

S  
806

PREM 19/652

Confidential Filing

# ARGENTINA

Pt 1: April 1982

Pt 10: June 1982

## Handling of the Falkland Crisis.

2 The Defense of the Islands after  
Repossession.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>26.5.82</del>							
<del>1.7.82</del>							
<del>5.7.82</del>							
<del>8.7.82</del>							
<del>16.7.82</del>							
<del>20.7.82</del>							
<del>25.7.82</del>							
<del>28.8.82</del>							
<del>4.8.82</del>							
<del>5.8.82</del>							
<del>6.8.82</del>							
<del>10.8.82</del>							
<del>17.8.82</del>							
<del>20.8.82</del>							
<del>24.8.82</del>							
<del>2.9.82</del>							
<del>7.9.82</del>							
<del>16.9.82</del>							
28.9.82							
<del>ends</del>							



● PART 10 ends:-

28. 9. 82

PART 11 begins:-

1. 10. 82

## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Date 24 May 2012

**PREM Records Team**



Argentina 58  
60

Ref. A09588

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

To note.

A.S.C. 20.  
9The Planning For and Timing of the Argentine Decision to Invade  
The Falkland Islands

--- The Joint Intelligence Committee have now completed an assessment of the intelligence and other information received since April up to 25 August which has a bearing on the planning for and timing of the Argentine decision to invade the Falkland Islands. I attach the assessment herewith. I am also sending copies of the assessment, with copies of this minute, to the Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and for Defence.

2. All the significant intelligence covered by this assessment has been sent to Lord Franks, and I have thought it right to send him this assessment also, in the first instance on a personal basis and for him alone, and not as formal evidence to his Committee; but making it clear that copies are available, if he would like other members of his Committee to see it.

RCA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

28 September 1982



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 187, 28 September 1982 (folio 59)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012 M. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 186, 21 September 1982 (folio 58)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Coler to Fall dated 16 September 1982 (folio 57)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. J. Land</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Fall to Coles dated 14 September 1982 (folio 56)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>M. Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK NTSUM No. 1851</i> <i>11x September 1982 (folio 55)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



File  
CONFIDENTIAL ECLIPSE

8 September 1982

I understand that when the Prime Minister was at Balmoral last weekend, The Queen Mother enquired after Sir Nicholas Henderson. The Prime Minister offered to make available his recent despatch, on his departure from Washington, about the Falklands crisis. I enclose a copy of this despatch, together with an earlier despatch written by Sir Nicholas shortly before he left Paris.

A. J. COLES

Sir Martin Gilliat, GCVO, MBE



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No 184, 7 September 1982 (folio 54)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



Ref: B06584

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD(FAF): The Falklands Garrison and Its Costs

## BACKGROUND

flag A  
flag B  
flag C

1. You will recall that in June the Sub-Committee was presented (OD(FAF))(82) 2) with an initial assessment of the size of garrison which might be required to ensure the security of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies in the face of the threat from Argentina. Following discussion at OD(FAF)(82) 1st Meeting, the Secretary of State for Defence was invited to inform the Sub-Committee of the results of his further studies on force levels, including the feasibility of deploying forces to the area for training. The Defence Secretary's minute to you of 2nd September now before the Sub-Committee covers a paper by Ministry of Defence officials which describes the planned force levels to be achieved in the South Atlantic by the end of next month, discusses the factors affecting these figures, including our ability to reinforce, and sets out the rough order of costs. As the Defence Secretary points out, both the size of the garrison and the costs involved are very large; you will note however that the force level is rather less than the June figure while the costs are substantially higher. The Defence Secretary would welcome at least a preliminary discussion of the political guidance which might be given to the Chiefs of Staff before further planning is undertaken.

## HANDLING

2. There is not sufficient material in the Defence Secretary's minute to enable the Sub Committee to arrive at decisions on future force levels. The aim of the discussion will therefore be to establish those aspects on which the Sub-Committee will require further detailed advice and the time by which decisions will need to be taken.
3. You will wish to invite the Defence Secretary to introduce the subject and perhaps explain the criteria he considers should be used to determine the size of the future garrison. The discussion might focus on the following questions.





- i. What additional facilities would be required to enable a greater proportion of the forces to be provided by reinforcement? Where would the troops be stationed? What would the costs be and how great might the savings be over the proposals now put forward by the Chiefs of Staff?
- ii. Does the Defence Secretary envisage additional intelligence arrangements to provide better warning? If so, what could these be? What would they cost?
- iii. Can force levels on the Islands be maintained by rotating troops to the area for training?
- iv. Could the force levels on the Islands be reduced sufficiently to achieve an appreciable reduction in the social impact of the garrison on the way of life of the Islanders?
- v. What are - or are likely to be - the views of our NATO partners on this diversion of resources to the South Atlantic? Are some elements of the force of less importance to NATO than others? Is there any scope for further assistance from the United States in meeting our other NATO commitments?
- vi. When does the Defence Secretary wish the Sub-Committee to take decisions on this considered proposals?

## CONCLUSION

4. Depending on the points made in discussion the Sub-Committee might
  - a. Note the force levels to be achieved by October.
  - b. Invite the Defence Secretary to circulate by the end of October his alternative proposals, with costings, for future force levels in the South Atlantic, taking account of reinforcement capability, the potential (if any) for improved intelligence arrangements and the impact on our NATO commitments, and to indicate the timescale on which the force levels might be introduced.

3rd September 1982

A D S GOODALL





52

MO 5/21

PRIME MINISTERTHE FALKLANDS GARRISON AND ITS COSTS

/ I attach a paper on this subject which was prepared for me to forward to colleagues for discussion. The paper sets out the MOD's proposals for the garrison force levels which should be achieved by October, together with an indication of the extra costs.

2. The costs of sustaining a garrison at this level in the longer term would be substantial. Over a five year period the average annual extra running costs could be of the order of £200-250M a year: total capital costs could be of the order of £600M. This does not include the new airbase whose cost would be very substantial.

3. A force level of some 3,500 with a large military infrastructure will impose considerable social pressures on a small community of 1,800 islanders. The garrison will be subject to review but as the paper makes clear, there is a danger of setting the levels too high now and then sending the wrong signal to the Argentines by making significant reductions later.

4. These are formidable problems and I think that the need now is for us to give the Chiefs of Staff clearer political guidance on the force level which we are prepared to commit to the Falkland Islands and for how long. My own view is that the commitment of up to 6 frigates and a garrison of 3,500 men to the defence of the Falkland Islands beyond the short term is disproportionate



to our interests in the area. The South Atlantic cannot be compared in its strategic importance to us to say the Middle or Far East. The question we have to consider is whether, despite the risks inherent in such a course, we should revert to a smaller garrison, supported by the ability to reinforce much more rapidly (assuming the existence of an adequate airfield to take wide-bodied jets) and in greater strength than was the case before the invasion and by better intelligence to give us early warning of Argentine intentions. The alternative is to commit ourselves to substantial extra resources for defence, as we cannot afford yet further detriment to our main defence tasks.

5. I am copying this minute to the other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

52

Ministry of Defence  
2nd September 1982



SECRET

SECRET

Page 1 of 5 pages

FUTURE FORCE LEVELS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

Note for OD(FAF) by Ministry of Defence officials

1. The level of forces which needs to be maintained in the South Atlantic is critically dependent on the degree of advance warning we can expect of any major Argentine attack on the Falkland Islands or its Dependencies and on our ability to carry out a swift and effective reinforcement of the Islands. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has now been able to consider with his colleagues what level of forces would be appropriate to meet our needs in the light of the JIC's assessment of the warning time likely to be available to us and the views of the new Military Commissioner. This minute sets out his main conclusions.
2. It should be made clear at the outset that the CDS believes that the level of forces required should be subject to regular review, initially on a quarterly basis, in order to take account of such factors as further refinements in intelligence assessments about the future trend of Argentine intentions. The discussion at OD(FAF) on 28th July about the need for a permanent airfield capable of taking wide-bodied jets is also crucially important in the longer term. The force level set out in this minute is therefore that which it is judged appropriate to achieve by the beginning of October, at which point it should be reviewed in the light of our ability to provide more rapid reinforcement than at present.
3. The current threat is low. Argentina has neither the capability nor unity to mount a further invasion at present or in the near future. She could harass the Islands and Dependencies and threaten the lines of communication, but the current risk of such action is slight. It may, however, increase and could occur through some maverick action on the part of an individual Argentine service. More likely is some

SECRET

SECRET



SECRET  
SECRET

form of provocative action which stops short of military confrontation. Linked to the likelihood of such hostile or provocative action is the warning time which could be expected. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have reported separately that at present we could hope for some weeks political warning of any reinvasion attempt, while the military indicators could be expected to confirm such intentions about two weeks ahead. Warning of hostile or other action short of major operations is much more difficult. It is only likely to produce tactical warning for forces stationed in the Falklands area and not give time for strategic moves of reinforcements.

4. Against this background, the forces which are to be stationed in the South Atlantic must be sufficiently strong to provide convincing evidence of our determination to defend the Islands and their Dependencies against further military adventures. If the Argentines undertook military action despite such evidence, our forces must be strong enough to deal with more minor incidents, such as harassment or probing attacks, and capable of keeping the airhead open in the face of a major attack on the Islands to permit the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. The ability of the airfield to accept a flow of transport aircraft will be critical to the success of this strategy.

5. These factors have led the CDS to recommend the mix of forces shown at Annex up until October. This would involve a Garrison of about 3,550 for the defence of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. The military capabilities of the force are deliberately weighted in favour of air and sea defence, with the aim of preventing the Argentines from launching attacks on the Islands. The smaller land component, built around one battalion group, is designed to deal with minor



SECRET  
SECRET

incursions should the Argentines nonetheless succeed in landing forces on the Islands and, more importantly, to play its part in retention of the airhead if reinforcements are required. Military plans for reinforcement of the Islands are now being prepared. It will almost certainly be necessary to position some stockpiles of weapons and supplies on the Islands to ensure a sufficiently rapid build-up of forces. It will also be necessary to test our reinforcement plans. It is hoped to undertake the first such exercise in January 1983.

6. In addition to the Garrison force levels, some 750 Army personnel including 600 Royal Engineers are currently deployed to carry out work on the runway extension, Garrison accommodation, rehabilitation, mine clearance and EOD tasks. The first two tasks should be completed by early 1983, but it is difficult at this stage to estimate the extent and duration of the mine clearance operations and any further tasks which the Royal Engineers may be asked to fulfill on behalf of the civil authorities. Moreover, experience is showing how difficult it is to make progress on major engineering work during the Falklands winter. To expedite the important work which lies ahead, particularly on the accommodation for the garrison, the Military Commissioner has proposed that 300 more Royal Engineers should be deployed during the forthcoming Falklands summer (from November 1982 to April 1983), making 900 additional Royal Engineers in all, and that this should reduce to a total of 300 during the following Falklands winter. Plans are currently being made to do this. The garrison will also need to be supported by a significant number of ships taken up from trade to provide a number of essential services. Currently, more than 20 such ships are employed.

7. Among the other factors relevant to the level of forces to be stationed in the area, two are particularly important. Firstly,



there is the need to guard against over-insuring now at the risk of sending wrong signals to the Argentines if it were subsequently decided to reduce the force level to any significant degree. Secondly, we must be conscious of the political and social strains which a large military garrison must pose for a small island community. On the latter point, Lord Shackleton has recommended that the MOD consider maximising the number of women in the garrison and allowing accompaniment of married servicemen by their wives. We shall see what we can do to meet these understandable objectives, but as is being reported separately in the context of the Shackleton Report, this is unlikely to prove significant. The current plan is to limit tours of duty in the Falkland Islands to 4-6 months. This affords a number of benefits, but does mean that accompanied tours would be very hard to justify. Ultimately, factors such as these must be set against the consequences of deploying a level of forces which might prove inadequate to deter the Argentines or to mount a sufficiently effective defence.

8. There is also a need to minimise the adverse implications of these deployments for our NATO and home defence capabilities. The delayed availability to respond to an emergency in the Alliance area, and the loss of opportunities to conduct joint training with NATO allies, will effect the NATO duties of all three Services in a variety of ways. The forces lost to NATO in this way will be greater than those deployed in the South Atlantic at any one time in view of the transit of forces to and from the area. In the case of the Royal Navy for instance, there will on average be about half as many ships en route to and from the South Atlantic as are stationed in the area at any one time.



9. Ministers have decided that the costs of protecting the islands in future, as with the costs of the operation and of replacing lost or expended equipment, will be met from monies additional to that required to meet our commitment to NATO of 3% a year real growth. An accurate assessment of the cost of the garrison will depend on a clear definition of its size and of the length of time it is to be maintained. A provisional estimate suggests that the extra cost of establishing and maintaining a garrison of the size set out at Annex A for a period of 5 years would be of the order of £600M for capital costs and £200-250M a year for running costs. The elements are in Annex B: they include the cost of enhancements to existing force levels and equipment inventories where these are needed to avoid detriment to other capabilities and commitments. the principal capital components are additional Phantoms and DC10 tanker aircraft, helicopters and Rapier air defence missiles. Running costs cover the additional personnel required, fuel, freight and personnel movements and logistic support as well as the cost of running ships from the Standby Squadron to maintain fleet availability in the North Atlantic.

10. These costs do not however include provision for the new airbase which is an essential element in the defensive concept for the Islands. A survey of sites will be completed in October and this will enable an estimate of the cost to be made. But it is already clear that in addition to the runway costing about £45M a very substantial investment, possibly of some hundreds of millions of pounds, would be needed to provide the full range of facilities for the support and operation of sophisticated modern aircraft.

11. These cost figures will be further refined and discussed with the Treasury before a final estimate is presented to Ministers.



~~SECRET~~ANNEXPLANNED FORCE LEVELS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BY OCTOBER 19821. Falkland Islands and Dependenciesa. Navy

- 1 SSN
  - 1 SSK (occasionally on station depending on threat and availability)
  - 4/6 Destroyers/Frigates
  - 1 Ice Patrol Ship
  - 1 Multi-purpose stores ship (AEFS)
  - 1 Tanker (AO)
  - 5 Sea King Mk V Helicopters
  - 2/3 Armed Patrol Craft
  - 1 Tug
  - 1 Heavy Repair Ship
- } until May 1983

Notes: (1) CTF 317 intends to retain a Wessex 5 support helicopter squadron until 1 November 1982 to meet essential tasks.

(2) The withdrawal of the CVS Group is scheduled for the end of September but is dependent on the completion of the extension to Port Stanley runway and provision of adequate air defence ashore.

b. Army

- 1 Headquarters Unit
- 1 Infantry Battalion, reinforced by one Company Group, elements of which will be based on South Georgia
- 1 Blowpipe Detachment (8 firing units)
- 1 Field Battery (6 light guns)
- 1 Rapier Battery (12 firing units)
- 1 Signals Squadron
- 1 Army Air Corps Flight (9 Helicopters)
- 1 Field Squadron (Royal Engineers)
- 1 Field Support Squadron (Royal Engineers)
- 1 Composite Logistic Battalion

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

b. Army (Continued)

Until their tasks are complete:

1 Ammunition Company, 2 Pioneer Platoons and extra Royal Engineer units comprising an additional increment of 750 men (600 of whom are RE) for runway extension, garrison accommodation and mine clearance. RE numbers will, however, fluctuate seasonally, increasing to 900 during next Falklands summer (Nov 82 to Apr 83) and decreasing to 300 during next Falklands winter.

c. Air Force

- 4 Ground Control Intercept/Early Warning Radar (one of which is in reserve)
- 4 Phantom F4 Aircraft (on completion of runway extension - see Note (2) above)
- 6 Harrier GR3 Aircraft
- 2 Hercules C130K Aircraft
- 5 Chinook Helicopters
- 1 Air Defence Rapier Squadron (8 firing units). This may be adjusted upwards when the radars are fully deployed
- 3 Search and Rescue (SAR) Sea King Helicopters for use for SAR and as medium lift helicopters for logistic support.

d. Overall Manpower Estimates

Approximate strengths

Navy: 100 (plus 150 from Wessex 5 squadron until 1 November 1982)

Army: 2250 (plus 750 Royal Engineers and other specialist units until their tasks are complete)

RAF: 1200

Total: 3550 (plus 900 Royal Engineers, Naval personnel and other specialist units until their tasks are complete)

2. Merchant Ships

A significant number of ships taken up from trade will also be required. The number will vary according to requirements, but at present more than 20 are employed.

3. Ascension Island

a. Navy

2 Wessex V SAR Helicopters

b. Army

Some logistic support and personnel

c. Air Force

A number of Tanker aircraft and Hercules C130K Aircraft, to be determined primarily by the availability of South American staging facilities

4 Phantom F4

1 Air Defence Radar



ANNEX B

COMPONENTS IN THE COSTING OF THE FALKLANDS GARRISON

Principal Items of Capital Expenditure Excluding Airbase

- a. Aircraft: 12 Phantoms, 3 DC10 tankers, 3 Chinooks, 8 Sea Kings.
- b. Other equipment: 24 Rapier fire units and missiles, 12 light guns, support vehicles and communications.
- c. Logistic stockpile.
- d. Works.

Principal Running Costs

- a. Additional personnel and extra personnel costs.
- b. Additional fuel and logistic support.
- c. Chartered shipping.
- d. Running frigates in the Standby Squadron.

23 SEP 1982







The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 183, 1 September 1982 (folio 51A)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012 A. Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



2

From the Secretary of State

Prime Minister:

The Rt Hon Douglas Hurd CBE, MP  
Minister of State  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

H  
31/8  
31 August 1982

ms

Dear Douglas,

## FRIGATES FOR ARGENTINA

I have seen Tom Trenchard's letter to you of 13 August seeking your agreement that we should permit the export of equipment for incorporation into the frigates which are being built in West Germany for the Argentine navy.

It is regrettable that the FRG has not given us the assurance we have sought. And we might expect that in the wake of the French decision to lift the arms embargo there will be pressure within Germany to do likewise. But I do not believe we would be justified in continuing our objections to the export of the equipment, and thus exposing British companies to contractual penalties. Our best course of action seems to lie in telling the Germans that we are releasing the equipment but that we would hope and expect that as allies they would consult us before releasing the ships.

I am copying this to members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

J. H. H.  
Arthur

LORD COCKFIELD





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Hatfield to Butler dated 26 August 1982 (folio 51)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM NO 181, 24 August 1982 (folio 50)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 August, 1982

Prime Minister

A candidate for the weekend box, but you  
may like to glance at the summary this  
week.

Dear John,

I enclose an advance copy of Sir Nicholas Henderson's  
valedictory despatch which is concerned almost exclusively with  
US conduct during the Falklands crisis. The chronology (Annex A)  
and the detailed account of the negotiations (Annex B) referred  
to in paragraph 16 are respectively 23 and 49 pages in length.  
I have not enclosed them but can easily send copies if you wish.

Yours ever

John Holmes

(J E Holmes)  
Private SecretaryA J Coles Esq  
Private Secretary  
10 Downing Street



US POLICY IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WITH SOME VALEDICTORY COMMENTS  
ON US/UK RELATIONS

S U M M A R Y

1. Purpose of the despatch is to give a personal account of the involvement of the USA in the Falklands crisis; and to make some valedictory comments on the USA/UK relationship in the light of the outcome. (Paragraphs 1-3).
2. Far from exercising pressure at the end of March on the Argentinians over their illegal landings on South Georgia, as HMG asked them to do, the State Department counselled both governments to exercise restraint. Lord Carrington and I protested at this neutral stance. At this stage, ie. until the end of the month, neither the US intelligence community nor the JIC believed that the Argentine landings portended any serious challenge, let alone an invasion of the Falklands. (Paragraphs 4-8).
3. When intelligence had reached London of a clear intention to invade the Falklands, the Prime Minister sent the President a message on 31 March. This asked him to intervene urgently with President Galtieri. I saw Mr Haig on the evening of 31 March and gave him a summary of our intelligence. Despite scepticism from his own staff, Mr Haig immediately saw the danger and promised to act forthwith to try to forestall an Argentine invasion. (Paragraphs 9-11).
4. When President Reagan eventually spoke to President Galtieri

/on





on the evening of 1 April, the latter rejected his appeal and his offer to send Vice-President Bush to Buenos Aires to assist in a solution. On the morning of 2 April, when the invasion had occurred, the State Department issued a strong condemnatory statement. (Paragraphs 12-13).

5. The despatch then summarises the role and attitude of the USA up to invasion. It also discusses the question whether the previous pro-Argentine policy of the Reagan Administration had emboldened the Argentines to invade, and whether the US Government could have averted the invasion had they known Argentine intentions sooner. (Paragraphs 14-15).

6. An analysis is given of why the US Government became so intensely involved in negotiation: USA interests would be threatened by military conflict between Argentina and the UK. The Latin-lobby in the USA was influential, supported principally by Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick and Mr Thomas Enders. But Mr Larry Eagleburger had no doubt about the need for the US Government to back HMG. (Paragraphs 16-22).

7. Reasons for the neutral stance adopted by the US Government until the end of April. (Paragraphs 23-25).

8. Assurances from Mr Haig that the US Government was not at heart impartial and that there would be no repeat of Suez. (Paragraphs 26-27).

9. An account of the gap between Buenos Aires and London that Mr Haig was trying to bridge in his shuttle, and of the weak points he saw in the two sides. Mr Haig came to judge the Argentines

/as



as irrational and intransigent. The US Government comes out in support of Britain on 30 April. (Paragraphs 28-33)

10. USA efforts to reach a peaceful solution become more intense with the approach of battle. You visit Washington for a second time. Various plans are exchanged. Other countries - Peru, Brazil - and the UN Secretary General, become involved. The President telephones the Prime Minister twice. HMG advances its own proposals. The Argentinians continue to prevaricate. Mr Haig becomes increasingly worried after British troops have relanded. He fears the consequences of Argentine military humiliation on Latin-American opinion already whipped up at a meeting of the Rio Treaty. (Paragraphs 34-53)

11. The ceaseless negotiations failed to produce a peaceful settlement, but they brought advantages for Britain. The US decision to come down on the British side and give support was never something that could be taken for granted; it flowed from and was sustained by the way we handled the negotiations in contrast to the Argentinians. Mr Haig took us at all times into his confidence. He was in touch with me daily. His was the decisive influence in the US Government despite the pressure of the pro-Latinos. He was variable and erratic but handled decisive events in a way that was favourable to British interests. Had he succeeded this would have made a great difference to him personally. Certain conclusions can be drawn about the negotiating phase. (Paragraphs 54-61)

/12.





12. Despite the high degree of USA interest in the Falklands, there was ignorance and wavering in public opinion. It was essential for the Embassy to launch a major public relations campaign, directed at press, TV and Congress, the details of which are described in the despatch. As the prospect of a bloody battle increased, uncertainties in public opinion tended to grow. Our campaign therefore had to be sustained throughout the 74 days. It aroused no resentment or complaint of interfering. (Paragraphs 62-71)

13. The despatch gives details of the practical support given by the US Government: facilities on Ascension Island, new military equipment and missiles, communications channels, intelligence, economic backing - without which the repossession of the Islands would have taken longer and been more costly. (Paragraphs 72-73)

14. The nature of the US/UK relationship is described and what it meant in the Falklands crisis. (Paragraph 74-75)

15. The outcome of the crisis has been favourable to British interests in the USA, countering long-held doubts about our national will. It also gave emphasis to certain current features of American government. (Paragraphs 76-81)

16. The fillip to our relations will be subject to various tensions and to the changing pattern as between the two sides of the Atlantic. Pointers are given to the changing transatlantic balance - economic and military. (Paragraphs 82-84)

17. In conclusion, the despatch underlines the particular nature of the US/UK relationship and suggests that there is no incompatibility between this and membership of the EC. (Paragraph 85)



BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

27 July 1982

The Rt Hon Francis Pym MC MP  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Sir,

US POLICY IN THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WITH SOME VALEDICTORY  
COMMENTS ON US/UK RELATIONS

1. The policy of the USA Government in the Falklands crisis was fluctuating, but their involvement was intense and of cardinal importance to British interests.

2. I should like in this despatch, which will be my valedictory one from this post, to try to describe the ups and downs through which we travelled between the Argentine invasion and surrender. It will not be my purpose to cover all aspects of the operation, but only those involving the USA which was, however, central throughout the crisis; and my account will be personal in nature; it will be as I saw it. Sir Anthony Parsons has already sent a despatch covering the Falklands crisis at the UN.

3. The relationship between the USA and the UK, so difficult to define, yet so evident and important to both countries, did, I think, considerably affect the outcome; and, no less interesting, the outcome will, for some time

/at





at any rate, exercise an influence on the relationship. I will conclude with some comments upon this.

#### PRELIMINARIES TO INVASION

4. On Sunday 28 March, when the Americans were preoccupied with El Salvador, Lord Carrington sent me a telegram saying that it was now clear that the Argentinians had no intention of removing from South Georgia the group of Argentinians whose illegal landing there had been reported on 19 March. He asked me to deliver urgently a message to Mr Haig. The message gave an account of the events since the illegal Argentine landing on South Georgia and our attempts to resolve the problem peacefully. Lord Carrington asked Mr Haig to consider taking the matter up with the Argentinians. If the latter maintained that they would not remove the men themselves and that they would resist any attempt by the British to do so, the use of a third country's ship might be a compromise they could accept. Lord Carrington concluded by saying "If we do not find a solution soon, I fear the gravest consequences".

5. The following day Mr Stoessel, the Deputy Secretary of State in the State Department, asked me to see him. He said that he would also be sending for the Argentine Ambassador and would be speaking to him on similar lines. His purpose was to counsel both the British and Argentine governments to exercise restraint. Mr Stoessel said that the US would not take sides.

/6.



6. My immediate response was to protest. The Americans could surely not be neutral in a case of illegal occupation of sovereign British territory. They would not accept the illegal occupation of their own territory; they should not condone such a thing happening in the American continent.

7. As soon as he received my account of this conversation, Lord Carrington spoke on the same lines to Mr Ed Streater of the US Embassy; and I followed it by calling on Judge Clark at the White House on the morning of 30 March. I left him in no doubt what we thought about a neutral stance by America when the Argentinians appeared to be occupying our territory. After all, we had helped the Americans in many ways that were not always to our advantage.

8. It should be noted, as a matter of historical fact, that when, on 19 March, it was first reported that the Argentinians had landed on South Georgia, and indeed for some twelve days after that, the US intelligence community did not believe, any more than did the JIC in London, that this portended any serious challenge by the Argentinians, let alone an invasion of the Falkland Islands.

9. It therefore came as a shock here when it was realised that an Argentine assault on the Falkland Islands was imminent. When intelligence had reached London clearly indicating an Argentine intention to invade the Falkland Islands themselves, the Prime Minister sent a message to President Reagan on Wednesday 31 March leaving him in no doubt about the seriousness of the situation. She said

/that





that "we could not acquiesce in any Argentine occupation". She asked the President to speak urgently to the Argentine President asking him for an immediate assurance that he would not authorise any landing, let alone any hostilities. At 1845 (local time) the same day, I saw Mr Haig on instructions and referred to the Prime Minister's message to the President. I went on to give him an account in some detail of the military threat to the Falkland Islands, outlining some of the intelligence upon which our fears about Argentine intentions were based. I also mentioned the negative response we had had from the Argentine Foreign Minister to the strong efforts we had made to discuss a diplomatic solution to the South Georgia issue. I gave Mr Haig a piece of paper setting out the evidence we had that pointed categorically to an Argentine intention to invade on the morning of 2 April.

10. Mr Haig's reaction to the information I had given him was electric. He said that he had not been vouchsafed by his own staff intelligence of the kind I had given him. On the basis of my information, it was obvious that the most urgent action was necessary. Later in London he told the Prime Minister that the summary of intelligence I had handed him that day was much better than anything that the US authorities had compiled. The latter had had the various pieces of intelligence but had not put them together to make the whole picture.

11. It is interesting to recall that the Assistant Secretary

/for



for Latin American Affairs in the State Department, Mr Thomas Enders, who was also present at this meeting, did his best to minimise the reality of the threat to which I had drawn attention. He said that the US Government had had an assurance from the Argentine Foreign Minister that the Argentinians were not contemplating confrontation with us; indeed they had had this assurance confirmed. I pointed out that the movements of the Argentine fleet refuted what he was saying. Mr Enders spoke of the help the Argentinians had given the Americans in El Salvador. But Mr Haig immediately saw the danger. There was no question about the need to support the British in the effort to stop the use of Argentine force. He would take the matter up urgently with the Argentinians. He undertook to do everything to ensure that President Reagan sent off a message to the Argentine President forthwith.

12. The next day, 1 April, the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires transmitted a message from President Reagan to President Galtieri, but the latter would not say what the Argentinians were going to do. He muttered some mumbo-jumbo, to use the State Department's phrase, about the need for the British to talk about relinquishing sovereignty. It was therefore decided that the President should telephone President Galtieri. Unfortunately he had to undergo a medical check-up during the day and it was not until the evening that he was able to ring President Galtieri. At first the latter refused to take the call. The Americans /persisted





persisted and President Reagan eventually spoke to him. His words and tone were forceful, urging the Argentinians not to take action against the Falklands. He left President Galtieri in no doubt of the consequences of such action upon Argentine/US relations. He said that the British would treat it as a casus belli. The Americans were ready to provide good offices to help in any way. He was prepared to send Vice President Bush immediately to Buenos Aires to assist in a solution. But the Argentine President rejected everything. He said that there was no point in sending the Vice President when this was a matter of colonialism.

13. It was about 2200 hours when Mr Haig reported all this to me. Vice President Bush happened to be dining with me that evening, and he had expected to have to leave the table early to fly off to Buenos Aires; but I was now able to tell him that President Galtieri would not receive him. Mr Haig also told me that the President and he were ready to do anything that we might want them to do in these very dangerous circumstances, but it looked to the Americans as though the Argentinians were bent on an invasion and nothing would stop them. After telephoning the Prime Minister and telling her of President Galtieri's negative response, I spoke to Mr Haig again expressing gratitude for US support and urging the US to come out with a strong condemnation of the Argentine action if, as looked inevitable, they were going to go through with their  
/invasion



invasion the following morning. In fact the White House came out with a weasely statement early on the morning of 2 April, upon which the State Department, apologising that the White House spokesman had been inadequately prepared, made clear the US stance. This was to deplore the use of force to resolve the dispute and to call on Argentina immediately to cease hostilities and to withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands.

14. So far then - that is to say up to the time of the invasion - the role of the USA in the Falklands issue can be summarised as follows:

- (i) the US Government had been unaware of the imminence of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands until we produced clear evidence about it on the evening of Wednesday 31 March.
- (ii) As soon as Mr Haig was made aware of this he moved quickly to try to avert an Argentine invasion. He sent instructions to the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires. President Reagan made strenuous efforts to warn President Galtieri of the consequences of invasion and to dissuade him from doing so.
- (iii) Despite these efforts the US Government were extremely careful at the outset of the crisis, when it flared up over South Georgia, to adopt a neutral stance on the merits of the issue as between the British and the Argentinians. They were afraid of the impact of the crisis on relations  
/between





between the US Government and the countries of Latin America and of the possible increase in Soviet influence.

15. Two questions arise:

- (a) Did the US Government by their pro-Argentine policy in the preceding months encourage the Argentinians to conclude that they could get away with aggression against the Falkland Islands without incurring American hostility? Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick and Mr Thomas Enders had private talks with the Argentinians, and the latter visited Buenos Aires at this time. It is relevant that Mr William Casey, the head of the CIA, who was closely concerned in Cabinet discussion on this subject has implied to us privately that he thinks the Argentinians may well have been led up the wrong path: that they may have believed that their support for the USA in covert operations in Central America was more important to the USA than in fact it was and could be expected to earn them American acquiescence in a forward policy elsewhere. The Argentine military representative in Washington, General Miguel Gil, is known by the US Government to have advised Buenos Aires that Argentine backing for US anti-communist causes throughout Latin America would secure US acquiescence in Argentina's objectives. The fact that the US Chief of Naval Staff arrived for a long

/planned



planned visit to Buenos Aires on 2 April illustrates the efforts the US Administration were making to get alongside the Argentine military. Mr Haig, I might interject, came to be convinced of Mr Costa Mendez's evil and influential role throughout: his personal involvement in the decision to invade and his misreading of both the US and UK reactions to invasion.

What can be said even in the absence of hard Argentine evidence, is that Buenos Aires might well have thought that the US Government was in such need of Argentine support in their crusade against communism in Central America that they might condone Argentine action that previous US Administrations would have denounced.

- (b) Could the US Government, if they had been aware sooner of the Argentine intention to invade the Falklands, have exerted sufficient influence to deter them from doing so? Again, it is impossible now to give a categorical answer, but by the time the Americans did start to try in earnest to avert an invasion, it was very late for the Argentinians to take a decision to turn back, even if President Galtieri had wanted to do so.

#### NEGOTIATIONS

##### The First Rounds

16. I attach at Annex A a chronology of the main events in  
/the





the crisis, seen from Washington; and at Annex B a detailed account of the negotiations and American initiatives which continued in one form or another until the Argentine surrender on 14 June.

17. Security Council Resolution 502, passed on 3 April by ten votes to one, though ignored by the Argentinians, was the starting-point for the negotiations. This Resolution demanded a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Argentine forces; it also called upon Argentina and the UK to seek a diplomatic solution to their differences.

18. The US Government voted for this Resolution but they were very careful to do nothing throughout the month of April that might be taken as reflecting on their impartiality and hence as impairing their role as a negotiator seeking a peaceful settlement between two sides. It was to bring about some agreement between Buenos Aires and London that could avert further military conflict that Mr Haig's efforts were almost exclusively devoted throughout the month and indeed through much of the next. He believed that if the British had to resort to military force to retake the Islands, this would involve considerable risks and heavy loss of life. At the outset, the US Government were afraid that we might get into military difficulties which could embroil the USA further than they wanted. It is worth recalling this because some seven weeks later, when we established a force successfully on the Falklands, the Americans came to worry, not that we would get into a military impasse, but

/that



that we would succeed so overwhelmingly as to humiliate the Argentinians. The Americans were always worried about a possible increase of Soviet or Peronist influence in Argentina and about the enhancement of Soviet influence throughout Latin America. They were concerned too that any overt tilt towards the UK would jeopardise US interests in Latin America and, to be sure, once they did plump for us they became as much the target for Latin obloquy as we did.

19. I am sure that much has been heard in London of the influence here of the Latino-lobby. We were very much aware of them and were ready to send up chaff to deflect their missiles, which we generally succeeded in doing except when Mr Haig was out of the country and they seized the opportunity to mobilize the White House. Mr Haig frequently assured me that, notwithstanding occasional equivocal statements, the President himself was a staunch supporter; some of those around him, however, were cautious and urged him to remember above all the importance of good hemispheric relations.

20. The power of the Latino-lobby was minimal in Congress, confined to pro-Irish fanatics and Hispanics in the House, Jesse Helms in the Senate, and mavericks like Senator Stevens who never miss a chance to get at the European members of NATO. The main pillars of the lobby were Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN and with Cabinet rank, and Mr Thomas Enders in the State Department. Comparing Mrs

/Kirkpatrick





Kirkpatrick with Mr Enders, it is difficult to improve on the apophthegm going the rounds of the State Department that whereas the latter is more fascist than fool, Mrs Kirkpatrick is more fool than fascist. She said publicly on TV on 11<sup>th</sup> April that she did not see a need for the USA to make a choice between Britain and Argentina. Nor did she think Argentina could fairly be accused of aggression because they were simply asserting a long-stated claim. She is not, so I am assured, anti-British, but she has made the intellectual discovery that authoritarian regimes are different from totalitarian regimes, and had made Argentina the prime exhibit in the first category. Seen from Washington, she appears to be one of America's most reliable own-goal scorers: tactless, wrong-headed, ineffective and a dubious tribute to the academic profession to which she misses no opportunity of expressing her allegiance.

21. Mr Enders is a mountain of a man, with an unfailing track record: he was notorious for his performance in Cambodia and has been an unswerving promoter of better relations between Washington and the right-wing dictatorships of Latin America. From the beginning of the Falklands crisis he pleaded loudly for Washington not to burn its bridges with the Latins. He invariably tended to give the Argentinians the benefit of the doubt and was able to exert some influence on Mr Haig and, more especially, on the White House.

22. While mentioning personalities, I should add that

/Mr Larry



Mr Larry Eagleburger, the Under Secretary in the State Department, was consistently resolute. He was always alive to the bearing of this issue on the health of the Alliance. On many occasions when, before the decision of 30 April to back us, US support had to be hugger-mugger, he did his best to help us. It was difficult to believe that he and Mr Enders could be operating under the same roof; and indeed the roof did at times look like flying off. We have reason to be thankful to Mr Eagleburger for his ebullient, out-spoken support.

23. The neutral US posture shown at this stage and maintained until the end of April was, I know, difficult for many people to understand on the other side of the Atlantic where it was thought that the US Government could not justifiably fail to stick by an ally, particularly when it was the victim of blatant aggression; and, to be sure, this was the instinct of much of the American public, judged by the press and the considerable volume of mail we started receiving in the Embassy. But the US Government felt it could not be quite so easily committed. For one thing, they were aware of the deep-seated psychosis in the American people about the danger of becoming involved in another Vietnam. To begin with, too, there seemed to be a touch of Gilbert and Sullivan about the idea of a military clash 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic on behalf of a population of less than 2,000 sheep farmers inhabiting what the US President described as "that little ice-cold

/bunch





bunch of land down there".

24. There were other causes that made the Reagan Administration cautious about coming down too quickly or too emphatically on the British side. They feared the invocation of the Rio Treaty and a fermentation of "hemispheric solidarity" that could result in economic sanctions against Britain and hostility towards the USA. Since coming to office they had been making great efforts to improve relations with all regimes in Latin America, however authoritarian, provided they were anti-Communist. As a corollary, attempts had been made to mobilise such regimes in the fight against the spread of Communism in Central America, a prime task of the new Administration for which Argentina, in Washington's eyes, was the first in the line. By some process of historical and political adjustment, antiCommunism had come to be tacked on to anti-colonialism as the rationale for the most enduring of all expressions of US foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine. I might interpolate here that Britain's occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1832 came a decade after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and was considered then, as it has been ever since, as an exception to it.

25. I argued with Mr Haig and others at the beginning that none of this need inhibit them from making it bluntly plain to the Argentinians that for the US their act of outright aggression was entirely unacceptable and had to be reversed before progress could be made. I tried to

/convince





convince Mr Haig that his position would be strengthened rather than weakened by adopting such a posture, rather than retreating into impartiality. But the folk-lore about Latin American psychology was too strong for this argument to prevail.

26. Nonetheless, Mr Haig assured us that the US was not at heart impartial, that HMG had always supported the Reagan Administration in foreign policy, and that the US could not privately be evenhanded in anything involving their closest ally. But publicly their spokesmen said that the United States intended to steer a course "down the middle" and not to give any help either way. "It's a very difficult situation for the United States", President Reagan pleaded in answer to a press question on 6 April, "because we're friends with both of the countries engaged in this dispute...".

27. Mr Haig reassured me several times during the following weeks that there would be no repeat of Suez. Given the possible parallels, I do not think his assurances were otiose. The Falklands crisis touched on certain American nerves that had proved sensitive at Suez: the desire to prevent the use of force and promote a diplomatic solution; a recessive feeling about colonialism; concern that the British were expecting the USA eventually to pick up the cheque; worry about the Russians; a desire to remain neutral if at all possible; and the fear that what Britain was doing would rally other countries in the area against Western interests. But Mr Haig did not suffer from Dulles'

/"goodness"





"goodness" and, for reasons that will emerge in the following account, American inhibitions were overcome and there were no Suez-reflexes.

28. In the course of his shuttle between London, Buenos Aires and Washington, Mr Haig was trying to bridge a gap that may be described, at the risk of over-simplification, as follows. The Argentinians were not prepared to accept any settlement that did not provide either for negotiations on sovereignty, to be concluded in their favour within a specific time limit, or for an interim regime for the Islands, after the withdrawal of forces by both sides, that would promote the acquisition of sovereignty by administrative means, including population and economic transfers. The British Government insisted that sovereignty was theirs, that the traditional administration of the Islands must be restored and that there must be no infringement of the right of the islanders to decide their own future. Mr Haig believed that the weak point in the Argentine position, apart from their wrong-doing in invading the Islands, was their emphasis upon the transfer of sovereignty, regardless of the wishes of the population, something that was not in keeping with accepted principles or practice of de-colonisation or self-determination. The weakness of the British position, so he believed, lay in the prospect for them of having to contemplate a future for the Islands conducted in conflict with neighbouring Argentina, probably involving a considerable defence commitment in the South Atlantic for an indefinite

/time.





time. What therefore Mr Haig tried to do was to bring about some softening in the Argentine view on the transfer of sovereignty and some mitigation of the British contention that there could be no discussion about the future of the Islands or interim administration that advanced the prospect for Argentine sovereignty whatever the wishes of the islanders.

29. The bridge that Mr Haig tried to build between the British and Argentinians varied in construction with the changing military scene; but there were certain more or less constant features: the withdrawal of forces; the creation of some international interim administration after withdrawal; and commitment by both sides to discuss the future status of the Islands.

30. Throughout lengthy talks involving two visits by Mr Haig to London and Buenos Aires and one each by you and Mr Costa Mendez to Washington, HMG maintained unwaveringly that the Argentinians had to withdraw; that any interim administration must protect the rights of the Islanders; and that there could be no deadline for negotiations and no prejudgement of their outcome. But the Americans regarded HMG's attitude to the various American ideas as reasonable, particularly compared to the Argentine response. This was, according to the US view, intransigent and unacceptable. Mr Haig left President Galtieri in no doubt that if this intransigence persisted the US Government would come down on the British side.

/31.





31. As we put it to Mr Haig, if they could not succeed in extorting concessions on sovereignty the other motives of the Argentinians in this phase were evidently to spin out the negotiations so as to prolong the de facto occupation of the Islands, to try to postpone a British landing and to hope that, with the passage of time, Latin American and world opinion would veer increasingly to their side. But it would be wrong to give the impression that it was ever quite clear what they were up to. Mr Haig described to me the utter irrationality and chaotic nature of the Argentine leadership. There seemed to be about 50 people involved in the decisions, including various corps commanders. Later, by the end of May when we were back in the Islands in force, it came to look as though the junta, and the various corps commanders who exercised great influence behind them, would find it easier, given domestic instability and the rabble they had roused, to accept military defeat - for which scapegoats would be found - than to agree to a diplomatic compromise.

32. The Argentine reply to the US proposals worked out after these prolonged negotiations and put to them, as to the UK, on 27 April, amounted to a rejection; whereupon, Mr Haig made a statement on 30 April. Haig had been made aware of our own reservations but, greatly to our advantage, he turned a blind eye to these, focussing on the categorical objections of the Argentinians. He said that, while the US had reasons to hope that the UK would consider settlement

/on the





on the lines of the US proposals, Argentina had been unable to accept them.

33. He announced various economic measures against Argentina and, most important, he declared that the US would "respond positively to requests for materiel support for British forces".

From the US decision of 30 April to the Argentine surrender on 14 June

34. The US decision of 30 April to support Britain was a turning-point in our fortunes. But it did not put an end to negotiations or to America's part in them. On the contrary, the US Government's desire to bring off a peaceful settlement grew with the prospect of battle. Others too, the Peruvians, the Secretary General of the UN, and the Brazilians entered the diplomatic fray.

35. When you visited Washington a second time on 1-2 May, following a rough debate in the House of Commons, and coinciding with the first Vulcan attack on Port Stanley airfield, Mr Haig outlined a seven-point plan that had originated, he said, in a Peruvian initiative. This included: the setting up of a supervisory contact group comprising two Latin American countries, the FRG and the USA; and the laying down of a time limit - 30 April 1983 - by which a definitive agreement for the future of the Islands would have to be reached.

36. While the Prime Minister, you and other Ministers were considering this plan in London, Mr Haig was expressing

/great





great concern to me about

- (a) the latest Peruvian attitude after the sinking of the Belgrano on 3 May,
- (b) the deterioration in US and Western opinion that he feared would be likely to occur if Britain took further military action, and
- (c) the need for London to show an initiative in favour of peace by proposing a ceasefire to be followed by implementation of the seven-point plan.

He followed this up by asking me to transmit to London the text of his seven-point plan and the draft of a ceasefire statement to be made by HMG. It was the moment, he urged, for a magnanimous diplomatic move to be made by HMG when they had demonstrated their military dominance.

37. Mr Haig was extremely worked-up about the consequences of a prolongation of the fighting. He feared that we might look increasingly to the USA for support and that if opinion came to believe that we had missed the opportunity of peace, it would be difficult for the USA to stay in the supportive position that they had now adopted.

38. London replied to the US seven-point plan with certain amendments which I discussed with Mr Haig. He said that they would be rejected out of hand by Argentina. After a three-hour session Mr Haig produced a new set of points asking me to transmit them to London.

39. HMG accepted these latest proposals, though they presented considerable difficulties. The text was transmitted

/by the



by the US Government to the Peruvians for onward transmission to Argentina, who turned them down. The Argentine aim at this stage was to move to the UN. HMG let the Secretary General know that they could go along with his ideas for a framework, which, to be sure, were similar to those of the US/Peruvian plan.

40. Mr Haig's mood now changed. He told me on 7 May that he was full of admiration for the diplomatic stance HMG was now taking. He hoped "faint hearts" were not gaining ground in the UK. Two days later, however, he was arguing that Britain, while having to maintain maximum military pressure on the Falkland Islands, should avoid attacks on the mainland - a warning that we were to be given frequently in the days ahead.

41. He left the next day for a European tour. No sooner was he out of the country than Mrs Kirkpatrick got into the act. She managed to convince President Reagan that the Argentinians were ready to be forthcoming and persuaded him to telephone the Prime Minister, which he did on 13 May. In deciding to telephone Mrs Thatcher, President Reagan had also been influenced by a conversation he had just had with President Figueiredo of Brazil, who had expressed a readiness to do whatever he could to bring about a peaceful settlement. Discussing this telephone talk with Judge Clark afterwards, he told me how concerned President Reagan was about the worsening Falkland Islands situation. The US had already impaired its relations with the Latin American countries.

/There





There would be serious problems in the Alliance if hostilities became intensified and if there were feelings in the UK that the US was not being supportive enough.

42. I will not relate here, because Sir Anthony Parsons ' has done so in his despatch, the Secretary General's efforts during these weeks to promote a settlement and the US attitude towards them. Mr Haig was always somewhat suspicious of Mr Perez de Cuellar and was afraid that his activities would cut across what he was doing; it looked at times as though he was a little afraid of Mr Perez de Cuellar succeeding where he had failed, and this translated itself into private entreaties that we should not be more flexible with the Secretary General than we had been with him. But when his seven-point plan collapsed through Argentine intransigence he was resigned to the stream of negotiations continuing in New York.

43. Following a weekend of consultations at Chequers attended by Sir Anthony Parsons and myself, a British plan was submitted to the Secretary General of the UN on 17 May and published on the 20th. The main features of this British proposal were:

1. the mutual and balanced withdrawal of forces,
2. the appointment of a UN Administrator to administer the Islands, in consultation with the elected representatives of the Islanders,
3. negotiations between Britain and Argentina on the future of the Islands.

/44.





44. The Argentine response to this proposal was to seek changes designed to pre-judge the outcome of the negotiations, so that they would lead inexorably to Argentine sovereignty and control, to set aside the elected representatives of the islanders, and to enable the Argentine authorities to flood the Islands with Argentinians. They were not prepared to accept language or arrangements which would ensure that the outcome of negotiations would not be pre-judged and that the wishes of the islanders would be respected. They were still prevaricating in order to consolidate their position on the Islands. Although the Argentine response to the British proposals was negative, Mr Haig and Judge Clark were still convinced that this was not the end of the negotiating road. Mr Haig expressed to me on 21 May, after our forces had landed on the Falklands, and on several occasions in the next day or two how anxious he was about the military outcome, his hope that the British would seize the first moment of military success to show a readiness to negotiate, his fears, otherwise, about the long-term bitterness in Latin America, and the opportunity that he saw for the Soviets to increase their influence there.

45. On Saturday evening, 22 May, he came to see me privately at the Embassy to underline the concern of the US Administration at likely developments: at the continued will to fight and the spirit of revanchism that would prevail in Buenos Aires whatever the government in power, unless this could be headed off by British readiness to negotiate now rather than

/to pursue





to pursue the conflict to a bitter conclusion. Haig reinforced these fears by a dire prediction of what Congress was about to do in calling for a ceasefire. The New York Times, incidentally, had that morning published defeatist stories based on official briefing.

46. On 24 May Mr Haig suggested to me a possible plan involving a ceasefire and withdrawal, a US/Brazilian interim administration (President Figueiredo had made a considerable impact on Washington thinking) and discussions about the future without prior commitment. All this reflected Mr Haig's anxiety about the impending meeting of the Rio Treaty which, he foresaw, would isolate the USA from its hemispheric neighbours. I told Mr Haig immediately, without reference to London, that these ideas would be unacceptable there in current circumstances. Later the same day Mr Haig, in another change of mood, telephoned to say that the President supported Britain solidly.

47. In order to try to keep the idea of a negotiation going, Mr Haig sent you a further message saying that the USA would be prepared to provide a battalion to ensure no violation of any interim agreement on the Falklands. He asked HMG to consider a scheme submitted by Brazil in New York for withdrawal and an interim administration, with the addition, so Mr Haig suggested, of a US/Brazilian peace-keeping force. He followed this up with a plea to London that when we had reached the highest point of military pressure we should offer a magnanimous proposal to bring

/military





military activity to an end. But by this time British forces had been engaged in hazardous operations and the bridgehead had been established at San Carlos. The heavy Argentine air attacks marking their national day on 25 May heightened the tension in Washington almost as acutely as in London. You replied to Mr Haig that people in Britain would no longer accept the idea of mutual withdrawal or an interim administration. A few days later I rubbed this home on instructions from the Prime Minister and you, saying that we were determined to repossess the Falklands, reinstate British administration and only thereafter consider future developments, though we acknowledged the desirability eventually to have some kind of international security arrangement involving the Americans.

48. Mr Haig was worried by the way the British political attitude seemed to be hardening pari passu with the progress in British military operations. He was greatly concerned about the impact of this on Latin America; and it is relevant to record that the Rio Treaty signatories had just been meeting in Washington and, as Mr Haig had foreseen, had delivered a venomous attack on the US calling upon them to cease supporting Britain. Mr Haig had made a stout speech to the meeting blaming Argentina and contesting the invocation of the Rio Treaty for the defence of aggression by one of its own members.

49. It was in this context that Mr Haig thereupon floated the idea of creating an international umbrella organisation

/to consider





to consider the ultimate status of the Islands. Shortly afterwards he formulated this in a new plan of 29 May in which the umbrella idea became crystallised in another contact group comprising the UK, the USA, Brazil and Argentina. It was an essential feature of this fresh USA initiative that it should be launched before the final defeat of the Argentine forces.

50. This mood of anxiety in Washington was reflected in the decision taken by the President to telephone the Prime Minister again. This call took place on 31 May. Mr Reagan's purpose seemed to be not only to register concern about Latin American opinion but to float the idea of yet another US peace initiative. The Prime Minister was emphatic in response. She followed it by telephoning me to ask me to see Judge Clark at the White House and ensure that the President and he understood the British attitude. Thereupon, on 1 June I called on Judge Clark and made clear, at the Prime Minister's request, that Britain, having negotiated in good faith for weeks, during which time the Argentinians showed no sign of being ready to talk business, were not prepared now, when we were back in the Islands after considerable sacrifice, simply to pull out and make way for a contact group including countries from Latin America.

51. I recall how at one moment in this machine-gun exchange of ideas Mr Haig sought to recruit Winston Churchill for the cause of flexibility. He spoke of Churchill's call for magnanimity, to which I rejoined that Churchill had

/not





not talked of magnanimity until after victory had been achieved. But nothing assuaged the American concern at this stage - that is to say at the end of May and the beginning of June - about the dire consequences that would flow from overwhelming military defeat inflicted on the Argentinians. This sentiment was reflected in a hand-wringing editorial in the Washington Post, an unfailing barometer of defeatist pressure. I conveyed to London as best I could the evidence of a growing gap between the resolute attitude in London and the mood in Washington favouring a soft line by us towards Argentina.

52. The prospect of a bloody battle for Port Stanley heightened tension at the UN where the Latinos managed to get a resolution introduced into the Security Council calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal - an event that will be remembered only for the light it cast on the appalling relations between Mrs Kirkpatrick and Mr Haig.

53. The President and Mr Haig left Washington on 2 June for a European tour. With Summit and bilateral meetings there, and the Israel invasion of the Lebanon hitting the headlines, the diplomatic spotlight was momentarily off the Falklands where British forces were advancing for an assault on Port Stanley. Contrary to US fears of a major battle, this was avoided and the Argentine forces on the Islands surrendered on 14 June. That was the end of the ding-dong negotiating battle in Washington.

/The Significance ..





The Significance of the Negotiations seen in Retrospect and  
Mr Haig's part in them

54. Undeniably, the ceaseless diplomatic efforts that the US had been making since early April had not achieved their main purpose, which was to bring about a settlement that avoided bloodshed and humiliation for either side. But from the British angle, these prolonged negotiations brought advantages. During the considerable time that elapsed between the despatch of the task force from the UK and its readiness to repossess the Islands, there was a need for something to fill the diplomatic vacuum. Anything would have been better than further interventions by the UN. There were positive advantages in Mr Haig's to-ings and fro-ings and frequent proposals. Without them, Argentine intransigence would not have been exposed, and without this exposure the US decision to give Britain support would probably not have come when it did or been so categorical. Mr Haig's insistence on even-handedness in public between London and Buenos Aires so long as he thought he could bring off a negotiated settlement was exasperating to the UK; it seemed at times too to conflict with the practical support the USA were providing us. Thus his statement on 14 April that "since the onset of the crisis, the United States had not acceded to requests that would go beyond the scope of customary patterns of cooperation based on bilateral agreements" did not reflect the realities of the help the US were affording. Equally tiresome to London was Mr Haig's

/view





view that US interests would best be served by keeping President Galtieri in power and saving his face. He tended to believe that just because war would not benefit either side, it should be possible to negotiate peace. As Mr Kissinger has pointed out, he was reflecting here a long-held American tradition: that all international disputes must inherently be susceptible to peaceful settlement by reasonable men and women.

55. There was no doubt too, and I said so several times to Mr Haig, that he exaggerated the degree of Latin American solidarity on this issue and the extent of long-term resentment that would be caused to the USA by support for Britain.

56. Both Mr Haig and Mr Weinberger made personal efforts to ensure that we received practical support of a highly important kind. This is described later in the despatch. Mr Haig saw the crisis as something nearly as crucial to the US as to the UK and as having a close bearing on the future of the Atlantic Alliance. He took us at all times into his confidence, even when this involved thinking aloud and revealing how changeable were his moods and ideas. Elsewhere I have described how suspicious Mr Haig is by nature: a ready victim for any Iago. But I am sure that he came to trust us completely: and I believe that we benefited from this, though strong nerves were needed at times to cope with it. Just to give you some idea of the extent to which Mr Haig consulted us from the beginning to

/the end





the end of this crisis, I should record that I had innumerable meetings with him, often alone, and practically no day went by without him telephoning me, frequently several times.

57. The obvious question arises how far US policy might have been different if Mr Haig had not been Secretary of State, or to put it another way, whether he was on balance helpful or harmful to British interests.

58. As I have already indicated, there were obvious advantages in having the US Government busy in negotiation during the long interval between Argentinian aggression and our return to the Islands; but it does not follow from this that Mr Haig's methods were the most effective way of filling the negotiating vacuum or were the most favourable from our point of view. Although he dominated the US negotiating scene he never succeeded in eliminating everyone from the wings where indeed there were plenty of people eager to get on to the stage and play a different role. The influence of these pro-Latinos may well have encouraged the Argentinians in their intransigence which was obviously damaging to us. Given the American system of government it would not have been possible on this issue, or indeed on any other, to have had one clear-cut and decisive fount of policy.

59. From our point of view, Mr Haig, as many people in London know, and as will be apparent from the above narrative, was variable in mood and erratic in judgement. The President did not give a strong lead and allowed the frictions in the decision-making process to continue. I am sure, though, that

/Mr Haig's





Mr Haig's was the decisive influence throughout: he wanted us to win and would have been horrified if the Argentinians had got away with it. He did, it is true, persuade us to accept ideas we did not like, but he never tried to get us to go against our judgement of our fundamental interests. He handled many turning points in a way that was beneficial to us and the value of this can only be realised if it is kept firmly in mind that US support was not something that could ever have been taken for granted.

60. Now that Mr Haig has resigned, I have found myself wondering what the bearing was of the whole affair on him personally. Of course, if he had succeeded it would have been regarded as a personal triumph a la Kissinger; his prestige would have been boosted and he might have begun to look indispensable, something that would have discomfited his many enemies in high places. Success, too, might have assuaged the tension within him and compensated for the great physical stress he had undergone. The failure of the negotiation was undoubtedly a set-back to him, both to his standing as Secretary of State and to his inner peace of mind. On the day he left the State Department he confided to his senior staff that one of his greatest regrets on leaving office was that he had been unable to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Falklands crisis.

61. My overall conclusions about the negotiating phase of the Falklands crisis are as follows:

(a) had the Argentinians accepted any of the many

/proposals





proposals offered them, they would have secured something and would have been much better off than they were by choosing the alternative outcome of military confrontation leading to surrender;

- (b) The prolonged negotiations caused HMG difficulties but they were on balance beneficial, because
- (c) The US decision to come down on the British side and support us was not something that was inevitable or could have been taken for granted. It might not have happened without US exasperation with Argentine intransigence.
- (d) The US decision to support us and the way they did so owed a lot to Mr Haig, though it is doubtful whether the outcome did him much good personally;
- (e) Media, Congressional and public opinion exercised an important influence, as I will now describe.

#### THE MEDIA, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC

62. For an issue not directly involving US territory or nationals, the Falklands crisis attracted unprecedented US media interest. From the Argentine invasion to the surrender at Port Stanley it was front page news, and the lead story for TV, every day. The level of interest, the novelty of the issue, and the impossibility of securing on-the-spot coverage combined to produce an exceptional demand for information on HMG's policies and on daily, even hourly developments.

63. Although from the start there was sympathy for our cause in the media, Congress and the public, this was not

/universal





universal and there was much wavering. As I have already indicated, there was a tendency early on to regard the whole thing as some sort of opera bouffe. Then emerged the widespread feeling that a small population so far away could surely not be worth the risk of war, particularly one between two of the USA's allies. Lord Carrington's resignation, which a considerable number of people confessed to me they could not understand, encouraged speculation here about divisions on policy within the British Government. Doubts began to be expressed by military experts, on television and in the press, about our capability to mount a successful military operation in the South Atlantic.

64. It seemed essential to launch a public relations effort throughout the USA to get at the US press, radio and television. Clearly in a matter of this kind affecting American interests, the US Government would be influenced in their decisions by public opinion.

65. We therefore set in hand a major campaign, conducted throughout the country by the Embassy, BIS New York and the Consulates General. Its specific aims were:

- (a) to persuade the Americans that this was an issue of principle bearing upon them directly; aggression had occurred and if the Argentinians were able to get away with it this could encourage instability in the whole American hemisphere, riddled, as it was, with territorial claims;
- (b) to answer the question why we were prepared to

/go to





go to such lengths for less than 2,000 people at the other end of the world, by pointing out how strongly the Americans had felt about 52 hostages in Iran, and that what was at stake was whether, in the American hemisphere, differences were going to be settled by force, or whether the principle of self-determination, which the USA had pioneered, was going to prevail;

- (c) to rebut the idea that it was a colonial issue, and to remind the Americans that since the end of World War Two we had given a quarter of the world's population independence, but had not transferred a single person against their will to a third power, least of all to a military dictatorship;
- (d) to remind them of the implications for the Alliance;
- (e) to give a warning of the advantages the Soviets could derive from an Argentine victory to which they might well claim they had contributed;
- (f) to make it clear that the UK had the will and ability to restore British administration of the Islands, by force if necessary.

66. We concentrated a lot of effort on television. I gave more than 60 interviews, appearing frequently on programmes seen all over the USA, such as the morning news networks, the McNeil-Lehrer show, ABC's Nightline and the Sunday morning news magazines. As regards radio, BIS New York

/placed



placed 120 items with the major radio networks, covering 7,000 stations.

67. Sympathy and public support could at no stage be assumed. As the prospect of a bloody battle became more likely, the uncertainties in public opinion tended to increase. The subject therefore required constant attention and our campaign continued throughout the 74 days.

68. We levelled a particular campaign at Capitol Hill. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, I wrote to all members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, as well as the House and Senate leadership (some sixty Members of Congress in all) setting out our case. At the same time, I called on the 24 leading members of the House and Senate to brief them on our position and secure their support. The initial calls were made just before the Easter recess and were followed by other calls immediately after the recess finished. In addition, I and Embassy staff were in daily touch either with Members of Congress, particularly Committee Chairmen, or their staffs. We encouraged those members of the House and Senate who were keen to put down Resolutions in our support to do so and gave informal advice on the drafting.

69. The Administration was initially reluctant to see Congress express a strong view on the Falklands for fear that this would cut across their own efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the dispute. In fact, the growing strength of feeling in Congress undoubtedly influenced the

/Administration





Administration in its decision to come down on our side. The Senate adopted a Resolution supporting Britain on 29 April (the day before the Administration announced its decision to support us actively). The House of Representatives adopted a similar Resolution a few days later.

70. We continued to explain our case daily to Members of Congress to correct misapprehensions and to ensure that Members of Congress understood at each stage the steps we were obliged to take. When the British Government published its proposals for a peaceful settlement on 20 May, I wrote again to all the key Members of Congress sending them the text of our proposals and explaining the reasons why a negotiated settlement had proved impossible. One of the notable features of Congressional support was the extent to which those who are often critical of us over Northern Ireland eg. Senators Kennedy and Moynihan and Speaker O'Neill publicly backed us on the Falklands.

71. British readers may wonder whether such blatant canvassing of Congress might not have been counter-productive as it would have been mutatis mutandis with the House of Commons. But it is one of the facts of American public life that make it so different from ours, that no resentment is aroused there if foreigners try to sell their diplomatic wares, exert pressure, and indeed interfere in their deliberations. On the contrary any inhibition to do so would be regarded as a sign of lack of conviction.

/US SUPPORT



## US SUPPORT

72. I think it is worth describing what in practice the offer of US support meant to us. Apart from the obvious political implications, it had far-reaching practical benefits, as follows:

(a) Facilities on Ascension Island

The use of the US Air Force Base on Ascension Island was of course of crucial importance to our whole operation. The Americans could not have denied us the use of this base without infringing the terms of the agreement under which it had been set up. But nothing in the agreement bound them to be as cooperative as they were over the use of the base. They supplied additional accommodation and water purification plants and made available at short notice and as a result of diversion from their own supplies 12.5 million gallons of aviation fuel without which the build-up, surveillance, air-drop and bombing missions supported by tanker aircraft into the South Atlantic could not have taken place.

(b) Military Equipment

The Americans supplied a wealth of important equipment: for instance, the latest version of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, vital for the Harriers; Harpoon and Shrike missiles; 4,700 tons of airfield matting for the rapid reconstruction of Port Stanley airport; helicopter engines, submarine detection /devices,





devices, and many other important items of equipment. The Stinger missile, used for the first time in combat, was particularly effective. These supplies were paid for. Many major items of equipment were supplied from the US inventory, often at 24 hours' notice; flexibility was shown over the financial arrangements, and US readiness to meet requests as quickly and helpfully as possible was remarkable. Prior to 30 April some of the officials and military personnel with whom we had dealings showed signs of nervousness. But after that date all reservations disappeared, and those concerned worked night and day processing our requests. Some decisions were taken at the highest level to supply us with equipment out of existing stocks at the expense of US operational requirements. I was in frequent touch with Mr Weinberger, and on the few occasions Pentagon officials queried our requests, he over-ruled them. These equipment supplies were supplemented by technical advice on such matters as fitting missiles to aircraft in service in the South Atlantic, electronic counter-measures, dealing with unexploded bombs in frigates and scattered mines left by the Argentinians.

(c) Communications

Communications between the task force and the UK  
/were



were greatly facilitated by the provision of additional channels on US communications satellites. Inevitably some of the channels made available to us in this way were lost to the Americans. Our submarines and other forces could not have operated in the way they did without the use of US satellite communications, enabling us to bottle up the Argentine fleet and maintain the essential secure command and control links for the task force.

(d) Intelligence

American help in this area was significantly in excess of "customary cooperation in accordance with long-standing agreements" which was how the Americans described publicly the nature of these links. The Americans made real sacrifices on our behalf; and what they provided made an important contribution to the conduct of operations. Their readiness to help stemmed in part from an automatic instinct but also was the product of the intelligence relationship which had been nurtured since the Second World War. If the Argentines hoped that their support for US covert activities in Central America would influence US policy in their favour in this intelligence area, they were totally disappointed.

(e) Economic

Up to 30 April, the Americans held back from the economic sanctions imposed by our European and old  
/Commonwealth





Commonwealth allies. Thereafter they imposed limited sanctions (suspension of credits etc) which had a limited economic effect, but served as a demonstration of overall support.

(f) Denial of Military Equipment to Argentina

Initially, the Americans sought to restrict the supply of military equipment to Argentina by stepping up the implementation of the restrictions which had been imposed, on human rights grounds, in 1978. We were able to demonstrate that there were important loopholes in the existing embargo. The Administration closed these as quickly and effectively as it could. After 30 April all military exports to Argentina were suspended and certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales was withheld. In addition, the Americans made representations in support of our own approaches to third governments involved in the supply of military equipment to Argentina.

73. Some measure of the significance of US support for Britain over the Falklands is provided by:

- (i) the resentment it caused the Argentinians;
- (ii) an assessment of what would have happened without it; and
- (iii) the precedent of Suez.

I am speaking here, of course, of political as well as materiel support. It would be going too far to say that

/had



had the US remained on the side-lines and not given us the help they did, we could not have repossessed the Islands. But such a US stance would have heartened the Argentinians and exacerbated our problems. We would have taken longer to accomplish the task and suffered greater losses; there would have been considerable damage to US/UK relations and to the Alliance generally.

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE FOR US/UK RELATIONS

74. The Falklands crisis was the most important single test of US/UK relations certainly since Suez and possibly since the end of World War Two; and, unlike Suez, the relationship was of great benefit to us in the crisis and has been enhanced by it.

#### The Way the Closeness of Relations Helped

75. The way in which the relationship helped us over the Falklands illustrates some of its main features:

- (a) (i) The US has special relationships with many countries (eg. FRG, Israel, France); what distinguishes the British connection now, though it has not always been so, and perhaps only for the past 40 years, is collaboration on defence, including nuclear weapons technology, equipment, intelligence, communications, and inter-service exchanges. Some idea of the scale of this intermingling is shown by the fact that at present we have 295 officers and NCOs on liaison, exchanges or projects with the US forces and industry in

/the US.





the US. It is a two-way relationship, particularly in weapon-research and development.

(ii) In the 40-year timescale I am speaking of, the degree of nuclear weapons cooperation has been a sensitive barometer of the relationship: and at the present time, with the Trident project agreed to and the US Government attaching great importance to Britain as a continuing nuclear partner, the barometer is reading high. The Americans are well aware that the future of the Trident programme will turn on the next election in Britain; but few of them find it conceivable that we should choose to abandon nuclear weapons at a time when others - including Argentina - seem so clearly bent on acquiring them.

(iii) This defence connection brought us direct and immediate advantage as soon as the Falklands crisis broke. In the previous section of this despatch I have given some account of the specific support given. We would not have got it in the way we did without that established relationship. The same, of course, applies to the intelligence relationship.

- (b) (i) The other main attribute of the relationship has been the common cultural, demographic and democratic foundation. This subject, a staple of all transatlantic gatherings, has been talked to

/death;



death; but it only needs an issue to arise affecting the interests and sentiments of the two countries, as it did over the Falklands, for it to show its vitality.

(ii) Unlike the Israelis or the Irish or the Greeks, or many other nationalities, there is no organised British lobby in the United States. We have nothing, for instance, to match The Friends of Ireland, a bi-partisan group of Senators and Representatives on the Hill. But whenever I have grumbled about this to my diplomatic colleagues, they have found it laughable, asserting that the whole country is our lobby except for a few dissidents; somewhat on a par with Mrs Kirkpatrick's complaint that the State Department are "Brits in American clothing".

(iii) There have been major changes since the War in the ethnic composition of the American population which have had an important impact on national attitudes. The recent influx of Hispanic people has rivalled the great European migrations of the nineteenth century. The Hispanic population of America has almost doubled in a decade (illegal immigrants alone totalling some 10 million) and could overtake blacks as the largest minority group by the end of the century. The East coast Establishment no longer runs the country. Texans

/and





and Californians, who are very conscious of the USA as a Pacific power and of Mexico and Central America to the South, wield great influence. But the basic identity of the country remains an Anglo-Saxon one, with the English language and Anglo-Saxon traditions continuing to provide the pattern to which recent arrivals seek to conform, and our relations with those responsible for the conduct of public affairs have remained just as close as in the past. In fact, oddly enough, it is the Wasps of the Eastern seaboard, such as Franklin D Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles rather than the Kissingers or Brzezinskis, who have tended to scoff at the emotional baggage of the special relationship, seeing in it an impediment to the hard calculation of America's interest.

(iv) This does not mean that an anti-British seam does not run through American life, made up of many elements. But when the crunch comes, as it did over the Falklands, there is bedrock to fall back upon. An example came my way when I was talking at the height of the crisis to a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In response to my view that the issue was about aggression, and whether it should be tolerated in the Western hemisphere, the Senator demurred. Do you think, he asked rhetorically, that if the Falkland Islands had

/belonged





belonged to Brazil rather than to you, and Argentina had invaded them, the US would have reacted in the way they have done? It is because you are British, with all that that means in this country, that we have supported you.

The Effect of the Falklands Outcome on the Relationship

76. If you look at the other side of the coin and see what the Falklands outcome has done to the relationship between the two countries, the conclusion may look slightly different from opposite sides of the Atlantic. Seen from Britain, there may be doubts about the US role, at least in the early stages. Their initial impartiality was regarded by many in Britain as weak, and by some as disloyal to an ally. Their obsessive concern with Latin American relationships and their apparent readiness to put these ahead of, or at least on a par with, their European relationships, seemed incomprehensible to many at home. The twists and turns of US policy through the crisis left more than a shadow on the reputation of the Reagan Administration and brought more sharply home than anything else had done that in terms of coherence in foreign policy there was little to choose between it and its predecessor. These impressions were particularly strong among those who could not know about the substantial materiel help the Americans had been giving us behind the scenes from the outset.

77. The crisis also gave emphasis to the diffuse US decision-making process: the post-Vietnam-Watergate weakening of

/the





the executive; and the struggle for influence between the different branches of the executive. I doubt whether there is going to be any early remedy for this; there is certainly no easy prescription for foreign governments in dealing with it. But let us not depress ourselves into thinking that we are facing a new problem. I have come across a report from the US Embassy in London of 7 January 1950, that according to the US Archives was read with great interest by President Truman, containing the following as one of the main causes for the strain in US/UK relations: "The British have never really understood how policy is arrived at in US, and are often disconcerted by the confusion which appears to surround American foreign policy making. They are therefore often unduly worried ...".

78. Judged from this side of the Atlantic, the outcome was favourable to our interests. For a long time Britain has been identified with decline in the American press and in the mind's eye of many people here - a deterioration not just in industrial output but in national will, in the essential dash and doggedness that were regarded by Americans as a hallmark of the British character. Well, the Falklands have corrected that. They have shown that we are prepared to stand up for our rights and for certain beliefs, even at the risk of human life; and that we have the will and professionalism needed for success. In the early days of the operation so many wiseacres here were expressing, in private and public, advice as grave as it was expert,

/about





about the hazards of undertaking a reoccupation of the Islands. The results demonstrated how they had underestimated contemporary Britain. This will have left a mark.

79. I should interject here that if we are to derive due benefit from the successful outcome, we must as soon as possible and in the fullest manner let the US authorities have an account of the lessons of the whole military operation - to include everything from command and control, tactics, communications and logistics to weapons performance. This will be to our interest, not simply for the increased sales of military equipment that may follow, but in terms of the overall defence connection.

80. On our role as a defence partner, which, as I have suggested, is the rock upon which the relationship is founded, the Falklands outcome has made a particular impact. The Americans do not take naturally to the role of world policeman and were distressed when we ceased to be alongside them in this task. As Henry Kissinger said in his recent lecture in Chatham House:

"It is beyond the psychological resources of the United States - not only the physical - to be the sole or even the principal centre of initiative and responsibility in the non-Communist world. (This is one reason why I always favored the independent British and French nuclear deterrents.)"

81. I do not want to suggest that through our Falklands  
/operation





operation the Americans hope that we are showing a readiness to play a world role once again but in their eyes there is a good deal that can be done "out of area" that does not necessarily imply a full global responsibility. They believe that by our successful operation 8,000 miles away from the home base we have shown a capability that is both relevant to their own tasks with the Rapid Deployment Force and to the partnership between us for the defence of Western security.

#### The Future

82. The Falklands have given a fillip to our relations. How long it lasts will depend on what happens in many areas, and in particular on how the current trans-Atlantic tensions are handled on both sides. Differences of view and of interest on major economic issues, eg. steel, economic relations with the Soviet bloc and protectionism, could affect the gains from the Falklands. We have also to bear in mind the unequal balance and the changing pattern, economic and political, as between us and the USA.

83. The Americans are little aware of these changes. Few realise that in the past 25 years there has been a complete reversal in the relative economic strength of the USA and the Ten. In 1955 the ten countries that now make up the Community had a gross domestic product that was only about half that of the USA; by 1980 it was already larger. Moreover - a significant pointer to the future development of their respective economic strength - the Ten already invest more than the United States, and they are increasing their

/investment





investment at a faster rate. Above all, the USA is now much more dependent on foreign trade than even a decade ago. Today about one job in eight in the USA depends on exports: exports of agricultural products and raw materials have increased six times in the last ten years. In the same period American assets abroad have increased five times. Even those Americans that understand these trends have not yet fully thought through the implications that they will have for the future of the Transatlantic relationship.

84. Within this broad picture, our own national wealth, though it has grown, is now less than that of France and of the Federal German Republic. This weakness, though it is only comparative, has a bearing on the USA's attitude to us as an ally. But we still have far larger direct investments in the USA than any of our trading partners; and we now provide the Americans with nearly 10% of their crude oil imports. In addition we spend as much on defence as any other of America's allies (except perhaps the Germans) and decidedly more in relation to our national wealth. These are positive assets to balance the others.

#### CONCLUSION

85. From my two tours in Washington, spread over 35 years, and from the intense experience of the Falklands crisis, I am convinced that there is something particular about our relationship that transcends matters of immediate economic and military concern. This does not mean that we do not have conflicts of interests or disputes. But it is not

/like





like dealing with any other foreign power. We can and do discuss problems without fear of offence and in a spirit that seeks compromise rather than confrontation. There is nothing to match it in our relations with any other major country. Membership of the EC has not weakened our bilateral political relationship with the USA, whatever the initial fears, but it does mean that we are members of a club that has even more economic weight than the USA. I am in no doubt about the compulsion of our membership of the European Community; but now, after three years in Washington, I do not consider, any more than I did before, that it is incompatible with our close bilateral relations with the USA.

86. I am sending copies of this despatch (without enclosures) to the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Secretary of the Cabinet, and Her Majesty's Representatives at all EC posts, UKMis New York and UKDel NATO.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant

*Nicholas Henderson*

Nicholas Henderson



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 180, 20 August 1982 (to 1049)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>A. Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 179, 17 August 1982 (Bio 48)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 178, 10 August 1982 (folio 47)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Fletcher to Hatfield dated 9 August 1982 (K101046)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

SECRET

file B  
45

9

MR. HATFIELD

The Prime Minister has seen and noted  
Sir Robert Armstrong's minute (reference A09211)  
about Israel and arms to Argentina.

TIM FLESHER

9 August 1982

SECRET





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Fletcher to Hatfield dated 6 August 1982 (Blio 44)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Coler dated 6 August 1982 (folio 43)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 177, 6 August 1982 (folio 42)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Prime Minister dated 5 August 1982, with attachment</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



SECRET

40 2

Prime Minister:

Ref. A09211

MR COLES

Israel and Arms for Argentina

In your minute of 2nd August you said that the Prime Minister had asked when Israel purchased the Mirage aircraft which are now considered surplus. It is believed that their aircraft comprise most of a batch purchased over the period 1963-1966.

I should also draw your attention to an error in the assessment attached to my earlier minute. The word 'Argentine' should be substituted from 'Israeli' in the penultimate line of paragraph 2. The mistake is regretted.

  
R P HATFIELD

5th August 1982

SECRET



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 176, 4 August 1982 (folio 39)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



CONFIDENTIAL

MFJ

*Argentina*

4 August 1982

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of Brian Fall's letter of 30 July on the question of intelligence about Argentine intentions towards the Falkland Islands.

JC

*S*

Francis Richards Esq  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Santiago telegram No. 373 dated 3 August 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... <i>40</i> ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



*Instructions for completion of Dummy Card*

Use **Black Pen** to complete form

Use the card for one piece/item number only

Enter the Lettercode, Series and Piece/Item references clearly  
e.g.

LETTERCODE/SERIES

.....GRA 168.....

PIECE/ITEM .....49.....

(ONE PIECE/ITEM NUMBER ONLY)

Please Sign and Date in the box adjacent to the description that  
applies to the document being replaced by the Dummy Card

If the document is Closed under a FOI exemption, enter the number of  
years closed. See the TNA guidance *Preparation of records for  
transfer to The National Archives*, section 18.2

The box described as 'Missing' is for TNA use only (it will apply to a  
document that is not in it's proper place after it has been transferred to  
TNA)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 10 D/S

DIO

H/P

NNNN

ZCZCRKA333RSA397B

RR YDRKDV

DE YDRSAZ £1094 2151547

ZNY MMNSH

ZKZK RR OS ADE

R 031402Z AUG 82

FM MODUK

TO CABINET OFFICE

GCHQ

GCOL

SIS LONDON

SECURITY SERVICE

CINCFLEET

ZEN/CINCNAVHOME

YDRSANC/UKLF

HQSTC

HQ RAFG

FCOL

HQ 1 GP

HQ 38 GP

YDRKANC/HQ 18 GP

UKN-292M

BDILS(W)

JARIC

YDRKAOC/MGRM CDO FORCES

YDRKDHC/22 SAS

EWOSE BENSON

YDRKIHC/FOGIB

UKM-254

YDRKOZC/CBFSU ASI

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L COMINT CHANNELS

CABINET OFFICE KEEP AND PASS TO 10 DOWNING STREET

22 SAS EXCLUSIVE FOR I.O.

FOGIB PASS TO RAF DET GIB

UKM-254 PASS CTG 317.0/CTG 317.1

File Clerk

Please say that we need  
to receive the reduced  
product.

JL 3/8

Please note that I  
have told DIC that  
we would like to  
receive the reduced  
Intsum, which I  
understand they will  
issue on a  
weekly basis

Steve  
5/8/82

## OPERATION CORPORATE - MODUK INTSUM

1. WITH THE REDUCTION IN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT THREE ISSUES EACH WEEK OF THE MODUK INTSUM IS BEING REVIEWED.
2. ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED TO COMMENT ON:
  - A. THE VALUE OF THE RECENT ISSUES OF THE PRODUCT.
  - B. THEIR NEED TO RECEIVE THE REDUCED PRODUCT.
3. REPLIES ARE REQUESTED BY 051200Z AUG EITHER BY SIGNAL OR DIRECT TO THE DIC BY TELEPHONE 01-218-6737, ADDRESSED TO THE HEAD OF WATCH DIC FALKLANDS CELL.

£1094

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL



Handley

Argentina

CONFIDENTIAL

GPS 120

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PORT STANLEY 021830Z JULY

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 146 OF 2 AUGUST .

POLISH FISHING BOATS

1. AS MOD WILL HAVE INFORMED YOU OVER THE WEEKEND THE ROYAL NAVY DETECTED A POLISH TRAWLER NINETY MILES NORTH OF THE FALKLANDS ON THE MORNING OF 31 AUGUST. HAVING CONSULTED US, THEY SIGNALLED NORTHWOOD SUGGESTING THAT THE POLES BE REMINDED OF THE PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT ON 22 JULY THAT PORT STANLEY HARBOUR AND THE 3 MILE TERRITORIAL SEA AROUND THE FALKLANDS REMAINED CLOSED TO COMMERCIAL SHIPPING FOR REASONS OF SAFETY.
2. THE NAVY NOW SAY THERE ARE FOUR TRAWLERS ABOUT 60 MILES NORTH AND ONE MUCH CLOSER TO THE EAST WHICH APPEARS TO BE STEAMING SOUTH. ONE HAS ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO FISH THE FALKLANDS BANK.
3. FOR OBVIOUS SECURITY REASONS THE NAVY WILL WISH TO CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT THE POLES STAY OUTSIDE THE THREE MILE LIMIT, AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT DISPUTE THIS. BUT AS YOU KNOW HARBOUR DUES FROM THE POLISH FISHING FLEET HAVE BEEN A CONSIDERABLE SOURCE OF INCOME TO THE FIG IN THE PAST.

HUNT

[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

FALKLANDS UNIT

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

CONFIDENTIAL



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No 175, 2 August 1982 (folio 38)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Armstrong dated 2 August 1982 (Klio 37)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

BF

File

SECRET

da



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

MR. HATFIELD  
CABINET OFFICE

Israel and Arms for Argentina

The Prime Minister read over the weekend the note on the above subject prepared by the Assessments Staff, which was annexed to your minute of 30 July.

The Prime Minister has asked when Israel purchased the Mirage aircraft which, according to paragraph 3 of the assessment, are now considered to be surplus.

B/P /

I should be grateful for your comments.

A. J. COLES

2 August 1982

S

SECRET





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 174, 30 July 1982 (folio 35)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Fall to Coler dated 30 July 1982 (folio 34a)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Hatfield to Coler dated 30 July 1982, with attachment (folio 34)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

SECRET



Argentina 33  
Zile AN

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

WARNING OF ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION

I have shown the Prime Minister your minute A09118 of 27 July 1982, and she has noted the present position on American photographic satellite coverage of Argentina.

JAW.

28 July 1982

SECRET

AK





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 173, 28 July 1982 (folio 32)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

Ref: B06572

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

*Play A*

An Extended Permanent Airfield in the Falkland Islands  
(OD(FAF)(82) 14)

## BACKGROUND

*Play B*

The Defence Secretary's note was commissioned at the Sub-Committee's meeting on 6th July (OD(FAF)(82) 2nd Meeting) on the assumption that a decision to authorise the permanent extension of the runway at Port Stanley airfield would be required not later than the end of July (because the aluminium matting for the existing runway is assessed to have a useful life of only about two years, and it will take two years to build a new permanent runway). As explained in paragraph 8 of the Defence Secretary's note, however, final decisions on the site and size of the airfield cannot be taken until feasibility studies have been carried out, which will take until October. This less demanding timetable will enable Lord Shackleton's recommendations, and decisions on the garrison, to be taken into account when final decisions on the airfield are taken.

2. The note suggests that military rather than civil requirements are the determining factor in the choice of runway length. The Defence Secretary takes it (paragraph 9) that the costs will be considered as Falklands extra costs to be met outside Defence Budget totals. Treasury officials were not consulted, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer will need to be invited to confirm that this is his understanding.

## HANDLING

3. You will wish first to invite the Defence Secretary to introduce his paper. Can he confirm that the requirement for an extended permanent airfield in the Falkland Islands is likely to be inescapable, although the only formal commitment required at this stage is to the carrying out of feasibility studies?





4. In the ensuing discussion, the following points should be addressed.
  - a. Is it agreed that the costs of the new airfield should be treated as Falklands extra costs to be met outside Defence Budget totals (paragraph 9)? Whether or not a medium haul civil air service is established to Brazil or Uruguay, an extended runway will be required for military use.
  - b. Risk of financial penalties (paragraph 9) It would normally take at least a year to launch a major project of this sort. The size and nature of the possible penalties are not clear from the Defence Secretary's note: can they be quantified? Is it certain that the temporary matting will have to be replaced in two years?
  - c. Airfield construction. Is it envisaged that overseas firms will be invited to tender for the construction contract? Should any restrictions be placed on the source of civilian labour?
  - d. Length of runway. The Defence Secretary's paper points (paragraph 3) to a trade-off between runway length and garrison size. This will need to be quantified when proposals are brought forward for the garrison. Subject to this, the advantage of a longer runway is that it would enable more rapid reinforcement in an emergency.
5. The following further points will also need to be addressed.
  - a. Staging facilities on the South American mainland (paragraph 5). The immediate need for these arises because until there is a runway on the Falkland Islands at least 8,000 feet long, no military transport aircraft will be able to reach the Islands from Ascension Island carrying a useful load without refuelling in flight; and the RAF's tanker force would be seriously overused on such tasks, in the sense that aircraft life would quickly be consumed. The response from diplomatic posts in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay has, however, been discouraging on the prospects of securing agreement to the staging of British military aircraft through these countries. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office would prefer to test the market in these countries on civil flights before tackling the military requirement. But this





would leave the Ministry of Defence in difficulties: until agreement can be reached with one mainland South American country, it may be necessary to move troops as well as stores by sea, at least over the Ascension Island to Port Stanley leg of the journey.

*Place* b. South Georgia (paragraph 7a). The possibility of constructing an airstrip on South Georgia was remitted for study to the Defence Secretary at the Sub-Committee's meeting on 22nd June (OD(FAF)(82) 1st Meeting). The Defence Secretary intends to study the feasibility of constructing an airfield with a runway of up to 9,000 feet on South Georgia (there is thought to be a plateau on the island big enough for this). Could an airfield on this scale be justified? Would it make more sense to limit the study to the provision of an airstrip long enough to take Hercules aircraft (ie about 4,000')?

#### CONCLUSIONS

6. Subject to the discussion, you may wish to guide the Sub-Committee to the following conclusions.

- a. A permanently extended airfield on the Falklands will be required in about two years time. Decisions as to its size and siting will need to be taken in the light of the feasibility studies proposed by the Defence Secretary. These should be carried out on the basis of runway lengths from 8,000 feet to 11,250 feet and be completed by October.
- b. Airfield construction costs will be treated as Falklands extra costs, to be met outside the Defence Budget.
- c. Further consideration should be given to the questions of allowing tenders from overseas contractors and of using foreign labour.
- d. The use of airfields in Brazil, Chile, or Uruguay for military staging purposes should be pursued, but not to the point where the establishment of civil air links is prejudiced.





e. The Defence Secretary's study on the provision of an airstrip on South Georgia should concentrate on what would be required to enable RAF transport aircraft to land there from the Falkland Islands.

*ADG*

27th July 1982

A D S GOODALL



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Onand to Cotes dated 27 July 1982, with enclosures, (file 31)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. J. Land</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES  ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Whitmore dated 27 July 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>31 May 2012 A Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Armstrong dated 27 July 1982 (folio 29)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Coles dated 26 July 1982 (folio 28)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 172,</i> <i>26 July 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

Mr. Wright

Israel and Arms for Argentina

As you may be aware, the Government has made representations on more than one occasion recently to the Israeli Government about the latter's involvement in arms supplies to Argentina. We have recently heard that specific allegations about the Israeli supply of Mirage III aircraft as well as Skyhawks have been strongly denied at the highest level in Israel.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for a summary of intelligence relating to Israeli arms supplies to Argentina. Could this please be made available as quickly as possible.

A. J. COLES

23 July, 1982.

SECRET



*Back to Mr. [unclear]*

ISRAEL AND ARMS FOR ARGENTINA

25 JUNE.

1. The British Government has received a number of disturbing reports recently about Israeli involvement in arms supplies to Argentina.

2. I should particularly like to mention the following specific cases:

(a) It has now become clear that complicated transport and financial arrangements are being set in hand for the delivery of over 20 Mirage III type aircraft to Argentina. We understand that they are from the Israeli Air Force's existing stocks and likely to be delivered in the next few weeks. There is no doubt that the contract for this deal was signed after the invasion of the Falklands, after the aircraft were inspected by Argentine officers visiting Israel. Both private dealers and the Israeli Government are clearly involved. (We have already expressed our concern about an aspect of this on other <sup>channels</sup> ~~claimants~~.)

(b) IMI in Tel Aviv has offered substantial quantities of ammunition to Argentina, for delivery in the near future.

(c) According to a story going the rounds in Brazil, Argentina is confidently expecting to obtain around 20 'Skyhawk' aircraft from Israel using Brazil as an intermediary. Gossip in the international arms market indicates that nobody is fooled by the use of a Brazilian middleman. Another version of the story is that Argentina hopes to use a Venezuelan middle man.

(d) The British Government has naturally picked up the report in the Financial Times of 10 June about a proposed letter of credit to enable Argentina to buy some US\$50 million worth of military equipment; it is clear that this story was based on more than mere rumour. Indeed the bank has apparently confirmed to the Financial Times that an approach was made to them with the purpose of buying arms for Israel.

(e)



(e) A source in commercial circles tells us that the firm Pacific Commercial and Trading Inc (PCATI) which is registered in Switzerland, but is controlled by Israelis, is engaged in financial transactions with the Argentine Air Force involving very large sums indeed. A second source tells us that the Israeli Government is acting as a financial guarantor in that deal.

3. The British Government cannot reconcile these reports with the assurances it has received from the Israeli Government on this question.

4. It is as important as ever that Argentina should continue to be denied access to arms and military equipment. Not only has she refused to commit herself to a definitive end to hostilities, but statements coming out of Argentina remain bellicose and threatening (eg they have said there will be no peace until all British troops leave the Falklands). Our forces are still at risk and are on full alert. The withholding of arms remains an important way in which the Argentines can be induced to adopt a more sensible approach; any immediate resumption of arms supplies at this stage can only make them more intransigent.

5. Can we therefore ask whether the assurances we have received from the Israeli Government are still in force?



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No 171, 23 July 1982 (folio 26)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES  ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Omand to Coles dated 22 July 1982 (folio 25)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>31 May 2012 @Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Letter from Coles to Fall dated 22 July 1982 (folio 24)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 170, 21 July 1982 (fold 23A)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Pym to Prime Minister dated 20 July 1982 (folio 23)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



~~SECRET~~



22  
2.4 A4

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Principal Private Secretary*

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

WARNING OF ARGENTINE MILITARY ACTION  
AGAINST THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND DEPENDENCIES

B/F. x/ The Prime Minister has seen your minute A09046 of 19 July 1982 and JIC(82)(N)71 which you sent with your minute. She has taken note of the JIC's assessment. She would like to know whether the United States has any photographic satellite coverage of the Argentine. I should be grateful if you could let me know the answer to the Prime Minister's question.

KAW.

20 July 1982

~~SECRET~~

AL

CONFIDENTIAL



HLE

OD(SA)  
cc: HQ  
FCO  
CWL

10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

19 July, 1982

POSSIBLE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PLASTIC MINES

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 13 July. She agrees with your Secretary of State that publicity regarding the laying of plastic mines on the Falkland Islands by the Argentines should concentrate on Argentine irresponsibility rather than alleged contravention of or disregard for any specific agreement.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD(SA) and of the Attorney General and to David Wright.

A. J. COLES

N H R Evans, Esq  
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

RM

RM





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Prime minister dated 19 July 1982 (folio 21)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MOD UK INTSUM No. 169.</i> <i>19 July 1982 (folio 20)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



SECRET

18

05 7641 Ext. 3229

Communications on this subject should  
be addressed to

THE LEGAL SECRETARY  
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS

Our ref 400/82/177

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,  
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,  
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,  
LONDON, W.C.2.

16 July, 1982

N. H. R. Evans, Esq.,  
Assistant Private Secretary to the  
Secretary of State for Defence,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Whitehall,  
London SW1.

N.B. P.D.

A.J.C. 1/2

*See Evans,*

POSSIBLE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PLASTIC MINES

*T.D. 1/2*

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 13 July to John Coles. I have shown it to the Attorney General. He agrees with the analysis of the position which is set out in the letter and concurs in your Secretary of State's recommendation on the line which we should take, as described in the last substantive paragraph of your letter.

I am copying this letter to John Coles, to the Private Secretaries to the other Members of OD(SA) and to David Wright.

*Jan co,*  
*Shirley* *that*

H. STEEL

SECRET

15.11.1982

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MOD UK INTSUM No. 168, 16 July 1982 (folio 17)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

<p>LETTERCODE/SERIES .....</p> <p>PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)</p>	<p>Date and sign</p>
<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p><i>Minute from Coles to Armstrong dated 15 July 1982 (folio 16)</i></p>	
<p>CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
<p>RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958</p>	<p><i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i></p>
<p>TEMPORARILY RETAINED</p>	
<p>MISSING ON TRANSFER</p>	
<p>MISSING</p>	
<p>NUMBER NOT USED</p>	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 167, 14 July 1982 (folio 15)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

SECRET

147

①



Prime Minister

*Agree that publicity should  
emphasise Argentine  
irresponsibility rather than  
a breach of law?*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1

Telephone 01-~~980 7022~~ 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

13th July 1982

A.J.C. <sup>13</sup>/<sub>7</sub>.

*Yes  
ms*

*Dear John,*

POSSIBLE BREACHES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
PLASTIC MINES

*pt 9*

OD(SA), at its 62nd Meeting on June 24th, invited my Secretary of State in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, to arrange for appropriate publicity to be given to Argentine contraventions of the relevant international Conventions in respect of minelaying by Argentine forces in the Falkland Islands. It had been suggested that Argentina might have breached both the UN Weaponry Convention and the Geneva Conventions.

Officials from MOD, the FCO and the Law Officers Department have examined the relevant treaty texts. Their conclusion is that it would be preferable to stress Argentine irresponsibility rather than accuse them of actually breaching International Law. So far as the individual Conventions are concerned the position is as follows:

a. The Weaponry Convention has been signed by both Argentina and the UK but it has not been ratified by them or by the requisite 20 states to bring it into force. It is not, therefore, binding on Argentina or the UK.

b. Signature does not bind a state to observe a treaty but merely to "refrain from acts which would defeat its object and purpose" such as legislating in a way incompatible with the Treaty.

c. When in force, Protocol 1 of the Convention will prohibit the use of any weapon "the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by x-rays". However, in relation to the plastic-cased mines used by the Argentines:





(i) The primary effect of the mines in question is to injure by blast, not fragmentation.

(ii) While plastic fragments are not as readily detectable by x-ray as are metal ones, it is not necessarily impossible to detect them.

d. When in force, Protocol II to the Convention will ban the indiscriminate use of mines, particularly in so far as civilians would be put at hazard; it will require retention of records of all pre-planned minefields, and will commit parties to "endeavouring" to ensure the recording of other minefields placed by them. The Argentines would probably have contravened this Protocol had it been binding upon them.

e. Most of the anti-personnel mines found in the Falklands are made in Italy or Spain, and do not differ widely in plastic or explosive content from our own and other Allied weapons. It would therefore be unwise to criticise Argentina on grounds related to the nature or construction of the mines.

f. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 concern the protection of "war victims". They do not deal with the lawfulness of means and methods of combat.

g. The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions do cover means and methods of combat, but generally, not in relation to specific weapons. They do not address the question of minelaying practice. The UK has signed but not ratified the Protocols; Argentina has not signed them. The Protocols are therefore binding on neither state, although UK forces would seek to abide by them.

In view of these considerations my Secretary of State would be grateful for his colleagues' agreement that publicity should concentrate on Argentine irresponsibility in the casual sowing and improper recording of mines, which, whoever had won the war, would have constituted a serious hazard to the Islanders, troops and livestock for years to come. We should emphasise that this contravenes normally accepted standards, in particular those adopted by our forces. We should not allege contravention of or disregard for any specific agreement.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries of other members of OD(SA), the Attorney General and to David Wright in Sir Robert Armstrong's office.

*Yours ever*  
*Nick Evans*

(N H R EVANS)



13 JUL 1962



COPIED





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Coles dated 13 July 1982 (folio 14)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. J. Land</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Coles to Armstrong dated 12 July 1982 (folio 131)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

MR. WRIGHT

CABINET OFFICE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

The Prime Minister read over the weekend JIC(82)(IA)165. She noted from paragraph 5 of this assessment that the Mexican Ambassador, in reporting his call on Mr. Onslow on 29 June, had conveyed the mistaken impression that the British Government might countenance resuming discussions on sovereignty once relations between Britain and Argentina returned to normal. The Prime Minister has minuted:

"There is no question of resuming talks."

I am copying this minute to John Holmes.

A. J. COLES

12 July, 1982



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 166, 12 July 1982 (folio 13c)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





13B

Ref: B06559

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) 12th July

The two subjects for discussion will be

(a) the action to be taken on the Argentine response to the latest British message (despatched on 8th July: FCO telegram no. 148 to Berne) if a response has been received by the time OD(SA) meets; and

(b) the arrangements for the Falkland Islands Service, on which a note has been circulated by Ministry of Defence officials (OD(SA)(82) 70).

2. The Chief of the Defence Staff will be absent in Paris, and will not be represented; but the Defence Secretary will be accompanied by Sir Arthur Hockaday, who has been negotiating on his behalf with the Dean of St Paul's about the Falkland Islands Service.

Argentine Response

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office expects that the Argentine response, if one is forthcoming, is likely to be limited to nominating a port through which the prisoners should be returned. If so, the following questions will arise.

(i) Does the Sub-Committee agree that the response is sufficient to justify a conclusion that Argentina accepts that there is a cessation of active hostilities, and hence that the prisoners should be returned?

(ii) Assuming the answer to (i) is Yes, does the Defence Secretary judge it essential temporarily to retain the 35 Argentine prisoners who have volunteered to help with mine clearing? If so, have the conditions agreed in discussion at OD(SA) on 8th July been met? (ie that the volunteers have confirmed



individually, in writing and in the presence of witnesses, that they are willing to remain and willing to help with mine clearing operations; and that the International Committee of the Red Cross have been informed).

(iii) What are the implications for the maintenance of the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) and the 12 mile restriction?

4. The Defence Secretary is understandably anxious that no decision should be taken to lift the TEZ or the 12 mile restriction without consultation with the Chief of the Defence Staff. You may nevertheless wish to have a preliminary discussion of the question at this meeting, especially in view of the Attorney General's view that, once we are seen to accept that "active hostilities" have ended, our justification for maintaining the restrictions needs to be kept under constant and critical review; and that the justification will become more tenuous the longer the situation goes on without hostilities in fact taking place. (The Attorney General's views are set out in detail in the letter of 8th July from Mr Steel of the Attorney General's Chambers to me.) The question could be looked at again at the next meeting of OD(SA) on Thursday, 15th July, at which the Chief of the Defence Staff will be present.

#### The Falkland Islands Service

5. The main question here is whether the form of service, as annexed to the Ministry of Defence note, is acceptable; and, in particular, whether it is acceptable - or would be understood by the Armed Forces and the public - that no representative of the Services should take part in the Service, eg by reading one of the Lessons. You will wish to ask Sir Arthur Hockaday to introduce the note and explain the difficulties (which apparently stem largely from the attitude of the Free Church representatives).

*ADM Goodall*

9th July 1982

A D S GOODALL





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Minute from Armstrong to Coles dated 9 July 1982 (folio 13A)</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	



LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>Signal CX MEMO R/FI/217 of 2 July 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR ..... YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract/Item details:  <i>Signal CX 82/09006 (R/FI)</i> <i>of 7 July 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. J. Land</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

MR WHITMORE

FALKLANDS DEAD

This note explains the Evening Standard (and other) stories which anticipated the answer to Mr George Robertson's question:

"If Her Majesty's Government has yet reached a decision about whether to permit the bodies of troops killed in the Falklands to be brought back for burial in the United Kingdom."

The wording of this Question placed us in an impossible position against the background of the Lobby's lively, indeed almost daily, interest in the outcome.

The facts are that we have been questioned more or less every day for some time now on whether the bodies would be brought home. The Lobby has formed the view, especially in view of the Borneo precedent, that it would be inconceivable of the Prime Minister to go against the wishes of those families who want the bodies to be brought home.

Thus all they were waiting for was to know when a Question was to be answered. Robert Carvel has this evening admitted to me that he had got all he needed when he knew that the Question was to be answered substantively.

Neither I nor my staff revealed the terms of the Answer. We said it would be answered substantively at 4.00pm. But I am bound to say that, quite apart from not misleading the Lobby (which would be wrong and counter-productive), I did nothing to lead them away from the correct conclusion. I fell back on your well circulated view, notably via letters to MPs and families of the fallen, that you hoped to meet the wishes of the families of those who gave their lives.

The Lobby then used me to refresh their memory of previous lobby discussion on other points, eg:


- families which had indicated the desire for the dead to remain in the Falklands; I could not help beyond newspaper reports about the attitude of Col. H. Jones's widow.



- whether Government pays for transport of bodies home or of relatives to the War Grave;
- how many bodies were buried on land; I didn't know precisely but thought about 80 out of 255;
- whether the Answer would deal with an extension of the Commonwealth War Grave in Port Stanley; I said that so far as I knew the Cemetary there would be adequate to cope with the unfortunate consequences of the Falklands campaign.

I was of course well aware of the Prime Minister's concern, after the problem earlier this week, about the timing of this Answer. But short of setting out positively to mislead, which would have carried other dangers, there was no way of avoiding reports foreshadowing a positive outcome. What one hopes in these circumstances is that the Lobby will couch its story in advance of the Answer being given in speculative rather than concrete terms.

We seldom get problems of this kind. The reason for today's problem is the history of the continuing discussion in the Lobby of the subject.



B. INGHAM

8 July 1982

Ref: B06556



//

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) 8th July

This will be a short meeting. There are two subjects to be addressed: the Defence Secretary's memorandum on the burial of South Atlantic casualties (OD(SA)(82) 69) and the question what to do about the Argentine prisoners.

Burial of South Atlantic Casualties

2. You will wish to ask the Defence Secretary to introduce his memorandum. The main issues for decision are whether the Sub-Committee agrees that the next of kin of British servicemen killed should be offered the option of repatriation or of permanent burial in a military cemetery at Port Stanley; and how flexible the arrangements should be for allowing next of kin of those buried on the Falklands to visit the island at public expense. On the second point it would seem reasonable to limit visits by next of kin to widow plus two, who could be either parents or children of the deceased.

What to do about the Argentine prisoners

3. There has still been no direct Argentine response to the message conveyed to them through the Swiss on 3rd July. The Swiss believe that a direct response is unlikely to be forthcoming for some considerable time, if ever. Meanwhile however the new Argentine Foreign Minister, in a speech on 5th July, spoke of a de facto cessation of hostilities, and telephoned the United Nations Secretary General on the night of 6th July to say that his Government had decided to release Flight Lieutenant Glover through the International Committee of the Red Cross and would attach no conditions to the release.

4. You will wish to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary for his assessment of these developments and to invite views on whether they justify a decision to return the Argentine prisoners still in British hands. This could be on the basis of a unilateral statement by the United Kingdom that



SECRET

in view of

- (a) the fact that there have been no active hostilities since the Argentine surrender;
- (b) the Argentine Foreign Minister's statement of 5th July; and
- (c) the Argentine decision to release Flight Lieutenant Glover

we conclude that the Argentine Government regards hostilities as being at an end and we accordingly propose to return the prisoners. If it is decided to proceed in this way there would be advantage in doing so before the United Nations Secretary General arrives in London on 13th July.

5. A British statement in these terms would also have implications for the continued maintenance of the Total Exclusion Zone and the 12 mile restriction and also, in the longer term, for the maintenance of economic sanctions. But it would seem sensible to await Argentine reactions to the new British statement before deciding what to do about the TEZ and the 12 mile limit. These questions could be left for decision next week - perhaps at the next meeting of OD(SA) on Monday 12th July, depending on when the new statement is made.

ADM Goodall

7th July 1982

A D S GOODALL

cc Mr. Rickett  
Mr. Ingham

PRIME MINISTER

Burial of South Atlantic casualties

In the event you had no opportunity at Question time today to announce the Government's decision on this question.

The Defence Secretary has circulated the attached paper to OD(SA) colleagues for discussion on Thursday. While it would be possible to announce your decision before then, by way of a Written Answer, you may wish to give OD(SA) colleagues a chance to comment. You could then, following OD(SA), make the attached pursuant reply. Bernard Ingham would welcome this being made just before his Lobby at 1100 a.m. on Thursday so that there is a press story that day on a subject other than the Inquiry.

Agree to announce decision by attached pursuant reply after OD(SA) on Thursday?

A.J.C. 6/7

Yes  
no

6 July 1982

Please check we are not  
the Pursuant - reply too frequently  
not





MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
Telephone 01-218 2111/3

MO 5/21

6th July 1982

*Dear John,*

BURIAL OF SOUTH ATLANTIC CASUALTIES

/ We spoke this morning, following the discussion in OD(FAF) of this topic. You told me that the Prime Minister was still keen to make a positive reference to the possibility of repatriation. I have spoken again to the Secretary of State and he would have no objection to the Prime Minister using the attached form of words if she wishes to do so. As you will see this indicates that we shall be prepared to consider repatriation where practicable and where the relatives wish it. Our Press Office here have been alerted to the possibility that the Prime Minister will make such a statement at Question Time and appropriate press material is being prepared. Perhaps you could let me know whether the Prime Minister will wish to take the opportunity to make this announcement.

*Yours ever  
Nick Evans*

(N H R EVANS)

John Coles Esq

LINE TO TAKE

After considering all aspects of this most difficult problem, including the practical difficulties involved, and having read the letters I have received from the next-of-kin of those killed and others, I have decided that, where next-of-kin wish, arrangements will be made for the return to the UK of the bodies of the fallen who have been given temporary burial on land in the Falkland Islands. Where next-of-kin wish the bodies to remain in the Falkland Islands they will be buried with all due ceremony at Port Stanley. Arrangements will be made for close relatives to visit the graves if they so wish; and similar arrangements will be made for close relatives of those lost or buried at sea or in unmarked graves who wish to visit the Falkland Islands.





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PRM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 163</i> <i>5 July 1982 (folio 9)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

Ref: B06551

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) 5th JulySituation in the South Atlantic

President Bignone's inauguration speech on 1st July threw no new light either way on Argentina's willingness to consider hostilities with the United Kingdom as being at an end. As agreed at the last meeting of OD(SA) a message was sent on 2nd July to the new Argentine Government through the Swiss and Brazilian authorities, to the effect that the United Kingdom was ready to proceed with an exchange of prisoners on the assumption that active hostilities were over, and sought confirmation that Argentina was also ready to exchange prisoners on this basis. You may wish to ask Sir Antony Acland (in the absence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Yugoslavia) whether any answer has yet been received from Buenos Aires, or whether there have been any indications over the weekend as to the likely Argentine reaction. If it is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office view that a positive response is unlikely and that the Argentine Government can be expected to opt for a de facto cessation of hostilities becoming effective simply through the passage of time, the question arises whether, and if so, at what point, we should offer to return the prisoners on the basis of a unilateral statement by the United Kingdom that we regard active hostilities as being at an end. (Provided that Argentina then accepted the prisoners back - and a fortiori if they agreed at the same time to return Flight Lieutenant Glover - it could reasonably be assumed that Argentina too regarded active hostilities as over even if they declined to say so.) You might ask the views of the Defence Secretary and Sir Antony Acland on this possibility. The Attorney General should also comment.

2. You might then ask the Attorney General for his advice on the legality of maintaining (a) the Total Exclusion Zone round the Falkland Islands, and (b) the 12 mile restriction on Argentine warships once active hostilities are assumed to be over. The Defence Secretary should also be asked for his views on the continued military requirement for these restrictions.



Further Meetings

3. OD(SA) is not due to meet again until 9.30 am on Thursday 8th July. But a meeting of OD(FAF) at which the Chancellor of the Exchequer will be present has been arranged for 9.30 am on Tuesday 6th July to review the state of civil and military rehabilitation on the Falklands and to assess how the costs are to be met. Meanwhile the work of Lord Shackleton's committee on future development is going forward with a view to completing its report by about 16th July.

ADS Goodall  
...

2nd July 1982

A D S GOODALL

Prime Minister 2

cc Press Office



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 6169 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

1/7  
Argentina

MO 5/21

1st July 1982

pm.

Dear Willie

We told you last Tuesday of the proposed change of command in the South Atlantic. Rear Admiral Reffell is to replace Rear Admiral Woodward as Commander Task Group with effect from tomorrow, and Major General Thorne is to replace Major General Moore as Commander British Forces Falkland Islands on or about 17th July.

/ You might like to have the attached details of the two new Commanders.

Yours ever

Andy PIPER

(D T PIPER)

W F S Rickett Esq



STATEMENT OF SERVICE OF

REAR ADMIRAL D R REFFELL

Date of Birth: 6.10.28  
Entered Royal Navy: 1. 5.42  
Promoted Commander: 30. 6.63  
Promoted Captain: 31.12.70  
Promoted Rear Admiral: 7. 1.80  
Qualifications: (X)(N) psc odc(US)  
Married

Principal Appointments

As Commander

1963 - 65 Ministry of Defence for duty with Director of Naval Operations and Trade  
1965 - 67 HMS SIRIUS in Command  
1967 - 69 Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth as Executive Officer  
1969 - 70 Course at US Armed Forces Staff College

As Captain

1970 - 71 Staff of Commander Far East Fleet as Chief Staff Officer (Plans and Policy)  
1971 - 74 Ministry of Defence as Assistant Director Naval Warfare (Surface Warfare)  
1974 - 76 HMS HERMES in Command  
1976 - 78 Ministry of Defence as Director of Naval Warfare  
1978 - 79 Staff of Flag Officer Carriers and Amphibious Ships as Commodore Amphibious Warfare (in the rank of Commodore)

As Rear Admiral

1980 - 81 Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy)  
1982 Flag Officer Third Flotilla and Commander Anti-Submarine Group 2

## BIOGRAPHY

### MAJOR GENERAL D C THORNE CBE

Major General David Thorne was born on 13 December 1933. He was educated at St Edwards School, Oxford and entered the RMA Sandhurst in 1952. He was commissioned into the 1st Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment (now The 1st Bn The Royal Anglian Regiment) in February 1954, and served in the 1st Bn as Platoon Commander (1954-55), Signal Officer (1956-57), Company Commander (1965-66) and Commanding Officer (1972-74). He has also served with the Territorial Army as Adjutant of the 4th Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment from 1960-62.

After attending Staff College (1963), he has carried out staff appointments as GSO2 Instructor RAF College, Cranwell (1964-65), GSO2 DI2 in the MOD Intelligence Staff (1968-70), GSOI Directing Staff at the RAF Staff College (1970-72) and Colonel GS ASD 3/5 (Dec 1974-Oct 1977).

From Dec 1977 to Dec 1979, he commanded 3rd Infantry Brigade on operations in Northern Ireland, and in 1980 he attended a course at The Royal College of Defence Studies. He was appointed Vice Quarter-Master-General in January 1981.

General Thorne has represented the Army at cricket at both Service and Combined Service level; and he has also been capped for Norfolk. He has represented the Army at Inter-Service level at Squash Rackets; and has also represented Nottinghamshire and Norfolk.

He was awarded an OBE in 1975 on relinquishing Command of his battalion; and a CBE in 1980 for service on operations in Ulster with 3rd Brigade.

He is married, with a son and two daughters, and lives in Suffolk.



STATEMENT OF SERVICE OF

REAR ADMIRAL D R REFFELL

Date of Birth: 6.10.28  
Entered Royal Navy: 1. 5.42  
Promoted Commander: 30. 6.63  
Promoted Captain: 31.12.70  
Promoted Rear Admiral: 7. 1.80  
Qualifications: (X)(N) psc odc(US)  
Married

Principal Appointments

As Commander

1963 - 65 Ministry of Defence for duty with Director of Naval Operations and Trade  
1965 - 67 HMS SIRIUS in Command  
1967 - 69 Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth as Executive Officer  
1969 - 70 Course at US Armed Forces Staff College

As Captain

1970 - 71 Staff of Commander Far East Fleet as Chief Staff Officer (Plans and Policy)  
1971 - 74 Ministry of Defence as Assistant Director Naval Warfare (Surface Warfare)  
1974 - 76 HMS HERMES in Command  
1976 - 78 Ministry of Defence as Director of Naval Warfare  
1978 - 79 Staff of Flag Officer Carriers and Amphibious Ships as Commodore Amphibious Warfare (in the rank of Commodore)

As Rear Admiral

1980 - 81 Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy)  
1982 Flag Officer Third Flotilla and Commander Anti-Submarine Group 2

## BIOGRAPHY

### MAJOR GENERAL D C THORNE CBE

Major General David Thorne was born on 13 December 1933. He was educated at St Edwards School, Oxford and entered the RMA Sandhurst in 1952. He was commissioned into the 1st Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment (now The 1st Bn The Royal Anglian Regiment) in February 1954, and served in the 1st Bn as Platoon Commander (1954-55), Signal Officer (1956-57), Company Commander (1965-66) and Commanding Officer (1972-74). He has also served with the Territorial Army as Adjutant of the 4th Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment from 1960-62.

After attending Staff College (1963), he has carried out staff appointments as GS02 Instructor RAF College, Cranwell (1964-65), GS02 DI2 in the MOD Intelligence Staff (1968-70), GS01 Directing Staff at the RAF Staff College (1970-72) and Colonel GS ASD 3/5 (Dec 1974-Oct 1977).

From Dec 1977 to Dec 1979, he commanded 3rd Infantry Brigade on operations in Northern Ireland, and in 1980 he attended a course at The Royal College of Defence Studies. He was appointed Vice Quarter-Master-General in January 1981.

General Thorne has represented the Army at cricket at both Service and Combined Service level; and he has also been capped for Norfolk. He has represented the Army at Inter-Service level at Squash Rackets; and has also represented Nottinghamshire and Norfolk.

He was awarded an OBE in 1975 on relinquishing Command of his battalion; and a CBE in 1980 for service on operations in Ulster with 3rd Brigade.

He is married, with a son and two daughters, and lives in Suffolk.





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 161,</i> <i>1 July 1982</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

SECRET

Ref: B06548

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) 1st July

Situation in the South Atlantic

General Bignone is due to be installed as President of the Argentine tomorrow. It will thus be too early to assess how stable the new Argentine Government is likely to be or what policies it is likely to pursue on the Falklands dispute. You may nevertheless like to ask the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to report on the situation in Buenos Aires and on the state of international opinion in the aftermath of the apparent cessation of hostilities. Are there, for example, any signs of pressure on us from any of our principal allies to resume negotiations with Argentina in the near future? What are the prospects at the United Nations?

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might also be asked to report on progress towards the rehabilitation of the Islands following Mr Rex Hunt's return. You may wish to establish that no urgent work is being held up because of funding difficulties.

Argentine Prisoners

3. Both the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary are anxious to resolve the problem of what to do with the 560 remaining Argentine prisoners. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that the longer we retain the prisoners now that active hostilities have ceased the greater the risk of incurring international criticism that we are holding them for (unjustifiable) political purposes. The Chief of the Defence Staff should be asked where the prisoners now are: are they on their way to Ascension?



SECRET

4. Up to now we have been making Argentine acceptance that there has been a complete cessation of hostilities ~~and~~ the price for repatriating the prisoners. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to suggest that we should now lower this price; ie that we should offer through the Swiss to repatriate the prisoners in return for

a. Argentine acknowledgement that active hostilities are at an end; and

b. Argentine willingness to return Flight Lieutenant Glover.

This would seem sensible on both political and practical grounds: there is no reason to believe that General Bignone's Government will be ready to make a public statement that hostilities are definitively at an end; but they might be willing to acknowledge that active hostilities are over or at least to allow a unilateral statement to this effect by the United Kingdom to go unchallenged. It is in any case doubtful whether the degree of leverage which retaining the prisoners might give us would outweigh the practical and other difficulties involved in bringing them back to the United Kingdom.

Rules of Engagement

5. The Rules of Engagement have been modified in accordance with the note by officials circulated on 25th June (OD(SA)(82) 68). But the public announcement annexed to that note has not yet been made; and the Defence Secretary is considering a lower key announcement in the form of Notices to Mariners and to Airmen reminding them that the Total Exclusion Zone remains in force. He may wish to seek the views of his colleagues on this.

ADS

30th June 1982

A D S GOODALL



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 160, 30 June 1982 (Rlio 4)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012 M. Jayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 159, 29 June 1982, Folio 3</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION )	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>W. Dayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

<p>LETTERCODE/SERIES .....</p> <p>PIECE/ITEM ..... (one piece/item number)</p>	<p>Date and sign</p>
<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p>MODUK INTSUM No. 157, 27 June 1982 (folio 2)</p>	
<p>CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
<p>RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958</p>	<p>24 May 2012 M. Dayland</p>
<p>TEMPORARILY RETAINED</p>	
<p>MISSING ON TRANSFER</p>	
<p>MISSING</p>	
<p>NUMBER NOT USED</p>	





The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES ..... <i>PREM 19</i> .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... <i>652</i> ..... (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details:  <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 156, 26 June 1982 (folio 1)</i>	
CLOSED FOR .....YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>24 May 2012</i> <i>AWayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

PART 9 ends:-

Intsum 155 dated 25.6.82

PART 10 begins:-

Intsum 156 dated 26.6/82





IT8.7/2-1993  
2007:03

<FTP://FTP.KODAK.COM/GASTDS/Q60DATA>

Q-60R2 Target for  
KODAK  
Professional Papers

