Relations with Argentina.

Position of the Falkland Islands, their rehabilitation and future.

Shackleton Report and follow-up.

ARGENTINA.

Part 1: Sept 1979
Part 31: Nov 1982

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**Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents**

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The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

Signed [Signature]  Date 1 May 2012

PREM Records Team
Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard, 22 November 1982, columns 583-586

Signed [Signature] Date 1 May 2012

PREM Records Team
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 2619002 NOV 82
TO PRIORITY CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY
TELEGRAM NUMBER PERSONAL 38 OF 29 NOVEMBER

YOUR TELNO 395 : POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER
1. THE POSITION REMAINS THAT WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER HAS
   SAID THAT SHE HOPES TO VISIT THE FALKLANDS AT SOME STAGE,
   NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE
   THIS LINE IF ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS.
2. IN ANY CASE THE PROBLEM OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S
   DIARY HAS CLEARED SO THERE IS NO NEED TO POSTPONE THE PLANNED
   DATES FOR THE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS. AS REGARDS
   MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE FOR THEM YOU SHOULD SAY THAT NO
   DECISION HAS YET BEEN MADE BUT WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THERE
   WILL BE SOME MINISTERIAL PRESENCE DURING THE WEEK.

PJM
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED
HD OF FID PS
PS/PS

COPIES TO
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG, CABINET OFFICE

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL
SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

Following her consideration of your Secretary of State's letter of 26 November, the Prime Minister had a personal word today with Air Chief Marshal Sir David Evans, Chairman of the Trustees of the Fund. Mr. Jerry Wiggin and Mr. Steel (of the Attorney General's Office) were also present.

The Prime Minister said that she believed there was a good deal of public concern that disbursement of monies from the Fund to the seriously injured and the bereaved was proceeding too slowly. She was inclined to think that those who had contributed to the Fund did so in the expectation that capital sums of considerable size would be paid without delay to all in these categories. It was not felt to be right that the onus should be put on those in need to come forward and seek payment.

In further discussion it was emphasised that the Trustees had to proceed in accordance with the terms of the Trust Deed and with the law on charities in general.

The Prime Minister stressed that, with Christmas approaching, there was likely to be a good deal of public interest in the cases of the seriously injured and of bereaved families - she hoped that as many of these as possible would receive at least interim capital payments shortly.

In the light of the meeting, the Prime Minister decided that she would like herself to answer a suitable Question in Parliament this week describing the state of disbursements from the Fund. A text was agreed at the meeting and arrangements are in hand here for the Question to be answered.

A number of other points arose for action.

The Prime Minister would be grateful for a detailed fact sheet, showing what progress has been made so far in disbursing money from the Fund to those in need. It would be helpful if this could include details of the most seriously injured and of any obstacles or difficulties which are obstructing progress. Similar progress reports, at perhaps fortnightly intervals, would be useful in the future.
There was some discussion of the problem of when and how to wind up the South Atlantic Fund. Contributions were still being made but the point could be reached quite soon when there was no foreseeable use for monies over and above those which had already been contributed. The Prime Minister would be grateful for a note on this problem, prepared in consultation with the Attorney General's Office.

On a different point, Mrs Thatcher would also be grateful for a note about the law and procedures affecting members of the Armed Forces who have been the object of Irish terrorist attacks outside Northern Ireland and are thereby not able to receive compensation in the same way as those who suffer such attacks within Northern Ireland.

I am copying this letter to Henry Steel in the Attorney General's Office.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.
29 November 1982

Dear John,

Falkland Islands: Rehabilitation

I enclose a further progress report on the programme of rehabilitation, which updates the report sent to you on 2 November.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Offices of all members of OD(FAP) and to the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
1. The original £10 million for rehabilitation is now fully committed. So far £2.4 million have been spent and expenditure of £2.5-3 million is anticipated during December. Two officials, from the ODA and the FCO, visited the Islands from 11-16 November to quantify further spending requirements for essential rehabilitation work on the Islands' infra-structure which will not be covered by decisions on the Shackleton proposals. Proposals for an additional allocation of funds for rehabilitation work, based on their report, have now been put to Ministers.

Shipping rehabilitation supplies

2. No difficulty is being encountered in finding shipping space for all civil rehabilitation requirements. The major problem remains the inadequacy of unloading facilities at Port Stanley. The military staff involved are working flat out to avoid unnecessary delays but some bottlenecks seem inevitable. 15 ships are programmed to arrive before Christmas, although the original estimate for this period was only 2 vessels. The military staff in the Islands have stressed the vital necessity for effective harbour facilities in Port Stanley, both for current military needs and for the longer term development of the Islands.
Housing

3. Most of the materials for the first 27 prefabricated houses, together with essential plant and associated equipment, were shipped to Port Stanley on 16 November. Some of the construction team are also on board. An advance party is also being flown to the Islands to meet the arrival of the vessel on 5 December. Arrangements are in hand for the balance of the 54 houses to be shipped during December. The military authorities in charge of the harbour in Port Stanley have undertaken to unload the housing as rapidly as possible despite the inadequacy of local harbour facilities.

Mobile homes

4. The 10 mobile homes were unloaded at Stanley and transported to site on 16 November.

Replacement aircraft for the Falkland Islands Government Air Service

5. The Beaver aircraft was shipped from Britain on 15 November. It is expected to arrive in Stanley on 15 December. The two Islander aircraft should be ready for shipping on 26 November and 10 December respectively. Shipping arrangements are being investigated. A team of 6 men from Pilatus Britten Norman will be undertaking reassembly of the aircraft in Stanley over an estimated period of 6 weeks.

/Furnishings
Furnishings

6. Hard and soft furnishings for 24 existing Government houses are being supplied by John Lewis. The initial shipment left for Stanley on 25 November and will arrive in late December.

Compensation

7. The compensation scheme continues to function without significant problems. In mid November 477 claims had been received under the scheme; 338 had been cleared and interim payments had been made on 37. The total of claims paid stood at £1.7 million. There were only two persistent complainants. The estimated expenditure in the 1982/83 financial year on compensation is £2.5-3 million and the eventual total should be about £3.5-4 million. Officials are now considering a number of major claims from the Falkland Islands Company which will be submitted to Ministers before settlement.

Further rehabilitation work

8. The allocation of further funds for rehabilitation in addition to the original £10 million will enable the ODA and the Falkland Islands Government to initiate longer-term reconditioning of the power and water supplies, internal communications, the road system in Stanley, the schools and hospital, and a number of other essential services and social facilities. Expenditure on these will be met in the present and the two following financial years.
General

9. The most significant problem affecting the rehabilitation programme remains the congestion of harbour facilities at Port Stanley. There are no short-term solutions which have not yet been implemented. The provision of a new jetty for Port Stanley will be given priority consideration as a longer term development project.
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 29 November 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS WHITE PAPER

The Prime Minister saw over the weekend your Secretary of State's minute of 26 November and the draft White Paper which he enclosed.

As I told you on the telephone this morning, the Prime Minister has no objection to the circulation of the draft to OD. But Mrs. Thatcher has made a number of comments on the text which I list below.

Part I: Paragraph 102

With regard to the last sentence, the Prime Minister has pointed out that submarines were despatched to the South Atlantic before the date mentioned.

Part I: Paragraph 113

The Prime Minister doubts the wisdom of raising in this Paper the question of our consideration of a blockade of the Islands. She recalls that at the time the advice was that a blockade was simply not possible.

Part I: Paragraph 121

Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under For Exemption.

Part II: Paragraph 203

The Prime Minister would prefer the sentence "The group was briefed daily ...... overall commander of the operation." to be deleted. She considers it unwise to go into this detail. Mrs. Thatcher has also pointed out that the sentence later in the same paragraph, beginning "Care was taken to avoid British military action which would jeopardise our diplomatic efforts" is likely to cause difficulty in that the Government will be asked to provide specific instances.
Part II: Paragraph 205

With regard to the penultimate sentence, Mrs. Thatcher has asked what the changes are which will be introduced?

Part II: Paragraph 217

The Prime Minister is inclined to doubt whether the Paper should say (as in the second sentence of the draft) that the losses which the Task Force suffered were "less than we had feared". She has pointed out that we were never able to assess in advance the likely losses.

Part II: Paragraph 228

The Prime Minister has commented that this paragraph sounds weak.

Part II: Paragraph 229

The Prime Minister has asked whether the words "A longer term study" should not read "An urgent study"?

Part II: Paragraph 257

As I told you on the telephone, the Prime Minister asked why the University College of Cardiff had been asked to carry out a study of the relationship between the media and the Government in a time of armed conflict? Mrs. Thatcher would prefer the last sentence of this paragraph, referring to a special working party, to be deleted. She believes that the Government would be constantly asked to report on its progress.

Part III: Paragraph 305

Mrs. Thatcher has commented that this paragraph will cause trouble. She doubts whether it is really fair in the light of the increased provision that has been made for the Defence Budget.

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY
Alexander Fleming House, Elephant & Castle, London SE1 6BY
Telephone 01-407 5522
From the Minister of State for Social Security and the Disabled

Tim Fles unheard
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

26 November 1982

Dear Tim

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

In view of todays article in the Guardian about the Prime Minister's statement yesterday that varying sums had been made available out of the South Atlantic Fund you may wish to be aware of the letter (copy enclosed) that Mr Hugh Rossi sent to Sir David Evans earlier this week. He wrote to the Chairman of the Fund without knowing that your office had also been in contact with the Fund.

Yours ever,

CHRIS EVANS
Private Secretary
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY
Alexander Fleming House, Elephant & Castle, London SE1 6BY
Telephone 01-407 5522
From the Minister of State for Social Security and the Disabled

Air Chief Marshal Sir David Evans GCB CBE
Chairman
South Atlantic Fund
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall

23 November 1982

Dear Sir David,

I recently met some amputees who received their injuries in the Falklands campaign. Generally speaking the servicemen are satisfied with the attention and help they are receiving but they have one grievance.

They are extremely anxious as to their position under the South Atlantic Fund. No information as to what is likely to happen is being given to them. Meanwhile they are having to incur personal expenditure as a result of their injuries; e.g. the purchase of larger trousers and shoes because of artificial limbs, the installation of telephones where these were not previously necessary.

I did mention to them that it was possibly difficult for the Trustees of the Fund to make any announcement until the overall needs of those who had suffered had been ascertained. However this would not seem to preclude the Trustees from taking the initiative in making initial payments now, even of relatively modest sums, to meet the kind of personal expenditure I have indicated, without a formal application from the serviceman. I understand that you have been supplied with a complete list of all those injured and the extent of their injuries.

I promised them that I would write to see if anything could be done.

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Rossi

P.S. You may have noted that in yesterday’s debate in the House of Commons, David Trimble—a former Secretary of State of this Dept., referred to this problem and suggested an immediate £2000 on account.
PRIME MINISTER

FALKLAND ISLANDS WHITE PAPER

I am sending you the draft Falkland Islands White Paper before I circulate it to OD next week for discussion on 7th December. I plan to publish it on 14th December in time for a debate before Christmas. I will also be making a press statement on 14th December when I can fill in any of the details which cannot be fitted in to the White Paper itself with the tight printing deadlines.

2. I attach the draft which is, of course, still subject to minor changes. As you will see, it is in three parts. Part I covers the chronology of the campaign in uncontroversial but positive terms; Part II covers the major lessons particularly on the equipment side but also on the operational and logistic aspects of the campaign; and Part III - which you will wish to look at particularly - describes how we propose to adjust the future programme to take account of the Falkland Islands campaign. So much has now been written about the campaign that it is difficult to say anything particularly new, especially within the constraints of security and commercial confidentiality. But I think that the draft has come out reasonably well and that the White Paper will have a warm reception both generally and with our own supporters. Nothing of course, will satisfy the few extreme elements of the Naval lobby who will be satisfied only with the abandonment of Command 8288 - last year's policy paper. Such a course is, however, financially, politically and militarily impossible.

3. You will see that paragraph 311 in Part III lists a number
of quite significant enhancements to our forces. The detail on some of these is not specified in the draft and you will wish to know where matters currently stand:

a. We are assessing the competing claims of DC 10 and Lockheed Tri-star aircraft to satisfy the strategic tanker/freighter requirement. This is a complicated matter. I shall try to buy Tri-star but there are significant operational advantages for the DC 10. I shall keep you informed. I intend to reach a decision in time for an announcement on 14th December. The White Paper itself need not specify the particular type of aircraft to be bought.

b. On replacement destroyers and frigates, the tenders are still being evaluated and proposals have yet to be put to me, but a decision will be reached in time for the White Paper. My current thinking is that we should order now a total of four Type 22 frigates - one of these would be a non-Falklands order on which we have already made a preliminary announcement. One each of these orders is likely to go to Vosper Thornycroft and Cammell Laird with the remaining two going to the lead yard for the Type 22, Yarrows. The final Falklands replacement order can be placed in the spring - there is no need to order more than 4 ships now and there are some advantages in handling the long term programme here in leaving our options on the last ship open for a little bit longer. But I still need to give further consideration to the political pros and cons of the timing of the final replacement ship order and I will keep you informed.

c. You will see that I intend to take all available ships out of the Standby Squadron and keep them operational for the next 2/3 years to cover the Falklands commitment.
d. We are not yet in a position to order the replacement for the landing ship Sir Galahad. In any case it helps us to keep this open for the moment because the order might go to the Australians as an offset for a purchase by them of a new Invincible-class aircraft carrier - though I have to say that I think the prospects for this order are not all that good. If an Australian order does not materialise, obviously we shall build the landing ship here.

4. There is one further point I should mention about our plans for the Royal Dockyards. Taking account of the increased number of ships which we can now afford to maintain in the Fleet and the extra load which results, I have looked again at the planned rundown at Portsmouth which, as you will recall, was due to reduce from a dockyard employing around 6,000 people to a naval base employing about 1300. I now intend that the naval base should be expanded to allow it to provide some capability for restorative refits and some weapon updating and that the mixed naval/civilian work force there should increase to some 2,800. We will have tough negotiations with the Unions to limit the demarcation and other problems which have bedevilled Portsmouth for years. We must not lose this unique opportunity of achieving greater productivity as a quid pro quo for agreeing to an extra 1500 men. We should make progress, with a consultative paper being issued on the same day as the White Paper. Our plans for Chatham will not be changed and we shall still achieve most of the overhead reductions which we sought at the time of Cmnd 8288.

5. Subject to your views I propose to circulate the draft on Monday prior to my departure to Brussels for the NATO meetings.
CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLANDS WHITE PAPER

PART I

THE OPERATION

101. On 2 April 1982 in an act of unprovoked aggression against British sovereign territory and British people Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands. The next day they invaded South Georgia. These invasions were launched despite urgent calls upon the Argentine Government from the President of the USA, the President of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Secretary General of the UN to desist from military action. The invasion was immediately condemned by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 502. That Resolution went on to call for an immediate withdrawal of the Argentine forces occupying the Falkland Islands, and for a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

102. The Government made clear from the first its willingness to accept and abide by Resolution 502. We engaged in intense and prolonged diplomatic activity in pursuit of a peaceful solution. But we could not depend upon it. We therefore took military steps intended to put pressure on Argentina to withdraw and to make possible our repossession of the Islands by force if that should ultimately prove necessary. Three days after the invasion the first ships left the United Kingdom of what was to become the largest task force in recent history.
103. While diplomatic efforts continued the net was gradually drawn more tightly around the Argentine garrison on the Falklands. On 12 April we imposed a maritime exclusion zone of 200 miles around the Falklands against Argentine naval ships. On 23 April we warned that any approach by Argentine forces which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would be dealt with appropriately. On 25 April the task force re-possessed South Georgia. The recapture of South Georgia dealt a psychological blow to the Argentine Government and provided clear evidence of the United Kingdom's resolve and willingness to resort to military action if all other courses were closed. It also gave the task force an anchorage nearer the Falklands. On 29 April we warned that all Argentine vessels shadowing the task force would be liable to attack. Despite this increasing military pressure, however, Argentina showed no signs of yielding on any points which could make negotiations possible.

104. We took further measures: on 30 April a total exclusion zone was imposed; on 1 May Port Stanley airfield was bombed; and on 7 May we warned that any Argentine warship or military aircraft over 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be treated as hostile. Even at this stage the way was open for the Argentine Government to accept a peaceful withdrawal of their troops. They declined, and it became clear that the Falklands would have to be retaken by force.

105. The first major landing on the Falkland Islands was made at San Carlos Water on the night of 20/21 May. In the actions which followed there were inevitably setbacks and casualties. Nevertheless, just over three weeks
later Major General Moore, the Land Force Commander, accepted the surrender of General Menendez and his force at Port Stanley. It was by any standards a brilliant campaign, marked by exceptional logistic planning and improvisation, and carried through with outstanding skill and fortitude.

DEPLOYMENT

106. To despatch a task force in such a short space of time was a remarkable achievement. It was the result of close cooperation between the Services, the Merchant Navy, the Royal Dockyards and commercial ports, the stores and transport organisations of the Ministry of Defence, and Industry. The task force had to be stocked and provisioned for at least three months at sea. Many of the merchant ships required extensive modification to prepare them for their new role. Eventually nearly 120 ships were deployed. These included 46 warships, 23 from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary; and 53 merchant ships whose civilian crews were all volunteers.

107. The Falkland Islands lie 8,000 miles south-west of the United Kingdom and over 3,500 miles from Ascension Island; but only 400 miles from the Argentine mainland. The task force needed to be self-sufficient in food, water, fuel, ammunition and all the other military equipment it was likely to require. Sound transport and logistic arrangements were vitally important. The ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the Merchant Navy and the Royal Air Force's transport aircraft were to be the task force's lifeline. Merchant shipping alone transported 9,000 personnel, 100,000 tons of freight and 95 aircraft to the South Atlantic. The supply chain carried 400,000 tons of fuel. Royal
Fleet Auxiliary support ships transferred ammunition, dry cargo and fuel on some 1200 occasions, in addition to more than 300 helicopter transfers. British forces established a joint "forward operating base" at Ascension Island. The Royal Air Force moved over 5,800 people and 6,600 tons of stores through Ascension Island in more than 600 sorties by Hercules and VC10 aircraft. Hercules aircraft also made some 40 supply drops to the task force which entailed mid-air refuelling in round-trips lasting in many cases over 25 hours. This massive logistic effort enabled the warships and the aircraft of the task force to operate continuously without returning to distant bases for reprovisions.

108. In the space of seven weeks a task force of 28,000 men and over 100 ships had been assembled, sailed 8,000 miles, effectively neutralised the Argentine navy and fought off persistent and courageous attacks from combat aircraft which outnumbered our own by more than six to one. This in itself was no mean feat, but the task force then put ashore 10,000 men on a hostile coast while under threat of heavy air attack; fought several pitched battles against an entrenched and well-supplied enemy who at all times out-numbered our forces; and brought them to surrender within three and a half weeks.

FROM SOUTH GEORGIA TO SAN CARLOS

109. The first action at sea took place off South Georgia when on 25 April the Argentine submarine Santa Fe was attacked on the surface some five miles from the main harbour at Grytviken. She was badly damaged and subsequently beached. The same day the Island was repossessed by Royal Marines and Special
Forces, which comprise the Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) of the Royal Marines. On 1 May a Vulcan followed by Sea Harriers carried out their first attacks on the Falklands, and the first Argentine aircraft were shot down. The carrier group made a major demonstration of force, simulating an amphibious landing off Port Stanley which successfully drew the Argentines and revealed some of their defensive positions.

110. On 2 May HMS Conqueror detected the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, accompanied by two destroyers, sailing near to the total exclusion zone. Other Argentine ships were also thought to be probing our defences to the north of the Zone. The Belgrano, and her escorts armed with Exocet missiles, posed a clear threat to the ships of the task force. She was therefore attacked and sunk by torpedoes. Thereafter major Argentine warships remained within 12 miles of the Argentine coast and took no further part in the Campaign. Argentine submarines continued to pose a serious threat, but no task force ships were successfully attacked.

111. The task force suffered its first major loss on 4 May. HMS Sheffield, while on forward radar picket duty was hit by an Exocet missile launched from an Argentine Super Etendard aircraft. The missile hit fuel tanks amidships and serious fires started, which filled the central section of the ship with acrid smoke. After nearly four hours, with the fires increasing in intensity, the Captain gave orders to abandon ship. 20 members of her crew died.

112. By mid-May the task force had accomplished two of its main tasks: the
movement of the troops safely to the South Atlantic and the establishment of control of the seas around the Islands. The role of the carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, was crucial at this and subsequent stages – in providing air defence and the means of attacking enemy ships and ground positions while their helicopters provided constant anti-submarine protection.

113. The question now was whether to settle into a blockade or go for a full scale landing. Although we considered a blockade of the Islands, it became clear that climatic and other factors could prolong such an approach and seriously jeopardise our forces. We decided, therefore, on an amphibious landing, followed by whatever action proved necessary to retake the Islands. San Carlos was chosen as the site for the landing because it offered a good anchorage which could be protected against submarine attack and was an area known to be lightly defended by the enemy and difficult for him to reinforce rapidly. The low hills surrounding the inlet afforded good protection against the risk of Exocet attack. By now men of the SAS and the SBS, had for some time been reconnoitring East and West Falkland. Taking advantage of the intelligence they had gained, and under cover of a naval bombardment, the SAS carried out a daring night raid on Pebble Island on 15 May. They destroyed 11 Argentine aircraft on the ground.

114. On 20 May the main amphibious force moved towards San Carlos Water, taking advantage of an overcast sky and poor visibility, and keeping strict radio silence. Meanwhile Special Forces mounted a series of diversionary raids at various points around East Falkland. Under cover of naval gunfire men of the 3rd Commando Brigade (3 Cdo Bde) including the 2nd and 3rd Battalions,
the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA and 3 PARA) embarked in their landing craft and headed for the shore. The landing was made over four beaches. Helicopters operated continuously moving stores and helping to establish the beach-head. The operation achieved complete tactical surprise. 5,000 men were safely landed, and what little opposition there was quickly collapsed. British losses in this phase were two helicopters and their crews.

115. The next morning brought clear blue skies, but the landing force had won a vital few hours to establish defensive positions and begin to set up their Rapier fire units. At mid-day the Argentine air force began a series of fierce and protracted attacks against the beach-head and the ships supporting it.

116. The Sea Harriers on combat air patrol provided the outer layer of defence. The second layer was provided by a pair of ships known as the 'missile trap', positioned off the northern entrance to Falkland Sound. These were usually a Type 42 destroyer armed with Sea Dart and a Type 22 frigate with Sea Wolf. The next layer of defence, which became known as the 'gunline', was a group of three or four ships inside the entrance to the Sound using every gun and missile system they possessed to fight off the incoming Argentine aircraft. Finally within the anchorage itself (nicknamed 'bomb alley'), where there were often up to eight troop or stores ships at any one time, the small calibre guns and Sea Cat missiles from the assault ships HMS Intrepid and HMS Fearless, together with Blowpipe missiles, machine guns and notably the Rapier fire units on shore provided the final layer of defence.
117. The Argentine pilots were courageous and persistent in their attacks and ships of the task force suffered loss and damage during the first few days after the landing. On the gunline we lost HMS Ardent and HMS Antelope on 21 and 23 May; 24 men died. Six other ships were damaged between 21 and 24 May. But the Argentines paid a heavy price. On 21 May our forces shot down at least [18] out of [40] attacking aircraft. When attacks resumed on 23 May [9] out of [17] attacking aircraft were destroyed; on 24 May a further [9] were shot down. Air attacks on the beach-head now become much less frequent and British forces were safely established ashore. The battle of San Carlos had been won.

118. On the 25 May, Argentina's National Day, the Argentine air force made a major effort against the task force. HMS Coventry had been in the "missile trap" to the north west and had successfully controlled Sea Harriers and shot down two aircraft herself. She was attacked at low-level by waves of Skyhawk aircraft which overwhelmed her defences. She capsized quickly. Survivors were rescued by HMS Broadsword and helicopters; 19 men died.

119. Later that same day the merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor, which had delivered Harriers to the task force and was carrying much-needed supplies, including helicopters, was hit by two air-launched Exocet missiles and set on fire. The fire spread rapidly and the ship was abandoned with the loss of 12 lives. A third attack on the task force by air-launched Exocet on 30 May was successfully countered.
FROM SAN CARLOS TO FITZROY

120. With the establishment of a firm bridge-head the advance on Port Stanley became the next objective. One threat to the flank of any attack on Port Stanley lay in the significant Argentine garrison and airfield at Darwin and Goose Green. 2 PARA was given the task of removing that danger and seeking an early victory. Overnight on 26/27 May one company of 2 PARA secured Camilla Creek House. After a 12 mile night approach march the rest of the battalion joined them and lay up for the day. An artillery troop of three 105mm light guns was flown into position to assist the impending assault which started at 0200 hours on 28 May.

121. 2 PARA began by attacking Port Darwin, supported by Naval gunfire. The settlement was secured by mid-afternoon but the battalion were then faced with an advance on Goose Green where the enemy were dug into strong defensive positions which had to be approached across the open ground of a narrow isthmus. Harrier aircraft were called in to attack the Argentine positions. The battalion was attacked by Pucara light aircraft from Goose Green one of which was shot down by a Blowpipe missile. The battalion eventually overcame stiff resistance and pushed the enemy back into the settlement. A timely strike by the Harriers on defensive positions, considerably helped the progress of the paratroopers and the next day the Argentine Commander surrendered.

122. Besides securing the flank the battle was significant for three reasons. First it gave us a chance to assess the fighting qualities of the enemy.
Second, it inflicted a serious blow to the strength of the Argentines; 46 were killed and approximately 1000 prisoners were taken. British casualties totalled 17. Third, and most importantly, by their outstanding performance against a numerically superior enemy 2 PARA established a psychological ascendancy over the Argentines which our forces never lost.

123. In the course of a remarkable march of 50 miles over difficult terrain in inhospitable conditions, 45 Cdo RM and 3 PARA secured Douglas Settlement and Teal Inlet on 30 May. Meanwhile the SAS established a patrol base forward on Mount Kent. 42 Cdo RM, making best use of the helicopter lift available, leap-frogged forward to secure Mount Kent and Mount Challenger, the western approaches to Port Stanley. On the same day Major General Moore assumed command of all land operations, and the 5th Infantry Brigade (5 Bde) came ashore.

124. The Land Force Commander decided to press on quickly with the advance on Port Stanley and to commit 5 Bde to the South. When it was discovered that the Argentines had evacuated Fitzroy Settlement 2 PARA moved forward rapidly to secure the area, which was an important point in the advance on Stanley. The 1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles (1/7 GR) and the rest of 2 PARA advanced by sea and by air while the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards (2 SG), the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (1 WG) and logistic support units were transported to Fitzroy by sea. The loss of Chinook helicopters on the Atlantic Conveyor had effectively precluded the option of air-lifting the bulk of 5 Bde. Passage by sea was therefore the only way to move forward quickly, maintaining the impetus of the advance and minimising
the risk of Argentine counter attack. On the night 5/6 and 6/7 June the Scots Guards and elements of the Welsh Guards were successfully moved by HMS Intrepid and HMS Fearless. The deployment of the balance of the Welsh Guards was thwarted by appalling weather. On the night 7/8 June Sir Galahad was dispatched with support units and the remaining Welsh Guards. On 8 June the cloud lifted and, before the final elements had been disembarked from the landing ships, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were hit by an air strike at Fitzroy. Both ships were abandoned. The Sir Galahad, which had a large number of men on board, was burnt out. 50 men lost their lives, of whom 32 were from the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. The courageous efforts of the helicopter pilots and rescue boat crews who took their craft again and again into the flames and blinding smoke rising from the stricken vessel prevented greater lose of life. But for the bravery of the seamen and the dedication of all those who assisted ashore the loss of life would have been much greater. Later that day a pair of patrolling Sea Harriers destroyed four Mirages over Choiseul Sound.

ADVANCE ON PORT STANLEY

125. Despite previous set-backs through loss of men and equipment, particularly helicopters, the first phase of the main battle for Port Stanley began when 3 Cdo Bde mounted a three battalion night attack on 11/12 June. Simultaneously targets further to the east were bombarded by Naval vessels. As a result of vigorous and aggressive patrolling the troops were able to achieve initial surprise and after a night of stiff fighting 3 PARA took Mount Longdon, 45 Cdo captured Two Sisters, and 42 Cdo captured Mount Harriet. British casualties
were 22 killed and 44 wounded. Throughout the following day, all these positions came under considerable enemy artillery fire, causing more casualties. The shelling was not, however, all one way: the Argentine defences were heavily bombarded by our own artillery and at night by Naval guns.

126. During the night 11/12 June HMS Glamorgan was withdrawing from a bombardment of shore positions around Port Stanley when she was hit by a shore-launched Exocet missile. Her company extinguished severe fires and the ship continued to be available for action. 13 men died. It was the last direct attack on a British ship in the campaign.

127. The second phase took place on the night of 13/14 June. In the north, in another superbly executed night attack, 2 PARA captured Wireless Ridge. Further south 2 SG had a hard fight to capture Tumbledown Mountain from a regular Argentine Marine battalion whose heavily defended machine gun emplacements put up fierce resistance for a number of hours. The Scots Guards secured their objectives and the Gurkhas moved through to take Mount William to the south-east. In this final phase we lost 20 men.

128. Large numbers of the enemy abandoned their positions, discarded their weapons and stood around disconsolately. British troops followed up to the edge of Port Stanley where they were ordered to halt and fire only in self defence, to avoid fighting in the town and among the civilian population. Soon afterwards white flags were reported over Stanley and General Moore accepted the Argentine surrender.
CHRONOLOGY

2 April  Argentina invades the Falkland Islands.

3 April  Argentina invades South Georgia; UN passes Security Council Resolution 502; first RAF transport aircraft deploy to Ascension Island.

5 April  First task force ships sail from the United Kingdom.

12 April  200 mile maritime exclusion zone comes into effect.

25 April  British Forces recapture South Georgia; submarine Santa Fe attacked and disabled.

30 April  Total exclusion zone comes into effect.

1 May  First attack on Falklands by Vulcans, Sea Harriers and warships; first Argentine aircraft shot down.

2 May  General Belgrano sunk by HMS Conqueror.

4 May  HMS Sheffield hit by Exocet missile; later sinks.

7 May  Exclusion zone extended to 12 miles off the Argentine coast.

9 May  Two Sea Harriers sink trawler, Narwal, which had been shadowing task force.

11 May  HMS Alacrity sinks store ship Cabo de los Estados in Falkland sound.
14/15 May  Special Forces night raid on Pebble Island; 11 Argentine aircraft destroyed on the ground.

21 May  3 Cdo Bde RM establish beach-head at San Carlos; HMS Ardent lost; 20 Argentine aircraft destroyed.

23 May  HMS Antelope crippled (sinks on 24 May); at least 7 Argentine aircraft destroyed.

24 May  8 Argentine aircraft destroyed; some damage to ships.

25 May  HMS Coventry lost and Atlantic Conveyor hit by Exocet (sinks 28 May); 5 Argentine aircraft destroyed.

28 May  2 PARA recapture Darwin and Goose Green; over 900 prisoners taken.

29 May  45 Cdo secure Douglas settlement; 3 PARA recapture Teal Inlet.

30 May  42 Cdo secure Mount Kent and Mount Challenger.

31 May  5 Infantry Brigade lands at San Carlos.

8 June  Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram hit at Fitzroy; 10 Argentine aircraft destroyed.

11/12 June  Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon secured; HMS Glamorgan hit by shore-based Exocet - damaged but seaworthy.

13/14 June  Tumbledown Mountain, Wireless Ridge and Mount William secured; General Menendez surrenders.
20 June  South Thule secured.

25 June  Mr Hunt, Civil Commissioner, returns to Port Stanley
PART II

THE LESSONS LEARNED

INTRODUCTION

201. The Falklands Campaign was in many respects unique. We must be cautious, therefore, in deciding which lessons of the campaign are relevant to the United Kingdom's main defence priority - our role within NATO against the threat from the Soviet Union and her allies. The basic ingredients for success were present from the outset: a firm resolve; flexibility of forces, equipments and tactics; human ingenuity; and well trained officers and men.

202. The campaign provided the Royal Navy's first experience of battle in the missile age. At San Carlos British forces undertook the first large scale amphibious operation for many years. And in the land battles for Port Stanley they experienced an infantry battle at brigade strength and in extreme weather conditions. Our analysis of the campaign is continuing; some new lessons have been learned; many more old lessons have been reinforced. The following sections describe the principal lessons and the steps we are taking to apply them.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

203. The higher management of the crisis was conducted by a small group of Ministers which was chaired by the Prime Minister and met almost daily.
The Attorney General attended meetings when legal advice was required. Those in attendance always included the Chief of the Defence Staff, as the Government's principal military adviser. This group of Ministers ensured that the diplomatic, economic and military strands of our policy were properly coordinated. On the military side it established clear guidelines within which commanders were to conduct the operations, without making any attempt to direct the battle from 8,000 miles away. The group was briefed daily on the current military situation by the Chief of Defence Staff, who conveyed guidance and issued instructions direct to the Commander in Chief Fleet, the overall commander of the operation. This short and clear chain of command made possible quick reaction to events and to the needs of the forces in the South Atlantic. Care was taken to avoid British military action which would jeopardise our diplomatic efforts, but at no time did diplomatic or political considerations inhibit the task force from taking all measures necessary to defend itself.

204. Effective political control and higher command of the operation required good communications between the United Kingdom and the task force. The vital importance was shown of satellite communications in operations conducted at great distance. We currently plan to acquire a new British military satellite and to provide a terminal in all major surface warships, which will be a significant improvement. There were times during the Falklands Campaign when the flow of signal traffic to the task force threatened to exceed the capacity of the available systems. This never delayed the transmission of important operational messages but it did affect some other traffic. As the task force sailed south it became increasingly important to receive frequent
detailed situation reports from the area of operations both as general back-
ground for decision makers in Whitehall and as the essential basis for early
and accurate announcements to Parliament, press and media on events in the
South Atlantic. Hard pressed local commanders were not always able to provide
these and for the future we are considering how they might be enabled to do
so. It will not, of course, be the intention to impose any detailed direction
of actions in the field which must remain the responsibility of the commander
on the spot.

205. We have studied the management of the crisis carefully. In particular
we have looked at the effectiveness of inter-Departmental coordination and
the liaison between the Ministry of Defence and operational headquarters,
which in this case was the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Fleet.

Some small changes would be helpful to the management of any future crisis
and these will be introduced. In every important respect the Government and
military machine worked extremely well during the crisis.

MEN

206. The most important factor in the success of the task force was the
skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual Servicemen. The value
of professional, volunteer, highly trained and carefully selected armed
forces was amply demonstrated. The specialised training of a substantial
proportion of the landing force - such as the commandos - was a particularly
significant asset. The quality of British Servicemen was exemplified by
the defence of the landing at San Carlos; by the determined assault on heavily
defended enemy positions at Goose Green; by the remarkable series of night
attacks before the fall of Port Stanley; and by the outstanding performance
of the Harrier and helicopter pilots.

207. The manner in which the task force responded to the many challenges
and difficulties it encountered totally vindicated the priority we attach to
training at all levels from the teaching of individual skills to large scale
exercises. The Campaign highlighted the importance of both physical and
mental toughness. To achieve and maintain this we need to keep readiness
and training at as high a level as possible.

MARITIME OPERATIONS

208. The operations of the task force at sea were guided by three established
principles of maritime warfare: containment of enemy forces, defence in depth
and keeping the initiative. The course of the campaign emphasised the
relevance of these principles, and the importance of both a balanced fleet
and the support of ships from the Merchant Navy. The key questions of warship
performance and maritime anti-air warfare are discussed in paras [217-220]
and [224-229].

209. Amphibious Warfare. The experience gained by the Royal Navy and
Royal Marines from their extensive training in amphibious operations proved
vital. The landings at San Carlos clearly demonstrated the capability of
HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid to launch and support amphibious operations
and of the value of suitably adapted merchant ships to support such operations.
3 Cdo Bde RM, reinforced by 2 PARA, 3 PARA and other elements proved ideally suited for the task. The helicopters deployed with the landing force played an invaluable part and we are now taking steps to improve our helicopter lift capability in support of amphibious operations. The weather, terrain and the likely requirement to land away from established ports were similar to the conditions British forces would face in Norway, on NATO’s northern flank. The success of the Falklands Campaign bore out our confidence, and that of our Allies, in the ability of British amphibious forces to react swiftly and effectively to emergencies in and away from the NATO area.

210. Nuclear-Powered Submarines. Our nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) played a crucial role. After the sinking of the General Belgrano the Argentine surface fleet effectively took no further part in the Campaign. The SSNs were flexible and powerful instruments throughout the crisis, posing a ubiquitous threat which the Argentines could neither measure nor oppose. Their speed and independence of support meant that they were the first assets to be deployed, enabling us to declare the maritime exclusion zone early. They also provided valuable intelligence to our forces in the total exclusion zone.

LAND OPERATIONS

211. The most decisive factors in the land war were the high state of individual training and fitness of the land forces, together with the leadership and initiative displayed especially by junior officers and NCOs. The Campaign underlined the importance of night operations and aggressive patrolling,
which were particularly important during the determined series of attacks around Port Stanley, where assaults were conducted against a prepared enemy with clear fields of fire. A number of lessons will be reflected in training priorities and equipment plans. The present types of weapons proved effective but the infantry need to be supported by greater direct and indirect firepower in attack. Milan and 66 mm anti-tank weapons proved highly effective against prepared enemy positions, but there is also a requirement for an area attack weapon such as a grenade launcher.

212. The infantry would not have been able to carry their objectives without the support they received from artillery and Naval bombardment. The ability of the 105 mm light guns to bring down instant and accurate fire at night or through smoke and fog contributed significantly to the final collapse of Argentine morale. The importance was underlined of all ranks being trained and able to call for fire.

SPECIAL FORCES

213. The Special Air Service and the Special Boat Squadron played a key role in the Campaign. They operated in advance of the main land forces to gather essential intelligence, and also conducted widespread raids to confuse and disorganise the Argentine forces. This tactic was notably successful in assisting the landing force to come ashore virtually unopposed at San Carlos. Later, they moved ahead of the main force to reconnoitre the high ground around Mount Kent, from which the final assault was launched on the Argentine positions in front of Port Stanley.
214. In the most demanding circumstances the Special Forces were thoroughly tested in the skills and tactics which they would employ in any future war in the NATO area. Their response has justified our confidence that existing selection and training methods produce Special Forces which are well prepared for the calls that might be made on them in general war. The combination in a single patrol of intelligence-gathering skills and the capacity to mount highly destructive raids gives military commanders a flexible and potent weapon. Experience in the Falklands confirmed this, as well as providing useful lessons for the future, particularly about improvements in equipment.

EQUIPMENT

215. Weapons systems depend for their effectiveness not only on their inherent quality but also on the thorough and realistic training of their operators, and on first class maintenance, spares and servicing. The British Armed Forces are primarily organised and equipped for operations in the NATO area against the Warsaw Pact. In the South Atlantic they faced a different challenge. Particularly aircraft but also other equipments were constantly in demand to perform unfamiliar tasks which were important to the operation. In doing so they had to overcome the effects of a long sea passage and damp on land-based missiles, electronics and other equipments. On the other hand, some conditions were easier than they would be in NATO operations; for example, the virtual absence of electronic counter-measures (ECM) in the Argentine inventory.

216. Nevertheless, the Campaign provided a unique opportunity to test our equipment in combat. Experts have assessed the performance of individual
equipments and their support arrangements. Generally the equipment and weapons systems – designed mainly for operations in NATO – performed well in particularly demanding circumstances: as well as, and sometimes better than, expected. The operational availability of equipment was impressive. In most cases the need was confirmed for improvements already planned. We discuss in the remainder of this section the performance of the main weapons platforms and the contribution of equipment in the roles in which it was deployed.

Warships

217. Operations in support of an amphibious landing within range of enemy aircraft and without the assistance of AEW aircraft or land-based all-weather fighters inevitably risked ship losses. The losses the task force suffered were tragic and heavy but they were less than we had feared, given the difficulties encountered. In addition to the four warships one RFA and one merchant ship which lost, eight other warships and two RFAs suffered varying degrees of damage. In most cases the ships continued to take part in operations, making good damage through the efforts of their crews aided by specialist teams. The Carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible were effective and flexible command ships and provided good platforms for air operations. For example, on 1 May HMS Hermes tasked 12 Sea Harriers in attacks on Port Stanley and Goose Green, yet one hour after their return home the same aircraft were airborne for air defence patrols.
218. In our assessment of the lessons to be drawn for warship design we have had the benefit of a valuable independent review conducted by members of the Marine Technology Board of the Defence Scientific Advisory Council. It is clear that RN ships are strong and reliable platforms able to operate continuously at sea even in the most difficult weather conditions. No fundamental design defects have been identified.

219. There has been comment on the use of aluminium in the construction of ships. The facts are that aluminium was used in the superstructure of the Type 21 class of frigate and to a small extent in a few other classes, but not in the Type 42 destroyers, such as HMS Sheffield. In addition, aluminium is sometimes used for non-structural minor bulkheads, ladders and ventilation trunking. By use of aluminium it is possible to make significant savings in the weight of the ships above the water-line, and there is no evidence that it has contributed to the loss of any vessel. It has, however, been recognised that this metal loses strength in fires and therefore its extensive use in the construction of RN warships was discontinued several years ago.

220. Some important lessons have been learned about the rapid spread of fire and smoke in ships, and about the use of materials which can prove hazardous in fires. Cabling fitted in older ships can prove inflammable; this hazard will be greatly reduced in new ships. Urgent studies are now in hand aimed at improving the survivability of existing ships and incorporating lessons in future designs. Examples of measures which will be taken include improved fire zones; changes to the design of watertight doors and hatches; the provision of more escape hatches; improvements to the smoke tightness
of bulkheads; the re-siting of fuel tanks; reductions in inflammable materials; and additional fire pumps, breathing apparatus and personal breathing sets.

**Aircraft**

221. **Harrier.** 28 Sea Harriers and 14 RAF Harrier GR3s were eventually deployed to the South Atlantic. Over 1100 combat air patrol missions and 90 offensive support operations were flown by Sea Harriers and 125 ground attack and tactical reconnaissance sorties by Harrier GR3s. These aircraft were a major success, showing themselves to be flexible, robust, reliable and effective. Sea Harriers, which are intended largely for air defence, were also employed in the ground attack and reconnaissance roles: the Harrier GR3s, primarily ground attack aircraft, were converted within a week to use Sidewinder AIM 9L air-to-air missiles in the air defence role. There was [95%] availability at the beginning of each day and 99% of all planned missions were flown.

Sea Harrier demonstrated itself to be more than a match for Argentine conventional fixed wing aircraft with 20 confirmed and 4 probable kills, of which 16 and 2 respectively are attributable to Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles. Six Sea Harriers were destroyed, of which two were lost in action - one to small-arms fire and one to a Roland surface to air missile. Four GR3s were also lost in action, all to ground gunfire. Most aircraft engaged in offensive support survived damage, which usually resulted from intense Argentine anti-aircraft gunfire. The need was demonstrated for certain improvements to Sea Harrier to provide greater endurance and weapon carrying capacity and a better radar. As a result Sea Harriers, starting with those already deployed in HMS *Illustrious*, are being given greater endurance by the fit of larger
drop tanks, and increased armament by the fit of four rather than two Sidewinder missiles. Improvements to the Sea Harrier's radar and radar warning receiver systems are planned. The need to improve Sidewinder AIM 9L being urgently examined.

222. Nimrod. The Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft was given a simple, effective air-to-air refuelling capability and sixteen aircraft have been modified in this way. This, with the addition of vision aids, improved navigation equipment, and a variety of weapons including Harpoon, Stingray and Sidewinder, has greatly enhanced its overall capability. A total of 34 Nimrods will eventually be modified to enable them to carry anti-shipping and air-to-air missiles. The Nimrods' Searchwater radar performed well, enabling crews to monitor shipping at long range outside missile engagement zones of possible enemy warships. The full capability of this radar is still being developed and exploited.

223. Helicopters. Almost 200 helicopters of seven different types (Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Gazelle, Wasp, Scout and Chinook) were deployed. After the loss of three Chinooks and six Wessex in the Atlantic Conveyor, there was a shortage of helicopters to support the ground forces even though a squadron of Sea King anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters had been converted to the support role. A graphic illustration of the Chinook's capability was supplied by the single aircraft to survive the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor; without spares and ground support, it flew 109 hours in combat conditions, carrying up to 80 armed troops in a single lift. In addition helicopters were also heavily committed in the ASW or anti-surface vessel warfare (ASVW)
role, logistics, search and rescue, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance or support roles. Naval helicopters operated at over three times peacetime rates. Lynx performed well and the Sea King Mk 4 with its large internal and external load capability was particularly useful. Of the Army helicopters, Gazelle is designed to be used predominantly as a reconnaissance and command and communications helicopter. Without offensive armament and in a country devoid of natural cover it proved vulnerable to ground fire and we are currently assessing ways of enhancing its battlefield survivability.

Air Defence

224. The battle for air superiority was vital to the success of the campaign. In NATO operations in the Eastern Atlantic the Royal Navy would be supported by land-based aircraft and, when available, the carrier strength of the United States Navy. In the South Atlantic, the task force was faced with an efficient land-based air force of over 200 frontline aircraft, and its greatest handicaps were the shortage of fighter aircraft and the lack of airborne early warning (AEW). Sea Harriers were outnumbered six to one. AEW aircraft could not be deployed at all. The task force relied on a mix of systems for air defence. These comprised electronic detection systems, fighter aircraft, electronic counter-measures (ECM), medium and short range missiles, medium-calibre guns and, finally, close range point defence systems such as rapid-firing guns and hand-held missile launchers. These systems between them destroyed a total of [73] enemy aircraft confirmed and a further [14] probables. By the time of the final assault on Port Stanley the Argentine air force had been effectively neutralised as a fighting force. Our assessments of Argentine
air losses and of the performance of individual missile systems are shown at Annex B.

225. The value of the medium range air defence missile Sea Dart was evident in the eight kills it achieved. The known capability of the system also deterred many attacks and forced the Argentine aircraft to fly at low altitude, which often prevented their bombs from fusing and made them easier targets for other systems. There are areas in which the Sea Dart can be improved and these are either in hand or being studied.

226. Although designed primarily as a self-defence weapon against missiles, the capable Sea Wolf point defence system was used against aircraft attacking accompanying vessels which lacked this capability. In this role it shot down five Argentine aircraft. No opportunity arose to use Sea Wolf against missiles. The flexibility of this system was shown by the speed with which its software was adapted to cope with low-level aircraft attacks. A package of improvements for Sea Wolf is already in hand.

227. As acknowledged above the absence of airborne early warning (AEW) was a severe handicap against Argentine air attacks mounted at very low level especially given that the radars deployed at San Carlos suffered considerable interference from surrounding high land. This also proved an important limitation in the task force's ability to deal with the threat from Exocet by intercepting the aircraft carrying it before the missile could be launched. The difficulty of guaranteeing detection of low-flying aircraft made it prudent for the carriers to operate well to the east of the Falklands, which
limited the patrol time of Sea Harriers. This shortcoming has now been remedied in part by the deployment in HMS *Illustrious* of two Sea King helicopters equipped with modified Searchwater Radars, which taken with the deployment of Sea Harriers with greater endurance represents a major improvement in our carrier-borne air defence capability. We are considering what further steps might be taken to improve the AEW capability of the Fleet, bearing in mind that the Nimrod AEW Mk 3 will be deployed in the Eastern Atlantic from 1984. In the Falklands we now have RAF Phantoms which, when on combat air patrol, can provide some early warning of low-level air attack.

228. We responded to the threat posed by Exocet by devising and deploying very quickly electronic and other counter-measures. For example, chaff was extensively and successfully used. We will rely on a mix of ECM and point defence systems for defence against surface skimmers. Apart from the provision of AEW, a number of measures are planned to enhance the ability of RN warships to deal with this threat. The improved Sea Wolf system already ordered, for example, has an all weather capability against low level missiles and several programmes are in hand to improve our ship-borne ECM capability.

229. Other areas for improvement which have been identified in the shipborne anti-air warfare field include:

a. The need for a point defence weapon system for high value units. As an interim measure the American Vulcan–Phalanx gun system has been mounted on HMS *Illustrious* and HMS *Invincible* and low-level air defence guns have been fitted to a number of other ships. A longer term study
of close-in weapon systems is in progress to identify the most cost-effective fit for the future.

b. The need for more realistic training. In particular all ships need to be fitted with a wide range of on-board trainers if the Royal Navy is to optimise the performance of its high technology systems. There is also the need for more realistic targets for the peacetime training of anti-air warfare (AAW) weapon system operators.

c. Shipborne surveillance radars and command and weapon control systems. Various improvements are being urgently examined.

230. As to land-based air defence, Rapier performed well and had a major impact on the campaign. It was employed only in the optical mode to provide land-based low level air defence after the landings on 21 May. The conditions for the operation of Rapier were severe. The system had been exposed to the rigours of a long sea voyage, and was without its second-line support. Enemy air attacks were generally prosecuted at below 100 feet, often in valleys shrouded by mist and in poor light. The proximity of friendly forces such as ships and helicopters often inhibited the Rapier operators from engaging targets. Nevertheless, it scored 14 confirmed kills and 6 probables, about 50% of valid firings, and the success rate from valid firings after the system had settled down is estimated to be about two in three. A series of improvements to the system's reliability and speed of reaction has already been developed and is being incorporated in Rapiers in the United Kingdom and Germany. We have also planned for some time to introduce later in the decade a further
series of improvements to the missile, fuze, the radars and of the capability of the system against multiple targets.

231. Blowpipe is a point defence missile system designed to be operated, and carried limited distances, by one man. In this campaign it was used extensively against fast crossing targets for which it was not designed, and subjected to far rougher handling than it had been designed to withstand. Despite this it brought down nine enemy aircraft and a further two probables, a success rate of some 18%. Experience in the campaign has confirmed a need for the series of improvements already in hand, which include enhancements to the missile warhead and motor and the introduction of an improved aiming unit and an alerting device. These improvements should be completed in stages over the next six years.

Anti-Surface Vessel Warfare (ASVW)

232. The strategic dominance of the SSN and its crucial part in the campaign have already been described in paragraph 210. Apart from the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano surface action was confined to engagements against patrol craft and small merchant vessels. The helicopter mounted air-to-surface guided weapon Sea Skua was deployed for the first time and performed excellently. It scored eight hits with eight firings, destroyed one patrol craft and seriously damaged two other Argentine ships. The 4.5 inch gun also proved to be accurate and effective in the anti-surface ship role.
Anti-Submarine Warfare

233. In the face of the threat from Argentine submarines, ships and aircraft carried out extensive anti-submarine operations. The ability to sustain such operations was proved. However, the operations highlighted the difficulties of conducting ASW in shallow water. We have already planned a number of improvements in our ASW capability and will be examining what other measures are now required.

Land Warfare

234. In general the land forces found most of their equipment well able to withstand the rugged treatment it received on the Falklands. Of special interest were:-

a. Mobility. The ground forces were heavily dependent on helicopters and tracked vehicles for mobility. The tracked combat reconnaissance vehicles, Scorpion and Scimitar, performed very well in boggy conditions, covering an average of 350 miles each. One vehicle withstood a shell which landed 1½ metres away; another ran over a mine which severely damaged the vehicle but left the crew unharmed. The Combat Engineer Tractor was also an essential and effective vehicle on this demanding terrain. The extensive use of mines by the Argentine army was a notable problem. An assessment of the Army’s ability to breach minefields rapidly had been set in hand before the Campaign.
b. **Artillery and Naval Gunfire Support.** The main land-based artillery support for the ground forces was provided by the 105mm Light Gun, which together with its ammunition was deployed mainly by helicopter. Its performance was excellent. The five batteries engaged fired nearly 17,500 rounds. Some guns fired as many as 500 rounds in 24 hours. Task Force ships fired 8,000 rounds of ammunition in highly accurate Naval gunfire support attacks on ground targets.

c. **Anti-Armour and Personal Weapons.** The self-loading rifles and general purpose machine guns proved effective small arms, notwithstanding that the weight of weapons and ammunition presented physical and logistic problems in such unfavourable terrain. These problems will be eased considerably by the new small arms which should enter service in the mid-1980s. The 81mm mortar proved versatile and effective. Although not used in their primary role, anti-armour weapons such as Milan were very effective against strong defensive positions.

d. **Night Fighting.** A requirement was demonstrated for more night fighting equipment. Since the conflict we have placed orders for the procurement of general purpose **night vision goggles** for the infantry and night-flying goggles for the Army Air Corps. Further purchases of both types are planned.

e. **Combat Clothing.** In the exceptionally demanding conditions of the Falkland Islands winter a number of shortcomings were identified clothing and personal equipment. Replacement of some of these items has already commenced.
Air-to-Ground Warfare

235. Although there was only limited opportunity to observe the effectiveness of our own land-based air power in combat conditions, several lessons emerged—both from our own operations and those of the Argentines—which are important for future procurement policy. The most significant among these are:

a. **Attack on Airfields.** In the longest range bombing missions yet flown, Vulcan bombers attacked Port Stanley airfield but with only 1000 lb bombs they were unable to close the runway for more than a short period. The need was underlined for an advanced airfield attack weapon such as JP 233.

b. **Defence Suppression.** Although combat aircraft were quickly fitted with chaff and flare dispensers and some active ECM equipment, which proved vital in the event, the lack of defence suppression weapons to attack enemy radars exposed the Harriers to heavy and accurate ground-fire. However, Vulcan attacks were made on radars close to Port Stanley using Shrike anti-radiation missiles, with some success; the procurement of anti-radiation missiles is included in our forward plans.

c. **Close Air Support.** The campaign exposed the limitations of the traditional method of forward air control of close air support operations. In the later stages laser target marking from the ground was used, enabling laser-guided bombs to make direct hits on their targets. For the future, tactical ground-air communications will be improved, and
the efficiency of laser target marking will be further explored.

d. **Air Reconnaissance.** The absence of a dedicated overland air reconnaissance capability was a serious handicap in the Campaign, and the resulting lack of precise information on enemy dispositions presented an additional hazard to the ground forces. We plan to improve our tactical reconnaissance capability.

e. **Sea-Skimming.** The Campaign showed the potential of air-launched, sea-skimming missiles. We have already equipped a number of Nimrod aircraft with the Harpoon anti-ship missile and we will further improve our existing capability in this area by the early acquisition of the advanced Sea Eagle missile, which has a longer range and more discriminating capability than Exocet.

**PROCUREMENT AND IMPROVISATION**

236. In the exceptional circumstances of the campaign our procurement processes proved adaptable to meet the wide variety of military needs against very tight timescales. New operational demands were satisfied in record times through the ready availability of a broad spectrum of scientific and engineering expertise in the Ministry of Defence research establishments and of the comprehensive resources of the United Kingdom's defence industry. The Campaign demonstrated the value of a broadly based national defence industry, and the benefits of an in-house research capability.
237. Those concerned at all levels in both Government and Industry worked hard to enhance our operational capabilities by specific threat assessment and computer modelling work, material and software modifications to equipment, rapid development of new equipment capabilities and accelerated introduction of equipments into service. Examples included the development of important, often vital, equipments by combining existing items in new ways, such as the creation of AEW equipment using Nimrod Searchwater radars in Sea King helicopters (in only eleven weeks); the invention, production, proving and delivery in record time of many new equipments, including manportable radar jammers (10 days from order to delivery); the accelerated introduction into service of HM Ships Illustrious and Brazen and weapons such as the Sea Skua anti-ship missile; and the adaptation of Vulcan, Hercules and Nimrod aircraft for air-to-air refuelling.

238. The urgency of the requirement frequently warranted the acceptance of lower engineering and safety standards; and emergency arrangements worked well for the limited period of the operation. Overriding priority was given to the operation at all times and decisions were determined by what could be achieved in the limited time available.

239. The experience of the campaign is being put to full use in the continuing quest for greater efficiency in the procurement process. It would be unrealistic to expect sweeping changes since the bulk of the emergency practices used were special to the operation and because equipment requirements were narrowed to the immediate task of countering specifically known Argentine capabilities. Budgetary and cash limit restraints were removed although the principles of
accountability and cost-effectiveness continued to apply.

LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL

240. A military operation of this scale required the specialised skills of many thousands of managers, engineers and technicians. They performed a multitude of roles, particularly in the logistics field, which were essential to the success of the operation but which did not require detailed political direction. As was to be expected they responded well to the need for speed of action in following well established procedures and for improvisation whenever this was likely to assist the operational commander.

241. The logistic support of the Falklands campaign was a major success. Despite lines of communication which stretched half way round the world, the task force rarely lacked essential supplies, and equipment and spares were maintained at high levels of availability. The task force was equipped and despatched in a remarkably short time, reflecting the high state of readiness and training of all three Service. Four lessons stand out.

242. First rates of usage, particularly of ammunition, missiles, and anti-submarine weapons were significantly higher than anticipated. Last year we announced plans to increase substantially war reserve stocks in order to improve staying power; scalings for 'out of area' operations will be reviewed in the light of experience in the Falklands Campaign.

243. Second we need to consider the level of logistic support maintained for
'out of area' operations. Since the late 1960s there has been a steady reduction in the Services capability to support large forces outside the NATO area. All the demands of the task force were met, but only by giving it first call on resources and by using some stocks earmarked for NATO. The Services' logistic capability to support 'out of area' operations has to be considered in the light of the Government's overall policy for such operations and this is discussed in Part III. We shall, however, review the size and composition of the special stockpile being created to support 'out of area' land operations. We shall also consider whether logistic support could be organised as part of a flexible system able to support forces whether inside or outside the NATO area.

244. Third, air-to-air refuelling is vital in supporting operations at long range. For example, RAF Harriers flew non-stop to the South Atlantic from Ascension Island with tanker support. In the operations from Ascension Island, the relatively small amount of fuel carried by the Victor tanker aircraft resulted in a large proportion of the available tanker force being used for each Vulcan, Nimrod and Hercules sortie. A large capacity strategic tanker aircraft is needed to provide greater operational flexibility in the future and our proposal for this is discussed in Part III.

245. Finally the campaign brought home the significant contribution which civil resources can make to the nation's strength in a crisis. This was discussed in the Statement on the Defence Estimates for 1982 (Cmnd 8529). Our intention to review the use of national logistic and manpower resources in this way has now been given even greater impetus. The smooth and rapid implementation of existing contingency plans to use merchant shipping in
support of the Services was a major success story of the Campaign. More than 50 ships were taken up from trade, from passenger liners to trawlers. They provided vital support across the entire logistic spectrum. Tankers carried fuel for ships, aircraft and land forces. Liners, such as the QE2 and Canberra, and ferries gave service as troop carriers. Ships, such as the Atlantic Conveyor, carried helicopters, Harriers, heavy equipment and stores. Other vessels were taken up as hospital ships, repair ships or tugs. All of these ships were manned by volunteer, civilian crews, supplemented by small naval parties.

246. Amongst the more notable conversions made to merchantmen were:-

a. The fitting of flight decks which were designed and constructed in a matter of days and subsequently stood up to extremes of weather. Whilst no substitute for operational flight decks, these temporary facilities were invaluable.

b. The provision and fitting of equipment for all merchant ships to enable them to replenish at sea.

c. The equipping of trawlers as minesweepers (in addition to the deployment of the new Hunt Class mine counter-measures vessels to the South Atlantic), which swept some ten enemy buoyant mines.

d. The provision of additional communication, navigation and cryptographic equipment.
e. The provision of shipboard water production plants.

247. Civil air carriers supplemented the efforts of the RAF Air Transport Force and between April and June transported more than 350 tons of freight, including helicopters, to Ascension Island.

248. The Dockyards, civilian ports, stores depots, marines services and staff in Government Departments and Industry played a major part in despatching and sustaining the task force. All gave unstinted assistance working long hours including weekends and Bank holidays. British Rail and the road haulage firms reacted rapidly to move vast quantities of stores and equipment to the docks.

249. As a consequence of the Campaign we have decided that militarily useful features should be incorporated in the replacement for Atlantic Conveyor, involving principally a prefabricated helicopter flight-deck. We also have an option to take up the ship for a period each year for exercises. For the longer term a working party of the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee will examine ways in which merchant ships likely to be required in any future emergency might be designed, modified or equipped for possible use in support of the Armed Forces or for self-defence.

250. The manpower demands of the campaign were met almost entirely by our regular forces, and there was no general recall of reservists. It was, however, necessary to effect a selective call-out of a small number of Naval reservists.
and to retain some Naval personnel who might otherwise have been due to leave. The call out worked smoothly but the exercise indicated the need to consider the legislation on the recall of reservists. As we pointed out in Cmd 8529 the various categories of Reserves would play an essential part in any future war in the NATO area. Some enhancements to our capabilities have already been made, for example by the expansion of the Territorial Army and other steps are being studied.

251. The outstanding feature of the medical and casualty evacuation system was the dedication of the doctors and medical staff both in the field and on board ship. Casualties were in surgery within six hours or less and, as a result of the skill of our medical teams, over 90% survived. Extensive use was made of helicopters and hospital ships. VC10s were used in an aero-medical role to return casualties speedily to the United Kingdom. There were some difficulties in the initial planning of medical support for the Operation. These are being studied with a view to making the most effective and economical use of medical resources from all three Services in future operations.

252. The casualty reporting systems of all three Services were rapidly expanded for the operation. For example the Royal Navy set up their own casualty coordination centre at HMS Nelson in Portsmouth. It collated information

Note
1. In all 255 task force lives, Service and civilian, were lost in the operation. A further 777 were injured. In many cases these injuries were not serious and the men were quickly able to rejoin their units. Over 700 of the injured are now fully employed once more.
from the task force via Fleet Headquarters and passed it to casualty action
centres in Service locations. Families were able to telephone with enquiries
and at the height of the operation thousands of calls were dealt with every
day. Wherever possible, next of kin were informed before news of an incident
was made public. This was done by personal visits in the case of death or
serious injury. In some cases the expectation that news could reach the
public early from other sources, such as Argentine claims, led to an announce-
ment before all next of kin had been told.

253. There were some errors and delays. It was difficult to establish the
extent of casualties immediately after an incident at sea because of the
constant helicopter transfer of personnel between ships, and the fact that
survivors might be recovered by different means to different ships. It
could take many hours to establish who was missing while other operations
continued. Given these difficulties, the system worked as well as could be
expected and improved during the Operation.

254. By the end of the Campaign our forces had taken a total of 11,500
Argentine prisoners of war. The operational situation and the climate
increased the considerable difficulties in handling so many prisoners -
especially given the shortage of buildings on the Islands and the loss of
tentage for 4,500 men in the Atlantic Conveyor. Nonetheless, all prisoners
received adequate food, clothing and medical attention. The procedures laid
down in the Third Geneva Convention were followed as closely as possible,
although many prisoners had to be accommodated in ships. The International
Committee of the Red Cross judged this unusual step reasonable in the cir-
cumstances. The problems raised by handling prisoners of war will be given more emphasis in training and planning in future.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

255. The Government's firm objective from the outset was to provide as quickly as possible accurate information on developments in the diplomatic and military fields. In addition to the frequent reports which Ministers made to Parliament, No 10 Downing Street Press Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office provided regular briefings for the British and international press and for defence attaches. Abroad, our diplomatic missions with the help of the Central Office of Information launched and maintained an intensive effort with their local media to present the British case fully and accurately and, where necessary, to counter Argentine dis-information. At the same time they kept other Governments informed of the latest developments, canvassing support both in foreign capitals and at the United Nations. Arrangements were also made to convey a substantial British press corps to the South Atlantic.

254. It was crucial that public opinion, both at home and abroad, understood and supported our cause. Without the support of the British people it would not have been possible to mount and sustain the operation. It was vital to retain the support of friends and Allies abroad. That this was largely achieved is a measure of our success in providing a reliable account of the diplomatic and military developments. Of course there were problems. The need to delay or, in some cases, prevent altogether the publication of certain
information on military operations caused considerable controversy at the
time and continues to be the subject of widespread debate. It is easy to
overlook the factors influencing the public release of certain categories of
information. At all times our practice had to be consistent with the overriding
dictates of national and operational security and the protection of the
lives or the men and women of the task force in the South Atlantic. At the
same time, we were concerned to ensure that as far as possible their families
were caused the minimum of distress. Regrettably, press speculation and
false Argentine propaganda sometimes obliged us to release information about
the operation sooner than family considerations would otherwise have dictated.
Another factor contributing to our difficulties was the absence on some
occasions of sufficiently detailed and up to date situation reports from the
task force. To some extent this can be attributed to the limitations imposed
by our communications systems, which did not always have the capacity to
meet the requirements of the press, on top of the vast flow of vitally important
operational traffic.

257. These matters deserve careful and considered analysis. The Ministry of
Defence has therefore commissioned a wide ranging study by the University
College of Cardiff into the relationship between the media and the Government
in a time of armed conflict. In addition, the House of Commons Defence
Committee is currently conducting an extensive inquiry into the way in
which these matters were handled during the crisis and we shall wish to take
its report into account in our analysis. Meantime, a number of practical
improvements are being made in the light of the Falklands experience, including
new arrangements for accrediting journalists to military units and more
extensive training opportunities for public relations officers. The Ministry of Defence is also discussing with the press the extent to which the difficulties which arose could be avoided in future. A special working party will be set up to consider whether any new measures, including the introduction of a system of censorship, are necessary in order to protect military information immediately before or during an operation.
301. We have learned a great deal from the Falklands campaign. Many of the lessons are not new but they are no less important for that - we have seen again the value of professional, well-motivated forces capable of responding quickly and imaginatively to the unexpected. The Armed Forces have demonstrated their capability to operate out of the NATO area in the most difficult circumstances and on the other side of the world; and they have gained direct experience of such an operation and the logistic effort necessary to support it. We now intend to introduce new and additional equipments to increase their mobility, flexibility and readiness for operations within the NATO area and elsewhere.

302. This is not to say that we now take a different view of the major threat to the security of the United Kingdom, which comes from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The remorseless growth in the size and sophistication of the Soviet Armed forces, and the disposition of Soviet leaders to exploit their military power for political purposes - directly or indirectly - continue unabated. It is still in Europe that we and our Allies face the greatest concentration of Warsaw Pact forces. In "The Way Forward" (Command 8288) we identified the four main roles in which the Armed Forces help to counter that threat: providing an independent element of strategic and theatre nuclear forces committed to the Alliance; defending the United Kingdom homeland; a major land and air contribution on the European mainland; and deploying a major maritime capability in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel. These roles remain the priority for our defence effort - and the enhancement and modernisation of the forces devoted to these tasks must still have the first call
on our resources.

303. "The Way Forward", however, also drew attention to the significance of threats posed to Western interests outside the NATO area. In countering these threats, our military effort plays a part at three levels:

a. Military assistance and training to countries of importance to Western interests which request our help, (this year we have military training teams varying in size from one man to more than 150 in more than 30 countries; and we are training about 5,000 foreign and Common-wealth students at defence establishments in this country).

b. Periodic deployment of British forces, for example naval task groups, to demonstrate a presence, to acquire experience of conditions away from the European theatre, and to exercise with the forces of our Allies and friends.

c. Maintenance of a capability to intervene unilaterally or with Allies either to protect our national interests, or in response to a request for help from our friends.

It is this last capability which has just been demonstrated so effectively in the Falklands Campaign.

304. The policy of successive Governments has been that operations outside the NATO area should be undertaken by forces whose primary role is in support of the Alliance. The Falklands Campaign showed that many elements of the
Armed Forces have the basic characteristics of flexibility and mobility which make them well suited to respond to unforeseen challenges arising outside Europe. We were already planning before the Falklands emergency a number of measures to enhance this capability by:

- the designation of a two-star headquarters to command forces committed to such operations;

- the fitting of station-keeping equipment to a number of Hercules aircraft, which would considerably enhance the ability to deploy a parachute assault force at night or in poor weather;

- the establishment of a stockpile of weapons, equipment and stores which could be drawn on to support operations outside the NATO area without diverting NATO stocks; and

- the greater use of civilian assets, such as merchant ships, to provide logistic and other support for our forces.

We had also already announced that the two assault ships HMS Fearless and Intrepid were to be retained in service. These ships emphatically proved their worth in the Falklands conflict, and will remain an important element in our amphibious capability.

305. We should like to have done more in this area. Unfortunately the defence budget has for several years been under intense and consistent pressure, which has made it difficult to meet the escalating real cost of the
Armed Forces' equipment for their primary roles, and left little margin for additions of this kind.

306. The success of last year's review of the defence programme in matching resources to our revised forward plans had already won us a degree of flexibility to make adjustments to the defence programme. In addition, as already announced, the cost of the Falklands Campaign and of replacing the ships and other equipment lost, together with the extra costs of maintaining a substantial garrison in the Falklands, are all to be found from monies additional to the 3% increase in real terms by which the defence budget is planned to grow annually over the period until 1985/86 covered by existing public expenditure plans. These developments mean that we can now finance significant force enhancements over the next few years.

307. We have already announced that:

- following our experience in the Falklands, we intend that two aircraft carriers should be available for deployment at short notice. To ensure this a third carrier will be maintained in refit or reserve and we shall not proceed with the sale of HMS Invincible

- restrictions on Armed Forces training and activity levels have been lifted. This will help to maintain the high standards of professionalism and fitness demonstrated by all three Services during the conflict.

308. During the conflict a great variety of equipments and improvements were specially introduced for the forces involved in the operation, exceeding
£200M in value and including:

a. Vulcans, Nimrod and Hercules aircraft were equipped for the air-to-air refuelling receiver role, and Vulcan and Hercules aircraft were also converted to the tanker role.

b. Nimrod aircraft were modified to carry bombs, the Harpoon anti-ship missile, and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.

c. the purchase of additional Sidewinder AIM 9L air-to-air missiles for Harriers and conversion of RAF Harrier GR3 aircraft to carry them.

d. introduction of laser guided bombs for RAF Harrier GR3 aircraft.

e. adaptation of the Sea Wolf shipborne missile system more effectively to deal with low level aircraft attacks.

f. fitting of a close-in weapon system to HMS Illustrious.

g. accelerated introduction into service of the Sea Skua anti-ship missile and Sub-Harpoon submarine launched anti-ship missiles.

h. further development of ship-borne chaff and electronic counter measures to deal with sea-skimming missiles; and development of these for tactical aircraft and helicopters.

Most of this equipment remains available for use by the Services, whether in
the South Atlantic or elsewhere.

309. The replacement of ships and other equipment lost in the Falklands campaign will enhance the capabilities of the Services, since replacements will be newer and in many cases more capable than their predecessors: The major orders are for:

a. replacement of the two Type 42 destroyers and two Type 21 frigates. [ ] Type 22 frigates are to be ordered now (including 1 Type 22 order not related to the Falklands losses). [ ] of these ships will be of the new Batch III design equipped with the 4.5" gun.

b. a replacement for the logistic landing ship, RFA SIR GALAHAD. Detailed design work on the new ship is in hand and we expect to place an order during 1983. RFA SIR TRISTRAM is to be brought back to Britain and we hope that it can be repaired.

c. the replacement of all lost Harrier aircraft and Sea King, Lynx and Chinook helicopters. (See also paragraph 311 below).

310. We shall maintain a sizeable garrison on the Falkland Islands for the foreseeable future including air defence radars, RAF Phantom, Harrier and Hercules aircraft, Chinook and Sea King helicopters, Rapier air defence systems, an infantry battalion, and supporting arms. Nuclear-powered submarines, destroyers, frigates and patrol craft with afloat support will be deployed in the South Atlantic; and the Ice Patrol ship - HMS Endurance - will be retained in service there. These forces can be reinforced as necessary by
others already identified for this purpose and we shall periodically mount exercises to test our reinforcement capability - this will be significantly enhanced by the further improvements outlined below.

311. In the light of the conflict and in order to provide for the defence of the Falkland Islands without a major diversion of effort from the Armed Forces' primary NATO roles, we intend - with the funds now available - to make a number of further additions and improvements to the Armed Forces. These measures will increase our total force levels, though those forces based in the Falkland Islands will be at a lower state of readiness for NATO than when in the European theatre. The main enhancements to be made are:

a. the purchase of at least [ ] wide-bodied tankers which will considerably enhance the capacity of the RAF's tanker force and will be a significant force multiplier for all the RAF's combat aircraft. Additionally, they will greatly enhance the Armed Forces' strategic mobility given their capacity also to carry large numbers of troops and heavy equipment, both for operations in Europe or elsewhere. They will transform our ability to support the Falkland Islands garrison, and to reinforce it quickly.

b. subject to the satisfactory completion of negotiations currently in train, the purchase of at least 12 Phantom F-4 J aircraft which will form a squadron for the air defence of the United Kingdom to replace the squadron of Phantom FGR2 aircraft committed to the South Atlantic. The deployment between theatres of this increased total Phantom force will be adjusted as and when necessary and can be quickly
accomplished. For example, 2 Phantoms could be moved from Ascension Island to the Falkland Islands supported by a single strategic tanker.

c. the purchase of 24 additional Rapier fire units for the Army and the Royal Air Force.

d. in addition to the three Chinook replacements already referred to, the purchase of five more Chinook medium lift helicopters. Each has the ability to lift up to 80 men and add greatly to the mobility of our land forces; their value was clearly demonstrated by the contribution made by the single Chinook helicopter which was available in the Falkland Islands Campaign.

e. an increase in the number of operational Destroyers and Frigates. By running on ships to cover those lost in the Falklands campaign, we intend to maintain total numbers at about 55 at 1st April 1983 and 1984. Under previous plans, up to 4 ships would have been in a standby squadron by 1985. We have now decided, in view of the Falklands commitment, that over the next 2-3 years - which is as far ahead as we can plan at this stage - the destroyers and frigates previously planned to go into the standby squadron should be retained in the running Fleet thus enhancing ship availability.

f. The provision of point defence for our aircraft carriers Invincible, Illustrious and Ark Royal, the assault ships Intrepid and Fearless, the destroyer Bristol and all the Type 42 destroyers.
g. In addition to replacement of all the battle losses, as announced in July, the purchase of an additional 7 Sea Harrier aircraft and 6 Sea King ASW helicopters.

h. The purchase of Searchwater radar and associated avionics equipments for Sea King helicopters in order to equip each of the operational aircraft carriers with an organic Airborne Early Warning capability.

i. In the light of rates of consumption during the Falklands campaign both of ammunition and stores, we are reviewing the size and composition of the stockpile intended to support operations outside the NATO area, and its relationship to NATO war stocks. We plan to increase substantially the number and range of items in this stockpile at a cost of at least £10M. Additional stocks of ammunition and other equipments are being procured for basing in the Falkland Islands.

312. As indicated in Part II there is a case for a number of other force and equipment enhancements in the light of the Falklands campaign. Many of these, for instance more modern radar systems for our ships, extra night vision equipment for the Army and the JP233 airfield denial weapon for the RAF are already provided for in our forward programmes; others are not. The scope for further improvements in our forces will be assessed against the available resources in the normal annual recosting of the defence programme as a whole which will be completed during the early part of the new year.
CONCLUSION

313. The many useful lessons we have learned from the Falklands campaign, which are described in some detail in this White Paper, do not invalidate the policy we have adopted following last year's defence programme review. The Soviet Union, its policies and its military capabilities continue to pose the main threat to the security of the United Kingdom and our response to this threat must have the first call on our resources. Following the Falklands campaign, we shall now be devoting substantially more resources to defence than had been previously planned. In allocating these, we shall be taking measures which will strengthen our general defence capability by increasing the flexibility, mobility and readiness of all three Services for operations in support of NATO and elsewhere.

314. Above all, the success of the Falklands campaign demonstrated conclusively the superb quality and commitment of British servicemen. It also showed the crucial role of the merchant marine, of civil servants on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, in the dockyards and elsewhere, and of British industry, all of whom gave tireless and unstinting support to the Task Force. The quality and reliability of much service equipment was proved, as was the ingenuity and capacity for improvisation of the Services, defence establishments, and British industry. Finally, the campaign confirmed that the British people and their Government have the will and resolve to resist aggression and the fortitude to withstand setbacks and casualties. We and our NATO Allies can draw confidence from this: the deterrent posture of the NATO Alliance as a whole has been immeasurably strengthened.
## ANNEX A

### COMPOSITION OF THE TASK FORCE AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

1. **SHIPS OF THE ROYAL NAVY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Type/Class</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Submarines:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conqueror, Courageous, Spartan, Splendid, Valiant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fleet:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Onyx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oberon Class</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Invincible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ASW Carrier:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hermes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ASW/Commando Carrier:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fearless, Intrepid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Assault Ships:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Antrim, Glamorgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Guided Missile Destroyers:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>County Class</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cardiff, Coventry, Exeter, Glasgow, Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 82</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Andromeda, Argonaut, Minerva, Penelope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Plymouth, Yarmouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>General Purpose Frigates:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Active, Alacrity, Ambuscade, Antelope, Ardent, Arrow, Avenger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leander Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brilliant, Broadsword</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rothesay Class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dumbarton Castle, Leeds Castle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brecon, Ledbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Type 22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella, Pict</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Offshore Patrol:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Castle Class</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mine Counter-Measures</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hunt Class</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extra Deep Armed Team Sweep Trawlers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ice Patrol Ship:</td>
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<td>Endurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Survey Ships²:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hecla, Herald, Hydra</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**

1. Taken up from trade, commissioned and manned by RN personnel.
2. Employed as ambulance ships.

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### 2. SQUADRONS OF THE FLEET AIR ARM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Sqdn</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Embarked In:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>Wessex Mk 3</td>
<td>County Class destroyers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Hermes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Invincible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Hermes, Invincible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>Hermes, Invincible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>Lynx Mk 2</td>
<td>Invincible, Hermes, Type 42 destroyers, Leander Class and Type 21 (except Active) frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>Sea King Mk 5</td>
<td>Invincible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>Sea King Mk 2</td>
<td>Fort Grange, Olmeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>Sea King Mk 2</td>
<td>Atlantic Causeway, QE2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>Sea King Mk 5</td>
<td>Hermes, Fort Austin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>Wasp</td>
<td>Active, Endurance, Plymouth, Yarmouth, Survey ships, Contender Bezant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>Wessex Mk 5</td>
<td>Invincible, Fort Austin, Intrepid, Resource, Tidepool, Tidespring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>Sea King Mk 4</td>
<td>Hermes, Fearless, Intrepid, Canberra, Elk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>Wessex Mk 5</td>
<td>Engadine, Atlantic Causeway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>Wessex Mk 5</td>
<td>Olna, Olwen, Regent, Atlantic Conveyor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. SHIPS OF THE ROYAL MARITIME AUXILIARY SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Type/Class</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Mooring and Salvage Vessel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Goosander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Tug</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Typhoon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### 4. SHIPS OF THE ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Type/Class</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Fleet Tankers, Large:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Olmeda, Olna, Olwen, Tidepool, Tidespring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fleet Tankers, Small:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Blue Rover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Support Tankers:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Appleleaf, Bayleaf, Brambleleaf, Pearleaf, Plumleaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Fleet Replenishment Ships:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fort Austin, Fort Grange, Resource, Regent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Stores Support Ships:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stromness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Helicopter Support Ship:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Engadine</td>
</tr>
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### SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Ship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SS Canberra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>RMS Queen Elizabeth II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>SS Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MV Alvega</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MV Anco Charger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>MV Balder London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>MV British Avon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>MV British Dart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>MC British Esk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>MV British Tamar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>MV British Tay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>MV British Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>MV British Trent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>MV British Wye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>MV Fort Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>MV Fort Rouge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>MV G A Walker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MV Scottish Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>MV Shell Eburna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>SS Atlantic Causeway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>SS Atlantic Conveyor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>MV Baltic Ferry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>MV Contender Bezant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MV Elk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MV Europic Ferry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MV Nordic Ferry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>MV Tor Caledonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>MV Astronomer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>MV Norland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>TGV Rangatira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>MV Saint Edmund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>RMS Saint Helena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>General Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>MV Avelona Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>MV Cedar Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>MV Geestport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>MV Laertes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>MV Lycaon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>MV Myrmidon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>MV Saxonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>MV Strathewe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Offshore Support Vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Container Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>MV British Enterprise III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>MV Stena Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>MV Stena Seaspread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>MV Wimpey Seahouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>MT Irishman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>MT Salvageman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cable Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C S Iris</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

1. In addition MVs Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella and Pict were taken up and commissioned as mine counter-measures vessels.
### 6. ROYAL MARINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3 Commando Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>40 Commando Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>42 Commando Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>45 Commando Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>The Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>The Special Boat Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Royal Marines Detachments (including landing craft crews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Air Defence Troop Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1st Raiding Squadron Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The Bands of Her Majesty's Royal Marines Commando Forces and Flag Officer 3rd Flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Field Records Office Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7. ARMY UNITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Two troops The Blues and Royals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>4th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (less on battery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>12th Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery (less one battery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>29th Commando Regiment Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Elements 43 Air Defence Battery, 32nd Guided Weapons Regiment Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Elements 49th Field Regiment Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Elements Royal School of Artillery Support Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Elements 33 Engineer Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>36 Engineer Regiment (less one squadron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Elements 38 Engineer Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Elements Military Works Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Elements 2 Postal and Courier Regiment Royal Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Elements 14th Signal Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Elements 30th Signal Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>5th Infantry Brigade Headquarters and Signals Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Elements 602 Signal Troop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2nd Battalion Scots Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1st Battalion Welsh Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1st Battalion 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Elements 22nd Special Air Service Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>656 Squadron Army Air Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Elements 17 Port Regiment Royal Corps of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Elements 29 Transport and Movements Regiment Royal Corps of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Elements 47 Air Despatch Squadron Royal Corps of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>407 Troop Royal Corps of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Elements The Joint Helicopter Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>16 Field Ambulance Royal Medical Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Elements 19 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Elements 9 Ordnance Battalion Royal Army Ordnance Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 3. Royal Administration Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Unit Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>81 Ordnance Company Royal Army Ordnance Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>10 Field Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Elements 70 Aircraft Workshop Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Elements 160 Provost Company Royal Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>6 Field Cash Office Royal Army Pay Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>601 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>602 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.</td>
<td>603 Tactical Air Control Party (Forward Air Controller)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 8. Royal Air Force Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Flying Squadrons</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1(F) Squadron¹</td>
<td>Harrier GR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detachments of:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>10 Squadron</td>
<td>VC 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>18 Squadron</td>
<td>Chinook HC Mk 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>24 Squadron</td>
<td>Hercules C Mk 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>30 Squadron</td>
<td>Hercules C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>47 Squadron</td>
<td>Hercules C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>70 Squadron</td>
<td>Hercules C1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>29 Squadron</td>
<td>Phantom FGR2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>42 Squadron</td>
<td>Nimrod Mk 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>44 Squadron</td>
<td>Vulcan B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>50 Squadron</td>
<td>Vulcan B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>101 Squadron</td>
<td>Vulcan B2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>55 Squadron</td>
<td>Victor K2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ser</td>
<td>Flying Squadrons</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>57 Squadron</td>
<td>Victor K2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>120 Squadron</td>
<td>Nimrod Mk 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>201 Squadron</td>
<td>Nimrod Mk 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>206 Squadron</td>
<td>Nimrod Mk 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>202 Squadron</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Sea King</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Royal Air Force Regiment</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. 3 (Regiment)</td>
<td>Wing Headquarters Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. 15 (Regiment)</td>
<td>Squadron Detachment Field Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. 63 (Regiment)</td>
<td>Squadron (Rapier)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22. Tactical Communications Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Tactical Supply Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

1. Embarked in HMS Hermes and ashore.
# ANNEX B

## WEAPONS SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE AGAINST ENEMY AIRCRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Weapon System</th>
<th>Aircraft Kills</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Sea Harrier with AIM 9L Sidewinder Missile</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sea Harrier with 30mm ADEN Cannon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sea Wolf</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sea Dart</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sea Cat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Rapier</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Blowpipe</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Stinger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Others&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. A probable kill is one where there are reasonable grounds to believe an aircraft was destroyed, but there is insufficient weight of collateral evidence to claim a confirmed kill.

2. Missile system kill rates are expressed as total kills (including probables) as a percentage of total valid firings. 'Out-of-envelope', non-feasible and certain other engagements terminated, eg. for safety reasons, have been discounted, since they are not relevant to the assessment of system performance.

3. N/A = Not applicable.

4. Others comprise 4.5" gun, 20mm, 40/60mm Bofors, Rarden Cannon and small arms.

5. An estimated total of 117 Argentine aircraft were destroyed (including probables and those destroyed on the ground). This total comprises: 45 A4 Skyhawk, 27 Mirage, 20 Pucara, 4 Aeromacchi, 4 Mentor, 3 Canberra, 2 Skyvan, 1 C130 Hercules, 1 Lear Jet, 6 Puma, 2 Bell Huey and 2 Chinook (the last three aircraft types named being helicopters).
**ANNEX C**

**SHIP AND AIRCRAFT LOSSES**

### Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>HMS Sheffield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>HMS Ardent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>23 May</td>
<td>HMS Antelope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>HMS Coventry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>Atlantic Conveyor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>Sir Galahad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Aircraft

**Lost to Enemy Fire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Parent Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>RN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>Lynx(^1)</td>
<td>RN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>2 x Gazelle</td>
<td>RM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>21 May</td>
<td>Harrier GR3</td>
<td>RAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>6 x Wessex 5(^2)</td>
<td>RN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>Lynx(^2)</td>
<td>RN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>3 x Chinook(^2)</td>
<td>RAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>25 May</td>
<td>Lynx(^3)</td>
<td>RN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>Harrier GR3</td>
<td>RAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Scout</td>
<td>RM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>30 May</td>
<td>Harrier GR3</td>
<td>RAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2 June</td>
<td>Sea Harrier</td>
<td>RN</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>Gazelle</td>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>Wessex 3(^4)</td>
<td>RN</td>
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</tbody>
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**Other Losses**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
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<th>Aircraft Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2 x Wessex 5</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Sea King Mk 4</td>
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<td>RN</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>Harrier GR3</td>
<td>RAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Lynx - English Electric type of aircraft
\(^2\) Wessex - British Navy helicopter
\(^3\) Lynx - British Navy helicopter
\(^4\) Wessex - British Navy helicopter
Notes
1. Lost in bomb attack on HMS Ardent
2. Lost in Atlantic Conveyor
3. Lost when HMS Coventry sank
4. Lost in missile attack on HMS Glamorgan
Prime Minister

Alf Morris has put down a question asking if you will make a statement clarifying the exact position as to whether the Fund, after his question on Thursday, it is for ordinary written answer, would you like to answer him substantively, or would you prefer him to ask a new question?

26th November 1982
Winston Churchill's question: You could then refer Mr Morris to my Wiggini answer (draft attached)?

or would you prefer to discuss the matter with Mr Wiggini and Sir David Evans, the Chairman of the Trustees?

Mo 5/21/3
A new word was 'in someone for himself' it could help.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have seen Mr Coles' letter of 25th November recording your reactions to the letter my Assistant Private Secretary wrote the previous day on the question of further interim capital payments to those injured in the Falklands campaign.

I can, of course, understand why you felt that interim payments should be made, and I was pleased that the Trustees had made such payments to the most seriously injured servicemen. Before my secretary wrote on 24th November I had had soundings taken of the Chairman of the Trustees of the Fund, Air Chief Marshal Sir David Evans, on the question of further interim payments and the advice in the letter from my office reflected Sir David's, and I believe, other Trustees', views.

In the light of your further comments, however, I again approached Sir David on this. I enclose a copy of a minute I have now received from him. As his minute brings out, if the Fund is to enjoy the benefits that come with charitable status it has to be very careful that it stays within the bounds of its Trust deed, which Sir David touches on in his paragraph 4.

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
Nonetheless interim payments to other wounded servicemen will be made over the next few weeks, as their assessments are completed. The more seriously wounded will get further payments when their assessments have been completed. The essential problem with many of the remainder, however, is that the overwhelming proportion of them are back with their units and are fully fit, and the Trustees cannot pay "compensation" to them under the Trust Deed unless they can identify "need" which, I know, they will interpret generously. More generally, the Trustees have been anxious not to get hopelessly out of line with payments to Northern Ireland casualties. If we do so it will raise the whole spectre of Government-financed benefits.

Having said all this, I recognise that there is a great problem with the South Atlantic Fund (and, as you know, I had direct experience of Penlee). There is also, clearly, misunderstanding about what the Fund has done, and is continuing to do, to help the Falklands bereaved and injured. I now understand that Winston Churchill and Alf Morris have tabled Parliamentary Questions on this for answer next week. / I attach a draft of the Answer Jerry Wiggin was proposing to give to Winston's Question but you may now prefer to give the substantive Answer yourself in which case we would provide you with a revised draft.

There is much to be said for answering the Questions as soon as possible, and, as you know, I am in NATO next week. If you are still concerned you might care to have a personal word with Sir David Evans who would, I know, be happy to discuss all this with you. Although as Chairman of the Trustees Sir David is responsible for the policy you might like Jerry Wiggin to come along too since he answers most of the Questions on this in the House.

Truly ever

John

If this really is not a valid reply, I fear it to fail with regard in my view. People continued to call the S. Atlantic Fund to help people in their trust.
VCDS (P&L) 19/5

S of S

Copy to:

Minister (AF)
US of S (AF)
CDS
2SL
AG
AMP
2nd PUS
Hd of DS14
Sec SAF

THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

1. Your M0/5/21/3 dated 25 November sought further advice in light of the Prime Minister's comments on your earlier note on the South Atlantic Fund dated 24 November 1982.

2. May I first remind you that the Fund was established by your statement in the House on 25 May as a holding Fund which would disburse money through existing Charities. Subsequently it was registered as a Charitable Trust following the Attorney General's guidelines issued after Fenlee; thus the Trust Deed reflects the policy of using the existing experienced machinery of Service Charities to achieve the Fund's principal aim of alleviating suffering. Whilst this charitable status brings considerable financial benefits to the Fund it also imposes restrictions; and the 'narrow road' that has to be followed by the Trustees as a result is best trodden without the spotlight of full publicity. In fact, many individuals who have received help from one of the many Charities through which we have to work may not appreciate that the money or payments they have received originated from the South Atlantic Fund. You are well aware that the £1.5M quickly transferred to the Service Charities at the outset was to ensure that cash was immediately available for those who had to deal at first-hand with any needs to alleviate suffering. We did this specifically to avoid any valid accusation of delay caused by any so-called 'bureaucratic process'. The Service Charities were also told to request further financial assistance if the £1.5M 'advance' was inadequate. We also contacted some 200 further charities and invited them to provide immediate assistance whenever and wherever required and undertook to provide reimbursement of any financial expenditure.

3. Against this background the necessary process of assessment - both welfare and medical - has been proceeding as quickly as circumstances and resources permit. We are not lacking in advice and views from many quarters - often conflicting. Whilst we, the Trustees, have been attempting to speed the process, much expert and specialist advice counsels against haste. For instance, the British Limbless Ex-Servicemen's Association has advised that experience has shown that large sums paid to the limbless too early can often create problems in the future. Moreover, many of the bereaved and the injured have asked for time to come to terms with their new situation before they decide how they wish to live their future lives. Immediate needs have already been met by the
interim awards of which you are aware. The Trustees are also of the view that interim and final assessments should be completed not only fairly and compassionately, but also confidentially to avoid any possible embarrassment to those concerned as so-called 'charity' still has an unfortunate connotation to many.

4. I can fully understand the Prime Minister's concern and, to a certain extent, share her feeling of impatience. However, we are dealing with many complex issues and are inevitably dependant on the advice of experts in these matters. Under the terms of the Trust Deed to which we are bound we must continue to follow the assessment processes that are well underway and we will continue to insist on the quickest possible resolution of capital payments from the Fund. The only real alternative would be to make arbitrary awards which in turn could create as many problems as they would solve; for example, the charitable status of the Fund could then be open to challenge, and the Trustees would have difficulty in justifying the basis of such awards.

5. I do hope that the Prime Minister can be given the fullest possible explanation of the issues involved, especially as there have been so many misleading and ill-informed reports recently about the Fund. The Trustees have been equally irritated by misleading reports and, even more, by alleged views and statements of the Trustees that are contrary to fact.

6. One final point. I have seen the detailed answer which US of S(AF) has suggested should be given in response to the Parliamentary Question tabled by Winston Churchill, MP; I thoroughly endorse this approach which should help to set the record straight and I recommend that the full answer be given as soon as possible.
Question (Mr Winston Churchill)

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence the latest state of the South Atlantic Fund, what disbursements have so far been made and if he will make a statement.

Answer (Mr Jerry Wiggin)

I have consulted the Trustees and they are grateful for this opportunity to place on record some of the facts about the work of the South Atlantic Fund. They are glad of the opportunity to correct some recent misleading press reports about the conduct of the Fund.

The Fund was established as a holding fund which would disburse money through existing Charities. Subsequently it was registered as a Charitable Trust (following guidelines issued after the Falkland Disaster) and the Trust Deed reflects the policy of using the existing expertise and machinery of Service Charities to achieve the Fund's principal aim of alleviating suffering. Thus many individuals who have received help may not appreciate that the money they have received originated from the South Atlantic Fund. The Trustees quickly transferred £1.5 M to Service Charities so that they had funds available to relieve immediately
any suffering that came to their notice. They have applied this money to assist people in many ways, such as moving house, meeting educational expenses, expenses of visiting the injured in hospital, and the provision of suitably modified cars. Additionally some two hundred charities were contacted and invited to give immediate assistance whenever required and subsequently to seek reimbursement.

The Trustees anticipated that assessing the long term needs of the bereaved and injured comprehensively and compassionately could take some time as the services would not wish to hurry or press individuals to come to terms with their situation and to decide how they wished to live their future lives. Interim grants totalling £1.9M were therefore made through appropriate charities to the bereaved to meet their immediate needs pending completion of the longer term assessments, which are being conducted comprehensively, compassionately and as expeditiously as possible. The Trustees are very conscious of the wish for speed and confidentiality in reaching settlements. Specialist charities such as BLESMA and St Dunstans are being consulted.
The Trustees also informed me that compassionate medical assessments have been conducted of those most seriously injured and interim grants totaling some £350,000 have been made to help them over the rehabilitation period, again through other Charities. The Trustees continue to fund interim awards on a personal and confidential basis and stress that they have so far funded only a small fraction of what will be disbursed over the next four months.

To date donations to the Fund amount to the magnificent sum of £13.8M. The Trustees have already announced that the Fund is now at a level where-in conjunction with the principal Service and associated Charities, it is able to make a substantial contribution towards meeting the needs of all those who have suffered, or could suffer in the future, as a result of the operations in the South Atlantic. They recognise that a number of fundraising activities are still underway and contributions will continue to be gratefully received. However, now that the needs of those who suffered as a result specifically
of the South Atlantic operations have been so generously
provided for, it is hoped that support will return to the
established Service and associated Charities whose work continues
undiminished across a wide field of need.
The South Atlantic Fund

The Prime Minister has seen your letter of 24 November.

Mrs. Thatcher has commented:

"I do not think that this is enough. People contributed to the Fund in the expectation that a considerable number of capital sums would be paid so that people did not have to apply for each need to be met. We are coming up to Christmas and money is needed at such a time. Criticism will mount and in my view rightly so."

I should be grateful if you could arrange for the Prime Minister's points to be considered and for further advice to be submitted.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A J COLES

Derek Piper, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.
In your letter of 16th November to Richard Mottram you referred to the briefing we had provided that day for Prime Minister's Question Time, on the South Atlantic Fund. The Prime Minister had not been happy with the line that there is no need for the Trustees to pay out a capital sum now to those injured in the Falklands campaign. The Prime Minister asked for my Secretary of State's views on this.

In fact the Trustees of the South Atlantic Fund always intended to make interim awards (where appropriate) to those who were injured as soon as medical assessments could be completed. The Trustees have now considered this further and have decided to make interim payments to the more seriously injured pending the assessment of their long-term needs. As a result of this decision sums of between £2,000 and £20,000 have now been paid to the 73 most seriously injured. The total sum involved is £345,000. and the payments are calculated on the basis of medical assessment of the severity of the injury and of the likely immediate need. In all cases these payments will be less than the final payments which will be made when the assessments of long-term need, which are now underway, are completed.

The Chairman of the Trustees is satisfied that the process of assessing the needs of all the others injured is continuing as quickly as circumstances and resources permit. All cases of need that have arisen so far have been dealt with speedily and if any arise before final awards are made they too will be similarly treated urgently by the Fund.

As regards those Servicemen and others who were only very slightly injured and who recovered fully and rejoined their units after only a few days recuperation, the Trustees of the Fund do not consider it appropriate or necessary to make interim payments. All such cases are, however, being included in the current review assessing long-term needs and it is expected that, when these assessments are complete, everyone concerned will receive some payment from the Fund.  

A J Coles Esq
My Secretary of State was glad to learn of the Trustees' decision to make interim payments to those most seriously injured. So far as the others are concerned Mr Nott believes that we should press on as quickly as possible with the necessary assessments to allow final awards to be paid, and is inclined to think that in the meantime we should accept the Trustees' judgement, in the light of the expert advice they are receiving, on the requirement for further interim payments. An exception to this concerns Servicemen who were injured but who choose to leave the Service. There are, for example, two Welsh Guardsmen whose normal period of service is coming to an end this month and who are not continuing to serve. They are to be given interim payments of £1,000 and £700 respectively. There is also one Private in 3 Para who received a comparatively minor injury (a wound to his left hand) which would probably not have prevented him being found alternative employment within the Army but who chose to be medically discharged this week. This soldier's long-term needs are being assessed but he too received an interim award of £1,000 from the South Atlantic Fund when he left.

There is nothing in this letter on which the Prime Minister should not draw if this is raised with her in the House, except for the detailed amounts of money being paid to Servicemen which would not normally be disclosed.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

[Handwritten note]

(D T PIPER)
FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Thank you for your letter of 23 November. The Prime Minister agrees that the messages to President Nyerere and the Sultan of Oman should be despatched.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Thank you for your message regarding the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Falkland Islands — a matter which Allan MacEachen and I discussed with Francis Pym when he was here and which our officials in Ottawa, London and New York have reviewed at length.

We fully share your own well-founded concerns regarding the use of force to settle international disputes, a position we have made clear to Argentina and other nations, both by our actions and our words.

When I wrote to you last June, I mentioned that the manner in which the longer term problems regarding the status and security of the Falklands are solved would have important implications for the relations of your allies with Argentina and other Latin American countries and indeed for long-term peace and stability in the region. It continues to be our hope that Britain and Argentina will eventually be able to resolve their differences over the islands. Thus, we have attempted to maintain a dialogue with the new leaders of Argentina in order to encourage them to make a public commitment that this question would be dealt with by peaceful means only. We shall continue our endeavours to persuade present and future leaders of Argentina to abide by the rules of international law and not resort to force as was done so unwisely last spring.

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London
Regarding the United Nations resolution itself, we would have much preferred that it not come forward this year, so soon after the conflict. We appreciate the special problems that this may have created for you. Unfortunately however, the resolution sponsored by 20 Latin American countries did come forward and while we did not discuss the text of the resolution with the Latin Americans in any formal way, we did tell the Argentines that in its initial form, the resolution contained the same elements which had given us difficulties in past resolutions and thus would lead us to abstain on the vote.

In response to these and similar views, Argentina produced a new text which, I must tell you frankly, removed many of these objectionable elements. It also strongly suggested that the present government of Argentina was attempting to distance itself from its discredited predecessor by adopting a much more realistic approach to the Falklands issue. What was particularly significant, in my view, was that the new text contained a reaffirmation of United Nations principles regarding the non-use of force in international relations and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means.

In reaching our position on the matter, we felt it necessary to take this situation into account, as well as the importance of our growing relations with our Latin American neighbours.

We also felt it important to take fully into consideration our understanding of, and sympathy with, your serious concern with this matter and the importance which your government attached to the vote on the issue.

We thus concluded that in the light of all circumstances, we should abstain on the vote and, as you know, this was the position taken by our delegation.

Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.

Yours sincerely, and best wishes.

[Signature]
Prime Minister

You may like to look at

at OD FAF meeting folder
tonight - since you will have

more time than on Wednesday

right.

A. F. C. 13/11
PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

OD(FAF): Falkland Islands - Civilian Rehabilitation

BACKGROUND

Ministers agreed on 6th July (OD(FAF)(82) 2nd Meeting) to make available an initial allocation of up to £10 million on a special account for rehabilitation in the Falklands. It was agreed that the money should be found where possible from the existing Aid programme, but that the bulk of it should come if necessary from the Contingency Reserve. Arrangements to this effect were subsequently agreed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chief Secretary, Treasury.

2. In his minute to you of 22nd November, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explains that the £10 million are now fully committed; the main categories of expenditure are set out in paragraph 2 of his minute. He proposes that an additional £5 million should be allocated for further rehabilitation work, the major element of which would be repair work on public utilities (water supply, sewage, roads, telephones, hangars and electricity supplies). The remainder would comprise a number of smaller projects including the replacement of facilities at Port Stanley needed to meet military requirements in the medium term (the school hostel and part of the school, some of the hospital accommodation and public meeting halls).

3. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary makes no specific proposals as to how this additional expenditure (which will fall in this and the next two financial years) might be funded, but says that he will wish to take account of it in discussing the funding of other Falklands commitments - i.e., the development aid package outlined in OD(FAF)(82) 22. Allowance has been made for it in the consolidated statement of future expenditure on the Falklands contained in OD(FAF)(82) 23.

HANDLING

4. You could invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to speak to his minute. He may ask Mr. Onslow to comment on the rehabilitation programme as a whole in the light of his visit to the Islands. It will be important to establish how far the additional rehabilitation work
proposed (and hence its funding) should take priority over the economic development measures recommended in OD(FAF)(82) 22. (The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is likely to argue that rehabilitation should be a first charge on whatever funds may be available.)

CONCLUSIONS
5. Subject to the discussion, the Sub-Committee could be guided to agree that a further £5 million should be allocated on special account to civilian rehabilitation on the Falkland Islands, over and above the amount approved for economic development under the preceding item; that the funding of the £5 million for rehabilitation should be agreed between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Chief Secretary, Treasury, in the context of their discussion of the funding arrangements for the development aid package discussed under the previous item; and that the same principle should apply as in the case of the initial £10 million, namely that the money should be found from the Contingency Reserve to the extent that it cannot be met from savings in the Aid programme.

23rd November 1982

A D S GOODAIL
PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982
(OD(FAF)(82) 22 and 23)

BACKGROUND

Ministers last considered Lord Shackleton's Report on 6th September 1982, immediately prior to its publication (OD(FAF)(82) 5th Meeting). After examining a preliminary commentary on the Report by officials, Ministers asked for detailed recommendations in due course on the implementation of the Report's proposals; and for a comprehensive estimate of the actual and potential cost to public funds of all Falklands-related expenditure. The note by officials circulated under OD(FAF)(82) 22 meets the first of these remits; that circulated under OD(FAF)(82) 23 meets the second.

2. Only the first of these notes contains questions for decision; the second is intended primarily for background, and many of the figures it contains are still uncertain or speculative. It does however highlight the fact that the expenditure proposed for economic development (£10.5 million) and rehabilitation (£15 million) is relatively insignificant beside the combined cost of the garrison and airfield over the same period, which is provisionally estimated at £2,000 million.

3. The note circulated under OD(FAF)(82) 23 stresses that the development package now recommended would not be justified on normal economic criteria: its objective is social and political as well as economic, namely "to generate and sustain a level of useful economic activity for a civilian population of about the present size, or preferably slightly larger, and to provide that population with a secure and reasonably stable social framework". Ministers will wish to decide whether this is a valid and justified objective.

4. Of the main Shackleton proposals, only that for a system of compulsory land transfer is rejected by officials outright; the related proposal for the establishment of a Falkland Islands Development Agency (FIDA) is accepted. Officials prefer a gradualist approach to land transfer, with FIDA acquiring land as it becomes available on the open market and selling
or leasing it on soft terms. This involves considerably less expenditure (initially £0.5 million) than was envisaged by Shackleton under a system of compulsory transfer (£7.9 million). On offshore fisheries, officials in effect make no recommendation. They point out that Lord Shackleton's long-term proposal for an exploratory fishing programme is dependent on the Government's readiness to establish a 200 mile fisheries limit round the Falklands. This has wide implications and is being examined separately. Officials are also a good deal more cautious than Shackleton on tourism, and do not favour building the hotel which Shackleton recommended.

5. Shackleton recommendations endorsed (with some modifications) by officials include significant investment (£7 million) in the improvement and diversification of agriculture; measures to encourage the establishment of a small knitwear industry; and initial steps towards the establishment of inshore fisheries. On infrastructure, officials make recommendations for a new jetty (£7.7 million), new roads (£7.5 million) and other projects. The total developmental package identified would cost some £31 million over the next 5 to 6 years. Ministers are invited to endorse this package in broad terms; detailed implementation of the measures proposed would be for the Overseas Development Administration and FIDA.

6. The statement by the No. 10 Press Office welcoming the Shackleton Report on publication said that in addition to obtaining the views of the islanders the Government hoped for a wide measure of interest and public debate of the Report, which would be taken into account before final conclusions were reached. The Report has not yet been debated in either House of Parliament: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office expect a House of Commons debate before the Christmas Recess, but it is not yet clear whether it will relate specifically to the Shackleton Report or deal with Falkland Islands issues generally. Ministers will not want to prejudge the outcome of the forthcoming parliamentary debates; at the same time they will presumably want to be able, in the course of those debates, to give a considered reaction to the Shackleton recommendations and a clear indication of the Government's plans for the development of the Islands. It would therefore seem desirable to reach a preliminary consensus at the present meeting as to which recommendations are suitable for implementation, and on the overall size of the development package, but with the understanding that decisions will be subject to confirmation in the light of the parliamentary debates.
7. The Minister for Overseas Development and the Chief of the Defence Staff have been invited to attend.

HANDLING

8. You may like to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to open the discussion: he will probably want to ask Mr Onslow, as the Minister with immediate responsibility for Falkland affairs, to say how far the recommendations in the officials' note tally with his own views following his visit to the Islands in October. Points to establish in the subsequent discussion are -

   a. Is the central objective defined in paragraph 6 of the officials' note attached to OD(FAF)(82) 22 the right one? Is it right to accept that strict economic considerations should not apply to the development of the Falkland Islands? (It is because of doubts on this score that Treasury officials have expressly reserved their Ministers' position: you may therefore like to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer to comment).

   b. In the package of measures proposed by officials, is the balance between income-creating and infrastructure projects about right?

   c. Is it right to go ahead with the establishment of a Falkland Islands Development Agency as proposed (paragraph 9a and Annex B of the officials' note)?

   d. Does the Sub-Committee endorse the gradualist approach to land transfer recommended by officials in preference to Lord Shackleton's more radical proposals for compulsory purchase?

   e. Is any of the other measures proposed by officials objectionable? Is anything missing? Is the package recommended sufficient to enable Ministers to refute any charges that important parts of the Shackleton Report are being shelved or ignored?

   f. Is the total financial outlay proposed (£30.5 million over 6 years as against Lord Shackleton's very approximate costing of £30-35 million for the proposals in his Report) of about the right order, especially in relation to proposed expenditure on the garrison?
CONCLUSIONS

9. Subject to the discussion, you might guide the Sub-Committee to -
   a. Endorse the special developmental criteria for the Falkland Islands defined in paragraph 6 of the officials' note.
   b. Endorse the package of measures proposed in the officials' note provisionally, as the basis for the Government's response to the Shackleton Report in forthcoming parliamentary debates.
   c. Invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to begin discussing funding arrangements with the Chief Secretary, Treasury.

23rd November 1982

A D S GOODALL
Dear John,

Falklands at the General Assembly

In your letter of 12 November you asked for a draft message from the Prime Minister to the Sultan of Oman. You subsequently asked me by telephone for a draft message to President Nyerere of Tanzania in response to his letter of 8 November (copy attached for ease of reference).

I attach two draft messages in the form of telegrams to Dar es Salaam and Muscat.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 464: FALKLANDS AT UNGA
1. Please convey to President Nyerere the following reply from the Prime Minister. Begins:

Thank you for your letter of 8 November. I was grateful for the sympathy shown by Tanzania during the Falklands crisis, and I know how strongly you feel about self-determination. As you know, following the recent General Assembly debate, more than 60 countries refused to lend their support to Argentina, among them more than two-thirds of the Commonwealth. I will not conceal from you my disappointment that Tanzania was not among that number. While I recognise that you wished to consider the implications of Tanzania's vote for various African issues, I very much hope that the reservation expressed in your message does not mean that you consider the principles of self-determination not to apply to the Falkland Islands.

Please accept, in turn, my kind regards and warm personal
<<<<<

wishes.

I look forward to meeting you again at the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which is shortly to be prepared by the Meeting of Commonwealth Senior Officials in Arusha.

ENDS

PYM

NNNN
FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE MUSCAT
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
FALKLANDS AT UNGA

1. The Prime Minister wishes to thank the Sultan of Oman for his country's negative vote. Please convey to him the following message.
BEGINNS I should like to convey to you my very great appreciation of Oman's recent vote against the Latin American resolution on the Falkland Islands at the UN General Assembly. I can assure you that this decision was most warmly received in this country and I am most grateful to you for taking it. ENDS

PYM
NNNN

NNNN ends telegram
BLANK

File number
Dept

Drafted by (Block capitals)
PRIVATE SECRETARY

TelephoneNumber 233 4641

Authorised for despatch

Commen reference Time of despatch

Falkland Islands General
FCO UND
PRIME MINISTER

PNQ AND STATEMENTS

This afternoon John Nott answered a PNQ from Teddy Taylor about the French sale of Exocets to Argentina, Patrick Jenkin made a statement on the informal industry council on steel, and Nigel Lawson made a statement about the Britoil offer for sale. I think Patrick Jenkin had the easiest ride. John Nott faced some outrage from the Government backbenches, and the Opposition were determined to shout and hoot at Nigel Lawson.

Exocets

John Nott argued that our defence capability in the Falklands, and especially our early warning systems, were sufficient to ensure their protection. The Government regretted the French action since there was no formal cessation of hostilities, and our views had been made clear to the French. On the other hand, they could be said to be simply honouring long-standing contracts. On the sale of Rolls Royce engines to the FRG for frigates destined for Argentina, Mr. Nott said that the Government would naturally be concerned if these frigates were to be delivered soon. But again this was a long-standing contract with a major NATO ally and trading partner. All Governments, including the last Labour Government, had traded in arms. It would be very difficult to control this trade through NATO, as Mr. Silkin suggested.

Tam Dalyell raised the old story of the seven hour telephone conversation between an Aero-Spatiale executive and the Argentines, but Mr. Nott said that these reports had never been confirmed, and that he was satisfied that France had supported us fully over the Falklands.

Towards the end of the questioning, Frank Allaun asked Mr. Nott why he regretted the French decision to export Exocets, while at the same time allowing the export of Rolls Royce engines. He also argued that "long-standing contracts" like these had surely / been
been overtaken by the hostilities. In answer, Mr. Nott repeated that these were long-standing contracts, and that the FRG had been told we regretted their contract to supply frigates. This was not very well received by the House. Peter Viggers repeated that there was no end to the hostilities, and said that we must ensure that the missiles did not arrive. Bernard Braine made the same point. Mr. Nott argued that he had only seen reports of missiles being shipped, and that these had not been confirmed.

Steel

Mr. Jenkin was committed to make this statement because the Opposition had called for a statement, if not a debate, on last week's closures. Stan Orme, leading for the Opposition, said that Mr. Jenkin's statement was merely words and no action. The UK was bearing the brunt of the closures in Europe. Community imports now accounted for two-thirds of total steel imports into the UK. Third country imports were growing. The industry needed protection. He called for an assurance that there would be no closure of any of the five integrated steel plants. He urged the Government to provide money to maintain capacity in the steel industry.

Patrick Jenkin pointed out that the meeting last week had been an informal council, and that it was not in the business of making firm proposals for action. It had, however, allowed him to say that the UK would make no more sacrifices in meeting capacity reductions in Europe. The Commission would be putting forward formal proposals shortly on the enforcement of price rules. The Foreign Affairs Council had agreed a negotiating mandate on voluntary restraint arrangements on imports from third countries. He would not be drawn on closures. He would make a statement before Christmas. The industry needed to be competitive, and it was the function of the BSC Board to restore the Corporation to viability. He would not stand in the way of capacity reductions, unless these raised a question mark over the future of the five major plants. The Government would have to be involved in any decision on these plants.

/ Most of
Most of the questioning concentrated on the inadequacy of the Commission's response to the problems facing the steel industries, and the recent closures at Craig Neuk and Round Oak were given as examples. There were also accusations that other members of the community were cheating on the rules, particularly on prices. But, to some extent, the House recognised that they could not have expected firm decisions from last week's meeting.

Britoil

Merlyn Rees said that Amersham had been over-subscribed by 23 times, and that Britoil had been under-subscribed by 70%. This showed that Mr. Lawson did not understand the workings of the free market. Mr. Lawson had claimed that Britoil was a strong soundly based company, but clearly the City did not agree with him. The small shareholders who had bought shares would lose from this sale. It was an absurd way to value the nation's assets. There should be a Select Committee inquiry and a full debate, and Nigel Lawson should resign.

Nigel Lawson had to struggle to make himself heard over the hooting of the Opposition, which became all the louder when he said he would not resort to abuse. He said he would welcome a PAC inquiry. Less than a week ago the Opposition had said the sale would be "a City rip-off". Now they complained when the shares were left with the underwriters. There was always a risk in an offer for sale. That is why he had gone to such pains to have this one underwritten. He quoted Merlyn Rees as having said "There is no need for underwriting. It would not matter in the short run if all the shares were not sold". There were always changes of sentiment in the nine or ten days between the announcement of the sale and the closing date for applications. He quoted Lord Kearton who considered that the sale was "not managed badly at all".

In questions, the Opposition simply continued to paint the sale as a failure, and called for Parliamentary scrutiny. The Government backbenches accused the Opposition of having caused the under-subscription by talking down the sale; they drew / attention
attention to Sheikh Yamani's unhelpful remarks, and pointed out that a fixed price sale would probably have been under-subscribed as well.

Merlyn Rees wound up by claiming that he had never objected to the underwriting, which allowed Mr. Lawson to have another go at him. He accused the Opposition of hypocrisy: they had been horrified at the prospect of "a City rip-off", now they were horrified when the City had itself paid a good price for the taxpayer.

22 November 1982
PM/82/101

PRIME MINISTER

Falkland Islands: Civilian Rehabilitation

1. OD(FAF) meeting on 6 July agreed to make available an initial allocation of up to £10 million for rehabilitation in the Falklands. At the forthcoming OD(FAF) meeting on 25 November we shall be considering an economic development programme for the Islands against the background of decisions on our military commitment and its costs. At this stage, colleagues may find it helpful to have a brief report of the use made of the £10 million rehabilitation grant. It may be convenient to consider potential further rehabilitation requirements in the course of that meeting.

Existing Rehabilitation Programme

2. The £10 million grant is now committed to the first round of rehabilitation requirements. The main categories of commitment are as follows:

- **Housing** £6.0m
  (includes supply and erection of 54 prefabricated furnished houses, with necessary plant, etc; 10 mobile homes; replacement furnishing kits for 24 damaged houses; connection of local services to new housing).

- **Three new aircraft for Falkland Islands Government Air Service** £0.6m

- **Replacement supplies of fuel, building materials, plant equipment and tools** £2.2m

- **Reimbursement for work undertaken by Royal Engineers** £0.2m

/Estimate
Estimate for freight plus agents' charges £1.0m

TOTAL £10.0m

Payments totalling £2.42 million had been made as at 15 November. Payments of the order of £3 million are expected during December. Spending on the items listed above is forecast to reach £8.6 million in the current financial year, leaving a balance of about £1.4 million in 1983/84.

3. The individual departments of the Falkland Islands Government are just completing the preparation of inventories of lost equipment and stores. Present indications are that claims for replacement will total about £0.5 million.

4. The major proposed further expenditure on rehabilitation will relate to repair work which has yet to be undertaken on a number of major utilities (this is separate from proposed expenditure on further infrastructural development, covered in OD(FAF)(82)22). Present best estimates of cost and phasing are set out below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(units: £m)</th>
<th>1982/83</th>
<th>1983/84</th>
<th>1984/85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water supplies</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads (Stanley)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangars</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.235</td>
<td>1.540</td>
<td>1.160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/5. In addition
5. In addition there is a range of other smaller projects which are urgently required for the maintenance of essential services and social facilities. These include replacements for certain facilities at Port Stanley which appear to be needed to meet military requirements for the medium term future - for example, the school hostel building and part of the school, a large section of the accommodation in Stanley hospital and all halls/meeting rooms suitable for public entertainment. As an immediate response to this situation, the Falkland Islands Government will look to HMG to meet the cost of renting possible alternative hostel accommodation for the school year commencing in March and providing a prefabricated building to serve for public meetings and entertainment. They will also wish to propose the rehabilitation and extension of the hospital and the schools. It is not yet possible to make precise estimates or projected phasing for this expenditure but the total cost of these additional projects will be in the region of £1.0 million.

6. The needs identified above will absorb at least £5.0 million. I therefore invite colleagues to agree in principle that we should provide a further £5.0 million for civilian rehabilitation in the Falkland Islands. Expenditure is likely to fall in the current and the two following financial years, and I shall wish to take this into account when we discuss the funding of my Falklands commitments in OD(FAF).

7. This will not necessarily represent the final bid for civilian rehabilitation, but I have included all those items where there is a real present expectation of a valid bid against rehabilitation funds.

8. I am
8. I am sending copies of this minute to members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
22 November 1982
CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 19194QZ NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FC0
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1109 OF 19 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

FOLLOWING FROM PETRIE IN ABSENCE FROM PARIS OF AMBASSADOR.

YOUR TELNO 646: FRENCH ARMS FOR ARGENTINA.

1. GUTMANN BEING UNAVAILABLE I CALLED THIS EVENING ON THE
   DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE QUAI AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED.

2. MARTIN TOOK NOTE. HE RECALLED THE TERMS OF CHEYSSON'S LETTER
   OF 3 SEPTEMBER TO YOU (FCO TELNO 305 TO PARIS) AND SAID THAT THE
   PRESENT DELIVERIES REPRESENTED PART FULFILMENT OF CONTRACTS
   PREVIOUSLY SIGNED AND PAID FOR. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, GO
   BEYOND THE UNDERTAKINGS WHICH CHEYSSON HAD THEN GIVEN THAT THE
   EXECUTION OF THESE CONTRACTS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A "PRUDENT
   AND PROGRESSIVE MANNER" AND THAT THE QUESTION OF ANY FUTURE
   CONTRACTS WOULD BE MOST CAREFULLY EXAMINED ON A CASE BY
   CASE BASIS. I REPLIED THAT HE WOULD SEE THAT THE VIEWS OF THE
   BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CHANGED EITHER, AND THAT HIS REFERENCE
   TO FURTHER DELIVERIES MADE IT MORE RATHER THAN LESS IMPORTANT
   THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD TAKE US INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR POLICY.
AND PROGRESSIVE MANNER" AND THAT THE QUESTION OF ANY FUTURE
CONTRACTS WOULD BE MOST CAREFULLY EXAMINED ON A CASE BY
CASE BASIS. I REPLIED THAT HE WOULD SEE THAT THE VIEWS OF THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CHANGED EITHER, AND THAT HIS REFERENCE
TO FURTHER DELIVERIES MADE IT MORE RATHER THAN LESS IMPORTANT
THAT THE FRENCH SHOULD TAKE US INTO THEIR CONFIDENCE. THEIR POLICY
AT PRESENT SEEMED ONLY TOO LIKELY TO LEAD TO FURTHER DISAGREEABLE
EXCHANGES BETWEEN US.

FRETWELL

NNNN

L

SENT RECF AT 19 2000Z AB/RJ

OK FOR FINLS KK
RESTRICTED

OO PARIS
GRS 390
RESTRICTED
FM FCO 191530Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 647 OF 19 NOVEMBER
AND TO MODUK
MY TELNO 646: AM39S FOR ARGENTINA
1. IN CARRYING OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS IN MY TUR YOU SHOULD
ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH ARE AWARE OF THE FULL PRESS LINE BEING
TAKEN BY NEWS DEPARTMENT, IE:
'THese ARE Part O\nOF AN EX\nISTS CONTRACT FOR WHICH
Licences had AL\nREADY BEEN ISSUED. WE ARE NATURALLY DISAPPOINTED
THAT DELIVERIES HAVE BEEN RESUMED, PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE
OF A DEFINITIVECESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON THE PART OF ARGENTINA.
AS WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID, HOWEVER, IT IS FOR EACH COUNTRY TO
DEcIDE ITS OWN POLICY ON ARMS SALES.'
2. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, NO 10 TOLD THE LOBBY
THIS MORNING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NO COMMENT ON THE EXPORT
OF EXCELS AND SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT BY FRANCE TO ARGENTINA.
THE COMMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HER ON EARLY NEWS BROADCASTS WERE
'LURID': THE GOVERNMENT POSITION WAS THE ONE STATED BY THE FCO
SPOKESMAN (PARA 1 ABOVE).
UNATTRIBUTABLY NO 10 HAVE REFERRED TO THE FACTS THAT THIS IS A
LONG-STANDING CONTRACT, AND THAT THE FRENCH ARE WELL AWARE OF
OUR VIEWS. THEY HAVE CONCEDED THAT THE MATTER WAS NOT RAISED
AT THE ANGLO-FRENCH SUMMIT BECAUSE OUR VIEWS WERE ALREADY WELL
KNOWN. THEY HAVE DECLINED TO ANSWER A QUESTION ON FUTURE
CONTRA\nCTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WAS HYPOTHETICAL AND CONCLUDED
BY AFFIRMING THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD BEEN LOYAL AND
HELPFUL DURING THE CONFLICT. ON YOUR APPROACH TO THE FRENCH,
THEY ARE SPEAKING AS IN PARA 3 OF MY TUR.
3. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE FRENCH THAT, SPEAKING ON BBC'S
'WORLD AT ONE' TODAY, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID:
'WE HAVE ASKED ALL OUR ALLIES NOT TO DELIVER ARMS UNTIL WE HAD
GOT AN UNDERTAKING FROM THE ARGENTINES THAT HOSTILITIES HAD
PERMANENTLY CEASED. YOU SEE, THEY HAVE NEVER ADMITTED THEY HAVE PERMANENTLY CEASED. THEY HAVE IN FACT STOPPED AT THE MOMENT, BUT THEY HAVE NEVER SAID HOSTILITIES ARE PERMANENTLY AT AN END. NOW, AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE A VERY BIG GARRISON AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A BIG GARRISON DOWN THERE BECAUSE WE MUST KEEP ENOUGH PEOPLE THERE IN SHIPS, IN AIRCRAFT AND IN MEN AND EQUIPMENT BOTH TO DETER, AND, IF NECESSARY, TO DEFEAT. AND WE SHOULD FEEL VERY DEEPLY HURT, I THINK, IF THE ARMAMENTS OF OUR ALLIES WERE USED AGAINST US. ANYTHING OF COURSE IS A THREAT UNTIL THEY HAVE AGREED PERMANENTLY TO STOP HOSTILITIES WHICH THEY HAVE NOT.'

PYM

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CABINET OFFICE

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FAIRLAND ISLANDS

2
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DSKBY 1917002
FM FCO 191215Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 646 OF 19 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

FRENCH ARMS FOR ARGENTINA
1. PLEASE TELL THE QUAI AT A SUITABLY HIGH LEVEL THAT THE PRIME MINISTER AND I ARE NATURALLY DISAPPOINTED THAT THE FRENCH HAVE HANDED OVER AM39 AND SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT, PARTICULARLY WHEN ARGENTINA HAS STILL NOT ACCEPTED A DEFINITIVE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES.
2. YOU SHOULD ADD MY STRONG HOPE THAT, HAVING RELEASED THESE ITEMS ORDERED IN 1981, THE FRENCH WILL NOT ACCEPT NEW ORDERS FROM ARGENTINA FOR NEW AM39S OR SUPER ETENDARDS NOR FOR OTHER SENSITIVE WEAPONS. IF THERE ARE SUCH SALES IN THE FUTURE, REACTIONS HERE WILL INEVITABLY BE STRONGER. YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS TO THE FRENCH THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THEIR TELLING US WHAT THEY ARE UP TO OVER ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA (FURTHER BACKGROUND IN ADDENDUM TO BRIEF FOR ANGLO FRENCH SUMMIT).
3. WE ARE CONFIRMING TO THE PRESS THAT YOU ARE CONTINUING TO MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN TO THE FRENCH. YOUR APPROACH WILL NOT BE DESCRIBED AS A PROTEST AND I AM NOT CALLING IN YOUR OPPOSITE NUMBER HERE. FULLER PRESS LINE IS BEING TELEGRAPHED SEPARATELY.

PYM

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UNCLASSIFIED
DESKB 1915002
FM WASHINGTON 191431Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3755 OF 19 NOVEMBER
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK, OAS POSTS, INCLUDING NASSAU, EXCLUDING BUENOS AIRES

OAS/FALKLANDS

1. SUMMARY. OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY APPROVED THE FALKLANDS RESOLUTION 21-0-7. UNCHARACTERISTICALLY BRIEF DEBATE WITH ROUTINE CONDEMNATION OF UK QUOTE COLONIALISM UNQUOTE. NO CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEANS ABSTAINED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR UN VOTES.

2. DETAILS. THE RESOLUTION WAS CARRIED: 21 VOTES FOR (LATINS PLUS GRENADA, U.S.), 0 VOTES AGAINST, 7 ABSTENTIONS (ANTIGUA/BARBUDA, BAHAMAS, BARBADOS, DOMINICA, ST LUCIA, JAMAICA, TRINIDAD AND TOBA- GO). ST VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES AND EL SALVADOR WERE UNINTENTIONALLY ABSENT.
3. FOREIGN MINISTER LANARI INTRODUCED THE RESOLUTION USING AN ABRIDGED VERSION OF HIS UN SPEECH. HE DEALT ESPECIALLY ON BRITISH QUOTE COLONIALISM UNQUOTE, (A THEME TAKEN UP BY OTHER SPEAKERS) AND SAID THAT THE UK MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS THREATENED THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. HE CITED AS EXAMPLES A NUMBER OF MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE ZONE SURROUNDING THE ISLANDS IN RECENT MONTHS.

4. 17 LATIN CO-SPONSORS MADE BRIEF SUPPORTIVE STATEMENTS. A NUMBER (PARTICULARLY THE DOMINICA REPUBLIC), DWELT ON THE NEED TO RESOLVE DISPUTES PEACEFULLY, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT TAKEN AS CRITICISM OF ARGENTINA.

5. IN EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE, THE ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEANS SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO SUPPORT THE RESOLUTION SINCE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR VOTES IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON A SIMILAR RESOLUTION. DOMINICA IMPLICITLY CRITICISED ARGENTINA FOR ITS INVASION. THE UNITED STATES’ EXPLANATION OF VOTE INCLUDED THE QUALIFIERS WE HAD BEEN PROMISED (PARAS 3 AND 4 OF MY TELNO 3713) (FULL TEXT TO F C O ONLY).


WRIGHT

NNNN
Mr. Tam Dalyell, MP

The Prime Minister agrees with the reply which Mr. Nott proposes to send to Mr. Dalyell's letter of 16 November about RAF Fort Austin.

D.T. Piper, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1982

THE FALKLANDS CRISIS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Your letter of 16 November enclosed the text of an article which Sir Anthony Parsons proposes to publish in the January issue of "International Affairs".

We have no objection to the publication of this article but would like to see some changes to the text.

On page 2, we should like the sentence "Meanwhile I had been warned by London that an invasion of the Falklands might be imminent" to be deleted. As you know, there is great interest at present in the sequence of events which led to the Government being aware of the likelihood of an Argentine invasion. This is bound to be revived when the Franks Report is published - and that could be in January. While the sentence concerned need not necessarily contribute to the argument, some readers might be inclined to investigate when precisely Sir Anthony Parsons received the warning that an invasion was imminent. I note that, according to his narrative, this can only have been on 31 March but even that does not dispose of the matter because there is interest in the precise time on that day when the facts became available.

On page 3, in the middle paragraph, we should like the words "tactical" and "and avoid involvement in the merits of the dispute over sovereignty on which we could not expect to secure majority support" to be deleted. Both of these could lead to unfavourable comment by people who are inclined to argue that the Government's attitude on sovereignty has not always been sufficiently robust.

On page 5, could the sentence "At the outset .... Jordan" be deleted? Given the Prime Minister's relations with, in particular King Hussein, and his ready response to her request that he should vote for the resolution in question, I do not think she would want it put about by, as it were, a member of her staff that there was a time when we doubted whether Jordan would be with us. Nor would she wish to indicate that we doubted others who voted with us.

/On page 9,
On page 9, the reference to "the Inner Cabinet" should be deleted. The sentence could simply read "That weekend in London and at Chequers our final detailed position on the draft agreement was worked out".

I should be grateful if you could pass on these points to Sir Anthony Parsons.

John Holmes Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
PP COLOMBO

GRS 175
RESTRICTED
PM FCO 171550Z NOV 82
TO PRIORITY COLOMBO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 214 OF 17 NOVEMBER
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA

1. ON 4 NOVEMBER THE PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JAYEWARDENE VIA THE SRI LANKAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON.

BEGINs

'YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER DELIVERED TO ME YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING THE RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ON THE MATTER AND I HAVE DIRECTED MY DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO VOTE AGAINST THE RESOLUTION.' ENDS

2. PLEASE SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MRS THATCHER TO THE PRESIDENT IN REPLY.

BEGINs

'YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER DELIVERED TO ME ON 4 NOVEMBER YOUR REPLY TO MY MESSAGE ABOUT THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WHICH WAS VOTED ON LATER THAT DAY. SRI LANKA'S DECISION TO VOTE AGAINST THIS RESOLUTION IS MOST WARMLY APPRECIATED IN THIS COUNTRY AND I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE DECISION YOU TOOK.' ENDS

PJM

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FALKLAND ISLANDS

RESTRICTED
BRITISH NATIONALITY (FALKLAND ISLANDS) AMENDMENT BILL

Baroness Vickers has introduced a Bill (similar to those tabled last Session by Mr Kilroy-Silk and Lord Bruce of Donnington) to give British citizenship to everyone who has a connection with the Falkland Islands. Under the British Nationality Act 1981, most Falkland Islanders will in fact be British citizens but there are estimated to be about 400 whose connections with the United Kingdom are not close enough to give them the right of abode. Baroness Vickers' Bill would give them British citizenship. They already have freedom to enter the United Kingdom under an administrative concession which I announced last April.

There are drawbacks to allowing the Bill to pass. It would create an exception to the principle only recently enacted in the British Nationality Act 1981 that the United Kingdom should have a citizenship (British citizenship) confined to those with close connections with the United Kingdom while the dependent territories should have their own citizenship.

Moreover the Bill may well be seen as a precedent. A House of Lords Question has already been tabled about the Pitcairn Islanders. The inhabitants of St Helena are known to wish to have British citizenship. The Hong Kong government may be less eager to press for further concessions if they are to have their way on nomenclature in passports. There is nevertheless a substantial risk that Hong Kong supporters will try and insert a provision giving legal backing to that administrative concession. This could be damaging because it would be almost impossible to leave British Overseas
citizens out of any legislative declaration that particular categories of citizens were British nationals.

Despite these drawbacks, I do not see how the Government can be seen to be actively opposing Baroness Vickers' Bill, which will command widespread support among our supporters. Even lack of co-operation could be damaging to us. I therefore recommend that, while we should make clear the implications which the Bill has for the overall scheme of citizenship set out in the 1981 Act, we should not oppose the Bill. Indeed I think that we should go further and offer drafting assistance if the Bill is given a Second Reading. We should make it clear that we were only doing this on the basis that the Bill remained confined to Falkland Islanders' citizenship and was not widened to bring in anyone else. I do not envisage that we should offer Government time for the Bill when it reaches the Commons, but it could well be passed on the nod if we do not seek to block it.

The Bill is expected to have its Second Reading on Monday, 29 November, and I therefore propose to circulate a memorandum to Legislation Committee on Friday, 18 November recommending the line suggested in paragraph 4.

I am sending copies of this minute to the members of OD and L as well as to Sir Robert Armstrong and First Parliamentary Counsel.

17 November 1982
PRIME MINISTER

Sir Anthony Parsons

Tony Parsons wants to publish in "International Affairs" next January the attached article which deals with the Falklands crisis in the United Nations.

I see no objection to publication. But he will be by then a member of your staff here. In the attached letter to the Foreign Office I have suggested certain amendments.

Agree that the article may be published, subject to those amendments?

[Signature]

17 November 1982
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-3320032 218 6169

MO 5/21

17th November 1982

Dear Tom,

Following the exchange he had with my Secretary of State and subsequently with the Prime Minister during Questions yesterday about RAF Fort Austin, Tam Dalyell MP has now written the attached letter on the same subject, which he has copied to Lord Franks.

My Secretary of State does not propose to deal with any points of detail in his reply but feels that it should cover Mr Dalyell's allegation that there is an inconsistency between what the Prime Minister said to him during Questions on 26th October and what the Prime Minister and my Secretary of State said yesterday.

If the Prime Minister is content Mr Nott proposes to reply to Mr Dalyell on the lines of the attached draft.


A J Coles Esq

RESTRICTED
Thank you for your letter of 16th November about RFA Fort Austin.

I made it clear in the House that RFA Fort Austin sailed from Gibraltar on 29th March to replenish HMS Endurance. The Prime Minister also made this clear when you later raised the matter with her. I really cannot help it if you do not accept what we said – but it is the truth.

Nor can I understand why you are having difficulty reconciling what the Prime Minister and I said yesterday with what the Prime Minister said to you in the House on 26th October. It was made clear in the House on 30th March, following the illegal landing on South Georgia by a party of Argentine citizens, that HMS Endurance was being retained in the area for as long as necessary. It was against this background that RFA Fort Austin sailed to replenish HMS Endurance.

In her reply to you of 26th October, which you seem to regard as somehow inconsistent with all this, the Prime Minister was repeating that she had no warning before 31st March of the invasion of the Falkland Islands. I see no inconsistency here.

Since you copied your letter to Lord Franks I am doing the same.
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 205/82
UNP 040/14
General Distribution
UNITED NATIONS
16 November, 1982

THE FALKLANDS DEBATE AT THE 37TH SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY

United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the
United Nations at New York to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

SUMMARY

The despatch describes the four-month diplomatic battle which
culminated in the General Assembly’s adoption of a resolution on
the Falklands on 4 November and its implications for future British
policy on the Falklands at the UN (paragraph 1).

2. In June Mexico proposed that the Latin American
countries should take a joint initiative at the General Assembly for a resump-
tion of negotiations between the UK and Argentina. After some
misgivings, the Argentines accepted this idea (paragraphs 2–4).

3. It was decided that we should resist it to the hilt, both in
the Non-aligned Movement and at the General Assembly. We
would not table a draft resolution of our own but might table
spoiling amendments to an Argentine draft resolution (paragraphs
5–10).

4. We won two procedural skirmishes at the opening of the
General Assembly but were unable to block the election of Cuba
as Chairman of the Decolonisation Committee (paragraphs 11–14).

5. The Non-aligned Movement’s Ministerial meeting at the
beginning of October went well for us, thanks to the readiness of
the moderates to stand up to the Argentines (paragraphs 15 and 16).

6. The Argentines were prevailed upon to tone down the first
draft of their resolution but the version tabled on 1 October was
totally unacceptable to us (paragraphs 17 and 18).

7. We considered getting our friends to table an amendment
which would be unacceptable to the Argentines but would command
wide support amongst the membership at large. But there were
dangers in this course and it was decided to concentrate instead on
mustering as many No votes and abstentions as we could (para-
graphs 19–22).

8. Both we and the Argentines lobbied intensively. We hoped
for an American abstention but were less confident of the Ten.
We encountered good support in the Third World, especially the
Commonwealth. Under pressure of our lobbying the Argentines
further watered down their draft. President Reagan’s decision to
vote in favour was a major blow (paragraphs 23–29).
9. The debate in the General Assembly went well for us, although most speakers supported Argentina. The Falkland Island Councillors put up a good performance in the Fourth Committee (paragraphs 30–33).

10. The vote, taken on 4 November, was 90 for, 12 against and 52 abstentions. In UN terms this was a good result for us, though it would have been better but for the American defection (paragraphs 34–36).

11. For the future, we must continue to emphasise the principles on which our position is based and to take advantage of the Commonwealth which stood us in good stead on this occasion. We must resist any attempt by the Argentines to remove UN discussion of the Falklands from the Decolonisation context. We should bear in mind the possibility of splitting Latin American solidarity. Finally, we should consider next year whether we can give our friends something positive to vote for rather than asking them to vote against the “motherhood” principles in the Argentine draft (paragraphs 37–43).

(Confidential)

Sir,

New York,
16 November, 1982.

On 4 November 1982 the General Assembly adopted by 90 votes for, 12 against and 52 abstentions General Assembly resolution 37/9 which requests Argentina and the UK to resume negotiations for an early, peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands and asks the Secretary General to use his good offices to that end. The vote was the culmination of a diplomatic battle which had lasted for more than four months. This despatch contains an account of that battle and some thoughts on its implications for our future policy on the Falklands at the UN.

The Mexican initiative

2. After General Mendez’s surrender on 14 June, it was clear that we would soon come under pressure to negotiate with the defeated Argentines. It was equally clear that this would be totally unacceptable to the UK. We did not have to wait long. At a press conference on 23 June the Foreign Minister of Mexico urged that, at the forthcoming General Assembly, the Latin American countries should jointly propose negotiations between the UK and Argentina under UN auspices. This seems to have been a personal initiative of Sr. Castaneda. We did not like it and we told him so. At first the Argentines too were unhappy; they wanted a strong resolution which would characterise the Falklands as a colonial situation and endorse Argentina’s claim to sovereignty. But the Mexicans won them round to their initiative which was endorsed in a joint Argentine/Mexican communiqué on 12 July.

3. Thereafter the Argentines made the running, sending senior envoys round the capitals of South and Central America. They deliberately excluded the Caribbeans (except Cuba and Haiti) and the two continental Anglophones (Belize and Guyana). Even so, their task was not altogether easy. Several of the Foreign Ministries concerned told Her Majesty’s Representatives of their misgivings about what was proposed. Chile was especially reluctant. But by mid-August the Argentines had got the Foreign Ministers of all 18 Spanish-speaking countries, plus Brazil and Haiti, to sign a joint letter to the Secretary
General. This proposed the inscription of a new item entitled “Question of the Malvinas Islands” on the agenda of the 37th Regular Session of the General Assembly. It went on to say that the persistence of “this colonial situation in America” had led to serious armed conflict; the “countries of America” believed that negotiations should be held under UN auspices.

4. While the Argentine envoys were telling their fellow Latins of their moderation, their colleagues were singing a different tune elsewhere. Throughout July and August they raised the Falklands in every possible international forum. The summer meeting of the Economic and Social Council was treated to a series of vituperative statements, including allegations of “nuclear pollution” and “economic aggression”. The Argentines made much of the “illegality” of economic sanctions against Third World countries but with Commonwealth support we succeeded, by a procedural ploy, in preventing any vote being taken on a draft resolution to that effect. At the UNESCO conference on World Cultural Policies in Mexico City, however, Argentina did secure adoption of extreme resolutions on the “Elimination of Continued Colonial Situations” and on our alleged interference with Argentine “scientific activities” in the South Sandwich Islands. But we won a clear victory at the UN Committee of 24’s session in August when Councillors Cheek and Blake from the Falkland Islands defied a flood of Latin rhetoric with dignified and forceful statements about the Islanders’ right to determine their own future and the outrageous treatment they had received from the Argentine occupiers.

United Kingdom strategy

5. On 16 August the letter signed by the 20 Foreign Ministers was delivered to the Secretary General. The die was cast. Any attempt by us to block the new item would be sure to fail. We were thus faced with the certainty of a major debate in Plenary and the possibility of another one in the Fourth (Decolonisation) Committee (though in the event this did not materialise). Our greatest danger would be a mild resolution which called simply for a resumption of negotiations without prejudging their outcome. This would attract an overwhelming majority and we would be almost alone in opposing it. It was time to determine our strategy.

6. The strategic choice ranged between fighting the Argentines all the way and “letting the wave break over us”. The latter course would be based on the calculation that a General Assembly resolution would not be binding and that to fight against it would give it an importance it might otherwise lack. That course had its attractions. But I had little hesitation in recommending that we should fight all the way. We had an excellent case, based on the principles and purposes of the Charter, especially self-determination and the non-use of force; this would help us to chip away at the prejudicial text which the Argentines had pushed through the General Assembly and the Non-Aligned Movement in previous years; our friends and allies would not understand if we suddenly gave up the fight; we would never have better ground to fight on; and if we let a bad resolution go through this year it would become a permanent feature of the UN scene. Fighting all the way would mean a massive lobbying campaign here and in capitals. We would first have to try to prevent the Non-Aligned Movement, who were to meet at Foreign Minister level in September, from endorsing the Movement’s previous support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty and exclusion of the Falklands from the otherwise universal principle of self-determination. Thereafter we would have to lobby world-wide to keep to a minimum the votes in favour of the Argentine draft resolution; we would not be able to defeat it but we had a chance of denying it a convincing majority.
7. On 3 September you accepted my recommendations. You decided that we should discourage our friends from entering into discussions about the draft resolution which the Argentines were by then touting around the world; we did not want to see any improvements to it. Our objective was to be that the number of votes in favour of the Argentine draft should be less than half, and preferably much less than half, the total membership of the UN.

8. With this decision on strategy behind us, we turned to the tactics we should employ against the Argentine draft resolution. Herr Genscher had suggested to you at the end of August that we might get a friendly country to table a counter-draft acceptable to us. I did not like this idea. The counter-draft would be vulnerable to amendment, above all to an amendment proposing negotiations, which would be unacceptable to us but would command overwhelming support here. Moreover the Latin draft would have priority in the voting and the Latins might even be able to prevent our draft coming to the vote at all.

9. There was, in fact, a kind of symmetry between our position and that of the Argentines: each of us rested his case on certain “motherhood” principles (negotiations for the Argentines; non-use of force and self-determination for us); whichever of us tabled a resolution based on his “motherhood” principles became vulnerable to an amendment containing the other side’s principles. I therefore believed that we should let the Argentines table their draft and then get our friends to put down spoiling amendments to it, in the hope of either converting it into something the Argentines could not accept or obliging them to withdraw it. In recommending this course, I recognised that there were two risks. First, our friends’ amendments could be subjected to counter-amendment by the Argentines. Secondly, the success of our friends’ amendments might depend on our being able to say that we would support the resolution if the amendments were accepted; and that could mean that the resolution would have to be amended more than our friends thought reasonable.

10. On 20 September you decided that we should not pursue Herr Genscher’s idea of a draft resolution of our own. You expressed interest in spoiling amendments but preferred to defer a decision until the Argentine draft had been tabled. You were particularly concerned not to run the risk of the Assembly’s voting down an amendment calling for self-determination for the Islanders.

Opening of the General Assembly

11. We had some procedural skirmishes with the Argentines and their friends as soon as the General Assembly opened in late September. We and the Americans failed in an attempt to block the candidacy of the Permanent Representative of Cuba for the Chairmanship of the Fourth Committee, which was where the Island Councillors and other petitioners would be heard. The Finns were prepared to take the job but only if the Cuban withdrew voluntarily; this he refused to do. In the event Mr. Roa-Kouri gave us no cause for complaint.

12. Our second skirmish we won. In the General Committee on 22 September we successfully moved an amendment to change the title of the new item from “Question of the Malvinas Islands” to “Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)”, the latter being the normal UN usage. We had been ready to force this to a vote but did not need to do so as the Latins recognised that they would be beaten and therefore acquiesced in our amendment.

13. We were also successful two days later in getting the General Assembly to decide that “bodies and individuals with an interest in the question” (which

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for us meant the Falkland Island Councillors) should be heard in the Fourth Committee when the new item was being discussed in Plenary. (Individuals cannot be heard in Plenary.) The Argentines had earlier given an informal undertaking through the Secretariat that they would not make difficulties about the Councillors being heard. But when we tried to firm this up, they reneged. I decided that as the Councillors’ testimony was such an impressive part of our case we must take the risk of forcing the question to a vote. We won it by 41–33–24, with African support tipping the vote our way.

14. The Falklands crisis featured of course in the Assembly’s General Debate (27 September to 15 October) and was mentioned by just over half the speakers. You included in your own speech on 29 September a powerful statement of our policy, which provoked a right of reply from Argentina that evening. On 1 October the Argentine Foreign Minister, Sr. Aguirre Lanari, made a long and emotional statement devoted almost entirely to the Falklands. With the exception of Vice-President Illueca of Panama, the rest of the Latin speakers were studiously moderate. Most other speakers referred to the Falklands only in passing, as an example of the conflict-ridden state of the world. I decided not to reply to each and every criticism of our policy—I did not want to seem, like the Argentines, boringly obsessed with this issue—so I confined myself to a brief right of reply to Argentina at the end of the debate.

Non-Aligned Movement

15. Our main preoccupation during September was the Non-Aligned Movement. Following the cancellation of the Baghdad Summit, the Movement’s Co-ordinating Bureau was to meet in New York at Foreign Minister level on 4–5 October. The communiqué adopted on that occasion would be the only opportunity we would have before the Falklands debate erode the previous NAM language endorsing the Argentine case. On 16 September you sent messages to your colleagues in many non-aligned countries and followed these up with several of them during your visit here at the end of the month.

16. The Cubans prepared the first draft of the communiqué. The paragraph on the Falklands was strongly pro-Argentine. A number of moderate non-aligned, most of them from the Commonwealth, objected and pressed for the inclusion of references to the non-use of force and self-determination. Belize, Botswana and Jamaica were especially brave and determined. It took three days of heated argument before agreement was reached and even then a number of countries said that they were not satisfied and would enter reservations. The text finally adopted was still very unsatisfactory from our point of view. It reiterated support for the Argentine claim to sovereignty and called for the resumption of negotiations. But it did say that these should take into account the principles and decisions of the Non-Aligned Movement; as those principles include self-determination and the non-use of force, we could at least console ourselves that our friends had begun to turn round the unqualified endorsement which the Movement had given to the Argentine case since the Lima Summit in 1975. Moreover the readiness of the moderates to do serious and prolonged battle with the Argentines was unprecedented and made it difficult for the latter to claim that there was NAM consensus on the subject (but it also of course alerted them to the limited support their resolution, as then drafted, would receive).

Evolution of the Argentine draft resolution

17. On 1 October the twenty co-sponsors tabled their draft resolution. Since mid-August Argentine envoys had been scurrying round the world to lobby support for it. In its first version it contained preambular paragraphs
characterising the Falklands as a colonial situation incompatible with world peace, recalling previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and taking note of the NAM’s recognition of Argentina’s right to sovereignty. The operative paragraphs requested the Argentine and UK Governments to begin negotiations for a peaceful solution, taking into account the General Assembly resolutions and the NAM declarations, and asked the Secretary General to undertake a new mission of good offices and report back to next year’s Assembly. Even some of Argentina’s Latin friends felt that the references to the NAM declarations went too far in prejudging the issue in Argentina’s favour and that such a resolution would not command overwhelming support in the Assembly.

18. By early September the Argentines had been prevailed upon to remove from their draft the explicit statements that the NAM declarations supported Argentina’s case and the requirement that the proposed negotiations should take those declarations into account. But the revised draft now characterised the dispute as “the sovereignty dispute”. Some of our friends, notably the Americans and the French, showed a disturbing readiness to negotiate further changes with the Argentines, despite our protests, and the version finally tabled was softened further to meet some of the points they had been making; it now contained only the minimum possible reference to the NAM declarations and omitted the requirement that the negotiations should take account of previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

United Kingdom tactics

19. The tabling of the Argentine draft resolution on 1 October led us to take decisions on our tactics. At that stage no date had been fixed for the debate but it was likely to be during the first week in November (I resisted attempts by the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Imre Hollai of Hungary, to bring it forward at Argentine request). I began by exploring with my Australian, Canadian and New Zealand colleagues whether it would be possible to get some of our friends to table spoiling amendments. The Australian and New Zealander liked the idea; the Canadian was less keen. But it became clear that they saw difficulty in tabling amendments unless (a) they had the company of a representative group of other Commonwealth countries; and (b) we could undertake not to oppose, and preferably to vote for, the draft resolution if the amendments were adopted; they did not like the concept of “spoiling” amendments.

20. This was obviously a major difficulty, given the complete unacceptability to us of any call for negotiations. But I nevertheless recommended that you should authorise me to examine the possibilities further. I had in mind an amendment which would delete the Argentine draft’s call for a resumption of negotiations on sovereignty and would instead request the two governments to “bring about conditions which would permit a resumption of the search, with the participation of the representatives of the population of the Falkland Islands, for a peaceful solution to their differences within the framework of Article 73 of the UN Charter”.

21. I had three main reasons for making this recommendation. First, I had encountered wide sympathy for our view that it was too soon for anyone, least of all the Argentines, to talk about the resumption of negotiations; there would therefore be support for “bringing about conditions”. Secondly, I had been impressed by how well our position was protected by the Charter itself, Article 73 of which defines the obligations of the Administering Powers of non-self-governing territories and provides that the interests of the inhabitants are
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paramount. By relying on Article 73 we could show that our opponents were pressing us to do something contrary to our obligations under the Charter. Sympathy for our position and that of the Islanders might enable us to reverse the trend of previous General Assembly resolutions which had implicitly favoured the principle of territorial integrity at the expense of that of self-determination. Thirdly, our lobbying had revealed that, for all this sympathy for our position, delegations were going to find it very difficult to vote against the “motherhood” principle of negotiations; if we were to enlist their help in defeating the Argentines we would have to give them something positive to vote for. My proposed amendment provided that. It was not without risks, especially the risk of Argentine counter-amendment. But I believed that it offered a good chance of inflicting a diplomatic defeat on the Argentines, whereas it was we who were likely to suffer a defeat if we confined ourselves to lobbying against the apparently innocuous Argentine draft, especially as the latter might well be further softened by its co-sponsors.

22. On 20 October, however, you informed me that you and your colleagues had decided not to pursue the idea of an amendment. The one I had proposed did not meet all your concerns. We would not therefore be able to promote it ourselves and we would still have to vote against the draft resolution even if the amendment succeeded. You also felt that Article 73 was an inadequate substitute for the principle of self-determination. The phrase referring to it in the amendment was in any case vulnerable to counter-amendment. You feared that we could easily lose control of the exercise. You concluded that we should abandon the idea of amendment and should concentrate our efforts on obtaining votes against, or at least abstentions on, the existing Argentine draft.

The competition for votes

23. With this decision taken, our worldwide lobbying campaign moved into its final phase. The Argentines had been very active in September but I had the impression that their campaign had lost momentum and that they might have peaked too soon. This was an opportunity we could seize. The Prime Minister sent personal messages to nearly 50 of her colleagues, including President Reagan, and you similarly addressed some 25 Foreign Ministers. In New York we mounted a systematic lobbying campaign of over 100 delegations (having written off the Latins, the Soviet bloc and the radical non-aligned).

24. At the beginning of this campaign, on 20 October, our tentative estimate was that the existing Argentine draft was likely to be adopted by 102–2–50. There were two groups of Third World states whose votes would be of critical importance but were difficult to predict—the Arabs and the more important Commonwealth Africans. We worked hard on these, enlisting the support in the latter case of the Commonwealth Secretary-General in London.

25. But our main problem lay with our closest friends and allies the Americans and the Ten. Since the late summer, the Americans had been telling us here, in London and in Washington that it would be very difficult for them not to support a non-prejudicial call for negotiations. But on 17 September Secretary Shultz had told Sir Oliver Wright that the US would not support a resolution which made any mention of sovereignty or prejudged the outcome or urged us to start negotiations soon. The Argentine draft still did all these things; in particular the Argentines had told a number of our friends that “sovereignty” was a sine qua non for them. I was reasonably hopeful therefore that we could count on an American abstention.

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26. I was much less confident of the Ten. At the Political Co-operation dinner here at the end of September, Ministers and Political Directors alike had shown every sign of wanting to vote for the Argentine draft. Since then, the Danish Presidency had worked helpfully for a joint abstention by our nine partners but it had become common talk here that France, Greece, Italy and Ireland would vote in favour and that Germany and the Netherlands were likely to join them. This was most damaging. Third World delegations kept on saying to us: "If your close friends will not support you, how can you expect us to?". We also encountered repeated pleas that we should introduce amendments of our own; many delegations said that they wanted to support us, would vote for almost any alternative to the Argentine draft but could not bring themselves to vote against, or even abstain on, a call for negotiations. The Argentines, they said, lived in dread of our tabling an amendment on the Islanders' right to self-determination.

27. After a week's hard work, both here and in capitals, our lobbying returns were quite promising. A number of countries, not only the small Island states of the Caribbean and Pacific, but also Gambia, Oman and Sri Lanka, had revealed an unexpected readiness to join us in voting against the draft; and many Africans, both Commonwealth and Francophone, seemed ready to abstain. By the weekend of 30–31 October, on the eve of the debate, our revised estimate of the vote was 87–7–61, and I did not exclude the possibility of getting the Yes votes down into the 70s.

28. But we were about to receive a double blow. Late on Sunday evening, 31 October, the Japanese Mission told us that the Argentines had just given the Japanese in Tokyo a revised draft resolution which would be tabled here the next day. It contained a number of cosmetic changes: deletion of one of the references to the Falklands as a colonial situation; the addition of preambular paragraphs about the de facto cessation of hostilities, the need to "take due account of the interests of the population" and the non-use of force; deletion of the remaining reference to the NAM declarations; and a strengthening of the request to the Secretary-General to exercise his good offices. It was later reported in the press that these amendments had been negotiated between Mr. Enders, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs in the State Department, and the Argentine Ambassador in Washington, in order to devise a text which the Americans could vote for and which would command wide support. They had been cleverly drafted, within the limits of Argentine policy, to answer some of the points we had been making in our lobbying. They threatened to undo much of our work.

29. Late the following day, Monday, 1 November, the Resident Clerk told us that President Reagan had informed the Prime Minister that the Americans had decided to vote in favour of the revised draft. The next morning, 2 November, Mrs. Kirkpatrick quickly informed the Argentine Foreign Minister of this decision and her Mission assiduously spread the word round the UN. By lunchtime, everyone knew that we had been deserted by our major ally. A stampede to follow the American lead seemed imminent.

The debate

30. It was in this unpromising atmosphere that the debate opened on 2 November. The Argentine Foreign Minister spoke first, Mr. Hollai, with his now customary partiality to Argentina, having rejected my argument that as the
representative of the Administering Power I had the right to do so. Sr. Aguirre Lanari made a long and legalistic speech concentrating on Argentina’s claim to sovereignty and on the irrelevance of self-determination in the Falklands. My own speech set a different tone. Its themes were the Argentine act of aggression earlier this year, the UN principles at stake, the rights of the Islanders and the inadequacies of the Argentine draft resolution, even in its revised form. I also set out to sow doubts about how far the historical record of 1833 supported Argentina’s case, citing the “Four Myths” on which Sr. Aguirre Lanari rested his entire argument about colonialism, territorial integrity and self-determination.

31. The afternoon of 2 November was devoted to the hearing in the Fourth Committee of Councillors Cheek and Blake from the Falkland Islands and of four petitioners produced by the Argentines. Two of these were long-term residents who had settled in Argentina after the conflict and two were Island women married to Argentines. Panama, on behalf of the Latin American group, sought to undermine the credentials of Messrs. Cheek and Blake to speak for the Islanders. I rebutted this and took the Latins to task for their attempts to stifle free speech. Mr. Cheek and Mr. Blake then put up their usual skilful performance, dealing confidently and with impressive honesty with an hour of over-orchestrated cross-questioning by the Latin pack. Of the four Malvinenses, the two women had nothing to say but the two renegades spoke quite effectively. Nevertheless the overall effect of their testimony was to reinforce our arguments about the traumatic impact of the invasion on the Islanders and the need for them to have time to consider their wishes for the future. The general view was that we had had very much the better of the day, both in Plenary and in the Fourth Committee.

32. Thereafter the debate degenerated into a flood of Latin and Communist rhetoric. Of the 49 speakers, only 4 (Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, Fiji, Jamaica) spoke on our side. I had considered mustering more of our friends to match Argentina’s hordes. But I decided not to do so. All but our closest supporters would have had to say something in favour of negotiations and that would not have helped us. The better tactic seemed to be to get our friends to speak en masse in explanation of vote immediately before the vote. They would not then have to cover the whole subject and could confine themselves to explaining why they would not vote for the draft resolution.

33. I did, however, take the floor at the end of the second day’s proceedings to deliver a right of reply to the Argentine speech of the previous day. This provided me with an opportunity to restate clearly our case on self-determination. Finally, I made a brief explanation of vote before the vote itself on 4 November as a final forceful reminder of the principles for which we stood and the failures of the draft resolution to acknowledge them. To my surprise, Sr. Aguirre Lanari failed to speak again in right of reply until the very close of the proceedings. I was thus able to concentrate in my statements on the defects of the draft resolution and the patently unconvincing nature of his opening speech, without being distracted by the need to rebut Argentine propaganda themes. The Argentines seemed to be in an agony of indecision about their tactics. On the last morning, they made a despairing attempt to have themselves inscribed to explain their vote on their own draft resolution (something which the General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure specifically exclude). It looked as if the Spanish Permanent Representative, Sr. de Pinies (who had been, for him, strikingly muted in the debate) was behind this procedural move, but the Secretariat stood fast, although Mr. Hollai was originally minded to give in to the Argentine request.
The vote

34. During the two and a half days of debate we maintained relentless lobbying, as did the Argentines. Posts in capitals put up a persistent and valiant performance; telegrams reporting the results of their lobbying peaked at 63 on the day of the vote. Our support stood up better than I had feared; our arguments continued to convince and most of our friends saw through the cosmetic nature of the Argentine amendments. Of the Ten all except Greece were finally instructed to abstain (contrary to Mrs. Kirkpatrick's confident predictions to the press that most of them would vote Yes). This was a major gain for us but it came only at the last moment and was too late to have much effect on other delegations. The Arabs remained admirably firm. But Japan followed the US. And on the morning of the vote it became clear that the bulk of the more important Commonwealth African countries had eluded us. We had to work hard to prevent a general African slide into voting Yes.

35. The vote was taken on the evening of 4 November, after a long series of statements and explanations of vote, more than two-thirds of which had been on our side. The result was 90 votes in favour, 12 against and 52 abstentions. It was greeted with prolonged applause by the Latin American claque and an emotional closing speech by Sr. Aguirre Lanari.

36. In UN terms, the vote was a sensation. It was the largest turnout ever recorded, only three members (Djibouti and Seychelles, and of course South Africa) being absent. The normal patterns were broken. Except for the Latins and the Eastern Europeans, every regional group and sub-group was split. The US voted with the Soviet bloc and the radical non-aligned, with no Western company other than Austria, Greece, Malta and Spain. Israel voted with the radical Arabs and against the moderates. Of the 91 members of the Non-aligned Movement, only 56 (less than two-thirds) supported Argentina; the myth of non-aligned endorsement of her case was exposed. Although the Argentines hailed the result as a victory, many here thought it a pretty hollow one. We were widely congratulated on having forced the Argentines to water down their draft and even then having mustered 12 Noes and 52 abstentions. But for the American defection we would have forced the Yes votes down to the low 80s; and if we could have additionally carried the Front Line States with us we could probably have just achieved your objective of more abstentions and Noes than Yes votes.

Conclusions

37. Because of the Argentine invasion, the Falklands in effect became this year a new item on the agenda. There was thus a lot to play for in an unfamiliar situation where the usual rôles were reversed. It was Argentina, a Third World country, which was insisting, in 19th century fashion, on its claim to territory and trying to impose its sovereignty on an unwilling population; and it was Britain, in many eyes still an arch-imperialist, which was championing the principles dear to the Third World, especially self-determination and non-use of force. Many Third World countries found it difficult to adjust to this situation, being torn between Third World solidarity and their attachment to cherished principles. Our lobbying showed that the solidarity could be splintered whereas the nominal attachment to the two principles remained strong. My first conclusion is that we must continue to take every opportunity generally and not only in the Falklands context to drive home that it is we who are adopting "a principled stand".

38. My second conclusion derives from the nature of the support we received. It is striking that whereas Argentina, an unpopular régime with few friends even in its own continent, managed to manipulate all its Latin American
brethren into co-sponsoring its resolution and even extorted support from the US, we did not get a single European country to vote for us. Indeed the uncertainty until the last moment about whether the Ten would even abstain was a signal weakness of our position; even worse was President Reagan’s decision to vote against us and Mrs. Kirkpatrick’s assiduity in making this widely known, contrary to normal American practice, 48 hours before the vote. Our true friends turned out to be in the Commonwealth. All but one of the No votes and 40 per cent of the abstentions were from Commonwealth countries; only 12 of them voted Yes. The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth was unstintingly helpful throughout. This leads me to wonder whether we may not in the past have underestimated the potential value to us of the Commonwealth at the UN. I am not suggesting that we should try to convert the Commonwealth into a bloc which regularly votes together; that would be impracticable. But I do think that we should exploit the Commonwealth link as a means of plugging our views on key issues into the various regional sub-groups, most of them containing some Commonwealth countries, which are assuming growing importance here.

39. Finally, I draw four conclusions more specifically about our future policy on the Falklands at the UN. For there is no escaping the fact that, unless there is some remarkable change in Buenos Aires or Port Stanley, the new Falklands item will remain on the agenda of Plenary for the indefinite future. It may be that in due course Ministers will come to the conclusion that it is better “to let the wave break over us” and to allow the Argentine resolution to be adopted with steadily increasing majorities year after year. But it seems to me more likely that we shall continue, for both domestic and international reasons, to resist this process. It is not too soon to start thinking how we can best do so.

40. First, we must watch like lynxes for any attempt by the Argentines to try to remove the Falklands from the “decolonisation” context in which they have always been considered at the UN. This year’s debate brought home how much it helps us that the Falklands are an Article 73 territory. Any Argentine attempt to change this, e.g. by trying to prevent discussion of the Falklands in the Committee of 24 next year, will have to be firmly resisted.

41. Secondly, we must keep up the work of educating governments about the principles on which we stand, especially Article 73 with which they are not entirely familiar, drawing their attention to the reversal of roles to which I have referred in paragraph 37 above.

42. Thirdly, I believe that we should not lose sight of the possibility of splitting Latin American solidarity. We will not be able to achieve this in public; it is probably inevitable that next year there will be another Argentine draft resolution co-sponsored by the same states as this year. But in private many Latin American representatives speak openly of their disagreement with Argentine policy. This year they, and of course the Americans, succeeded in getting the Argentines to water down their resolution to a degree which must have caused some worries in Buenos Aires. This showed that private pressure from the Latins can move the Argentine position. The consequences for us this year, in terms of the vote here, were unwelcome. But in the real world they may not be wholly without value; at the very least, they show that the Argentine position is open to erosion. It is also for consideration whether we should mobilise others of our friends to put pressure on the Argentines, e.g. the major Commonwealth Africans who voted for negotiations without supporting the Argentine case as such (my Nigerian colleague has just floated this idea with me).
43. Fourthly, I believe that in our tactics next year, we must, if we possibly can, give our friends something positive to vote for. If we do not, there is likely to be a considerable falling away from the support we received this year. A number of abstainers told us that they could see that it was too soon to expect us to negotiate with Argentina now but that in time we would have to do so. Their votes will be difficult to retain next year. Indeed, I still have some regrets that you decided this year not to pursue the amendment proposal I had put to you in mid-October, though I readily recognise that its admitted risks must have looked much less acceptable in London than they did in New York. But the reactions to our subsequent lobbying more than confirmed my belief that if we are to obtain maximum benefit from the sympathy and support we enjoy here it will be by asking our friends to vote for our "motherhood" principles rather than against those of the Argentines.

44. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassador in Washington.

I am Sir

Yours faithfully

J. A. THOMSON.
Dear John,

Your answers to Question Number 10 to Ron Leighton, to the supplementaries, and the Prime Minister's reply to me as for Austin are astonishing.

Do you and the Prime Minister seriously suggest that the 16,500 (? for RFH) for Austin was sent to the South Atlantic as a routine operation to supply HMS...
Endurance. (3500 tons)

You should not insult us by supposing that the House of Commons is so stupid as to believe that.

The fact is, as you know, and as the Natmin Union of Seamen have submitted documentary evidence to the Finance Committee, that
to the anger of the crew of the "Fort Austin" who believed they were going home to Britain. "Fort Austin" was diverted to the South Atlantic on 28th/29th March. The decision to change course to the South Atlantic, and not to return to Britain, came in the form of an order from London.
So why do you call the Prime Minister try to pretend otherwise to the House of Commons?

In your answer to my supplementary question, you said “Of course” Ministers knew about it. Since Fort Austin was carrying supplies for the “Conqueror”, and
Since Fort Austin, either then or/and later carriers had round/and/or and nuclear weapons, it would have been shocking if Ministers did not know of this most important decision to divert ships.

If, as you indicated, Ministers were fully aware to the decision to send major ships to the South...
Atlantic, why did Ministers not inform the Prime Minister of such a crucial set of decisions? Or did they? No, that letter did not answer the question I put to him.

If you and other Ministers did indeed tell the Prime Minister, what is the explanation?
at the Prime Minister's reply in this exchange, on Tuesday which I enclose?

How could the Prime Minister use the phrase "out of the blue" in what was to Wednesday 31st March?
When I went before the Finance Committee on 22nd October, Lord Francis said that he would be interested in any additional information. I felt I ought to go to the House. I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Francis.

Yours Sincerely,

[Signature]
The South Atlantic Fund

The Prime Minister was not entirely happy with the briefing provided today on the above subject in connection with her Parliamentary Questions.

Mrs. Thatcher takes the view that a small capital sum should be paid to all of those injured in the Falklands campaign. She does not think they should be obliged to approach the Fund and make a request. In her view, a policy which depends on the injured initiating requests for aid is not sufficiently sensitive.

While she is aware that it is for the Trustees to administer the Fund, Mrs. Thatcher would be most grateful for Mr. Nott's considered views on this matter and advice on how the Trustees might be approached, if it were decided that an attempt should be made to change the present policy.

JC

Richard Mottram, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.
Dear [Name],

The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations

You will wish to see the enclosed text of an article which Sir A Parsons proposes to publish in the January issue of Chatham House's magazine 'International Affairs'. The article is largely factual and deals with events which were for the most part public knowledge at the time. We see no reason to object to publication or to propose any changes to Sir A Parsons' draft. I should be glad to know whether any objection is seen in No 10.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
THE FALKLANDS CRISIS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

31st March - 14th June

There were features of the Falklands crisis in the UN which combined to give it an unique quality. First its unexpectedness: the crisis hit the Security Council like a bolt from the blue. The Falklands problem had of course been considered sporadically by the General Assembly over the years, but I doubt whether more than a handful of delegations were aware of the bilateral discussions which had taken place in New York in February 1982 between the British Minister of State, Mr Richard Luce, and the Argentine Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Enrique Ros, still less of the subsequent diplomatic exchanges between the British and Argentine Governments. The tension which had built up in late March over the incident of the scrap dealers on South Georgia had not impinged on the Security Council which was preoccupied with the Middle East - the Lebanon and the West Bank - and latterly with a novel Nicaraguan complaint about potential United States aggression and interference in Central America. Secondly, the crisis, when it struck, attracted more public attention than the most long-serving members of the UN Secretariat could remember being generated by any event in the history of the Organisation. Even now, it is not easy to understand why. Perhaps it was the very improbability of a war between Britain and Argentina, perhaps the remoteness and the romantic overtones of the cause of the hostilities. Perhaps the spectacle of an ex-imperial power which had willingly given up a vast empire suddenly girding itself to defend a tiny community 8,000 miles from its shores, perhaps the novelty of the involvement in conflict of a country from a sub-continent which has been blessedly almost free of the wars and tensions which have beset Europe, Africa and Asia over the past two or three generations. Whatever the reason the fact was that, particularly when the negotiations moved to the United Nations, television, radio and press, not just from Britain, the United States and Argentina, but from all over the world, swarmed to New York. For weeks, every time the Secretary-General, myself, or the Argentine negotiators entered or left the UN building, we were besieged by hordes of cameras
of cameras and microphones. I and my staff had never known anything like it. We must have given hundreds of press, TV and radio interviews. It reached the stage when I was being buttonholed by total strangers in the streets of New York and was being told by visitors from Africa, Eastern Europe and from as far away as East Asia that we, the principal actors in the Falklands drama in New York, were appearing on their television screens more frequently than their own political leaders!

My narrative begins on 31st March when the newly arrived Argentine Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, called on the President of the Security Council for the month of March, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick of the United States, to tell her that his government was contemplating bringing the question of South Georgia to the attention of the Security Council. Mrs Kirkpatrick was disposed to arrange a meeting between him and me without having recourse to the Council. Meanwhile I had been warned by London that an invasion of the Falklands might be imminent: the meeting between Ambassador Roca and myself never took place although, on 1st April, he circulated a letter to the Council setting out the Argentine position on the South Georgia incident.

On 1st April the storm broke in New York. The UN Secretary-General, alarmed by press reports, summoned Ambassador Roca and myself separately in the morning to appeal to both our governments to exercise restraint. I responded positively and the Secretary-General, having publicised his appeal at the midday press conference, reiterated it at New York airport in the afternoon as he was leaving for a previously arranged series of visits to European capitals. By that time events had moved on. I had been informed at lunch time by the FCO that an Argentine invasion was imminent and had been instructed to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council to take pre-emptive action. I saw Ambassador Kamanda of Zaire (the President for the month of April) early in the afternoon and the Council met in informal consultations shortly thereafter. I outlined the situation to the astonishment of the assembled delegates. Some of them clearly thought that I had lost my senses and there were murmurs about the need for further time. /I insisted
I insisted that there was no time to lose and the Council met in the late afternoon in public session for the adoption of a Presidential statement appealing to both parties to exercise restraint. After a brief exchange between myself and Ambassador Roca who appeared to be taken by surprise by this development, the President read out the statement. I immediately took the floor to assure the Council that my Government would be guided by the Presidential appeal and challenged Ambassador Roca to respond similarly. He remained silent.

When we returned that evening to our delegation offices, we were in little doubt that we would wake up the following morning to hear the news that Argentine forces had invaded the Falklands. We decided that we must be ready to initiate immediate action in the Security Council. We agreed on two important considerations. First we must concentrate on the illegitimate use of force to settle a long-standing political problem, and avoid involvement in the merits of the dispute over sovereignty on which we could not expect to secure majority support. Second we must act quickly and avoid becoming mired in the long negotiations which normally precede the adoption of a resolution by the Council. That evening we sketched out the text which was adopted two days later as Security Council Resolution No 502.

The following morning, 2nd April, our worst fears were realised. Argentine forces had invaded the Falklands. After hurried consultation with London, I called the Council, set out the salient facts and read out, in final form, the text of the resolution which I was tabling. I took the almost unprecedented step
unprecedented step of bypassing the customary stages of circulating a 'working paper' leading to a preliminary draft resolution, a 'blue draft', in order to put the Council on notice that (a) we would not accept amendments to our draft, and (b) we would, according to the conventions, insist on a vote within 24 hours of tabling. My first intention was to demand a vote the same day but I readily acceded to pressure from members of the Council to wait until 3rd April as the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Mr Costa Mendez, was en route for New York to present his government's case to the Council.

On 3rd April, the Argentinian Foreign Minister arrived and a fierce and complex debate ensued during which Argentine forces invaded South Georgia. Costa Mendez spoke first, the burden of his statement, backed by a lengthy historical survey, being that Argentina had done nothing more than recover national territory which had been seized by the British by an illegitimate act of force in 1833. He was supported to a greater or lesser extent by certain Latin American delegates including the Foreign Minister of Panama (the Latin American member of the Council) who expressed himself in vitriolic terms and concluded by proposing a suspension of the meeting for two or three hours so that the Council could consider the text of an alternative, and strongly prejudiced, draft resolution which he had read out to the Council. I opposed this delaying tactic equally firmly and it was defeated in a procedural vote by 7 in favour (China, Ireland, Japan, Panama, Poland, Spain, USSR) to 3 (France, UK, US) with 4 abstentions (Guyana, Jordan, Togo, Zaire), thus failing to secure the necessary 9 votes.

The debate continued and I spoke in refutation of the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, in particular of the dangerous proposition he had put forward that the peaceful settlement Articles of the UN Charter applied only to disputes which had arisen since the Charter entered into force in 1945. At the close of the debate the Panamanian Foreign Minister tried to rob me of my vote by claiming that, under Article 27(3) of the Charter 'in decisions under Chapter VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes] of the Charter a party to a dispute - in this case the United Kingdom - shall abstain from voting'. I counter-attacked that the resolution had been /drafted in
drafted in relation to a breach of the peace and had been proposed with Chapter VII [Acts with respect to threats to the peace ...] of the Charter in mind: hence the provisions of Article 27(3) did not apply. I was supported by the Permanent Representative of Spain, an accepted expert on UN procedures, and Panama decided not to call for a procedural vote.

What were our feelings as the vote drew near? At the outset we had been confident of 4 certain votes in favour (UK, US, France, Guyana) with 2 probables (Japan, Ireland) and 4 possibles (Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Jordan). We knew that our maximum number of favourable votes was 10 since the three Communist delegations (USSR, China, Poland) could not be expected to support a draft resolution tabled by the United Kingdom nor, for different reasons, could Spain and Panama. It all therefore depended on the votes of the four Non-Aligned delegates, 3 from Africa and 1 from Asia (Jordan). Without securing the support of three of these four, assuming that we could count on Japan and Ireland, we would still fall short of the necessary 9 votes for the adoption of the resolution. For once in the United Nations, the debate itself was of crucial importance. Few delegations were knowledgeable about the Falklands. The Non-Aligned had committed themselves at successive Summits to the Argentine position on sovereignty: yet all Non-Aligned states in the UN have a healthy antipathy to the use of force to settle political problems. It was an open contest and I felt, as never before in my UN experience, that the listeners were hanging on the words of the speakers, and that a significant number of delegations was ready to decide their votes in the light of the debate, not in the light of previously entrenched positions as has for years been the case over, for example, the Middle East and Southern Africa.

Before the debate started on 3rd April, we in the British Delegation discussed this question at length. As I recall, we concluded that we would probably secure 7 or 8 votes, with luck we would get 9, with unbelievable luck we might achieve the maximum of 10. Would there be a Soviet or Chinese veto? We discounted the latter, our instinct telling us that China would abstain. We had no feel for the likely position of the USSR, even less as
even less as the Soviet Delegation dashed to and from the telephone as the debate wore on.

When the moment came, we were on tenterhooks, although careful to give no outward sign of concern: I did not even look in the direction of my Soviet colleague as the pencils went up! The result was better than we had dared to hope for – 10 in favour (UK, US, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Togo, Zaire, Uganda, Jordan), 1 against (Panama) with 4 abstentions (China, USSR, Poland, Spain). Resolution 502 was born (text at Annex) and I confess that, on our return to my office to report the day’s proceedings to London, I and my Falklands team unhesitatingly emptied a couple of bottles of champagne which we found in the refrigerator – the left-overs from a farewell party of the previous week. Antipathy to the use of force had triumphed. We had secured a firm base of international support amongst a wide spectrum of member states, without which, in my view, it would have been difficult to persuade our partners, friends and allies to join us in the economic and political measures which, coupled with military action under Article 51 of the Charter (the inherent right of individuals on collective self-defence), formed the three planks of the British Government’s policy, accepted by all parties in Parliament, of reaction to the Argentine aggression.

There followed a period of intensive private and public activity in the UN while Secretary of State Haig pursued his shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires throughout April. We took opportunities in various UN bodies to press our case against Argentina while the Argentines concentrated on mobilising support amongst the Non-Aligned Movement for their sovereignty claim, and solidarity in the Organisation of American States. I kept in close touch with the Secretary-General and with the President of the Security Council. Regular briefings were held with the ten members of the European Community and with Commonwealth delegations. On 8th April the Secretary-General established a task force headed by Under-Secretary-General Rafeq Ahmed of Pakistan to work on contingency plans in the event that Secretary Haig’s efforts failed and the Secretary-General was called upon to use his good offices between the parties. On 19th April the Secretary-General gave /to ourselves.
to ourselves, the Argentine and US delegations a list of the ways in which the UN might be able to help to bring about a negotiated settlement. We conscientiously circulated to the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, the detailed measures which we were taking under Article 51. This led to a blizzard of Notes from ourselves and the Argentine delegation eventually numbering well over one hundred, describing and justifying the various military and other moves made by both sides. Throughout I made our position crystal clear both in public and in private, namely that we would obviously prefer the peaceful implementation of the central paragraph of SCR 502 - total Argentine withdrawal - but we would not in the meantime allow anything to inhibit us from exercising our inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

Throughout April nerves became increasingly frayed amongst the Security Council membership as the international media, and our own Notes, reported the steady advance of the British Task Force. To begin with it had been difficult to convince my colleagues that we meant business and there was a tendency to believe that the Falklands crisis would follow the pattern of so many events of which the Security Council was seized - a violent change in the status quo followed by an interminable negotiation leaving the altered situation unredressed: the Middle East, Afghanistan, South East Asia being good examples. However, as the days of April passed, there was a growing realisation that we were serious. Pressure from various delegations rose and fell for a return to the Security Council and a call for military restraint combined with negotiations. I held firm to our line and the President of the Council, as well as the Secretary-General, maintained that the Council should do nothing which might inhibit Secretary Haig's efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. Our re-possession of South Georgia on 25th April further raised the temperature and the pace quickened at the turn of the month with our announcement of a Total Exclusion Zone, Secretary Haig's announcement of the failure of his mission, and the sinking of the General Belgrano on 2nd May followed two days later by the sinking of HMS Sheffield. The stage was set for the next phase, the initiative by the Secretary-General which he had increasingly come to regard as /both necessary
both necessary and inevitable.

On 2nd May, coincidentally with the abortive initiative by the President of Peru, the Secretary-General gave to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Francis Pym, who was staying that night with me in New York, a 'set of ideas' for a negotiated settlement including the concepts of mutual withdrawal, the commencement of diplomatic negotiations for a definitive settlement of the dispute, the lifting of sanctions and exclusion zones, and the establishment of transitional arrangements in the Falklands pending the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations. The same day he presented his 'set of ideas' to the Argentine delegation. He was immediately almost blown off course by a formal request from Ireland to return to the Security Council. This led to a difficult session of informal consultations of the Council in which I repeatedly made clear that we were not prepared to 'exercise restraint' - a meaningless phrase in the circumstances of the hostilities in the South Atlantic - or to freeze our military preparations in any circumstances other than immediate Argentine withdrawal. Fortunately it emerged that our support had not evaporated and the disposition of the Council was to allow the Secretary-General to pursue his negotiations without the hindrance of an acrimonious public debate: Ireland agreed to suspend its request.

On 5th and 6th May respectively the Argentine and British Governments indicated their willingness to proceed on the basis of the Secretary-General's 'set of ideas', and the most intensive and vigorous series of negotiations, attended by maximum public interest, continued until 19th May. The Secretary-General saw myself and my Argentine colleague, Vice-Minister Enrique Ros, once or more often twice a day throughout the whole period, weekends included, working in an orderly and systematic way towards the elaboration of an agreement which would embrace the points in his original document, and which would put the Islands under temporary UN administration for a defined period during which negotiations for a final settlement would be carried out under his auspices.

As the talks progressed my hopes fluctuated. I began with little optimism but was inclined to revise this when, on 11th May, the
May, the Argentine delegation agreed to a formulation under which the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations would not be prejudged at the outset, i.e., establishing that the outcome need not be the transfer of the Falklands to Argentine sovereignty. This was a major concession, or so it seemed. By the weekend of 15th/16th May when I was summoned to London for consultations, I was not entirely without hope of a successful result, although my instinct told me otherwise. The two sides did not seem to be impossibly far apart on the modalities of mutual withdrawal and the timing of the lifting of exclusion zones and sanctions. On the interim administration of the Islands under UN auspices we were still separated on the vital point of principle that the democratic institutions in the Falklands must be revived during the transitional period. But we appeared reasonably close on the nature and duration of the diplomatic negotiations for a definitive solution. There were other differences but they did not seem to be necessarily to be unbridgeable.

That weekend in London and at Chequers the Inner Cabinet worked out our final detailed position on the draft agreement, which was subsequently announced to the House of Commons and published on 20th May. I returned to New York on 17th May and presented our proposals to the Secretary-General the same morning, making clear that they were final and that we required a response from the Government of Argentina within 48 hours: in our view there was no case for allowing the negotiations to drag on any longer. In the late evening of 18th May the Secretary-General gave me a summary of the Argentine response: it was immediately clear that this amounted to rejection of our proposals. This was confirmed when I received the full text on the morning of 19th May. The Secretary-General made a last-minute attempt to avert failure: he spoke on the telephone to President Galtieri and to Mrs. Thatcher and subsequently sent to both sides an Aide-Memoire containing full formulations on the two questions of the interim Administration and the diplomatic negotiations, with briefer comments on the other points. I responded on 20th May that we would have views on his Aide-Memoire which did not agree with our own proposals (although it was not far removed from them) but that we would need to see the Argentine reaction before commenting.
before commenting in detail. The Secretary-General received no response from the Argentine delegation by the dead-line which he had set.

On the evening of 20th May the Secretary-General reported failure to the President of the Security Council. On 21st May, at the request of Panama, the Council met in open session for a debate which continued for 5 days. The Secretary-General opened the proceedings with a methodical and impartial summary of the negotiations. He concluded that, towards the end of the previous week, essential agreement had been reached on many points, leaving 4 crucial differences, namely certain aspects of the interim administration of the territory; provisions for the extension of the time frame for completion of the diplomatic negotiations and the related duration of the interim administration; certain aspects of the mutual withdrawal of forces; and the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the interim agreement. The Secretary-General described how he had spoken by telephone to President Galtieri and Mrs Thatcher and drew attention to the subsequent aide-memoire which he had presented to both parties. He finished his summary by stating that, by the previous evening, the necessary accommodations had not been made: he had therefore concluded that he must inform the President of the Council of his appraisal.

Vice-Minister Ros spoke next in strong but measured terms. He rehearsed the Argentine position on all aspects of the dispute and reiterated Argentina's willingness to negotiate on the basis of SCR 502 notwithstanding their reservations about the resolution. He criticised in detail our position on the various aspects of the Perez de Cuellar negotiations and dealt fiercely and at length with our military build-up and the hostilities which had already taken place (by that time British forces had landed on the Falklands).

I spoke next. I first responded to all the points which Ros had made, ending with the question of who had shown flexibility or rigidity during Perez de Cuellar's negotiations. I said that my Government could have adopted the legitimate attitude that there was no alternative to the withdrawal of the aggressor and the full restoration of the status quo ante.

/But, by 17th May,
But, by 17th May, we had been prepared to contemplate parallel and mutual withdrawal under United Nations supervision, and a short interim period under UN administration in order to enable diplomatic negotiations to proceed for a definitive settlement of the problem. Although we insisted that the democratic institutions on the Island should remain during the interim period, we were prepared to accept Argentine representation in those institutions disproportionate to the size of the Argentine community. None of this demonstrated rigidity or inflexibility. However, the Argentine response to our proposals had been wholly unsatisfactory, and we had no choice but to regard it as a further attempt to procrastinate in order to enable Argentina to consolidate its hold on what it had seized by force. The Argentine Government had insisted on including South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in the agreement. This was unacceptable. These islands were 1000 miles from the Falklands: they were uninhabited and our title to them rested on different grounds to our title to the Falklands. The Argentine Government had insisted on an unequal process of withdrawal of forces which we would not accept. The Argentine Government had rejected the continuation in being of the democratic institutions on the Islands which we had developed over the years in accordance with our obligations under Article 73 of the Charter. Argentina was only prepared to entertain the possibility that 'persons' who were members of the population of British origin, and Argentine residents in the islands, in equal numbers, might be appointed as 'advisers' by the UN interim administration. This was not only wholly unacceptable to us in concept but the idea of parity in numbers of 'advisers' between a population of about 30 and a population of about 1800 was ludicrous. Argentina required freedom of access with respect to residence and property during the interim period. This would have enabled Argentina fundamentally to change the demographic status of the islands during a short interim administration, clearly an unacceptable proposition. The Argentine formulation on how and when and by what means the negotiations for a final settlement should be concluded was also totally unacceptable: there was equally no assurance, contrary to what we had previously been led to believe, that Argentina agreed to language which would leave it beyond doubt that the outcome of
the negotiations should not be prejudged at the outset. I summed up that I had said enough to demonstrate the justice of my Government's conclusion that the Argentine response amounted to a comprehensive rejection of our proposals. I concluded that, although my Government's mind would never be closed to any avenue which promised to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis, we could not in the meantime allow ourselves to be in any way inhibited from carrying out military action in accordance with our inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

Nearly 50 delegations then spoke in the debate, apart from frequent interventions by myself, Argentina, Panama and others in right of reply and to introduce or explain draft resolutions. Almost every member of the Latin American group took the floor in support of Argentina. Many of the Latin American delegates expressed their support in relatively restrained terms: only Venezuela and Panama were nakedly hostile and abusive and I had some brisk exchanges with the Foreign Minister of Panama. These effusions were offset by strong statements on our side from New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Kenya, Belgium, Guyana and other Caribbean representatives. The remainder of our friends and partners, including the United States, expressed themselves in carefully balanced language.

At the end of the debate my Irish colleague tabled a resolution designed to achieve a suspension of hostilities and a resumption of negotiations in terms which I had told him in advance that we would have to oppose. But the Non-Aligned Members of the Council, less of course Panama, were anxious to avoid a British negative vote and proposed to amend the Irish text to a point where we could accept it. I thanked my Non-Aligned colleagues but warned them that their amendments, although acceptable to us, might well impose an impossible task on the Secretary-General. We were resolved not to accept a cease-fire unless it was inextricably linked to immediate Argentine withdrawal. In the light of all our experience in the past rounds of negotiations conducted by Secretary Haig, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General, my honest feeling was that the Secretary-General would not be able to achieve positive results within the deadline of 7 days which the draft resolution stipulated.

/I advised them
I advised them to make sure that the Secretary-General was willing to try his hand again, before they brought their draft to a vote. After consulting the Secretary-General, they decided to go ahead and, on 26th May, SCR 505 (text at Annex 2) was adopted unanimously. I made our position clear in explanation of our vote.

The Secretary-General lost no time in approaching my Argentine opposite number and myself, although he was under no illusions regarding the magnitude of his task since I had made clear in my statements in the debate that we were not prepared to become embroiled in another endless negotiation leaving our hands tied and Argentine forces entrenched on the Islands. After a week of hectic but fruitless negotiation the Secretary-General reported failure to the Council on 2nd June, and the formal meetings resumed.

My Spanish colleague took the lead with Panama on behalf of Argentina and, after two days of debate and negotiation involving several amendments to their original text, they pressed to the vote an apparently innocuous cease-fire resolution which, in our judgment, would have had precisely the effect which we refused to contemplate. The vote was deliberately timed to coincide with a ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement Coordinating Bureau which was taking place in Havana.

Even at this late stage, and even given the predilection of the United Nations to adopt without question calls for ceasefires and military restraint, Spain and Panama had the gravest difficulty in securing the necessary 9 votes to turn our negative vote into a veto. We were not isolated. Had it not been for 2 last-minute switches in voting intentions, the draft would only have secured 7 votes. As it was, the voting was 9 in favour (Spain, Panama, China, USSR, Poland, Ireland, Japan) 2 against (UK, US) with 4 abstentions (France, Jordan, Guyana, Togo). Three of the five uncommitted Non-Aligned delegations had not been prepared to cast their votes in the opposite sense to ours. Fortunately any odium which might have attached to us for using our veto was diverted by the astonishing statement by Mrs Kirkpatrick after the vote that she had been requested by her Government to record the fact that, were it possible to change their vote,
change their vote, they would like to change it from a veto - a 'no' - to an abstention. This revelation left the Council and the media stunned and I was able to escape from the Chamber almost unnoticed by the press, the microphones and the TV cameras as they engulfed Mrs Kirkpatrick.

The conclusion of this debate brought the drama in the United Nations to a close. The Secretary-General, whose mandate under SCR 505 remained in being, made a last-minute attempt with us and Argentina to avert a final battle for Port Stanley, but without success. On 14th June Argentine troops on the Falklands surrendered and on 24th June British forces repossessed the South Sandwich Islands. By that time the attention of the Security Council had turned to the tragedy of the Lebanon and the General Assembly was in the midst of the Second Special Session on Disarmament: action in New York over the Falklands had declined to desultory exchanges of Notes by ourselves, the Argentine and Panamanian Missions.

As I reflect many months later on what was undoubtedly the most hectic and tempestuous episode in my long association with the United Nations, a multitude of impressions and indeed of lessons for the future fill my mind. I will end this article by setting some of these down.

First, the Falklands crisis exploded the myth that Western states and particularly ex-imperial powers, are permanently isolated and on the defensive in an Organisation which is dominated by a Third World majority and obsessed by the doctrine of de-colonisation. Our cause was right - resistance to the use of force to regulate political disputes - and our policy was clear and resolute. The uncommitted Non-Aligned members of the Security Council, and a large number of delegations outside the Council, were prepared to judge the case on its merits. We started out with the maximum support for our initiative in calling the Security Council and tabling our own resolution and, even when the natural instinct of the United Nations to favour negotiations against mounting hostilities took charge, the basic justice of our cause was not forgotten and I never felt the coldness of isolation. As I have pointed out earlier in this article, only 2 of the 5 uncommitted Non-Aligned delegations
Aligned delegations on the Council felt able to support an apparently innocuous draft resolution calling for a cease-fire as late as 4th June.

Secondly, the Falklands crisis destroyed a second myth, namely that United Nations debates are invariably sterile affairs consisting of dull set speeches generally addressed to domestic audiences with the pattern of voting predetermined before the debate begins. The Falklands debates were lively, serious and full of meaning. Many of the statements delivered, including a large number of my own, were extemporised in the light of the current of the day's proceedings. There was no miasma of boredom hanging over the Council Chamber. Every word was listened to with close attention, every document carefully studied, and I felt throughout, as I have no doubt that my Argentine opposite numbers did, that tactical errors and omissions in debate and in private consultations, could cost support and forfeit votes when the time came. This was in vivid contrast to the sterilities of debate on the subjects which mainly preoccupy the Security Council. The Falklands debate had a pristine quality which I had not previously encountered.

Thirdly, I was profoundly impressed by the diplomatic skill, the dedication and impartiality of the Secretary-General. I had known and liked Javier Perez de Cuellar for a long time and had warmly welcomed his election, only a few months before, to the Secretary-Generalship. The Falklands crisis was his first and most exacting test. He did not succeed, but no-one could have done more or done it with greater expertise. He passed with flying colours, an excellent augury for the future of the Organisation under his stewardship.

Fourthly, I was intrigued by the difference between the attitudes of many states as expressed in their capitals as compared to their public positions as stated before the eyes of the world in New York. On the Latin American side, so far as I know, little or no hostility was manifested towards Britain in the majority of Latin American capitals. This contrasted strongly with the flood of rhetoric which poured out in the Security Council. On the Western side, we received invaluable support from
support from the United States, certain Commonwealth countries and our European partners in capitals: with some notable exceptions to which I have drawn attention this was not apparent in statements before the Council.

Fifthly, what were the true intentions of Argentina following the invasion? Were their protestations of willingness to implement SCR 502 in all its parts sincere? I can only express a personal view but, on reflection, I still believe that what I thought at the time was right. I am convinced that the Argentine Government made two fatal miscalculations at the outset. They did not believe that we would react militarily to their seizure of the Falklands and South Georgia and they never expected that we would win and hold the diplomatic initiative in New York: how could a former imperial power prevail diplomatically in the UN over an issue of decolonisation against a member of the Non-Aligned Movement whose cause in the South Atlantic had been espoused by successive Non-Aligned Summits? They were wrong: they had underestimated the depth of the antipathy of virtually the whole membership to the use of force to regulate political disputes whatever the merits.

Thereafter I believe that the Argentine Government was determined to remain in possession of the Islands; having embarked on their military adventure, they had no intention of seriously negotiating the peaceful implementation of SCR 502. Their objective was to play for time indefinitely in the hope that international opinion would gradually move against us; that the origins of the crisis would be forgotten; that, as our military reaction developed we would be seen as the aggressor and they as the victims; that as they gradually pushed us onto the wrong foot in the eyes of world opinion we would not dare to pursue our military operations beyond, say, a temporary blockade; and that, after a time, we would abandon our attempts to repossess the Islands and content ourselves with saving face in a welter of interminable UN negotiations. I may of course be wrong and I must emphasise that the above opinion is strictly personal.

In conclusion I venture to suggest that the reputation of Britain in the United Nations has been greatly enhanced by our handling of the Falklands crisis. Not only our allies and /partners, but
partners, but our adversaries too, could witness the unswerving determination with which we pursued all three aspects of our policy, diplomatic, military and economic. And I like to believe that many Non-Aligned countries may have felt reassured to know that Britain is still both capable and willing to act firmly when important national interests and internationally accepted principles are at stake.
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ: Falklands.
SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH SHULTZ: FALKLANDS.


2. SHULTZ SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE U.S. ROLE IN AMENDING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND MR PYM THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER.

3. SHULTZ SAID THAT THERE WAS A RESOLUTION AT THE OAS MEETING WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO SUPPORT, BUT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT REFERENCES TO RESOLUTIONS WHICH THEY HAD NOT SUPPORTED IN THE PAST. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF ITS INTERESTS IN THE HEMISPHERE.

4. THIS MORNING, FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF WASHINGTON TEL NOS 3689 AND 3690, BULLARD RANG BURT TO ASK ABOUT AMERICAN INTENTIONS. BURT WAS UNSIGHTED ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. BULLARD SAID THAT, FOLLOWING THE VOTE IN THE UNGA, EVERY WORD OF ANY RESOLUTION VOTED FOR BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE OAS WOULD BE SCRUTINISED MINUTELY IN LONDON. HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DRAFT IN THE SECOND TUR WAS THE ONE WHICH SHULTZ HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. INTENDED TO VOTE FOR. HE MENTIONED PARTICULARLY PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 1. BURT TOOK NOTE, BUT URGED THAT BRITISH VIEWS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE PRESSSED IN WASHINGTON. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD LIKE SIR O WRIGHT TO ACT ON THIS ADVICE.

SUTHERLAND

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

OO UKMIS NEW YORK
PP WASHINGTON
GRS 550
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 151300Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1000 OF 15 NOVEMBER
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
YOUR TELNO 1836: FALKLANDS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. WE AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE LINE YOU PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

2. WE SHOULD HOWEVER PREFER YOU NOT (NOT) TO USE THE PHRASE 'NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY' EITHER WITH REFERENCE TO THE PAST OR TO THE FUTURE. THE 1977 TERMS OF REFERENCE DID SPECIFICALLY MENTION THAT A SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTE EXISTED, BUT ALL TALKS WERE HELD ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE'S POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE PREJUDICED. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SAY NOW THAT, IF THERE WERE A CHANGE OF HEART IN ARGENTINA, SOVEREIGNTY COULD AGAIN BE ON THE AGENDA. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN YOUR STATEMENT TO THE ASSEMBLY, IE THAT IF THERE WERE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF HEART BY ARGENTINA THEN THERE WOULD BE HOPE THAT THE DISPUTE COULD BE PUT BEHIND US.

3. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO MAKE THE ARTICLE 73 POINT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BUT WE SHOULD PREFER YOU WHEN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS TO REST SIMPLY ON THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND BY ME REJECTING THE RESOLUTION.

4. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTINUES TO HAVE A MANDATE UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505. THAT RESOLUTION WAS ADDRESSED TO A SITUATION WHICH NO LONGER EXISTS AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MANDATE HAS IN OUR VIEW ACCORDINGLY LAPSED.

5. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW MUCH CAPITAL THE ARGENTINES ARE ABLE TO MAKE OUT OF THE PASSAGE OF THEIR MUCH DILUTED RESOLUTION WITH ITS RATHER POOR LEVEL OF SUPPORT. IN GENERAL WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN YOUR REPLYING IN BRIEF BUT FIRM TERMS TO ANY ARGENTINE ATTACKS, IN THE HOPE THAT THE TEDIOUS THEY MAY ENGENDER

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WILL INCREASE SYMPATHY FOR OUR POSITION.
ARGENTINE INTENTIONS
6. THERE ARE OF COURSE MANY OPTIONS OPEN TO THE ARGENTINES. WE DO NOT THINK THEY WILL SEE IT AS IN THEIR INTERESTS TO ANNOUNCE A DEFINITIVE END TO HOSTILITIES AND/OR A RENUNCIATION OF THE FUTURE USE OF FORCE, UNLESS THIS WERE FIRMLY TIED TO A BRITISH CONCESSION, PROBABLY ON NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE NECESSARILY THINK THERE WILL BE FURTHER HOSTILITIES: SIMPLY THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL PREFER TO KEEP THEIR OPTIONS OPEN AND US GUESSING.
7. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HOPE FOR A MUTUAL RELAXATION OF COMMERCIAL SANCTIONS (AND ARE INDEED WORKING ON THIS), A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND/OR SERVICES FOR THE ISLANDS MUST BE A MUCH DIMMER PROSPECT AND ONLY CONCEIVABLE IF WE AGREE TO SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE ISLANDS' FUTURE.
8. IF, UNEXPECTEDLY, THE ARGENTINES DID TAKE ANY OF THE STEPS OUTLINED IN YOUR PARA 8, WE SHOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY EXACTLY WHAT WAS ON OFFER, BUT IN PRINCIPLE WE WOULD WELCOME THEM. THERE ARE SOME STRAWS IN THE WIND, EG AN OFFER, OF SORTS, ON MINING CLEARANCE. WHETHER THESE WILL AMOUNT TO A BASIS ON WHICH WE MIGHT NUDGE THE ARGENTINES TOWARDS ANNOUNCING A DEFINITIVE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES REMAINS TO BE SEEN. ANY COOPERATION ON REPATRIATION OF THEIR DEAD WOULD CERTAINLY BE WELCOME. A DEFINITIVE CESSION OF HOSTILITIES (OR EVEN A VISIBLE LOWERING OF THE TEMPERATURE FALLING SHORT OF THAT), PROVIDED IT WERE NOT DEPENDENT ON AGREEMENT ON OUR PART TO NEGOTIATIONS, COULD HELP WITH VITALLY IMPORTANT LINKS WITH BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY.

PYM

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PP UKMIS GENEVA

GRS 350
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TO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA
AND PRIORITY TO CIVIL COMMISSIONER PORT STANLEY
INFO MODUK (PS/MR WIGGIN)
INFO SAVING BERNE, BRASILIA
ARGENTINE DEAD ON THE FALKLANDS

1. WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE NOW UNLIKELY TO RECEIVE A POSITIVE ANSWER FROM THE ARGENTINES OVER REPATRIATION OF THEIR DEAD IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IF AT ALL. WE ALSO URGENTLY NEED TO MAKE MORE SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEAD ON THE ISLANDS WHOM THEY BURIED, OPEN IN AN UNSATISFACTORY MANNER. WE ARE THEREFORE STARTING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REBURIAL OF ALL THE ARGENTINE BODIES. ON THE BASIS OF PRELIMINARY WORK BY THE COMMONWEALTH WAR GRAVES COMMISSION (CWGC) THREE SEPARATE SITES ARE ENVISAGED FOR ARGENTINE CEMETERIES: GOOSE GREEN FOR THOSE ALREADY BURIED IN AND AROUND THE SETTLEMENT, ADJACENT TO PORT STANLEY FOR THOSE NOW BURIED INSIDE THE CEMETERY THERE, AND A THIRD ELSEWHERE. ACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE MOD OR CWGC. ALL THE BODIES WOULD BE BURIED IN WOODEN COFFINS AND THE GRAVES MARKED WITH CROSSES (ON THE FRENCH PATTERN AND IN CONTRAST WITH OUR OWN DEAD WHO WILL HAVE HEADSTONES). REBURIAL WILL BE CARRIED OUT WITH DIGNITY ACCORDING TO RC RITES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN THE NEW YEAR.

2. PLEASE INFORM THE ICRC OF THE ABOVE AND ASK THEM TO INFORM THE ARGENTINES. YOU SHOULD ALSO ASK THEM TO PASS ON THE MESSAGE THAT OUR OFFER OF REPATRIATION STILL HOLDS GOOD: IF THE ARGENTINES WANT TO TAKE IT UP, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY SHOULD LET US KNOW BEFORE ACTUAL REINTERMENT TAKES PLACE (APART FROM ANYTHING ELSE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS NEED TO BE MADE FOR COFFINS WHICH ARE BEING TRANSPORTED ANY DISTANCE).

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FOR PORT STANLEY

3. We understand that you and General Thorne have discussed these arrangements with CWGC representative and we assume this will be reflected in his report. We should be grateful however for your views on sites for Argentine cemeteries, taking full account of feelings of the Islanders. Would there be reservations about burying Argentine dead at San Carlos, which is one idea being considered by the CWGC?

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Falklands at the General Assembly

Thank you for your letter of 12 November. The Prime Minister agrees that the proposed message from herself to the President of Sri Lanka should be despatched and I should be grateful if you would arrange for this.

Mrs. Thatcher also considers that we should thank the Sultan of Oman for his country's negative vote. I should be grateful if you would provide a draft.

A. J. Coles

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RESTRICTED
12 November 1982

Michael Scholar Esq.
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

Dear Michael,

ARGENTINA: FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

The Bank of England are continuing to keep a close eye on progress in the lifting of financial sanctions by Argentina against the United Kingdom. The following paragraphs set out to the substance of their latest report, which is in general encouraging.

Payment of Arrears Due to UK Banks

As has been mentioned in the press, the four major clearing banks have reached agreement, on terms which are satisfactory to them, with the Argentine Central Bank on the settlement of outstanding payments. The terms involve some rolling-over, but arrears of interest are to be paid, and the other terms of syndicated loans will be honoured. This should effectively bring the position of the four banks into line with that of banks in other countries.

Similar individual agreements are now being sought for other British banks with claims on Argentina, following an approach by the Bank of England at the request of the Argentine Central Bank to invite these other British banks to settle on the same basis.

Presence of Supervisors in British Enterprises

Supervisors have still not been removed from British non-banking companies, and the Bank of England has asked companies concerned to keep them informed of developments. But the President of the Argentine Central Bank has said that any UK company having difficulty with its "supervisor" should contact him, and he will try to help. We are not in fact aware of any difficulties, and in one case, that of the Wellcome Foundation, the "supervisor" has been a positive help in organising an approach to the Argentine authorities to waive some unofficial boycott of supplies of pharmaceuticals.

Pensioners

Progress has been made. The Argentine Committee which is responsible for implementing the law under which payments have been restricted has now agreed that remittances may be made, and they are expected to be made shortly.
Other Points

The position under other headings is much as it was previously, but in the vast majority of cases any difficulties being experienced by British companies are no more than those being experienced by the companies of other countries.

Copies of this letter go to Brian Fall at the FCO and John Rhodes at DOT.

Yours ever,

J O KERR

Principal Private Secretary
Prime Minister

Agree that the message should be telephoned?

M.E.C.

12 November 1982

Dear Jim,

Falklands at the General Assembly

Thank you for your letter of 4 November, with which you enclosed a copy of a message from the President of Sri Lanka to the Prime Minister about the Sri Lankan decision to vote against the Argentine draft resolution.

We recommend that the Prime Minister should send a brief message of appreciation in reply. We had not expected Sri Lanka to do better than abstain and the decision is known to have been very much the President's own.

We do not propose that the Prime Minister should send any other messages of appreciation. Her messages to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand, Fiji and Belize in the week before the vote already took the form of expressions of gratitude for the robust attitude those governments were taking rather than requests for assistance. Apart from Sri Lanka, the only Heads of Government to have replied to the Prime Minister's messages are Australia, Singapore and the Maldives, which all abstained. All the posts concerned have already been asked to convey our thanks as appropriate for negative votes or abstentions, making clear that they do so on instructions from Ministers.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF SRI LANKA

Your High Commissioner delivered to me on 4 November your reply to my message about the Argentine resolution on the Falkland Islands which was voted on later that day. Sri Lanka's decision to vote against this resolution is most warmly appreciated in this country and I am most grateful to you for the decision you took.
FM Rome 110915Z Nov 82

To Immediate FCO

Telegram No. 571 of 11 Nov 82


Saying for Info all other EC Posts

 Falklands at the General Assembly: Italian Vote

1. A member of Spadolini’s diplomatic office telephoned yesterday, following Spadolini’s return from the U.S. to say that given the current uncertainty over the future of the government it was not certain whether a formal reply would be issued to the Prime Minister’s message about the Italian vote at the United Nations. But Spadolini wanted us to know that, since receipt of the Prime Minister’s message, he had continued to advocate a change in the Italian vote even during the first few days of his visit to the U.S., and at the risk of damaging Italy’s relations with Argentina. As for the message itself he had found its tone hard, but quite understandable given the immense importance which he knew the Prime Minister attached to the issue.

2. This emollient line from Palazzo Chigi contrasts with the asperity of Malfatti (MFA) at the time (my telegram No. 556).

3. I shall delay my recommendation on the next Anglo-Italian Summit until the present confused political situation (my telegram No. 467. Not to all) becomes clearer. The fate of Spadolini’s government hangs in the balance, and he has cancelled the Franco-Italian Summit on 12 November.

4. FCO PSE pass saving addresses

ARCULUS

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FROM DAR ES SALAAM 101025Z NOV 82 TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4639 OF 10 NOV 82

SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

OUR IPT: FALKLANDS: PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGES.

TEXT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S LETTER DATED 8 NOVEMBER TO THE PRIME MINISTER IS AS FOLLOWS:

DEAR MRS THATCHER,

THANK YOU FOR WRITING TO ME ABOUT THE U.N.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ISSUE.

OUR FOREIGN MINISTER, NDUGU SALIM AHMED SALIM, DID SPEAK TO YOUR HIGH COMMISSIONER TO EXPLAIN TO HIM WHY WE FELT THAT WE HAD TO VOTE FOR THE AMENDED RESOLUTION. YOU WILL HAVE HAD A FULL REPORT FROM MR. SANKEY. YET I WANTED TO WRITE TO YOU PERSONALLY FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, BECAUSE I DO VALUE OUR DIRECT COMMUNICATION ON MATTERS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES; AND SECONDLY BECAUSE I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE DO UNDERSTAND BRITAIN'S POSITION ON THIS QUESTION. WHEN AMIN'S TROOPS HAD BEEN PUSHED OUT OF TANZANIA WE DID NOT AGREE TO TALK WITH HIM, AND ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOT A DIRECT PARALLEL BETWEEN THE TWO SITUATIONS TNEU-95-9, (E SUFFICIENT SIMILARITIES FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES WHICH PROMPTED YOUR GOVERNMENT'S STAND. TANZANIA IS ALSO VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION: ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON THAT SCORE RELATE TO PROBLEMS OF ITS APPLICATION IN PARTICULAR SITUATIONS. IN OUR OWN CONTINENT, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE THE PROBLEM OF MAYOTTE AS PART OF COMOROS, AND INDEED THE PROBLEM OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA.

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES TO YOU. I AM HAPPY TO SEE FROM NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPHS THAT YOUR HEALTH DOES NOT SEEM TO BE AFFECTED BY THE STRAINS OF HIGH OFFICE IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES, AND I HOPE THEY GIVE AN ABSOLUTELY CORRECT PICTURE.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JULIUS K. NYERERE

FCO PSE PASS SAVING

SANKEY

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COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS' CRISIS

1. Attached is a list of Commonwealth Governments' reactions to the Falklands crisis as at 8 November 1982.
2. Dependent Territories have been eliminated from the list.

8 November 1982
COMMONWEALTH COORDINATION DEPARTMENT
COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS' REACTIONS TO FALKLANDS CRISIS

COUNTRY

*Antigua and Barbuda
Robust statement by PM copied to Commonwealth SG. Full support to UN initiative. Support in OAS/UN. Remain "strongly pro-British" after recapture of S. Georgia. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November; spoke in UK favour at UN before and at debate.

*Australia
Recalled Ambassador. He returned 28 April, delivering strongly worded message to Galtieri. Ban on imports; ban on credit. Robust statements/messages of support before and after recapture of S. Georgia. Statement at Security Council. PM wrote to President Reagan/lobbied with VP Bush. But quoted as saying that unlikely to be drawn into "hostilities": "outside our sphere of influence and our region". Private message of congratulations to PM and congratulatory public statement following Argentine surrender. Government contribution of A$250,000 to national appeal to assist families of British servicemen and Falkland Islanders. Diplomatic effort in BA to ensure fast return of Argentine prisoners. Offer to reconsider purchase of Invincible. Spoke robustly in Committee of 24. Abstained in Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Bahamas
Robust reply to PM's letter, to be referred to in Government statement. Note to Argentine Government urging compliance with SCR 502. Robust statement. PM and Foreign Minister refused to see Argentine lobbying delegation travelling in Caribbean; seen by senior official. Abstained in Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Bangladesh
Statement condemning "use of force in settling disputes". Robust statement privately to High Commissioner from Permanent Secretary Foreign Affairs. Helpful in NAM. "Sympathetic" but abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

*+Barbados
"Full and complete support to any Commonwealth protest and initiative". Prime Minister delivered statement during televised budget debate ensuring maximum coverage. Support in OAS. Although sympathetic to UK position, PM said Barbados would be unlikely to vote against Argentine resolution (28 September). Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

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*Belize

Reply to PM. Telegram to UNSG. Robust statement. Message to Caricom ministers urging support for SCR 502. Continued support after recapture of S. Georgia and further hostilities. Sustained pro-British attitudes throughout the hostilities, in the press, at home and abroad (e.g. meeting in Costa Rica in May). Further message to some Commonwealth colleagues urging them to rally Caricom and Commonwealth countries to support UK at UN. Instructions to support us in NAM and UN. Unsuccessful attempt to table helpful statement in NAM Regional meeting, but played crucial role in mustering moderates in full NAM meeting. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

*Botswana

Statement 'strongly condemns' Argentine action. No specific mention of support for UK. Replied to SG's letter. 'Likely' to continue support following recapture of S Georgia (BHC). Helpful in NAM. Strong statement at 27th UNGA in defence of non-use of force and self-determination but voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November, although claim that position on basic issues has not altered. High Commission does not write off support in the future.

*Canada


Cyprus

After long silence prior to recapture of South Georgia, initially declined to make 'an independent statement' but undertook not to say anything 'adverse'. However statement published on 24 May referred to SCR 502 but condemned 'the retention at the end of the 20th century of the last remnants of colonialism'. We remonstrated, and the speech subsequently made by the Cyprus Foreign Minister in Havana was apparently in milder language although the message remained essentially the same. A further statement, issued on 21 June and quoting the Havana speech, confirmed that this remained the Cyprus Government's position. Voted for the Argentine resolution on 4 November.

*Dominica

Robust letter to Prime Minister. Robust message to UNSG. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

/Fiji ....
Robust statement by PM. 'Understanding and support' at official level after recapture of S. Georgia. Helpful in Committee of 24. UK can count on 'continued support at UNGA and in Committee of 24'. Outstanding efforts at UN: lobbying with some success among Africans. First to declare unequivocal support to vote against Latin American resolution. PM thanked Ratu Mara. As Chairman of CHGRM he agreed to urge support at UN for UK policy on Falklands. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.


Response unlikely because of domestic crises. But Ghana 'would not condemn Britain, nor support Argentina'. Instructions to Missions on these lines. Entered reservation on NAM statement. After Argentine lobbying, MFA said 'now was not the time to open a debate on sovereignty'. Voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Unhelpful statement supporting Argentine's territorial claim but disapproving of use of force. Voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Strong statement by Guyana Government. Voted for SCR 502. Robust reply to Ramphal's letter. Robust reply PM letter. Assurance of support from PM in UN/NAM before and after recapture of S. Georgia. Entered reservation on NAM statement after some attempt at Havana to amend it. Keen to help us. Not optimistic that support in NAM would affect pro-Argentine tilt, but thought that likely to be more effective in UNGA. Unsuccessful attempt to table helpful statement in NAM Regional Meeting. Supported references to self-determination/non-use of force in full NAM Meeting. Abstained on Latin American resolution.

Lukewarm: appealing to 'all parties' to seek a 'peaceful resolution'. PM privately does not approve either of Argentine or UK action over S. Georgia. BHC thinks in public India 'will probably try to maintain some sort of balance', but that Indian sympathies 'essentially with us'. This could change...
if international opinion turned against UK. India would 'try (repeat try) to ensure a moderate consensus' in NAM, but would find it difficult not to support call for negotiations. PM 'made no particular response' to Mr Nott's personal appeal during his visit. Reacted unhelpfully to PM's message to CGRM Heads of Delegation. Voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

* Jamaica
Robust statement. As deputy PM recently told Mr Onslow, maintained firm stance in OAS. Some attempt at Havana to change language of NAM statement: subsequent reservation. Continued 'general sympathy and support'. Glad to see 'resumption of contact' with Argentina not ruled out. 'Ready to speak right' in NAM and UNGA provided not isolated. Introduced references to self-determination and non-use of force into NAM communiqué. Abstained in Latin American resolution on 4 November but made robust statement as explanation of vote.

* Kenya
Robust statements (one in UNGA). Entered reservation on NAM statement. Kenya would support in UN even if NAM position different; President also continuing chairman of OAU. Supported moderate amendments helpful to UK in NAM communiqué. Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

* Kiribati
Robust statement in message to Argentine Government condemning invasion (made public).

* Lesotho
Response to SG expressing '"deep concern". Helpful in NAM. PM 'saw no difficulty about support' over S. Georgia but would need to consult. Statement in National Assembly in support of S. Georgia. Entered reservation on NAM statement. Lesotho's support for Britain reiterated by Lesotho High Commissioner on 25 May. No reason why Lesotho's '"basically pro-UK attitude" should change. Agreed Argentine demand for negotiations leading to sovereignty inappropriate. Entered reservation on NAM resolution. Promised support in debate. Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

* Malawi
President's robust reply to PM. moral backing for use of force if necessary. Robust statement. President assured that he '"fully supported British action in S. Atlantic" following recapture of S. Georgia and further hostilities. President's '"deep sorrow" at losses of HMS "Sheffield" and Harriers. Personal message of congratulations from President following Argentine surrender. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

/Malaysia
Malaysia
Weak statement although 'deeply disturbed'. Little prospect of 'official reaction' to recapture of S. Georgia; but UK points conveyed to PM. Voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

The Maldives
Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November. President wrote to PM explaining position.

Malta
Government remained aloof throughout and made no statement. Avoided participation in Council of Europe vote; but in conversation with BHC Foreign Minister said Malta 'committed in support'. During televised debate at beginning of May, however, he said that too much attention was being given to the issue. Voted in favour of Latin American UN resolution.

*Mauritius

Nauru

*New Zealand
Robust statements/messages of support. Broken diplomatic relations. Support at UN. Cancelled Argentine flight schedule. Ban on trade, supply of arms/military material, export credits. 'Support of (NZ) Government' for action taken to recapture S. Georgia. Loan of frigate. Congratulatory private message to PM and positive public statement following Argentine surrender. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

*Nigeria
Message to PM, acknowledged by her. Helpful statement. Instructions to be helpful in NAM: Support for 'genuine negotiations', self-determination, appreciation of UK mood. Intervention helpful to UK in NAM but voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

/Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea

Robust statement by PM PNG. To make feelings known through international bodies. Responded to SG quoting statement. Told Argentine Government that unless complies with SCR 502 PNG will break off diplomatic relations. Assurance of continued support after recapture of S. Georgia. New Government confirmed would follow similar (sympathetic) line to predecessor. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Saint Lucia

Strong statement. Helpful statement in OAS. Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Robust statement. Copy sent to SG. Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Seychelles

Response to PM letter deploiring aggression: made public. Unwilling to give indication of 'likely Government reaction' after recapture of S. Georgia. Believe did not attend NAM. Do not know if entered reservation. In the event absent from vote on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Sierra Leone


Singapore

Fairly robust statement although no specific mention of support for UK. Robust reply from PM to PM's message. Entered reservation in NAM statement. Supported moderate amendments helpful to UK in NAM communiqué. Abstained in Latin American resolution on 4 November. PM wrote to Mrs Thatcher explaining reason.

/Solomon Islands ...
**Solomon Islands**
Robust statement. Government has also sent message to SG of UN and to SG of Commonwealth. 'Assurance' of support to Prime Minister. Robust reply to PM letter. 'Wholly sympathetic' over action to recover S. Georgia. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

**Sri Lanka**
Message to Prime Minister 'condemns use of force' but no specific support for UK. Helpful in NAM. Voted against Latin American resolution on 4 November.

**Swaziland**
Statement expressing 'great concern' at invasion and supporting SCR 502. Instructions on similar lines sent to New York. Following S. Georgia and other hostilities PM and FM gave assurance of continued support in UN and generally. Entered reservation on NAM statement. Intervention helpful to UK in NAM. Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

**Tanzania**
Statement regrets Argentine military actions but no specific mention of support for UK. Letter to PM from President expressing 'sympathy' over Falkland problem. 'Wholly sympathetic' response from Foreign Minister after recapture of S. Georgia and 'no tendency' at highest level to criticise even if force used to remove Argentines. President privately expressed pleasure at Falklands outcome. Went along with NAM on Argentine sovereignty. Voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

**Tonga**
Robust reply to PM letter: would support 'any action' by us to reassert sovereignty. Robust public statement. Argentine citizens banned from Tonga. 'Sympathetic understanding' of UK position after recapture of S. Georgia.

**Trinidad and Tobago**
'Feeble' public statement, but helpful in OAS. Twice abstained in votes to invoke Rio Treaty. Likely that Trinidad would maintain in OAS its support for SCR 502. PM's message thanking for help in OAS made public. Senior Minister privately expressed strong support for UK position. Entered reservation on NAM statement after some attempt at Havana to amend it. Abstained in Latin American resolution on 4 November.

/Tuvalu ....
Robust reply to SG and Secretary of State. Congratulatory message from PM following Argentine surrender.

Voted for SCR 502. Helpful with Non-Aligned. Replied to PM letter: "great concern". Statement condemning aggression. Support after recapture of S. Georgia and continued support in UN. Supported SCR 505 but no reservation on NAM. Appeal for support at UN to be given "sympathetic consideration". But in event voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

statement "strongly condemns" invasion, but also calls upon UK to 'reconsider' military retaliation. Copied to SG, PM, Argentine Government, UN. PM "most receptive" and "entirely satisfied" over recapture of S. Georgia. Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Abstained on Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Statement by Acting President deploiring invasion. Support in NAM. Continued support after recapture of S. Georgia. Foreign Minister expressed 'very deep sorrow' at loss of life in HMS Sheffield. High Commission told Mr Onslow on 25 May that no change in Zambia's attitude to British stance on Falklands. Entered reservation on NAM statement. Voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Inadequate statement but urging UK and Argentina to abide by SCR 502. Protested successfully in NAM at Chair's (Cuba) attempt to steamroller unhelpful text through meeting. But voted for Latin American resolution on 4 November.

Notes:

* Countries which have explicitly (or implicitly through support for SCR 502) in public or in private condemned Argentina's invasion and/or called for withdrawal of Argentine forces.

+ Countries which have expressed support for the principles of self-determination in relation to the Falklands.
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PM FCO 081530Z NOV 82
TO ROUTINE CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 8 NOVEMBER 1982

FALKLANDS PROPAGANDA: LETTERS BY THE LATE LT TINKER RN
OUR GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NO 206.

1. THE LETTERS AND POEMS IN THE BOOK ARE BY LT TINKER RN WHO
   WAS KILLED ON 12 JUNE WHEN HMS GLAMORGAN WAS HIT BY AN EXOCET
   MISSILE.

2. THE LETTERS ARE TO LT TINKER'S WIFE AND PARENTS AND THE
   EXTRACTS PUBLISHED SO FAR ARE CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY
   ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

3. THE ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN HAS ALREADY MADE SOME
   USE OF THE LETTERS PARTICULARLY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:
   A. 'HERE WE ARE IN 1982, FIGHTING A COLONIAL WAR ON THE
      OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD'.
   B. 'EVEN IF GREAT BRITAIN RECONQUERS THE ISLANDS, WE SHALL
      STILL HAVE TO TALK WITH THE ARGENTINES AND REACH SOME
      KIND OF SETTLEMENT'.
   C. 'IF GREAT BRITAIN TURNS THE ISLANDS INTO A FORTRESS
      IT WILL SHOW THE COMPLETE HYPOCRISY OF THE BRITISH
      GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAD INTENDED TO LEAVE THE ISLANDERS
      COMPLETELY DEFENCELESS AND TO TAKE AWAY THEIR BRITISH
      CITIZENSHIP'.

LINE TO TAKE

4. YOU SHOULD NOT DRAW ATTENTION TO THESE LETTERS, BUT IF ASKED
   YOU MAY SAY THAT THEY ARE AN ISOLATED CASE. MOST MEMBERS OF THE
   FORCES STRONGLY BELIEVE IN THE PRINCIPLES THEY WERE DEFENDING,
   THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE
   REJECTION OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES. IT WAS

/TRAJIC

RESTRICTED
TRAGIC THAT MANY TALENTED YOUNG LIVES WERE LOST AS A RESULT OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. THE FACT THAT SUCH VIEWS ARE BEING PUBLICISED HERE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WORKINGS OF A FREE PRESS IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY.

PYM

SENT BY TELEGRAM TO:

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[ALL ROUTINE]

AND SAVING TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS

FCO/WHITEHALL
INFORMATION

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
GUIDANCE
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

Argentine Dead on the Falkland Islands

1. We discussed in Cabinet on 28 October what to do about the Argentine dead on the Falklands. You indicated separately to me that in view of the urgency of the problem, to which the Prime Minister drew attention in Cabinet, and as we cannot expect an early answer from the Argentines, you are trying to organise civil contractors to arrange reburial in Stanley.

2. I accept that the chances of the Argentines agreeing to repatriation now are slim. I therefore agree that we must go ahead with the reburial of all the Argentine dead on the Falklands. But I do not think that Stanley is the best place for an Argentine cemetery. They should all be buried together, but preferably in a site well outside the capital. A cemetery in Stanley would be likely to cause resentment among the Islanders and could be contrasted unfavourably with our decision to bury our own dead at San Carlos. It will be important to consult the Civil Commissioner about all this and to get his advice on possible locations.

3. Moreover, I do not think we should close off entirely the possibility of these bodies being repatriated to Argentina. We have no alternative now to burying their dead, but I am keen to keep open means of eliminating the Argentines' locus standi on the Islands that a permanent cemetery entails under the Geneva Convention. This means that, despite the obvious difficulties, those bodies which
lie in mass graves would need to be put with the others, and not just concreted over, which I understand your officials have been considering, since such a procedure would preclude subsequent reburial and would also in our view conflict with Article 17 of the First Geneva Convention which obliges us to allow for 'subsequent exhumations and possible transportation to the home country'.

4. We had hitherto refrained from publicity about the Argentine dead. The ICRC were still negotiating with Argentina and it seemed best not to risk jeopardising this process. But these negotiations have got nowhere and I think we should hold back no longer, while being careful to respect ICRC sensitivities. There is just a chance that we might shame the Argentine authorities into agreeing to repatriation.

5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Prime Minister and other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
8 November 1982
CONFIDENTIAL

File

cc: Trade
MOD
Att. Gen.
HO
CO

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 8 November 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS GOVERNMENT OFFICE

Thank you for your letter of 3 November. As I told your office at the end of last week, given the Islanders' views as reported in your letter, the Prime Minister agrees that they should finance the Falkland Islands Government Office in London.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A.J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL
8 November 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: REHABILITATION

The Prime Minister has noted the contents of the progress report enclosed with your letter of 2 November.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
PRESS SUMMARY

1. TOP COVERAGE TODAY IS GIVEN TO THE VOTING AT UNGA FALKLANDS DEBATE. AGAIN THERE ARE FULL PRESS AGENCY REPORTS AND MOST PAPERS PRINT COMPLETE DETAILS OF THE VOTING. "LA NACION"'S CORRESPONDENT REMARKS THAT THE RESOLUTION DOES NOT SATISFY ALL ARGENTINA'S ASPIRATIONS BUT THAT IT IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FOR THE FUTURE. "CONVENCION"'S CORRESPONDENT CONSIDERS THAT IT IS NOT A QUOTE SPECTACULAR VICTORY UNQUOTE FROM THE STRICT POINT OF VIEW OF THE FALKLANDS ISSUE BUT THAT ITS IMPORTANCE LIES IN THE FACT THAT IT IS THE FIRST DIPLOMATIC VICTORY AFTER A MILITARY DEFEAT. MOST PAPERS REPORT HBM AMBASSADOR TO UN'S COMMENT THAT AS A GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, THE DRAFT IS ADVISORY AND NOT BINDING.

2. PRESIDENT BIGNONE YESTERDAY OFFICIATED AT A CEREMONY AT THE BIRTHPLACE OF GENERAL SAN MARTIN IN CORRIENTES PROVINCE TO INAUGURATE A MEMORIAL FOR THOSE WHO DIED IN THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. THE MEMORIAL IN AN "ARCH OF TRIUMPH" IS SYMBOCALLY INCOMPLETE. THE ARCH IS TO BE FINISHED WHEN ARGENTINA FINALLY REGAINS SOVEREIGNITY OF THE ISLANDS.
3. IN A MEETING HELD YESTERDAY THE MILITARY JUNTA DECIDED TO FORM A COMMISSION, COMPRISED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, TO DRAW UP A BASIS FOR THE PLANNED QUOTE CONCERTACION UNQUOTE. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE FALKLANDS DEBATE AND ANALYSED THE RECENT INCIDENCE OF DECLARATIONS MADE BY RETIRED MEMBERS OF THE FORCES. THIS IS BELIEVED TO REFER TO STATEMENTS MADE BY ADMIRAL MASSERA, NOW UNDER ARREST, AND TO A FORTHCOMING PUBLICATION OF A BOOK OF EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH GENERAL GALTIERI NAMING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT AND THE ARGENTINE DEFEAT. SOME PAPERS REPORT THAT IN IT GALTIERI STATES HIS SUGGESTION TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 WAS OPPOSED BY OTHER JUNTA MEMBERS AND THEN FOREIGN MINISTER COSTA MENDEZ. SOME OF THE BOOKS EXPECTED REVELATIONS ARE ALREADY BEING DISPUTED AND IT IS SURE TO AROUSE CONTROVERSY.

4. "LA NACION" REPORTS THAT IN ADDITION TO ITALY, SPAIN AND WEST GERMANY ARE TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF DISAPPEARED PERSONS.

JOY

LEE

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FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
FOO
FID
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FAKLAND ISLANDS

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED
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FM KINSHASA 051826Z NOV 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 5 NOV 82
INFO SAVING UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 122: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. THANK YOU FOR THOSE TIMELY INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH ENABLED
   ME TO EXPRESS THANKS TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU ON BEHALF OF
   BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

2. I ALSO GAVE HIM A COPY OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE
   DELIVERED TO HIS OFFICE ON 29 OCTOBER, REMARKING THAT IT
   HAD NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. HE TOLD ME THAT
   THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD SEEN IT. WHILE ON HOLIDAY,
   HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY AIDE THAT THERE WAS A MESSAGE FROM
   THE PRIME MINISTER ASKING ZAIRE NOT TO VOTE FOR THE
   ARGENTINE DRAFT RESOLUTION. BECAUSE OF THE GOOD RECEIPTION
   HE HAD RECEIVED FROM MRS THATCHER IN LONDON IN DECEMBER 1981,
   HE HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS THAT ZAIRE SHOULD ABSTAIN. ZAIRE
   HAD BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FROM ARGENTINE, SUPPORTED BY MEMBERS
   OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND THE DECISION HAD NOT BEEN
   AN EASY ONE.

3. FULL RECORD OF THE MEETING (WHICH COVERED ALSO OTHER
   TOPICS) FOLLOWS BY BAG.

4. FCO PLEASE PASS COPY SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK

SNODGRASS
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
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FM COLOMBO 050545Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 309 OF 5 NOVEMBER
INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 108 TO GEORGETOWN

FALKLAND ISLANDS & PRIME MINISTERIAL MESSAGE

1. WOULD YOU PLEASE PASS TO THE PRIME MINISTER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRESIDENT GAYCOM OF THE MALDIVES?

BEGINS:

I HAVE THE PLEASURE OF ACKNOWLEDGING YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. THE GOVERNMENT OF MALDIVES HAS BEEN FOLLOWING THIS ISSUE VERY CLOSELY. AS REPEATEDLY INDICATED, MY GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF RESORTING TO MILITARY ACTION IN SETTLING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. DESPITE THE SUPPORT OF SOME OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO ARGENTINA'S POSITION IN THE FALKLANDS PROBLEM, I HAD PERSONALLY EXPRESSED MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS CLEARLY ON THE MATTER, IN MY RESPONSE TO YOUR WORDS OF WELCOME AT THE LUNCHEON IN LONDON DURING THE CRISIS. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THIS POSITION AND I HAVE ASKED THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO INSTRUCT THE MALDIVES DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO ABSTAIN ON THE ARGENTINIAN RESOLUTION.

WITH THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

ENDS.

NICHOLAS

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FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
FAKLAND ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr Flesher,

Further to the High Commissioner's letter to the Prime Minister of 29 October 1982 conveying the text of a letter from the Australian Prime Minister, enclosed is the original of the letter forwarded by diplomatic bag.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
(Neroli Doust)
Personal Secretary

Mr Timothy Flesher,
Private Secretary,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1.
My Dear Margaret

Thank you for your letter of 26 October asking for Australia's support in the vote on the Argentine resolution on the Falklands.

My Government has carefully considered your letter. I am pleased to be able to say that Australia continues to support Britain in this matter, and will abstain in the vote on the Argentine resolution.

We would be happy for you to refer to our position in representations your Government may make to others on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain
UNITED KINGDOM
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 671 OF 5/11/82

MY TELNO 670: Falklands at the UN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER FROM MR SUZUKI:

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN IN SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR GAVE ME VERY GREAT PLEASURE. I CANNOT STRESS TOO HIGHLY THE SIGNIFICANCE I ATTACH TO THAT VISIT AND OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON WIDE-RANGING SUBJECTS INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN WAS MOST FRUITFUL IN TERMS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND
Our cooperation in world affairs and deeply impressed the Japanese people. I highly evaluate, in particular, the strengthening political cooperation between our two countries, on which I reached agreement with you on that occasion, since it will be the basis for building up new Anglo-Japanese relations.

On the occasion of your visit I listened with the utmost attention to your views on negotiations with Argentina on the Falkland Islands. It may be recalled that throughout the discussions at the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere, Japan has constantly adhered to the position that all international disputes should be settled peacefully by negotiation between the parties concerned. With regard to the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, Japan has maintained the attitude that she is not in a position to render judgment. I fully agree to the view of the United Kingdom that the serious consequences brought about by the unacceptable action, the use of armed force, of Argentina cannot easily be removed. I also understand the position of the United Kingdom that political conditions for negotiating with Argentina on sovereignty have not fully matured as yet, so short a time after the regaining of the Falkland Islands by your country as a result of your great efforts. I have also paid full attention to the view of your country that the present draft resolution is unacceptable in its background and intention if not in its content.

However, I feel that many of its co-sponsor countries earnestly hope, as your country does, that the long ties of friendship and cooperation which have existed between the United Kingdom and Argentina be restored and that a genuine reconciliation be attained between your country and Argentina, and also between you and the other Latin American countries. I believe that it is this earnest hope that made these Latin American countries to exert their utmost efforts to revise the text of the draft. After long and careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that the draft resolution under reference could provide a basis for attaining a genuine reconciliation between the United Kingdom and Argentina and also between the United Kingdom and the other Latin American countries, and I feel it might be desirable for the United Kingdom to leave open a way of negotiations.
AM AWARE THAT IT IS OPEN TO QUESTION WHETHER NOW IS THE MOST OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO CALL FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND ARGENTINA AND THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM IS DISSATISFIED WITH MANY POINTS IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HOWEVER, BASED ON THE CONSIDERATION THAT, IN VIEW OF THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD, IT IS DESIRABLE FOR A LASTING PEACE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND FROM THE DESIRE TO SEE THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN YOUR COUNTRY AND ARGENTINA AS WELL AS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES BE RESTORED WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY, I REGARD THAT THE RESUMPTION OF GENUINELY BROAD-RANGING NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PRECONDITIONS IS NECESSARY.

I TRUST THAT YOU WILL FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS IDEA OF JAPAN. EVEN IF THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN VOTING ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION UNDER REFERENCE, THIS WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCE THE BASIC ATTITUDE THEY SHARE IN COMMON TO SAFEGUARD FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, AND I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A DIFFERENCE SHOULD NOT CAUSE ANY RETROGRESSION OF THE FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN BUILT UP OVER THE YEARS. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT MY COUNTRY WILL MAKE ALL POSSIBLE EFFORTS IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES OF THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA AND THUS TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN SOLIDARITY. I BELIEVE THAT THIS COULD BE A GOOD FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD THE KIND OF NEW CREATIVE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES THAT YOU AND I AGREED IN TOKYO. WITH KINDEST REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY,

ZENKO SUZUKI

PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN
Dear John,

Tony Parsons has written a paper for Chatham House's magazine 'International Affairs' about the handling of the Falklands crisis at the United Nations. It is in fact the text of a lecture that he gave at Chatham House a few weeks ago. As it will appear shortly after he takes up his new appointment, he has asked me to get in touch with you in this way to enquire whether it should be seen at No. 10 before approval is given for its publication.

The paper is largely factual and describes events most of which took place under the full glare of publicity. Robin Fearn and I have been through it and have identified only one sentence which we might prefer to see omitted. I am awaiting the final clearance from Library & Records Department.

Could you let me know if you would like me to send a copy across?

Yours ever,

N C R Williams
United Nations Department
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Minute from Hatfield to Coles

dated: 4 November 1982

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 150124Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1816 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS (FOR S.O.F.S. PARTY).

MIPT: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE RESULT OF THIS EVENING'S VOTE ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION:

YES (90): AFGHANISTAN, ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGOLA, ARGENTINA, AUSTRIA, BENIN, BOLIVIA, BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, BURUNDI, BYELORUSSIA, CAPE VERDE, CAR, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, COMOROS, CONGO, COSTA RICA, CUBA, CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, DEMOCRATIC YEMEN, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ETHIOPIA, GABON, GDR, GHANA, GREECE, GRENADA, GUATEMALA, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU, HAITI, HONDURAS, HUNGARY, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, ISRAEL, IVORY COAST, JAPAN, LAOS, LIBERIA, LIBYA, MADAGASCAR, MALAYSIA, MALI, MALTA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, MOZAMBIQUE, NICARAGUA, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, ROMANIA, RWANDA, SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE, SPAIN, SURINAME, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, TOGO, TUNISIA, UGANDA, UKRAINE, USSR, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, TANZANIA, UNITED STATES, UPPER VOLTA, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA, VIETNAM, YEMEN, YUGOSLAVIA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE.

NO (12): ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BELIZE, DOMINICA, FIJI, GAMBIA, MALAWI, NEW ZEALAND, OMAN, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, SOLOMON ISLANDS, SRI LANKA, UNITED KINGDOM.

ABSTAIN (52): AUSTRALIA, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BANGLADESH, BARBADOS, BELGIUM, BHUTAN, BURMA, CANADA, CHAD, DEMARK, EGYPT, FINLAND, FRANCE, FRG, GUYANA, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, JAMAICA, JORDAN, KENYA, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LESOTHO, LUXEMBOURG, MALDIVES, MAURITANIA, MAURITIUS, NEPAL, NETHERLANDS, NIGER, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, QATAR, ST LUCIA, ST VINCENT AND GRENADINES, SAMOA, SAUDI ARABIA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SOMALIA, SUDAN, SWAZILAND, SWEDEN, THAILAND, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, TURKEY, CAMEROON, VANUATU, ZAIRE.

NOT PRESENT OR NOT PARTICIPATING (3): DJIBOUTI, SEYCHELLES, SOUTH AFRICA.

THOMSON

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FAULKLAND ISLANDS

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DESKBY 241803Z UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.
FM FCO 041713Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 955 OF 4 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS AND WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED

NIFT
LINE TO TAKE AFTER UN FALKLANDS VOTE
THIS IS THE SORT OF RESOLUTION WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY USUALLY PASS BY A LARGE MAJORITY. BUT
MANyt GOVERNMENTS - HOWEVER THEY CAST THEIR VOTES - MUST HAVE
RECOGNISED THAT THIS ONE IS A HYPOCRITICAL SHAM.
- HOW CAN LAST APRIL'S AGGRESSOR TALK NOW ABOUT THE NON-USE
OF FORCE?
- HOW CAN A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS VANDALISED THE ISLANDS NOW
CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE DESTRUCTION IS THERE FOR
ALL TO SEE AND THE DANGER FROM MINES PERSISTS?
- HOW CAN THE INVADER OF THE ISLANDS NOW CALL FOR THE
ISLANDERS' INTERESTS TO BE RESPECTED?

THE ARGENTINE POSITION IS SIMPLY NOT CREDIBLE. THIS HAS
BECOME CLEARER AS THEY HAVE WATERED THEIR RESOLUTION DOWN IN
ORDER TO ATTRACT SUPPORT. BUT IT REMAINS OBJECTIONABLE.
IT ENTIRELY OVERLOOKS THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS AND THEN
CALLS FOR EARLY NEGOTIATIONS AS IF THE ARGENTINE INVASION
HAD NEVER HAPPENED. THIS IS PHONEY DIPLOMACY. I CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT IT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON OUR POLICY IN THE ISLANDS.

OF COURSE A VOTE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS NOT THE END OF THE
WORLD. WHAT MATTERS IS WHAT HAPPENS IN THE ISLANDS. THERE
WE WILL NOT BE DEFLECTED FROM OUR THREE PRIORITIES:

- REPAIRING THE DAMAGE
- PROVIDING FOR THEIR DEFENCE
- PLANNING FOR THEIR FUTURE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

LATER ON, WHEN THINGS HAVE SETTLED DOWN, WE WILL CONSULT THE
ISLANDERS ABOUT HOW THEY SEE THE FUTURE. BUT AFTER THE
TRAUMA OF THE INVASION, IT IS NOT YET TIME FOR THAT. IT IS
EVEN LESS TIMELY TO TALK ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE
ARGENTINES HAVE CLEARLY NOT CHANGED THEIR SPOTS.

DYM

NNNN

NNNN
GRS 428
RESTRICTED
DESKBY 741902Z TO ALL
FROM F CO 741713Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 954 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO IMMEDIATE PARIS.
to Info IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.

FROM GOULDEN NEWS DEPARTMENT
TELNO 1795: FALKLANDS DEBATE : PRESS LINE
1. IN HANDLING INTERVIEWS AFTER THE VOTE, YOU WILL WISH TO BE
GUIDED BY THE LINE IN MIFF, ON WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE
INTENDS TO BASE A RADIO INTERVIEW FOR HOME AND OVERSEAS CONSUMP-
TION AS SOON AS THE OUTCOME IS KNOWN. THE RESIDENT CLERK WILL LET
YOU KNOW OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES AND WILL TELEPHONE YOU AS
SOON AS THE STATEMENT HAS BEEN USED.
2. THE THREE MAIN THEMES WE WILL PRESS IN BRIEFING ARE:
1.) THE REMARKABLE THING IS THE WAY IN WHICH WORLD OPINION
FORCED ARGENTINA TO MODIFY ITS DRAFT. THEY HAVE BEEN
COMPELLED VIRTUALLY TO CONDEMN THEIR USE OR FORCE OUT
OF THEIR OWN MOUTHS. THEY HAVE HAD TO GIVE UP ALL REFERENCE
TO THE DECLARATIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WHICH GAVE
CATEGORIC SUPPORT TO THEIR CLAIM, AND WHICH THEY HAD WORKED
SO HARD TO SECURE. MANY NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES NOW THINK THEY
WERE A MISTAKE.
2.) GIVEN THE WATERED-DOWN NATURE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THE
NATURAL INCLINATION OF MEMBERS TO VOTE FOR NEGOTIATIONS,
THE VOTE WAS LOW BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY STANDARDS;
3.) GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ARE ONLY RECOMMENDATIONS,
WHICH WE ARE FREE TO REJECT IF WE THINK IT RIGHT TO DO
SO. WE REJECT THIS ONE. IT WILL NOT DEFLECT HMG FROM THEIR
POLICIES ON THE FALKLANDS.
3. ON OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE, WE INTEND TO TAKE THE
FOLLOWING APPROACH:
1.) REACTION TO ANY POSITIVE VOTE BY CLOSE FRIENDS: REGRET
AND DISAPPOINTMENT (BUT NOT QUOTE DISMAYED UNQUOTE AS HAS
BEEN ATIBUTED TO SOME GOVERNMENT SOURCES). UNATTRIBUTABLY
WE WILL COMMENT THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO VOTED YES CLEARLY
DID SO FOR REASONS UNCONNECTED WITH THE FALKLANDS ISSUE.
VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THOSE WHO HAVE SUPPORTED US BY VOTING
AGAINST OR ABSTAINING.
2.) WHY SO FEW SPEAKERS ON OUR SIDE: THERE WERE IN FACT SEVERAL
GOOD SPEECHES ON OUR SIDE. BUT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR OUR
FRIENDS TO MATCH THE REPEETITIVE RHETORIC OF THE LATINOS AND
THE COMMUNISTS WHICH DID THE ARGENTINES LITTLE GOOD.
3.) EFFECT ON HMG'S VOTING ON OTHER ISSUES: WE WILL CONTINUE
to VOTE AT THE UN ON THE MERITS OF EACH RESOLUTION.
4. PARIS: UKMIS NEW YORK WILL TELEPHONE YOU AS SOON AS THE NEWS
OF THE VOTE BREAKS. IF THAT HAPPENS BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SEES TO BED, HE MAY MAKE THE STATEMENT TO THE BBC AND COI. I
ASSUME THAT THIS COULD BE ARRANGED AT THE RESIDENCE IF NECESSARY.
IN THAT CASE, PLEASE INFORM RESIDENT CLERK AS SOON AS IT HAS BEEN
DONE.

FWM:

WWW:
4 November 1982

I enclose a message which the President of Sri Lanka has addressed to the Prime Minister via his High Commissioner. As you will see he has directed his delegation at the United Nations General Assembly to vote against the Falklands resolution. I should be grateful for your advice on whether the Prime Minister should reply and if so for a draft.

TF

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
4 November 1982

I am writing in the Prime Minister's absence in Paris, to thank you for your letter of 4 November conveying a message from your President. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

TIM FLESHER

His Excellency Mr. A.T. Moorthy.
SECRET/TOP SECRET
TO BE RETURNED TO REGISTRY FOR DESTRUCTION ON COMPLETION OF INTENT IN THE PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 209A92

INWARD

05 NOV 1982

FOPA 078/04
ZZ PARIS
GR 250
SECRET
DEYOU (WASHINGTON ONLY)
FM FCO 0423052 NOV 82
TO FLASH PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 604 OF 4 NOVEMBER
AND TO WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CABINET OFFICE
M CABINET OFFICE 0423052 NOV 82

TO FLASH PARIS
TELNO.MISC 225, OF 4 NOVEMBER,
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON (DEYOU).
FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:

DEAR MARGARET,

READING YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 4, I REALIZE THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THESE EVENTS IS INDEED QUITE DIFFERENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU, MARGARET, THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT MAKE A DECISION TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA AGAINST BRITAIN, OR TO SUPPORT DICTATORSHIP AGAINST DEMOCRACY. NEITHER DID WE ABANDON THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. WE REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO A LONG-STANDING CONFLICT. WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION THROUGHOUT THIS LONG, DIFFICULT DISPUTE. IT IS THE PRINCIPLE TO WHICH BRITAIN HERSELF HAS ADHERED FOR SO MANY YEARS WITH REGARD TO THIS AND OTHER DISPUTES. CERTAINLY, WE WILL NEVER ALTER OUR VIEW THAT A PEOPLE MUST ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE AND CERTAINLY WE MEAN THIS WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE ON THE FALKLANDS.

FINALLY, YOU AND I HAVE SUPPORTED EACH OTHER IN THE PAST BECAUSE OF OUR SHARED FAITH IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SHARED COMMITMENT TO THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND VALUES. I FEEL SURE NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL ABANDON THOSE PRINCIPLE AND VALUES NOR THE EFFORT TO HELP OUR PEOPLES UNDERSTAND THEIR APPLICATION IN THIS COMPLEX, DIFFICULT WORLD.

I ASSURE YOU WE STAND AS FIRMLY WITH YOU ON THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-USE OF FORCE, OF NEGOTIATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION AS EVER.

RON

ENDS

PU
PYM

NNNN
SENT/RECD 0423272 IJC/AB
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 729878

CABFO 5/4
ZZ PARIS
ZZ WASHINGTON
GR 350
DE Y OU (WASHINGTON ONLY)
SECRET
FM CABINET OFFICE 042305Z NOV 82
TO FLASH PARIS
TELNO, MISC 225, OF 4 NOVEMBER,
AND TO FLASH WASHINGTON (DEVOO).

794 94 FOR PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:

DEAR MARGARET,

READING YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 4, I REALIZE THAT OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF THESE EVENTS IS INDEED QUITE DIFFERENT.
I CAN ASSURE YOU, MARGARET, THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT
MAKE A DECISION TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA AGAINST BRITAIN, OR TO
SUPPORT DICTATORSHIP AGAINST DEMOCRACY. NEITHER DID WE ABANDON
THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION. WE REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT
FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO A LONG-STANDING CONFLICT. WE
HAVE SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATION THROUGHOUT THIS
LONG, DIFFICULT DISPUTE. IT IS THE PRINCIPLE WHICH BRITAIN
HERSelf HAS ADHERED FOR SO MANY YEARS WITH REGARD TO THIS AND
OTHER DISPUTES. CERTAINLY, WE WILL NEVER ALTER OUR VIEW THAT
A PEOPLE MUST ULTIMATELY DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE AND CERTAINLY
WE MEAN THIS WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE ON THE FALKLANDS.

FINALLY, YOU AND I HAVE SUPPORTED EACH OTHER IN THE PAST
BECAUSE OF OUR SHARED FAITH IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP
AND OUR SHARED COMMITMENT TO THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
AND VALUES. I FEEL SURE NEITHER YOU NOR I WILL ABANDON THOSE
PRINCIPLES AND VALUES NOR THE EFFORT TO HELP OUR PEOPLES
UNDERSTAND THEIR APPLICATION IN THIS COMPLEX, DIFFICULT WORLD.

I ASSURE YOU WE STAND AS FIRMLY WITH YOU ON THE PRINCIPLES
OF NON-USE OF FORCE, OF NEGOTIATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION AS EVER.

RON

ENDS

FCO PSE PASS COPY RESIDENT CLERK

NNNNM
SENT AT 042310Z MJW/IJC
My dear Prime Minister,

I have much pleasure in conveying the following message from my President addressed to you:

"Your High Commissioner delivered to me your message regarding Resolution on the Falklands at the United Nations General Assembly. I appreciate your concern on the matter and I have directed my Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly to vote against the Resolution."

With my highest esteem and warm personal regards,

Your sincerely,

A.T. Moorthy

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1
FLASH
0413052
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL
FROM CABINET OFFICE LONDON
TO WHITE HOUSE

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

BEGINS

I DELAYED REPLYING TO YOUR MESSAGE OF 2 NOVEMBER ABOUT THE
FALKLANDS UNTIL MY CABINET MEETING THIS MORNING. MY COLLEAGUES
AND I HAVE NOW DISCUSSED IT AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW OUR UNANIMOUS
VIEW.

THE BRITISH PEOPLE WOULD SEE YOUR VOTE FOR THIS RESOLUTION
AS AN AMERICAN DECISION TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA AGAINST BRITAIN,
TO SUPPORT A DICTATORSHIP AGAINST THE HOME OF DEMOCRACY.

THE ISSUE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS AT THE HEART OF WESTERN
DEMOCRACY. NOTHING COULD BE MORE FUNDAMENTAL. THE FALKLAND
ISLANDERS WANT TO STAY BRITISH. THE OBJECT OF THESE ARGENTINE
MANOEUVRES AT THE UN IS SIMPLY TO START A PROCESS WHICH WILL DENY
THEM THAT CHOICE.

NEGOTIATIONS? ARGENTINA SIMPLY WANTS TO ACHIEVE BY NEGOTIATION
WHAT IT FAILED TO ACHIEVE BY MILITARY AGGRESSION WHICH COST SO
MANY YOUNG LIVES.

I HAVE SUPPORTED YOU IN EVERY WAY I KNOW BECAUSE OF MY FAITH
IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND YOUR PERSONAL COMMITMENT
TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. NOTHING CAN SHAKE MY BELIEF IN THE
VALUES FOR WHICH YOU AND I STAND. BUT IF AMERICA VOTES IN THE
WAY YOU PROPOSE, MY TASK WILL BE IMMEASURABLY HARDER.

I KNOW VERY WELL HOW DIFFICULT A CHANGE WOULD BE FOR YOU NOW,
WITH ALL THE PUBLICITY THAT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO YOUR INTENTIONS.
BUT THE FREE WORLD WOULD UNDERSTAND AND APPLAUD A DECISION TO
ABSTAIN.

I DO URGE YOU TO LOOK AT THIS AGAIN URGENTLY AND PERSONALLY.
SO MUCH DEPENDS ON IT.

MARGARET THATCHER

NNNN
I delayed replying to your message of 2 November about the Falklands until my Cabinet meeting this morning. My colleagues and I have now discussed it and I want you to know our joint view.

The British people would see your vote for this resolution as an American decision to support Argentina against Britain, to support a dictatorship against the home of democracy.

The issue of self-determination is at the heart of Western democracy. Nothing could be more fundamental. The Falkland Islanders want to stay British. The object of these Argentine manoeuvres at the UN is simply to start a process which will deny them that choice.

Negotiations? Argentina simply wants to achieve by negotiation what it failed to achieve by military aggression which cost so many young lives.

I have supported you in every way I know because of my faith in the Anglo-American relationship and in you personally. Nothing can shake my belief in the values for which you and I stand. But if America votes in the way you propose, my task will be immeasurably harder.

I know very well how difficult a change would be for you now, with all the publicity that has been given to your intentions.
But the free world would understand and applaud a decision to abstain.

I do urge you to look at this again urgently and personally. So much depends on it.
CONFIDENTIAL

FM Rome 0311052 Nov 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 456 OF 03 Nov 82
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, BONN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, WASHINGTON, BIS BUENOS AIRES
SAVING FOR INFO UKREP BRUSSELS AND UKDEL NATO

MY TELEGRAM NO. 553
1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AT THE MFA SUMMONED ME LAST EVENING TO MAKE TWO COMPLAINTS.
2. THE FIRST WAS THAT PRIME MINISTER SPADOLINI WAS VERY UPSET AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S REFUSAL TO SEE HIM, MORE ESPECIALLY AS SHE WAS SEEING THE FRENCH AND GERMAN LEADERS.
3. THE SECOND WAS THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO SPADOLINI OF 27 OCTOBER ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (LAST PARAGRAPH FOR ITALY) HAD BEEN RECEIVED VERY BADLY IN ROME. THIS WAS NOT THE WAY TO GET ITALY TO DO WHAT WE WANTED.
4. I SAID IT WAS WE WHO HAD GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT. THE OTHER DAY I HAD HAD TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO URGES HIM TO CHANGE ITALY'S UNSATISFACTORY POSITION ON THE FALKLANDS AND ON THE 1982 BUDGET REFUND.
6. WE WENT OVER THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION AND I ADDED TO THE USUAL ARGUMENTS A NEW ONE, NAMELY THAT THE SITUATION MUST HAVE BEEN CHANGED FOR THE ITALIANS BY THE DRAMATIC REAPPEARANCE IN THE ITALIAN PRESS OF THE AFFAIR OF THE ITALIAN 'DISAPPEARED' IN ARGENTINA. (DETAIL IN MIHF, SAVING TO SOME POSTS). THIS WOULD GIVE COLOMBO AN ADMIRABLE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN AN ABSTENTION. ON THE OTHER HAND A FAVOURABLE VOTE WOULD PROBABLY NOW ATTRACT CRITICISM HERE. MALFATTI DID NOT CONCEDE THIS BUT THE POINT IS, I THINK, A VALID ONE AND MAY BE USEFUL IN NEW YORK.

CONFIDENTIAL
7. At the end, Malfatti begged me earnestly to do what I could to salvage a quick in-and-out visit to London by Spadolini after it was known that the Italians had abstained. He also begged me not to exclude Colombo, who also had political reasons to wish to avoid a snub.

8. As I emerged from the Ministry, I met my Irish colleague who had been on instructions to find out how the Italians would vote. He said he had been told they were moving towards an abstention.

9. All this was before I heard on the BBC that the Americans would vote in favour. It will be difficult for the Italians to differentiate themselves from the Americans, the French and perhaps others in the Community, but the new factor of the 'disappeared' may be of help.

10. FCPO PSE pass saving addressees

ARCLUS

(Repetition to RIGUEROS BUENOS AIRES)

(referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.)

[Copies sent to No 10 Downing Street]

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

FCO

ADDİTİONAL DISTRIBUTİON

PULİS

CABİNET OFFİCE

CONFIDENTİAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040153Z NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE F CO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1808 DATED 3 NOVEMBER 82
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME, ATHENS, DUBLIN, BONN.

FALKLANDS: US MISSION AND THE PRESS

1. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG UN CORRESPONDENTS ABOUT THE ROLE WHICH THE US MISSION IS TRYING TO PLAY THROUGH THE PRESS. CORRESPONDENTS NOTED THE TIME LAG BETWEEN MRS KIRKPATRICK’S SPOKESMAN’S STATEMENT ON 2 NOVEMBER THAT AN AMERICAN DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AND SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT. FOR SOME HOURS THE STATE DEPARTMENT APPARENTLY FAILED TO ENDORSE THE US MISSION’S REPORT, GIVING RISE TO SPECULATION HERE THAT THE MISSION’S MOTIVE IN GOING PUBLIC SO QUICKLY WAS TO GUARD AGAINST A SUBSEQUENT CHANGE OF MIND.

2. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 3 NOVEMBER MRS KIRKPATRICK GAVE AN UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO TWO BRITISH CORRESPONDENTS (REUTERS AND BBC: PLEASE PROTECT) WHO WERE PRESENT, AND THE STORIES THEY ARE FILING WILL PRESUMABLY APPEAR OVERNIGHT.
3. Mrs Kirkpatrick predicted that there would be "massive support" for the resolution. The votes in favour would include about half of the ten (she named France, Italy, Ireland and Greece). She said that there would be a number of abstentions and a handful of negative votes. The US was supporting the resolution for reasons of principle and not, for example, because President Reagan would shortly be visiting Latin America. The US believed in the settlement of disputes by negotiation and not in the use of force (hence their opposition to Argentina's invasion). There had been a progressive moderation and alteration of the draft resolution. The US had interests and responsibilities in the hemisphere which were not identical to those of the UK, although they shared the same fundamental values as us. She expressed concern that Cuba and Nicaragua had tried to exploit the Falklands dispute in order to fuel the flames of Latin American nationalism.

4. With regard to the British attitude to the American vote, Mrs Kirkpatrick said that the Americans had consulted US frequently, and had told us of their decision at the same time as they told the Argentines. In reply to a question, she admitted that the British government had never indicated that they could live with the resolution. She said that it was of great importance to the United States to have a strong Britain in the world. And President Reagan had a deep regard for the Prime Minister. However, she did not think that the US had done anything which violated British interests and did not believe that vital British interests would be affected by the resolution. (On deep background, she interjected that the resolution would of course have no real effect).

Comment
5. We spent yesterday trying to limit the damage done by the US mission's announcement as the debate was opening. As reported separately, we have devoted a lot of effort today to countering rumours that we had little support among the Europeans. Mrs Kirkpatrick's prediction of massive support for the resolution and of the defection of half of our European partners will doubtless be carried around the world by Reuters, BBC and others present, and featured in tomorrow's
Reuters, BBC and others present, and featured in tomorrow’s US press (it may miss British deadlines). It is another unhelpful act which could influence the votes of waverers.

6. It is too late in the New York day to arrange a counter-briefing. Through the day we have taken the line that our support is holding up well. In conjunction with the Kirkpatrick story, AP and Reuters may reflect our briefing that we do not share the US assessment of the likely outcome and believe that a substantial number of delegations will not support the resolution. We told them that, so far as we were aware, final voting decisions had not been taken by members of the Ten in the manner indicated at the US briefing. If the story breaks on the lines indicated to us, you may wish to consider taking corrective action early on a November London time, if we are sufficiently confident of our basis for doing so, in a way which could still reach a worldwide audience some hours before the vote is taken.

Thomson

NNNN
GRS 1100
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 040830Z
FM WASHINGTON 040010Z NOV 02
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3350 OF 3 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 3529: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

1. FOLLOWING UP MY BRIEF DISCUSSION WITH EAGLEBURGER YESTERDAY, MINISTER SPOKE TO HIM AGAIN THIS MORNING TO UNDERLINE THE STRENGTH OF OUR OBJECTIONS BOTH TO THE WAY THE AMERICANS HAD PROCEEDED AND TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR DECISION. HE SAID FIRST THAT WE HAD BEEN ASSURED ALL ALONG THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT WORK ACTIVELY WITH THE ARGENTINIANS FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT. WE NOW HAD CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAD ON THE CONTRARY DONE JUST THAT.

2. ANOTHER OBJECTION WAS THAT WE HAD NOT SEEN A TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT UNTIL AFTER WE HAD RECEIVED THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE TELLING THE PRIME MINISTER OF HIS DECISION TO ACCEPT IT. THOMAS SAID THAT THE LEAST WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED WAS THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE LET US KNOW IN ADVANCE THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS HAD
Would have let us know in advance that the Latin Americans had now amended the text sufficiently to meet American objections, and that they felt compelled, given the importance of restoring their relations with Latin American countries, to give their support to this amended draft. At the very least they should have given us the opportunity to express our views about it before the President made his decision. Instead of that, the U.S. decision had become public knowledge in the United Nations, and indeed in the US press, almost at the same moment as we were told about it. This was no way to treat an ally. He told Eagleburger that I felt I had been personally deceived over this whole process.

3. Thomas then went through our objections of substance to the draft:

(i) The claim that the maintenance of a colonial situation was incompatible with the UN ideal of universal peace was a travesty. The only threat to peace in the area had arisen from the desire of the Argentines to liberate the Falklands against the wishes of their inhabitants.

(ii) The references to earlier resolutions entirely prejudged the question of sovereignty, which was specifically what Shultz and others had told us the US would not support.

(iii) The reference to a de facto cessation of hostilities was a charade; it was simply not supported by what Argentine spokesmen had been saying.

(iv) The reference to the quote interests unquote of the Islanders was a smokescreen. It was a transparently inadequate reference to the principle of self-determination. The Argentines had themselves shown by their invasion how they interpreted the quote interests unquote of the Islanders.

(v) Operative para 1 was a piece of weasel wording which clearly called for resumption of negotiations about sovereignty. This again was one of the things which we had been assured the US would not support.

4. All in all, Thomas said that the US would never have accepted such ambiguous and prejudicial language in a UN resolution on a matter of importance to itself. We found it incomprehensible that they should do so on a matter of such importance to the UK.

5. Eagleburger did not attempt to refute all these points and was clearly dismayed by the force of our reaction. He said our views on all these issues had been abundantly made clear on frequent occasions in Washington and they had tried to take them into account in reaching a difficult decision. As far as he knew, these
ACCOUNT IN REACHING A DIFFICULT DECISION. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE
HAD BEEN NO QUESTION OF AMERICANS OFFICIALS DOING ANYTHING MORE
THAN EXPLAINING TO THE ARGENTINES WHY THE EARLIER DRAFT WAS NOT
ACCEPTABLE. IF WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT AMERICANS HAD DONE MORE THAN
THAT, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW IT. (THOMAS REPLIED ON THIS POINT
THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO REVEAL SOURCES BUT THERE WAS NO
ROOM FOR DOUBT ABOUT THEIR RELIABILITY). THE ONLY OTHER POINT OF
SUBSTANCE THAT EAGLEBURGER REFERRED TO WAS THE PASSAGE IN THE
PREAMBLE ABOUT CESSION OF HOSTILITIES. HE FELT THAT THIS WAS
THE STRONGEST COMMITMENT WE HAD YET HAD FROM THE ARGENTINIANS
THAT THEY WOULD NOT LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK.

6. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT MRS
KIRKPATRICK WOULD BE MAKING A STATEMENT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE MORE TO OUR LIKING THAN THAT US VOTE.
THOMAS SAID THAT WE STILL HOPED THAT THE US VOTE WOULD BE CHANGED
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER
HAD PUT TO THE PRESIDENT. IF IT CAME TO A SPEECH BY MRS KIRKPATRICK,
HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANT THING FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THAT IT
SHOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE VOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN AND THAT
IT SHOULD THEN MAKE VERY STRONGLY THE POINTS ABOUT THE SELF-DETER-
MINATION, NON USE OF FORCE, ETC, TO WHICH WE BELIEVED THE AMERICANS
STILL ATTACHED IMPORTANCE.

7. EAGLEBURGER SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT HE HAD SPOKEN
TO MRS KIRKPATRICK WHO HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SIR J THOMSON
EARLIER IN THE DAY ON THE SAME SUBJECT. SHE HAD TOLD EAGLEBURGER
THAT SHE DID NOT INTEND TO SPEAK EXCEPT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE
AND THIS WOULD NOT UNTIL AFTER THE VOTE HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE HAD
AGREED WITH HER THAT SHE WOULD INCLUDE THE MAIN POINTS MADE IN
THE PRESIDENT'S MOST RECENT MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER (NOT
YET RECEIVED HERE) INCLUDING NON-USE OF FORCE, NO PREJUDICE ON
THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF DETERMINATION (THOUGH NOT
USING THIS PHRASE). IN ADDITION, MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD DECIDED NOT
TO MAKE THE SPEECH Herself BUT TO LEAVE THIS TO ONE OF HER
DEPUTIES. THIS WAS PARTLY IN RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT SHE
RECOGNISED SHE WAS NOT THE MOST POPULAR FIGURE IN LONDON AND PARTLY
TO ENSURE THAT DUE ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE US
STATEMENT RATHER THAN TO THE PERSON MAKING IT. (THIS PRESUMABLY
MEANS THAT SHE FEELS IT WOULD BE BAD FOR HER OWN RELATIONS WITH
HER ARGENTINIAN FRIENDS IF SHE WERE PERSONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH IT).

8. I SHALL BE SEEING SHULTZ ON FRIDAY ON ANOTHER MATTER AND WILL
ASK FOR A FEW MINUTES ALONE WITH HIM TO GO OVER THIS GROUND AGAIN.
I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT HE SHOULD BE HIMSELF IN NO DOUBT
B. I shall be seeing Shultz on Friday on another matter and will ask for a few minutes alone with him to go over this ground again. I think it is important that he should be himself in no doubt about the strength of your feelings on this question, on the substance, on the hypocrisy and on the deception.

Wright

GNHNN
FM FCO 031110Z NOVEMBER 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1936: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
1. I asked the American Ambassador to call this morning.
2. I told Louis that the Prime Minister had been horrified
   by the terms of President Reagan's message to her. Our
   resentment had been magnified tenfold by the publicity
   given to it before her reply could be considered.
3. I told Louis that we had been very successful in our
   lobbying against the Argentine draft as originally tabled
   and had brought Argentina close to a defeat in UN terms.
   This had caused her to introduce changes and there were
   reports, the truth of which I could not judge, that these
   changes had been decided upon in consultation with US officials.

/// The result was a draft of sickening hypocrisy. The publicity
// given to the US decision was undermining the support we had
/ in other parts of the world. We had even been making some

NNNN ends

BLANK

Catchword
/impact on the French

File number
UNP

Dept UND

Distribution
Falkland Islands General
UND

Drafted by (Block capitals)
N C R WILLIAMS

Telephone number
233 4330

Authorised for despatch

Comence reference

Time of despatch
impact on the French but now saw virtually no hope of holding
them back from a positive vote. The US decision would give
encouragement to Argentina to pursue her objective of the
transfer of the Islands to herself against the wishes of the
Islanders.

4. Ambassador Louis said that the Argentines had approached
the Americans with various ideas for changes in the draft
resolution to which the Americans had responded by stating
their objections to the original draft. That draft had
prejudged sovereignty and imposed a timetable. These concerns
were now met (sic). A reference to the interests of the
Islanders had been introduced, which we were free to define
as we wished. While the reference to the cessation of hostilities
was not fully satisfactory from the UK point of view it was
still a valuable improvement to the draft.

5. Louis said that the United States believed that they would
not be taking a position prejudicial to the United Kingdom on
sovereignty or self-determination by voting for the amended
draft. They would not press for 
other negotiations. They supported the proposition
that the views of the
Falkland Islanders should be given weight. They had not
forgotten Argentina's use of force but feared they would give
the wrong signal to moderate opinion in Argentina if they did
not vote in favour.

6. I spoke once again of the shock with which we had learnt
of the publicity given to the American decision. Reagan's
message had said nothing about any intention to publicise
it forthwith. Louis asked me whether I had not discussed
the American position with Shultz. I confirmed that I had
pressed Shultz to abstain but there had been no consultation
which had of course not existed at that time.

I.P. Ltd Dmd 8200051 56-00 8/80

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NNNNN ends telegram
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Catchword
17. Louis said
7. Louis said that the President would reply to the Prime Minister's message of yesterday.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 164 TO ABIDJAN: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. MALLABY SPOKE IN ACCORDANCE WITH TUR TO ZELLER (FEDERAL CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE) THIS MORNING AND TO PFEFFER (POLITICAL DIRECTOR MFA) OVER LUNCH. HE ADDED THAT US VOTING INTENTIONS WERE NOT ENTIRELY RELEVANT TO GERMANY'S DECISION, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE FRG AND THE UK ARE PARTNERS IN POLITICAL COOPERATION.

2. ZELLER CALLED BACK LATER TO SAY THAT THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN VOTE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE FEDERAL CABINET THIS MORNING. THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY WITH A PROTECTING POWER IN BERLIN AND A EUROPEAN PARTNER HAD INFLUENCED THE CABINET'S TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTENTION. THE GERMANS WOULD MAKE KNOWN TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS...
NEED FOR SOLIDARITY WITH A PROTECTING POWER IN BERLIN AND A EUROPEAN PARTNER HAD INFLUENCED THE CABINET'S TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTENTION. THE GERMANS WOULD MAKE KNOWN TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT THIS WAS THEIR TENDENCY. ZELLER MADE CLEAR THAT THERE WAS SO FAR NO DEFINITE GERMAN DECISION TO ABSTAIN BY SAYING THAT THE INTENTIONS OF OTHER EC MEMBERS WERE OF GREAT INTEREST TO GERMANY AND THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WERE KEEN NOT TO BE ALONE AMONG THE EUROPEANS IN ABSTAINING. MALLABY ARGUED THAT GERMANY WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO BE ALONE IN ABSTAINING AND ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE PRIME MINISTERS VISIT TO PARIS TOMORROW.

3. THE DISCUSSION WITH PFEFFER ABOUT THE FALKLANDS AT THE UN FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY ON ONE ABOUT LAST WEEK'S ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT WHICH PFEFFER AGREED HAD BEEN A NOTABLE SUCCESS. HE ALSO AGREED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BERLIN HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AND HAD EVOKED A VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE IN BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. MALLABY GAVE PFEFFER A SPEAKING NOTE BASED ON TUR WITH AN ANNEX ABOUT MAYOTTE. PFEFFER DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT THE ARGENTINE RESOLUTION WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED. HE SAID THAT GENSCHER WOULD HIMSELF TAKE THE FINAL DECISION ON HOW TO VOTE. THE OUTCOME COULD STILL BE INFLUENCED BY THE VOTING INTENTIONS OF OTHERS. BUT PFEFFER CONTINUED THAT GENSCHER'S PRESENT VIEW WAS THAT THE BRITISH ROLE IN BERLIN, UNDERLINED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, SHOULD CAUSE GERMANY TO ABSTAIN. PFEFFER DID NOT SEEM TO ASSUME THAT GERMANY WOULD BE ALONE IN ABSTAINING, AND HIMSELF SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE MIGHT YET ABSTAIN FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO PARIS. MALLABY ARGUED THAT THE GERMAN DESIRE TO BE IN GOOD COMPANY IN ABSTAINING POINTED STRONGLY TOWARDS A GERMAN EFFORT TO PERSUADE AS MANY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE, NOTABLY AMONG THE TEN, TO ABSTAIN TOO. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT GERMANY'S TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTENTION SHOULD BE DECLARED TO OTHERS AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE; IT WOULD BY NO MEANS BE GOOD ENOUGH TO SAY THAT GERMANY HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO VOTE.

4. PFEFFER ASKED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPARE NOTES ABOUT OTHERS VOTING INTENTIONS WITH THE FEDERAL MFA RIGHT UP TO THE VOTE. GRATEFUL FOR REPITITION OF RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

TAYLOR
FM ROME 0315202 NOV 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NO. 557 OF 03 NOV 82
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BIS BUENOS AIRES
SAVING FOR INFO PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG,
COPENHAGEN, ATHENS, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, HOLY SEE

MIPT: THE FALKLANDS AT THE UN: ITALY AND THE DESAPARECIDOS
1. THE PUBLICATION IN CORRIERE DELLA SERA OF 31 OCTOBER OF A LIST
   OF 297 ITALIANS SAID TO FIGURE AMONG THE "DESAPARECIDOS" HAS
   PROVOKED A POLITICAL STORM IN ITALY.
2. SUCCESSIVE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS ARE BEING CRITICISED FOR NOT
   DOING ENOUGH TO FIND OUT THE FATE OF ITALIAN CITIZENS OR OF
   ARGENTINES WITH ITALIAN FAMILY LINKS WHO DISAPPEARED IN ARGENTINA.
   THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN
   BUENOS AIRES HAVE REPLIED TO PRESS CRITICISM BY SAYING THAT THEY
   ASKED THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES FOR INFORMATION ON ITALIANS WHO
   DISAPPEARED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
   HAS NOW SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES WILL BE ASKED URGENTLY
   WHETHER ANY ITALIANS ARE AMONG THOSE FOUND IN THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED
   COMMON GRAVES. THE ARGENTINE MFA HAS REPORTEDLY DENIED RECEIVING
   ANY ITALIAN PROTEST NOTE UNTIL NOW.
3. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S POLICY HAS PROVOKED CRITICISM BOTH
   FROM THE OPPOSITION AND WITHIN THE GOVEMBER COALITION. THE
   ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) HAS CONDEMNED THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY
   AS INEFFECTUAL AND WILL REQUEST A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. THE
   SOCIALISTS (PSI) HAVE DEMANDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACT WITH FIRMNESS
   TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION FROM THE ARGENTINES. THEY HAVE
   DEMANDED A MEETING OF THE FOLLOWING:
   PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
   PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
   MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
   PS/CHANCELLOR
   MR ILETT
   MR LITTTLER
   SIR R ARMSTRONG
   MR A D S GOODALL
   CABINET OFFICE
   DIO
   MR A TILCHER
   DOT
   MR G ROBERTS
   IAT
3. The Italian government’s policy has provoked criticism both from the opposition and within the governing coalition. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) has condemned the government’s policy as ineffectual and will request a parliamentary debate. The Socialists (PSI) have demanded that the government act with firmness to obtain further information from the Argentines. They have contrasted unfavourably the Italian government’s softly-softly approach with the French government’s tougher line, including a threat to break off relations with Argentina over the case of two missing nuns. The office of President Pertini (Socialist) claims that he has taken every opportunity to tackle the Argentines over Italian human rights cases.

4. In defending the government’s policy the Republican (PRI) spokesman implicitly criticised the PSI, recalling that only a few months ago the latter were demanding that the Italian government support the Argentine regime over the Falklands. The official Social Democrat paper (UMANITA) makes the same link, and criticises those who ended up during the Falklands crisis supporting a tyrannical and blood-stained regime. La Repubblica (Independent Left-Wing) has an outspoken editorial criticising the Italian government and indeed the Pope for equivocal attitudes towards the Argentine junta. "The junta we backed during the Falklands war was the same that has put 20,000 Argentine citizens under the ground, in contempt of every human right, among them 300 Italian citizens!"

5. There is almost no reporting of the forthcoming vote at the UN on the Falkland Islands, and no explicit link is made in the media between Italy’s attitude towards the ‘Desaparecidos’ and her voting intentions on the Argentine resolution.

6. FCO PSE pass saving addressees except Holy see

ARCULUS
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GRS 80

CONFIDENTIAL

FM COLOMBO 03090002 NOV 82
TO IMMEDIATE FC0
TELEGRAM NUMBER 306 OF 3 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 TO ABIDJAN: FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THE SECRETARY (PUS) FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS TOLD US THAT ON PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS THE SRI LANKA DELEGATION HAS BEEN TOLD TO VOTE AGAINST THE ARGENTINIAN REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE SRI LANKA GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE IN A VERY SMALL MINORITY, BUT ARE STICKING TO THEIR POSITION.

2. WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO LOBBY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MALDIVES IN THE TIME AVAILABLE.

NICHOLAS

[CÓPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
SCO UNP FID
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
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Dear John,

Falkland Islands Government Office

In your letter of 28 October you reported the Prime Minister's comment that the Office should be given a 75% subsidy on the grounds that the Islanders might not really be able to afford the running costs.

The Islanders have taken the view that if the Office is to represent the interests of the Falkland Islands Government, it must be seen to be under the FIG's control, and unless the FIG pay for their Office, they cannot call the tune. A subsidy as suggested might arouse suspicions of an FCO take-over of the Office, which they would find every bit as unacceptable as the FCO discharging the Office's functions on behalf of FIG.

Councillors who hitherto had claimed they could not afford it now say they are prepared to readjust their priorities. In fact the FIG may pare down salary and other costs so that the outlay will fall below the £73,000 pa we calculated earlier. Mr Pym is firmly of the view that in these circumstances we should not try to stand in the FIG's way. As my letter of 28 October made clear, the Civil Commissioner is well aware of our concern that the FIG should not be misused as a lobbying point here.

Once the Islands' Standing Finance Committee have voted the necessary funds, FIGO will have to work within its budget, and our view is that the Civil Commissioner will insist the Office complies. Should, however, a deficit develop which the FIG cannot cover, then Ministers would no doubt have to consider what discreet form of assistance might be given and from what source it should be provided. But we would not propose to reveal this to the Falkland Islands Government in advance.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD(FAF) and to Sir Robert Armstrong. Given Mr Pym's views we have not consulted the Treasury separately.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
SECRET

WSG 12th Meeting

FALKLAND ISLANDS REVIEW:

MEETING OF WHITEHALL SUPPORT GROUP (WSG)
WEDNESDAY 3 NOVEMBER 1982 AT 10.00 am

PRESENT:

Mr D H Colvin - Cabinet Office (In the Chair)
Mr C C Bright - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr R Jackling - Ministry of Defence
Mr T W Savage - JIC

ITEM 1 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Summing up a short discussion, the Chairman said that it was now possible to see the Review as falling into four distinct phases:

1. **Written evidence** (from July to the end of September when written material was compiled and examined).

2. **Oral evidence** (from the end of September to the beginning of November).

3. **Drafting the final report** (from November until December/January 1983). The timing remained unclear although the Prime Minister still hoped that the Review Committee would report within six months of embarking on its task i.e by 8 January 1982).

4. **Publication**.

Phases 1 and 2 had now been completed. It was not clear whether, and if so how, the Group would be involved in phases 3 and 4. On phase 3 some consultation might be needed over the drafting/certain sensitive passages. On phase 4, the question of press arrangements would need to be addressed, whether responses should be centrally coordinated or left to individual Departments etc. There would also be the question of the Parliamentary Debate. On phase 3, the Chairman would try to find a
suitable occasion to speak to Mr Rawsthorne and let members of the Group know the outcome.

ITEM 2: DATE OF NEXT MEETING

It was agreed to meet when occasion next demanded.

Cabinet Office
8 November 1982
2 November 1982

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher
Prime Minister of London
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AH
ENGLAND

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message on the final debate in the United Nations on the Falkland Islands. You can be assured that Belize will continue to give our full support on this matter.

I take this opportunity to renew assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.

Sincerely,

George Price
Prime Minister

(George Price)
PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T203/82

NOVEMBER 2, 1982

DEAR MARGARET:

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE AND WOULD LIKE TO
RESPOND IMMEDIATELY, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE TO
BOTH OF US.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE
TO YOU, HAVING JUST PAID SO MUCH IN BLOOD AND TREASURE TO REPULSE
THE ARGENTINE INVASION. WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO PESS YOU —
OR TO SEE YOU BE PREPARED — INTO NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE YOU ARE
READY. EQUALLY, WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO TAKE A POSITION ON THE
SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER THAT IS IN ANY WAY PREJUDICIAL TO YOUR
POSITION ON THE QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

INDEED RESOLUTION 1514 CONTAINS STRONGER REFERENCES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION THAN IT DOES TO THE PRINCIPLE THE ARGENTINES
PROCLAIM, "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

MARGARET, MY COUNTRY HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED YOU AND ALWAYS
WILL IN DEFEATING ANY EFFORT TO SOLVE THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE BY
FORCE, YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN NEUTRAL ON THE
QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, AND WE HAVE ALWAYS FAVORED PEACEFUL
SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE BY NEGOTIATION. I AM WELL AWARE THAT IT
WAS THE ARGENTINES THAT INTERRUPTED NEGOTIATIONS BY ATTACKING
THE ISLANDS, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT IN ITSELF IS REASON NOT
TO SUPPORT A SOLUTION BY NEGOTIATIONS SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE.
IT IS HARD FOR THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE ANY OTHER POSITION.

READING YOUR MESSAGE, I BELIEVE MORE WEIGHT OUGHT TO BE
GIVEN TO THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION AS IT NOW STANDS. THE
BRAZILIAN AMENDMENTS HAVE MADE IT MUCH LESS OBJECTIONABLE. IT
WAS ON THE BASIS OF THIS NEW TEXT THAT MY COLLEAGUES INFORMED
ARGENTINA AND OTHER SPONSORS THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT IT. IN
PARTICULAR, THE REFERENCES TO BE FACTO CESSION OF HOSTILITIES
AND THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES NOT TO RENEW THEM TAKES US A
GOOD WAY TOWARDS THE FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF HOSTILITIES WE
BOTH HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR. AND I WOULD AGREE WITH YOU
THAT THEY ARE NOT EQUIVALENT.

END OF PAGE 01

AT THE TIME OF THE VOTE, OUR REPRESENTATIVE WILL PUT
CLARLY ON RECORD OUR VIEWS THAT FORCE MUST NOT BE USED AGAIN
TO SOLVE THE DISPUTE, THAT THE UNDERLYING QUESTION OF
SOVEREIGNTY IS NOT AND CANNOT BE PREJUDICED BY THE RESOLUTION,
AND THAT THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE ISLANDERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.

I AM TRULY SORRY THAT WE DISAGREE ON THIS MATTER AND FOR MY
PART WILL DO EVERYTHING IN MY POWER TO MAKE SURE THIS
RESOLUTION IS NOT ABUSED. YOU MAY BE CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED
STATES WILL CONTINUE TO ADVISE BY THE JOINTLY SHARED PRINCIPLES
WHICH GUIDED BOTH OUR COUNTRIES THROUGH THE FALKLANDS CRISIS TO
ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

WITH BEST WISHES,

RON

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GRS 130
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FM WASHINGTON C22300Z
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3529 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 935 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. AT THE COMMUNITY PRESIDENCY'S LUNCH FOR SHULTZ TODAY, I HAD UNFORTUNATELY ONLY A BRIEF OPPORTUNITY FOR A WORD WITH EAGLEBURGER. HE ASKED WHETHER I HAD SEEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S LATEST MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. I SAID I HAD. HE THEN ASKED ME TO SPEAK CANDIDLY AND PERSONALLY ABOUT THE AMERICAN DECISION. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT IT TOTALLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE. OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THE REASONS WHY WE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. THEY KNEW EQUALLY WELL, SINCE IT HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE, THAT THERE WAS NO ONE EFFECTIVE IN BUENOS AIRES FOR US TO NEGOTIATE WITH, EVEN IF WE HAD A MIND TO DO SO. THE AMERICANS THEREFORE WERE APPARENTLY READY TO VOTE FOR A CHARADE AND EXPECTED US, AS A RELIABLE FRIEND AND ALLEY, TO TAKE PART IN THAT CHARADE. I THOUGHT IT WAS INTOLERABLE.

2. UNFORTUNATELY WE WERE INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT SO I WAS CUT SHORT IN FULL FLOW. BUT I THINK EAGLEBURGER GOT THE VIBES.

WRIGHT

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1. Before Cheek and Blake were heard Chile made a brief procedural statement regretting that there was to be substantive discussion in the Fourth Committee. As members of the Committee of 24 (which had reported directly to Plenary) they saw no need for petitioners to be heard again following the appearance of petitioners before that Committee in August. Panama, claiming to speak on behalf of the 20 co-sponsors of the Latin Draft Resolution (many of which had not been consulted) complained that the present Falkland Islanders had no 'legitimate relation' with the Territory. The only true inhabitants had been the Argentine citizens evicted in 1933.

I stressed that the UK had no objection to anybody or individual addressing the Fourth Committee. We did not seek to muzzle anyone in contrast to those who had sought to oppose in the General Assembly the hearing of such bodies and individuals. The Argentines made a churlish reply that the Latin Americans had not intended to oppose the right of the councillors to speak, but did challenge their 'representatives'!

2. After the councillors had delivered their statements Listre (Argentina) put a series of questions to them which were followed and often duplicated, by an orchestrated barrage of questions from Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Cuba. The questions covered inter alia minefields (the Argentines had, contrary to Cheek's assertions, recorded all of their minefields), the treatment of the islanders during the occupation (no complaints, no fatalities, compensation paid for damages etc), the Falkland Islands Company, British nationality laws, political and educational affairs and economic assistance from Argentina, Cheek and Blake unfailingly delivered robust but courteous replies, and on many occasions turned the questions round to score points off their questioners. It was a cool and impressive performance. Fuller details follow by bag.

3. Each of the four pro-Argentine individuals called for negotiations with Argentina to settle the dispute. Mrs Coultts de Macielo and Mrs Minto de Pennisi made simple, rather homespun statements, expressing concern for their families who remained in the islands, describing the isolated and primitive way of life there and commending Argentina for her attempts to promote development. Peace must be restored to the islands and the British military forces withdrawn.

5. ALEXANDER BETTS STRESSED THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE ISLANDERS. THEIR WISH FOR CONTINUITY IN THEIR COLONIAL STATUS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED FOR 149 YEARS BUT NOW THEY MUST ACCEPT CHANGE AND ADAPT. THE ISLANDERS' PREVIOUS LIFESTYLE WOULD NEVER RETURN FOLLOWING THE INVASION. THE PRESENCE OF THE MILITARY GARRISON NECESSITATED RATIONING OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY AND LIMITED COMMUNICATIONS. HOW LONG WOULD THE UK BEAR THE COST? MILLIONS OF POUNDS WERE NEEDED TO REVIVE THE ECONOMY: THE ORIGINAL SHACKLETON REPORT HAD ADVISED THAT COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA WAS NECESSARY. NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE RESUMED, BUT NOT IN SecRETY AS BEFORE. THE ISLANDERS MUST BE GIVEN THE FACTS, AND TIME TO CONSIDER THEM. IN THE MEANWHILE THERE SHOULD BE A DEMILITARISED ZONE AROUND THE FALKLANDS. THE UN MUST MAINTAIN ITS CREDIBILITY BY ASKING FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

THOMSON

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TELEGRAM NO.1790 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PRIORITY ALL EC POSTS, CARACAS,
BOGOTA, BRASILIA, LIMA, MEXICO CITY.

FALKLANDS AT UNGA 37 : FIRST DAY.

1. THE DEBATE ON ITEM 135 OPENED AS SCHEDULED THIS MORNING
   (2 NOVEMBER). THE RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMITTEE OF 24 BRIEFLY
   INTRODUCED THE COMMITTEE’S REPORT ON THE TERRITORY. THE
   ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER THEN SPOKE FOR AN HOUR (SUMMARY
   IN MY TELNO.1795). IT WAS A HEAVY AND LEGALISTIC PERFORMANCE
   IN WHICH AGUIRRE LANARI CONCENTRATED ON ARGENTINA’S CLAIM TO
   SOVEREIGNTY AND ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF SELF DETERMINATION IN
   THE FALKLANDS. THE ASSEMBLY LISTENED CAREFULLY AT FIRST BUT
   HE HAD LOST HIS AUDIENCE BY HALF WAY THROUGH.

2. I SPOKE NEXT (TEXT IN MY TELNO.1784 TO FCO, CO1 AND
   WASHINGTON ONLY). MY SPEECH WAS DELIBERATELY VERY DIFFERENT
   FROM AGUIRRE LANARI’S. I CONCENTRATED ON THE ARGENTINE ACT OF
   AGGRESSION EARLIER THIS YEAR, ON THE UN PRINCIPLES AT STAKE, ON THE
   RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS AS A PEOPLE AND ON THE INADEQUACIES
   OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. IF MY STATEMENT MADE A BETTER IMPACT
   THAN AGUIRRE LANARI’S (AND HE WAS AN EASY ACT TO FOLLOW),
   IT WAS BECAUSE IT WAS ABOUT SUBJECTS WHICH WERE CLOSER TO
   THE HEARTS OF MY AUDIENCE. BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE COMPLIMENTS
   WE RECEIVED WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO DECISIONS TO VOTE NO OR
   ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION.

3. THERE WAS NO TIME FOR FURTHER STATEMENTS IN THE PLENARY THIS
   MORNING AND ITS PROCEEDINGS WERE ADJOURNED UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING
   (3 NOVEMBER).

4. THE AFTERNOON WAS DEVOTED TO THE HEARING OF PETITIONERS IN
   THE FOURTH COMMITTEE. ALTHOUGH THE COMMITTEE HAD DECIDED YESTER-
   DAY TO GRANT HEARINGS TO CHEEK AND BLAKE, AS WELL AS TO THE
   FOUR QUISLINGS MOBILISED BY THE ARGENTINES, A NUMBER OF LATIN
   DELEGATIONS INSISTED FIRST ON MAKING STATEMENTS CALLING IN
   QUESTION CHEEK’S AND BLAKE’S CLAIMS TO REPRESENT THE ISLANDERS.
   I SPOKE BRIEFLY IN REPLY. CHEEK AND BLAKE THEN MADE ADMIRABLE
   STATEMENTS (TEXTS IN MY TELNO.1707 TO FCO, CO1 AND WASHINGTON ONLY).
   THEY PROCEEDED TO DEAL FLUENTLY WITH SOME PRETTY INEPT QUESTIONING
   FROM THE LATIN DELEGATIONS. ONLY LISTRE (ARGENTINA), WITH A SERIES
   OF QUESTIONS ON THE ISLANDERS’ DEPENDENCE ON ARGENTINA SINCE THE
   1971 COMMUNICATIONS AGREEMENT AND THE ALLEGED INADEQUACY OF
   BRITISH PROVISION FOR THE ISLANDERS, MADE ANY IMPACT. CHEEK
   AND BLAKE WON EASILY ON POINTS.
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5. THE ARGENTINE PETITIONERS WERE THEN HEARD. THE TWO WOMEN (MINO DE PENISI AND GOUTS DE MACIELLO, BOTH OF THEM ISLANDERS MARRIED TO ARGENTINES) WERE UNIMPRESSIVE, READING OUT STATEMENTS WHICH HAD CLEARLY BEEN WRITTEN FOR THEM. THE TWO MEN (REED, AN ARGENTINE MARRIED TO AN ISLANDER, AND BETTS, AN ISLANDER WHO NOW HAS ARGENTINE CITIZENSHIP) PUT UP A RATHER BETTER PERFORMANCE. THEY MADE THE USUAL ARGENTINE PROPAGANDA POINTS ABOUT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STAGNATION ON THE ISLANDS AND THE NEED FOR THE ISLANDERS TO LIVE WITH ARGENTINA, FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE OF THE MANY ARGENTINE CITIZENS OF BRITISH ORIGIN. THEY MAY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SOWING THE THOUGHT THAT BLAKE AND CHEEK REPRESENT ONLY ONE POINT OF VIEW ON THE ISLANDS AND THAT THERE IS AT LEAST A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY WHO FAVOUR CLOSER TIES WITH ARGENTINA. WE WILL TRY TO COUNTER THIS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE DEBATE, THOUGH SOME OF THE POINTS THEY MADE (EG THE EXTENT OF THE CHANGES CREATED BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION) ARE ONES THAT WE CAN TURN TO OUR ADVANTAGE.

6. THERE ARE NOW 38 SPEAKERS INSCRIBED FOR THE REMAINING ONE AND HALF DAYS OF DEBATE, ONLY TWO OF THEM ARE LIKELY TO SPEAK ON OUR SIDE (ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, WHICH HAS REMAINED ON THE LIST AFTER ALL - MY TELNO.1783 AND FIJI) PLUS PERHAPS ZAIRE. THE SPEAKERS LIST REMAINS OPEN UNTIL NOON TOMORROW (3 NOVEMBER) AND WITH SO MANY ALREADY INSCRIBED IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE VOTE WILL BE REACHED ON THURSDAY MORNING. THERE IS TALK OF ITS BEING POSTPONED UNTIL FRIDAY, 5 NOVEMBER.

7. PLEASE SEE MIFT ON VOTING INTENTIONS.

THOMSON

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TELEGRAM NO.1785 OF 2 NOVEMBER 1982
INFO PRIORITY BIS BUENOS AIRES AND WASHINGTON.

UNGA 37 : FALKLANDS : ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH.

1. AGUIRRE LANARI Addressed the General Assembly for nearly an hour
this morning (2 November).

2. He said that the question of the Falklands originated in the
perspective of anachronistic forms of colonial domination. The
conflict would not have arisen had colonialism been eradicated.

The U.N. had once more to pay attention to its most fruitful
function - decolonization. This was why Argentina and the Latin
Americans had requested inscription of the item and had tabled
a draft resolution, now amended.

3. Aguirre Lanari said that he would not recite in extenso the
historical basis of Argentina's claim, but would pose a few histori-
cal questions: Why
Did Ambassador Keene in 1749 request permission for an exploratory
tour and then not undertake the tour on refusal of permission by
Minister Caryajal of Spain? Why did the UK not object when France
ceded to Spain sovereignty over Bougainville's settlement in 1764?
Why did the UK admit the reservation made by Spain in 1775
affirming the Spanish right to sovereignty? Why, when US captain
Duncan invaded the islands in 1831, did the UK leave it to
Argentina to respond, thus implicitly admitting that the UK had
no interest? Why did British consuls up to 1833 recognise the
jurisdiction of Buenos Aires government? The doctrine of
'estoppel' in Anglo Saxon law prevented states from acting
against their former recognition of certain situations.

4. The question was one of sovereignty, and Argentina's legal
case was solidly based. The dispute originated with Britain's
forceful occupation in 1833. Spain's sovereignty was inherited
by the newly born Latin American states, and Argentina admin-
istered the islands through six governors from 1810 and 1833.
The UK did not challenge Argentina's sovereignty when recognising
Argentine independence in 1825. Britain's illegal occupation by
force had always been challenged by Argentina (Res Nulius and
Res Derelictae did not apply in this case).

5. There had been seventeen years of fruitless negotiation before
the conflict, because the UK had lacked the political will to
discuss sovereignty.
6. The dispute was about territorial integrity and not about self-determination. The right to self-determination was a fundamental right, but at times the General Assembly had decided that territorial integrity was more appropriate in a specific case - the Falklands was such a case, as were Gibraltar, Mayotte, the Malagasy Islands and the islands off Namibia. This principle was established in para 6 of Resolution 1514(XV) and was upheld in the case of Gibraltar by Resolution 2353(XXII) which stated that colonial situations which destroy national unity and territorial integrity are incompatible with the charter. The General Assembly had also declared invalid the 1967 referendum in Gibraltar. The ICJ advisory opinion (presumably the one on the Western Sahara, though Aguirre Lanari did not say so and contrived to give the impression that the Court had pronounced on the Falklands) also upheld this principle in paras 59 and 162. The Falklands inhabitants did not have legitimate ties with the territory, and therefore did not possess the right to self-determination. The UK's insistence on the latter was a manoeuvre designed to perpetuate the colonial situation.

7. Argentina would not accept the British claim. The UK government had itself subordinated the Islanders' wishes to those of the British Parliament in a statement on 3 April. To accept the British case on self-determination for the Falklanders would be tantamount to granting that right to the inhabitants of the illegal settlements established in Arab and Palestinian territory occupied since 1967. The British subjects in the islands were the mere instruments of colonial domination. The only people with the right to exercise self-determination in relation to the Falklands was the people of Argentina. The UK and Argentine governments were the sole parties to the dispute.

8. Argentina had reiterated her reservations at all times at the UN from 1946 onwards, including 1964 when she decided to participate in the Special Committee on Decolonisation, which had upheld the Argentine position that the dispute was a colonial one between the UK and Argentina only. This position was reflected in Resolution 2065. Negotiations between the UK and Argentina had started in 1966. In 1968 the Argentine and British negotiators had agreed on a memorandum recognising Argentine sovereignty as soon as adequate safeguards for the Islanders were forthcoming from Argentina, but the UK had refused to implement it. In 1973 the General Assembly called in Resolution 3160 for negotiations to be speeded up, but the UK still refused to negotiate on sovereignty. The same happened in 1976 (Resolution 31/49).

10. The recent UK aggression was aggression against the whole continent. Latin America was still regarded as ground for colonialist and expansionist adventurism. The UK had received the support of economic sanctions against Argentina and the military support of one of the most powerful alliances in the world to establish a military base which was a constant provocation to Argentina and Latin America.

11. The resolution had been tabled because political, strategic, historic, economic and geographical aspects, and not the alleged logic of recent events, had to be considered for a just and final solution. The terms of the dispute determined that it was one of sovereignty between the UK and Argentina alone. The UK might enjoy the administration, control and riches of the territory, but Argentina would never cede sovereignty. The end of the road had been reached, and the only valid alternative was negotiation.

THOMSON

Repetition to Buenos Aires
referred for departmental decision.
repeated as requested to other posts.

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FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL

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FAKLAND ISLANDS

CABINET OFFICE
GR3 520
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM FCO 0211302 NOV 72
TO IMMEDIATE ABIDJAN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 2 NOVEMBER
AND TO CERTAIN OTHER POSTS
MY TELNO 156: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. ARGENTINA IS NOW CIRCULATING, AND WILL PROBABLY TODAY TABLE, A REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION. IT IS EVIDENTLY DESIGNED TO OVERCOME OBJECTIONS ENCOUNTERED BY THE PREVIOUS DRAFT. FOR US HOWEVER IT REMAINS WHOLLY UNSATISFACTORY. WE SHALL VOTE AGAINST IT. PLEASE EXPLAIN TO THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED WHY THIS IS SO AND URGE THEM AGAIN, IF THEY SHOW SIGNS OF BEING ATTRACTION TO THE NEW DRAFT, NOT TO SUPPORT IT.


3. THE REDRAFT REMAINS UNACCEPTABLE TO US BECAUSE:
   (A) THE PREAMBULAR REFERENCES TO PREVIOUS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS STILL ENSURE THAT THIS TEXT IS PREJUDICIAL ON THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE. COUNTRIES WHICH WISH TO AVOID TAKING A POSITION ON THE DISPUTE WILL THEREFORE HAVE ONLY ONE COURSE AVAILABLE TO THEM.
   (B) THE REFERENCE TO THE 'INTERESTS' OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS IN THE PREAMBLE IS A SMOKE SCREEN. THE ARGENTINES HAVE SHOWN THIS YEAR BY THEIR MILITARY INVASION HOW THEY INTERPRET THE CONCERN THEY HAVE TRADITIONALLY EXPRESSED FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS - INTERESTS WHICH, ARGENTINA ARGUES, ARE BEST SERVED BY THEIR BEING INCORPORATED INTO ARGENTINA. THIS LANGUAGE IS A STALE BORROWING FROM EARLIER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS. IT IS

CONFIDENTIAL
A TRANSPARENTLY INADEQUATE ATTEMPT TO SATISFY THE RIGIDLY
ACKNOWLEDGED NEED TO ENFORCE THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION.
ONLY THE ISLANDERS CAN LEGITIMATELY SPEAK FOR THEIR INTERESTS.
(C) IT REMAINS (AS PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS HAVE EXPLAINED)
UNACCEPTABLE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD BE ASKED TO
NEGOTIATE WITH THE AGRESSOR IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH NOW EXIST.

(D) THE UNACCEPTABLE IMPLICATION THAT THE PRESENT STATUS OF
THE ISLANDS IS A THREAT TO THE PEACE REMAINS.

4. POSTS IN NON-ALIGNED CAPITALS MAY MAKE USE OF THE ARGUMENT
THAT ANY OBLIGATION FELT BY THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT
ARGENTINA'S CASE BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS NAM POSITIONS NEED NO LONGER
APPLY NOW THAT RESOLUTION MAKES NO REFERENCE TO NON-ALIGNED
PRONOUNCEMENTS.

5. EC POSTS: YOUR HOST COUNTRIES (ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH AND
GERMAN) REMAIN THE KEY TO MANY OTHER VOTES. YOU SHOULD INSIST
THAT THE AMENDMENTS INTRODUCED AT THIS LATE STAGE, WHILE
REPRESENTING AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ARGENTINA OF THE WEAKNESS OF
SUPPORT FOR THE EARLIER DRAFT, ARE SUPERFICIAL, AND BEHIND YOUR
HOSTS THAT IN 1975 THEY (EXCEPT GREECE) ABSTAINED ON A RESOLUTION
COUCHED IN SIMILAR TERMS. FOR PARIS: YOU SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION
TO THE COINCIDENCE OF THE VOTE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL
IN PARIS ON 4 NOVEMBER. FOR BRUSSELS: YOU SHOULD MAKE SUITABLE USE
WITH THE GERMANS OF OUR ROBUST POSITION ON BERLIN.

6. EC POSTS THAT HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO SHOULD MAKE GOOD
USE OF THE MAIOTTE PARALLEL WHICH SEEMED TO MAKE AN
IMPRESSION ON PEPPER WHEN HE MENTIONED IT TO HIM. (NASH'S
LETTER OF 15 OCTOBER TO RATFORD AND OTHER EC HEADS OF CHANCERY.)

7. MULTI-CREDENTIALED POSTS NEED NOT TAKE ACTION ON THIS TELEGRAM
IN THEIR OTHER CAPITALS IF SUCH ACTION COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED WITH
OUT UNDUE COST WITHIN 24 HOURS OF RECEIPT.

8. FOR WASHINGTON: WE ARE CONSIDERING SEPARATELY OUR RESPONSE TO
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

FYI:

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

I received your message about the Falklands just as I was going into a meeting of my Cabinet this morning. I discussed it with my colleagues and I must tell you at once that we are utterly dismayed by its contents.

If the United States votes for a resolution on the lines of the Argentine draft, you will encourage the Argentines in their ambition to secure the transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands to themselves, against the wishes of the inhabitants. Their sole purpose in putting forward this draft is to further that ambition.

The resolution misrepresents the situation completely. It mocks the concept of self-determination by saying that the "interests" of the Falkland Islanders will be "taken duly into account". It retains references to previous resolutions which prejudge the issue. It calls for early negotiations but you and all our friends know why negotiations are not acceptable to us. And it does this against the background of continuing bellicose statements by representatives of the Argentine regime.

You rightly refer to the staunch support which you gave us during the conflict in the South Atlantic. I remain deeply grateful. May I say that we have also supported you at the

/ UN
UN and elsewhere in matters of prime concern to the United States.

The vote on this Argentine resolution is a matter of prime concern to Britain. That is why I must make an urgent and personal appeal to you to think again. A vote by the United States for the resolution would be received here with incomprehension. Worse, it would be seen as an affront to the Government and the people of Britain and to me personally. I cannot believe that you would consider delivering such a blow to the right of self-determination which means so much to the democracies of the free world. I had greatly hoped that you would vote against this hypocritical text. But if you cannot, I must ask you, with all we have done together in mind, at least to abstain.

With best wishes
Margaret.
Dear Margaret:

I have given careful consideration to the issues raised by your letter of October 25. I understand the importance to you of the United Nations Resolution on the Falklands, and appreciate your concerns.

When we were first approached by the Argentine representatives on their proposed resolution, we made very clear our objection to much of its content. They were the same objections which your letter identifies. We emphasized that the United States could not accept any resolution which prejudged the questions of sovereignty or the outcome of any negotiation. We further stressed that we could not support any resolution with unrealistic deadlines on negotiations or other processes of peaceful settlement.

Argentina, however, now proposes to delete references to the non-aligned movement's communiques which specifically prejudge the question of sovereignty, to reaffirm expressly principles of the UN Charter concerning non-use of force in international relations, and to make other changes which make the resolution more moderate. While the revised version suggests negotiations at an earlier rather than later date, we do not consider this to be a strict deadline. We conclude that the resolution in its revised form does not legally prejudice the position of either party in the dispute.

The United Kingdom is justifiably concerned that there was no reference to the recent hostilities or to self-determination in the resolution. The most recent revisions to the draft expressly refer to the cessation of hostilities and the intention of the parties not to renew them, coupled with reaffirmation of the principles of non-use of force and peaceful resolution of disputes. The United States assumes that any negotiations undertaken by the United Kingdom and Argentina would necessarily take into account the views of the Falkland Islanders. The reference to Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly underscores the principle of self-determination, and the revised draft now expressly refers to the necessity of taking the interests of the islanders into account.

Our support for your position during the hostilities was based on our strong belief that disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. We continue to hold that belief and support your position that any solution to the problem must be accomplished in the context of all relevant elements of the UN Charter. We do not believe, however, that the resolution, as currently written, prejudices that position and consider that it is moderately positive in reaffirming the
fundamental obligations of the charter concerning the non-use of force. For these reasons we believe it reasonable now to vote for the substantially modified resolution.

We understand your reluctance to enter into negotiations.

When loss of life remains fresh in everyone's mind, we can appreciate your desire for a cooling off period and more concrete evidence from Argentina that it will not resort again to further use of force. Nevertheless, we believe it is important that the options of negotiations or other means of peaceful settlement not be foreclosed, particularly in light of the fact that the Government of Argentina now suggesting negotiations is a different one from the one which launched the aggression.

Margaret, I know how you have anguish over this conflict from the beginning. Your courage and leadership throughout have been a source of deep personal inspiration to me. I count it as a privilege to have been able to support you and Britain at this critical moment. You may be absolutely confident that I would do it all again the same way.

Sincerely,

/S/ Ron

Ronald Reagan
2 November, 1982

Dear Sir,

Falkland Islands: Rehabilitation

I enclose a further progress report on the programme of rehabilitation, which updates the report sent to you on 18 October.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Offices of all members of OD(FAF) and to the Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
FINANCE

1. The original £10 million allocation for rehabilitation is now fully committed on housing, aircraft, building materials, fuel, equipment and plant. Financing of further rehabilitation work (see paragraph 8 below) will need to be considered in the near future.

SHIPPING OF REHABILITATION SUPPLIES

2. A meeting was held under FCO chairmanship on 1 November attended by representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade, the Crown Agents and all the major private companies involved in shipping to the Falklands. This meeting discussed the best means of achieving effective coordination of all future shipments to prevent unnecessary delays in unloading goods through the limited harbour facilities at Port Stanley. The Government Freight Agents were charged with overall coordination of the shipping programme.

HOUSING

3. Materials for the first 27 of the planned 54 new civil housing units will reach Port Stanley in early December. It is planned to ship the second batch of 27 in mid December. A representative of the construction firm has paid a visit to the Falklands to assess the site preparation work being undertaken by the local Public Works Department.
Mobile Homes
4. The 10 mobile homes left for the Islands on board Vibeke Mac on 16 October. They are due to arrive in Port Stanley on 12 November.

Replacement aircraft for the Falkland Islands Government Air Service
5. One Beaver aircraft and two Islanders have been ordered. The Beaver arrived in Felixstowe from Canada on 21 October. It is being freighted to Gravesend for inspection by the Crown Agents before onward shipment to the Falklands in early November. Ex-works delivery dates for the two Islanders are 3 and 17 December. They will be shipped as soon as possible thereafter.

Furnishings
6. The Falkland Islands Government have requested replacement furnishings for 24 existing Government houses. Tenders for these furnishings have now been evaluated by the Crown Agents and the contract placed. The consignments should be available for shipping by the end of November.

Compensation
7. The compensation scheme continues to function without significant problems. FCO Ministers have now approved an interim settlement with the Falkland Islands Company for £815,415. The Company will be submitting a further claim for about £700,000 in the near future. Officials are now considering the final settlement of the major civilian claim for death or injury during the conflict, which concerns
provision for the future accommodation of a severely disabled girl, Cheryl Bonner, whose mother was killed by Royal Navy shelling.

**Further rehabilitation work**

8. Existing rehabilitation funds are now fully committed, but there are requirements for further work on the Islands' infra-structure which will not be covered by decisions on the Shackleton proposals. These include the inadequate power and water systems, the school hostel and Stanley Hospital, where military needs have led to requisitioning of civilian facilities, and social and entertainment facilities now that all larger buildings are under military control as temporary accommodation. Officials are now seeking to quantify these needs before putting proposals to Ministers for an additional allocation of funds. Two officials, from the ODA and the FCO, are paying a visit to the Islands for this purpose in the week beginning 7 November.

**General**

9. No major problems affecting the rehabilitation programme have arisen in the period under review.
2 November 1982

Dear John,

Falklands at the General Assembly

I sent you last night the revised version of the Argentine draft resolution. This has now been tabled and will be circulated in New York this afternoon. The changes are a tribute to the impact we have made in our lobbying. In UN terms, Argentina has been virtually compelled to condemn her own use of force out of her own mouth. She has had to drop all reference to the Non-Aligned declarations which were the results of years of diplomatic effort on her part. And though she has always pretended to be ready to take account of the 'interests' of the Islanders she would no doubt have much preferred not to refer to them in this draft.

But the amendments of course in no way meet our central concerns and we are instructing posts today to make this clear and to continue to press our friends for abstentions or negative votes. We must however accept that the number of such votes that we shall achieve is now likely to be considerably less than seemed possible at the end of last week. The US and French votes remain critical. We have already sent you a draft reply to President Reagan's most unsatisfactory message. Mr Pym does not recommend a further message to Mitterrand. But the Paris Embassy will be lobbying firmly and drawing attention to the likely coincidence of the vote with the Prime Minister's arrival in Paris on 4 November. The Embassy in Bonn will draw attention to what was said during last week's Summit.

Mr Pym continues to think that the tactics outlined in his minute of 18 October to the Prime Minister are the right ones. There is no prospect of amending the resolution in such a way as to justify a switch of vote on our part, even to an abstention. Nor do we see any chance of effective wrecking amendments which, even if they were defeated, could help to swell the number of eventual abstentions. We are very conscious of the risk that a reference to self-determination in the Falklands context might be voted down by the Assembly. This would be most damaging to our case in future.

/Our main
Our main concern must be to make our position on negotiations absolutely clear to the public here and in the Islands. In our public presentation we should also highlight the impact on international opinion we have already had, reflected in the changes the Argentines have been forced to make, but also draw attention to the increased superficial attraction of the Argentine resolution in the peculiar world of the UN. This would help to play down the significance of what will inevitably be seen by many as a diplomatic defeat for us. But we should not seek major publicity until after the vote.

It is possible that one or other of our friends may be interested in negotiating some further changes to the draft. This would not make any difference to our vote and would, we hope, not sway the voting intentions of others. But the inclusion of, for example, references to Article 73 of the Charter and our responsibilities to the Islanders could stand us in good stead in future years at the UN.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street
Dear John,

Falklands: General Assembly Debate

We spoke on the telephone about the revised draft resolution likely to be tabled by the Argentines. I enclose a copy together with a copy of the previous version for comparison. The revised version will be seen as a considerable improvement by many of the UN membership and may affect our lobbying exercise, which had hitherto seemed to be going well. We are considering the implications of this and will let you have our views as soon as possible.

Yours ever,

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
'"The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
Realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompati-
ble with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,
Recalling its resolutions 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX)
of 16 December 1965, 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 and
31/45 of 1 December 1976,
Recalling further Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of
3 April 1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,
Taking into account the existence of a de facto cessation of
hostilities in the South Atlantic and the intention of not
resuming them expressed by the parties,
Reaffirming the principles of the Charter on the non use of
force or the threat of the use of force in international relations
and on the peaceful settlement of international disputes,
Reaffirming the need that the parties take duly into account
the interest of the population of the Islands in accordance
with Resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly,

1. Requests the Governments of Argentina and of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume
negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful
solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question
of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of this
resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices
in order to assist the parties in complying with the request
made in paragraph 1 above taking adequate measures with
that aim,

3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the
General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress
made in the implementation of this resolution,

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-
eighth session the item entitled 'Question of the Falkland
Islands (Malvinas)'.
The General Assembly,

having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
realising that the maintenance of colonial situations is
incompatible with the United Nations ideal of universal peace,
considering that its resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 was
inspired by the coveted goal of ending colonialism in all areas and
in all forms, one of which encompasses the question of the Falkland
Islands (Malvinas),
recalling its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December, 3160 (XXVIII) of
14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,
recalling further Security Council resolutions 502 (1982) of 3 April
1982 and 505 (1982) of 26 May 1982,
taking note of the statements and communiques of the Movement of
Non-Aligned countries on the question of the Falkland Islands
(Malvinas),

1. requests the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom
   of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in
   order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the
   sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland
   Islands (Malvinas);

2. requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of this resolution
   to undertake a renewed mission of good offices in order to
   assist the parties in complying with the request made in
   paragraph 1 above;

3. requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General
   Assembly at its thirty-eighth session on the progress made in
   the implementation of this resolution;

4. decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-
   eighth session the item entitled 'Question of the Falkland
   Islands (Malvinas)'.
CONFIDENTIAL

IN TELNO 772: FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. THE REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARIAT TODAY BUT WILL NOT REACH DELEGATIONS IN ITS FINAL FORM UNTIL FIRST THING TOMORROW (2 NOVEMBER). THIS HAS GIVEN US THE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOME PRE-EMPTIVE LOBBYING. BUT THE ARGENTINES HAVE BEEN ACTIVE TOO. THERE IS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DISARRAY, WITH HOST DELEGATIONS FEELING THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO RECONSIDER THEIR EARLIER RECOMMENDATIONS (IF ANY) AND SEEK NEW INSTRUCTIONS. I WAS THEREFORE GLAD TO SEE FROM YOUR TELNO 771 TO NEW DELHI THAT WE ARE UNDERTAKING A FURTHER ROUND OF LOBBYING IN CAPITALS.

2. THE UNITED STATES' DECISION TO VOTE IN FAVOUR (YOUR TELNO 936) IS LIKELY TO BECOME KNOWN SOON, UNLESS IT CAN BE CHANGED. THE REVISED DRAFT HAD BEEN PREPARED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE AMERICANS.

3. IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED HERE THAT THE ARGENTINE AMENDMENTS WILL HAVE DISPELLED ANY REMAINING DOUBTS ABOUT FRANCE, ITALY AND IRELAND VOTING IN FAVOUR AND THAT OTHERS OF OUR PARTNERS MAY FOLLOW THEM. SOME OF THE NORDICS ARE WOBBLING BUT THE SWEDES AND NORWEGIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY THINK THEY WILL STICK TO AN ABSTENTION. THE JAPANESE HAVE MORE OR LESS TOLD US THAT THEY WILL VOTE IN FAVOUR.

4. THERE IS LITTLE NEW TO REPORT ABOUT THE AFRICANS. IT IS KNOWN HERE THAT THE LARGE COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES HAVE YET TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS. UNLESS AND UNTIL THEY DO SO, THERE ARE FEW AFRICAN ABSTENTIONS THAT WE CAN COUNT ON.

5. AMONGST THE ARABS, OMAN REMAINS SOLID. I AM REASONABLY HOPEFUL THAT OUR FRIENDS IN THE SUB-CONTINENT (APART FROM INDIA) WILL STICK TO ABSTENTIONS. KOH (SINGAPORE) HAS TOLD ME THAT A JOINT ASEAN ABSTENTION HAS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE AS INDONESIA HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR, HAVING DONE A DEAL WITH THE LATINOS ON THE EAST TIMOR VOTE. THE PHILIPPINES INCLINE TOWARDS A YES VOTE. THE OTHER THREE ARE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. THE PACIFICS SEEM TO BE SOUND, FOR THE MOMENT.

6. THE ONLY GROUP WHOM WE KNOW TO HAVE CONSIDERED THE REVISED DRAFT COLLECTIVELY ARE THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEANS. MOSELEY (BARBADOS) HAS TAKEN THE LEAD IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH A COMMON POSITION. HIS FIRST PREFERENCE WAS THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO MANOEUVRE TO AVOID ANY VOTE AT ALL. BUT HIS PRINCIPAL COLLEAGUES THOUGHT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF PERSUADING THE LATINOS TO ACCEPT THIS AND A TENDENCY EMERGED TO FAVOUR A COMMON POSITION OF NON-PARTICIPATION (THOUGH IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT GRENADA WOULD BE MOST UNLIKELY TO JOIN THIS).

CONFIDENTIAL

[Signature]

[Date]

[Location]
KARRAN (GUYANA) LATER CONSULTED ME. I SAID THAT AVOIDANCE OF A VOTE
WOULD HAVE BEEN GOOD BUT THAT I DID NOT LIKE THE IDEA OF NON-
PARTICIPATION. WE HOPED THAT SOME OF THE CARIBBEANS WOULD VOTE
NO AND THAT THE OTHERS, EXCEPT GRENADA, WOULD ABSTAIN. WE WERE ALSO
HOPING FOR GOOD EXPLANATION OF VOTE, STRESSING THE PRINCIPLE OF
SELF-DETERMINATION. KARRAN SAID HE WOULD BRIEF HIS MINISTER
ACCORDINGLY. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO TRY TO KILL THE IDEA OF NON-
PARTICIPATION, WHICH COULD BE DAMAGING IF IT CAUGHT ON.
7. SEE NIFT.

THOMSON

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From the Private Secretary

1 November 1982

FALKLANDS

I enclose a copy of a letter from the Australian High Commissioner in which he conveys a message from the Australian Prime Minister. This is to the effect that Australia will continue to support Britain on the Falklands issue and will abstain in the vote on the UN Resolution.

John Holmes Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RESTRICTED
FALKLANDS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Thank you for your letter of 29 October about the speech which Sir John Thomson will make at the beginning of the Debate on the Falklands in the United Nations General Assembly, probably tomorrow.

The Prime Minister is generally content with the draft as amended. You should know, however, that with regard to paragraph 17 the Prime Minister has asked whether the word "administration" in the 7th line should not read "sovereignty".

Mrs. Thatcher is also doubtful about the second sentence in paragraph 19 which reads "There is so much more in dispute than just the question of sovereignty over land". She is not clear about the meaning of this sentence and you may think that it can be discarded.

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1. Following is revised text of draft resolution which the Japanese have given us. They tell us it will be handed over to the Secretary General latter today, 1 November.

"The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), realizing that the maintenance of colonial situations is incompatible with the United Nations Ideal of Universal Peace, recalling its resolutions 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065(XX) of 16 December 1965, 3160(XXVI) of 14 December 1973 and 31/49 of 1 December 1976,


Taking into account the existance of a the facto cessation of hostilities in the South Atlantic and the intention of not resuming them expressed by the parties;

Reaffirming the principles of the Charter on the non use of force or the threat of the use of force in international relations and on the peaceful settlement of international disputes

Reaffirming the need that the parties take duly into account the interest of the population of the islands in accordance with resolution 2065(XX) of the General Assembly

1. Requests the governments of Argentinian and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)."
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THIS RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN COMPLYING WITH THE REQUEST MADE IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE TAKING ADEQUATE MEASURES WITH THAT AIM.

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHT SESSION ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

4. DECIDES TO INCLUDE IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF ITS THIRTY-EIGHT SESSION THE ITEM ENTITLED "THE QUESTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)."

CORTAZZI

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