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Resignation of Commander Trestrail.

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SECURITY

July 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
~~20.7.82~~ ~~[illegible].7.82~~ ~~[illegible].11.82~~ 24.11.82							

PREM 19/916

Secret

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

I understand the anxieties of H.M's. I have no doubt my HF the Leader of the House will have taken note of the request for a debate. Perhaps we could leave the matter to be discussed through the usual channels

Col 492

HOME DEPARTMENT

24.11.82

Security

Commander Trestrail (Report)

Mr. Mates asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has received Lord Bridge's report on the appointment, as the Queen's Police Officer, and the activities of Commander Trestrail; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Whitelaw: I informed the House on 21 July that I had invited Lord Bridge to investigate the appointment, as Queen's Police Officer, and the activities of Commander Trestrail, with a view to determining whether security was breached or put at risk; and to advise whether, in the light of that investigation, any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable. I also arranged for Lord Bridge to see all the papers relating to the intrusion into Buckingham Palace on 9 July by Mr. Michael Fagan, so that he could make any further inquiries he considered necessary and advise on the adequacy of police inquiries. I have received Lord Bridge's report and it has been published today.

The report makes it clear that there was no breach of security and concludes that security was not put at risk; there was no connection between Commander Trestrail

24.11.82

and Mr. Fagan; but the risks Commander Trestrail took in his homosexual activities, and the indiscretions he committed, cast serious doubt on the soundness of his judgment which made it impossible for him to continue as the Queen's Police Officer.

For the future, Lord Bridge has observed that the question whether the positive vetting procedures can or should be enhanced could be resolved only after fuller consideration than has been possible in the course of this inquiry. This is a matter which will no doubt be further considered by the Security Commission in its examination of the Prime case. For those to whom positive vetting does not apply, Lord Bridge has concluded that the safeguards lie in careful staff management, and in particular in the careful selection and supervision of staff. It is Lord Bridge's view that the reorganisation of Royalty protection arrangements, which I announced to the House on 21 July, offers the opportunity to devise new and appropriate measures to ensure that the selection and supervision procedures are as effective as they can be made.

The report makes two specific recommendations. The first is that the current positive vetting criterion for the police service is imprecise, and that the Home Office, with the police, should attempt to give more positive guidance on the application of positive vetting to police posts. The second is that the identification by the police of positively vetted posts within the Royalty protection organisation should follow the outcome of the attempt to provide more positive guidance.

I am grateful to Lord Bridge for his full and detailed report. I accept the recommendations which he has made, and will ensure that they are taken forward by the Home Office in consultation with those concerned.

Mr. Raison: The high figures for 1980 reflect the clearance of a backlog of cases of foreign nationals that had been held in abeyance pending court decisions.

I regret that incorrect figures for the number of persons removed as illegal immigrants in the first two quarters of 1982 were given in the answer to my hon. Friend's question on 18 November.—[Vol. 32, c. *240-41*.] Those figures did not include people who made a voluntary departure under the supervision of the Immigration Service. The following table gives the corrected figures for the first two quarters of 1982 and the figure for the third quarter which is now available.

	1st Qtr.	*2nd Qtr.*	*3rd Qtr.*	*4th Qtr.*	*Total*
1978	123	135	147	133	538
1979	117	148	152	168	585
1980	230	280	250	140	900
1981	200	170	130	150	650
1982	140	160	140		

Mr. Marlow asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many prosecutions there have been as a result of the investigations in the last five years into organised schemes of abuse of marriage rules.

Mr. Raison: We shall reply as soon as possible.

Plastic Bullets

Mr. George Cunningham asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the reason for delay in replying to the question tabled by the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury for 28 October about plastic bullets; and if he will publish his reply in the *Official*

E.R.

BRIEFING FOR PRIME MINISTER'S QUESTIONS ON THURSDAY 25 NOVEMBER 1982

LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT

The police were twice warned that Trestrail was homosexual. Why was no action taken?
Lord Bridge's clear conclusion is that no action could reasonably have been taken on the basis of the two so-called "warnings" or "alerts". They involved a police officer, now retired and called "X" in the Report, conveying suspicions to the Queen's Police Officer at the time, Commander Perkins [who is now deceased]. Lord Bridge accepts that the officer acted in good faith. But, equally, he finds that the officer was quite unable to advance any rational basis for his suspicion. He believes that Commander Perkins would have shared that view, and that it was not a matter of "brushing aside" a warning but of being offered no more than, and I quote, a "gut feeling". [Given the misleading accounts of this section of the Report, I should perhaps quote the concluding sentence in full:

"In the result, nothing in the evidence of "X" caused me to modify the strong impression I received from all the other evidence I heard and read that there was nothing whatever in Trestrail's behaviour in his day to day professional and public life (saving the bare fact that he was a bachelor with no known female attachments) to arouse in an ordinary person the suspicion that he was a homosexual".]
[The paragraph in question is number 3.2]

Why was no action taken until this year on the recommendation, made in 1979, for a unified command structure for Royalty protection?
That is to misunderstand the nature of the 1979 report, which covered a range of protection issues. Work on proposals for improving the command structure was undertaken in 1979 and 1980 by a senior officer, and that resulted in improvements in co-ordination and liaison. There also flowed from the 1979 report extensive work on improving physical security, commissioning two million pounds worth of work. The adequacy of the organisational arrangements was reported on again in October 1981, and work on the recommendations of that, last year and this, laid the foundations for the new structure which my rt hon Friend the Home Secretary announced on 21 July.

What confidence can we have that the new arrangements at the Palace will be any better than the old?
That confidence provided by the statement of my rt hon Friend the Home Secretary on 21 July, and the measures flowing from that. Those include the establishment of the

E.R.

new Royalty Protection Department under Deputy Assistant Commissioner Smith; the increase in the complement of the Department; and the establishment of the new, permanent group to examine the effectiveness of the arrangements made.

Are selection procedures for sensitive posts such as those in the Royal Protection Group being tightened up - the selection procedure followed when Trestrail was appointed seems to have been rather lax?

Lord Bridge makes clear that Trestrail was appointed [in 1966] to the Royalty Protection Group before the introduction [in 1969] of a formal method of selecting Royalty protection officers. [These matters are dealt with in paragraphs 2.2 and 4.5 of the Report] As Lord Bridge indicates, the means of further improving management and selection procedures is provided by the introduction of the new Royalty Protection Department.

How will the Government improve criteria for positive vetting in the police force? (paragraph 9.6 of the Bridge Report)

As Lord Bridge envisages in his Report [in paragraph 5.6] the Home Office, in consultation with the police, will develop more positive guidance, either by definition or by illustrative examples.

BRIDGE REPORT ON TRESTRAIL: NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

Q1 POSITIVE VETTING USELESS OR INADEQUATE?

A1 That is a matter on which we shall have to await the advice of the Security Commission in the light of its investigation into the Prime case. But no vetting process can be proof against someone who is sufficiently determined and sufficiently skilful to keep his activities secret, unless the authorities are prepared to resort to methods of investigation and surveillance which, I believe, most members of this House would contemplate with extreme repugnance.

Q2 SHOULD WE USE POLYGRAPH (LIE DETECTOR) IN POSITIVE VETTING PROCESS?

A2 As Lord Bridge said in his report, the use of the polygraph raises questions which require thorough investigation. The Security Commission may wish to consider this in their investigation into the Prime case.

Q3 NEED FOR REGULAR SURVEILLANCE AND RANDOM PROCEDURES IN POSITIVE VETTING?

A3 The Security Commission will no doubt consider fully any option for the improvement of the positive vetting process that they judge to be appropriate. We must await their report.

Q4 SHOULD POSITIVE VETTING BE EXTENDED TO ALL THOSE OCCUPYING SECRETIVE POSTS RATHER THAN JUST THOSE WITH ACCESS TO HIGHLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION?

A4 Positive vetting is time consuming and expensive. It should not be used as a substitute for careful recruitment, selection and staff management.

25.11.82

Wednesday, 24th November, 1982.

Written No. 169

Mr. Michael Mates (Petersfield): To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether he has received Lord Bridge's report on the appointment, as The Queen's Police Officer, and the activities of Commander Trestrail; and if he will make a statement.

MR. WILLIAM WHITELAW

I informed the House on 21st July that I had invited Lord Bridge to investigate the appointment, as Queen's Police Officer, and the activities of Commander Trestrail, with a view to determining whether security was breached or put at risk; and to advise whether, in the light of that investigation, any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable. I also arranged for Lord Bridge to see all the papers relating to the intrusion into Buckingham Palace on 9th July by Mr. Michael Fagan, so that he could make any further inquiries he considered necessary and advise on the adequacy of police inquiries. I have received Lord Bridge's report and it has been published today.

The report makes it clear that there was no breach of security and concludes that security was not put at risk; there was no connection between Commander Trestrail and Mr. Fagan; but the risks Commander Trestrail took in his homosexual activities, and the indiscretions he committed, cast serious doubt on the soundness of his judgement which made it impossible for him to continue as The Queen's Police Officer.

For the future, Lord Bridge has observed that the question whether the Positive Vetting procedures can or should be enhanced could only be resolved after fuller consideration than has been possible in the course of this inquiry. This is a matter which will no doubt be further considered by the Security Commission in its examination of the Prime case. For those to whom Positive Vetting does not apply, Lord Bridge has concluded that the

safeguards lie in careful staff management, and in particular in the careful selection and supervision of staff. It is Lord Bridge's view that the reorganisation of Royalty protection arrangements, which I announced to the House on 21st July, offers the opportunity to devise new and appropriate measures to ensure that the selection and supervision procedures are as effective as they can be made.

The report makes two specific recommendations. The first is that the current Positive Vetting criterion for the police service is imprecise, and that the Home Office, with the police, should attempt to give more positive guidance on the application of Positive Vetting to police posts. The second is that the identification by the police of Positively Vetted posts within the Royalty protection organisation should follow the outcome of the attempt to provide more positive guidance.

I am grateful to Lord Bridge for his full and detailed report. I accept the recommendations which he has made, and will ensure that they are taken forward by the Home Office in consultation with those concerned.

Update

QUESTION AND ANSWER BRIEF FOR RESPONDING TO ENQUIRIES ON THE PUBLICATION OF LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT

1. Q. Does the Home Secretary agree that there was no breach of security?
A. Yes. This was the finding of an exhaustive inquiry which was designed to have identified any breach had it occurred.

2. Q. Does the Home Secretary accept that security was not put at risk?
A. Weighing carefully all the evidence before him, Lord Bridge's judgment was that "security was not put at risk" (paragraph 9.2) and that if Trestrail had been "blackmailed to disclose some information or otherwise to act in some way which could have been detrimental to the safety or well being of the Royal Family, everything points to the conclusion that he would have put duty before self-interest and made a full and prompt report of the threat" (paragraph 3.4).

3. Q. But Lord Bridge established Trestrail's readiness to lie, failure to report a blackmail attempt to the police, lack of judgement etc. How can he then conclude that there was no security risk?
A. The question is whether Trestrail would, whatever else he may have done, ever do anything to prejudice the safety of the Queen. On the basis of all the evidence before him, Lord Bridge judged that he would not.

4. Q, Do not Lord Bridge's comments that it may be impossible to uncover some factors if the subject is determined to conceal them imply that the PV procedure is useless?
A. No. He rightly draws attention to the limitations of present procedure. This is now a matter which the Security Commission will no doubt study in its examination of the Prime case.

5. Q. But he says elsewhere (paragraph 4.8) that it is difficult to envisage a practicable selection procedure sufficiently rigorous to have discovered Trestrail's homosexual activities.
A. Of course it is difficult, as the circumstances spelled out in the report made clear. It depends in part on a judgement on the kind and extent of surveillance which are acceptable in this country. But for the future, Lord Bridge emphasises the crucial importance

E.R.

of better management and supervision. And as far as sensitive, PV posts are concerned, it is just the problem to which the Security Commission is addressing itself.

6. Q. Lord Bridge criticises the lack of positive guidance in the Home Office circular on the definition of those police officers who should be Positively Vetted. Has (i) the security of the Queen and (ii) state secrets been put at risk because of this?
A. (i) No. The report makes clear that Positive Vetting is not used to select officers for guarding the Royal Family; this is a matter for good line management and selection procedures. PV is intended exclusively for officers having "actual or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information". (Some police guardians may, like Trestrail, by the nature of their jobs have access to such intelligence and then be candidates for PV.)
(ii) The general run of police posts are not involved with 'state secrets'. As the report makes clear (paragraph 5.5) in order to apply PV to the police there is a special criterion broader than that which applies to the public service generally. For that reason, the guidance was already designed to cover the most sensitive posts. The Home Secretary accepts that this guidance should be as free from doubt as is possible. Work will be done to improve the guidance from that point of view, but we have no evidence that the existing rules have prejudiced security.

7. Q. Given the criteria for PV, why was Trestrail only Vetted in 1982? If his job required him to have sensitive information then, surely it would have been necessary for him to have it before?
A. Whether this particular post should be PVd is a very fine judgement. On that basis, the Home Secretary accepts Lord Bridge's view that the matter should be looked at in the context of arrangements in the new Royalty Protection Department (paragraph 8.3).

8. Q. Is the Home Secretary now satisfied with security arrangements for the Queen, Royal Family generally?

F.R.

Answer: The Home Secretary believes that his statement of 21 July ., and the measures flowing from it, including the establishment of the new Royal Protection Department under DAC Smith, the increase in the complement of the Department and the establishment of the new permanent group to examine the effectiveness of the arrangements made, are the best means of fulfilling the objective, that the protection given to the Queen and members of Her Family is the best that can be provided.

9. Q. Was any of Lord Bridge's report censored?

A. Lord Bridge's report is published in full in full agreement with him. Obviously, in any published report dealing with security matters, a certain degree of confidentiality has to be preserved. Lord Bridge himself was well aware of that. But none of this would prevent him from making sure that none of the essential facts and judgements was omitted.

Other Issues

10. Questions on aspects of PV and Security Commission should be referred to No 10 or the MPO.

11. There may be questions arising for amplification of facts: eg is "Y" (paragraph 3.2) still alive? There may be challenges to the author's views/ decisions: eg surely he should have interviewed Rauch making whatever allowance he need for the man's character. The general line to take with such questions should be that the conduct of the Inquiry, and the level of detail given in the report, are matters for Lord Bridge's judgement and that it would not be appropriate to comment and to appear to vary or go beyond that.

ADDITIONAL BRIEFING ON LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT

1. Are stable homosexual relationships now adceptable under PV criteria? - There is no general answer on this. Individual cases will be considered in the context of the job and other factors to see if a security side exists.

2. Are the Home Office involved in all PVs" - PV proposals are approved in every case by the parent department. The Home Office acted in this capacity for Trestrail.

3. Para 2.5 of the report implies doubt over this report ever being published. Did such dout exist. - No, Bridge is being polite in that a decision to publish was not his to make.

4. Are the Home Office circulars referred to publicly available? - No, they concern security matters.

5. The report recommends additional criteria for deciding if police need vetting because they don't have regular contact with Top Secret documents. - The Home Secretary has said he wants these criteria produced urgently and while we can't be precise we expect them to be ready as early as possible in the New Year. A decision on publication will have to await their preparation.

6. McNee said that all of the Royal Protection Group officers, 43, should be PV'd when the Trestrail story broke. Bridge says this is wrong and indeed the Metropolitan Police had arrived at the same conclusion. They therefore proceeded with the vetting of 8 officers, including Trestrail's replacement, and these are still underway.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

22 November 1982

Dear John,

LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT ON TRESTRAIL

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 19 November and is content with the arrangements which the Home Secretary has in mind for the publication of Lord Bridge's report, and and with the terms of the Written Answer. She fears that the question of positive vetting will come in for considerable criticism but is satisfied that there is nothing further which can be done about the text.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield.

Yours ever,

Robin Butler

John Halliday Esq.,
Home Office.

SECRET

RETURN to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 23 November 1982 for

Report of an Inquiry by the Right Honourable Lord Bridge of Harwich into the appointment as The Queen's Police Officer, and the activities, of Commander Trestrail; to determine whether security was breached or put at risk, and advise whether in consequence any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable.

Ordered by The House of Commons *to be printed*
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REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD BRIDGE OF HARWICH INTO THE APPOINTMENT AS THE QUEEN'S POLICE OFFICER, AND THE ACTIVITIES, OF COMMANDER TRESTRAIL; TO DETERMINE WHETHER SECURITY WAS BREACHED OR PUT AT RISK, AND ADVISE WHETHER IN CONSEQUENCE ANY CHANGE IN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IS NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE.

The Rt Hon William Whitelaw CH, MC, DL, MP
Secretary of State for the Home Department

INTRODUCTION

Terms of Reference

1.1 As you informed the House of Commons on 21 July last, you invited me "to investigate the appointment as Queen's Police Officer and the activities of Commander Trestrail with a view to determining whether security was breached or put at risk; to advise whether in the light of that investigation any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable; and to report". You added: "Although I have no evidence of a connection between this matter and the incident on 9 July, I am arranging for Lord Bridge to see all the papers relating to the events on 9 July so that he can make any further inquiries he considers necessary and advise on the adequacy of the police inquiries". In the light of the opening phrase of this addendum to my terms of reference, I have interpreted it narrowly, as directed solely to the adequacy of the police inquiries into the incidents in which Fagan broke into Buckingham Palace and, more particularly, as to whether Fagan could have acted on any inside knowledge of the geography of Buckingham Palace other than such as he might have obtained from published sources and, if so, whether there was any possibility that such information had been made available to him, directly or indirectly, through Commander Trestrail.

Conduct of the Inquiry

1.2 In addition to considering all the relevant documentary material, I have taken oral evidence from twenty witnesses. These included the Commissioner and senior serving and retired officers of the Metropolitan Police, senior members of the staff of the Royal Household, civil servants both in the Ministry of Defence and in the Home Office who took part in the positive vetting of Commander Trestrail, the senior civil servants responsible for policy in the Police Department of the Home Office and Commander Trestrail himself. There were substantial discrepancies between the accounts of the relationship between Trestrail and the male prostitute Michael Rauch (alias Pratt, alias Price) given by Trestrail in statements made to the police and in the course of my Inquiry on the one hand and in the statement made by Rauch to the police and (still more strikingly) in versions of events attributed to Rauch in the press on the other. I considered (a) that the essential aspects of the relationship relevant to

security were not in dispute and (b) that, in the light of his character and antecedents and the circumstances in which he made his disclosures, Rauch would be a witness on whom it would be unsafe to place any reliance. I accordingly did not seek to take evidence from Rauch.

1.3 I wish to acknowledge gratefully the very considerable assistance I have had from Mr. J. A. Daniell, who has acted as my Secretary for the purposes of this Inquiry. He has not only organised the administrative machinery necessary to the conduct of the Inquiry with unfailing efficiency; he has also contributed constructively and helpfully, both in form and in substance, to the drafting of this Report.

THE PRIMARY FACTS

Trestrail's police career

2.1 Trestrail joined the Metropolitan Police on 20 October 1952 and his first posting as a police constable was to 'D' Division (Paddington) in January 1953. He was well thought of by his senior officers, progressing to Sergeant in 1960 and Station Sergeant in 1962. Throughout this period Trestrail was consistently marked highly in reports by his superior officers for qualities of reliability, appearance, demeanour and enthusiasm as well as for his capacity to supervise others. Following selection for further promotion he attended the Police College 'A' course for Inspectors from January to June 1965, a residential course which provided an opportunity to assess his general character and social behaviour in addition to his professional and academic ability. The College Commandant's final report on his performance on the course was in glowing terms, as the following quoted extracts show:—

> "Station Sergeant Trestrail is an exceptionally pleasant officer . . . He has a good logical brain and his energies are well directed and well sustained . . . He is a very good member of any team, making notable contributions to the project in hand. His powers of leadership and command are well developed and his marked vocation for the service, together with his engaging character, enables him to exercise them with good effect . . .
>
> "His powers of analysis and reasoning were impressive. He was receptive to new ideas and was tolerant of the views of his colleagues. . . . He took a full part in the sporting and social activities of the College and was very popular with his colleagues . . .
>
> "Station Sergeant Trestrail has the necessary professional and personal qualities to fill the rank of Inspector very creditably indeed and may confidently be expected to rise to higher rank".

2.2 Having served as Inspector in 'A' Division for one year, during which time he again impressed his superiors, Trestrail was posted in June 1966 to the Royalty Protection Group at Buckingham Palace. He served for a short period as staff officer to the Queen's Police Officer (Commander Perkins, now deceased), and then in July 1966 was appointed to be one of the two protection officers assigned to His Royal Highness Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. He remained with Prince Philip until July 1973, rising to the rank of Superintendent. His ability was such that he was selected to succeed Commander Perkins as the Queen's Police Officer which he did in the rank of Chief Superintendent on 1 July 1973. He was promoted to Commander A.1 Branch (Royalty Protection) on 1 July 1978.

Trestrail's duties as Queen's Police Officer

2.3 As the Queen's Police Officer, Trestrail was Her Majesty's personal protection officer and accompanied her on public and private occasions when she was outside Buckingham Palace. His role was to guard Her Majesty against any attack or threat from any source. In common with all royalty protection officers he was required to provide the necessary level of security

while taking into account his Royal principal's desire to move freely in discharge of her official duties and to lead as normal a life as possible. In order effectively to carry out his duties, Trestrail was required to reconnoitre prospective visits both at home and abroad, to plan and organise the appropriate security arrangements in conjunction with local police forces and other agencies involved, to inspect proposed accommodation and to receive threat assessments relating to his Royal principal in the area which she was visiting. Inevitably a considerable amount of time was spent away from Buckingham Palace while such reconnaissances were taking place. In addition to his personal protection duties, Trestrail commanded the Royalty Protection Group. While protection officers of necessity have to act very much on their own initiative, the Queen's Police Officer was responsible for their efficient operation as a group. He had to know their strengths and weaknesses and ensure that overall policy on protection was being uniformly interpreted and implemented, in accordance with the demands of security and the wishes of the Royal Family. Trestrail had other important management responsibilities including the training and welfare of protection officers; recommending officers for promotion; and sitting on selection boards. From 1 July 1978 he reported to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'A' Department on routine matters but had direct access to the Assistant Commissioner 'A' on sensitive issues concerning the Royal Household. In carrying out his duties, Trestrail had to communicate effectively with people representing a variety of interests, at home and abroad, including members of the Royal Household, senior service officers, public authorities, police officers of all ranks and members of the public.

The disclosure of Trestrail's homosexual activities

2.4 After reading press reports of the incident on 9 July in which Fagan broke into Buckingham Palace and gained access to the Queen's bedroom, Rauch spoke to a reporter of the Sun newspaper, said that he was a male prostitute who had been employed over a period of years by the Queen's Police Officer to engage in homosexual activities and offered to sell his story for £20,000. The reporter informed the editor, who, very properly, decided not to use the story and promptly reported the matter to the Press Secretary at Buckingham Palace. The Private Secretary to the Queen informed the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police of Rauch's allegation. This was late on Friday, 16 July. An immediate police investigation was instituted. On 17 July Rauch was interviewed at New Scotland Yard and made a statement detailing his account of his relationship with Commander Trestrail. Commander Trestrail was then immediately called to the Yard and confronted with Rauch's allegation. His initial reaction was to deny that he knew Rauch; but within minutes he admitted the association and asked to be allowed to resign from the police force forthwith. His resignation was accepted by the Commissioner.

The nature and extent of Trestrail's homosexual activities

2.5 Since it is no part of my purpose that this Report, if published, should satisfy the curiosity of the prurient, I shall confine what I say under this heading to a very general account of the way in which Trestrail carried on

his homosexual activities and need refer only to such details as are of possible security significance. Trestrail has been aware of his homosexuality since his teens. He has always been reluctant to acknowledge it, even to himself, and has sought to repress it. In the result, the occasions of his homosexual activity have been spasmodic and infrequent—separated by intervals of "months" according to his own account. They normally only occurred when he had taken drink and felt unable to control his urge for some homosexual contact. The great majority of his contacts have been with male prostitutes but some have been with fellow homosexuals recognised as such in casual encounters. According to Trestrail's account, with two exceptions all his contacts involved only a single homosexual incident with any single individual.

2.6 The first exception was a Spanish visitor from the Canary Islands whom Trestrail met in Hyde Park several years ago when each was seeking a homosexual partner. This incident was followed by a few further homosexual encounters between the two men. They continued their acquaintance by the exchange of Christmas cards. They met more recently, once when Trestrail paid a private visit to the Canaries and again when the Spaniard visited England, but there was on these occasions no further homosexual activity between them. The second exception was Rauch (known to Trestrail as Michael Pratt). The acquaintance began by Trestrail picking up Rauch in the Piccadilly area, where Rauch was plying his trade as a male prostitute, and going to Rauch's flat nearby. I am unable to make precise findings as to the length of the acquaintance or the number of occasions on which they met. It is sufficient to say that there were a number of meetings over a period of years sometimes at flats occupied by Rauch, occasionally at Trestrail's flat in Teddington. I accept without hesitation Trestrail's evidence to me that on every occasion the relationship was simply that of prostitute and paying customer, that there was no emotional involvement and that the meetings were by no means regular or frequent. At some stage Trestrail disclosed, in response to questions from Rauch, that he was the Queen's Police Officer. The only other homosexual partner to whom he had made the same disclosure was the Spaniard referred to above. Rauch never entered Buckingham Palace. He did, on one occasion, telephone Trestrail there using the number given for Buckingham Palace in the public telephone directory.

Rauch's antecedents

2.7 Rauch was convicted of an offence of blackmail and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment at the Central Criminal Court on 29 April 1969. In addition he has two convictions for importuning and one for criminal damage, all in the early 1970s. Of these convictions Trestrail knew only about one for importuning.

The blackmail attempt

2.8 On a date which I cannot fix with precision but which I think was probably two or three years ago Trestrail received a recorded delivery letter from Rauch demanding £2,000 under threat of selling his story to a German newspaper. He claimed to have a compromising photograph

to support it. Shortly afterwards Rauch telephoned Trestrail who told him he would not pay but would take the blackmailing letter to the police. In evidence Trestrail assured me that, when he made this reply to Rauch, he intended to do as he said. He realises now that it was his duty to go to the police. In the event, recognising that it would mean the end of his career, he was unable to find the courage and strength of will to do so. He waited for some time in acute fear of disclosure, but when it seemed clear that Rauch did not intend to carry out his threat, Trestrail destroyed the letter. He told me in evidence that since the blackmail attempt he had had no further contact with Rauch and, indeed, had engaged in no further homosexual activity. I see no reason to disbelieve this.

CONCLUSIONS OF FACT WITH REGARD TO TRESTRAIL

Trestrail's reputation

3.1 The evidence I have received demonstrates that Commander Trestrail performed his duties as Queen's Police Officer with the utmost efficiency. His senior officers in the Metropolitan Police, his colleagues, senior members of the staff of the Royal Household who worked closely with him and officers of other forces with whom he was frequently in contact all had the highest regard for his capacity for firmness and quick decision coupled with tact, discretion and an outstanding ability to communicate with others on professional matters—all very necessary qualities for the difficult responsibilities the Queen's Police Officer has to discharge. Above all no one doubted his total devotion to duty or his unswerving loyalty to Her Majesty and the members of the Royal Family. Furthermore, until the disclosure made in July last, no one of those to whom I have referred, with a solitary exception whom I must mention, entertained the slightest suspicion of Commander Trestrail's homosexual inclinations, let alone of the secret double life he was leading.

3.2 The one person who says that he entertained any suspicion about Trestrail's homosexuality was an officer who served with Trestrail in the latter's early years in the Royalty Protection Group. It is unnecessary to name him and I will refer to him as X. He has now been in retirement for some years. On hearing of Trestrail's resignation and the reason for it, X, very properly, communicated with Scotland Yard, volunteered a statement and in due course gave evidence before me. The substance of what X told me was that twice after Trestrail's joining the Royalty Protection Group he reported to Commander Perkins, who was then Queen's Police Officer, his suspicion that Trestrail was a homosexual, first in general terms, secondly with reference to a suspected homosexual relationship between Trestrail and another officer in the Group, whom I will call Y. According to X, Commander Perkins simply brushed the matter aside, telling X in effect that it was nothing to do with him. I accepted X as a perfectly honest witness. I have no doubt that he did entertain a suspicion of Trestrail's homosexuality. However, he admitted he had no evidence whatever to substantiate his suspicion and he was quite unable to explain to me in any way that I found convincing what was the ground for it. He said that it was a "gut feeling". I have no doubt that he said something about his suspicion to Commander Perkins. What I cannot accept is the accuracy of X's recollection that Commander Perkins, if the matter was presented to him as one calling for serious consideration, simply brushed it aside. It seems to me almost inconceivable that Commander Perkins, receiving a serious report from one of his officers of suspected homosexuality in another, would not at least have wanted to know the ground for the suspicion. I think the probability is that Commander Perkins' reaction was, much as mine, that X, on being questioned, was quite unable to advance any rational basis for his suspicion. With regard to the other officer, Y, Trestrail readily agreed that they had for many years been close friends, but insisted that Y was actively heterosexual, and that his own relationship with Y had never had any homosexual element whatever. I unhesitatingly accepted this evidence. In the result nothing in the evidence

of X caused me to modify the strong impression I received from all the other evidence I heard and read that there was nothing whatever in Trestrail's behaviour in his day to day professional and public life (saving the bare fact that he was a bachelor with no known female attachments) to arouse in an ordinary person the suspicion that he was a homosexual.

Trestrail's character and the implications of his homosexual activities

3.3 Trestrail in giving evidence to me, impressed me as anxious to be completely frank and to give me all the help he could in the conduct of my Inquiry. I think there is an undoubted conflict in his character between the image of himself which he has succeeded so well in projecting in his public and professional life and which he would like to live up to and his taste for casual and promiscuous homosexual encounters which he himself recognised as sordid and degrading. Professionally, he was a model of tact and discretion and I have no doubt that in carrrying out his duties he acted loyally and to the highest standards.

3.4 I turn to the crucial question whether security was breached or put at risk by the conduct of his private life. In behaving as he did, Trestrail clearly laid himself open to blackmail and, as I have described, one blackmail attempt was made. He constantly ran the risk, though perhaps not great, of recognition in any casual encounter and committed the serious indiscretion of disclosing his identity and position to Rauch and to the Spaniard. Nevertheless, on consideration of the whole of the evidence, I am fully satisfied that there was no actual breach of security and, on the basis of my assessment of Trestrail's character, I find it difficult to envisage circumstances in which any risk to security could have arisen. When blackmailed for money, Trestrail did not succumb to the threat, although he did not, as he should have done, report the incident. If he had been blackmailed to disclose some information or otherwise to act in some way which could have been detrimental to the safety or well-being of the Royal Family, everything points to the conclusion that he would have put duty before self-interest and made a full and prompt report of the threat. This will provoke some to ask whether, if Trestrail did his job so well and represented no risk to security, it was necessary or right to accept his resignation. I have no doubt that it was. In the public discussion in the media and in Parliament, following Commander Trestrail's resignation, it was frequently stressed that homosexual acts between two consenting adult males in private are no longer unlawful. I recognise this and do not regard it as any responsibility of mine to express a moral judgement. There are, however, two considerations (if no others) which, once Trestrail's secret life became known, dictated the impossibility of his continued employment as Queen's Police Officer. First, the risks he took and the indiscretions he committed, no matter how compulsive the urge which drove him to act as he did, must be seen as raising serious doubt as to the soundness of his judgement. Secondly, even in today's permissive society, indiscriminate promiscuous behaviour, whether homosexual or heterosexual, particularly when it involves relations with prostitutes, still attracts general disapproval; to continue to employ, in a position of responsibility close to the Queen, a man known to have indulged in such practices would clearly be unacceptable.

Trestrail and Fagan

3.5 The question how Fagan came to find his way to the Queen's bedroom is one to which no confident answer can be given. I am satisfied, however, that the police have made all inquiries it was possible for them to make in seeking the answer and can now carry the matter no further. The search for a rational explanation of Fagan's actions is not assisted by the fact that Fagan is not a rational man. One thing is certain, no hint or trace of any link between Trestrail and Fagan has come to light and I am convinced that there was no connection, direct or indirect, between them.

THE ROYALTY PROTECTION GROUP AND TRESTRAIL'S APPOINTMENTS

The development of the Group in recent years

4.1 The personal protection afforded to members of the Royal Family has traditionally been based upon the need to preserve the line of succession to the Throne. Full time protection is afforded to the Queen and her immediate family while other members of the Royal Family are protected on all public and some private occasions. By protection is meant the arrangement whereby the person concerned is protected by an allocated police officer from the time that he or she leaves the Royal residence until his or her return. The men concerned come from the uniformed branch of the Metropolitan Police but wear plain clothes when on protection duties.

4.2 Until 1974 the Royalty Protection Group consisted of a relatively small team of officers. However, since then, the Group has grown considerably in size to its present strength of 43. In part this reflects the increase in the amount of protection work required, but it is mainly due to a revision in security procedures put into effect following the attempt to kidnap Her Royal Highness Princess Anne in 1974. In particular it was decided in the aftermath of that incident to include in the Royalty Protection Group a team of "back-up sergeants" whose task would be to man a second car, following members of the Royal Family when they were being driven on outside engagements. (The individual protection officers would continue to accompany their Royal principals in the lead vehicle). The present position is that of the 43 officers in the Group, 17 are allocated to back-up duties. This has implications for selection procedures in that it was accepted from the start that the back-up teams would provide a pool from which personal protection officers could be selected.

4.3 The Royalty Protection Group until July of this year came under the command of the Queen's Police Officer. It was a Branch (A1) of 'A' Department at New Scotland Yard, thus coming under the direct supervision of the Assistant Commissioner 'A' and the Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'A' in charge of operations. This represented a change from the position prior to June 1978 when Royalty protection was the responsibility of the Commander in charge of 'A' District (formerly 'A' Division), based at Cannon Row.

Selection procedures for the Royalty Protection Group

4.4 There are two basic elements in the selection procedures for members of the Royalty Protection Group. First, it is for senior officers in the Metropolitan Police to be satisfied that a man is of sound character, is professionally competent and has or can be trained in the necessary specialist skills to fit him for protection duty; secondly, the officer selected must be acceptable to the person whom he is to protect. The Metropolitan Police were unable to provide me with an authoritative detailed account of how police officers were selected to become members of the Royalty Protection Group prior to 1969. However, from what I was told, it would seem that

some kind of "head hunting" system operated. For example, the then equivalent of area Deputy Assistant Commissioners might be asked to nominate officers whom they considered to be suitable; nominees would then be interviewed before a headquarters board and, if considered suitable, would be placed on trial attachment to Royalty protection duties. It would be for the Queen's Police Officer to confirm the appointment on the basis of performance during the trial attachment and provided that the Royal principal was satisfied with the officer. Given the small number of men then employed on Royalty protection work and, presumably, the infrequency with which vacancies arose, I can well understand that selection was carried out on an *ad hoc* basis without formalised procedures; no doubt personal records were checked in order to confirm that nothing was known about those being selected which might render them unsuitable.

4.5 In 1969, a new method of selecting Royalty protection officers was introduced and it forms the basis of the procedure in use up to the present time. All members of the Force are notified of forthcoming vacancies (usually in the back-up team) by means of Police Orders. Sergeants and Inspectors may then forward personal applications through their respective District Commanders to headquarters. The District Commanders have a significant part to play in the selection process in that they are expected to consider applications carefully and endorse them with their recommendations (or otherwise). Those considered worthy of interview are seen by a selection board consisting of the Assistant Commissioner 'A' or his Deputy and the Queen's Police Officer. If successful the officer serves his trial attachment to the Royalty Protection Group before having his position confirmed by the Queen's Police Officer. There is also now the additional safeguard that before appointment as personal protection officers, most men will have proved their worth as back-up sergeants. However, apart from routine steps to ensure that recruits are not known criminals or security risks, no special checks have been made on the character and background of officers selected for Royalty protection duties.

The selection procedures as applied to Trestrail

4.6 There appears to be no documentary record of the circumstances in which Trestrail was in 1966 posted to the Royalty Protection Group or of the means by which he was selected. I have had therefore to rely heavily upon witnesses' unaided recollection and in particular that of Trestrail himself. In the mid sixties it seems that there was some concern over whether it was reasonable for the Queen's Police Officer to combine his duties in protecting the Queen with sole responsibility for the administration of the Royalty Protection Group. It was therefore decided that he should have a staff officer to assist him with the administration. Very much in line with the sort of approach which I described in paragraph 4.4, the Assistant Commissioner 'A' of the day asked his staff officer if he knew of anyone suitable. The staff officer, a Chief Superintendent, identified Trestrail, who had previously served under his command but who by then was a recently promoted Inspector serving in 'A' Division (now 'A' District). Trestrail was called in to see the Assistant Commissioner 'A' who took him through his life history and police career before asking him if he would be prepared

to take on the task of assisting the Queen's Police Officer. At a later stage Trestrail saw the Queen's Police Officer (Commander Perkins) and was then posted to the Palace. At no time does there appear to have been a "board" in the normally understood sense of the word and Trestrail was not conscious of any particular effort being made to assess his personality or ascertain his outside interests. However, I can only presume that those involved in the selection process must have called for his personal file, which at that stage would have charted the progress of a good all round police officer with no blemish on his record. The report of his performance on the Police College 'A' Course for Inspectors (see paragraph 2.1) may well have been regarded as particularly relevant.

4.7 After only one month at Buckingham Palace, Trestrail was appointed to be one of Prince Philip's protection officers. This fact is recorded in his personal file, but again there is no record of how he came to be given the appointment. So far as Trestrail's appointment as Queen's Police Officer is concerned, the following is taken from his Annual Qualification Report of 1973, completed on 18 June by Commander Perkins:—

> "Superintendent Trestrail has been selected to succeed me (i.e. as Queen's Police Officer) on my retirement on 30 June 1973 and I have no hesitation in recommending him for the appointment. I feel that he will give every satisfaction in the new sphere as he has done in the past with His Royal Highness Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh".

Apart from this, no documentation has been found in Metropolitan Police records or those at Buckingham Palace concerning the appointment. I can therefore only give the briefest summary of the most significant reasons for the appointment, based on views expressed by senior police officers and a senior member of the Royal Household. Trestrail would have been well known to the Queen, both by virtue of his position as Prince Philip's protection officer and because he would have deputised for Commander Perkins from time to time. There is no doubt that Trestrail was held in the highest regard as a result of his service with Prince Philip. In view of this and because by 1973 he was the senior officer on Prince Philip's team, it is clear that his superiors and members of the Royal Household regarded him as the natural successor to Commander Perkins.

Conclusion

4.8 Since Commander Trestrail's appointment as Queen's Police Officer is specifically mentioned in my terms of reference, I have thought it right to set out in this section of my Report both the background and the detail at some length. In the end, however, nothing is to be gained by a detailed critique of past methods of selecting members of the Royalty Protection Group in general or the Queen's Police Officer in particular. For reasons which will become more apparent when I examine the question of positive vetting, it is difficult to envisage a practicable selection procedure sufficiently rigorous to have discovered Trestrail's homosexual activities, so long as he was determined to conceal them.

POSITIVE VETTING

History and background

5.1 Positive vetting (PV) was first introduced in 1952 as a means of investigating the reliability of Government staff employed in exceptionally secret work. The standard criterion in the public service is that PV is applied to those who are being considered for employment on duties which require regular and constant access to Top Secret information. This classification is, by definition, applicable to: "Information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation". The purpose of PV has always been the protection of classified information; it was not and is not designed to enable checks to be made on people employed in public posts which may be very responsible for reasons other than that they involve access to highly classified information.

5.2 The PV procedure involves the checking of records, the completion of a security questionnaire by the individual concerned and consultation in writing with character referees named in the questionnaire. However, the central feature of the process is the field investigation carried out by an Investigating Officer who, in the case of most Home Civil Service departments, is employed by the Ministry of Defence. This element of the procedure is costly: I am advised that the average cost per investigation is unlikely to be less than £750 and may well be more. It is also time consuming. A substantial increase in the number of PV posts would necessitate the employment of more Investigating Officers and probably increase the time taken to secure PV clearances, unless the quality of each investigation were to be less searching. It was factors such as these which led the Security Commission recently to recommend that PV posts in the Civil Service be reviewed with a view to reducing their number if at all possible: see Cmnd. 8540 (May 1982).

Positive vetting in the police

5.3 PV clearance for the holders of certain posts in police forces was first required following the publication of the Radcliffe Report (Cmnd. 1681) in April 1962. The spy scandals with which that report was largely concerned highlighted the close liaison necessarily maintained between the Security Service and police Special Branches. The two services must, in the field of counter-espionage, frequently act in co-operation. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch also performs its own distinct role, which has grown so greatly in importance in recent years, of co-ordinating the collection of intelligence relating to Irish Republican activities. Both these functions of Special Branches require that their members have access to highly sensitive information. Chief Officers of police with responsibility for Special Branches must have similar access.

5.4 The Home Office have issued three circulars (in 1963, 1973 and 1979) giving guidance on PV in police forces which reflects the implications of these factors. I will not examine the detailed development and minor changes of policy which have taken place over the years. Before 1973 the responsibility for carrying out the prescribed PV procedures and granting

PV clearance was that of the Chief Officers of the police forces concerned. Since 1973 the field investigation has been carried out by the Ministry of Defence for the police, as for most Government Departments, and the decision to give or withhold PV clearance has been that of the Home Office.

5.5 Since few police officers have regular and constant access to information formally classified as Top Secret, it has been evident from the start that, to protect the security of the kind of highly sensitive information which Special Branches, in particular, handle, an additional criterion to the standard criterion used in the Civil Service would be required for the designation of PV posts in police forces. The formula which has been in use since 1963 has been that PV clearance should be required for all officers (or civilian employees) having "actual or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information". In provincial forces the circulars have made it clear that this criterion will automatically apply to all Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables and to all officers and civilians engaged in Special Branch work.

5.6 In the Metropolitan Police the PV criterion is taken to apply automatically to the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners and to the Special Branch. But Deputy Assistant Commissioners and Commanders, although of substantially equivalent rank to Assistant Chief Constables, are not automatically required to hold PV clearance. Whether anyone below the rank of Assistant Commissioner and outside the Special Branch requires PV is decided *ad hoc* by the Commissioner with the advice of the Assistant Commissioner 'C' Department. Since there are 18 Deputy Assistant Commissioners and 55 Commanders, many of whom hold posts wholly unconnected with security work, this is perfectly reasonable. But it creates a difficult problem of judgement in the application of a very imprecise formula. I fully appreciate the difficulty of devising clear and readily applicable definitions in this field but the phrases "potential access" and "highly secret" are both open to a wide range of interpretations. If, as I understand, the Police Department of the Home Office contemplate the issue of a revised circular on the subject of PV in police forces in the not too distant future, I would earnestly hope that it may be possible, by illustrative examples if not by definition, to give more positive guidance than is presently offered as to where the PV line is to be drawn.

POSITIVE VETTING IN THE ROYALTY PROTECTION GROUP

History

6.1 Until November 1981 no member of the Royalty Protection Group was subject to PV. A review of PV posts in the Metropolitan Police led to a decision in November 1981 to require PV clearance for the holders of about ten posts not previously subject to the procedure. The Queen's Police Officer was the only member of the Royalty Protection Group included in the additions. As previously stated, Commander Trestrail was granted PV clearance on 1 April 1982. On 19 July 1982, you informed the House of Commons of Commander Trestrail's resignation. On 21 July the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police decided that the holders of all 43 posts in the Royalty Protection Group should be subject to PV and immediate steps were taken to set in train the necessary procedures to implement this decision.

6.2 The facts, as baldly stated in the previous paragraph, inevitably invite criticism. If the designation of PV posts is governed by a consistent policy, the omission of the entire Royalty Protection Group before 1981 and the decision in November 1981 to subject only the Queen's Police Officer to PV cannot be reconciled with the Commissioner's decision on 21 July 1982 to subject the Group as a whole to PV. This latter decision, at first blush, lends colour to the view that there had been a long-standing failure to take a necessary security precaution for the safety of the Queen and the Royal Family and that this failure was compounded by a positive error of judgement when, in the course of the 1981 review of PV posts, that of the Queen's Police Officer, alone in the Royalty Protection Group, was included. I am satisfied that this view stems from an over-simplification of the facts and, on a proper understanding of the history, cannot be supported.

The policy considerations

6.3 The only information to which Royalty protection officers, as such, have access which could conceivably qualify for consideration as "highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information" is that which they obtain from the Special Branch in the form of, or as relevant to, threat assessments affecting their Royal principals. The importance of this information has, no doubt, been steadily growing over recent years as the threat of terrorism itself has grown. The evidence I heard as to the degree of sensitivity of the kind of information which was given by the Special Branch to Commander Trestrail, as Queen's Police Officer, and of that which he needed to pass on to Royalty protection officers under his command, was not wholly consistent and is difficult for me to evaluate. The evidence could only be expressed in general terms and inevitably reflected in large measure the subjective judgement of those who gave it. In the light of these considerations and of the lack of precision of the criterion to be applied by the Metropolitan Police in deciding what posts should receive PV clearance, to which I have drawn attention in paragraph 5.6, I see no ground on which I could properly criticise either the absence of any requirement of PV in the Royalty Protection Group up to 1981 or the decision taken in 1981, in the course of a general review, that the Queen's Police Officer, but no other

member of the Royalty Protection Group, should be subject to PV. I examine in section 8 of the Report the factors that should govern the application of PV to those engaged in Royalty protection in future.

An apparent anomaly

6.4 Again at first blush, it might seem anomalous that personal protection for Government Ministers, important foreign visitors and other prominent figures identified as under potential threat, is provided by officers who hold PV clearance. The explanation is simple and the anomaly is apparent, not real. Personal protection for these categories of person has always been provided by officers of the Special Branch. They require PV clearance because they may be engaged in any of the duties which are performed by the Special Branch, not because they are personal protection officers, which is only an incidental role. Royalty protection officers, in contrast, have never been drawn from the Special Branch (for reasons which I have not thought it necessary to investigate) and have no other duty than that of personal protection.

The reaction to Trestrail's resignation

6.5 The decision of the Commissioner on 21 July 1982 to apply a " blanket " PV requirement to the Royalty Protection Group was not based on a re-appraisal of the quality and sensitivity of any secret information to which members of the Group have access. Nothing that occurred between the considered decision taken in November 1981 and the decision in July 1982 suggested the need for any such re-appraisal. The Commissioner's decision, as he readily acknowledged, was a reaction to the public outcry in Parliament and the media provoked by the disclosure of Trestrail's homosexual activities, coming, as it did, hard on the heels of the Fagan incident. No evidence I have heard came near to satisfy me that " blanket " PV in the Royalty Protection Group could possibly be justified on the basis of the criterion of " access or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information " even on the most liberal interpretation of that formula. Indeed, the Commissioner, who was entirely frank, scarcely attempted to justify his decision on that basis. He justified it rather on the basis that, in the face of acute public disquiet about the safety of the Queen and the Royal Family and strong criticism of the Metropolitan Police, he felt it was his duty to take, and to be seen to be taking, every possible step towards the enhancement of Royal security and that " blanket " PV applied to the Royalty Protection Group was one obvious such step to take in the circumstances. I entirely understand and sympathise with the reasons for the Commissioner's decision in the difficult predicament in which he was placed by the pressure of events. But, as I think the Commissioner himself, with hindsight, accepts, the far-reaching implication of the decision is that the PV procedure can properly be used for purposes other than the protection from disclosure of nationally important and highly sensitive information. The possibility of a change of policy to extend the grounds on which PV should be required in the public service is another matter which I discuss in section 8 of the Report.

THE POSITIVE VETTING OF COMMANDER TRESTRAIL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

A general misapprehension

7.1 Much of the public discussion following the Trestrail disclosure proceeded on the implicit assumption that, if a possible bar to the grant of PV clearance, such as homosexuality, has not been discovered in the course of PV procedures, the procedures cannot have been properly carried out. The assumption is false. Some disqualifying factors are more easily ascertained than others. But there are undoubtedly some factors which, if the subject is determined to conceal them, it may be impossible for the presently prescribed procedures to uncover, no matter how carefully and thoroughly they are carried out. If a man in a public position leads a secret double life and succeeds, as Trestrail did for so long, in maintaining a total and effective separation between the two sides of his activities, this must present the PV investigator with an almost impossible task.

The field investigation in Trestrail's PV

7.2 The only stage of the PV procedures in which there was the slightest prospect, in the face of Trestrail's concealment, of discovering his homosexual activities was the field investigation. In view of the clear conclusion I have reached, I can deal with this aspect of the matter quite shortly. The field investigation was carried out by a senior and experienced Investigating Officer (IO) in the Personnel Security Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Defence, who was himself a former police officer. The IO discussed with his superior, the Deputy Chief Investigating Officer, by whom the job had been allocated to him, how it should be done. In view of Trestrail's bachelor status, both had the possibility of homosexuality in mind. The IO conducted all the interviews which were appropriate. He wrote a very full and thorough report which I am satisfied gave an accurate account of his investigation. In every interview he specifically canvassed the possibility of Trestrail being a homosexual. He was specifically and emphatically assured by Trestrail's immediate superiors during the preceding nine years of his service, by Trestrail's referees and by a senior member of the staff of the Royal Household who had been in almost daily contact with Trestrail for many years (to summarise the unanimous effect of their expressed opinions), that they had heard no hint or rumour, nor had any reason from their own observation, to arouse the slightest suspicion of homosexuality on Trestrail's part. I have no hesitation in concluding that the field investigation was carried out efficiently and with complete propriety. There being no ground disclosed in the IO's report to withhold PV, the grant of PV clearance by the Home Office was the inevitable outcome. No one concerned in the PV procedures in Trestrail's case can be criticised in any way.

Possible improvements in the PV procedures

7.3 It is possible that the kind of obstacle to PV clearance which eluded discovery in Trestrail's case might be discovered by a system of random and covert surveillance of the subject's private activities. This would (a) add

enormously to the cost of PV; (b) not necessarily be successful—this would depend on the length of the surveillance and the frequency of the subject's irregular behaviour; and (c) be strongly resented by most public servants as an unjustifiable invasion of their privacy.

7.4 The possibility of the use of the polygraph (the lie detector) in interviewing a candidate for PV clearance has also been canvassed in the press. Before any positive recommendation to employ this device could be made, a very thorough investigation of every aspect of its use would be essential. Such an investigation was obviously beyond the scope of my present Inquiry. I have, however, read the discussion of the subject in the Research Study entitled " Police Interrogation: The Psychological Approach " prepared for the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure by Barrie Irving and Linden Hilgendorf and published by HMSO in 1980: see pages 55 to 61. This reveals a strong conflict of opinion as to the validity of the claims made by its proponents for the polygraph tests of veracity and an admitted error rate, on any view, of 12%. These factors alone seem to me to raise questions as to whether the polygraph could properly be used in the conduct of PV interviews which could only be resolved after very much fuller consideration.

FUTURE PERSONNEL SECURITY OF THE ROYALTY PROTECTION GROUP

A possible new criterion for requiring positive vetting

8.1 The conclusion that security was not in fact breached or put at risk by Trestrail's homosexual activities is no reason for complacency. For the future all appropriate steps must be taken to ensure the complete reliability and trustworthiness of officers engaged in Royalty protection. I have examined the possibility that, in connection with the safety of the Royal Family, some new criterion, not based on the subject's access to highly classified information, might be introduced to designate posts requiring PV clearance. An uncompromising call for such a criterion is implied in the question put to you by Mr. Arthur Lewis MP which you answered in writing on 30 July: see Hansard, Col. 772. I quote the Question and Answer:

> " *Mr. Arthur Lewis* asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will arrange for all police and other staff under the control of his Department who have more than an occasional meeting with members of the Royal Family to be positively vetted, whether or not they come into contact with secret documents and papers, and for all staff at the various palaces, including the police, to be positively vetted on the same basis.
>
> *Mr. Whitelaw*: I will consider the best arrangements for the future in the light of Lord Bridge's recommendations."

Under the present practice only eight members of the staff of the Royal Household require PV clearance. The basis of the requirement is that the persons in question perform duties which require that they be authorised to handle Cabinet papers and minutes passed to the Palace to be seen by the Queen and in some instances also by the Prince of Wales. I fully understand the thinking underlying Mr. Lewis' proposal. Not only does the Monarchy occupy a unique position in our constitution, but the Royal Family are held uniquely in the affection and esteem of the people both of this country and of the many Commonwealth countries of which the Queen is the Sovereign. But Mr. Lewis' proposal would cast the PV net so widely that it would be difficult to formulate a rational justification for it as a necessary security measure which could not plausibly be argued to be applicable to many other situations where absolute reliability and trustworthiness are required of persons discharging high and important responsibilities. It is somewhat ironical that calls for wholesale enlargement of the scope of PV (when the Security Commission and others have been seeking means to curtail it) should have been provoked by Fagan's invasions of Buckingham Palace, followed shortly by the unrelated incident of Commander Trestrail's resignation, when it is perfectly clear that no earlier extension of the scope of PV could have had any effect in preventing these occurrences. I have no reason to doubt that, in the selection, recruitment and supervision of the domestic staffs of Royal Palaces, as a matter of good staff management, appropriate steps are taken to ensure that unsuitable people are not employed. No doubt the system is not infallible and staff must sometimes be dismissed. If a stricter

selection and recruitment procedure is required to ensure that undesirables, who might conceivably represent a threat to the Royal Family, are excluded, I am convinced that the duty to devise such a procedure must rest with the senior officers of the Royal Household responsible for staff matters and that the danger, if there is one, is not such as could justify the wholesale extension of the use of PV for a purpose for which it was never designed. The criterion by which the need for PV clearance should continue to be measured must be related, as it always has been hitherto, to the subject's access to highly classified information.

Selection of Royalty Protection Officers

8.2 There is no evidence whatever to suggest that any police officer engaged in the protection of Royalty, whether in the uniformed branch guarding premises, or as a personal protection officer, has ever been actively disloyal. Nevertheless, the selection procedures for the Royalty Protection Group do not seem to have been as thorough and systematic as they should have been. I believe that any weaknesses in the system in the past must be attributed in large part, like other weaknesses now recognised, to the lack of a unified command structure which was noted in 1979 in a report prepared by Assistant Commissioner Wilson and Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dellow, as a result of a review of security arrangements following the assassination of Earl Mountbatten of Burma. Now, in accordance with the arrangements outlined in your statement to the House of Commons on 21 July, a new unified command structure is being set up. The protection of Her Majesty the Queen, other members of the Royal Family and their residences will be the single responsibility of a Deputy Assistant Commissioner reporting directly to the Commissioner. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Colin Smith has been appointed to head this new department. He and his support staff, who will not themselves undertake personal protection duties, will be free to concentrate on management tasks and, in particular, to devise measures to ensure that only officers suitably qualified both by possession of the necessary professional competence and specialist skills and also in character are appointed members of the Royalty Protection Group, to maintain effective supervision of members of the Group throughout their service and to be alert to detect possible indications of unreliability which may become apparent from their general life style. In planning how best to discharge these responsibilities, Mr. Smith should, and I have no doubt will, consult fully with the appropriate senior members of the staff of the Royal Household (and, indeed, so far as she may wish, with Her Majesty herself) and with senior civil servants responsible for the Police Department of the Home Office. But the responsibility for the proper performance of these tasks must rest primarily with Mr. Smith, and through him, ultimately, with the new Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to whom Mr. Smith will be immediately answerable. These are essentially matters which belong to the province of proper internal police personnel management. I cannot emphasise too strongly that PV procedures were never designed to be, and never could be, an appropriate substitute for suitable methods of personnel selection and supervision designed by the employer to ensure that important posts are always filled by suitable persons. This is especially

evident where, as here, the PV investigation is undertaken by an agency independent of the employer. PV clearance is a special insurance against the unauthorised disclosure of information of a very high degree of sensitivity and importance to the national interest.

PV posts in the new Royalty Protection Department

8.3 It would be quite wrong for me, before the new organisation has taken detailed shape or its operational methods have been determined, to attempt to decide what posts under Mr. Smith's command will require PV clearance. When the procedure set in train by the Commissioner's decision of 21 July that all members of the Royalty Protection Group be positively vetted has been completed, there will be a breathing space for careful consideration to be given to the details of a new policy. But for the future I cannot say either that all members of the Royalty Protection Group should require PV or that none should. The decision, in my judgement, should be governed entirely by the kind of information to which, on a " need to know " basis, it is necessary for any officer to have access and by the application either of the existing criterion for police PV or of any amended and more precise criterion which the Home Office may issue. The responsibility for determining on this basis what posts in the Royalty Protection Group require PV should be that of the Commissioner, advised by Mr. Smith and other senior officers in the Metropolitan Police. I can give no authoritative guidance as to the level of intelligence or counter-intelligence information, likely to be of concern to those engaged in Royalty protection, that ought to be regarded as requiring that it be handled only by those with PV clearance. My own opinion would be that threat assessments generally and information as to the existence or suspicion of specific threats should be capable of dissemination to those affected without any disclosure of the sources on which they are based and in that case would not qualify as " highly secret " within the present police PV criterion. Any disclosure of sensitive sources in this field, however, must clearly be treated as " highly secret ". In this connection it would be appropriate both for the Home Office in considering any amendment of the criterion, and for the Commissioner in considering how it should be applied, to seek the advice of the Security Service.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Commander Trestrail carried out his duties as Queen's Police Officer loyally and efficiently but led a secret double life in that he indulged in promiscuous homosexual activities, mostly with prostitutes.

9.2 There was no breach of security and, in my judgement, security was not put at risk.

9.3 There was no connection, direct or indirect, between Trestrail and Fagan.

9.4 When Trestrail's homosexual activities came to light his resignation was rightly accepted. Doubts as to the soundness of his judgement and public opinion with regard to indiscriminate promiscuity would, in any event, have made it impossible for him to continue as Queen's Police Officer.

9.5 The circumstances of Trestrail's appointment, first as a member of the Royalty Protection Group in 1966, then as Queen's Police Officer in 1973, were in no way unusual. Although at the relevant dates, the selection procedures for appointment to, and promotion within, the Royalty Protection Group, could be criticised, different procedures, no matter how rigorous, could not have been expected to discover Trestrail's homosexual activities.

9.6 The primary criterion for positive vetting in police forces, sc. " actual or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information " is imprecise and should, if possible, be amended to give more positive guidance.

9.7 No officers in the Royalty Protection Group were subject to PV before 1981. The decision that the Queen's Police Officer should be positively vetted was taken in 1981. In the light of the imprecise criterion, no evidence as to the secret character of any information, to which members of the Royalty Protection Group had access, justifies criticism of the omission to apply PV to the Royalty Protection Group at any earlier date than 1981, or at that date to members of the Group other than the Queen's Police Officer.

9.8 The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police decided to apply " blanket " PV to the Royalty Protection Group immediately following the Trestrail disclosures. This was an understandable reaction to public concern and criticism but was not justified by the application of the approved criterion for designating PV posts.

9.9 The PV procedures are not, and cannot be, infallible. In Trestrail's case they were carried out efficiently and thoroughly. The failure to discover Trestrail's homosexual activities attracts no blame.

9.10 Whether the PV procedures could or should be enhanced by resort to covert surveillance or to the use of the polygraph are questions which could only be resolved after fuller consideration than has been possible in the course of this Inquiry.

9.11 There is no justification for introducing a new policy as the basis for PV which would extend it to all who work in close association with the Royal Family or to any other category of public servants in positions of particular trust and responsibility. The elaborate and expensive PV procedure has always been confined to those with access to highly classified information and should remain so. It is no substitute for efficient personnel management. It is a special insurance against unauthorised disclosure of highly secret information of importance to the national interest.

9.12 The selection and supervision of officers of suitable character and abilities to serve in the Royalty Protection Group is a matter of proper internal police personnel management. The new organisation now being established to bring every aspect of Royalty protection under the command of a Deputy Assistant Commissioner, answerable directly to the Commissioner, will provide the opportunity to devise new and appropriate measures to ensure that methods of selection and supervision are as effective as they can be made.

9.13 What posts in the Royalty Protection Group, after the reorganisation has been completed, will require PV clearance, must depend on any revised guidance issued by the Home Office and the application of that guidance by the Metropolitan Police in the light of the character of any secret information to which Royalty protection officers need access. Both should seek the advice of the Security Service.

POSTSCRIPT

10. Almost without exception, those who knew Commander Trestrail expressed to me their personal regret that his distinguished career should have had to end so unhappily and their sympathy with him in the ordeal to which he was subjected by the singularly unpleasant publicity which the circumstances of his resignation attracted. I share those sentiments.

BRIDGE OF HARWICH
13 October 1982

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRET

6

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

Prime Minister
The amendments have been marked on the attached copy of the report. The key amendments on positive vetting are those in paras. 4.8, 7.3, 7.4 and 9.10.
Are you content with the Home Secretary's proposals for handling the Report, including the Written Answer?

19 November 1982

Dear Robin,

LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT ON TRESTRAIL

FERB 19.11.

TPM

My letter to you of 8 November outlined the way in which the Home Secretary intended to take forward publication of Lord Bridge's report into the Trestrail affair. Since then, and in the light of the Prime Minister's reference of the Prime case to the Security Commission, Lord Bridge has asked for certain additional amendments to be made, which the Home Secretary judges will be very helpful in deflecting the criticism that Lord Bridge had already made up his mind on Positive Vetting. They are marked with an asterisk in the enclosed consolidated list of amendments to the report.

The Home Secretary would now prefer to aim for publication of the report on Wednesday 24 November. This will allow us a little more time to make arrangements for publication, and to settle the terms of the Written Answer to an inspired Question.

The Question and Answer which the Home Secretary proposes are also enclosed. He has concluded that it would not be right to produce too lengthy a reply, but rather to concentrate, in paragraph 2 of the Answer, on the essential findings in Lord Bridge's report which directly answer the terms of reference of the enquiry.

Questions about Positive Vetting, and about the link of this report with the Security Commission's remit in the Prime case, will be taken by the MPO, who will respond by referring to what the Prime Minister said in her statement and supplementary answers on the Prime case. The Home Office will handle other Questions related to the police, Royalty protection and the way in which the particular recommendations will be taken forward.

The Home Secretary would be grateful to know if the Prime Minister is content with these arrangements, and with the terms of the Written Answer.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Richard Hatfield in Sir Robert Armstrong's office.

Yours ever,

J F HALLIDAY

F E R Butler, Esq.

SECRET

CR.

LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT OF HIS INQUIRY INTO THE TRESTRAIL AFFAIR: PAPER OF AMENDMENTS

1. (i) Paragraph: 1.2, line 5.
(ii) Amendment: Delete "(Procurement Executive)".

* 2. (i) Paragraph: 4.8, last sentence.
(ii) Amendment: Substitute "difficult" for "virtually impossible".

3. (i) Paragraph: 5.1, second and fourth sentences.
(ii) Amendment: Delete the fourth sentence in brackets, and amend the opening words of the second sentence to read: "The standard criterion in the public service is that PV is applied to those who..... information".

4. (i) Paragraph: 5.2, line 6.
(ii) Amendment: Delete the words "(Procurement Executive)".

a

5. (i) Paragraph: 5.2, third sentence.
(ii) Amendment: Re-write as: "This element of the procedure is costly: I am advised that the average cost per investigation is unlikely to be less than £750 and may well be more".

6. (i) Paragraph: 5.3, fourth sentence.
(ii) Amendment: Amend last clause to read: ".. .. recent years, of co-ordinating the collection of intelligence relating to Irish Republican activities".

7. (i) Paragraph: 5.3, fifth sentence.
(ii) Amendment: For "Special Branch" read "Special Branches".

8. (i) Paragraph: 5.4, line 7.
(ii) Amendment: Delete "(Procurement Executive)".

9. (i) Paragraph: 7.2, lines 6 and 7.
(ii) Amendment: For "Personnel Security Unit" substitute "Personnel Security Investigation Unit"; and delete "(Procurement Executive").

* 10. (i) Paragraph: 7.3, last sentence.
(ii) Amendment: Delete last sentence.

C.R.

11. (i) Paragraph: 7.4, first and last sentences.

(ii) Amendment: Delete "so called" from first sentence. Amend last sentence to read: "These factors alone seem to me to raise questions as to whether the polygraph could properly be used in the conduct of PV interviews which could only be resolved after very much fuller consideration".

12. (i) Paragraph: 9.10, paragraph as a whole.

(ii) Amendment: Substitute: "Whether the PV procedures could or should be enhanced by resort to covert surveillance or to the use of the polygraph are questions which could only be resolved after fuller consideration than has been possible in the course of this Inquiry".

E.R. SECRET DRAFT

ARRANGED QUESTION FOR WRITTEN ANSWER

To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, whether he has received Lord Bridge's report on the appointment, as The Queen's Police Officer, and the activities of Commander Trestrail; and if he will make a statement.

Draft Reply

I informed the House on 21 July that I had invited Lord Bridge to investigate the appointment, as Queen's Police Officer, and the activities of Commander Trestrail, with a view to determining whether security was breached or put at risk; and to advise whether, in the light of that investigation, any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable. I also arranged for Lord Bridge to see all the papers relating to the intrusion into Buckingham Palace on 9 July by Mr Michael Fagan, so that he could make any further inquiries he considered necessary and advise on the adequacy of police inquiries. I have received Lord Bridge's report and it has been published today.

2. The report makes it clear that there was no breach of security and concludes that security was not put at risk; there was no connection between Commander Trestrail and Mr Fagan; but the risks Commander Trestrail took in his homosexual activities, and the indiscretions he committed, cast serious doubt on the soundness of his judgement which made it impossible for him to continue as The Queen's Police Officer.

3. For the future, Lord Bridge has observed that the question whether the Positive Vetting procedures can or should be enhanced could only be resolved after fuller consideration than has been possible in the course of this Inquiry. This is a matter which will no doubt be further considered by the Security Commission in its examination of the Prime case. For those to whom Positive Vetting does not apply, Lord Bridge has concluded that the safeguards lie in careful staff management, and in particular in the careful selection and supervision of staff. It is Lord Bridge's view that the reorganisation of Royalty protection arrangements, which I announced to the House on 21 July, offers the opportunity to devise new and appropriate measures to ensure that the

selection and supervision procedures are as effective as they can be made.

4. The report makes two specific recommendations. The first is that the current Positive Vetting criterion for the police service is imprecise, and that the Home Office, with the police, should attempt to give more positive guidance on the application of Positive Vetting to police posts. The second is that the identification by the police of Positively Vetted posts within the Royalty protection organisation should follow the outcome of the attempt to provide more positive guidance.

5. I am grateful to Lord Bridge for his full and detailed report. I accept the recommendations which he has made, and will ensure that they are taken forward by the Home Office in consultation with those concerned.

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

9 November 1982

Dear John.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 8 November to me about Lord Bridge's report and has noted that the Home Secretary proposes to publish it at 3.30 pm on Tuesday 23 November with an accompanying Written Answer to an inspired Question. The Prime Minister looks forward to seeing the terms of the Home Secretary's statement.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

Robin Butler

John Halliday Esq.,
Home Office.

AM

CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

cMr Flesher
Miss Wallace

MR INGHAM

THE BRIDGE REPORT

Brian Mower rang. The Report was initially scheduled for publication on Tuesday, 23 November, but will nowbe going out on Wednesday, 24.

Home Office propose 1530 pub. with CFRs at 1200.

It will be presented to the House as "an unopposed return on an Order", which will entail notification being given on the Order paper the day before ie. Tuesday.

Brian would like a few words on the content of the report and its handling.

17/xi

Michael

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRET

Prime Minister
23 November is the day of publication of the unemployment figures.

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

FERB 8.11.

5

8 November 1982

acle 9/11 FERB

Dear Robin,

LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT

with FERB?

In my letter of 13 October covering a copy of the report of his inquiry into the Trestrail affair which Lord Bridge has submitted to the Home Secretary, I said that the Home Secretary had asked us to consult the Palace, the Management and Personnel Office (MPO), the Commissioner and others concerned about a publishable text of the report.

Those consultations have been completed, and as a result Lord Bridge has made a number of minor amendments to the report.

The Home Secretary proposes to publish the report in full in the form of a Return to an Address. That will attract absolute privilege and so prevent any attempt to mount a mischievous action for libel. We do not consider that the report is actually libellous, but we should guard against, for example, Rauch seeking to take issue in the courts with the statement that he attempted to blackmail Trestrail (paragraph 2.8).

The Home Secretary proposes that the report should be published at 3.30 pm on Tuesday 23 November with an accompanying Written Answer to an inspired Question. We shall be consulting separately about the terms of the Answer. At present, the Home Secretary envisages a relatively brief statement, letting the report, as far as possible, speak for itself. The statement would acknowledge receipt of the report; thank Lord Bridge for it and announce its publication; summarise, without comment, the findings and conclusions (grouped in section 9); explain that there were two recommendations on the need to attempt a more precise criterion for the application of positive vetting (PV) to the police service and consequently to officers in the Royalty Protection Department; accept those recommendations; and say that they were being taken forward by the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police in consultation with the Security Service.

The main criticism the report seems likely to attract may be a charge of complacency, particularly in concluding both that the PV procedure was carried out "efficiently and with complete propriety" in Trestrail's case and that the

Robin Butler, Esq.

SECRET

/contd ...

procedure is satisfactory, even though it failed to reveal Trestrail's proclivities. Such a criticism would be of the PV procedure in general, not in its specific application to the police, and the Home Secretary would not propose to anticipate it in his statement. Anyone taking up the point would be referred to the MPO, who are preparing a line of reply.

I will write to you again about the terms of the Home Secretary's statement.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

J F HALLIDAY

SECRET

F.R.

LORD BRIDGE'S REPORT OF HIS INQUIRY INTO THE TRESTRAIL AFFAIR: PAPER OF AMENDMENTS

1. (i) Paragraph: 1.2, line 5.

(ii) Amendment: Delete "(Procurement Executive)".

(iii) Proposer and reason. Ministry of Defence (MOD), who explained that not all concerned are in the Procurement Executive and that although the Personnel Security Investigation Unit (PSIU) came under the Director of Security (Procurement Executive) at the time of Trestrail's vetting and of Lord Bridge's Inquiry, that Division ceased to exist on 4 October and the PSIU is now under the Director of MOD Security. The deletion of the words "(Procurement Executive)" saves having to elaborate upon the change in MOD organisation and the fact that at the time some seen from MOD were under the Procurement Executive, but others not.

2. (i) Paragraph: 5.1, second and fourth sentences.

(ii) Amendment: Delete the fourth sentence in brackets, and amend the opening words of the second sentence to read: "The standard criterion in the public service is that PV is applied to those who .. .... information".

(iii) Proposer and reason. The Security Service, who suggested that although the fourth sentence is true it could result in undesirable speculation about the other PV criteria in delicate areas (eg ATOMIC, COMINT). The amendment to the second sentence is consequential to the deletion of the fourth sentence.

3. (i) Paragraph 5.2, line 6

(ii) Amendment: Delete the words "(Procurement Executive)".

(iii) Proposer and reason: MOD, for the same reasons given for amendment number 1 (see paragraph 1(iii) above).

4. (i) Paragraph 5.3, fourth sentence.

(ii) Amendment. Amend last clause to read: "..... recent years, of co-ordinating the collection of intelligence relating to Irish Republican activities".

(iii) Proposer and reason. The Security Service, for the reason that the amendment avoids mentioning the contentious matter of subversive activities, with the added advantage of being a direct quotation from a previous Home Secretary's statement on Spcial Branch functions (Mr Merlyn Rees, MP - Official Report col. 1716, 24 May 1978).

SECRET

F.R.

5. (i) Paragraph 5.3, fifth sentence.

(ii) Amendment. For "Special Branch" read "Special Branches".

(iii) Proposer and reason. When Lord Bridge visited the Security Service on 15 October he agreed that he had intended the plural.

6. (i) Paragraph 5.4, line 7.

(ii) Amendment. Delete "(Procurement Executive)".

(iii) Proposer and reason. MOD, for the same reasons given for proposed amendments number 1 (see paragraph 1(iii) above).

7. (i) Paragraph 7.2, lines 6 and 7.

(ii) Amendments. For "Personnel Security Unit" substitute "Personnel Security Investigation Unit"; and delete "(Procurement Executive)".

(iii) Proposer and reason. MOD, who explained that the first amendment provides the correct, full title of the Unit; the reasons for the proposed deletion are those given for amendment number 1 (see paragraph 1(iii) above).

Security, July '82. Resignation of Trustee



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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

14 October 1982

Dear John,

REPORT OF LORD BRIDGES'S INQUIRY
INTO THE TRESTRAIL AFFAIR

Thank you for your letter of 13th October enclosing a copy of Lord Bridges's report. I have shown this to the Prime Minister.

Mrs Thatcher will look forward to seeing the Home Secretary's conclusions about publication when he has completed his consultations.

I am copying this letter to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,

Robin Butler

John Halliday Esq.,
Home Office.

SECRET

3A

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

We will be getting further advice on publication following the consultations at X/ in the Home Secretary's letter.

I am afraid that the report may not dispel public misgivings about a PV procedure which fails to reveal that a man is a promiscuous homosexual.

F.E.R.B.

13.10

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRET

3

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SWIH 9AT

13 October 1982

Dear Robin,

REPORT OF LORD BRIDGE'S INQUIRY INTO THE TRESTRAIL AFFAIR

Lord Bridge has today submitted to the Home Secretary his report of his inquiry into the Trestrail affair. I enclose a copy of the report, which the Home Secretary has asked should be given to the Prime Minister.

The Home Secretary's initial judgment is that the report is essentially satisfactory. The findings and conclusions are summarised in section 9. Lord Bridge finds no evidence or likelihood of a breach of security; endorses the integrity of the positive vetting (PV) procedures and those responsible for them; and rejects suggestions that the PV scheme should be distorted in its application to Royalty Protection. The principal criticisms, of the then Commissioner's decision in July to have all Royalty Protection officers's PV'd, and of the current criterion for the application of PV to posts in the police service, are temperate and set in the context of proposals for future action which should prove manageable. On the basis of the report, there does not seem to be scope for any significant, legitimate criticism of anyone concerned, at the Palace, in Government or elsewhere.

Lord Bridge has made it clear that he wishes the report to be published as far as possible as it stands, and would be most reluctant to agree to amendments other than any which may be necessary in the interests of security. The Home Secretary has asked us to consult the Palace, the Management and Personnel Office, the Commissioner and others concerned on that basis.

Lord Bridge is eager that the report should be published quickly. The Home Secretary sees advantage in getting into a position to be ready to do that, but there can be no immediate commitment to a particular date for publication. A copy of the report is going to Sir Philip Moore by bag.

One argument in favour of early publication is that that would reduce the chances of a leak. This risk has governed the classification, and the numbering procedure.

The Home Secretary does not propose to take steps to announce that he has received Lord Bridge's report, for example by means of an arranged Parliamentary Question. If we are asked, we shall simply say that the report has been received and that the Home Secretary will make an announcement about its publication in due course.

SECRET

The Home Secretary will keep the Prime Minister in touch with developments on the text and handling of Lord Bridge's report, and on what he proposes to say on the day of publication.

A copy of this letter goes to Sir Robert Armstrong, with a copy of the report.

Yours ever,

John Halliday

J. F. HALLIDAY

Robin Butler, Esq.

No.10

SECRET

Copy No 13 of 26

The Rt Hon William Whitelaw CH, MC, DL, MP
Secretary of State for the Home Department

INTRODUCTION

Terms of Reference

1.1 As you informed the House of Commons on 21 July last, you invited me "to investigate the appointment as Queen's Police Officer and the activities of Commander Trestrail with a view to determining whether security was breached or put at risk; to advise whether in the light of that investigation any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable; and to report". You added: "Although I have no evidence of a connection between this matter and the incident on 9 July, I am arranging for Lord Bridge to see all the papers relating to the events on 9 July so that he can make any further inquiries he considers necessary and advise on the adequacy of the police inquiries". In the light of the opening phrase of this addendum to my terms of reference, I have interpreted it narrowly, as directed solely to the adequacy of the police inquiries into the incidents in which Fagan broke into Buckingham Palace and, more particularly, as to whether Fagan could have acted on any inside knowledge of the geography of Buckingham Palace other than such as he might have obtained from published sources and, if so, whether there was any possibility that such information had been made available to him, directly or indirectly, through Commander Trestrail.

Conduct of the Inquiry

1.2 In addition to considering all the relevant documentary material, I have taken oral evidence from twenty witnesses. These included the Commissioner and senior serving and retired officers of the Metropolitan Police, senior members of the staff of the Royal Household, civil servants both in the Ministry of Defence ~~(Procurement Executive)~~ and in the Home Office who took part in the

positive vetting of Commander Trestrail, the senior civil servants responsible for policy in the Police Department of the Home Office and Commander Trestrail himself. There were substantial discrepancies between the accounts of the relationship between Trestrail and the male prostitute Michael Rauch (alias Pratt, alias Price) given by Trestrail in statements made to the police and in the course of my Inquiry on the one hand and in the statement made by Rauch to the police and (still more strikingly) in versions of events attributed to Rauch in the press on the other. I considered (a) that the essential aspects of the relationship relevant to security were not in dispute and (b) that, in the light of his character and antecedents and the circumstances in which he made his disclosures, Rauch would be a witness on whom it would be unsafe to place any reliance. I accordingly did not seek to take evidence from Rauch.

1.3 I wish to acknowledge gratefully the very considerable assistance I have had from Mr J A Daniell, who has acted as my Secretary for the purposes of this Inquiry. He has not only organised the administrative machinery necessary to the conduct of the Inquiry with unfailing efficiency; he has also contributed constructively and helpfully, both in form and in substance, to the drafting of this Report.

THE PRIMARY FACTS

Trestrail's Police Career

2.1 Trestrail joined the Metropolitan Police on 20 October 1952 and his first posting as a police constable was to 'D' Division (Paddington) in January 1953. He was well thought of by his senior officers, progressing to Sergeant in 1960 and Station Sergeant in 1962. Throughout this period Trestrail was consistently marked highly in reports by his superior officers for qualities of reliability, appearance, demeanour and enthusiasm as well as for his capacity to supervise others. Following selection for further promotion he attended the Police College 'A' course for Inspectors from January to June 1965, a residential course which provided an opportunity to assess his general character and social behaviour in addition to his professional and academic ability. The College Commandant's final report on his performance on the course was in glowing terms, as the following quoted extracts show:-

> "Station Sergeant Trestrail is an exceptionally pleasant officer ... He has a good logical brain and his energies are well directed and well sustained ... He is a very good member of any team, making notable contributions to the project in hand. His powers of leadership and command are well developed and his marked vocation for the service, together with his engaging character, enables him to exercise them with good effect ...
>
> "His powers of analysis and reasoning were impressive. He was receptive to new ideas and was tolerant of the views of his colleagues. ... He took a full part in the sporting and social activities of the College and was very popular with his colleagues ...
>
> "Station Sergeant Trestrail has the necessary professional and personal qualities to fill the rank of Inspector very creditably indeed and may confidently be expected to rise to higher rank".

2.2 Having served as Inspector in 'A' Division for one year, during which time he again impressed his superiors, Trestrail was posted in June 1966 to the Royalty Protection Group at Buckingham Palace. He served for a short period as staff officer to the Queen's Police Officer (Commander Perkins, now deceased), and then in July 1966 was appointed to be one of the two protection officers assigned to His Royal Highness Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. He remained with Prince Philip until July 1973, rising to the rank of Superintendent. His ability was such that he was selected to succeed Commander Perkins as the Queen's Police Officer which he did in the rank of Chief Superintendent on 1 July 1973. He was promoted to Commander A.1 Branch (Royalty Protection) on 1 July 1978.

Trestrail's duties as Queen's Police Officer

2.3 As the Queen's Police Officer, Trestrail was Her Majesty's personal protection officer and accompanied her on public and private occasions when she was outside Buckingham Palace. His role was to guard Her Majesty against any attack or threat from any source. In common with all royalty protection officers he was required to provide the necessary level of security while taking into account his Royal principal's desire to move freely in discharge of her official duties and to lead as normal a life as possible. In order effectively to carry out his duties, Trestrail was required to reconnoitre prospective visits both at home and abroad, to plan and organise the appropriate security arrangements in conjunction with local police forces and other agencies involved, to inspect proposed accommodation and to receive threat assessments relating to his Royal principal in the area which she was visiting. Inevitably a considerable amount of time was spent away from Buckingham Palace while such reconnaissances were taking place. In addition to his personal protection duties, Trestrail commanded the Royalty Protection Group. While protection officers of necessity have to act very much on their own initiative, the Queen's Police Officer was responsible for their efficient operation as a group. He had to know their strengths and weaknesses and ensure that overall policy on protection was being uniformly interpreted and implemented, in accordance with the demands of security and the wishes of the Royal Family. Trestrail had other important management responsibilities including the training and welfare of protection officers; recommending officers for promotion; and sitting on selection boards. From 1 July 1978 he reported to

the Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'A' Department on routine matters but had direct access to the Assistant Commissioner 'A' on sensitive issues concerning the Royal Household. In carrying out his duties, Trestrail had to communicate effectively with people representing a variety of interests, at home and abroad, including members of the Royal Household, senior service officers, public authorities, police officers of all ranks and members of the public.

The Disclosure of Trestrail's Homosexual Activities

2.4 After reading press reports of the incident on 9 July in which Fagan broke into Buckingham Palace and gained access to the Queen's bedroom, Rauch spoke to a reporter of the Sun newspaper, said that he was a male prostitute who had been employed over a period of years by the Queen's Police Officer to engage in homosexual activities and offered to sell his story for £20,000. The reporter informed the editor, who, very properly, decided not to use the story and promptly reported the matter to the Press Secretary at Buckingham Palace. The Private Secretary to the Queen informed the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police of Rauch's allegation. This was late on Friday, 16 July. An immediate police investigation was instituted. On 17 July Rauch was interviewed at New Scotland Yard and made a statement detailing his account of his relationship with Commander Trestrail. Commander Trestrail was then immediately called to the Yard and confronted with Rauch's allegation. His initial reaction was to deny that he knew Rauch; but within minutes he admitted the association and asked to be allowed to resign from the police force forthwith. His resignation was accepted by the Commissioner.

The Nature and Extent of Trestrail's Homosexual Activities

2.5 Since it is no part of my purpose that this Report, if published, should satisfy the curiosity of the prurient, I shall confine what I say under this heading to a very general account of the way in which Trestrail carried on his homosexual activities and need refer only to such details as are of possible security significance. Trestrail has been aware of his homosexuality since his teens. He has always been reluctant to acknowledge it, even to himself, and has sought to repress it. In the result, the occasions of his homosexual activity have been spasmodic and infrequent - separated by intervals of "months" according

to his own account. They normally only occurred when he had taken drink and felt unable to control his urge for some homosexual contact. The great majority of his contacts have been with male prostitutes but some have been with fellow homosexuals recognised as such in casual encounters. According to Trestrail's account, with two exceptions all his contacts involved only a single homosexual incident with any single individual.

2.6 The first exception was a Spanish visitor from the Canary Islands whom Trestrail met in Hyde Park several years ago when each was seeking a homosexual partner. This incident was followed by a few further homosexual encounters between the two men. They continued their acquaintance by the exchange of Christmas cards. They met more recently, once when Trestrail paid a private visit to the Canaries and again when the Spaniard visited England, but there was on these occasions no further homosexual activity between them. The second exception was Rauch (known to Trestrail as Michael Pratt). The acquaintance began by Trestrail picking up Rauch in the Piccadilly area, where Rauch was plying his trade as a male prostitute, and going to Rauch's flat nearby. I am unable to make precise findings as to the length of the acquaintance or the number of occasions on which they met. It is sufficient to say that there were a number of meetings over a period of years sometimes at flats occupied by Rauch, occasionally at Trestrail's flat in Teddington. I accept without hesitation Trestrail's evidence to me that on every occasion the relationship was simply that of prostitute and paying customer, that there was no emotional involvement and that the meetings were by no means regular or frequent. At some stage Trestrail disclosed, in response to questions from Rauch, that he was the Queen's Police Officer. The only other homosexual partner to whom he had made the same disclosure was the Spaniard referred to above. Rauch never entered Buckingham Palace. He did, on one occasion, telephone Trestrail there using the number given for Buckingham Palace in the public telephone directory.

Rauch's Antecedents

2.7 Rauch was convicted of an offence of blackmail and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment at the Central Criminal Court on 29 April 1969. In addition he has two convictions for importuning and one for criminal damage, all in the early 1970s. Of these convictions Trestrail knew only about one for importuning.

The Blackmail Attempt

2.8 On a date which I cannot fix with precision but which I think was probably two or three years ago Trestrail received a recorded delivery letter from Rauch demanding £2,000 under threat of selling his story to a German newspaper. He claimed to have a compromising photograph to support it. Shortly afterwards Rauch telephoned Trestrail who told him he would not pay but would take the blackmailing letter to the police. In evidence Trestrail assured me that, when he made this reply to Rauch, he intended to do as he said. He realises now that it was his duty to go to the police. In the event, recognising that it would mean the end of his career, he was unable to find the courage and strength of will to do so. He waited for some time in acute fear of disclosure, but when it seemed clear that Rauch did not intend to carry out his threat, Trestrail destroyed the letter. He told me in evidence that since the blackmail attempt he had had no further contact with Rauch and, indeed, had engaged in no further homosexual acitivity. I see no reason to disbelieve this.

CONCLUSIONS OF FACT WITH REGARD TO TRESTRAIL

Trestrail's Reputation

3.1 The evidence I have received demonstrates that Commander Trestrail performed his duties as Queen's Police Officer with the utmost efficiency. His senior officers in the Metropolitan Police, his colleagues, senior members of the staff of the Royal Household who worked closely with him and officers of other forces with whom he was frequently in contact all had the highest regard for his capacity for firmness and quick decision coupled with tact, discretion and an outstanding ability to communicate with others on professional matters - all very necessary qualities for the difficult responsibilities the Queen's Police Officer has to discharge. Above all no one doubted his total devotion to duty or his unswerving loyalty to Her Majesty and the members of the Royal Family. Furthermore, until the disclosure made in July last, no one of those to whom I have referred, with a solitary exception whom I must mention, entertained the slightest suspicion of Commander Trestrail's homosexual inclinations, let alone of the secret double life he was leading.

3.2 The one person who says that he entertained any suspicion about Trestrail's homosexuality was an officer who served with Trestrail in the latter's early years in the Royalty Protection Group. It is unnecessary to name him and I will refer to him as X. He has now been in retirement for some years. On hearing of Trestrail's resignation and the reason for it, X, very properly, communicated with Scotland Yard, volunteered a statement and in due course gave evidence before me. The substance of what X told me was that twice after Trestrail's joining the Royalty Protection Group he reported to Commander Perkins, who was then Queen's Police Officer, his suspicion that Trestrail was a homosexual, first in general terms, secondly with reference to a suspected homosexual relationship between Trestrail and another officer in the Group, whom I will call Y. According to X, Commander Perkins simply brushed the matter aside, telling X in effect that it was nothing to do with him. I accepted X as a perfectly honest witness. I have no doubt that he did entertain a suspicion of Trestrail's homosexuality. However, he admitted he had no evidence whatever to

substantiate his suspicion and he was quite unable to explain to me in any way that I found convincing what was the ground for it. He said that it was a "gut feeling". I have no doubt that he said something about his suspicion to Commander Perkins. What I cannot accept is the accuracy of X's recollection that Commander Perkins, if the matter was presented to him as one calling for serious consideration, simply brushed it aside. It seems to me almost inconceivable that Commander Perkins, receiving a serious report from one of his officers of suspected homosexuality in another, would not at least have wanted to know the ground for the suspicion. I think the probability is that Commander Perkins' reaction was, much as mine, that X, on being questioned, was quite unable to advance any rational basis for his suspicion. With regard to the other officer, Y, Trestrail readily agreed that they had for many years been close friends, but insisted that Y was actively heterosexual, and that his own relationship with Y had never had any homosexual element whatever. I unhesitatingly accepted this evidence. In the result nothing in the evidence of X caused me to modify the strong impression I received from all the other evidence I heard and read that there was nothing whatever in Trestrail's behaviour in his day to day professional and public life (saving the bare fact that he was a bachelor with no known female attachments) to arouse in an ordinary person the suspicion that he was a homosexual.

Trestrail's Character and the Implications of his Homosexual Activities

3.3 Trestrail in giving evidence to me, impressed me as anxious to be completely frank and to give me all the help he could in the conduct of my Inquiry. I think there is an undoubted conflict in his character between the image of himself which he has succeeded so well in projecting in his public and professional life and which he would like to live up to and his taste for casual and promiscuous homosexual encounters which he himself recognised as sordid and degrading. Professionally, he was a model of tact and discretion and I have no doubt that in carrying out his duties he acted loyally and to the highest standards.

3.4 I turn to the crucial question whether security was breached or put at risk by the conduct of his private life. In behaving as he did, Trestrail clearly laid himself open to blackmail and, as I have described, one blackmail attempt

was made. He constantly ran the risk, though perhaps not great, of recognition in any casual encounter and committed the serious indiscretion of disclosing his identity and position to Rauch and to the Spaniard. Nevertheless, on consideration of the whole of the evidence, I am fully satisfied that there was no actual breach of security and, on the basis of my assessment of Trestrail's character, I find it difficult to envisage circumstances in which any risk to security could have arisen. When blackmailed for money, Trestrail did not succumb to the threat, although he did not, as he should have done, report the incident. If he had been blackmailed to disclose some information or otherwise to act in some way which could have been detrimental to the safety or well-being of the Royal Family, everything points to the conclusion that he would have put duty before self-interest and made a full and prompt report of the threat. This will provoke some to ask whether, if Trestrail did his job so well and represented no risk to security, it was necessary or right to accept his resignation. I have no doubt that it was. In the public discussion in the media and in Parliament, following Commander Trestrail's resignation, it was frequently stressed that homosexual acts between two consenting adult males in private are no longer unlawful. I recognise this and do not regard it as any responsibility of mine to express a moral judgement. There are however, two considerations (if no others) which, once Trestrail's secret life became known, dictated the impossibility of his continued employment as Queen's Police Officer. First, the risks he took and the indiscretions he committed, no matter how compulsive the urge which drove him to act as he did, must be seen as raising serious doubt as to the soundness of his judgement. Secondly, even in today's permissive society, indiscriminate promiscuous behaviour, whether homosexual or heterosexual, particularly when it involves relations with prostitutes, still attracts general disapproval; to continue to employ, in a position of responsibility close to the Queen, a man known to have indulged in such practices would clearly be unacceptable.

Trestrail and Fagan

3.5 The question how Fagan came to find his way to the Queen's bedroom is one to which no confident answer can be given. I am satisfied, however, that the police have made all inquiries it was possible for them to make in seeking the answer and can now carry the matter no further. The search for a rational explanation of Fagan's actions is not assisted by the fact that Fagan is not a rational man. One thing is certain, no hint or trace of any link between Trestrail and Fagan has come to light and I am convinced that there was no connection, direct or indirect, between them.

THE ROYALTY PROTECTION GROUP AND TRESTRAIL'S APPOINTMENTS

The Development of the Group in Recent Years

4.1 The personal protection afforded to members of the Royal Family has traditionally been based upon the need to preserve the line of succession to the Throne. Full time protection is afforded to the Queen and her immediate family while other members of the Royal Family are protected on all public and some private occasions. By protection is meant the arrangement whereby the person concerned is protected by an allocated police officer from the time that he or she leaves the Royal residence until his or her return. The men concerned come from the uniformed branch of the Metropolitan Police but wear plain clothes when on protection duties.

4.2 Until 1974 the Royalty Protection Group consisted of a relatively small team of officers. However, since then, the Group has grown considerably in size to its present strength of 43. In part this reflects the increase in the amount of protection work required, but it is mainly due to a revision in security procedures put into effect following the attempt to kidnap Her Royal Highness Princess Anne in 1974. In particular it was decided in the aftermath of that incident to include in the Royalty Protection Group a team of "back-up sergeants" whose task would be to man a second car, following members of the Royal Family when they were being driven on outside engagements. (The individual protection officers would continue to accompany their Royal principals in the lead vehicle). The present position is that of the 43 officers in the Group, 17 are allocated to back-up duties. This has implications for selection procedures in that it was accepted from the start that the back-up teams would provide a pool from which personal protection officers could be selected.

4.3 The Royalty Protection Group until July of this year came under the command of the Queen's Police Officer. It was a Branch (A1) of 'A' Department at New Scotland Yard, thus coming under the direct supervision of the Assistant Commissioner 'A' and the Deputy Assistant Commissioner 'A' in charge of operations. This represented a change from the position prior to June 1978 when Royalty protection was the responsibility of the Commander in charge of 'A' District (formerly 'A' Division), based at Cannon Row.

Selection procedures for the Royalty Protection Group

4.4 There are two basic elements in the selection procedures for members of the Royalty Protection Group. First, it is for senior officers in the Metropolitan Police to be satisfied that a man is of sound character, is professionally competent and has or can be trained in the necessary specialist skills to fit him for protection duty; secondly, the officer selected must be acceptable to the person whom he is to protect. The Metropolitan Police were unable to provide me with an authoritative detailed account of how police officers were selected to become members of the Royalty Protection Group prior to 1969. However, from what I was told, it would seem that some kind of "head hunting" system operated. For example, the then equivalent of area Deputy Assistant Commissioners might be asked to nominate officers whom they considered to be suitable; nominees would then be interviewed before a headquarters board and, if considered suitable, would be placed on trial attachment to Royalty protection duties. It would be for the Queen's Police Officer to confirm the appointment on the basis of performance during the trial attachment and provided that the Royal principal was satisfied with the officer. Given the small number of men then employed on Royalty protection work and, presumably, the infrequency with which vacancies arose, I can well understand that selection was carried out on an ad hoc basis without formalised procedures; no doubt personal records were checked in order to confirm that nothing was known about those being selected which might render them unsuitable.

4.5 In 1969, a new method of selecting Royalty protection officers was introduced and it forms the basis of the procedure in use up to the present time. All members of the Force are notified of forthcoming vacancies (usually in the back-up team) by means of Police Orders. Sergeants and Inspectors may then forward personal applications through their respective District Commanders to headquarters. The District Commanders have a significant part to play in the selection process in that they are expected to consider applications carefully and endorse them with their recommendations (or otherwise). Those considered worthy of interview are seen by a selection board consisting of the Assistant Commissioner 'A' or his Deputy and the Queen's Police Officer. If successful

the officer serves his trial attachment to the Royalty Protection Group before having his position confirmed by the Queen's Police Officer. There is also now the additional safeguard that before appointment as personal protection officers, most men will have proved their worth as back-up sergeants. However, apart from routine steps to ensure that recruits are not known criminals or security risks, no special checks have been made on the character and background of officers selected for Royalty protection duties.

The Selection Procedures as Applied to Trestrail

4.6 There appears to be no documentary record of the circumstances in which Trestrail was in 1966 posted to the Royalty Protection Group or of the means by which he was selected. I have had therefore to rely heavily upon witnesses' unaided recollection and in particular that of Trestrail himself. In the mid sixties it seems that there was some concern over whether it was reasonable for the Queen's Police Officer to combine his duties in protecting the Queen with sole responsibility for the administration of the Royalty Protection Group. It was therefore decided that he should have a staff officer to assist him with the administration. Very much in line with the sort of approach which I described in paragraph 4.4, the Assistant Commissioner 'A' of the day asked his staff officer if he knew of anyone suitable. The staff officer, a Chief Superintendent, identified Trestrail, who had previously served under his command but who by then was a recently promoted Inspector serving in 'A' Division (now 'A' District). Trestrail was called in to see the Assistant Commissioner 'A' who took him through his life history and police career before asking him if he would be prepared to take on the task of assisting the Queen's Police Officer. At a later stage Trestrail saw the Queen's Police Officer (Commander Perkins) and was then posted to the Palace. At no time does there appear to have been a "board" in the normally understood sense of the word and Trestrail was not conscious of any particular effort being made to assess his personality or ascertain his outside interests. However, I can only presume that those involved in the selection process must have called for his personal file, which at that

stage would have charted the progress of a good all round police officer with no blemish on his record. The report of his performance on the Police College 'A' Course for Inspectors (see paragraph 2.1) may well have been regarded as particularly relevant.

4.7 After only one month at Buckingham Palace, Trestrail was appointed to be one of Prince Philip's protection officers. This fact is recorded in his personal file, but again there is no record of how he came to be given the appointment. So far as Trestrail's appointment as Queen's Police Officer is concerned, the following is taken from his Annual Qualification Report of 1973, completed on 18 June by Commander Perkins:-

> "Superintendent Trestrail has been selected to succeed me (i.e. as Queen's Police Officer) on my retirement on 30 June 1973 and I have no hesitation in recommending him for the appointment. I feel that he will give every satisfaction in the new sphere as he has done in the past with His Royal Highness Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh".

Apart from this, no documentation has been found in Metropolitan Police records or those at Buckingham Palace concerning the appointment. I can therefore only give the briefest summary of the most significant reasons for the appointment, based on views expressed by senior police officers and a senior member of the Royal Household. Trestrail would have been well known to the Queen, both by virtue of his position as Prince Philip's protection officer and because he would have deputised for Commander Perkins from time to time. There is no doubt that Trestrail was held in the highest regard as a result of his service with Prince Philip. In view of this and because by 1973 he was the senior officer on Prince Philip's team, it is clear that his superiors and members of the Royal Household regarded him as the natural successor to Commander Perkins.

Conclusion

4.8 Since Commander Trestrail's appointment as Queen's Police Officer is specifically mentioned in my terms of reference, I have thought it right to set out in this section of my Report both the background and the detail at some length. In the end, however, nothing is to be gained by a detailed critique of past methods of selecting members of the Royalty Protection Group in general or the Queen's Police Officer in particular. For reasons which will become more apparent when I examine the question of positive vetting, it is ~~virtually impossible~~ difficult to envisage a practicable selection procedure sufficiently rigorous to have discovered Trestrail's homosexual activities, so long as he was determined to conceal them.

POSITIVE VETTING

History and Background

5.1 Positive vetting (PV) was first introduced in 1952 as a means of investigating the reliability of Government staff employed in exceptionally secret work. The standard criterion in the Public service is that PV is applied to those who are being considered for employment on duties which require regular and constant access to Top Secret information. This classification is, by definition, applicable to: "Information and material the unauthorised disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation". ~~(There are other criteria applicable to people engaged in specialist work but these are not relevant for the purpose of this Inquiry)~~. The purpose of PV has always been the protection of classified information; it was not and is not designed to enable checks to be made on people employed in public posts which may be very responsible for reasons other than that they involve access to highly classified information.

5.2 The PV procedure involves the checking of records, the completion of a security questionnaire by the individual concerned and consultation in writing with character referees named in the questionnaire. However, the central feature of the process is the field investigation carried out by an Investigating Officer who, in the case of most Home Civil Service departments, is employed by the Ministry of Defence ~~(Procurement Executive)~~. This element of the procedure is costly; ~~nearly a year ago, the Security Commission was given an estimate of £700 as the average cost per investigation and considered this probably to be an under-estimate~~. I am advised that the average cost per investigation is unlikely to be less than £750 and may well be more. It is also time consuming. A substantial increase in the number of PV posts would necessitate the employment of more Investigating Officers and probably increase the time taken to secure PV clearances, unless the quality of each investigation were to be less searching. It was factors such as these which led the Security Commission recently to recommend that PV posts in the Civil Service be reviewed with a view to reducing their number if at all possible: see Cmnd 8540 (May 1982).

Positive Vetting in the Police

5.3 PV clearance for the holders of certain posts in police forces was first required following the publication of the Radcliffe Report (Cmnd 1681) in April 1962. The spy scandals with which that report was largely concerned highlighted the close liaison necessarily maintained between the Security Service and police Special Branches. The two services must, in the field of counter-espionage, frequently act in co-operation. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch also performs its own distinct role, which has grown so greatly in importance in recent years, of ~~operating intelligence and counter-intelligence services in relation to Irish Republican terrorist and subversive activities~~ co-ordinating the collection of intelligence relating to Irish Republican activities. Both these functions of Special Branches require that their members have access to highly sensitive information. Chief Officers of police with responsibility for Special Branches must have similar access.

5.4 The Home Office have issued three circulars (in 1963, 1973 and 1979) giving guidance on PV in police forces which reflects the implications of these factors. I will not examine the detailed development and minor changes of policy which have taken place over the years. Before 1973 the responsibility for carrying out the prescribed PV procedures and granting PV clearance was that of the Chief Officers of the police forces concerned. Since 1973 the field investigation has been carried out by the Ministry of Defence ~~(Procurement Executive)~~ for the police, as for most Government Departments, and the decision to give or withhold PV clearance has been that of the Home Office.

5.5 Since few police officers have regular and constant access to information formally classified as Top Secret, it has been evident from the start that, to protect the security of the kind of highly sensitive information which Special Branches, in particular, handle, an additional criterion to the standard criterion used in the Civil Service would be required for the designation of PV posts in police forces. The formula which has been in use since 1963 has been that PV clearance should be required for all officers (or civilian employees) having "actual or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information". In provincial forces the circulars have made it clear that this criterion will automatically apply to all Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables and to all officers and civilians engaged in Special Branch work.

5.6 In the Metropolitan Police the PV criterion is taken to apply automatically to the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners and to the Special Branch. But Deputy Assistant Commissioners and Commanders although of substantially equivalent rank to Assistant Chief Constables, are not automatically required to hold PV clearance. Whether anyone below the rank of Assistant Commissioner and outside the Special Branch requires PV is decided ad hoc by the Commissioner with the advice of the Assistant Commissioner 'C' Department. Since there are 18 Deputy Assistant Commissioners and 55 Commanders, many of whom hold posts wholly unconnected with security work, this is perfectly reasonable. But it creates a difficult problem of judgement in the application of a very imprecise formula. I fully appreciate the difficulty of devising clear and readily applicable definitions in this field but the phrases "potential access" and "highly secret" are both open to a wide range of interpretations. If, as I understand, the Police Department of the Home Office contemplate the issue of a revised circular on the subject of PV in police forces in the not too distant future, I would earnestly hope that it may be possible, by illustrative examples if not by definition, to give more positive guidance than is presently offered as to where the PV line is to be drawn.

POSITIVE VETTING IN THE ROYALTY PROTECTION GROUP

History

6.1 Until November 1981 no member of the Royalty Protection Group was subject to PV. A review of PV posts in the Metropolitan Police led to a decision in November 1981 to require PV clearance for the holders of about ten posts not previously subject to the procedure. The Queen's Police Officer was the only member of the Royalty Protection Group included in the additions. As previously stated, Commander Trestrail was granted PV clearance on 1 April 1982. On 19 July 1982, you informed the House of Commons of Commander Trestrail's resignation. On 21 July the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police decided that the holders of all 43 posts in the Royalty Protection Group should be subject to PV and immediate steps were taken to set in train the necessary procedures to implement this decision.

6.2 The facts, as baldly stated in the previous paragraph, inevitably invite criticism. If the designation of PV posts is governed by a consistent policy, the omission of the entire Royalty Protection Group before 1981 and the decision in November 1981 to subject only the Queen's Police Officer to PV cannot be reconciled with the Commissioner's decision on 21 July 1982 to subject the Group as a whole to PV. This latter decision, at first blush, lends colour to the view that there had been a long-standing failure to take a necessary security precaution for the safety of the Queen and the Royal Family and that this failure was compounded by a positive error of judgement when, in the course of the 1981 review of PV posts, that of the Queen's Police Officer, alone in the Royalty Protection Group, was included. I am satisfied that this view stems from an over-simplification of the facts and, on a proper understanding of the history, cannot be supported.

The Policy Considerations

6.3 The only information to which Royalty protection officers, as such, have access which could conceivably qualify for consideration as "highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information" is that which they obtain from the Special Branch in the form of, or as relevant to, threat assessments affecting their Royal principals. The importance of this information has, no doubt, been steadily growing over recent years as the threat of terrorism itself has grown. The evidence I heard as to the degree of sensitivity of the kind of information which was given by the Special Branch to Commander Trestrail, as Queen's Police Officer, and of that which he needed to pass on to Royalty protection officers under his command, was not wholly consistent and is difficult for me to evaluate. The evidence could only be expressed in general terms and inevitably reflected in large measure the subjective judgement of those who gave it. In the light of these considerations and of the lack of precision of the criterion to be applied by the Metropolitan Police in deciding what posts should receive PV clearance, to which I have drawn attention in paragraph 5.6, I see no ground on which I could properly criticise either the absence of any requirement of PV in the Royalty Protection Group up to 1981 or the decision taken in 1981, in the course of a general review, that the Queen's Police Officer, but no other member of the Royalty Protection Group, should be subject to PV. I examine in section 8 of the Report the factors that should govern the application of PV to those engaged in Royalty protection in future.

An Apparent Anomaly

6.4 Again at first blush, it might seem anomalous that personal protection for Government Ministers, important foreign visitors and other prominent figures identified as under potential threat, is provided by officers who hold PV clearance. The explanation is simple and the anomaly is apparent, not real. Personal protection for these categories of person has always been provided by officers of the Special Branch. They require PV clearance because they may be engaged in any of the duties which are performed by the Special Branch, not because they are personal protection officers, which is only an incidental role. Royalty protection officers, in contrast, have never been drawn from the Special Branch (for reasons which I have not thought it necessary to investigate) and have no other duty than that of personal protection.

The Reaction to Trestrail's Resignation

6.5 The decision of the Commissioner on 21 July 1982 to apply a "blanket" PV requirement to the Royalty Protection Group was not based on a re-appraisal of the quality and sensitivity of any secret information to which members of the Group have access. Nothing that occurred between the considered decision taken in November 1981 and the decision in July 1982 suggested the need for any such re-appraisal. The Commissioner's decision, as he readily acknowledged, was a reaction to the public outcry in Parliament and the media provoked by the disclosure of Trestrail's homosexual activities, coming, as it did, hard on the heels of the Fagan incident. No evidence I have heard came near to satisfying me that "blanket" PV in the Royalty Protection Group could possibly be justified on the basis of the criterion of "access or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information" even on the most liberal interpretation of that formula. Indeed, the Commissioner, who was entirely frank, scarcely attempted to justify his decision on that basis. He justified it rather on the basis that, in the face of acute public disquiet about the safety of the Queen and the Royal Family and strong criticism of the Metropolitan Police, he felt it was his duty to take, and to be seen to be taking, every possible step towards the enhancement of Royal security and that "blanket" PV applied to the Royalty Protection Group was one obvious such step to take in the circumstances. I entirely understand and sympathise with the reasons for the Commissioner's decision in the difficult predicament in which he was placed by the pressure of events. But, as I think the Commissioner himself, with hindsight, accepts, the far-reaching implication of the decision is that the PV procedure can properly be used for purposes other than the protection from disclosure of nationally important and highly sensitive information. The possibility of a change of policy to extend the grounds on which PV should be required in the public service is another matter which I discuss in section 8 of the Report.

THE POSITIVE VETTING OF COMMANDER TRESTRAIL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

A General Misapprehension

7.1 Much of the public discussion following the Trestrail disclosure proceeded on the implicit assumption that, if a possible bar to the grant of PV clearance, such as homosexuality, has not been discovered in the course of PV procedures, the procedures cannot have been properly carried out. The assumption is false. Some disqualifying factors are more easily ascertained than others. But there are undoubtedly some factors which, if the subject is determined to conceal them, it may be impossible for the presently prescribed procedures to uncover, no matter how carefully and thoroughly they are carried out. If a man in a public position leads a secret double life and succeeds, as Trestrail did for so long, in maintaining a total and effective separation between the two sides of his activities, this must present the PV investigator with an almost impossible task.

The Field Investigation in Trestrail's PV

7.2 The only stage of the PV procedures in which there was the slightest prospect, in the face of Trestrail's concealment, of discovering his homosexual acitivites was the field investigation. In view of the clear conclusion I have reached, I can deal with this aspect of the matter quite shortly. The field investigation was carried out by a senior and experienced Investigating Officer (IO) in the Personnel Security Investigation Unit of the Ministry of Defence ~~(Procurement Executive)~~, who was himself a former police officer. The IO discussed with his superior, the Deputy Chief Investigating Officer, by whom the job had been allocated to him, how it should be done. In view of Trestrail's bachelor status, both had the possibility of homosexuality in mind. The IO conducted all the interviews which were appropriate. He wrote a very full and thorough report which I am satisfied gave an accurate account of his investigation. In every interview he specifically canvassed the possibility of Trestrail being a homosexual. He was specifically and emphatically asssured by Trestrail's immediate superiors during the preceding nine years of his service, by Trestrail's

referees and by a senior member of the staff of the Royal Household who had been in almost daily contact with Trestrail for many years (to summarise the unanimous effect of their expressed opinions), that they had heard no hint or rumour, nor had any reason from their own observation, to arouse the slightest suspicion of homosexuality on Trestrail's part. I have no hesitation in concluding that the field investigation was carried out efficiently and with complete propriety. There being no ground disclosed in the IO's report to withhold PV, the grant of PV clearance by the Home Office was the inevitable outcome. No-one concerned in the PV procedures in Trestrail's case can be criticised in any way.

Possible Improvements in the PV Procedures

7.3 It is possible that the kind of obstacle to PV clearance which eluded discovery in Trestrail's case might be discovered by a system of random and covert surveillance of the subject's private activities. This would (a) add enormously to the cost of PV; (b) not necessarily be successful - this would depend on the length of the surveillance and the frequency of the subject's irregular behaviour; and (c) be strongly resented by most public servants as an unjustifiable invasion of their privacy. ~~To my mind it would be wholly unacceptable.~~

7.4 The possibility of the use of the polygraph (the ~~so-called~~ lie detector) in interviewing a candidate for PV clearance has also been canvassed in the press. Before any positive recommendation to employ this device could be made, a very thorough investigation of every aspect of its use would be essential. Such an investigation was obviously beyond the scope of my present Inquiry. I have, however, read the discussion of the subject in the Research Study entitled "Police Interrogation: The Psychological Approach" prepared for the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure by Barrie Irving and Linden Hilgendorf and published by HMSO in 1980: see pages 55 to 61. This reveals a strong conflict of opinion as to the validity of the claims made by its proponents for the polygraph tests of veracity and an admitted error rate, on any view, of 12%. These factors alone seem to me to raise ~~a grave doubt~~ questions as to whether the polygraph could properly be used in the conduct of PV interviews, which could only be resolved after very much fuller consideration.

FUTURE PERSONNEL SECURITY OF THE ROYALTY PROTECTION GROUP

A Possible New Criterion for Requiring Positive Vetting

8.1 The conclusion that security was not in fact breached or put at risk by Trestrail's homosexual activities is no reason for complacency. For the future all appropriate steps must be taken to ensure the complete reliability and trustworthiness of officers engaged in Royalty protection. I have examined the possibility that, in connection with the safety of the Royal Family, some new criterion, not based on the subject's access to highly classified information, might be introduced to designate posts requiring PV clearance. An uncompromising call for such a criterion is implied in the question put to you by Mr Arthur Lewis MP which you answered in writing on 30 July: see Hansard, Col 772. I quote the Question and Answer:

> "Mr Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will arrange for all police and other staff under the control of his Department who have more than an occasional meeting with members of the Royal Family to be positively vetted, whether or not they come into contact with secret documents and papers, and for all staff at the various palaces, including the police, to be positively vetted on the same basis.
>
> Mr Whitelaw: I will consider the best arrangements for the future in the light of Lord Bridge's recommendations."

Under the present practice only eight members of the staff of the Royal Household require PV clearance. The basis of the requirement is that the persons in question perform duties which require that they be authorised to handle Cabinet papers and minutes passed to the Palace to be seen by the Queen and in some instances also by the Prince of Wales. I fully understand the thinking underlying Mr Lewis' proposal. Not only does the Monarchy occupy a unique position in our constitution, but the Royal Family are held uniquely in the affection and esteem of the people both of this country and of the many Commonwealth countries of which the Queen is the Sovereign. But Mr Lewis' proposal would cast the PV net

so widely that it would be difficult to formulate a rational justification for it as a necessary security measure which could not plausibly be argued to be applicable to many other situations where absolute reliability and trustworthiness are requried of persons discharging high and important responsibilities. It is somewhat ironical that calls for wholesale enlargement of the scope of PV (when the Security Commission and others have been seeking means to curtail it) should have been provoked by Fagan's invasions of Buckingham Palace, followed shortly by the unrelated incident of Commander Trestrail's resignation, when it is perfectly clear that no earlier extension of the scope of PV could have had any effect in preventing these occurrences. I have no reason to doubt that, in the selection, recruitment and supervision of the domestic staffs of Royal Palaces, as a matter of good staff management, appropriate steps are taken to ensure that unsuitable people are not employed. No doubt the system is not infallible and staff must sometimes be dismissed. If a stricter selection and recruitment procedure is required to ensure that undesirables, who might conceivably represent a threat to the Royal Family, are excluded, I am convinced that the duty to devise such a procedure must rest with the senior officers of the Royal Household responsible for staff matters and that the danger, if there is one, is not such as could justify the wholesale extension of the use of PV for a purpose for which it was never designed. The criterion by which the need for PV clearance should continue to be measured must be related, as it always has been hitherto, to the subject's access to highly classified information.

Selection of Royalty Protection Officers

8.2 There is no evidence whatever to suggest that any police officer engaged in the protection of Royalty, whether in the uniformed branch guarding premises, or as a personal protection officer, has ever been actively disloyal. Nevertheless, the selection procedures for the Royalty Protection Group do not seem to have been as thorough and systematic as they should have been. I believe that any weaknesses in the system in the past must be attributed in large part, like other weaknesses now recognised, to the lack of a unified command structure which was noted in 1979 in a report prepared by Assistant Commissioner Wilson and Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dellow, as a result of a review of security arrangements following the assassination of Earl Mountbatten of Burma. Now,

in accordance with the arrangements outlined in your statement to the House of Commons on 21 July, a new unified command structure is being set up. The protection of Her Majesty the Queen, other members of the Royal Family and their residences will be the single responsibility of a Deputy Assistant Commissioner reporting directly to the Commissioner. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Colin Smith has been appointed to head this new department. He and his support staff, who will not themselves undertake personal protection duties, will be free to concentrate on management tasks and, in particular, to devise measures to ensure that only officers suitably qualified both by possession of the necessary professional competence and specialist skills and also in character are appointed members of the Royalty Protection Group, to maintain effective supervision of members of the Group throughout their service and to be alert to detect possible indications of unreliability which may become apparent from their general life style. In planning how best to discharge these responsibilities, Mr Smith should, and I have no doubt will, consult fully with the appropriate senior members of the staff of the Royal Household (and, indeed, so far as she may wish, with Her Majesty herself) and with senior civil servants responsible for the Police Department of the Home Office. But the responsibility for the proper performance of these tasks must rest primarily with Mr Smith, and through him, ultimately, with the new Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to whom Mr Smith will be immediately answerable. These are essentially matters which belong to the province of proper internal police personnel management. I cannot emphasise too strongly that PV procedures were never designed to be, and never could be, an appropriate substitute for suitable methods of personnel selection and supervision designed by the employer to ensure that important posts are always filled by suitable persons. This is especially evident where, as here, the PV investigation is undertaken by an agency independent of the employer. PV clearance is a special insurance against the unauthorised disclosure of information of a very high degree of sensitivity and importance to the national interest.

PV Posts in the New Royalty Protection Department

8.3 It would be quite wrong for me, before the new organisation has taken detailed shape or its operational methods have been determined, to attempt to decide what posts under Mr Smith's command will require PV clearance. When the procedure set in train by the Commissioner's decision of 21 July that all members of the Royalty Protection Group be positively vetted has been completed, there will be a breathing space for careful consideration to be given to the details of a new policy. But for the future I cannot say either that all members of the Royalty Protection Group should require PV or that none should. The decision, in my judgement, should be governed entirely by the kind of information to which, on a "need to know" basis, it is necessary for any officer to have access and by the application either of the existing criterion for police PV or of any amended and more precise criterion which the Home Office may issue. The responsibility for determining on this basis what posts in the Royalty Protection Group require PV should be that of the Commissioner, advised by Mr Smith and other senior officers in the Metropolitan Police. I can give no authoritative guidance as to the level of intelligence or counter-intelligence information, likely to be of concern to those engaged in Royalty protection, that ought to be regarded as requiring that it be handled only by those with PV clearance. My own opinion would be that threat assessments generally and information as to the existence or suspicion of specific threats should be capable of dissemination to those affected without any disclosure of the sources on which they are based and, in that case would not qualify as "highly secret" within the present police PV criterion. Any disclosure of sensitive sources in this field, however, must clearly be treated as "highly secret". In this connection it would be appropriate both for the Home Office in considering any amendment of the criterion, and for the Commissioner in considering how it should be applied, to seek the advice of the Security Service.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Commander Trestrail carried out his duties as Queen's Police Officer loyally and efficiently but led a secret double life in that he indulged in promiscuous homosexual activities, mostly with prostitutes.

9.2 There was no breach of security and, in my judgment, security was not put at risk.

9.3 There was no connection, direct or indirect, between Trestrail and Fagan.

9.4 When Trestrail's homosexual activities came to light his resignation was rightly accepted. Doubts as to the soundness of his judgement and public opinion with regard to indiscriminate promiscuity would, in any event, have made it impossible for him to continue as Queen's Police Officer.

9.5 The circumstances of Trestrail's appointment, first as a member of the Royalty Protection Group in 1966, then as Queen's Police Officer in 1973, were in no way unusual. Although at the relevant dates, the selection procedures for appointment to, and promotion within, the Royalty Protection Group, could be criticised, different procedures, no matter how rigorous, could not have been expected to discover Trestrail's homosexual activities.

9.6 The primary criterion for positive vetting in police forces, sc. "actual or potential access to highly secret intelligence or counter-intelligence information" is imprecise and should, if possible, be amended to give more positive guidance.

9.7 No officers in the Royalty Protection Group were subject to PV before 1981. The decision that the Queen's Police Officer should be positively vetted was taken in 1981. In the light of the imprecise criterion, no evidence as to the secret character of any information, to which members of the Royalty Protection Group had access, justifies criticism of the omission to apply PV to the Royalty Protection Group at any earlier date than 1981, or at that date to members of the Group other than the Queen's Police Officer.

9.8 The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police decided to apply "blanket" PV to the Royalty Protection Group immediately following the Trestrail disclosures. This was an understandable reaction to public concern and criticism but was not justified by the application of the approved criterion for designating PV posts.

9.9 The PV procedures are not, and cannot be, infallible. In Trestrail's case they were carried out efficiently and thoroughly. The failure to discover Trestrail's homosexual activities attracts no blame.

9.10 Whether the PV procedures could or should be enchanced by resort to covert surveillance or to the use of the polygraph are questions which could only be resolved after fuller consideration than has been possible in the course of this inquiry.

9.11 There is no justification for introducing a new policy as the basis for PV which would extend it to all who work in close association with the Royal Family or to any other category of public servants in positions of particular trust and responsibility. The elaborate and expensive PV procedure has always been confined to those with access to highly classified information and should remain so. It is no substitute for efficient personnel management. It is a special insurance against unauthorised disclosure of highly secret information of importance to the national interest.

9.12 The selection and supervision of officers of suitable character and abilities to serve in the Royalty Protection Group is a matter of proper internal police personnel management. The new organisation now being established to bring every aspect of Royalty protection under the command of a Deputy Assistant Commissioner, answerable directly to the Commissioner, will provide the opportunity to devise new and appropriate measures to ensure that methods of selection and supervision are as effective as they can be made.

9.13 What posts in the Royalty Protection Group, after the reorganisation has been completed, will require PV clearance, must depend on any revised guidance issued by the Home Office and the application of that guidance by the Metropolitan Police in the light of the character of any secret information to which Royalty Protection officers need access. Both should seek the advice of the Security Service.

SECRET

POSTSCRIPT

10. Almost without exception, those who knew Commander Trestrail expressed to me their personal regret that his distinguished career should have had to end so unhappily and their sympathy with him in the ordeal to which he was subjected by the singularly unpleasant publicity which the circumstances of his resignation attracted. I share those sentiments.

Bridge of Harwich

BRIDGE OF HARWICH

13 October 1982

SECRET

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Extract/Item details: Letter from Whitmore to Walters dated 20 July 1982 (Folio 2)	
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Commander Trestrail

3.30 pm

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. William Whitelaw): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement. Commander Trestrail, The Queen's police officer, has confessed to having a homosexual relationship over a number of years with a male prostitute. He has resigned from the Metropolitan Police.

I have thought it right to report this to the House at the earliest possible opportunity. I shall make a further announcement in the course of my statement on Wednesday.

Mr. Roy Hattersley (Birmingham, Sparkbrook): I thank the Home Secretary for reporting these facts to the House at the first opportunity. I can imagine the difficulties involved in making such a statement, but I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman was right to give the House his authoritive account of these events rather than allow the story to be told by leaks, half-truths and inneundo. I am sure that my right hon. and hon. Friends will wish to await the right hon. Gentleman's statement on Wednesday before taking up wider security matters at the Palace.

Mr. Whitelaw: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. I have made it clear throughout that it is my duty to the House to report everything to it at the earliest possible opportunity that I can find. This I have done on every occasion, and this I will continue to do.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. I propose to call two more hon. Members from each side of the House on this limited statement. When I have called those four hon. Members, we shall move on to the next statement.

Mr. George Cunningham (Islington, South and Finsbury): Are we to assume that this information was not known to the Security Service till now? Does that mean that no positive vetting was carried out on the commander, or that there was a positive vetting, which failed to reveal these facts?

Mr. Whitelaw: He was positively vetted.

Mr. Jonathan Aitken (Thanet, East): Will this aspect of security lapses surrounding the Queen's security be covered by the Dellow report, bearing in mind that some reports say that it is already in the hands of those in authority?

Mr. Whitelaw: All these matters will be covered by my statement on Wednesday, which will include the Dellow report and every other matter that comes before me.

Mr. J. Grimond (Orkney and Shetland): I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his statement. Can he tell us what the functions of the Queen's police officer are and whether these incidents came to light only when the inquiries into the breach of security at the Palace were taking place, or were they separate from that?

Mr. Whitelaw: They were separate from that. The duties of the Queen's police officer are to protect the Queen outside the Palace and on all her outside visits.

Mr. Patrick McNair-Wilson (New Forest): Will my right hon. Friend tell the House how long these facts have been known to him?

Mr. Whitelaw: Since 9.15 am.

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

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