nations Department  
5.40 pm

cc: PS/Mr Hurd  
PS/PUS  
Sir A Acland  
Mr Goodison

UN

10 December 1981

UN Secretary General

I enclose a copy of a telegram which the Prime Minister has received from the President of Guyana seeking support for the candidature of Mr. Sonny Ramphal for the post of UN Secretary General.

I should be grateful if you would provide a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send in the next few days.

JOHN COLES

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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T174/81

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SUBJECT

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HQ UNQ

FOLLOWING FOR : .-MARGARET THATCHER,  
PRIME MINISTER,  
UNITED KINGDOM.  
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129.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE

YOUR EXCELLENCY, SERIAL No. T174/81

I WRITE TO YOU IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES FOLLOWING THE IMPASSE IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF THE CANDIDATURES OF SECRETARY-GENERAL KURT WALDHEIM AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALIM AHMED SALIM OF TANZANIA FOR THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP STOP SONNY RAMPHAL, CURRENTLY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL AND FORMERLY FOREIGN MINISTER OF GUYANA IS WILLING TO OFFER HIS SERVICES AND BE CONSIDERED FOR APPOINTMENT STOP AS I TOLD YOU WHEN WE MET ON NOVEMBER 10, HE HAS MY COMPLETE SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE.

SONNY RAMPHAL'S WORK ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION ARE WELL KNOWN STOP HIS RECORD AS FOREIGN MINISTER OF GUYANA AND NOW AS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH SERVING 46 COUNTRIES OF ALL CONTINENTS IS MY BEST TESTIMONY OF HIS WORTH AS A TRUE INTERNATIONALIST, AN EXPERIENCED ADMINISTRATOR AND A MAN OF BOTH VISION AND PRACTICALITY STOP IN HIS CURRENT OFFICE HE ALREADY BELONGS TO A WIDER COMMUNITY THAN GUYANA, OR INDEED ANY ONE GEOGRAPHIC REGION, AND IT IS OUR PRIVILEGE TO PUT HIM FORWARD FOR SERVICE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE BELIEF OF HIS BEING ACCEPTABLE TO A WIDE CROSS-SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY STOP I HOPE HIS CANDIDATURE WOULD BE WELCOME TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND I SEEK YOUR SUPPORT FOR IT.

YOURS SINCERELY,

L.F.S. BURNHAM  
PRESIDENT  
CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA.

FOREIGN GUYANA.

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON


THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

7 December 1981

My dear Bonnie Hunter,

On 17 November I wrote to you enclosing the text of a letter from the Australian Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Malcolm Fraser, concerning Mr Salim's candidature for Secretary-General of the United Nations.

.... I now enclose the original of Mr Fraser's letter.

Sincerely,  


R.V. GARLAND

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1.

SUBJECT



PRIME MINISTER'S

PRIME MINISTER

PERSONAL MESSAGE

CANBERRA

SERIAL No. T 158/81

19 NOV 1981

My Dear Margaret

I am sure you will understand that we have been taking a close interest here in the progress of the UN Secretary-General election.

I was impressed by Salim Salim when I met him in Melbourne during CHOGM. I think that his experience, and his own personal qualities, would make him an excellent Secretary-General.

Australia's close relationship with Salim began while he was Chairman of the UN Committee of 24 on Decolonization. He acted with firmness and restraint, and was to a large degree responsible for the adoption in the Committee of 24 and the General Assembly of moderate and responsible resolutions on small territories.

Given the support that has built up for Salim in the Assembly - support which includes a large number of friends and allies of the United States - I am not convinced that the United States is necessarily committed to maintaining a veto of Salim. On the other hand, the Chinese veto of Kurt Waldheim seems firmly entrenched.

I think it would be difficult now for Waldheim to command the necessary Third World support to be fully effective in a third term. On the other hand Salim's prestige as an incoming Secretary-General would not be impaired by the voting to date. In these circumstances it would seem a pity to have to settle on any less attractive third candidate.

I know that the United Kingdom has not vetoed Salim. I wonder, however, whether you might not come to the conclusion that it would be helpful in the present situation for the United Kingdom to be quite positive in support of Salim? This might have a significant effect on other Council members and could be a key to a satisfactory resolution of the present deadlock.

You sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
LONDON SW.1.  
UNITED KINGDOM



PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

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Malcolm Fraser

The Rt. Hon., Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
LONDON SW.1.  
UNITED KINGDOM

File

280  
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7 December 1981

ELECTION OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL

The Prime Minister has seen and noted the contents of your letter of 4 December.

A. J. COLES

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

4 December 1981

Prime Minister

You will wish to note.

WHL 4/12

Dear John,

Election of UN Secretary-General

The new (Ugandan) President of the Security Council has started his month of office in an unexpectedly business-like way. A Chinese proposal (which we oppose) that the normal 5-year term should be split in two with Salim taking over from Waldheim in the middle of 1984 seems to have been pushed aside. Waldheim withdrew last night, though he doubtless hopes that the Council will eventually have to turn to him again. Salim may follow suit and there is now a good prospect that the Council will soon start voting on third candidates.

Lord Carrington has accordingly been giving further thought to how we should vote on the third candidates who we expect to emerge. The instructions he has already issued, with the Prime Minister's concurrence, imply that we would vote in favour of Perez de Cuellar, the Peruvian diplomat who is Waldheim's Special Representative on Afghanistan. Lord Carrington thinks we should also vote in favour of Sadruddin Aga Khan, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, whose administrative capacity and political judgement are at least equal to those of any other likely candidate. It has already been agreed that we would abstain on Castaneda (Mexican Foreign Minister) and for the time being on Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary General, and Ortiz de Rosas (Argentine Ambassador in London). Lord Carrington considers that in certain circumstances we might eventually vote for Ramphal and/or Ortiz.

/A number of

John Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street



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A number of entirely unsuitable candidates have tentatively put themselves forward including certain Permanent Representatives in New York and Geneva. Lord Carrington thinks that as a Permanent Member we must be prepared to play our part in preventing the accidental success of such a candidate and should be ready to use the veto if there is any risk of one of them getting the required nine positive votes (while attempting to share this duty with the Americans and French). But he is asking Sir A Parsons to consult us before vetoing, if time permits.

---

*yours ever,*

*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK  
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FM FCO 021520Z DECEMBER 81  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 826 OF 2 DECEMBER 1981  
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1409: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. WE ENDORSE THE HARD LINE YOU HAVE TAKEN AGAINST THE IDEA OF A SPLIT TERM. WHILE THERE DO NOT (NOT) SEEM TO BE ANY LEGAL OBJECTIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAKING SUCH A RECOMMENDATION, THE COUNCIL WOULD CLEARLY BE WRONG TO DECIDE NOW THAT A MAN SHOULD TAKE OVER THE OFFICE IN THE COURSE OF 1984 WHATEVER HE MIGHT DO OR WHATEVER MIGHT HAPPEN TO HIM IN THE INTERIM. SPLIT TERMS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP ARE NOT REAL PRECEDENTS SINCE IT IS COUNTRIES RATHER THAN INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE ELECTED.
2. SALIM'S OWN POSITION IN THE INTERIM WOULD BE A DIFFICULT ONE. IF HE WERE TO CONTINUE AS TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER THERE WOULD BE AN OBVIOUS CONFLICT OF DUTY. WALDHEIM'S POSITION WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT, THOUGH HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE LESS AFFECTED THAN HIS MANAGEMENT OF THE SECRETARIAT, ON WHICH HE MIGHT FEEL UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO CONSULT HIS DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR. THIS NEED NOT (NOT) BE ALTOGETHER A BAD THING, THOUGH IT MIGHT HAVE UNWELCOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE URQUHART SUCCESSION.
3. WE FEAR THAT THE PRESENT NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD HAVE LITTLE COMPUNCTION ABOUT PRE-EMPTING THE RIGHTS OF THE COUNCIL TWO YEARS HENCE AND THE SPLIT-TERM IDEA MAY BE HARD TO STOP. IF A VOTE SEEMED LIKELY MINISTERS WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO CONSIDER

*/CAREFULLY*

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CAREFULLY WHETHER YOU SHOULD VETO. BUT THERE IS A RISK THAT, WHATEVER THE PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS WE MIGHT ADVANCE, IT WOULD BE SEEN AS A VOTE AGAINST SALIM AND AS INCONSISTENT WITH THE POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN HITHERTO ON HIS CANDIDATURE.

4. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ADOPT A SOFTER LINE ON SALIM IF HE WAS NOT TO TAKE OFFICE FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS SINCE ONE ELEMENT IN THEIR THINKING HAS BEEN THE NEED TO AVOID JEOPARDISING THE PROSPECTS IN NAMIBIA IN THE MORE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER NEWS ON AMERICAN VIEWS.

5. WE ARE CONCERNED AT THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HITHERTO AND SHOULD WELCOME IT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A SYSTEM WHICH DID NOT REVEAL THE NEGATIVE VOTE OF A PERMANENT MEMBER UNLESS THERE WERE 9 VOTES IN FAVOUR. MINISTERS WILL OBVIOUSLY WISH TO TAKE THE CONFIDENTIALITY OR OTHERWISE OF THE VOTING INTO ACCOUNT WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST ANY MANIFESTLY UNSUITABLE CANDIDATES THAT MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES.

6. GRATEFUL IF FUTURE TELEGRAMS ON THIS SUBJECT COULD ALL BE IMMEDIATE.

CARRINGTON

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PS/MR HURD

PS/MR LUCE

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

MR BULLARD  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR DAY  
SIR A ACLAND  
MR GOODISON

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 012314Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1409 OF 1 DECEMBER,

INFO WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, UKMIS GENEVA.

MY TEL NO 1395: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. OTUNNU (UGANDA) HAS BEEN QUICK INTO HIS STRIDE AS PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. HE IS SEEING ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY, PLUS THE TWO CANDIDATES, TODAY (1 DECEMBER) AND TOMORROW AND TELLING THEM THAT HE INTENDS TO PROCEED AS FOLLOWS. HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE URGENCY BUT ALSO OF THE NEED NOT TO GET THE WRONG DECISION BY RUSHING THINGS. HE PLANS A FOUR-STAGE APPROACH. FIRST, HE WILL TRY TO DISCOVER WHETHER A SPLIT TERM IS A VIABLE OPTION: IF NOT, IT SHOULD BE PUT TO REST. SECONDLY, HE WILL ENQUIRE OF THE CHINESE AND THE AMERICANS WHETHER THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE TWO PRESENT CANDIDATES IS IMMUTABLE. IF SO, HE WILL, THIRDLY, ASK THE TWO CANDIDATES TO STAND ASIDE TEMPORARILY TO ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES. ASSUMING THAT THEY AGREE, HE WILL, FOURTHLY, UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS TO IDENTIFY A SHORT LIST OF CANDIDATES ON WHOM THE COUNCIL COULD THEN PROCEED TO VOTE.

2. OTUNNU SAW ME THIS AFTERNOON. I APPLAUDED THE CLARITY OF HIS ANALYSIS AND SAID THAT I SAW NO DIFFICULTIES ABOUT HIS APPROACH. I SAID UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE UK WAS OPPOSED TO A SPLIT TERM: IT WOULD BE A DEAL UNWORTHY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: IT WAS IMPRACTICABLE, BECAUSE GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO AGREE NOW TO THE APPOINTMENT IN 1984 OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO MIGHT BY THEN HAVE BECOME PERSONALLY OR POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE: MOREOVER, IF CANDIDATE X WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS NOW, WHAT REASON WAS THERE TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD BECOME ACCEPTABLE IN TWO OR THREE YEARS' TIME? FINALLY, THE CANDIDATE WHO SERVED FOR THE FIRST PORTION OF A SPLIT TERM WOULD HAVE SEVERELY DIMINISHED AUTHORITY.

3. OTUNNU INDICATED THAT PERSONALLY HE SYMPATHISED WITH THESE VIEWS, BUT HE SAID THAT BOTH THE CHINESE AND THE RUSSIANS HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM TODAY THAT THEY WERE READY TO CONSIDER A SPLIT TERM. BUT THE CHINESE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD INSIST THAT WALDHEIM AND SALIM SHOULD BE TREATED IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY IN ANY DOCUMENT ENSHRINING THE SPLIT TERM, WHEREAS THE RUSSIANS SEEMED MORE ATTRACTED BY A SIMPLE EXTENSION OF WALDHEIM'S APPOINTMENT (SEE PARA 5 BELOW). THE CHINESE HAD MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE LATTER WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THE CHINESE HAD NOT RAISED ANY OBJECTION TO OTUNNU'S PROPOSED FOUR STAGES AND HAD CONFIRMED THAT THEIR OPPOSITION TO WALDHEIM WAS IMMUTABLE. NOR HAD WALDHEIM EXPRESSED ANY OPPOSITION TO WHAT OTUNNU PROPOSED.

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4. ON THE TIMING, I URGED OTUNNU TO COMPLETE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNCIL BY 15 DECEMBER WHEN THE GA'S SESSION IS DUE TO END. HE AGREED: IT WAS NECESSARY TO QUOTE STEM THE RISING TIDE OF PANIC UNQUOTE. HE HOPED TO COMPLETE THE FIRST TWO STAGES BY TOMORROW EVENING (THIS OF COURSE DEPENDS ON HIS GETTING FROM MRS KIRKPATRICK A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE IMMUTABILITY OF US OPPOSITION TO SALIM).

5. ONE OF WALDHEIM'S CAMPAIGN MANAGERS HAD EARLIER TOLD ME THAT OVNIKOV (USSR) HAD SEEN HIM THIS MORNING AND CONFIRMED THAT, AS SURMISED IN PARAGRAPH 11 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, THE RUSSIANS WERE HOPING TO EXPLOIT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL FOR A SPLIT TERM AND TURN IT INTO A SIMPLE EXTENSION OF WALDHEIM'S APPOINTMENT FOR TWO YEARS. WALDHEIM OF COURSE WOULD WELCOME THIS. AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE IS THUS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING FORGED BETWEEN WALDHEIM AND THE RUSSIANS. I AM FAIRLY CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL FOUNDER ON CHINA'S IMPLACABLE OPPOSITION TO WALDHEIM. WALDHEIM'S CAMPAIGN MANAGER (PROTRASKA - AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR TO UNESCO) AND LEPRETTE (FRANCE) BOTH FEEL THAT A SHORT EXTENSION OF THIS KIND WOULD LEAVE WALDHEIM WITH VIRTUALLY NO AUTHORITY, SOMETHING THAT WOULD PLEASE THE RUSSIANS. I AGREE WITH THEM.

PARSONS

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PS|

PS|LPS

PS|MR LUCE

PS|MR HURD

PS|LORD TREFGARNE

PS|PUS

MR BULLARD

MR DAY

LORD BRIDGES

SIR A ACLAND

MR GOODISON

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FM FCO 231215Z NOV 81  
TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 469 OF 23 NOVEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY UKHIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE DAR ES SALAAM  
SAVING TO WASHINGTON  
MIPT: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 161/B/81

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR FRASER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER:  
BEGINS

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE BEEN TAKING A CLOSE  
INTEREST HERE IN THE PROGRESS OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL  
ELECTION.

I WAS IMPRESSED BY SALIM SALIM WHEN I MET HIM IN MELBOURNE  
DURING CHOQM. I THINK THAT HIS EXPERIENCE, AND HIS OWN PERSONAL  
QUALITIES, WOULD MAKE HIM AN EXCELLENT SECRETARY-GENERAL.  
AUSTRALIA'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH SALIM BEGAN WHEN HE WAS  
CHAIRMAN OF THE UN COMMITTEE OF 24 ON DECOLONIZATION. HE ACTED  
WITH FIRMNESS AND RESTRAINT, AND WAS TO A LARGE DEGREE RESPONSIBLE  
FOR THE ADOPTION IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24 AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
OF MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE RESOLUTIONS ON SMALL TERRITORIES.  
GIVEN THE SUPPORT THAT HAS BUILT UP FOR SALIM IN THE ASSEMBLY -  
SUPPORT WHICH INCLUDES A LARGE NUMBER OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES OF  
THE UNITED STATES - I AM NOT CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS  
NECESSARILY COMMITTED TO MAINTAINING A VETO OF SALIM. ON THE  
OTHER HAND, THE CHINESE VETO OF KURT WALDHEIM SEEMS FIRMLY  
ENTRENCHED.

I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT NOW FOR WALDHEIM TO COMMAND  
THE NECESSARY THIRD WORLD SUPPORT TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE IN A THIRD  
TERM. ON THE OTHER HAND SALIM'S PRESTIGE AS AN INCOMING SECRETARY  
GENERAL WOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED BY THE VOTING TO DATE. IN THESE  
CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD SEEM A PITY TO HAVE TO SETTLE ON ANY LESS

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ATTRACTIVE THIRD CANDIDATE.

I KNOW THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS NOT VETOED SALIM. I WONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER YOU MIGHT NOT COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO BE QUITE POSITIVE IN SUPPORT OF SALIM? THIS MIGHT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS AND COULD BE A KEY TO A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION OF THE PRESENT DEADLOCK.

ENDS

CARRINGTON

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BF  
ON  
20 November 1981Election of the United Nations Secretary-General

The Prime Minister has seen and approved the text of the message to Mr. Fraser enclosed with your letter to me of 19 November. I should be grateful if you could arrange for its despatch.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

CS  
R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

19 November 1981

Dear Michael,

Rmni Rmni

Yes not Agree with ?

D

And.

Election of the United Nations Secretary-General

Thank you for your letter of 17 November with which you enclosed the text of a message from Mr Malcolm Fraser to the Prime Minister suggesting that we should switch to support of Mr Salim.

As you know, President Nyerere had suggested to Mr Fraser that he should approach the Prime Minister in this way. Mr Fraser will no doubt pass on to Nyerere the gist of the Prime Minister's reply.

I enclose a draft reply which follows the line already taken with Salim himself by Lord Carrington and by our Permanent Representative in New York.

The draft does not comment directly on Mr Fraser's assertion that American opposition to Salim is less firmly entrenched than Chinese opposition to Waldheim. Our own belief is that neither country is likely to reconsider its position unless a number of third candidates have been considered and rejected by the Security Council. You will have seen that the Council held 8 more rounds of voting on 17 November and the feeling is building up that the Council must soon proceed to consider other candidates, despite the opposition that the African Group has hitherto maintained.

We propose to telegraph the text of the Prime Minister's reply to the High Commissioner in Canberra for delivery.

yours ever  
Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

17 9 11 1967



DRAFT: ~~XXXX~~te/letter/te~~XXXXXX~~XXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

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Unclassified

The Right Honourable  
Malcolm Fraser CH MP

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SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your message about the election of  
the United Nations Secretary-General.

CAVEAT.....

I was most interested to have your opinion of  
Salim Salim. We also have a high regard for his  
abilities. The problem is that African and Middle Eastern  
issues continue to dominate the political work of the  
United Nations and of the Secretary-General and it seems  
to us that it would be best if, for the time being, the  
Secretary-General were not someone whose background, like  
Mr Salim's, is so heavily involved in these issues. I  
must make it clear that this does not in any way reflect  
on his personal integrity or on his determination to be  
objective if elected. I have no doubts on these points,  
but Mr Salim would inevitably be seen by the world as the  
possessor of strong views on these subjects and this could  
affect his ability to play the full part that the  
Secretary-General should on these very difficult problems.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

/As you know,

As you know, the deadlock in the Security Council continues despite a further 8 rounds of voting. I very much hope that the Council will succeed in finding a way forward before long.

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GRS 850  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DESKBY 200900Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 192330Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1289 OF 19 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, UKMIS  
GENEVA.

MY TELNO 1274: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TOLD ME THIS EVENING (19 NOVEMBER) THAT HE HAD CONTACTED ALL THE CANDIDATES BUT HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY REPLIES TO HIS QUESTION WHETHER THEY WISHED TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT BALLOT.

2. HE HAD ALSO CONSULTED ALL MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO), ALL HAD AGREED TO WHAT HE WAS DOING, WITH THE GLOSS FROM THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO VOTE ON AN EXPANDED LIST OF CANDIDATES BEFORE 27 NOVEMBER. WITH MUNOZ LEDO, WHOM HE HAD SEEN LAST, HE HAD HAD A FLAMING ROW. MUNOZ LEDO HAD BEGUN BY COMPLAINING THAT SLIM SHOULD NOT HAVE CONTACTED THE CANDIDATES WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE COUNCIL. SLIM REPLIED THAT ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAD AGREED: IN ANY CASE HE WOULD BE REPORTING HIS CONSULTATIONS IN DETAIL TO THE COUNCIL; MUNOZ LEDO SAID THAT IN THAT CASE HE WOULD NOT COME TO THE NEXT MEETING.

3. MUNOZ LEDO HAD THEN ASKED WHO THE CANDIDATES WERE. SLIM PRODUCED THE LIST HE HAD GIVEN ME YESTERDAY (GOULDING'S LETTER 431/2 OF 18 NOVEMBER TO WILLIAMS). WHEN HE SAW CASTANEDA'S NAME, MUNOZ LEDO EXPLODED: HOW HAD SLIM DARED TO INCLUDE THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AS A CANDIDATE AT THE REQUEST OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE (KOH)? SLIM POINTED OUT THAT THE COUNCIL HAD AGREED THAT CANDIDACIES COULD BE PUT FORWARD BY ANY MEMBER OF THE UN, BUT HE AGREED TO CIRCULATE A REVISED NOTE ON CASTANEDA WHICH WOULD STATE THAT ACCORDING TO MUNOZ LEDO, KOH'S COMMUNICATION DID NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. SLIM HAD DULY DONE THIS BUT HAD OF COURSE INFURIATED KOH, WHO HAD CHECKED WITH CASTANEDA'S CHEF DE CABINET THAT ALTHOUGH HIS CANDIDACY HAD NOT YET BEEN PRESENTED FORMALLY CASTANEDA WOULD BE A CANDIDATE ("BUT NOT AN ACTIVE ONE") IF SALIM WAS NO LONGER THERE.

4. I REPORT THIS GROTESQUE EPISODE AT LENGTH TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEPTHS TO WHICH THIS CONTEST HAS SUNK. MUNOZ LEDO'S RAGE IS OF COURSE DUE TO HIS OWN AMBITIONS TO BE A CANDIDATE WHICH ACCORDING TO SLIM HAVE BEEN VETOED BY LOPEZ PORTILLO. IT SEEMS THAT OUT OF SPITE MUNOZ LEDO IS NOW TRYING TO BLOCK CASTANEDA'S CANDIDATURE. WITH LUCK THIS EPISODE SHOULD MEAN THAT WE SHALL NOT BE ASKED TO VOTE ON EITHER CASTANEDA OR MUNOZ LEDO.

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\* In my view he is probably  
the best candidate in my case.

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Hand

5. DE PINIES (SPAIN) CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT ALL THE LATIN AMERICAN CANDIDATES WILL DECLINE TO BE INCLUDE IN THE NEXT BALLOT. HE SEEMS TO HAVE DECIDED TO PROMOTE SADRUDDIN'S CANDIDACY AND HAS URGED MY JORDANIAN COLLEAGUE TO TELL SADRUDDIN, WHO ARRIVES IN NEW YORK TOMORROW, THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR HIM TO MAKE HIS MOVE: HE SHOULD, AS A MATTER OF HONOUR, INFORM WALDHEIM THAT HE WAS DOING SO: HE SHOULD THEN SEE THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE: UNLESS EITHER OF THEM WAS ABSOLUTELY NEGATIVE, HE SHOULD ASK TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT BALLOT. DE PINIES CALCULATES, IN MY VIEW \*  
RIGHTLY, THAT SADRUDDIN WOULD HAVE A CHANCE OF GETTING ELECTED STRAIGHT AWAY.

6. WALDHEIM ASKED TO SEE ME THIS EVENING. HE RAISED THE IDEA OF A TERM SPLIT BETWEEN HIM AND SALIM, WHICH HE SAID WAS NOT HIS IDEA BUT ONE PUT TO HIM BY THE AFRICANS. I TOLD HIM FIRMLY THAT I THOUGHT THIS WAS A BAD IDEA. FIRST, IF I WAS RIGHT IN THINKING THAT THE CHINESE INTENDED TO MAINTAIN THEIR VETO, THE SPLIT TERM COULD ONLY RESULT FROM A DEAL IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH WOULD MEAN A DANGEROUS SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE ASSEMBLY AND THE COUNCIL. SECONDLY, THE IDEA WAS IMPRACTICAL: HOW COULD GOVERNMENTS BE ASKED TO AGREE NOW THAT SALIM SHOULD BECOME SECRETARY GENERAL IN 1984 OR 1985, BY WHICH TIME SALIM MIGHT BE DEAD, MAD OR IN PRISON AND HIS COUNTRY AT WAR WITH ALL AND SUNDRY IN AFRICA? THIRDLY, I BELIEVED THAT A SPLIT TERM WOULD UNDERMINE WALDHEIM'S AUTHORITY FROM THE OUTSET: INEVITABLY THE SECRETARIAT AND MEMBER STATES WOULD START PAYING COURT TO THE MAN THEY KNEW WAS TO BECOME SECRETARY GENERAL IN TWO OR THREE YEARS' TIME. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO VOTE FOR WALDHEIM. MY EFFORTS TO GET THE FIELD OPENED DID NOT IMPLY ANY CHANGE IN OUR POSITION: MY CONCERN HAD BEEN TO MAINTAIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL IN THIS MATTER AND TO PREVENT THE INITIATIVE SLIPPING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: ALSO TO GET AWAY FROM THE GRIM SINGLE COMBAT WHICH, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, WAS BEGINNING TO DAMAGE HIS AUTHORITY BOTH NOW AND, EVEN IF HE WON IN THE END, IN THE FUTURE.

7. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER WHEN WE KNOW HOW THE CANDIDATES HAVE REPLIED TO SLIM.

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SIR A ACLAND  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR DAY

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 182356Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1274 DATED 18 NOVEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA  
UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1262: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS DECIDED TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK. HE SAW LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND ME TOGETHER THIS AFTERNOON (18 NOVEMBER) AND HAS SEEN OR WILL BE SEEING ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL INDIVIDUALLY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD DECIDED THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO HAVE FURTHER ROUNDS OF BALLOTING BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM ALONE. HE THEREFORE INTENDED TO SPEAK TO ALL SIX CANDIDATES OF WHOSE INTEREST HE OR HIS PREDECESSOR HAD BEEN NOTIFIED ON A CONDITIONAL BASIS. THESE WERE ORTIZ DE ROSAS, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, SONNY RAMPHAL, JORGE ILLUECA, SADRUDDIN KHAN AND JORGE CASTANEDA. HE THOUGHT THAT KENNETH DADZIE MIGHT ALSO EMERGE AS A CANDIDATE (APPARENTLY ON THE BASIS OF REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO MRS KIRKPATRICK BY REUTERS). HE ASKED LEPRETTE AND ME TO LET HIM KNOW OF ANY OTHER CANDIDATES WHO MIGHT COMMAND RESPECT. HE SAID THAT NEITHER THE PREVIOUS PRESIDENT NOR HE NOR THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED ANY COMMUNICATION ABOUT THE CANDIDACY OF RAMPHUL (MAURITIUS).
2. HE WOULD SAY TO ALL THE SIX CANDIDATES THAT, IF THEIR CANDIDACIES WERE SERIOUS, THEY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT ROUND OF BALLOTING. IF THEY DECLINED TO BE INCLUDED, HE WOULD TAKE IT THAT THEY WERE NOT SERIOUS CANDIDATES. HE WOULD ARGUE THAT, AFTER VEToes HAD MADE 16 BALLOTS INCONCLUSIVE, A NEW SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED WHICH SHOULD "LIBERATE THEM FROM THEIR CONSCIENCES". HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN TO MY PANAMANIAN, ARGENTINE AND GUYANESE COLLEAGUES, WOULD BE SEEING THE PERUVIAN LATER TODAY AND WOULD CONTACT SADRUDDIN IN GENEVA. THERE WAS A COMPLICATION ABOUT CASTANEDA'S CANDIDACY: IT HAD BEEN COMMUNICATED TO HIM BY TELEPHONE BY THE SINGAPOREAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE BUT MY MEXICAN COLLEAGUE CLAIMED TO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT IT EXCLAM
3. SLIM SAID THAT NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN SO FAR HAD RAISED OBJECTION TO THIS PROCEDURE. WITH THE CHINESE HE HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT, IF THEY DID NOT WANT WALDHEIM TO SERVE ANY LONGER, IT WAS IN THEIR INTERESTS TO LET SOME THIRD CANDIDATE BE APPOINTED: OTHERWISE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD IN THE END EXTEND WALDHEIM'S TERM (CF PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). IF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OBJECTED, HE WOULD CALL A FORMAL MEETING, REPORT THE OUTCOME OF HIS CONSULTATIONS AND, IF CHALLENGED, PUT HIS PROPOSED PROCEDURE TO THE VOTE. ASSUMING THIS ALL WORKED, HE HOPED TO HOLD THE NEXT ROUND OF BALLOTING ON MONDAY AFTERNOON, 23 NOVEMBER ON AN EXPANDED LIST OF CANDIDATES.

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4. LATER THIS AFTERNOON, DE PINIES (SPAIN) CONVENED A MEETING OF THE FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PLUS JAPAN. HE ARGUED, WITH SOME VIGOUR, THAT SLIM'S INITIATIVE WAS A NON-STARTER. ALL THE LATIN AMERICAN CANDIDATES WOULD TELL SLIM THAT THEY DID NOT WANT THEIR NAMES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT ROUND OF BALLOTING AS ALL THEIR CANDIDACIES WERE, TO GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, CONDITIONAL ON SALIM'S WITHDRAWAL OR DECLARATION BY THE COUNCIL THAT A DEADLOCK EXISTED. THE ONLY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION HE HAD WAS THAT UNCONVINCING ONE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD FIND SOME EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVANT WHO WOULD NOT BE BOUND TO ANY GOVERNMENT OR REGIONAL GROUP.

5. THE REST OF US TOOK THE LINE THAT DE PINIES MIGHT WELL BE RIGHT ABOUT THE LATIN AMERICANS BUT THAT IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE COUNCIL TO BE BLACKMAILED BY THE AFRICANS AND THE NON-ALIGNED. IT WAS FOR THE COUNCIL, NOT THE CANDIDATES, TO DETERMINE ITS PROCEDURES. OTUNNU'S PRESIDENCY WAS APPROACHING. THE COUNCIL MUST THEREFORE TAKE ACTION TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE. SLIM HAD TAKEN A COURAGEOUS STEP TO CALL THE CANDIDATES' BLUFF AND WE SHOULD SUPPORT HIM. OTHERWISE THE PROSPECT OF SOME KIND OF SPLIT TERM LOOMED. DE PINIES WAS RELUCTANTLY BROUGHT TO SUBSCRIBE TO THESE VIEWS.

6. WE THEN DISCUSSED VARIOUS WAYS FORWARD IF THE EXISTING CANDIDATES ALL DECLINED TO BE VOTED ON WHILE SALIM AND WALDHEIM REMAINED CANDIDATES. IT WAS AGREED THAT IN THAT CASE SLIM SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CALL A FORMAL MEETING AND PROPOSE FROM THE CHAIR THAT HE SHOULD WRITE A FORMAL LETTER TO EACH OF THE CANDIDATES WHICH WOULD TAKE NOTE OF THEIR REPLIES TO HIS ENQUIRY AND SAY THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD NO LONGER CONSIDER THEM AS CANDIDATES AND WOULD BE LOOKING ELSEWHERE (THE OBJECT OF COURSE BEING TO CALL THEIR BLUFF). IF THIS PROCEDURE WAS CHALLENGED, THE CHALLENGE SHOULD BE PUT TO THE VOTE AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FAIL TO OBTAIN 9 VOTES.

7. SLIM'S INITIATIVE OFFERS SOME HOPE OF BREAKING THE DEADLOCK. MY OWN HUNCH, WHICH IS SHARED BY MOST OF THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IS THAT A FORMAL COMMUNICATION OF THE ABOVE KIND FROM SLIM WOULD CALL SOME OF THE CANDIDATES' BLUFF, THOUGH ALL OF THEM WILL BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. IF SOME OR ALL OF THE CANDIDATES RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SLIM'S ORAL APPROACH, WE COULD BE VOTING ON A WIDER LIST ON 23 NOVEMBER. I DO NOT NEED INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS STAGE BUT WILL TELEGRAPH MY RECOMMENDATIONS AS SOON AS THE CANDIDATES ARE KNOWN.

PARSONS  
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PS|MR LUCE  
PS|LORD TREFGARNE  
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DESKBY 180900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 172323Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1262 DATED 17 NOVEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA,  
UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1228: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE COUNCIL HELD EIGHT FURTHER BALLOTS THIS MORNING (17 NOVEMBER). THEY WERE INCONCLUSIVE BUT SERVED THE PURPOSE OF CONFIRMING THAT A DEADLOCK UNDENIABLY EXISTS. BEFORE THE MEETING ADJOURNED I AND MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD CONSIDER INCLUDING IN FURTHER BALLOTS THOSE CANDIDATES WHO WERE KNOWN TO HAVE DECLARED A CONDITIONAL INTEREST. NO DATE HAS BEEN FIXED FOR A FURTHER MEETING.

2. THE RESULTS OF THE EIGHT BALLOTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

BALLOT NO	SALIM			WALDHEIM		
	YES	NO	ABST	YES	NO	ABST
9	10	1	4	11	4	0
10	9	1	5	10	4	1
11	8	1	6	9	4	2
12	8	3	4	9	4	2
13	8	3	4	9	4	2
14	8	3	4	9	4	2
15	8	3	4	9	4	2
16	8	4	3	9	4	2

THE VOTES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS REMAINED CONSTANT THROUGHOUT: 2 - 1 - 2 FOR SALIM AND 4 - 1 - 0 FOR WALDHEIM. THERE WAS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF MOVEMENT IN THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS' VOTES, WITH BOTH SALIM AND WALDHEIM DECLINING FROM AN EARLY HIGH OF 10 AND 11 FAVOURABLE VOTES RESPECTIVELY. AFTER THE 14TH BALLOT, WHEN THE PATTERN HAD REMAINED CONSTANT FOR THREE SUCCESSIVE ROUNDS, THE MEXICAN PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BREAK. SPAIN, FRANCE AND IRELAND SUGGESTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO FURTHER BALLOTS TO CONFIRM THAT THE PATTERN WAS FROZEN. AS YOU WILL SEE, THESE TWO FURTHER BALLOTS PRODUCED ALMOST NO CHANGE.

3. BEFORE THE MEETING ADJOURNED, I SUGGESTED, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THAT THE COUNCIL WAS IN A DEADLOCK AND TIME WAS BEGINNING TO PRESS: SHOULD WE NOT CONSIDER INCLUDING IN FUTURE BALLOTING THOSE WHO HAD PRESENTED CONDITIONAL CANDIDACIES, IF THEY SO WISHED? THE PRESIDENT (SLIM, TUNISIA) AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO ALL CANDIDATES WHO WANTED TO COME FORWARD; THE CANDIDATES THEMSELVES SHOULD INFORM HIM OFFICIALLY IF THAT WAS THE CASE. MRS KIRKPATRICK ARGUED THAT, GIVEN THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES,

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IT SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN VOTING ON OTHER "KNOWN CANDIDATES"; THERE WAS AMPLE PRECEDENT FOR THIS. THERE WAS NO DISSENT FROM THESE PROPOSALS AND A NUMBER OF NODS OF APPROVAL ROUND THE TABLE. THE COUNCIL THEN ADJOURNED LEAVING THESE UNRESOLVED ISSUES TO BE PURSUED FURTHER IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

4. WALDHEIM HAD TELEPHONED ME AT LENGTH AT HOME LAST NIGHT. WE COVERED MUCH FAMILIAR GROUND. BUT HE LEFT ME WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE IS HANKERING AFTER A SHORTENED OR SPLIT TERM AS A LAST RESORT. CONVERSATIONS WITH COLLEAGUES TODAY SUGGEST THAT HE NOW ACCEPTS THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF GETTING THE CHINESE TO LIFT THEIR VETO AND THAT HIS NEW TACTIC FOR CLINGING TO OFFICE MAY BE TO GET THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO EXTEND HIS TERM FOR TWO OR THREE YEARS. HIS IDEA SEEMS TO BE THAT, IF THE DEADLOCK IN THE COUNCIL PERSISTS FOR ANOTHER THREE OR FOUR WEEKS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD BE MOVED TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION EXTENDING HIS TERM, ON THE PRECEDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY'S ACTION WHEN THE RUSSIANS BLOCKED THE RE-APPOINTMENT OF TRYGVE LIE IN 1950 (G.A. RESOLUTION 492(V)). HE CALCULATES THAT THE AFRICANS WOULD SUPPORT THIS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT IF THEY BLOCKED THE RESOLUTION IN THE ASSEMBLY THE PROBABLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A LATIN AMERICAN, WHO WOULD KEEP THEM OUT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP FOR TEN YEARS; IF ON THE OTHER HAND THEY ALLOWED WALDHEIM TO BE EXTENDED, THEY COULD FIGHT AGAIN IN 1983 OR 1984. THIS SCENARIO SOUNDS ALL TOO PROBABLE.

5. IF WALDHEIM DECIDES TO PURSUE THIS PLOY, BOTH HIS CAMP AND THE AFRICANS WILL BE OPPOSED TO ANY OPENING OF THE FIELD TO OTHER CANDIDATES, ALTHOUGH HITHERTO HE HAS BEEN IN FAVOUR OF THIS. HE MAY NOT THEREFORE BE ENTIRELY HAPPY ABOUT WHAT MRS KIRKPATRICK AND I SAID IN THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING. BUT WE HAVE FULFILLED OUR UNDERTAKING TO VOTE FOR HIM THROUGH THICK AND THIN AND I DO NOT MYSELF THINK THAT OBLIGATION SHOULD EXTEND TO FOLLOWING HIM IN ALL HIS TWISTS AND TURNS IN HIS DESPERATION TO RETAIN HIS OFFICE. INDEED I AM JUST BEGINNING TO WONDER WHETHER, AFTER HIS UNDIGNIFIED, AND IN CHARTER TERMS INDEFENSIBLE, BEHAVIOUR OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS, HIS ABILITY TO CONTINUE AS AN EFFECTIVE SECRETARY GENERAL MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED. I WILL KEEP A CAREFUL EYE ON THIS ASPECT.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 November 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Australian High Commissioner setting out the terms of a message to her from Mr. Fraser about the election of the UN Secretary General.

I should be grateful if you could let me have as soon as convenient the text of a draft reply which the Prime Minister might send to Mr. Fraser.

MOBBA

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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MM



dl

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

17 November 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 17 November. The text of the message from Mr. Fraser has, of course, been brought to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

MODBA

His Excellency The Honourable R.V. Garland

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AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION · LONDON

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 158/81

17 November 1981

✓. Master set  
ops.

My dear Prime Minister,

A telegram from my Prime Minister asks me to convey to you the following text of a letter, the original of which is en route by diplomatic bag:

Begins -

"Dear Margaret,

I am sure you will understand that we have been taking a close interest here in the progress of the UN Secretary-General election.

I was impressed by Salim Salim when I met him in Melbourne during CHOGM. I think that his experience, and his own personal qualities, would make him an excellent Secretary-General.

Australia's close relationship with Salim began when he was Chairman of the UN Committee of 24 on Decolonization. He acted with firmness and restraint, and was to a large degree responsible for the adoption in the Committee of 24 and the General Assembly of moderate and responsible resolutions on small territories.

Given the support that has built up for Salim in the Assembly - support which includes a large number of friends and allies of the United States - I am not convinced that the United States is necessarily committed to maintaining a veto of Salim. On the other hand, the Chinese veto of Kurt Waldheim seems firmly entrenched.

I think that it would be difficult now for Waldheim to command the necessary Third World support to be fully effective in a third term. On the other hand Salim's prestige as an incoming Secretary-General would not be impaired by the voting to date. In these circumstances it would seem a pity to have to settle on any less attractive third candidate.

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I know that the United Kingdom has not vetoed Salim. I wonder, however, whether you might not come to the conclusion that it would be helpful in the present situation for the United Kingdom to be quite positive in support of Salim? This might have a significant effect on other council members and could be a key to a satisfactory resolution of the present deadlock.

Yours sincerely,

Malcolm Fraser."

Ends.

*Sincerely,  
R.V. Garland*

R.V. GARLAND

The Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,  
Prime Minister,  
No. 10 Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1.

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FM DAR ES SALAAM 160815Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO 351 OF 16 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

ROUTINE WASHINGTON, CANBERRA

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ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. ON 7 NOVEMBER PRESIDENT NYERERE ASKED THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER TO SUGGEST TO MR FRASER THAT HE SHOULD SPEAK TO MRS THATCHER, AND ALSO TO PRESIDENT MARCOS OF THE PHILIPPINES, TO URGE THEM TO SUPPORT MR SALIM'S CANDIDATURE. NYERERE BELIEVED THAT IF WE WERE TO CHANGE OUR VOTE THIS COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICANS. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT ACTION IF ANY MR FRASER HAD TAKEN.

2. NYERERE TOLD THE HIGH COMMISSIONER THAT HE WOULD BE MAKING A SIMILAR APPROACH TO ME. HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT, IT WOULD SEEM HE DID NOT FEEL ABLE TO GO SO FAR AS TO ASK FOR A CHANGE IN OUR VOTE (MY TELNO 333).

3. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER TOLD ME THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT STRONGLY FAVOURED SALIM'S CANDIDATURE.

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THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 121930Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1228 OF 12 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON DARESSALAAM VIENNA PARIS UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1207: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. I SAW THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (SLIM, TUNISIA) THIS MORNING (12 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT HIS CONSULTATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT A MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL WERE IN FAVOUR OF RESUMING BALLOTING EARLY NEXT WEEK, THOUGH QUOTE THREE OR FOUR DELEGATIONS UNQUOTE WERE UNHAPPY (I THINK THESE PROBABLY INCLUDE UGANDA, BECAUSE FURTHER BALLOTING MIGHT CONFIRM THE DEADLOCK AND OPEN THE WAY FOR THIRD CANDIDATES: THE CHINESE, BECAUSE THEY FIND IT EMBARRASSING TO HAVE TO GO ON VETOING; AND THE RUSSIANS WHO NOW SEE THAT A ROUND OF INTENSIVE BALLOTING MIGHT LET IN THIRD CANDIDATES AND FORCE THEM TO START VETOING).
2. SLIM ACCORDINGLY INTENDS TO CONVENE THE COUNCIL TO RESUME BALLOTING ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 NOVEMBER, WITHOUT PRIOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. HE EXPECTS THAT AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OR TWO SOMEONE WILL CALL FOR A FURTHER ADJOURNMENT. BUT HE ASSUMES THAT THIS WOULD BE CHALLENGED AND (I THINK RIGHTLY) THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE 9 VOTES IN FAVOUR OF ADJOURNMENT, AT ANY RATE AT THE BEGINNING.
3. SLIM WENT ON TO SAY, SPEAKING AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF TUNISIA, THAT THERE WAS MUCH CONFUSION ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE OAU AND NAM ENDORSEMENTS OF SALIM. HE DID NOT APPROVE OF EITHER AND HE HAD TOLD SALIM AND THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AFTER THE FIRST SIX BALLOTS THAT, FOLLOWING SALIM'S FAILURE TO GET ELECTED, HE NO LONGER FELT BOUND TO HIM. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD ENDORSED THAT POSITION. SLIM MORE OR LESS INVITED ME TO PASS ROUND THE WORD THAT OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND SALIM'S OTHER CHAMPIONS HAD NO RIGHT TO TRY TO FRIGHTEN OTHER CANDIDATES FROM ENTERING THE CONTEST.

PARSONS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

PS/LORD TREGARNE

SIR A ACLAND

MR. GOODISON

PS/NO 10

~~DOWNING 57~~

MR DAY

MR BULLARD

PS/MR WEA

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NOV 10 1981  
RECEIVED  
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 110041Z NOV 81  
TO PRIORITY P.C.O. OFFICER PA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1207 DATED 10 NOVEMBER 81  
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, PARIS, UKMIS GENEVA

(196)

MY TELNO 1170: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (SLIM, TUNISIA) IS CONTINUING TO SEE INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS BUT HAS NOT SCHEDULED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE OR A RESUMPTION OF BALLOTING. HE SAW LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND ME TOGETHER THIS MORNING (10 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT MY CHINESE COLLEAGUE HAD TOLD HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN CHINA'S POSITION: IT WAS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE: CHINA WANTED A SECRETARY GENERAL FROM THE THIRD WORLD. SLIM CONCLUDED THAT IF THE UNITED STATES ALSO MAINTAINED THEIR VETO (AND HE WAS TO SEE MRS KIRKPATRICK LATER TODAY), HE COULD SEE NO POINT IN FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. HE HAD SEEN SALIM YESTERDAY, HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS EMBARRASSING HIS FRIENDS BY STAYING IN THE RACE AND HAD URGED HIM TO WITHDRAW. SALIM HAD REJECTED THIS CRITICISM AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO REMAIN IN THE RACE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.
2. LEPRETTE AND I URGED ON SLIM THAT THE ONLY WAY FORWARD WOULD BE FOR THE COUNCIL TO HOLD A FULL HALF DAY OF BALLOTING, WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, WHICH WOULD PERMIT PERHAPS 15 OR 20 BALLOTS. THIS WOULD EITHER INDICATE A TREND OR (MORE LIKELY) DEMONSTRATE CONVINCINGLY THAT WE WERE DEADLOCKED. ONCE THAT HAD HAPPENED, MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO DENY THAT A DEADLOCK EXISTED AND THE WAY COULD BE OPEN FOR THIRD CANDIDATES TO ENTER THE CONTEST. WE TOLD SLIM THAT OUR OWN CONSULTATIONS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, TO THE USSR, TO JAPAN AND TO SEVERAL NON-ALIGNED. SLIM PROVED RELUCTANT, HOWEVER, TO ACCEPT THIS ADVICE, FOR REASONS THAT ARE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR.
3. SALIM ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON. HE REHEARSED HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU IN MELBOURNE, DESCRIBED SIR P MOON'S MEETING WITH NYERERE ON 9 NOVEMBER (DAR ES SALAAM TELSNOs 333 AND 334) AND REPEATED NYERERE'S REQUEST THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO STOP VETOING HIM. I GAVE HIM NO REASON TO HOPE THAT WE WOULD INTERVENE WITH THE AMERICANS AND WENT ON TO TELL HIM FRANKLY WHY WE PREFERRED WALDHEIM TO HIM. THIS CAUSED NO OFFENSE, THOUGH HE DID SAY THAT THE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION WAS THAT THERE COULD BE NO AFRICAN SECRETARY GENERAL UNTIL THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA HAD BEEN RESOLVED.
4. I PUT TO SALIM THE IDEA OF AN INTENSIVE ROUND OF BALLOTING AS THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT, WHILE NOT INVITING THIRD CANDIDATES TO ENTER THE RACE, HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THEIR DOING SO. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS MESSAGE SEEMED NOT TO HAVE REACHED THE THIRD CANDIDATES CONCERNED: HE DID NOT COMMENT FURTHER.

CONFIDENTIAL

/HE WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

HE WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT A ROUND OF INTENSIVE BALLOTING, PREFERRING TO CLING TO THE HOPE THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER THE AMERICANS COULD BE GOT TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. I TRIED TO DISCOURAGE HIM FROM OPTIMISM ON THIS SCORE AND BY THE END OF THE CONVERSATION I THINK THAT HE HAD BECOME MORE AMENABLE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT A ROUND OF ~~WIDENING OF THE FIELD~~ <sup>INTENSIVE BALLOTING</sup> MIGHT BE THE BEST WAY FORWARD, IF IT LED TO A WIDENING OF THE FIELD. THIS WOULD CARRY RISKS FOR HIM (I.E. ONE OF THE THIRD CANDIDATES MIGHT GET ELECTED). BUT IF THE VOTING REMAINED INCONCLUSIVE, A NEW SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN PRODUCED IN WHICH THE AMERICANS (OR OF COURSE, AS I POINTED OUT, THE CHINESE) MIGHT COME TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

5. WITHOUT CREATING THE IMPRESSION OF A BRITISH INITIATIVE, I WILL CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE IDEA THAT THE WAY FORWARD LIES IN A ROUND OF INTENSIVE BALLOTING. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE AND OTHERS ARE DOING LIKEWISE.

PARSONS

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PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
SIR A ACLAND  
MR GOODISON

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

210

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FM FCO 091630Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 189 OF 9 NOVEMBER

AND TO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM GOODISON

YOUR TELNO 1170: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

196

1. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR SADRUDDIN'S OFFER TO COME TO LONDON. WE HAVE HOWEVER NOTHING NEW TO SAY TO HIM, AND SUCH A VISIT WOULD THEREFORE SERVE LITTLE PURPOSE. MORE IMPORTANT, IT MIGHT, IF IT BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, DAMAGE HIS PROSPECTS. TO THE EXTENT THAT SADRUDDIN SEEKS OUR ADVICE ON TACTICS, IT WOULD BE BEST TO RELY ON HIS DIRECT LINK WITH SIR A PARSONS. WE DO NOT WANT TO CROSS WIRES.

CARRINGTON

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PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

SIR A ACLAND

MR GOODISON

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FM UKMIS GENEVA 061510Z NOV 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 376 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1170: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

196

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOODISON, AUSS

*draft submitted*  
*discussed*  
*11/10/81*

1. SADRUDDIN TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING (6 NOVEMBER) TO SAY THAT HE WOULD BE MOST WILLING TO GO TO LONDON EG FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY IF AT ANY STAGE IT WAS THOUGHT USEFUL. I THANKED SADRUDDIN FOR THE OFFER AND SAID THAT I WOULD PASS IT ON.

2. SADRUDDIN'S PRESENT ASSUMPTION IS THAT THERE WOULD BE SEVERAL DAYS BETWEEN A SITUATION ARISING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THERE WERE FURTHER CANDIDATES IN THE FIELD AND ACTUAL BALLOTING ON THOSE CANDIDATES. HE HAS OF COURSE HOISTED IN THE POINT THAT MATTERS MIGHT MOVE VERY QUICKLY. AS AGAINST THAT HE BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE "UNDIGNIFIED TO HANG AROUND" IN NEW YORK AND HE WISHES IN PARTICULAR TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF DISLOYALTY TO WALDHEIM. HE HAS REPEATED TO ME HOW UNPLEASANT HE FOUND THE ATMOSPHERE IN NEW YORK AND HIS MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE TASK THAT ANY NEW SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD HAVE AFTER THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN DURING THE CONDUCTING OF THE ELECTION. BUT HE CONTINUES TO PUT GREAT STORE ON ANY ADVICE WE MAY GIVE HIM.

3. I TOLD HIM YOUR REACTION TO THE BERNARD NOSSITER ARTICLE IN YESTERDAY'S INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. ONE POINT WHICH EXERCISED HIM WAS THE WAY IN WHICH IT ASSOCIATED HIM WITH PAKISTAN, AND THE DIFFICULTIES THIS COULD CAUSE FROM THE AFGHAN AND INDIAN ANGLES.

4. MY US OPPOSITE NUMBER (WHO LEAVES GENEVA ON 9 NOVEMBER) HAD A MEETING WITH SADRUDDIN YESTERDAY. HELMAN TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT THERE WAS NOTHING DEFINITE THAT HE COULD SAY ABOUT US INTENTIONS HE CONFIRMED THE VERY CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND SADRUDDIN. (WHEN IT WAS PROPOSED THAT BUSH SHOULD COME HERE LAST APRIL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN AFRICA, BUSH'S ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS TO STAY WITH SADRUDDIN. HELMAN TOLD HIM THAT THIS WAS RULED OUT ON SECURITY GROUNDS.)

MARSHALL

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PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/LORD TREFGARNE

PS/PUS

SIR A ACLAND

MR GOODISON

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DESKBY 050900 FCO

DESKBY 050500Z RIYADH

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 050045Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1170 OF 4 NOVEMBER 1981

INFO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, UKMIS GENEVA

194

MY TELNO 1162: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HELD TWO FURTHER INCONCLUSIVE ROUNDS OF BALLOTING BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM THIS EVENING (4 NOVEMBER) THE RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS (PM = PERMANENT MEMBER).

BALLOT 7	SALIM			WALDHEIM		
	YES	NO	ABST	YES	NO	ABST
PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON PM'S	7	1	2	6	3	1
TOTAL	9	2	4	10	4	1

BALLOT 8

PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON PM'S	6	2	2	6	3	1
TOTAL	8	3	4	10	4	1

SALIM THUS MANAGED TO GET UP TO 9 VOTES ON THE 7TH BALLOT BUT SLIPPED BACK TO 8 ON THE 8TH. THE US AND CHINESE NEGATIVE VOTES REMAINED FIRM.

2. AFTER THE 8TH VOTE OTUNNU (UGANDA) PROPOSED AN ADJOURNMENT OF AT LEAST A WEEK. AFTER DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WOULD INVITE DELEGATIONS TO SEE HIM INDIVIDUALLY NEXT MONDAY (9 NOVEMBER) AND THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD THEN MOVE INTO INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE, EITHER THAT DAY OR ON 10 NOVEMBER. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR THE COUNCIL TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF OTHER CANDIDATES, AT LEAST ONE OF WHOM (IE RAMPHUL) HAD FORMALLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY APPLIED. BUT WAS NOT TAKEN UP BY OTHER DELEGATIONS.

3. THERE IS INCREASING RESTIVENESS AMONGST THE TWO LATIN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AT THE STRANGLEHOLD THE AFRICANS HAVE IMPOSED ON THE PROCEEDINGS. MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO) INTENDS TO SEE SALIM TOMORROW AND OBVIOUSLY HOPES THAT HE WILL WITHDRAW. BUT I THINK THAT THE AFRICANS WILL STAND FIRM AND THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO SIGN OF WALDHEIM CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL.

PARSONS

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EAD	PS/LPS	SIR A ACLAND
NAD	PS/MR LUCE	MR GOODISON
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ON 11/15/81 BY 1043 BJS/STP

UKMIS GENEVA

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Ci A Auland  
Mr Goodison  
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DESKBY FCO 040900Z

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 032352Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1162 OF 3 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON PARIS DARESSALAAM VIENNA UKMIS GENEVA

MY TELNO 1146: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

1. SLIM (TUNISIA), THIS MONTH'S PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WANTS THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO HELP THE COUNCIL FIND A WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE. AFTER CONSULTING EACH OF US INDIVIDUALLY, HE ARRANGED FOR MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA), LEPRETTE (FRANCE) AND ME TO MEET PRIVATELY BEFORE THIS AFTERNOON'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL.

2. THE THREE OF US AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO A FURTHER SERIES OF BALLOTS BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM. THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT A DEADLOCK EXISTED. WE HAD SOME INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW THE FIELD COULD THEN BE OPENED FOR OTHER CANDIDATES, IF THE AFRICANS CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT SALIM WAS THE CANDIDATE OF AFRICA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND TRIED TO FRIGHTEN OFF OTHER POTENTIAL CANDIDATES. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO TRY TO PUSH THINGS ALONG (AND LEPRETTE REPORTED THAT TROYANOVSKY (USSR) TOOK THE SAME VIEW). WE WOULD HAVE TO RELY ON OTHERS IN THE COUNCIL, PERHAPS DORR (IRELAND) OR THE LATINS, TO GET THE FIELD OPENED. WE ALSO AGREED THAT IF POSSIBLE THE ELECTION SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE 1 DECEMBER WHEN OTUNNU (UGANDA) ASSUMES THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK REPORTED THAT SALIM WAS PRESSING THE AMERICANS HARD TO LIFT THEIR VETO AND HAD VISITED WASHINGTON FOR THAT PURPOSE. HE EXPECTED HIS VOTE TO CONTINUE TO RISE. MRS KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT ENJOYING QUOTE TAKING THE RAP UNQUOTE FOR BLOCKING SALIM: QUOTE PERHAPS THE LATTER WAS RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT THE U S MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE THAN CHINA UNQUOTE. SHE HERSELF WAS AMBIVALENT. BUT SHE WENT ON TO LIST THE REASONS WHY THE U S WOULD NOT WANT SALIM ELECTED (BUSH'S DISTASTE FOR HIM, THE RISK THAT HE WOULD BE A PRISONER OF THE AFRICANS - AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS CURRENT BEHAVIOUR, HAIG'S RELUCTANCE TO HAVE AN AFRICAN SECRETARY GENERAL WHEN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE IN THE BAG ETC).

THE COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. SLIM CONFIRMED



TARY GENERAL WHEN A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE IN THE BAG ETC).

4. WHEN THE COUNCIL MET IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS, SLIM CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE STILL ONLY TWO CANDIDATES. DORR SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF MAURITIUS SEEKING IRISH SUPPORT FOR RAMPHUL'S CANDIDATURE IN TERMS WHICH INDICATED THAT THAT CANDIDATURE WAS NOT CONDITIONAL IN ANY WAY. SLIM DENIED THAT HE OR HIS GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED ANY SIMILAR NOTIFICATION. DE PINIES (SPAIN) CONFIRMED THAT ALL THE POSSIBLE CANDIDATURES NOTIFIED TO HIM DURING HIS PRESIDENCY WERE CONDITIONAL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE EXISTING CANDIDATES. NISIBORI (JAPAN) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WAS IN DEADLOCK, THOUGH IT WAS RELUCTANT TO ADMIT IT, BUT THE ONLY CONCLUSION HE DREW WAS THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD PRESS ON WITH FURTHER BALLOTING. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT 2230Z ON 4 NOVEMBER. NO ONE INCLUDING SLIM SUGGESTED THAT RAMPHAL'S NAME SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE BALLOTING ON 4 NOVEMBER. SLIM TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT HE THOUGHT IT TOO ABSURD TO TAKE SERIOUSLY.

PARSONS

NNNN

UN

2 November, 1981

CF

SECRETARY GENERALSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I enclose a message which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Mauritius proposing the candidature of the Mauritian representative at the United Nations, Mr Ramphul, for the succession to Dr Waldheim as Secretary-General of the UN. You kindly said that you would arrange for Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam's message to be acknowledged.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

lib

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 151 B/81

30 OCT 1981/1951

ZCZC CLF0956 LBF052 ELB3595 MAR428 PGR005

GBXX BV IMPL 485

PORTLOUISMAURITIUS 485/484 30 2100 PART1/288 PAGE1/38

ETATPRIORITY

H.E. MRS MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
UNITED KINGDOM  
LONDONSW1

DR THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR SEEWOSAGUR RAMGOOLAN, PRIME MINISTER  
OF MAURITIUS, PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO HIS EXCELLENCY  
MRS. MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

LBF052 ETATPRIORITY PAGE2/50

AND HAS THE HONOUR TO INFORM HIS EXCELLENCY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF  
MAURITIUS IS PROPOSING THE CANDIDATURE OF HIS EXCELLENCY  
MR. RADHA KRISHNA RAMPHUL, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MAURITIUS  
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR THE POST OF SECRETARY GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE CANDIDATURE OF MR. RADHA KRISHNA  
RAMPHUL IS NOT REPEAT

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TELECOM  
for enquiries dial the number  
shown in your dialling instructions  
Telegra

SUBJECT

cc Master  
eps

NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY GROUP AND IS ABSOLUTELY INDEPENDENT. HIS CANDIDATURE IS BEING PROPOSED SOLELY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS LONG EXPERIENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND HIS PROVEN AND RECOGNIZED ABILITY. THE CURRICULUM VITAE OF MR. RADHA KRISHNA RAMPHUL IS AS FOLLOWS:-

RAMPHUL, RADHA KRISHNA: MAURITIAN DIPLOMAT SEMI COLON BORN 4TH

COL 4TH

JANUARY 1926, CUREPIPE SEMI COLON SON OF PUNDIT SOOKDEV RAMPHUL AND RHIKYA RAMNARAIN SEMI COLON MARRIED LEELA DEVI LALLAH 1950 SEMI COLON ONE SON, ONE DAUGHTER SEMI COLON EDUCATED LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND LINCOLN'S INN, LONDON SEMI COLON COMPANY SECRETARY AND MANAGER SUGAR ESTATES 1946-50 SEMI COLON HELPED ORGANIZE

COL 1926, 1950 1946-50

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for enquiries dial the number in your dialling instructions  
British TELECOM for enquiries dial the number shown in your dialling instructions  
T 1292  
Telegram for enquiry shown in

FIELD WORKERS' TRADE UNION 1945-50 SENI COLON DIRECTOR  
PRIVATE FIRM IN LONDON 1955-69 SENI COLON PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS 1969 SENI COLON REPRESENTATIVE UN  
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1971-73, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF  
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 1971, FIRST AND SECOND UN DECADE, VARIOUR  
CONFERNCES AND ALL UN CONFERENCES ON LAWS OF

COL 1945-50 1955-69 1969 1971-73, 1971

LBF052 ETATPRIORITY PAGE6/50

THE SEA, REVIEW CONFERENCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY  
(GENEVA, MAY

1975) SENI COLON CHAIRMAN AFRICAN GROUP 1970-73, DECEMBER  
1976. VICE CHAIRMAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 25TH SESSION 1970  
SENI COLON VICE-CHAIRMAN LAW OF THE SEA COMMITTEE. VICE  
CHAIRMAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE, 26TH SESSION  
1971. CHAIRMAN 27TH SESSION 1972. CHAIRMAN OF UN COMMISSION

COL 1975) 1970-73 196. 25TH 1970 26TH 1971. 27TH 1972.

ETATPRIORITY PAGE7/50 WORDS

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Telegram

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UN HUMAN RIGHTS, 29TH SESSION 1973. VICE-CHAIRMAN  
REVIEW CONFERENCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION  
TREATY 1975. REPRESENTATIVE OF CHAIRMAN, ORGANISATION  
OF AFRICAN UNITY AT UN 1976-77. CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE  
OF MAURITIUS TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1976 (PRESIDENT DECEMBER  
1977) SEMI COLON MEMBER INDIAN CULTURAL ASSOCIATION,  
INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE, WORLD ASSOCIATION  
OF WORLD FEDERALISTS, NATIONAL

COL 29TH 1973. 1975. 1976-77. 1976 1977)

LBF051 ETATPRIORITY PAGE8/50

TRUST OF U.K., SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTE UNITED STATES,  
WORLD WILD LIFE SOCIETY SEMI COLON OFFICIER DE L'ORDRE  
DU MERITE CENTRAFRICAIN, OFFICIER DE L'ORDRE NATIONAL DU  
LION. LEISURE INTERESTS: CHESS, GOLF, RIDING,  
SHOOTING, FISHING, TENNIS, SWIMMING, READING,  
WILDLIFE. ADDRESS: PERMANENT MISSION OF MAURITIUS  
TO UNITED NATIONS, 820 SECOND AVENUE, 15TH FLOOR,  
NEW

COL 820 15TH

enquiries dial the number  
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TELECOM

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Telegram

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ETATPRIORITY PAGE9/50

YORK, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. THE GOVERNMENT OF MAURITIUS FEELS  
THAT AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE THIRD WORLD MR. RADHA KRISHNA  
RAMPHUL WOULD EMINENTLY SUIT THIS POST OF EXECUTIVE,  
ADMINISTRATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL STANDING. THE GOVERNMENT  
OF MAURITIUS THEREFORE SEEKS YOUR SUPPORT FOR SUCH A  
CANDIDATURE AND HOPES THAT YOU WOULD REQUEST YOUR REPRESENTATIVE

ETATPRIORITY PAGE10/16

ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE HIS WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT.  
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SIR SEENOOSAGUR RAMGOOLAM

PRIME MINISTER

MAURITIUS

shown in your dialling instructions

enquiries dial the number  
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British TELECOM  
for enquiries dial the number  
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HL

UN.

29 October 1981

UN Secretary General

I enclose a copy of the message which the Prime Minister has received from the Prime Minister of Peru asking her to support the candidature of Senor Perez de Cuellar for the Secretary Generalship of the United Nations. You have already acknowledged receipt of Senor Ulloa's message.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

5





(2)

10 DOWNING STREET

Premier Minister.

mt

U.N. Secretary General.

Two more ballots to-day produced no new candidates & no significantly different results. Waldheim's vote remains steady at 10/11 with one veto; Salin has climbed back up to 8 with one veto.

There will probably be no new ballot until Friday: the Americans are arguing for an even longer pause for reflection.

And 28/x

CONFIDENTIAL



CM

SECRETARY OF STATE

UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. We need authority to despatch this telegram of further instructions to Tony Parsons before you and the PM are tied up with Hussein.
2. The telegram does not refer to Ramphal. It is by no means certain that Ramphal will be a candidate in the next round of voting. Our experts have hitherto not rated his chances highly because he is not well known in UN circles.
3. If you wish, we could:
  - a. emphasise to Tony Parsons that we are very keen to avoid having Ramphal as Secretary General, though not to the point of casting our veto;
  - b. suggest that Tony should do some discreet lobbying against Ramphal, with the object of encouraging the Americans to veto him;
  - c. spread a little dirt with US officials here or in Washington.
4. However, on balance I think it would be a mistake to do b. and c., and that a. would therefore be otiose. We face the awkward question of explaining our own unwillingness to veto. It is very likely that news of our lobbying would get back to Ramphal. If he is elected, we shall have to live with him as Secretary General (and I suspect that he might not be as awful as we now think). If he is not elected, we must continue to live with him as Commonwealth Secretary General. If the senior Commonwealth member was perceived as having stymied Ramphal's chances, Ramphal would certainly do all he could to whip up feeling in the Commonwealth against us.
5. I propose to consult Michael Alexander before despatch of the telegram, unless you want to have a word with the PM at 11.45.

RWJL

28 October 1981

28 OCT 1981





PS

Mr Goodison

cc PS/PUS

Sir A Acland.

## ELECTION OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

## PROBLEM

- A B 1. In his telegrams 1118 and 1119 Sir A Parsons has reported on yesterday's deadlock in the Security Council and made recommendations about how he should vote today.

## RECOMMENDATION

- / 2. I submit a draft telegram of instructions.

## ARGUMENT

3. There may be some garbling in paragraph 4 of Sir A Parsons' second telegram. In view of the possibility of a number of third candidates joining the contest, it is not clear why he ~~stated~~ ~~assumed~~ that the first ballot would be between the 4/5 named in the third sentence. This may be just an assumption.
4. Sir A Parsons proposes to stop voting for Waldheim when his support dips below nine votes. Given our repeated assurances of support (and our failure to join in vetoing Salim) Ministers may prefer to continue to support him until he withdraws. Since we can vote in parallel for other candidates we would lose little if anything. The successful candidate would be unlikely to hold this against us. And there is always the very slight chance that if there is no agreement on another candidate support for Waldheim could grow again.
- C 5. On Perez de Cuellar the Secretary of State has already decided that we should lean towards him (FCO telegram no 646).  
Sir A Parsons has said that he would make an excellent Secretary-General.

/6. On Ortiz,



6. On Ortiz, opinions are less clear cut. It is agreed that he is able, experienced and generally well disposed towards the West. We are inclined to discount the possibility that he could use the Secretary-Generalship to embarrass us in any very serious way over Falklands. We voted for him in 1971. But Mr Ridley, whom the Private Office consulted last night, while agreeing that Mr Ortiz is a competent and experienced man, also described him as not altogether truthful or trustworthy. Sir A Parsons has also expressed reservations about his personal style. Against this background and given the Secretary of State's instructions that we should lean towards Perez, it seems better that Sir A Parsons should abstain on Ortiz unless and until he establishes a clear lead over Perez.

7. Ministers may like to be aware <sup>that</sup> in addition to the possible candidates already named in the correspondence, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan has now arrived in New York from Geneva. Prince Sadruddin was High Commissioner for Refugees from 1965 to 1977 since when he has been doing odd jobs for the Secretary-General and running the 'Bellerive' group on nuclear affairs. Successive British Governments have had a high opinion of him but it is unlikely that he would do well in the elections as his wealth and rank might count against him and he has been rather away from the centre of UN affairs in recent years.

D E F 8. Personality reports on Perez, Ortiz and Prince Sadruddin's Who's Who entry are attached.

*William*

N C R Williams  
United Nations Department

28 October 1981

*/ agree*



Confidential

I agree with Mr Williams, in thinking that we should continue voting for Waldheim until he falls out. Otherwise, Sir A Parsons's proposals on Perez de Cuellar are certainly right. Ortiz can wait.

Woodward

28

10



*With the compliments of*

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

For Michael Alexander.

From: Rodric Lyne.

27.10.81.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
SW1A 2AH

UN

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OO FCO

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PS/ab. Hurd

Ld J. Gordon Lennox

PS/LPS

PS/POS

Sic. AAdair

RESTRICTED

FM LUXEMBOURG 271447Z OCT 81  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 27 OCTOBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE FCO

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. YOU WILL WISH TO KNOW THAT WALDHEIM HAS TWICE TELEPHONED THORN TO URGE COMMUNITY GOVERNMENTS ON GROUNDS OF EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY TO VOTE FOR HIM. THORN TOOK THE LINE THAT THIS WAS NOT THE COMMISSION'S BUSINESS, BUT THAT HE WOULD PASS THE MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS PRESIDENCY CAPACITY. APPARENTLY, WALDHEIM BETRAYED ANXIETY THAT SALIM MIGHT GET NINE VOTES ON THE FIRST ROUND. HE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD BE VETOED, BUT HE COULD NOT BE SURE.

FCO ADVANCE TO:

FCO - UND PS PS/MR HURD LORD N GORDON LENNOX

THOMAS

*[Handwritten signature]*

ADVANCED AS REQUESTED

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SIA. A. P. L. M.

M. G. S. D. S. M.

GRS 550

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RL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 1212Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1115 DATED 27 OCTOBER 81

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, VIENNA, LIMA, UKMIS GENEVA, WASHINGTON, PARIS

ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HELD FOUR BALLOTS THIS MORNING (27 OCTOBER) BETWEEN SALIM AND WALDHEIM. THEY WERE INCONCLUSIVE. SALIM CAME OUT THE BETTER IN THE FIRST ROUND WITH 11 VOTES TO WALDHEIM'S 10. BUT HE RECEIVED ONE VETO AND ONE PERMANENT MEMBER CONTINUED TO VOTE AGAINST HIM IN THE SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS. BY THE FOURTH ROUND THE VOTES IN HIS FAVOUR HAD FALLEN TO SIX. WALDHEIM ALSO RECEIVED ONE VETO (PRESUMABLY FROM CHINA) IN EACH ROUND BUT THERE WERE ELEVEN OR TEN POSITIVE VOTES IN HIS FAVOUR THROUGHOUT. THE COUNCIL IS TO MEET AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING (28 OCTOBER) BY WHICH TIME SALIM MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN AND OTHER CANDIDATES MAY HAVE ENTERED THE RING.

DETAIL

DETAIL

2. DETAILS OF THE FOUR BALLOTS WERE AS FOLLOWS (PM = PERMANENT MEMBER):

	SALIM			WALDHEIM		
	YES	NO	ABST	YES	NO	ABST
BALLOT 1						
PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON-PM'S	9	1	-	6	3	1
TOTAL	11	2	2	10	4	1
BALLOT 2						
PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON-PM'S	8	1	1	7	2	1
TOTAL	10	2	3	11	3	1
BALLOT 3						
PM'S	2	1	2	4	1	-
NON-PM'S	6	1	3	6	2	2
TOTAL	8	2	5	10	3	2
BALLOT 4						
PM'S	1	1	3	4	1	-
NON-PM'S	5	1	4	6	3	1
TOTAL	6	2	7	10	4	1

3. AFTER THE SECOND BALLOT THE PANAMANIAN PROPOSED AN ADJOURNMENT OF ONE HOUR. THIS WAS OPPOSED BY THE PHILIPPINES, THE PANAMANIAN PROPOSAL WAS PUT TO THE VOTE AND LOST 6-4-4 WITH ONE MEMBER NOT PARTICIPATING. AFTER THE THIRD BALLOT THE PANAMANIAN PROPOSAL WAS REVIVED BY MEXICO. AFTER SOME PROCEDURAL DEBATE IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD A FOURTH BALLOT AND THEN ADJOURN UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING.

4. SINCE THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED THE RUSSIANS HAVE TOLD THE PRESS THAT THEY DID NOT EXERCISE THEIR VETO, THUS POINTING THE FINGER AT THE AMERICANS FOR VETOING SALIM.

PARSONS

NNNN

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[Limits]

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NR DM

S.E.A. MAN

M.C. MAN

R.C.

IMMEDIATE

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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 280900Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 272123Z OCT 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1119 DATED 27 OCTOBER 81

MIPT AND YOUR TELNO 646: ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY GENERAL

1. AS INSTRUCTED, I VOTED FOR WALDHEIM AND ABSTAINED ON SALIM THROUGHOUT.
2. WE KNOW FROM CLANDESTINE OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS THE AMERICANS WHO VETCED SALIM. (THE US MISSION DO NOT KNOW THAT WE ARE IN NO DOUBT AS TO HOW THEY VOTED AND IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT KNOW ) I BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER VOTE AGAINST SALIM CAME FROM THE PHILIPPINES. WE WERE ALSO ABLE TO OBSERVE THAT THE RUSSIANS ABSTAINED ON SALIM THROUGHOUT. IT IS CLEAR THEREFORE THAT THE FRENCH JOINED THE CHINESE IN VOTING FOR HIM UNTIL THE FOURTH ROUND, WHEN THEY MOVED TO AN ABSTENTION. IF WE ARE RIGHT ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES, ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, INCLUDING THE GDR, THUS VOTED FOR SALIM ON THE FIRST ROUND. BUT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE VETO AGAINST HIM LED TO RAPID EROSION OF HIS SUPPORT IN ROUNDS 3 AND 4.
3. WALDHEIM'S SUPPORT, BY CONTRAST, REMAINED SOLID AND INCLUDED FOUR OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS (THE FRENCH DOUBLE-VOTED ON THE FIRST THREE ROUNDS). BUT THE CHINESE VETO REMAINED FIRM TOO. THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE CONTINUED TO VETO WALDHEIM EVEN AFTER THE VOTES IN FAVOUR OF SALIM HAD FALLEN BELOW NINE IN ROUND 3 SUGGESTS THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THEIR OPPOSITION TO WALDHEIM UNTIL THE END IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE ELECTION OF A THIRD WORLD CANDIDATE.
4. I ASSUME THAT SALIM WILL NOW WITHDRAW (OR THAT, IF HE DOES NOT, HE WILL NO LONGER BE A SERIOUS CONTENDER) AND THAT A NUMBER OF THIRD CANDIDATES WILL JOIN THE CONTEST. WE SHALL PROBABLY NOT KNOW UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING WHO THEY ARE: IF THEY ARE NUMEROUS, THERE MAY BE A MOVE TO POSTPONE FURTHER

BALLOTING FOR A WHILE. BUT, THE FIRST BALLOT TOMORROW IS BETWEEN WALDHEIM, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, ORTIZ DA ROSAS AND RAMPHAL WITH OR WITHOUT SALIM. I WOULD PROPOSE, FOLLOWING MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH WILLIAMS TODAY, TO VOTE FOR THE FIRST TWO AND TO ABSTAIN ON THE OTHERS IN THE EARLY ROUNDS BUT STOP VOTING FOR WALDHEIM IF HIS VOTE FALLS BELOW NINE. I WOULD ALSO PROPOSE TO START VOTING FOR ORTIZ DA ROSAS, AS WELL AS PEREZ DE CUELLAR, IF HE BEGINS TO SCORE SUBSTANTIALLY BETTER THAN DE CUELLAR.

5. ALTERNATIVELY, I WOULD BE QUITE HAPPY, IN THE LIGHT OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELNO 646, TO VOTE FROM THE OUTSET FOR ORTIZ DA ROSAS, AS WELL AS WALDHEIM AND DE CUELLAR. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE A SLIGHT PERSONAL PREFERENCE FOR DE CUELLAR. I THINK THAT, IF ELEVATED TO THE SECRETARY GENERALSHIP, HE WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO BE POMPOUS AND STARCHY THAN ORTIZ DA ROSAS. BUT BOTH ARE ANGLOPHILES AND MEN OF COMMONSENSE AND MODERATION. THERE IS LITTLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THEM.

PARSONS

NNNN

THATS ALL BIBI OR NOW  
263563 PRDRME G

PCRG BEEEE

SUBJECT.

0234

Master ser  
ppr.

263563 PRDRME G  
20187PE MINDEF

ho lo. JTK  
NO DISTRIBUTION

LIMA, 27TH OCTOBER 1981

FOLLOWING TELEX FOR:

THE RT. HONORABLE  
MRS. MARGARET THATCHER

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T.150/81

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

FORGIVE THE INTRUSION BUT IT APPEARS THAT THE ELECTION OF  
SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS IS IN STALEMATE AND THAT  
THE TWO PRINCIPAL CONTENDORS DO NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY SUP-  
PORT. IN THIS SITUATION IT APPEARS THAT PERUVIAN AMBASSADOR PEREZ  
DE CUELLAR, WHO HAS BEEN NUMBER TWO MAN AT UNITED NATIONS FOR  
THE PAST TWO YEARS AND COMMISSIONAIRE IN AFGHANISTAN IS A  
POSSIBLE COMPROMISE CANDIDATE STOP IF THIS IS THE CASE AND  
THE SITUATION EVOLVES FAVOURABLY, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE  
VERY APPRECIATIVE FOR ANY HELP OR ASSISTANCE YOUR GOVERNMENT  
COULD GIVE THIS POSSIBLE PERUVIAN OPTION WHICH WOULD HAVE  
GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR US STOP MANY THANKS AND MY CONTINUED  
BEST WISHES FOR YOUR SUCCESS. WE ARE TRYING HARD HERE.  
VERY CORDIALLY,

MANUEL ULLOA ELIAS  
PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER  
OF ECONOMY, FINANCE AND COMMERCE

20187PE MINDEF  
263563 PRDRME G

UN

File No. ....

Department UND .....

OUTWARD

Drafted by N C R WILLIAMS  
(Block Capitals) .....

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn. ....

Security Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY <u>281400</u> .....Z

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(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
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- MR DAY
- SIR A ACLAND
- MR GOODISON

YOUR TELEGRAMS 1118 AND 1119; ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. In view of our repeated assurances of support for Waldheim I should like you to continue to vote for him until he withdraws. You may start voting for Perez de Cuellar as soon as his hat is in the ring. I should like you to abstain on Ortiz initially in the hope of giving Perez a clear lead. But you may start voting for Ortiz if he begins to score substantially better than de Cuellar.

**Copies to:-**

GRS 270  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DEHOC  
FM FCO 260952Z OCT 81  
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 646 OF 26 OCTOBER

CONFIDENTIAL

*Personal*

*PS/NO 10 (2)*

*File  
H.A. Paul*

ELECTION OF UN SECRETARY -GENERAL

1. I HAVE SEEN GOULDING'S TELELETTER OF 19 OCTOBER ON THE QUESTION OF HOW YOU SHOULD VOTE IN THE EVENT OF A DEADLOCK BETWEEN WALDHEIM AND SALIM.
2. I ACCEPT THAT OF THE THREE LATIN AMERICAN CANDIDATES ALREADY KNOWN TO BE WAITING TO COME FORWARD, WE SHOULD LEAN TOWARDS PEREZ DE CUELLAR. I WOULD NOT HOWEVER AT THIS STAGE WHOLLY EXCLUDE SUPPORTING ORTIZ (AS WE DID IN 1971). IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT HE IS OBSESSED WITH THE FALKLANDS BUT THE SCOPE THE SECRETARY-GENERALSHIP WOULD GIVE HIM TO EMBARRASS US ON THAT SUBJECT IS PROBABLY LIMITED. IN LONDON WE HAVE KNOWN HIM GENERALLY AS AN ABLE AND MODERATE MAN. I WOULD NOT (NOT) WANT TO SEE RAMPHAL EMERGE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE OF HIS VERY DETERMINED ADVOCACY OF SOUTHERN POINTS OF VIEW IN THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE.
3. OF THE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE TELELETTER, CASTANEDA, THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT GIVE US AN UNCOMFORTABLE TIME WITH HIS LEFT-OF-CENTRE VIEWS. YOUR MEXICAN COLLEAGUE MUNOZ LEDA SEEMS, FROM REPORTS OF SOME OF HIS ERRATIC ACTIVITIES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO BE MOST UNATTRACTIVE. I DOUBT IF WE COULD SUPPORT ANY AFRICAN CANDIDATE. I HAVE BEEN TAKING THE LINE WITH SALIM AND OTHERS THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO HAVE AN AFRICAN SECRETARY-GENERAL AT A TIME WHEN AFRICAN ISSUES ARE SO MUCH TO THE FORE AT THE UN.
4. I AGREE THAT YOU MAY START VOTING FOR THIRD CANDIDATES WHEN IT IS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT DEADLOCK HAS BEEN REACHED, EVEN IF WALDHEIM IS STILL IN THE RUNNING. I AM CONTENT TO LEAVE DETAILED TACTICAL DECISIONS TO YOU.
5. I DO NOT AT PRESENT ENVISAGE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH I WOULD WISH YOU TO USE THE VETO.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED  
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PS [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]  
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PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/LORD TREFGARNE  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
MR DAY  
SIR A ACLAND  
MR GOODISON

CONFIDENTIAL

26 October 1981

Election for the Secretary-Generalship  
of the United Nations

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 20 October. Despite a number of efforts on his part, Dr. Waldheim failed to find an opportunity to lobby the Prime Minister at Cancun. The Prime Minister limited her exchanges with him to wishing him "good luck" when they took leave of each other at the end of the Conference.

MA

CS

Roderic Lyne, Esq.†  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.



010  
CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

20 October 1981

*Dear Michael,*

Election for the Secretary-Generalship  
of the United Nations

Mr Waldheim will be at Cancun and will no doubt be lobbying intensively for support in the election for the Secretary-Generalship which is now to take place on 27 October.

There are only two declared candidates, Waldheim and Salim, the Foreign Minister of Tanzania, who now has the endorsement of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers as well as the OAU and the League of Arab States. Two people have notified the President of the Security Council that they will be candidates in the event of a deadlock between Waldheim and Salim. These are Ortiz, the Argentine Ambassador in London, who stood in 1971 and came close to success, and Perez de Cuellar, the Peruvian who was until recently an Under Secretary-General in New York and is still Waldheim's personal representative for Afghanistan. Both have good qualities. Other names may emerge, including possibly that of Sonny Ramphal.

Mr Waldheim is clearly becoming increasingly concerned. He knows that the Chinese will veto him at least once and is afraid that Salim may be vetoed only by the Russians. At Cancun he may press us to undertake to veto Salim also and to refrain from voting in favour of anyone else.

The procedure in the election is likely to permit members of the Security Council to vote in favour of more than one candidate in each round. Ministers having told Waldheim that they support him, it follows that we shall not vote for anyone else in the first round. But if there is a deadlock, we would wish to retain our freedom to start voting for other candidates even if Waldheim's hat is still formally in the ring. As for the veto, the Prime Minister has already endorsed Lord Carrington's view that we should not veto Salim.

/Lord Carrington

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Lord Carrington therefore suggests that if approached by Waldheim at Cancun the Prime Minister should refuse to be drawn beyond confirming that we shall be voting for Waldheim.

As for the other Permanent Members, Haig has told Lord Carrington in confidence that the Americans will vote for Waldheim but we do not know whether they will veto Salim. The French seem still to be torn between Waldheim and Salim, but are most unlikely to veto either. We believe that the Russians will favour Waldheim and are quite likely to veto Salim. It seems certain that the Chinese will begin by vetoing Waldheim; in general they will want to please the Third World, but this group is not unanimous in its support of Salim.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

21 OCT 1981

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 118AA/81

THE STATE HOUSE,  
DAR ES SALAAM,  
TANZANIA.

18th August, 1981.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,  
The Prime Minister,  
10 Downing Street,  
Whitehall,  
London, S.W.1.

T 118AA/81

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

This letter is brought to you by Ndugu Benjamin Mkapa, now the Minister for Information and National Culture in the Tanzanian Government. I have complete trust in Ndugu Mkapa; you may speak to him with the same frankness with which you would speak to me, confident that anything you care to say to him will be reported fully and accurately to me.

You may be aware that at the Nairobi Heads of Government Conference of the Organisation of African Unity, Ndugu Salim A. Salim was unanimously and enthusiastically adopted as the African candidate for the post of United Nations Secretary-General. Ndugu Salim is a Tanzanian, and is currently the Foreign Minister of my country after spending more than ten years as Head of the Tanzanian Mission to the United Nations. But I wish to stress that he is not the Tanzanian candidate for this post; nor am I writing to you in support of him as a Tanzanian. It would be presumptuous of Tanzania to put forward a candidate for so high an international office, however highly qualified he might be in other respects. Nevertheless, I did accept the nomination of Ndugu Salim with some pride that my country has produced a person whom so many independent states felt was worthy of this great responsibility.

One of the factors which led to Africa making this nomination is a widespread feeling that it would be appropriate for the next Secretary-General to come from the Third World. This does not imply a belief that the post should be allocated on a geographical basis. On the contrary, we feel strongly that the most vital consideration, for both the Security Council and the General Assembly, should be the ability of a particular candidate to serve the needs of the United Nations

and within that framework to promote the search for world peace. Yet considerations of nationality and region of origin cannot be - and have not been - completely disregarded. It is therefore not entirely irrelevant that three of the four holders of this post so far have come from Europe, and the other one from Asia.

On a matter such as this I do realise that your Government will wish to take all factors into account, and that it is not likely to be possible for you to give any immediate expression of opinion about British policy. I would nevertheless like to express my appreciation of your readiness to receive Ndugu Mkapa - if indeed that has proved possible - and of the careful consideration which I am confident your Government will give to the unanimous African opinion relating to this post.

In conclusion, let me say that I am looking forward to meeting you again in Melbourne next month. Until then I send my personal good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 May 1981

UN Secretary-Generalship

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 5 May about Mr. Waldheim's third term.

The Prime Minister agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that Mr. Waldheim's continuation in office is likely to suit us better than a change. She also agrees that we should avoid being over-active in the coming months. Nonetheless it should be clear that we support Mr. Waldheim.

As regards what was said by the Prime Minister to Mr. Waldheim in May last year, her own recollection is that she gave Mr. Waldheim an indication, but no more, that she would prefer him to carry on.

M. P. D. ALCANTARA

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(1)



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Can you throw any light on 'A' below?

Do you agree with 'B' overleaf? 5 May 1981

And s/s

Agree we should not be over what but think we should support him not

Dear Michael,

United Nations Secretary-Generalship

Mr Waldheim's second term expires on 31 December. Lord Carrington has been considering how we should approach the election, which is likely to take place in December.

The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Charter does not lay down a fixed term, but five years has become normal. There have been four Secretaries-General: Mr Lie (Norway) from 1946 to 1953; Mr Hammarskjold (Sweden) from 1953 to 1961; U Thant (Burma) from 1961 to 1971; and Mr Waldheim.

The five Permanent Members hold the key and within the five it is the attitudes of the Americans and the Russians that are crucial. We ourselves could hardly maintain a veto on a candidate acceptable to the rest of the Council or force through a candidate of our own. The preliminary view of officials in the new American Administration is that it would be unwise to risk a change. The Russians are likely to want to stick to Waldheim. Third World sentiment, which the Chinese would probably champion, would be strongly in favour of a Third World Secretary-General if a change were made, but we expect that the developing countries would acquiesce in a further term for Mr Waldheim, who has cultivated them assiduously.

Waldheim himself seems anxious to secure a third term, but if strongly challenged and unsure of support from the major powers would probably withdraw rather than engage in a protracted campaign. He appears to be under the impression that he already has a promise of support from the Prime Minister following a conversation over dinner during his official visit in May last year. We have no proper record of that conversation. I do not know whether you can shed any light on the episode.

/Politically

On withdrawal - A. Yes. We discussed the matter previously. I should reach Peter here to carry on with present matter or ul. present matter to go to an - understand not



Politically, Waldheim has not been very impressive. But the Secretary-General's room for manoeuvre is limited. A strong personality would in practice be unable to do more than marginally better, but might make difficulties for us in a number of ways. Waldheim is at least susceptible to influence and his cautious approach often suits us.

Waldheim is a bad manager and the Secretariat has now been neglected - or worse - for twenty years. It is doubtful whether much can now be done about the situation (or whether anyone with a chance of obtaining Waldheim's job has the necessary talent or interest). It is also doubtful whether it matters directly to the United Kingdom what happens to the Secretariat as a whole.

What we do attach importance to is the special political unit, which handles the most delicate political questions and is jointly headed by Brian Urquhart. As the result of pressure from the Prime Minister, Waldheim has now promised that he will look to us to provide a successor to Urquhart if he is Secretary-General when Urquhart retires. A Third World Secretary-General would be unlikely to want a Briton as his key political adviser.

A number of other names are being bandied about. Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, has come closer to declaring his candidacy than anyone but is not well known in UN circles. The candidate most talked of is Salim, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister. We would have considerable reservations about either. A number of Latin Americans are talked of (most of them unacceptable to the Russians) as are some senior UN officials. But a NATO national has no chance. Nor is it likely that the Secretary-Generalship could go a second time to Sweden (or a third time to Scandinavia - or indeed a fourth time to Europe).

Addition: 6/5/81

"The names of Trudeau and Palme are also mentioned."

(Michael Hall, Fco.)

Lord Carrington's conclusions are that:


- B.
- Push letter*
- (a) we should not be over-active in the coming months but should watch developments and maintain discreet contact with the French and Americans; and
  - (b) the continuation in office of Mr Waldheim is likely to suit us better than a change.

He would be glad to know whether the Prime Minister agrees.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*  
 (R M J Lyne)  
 Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing St





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