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PREM 19/650

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PART 8
CABINET TWO

MT

TOP SECRET

Confidential filing

Handling of the Falkland Crisis

ARGENTINA

Pt. 1: April 1982

Pt. 8: June 1982

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
2.6.82							
3.6.82							
6.6.82							
ends							
PREM 19/650							

PART 8 ends:-

6 JUNE 1982

PART 9 begins:-

7 JUNE 1982

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

[illegible]

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed Wayland

Date 15 May 2022

PREM Records Team



The National Archives

LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>650</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 127, 6 June 1982 (folio 21)</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>15 May 2012 @Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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Extract/Item details: <i>JICTEL 775 061410Z Jun 82, 6 June 1982 (folio 19)</i>	
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<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p><i>MODUK INTSUM No. 124,</i> <i>5 June 1982 (folio 18B)</i></p>	
<p>CLOSED FOR YEARS</p> <p>UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
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<p>CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
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<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>MODUK INTSUM No. 120,</i> <i>3 June 1982</i></p>	
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15 JP

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR MICHAEL PALLISER

SUPPLY BY FRANCE OF EXOCET MISSILES TO PERU

Thank you for your letter of 1 June describing your conversation with M. Gutman about the above. The Prime Minister has noted its contents.

I am copying this letter to Sir Frank Cooper and Sir Antony Acland.

A. J. COLES

3 June 1982

B



SAFE CONDUCT PASS

INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH FORCES

The soldier who bears this pass has signalled his desire to cease fighting. He is to be treated strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention and is to be evacuated from the area of operations as soon as possible. He is to be given food and medical treatment if he requires it and is then to be held in a place of shelter to await repatriation.

J F WOODWARD
Rear Admiral
Commander,
British Forces

INSTRUCCIONES A LAS FUERZAS BRITANICAS

El soldado que porta este pase ha señalado su deseo de no seguir peleando. Se le tratará estrictamente de acuerdo a lo estipulado por la Convención de Ginebra y deberá ser evacuado del área de operaciones lo mas pronto posible. Se le suministrará alimentos y tratamiento médico de ser necesario y después será internado en un lugar de albergue donde esperará su repatriación.

J F WOODWARD
Rear Admiral,
Comandante en Jefe
de las Fuerzas Británicas

COMO UTILIZAR ESTE PASE

Si Vd. desea acogerse a las ventajas ofrecidas en este pase, Vd. deberá hacer lo siguiente :

- Deponer su arma.
- Mantener este pase en posición bien visible.
- Avanzar hacia el integrante de las fuerzas británicas mas próximo.

PASE DE SALVO CONDUCTO



Dirigida a :

General de Brigada Don Mario Benjamín Menendez,
Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Argentinas.

Indudablemente Vd. y el que suscribe comprendemos perfectamente la muy seria situación militar ante la cual se encuentran hoy día Vd. y las fuerzas militares bajo su comando. No habrá escapado a su criterio que las fuerzas británicas bajo mi comando han logrado establecer una presencia dominante en el área, y de que no existe posibilidad alguna de que las suyas reciban ayuda o socorro.

Ahora las cosas han llegado al punto que hacen necesario que Vd. ponga en tela de juicio la justificación de continuar resistiendo fuerzas tan abrumadoras. Es Vd. que tiene que decidir respecto al bienestar suyo personal, la de sus fuerzas y de la población civil.


Hasta el momento su comportamiento indica claramente que la preservación de vidas humanas es para Vd. motivo de primerísima importancia, y tengo la certeza de que esta motivación seguirá siendo para Vd. de primordial consideración.

Entiendo perfectamente que antes de hacerme llegar su decisión, o comunicarla a las fuerzas bajo su comando, Vd. querrá valorar su posición minuciosamente. No obstante, y dadas las dificultades en lo que tiene que ver con las comunicaciones internas dentro de las islas, hago llegar a Vd. una copia de las órdenes impartidas a mis fuerzas, las que van reproducidas al dorso de la presente.

J. Forster
Woodward

Rear Admiral John Forster Woodward, Royal Navy.
Comandante en Jefe de las Fuerzas Británicas.

¡ISLAS DE CONDENADOS!!



SOLDADOS DE LAS FUERZAS ARGENTINAS:

Están Vds. completamente a solas. Desde su patria no hay esperanza de relevo o ayuda. Están Vds. condenados a la triste tarea de defender una isla remota. Pronto caerá sobre Vds. todos los rigores de un invierno cruel y despiadado y la armada argentina no está en condiciones de suministrarles los víveres o refuerzos que Vds. tanto necesitan. Sus familias viven con el tremendo terror que nunca los volverán a ver. Todo esto, como Vds. bien saben, es la purísima verdad.

¿CUALES SON LAS RAZONES POR LAS CUALES SE ENCUENTRAN VDS. EN ESTA SITUATION TAN CALAMITOSA?

Los responsables son los egoistas que se han nombrados a sí mismo como dirigentes de la Argentina sin tomar en consideración la voluntad del pueblo argentino, y quienes embarcaron a Vds. en una absurda aventura, sabiendo que no existía esperanza de éxito alguno. Ahora, detrás del reconocido coraje del soldado argentino, los mismos dirigentes buscan esconder su torpe incompetencia.

¡¡ SOLDADOS!! HAN CUMPLIDO VDS. CON TODO QUE LA PATRIA LES PUEDE EXIGIR.

UNICAMENTE SON LOS GENERALES QUE EXIGEN MAS.

NO ES JUSTO QUE CON SUS VIDAS PAGUEN VDS.
LAS TORTUOSAS AMBICIONES DE LOS RESPONSABLES
DE ESTA LOCA AVENTURA MAL VISTA POR EL
MUNDO ENTERO.

SOLDIERS OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES

You are completely alone. There is no hope whatever of help or relief from your Country. You are condemned to the sad task of defending a remote island. Very soon now, you will feel all the rigours of a cruel and heartless winter and the Argentine Navy is not in any condition to supply the food and reinforcements which you so badly need. Your families live with a tremendous terror that they will never see you again. All this is the perfect truth, as you well know.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR YOUR BEING IN THIS TERRIBLE SITUATION?

Those responsible are the selfish people who have nominated themselves as the leaders of Argentina without taking into consideration the will of the Argentine people and who launched you on an absurd adventure knowing that there was no hope of success whatever. Now, those same leaders are trying to hide their clumsy incompetence behind the recognised courage of the Argentine soldier.

**SOLDIERS! YOU HAVE DONE EVERYTHING YOUR
COUNTRY COULD DEMAND OF YOU. ONLY THE
GENERALS ARE DEMANDING MORE!**

It is unjust for you to pay with your lives for the tortuous ambitions of those responsible for this adventure which is regarded so badly by the rest of the world.

Note: This is a literal translation of the Spanish text. We have consulted the translator, a native of the area, and he advises that this form of em...ve language is best suited to the aim.



A Message from His Excellency the Governor

Mr Rex Hunt CMG

The British Task Force is now at hand and has cut the Argentine access to the Islands. I am sorry that I cannot be with it in person but am confident that I shall rejoin you shortly.

Your terrible experience under the occupying force will soon be ended. I know that you will continue to be patient and resolute. Do nothing to antagonise the Argentines and stay under cover until the Task Force has liberated you.

My thoughts and feelings are with you all in this final hour of trial before the aggressors are defeated and your freedom is restored.

Best wishes and God bless you.

R. M. HUNT

Governor and Commander-in-Chief

The Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.





SOLDADOS

Tus valerosos compañeros de armas ubicados hace poco en las islas Georgia del Sur han vuelto a su tierra patria. Fotografías de ellos recibiendo la bienvenida con honores militares y reunidos a sus seres queridos han aparecido en todos los periódicos argentinos.

Las tropas argentinas ultimamente acantonados en esas islas, se rindieron el día 24 de Abril. A corto plazo fueron trasladados por mar a la isla de Asunción y luego enviados por avion a Montevideo. Llegaron a Buenos Aires el 14 de Mayo.


El capitán de fragata don Alfredo Astiz, comandante a cargo de las fuerzas en Georgia del Sur se rindió con honor al darse cuenta que las fuerzas británicas poseen una superioridad en potencia de fuego. Esta fotografía lo muestra firmando el documento de rendicion.

Los pueblos británicos y argentino son dos naciones que tienen lazos amistosos tradicionales que abarcan mas de cien años. No queremos derramar mas sangre, pero estamos dispuestos a hacerlo si no hay alternativa. Mas perdidas inútiles de vida no crearán mas que madres desconsoladas.

Tus compañeros de armas en Georgia del Sur tomaron una decision correcta y honorable.

Tu debes ahora hacer lo mismo. Piensa en el peligro que te encuentras. Tus raciones y pertrechos de guerra estan escasísimos debido al bloqueo naval británico. Tu situacion empeora.

Piensa en tus queridos y en tu hogar que esperan tu dichoso retorno.




SOLDIERS

1. Your valiant companions at arms recently on South Georgia have returned to their fatherland. Photographs of them being received with military honours and re-united with their loved ones have appeared in all the Argentinian press.
2. The Argentinian troops recently garrisoned on those islands surrendered on the 24th of April. They were recently transferred by sea to Ascension Islands and shortly flown to Montevideo. They arrived in Buenos Aires on the 14 of May.
3. Lieutenant Commander Alfredo Astiz, the commander in charge of the forces in South Georgia on realising that the British forces possessed a superiority in fire power, surrendered with honour. This photograph shows him signing the surrender document.
4. The populations of both Britain and the Argentine are two nations who have traditional ties going back for more than 100 years. We do not wish to spill more blood but if there is no alternative, we are prepared to do so. More useless deaths will only create more disconsolate mothers.
5. "Your companions at arms in South Georgia made the correct and honourable decision.
6. You must now do the same yourself. Think of the danger you are in. Your rations and war supplies are in short supply because of the British Naval blockade. Things will get worse.
7. Think of your loved ones and the home that awaits your happy return.

● Desde las

20 a las 23 horas



Frecuencia

9,71 MHz

Ref: B06519

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 4th JuneMilitary Issues

Your meeting at 9.15 tomorrow should begin with the usual military briefing from the Chief of the Defence Staff.

2. The Defence Secretary should then be asked to comment on the new paper (OD(SA)(82) 60) produced primarily by Ministry of Defence officials on Argentine prisoners of war. This complements their earlier paper on securing a surrender (OD(SA)(82) 59). It is somewhat inconclusive and it fails to grapple with the prospects for using prisoners as a lever to obtain a mainland ceasefire. But its conclusions seem satisfactory so far as they go: viz that we should repatriate most prisoners collected prior to a general surrender, since they merely get in the way of operations; but that we should hold on to those who surrender when Port Stanley falls until it is clear that we have achieved a complete cessation of hostilities. You should establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Attorney General agree. The Sub-Committee ought also to give at least preliminary consideration to what we do if the leverage fails to produce a mainland ceasefire. Do we hold on to the prisoners indefinitely? Where do we keep them? Have we any other levers?

3. The Attorney General is due to report on the particular problem of Commander Astiz. He is currently considering with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Legal advisers whether it would be legally permissible for us to allow the French to interview Astiz while he is in our custody. The answer is likely to be that this would be legally dubious and therefore open to both legal and political criticism, since it would be dangerously close to coercion even if we assume that Astiz would refuse to answer the French interviewers' questions; but that the legal situation is not 100 per cent clear and no doubt we could mount some kind of defence of our



conduct if we do decide to let the French have access. In the light of this unwelcome advice the Sub-Committee will need to consider

- a. whether to allow French access and do our best to justify it legally;
- b. if so, whether he can thereafter be repatriated;
- c. if there is not to be French access, whether he can simply be repatriated as soon as arrangements can be made after his arrival here on 6th June.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should be asked for his views on whether it is more important for us to be helpful to the French or to stick to the letter of the Geneva Convention. The Defence Secretary should also comment; his main concern is to be rid of Astiz quickly.

Political Issues

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should report on overnight developments in the Security Council. He may also have views on how far, following suggestions at the Cabinet this morning, we are in a position to put pressure on Spain to adopt at least a neutral stance.

5. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is not likely to be ready before Monday to make proposals about the administration of the Islands, including the possible return of the Governor and/or the appointment of a high-level Special Commissioner; nor to report on ways of restoring our position in Latin America.

Next Meeting

6. Monday morning, after Versailles. Time not yet fixed but probably 9.30.

3rd June 1982

R L WADE-GERY

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Spoke to the Prime Minister
With his agreement I subsequently
suggested to the A.G. that he should read this
up with the
Defence
Secretary.
He said he
would take on



10 DOWNING STREET

Can we
have a
word?
not

Prime Minister.

The Attorney General
gave this to me this morning.
He said that he would
leave it to me to decide
whether to show it to you:
he felt when he re-read
it this morning that the
words seemed less good than
it had done yesterday. None-
theless, I think that you
will wish to see it.

Passage deleted and retained under
Section 3(4) (Wayland, 15 May 2012)

2. vi. 1941

From the Attorney-General

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48-643/3366

PRIME MINISTER

Dunstable Park

Ripley

Surrey G 1123 6:11

Argentina

I spoke briefly to you this morning about this idea.

The risk of resupply to the Argentines of further air-to-sea missile justified consideration of all options to prevent this - even the most way-out which may be thought to be more appropriate to a James Bond movie!

The scenario which I have discussed in the most general terms with Charles Hughson who has vast experience in air freight and the industry generally (he is a Test pilot and ~~was~~ a past Chairman of Trade Winds & now, since the takeover by LORRHO a director of the only cargo airline operating in

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Surrey GU23 6AL

the U.K.) envisages a seller willing to sell these missiles but having difficulty in effecting airfreighting to Latin America. This information may become available through security sources.

The profits (see CARGO LUX + \$360,000 for an "empty heavy water container") can be enormous and will attract the cowboy carriers in circumstances where the exporting country will not want to risk its own aircraft for publicity reasons.

If we can discover a situation where the freight is being offered to the

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Dunstable Park
 Ripley
 Surrey GU23 6AL

Cowboys, Charles Hupson takes the view that there is a reasonable chance that he can, through MEA or TMA or some other similar carrier, get the job but with the condition (not unusual) that the "Loadmaster" is a man whom he nominates (all of this with the totally independent of any U.K. connection).

If this can be agreed, the Loadmaster has total control over the flight and, therefore, could redirect the aircraft, in transit, to (for example) Bermuda.

This will cost money (this is an expensive dirty business) but worth, in my

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view, be cheap at the price

Charles Hughson has access to his own
Office dealing with air freight in BEYROUT and
connections in many other cities in the Middle
East and the best possible sources to the
"cowboys"

This seems to me, although highly
unlikely, an option we should keep open

It is probably unnecessary to add
that Charles Hughson's loyalty and
integrity is beyond question

M.H.

1. VI. 82

SECRET

10



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

2nd June 1982

Seen by the Prime

Minister

Dear John,

*the
2v*

EXOCET ATTACK, 25TH MAY

/ My Secretary of State thought that the Prime Minister would be interested to see the attached report, prepared for the Chief of the Defence Staff, on the attack by Exocet on 25th May in which the Atlantic Conveyor was struck.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*John and
David Wright*
(D B OMAND)

A J Coles Esq

SECRET

1. You may be interested to know more about the EXOCET attack on 25 May in which ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was struck.

2. At the time the ship was in company with elements of the Battle Group operating in the Total Exclusion Zone to the north east of the Falkland Islands. First, the sequence of events (which is illustrated on the attached diagram):

a. At 1936 Agave radar (Super Etendard) was detected to the north west by two ships of the force, the destroyer EXETER and the frigate AMBUSCADE, on their electronic warfare sensors. All ships took immediate, pre-planned countermeasures. AMBUSCADE, the westerly ship, fired a pattern of chaff from her 4.5 in gun to confuse the enemy's target indication appreciation and simultaneously deployed a protective pattern of chaff from her 3" rocket launcher to decoy missiles. Other ships including the carrier HERMES also fired chaff.

b. 30 Seconds later, 1 or 2 aircraft were detected by AMBUSCADE on radar at a range of 28 miles.

c. After a further 30 seconds BRILLIANT detected the same aircraft at 26 miles.

d. At 1938 AMBUSCADE detected Agave radar lock on.

e. At 1939 missile release was detected by BRILLIANT and AMBUSCADE. Further preplanned countermeasures were taken. AMBUSCADE resowed a full pattern of chaff believing herself to be the target. The attack aircraft turned away immediately.

f. 41 seconds later two missiles were seen on radar in HERMES, BRILLIANT and AMBUSCADE. The missiles were then seen to veer towards the chaff pattern laid by AMBUSCADE at 1936. Having passed through, or under, the chaff the missile homing heads restarted a search pattern and one certainly achieved acquisition on ATLANTIC CONVEYOR who was struck in the starboard quarter.

3. This was a copybook performance by the warships against a well conducted attack by the Argentines. The ships were alert, professional and carried out the correct procedures. It was sheer bad luck that, having decoyed the missiles from the designated targets, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was within the restricted search area of the missiles' homing heads; she had no self protection capability of her own and the warships were then unable to help her. With a missile such as EXOCET, a ship targetted must rely on its own defences; it is virtually impossible to destroy the missile except down the line of its flight path.

4. There are some other points of interest. The attack aircraft approached very low from the north west. It is probable

that they had been in-flight refuelled and came from Puerto Deseado. There appeared to be no form of tactical direction but the Super Etendards could have been advised of the Battle Group's operating area by enemy forces on the Islands who would observe our own aircraft flight patterns on their radar. Having made a detection the Argentines fired at the nearest radar echo and then beat a hasty retreat - also at low level. Of course, as they have no airborne early warning capability, the Battle Group could not obtain warning of the forthcoming low level attack until the Argentines were obliged to transmit. This meant that there was no time to use our fighters.

5. We have been closely studying our tactics and material countermeasures against the Argentine EXOCET threat - whether launched from airborne or surface platforms - ever since the start of the Falklands crisis and particularly in the light of the attack on SHEFFIELD. The advice given to the Task Force has proved sound in practice. There is now a further new material countermeasure available to them; a jammer which was designed, trialled and produced within a very short timescale for mounting on a Lynx helicopter. This jammer will seduce missile homing heads even after they have locked on. The first jammers were delivered to the Task Force last week and, given any intelligence of attack, could be invaluable in its defence. We are also doing what we can to give RFAs and Merchant vessels employed on this Operation some self protection capability against these missiles. 15 3" rocket (chaff) launchers systems similar to those fitted in our warships are available and

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UK EYES B
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UK EYES B



CINCFLEET has been asked to state his priorities for fitting. It may be possible to install some in ships already deployed and this is being investigated. We are also making arrangements to send out some small hand-held radar warning receivers which have a limited capability but could give early warning to merchant ships of approaching aircraft.

4 of 4
UK EYES B
SECRET


INITIAL DETECTION

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SECRET



<p>LETTERCODE/SERIES</p> <p>PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)</p>	<p>Date and sign</p>
<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p>MODUK INTSUM No. 119, 2 June 1982 (folio 9)</p>	
<p>CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
<p>RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958</p>	<p>15 May 2012 @Dayland</p>
<p>TEMPORARILY RETAINED</p>	
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<p>NUMBER NOT USED</p>	



LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>650</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 118, 2 June 1982 (folio 8)</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>15 May 2012 C. Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING ON TRANSFER	
MISSING	
NUMBER NOT USED	

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

2 June 1982

Dear John,

During recent OD(SA) discussions there have been a number of references to likely Latin American reactions if the United Kingdom were to take some new and dramatic step in the Falkland Islands conflict. The Prime Minister's impression is that Latin American attitudes are at present anything but uniform and that it is unlikely that any action on our part would produce a solid Latin American front giving practical, as distinct from rhetorical, support for Argentina.

Mrs. Thatcher would be most interested to see an FCO assessment of likely Latin American attitudes in the case of (a) action against the mainland and (b) action against Argentine ships within Argentina's territorial waters. I should stress that the Prime Minister is not thinking in terms of such action at present but merely wishes to have a better feel for likely Latin American reactions if we are obliged to embark, at some point in the future, on new steps.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

*Yours ever
John Holmes.*

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RW

SECRET

Ref: B06510

PRIME MINISTERFalklands: OD(SA) on 2nd JuneMilitary Issues

Your meeting at 9.30 am tomorrow should begin with the usual military briefing from the Chief of the Defence Staff.

2. The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Defence Secretary should then speak to a note by Ministry of Defence officials (OD(SA)(82) 59) on how to seek a local Argentine surrender. The basic proposal seems sound. But it leaves open the further question of how to deal with prisoners resulting from a mass surrender (on which the Ministry of Defence are preparing a separate paper); and in particular the scope for using them as a lever to obtain a mainland ceasefire. Hence the square brackets round one sentence in the annexed draft message, which the Sub-Committee will need to discuss. The sentence should clearly be omitted if we are likely to delay repatriation, perhaps for quite a long time, while we try the force of such leverage.

3. Behind this issue, of course, lies the further problem of what to do if the leverage fails. Pressure on Argentina via the Americans may be part of the answer. But in the end we may have to choose between some form of political negotiation with Argentina (which the Americans are likely to urge on us anyway) and continuing indefinitely without a mainland ceasefire. In the latter case the Exocet threat would also continue.

4. Next, the Attorney General should be asked to report on his efforts to find a way round the 12 mile sanctuary problem. The Defence Secretary and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should comment.

5. The Defence Secretary will not be ready for further discussion of repatriating the dead or of gratuities.

Political Issues

6. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or Sir Antony Acland should be asked to report on overnight developments in New York. Does Sir Anthony Parsons need new instructions?
7. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should then report whether Mr Haig is coming to London tomorrow. If not, ought Mr Pym to go to Paris? or can things wait until you see President Reagan on 4th June?
8. Sir Michael Palliser should report on his talk with Lord Shackleton. Are the arrangements for the latter's revision exercise now in place? When can he start and how long will he take? Should the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary see that he is provided with the scenarios promised at your meeting with him and Lord Buxton?
- [REDACTED]

Next Meetings

9. These have been arranged at
- 9.45 on 3rd June, after which the Defence Secretary and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should report to the Cabinet (which meets at 11.00);
 - 10.00 on 4th June, ie just before you leave for France.

Rawh.

1st June 1982

R L WADE-GERY



LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>650</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 117</i> <i>(Blio 4)</i>	
CLOSED FOR YEARS UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>15 May 2012</i> <i>Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
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NUMBER NOT USED	

<p>LETTERCODE/SERIES</p> <p style="text-align: center;">..... <i>PREM 19</i></p> <p>PIECE/ITEM <i>650</i></p> <p>(one piece/item number)</p>	<p>Date and sign</p>
<p>Extract/Item details:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>MODUK INTSUM No. 116,</i> <i>1 June 1982 (folio 3)</i></p>	
<p>CLOSED FOR YEARS</p> <p>UNDER FOI EXEMPTION</p>	
<p>RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)</p> <p>OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958</p>	<p><i>15 May 2012</i> <i>Wayland</i></p>
<p>TEMPORARILY RETAINED</p>	
<p>MISSING ON TRANSFER</p>	
<p>MISSING</p>	
<p>NUMBER NOT USED</p>	

CONFIDENTIAL

Trip



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 June 1982

SUPPLY OF ARMS BY SOUTH AFRICA TO ARGENTINA

The Prime Minister was grateful for your letter of 29 May but in the end decided not to speak to Mr. De Wet about South African activities with regard to the supply of arms to Argentina.

A.J. COLES

Miss J.E. Ridley,
Ministry of Defence.

RB

CONFIDENTIAL

*Prime Minister*

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01-930 3422 ext~~ 233 8224John Coles, Esq.,
No. 10

1 June, 1982.

Dear John,

SUPPLY BY FRANCE OF EXOCET MISSILES TO PERU

1. After the discussion at Chequers that resulted in the despatch of FCO telegrams to Paris numbers 310 and 311 it was, as you know, agreed that I should discuss this matter with Monsieur Gutman at the outset of the talks that Antony Acland and I were due to have with him and the German State Secretary today. When Gutman came to see me in my office, accompanied by the French Ambassador, he said that he had not been able to get a definitive view from the Elysée on the President's reaction to the Prime Minister's message before he himself had to leave Paris to come to London. But he could assure me that the matter was being treated urgently and seriously in Paris; though it presented a number of difficulties to the French, particularly in regard to their credibility in respect of contracts concluded with countries other than the Argentine.
2. I need not record our discussion in detail. I made it absolutely clear to him that this was a matter of crucial importance to the Anglo-French relationship in general and to the Prime Minister's own relationship with the President in particular. I did not believe that I would be overstating the matter if I used the word "catastrophic" in relation to any supply by France of these missiles to Peru.
3. Subsequently, before lunch at the French Embassy, Gutman told me that he had already telephoned to Paris in the light of our conversation and he understood that the reply to our request would be satisfactory. He was again called to the telephone later and at the end of lunch told me that it had been decided that the Peruvian Ambassador in Paris should be summoned tomorrow to the Quai d'Orsay. He would be informed (without any subterfuge in regard to technical difficulties, etc. relating to the missiles) that the French Government had decided for political reasons that these missiles could not be supplied to Peru for the time being. Gutman did not specify the period, but said that it would be for "quite a while" ("un bon petit moment").

4. I asked if the Prime Minister could expect a reply from the President. He said that he expected so; but in any case what he was saying to me was a formal communication and I could take it as the official response of the French Government. I thanked him and said that I knew the Prime Minister and her colleagues would greatly appreciate this decision.

5. I am sure it remains very important to keep this whole business as closely to ourselves as possible, irrespective of anything the Peruvians may say about it. So I am only sending copies of this letter on a Secret and Personal basis to Frank Cooper and Antony Acland.

Tom

Richard

(Michael Palliser)

PART

7

ends:-

31

May 1982

PART

8

begins:-

1 June

1982

