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PREM 19/645

The Handling of the Falklands
Invasion

ARGENTINA

Part 1: April 1982

Part 3: April 1982

PART 3.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
24.4.82							
26.4.82							
27.4.82							
29.4.82							
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PREM 19/645

PART 3 ends:-

29. 4. 82

Wade Jerry to Pat 306#86 29/4

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PART 4 begins:-

Wade Jerry to Pat 306#86 30/4 |

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
ODO (SA) (82) 7 (Revise)	23 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 24	23 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 23	23 Apr 82
* ODA (SA) (82) 29 [* as on document in file - should be marked ODO (SA)]	23 Apr 82
ODO (SA) (82) 30	23 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 25	24 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 26	24 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 15th Mtg	24 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 16th Mtg	25 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 27	25 Apr 82
ODO (SA) (82) 31	26 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 17th Mtg	26 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 28	27 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 29	27 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 30	27 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 31	27 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 18th Mtg	27 Apr 82
CC (82) 20th Item 1	28 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 32	28 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 33	28 Apr 82
C (82) 17	28 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 19th Mtg	28 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 32	29 Apr 82
OD (SA) (82) 33	29 Apr 82

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____

Date _____

PREM Records Team

Sheet 1 of 2



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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>645</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 51, 29 April 1982, (folio 41)</i>	
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SIR I SINCLAIR
MR BILLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR URE
N°10 DS

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ADVANCE COPY

Hd/DEFENCE
MR WRIGHT
MR GILMORE
SIR MICHAEL PALMER
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
MR WADE-GERY
PS/DEFSEC
PS/HOME SEC
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

CABINET OFFICE

X19

WONFO 36/29

ZZ F C O

GR 430

D E D I P

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 291625Z APR 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1509 OF 29 APRIL

And To Flash UKMS WY.

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS SPOKEN TO ME. I HAD NOT BY THEN RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE CONTAINED IN FCO TELNO 868. HAIG MENTIONED THE PM'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH HE SAID SHOWED NERVOUSNESS THAT WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE. THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE REPLYING.

2. I HAVE NOW CONVEYED YOUR MESSAGE. IN DOING SO I HAVE TOLD HAIG THAT I HAVE INFORMED YOU OF HAIG'S INTENTION TO GO PUBLIC AT 10 AM LOCAL TIME TOMORROW RATHER THAN TONIGHT. HAIG EXPLAINED THAT THIS CHANGE OF TIMETABLE HAD BEEN NECESSITATED BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT WAS GOING TO MAKE AN IMPORTANT TELEVISION BROADCAST ABOUT THE BUDGET AT 8 PM THIS EVENING.

3. HAIG SAID THAT THE STATEMENT TO BE MADE TOMORROW MORNING, WHICH WOULD BE PRECEDED BY A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND CONSULTATIONS ON THE HILL, WOULD CONVEY A TONE MORE OF SORROW THAN OF ANGER. THE FOCUS WOULD BE ON THE NEED TO RESPECT THE RULE OF LAW WHICH THE ARGENTINIANS HAD VIOLATED. THEY HAD ALSO SHOWN A LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATION.

4. THE STATEMENT WOULD ALSO INDICATE THE ACTION THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD HENCEFORTH TAKE. THEY WOULD NOT BE IN A STATE OF WAR WITH ARGENTINA, BUT HE WAS INTENDING TO GO FURTHER THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAD RECOMMENDED. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS FULLY ABOARD.

PRESIDENT WAS FULLY ABOARD.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD A WORD FROM COSTA MENDEZ SINCE THEIR MEETING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, THOUGH HE HAD PROMISED TO GET BACK TO HIM URGENTLY. HE WAS SURE, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN COSTA MENDEZ DID RETURN HE WOULD SAY THAT THE ARGENTINIAN BOTTOM LINE WAS THE PROPOSAL THEY HAD MADE TO HIM WHEN HE LEFT ARGENTINA WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE BOTH TO HIM, HAIG, AND TO HMG. HAIG REFERRED TO MISCHIEF BEING PUT ABOUT IN BA ABOUT THE COLLUSION BETWEEN HMG AND THE US GOVERNMENT. HE WAS SURE THAT THERE WAS AN "INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM IN BA". THEY HOPED THEY COULD MANIPULATE THE US GOVERNMENT WHEREAS THEY WERE JUST STRANGLING THEMSELVES.

6. HAIG ALSO TOLD ME PERSONALLY OF A CALL HE HAD JUST HAD FROM GENSCHER. THIS PRAISED HIM FOR THE SPEECH HE HAD MADE YESTERDAY ON FOREIGN POLICY AND WENT ON TO DEAL WITH THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THERE HAD BEEN NO UNCERTAINTY IN GENSCHER'S ATTITUDE ON THIS SUBJECT. HAIG HAD TOLD HIM HOW ESSENTIAL IT WAS THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SHOULD STAY STRONGLY BEHIND BRITAIN; AND HE HAD TOLD GENSCHER THAT THE US WOULD BE MOVING BEHIND BRITAIN TOO VERY SHORTLY.

7. I HAVE EMPHASISED TO HAIG THE DELICACY OF THE WAY IN WHICH THEY REFER TO THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO THE US PROPOSALS. I HAVE ASKED HIM TO LET US SEE THE TEXT ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE ANYTHING IS AGREED OR PUBLISHED. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T. ON THIS SUBJECT.

HENDERSON

NNNN

11/1/80
11/1/80

Ref: B06483

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 30th AprilDiplomatic Issues

1. Your colleagues will have seen your message to President Reagan (OD(SA)(82) 34). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should report on American reactions; on any further news from Buenos Aires; and on the diplomatic future. On the last point he is circulating a paper tonight (OD(SA)(82) 35) on the need to fill the gap left by the collapse of the Haig Plan, in order to forestall unacceptable initiatives, maintain support for our position and provide a means of progress if the Argentines start to crack.

Military Issues

2. The Defence Secretary will be asking for two military decisions tomorrow.

(i) OD(SA)(82) 32, on the Enforcement of the TEZ, seeks freedom of action to attack Stanley airfield; ie the reinstatement of Suffixes SIERRA and TANGO in the ROE for the TEZ (OD(SA)(82) 24, Annex A, page 5). This is unlikely to be opposed. But it would be as well to ask for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's assessment of the effect on the Islanders and on world opinion. He may also have the answer to your query on the Islanders' medical helicopters.

(ii) OD(SA)(82) 33, on Special Forces' Direct Action Operations, seeks freedom at this stage to attack only military installations. This should cause no difficulty.

* ~~~~~ *

3. Orally, the Chief of the Defence Staff will seek authority for the remainder of the Amphibious Group, including the big ships, to sail from Ascension if no decisions has been taken to the contrary by midnight on Sunday, 2nd May. You will wish to make sure that the

* See now Washington telegram no. 1509

Defence Secretary has no objection, given his past worries about the political difficulty of turning the Group back without either a settlement or an invasion.

4. The Defence Secretary expects to circulate later tomorrow, for consideration on Saturday, a paper on the Argentine aircraft-carrier. This will be a difficult issue, where military and legal requirements may conflict. In the same timetable, the Chief of the Defence Staff hopes to get to the Sub-Committee a paper on Force Levels, ie the reinforcement Brigade and its need for shipping.

* ~~~~~ *

Next Meetings

5. The Defence Secretary would like the Sub-Committee to meet on Saturday, 2nd May. At present, no operational need is foreseen for meetings on Sunday or (Bank Holiday) Monday.

RLW

29th April 1982

R L WADE-GERY

* ~ * Passages deleted and retained
under Section 3(4).

CAWayland
8 May 2012



Prime Minister

34A

MO 5/21

A.F.C. 27/2

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

SOUTH AFRICA

Eldon Griffiths spoke to me in the House of Commons three days ago to say that he had just returned from a visit to South Africa where he had talked to Horwood, the Finance Minister, about the Falklands crisis. As you know Horwood has been friendly to us in the recent past, and I believe we owe some of our recent large South African contracts to him. Horwood told Eldon Griffiths that he believed that the South African Cabinet would respond favourably to any approach from the United Kingdom for the use of South African naval and other support facilities. Eldon also obtained the same general message from other politicians and military personnel to whom he talked.

2. I told him that we would not wish to approach South Africa for help at the present time for reasons which he would understand but I was interested to hear this viewpoint as it conflicted a little with what I might have expected. Eldon Griffiths responded that he would like to check out his impression and I said that I saw no reason why he should not do this, as long as it was quite clear that it purely came from him.

3. Yesterday evening Eldon Griffiths telephoned me to say that he had had a further word with Horwood who had talked to P W Botha, the Prime Minister, on this subject. Botha said that the South African Cabinet would be likely to respond favourably to any such approach from the UK for help and that he thought that this would be the view of the majority of his colleagues. Horwood said that he would like a response from Eldon Griffiths one way or another as to whether we would be needing assistance.



4. I think it would be right for me to respond to Eldon Griffiths by telling him that we do not require any help at the present time but we were, nevertheless, most grateful to know of the South African's willingness to consider an approach from us, should we think it necessary.

5. I record this matter for two reasons. First, South Africa could, of course, provide very important bunkering facilities to us and also shelter for our ships, but also because it gives a very different read-out to the message which I saw a week or two ago from our Representative in Pretoria.

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and other Members of OD(SA) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

? I enclose Eldon's Griffiths letter
just received

SW.

29th April 1982

Ministry of Defence



Secret

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

Dear John

29th April, 1982.

We spoke last night on the telephone about South Africa.

I confirm the following:

1. The impression you had received, namely that the "Boers" would react negatively to the idea of our using their air and naval facilities in Cape Province, is incorrect.
2. The South African Prime Minister says he is "most interested" in the possibility of our Task Force vessels and/or aircraft making use of these installations in the event that a lengthy operation needs to be continued in the Falklands. He asks that the following message be conveyed to our Prime Minister:

"I should be willing to discuss this. If Mrs. Thatcher would find it useful, I suggest she deposes someone who can speak on her behalf to come out here and talk to me directly about it".

In conveying this message to me the Finance Minister of South Africa (Owen Horwood) repeated what he told me in Cape Town last week, namely "our attitude would be constructive".

3. Mr. Botha's comments were made yesterday at a meeting which Horwood sought at my request, following our brief talk in the lobby. As a result of that talk, I told Horwood by telephone (as we agreed) that the prevailing impression in Whitehall was different from the one I had formed during my talks with him in Cape Town. Simonstown came up because, during my visit, the Task Force had reached almost exactly the same latitude as Cape Town. Horwood agreed that it would be odd for our forces to have to continue carrying most of their food and rations 8,000 miles from Portsmouth when plentiful supplies were available in South Africa; also that the docking and engineering facilities that might be needed if our ships ^{were to} remain at sea for long periods, ^{are still} ~~were~~ available at Simonstown, Cape Town and Durban.

4. My involvement arises from a long personal friendship with Owen Horwood, reaching back to the time when, while working



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

for Alec, I first became interested in the Simonstown Agreement. You will recall that this provided Britain with access not only to the relatively small harbour at Simonstown, but to all the air and naval facilities of South Africa - in return for our supplying weapons for external defence.

5. In view of the South African Prime Minister's personal message, I think it important ~~that~~ some response - even if it be of a holding nature, - be sent to Owen Horwood. May I also request that the details of my communications are not made available to our Embassy in South Africa? My impression is that Botha and Horwood would prefer at this stage to handle any discussions that might arise on a personal and confidential basis.

John Nott
J. Nott

The Rt. Hon. John Nott, M.P.
Secretary of State,
Department of Defence,
Main Building,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats
CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby
~~IMMEDIATE 18/57~~
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CONFIDENTIAL
~~DESKBY 1845Z~~ **FLASH**
FM FCO 29 Z APRIL 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER
1. I rang Haig at 1700Z.
2. Haig said that Costa Mendez had refused to see him. His impression was that the Argentinians were trying to buy time, and to secure changes from the British end. I said that there could of course be no question of this. Haig said that this was fully understood. He intended to brief the Senate this afternoon and to go much further than he had yet done in indicating that there was no question where the problem lay, in that the Argentinians were reacting negatively to proposals that were already asking less of them than of the British. He would, however, not go so far as to rule out any resumption of US activity in promoting a negotiated settlement for the future. I said that the Argentinian position ^{was} ~~is~~ beginning to look very like a refusal of the American proposals. Haig said that if their answer was no, so be it.
PYM
NNNN

*Mr 29/4
h-a*

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/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
File number	Dept S/S OFFICE	Distribution Falklands
Drafted by (Block capitals) F N RICHARDS		<i>PS PS/POUS Mr Hittard Mr Ure Planning Staff S Am D Mr Coles (No 10) 125 / Date</i>
Telephone number 233 4831		
Authorised for despatch <i>Hittard 28/4</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
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~~John Colles.~~

With the compliments of

John Holmes.
28.4.82.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON, SW1A 2AH

OUT TELEGRAM

32A


		Classification and Caveats	Precedence/Deskby
		DEDIP SECRET	IMMEDIATE

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PRE/ADD	7	TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TEL NO	8	TELEGRAM NUMBER
	9	REPEATED FOR INFO IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK - PERSONAL
	10	FOR AMBASSADOR
	11	PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY OF STATE
	12	1. I know that Haig will let you know, and that you will
	13	report to us immediately, when there is any clear response from
	14	Galtieri and the Junta. Should they accept the American
	15	proposals I do not have to tell you that the political
	16	situation here will be extremely difficult to handle and we
	17	will need time for appropriate consultations. I hope Haig will
	18	understand this and will not (not) force our hand or add to our
	19	problems by premature publication. There needs to be the
	20	closest consultation on timing and presentation.
	21	2. The problem will be less critical in the event of
///	22	Argentinian rejection or qualified acceptance with demands for
//	23	further modification, but we will require advance warning of
/	24	Haig's intentions as regards publication and time to react.
	25	3. In the event of Argentinian acceptance American willingness

MR 29/4

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK	Catchword to
File number	Dept	Distribution	
SIR A ACLAND		PS PS/PUS	
Drafted by (Block capitals)		<i>Copies returned to</i> PS / No 10 PS / Home Secretary PS / Secretary of State for Defence PS / Chancellor of the Duchy	
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Authorised for despatch	<i>JF 29/4</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch		

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

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 to give a precise security guarantee of the Islands and Dependencies is absolutely essential so that there can be no question of reoccupation by the Argentines or an Argentinian change of mind during the withdrawal process should, for example, Galtieri be ousted. You will remember that I raised this with Haig during my visit and got only a qualified answer.
 4. I leave it to you to judge whether you should put these points to Haig now or whether you make them when you get firm and final news of the Argentinian reaction.
 5. Congratulations on your great public relations effort. It has obviously been a huge success and has contributed considerably to the favourable congressional and public mood.

PYM
 NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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12 8 APR 1982



SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)
01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

MO 5/21

28th April 1982

Dear Sir,

MILITARY COMMENTS ON DRAFT "MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT"

The amended text of the draft "Memorandum of Agreement" was circulated last night under cover of OD(SA)(82)31. ^{below} The Chief of the Defence Staff has now sent us the attached note giving his view on the military implications of aspects of the draft Agreement. You will wish to be aware of these and they may be drawn on if it is decided to produce any further commentary on the proposals.

2. I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Coles (No 10) and to Brian Fall (FCO)

John Coles
Brian Fall
(D B OMAND)

David Wright Esq

SECRET

2038/1

CDS NOTECOMMENTARY ON DRAFT HAIG AGREEMENT : WITHDRAWAL2.2.1 "within seven days each withdraws half of forces inside MEZs"

not even-handed:

- we have two SSNs
- they have over 7,000 troops and ancillary equipment

in addition:

- the UK TF withdraws to 2,000 nm (7 days at 12k)
- the Argentinians withdraw to the mainland (400 nm) and place themselves in a condition such that they cannot be reinserted in 7 days. How? How can this be verified?

It would be acceptable if the timing was two days steaming at 12k (570 nm) and the same period applied to Argentinian reinsertion.

2.2.2 "within 15 days each withdraws remaining forces to usual operating areas or normal duties"

Acceptable depending on our interpretation of usual operating areas or normal duties. We would take this as the high seas.

It might be argued that these proposals are acceptable because the Reagan letter provides a US guarantee of withdrawal and against reintroduction (para iii). This guarantee is not part of the agreement (which is bilateral) and has no legality.

CONFIDENTIAL

ds



B/P

cc MOD
LWD
CO.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 April 1982

Dear Sir,

Falkland Islands

The Prime Minister has seen OD(SA)(82)28 to which is annexed the draft protocol on the Special Interim Authority. She has asked whether this would be implemented by an Order in Council or whether an Order would be laid before Parliament.

On various occasions in the last few days, the Prime Minister has referred to the question of legislation to implement any agreement which might be reached with Argentina and, where relevant, with the United States. I believe she would welcome advice on this matter.

I am copying this letter to David Omand (Ministry of Defence) and David Wright (Cabinet Office), and to Henry Steel (Law Officers' Department).

Yours ever
John Holmes.

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



The National Archives

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Ref: B06481



PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 29th April

Military issues

1. Most of the outstanding military decisions can wait until 30th April, when the diplomatic situation may be clearer. But your meeting at 0900 tomorrow will need to consider the following.

(a) Amphibious Group. The deadline for stopping it sailing from Ascension has been extended (without detriment to the planned sailing time) to 1000 tomorrow. Is the Sub-Committee content not to stop it? With the Defence Secretary's agreement, some small slower ships have sailed today. The eye-catching decision concerns Canberra and Norland. They are fast, and could probably catch up if they were held a day or two longer. But it would be safer militarily to let them go tomorrow.

(b) Force levels. The Defence Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff will want to mention this new problem orally tomorrow and to put in a paper for 30th April. The Force Commander will probably need another Brigade (over 2,000 men) if he is to be sure of avoiding military stalemate after the landing. A suitable Brigade is available, and would not need to arrive until two weeks after D-Day. But shipping for it would need requisitioning soon; this might, but need not, involve QE 2. The Sub-Committee need only give this preliminary consideration tomorrow.

2. The military decisions for 30th April will probably be: freedom to attack the airfield; freedom to use Vulcans; offensive operations by Special Forces; force levels (see above); ~~████████████████████~~, and possibly the problem of the Argentine aircraft carrier.

Diplomatic Issues

3. If the Argentines have accepted the Haig Plan, the Sub-Committee will need to consider what recommendation it will make to the Cabinet. The United States military guarantee will be a crucial issue. Mr Haig has spoken reassuringly about this to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary today. But what, physically, will it involve? And will it require Congressional approval?

4. If the Argentines have rejected the Haig Plan, the immediate issues will be

- When will the Plan be published? The timing may be important vis-a-vis the Debate in Parliament.
- How and where do we consult with Mr Haig on the next steps? When will the Americans come down off the fence, on our side, and what will this involve? (If American economic sanctions are likely you will need to warn the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England, because of the effect on the international system if Argentina defaults). What other forms of diplomacy, if any, would we want to see filling the gap left by Mr Haig? Or would Mr Haig himself, in a Mark II guise, be the least evil alternative to Haig Mark I?

5. If the Argentines have equivocated, or are still not answering, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's advice will be needed on the implications. Mr Haig has already asked us to be giving preliminary thought to what should be done if the Argentine reply is to ask where the British Government stands on the proposals.

Next Meeting

6. Already fixed for 0945 on Friday, 30th April.

R.L.G.

28th April 1982

R L WADE-GERY



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Ref: B06480



PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 28th April

Diplomatic Issues

1. Your meeting at 0900 hours tomorrow should begin with a report from the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on the Haig situation.

- If the Argentines have accepted Mr Haig's proposals, the Sub-committee will need to consider whether we can too and what should be said to the Cabinet.
- If they have turned him down, you should seek to establish whether he now accepts that his mediation attempt is at an end; if so, whether and in what form he will be announcing United States support for Britain; and if not, whether an approach from you to President Reagan is needed to clarify the position.
- If the Argentine attitude is still unclear, the Sub-Committee will need to decide how long we and the Americans should allow such equivocation to continue before deeming no answer to be a No answer.

2. If the Haig proposals are still in play, the Sub-Committee may wish to take note that OD(SA)(82) 31 comments on some apparently minor differences between the text Mr Haig gave us last week (OD(SA)(82) 25) and the one he has given both the Argentines and us this week; that OD(SA)(82) 29 circulates the latest American draft of a Protocol on the establishment and operation of the Special Interim Authority, which would be signed by the United States as well as Argentina and Britain. No decisions are needed in either case.



Military Issues

3. The Chief of the Defence Staff should report on the latest situation.
4. You could then clear two comparatively minor matters out of the way -
 - (i) The Defence Secretary should report on what has been done about the shot prisoner, and why.
 - (ii) The Chief of the Defence Staff should explain the need for a new warning to the Argentines, this time about their merchant ships on the high seas, as proposed in OD(SA)(82) 30. If the Defence Secretary and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agree, the proposal should be endorsed.
5. That leaves the five big decisions identified at this morning's meeting (the Ministry of Defence will not be ready by tomorrow to make proposals on the sixth, ie the Argentine aircraft carrier).

12m- | (a) The TEZ. Do the Sub-Committee agree to announcing this tomorrow? That is likely to be the decision, whatever has happened on the Haig front. If so, can the announcement be at 1100 London time tomorrow, to come into effect 24 hours later? This particular timing would suit the Ministry of Defence, since the TEZ would then start just before dawn (local time) in the Falklands; the Cabinet would still be sitting when the announcement was made, but you may think that acceptable since you warned them last week that this was the sort of issue on which it would probably not be possible to consult them in advance.

(b) Stanley airfield. Do the Sub-Committee agree that it may be destroyed, at the discretion of the military commanders, any time after the TEZ is in force? Or should they be given unconditional discretion only to strafe it, with conditional discretion to destroy (ie bomb) it if the Argentines in fact go on using it? There may be a case for postponing this decision if Mr Haig's hat is still in the ring.



(c) Vulcans. Does the Sub-Committee remain content that they may be deployed to Ascension tomorrow night? That is the only immediate decision. You need not decide before 29th April whether to give the military commanders discretion to use them against the airfield.

(d) Special Forces. The Ministry of Defence 's paper (OD(SA)(82) 29) seeks three decisions -

- May they be inserted into the Falkland Islands?
- May this be done any time after the TEZ is in force?
- Any restrictions on their operational activities (eg minimise Argentine casualties)?

Their prime role is to gather intelligence. This is urgent, because of the invasion window. But it could no doubt wait a day or so, if there is a strong case for that on Haig grounds.

(e) The Amphibious Group. Should it sail from Ascension on 29th April? This is essential for the window. But since the ships are at six hours notice, the decision could (just) be left until your meeting at 0930 on 29th April.

Next meetings

6. Already fixed: 0930 on Thursday, 29th April; and 0945 on Friday, 30th April.

27th April 1982

R L WADE-GERY



The National Archives

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SECRET

PRIME MINISTERThe destruction of Pat Stanley Airfield

Ministers are to decide tomorrow whether to decide to deploy Vulcans to Ascension.

2. Discussions with MOD this afternoon made it clear a number of things:

1. It is not a matter of Vulcans or Harriers. Even if ~~the~~ a Vulcan went in on Thursday night, Harriers would have to go in on Friday morning, to see what results had been achieved, and to 'strafe' the associated facilities and parked aircraft. And, if the airship was being repaired, Vulcans or Harriers would have to do a repeat operation. The force commander might even want to send in Harriers in the evening before a Vulcan went in, to try to trace out the radar.

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2. A Vulcan would drop a streak of 21 bombs diagonally across the strip, with high statistical probability of one or two falling on the strip. The streak would shudder about 2,000 feet (dropped from 400 feet). Windows would probably not be broken in Port Stanley, 2½ miles away.

4 Harriers dive bombing the strip could carry 8 bombs, with a high statistical probability of six hits on the runway.

3. It would be militarily acceptable to declare the T&Z but not to bomb the runway unless and until the Argentines used it. So far they have failed to challenge any of our warnings. They might decide not to challenge this.

3. I attach a list of questions which you might like to cover when this subject is discussed.

SECRET

RGA

26. iv. 82

PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD

MILITARY QUESTIONS

1. Why bomb it with a Vulcan?
2. What will bombing by a Vulcan achieve?
3. How could Vulcan bombing fail?
4. Statistically, what is the size of bomb pattern from a Vulcan and how far away from the target could bombs fall?
5. How many non-Argentiniens are there on, or near, the airfield?
6. What are the statistical risks of hitting other targets, for example, buildings or people in Port Stanley - or non-military activities elsewhere?
7. What are the risks of breaking windows or doing minor damage over a wide area - and how wide?
8. Is it possible that, if one or two bombs hit the runway, little else military might be hit?
9. What is the probability that the target could be missed altogether - or only the edge of it be hit?
10. How long will the Vulcan flight take?
11. How many in-flight refuellings will each Vulcan flight take and what would happen if one or more failed?
12. How easy is it to fill in a hole in the runway and how long will it take?

13. Do all Argentine aircraft need the full length of the runway?
14. Have the Argentinians got tarmac, earth moving and matting available on the Falklands?
15. When will the airfield need to be bombed by a Vulcan again and how frequently can bombings take place?

CRITICAL MILITARY QUESTIONS

16. What military threat does the airfield pose to the main task force? Is this threat acceptable, and for how long? How much fuel and ammunition is there for the Argentinians to operate from the airfield?
17. Is it not accepted practice that the best way of putting out an airfield is both to bomb it and attack it with guns, rockets, etc - in other words would we not need to use both Vulcans and Harriers?
18. Why not just use Harriers in the ground attack role to strike at aircraft, helicopters, stores, radars, guns, ammunition etc? Would this not be very effective? Are there not British pilots in the task force trained for attacks against targets on the ground?
19. How effective/risky would naval gunfire support be against aircraft, helicopters, stores, etc on the ground?
20. Will not the declaration of the TEZ stop the Argentinians using Port Stanley airfield? Why not wait and see - they backed off elsewhere?



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13

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falklands: OD(SA) on 27th April

Your meeting at 0900 tomorrow, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's absence, should cover the following points.

- (a) Latest diplomatic situation. Sir Antony Acland can report on the OAS meeting and any news from Mr Haig (on the Mexicans).
- (b) Latest military situation. The Chief of the Defence Staff can report any developments.
- (c) The Vulcan option. The Chief of the Air Staff will be ready to brief the Sub-Committee on whether the Vulcan option against Stanley airfield is technically feasible; and if so
- what it would actually involve (including subsidiary roles for the Harriers, see below);
 - how it would compare with the all-Harrier option in terms of risk to our aircraft and to Stanley town; and in terms of effectiveness;
 - how often it would have to be repeated.
- (d) Airfield timing. The Chief of the Defence Staff should comment on an interesting new possibility. Instead of being ordered to destroy the airfield as soon as possible after the TEZ is in force, ie on Thursday night, the Force Commander might be given discretion to do so if - but only if - the Argentines go on using it (for military or resupply purposes) after the TEZ is established. If they do, we should only have lost a day or so. But there is a real possibility that, in the light of the proposed Announcement, fear will keep them from using the airfield at all. In that case we should have avoided upsetting the Islanders (and perhaps domestic and world opinion); risking our aircraft on repeated bombing attacks; and destroying a valuable asset for the future.



(e) Vulcan deployment. The Defence Secretary should say whether he wants the Vulcans sent to Ascension tomorrow. This is the only military point on which the Sub-Committee will need to take a firm decision before Wednesday.

(f) Special Forces. The Chief of the Defence Staff wishes to raise this orally. No firm decisions will be possible until Wednesday, when the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will be back. But the Ministry of Defence need general guidance, so that the Force Commander can make provisional plans.

2. Sir Antony Acland may wish to revert to the idea of warning Mr Haig that we may well be announcing the TEZ on Wednesday (for enforcement on Thursday). This would have to be done tomorrow if at all. It would not involve warning him about the airfield attack plan. Today's message told him only that "the next phase of operations will have to start very soon".

3. The Sub-Committee will need to be very clear what the so-called Vulcan option will involve. The Chief of the Air Staff's concept appears to be that Harriers should also be used against the airfield, both ahead of the Vulcans in order to take out the radars and after them in order to destroy helicopters, aircraft, stores and equipment. For these attacks the Harriers would use rockets; only the Vulcans would use bombs. Rocket attack by Harrier would of course remain an option even if the runway itself did not have to be bombed at all, ie if the tactic at (d) above were adopted and worked.

4. The next meeting after tomorrow's is already fixed: 0900 on Wednesday, 28th April.

26th April 1982

R L WADE-GERY



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PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

SIR FRANK COOPER CCB CMG

25. 4. 82

Dear Sir,

This may be

of interest to you.

*Yours ever
Fred*

PUS/

Secretary of State

Copy to: CDS

At the Chequer's meeting tomorrow it will be important to confront your colleagues with the need for tough decisions soon on how to use the formidable military capability we have deployed to the South Atlantic. During the course of next week we shall be in a position:

- a. to impose a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falkland Islands, which would prevent the reinforcement and resupply of the Argentine garrison by either sea or air;
- b. to bomb Port Stanley airfield with either Vulcans from Ascension, or Harriers from the Task Group, and to mount any further attacks necessary to ensure that damage is not made good and the airport remains closed;
- c. to attack the Argentine fleet at sea outside our TEZ either with surface ships or submarines;
- d. to mount limited operations by special forces to gather intelligence and then to attack Argentine military personnel and facilities on the Falkland Islands;

and within two or three weeks, depending on a decision to sail the Amphibious Group from Ascension

- e. to undertake a major landing on the Falkland Islands with a marine brigade, two infantry battalions and supporting arms.
2. In considering what part military action should play in resolving the crisis Ministers will need to be clear about political objectives - both medium and long term. The political and military objectives as currently formulated are summarised at Annex B.
 3. As to the military possibilities, these seem to me to fall into four graduated phases, as follows:

- a. Establishment of a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). Once we had announced the TEZ our forces would police it reactively. They would only attack Argentine forces which entered the zone, or which posed a direct threat to them from outside the zone.

b. Establishment of a TEZ together with attacks to neutralize Port Stanley airfield and/or harrassment operations by special forces. Enforcement of the TEZ would remain reactive, but we would mount attacks against Port Stanley airfield - including the runway, installations, and aircraft - which would be intended both to facilitate enforcement of the TEZ, and to make a dent in the Argentine military capability and morale. In addition the SAS and SBS could mount attacks against Argentine military installations and personnel which would similarly attrite capability and morale.

c. Enforce the TEZ, attack Port Stanley airfield, and authorise unrestricted operations by our SSNs against the Argentine fleet on the high seas. This would further escalate the conflict. The sinking of the Argentine aircraft carrier and two or three other major warships would be a heavy blow to Argentine military and political morale, and would improve our military position if a protracted conflict ensued.

d. In addition to a, b, and c above, sail the amphibious force from Ascension, and mount major landings on the Falkland Islands as soon as you are in a position to do so. A major landing on the Falkland Islands which looked as though it might succeed in evicting the Argentine garrison could lead to a quick political solution, or it could lead to protracted operations which might eventually lead to the surrender of the Argentine garrison. The maintenance of an effective TEZ would be essential.

In considering what military action to take in support of our diplomatic strategy, - and crucially - how to relate military to diplomatic action, Ministers will need to address a number of difficult questions. I suggest what seem to me to be some of the more pertinent at Annex A.

24th April 1982

PUS

QUESTIONS ARISING IN RELATION TO PHASES-OF
MILITARY ACTION

- a. Establishment of a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)
- i. Should we contemplate a long drawn out blockade during which nothing much might be happening and the capability of the Argentine garrison on the Falklands would be slowly eroded?
 - ii. Are we prepared to sink merchant ships and shoot down civil aircraft to enforce the TEZ?
- b. Establishment of a TEZ together with attacks to neutralize Port Stanley airfield and/or harrassment operations by special forces
- i. Are we prepared - and in what timescale - to mount attacks on Stanley airfield with Vulcans, Sea Harriers, naval gunfire, special operations, or a combination?
 - ii. Are we prepared to give special forces a pretty free reign to operate against Argentine forces on the Falklands?
- c. Enforce the TEZ, attack Port Stanley airfield, and authorise unrestricted operations by our SSNs against the Argentine fleet on the high seas.
- i. Are we prepared to contemplate a major sea battle involving the loss of ships on both sides?
 - ii. Would our international support hold up if we were to extend the conflict in this way?
 - iii. What would be the risk of sinking a non-belligerent submarine by accident?
 - iv. How would we react to reprisals taken against the islanders by the Argentine garrison, or reprisals against the British in Argentina?
 - v. Are we prepared to attack airfields on the Argentine mainland from which Argentine combat aircraft would threaten our surface fleet?

d. In addition to a, b, and c above, sail the amphibious force from Ascension, and mount major landings on the Falkland Islands as soon as you are in a position to do so

i. Are we prepared to take the calculated risk of sailing our amphibious force from Ascension to the Falklands and when? If we do not sail the force what is the explanation?

ii. Are we prepared to commit our ground forces to a landing and follow up operations on the Falklands? What would be the aim? Could it succeed? What happens if it fails?

iii. Are we prepared to contemplate significant casualties at sea and/or on land? Are we prepared to commit forces on a significant scale to operations in the South Atlantic which could continue for several months and at the expense of NATO commitments?

2. In addition there are a number of more general questions which deserve consideration.

a. On whose side is time?

b. Will the diplomatic, international, and economic fronts hold up - and in what circumstances?

c. Will we pursue our aims in the face of criticism, opposition, and even obstruction from the Americans and other allies?

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

POLITICAL

1. Our political objectives have been consistent since the invasion and the Prime Ministers initial commitment to Parliament (Hansard 3rd April; Col 633) "It is the Governments objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British Administration at the earliest possible moment". This formulation has remained the principle feature also of private deliberation; "... essential elements in the Governments stance should continue to be that Argentine troops must be withdrawn before negotiations could take place and that thereafter the wishes of the Islanders must remain paramount." (OD(SA) 4th Mtg 11th April). The latter point being the most important: "Most vital issue of all was the need, in relation to the longer term, to sustain the principle that the wishes of the Islanders were paramount." (OD(SA) 10th Mtg 19th April).
2. In public, sovereignty has been given greater prominence than in private. "Our mission is to restore British sovereignty to the islands and to give the people what they want" (The Prime Minister, Hansard 6th April, Col 824). Although other public words have been more cautious; "We are going to restore British administration to the Falkland Islands - that was the Prime Ministers commitment and we mean to stick to it .." (Mr Nott on "Weekend World" 4th April). "The restoration of British administration of the islands is still Her Majesty's Governments intention" (FCS, Hansard 21 April, Col 274). Within OD(SA) there has been an apparent move from sovereignty, for example

in discussion of the first Haig formulation "it would probably be necessary also to make clear that the Government were continuing to seek the restoration of British administration" (OD(SA) 6th Mtg, 13th April). But the tone later becomes more robust.

3. There was a reference in OD(SA) 7th Meeting (15th April) that "the dependencies should not necessarily be treated in the same way in any longer term settlement, since they had an importance of their own in relation to Antarctic claims". Otherwise it is only recently that the separate constitutional basis of the dependencies has been brought out in public.

MILITARY

4. Military objectives have, whilst based on the strategic longer term aim of removing Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands, tended to concentrate on more limited tactical objectives. The public presentation has concentrated on unspecified threat rather than execution (".. diplomacy may continue to prove insufficient to deal with Argentine aggression" Lord Carrington 3rd April Col 1581 Hansard; "Our Naval task force gives us the strength from which to urge a settlement." Lord Belstead 7th April Hansard Col 258 ".. [The task force will be] fully adequate for any action that may be required in exercise of our undoubted right of self-defence"). But in private some guidelines have been articulated: "in reality there was no intention of attacking the Argentine mainland" (OD(SA) 8th Mtg 16th April), "the political needs would best be served by a quick clean operation with maximum prisoners and minimum dead. If the two requirements (of speed v casualties) conflict, speed should be secondary." (OD(SA) 11th Mtg 19th April).

5. Formally the missions of operations have been stated as follows:

a. OPERATION CORPORATE: "The overall aim of HMG in the current situation is to bring about the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and dependencies and the reestablishment of British administration there as quickly as possible. Military deployments and operations are directed to the support of this aim".

b. OPERATION PARAQUET: Mission - "To repossess South Georgia as soon as possible".

CINCFLEET OORDER 2/82
Endorsed by CDS 2038/1/1 of 14 April 1982
Authorised by OD(SA) 19 April 1982 (Second Meeting)

c. OPERATION SUTTON: Aim - "To land a force in the Falkland Islands with a view to repossessing the islands" (ie identical to COS directive in COS 9/82).

CINCFLEET OORDER C3 dated 19 April 1982
Taken 'note' of by COS (CDS 2038/1/2 dated 21 April 1982
Subject of presentation to OD(SA) 22 April 1982

11A

OPERATION SUTTON - DECISIONS (AS AT SUN 25 APR)

1. Vulcans. Vulcan bombers are ready in UK for deployment to Ascension Island. They will be available for tasking in the South Atlantic 2 days after the decision is taken to deploy them to Ascension Island. If that decision is taken on Sun 25 Apr, they could be on task on Tue 27 Apr.
2. Amphibious Group. The Amphibious Group is assembled at Ascension Island. It can arrive off the Falklands 14 days after sailing, assuming a speed of advance of 10 knots.

*Paragraph deleted and retained under
Section 3(4)*

*AWayland
8 May 2012*

4. Total Exclusion Zone. The expansion of the Maritime Exclusion Zone into a TEZ should be promulgated at least 24 hours before the earliest date of a VULCAN attack on Port Stanley Airfield (27 Apr.) and 48 hours before the Carrier Battle Group arrives on 29 Apr, whichever is the sooner. This decision should therefore be taken by OD(SA) on Sunday 25 Apr for promulgation on 26 April.
5. Rules of Engagement. Rules of Engagement for the Carrier Battle Group will be submitted for OD(SA) approval on Mon 26 Apr.
6. Special Forces with Task Group. SBS and SAS can be inserted for intelligence gathering and offensive operations after the Carrier Battle Group arrive in the TEZ. This decision should be taken on 26 Apr if insertion is to be made at the first opportunity.



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10B

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Sir Robert Armstrong

FALKLANDS:OD(SA), 26 APRIL

Following this afternoon's discussion at Chequers, business at OD(SA)'s meeting at 11.15 hrs tomorrow could conveniently be taken as follows:-

A. Diplomatic

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should cover

- latest news on the Haig front;
- any decisions he requires;
- any further points he wishes to raise on the Islanders (the FCO are now pursuing the two points raised today - broadcasts and sea evacuation - and are unlikely to be ready to report on either tomorrow);
- implications of Sr Costa Mendes' statement that after the Santa Fe incident we are now "technically at war" (do we, in particular need Emergency Legislation?)

B. Military

After reporting on the latest situation, the Defence Secretary should cover the decisions needed from the Sub-Committee, as follows:-

- (i) Call-up of selected reservists (OD(SA)(82)22).
A comparatively small matter, which could be got out of the way at the start.
- (ii) Total Exclusion Zone (OD(SA)(82)24)
 - a. Can the proposed ROE be approved now (for implementation only when the TEZ comes into force)?
 - b. Are the terms of the proposed announcement approved? How long notice should it give? The paper suggests 48 hours, but FCO advice today was that 24 might be enough. If so, no announcement would be needed until 28 April, even if enforcement is to begin on 29 April.

SECRET

/c.

- c. When is enforcement to begin? 29 April is both the earliest date and the one MOD favour. Does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agree? No final decision is needed until 28 April. But the Government will be virtually committed once the date of the announcement is fixed; if this is to be 28 April (see above), a decision will be needed by 27 April.
- d. The Sub-Committee should carefully note three points:
- Any Argentine combat aircraft may be attacked if it comes within 40 miles of a British unit.
 - Non-Argentine merchant ships or aircraft may in certain circumstances be attacked (Mr Haig was told at one stage that Soviet blockade-runners might be used).
 - Stanley airfield is an authorised target; see below.

(iii) Stanley Airfield

- a. The decision to attack it is part of (ii) above.
- b. That leaves open
- When? 29 April? Decide on 28 April?
 - How? Vulcans or Harriers? If that too can be decided on 28 April, do we need to decide now whether to deploy Vulcans to Ascension (Mr Omand's letter of 23 April to Mr Whitmore)?
 - Should anything about the airfield attack be broadcast to the Islanders, either before or after it happens?

/c.

- c. The Sub-Committee should note that, unless the airfield is destroyed on 29 April, Special Forces (see below) cannot be inserted on that date. If they aren't, they will not have collected the intelligence required if the invasion "window" is open promptly on 16 May.
- d. Repeated attacks on the airfield will be needed, to inhibit repair. How often? Every 3 days or so?

(iv) Special Forces

- a. Should they be inserted? Decision by 28 April?
- b. If so, when? 29 April?
- c. What operations will they be allowed to undertake, apart from intelligence-gathering?

(v) Amphibious Group

- a. Should it sail from Ascension on 29 April? Decide on 28 April? If it doesn't, the invasion window won't open promptly on 16 May.
- b. Politically, does sailing it commit us to an assault on the Falklands if there is no diplomatic settlement by the third week in May?

(vi) United States

- a. Should Mr Haig be warned of any of our military decisions?
- b. If so, which and when?

2. Tomorrow's meeting need not address the following:

- Attacking Argentina's aircraft carrier.

The MOD are preparing a paper, for a later meeting, on the ROE which would be required and on whether advance warning could be given that she should not cross a given line.

*Passage deleted and retained under
Section 3(u) (Wayland, 8 May 2012)*

- South Thule. The MOD have no proposal to make at present.

3. The Sub-Committee will no doubt wish to meet again on 27 April.



R L Wade-Gery
25 April, 1982



The National Archives

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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>645</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Omand to Whitmore dated 24 April 1982</i>	
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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 April 1982

Falklands - Selective Call Out of Reservists

The Prime Minister has seen memorandum OD(SA)(82)22 of 22 April by the Secretary of State for Defence and has asked that it should be discussed at OD(SA).

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Members of OD(SA) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

A. J. COLES

David Omand, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

RM.



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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>645</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 41</i> <i>dated 24 April 1982 (folio 4B)</i>	
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Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 39, 23 April 1982 (folio 6A)</i>	
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LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>645</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract/Item details: <i>MODUK INTSUM No. 38, 23/4/82</i> <i>(folio 4)</i>	
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Extract/Item details: <i>Letter from Omand to Holmes dated 23 April 1982</i>	
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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-930 5422 ext 233 8224

MR WHITMORE

cc Sir R Armstrong.

p.a. M 4/5.

No - it doesn't add to our perceptions in any way. Request meeting if you will then to be circulated at the Prime Minister's meeting it would be helpful to know in the course of future.

Prime Minister

A.S.C. 23/4


THE FALKLANDS: BRITISH OBJECTIVES

1. I attach a minute I put today to Sir R Armstrong. I have discussed it with him. He asked me to say that he agrees with it and that I should put it to you for the Prime Minister to read, if she wishes, before Sunday's discussions at Chequers.
2. You will see that its main purpose is to elucidate the direction in which the Prime Minister would wish me to go in carrying out my remit from OD(SA) to assess our objectives in relation to a long-term settlement. It concentrates essentially on one issue, that of sovereignty: though it also draws attention to a number of related matters. Ideally I should have preferred to put it forward after the various supporting papers referred to in it had become available. But time, as the Prime Minister rightly reminded us the other day, is very short: not just before Sunday's meeting, important as that will be, but also because, as the military options expand and become more immediate, so the time for diplomatic discussion, if that is to continue, is foreshortened.
3. So what I have tried to do in my minute is to recall the basis on which we have so far been operating; to enquire whether the Prime Minister wants to change that basis; and to draw attention to what seem to me to be the risks of such a course. The views in the minute are mine (though, as I say, Sir R Armstrong tells me that he shares them) and I do not think that it would be right for me, until the Prime Minister has considered them, to circulate the minute to any of the other members of OD(SA). Equally, I

hope that, whatever view the Prime Minister takes of the arguments I have tried to set out, she may wish them at some time soon to be considered by her colleagues, particularly if, notwithstanding those arguments, she remains desirous of change. She might therefore like the minute to be circulated at the Chequers meeting; or she might wish to discuss it with me. I am at her disposal.

4. I repeat that I should have preferred to have written this with a greater weight of supporting paper and it may be that the papers, when they come, will not support me. But, given the pressure of time, I hope the Prime Minister will accept this as the best considered judgment that I can offer her at present.

5. I am sending a copy of this minute to Sir R Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Michael Palliser". The signature is written in a cursive style and is underlined with a single horizontal line.

(MICHAEL PALLISER)

23 April 1982.

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

THE FALKLANDS: BRITISH OBJECTIVES

1. OD(SA) instructed me to prepare an assessment of British objectives in relation to a long-term settlement of the Falkland Islands issue. Papers are being produced urgently on possible forms of future status for the Islands and on our interests in the dependencies. But such papers need to be based on a clear definition of the Government's attitude towards the future of the Islands. If we are working on the sort of lines that have governed the attitude of successive administrations, papers can readily be prepared but, if the guidelines are changed the options will be different. I recognise that there is a chicken-and-egg quality to this. It is difficult for Ministers to formulate objectives precisely when work on position papers is still underway. But I think that at this stage certain political and diplomatic predictions can be made clearly enough for me to define some fundamental issues on which early guidance is needed. The primary purpose of this minute is to examine the consequences of any fundamental shift in Government policy about sovereignty: and to outline the likely reaction to any such shift of Argentina, other Latin American countries, the Americans and other allies, as well as the consequences for Soviet opportunism in the region.

2. I should make it clear that necessary work is not being held up meanwhile. The Assessments Staff are urgently preparing papers on:

- a. Prospects for internal stability in Argentina;
- b. Soviet strategic interests and opportunities in the area.

I hope these will be available at the beginning of next week. An FCO paper on British interests in the dependencies and the place of the dependencies in the possible arrangements currently under discussion with Mr Haig is also nearly ready.

3. Current exchanges through Mr Haig have been on the basis of Security Council Resolution No 502; they have addressed arrangements for Argentine withdrawal, the nature of an interim administration of the Islands, and the framework for the negotiation of a long-term solution to the dispute. They have not touched directly on the substance of such a solution. But, on the terms of reference for the long-term negotiations, there have been major differences between the two sides. The Argentines dismiss the notion of consulting the wishes of the Islanders and insist that Argentine sovereignty is not negotiable; we do not accept the latter proposition and are also insisting that in any long-term solution the wishes of the Islanders must be paramount.

4. This British position has been broadly in line with that of successive Governments. In particular it has been Britain's consistent position over many years that our fundamental concern was to safeguard the wishes of the people of the Falkland Islands, but that, subject to these, we were prepared to discuss the issue of sovereignty without prejudice. (A selection of policy statements by this and previous administrations is at Annex A). Very little emphasis has hitherto been put on the strategic importance of the region to Britain; and it has been taken as axiomatic that its economic potential and opportunities for us therefrom could **best** be exploited in co-operation with the Argentine. It has for many years been accepted that western strategic interests in Latin America as a whole were for the Americans to assess and protect as necessary. This assumption has been the basis of United States' policy since the inception of the Monroe doctrine. America's allies have implicitly worked on the same assumption.

5. The Prime Minister on the other hand has suggested in several of the OD(SA) discussions that the Government should be thinking in terms of a continuation of British sovereignty both over the Falklands and over the dependencies, more particularly South Georgia. She has also asked whether, in the aftermath of the Argentine invasion, and given the inherent unreliability of Argentina, we should any longer be prepared to discuss the issue of sovereignty (whether of the Falklands or of its dependencies) with

this or any other Argentine government; and whether at the most we should not confine ourselves to considering other forms of status for the Islands - independence, some form of US or UN presence, security guarantees etc. In short, should we not be considering whether a new policy of this kind is required in the light of the new situation in the region and in particular of:

- a. The strategic significance to the West of the Falklands, South Georgia and Sandwich in the new circumstances;
- b. The confirmation of the inherently unstable nature of Argentina, the consequent fragility of any agreement reached with an Argentine Government; and
- c. The susceptibility of Argentina to even more extreme and unguided regimes in the future, including the possibility of a left-wing take-over and the consequent opportunities for the Russians - the gaining of naval facilities in the Falklands or its dependencies etc.

6. These are all cogent and legitimate questions. If the answers to them were in the affirmative, we should recognise that this would represent a fundamental shift in British policy on the issue of sovereignty. What would be the likely reactions abroad?

i. The Argentine reaction.

The only safe assumption is that refusal by HMG to agree to further negotiations on the issue of sovereignty would result in due course in further armed hostilities. The recapture of the Islands and subsequent refusal to negotiate on their status would leave Argentina profoundly embittered, whatever the complexion of its future governments, dedicated to maximise opposition to Britain in the area and to a further invasion of the Islands when and if this became feasible. To the extent that Britain was supported by its friends and allies this opposition would be directed at western interests in general and the greatest pressure would be placed on the United States to take the Argentine side on the sovereignty issue.

Previous statements on sovereignty were without prejudice to our interests

ii. General Latin American attitudes.

Support for Argentina would further solidify. Continuing confrontation with Britain, and with the West in general, would enhance the likelihood of a radical re-alignment in Argentina and neighbouring countries, with increased opportunities for the Russians to exploit. In this context it should not be forgotten that the Argentines pursue their claim on the dependencies with the same sort of intensity as on the Falklands themselves. The present crisis began with the illegal landing of Argentines on South Georgia. They have had an illegal military presence on Southern Thule since 1977. Even though our title to South Georgia is even better than to the Falklands, the Argentine claims, in their own eyes, is just as strong. Most, if not all, of the Latin American Governments take the same view.

iii. General western reactions.

The strong support for Britain from western allies is rooted in opposition to Argentina's use of force and to its unattractive regime and in support for the Islanders' right to self-determination. Most allies have avoided taking sides on sovereignty: but many of them have their doubts about the validity of British rights. The use of force will inevitably lead to demands for action against us in the Security Council. Though we can block mandatory resolutions by the veto, the validity of Security Council Resolution 502 will thereafter be marginal, and at this stage the support of many of our friends will begin to fall away. Our refusal to discuss sovereignty, whether stated before or after the reconquest of the Islands, will further undermine our position with our friends. We could face virtual isolation.

iv. United States' reactions.

The Americans have consistently refused to take a public position on the sovereignty issue. They would probably see a refusal by us to negotiate on this as evidence that we had not been dealing with them in good faith, ie that we had taken Haig for a ride. They would be unlikely in these circumstances to offer any form of security guarantee. Thus, under a

policy of retaining sovereignty, responsibility for deterring further invasions, with all the attendant costs, could remain with Britain alone. The continued tension between Argentina and its neighbours on the one hand and ourselves on the other would be seen in Washington as a serious obstruction to America's overall strategy in Latin America. The "hemispheric" lobby group in the State Department (Enders and Co), in New York (Kirkpatrick) and in Congress (Helms) - so far satisfactorily checked by the wave of popular US support for us - would recover lost ground. The Americans' overriding concern would be the consequences of our actions for Soviet opportunism.


v. Soviet opportunities.

I do not wish to anticipate the expert assessment. But some general judgements can be made with confidence. The Russians will be looking to exploit opportunities in Argentina as a whole. The opportunistic search for influence is the first purpose of their general policy towards the Third World and they have the particular interest in Argentina that she provides a large proportion of Soviet grain imports. They will seek to expand their own exports (eg arms and machinery) and more generally to extend their influence beyond the field of trade. Whatever their concept of their strategic interests in the area they will welcome continuing tension between Britain and Argentina with the resultant discomfiture of the United States and loss of influence for it in Latin America, as an ideal opportunity to expand their own influence. They will see a negotiated settlement of the dispute - on whatever terms - as a hindrance, particularly if, as seems likely, it led to a rapprochement between Argentina and Western Europe, and enabled the Americans to thicken up relations with the Argentines. In short, the Russian interest lies in continuing tension (and preferably strife) between Britain and Argentina.

7. There is one further factor to consider in deciding on any shift of policy on the sovereignty issue: namely, the wishes of the Islanders. It remains the Government's stated policy that these should be paramount. In the past they prevented any serious discussion of the sovereignty issue with Argentina; hence the Argentine invasion. As the Prime Minister has said in Parliament, we

cannot be certain how that will have affected the Islanders' thinking. Their determination to remain a British colony may have been reinforced. But if there has been any kind of change in their attitude to the issue of sovereignty, would the considerations outlined in paragraph 5 above lead us to refuse to discuss sovereignty whatever the Islanders' wishes?

8. To sum up, the Prime Minister and her colleagues will need to decide (and I hope the papers referred to in paragraph 2 above will be helpful in this respect), the critical issue^{of} whether we are prepared to negotiate further on the sovereignty issue, thus implicitly accepting that we could in certain circumstances entertain a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina (of the Falklands alone or including the dependencies). If we are to consider resuming negotiations on the sovereignty issue in due course then an objectives paper such as I have been commissioned to prepare, together with negotiating options, can be quickly written. But if the Prime Minister and her colleagues decide that we should not now countenance negotiations on sovereignty, then our objectives will be different. We shall also need to examine the implications of this decision for the current discussions with the Americans as well as preparing for diplomatic action to explain and defend that new position.



MICHAEL PALLISER

Cabinet Office

23 April 1982

Ref: B06476

PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Chequers Meeting on the FalklandsOrder of Proceedings

Your meeting which starts at 10.30 on Sunday, 25th April could conveniently be taken in three phases:

- I The normal attenders at OD(SA) should meet, without military briefers present, to hear the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's report on his Washington visit. He may wish Sir Ian Sinclair to be present. No decisions should be taken.
- II With military briefers present the Sub-Committee should be given an up-date on the military situation and reminded of the issues coming up for decision. This should lead into a discussion in depth of options and implications, as suggested by the Defence Secretary. Such discussion could continue, less formally, over lunch.
- III After lunch, normal OD(SA) attenders should reconvene alone, to identify major decisions which are imminent in both the diplomatic and the military fields. They should be talked through and related to each other, thus pulling together the threads from both I and II. But the Sub-Committee may well feel that they would like to reflect overnight before taking any final decisions; and on present evidence there are none which need deciding before 26th April.

Papers

2. For Phase II the briefers will table an up-to-date military timetable and a critical path for military decision-taking. Other relevant papers are listed on the agenda notice, as follows.



(a) OD(SA)(82) 22, the Defence Secretary's note on call-up. You want to discuss this in the Sub-Committee, but the Defence Secretary will not be pressing for discussion on Sunday.

(b) OD(SA)(82) 23, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's note on United Nations possibilities. This may be relevant to Phase I.

(c) OD(SA)(82) 24, the Ministry of Defence recommendations on Rules of Engagement for the proposed Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). This will be central to Phase II.

(d) The Defence Secretary's minute to you of 22nd April on Maritime Rules of Engagement, relating to submarines between 10° and 35° South, ie off Brazil. You have provisionally agreed to this proposal (Mr Coles' letter to Mr Omand of 23rd April). The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may be dubious. But it is not a major issue and could well wait a few days.

(e) Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to Mr Coles of 22nd April on Falkland Islanders and financial help for those wanting to leave temporarily. You have now agreed to this (Mr Coles' letter to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of 23rd April) and made further suggestions for broadcasts to the Islanders. Special broadcasts may well be appropriate when the TEZ is announced and again after the airfield has been destroyed (if these are the decisions in each case). This will be relevant to Phase II.

(f) My minute to Mr Coles of 23rd April on Falklands Military Decisions about SSN Conqueror and about Argentine Boeing 707s. This need only be noted. But a further decision, on shooting down 707s if necessary, may be imminent by Sunday. If so it will come up in Phase II.

(g) The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Secretary's letter to Mr Coles of 23rd April on the Dependencies. This may be relevant to Phase I.

Issues

3. The main issues in Phase I will be
- How wide is the gap between our minimum requirements and the maximum Mr Haig thinks he could eventually negotiate?
 - Has Mr Haig taken on board how essential it will be for the United States to act as guarantor of any agreement?
 - Which disputed points are most difficult from his point of view and which are most essential from ours?
 - Is Mr Haig ready to go on trying? If so, what does he see as the next move? If he plans to revisit Buenos Aires, when?
 - Is it possible to negotiate at all with the present Argentine Government? If not, what are the prospects for it falling?
 - How does Mr Haig see further British military moves (eg TEZ and bombing the airfield) in relation to the diplomatic process? What are the lessons of South Georgia?
 - How solid is American support for Britain? Will it alter if there is bloodshed? Would they object to certain uses of their facilities on Ascension? In what circumstances would they be prepared to apply economic sanctions?
 - What are the diplomatic alternatives if the Haig process collapses ?
4. Phase II will high-light four major decisions.
- (i) Declaration and enforcement of the TEZ and related ROE.
 - (ii) Taking out Stanley airfield: whether, how and when?
 - (iii) Use of Special Forces: when, how inserted, how tasked?

- (iv) Should the Amphibious Group now sail from Ascension?
Do the Sub-Committee accept the Defence Secretary's provisional view that once sailed it must be used unless there is a diplomatic settlement, ie that a decision to sail it is tantamount to a decision to assault the Islands if there is no settlement by the third week in May?

5. Item (ii) above is rightly seen by the Ministry of Defence as an integral part of (i). International (and domestic) opinion may see it as a step change from (i), because it is essentially active rather than passive.

6. Item (iii) essentially relates to (iv). The main role of the SAS will be to gather intelligence for a landing. The case for using them therefore turns on how seriously the landing option is contemplated.

Passage deleted and retained

under Section 3(4)

*W. Wayland
8 May 2012*

7. Other decisions identified in Phase II will include

- *Passage deleted and retained under Section 3(4)*
 - messages to the Islanders;
 - repossessing Southern Thule;
 - submarine offensive against the Argentine navy outside the TEZ.
- W. Wayland,
8 May 2012*

8. Phase III might be handled as follows.

- First, focus on inter-relations. The diplomatic prospects affect the military decisions, and vice versa. What are the particular lessons of that, as things stand on Sunday?



- Second, does the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary need any immediate guidance on his next moves vis-a-vis the Americans?

- Third, how far can we distinguish between (a) our absolutely vital requirements in a settlement and (b) other important issues on which we could in the last resort compromise? The diplomatic process must not be allowed to cloud our vision on (a); nor to break down because we are too zealous on (b).

- Finally, what specific military and diplomatic decisions should the Sub-Committee aim to take on 26th April? The diplomatic decisions will of course include how far to tell the Americans about the military ones.

23rd April 1982

R L Wade-Gery

R L WADE-GERY



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OF ² COPIES

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

23 April, 1982

OPERATION PARAQUET

Thank you for your letter of 23 April.

The Prime Minister agrees that a telegram should be sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary informing him, for his strictly personal information, that there has been bad weather causing some delay, but that reconnaissance is proceeding.

A. J. COLES

P. R. H. Wright, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office



TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 April, 1982.


A.J. Coles, Esq.,
10 Downing St.

Dear Sir,

OPERATION PARAQUET

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary asked before his departure for Washington yesterday if I would ensure that he was kept informed of any developments over Operation Paraquet.

I understand that the Prime Minister has instructed that information on this operation should be kept very close indeed, but I would be most grateful if you were able to authorise the despatch of a telegram on the lines of the enclosed draft. In the circumstances, I am showing this letter and its enclosure to the Permanent Under-Secretary, but to no one else here.

Yours truly,


(P.R.H. Wright)

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

File No.

Department

Drafted by P.R.H. Wright
(Block Capitals)

Tel. Extn. 233 5617

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
TOP SECRET	
Precedence	
FLASH	
DESKBY	Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE

Despatched

(Date)
(Time) Z

POSTBY Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix) DEDIP

(Security Class.) TOP SECRET

(Caveat/ Privacy marking)

(Codeword)

(Deskby) Z

TO FLASH WASHINGTON
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. of

AND TO (precedence/post)

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info)

SAVING TO (for info)

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

strictly
Following/personal for Private Secretary to
Secretary of State from Wright: Parquet.

The Prime Minister has agreed that the Secretary
of State should be told, for his strictly personal
information, that ~~there have been some initial~~
problems, mainly caused by bad weather,
over the first reconnaissance, and that this
will have led to some delay. Further parties have now
been landed, but it is unlikely that the operation
~~itself will now take place before 25 or 26 April.~~

*There has been bad weather causing some
delay but reconnaissance is proceeding.*

Copies to:-

PART 2 ends:-

22.4.82

PART 3 begins:-

23.4.82

