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PREM 19/813

PART 2

TOP

SECRET

Confidential Filing

Internal Situation.

Iraqi/Iranian Relations.

Iraqi/Syrian Relations.

Threat to oil supplies from the Gulf.

IRAQ

Part 1: April 1980

Part 2: October 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>2.10.80.</del>		<del>12.3.81</del>					
<del>2.10.80</del>		<del>13.4.81</del>					
<del>6.10.80</del>		<del>4.5.81</del>					
<del>9.10.80</del>		<del>12.5.81</del>					
<del>10.10.80</del>		<del>8.10.81</del>					
<del>15.10.80</del>		<del>16.11.81</del>					
<del>17.10.80</del>		<del>7.12.81</del>					
<del>20.10.80</del>		<del>15.12.81</del>					
<del>28.10.80</del>		<del>3.12.81</del>					
<del>31.10.80</del>		<del>13.5.82</del>					
<del>3.11.80</del>		<del>24.5.82</del>					
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<del>11.11.80</del>		<del>22.6.82</del>					
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<del>29.12.80</del>							

PREM 19/813

● PART 2 ends:-

Baghdad tel 361 10/6/82

PART 3 begins:-

Fco tel 168 to Brussels, covering  
Tehran tel 381 28/6/82



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FM BAGHDAD 101017Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 361 OF 10/06/82

INFO PRIORITY MIDDLE EAST POSTS: UKMIS NEW YORK: WASHINGTON:

UKDEL NATO: STOCKHOLM: MOSCOW: PARIS.

INFO SAVING UKREP BRUSSELS

MY IPT 360.

IRAQ-IRAN: CEASEFIRE OFFER.

1. FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI SUMMONED ME TODAY, 10 JUNE, TO ACQUAINT HMG, AS A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER, OF THE TERMS OF IRAQ'S CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OFFER SUMMARISED IN MY IPT.

2. HAMMADI EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS OFFER MADE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPEAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE WHICH HAD MET IN JEDDA FROM 6 TO 8 JUNE. THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WAS GRAVE AND COMPLICATED, SO IRAQ HAD THOUGHT IT OPPORTUNE, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON HIS VISIT HERE ON 9 JUNE, TO MAKE AN IMMEDIATE UNILATERAL OFFER TO END THE WAR WITH IRAN. EXPLAINING THE THIRD POINT OF THE RCC'S OFFER, HE SAID THAT IRAQ AIMED TO TRY AND SETTLE ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH IRAN BILATERALLY, BUT WAS READY TO TAKE EVERYTHING TO ARBITRATION IF IRAN WAS NOT YET READY FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. THE POSSIBLE ARBITRATORS WERE SET OUT IN IRAQ'S ORDER OF PREFERENCE. ANYTHING IRAQ'S FRIENDS COULD DO TO GET IRAN TO CONSIDER THIS OFFER SERIOUSLY WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

3. I ASKED WHERE THIS LEFT THE IDEA OF RESORTING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE MAIN ISSUES AGAINST WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED IRANIAN TERRITORY, WHICH TARIQ AZIZ HAD EXPLAINED TO ME 25 MAY (MY TEL NO 330). HAMMADI SAID THAT THE RCC'S THREE-POINT OFFER OF 10 JUNE TOOK PRIORITY OVER RESORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT IF IT WERE REJECTED BY IRAN, IRAQ WOULD HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO CONTINUE TO TRY AND USE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ROUTE.

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4. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE WITH HAMMADI A COPY OF THE 9 JUNE STATEMENT OF THE TEN ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON (BONN TEL NO 545). HAMMADI READ THIS THROUGH AND SAID HE LIKED THE GOOD STRONG TEXT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKREP BRUSSELS.

EGERTON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

IRAQ/IRAN

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AFFAIRS

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Iran/Iraq

Previous  
Reference:  
CC(82) 30th  
Conclusions,  
Minute 3

CC(82) 31<sup>st</sup> 3.6.82 Item 2.

2. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY said that Jordan's efforts to convene a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq had failed to attract support. The course of the conflict did not at present pose a direct threat to King Hussein's own position.

The Cabinet -

Took note.



IRAQ JL

10 DOWNING STREET

3 June 1982

From the Private Secretary

IRAN/IRAQ:  
KING HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of your letter of 2 June and has authorised the despatch of the two telegrams to Amman which you enclosed.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

B





CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 June 1982

Prime Minister

Dear John,

Yes

Agree with telegram at Flago

A & B?

A.S.C. 2/6

Iran/Iraq: King Hussein's Message to the Prime Minister

I enclose a draft message which the Prime Minister may wish to send to King Hussein in reply to the message the King sent to her on 19 May along with a copy of a message to President Reagan. Since then the King has summoned Mr Urwick (Amman telno 218) and sought UK support for an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The proposed message from the Prime Minister, along with the covering draft telegram to Amman, covers this latest request by the King. Copies of the relevant telegrams from Amman are enclosed.

Sir Anthony Parsons was informed, over the weekend, of King Hussein's initiative and of the Prime Minister's belief that we owed him a debt in the Security Council. The Council has already met for informal consultations at Jordanian prompting. But the initiative turned out to be ill-considered; the Iraqis themselves do not want a full Security Council meeting yet (and may not for some time) since they wish first to try to line up the necessary support in the non-aligned movement.

We and the Ten are keeping a close eye on developments. We are conscious that there is little that the Ten can usefully to to encourage a diplomatic solution, but we stand ready to help if we can. A proposal to make representations in Baghdad and Tehran is under consideration by the Ten. I enclose a copy of a statement that was issued by the Foreign Ministers on 24 May. This was well received in Iraq; we have no record of Iranian reactions.

Yours ever

*J E Holmes*

(J E Holmes)  
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq  
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

OUT TELEGRAM

		Classification and Caveats <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Precedence/Deskby <b>IMMEDIATE</b>
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ZCZC	1	ZCZC
GRS	2-	GRS
CLASS	3	CONFIDENTIAL
CAVEATS	4	
DESKBY	5	
FM FCO	6	FM FCO JUNE 82
PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON
	10	INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA,
	11	KUWAIT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, PARIS, MOSCOW, STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS,
	12	ALGIERS, MUSCAT, UKREP BRUSSELS, TEL AVIV, MODUK (D14)
	13	INFO ROUTINE BIS TEHRAN
	14	YOUR TELNO <sup>207 b</sup> 218 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ WAR
	15	1. MIFT contains the text of the Prime Minister's
	16	acknowledgement of King Hussein's message. Original will follow
	17	by bag.
	18	2. In handing over the message you should refer to your
	19	audience with the King on 30 May and say that the Prime Minister
	20	wishes to respond sympathetically to the King's request for
	21	<u>support at the United Nations, not least because of the</u>
///	22	<u>magnificent Jordanian response over the adoption of Resolution</u>
//	23	502. You should therefore assure the King that we take seriously
/	24	the threat to the region posed by the conflict between Iran and
	25	Iraq, and that we intend to work for a constructive and

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword honourable
File number	Dept Private Office	Distribution Standard:
Drafted by (Block capitals) J E HOLMES		MED ESID NENAD CONS Dept NAD CONS EM Unit UND Cabinet Office
Telephone number 233 4641		EESD ECD WED
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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1 ZCZC

2 honourable outcome acceptable to both sides.

3 3. You should add that we understand that the Iraqis only  
 4 want to bring the matter to the Council when they have obtained  
 5 the necessary NAM support. We believe that it is likely to be  
 6 necessary to give the Secretary General as much latitude as  
 7 possible since the gulf between the two sides remains wide, and  
 8 Iranian suspicions of the United Nations will need to be allayed  
 9 if a constructive outcome is to be obtained. But we await the  
 10 results of current discussions, particularly in Havana, and  
 11 hope to remain in close touch with the Jordanians.

12 4. Strictly for your own information, like Sir A Parsons, we  
 13 think the Jordanian approach to the Security Council ill-  
 14 considered. It is difficult to understand why King Hussein  
 15 should take an initiative which cuts across what the Iraqis  
 16 themselves seem to want. We owe a debt in the Security Council  
 17 to the King and we should therefore go along with him if at  
 18 all possible (there might conceivably be advantage for us in  
 19 diverting the Council from the Falklands though we have to be  
 20 careful to avoid supporting language inconsistent with our  
 21 current position in the council on the Falklands) But we have no  
 22 real interest in having this question come to the Security  
 23 Council in a way which will antagonise the Iranians and possibly  
 24 even give the Soviet Union opportunities to improve their  
 25 standing in Iran. We see no likelihood that the Council will be  
 26 able to adopt a resolution of the kind suggested by the King.  
 27 The best that it could probably do in present circumstances  
 28 would be to ask the Secretary General (again) to explore the  
 29 possibilities of a solution that was acceptable to both sides.  
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SUBJECT <sup>of MASTER</sup> ops

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6 FM FCO 021000Z JUNE 82  
7 TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

PR. MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T.120A/82

9 AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK DI4  
10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
11 ROUTINE BIS TEHRAN, ALGIERS, ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA,  
12 KUWAIT, CAIRO, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, MOSCOW,  
13 STOCKHOLM, BRUSSELS, UKREP BRUSSELS  
14 MIPT. Following is text.

15 Your Majesty

16 I am most grateful for Your Majesty's message of 18 May  
17 and for your kind words of support which I greatly value.

18 It was good of you to send me a copy of your message to  
19 President Reagan. I have read it with interest and concern.  
20 My earnest hope is that there might be a way to bring the fighting  
21 between Iran and Iraq to an end by diplomatic means before others  
22 become involved in the conflict. As you will have seen from the  
23 statement issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 24 May,  
24 we and our European partners stand ready to help if the  
25 countries concerned feel there is a role we can usefully play.

///  
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NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword  /I have also
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Classification and Caveats

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I have also read with concern Mr Urwick's account of the anxieties you expressed to him on the evening of 30 May. I arranged for our Ambassador at the UN to be told forthwith of your belief that there should be an immediate meeting of the Security Council. I understand that the Security Council has already met for informal consultations, and that there will probably be a full meeting before long, but that, in accordance with Iraqi wishes, this is unlikely to take place until the outcome of discussions at the current Non-Aligned Meeting in Havana is known. We shall continue to follow events at the UN closely and I would like to assure you that the British delegation will keep in close touch with your own so that we may work together for an honourable and constructive outcome which will be acceptable to both sides.

I sincerely reciprocate your good wishes.

ENDS

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NNNN ends telegram

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FM AMMAN 200645Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 19 MAY 1982

INFO YODUK (DI4B) PRIORITY WASHINGTON, ROUTINE ABU DHABI,  
BAHRAIN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT,  
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY TWO IFTS (COPIED TO BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON ONLY) CONTAIN THE TEXTS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN AND OF A LETTER THE KING HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG). THE MESSAGES REFLECT THE KING'S GROWING CONCERN OVER THE GULF WAR AND HIS FEELING THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO SET IN HAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING BETWEEN ARAB STATES IN CASE IRANIAN FORCES CARRY THE WAR ONTO IRAQI SOIL.
2. WHEN SEEING KING HUSSEIN AT HIS HOME THIS AFTERNOON, I HAD ASKED HIM HOW HE VIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR SINCE OUR LAST MEETING ON 9 MAY (MY TELNO 193). THE KING BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAD SAID EARLIER IN THE DAY: THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO HOLD KHORRAMSHAHR WHATEVER THE COST AND IN SPITE OF JORDANIAN ADVICE THAT THE CITY WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND (MY TELNO 205). THE KING SAID HE FEARED THAT, IF THE IRANIANS WON THE BATTLE FOR KHORRAMSHAHR, THEIR TROOPS WOULD ENTER IRAQ AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT STOP THE WAR UNTIL THEY HAD BROUGHT ABOUT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DOWNFALL.
3. I THEN ASKED THE KING WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS. AT THAT POINT HE LEFT THE ROOM FOR A WHILE AND RETURNED BEARING A HAND-WRITTEN LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER (WHICH, ALTHOUGH DATED 18 MAY, I AM CERTAIN HE WROTE ON THE SPOT) AND A COPY OF A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH HE HAD JUST GIVEN TO THE US AMBASSADOR.
4. AFTER ASKING ME TO READ THE MESSAGES, THE KING REFERRED TO CONSULTATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE PAST WEEK. HE HAD SENT HIS PRIME MINISTER TO IRAQ ON 12 MAY AND HAD RECEIVED IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN AMMAN ON 17 MAY (HE MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQIS, IN ADDITION TO GIVING THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER THE LATEST MILITARY PICTURE, HAD EXPRESSED INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE THREAT FROM THE KURDS, PARTICULARLY IN MOSUL). HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN DURING HIS VISIT TO JORDAN FROM 11-14 MAY AND WITH PRINCE TURKI OF SAUDI ARABIA ON 13-14 MAY. HE WAS ALSO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR ON 17 MAY.
5. THE KING, WHO REPEATEDLY EXCUSED HIMSELF FOR TROUBLING THE PRIME MINISTER WITH HIS PROBLEMS AT A TIME WHEN SHE HAD SO MANY PREOCCUPATIONS OF HER OWN, SAID HE NOW FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS IMMEDIATELY TO ENABLE JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES TO GO TO THE HELP OF IRAQ SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY.

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/ HE HAD

HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY DISTURBED TO HEAR FROM SULTAN QABOOS OF THE APPARENTLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN IN DISCUSSION WITH THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT HELP FOR IRAQ, IN WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD URGED THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ARAB AFFAIRS. HENCE HE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

6. THE KING SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE STILL AWAITED A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM SULTAN QABOOS THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY SINCE THEY HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SENT MUCH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ AND HAD ALSO, HE BELIEVED, OFFERED TO SEND EGYPTIAN OFFICERS. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT, IF THE EGYPTIANS WERE TO AGREE TO SEND TROOPS TO ASSIST IRAQ, THEY MUST BE FULLY READMITTED INTO ARAB RANKS. THEIR FORCES WOULD HAVE TO PASS THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA OR JORDAN, OR PERHAPS BOTH SINCE JORDAN WOULD NATURALLY GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE. INDEED IF EGYPT WERE WILLING TO SEND TWO DIVISIONS, THE KING ENVISAGED THAT ONE EGYPTIAN DIVISION MIGHT STAY IN JORDAN RELEASING ONE JORDANIAN DIVISION TO GO TO IRAQ. IRANIAN ENTRY INTO IRAQ WOULD IN ANY CASE BRING INTO FORCE THE ARAB JOINT DEFENCE TREATY AND WOULD, THE KING THOUGHT, MAKE THE POSITION OF SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HELPING IRAN IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY.

7. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE FELT HE COULD AFFORD TO SPARE TROOPS TO HELP IRAQ, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO JORDAN FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. THE KING REPLIED THAT THIS WAS WHY HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO "KEEP ISRAEL OFF OUR BACKS," ESPECIALLY IF JORDANIAN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ WERE TO LEAD TO A DIRECT THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA. HE JUST HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD REALISE WHAT WAS AT STAKE.

8. THE KING SAID HE HAD SPOKEN VERY CLEARLY TO PRINCE TURKI DURING HIS RECENT VISIT OF THE DANGERS AHEAD AND OF THE NEED FOR THE ARABS TO POOL THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO MEET THE THREAT FROM IRAN BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE: ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE MUST BE EXTENDED TO EGYPT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HER TO COME TO THE HELP OF IRAQ, IF AN IRAQI COLLAPSE WAS TO BE AVOIDED. HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM THE SAUDIS.

COMMENT

9. THE KING'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS, EVEN BY THE STANDARDS OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS, EXCEPTIONALLY LONG-WINDED. THE ARGUMENT IS ON FAMILIAR JORDANIAN LINES AND, ACCORDING TO THE US AMBASSADOR WITH WHOM I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES, IS UNLIKELY TO CARRY MUCH CONVICTION WITH THE AMERICANS. AMBASSADOR VIETS TOLD ME HE HAD PUT FORCIBLY TO THE KING THE US VIEW THAT ANY TILT BY THE AMERICANS TOWARDS IRAQ WOULD PUSH IRAN INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

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10. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THE KING IS EXAGGERATING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE SEMICLN THE US EMBASSY IN CAIRO APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT, AT THE VERY MOST, PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL COMMIT ONLY TOKEN FORCES. VIETS TRIED HARD TO PIN DOWN THE KING ON WHETHER HE WOULD SEND REGULAR FORCES TO IRAQ: THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT, IF EGYPT SENT TROOPS, JORDANIAN FORCES WOULD BE AT THEIR SIDE. VIETS SUGGESTED TO THE KING THAT RENEWED EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO TRY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, BUT THE KING HAD ARGUED UNCONVINCINGLY THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME TO BRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO PLAY.

11. THE KING MENTIONED TO VIETS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BAHRAINI CROWN PRINCE SAYING THAT SENTENCE WOULD BE PASSED ON THE COUP PLOTTERS ON 20 MAY AND OF BAHRAINI CONCERN THAT THERE WOULD BE A RENEWED IRANIAN ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT THE REGIME: THE KING HAD PROMISED TO SEND UP TO A BRIGADE TO HELP BAHRAIN IF THIS WERE NECESSARY.

12. WHATEVER ONE MAKES OF ALL THIS, THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE ALARMIST VIEW THE KING NOW TAKES OF THE COURSE OF THE WAR AND HIS FEAR THAT, IF IRAQ COLLAPSES, OTHER REGIMES IN THE GULF WILL ALSO FALL. THE FULL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISKS HE HAS RUN BY IDENTIFYINGL JORDAN SO CLOSELY WITH IRAQ ARE BEGINNING TO SINK IN, AND HE SEEMS TO BE SEARCHING DESPERATELY FOR SOME WAY OF AVERTING THE DOWNFALL OF PRESIDENT SADDAM.

13. THE KING CLEARLY WANTS TO KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED OF HIS THINKING, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS EXPECTING ANY HELP FROM US AT THIS STAGE.

URWICK

STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
IRAQ/IRAN

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CONFIDENTIAL



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CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY NEWYORK 311300Z MAY

FM AMMAN 311000Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 213 OF 31 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE DEKSBY 311300Z NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), ABU DHABI,  
ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, MUSCAT,  
PARIS, STOCKHOLM AND UKREP BRUSSELS

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 893: IRAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME ON THE EVENING OF 30 MAY TO REQUEST OUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAW MY US AND SOVIET COLLEAGUES SEPARATELY, AND HAD INTENDED ALSO TO SEE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BUT HE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE KING SAID HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTING JORDAN'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 206) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENCOURAGE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE TOO LONG. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 29 MAY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM THROUGH HIS HALF-BROTHER (PRESUMABLY BARZAN, WHOSE VISITS HERE ARE NOT PUBLICISED) URGING THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND HE FEARED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO TO ACT WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CLEAR-CUT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND AN END TO BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL REMAINING IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THEIR HANDS. BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE FOR A FEW DAYS MORE, IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT WELL BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BASRA AND IT WOULD BY THEN BE TOO LATE FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE EFFECTIVE.
3. THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY APPROACHED US ON THIS MATTER. I CONFIRMED THIS, SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OVER THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR AND WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 321 TO BAGHDAD). WE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST IF ISLAMIC AND PARTICULARLY ARAB COUNTRIES COULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAID

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# CONFIDENTIAL

HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW, BUT NONETHELESS HOPED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR MOVES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. I SAID I FELT SURE WE WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN THE COUNCIL.

URWICK

BT

## STANDARD

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## ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

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FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241712Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2073 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN

THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK

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M I P T: DECLARATION OF THE TEN ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

1) THE TEN EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH HAS NOW LASTED TWO YEARS AND CLAIMED VERY NUMEROUS VICTIMS, LED TO CONSIDERABLE MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, CREATED GRAVE SUFFERING FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, AND HAS DIVERTED SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES WHICH THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD WISHED TO DEVOTE TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

2) WHILE REAFFIRMING THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND OF NON INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE TEN EXPRESS THE GRAVE CONCERN WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF THE FIGHTING CAUSES THEM. THEY DEPLORE THIS THE MORE BECAUSE THEY HAVE LONG STANDING AND CLOSE LINKS WITH EACH OF THE TWO BELLIGERENTS AS WELL AS WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. THEY RECALL THAT SINCE 23 SEPTEMBER 1980 THEY HAVE TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

3) THE TEN PAY TRIBUTE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS MADE BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

/4.

4) THE TEN, FOR THEIR OWN PART, EARNESTLY DESIRE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, SUCH AS THOSE DEFINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION NO 479 OF THE 28 OF SEPTEMBER 1980. THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A JUST AND LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ASSURING THE SECURITY OF THE TWO STATES IN RESPECT FOR THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THEIR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITY, IS MORE THAN EVER URGENT AND NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TO WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION ASPIRE.

5) THE TEN ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN EVERY EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARDS PEACE, TO THE EXTENT THAT EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES REQUEST THEM TO DO SO, AS WELL AS TO CONSIDER, WHEN HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATING IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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
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Extract/Item details:  <i>Summary of JIC Paper, undated, but assumed to be c. 1 June 1982 (folio 32)</i>	
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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 011733Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 903 DATED 1 JUNE 82

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, JEDDA, TEHRAN  
STOCKHOLM, CAIRO, AMMAN

MY TELNO 896: IRAN/IRAQ

1. I HAVE NOW SEEN BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 334. IF AND WHEN IRAN/IRAQ COMES FORMALLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IF THE IRAQIS ADVANCE THE POLICY ON WITHDRAWAL SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF BAGHDAD TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I CANNOT SEE HOW WE CAN SUPPORT IT WITHOUT EXPOSING OURSELVES TO CHARGES OF HYPOCRISY AND DOUBLE STANDARDS. ADMITTEDLY, WE HAVE A CLEAR AND MANDATORY DEMAND FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS, AND THE ONLY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION SO FAR ADOPTED ON IRAN/IRAQ (SCR 479) IS FUZZY AND NON-MANDATORY. BUT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE IRAQIS ARE OCCUPYING WHAT IS UNQUESTIONABLY IRANIAN TERRITORY. WE HAVE RIGHTLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM OUR TERRITORY AS PART OF A PACKAGE INVOLVING GENERAL PRINCIPLES, AND WE WOULD BE VERY EXPOSED IF WE TOOK A DIFFERENT ATTITUDE REGARDING IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. FOLLOWING IRAQI WITHDRAWAL, IF IT TOOK PLACE WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS, THIS PROBLEM WOULD OF COURSE CEASE TO EXIST FOR US, AND WE WOULD BE FREE TO SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT BY SAMARRAI.

2. THE SAME PROBLEM APPLIES TO A SLIGHTLY LESSER EXTENT TO KING HUSSEIN'S FORMULATION IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 218. THE PROBLEM WOULD OF COURSE BE TRANSFORMED IF THE IRANIANS OCCUPIED IRAQI TERRITORY. THEN WE WOULD BE ON SAFE GROUND TO SUPPORT CALLS FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL.

13

# CONFIDENTIAL

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3. I REALISE THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT DOING ANYTHING TO MAKE LIFE MORE DIFFICULT FOR KING HUSSEIN, AND I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE INVALUABLE SUPPORT HE GAVE US OVER SCR 502. BUT I HAVE TO SAY THAT THE INITIATIVE HE LAUNCHED WHICH LED TO THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY (31 MAY) WAS A LEAD BALLOON. A NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE FURIOUS AT BEING DRAGGED BACK ON A PUBLIC HOLIDAY WHEN THEY KNEW THAT NEITHER IRAQ NOR IRAN NOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, NOR, SO FAR AS THEY COULD SEE, ANYONE EXCEPT JORDAN WANTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONVENE IMMEDIATELY. THEY WERE THEN TREATED TO A RAMBLING DISSERTATION BY HAZEM NUSEIBEH, THE CONTENT OF WHICH WAS WORTHY OF MR PECKSNIFF, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER STYLISTICALLY.

PARSONS

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

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*Iraq  
LHM*

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

1 June 1982

IRAN/IRAQ

As I told you over the weekend, the Prime Minister commented, with reference to your telegram No. 218 of 31 May, that we must do all we can to help, particularly as King Hussein was especially helpful to us in connection with UN Security Council Resolution 502.

**A. J. COLES**

John Holmes Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*sg*

IRAN/IRAQ

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DESKBY NEWYORK 311300Z MAY

FM AMMAN 311300Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 219 OF 31 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY 311300Z NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD: PRIORITY 0800 (014), ABU DHABI, ALGIERS, BAHRAIN, CAIRO, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, MUSCAT, PARIS, STOCKHOLM AND UKREP BRUSSELS

UKHIS NEW YORK TELNO 8931 IRAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME ON THE EVENING OF 30 MAY TO REQUEST OUR SUPPORT IN BRINGING THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAW MY US AND SOVIET COLLEAGUES SEPARATELY, AND HAD INTENDED ALSO TO SEE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BUT HE WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE KING SAID HE WOULD BE INSTRUCTING JORDAN'S REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUND TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE CLAIMED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (MY TELNO 206) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING

*N.B. We can do help. King Hussein was especially helpful to us over this crisis. Mr. Cohen informed. must do all. Resolution 502*

*ms*

2. THE KING EXPLAINED THE BACKGROUNDS TO HIS REQUEST IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS. HE STATED THAT THE US RESPONSE TO HIS ORIGINAL REQUEST (NY TELNO 226) HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DOING ALL THAT THEY COULD TO ENCOURAGE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES SUCH AS ALGERIA, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT TAKE TOO LONG. HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE ON 29 MAY FROM PRESIDENT SADDAM THROUGH HIS HALF-BROTHER (PRESUMABLY BARZANI, WHOSE VISITS HERE ARE NOT PUBLICISED) URGING THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY AND HE FEARED THAT THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ACT WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A CLEAR-CUT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND AN END TO BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES, IN RETURN FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL REMAINING IRANIAN TERRITORY IN THEIR HANDS. BUT IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE FOR A FEW DAYS MORE, IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT WELL BE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF BASRA AND IT WOULD BY THEN BE TOO LATE FOR A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE EFFECTIVE.

3. THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ALREADY APPROACHED US ON THIS MATTER. I CONFIRMED THIS, SAID THAT WE SHARED THE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION OVER THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR AND WOULD WISH TO CONTINUE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 321 TO BAGHDAD). WE FELT IT WOULD BE BEST IF ISLAMIC AND PARTICULARLY ARAB COUNTRIES COULD TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING THE MATTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR VIEW, BUT NONETHELESS HOPED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR MOVES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. I SAID I FELT SURE WE WOULD WORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUTCOME IN THE COUNCIL.

URVICK

BT

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GR 280

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 320 OF 25 MAY 82

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT,  
JEDDA, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, WASHINGTON, UKMIS  
NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO

INFO ROUTINE MUSCAT, CAIRO

INFO SAVING BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, STOCKHOLM, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD,  
MOSCOW.

MY TELNO 317 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ

1. THERE WERE SCENES OF JUBILATION IN TEHRAN WHEN THE  
LIBERATION OF KHORRAMSHAHR WAS ANNOUNCED ON THE AFTERNOON  
OF 24 MAY. THOUSANDS OF PRISONERS HAVE BEEN SHOWN ON TELEVISION  
AS WELL AS SCENES OF THE IRANIAN ENTRY INTO KHORRAMSHAHR.  
FOREIGN REPORTERS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO VISIT KHORRAMSHAHR  
AND SEE EQUIPMENT CAPTURED FROM THE IRAQIS, ETC.

2. THE MORALE OF THE REGIME WILL HAVE BEEN RAISED SKY-HIGH  
BY THE REGAINING OF KHORRAMSHAHR, WHICH EVIDENTLY CAME  
ABOUT THROUGH A COMBINATION OF SURRENDER AND RETREAT OF IRAQI  
UNITS AFTER SOME INITIAL FIGHTING. KHOMEINI HAS SAID THAT  
IRAN NOW SPEAKS TO NEIGHBOURING STATES FROM A POSITION OF  
STRENGTH. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SAID THAT IRAN INTENDS  
TO PURSUE HER DEMANDS FOR REPARATIONS AND CONDEMNATION OF  
THE AGGRESSOR NOW THAT SHE HAS FORCED IRAQ TO WITHDRAW FROM  
ALMOST ALL HER TERRITORY. HE WARNED THE GULF STATES NOT TO  
THROW IN THEIR LOT WITH SADDAM THE AGGRESSOR BUT TO CHOOSE  
A PATH OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH IRAN. THE REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE UAE AND QATAR CALLED AT THE MFA ON 24 MAY, NO DOUBT  
TO BE TOLD THE SAME. RAFSANJANI, WHO AFFECTS A MORE HAWKISH  
ATTITUDE THAN MOST OF THE IRANIAN LEADERS, HAS PROMISED ACTION  
SOON TO LIBERATE THE REST OF IRAN'S TERRITORY AND SAID HE  
THINKS IRAN WILL HAVE TO EXERT PRESSURE (UNSPECIFIED) ON IRAQ  
IF SHE IS TO GET HER TO PAY REPARATIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RUNDLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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From the Private Secretary

24 May 1982

IRAN/ IRAQ WAR

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 21 May. With regard to your paragraph 9, she commented that she would expect the Soviet Union to opt for Iran rather than Iraq, working through Syrian influence which Mrs. Thatcher understands is becoming greater in Iran.

The Prime Minister has also said that she would like to see a fresh JIC assessment of the Iraq/Iran situation. I should be grateful if David Wright (to whom I am copying this letter together with a copy of your own) could kindly set this in hand.

B/E  
received  
27/5/82

At a later stage the Prime Minister may wish to hold a meeting to discuss the Iraq/Iran situation.

A. J. COLES

S. M. J. Lamport, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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IRAN/IRAQ

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~~PS/LPS~~

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

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MR J C MOBERLY

*MR MIERS*

MR ADAMS

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/UND

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2073 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEHRAN PRIORITY BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN

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WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING STRASBOURG

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NNNN



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 May 1982

A J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street  
London SW1

Prime Minister

*Yes - and we might discuss it. Would you like to see a formal SIC assessment of the Iraq/Iran situation?*

Dear

*John*

*A.S.C. 2/5*

IRAN/IRAQ WAR

The Prime Minister recently mentioned to Mr Hurd her concern about the course the Iran/Iraq war is taking and the implications for stability in the area.

2. The Iranians have now expelled Iraqi troops from virtually all of their southern province of Khuzestan and are preparing to assault Khorramshahr, which has symbolic importance because of the long and bloody Iranian defence of it in the early part of the war. The Iraqis have a corresponding interest in preventing its capture and have fortified it with a strong garrison.

3. Both sides have been talking of peace - the Iraqis because of the increasingly debilitating effort of the war, and the Iranians on terms which the Iraqis could not possibly accept. The Iranians are believed to be bent on overthrow of Saddam Hussein (as well as obtaining reparations). Even if they do not capture Khorramshahr soon, which would be a further serious blow to Saddam Hussein's chances of survival, the Iranians may be tempted to turn the screw on him by invading Iraq. They are only a few miles from Basra. The Iranians might try to stimulate an invitation to intervene from the Shi'ite majority in Iraq, which is concentrated in the south.

4. The moderate Arabs are gravely perturbed by the prospect of Saddam Hussein being overthrown. The Jordanians, Egyptians, Omanis and (we believe) the Saudis are particularly concerned. The smaller Gulf States are also worried: but because of their need to find some accommodation with their powerful neighbour, they will be reluctant to join in any action too obviously directed against Iran.





5. The Gulf Arabs have helped Iraq with money and the Egyptians have supplied ammunition and weapons. But there is little more they can do in practice - Iraq's problem is not lack of money and materials but lack of morale and motivation and bad military staff work.

6. There is little that the West can do to stop the war at present. The Americans have expressed their anxiety. But they have no clear idea of what ought to be done. We ourselves have no leverage over the Iranians. We could urge the Arabs to press the Iraqis to sue for peace more directly than they are at present in order to avert defeat. But any such suggestion by us could be deeply resented by our Arab friends. We cannot risk the potential damage to our interests. We think it best therefore to wait until there is more equilibrium in the situation - either as a result of the Iranians occupying Iraqi territory in the south to counter-balance Iranian territory still held by Iraq in the north, or else as a result of a bloody and debilitating stand-off for both sides in the battle for Khorramshahr. At that moment, it might be useful, or at least realistic for the Ten or the West as a whole to call for a cessation of hostilities. We are discussing the draft of a possible declaration in the Political Cooperation machinery of the Ten for use at an opportune moment.

7. Nor do we think that the situation would be helped by the West, or the United States, adopting a more explicit posture on the region's security. This could encourage a tendency towards polarisation and confrontation between Iran and the moderate Arabs across the Gulf. This would be highly undesirable. It may come but we should do nothing to encourage it. In particular, if the Americans assumed explicit responsibilities for security on the Arab side, this could have the effect of tempting the Soviet Union to offer similar help to the Iranians.

8. This danger of polarisation between moderate Arabs and a militant Iran supported by extremist Arabs such as Syria and Libya, and by the Soviet Union, suggests that the West should not react too precipitately in the present situation. Although the Syrians are at present cooperating with Iran to bring about the downfall of Saddam Hussein, their motives are primarily anti-Saddam Hussein, not pro-Iran. Moreover, they have not yet taken any military action themselves against Iraq and they would probably not welcome a Shi'a Islamic republic on the Khomeini model in Iraq (they would hope for a pro-Syria Ba'ath regime). Also it is to be doubted whether the Syrians would consider it in their interests to be more fully implicated with Iran in confronting the moderate Arabs after the defeat of Iraq, since this could be damagingly presented as joining Iran in an anti-Arab front. We should therefore do nothing to push Syria in a direction in which it would probably otherwise not wish to go.



*I would expect it to go for Iran (i.e. to through Syrian influence which is becoming greater in Iran.)*

3 9. Moreover, the Soviet Union seems at present to be in even more of a dilemma than the West. It would wish to avoid making the choice if at all possible between Iraq and Iran. Relations between Iran and the Soviet Union are not good. The Soviet Union's economic involvement in Iran remains significant. About 1500 technicians are working in steel, power and transport projects. But the regime in Tehran is stronger than a year ago and its policy and philosophy remains hostile to the Soviet Union and to the West. There are few signs that the Soviet Union has been able successfully to woo the Iranians or that the pro-Moscow Tudeh (communist) Party has so far gained any strength or influence. An Iranian victory over Iraq would be unlikely to give the Soviet Union any additional opportunities for mischief-making or extending its influence in Iran.

*Field*


10. Mediation efforts by the United Nations (Mr Olaf Palme), the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference are in abeyance. We know that the latter have proposed mutual withdrawal followed by a ceasefire (rather than the more usual course of a ceasefire first) and that Iran would then be allowed to reoccupy her own territory up to the international border. The question of reparations etc would be dealt with under negotiating machinery to be established by the Islamic Conference. With Iran determined to overthrow Saddam Hussein and believing she has the means to do so, this proposal, however elegant, is unlikely to prove acceptable.

11. King Hussein's letter to President Reagan, of which he has sent a copy to the Prime Minister (Baghdad telegrams Nos 206-8) addresses many of the questions considered above. It would be wise to discuss this with the Americans before replying. FCO officials will be discussing the Middle East with their American counterparts on Monday, and King Hussein's letter will of course be included in the talks. We shall accordingly submit a draft reply for the PM to send to King Hussein as early as possible next week.

*Yours ever*  
*S M J Lamport*  
S M J Lamport  
Private Secretary to Mr Hurd

20 MAY 1982

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FM AMMAN 200645Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

10. DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).

TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 19 MAY 1982

INFO MODUK (DI4B) PRIORITY WASHINGTON. ROUTINE ABU DHABI, BAHRAIN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK

IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY TWO IFTS (COPIED TO BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON ONLY) CONTAIN THE TEXTS OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN AND OF A LETTER THE KING HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (ORIGINALS FOLLOW BY BAG). THE MESSAGES REFLECT THE KING'S GROWING CONCERN OVER THE GULF WAR AND HIS FEELING THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO SET IN HAND CONTINGENCY PLANNING BETWEEN ARAB STATES IN CASE IRANIAN FORCES CARRY THE WAR ONTO IRAQI SOIL.
2. WHEN SEEING KING HUSSEIN AT HIS HOME THIS AFTERNOON, I HAD ASKED HIM HOW HE VIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR SINCE OUR LAST MEETING ON 9 MAY (MY TELNO 193). THE KING BEGAN BY REPEATING WHAT THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF HAD SAID EARLIER IN THE DAY: THAT THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO HOLD KHORRAMSHAHR WHATEVER THE COST AND IN SPITE OF JORDANIAN ADVICE THAT THE CITY WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND (MY TELNO 205). THE KING SAID HE FEARED THAT, IF THE IRANIANS WON THE BATTLE FOR KHORRAMSHAHR, THEIR TROOPS WOULD ENTER IRAQ AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT STOP THE WAR UNTIL THEY HAD BROUGHT ABOUT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DOWNFALL.
3. I THEN ASKED THE KING WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS. AT THAT POINT HE LEFT THE ROOM FOR A WHILE AND RETURNED BEARING A HAND-WRITTEN LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER (WHICH, ALTHOUGH DATED 18 MAY, I AM CERTAIN HE WROTE ON THE SPOT) AND A COPY OF A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN WHICH HE HAD JUST GIVEN TO THE US AMBASSADOR.
4. AFTER ASKING ME TO READ THE MESSAGES, THE KING REFERRED TO CONSULTATIONS HE HAD HAD WITH OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE PAST WEEK. HE HAD SENT HIS PRIME MINISTER TO IRAQ ON 12 MAY AND HAD RECEIVED IRAQI FIRST DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN AMMAN ON 17 MAY (HE MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQIS, IN ADDITION TO GIVING THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER THE LATEST MILITARY PICTURE, HAD EXPRESSED INCREASING CONCERN OVER THE THREAT FROM THE KURDS, PARTICULARLY IN MOSUL). HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN DURING HIS VISIT TO JORDAN FROM 11-14 MAY AND WITH PRINCE TURKI OF SAUDI ARABIA ON 13-14 MAY. HE WAS ALSO KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE EGYPTIANS AND HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF WAR ON 17 MAY.
5. THE KING, WHO REPEATEDLY EXCUSED HIMSELF FOR TROUBLING THE PRIME MINISTER WITH HIS PROBLEMS AT A TIME WHEN SHE HAD SO MANY PREOCCUPATIONS OF HER OWN, SAID HE NOW FELT IT ESSENTIAL TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS IMMEDIATELY TO ENABLE JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES TO GO TO THE HELP OF IRAQ SHOULD THIS PROVE NECESSARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ HE HAD

HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY DISTURBED TO HEAR FROM SULTAN QABOOS OF THE APPARENTLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE THE AMERICANS HAD TAKEN IN DISCUSSION WITH THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT HELP FOR IRAQ, IN WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD URGED THE EGYPTIANS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ARAB AFFAIRS. HENCE HE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO SEND A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN.

6. THE KING SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE STILL AWAITED A REPLY FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM SULTAN QABOOS THAT THE EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY SINCE THEY HAD OF COURSE ALREADY SENT MUCH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ AND HAD ALSO, HE BELIEVED, OFFERED TO SEND EGYPTIAN OFFICERS. IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT, IF THE EGYPTIANS WERE TO AGREE TO SEND TROOPS TO ASSIST IRAQ, THEY MUST BE FULLY READMITTED INTO ARAB RANKS. THEIR FORCES WOULD HAVE TO PASS THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA OR JORDAN, OR PERHAPS BOTH SINCE JORDAN WOULD NATURALLY GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE. INDEED IF EGYPT WERE WILLING TO SEND TWO DIVISIONS, THE KING ENVISAGED THAT ONE EGYPTIAN DIVISION MIGHT STAY IN JORDAN RELEASING ONE JORDANIAN DIVISION TO GO TO IRAQ. IRANIAN ENTRY INTO IRAQ WOULD IN ANY CASE BRING INTO FORCE THE ARAB JOINT DEFENCE TREATY AND WOULD, THE KING THOUGHT, MAKE THE POSITION OF SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HELPING IRAN IMPOSSIBLE TO JUSTIFY.

7. I ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE FELT HE COULD AFFORD TO SPARE TROOPS TO HELP IRAQ, GIVEN THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO JORDAN FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND SYRIA. THE KING REPLIED THAT THIS WAS WHY HE HAD ASKED PRESIDENT REAGAN TO "KEEP ISRAEL OFF OUR BACKS," ESPECIALLY IF JORDANIAN INTERVENTION IN IRAQ WERE TO LEAD TO A DIRECT THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA. HE JUST HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD REALISE WHAT WAS AT STAKE.

8. THE KING SAID HE HAD SPOKEN VERY CLEARLY TO PRINCE TURKI DURING HIS RECENT VISIT OF THE DANGERS AHEAD AND OF THE NEED FOR THE ARABS TO POOL THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO MEET THE THREAT FROM IRAN BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE: ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE MUST BE EXTENDED TO EGYPT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR HER TO COME TO THE HELP OF IRAQ, IF AN IRAQI COLLAPSE WAS TO BE AVOIDED. HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM THE SAUDIS.

COMMENT

9. THE KING'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS, EVEN BY THE STANDARDS OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS, EXCEPTIONALLY LONG-WINDED. THE ARGUMENT IS ON FAMILIAR JORDANIAN LINES AND, ACCORDING TO THE US AMBASSADOR WITH WHOM I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES, IS UNLIKELY TO CARRY MUCH CONVICTION WITH THE AMERICANS. AMBASSADOR VIETS TOLD ME HE HAD PUT FORCIBLY TO THE KING THE US VIEW THAT ANY TILT BY THE AMERICANS TOWARDS IRAQ WOULD PUSH IRAN INTO THE ARMS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

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10. ACCORDING TO VIETS, THE KING IS EXAGGERATING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO INTERVENE SEMICLN THE US EMBASSY IN CAIRO APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT, AT THE VERY MOST, PRESIDENT MUBARAK WILL COMMIT ONLY TOKEN FORCES. VIETS TRIED HARD TO PIN DOWN THE KING ON WHETHER HE WOULD SEND REGULAR FORCES TO IRAQ: THE KING HAD REPLIED THAT, IF EGYPT SENT TROOPS, JORDANIAN FORCES WOULD BE AT THEIR SIDE. VIETS SUGGESTED TO THE KING THAT RENEWED EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO TRY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS, BUT THE KING HAD ARGUED UNCONVINCINGLY THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT TIME TO BRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL INTO PLAY.

11. THE KING MENTIONED TO VIETS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE BAHRAINI CROWN PRINCE SAYING THAT SENTENCE WOULD BE PASSED ON THE COUP PLOTTERS ON 20 MAY AND OF BAHRAINI CONCERN THAT THERE WOULD BE A RENEWED IRANIAN ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT THE REGIME: THE KING HAD PROMISED TO SEND UP TO A BRIGADE TO HELP BAHRAIN IF THIS WERE NECESSARY.

12. WHATEVER ONE MAKES OF ALL THIS, THERE WAS NO MISTAKING THE ALARMIST VIEW THE KING NOW TAKES OF THE COURSE OF THE WAR AND HIS FEAR THAT, IF IRAQ COLLAPSES, OTHER REGIMES IN THE GULF WILL ALSO FALL. THE FULL CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISKS HE HAS RUN BY IDENTIFYINGL JORDAN SO CLOSELY WITH IRAQ ARE BEGINNING TO SINK IN, AND HE SEEMS TO BE SEARCHING DESPERATELY FOR SOME WAY OF AVERTING THE DOWNFALL OF PRESIDENT SADDAM.

13. THE KING CLEARLY WANTS TO KEEP US CLOSELY INFORMED OF HIS THINKING, BUT HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS EXPECTING ANY HELP FROM US AT THIS STAGE.

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IRAQ/IRAN

[NOT ADVANCED]

SUBJECT <sup>SE</sup> MASTER  
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10. DOWNING STREET. (2COPIES).

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FM AMMAN 200700Z MAY 82  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 19 MAY  
INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON

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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T.108c/82

MY TELNO 206: IRAQ/IRAN  
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF  
MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN DATED 18 MAY

BEGINS:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I EXTEND TO YOU MY SINCEREST GOOD WISHES AND SHARE WITH YOU YOUR CONCERNS RELATING TO THE FALKLAND CRISIS. PLEASE REST ASSURED OF OUR TOTAL SUPPORT OF YOUR POSITION.  
I WOULD NOT WISH TO ADD TO YOUR PRESENT PREOCCUPATIONS BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND CONFIDENCE I FEEL I MUST APPRAISE YOU OF DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR AREA.  
ENCLOSED IS THE COPY OF A MESSAGE I HAVE SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN OUR AREA.  
KINDLY ACCEPT WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM MY BEST WISHES FOR EVERY FUTURE SUCCESS.

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND  
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 208 OF 19 MAY

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD AND WASHINGTON

MY TELS NOS 206 AND 207: IRAQ/IRAN

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM KING HUSSEIN DATED 18 MAY

BEGINS

BOTH NOOR AND I EXTEND TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT AND TO MRS. REAGAN, OUR WARMEST GREETINGS AND BEST PERSONAL WISHES.

THIS IS, INDEED, AN AWESOME AND EXTREMELY VOLATILE PHASE IN THE HISTORY OF OUR AREA. THE THREATS OF FRAGMENTATION AND DEVASTATING SECTARIAN STRUGGLES AMONGST MOSLEMS AND ARABS IN PARTICULAR, ARE EXTREMELY REAL AS IS THE THREAT TO THE ARAB IDENTITY, FREEDOM, AND FUTURE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE VITAL INTERESTS OF SO MANY NATIONS IN THE WORLD ARE IN JEOPARDY INCLUDING JAPAN, EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND MANY OTHERS BOTH IN THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING WORLD. IN FACT, MR. PRESIDENT, AN ALWAYS DREADED STATE OF MILITARY CONFLICT MAY SHORTLY EMBROIL JORDAN. I WISH I COULD REPORT TO YOU OTHERWISE, BUT DEEM IT MY DUTY TO APPRAISE YOU OF THE FACTS.

THE FOCAL POINT OF DANGER IS THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR WHICH HAS RAGED FOR THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS. THE TRAGEDY IS THAT IT HAS CONTINUED WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS AND DETERMINED EFFORT TO STOP IT IN TIME. IRAQ HAS NEVER HAD ANY TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES IN IRAN. IRAQ WAS INTERNALLY SUBVERTED AND MILITARILY PROVOKED INTO WAR FOR HER LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE. IRAQ'S PROBLEMS BEGAN WHEN IT ASSUMED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE WHILE AWAITING NEGOTIATIONS TO REMOVE ONCE AND FOR ALL THE CAUSES FOR THE WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BY CONCLUSIVE DEFINITION OF THEIR BORDERS ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR HISTORICAL LEGITIMATE RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE IDEAL MOMENT TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND ALL HER ARAB NEIGHBORS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AND TO BASE RELATIONS FOR ALL TIMES TO COME ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOVEREIGN STATES. NONE OF THIS HAPPENED AND SUPPORT OF IRAN ENABLED HER TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN A SERIES OF BATTLES - ABADAN, BOSTAN, DEZFUL, AND NOW IRAQ IS DETERMINED TO FIGHT REGARDLESS OF COST, THE SEEMINGLY UNTENABLE BATTLE TO RETAIN KHORRAMSHAHR, THE ONLY REMAINING ASSET IT HOLDS IN IRAN, TO SECURE AN HONORABLE PEACE AND THE OBJECTIVES I OUTLINED BEFORE THE BATTLE BEGINS ON IRAQ SOIL.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ THE PROBLEM



THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FACT THAT IRAN HAS BEEN SOUGHT OUT WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY BY BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS THE PRIME PRIZE TO BE WON. IT IS A KNOWN FACT, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT IRAN HAS BEEN RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT OF OIL RESERVES. I KNOW OF THE PREVIOUS REGIME'S CONCERTED EFFORTS TO SECURE ECONOMIC PROGRESS BEFORE THAT EVENTUALITY MATERIALIZED AND THE FORMER REGIME'S EFFORTS IN SEARCHING FOR AND ATTEMPTING TO HARNESS ALTERNATE SOURCES OF ENERGY, INCLUDING THE NUCLEAR ONE, FOR PRECISELY THAT REASON. IRAN'S INTEREST IN OIL BELONGING TO HER NEIGHBORING STATES IS NOW OBVIOUS. IRAN'S METHOD OF SECURING IT IS BY WAR, THE THREAT OF WAR, AND BY INCITING SECTARIAN CONFLICT WITHIN THE AREA. I WARNED OF THIS ALL ALONG. IT IS THE REALITY OF THESE THREATS THAT CAUSED JORDAN AMONGST OTHER PAN-ARAB AND NATIONAL COMMITMENTS TO SUPPORT IRAQ. IRAQ TO US HAS BEEN THE ARAB BULWARK AGAINST THESE THREATS AND THE FIRST SOLID LINE OF DEFENCE EASTWARDS FOR THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD. IRONICALLY ENOUGH, THIS APPLIED EQUALLY TO OUR MANY MUTUAL INTERESTS.

MAY I SHARE WITH YOU, MR PRESIDENT, MY PERSPECTIVE OF THE OVERALL SOVIET POSITION IN THE AREA? THE SOVIET ASSETS IN IRAN HAVE GROWN RATHER THAN DIMINISHED. THE SOVIETS ARE IN AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR THIRD LONGEST BORDER WITH IRAN. THE SOVIETS ARE THE MOST LOGICAL INHERITORS OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN IRAN WHICH IS AN ANACHRONISM AND AN INSULT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, DIGNITY, AND THE TRUE TEACHINGS OF ISLAM. IRAN IS RIDING ON A TIDAL WAVE OF IGNORANCE, BITTERNESS, HATRED AND GREED WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONTAINED BY OUR COMBINED EFFORTS, IF NOT TOTALLY ISOLATED. IRAQ CHECKED IT AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO TO THE BEST OF ITS ABILITY SEMICLN BUT WITH FRESH AND CONTINUOUS SUPPORT THE IRANIAN TIDE MAY CAUSE UNTOLD DAMAGE BEFORE IT INEVITABLY EBBS. EVEN IF THE REMOTEST POSSIBILITY EXISTED IN TURNING THE TIDE IN ARAN TOWARDS FREEDOM, LIFE, AND PROGRESS, THIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CAUSE OR REASON TO NEGLECT SHORING UP IRAQ AND THE REST OF THE AREA IN THE FACE OF OBVIOUS SOVIET DESIGNS. THE SOVIETS, IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY, ARE IN SYRIA, SOUTH YEMEN, ETHIOPIA, AND LIBYA. ALIGNED WITH THE ARAB STATES IN THIS GROUP SADLY IS ALGERIA. WITHIN THIS GROUP ARE ALL THE RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE ENTIRE AREA. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN AND ARE FOSTERING THE CREATION OF AN AUTONOMOUS KURDISH STATE WITH DIRECT LAND CONTACT WITH SOVIET TERRITORY. THE HURMUZ STRAITS ARE IN GRAVE JEOPARDY. SOVIET SURROGATE STATES STRADDLE BAB EL MANDAB. THE ENTIRE AREA IS VITAL TO THE SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. IT IS THEIR WAY TO AFRICA AND OFFERS GREATER FRONTAGE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT IS ONE OF THE MOST VITAL COMMUNICATIONS CROSSROADS IN OUR WORLD. IT IS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF ENERGY, THE CONTROL OF WHICH IS VITAL IN SHAPING THE WORLD'S DESTINY. INSTABILITY IN THIS AREA IS INSTABILITY IN THE WORLD, BOTH AT THE LEVEL OF THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF SUCH INSTABILITY WOULD ONLY BE COMMUNISM AND THE SOVIET UNION. I KNOW WHAT A DEVASTATING SHOCK IT WAS TO THE

SOVIETS TO HAVE LOST EGYPT. I KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY Poured INTO SO MANY STATES IN OUR AREA AND IN SUCH ABUNDANCE THE MOST SOPHISTICATED OF THEIR WEAPONRY IF THEY WERE NOT SURE THAT IT WOULD BE IN SAFE AND LOYAL HANDS. THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER RISK A REPEAT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH EGYPT IN ANY OTHER STATE. NOR ARE THESE WEAPONS TO BE USED FOR ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION SINCE AN ARAB-ISRAELI UNRESOLVED CONFLICT IS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SOVIET STRATEGY. THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER ONCE HINTED AT ANY POSSIBLE CHANGE OF THEIR UNEQUIVOCAL AND TOTAL COMMITMENT TO THE SURVIVAL AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL FOR ALL TIMES. THE SOVIETS HAVE CLAIMED ALL ALONG THEIR COMMITMENT TO A SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND 338 IN ADDITION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE STIPULATED IN THE U.N. PARTITION PLAN OF 1947 BASED ON WHICH ISRAEL WAS CREATED. THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO INCORPORATED INTO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, IN ADDITION TO THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND 338, REFERENCES TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

SOVIET ARMS ARE THUS IN THE HANDS OF SURROGATES WHO WOULD USE THEM IN OUR AREA PRIMARILY TO FURTHER SOVIET AIMS. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO VISUALIZE SOVIET OR AMERICAN TROOPS APPEARING IN THE AREA, IN WHAT MAY WELL CREATE THE FLASHPOINT OF A DEVASTATING WORLD WAR. IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WITH LONG-RANGE DYNAMIC PLANNING AND THROUGH THEIR AVAILABLE ASSETS WITHIN THE AREA, ARE CONTINUALLY GAINING GROUND IN A MOST OMINOUS WAY.

LET US LOOK AGAIN AT IRAN AND WE WILL FIND IN SUPPORT OF MY THEORY OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET INDIRECT COOPERATION THERE, THE FACT THAT SYRIA, LIBYA, AND THEIR COLLABORATORS IN THE AREA, ARE SUPPORTING IRAN, WITHOUT LIMITATIONS, WITH SOVIET WEAPONRY AND EXPERTISE. NORTH KOREAN AND OTHER EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES, IF NOT THE SOVIETS DIRECTLY, ARE ALSO ON THE IRANIAN SIDE. OTHER FREE WORLD SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO IRAN TOGETHER WITH ISRAEL WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPLYING AMMUNITION, VITAL SPARE PARTS, AND EQUIPMENT ON THE ONE HAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL IS OBVIOUSLY USING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE UNITED STATES TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF ITS SUPPORT TO IRAN AND OBVIOUSLY TO CONVINCING WASHINGTON THAT IRAQ SHOULD NOT BE HELPED AND THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE MILITARILY EQUIPPED. ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE IN REJECTING ALL THE BASIC PRINCIPLES, THE ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WOULD FACILITATE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST, DURABLE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, IS CONTINUOUSLY CAMOUFLAGED AND THUS MAINLY ACCEPTED, DEFENDED OR TOLERATED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS ARE MOST ISRAELI ACTIONS. HOW STRANGE, SIR, IT WAS TO BE ASKED OF JORDAN WOULD SUPPORT THE BRITISH RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN WE HAVE BEEN CALLING FOR THE UPHOLDING OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES INVOLVED FOR SO MANY YEARS, NAMELY THE INADMISSABILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY FORCE AND THE

SACRED RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. WOULD THE FALKLAND CRISIS HAVE ARISEN HAD THOSE PRINCIPLES BEEN APPLIED IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT SINCE NOVEMBER OF 1967? WE ARE NOW APPRAISED OF THE IMMINENT DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT TO REENACT THE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL. WAS I, SIR, NOT CORRECT ALL ALONG WHEN I WARNED OF POLARIZATION IN THE AREA AS AN ISRAELI PRIME OBJECTIVE? IS IT THEN SURPRISING THAT ISRAEL SHOULD SUPPORT IRAN IN HER WAR AGAINST THE ARAB NATION ALONGSIDE SUCH SEEMINGLY STRANGE COMPANY, OR FOR US TO CONCLUDE THAT AT LEAST UNWITTINGLY, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS HELPING THE SOVIETS, AGAINST YOUR BEST INTERESTS IN THE IRANIAN SITUATION?

MR. PRESIDENT, BEFORE LONG I FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IRANIAN MILITARY PENETRATION INTO IRAQ. IRAN'S AND SYRIA'S ANNOUNCED OBJECTIVE IS TO TOPPLE THE REGIME IN BAHGDAD. IT IS IS OBVIOUS THAT WHAT IS SOUGHT TO REPLACE IT IS A REGIME THAT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE IRANIAN SYRIAN ALLIANCE. IRAN AND HER ALLIES WOULD THUS SOON THREATEN THE ENTIRE NON-RADICAL ARAB AREA EAST OF SUEZ.

I ADDRESS YOU NOW, SIR, TO APPRAISE YOU OF THE ONLY TWO CHOICES OPEN TO US. THEY ARE: A) TO DESPATCH FORCES TO IRAQ TO ASSIST, IF POSSIBLE, TO AVERT POSSIBLE DISASTER. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED THE MOMENT IT APPEARS THAT IRANIAN FORCES ARE THREATENING TO MOVE INTO IRAQ. WE WOULD BE RISKING AT SUCH A POINT JORDAN'S EXPOSURE TO A DIRECT SYRIAN MILITARY THREAT WITH REDUCED JORDANIAN CAPABILITIES SEMICLN OR B) TO BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AGAINST SYRIA IF IT MOVES MILITARILY AGAINST IRAQ. THE FACT IS THAT IF IRAQ FALLS, THEN THE ENTIRE AREA IS MORE THAN LIKELY LOST. OUR OPTIONS ARE THUS OBVIOUS AND LIMITED. THE GULF AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE MILITARILY A VACUUM. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR JORDAN, NOR EGYPT, MAY HAVE THE TIME TO REACT ADEQUATELY TO REVERSE THE COURSE OF A SUDDEN DISASTER THAT COULD OVERTAKE ANY STATE IN THE AREA. THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF IRAN AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THESE STATES WOULD PRECLUDE THAT. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY THE CASE IF, HEAVEN FORBID, WE SUFFERED A SERIOUS REVERSE IN IRAQ.

I BELIEVE THAT EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS SHOULD IDEALLY AND URGENTLY DEVELOP AND COMPLETE CONTINGENCY PLANS WILL ALL CONCERNED, LEADING TO POSSIBLE JOINT PREPOSITIONING OF TROOPS IN THREATENED AREAS. HENCE I HAVE INTENSIFIED MY EFFORTS WITH EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, THE GULF STATES, AND OMAN, THAT ALL LIKE-MINDED ARABS COME TOGETHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ANTICIPATE ALL POSSIBILITIES AND TO BE IN A POSITION ALSO TO REACT ADEQUATELY TO ANY IRANIAN MOVE INTO IRAQ. UNDER NO CONDITIONS MUST WE PERMIT WEAKNESS TO LEAD TO A SUNNI-SHI ITE SECTARIAN CONFLICT WITHIN THE AREA - AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF A REVERSAL. WE FEEL WE MUST BE IN A POSITION TO INVOKE THE CHARTER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE ARAB JOINT DEFENCE TREATY. I FEEL THAT THOSE AMONGST US WITH MATERIAL

MEANS SHOULD USE SOME OF THEM TO SAVE THE ARAB FUTURE RATHER THAN SUCCUMB TO BLACKMAIL AND FINANCE THEIR OWN DOWNFALL.

SIR, I BELIEVE THAT IF THINGS GO BADLY THE UNITED STATES WOULD INEVITABLY LOSE ALL IN THIS AREA. PEACE IN THE WORLD WOULD BE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY AND ODDLY ENOUGH, I BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD INEVITABLY ALSO LOSE. I AM TRYING, SIR, TO COPE TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITIES WITH REALITIES AND EVENTS. I HOPE THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE THREATS, AND ACTIVE COOPERATION, WILL HELP US AVERT DISASTER AND GAIN THE INITIATIVE AT LEAST ONCE, WHEN THERE IS SO MUCH AT STAKE.

I ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIVING YOUR LETTER OF APRIL 23RD, 1982, CARRIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEST. ACCORDING TO YOUR WISHES WE REFRAINED FROM PRESENTING AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR AN F.16 F.5G MIX AND THE MOBILE ADVANCED HAWK. THE ISRAELI LOBBY IN WASHINGTON SEEMS, HOWEVER, TO BE SPARING NO EFFORT IN CAMPAIGNING AGAINST POSSIBLE FUTURE SALES TO JORDAN. HAVING NOT PRESENTED AN OFFICIAL REQUEST WE ARE IRONICALLY, HELPLESS TO REFUTE THEIR ARGUMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON A SUBJECT THAT FOR ALL PURPOSES DOES NOT EXIST. THE JMC MEETINGS WERE UNFORTUNATELY, AND IN MY CANDID OPINION, NON-PRODUCTIVE, IF NOT DISASTEROUS. THIS IS CERTAINLY TRUE IF YOU CONSIDER THE SIZE OF THE CHALLENGE WE FACE NOW AND THE IMMEDIATE URGENT GLARING INADEQUACIES WE SUFFER FROM. THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT KNOWS WHAT WE POSSESS AND LACK IN ANY EVENT.

IN ALL OF THIS I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT MAY SERIOUSLY CONSIDER AND SUCCEED IN KEEPING ISRAEL OFF OUR BACKS WHILE WE FACE OUR DESTINY - WHATEVER IT BE.

FINALLY, I HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE MAY REALIZE AS I KNOW YOU DO, SIR, THAT WE ARE STILL YOUR FRIENDS AND COULD NOT BE OTHERWISE, REGARDLESS OF THE PRICE WE HAVE HAD TO AND MAY HAVE TO PAY FOR OUR FRIENDSHIP AND COMMUNALITY OF UNTARNISHED BELIEFS AND PRINCIPLES. IN ANY EVENT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT COME WHAT MAY, WE ARE STOUT OF HEART. GOD HELP US ALL AND GUIDE OUR STEPS.

WITH MY HIGHEST ESTEEM AND BEST REGARDS.

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FM ALGIERS 301310Z DECEMBER 81

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 30 DECEMBER

FOR INFO ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD WASHINGTON NEW YORK

SAVING FOR INFO TO BIS TEHRAN

IRAQ/IRAN WAR: ALGERIAN MEDIATION

1. I TACKLED LAKHDAR BRAHIMI (AMBASSADOR AT LARGE AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE) ABOUT THIS LAST NIGHT. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE ALGERIANS WERE INDEED CONSIDERING WHETHER TO CHANCE THEIR ARM. FOREIGN MINISTER BENYAHIA WAS PARTICULARLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE QUESTION.

2. BRAHIMI SAID THAT OPINION WAS ABOUT EQUALLY DIVIDED. SOME, INCLUDING HIMSELF, TOOK THE VIEW THAT THE ALGERIANS SHOULD TRY. OTHERS FELT THAT SINCE IT WAS A HAND THEY COULD ONLY PLAY ONCE, THEY SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE OMENS WERE MORE PROMISING.

3. BRAHIMI HAD VISITED BAGHDAD RECENTLY AND FOUND THE IRAQIS DESPERATE TO END THE WAR AND READY TO ACCEPT THE MOST MODEST OF IRANIAN FACE-SAVERS. IF KHOMENI WERE OUT OF THE WAY, BRAHIMI THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WOULD OBLIGE, BUT SO LONG AS THE OLD MAN DOMINATED THE SCENE, THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL PEACE INITIATIVE WERE SLIM.

4. STOCKHOLM'S LETTER. I SHOULD PREFER TO PASS THIS TO MY SWEDISH COLLEAGUE HERE, WITHOUT NAMING MY SOURCE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BIS TEHRAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM BAGHDAD 151105Z DEC 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 766 OF 15/12/81

AND TO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR DI4); AND PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, STOCKHOLM, DAMASCUS.

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, ANKARA, BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKMIS NEW YORK

AND TEL AVIV.

SIC

TEHRAN TEL NO 634 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN

1. ACCORDING TO IRAQI COMMUNIQES, THE LATEST BATTLE WHICH BEGAN WITH AN IRANIAN ATTACK IN THE GILAN GHARB AND SAR POLE-ZOHAB (CENTRAL) SECTOR AT DAWN ON 11 DECEMBER HAS NOW ENTERED ITS FIFTH DAY. FIERCE FIGHTING IS SAID TO BE CONTINUING, WITH THE IRAQIS CLAIMING TO HAVE MOUNTED SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-ATTACKS IN WHICH 1,150 IRANIANS WERE KILLED IN THE PERIOD 11-13 DECEMBER AND A FURTHER 1,600 ON 14 DECEMBER, FOR THE LOSS OF A GRAND TOTAL SO FAR OF 133 IRAQIS.

2. ALTHOUGH THE FIGURES FOR IRANIAN CASUALTIES ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED, THE VIEW HERE, BASED ON THE TONE OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIQES AND SOME CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE APPEARANCE OF IRANIAN POWS SAID TO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN THE GILAN GHARB AREA ON IRAQI TV, IS THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE, ON THIS OCCASION, MET WITH SOME SUCCESS, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN THIS HILLY REGION ARE MUCH STRONGER THAN THOSE IN THE RELATIVELY OPEN TERRAIN FURTHER SOUTH.

3. THERE HAS INEVITABLY BEEN SOME SPECULATION ABOUT WHY THE IRANIANS HAVE SWITCHED THEIR ATTACK FROM BOSTAN TO THE RELATIVELY WELL DEFENDED GILAN GHARB AREA. ONE POSSIBILITY BEING CANVASSED HERE IS THAT THE IRANIANS WISH TO PREVENT THE IRAQIS TRANSFERRING TROOPS FURTHER SOUTH TO REINFORCE ANY COUNTERATTACK ON THE SALIENT WHICH THE IRANIANS OPENED UP IN THE IRAQI LINES AROUND BOSTAN EARLIER THIS MONTH.

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/ 4. IRAQI

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4. IRAQI COMMUNIQES HAVE NOT MENTIONED ANY AIR RAIDS ON IRANIAN TOWNS, ALTHOUGH THEY REPORT CONSTANT SORTIES AGAINST BATTLEFIELD TARGETS. THE IRAQIS REPORT AN IRANIAN AIR RAID ON BASRA ON 14 DECEMBER. TWO F14S ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN IN A DOG-FIGHT OVER GILAN GHARB FOR THE LOSS OF ONE IRAQI PLANE ON 12 DECEMBER.

5. THE IRAQIS HAVE AT LAST PUBLICLY ADMITTED THE LOSS OF BOSTAN BUT CLAIM THAT THIS, AND THE CAPTURE OF A 2 KM SECTION OF AN 11 KM IRAQI HELD CORRIDOR AT SHAIB, NEAR BOSTAN, WERE THE ONLY IRANIAN SUCCESSES DURING THE 29 NOVEMBER TO 5 DECEMBER BATTLE, GAINED AT THE VAST COST OF MEN AND MATERIAL DETAILED IN MY TEL NO 759.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSES.

EGERTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FM BRIT INT SECT TEHRAN 070730Z DEC 81  
TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 619 OF 7 DECEMBER 81

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (DI4), BAGHDAD

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, AMMAN, JEDDA, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,  
MOSCOW.

INFO SAVING STOCKHOLM, ABU DHABI, UKDEL NATO, DAMASCUS,  
PARIS.

MY TELNO 612 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAN/IRAQ.

1. IRANIAN CASUALTIES IN THE BOSTAN OFFENSIVE ARE ESTIMATED  
HERE TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN TWICE THE IRAQIS. HOSPITALS  
IN SHIRAZ, AHWAZ AND EVEN TEHRAN ARE FULL OF WAR-WOUNDED. BUT  
THIS WILL HAVE NO SIGNIFICANTLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON IRANIAN MORALE.

2. THE OFFENSIVE MAY HAVE BEEN TIMED PARTLY TO TAKE PLACE  
BEFORE THE WINTER RAINS, OIT

LSO AS A RIPOSTE TO SADDAM'S  
SPEECH OF 23 NOVEMBER (BAGHDAD TELNO 725). THE CODE-NAME USED  
WAS "THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM", CONTRASTING IRAN'S MILITARY  
ACTIVITY WITH THE PASSIVITY OF THE FAHD PLAN DISCUSSED AT THE  
FEZ CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO MILITARY ATTACHES HERE, IRAN  
HAD BEEN MOBILISING MORE MEN DURING THE LAST MONTH.

3. THE CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF, GENERAL ZAHIR-NEZHAD, HAS  
STRESSED IN AN INTERVIEW THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING CUT  
IRAQ'S LOGISTICAL ROUTE FROM AMAREH THROUGH BOSTAN TO SOUTHERN  
KHUZESTAN.

4. DOCUMENTARY FILM EVIDENCE HERE SHOWS BOTH THE COMMANDER  
OF THE GROUND FORCES, COLONEL SHIRAZI, AND THE HEAD OF  
THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, REZAI, AS HAVING BEEN AT OR NEAR  
THE FRONT WHEN THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN. IT IS HOWEVER RUMOURED  
THAT THERE IS BAD BLOOD BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY  
GUARDS BECAUSE THE LATTER WERE GIVEN THE MAJOR ROLE. THE PRIME  
MINISTER, MOUSSAVI, HAS MADE A TOUR OF THE FRONT. IN AN INTERVIEW  
AFTERWARDS HE SAID THAT IF IRAQ CONTINUED TO RESIST IRAN MIGHT  
HAVE TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK INTO IRAQI TERRITORY. THIS IS NOT  
TO BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY, BUT IS INDICATIVE OF THE IRANIAN  
MOOD.

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/ 5. IRANIAN



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5. IRANIAN CLAIMS TO HAVE DOWNED 18 IRAQI AIRCRAFT SINCE 29 NOVEMBER ARE LIKELY TO BE FALSE, BUT NOT THE CLAIM TO HAVE SHOT DOWN A MIRAGE NEAR AHWAZ ON 3 DECEMBER AND CAPTURED THE PILOT, WHO IS NOW IN A TEHRAN HOSPITAL. HE HAS REPORTEDLY SAID THAT FRENCH TECHNICIANS ARE TRAINING IRAQI PILOTS IN IRAQ.

6. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE OFFENSIVE WILL HAVE BROUGHT AN END TO THE WAR NO NEARER. THE IRANIANS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DIG IN FOR THE WINTER IF THE IRAQIS DO NOT MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL COUNTER ATTACK SOON. BADLY SHORT OF SERVICEABLE EQUIPMENT (THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE CAPTURED A LOT MORE FROM THE IRAQIS), THEY NEVERTHELESS SEEM COMMITTED TO FIGHTING ON WITH THEIR SUPERIOR MANPOWER.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RUNDLE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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1009

16 November 1981

Gulf Patrol

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your letter to me of 12 November on this subject.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (FCO), John Rhodes (Department of Trade) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

J. D. S. Dawson, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
 Telephone 01-~~830 7072~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

*Prime Minister*

②

12th November 1981

*Don Michael,*

*Phil 13/11*

*[Handwritten signature]*

GULF PATROL

*below* — Thank you for your letter of 6th November.

We have not so far briefed the Sultan of Oman, though the FCO intends to issue guidance to Gulf posts on the change of notice for the ships on Patrol and to invite posts to brief host governments. The Defence Secretary shares the Prime Minister's views on the importance of carrying the Omanis with us, not least because of the considerable, if essentially discreet, support which they have provided to the Royal Navy in the conduct of the Patrol. He does not envisage that the change of notice will prompt any adverse reaction from the Sultan. We shall emphasise to the Omanis that we are retaining the flexibility to resume a constant patrol in the Straits of Hormuz area should this be necessary and that, whilst the Patrol would be placed at a maximum of 7 days' notice, for much of the time ships will be at shorter notice and will continue to deploy regularly in waters off the coast of Oman. We will also make it clear to Oman that ships on Patrol will continue to provide sea training for officers of the Sultan of Oman's Navy, and other training, on an opportunity basis - though the frequency of opportunity will inevitably decline.

You also asked about port visits. On the advice of HMA Muscat, visits to Muscat by ships on Patrol are currently limited to one visit every 6 months or so. This is in deference to Omani sensitivities about not being seen to be too closely associated with the Patrol. Indeed at the outset of the patrol, the Omanis had indicated that, whilst visits for emergency repairs would be acceptable, visits for recreational purposes would not. This earlier attitude has now softened and a very successful ship visit took place in early June. A second visit is not likely before December. Another important

M O'D B Alexander Esq



consideration is that independent recreational facilities in Muscat are almost non-existent, and hospitality for visiting ships' companies falls very heavily on the relatively small British community. We feel that it is not reasonable to over-tax this hospitality, which in June was most generous.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO), John Rhodes (DOT), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours sincerely*

*John Dawson*

---

(J D S DAWSON)



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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

6 November, 1981.

Gulf Patrol

The Prime Minister has seen the Secretary of State for Defence's minute to her of 3 November on this subject. She has asked about the reaction of the Government of Oman. She has commented that Oman is a good friend of Britain, and that the Sultan is paying a State Visit to this country next year.

B/P

I should be grateful if you could let me know whether we have taken steps to brief the Sultan, and whether we have it in mind, for instance, to make regular port visits to the country.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), John Rhodes (Department of Trade), and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

David Omand, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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(2)

MO 3/9/4/2 *Is this one* *Prime Minister*  
*where we are having* *To note.*  
*a state visit from*  
PRIME MINISTER *Oman next year* *with* *think* *S/A*  
*and she is a good friend of Britain.*  
GULF PATROL

As you know, following President Carter's approach to you last year, we have maintained since last October two warships on patrol in the Gulf of Oman. This requires four warships and an average of three Royal Fleet Auxiliaries to be deployed East of Suez for most of the time. The cost of the operation is considerable - over £14m a year. Moreover, so long as ships have been required to remain at immediate notice in the Gulf of Oman it has not been possible to programme them to make visits to ports in the area in support of our general defence and foreign policy objectives.

2. The war between Iran and Iraq has settled down to a stalemate which could drag on indefinitely. We cannot discount the threat of isolated incidents against merchant shipping, particularly given the current internal chaos in Iran, but the threat of general disruption to shipping passing through the southern end of the Gulf, which was very real at the outbreak of the war, seems to have receded.

3. I have therefore agreed to an adjustment in the present pattern of deployment. Ships will in future be put on a maximum of seven days notice to reach the Straits of Hormuz. This will enable us to reduce for much of the time the number of warships required to be East of Suez from four to two (and so the cost of the operation) while at the same time allowing greater flexibility for visits to the Indian Ocean states such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka, and possibly also some of the Gulf States.



4. I understand that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is content to support the extension of notice on condition that we retain the flexibility to resume a constant patrol in the Straits of Hormuz should there be a serious deterioration in the Gulf. There is no problem about this. He also attaches, as I do, importance to expanding the political impact of the RN presence by the port visits to neighbouring countries that I hope will now be possible.

5. The US Administration sets great store by the retention of a constant RN presence in the Indian Ocean. This will of course continue. But since the total number will be reduced, I have asked that the Americans (who have themselves recently pulled back a Carrier Battle Group from the immediate vicinity of the Straits of Hormuz) should be alerted to our intentions and this will be done.

6. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Secretary of State for Trade, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

FW

Ministry of Defence

3rd November 1981





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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 082305Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1009 OF 8 OCTOBER,

INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN BAGHDAD MODUK (D14)

ROUTINE, JEDDA AMMAN KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON.

INFO SAVING TO STOCKHOLM ABU DHABI BAHRAIN DOHA AND MUSCAT.

TEHRAN TEL NO 489: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE HAD AN INDIRECT REPORT ABOUT THE MEETING BETWEEN CHATTY AND MOUSSAVI. ACCORDING TO THIS REPORT MOUSSAVI INDICATED TO CHATTY THAT HE REGARDED THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AS IRAN'S CHOSEN INTERMEDIARY, EXCLUDING BOTH PALME AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND THAT NOW THAT IRAN HAD RETAKEN ABADAN SHE WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR. CHATTY IS SUPPOSED TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP THIS REPORT.

2. MEANWHILE YOU MAY LIKE TO HAVE THE FULL TEXT OF MOUSSAVI'S CONDITIONS FOR THE ENDING OF THE WAR. THESE WERE

QUOTE

- (1) THE UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL INVADING IRAQI FORCES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN IRAN.
- (2) FINDING THE AGGRESSIVE PARTY AND CONDEMNING IT IN A QUALIFIED INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.
- (3) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY (AT THE CEREMONIES OF WHICH THE HAPPY IRAQI PARTY WAS PHOTOGRAPHED EMBRACING THE CRIMINAL SHAH OF IRAN).
- (4) PAYMENT OF PROPER COMPENSATIONS BY THE AGGRESSOR.

UNQUOTE

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ALL.

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ADVANCED

PARSONS

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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IRAQ/IRAN

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Extract from : Record of Conversation, Prime Minister/<sup>Iraq</sup>  
Sec General of the United Nations - House of Commons

Tuesday, 12 May at 1530hM.

Subject file  
United Nations  
May 79,  
Visit of Dr. Waldheim

Iraq/Iran

Dr. Waldheim said that no solution was in sight. Both sides, and indeed the world at large, had grown accustomed to the war and neither would contemplate concessions. He had seen Mr. Palme in Geneva the previous day. Mr. Palme would be visiting the area again later in May.

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FM BAGHDAD 041025Z MAY 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 236 OF 4 MAY, 1981

INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN STOCKHOLM  
SAVING JEDDA WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MODUK (FOR DI4) NEW DELHI

MY TEL NO 224 AND TEHRAN TELNO 152: IRAQ/IRAN

1. AT A ROUTINE MEETING OF EC REPRESENTATIVES HERE ON 2 MAY, WE COMPARED NOTES ON THE CONTRADICTIONARY REPORTS ABOUT RECENT FIGHTING IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR OF THE LAND FRONTIER. THE CONSENSUS WAS AS FOLLOWS.
2. AN IRANIAN ATTACK MOUNTED ABOUT 13 APRIL FROM ILAM PROVINCE BY REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AND PARATROOPERS, WITH SOME AIR SUPPORT, HAD MADE INITIAL GAINS. THE IRANIAN CLAIMED CAPTURE OF A RIDGE INSIDE IRAQ CALLED THE LANOON HEIGHTS (NOT MARKED ON ANY MAPS AVAILABLE TO US). ABOUT 18 APRIL THE OFFENSIVE PETERED OUT AND THE IRAQIS REGAINED CONTROL OF AREAS INSIDE IRAQ. FIGHTING WAS BITTER AND BOTH SIDES SUSTAINED HIGHER THAN USUAL LOSSES.
3. ABOUT 25 APRIL AN IRAQI COUNTER ATTACK BEGAN IN THE SERBIL ZAHAB REGION, EAST OF QASR-I-SHIRIN ON THE KERMANSHAH ROAD, AND ALSO AT GAILAN GHARB ABOUT 10 KILOMETRES FURTHER SOUTH. ARMOUR WAS USED AND SIX IRANIAN VILLAGES CAPTURED, WITH CLAIMS OF HEAVY LOSSES BY IRAN IN MEN AND EQUIPMENT. IRANIAN DEAD WERE PUT AT 1703 OVER 6 DAYS. IRAQI CASUALTIES WERE ADMITTED TO BE 221 OVER THE SAME PERIOD, BUT THIS FIGURE SHOULD BE MULTIPLIED BY ABOUT FIVE. A SMALL NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ON EACH SIDE WERE SHOT DOWN, AND SOME TANKS KNOCKED OUT.
4. ROCALVE (FRANCE) SAID THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS BITTER BUT LOCALISED FIGHTING WAS THAT IT MARKED THE COLLAPSE OF THE IRANIAN SPRING OFFENSIVE FOR WHICH THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN WAITING SO ANXIOUSLY IN MID-APRIL. HIS PEOPLE WHO HAD VISITED THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HERE DURING THE SERBIL ZAHAB COUNTER-ATTACK HAD FOUND THE IRAQIS SUPREMELY CONFIDENT ABOUT ITS OUTCOME. NOW THEY WERE WAITING FOR THE TERRAIN IN KHUZISTAN TO DRY OUT. BUT IT WAS NO (NO) LONGER EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A BIG IRAQI PUSH THERE BETWEEN MID-MAY AND MID-JUNE, WHICH MARKED THE END OF THE SPRING FIGHTING SEASON.
5. MORALE. JOHNS (DENMARK) ASKED WHAT EFFECT WAS DISCERNIBLE ON CIVILIAN MORALE IN BAGHDAD AND ELSEWHERE AS A RESULT OF THESE CLASHES. I SAID THAT THE GENERAL FEELING SEEMED TO BE CONCERN

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AT THE NUMBER OF ADMITTED IRAQI CASUALTIES. YET ANOTHER RECENT DECREE ANNOUNCING INCREASED BENEFITS IN CASH AND IN KIND FOR THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN ACTION SHOWED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE OF THIS CONCERN. WHILE THE IRAQI PROPAGANDA MACHINE WAS MAKING THE MOST OF THE VICTORY AT SERBIL ZAHAB (WHICH PRESIDENT HUSSAIN IS NOW REPORTED TO HAVE VISITED, ETC.) THE INCIDENTS THERE AND AT THE LANOON HEIGHTS COULD BE SEEN AS PART OF THE PROCESS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES WEAKENED EACH OTHER, THEREBY BRINGING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT NEARER. NOBODY HAD A DATE FOR PALME'S NEXT VISIT, THOUGH THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND NAM CONCILIATION EFFORTS REMAINED IN ORBIT.

6. ALL AGREED THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE LONGER FOR THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE RECENT CLASHES TO BECOME APPARENT. WE ARE HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT NO JOURNALISTS OR DEFENCE ATTACHES HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO VISIT ANY OF THE FRONTS RECENTLY.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

EGERTON

## IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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At Mrs. Gandhi's request, Mr. Rao gave an account of the recent visit by three Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers and the Head of the PLO Political Department to Iran and Iraq. The Group had been asked by the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers to try to bring about peace between the two countries. In Iran, Mr. Rao said the Group had visited areas close to the fighting. They had been to Dezful and Ahwaz, where there had been intermittent shelling. The purpose of the mission had been to listen to both sides and not to put forward concrete proposals. Mr. Rao noted that, following the failure of the Islamic Conference initiative, to get both sides to accept its proposals, the Non-Aligned Group had felt it more appropriate to try to understand the positions of both sides before making proposals. The Group had been received cordially "and with confidence". In Baghdad it had met Mr. Tariq Aziz and Mr. Izzat Ibrahim who had given them a full account of the Iraqi position. They had spoken of the incessant interference by Iran in Iraq's internal affairs, which had compelled the latter to send their troops in in sheer self-defence. The Iraqis were prepared to have a ceasefire and then negotiate on substantive aspects of the dispute, before withdrawing. The Iranian approach was exactly the opposite. However, the two positions were not as inflexible and diametrically opposed as they might appear. In informal discussion with the two sides, the Non-Aligned Group had found signs of flexibility which needed to be analysed carefully and built on. The Group would meet again in Algiers in two or three days time to compare notes. If issues were identified, on which further discussion with Iran and Iraq was necessary, there would be a second trip to Tehran and Baghdad. In answer to the Prime Minister's question, Mr. Rao said that there was ground for hope, but a solution would take time. The Prime Minister said that it would be a great achievement if peace was

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
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brought to the area. It would make a great difference to the world economy and might bring down oil prices. Though Mrs. Gandhi doubted whether these would come down, the Prime Minister pointed out that this had happened and there was pressure even now on the premiums. Mr. Rao said that it was something that the fighting between the two countries had not escalated. The Prime Minister spoke of apprehensions that, if peace initiatives showed no sign of success, this might happen. Mr. Rao said that the Non-Aligned Group hoped that its initiative would reduce this danger. He referred to the efforts of others, including Mr. Palme. The latter was concerned primarily with the Shatt-el-Arab, though he accepted that this issue could not be seen in isolation. He had come to no conclusion about how to resolve it. All the strands of the Iran/Iraq dispute were interdependent.

Returning to the Iran/Iraq conflict, the Prime Minister said it would be a great achievement if the Non-Aligned Group could resolve it. Mrs. Gandhi said that the prestige of the two sides was involved. Mr. Rao added that, though the Non-Aligned Group had the goodwill of both sides, there were no hard issues to get to grips with. When the Prime Minister remarked that the conflict had started over differences about the Shatt-el-Arab, Mr. Rao said that the Iranians had taken the line that there would be no difficulty over resolving substantive issues, once the Iraqis had withdrawn. Sir John Graham asked whether they had insisted on observance of the 1975 agreement. Mr. Rao conceded that the Iranians would want to use that as a basis for discussion, but they were not inflexible about it. Bani Sadr had made it clear that Iran would be flexible on substantive issues. However, Mr. Rao did not rule out the possibility that Iran's position would harden once negotiations started. He said that both sides agreed that there must be a package solution. They accepted that specific aspects of the conflict could not be taken in isolation. Mrs. Gandhi said that the various issues would have to be resolved simultaneously so that neither side would lose face. Mr. Rao explained that when the Iranians said that a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops must take place simultaneously they meant that a decision about both must be taken at the same time and that withdrawal must follow as soon as possible after a ceasefire. Mrs. Gandhi recalled that at the start of the conflict, dignitaries from both sides had visited India and urged the latter to brand their opponents as the aggressors. Mr. Rao commented that both sides could only agree to a fact-finding mission on the understanding that its purpose was to identify the aggressor. It would be better to deal with the issues and leave the allocation of responsibility on one side.

18 April 1981



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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 13 APRIL, 1981

INFO ROUTINE DELHI JEDDA TEHRAN KUWAIT UKMIS NEW YORK STOCKHOLM  
SAVING HAVANA MODUK (FOR DI4) WASHINGTON ISLAMABAD

WOGAN'S TELELETTER OF 9 APRIL TO GRAY: IRAQ/IRAN:

NON-ALIGNED GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE.

1. THE TEAM COMPOSED OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF INDIA, CUBA AND ZAMBIA, AND THE HEAD OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE PLO, DULY ARRIVED HERE ON 8 APRIL.
2. THE PRESS REPORTS THAT THEY WERE RECEIVED BY TARIQ AZIZ, RCC MEMBER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, AND BY SAADUN HAMMADI, FOREIGN MINISTER, SITTING TOGETHER ON 9 APRIL. LATER THAT DAY THEY WERE SEEN BY IZZAT IBRAHIM, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE RCC.
3. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS IXSAHIM REAFFIRMED IRAQ'S COMMITMENT TO NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES AND READINESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE MISSION. IRAN HAD TURNED DOWN IRAQ'S REPEATED OFFERS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WAS THEREFORE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR'S CONTINUATION. HE REAFFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT (NOT) WITHDRAW FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY UNTIL IRAQI RIGHTS HAD BEEN SECURED AND A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT REACHED.
4. THE INDIAN EMBASSY, WHOSE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS A MEMBER OF THE MISSION, HAVE TOLD US THAT THE VISITS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN WAS ESSENTIALLY (NEXT THREE WORDS UNDERLINED) PRISES DE CONTACT DESIGNED TO EXPLORE THE ATTITUDES OF BOTH SIDES. IN BAGHDAD THE MISSION HAD OBTAINED CLARIFICATION OF THE IRAQIS' ATTITUDE ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE IRAQIS HAD AGAIN CONFIRMED THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN PARA 06 OF THE DELHI NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECLARATION (WETHERELL'S TELELETTER OF 16 FEBRUACY TO WOODS AND PARA 1 (III) OF MY TELELETTER OF 24 MARCH TO MIERS). BUT THEY NOW SAID THAT THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INSURANCE AGAINST FURTHER IRANIAN INTERFERENCE AND INTERVENTION IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE IRAQIS WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD TERRITORY UNTIL INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AGAINST SUCH INTERFERENCE COULD BE PROVIDED, AND ADDITIONALLY AS INSURANCE FOR IRANIAN REPARATIONS FOR THE WAR SEMICOLON

(B) THE IRAQIS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN AN EARLY AND (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) QUICK SETTLEMENT. THEY DID NOT WANT A LONG DRAWN OUT NEGOTIATION SEMICOLON HOWEVER

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/(C) THEY

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(C) THEY HAD SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO (NO) WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES UNTIL A NEW FRONTIER (BY IMPLICATION BOTH LAND AND RIVERINE) HAD BEEN DEMARCATED AND INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED SEMICOLON

(D) THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND APPORTION BLAME FOR AGGRESSION SHOULD FORM PART OF THE PROCESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON

(E) THE IRAQIS HAD STRONGLY EMPHASISED THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE TO IRAQ OF SOVEREIGNTY, INCLUDING FULL NAVIGATION RIGHTS, OVER THE WHOLE SHATT AL-ARAB.

5. THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) DISCUSSION WITH THE IRAQIS ABOUT TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE.

6. THE INDIAN EMBASSY'S VIEW IS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CLARIFICATIONS IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE MISSION WILL BE ABLE TO FIND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN TO JUSTIFY ANY HOPES FOR A CEASEFIRE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THERE APPEAR TO BE NO (NO) PLANS FOR THE NAM MISSION TO RETURN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS SAID, IN ANY CASE, TO HAVE OTHER COMMITMENTS THAT WOULD PRECLUDE HIS PARTICIPATION IN A SECOND VISIT BEFORE THE END OF MAY.

7. COMMENT. THE PROFESSED IRAQI INTEREST IN AN EARLY SETTLEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE NAM 'PRINCIPLES' AT PARA 4 (A) AND (B) ABOVE IS CONTROVERTED BY THEIR STATED REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY MILITARY WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT HAVING ACHIEVED A SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB. A VIEW CURRENT HERE IS THAT NEITHER SIDE HAS YET BEEN BADLY ENOUGH HURT BY THE WAR TO HAVE MUCH INTEREST IN A CEASEFIRE ON TERMS THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER. BOTH APPEAR

TO BE WAITING FOR SOMETHING TO TURN UP. IN ANY CASE THIS YEAR THE RAINS HAVE BEEN VERY HEAVY UNTIL RECENTLY, AND THERE IS AT LEAST ANAOTHER MONTH BEFORE THE TERRAIN IN KHUZISTAN DRIES OUT SUFFICIENTLY FOR MAJOR MOVEMENTS.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES  
EGERTON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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*SIR A. Adams*

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FM AMMAN 111055Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 092 OF 11 MAR

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD ROUTINE JEDDA TEHRAN UKMIS NEWYORK AND  
WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO MOSCOW

MY TELNO 88 OF 10 MARCH AND BAGHDAD TELNO 144 OF 7 MARCH:

IRAQ/IRAN

1. WHEN SEEING KING HUSSEIN LAST NIGHT I ASKED FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS RECENT VISIT TO IRAQ FROM 3-5 MARCH.
2. KING HUSSEIN CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE DAY HE HAD SPENT VISITING IRAQI UNITS IN ONE SECTOR OF THE FRONT AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD HAD TO FACE OWING TO THE UNFAVOURABLE TERRAIN. HE WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SO FAR TRIED TO AVOID NEEDLESS MILITARY HUMILIATION OF IRAN, BUT WITH THE RAINY SEASON NOW COMING TO AN END AND WITH NO END TO THE WAR IN SIGHT, HE THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE OTHER THAN TO HIT THE IRANIANS REALLY HARD. MORALE IN THE IRAQI UNITS HE HAD VISITED WAS HIGH AND THE IRAQIS SEEMED TO BE COPING WELL WITH THEIR SUPPLY PROBLEMS.
3. THE KING SAID HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQI LEADERS MORE THAN EVER DISSILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE THOUGHT THEY WERE ONLY

3. THE KING SAID HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQI LEADERS MORE THAN EVER DISSILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE THOUGHT THEY WERE ONLY WAITING FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING TO REVEAL FULLY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD LET THEM DOWN AND THAT, WHEN THEY DID SO, THERE WOULD BE A COMPLETE BREAK AND A FUNDAMENTAL REALIGNMENT OF IRAQI FOREIGN POLICY.

4. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN 'FLABBERGASTED' BY THE INEPTITUDE OF THE ISLAMIC GOODWILL MISSION. THEY HAD VISITED BAGHDAD WHILE HE WAS THERE AND HAD LEFT A LARGE BATCH OF DOCUMENTS FOR THE IRAQIS IN SEALED ENVELOPES WITH THE REQUEST THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE OPENED UNTIL AFTER THE MISSION HAD LEFT. THEIR ACTUAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN VERY BRIEF. THE KING BELIEVED THAT THE PAKISTANI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MISHANDLED MATTERS AND PUT THE EMPHASIS ON THE WRONG POINTS. THE MISSION ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE DRAWN A BLANK IN TEHRAN. I ASKED THE KING WHAT ELSE MIGHT BE DONE TO TRY TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END. HE THOUGHT, THAT AS LONG AS THE ISLAMIC MISSION PURPORTED TO BE STILL IN BUSINESS, THERE WAS LITTLE ANYONE ELSE COULD DO. AT PRESENT THE IRANIANS ONLY SEEMED PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AN END TO THE WAR ON TERMS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE IRAQIS TO ACCEPT. THE KING SAID HE WAS HIMSELF COMPOSING A LONG MESSAGE CONCERNING THE MISSION TO PRINCE FAHD IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO MOSCOW.

URWICK

NNNN



NSPM.

JMW

29xii

FCS/80/180SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCEThe Iran/Iraq Conflict: British Support to the Gulf Region

1. We have been studying the proposals contained in your letter of 5 November, and the paper enclosed with it, with great interest.

*(We do not appear to have a copy - will request one if required)*

2. I am grateful to your officials and to the Service staffs for this valuable work. I agree with the general thrust of the conclusions. I am also content with the specific recommendations for the work which should be set in hand. To the extent that they are not already in train, the low level commitments can be pressed forward. In presenting them we should bear in mind the need to maximise the political benefit and leverage they give. General Perkins's recent visit is an excellent example of the benefits we can derive without any large commitment of British forces. Our willingness and ability to make a speedy and practical response to the UAE's enquiries has put us in a favourable light and should have laid to rest any lingering doubts the Rulers may have had that we had lost interest in them.

3. The paper has rightly concentrated on our response to the threats flowing from the Iraq/Iran conflict, for which purpose it ranks the possible responses under three broad headings in terms of their resource cost and of the political commitment they imply. I have no quarrel with this methodology. But the way in which the paper has followed this approach may, perhaps, tend to reduce its usefulness beyond the current crisis. It might be useful for our officials to meet soon to take stock of what is in hand. They might also consider revising the paper to serve as a basis for a longer term policy in the Gulf area. In particular they might look at the passages on the threat and

/possible



possible responses which highlight the point about the paper's longer term usefulness.

4. I understand that work is already well in hand on the most urgent priorities identified in the paper. I hope that we can agree that officials should meet early in the New Year to take matters further.

5. I am copying this minute to Sir Robert Armstrong.

C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

29 December 1980

29 DEC 1980



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FM BAGHDAD 281045Z DEC 80  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 707 OF 28/12/80  
AND TO ROUTINE MODUK DI4  
INFO TO ROUTINE AMMAN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, STOCKHOLM, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
MOSCOW, PARIS AND WASHINGTON

*Prime Minister*

*MP 29/12/80*

SIC U/N

*mo*

IRAQ/IRAN: SADDAM HUSSAIN'S 24 DECEMBER SPEECH

1. IN A SPEECH TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSAIN SAID THAT IRAQI POSITIONS IN DEZFUL, GILAN, AHWAZ AND ABADAN WOULD CONSTITUTE IRAQ'S MILITARY FRONTIER FOR THE PERIOD OF THE PRESENT STATE OF WAR. THE MILITARY MAP THUS DRAWN AFFORDED THE BEST MEANS OF DEFENDING IRAQI TERRITORY: ANY WITHDRAWAL WOULD PUT IRAQ IN A WORSE POSITION. IRAQI FORCES WOULD THEREFORE REMAIN WHERE THEY WERE UNTIL IRAN CONCEDED IRAQI RIGHTS.

2. HE ALSO REVEALED THAT "BECAUSE OF IRANIAN STUBBORNNESS, IRAQI TROOPS IN KURDISTAN HAD BEEN ORDERED TO CLOSE ANY SALIENTS AND LOOPHOLES IN THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. A WEEK AGO THEY HAD CROSSED INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY. IRAQ WAS NOW OCCUPYING THE BEST POSSIBLE MILITARY POSITIONS FROM THE JUNCTION OF THE IRANIAN, TURKISH AND IRAQI BORDERS IN THE NORTH, TO THE SHATT AL-ARAB IN THE SOUTH.

2. HE REPEATED THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT (NOT), AS ADVISED BY SOME, CONSIDER THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, ADDING (MORE INSISTENTLY THAN IN HIS OTHER SPEECHES) THAT ALTHOUGH IRAQ COULD HAVE HONOURED IT HAD IT NOT BEEN VIOLATED BY IRAN, THE LEGAL RIGHTS IT CONFERRED HAD ACCRUED IN ABNORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, I.E. WHEN IRAN WAS BACKED BY US AND ZIONIST FORCES HOSTILE TO IRAQ.

*/4.*

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4. HUSSAIN'S REMARKS CONSTITUTE THE CLEAREST STATEMENT WE HAVE HAD RECENTLY OF THE REDUCED SCALE OF IRAQI MILITARY OBJECTIVES. THEY INDICATE A DETERMINATION TO CONSOLIDATE A LONG BUT SHALLOW FRONT AND AWAIT EVENTS IN IRAN, WHILE 'CREATING FACTS' THROUGH THE ABSORPTION OF EG. KHORRAMSHAHR INTO THE ADMINISTRATION (MY TEL NO 704). THE MENTION OF OPERATIONS IN KURDISTAN SUGGESTS, THAT THE IRANIAN AGITATION AMONG THE IRAQI KURDS MAY AGAIN BE BEGINNING TO TAKE EFFECT, AND THAT IRAQIS ARE CONSCIOUS THAT, IN THE WAR OF ATTRITION WHICH THEY NOW EXPECT, THE NORTH-EAST MAY IN TIME PROVIDE THE MOST PERSISTENT DRAIN ON THEIR RESOURCES.

EGERTON

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*Sr A. Adams*

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 859 OF 30TH NOVEMBER 1980

AND TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG

REPEATED PRIORITY DUBLIN, PARIS, BONN, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE,  
 COPENHAGEN, ROME, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO,  
 DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV.

SAING TO TUNIS, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT.

MY TELNO 858: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AT OUR MEETING TODAY, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER  
 THUNAYYAN ALSO ASKED ME TO PASS A MESSAGE FROM HIS  
 GOVERNMENT TO HMG ON IRAN/IRAQ, WITH A VIEW TO ACTION BY THE  
 EUROPEAN COUNCIL.

2. HE SAID THAT THE AMMAN SUMMIT'S DECLARATION MADE CLEAR  
 THE ARAB'S POSITION ON THE CONFLICT; AND HE DID NOT THINK THOSE  
 WHO WERE ABSENT WOULD DISAGREE. IF THE CONFLICT CONTINUED  
 IT WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT NOT ONLY THE COMBATANTS, BUT THEIR  
 NEIGHBOURS, THE REGION GENERALLY AND, EVENTUALLY, THE WHOLE GLOBE.  
 ONLY THE USSR (AND ISRAEL) BENEFITTED FROM INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.

ONLY THE USSR (AND ISRAEL) BENEFITTED FROM INSTABILITY IN THE AREA. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO BENEFIT TO THE WEST, INCLUDING THE UK. SAUDI ARABIA RECOGNISED AND APPRECIATED OUR CONCERN TO SEE A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT - THUNAYYAN REFERRED TO OUR CONVERSATION THE PREVIOUS DAY (MY TELNO 856).

3. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR STATES WITH HISTORIC TIES WITH BOTH COMBATANTS TO INTERVENE IN THE DISPUTE. THE AMMAN DECLARATION SHOWED THAT IRAQ WAS READY TO CONSIDER A SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF A CEASEFIRE AND (SIC) PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. (I CAN FIND NO REFLECTION OF THE LATTER POINT, WHICH SEEMS INHERENTLY UNLIKELY, IN AMMAN TELNO 491.) NOW WAS THE TIME FOR POWERS OUTSIDE THE REGION TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON BOTH PARTIES TO BEGIN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

4. SINCE THUNAYYAN WENT STRAIGHT ONTO THE MESSAGE IN MIPT, I WAS NOT CALLED UPON TO COMMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

GRAY

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 270011Z NOV 83

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1879 OF 26 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN STOCKHOLM

UKMIS GENEVA

*Read in full*

*MA*

MY TELNO 1865: IRAN/IRAQ: PALME MISSION

1. PALME CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING (26 NOVEMBER) IN MY CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. HE SAID THAT HIS VISIT TO THE AREA HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE CONFLICT WAS DEEPLY ROOTED IN HISTORY. THE ONLY NEW INGREDIENT WAS THE ATTEMPTED EXPORT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. HE NOW SAW CLEARLY THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUICK SOLUTION. THE WAR WOULD NOT BE STOPPED BY ECONOMIC OR RESUPPLY FACTORS. WHAT HAD STRUCK HIM MOST WAS THE MILITARY EUPHORIA ON BOTH SIDES. BOTH WERE CONVINCED THAT THEY COULD STILL MAKE MAJOR MILITARY GAINS (THE IRANIANS HAD TALKED OF REACHING BAGHDAD) AND HAD MADE TOTALLY CONTRADICTORY CLAIMS ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THAT BOTH ACCEPTED THAT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE END BUT BECAUSE OF THIS MILITARY EUPHORIA NEITHER WAS READY FOR IT YET, THOUGH THE IRAQI ATTITUDE WAS LESS NEGATIVE THAN THE IRANIAN. THE PROBLEM WAS THUS ONE OF TIMING: WHEN WAS THE MOMENT TO LAUNCH DIPLOMATIC PROPOSALS? THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION DEPENDED ON THE MILITARY SITUATION AND HE HAD FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN RELIABLE INFORMATION ON THAT. HE HAD BEEN TAKEN TO THE "FRONT" AT DEZFUL AND KERMANSHAH BUT HAD FOUND LIFE IN BOTH TOWNS TO BE ENTIRELY NORMAL. THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE WAR HAD BEEN SOME DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ROCKET ATTACKS IN DEZFUL AND THE DISTANT SOUND OF ARTILLERY FIRE.

3. IN IRAQ HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY SADDAM. THE IRAQIS HAD PRESENTED THEIR ARGUMENTS SKILFULLY. THEY HAD EXPRESSED READINESS TO NEGOTIATE BUT THEY WERE SHARPENING THEIR TERMS ALL THE TIME, ESPECIALLY ON THE SHATT. SADDAM AND TARIQ AZIZ HAD MADE VEILED THREATS ABOUT THE ETHNIC FRAGILITY OF IRAN, APPARENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT PRESSURE ON PALME TO GET THE IRANIANS TO MOVE TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE IRAQI TERMS.

4. IN IRAN, HE HAD SEEN RAJAIE AND BANI SADR. BEHESHTI HAD BEEN EVASIVE BUT HE HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ON THE TELEPHONE. RAJAIE HAD NOT BEEN INTERESTED IN THE PRACTICALITIES OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. HE SAW THE WAR AS A STRAIGHT FIGHT BETWEEN GOOD AND EVIL. WHEN PALME HAD ASKED HIM HOW THE IRAQIS COULD WITHDRAW WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE, RAJAIE HAD MERELY REPLIED THAT THE PROPHET HAD SAID THAT MUSLIMS SHOULD NEVER ATTACK AN ENEMY WHO HAD TURNED HIS BACK.

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/ BANI SADR,

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BANI SADR, PALME SAID, NOW LIVES PERMANENTLY IN DEZFUL, SURROUNDED BY REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS. PALME BELIEVED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO MAKE THE REGULAR ARMY HIS POWER BASE, CAPITALISING ON THE REGULAR OFFICERS' DISAFFECTION WITH THE AYATOLLAHS. BANI SADR HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH, SAYING THAT HIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BRING DOWN SADDAM EITHER BY MAKING HIM LOSE THE WAR OR BY FORCING HIM TO ACCEPT TERMS SUFFICIENTLY HUMILIATING TO ENSURE HIS OVERTHROW BY HIS RIVALS IN IRAQ. BANI SADR WAS STILL LOOKING FOR INTERNATIONAL "CONDEMNATION" OF IRAQ AND TALKED OF HAVING SADDAM EVENTUALLY CONDEMNED AS A CRIMINAL BY SOME NUREMBERG-TYPE TRIBUNAL.

5. PALME SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE SHIPS TRAPPED IN THE SHATT. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO AN INFORMAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (NOT TO BE CALLED A "CEASEFIRE") OVER THE WATERWAY WHILE THE SHIPS WERE EVACUATED FLYING THE RED CROSS FLAG. THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE TO DO SOME DREDGING FIRST. PALME HAD ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS IN WRITING AND WAS HOPING FOR THE IRANIAN RESPONSE TODAY. (WALDHEIM SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING BUT THAT HE HAD URGED PALME NEVERTHELESS TO PROCEED WITH HIS PLAN). PALME SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT THIS OPERATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE AT THE BEGINNING OF DECEMBER THOUGH THE IRAQIS COULD STILL MAKE DIFFICULTIES OVER DREDGING, THE CLEARING OF ORDNANCE AND GUARANTEES THAT IRAN WOULD NOT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE CEASEFIRE. HE WAS EXPLORING WITH IMCO WHETHER THEY COULD HELP WITH PILOTS AND PROVIDE SOME KIND OF UN OBSERVATION OF THE OPERATION WHICH MIGHT REASSURE BOTH SIDES. PALME ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EVACUATION OF THE SHIPS BOTH FOR COMMERCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATION.

6. WALDHEIM ADDED LATER THAT NONE OF PALME'S IRANIAN INTERLOCUTORS HAD MENTIONED THE CAPTIVE OIL MINISTER. PALME HAD EVENTUALLY RAISED THIS HIMSELF WITH BANI SADR WHO HAD DISMISSIVELY SAID THAT THE MINISTER HAD BEEN WARNED NOT TO GO SO NEAR THE FRONT AND THAT THE IRANIANS ATTACHED NO IMPORTANCE TO HIS EARLY RELEASE. ONE OF BANI SADR'S GENERALS HAD ADDED "HE IS ONLY ONE OF THOSE REVOLUTIONARIES ANYWAY".

7. PALME STRESSED THAT HE WAS BEING VERY CAUTIOUS NOT TO SAY ANYTHING IN PUBLIC WHICH COULD BE REPRESENTED AS A VALUE JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE CONFLICT, AS THIS WOULD WRECK HIS CHANCES OF MAKING FURTHER PROGRESS. HE AGREED WITH ME THEREFORE THAT IT WAS UNDESIRABLE FOR WALDHEIM TO BRIEF THE COUNCIL ORALLY IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. THE UN HAS TODAY ISSUED AN ANODYNE PRESS STATEMENT BUT AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL HAVE BEGUN TO ASK FOR FULLER BRIEFING WALDHEIM HAS DECIDED TO CIRCULATE A BRIEF WRITTEN REPORT, HOPING THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO LEAVE IT AT THAT FOR THE TIME BEING.

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8. ASSUMING THAT THE EVACUATION OF THE SHIPS GOES AHEAD IN EARLY DECEMBER AS PLANNED, PALME IS THINKING IN TERMS OF RETURNING TO THE AREA SOME TIME IN THE SECOND HALF OF DECEMBER. HE DOES NOT WANT TO LOSE THE PERSONAL CONTACTS HE HAS MADE THIS TIME, BUT SEES NO POINT IN RUSHING BACK UNTIL HE HAS SOME MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS TO FLOAT. TO THIS END HE PLANS TO USE THE NEXT FEW WEEKS STUDYING THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SHATT DISPUTE, THE ELEMENTS THAT MIGHT GO INTO A NON-INTERFERENCE AGREEMENT AND POSSIBLE ROLES FOR THE UN. HE RETURNS TO STOCKHOLM TODAY BUT WILL BE BACK IN THE UNITED STATES ON A PRIVATE SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT NEXT WEEK.

9. I THINK THAT PALME HAS MADE AN EXCELLENT START. HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED BY THE VARIOUS PERSONALITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES, WHICH, AS I ADVISED HIM ON 14 NOVEMBER (MY TELNO 1786), SHOULD BE HIS FIRST OBJECTIVE. SO FAR HE IS DOING MUCH BETTER THAN PRESIDENT ZIA, HABIB CHATTY OR THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER. BUT HE MENTIONED MORE THAN ONCE THAT HE FELT HAMPERED BY HIS IGNORANCE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AND ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP. I SAID THAT OUR INFORMATION SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS A LOW-INTENSITY WAR, CERTAINLY MUCH LOWER THAN THE COMBATANTS OR THE PRESS WOULD LEAD US TO BELIEVE. I ADDED THAT IF HE COULD STOP OVER IN LONDON ON ONE OF HIS FORTHCOMING JOURNEYS, I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO ARRANGE A BRIEFING FOR HIM AND THAT I WOULD ASK FOR A MESSAGE ON THIS TO BE PASSED TO HIM VIA H M AMBASSADOR IN STOCKHOLM. I VERY MUCH HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SET UP SOMETHING ON THESE LINES AND THAT STOCKHOLM CAN BE INSTRUCTED TO KEEP PALME INFORMED OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MILITARY FRONT.

PARSONS

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

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FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 242337Z NOV 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1865 OF 24 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN STOCKHOLM

UKMIS GENEVA

*Iraq*

*ms*

MY TELNO 1833 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ - MR PALME'S MISSION

1. WHEN I SAW WALDHEIM THIS MORNING ABOUT FUTURE SECURITY COUNCIL BUSINESS, HE TOLD ME THAT PALME HAD JUST TELEPHONED HIM FROM GENEVA. HE WILL BE COMING TO NEW YORK TOMORROW AFTERNOON (25 NOVEMBER) AND WILL SEE WALDHEIM AT ABOUT 1700 HOURS.

2. WALDHEIM SAID THAT PALME HAD TOLD HIM THAT HIS MISSION HAD GONE MUCH BETTER THAN THE PESSIMISTIC REPORTS IN THE MEDIA HERE HAVE SUGGESTED. THE ATMOSPHERE IN BOTH TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD HAD BEEN GOOD AND, ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES TALKED TOUGH ABOUT THEIR MILITARY AIMS, THEY CLEARLY WISHED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS THE IRANIANS HAD ATTACKED THE IRAQIS, NOT THE UN. THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY FORTHCOMING AND VERY POSITIVE ABOUT THE U N.

3. PALME SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD NOW AGREED TO RELEASE THE TRAPPED SHIPS (MY TEL 1786 PARA 5 AND UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 495). INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED FOR A WEEK'S CEASEFIRE TO ENABLE THE SHIPS TO LEAVE. THE DETAILS WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH IMCO AS WELL AS WITH THE ICRC.

4. PALME SAID THAT MALMIERCA'S MISSION HAD FAILED COMPLETELY AND THAT HE HAD RETURNED TO HAVANA. THE ISLAMIC CONGRESS EMISSARY (MR CHATTY) HAD FARED NO BETTER. NEVERTHELESS, WALDHEIM SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK PALME INTENDED TO RETURN VERY SOON TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THOUGH HE MIGHT HAVE MORE TO REPORT THAN HE HAD SAID ON THE TELEPHONE IF THIS TURNS OUT TO BE THE CASE, I THINK IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RESIST PRESSURE FROM MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL FOR AN ORAL REPORT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS. AS I POINTED OUT TO WALDHEIM, THE DISADVANTAGE OF THIS IS, OF COURSE, THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ORAL REPORT WILL INEVITABLY LEAK, THUS COMPLICATING PALME'S FURTHER EFFORTS. THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID THIS WOULD BE FOR PALME TO RETURN TO TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD BY THE WEEKEND IN WHICH CASE WALDHEIM MIGHT JUST BE ABLE TO HOLD THE LINE BY SAYING THAT HIS GOOD OFFICES WERE CONTINUING AND THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO DEFER HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL UNTIL THE NEXT ROUND WAS COMPLETE.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1860 OF 24 NOVEMBER 1980  
INFO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN.

MY TELNO 1755: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I ASKED MCHENRY THIS MORNING (24 NOVEMBER) IF THERE HAD BEEN A FURTHER CONTACT WITH TROYANOVSKY. HE SAID THAT TROYANOVSKY HAD GOT IN TOUCH WITH HIM A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO. HE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORITY FROM MOSCOW TO SEE IF THE US AND USSR COULD WORK SOMETHING OUT TOGETHER. HOWEVER, TROYANOVSKY'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO LEAVE THINGS ALONE UNTIL THE OUTCOME, IF ANY, OF THE PALME MISSION WAS CLEAR.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 655 OF 24/11/80  
INFO TO PRIORITY AMMAN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK  
SAVING TO DAMASCUS

AMMAN TEL NO 482. IRAQ/IRAN: ATTITUDE OF THE SUPERPOWERS.

1. THE COMPLEMENT TO THIS VERY INTERESTING REPORT IS THAT EAGLETON OF THE US INTERESTS SECTION HERE TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN RECEIVED, FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN IRAQ EARLIER THIS YEAR, BY MINISTER OF STATE HAMID ALWAN AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. ALWAN HAD SAID THAT THE TIME WAS RIPE FOR CLOSER US' IRAQI RELATIONS, AND THAT EAGLETON COULD COUNT ON ACCESS IN FUTURE TO HIM (ALWAN) WHEN EVER HE NEEDED IT.

2. EAGLETON ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HIS REPEATED EXPLANATIONS HAD GOT THE IRAQIS OVER THE HUMP OF THE US DOLLARS 550 MILLION PACKAGE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT, PART OR ALL OF WHICH WOULD BE RELEASED TO IRAN (AFTER CLOSE US INSPECTION OF THE DETAILED LIST), IF AND WHEN THE HOSTAGES WERE FREED. THE IRAQIS WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE A GREAT FUSS ON THEIR PROPAGANDA MACHINE AS AND WHEN THIS PAID-FOR EQUIPMENT WAS DELIVERED, BUT WOULD NOT (NOT), EAGLETON THOUGHT, THROW THE INTERESTS SECTION OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN RETALIATION. HIS STAFF HAD IN ANY CASE ALREADY BEEN SLIMMED DOWN TO THE MINIMUM. THE IRAQIS' MAIN OBJECTIVE NOW WAS TO GET THE AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE NOT (NOT) TO SUPPLY IRAN WITH ANY REPEAT ANY WARLIKE MATERIAL BEYOND THE US DOLLARS 550 MILLION PACKAGE.

3. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS HERE AMONG MY COLLEAGUES REMAINS THAT THE FORMAL RESTORATION OF US-IRAQI RELATIONS IS STILL SOME WAY OFF.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 172 OF 23 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO JEDDAH KUWAIT BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI MUSCAT AMMAN MODUK (FOR  
DMAO)

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON PARIS

**GULF SECURITY SITUATION**

1. WHEN I CALLED ON THE AMIR ON 22 NOVEMBER FOR A GENERAL TALK, HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AND THE IRANIAN INTERNAL SITUATION. HE FEARED THAT THE FIGHTING COULD SPREAD, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE IRANIAN AIR ATTACKS ON KUWAIT, ON WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TELEPHONED HIS SYMPATHIES TO THE KUWAITIS. HE THOUGHT HE HAD SEEN AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE HAD BEEN THREE SUCH ATTACKS.

2. HE SAW LITTLE HOPE OF AN EARLY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ, GIVEN THE IRANIANS' INTRANSIGENT RESPONSE TO OLOF PALME AND OTHER POTENTIAL MEDIATORS, THEIR TOTAL DENIGRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS EFFORTS FOR PEACE, AND THE AMORPHOUS NATURE OF THE PRESENT IRANIAN REGIME. YASSER ARAFAT, WHO PASSED THROUGH HERE BRIEFLY LAST WEEK, HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD LOST ALL HIS EARLIER ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IRANIANS: INSTEAD OF HAVING A DISCUSSION WITH A GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, ONE QUOTE HAD TO TALK TO A HUNDRED PEOPLE UNQUOTE.

3. WE DISCUSSED QATAR'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS, AND HM GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO THE QATAR ARMED FORCES. THE AMIR WAS CLEARLY STILL WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR ATTACKS ON QATAR'S OIL INSTALLATIONS - WHICH HE CHARACTERISED WITH A LAUGH AS BEING QUOTE YOUR UNQUOTE (IE THE UK'S) RESPONSIBILITY: AND HE QUESTIONED ME ON THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES OF OUR SQUADRON NOW IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. I SAID THAT ROCKETS WERE THE ONLY ANSWER TO LOW-LEVEL AIR ATTACK (SO LEAVING AN OPENING FOR MAJOR REPRESENTATIONS TO HIM ON BEHALF OF RAPIER).

4. HE SAID HE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO MORE THAN READ HIS MINISTER OF STATE'S REPORT ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CONFERENCE IN AMMAN, THOUGH HE HAD SUMMONED HIM BACK FOR THAT EVENING TO REPORT TO HIM PERSONALLY. HE WAS SORRY THAT KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WOULD NOT BE AT THE SUMMIT, AS A PROPONENT OF MODERATION.

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/5. MY FRENCH

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5. MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE FOLLOWED ME IN TO SEE THE AMIR, WITH A WRITTEN MESSAGE TO HIM FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD.

6. SIGNIFICANTLY ALSO, - AND CONTRARY TO THE SENSE OF HIS REMARKS TO LORD STRATHCONA EARLIER THIS MONTH - KHALIFA EXPRESSED

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SATISFACTION AND RELIEF OVER THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE US, NOW THAT HE HAD SEEN THE CALIBRE OF THE ADVISERS WHOM GOVERNOR REAGAN WAS ENLISTING, HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER'S VACILLATIONS AND U-TURNS IN POLICY HAD ALWAYS DISQUIETED HIM. HE WAS GLAD THAT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THE VAN, WERE NOW IN CONTACT WITH REAGAN. HE ASSUMED THAT THE PM WOULD BE SEEING HIM SHORTLY.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1755 OF 11 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN

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MY TELNO 1732: IRAN/IRAQ

1. AFTER WHAT THE US MISSION DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING OF A STRUGGLE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MCHENRY GOT AUTHORITY TO TALK TO TROYANOVSKY (USSR). HE DID SO THIS AFTERNOON (11 NOV) AND BRIEFED ME AFTERWARDS.
2. MCHENRY SAID THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO TROYANOVSKY THAT US AND SOVIET INTERESTS COINCIDED IN THE NEED TO END THE FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. IT HAD FOR THE MOMENT BEEN CONTAINED BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS A DANGER OF A FLARE UP RISKING INVOLVEMENT OF THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. HE DID NOT THINK THAT ACTION BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CROSS WIRES WITH WALDHEIM'S PROPOSED MISSION. THE FACT WAS THAT THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD INFLUENCE WITH THE PARTIES AND SHOULD USE IT. TROYANOVSKY KNEW THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR ANY DEFINITIVE RESOLUTION IE CEASE FIRE, WITHDRAWAL, NON-INTERFERENCE, NEGOTIATIONS ETC. MCHENRY THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER WORKING TOWARDS A KIND OF RESOLUTION 242 RELATED TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.
3. TROYANOVSKY'S REACTION WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE, ALTHOUGH HE NATURALLY SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT AND CONSULT MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE US BELIEVED THIS, THE SOVIET UNION WANTED AN END TO THE FIGHTING. THE CONFLICT WAS ONLY BENEFITING ISRAEL. IF THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS ACTED TOGETHER AND EFFECTIVELY, THIS WOULD REINTRODUCE THE US INTO THE MIDDLE EASTERN ACT IN A BIG WAY, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS MIGHT ARGUE THAT SUCH A COURSE HAD THE DISADVANTAGE OF DOING THE SAME FOR THE SOVIET UNION. TROYANOVSKY ALSO ASKED WHETHER MCHENRY THOUGHT THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD APPROVE OF SOVIET/AMERICAN CO-OPERATION AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE. MCHENRY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD DO WORSE THAN START OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT WITH A REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION. TROYANOVSKY AND MCHENRY AGREED THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT LIKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE AND TROYANOVSKY ADDED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT 'FOR THEIR OWN REASONS'.
4. THEY AGREED TO KEEP THEIR CONVERSATION VERY MUCH TO THEMSELVES. MCHENRY TOLD TROYANOVSKY THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THE CONTACT TO ANYONE ELSE. HE DID NOT TELL TROYANOVSKY THAT HE WAS KEEPING ME INFORMED.
5. PETRIE OF THE US MISSION WARNED ME LATE ON 10 NOVEMBER THAT MCHENRY WAS GOING TO SEE TROYANOVSKY. HE ALSO GAVE ME A COPY OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN MY I.F.T.). THIS HAD BEEN PREPARED IN

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THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IT WAS OUTRAGIOUSLY BLUNT BUT ILLUSTRATED THE LINES ON WHICH THE AMERICANS WERE WORKING. THE AMERICANS SAY THEY HAVE NOT SHOWN IT TO ANYONE ELSE. THEY HAVE ASKED US NOT TO REVEAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT TO AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON OR ELSEWHERE.

6. I HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS THAT, IF THEY WANT THEIR EXERCISE TO BE EFFECTIVE, THEY MUST ACT WITH COMPLETE DISCRETION. FIRST, THEY MUST LET WALDHEIM'S INITIATIVE, WHICH IS NOW IMMINENT (MY TELNO 1754), HAVE A CHANCE. SECONDLY THEY MUST KEEP THEIR DRAFT PAPER OUT OF THE PRESS LEST IT BE PUBLICLY DENOUNCED PREMATURELY BY BOTH OF THE PARTIES. I EMPHASISED THAT A CONCEPT IN MCHENRY'S MIND OF PRODUCING A RESOLUTION UNACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES IN THE HOPE OF EVENTUALLY DRAWING THEM TOWARDS IT WAS INVALID IN THE CASE OF IRAN/IRAQ. IF THE IRANIANS AND THE IRAQIS GOT WIND OF SOMETHING WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, THEIR PROBABLE REACTION WOULD BE PUBLICLY TO DENOUNCE IT, THUS PAINTING THEMSELVES INTO CORNERS FROM WHICH THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES. THE ANALOGY OF 242 WAS IMPERFECT. IN THE JUNE WAR, THE ARABS HAD BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY THRASHED AND WERE EAGER TO GRASP LIFE LINES. FOR THEM, 242 WAS A GODSEND BECAUSE, IN EFFECT, IT REQUIRED THE ISRAELIS TO SURRENDER TERRITORY AND THE ARABS ONLY TO SIGN BITS OF PAPER ABOUT PEACE. THE AMERICANS TOOK THESE POINTS WELL.

7. I THINK THAT THE ABOVE IS A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED THAT THE AMERICANS CAN AVOID LEAKING IT TO THE PRESS PREMATURELY EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY INFORMING TOO MANY MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1732 OF 7 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN.

MY TELNO 1722 (NOT TO AMMAN): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KAISER (BANGLADESH) TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING (7 NOVEMBER). HE SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE WORKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION. HIS PRIVATE OPINION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE TWO OR THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE TO SURFACE IT.

2. KAISER HAD HAD AN INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH TROYANOVSKY (USSR). THE LATTER HAD SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NO ONE BELIEVED IT, THE FACT WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED URGENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO STOP THE WAR AND BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THIS DOES NOT SURPRISE ME. DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS I HAVE DETECTED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION HERE, AWAY FROM THEIR ORIGINAL PRO-IRAQI STANCE. THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO BE MORE EVEN HANDED AND THERE IS ON THE FACE OF IT MORE AFFINITY BETWEEN THEIR ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. I MADE THIS POINT TO VANDEN HEUVEL (US) AT DINNER LAST NIGHT AND I HAVE SINCE TOLD HIM OF KAISER'S CONVERSATION WITH TROYANOVSKY. I SAID TO VANDEN HEUVEL THAT, ALTHOUGH LONG TERM SOVIET AND AMERICAN OBJECTIVES WERE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENT, I HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, IN THE SHORT TERM, THEY BOTH WANTED THE SAME THING IE AN END OF THE WAR AND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE DISPUTES. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ACTIVITY BY PERIPHERAL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE. IT SEEMED A PITY THAT SOVIET/US RELATIONS WERE NOW SO DISTANT THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO COME TOGETHER AND ACT FIRMLY EVEN WHEN THEIR INTERESTS COINCIDED. IF THEY WERE TO GIVE A LEAD, THE COUNCIL WOULD FOLLOW AND WE MIGHT GET SOMEWHERE. HAD THEY BEEN SPEAKING BILATERALLY TO THE RUSSIANS EITHER IN NEW YORK OR ELSEWHERE?

5. VANDEN HEUVEL TOOK MY POINT VERY READILY AND SAID THAT HE AGREED ENTIRELY WITH MY THESIS. THERE HAD, SO FAR AS HE KNEW, BEEN NO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE AND I REALISED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET ANYTHING POSITIVE DONE ON THE UNITED STATES SIDE IN THE WAKE OF THE ELECTIONS. BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY FEED THIS THOUGHT INTO THE MACHINE.

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TELNO 460 OF 6 NOV 80

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD PARIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING TO TEL AVIV

BAGHDAD TELNO 605 OF 5 NOVEMBER: IRAQ/IRAN

1. MR EGERTON'S ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH WHAT KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN SAYING TO ME HERE ABOUT HIS EXCHANGES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT (SEE FOR EXAMPLE MY TELS NOS 430, 447 AND 459). I HOPE TO FIND OUT MORE AFTER TARIQ AZIZ HAS BEEN TO AMMAN FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO PARIS, BUT IN OUR EXCHANGES ON THIS SUBJECT KING HUSSEIN HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT BOTH HE AND SADDAM PUT MORE FAITH IN A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAN IN THE OTHER PEACE INITIATIVES NOW UNDER WAY.
2. AT THE SAME TIME THE KING HAS GIVEN ME THE VERY STRONG IMPRESSION THAT HE DOES NOT WISH THIS LEFT ENTIRELY IN THE HANDS OF THE FRENCH AND THAT IDEALLY HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE BRITAIN AND FRANCE WORKING TOGETHER. HE SETS ALL THIS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TOTAL IRAQI DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND DISTRUST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ALSO OF HIS BELIEF THAT WE NOW HAVE A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ ON A NEW FOOTING AND AT THE SAME TIME GAIN SUBSTANTIAL COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGES FOR OURSELVES RATHER THAN LEAVING THE FIELD TO THE FRENCH. KING HUSSEIN HAS ALSO RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO BUILD THE NEW RELATIONSHIP FOR WHICH HE HOPES WITH IRAQ UNTIL THE SPARKES AND SMITH CASES ARE SATISFACTORILY SETTLED: HENCE HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO TRYING TO RESOLVE THEM.
3. THERE IS OF COURSE A STRONG ELEMENT OF SELF-INTEREST IN ALL THIS. THE IRAQIS ARE IN A MESS, KING HUSSEIN IS FOR BETTER OR WORSE IN IT WITH THEM AND HE IS LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. BUT I THINK DUE WEIGHT SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO WHAT I HAVE FOUND IN MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM IN RECENT MONTHS TO BE AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT STRAND IN HIS THINKING. THIS IS THAT THE PART PLAYED BY THE TWO SUPER-POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS HAD PROVED DEEPLY HARMFUL TO THE ARABS AND THAT THE LONG-TERM AIM OF ARAB POLICY SHOULD BE TO REDUCE THE DEGREE OF INTERFERENCE BY BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN ARAB AFFAIRS AND PARTICULARLY TO GET RID OF SOVIET AND US MILITARY FACILITIES IN THE AREA. HE SEES EUROPE IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT LIGHT: COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SHED THEIR IMPERIAL PAST AND VALUABLE COMMERCIAL PARTNERS WITH WHOM THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA CAN HAVE

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AN EQUAL AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP. BUT ABOVE ALL HE LOOKS TO BRITAIN, BECAUSE OF HER LONG EXPERIENCE OF THE AREA AND OF HIS OWN CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH US AND ADMIRATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOURSELF, TO TAKE A LEAD.

4. SOME OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF COURSE ALSO APPLY TO HIS THINKING ABOUT ARAB/IKRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE KNOWS THAT WITHOUT US PRESSURE THE ISRAELIS WILL NEVER BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; BUT HE BELIEVES EUROPE HAS A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN INFLUENCING THE AMERICANS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

5. THE KING IS MUCH LESS GOOD ON DETAIL AND, WHEN I TRY TO PIN HIM DOWN ON PRECISELY WHAT WE SHOULD DO, USUALLY TRIES TO AVOID COMMITTING HIMSELF. THIS SEEMS AT LEAST PARTLY FROM A DISLIKE OF TELLING OTHERS WHAT TO DO (JUST AS HE STRONGLY RESENTS AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO DICTATE TO HIM) AND ALSO BECAUSE BY TEMPERAMENT HE TENDS TO ESCHEW DETAIL AND CONCENTRATE ON THE BROAD POLICY ISSUES  
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 915 OF φ6 NOVEMBER 198φ

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND AMMAN.

INFO SAVING TO BONN AND MOSCOW.

VISIT TO PARIS OF MR TAREQ AZIZ

1. I ASKED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ELYSEE THIS MORNING IF HE COULD TELL ME ANYTHING ABOUT MR TAREQ AZIZ'S VISIT TO PARIS YESTERDAY.
2. WAHL SAID THAT THE IRAQI ATTITUDE WAS NOW A BLEND OF SATISFACTION AND EMBARRASSMENT - SATISFACTION THAT THEY HAD SEIZED THE TERRITORY WHICH THEY FELT THEY NEEDED FOR BARGAINING WITH IRAN AND EMBARRASSMENT BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT FIND A WAY OF BRINGING IRAN TO BARGAIN. WAHL SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF MR TAREQ AZIZ'S FIRST VISIT TO PARIS. DURING IT PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD IMPRESSED ON HIM THE NEED FOR THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO CLARIFY PUBLICLY ITS OBJECTIVES, TO AVOID ENLARGING THE WAR AND NOT TO MAKE UNNECESSARY ENEMIES. SUBSEQUENTLY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD SEEMED TO HAVE HOISTED IN THESE POINTS.
3. ON THIS OCCASION A NEW ELEMENT HAD EMERGED IN THE IRAQI ARGUMENT. THEY WERE NOW SAYING THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT REMAIN CONTENT FOR LONG WITH AN INDETERMINATE SITUATION AND WOULD WANT TO PRESS ON TO NEW OBJECTIVES. IRAQ NEEDED CERTAIN SUPPLIES AND WOULD BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY AMERICAN HELP BEING GIVEN TO IRAN. IRAQ WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR HELP IF DEVELOPMENTS APPEARED TO BE AGAINST IRAQ'S INTERESTS. WAHL SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DONE HIS BEST TO PERSUADE THE IRAQIS TO BE OPEN TO THE INITIATIVES OF THE NON-ALIGNED, OF THE ARAB STATES AND IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO REUTER AND AFP REPORTS OF WHAT TAREQ AZIZ HAD SAID AFTER LEAVING THE ELYSEE YESTERDAY. I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE REUTER TAPES. TAREQ AZIZ WAS ACCUSING THE US ADMINISTRATION OF BEING PRO IRANIAN AND SAID THAT DIRECT OR INDIRECT AID FROM THE US ENCOURAGED TEHRAN TO CONTINUE WAR AND THIS WAS DAMAGING TO THE INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST REGION. WAHL AGREED WITH ME WHEN I COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO BE BAD LINE FOR TAREQ AZIZ TO HAVE TAKEN. HE ADDED THAT IN CONVERSATION TAREQ AZIZ HAD INSISTED THAT IRANIAN AIRCRAFT WERE FLOWN BY ISRAELI PILOTS. THERE WAS NOTHING ONE COULD DO TO STOP HIM TALKING LIKE THIS BECAUSE HE COULD NOT ADMIT THAT THE IRANIANS WERE RESISTING SUCCESSFULLY.
4. WAHL WENT INTO A LONGISH ACCOUNT OF THE FRENCH RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, SAYING THAT IT HAD STARTED WHEN MONSIEUR CHIRAC WAS PRIME MINISTER AND HAD THEN BEEN PURSUED BY MONSIEUR BARRE, THE

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AIMS ON THE FRENCH SIDE BEING SIMPLY TO SECURE A SOURCE OF OIL AND TO OPEN A MARKET FOR FRENCH EXPORTS. IN THE COURSE OF TIME THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAIN DID NOT WANT TO BE COMPLETELY COMMITTED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WAS PREPARED TO MOVE INTO A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN POWERS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD UNDERSTOOD ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS THAT THE US GOVERNMENT (HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED BRZEZINSKI) AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SYMPATHISED WITH WHAT FRANCE WAS DOING. IT WAS STILL IMPORTANT NOT TO LEAVE IRAQ TO THE SOVIET UNION, BUT AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO LIMIT THEIR PRESENT ADVENTURE.

5. I ASKED WAHL ABOUT FRENCH ARMS SUPPLIES FOR IRAQ. HE DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY BUT SEEMED TO INDICATE CLEARLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE MIRAGE F1 AIRCRAFT ORDERED BY IRAQ WOULD HAVE TO BE DELIVERED WHEN THEY WERE READY. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WAS OF COURSE DOING NOTHING AT ALL TO ACCELERATE THE COMPLETION AND DELIVERY OF THESE AIRCRAFT. BUT EVEN IF THE AIRCRAFT WERE TO BE DELIVERED IRAQ WOULD NOT HAVE THE PILOTS TO FLY THEM. THERE WERE SOME PILOTS BEING TRAINED IN FRANCE BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE READY BY THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT WERE. DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT WOULD THEREFORE HAVE A SYMBOLIC RATHER THAN A PRACTICAL VALUE.

6. I ASKED WAHL WHAT THE POSITION WAS OVER THE RESEARCH REACTOR WHICH FRANCE WAS SUPPLYING TO IRAQ. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH TECHNICIANS AT THE REACTOR SITE HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 20 AND THE URANIUM FUEL HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE REACTOR. AS IT HAD BEEN IRRADIATED THERE WAS NO FEAR THAT THE IRAQIS COULD DO ANYTHING WITH IT. IT WAS AT PRESENT BEING GUARDED BY THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. STEPS WERE IN HAND TO ACTIVATE INSPECTION OF THE ARRANGEMENTS BY THE IAEA.

7. IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF WAHL'S ATTITUDE I SUGGESTED THAT IT SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT IRAN MIGHT BECOME THE RUSSIA FOR SADDAM HUSAIN'S GRANDE ARMEE. WAHL SAID HE FEARED THAT THIS MIGHT BE SO. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY AT TEHRAN HE COMMENTED THAT HE HOPED THE IRANIANS WOULD NOT BE TEMPTED TO LOOK FOR HOSTAGES THERE BECAUSE OF FRANCE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 914 OF 6 NOVEMBER 1980

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND AMMAN

INFO SAVING BONN AND MOSCOW

IRAQ/IRAN: FRENCH ASSESSMENT

1. WHEN MINISTER SAW SERVANT (SOUS-DIRECTEUR IN CHARGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE QUAI) ON 5 NOVEMBER, HE ASKED HIM FOR A FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI INTENTIONS. SERVANT SAID THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT THE IRAQIS WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT OF THE WAR. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY A REFERENCE IN A SPEECH BY SADDAM HUSSEIN BEFORE THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAQ WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN RETURN FOR RECOGNITION OF THEIR RIGHTS. THIS HAD NEVER BEEN EXPRESSED SO CLEARLY BEFORE IN A PUBLIC SPEECH IN IRAQ (BAGHDAD TEL NO 605 REFERS).
2. JAMES ASKED WHETHER TAREQ AZIZ WOULD ASK FOR MORE FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT. SERVANT SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO INTERRUPTION IN THE SUPPLIES OF FRENCH MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ. THE BULK OF IT WAS RADAR AND SPARE PARTS AT PRESENT. THERE WERE NO AIRCRAFT BEING SUPPLIED THOUGH THE MIRAGE F1 WERE ON ORDER. ONE OF IRAQ'S PROBLEMS WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS LIMITING ITS SUPPLIES OF ARMS AND SPARE PARTS.
3. JAMES ASKED WHETHER THE PRO-IRAQI STANCE OF FRANCE WAS CAUSING PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAN. SERVANT SAID THAT UP TILL NOW THE IRANIANS HAD NOT EXPRESSED ANY SPECIAL CONCERN AT FRANCE'S CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH IRAQ. THE NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD ARRIVED AND WAS AT WORK. BUT THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUED THE MORE HOSTILE THE IRANIAN ATTITUDE TO FRANCE WOULD BECOME.
4. THE FRENCH WERE USING THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE IRAQIS TO SHOW AS MUCH MODERATION AS POSSIBLE. THE DIFFICULTY WAS, HOWEVER, THAT THE IRANIANS SHOWED NO SIGNS OF BEING PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS. THE FRENCH SAW NO SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR THEMSELVES EXCEPT BY WORKING ON THE IRAQIS AND THROUGH THE NON-ALIGNED AND ISLAMIC GROUPS, ESSENTIALLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

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# CONFIDENTIAL

5. FOR THE TIME BEING THE FRENCH WERE FINDING THEIR OIL ELSEWHERE AND THEY HAD NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM. SERVANT'S EXPECTATION WAS THAT THE WAR WOULD DRAG ON FOR SOME TIME YET. THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH MORALE IN THE ARMY AND THAT THE BA'ATH PARTY STRUCTURES WERE HOLDING UP WELL TO THE STRAINS. AS REGARDS SOVIET POLICY, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS' PRIME OBJECTIVE WAS TO AVOID TAKING SIDES. IN THE LONGER TERM THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR INFLUENCE IN IRAQ AND TO BEGIN TO ACQUIRE INFLUENCE IN IRAN. THE FRENCH THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND GENERALLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WEST TO WORK AGAINST THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAQ.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO BONN AND MOSCOW

HIBBERT.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

IRAQ

SECRETARY OF STATE  
TINNEY HOUSE  
MILLEN BUILDING

01 211 6402

F.S. Hunt

B M Norbury Esq  
Private Secretary  
Ministry of Defence  
Main Building  
Whitehall  
LONDON  
SW1

5 November 1980

Dear Brian,

IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT: MOD PRESENTATION

You copied your letter of 28 October to George Walden to Julian West.

We are very interested in the proposed DIS presentation on the Iran/Iraq conflict since the likely duration and outcome of the war has such important implications for the world oil market, and would accordingly like to attend in strength. As regards Ministerial attendance, the Secretary of State, together with Mr Norman Lamont and Mr John Moore would like to be present. We should also like four places for Senior Officials, and one for a private secretary.

Of the two dates offered we would prefer Monday 10 November since there is a danger of the Tuesday date clashing with the meeting of E planned for 11 a.m. on that day. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely,

Goeff Dart

G S DART  
Private Secretary

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

STATION

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

~~22~~ 19

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
~~SIR J GRAMM~~  
(Stet.) || ~~MR J C NOBERLY~~  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

S/R A. ACAND

Read in full

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 031000Z NOV 80

FM AMMAN 030900Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 03 NOV

INFO BAGHDAD, BONN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW,  
PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 445 OF 1 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 1 NOVEMBER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEAL BETWEEN IRAN AND THE US ON THE HOSTAGES AND OF US AGREEMENT TO RELEASE DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAN WERE UPPER-MOST IN HIS MIND AND HAD BEEN THE MAIN TOPIC OF HIS RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED EXTREME CONCERN OVER THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS, ESPECIALLY IF AS A RESULT IRAN WERE EVENTUALLY TO COME OUT ON TOP IN THE WAR (THE FIRST TIME HE HAS MENTIONED THIS POSSIBILITY TO ME). HE SAID THAT FOR THE ARABS THIS WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES SQUEEZED BETWEEN IRAN AND ISRAEL: IT MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

2. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LONG LETTER TO SADDAM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT THE ISSUES AS HE SAW

2. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LONG LETTER TO SADDAM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT THE ISSUES AS HE SAW THEM AND THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ARAB WORLD. HE WAS EXPECTING THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER LATER THAT DAY AND HOPED TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH HIM (TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS A BRIEF VISIT TO AMMAN BY HAMMADI, WHO WAS RECEIVED BY KING HUSSEIN AND LEFT FOR NEWYORK ON 2 NOVEMBER). HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SADDAM AGAIN THAT MORNING ON THE TELEPHONE.

3. THE KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SOME FORM OF EUROPEAN MOVE TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END WAS NOW MORE NEEDED THAN EVER AND HE HOPED SOMETHING MIGHT COME OF RECENT CONTACTS. ONE DIFFICULTY HE SAW WAS THAT, APART FROM OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH, THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AREA. PRINCE HASSAN'S RECENT VISIT TO PARIS RECEIVED A BRIEF MENTION, BUT THE KING CLEARLY DID NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN ON IT.

4. THE KING REVERTED TO WHAT HE TERMED IRAQ'S KEEN INTEREST IN ACQUIRING CHIEFTAIN TANKS (SEE MY TELNO 430 OF 28 OCTOBER, PARA 6). I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK WE COULD PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH THE IRAQIS WHILE THE CONFLICT WAS IN PROGRESS, AND HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD AT LEAST START THINKING ABOUT IT, LOOKING AT WHEN WE COULD OFFER DELIVERY ETC AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF IRAQ'S WISH TO LESSEN HER DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE KING DID NOT, EVEN BY IMPLICATION, LINK THIS QUESTION WITH THE DETAINED BRITISH SUBJECT (MY TUR, NOT TO ALL). BUT WHAT SEEMS TO BE SADDAM'S OBSESSION (SHARED BY THE KING) OVER THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF US MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAN, IRAQI ANGER OVER SOVIET REFUSAL TO ALLOW ARMS SUPPLIES TO GET THROUGH TO IRAQ (WHICH SADDAM DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE ADMITTED TO KING HUSSEIN UNTIL HIS LATEST VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON 27/28 OCTOBER) AND THE IRAQI DESIRE TO COUNTERBALANCE WHAT THEY SEE AS IMPENDING US RESUPPLY OF IRAN MUST, I THINK BE INFLUENCING THE IRAQIS IN THEIR DEALINGS ON THIS MATTER.

URWICK

NNNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

*Iraq*



Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-233 3000

31 October 1980

*hs* *Am* *3/11*

B.M. Norbury, Esq.,  
Private Secretary,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Main Building,  
Whitehall,  
LONDON. S.W.1.

*Dear Brian,*

IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT : MOD PRESENTATION

You sent me a copy of your letter of 28 October to George Walden.

Our nominees for your presentation are the Chief Secretary and Mr. R.G. Lavelle; the preferred date is 11 November. If the presentation has to take place on 10 November, then we should like Mr. F.R. Barratt and Mr. J.E. Hansford to attend. Perhaps you could settle the arrangements with their offices.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.


*Yours sincerely*

*John Wiggins*

A.J. WIGGINS

CONFIDENTIAL

1-3 Nov 1980



IMMEDIATE

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

19 22 20

D/B 301200Z  
(rec'd 11382)

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
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ADVANCE COPY

~~RESIDENT CLARK~~

SIR A. Acland

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 300953Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 579 OF 30/10/80

INFO IMMEDIATE WARSAW (DESKBY 301200Z) FOR P.S.

PRIORITY AMMAN, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND BAHRAIN  
INFO SAVING TO UK DEL NATO.

DESKBY 301200Z

KUWAIT TELS 619 TO YOU AND 38 TO US; LORD GEORGE-BROWN.

1. LORD GEORGE-BROWN VISITED BAGHDAD AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT HUSSAIN FROM 1330 HOURS ON 29 OCTOBER UNTIL 0800 HRS ON 30 OCTOBER. HE HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ OF THE RCC AND THEN TWO HOURS WITH THE PRESIDENT. I BRIEFED HIM OVER LUNCH ON 29 OCTOBER, AND DICKSON DEBRIEFED HIM THIS MORNING BEFORE HE RETURNED TO KUWAIT. FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF WHAT HE TOLD DICKSON. ON SPARKES, GEORGE-BROWN'S REMARKS ARE IN MY IFT.

2. GEORGE-BROWN SAID THAT HE HAD FOUND SADDAM HUSSAIN WEARY, ALTHOUGH CONFIDENT ABOUT THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE WAR. TARIQ AZIZ HAD BEEN VERY RELAXED. THEY REALISED THAT THEIR EARLIER STRATEGY HAD BEEN WRONG, AND HAD SETTLED DOWN NOW TO A WAR OF ATTRITION.

*Read i full*

AZIZ HAD BEEN VERY RELAXED. THEY REALISED THAT THEIR EARLIER STRATEGY HAD BEEN WRONG, AND HAD SETTLED DOWN NOW TO A WAR OF ATTRITION. IRAQ HAD TAKEN THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN DECIDING IT NEEDED NEITHER MEN NOR MATERIAL HELP FROM OUTSIDE. IT HAD IN FACT REFUSED TWO SUCH OFFERS. IT HAD LOST ONLY ABOUT TWO PER CENT OF ITS ARMOUR. THE LOSSES OF MEN HOWEVER IN GETTING INTO KHORRAMSHAHR HAD BEEN HEAVY, AND THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED NOT (NOT) TO SEND INFANTRY OR ARMOUR INTO AHWAZ OR DEZFUL. HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO ENTER ABADAN, BUT IT WAS COMPLETELY ENCIRCLED. THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD BEEN ASTONISHED BY THE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THE SHAH HAD STOCKPILED, AND FREELY ADMITTED THAT THE IRANIAN WEAPONS AND AIRCRAFT WERE MUCH BETTER THAN WHAT IRAQ HAD. HOWEVER IRANIAN TROOPS WERE NOT CAPABLE OF USING THEM IN MANY CASES, AND MUCH HAD BEEN CAPTURED WITHOUT A FIGHT. THE IRANIANS HAD HAD HUGE LOSSES, EG. EIGHTY TWO TANKS IN TWELVE HOURS AT AHWAZ, AND TWENTY NINE IN THREE HOURS AT DEZFUL. ALL THE DIVISIONS OF IRAN'S FORCES WERE NOW COMMITTED IN THE SOUTH WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE IN TEHRAN. SADDAM REMARKED THAT THE WAY INTO IRAN WAS NOW OPEN FOR THE RUSSIANS.

3. SADDAM WAS INCENSED ABOUT THE APPARENT US WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE SPARE PARTS FOR IRAN IF THE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED. ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR, IT WOULD CERTAINLY PROLONG IT, AND WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR THE WHOLE AREA. THE PRESIDENT TOLD GEORGE-BROWN THAT IF THE WAR CONTINUED, HIS POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY WOULD BE SEVERELY CURTAILED. HE HAS FOUND WHEN VISITING FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN THE WAR THAT THEY URGED HIM REPEATEDLY NOT (NOT) TO GIVE UP ONE INCH OF LAND GAINED. THIS WAS A FAIR REFLECTION OF PUBLIC OPINION, HE CLAIMED. HE WOULD HAVE FEWER OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUED. TARIQ AZIZ DID NOT AGREE WITH THIS VIEW AND SAID SO TO SADDAM .LC

HE SAID WITH QUOTE CHILLING DELIBERATION UNQUOTE THAT IF IRANIAN FORCES WITHDREW INTO THE CITIES, AS WAS OFTEN THE CASE WITH AN ARMY IN DIFFICULTIES, HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO BOMBARD THEM INTO SUBMISSION. HE MENTIONED AHWAZ AND DEZFUL PARTICULARLY. IRAQI COLUMNS HAD IN FACT MOVED AWAY FROM AHWAZ AND DEZFUL BACK TOWARDS THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SHATT, SO AS TO MAKE QUITE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE DESIGNS ON IRANIAN TERRITORY. HE IMPLIED THAT IRAQI MILITARY EXPERTISE AND STRATEGY WERE NOT (NOT) UP TO THE TASKS OF CAPTURING THESE TWO CITIES.

4. SADDAM REPEATED THAT HE WAS PREPARED FOR A CEASEFIRE AT ANY TIME, AND HAD NO INTENTION OF RETAINING ANY IRANIAN TERRITORY. HE REQUIRED HOWEVER ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT AL ARAB, AND THE OTHER AREAS WHICH HAD BEEN CONCEDED UNDER THE 1975 AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HANDED OVER AND WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD THEN USED TO SHELL IRAQI POSITIONS FROM

THE SHATT AL ARAB, AND THE GULF.  
UNDER THE 1975 AGREEMENT, BUT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN HANDED OVER AND WHICH THE IRANIANS HAD THEN USED TO SHELL IRAQI POSITIONS FROM SINCE 4 SEPTEMBER. NEGOTIATION WAS NOT (NOT) POSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, SADDAM CONTINUED, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH ANY ESTABLISHED CENTRAL AUTHORITY IN IRAN. IF THE WAR CONTINUED, THEN THERE WOULD ALSO BE A SERIOUS DANGER OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF IRAN WHICH (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT DESIRE IT) HE WOULD PROBABLY ENCOURAGE IF IT WOULD BRING THE WAR TO A SPEEDIER END. HE HAD MADE AN OFFER TO THE EXILED IRANIANS BAKHTIAR, JAM AND AMINI TO COME BACK AND TAKE PART IN THE RUNNING OF THE CAPTURED TERRITORIES. THEY HAD ACCEPTED THIS.

5. LORD GEORGE-BROWN TOLD US THAT WE MAY EXPECT TO HEAR THAT THESE EXILES HAVE AGREED TO SET UP SOME SORT OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

6. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT RULE OUT AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE IN THE SHAPE OF A DEMILITARISED ZONE ALONG THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SHATT IF THAT WAS WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO ENSURE IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY AND AT THE SAME TIME ILLUSTRATE THAT IRAQ DID NOT WISH TO OCCUPY IRANIAN TERRITORY. LORD GEORGE-BROWN TOLD US THAT IN KUWAIT HE HAD LEARNED (POSSIBLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OR THE FOREIGN MINISTER) THAT THE WIDTH OF TERRITORY THE IRAQIS BELIEVED THEY NEEDED TO CONTROL BEFORE THEY WOULD CEASE THEIR ADVANCE INTO KHUZISTAN WAS A STRIP ELEVEN KILOMETRES WIDE FROM THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SHATT.

7. TARIQ AZIZ AND THE PRESIDENT DISAGREED COMPLETELY ON THE BRITISH POSITION. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT AN OFFICIAL LINE TOWARDS IRAQ WAS GOOD ALTHOUGH THE MKODIA WAS GENERALLY HOSTILE. HE HAD HAD SEPARATE REPORTS THAT TWO BRITISH AMBASSADORS IN OTHER CAPITALS HAD PUT IT ABOUT THAT WE WERE DISQUIETED THAT IRAQ HAD DONE SO WELL MILITARILY. TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THESE AMBASSADORS WAS, IN FACT, TYPICAL OF HMG'S VIEW, AND THAT HMG HAD ALREADY MADE A DECISION TO FOLLOW THE AMERICANS IN RESUPPLY TO IRAN OF SPARE PARTS IF THE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT HMG HAD NOT (NOT) YET TAKEN SUCH A DECISION, BUT THAT IF THEY DID, THE RESULTS WOULD ~~BE~~ <sup>BE</sup>

& EXTREMELY DAMAGING TO UK INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. WHEN LORD GEORGE-BROWN ASKED WHAT SUCH DAMAGE WOULD AMOUNT TO, SADDAM HUSSAIN DID NOT ELABORATE. HE DID REPEAT HOWEVER THAT IT WOULD PROLONG THE WAR, WHICH WAS HARDLY IN LINE WITH HMG'S EXPRESSED WISH TO SEE IT BROUGHT TO AN EARLY END.

8. ON THE SUBJECT OF ARAB SOLIDARITY, SADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD SENT HIS MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO BAHRAIN WHEN THE AUTHORITIES THERE

8. ON THE SUBJECT OF ARAB SOLIDARITY, SADDAM SAID THAT HE HAD SENT HIS MINISTER OF DEFENCE TO BAHRAIN WHEN THE AUTHORITIES THERE SHOWED SIGNS OF FALTERING, AND THAT THEY WERE MUCH STIFFENED AS A RESULT.

9. THE INTERPRETER, MAZIN ZAHAWI, WITH WHOM LORD GEORGE-BROWN HAD A WORD WHILE WAITING TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, VOLUNTEERED THAT SOME SECTIONS OF THE IRAQI FORCES HAD BEEN VERY INEFFICIENT. FOR EXAMPLE THEIR RADAR HAD MISREAD THE BLEEPS AND SHOT DOWN A NUMBER OF THEIR OWN PLANES.

10. LORD GEORGE-BROWN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD REMARKED THAT HE WAS VERY HAPPY THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO RECEIVE THAT DAY THE CREDENTIALS OF THE NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR WHO HAD MADE A VERY FAVOURABLE IMPRESSION ON HIM, AND WITH WHOM HE HAD ENJOYED HIS CONVERSATION (SUMMARY IN MY TEL NO 574 (NOT TO ALL)).

11. GEORGE-BROWN ASKED US PARTICULARLY TO RESPECT HIS CONFIDENCE. THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SPOKEN TO ANYONE ELSE IN SUCH FRANK TERMS, AND TRUSTED HIM. GEORGE-BROWN SAID THAT IF OTHER POINTS OCCURRED TO HIM HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DIVULGE THEM ON RETURN TO LONDON.

12. SEE MY IFT, NOT TO ALL.

EGERTON

NNNN

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GRS 415

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 301650Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 898 OF 30 OCTOBER 1980

INFO BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA,  
TEL AVIV AND BONN

*Read in full*

*MS*

MY TELNO 890: IRAN/IRAQ: VISIT OF M MORIZET

1. WHEN MINISTER CALLED TODAY ON M LECLERCQ, DIPLOMATIC COUNSELLOR AT THE ELYSEE, HE ASKED HIM WHAT THE BACKGROUND WAS TO THE VISIT OF M MORIZET TO BAGHDAD.

2. LECLERCQ SAID THE IDEA HAD BEEN TO MAKE A GESTURE TOWARDS PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD HAD A NUMBER OF CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND SEVERAL MESSAGES HAD PASSED BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT GISCARD. THE IRAQIS WERE NOT DOING WELL IN THEIR WAR AGAINST IRAN. WHEN AGHA SHAHI HAD PASSED THROUGH PARIS THE OTHER DAY, HE HAD SAID THE IRANIANS WERE DISORGANISED BUT PROSECUTING A WAR WITH FULL NATIONAL SUPPORT. THE IRAQIS WERE COMPARATIVELY WELL ORGANISED BUT THE LEADERSHIP WAS COMPLETELY CUT OFF FROM THE POPULAR ROOTS. LECLERCQ SAID THE REPUTATION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD SUFFERED AND, GIVEN THE FRENCH INTERESTS IN IRAQ, THE PRESIDENT HAD JUDGED IT WISE TO MAKE A GESTURE IN HIS DIRECTION. MORIZET HAPPENED TO BE IN PARIS AT THE TIME ATTENDING A CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND HAD THEREFORE BEEN USED AS ENVOY, GIVEN HIS GOOD CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQIS FROM HIS TIME AS AMBASSADOR THERE.

3. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY FRENCH INITIATIVE. THE ONLY INITIATIVES WHICH WERE LIKELY TO RUN WERE THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE ISLAMIC AND NON-ALIGNED GROUPS. JAMES ASKED ABOUT A REPORT IN THE PARIS PRESS THAT THE FRENCH WERE MAKING PROPOSALS FOR A CEASEFIRE AT THE UNITED NATIONS. LECLERCQ SAID THAT THE IRAQIS HAD ASKED THE FRENCH TO HELP IN ENSURING THAT ANY RESOLUTION THAT WAS PUT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE A BALANCED ONE AND SHOULD NOT MERELY CONDEMN IRAQ. THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO HELP IRAQ IN THIS WAY. LECLERCQ SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH POLICY IN THE IRAN/IRAQ DISPUTE WAS DIFFERENT BUT COMPLEMENTARY. THE FRENCH WERE MAINLY CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME AND IRAQ'S POSSIBLE RETURN TO SOVIET INFLUENCE. THEY WERE IN FAVOUR OF THE EVOLUTION WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN IRAQ OVER THE LAST YEAR TOWARDS A LESS PRO-SOVIET POLICY. HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE MORE CONCERNED THAN THE FRENCH WITH THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF TOTAL COLLAPSE OF THE IRANIAN REGIME AND OF THE ENSUING RISK OF AN EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN AND IN THE AREA GENERALLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

*ALTHOUGH*

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ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH HAD AN EMBASSY IN IRAN AND INDEED THEIR  
AMBASSADOR HAD ARRIVED IN TEHRAN YESTERDAY, THEY HAD LITTLE  
INFLUENCE ON OR CONTACT WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT  
TIME. THE FACT THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE IRAQIS WERE CLOSE  
DID NOT FAVOUR THEM IN IRANIAN EYES.

HIBBERT.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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VED	CABINET OFFICE
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ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

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CONFIDENTIAL



OUT TELEGRAM

29.10.80 29

	Classification and Caveats SECRET-BURNING BUSH/DEDIP	Precedence/Deskby IMMEDIATE
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1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 SECRET-BURNING BUSH  
4 DEDIP  
5  
6 FM FCO 291615Z OCT 80  
7 TO IMMEDIATE WARSAW  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM HEAD OF PLANNING STAFF  
10 QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, 27 OCTOBER  
11 1. The Secretary of State may wish to have a short account of  
12 the Quadripartite discussion on Iran/Iraq on 27 October.  
13 2. Our new move of circulating in advance a list of questions  
14 about Western action helped to focus discussion on policy. The  
15 French will now circulate a note of the points agreed ad  
16 referendum on 27 October and of those on which there was no  
17 agreement. We shall be free to comment on the formulations used.  
18 The next meeting will be on 13 November in Paris.  
19 3. There was general agreement that stalemate persisted in the  
20 war; that the four should continue for the moment to leave others  
21 to lead in mediation efforts; that the Russians were still  
22 keeping their options open; and that it would not be in Western  
23 interests for the Soviet Union to be a party to any new arrangement  
24 concerning territory or navigation in the Gulf after the war.  
25 4. In discussion of Naval matters, there were differences on

*mf* Read in full.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword whether
File number	Dept S/S Office	Distribution Limited - Head of Planning Staff PS Sir J Graham Mr Bullard cc M Alexander, No 10
Drafted by (Block capitals) C L G Mallaby		
Telephone number 233 4333		
Authorised for despatch <i>RmjL 29/X</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats SECRET-BURNING BUSH/DEDIP	Page 2
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1 <<<<  
2 whether action would be appropriate only after an interruption of  
3 shipping in the Gulf. The Americans seemed to envisage that  
4 action might be necessary when interruption was only threatened.  
5 The conclusion was that there would be no Naval action before  
6 political decisions by governments; that high level consultations  
7 between the four and maybe Australia and New Zealand would be  
8 needed before the decisions were taken; and that the need for  
9 these consultations would arise if anything happened which im-  
10 pinged on freedom of navigation. This implies that consultations  
11 would take place in the event of an interruption or if an  
12 interruption was threatened. It was thought that the  
13 consultations might take place among Heads of Government and/or  
14 Foreign Ministers. The French agreed after some discussion that  
15 a quickly convened meeting of the four Political Directors might  
16 be an element in the consultations and that contact between  
17 Christopher and the three Ambassadors in Washington could be borne  
18 in mind as a possibility.  
19 5. The French suggested some further guidelines: that we should  
20 not allow an event which threatened shipping in the Gulf to pass  
21 without any Western reaction; that we should act speedily if such  
22 an event took place; that we should not act punitively or in  
23 retaliation but in order to restore freedom of navigation; and  
24 that we should act to the degree necessary to achieve this result  
25 but no more.  
26 6. The French displayed a strong preference for taking Naval  
27 action alone in response to certain types of incident, for instance  
28 if a merchant vessel was involved which belonged to France or a  
29 country friendly to France or was carrying oil for France. They  
30 recognised that a broader threat to shipping would require action  
31 by all the Western Navies in the area. It was pointed out in  
32 discussion that the nearest Naval units to an incident involving a  
33 single tanker would be the right ones to take action.  
34 7. The Americans firmly opposed our MOD's insistence on Naval

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats SECRET → BURNING BUSH	Page 3
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convoying of tankers as the right way to keep the Gulf open. The Americans argued that escorted convoys would not work for vast tankers which had to keep 18 miles apart, and that convoying in narrow Straits would be difficult. They advocated their sectoral approach, under which each Navy would have responsibility for a designated area of water. They suggested that this would allow for a kind of convoying if necessary: merchant ships could be seen through one sector by the Navy responsible there and handed on to another Navy when entering the next sector. The Americans did not give a straight answer when asked whether they were satisfied that merchant vessels would be persuaded to enter the Gulf under these Naval arrangements. (We are going over these matters again with MOD.) The best conclusion the Quadripartite discussion could reach was that only the Navies could reconcile these important differences about the best type of Naval action and that the Naval talks, which the French still insist should remain bilateral, should be speeded up and should take account of the Political Directors' discussion.

8. There were differences about whether the agreement of littoral states would be needed before any Naval action. The elastic formulation agreed upon was that we should secure the agreement of the littoral states. The French argued that some, for instance Kuwait, might prefer not to be consulted before Naval action. The Americans also revealed that, while preferring to act jointly with friendly Navies, they might do so alone if necessary: the main thing was that the US intended to keep shipping moving in the Gulf.

9. In a discussion about the hostages, the Americans said that they had no intention, if there was a deal, of supplying to Iran military equipment not already contracted for. But military goods worth \$400 million were already waiting to go. There were three categories. The first was sophisticated equipment which the US had decided not to deliver even before the hostages were seized;

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

SECRET-BURNING BUSH

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1 this would not be released. The second category was spares and  
 2 less advanced equipment; this would be released. The third was  
 3 major pieces of equipment belonging to Iran which were being  
 4 overhauled or modernised in the US. Here decisions would be  
 5 taken case by case. The French argued against the US going too  
 6 far too fast in rebuilding relations with Iran. US support for  
 7 Iran as well as Israel could create the feeling that the  
 8 Americans were anti-Arab on everything. The American reply was  
 9 that domestic opinion would not allow the US again to become the  
 10 protector of Iran. The US wanted to be the protector of  
 11 Israel and of Saudi Arabia, while trying also to keep Iraq away  
 12 from the Soviet Union.  
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15 CARRINGTON

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NNNN ends telegram

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Catchword

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~~PS~~

Mr. Alexander  
No 10 Downing St.

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FM FCO 291615Z OCT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE WARSAW  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 508 OF 29 OCTOBER

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM HEAD OF PLANNING STAFF  
QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS, 27 OCTOBER

1. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO HAVE A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSION ON IRAN/IRAQ ON 27 OCTOBER.
2. OUR NEW MOVE OF CIRCULATING IN ADVANCE A LIST OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN ACTION HELPED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON POLICY. THE FRENCH WILL NOW CIRCULATE A NOTE OF THE POINTS AGREED AD REFERENDUM ON 27 OCTOBER AND OF THOSE ON WHICH THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT. WE SHALL BE FREE TO COMMENT ON THE FORMULATIONS USED. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE ON 13 NOVEMBER IN PARIS.
3. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT STALEMATE PERSISTED IN THE WAR: THAT THE FOUR SHOULD CONTINUE FOR THE MOMENT TO LEAVE OTHERS TO LEAD IN MEDIATION EFFORTS: THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL KEEPING THEIR OPTIONS OPEN: AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN WESTERN INTERESTS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO BE A PARTY TO ANY NEW ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING TERRITORY OR NAVIGATION IN THE GULF AFTER THE WAR.
4. IN DISCUSSION OF NAVAL MATTERS, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ON WHETHER ACTION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE ONLY AFTER AN INTERRUPTION OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF. THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO ENVISAGE THAT ACTION MIGHT BE NECESSARY WHEN INTERRUPTION WAS ONLY THREATENED. THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO NAVAL ACTION BEFORE POLITICAL DECISIONS BY GOVERNMENTS: THAT HIGH LEVEL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE FOUR AND MAYBE AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE THE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN: AND THAT THE NEED FOR THESE CONSULTATIONS WOULD ARISE IF ANYTHING HAPPENED WHICH IMPINGED ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THIS IMPLIES THAT CONSULTATIONS

WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE EVENT OF AN INTERRUPTION OR IF AN INTERRUPTION WAS THREATENED. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE CONSULTATIONS MIGHT TAKE PLACE AMONG HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND/OR FOREIGN MINISTERS. THE FRENCH AGREED AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THAT A QUICKLY CONVENED MEETING OF THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS MIGHT BE AN ELEMENT IN THE CONSULTATIONS AND THAT CONTACT BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER AND THE THREE AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON COULD BE BORNE IN MIND AS A POSSIBILITY.

5. THE FRENCH SUGGESTED SOME FURTHER GUIDELINES: THAT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW AN EVENT WHICH THREATENED SHIPPING IN THE GULF TO PASS WITHOUT ANY WESTERN REACTION: THAT WE SHOULD ACT SPEEDILY IF SUCH AN EVENT TOOK PLACE: THAT WE SHOULD NOT ACT PUNITIVELY OR IN RETALIATION BUT IN ORDER TO RESTORE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: AND THAT WE SHOULD ACT TO THE DEGREE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT BUT NO MORE.

6. THE FRENCH DISPLAYED A STRONG PREFERENCE FOR TAKING NAVAL ACTION ALONE IN RESPONSE TO CERTAIN TYPES OF INCIDENT, FOR INSTANCE IF A MERCHANT VESSEL WAS INVOLVED WHICH BELONGED TO FRANCE OR A COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO FRANCE OR WAS CARRYING OIL FOR FRANCE. THEY RECOGNISED THAT A BROADER THREAT TO SHIPPING WOULD REQUIRE ACTION BY ALL THE WESTERN NAVIES IN THE AREA. IT WAS POINTED OUT IN DISCUSSION THAT THE NEAREST NAVAL UNITS TO AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A SINGLE TANKER WOULD BE THE RIGHT ONES TO TAKE ACTION.

7. THE AMERICANS FIRMLY OPPOSED OUR MOD'S INSISTENCE ON NAVAL CONVOYING OF TANKERS AS THE RIGHT WAY TO KEEP THE GULF OPEN. THE AMERICANS ARGUED THAT ESCORTED CONVOYS WOULD NOT WORK FOR VAST TANKERS WHICH HAD TO KEEP 18 MILES APART, AND THAT CONVOYING IN NARROW STRAITS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. THEY ADVOCATED THEIR SECTORAL APPROACH, UNDER WHICH EACH NAVY WOULD HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DESIGNATED AREA OF WATER. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW FOR A KIND OF CONVOYING IF NECESSARY: MERCHANT SHIPS COULD BE SEEN THROUGH ONE SECTOR BY THE NAVY RESPONSIBLE THERE AND HANDED ON TO ANOTHER NAVY WHEN ENTERING THE NEXT SECTOR. THE AMERICANS DID NOT GIVE A STRAIGHT ANSWER WHEN ASKED WHETHER THEY WERE SATISFIED THAT MERCHANT VESSELS WOULD BE PERSUADED TO ENTER THE GULF UNDER THESE NAVAL ARRANGEMENTS. (WE ARE GOING OVER

THESE MATTERS AGAIN WITH MOD.) THE BEST CONCLUSION THE QUADRIpartite DISCUSSION COULD REACH WAS THAT ONLY THE NAVIES COULD RECONCILE THESE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE BEST TYPE OF NAVAL ACTION AND THAT THE NAVAL TALKS, WHICH THE FRENCH STILL INSIST SHOULD REMAIN BILATERAL, SHOULD BE SPEEDED UP AND SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS' DISCUSSION.

8. THERE WERE DIFFERENCES ABOUT WHETHER THE AGREEMENT OF LITTORAL STATES WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE ANY NAVAL ACTION. THE ELASTIC FORMULATION AGREED UPON WAS THAT WE SHOULD SECURE THE AGREEMENT OF THE LITTORAL STATES. THE FRENCH ARGUED THAT SOME, FOR INSTANCE KUWAIT, MIGHT PREFER NOT TO BE CONSULTED BEFORE NAVAL ACTION. THE AMERICANS ALSO REVEALED THAT, WHILE PREFERRING TO ACT JOINTLY WITH FRIENDLY NAVIES, THEY MIGHT DO SO ALONE IF NECESSARY: THE MAIN THING WAS THAT THE US INTENDED TO KEEP SHIPPING MOVING IN THE GULF.

9. IN A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE HOSTAGES, THE AMERICANS SAID THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION, IF THERE WAS A DEAL, OF SUPPLYING TO IRAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT NOT ALREADY CONTRACTED FOR. BUT MILITARY GOODS WORTH DOLLARS 400 MILLION WERE ALREADY WAITING TO GO. THERE WERE THREE CATEGORIES. THE FIRST WAS SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT WHICH THE US HAD DECIDED NOT TO DELIVER EVEN BEFORE THE HOSTAGES WERE SEIZED: THIS WOULD NOT BE RELEASED. THE SECOND CATEGORY WAS SPARES AND LESS ADVANCED EQUIPMENT: THIS WOULD BE RELEASED. THE THIRD WAS MAJOR PIECES OF EQUIPMENT BELONGING TO IRAN WHICH WERE BEING OVERHAULED OR MODERNISED IN THE US. HERE DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN CASE BY CASE. THE FRENCH ARGUED AGAINST THE US GOING TOO FAR TOO FAST IN REBUILDING RELATIONS WITH IRAN. US SUPPORT FOR IRAN AS WELL AS ISRAEL COULD CREATE THE FEELING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE ANTI-ARAB ON EVERYTHING. THE AMERICAN REPLY WAS THAT DOMESTIC OPINION WOULD NOT ALLOW THE US AGAIN TO BECOME THE PROTECTOR OF IRAN. THE US WANTED TO BE THE PROTECTOR OF ISRAEL AND OF SAUDI ARABIA, WHILE TRYING ALSO TO KEEP IRAQ AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED  
HEAD/PLANNING STAFF  
PS  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD

COPIES TO:

MR ALEXANDER  
NO 10 DOWNING STREET

GRS 1000

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FM AMMAN 281712Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 430 OF 28 OCT 80

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD BONN DAMASCUS JEDDA MOSCOW PARIS ROME TEL  
AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 428 (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I WAS SUMMONED BY KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON IMMEDIATELY ON HIS RETURN FROM IRAQ. HE CLAIMED HE HAD FOUND IRAQI MORALE HIGH AND PRESIDENT SADDAM CONFIDENT IN THE STRENGTH OF HIS POSITION AND IN THE BELIEF THAT AN OPPORTUNITY NOW EXISTED TO ACHIEVE A LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE GULF.
2. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOWN LARGE QUANTITIES OF CAPTURED IRANIAN EQUIPMENT, MUCH OF IT BRAND NEW, INCLUDING CHIEFTAIN AND M60 TANKS, SCORPIONS AND 155MM ARTILLERY. THE IRAQIS WERE, HOWEVER, BEGINNING TO RUN SHORT OF AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS. SINCE THE START OF THE CONFLICT THE RUSSIANS HAD COMPLETELY SHUT OFF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAQ AND HAD FORBIDDEN SOVIET VESSELS WHICH HAD BEEN ON THEIR WAY TO IRAQ WHEN THE WAR BEGAN TO LAND THEIR CARGOES IN ARAB PORTS, IN SPITE OF OFFERS TO RECEIVE THEM FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. 170 TANKS AND IMPORTANT CONSIGNMENTS OF AMMUNITION AND SPARES WERE THUS BEING PREVENTED FROM REACHING IRAQ. THE IRAQIS HAD HAD VERY HEATED EXCHANGES WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THIS SUBJECT: ACCORDING TO THE KING, THE IRAQIS WERE NOW COMPLETELY DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE LOOKING FOR NEW AND CLOSER RELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN EUROPE.
3. THE KING SAID HE HAD OF COURSE DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. SADDAM REMAINED VERY SCEPTICAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEDIATION ATTEMPT AND, ALTHOUGH HE HAD GONE ALONG WITH THE ISLAMIC INITIATIVE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS. HE HAD HOWEVER BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY HIS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD'S EMISSARY (KING HUSSEIN UNDERSTOOD HE WAS AT PRESENT IN BAGHDAD AND REPRESENTED A EUROPEAN MEDIATION ATTEMPT: I TOLD THE KING THAT I DID NOT KNOW ON WHAT BASIS HE HAD BEEN SENT). THE FRENCH ENVOY HAD APPARENTLY SUGGESTED TO THE IRAQIS THAT A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED. THIS WAS VERY MUCH IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM'S OWN INCLINATION AND SADDAM HOPED THAT THE EUROPEANS WOULD NOW PURSUE THE ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT ON THESE LINES (PRESUMABLY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH THE KING DID NOT SAY SO).

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4. THE KING THEN WENT ON TO GIVE A (PRETTY DISCOURAGING) ACCOUNT OF SADDAM'S CURRENT THINKING ON THE MAIN ISSUES. SADDAM HAD REITERATED THAT HE WAS NOT SEEKING TERRITORIAL GAINS OR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN. NONETHELESS HE HAD REFERRED TO ARABISTAN AS AN ARAB ISSUE AND TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME NEW STATUS FOR THE CITY OF KHORAMSHAHR, SUCH AS THE REVIVAL OF THE OLD ARAB SHEIKHDOM. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST MIGHT ONE DAY WELCOME THIS, ESPECIALLY IF THE REST OF IRAN WERE TO FALL UNDER COMMUNIST RULE. SADDAM HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE 3 ISLANDS AND TO THE THREAT THEY COULD PRESENT TO WESTERN SECURITY IF THEY WERE TO FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS, AND STILL SEEMED TO BE THINKING OF THEIR RETURN TO ARAB RULE. ON THE SHATT, SADDAM HAD SAID HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO REVERT TO THE POSITION WHICH EXISTED BEFORE THE 1975 TREATY (THE CONDITIONS WHICH IRAQ HAD THEN ACCEPTED HAVING PROVED IMPOSSIBLE) AND THAT IRAQ SHOULD HAVE FULL SOVREIGNTY OVER THE SHATT: THE IRANIANS HAD IN ANY CASE BUILT A CANAL WHICH LESSENERED THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE SHATT, WHEREAS IT WAS IRAQ'S ONLY OUTLET TO THE SEA. THE KING MADE NO REFERENCE TO SADDAM'S VIEWS ON DELINEATION OF THE NORTH WESTERN FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

5. THE KING SAID HE WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSING HIS VISIT WITH ANY OTHER WEST EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES IN AMMAN FOR THE TIME BEING (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS IN ANY CASE IN PARIS) AND ASKED ME NOT TO REVEAL WHAT HE HAD SAID TO MY EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES HERE. HOWEVER HE HOPED YOU MIGHT DRAW ON WHAT HE HAD SAID IN DISCUSSING WITH OTHER EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WHAT SHOULD NOW BE DONE TO TERMINATE THE CONFLICT. I DID NOT THINK IT PROFITABLE AT THIS STAGE TO START A DISCUSSION WITH THE KING ON WHY PRESIDENT SADDAM'S IDEAS WERE UNLIKELY IN THEIR PRESENT FORM TO PROVIDE A FRUITFUL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE IRANIANS: PRESUMABLY THEY IN ANY CASE REPRESENT A MAXIMAL IRAQI OPENING POSITION.

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6. KING HUSSEIN ALSO MENTIONED KEEN IRAQI INTEREST IN THE CHIEFTAIN TANK AND OTHER BRITISH DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND IN THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES WITH JORDAN AND THE UK FOR THE ASSEMBLY OF LAND ROVERS AND ROLLS ROYCE DIESEL ENGINES (BOTH OF WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE JORDANIANS). HE SAID THAT JORDAN AND IRAQ WOULD BE FORMING A JOINT COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES MORE FULLY. I ASSUME ALL THIS WAS INTENDED TO INCREASE OUR INTEREST IN IRAQ'S NEW ENTHUSIASM FOR CLOSER LINKS WITH BRITAIN AND WESTERN EUROPE.

7 SEE MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 429 (NOT TO ALL) ON BRITISH SUBJECTS IMPRISONED IN IRAQ.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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IRAQ/IRAN

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IRAQ



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~920702X~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

28th October 1980

Dear George,

*Handwritten initials and date:*  
Handwritten signature/initials  
29/10

IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT: MOD PRESENTATION

My Secretary of State has asked the Defence Intelligence Staff to give a presentation on the Iraq/Iran conflict. We are trying to arrange this for Monday 10th November at 10 a.m. or Tuesday 11th November at the same time.

My Secretary of State wondered whether Ministers, and senior officials, from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Treasury, and the Departments of Trade and Energy would like to attend this presentation and I should be grateful for advice from you, and those to whom I am copying this letter, by the end of this week with an indication of the preferred date. We might have to limit the attendance of officials if there was undue competition for seats but we can consider that further in the light of bids.

I am sending copies of this letter to Stephen Gomersall (Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal), John Wiggins and Terry Mathews (Treasury), Stuart Hampson (Trade) and Julian West (Energy). Copies also go to Michael Alexander at No 10 and David Wright (Cabinet Office), the latter of whom may wish to consider whether Sir Robert Armstrong or a member of the Cabinet Secretariat would wish to attend. We are inviting the Chairman of JIC.

*Handwritten signature:*  
Young and  
Barn

(B M NORBURY)

G G H Walden Esq

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PS  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/FUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE  
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 CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
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RESIDENT CLERK

*SIR A. ACSD*

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 CABINET OFFICE DIO

ADVANCE COPY

*MT.*

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FM AMMAN 281200Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 428 OF 28 OCT 80

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD DAMASCUS JEDDA TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK  
 AND WASHINGTON

*Read in full.*

YOUR TELNO 877 OF 22 OCTOBER TO UKMIS NEW YORK; IRAN/IRAQ.

1. KING HUSSEIN, ACCOMPANIED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, LEFT FOR BAGHDAD LATE ON 26 OCTOBER AND IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO AMMAN THIS AFTERNOON. NO NEWS OF THIS VISIT HAS YET BEEN RELEASED HERE.
2. MY US COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) SAW KING HUSSEIN SEVERAL TIMES LAST WEEK, BOTH TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS REFERRED TO IN YOUR TUR AND ALSO TO TRY TO ALLAY JORDANIAN AND IRAQI ANXIETIES CONCERNING A POSSIBLE US DEAL WITH IRAN ON THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES. VELIOTES TOLD ME THAT HE HAD FLOATED WITH THE KING A NUMBER OF IDEAS AS IF THEY WERE HIS OWN ON ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ TO COVER BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND NON-INTERVENTION IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL

BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND NON-INTERVENTION IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS: THE AMERICAN HOPE WAS THAT THE UNDERTAKING ON NON-INTERVENTION, WHICH WAS REALLY INTENDED TO APPLY TO THE IRANIANS, MIGHT MAKE THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL MORE PALATABLE TO THE IRAQIS. KING HUSSEIN HAD REACTED PREDICTABLY, CLAIMING THAT THE REAL AGGRESSOR HAD BEEN IRAN AND THAT THE DEMAND FOR TOTAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL AMOUNTED TO TAKING SIDES IN THE CONFLICT.

3. ON THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF US ARMS SUPPLIES FOR IRAN, VELIOTES SAID HE HAD TOLD THE KING BLUNTLY THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE SPARE PARTS AND AMMUNITION IN US WAREHOUSES AWAITING SHIPMENT TO IRAN, WHICH HAD BEEN BLOCKED AS A RESULT OF THE TRADE EMBARGO AFTER THE SEIZURE OF THE HOSTAGES. THERE WAS THEREFORE NO GUARANTEE THAT SOME ARMS SUPPLIES MIGHT NOT REACH THE IRANIANS AS A RESULT OF ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED WHETHER THEY WOULD MAKE ANY REAL IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

4. KING HUSSEIN TOLD VELIOTES A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE INTENDED GOING TO BAGHDAD AGAIN FOR TWO MAIN REASONS:

A. TO REVIEW THE LATEST MILITARY SITUATION SEMICOLON

B. TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION.

WHILE THE KING DID NOT TELL VELIOTES IN TERMS THAT HE WOULD BE TRYING TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT SADDAM TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE WAR MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END, VELIOTES'S OWN PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT, WHEREAS 10 DAYS AGO KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE TAKEN A NEGATIVE VIEW ON ALMOST ANY OF THE POSSIBLE CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVES (SEE MY TELS NOS 413 AND 419), HE HAD SINCE MODIFIED HIS ATTITUDE AND, IF HE SENSED PRESIDENT SADDAM WAS HIMSELF LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT, WOULD BE WILLING TO ENCOURAGE HIM.

5. VELIOTES BELIEVES THAT THE SAUDIS ARE INFLUENCING THE KING IN THIS DIRECTION. FOLLOWING HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, KING HUSSEIN WAS ASKED BY PRINCE FAHD TO SEND HIS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (WHO IS ALSO IN OVERALL CHARGE OF JORDAN'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES) TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. GENERAL SHAKER VISITED SAUDI ARABIA ON 24 OCTOBER SEMICOLON ON SHAKER'S RETURN KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED A FURTHER MESSAGE FROM PRINCE FAHD. BASED ON A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, VELIOTES DEDUCES THAT THE SAUDIS ASKED KING HUSSEIN TO TAKE THE LEAD WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM IN DISCUSSING WAYS OF TERMINATING THE CONFLICT.

6. THE SAUDIS ALSO WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH GENERAL SHAKER A REPORT

6. THE SAUDIS ALSO WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH GENERAL SHAKER A REPORT THEY HAD RECEIVED THAT SYRIA AND LIBYA HAD AGREED THAT LIBYA SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TARGETTING RADICAL PALESTINIAN GROUPS AGAINST CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES. GENERAL SHAKER ALSO REFERRED TO A REPORT WHICH HE BELIEVED TO BE WELL-FOUNDED THAT LIBYA HAD GIVEN SYRIA US DOLLARS 500 MILLION IN CASH AND HAD ALSO PROMISED TO PAY FOR AN ADDITIONAL US DOLLARS 1,000 MILLION WORTH OF ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION. SHAKER HAD TOLD VELIOTES THAT, WITH IRAQ LIKELY TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH IRAN FOR MANY YEARS TO COME, JORDAN WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO RELY ON IRAQI ASSISTANCE IN RESISTING SYRIAN THREATS TO THE JORDANIAN REGIME.

7. VELIOTES SPEAKS VERY FREELY, BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO BE SURE HOW FAR HE IS ADDING HIS OWN PERSONAL INTERPRETATION TO WHAT HE HAS BEEN TOLD. I HOPE TO SEE BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHORTLY AFTER THEIR RETURN FROM IRAQ AND OBTAIN A CLEARER IDEA OF WHETHER OR NOT KING HUSSEIN SEES ANY POSSIBILITY OF NUDGING THE IRAQIS TOWARDS A CESSATION OF THE CONFLICT.

8. MEANWHILE IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION JORDANIAN MINISTERS ARE MAKING NO SECRET OF THEIR UNEASE OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN I SAW HIM ON 27 OCTOBER DESCRIBED THE WAR AS A "TOTAL DISASTER" BUT HAD NO NEW IDEAS ON HOW IT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END. THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION (WHO IS ALSO ACTING PRIME MINISTER DURING MR BADRAN'S ABSENCE IN IRAQ) TOLD LORD HOME THIS MORNING THAT THE IRAQIS HAD "COMPLETELY MISCALCULATED"; THEY HAD BEEN BANKING ON A QUICK VICTORY FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND HAD ENTIRELY FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES. BUT HE TOO COULD SEE NO EARLY END TO THE CONFLICT.

URWICK

NNNN



cc me JS  
60

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

28 October 1980

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

The Prime Minister has approved the text of the message to President Giscard enclosed with your letter to me of 27 October. The message has issued this morning on the direct line.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SP

SUBJECT

27

T 212/80

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 212/80

00 28 1230Z

PARIS FROM LONDON  
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL 0024

BT

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,  
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 OCTOBER ABOUT THE IRAN/  
IRAQ CRISIS. I WAS GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR LETTING ME KNOW IN  
ADVANCE OF YOUR DECISION TO SEND TO THE AREA A MINESWEEPING  
FLOTILLA WHICH WILL BE OPERATIONAL ON 20 NOVEMBER.

I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ,  
OR FOR THAT MATTER THE WATERS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WERE TO BE  
MINED THIS WOULD PRESENT A GRAVE THREAT TO OIL SUPPLIES VITAL  
TO THE WORLD.

FOR OUR PART WE HAVE ON STAND-BY A SPECIALISED MINING  
CLEARANCE TEAM. THIS TEAM WITH ITS EQUIPMENT IS AIR-  
TRANSPORTABLE AND COULD THEREFORE BE IN THE AREA AT SHORT  
NOTICE. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT COMPLEMENT TO  
EFFORTS WHICH YOU AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO MAKE.

MEANWHILE I BELIEVE IT REMAINS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR  
ALL OF US TO CO-ORDINATE ACTION IN THIS WAY, IF WE ARE TO BE  
ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE THREATS AND TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION,  
WITHOUT PROVOKING THE VERY DANGERS WHICH WE ARE SEEKING TO  
AVOID.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER.



00 281230Z

PARIS FROM LONDON  
SECRET GOVERNMENTAL 0024  
BT

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 24 OCTOBER ABOUT THE IRAN/  
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I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH YOU THAT IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ,  
OR FOR THAT MATTER THE WATERS OF THE PERSIAN GULF, WERE TO BE  
MINED THIS WOULD PRESENT A GRAVE THREAT TO OIL SUPPLIES VITAL  
TO THE WORLD.

FOR OUR PART WE HAVE ON STAND-BY A SPECIALISED MINING  
CLEARANCE TEAM. THIS TEAM WITH ITS EQUIPMENT IS AIR-  
TRANSPORTABLE AND COULD THEREFORE BE IN THE AREA AT SHORT  
NOTICE. IT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT COMPLEMENT TO  
EFFORTS WHICH YOU AND OTHER COUNTRIES ARE ABLE TO MAKE.

MEANWHILE I BELIEVE IT REMAINS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR  
ALL OF US TO CO-ORDINATE ACTION IN THIS WAY, IF WE ARE TO BE  
ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE THREATS AND TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION,  
WITHOUT PROVOKING THE VERY DANGERS WHICH WE ARE SEEKING TO  
AVOID.

YOUR SINCERELY,  
MARGARET THATCHER.

[ for transmission on the direct line  
to Paris. ]

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

T 212/80

S E C R E T

My Dear President,

Thank you for your message of 24 October about the Iran/Iraq crisis. I was grateful to you for letting me know in advance of your decision to send to the area a minesweeping flotilla which will be operational on 20 November.

I certainly agree with you that if the Straits of Hormuz, or for that matter the waters of the Persian Gulf, were to be mined this would present a grave threat to oil supplies vital to the world.

For our part we have on stand-by a specialised mining clearance team. This team with its equipment is air-transportable and could therefore be in the area at short notice. It would constitute an important complement to efforts which you and other countries are able to make.

Meanwhile I believe it remains extremely important for all of us to co-ordinate action in this way, if we are to be able to respond to the threats and take effective action, without provoking the very dangers which we are seeking to avoid.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher.

NO DISTRIBUTION  
GIVEN BY COMMLEN.

*Thatcher*  
28/11

26(A)



Type for transmission  
on Swift line.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1A 2AH

(1)

27 October 1980

Prime Minister

As per attached draft reply to Pres. Giscard.

Print - 27/17

Dear Michael,

Speed sub

Iraq/Iran: Minesweeping in the Gulf:  
Message from President Giscard

I attach a self-explanatory draft reply to the message from President Giscard enclosed with your letter to me of 24 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever  
Rodric Lyne

PP (P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing St

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: ~~minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note~~  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:  
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:  
President of the French Republic

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:  
*My Dear President,*

.....In Confidence

Thank you for your message of 24 October about the Iran/Iraq crisis. I was grateful to you for letting me know in advance of your decision to send to the area a minesweeping flotilla which will be operational on 20 November.

CAVEAT.....

I certainly agree with you that if the Straits of Hormuz, or for that matter the waters of the Persian Gulf, were to be mined this would present a grave threat to oil supplies vital to the world.

For our part we have on stand-by a specialised mining clearance team. This team with its equipment is air-transportable and could therefore be in the area at short notice. It would constitute an important complement to efforts which you and other countries are able to make.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Meanwhile I believe it remains extremely important for all of us to co-ordinate action in this way, if we are to be able to respond to the threats and take effective action, without provoking the very dangers which we are seeking to avoid.

*Your sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher*

086120 27 OCT 1980



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ZZ PARIS

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FM FCO 271230Z OCTOBER 80

TO FLASH PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 415 OF 27 OCTOBER.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT),  
WASHINGTON

INFO SAVING BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI,  
DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

FOR BULLARD

WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS NOS 4390 AND 4391: DEFENCE ISSUES IN THE  
PERSIAN GULF

1. IT IS CLEAR FROM BARTHOLOMEW'S COMMENTS RECORDED IN WASHINGTON TUR THAT ALTHOUGH THERE HAS RECENTLY APPEARED TO BE A GREATER DEGREE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE NAVY-TO-NAVY TALKS IN LONDON, THERE IN FACT REMAINS A WIDE GULF BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES OVER CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
2. AS WE SEE IT, THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US IN THE UNDERLYING CONCEPT. FOR OUR PART WE HAVE ALWAYS MAINTAINED THAT IT IS HARD TO ENVISAGE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH NAVAL ACTION IN ADVANCE OF A STOPPAGE OF SHIPPING WOULD NOT PROVOKE PRECISELY THE DANGERS WHICH WE HOPE TO AVOID. INDEED, WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATE ACTION. WE NOTE THAT BARTHOLOMEW STATES THE FIRM US VIEW THAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT A STANDSTILL. WE HAVE HOWEVER YET TO VISUALISE A CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH TAKES THE RISKS SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE PRESENT POSITION BUT FALLS SHORT OF ONE IN WHICH FORCE IS USED OR THREATENED, THUS EFFECTIVELY CLOSING THE STRAITS. FROM THIS DIFFERENCE SPRINGS THE GAP IN OUR OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS.
3. IN OUR VIEW SHIPPING MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL NOT ONLY BY HOSTILE (IE IRANIAN) ACTION BUT BY THREAT OF ACTION. A THREAT MIGHT TAKE THE FORM EITHER OF A DECLARATION THAT IRAN HAD QUOTE CLOSED UNQUOTE THE STRAITS AND WOULD REGARD AS HOSTILE ANY VESSEL ATTEMPTING PASSAGE, OR A STATEMENT THAT IRAN HAD MINED

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THE STRAITS. IN EITHER CASE WE BELIEVE THAT TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, AND ALMOST REGARDLESS OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE THREAT, MERCHANT SHIPPING WOULD BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL. THUS A THREAT WOULD HAVE MUCH THE SAME EFFECT AS AN OUT-OF-THE-BLUE ATTACK ON A MERCHANT VESSEL (EG BY AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE SHIPPING). AS WE SEE IT, THEREFORE, THE MOST IMPORTANT CONTINGENCY FOR WHICH TO PLAN IS ONE IN WHICH THE TASK WILL BE TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF MERCHANT TRAFFIC THROUGH THE STRAITS AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN CLOSED EITHER BY FORCE OR BY THREAT OF FORCE.

4. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT IS MEANT BY BARTHOLOMEW'S STATEMENT THAT THE US BELIEVE THAT THE NAVIES SHOULD ACT TO PREVENT A STANDSTILL. IT IS PRECISELY IN ORDER TO DETER THE USE OR THE THREAT OF FORCE THAT WE HAVE POSITIONED SURFACE VESSELS IN THE GULF OF OMAN. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS ACTION (WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THE US AND FRENCH PRESENCE OUTSIDE IN FACT ALREADY AMOUNT TO A ZONAL OR SECTORAL APPROACH) WILL REMAIN A SUFFICIENT DETERRENT TO PREVENT A CLOSURE. BUT IN OUR VIEW TO DO MORE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN SHIPPING IS PASSING NORMALLY THROUGH THE GULF RUNS THE RISK OF BEING REGARDED AS PROVOCATIVE.

5. FROM THIS BASIC DIFFERENCE OF VIEW OF THE SCENARIO APPEARS TO STEM THE GAP BETWEEN OUR CONCEPT AND THAT OF THE AMERICANS ABOUT ESCORTING. THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT, FOLLOWING A CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS, NAVIES ON THE SPOT WILL HAVE TO TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RE-ESTABLISH THE CONFIDENCE OF SHIPPERS AND INSURERS. IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT NOTHING SHORT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ESCORTING GROUPS OF SHIPS, AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, WILL DO THIS. BARTHOLOMEW APPEARS TO RECOGNISE THIS IN HIS SUGGESTION FOR A COMPROMISE (LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 4 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 4390).

6. AS REGARDS THE FRENCH, WE ENTIRELY ACCEPT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE WORKING WITHIN WHAT THEY UNDERSTAND TO BE POLITICALLY TOLERABLE LIMITS. BUT HERE AGAIN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN US ARISES FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE AND THE AMERICANS ENVISAGE THE USE OF NAVAL VESSELS. WE UNDERSTAND

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THAT THE FRENCH HAVE SAID THEY WOULD CONSIDER JOINT OPERATIONS ONLY IN EXTREMIS. A SHIPPING STANDSTILL IN THE GULF WOULD SURELY BE A CONTINGENCY SUFFICIENTLY EXTREME TO WARRANT CO-OPERATION IN THE KIND OF COURSE OF ACTION WE ENVISAGE.

7. GRATEFUL IF BULLARD COULD MAKE THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 2 TO 6 ABOVE TO HIS US INTERLOCUTOR. HE COULD ADD THAT, IF NOTHING ELSE, BARTHOLOMEW'S COMMENTS HAD REVEALED THAT, IN SPITE OF APPARENT PROGRESS IN THE NAVY-TO-NAVY TALKS, THERE WAS STILL A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF BASIC MISUNDERSTANDING. THIS REINFORCED OUR VIEW THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED FOR WIDER CONSULTATIONS, NOT ONLY AT THE MILITARY LEVEL, BUT ALSO AT THE POLITICAL.

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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

24 October 1980

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD

I enclose a copy of a message which the Prime Minister has just received from President Giscard on the direct line. You will no doubt wish to consider whether we should offer any comment on the message.

I am sending copies of this letter, and its enclosure, to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

CS

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SUBJECT

Prime Minister

2/

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL NO. T218/80

ZZ 241102Z  
LONDRES DE PARIS  
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL 110  
BT  
DE MONSIEUR VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE  
A  
MADAME MARGARET THATCHER  
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI  
LONDRES

nb

PARIS LE 24 OCTOBRE 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

LES AUTORITES IRANIENNES ONT LAISSE ENTENDRE QUE LE MINAGE  
DU DETROIT D'ORMUZ N'ETAIT PAS EXCLU.

A NOTRE CONNAISSANCE, LES ETATS-UNIS NE DISPOSENT COMME MOYENS  
DE DRAGAGE DANS CETTE ZONE QUE DE TROIS HELICOPTERES DONT L'EFFI-  
CACITE EST EVIDEMMENT MOINDRE QUE CELLE D'UN ENSEMBLE DE BATIMENTS  
SPECIALISES.

C'EST POURQUOI J'AI DECIDE D'ENVOYER DANS LA ZONE UNE FLOTILLE  
COMPOSEE DE DEUX CHASSEURS DE MINES, DE TROIS DRAGUEURS OCEANIQUES  
ET D'UN BATIMENT DE SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE.

LES BATIMENTS APPAREILLERONT LE MARDI 28 OCTOBRE 1980. LES  
PREMIERS D'ENTRE EUX DOIVENT ARRIVER A DJIBOUTI LE 11 NOVEMBRE.  
LA FLOTILLE SERA OPERATIONNELLE LE 20 NOVEMBRE.

JE VOUS PRIE DE CROIRE, MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE, EN MES  
SENTIMENTS LES MEILLEURS.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT

CFN 28 OCTOBRE 1980 11 NOVEMBRE 20 NOVEMBRE

NNNN

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

*Iraq*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 230930Z

FM BAGHDAD 230730Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 549 OF 23/10/80

AND SAVING TO IMMEDIATE HM YACHT BRITANNIA (FOR PS) DESKBY 231100Z

AND IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 231100Z

FO INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN KUWAIT TEL AVIV  
AND BONN

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 1560, 1567 AND 1568 **IRAQ/IRAN**

1. I AGREE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD REACT BADLY, AT THIS STAGE TO A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF THE TYPE OUTLINED BY - ARDAKANI (IRAN). THIS IS BECAUSE IRAQ HAS NEITHER MADE DEMONSTRABLY SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN KHUZISTAN, NOR BEEN RECEIVED AS LIBERATORS BY THE ARABS THERE.

2. WHAT SADDAM WOULD CONSIDER ADEQUATE GAINS IN THAT REGION IS A QUESTION I DISCUSSED ON 21 OCTOBER WITH THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (MAJOR GENERAL FURSDON) AND GUARDIAN (DAVID FAIRHALL) DEFENCE CORRESPONDENTS, BOTH RECENTLY BACK FROM OCCUPIED KHUZISTAN AND ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE UK AS NO (NO) FURTHER PRESS TRIPS TO THE FRONT ARE BEING PERMITTED BY THE IRAQIS. BOTH THOUGHT THAT SADDAM'S MINIMUM PLAN NOW COMPRISED SEIZURE OF THE PORT AND MOST OF THE TOWN OF KHORRAMSHAHR; THE SEALING OFF OF ABADAN; AND THE NEUTRALISATION OF DEZFUL, WITH ITS UNDERGROUND JOINT COMMAND CENTRE AND MILITARY AIRPORT. NEITHER THE CAPTURE OF AHWAZ NOR BANDAR KHOMEINI WAS NEARLY AS IMPORTANT; THE FORMER BEING SPRAWLY WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HOLD. FURSDON SAID THAT AN ADDED COMPLICATION WAS THE CROSS-COUNTRY IRAQI SUPPLY LINE FROM AMARA TO DEZFUL, WHICH INVOLVED A RIVER CROSSING (OF THE KARKHEH, A TRIBUTARY OF THE KARUN), AND WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE SECURE BEFORE THE RAINS STARTED IN NOVEMBER. THE THREAT TO THIS SUPPLY LINE FROM LOW-FLYING PHANTOMS WAS CONSIDERABLE, BOTH WITHIN IRAN AND ON THE KUT TO AMARA HIGHWAY, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN PROHIBITED TO CIVILIAN TRAFFIC, AND IS JAMMED DAILY WITH RESUPPLY CONVOYS. THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE IRAQI ACK-ACK OR INTERCEPTION IN THIS SECTOR. FURSDON REMARKED THAT IT WAS LUCKY THAT THE IRANIANS DID NOT YET SEEM TO HAVE OR BE USING NAPALM, THE IDEAL ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON FOR DEALING WITH CONVOYS; NOR APPARENTLY ANY LAND OR SEA MINES.

3. COMMENT.

IN THIS CURIOUS WAR, A NON-WIN BY IRAQ WILL BE SEEN AS TANTAMOUNT TO FAILURE. SADDAM HAS PUT HIS PEOPLE ON NOTICE, IN HIS EID SPEECH (MY TEL NO 541) THAT THEY MAY BE IN FOR A

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LONG HAUL. THIS IS AN UNWELCOME MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY TO THE IRAQI ARMY, WHO HAVE NEITHER THE TRAINING NOR I SUSPECT THE PATIENCE, TO BE AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION. THEY MUST BE WONDERING WHY THE IRAQI AIRFORCE HAS NOT (NOT) YET BEEN HEAVILY COMMITTED.

4. UKMIS TEL NO. 1568, JUST RECEIVED. TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT SEEMS ADMIRABLE. IF A REFERENCE TO FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ALL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA COULD BE WORKED INTO ITS PARA. 6 THAT WOULD SUIT THE IRAQIS (C.F. PARA 3. OF FCO TEL NO. 420 TO ME).

EGERTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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COPY NO. 21

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FM WASHINGTON 221910Z OCT 80

Read i full

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4353 OF 22 OCTOBER 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK STOCKHOLM HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN)

FOLLOWING FROM FRETWELL IN AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE ON TOUR.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1561: U.S. HOSTAGES IN IRAN

*ms*

1. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF ACTIVITY IN TRAIN RELATING TO THE HOSTAGES, SOME OF WHICH HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN MATERIAL FROM SOURCES WHICH MUST ON NO ACCOUNT BE QUOTED OR COMPROMISED. ARDAKANI'S REMARK PROVIDES USEFUL COLLATERAL.

2. U.S. OFFICIALS ARE EXTREMELY TIGHT-LIPPED ON THIS SUBJECT. THEIR FINGERS WERE BURNED WHEN THE ELABORATE DEAL TO SECURE THE HOSTAGES' RELEASE COLLAPSED JUST WHEN SUCCESS WAS IN SIGHT EARLIER IN THE YEAR. THEY ARE FEARFUL THAT ANY DEAL WHICH IS NOW EMERGING WILL SIMILARLY BE FRUSTRATED BY AN IRRATIONAL IRANIAN ACT OR SOME UNACCEPTABLE NEW DEMAND AT THE LAST MOMENT. THEY ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THE QUESTION IN RELATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. VEST TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT CHRISTOPHER MIGHT BE ABLE TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THE HOSTAGES ON FRIDAY, BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME NO-ONE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD AUTHORITY TO DO SO.

3. WE KNOW FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN PUTTING TOGETHER THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR RESPONSE TO THE DEMANDS FORMULATED BY KHOMEINI ON 12 SEPTEMBER. THEY HAVE FOR INSTANCE ASSEMBLED COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENTATION ABOUT THE HISTORY OF U.S./IRANIAN RELATIONS (WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 4064). THEY HAVE TRIED OUT VARIOUS FORMULAE FOR THE APOLOGY WHICH THE IRANIANS AT ONE TIME DEMANDED, ALTHOUGH THAT NO LONGER SEEMS TO BE A CENTRAL ISSUE. THEY HAVE PUBLICLY OFFERED TO UNFREEZE IRANIAN ASSETS (APPARENTLY IGNORING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WILL ARISE FROM THE NUMEROUS COURT ACTIONS IN WHICH CLAIMS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE ASSETS AND WHICH MAY TAKE A LONG TIME TO RESOLVE). THEY HAVE EXPRESSED U.S. INTEREST IN THE CONTINUING INTEGRITY OF IRAN.

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4. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH THE IRANIANS ON THESE AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS THROUGH A RANGE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN TEHRAN AND IN EUROPE. THEY HAVE ALSO TRIED TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE IRANIANS THROUGH ALL AVAILABLE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION, INCLUDING BOTH ARAB AND WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THEY HAVE HELD OUT BAIT IN THE FORM OF THE PROMISED RELEASE OF SOME ARMS SUPPLIES ALREADY PAID FOR BY THE IRANIANS:

AND THEY HAVE UNDERLINED THE DAMAGE WHICH THE DISPUTE IS CAUSING TO IRAN ITSELF. THEY HAVE PROBABLY SOUGHT TO CONVEY THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE A BETTER BET THAN REAGAN FOR BOTH THE ARAB WORLD AND IRAN, BECAUSE OF HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SEEK A GENUINE SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIANS (A THEME OF WHICH THERE WERE ECHOES IN U.S. CONTACTS WITH LIBYA IN THE BILLYGATE AFFAIR).

5. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BOTH CARTER AND MUSKIE HAVE MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS INDICATING A TILT TOWARDS IRAN IN ITS CONFLICT WITH IRAQ - THE REFERENCES TO IRAQI AGGRESSION AND INVASION, THE STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN, ETC. IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THESE STATEMENTS ARE SIMPLY DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE AND ENCOURAGE IRANIANS WHO WANT TO SETTLE THE HOSTAGE PROBLEM OR WHETHER THEY ARE PART OF AN AGREED SCENARIO REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO COMMIT HIMSELF PUBLICLY ON THESE POINTS.

6. I PICKED UP AN OBSCURE HINT FROM A SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME ARGUMENT WITHIN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ABOUT HOW TO RESPOND TO RAJAI'S SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD WITHDRAW THE FOUR AWACS AIRCRAFT FROM SAUDI ARABIA. THE QUESTION HAD BEEN RESOLVED, HE THOUGHT DEFINITELY, IN FAVOUR OF RETAINING THE AWACS. BUT THE FACT THAT THE QUESTION COULD BE CONSIDERED AT ALL SUGGESTS THAT SOME PEOPLE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION IS CLOSE AND THAT IT WOULD BE WORTH ONE FINAL PUSH TO BRING IT OFF, EVEN AT A SIGNIFICANT COST.

/7. THE

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7. THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE HOSTAGE-TAKING FALLS ON 4 NOVEMBER AND BOTH CANDIDATES ARE HIGHLY CONSCIOUS OF THE ELECTORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY DEAL WHICH CAN BE DONE BEFORE THEN. VIEWS DIFFER ABOUT WHETHER THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES OR THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DEAL WOULD BE AN ELECTION-WINNER FOR CARTER, BUT THE RESULTING SENSE OF RELIEF AND EVEN EUPHORIA WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT. IT IS NO DOUBT AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST THIS THAT REAGAN HAS NOW STARTED TO CRITICISE CARTER FOR THE FACT THAT THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN HELD AT ALL.

8. IN SHORT ALL THE PIECES WHICH CAN BE PUT TOGETHER ARE NOW IN PLACE FOR A DEAL ON THE HOSTAGES AND THE ADMINISTRATION WILL GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO PULL IT OFF IN THE NEXT 12 DAYS. HOPES HAVE BEEN DASHED BEFORE AND THERE IS STILL NO CERTAINTY THAT KHOMEINI WILL FINALLY DECIDE TO PRESS THE BUTTON FOR THEIR RELEASE, BUT MY BEST GUESS IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVE A DEAL IS NOW WITHIN REACH.

HENDERSON

LIMITED

HD/MED	PS/MR RIDLEY
HD/NAD	PS/PUS
HD/NENAD	SIR E YOUDE
HD/DEF D	SIR J GRAHAM
HD/PUSD	SIR A ACLAND
HD/PLANNING STAFF	MR DAY
HD/ERD	MR J MOBERLY
PS	MR HARDING
PS/LPS	MR P H MOBERLY
PS/MR HURD	LORD BRIDGES

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TOP SECRET



25 OCT 1980





CONFIDENTIAL

*Wing.*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-~~8307022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 3/9/4/2

20th October 1980

*to Paul*

*MP*

*Prime Minister* (2)

*Paul - 20/10*

*Dear Michael,*

GULF OF OMAN PATROL

You wrote on 14th October conveying the Prime Minister's agreement to the strengthening of our naval presence in the Persian Gulf area. This is to let you know that on the latest timings we have HMS ALACRITY will join HMS COVENTRY in the Gulf of Oman on Wednesday, 22nd October.

We are assuming that there will be a need to maintain two warships (plus afloat support) on patrol in the Gulf of Oman for the foreseeable future. We can provide this presence up until the beginning of December by detaching ships on rotation from the RN Task Group but thereafter the patrol will be conducted by ships sailed from the UK.

I should perhaps also mention that we are looking urgently at the possible threat of mining in the Persian Gulf and at ways of dealing with it. This is one of the subjects being pursued within the current Naval Staff talks with the United States, but for our part we have taken the precaution of placing four mine-hunters on notice: they could arrive in the Gulf within six weeks of a decision to sail them. A naval clearance diving team could however be got there inside a week.

I am copying this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Your ever,*  
*David Omand*

(D B OMAND)


M O'D B Alexander Esq

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-920 7000



20 OCT 1980



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FM MUSCAT 180816Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 298 OF 18 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE HMY BRITANNIA, (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY), WASHINGTON,

PRIORITY JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI

INFO SAVING PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 297: IRAN/IRAQ

1. MOBERLY AND I HAD A FURTHER SESSION WITH QAIS ZAWAWI LAST EVENING AT HIS SUGGESTION. IT EMERGED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE US AMBASSADOR EARLIER IN THE DAY. YUSUF ALAWI (UNDER SECRETARY MFA) WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, WAS ALSO PRESENT.
  
2. ARISING OUT OF HIS LATEST ENCOUNTER WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE, ZAWAWI MADE THE FOLLOWING PARTICULAR POINTS:-
  - A) THE OMANIS HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE TERM "INTERNATIONAL FORCE" WHICH THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO BE USING IN THE CONTEXT OF NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING. THEY WOULD PREFER SOME MORE AMBIGUOUS PHRASE:
  - B) THEY SAW THE NEED FOR THOSE CONCERNED (IE AMERICANS, FRENCH AND OURSELVES) TO ESTABLISH A UNIFIED NAVAL COMMAND WITH WHOM THE OMANIS COULD DISCUSS THE DEVELOPING SITUATION, RATHER THAN HAVING TO DEAL WITH EACH BILATERALLY:
  - C) HE HOPED THAT OUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS WOULD LEAD TO A DEFINITE CONTINGENCY PLAN. HE REALISED THAT THIS COULD NOT BE READY FOR SOME WHILE BUT HE WOULD BE IN LONDON IN EARLY NOVEMBER AND LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS THEN, THOUGH THE OMANIS WOULD OF COURSE MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THIS EMBASSY MEANWHILE.
  
3. THE AMERICANS HAD OFFERED TO SHARE WITH THE OMANIS INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM AWACS, BUT THE OMANIS HAD RESPONDED CAUTIOUSLY. BEFORE REACHING ANY FIRM AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT IT MIGHT INVOLVE IN THE WAY OF ANY AMERICAN TEAM OR SPECIAL INSTALLATIONS IN OMAN. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF CURRENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US, ZAWAWI HAD MADE CLEAR TO WILEY THAT THE OMANIS WISHED THE DISCUSSIONS TO MOVE SLOWLY AT A PACE DICTATED BY THE OMANIS.
  
4. YUSUF ALAWI WAS FULL OF THE IDEA THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CONTEMPLATING A SPARES-FOR-HOSTAGES DEAL WITH THE IRANIANS. MOBERLY COMMENTED THAT THIS POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN RAISED WITH HIM IN OTHER GULF STATES, AND HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT WE CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

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5. OUR CONTACTS WITH ZAWAWI DURING MOBERLY'S VISIT HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SATISFACTORY AND BODE WELL FOR CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATION AS THE REGIONAL SITUATION DEVELOPS.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PARIS AND UKMIS NEW YORK

LUCAS

[REPEATED AS  
REQUESTED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM WASHINGTON 182305Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4321 OF 18 OCTOBER 1980,

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS(D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS 5, DNOT), H M Y  
BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN)

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT,

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 1658: IRAN/IRAQ - DEFENCE ISSUES

1. FRETWELL ACTED TODAY ON THESE INSTRUCTIONS WITH BARTHOLOMEW (STATE DEPARTMENT), WHO WORKS VERY CLOSELY WITH THE PENTAGON ON THESE MATTERS.

2. BARTHOLOMEW WAS GLAD TO HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE NAVAL TALKS IN LONDON WERE NOW MAKING BETTER PROGRESS, RECOGNISING THAT OWING TO THE URGENCY OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION THE U S HAD GOT OFF TO A ROCKY START WITH INCOMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS. OUR EARLIER EXPRESSION OF DISSATISFACTION HAD BEEN USEFUL.

3. HE NOTED THAT THE TWO NAVIES SEEMED TO BE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE U S SECTOR CONCEPT AND OUR OWN IDEAS WHICH APPEARED MORE AKIN TO CONVOYING. CONVOYING IMPLIED A GREATER DEGREE OF INTEGRATION IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE U S PREFERENCE FOR THE SECTOR CONCEPT HAD BEEN PARTLY INFLUENCED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THEY HAD FORESEEN A MORE INTEGRATED STRUCTURE LEADING TO PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH AND THE GULF STATES AND PERHAPS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, WHOSE REACTION COULD BE HOSTILE.

4. BARTHOLOMEW UNDERTOOK TO LET US HAVE CONSIDERED U S COMMENTS NEXT WEEK. HE ASSUMED (AND FRETWELL CONFIRMED) THAT WE WOULD WANT TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THESE POINTS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL AS WELL AS IN THE NAVAL TALKS. HIS PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR T U R WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE U S WOULD AGREE, AS LONG AS THE OMANIS WOULD CO-OPERATE:

(B) THE U S HAD ALREADY DONE SOME THINKING ABOUT EXTENDING AIR COVER, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE USE OF SAUDI FACILITIES AND PERHAPS THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES TAKING UP SOME OF THE AIR-DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITY WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR F 5'S:

(C) THE U S HAD THOUGHT IN TERMS OF A LESS INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE) (IN ANY CASE THEY PREFERRED TO TALK ABOUT A "CO-ORDINATING NETWORK" RATHER THAN A "COMMAND STRUCTURE"):

(D) NO COMMENT:

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(E) U S CO-OPERATION WITH THE FRENCH LOCALLY HAD BEEN GOOD. METHODS AND CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION AND CO-ORDINATION HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY ARRANGED. THE EXERCISE EVIDENTLY HAD A POLITICAL GREEN LIGHT FROM PARIS, SO LONG AS IT WAS CONDUCTED IN A LOW KEY ON THE SPOT. THE FRENCH HAD NOT COMMENTED SO RESTRICTIVELY ABOUT ACTIVE NAVAL COOPERATION TO THE U S AS TO US ALTHOUGH THEY INSISTED ON PRESERVING THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN DECISION-MAKING:

(F) THIS IS COVERED IN MY 2 I F T'S:

(G) AS EARLIER REPORTED (MY TELNO 4309), THE U S HAD ALREADY FOCUSED ON THE MINING THREAT, THEY WERE STEPPING UP THEIR OWN ANTI-MINING CAPABILITY, AND WOULD WANT TO EXPLORE THAT OF OTHERS. PROPOSALS WERE SHORTLY TO BE PUT TO THE SAUDIS.

5. BARTHOLOMEW THEN GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF RECENT U S APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES (YOUR TELNO 391 TO MUSCAT), WHICH HAD COVERED BOTH THE CO-ORDINATION OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND AIR-DEFENCE. SEE MY 2 I F T'S.

F C O PASS SAVING , MOSCOW. UKDEL NATO.

HENDERSON.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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FM WASHINGTON 182310Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4322 OF 18 OCTOBER 80.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT) AND  
HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN).

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN.

INFO SAVING UK MIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

M.I.P.T. : U.S. TALKS WITH GULF STATES ON NAVAL COORDINATION.

1. BARTHOLOMEW DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF RECENT U.S. APPROACHES TO  
THE GULF STATES (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 391 TO MUSCAT) IN THE FOLLOWING  
TERMS.

SAUDI ARABIA.

2. AS THE RESULT OF AMBASSADOR WEST'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FAHD,  
SULTAN AND ABDULLAH, THE SAUDIS HAD AGREED TO BEGIN BILATERAL  
PLANNING. THIS WOULD COVER JOINT SUPPLY MEASURES, INCLUDING  
COUNTER-OPERATIONS AGAINST MINING EXTENDING BEYOND SAUDI WATERS.  
THE U.S. NAVY TEAM WOULD BE PURSUING THESE TALKS TODAY WITH THE  
SAUDIS. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR  
EXCHANGING INFORMATION ON THREATS TO SHIPPING AND OTHER DEVELOP-  
MENTS IN THE GULF. THE SAUDIS HAD THUS AGREED TO PARTICIPATE  
ACTIVELY IN IMPROVING THE DEFENCE SITUATION IN THE AREA.

OMAN.

3 FOLLOWING THE OMANI APPROACH IN WASHINGTON, WHICH HAD BEEN  
FOLLOWED UP IN MUSCAT, THE OMANIS HAD AGREED TO NAVAL TALKS WITH  
THE U.S. AND WERE CONSIDERING ALLOWING THE U.S. INCREASED ACCESS  
TO THEIR FACILITIES TO EASE COORDINATION. THEY HAD EMPHASISED  
THAT THEY WANTED THESE TALKS TO BE BILATERAL, AND WOULD PREFER  
THE U.S. TO HOLD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OTHER GULF STATES  
INVOLVED. THEY HAD ALSO NOTED THE LIMITED CAPABILITIES OF THE  
REST OF THE GULF STATES, AND THEIR OWN OPPOSITION TO THESE STATES  
BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE DEFENCE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

KUWAIT.

4 IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE RESPONSE TO MOBERLY THAT THE KUWAITIS  
WERE IN A SPECIAL POSITION AND WOULD NOT COOPERATE. THE U.S. WOULD  
NOT PURSUE THE ISSUE WITH THEM BUT WOULD KEEP THEM INFORMED ON A  
SPORADIC BASIS. IT WAS NOTED HOWEVER THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD  
WELCOMED THE ARRIVAL OF THE AWACS AND THE U.S. GUIDED-MISSILE  
CRUISER (USS LEAHY) IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA  
(PAKENHAM'S LETTER TO LOGAN OF 15 OCTOBER).

UAE.

5. UAE LEADERS HAD EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN THE U.S. APPROACH BUT  
HAD GIVEN NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE AND CONTENTED THEMSELVES WITH

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LISTENING CALMLY TO WHAT THE U.S. HAD TO SAY. THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION TO THE USS LEAHY'S ARRIVAL, AND NO ATTEMPT TO PICK UP THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. IT HAD HOWEVER BEEN VOLUNTEERED THAT IN A REAL EMERGENCY THE UAE WOULD ALLOW U.S. SHIPS TO USE THEIR PORTS FOR REPAIRS. THE QUESTION HAD BEEN POSED WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF IRAN ATTACKED THE SMALLER GULF STATES. THE U.S. RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT WASHINGTON'S CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE GULF STATES AND ITS OWN INTEREST IN THE AREA HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR. ANY REQUESTS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE WOULD RECEIVE EARLY AND HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY THE UAE LEADERS. THE MINIMUM U.S. REQUIREMENT FROM THE UAE WAS THEIR SILENT ASSENT TO WESTERN ACTIVITIES. THE U.S. WOULD NOT PUSH THE QUESTION WITH THEM AT THIS POINT BUT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF THE OTHER GULF STATES WERE TO LEARN OF THE SAUDI ATTITUDE TOWARDS NAVAL COORDINATION. THIS WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

6. REFERRING TO FRETWELL'S EARLIER BRIEFING ON OUR RECENT ACTIONS WITH THE UAE (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1661, DURING WHICH FRETWELL ALSO DREW ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF MUSCAT TELEGRAM NO 298) BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US TO ENSURE THAT WE WERE ALL WORKING ALONG THE SAME LINES. QATAR.

7 THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION OF SUBSTANCE, APART FROM GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT MULTILATERAL PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES IN THE GULF WAS PRUDENT. SOME INTEREST HAD BEEN INDICATED IN THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. THE U.S. ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE QATAR POSITION AMOUNTED TO SILENT ASSENT. BAHRAIN.

8 AGAIN NO REACTION OF SUBSTANCE, AND NO RESPONSE TO THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER. THE BAHRAINIS HAD SAID THAT IN THEIR VIEW NEITHER IRAN NOR IRAQ WOULD SEE IT IN THEIR INTERESTS TO INTERFERE WITH GULF SHIPPING. THE U.S. THOUGHT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME LINGERING SUSPICION IN BAHRAIN THAT SOMETHING AS YET UNEXPLAINED LAY BEHIND THE ARRIVAL OF THE USS LEAHY.

9. BARTHOLOMEW'S CONCLUSION WAS "SO FAR SO GOOD", WITH THE EXCEPTION OF KUWAIT. PERSONALLY HE FELT THAT THE U.S. HAD RECEIVED A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM THE GULF STATES AS A WHOLE, BUT THE NEXT STEPS WOULD OBVIOUSLY REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

10. SEE M. I. F. T.  
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FM WASHINGTON 182315Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4323 OF 18 OCTOBER 80.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), ACDS (OPS) DS5, DNOT). AND  
HMY BRITANNIA (FOR WALDEN).

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.

INFO ROUTINE KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA AND BAHRAIN.

INFO SAVING UK MIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

M.I.P.T. : U.S. TALKS WITH GULF STATES ON AIR DEFENCE.

1. BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THERE WERE TWO ASPECTS TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GULF STATES ABOUT AIR DEFENCE:

(I) THE PROVISION VIA THE AWACS OF INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL THREATS;

AND

(II) THE POSSIBILITY OF INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GULF STATES. THIS SECOND PROPOSAL HAD ONLY BEEN RAISED WITH THE SAUDIS AND OMANIS WHO WERE IN A SPECIAL CATEGORY.

2. ON THE AWACS INFORMATION OFFER, HE HAD ALREADY DESCRIBED THE REACTION OF THE OTHER GULF STATES (MIPT).

THE OMANIS HAD ASKED FOR A U.S. TECHNICAL TEAM, EITHER FROM SAUDI ARABIA OR FROM THE U.S., TO VISIT MUSCAT TO PURSUE THE OFFER. THIS THE U.S. WOULD NOW BE ARRANGING. BARTHOLOMEW SAID THAT THE OMANIS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT, SINCE THE AWACS ORBIT DID NOT COVER THEIR TERRITORY, SOME LINK MIGHT NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE AWACS AND THE CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT IN THE ARABIAN SEA TO COVER THEIR INTERESTS. TECHNICALLY, HE NOTED, THE INFORMATION FROM RIYADH COULD BE PASSED EITHER BY SIMPLE LAND LINES OR BY STATIONING A U.S. TEAM (OF ABOUT 10 MEN) IN OMAN TO HANDLE THE TRANSFER OF INFORMATION.

3. ON INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE, THE U.S. HAD SUGGESTED TO THE OMANIS THAT THEY MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER AMONG THE GULF STATES. NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM MUSCAT, BUT PRELIMINARY REACTIONS WERE FAVOURABLE. THE SAUDIS ALSO SEEMED INTERESTED AND THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JEDDA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CONCEPT FURTHER

/ WITH THEM.

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WITH THEM. (BARTHOLOMEW UNDERLINED THAT IN ALL THESE APPROACHES U.S. REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN EMPHASISING THE U.S. POSITION OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-BELLIGERENCE IN RESPECT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT). THE U.S. HAD INDICATIONS THAT SULTAN MIGHT DISCUSS THE AIR DEFENCE CONCEPT DURING HIS PRESENT VISIT TO OTHER GULF STATES. THEY HAD LEARNED (AND THIS WAS VERY SENSITIVE) THAT THE SAUDIS WERE ALREADY EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF MOVING SOME OF THEIR OWN RADAR CAPABILITY INTO BAHRAIN.

4. FRETWELL ASKED WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO INSTALL A REAL AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY IN THE GULF STATES. BARTHOLOMEW REPLIED THAT, IN THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA, IT WAS PARTLY A MATTER OF REALISING THE POTENTIAL OF WHAT THEY ALREADY HAD.

THIS INCLUDED FILLING GAPS IN THEIR RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES, IMPROVING LINKS WITH THE HAWK SYSTEMS AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR F5S. FOR THE UAE AND BAHRAIN, GREATER INITIAL INVESTMENT WOULD BE NEEDED. THE FORMER HAD INDICATED INTEREST IN NEW SAM SYSTEMS AND THE U.S. HAD BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE BAHRAINIS FOR SOME TIME THE SUPPLY OF HAWK MISSILES. BARTHOLOMEW EMPHASISED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO READY-MADE SCHEME FOR INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE IN THE GULF.

AS THEY HAD TOLD THE OMANIS, THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A SCHEME WOULD BE POSITIVELY UNHELPFUL, IN PUTTING TOO MUCH OF A WESTERN STAMP ON THE DEFENCE OF THE GULF STATES.

FCO PASS SAVING MOSCOW AND UK DEL NATO.

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FM F C O 171607Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1658 OF 17 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS(D STAFF)), ACDS (OPS), DS 5, DNOT,

JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT

INFO PRIORITY H M ROYAL YACHT BRITANNIA (FOR S OF S)

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

*You may have to glance through this tel. & the three replies from Washington. No need to read in detail.*

*1/2 hrs*

YOUR TELNO 4272: IRAN/IRAQ - DEFENCE ISSUES

1. WE FAVOUR KEEPING OPEN EVERY CHANNEL TO THE US ADMINISTRATION. EVEN THOUGH YOU HAVE NOW SEEN MUSKIE (YOUR TELNO 4276), IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO MAINTAIN YOUR USEFUL DIALOGUE WITH KOMER AND WITH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.

2. THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE US NAVY REPRESENTATIVES HERE ARE NOW BEING BETTER BRIEFED TO RUN A PROPER DIALOGUE WITH THE ROYAL NAVY. OUR REPRESENTATIONS ALSO SEEM TO HAVE RESULTED IN A USEFUL EVOLUTION IN THE PENTAGON'S THINKING ON THE SORT OF NAVAL PROTECTION EXERCISE THAT WOULD BE NEEDED IN AN EMERGENCY. MUCH MORE STAFF WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE (AS THE TWO NAVIES ARE AWARE) AND MANY ISSUES STILL DEMAND CLOSER AND MORE COORDINATED POLITICAL MANAGEMENT. IN PARTICULAR IT IS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DECISION TO PUT INTO EFFECT NAVAL MEASURES OF THE KIND NOW BEING DISCUSSED SHOULD BE TAKEN JOINTLY BY THE GOVERNMENTS WITH SHIPS TAKING PART. THE MEETING WITH CHRISTOPHER WILL BE USEFUL TO THAT END BUT YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE THIS POINT TO YOUR CONTACTS. TO COUNTER KOMER'S REMARK THAT THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATION, IF THERE WERE TIME, YOU COULD POINT OUT THAT, WHILE ANY ATTACK WOULD CREATE A CRISIS, THERE

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IS PERHAPS NO OVER-RIDING NEED FOR INSTANT REACTION, GIVEN THE HIGH LEVEL OF WESTERN OIL STOCKS.

3. ON THE NAVAL LEVEL, THE AMERICANS NOW SEEM TO AGREE WITH THE RN VIEW THAT:

(A) UNTIL A REAL THREAT TO FREE PASSAGE IN THE GULF MATERIALISES, USN, RN AND PRESUMABLY FRENCH NAVAL FORCES NOW ON STATION OUTSIDE THE STRAITS SHOULD REMAIN THERE ON PATROL (PERHAPS WITH CLOSER COORDINATION TO PREVENT CONFUSION AND OVERLAPPING) SEMI-COLON

(B) THE JOINT ALLIED RESPONSE TO ANY MILITARY THREAT TO THE STRAITS AND THE GULF, WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY HAVE CLOSED THEM TO UNPROTECTED MERCHANT SHIPPING, WOULD BE TO MOUNT A SET-PIECE OPERATION TO ESCORT A SMALL NUMBER OF MERCHANT SHIPS THROUGH TO THEIR GULF DESTINATIONS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE AIR COVER FROM THE SEVENTH FLEET. THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE WOULD BE TO RESTORE THE SHIPPING COMMUNITY'S CONFIDENCE. ANY MERCHANT SHIP, WHATEVER FLAG SHE WAS FLYING, COULD AVAIL HERSELF OF THIS PROTECTION SEMI-COLON

(C) THIS OPERATION WOULD BE REPEATED UNTIL THE THREAT HAD DIMINISHED SUFFICIENTLY FOR SHIPOWNERS AND INSURERS TO PUT THEIR SHIPS INTO THE GULF WITHOUT NAVAL SUPERVISION.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AGAIN TO THE PENTAGON (AND ALSO IF YOU JUDGE IT APPROPRIATE TO STATE DEPARTMENT AT SENIOR OFFICIAL LEVEL). YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE GLAD THAT OUR RESPECTIVE NAVIES' IDEAS SEEM NOW TO BE CONVERGING. YOU COULD EXPLAIN OUR OWN THINKING ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE LATEST CONCEPT:

(A) WE ASSUME THAT THE OMANIS WOULD ALLOW OUR NAVAL FORCES TO OPERATE IN THIS FASHION INSIDE THEIR CLAIMED TWELVE MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, AND THAT THE NON-BELLIGERENT GULF STATES WOULD DO LIKEWISE.

(B) ONLY THE US BATTLE GROUP IN THE AREA COULD SUPPLY THE AIR COVER WHICH WOULD BE A PREREQUISITE FOR NAVAL ESCORT OPERATIONS AS DESCRIBED. BUT SUCH FLEET AIRCOVER COULD PROBABLY NOT

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OPERATE NORTH OF, SAY, BAHRAIN. IF SHIPS NEEDED TO BE ESCORTED FURTHER THAN THIS (AND NOT ALL WOULD), THEN THIS GAP MIGHT NEED TO BE COVERED BY LANDBASED FLIGHTS. IF SO, FROM WHERE, AND WHAT PRIOR DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE WOULD BE NEEDED?

(C) A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND WORKABLE COMMAND STRUCTURE WILL BE NEEDED, WITH WHICH THE FRENCH CAN ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES. THE ESTABLISHED RADFORD/COLLINS ARRANGEMENT (FOR CONTROL OF SHIPPING), FOR WHICH WELL UNDERSTOOD RULES OF ENGAGEMENT - PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TUR - HAVE NOW BEEN DRAWN UP, IS OUR PREFERRED FRAMEWORK.

(D) WE THINK CURRENT FORCE LEVELS ARE ADEQUATE TO THE TASK.

(E) ARE NAVAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE AREA IN STEP WITH THOSE ELSEWHERE? (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE FRENCH SAY THAT ONLY IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES COULD THEY CONSIDER ACTIVE NAVAL COOPERATION SEMI COLON BUT DOUBTLESS BILATERAL TALKS WILL CONTINUE LOCALLY.)

(F) A NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING OPERATION WOULD NEED TO BE MOUNTED TO LIAISE WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING. WE ENVISAGE THAT THIS COULD BE BASED ON FACILITIES AFLOAT, WITH HELICOPTER SUPPORT, IF A SHORE-BASED OPERATION WAS POLITICALLY DIFFICULT. OMAN MIGHT BE WILLING TO COOPERATE, BUT IN ANY CASE PROVISION OF NECESSARY FACILITIES IN ADVANCE OF ANY PROTECTION OPERATION WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

(G) THE THREAT OF MINING REMAINS. A MERE CLAIM TO HAVE MINED AN AREA IN THE GULF MIGHT REQUIRE IT TO BE SWEEPED BEFORE TRAFFIC COULD BE RESTORED. EARLY CONSIDERATION THEREFORE NEEDS TO BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A WESTERN MINE-CLEARING CAPABILITY IN THE AREA. THERE IS NONE AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THE SAUDIS HAVE A 4 COASTAL MINESWEEPERS.

5. PROBLEMS SUCH AS THESE, WHICH ARE FAR FROM BEING RESOLVED ON THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, CARRY WIDE-RANGING POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THAT THEY ARE NOW UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION ILLUSTRATES THAT OUR TWO NAVIES ARE COMMUNICATING USEFULLY. BUT THE NEED TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE POLITICAL COORDINATION OF THE OPERATION, IN PARTICULAR SOME MECHANISM FOR PROMPT POLITICAL

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CONSULTATION TO OVERSEE ANY NAVAL OPERATION, REMAINS. WE ARE WORKING ON IDEAS TO MEET THIS NEED AND WILL BE PUTTING THEM TO CHRISTOPHER NEXT WEEK.

FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION THE NEED, IT SEEMS TO US, IS FOR A GROUP IN ONE OF THE FOUR CAPITALS, AT A SUFFICIENTLY INCONSPICUOUS LEVEL TO ESCAPE PUBLICITY, TO BE ABLE TO MEET DAILY OR AT SHORT NOTICE, TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND TO FEED BACK PROPOSALS FOR APPROVAL IN CAPITALS. THE QUADRIPARTITE MACHINERY AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL IS ADMIRABLE FOR ITS PURPOSE BUT INVOLVING AS IT DOES REPRESENTATIVES FROM CAPITALS IT CANNOT FULFIL THE NEED FOR DAY-TO-DAY CONTACT. THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE GROUP SHOULD THUS, IT SEEMS TO US, BE COUNSELLORS FROM EMBASSIES MEETING WITH OFFICIALS OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT, PROBABLY IN WASHINGTON.

6. YOU SHOULD DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICANS TO MUSCAT TELNO 297, PARAS 4 AND 5, AND SAY THAT WE PROPOSE THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OUR NA IN MUSCAT SHOULD BRING THE CSON IN ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OUR THINKING. WE WOULD HOPE THE AMERICANS WOULD ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THIS.

7. COPY ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH THEIR US, FRENCH OR GERMAN COLLEAGUES, OR WITH THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS, WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

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*SR A. Adams*

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*Prime Minister*  
18. 10. 80

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 180136Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1540 DATED 17 OCTOBER 80

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN,  
UKMIS GENEVA, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, KUWAIT, JEDDA, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,  
ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, ROME, BELGRADE, DACCA.

MY TELNO 1521: SECURITY COUNCIL: IRAQ/IRAN

1. IN THE MOST CROWDED SECURITY COUNCIL CHAMBER ANYONE COULD REMEMBER, PRIME MINISTER RAJAIE SPOKE FOR OVER AN HOUR THIS EVENING. IT WAS A TOTALLY UNYIELDING PERFORMANCE WHICH, OFFERED NO HOPE OF AN EARLY CESSATION OF THE HOSTILITIES, OR REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY BREAKTHROUGH ON THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WAS IMMINENT.
2. IN HIS HARANGUE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE US, ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND, IN PASSING, EGYPT, THE SOVIET UNION, MOROCCO, AND THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, HE ONLY BRIEFLY REFERRED TO THE STRONG POINT OF THE IRANIAN CASE, IE THE PROVISION IN ARTICLE 6 OF THE 1975 TREATY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE.
3. RAJAIE SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD COMMITTED HIS AGGRESSION BASED ON RIDICULOUS PRETEXTS, AND HIS FORCES, LIKE HITLER'S, HAD ACTED WITHOUT MERCY. ACCUSING THE IRAQI FORCES OF PLUNDER, RAPE AND TORTURE, HE APPEALED TO THE CONSCIENCES OF THE PEOPLES OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, AND IN PARTICULAR, THE MOSLEM PEOPLES, TO SIT IN JUDGEMENT. IT WAS SURPRISING THAT THOSE WHO PROFESSED BELIEF IN HUMAN DIGNITY, REMAINED ALGEE AND DECLARED THEIR

SIT IN JUDGMENT. IT WAS SURPRISING THAT THOSE WHO PROFESSED BELIEF IN HUMAN DIGNITY, REMAINED ALCOE AND DECLARED THEIR NEUTRALITY IN THE FACE OF OPEN AGGRESSION. THE RESISTANCE OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES AND PEOPLE HAD STUPEFIED THE WORLD. THEY WERE PREPARED TO FIGHT A PROLONGED WAR UNTIL THE IRAQI PEOPLE BECAME AWARE OF THE TYRANNICAL AND "DEPENDENT" NATURE OF SADDAM'S REGIME AND BY OVERTHROWING THE REGIME, COULD DEAL A LETHAL BLOW TO US IMPERIALISM WHICH DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WAS HELPING IRAQ. ALL WHO HELPED SADDAM, AND HE HIMSELF, WOULD DIE IN THE DESTRUCTION. US AWAC'S AND RUSSIAN TUPOLEVS WOULD NOT WIN. GOOD WOULD TRIUMPH OVER EVIL AND THE DAY WOULD COME WHEN THE CRIMINAL, SADDAM, WOULD BE JUDGED BY A REVOLUTIONARY TRIBUNAL IN IRAQ. IRAQ'S AIM WAS TO TOPPLE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND IT HAD BLINDLY FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF ITS MASTERS, THE SUPERPOWERS. ITS ACTIONS NOW SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH ITS FAILURE EVER TO FIGHT AGAINST THE INVADERS OF JERUSALEM.

4. IRAQ HAD GIVEN ASYLUM AND SUPPORT TO THE LACKEYS OF THE US AND THE PAHLAVI HENCHMEN. IRAQ CLAIMED TO BE FIGHTING THE US, BUT NEVER ATTACKED THE SHAH'S US-DOMINATED ARMY. THEIR CURRENT ACTION WAS "A US MISSION WITHOUT A US APPEARANCE." THE US SAW IN THIS ATTACK AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR HOSTAGES TO BE FREED. PUPPET REGIMES OF THE US, EG JORDAN, EGYPT AND MOROCCO, WERE PRIMARY SUPPLIERS OF EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ VIA THE PORT OF AQABA. EGYPTIAN PILOTS AND CREWS, AND UNITS OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY, WERE ACTIVE IN IRAQ. THERE WAS A BUILD-UP OF SUPERPOWER FORCES AND FLEETS IN THE AREA, AND MILITARY AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THE US, WHICH HAD REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OLYMPICS BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN, NONETHELESS WAS TAKING PART IN THIS WAR AND AT THE SAME TIME, ENGAGING IN SALT TALKS. HENCE SOVIET WEAPONS COULD BE SENT VIA THE US LACKEY, JORDAN, TO IRAQ.

5. IN AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION, THE IRAQIS NOW SAID THEY WANTED A CEASEFIRE. OTHER COUNTRIES UNFORTUNATELY SUPPORTED THAT REQUEST. IRAN HEREBY DECLARED THAT A FAIR SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY BE FOUND IF THE AGGRESSOR WAS CONQUERED AND PUNISHED - "THAT IS OUR FINAL POSITION." IRAN RELIED ON GOD AND THE PEOPLE'S WILL. HE WAS NOT HERE TO ASK THE COUNCIL TO DO ANYTHING. HE WAS HERE TO EXPOSE WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN IRAN. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO HELP OPPRESSED PEOPLE BECAUSE OF THE VETO. EVEN WHEN IT ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS, IT COULD NOT IMPLEMENT THEM EG. ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA. HE HAD COME TO REMIND THE MAJOR POWERS AND FORCES OF EVIL THAT AN END MUST BE PUT TO THEIR PLOTS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WHICH WOULD NEVER BE VANQUISHED. NO DECISION OF THE COUNCIL WOULD CHANGE IRAN'S POSITION. THEY WOULD FIGHT



WITH THEIR BARE HANDS. THEY WOULD WIN.

6. AFTER RAJAIIE HAD WALKED OUT SAADOUN HAMMADI (IRAQ) SPOKE AT GREAT LENGTH, DRAWING LARGELY ON HIS STATEMENT OF 15 OCTOBER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO REBUT RAJAIIE'S ARGUMENTS. HE ARGUED INTER ALIA THAT IRAN HAD VIOLATED THE PACKAGE DEAL ENSHRINED IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE 1975 TREATY AND THAT THE WHOLE TREATY HAD THEREFORE CAME TO AN END. HENCE ARTICLE 6 (PROCEDURES FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ITS TERMS) NO LONGER APPLIED. IRAQ THEREFORE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO "ACT IN SELF-DEFENCE".
7. MCHENRY (US) THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY ON THE HOSTAGES, FOR OBVIOUS DOMESTIC REASONS. HE SPOKE OF THEIR PLIGHT AND OF THE NEED FOR THEM TO BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DECISION OF THE ICJ. TAKING UP A RHETORICAL QUESTION BY RAJAIIE AS TO HOW THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THE WAR WAS GOING TO HELP THE HOSTAGES, MCHENRY SAID THAT IT WAS THE VERY PRINCIPLES WHICH RAJAIIE HIMSELF HAD EXPOUNDED THAT SHOULD OBLIGE IRAN TO RELEASE THEM. IT WAS IRONICAL THAT RAJAIIE HAD REFERRED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S INABILITY TO IMPLEMENT ITS RESOLUTIONS BECAUSE OF THE SUPERPOWERS, WHEN IT WAS IRAN WHICH HAD FOR MONTHS BEEN IN BLATANT DEFIANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
8. THERE WAS THEN AN EXCHANGE OF INCREASINGLY STERILE RIGHTS OF REPLY BETWEEN IRANIAN AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES, THE PRINCIPALS HAVING LEFT. MCHENRY WAS TEMPTED TO JOIN IN BUT SENSIBLY DID NOT DO SO.
9. RAJAIIE'S STATEMENT APPEARS TO LEAVE THE COUNCIL COMPLETELY BLOCKED. EVEN A CALL ON THE COUNCIL TO CONDEMN IRAQI AGGRESSION AND DEMAND IRAQI WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS DISCOURAGING THAN HIS TOTAL REJECTION OF ANY ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL. IN FACT, HIS POINT WAS NOT SO MUCH THAT THE IRAQIS SHOULD WITHDRAW, BUT THAT THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD BE CONQUERED AND PUNISHED. MY FIRST REACTION IS THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL HAVE TO SLOG IT OUT FOR SOME TIME TO COME BEFORE EITHER OR BOTH BECOME AMENABLE TO MEDIATION BY ANY INTERNATIONAL BODY.
10. RAJAIIE IS SAID TO BE LEAVING HERE TOMORROW (18 OCTOBER) AND TO BE SPENDING TWO DAYS IN ALGIERS ON HIS WAY HOME.

PARSONS

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FROM ABU DHABI 160915Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 340 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO DUBAI AND MODUK

YOUR TELNO 226 OF 14 OCTOBER

*ms*

**SECURITY OF THE GULF.**

1. YOUR PARA 4. A MEMBER OF MY STAFF HAS SPOKEN TO ZAKI NUSSEIBEH, WHO INTERPRETED FOR ZAID AND GISCARD AT THEIR 75 MINUTE MEETING ON 15 OCTOBER.
2. NUSSEIBEH WAS DISCREET BUT GAVE A STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN EXTREMELY POSITIVE, AND HAD COVERED LONG-TERM COOPERATION PLANS INCLUDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. AIR DEFENCE IN PARTICULAR WAS PROBABLY DISCUSSED.
3. HE ALSO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ZAID OPPOSED MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND LOOKED INSTEAD TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AMONG WHICH WE MIGHT SUPPOSE FRANCE TO BE ESPECIALLY FAVOURED.
4. NUSSEIBEH SAID THAT THE UAE HAD DECIDED IN ADVANCE OF THE VISIT TO ALLOT FRANCE AN ADDITIONAL 50,000 B/D OF CRUDE AND INFORMED GISCARD OF THIS ON HIS ARRIVAL.
5. THE EXTENT TO WHICH ZAID WAS PLEASED WITH THE TALKS IS SHOWN BY HIS UNPRECEDENTED FIRST PERSON STATEMENT ABOUT THEM, WHICH APPEARED IN THE LOCAL PRESS ON 16 OCTOBER.

ROBERTS

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IRAN/IRAQ

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FM JEDDA 161147Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 759 OF 16 OCTOBER

AND IMMEDIATE ROME, PRIORITY WASHINGTON MUSCAT, ROUTINE MOSCOW, PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, DOHA, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI AND DUBAI.

Read in full.

YOUR TELNO 391 TO MUSCAT: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE TELLS ME THAT HE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT A WEEK AGO TO TELL THE SAUDIS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL THAT THE USA WAS DETERMINED THAT THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN, ASSURED THAT SAUDI ARABIA SHARED THIS AIM, AND WAS THEREFORE PROCEEDING WITH CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING. AMBASSADOR WEST HAD TO WAIT 4 OR 5 DAYS FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRINCE FAHD. BY THAT TIME USS LEAHY HAD ALREADY ENTERED THE GULF AND THERE WAS PUBLIC NEWS OF FRENCH UNITS IN THE AREA. WEST TOLD FAHD THAT HE PRESUMED THESE MOVES WERE THE RESULT OF THE CONSULTATIONS. FAHD SAID "FINE".

2. WEST SAW PRINCE SULTAN THIS MORNING AND REITERATED THE USA'S RESOLVE TO KEEP THE LANES OPEN IN ANY EVENTUALITY AND THEIR INTENTION TO CONSULT WITH OTHER INTERESTED AND FRIENDLY POWERS AND TO KEEP THE SAUDIS INFORMED. HE GAVE SULTAN EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT OR CRITICISE, BUT SULTAN READILY AGREED TO WHAT WAS PROPOSED.

TO OBJECT OR CRITICISE, BUT SULTAN READILY AGREED TO WHAT WAS PROPOSED.

3. I COMMENTED THAT THIS ATTITUDE WAS IN LINE WITH WHAT PRINCE TURKI HAD TOLD ME BUT AGAINST THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THUNAYYAN) AND OTHER OFFICIALS IN THE MFA AND THE VIEWS AIRED REGULARLY IN THE LOCAL PRESS. WEST SAID THIS WAS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE GAP BETWEEN PRINCE SAUD AND PRINCE FAHD. SAUD HAD MADE STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT FOREIGN POWERS SHOULD KEEP OUT OF THE GULF AND THAT THE LOCAL STATES COULD LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN COMMUNICATIONS. HE MUST KNOW THAT THIS WAS NONSENSE, BUT AS USUAL HE WAS INCLINED TO TAKE THE STANDARD ARAB NATIONALIST LINE.

4. WEST ADDED THAT SAUD HAD JUST LEFT FOR TEN DAYS HOLIDAY IN PARIS WITH HIS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MANSOURI. WHEN I EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT SAUD SHOULD GO AWAY AT A TIME OF CRISIS, WEST COMMENTED THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SAUD WAS MIFFED BECAUSE THE BIG DECISIONS WERE TAKEN BY OTHERS AND THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HAD "HIS WRIST SLAPPED" OVER HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. TURKI ON THIS ISSUE WAS, PRIVATELY AT LEAST, WITH FAHD AND SULTAN AND AGAINST HIS BROTHER SAUD.

5. WEST SAID THAT HE WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT IF WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD TO INTERVENE IN GULF SECURITY, THEY WOULD GET FULL SUPPORT FROM THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT IN PRIVATE, THOUGH HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE WHAT THEIR PUBLIC ATTITUDE WOULD BE.

6. NOW THAT WE HAVE THIS CLARIFICATION OF SAUDI VIEWS AT THE TOP AND GIVEN THAT FAHD AND SULTAN WILL BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PILGRIMAGE FROM NOW ON FOR A WEEK, I DO NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSE TO TRY FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH EITHER OF THEM UNLESS YOU WISH TO DISTANCE HMG FROM THE AMERICAN APPROACH. I TAKE IT THAT AS OF NOW, THOUGH YOU ARE NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH AMERICAN PROCEDURE, YOU WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE WHAT WOULD HAVE TO BE A CONSPICUOUS EFFORT TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

CRAIG

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM TEL AVIV 160915Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 491 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO WASHINGTON BRUSSELS LUXEMBOURG AMMAN AND CAIRO

INFO SAVING DAMASCUS BAGHDAD BEIRUT

MY TEL NO 485: IRAN/IRAQ/ISRAEL

1. IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE JERUSALEM POST TODAY, SHAMIR IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE HOPED THE EC INITIATIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DYING. HE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION DURING HIS RECENT VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE THAT THERE WAS NOW MUCH LESS INTEREST IN THE INITIATIVE IN THE LIGHT OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. WHILE THE EC HEADS OF STATE HAD INCLUDED CONSIDERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, AND THE THORN MISSION, ON THE AGENDA FOR THEIR DECEMBER SUMMIT MEETING, HE WAS "NOT SO SURE THEY WILL DECIDE ANYTHING".

2. SHAMIR ADDED THAT MANY PEOPLE WERE COMING TO REALISE THE VALIDITY OF ISRAEL'S LONG-STANDING CONTENTION THAT THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS NOT THE SOLE OR MAIN CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. THE PROBLEM WAS NOT TODAY "THE BURNING ISSUE": UNDERSTANDABLY ENOUGH, THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' CONCERNS WERE RIVITTED ON THE STATE OF THE OIL LIFELINE THROUGH THE GULF. HE HOPED THE WAR WOULD BRING HOME THE FACT THAT LONG-TERM WESTERN OVER-DEPENDENCE ON INHERENTLY UNSTABLE STATES FOR CRUCIAL OIL SUPPLIES WAS A HIGHLY DANGEROUS CONDITION.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

ROBINSON

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IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM MUSCAT 161541Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE), WASHINGTON,  
 PRIORITY DUBAI, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, KUWAIT, JEDDA, BAGHDAD,  
 AMMAN

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 391: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. MOBERLY AND I HAD AN HOUR WITH QAIS ZAWAWI THIS MORNING AND HALF AN HOUR WITH THE SULTAN (WITH ZAWAWI IN ATTENDANCE) THIS AFTERNOON.
2. MOBERLY SPOKE ON BOTH OCCASIONS ABOUT THE GENERAL OBJECTS OF HIS CURRENT TOUR, AND ADDED SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS OF OUR RESPONSE TO ZAID'S APPROACH AND OF NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING, DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE ON YOUR TELS 391 AND 392.
3. ZAWAWI ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DIRECT CONNECTION BETWEEN ZAID'S REQUEST AND THE BRITISH NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND WAS TOLD THERE WAS NOT. HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SAUDI ATTITUDES AND SAID THAT THE OMANIS PROPOSED TO SUGGEST REACTIVATING THE TAIF GROUP OF THE SIX OF 1979 (I.E. GULF STATES OTHER THAN IRAQ AND IRAN) IN ORDER TO POINT THE MORAL THAT THE DANGER WHICH THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING DISCUSSED THERE HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO COUNTER WAS NOW FACING THE SIX AND THAT FACILITIES FOR THE WESTERN POWERS WERE NECESSARY TO BALANCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA.

IN THE AREA.

4. ZAWAWI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SPOKEN TO THE OMANIS ABOUT THE PROPOSED NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING (CURIOUSLY, MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS APPROACH WHEN HE SAW MOBERLY AT MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT). THE OMANIS THOUGHT THAT THIS REQUIRED BROADER CONSULTATIONS AND THAT IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE PURPOSE OF ANY INTERNATIONAL NAVAL ACTION WOULD BE LIMITED TO MAINTAINING FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF NAVIGATION.
5. THE OMANIS HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE AMERICANS IN WASHINGTON THEIR WISH TO IMPROVE OMANI DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AREA, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING ALTERNATIVE SEA LANES IF THE NORMAL CHANNELS WERE BLOCKED (HIS THOUGHT HERE WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR).
6. MOBERLY REPLIED THAT WE WOULD WELCOME IT IF THE OMANIS COULD PERSUADE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX TO CO-ORDINATE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THIS WAY. BUT HE HAD DETECTED SIGNS OF NERVOUSNESS FURTHER UP THE GULF AT BEING SEEN TO BE GETTING TOGETHER. IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY TO AVOID PREMATURE PUBLICITY ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND THE TIMING OF ANY MEASURES PROPOSED WOULD NEED CAREFUL JUDGMENT, OTHERWISE NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN THE AREA COULD FRUSTRATE EFFECTIVE ACTION.
7. ZAWAWI THOUGHT THAT SOME NERVOUSNESS IN THE REGION WAS NOT ALTOGETHER UNWELCOME. HE REAFFIRMED OMAN'S NEUTRALITY IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT "ALTHOUGH WE HAD SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THE BEGINNING". COMMENTING ON MOBERLY'S UNDERLINING OF YOUR RECOGNITION THAT THE VARIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION ARE INTERCONNECTED AND THAT PROGRESS ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE IS ESSENTIAL, ZAWAWI SAID THAT THE ARABS SHOULD REALISE THAT U.S. SUPPORT OF ISRAEL WAS NOTHING NEW, THAT IT WAS PROBABLY LESS NOW THAN IT HAD EVER BEEN AND THAT CO-OPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS MADE MORE SENSE THAN THE REVERSE.
8. AT THE AUDIENCE, MOBERLY REPEATED MORE BRIEFLY WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ZAWAWI. QABOOS GAVE HIS SEAL OF APPROVAL, AS IT WERE, TO ZAWAWI'S REPLY, AND EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH MOBERLY HAD CONVEYED BUT DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION EXCEPT TO STRESS THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO PROVIDE ANY FACILITIES THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED FROM OMAN.
9. BOTH QABOOS AND ZAWAWI WELCOMED OUR RESPONSE TO ZAID AND NEITHER REACTED BY SUGGESTING SIMILAR ACTION IN OMAN. BOTH ALSO AFFIRMED THEIR READINESS TO MAINTAIN CONTINUING CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH US AS THE SITUATION IN THE AREA EVOLVED.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PARIS, BONN, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW AND  
TEL AVIV

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GRS 520  
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FM AMMAN 161225Z OCT 80  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 419 OF 16 OCT 80  
INFO PRIORITY ROME (FOR PS SECRETARY OF STATE) AND WASHINGTON  
ROUTINE BAGHDAD JEDDA TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK  
SAVING TO DAMASCUS

MY TELNO 413 OF 15 OCTOBER: IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I HAVE SINCE COMPARED NOTES WITH THE US AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THE EVENING OF 14 OCTOBER. VELIOTES OBTAINED THE CLEAR IMPRESSION FROM THE KING THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WANTED TO BE IN FULL CONTROL OF ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR BEFORE RESPONDING TO ANY PEACE INITIATIVE AND THAT THIS WAS ONE REASON WHY SADDAM WAS NOT IN AN IMMEDIATE HURRY TO RESPOND TO CURRENT MEDIATION EFFORTS. BUT VELIOTES THOUGHT THAT BOTH SADDAM AND KING HUSSEIN WERE WORRIED THAT THE ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION DESCRIBED IN PARAS 6 AND 7 OF MY TUR WOULD BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND THAT IRAQ MIGHT THEN COME UNDER PRESSURE FROM WORLD OPINION, AND EVEN FROM WITHIN IRAQ, TO DECLARE A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAW FROM THE IRANIAN TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED. HOWEVER VELIOTES ALSO THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS BEGINNING TO SEE THAT A PROLONGATION OF HOSTILITIES COULD HAVE UNFAVOURABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR IRAQ: THE KING HAD HIMSELF ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM MIGHT BE IN FOR TROUBLE WITH THE IRAQI SHI'ITES IF THE CONFLICT CONTINUED.

2. IN SPEAKING ABOUT HIS RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABI, KING HUSSEIN HAD ADMITTED THAT "THE SAUDIS DID MORE LISTENING THAN TALKING". VELIOTES HAD ASKED THE KING IF THE SAUDIS HAD ANY IDEAS ON HOW THE CONFLICT MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO AN END. THE KING SAID THAT THEY HAD NOT, BUT REVEALED THAT THEY HAD SHOWN CONCERN LEAST IT SHOULD SPREAD TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SAUDIS HAD ALSO APPARENTLY REVEALED UNEASE ABOUT IRAQ'S POSITION ON THE TUNBS AND ABU MUSA: THE KING TOLD VELIOTES THAT HE HAD HAD TO EXPLAIN THIS AT SOME LENGTH.

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3. ACCORDING TO VELIOTES (PLEASE PROTECT), THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB WITH THE ISRAELIS REGARDING THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE PUBLIC WAR OF NERVES THE ISRAELIS HAD MOUNTED AGAINST JORDANIAN AID TO IRAQ (WHICH THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES HAD TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV WAS QUITE DELIBERATE). VELIOTES HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL THE KING THAT THE ISRAELIS, IN HAILING A SHIP IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND ASKING WHAT CARGO IT CARRIED, HAD NOT IN THE US VIEW ACTED CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: INDEED US COASTGUARDS DID THIS REGULARLY OFF THE AMERICAN COAST IN CHECKING ON DRUG SMUGGLING ETC. THE US DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD DELIBERATELY TRY TO IMPEDE SHIPPING PASSING THROUGH THE GULF. IT WAS THE CLEAR US VIEW THAT THE GULF OF AQABA WAS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AND THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NO RIGHT WHATEVER TO IMPEDE THE PASSAGE OF SHIPPING UNLESS IT WERE WITHIN ISRAELI TERRITORIAL WATERS ( THIS MATTER IS NOT QUITE CLEAR, AS THE ISRAELIS CLAIM 6 MILES AND THE US DOES NOT RECOGNISE THEIR CLAIM TO AS MUSH AS THIS.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO DAMASCUS

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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*From Muskie*  
*ds*

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 161730Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4288 OF 16 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN), PARIS (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR),  
 BONN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR), UKDEL NATO (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR),

PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

*ms*

MY TELNO 4276

IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATION

1. MUSKIE'S REMARKS, MADE TO ME WITHIN HOURS OF A VERY DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT EXPRESSED TO ME BY KOMER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REFLECT THE DISARRAY THAT EXISTS HERE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ON FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY.

2. MUSKIE'S APPROACH REMAINS CAUTIOUS, HIS TECHNIQUE SOCRATIC. HE WANTS TO FEEL HIS WAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RATHER THAN IMPOSE IT. HE IS WARY OF LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS THAT COULD INVOLVE FAR-REACHING MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS AND EVENTUALLY ALSO MAKE THE U.S. MORE UNPOPULAR IN THE REGION AND NOT NECESSARILY MORE ABLE TO SECURE OIL. HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER OF PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH A PRETEXT FOR INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN THE REGION.

3. THE OTHER MAIN SCHOOL OF THOUGHT, LED BY BRZEZINSKI, HAROLD BROWN AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GENERALLY, FAVOURS USING THE PRESENT CRISIS TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT DEFENCE POSITION FOR THE U S A IN THE GULF. THEY WISH TO SEIZE UPON CURRENT SAUDI FEAR, PARTICULARLY OF AIR RAIDS FROM IRAN, TO CREATE THE FORWARD FACILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES, SO THAT THEY COULD IN THE LAST RESORT ESTABLISH A THIN RED LINE TO TRY TO DETER OR BLOCK A SOVIET MILITARY ADVANCE INTO THE AREA. THEY SEE THE INITIAL SAUDI INVITATION TO THEM AS THE LONG-SOUGHT CARD OF ENTRY SEMICLN AND NOW THAT THEY HAVE THEIR FOOT IN THE DOOR, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE PERSUADED EASILY TO TAKE IT OUT. THEY PERCEIVE A LINK BETWEEN THEIR GROWING CONNECTION WITH EGYPT AND THEIR NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SAUDIS, THE ONE HELPING THE OTHER AND BOTH HELPING TO OVERCOME THE HANDICAP IMPOSED ON THEIR MIDDLE EAST POLICY BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL.

4. THAT PUTS IT VERY BALDLY BUT IT IS THE BASIC LINE-UP AT THE MOMENT AND THE SUBJECT OF OPEN PRESS SPECULATION. THERE WILL OF COURSE BE NO RECONCILIATION AND NO CLEAR-CUT POLICY UNTIL AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SEMICLN AND EVEN THEN IT MAY TAKE TIME.

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SECRET

5. YOU MIGHT WELL ASK WHAT AMERICA'S ALLIES ARE MEANT TO DO IN THIS UNTIDY SITUATION. THE ANSWER INEVITABLY IS THAT WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TRY TO MUDDLE THROUGH UNTIL NOVEMBER, BEARING IN MIND THE NOT ALTOGETHER HEARTENING THOUGHT THAT EVEN THEN, THE HOUSE HERE MAY NOT BE PUT IN ORDER QUICKLY: THE REPUBLICANS, IF THEY WIN, WILL TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS TO SETTLE IN SEMICLN THE DEMOCRATS, IF THEY ARE RETURNED, ARE EXPECTED TO GO IN FOR A CONSIDERABLE SHAKE-UP SEMI-CLN AND, HOWEVER LIBERATED FROM IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PRESSURES HE MAY BE, I DO NOT SEE CARTER SUDDENLY BECOMING A DYNAMIC LEADER. BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN DRAW ANY USEFUL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR DEALINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN TERMS EITHER OF POLICY OR TACTICS UNTIL WE KNOW THE ELECTION RESULTS AND WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN PLACE. AMERICA'S CONFUSION SHOULD BE EUROPE'S CHANCE BUT, SEEN FROM HERE, EUROPE DOES NOT SEEM ABLE TO HARNESS ITSELF TO FILL THE VACUUM. WHAT IS GALLING AND DISTURBING ARE THE CONTINUING SIGNS THAT, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC POLEMICS AND THE DAMPER IMPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION ON TALK OF DISARRAY IN THE ALLIANCE, EUROPE IS STILL CONSIDERED HERE BY IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF THE CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION TO BE WAYWARD, SELFISH AND PREPARED NEITHER TO HELP THEMSELVES NOR THE ALLIED CAUSE GENERALLY. IT MAY BE WRONG TO RAISE THE SPECTRE OF MANSFIELDISM BUT IT WOULD BE EQUALLY WRONG TO DISCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD OF TROUBLE FOR EUROPE IN THE NEXT CONGRESS.

HENDERSON

LIMITED  
MED  
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PLANNING STAFF  
NAD  
WED  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A ACLAND  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR P MOBERLY  
CABINET OFFICE

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

-2-

SECRET

18

FM FCO 161728Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON  
TELNO. 1650 OF 16 OCTOBER,  
AND TO IMMEDIATE: BONN, PARIS,  
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN).

*Prime Minister*  
*Mr*  
*(1) x*

YOUR TELNO4276: IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS.

*Mr*

1. WE SHALL LET YOU KNOW THE FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONSES AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THEM. (PARIS TELNOS 852 AND 857 SUGGEST THAT THE FRENCH REPLY MAY BE NEGATIVE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GERMANS ARE HESITATING: THEY MAY SUGGEST, INSTEAD OF A MINISTERIAL MEETING AS WE HAD PROPOSED, THAT THE MEETING ALREADY FIXED AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL FOR 27 OCTOBER BE GIVEN SPECIFIC TASKS OF AN OPERATIONAL CHARACTER..) AT ANY RATE WE PROPOSE TO GIVE THEM BOTH UNTIL THE WEEKEND TO RESPOND. THIS MEANS THAT TUESDAY 21 OCTOBER IS THE EARLIEST REALISTIC TIME FOR A MEETING HERE.
2. IF THE FRENCH AND/OR THE GERMAN REPLY IS NEGATIVE, WE SHALL WANT TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER OR NOT TO GO AHEAD BILATERALLY WITH THE AMERICANS ALONE. OUR PRESENT VIEW IS THAT THIS WOULD RISK SERIOUSLY DAMAGING THE QUADRIPARTITE FORUM WITHOUT BRINGING THE BENEFITS OF CO-ORDINATION WHICH WE HAD HOPED TO SECURE BY A MEETING OF THE FOUR. IT MIGHT BE DIFFERENT IF THERE WERE A CHANCE OF CHRISTOPHER COMING TO LONDON IN SECRET, WHICH WE JUDGE TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, OR AS PART OF A EUROPEAN TOUR, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE ORGANISED SEPARATELY AND BY THE AMERICANS.
3. IN CONVEYING THE FOREGOING TO THE AMERICANS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE PROPOSE TO KEEP ABSOLUTELY QUIET ABOUT THE IDEA OF A MEETING IN LONDON AND HOPE THAT THEY WILL DO LIKEWISE. IF IT SHOULD LEAK, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF HAS NATURALLY LED TO A GOOD DEAL OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATION ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS AND THAT THE IDEA OF A VISIT BY CHRISTOPHER TO EUROPE REPEAT EUROPE IS ONE OF MANY THAT HAVE BEEN UNDER ?CONSIDERATION.
4. THE FOREGOING IS SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENTS WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY WISH TO SEND.
5. BONN AND PARIS: PLEASE INFORM THE GERMANS AND FRENCH THAT CHRISTOPHER IS WILLING TO COME TO LONDON ON THE BASIS SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 389 TO BONN AND THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THEIR REACTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PLEASE ALSO TELL THEM ABOUT THE CONTINGENCY PRESS LINE SUGGESTED IN PARA. 3 ABOVE.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

LIMITED  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
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HD/MED  
HD/DEF D  
HD/EESD  
HD/MAED  
PS  
PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A ACLAND  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD  
MR P MOBERLY  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
SECRET



1) Mr Hancock - MS 2  
2) Prime Minister.

## WEEKLY OIL REPORT

## IRAN/IRAQ

1. Fighting continues between Iran and Iraq; a prolonged stalemate seems certain. Iraqi refinery capacity may now be down to 60,000 bd; Iraqi oil export facilities in the Gulf have reportedly all been damaged as well as the pumping facilities for the export pipeline through Turkey. There is no indication of the Syrians being prepared to allow Iraqi use of the export pipeline through Syria. The Iranians probably still have 140,000 bd refinery capacity. The main Iranian export terminal at Kharg Island has been damaged although offshore facilities lower down the Gulf are apparently still exporting 200,000 bd. Both sides appear to have adequate supplies of fuel to continue fighting. How long damaged facilities will take to repair once fighting stops is hard to estimate; much will depend on which key and hard to replace items have been affected. According to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) the Iraqi loading facilities on the Gulf could take several months to repair.

## OPEC

2. There have been numerous reports about production increases by Gulf producers, led by Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti, Qatari, UAE and Saudi Oil Ministers met in Saudi Arabia on 10 October after Yamani had visited those countries and Bahrain earlier in the week. Their communique said that the Ministers had decided "to take certain measures to rectify the situation and alleviate the problems, particularly of the developing countries".

3. The extent to which Kuwait, Qatar and UAE committed themselves to any increase in planned production is obscure. It looks as if Kuwait where liftings were already planned to rise to 1.7 or 1.8 mbd for seasonal reasons agreed in principle to do more to help developing countries going short. Qatar and UAE may have offered relatively small increases. What appears to be an authoritative statement of the Saudi position in MEES says that ARAMCO's allowable production will be raised from 9. mbd to between a minimum of 10 mbd and a



maximum of 11 mbd. Decisions on production level will be taken monthly (other press reports suggest that the chosen level is at present 10.4 mbd). The incremental production is designed to help governmental and company customers hard hit by loss of Iranian and Iraqi supplies. ARAMCO is apparently to act as the export channel for the oil. It is not clear whether Saudi Arabia will take on new customers and decisions on disposal have apparently not yet been made.

4. The Saudi initiative appears to have been decided on when spot market prices started to rise and designed primarily to forestall a surge in prices which would, inter alia, have destroyed groundwork laid for the introduction of the Long Term Strategy. It may also have been motivated by a wish to assist the Iraqis (who earlier requested increases from other Gulf producers) and third world countries particularly hard hit.

5. The OPEC preparatory meeting due to have been held in London on 14/15 October to discuss the long term strategy has been called off; plans for the Summit in Baghdad on 4 November have apparently now been shelved.

6. Until the precise levels of Saudi, UAE and Kuwaiti production become clearer it is difficult to estimate exactly the current balance between oil supply and demand. But companies continue to report high stocks and, trading on the spot market is very thin. ~~It~~ may be as little as 1.5 mbd which can at present be met easily from stocks. Spot crude prices have not risen above the levels they reached before the Saudi action: Arab light \$4 up on mid September levels at \$36, top quality African crudes at \$37. Prices for heavy fuel oil rich crude are still firming, however, reflecting in part the loss of fuel oil production from Abadan.



## GREECE

7. Under a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Greek Government last November, British firms were to have been favoured in a number of projects, including the supply by GEC of a 2 x 350 MW coal-fired power station and the associated supply by NCB and Shell of the coal; in return, Greece would be sold some North Sea oil. However, some members of the Greek Government now want the contracts put out to international tender, thereby shelving the understanding with the UK. This prevented the signature of the contracts during the Prime Minister's visit to Greece last month. The Secretary of State for Trade pursued the matter when he visited Athens on 12-14 October.

Our Ambassador in Athens believes that Britain still has a chance of gaining the contracts with Greece.

*Handwritten signature*

J E D'ANCONA  
CIP 2  
ROOM 1409  
EXT 5509

15 October 1980



WEEKLY ENERGY REPORT


PS/Prime Minister  
PS/Secretary of State  
PS/Minister of State  
PS/Mr Moore  
PS/Mr Lamont  
PS/PUS

Mr D le B Jones  
Mr Beasley  
Mr T P Jones  
Mr Custis  
Mr Herzig  
Mr Priddle  
Mr Spain  
Mr Morphet  
Mr Monger  
Mr Manley  
Mr Guinness  
Mr Kelly  
Mr Price  
Mr Hampton  
Mr Scarr  
Dr Palmer

CIP PRINCIPALS

Mr Portillo  
Miss Moxey  
Mr Carr  
Miss Brown FCO  
Mr Tatham FCO  
Mr Fall FCO  
Mr McIntyre Treasury  
Mr Turnbull Treasury  
Mr Jones Washington  
Mr Smith UK DEL OECD Paris  
Mr Bone UK Rep Brussels  
Mr Thomas BE Tokyo  
Mr Westmacott BE Paris  
Mr Longworth BE Bonn  
Ms Probyn BE Oslo  
Mr Sullivan BE The Hague  
Mr Bache BE Vienna





17 OCT 1980

FM PARIS 151815Z OCT 80

Read in full

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 OF 15 OCTOBER 1980

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BONN, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA AND BAHRAIN  
INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, LUXEMBOURG, CAIRO AND DAMASCUS

ms

IRAN/IRAQ: FRENCH POLICY

1. ALTHOUGH I HAVE REPORTED ASPECTS OF FRENCH POLICY IN A NUMBER OF RECENT TELEGRAMS (EG NOS 838, 847 AND 852), IT MAY BE USEFUL AT THIS STAGE IF I TRY TO DRAW TOGETHER THE THREADS (BEARING IN MIND THAT SOME ASPECTS OF THE PICTURE, EG, CONTACTS BETWEEN NAVIES, ARE NOT KNOWN IN DETAIL TO US IN PARIS). THE GAME WHICH THE FRENCH FIND THEMSELVES PLAYING IS VERY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT.

2. THE FRENCH ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO IRAQ. THEIR PAST INVESTMENT, BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, HAS BEEN AIMED PRIMARILY AT INCREASING THE SECURITY OF FRENCH OIL SUPPLIES AND SELLING ARMS AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY TO IRAQ IN ORDER TO OFFSET A VERY LARGE BILL FOR OIL. IT IS NOT EASY FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO DO OTHER THAN MAINTAIN SOME PUBLIC BIAS IN FAVOUR OF IRAQ, AT ANY RATE AS LONG AS IRAQ LOOKS AS IF IT IS WINNING. THE WAY THE WAR IS GOING MUST BE GRADUALLY UNDERMINING CONFIDENCE HERE THAT THE FLOW OF IRAQI OIL COULD REVERT TO FORMER LEVELS AT AN EARLY DATE OR THAT ARMS AND OTHER EXPORTS TO IRAQ (EG NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY) CAN CONTINUE TO FLOW WITHOUT CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT FOR FRANCE ELSEWHERE. THE FRENCH ARE FOR THE MOMENT HOLDING ON TO THEIR PROFITABLE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ, BUT A GOOD DEAL LESS IS BEING HEARD ABOUT ITS 'PRIVILEGED' NATURE.

3. IRAN HAS TURNE SOUR FOR FRANCE AS FOR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES IN SPITE OF THE HELP GIVEN TO KHOMEINI IN THE PAST. FOR THE MOMENT FRANCE OWES IRAN NOTHING BUT FOR LONG-TERM REASONS IS ANXIOUS NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED BY IRAN AS UNFRIENDLY.

4. FRANCE IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE DANGER THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR, WITHOUT BEING SURE WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT DO THIS BY HELPING IRAN OR BY HELPING IRAQ. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY WISH TO AVOID FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE TAKING SIDES IN A WAY WHICH MIGHT LINE HER UP CLEARLY ON THE WRONG SIDE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS WITHOUT DIFFICULTY THAT THE US ALONE ARE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO BRING ENOUGH WEIGHT TO BEAR TO COUNTER-BALANCE UNTOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, BUT IT REMAINS A CENTRAL POINT OF FRENCH POLICY THAT FRANCE CANNOT BE SEEN TO DEFER TO US LEADERSHIP EITHER IN NATO OR, A FORTIORE, OUTSIDE. IRONICALLY THE FRENCH WISH TO HAVE THE REALITY OF THE US PRESENCE AND PERHAPS OF US ACTION IN THE GULF AREA WITHOUT THE APPEARANCE, AND THE APPEARANCE OF FRENCH PRESENCE AND ACTION WITHOUT THE REALITY.

6. THE FRENCH NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, WHILE NOT ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION IN THE GULF, IS SOMETHING OF A WINDFALL FOR FRENCH POLICY THERE AT THE PRESENT TIME. WITH A COUPLE OF LARGE FRIGATES AND FOUR CORVETTE-SIZED SHIPS PLUS SUPPORTING ELEMENTS, THE FRENCH CAN TALK OF HAVING A LITTLE FLEET IN THE AREA. THANKS TO THEIR BASE FACILITIES AT JIBUTI THEY CAN CHOOSE FROM DAY TO DAY WHETHER TO SAY THE SHIPS ARE ON NORMAL STATION OR PRESENT IN THE VICINITY OF THE CRISIS. GIVEN THAT FRENCH APPEARANCES ARE ADMIRABLY LOOKED AFTER IN THIS WAY, ALL THAT REMAINS FOR THEM TO DO IS TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE FIRMLY IN TOUCH WITH THE REALITY OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE. FOR THIS NOTHING MORE THAN BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH WASHINGTON IS NECESSARY.

7. THESE VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS SEEM TO DETERMINE THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TO PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL COLLABORATION ON A 3 OR 4 POWER BASIS IN RELATION TO EVENTS IN THE GULF. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN THE DIRECTION WHICH YOU WISH ONLY IF EVENTS ON THE GROUND BEGIN TO LOOK MORE DANGEROUS AND FRANCE'S ATTITUDE OF WATCHING AND WAITING BEGINS TO LOOK LIKE NON-PARTICIPATION AND BEING LEFT ASIDE.

8. FOR THE MOMENT THE FRENCH ARE KEEPING WELL IN WITH THE ARABS BY THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL AND BY VAGUE ASSURANCES OF READINESS TO BE HELPFUL TO THE GULF STATES. MAINTENANCE OF THE FLOW OF OIL TO FRANCE REMAINS A DOMINANT FRENCH PRIORITY. 72% OF FRANCE'S OIL IMPORTS HAVE BEEN COMING FROM GULF STATES. PRESIDENT GISCARD IS SAID TO HAVE USED HIS STOP-OVER IN ABU DHABI ON 14 OCTOBER TO SECURE ASSURANCES FOR INCREASED OIL FROM THE UAE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 14 BILLION FRANC NAVAL ORDER FROM SAUDI ARABIA IS A SURE SIGN THAT FRANCE HAS EVERY INTEREST SIMPLY IN HOPING THAT NOTHING GOES MORE WRONG THAN IT HAS ALREADY. IT MAY BE NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE LITTLE FRENCH FLEET IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS SERVED A VERY IMPORTANT AIM FOR FRANCE BY ACTING AS A SORT OF DISPLAY PLATFORM TO HELP SELL FRENCH NAVAL EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE GULF.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES

HIBBERT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DESK.

MEM

MEM

IRAQ/IRAN

MEMAD

MEM

MEM

CABINET OFFICE

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ES-62

17

SECRET

FROM WASHINGTON 151745Z OCT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4276 OF 15 OCTOBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE ROME (FOR WALDEN), BONN AND PARIS.

Read is full  
m

YOUR TELNOS 389 AND 391 TO BONN.

**IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATION**

1. I DECIDED TO SEE MUSKIE IN ORDER TO HAND OVER THE MESSAGE AND TO BRING HOME TO HIM PERSONALLY YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION ON A MATTER THAT COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US. HE WAS CAMPAIGNING YESTERDAY BUT SAW ME THIS MORNING ACCOMPANIED BY WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND GEORGE VEST.
2. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THERE WAS A SERIOUS DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND DISAGREEMENT DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC UNLESS SOME OF THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL ISSUES COULD BE DISCUSSED. THE UNITED STATES HAD ASKED US TO TAKE PART IN AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE AND HAD SUGGESTED A CONCEPT BY WHICH THIS FORCE WOULD OPERATE. THERE HAD BEEN NAVAL TALKS ABOUT THIS IN LONDON AND IT WAS NOW SUGGESTED THAT THESE SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE COMMANDERS IN THE GULF. BUT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POLITICAL QUESTIONS WERE INVOLVED: TO WHAT EXTENT WAS IT MILITARILY FEASIBLE, AS PROPOSED BY THE USA, TO LEAVE THE INITIAL REACTION TO SOME INCIDENT TO THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES? WHAT WERE THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE SUGGESTED INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE? HOW LONG WAS THIS NAVAL FORCE INTENDED TO REMAIN IN EXISTENCE? THESE WERE ALL HIGHLY POLITICAL ISSUES, WHICH COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH BY NAVAL OFFICERS OPERATING IN THE AREA. THEY HAD TO BE CONSIDERED AT A POLITICAL LEVEL, AND AT A VERY SENIOR ONE.
3. THEN THERE WAS THE QUESTION OF US INTENTIONS AS A WHOLE IN THE GULF, THE ATTITUDES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED AND OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION. A GREAT DEAL WAS APPEARING IN THE UNITED STATES PRESS AT THE MOMENT ABOUT THE NEW COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GULF. ASSUMPTIONS WERE BEING MADE ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. I WISHED TO TELL MR MUSKIE FRANKLY THAT I KNEW THERE WAS A FEELING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC THAT THE AMERICANS MIGHT BE FORCING THE PACE A BIT. AT ANY RATE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR US TO HAVE EVIDENCE OF THE READINESS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT TO WELCOME ADDITIONAL US INVOLVEMENT. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW MORE OF THE PRESENT US INTERPRETATION OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE OTHER GULF STATES TO INCREASED UNITED STATES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION.

4. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE WANTED URGENT POLITICAL TALKS AND HOPED THAT WARREN CHRISTOPHER COULD GO TO LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE. YOU WERE MAKING SIMILAR PROPOSALS TO THE FRENCH AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTERS.

5. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE WAS VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THESE QUESTIONS AND TO OUR PROPOSALS. INDEED HE DREW "COMFORT" FROM THEM. HE EXPLAINED THE ORIGINS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE. THE IDEA HAD BEEN ADVANCED TO MEET A SUDDEN EMERGENCY. (COMMENT: INDEED, WE UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS ADVANCED BY THE WHITE HOUSE WITHOUT MUSKIE'S BEING CONSULTED). THE SITUATION WAS NOT AT THE MOMENT DANGEROUS AND IT WAS THEREFORE ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE THAT WE SHOULD TALK TOGETHER ABOUT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

6. THE TRUTH WAS, HE ADMITTED - SOMEWHAT DISARMINGLY THOUGH PERHAPS ALSO SOMEWHAT FRIGHTENINGLY - THAT HE HIMSELF AND CHRISTOPHER AND THE OTHERS CONCERNED HAD NOT SO FAR HAD TIME TO DISCUSS IT AMONG THEMSELVES. HE REPEATED HIS GREAT SYMPATHY WITH OUR QUESTIONS.

7. HE ALSO ADMITTED THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN WASHINGTON ON WHAT TO DO: WHETHER TO USE THE PRESENT EMERGENCY AS A MEANS OF ESTABLISHING SOME MORE PERMANENT US PRESENCE IN THE AREA. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS WHO, TO USE MY PHRASE, WERE EAGER TO "FORCE THE PACE". HE TOLD ME THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY NOT INTENDED THAT THE NAVAL FORCE SHOULD BE PERMANENT. NOR WAS THE DESPATCH OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA PERMANENT. THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE IN THE SAUDI ATTITUDE BUT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO SAY THAT ANY LONG-TERM PREDICTIONS OR ARRANGMENTS COULD NOW BE MADE. HE HIMSELF WOULD ALSO LIKE MORE EVIDENCE OF THE REAL INTENTIONS OF THE SAUDIS AND OF THE OTHER GULF STATES. CHRISTOPHER INTERJECTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE US VIEW ON THE HESITATIONS OF THE OTHER GULF STATES TO COMMIT THEMSELVES MORE OPENLY TO THE AMERICANS WAS ENTIRELY IN LINE WITH OURS. INDEED, THE OPINIONS WE HAD EXPRESSED ON THIS SUBJECT HAD HAD CONSIDERABLE EFFECT ON AMERICAN THINKING.

8. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT LONDON WOULD BE A GOOD PLACE FOR A POLITICAL MEETING. HE KNEW THAT CHRISTOPHER LIKED GOING THERE. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO HAVE TOO MANY MEETINGS IN PARIS. IT WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO TRY TO ESTABLISH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND TO DISCUSS THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS THAT YOUR MESSAGE REFERRED TO.

9. I SAID THAT IT THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO TALK ABOUT WHAT WE THOUGHT THE SOVIET INTENTIONS AND REACTIONS WERE LIKELY TO BE. MUSKIE AGREED. HE SAID THAT GROMYKO HAD PUT TO HIM HIS EXTREME CONCERN ABOUT THE IDEA OF A MULTINATIONAL FLEET IN THE GULF.

SECRET

10. I SAID THAT THERE WAS YET ANOTHER PROMINENT ARTICLE IN THE US PRESS TODAY, ONE BY KAREN HOUSE ON THE FRONT PAGE OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (REPORTED SEPARATELY) ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A NEW US STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SAUDI ARABIA. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY WRONG THAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE PUBLISHING AUTHORITATIVE ARTICLES ON THESE POLITICAL ISSUES WHEN NO DISCUSSIONS WERE TAKING PLACE ON THEM BETWEEN THE ALLIES.

11. MUSKIE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD COME TO THE PROPOSED FOUR POWER POLITICAL TALKS. I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW BUT IT STRUCK ME THAT THERE MIGHT BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN BILATERAL TALKS ON STRICTLY NAVAL MATTERS (WHICH RAISED ALL SORTS OF SENSITIVE ISSUES FOR THEM) AND THEIR ATTITUDE TO POTENTIAL QUADRIPARTITE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH IN GENERAL THEY HAD ALWAYS FAVOURED.

12. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE COMPLETELY RIGHT TO RAISE THESE QUESTIONS AND HE HIMSELF WAS EAGER TO COME OVER FOR TALKS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

13. IT WAS LEFT THAT I WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM AGAIN AS SOON AS WE HAD HEARD FROM THE OTHER TWO COUNTRIES AND HAD HIT UPON A DATE.

HENDERSON

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DEFENCE D  
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MAED  
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PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIRA ACLAND  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD  
MR P MOBERLY  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR BRAITHWAITE

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3

SECRET

Weekend Box

(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister:  
You asked for three three  
pieces of background.

15 October 1980

*Ans*  
*1/4x*

*f. Ans*

*ms*

Dear Michael,

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 13 October.

/A

I attach a copy of the 1971 Treaty of Friendship between the UAE and the UK. Exactly similar agreements were signed the same year with Bahrain and Qatar. None of these agreements mentions military matters. But all three agreements speak of the need to encourage educational, cultural and commercial links, and refer to 'consultation on matters of mutual concern in time of need'. This phrase provided the basis for the offer John Moberly recently made to UAE leaders on behalf of Lord Carrington to send an emissary to Abu Dhabi to discuss the UAE's security needs, following hints from prominent figures there that they would welcome some form of assurance from us. It does not however amount to any undertaking of a military nature. We have no defence agreement with the UAE.

/B

I enclose a copy of the text of the Security Council resolution No 479 which called on Iran and Iraq to end the fighting.

/C

I also enclose a background note on the 1975 Algiers Agreement.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing St

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP  
BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Considering that the United Arab Emirates has assumed full responsibility as a sovereign and independent State;

Determined that the long-standing and traditional relations of close friendship and co-operation between their peoples shall continue;

Desiring to give expression to this intention in the form of a Treaty of Friendship;

Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The relations between the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall be governed by a spirit of close friendship. In recognition of this, the Contracting Parties, conscious of their common interest in the peace and stability of the region, shall :

- (a) consult together on matters of mutual concern in time of need;
- (b) settle all their disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties shall encourage educational, scientific and cultural co-operation between the two States in accordance with arrangements to be agreed. Such arrangements shall cover among other things :

- (a) the promotion of mutual understanding of their respective cultures, civilisations and languages;
- (b) the promotion of contacts among professional bodies, universities and cultural institutions;
- (c) the encouragement of technical, scientific and cultural exchanges.





UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT ADOPTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL,  
26 SEPTEMBER 1980.

Having begun consideration of the item entitled 'The situation between Iran and Iraq',

Mindful that all member states have undertaken the charter obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Mindful as well that all members are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,

Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq:

1. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law.
2. Urges them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would facilitate the fulfilment of their charter obligations.
3. Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.
4. Supports the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of this situation.
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours.

## THE 1975 ALGIERS ACCORD BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND NOTE

1. In the early 1970s relations between Iran and Iraq were hostile. There was a long-standing dispute over the boundary in the Shatt-al-Arab river and the control of navigation there, as well as some disagreement over the land frontier. Iraq supported dissident movements among minority groups in Iran including the Arabs of Khuzistan and the Baluchis. Iran gave ever-increasing cross-border assistance to the Kurdish leader in Iraq, Mulla Mustapha Barzani, who had been at war with the Baghdad government on and off since the early 1960s. Iraq also resented Iran's occupation of three islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, in 1971 at the time of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. (The islands, situated near the Straits of Hormuz, had been in dispute between Iran and the Trucial States - now the United Arab Emirates.)

2. In 1975 Iran and Iraq signed agreements which in effect settled the main points of dispute between them until the Iranian revolution in 1979. These agreements consisted of

(a) A Joint Communiqué signed at Algiers in March 1975.

(b) A Treaty Relating to the State Boundary and Good Neighbourliness signed at Baghdad in June 1975. Attached to this were Protocols concerning the redemarcation of the land boundary, the delimitation of the river boundary, and border security.

(c) An Agreement on Regulations Concerning Navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab signed in Baghdad in December 1975.

3. These agreements meant that Iraq surrendered her claim to the waters of the Shatt-al-Arab beyond the thalweg (deep water channel), a claim based on historical and treaty right and till then bitterly defended; that she implicitly recognised Iran's occupation of the three Gulf islands; and that in return she obtained the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurds and demarcation of the land border.

4. The agreements worked well. The land border was demarcated and the Iraqis established control over the Kurdish north. Propaganda attacks

/ceased

ceased, and so did attempts at subversion. Detailed regulations for joint navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab were drawn up (control having previously been in the Iraqis' hands). It is not clear to what extent they were implemented, but neither side is known to have made complaints on the subject up to the time of the Iranian revolution.

5. For Iraq the most contentious issue in the 1975 agreements was the concession of a thalweg frontier in the Shatt-al-Arab. The frontier traditionally lay along the Iranian bank. This was recognised in international treaties going back to 1913 and most recently in the 1937 treaty between Iran and Iraq. (The 1913 Constantinople Protocol signed by Britain, Russia, Turkey and Persia did, however, provide for a thalweg frontier off Khorramshahr to facilitate navigation there, and the 1937 treaty provided additionally for a thalweg frontier off Abadan). In attempting to justify the present hostilities the Iraqis have argued that the 1975 treaty was imposed upon them by outside powers at a time when they were militarily weak. The Iranians, for their part, have argued in the past that it is not equitable for the frontier to lie on their side of the river; but elsewhere in the world there are examples both of international frontiers following the thalweg and of such frontiers following one bank of a river.

16 OCT 1980

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SECRET

cc: MOD BK  
CO



file

16

Iraq

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 October 1980

Message to President Carter

Further to Paul Lever's letter to me of 14 October, I enclose the text of the message from the Prime Minister to President Carter about the situation in the Gulf in the form in which it has been despatched over the direct line to the White House. As you will see it is as drafted except for the addition of a new penultimate paragraph and the change which you put to me with regard to the paragraph on insurance.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Roderic Lyne, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TR

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MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, 15 OCTOBER

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 9 October about the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the situation in the Gulf area generally. I am grateful to you for letting me have your assessment of recent developments.

I agree that there are four particular objectives we should be pursuing.

The first, an early ending of hostilities, is of overriding importance, although I believe we must be patient, as neither party to the fighting seems yet ready for peace on realistic terms. Our respective governments are nevertheless doing what they can to prepare for the time, although the prospects are not yet promising. This matter should certainly remain before the Security Council. I too had useful talks with President Zia who seemed pessimistic about his chances of taking matters further for the time being. It may be that another mediator, perhaps from India or another non-aligned country, could build on the foundations he has laid and pursue talks with the two sides.

Your second objective, that we must prevent the conflict being extended, is of crucial importance. I agree that your efforts so far seem to have been successful. Indeed there seems to be a growing realisation, for example in the attitude of King Hussein, of the dangers. We must keep this up.

As regards contingency preparations to protect shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, it has been helpful to have an early sight of your plans. Our comments on these have been passed to you through various channels, most recently by our Embassy in Washington. You will know that we welcome the general

/ concept

SECRET

- 2 -

concept of concerted action to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect the oil flow so essential to us all, and are ready and able to play our part. But we have certain reservations about some aspects of your proposals. In particular, I doubt whether, if the threat to close the Straits were to be realised, the concept of operations now being discussed would be effective in restoring confidence among ship-owners and masters.

I hope you will share our view that in order to avoid misunderstanding and perhaps miscalculation, it is of the utmost importance that there should be joint consultations among those Western Governments most closely concerned in this matter and whose forces will be involved. I consider that our immediate objective should be to establish clear political guidelines for naval commanders in the area so that together they can draw up contingency operational plans. We shall have two warships plus associated support vessels in the Gulf of Oman on 22 October; and other ships will be exercising with yours from next week in the Indian Ocean. With this in mind, Peter Carrington is proposing to Mr. Muskie that Mr. Christopher should visit London very soon for joint talks with us, the French and, if they wish to join us, the Germans. I hope you can agree.

On the related question of insurance, we are as you know ready to take part in talks although we do not see any immediate need for action.

Fourthly, you suggest we should be willing to respond to certain requests for assistance from those non-belligerent friends in the area who may feel threatened by the current situation. I entirely agree. We have already been in touch with certain of the Gulf Rulers and the Saudis about the possibility of providing aid for defensive purposes. Our thinking is at a very preliminary stage. We shall be examining the possibilities urgently, and shall keep you informed. It is

/ essential

SECRET



essential that we work closely together both to avoid duplication, which would have serious political implications, besides being wasteful, and to avoid gaps in our efforts.

More generally, I believe that we should be thinking in terms of continuing exchanges of information and analysis on the whole range of problems in the area. I would like to see the new Quadripartite machinery developed in this direction.

Finally, I look forward to maintaining close and direct contact with you as the situation develops.

Yours sincerely,  
Margaret Thatcher

SSN - 2410

DTG - 151129Z

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

For transmission on the direct line to the White House.

ISA

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, 15 OCTOBER

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your message of 9 October about the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the situation in the Gulf area generally. I am grateful to you for letting me have your assessment of recent developments.

I agree that there are four particular objectives we should be pursuing.

The first, an early ending of hostilities, is of overriding importance, although I believe we must be patient, as neither party to the fighting seems yet ready for peace on realistic terms. Our respective governments are nevertheless doing what they can to prepare for the time, although the prospects are not yet promising. This matter should certainly remain before the Security Council. I too had useful talks with President Zia who seemed pessimistic about his chances of taking matters further for the time being. It may be that another mediator, perhaps from India or another non-aligned country, could build on the foundations he has laid and pursue talks with the two sides.

Your second objective, that we must prevent the conflict being extended, is of crucial importance. I agree that your efforts so far seem to have been successful. Indeed there seems to be a growing realisation, for example, in the attitude of King Hussein, of the dangers. We must keep this up.

As regards contingency preparations to protect shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, it has been helpful to have an early sight of your plans. Our comments on these have been passed to you through various channels, most recently by our Embassy in Washington. You will know that we welcome the general

/ concept

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Revised page 2  
cc FCO  
MOD  
CO

- 2 -

concept of concerted action to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect the oil flow so essential to us all, and are ready and able to play our part. But we have certain reservations about some aspects of your proposals. In particular, I doubt whether, if the threat to close the Straits were to be realised, the concept of operations now being discussed would be effective in restoring confidence among ship-owners and masters.

I hope you will share our view that in order to avoid misunderstanding and perhaps miscalculation, it is of the utmost importance that there should be joint consultations among those Western Governments most closely concerned in this matter and whose forces will be involved. I consider that our immediate objective should be to establish clear political guidelines for naval commanders in the area so that together they can draw up contingency operational plans. We shall have two warships plus associated support vessels in the Gulf of Oman on 22 October; and other ships will be exercising with yours from next week in the Indian Ocean. With this in mind, Peter Carrington is proposing to Mr. Muskie that Mr. Christopher should visit London very soon for joint talks with us, the French and, if they wish to join us, the Germans. I hope you can agree.

On the related question of insurance, we are as you know ready to take part in talks although we do not see any immediate need for action.

Fourthly, you suggest we should be willing to respond to certain requests for assistance from those non-belligerent friends in the area who may feel threatened by the current situation. I entirely agree. We have already been in touch with certain of the Gulf Rulers and the Saudis about the possibility of providing aid for defensive purposes. Our thinking is at a very preliminary stage. We shall be examining the possibilities urgently, and shall keep you informed. It is

/ essential

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- 3 -

essential that we work closely together both to avoid duplication, which would have serious political implications, besides being wasteful, and to avoid gaps in our efforts.

More generally, I believe that we should be thinking in terms of continuing exchanges of information and analysis on the whole range of problems in the area. I would like to see the new Quadripartite machinery developed in this direction.

Finally, I look forward to maintaining close and direct contact with you as the situation develops.

Yours sincerely,  
Margaret Thatcher

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cc Master  
ops

SUBJECT

kg. *[Signature]* 15/11

CAB/WTE HSE 001/15

GRS 970

SECRET  
IMMEDIATE  
151129Z OCT 80  
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
BT

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 9 OCTOBER ABOUT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND THE SITUATION IN THE GULF AREA GENERALLY. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR LETTING ME HAVE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

I AGREE THAT THERE ARE FOUR PARTICULAR OBJECTIVES WE SHOULD BE PURSUING.

THE FIRST, AN EARLY ENDING OF HOSTILITIES, IS OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE WE MUST BE PATIENT, AS NEITHER PARTY TO THE FIGHTING SEEMS YET READY FOR PEACE ON REALISTIC TERMS. OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS ARE NEVERTHELESS DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO PREPARE FOR THE TIME, ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT YET PROMISING. THIS MATTER SHOULD CERTAINLY REMAIN BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I TOO HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA WHO SEEMED PESSIMISTIC ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF TAKING MATTERS FURTHER FOR THE TIME BEING. IT MAY BE THAT ANOTHER MEDIATOR, PERHAPS FROM INDIA OR ANOTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY, COULD BUILD ON THE FOUNDATIONS HE HAS LAID AND PURSUE TALKS WITH THE TWO SIDES.

YOUR SECOND OBJECTIVE, THAT WE MUST PREVENT THE CONFLICT BEING EXTENDED, IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. I AGREE THAT YOUR EFFORTS SO FAR SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. INDEED THERE SEEMS TO BE A GROWING REALISATION, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE ATTITUDE OF KING HUSSEIN, OF THE DANGERS. WE MUST KEEP THIS UP.

AS REGARDS CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS TO PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, IT HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO HAVE AN EARLY SIGHT OF YOUR PLANS. OUR COMMENTS ON THESE HAVE BEEN PASSED TO YOU THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, MOST RECENTLY BY OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. YOU WILL KNOW THAT WE WELCOME THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF CONCERTED ACTION TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND TO PROTECT THE OIL FLOW SO ESSENTIAL TO US ALL, AND ARE READY AND ABLE TO PLAY OUR PART. BUT WE HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF YOUR PROPOSALS. IN PARTICULAR, I DOUBT WHETHER, IF THE THREAT TO CLOSE THE STRAITS WERE TO BE REALISED, THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS NOW BEING DISCUSSED WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE AMONG SHIP-OWNERS AND MASTERS.

I HOPE YOU WILL SHARE OUR VIEW THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING AND PERHAPS MISCALCULATION, IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THERE SHOULD BE JOINT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THOSE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MOST CLOSELY CONCERNED IN THIS MATTER AND WHOSE FORCES WILL BE INVOLVED. I CONSIDER THAT OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH CLEAR POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR NAVAL COMMANDERS IN THE AREA SO THAT TOGETHER THEY CAN DRAW UP CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL PLANS. WE SHALL HAVE TWO WARSHIPS PLUS ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VESSELS IN THE GULF OF OMAN ON 22 OCTOBER: AND OTHER SHIPS WILL BE EXERCISING WITH YOURS FROM NEXT WEEK IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. WITH THIS IN MIND, PETER CARRINGTON IS PROPOSING TO MR MUSKIE THAT MR CHRISTOPHER SHOULD VISIT LONDON VERY SOON FOR JOINT TALKS WITH US, THE FRENCH AND, IF THEY WISH TO JOIN US, THE GERMANS. I HOPE YOU CAN AGREE.

ON THE RELATED QUESTION OF INSURANCE, WE ARE AS YOU KNOW READY TO TAKE PART IN TALKS ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE NEED FOR ACTION.

FOURTHLY, YOU SUGGEST WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO RESPOND TO CERTAIN REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO MAY FEEL THREATENED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION. I ENTIRELY AGREE. WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH CERTAIN OF THE GULF RULERS AND THE SAUDIS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING AID FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. OUR THINKING IS AT A VERY PRELIMINARY STAGE. WE SHALL BE EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITIES URGENTLY, AND SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER BOTH TO AVOID DUPLICATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS, BESIDES BEING WASTEFUL, AND TO AVOID GAPS IN OUR EFFORTS.

MORE GENERALLY, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE THINKING IN TERMS OF CONTINUING EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS IN THE AREA. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE NEW QUADRIPARTITE MACHINERY DEVELOPED IN THIS DIRECTION.

FINALLY, I LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING CLOSE AND DIRECT CONTACT WITH YOU AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

MARGARET THATCHER.

BT

NNNN

SENT AT 151314ZZ BRH



SECRET

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14

Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

With the agreement of the FCO,  
I have added a new paragraph  
at the end of the text.

London SW1A 2AH

14 October 1980

Apex amended text?

Paul 14/10

Dear Michael,

Message from President Carter

Thank you for your letter of 9 October.

I attach a suggested draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Carter. Lord Carrington discussed this with the Prime Minister this morning: the reply provides an opportunity for the Prime Minister to impress upon the President the importance we attach to properly co-ordinated multilateral discussions on naval contingency planning in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. Lord Carrington proposes in addition himself to send messages to Mr Muskie, M. Francois-Poncet and Herr Genscher suggesting a quadripartite meeting in London to be attended by Warren Christopher and his opposite numbers, to discuss the whole situation.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
London

SECRET

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

President Carter

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your message of 9 October about the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the situation in the Gulf area generally. I am grateful to you for letting me have your assessment of recent developments.

I agree that there are four particular objectives we should be pursuing.

The first, an early ending of hostilities, is of overriding importance, although I believe we must be patient, as neither party to the fighting seems yet ready for peace on realistic terms. Our respective governments are nevertheless doing what they can to prepare for the time, although the prospects are not yet promising. This matter should certainly remain before the Security Council. I too had useful talks with President Zia who seemed pessimistic about his chances of taking matters further for the time being. It may be that another mediator, perhaps from India or another non-aligned country, could build on the foundations he has laid and pursue talks with the two sides.

/Your

Enclosures—flag(s).....



SECRET

Your second objective, that we must prevent the conflict being ~~expanded~~<sup>extended</sup>, is of crucial importance. I agree that your efforts so far seem to have been successful. Indeed there seems to be a growing realisation, for example in the attitude of King Hussein, of the dangers. We must keep this up.

As regards contingency preparations to protect shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz, it has been helpful to have an early sight of your plans. Our comments on these have been passed to you through various channels, most recently by our Embassy in Washington. You will know that we welcome the general concept of concerted action to ensure freedom of navigation and to protect the oil flow so essential to us all, and are ready and able to play our part. But we have certain reservations about some aspects of your proposals. In particular I doubt whether, if the threat to close the Straits were to be realised, the concept of operations now being discussed would be effective in restoring confidence among ship-owners and masters. ~~NP~~ I hope you will share our view that in order to avoid misunderstanding and perhaps miscalculation, it is of the utmost importance that there should be joint consultations among those Western governments most closely concerned in this matter and whose forces will be involved. I consider that our immediate objective should be to establish clear political guidelines for naval commanders in the area so that together they can draw up contingency operational plans. We shall have 5 ships, plus associated

/support

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support vessels, in the area on 29 October. With this in mind, Peter Carrington is proposing to Mr Muskie that Mr Christopher should visit London very soon for joint talks with us, the French and, if they wish to join us, the Germans. I hope you can agree.

On the related question of insurance, we are as you know ready to take part in talks <sup>although</sup> We do not see any immediate need for action, ~~but certainly it will be needed to supplement naval activity should there be a real threat to the security of shipping in the Gulf.~~

<sup>Fourthly,</sup>  
~~Finally~~ you suggest we should be willing to respond to certain requests for assistance from those non-belligerent friends in the area who may feel threatened by the current situation. I entirely agree. We have already been in touch with certain of the Gulf Rulers and the Saudis about the possibility of providing aid for defensive purposes. Our thinking is at a very preliminary stage. We shall be examining the possibilities urgently, and shall keep you informed. It is essential that we work closely together both to avoid duplication, which would have serious political implications, besides being wasteful, and to avoid gaps in our efforts.

~~I look forward to maintaining close contact with you on all these matters.~~

*Pres /*

SECRET

More generally I believe that we should be thinking in terms of continuing exchanges of information and analysis on the whole range of problems in the area. I would like to see the new Quadrópartite machinery developed in this direction.

Finally, I look forward to maintaining close and direct contact with you as the situation develops.

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14 OCT 1980

*Need*      *nb*

CONFIDENTIAL



File Iraq @SC  
10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

14 October 1980

IRAN/IRAQ

As I mentioned to you on the telephone, the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary discussed briefly this morning the question of our naval presence in the Persian Gulf area. The Prime Minister said that she was anxious that the presence of HMS Coventry should be reinforced as soon as possible by the addition of at least one other vessel. You told me that this was already in hand.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

David Omand, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 500

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 1471742Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 458 OF 14 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD MODUK (AUS D STAFF) MUSCAT  
ABU DHABI DUBAI BAHRAIN DOHA ISLAMABAD KUWAIT JEDDA STOCKHOLM  
NEW DELHI

IRAN/IRAQ EXERCISE BEACON COMPASS

1. THE AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER CALLED ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL  
TODAY ON INSTRUCTIONS.

2. SIR J PLIMSOLL SAID THAT AUSTRALIAN MINISTERS HAD REVIEWED RAN  
PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT IN THE LIGHT  
OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, THE EXERCISE WOULD BE OPEN TO  
MISINTERPRETATION BY IRAQ AND IRAN AND PLAY INTO COMMUNIST HANDS.  
THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE TIMING AND SCALE WERE WRONG IN RELATION TO  
THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT. THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR IN IRAQ HAD  
ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED ABOUT THE INADVISABILITY OF HOLDING THE  
EXERCISE. SIR J PLIMSOLL WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF  
THE EXERCISE (TO SHOW STRENGTH POST AFGHANISTAN) WOULD NO LONGER  
BE FULFILLED. FOR THESE REASONS THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD  
PREFER TO SEE THE EXERCISE CANCELLED AND HOPED THAT THE UK WOULD  
AGREE.

3. THE LPS SAID THAT WE SAW THE EXERCISE IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT.  
ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOW NOT FULFILL THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE, GIVEN THE

INCREASING CONCERN OF GULF RULERS FOR REASSURANCE IT HAD TWO NEW  
PURPOSES TO WHICH WE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE:

- A. IT WOULD PROVIDE REASSURANCE TO THE RULERS THAT WESTERN POWERS  
WERE ABLE AND WILLING TO OPERATE IN THE NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN:
- B. SINCE THERE WAS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT WESTERN POWERS MIGHT  
NEED TO PROVIDE NAVAL PROTECTION FOR MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE GULF,  
THE EXERCISE PROVIDED GOOD COVER FOR DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL VESSELS  
IN THE GENERAL VICINITY WITHOUT UNDULY RAISING THE TEMPERATURE:

4. THE LPS ADDED THAT, GIVEN THE UNSATISFACTORY CO-ORDINATION OF  
PLANNING WITH THE AMERICANS, PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE PROVIDED  
US WITH A LEVER TO INDUCE THE AMERICANS TO TAKE HEED OF OUR CONCERNS  
ABOUT THIS. MOREOVER TO PULL OUT OF THE EXERCISE ENTIRELY WOULD LOOK  
WEAK IN THE EYES OF THE GULF RULERS, WOULD PROBABLY ANNOY THE  
AMERICANS (AND INCIDENTALLY WOULD WEAKEN OUR HANDS IN DEALING WITH  
THEM) AND COULD BE DELIBERATELY MISINTERPRETED BY THOSE HOSTILE TO US  
FOR ALL THESE REASONS, AND BECAUSE WE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT BOTH TO  
DILUTE THE STRONG AMERICAN PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND SHOW A WILLING-  
NESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THEM, THE UK BELIEVED THE EXERCISE SHOULD  
GO AHEAD. HE HOPED THE AUSTRALIANS WOULD AGREE TO IT DOING SO.

CONFIDENTIAL

/5. SIR J PLIMSOLL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. SIR J PLIMSOLL UNDERTOOK TO REPORT OUR VIEWS TO CANBERRA BUT DID NOT RULE OUT A DECISION BY THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTERS TO PULL OUT.

6. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO RETAIN AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE REINFORCE WHAT HAS BEEN SAID HERE AT A SUITABLY SENIOR POLITICAL LEVEL DRAWING ON THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3-4 ABOVE.

7. GRATEFUL IF BAGHDAD AND OTHER POSTS WOULD REPORT ANY REPRESENTATIONS THEY MAY HAVE RECEIVED ABOUT THE EXERCISE.

CARRINGTON

MINIMAL  
DEF DEPT  
MED  
SPD

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

IRAQ/IRAN

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 18φ

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS 141214Z OCT 8φ

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 85φ OF 14 OCTOBER 198φ

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE BONN AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING KUWAIT DOHA ABU DHABI AND DUBAI

IRAN/IRAQ: INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT BANI SADR

1. IN AN INTERVIEW IN THIS WEEK'S EDITION OF THE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, PRESIDENT BANI SADR IS QUOTED AS MAKING INTER ALIA THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

"IF THE IRAQI ARMY FIGHTS ALONE, WE SHALL SOON STRIKE IT A FATAL BLOW. HOWEVER IF OTHER COUNTRIES INTERFERE, IT COULD TAKE A LONG TIME. BUT WE HAVE THE MEANS TO MAKE THEM UNDERSTAND THAT WE SHALL SPARE NO-ONE. IF THE GULF COUNTRIES ENTER THE WAR, WE SHALL DESTROY THEIR OIL INSTALLATIONS ..... WE SHALL ATTACK HORMUZ IF THE WAR SPREADS AND IF THE GREAT POWERS TAKE PART THROUGH INTER-MEDIARY COUNTRIES".

"(IRAN WILL END THE WAR) WHEN THE REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS BEEN BROUGHT DOWN. TO DO THAT WE ARE READY TO CARRY THE FIGHTING INSIDE IRAQ".

"WHEN (IRANIAN) TERRITORY IS LIBERATED, NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN - NOT OVER THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, THE TWO BORDERING COUNTRIES HAVING THE RIGHT TO FREE PASSAGE; BUT DISCUSSIONS COULD TAKE PLACE OVER THE SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF SQUARE KILOMETRES WHICH THE IRAQIS CLAIM BY ILAM, BETWEEN KHUZISTAN AND KERMANSHAH".

FCO PLEASE PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

HIBBERT.

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

MED

MAED

IRAQ/IRAN

NEWAD

TRED

NAD

ERD

UND

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EESD

CONS D

ECOD

CONS EM UNIT

WED

CABINET OFFICE

ES=SD

RID

GR 270

UNCLASSIFIED

FM TEL AVIV 140800Z OCT 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 486 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO AMMAN BAGHDAD WASHINGTON AND CAIRO

INFO SAVING TO EC POSTS, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS

MY TEL NO 475 AND AMMAN TELNO 396: IRAN/IRAQ/ISRAEL

MT

1. SHAMIR, TALKING TO HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS ON 13 OCTOBER AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE EC INITIATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS FADING FAST, MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. EUROPEAN OPINION WOULD FIND IT RIDICULOUS IF EC POLITICIANS WERE TO CONTINUE TO FOCUS ON THEIR INITIATIVE WHEN THE REST OF THE WORLD WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE GULF WAR. MOREOVER, THE ARGUMENT THAT THE EC INITIATIVE FILLED A VACUUM CAUSED BY THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS WOULD SOON BE INOPERATIVE. BUT WHILE ISRAEL WAS SOMETIMES ESTRANGED AND ALIENATED IN EUROPE, SHE WAS ALMOST "PART OF THE FAMILY" IN THE US; ITS INTERESTS WERE SEEN AS AN ELECTORAL CONSIDERATION AND ITS POSITIONS AND VIEWS WERE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY.

2. SHAMIR IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HOWEVER THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR ENDED, IT WOULD BE TO ISRAEL'S DISADVANTAGE. WHICHEVER SIDE WON, IT WAS LIKELY TO BECOME THE MAJOR GULF POWER AND MORE OPENLY HOSTILE TO ISRAEL EVEN IF THERE WERE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, THE TWO SIDES MIGHT LATER TURN ON ISRAEL TOGETHER.

3. PRESS REPORTS THAT THERE ARE NOW 43 SHIPS AT AQABA WITH CARGO FOR IRAQ (FOUR SOVIET, FOUR CUBAN, THREE RUMANIAN, TWO YUGOSLAV, ONE IRAQI, ONE SYRIAN AND THE REST, WEST EUROPEAN). THIS IS SAID TO BE THREE TIMES THE NORMAL NUMBER. THE CARGOES ARE REPORTED TO INCLUDE AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS AND SUPPLIES, BUT NO (NO) HEAVY WEAPONS.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

ROBINSON

REPEATED AS REQUESTED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

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IRAQ/IRAN

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ARAB/ISRAEL

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CABINET OFFICE

ES45D

RID



*Informing but I think  
we should preserve.*

*a copy to me & to  
Mr Alexander (No 10)*

*Immediate 13D*

GRS 54φ

SECRET

FM PARIS 14162φZ OCT 8φ

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 852 OF 14 OCTOBER 198φ

INFO ROUTINE BONN, WASHINGTON, MODUK (AUS(D STAFF), DS 5, ACDS(OPS)),  
JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA,  
BAHRAIN, MUSCAT AND AMMAN.

INFO SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, E TEL AVIV, UKDEL NATO,  
CAIRO AND DAMASCUS.

*2. Repeat immediate to Rome for*

*P.S.*

*Russ.*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1624 TO WASHINGTON: IRAN/IRAQ: NAVAL COOPERATION

1. MINISTER SPOKE ON 14 OCTOBER ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED TO ROBIN, POLITICAL DIRECTOR AT THE QUAI. HE REINFORCED THE POINT THAT BILATERAL TALKS COULD LEAD TO CONFUSION AND POSSIBLY ILL-CONSIDERED ACTION.
2. ROBIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED. THEY WERE READY TO HAVE BILATERAL NAVAL TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH, BUT NOT TRILATERAL CONVERSATIONS. AT THE PRESENT TIME THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE FRENCH, US AND BRITISH HAD DONE ENOUGH BOTH BY DECLARATION AND BY ACTION TO DETER INTERRUPTION OF TRAFFIC THROUGH THE GULF. IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED AND THERE EMERGED A REAL THREAT TO FREE MOVEMENT OR WORSE, ROBIN GAVE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT BE READY TO RECONSIDER THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE. BUT THEY THOUGHT THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN SO FAR AND THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN HAND WERE SUFFICIENT AND THESE COULD BE ADEQUATELY COORDINATED ON A BILATERAL BASIS.
3. THE FRENCH HAD A POLITICAL OBJECTION TO TRILATERAL COOPERATION AT THIS STAGE. IT WOULD INCREASE THE VISIBILITY OF THE WEST'S ACTIONS IN THE GULF AND WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME KNOWN TO THE GULF STATES AND TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE FRENCH MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTION TAKEN TO DETER INTERRUPTION OF MOVEMENT IN THE GULF AND ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT PROMOTE THE RESTORATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE IN THE GULF AREA.
4. JAMES SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE SURELY NOT OPPOSED TO A GREATER DEGREE OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THIS AREA. IN THE PAST THEY HAD CRITICISED THE AMERICANS FOR NOT DOING ENOUGH. ROBIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH WISHED TO WEIGH CAREFULLY THE REPERCUSSIONS THAT ANY INCREASE IN AMERICAN INFLUENCE WOULD HAVE ON THE SOVIET UNION. ANYTHING THE AMERICANS DID WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SOVIET RIPOSTE. THIS PREOCCUPIED THE FRENCH.

SECRET

/5.ROBIN SAID

S E C R E T

5. ROBIN SAID THAT THEY WOULD TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF BRITISH VIEWS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF TRILATERAL COOPERATION. WHEN JAMES PRESSED ROBIN TO RE-CONSIDER THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, ROBIN SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER WERE LEAVING TODAY FOR CHINA MEANT THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE OF A CHANGE UNLESS THE SITUATION DETERIORATED DRAMATICALLY.

6. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE DESCRIBED ABOVE WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN A CONVERSATION I HAD WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY. HARTMAN TOLD ME THAT THE REACTIONS THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED WERE ALL CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEW THAT THE FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO HAVE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS BUT NOT TRILATERAL.

7. THE ABOVE SUGGESTS THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN AN APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE GULF AREA AND TO AVOID BEING SEEN TO BE IN TOO CLOSE NAVAL OR MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH THEIR ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE AMERICANS. THIS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH A READINESS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND CONFIDENTIAL CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. NAVY IN WASHINGTON AND POSSIBLY ON THE SPOT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

LIMITED  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/MED  
HD/DEF D  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A ACLAND  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR P H MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE

[NOT ADVANCED]

2

S E C R E T

GRS 530

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13C

FM F C O 141625Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 399 OF 14 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS WASHINGTON ROME (FOR WALDEN)

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF MESSAGES TO MUSKIE/FRANCOIS-PONCET.

BEGINS: I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT IN OUR VARIOUS RESPONSES, BOTH IN ACTIONS ON THE GROUND AND IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING, THE FOUR WESTERN GOVERNMENTS PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED (ALTHOUGH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS PRECLUDED FROM TAKING PART IN MILITARY MEASURES, THEY ARE OF COURSE DEEPLY CONCERNED) ARE FAILING TO WORK AS CLOSELY TOGETHER AS WE SHOULD, AND ARE RUNNING THE RISK EITHER OF TREADING ON EACH OTHER'S TOES OR OF FAILING TO UNDERTAKE NECESSARY ACTIONS, BECAUSE WE ASSUME THAT SOMEBODY ELSE WILL BE DOING IT.

2. ONE EXAMPLE IS THE NAVAL PLANNING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON BETWEEN OURSELVES AND YOU AND THE FRENCH/OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS AND YOU AND THE AMERICANS. WE/WE AND THE AMERICANS HAVE HAD SOME TALKS IN LONDON ABOUT A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, AND I AM TOLD THAT THE US INTENTION IS THAT FURTHER PLANNING SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, IE TO THE NAVAL COMMANDERS IN THE GULF OF OMAN. BUT THE CONCEPT THAT I HAVE SEEN, WHILE WHOLLY ADEQUATE FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION, IN WHICH THE THREAT OF A CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ IS MERELY A POTENTIAL ONE, WOULD NOT, SO BRITISH EXPERTS BELIEVE, BE ADEQUATE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE TO TANKER OWNERS AND MASTERS, SHOULD SHIPPING COME UNDER ACTUAL ATTACK IN THE STRAITS OR THE GULF. IN THAT EVENT, TOO, BRITISH EXPERTS BELIEVE THAT ANY NAVAL MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE SUPPLEMENTED, IF THEY WERE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE, BY STEPS BY GOVERNMENTS TO ASSUME, OR UNDERWRITE, WAR RISK INSURANCE COVER. THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONSIDERED MULTILATERALLY IN ANY DETAIL.

3. BUT MY CONCERNS EXTEND WIDER THAN THESE NAVAL TALKS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN APPROACHED, BOTH BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UAE, WITH THE LATTER OF WHOM WE HAVE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, WHICH REQUIRES US TO CONSULT IN TIME OF NEED, ABOUT THE PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND PROTECTION. CLEARLY WESTERN RESOURCES ARE LIMITED, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE WE OUGHT ALL TO BE CONCERTING OUR EFFORTS, BOTH IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE GREATEST EFFECT AND ALSO TO AVOID TAKING MEASURES INDIVIDUALLY WHICH, IN ISOLATION, MAY SEEM DESIRABLE BUT CUMULATIVELY MIGHT BY INADVERTENCE HAVE UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS.

SECRET

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**SECRET**

4. WITH ALL THIS IN MIND, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR COULD MEET, AT A SENIOR POLITICAL LEVEL, BOTH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND TO REACH DECISIONS WHICH CAN SERVE AS CLEAR GUIDELINES FOR OUR OFFICIALS. IF YOU AGREE, I WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR WARREN CHRISTOPHER/YOUR REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT LONDON IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR JOINT TALKS. I MYSELF UNFORTUNATELY SHALL BE AWAY DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS, BUT IAN GILMOUR WILL BE AVAILABLE AND WOULD BE GLAD TO TAKE PART. ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD CONSIDER SOME OTHER MEETING PLACE IF THAT SUITED YOU AND THE FRENCH/ AND THE AMERICANS. EVEN IF SUCH A MEETING WERE TO BECOME KNOWN TO THE PRESS, I DO NOT THINK THAT SHOULD BE AN OBSTACLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. I AM THEREFORE WRITING IN SIMILAR TERMS BOTH TO JEAN FRANCOIS PONCET/ED MUSKIE AND HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER. ENDS.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED  
MIED  
DEFENCE  
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MAE  
PS  
PS LPS  
PS MRHUR  
PS PUS  
SIR A. A. CLAN  
SIR J. GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD  
MR P. H. MOBERLY  
MR I. C. MOBERLY  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR BRAITHWAITE

COPIES SENT TO  
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

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**SECRET**

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GRS 160

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SECRET

FM F C O 141625Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 388 OF 14 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME (FOR WALDEN)

MIPT: IRAQ/IRAN: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF A MESSAGE TO HERR GENSCHER.  
 BEGINS: I HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT THE LACK OF EFFECTIVE  
 COORDINATION OF THE VARIOUS RESPONSES TO THE IRAQ/IRAN  
 CRISIS WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE  
 PRECLUDED FROM DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY MEASURES  
 TAKEN IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. NONETHELESS, I BELIEVE  
 IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP CLOSELY TOGETHER IN ALL  
 THIS, GIVEN THAT THE DISCUSSION WOULD NO DOUBT STRAY INTO  
 POLITICAL MATTERS, SINCE ALL OUR INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED.  
 I AM THEREFORE SENDING YOU A COPY OF A MESSAGE WHICH I  
 HAVE ADDRESSED TO ED MUSKIE AND JEAN FRANCOIS-PONCET, SUGGESTING  
 A MEETING IN LONDON, OR ELSEWHERE. I SHOULD BE VERY GLAD  
 IF YOU FELT IT POSSIBLE TO BE REPRESENTED.

CARRINGTON  
LIMITED

MED

DEF. 1

En SSI

MAED

PS

PS/LRS

PS/MRHURD

PS/PUS

SIR.A.ACLAND

SIR J. GRAHAM

MR BULLARD

MR.P.H.MOBERLY  
MR.J.C.MOBERLY  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR BRAITHWAITE

COPIES SENT TO  
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OO BONN  
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*La. Hunt*

FM FCO 141600Z OCTOBER 1980  
TO IMMEDIATE BONN  
TELEGRAM NO 387 OF 14 OCTOBER  
AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON PARIS ROME (FOR WALDEN)  
IRAN/IRAQ: ALLIED CONSULTATIONS

1. MY TWO IFTS CONTAIN THE DRAFTS OF MESSAGES FROM THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE. THE FIRST DRAFT IS TO HERR GENSCHER, THE  
SECOND TO MR MUSKIE AND M. FRANCOIS-PONCET. SUBJECT TO  
CONFIRMATION FROM THE PS IN ROME THAT THE TEXTS ARE  
ACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, PLEASE DELIVER ALL THREE AS  
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

CARRINGTON  
NNNN

[ COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST ]

DISTRIBUTION

LIMITED	PS/PUS
MED	SIR A ACLAND
DEFENCE	MR BULLARD
ENS AND SD	MR GRAHAM
MAED	MR P H MOBERLY
PS	MR J C MOBERLY
PS/LPS	LORD BRIDGES
PS/MR HURD	MR BRAITHWAITE

1

SECRET

GR 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ABU DHABI 140850Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 334 OF 14 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI AND MUSCAT

ROUTINE MUSCAT.

MY 331 + YOUR 222

YOUR TELNO 331:

mf

SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. IN MY ABSENCE IN DUBAI, FIRST SECRETARY SAW THE MINISTER OF STATE THIS MORNING AND PUT THE SUGGESTIONS IN YOUR PARA 4.
2. AS EXPECTED RASHED ABDULLAH, WHILE APPRECIATING OUR READINESS TO SEND A TEAM AT SHORT NOTICE, REGRETTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN ANYBODY COMING TO START DISCUSSIONS BEFORE OR DURING THE ID HOLIDAY. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT SUCH A TEAM WOULD BE MOST WELCOME "A DAY OR TWO AFTER THE ID". HE ALSO DECLINED THE SUGGESTION THAT ONE MAN COULD COME OUT THIS WEEK TO HOLD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS.
3. SINCE ON THE DAY OR TWO FOLLOWING AN ID UAE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE NORMALLY ONLY WORKING AT HALF STRENGTH, I SUGGEST THAT THE FIRST PRACTICAL DATE FOR GENERAL PERKINS AND HIS TEAM TO ARRIVE WOULD BE 25 OCTOBER. HOWEVER I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND WOULD UNDERLINE OUR WILLINGNESS TO START SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IF ONE MEMBER OF PERKIN'S STAFF COULD ARRIVE ON 22 OCTOBER.

ROBERTS

BT

IMMEDIATE

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
~~MR J O MOBERLY~~  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
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CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*SUR A A CLAY*

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FROM COMMCEN HSP  
TO MODUK

CONFIDENTIAL UK COMMS ONLY  
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Secretary of State for Defence

*Ph...*  
- 14/x

## IRAN/IRAQ : DEPLOYMENT OF HM SHIPS

The deployment of HMS COVENTRY to the Gulf of Oman has proved a valuable step. It has confirmed HMG's willingness and ability to play a part in the protection of western interests in the Gulf whilst at the same time creating an opportunity to exercise some influence on the plans of our allies. The ship's presence has also added conviction to the assurances that we have needed to give to Gulf rulers about our concern for their security.

2. Although the fighting between Iraq and Iran now seems to be moving at a slower pace the dangers posed by the conflict to freedom of navigation in the Gulf have not diminished. The possibility remains that either of the parties might be tempted into an irrational gesture against neutral shipping. Western naval powers may still need to undertake a naval control of shipping exercise. We therefore think that it would be prudent to move a second Royal Navy ship to the area as soon as possible. The Foreign Secretary had a word with the Prime Minister about this just before he left for Italy this morning, and I understand she agrees.

3. I believe that our officials have already discussed this possibility, and that HMS ALACRITY, currently in Singapore, is best placed for such a move. I know that certain ships are already programmed to visit Gulf ports early next month after taking part in Exercise Beacon Compass. But there is no knowing how quickly our ships might be needed. It would also be wise to maintain some parity in numbers between ourselves and those of our allies who have ships already there or nearby, since otherwise our advice on the possible deployment of ships into the Gulf itself may be discounted.

/4. I am

4. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.

J.H.G.

14 October 1980

14 OCT 1950

10 11 12 1 2 3 4  
5 6 7 8 9

*From: Munich.*

*From: Munich. 12A  
containing advisory ID  
on ground.*

SECRET

*MUS  
12A*

*Mr Wade-Gery  
Mr Hastic-Smith  
Mr DJ. Wright*

*I hope I have covered  
this in the such files  
in future.*

*MS*

*containing*

*17/10*

GRS 359

SECRET

FM FCO 130933Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1624 OF 13 OCTOBER

AND TO PRIORITY PARIS AND BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (AUS (D STAFF), DS 5, ACDS (OPS)),

PRIORITY JEDDA KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA BAHRAIN MUSCAT

AND AMMAN

INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW TEL AVIV UKDEL NATO CAIRO AND  
DAMASCUS

YOUR TELNO 4235: IRAN/IRAQ: DEFENCE ISSUES.

1. IT IS REASSURING TO KNOW THAT THE AMERICANS ARE GOING SLOW ON TALKS ON NAVAL COOPERATION WITH THE GULF STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, BARTHOLOMEW'S PROPOSAL THAT THE OTHER POINTS WE HAVE RAISED WITH THEM SHOULD BE PURSUED IN THE NAVAL TALKS IS NOT PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. THE NAVAL TALKS HERE HAVE BEEN LITTLE SHORT OF A FIASCO. OUR INTERLOCUTORS (CINCUSNAVEUR) ARE ON THE PERIPHERY AND CANNOT SUSTAIN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE. THEY HAVE ANYWAY TOLD US THAT THE PENTAGON NOW WISHES TO TRANSFER THE NAVAL TALKS TO THE LOCAL COMMANDERS IN THE GULF AREA AND THAT MEANWHILE THE PLANNING CONCEPT SET OUT IN THE SECOND US PAPER HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE SO THAT THE LOCAL US COMMANDER ON US MIDWAY CAN DRAW UP AN OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THAT BASIS.

2. IF THIS INFORMATION IS ACCURATE, THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE TAKEN SCANT ACCOUNT OF THE COMMENTS WE HAVE MADE. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SPEAK AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL IN STATE DEPARTMENT AND ALSO IN THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

(A) WE CONTINUE TO HAVE IMPORTANT MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE SECOND US PAPER. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC PLANNING CONCEPT OF DIVIDING THE SEA AREAS INTO ZONES IS LIKELY, IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS INCIDENT, TO PROVIDE SHIPOWNERS WITH THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE TO RESUME PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND IN THE GULF. INDEED THE AMERICAN PLAN IS A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS BEING DONE AD HOC ALREADY.

(B) WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE LITTORAL STATES COULD ADEQUATELY PROTECT THEIR OWN WATERS IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF REAL DIFFICULTY: THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE OMANI RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE KEY PART OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

SECRET

/(O) WE NOTE

S E C R E T

(C) WE NOTE WHAT BARTHOLOMEW SAYS ABOUT AIR COVER. BUT HAVE THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THE CONSEQUENCES OF DESTROYING HOSTILE AIRCRAFT OVER OR ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY? HOW WOULD THIS SQUARE WITH A NEED FOR DE-ESCALATION? THERE WOULD ALSO BE A NEED FOR LIAISON AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL, WHICH ARGUES FOR CLOSER NAVAL COORDINATION THAN AT PRESENT ENVISAGED.

(D) WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS APPRECIATE THE VITAL NECESSITY OF ADEQUATE POLITICAL CONTROL. THIS APPLIES IN THE PRESENT SITUATION OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND BEGIN UNDERLINING A FORTIORI END UNDERLINING IN A REAL CRISIS.

(E) WE RECOGNISE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO MULTILATERAL NAVAL DISCUSSION. IN OUR VIEW WE SHOULD NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON THE FRENCH THE VALUE OF JOINT PLANNING. THE RISKS OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION MUST BE GREATER IF ARRANGEMENTS ARE ONLY DISCUSSED ON A BILATERAL BASIS. THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH POTENTIALLY AFFECTS US ALL, AND HAVING BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE, WE BELIEVE THAT PLANNING AND ACTION MUST BE JOINT.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL THE AMERICANS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT US PLANNING, WE ARE INSTRUCTING THE CAPTAIN OF HMS COVENTRY NOW IN THE GULF TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIS US AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES. WE ARE DOING THIS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT A CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION ABOUT PRACTICAL NAVAL ISSUES REMAINS OPEN. BUT THE CAPTAIN IS BEING TOLD TO RESERVE THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON POLITICAL ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT NO POLITICAL DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PUT ANY OPERATIONAL MEASURES INTO EFFECT. MEANWHILE WE ARE CONSIDERING WHAT STEPS NEED TO BE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL CONTROL AND WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY INDICATION OF US THINKING. FINALLY WE SHOULD BE GLAD TO LEARN HOW FAR THE US HAVE GOT IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE OMANIS AND SAUDIS.

4. MEANWHILE THE GERMAN MFA HAVE APPROACHED THE EMBASSY IN BONN WITH A SUGGESTION FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON NAVAL CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE GULF. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE GERMANS ARE CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF PRECIPITATE OR ILL-CONSIDERED AMERICAN ACTION. BUT THE EMBASSY THINK THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE HANDLING THIS. WE SEE THIS APPROACH FROM BONN AS A POSSIBLE WAY OF INVOLVING THE FRENCH MORE CLOSELY WITH OUR THINKING. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF BONN COULD REPLY TO THE GERMANS MAKING THE POINT THAT, WHILE OF COURSE WE WOULD WELCOME BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WE WONDER WHETHER THE GERMANS MIGHT NOT SEE ADVANTAGE

2  
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/IN OUR

S E C R E T

IN OUR DOING THIS BEGIN UNDERLINING A TROIS END UNDERLING WITH THE FRENCH. FOR THE TIME BEING WASHINGTON SHOULD NOT (NOT) MENTION THIS GERMAN APPROACH TO THE AMERICANS.

5. PARIS SHOULD SPEAK TO ROBIN, GIVING HIM A FULL ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 ABOVE. THEY SHOULD REINFORCE THE POINT THAT CONTINUED SEPARATE SETS OF BILATERAL TALKS ON THE NAVAL NET ARE A RECIPE FOR CONFUSION, ARE LIKELY TO COMPOUND THE DANGERS OF INADEQUATE POLITICAL CONTROL AND, IF THE WORST CAME TO THE WORST, COULD LEAD TO ILL-CONSIDERED ACTION. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE CONTINUES TO BE TO INVOLVE IN THE NAVY-TO-NAVY PLANNING TALKS ALL THREE COUNTRIES WITH SHIPS IN THE AREA. WE TRUST THEREFORE THAT THE FRENCH WILL RECONSIDER THEIR REFUSAL TO TALK BEGIN UNDERLINING A TROIS END UNDERLINING.

6. OTHER POSTS TO WHOM THIS TELEGRAM IS REPEATED SHOULD TREAT IT AS STRICTLY FOR THEIR PRIVATE INFORMATION ONLY. WE SEE A REAL DANGER THAT WIDE DISCUSSION OF THESE AMERICAN CONTINGENCY PLANS, DISTORTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF INCREASING, RATHER THAN DECREASING, TENSION, AND PERHAPS EVEN OF PROVIDING IRAN WITH THE TRIGGER OR ETHE EXCUSE FOR SOME WILD MOVE IN OR AROUND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

CARRINGTON

LIMITED

HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/MED  
HD/DEF D  
PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR A ACLAND  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR BULLARD  
LORD BRIDGES  
MR P H MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE

*also copied to Mr Alexander  
10, Darning Street.*

3

S E C R E T

file  
**CONFIDENTIAL** lag asg

BF 14-10-80

13 October 1980

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING: 6 OCTOBER

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Mallaby's record of the above meeting. As a result she has asked for a background note on the terms of:

- (a) The 1971 Anglo-UAE Defence Agreement;
- (b) The Security Council Resolution referred to in paragraph 9 of the record; and
- (c) The 1975 Algiers Agreement.

I should be grateful if you could let me have this as soon as possible.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

George Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 18

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR E YOUDE~~  
SIR J GRAHAM  
~~MR J C HOBERLY~~  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
~~HD/CONS D~~  
~~CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
PUSD (2)  
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

SUR A ACLAUD

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

DESKBY 131330Z  
ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

*M*

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY FCO 131330Z

FM TRIPOLI 131200Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NUMBER 452 OF 13 OCTOBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD, AMMAN, JEDDAH, WASHINGTON.  
IRAQ/IRAN: LIBYAN ATTITUDE

1 AS YOU WILL ALREADY KNOW FROM AGENCY REPORTS, THERE HAVE BEEN TWO FURTHER, AND UNEXPECTEDLY RAPID, DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MY TELELETTER NO 769 OF 9 OCTOBER TO MILES, NENAD.

2 FIRST, QADHAFI SENT MESSAGES TOWARDS THE END RJ LAST WEEK TO KING KHALID AND GULF RULERS DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF US AWACS AIRCRAFT AND BASES FROM THE ARAB PENINSULAR AND GULF, AND CALLING FOR AN ALIGNMENT "WITH THE MUSLIMS IN IRAN".

3 SECOND, IRAQ HAS BROKEN OFF RELATIONS WITH LYBYA (AND SYRIA). THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND HIS STAFF WERE ALL WITHDRAWN ON 11 OCTOBER.

4 FURTHER DETAILS AND COMMENTS FOLLOW.

EDS



UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 131735Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4266 OF 13 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, ROUTINE MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, MUSCAT.

INFO SAVING CAIRO, TEL AVIV, ABU DHABI, DAMASCUS, DOHA, PARIS,  
BONN, AMMAN.

*Read in full*

IRAN/IRAQ: U.S. AID TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES CARRIED ON 12 OCTOBER A LONG ACCOUNT, BASED ON OFFICIAL BRIEFING, OF THE U.S. DELIBERATIONS LEADING UP TO THE DISPATCH OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA ON 29 SEPTEMBER. TEXT BY BAG, FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS.
2. ON 26 SEPTEMBER THE SAUDIS SENT THE AMERICANS ON C I A CHANNELS A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE AGAINST POSSIBLE IRANIAN ATTACK, ALSO REFERRING TO THEIR OWN PREPARATIONS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST IRAN, IF NECESSARY. THEY HAD BEEN ALARMED BY THE IRANIAN WARNINGS AGAINST ALL WHO HELPED IRAQ, GIVEN THAT IRAQI PLANES HAD LANDED ON THEIR AIRFIELDS AND USED THEIR AIRSPACE TO FLY TO OMAN.
3. ON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, WHICH WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THE HELP EXPECTED FROM THE U.S., OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON UNDER BRZEZINSKI'S LEADERSHIP WORKED OUT A SERIES OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES. THE MINIMUM WAS THE DESPATCH OF FOUR AWACS. OTHERS WERE: TO SEND TO SAUDI ARABIA TWO F-14 SQUADRONS (40 PLANES) FROM THE USS EISENHOWER IN THE ARABIAN SEA SEMICLN TO SEND TWO F-15 SQUADRONS THERE FROM THE U.S. SEMICLN AND/OR TO STATION HAWK ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES IN SAUDI ARABIA WITH U.S. CREWS (SEVERAL HUNDRED MEN). THESE MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS WERE FAVOURED BY THE PENTAGON WHO HAD BEEN PRESSING THE SAUDIS TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO STOCKPILE EQUIPMENT THERE FOR FUTURE USE.
4. WHILE THESE OPTIONS WERE BEING PREPARED, THE SITUATION WAS COMPLICATED BY REPORTS FROM U.S. AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE THAT IRAQI HELICOPTERS AND PLANES WERE PLANNING TO USE OMANI AND PERHAPS SAUDI FACILITIES TO ATTACK IRANIAN BASES ACROSS THE GULF AND ON THE TUNBS/ABU MUSA. A FIRST MEETING OF SUBSTANCE ON THE ISSUES, ON THE AFTERNOON OF 27 SEPTEMBER, BROUGHT NO DECISION ABOUT AID TO THE SAUDIS. BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH THE SAUDIS AND OMANIS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED FROM GIVING SUPPORT TO THE IRAQIS. THE PRESIDENT (AT CAMP DAVID) ORDERED ONE AWACS SENT TO THE U K IN CASE THE OPTION OF USING IT IN SAUDI ARABIA WAS PURSUED.
5. THE FOLLOWING DAY A SECOND MEETING WAS HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE BETWEEN BRZEZINSKI, BROWN AND MUSKIE (WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MAINE WHERE HE HAD SPENT THE PREVIOUS TWO DAYS). MUSKIE, FOLLOWING HIS OWN MEETING IN NEW YORK WITH GROMYKO ON 25 SEPTEMBER WAS VERY

*mb*

CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO PRESERVE U.S. AND SOVIET NEUTRALITY AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT. THE RESULT OF THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING WAS AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO PUSH THE SAUDIS INTO LONGER-TERM COMMITMENTS AT THIS TIME. THE MEETING CONCLUDED, AFTER SOME HEATED EXCHANGES (WITH MUSKIE ON ONE SIDE AND BRZEZINSKI AND BROWN ON THE OTHER), THAT WHILE THE U.S. NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CONCERN FOR SAUDI SECURITY, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO INTRODUCE ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY SYSTEMS. BRZEZINSKI AND BROWN ACCEPTED THAT FOR THE MOMENT THE DESPATCH OF THE AWACS WAS SUFFICIENT, PARTLY BECAUSE THE U.S. NAVY REPORTED THAT THE F-14'S FROM THE U S S EISENHOWER COULD BE FLOWN TO THE SCENE IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS IN LESS THAN TWO HOURS.

6. A FORMAL REQUEST FROM THE SAUDIS FOR THE AWACS WAS ELICITED BY GENERAL JONES AND AMBASSADOR WEST IN JEDDA ON 29 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH SAUDI AGREEMENT THAT THE DESPATCH SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. AT THE SAME TIME INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REPORTED THAT THE IRAQI PLANES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN WERE BEING WITHDRAWN. THE FORMAL DECISION TO SEND THE AWACS WAS TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT LATER THE SAME DAY, WHILE CONGRESS WAS BEING BRIEFED ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

7. A PENTAGON OFFICIAL IS QUOTED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORT AS CLAIMING THAT THE U.S. RESPONSE DISCOURAGED THE IRANIANS, DEMONSTRATED THE COMMITMENT TO THE SAUDIS AND IN THE LONGER TERM QUOTE OPENED THE DOOR TO MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE MILITARY COLLABORATION WITH THE SAUDIS UNQUOTE. A WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE U.S. ACTION STOPPED THE MINDLESS GRAVITATION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER GULF STATES TOWARDS IRAQ, AND PLACED THE U.S. QUOTE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO MOVE AHEAD ON BUILDING A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH WEST ASIA UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, HOWEVER, THE STATE DEPARTMENT REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE A POLICY OF CAUTION, MAINTAINING NEUTRALITY AND AVOIDING PROVOCATION TO THE RUSSIANS.

FC O PASS SAVING CAIRO, TEL AVIV, ABU DHABI, DAMASCUS, DOHA, PARIS, BONN, AMMAN.

HENDERSON

[PASSED SAVING AS REQUESTED]  
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MEMD	MAED
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UND	ECON D
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EGD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE
ES & SD	
RID	

ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 525

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 131205Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 407 OF 13 OCT

INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BONN, PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK  
AND WASHINGTON

IRAN/IRAQ: JORDANIAN INTEREST IN POSSIBLE EUROPEAN MOVE.

1. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE SAW MARWAN QASEM, THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON 11 OCTOBER, THE DAY AFTER THE LATTER'S RETRUN FROM NEW YORK, AND CONVEYED TO HIM A FORMAL DENIAL THAT WEST GERMANY WAS SENDING MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN (MY TELNO 397 OF 10 OCTOBER NOT TO ALL REFERS).
2. QASEM (WHO SHOWED NONE OF THE OPTIMISM JORDANIANS HAVE EVINCED HITHERTO ABOUT THE IRAQIS' ABILITY TO END THE WAR ON THEIR TERMS) EMPHASISED THE NEED TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE WAS NOT IN ANY POSITION TO STOP IT AND SUGGESTED THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN TRYING TO DO SO. QASEM THOUGHT THAT THE TIMING FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE WAS NOW MORE PROPITIOUS, AS THE CONFLICT HAD INCREASED THE AUTHORITY WIELDED WITHIN IRAN BY THE IRANIAN PRESIDENT: FOR EXAMPLE, HE ATTRIBUTED IRAN'S AGREEMENT TO TAKE PART IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO BANI-SADR'S GREATER SAY IN THE DIRECTION OF IRANIAN AFFAIRS. QASEM WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE MIGHT BE BASED ON TRYING TO CONVINCE THE IRANIANS TO ACCEPT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1975 ALGIERS TREATY AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE EMPHASISED THAT IRAQ HAD NO CLAIM WHATEVER TO KHUZESTAN (NOT QUITE WHAT THE IRAQIS WERE SAYING TO THE JORDANIANS EARLIER ON) AND THAT ADHERENCE TO THE 1975 TREATY MIGHT OFFER A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR BOTH SIDES. QASEM SUGGESTED THAT A SUCCESSFUL INITIATIVE BY THE EUROPEANS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA, WHEREAS CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT MIGHT WELL HAVE VERY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES: HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE DANGER THAT ISRAEL MIGHT TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION.
3. QASEM ALSO SAW MY FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES ON 12 OCTOBER. I UNDERSTAND HE PUT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WITH THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE THAT WHEN SPEAKING TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR HE HAD SEEMED IN A CONSIDERABLE HURRY TO SEE A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE LAUNCHED WHEREAS WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THE FOLLOWING

CONFIDENTIAL

/DAY

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DAY HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR HASTE. MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE IS FAR FROM CLEAR WHETHER QASEM'S PROPOSAL REPRESENTED A THOUGHT-OUT JORDANIAN POSITION OR WHETHER QASEM, WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY REPORTS THAT THE WAR WAS GOING BADLY FOR THE IRAQIS, WAS MERELY FLOATING AN IDEA IN ORDER TO SEE WHAT REACTION HE GOT.

4. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE QASEM MYSELF TOMORROW MORNING AND HOPE TO BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH HOW FAR PARAZ ABOVE REPRESENTS CONSIDERED JORDANIAN THINKING. I ALSO HOPE TO SEE KING HUSSEIN WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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WED	CABINET OFFICE

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ADDITIONAL DISTR.

IRAQ/IRAN

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

2.  
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IRAN/IRAQ

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PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR E YOUDE~~  
SIR J GRAHAM  
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
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Sir A Ahmad

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GR 260

SECRET

FROM ABU DHABI 130914Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 331 OF 13 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI AND MODUK

ROUTINE DOHA BAHRAIN JEDDA KUWAIT AND MUSCAT

MY TELNO 329: SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. WHEN I TOOK MOBERLY THIS MORNING TO CALL ON THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RASHED ABDULLAH, THE LATTER SAID THAT BOTH SHAIKH ZAYED AND SHAIKH RASHED HAD NOW AGREED THAT OUR OFFER TO SEND AN EXPLORATORY TEAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE MATTER WAS NOW IN THE HANDS OF SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHED, THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AND OF SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN ZAYED, THE DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER, WHO WAS LOOKING INTO THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF RECEIVING THE PROPOSED TEAM. RASHED ABDULLAH EXPECTED TO HEAR FROM THEM VERY SOON, AFTER WHICH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE WOULD BE PUT IN TOUCH WITH AN APPROPRIATE CONTACT TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS.

2. RASHED ABDULLAH MENTIONED THAT THE UAE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH

THEM VERY SOON, AFTER WHICH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE WOULD BE PUT  
IN TOUCH WITH AN APPROPRIATE CONTACT TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS.

2. RASHED ABDULLAH MENTIONED THAT THE UAE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH  
WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER GULF STATES TO DISCUSS THEIR  
COMMON DEFENCE PROBLEMS AND NEEDS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT  
SITUATION. SAUDI ARABIA WAS ALREADY RECEIVING NEW EQUIPMENT  
FROM THE US AND WAS FLYING DEFENSIVE PATROLS WITH F-15S.

I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERLINE THAT THE OFFER TO SEND AN  
MOD TEAM HAD BEEN MADE ONLY TO THE UAE AND WAS NOT FOR DISCUSSION  
WITH GULF NEIGHBOURS. RASHED ABDULLAH CONFIRMED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD  
THIS.

ROBERTS  
BT

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
~~MR J C MOBERLY~~  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
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*Sir I GILMOUR*

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DESKBY 130800Z  
ADVANCE COPY

OO FCO DESKBY 130800Z

GR 250

SECRET

FROM ABU DHABI 130415Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO (DESKBY 130800Z OCT)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 13 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBAI, MODUK

ROUTINE DOHA, BAHRAIN, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT.

MY TELNO 328: SECURITY OF THE GULF.

1. SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL THIS MORNING, MOBERLY WAS RECEIVED BY SHAIKH ZAYED AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 228. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITH YOUR PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THAT HE WOULD BE CONVEYING SHAIKH ZAYED'S REACTIONS DIRECTLY TO YOU.

2. SHAIKH ZAYED'S INITIAL COMMENT WAS THAT HE WOULD HAVE HOPED THAT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REASSURE HIM IN THIS WAY AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN THE CRISIS. HAVING GOT THAT OFF HIS CHEST, HOWEVER, HE WENT ON TO EXPRESS WARMEST APPRECIATION OF OUR READINESS TO CONSULT CLOSELY, TO CONSIDER MILITARY

OF OUR READINESS TO CONSULT CLOSELY, TO CONSIDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN PRINCIPLE AND TO MAKE THE SPECIFIC OFFER OF READINESS TO SEND A SMALL MOD TEAM TO EXAMINE THE UAE'S NEEDS AND FACILITIES. SHAIKH ZAYED SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US SOON ABOUT THE LATTER OFFER AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH HIS ADVISERS.

3. SHAIKH ZAYED ADDED THAT OUR READINESS TO SUPPORT HIM IN THIS WAY WOULD GENERATE RENEWED CONFIDENCE AND HE WENT ON TO SPEAK FULSOMELY ABOUT HOW THIS WAS A SYMBOL THAT AFTER A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND THE UAE WAS NOW RESTORED TO ITS PROPER LEVEL.

4. SHAIKH ZAYED'S FURTHER COMMENTS ON THE SITUATION ARE IN MIFT.

ROBERTS  
BT

NNNN





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 October 1980

*Despatched by Prime Minister  
to Lord Carrington earlier today.*

*Dear Michael,*

Iran/Iraq

*Ca. 12h  
13/X*

You asked for an account of recent developments.

Situation on the ground

The Iraqis are continuing to advance from Khorramshahr towards Abadan and also towards two other ports about 60 miles away, Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Mashur. The main military activity is in the south, but there is some activity in the central/northern sector where the Iraqis are still apparently attempting to seize the city of Dezful, and are attacking south of Ahwaz. They have not yet, as far as we know, cut the strategic oil pipe-lines in that area. In the air Iranian activity has decreased significantly in the last week, whilst Iraqi activity has increased. The Iranians seem nevertheless to have caused substantial damage to the Iraqi oil installations though it is far from clear how long it would take to repair. At sea there is little change: Iranian vessels continue to patrol in the Straits of Hormuz but are not interfering with the normal passage of ships. The disposition of other naval forces in the area is shown in the attached map.

Attempts at mediation

The main focus is in New York. The President of the Security Council (Trojanovsky, USSR) called consultations of the whole on 10 October and informed members that Ardakani (Iran) had received instructions to participate in a formal Council meeting. This might take place very soon. Trojanovsky said he would arrange the timing once he had confirmation that the Iranians were ready. The likely outcome of this meeting is not yet clear but it is mildly encouraging that the Iranian has instructions to participate.

Chatti, the Secretary General to the Islamic Conference, has been despatched once again to Tehran and Baghdad by President Zia, but we have no news of how he has been doing.

There have been no other initiatives on mediation, but both the Iranians and the Iraqis have told the Indian Government that they hope the Indians would be willing to help towards this end.

/Shipping



### Shipping

Action in the UN to secure the release of trapped ships may provide an opportunity for a limited ceasefire, although neither side has yet responded to the Secretary-General's appeal of 11 October.

Three British ships (one UK registered and two registered in Hong Kong) are trapped in Basra but are in no immediate danger. One UK registered ship, the Altanin, with 38 persons on board is in a much riskier position off Khorramshahr. The Consul from Baghdad has gone to the area to try to arrange with the local military authorities for the disembarkation of all but a skeleton crew. The owners have been advised that unless the situation becomes intolerable, no landing should be attempted without the agreement of the Iraqi military. Priority has been given on the advice of the Embassy in Baghdad to securing Iraqi co-operation for this operation in the first instance. We are, however, in touch with a number of other countries with shipping trapped in the Shatt-al-Arab about the possibility of joint demarches to both Iran and Iraq to allow the ships to leave.

### Oil

Shipping continues to pass to and from the Gulf ports, other than those in Iraq and Iran, normally. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have raised output in order to offset, for the benefit of developing countries, the loss of Iraqi and Iranian oil.

### UK contribution to security in the Gulf

HM Coventry is now deployed in the Gulf of Oman. We are discussing with the MOD how best to move another ship to the area immediately.

We have informed the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zaid, that, in the spirit of our Friendship Treaty, we stand ready in principle to provide military assistance if asked. We have told the Shaikh that we would like to send a small team, mainly from the MOD, to consult the Rulers on the UAE's likely needs and on what the local facilities are. As a first step a former commander of the Sultan of Oman's Army is flying out to the Gulf this week where he will meet Mr J C Moberly. (There is some difficulty because of a local holiday, the 'Id al Adha, but we believe it is important to react swiftly.)

/Consultations



Consultations with our Allies

We have not yet told our allies of the initiative to help the UAE. When the arrangements for General Perkins' visit have been completed, we intend to tell the Americans and French in general terms.

My impression is that Lord Carrington is still rather concerned at the inadequacy of allied consultations. There was a useful Quadripartite discussion in Paris last week and there will be another meeting there on 27 October. But so far there has not been much enthusiasm on the part of our partners for giving them a more politico-military content. There is still too much of an impression of separate approaches and inadequate coordination. We shall continue to press upon the Americans and French the need for close contact and some form of military consultations.

Lord Carrington did not see this letter before despatch, but will see a copy over-night.

I am copying this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).


*J. G. H. Walden*

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street

*Mr. [unclear] / Mr. [unclear]*

*Letter for [unclear] - for MB  
July 3 from [unclear] 13/10  
& no [unclear]*



10-10-80.

M. O. D. B. Alexander Esq

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*With the compliments of*  
*George Walden*  
**THE PRIVATE SECRETARY**

**FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE**  
**SW1A 2AH**

File No. ....  
 Department DEFENCE  
 Drafted by D H GILLMORE  
 (Block Capitals)  
 233 3372  
 Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD  
 TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
SECRET	9
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY	Z

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 (Time) ..... Z  
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PREAMBLE  
 (Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
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 AND TO (precedence/post) (PRIORITY) PARIS BONN  
 AND SAVING TO .....  
 REPEATED TO (for info) IMMEDIATE: MODUK (AUS (D STAFF)), DS 5, ACDS (Ops.),  
 PRIORITY: JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN,  
 MUSCAT, AMMAN  
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 MR BRIDGES  
 MR P H MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE

Copies to:-

[TEXT]  
 YOUR TELNO 4235: IRAN/IRAQ: DEFENCE ISSUES  
 1. It is reassuring to know that the Americans are going slow on talks on naval cooperation with the Gulf States. On the other hand, Bartholomew's proposal that the other points we have raised with them should be pursued in the naval talks is not particularly helpful. The naval talks here have been little short of a fiasco. Our interlocutors (CINCUSNAVEUR) are on the periphery and cannot sustain a serious dialogue. They have anyway told us that the Pentagon now wishes to transfer the naval talks to the local Commanders in the Gulf area and that meanwhile the planning concept set out in the second US paper has been approved by the Secretary for Defense so that the local US Commander on US Midway can draw up an operational plan on

that basis.

2. If this information is accurate, the Americans appear to have taken scant account of the comments we have made. You should therefore speak at an appropriately high level in State Department and also in the White House on the following lines:

(a) We continue to have important misgivings about the second US paper. In the first instance we do not believe that the basic planning concept of dividing the sea areas into zones is likely, in the event of a serious incident, to provide shipowners with the necessary confidence to resume passage through the Straits of Hormuz and in the Gulf. Indeed the American plan is a description of what is being done ad hoc already.

(b) We do not consider that the littoral states could adequately protect their own waters in circumstances of real difficulty; this applies particularly to the Omani responsibility for the key part of the Straits of Hormuz.

(c) We note what Bartholomew says about air cover. But have the Americans considered the consequences of destroying hostile aircraft over or on their own territory? How would this square with a need for de-escalation? There would also be a need for liaison and operational control, which argues for closer naval coordination than at present envisaged.

(d) We are not convinced that the Americans appreciate the vital necessity of adequate political control. This applies in the present situation of contingency planning and a fortiori in a real crisis.

(e) We recognise that the French have expressed

/opposition

SECRET

opposition to multilateral naval discussion. In our view we should nevertheless continue to impress on the French the value of joint planning. The risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation must be greater if arrangements are only discussed on a bilateral basis. This is a situation which potentially affects us all, and having been invited to participate, we believe that planning and action must be joint.

3. You should also tell the Americans that, notwithstanding our misgivings about US planning, we are instructing the Captain of HMS Coventry now in the Gulf to make contact with his US and French colleagues. We are doing this in order to ensure that a channel for communication about practical naval issues remains open. But the Captain is being told to reserve the Government's position on political issues that may arise and to make clear that no political decision has been taken to put any operational measures into effect. Meanwhile we are considering what steps need to be taken to establish political control and would welcome an early indication of US thinking. Finally we should be glad to learn how far the US have got in their talks with the Omanis and Saudis.

4. Meanwhile the German MFA have approached the Embassy in Bonn with a suggestion for bilateral discussion on naval contingency planning in the Gulf. There is no evidence that the Germans are concerned at the possibility of precipitate or ill-considered American action. But the Embassy think they are worried about the way in which the Americans are handling this. We see this approach from Bonn as a possible way of involving the French more closely with our thinking. We should therefore be grateful if Bonn could reply to the Germans making the point that, while of course we would  
3 /welcome

SECRET



welcome bilateral discussions, we wonder whether the Germans might not see advantage in our doing this à trois with the French. For the time being Washington should not (not) mention this German approach to the Americans.

5. Paris should speak to Robin, giving him a full account of our views set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. They should reinforce the point that continued separate sets of bilateral talks on the naval net are a recipe for confusion, are likely to compound the dangers of inadequate political control and, if the worst came to the worst, could lead to ill-considered action. Our strong preference continues to be to involve in the Navy-to-Navy planning talks all three countries with ships in the area. We trust therefore that the French will reconsider their refusal to talk à trois.

6. Other posts to whom this telegram is repeated should treat it as strictly for their private information only. We see a real danger that wide discussion of these American contingency plans, distorted by the Soviet Union, may have the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, tension, and perhaps even of providing Iran with the trigger or <sup>the</sup> excuse for some wild move in or around the Straits of Hormuz.

*R*  
13/10

# CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 170

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAHRAIN 110435Z OCT 80

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 165 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON BAGHDAD KUWAIT ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT

JEDDA PARIS BONN MOSCOW AMMAN

IRAN/IRAQ

1. WHEN JOHN MOBERLY CALLED ON THE AMIR YESTERDAY THE LATTER EXPLICITLY STATED THAT WHILE BAHRAIN'S SYMPATHIES WERE STRONGLY WITH IRAQ ITS OFFICIAL POLICY WAS TO STAND WELL AWAY FROM THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.
2. HE WAS GLOOMY ABOUT THE CHANCES OF AN EARLY SUCCESS FOR MEDIATION ATTEMPTS. QUOTE HOW COULD A FIRE BE PUT OUT WHEN MORE WOOD WAS BEING PUT ON IT FROM BEHIND UNQUOTE - BY SYRIA AND THE PLO? HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ARAB WORLD OF THE SYRIA-USSR FRIENDSHIP TREATY AND SPOKE IN FAMILIAR TERMS OF THE WAY THE RUSSIANS WERE WINNING TRICK AFTER TRICK IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITHOUT THE NEED FOR SUCH VISIBLE ACTIONS AS FLEET MOVEMENTS, BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED AMERICAN FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE AREA.
3. AT THE SAME TIME HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT WAS UNLIKELY TO SPREAD AND CAUTIONED AGAINST ANY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPER-POWERS. HE AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WAS PRESENT, MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS UP TO THE GULF STATES THEMSELVES TO KEEP THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ OPEN.

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FM DOHA 111400Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 11 OCTOBER

INFO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW AND AMMAN.

IRAQ/IRAN.

*M.*

WHEN THE AMIR RECEIVED MOBERLY THIS MORNING, HE QUESTIONED HIM CLOSELY ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE EXPRESSED HIS WARM APPRECIATION OF THE GENERAL MESSAGE OF REASSURANCE AND SUPPORT WHICH MOBERLY GAVE HIM DRAWING ON PARA 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 220 TO ABU DHABI. HE SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE BRIEFING HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING ON A REGULAR BASIS FROM THE EMBASSY, AND CONFIRMED HIS WISH TO STAY IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD NO PARTICULAR REQUESTS TO PUT TO US AT PRESENT BUT THAT THE SITUATION COULD CHANGE FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. WITH REGARD TO MEDIATION HE HAD FEW EXPECTATIONS FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE BUT HE SAW SOME HOPE OF PROGRESS THROUGH THE U.N. HE THOUGHT THE IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS NOW FOR THE IRANIAN CASE TO BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT MARK A SIGNIFICANT AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. HE WAS SCEPTICAL, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP WERE CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING A CONSISTENT AND LOGICAL COURSE AND AGREED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT DISCERN WHERE THE REAL POWER IN IRAN NOW LAY. SHAIKH KHALIFA AGREED THAT IN THE MEANTIME OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS CONTAINING THE CONFLICT AND THAT WE SHOULD ALL MOVE ONLY WITH THE GREATEST CAUTION.

2. UNUSUALLY AS WE LEFT SHAIKH KHALIFA, SHAIKH HAMAD, THE HEIR APPARENT, ASKED US TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION WITH HIM. HE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT THE VULNERABILITY OF QATAR, LIKE THE OTHER SMALLER STATES IN THE GULF, IN THE LIGHT OF IRANIAN THREATS TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THEM SHOULD THEY BE PERCEIVED AS HELPING IRAQ. IN THIS CONTEXT HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHAT WE THOUGHT QATAR'S REACTION SHOULD BE TO IRAQI REQUESTS FOR EITHER MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. MOBERLY SAID THAT THOUGH WE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT QATARI SYMPATHIES COULD BE WITH THE IRAQIS AS FELLOW ARABS, ANY DEPARTURE FROM QATAR'S STATED POLICY OF NEUTRALITY WOULD BE MOST UNWISE. THOUGH SMALL AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC AID MIGHT BE LESS PROVOCATIVE TO THE IRANIANS, HIS PERSONAL ADVICE WOULD BE TO STEAR CLEAR OF ANY INVOLVEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. SHAIKH HAMAD SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY AGREED WITH THIS VIEW.

3. SHAIKH HAMAD SEEMED ANXIOUS TO ESTABLISH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH US ABOUT THE REACTION TO ANY ATTACK: IT WOULD BE TOO LATE, HE SAID, TO CONCERT MEASURES AFTER THE EVENT. ON THE OTHER HAND HE SEEMED AS ANXIOUS AS THE KUWAITIS AND THE SAUDIS TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BE SEEN, AS MILITARY COOPERATION WITH

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US (AND A FORTIORI (LAST TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) THE AMERICANS) E.G. HE MADE HIS VIEW CLEAR THAT THE NAVAL VISIT PLANNED FOR MID-NOVEMBER MIGHT NOW BE IN OPPORTUNE FOR THIS REASON, THOUGH HE PROMISED A FIRM DECISION ON THIS LATER.

4. IN CONCLUSION SHAIKH HAMAD UNCONSCIOUSLY ECHOED THE BAHRAINI FOREIGN MINISTER'S LANGUAGE IN STRESSING THAT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE WEST CONTINUED TO BE BEDEVILLED BY THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB/ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN LARGELY FORGOTTEN AFTER A MONTH FOR THIS REASON. HASSAN KAMEL, THE AMIR'S ADVISER, DEVELOPED THE SAME THEME AT LENGTH AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

5. THOUGH SHAIKH KHALIFA REMAINS RESILIENT IN HIS APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS, HE AND SHAIKH HAMAD ARE CLEARLY VERY WORRIED BY QATAR'S DEFENCELESSNESS AND BY THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESSURES UPON THEM.

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TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 220 OF 10 OCTOBER

AND TO DUBAI, MODUK, PRIORITY DOHA, BAHRAIN,  
INFO JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT.*fg*  
*Reed*

YOUR TELNO 322: SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. I WISH TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF JOHN MOBERLY'S VISIT TO THE U.A.E. TO CONVEY ASSURANCES TO U.A.E. LEADERS OF MY PERSONAL CONCERN AND INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF THE GULF AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME.
2. IN SPEAKING TO U.A.E. LEADERS YOU AND HE SHOULD SAY THAT HE IS TRAVELLING WITH MY PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THAT I SHALL BE TAKING A CLOSE INTEREST IN HIS REPORT UPON HIS RETURN. THE FOLLOWING POINTS COULD BE MADE:
  - A. WE ALL HAVE THE STRONGEST INTEREST IN NOT SEEING THE CONFLICT SPREAD. THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGHOUT THE GULF ARE OF VITAL INTEREST TO US ALL:
  - B. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THE BALANCED AND WISE JUDGMENT OF GULF GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAS PREVENTED THEM FROM BECOMING EMBROILED IN THE CURRENT CONFLICT:
  - C. I SHARE THE CONCERN OF THOSE IN THE GULF WHO SAY THAT THE WEST, IN MAKING CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR E.G. SHIPPING SHOULD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE REFRAIN FROM TAKING ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT THE BEGINNING OF SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA:
  - D. ON SECURITY QUESTIONS OF THIS NATURE WE WISH TO ACT ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF, AND INDEED AT THE INVITATION OF, GULF STATES - AS THE AMERICANS HAVE OVER A.W.A.C.S. TO SAUDI ARABIA:
  - E. WE WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GULF ON THEIR SECURITY NEEDS AS WELL AS ON WIDER QUESTIONS SUCH AS ENERGY. WE HOPE THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO CONSULT US IF THEY THINK WE CAN HELP:
  - F. THE DECISION BY SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES TO INCREASE THEIR OIL PRODUCTION HAS BEEN EXTREMELY WELCOME TO THE WHOLE WEST.
3. ON BRITISH ASSURANCES TO THE U.A.E. OF A MILITARY NATURE (SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH ARE REPORTED TO HAVE OFFERED), YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR FRIENDSHIP TREATY, WE STAND READY IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE IF ASKED. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WHILE MINISTERS ARE CONSIDERING WHAT THEY MIGHT DO TO HELP IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM, MAINLY FROM THE M.O.D., TO CONSULT WITH THE RULERS ON THE U.A.E.'S LIKELY NEEDS, AND ON WHAT THE LOCAL FACILITIES ARE. IN THIS WAY EFFECTIVE CONTINGENCY PLANS COULD BE LAID. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF SUCH A VISIT. YOU SHOULD AVOID BEING DRAWN AT THIS STAGE ON THE EXACT FORM OUR ASSISTANCE MIGHT TAKE, THOUGH YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.

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4. (FOR BAHRAIN AND DOHA).

WE DO NOT WISH TO GENERATE SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM OTHER GULF STATES. IF H.M. REPRESENTATIVES IN BAHRAIN AND DOHA RECEIVE ENQUIRIES ABOUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE THEY SHOULD SIMPLY TAKE NOTE, AND REPORT BACK, WITHOUT COMMITMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT WE WOULD IN PRACTICE BE ABLE TO DEPLOY CERTAIN TYPES OF ASSISTANCE TO MORE THAN ONE PLACE AT A TIME.

CARRINGTON

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*Revised Clerk  
has been informed*

PRIME MINISTER

*Is  
Pym*

Following your meeting in Brighton this afternoon with Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym, the FCO would like to send to Abu Dhabi the attached telegram setting out our response to the approach we have received from the UAE.

The key paragraph is paragraph 3, and this seems to me to be wholly consistent with the conclusions which you reached this afternoon with Lord Carrington and Mr. Pym.

Paragraph 4 of the draft telegram is necessary because while the FCO think it important to keep our other posts in the Gulf area in the picture, they are anxious - and the MOD even more so - not to be faced by similar requests for help from the UAE's neighbours. If a number of Gulf States ask us for assistance, we would have difficulty in responding to all of them, given the limitations on our own resources.

*Agreed* The FCO would like to dispatch the telegram tomorrow, Saturday. Are you content with it?

*Yes not*

(SGD) C.A.W.

10 October 1980

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File No. ....

Department: MED

Drafted by (Block Capitals) H D A C Miers

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification <b>SECRET</b>
<b>IMMEDIATE</b>
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
 (Security Class.) **SECRET** (Caveat) .....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Privacy marking) .....  
 (Deskby) .....Z

TO **IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI** (precedence) (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) **IMMEDIATE DUBAI, PRIORITY DOHA, BAHRAIN**

**IMMEDIATE MOD**

AND SAVING TO **JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT**

REPEATED TO (for info) .....

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

Yourtel no 322 of 7 October : Security of the Gulf

1. I wish to take the opportunity of John Moberly's visit to the UAE to convey assurances to UAE leaders of my personal concern and interest in the security of the Gulf at this difficult time.

2. In speaking to UAE leaders you and he should say that he is travelling with my personal authority and that I shall be taking a close interest in his report upon his return. The following points could be made:

a. We all have the strongest interest in not seeing the conflict spread. The Straits of Hormuz and freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf are of vital interest to us all ;



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b. I greatly appreciate the balanced and wise judgment of Gulf governments which has prevented them from becoming embroiled in the current conflict;

c. I share the concern of those in the Gulf who say that the West, in making contingency plans for eg shipping should as far as possible refrain from taking actions which might be thought the beginning of superpower involvement in the area ;

d. on security questions of this nature we wish to act only with the agreement of, and indeed at the invitation of, Gulf states - as the Americans have over AWACS to Saudi Arabia ;

e. we wish to keep in close touch with the Gulf <sup>states</sup> on their security needs as well as on wider questions such as energy. We hope they will not hesitate to consult us if they think we can help ;

f. the decision by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to increase their oil production has been extremely welcome to the whole West.

3. On British assurances to the UAE of a military nature (similar to what the French are reported to have offered), you should say that in the spirit of our friendship treaty, we stand ready in principle to provide such assistance if asked. You should add that while Ministers are considering what they

/might

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

might do to help in certain circumstances, we would like to send a small team, mainly from the MOD, to consult with the rulers on the UAE's likely needs, and on what the local facilities are. In this way effective contingency plans could be laid. It would of course be important to maintain the secrecy of such a visit. You should avoid being drawn at this stage on the exact form our assistance might take, though you should make it clear that it would be defensive in nature.

4. (For Bahrain and Doha)

We do not wish to generate similar requests from other Gulf states. If HM Representatives in Bahrain and Doha receive enquiries about military assistance they should simply take note, and report back, without commitment. It is unlikely that we would in practice be able to deploy certain types of assistance to more than one place at a time.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

10 October 1980

Iran/Iraq: Military Aid to the Gulf States

The Prime Minister met the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary in the Grand Hotel at Brighton this afternoon to consider what response should be given to the approach which we had had from the UAE seeking from us offers of support and assurances of military protection in the context of the Iran/Iraq conflict. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in deciding what answer to give to the Gulf Rulers who had asked for help we should bear in mind that the French had already made it clear that they were ready to provide military support for the Gulf States. The UAE claimed that they would prefer to look to the United Kingdom, as old friends, for assistance. If our response was negative, our relations with them would suffer and our trade with them was likely to be damaged. If, on the other hand, France was more forthcoming, she would probably gain from our loss. Nonetheless, it would not be wise to give the UAE a blanket assurance of help, for this could lead us into an open-ended military commitment which we might regret. Rather, our response should be to tell them that we would like to consult with them, as the terms of our Treaty of Friendship with them required us to do in times of crisis and need. The purpose of these consultations would be to establish what facilities the UAE already had and what military help they required so that we could assess what we might be able to do.

The Defence Secretary said that he was very anxious to avoid an open-ended commitment which might suck in more and more British troops. The fact was that we could not provide more than a fairly limited amount of military assistance.

The Prime Minister said that they were agreed that we should respond positively to the approaches which the Gulf States had made to us. But we should not go further at this stage than the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had proposed. Lord Carrington, in consultation with Mr. Pym, should arrange for the UAE to be told that we were ready to send someone out to the Gulf to assess what help they needed so that we had a basis for contingency planning. We should offer consultations only to those States that had approached us for support, and we should seek to keep our response confidential. The

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Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should consider further the question of telling our quadripartite partners what we had decided to do.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

G. A. WHITMORE

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

KRB

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IRAN/IRAQ

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PS  
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PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
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FM PARIS 101130Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 847 OF 10 OCTOBER 1980

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON ABU DHABI DUBAI AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING TO BAGHDAD MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO

DUBAI TELNO 117 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN: FRENCH VIEWS

1. PRESIDENT GISCARD IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A ONE AND A HALF HOUR TRANSIT STOP IN THE UAE ON 14 OCTOBER (NOT 12 OCTOBER AS REPORTED IN ABU DHABI TELNO 322) ON HIS WAY TO CHINA AND A SIMILAR STOP ON HIS WAY BACK ON 22 OCTOBER. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE NOT GIVEN US MUCH NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS BUT THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS WHAT YOU ALREADY KNOW.

2. LEVITTE, DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE, TOLD THE HEAD OF CHANCERY ON 9 OCTOBER THAT GISCARD WOULD MEET SHAIKH ZAID IN ABU DHABI. ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE SOME BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS INCLUDING FOLLOW-UP TO THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING PRESIDENT GISCARD'S VISIT LAST MARCH, DISCUSSION WOULD PROBABLY CONCENTRATE ON IRAN/IRAQ. PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS LIKELY

ABLY CONCENTRATE ON IRAN/IRAQ. PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS LIKELY TO REASSURE THE UAE OF FRENCH SUPPORT SHOULD THE CONFLICT SPREAD. LEVITTE THOUGHT THAT THIS RISK HAD FURTHER DIMINISHED SINCE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELNO 831 (NOT TO ALL). HOWEVER, PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS PREPARED TO AUTHORISE FRENCH MILITARY ACTION. LEVITTE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT THIS ACTION MIGHT BE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT MIGHT OCCUR, BUT HE IMPLIED IT WOULD BE AUTHORISED IF THE UAE OR FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION ON THIS SCORE WAS "NOT TO BE TAKEN LIGHTLY". LEVITTE ADDED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNITED STATES. ANY FRENCH (AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN) ACTION MIGHT BE LARGELY SYMBOLIC, BUT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACT ALONE, SINCE THIS COULD PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH A STRONGER PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION. FINALLY LEVITTE SAID THAT THE PROVISION OF US EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN HANDLED SKILLFULLY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE IN RESPONSE TO LOCAL REQUESTS.

3. ON CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN'S VISIT TO PARIS (AMMAN TELNOS 386 AND 490, NOT TO ALL), LEVITTE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO DETAILS OF THE TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT HAD BEEN THE MAIN, AND PERHAPS ONLY, SUBJECT AND THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD CAUTIONED THE JORDANIANS AGAINST DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD NO DETAILS OF PRESIDENT GISCARD'S MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 8 OCTOBER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 10/1218Z DA/GVL

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 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/PUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE  
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*SIR A ACLAUD*

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 394 OF 09 OCT

INFO MODUK (DI4B), BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK  
 AND WASHINGTON.

JORDAN AND IRAN/IRAQ.

1. I CALLED ON THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES THIS MORNING, PRIMARILY TO SEEK HIS IMPRESSIONS ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD WITH KING HUSSEIN AND ALSO TO OBTAIN PRECISE CONFIRMATION FROM HIM OF THE EXTENT OF JORDANIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT (I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY HIS COMMENTS ON KING HUSSEIN'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW AND POSSIBLE JORDANIAN ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE RUSSIANS).
2. ON THE MILITARY SITUATION, GENERAL SHAKER CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN VERY FAVOURABLY IMPRESSED BY THE IRAQI MILITARY EFFORT AND IN PARTICULAR BY THEIR ABILITY TO DEPLOY SUCH LARGE MILITARY FORMATIONS EFFECTIVELY AGAINST IRAN. HE THOUGHT THEIR COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES WERE WORKING SMOOTHLY AND THAT ON THE WHOLE IRAQI MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MORALE WAS HOLDING UP WELL. HE REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN THE KING AND HIMSELF INTO AN ALMOST WHOLLY SHI'ITE QUARTER OF BAGHDAD AND THAT EVEN THERE THEY HAD BEEN ENTHUSIASTICALLY RECEIVED. HE READILY ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD COME AS AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE TO THE IRAQIS. THE IRAQIS WERE NOW PREPARING FOR A LONG HAUL AND WERE, FOR EXAMPLE,

IRAQIS WERE NOW PREPARING FOR A LONG HAUL AND WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, BUILDING ROADS TO PROVIDE ACCESS INTO THE IRANIAN TERRITORY WHICH THEY HAD CAPTURED. HE THOUGHT THEY COULD AFFORD TO SIT IT OUT, AND REGARDED THEIR CONTROL OF OIL PIPELINES AS THE KEY TO BRINGING ABOUT THE EVENTUAL DOWNFALL OF THE KHOMEINI REGIME. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, PLACE MUCH FAITH IN THE EFFORTS OF IRANIAN EXILES TO SET UP A RIVAL REGIME AND READILY AGREED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THEY COULD SCARCELY HOPE FOR SUCCESS IF THEY WERE SEEN TO BE DEPENDING ON A VICTORIOUS IRAQ.

3. GENERAL SHAKER WAS EMPHATIC THAT THE IRAQIS HAD NOT REQUESTED ANY FORM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, EITHER MEN OR MATERIAL, BEFORE, DURING OR SINCE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE JORDANIANS HAD BEGUN ANY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ AND HE EMPHATICALLY DENIED THIS. HE EQUALLY DISMISSED ISRAELI AND OTHER REPORTS OF JORDANIAN UNITS EITHER BEING ON THEIR WAY OR BEING STOOD READY FOR DESPATCH TO IRAQ AS COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. THE IRAQIS DID NOT NEED SUCH HELP, AND HAD PLENTIFUL RESERVES OF BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL. NOR DID HE FORESEE THAT THEY WOULD NEED JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE EVEN IF THE WAR WERE TO BE PROLONGED FOR SOME MONTHS.

4. AS FAR AS OTHER FORMS OF HELP WERE CONCERNED, IT WAS NO SECRET THAT IRAQI CIVIL AIRCRAFT AND A FEW MILITARY TRANSPORTS HAD MADE USE OF JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS (GENERAL SHAKER HOWEVER SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT ANY IRAQI FIGHTER AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS). SUCH ASSISTANCE WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE OTHER HELP JORDAN WAS EXTENDING TO IRAQ, FOR EXAMPLE THROUGH INCREASED USE OF THE PORT OF AQABA FOR IRAQI CARGOES. BUT THE JORDANIANS HAD NOT GONE BEYOND THIS AND, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD OFFERED THE IRAQIS FULL USE OF THE KING HUSSEIN MEDICAL CENTRE FOR THE TREATMENT OF CASUALTIES, NONE HAD SO FAR BEEN SENT.

5. I ASKED THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF SYRIA TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT. HE REFERRED TO THE IRAQI BELIEF THAT THE SYRIANS WERE SUPPLYING BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL TO IRAN: HE SAID THAT JORDAN HAD NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE FOR THIS, BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE JORDANIANS WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER THE SUBVERSIVE THREAT TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA, WHICH HE THOUGHT HAD INCREASED AS A RESULT OF JORDANIAN/SYRIAN DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE WAR, AND WOULD REMAIN VERY WATCHFUL.

6. MY DEFENCE ATTACHE SAW GENERAL SHAKER EARLIER IN THE MORNING AND IS REPORTING IN GREATER DETAIL HIS MILITARY IMPRESSIONS ON THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT.



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TO PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 246 OF 9 OCTOBER

INFO ROUTINE DOHA DUBAI KUWAIT BAGHDAD BAHRAIN ABU DHABI MUSCAT  
JEDDA ALGIERS DAMASCUS CAIRO STOCKHOLM WASHINGTON PARIS BONN OTTAWA  
CANBERRA WELLINGTON NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD MOSCOW BRUSSELS DUBLIN  
LUXEMBOURG THE HAGUE COPENHAGEN ROME ANKARA UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS  
UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 384: (NOT TO ALL): IRAN/IRAQ.

1. OUR POSTURE ON THIS DISPUTE DIFFERS SOMEWHAT FROM THAT OF THE AMERICANS. FOR EXAMPLE IN OUR APPRECIATION OF THE NEED TO INTERVENE, AND OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN RESULTS. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE THINKING BEHIND OUR COMPARATIVE INACTIVITY IN MY BBC 4 INTERVIEW OF 2 OCTOBER.
2. THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS MAY BE OF USE IN CONTACTS WITH THE KING. I AM REPEATING THEM TO A WIDE SELECTION OF POSTS FOR BACKGROUND.  
(A) OUR UNIQUE VULNERABILITY TO IRAQI HOSTILITY (BECAUSE OF OUR HISTORICAL ROLE THROUGH THE MANDATE, OUR PAST POSITION IN THE GULF AND SUSPECTED SYMPATHY WITH U.S. POLICY ON PALESTINE) INHIBITS US FROM PRESSING TOO SOON OR TOO MUCH IN ISOLATION OUR FUNDAMENTAL DISTASTE FOR THIS IRAQI ADVENTURE WHICH, THROUGH CYNICAL REPUDIATION OF AN INTERNATIONALLY BINDING LEGAL AGREEMENT ONLY 5 YEARS OLD, FOLLOWED BY THE OPPORTUNISTIC INVASION OF A NEIGHBOUR, HAS ERODED RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED SYSTEM FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. WE LACK THE POLITICAL STRENGTH, AND COMMERCIAL COMPETITIVENESS, TO RISK BEING ACCUSED BY THE ARABS AS A WHOLE OF WORKING AGAINST THIS NEW 'ARAB' CAUSE THAT THEY SEEM TEMPTED, OR COMPELLED, TO ESPOUSE - IN PUBLIC AT ANY RATE.  
(B) WE HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A FORWARD POLICY IN THE GULF (FCO TELNO 1598 TO WASHINGTON (NOT TO ALL)). WE BELIEVE IF THERE IS TO DEVELOP A SITUATION IN WHICH THE WEST, ESPECIALLY THE U.S., CAN PLAY A STRONG MILITARY PART IN THE AREA, WHICH WE AGREE IS DESIRABLE, IT MUST BE CULTIVATED OVER TIME AND PROBABLY CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT TO FRUITION IN THE WAKE OF REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. TO FORCE IT ON TO UNWILLING GOVERNMENTS RISKS UNDERMINING THEM.  
(C) WE DO NOT IN ANY CASE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IS OPPORTUNE FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT INITIATIVE, WHETHER BY OURSELVES OR OTHERS, TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. THERE ARE VIRTUES IN PATIENCE (BBC INTERVIEW OF 2 OCTOBER).

SECRET

/3. IT FOLLOWS

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3. IT FOLLOWS THAT, FOR THE TIME BEING, WE HAVE TO CONFINE OUR POLICY TO THE FOLLOWING:

(A) WORKING AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF THE CONFLICT (SEE THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THE DECLARATION OF THE NINE, AND APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIONS IN THE GULF: MY TELNO 203 TO ABU DHABI). YOU MAY CERTAINLY THEREFORE POINT OUT TO THE KING THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT WAR AND OF THE INVOLVEMENT IN IT OF OTHERS.

(B) ENCOURAGING ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION BY THOSE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE PARTIES (EG THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OR OTHER THIRD WORLD ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE H. A. M, BUT SEE FCO TELNO 658 TO DELHI), EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN EARLY PROGRESS.

(C) WAITING FOR THE PARTIES TO REALISE THAT NO SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE IF EACH MAINTAINS ITS PRESENT ATTITUDE. SUCH REALISATION COULD COME AS A RESULT OF A CHANGE OF REGIME IN EITHER COUNTRY, OR LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT (MORE LIKELY IN THE CASE OF IRAQ, AS AND WHEN THE ARABS BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THIS ADVENTURE: WE MUST STAND READY TO ENCOURAGE, BUT NOT TO ANTICIPATE, SUCH DISILLUSIONMENT).

(D) REFRAINING FROM ANY SPECIFICALLY BRITISH INITIATIVES WHICH COULD SERVE TO STIR THINGS UP AND DAMAGE OUR OWN INTERESTS, WHILE WORKING FOR A COLLECTIVE WESTERN OR EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISES. E. G. THROUGH THE IEA ON OIL, THROUGH THE EC POLITICAL COOPERATION MACHINERY ON STATEMENTS OF POLICY (THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS AGREEMENT ON 7/8 OCTOBER)

(E) WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES AND THE MINIMUM OF PUBLICITY ON CONTINGENCY PLANS, E. G. JOINT NAVAL MEASURES TO ENSURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION: POSSIBLE INGREDIENTS OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT: POSSIBLE COLLECTIVE PRESSURE TO BE BROUGHT ON THE BELLIGERENTS THROUGH DENIAL OF ARMS, ECONOMIC PRESSURE, ETC.

4. SO FAR EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT SPREADING HAVE PROVED SUCCESSFUL. WE MAY HAVE TO GO FURTHER IF IT SHOWS SIGNS OF SPREADING. EVEN IF IT DOES NOT, A PERIOD OF STALEMATE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN MAY FOLLOW. MEANWHILE, WE NEED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE REGION. IN PARTICULAR:

(A) WE CAN EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONFLICT AND ANALYSES RELATED TO IT, E. G. ON SOVIET ATTITUDES.

(B) WE CAN REASSURE OUR FRIENDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO FEEL THREATENED BY THE CONFLICT, THAT WE SHARE THEIR CONCERN AND DO NOT INTEND TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THEM, E. G. BY PREMATURE INTRODUCTION OF NAVAL FORCES (FCO TELNO 1598 TO WASHINGTON)

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(C) WE CAN CONFIDE IN THEM OUR VIEWS ON CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISES (E. G. ON OIL SUPPLY, SHIPPING INSURANCE) AND THANK THEM WHERE APPROPRIATE, FOR THEIR DECISIONS TO INCREASE OIL PRODUCTION. 5. TO FURTHER THESE EXCHANGES, RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN SENT BY BAG COPIES OF BRIEFING MATERIAL PREPARED IN THE DEPT DURING THE WEEK.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRFD
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE
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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

- 3 -  
SECRET

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*Paul*

SECRET

Secretary of State

Sir J Graham

Private Secretary *Ar*

IRAN/IRAQ: MILITARY AID TO GULF STATES

Problem

1. Certain Gulf rulers have approached us looking for offers of support and assurances of military protection. There are indications that the French have made similar offers to the Rulers. What action should we take?

Recommendation

2. I understand that the Secretary of State wishes to discuss this tomorrow with the Prime Minister. I recommend that he should do so, having first spoken to Mr Pym, and that he should seek agreement that we should offer a general assurance to Gulf States. I submit a draft telegram of instructions. I further recommend that the MOD be asked to give further consideration to the options that might need to be examined. MED concur.

Background

3. The UK has Treaties of Friendship (which expire in 1981) with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. These require us to consult in times of crisis and need. We also have a Treaty of Friendship with Oman. British Loan Personnel are currently serving in all these countries and in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with which we have no such Treaty.

4. The Gulf Rulers are already aware of the implications for them of the present conflict. It is likely that if the war continues they will look to the West for some form of reassurance and/or assistance in maintaining the integrity of their States. Both because of their historical ties with us and because they fear the involvement of both superpowers if they were to turn to the Americans, the Gulf Rulers are likely to look first to the UK for help. The Ruler of Ras al Khaimah has already indicated that he would prefer our help to that of anyone else (Dubai telno 38 to Abu Dhabi). The UAE Minister of Petroleum has made similar points (Abu Dhabi telno 322). In his

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/telegram

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C telegram no 117 from Dubai, HM Ambassador has suggested that the UAE is already looking to us for reassurance. It is likely that Bahrain and Qatar would also look in our direction.

5. The French appear to have offered some form of unspecified assistance to the UAE. Their performance in Zaire and their covert help to Saudi Arabia during the Mecca incident indicates that they will be ready to deliver. We need to show a willingness to give similar assurances.

Argument

6. There are a number of possible scenarios in which the Gulf States may seek outside aid. These range from threats to internal security caused by internally or externally inspired subversion to full-scale war against them. If either Iran or Iraq were to launch an all-out attack by land or sea on the Gulf States, UK resources would not be sufficient by themselves to repel such an attack. Moreover it would be impossible for the UK alone to put troops on the ground in sufficient numbers in a short time-scale. But there are a number of lesser scenarios where the UK could render aid, eg:

- (a) internal security problems overstretching local resources;
- (b) rescue of a Ruler beleaguered/<sup>in his Residence</sup> as a result of internal disorder;
- (c) air attacks on Gulf States.

(a) could probably be dealt with by using up to a battalion of infantry or an RN Royal Marine Commando. A force of this size (Spearhead battalion) is always on standby in the UK for duty abroad. It and its air transport are at 72 hours' notice to move, with the leading company at 24 hours' notice. The Overseas Anti-Terrorist Team (Pulpitt) drawn from No 22 SAS is always on 24 hours' standby, and is trained and equipped in such a way that alone or supported by infantry up to battalion strength could undertake a rescue mission as in (b) above.

7. The greatest immediate threat to the area is, however, probably from air attack. The Gulf States and their oil installations, ports and airfields are particularly vulnerable. An Iranian attack in retaliation for alleged support for Iraq cannot be ruled out. The RAF could provide, at about 72 hours' notice, a range of possible elements of assistance. A Rapier detachment could be made available from the unit now deployed at RAF Lossiemouth. AEW aircraft and


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mobile radar could also be deployed. At the other extreme a squadron of RAF air defence aircraft might be made available by removing them from the UK Air Defence Region. / In all of these cases, of course, it would be necessary to inform SACEUR,. Moreover, if steps of this kind had to be taken in parallel with the despatch of the Spearhead battalion, we would face severe problems of airlift.

8. As far as the Navy is concerned, HMS Coventry is, of course, already in the area and the RFA Olwyn will join her in the Gulf of Oman tomorrow. The remainder of Task Force 318.0 is still in the Far East within ten days' steaming time of the Gulf, where, on the basis of plans made before the present Iraq/Iran crisis, they are due to make port visits.

9. An alternative which would perhaps provide as large a measure of assistance, but one that is less visible, would be the despatch of a Rapier detachment in the guise of either a Defence Sales Team, or a specialised training detachment.

10. We have been in touch with MOD officials to alert them to the possible need to look urgently at contingency planning to deal with the sort of scenarios outlined above. The MOD are deeply concerned at the risk of giving an open-ended commitment which would add to the already marked overstretch of our defence resources. They are also worried about the precedent that the giving of such a commitment could have elsewhere in the world. They have been told, however, that the political requirement to be in a position to give some reassurance and perhaps active assistance to the Gulf Rulers is a very strong one. But they point out that the problems of supporting and resupplying UK forces on the ground after the initial deployment would be considerable. There would also be a need for adequate communications back up. And the cost in terms of fuel resources alone would, in present economic circumstances, have important repercussions elsewhere.(eg in NATO).



D H Gillmore  
Defence Department

9 October 1980

9/10/80  
SECRET

/cc to

File No.....

Department MED

OUTWARD

Drafted by (Block Capitals) K J PASSMORE

TELEGRAM

Tel. Extn. 4774

Security Classification SECRET
Precedence IMMEDIATE
DESKBY .....Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched (Date) ..... (Time) .....Z	POSTBY .....Z
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PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) ..... Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix) .....  
 (Security Class.) SECRET (Caveat/Privacy marking) .....  
 (Codeword) ..... (Deskby) ..... Z

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI (precedence) (post) Tel. No. .... of .....

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE DUBAI, DOHA, BAHRAIN, MUSCAT

AND SAVING TO .....

REPEATED TO (for info) JEDDA, KUWAIT

SAVING TO (for info) .....

Distribution:-

Iraq/Iran

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO.322 OF 7 OCTOBER: SECURITY OF THE GULF

1. I wish to use the opportunity of John Moberly's visit to the UAE to convey assurances to UAE leaders of my personal concern and interest in the security of the Gulf at this difficult time.

2. In speaking to UAE leaders you and he should say that he is travelling with my personal authority and that I shall be taking a close interest in his report upon his return. The following points could be made:-

- a. We all have the strongest interest in not seeing the conflict spread. The Straits of Hormuz are of vital interest to us all;

and freedom of navigation throughout the Gulf

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b. I greatly appreciate the balanced and wise judgment of Gulf governments which has prevented them from becoming embroiled in the current conflict;

c. I share the concern of those in the Gulf who say that the West, in making contingency plans for eg. shipping should as far as possible refrain from taking actions which might be thought the beginning of superpower involvement in the area;

d. on security questions of this nature we wish to act only with the agreement of, and indeed at the invitation of, Gulf states - as the Americans have over AWACS to Saudi Arabia;

e. we wish to keep in close touch with the Gulf on their security needs as well as on wider questions such as energy. We hope they will not hesitate to consult us if they think we can help; ~~in any way.~~

f. the decision by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to increase their oil production has been extremely welcome to the whole West.

3. ~~If you are asked about~~ <sup>On</sup> British assurances to the Gulf states of a military nature, or for any commitment similar to what the French are reported to have offered Abu Dhabi, you should say that in the light of our Treaty of Friendship we have been considering what assistance we might make available if Gulf rulers asked for it. In principle, as conditions prevailing at the time of a request from Gulf rulers might dictate,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Lord  
Carmichael  
thinks  
this is  
too  
explicit.

WE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE CERTAIN AIR DEFENCE ELEMENTS, A BATTALION SIZED UNIT OF GROUND FORCE TROOPS, OR MORE LIMITED NUMBERS OF SPECIALISED FORCES. IF WE WISHED TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NEED TO SET IN HAND MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENTS. DO RULERS THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DO SO? IN ANY CASE WE SHOULD GIVE THESE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS NO PUBLICITY.

4. ON PARA 3 ABOVE BAHRAIN AND DOHA HAVE DISCRETION TO SPEAK TO APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF QATARI AND BAHRAINI GOVERNMENTS IF THEY DEEM IT OPPORTUNE.

WE WOULD BE READY TO LOOK URGENTLY AT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE. WE SHOULD FIRST WISH TO MAKE A MORE DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE POSITION ON THE GROUND. THIS WOULD NATURALLY INVOLVE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS, WHICH WE HOPE COULD BE GIVEN NO PUBLICITY.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 October 1980

B F 14/10/80

Message from President Carter

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from President Carter about the situation in the Middle East. This will clearly require a relatively early response. We should perhaps aim to reply by the middle of next week.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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O 091558Z OCT 80  
FM PRESIDENT CARTER  
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER  
ZEM

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OF ICE CHANNELS WH07472  
OCTOBER 9, 1980

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cc Master  
Ops

DEAR MARGARET:

IN ADDITION TO THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN POLAND, ABOUT WHICH I COMMUNICATED TO YOU OCTOBER 7, DURING THESE DAYS WE SHARE A COMMON CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, AND I WISH TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND TO BE SURE THAT YOU ARE ADVISED OF OUR VIEWS AND ACTIONS.

IN MY VIEW THERE ARE FOUR OBJECTIVES WHICH WE SHOULD BE PURSUING. FIRST, WE SHOULD BE DOING WHAT WE CAN TO BRING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION AND TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A FAIR AND LASTING SOLUTION. ITS CONTINUATION SERVES NO ONE'S INTEREST.

SECOND, WE SHOULD BE WORKING TO DISCOURAGE ANY EXPANSION OR ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, APPROACHING THIS FROM OUR OWN POSITION OF STRICT IMPARTIALITY TOWARDS THE COMBATANTS.

THIRD, WE SHOULD BE MAKING THE NECESSARY CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS TO ENABLE US TO ENSURE UNIMPEDED MOVEMENT OF SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

FOURTH, WE SHOULD BE WILLING, IN APPROPRIATE CASES, TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THOSE NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO MAY FEEL THREATENED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION.

I REMAIN DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE WAR IS CONTINUING. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ZIA OF PAKISTAN ON FRIDAY, I ENCOURAGED HIM TO CONTINUE THE TASK WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED BY THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. WE SHOULD KEEP THE MATTER BEFORE THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. AS WE FACE THE PROSPECT OF A PROTRACTED CONFLICT OF ATTRITION WITH AN OCCASIONAL FLARE-UP, WE SHOULD NOT RELAX OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WILL END THE CONFLICT. IF THE SITUATION SETTLES INTO AN UNRESOLVED STALEMATE OR RESULTS IN A MAJOR IMBALANCE, THE THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND TO OUR VITAL INTERESTS WILL PERSIST.

OUR VARIOUS EFFORTS HAVE, WE BELIEVE, REDUCED THE IMMEDIATE DANGER OF EXPANSION AND ESCALATION. NEVERTHELESS

END OF PAGE 01

THE TEMPTATION EXISTS ON THE PART OF JORDAN AND THE GULF STATES TO SHOW THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH IRAQ. WE BELIEVE THAT CONSPICUOUS ACTS OF SUPPORT FOR IRAQ COULD INCREASE THE RISK PARTICULARLY TO THE GULF STATES AND INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INTERRUPTION OF VITAL OIL SUPPLIES. YOUR OWN RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE OMANIS WERE MOST IMPORTANT. I HOPE THAT YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO DISCOURAGE ESCALATION.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE UNIMPEDED MOVEMENT OF SHIPPING, LET ME THANK YOU FOR YOUR RAPID RESPONSE TO MY MESSAGE OF LAST WEEK. NOW THAT CONTACTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OUR THOUGHTS ON THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR A NAVAL COORDINATION EFFORT HAVE BEEN CONVEYED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND OTHER ALLIES, WE ARE INTRODUCING FOR CONSIDERATION A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BY OUR NAVIES SHOULD THE SITUATION REQUIRE IT.

WITH SOME 15 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL PER DAY PASSING THROUGH THOSE WATERS, WE MUST PRESS AHEAD WITH THIS PLANNING. AND ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE OF WAR INSURANCE HAS BECOME LESS ACUTE, WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME AN EXCHANGE WITH YOU ON THIS MATTER.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SECURITY OF NON-BELLIGERENTS, THE SAUDIS HAVE COME TO US WITH THEIR CONCERNS THAT EXPANSION OF THE WAR COULD LEAD TO AIR ATTACKS ON OIL FACILITIES IN THE KINGDOM. WE ARE, ACCORDINGLY, TAKING STEPS TO BOLSTER SAUDI AIR DEFENSE.

WE ARE SENDING TO SAUDI ARABIA U.S. AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT, AND COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENSE RADAR. THESE AIRCRAFT AND RADAR WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE SAUDI SELF DEFENSE CAPABILITY BY PROVIDING EARLY WARNING. WE ARE CONSULTING FURTHER WITH SAUDI ARABIA ON WHAT ELSE THEY MIGHT NEED TO PROTECT SAUDI OIL FACILITIES FROM AIR ATTACK.

I HAVE TAKEN THESE STEPS IN RECOGNITION OF THE GREAT STAKE THE WEST HAS IN THE CONTINUED NORMAL FLOW OF SAUDI OIL= TO GIVE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE TO THE SAUDI MONARCHY THAT ITS FRIENDS WILL STAND BY IT IN ITS HOUR OF STRONGLY FELT NATIONAL NEED= AND TO AVOID FURTHER INSTABILITY IN THE REGION WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD EXPLOIT.

DEFENSIVE HELP OF THIS KIND TO OUR NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS DOES NOT REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM THE BASIC POSTURE OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THIS CONFLICT WHICH IT SEEMS IN OUR INTEREST TO PURSUE. GIVEN THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS WE ALL HAVE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE GULF, IT SEEMS TO ME THIS IS CLEARLY OUR WISEST POLICY.

END OF PAGE 02

I AM GIVING THIS ASSESSMENT TO YOU BECAUSE OUR TWO  
GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER ALLIES MUST COMMUNICATE CLOSELY AS  
THIS CRISIS EVOLVES.

SINCERELY,  
JIMMY CARTER

THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.,  
PRIME MINISTER,  
LONDON

Ø84Ø  
£7472

NNNN

HOW IS THAT??

RECEIVED FINE TKU AT 1612/Ø9 RK



FCS/80/150

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

1. I was sorry that you were not after all able to visit Iraq during your recent visit to the Middle East.
2. Our Ambassador in Baghdad has telegraphed to say that the Iraqis now plan to mount the Trade Fair from 15 November, and that he would greatly value your presence there on the British Day which he hopes to have on 16 November. I understand that you would be willing to attend, but that you would like to be reassured that a visit by yourself to the Baghdad Trade Fair would be worthwhile and that it is a realistic proposition in the circumstances.
3. I am sure that your presence at the Fair would be valuable. The Iraqis regard the event as important, and attendance by VIPs from overseas as the touchstone of individual countries' views of the Iraqi market. Although one cannot say that the presence of a Cabinet Minister will produce dividends in the form of contracts, it is clear that countries which do not send such high level representatives will be handicapped in their pursuit of government business, which is what counts in Iraq. And we are, for other reasons, already at a disadvantage in that market vis-a-vis our European competitors. Although our exports at £250 million show a healthy increase, we have yet to secure a really big contract, for which some political gesture beforehand is probably necessary.
4. Whether the Iraqis are being realistic in aiming to mount the Fair as soon as mid-November, I cannot say: certainly their plan for a quick strike against Iran has misfired and the two countries may be in for a longish conflict. But I would hope that the international community would have found some way of arranging a durable ceasefire in less than six weeks from now. It is unlikely that the air raid damage to Baghdad will be so severe as to rule out a Trade Fair in the immediate aftermath of



a ceasefire, though I suspect that life in the city will be uncomfortable for some time to come. I would expect the Iraqis to make every effort to mount the Fair on schedule, provided that they judge it safe to do so.

5. Our Ambassador has pointed out that despite the obvious uncertainties we need to respond to the Iraqi announcement fairly soon. It would be most helpful therefore if you could let me know before too long whether or not you would, in principle, be prepared to attend the British Day at the Fair. The decision on whether or not it will be feasible for you to do so will need to be taken later in the light of developments.

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister, to John Nott and to Robert Armstrong.


C

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

8 October 1980

-8 OCT 1980





IRAN/IRAQ

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPIES

20

ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR B YOUNG~~  
SIR J GRAHAM  
~~MR J O'BRYEN~~ & A A CLAND  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/MENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
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PUSD (2)  
NEWS D  
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

CONFIDENTIAL

FM JEDDAH 081133Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 728 OF 8TH OCTOBER 1980

REPEATED PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, AMMAN, ABU DHABI,  
BAHRAIN, DOHA, MUSCAT, TRIPOLI.

YR TELNO 535: IRAQ/IRAN

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON THE DIRECTOR OF ARAB  
AFFAIRS IN THE MFA THIS MORNING TO HAND OVER A  
DOCTORED VERSION OF TUR. SHURA WAS AS GRATEFUL AS EVER  
FOR THIS INFORMATION.

2. SHURA WAS CLEARLY WORRIED THAT THE WAR MIGHT  
SPILL OVER INTO THE ARAB GULF STATES. HE THOUGHT THAT  
IF IRAN BEGAN TO LOSE HEAVILY, OR IF IT INTERPRETED  
ANY JORDANIAN ENTRY INTO THE WAR AS THE BEGINNING OF  
A GENERAL ARAB LINE-UP AGAINST IRAN, THEN IT MIGHT  
SEEK TO CLOSE THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND ATTACK KUWAIT,  
WHOSE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ WAS PUBLICLY  
KNOWN. GRAY ASKED WHETHER IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY  
SAUDI ARABIA WOULD, AS INDICATED BY PRINCE SAUD,  
INTERVENE TO SUPPORT KUWAIT SEMI COLON SHURA THOUGHT SUCH  
ASSISTANCE WOULD STOP SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION.

INTERVENE TO SUPPORT KUWAIT SEMI COLON SHURA THOUGHT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD STOP SHORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. GRAY SUGGESTED THAT CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS MIGHT ALSO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE US ADMINISTRATION TO INTERVENE WITH NAVAL FORCES TO ENSURE FREE NAVIGATION SEMI COLON SHURA DID NOT COMMENT, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THAT WOULD BRING IN THE USSR TOO.

3. GRAY REFERRED TO SHURA'S STATEMENT WHEN LAST THEY MET THAT IRAQ HAD PLANNED A LONG WAR SEMI COLON ON WHAT WAS THIS BASED? SHURA SAID IT WAS HIS OWN INTERPRETATION OF IRAQI ACTIONS IN DISPERSING THEIR AIRCRAFT AROUND THE PENINSULA AND DIVERTING THEIR SHIPS TO AQABA. HE SEEMED SURPRISED THAT IRAQI TROOPS WERE STILL ADVANCING.

4. ON SYRIAN ATTITUDES, SHURA SAID HE EXPECTED ASSAD TO SIGN A FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN MOSCOW; THE REASON WAS THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. HE THOUGHT THE TREATY WOULD BE ON PDRY RATHER THAN IRAQI LINES. BUT HE DID NOT EXPECT SYRIA (AND EVEN LESS LIBYA) TO BE DRAWN MILITARILY INTO THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR, THOUGH THEY WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE HELP WITH WAR MATERIEL.

5. SHURA ASKED WHAT CHANCES THERE WERE OF A CHANGE OF REGIME IN TEHRAN. GRAY REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF TUR: (WE HAD DELETED LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 8) SHURA SEEMED DISAPPOINTED.

6. SHURA CAME FROM AND WAS RETURNING TO A MEETING WITH HIS DEPUTY MINISTER ABOUT THE SECURITY SITUATION DURING THE HAJJ. HE TOLD GRAY THAT THE SAUDIS EXPECTED TROUBLE BETWEEN THE IRAQIS AND IRANIANS EVEN WITH THE REDUCED NUMBERS NOW ARRIVING SEMI COLON AND ALSO A MARCH BY THE LIBYANS ON THEIR EMBASSY TO DEMAND ITS CONVERSION TO A PEOPLE'S BUREAU.

CRAIG

NNNN

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22 20X

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
~~SIR I YONDE~~  
SIR J GRAHAM  
~~MR J O HOBBEN~~  
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NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE DIO

(v)

*Sir I Gilman*

DISVRY 081130Z  
ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

GPS 310

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 081130Z

FM DUBAI 080910Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI

TELEGRAM NUMBER 38 OF 8 OCTOBER

AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO

INFO PRIORITY MODU BAHRAIN DOHA JEDDA HKUWAIT MUSCAT PARIS

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 322 TO FCO: IRAN/ IRAQ

1. I RECEIVED A MESSAGE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT THE RULER OF RAS AL-KHAIMAH WISHED TO SEE ME ON AN URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL MATTER. I CALLED ON HIM THIS MORNING. THE CROWN PRINCE, SHAIKH KHALID, WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. SHAIKH SAQR SAID THAT A FEW DAYS AGO HE HAD VISITED SHAIKH ZAID IN ABU DHABI. THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUING IRAQ/ IRAN WAR, AND HAD AGREED THAT IRAN WAS UNLIKELY TO BE AMENABLE TO MEDIATION BY ANY CONCEIVABLE COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES. IRAN HAD ALREADY THREATENED THE U A E AND OTHER STATES WITH RETALIATION FOR THEIR ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

3. SHAIKH ZAID HAD REVEALED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED UNSPECIFIED OFFERS OF SUPPORT FROM FRANCE, WHICH HE WAS DISPOSED TO ACCEPT. SAQR HAD ARGUED VERY STRONGLY THAT BRITAIN HAD FAR GREATER HISTORICAL LINKS WITH AND EXPERIENCE OF THE AREA, AND IT WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATLY PREFERABLE TO RELY ON US. HE THOUGHT THAT ZAID HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THESE ARGUMENTS, BUT SOME SORT OF RESPONSE FROM

OF COUNTRIES. IRAN HAD ALREADY THREATENED THE U A E AND OTHER STATES WITH RETALIATION FOR THEIR ALLEGED SUPPORT FOR IRAQ.

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4. THIS APPROACH SEEMS TO FIT WITH THAT BY MANA AL-OTEIBA REPORTED IN YOUR TUR. WHATEVER THE NATURE OF THE FRENCH CONTACTS WITH ZAID, THEY HAVE CLEARLY DISMAYED SOME OF HIS ADVISERS AND OTHER SHAIKHS. SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM US WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY TIMELY.

5. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY OF ASKING SHAIKH SAQR WHETHER HE HAD RECEIVED ANY IRAQI REQUEST FOR USE OF FACILITIES IN RAS AL-KHAIMAH FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAN. HE SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT HE HAD NOT: ANY SUCH SUGGESTION WAS MERELY A MALICIOUS RUMOUR ORIGINATING IN ABU DHABI. HE KNEW OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI AIRCRAFT TO OMAN, BUT SAID THAT THE TARGET, IF AN OPERATION HAD BEEN MOUNTED, WOULD HAVE BEEN BANDAR ABBAS AND NOT REPEAT NOT THE ISLANDS. THE IRAQIS HAD GIVEN HIM AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT NO ATTACK WOULD BE MADE ON THESE WITHOUT U A E KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS ✓ TO SAVING ADDRESSEE.

HASKELL

BT

[Handwritten: Saving, as requested.]

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GRS 450

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO Q81454Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 245 OF 8 OCTOBER 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON

PRIORITY JEDDA KUWAIT DAMASCUS DOHA ABUD DHABI MUSCAT UKMIS NEW YORK  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 382 (NOT TO ALL) : IRAQ/IRAN

1. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON GRAHAM THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE SAID THAT, AS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD KNOW, JORDAN HAD TAKEN A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ. THIS WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ARAB LEAGUE CHARTER AND MARCHED WITH THEIR OWN FEELINGS. NEVERTHELESS, THEIR SUPPORT DID NOT INVOLVE THE DESPATCH OF ANY MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL AND WAS CONFINED TO DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND THE FACILITATION OF TRANSIT THROUGH JORDAN FROM AQABA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN PRESSING THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, OVER THIS SUPPORT, AND HE WISHED TO ENQUIRE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW.
2. GRAHAM SAID THAT WE HAD NOTED THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. WE DEPLORED THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN: NOT ONLY DID IT INVOLVE THE TEARING UP OF A SOLEMN TREATY BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REGULATING THEIR BORDER, BUT THE FIGHTING WAS IN AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AREA AND, ESPECIALLY IF IT SPREAD, WOULD PUT AT RISK THE INTERESTS OF MANY OF US, BOTH WITHIN THE REGION AND OUTSIDE. WE DID NOT YET SEE HOW THE CONFLICT COULD BE BROUGHT TO AN EARLY END, BUT WE THOUGHT IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE AREA OF COLICT SHOULD NOT BE WIDENED AND THAT OTHER STATES SHOULD NOT BE DRAWN IN. WE HOPED, THEREFORE, THAT IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT, THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD COUNSEL CAUTION AND THE NEED TO SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
3. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT KING HUSSEIN, WITH HIS WIDE EXPERIENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD, WOULD USE HIS POSITION PRECISELY TO THESE ENDS.
4. THERE WAS THEN SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF THE

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46879 - 1

FIGHTING, THE POSITION OF VARIOUS ARAB STATES, AND THE RISK THAT IRAN MIGHT, EITHER IN RETALIATION FOR ALLEGED SUPPORT OF IRAQ OR AS AN ACT OF DESPERATION, ATTACK TARGETS IN THE LITTORAL STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE AMBASSADOR ACCEPTED THAT SUCH ACTION COULD WELL LEAD TO WESTERN INTERVENTION, AND VOLUNTEERED THAT THAT WAS TO BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. IN CONCLUSION, THE AMBASSADOR REPEATED THE ASSURANCE THAT, SO FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE WAS NO PLAN IN THE AIR TO SEND MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ: THERE WAS NO NEED SINCE THE IRAQIS HAD ONLY COMMITTED SO FAR THREE DIVISIONS.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

GR 150

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 082355Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4236 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, JEDDA, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AMMAN.

IRAN/IRAQ: US/SOVIET CONTACTS.

1. IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL IN WISCONSIN ON 6 OCTOBER (WHICH HAS RECEIVED SCANT NOTICE IN THE NATIONAL MEDIA), PRESIDENT CARTER REVEALED THAT HE HAD EXCHANGED LETTERS WITH BREZHNEV ABOUT THE WAR. BREZHNEV'S LETTER HAD BEEN HANDED OVER DURING THE GROMYKO/MUSKIE CONTACTS IN NEW YORK.

2. ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS WERE AS ANXIOUS AS THE US TO KEEP THE CONFLICT CONFINED TO THE PRESENT PARTICIPANTS, CARTER SAID: QUOTE I HOPE SO. MY BELIEF IS THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT WAR TO BREAK OUT IN A GENERAL WAY THROUGHOUT THE PERSIAN GULF. THE BIGGEST THREAT TO OUR SECURITY WOULD BE IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE TEMPTED TO MOVE INTO IRAN OR INTO AN AREA WHERE THEY CAN CONTROL THE PERSIAN GULF OR ACCESS TO IT. THIS WOULD BE A DIRECT THREAT NOT ONLY TO OUR OWN SECURITY BUT THE SECURITY OF OTHER WESTERN NATIONS WHO DEPEND ON OIL SUPPLIES FROM THAT REGION FOR THEIR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING UNQUOTE.

F C O PASS SAVING PARIS, BONN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN.

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED  
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IRAQ/IRAN

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 082306Z OCT 80

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4234 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO MODUK, BAGHDAD AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO,

UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN

AND DOHA

M I F T: IRAN/IRAQ: US POSITION

1. FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF WARREN CHRISTOPHER'S SPEECH YESTERDAY IN BOSTON:

- (I) THE US HAVE VITAL INTERESTS AT STAKE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA AND WILL DEFEND THEM. THE US PURPOSE IS NOT TO DOMINATE THE AFFAIRS OF ANY NATION IN THE REGION BUT TO HELP BUTTRESS THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THE US HAS NOTHING TO GAIN BY CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT OR BY TAKING SIDES IN IT. THE IRAN HOSTAGE ISSUE MAKES PEACE ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE.
- (II) THE LOCATION OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES MAKES THE CONFLICT MORE DANGEROUS. "IF THE IRAQIS TAKE AND ATTEMPT TO KEEP KHUZESTAN, THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT WOULD BE FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED, AND THE DANGER DRAMATICALLY SHARPENED."
- (III) THE US REFUSAL TO TAKE SIDES IS NOT A SIGN OF INDIFFERENCE. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SEIZURE OF TERRITORY BY FORCE AND THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS. THE US HAS SUPPORTED THE PEACE EFFORTS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO URGE RESTRAINT ON ALL EXTERNAL POWERS. WE EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE ITS OWN SELF-DISCIPLINE. WHILE SOVIET CLAIMS ABOUT US PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFLICT ARE UNTRUE AND IRRESPONSIBLE, THE RUSSIANS HAVE GENERALLY BEHAVED WITH CAUTION. THEY SHOULD PERSIST IN SUPPORTING AN EARLY END TO THE WAR.
- (IV) THE US ALSO SEEK TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT FROM SPREADING. "THE OTHER STATES OF THE GULF AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA HAVE GROUNDS FOR DEEP CONCERN. THEY DESERVE OUR HELP, WHEN THEY ASK FOR IT, IN DETERRING THE POSSIBILITY OF UNPROVOKED ATTACK." HENCE THE DESPATCH OF AWACS TO SAUDI ARABIA. "THEIR PURPOSE IS STRICTLY DEFENSIVE - TO PROVIDE WARNING TIME AND TO ASSIST THE SAUDIS IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE IF THERE IS SUCH A NEED. THEIR PRESENCE HAS NOT ALTERED IN ANY WAY OUR NEUTRALITY IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT."
- (V) THE US WISH TO KEEP THE CONFLICT FROM ENDANGERING THE FLOW OF OIL, AND NOTE THE CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION ADOPTED BY SAUDI ARABIA AND SOME OTHER PRODUCERS.

/2. Summary



2 SUMMING UP, CHRISTOPHER EMPHASISED THAT THE US WERE NEUTRAL AND WOULD NOT INTERVENE ON EITHER SIDE, THEY EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT, AND WOULD WORK FOR AN EARLY END TO THE FIGHTING. FURTHERMORE, 'NEUTRALITY IN THIS CONFLICT DOES NOT MEAN AMERICAN INDIFFERENCE. WE WILL DEFEND OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

SPECIFICALLY:

- THERE MUST BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH FREE TRANSIT IN THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ AND THE PERSIAN GULF. WE WILL DO WHAT IS REQUIRED TO PREVENT SUCH INTERFERENCE.
- TO PREVENT THE CONFLICT FROM EXPANDING IN WAYS WHICH THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE REGION, WE WILL ALSO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM NON-BELLIGERENT FRIENDS IN THE AREA WHO FEEL THREATENED BY THE CONFLICT.'

FCO PASS SAVING: PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO  
AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN,  
DOHA

HENDERSON

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

GR 300

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WASHINGTON 202305Z OCT 80

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4233 OF 8 OCTOBER

INFO MODUK, BAGHDAD AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO,

UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,

BAHRAIN AND DOHA

IRAN/IRAQ: US POSITION

1. WARREN CHRISTOPHER (DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE), YESTERDAY SET OUT CURRENT US THINKING IN A SPEECH IN BOSTON. SUMMARY IN M I F T, TEXT BY BAG (NOT TO ALL).

2. THE PRESS HAS PICKED OUT THE REFERENCES TO THE US BEING WILLING TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM NON-BELLIGERENTS IN THE AREA WHO FEEL THREATENED BY THE CONFLICT. THE NEW YORK TIMES ALSO REPORTS THAT US AMBASSADORS IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS OMAN, KUWAIT AND THE UAE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS US READINESS TO SUPPLY THEM WITH INFORMATION FROM THE AWACS OPERATING FROM SAUDI ARABIA, MORE AWACS FOR THEMSELVES, GROUND RADAR AND OTHER DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT TO HELP PROTECT THEM AGAINST IRANIAN AIR ATTACK, PROVIDED THAT RECIPIENTS AVOIDED DIRECT OR INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT.

3. THE PRESS ALSO REPORTS THAT, AS PART OF THE POLICY OF DISCOURAGING THIRD COUNTRY INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR, THE US HAD COMMUNICATED CLEARLY AND EMPHATICALLY TO JORDAN THEIR UNHAPPINESS WITH THE CURRENT ATTITUDE IN AMMAN, BUT THAT THIS HAD HAD LITTLE EFFECT.

4. IT WAS ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY BY THE PENTAGON THAT GENERAL PIOTROWSKI, THE US COMMANDER OF ALL AIR DEFENCE SQUADRONS, HAD ARRIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA WITH A 20-MAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM. HE WOULD BE MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND TO WASHINGTON ON

- (I) INTEGRATING THE US AIR-DEFENCE SYSTEMS INTO THE SAUDI NETWORK:  
AND
- (II) IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REST OF THE SAUDI AIR-DEFENCE NETWORK.

FCO PASS SAVING PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO, TEL AVIV, CAIRO  
AMMAN, DAMASCUS, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN  
AND DOHA (REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

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ES&SD		

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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PS  
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SIR E YOUDE  
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~~MR J C MOBERLY~~  
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

GPS620

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 072115Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1456 OF 7 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

INFO MOSCOW BONN PARIS JEDDA BAGHDAD TEL AVIV

MY TELNO 1436 (NOT TO ALL) AND WASHINGTON TELNO 4202:

US INTENTIONS: IRAN/IRAQ

*\*~\* Passage deleted  
and closed, 40 years,  
under FOI Exemption.*

*Wayland  
13 September 2012*

1. THE UNITES STATES ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS  
PUZZLING. APART FROM MUNOZ LEDO (MEXICO)\*  
\* MCHENRY IS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL WHO IS  
ACTIVELY PRESSING FOR THE COUNCIL TO MOVE INTO PUBLIC SESSION  
TO 'BEGIN DICUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE'.

2. THE REST OF US IE THE FOUR WESTERN MEMBERS PLUS THE OTHER  
NON-ALIGNED DO NOT BELIEVE THAT COUNCIL ACTION AT PRESENT CAN STOP  
THE FIGHTING, NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IS RIPE - ALTHOUGH  
THIS TIME MAY WELL COME - FOR THE COUNCIL TO ACT EFFECTIVELY  
IN ITS PEACE-KEEPING/MEDIATION ROLE. WE SEE NO PURPOSE IN ACTIVITY  
FOR ACTIVITY'S SAKE. PUBLIC DEBATE ON THE SUBSTANCE WOULD ONLY  
MEAN TAKING SIDES. FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN A STRAIGHT-FORWARD CALL FOR  
A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE PRO-IRAQI WHILE CEASE-FIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL  
COULD BE PRO-IRANIAN A FORTIORI. FOR THE COUNCIL TO START

DISCUSSING WHO WAS THE MORE TO BLAME OVER BREACHES OF THE 1975 AGREEMENT OR WHERE THE BOUNDARY SHOULD RUN IN THE SHATT EL ARAB AND THE LAND FRONTIERS WOULD BE EXTREMELY AWKWARD. VERY FEW COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SPEAK ON SUCH TOPICS AND, IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF THE COUNCIL ADOPTING A RESOLUTION GOING BEYOND SCR 479, IT WOULD EITHER CONTINUE TO ALIENATE THE IRANIANS OR ALIENATE THE IRAQIS, THUS DAMAGING ITS CHANCES OF BEING ABLE TO ACT EFFECTIVELY WHEN THE RIGHT MOMENT COMES.

3. WE AND THE OTHER WESTERN MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PUT ALL THIS TO THE AMERICANS ON 6 OCTOBER AT A MEETING CALLED BY MCHENRY. HE ACCEPTED THE FORCE OF OUR ARGUMENTS BUT CONTINUED TO HANKER AFTER PUBLIC DEBATE.

4. IT MAY BE THAT MCHENRY'S ATTITUDE REFLECTS HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUNCIL ETC, (HE SAID THAT WE WERE ALLOWING THE COUNCIL TO BE PUSHED INTO A POSITION WHERE IT COULD ONLY ACT IF THE COMBATANTS WANTED IT TO) BUT HIS MISSION TELL US THAT HE IS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT A PARTIAL ANSWER MAY BE THAT THE ISRAELI LOBBY HAVE BEEN CRITICISING THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE GROUND THAT THEY DO NOTHING TO PREVENT THE ARABS FROM RUSHING INTO FORMAL SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL, EXCORIATING ISRAEL AND THE US AND ADOPTING OFFENSIVE RESOLUTIONS. HOW IS IT THEN THAT THEY ARE SITTING BACK AND ALLOWING UNSAVOURY COUNTRIES LIKE IRAQ AND IRAN TO CONDUCT A MAJOR WAR WITHOUT THE SECURITY COUNCIL EVEN MEETING? MCHENRY'S REMARKS AT LAST FRIDAY'S INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS LEND SOME CREDENCE TO THIS THEORY (MY TELNO 1444).

5. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE AMERICANS MAY SEE PUBLIC SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL AS A MEANS TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, WHEN MY NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE SAID AT THE MEETING ON 6 OCTOBER THAT A FIRM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR WOULD BRING THE NON-ALIGNED BEHIND A SUPER-POWER CONSENSUS, SILENCE FELL ON THE US DELEGATION. IT IS IN FACT DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PUBLIC DISCUSSION COULD BRING THIS ABOUT.

6. WHEN WE COMPARED NOTES AFTER THE MEETING BROKE UP, WE HAD A FEELING, ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT TO DEFINE, THAT THE AMERICANS WERE CASTING ABOUT TO FIND SOMETHING PRO-IRANIAN TO DO. IF SO, IT MAY BE THAT THEY SEE A COUNCIL MEETING AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY SOMETHING IN PUBLIC WHICH THEY MIGHT HOPE WOULD HAVE A FAVOURABLE EFFECT ON THE HOSTAGES PROBLEM.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 071436Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1455 DATED 7 OCTOBER 80

INFO PRIORITY ANKARA, DAMASCUS, TRIPOLI, WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD,  
JEDDA, AMMAN, PARIS, MOSCOW, BONN.

IRAN/IRAQ

1. MY TURKISH COLLEAGUE TOLD ME IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ON 6 OCTOBER  
THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAD FORMALLY ASKED FOR TRANSIT RIGHTS  
THROUGH TURKEY FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES DESTINED FOR IRAN. THE IRAQI  
GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED THE TURKS FOR PERMISSION FOR THEIR AIRCRAFT  
TO OVER-FLY TURKEY WITH MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION.  
THE TURKS HAD REFUSED BOTH REQUESTS.

PARSONS

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

22

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PS/MR HURD  
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CABINET OFFICE DIO

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

Sir A. ACLAND

GRS 500

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 071630Z

FROM KUWAIT 071515Z OCT

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 472 OF 7/10/80,

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS AND WASHINGTON,

INFO PRIORITY BONN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, ABU DHABI  
BAHRAIN, MUSCAT, AMMAN, DOHA, TEL AVIV.

IRAQ/IRAN.

WHEN MOBERLY CALLED TODAY ON THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, SHAIKH SALIM AL SABAH THE LATTER EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT IRANIAN THREATS DIRECTED SPECIFICALLY AGAINST KUWAIT. HE SAID THAT KUWAIT HAD TAKEN ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO DEFEND HERSELF AND ADDED WITH SOME EMPHASIS THAT KUWAIT MUST RELY ON HER OWN EFFORTS IN THIS SITUATION. HE THEN REFERRED TO KUWAIT'S OBLIGATIONS TO IRAQ UNDER THE ARAB LEAGUE CHARTER AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN THE LAST RESORT KUWAIT WOULD BE BOUND TO SIDE WITH IRAQ, THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S AMBITION TO BE THE NEW NASSER COULD POSE AS MUCH OF AN EVENTUAL

AMBITION TO BE THE NEW MASSER COULD POSE AS MUCH OF AN EVENTUAL THREAT TO KUWAIT AS THE PRETENSIONS OF IRAN.

2. WHILE SHAIKH SALIM SAID HE WOULD WARMLY WELCOME FURTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS WITH US ABOUT THE EVOLVING SITUATION, HE DID NOT SEE MUCH SCOPE FOR CO-ORDINATION OF POLICY OWING TO KUWAIT'S INABILITY TO TAKE A NEUTRAL POSITION. THOUGH HE DID NOT RULE OUT A TIP AND RUN ATTACK, HE WAS INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A ~~CARELESS~~<sup>SERIOUS</sup> IRANIAN MOVE AGAINST ANY OF THE GULF STATES SINCE THE IRANIANS WOULD KNOW THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE SAUDI ARABIA AND SAUDI ARABIA'S FRIENDS. HE WAS REASSURED BY A CONCILLIATORY STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT BANI SADR HEARD ON THE RADIO THIS MORNING. HE URGED THAT WE WORK WITH THE AMERICANS AND IF NECESSARY THE RUSSIANS AT THE U N OR THROUGH THE ISLAMIC OR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENTS TO ENCOURAGE BANI SADR TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS. KUWAIT DID NOT WISH TO SEE MORE FIGHTING OR SOVIET OR U S INVOLVEMENT. A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION HAD TO BE FOUND QUICKLY.

3. SHAIKH SALIM ALSO SPOKE SEVERAL TIMES OF THE SOVIET NEED FOR OIL IN THE LATTER PART OF THE 1980'S AND SPECULATED THAT THIS WOULD PREDISPOSE THE RUSSIANS TO LOOK FOR WAYS OF EXPLOITING THE SOLUTION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. HE SEEMED VERY NERVOUS BOTH ABOUT THE RISKS OF THE CONFLICT REMAINING UNRESOLVED FOR LONG AND ABOUT POSSIBLE SUPER-POWER INVOLVEMENT. THE NEAREST HE CAME TO RECOGNISING A ROLD FOR THE AMERICANS WAS IN HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE SQZPORT OF SAUDI ARABIA BY HER "FRIENDS" MIGHT DETER IRANIAN ATTACKS.

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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
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~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

*Sir A. ALAN D*

*Head of Watch - Special  
Handling Mod  
(By envelope)*

*ms*

SECRET UK EYES ALPHA  
SIC

GRS 1055

SECRET

UK EYES ALPHA

FM AMMAN 071200Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 382 OF 07 OCT

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DI4) AND WASHINGTON.

ROUTINE ANKARA, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT, TEL AVIV,  
TRIPOLI AND UKMIS NEW YORK

IRAQ/IRAN

1. ON KING HUSSEIN'S RETURN FROM BAGHDAD ON THE EVENING OF 5 OCTOBER HE SUMMONED MY US COLLEAGUE TO CHECK ON A REPORT WHICH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD RECEIVED FROM THE SAUDIS, ALLEGEDLY BASED ON A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND MR MUSKIE FROM WHICH THE SAUDIS CLAIMED TO HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SUPPLYING DOLLARS 50 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN. AMBASSADOR VELDTER SAW KING HUSSEIN AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 OCTOBER



DOLLARS 50 MILLION WORTH OF MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN. AMBASSADOR VELIOTES SAW KING HUSSEIN AGAIN ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 OCTOBER (ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO WAS HERE ON A BRIEF VISIT) AND WAS ABLE TO CLEAR UP THE MISUNDERSTANDING. APPARENTLY THE SAUDIS HAD ASKED WHAT REQUESTS THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED FOR SPARES PRIOR TO THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HOSTAGES AND HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN OUTSTANDING REQUEST FROM THE IRANIANS FOR 50 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF SPARES BUT THAT SINCE THEN ALL SUCH TRANSACTIONS HAD OF WAMNACUOO BEEN FROZEN. THIS HAD GOT MUDDLES IN TRANSMISSION BY THE SAUDIS AND HAD REACHED PRESIDENT SADDAM IN THE MUCH MORE DAMAGING VERSION DESCRIBED ABOVE.

2. DURING THESE TWO INTERVIEWS WITH KING HUSSEIN, AMBASSADOR VELIOTES LEARNT A GOOD DEAL ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD AND HIS DISCUSSIONS THERE WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN (HE ASKED THAT HIS CONFIDENCE BE FULLY PROTECTED). ON THE QUESTION OF SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ, KING HUSSEIN HAD MENTIONED THAT TWO SOVIET VESSELS DESTINED FOR IRAQI PORTS WHICH HAD BEEN WAITING AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR IRAQ HAD BEEN DIVERTED TO SAUDI PORTS AND THAT THEIR CARGOES WERE BEING TRANSPORTED BY LAND FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO IRAQ.

3. KING HUSSEIN AFFIRMED THAT SULTAN QABOOS'S STANDING WITH IRAQ WAS NOW VERY HIGH AND THAT HE HAD GAINED A LOT OF POINTS WITH THE IRAQIS BY HIS INITIAL AGREEMENT TO MAKE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO IRAQ AND HAD NOT LOST AS A RESULT OF THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE OFFER. (THE KING HAS OF COURSE A STRONG INTEREST IN MAKING THE BEST TO THE AMERICANS OF THIS UNHAPPY AFFAIR).

4. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION OVER DENIALS BY SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN AND TURKEY THAT THEY WERE SENDING MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN. THE KING SAID THAT THE TURKS HAD EARNED PARTICULARLY GOOD MARKS WITH THE IRAQIS BY THEIR RAPID REPAIR OF THE OIL PIPELINE. HOWEVER THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD ~~YB~~ CLAIMED

~~ND~~ THAT LIBYA AND SYRIA WERE SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT (NOTABLY STRELLA HAND-HELD ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES AND SAM 6S) AND SENDING MEN TO IRAN, AND THAT THE IRAQIS HAD CAPTURED EQUIPMENT WITH LIBYAN AND SYRIAN MARKINGS AND EVEN SOME PRISONERS FROM THESE COUNTRIES.

5. PRESIDENT SADDAM CONTINUED STRONGLY TO SUSPECT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN PART IN THE ATTACK ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR INSTALLATION, PARTLY BECAUSE THE ATTACK HAD BEEN SO ACCURATE. HE WAS ALSO DISTURBED BY PRESS REPORTS, APPARENTLY EMANATING FROM KUWAIT, THAT ISRAEL WAS PLANNING TO BLOCK THE SHIPMENT OF SUPPLIES DESTINED FOR IRAQ THROUGH AQABA.

6. KING HUSSEIN ASSURED AMBASSADOR VELIOTES THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM

6. KING HUSSEIN ASSURED AMBASSADOR VELIOTES THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD NOT REQUESTED ANY MILITARY HELP FROM JORDAN DURING HIS VISIT AND THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD CLAIMED HE HAD NO NEED FOR IT. HE TOLD THE KING THAT IRAQ HAD LOST 30 AIRCRAFT AND 50 TANKS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING: MOST OF THE TANKS HAD BEEN LOST IN KHORRANSHAHR AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE TO SEND TANKS INTO THE CITY. PARTLY FOR THIS REASON, THE IRAQIS HAD DECIDED TO STAY OUTSIDE THE CITIES OF AHWAZ AND DEZFUL AND AVOID BECOMING INVOLVED IN STREET FIGHTING. HE CLAIMED THAT THE OIL PIPE-LINES NEAR DEZFUL WHICH LINK TEHRAN AND THE SOUTHERN OIL FIELDS HAD BEEN CUT BY IRAQI TROOPS. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD SAID HE WAS WORRIED BY SEVERAL IRANIAN ATTEMPTS TO BOMB DAMS ON THE EUPHRATES WHICH, IF SUCCESSFUL, COULD RESULT IN MANY THOUSANDS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

7. MY US COLLEAGUE HAD PREVIOUSLY ON INSTRUCTIONS SPOKEN IN STRONG TERMS TO KING HUSSEIN ABOUT THE DANGERS THE AMERICANS SAW IN ANY EXTENSION OF THE FIGHTING AND ON THE NEED TO READ VERY CAREFULLY WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE FUTURE OF KHUZESTAN. THE KING CLAIMED TO VELIOTES THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED KHUZESTAN AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT SADDAM AND HAD ALSO COUNSELLED CAUTION. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD CLAIMED AT ONE POINT IN THEIR DISCUSSION THAT LARGE-SCALE EXECUTIONS HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE OF PRO-IRAQI ARABS IN KHUZESTAN. HE HAD GONE ON TO ASSERT THAT THE BEST OUTCOME OF THE WAR WOULD BE IF PRO-WESTERN MILITARY ELEMENTS WERE TO TAKE OVER IN IRAN AND CREATE A GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH IRAQ AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES COULD ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS, BUT HAD EXPRESSED FEARS THAT A MORE LIKELY OUTCOME WAS A COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN IRAN. HE HAD ENQUIRED OF THE KING WHETHER THERE WAS NOT SOME WAY IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE COULD "SIT AND THINK ABOUT THE PROBLEM WITH THEIR ARAB FRIENDS" WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KHUZESTAN'S FUTURE. PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD SAID HE DID NOT ENVISAGE IRAQ NEED BE A PARTICIPANT IN ANY SUCH TALKS SEMICLN KING HUSSEIN HAD ALSO FORMED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE IRAQIS WERE NOT YET READY FOR DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE US.

8. VELIOTES THINKS WE ARE LIKELY TO HEAR MORE FROM THE IRAQIS AND JORDANIANS ABOUT KHUZESTAN AND INTENDS URGING THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO INITIATE TALKS WITH US ON THIS SUBJECT, SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP OUR OWN THINKING FURTHER. HE TOLD ME THAAAAAAAAAAT THE AMERICANS HAD INCORPORATED IN THEIR INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIM TO USE WITH THE KING THE POINT I HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE ON A PERSONAL BASIS TO KING HUSSEIN ABOUT THE RISK OF A NEEDLESS PROLONGATION OF THE WAR IF THE IRANIANS GOT TO KNOW OF IRAQI INTENTIONS FOR AN INDEPENDENT OR AUTONOMOUS KHUZESTAN (SEE PARA 7 OF MY TELNO 363 OF 28 SEPTEMBER).

KHUZESTAN (SEE PARA 7 OF MY TELNO 353 OF 28 SEPTEMBER).

URWICK

BT

PARA 4 LINE 5

HOWEVER THE IRAQI PRESIDENT HAD CLAIMED THAT LIBYA AND SYRIA WERE

RGRTKS BWANA .. THASS ME ZNB .. EREONE MORE OOO THEN ME DCR AT  
T'END

CCN PARA 1 LINE 14

WORTH OF SPARES BUT THAT SINCE THEN ALL SUCH TRANSACTIONS HAD  
OF COURSE BEEN FROZEN.

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FM FCO 061635 OCT 1980

TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1598 OF 6 OCTOBER

INFO PARIS BONN JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT BAGHDAD ABU DHABI

MOSCOW BAHRAIN MUSCAT AMMAN DOHA TEL AVIV

YOUR TELNO 4202: IRAQ/IRAN - US INTENTIONS

1. THE FORECAST IN PARA 1(B)(I) OF YOUR TUR THAT THE AMERICANS WILL WISH TO INVOLVE WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND THE UK, IN TALKS ON NAVAL COOPERATION, AND THAT THEY MAY SUGGEST JOINT EXPLORATORY APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES, HAS BEEN FULFILLED. THE US EMBASSY HERE HAVE DELIVERED 2 PAPERS (TEXT BY BAG). THE PAPERS ASK WHETHER WE WOULD AGREE THAT THE GULF STATES SHOULD BE URGENTLY CONSULTED ABOUT 'A CO-ORDINATED NAVAL EFFORT IN THE GULF AND STRAITS AREA, WITH ACTIVE MILITARY PARTICIPATION BY OTHER CONCERNED STATES AND STATES IN THE GULF, TO ASSURE THE PROTECTION OF OUR MUTUAL INTEREST IN PROTECTION OF NAVIGATION'. THIS WOULD INVOLVE JOINT PATROLLING WITH LOCAL NAVIES AND MORE FACILITIES FOR THE US IN BAHRAIN AND OMAN. A SIMILAR APPROACH HAS BEEN MAD IN PARIS.
2. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU (NOT TO ALL)FCO TELNO 392 TO PARIS OUTLINING OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION. WE BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE TO BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GULF STATES TO ACCEPT AND A FORTIORI TO COOPERATE IN SUCH A FORCE. A BETTER COURSE WOULD BE TO CARRY ON OUR PRESENT CONTACTS WITH THEM AND TO TRY IN THE COURSE OF THESE TO BRING OUT THE NEED FOR SUCH A FORCE, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL THEMSELVES ASK FOR PROTECTION OF THIS SORT, IF THE THREAT DEVELOPS. AN EXCEPTION TO THIS COULD BE OMAN, WHERE THE PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO BE MORE WARMLY RECEIVED AND WHOSE ACTIVE COOPERATION IS MORE NECESSARY.
3. WHILE WE DO SHARE THE AMERICAN'S SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE

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*(NEED)*

# SECRET

NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF A TECHNICAL NATURE, WE DOUBT IF THERE IS SUCH URGENCY OVER THE APPROACHES. IN PARTICULAR WE QUESTION THEIR PERCEPTION, (PARA 1A OF YOUR TUR) THAT THEY ARE NOW 'NEEDED' IN THE GULF. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE (YOUR TUR NO 4200) THAT EVEN THE INVITATION TO SEND AWACS WAS CONTRIVED AND WE NOTED THE SAUDI HESITATIONS OVER PUBLICITY.

4. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND ON OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. WE SHALL ALSO BE CONSIDERING WHETHER AND IF SO WHEN ANYTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO THE RUSSIANS.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ALL THESE CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

MED	MAED
NENAD	TRED
NAD	ERD
UND	ECON D
EESD	CONS D
ECD	CONS EM UNIT
WED	CABINET OFFICE
ES4SD	

ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

2  
SECRET

Michael ->

① what are the terms of the 1971 Anglo-Iranian def. agreement?

② the terms of the 1971 Anglo-Iranian def. agreement. (written in red)

cc: PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/Mr Hunt  
PS/PVS  
Mr Bullard  
Sir J Graham  
Sir A Acland

SECRET - BURNING BUSH

NOT FOR ENTRY

You may like to glance through this record of Monday's discussion in Paris. It does not give any great impression of urgency & the French are still keeping their distance. There

will be another meeting in three weeks time.

S/S

Print 8/x

Lord Bridges  
Mr I C Moberly  
Mr P H Moberly  
Mr Gillmore,  
Defence Dept.  
Mr Heap, ESSD  
Mr Fall, EESD

Mr R Wade-Gery,  
Cabinet Office  
Personal to HM Ambrs. at  
Washington  
Paris  
Bonn  
UKDEL NATO

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS,  
PARIS, 6 OCTOBER

IRAQ/IRAN

General Assessment

1. There was a long and generally very satisfactory discussion. Everyone agreed with Mr Vest's prognosis of a "prolonged, low-intensity struggle", i.e. stalemate caused by Iraq's inability to advance much further and Iran's to eject the Iraqi invaders. A widening of the conflict was not thought likely in the immediate future, although a rash move by either side, especially perhaps Iran, could not be ruled out. The Americans thought that Iran's naval and air activity could probably continue for some time and that the "psychological fervour" of the revolution could well carry Iran through the difficult period ahead, even if, for example, kerosene for cooking ceased to be available. Iraq, on the other hand, was better placed to obtain supplies, for instance from Jordan.
2. It was generally felt that the Arabs did not want either Iraq or Iran to emerge from the war as clear victor and thus as top dog in the area. This was also agreed to be the Western interest.
3. During this discussion, the French displayed a strong tendency to see through Iraqi eyes. They thought, for instance, that Iraq had got Khuzestan. They played down the danger of escalation and only after some discussion subscribed to the point (recorded above) that rash acts were possible. They did, however, say that the Iraqi Government, despite its apparent strength, could collapse suddenly if there was a major external shock.
4. The French were disposed to stress the limited nature of Iraq's political objectives. But Mr Bullard pointed out that they were significant in relation to the history of the area. I think everyone accepted Mr Bullard's view that a settlement which was humiliating to Iran, and which was brought about when Iran is unusually weak, would be a recipe for more trouble in the future. The French thought that the inclusion in Iraq's objectives of the return of the Islands to Arab rule had been designed to gain Arab support; this point was possibly less central in Iraqi minds than the other objectives.

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Soviet attitude

5. On the Soviet attitude, I think everyone agreed with our view that the Russians were being even-handed because they were uncertain about what would happen and about where Soviet interests would lie. They were keeping all their options open. These included military moves; a diplomatic initiative on the lines of Tashkent; or a move to make gains if Iran broke up. The Americans added that another Soviet aim was probably to use the crisis to spread the impression that the Americans would not stand by their friends in the region; hence the Soviet propaganda about non-interference. The French mentioned the possibility that the Russians in due course might seek a division of influence with the Americans in the general area of the Near East (this fits with the general French tendency to see the area from the Gulf to Afghanistan as a single chess board; another French remark was that Iraq, with its likely new influence, might want to make friends with Afghanistan).

6. We were given an account of an "oral statement" made by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington to Mr Muskie on 4 October. Dobrynin said that it was important that the US and the Soviet Union should have a precise and clear view of each other's positions about Iran/Iraq. The Soviet position remained that neither large powers nor small should interfere. The Soviet Union would adhere to this principle on the understanding that the United States and others also did so. There would be all sorts of consequences if anyone interfered militarily. Dobrynin asked some questions, but evidently not in a hectoring way, about the AWACS in Saudi Arabia.

7. The French said that, if the Russians went for a peaceful settlement between Iran and Iraq, this would show that the invasion of Afghanistan had not been part of a major offensive towards warm waters. More convincingly, M. Robin said that, while the movements of Western ships to the general area of the crisis and the provision of AWACS to Saudi Arabia were good moves, the West should bear in mind that the Russians could see our purpose as being to take advantage of the Iran/Iraq situation to tighten a Western grip on the area.

Diplomatic action

8. It was generally agreed that there was little that the Western countries could immediately do to promote a settlement. It was better to encourage Islamic mediation than non-aligned. We should keep on talking to Iraq's lesser neighbours, if only to counter-balance wilder influences. A return to the Security Council was not desirable now but might be necessary in due course. The elements of a settlement were not yet visible.

/ Arms sales

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Arms sales

9. On Western arms sales to the belligerents, Mr Bullard said that the United Kingdom had received no request. Because of sanctions, we would not supply arms to Iran. If Iraq sought British arms, we would probably decline, citing the Security Council Resolution. Did the other three have the same policy? The American and German replies were unequivocally that arms would not be supplied. M. Robin mentioned that France would not supply arms to Iran but did not reply specifically on Iraq.

Naval contingencies

10. Mr Vest explained the "preliminary concept" for coordinated naval activity in the Gulf which was put to us by the US Embassy in two communications during the weekend. He stressed that the various naval contingents would remain under national command. The purpose would be to deter interference with shipping, i.e. avoid the use of force. Mr Bartholomew was coordinating this in the State Department and would be glad to answer any questions from Ambassadors there. Mr Vest also explained the US reasons for wanting to approach Gulf States about this matter without delay. Mr Bullard gave preliminary comments in accordance with FCO telegram No 392 to Paris. The French agreed that it was premature to approach the Gulf States. The Germans displayed some nervousness about action which might look like "imperialism" or smack too much of superpower interference. Messrs Vest and Blackwill indicated that they too agreed personally with Mr Bullard; they said that there was, however, a strong head of steam in Washington behind the idea of talking immediately to the Gulf States about naval matters. They therefore suggested that the British idea of describing our concern to the Gulf States, in the hope that they would themselves suggest contingency discussions, should be advocated by the British, French and German Ambassadors in Washington. (Instructions are in hand.)

11. In the French view, the preparatory measures had been taken by moving ships to the area. This also provided an element of deterrence. Naval talks were the place to consider what action to take if shipping was harrassed or the Straits were blocked. France preferred to talk bilaterally to the US Navy, while the British did the same, although trilateral talks were not ruled out at some stage. (M. Robin later said that he had made this point on instructions, although in his own view trilateral talks would make practical sense.) Mr Bullard made clear our preference for trilateral talks. The Americans said that they would accept bilateral or trilateral ones. They should anyway be under close political direction. The Germans are being kept informed about American thinking on naval matters. The Americans have also put their ideas for substantive discussion to New Zealand and for information to Italy and Australia.

/12. Although

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12. Although this was not explicitly agreed, I think the result of this discussion is that the naval talks should now look at the US "preliminary concept" in terms of military feasibility, and report back to Political Directors.
13. Messrs Vest and Blackwill said "Yes" in unison to Mr Bullard's question whether there was a US decision to take, if the Straits were closed for whatever reason, whatever action might be necessary to reopen the Gulf. The impression given by this exchange was, however, that the US Government was working on the firm assumption that the necessary action would be taken rather than that an explicit decision to this effect had been reached.
14. The Germans suggested that thought should be given to "political orchestration" before any naval action in the Straits. Prior approaches might be made to a number of countries, in the hope inter alia of eliciting non-aligned statements in favour of the principle of freedom of navigation. Moves in the UN might be for consideration. It was agreed that this aspect should be discussed at the next Quadripartite meeting of Political Directors on 27 October.

Oil

15. There was little discussion of oil supplies or marine insurance. The French mentioned interestingly that the Iraqi Government had said that it would ensure that France did not run short of oil. The implication seemed to be that Iraq would persuade its friends to help France if necessary. The Americans summarised an intelligence assessment of the damage to oil facilities in Iran and Iraq. It was due to be conveyed in full to HMG through other channels on 6 October. They said that military damage had been to storage areas and pipelines, not processing plant. It would probably be possible, in technical terms, to restore the export capacity of Iran and Iraq quite quickly after hostilities ended.

Some lesser points

16. a) The Americans assessed the Iraqi Army to be within 10 kilometres of the Northern pipeline from Deziul and in a position to cut it when they wanted (this may not accord with the views of MOD as of the weekend).
- b) The French, while being sure that Iraq would not accept the internationalisation of the Shatt, wondered whether any international arrangements about navigation might be for consideration.
- c) The Americans mentioned the low level surveillance system which today's press reports as being installed in Saudi Arabia to complement AWACS.

/ d) Mr Vest

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- d) Mr Vest asked whether the Anglo-UAE Defence Agreement of 1971 might be relevant to the present situation. Mr Bullard deflected the question.
- e) The Germans suggested that we should study the legal status of the Straits of Hormuz, in case we needed legal arguments to defend any naval action there in due course. Others agreed and this will no doubt come up at the next meeting on 27 October.
- f) The Americans said that they would turn down any proposal by the Soviet Union that it should join in efforts to prevent the blocking of the Gulf. They would argue that the US had a far greater interest than the Soviet Union and that a superpower condominium was undesirable. The French agreed.
- g) The French did not mention their earlier idea of trying to bargain with the Arabs about the fate of the Gulf islands.

C L G Mallaby

C L G Mallaby  
Planning Staff  
W11 233-4333

7 October 1980

SECRET - BURNING BUSH

*Iraq*

PS  
 PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
 PS/MR HURD  
 PS/FUS  
 SIR E YOUDE  
 SIR J GRAHAM  
 MR J C MOBERLY  
 MR BRAITHWAITE  
 HD/MED  
 HD/MENAD  
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 ED/CONS D  
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 647 OF 6 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON AND JEDDA - ROUTINE TEL AVIV,

UKMIS NEW YORK AND AMMAN

INFO SAVING KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS

**IRAN/IRAQ WAR**

1. WHEN I ACCOMPANIED MR DAVID STEEL AND A GROUP OF LIBERALS TO CALL ON PRESIDENT SADAT ON 4 OCTOBER, SADAT WAS ASKED ABOUT THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. HE SAID HE REMAINED ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL AND CONDEMNED BOTH SIDES. THEY WERE IRRESPONSIBLE AND WOULD BOTH SUFFER. IT LOOKED AS IF IRAQ WAS IN FOR TROUBLE HAVING UNDER-ESTIMATED THE CAPACITY OF THE IRANIAN AIRFORCE. SYRIA, LIBYA AND ALGERIA WERE OPPOSING IRAQ. NOW IRAN WAS WRONGLY THREATENING THE SMALLER GULF STATES. THESE NO LONGER HAD CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES.

2. THE SITUATION PRESENTED GREAT DANGERS, THEREFORE, AND THE WEST

2. THE SITUATION PRESENTED GREAT DANGERS, THEREFORE, AND THE WEST SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE CONFLAGRATION DID NOT SPREAD. HE WOULD REVEAL A SECRET WHICH HE HAD NOT REVEALED PUBLICLY BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO CAUSE TROUBLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA, BUT HE KNEW THAT WHEN SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD VISITED SAUDI ARABIA RECENTLY HE HAD WARNED THE SAUDIS OF HIS INTENTIONS AND THEY HAD PASSED THIS TO THE AMERICANS. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD DONE NOTHING. IN THIS SITUATION THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE MORE RESOLUTE. HE HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF VEHEMENTLY TO THIS EFFECT IN AN INTERVIEW AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAD COMPLAINED TO HIM, JUST NOW, THAT THIS WAS REFLECTING BADLY ON HIM (CARTER). CARTER WAS A GOOD FRIEND, THOUGH HESITANT, AND SADAT DIDN'T WANT TO CAUSE HIM TROUBLE, BUT THE US HAD A RESPONSIBILITY. WESTERN EUROPE, WHICH WOULD BE MUCH MORE AFFECTED THAN THE US BY ANY INTERRUPTION IN OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE GULF, SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE US. HE DIDN'T WANT NATO TANKS TO STAND LIKE SCARECROWS IN THE FIELDS OR WESTERN CIVILISATION, WITH WHICH EGYPT WAS BOUND UP, TO BE PUT AT RISK.

3. HE HAD BEEN ANNOYED TOO AT NOT BEING INFORMED THAT THE US ALREADY HAD A NAVAL FORCE INSIDE THE GULF. THIS WOULD BE USED TO LIMIT THE WAR.

4. NOW THAT THE SHAH HAD DISAPPEARED EGYPT WAS THE ONLY STABILISING FORCE IN THE AREA, WITH CORRESPONDING RESPONSIBILITIES. THIS WAS WHY, PRESIDENT SADAT SAID, HE HAD OFFERED FACILITIES TO THE UNITED STATES IN EGYPT. NOT BASES; HE NEEDED ARMS BUT NO MEN. HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO MAKE THESE FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE ALSO IN ORDER TO PRESERVE STABILITY IN THE GULF.

FCO PASS SAVING KHARTOUM, TRIPOLI AND DAMASCUS.

C PARA 2 LINE 10 WA PRESIDENT CARTER

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Read in full

FM WASHINGTON 041825Z OCT 80  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4202 OF 4 OCTOBER  
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS PRIORITY BONN JEDDA UKMIS NEW YORK KUWAIT  
BAGHDAD ABU DHABI MOSCOW BAHRAIN MUSCAT AMMAN DOHA TEL AVIV

**IRAQ/IRAN: US INTENTIONS**

1. YOU KNOW FROM LAST WEEKEND HOW DIFFICULT IT IS TO PERCEIVE ANY PATTERN OF US POLICY ON THE IRAQ/IRAN CRISIS; BUT CERTAIN STRANDS SEEM TO BE EMERGING THAT I SHALL TRY TO DESCRIBE THOUGH, BEING AS THEY ARE WITHOUT DESIGN OR INTENT, TOO MUCH SHAPE SHOULD NOT BE ATTACHED TO THEM.

(A) SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE HAD DIFFICULTIES IN GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY COMMITMENT TO DEFEND THE GULF FROM EXTERNAL ATTACK, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME OF THE COUNTRIES TO BECOME VISIBLY INVOLVED, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THE US ARE UNPOPULAR WITH MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD OVER PALESTINE AND LOATHED IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. BUT THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT AND THE NEW THREAT TO THE GULF HAVE SUDDENLY CHANGED THE SCENE. THANKS TO THE FEAR OF AN ATTACK FROM IRAN THAT MIGHT FLOW FROM IRAQI ACTION, THE USA ARE NOW WANTED, AND THERE IS LESS INHIBITION ON THE PART OF THE GULF STATES IN EXPRESSING THEIR WISHES. THE USA HAS BEEN VOUCHSAFED THE LEVERAGE THAT FOR SO LONG HAS ELUDED THEM. THE PRESIDENT'S SECURITY COMMITMENT RELATED TO AN EXTERNAL THREAT; NO MATTER IF IT IS AN INTERNAL THREAT THAT OFFERS AMERICA AN ENTRY INTO THE AREA NOT JUST WITH LOCAL ACQUIESCENCE BUT BY LOCAL INVITATION.

BY CONTRAST, THE SOVIET UNION, UNTIL RECENTLY THE TERTIUS GAUDENS OF ANY TROUBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOW LOOK UNCOMFORTABLE. THEY CANNOT WANT THE WAR EITHER TO CONTINUE OR TO SPREAD; IT IS AWKWARD FOR THEM IF THEIR ARMS-CLIENT, IRAQ, IS IN DIFFICULTY; NOR CAN IT HELP THEM IN IRAN THAT IRAQ IS ATTACKING THE IRANIANS WITH SOVIET ARMS; IT DOES NOT SUIT THEM AT ALL THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE INVITED IN TO PLAY A HAND IN THE GULF (HENCE THE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET TUNE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING).

(B) FOR THE USA, THE CONTINUED INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA IS PARAMOUNT. THE USA CANNOT MISS THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET THE SAUDIS WISH FOR HELP; NOR MUST THEY DO ANYTHING TO LET THE SAUDIS DOUBT THE RELIABILITY OF AN AMERICAN LINK. IN PRACTICE, IMMEDIATE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT CAN TAKE TWO FORMS:

/(1)

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(I) NAVAL COOPERATION

DISCUSSIONS ARE TAKING PLACE WITH THE SAUDIS ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS WESTERN NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ AND THE GULF. THESE ALSO EMBRACE THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER GULF STATES. THE USA WILL ALSO WISH TO INVOLVE WESTERN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND THE UK, AND THEY MAY WISH THEM TO JOIN IN EXPLORATORY APPROACHES TO THE GULF STATES.

(II) AWACS/HAWKS

AN AMERICAN TECHNICAL TEAM IS NOW IN SAUDI ARABIA DISCUSSING HOW BEST TO LINK UP THE AWACS WITH SAUDI AIR DEFENCES, NOTABLY THEIR HAWK MISSILES. INTEREST IN AWACS INFORMATION IS EXPECTED FROM THE OTHER GULF STATES. THIS INTEREST MAY REACH THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE SAUDIS, WHO HAVE REACTED POSITIVELY TO THE IDEA OF SHARING THE AWACS INFORMATION. MEANWHILE, THERE IS AN AMERICAN MILITARY SURVEY TEAM IN BAHRAIN WHO WILL EXPLORE WITH THE BAHRAINIS THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING AN AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM LINKED WITH THE AWACS. OTHER GULF STATES MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING THEIR AIR DEFENCES.

(C) WHAT IS ALSO AT ISSUE IS THE LONGER TERM READINESS OF THE USA TO BECOME INVOLVED, NOT JUST IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND WARNING, BUT IN OPERATIONS IN DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA OR THE GULF STATES IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK (EG FROM IRAN). THIS IS A DELICATE MATTER AND THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION BY THE AMERICANS OF ANY SUCH READINESS WOULD REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL HANDLING ON THEIR PART. THE PRESENT POSITION IS HELD BY MEANS OF THE CURRENT TALKS ON NAVAL AND AWACS COOPERATION. IT MAY BE THAT THE SAUDIS DO NOT WANT ANYTHING GOING FURTHER AT THE MOMENT. THERE ARE OF COURSE CONGRESSIONAL ASPECTS (WAR POWERS ACT) BUT MY OWN GUESS IS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE READY TO BECOME INVOLVED IN DEFENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDED THERE WAS A CLEAR INVITATION: INDEED I THINK THAT THIS IS JUST THE OPENING THEY MAY BE LOOKING FOR.

(D) THE US GOVERNMENT DO NOT SEE ANY IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING CLOSE TO IRAQ. THEY ARE TEMPTED BY THE IDEA THAT IF THINGS GO BADLY FOR IRAQ IN THE WAR AND IF THE SOVIETS ARE NOT THOUGHT TO HAVE GIVEN BAGHDAD THE FULL SUPPORT THEY EXPECTED, THE LATTER MAY BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE SOVIET ALLIANCE. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE WRITTEN OFF IRAN AND HAVE DECIDED TO PUT THEIR SHIRT ON IRAQ.

/(E) THE

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(E) THE AMERICANS DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, FAVOUR THE DISMEMBERMENT OR DISINTEGRATION OF IRAN: THE SOVIETS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO MOVE IN: THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE EASED: THE IRAQIS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO CLING ON TO THE OIL OF KHUZESTAN AND EXPLOIT THIS FOR THEIR USE: A DANGEROUS VACUUM WOULD BE CREATED: ANY INCREASE IN IRAQI POWER OR INFLUENCE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS. IT IS NOT REALISTIC, THE AMERICANS REALISE, TO HOPE THAT THE IRANIANS WILL, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, SEE THEIR INTEREST AS LYING IN CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE USA: NEVERTHELESS, THE AMERICANS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE IRANIANS WILL NOT PERCEIVE THE DANGERS OF COMPLETE ISOLATION, NOT TO MENTION THEIR DEPENDENCE UPON AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. THEY HAVE SENT MESSAGES TO IRAN EXPLAINING THE AWACS EXERCISE: THEY WANT TO GET IT ACROSS TO THE IRANIANS THAT THEY ARE NOT IN LEAGUE WITH THE IRAQIS AND THAT US POLICY IS TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF IRAN.

(F) LOOKING A LITTLE FURTHER AHEAD, THE US/ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE EXISTENCE OF US DEFENCE FACILITIES IN EGYPT AND OMAN AND PERHAPS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES MAY ALREADY BE WORRIED BY THIS AS THEY ARE THE US CANCELLATION OF STRATEGIC TALKS AND NAVAL MANOEUVRES.

2. AS I HAVE SUGGESTED, IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO THINK THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE FORMULATED CLEAR-CUT POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO RECENT EVENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE SCENE HAS SHIFTED AND THERE DOES SEEM TO BE SCOPE FOR US MOVEMENT BEYOND THE CONFINES OF RECENT YEARS: AND A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES AT STAKE, OF THE MEANS OF CONSULTATION ABOUT POLICIES, AND INDEED OF WHAT THOSE POLICIES SHOULD BE, SHOULD BE AMONG THE FIRST PRIORITIES FOR ALL OF US AFTER THE NOVEMBER ELECTION.

3. PARIS, PLEASE SHOW BULLARD.

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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IRAQ/IRAN

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FM MUSCAT 040938Z OCT 87

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 283 OF 4 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, JEDDA,  
BAGHDAD, AMMAN, ROUTINE BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, DOHA

WASHINGTON TELNO 41644 IRAQ/IRAN/OMAN

1. I COMPARED NOTES WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THIS MORNING. WE AGREED LARGELY ON HOW AND WHY THE PROPOSED IRAQI OPERATION HAD BEEN PUT ON AND THEN CALLED OFF, THOUGH I DID NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL MY CONVERSATION WITH BENNETT (PARA 7 AND 8 OF MY TELNO 279). WILEY SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW THE SULTAN IN SALALAH ON 1 OCTOBER TO DELIVER THE ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE SULTAN HAD TAKEN THE LINE THAT HE HAD KNOWN ALL ALONG THAT THE TIME LIMIT HE HAD PUT ON THE IRAQI OPERATION (TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE FORMAL JAQI REQUEST ON 26 SEPTEMBER) WOULD RENDER ITS IMPLEMENTATION IMPOSSIBLE (IE PRECISELY THE INTERPRETATION ZAWI HAD GIVEN ME ON THE SAME DAY BUT ALLEGEDLY AS HIS OWN PERSONAL THOUGHT). NEVERTHELESS THE SULTAN HAD GIVEN WILEY AN ASSURANCE THAT THE EPISODE WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. ZAWAWI HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO EMPHASISE THAT AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS HAD NOT BEEN A DECISIVE FACTOR IN CALLING OFF THE OPERATION.

3. GENERAL JONES HAD COME AND GONE. HE DID NOT CALL ON THE SULTAN, BUT WILEY WAS CONFIDENT THAT HIS TALKS WITH ZAWAWI AND GHAZALI, TOGETHER WITH HIS VISITS TO MASIRAH AND TO THE US FLEET IN THE AREA, HAD GIVEN HIM A USEFUL FEEL FOR THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE AMERICANS ARE OPERATING HERE.

4. AS REGARDS THE ACCESS AGREEMENT ASPECT (PARA 2 OF TUR) WILEY SAID THAT THE IRAQI EPISODE HAD RAISED IN AN ACUTE FORM THE DELICATE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE APPLICATION OF THE VERY GENERAL ASSURANCES GIVEN IN THE PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENTIAL LETTER<sup>R</sup> TO QABOOS (DETAILS OF WHICH WILEY HAS NEVER REVEALED TO ME). HE WAS CERTAIN IN HIS OWN MIND THAT THE ASSURANCES DID NOT EXTEND TO ATTACKS PROVOKED BY THE OMANIS THEMSELVES, BUT FURTHER ELUCIDATION WOULD NO DOUBT BE REQUIRED.

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5. WHAT WAS EXERCISING WILEY ABOVE ALL ELSE WAS THE LEAKS REPORTED TODAY FROM BOTH WASHINGTON AND LONDON. HE WAS CLEAR (AND DEPRESSED) THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DELIBERATE LEAK IN WASHINGTON ABOUT AMERICAN ACTIVITY IN CONTAINING THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF AREA. WHILE THE LEAK WAS UNDERSTANDABLE IN ELECTORAL TERMS IT WAS BOUND TO UNDERMINE OMANI CONFIDENCE AND MAKE THEM EVEN LESS PREPARED TO CONSULT BEFORE EMBARKING ON SUCH VENTURES AS THE IRAQI OPERATION. WILEY ALSO REFERRED TO ALLEGED LEAKS IN LONDON TO THE EFFECT THAT BRITAIN HAD MODERATED US REACTIONS TO THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT (PERHAPS A GARBLED ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW REPORTED IN VERBATIM 119/80). HE EXPECTED BOTH OF US TO BE TAKEN TO TASK BY THE OMANIS. I HAVE HAD NO SUCH INDICATIONS SO FAR, ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT THE OMANIS WERE ANGERED BY PHILIP WHITFIELD'S REPORT ABOUT AN IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE HERE (PARA 6 OF MY TELNO 279).

LUCAS

## IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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FM WASHINGTON 040130Z OCT  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4198 OF 3 OCT 80

FOR NEWS DEPT.

YOUR TEL NO 1591 : IRAN/IRAQ : PRESS.

1. FOLLOWING THE WALL STREET JOURNAL STORY (MY TEL NO 4186),  
BRZEZINSKI EVIDENTLY WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH HENRY BRANDON  
(AND 3 OR 4 OTHERS) IN SOME DETAIL : BRANDON ASKED ME WHETHER  
THERE HAD BEEN A DIVISION OF LABOUR WHEREBY WE WORKED ON THE  
OMANIS AND THE AMERICANS ON THE SAUDIS (I DENIED THIS).  
AS AGREED WITH THE PRIVATE SECRETARY. I CONFIRMED TO HIM  
UNATTRIBUTABLY THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS HAD WORKED TO PREVENT  
THE WAR SPREADING TO THE LOWER GULF. WE CAN EXPECT THE STORY TO  
BREAK OUT IN FAIRLY FULL AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL TERMS.

2. TRANSCRIPT OF SOFS'S BBC INTERVIEW NOW AVAILABLE HERE.

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD  
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IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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*Desk by 021430<sup>2</sup>*  
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PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHWAITE  
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*Read in full.*

GR 1200

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DESKBY 021430Z FCO, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FM MUSCAT 020703Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 2 OCTOBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY JEDDA,  
BAGHDAD, AMMAN, MODUK, ROUTINE BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI,  
DUBAI, DOHA

MR TUNNELL'S TELNO 276 (NOT TO AMMAN): IRAN/IRAQ: OMANI INVOLVEMENT

1. FOLLOWING MY RETURN FROM LEAVE, I SAW IN SUCCESSION ON 1 OCTOBER QAIS ZAWAWI (AT MY REQUEST) AND AVM BENNETT (AT HIS).
2. ZAWAWI CONFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI OPERATION WAS OFF. IT HAD BEEN VIABLE ONLY BETWEEN 26 AND 28 SEPTEMBER (AND PERHAPS THE SULTAN HAD REALISED ALL ALONG THAT HIS CHEQUE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE CASHED). THE ONLY REMAINING IRAQI AIRCRAFT ON OMANI SOIL (THE TWO HELICOPTERS) WOULD BE LEAVING WITHIN 24 TO 48 HOURS AND THE DANGER OF IRANIAN RETALIATION HAD (SIC) THEREFORE BEEN AVERTED. (ACCORDING TO BENNETT, THE TWO AIRCRAFT ARE ONLY AWAITING "CLEARANCE" FOR THEIR RETURN JOURNEY).

3. I SAID THAT YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SULTAN WHICH I HAD BROUGHT BACK WITH ME (AND WHICH ZAWAWI UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY

ONLY AWAITING "CLEARANCE" FOR THEIR RETURN JOURNEY).

3. I SAID THAT YOUR PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SULTAN WHICH I HAD BROUGHT BACK WITH ME (AND WHICH ZAWAWI UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY TO HM IN SALALAH) HAD OF COURSE BEEN WRITTEN IN DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. NEVERTHELESS I THOUGHT THAT ITS THEME - YOUR CONCERN TO AVOID WIDENING THE CONFLICT, TOGETHER WITH BRITAIN'S CONTINUING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THE SULTAN - REMAINED RELEVANT.

4. HAVING READ THE MESSAGE, ZAWAWI ENQUIRED ARCHLY WHETHER WE WOULD LIKE IT PUBLICISED. I REPLIED WITH AN EMPHATIC NEGATIVE, STRESSING THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO EMBARRASS THE OMANIS NOR TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION IN BAGHDAD THAT WE WERE TRYING TO FRUSTRATE ARAB CAUSES. ZAWAWI THOUGHT THAT A BONUS OF THE EPISODE HAD BEEN THAT THE IRAQIS (WHO HAD NATURALLY BELIEVED THAT THE BRITISH, THROUGH THEIR LSP IN THE OMANI FORCES, WOULD BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR AGAINST THE PROPOSED OPERATION) HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY OMAN'S INDEPENDENCE AS WELL AS BY HER WILLINGNESS TO HELP (CF. PARA 2 OF TUR). THE OMANIS MIGHT WELL NEED THIS CREDIT IN BAGHDAD LATER.

5. I SAID THAT SO FAR AS LSP WERE CONCERNED IT HAD BEEN MY INTENTION (ON INSTRUCTIONS), AFTER CONSULTATION WITH HIM, TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SERVICE COMMANDERS THAT IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES INVOLVING THE SULTANATE THEY WERE TO PLAY THEIR FULL PART IN DEFENDING OMANI SOIL. ZAWAWI SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT OF THIS NOR ANY OBJECTION TO MY SPEAKING TO THE SERVICE COMMANDERS IN THIS SENSE.

6. IN TRYING TO PUT AS GOOD A FACE AS POSSIBLE ON THE SULTAN'S DECISION TO ACCEDE TO THE IRAQI REQUEST FOR FACILITIES, ZAWAWI INADVERTENTLY REVEALED THAT HE HAD KNOWN OF THE DECISION SOME 12 HOURS IN ADVANCE (PRESUMABLY AFTER THE JORDANIAN APPROACH - SEE PARA 7 BELOW) AND ADMITTE ITHAT HE MUST TAKE HIS SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOT HAVING CONTESTED IT. IN CLAIMING THAT THE SULTANATE HAD BEEN IN GOOD COMPANY (THOUGH HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN POOR CONSOLATION) HE PRESSED ME FOR INFORMATION ON THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO THE CONFLICT. I DREW ON YOUR TELNO 202 TO ABU DHABI AND AMMAN TELNO 368 TO YOU, AS WELL AS OTHER RECENT REPORTS, IN EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT BY AND LARGE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN VERY CIRCUMSPECT. ZAWAWI SAID THAT THE OMANIS HAD MADE A STATEMENT OF THEIR NEUTRALITY (THIS WAS REPORTED ON THE LOCAL RADIO ON 30 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH A DENIAL OF ANY IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SULTANATE WHICH WAS APPARENTLY IN

BEEN VERY CIRCUMSPECT. ZAWAMI SAID THAT THE OMANIS HAD MADE A STATEMENT OF THEIR NEUTRALITY (THIS WAS REPORTED ON THE LOCAL RADIO ON 30 SEPTEMBER, TOGETHER WITH A DENIAL OF ANY IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SULTANATE WHICH WAS APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO AN ENQUIRY FROM THE BBC, BUT NEITHER MFA NOR MINISTRY OF INFORMATION CAN PRODUCE A TEXT). HE ALSO REFERRED TO A BBC REPORT THAT KING KHALID HAD MADE AN UNCOMPROMISINGLY PRO-IRAQ STATEMENT (WHICH THE SAUDI AMBASSADOR HAD DENIED TO HIM) AND TO CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS MADE ON QATAR'S BEHALF BY SHAIKH SUHAIM (PRO-IRAQ) AND ISSA KAWARI (NEUTRAL), THOUGH ZAWAMI AGREED WITH ME THAT THE FORMER WAS HARDLY TO BE TAKEN AS REPRESENTING THE EMIR.

7. THE OBJECT OF COMMANDER SULTAN OF OMAN'S AIR FORCE IN SEEING ME WAS CLEARLY TO PUT THE BEST POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTION ON HIS OWN ROLE IN THE AFFAIR (BUT TO BE FAIR GENERAL WATTS, WHO HOLDS NO PARTICULAR BRIEF FOR BENNETT, TOLD ME HE THOUGHT CSOAF HAD DONE A GOOD JOB ON THIS OCCASION). HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED ON 24 SEPTEMBER TO SEE THE SULTAN IN SALALAH THE NEXT DAY. LEAVING SALALAH ON 25 SEPTEMBER WAS AHMAD LOZI, A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF KING HUSSAIN. QABOOS TOLD BENNETT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM HUSSAIN ASKING HIM TO ACCEDE TO THE IRAQI REQUEST. BENNETT CLAIMS TO HAVE COUNSELLED CAUTION, TO HAVE REALISED AT AN EARLY STAGE THAT THIS WOULD BE UNAVAILING AND THEREFORE TO HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THE IRAQI PLAN WHILE TAKING CARE TO POINT OUT THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN ITS WAY. THE IRAQI EMISSARIES HAD ARRIVED IN SALALAH ON 26 SEPTEMBER, 12 HOURS AFTER LOZI'S DEPARTURE, WHEN QABOOS TOLD THEM OF HIS POSITIVE DECISION. THEREAFTER BENNETT HAD TAKEN THEM ROUND THE COURSE (EG TO MUSANDAM) AS A RESULT OF WHICH THEY HAD REACHED THE INDEPENDENT CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPOSED OPERATION WAS A NON-STARTER. BENNETT HAD RETURNED TO SALALAH ON 28 SEPTEMBER TO TELL THE SULTAN THIS AND TO SEEK PERMISSION TO "STAND DOWN". QABOOS HAD AGREED APPARENTLY WITHOUT DEMUR, WHILE EXPRESSING SOME CONCERN ABOUT KING HUSSAIN'S REACTION. ZAWAMI WAS THEREUPON SENT POST-HASTE TO JORDAN TO EXPLAIN MATTERS (AN ITEM WHICH HE DID NOT REVEAL TO ME).

8. I ASKED BENNETT

A) WHY HE HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO REPORT THE SULTAN'S DECISION TO HMG AT ONCE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF HIS OPPOSITION TO IT, DELICATE THOUGH I REALISED HIS POSITION WOULD BE. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL GUIDELINES GIVEN HIM BY CGS, AND THAT AS EVENTS HAD DEVELOPED IT HAD NOT PROVED NECESSARY (CP. GENERAL THE O'MORCHOE'S ACTION WITH MY

A) WHY HE HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO REPORT THE SULTAN'S DECISION TO HMG AT ONCE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF HIS OPPOSITION TO IT, DELICATE THOUGH I REALISED HIS POSITION WOULD BE. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL GUIDELINES GIVEN HIM BY CGS, AND THAT AS EVENTS HAD DEVELOPED IT HAD NOT PROVED NECESSARY (CP. GENERAL THE O'MORCHOE'S ACTION WITH MY PREDECESSOR OVER THE UAE BORDER PROBLEM TWO YEARS AGO)  
SEMI COLON

B) WHETHER THE SULTAN MIGHT HAVE CALCULATED THAT THE OPERATION WAS A NON-STARTER ANYWAY. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN INTERPRETATION WHICH WE SHOULD FOSTER  
SEMI COLON

C) IF THE IRAQIS HAD ANY REASON TO FEEL THAT "THE BRITISH" HAD SABOTAGED THEIR PLAN. HE REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS, AND THAT THEY HAD NOT SAID SO AT THE TIME, THOUGH THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THEY WOULD NOT SAY SO ON RETURN TO BAGHDAD.

9. I HAVE ALSO SPOKEN ON THE LINES OF PARA 5 ABOVE TO ALL THREE SERVICE COMMANDERS (WHO, AS IT HAPPENED, WERE FOREGATHERED AT MY HOUSE LAST NIGHT AT A FAREWELL PARTY FOR CSON ARRANGED BEFORE MY RETURN.

10. IT IS CLEAR FROM OTHER CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD IN THE PAST TWO DAYS THAT QABOOS' DECISION TO GO ALONG WITH THE IRAQIS HAS AROUSED A STORM OF CRITICISM WITHIN THE "ESTABLISHMENT" (SALEM CHAZALI WAS QUOTED TO ME AS HAVING DESCRIBED IT AS "THE WORST DECISION HIS MAJESTY HAS EVER MADE".) AS USUAL, HOWEVER THE "ESTABLISHMENT" FAILED - IF IT EVER TRIED - TO DISSUADE HIM. BUT THEIR CONFIDENCE (AND OURS) IN HIM MUST HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED (QABOOS REMARKED TO CSON IN A DIFFERENT BUT NOT UNRELATED CONTEXT A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO THAT ONE HAD TO TAKE RISKS AND HE FOUND IT RATHER EXCITING TO DO SO EXCLAMATION MARK). THE AFFAIR REINFORCES THE DOUBTS ABOUT THE SULTAN'S JUDGMENT EXPRESSED IN MY DESPATCH OF 5 JULY. I THEREFORE ENDORSE MR TUNNELL'S COMMENT IN PARA 4 OF TUR THAT WE HAVE SOME HARD THINKING TO DO ON HOW TO HANDLE THE REGIME.

11. WE MAY ALSO NEED TO RECONSIDER THE POSITION OF SERVICE COMMANDERS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THE OPERATION HAD GONE AHEAD WITH THE CONSEQUENCES WE ENVISAGED, BENNETT'S SILENCE WOULD HAVE LOST US TWO VALUABLE DAYS IN WHICH TO REACT (I.E. BETWEEN THE TIME BENNETT KNEW WHAT WAS AFOOT ON 25 SEPTEMBER AND THE TIME ZAWAMI SPOKE TO TUNNELL ON 27 SEPTEMBER).

THE AFFAIR REINFORCES THE DOUBTS ABOUT THE SULTAN'S JUDGMENT EXPRESSED IN MY DESPATCH OF 5 JULY. I THEREFORE ENDORSE MR TUNNELL'S COMMENT IN PARA 4 OF TUR THAT WE HAVE SOME HARD THINKING TO DO ON HOW TO HANDLE THE REGIME.

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LUCAS  
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UNCLASSIFIED

● KBY FCO 021530Z

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 021530Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1416 OF 2 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON BAGHDAD

INFO ROUTINE BONN PARIS MOSCOW NEW DELHI ISLAMABAD UKDEL NATO

MT

MY TELNO 1414: IRAQ/IRAN.

1. AT THE END OF LAST NIGHT'S ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MINISTERIAL MEETING (PARA 2 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), AGHA SHAHI TOLD JOURNALISTS OF THE FOUR CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE IRAQI CEASEFIRE OFFER. THEY ARE:

(I) CESSATION OF IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION AND OF ANY AIR RECONNAISSANCE OVER IRAQI TERRITORY;

(II) CESSATION OF STATEMENTS BY THE IRANIAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP REJECTING THE CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS;

(III) THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO IRANIAN MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS AT THE LINE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO ARMIES OR ANYWHERE ON THE IRAQI BORDER.

(IV) THAT THE CEASEFIRE OFFER WOULD LAPSE IF AT THE TERMINATION OF THE SET PERIOD THERE WAS NO CLEAR PUBLIC DECLARATION BY QUOTE THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN IRAN UNQUOTE ACCEPTING THE CEASEFIRE AND IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS.

2. SHEMIRANI (IRAN) FLATLY REJECTED THESE CONDITIONS.

PARSONS

IMMEDIATE

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IRAN/IRAQ

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PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
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IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY FCO 021630Z

FROM UKMIS NEWYORK 021530Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

SECRET



File 3  
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10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

2 October 1980

MESSAGE FROM CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

I enclose the text of a message to the Prime Minister from Chancellor Schmidt received here this morning. This results from the Prime Minister's message of 28 September.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

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GRS 135  
CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PARIS 011136Z OCT 80  
TO ROUTINE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 830 OF 1 OCTOBER 1980  
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON BONN AND BAGHDAD

*It looks as though the French  
may be being even more active  
with the Arabs than we had  
thought!*

*And*

IRAN/IRAQ: FRENCH VIEWS

1. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER (ECONOMIC) AT THE INAUGURATION OF A VIDEO-COMMUNICATIONS EXHIBITION IN CANNES ON MONDAY THE FRENCH MINISTER FOR INDUSTRY, M GIRAUD, ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO JOIN THE FRENCH IN SUPPORTING OR RE-AFFIRMING THAT THERE IS A LEGITIMATE ARAB EMIRATE CLAIM TO THE LOWER GULF ISLANDS. GIRAUD SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD BE DONE IN RETURN FOR AN ASSURANCE BY THE IRAQIS THAT THEY WOULD NOT EXTEND THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN ORDER TO RE-POSSESS THE ISLANDS BY FORCE. IN REPLY PETRIE LIMITED HIMSELF TO DESCRIBING THE BRITISH POSITION ON THE LINES OF YOUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 101. M GIRAUD'S SUGGESTION AT A CHANCE MEETING DOES NOT OF COURSE CONSTITUTE A FORMAL PROPOSAL, BUT IT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO YOU AS A POINTER TO THINKING IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

HIBBERT.

THIS TELEGRAM  
WAS NOT  
ADVANCED

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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IRAQ/IRAN

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FM WASHINGTON 012240Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4162 OF 1 OCTOBER

INFO PRIORITY JEDDA BAGHDAD KUWAIT MODUK

ROUTINE AMMAN BAHRAIN ABU DHABI DUBAI DOHA MUSCAT UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TEL 4154: IRAQ/IRAN/SAUDI ARABIA - AWACS

1. STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE TOLD US THAT THE KUWAITIS HAVE ALREADY PUT OUT A FEELER ABOUT ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE FROM THE AWACS. OTHER GULF STATES ARE THOUGHT LIKELY TO FOLLOW SUIT SOON. PROVIDED THE SAUDIS AGREE (THEIR VIEWS ARE BEING SOUGHT TODAY), STATE DEPARTMENT AT WORKING LEVEL ARE INCLINED TO ACCEDE TO SUCH REQUESTS, DESPITE THE POTENTIAL RISK OF COMPROMISING DECLARED US NEUTRALITY BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN IF ANY AWACS INTELLIGENCE FINDS ITS WAY TO BAGHDAD.
2. OTHER US GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS WILL BE INVOLVED BEFORE A FINAL DECISION IS TAKEN.

HENDERSON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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ADDITIONAL DISTN.

IRAQ/IRAN

[NOT ADVANCED]

S E C R E T

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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PS  
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PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
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MR BRAITHEWAITE  
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*MT*

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 011445Z OCT 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 831 OF 01 OCTOBER 1980

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD.

INFO ROUTINE BONN.

INFO SAVING TO ISLAMABAD, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

TELECON LEVER/YOUNG: IRAN/IRAQ: GULF ISLANDS

1. HEAD OF CHANCERY ASKED THE DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE THIS MORNING WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD HAD FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE IRAQIS OVER THE GULF ISLANDS SINCE OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE ELYSEE LAST WEEKEND. LEVITTE SAID THAT, AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE, THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE IRAQIS. AS WE KNEW (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 825) PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD WARNED TARIQ AZIZ ON 25 SEPTEMBER OF THE DANGERS OF ANY ATTACK AGAINST THE GULF ISLANDS. LEVITTE BELIEVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD TAKEN ON BOARD THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS. THE RISK OF AN ATTACK SEEMED TO HAVE RECEDED SOMEWHAT IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE DAYS PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE RETICENCE SHOWN BY THE GULF ARAB RULERS AND BY WESTERN LEADERS AND ALSO, OF COURSE, BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE IRAQ/IRAN FRONTIER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT.

G E H E I M -

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND  
DER BUNDESKANZLER

BONN, DEN 1. OKTOBER 1980

SEHR VEREHRTE FRAU PREMIERMINISTER,  
LIEBE MARGARET,

FUER IHR FERNSCHREIBEN VOM 28. SEPTEMBER DANKE ICH IHNEN. ICH TEILE IHRE BESORGNISSE UEBER DIE ENTWICKLUNG IM PERSISCHEN GOLF, DIE IN VIELERLEI HINSICHT ERNSTE GEFAHREN HERAUFBESCHWOERT. WAS UNSERE OELVERSORGUNG AUS DEM PERSISCHEN GOLF ANGEHT, SO WURDEN DIESE FRAGEN AUF DER SITZUNG DER OELMARKTGRUPPE DER INTERNATIONALEN ENERGIEAGENTUR AM 29. UND 30. SEPTEMBER IN PARIS EINGEHEND EROERTERT.

ICH WUERDE ES FUER SEHR GEFAEHRlich HALTEN, WENN DIE KAEMPFE NOCH LAENGER ANDAUERTEN. UNSERE BOTSCHAFTER IN BAGDAD UND TEHERAN WURDEN DAHER ANGEWIESEN DIE PRAESIDENTEN BEIDER LAENDER AUFZUSUCHEN UND UNSER DRINGENDES INTERESSE ZU UNTERSTREICHEN, DIE KAMPFHANDLUNGEN ZU LOKALISIEREN, SIE SOBALD WIE MOEGlich ZU BEENDEN UND DIE FREIE SCHIFFFAHRT IM GOLF ZU GEWAHRLEISTEN. DAS GLEICHE IST HIER DEM IRAKISCHEN BOTSCHAFTER UND DEM IRANISCHEN GESCHAFFTSTRAEGER MITGETEILT WORDEN.

ICH BIN EBENFALLS DER AUFFASSUNG, DASZ WIR UNS WEGEN DER WEITEREN ENTWICKLUNG ENG UND SORGFAELTIG KONSULTIEREN SOLLTEN. HIERFUER HALTE AUCH ICH ES FUER WUENSCHENSWERT, DASZ DIE VIER POLITISCHEN DIREKTOREN HIERUEBER IM RAHMEN UNSERER BEWAHRTEN VIERER-ZUSAMMENARBEIT KONSULTATIONEN AUFNEHMEN. ICH DENKE, DASZ DIE FRANZOESISCHE SEITE ALSBALD NACH M. FRANCOIS-PONCETS RUECKKEHR AUS NEW YORK HIERZU EINLADEN WIRD. WIR SIND AN EINER BALDIGEN EINBERUFUNG EINES SOLCHEN TREFFENS SEHR INTERESSIERT. MIT FREUNDLICHEN GRUESZEN  
YOUR  
HELMUT SCHMIDT

- S E C R E T -

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

BONN, 1. OCTOBER 1980

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,  
DEAR MARGARET,

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. 7194/80.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM OF 28 SEPTEMBER. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WHICH IN VARIOUS WAYS HAVE GIVEN RISE TO SERIOUS DANGER. AS REGARDS OUR OIL SUPPLIES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF, THESE MATTERS WERE DISCUSSES IN DEPTH AT THE MEETING OF THE OIL MARKET GROUP OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY ON 29 AND 30 SEPTEMBER IN PARIS.

IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS IF THE FIGHTING WERE TO CONTINUE FOR MUCH LONGER. OUR AMBASSADORS IN BAGHDAD AND THIRAN HAVE THEREFORE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CALL IN THE PRESIDENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES TO STRE

THAT WE CONSIDER IT URGENTLY NECESSARY THAT THE FIGHTING SHOULD BE LOCALIZED AND STOPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT FREE PASSAGE FOR

SHIPPING IN THE GULF SHOULD BE GUARANTEED. THE SAME HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR AND THE IRANIAN CHARGE D AFFAIRES IN BONN.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE CONSULTATION ON THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. I, TOO, DEEM IT DESIRABLE THAT THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD BEGIN CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE GROUP OF FOUR WHICH HAS PROVED SO VALUABLE UP TO NOW. I THINK THAT THE FRENCH SIDE WILL SEND OUT INVITATIONS FOR A MEETING OF THIS KIND AS SOON AS M. FRANCOIS-PONCET RETURNS FROM NEW YORK. WE WOULD LIKE THE MEETING TO BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

YOURS SINCERELY,  
HELMUT SCHMIDT



SECRET AND PERSONAL

②

Ref. A03098

*Prime Minister*

MR. ALEXANDER

*MS*

*Ant*

While I was in Washington on Thursday, 25th September 1980 for a meeting of Personal Representatives, I called on Dr. Brzezinski at the White House, at his request, at 3.00 pm that day.

2. At that stage the Prime Minister's reply to the message from the President about contingency planning in relation to the situation in the Gulf had not yet been received in the White House. I was able to assure Dr. Brzezinski that the President could expect a prompt and positive answer. I reported separately by telegram what Dr. Brzezinski told me about the French response.

3. We agreed that the conflict was unlikely to be brought to an end until the Iraqis had achieved their objectives, whatever those were. At present they seemed to be limited, and not far short of being realised; but it could well be that the objectives themselves might be extended, if Iraqi operations on the ground continued to be successful. It would not be possible to expect an end to the fighting for at least another few days. Dr. Brzezinski said that the statement which had been made by the President the previous day had been designed primarily to reassure and calm oil markets, with a view to avoiding the development of the sort of scramble and price rise which followed the Iranian revolution and the Shah's departure into exile. Dr. Brzezinski suggested that we should consider making a similar statement. (I was able to mention this to the Secretary of State for Energy in the British Embassy at Washington later that day, and he said that his meeting the following day with the American Secretary for Energy might provide the opportunity for saying something of that kind.)

4. Dr. Brzezinski and I briefly discussed the situation in Afghanistan. We agreed that it appeared that the Russians were not intending significantly to increase their own commitment in the country, but were settling down for a long haul. Dr. Brzezinski said that there were signs that the Russians were seeking to train an Afghan force capable of taking more of the load of "pacification" off the Soviet troops.



SECRET AND PERSONAL

5. On Poland, we agreed that the Polish Government, under pressure from the Soviet Government, would be at pains to try to whittle away concessions that had been won. The danger of Soviet military intervention was not by any means past, though there were no signs of preparation for it at present. Dr. Brzezinski drew a parallel with Czechoslovakia in 1968: he said that, if one set out a schedule of the events of 1968, what had happened so far in Poland appeared to take one about half way through that schedule. The parallels were in many respects disturbingly similar. But he thought that the Soviet Government would be very reluctant to intervene in Poland, partly because of their commitments elsewhere and partly because they could expect more resistance in Poland than they encountered in Czechoslovakia, including resistance by the Polish Army.

6. We very briefly discussed crisis management. I said that it had been a convenient coincidence that at the time of the conflict in the Persian Gulf Foreign Ministers had been assembled in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, and it had been possible to have consultations speedily at a high level. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that that had been convenient, and thought that we should need to provide ourselves with machinery for quadripartite consultation which could if necessary be quickly and discreetly activated. We did not pursue this discussion in detail, though I commended the proposals for consultation in Paris discussed by the four Foreign Ministers in New York.

7. Dr. Brzezinski said that he hoped that after the election we might think in terms of another meeting of the kind which we had had with Monsieur Wahl and Herr von Staden in Venice. Again, and for obvious reasons, we did not pursue this, though we agreed to be in touch after the election.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Walden.

REA

(Robert Armstrong)

30th September, 1980



GRS 425

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1405 OF 30 SEPTEMBER.

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW,  
NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD AND UKDEL NATO.MY TEL NO 1399: IRAQ/IRAN. 

1. AT IRAQI REQUEST, SAADOUN HAMMADI MET MUSKIE AT NOON TODAY (29 SEPTEMBER).

2. THE US MISSION (PLEASE PROTECT) HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION. MUSKIE BEGAN BY EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING. IF THE SEA LANES WERE PLACED IN JEOPARDY, THE US WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO ABOUT DEFENDING THEM. MUSKIE EXPLAINED THAT THE AWAC'S HAD BEEN SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AT SAUDI REQUEST. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM HAMMADI ABOUT WHAT THE US WANTED, MUSKIE SAID THAT THE US WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THESE COULD COVER THE 1975 TREATIES, THE NEW TERRITORIES REQUIRED BY THE IRAQIS, AND POSSIBLY THE THREE GULF ISLANDS.

3. HAMMADI SAID THAT IRAQ HAD NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AND WOULD ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT CONDITIONS. THIS POSITION WAS DESIGNED TO ATTRACT THE IRANIANS, THOUGH IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO GET THEM TO THE TABLE. THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY COME, HOWEVER, EITHER BECAUSE OF IRAQI MILITARY PRESSURE OR BECAUSE OF A CRUMBLING OF THE IRANIAN REGIME. FOR MUSKIE'S OWN INFORMATION, THE TWO IRAQI NON-NEGOTIABLE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT WERE A REVERSION TO THE TRADITIONAL AND HISTORICAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER IRAQI LANDS, INCLUDING THE SHATT-AL-ARAB, AND A GUARANTEE FROM THE IRANIANS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

4. HAMMADI ASKED ABOUT HINTS IN THE US PRESS THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARED TO DO A DEAL WITH THE IRANIANS ON SPARE PARTS IN RETURN FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. MUSKIE ADAMANTLY DENIED THIS.

5. THROUGHOUT THE TALKS HAMMADI STRESSED THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE PATIENT. THE QUESTION OF FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION OR HIS APPEARANCE BEFORE IT DID NOT ARISE. IN CONCLUSION, HAMMADI DECLARED THAT IRAQ WOULD NOT GO BACK TO THE PRE-1975 SITUATION AND ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE US AND HER ALLIES IF THE CURRENT REGIME IN IRAN WAS QUOTE CUT DOWN TO SIZE UNQUOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/6. WALDHEIM

CONFIDENTIAL

6. WALDHEIM THIS EVENING ISSUED THE REPORT CALLED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 479. THE ONLY POINT OF INTEREST IT CONTAINS IS THE NEWS THAT THE IRANIAN MISSION HERE HAS TOLD WALDHEIM THAT HE WILL RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE BY THE MORNING OF 1 OCTOBER.

PARSONS

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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TELNO 370 OF 30 SEP 80

INFO PRIORITY TO ABU DAHBI ALGIERS ANKARA BAGHDAD BAHRAIN  
DAMASCUS DOHA DUBAI JEDDA KUWAIT MUSCAT  
TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

*Read 2 full***JORDAN AND THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT**

1. KING HUSSEIN SENT CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO BAGHDAD ON 29 SEPTEMBER WITH A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADDAM EXPRESSING JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR IRAQ. ACCORDING TO ACCOUNTS IN TODAY'S JORDANIAN PRESS THE MESSAGE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RECOVERY OF ALL LANDS BELONGING TO IRAQ AND OF IRAQ'S RIGHTS IN THE SHATT AL ARAB AND ALSO TO THE RESTORATION OF THE 3 ARAB ISLANDS IN THE GULF SEIZED BY IRAN AND TO THE NEED FOR AN END TO THREATS OF DOMINATION BY IRAN OVER OTHER ARAB GULF COUNTRIES. THE MESSAGE ALSO CALLED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARAB/IRANIAN RELATIONS ON A NEW AND SOUNDER FOOTING SO THAT THE GULF CEASED TO BE AN AREA OF TENSION AND RIVALRY.
2. THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL MEETING ON 29 SEPTEMBER, AFTER HEARING A STATEMENT BY THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER, ALSO DECLARED ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR IRAQ IN ITS BATTLE TO "LIBERATE USURPED ARAB LANDS" AND APPEALED TO OTHER ARAB STATES TO RALLY BEHIND IRAQ REGARDLESS OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. THE COUNCIL CALLED ON ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO "AVERT FURTHER BLOODSHED AMONG MUSLEM BROTHERS AND PUT AN END TO THE WAR" AND CALLED ON ARAB STATES TO REJECT ANY INTERVENTION IN THE GULF, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF THE BIG POWERS.
3. KING HUSSEIN'S RECEPTION OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS IN AMMAN YESTERDAY IS ALSO WIDELY REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS. ADNAN ABU ODEH, THE JORDANIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION (HE IS ALSO ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHILE THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IS IN NEW YORK) WHOM I SAY THIS MORNING TOLD ME THAT THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE TO JORDAN AND THAT HE HAD MERELY BEEN TRANSITING AMMAN ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK.
4. ABU ODEH WAS STILL EXPECTING THE PAKISTANI PRESIDENT TO COME THROUGH AMMAN LATER TODAY ON HIS WAY FROM BAGHDAD TO NEW YORK AS HIS AIRCRAFT IS APPARENTLY STILL HERE (ALTHOUGH THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR DOES NOT THINK HE WILL DO SO; SEE MY TELNO 366, NOT TO ALL). ABU ODEH SAID THAT THE JORDANIANS KNEW OF NO OTHER PEACE INITIATIVES AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS AWARE OF PRESS REPORTS THAT KUWAIT AND ALGERIA MIGHT BE TRYING TO MOUNT SOME FORM OF MEDIATION. WHILE WELL AWARE THAT IRAN'S MILITARY

CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE AIR AND AT SEA, WAS BY NO MEANS EXHAUSTED, ABU ODEH WAS CLEARLY HOPING FOR AN EARLY END TO THE FIGHTING AND OPINED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL OF US IF IRAQ CAME OUT ON TOP.

5. WE STILL HAVE LITTLE OR NO EVIDENCE OF DIRECT JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ AND BOTH KING HUSSEIN IN SPEAKING TO ME AND THE JORDANIAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN DISCUSSION WITH MY DEFENCE ATTACHE TODAY (REPORTED SEPARATELY TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, COPY TO FCO) HAVE CATEGORICALLY DENIED THAT ANY SUCH HELP HAD BEEN REQUESTED. WE KNOW THAT TWO IRAQI MILITARY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT WERE IN JORDAN FOR A WHILE AND THAT SOME IRAQI CIVIL AIRCRAFT ARE ALSO ON JORDANIAN AIRFIELDS (REPORTED BY MY AIR ATTACHE TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TODAY). REPORTS BY TRAVELLERS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY VEHICLES HEADING TOWARDS IRAQ APPEAR TO BE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. ISRAELI PRESS REPORTS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ SEEM (ACCORDING TO MY US COLLEAGUE: PLEASE PROTECT) TO FORM PART OF A WAR OF NERVES BEING CONDUCTED BY THE ISRAELIS AGAINST JORDAN AND US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR.

6. THE JORDANIANS ARE, HOWEVER, HELPING THE IRAQIS IN OTHER WAYS. FOR EXAMPLE IRAQI CARGOES (CIVIL, AS FAR AS WE KNOW) ARE BEING GIVEN PRIORITY AT AQABA WITH THE RESULT THAT AQABA PORT IS NOW SERIOUSLY CONGESTED AND THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE HAVING PROBLEMS IN FINDING SUFFICIENT LORRIES TO CARRY FREIGHT TO IRAQ (SEE OUR TELNO CRED A 114 OF 30 SEPTEMBER TO DOT).

7. THE JORDANIANS REMAIN VERY PREOCCUPIED OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRANIANS MAY BE RECEIVING MILITARY SPARES THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES, A QUESTION KING HUSSEIN RAISED WITH ME ON 28 SEPTEMBER (SEE PARAS 3 AND 8 OF MY TELNO 363). MY US COLLEAGUE TOLD ME TODAY THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD TELEPHONED HIM AT MIGNIGHT ON 28 SEPTEMBER IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE HAD SEEN THE PAKISTANI PRESIDENT: PRESIDENT ZIA HAD APPARENTLY TOLD THE KING THAT THE IRANIANS HAD ASSURED HIM THEY WERE RECEIVING ALL THE MILITARY SPARES THEY NEEDED. THE US AMBASSADOR WAS ABLE TO GIVE THE KING A FIRM ASSURANCE THE FOLLOWING MORNING, ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON, THAT THE US WAS NOT SENDING ANY MILITARY SPARES TO IRAN AND WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO GRANT PERMISSION FOR THIRD COUNTRIES TO DO SO IF THEY WERE CONSULTED.

URWICK

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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IRAQ/IRAN

[NOT ADVANCED]

