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PREM 19/631

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PART 20.

MT.

SECRET.

Confidential filing.

Relations with Argentina.

ARGENTINA.

Position of the Falklands Islands.

Part 1: Sept 1979

Part 20: May 1982.

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
25.5.82.							
27.5.82							
28.5.82							
27.5.82							
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PART 20 ends:-

27.5.82

PART 21 begins:-

28.5.82

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: QD(82) 45

Date: 27 May 1982

Signed Wayland Date 19 April 2012

PREM Records Team

MICHEL DEBRÉ

*avec reconnaissance place.
Les lettres à N. D.
m*

Paris, le 27 mai 1982

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Je serais heureux que vous puissiez faire part à Madame Thatcher de mon approbation et de mon admiration pour ce qui concerne son action aux Malouines.

Vous trouverez ci-joint un texte bref que je publie dans "la lettre" qui est présentement mon principal moyen d'expression.

*Revue, monsieur l'ambassadeur, je vous prie
l'expression de mes sentiments en pour être agréés*

M. Debré

A propos des Malouines

Les commentaires sur la guerre des Malouines ont trop souvent laissé dans l'ombre un point cependant essentiel.

Le droit international est fondé sur l'interdiction de se faire justice soi-même.

Le droit international est fondé sur le respect de la souveraineté.

Le droit international condamne l'agression.

L'Argentine a entendu substituer par la force sa souveraineté à la souveraineté britannique. Elle a prétendu être à la fois juge et partie et se faire justice. Elle a été l'agresseur.

Ce n'est pas seulement une humiliation que la Grande-Bretagne a entendu effacer. Ce n'est pas seulement une possession lointaine que la Grande-Bretagne a entendu reconquérir. C'est un principe de droit international qu'elle défend.

Que n'aurait-on dit si la Grande-Bretagne n'avait pas relevé le gant ?

Et quelle hypocrisie de croire que l'O.N.U. ou toute autre instance internationale aurait assuré le triomphe de ce principe.

La Grande-Bretagne a servi la cause du Droit, dans un monde où trop souvent on ne défend plus le Droit qu'en paroles, c'est-à-dire qu'on l'abandonne.



TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM M. MICHEL DEBRE TO
HM AMBASSADOR, PARIS

I should be glad if you could convey to Mrs Thatcher my approval and my admiration of her action over the Falklands.

You will find enclosed a brief text to be published in 'The Letter', which is at present my main mouthpiece.



TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT:

ABOUT THE FALKLANDS

Commentators on the war of the Falklands have too often obscured an essential factor.

International law is based on not taking the law into ones own hands.

International law is based on respect for sovereignty.

International law condemns aggression. Argentina has intended to substitute her sovereignty for British sovereignty by force. She has claimed the role of judge as well as plaintiff and has taken the law into her own hands. She has been the aggressor.

It is not only humiliation which Great Britain intends to erase. It is not only a distant possession which Great Britain intends to reconquer. She is defending a principle of international law.

What would not have been said if Great Britain had not taken up the challenge?

And what hypocrisy to believe that the United Nations or any other international body could have ensured that this principle triumph.

Great Britain has served the cause of Law in a world where the Law is all too often only defended verbally, that is to say it is abandoned.

SH



DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
01-212 3434

M A Pattison
Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

My ref:
Your ref:

27 May 1982

Dear Sir *MA*

We spoke about this evening's Adjournment Debate - "Government Policy on Sporting Contacts with Argentina as it Affects Participation in the World Cup". I enclose, as promised, a copy of Mr Macfarlane's speech.

I am copying this to Adam Wood (Lord Belstead's office), Jeremy Cresswell (Mr Cranley Onslow's office) and Simon Fuller (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever
W L Smith

W L SMITH
Private Secretary

SPEECH FOR

NEIL MACFARLANE MP

PARLIAMENTARY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO THE

ADJOURNMENT DEBATE

ON

JOHN CARLISLE MP (LUTON WEST)

GOVERNMENT POLICY ON SPORTING CONTACTS WITH ARGENTINA

AS IT AFFECTS PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD CUP

ON

27 MAY 1982

1

Mr Speaker. I am grateful to my hon Friend the Member for Luton West for giving me the opportunity to end recent Press speculation and to state clearly on the record, once again, the Government's views on our participation in the World Cup.

I remind the House that, on 21 April, in answer to a Question from the hon Member for Stirlingshire West I said "There is no question of a boycott". In answer to further Questions I added that "As matters now stand, we (the Government) have no objection to British teams taking part in international competitions where Argentina may also be represented." I added that the position would be kept under constant review in the light of changing circumstances.

On 19 May, in answer to a Question from the hon Member for West Lothian, I repeated the Government's view that no objection was seen to participation in the World Cup Finals. I also made it clear on that occasion to my hon Friend the Member for Luton West that I had put no pressure on the three British Football Associations to withdraw.

It is the Government's policy to discourage all sporting contact with Argentina either here or in that country at representative, club or individual level.

Outside these two countries we see no objection to British teams or individuals competing in any international events where Argentina may be represented. This policy applies to all sporting events.

There are a number of reasons for this stance. It is the Argentines who are the aggressors and who stand condemned in the eyes of the world through United Nations Resolution 502. We in the United Kingdom are the innocent party and, as I have said on previous occasions, I feel that it would be grossly unfair to penalise our sportsmen and women by denying them the right to participate in international competition abroad simply because the guilty party, Argentina, does not withdraw from such competition. Certainly they have given no indication that their football team will not be going to Spain.

In addition, as I have said before, there must be many millions of people in this country who would think it strange if our teams withdrew from the World Cup because of the actions of Argentina, who are solely responsible for the battle in the Falklands.

As several hon Members have indicated before, there would be no problem if the Argentinian team had been, or were to be, banned from participation. This is a decision which only the Federation Internationale de Football Associations could take. Their Brazilian President, Dr Havalange, has already stated that no such ban on the World Cup holders will be made.

My hon Friend, the member for Luton West has criticised UEFA for taking no action with FIFA. That is entirely a matter for our own home Football Associations who are members of that organisation. What debate might have gone on inside UEFA - or indeed within FIFA itself if the matter had been raised by Mr Harry Cavan, Chairman of the Northern Ireland Football Association, but also a senior Vice-President of FIFA - I cannot say as I have not been privy to any such discussions. All I can say is that this is a matter in which Government has no locus whatsoever.

I must emphasise that, however the Government views this situation, the final decision on whether or not to participate in the World Cup Finals is one for the football authorities, and their players. Certainly the authorities have made clear their wish to participate.

It has been reported in some papers that a few individual footballers - and perhaps one or two administrators - have queried the morality of participation. Again, should any player feel that strongly on the issue, the decision whether or not to go must rest entirely with him.

Public opinion on this issue, like so many others, is difficult to gauge. Certainly there are indicators such as the recent poll by a Scottish newspaper which showed that 90% of those asked favoured their teams' participation in the World Cup. I have had - as one would expect - much correspondence on the matter. Virtually everyone who has written to me has favoured our teams going. Some have made the very valid point that, bearing in mind the love of football by the average Argentine citizen, any withdrawal by the UK teams would be greeted with great joy in Argentina and be regarded by them as a moral victory over us and presented by the Argentine Government as an indication of world opinion against Great Britain.

Some of the letters I have had come from people with husbands or sons in our Task Force now engaged so heroically and perilously in action in and around the Falklands. I would like to quote from one letter from a lady whose husband is on one of our warships. She mentioned how many of her husband's colleagues enjoy their football and support our international teams and who would be saddened by any withdrawal from the World Cup.

She said "Argentina must be gloating over the fact that with the possibility of England withdrawing, they may possibly retain the World Cup (though not the Falkland Islands). As the wife of a sailor serving his country, I ask you please to consider these facts". Another letter says "What a boost to the spirits of our armed forces if they won, and if not, they would have had a go." A third comments that a boycott "May even be misconstrued as guilt or misreported as action taken by FIFA against the aggressor."

Returning to Press speculation. There have been some inferences that, despite my public statements, I have been quietly pressing our football authorities behind the scenes to withdraw from the World Cup. This I emphatically deny. I am in constant touch with the football authorities over the World Cup and a whole range of other footballing matters and have been since last September. In answer to their questions, I have told them simply that the Government sees no objection to their going to Spain. Indeed, only three days ago, a leaflet of guidance for people travelling to the World Cup was published and distributed under cover of a Press statement from me, demonstrating that my Department has gone to some lengths to tackle the potential problem of hooliganism in Spain. My officials have visited the centres where first round matches are to be played and advised local officials of the preventative measures taken in Britain. I have visited Madrid for talks with my opposite number.

I have mentioned public opinion in this country. There is also the matter of Spanish public opinion in relation to its effect upon those British supporters who will be going to Spain in support of their teams -- and in relation to some of the 4 million British people who travel to Spain every year for their holidays.

It has been reported that, because of Spain's cultural and historical links with Latin America, and for other reasons, public opinion in Spain is running high in connection with the Falklands issue in sympathy with Argentina. For this reason there must be some increased risk of incidents resulting from contacts between a variety of visiting football fans. We have, however, received assurances from the Spanish Minister for Culture and her Secretary of State for Sport, from the Royal Organising Committee for the World Cup, from regional Civil Governors, Chiefs of Police, stadia authorities and so on, that the British teams and their fans are most welcome and that they will enjoy the traditional hospitality which Spain offers our people.

Government business permitting, I am intending to be in Spain for a few days of the first phase of the World Cup and will keep in close contact with our three Football Associations.

To conclude - I repeat that the final decision on whether or not our three teams participate in the World Cup Finals lies solely with the football authorities, and their players. The Government sees no objection to their taking part. I hope that this statement will end all future speculation and I am sure that the House will join me in wishing our 3 teams success.

28 MAY 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 601

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCC 271524Z MAY 82

TO FLASH URMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 475 OF 27 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 868 AND PARA 4 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1915

FALKLANDS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEW MANDATE

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM ME TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S QUESTION IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TUR OR IF YOU PREFER, SPEAK FROM IT. YOU SHOULD KEEP IN MIND IN YOUR DISCUSSION WITH THE SYG THAT IT IS AS MUCH IN OUR OWN INTEREST AS IN HAIG'S TO SPIN OUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PRESENT EFFORTS.

BEGINS:

I AM GLAD THAT YOU ARE UNDERTAKING RENEWED EFFORTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL COOPERATE FULLY IN YOUR EFFORTS.

AS YOU KNOW BETTER THAN ANYONE, SEVERAL MAJOR ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR A PEACEFUL END TO THE CRISIS. THE UK ACCEPTED THE PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, WHICH REMAINS THE BASIS OF BRITISH POLICY, AND HAS PARTICIPATED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND ACTIVELY IN THE EFFORTS FOR A SETTLEMENT. ARGENTINA, BY CONTRAST, HAS REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 502 AND HAS TURNED DOWN SUCCESSIVE PROPOSALS BY THE US SECRETARY OF STATE, THE PRESIDENT OF PERU IN CONSULTATION WITH THE US AND THEN BY YOURSELF AFTER YOUR COURAGEOUS FIRST ATTEMPT TO END THE CRISIS.

YOU HAVE ASKED ABOUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S DEFINITION OF ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE. IN OUR VIEW, A CEASEFIRE WHICH WAS NOT LINKED INSEPARABLY TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD IVE ARGENTINA ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR PROCRASTINATION THROUGH INTRANSIGENCE. THE BRITISH ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THEREFORE THAT A CEASEFIRE IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE AND WOULD BE

1

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ACCEPTABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

ACCEPTABLE IF IT WAS INSEPARABLY LINKED TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND THE COMPLETION OF THAT WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD.

ONE REASON FOR THIS BRITISH VIEW IS ARGENTINA'S RECORD OF DELIBERATE DELAY AND INFLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATIONS. A CHANGE OF POSITION BY ARGENTINA INVOLVING WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 502 COULD TRANSFORM THE SITUATION. IT WOULD BE MOST ENCOURAGING IF, IN YOUR RESUMED EFFORTS FOR PEACE UNDER THE MANDATE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505, YOU COULD OBTAIN FROM ARGENTINA CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF SUCH A CHANGE. ARGENTINA'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION YESTERDAY MAY NOT DO THIS, IN WHICH CASE I HOPE WOULD GO BACK TO THEM ON THE POINT.

IF YOU DECIDED TO VISIT BUENOS AIRES OR SEND AN EMISSARY THERE, A VISIT TO LONDON, PERHAPS IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, WOULD BE MOST WELCOME TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. I SHOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE IN THE LONG TERM.

THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IS BASED ON OUR DESIRE TO IMPLEMENT ARTICLE 73 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THAT OF COURSE REQUIRES THE MAINTENANCE OF THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS, SO THAT THE PEOPLE'S INTERESTS AND THEIR WELL BEING CAN BE SAFEGUARDED. GIVEN ARGENTINA'S INVASION, THE FUTURE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS CAN BE ENSURED ONLY BY A CONTINUED BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE OR PERHAPS BY NEW INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN THE VIEW OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, SUCH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD REQUIRE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES. IF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE DEvised, THE QUESTION OF BRITISH MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS COULD BE SEEN IN A NEW LIGHT.

ENDS.

2. WASHINGTON: PLEASE DELIVER A COPY OF THE ABOVE TO HAIG.

PYM

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE
LIMITED
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/FRANKING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/RED
HD/ECD (E)
HD/PUSD
DEP HD/PUSD
HD/PES D
PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/LORD BELSTRA
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MR BULLARD
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PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WALE-GERY
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MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
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SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
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TELEX: 885849

I shall be
returning to the
FPO at the end of this
year

EDWARD C. GLOVER, M. V. O.

DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR

year after a 2 year
secondment in the
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A.J. Coles Esq.,
Private Secretary to the
Prime Minister,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON. SW1.

27th May 1982

Dear John

THE FALKLANDS ISLANDS

I am writing to let you know that the Australian Federal Minister for Telecommunications, Mr. Neil Brown QC, MP, a close family friend, telephoned me on Tuesday 25th May from Canberra to convey his deep regret at the sinking of HMS Coventry. He said that the Australian Government had already expressed its support for Her Majesty's Government's policy on the Falklands, but he wanted to take this opportunity to let me know on a personal basis the extent of his own support for the Prime Minister's policy. He asked me to pass on his comments to whomever I thought most appropriate. It is for this reason that I am writing to you.

Yours sincerely
E.C. Glover

E.C. Glover



BRITISH EMBASSY,
LUXEMBOURG.

27 May 1982

A J Coles Esq
No. 10
Downing Street

Dear John,

I was visited today by a Mr Jackson who is a technician with the NATO Supply Headquarters in Luxembourg, NAMSA.

He used to be a radar expert. He said that, as a British subject concerned to do his bit over the Falklands crisis, he wanted to pass on to the Prime Minister an idea he had had which might help deal with the Exocet missile. He handed me the enclosed copy of a letter which he has sent today to the Prime Minister in the post. He asked if I could forward it to No. 10 by the bag.

I believe that Jackson was genuinely trying to help - though I cannot comment usefully on his idea. However, I thanked him on the Prime Minister's behalf and undertook to forward the copy.

Yours ever,

Jeremy Thomas

J C Thomas

Leslie F. Jackson B.Sc.
4 rue Eich
Garnich 8354
Luxembourg
Grand Duchy

27th May, 1982

The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London, England

To: Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Advance Copy to: British Ambassador, Luxembourg

Dear Madam,


I appreciate the magnitude of the problems facing you at the moment concerning our Forces in the South Atlantic.

For this reason I would not normally presume upon your valuable time, but I have a proposal to make concerning the Exocet missile, the details of which are attached.

I have no intimate knowledge of the Exocet system, but have certain experience in radar. My proposal is both simple and easy to implement, and indeed sometimes simple answers can provide results, such as our recent success in firing machine guns on the ships pointing vertically upwards such that the enemy aircraft have to fly through the bullets.

I hope that you and your experts may by now hold a more elegant solution to the dangers posed by this missile, but if you can make use of my idea, may I wish you Good Luck.

Yours sincerely,



Leslie F. Jackson

Enc.

Garnich
Luxembourg

27th May, 1982

SUBJECT:

Suggestion for displacing the
centre of a radar target

L.F. Jackson

1. A missile that operates on fire and forget basis usually depends on the following:
 - inertial platform guidance to approximate position
 - final guidance by radar fuse in order to destroy target
2. In principle an inertially guided low flying missile is difficult to destroy.
3. In principle the final guidance will be ECCM proofed and probably operates at X or Ku band.
4. Target size fluctuates rapidly with small changes in aspect.
5. Spherical target remains constant.
6. At X or Ku band a relatively small surface area can be made to reflect large amounts of energy.
7. By increasing the effective reflective area in a non-symmetrical fashion, the effective centre of the target can be falsely shifted either to cause a complete miss or reduce destruction.
8. Ways of shifting target reflection central point:
 - Ejecting chaff on an as need basis.
Fast reactions are needed for this permanently.
 - Distorting the symmetry of the target shape by incorporating large reflective area at front or rear of target or at some short distance from target. (on tow).

The former may not be successful due to timing. The latter can be accomplished quite cheaply and easily - for example by means of reflective cones or by a small metallized balloon.

The latter can be installed in a similar fashion to the World War II Blimp in a sensitive area. Such multiple disposable choices for a missile could cause confusion even in the transfer of data from the launcher to the missile in the initial launch stages.

oOo

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1961 RRDRME G
007 UKBNE CH

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GRS 200

UNCLASSIFIED

(FM BERNE 20.345Z)

FM BIS BUENOS AIRES

TO IMMEDIATE PCO

TELNO 1 31 OF 27 MAY

MESSAGE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

RC

~~Hd~~

[Gen. Unit (via
Bris)]

X9

ps / No to Downing
A. (2)

ms

ps (6)

Hd Consular Dept.

1. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL, G.T. MURCHISON, HAS ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

QUOTE

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

I WOULD LIKE TO REGISTER MY APPRECIATION FOR HAVING TAKEN THE TROUBLE TO ANSWER THE DIFFERENT MESSAGES I HAVE SENT YOU ON BEHALF OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC. WE HAVE ALSO REQUESTED FROM THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS BE PERMITTED ACCESS TO THE ISLANDS, AND HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THEY ARE INSTRUMENTING THIS. WE HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO SEND OUR OWN DELEGATION WITH THE SOLE OBJECT OF OFFERING HELP TO THE ISLANDERS.

RECENTLY AND PREVIOUS TO THE BRITISH DISEMBARKATION, WE HAVE RECEIVED NEWS FROM THE ISLANDERS, WHICH INDICATES THAT THEY ARE BEING WELL TREATED AND NOT UNDERGOING ANY HARDSHIP OTHER THAN AN UNDERSTANDABLE ANXIETY DUE TO THE CONFRONTATION WHICH IS TAKING PLACE AROUND THEM.

PLEASE CONTACT US IF THERE IS ANY ROLE WHICH YOU FEEL THE BRITISH COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA CAN PLAY IN ORDER TO BRING TO AN END THIS CONFLICT. IN THE MEANWHILE, WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE FUTURE WITH HOPE AND WITH THE FIRM OBJECTIVE OF HELPING TO RE-ESTABLISH THE CORDIAL AND BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTED IN BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN THE PAST. YOURS SINCERELY, G.T.

PLEASE CONTACT US IF THERE IS ANY ROLE WHICH YOU FEEL THE BRITISH
COMMUNITY IN ARGENTINA CAN PLAY IN ORDER TO BRING TO AN END THIS
CONFLICT. IN THE MEANWHILE, WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE FUTURE WITH
HOPE AND WITH THE FIRM OBJECTIVE OF HELPING TO RE-ESTABLISH
THE CORDIAL AND BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTED IN BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN THE PAST. YOURS SINCERELY, G.T.
MURCHISON, CHAIRMAN, BRITISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL IN THE ARGENTINE
REPUBLIC

UNQUOTE

JOY

POWELL-JONES

NNNN

SENT AT RECD AT 201400Z TM



The National Archives

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SUBJECT

OUT TELEGRAM

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Classification and Caveats

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Precedence/Deskby

FLASH

ZCZC
GRS
CLASS
CAVEATS
DESKBY
FM FCO
PRE/ADD
TEL NO

1 ZCZC
2 GRS
3 CONFIDENTIAL
4
5
6 FM FCO 27 MAY 82
7 TO FLASH MEXICO CITY
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 114A/82**

9 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
10 YOUR TELNO 432: FALKLANDS: MESSAGE TO LOPEZ PORTILLO
11 1. Please deliver following message to President Lopez Portillo
12 from the Prime Minister.
13 Begins.
14 Your Ambassador in London has told the Foreign and Commonwealth
15 Secretary of your continuing deep concern about the situation in
16 the Falklands.
17 I entirely share Your Excellency's concern. Throughout the past
18 seven weeks I have greatly appreciated the constructive
19 contributions which you personally and your Government have made
20 in order to resolve this tragic crisis. It is a matter of the
21 deepest disappointment to me that ~~the~~ ^{all our} efforts ~~which we have all~~
22 ~~made~~ have come to nothing because of Argentine obduracy.
23 As you, Mr President, will be fully aware, the conflict which is
24 taking place has not been of our ~~seeking~~ ^{making}. It was the Argentine
25 forces' unprovoked invasion of the Falkland Islands ~~nearly eight~~

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword <i>weeks which</i>
File number	Dept CMU	Distribution FALKLANDS GENERAL
Drafted by (Block capitals) P R Fearn		
Telephone number 233 4692		
Authorised for despatch <i>J. Holmes 26/5</i>		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH	Page 2
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<<<<

1 <<<<

2 ~~weeks ago~~ which ~~has~~ brought about the present situation. Despite

3 all the attempts by the international community, for which we are

4 most grateful, Argentina has stubbornly refused to withdraw from

5 the Islands, end her aggression and bring peace to the region. ^{she} ~~is~~

6 ^{has} disregarded ~~the~~ the clear expression of ~~the~~ international will

7 contained in Security Council Resolution 502. ^{confrontation} ~~The problem~~ could

8 have been ^{avoided} ~~resolved~~ at any time through a withdrawal of Argentine

9 forces.

10 It is not Britain's wish or practice to use force to end disputes:

11 but when an aggressor refuses to heed attempts to achieve

12 peaceful solutions, we are obliged to act in defence of our ^{rights and}

13 interests, as provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In

14 doing so, we are defending not only the rights of the Falkland

15 Islanders: we are showing to the world that aggression cannot be

16 allowed to succeed.

17 We are conscious that the Argentine Government has been attempting

18 to suggest that British action on the Falklands somehow involves

19 Latin America as a whole. This is not the case. Our dispute is

20 with the Argentine Military ^government. ~~It is not~~ It is not with the

21 Argentine people and certainly not with the other countries of

22 the region. We recognise the very important role which the

23 countries of Latin America play in the international community and

24 value very highly our relations with them. We wish to preserve

25 and strengthen them. It is in all our interests that Argentine

26 attempts to widen the scope of the dispute should not be allowed

27 to succeed. I hope that it will not be forgotten at the planned

28 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of American

29 States that it was Argentina who committed the aggression and

30 Britain who was the victim.

31 With warm personal good wishes.

32 Ends.

33 2. In delivering this message, you should also draw as

34

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//
/

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword appropriate
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH	Page 3
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 appropriate on the points in my telno 68 to Asuncion.
 PYM
 NNNN

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword
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ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (35)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR GNSLOW
PS/PUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
~~MR WRIGHT~~
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/EPD
HD/ECD(3)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)~~
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

~~MR WRIGHT~~

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

UNCLASSIFIED
FM UKMIS GENEVA 270930Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 275 OF 27 MAY 1982
INFO PRIORITY BERNE, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, MOD (DS11).

MY TELNO 270: FT LT GLOVER: TELECON HART/HULSE

1. THE ICRC HAVE NOW RECEIVED FROM BUENOS AIRES CONFIRMATION THAT FLT LT GLOVER WAS CAPTURED AND IS NOW BEING HELD IN PORT STANLEY. THE ARGENTINIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION TO TRANSFER HIM TO THE MAINLAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. THE ICRC IN BUENOS AIRES HAVE REQUESTED DETAILS ABOUT HIS STATE OF HEALTH AND FOR ACCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

MARSHALL

NNNNN

(20)
35

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES

MMW

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
~~MR WRIGHT~~
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD (2)
MR REED, PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
~~RECEIVED~~
HD/WED.

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 Dst)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET
OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LUXEMBOURG 270920Z MAY
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELGRAM NUMBER 167 OF 27 MAY 1982

INFO BRUSSELS AND MODUK (FOR DIC ARMS CONTROL CELL)

MY TELNO 165: FALKLAND ISLANDS: ARMS SALES

1. ECONOMIC DIRECTOR, MFA, RANG ME THIS MORNING TO REPORT THAT MFA AND TRANSPORT MINISTRY ARE URGENTLY PREPARING RECOMMENDATIONS TO ALLOW LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT GREATER CONTROL OF CARGOLUX OPERATIONS. MADAME FLESCHE IS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE THIS, BY ASSUMING FRESH LEGAL POWERS IF NECESSARY. SHE HAS SUMMONED THE BOARD OF CARGOLUX TOMORROW (INCLUDING THE ICELANDERS).
2. I SPOKE TODAY TO ONE OF THE SENIOR LUXEMBOURG MEMBERS OF THE CARGOLUX BOARD OF DIRECTORS, FRANSSENS. HE IS THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF KREDIETBANK WHO ARE A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY SHAREHOLDER IN GARGOLUX. I GAVE HIM THE BACKGROUND OF WHICH HE WAS UNAWARE. HE PROMISED HIS FULL SUPPORT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD MAKE IT PLAIN TO OLAFSSON THAT UNLESS HE BEHAVED HIMSELF FORTHWITH, HE, FRANSSENS

TO OLAFSSON THAT UNLESS HE BEHAVED HIMSELF FORTHWITH, HE, FRANSSENS
WOULD NOT ONLY RESIGN FROM THE BOARD BUT ENSURE THAT KREDIETBANK'S
HOLDING IN GARGOLUX WAS WITHDRAWN. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO EXERT THE
MAXIMUM PRESSURE, REMINDING HIM THAT LUXEMBOURG'S CREDIBILITY
(UNSPOKEN THOUGHT, NOT LEAST AS A BANKING CENTRE) WAS INVOLVED.

THOMAS

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 271010Z WHL/V RK

~~NORTHERN IRELAND~~:

ADVANCE COPIES

22

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS
PS/TM ONSLOW
MR BULLARD
MR GIFFARD
MR GOODISON

HD/RID
Hd/S Omb
HD/PUSD (2)

HD/INFORMATION DEPT

HD/NEWS DEPT

...

...

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO SEC OF
STATE RM 66 A/2 GGS

N IRELAND OFFICE [4 copies]

MR WOODFIELD
MR MARSHALL
MR G L ANGEL
MR HARRINGTON

CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
DIO

~~NO 10~~ DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 271650Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 27 MAY

AND TO INFO IMMEDIATE N I O (B) , UKMIS NEW YORK AND
PRIORITY INFO WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 74 (NOT TO ALL): MEETING WITH TAOISEACH

1. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THESE INSTRUCTIONS. I SAW THE TAOISEACH
AT THREE O'CLOCK THIS AFTERNOON AND THE CONVERSATION WAS ALMOST
ENTIRELY ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE FALKLANDS CRISIS.

NORTHERN IRELAND

2. THE TAOISEACH MADE THE USUAL NOISES ABOUT THE FAILED POLITICAL
ENTITY. SECONDLY, HE SAID THAT THE SPIRIT OF THE ANGLO-IRISH
INITIATIVE WHICH HE HAD LAUNCHED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS NOW
QUITE DEAD BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO CONSULT THE IRISH GOVERNMENT
BEFORE PUTTING FORWARD DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS. HE WENT ON TO SAY
THAT THE PREVIOUS COALITION GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO WARNED US

~~BEFORE PUTTING FORWARD DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PREVIOUS COALITION GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO WARNED US THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE UNWORKABLE. I WAS ABLE TO DEAL WITH THIS POINT QUICKLY BY POINTING OUT THAT PROFESSOR DOOGE'S LETTER WAS BASED ON THE WRONG ASSUMPTION THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD BE IN SOME WAY SIMILAR TO THE CONVENTION REPORT OF 1975. I WENT ON TO TELL MR HAUGHEY THAT I HAD SEEN PROFESSOR DOOGE ONLY TWO DAYS BEFORE WHO HAD CONFIRMED THIS. WHILE ACCEPTING THIS, HE CRITICISED THE PROPOSALS FOR HAVING NOTHING IN THEM OF AN IRISH DIMENSION. I SAID HE REALLY MUST STOP CRITICISING IN THIS WAY AND SEE THE MATTER MORE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, WHO HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT DIRECT RULE COULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND WHAT THE PROVINCE WAS SUFFERING FROM WAS LACK OF ANY POLITICAL LIFE WORTH HAVING. THE PROPOSALS, WHICH HAVE YET TO PASS THROUGH PARLIAMENT, PROVIDE COPPER-BOTTOMED GUARANTEES FOR THE MINORITY COMMUNITY THAT IF THERE WERE NOT PROPER CROSS-COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS THEN THEY WOULD NOT HAPPEN. I ALSO MADE THE POINT IN PARAGRAPH FIVE OF T U R ABOUT THE PARLIAMENTARY TIER BUT HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO SUGGEST THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN ALTERNATIVE. I ADDED THAT WITHOUT AN ASSEMBLY THERE WOULD NEVER BE ANY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO TAKE PART IN ANYTHING. THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION WAS CONCLUDED BY HIS SAYING THAT WE MUST AGREE TO DIFFER.~~

FALKLAND ISLANDS

3. I SAID THAT THE TABLING BY THE IRISH REPRESENTATIVE OF A RESOLUTION WHICH THE IRISH KNEW WE COULD NOT ACCEPT, FOLLOWING ON HIS RADIO INTERVIEW ON SUNDAY CRITICISING IN SUCH EXTREME TERMS THE DEVOLUTION PROPOSALS, HAD MEANT OUR RELATIONS HAD TAKEN A CONSIDERABLE TURN FOR THE WORSE. THIS NETTLED HIM AND HE SAID THAT ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS WERE OFTEN TAKING CONSIDERABLE TURNS FOR THE WORSE. HOWEVER, THEIR ACTIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE CONCERNED TO PREVENT A MORE UNWELCOME PANAMANIAN RESOLUTION. HE THREW IN THE OLD POINT ABOUT IRELAND BEING A SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRY NOT BOUND TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD. I SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF OUR EVER CONTESTING IRELAND'S TAKING AN INDEPENDENT LINE, BUT IT WAS A PECULIAR SITUATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHEN 3 AFRICAN NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS HAD TO AMEND AN IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION TO MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE TO US. FURTHERMORE, NO ONE COULD SUGGEST THAT UGANDA OR OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN OR CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH WERE IN ANY SENSE NOT INDEPENDENT. IF THE IRISH HAD THOUGHT THEY WERE BEING HELPFUL, WHY DID THEY NOT ASK US FIRST? THIS LED TO SOME RATHER INCONCLUSIVE TALK ABOUT THE DEGREE OF THE COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR TWO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK. I DID NOT EXPECT TO GET ANYWHERE ON THIS TOPIC, BUT AT LEAST I WAS ABLE TO

... WITH US A RATIONAL AND COHERENT CONVERSATION.

COLLABORATION BETWEEN OUR TWO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK. I DID NOT EXPECT TO GET ANYWHERE ON THIS TOPIC, BUT AT LEAST I WAS ABLE TO MAKE THE POINTS IN WHAT WAS A RATIONAL AND COHERENT CONVERSATION.

4. WE ENDED OUR TALK BY AGREEING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PUSHING FORWARD WITH OUR VARIOUS CROSS-BORDER AND EAST-WEST PROJECTS AND CONTACTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE AIIC. I AM GLAD TO SAY THAT CROSS-BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION WAS NOT MENTIONED NOR WERE ANY COMMUNITY ISSUES.

5. I SAID THAT I WAS GOING TO ENGLAND TOMORROW AND WOULD PROBABLY BE HAVING TALKS AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE THANKED ME FOR KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH HIM AND HOPED I WOULD COME AND SEE HIM ON MY RETURN.

6. COMMENT. OUR CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE JUST AS EARLY INDICATIONS WERE COMING IN THAT THE OPPOSITION LOOKED LIKELY TO RETAIN THEIR SEAT IN THE DUBLIN WEST BY-ELECTION. CONSIDERING THE ENORMOUS EFFORT MR HAUGHEY HAS PUT IN TO THE CAMPAIGN, THE NEWS MUST COME AS A CONSIDERABLE DISAPPOINTMENT. BUT HE DID NOT LET THIS SHOW, NOR DID HE MENTION IT. I AM NOT SURE WHAT IMPRESSION I MADE AND ANY EFFECT CAN ONLY BE SEEN IN WHAT HE DOES IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS REGARDS OUR AFFAIRS. AT THE LEAST I THINK HE KNOWS THAT OUR RELATIONS WILL NEED TIME AND EFFORT TO PUT RIGHT. IF SO, I SHOULD LIKE TO THINK HE WILL DO NOTHING TO MAKE THEM EVEN WORSE.

FIGG.

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 261720Z HMT/DAB

ADVANCE COPY

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

FLASH

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET
OFFICE

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 270425Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1921 OF 27 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 1065: FALKLANDS

1. I HAVE DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO HAIG WHO IS GRATEFUL FOR THIS FRANK ACCOUNT, THOUGH CERTAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WAY THINGS MAY DEVELOP WHICH HE WANTS TO DISCUSS AGAIN URGENTLY WITH ME.

2. I AM CONSCIOUS OF A GAP BETWEEN THE MOOD IN LONDON AND OPINION HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO DESCRIBE THIS TO YOU TOGETHER WITH ITS POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS.

3. THE AMERICANS RECOGNISE THAT THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SCENE HAS INEVITABLY BROUGHT ABOUT A CHANGE IN OUR ATTITUDE ABOUT WITHDRAWAL AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS. AS THEY SEE IT, WE ARE NOW INSISTING ON SURRENDER OF THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON AND A RETURN OF BRITISH RULE WITHOUT ANY DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A LONG-TERM SOLUTION - IN EFFECT WE ARE BASING

ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE A LONG-TERM SOLUTION - IN EFFECT WE ARE BASTING OURSELVES ON A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

4. THE AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THIS:

- A) WILL HARDEN ARGENTINIAN MILITARY RESISTANCE IN THE SHORT AND LONGER TERM:
- B) WILL SOLIDIFY THE LATIN AMERICANS IN THEIR BACKING FOR ARGENTINA, NOT JUST NOW BUT IN THE FUTURE:
- C) WILL ENCOURAGE CONTINUED ARGENTINE HOSTILITIES AGAINST US, RENDERING DIFFICULT THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL LIFE ON THE ISLANDS, APART ALTOGETHER FROM THE DEMANDS THAT THIS WILL PLACE ON OUR LONG - TERM DEFENCE INTERESTS:
- D) WILL HELP THE RUSSIANS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND,
- E) PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, POSE FOR THE AMERICANS THE PROBLEM OF EITHER EXACERBATING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE WHOLE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD OR BRINGING ABOUT A DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U S AND THE UK.

5. I SHOULD SAY THAT THIS INTERPRETATION IS NOT SIMPLY A REFLECTION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN LOBBY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR WHITE HOUSE: IT IS, I BELIEVE, A GROWING VIEW IN THE US ADMINISTRATION AND ONE THAT IS CERTAINLY LIKELY TO BECOME MORE DOMINANT IF THINGS GO ON AS THEY ARE.

6. LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE STRENGTH OF FEELING AT HOME ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT, IF WE ARE GOING TO KEEP THE AMERICANS WITH US, SOMETHING THAT I BELIEVE IS ESSENTIAL, WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE SOME ALLOWANCE FOR THEIR VIEWS AND INTERESTS. I DO NOT SUGGEST THAT THEY REGRET THEIR DECISION OF 30 APRIL TO COME DOWN ON OUR SIDE, BUT THEY ARE INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE COSTS THAT THIS IS LIABLE TO INVOLVE FOR THEM.

7. THERE IS OF COURSE AN IMMEDIATE NEED TO KEEP THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL IN PLAY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE SO AS TO AVOID ANOTHER MUCH LESS ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE IS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE FORTHCOMING OAS MEETING AND THE DILEMMA THAT THIS POSES FOR THE US. THERE IS FURTHERMORE THE LONG-TERM PROBLEM, WHICH AFFECTS BOTH THE UN AND OAS ISSUES, THAT I WANT TO PUT TO YOU. IF WE ARE TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE OF OUR REQUIREMENTS AND THE NEEDS OF THE AMERICANS, WE HAVE TO PRODUCE SOMETHING IN RELATION TO THE LONG-TERM STATUS OF THE ISLANDS THAT IS NOT SIMPLY A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, AND THAT DOES NOT LEAVE US IN INDEFINITE CONFRONTATION WITH ARGENTINA, AND HENCE LATIN AMERICA. I AM NOT HERE DEALING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION THAT FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON BECAUSE THIS WILL BE BRITISH. THIS WILL BE

WITH ARGENTINA, AND HENCE LATIN AMERICA. I AM NOT HERE DEALING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION THAT FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON BECAUSE THIS WILL BE BRITISH. THIS WILL BE A MATTER OF FACT. BUT IT WILL PRESUMABLY BE DESIRABLE AT A FAIRLY EARLY STAGE TO HAVE SOME SORT OF PEACE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS, AND IT IS HERE THAT THE LONG TERM ISSUE WILL ARISE.

8. SO THE QUESTION HAS TO BE FACED WHAT SORT OF PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE COULD WE CONSIDER PUTTING FORWARD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. I SHOULD INTERJECT THAT EVEN IF WE OURSELVES DO NOT HAVE IDEAS ON THIS, I AM SURE THAT OTHERS ARE GOING TO START PROPOUNDING THEM: AND THE AMERICANS WILL TAKE THE VIEW, THAT IF WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO TACKLE THIS ASPECT A DIVERGENCE OF INTEREST WILL DEVELOP BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND LONDON. THE AMERICANS, AS YOU KNOW, INSIST THAT THE MOMENT TO ADVANCE SUCH IDEAS WILL BE WHEN WE ARE AT OUR MAXIMUM MILITARY STRENGTH.

9. COULD WE CONTEMPLATE SAYING, AS PART OF A PEACE OFFER, SOMETHING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A) THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS MUST PROVIDE FOR RETURN TO NORMAL LIFE, WHICH IN TURN PRE-SUPPOSES PROVISION FOR THEIR LONG-TERM SECURITY.

B) THESE REQUIREMENTS COULD BE ACHIEVED BY SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE ISLANDERS COMBINED, FOR THE LONGER TERM, WITH SOME MEASURE OF INTERNATIONALISATION.

C) IN THE IMMEDIATE YEARS AHEAD THEIR DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS SHOULD BE SAFEGUARDED BY SOME INTERNATIONAL GROUP COMPRISING SAY TWO REGIONAL POWERS, PLUS THE US AND THE UK, WITH THE PRESENCE PERHAPS OF US AND BRAZILIAN FORCES, AND

No
D) THAT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FUTURE, IN A GIVEN NUMBER OF YEARS THIS GROUP WILL, IN KEEPING WITH THE WISHES AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS, MAKE PROPOSALS ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

10. I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTY OF TRYING TO FOCUS ON THIS TYPE OF LONG-TERM PROBLEM IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE. BUT, AS I SUGGEST, I BELIEVE THAT OUR MILITARY INTERESTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY IT. I AM ALSO WORRIED BY THE POTENTIAL SWING IN AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND CONVINCED THAT THE BEST WAY OF INFLUENCING THIS WILL BE BY ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER INFORMAL, WITH THEM ABOUT THE FUTURE. THIS CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT AT THE PRESENT TIME BE AT A HIGH LEVEL, OR INVOLVE ANYTHING REMOTELY IN THE NATURE OF A COMMITMENT. IT IS SIMPLY A QUESTION OF TRYING OUT THE GROUND AND PREVENTING THE AMERICANS FLYING OFF WITH SOMETHING THAT IS UNWELCOME TO US. WHATEVER OUR RESERVATIONS, THE AMERICANS ARE EAGER TO TEST US OUT WITH CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS. I DO NOT ASK YOU AT THIS STAGE

WHATEVER OUR RESERVATIONS, THE AMERICANS ARE EAGER TO TEST US OUT WITH CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS. I DO NOT ASK YOU AT THIS STAGE TO RESPOND TO ALL THAT HAS BEEN SET OUT ABOVE BUT, IF WE ARE TO KEEP THE AMERICANS WITH US, THERE WILL BE A NEED TO DISCUSS WITH THEM IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

HENDERSON

NNNN

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 27

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1630 hours on 27 May 1982 contains information and suggested lines to take on the following -

1. Security Council Resolution 505
2. Participation in the World Cup

Cabinet Office

27 May 1982

RESTRICTED

1. Security Council Resolution 505

SCR 505 which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council yesterday (26 May) calls on the Secretary General to renew his efforts to find a peaceful solution, to contact both parties immediately with a view to negotiating mutually acceptable terms for a cease fire, and to submit an interim report to the Security Council within a week. The text of the Resolution and Sir Antony Parsons' explanation of the UK vote in favour are attached.

Britain welcomes SCR 505, as it welcomes any mechanism which offers the chance of achieving Argentine withdrawal by diplomatic means but in view of the Argentine record in previous negotiations is not unduly optimistic about the outcome of the Secretary General's efforts. The Secretary General has also said that he regards his task as extremely difficult.

The Resolution three times reaffirms SCR 502, (the text of which is attached) and Sir A Parsons has made it quite clear that for the UK 'the only acceptable condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked with an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal'. He also made it clear that 'the situation has changed since the Secretary General reported to the Council on 21 May We cannot now accept that Argentine withdrawal be linked in anyway to parallel British withdrawal'.

2. British Participation in the World Cup

There is to be an adjournment debate this evening (27 May) on Government policy regarding participation by British teams in the World Cup. The Government's policy remains to discourage all sporting contact either in the UK or in Argentina but sees no objection to British teams or individuals competing in any international events held elsewhere where Argentina may be represented. The Argentines are the aggressors and very many people would think it strange if our teams withdrew from the World Cup as a result of their actions and a withdrawal might also be misinterpreted abroad. Nevertheless, some people have queried the morality of participation and the final decision is for the football authorities and the individual players concerned.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 505 (1982) WHICH WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982, NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982:

3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS):

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING, IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE:

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

ENDS

INCLASSIFIED

F UKM IS NEW YORK 262125Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 DATED 26 MAY 82
AND TO IMMEDIATE C O I
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

26 MAY



199

MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY:

I SHOULD FIRST LIKE TO EXPRESS THE VERY HEARTFELT APPRECIATION
OF MY DELEGATION TO THOSE NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS WHICH HAVE
WORKED SO HARD TO PRODUCE A TEXT OF A RESOLUTION WHICH HAS
JUST COMMANDED UNANIMITY IN THE COUNCIL.

MY DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST
ADOPTED AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505. WE DID SO BECAUSE
IT CONTAINS A CLEAR REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502. IT REGISTERS
BEYOND DOUBT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS HAVE
BEEN AND WILL BE CONCENTRATED ON ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SCR 502. THIS IS THE KEY TO THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE
REGION WHICH ALL OF US SO DEVOUTLY WISH. IN PARTICULAR THIS
KEY LIES IN THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF SCR 502, NAMELY THE
UNCONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

MY DELEGATION WILL CERTAINLY COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS RENEWED MISSION. IN THE LIGHT OF
CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY DELEGATIONS IN THE DEBATE AND IN
EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE THIS MORNING, I MUST MAKE CLEAR, SO THAT
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MISUNDERSTANDING, THAT FOR OUR PART THE
ONLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR A CEASEFIRE IS THAT IT SHOULD BE
UNEQUIVOCALLY LINKED WITH AN IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE
WITHDRAWAL. THE HISTORY OF THE LAST TWO MONTHS HAS DONE NOTHING
TO CREATE BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA.
FIRST, ARGENTINA INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITHOUT WARNING
WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS AND IN DEFIANCE OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL OF 1 APRIL. SECONDLY, WE HAVE
EXERTED OURSELVES TO THE UTMOST IN SIX ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS
FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE
ARGENTINE INVASION: IN EVERY INSTANCE WE HAVE FOUND AT THE END
THAT WE HAVE TRAVELLED IN A CIRCLE OF BATHES THAT WE HAVE NEVER

FIRST, ARGENTINA INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITHOUT WARNING WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS AND IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL OF 1 APRIL. SECONDLY, WE HAVE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO THE UTMOST IN SIX ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION. IN EVERY INSTANCE WE HAVE FOUND AT THE END THAT WE HAVE TRAVELLED IN A CIRCLE OR RATHER THAT WE HAVE NEVER LEFT THE POINT OF DEPARTURE. HENCE A SIMPLE VERBAL AGREEMENT BY ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF AN ARGENTINE COMMITMENT TO PRACTICAL AND IRREVOCABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL.

MR. PRESIDENT THE COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO BE QUITE CLEAR ON ANOTHER POINT. THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED SINCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON 21 MAY. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 502 IS PLAINLY STATED. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. WE CANNOT NOW ACCEPT THAT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL BE LINKED IN ANY WAY TO PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.

MR. PRESIDENT, WE DO NOT MINIMISE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S TASK. BUT, I WOULD BE THE LAST TO UNDERESTIMATE HIS GREAT SKILL AND DEVOTION. IF ANYONE CAN SUCCEED IN THE TASK BEFORE HIM, IT IS OUR SECRETARY-GENERAL. I SHOULD LIKE AGAIN TO ASSURE THE COUNCIL THAT MY DELEGATION WILL COOPERATE WITH HIM TO THE FULL.

MR. PRESIDENT, I CANNOT CONCLUDE THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT EXPRESSING A LITTLE SURPRISE AT THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE OF THE DISTINGUISHED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR. ON 1 APRIL THE SOVIET UNION JOINED IN THE CALL BY ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE. ON 2 APRIL ARGENTINA DID USE FORCE. THIS WAS REGISTERED IN SCR 502 WHICH THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT OPPOSE. I AM STILL WAITING TO HEAR A FIRM CONDEMNATION OF THIS FIRST USE OF FORCE FROM THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAS ADOPTED, IF I MAY SAY SO, SOMETHING OF A ONE-EYED STANCE THIS MORNING: NOT SEEING THE USE OF FORCE BY ARGENTINA BUT FOCUSING WITH ONE EYE ON THE UNITED KINGDOM'S ACTIONS IN EXERCISE OF OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE.

PARSONS

FM UN HQ
THE RT. HON. LORD CARRINGTON KCMG MC
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
LONDON SW1 (ENGLAND)

FW CAAIR 3.4.82
MIS0057-4

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO TRANSMIT HERewith THE TEXT OF RESOLUTION
502 (1982) ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2350TH MEETING
ON 3 APRIL 1982.

QUOTE:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
RECALLING THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL AT THE 2345TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 APRIL
1982 (S/14944) CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO REFRAIN
FROM THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND IS-
LANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS),

DEEPLY DISTURBED AT REPORTS OF AN INVASION ON 2 APRIL 1982 BY
ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA,

DETERMINING THAT THERE EXISTS A BREACH OF THE PEACE IN THE REGION
OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS),

1. DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES;
2. DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);
3. CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RESPECT
FULLY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS.

UNQUOTE.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

J. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS

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FALKLAND ISLANDS

[COPIES SENT
EM STAFF
MOD SITEEN]

MFJ

27 May 1982

~~B. H. G. tel~~

Falkland Islands: Message to
President of Mexico

Thank you for your letter of 26 May.

As I told you yesterday, the Prime Minister approved the draft message from herself to President Lopez Portillo, subject to a number of detailed drafting amendments which I conveyed to you on the telephone.

AJC

John Holmes Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0630 HOURS, 27 MAY

UN

(a) Security Council Resolution

1. The amended Irish draft was adopted unanimously on 26 May as Security Council Resolution 505. Sir A Parsons spoke in explanation of vote underlining our requirement that the only acceptable condition for a cease-fire was Argentine withdrawal. Subsequently, the Secretary General formally asked for a reply with 24 hours to the question 'what is HMG's definition of acceptable terms for a cease-fire'. The identical question has been put to the Argentines. Sir A Parsons will see the Secretary General at 2100 today.

(b) Prospects

2. The Ambassador is not hopeful of our chances of avoiding another Council Meeting within the next 2/3 days. The Secretary General will not allow himself to be used as a vehicle for buying time and if there is no shift in either UK or Argentine positions within the next day he will make an early report of failure to the Council. The result could well be a simple cease-fire Resolution which we would have to veto. We would be isolated.

Military Action

3. With the exception of a Harrier attack on Port Stanley Airport there have been no military operations for the past 24 hours. MOD have no information on US media reports that we have taken Goose Green.

27 May 1982

Emergency Unit

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION)
 0700 HRS 27 MAY 1982

UNSecurity Council adoption of Irish draft Resolution

A
 UKMIS New York
 telno 856

1. The Security Council yesterday (26 May) unanimously adopted the Irish draft resolution, as amended by the non-aligned members and ourselves. The Japanese did not press their draft to a Vote.

B
 UKMIS New York
 telno 857

2. The resolution, which was adopted as SCR 505, requests the Secretary General to submit an interim report to the Security Council as soon as possible, and in any case not later than seven days after the adoption of the resolution.

C
 UKMIS New York
 telno 858

In his explanation of vote, Sir Anthony Parsons stressed that the only acceptable British condition for a ceasefire is that it should be unequivocally linked with an immediate commencement of Argentine withdrawal.

D
 UKMIS New York
 telno 868

3. The Secretary General asked formally for HM Government's definition of acceptable terms for a ceasefire. He asked for an answer within 24 hours. Sir A Parsons has asked for guidance on this question. The Secretary General will be putting the same question to the Argentines.

Sir Anthony Parsons' assessment

E
 UKMIS New York
 telno 869

4. The Secretary General is likely to report to the President of the Security Council after 24 hours that he cannot make any progress with the mission, if we tell him that our position is unchangeable. He will not allow himself to be used as a vehicle for buying time and the likelihood is that the President will recall the Council. By the weekend we could be faced with having to veto a straightforward call for a ceasefire. We could be isolated. The Ambassador will be meeting the Secretary General at 2100 today.

Rio Treaty Meeting

F
 FCO telno 68
 to Asuncion

5. Posts in Latin American countries have been instructed to lobby the Governments in advance of the meeting of the Rio Treaty signatories in Washington, later today.

G
 Mexico City
 telno 439

6. The Mexican Foreign Minister feels that the situation is deteriorating and there are increasing pressures for some form of action against Britain in other Latin American countries.

H
 Brasilia telno
 210

7. The Brazilian Foreign Minister has stated that his country would not be able to stand out against the majority opinion, or to moderate the outcome.

/8. However,

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8. However, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic suggest that they will be taking a moderate attitude and would be reluctant to go along with any retaliatory action at this stage.

Joint approach made by Colombia, Brazil and Peru

I
FCO telno 109
to Bogota

9. The Colombian Ambassador has delivered an oral message on behalf of the Presidents of Colombia, Brazil and Peru, proposing a 5-day truce. He said that the three Governments would not wish to put forward formal proposals for a settlement at this stage. However the Ambassador has since warned that President Turbay, after further consultation with his Brazilian and Peruvian colleagues, may be intending to send a formal message to the Prime Minister, setting out his proposals more fully.


Comment

10. Following Sir A Parsons's very firm Explanation of Vote, the UN Secretary General clearly sees little scope for further action by him. We could, therefore, find the issue back in the Security Council by the weekend, in which case we could find ourselves isolated. An early report of failure by the Secretary General would also harden attitudes at the Rio Treaty meeting, which starts today, and would thus increase the risks of Latin American action against us.

11. Sir A Parsons will need instructions, by 1900Z at the latest, on:

- (a) how to respond to the Secretary General's request for a definition by us of 'acceptable terms for a ceasefire';
- (b) whether, in order to buy time, he should encourage the Secretary General to visit or to send envoys to London and Buenos Aires.

12. It seems also clear that, if the matter is returned to the Security Council, we cannot count on firm US support if there is no movement from our present position. We may therefore also need to consider whether, in the light of our position on para 11 (a) and (b) above, we should take further action in Washington to stiffen the Americans.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

27 May 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

26 MAY

UNCLASSIFIED

F [REDACTED] UKMIS NEW YORK 262106Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE F C G
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 858 DATED 26 MAY 82
 AND TO IMMEDIATE C O I
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MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY:

I SHOULD FIRST LIKE TO EXPRESS THE VERY HEARTFELT APPRECIATION OF MY DELEGATION TO THOSE NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS WHICH HAVE WORKED SO HARD TO PRODUCE A TEXT OF A RESOLUTION WHICH HAS JUST COMMANDED UNANIMITY IN THE COUNCIL.

MY DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE RESOLUTION JUST ADOPTED AS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505. WE DID SO BECAUSE IT CONTAINS A CLEAR REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502. IT REGISTERS BEYOND DOUBT THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN AND WILL BE CONCENTRATED ON ENSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THIS IS THE KEY TO THE RETURN OF PEACE TO THE REGION WHICH ALL OF US SO DEVOUTLY WISH. IN PARTICULAR THIS KEY LIES IN THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF SCR 502, NAMELY THE UNCONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

MY DELEGATION WILL CERTAINLY COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS RENEWED MISSION. IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY DELEGATIONS IN THE DEBATE AND IN EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE THIS MORNING, I MUST MAKE CLEAR, SO THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MISUNDERSTANDING, THAT FOR OUR PART THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR A CEASEFIRE IS THAT IT SHOULD BE UNEQUIVOCALLY LINKED WITH AN IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THE HISTORY OF THE LAST TWO MONTHS HAS DONE NOTHING TO CREATE BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. FIRST, ARGENTINA INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITHOUT WARNING WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS AND IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL OF 1 APRIL. SECONDLY, WE HAVE EXERTED OURSELVES TO THE UTMOST IN SIX ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION: IN EVERY INSTANCE WE HAVE FOUND AT THE END THAT WE HAVE TRAVELLED IN A CIRCLE OR RATHER THAT WE HAVE NEVER

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
PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 262125Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 856 OF 26 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN,
MADRID, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY,
GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO.

005

MY TELNO 854: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

SUMMARY

1. THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MORNING (26 MAY) UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AS SCR 505 THE IRISH DRAFT AS AMENDED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AND OURSELVES. THE JAPANESE DID NOT PRESS THEIR DRAFT TO A VOTE. STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN THE DEBATE BY THE FRG (QUITE GOOD) AND YUGOSLAVIA (NON-ALIGNED MUMBO-JUMBO). IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, SPAIN, PANAMA (AT LENGTH), CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION COMPLAINED THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SPOKE ABOUT THE AMERICANS' HEMISPHERIC CONCERNS. MY VERY FIRM EXPLANATION OF VOTE PRODUCED LITTLE REACTION FROM THE ARGENTINES BUT A TROUBLE-MAKING INTERVENTION FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

DETAIL

2. THE ARGENTINES INFORMED OTUNNU (UGANDA) FIRST THING THIS MORNING THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT THE DRAFT AS IT HAD EMERGED LAST NIGHT. OTUNNU OBTAINED AGREEMENT THAT THE REVISED DRAFT SHOULD BE SPONSORED BY GUYANA, IRELAND, JORDAN, TOGO, UGANDA AND ZAIRE. THE COUNCIL DULY MET AT 1630Z TO HEAR TWO LATE SPEAKERS IN THE DEBATE (FRG AND YUGOSLAVIA) AND TO VOTE.

3. VAN WELL (FRG) SAID THAT THIS WAS A WAR WHICH SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED. THE FRG RECOGNISED THAT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT NATIONAL CONCERN OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE FOR MANY YEARS. BUT ARGENTINA HAD DEFIED THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHEN IT CHOSE TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY FORCE. ITS INVASION WAS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHARTER AND HAD LED THE UK TO INVOKE ITS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 51. THE FRG ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IT APPEALED URGENTLY TO BOTH SIDES TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT ENDORSED WHAT BELGIUM HAD SAID ON 23 MAY

... YEARS. BUT ARGENTINA HAD DEFIED THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WHEN IT CHOSE TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE BY FORCE. ITS INVASION WAS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHARTER AND HAD LED THE UK TO INVOKE ITS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 1. THE FRG ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE. IT APPEALED URGENTLY TO BOTH SIDES TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IT ENDORSED WHAT BELGIUM HAD SAID ON 23 MAY IN REPLY TO CRITICISM OF THE EC'S ECONOMIC MEASURES. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD RESUME HIS EFFORTS WITH A CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC MANDATE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH SCR 502. THE MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT WERE A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. IT WAS UP TO THE PARTIES TO CREATE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS.

4. KOMATINA (YUGOSLAVIA) MADE A TYPICALLY NON-ALIGNED SPEECH, FULL OF QUOTATIONS FROM VARIOUS NON-ALIGNED STATEMENTS. HE HARDLY MENTIONED THE UK AND DID NOT MENTION THE ARGENTINE INVASION AT ALL. HE DID, HOWEVER, EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR SCR 502 AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE MEANS OF SOLVING THE CRISIS.

5. DORR (IRELAND) THEN GAVE VENT TO A LONG AND REPETITIVE JUSTIFICATION OF IRELAND'S CALLING OF THE COUNCIL AND TABLING OF ITS DRAFT RESOLUTION ON 24 MAY. HE CLAIMED FULL CREDIT FOR THE OUTCOME, DESCRIBING THE NEW DRAFT AS A "SLIGHTLY REVISED VERSION" OF THE IRISH TEXT (WHICH ROSENSTOCK (USA) SAID IN A STAGE WHISPER WAS LIKE SAYING THAT A CASTRATO WAS A SLIGHTLY REVISED MALE) THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD SET THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A VERY DIFFICULT TASK BUT IRELAND HOPED THAT HE COULD FIND A BASIS ON WHICH THE PARTIES COULD STOP THE FIGHTING AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS.

6. CTUNNU (UGANDA) THEN INTRODUCED THE NEW DRAFT WITH ADMIRABLE BREVITY. THE DRAFT ATTEMPTED TO EXPRESS THOSE AREAS OF CONSENSUS WHICH, IN THE CO-SPONSORS' VIEW, HAD EMERGED IN THE DEBATE, VIZ A DEEP CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED FIGHTING, A WISH FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS AND A DESIRE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD INITIATE MEASURES WHICH WOULD BRING AN END TO THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES. HE HOPED THAT THE DRAFT WOULD MAKE A MODEST CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PEACE.

7. DE PINIES (SPAIN), IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT ORDER A CEASEFIRE OR GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A MORE PRECISE MANDATE. BUT SPAIN WOULD NEVERTHELESS VOTE IN FAVOUR.

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8. ILLUECA (PANAMA) SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS BUT AT GREAT LENGTH. HE ALSO COMPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO MENTION OF DECOLONISATION NOR AN APPEAL TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPLYING ARMS TO EITHER ARGENTINA OR THE UK (A REFERENCE, AS HE EXPLAINED, TO REPORTS IN TODAY'S AMERICAN PRESS OF US RESUPPLY OF MISSILES AND OTHER ITEMS TO THE UK). IT SEEMED THAT THE DRAFT WAS THE ONLY VIABLE POSSIBILITY FOR THE COUNCIL AT THIS TIME. PANAMA WOULD NOT THEREFORE OPPOSE IT. BUT SHE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO CALL FOR A FURTHER MEETING AS NECESSARY. ILLUECA WAS ON HIS BEST BEHAVIOUR, THOUGH HE NEARLY BECAME CARRIED AWAY BY HIS OWN RHETORIC ON ALLEGED US ARMS SUPPLY TO THE UK.

9. LING QING (CHINA), SPEAKING IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, ALSO REGRETTED THAT THE DRAFT DID NOT CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE OR CONFIRM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR AS A BASIS FOR HIS NEW EFFORTS. BUT THE DRAFT COULD BE REGARDED AS A STEP FORWARD AND CHINA WOULD SUPPORT IT.

10. THE VOTE WAS THEN TAKEN. ALL VOTED IN FAVOUR AND THE DRAFT WAS ADOPTED BY SCR 505 (1982). THERE WERE ONLY TWO MINOR CHANGES TO THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 848 BUT FOR THE RECORD, AND AT THE EMERGENCY UNIT'S REQUEST, THE TEXT AS ADOPTED IS IN MIFT.

11. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SPOKE NEXT. HE THANKED THE COUNCIL FOR ITS SUPPORT AND FOR THE RENEWED CONFIDENCE SHOWN IN HIM. HE RECOGNISED THE DIFFICULTIES THE COUNCIL FACED BUT HE FEARED THAT THE RESOLUTION DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR OR PRECISE GUIDANCE FOR THE PARTIES OR FOR HIM. THE EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. BUT HE WOULD DO ALL HE COULD. HE URGED THE PARTIES TO RECOGNISE THAT A LASTING SOLUTION COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT WAS A CEASE FIRE. A RESTORATION OF PEACE COULD THEN BE ACHIEVED "IN CONSONANCE" WITH SCR 502 AND HIS EARLIER EFFORTS.

12. NISIBORI (JAPAN) SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT PRESS FOR HIS DRAFT TO BE VOTED ON AS ITS MAIN IDEAS HAD BEEN INCORPORATED IN SCRO 505.

13. TROYANOVSKY (USSR), IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, QUOTED AT LENGTH FROM THE TASS STATEMENT OF 23 MAY. ON THAT BASIS THE SOVIET UNION HAD VOTED IN FAVOUR IN SPITE OF THE DRAFT'S SHORTCOMINGS. HE CONFIRMED SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH SCR 502 BECAUSE IT ENTIRELY DISREGARDED THE DECOLONISATION ASPECT. THE RUSSIANS FAVOURED AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE.

14. MRS KIRKPATRICK (USA) SAID THAT SHE HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THIS CONFLICT WAS ESPECIALLY POIGNANT AND PAINFUL FOR THE UNITED STATES. THE USA WELCOMED THE RESOLUTION AND PLEDGED ITS SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. SHE COULD ASSURE ILLUECA THAT THE AMERICANS HAD THE DEEPEST RESPECT FOR ALL THEIR NEIGHBOURS IN THE HEMISPHERE. THE UNITED STATES WAS PART OF THE HEMISPHERE; THE SOONER THE CONFLICT WAS ENDED, THE SOONER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO JOIN LATIN AMERICA IN BUILDING THE HEMISPHERE'S FUTURE.

15. I MADE A VERY STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR TELNO 463 (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT TO YOU, WASHINGTON AND COI ONLY).

16. LISTRE (ARGENTINA) THANKED ALL CONCERNED. BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE "OF MORE THAN ONE PERMANENT MEMBER" THE COUNCIL HAD NOT BE ABLE TO ACT AS IT SHOULD HAVE DONE AND HAD TRANSFERRED THE PROBLEM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL. ARGENTINA WOULD RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FIRM PURPOSE OF ENSURING THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS. THE COUNCIL HAD HEARD HOWEVER THAT OTHERS WOULD INSIST ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

17. TROYANOVSKY (USSR), IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO MY CRITICISM OF THE RUSSIANS IN MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE, SAID THAT I HAD FAILED TO TAKE NOTE OF THE CALL FOR A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN SCR 502 AND OF THE STATEMENT IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 505 THAT THE SECRETARY SHOULD BEAR IN MIND HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY. I HAD AGAIN PUT FORWARD AN ULTIMATUM AND THIS RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF MY VOTE IN FAVOUR.

18. I DECIDED NOT TO PROLONG THE PROCEEDINGS BY AN EXCHANGE WITH TROYANOVSKY AND SIMPLY SAID THAT I JUDGED THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD PREFER ME TO PURSUE IN PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS OUR DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THESE, AS OF OTHER, RESOLUTIONS.

19. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

CC LUXEMBOURG


26 MAY 1982

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 262104Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 857 DATED 26 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, MADRID, ALL EC POSTS, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, AMMAN, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, ASUNCION, BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, LA PAZ, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, PORT OF SPAIN, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, TEGUCIGALPA, CARACAS, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, HAVANA, BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, DACCA, LAGOS, NEW DELHI, YAOUNDE, DAKAR, ADDIS ABABA, JAKARTA, BAGHDAD, MASERU, MAPUTO, MOGADISHU, COLOMBO, DAMASCUS, BELGRADE, LUSAKA, ALGIERS, LUANDA, BAHRAIN BELMOPAN, GABORONE, RANGOON, NICOSIA, SANA'A, CAIRO, BANJUL, TEHRAN, ABIDJAN, NAIROBI, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, LILONGWE, KUALA LUMPUR, VALLETTA, PORT LOUIS, RABAT, KATHMANDU, MUSCAT, ISLAMABAD, DOHA, JEDDA, FREETOWN, SINGAPORE, KHARTOUM, DAR ES SALAAM, TUNIS, ABU DHABI, CARACAS, HARARE, ANTANANARIVO, LIBREVILLE, MONROVIA, VICTORIA, VILA.

MIPT(NOT TO ALL) FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 505 (1982) WHICH WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 26 MAY BEGINS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982,

NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO BELIEVE IS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION;

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982;

3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO NEGOTIATING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING, IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE;

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE NOT LATER THAN SEVEN DAYS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

ENDS

PARSONS

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OO F C O DESKBY 270300Z

GRS 280

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 270300Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 270104Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 868 DATED 26 MAY 82

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

27 MAY 1982



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MY TELNO 856: FALKLANDS

1. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS QUICK INTO HIS STRIDE FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF SCR 505. HE SAW ME AT 19830Z AND LISTRE (ARGENTINA) (IN ROS'S TEMPORARY ABSENCE) AT 2130Z.

2. PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED TO SEE ME PRIVATELY BEFORE THE FULL MEETING. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION BUT WAS VERY SORRY THAT I HAD HAD TO PUT IT SO FULLY IN MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE THIS MORNING (MY TELNO 858)M THIS HAD MADE HIS JOB IMMENSURABLY MORE DIFFICULT. WAS IT REALLY THE CASE THAT WE COULD NO LONGER CONTEMPLATE ANY PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL? I CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT IT USEFUL THAT THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION MIGHT DEFUSE THE RIO TREATY MEETING. BUT, AFTER THE FIRS ROUND WITH OURSELVES AND THE ARGENTINES HE DID NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD HAVE ANY ALTERNATIVE BUT TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE WERE UNOBTAINABLE. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT HE MIGHT BE REPORTING FAILURE IN 24 OR 48 HOURS' TIME. I URGED HIM NEVERTHELESS TO TRY TO FIND SOME CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION.

3. AT THE FULL MEETING, PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED ME FORMALLY TO PUT A SINGLE QUESTION TO YOU:

"WHAT IS HM GOVERNMENT'S DEFINITION OF ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE FIRE?" HE WOULD BE PUTTING THE SAME QUESTION TO LISTRE AND WOULD LIKE A REPLY FROM EACH OF US IN 24 HOURS, IE IN OUR CASE BY 272000Z. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONVEY HIS QUESTION TO YOU AND ASK YOU FOR THE FULLEST REPLY YOU COULD PROVIDE. MEANWHILE, I COULD ONLY REPEAT WHAT I HAD SAID IN MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE WHICH I HAD DELIVERED ON INSTRUCTIONS PREPARED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN LONDON. OUR POSITION WAS VERY FIRMY BUT I COULD ASSURE

TRY TO FIND SOME CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION.

3. AT THE FULL MEETING, PEREZ DE CUELLAR ASKED ME FORMALLY TO PUT A SINGLE QUESTION TO YOU:

"WHAT IS HM GOVERNMENT'S DEFINITION OF ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE FIRE?" HE WOULD BE PUTTING THE SAME QUESTION TO LISTRE AND WOULD LIKE A REPLY FROM EACH OF US IN 24 HOURS, IE IN OUR CASE BY 272000Z. I SAID THAT I WOULD CONVEY HIS QUESTION TO YOU AND ASK YOU FOR THE FULLEST REPLY YOU COULD PROVIDE. MEANWHILE, I COULD ONLY REPEAT WHAT I HAD SAID IN MY EXPLANATION OF VOTE WHICH I HAD DELIVERED ON INSTRUCTIONS PREPARED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN LONDON. OUR POSITION WAS VERY FIRM. BUT I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT IF HE COULD DETECT ANY CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION IT WOULD BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY BY US.

4. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM

PARSONS

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NVFC 209/27

CO F C O DESKBY 270300Z


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27 MAY 1982

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DESKBY 270300Z

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 270121Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 869 DATED 26 MAY 82
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON



MIPT: FALKLANDS

1. THE DEBATE COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE IN TERMS OF THE VIOLENCE OF THE RHETORIC. APART FROM ILLUECA AND ONE OR TWO OTHER NASTIES, THE LATIN AMERICANS STATED THEIR POSITIONS IN REASONABLE LANGUAGE. WE OWE A LOT TO THE OLD COMMONWEALTH, KENYA, GUYANA AND BELGIUM FOR THEIR ROBUST SUPPORT; SLIGHTLY LESS TO THE FRG, LITTLE OR NOTHING TO THE REST OF OUR PARTNERS WHO SPOKE, INCLUDING FRANCE; THE US STATEMENT WAS TOO EVEN HANDED FOR OUR LIKING. HOWEVER TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT, ALL THESE STATEMENTS OFFSET THE LATIN AMERICAN BARRAGE AND ILLUECA DAMAGED HIS OWN SIDE.

2. THE FACT THAT WE EMERGED WITHOUT HAVING TO VETO, WHICH SEEMED MOST UNLIKELY AT THE OUTSET, WAS DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS - THE FIRMNESS WITH WHICH WE STATED OUR OWN POSITIONS BOTH PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY; THE RELUCTANCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO ALLOW A VETO SITUATION TO DEVELOP BOTH BECAUSE OF BASIC SYMPATHY FOR US AND BECAUSE THEY REALISED THAT A DEADLOCK WOULD EFFECTIVELY DEAL THE UN OUT OF ANY FURTHER USEFUL ROLE IN THE CRISIS; THE IRISH TACTICS WHICH THE NON-ALIGNED FOUND BOTH IRRITATING AND UNACCEPTABLE; AND THE LATIN AMERICAN DESIRE TO GET OUT OF THE COUNCIL IN ORDER TO LEAVE THEIR HANDS FREE FOR THE OAS MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON 27 MAY. CTUNNU (UGANDA) MADE AN ENORMOUS CONTRIBUTION BY THE SKILL, PATIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING WITH WHICH HE NEGOTIATED THE DRAFT TO A POINT WHERE WE COULD ACCEPT IT. IT IS IRONIC, IN THE LIGHT OF MY EXPERIENCE HERE, THAT OUR BEST SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE COME FROM AMERICANS, ASIANS AND CARIBBEANS WITH OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES

MY EXPERIENCE HERE, THAT OUR BEST SUPPORT SHOULD HAVE COME FROM AFRICANS, ASIANS AND CARIBBEANS, WITH OUR PARTNERS AND ALLIES EITHER USELESS OR ACTIVELY UNHELPFUL. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IRELAND WAS PREPARED TO PUSH US TO A VETO WITH FULL FORE-KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR DRAFT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? I BELIEVE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL WOULD BE ONLY TOO HAPPY FOR PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO TAKE A FULL WEEK BEFORE REPORTING; THEY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF THE FALKLANDS FOR THE TIME BEING AND REALISE THAT THE COUNCIL IS POWERLESS TO STOP MILITARY ACTION. HOWEVER, FROM PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S MANNER THIS EVENING (NOT THAT HE WAS IN THE LEAST UNFRIENDLY) HE IS NOT GOING TO ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE USED SIMPLY AS A VEHICLE FOR BUYING TIME, AND HE WAS SEVERELY SHAKEN BY MY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL - THE ONLY NEGOTIATING CARD WHICH HE MIGHT HAVE HELD.

4. BY TOMORROW (THURSDAY) EVENING HE IS LIKELY TO BE FACED WITH THE FOLLOWING SITUATION:

(A) ON OUR SIDE, INSISTENCE ON IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, LEADING TO A RESUMPTION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION OF THE FALKLANDS, WITH NO PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL OR UN INVOLVEMENT.

(B) ON THE ARGENTINE SIDE, WILLINGNESS FOR A CEASEFIRE WITH A MILITARY FREEZE IN SITU OR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL COUPLED WITH THE RE-OPENING OF A NEGOTIATING PROCESS BASED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS EFFORTS. (THIS IS OF COURSE GUESSWORK BUT SUCH A POSITION WOULD EMERGE NATURALLY FROM ARGENTINE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE).

5. MY PRESENT FEELING IS THAT, IN THIS SITUATION, PEREZ DE CUELLAR MIGHT GIVE IT ANOTHER 24 HOURS TO ENABLE US FORMALLY TO COMMENT ON WHATEVER FORMAL RESPONSE HE GETS FROM THE ARGENTINES - AS OPPOSED TO WHATEVER LISTRE TOLD HIM OFF THE CUFF THIS EVENING. ASSUMING THAT WE TELL HIM THAT OUR POSITION IS UNCHANGEABLE, I BELIEVE THAT HE WILL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (PROBABLY ON FRIDAY EVENING BUT POSSIBLY TOMORROW THURSDAY) THAT HE CANNOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS WITH HIS MISSION IN THE LIGHT OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE TWO PARTIES, PARTICULARLY OURS.

6. THE LIKELIHOOD THEN IS THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL RECALL THE COUNCIL THE NEXT DAY. A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD STILL BE IN WASHINGTON FOR THE OAS MEETING, AND MIGHT DESCEND ON THE COUNCIL FOR ITS RESUMED SESSION.

COUNCIL THE NEXT DAY. A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD STILL BE IN WASHINGTON FOR THE OAS MEETING, AND MIGHT DESCEND ON THE COUNCIL FOR ITS RESUMED SESSION.

7. EVENTS WOULD THEN MOVE FAST. ONE CLEAR THREAD THAT RAN THROUGH JUST ABOUT ALL THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE, INCLUDING THOSE FROM COUNTRIES WELL DISPOSED TO US, WAS THAT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT BEFORE THE HOSTILITIES ESCALATED FURTHER, THUS PRECIPITATING THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND THE WEST TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED IN PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS.

8. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE COULD WELL BE FACED BY SATURDAY OR SUNDAY WITH HAVING TO VETO A STRAIGHTFORWARD CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, COMBINED WITH A RENEWAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MANDATE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE SOME KIND OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE WOULD ATTRACT BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF HIS PRESENT EFFORTS BECAUSE OF OUR REFUSAL TO ENTERTAIN THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, THUS LEAVING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH NO BASIS ON WHICH TO NEGOTIATE.

9. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I WOULD EXPECT US TO BE VERY ISOLATED. I WOULD BE MOST DUBIOUS, TO SAY THE LEAST, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FRENCH STANDING BY US, ALSO THE AMERICANS UNLESS THE PRESIDENT WAS PREPARED TO GIVE A DIRECT INSTRUCTION TO MRS KIRKPATRICK. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE REST OF THE COUNCIL WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A RESOLUTION.

10. THE ONLY POSSIBILITY I SEE TO BUY MORE TIME, IE THE FULL WEEK WHICH PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAS BEEN GIVEN BY THE COUNCIL, WOULD BE FOR ME TO SUGGEST TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD PERSONALLY GO TO LONDON AND BUENOS AIRES SO THAT HE COULD REPORT TO THE COUNCIL THAT HE HAD CARRIED HIS ENDEAVOURS TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON BOTH SIDES. HE MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO DO THIS - IT IS NOT HIS STYLE - AND MIGHT SUGGEST THAT HE SHOULD SEND SEPARATE ENVOYS TO EACH CAPITAL, AN IDEA WHICH HE HAD IN MIND IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE LAST ROUND. EVEN THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF BUYING A FEW MORE DAYS.

11. PEREZ DE CUELLAR, AT THIS AFTERNOON'S MEETING, INSISTED THAT HE SHOULD GIVE BOTH PARTIES TWENTY-FOUR HOURS TO COME UP WITH ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS WHICH HE HAD POSED. I HAVE THEREFORE ARRANGED TO MEET HIM AT 2000Z TOMORROW 27 MAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 MAY 1982

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FM FCO 260930Z MAY 82

TO FLASH ASUNCION

TELEGRAM NUMBER 68 OF 26 MAY

AND FLASH TO BOGOTA, QUITO, LIMA, LA PAZ, SANTIAGO, BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, MONTEVIDEO, TEGUCIGALPA, CARACAS, SAN JOSE, PORT OF SPAIN, SANTO DOMINGO

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PANAMA CITY, HAVANA, BRIDGETOWN, KINGSTON, GEORGETOWN

FALKLAND ISLANDS: RIO TREATY MEETING: 27 MAY

1. WHILE OUR LOBBYING OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS IN ADVANCE OF THE MEETING OF RIO TREATY SIGNATORIES IN WASHINGTON ON 27 MAY NEEDS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF LATIN AMERICAN SENSITIVITIES, WE SHOULD DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE MODERATES AND TO PUT OUR CASE ACROSS. PLEASE THEREFORE SPEAK AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL, PREFERABLY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE FOLLOWING LINES (WITH DISCRETION TO DRAW ON THOSE POINTS WHICH CAN, IN YOUR VIEW, BE MOST SUITABLY DEPLOYED IN YOUR LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES).

2. YOU MAY SAY, MAKING CLEAR THAT YOU ARE SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, THAT WE FULLY SHARE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE FALKLANDS. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT THE CONFLICT IS NOT OF OUR CHOOSING. THE ARGENTINE INVASION INTERRUPTED A SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT RESOLVING THE DISPUTE OVER THE FALKLANDS PEACEFULLY. OVER SEVEN WEEKS HAVE NOW PASSED SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED RESOLUTION 502 CALLING FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. SINCE THEN WE HAVE PARTICIPATED FULLY AND POSITIVELY IN THE MANY EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE BRITISH DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT (GUIDANCE TELNO 86) CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED OUR DETERMINATION TO FIND A BASIS FOR AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE CONFLICT IMMEDIATELY TO AN END. BUT ARGENTINA REJECTED THIS AND HAS THROUGHOUT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 502. WE HAVE BEEN LEFT WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT, RELUCTANTLY, TO INCREASE THE MILITARY PRESSURES TO END THEIR ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF BRITISH TERRITORY. OUR MILITARY AIMS ARE LIMITED AND WE CONTINUE TO HOPE

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THAT THERE CAN BE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE ARGENTINE POSITION.

3. THE FACT REMAINS THAT ARGENTINA IS THE AGGRESSOR AND THE UK IS THE VICTIM. THIS ESSENTIAL POINT MUST NOT BE LOST SIGHT OF. OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE IS CLEAR. COSTA MENDEZ IS REPORTEDLY TAKING THE LINE (LIMA TELNO 198 NOT TO ALL) THAT ARGENTINA HAS NO OBJECTION TO A CEASEFIRE LEAVING BRITISH FORCES IN THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS. IF THIS IS RAISED WITH YOU, YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT IT MISSES THE POINT. IT IS ARGENTINA AS THE AGGRESSOR WHICH IS OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 502.

4. YOU SHOULD GO ON TO SAY THAT OUR QUARREL IS WITH THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, NOT WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. INDEED, OUR SYMPATHY LIES WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD TO BEAR THE BRUNT OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S DISASTROUS DECISION TO INVADE THE ISLANDS. WE HAVE HAD NO DISPUTE WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA. WE UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE CRISIS CAUSES FOR THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. IT IS OUR PROFOUND HOPE THAT IT CAN BE RESOLVED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT DAMAGE TO OUR LONGSTANDING AND FRIENDLY TIES WITH LATIN AMERICA, TO WHICH GREATEST IMPORTANCE AND WHICH WE WISH TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN. WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THE ROOM WHICH THIS CONFLICT HAS GIVEN FOR MISCHIEF-MAKING BY COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NO TRADITIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFFAIRS OF LATIN AMERICA: IT IS IN EVERYONE'S INTERESTS THAT THIS BILATERAL DISPUTE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WIDEN IN SCOPE.

5. A DECISION BY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION AFFECTING THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UK WOULD SERVE NO PURPOSE AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT NONE WILL BE TAKEN. IT WOULD BE A MATTER OF DEEP REGRET FOR US IF OUR FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES WERE TO BE SET BACK IN THIS WAY.

6. THE BASIC ISSUE IS SELF-DETERMINATION NOT COLONIALISM (EXCEPT ON THE PART OF ARGENTINA, SEE BELOW). ANY APPARENT ENDORSEMENT FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BY FORCE WOULD HAVE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS BOTH FOR THE REGION AND ELSEWHERE. OUR RECORD OF DECOLONISATION SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. WE TAKE PRIDE IN THE PART WE PLAYED IN ASSISTING INDEPENDENCE IN

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LATIN AMERICA. WE HAVE OURSELVES BROUGHT OVER 40 COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES TO INDEPENDENCE (ZIMBABWE AND BELIZE ARE RECENT EXAMPLES). IT IS THE ARGENTINES WHO ARE SEEKING TO COLONISE THE ISLANDS AGAINST THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

7. ON ECONOMIC MEASURES YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE IN PARA 5(C) OF MY TELNO 81 TO BRASILIA.

8. PLEASE KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOUR US COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO UNDERTAKE ENERGETIC LOBBYING IN ORDER TO LIMIT DAMAGE FROM THE RIO TREATY MEETING TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

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
27 MAY 82

MEXICO CITY 262355Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM PUMBER 439 OF 26 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK



YOUR TELNO 68 TO ASUNCION; FALKLANDS; RIO TREATY MEETING

1. I SPOKE ACCORDINGLY TO ROSENZWEIG DIAZ (ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER) AND TELLO (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) TODAY.
2. ROSENZWEIG DIAZ SAID THAT THE SITUATION WAS DETERIORATING. THERE WERE INCREASING PRESSURES FOR SOME FORM OF ACTION AGAINST BRITAIN IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. MOREOVER THE POLITICAL MAP WAS CHANGING IN UNPREDICTABLE FASHION WITH SUCH COUNTRIES AS CUBA AND NICARAGUA COMING TO THE AID OF ARGENTINA. HE WAS MORE WORRIED THAN HE HAD EVER BEEN. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 505 WOULD SCARCELY ADVANCE THINGS. HE SYMPATHIZED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REACTION.
3. ROSENZWEIG BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED THE MEXICAN POSITION AS SET OUT IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT OF 21 MAY (MY TELNO 423). THE LACK OF A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR FULFILMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF UNSCR 502. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WENT WITHOUT SAYING. A KEY POINT FOR MEXICO WAS THAT THE OPERATIVE CLAUSES IN UNSCR 502 TAKE EFFECT SIMILTANEOUSLY; IN OTHER WORDS AN IMMEDIATE END TO HOSTILITIES SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. HE MENTIONED THIS POINT BECAUSE HA HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION FROM REMARKS MADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT THE BRITISH WERE NOW INSISTING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE HOSTILITIES COULD END. HE ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE REASSURANCE ON THIS POINT, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE RIO TREATY MEETING.
4. I SAID THAT PEOPLE SOMETIMES FORGOT THAT WE WERE THE VICTIMS RATHER THAN AGGRESSORS. WE WERE STANDING UP FOR THE SAME PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT AS THEMSELVES: RESPECT FOR LAW, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, AND SELF-DETERMINATION. WE HAD NOW ASSUMED OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, AND LOOKED FOR SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY. ROSENZWEIG REPEATED THAT THE MEXICAN POSITION AS STATED IN THE MINISTER'S DECLARATION OF 6 APRIL (MY TELNO 256) HAD NOT CHANGED.
5. ON THE PANAMANIAN DECLARATION ABOUT THE RIVER PLATE, I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED IN YOUR GUIDANCE TELNO 108. ROSENZWEIG WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED. I LEFT HIM THE TEXT OF SIR ANTHONY PARSON'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, AND SELF-DETERMINATION. WE HAD NOW ASSUMED
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CORRECTION OF TEXT:

PARA 3 LINE 9 FIRST WORD SHOULD READ QUOTE HE UNQUOTE.

TICKELL

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CONFIDENTIAL

DECKBY 201800Z

FM BRASILIA 201800Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 210 OF 26 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

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YOUR TELNO 65 TO ASUNCION: FALKLANDS: RIO TREATY MEETING

1. I MADE THE POINTS IN TUR THIS MORNING TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PUTTING HIM STRAIGHT ALSO ON THE RIVER PLATE ISSUE (UKMIS TELS NOS 852 AND 853) AND INFORMING HIM OF OUR REACTION TO THE REVISED IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION AT THE UN.

2. GUERREIRO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT ADOPTION OF THE AMENDED RESOLUTION COULD HOLD THE POSITION FOR A SHORT TIME, LEADING EVEN TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE TIAR MEETING, SO LONG AS THE NEXT FEW CRUCIAL DAYS LED TO THE OUTLINE OF AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT AND WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A TACITLY-AGREED REDUCTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

3. FAILING THIS, GUERREIRO BELIEVED THE ARGENTINES WOULD SEEK STRONG MEASURES AT THE TIAR, AND BRAZIL WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAND OUT AGAINST THE MAJORITY OPINION, OR TO MODERATE THE OUTCOME, AS SHE HAD DONE PREVIOUSLY. I ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER BRAZIL WOULD GO ALONG WITH ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST BRITAIN OR THE BREAKING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. GUERREIRO SAID BRAZIL HAD NOT CONTEMPLATED THINGS COMING TO SUCH A PASS, NOR SO FAR HAD ARGENTINA EXPECTED IT OF HER. HOWEVER, GREAT SOPHISTICATION WAS REQUIRED FROM BRITAIN AT THIS POINT TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD AVOID THE JUNTA BEING REDUCED TO DESPERATION. THE PROBLEM NOW HAD MUCH WIDER IMPLICATIONS THAN THE FUTURE OF THE ISLANDS THEMSELVES. A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN ARGENTINA AND AN INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS THERE WOULD AFFECT THE WHOLE REGION. IT WOULD ALSO STORE UP TROUBLE FOR BRITAIN, SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO KEEP THE MALVINAS ISSUE ALIVE AT A HIGH EMOTIONAL PITCH FOR A LONG TIME.

COMMENT

4. BRAZIL'S POSITION IS AT THIS STAGE DETERMINED LESS BY FEAR OF A CONFIDENT ARGENTINA THROWING ITS WEIGHT AROUND IN THE REGION THAN OF AN IMPLODING ARGENTINA PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET/CUBAN MISCHIEF-MAKING AND AN EVENTUAL LEFT-WING

COMMENT

4. BRAZIL'S POSITION IS AT THIS STAGE DETERMINED LESS BY FEAR OF A CONFIDENT ARGENTINA THROWING ITS WEIGHT AROUND IN THE REGION THAN OF AN IMPLoding ARGENTINA PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET/CUBAN MISCHIEF-MAKING AND AN EVENTUAL LEFT-WING REGIME THERE BECOMING A SUBVERSIVE THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBOURS. WHATEVER THE JUSTICE OF OUR CAUSE (FOR WHICH MANY BRAZILIANS HAVE MUCH SYMPATHY), THEY WILL HOLD US, AS THE SANER AND MORE CIVILISED - AS WELL AS THE MORE POWERFUL - PARTY, LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH AN OUTCOME.

5. IT MAY SEEM REGRETTABLE THAT THE BRAZILIANS DO NOT DRAW THE CONCLUSION FROM THIS GLOOMY PROGNOSTICATION THAT THEY SHOULD THEMSELVES PLUCK UP THEIR COURAGE AND TACKLE THE ARGENTINES HEAD ON ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR INTRANSIGENCE. BUT THEIR JUDGEMENT IS THAT THE JUNTA IS IMPERVIOUS TO REASON AND WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY TO ANY PRESSURE THAT BRAZIL COULD BRING TO BEAR.

HARDING

NNNN

SENTAT 262120Z


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26 MAY 1982



OO UKMIS NEW YORK
OO WASHINGTON
GRS 773
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 261830Z
FM FCO 261659Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 26 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BRASILIA, LIMA
FALKLAND ISLANDS: JOINT APPROACH OF PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA,
BRAZIL AND PERU

1. THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME TODAY TO DELIVER AN ORAL MESSAGE ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CRISIS, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THIS HAD CAUSED IT IN A LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO HIM (MY TELNO 108, NOT TO ALL), PRESIDENT TURBAY HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENTS OF BRAZIL AND PERU, WHO HAD AGREED TO PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE UK'S POSITION, WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT. THEY WERE HOWEVER CONCERNED TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE AND AT THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, THERE WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURES AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING ON 27 MAY TO TAKE RADICAL POSITIONS AGAINST THE UK.
2. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS TIME TO ALLOW PRESSURES TO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE UK COULD ACCEPT. IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. BUT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND ARRANGE. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS THEREFORE WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD CONSIDER AGREEMENT TO A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THE MILITARY STATUS QUO WOULD REMAIN (WITH A BAR ON MILITARY SUPPLY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, PRESSURE

COULD BE EXERTED ON ARGENTINA AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. THERE WAS NO WISH TO EMBARRASS US BY PUTTING FORWARD FORMAL PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE. THE IDEA WAS ONLY TO SUGGEST A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE UK ITSELF TO BUILD ON.

3. I SAID THAT I MUCH APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS MADE BY COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU TO ASSIST IN A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WE OURSELVES HAD NOT CLOSED ANY DOORS. BUT WE HAD ALWAYS MADE QUITE CLEAR THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IF THERE WERE TO BE A CEASEFIRE NOW, THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. OUR FORCES WERE ON BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND ARGENTINA WAS THE INVADER. IT WAS HOWEVER IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONSIDER A FIVE-DAY CEASEFIRE, EVEN WITHOUT ANY RE-SUPPLY TO THE ARGENTINE FORCES, IF THIS WERE NOT LINKED FIRMLY AND IRREVOCABLY TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS DID NOT REQUIRE PRIOR NEGOTIATION: THERE WAS NO REASON WHY SUCH A WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BEGIN IMMEDIATELY IF ARGENTINA CHOSE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO SIGN OF AN ARGENTINE CHANGE OF MIND: AND IN THE HIGHLY-CHARGED ATMOSPHERE IN BUENOS AIRES, IT WAS PROBABLY DIFFICULT FOR GALTIERI TO TAKE ANY SUCH DECISION.

4. I MADE CLEAR TO RESTREPO-LONDONO THAT WE WERE NATURALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. WE HAD NO WISH FOR THIS AND WE PLACED A HIGH VALUE ON OUR LONG-STANDING FRIENDLY TIES. OUR QUARREL WAS ONLY WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NOT WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, NOR WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

5. RESTREPO-LONDONO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT BACK TO PRESIDENT TURBAY. HE LEFT WITH ME A SPEAKING-NOTE ON THE INFORMAL IDEAS OF THE PRESIDENT. TEXT IN MIFT.

6. GRATEFUL IF YOU, BRASILIA AND LIMA COULD KEEP US INFORMED OF REACTIONS. WE POINTED OUT TO RESTREPO-LONDONO THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AT PRESENT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON WHICH A VOTE WAS TO BE TAKEN TODAY, COULD PROVIDE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND HELP DETER THE ADOPTION OF RADICAL MEASURES AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING. YOU SHOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY

TO EMPHASISE THAT WE FULLY SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL IN TURN UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. THE CRISIS IS NOT OF OUR MAKING. WE ARE USING THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. THE PROBLEM COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AT ANY TIME OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS BY ARGENTINE READINESS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502. WE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CAN USE ALL THEIR INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES TO PERSUADE ARGENTINA OF THE NEED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES, SO THAT PEACE CAN BE RESTORED.

7. ON PARA 4 OF LIMA TELNO 198 (NOT TO BRASILIA), THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY INTENTION OF PRESIDENT TURBAY TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASSUMED (AS DO WE) THAT THIS HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY HIS CALL ON ME TODAY.

PYM

MADE COPIES: FA. LAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39) (45)

PS
PS/MR FORD
PS/MR GIBSON
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MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GLENN
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLORE
HD/PSD (2)
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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS 760
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RESIDENT CLERK

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MR JETT } TREASURY
MR LITTLER }
SIR R ARMSTRONG }
SIR M PALLISER } CABINET
MR WADE-GERY } OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO }
DIO }

RK 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Mrs. Dickson, D/ENER

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL
FM MEXICO CITY 261841Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 441 OF 26 MAY
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON AND UKHIS NEW YORK

FOR TELNO 443: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MEXICAN PRESIDENT
1. I DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO THIS MORNING. WE WERE ALONE. I UNDERLINED OUR RESENTMENT AT ACCUSATIONS OF COLONIALISM AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE GENEROSITY OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WE HAD PUT TO THE ARGENTINES BUT WHICH THEY HAD REJECTED.
2. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS WARM THANKS TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE DEPLORED THE LOSS OF LIFE AND WASTE OF RESOURCES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT. HE DID NOT DOUBT OUR CAPACITY TO RECOVER THE ISLANDS AND INDICATED THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT BE TOO LONG ABOUT IT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD COME OUT OF THE RIO TREATY MEETING; MEXICO HAD ENGAGEMENTS WHICH IT HAD TO RESPECT. HIS OWN OFFER TO PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR A FACE TO FACE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL GALTIERI STILL STOOD BUT HE EARLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO WORK AT PRESENT

STILL STOOD , BUT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO LOOK AT PRESENT THROUGH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. HE FOUND THE WHOL SIT- UATION DEEPLY DEPRESSING AND DANGEROUS.

3. I ALSO SAW THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SECRETARY. HE SAID HE FOUND OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT INTELLIGENT, CONSTRUCTIVE AND EXTREMELY REASONABLE; AND HA HAD WARMLY COMMENDED IT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IF THE ARGENTINES HAD HAD ANY SENSE THEY WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED IT. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT FOR THEM THE ISLANDS REPRESENTED A MAJOR INTERNAL ISSUE, AND ANYWAY MILITARY GOVERNMENTS COULD SELDOM RETREAT.

4. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED MORE SAD AND WORRIED THAN ANYTHING ELSE. AS ALWAYS HE WAS WARM AND SYMPATHETIC. I DID NOT PRESS HIM ON DETAILS AS I DOUBT IF HE IS FULLY AWARE OF THEM. HE SAW THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MEXICAN OAS REPRESENTATIVE LAST NIGHT BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT COMMENT ON THEM.

TICKELL

NNNN



MO 5/21/2

*Willie
PM does not need to
write to the Steel.
Do you want to
turn the information
below into a
note for P.M.?*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~9387022~~ 218 2111/3

26th May 1982

*MAJ
27/v.*

Dear Mike,

Yesterday you asked for a draft of a letter which the Prime Minister might send to David Steele MP amplifying the Answer she gave in the House about the South Atlantic Fund. I am attaching a suggested letter.

Willie Rickett has also requested a little more background for the Prime Minister on the way in which donations from the public are being administered. The donations seem to have fallen into three broad categories: welfare money which is specifically directed to one of the existing Service charities; welfare money which is not directed to one of our existing charities but is rather given in support of those in the Task Force generally; and money intended to defray the cost of operations. The first of these is straight forward, the third is being held in a suspense account by the Treasury. The South Atlantic Fund is designed to deal with the second category.

The South Atlantic Fund has been established on the principle that there should be one fund and not many, with its terms drawn sufficiently wide so as to prevent too much money being directed at only a few people. The Trustees of the Fund will therefore have the flexibility to direct donations across the whole spectrum of those in need - RN, Army, RAF, Merchant Marine and others. The Fund will therefore simply hold money on behalf of existing charities until we have a clearer idea of how best it can be used. Of course, the existing charities can already be used to help those who are in immediate need. We believe that these procedures should avoid the kind of problems experienced by the Penlee Fund.

We hope that these arrangements will be sufficiently flexible for us to meet the wishes of the vast majority of donors.

*Yours ever
Gene Ridley*

(J E RIDLEY)(MISS)

Mike Pattison Esq

DRAFT LETTER TO RT HON DAVID STEELE, MP

I thought it would be helpful if I expanded on ^{my} ~~the~~ answer ~~I gave~~ to you [yesterday] in the House ^{on Wednesday} ~~when you asked~~ about money sent by the public for charitable purposes connected with the Task Force.

I agree with you wholeheartedly that we have many organisations working in this area who cater very well for those in need, and as John Nott explained we will be using these charities to identify and help the needy. Although the South Atlantic Fund will have charitable status it will not itself be involved directly in charitable work: it will simply hold on to the money we receive and divide it between existing charities as the need arises. If a member of the public wants to send money for men on the Task Force but is not sure exactly where the money should go then the Fund is a convenient mechanism for directing the gift. Among the charities likely to benefit are the King George's fund for Sailors (which covers the RN and the Merchant Navy), the Army Benevolent Fund and the RAF Benevolent Fund.

As further background you may be interested to see the attached copy of the Press Release put out by the Ministry of Defence [yesterday] which details the arrangements for dealing with donations.

PRESS RELEASE ON SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND

The Ministry of Defence is aware of, and is most grateful for, the public desire to support all Service and civilian personnel involved in the present South Atlantic operations. Many donations have been received from both at home and abroad. Benevolent support for Servicemen, ex-Servicemen and their dependants who are in need, is normally provided through the following Benevolent Funds:

- a. For Royal Naval, Royal Marines, Royal Fleet Auxiliary, Merchant Naval and all seafaring personnel:

King George's Fund for Sailors
1 Chesham Street
London SW1X 9NF

- b. For Army personnel:

Army Benevolent Fund
Duke of York's Headquarters
King's Road
Chelsea
London SW5 4SP

- c. For Royal Air Force personnel:

Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund
67 Portland Place
London W1N 4AR

Of course, money donated to these Charities can be used only for the benefit of those specified, and for their dependants.

2. The Ministry of Defence has also received donations directed on a more general basis for the welfare of all people, both Service and civilian, who are involved in the Falkland Islands operations. It has therefore been decided to set up a trust fund to be called the "South Atlantic Fund" which will act as a collecting and banking agency for donations not specifically tied to a single Service of the Defence Forces. Subject to Trustee discretion, the funds collected will be distributed to the Service Charities and to other charities, as the need arises.

3. Further information on the South Atlantic Fund will be given as soon as the fund has been legally constituted. Meanwhile money for this fund will be held in a suspense account administered by the United Services' Trustee. Donations should be sent to:

South Atlantic Fund
Ministry of Defence
Archway Block South
Old Admiralty Building
London SW1A 2BE

4. The MOD believes that this arrangement will meet the need and would not wish to encourage the setting up of separate and more narrowly drawn funds or appeals.

5. Donations which have been sent specifically to defray the cost of military operations in the South Atlantic are being held separately.

GPS 210
UNCLASSIFIED
FM LIMA 261933Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 202 OF 26 MAY

FALKLANDS

1. TODAY'S PRESS HIGHLIGHTS THE MASS HELD YESTERDAY TO COMMEMORATE ARGENTINA'S NATIONAL DAY, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY PRESIDENT BELAUNDE, THE CABINET AND OTHER LEADING PERSONALITIES.
2. PROMINENCE IS ALSO GIVEN TO BRITAIN'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES' DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EMPOWERING THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE; MENTION IS MADE OF ARGENTINE DIFFICULTIES IN ACCEPTING THE DRAFT. ATTENTION IS ALSO FOCUSED ON THE LATEST EFFORTS BY THE PRESIDENTS OF BRAZIL, COLOMBIA AND PERU TO PROMOTE A NEW PEACE INITIATIVE, WITH REFERENCES TO THE VARIOUS TELEPHONE CALLS YESTERDAY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS. VENEZUELA IS SAID TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS INITIATIVE.
3. VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS REPORT THAT THE PERUVIAN SENATE HELD A SECRET SESSION LAST NIGHT TO DEBATE POSSIBLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA UNDER THE TERMS OF THE RIO TREATY. SOME SPEAKERS ARE SAID TO HAVE SUGGESTED THAT PERU MIGHT ACT AS THE CHANNEL BY WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SUPPLIED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ARGENTINA. THE CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES JOINT COMMAND, YESTERDAY REITERATED THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES' READINESS TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHENEVER SUCH A DECISION WAS REACHED. HOWEVER, HE AGAIN DENIED THAT AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN SENT TO ARGENTINA, AND RIDICULED REPORTS FROM BOLIVIA ABOUT PERUVIAN MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS.

WALLACE

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FALKLAND ISLAND GENERAL

FCO

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ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
 Telephone 01-938X02X 218 2111/3

MO 5/21

26th May 1982

N.S.P.R.

Dear John

MR 27/5

h.a.


NON-COMBAT AIRCRAFT: CONTINGENCY PRESS RELEASE

Thank you very much for your letter of 24th May concerning our draft press release against the possibility that we shoot down a non-combat aircraft.

We had originally included the third paragraph to which you refer because, at the time it was drafted, the Press would undoubtedly have asked as their first question whether the incident took place inside or outside the TEZ. However, since the concept of the TEZ is now less prominent, the Secretary of State has agreed that your arguments against including the paragraph are over-riding.

To avoid any confusion over drafts, I am attaching a revised press release.

I am copying this letter to John Coles (No 10), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and John Rhodes (Department of Trade).

Yours ever,

 (J E RIDLEY) (MISS)

J Holmes Esq

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE FOR ARGENTINE 707/C130 ENGAGEMENT

At [time] an Argentine military aircraft, [a Boeing 707/C130], which was engaged on surveillance duties against our own forces was shot down by a (missile/aircraft). We have no reports of any survivors.

We warned the Argentine authorities on 23rd April and again on 7th May that all Argentine aircraft engaging in surveillance of British forces would be regarded as hostile and were liable to be dealt with accordingly.

The intelligence gained from this type of surveillance operation can be used to direct air, surface ship and submarine attacks against our forces, with consequent risk to British lives.

The need for such action in our self-defence can easily be avoided if Argentina heeds our public warnings in future.

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SECRET D E D I P

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OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 261900Z
OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 261900Z

GRS 435
SECRET
D E D I P
DESKBY 261900Z
FM FCO 261800Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1065 OF 26 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 1889: HAIG'S VIEWS ON FALKLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING AS A FIRST RESPONSE FROM ME TO HAIG'S LATEST MESSAGE.

BEGINS. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH I RECEIVED YESTERDAY MORNING. YOU HAVE RAISED SOME VERY IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT QUESTIONS.

I DO OF COURSE UNDERSTAND THE DANGER OF ARGENTINA TURNING TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. AND WE IN LONDON ARE NATURALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISK OF ARGENTINE MILITARY STRIKES AGAINST THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AFTER WE HAVE REPOSSESSED THEM. I WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GENEROUS AND IMPORTANT OFFER OF AN AMERICAN BATTALION TO HELP IN DETERRING ANY ARGENTINE MOVE TO INVADE THE ISLANDS AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. WE ARE THINKING HARD ABOUT ALL THESE PROBLEMS.

2. IN THE MEANTIME I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU SOMETHING OF THE FLAVOUR OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE. WITH THE CONTINUED REFUSAL OF ARGENTINA TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH BRIDGEHEAD IN THE FALKLANDS, THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE IN PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN BRITAIN. IT WOULD NO LONGER BE REALISTIC TO ASK PEOPLE HERE TO ACCEPT THE IDEAS OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION OR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS. THEY ARE JUST NOT POLITICAL STARTERS NOW. AFTER THE EVENTS OF RECENT DAYS, AND THE BRITISH LOSSES AS WELL AS OUR MILITARY PROGRESS, WHAT

PEOPLE WANT TO SEE IS THE REPOSSESSION OF THE ISLANDS AND THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE WILL OF COURSE ENABLE US TO CONSULT THE ISLANDERS IN DUE TIME ABOUT THEIR WISHES FOR THE FUTURE.

3. ONE QUESTION I AM THEREFORE CONSIDERING IS WHETHER SOME OF THE IDEAS MENTIONED IN YOUR MESSAGE, AND PARTICULARLY YOUR OFFER OF A BATTALION, COULD BE USED AT A SOMEWHAT LATER STAGE. I MAY WANT TO COME BACK TO YOU ON THIS.

4. MEANWHILE, LET ME STRESS THAT I AM VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR BRITAIN AND THE US TO MAINTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH THE LATIN AMERICA COUNTRIES - ESPECIALLY THE MODERATES. I HAVE SPOKEN TODAY ON THE BBC LATIN AMERICAN SERVICE IN TERMS WHICH I HOPE WILL GO DOWN WELL IN THOSE COUNTRIES. THE PRIME MINISTER AND I HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH OUR OPPOSITE NUMBERS IN BRASIL, COLOMBIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, PERU AND ELSE WHERE. BRITISH AMBASSADORS THROUGHOUT THE AREA HAVE TODAY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE APPROACHES ABOUT THE OAS MEETING LATER THIS WEEK.

5. I GREATLY VALUE OUR EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES AND YOUR FREQUENT TALKS WITH NICKO HENDERSON. WITHOUT YOUR SUPPORT, THINGS WOULD BE FAR HARDER FOR US IN THESE DIFFICULT DAYS. ENDS.

PYM

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE
LIMITED

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HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
ED/PLANNING STAFF
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PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
PS/FUS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT

COPIES TO

PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/ S OF S DEFENCE
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR O'NEILL
HD/ASSESSMENTS STAFF
MR COLVIN
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE
DIRECTOR G C H Q

CABINET
OFFICE

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39) (40)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR GNSLOW
PS/PJS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
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MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

MT

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN 261335Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 484 OF 26 MAY

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO UKMIS NEW YORK ATHENS BRUSSELS
PARIS UKREP BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN THE HAGUE LUXEMBOURG ROME

FALKLANDS: GERMAN PUBLIC COMMENTS

1. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT YESTERDAY MADE WHAT SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS
TODAY CALL HIS FIRST PUBLIC CRITICISM OF BRITAIN'S HANDLING
OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT.

2. SPEAKING AT A MEETING OF THE SPD PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, HE SAID
THAT QUOTE SOLIDARITY WITH BRITAIN AS AN ALLY GAVE THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT THE OPPORTUNITY, AND PERHAPS ALSO THE MORAL DUTY,
IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY, TO JOIN WITH
OT R PARTNERS IN EXERTING AN INFLUENCE ON BRITAIN UNQUOTE.

~~IN KEEPING WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY, TO JOIN WITH
OF R PARTNERS IN EXERTING AN INFLUENCE ON BRITAIN UNQUOTE.~~
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAD AGREED TO THE EXTENSION OF EC SANCTIONS
ONLY AFTER QUOTE OVERCOMING SERIOUS INHIBITIONS UNQUOTE. THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN WAS STILL TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS
POWER TO END THE FIGHTING, AND IT THEREFORE SUPPORTED ALL ATTEMPTS
AT MEDIATION.

3. SOBOTTA (RHEINISCHE POST), WHO IS CLOSE TO THE CHANCELLOR,
COMMENTS ON SCHMIDT'S REMARKS IN TODAY'S PAPER. HE SAYS THAT BONN
STANDS ON THE SIDE OF BRITAIN, BERLIN'S PROTECTING POWER, OUT OF
NECESSARY COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF ITS OWN OBVIOUS
INTERESTS. BUT THIS SUPPORT IS GRUDGING AND FULL OF RESERVATIONS
STEMMING FROM INCOMPREHENSION AT MANY ASPECTS OF MRS THATCHER'S
FALKLANDS STRATEGY. BRITAIN'S LOSSES SEEMS STEADILY TO DIMINISH
HER READINESS FOR A CEASEFIRE. GERMANY WILL NOT GO THROUGH THICK
AND THIN WITH BRITAIN, DESPITE OR EVEN BECAUSE OF BERLIN.

4. GENSCHER IS REPORTED AS HAVING SAID IN A RADIO INTERVIEW IN
BRUSSELS YESTERDAY THAT THE EC HAD EXPRESSED ITS HOPE AND EXPECTAT-
ION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, AND
THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED AS WELL AS THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EC AND LATIN AMERICA ALL POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES
FOR NEGOTIATION MUST BE USED.
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

TAYLOR

NNNN

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FM FCO 261659Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 26 MAY 82
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BRASILIA, LIMA
MIPT:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR'S SPEAKING-NOTE:
 - (1). THE TWO PARTIES AGREE TO SUSPEND BELLICOSE ACTIONS FOR FIVE DAYS.
 - (2). UNITED KINGDOM PROPOSES MECHANISMS WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HER SO THAT, DURING THAT INTERIM PERIOD, THE NECESSARY AGREEMENTS TO ENTER INTO NEW NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE REACHED.
 - (3). NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ARE BEING PUT FORWARD AT THIS STAGE. THERE IS A WILLINGNESS TO ACT AS A GO-BETWEEN, BUT, SHOULD IT BE DEEMED APPROPRIATE, IDEAS WILL BE PRESENTED AT A LATER DATE.

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OO UKMIS NEW YORK

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DESKBY 261830Z

FM FCO 261659Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 26 MAY 82

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, BRASILIA, LIMA
FALKLAND ISLANDS: JOINT APPROACH OF PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA,
BRAZIL AND PERU

1. THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME TODAY TO DELIVER AN ORAL MESSAGE ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT HAD SOUGHT TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION THROUGHOUT THE PRESENT CRISIS, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THIS HAD CAUSED IT IN A LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO HIM (MY TELNO 108, NOT TO ALL), PRESIDENT TURBAY HAD SPOKEN TO THE PRESIDENTS OF BRAZIL AND PERU, WHO HAD AGREED TO PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON AN INFORMAL BASIS THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE UK'S POSITION, WHICH HAD BEEN CLEARLY SET OUT. THEY WERE HOWEVER CONCERNED TO AVOID FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE AND AT THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONS. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, THERE WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURES AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING ON 27 MAY TO TAKE RADICAL POSITIONS AGAINST THE UK.

2. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS TIME TO ALLOW PRESSURES TO BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON ARGENTINA TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH THE UK COULD ACCEPT. IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT THIS WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES. BUT SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND ARRANGE. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS THEREFORE WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD CONSIDER AGREEMENT TO A SUSPENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE DAYS, DURING WHICH TIME THE MILITARY STATUS QUO WOULD REMAIN (WITH A BAR ON MILITARY SUPPLY DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, PRESSURE

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COULD BE EXERTED ON ARGENTINA AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. THERE WAS NO WISH TO EMBARRASS US BY PUTTING FORWARD FORMAL PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE. THE IDEA WAS ONLY TO SUGGEST A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE UK ITSELF TO BUILD ON.

3. I SAID THAT I MUCH APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS MADE BY COLOMBIA, BRAZIL AND PERU TO ASSIST IN A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. WE OURSELVES HAD NOT CLOSED ANY DOORS. BUT WE HAD ALWAYS MADE QUITE CLEAR THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IF THERE WERE TO BE A CEASEFIRE NOW, THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL. OUR FORCES WERE ON BRITISH SOVEREIGN TERRITORY AND ARGENTINA WAS THE INVADER. IT WAS HOWEVER IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONSIDER A FIVE-DAY CEASEFIRE, EVEN WITHOUT ANY RE-SUPPLY TO THE ARGENTINE FORCES, IF THIS WERE NOT LINKED FIRMLY AND IRREVOCABLY TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. THIS DID NOT REQUIRE PRIOR NEGOTIATION: THERE WAS NO REASON WHY SUCH A WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BEGIN IMMEDIATELY IF ARGENTINA CHOSE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY NO SIGN OF AN ARGENTINE CHANGE OF MIND: AND IN THE HIGHLY-CHARGED ATMOSPHERE IN BUENOS AIRES, IT WAS PROBABLY DIFFICULT FOR GALTIERI TO TAKE ANY SUCH DECISION.

4. I MADE CLEAR TO RESTREPO-LONDONO THAT WE WERE NATURALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE. WE HAD NO WISH FOR THIS AND WE PLACED A HIGH VALUE ON OUR LONG-STANDING FRIENDLY TIES. OUR QUARREL WAS ONLY WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NOT WITH THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE, NOR WITH THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

5. RESTREPO-LONDONO UNDERTOOK TO REPORT BACK TO PRESIDENT TURBAY. HE LEFT WITH ME A SPEAKING-NOTE ON THE INFORMAL IDEAS OF THE PRESIDENT. TEXT IN MIFT.

6. GRATEFUL IF YOU, BRASILIA AND LIMA COULD KEEP US INFORMED OF REACTIONS. WE POINTED OUT TO RESTREPO-LONDONO THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AT PRESENT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON WHICH A VOTE WAS TO BE TAKEN TODAY, COULD PROVIDE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND HELP DETER THE ADOPTION OF RADICAL MEASURES AT THE RIO TREATY MEETING. YOU SHOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY

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TO EMPHASISE THAT WE FULLY SHARE THE CONCERN OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT THEY WILL IN TURN UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. THE CRISIS IS NOT OF OUR MAKING. WE ARE USING THE MINIMUM FORCE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES. THE PROBLEM COULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AT ANY TIME OVER THE PAST SEVEN WEEKS BY ARGENTINE READINESS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502. WE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS CAN USE ALL THEIR INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES TO PERSUADE ARGENTINA OF THE NEED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES, SO THAT PEACE CAN BE RESTORED.

7. ON PARA 4 OF LIMA TELNO 198 (NOT TO BRASILIA), THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY INTENTION OF PRESIDENT TURBAY TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASSUMED (AS DO WE) THAT THIS HAD BEEN OVERTAKEN BY HIS CALL ON ME TODAY.

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Prime Minister

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MANUEL ULLOA

Just to wind up the history of Señor Ulloa's visit to Europe. He left on Friday last finally for Lima. He left expressing regret that he had not been able to see you this time. Although, like most Latin American politicians, he has a desire to please, I think that that is true. He hopes still to play a part as a peace maker. The fact that he openly criticises and privately wishes to communicate is typical, though as a rich man who was once looked as Rockefeller's man in Peru in the last resort he will not wish to quarrel with the US or the West as such. I think he is still apprehensive of his own generals. It seems to me desirable to keep talking to him if only because he may be useful ultimately and because he is a source of information about Argentina. He said that he hoped very much that we would not bomb Argentinian air bases since "that would lead to a situation very difficult to control". He admitted that less conventional (and more effective?) means of getting rid of the Etandardes, which had already been mentioned as a possibility in the press, would be easier to cope with (perhaps because the Argentinians would not like to admit such a thing had occurred).

DR RAFAEL CALDERA

Dr Caldera tells me, through a source in the Venezuelan Embassy, that his president, Señor Herrera Campins hopes to send a delegation to Britain to discuss the Guyanan question with us. The person mentioned as a possible leader of the delegation, Ignacio Iribarren, an ex. foreign minister and ex. ambassador here, is a fine man and an anglophil.

Hugh Thomas



CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01-938342200~~ 233 8224

K 04

Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

26 May 1982.

*P. N. has seen.**See Anthony,**MR 27/5*

ISRAELI ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA

1. Lord Sieff spoke to me today to follow up our earlier conversation yesterday, reported in my letter of yesterday.
2. He said that he had immediately made enquiries. He had been assured "at a high level" that there was no change in Israeli policy on arms supplies to Argentina as previously described to him and conveyed to me in the conversation reported in my letter of 4 May. The Israeli Government dealt with certain other countries but they were being careful not to increase supplies to those other countries. For example he had noticed the report in today's "Daily Mail" (page 4, column 5) about a possible delivery to Argentina in an Ecuadorian aircraft. But he had been assured that those supplies were genuinely for Ecuador and they were of equipment that would not be suitable for what Israel had in the past sold to Argentina.
3. His informant had said that the Israeli Government could not, of course, control sales by private arms dealers outside Israel; nor could they guarantee that arms legitimately supplied by Israel to third countries might not be resold to Argentina at the very substantial premium that the Argentines seemed prepared to pay. But he repeated that the assurances given to him were categorical; and that this policy of the Government of Israel would continue to be followed, in spite of the fact that pressures of various kinds were now beginning to be brought to bear on the Jewish community in the Argentine.
4. Lord Sieff added that of course he could not guarantee that he was being told the truth. But at least he had gone to a high level and he hoped that the effect of this might in any case be salutary.
5. We agreed to keep in touch as necessary. I am copying this letter to Robert Armstrong and John Coles.

Michael Falliser
(Michael Falliser)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1982

*Dear John,*Falkland Islands: Message to President Lopez Portillo

Our Ambassador in Mexico City has recommended that the Prime Minister should send a personal message to the President of Mexico, to reach him before the OAS meeting planned for 27 May in Washington. I enclose a draft of a message to President Lopez Portillo, which Mr Pym has not had a chance to see himself. This should be despatched today if at all possible if it is to influence the Mexicans at the OAS meeting.

The Mexican position since the Argentine invasion has been evenly balanced. Although they voted in support of Argentina at the last OAS session and issued an unhelpful statement on 21 May (copy enclosed), the Mexican Government have privately sympathised with our position and have sought publicly to act as a force for moderation within the OAS. The Mexican position could well be crucial at the forthcoming OAS meeting, particularly if the Argentines, as expected, call for diplomatic and/or economic sanctions against Britain. We cannot be too specific about this in the message, as we must avoid any possibility of treading on Latin American sensitivities, but the suggested message makes clear our wish to avoid any damage to our relations with the rest of Latin America.

The Prime Minister has sent two previous messages to President Lopez Portillo (copies of both enclosed). When the Mexican Ambassador spoke to the Secretary of State on 20 May he made it clear that the President was still thinking in terms of a meeting on Mexican soil between the Prime Minister and President Galtieri. We have already made our views on this suggestion clear and there is no need to refer to it again in this new message.

Yours ever

(J E Holmes)
Private Secretary

J E Holmes

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

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OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

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TO FLASH MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK
YOUR TELNO 432: FALKLANDS: MESSAGE TO LOPEZ PORTILLO
1. Please deliver following message to President Lopez Portillo from the Prime Minister.
Begins.
Your Ambassador in London has told the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of your continuing deep concern about the situation in the Falklands.
I entirely share Your Excellency's concern. Throughout the past seven weeks I have greatly appreciated the constructive contributions which you personally and your Government have made in order to resolve this tragic crisis. It is a matter of the deepest disappointment to me that ^{all our} ~~the~~ efforts which we have all ~~made~~ have come to nothing because of Argentine obduracy.
As you, Mr President, will be fully aware, the conflict which is taking place has not been of our ^{making} ~~cooking~~. It was the Argentine forces' unprovoked invasion of the Falkland Islands ~~nearly eight~~

NNNN ends telegram		BLANK		Catchword <i>weeks which</i>	
File number		Dept CMU		Distribution FALKLANDS GENERAL	
Drafted by (Block capitals) P R Fearn					
Telephone number 233 4692					
Authorised for despatch					
Comcen reference		Time of despatch			

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats CONFIDENTIAL	FLASH	Page 2
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 2 ~~weeks ago~~ which ~~has~~ brought about the present situation. Despite
 3 all the attempts by the international community, for which we are
 4 most grateful, Argentina has stubbornly refused to withdraw from
 5 the Islands, end her aggression and bring peace to the region. *She*
 6 *has* disregard *ed* of the clear expression of ~~the~~ international will
 7 contained in Security Council Resolution 502. ~~The problem~~ *confrontation* could
 8 have been ~~resolved~~ *avoided* at any time through a withdrawal of Argentine
 9 forces.
 10 It is not Britain's wish or practice to use force to end disputes:
 11 but when an aggressor refuses to heed attempts to achieve
 12 peaceful solutions, we are obliged to act in defence of our *rights and*
 13 interests, as provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In
 14 doing so, we are defending not only the rights of the Falkland
 15 Islanders: we are showing to the world that aggression cannot be
 16 allowed to succeed.
 17 We are conscious that the Argentine Government has been attempting
 18 to suggest that British action on the Falklands somehow involves
 19 Latin America as a whole. This is not the case. Our dispute is
 20 with the Argentine Military ~~government.~~ It is not with the
 21 Argentine people and certainly not with the other countries of
 22 the region. We recognise the very important role which the
 23 countries of Latin America play in the international community and
 24 value very highly our relations with them. We wish to preserve
 25 and strengthen them. It is in all our interests that Argentine
 26 attempts to widen the scope of the dispute should not be allowed
 27 to succeed. I hope that it will not be forgotten at the planned
 28 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of American
 29 States that it was Argentina who committed the aggression and
 30 Britain who was the victim.
 31 With warm personal good wishes.
 32 Ends.
 33 2. In delivering this message, you should also draw as
 34

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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

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2	appropriate on the points in my telno 68 to Asuncion.
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Sen. Hunt
(via Bn 8) c

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GRS 366

SECRET

FM FCO 121451Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 375 OF 12 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELNOS 363 AND 364: FALKLANDS

1. PLEASE PASS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO. BEGINS.
DEAR MR PRESIDENT: I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RECENT MESSAGE
ABOUT PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S WILLINGNESS TO MEET ME ON MEXICAN
SOIL TO DISCUSS OUR DIFFERENCES. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE EVIDENT
CONCERN WHICH LAY BEHIND YOUR INITIATIVE. WE MUST NEGLECT NO
POSSIBILITY IN THE URGENT SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO A DISPUTE
WHICH HAS ALREADY HAD SUCH TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES, BUT, AS YOU KNOW,
WE ARE AT THIS PRESENT MOMENT MAKING INTENSE EFFORTS THROUGH THE
UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN NEW YORK TO WORK OUT A BASIS FOR AN
EARLY CEASEFIRE AND A SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I AND MY
COLLEAGUES ARE NOW GIVING THESE MATTERS OUR UNDIVIDED ATTENTION
AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO DURING THE COMING DAYS UNTIL IT IS
CLEAR THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INTERVENTION HAS EITHER
SUCCEEDED OR FAILED. I AM SURE YOU WOULD AGREE THAT OUR FIRST
PRIORITY MUST BE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT SR PEREZ DE
CUELLAR'S EFFORTS COME TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT
TO CUT ACROSS WHAT IS HAPPENING IN NEW YORK. I SHALL NOT

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HESITATE TO CONTACT YOU AGAIN IF SOME NEW APPROACH SEEMS DESIRABLE. IN THE MEANTIME I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO IMPRESS UPON PRESIDENT GALTIERI THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF REACHING EARLY AGREEMENT IN NEW YORK SO THAT HOSTILITIES CAN CEASE. THESE EFFORTS WILL ONLY SUCCEED IF ARGENTINA CAN BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES AND REFRAIN FROM PREVIOUS INSISTENCE ON PREDETERMINED ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE READY TO RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GOOD FAITH ONCE ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN.

IN VIEW OF INTENSE WORLDWIDE SPECULATION WHICH HAS ALREADY PLACED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL UNDER GREAT PRESSURE, I AM SURE YOU WOULD AGREE WITH ME THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO MAKE NO PUBLIC REFERENCE TO OUR OWN EXCHANGES AND TO YOUR INITIATIVE WITH PRESIDENT GALTIERI.

I SEND TO YOU MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES AND PERSONAL THANKS FOR YOUR ACTIVE INTEREST AND HELP. ENDS.

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TO IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY
TELEGRAM NUMBER 279 OF 8 APRIL

APR 8 1982
MEXICO CITY

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 247 AND 248:

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO
PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO:-

'I WANTED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AT A DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS
MOMENT IN WORLD AFFAIRS. I DO SO CONSCIOUS OF THE FRIENDSHIP
AND UNDERSTANDING WE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN US WHEN I VISITED
MEXICO LAST YEAR.

2. THROUGH AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIRTUALLY UNDEFENDED
ISLANDS HUNDREDS AND SOMETIMES THOUSANDS OF KILOMETRES FROM
THEIR OWN SHORES, ARGENTINE FORCES HAVE OUTRAGED THE PRINCIPLES
ON WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IS BASED AND ON WHICH MY COUNTRY,
AS YOURS, HAS BUILT ITS FOREIGN POLICY: IN PARTICULAR, SELF-
DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.
AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL HAS SINCE PASSED
A MANDATORY RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT, SO FAR THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF BEING WILLING TO
COMPLY WITH THIS RESOLUTION.

3. THIS CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND RULE OF
LAW AFFECTS ALL MEMBERS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY, AND I APPEAL
FOR YOUR HELP IN BRINGING HOME TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE
SERIOUSNESS OF ITS ACTIONS AND THE GREAT DANGERS ARISING FROM
ITS FAILURE SO FAR TO RESPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR WORLD PEACE. THE GREATER THE WEIGHT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISAPPROVAL OF ARGENTINE AGGRESSION, THE MORE
LIKELY A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

4. AS YOU KNOW THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS DESPATCHED

SUBSTANTIAL FORCES TO THE AREA. WE HOPE IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO USE THEM. WE ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE ALL PEACEFUL MEANS OF SETTLING THE DISPUTE. BUT FAILURE TO SETTLE IT BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER WILL MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF AGGRESSION BY POWERFUL COUNTRIES AGAINST WEAKER OR SMALLER NEIGHBOURS.

5. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE, THROUGH OUR AMBASSADORS, TO REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH THIS UNHAPPY PERIOD AND TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 May 1982

USE OF RNZN FRIGATE

The Prime Minister has seen Mr. Nott's minute of 25 May. She agrees that we should now formally accept Mr. Muldoon's offer to make a frigate available to the Royal Navy.

The Prime Minister has approved the draft message from herself to Mr. Muldoon, subject to the insertion of the word "generous" before "offer" in paragraph 1 and the deletion of the word "generous" in paragraph 3. She has also approved the press release.

We agreed on the telephone that you would arrange for the transmission of the Prime Minister's message and for the subsequent issue of the press release.

I am copying this letter to John Holmes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

A. J. COLES

Miss Jane Ridley,
Ministry of Defence

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 May 1982

FUTURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

With your letter of 20 May you enclosed a copy of the Governor's paper on the future of the Falkland Islands. Copies of this paper have since been circulated to members of OD(SA) where it is likely to be discussed in the course of the next few days.

The Prime Minister found the Governor's paper excellent. She has asked that the Secretary of State for Trade and Sir Michael Palliser consider how best the ideas in the Governor's paper can be taken forward. Sir Michael Palliser is already aware of the paper and your comments on it.

I am copying this letter, together with a copy of your letter and the Governor's paper, to John Rhodes and I should be grateful if he would bring these to the attention of Lord Cockfield who may wish to let the Prime Minister have his views in due course. I am also copying this letter to Sir Michael Palliser.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

JS

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

26TH MAY 1982

-- With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a short statement.

During the past 24 hours there has been a major increase in operational activity in the South Atlantic ~~both on the land~~
~~and at sea.~~

On the Falkland Islands themselves, three successive raids were made by Harriers from the Task Force on the Port Stanley airfield. These raids were successful and all our aircraft returned safely. As a result of the actions of the ships and aircraft of the Task Force the blockade of the remaining Argentine garrison on the Falklands remains effective.

During last night and during the course of the day the loading of heavy supplies into the San Carlos area has continued. Five major supply ships left San Carlos during the night having off loaded their cargoes. The force ashore is fully established with sufficient supplies to carry out their tasks for an extended period - but the build-up will continue ~~in preparation~~ ^{and} ~~for the arrival of~~ 5 Bde ^{4 on its way} ~~shortly~~.

One of the ships involved in taking further supplies ashore yesterday was the Atlantic Conveyor. It was intended that, defended by appropriate escorts, she would enter the San Carlos area last night.

Two war ships, including HMS COVENTRY were based to the north, outside the opening of Falkland Sound, to provide early warning of air attack and to provide an air defence screen ^{for} the supply ships ^{unloading in San Carlos Water}.

At approximately 1.30 ^{p.m.} London time an aircraft, probably on a reconnaissance mission, was detected by HMS COVENTRY and was shot down using her Sea Dart missile system. This was followed later in the afternoon by separate attacks by four Argentine Sky Hawks, which were shot down by HMS COVENTRY's Sea Dart, and by Sea Cat and Rapier missiles. This brings the total number of Argentine fixed wing aircraft destroyed to ~~three~~ ^{over fifty}.

At approximately 7.30 London time a further raid of Sky Hawks approached HMS COVENTRY. She was hit by several bombs and suffered severe damage. She later capsized. ~~Our latest casualty~~ ^{Initial reports}

~~figures~~ are that ~~about~~ 20 members of her crew died in the attack, about 20 were injured and the remainder of her crew, ~~about 280~~ ^{of some 280}

⁴⁵⁰ are safe on board other ships of the Task Force

protected by escorts and

After this attack on HMS COVENTRY, at about 8.30, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, ^{a merchant navy ship employed in the re-supply task but well to the NE of the Falk Is.} was attacked by two Super Etendard aircraft which fired Exocet missiles. She was hit and set on fire. She was loaded with supplies for British forces on the Falkland Islands, ~~and~~ ~~bringing into the area the supplies which would be used to provide food and clothing for the forces on the islands.~~ She had no Harriers embarked.

In this attack, 4 of those on board ATLANTIC CONVEYOR were killed and a small number were injured. The remainder of those 170 who were on board are now safe on other ships.

Mr Speaker,

Yesterday's losses were tragic, both for the Royal Navy and the Merchant Marine. The House will join with me in expressing our admiration and gratitude for the bravery and dedication of all concerned."

Mr Speaker, I would like to make a general comment on the conduct of operations to recover the Falklands so far.

During the past 7 weeks the Royal Navy has assembled, organised and despatched over 100 ships, involving over 25,000 men and women, 8,000 miles away to the other end of the world. The Task Force has recaptured South Georgia and successfully accomplished a hazardous amphibious landing of ~~nearly~~ ^{around} 5,000 men without a single fatal land casualty. The morale of our forces is high. By any historical standard this will be seen to have been one of the most remarkable logistic and military achievements of recent times.

In planning this operation substantial attrition of our ships; aircraft and equipment was both anticipated and expected. In spite of the loss of 4 naval warships the Task Force has more escort vessels today than a week ago. 10 ~~more~~ ^{more} destroyers and frigates have joined the force in the past 2 days. Attrition of our Harrier force has been much less than we had ~~assessed~~ ^{assessed} and they have achieved complete dominance in air combat and land attack. Otherwise in spite of massive movements of merchant ships in and out of hostile waters the ATLANTIC CONVEYOR is the first supply ship that we have lost.

When a setback occurs there is always a danger that it brings in train undue pessimism about the future, just as success sometimes creates needless euphoria. Neither are justified at the present time.

Our forces on the ground are now poised to begin their thrust upon Port Stanley: behind them are another 3,000 men of 5 Brigade - whilst reinforcements and resupply are ^{virtually} denied to the Argentine garrison on the island. Generally the military objective to repossess the Falkland Islands has gone forward exactly as we planned it. We have had losses and there may be more on land and sea, but the people of the Falkland Islands can be assured that our resolve is undiminished: we intend to free them from occupation and to restore their democratic rights.

PRESS STATEMENT - 26TH MAY

12 O'CLOCK NOON

We have received further reports overnight about the outcome of yesterday's Argentine air attacks on the Task Force.

HMS COVENTRY, a destroyer, was hit and has been lost. The ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, a merchant ship requisitioned to support the fleet, was also hit and has had to be abandoned. The Harrier reinforcements she was carrying for the Task Force had already been disembarked.

Rescue operations to recover the crew of these two ships have continued throughout the night. As we get information on casualties we are informing next of kin.

The Secretary of State for Defence will be making a statement this afternoon in Parliament.

PASSAGE FOR INSERTION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH

Our Forces are engaged in one of the most remarkable military operations in modern times. We have sent an immensely powerful Task Force in excess of 100 ships and 27,500 sailors, Marines and soldiers 8,000 miles down the Atlantic Ocean.

Our forces, in a series of measured and progressive steps, have, over the past weeks increased their grip on the Falkland Islands. They have re-taken South Georgia. In a slow process of attrition they have denied the Argentine garrison the means of resupply. Then, by direct attack and harassment and, finally, by the successful amphibious landing at San Carlos Bay in the early hours of Friday morning, they have placed themselves in a position to retake the islands and reverse the illegal Argentine invasion. In the latest phase, by the skill of our pilots, our gun line frigates, and those manning the Rapier missile batteries on shore they have inflicted heavy losses on the Argentine Air Force.

There have of course been tragic losses. You will have heard yesterday's news of the further attacks on our Task Force. HMS COVENTRY came under multiple air attack yesterday evening and later sank. One of the merchant marine ships supporting the Task Force was also attacked and badly damaged. John Nott will be making a statement in the House later this afternoon and he will give further details of these incidents.

Despite these losses our resolve has not weakened and our confidence is not undermined. Our forces are now established on the Falkland Islands with all the necessary supplies. Although they still face formidable problems in difficult terrain with a hostile climate their spirits are high. We must expect fresh attacks upon them, and there can be no question of pressing the Force Commander to move forward prematurely - the judgement about the next tactical moves must be his and his alone.

But one thing is certain. The days of the occupying Argentine garrison are numbered and it will not be long before the Falkland Islanders once again have their full democratic rights restored.

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HRS,
26 MAY 1982

UN

A: (UKMIS New (a) Security Council Debate
York telno.854)

1. The debate resumed on 25 May. There were 9 speakers: Guyana, Togo, Jordan, Netherlands, Chile, Italy, India, Panama and Argentina. Sir Anthony Parsons made a statement in right of reply to Costa Mendez whose speech was moderate but defensive and lack-lustre. Our support emerged more clearly as the debate developed. For this we should be especially grateful to Kenya, Guyana and Belgium.

B: (UKMIS New
York telno.
855)

C: (FCO telno. (b) Draft Resolutions
460 to UKMIS
New York)

2. Instructions were sent to Sir A Parsons on the various draft Resolutions. There was a desire throughout the Council to terminate the proceedings on 25 May without a veto. The text of the Irish draft Resolution was amended to incorporate the Non-Aligned amendments and those proposed by us. Sir A Parsons was then instructed to vote in its favour. However, Costa Mendez wished to study the draft in detail and it was decided to postpone a vote until 26 May. Sir A Parsons feels that there is a reasonable chance that the revised draft will be adopted today.

D: (UKMIS New
York telno.
847)

E: (UKMIS New
York telno.
848)

F: (FCO telno.
463 to UKMIS
New York)

G: (UKMIS New US Attitude
York telno.850)

H: (Washington
telno.1902)

3. Secretary of State Haig is reported to be upset at the press leak of his message to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

I: (UKMIS New River Plate
York telno.851)

J: (UKMIS
telno.852)

K: (UKMIS
telno.853)

L: (Washington
telno.1901)

4. The Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela have circulated a document in the Security Council. The text complains of the extension of the Exclusion Zone to the River Plate. Sir A Parsons has drafted, and circulated, a rejoinder which explains our position.

M: (Bogota
telno.127)

N: (Asuncion
telno.77)

O: (Montevideo
telno.374)

5. Our position appears to be generally misunderstood - perhaps deliberately. Our Embassies in Washington, Bogota and Asuncion have been approached with requests for clarification in advance of the meeting of the Rio Treaty signatories on 27 May. The uncertainty persists, despite a press statement from the President of Uruguay saying that there was no blockade of the River Plate.

Latin American Attitudes

P: (FCO telno. (a) Colombia
108 to Bogota)

Q: (Bogota
telno.128)

6. In a message to the Colombian President, the Prime Minister has urged him to press Argentina for a withdrawal of forces. The Colombian Foreign Minister has stressed that Britain should lobby hard at the forthcoming OAS meeting.

R: (FCO telno. (b) Dominican Republic
22 to Santo
Domingo)

7. The Prime Minister has also urged President Guzman to put pressure on Argentina for a withdrawal of forces.

(c) Peru

S: (Lima tel. No.198) 8. The Peruvian President told our Ambassador of a telephone conversation with the Colombian President, agreeing that all their efforts should be dedicated to avoiding a final confrontation on the Falklands. The Colombian President now proposes to telephone the Prime Minister.

(d) Mexico

T: (Mexico City telno.432) 9. The Mexican President's offer of help will provide the occasion for a personal message from the Prime Minister; preferably before the OAS meeting.

(e) Panama

U: (Panama City telno. 86) 10. The Panamanian Ambassador's remarks at the Security Council have been widely criticised.

OAS Meeting

V: (Santiago telno.259) 11. Argentina has sought Chilean support for an OAS draft Resolution. Its five points include: condemnation of British aggression; cessation of hostilities with return to 'natural bases'; resumption of negotiations at the UN; adoption of measures by OAS states to discourage the UK and assist Argentina.

W: (Caracas telno.180) Withdrawal of Ambassadors

12. Venezuelan efforts to persuade Latin American countries to withdraw their Ambassadors from London have not been successful so far.

Non-Aligned Meeting

X: (FCO to Dacca telno. 156) 13. Posts have been instructed to lobby NAM member countries before the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Havana from 31 May to 4 June.

Y: (Oslo telno.113) Import Embargo

14. The Norwegian ban on Argentine imports is to remain in force indefinitely.

Comment

15. At the United Nations we must now wait and see whether the delayed Argentine decision on the Irish/Non-Aligned draft will lead to a reopening of the package today. If so, we will need to give Sir A Parsons further instructions. Otherwise there is no immediate action required.

16. Since instructing Sir A Parsons to vote for the draft Resolution, one minor textual change has appeared in the final draft circulated (paragraph 4 of UKMIS New York telegram No.856). Sir A Parsons does not consider this to be of substance.

/17.

17. Argentine/Panamanian attempts to score propaganda points by distorting our position on the effect of the 12-mile limit on Uruguayan maritime rights in the River Plate have had some impact at the United Nations and with Latin American governments. We will need to brief posts today to set the record straight for the OAS meeting.

18. Lobbying instructions are being sent to posts for the OAS meeting. Our Ambassador in Mexico has recommended that a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Lopez Portillo today would be helpful.



26 May 1982

P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

GR 1600

26 MAY 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY PARIS 260630Z

DESKBY MOSCOW 260500Z

DESKBY PEKING, TOKYO 260300Z

DESKBY DUBLIN, ACCRA 260830Z

DESKBY MADRID, KINSHASA, WARSAW 260730Z

DESKBY KAMPALA, AMMAN, 260700Z

DESKBY PANAMA CITY, WASHINGTON, GEORGETOWN 261300Z

DESKBY UKDEL NATO 260800Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260200Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O


TELEGRAM NUMBER 854 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN, MADRID, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO 836; FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY

1. THE DEBATE WAS CONCLUDED THIS MORNING (25 MAY), WITH THE FOLLOWING SPEAKERS: GUYANA, TOGO, JORDAN, NETHERLANDS, CHILE, ITALY, INDIA, PANAMA (ILLUECA YET AGAIN) AND ARGENTINA (COSTA MENDEZ). I MADE STATEMENT IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO COSTA MENDEZ. ALTHOUGH THE GERMANS HAD INSCRIBED TO SPEAK, THEY DROPPED OUT AT THE LAST MOMENT. GUYANA WAS FIRST-CLASS, AS WAS CHILE GIVEN ITS CIRCUMSTANCES. THE OTHER NON-ALIGNED WERE NOT AT ALL BAD. NETHERLANDS WAS AS UNHELPFUL AS THE OTHER EUROPEANS (EXCEPT BELGIUM) HAVE BEEN, BUT ITALY WAS A BIT MORE ROBUST. COSTA MENDEZ WAS QUITE MODERATE BUT HIS SPEECH WAS DEFENSIVE AND LACKLUSTRE. IN GENERAL, OUR SUPPORT EMERGED MORE CLEARLY AS THE DEBATE DEVELOPED. THE ARGENTINES HAD THE BETTER OF THE FIRST TWO DAYS, WITH A FLOOD OF LATIN RHETORIC. BUT BY THE END THE GENERAL FEELING, I THINK, WAS THAT WE HAD WON QUITE HANDSOMELY ON POINTS. FOR THIS WE SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL TO KENYA, GUYANA AND BELGIUM - THE OLD COMMONWEALTH SUPPORT FOR US WAS TAKEN FOR GRANTED.



DETAIL

2. SINCLAIR (GUYANA) MADE A FIRST-CLASS STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT SPEAK ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DISPUTE. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE WAS TO END THE WAR BY MEANS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT CONSISTENT WITH SCR 502. THE WAR COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. BUT ARGENTINA HAD IGNORED THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL OF 1 APRIL AND HAD THEN DEFIED THE MANDATORY SCR 502 BY REFUSING TO WITHDRAW AND BY CONSOLIDATING ITS MILITARY PRESENCE. GUYANA PROFOUNDLY REGRETTED THIS VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER BY ARGENTINA. SHE COULD NOT CONDONE THE UNILATERAL RESORT TO FORCE, ESPECIALLY WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS. THERE WAS OTHER DISPUTES IN THE HEMISPHERE, SOME OF WHICH LOOKED PARTICULARLY OMINOUS AT PRESENT. THE ARGENTINE INVASION WAS EVEN BEING HELD ALOFT AS AN EXAMPLE TO BE EMULATED. IF THIS WAS ACCEPTED, WHAT COULD OTHER STATES EXPECT, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH WERE AT A MILITARY DISADVANTAGE? IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT AGGRESSION SHOULD NOT BE REWARDED. GUYANA APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES, PERU AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THERE WAS STILL A ROLE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 502. GUYANA REGRETTED THE LOSS OF LIFE BUT THIS WAS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF ARGENTINA'S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SCR 502. SHE HOPED THAT AT THIS LATE STAGE ARGENTINA WOULD RECONSIDER AND RETURN TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE GIVEN A FORMAL MANDATE TO BRING THIS ABOUT, ALWAYS ON THE BASIS OF SCR 502.

3. AMEGA (TOGO) WAS MORE EVEN-HANDED. HE REGRETTED THE LOSS OF LIFE AND THE WASTE OF RESOURCES. THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S APPEAL ON 1 APRIL AND SCR 502 SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH. THE SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE INVASION OF 2 APRIL, WHICH RECALLED THE PRECEDENT OF 1833. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UN AUSPICES.

4. NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) REGRETTED THE "FULLY FLEDGED WAR" BUT FOUND SCR 502 THE ONLY VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR A SOLUTION. QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE, NOT TREASURE ISLANDS, WERE AT STAKE. THE CONFLICT SHOWED THE NEED FOR THE UN TO TACKLE ISSUES BEFORE THEY ERUPTED. ARMED SEIZURES MUST NOT BE REWARDED. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE GIVEN A MANDATE TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, STARTING WITH A CEASEFIRE AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICAL DATE.

5. SCHELTEMA (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE INTENSIFICATION OF HOSTILITIES AND THEIR WIDE-RANGING CONSEQUENCES. A BILATERAL DISPUTE COULD HAVE UNINTENDED NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN CONTINENTS; BUT THE RULE OF LAW MUST BE UPHELD. THE ARGENTINE INVASION RAN COUNTER TO GA RESOLUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE NETHERLANDS WANTED A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION BASED ON SCR 502, STARTING WITH A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND A RESUMPTION OF TALKS.

6. TRUCCO (CHILE) REHEARSED SCR 502 IN FULL AND RECALLED CHILE'S SUPPORT FOR THE THREE GA RESOLUTIONS, THE LAST OF WHICH HAD CALLED FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE AND FOR NEITHER OF THE PARTIES TO MAKE UNILATERAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION. 15 YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED ABRUPTLY AND WITHOUT RECOURSE TO ANY ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SUCH AS ARBITRATION OR MEDIATION. OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 2(3) AND (4) AND CHAPTER VI OF THE CHARTER SHOULD BE OBSERVED, AND THE RECENT MANILA DECLARATION ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (SIC) EXPRESSLY STATED THAT FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT JUSTIFY RECOURSE TO FORCE. UN MACHINERY SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED SO THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT TAKEN BY SURPRISE. THE MANY TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE AMERICAS COULD OTHERWISE ENDANGER PEACE IN THE REGION. CHILE REJECTED THE USE OF FORCE AS A MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES, REMAINED NEUTRAL BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UK, SUPPORTED THE POPE'S APPEAL AND WOULD SUPPORT FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

7. ROCCA (ITALY) EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN. ARGENTINA'S RESORT TO FORCE VIOLATED TWO BASIC CHARTER PRINCIPLES. SCR 502 REFLECTED THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. ITALY HAD CLOSE TIES WITH BOTH PARTIES, BELIEVED SCR 502 SHOULD BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND WOULD SUPPORT A CEASEFIRE AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

8. KRISHNAN (INDIA) RECALLED THAT GA RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY INDIA AND HAD CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE REGRETTED THEIR BREAKDOWN AND WAS AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE. HE EXPRESSED SEVERAL EVEN-HANDED GENERALITIES, AND MANAGED TO TALK FOR FIFTEEN MINUTES WITHOUT MENTIONING ARGENTINE INVASION.

9. ILLUECA (PANAMA) READ OUT THE TERMS OF A DECLARATION SIGNED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARGENTINA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA AND VENEZUELA (REPORTED SEPARATELY), WHICH INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS ABOUT OUR INTENTION TO INFRINGE URUGUAYAN INTERESTS IN THE ESTUARY OF THE RIVER PLATE.

10. DORR (IRELAND) INTRODUCED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH A LENGTHY REVIEW OF ITS TERMS. SOMEONE HAD TO SAY "STOP THE WAR". THE RESOLUTION UPHELD PRINCIPLES AND NO-ONE COULD SAY THAT IRELAND HAD NOT TRIED.

11. COSTA MENDEZ (ARGENTINA) THEN DELIVERED HIS STATEMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN AWAITED WITH INTEREST SINCE HIS ARRIVAL AT THE WEEKEND. IT CONTAINED LITTLE NEW. HE THANKED THOSE WHO HAD SPOKEN IN ARGENTINA'S SUPPORT, ATTACKED THE UK FOR "UNLEASHING WAR" IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AND REJECTED ACCUSATIONS THAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO USE FORCE: IT WAS THE UK WHICH HAD USED FORCE TO OCCUPY THE ISLANDS IN 1833. COLONIALISM WAS AN ACT OF FORCE, PERMANENT AGGRESSION AND A CRIME: THAT WAS THE TRUE EXPLANATION OF CURRENT EVENTS. IT WAS NOT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE COLONIAL POWER PAR EXCELLENCE, TO GIVE LECTURES ON SELF-DETERMINATION. THE UK HAD ABSTAINED WHEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED RESOLUTION 1514, THE MAGNA CARTA OF DECOLONISATION. THE UK'S TRUE ATTITUDE TO SELF-DETERMINATION WAS DEMONSTRATED IN DIEGO GARCIA WHERE 1,400 INHABITANTS WERE COMPULSORILY MOVED TO MAKE WAY FOR AN AMERICAN MILITARY BASE. SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE MALVINAS WAS A JOKE. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE UK HAD INSISTED ON LEAVING INTACT "THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE ISLANDS", WHICH WAS JUST A FALSE COVER FOR THE COLONIAL STRUCTURES EXISTING THERE. THE INHABITANTS WOULD NOT DECIDE THE DESTINY OF THE ISLANDS BECAUSE THE LATTER BELONGED TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF ARGENTINA. ARGENTINA HAD NOT INTRODUCED FORMULAS TO PREJUDGE THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS: IT WAS BRITISH INSISTENCE ON THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS WHICH PREJUDGED THE SOLUTION. THE UK HAD PRESENTED ARGENTINA WITH A VIRTUAL ULTIMATUM. IN FACT IT WAS THE UK WHO HAD BROKEN OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY SAYING NO TO EACH ARGENTINE PROPOSAL. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE UK DID NOT WANT TO NEGOTIATE. THE COUNCIL SHOULD TAKE MEASURES TO ENSURE A CEASEFIRE AND AN IMMEDIATE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. MEANWHILE ARGENTINA WAS RESISTING INVASION. IT ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF ITS LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBOURS AND OTHER COUNTRIES AND WOULD NEVER ACCEPT TERMS AND CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD COMPROMISE THESE RIGHTS.

12. I SPOKE NEXT IN EXERCISE OF MY RIGHT OF REPLY (TEXT IN MIFT - TO FCO AND COI ONLY).

13. COSTA MENDEZ MADE THE MILDEST OF REJOINDERS, REPEATING THAT ARGENTINA WOULD GUARANTEE THE RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS.

PARSONS

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
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GR 1400

26 MAY 1982 (12)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260305Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 855 OF 25 MAY 1982
AND TO C O I.



MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN RIGHT OF REPLY ON 25 MAY:
QUOTE

IN MY MAIN SPEECH IN THIS DEBATE A FEW DAYS AGO I SET OUT
THE FULL POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT ON THE PRESENT CRISIS UP
TO THAT MOMENT. I SHALL NOT WEARY THE COUNCIL BY GOING THROUGH
ALL THAT AGAIN. MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ARE PLAINLY ON THE RECORD.
BUT I MUST TAKE UP SOME OF THE COUNCIL'S TIME BY RESPONDING TO
A NUMBER OF THE STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE JUST BEEN MADE BY THE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

SEVERAL SPEAKINGS, INCLUDING THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HAVE REFERRED TO THE EVENTS OF 1833. I SHOULD TRY TO PUT THEM
INTO PROPORTION. I PUT OUT INFORMATION ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN MY LETTER DATED 28 APRIL
(S/15007) TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND I ATTACHED
TO THAT LETTER A CHRONOLOGY OF SALIENT EVENTS. I SHALL NOW
SUMMARIZE THOSE EVENTS BRIEFLY.

THERE WERE BRITISH SETTLEMENTS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. THERE WERE ALSO FRENCH AND SPANISH SETTLEMENTS. THE LATTER WERE AUGMENTED BY CONVICTS. THE SPANISH SETTLEMENTS WERE ABANDONED IN 1806 AND THE ISLANDS WERE UNINHABITED FOR FULLY 13 YEARS BEFORE BUENOS AIRES BECAME INDEPENDENT FROM SPAIN. THE PERIOD FROM 1806 TO 1833 WAS MARKED BY SOME CONFUSION. MANY FISHING VESSELS, AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIP LEXINGTON, VISIT THE ISLANDS. BUENOS AIRES ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH A COLONY - ITS WORD AT THE TIME - BUT OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING MY OWN, DID NOT ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF BUENOS AIRES TO DO SO.

IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT AT THE TURN OF THE YEAR 1832-1833 A BRITISH SHIP VISITED THE ISLANDS. PORT STANLEY DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME. CAPTAIN ONSLOW OF HMS CLIO OCCUPIED PORT EGMONT. ON REACHING SOLEDAD HE FOUND A DETACHMENT OF 25 BUENOS AYREAN SOLDIERS AND THEIR SCHOONER THE SARANDI. A MUTINY HAD PREVIOUSLY OCCURRED AT PORT LOUI WHILE THE SARANDI WAS AT SEA AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARGENTINE SCHOONER HAD PLACED THE MUTINEERS IN IRONS, ABOARD A BRITISH SCHOONER AFTER THEY HAD KILLED THE GOVERNOR. AT THE COMMANDER'S REQUEST, THEY WERE TAKEN TO BUENOS AIRES. MOST PEOPLE ELECTED TO BE REPATRIATED: 18 WERE PERSUADED TO STAY BEHIND. NOT A SHOT WAS FIRED ON EITHER SIDE. CAPTAIN ONSLOW REASSERTED BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY BY RAISING THE FLAG.

I HAVE GIVEN THIS BRIEF ACCOUNT IN ORDER TO DISPEL ANY MISAPPREHENSION ABOUT 1833. THE EVENTS WERE NOWHERE NEAR AS DRAMATIC AS SOME OTHER SPEAKERS HAVE SUGGESTED. THOSE EVENTS BROUGHT TO AN END A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY AND WERE FOLLOWED BY 149 YEARS OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY, DURING WHICH THE ONLY VIABLE COMMUNITY THAT HAS EVER EXISTED ON THE ISLANDS CAME INTO BEING.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ARGENTINA IN HIS OPENING REMARKS TALKED OF THE OUTRAGE COMMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM. SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THE OUTRAGE WAS COMMITTED BY ARGENTINA WHEN, OUT OF A CLEAR BLUE SKY, ARGENTINE FORCES INVADED THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AT THE BEGINNING OF APRIL. THIS WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE TERMS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982) WHICH ARE ONLY TOO FAMILIAR TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

WHY ARE WE NOW IN CONFLICT? IT IS LUDICROUS TO SUGGEST THAT WE ARE TRYING TO CREATE SOME NEW FORM OF BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT ANYBODY IN THEIR WILDEST IMAGINATION CAN CREDIT THIS THESIS. WE ARE IN CONFLICT FOR VERY SIMPLE REASONS. WE ARE IN CONFLICT BECAUSE, FIRST, ARGENTINA INVADED THE ISLANDS AND PLACED THE COMMUNITY ON THE ISLANDS UNDER ALIEN RULE WHICH THEY DECIDEDLY DID NOT WANT AND, SECONDLY, BECAUSE ARGENTINA HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THE UNQUALIFIED DEMAND TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES, AS DEMANDED IN RESOLUTION 502 (1982) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE FOREIGN MINISTER REFERRED AT LENGTH TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND REFERRED TO MY COUNTRY AS THE COLONIAL POWER PAR EXCELLENCE. IT IS TRUE THAT WE TOOK THE POSITION IN THE 1960S THAT SELF-DETERMINATION WAS A PRINCIPLE AND NOT A RIGHT. HOWEVER, IN 1966 THE TWO INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS WERE ADOPTED. THESE BOTH STATE THAT:

"ALL PEOPLES HAVE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION. BY VIRTUE OF THAT RIGHT THEY FREELY DETERMINE THEIR POLITICAL STATUS AND FREELY PURSUE THEIR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT."

(GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2200A(XXI), ANNEX)

THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RATIFIED BOTH THESE COVENANTS, WHICH HAVE ENTERED INTO FORCE. FURTHERMORE, IN 1970, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS - THAT IS, WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM JOINING IN THE CONSENSUS - THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THIS STATES.

"BY VIRTUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES ENSHRINED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ALL PEOPLES HAVE THE RIGHT FREELY TO DETERMINE, WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, THEIR POLITICAL STATUS ... " ETC. (GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2625 (XXV), ANNEX)

NOT ONLY HAS MY COUNTRY ENDORSED THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE SENSE OF THE CHARTER, THE COVENANTS AND THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS DECLARATION, BUT WE HAVE GONE A GREAT DEAL FURTHER TO DISPROVE THE ALLEGATION THAT WE ARE THE COLONIAL POWER PAR EXCELLENCE. SINCE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 1514 (XV) WAS ADOPTED AT THE END OF 1960, WE HAVE BROUGHT TO SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE AND MEMBERSHIP OF THIS ORGANIZATION NO LESS THAN 28 STATES. WE ARE PROUD OF OUR RECORD, AND I THINK WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO BE.

I TURN NOW TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF ARGENTINA HAS ALLEGED THAT THE APPLICATION TO THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IS A TRAVESTY. THIS IS SIMPLY NOT SO. THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS ARE SMALL IN NUMBER - ABOUT 1,800 - BUT AS I HAVE SAID ON MANY PREVIOUS OCCASIONS IN THIS COUNCIL, THIS IN NO WAY AT ALL DETRACTS FROM THEIR RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNDER ARTICLE 73 OF THAT CHARTER. THEY ARE A COMMUNITY. THEY ARE A SMALL COMMUNITY, BUT THEY ARE A PEACEFUL COMMUNITY, THEY ARE A HOMOGENEOUS COMMUNITY AND THEY ARE A COMMUNITY WHICH HAS DEVELOPED DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OVER THE PERIOD OF A CENTURY.

I TURN NOW TO THE RECENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONDUCTED WITH SUCH AMAZING DILIGENCE. WE DID NOT ISSUE AN ULTIMATUM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. AS I STATED IN MY MAIN STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL A FEW DAYS AGO, WE REACHED THROUGH VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN LONDON WHAT MY GOVERNMENT GENUINELY AND CAREFULLY REGARDED AS THE FURTHEST IT COULD GO IN TERMS OF FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT COMPROMISING PRINCIPLES WHICH WE WERE NOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PREPARED TO ABANDON. ONE OF THOSE MAIN PRINCIPLES WAS THAT, EVEN IN AN INTERIM PERIOD, THE DEMOCRATIC, FREELY ELECTED INSTITUTIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COULD NOT BE DISMANTLED AND SET ASIDE. TO HAVE AGREED TO THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A MONSTROUS OFFENCE TO OUR OWN BELIEFS, TO OUR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES, TO OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A NATION, TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

ALL THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN THIS REGARD WAS THAT THEY MIGHT BE USED AS ADVISORS IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY BY THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATOR, PROVIDED THAT AN EQUAL NUMBER OF CITIZENS OF ARGENTINIAN ORIGIN COULD BE SIMILARLY USED. THE ARGENTINE COMMUNITY ON THE ISLAND AMOUNTS TO APPROXIMATELY 30 PEOPLE, THE ISLAND COMMUNITY TO APPROXIMATELY 1,800. STATISTICALLY THAT PROPOSITION WAS OBVIOUSLY TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. CONCEPTUALLY IT WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE LED TO THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THESE INSTITUTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND WHICH HAVE EVOLVED SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY. IT IS WORTH NOTING AT THIS POINT THAT GENERAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS FOR THE COUNCILS AS RECENTLY AS OCTOBER 1981. WERE THESE SIMPLY TO BE SET ASIDE EVEN DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD?

I WILL NOT GO INTO MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE NATURE OF OUR REPLY AND CONTRAST IT WITH THE NATURE OF THE ARGENTINE RESPONSE. I HAVE ALREADY DONE SO, IN GREAT DETAIL, IN MANY WAYS. I WOULD ONLY SAY THIS: THAT THROUGHOUT THE SEVEN WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS MY GOVERNMENT MADE MANY ADJUSTMENTS TO OUR ORIGINAL POSITION, IN THE SINCERE AND HEARTFEL HOPE OF REACHING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE REACHED A POINT WHERE WE BELIEVED THAT WE COULD GO NOT FURTHER WITHOUT, AS I HAVE JUST SAID, THE COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLES WHICH WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO COMPROMISE.

WHEN WE RECEIVED THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IT APPEARED TO US TO DEMONSTRATE NO ADVANCE OVER ITS INITIAL POSITION AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM SEVEN WEEKS PREVIOUSLY. WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO REGARD IT AS A COMPREHENSIVE REJECTION OF OUR PROPOSALS.

THE SITUATION REMAINS AS IT HAS REMAINED EVER SINCE THE BEGINNING OF APRIL. THE CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT IS THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF THE FALKLANDS AND ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATORY DEMAND CONTAINED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982). THE EFFECT IS THE CONFLICT WHICH IS CAUSING ALL OF US SUCH GRAVE CONCERN. REMOVE THE CAUSE, THE ILLEGAL ARGENTINE PRESENCE ON THE ISLANDS, AND THE EFFECT WILL DISAPPEAR. WE HAVE NO OTHER DESIRE BUT TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDERS, TO REDRESS THE WRONG WHICH HAS BEEN DONE, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT POLITICAL DISPUTES CANNOT AND MUST NOT BE SETTLED BY THE USE OF ARMED FORCE, AND TO DEMONSTRATE BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT AGGRESSION MUST NOT AND CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO PAY.

UNQUOTE.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251120Z MAY 82

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 460 OF 25 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS IMMEDIATE TOKYO, DUBLIN.

YOUR TELNO 844: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

1. AS YOU ALREADY KNOW OUR POSITION NOW IS THAT WHILE WE REMAIN WILLING TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE IF ARGENTINA CLEARLY AND IRREVOCABLY COMMITS HERSELF TO VERY EARLY AND TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF HER FORCES, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER CONDITIONS. WE CAN NOT (NOT) CONTEMPLATE ANY PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL OF OUR OWN FORCES. NOR WILL WE NOW ACCEPT ANY INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WHETHER BY THE UN OR ANYONE ELSE.

2. MINISTERS HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS POSITION. THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION IF IT IS PUT TO THE VOTE AS IT STANDS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF YOUR TELNO 842.

3. YOU SHOULD WORK FOR THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO THE IRISH DRAFT AS REVISED BY THE NON-ALIGNED:

- A) IN THE FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH SUBSTITUTE 'REAFFIRMING' FOR 'RECALLING',
- B) DELETE IN TOTO THE FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, DEALING WITH THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT,
- C) REVISE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 TO READ 'REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502'. (AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE '... GOOD OFFICES TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502'.)

YOU SHOULD ALSO PRESS HARD FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT (OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5) TO BE RENDERED WITHIN 7 DAYS RATHER THAN 2 OR 3 DAYS SO AS TO POSTPONE FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIVITY FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND TO CARRY US THROUGH THE OAS MEETING.

4. IF YOU ARE ABLE TO SECURE THESE AMENDMENTS YOU MAY VOTE FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE YOU SHOULD, WITH REFERENCE TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4, MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT INDICATING THE ONLY TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO US, ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE JAPANESE DRAFT RESOLUTION, OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 IS UNACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS EFFORTS BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT CONCLUDES BY, IN EFFECT, CITING ONLY TWO OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SCR 502, BUT OMITTS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IF THERE IS ANY LIKELIHOOD OF THIS DRAFT BEING TABLED, YOU SHOULD PRESS FOR THE REVISION OF THIS PARAGRAPH TO READ AS FOLLOWS: 'SUPPORTS ONCE AGAIN THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND REQUESTS HIM TO RENEW THE USE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND THE REALISATION OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE'. (AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE '... GOOD OFFICES TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502'.) THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF THUS AMENDED.

6. YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT DRAWING ATTENTION TO ITS FAILURE TO SPECIFY AN EARLY DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND ITS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH CAST IRON LINKAGE BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

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25 MAY 1982

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252110Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 847 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS,

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, TOKYO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 460: FA^L KLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS.

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE SITUATION AT 2030Z. THERE IS WIDESPREAD ANNOYANCE AMONGST THE NON ALIGNED AT DORR FOR TRYING TO FORCE THE ISSUE IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY. THERE IS A CORRESPONDING DESIRE THROUGH OUT THE COUNCIL TO TERMINATE THE PROCEEDINGS TODAY WITHOUT A VETO IE WITH THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO GET TEN OR ELEVEN VOTES.

2. THROUGH THE MORNING AND AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH, I HAVE NEGOTIATED FIRMLY ON THE IRISH DRAFT AS REVISED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS, ON THE BASIS OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. AS YOU WILL SEE, WE HAVE CARRIED ALMOST ALL OUR POINTS. THE ORIGINAL FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN DELETED: WE HAVE A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION OF 502 IN THE FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH (THIS IS THE NORMAL PLACE FOR SUCH RE-AFFIRMATIONS IN RESOLUTIONS WHEN THEY COME ROUND FOR THE SECOND TIME); AND WE HAVE GOT A SEVEN DAY RESPITE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5.

3. THE MAIN OPPOSITION TO THE AMENDMENT WE PROPOSED TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 HAS COME FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. I SPOKE TO HIM AT LUNCH TIME. HE SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND THAT THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD PASSED INTO HISTORY. IF WE WOULD ACCEPT "BEARING IN MIND THE APPROACH..." HE COULD GIVE ME HIS WORD THAT HE WOULD NOT TRY TO EXPOSE OR EMBARRASS US AT THE OUTSET OF A FRESH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE LANGUAGE MUST BE CONSISTENT IE "BEARING IN MIND SCR 502 AND BEARING IN MIND THE APPROACH ..." HE COULD NOT SEE HOW THIS WOULD GIVE US DIFFICULTY SINCE WE ALREADY HAD A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION OF 502 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE RESOLUTION, AND AN EQUALLY CLEAR REFERENCE TO IT IN OPERATIVE PARA 1.

4. OZOREZ TYPALDOS (PANAMA) AND OTHERS IN THE NON ALIGNED ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHATEVER THE SECRETARY GENERAL CAN LIVE WITH, AND I AM UNDER VERY STRONG PRESSURE TO AGREE THIS EVENING SO THAT WE CAN GET OUT OF THE COUNCIL BEFORE THIS FRAGILE NEAR-AGREEMENT BREAKS DOWN.

5. I KNOW THAT THIS RESOLUTION IS NOT IDEAL, BUT I DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED EVEN TO ABSTAIN IF WE WERE TO VETO SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE PHRASE "BEARING IN MIND THE APPROACH" (WHICH COMMITS US TO NOTHING) AND, FOLLOWING THE RE-AFFIRMATION OF 502 IN PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH ONE, AND ITS CLEAR MENTION IN OPERATIVE PARA 1, BECAUSE ITS THIRD MENTION IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 ONLY BORE THE RESOLUTION IN MIND.

6. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO ACCEPT THIS WITH A SUITABLE EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE. AFTER THE COUNCIL HAS COME SO FAR IN OUR DIRECTION, IT WILL CREATE A VERY BAD ATMOSPHERE IF WE ASK FOR MORE TIME, ASSUMING THAT STRONG PRESSURE RESUMES THIS EVENING FOR A VOTE TONIGHT. IF IT DOES NOT, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR DISCRETION TO PLAY IT BY EAR UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING PROVIDED THAT IT DOES NOT LOOK AS THOUGH THE WHOLE EDIFICE WILL COLLAPSE OVERNIGHT.

7. I HAVE PUT TO MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE THE AMENDMENTS YOU REQUIRE TO HIS RESOLUTION. BUT FOR THE MOMENT IT IS ON THE BACK BURNER WHILE ATTENTION IS FOCUSSED ON THE REVISED IRISH DRAFT.

PARSONS

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25 MAY 1982

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252040Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C C
TELEGRAM NUMBER 848 OF 25 MAY 1982
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS,
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, TOKYO.



MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT STANDS AT PRESENT, IE INCORPORATING:

- (A) THE NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS OF LAST NIGHT (MY TELNO 844):
- (B) 3 OF THE 4 AMENDMENTS YOU ASKED ME TO WORK FOR IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 460:
- (C) THE FORMULA SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PLACE OF THE AMENDMENT PROPOSED IN PARA 3(C) OF YOUR TELNO 460.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502(1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982,
NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) HAS SERIOUSLY
DETERIORATED,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502(1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502(1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982:

3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION, WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS):

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE:

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE WITHIN 7 DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

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25 MAY 1982

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FM FCO 252150Z MAY 1982

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 463 OF 25 MAY

RFI TO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, TOKYO

YOUR TELNO 848: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL



1. MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED THAT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE IRISH/NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AS IT NOW STANDS.
2. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE A VERY STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE. YOU WILL KNOW THE POINTS TO MAKE ON OUR POSITION. BUT IN RELATION TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT FOR OUR PART THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE CONDITION FOR A CEASEFIRE IS THAT IT SHOULD BE UNEQUIVOCALLY LINKED WITH AN IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. GIVEN THE HISTORY OF ARGENTINE PREVARICATION AND BAD FAITH, A SIMPLE VERBAL AGREEMENT BY ARGENTINA TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF AN ARGENTINE COMMITMENT TO PRACTICAL AND IRREVOCABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL.
3. THE COUNCIL SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN CLEARLY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SITUATION HAS MOVED SINCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON 21 MAY AND THAT AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL MUST NOW BE TOTALLY UNCONDITIONAL AND NOT LINKED TO ANY PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.
4. WASHINGTON. YOU SHOULD INFORM HAIG OR EAGLEBERGER IMMEDIATELY.

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26 MAY 1982

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260040Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 850 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DUBLIN, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING, MADRID, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN, UKDEL NATO.

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YOUR TELNO 463 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OTUNNU THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT IRISH/NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AS IT HAD EMERGED (IE THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 848). HE CONSULTED THE ARGENTINES AND INFORMED THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE POSITION HE HAD REACHED. DORR RAISED NO DIFFICULTIES. NOR DID THE RUSSIANS OVER THE TEXT, THOUGH THEY WERE SLIGHTLY RELUCTANT ABOUT VOTING TONIGHT, SOMETHING WHICH ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE KEEN TO DO. HOWEVER IT TOOK A LONG TIME TO FIND COSTA MENDEZ WHO HAD BEEN MEETING MRS KIRKPATRICK PRIVATELY AND HAD THEN GONE TO GROUND. ALL HIS AIDS SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT THE DRAFT BUT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONFIRMED BY COSTA MENDEZ PERSONALLY. WHEN HE WAS EVENTUALLY FOUND HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NEED TIME TO STUDY THE DRAFT. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE DECIDED TO POSTPONE A VOTE UNTIL TOMORROW (26 MAY). BY THAT TIME EVERYONE, INCLUDING PANAMA AND THE RUSSIANS, WANTED TO GET ON WITH IT AND THE ONUS FOR DELAY LAY SQUARELY WITH ARGENTINA.

2. I THINK THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT THE REVISED DRAFT WILL BE ADOPTED TOMORROW. THERE IS A GENERAL DESIRE TO END THIS PHASE IN THE COUNCIL AND RELIEF THAT OTUNNU HAS APPARENTLY DISCOVERED A WAY OF DOING SO WITHOUT A VETO. BUT THE AGREEMENT IS FRAGILE AND THERE IS AN OBVIOUS RISK THAT COSTA MENDEZ WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT FROM THE GENERALS TO TRY FOR MORE.

3. THE FINAL DRAFT AS CIRCULATED BY OTUNNU CONTAINS "NEGOTIATING" IN PLACE OF "ENSURING" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 848. THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME A CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE AND I HAVE NOT THEREFORE QUESTIONED IT, LEST OTHERS RE-OPEN OTHER PARTS OF THE PRESENT TEXT.

PARSONS

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
FM WASHINGTON 260120Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1902 OF 25 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

26 MAY 1982



FALKLANDS:

1. NBC TELEVISION REUTERS AND ASSOCIATED PRESS HAVE THIS EVENING CARRIED STORIES REPORTING THAT HAIG HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO YOU URGING BRITAIN NOT TO TRY TO CRUSH THE ARGENTINIANS IN THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT. ACCORDING TO THE STORY, ATTRIBUTED TO AN UN-NAMED SENIOR OFFICIAL, HAIG HAD URGED US TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT WHAT WE HAD TO GAIN FROM AN OUTRIGHT VICTORY AND HAD SUGGESTED THAT A CRUSHING VICTORY WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER THE UK OR THE US. THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD LOOK FOR A SCAPEGOAT AND THAT SCAPEGOAT WOULD PROBABLY BE THE UNITED STATES WHOSE RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, AND WITH LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY WOULD SUFFER. A CEASEFIRE, WHICH COULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO CLAIM VICTORY, MIGHT BE THE BEST OUTCOME.
2. THIS IS A GARBLED AND SLANTED ACCOUNT OF HAIG'S MESSAGE TO YOU. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT THIS STORY BUT HIS OFFICE SAY THAT HE IS UPSET ABOUT IT AND REGARDS IT AS VERY DAMAGING.
3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE REFUSING ALL COMMENT TO THE PRESS. WE WILL REFUSE TO COMMENT ON THIS STORY, BUT WILL SAY THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION AND NO DIMINUTION OF US SUPPORT FOR US. OF COURSE, WE ARE ALL LOOKING TO WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WE HAVE ACHIEVED OUR AIM, WHICH REMAINS, AS IT HAS BEEN ALL ALONG, TO REMOVE THE ARGENTINIANS FROM THE FALKLANDS.

HENDERSON

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PP CARACAS

PP PANAMA CITY

PP MONTEVIDEO

26 MAY 1982

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260105Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 851 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO PRIORITY CARACAS, PANAMA CITY, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELNO 462 (NOT TO ALL): FALKLANDS; RIVER PLATE.

1. IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 25 MAY, ILLUECA (PANAMA) READ OUT THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION SIGNED IN NEW YORK ON 24 MAY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARGENTINA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA AND VENEZUELA. IT HAS BEEN CIRCULATED AS SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/15111.

2. ON THE BASIS OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, I HAVE SENT A LETTER IN REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DECLARATION. THE LETTER WILL BE CIRCULATED AS S/15119. THE REMAINING POINTS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED IN PREVIOUS LETTERS AND STATEMENTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. TEXTS OF DECLARATION AND MY LETTER ARE IN MY 2 IFT'S.

PARSONS

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260106Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 852 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO PRIORITY CARACAS, PANAMA CITY, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON.



MIPT: FALKLANDS: RIVER PLATE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DECLARATION OF 24 MAY BY FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARGENTINA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA AND VENEZUELA BEGINS

THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ARGENTINA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA AND VENEZUELA, WHO ARE ATTENDING THE PRESENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE "QUESTION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE MALVINAS ISLANDS", HAVE DEEMED IT DESIRABLE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING DECLARATION TO THE COUNCIL:

1. WE CONFIRM THE REJECTION BY LATIN AMERICA OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S MILITARY OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT AND EXPRESS, UNEQUIVOCALLY AND FIRMLY, THE DESIRE OF OUR PEOPLES FOR PEACE AND THE HOPE THAT IT MAY MATERIALIZE AS A RESULT OF AN EFFECTIVE DECISION BY THE COUNCIL.

2. WE STRONGLY PROTEST AGAINST THE BRITISH DECISION, OFFICIALLY COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS DECIDED TO EXTEND ITS NAVAL AND AIR MILITARY ACTION TO THE RIVER PLATE. THIS DEPLORABLE DECISION, IN ADDITION TO VIOLATING GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIVER PLATE TREATY, CARRIES THE BRITISH AGGRESSION INTO THE VERY HEART OF THE CONTINENT, SINCE IT IGNORES ALL THE LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL REASONS WHICH CONFER ON THE RIVER PLATE THE SAME STATUS AS ATTACHES TO JURISDICTION ON LAND. THIS DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AGGRAVATING AND SPREADING THE CONFLICT WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM'S MILITARY ADVENTURE.

3. WE REJECT WITH RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, WITH THE HONOURABLE EXCEPTION

OF SPAIN AND ITALY, EXTENDING INDEFINITELY THE ECONOMIC
AGGRESSION WHICH, UNDER THE PRETEXT OF "SANCTIONS", HAS BEEN
IMPOSED ON ARGENTINA. THIS ACT, WHICH IS OFFENSIVE TO THE WHOLE
OF LATIN AMERICA, CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY AND PRESAGES THE GENERALIZATION OF A CONFLICT
WHICH, DAY BY DAY, IS ASSUMING THE CHARACTER OF AN INTERCONTINENTAL
CONFRONTATION.

4. WE NOTE WITH ALARM THAT, ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF WEEKS HAVE ELAPSED
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE BRITISH FLEET'S ARMED ATTACK ON THE
ARGENTINE REPUBLIC, THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS TAKEN NO ACTION TO
ACHIEVE THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. THIS CONCERN IS SERIOUSLY
INCREASED BY THE FACT THAT, AFTER FOUR DAYS OF DEBATE IN THE
COUNCIL, DURING WHICH BOTH THE FIGHTING AND THE LOSS OF LIFE
HAVE INTENSIFIED, IT HAS NOT PROVED POSSIBLE TO RESPONDE TO THE
CUTCRY OF MANKIND, WHICH DEMANDS AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE
AND VIGOROUS ACTION FOR PEACE, FOR WHICH PURPOSE IT IS ESSENTIAL
TO GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL A MANDATE. IT IS URGENTLY NECESSARY
FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHOSE DUTY IS TO ENSURE THE PEACE
OF THE WORLD, TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION TO HALT THIS MILITARY
ESCALATION. WE CANNOT CONTINUE TO REGARD WITH INDIFFERENCE THE
COURSE OF EVENTS WHICH ARE JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE OF MANKIND.
ENDS

PARSONS

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PP MONTEVIDEO

26 MAY 1982

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260107Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 853 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO PRIORITY CARACAS, PANAMA CITY, MONTEVIDEO, WASHINGTON.



MY 2 IPT'S: FALKLANDS: RIVER PLATE.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ADDRESS YOU ON THE SUBJECT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DECLARATION BY THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTERS OF ARGENTINA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA AND VENEZUELA CIRCULATED AS COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/15111.

THERE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND I SHOULD LIKE TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SET OUT THE TRUE POSITION. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ARE AWARE THAT THE TREATY OF THE RIO DE LA PLATA OF 1973 BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY ESTABLISHES A LINE AT THE MOUTH OF THE RIVER PLATE FROM PUNTA DEL ESTE TO PUNTA RASA DE CABO SAN ANTONIO. IN A COMMUNICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM MADE CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO ENGAGE IN ANY MILITARY ACTIVITIES INSHORE OF THAT LINE. THE REFERENCES TO PARAGUAY AND BOLIVIA ARE THEREFORE IRRELEVANT. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WISH TO DO NOTHING WHICH WOULD INFRINGE THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF URUGUAY.

MEASURES TAKEN IN RECENT DAYS, WHICH HAVE FORMED THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS LETTERS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, WERE IN EXERCISE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE IN THE FACE OF ARGENTINA'S ARMED INVASION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. THIS RIGHT IS RECOGNISED EXPLICITLY BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

ENDS

PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL


FM WASHINGTON 260105Z MAY 82

26 MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1901 OF 25 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND OAS POSTS.



FALKLANDS: EXCLUSION ZONE/RIVER PLATE

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT TOLD US TODAY THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO CLEAR UP AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE RUMOURS CIRCULATING IN THE UN AND THE OAS THAT WE HAD WARNED THE URUGUAYANS AGAINST ALLOWING ARGENTINE WARSHIPS TO USE THE RIVER PLATE, AS A REFUGE. THE US EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO HAD REPORTED THAT WE HAD GIVEN THE URUGUAYANS SUCH A WARNING, AND IT WAS NOW WIDELY BEING SUGGESTED IN LATIN AMERICA THAT THE BRITISH EXCLUSION ZONE APPLIED TO THE ESTUARY. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE EVEN SEEMED CONVINCED THAT WE INTENDED TO BLOCKADE IT.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PANAMANIANIANS HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATING RUMOURS OF THIS KIND AND THAT WE PROPOSE SHORTLY TO TELL THE URUGUAYANS FORMALLY THAT BRITISH OPERATIONS WILL NOT (NOT) BE EXTENDED TO THE WATERS COVERED BY THE 1973 TREATY OF THE RIVER PLATE (I.E. INSHORE OF A LINE FROM PUNTA DEL ESTE TO PUNTA RASA DE CABO SAN ANTONIO).

3. WE HAVE INFORMED THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF THIS. THEY WILL DO WHAT THEY CAN TO DAMP DOWN THE EXCITEMENT THESE REPORTS HAVE GENERATED. IN VIEW OF THE RIO TREATY MEETING HERE ON 27 MAY, THEY SUGGEST, IT WOULD BE AS WELL TO MAKE OUR POSITION KNOWN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

HENDERSON

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25 MAY 1982


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FM BOGOTA 251600Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 127 OF 25 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE MONTEVIDEO, UKMIS NEW YORK



FALKLANDS: RIVER PLATE EXCLUSION ZONE

1. UNDER SECRETARY (POLITICAL AFFAIRS) HAS ASKED FOR CONFIRMATION OF A LOCAL PRESS REPORT UNDER UN DATELINE THAT RIVER PLATE ESTUARY HAD BEEN DECLARED PART OF THE TEZ. IF CORRECT, HE VIEWED THIS AS A DANGEROUS ESCALATION AND WISHED TO KNOW URUGUAYAN REACTIONS.
2. I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION. MY UNDERSTANDING (BASED ON CONVERSATION LAST WEEK WITH URUGUAYAN AND OTHER OUTDATED REPORTS) WAS THAT WE HAD MERELY ASKED URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT TO CLARIFY WHETHER THEY CONSIDERED THE WATERS A RIVER OR AN ESTUARY.
3. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL OF REPORT AND ANY BACKGROUND WHICH I CAN PASS TO GOMEZ.

FCO PLSE PASS INFO ADDRESSEES


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FM ASUNCION 252200Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 25 MAY
AND TO MONTEVIDEO

25 MAY 1982



FALKLANDS

1. REPORTS HERE CLAIM THAT RIO PLATE AREA HAS BEEN INCLUDED
IN TEZ. GRATEFUL FOR CLARIFICATION URGENTLY.


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25 MAY 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM MONTEVIDEO 251425Z MAY 82
 TO PRIORITY FCO
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 374 OF 25 MAY 1982.



MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 371. THE RIVER PLATE.

QUESTION WERE PUT TO THE PRESIDENT AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY EVENING AS FOLLOWS:

SOVEREIGNTY IN THE RIVER PLATE.
 QUESTION.

- IT HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES THAT GREAT BRITAIN WOULD NOT RECOGNISE ARGENTINA'S AND URUGUAY'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE 200 MILES OF THE RIVER PLATE, BUT THAT THIS WOULD BE RECOGNISED IN A RADIUS NOT GREATER THAN 12 MILES. WHAT IS URUGUAY'S POSITION IN THE NOTE PRESENTED TO BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN MONTEVIDEO?

PRESIDENT ALVAREZ.

- IT IS A FORMAL ANSWER IN WHICH URUGUAY INFORMS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM THAT THE WATERS OF THE RIVER PLATE ARE GOVERNED BY A STATUTE WHICH IS DEFINED AND OF LONG STANDING. THEREFORE URUGUAY DOES NOT ACCEPT THAT THE RIVER PLATE BE CONSIDERED AN ESTUARY IN THE MANNER THAT GREAT BRITAIN IS TRYING TO DO.

IT IS NO MORE THAN A NOTE WHICH RATIFIES URUGUAY'S POSITION, ANSWERING THE UNITED KINGDOM'S POSITION WHICH IS ALREADY KNOWN.

THERE IS NO BLOCKADE.

QUESTION.

-GOING BACK ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, TELEGRAMS FROM OVERSEAS INDICATE THAT GREAT BRITAIN HAS BLOCKED THE RIVER PLATE. IS THAT SO, MR PRESIDENT?

ANSWER.

-NO, NOT AT ALL. THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS VERY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT. SPECIFICALLY THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED THE MOST ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN. IT WILL NOT AFFECT URUGUAY'S SOVREIGNTY IN THE RIVER PLATE.

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DESKBY 251130Z

FM FCO 250842Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 108 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

25 MAY 1982

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10 2
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ACTION

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TURBAY

1. PLEASE DELIVER, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF 21 MAY ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE HAVE BEEN MUCH AWARE IN RECENT WEEKS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE ADOPTED TOWARDS THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

I AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH YOU THAT IT SHOULD BE FOR DEMOCRATIC NATIONS TO SET THE WORLD AN EXAMPLE, BY THE PATIENCE WITH WHICH THEY PURSUE PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND BY THEIR RELUCTANCE TO RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE. I AM SURE YOU WILL RECOGNISE THAT IN THE SEVEN WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE HAVE ENGAGED IN GOOD FAITH SINCE ARGENTINA INVADED BRITISH TERRITORY, WE HAVE SHOWN THE GREATEST PATIENCE, AS WELL AS THE UTMOST OPEN-MINDEDNESS AND FLEXIBILITY CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THESE ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH BRITAIN AND COLOMBIA, AS DEMOCRATIC NATIONS, SHARE.

THE DIFFICULTY THROUGHOUT HAS BEEN ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO MATCH OUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE REJECTED EVERY PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN PUT TO THEM WHICH WOULD HAVE LED TO A CEASEFIRE COUPLED WITH A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, AS REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. WE LOOKED CLOSELY AND URGENTLY AT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S RECENT PROPOSALS, WHICH YOU MENTION, AND I REMAIN GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE FOR HIS CONTINUED CONCERN AND ACTIVE INTEREST.

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WORLD WHICH IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXAGGERATE.

YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER.

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FM BOGOTA 252230Z MAY


TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 128 OF 25 MAY

RFI WASHINGTON CARACAS PANAMA AND SAN JOSE

FALKLANDS: PM'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT TURBAY

26 MAY 1982



1. MESSAGE DELIVERED AT 252120Z . HE THANKED ME, SAID IT WOULD BE STUDIED CAREFULLY BUT MADE NO OTHER COMMENT. TEXT WILL BE RELEASED TO MEDIA LATER TONIGHT.
2. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION LONDONO SAID HE WOULD PASS ON OFFICIAL COLOMBIAN REACTION BUT HIS OWN PERSONAL COMMENT WAS THAT REPLY WAS MOST USEFUL AND POSITIVE. HE WENT ON TO CONFIRM THAT ANDEAN PACT MEETING (MY TELNO 124) HAS NOW BEEN POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. THE NEW PROBLEM WAS THE FORTHCOMING OAS MEETING (WASHINGTON TELNO 1877 TO FCO). COLOMBIA HAD BEEN WORKING HARD YESTERDAY AND TODAY PRESSING FOR A MODERATE LINE. VENEZUELA , AND PANAMA AND NICARAGUA WERE PARTICULARLY VEHEMENT BUT THERE WERE OTHERS OF SIMILAR TENDENCIES. HE COULD NOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY THE NEED FOR ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT AND ASKED THAT WE SHOULD LOBBY HARD WHEREVER POSSIBLE. THE OUTCOME IS IN DOUBT AS ARGENTINA IS CLOSE TO REACHING THE NECESSARY TWO THIRDS MAJORITY.
3. HE QUESTIONED ME ON THE RIVER PLATE ESTUARY (MY TELNO 127) I TOLD HIM I AWAITED YOUR REPLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS


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FROM FCO 250848Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 25 MAY
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON



MY TELNO 21 (NOT TO ALL) AND YOUR TELNO 43: MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT GUZMAN

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT GUZMAN.
2. BEGINS:

I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I APPRECIATE YOUR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IT IS A CONCERN WHICH I FULLY SHARE. THE TRAGIC CONFLICT WHICH HAS DEVELOPED HAS NOT BEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S SEEKING. OVER THE SEVEN WEEKS SINCE ARGENTINA LAUNCHED ITS UNPROVOKED AND UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SMALL AND PEACEFUL POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE SOUGHT URGENTLY, AND WITH OPEN-MINDEDNESS AND FLEXIBILITY, TO REACH A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER - PRINCIPLES TO WHICH ALL DEMOCRATIC NATIONS MUST ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. THE ROAD TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION HAS REGRETTABLY BEEN BLOCKED BY ARGENTINA. ARGENTINA HAS SHOWN NO READINESS TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S MANDATORY RESOLUTION 502 AND TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES: INSTEAD IT HAS SOUGHT ONLY TO CONSOLIDATE ITS AGGRESSION AND TO PREVARICATE IN NEGOTIATION. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS THROUGHOUT MADE CLEAR ITS DETERMINATION TO BRING TO BEAR ALL NECESSARY DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRESSURES ON ARGENTINA SO AS TO BRING TO AN END ITS OCCUPATION. WE HAVE AT EVERY STAGE STATED OUR POSITION WITH CLARITY: AND, USING OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, HAVE CONFINED OURSELVES TO USING ONLY WHAT FORCE PROVED NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND TO

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PROTECT OUR TASK FORCE.

3. IT IS STILL OPEN TO ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH THE CLEARLY EXPRESSED INTERNATIONAL WILL AND TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, BRINGING TO AN END THE PRESENT DANGEROUS CONFLICT. I HOPE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY CAN DO ALL IN YOUR POWER TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OF THIS. YOU WOULD BE MAKING A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. ENDS

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25 MAY 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 252055Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 25 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON BOGOTA

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT TURBAY OF COLOMBIA HAD TELPHONED TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO HIS LETTER (YOUR TELNO 107 TO BOGOTA) IN WHICH PRESIDENT TURBAY SAID HE SUPPORTED THE PERUVIAN PEACE PROPOSALS. ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE, TURBAY TOLD HIM THAT MRS THATCHER'S REPLY WAS RECEPTIVE, APPRECIATIVE AND COURTEOUS WHILE MAKING THE GENERAL RESERVATION ABOUT RESOLUTION 502. AS A RESULT, BOTH PRESIDENTS (WHO HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AT LENGTH ON THE TELEPHONE) HAD DECIDED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO AVOID THE FINAL CONFRONTATION ON THE ISLANDS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO A QUOTE DOUBLE HOLOCAUST UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD LEAVE EVERYBODY WORSE OFF THAN BEFORE. THEY HAD AGREED THAT ALL THEIR EFFORTS SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO THIS END. IN THIS CONTEXT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ HAD ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH TO SAY THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD NO OBJECTION TO A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH FORCES FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS.

2. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT TURBAY HAD DECIDED TO TELEPHONE THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON IN ORDER TO PUT THESE SUGGESTIONS TO HER AND PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WANTED HE TO KNOW THAT HE HAD AUTHORIZED PRESIDENT TURBAY ALSO TO SPEAK IN HIS NAME AND THAT HE WISHED TO BE ASSOCIATED IN EVERY WAY WITH PRESIDENT TURBAY'S APPEALS. BELAUNDE HAD ALSO SUGGESTED TO TURBAY THAT HE SHOULD TRY (IF THERE WAS TIME) TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS OF VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL WHO WOULD THUS ALSO BE ASSOCIATED WITH TURBAY'S TELEPHONE CALL.

3. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE ONLY WAY TO AVOID THE MEETING OF THE TIAR WHICH WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE ON THURSDAY WITH CONSEQUENCES WHICH WERE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WAS TO NEGOTIATE A CEASEFIRE BEFORE THEN.

WALLACE

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26 MAY 82


CONFIDENTIAL

FM MEXICO CITY 260005 Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 432 OF 26 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK



MY TELS NOS 423 AND 424; MEXICO AND THE FALKLANDS

1. THE TILT TOWARDS ARGENTINA IN THE MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT OF 21 MAY IS, I THINK, MORE APPARENT THAN REAL.

IF THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN HERE, THE DRAFTING WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN MORE BALANCED. CASTANEDA'S DISLIKE FOR THE ARGENTINE REGIME AND ALL IT STANDS FOR (WHICH IS SHARED BY PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO) UNDOUBTEDLY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN ESTABLISHING MEXICO'S MIDDLE POSITION.

2. THE STATEMENT WILL NEVERTHELESS HAVE GIVEN SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE ARGENTINES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA. IT HAS ALREADY HAD AN UNHELPFUL EFFECT ON PRESS AND TELEVISION IN MEXICO. THE PRESSURE FOR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO AGREE ON SOME FORM OF ACTION AGAINST BRITAIN WHEN THE OAS RECONVENES ON 27 MAY WILL BE CONSIDERABLE. THE MEXICANS SAY THEY ARE OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION, AND I EXPECT THEY ARE. THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO FORTIFY THEM TO STAND FIRM AND USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO STOP SOME OF THE SMALL LATIN AMERICAN MODERATES FROM FOLLOWING THE INTEMPERATE LEAD OF VENEZUELA AND PANAMA.

3. THE BEST WAY OF INFLUENCING TOP MEXICANS IS THROUGH PERSONAL APPROACHES TO THEM. EVER SINCE THE CANCUN MEETING PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO HAS BEEN A WARM ADMIRER OF THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ENJOYS HIS OCCASIONAL FORAYS INTO LIFE AT THE SUMMIT, AND THE ATTENTION WE HAVE PAID TO HIM DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS CERTAINLY HELPED (BY CONTRAST THE ARGENTINES SEEM VIRTUALLY TO HAVE IGNORED HIM). HIS GOODWILL TOWARDS THE PRIME MINISTER IS AN ASSET ON WHICH IT MAY NOW BE RIGHT TO DRAW.

4. PRESIDENT LOPEZ PORTILLO'S LATEST OFFER OF HELP THROUGH THE MEXICAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON (YOUR TELNO 424) WOULD PROVIDE THE OCCASION FOR A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE OAS MEETING. IN THIS THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT THANK HIM FOR HIS CONTINUED DESIRE TO HELP, DRAW ON SOME OF THE LANGUAGE IN HER RECENT MESSAGE TO THE POPE, REBUT ACCUSATIONS OF COLONIALISM, AND SET OUT ONCE MORE THE LEGAL GROUND OF OUR CURRENT ACTIONS AND HOPES FOR A FUTURE SETTLEMENT. THE MORE CONFIDENCE WE CAN SHOW IN HIM, AND THE MORE PRACTICAL ANY REQUESTS WE MAY MAKE OF HIM, THE MORE LIKELY HE IS TO USE HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA ON OUR BEHALF.

5. THE FACT THAT ALL THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE BEEN KEPT CONFIDENTIAL IS A STRONG POINT IN OUR FAVOUR. THE MEXICANS DISLIKE THE WAY IN WHICH THE ARGENTINES PLAY TO THE GALLERY.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM PANAMA CITY 251810Z MAY
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 86 OF 25 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

ACTION

UKMIS NEW YORK TEL NO 838 TO YOU: ILLUECA'S REMARKS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. ILLUECA'S OFFENSIVE PERSONAL REMARKS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN WIDELY CRITICISED HERE NOT ONLY, AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, BY THE OPPOSITION AND BY WOMEN COMMENTATORS, BUT ALSO IN THE GOVERNMENT PRESS. WRITING IN THE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED 'MATUTINO' HARMODIO IGAZA (WHO SUPPORTS THE ARGENTINE CASE AND WHO LED CRITICISM OF THE PRIORITY PASSAGE OF BRITISH FLEET AUXILIARIES THROUGH THE CANAL) DESCRIBES ILLUECA'S PERFORMANCE AS QUOTE THE GREATEST DIPLOMATIC ERROR IN OUR HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNQUOTE AND SAYS THAT ANY OTHER COUNTRY WOULD QUOTE HAVE NAMED A REPLACEMENT OPEN SQUARE BRACKETS FOR ILLUECA CLOSE SQUARE BRACKETS IN LESS THAN 24 HOURS.

2. THE GENERAL REACTION IS THUS ONE OF DISGUST. ILLUECA MAY FINALLY HAVE COOKED HIS OWN GOOSE.

FCO PLEASE PASS UKMIS NEW YORK

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ACTION

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
CONFIDENTIAL

20 MAY 1982

FM SANTIAGO 252255Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 259 OF 25 MAY 1982



CHILE/OAS

1. MFA TELL US ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER ON 24 MAY TO ASK FOR CHILEAN SUPPORT FOR A 5 POINT MEMORANDUM LISTING THE POINTS TO BE INCORPORATED IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION TO BE PRESENTED AT TIAR MEETING ON 27 MAY.

THIS WAS FOLLOWED UP BY A PERSONAL TELEPHONE CALL FROM GALTIERI TO PINOCHET LATER THAT EVENING. THE MFA'S POSITION ON THE FIVE POINTS IS :-

(I) CONDEMNATION OF UK AGGRESSION AGAINST ARGENTINA - CHILE WILL VOTE AGAINST.

(II) REQUESTS UK TO CEASE HOSTILITIES AND WITHDRAW TO "NATURAL BASES" - CHILE WILL VOTE AGAINST.

(III) URGES ARGENTINA AND UK TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS - CHILE WILL VOTE FOR.

(IV) URGES ALL OAS STATES NOT TO ADOPT MEASURES WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE UK TO CONTINUE THEIR AGGRESSION - CHILE WILL VOTE AGAINST.

(V) ASKS TIAR STATES TO ADOPT APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO ASSIST ARGENTINA RESIST UK AGGRESSION - CHILE WILL VOTE AGAINST.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER IS SHORTLY TO DECIDE WHETHER HE WILL BE ATTENDING THE MEETING IN PERSON.

HEATH

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ACTION



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GRS 117
CONFIDENTIAL
FM CARACAS 241400Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 24 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATEUKMIS NEW YORK AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

OUR TELNO 178 : FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS ABOUT VENEZUELAN EFFORTS TO GET LATIN AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST BRITAIN. WE NOW HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT VENEZUELAN HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SUPPORT AMONG LATIN AMERICAN STATES FOR WITHDRAWAL OF AMBASSADORS FROM LONDON AS A FIRST STEP. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THEY AND OTHERS PRIMARILY INVOLVED WOULD CONSIDER MINIMUM NUMBER OF STATES NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS GESTURE EFFECTIVE.
2. THE EFFORTS ARE BEING COORDINATED IN NEW YORK. HTERE WAS A MEETING IN CARACAS YESTERDAY OF ALL PARTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISORY COMMITTEE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT REPORTS OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER STATES WERE NOT ENCOURAGING AND COMMITTEE THEMSELVES WERE UNABLE TO AGREE ON A LINE. EFFECTIVELY VENEZUELAN POLICY STILL SEEMS TO BE IN DISARRY OVER WHAT TO DO AGAINST US AND HOW. OUTCOME OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IS LIKELY TO BE CRUCIAL FACTOR, THE LESS SATISFACTORY FOR ARGENTINA THE MORE THERE WILL BE PRESSRE FOR VENEZUELAN ACTION. BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT MAY YET COME TO NOTHING.

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25 MAY 1982

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FM FCO 251500Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE DACCA

TELEGRAM NUMBER 156 OF 25 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE LAGOS, NEW DELHI, KINSHASA, YAOUNDE,
DAKAR, ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, JAKARTA,
BAGHDAD, AMMAN, MASERU, MAPUTO, MOGADISHU, COLOMBO,
DAMASCUS, BELGRADE, LUSAKA, HAVANA
INFO IMMEDIATE TO ALGIERS, LUANDA, BAHRAIN, BELMOPAN, LA PAZ,
GABORONE, RANGOON, SANTIAGO, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE,
NICOSIA, SANA'A, QUITO, CAIRO, BANJUL, TEHRAN,
ABIDJAN, NAIROBI, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, LILONGWE,
KUALA LUMPUR, VALLETTA, PORT LOUIS, RABAT, KATHMANDU, MUSCAT,
ISLAMABAD, LIMA, DOHA, JEDDA, FREETOWN, SINGAPORE,
KHARTOUM, DAR ES SALAAM, PORT OF SPAIN, TUNIS, KAMPALA,
ABU DHABI, CARACAS, HARARE, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO SAVING ANTANANARIVO, LIBREVILLE, MONROVIA, VICTORIA, VILA.

FALKLANDS: NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

1. THE COORDINATING BUREAU OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETS AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL IN HAVANA FROM 31 MAY TO 4 JUNE IN PREPARATION FOR THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN BAGHDAD IN SEPTEMBER. CUBA AND OTHER SUPPORTERS OF ARGENTINA ARE LIKELY TO ASK THE MEETING TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ENDORSING THE ARGENTINE POSITION AND CRITICISING OUR MILITARY ACTION. SUCH A STATEMENT COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON ANY FURTHER DEBATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS, WHETHER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH COULD BE CALLED INTO EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION IF WE USE OUR VETO.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE IN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU AND, EXCEPT FOR HAVANA, SHOULD TAKE ACTION AT A HIGH LEVEL TO PUT OVER THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH

CONFIDENTIAL

3 BELOW. HAVANA IS NOT ASKED TO TAKE ACTION WITH THE CUBANS BUT SHOULD DO WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE TO MONITOR THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUREAU AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS. NON-MEMBERS OF THE BUREAU ARE PERMITTED TO ATTEND COORDINATING BUREAU MEETINGS AND WITH THE SUMMIT COMING UP MANY MAY DO SO. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES SHOULD, UNLESS THEY SEE OBJECTION, ACCORDINGLY TAKE SIMILAR ACTION WITH THEIR HOST GOVERNMENTS WHERE THESE ARE TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE HAVANA MEETING.

3. POSTS ALREADY HAVE AMPLE GUIDANCE ON WHICH TO DRAW. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT REPRESENTATIONS, THE MAIN POINTS TO GET OVER ARE:

- A) ESSENTIAL FOR NAM TO CONDEMN ARGENTINA FOR RESORT TO FORCE:
- B) BRITAIN MUST NOT BE CRITICISED FOR RESORTING TO FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE:
- C) NAM SHOULD CALL FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502:
- D) REAFFIRMATION OF TRADITIONAL NAM SUPPORT (EG IN THE 1975 DECLARATION BY FOREIGN MINISTERS AT LIMA, THE 1976 COLOMBO DECLARATION BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE 1981 NEW DELHI DECLARATION BY FOREIGN MINISTERS) FOR ARGENTINA'S POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME AS IT WOULD GIVE AID AND COMFORT TO THE AGGRESSOR:
- E) THIS SUPPORT SHOULD IN ANY CASE BE RECONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE UN CHARTER PRINCIPLE OF THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, WHICH ADMITS NO EXCEPTIONS:
- F) THERE SHOULD BE NO NAM CALL FOR DECOLONISATION OF THE ISLANDS UNLESS IT IS DIRECTED AT ARGENTINA.

POSTS SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT WE REGARD IT AS HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT ANY NAM STATEMENT ON THIS OCCASION SHOULD BE IN SATISFACTORY TERMS AND THAT WE LOOK TO OUR FRIENDS TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT IN HAVANA.

4. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, ARGENTINA HAS SINCE 2 APRIL SECURED NAM OR G77 ENDORSEMENT FOR ONE-SIDED STATEMENTS IN A NUMBER OF UN ORGANS. THEIR METHODS HAVE BEEN UNSCRUPULOUS

AND HAVE AROUSED SOME RESENTMENT. NAM COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO US SUCCEEDED IN MODERATING THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE STATEMENTS, WHICH WERE ISSUED BY THE NAM COORDINATING BUREAU MEETING AT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE LEVEL IN NEW YORK ON 26 APRIL AND 5 MAY. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN DECLARATIONS BY NAM MINISTERS OF HEALTH AT THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY IN GENEVA, AN NAM STATEMENT AT UNEP IN NAIROBI, AND A STATEMENT BY THE UNESCO G77 IN PARIS, WHICH IS LIKELY TO SURFACE AGAIN IN UNIDO IN VIENNA THIS WEEK. NONE OF THESE CRITICISED ARGENTINA'S RESORT TO FORCE AND MANY OF THEM FAILED TO MAKE ANY MENTION OF SCR 502. WE HAVE IN EACH CASE CIRCULATED COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENTS OF OUR OWN POSITION IN REPLY.

5. ACTION ADDRESSEES ACCREDITED TO MORE THAN ONE MEMBER OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU SHOULD ACT WHERE POSSIBLE WITH ALL, VIZ LAGOS ALSO WITH BENIN, ACCRA ALSO WITH TOGO, NEW DELHI ALSO WITH BHUTAN IF APPROPRIATE, AND KINSHASA ALSO WITH CONGO AND BURUNDI.

PYM

PP UKDEL NATO

UKMIS GENEVA

1726/25

GRS 35

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM OSLO 251200Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 25 MAY 82

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL BRUSSELS, BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA.
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, COPENHAGEN.

MY TELEGRAM NO 106 : NORWEGIAN BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS

NORWEGIAN MEASURES ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE IDEFINITELY.
AS LAW AND REGULATIONS CONTAIN NO TERMINAL DATE, IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY FOR NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY FORMAL STEP TO
BRING ABOUT THIS EXTENSION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING WASHINGTON, COPENHAGEN.

BROWN

NNNN

SENT AT
MORE

FALKLAND ISLANDS: SITREP 0730 26 MAY 1982

UN

(a) Security Council Debate

1. The Security Council debate concluded in the morning of 25 May. Costa Mendez's speech was moderate but defensive and lack-lustre. Sir A Parsons' conclusion is that we won quite handsomely on points for which we should be especially grateful to Kenya, Guyana and Belgium.

(b) Draft Resolution

2. Sir A Parsons was given authority to accept the Irish/NAM draft. Although all other members of the Council were prepared to vote on the text, the vote was deferred until today at the request of Argentina. There is a reasonable chance that the Resolution will be adopted today but the text is fragile and there is a risk that Argentina will seek to introduce further amendments.

Military Action

3. As a result of Argentine air attacks, HMS Coventry, a type 42 destroyer, was severely damaged and is sinking. The Atlantic Conveyor was hit by two Exocet missiles and has been abandoned. A type 22 destroyer, HMS Broadsword, was hit by a bomb but the damage is not estimated to be serious. There are no details yet of the casualties.

4. Argentine losses are assessed at three A4s and one Pucara. There are no reports of ground action on the Falklands.

US

5. A garbled and slanted account of a message from Haig to the Secretary of State has been leaked in Washington. Mr Haig regards this as 'very damaging'.

River Plate

6. A great deal of emotion is being generated over the extension of the Exclusion Zone to the River Plate area. The Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela have formally circulated a declaration on this question in the Security Council to which Sir A Parsons has formally replied. In addition posts in Washington and Latin America have been approached on this question and there is a requirement for us to issue clear guidance before the meeting of the Rio Treaty signatories in Washington on 27 May.

Emergency Unit

26 May 1982



tel
1/6
Robert SIMPSON

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

25 May 1982

Falkland Islands Company

The Prime Minister has had a letter from Mr. Robert Simpson, the composer, asking for information about what he calls "the full functions and international connections of the Falkland Islands Company".

I should be grateful if you could let me have as quickly as possible a factual note on the Company's operations.

CW

Brian Fall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

HU



PM/82/38

PRIME MINISTER

Falkland Islands: Future Policy

1. We all hope that we are now well on the way to achieving our main military objectives. Our two central aims are to repossess the Islands and to determine their future taking full account of the wishes of the Islanders. Other factors must not be allowed to override these aims but should nevertheless be given proper consideration. Some of the arguments in Mr Haig's latest rather disconcerting message are relevant. (I attach a copy of the text.) It may be helpful if I set out some of the main points for discussion by ODSA.

2. As you know, one of the major priorities of the Reagan Administration, when it took office, was to halt the spread of communist influence in Latin America and indeed the alarming growth of Soviet activity in the developing world more generally, as exemplified by what was happening in Nicaragua and El Salvador and what had already happened through the Cuban interventions with Soviet support in Angola and Ethiopia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While there has hitherto been a strong distrust in Argentina of the Soviet Union and Cuba, there must be a possibility of a regime emerging in Buenos Aires, in the face of military defeat, which in desperation could turn for support to the communist bloc. That would be a major gain for the Soviet Union and a serious setback for President Reagan's policy of stopping Soviet expansionism.

3. If Argentina did decide to cooperate with the Soviet Union or Cuba, she might well be able to obtain aircraft and

/other military



other military equipment from them. It is also possible that she might obtain aircraft from countries such as Libya, in addition to any that she may still have after the present hostilities. I fear that it would be uncharacteristic for Argentina, once driven off the Falkland Islands, to give up the attempt to advance her claim to sovereignty. Indeed the drive for revenge could easily become a major national cause. A campaign of military harassment of our forces on the Islands might begin, using whatever equipment and help could be acquired. This could be of considerable duration. It would of course involve military and financial costs for us.

4. The resources needed for the permanent or semi-permanent defence of the Islands and for their economic support would be very considerable in any event. We should perhaps begin to try to quantify these, and in any case should seek to limit the costs insofar as this does not prejudice more important considerations. We should need to use ships and other equipment which our Allies would consider should return to NATO duties. Another factor is that it will be desirable to restore communications between the Falkland Islands and the South American mainland, since the alternative will be very costly air services and other communications.

5. More broadly, Britain will have an interest in restoring political relations with the countries of Latin America, so as to exploit the growing markets that they represent. And of course we shall wish to make sure that our relations with our closest allies, in this case notably the United States, and also our general international reputation are not allowed to suffer because we have performed the essential international service of showing that aggression does not pay.

6. Mr Haig's main feeling seems to be that he is delighted
/at our



at our military success but concerned that we could lose international support if we concentrate exclusively on the military side of policy. This is certainly a point of view we ought to consider. Despite his failings he is fundamentally well disposed. It is likely that others in the US and the West will soon be thinking and talking in this way. I think that you and I may increasingly be pressed, not least at the Versailles Summit, to say much more about our medium term intentions for the Falklands. I would certainly expect President Reagan next month to have something to say about the risk of Argentine rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

7. Mr Haig's suggestions for an interim agreement are obviously unacceptable. They involve the concepts of mutual withdrawal and an interim administration, which are not relevant at a time when Britain is in the process of repossessing the Islands. But Mr Haig's suggestions contain one welcome and important element - an offer to provide a US battalion, together with one from Brazil, as a deterrent to Argentine re-invasion of the Islands. There are also attractions, of course, in the idea of a ceasefire, insofar as it would help to prevent Argentine air attacks against the Islands after we had repossessed them. A US involvement in the security of the Islands in the fairly near term should increase the chance of such involvement later on, which would greatly enhance the long term security and therefore the economic prospects of the Islands. It is pretty clear, by contrast, that the US will not be ready to guarantee the security of the Islands if there is simply a return to the status quo ante (paragraph 10 of Washington telno 1878). We need to look at whether we can make use of some elements mentioned by Mr Haig in order to devise an arrangement which would advance British interests, and would also be sufficiently tolerable to Argentina to reduce the risk of her turning for support to the Soviet Union and Cuba.



8. It is difficult to see clearly the way forward to meet all our considerations. I hope we can discuss these problems together so that a satisfactory policy can be evolved.

9. I am copying this minute, and Mr Haig's message, to the other members of ODSA, Sir Robert Armstrong and Sir Michael Palliser.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'F. Pym', written in a cursive style.

(FRANCIS PYM)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
25 May 1982

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SECRET STATE 142651

NIACT IMMEDIATE

25 MAY 82

TOR: 0433

CN: 12106

CHRG: STA

ACTION: AMB-5+2D/MD

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/24/82 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)

TAGS: PBOR, AR, FA, UK

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TUESDAY MORNING, YOUR TIME, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO FOREIGN SECRETARY PYM:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCIS:

AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS, I WANTED YOU TO HAVE MY LATEST THOUGHTS ON THE OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS WE FACE TOGETHER. FIRST AND FOREMOST, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOU CAN CONTINUE TO COUNT ON US SUPPORT AS YOU DO WHAT IS NECESSARY.

WE ARE FAST APPROACHING THE POINT AT WHICH THE UK WILL HAVE A DECISIVE LOCAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE, WITH SUCCESS CLEARLY WITHIN YOUR REACH. AT THAT POINT, WHICH EVEN ARGENTINE SELF-DELUSION CANNOT HIDE, THE ARGENTINES COULD FEEL COMPELLED TO TURN TO THE CUBANS AND SOVIETS AS THEIR LAST HOPE TO AVERT TOTAL HUMILIATION. SHOULD GALTIERI RESIST THESE PRESSURES, HE COULD BE SWEEP ASIDE AND REPLACED BY THOSE FAR MORE HOSTILE TO FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN INTERESTS. EVEN IF THE ARGENTINES DO NOT OPEN THEMSELVES TO THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, THEY ARE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO WANT TO CONTINUE A STATE OF WAR, WHICH THEY WILL PURSUE WITH WHATEVER MEANS THEY CAN ACQUIRE.

IF THIS OCCURS, HOWEVER SUCCESSFUL YOU ARE ON THE ISLANDS, WE WILL UNQUESTIONABLY FACE A FUTURE OF OPEN-ENDED CONFLICT, POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY THE EAST AND AT CONSIDERABLE RISK AND COST TO YOUR INTERESTS AND OURS. WHATEVER DISPOSITION TO SETTLE THERE MAY NOW BE IN BUENOS AIRES WILL EVAPORATE. MOREOVER, HOWEVER UNJUST, WE WILL TOGETHER BE LEFT ISOLATED IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WITH RELENTLESS PRESSURES TO SETTLE ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO ARGENTINA NOTWITHSTANDING THE JUSTICE OF OUR POSITION AND THE SUCCESS OF YOUR FORCES.

IN THE FACE OF THESE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS, I SEE MAJOR

ADVANTAGES IN AN EFFORT BY YOU TO PUT FORWARD TERMS OF A JUST AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT AS SOON AS YOU ARE SURE THAT YOU CAN AND WILL SUCCEED MILITARILY. I APPRECIATE FULLY YOUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT AGREEING, IN A SETTLEMENT, TO WITHDRAW BRITISH FORCES WITHOUT AN ASSURANCE THAT THE ISLANDS AND THE INHABITANTS WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY SAFE FROM RENEWED AGGRESSION IF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BROKE DOWN. THEREFORE, AND IN THE INTEREST OF AVERTING DANGEROUS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINA, THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A BATTALION-SIZE FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENSURING THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VIOLATION OF ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT PRECEDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT. BECAUSE OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO OUR STANDING WITH THE ARGENTINES AS A RESULT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR YOU, THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT A US-ONLY FORCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WE WOULD THEREFORE NEED TO PERSUADE THE MOST TRUSTWORTHY MAJOR HEMISPHERIC POWER -- BRAZIL -- TO JOIN US. A COMBINED FORCE WOULD PRESENT A CREDIBLE DETERRENT AND ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDERS FOR THE PERIOD OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT.

NO DOUBT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE PROPOSAL THE BRAZILIANS HAVE INTRODUCED IN NEW YORK. WE CAN APPRECIATE THAT LONDON WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS PROPOSAL, PARTICULARLY AS IT PERTAINS TO FORCE WITHDRAWAL AND INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. HOWEVER, AT THE POINT AT WHICH BRITISH MILITARY SUCCESS IS AT HAND, IT MAY WELL BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON A BRITISH PROPOSAL THAT CONTAINS ELEMENTS OF THE BRAZILIAN TEXT, WITH PROVISIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL AND INTERIM ADMINISTRATION ADJUSTED TO MEET YOUR CONCERNS, AND WITH THE US AND BRAZIL READY TO PROVIDE PEACEKEEPING FORCES. IF YOU AGREE THAT SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, WE WOULD BE READY TO ASSIST IN SUCH AN INITIATIVE, PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BRAZILIANS.

I HAVE ASKED THE BRAZILIANS IF THEY MIGHT CONSIDER PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE UNDER A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, THOUGH WITHOUT, OF COURSE, GIVING THEM ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN THEIR PROPOSAL, NOR COMMENTING IN ANY WAY ON THEIR TEXT.

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL REACTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO THESE IDEAS, WITH REGARD BOTH TO SUBSTANCE AND TIMING. IF OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL PEACEKEEPING COMPONENT MAKES THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MORE ATTRACTIVE TO YOU, I WOULD WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON OTHER NECESSARY PROVISIONS. AS

YOU CAN APPRECIATE, CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ALTER OUR ABILITY TO OFFER PEACEKEEPING FORCES IF RADICAL CHANGES OCCUR IN BUENOS AIRES. THIS ARGUES FOR MOVING QUICKLY ENOUGH TO FORESTALL ANY SUCH CHANGES.

I HOPE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT WHAT I AM SUGGESTING WOULD SERVE OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS, IF IT MADE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS PUT YOU IN A BETTER POSITION POLITICALLY IF AND AS YOU DO WHAT YOU MUST MILITARILY.

SINCERELY, AL

END OF TEXT.

HAIG

2/2

S E C R E T / N O D I S

STATE 142651

23 MAY 1962

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SUBJECT.

RESTRICTED

6921 - 2

RESTRICTED
FROM FCO 250848Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE SANTO DOMINGO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 22 OF 25 MAY
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 113/82.

MY TELNO 21 (NOT TO ALL) AND YOUR TELNO 43: MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT GUZMAN

cc Foster sec
per

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GUZMAN.
2. BEGINS:

I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I APPRECIATE YOUR DEEP CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. IT IS A CONCERN WHICH I FULLY SHARE. THE TRAGIC CONFLICT WHICH HAS DEVELOPED HAS NOT BEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S SEEKING. OVER THE SEVEN WEEKS SINCE ARGENTINA LAUNCHED ITS UNPROVOKED AND UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SMALL AND PEACEFUL POPULATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE SOUGHT URGENTLY, AND WITH OPEN-MINDEDNESS AND FLEXIBILITY, TO REACH A PEACEFUL NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER - PRINCIPLES TO WHICH ALL DEMOCRATIC NATIONS MUST ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. THE ROAD TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION HAS REGRETTABLY BEEN BLOCKED BY ARGENTINA. ARGENTINA HAS SHOWN NO READINESS TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S MANDATORY RESOLUTION 502 AND TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES: INSTEAD IT HAS SOUGHT ONLY TO CONSOLIDATE ITS AGGRESSION AND TO PREVARICATE IN NEGOTIATION. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS THROUGHOUT MADE CLEAR ITS DETERMINATION TO BRING TO BEAR ALL NECESSARY DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRESSURES ON ARGENTINA SO AS TO BRING TO AN END ITS OCCUPATION. WE HAVE AT EVERY STAGE STATED OUR POSITION WITH CLARITY: AND, USING OUR RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, HAVE CONFINED OURSELVES TO USING ONLY WHAT FORCE PROVED NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AN ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND TO

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PROTECT OUR TASK FORCE.

3. IT IS STILL OPEN TO ARGENTINA TO COMPLY WITH THE CLEARLY EXPRESSED INTERNATIONAL WILL AND TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, BRINGING TO AN END THE PRESENT DANGEROUS CONFLICT. I HOPE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY CAN DO ALL IN YOUR POWER TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OF THIS. YOU WOULD BE MAKING A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. ENDS

PYM

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
FCO
S AM D
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
FALKLAND ISLANDS

cf.

also papers regarding for Mrs
which is about Calicut.

28/5

- 1. MR. WHITMORE
- 2. PRIME MINISTER

c.c. Mr. Gow

You agreed to see Lord Shackleton and Lord Buxton. This week is difficult.

Would 1800 hours on Thursday, 3 June, suit you? You will have a briefing meeting for the Reagan visit at 4, and then nothing else that evening. But you are going to Versailles the following day, so there will be reading and packing.

Agree to see Lord Shackleton and Lord Buxton next Thursday week?

cf.

Min. Stephen.
Good. Thank you.

HW
21V.

Mr. Whitmore

16.15 on

Friday 28/5

cf.

25/5.

25 May, 1982.

SUBJECT

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CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 251130Z
FM FCO 250842Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE BOGOTA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 108 OF 25 MAY 1982
INFO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 114/82.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TURBAY

1. PLEASE DELIVER, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER.

✓ Master set
opt

BEGINS:

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF 21 MAY ABOUT THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. WE HAVE BEEN MUCH AWARE IN RECENT WEEKS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE ADOPTED TOWARDS THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

I AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH YOU THAT IT SHOULD BE FOR DEMOCRATIC NATIONS TO SET THE WORLD AN EXAMPLE, BY THE PATIENCE WITH WHICH THEY PURSUE PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND BY THEIR RELUCTANCE TO RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE. I AM SURE YOU WILL RECOGNISE THAT IN THE SEVEN WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE HAVE ENGAGED IN GOOD FAITH SINCE ARGENTINA INVADED BRITISH TERRITORY, WE HAVE SHOWN THE GREATEST PATIENCE, AS WELL AS THE UTMOST OPEN-MINDEDNESS AND FLEXIBILITY CONSISTENT WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THESE ARE PRINCIPLES WHICH BRITAIN AND COLOMBIA, AS DEMOCRATIC NATIONS, SHARE.

THE DIFFICULTY THROUGHOUT HAS BEEN ARGENTINA'S REFUSAL TO MATCH OUR CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. PRESIDENT GALTIERI AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE REJECTED EVERY PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN PUT TO THEM WHICH WOULD HAVE LED TO A CEASEFIRE COUPLED WITH A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, AS REQUIRED BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502. WE LOOKED CLOSELY AND URGENTLY AT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S RECENT PROPOSALS, WHICH YOU MENTION, AND I REMAIN GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE FOR HIS CONTINUED CONCERN AND ACTIVE INTEREST.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6920 - 2

THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STAGE MUST HOWEVER BE A FIRM INDICATION THAT ARGENTINA IS READY TO COMPLY WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, WHICH REQUIRES THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS. IT IS BECAUSE THERE HAS HITHERTO BEEN NO SIGN THAT ARGENTINA IS WILLING TO TAKE THE STEP THAT WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO INCREASE OUR MILITARY, AS WELL AS OUR DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC, PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA. WE HAVE AT EVERY STAGE IN THIS CONFLICT STATED OUR POSITION WITH CLARITY, AND HAVE CONFINED OURSELVES TO USING THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF FORCE NECESSARY TO IMPOSE PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA, TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS OF THE ISLANDERS, AND TO PROTECT OUR OWN FORCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR RIGHTS OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

I SHARE YOUR OWN ANXIETIES ON THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THIS CRISIS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN MY COUNTRY AND THOSE OF LATIN AMERICA. AS YOU KNOW, WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE REGION AND OUR CONSISTENT OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO FOSTER AND STRENGTHEN THEM. IT IS NO WISH OF OURS THAT THEY SHOULD BE PUT AT RISK. BUT I HOPE THAT YOU CAN AGREE THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES BY FORCE, IF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS ARE TO BE MAINTAINED. IF AGGRESSION IS NOT FIRMLY RESISTED, THE CONSEQUENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WOULD BE GRAVE.

THE POINT AT ISSUE HAS BEEN AND REMAINS ARGENTINE AGGRESSION. NO-ONE REGRETS MORE THAN I DO THAT ARGENTINA HAS SO FAR RESISTED ALL OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE NEVER WANTED TO RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION: BUT ARGENTINE OBDURACY HAS LEFT US NO CHOICE. THE DECISION TO END THE PRESENT CONFLICT RESTS SQUARELY WITH ARGENTINA.

IF YOU, MR PRESIDENT, CAN BRING HOME TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY THE EXTENT OF OUR DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE A JUST SOLUTION TO THIS CRISIS, BUT ALSO THE IMPERATIVE NEED TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, YOU WOULD BE MAKING A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE OF SOUTH AMERICA AND OF THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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WORLD WHICH IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXAGGERATE.
YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER.
ENDS

PYM

FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL
FCO
S AM D
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
FALKLAND ISLANDS

3

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 May 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF COLOMBIA FROM THE
PRIME MINISTER

Thank you for your letter of 24 May. As I told you earlier on the telephone, the Prime Minister is content that a message should be despatched to President Turbay on the lines you propose, subject to the following amendments:

- (a) Page 1, Line 18:
Delete "affair". Substitute "situation".
- (b) Page 1, Lines 18-20:
Delete the sentence "I share your sorrowcan be found".
- (c) Page 2, Lines 13-15:
Delete the sentence "We remain ready.... solution this crisis".
- (d) Page 2, Line 21:
Replace last seven words of this sentence with "which provides for the withdrawal of its forces from the Islands".
- (e) Page 2, Lines 22 & 23:
Delete the sentence "Negotiations outcome".
- (f) Page 2, Line 25:
Delete "so to negotiate". Substitute "to take this step".

/ (g)

(g) Page 2, Line 30:

Immediately after "Argentina" insert "to restore the rights of the Islanders" and then continue the sentence as drafted.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

file

DSC

25 May 1982

FALKLAND ISLANDS: MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC

Thank you for your letter of 24 May. As I told you earlier on the telephone, the Prime Minister agrees that the proposed message from herself to President Guzman should be despatched provided that the fourth sentence is deleted.

A. J. COLES

John Holmes, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

DSC

RESTRICTED

SAPU(82) 26

SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESENTATION UNIT (SAPU)

The attached paper issued at 1630 hours on 25 May 1982 contains information and suggested lines to take on the following -

1. Alleged Naval Design Blunders
2. UN Security Council Debate
3. Lt Cdr Astiz
4. Mr Nott's Panorama Interview
5. Mr Pym's radio interview after the EC Foreign Ministers' meeting

Cabinet Office

25 May 1982

RESTRICTED

1. Naval Design Blunders (Allegations in the Daily Mail)

The Daily Mail alleges that design blunders - notably the use of aluminium superstructures which are described as an "unacceptable fire hazard" - were a major reason for the loss of the Sheffield, Ardent and Antelope.

It is too early to say if the use of aluminium was a significant factor in the loss of any of these ships. Although all three were destroyed by fires, only the Type 21 frigates (Ardent and Antelope) incorporated significant amounts of aluminium in the superstructure and both ships sank only after multiple hits which would have caused serious difficulties for any warship.

Many factors are involved in warship design apart from ability to absorb damage, such as speed and armament, and aluminium construction has both advantages and disadvantages (as is pointed out in a more balanced article in the Times). While aluminium has a lower melting temperature than steel it is much lighter which permits the incorporation of more weapons systems and equipment without reducing speed or stability. For these reasons, many other navies - including the US Navy - use aluminium in warship construction. The decision to use aluminium in the Type 21 superstructure was taken after close consultation with the shipbuilder and designer, and careful consideration within MOD. It was not, as implied by the Daily Mail, against the wishes of the Royal Navy or simply the result of commercial pressures to produce an "export design".

The Daily Mail also claimed that a design decision in 1966 to reduce the length of the Sheffield class for financial reasons made it impossible to fit Sea Wolf missiles. The Type 42 class was designed around the Sea Dart missile to provide area air defence and was not intended to carry Sea Wolf which did not begin to enter service until four years later. We have subsequently twice considered fitting Sea Wolf to Type 42 destroyers but it was found to be impracticable to fit both Sea Wolf and Sea Dart.

2. UN Security Council Debate

Various draft resolutions have now been floated. Some are plainly unacceptable, although this does not mean that we are necessarily hostile to all of them. As Ministers have made unequivocally clear, calls for a cease-fire are not acceptable to us unless directly linked to a commitment

and a timetable for withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Islands, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 502. But we shall continue, in consultation with others, to work towards a satisfactory conclusion to the Security Council debate in which the Council will be faithful to SCR 502.

The Security Council's debate has inevitably produced statements from some Latin American countries strongly supporting Argentina. Some of these, notably the statement by the Foreign Minister of Panama, have been violent, irrational and in thoroughly offensive language. On the other hand there has been some strong support for Britain and not only from Western delegations. For example yesterday the Kenyan representative made a robust statement in support of Britain which gave the lie to any suggestion that the Falklands crisis is promoting a more general North/South confrontation. He said that the breach of peace had started with Argentina's aggression on 2 April and that this was a separate question from the rights or wrongs of Argentina's claim to sovereignty. Some of those who "felt obliged" to support Argentina's case on sovereignty had tried to treat the two problems as one. He pointed out that despite Argentina's claim the Falklands was not a colonial issue: Argentina was engaged in a purely territorial claim in total disregard of the inhabitants of the Islands. The Argentine claim could not be settled at their expense; their interests were paramount. If the principle of decolonisation was distorted in order to redistribute peoples, the UN would be in real trouble and there would be endless war and destruction. Argentina had flouted the principle of peaceful settlement. There had been a deliberate campaign of distortion in some of the statements of the Security Council debate. It was perverted reasoning to say that aggression had begun when the UK forces moved towards the Falklands. Argentina had no right to impose its own form of colonialism on the Falklands.

3. Lt Cdr Astiz

The Swedish and French Governments believe that Lt Cdr Astiz was responsible for the deaths of some of their subjects in suspicious circumstances, quite apart from other allegations (see for example today's Guardian) of his participation in torture and killings in Argentina, and have asked to

interview him. This presents problems for us because Astiz is a POW and under the Geneva Conventions cannot be questioned unless he is willing - or much less extradited. We have much sympathy with the Swedes and the French but have to bear in mind that the way in which we treat him could create a precedent if the Argentines were to capture any more of our own men. We have explained this to the Swedes and the French and are concerned not to seem insensitive to their opinion - or our own public opinion. Astiz has been visited by the ICRC on Ascension Island who were satisfied with the conditions under which we were holding him temporarily, but he cannot remain there. He is now being brought back to the UK by ship which will give us more time to think about the problem.

/4. Panorama Interview

4. Panorama Interview with Mr Nott - 24 May 1982

RICHARD LINDLEY: An opinion poll carried out for Panorama by MORI yesterday shows that the overwhelming majority of people supports the government's decision to take military action. Asked if it was right to go ahead with the landing, eighty percent said 'yes'. But although nearly two-thirds of the population sixty three percent thought we should go on fighting until the Argentines left the islands; nearly a third thought there should be an immediate ceasefire.

Mr Nott, you told the House of Commons this afternoon that the days of the Argentine garrison on the Falklands are numbered. Does that mean that you've ordered British commanders subject only to their own advice and their own opinions as to when to move to go all out to complete the reconquest of the Falklands?
RT.HON. JOHN NOTT, MP (Secy. for Defence): Yes, the task force commander has been told to repossess the Falkland Islands at the earliest possible opportunity.

LINDLEY: Argentina is supporting the call for a ceasefire. Would you be prepared under any circumstances to order a halt in our military advance and accept a ceasefire while further talks are held?

NOTT: Well, we've had six weeks of talks. I think that's right and we've made a succession of proposals all of which have been rejected by Argentina. We've gone backwards so far as their agreement is concerned to a withdrawal from the islands under the mandatory United Nations resolution and I see no reason why they should have changed their position. They have continuously said that they wanted a ceasefire and they wanted to negotiate, but every time that's been put to the test they have shown total intransigence.

LINDLEY: So we're not going to stop in the middle now?

NOTT: Absolutely not.

LINDLEY: Even though a third of the British public seems to think that a ceasefire now now that we've made our point, now that we've landed, a third of the public seems to think that a ceasefire would be a good idea?

NOTT: Well, two-thirds don't think it will be a good idea and I agree with the two-thirds.

LINDLEY: What you're after really is surrender?

NOTT: We're going forward to repossess the Falkland Islands. We must see how the Argentine garrison reacts. It's too soon to say; we've only just established a bridgehead; we're now making that secure and the task force commander will press forward as soon as he's ready to do so.

LINDLEY: If the Security Council seemed about to accept a resolution for a ceasefire would we veto it?

NOTT: Well, the Security Council has already passed a resolution — resolution 502 — requiring the Argentines to withdraw. They have totally ignored it. Indeed, following resolution 502 they continued to build up their forces on the islands. So that is the resolution that we are concerned about — withdrawal of the Argentines immediately — and only with withdrawal is a ceasefire sensible or a possible option.

PANORAMA: 24.5.82

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LINDLEY: So you don't think there's any possibility at all that the Security Council could call for a ceasefire now?

NOTT: Well, we already are operating under resolution 502 which has been ignored by the Argentinians.

LINDLEY: If it came to it, would you veto it?

NOTT: Veto what?

LINDLEY: If the Security Council did decide in a further resolution to call for a ceasefire would you veto it?

NOTT: Well, there can only be a ceasefire as we've made absolutely clear from the outset of this matter if there's total withdrawal of the Argentinians from the islands and so far they have shown no willingness to do that.

LINDLEY: You talked today in the House about the way in which despite the defensive screens we're now putting out some Argentine planes are still getting through to damage our ships. What do you feel about that?

NOTT: Well, we've shot down about fifty of their fixed wing aircraft which is an enormous loss of skilled pilots for the Argentinians. We've successfully now blockaded the islands for many weeks. Undoubtedly the garrison there is getting short of food and now last weekend we successfully accomplished the most difficult military operation which has been establishing a bridgehead. That was always going to be the most dangerous part of re-establishing our position on the islands and it went on the whole very well. We suffered losses — tragic losses — but the military aim has been achieved and achieved with remarkably little loss of life, in fact none from the troops who are now ashore.

LINDLEY: Is it possible to say that the worst period of taking casualties on the British side is now over?

NOTT: Well, I would hope so but nothing is certain in a battle of this sort. It may still be a very tough fight. I think the morale of the Argentinians on the garrison is low but they may well fight very hard and so I cannot be sure that we will not take further casualties. I sincerely hope not, but I cannot be sure.

LINDLEY: Do you believe that we shall reduce them to a minimum by moving as fast as we can?

NOTT: I think it's important we move fast, but as I said in the House today that kind of tactical decision is for the force commanders on the spot. They must make the decision
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NOTT: as to how they're going to move forward from here.

LINDLEY: Mr Nott, thank you very much. We'll be coming back to you to talk to you again in a moment.

LINDLEY: Mr Nott, is it right to suppose that when you've achieved your immediate military aim of ousting the Argentines from the Falklands we shall have to garrison and defend the islands for the foreseeable future?

NOTT: Well, of course, we would like to recreate a situation where the islanders can live in peace with their neighbours. But if in the short-term that doesn't prove possible then, yes, it will be necessary to garrison the islands. That's quite correct.

LINDLEY: You'd agree, I take it, that with the links with Argentina now broken first by Argentina and now by the fighting that's followed, that there's no going back to the relationship that sustained the people that before?

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NOTT: Well, I can't be sure. I mean clearly there's a total rupture in relations between the Falkland Islanders and Argentina at the moment, but that need not necessarily be long-lasting. After this is over I think we must try and recreate good relations between Argentina and Great Britain and with the Falkland Islands. I think that's possible.

LINDLEY: Listening to what Dr Costa Mendez said there it does seem that Argentina is unlikely to abandon its claim to sovereignty over the Falklands. Can you imagine that they're going to forget about it and not try again?

NOTT: Well, you see the Argentine government wants to impose colonialism on the Falkland Islands. They talk about colonialism there. What they want is to deny the islanders their democratic rights. In the interim arrangements which we put to the United Nations totally in accordance with the United Nations charter for the elected council to continue they denied the right of the islanders to keep their democracy. Colonialism is what the Argentines want for the people of the Falkland Islands who are British and we are denying that to Argentina and will continue to do so.

LINDLEY: Well, that may well be so, but the point is that they are very determined to keep on pressing their claim however it is interpreted. They don't appear and I think the British government was at pains to point out, when the negotiations were finally rejected, that Argentina, whatever it might have said on the one hand continue to assert sovereignty it seems very hard to imagine that just because they've got a bloody nose this time, just because you've beaten them this time that they're going to go away and forget about it doesn't it?

NOTT: Well, we haven't beaten them yet. It depends what you mean by them. I'm merely seeking withdrawal of the occupying Argentine forces in the islands. You say they're determined but so are we. Senator Moynihan who's been a great supporter of ours throughout in the United States talked about principles and of course there is a principle here, that of defending your own people however few in number. And after all these islands have been British for a hundred and fifty years and the Argentines may have a claim over them but they've been British and the people of the Falkland Islands have said they wish to remain British and this is the central issue which the Argentines cannot accept.

LINDLEY: Do you ever see them accepting it?

NOTT: The people of the Falkland Islands?

LINDLEY: Do you ever see the Argentines accepting that the islands will be anything but Argentinian.

NOTT: If one is to believe the Foreign Minister, no.

LINDLEY: That means, doesn't it then, that we are going to have to look after the islands for the foreseeable future. Have to garrison them, protect them?

NOTT: In the foreseeable future have repossessed them it seems probable that we will have to leave a garrison there, yes, and protect it.

LINDLEY: Any idea how much that would cost?

NOTT: I've no idea at all, but it needn't necessarily be particularly expensive. We would probably have to keep some submarines in the area and a garrison which was larger than the earlier one we would need to provide some air defence for the islands. It need not be extremely costly. If the Argentines suffer a defeat I think there's very much....a lot of exaggerated talk about the cost of defending the islands in the future.

LINDLEY: I've certainly seen one estimate that suggests that it might be as much as one thousand seven hundred million pounds to do the job properly over a three-year period. That's more than a million pounds per islander. Is that the sort of cost that we could consider...is it proportionate with Britain's other interests?

NOTT: Well, I haven't seen that figure. It's about what it costs us to....the British army on the Rhine...

LINDLEY: Are the Falklands that important?

NOTT: ...helping to defend Germany against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. I think it's a hugely exaggerated figure. But I must make the point that once we've repossessed the islands we will obviously try and create a peaceful environment in which the islanders can live in peace with their neighbours as was said on the television. That includes Chile and Uruguay and Brazil. I don't necessarily believe that because we have repossessed the islands the relations with the South American continent need remain bad. I don't accept it.

LINDLEY: Do you think we have the will to defend them as long as necessary?

NOTT: Oh absolutely.

PANORAMA: 24.5.82

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LINDLEY: I was looking back into history a little... I think it was in 1770 when the Spanish occupied the Falklands and the British fleet saw them off. Within four years we'd sailed away again because we couldn't afford to stay. You don't feel the situation is rather similar today?

NOTT: No, I don't at all. I'm sure that it will be essential for us to remain there and protect the Falkland Islands whilst the neighbour has an aggressive intention for the islands, but as I'm making clear we as soon as this is over we will want to get into discussions with Argentina and with Argentina's neighbours about the future. I prefer the word 'discussions' rather than 'negotiations'. Once we're back in control of British sovereign territory it is not negotiations we're talking about but discussions about the future of the islands which we'll be quite happy to talk about but subject of course to the wishes of the islanders themselves and they must remain paramount.

LINDLEY: How do you think we could ask or expect other nations in the area to help us to bear some of the defence burden of defending the Falklands against any revenge attack should Argentina decide to make one?

NOTT: Well, I don't think we could expect the other South American countries to help us defend the Falklands against Argentina but we would like to feel that we can come to a final long-term solution where the integrity of the Falkland Islands is guaranteed in an international way.

LINDLEY: By whom? America?

NOTT: Well, I think we haven't yet considered that matter. May be by the United States, may be by the United States in conjunction with other South American countries. But in the end it will be the wishes of the islanders that are paramount as we've said all along and that's in accordance with Article 72 of the United Nations charter. So why anybody should think there's something wrong or colonialist or undemocratic about the upholding of the principles of the charter I fail to see. The colonialism that's talked about is on the side of Argentina who wants to deny the democratic right to the Falkland Islanders.

LINDLEY: I think it's a little hard, though, for people to imagine how we can get others to defend a part of Britain as you suggest the Falklands really is at the other end of the world for us.

NOTT: Well, I'm looking...casting into the future. It may be we could bring the Falkland Islands into some general kind of arrangement. I mean the Antarctica is in some kind
FR

NOTT: of general arrangement which guarantees its integrity. These are all matters that'll have to be the right about. In the short-term we are concerned with the military aim which is to repossess the islands and ensure the withdrawal of the Argentinians.

LINDLEY: Do you agree with your war Cabinet colleague, Mr Parkinson, that we've ruled out for the foreseeable future giving sovereignty of the Falklands to Argentina. Is that out of the question?

NOTT: Oh, out of the question. Out of the question. We wouldn't have sent a task force with twenty six thousand people involved eight thousand miles which is half way... equivalent to half way across the Pacific from these islands. We wouldn't have done this with the full support of the British people only to arrive there, having suffered tragic losses of our men only once we're there to say: "Well, thank you very much we're now going to sit down with you and discuss sovereignty". That's not what it's all about. We've had six weeks of negotiations with the Argentinians. They've steadfastly opposed every kind of concession that we have made. In fact they've gone backwards. Now we are being asked... now we're there and now we're winning and taking them back and re-establishing democracy for our own people on these islands we're now being told that we must cease firing that there must be a truce. The notion is absurd. I'm in favour of negot....discussions about the long-term future of the islands as soon as we're back there. But let's achieve the restoration of British administration and then we can see what the islanders want.

LINDLEY: But during this period of negotiations...this six weeks...you've never once ruled out the possibility of handing sovereignty to Argentina. You've gone out of your way not to do that. Are you now saying that we never will?

NOTT: What I'm saying is that our immediate objective is now to repossess the islands. We tried for six weeks to get a reasonable peaceful settlement in accordance with the United Nations mandatory resolution, the Argentinians rejected it, we went through seven sets of proposals, now what I'm saying is there's a new situation and we're not going to talk about sovereignty at the moment that we're trying to retake the islands and free the Falkland Islanders from their occupation.

LINDLEY: I can see the logic of that, but there's another logic, too, isn't there? If it was right until two months ago for Britain to talk about handing over sovereignty to Argentina what in the long-term has changed about that once this emergency...once this crisis is over. If it made sense two months ago why doesn't it make sense now?

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NOTT: Well, in the short-term what has changed is that whilst we were discussing these issues with Argentina, in good faith she invaded the islands. That is what has changed and that has changed the whole atmosphere and mood of the situation. It's a fundamental change. Once we have peace re-established, once the union flag is flying again in Port Stanley, once we have tried to arrive at a peaceful solution with Argentina and her neighbours which secures the future of the islands and the wishes of the islanders then of course we're prepared to have talks with Argentina.

LINDLEY: How long will all this take?

NOTT: I've no idea. We're pressing on as fast as we can.

LINDLEY: But can I just return to that point. If it made sense from British point of view to think about giving the Falklands to Argentina won't it make sense to go on thinking that in a month or two?

NOTT: It doesn't make sense from the British point of view. These are British people. They've been occupied by an aggressor and we are now freeing them and restoring democracy.

LINDLEY: It no longer makes sense?

NOTT: Not in the short term, of course not, it can't.

LINDLEY: You used the word 'never' yourself in an interview.

NOTT: I used the word 'never' in answer to a question which I thought was referring to the interim arrangements which we were then discussing and which have now been withdrawn from the table since we failed to achieve a peaceful solution with the Argentinians now we are trying to achieve our military aims.

LINDLEY: So it's still a possibility in the future handing sovereignty to Argentina?

NOTT: Well, I've said it's impossible at this stage to talk about sovereignty.

LINDLEY: The government has been very clear, firm, decisive in the action it's taken. I think public support for your action shows that, but you have been unclear about the long-term.
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LINDLEY: Don't you think now rather than just say "well, let's hear what the islanders have to say" it is about time you told us what status, what shape you think the islands should take in the future?

NOTT: I'm not going to tell the islanders what they should have.

LINDLEY: Shouldn't you have a view?

NOTT: There are eighteen hundred people and at the moment they're under occupation and we will get there, we will re-establish British administration and then we will talk to these people who are free, they have their own democratic, their own elected council and what Argentina wants and I repeat it again is to establish colonialism over British people on those islands. They charge us with colonialism but we want to restore the democratic freedoms which British people on the islands have.

LINDLEY: I've heard...very briefly....I've heard another member of the War Cabinet hoped that more British settlers will go to the Falklands. Is it really the government's hope that the islands could become a viable independent territory, a little Britain at the end of the

NOTT: Well, I noted that Lord Chalfont said that that was impossible. I don't think I rule it out as firmly as that. It may be possible. Of course there are very few people there for the Falkland Islands to be totally independent. But with some broad... some kind of broad international guarantee I think it's a choice that possibly (I don't know) possibly the islanders might take.

LINDLEY: Mr Nott, thank you very much, indeed.

NOTT: Thank you.

LINDLEY: That's all from Panorama tonight. We'll be watching events on the Falklands just as closely as anybody. Until we see you next on Panorama, good night.

5. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S INTERVIEW WITH IRN AFTER THE COUNCIL MEETING TODAY ON ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA.

BEGINS

Q: MR PYM, CAN YOU TELL ME EXACTLY WHAT YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER COLLEAGUES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAVE AGREED WITH REGARD TO THE CONTINUATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA?

A: THEY HAVE AGREED UNANIMOUSLY THAT THESE ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA SHOULD CONTINUE. WE AGREED LAST MONDAY TO DO IT ON A CERTAIN BASIS UNTIL TODAY. TODAY WE HAVE AGREED UNANIMOUSLY TO CONTINUE ON THE SAME BASIS WITHOUT ANY TIME LIMIT. THEY NATURALLY HOPE - EVERYBODY HOPES - THAT THE DISPUTE WILL COME TO AN END BEFORE TOO LONG BUT THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT TO IT. THERE WAS DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER IT MIGHT CONTINUE FOR ONE MONTH BUT ON THE WHOLE THEY PREFERRED FOR IT TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY AND NATURALLY I AM ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME. INDEED I AM GRATEFUL.

Q: THERE ARE STILL TWO COUNTRIES WHO ARE NOT TAKING PART IN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA. DOES THAT DISAPPOINT YOU; THAT IS ITALY AND IRELAND.

A: THEY HAVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. THEY MADE IT CLEAR LAST TIME THAT THERE WOULD BE NO COMFORT TO ARGENTINA ON THE BASIS ON WHICH THEY WISH TO CONTINUE SANCTIONS. THEY HAVE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES AT HOME WHICH OF COURSE I RESPECT AND UNDERSTAND. THERE WAS SOLIDARITY AND UNANIMITY ALL AROUND THE ROOM FOR CONTINUING THESE MEASURES WITHOUT ANY TIME LIMIT.

Q: BUT WHAT DOES THAT DO FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY AT THE MOMENT?

A: IT GIVES US FURTHER AND STRONG AND I WOULD SAY ALMOST INCREASED BACKING ON THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES WHICH ARE STILL APPLIED. LET US REMEMBER, WE ARE APPLYING ALL THREE PRESSURES, THE ECONOMIC ONES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS MORNING, THE MILITARY ONES WHICH ARE MAKING SO MUCH NEWS AT HOME AND ALSO THE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES. THERE IS NOT MUCH SIGN OF ADVANCE ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT AT THE MOMENT FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE ARGENTINES DO NOT FEEL INCLINED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION BUT NONETHELESS IF THEY WERE TO DO THAT - IF THEY WERE TO COME FORWARD WITH SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT - NATURALLY WE SHOULD LISTEN TO THEM. WHAT HAS HAPPENED HERE TODAY IS TO MAINTAIN AND INCREASE THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ARGENTINA.

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS] *Primo Menzies*
To note
Ala Loga
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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 164 OF 25 MAY 1982
INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS AND CAPETOWN

YOUR TELNO 057 : POSSIBLE CARGOLUX INVOLVEMENT IN SUPPLY OF ARMS
BY SOUTH AFRICA TO ARGENTINA

1. I HAVE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE MADAME FLESCH ON HER RETURN TO LUXEMBOURG TOMORROW. MEANWHILE, I ASKED TO SEE THE PERMANENT SECRETARY AT THE MFA THIS AFTERNOON. HE HAD HIS ECONOMIC DIRECTOR WITH HIM. I REPORTED MY INFORMATION (PARAS 1-3 OF MY TELNO 163). WAGNER IMMEDIATELY CONFIRMED THAT THIS TALLIED WITH WHAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD HEARD LAST WEEK FROM MILLETT, AND THEIR OTHER SOURCES IN CARGOLUX. MADAME FLESCH HAD REACTED VERY SHARPLY. SHE HAD IMMEDIATELY SEEN THE LUXEMBOURG-APPOINTED PRESIDENT OF THE CARGOLUX BOARD (SIETZEN), AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT

SHARPLY. SHE HAD IMMEDIATELY SEEN THE LUXEMBOURG-APPOINTED PRESIDENT OF THE CARGOLUX BOARD (SIETZEN), AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT THIS FLIGHT WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AND MUST ON NO ACCOUNT BE REPEATED. SIETZEN HAD CLAIMED TO HAVE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER ABOUT IT, AND THE MFA OFFICIALS BELIEVE HIM.

2. WAGNER MADE NO SECRET OF HIS DISTASTE FOR THE BUNCH OF ICELANDERS RUNNING CARGOLUX. HE SAID THAT THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT HAD A MAJOR PROBLEM IN TRYING TO CONTROL THE COMPANY. THEY COULD EXERT SOME PRESSURE BUT HAD NO LEGAL POWERS. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THE LUXEMBOURG GOVERNMENT HAD ITS NOMINEE AS PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD. THE GOVERNMENT HAD A MINORITY SHAREHOLDING IN THE COMPANY. IT ALSO HAD A RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSURING THAT IT RESPECTED LUXEMBOURG LAWS AND OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO REPETITION OF THE FLIGHT. I NOTED THAT THEY HAD MADE NO ATTEMPT TO DENY MY INFORMATION. WHAT WAS SIETZEN DOING ABOUT IT? WHAT ASSURANCES HAD BEEN RECEIVED AS TO THE FUTURE?

3. WAGNER SAID THAT THEY HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INFORMATION TO SUGGEST ANY FURTHER FLIGHTS WERE PLANNED. THEY WOULD HOPE TO GET SATISFACTORY ANSWERS TO MY QUESTIONS IN TIME FOR MY MEETING WITH MADAME FLESCH TOMORROW.

4. WEYLAND SAID THAT MADAME FLESCH HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH YOU IN BRUSSELS YESTERDAY.

5. WAGNER SAID THAT THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT CARGO WAS INVOLVED EXCEPT THAT MILLETT HAD DESCRIBED IT AS QUOTE HEAVY UNQUOTE. THEY WOULD TRY TO DISCOVER WHAT IT WAS.

6. ACCORDING TO WAGNER, AERO-URUGUAY IS A COVER COMPANY OPERATING ONE OR TWO AIRCRAFT AND CONTROLLED BY OLAFSSON PERSONALLY.

7. I SAID I WOULD AWAIT THEIR FURTHER ENQUIRIES WITH INTEREST. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LUXEMBOURG INVOLVEMENT IN AIDING THE ARGENTINES SHOULD NOT OCCUR AGAIN. I REMINDED WAGNER AND WEYLAND THAT WE WERE NOT PLAYING GAMES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FOR THE BENEFIT OF MR OLAFSSON. THEY HAVE THE MESSAGE.

THOMAS

NNNN

DB251830

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*Prime Minister
TO ME
Mr. Lopez
Dist. Clerk
25/5*

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

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MR WRIGHT
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PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DST)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET
OFFICE

GRS 35φ
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY F C O 25183φZ
DESKBY UKMIS NEW YORK 25183φZ
FM PARIS 2517φ5Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 544 OF 25 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

ms

YOUR TELNO 29φ: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
1. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE QUAI I TOOK ACTION THIS AFTERNOON (25 MAY) WITH THE HEAD OF CHEYSSON'S CABINET.
2. I SAID THAT THE IRISH DRAFT WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UK AND MILITARILY IMPRACTICABLE. THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF A TRUCE LEAVING THE ARGENTINES IN POSITION OR OF A PARRALLEL WITHDRAWAL. WE WOULD VETO THE IRISH AND PANAMAMIAN DRAFTS IF NECESSARY AND TRUSTED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD SUPPORT US. SCHEER SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DEFEND THE IDEA OF A TRUCE, THOUGH HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN CONSIDERING (ON THE BASIS OF WHAT UKMIS HAD TOLD THE FRENCH MISSION IN NEW YORK) HOW FAR THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH THE UK ON THE DRAFT AND HOW FAR THEY COULD NOT. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT YET DRAWN UP THEIR FINAL POSITION. HE MADE NO

UKMIS HAD TOLD THE FRENCH MISSION IN NEW YORK) HOW FAR THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH THE UK ON THE DRAFT AND HOW FAR THEY COULD NOT. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NOT YET DRAWN UP THEIR FINAL POSITION. HE MADE NO COMMENT OF SUBSTANCE WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT WE REGARDED THE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE IRISH DRAFT PROPOSED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AS IMPORTANT THOUGH STILL NOT SUFFICIENT TO MAKE THE TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO US.

3. SCHEER VOLUNTEERED THAT THE FRENCH FOUND THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT "EXCESSIVE".

4. HE ASKED ABOUT THE JAPANESE DRAFT. I SAID THAT PARTS OF IT WERE UNACCEPTABLE. IT WAS INADEQUATE FOR EXAMPLE ON ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. SCHEER SAID THAT THE FRENCH SAW SOME POSITIVE POINTS IN IT AND ALSO IN THE IRISH DRAFT, PARTICULARLY THE REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND TO THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THESE SHOULD BE BUILT ON. I WARNED AGAINST THIS IDEA, POINTING OUT IN PARTICULAR THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF GOING BACK TO THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION.

5. SCHEER UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON THESE POINTS TO CHEYSSON AS SOON AS HE WAS AVAILABLE AND TO KEEP US INFORMED.

FRETWELL

NNNN

SENT/RECD 251745Z BC/DAB

UNCLASIFIED BY 1001 TO DO RIGHTS 507

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TYPISTS] *Permit Minutes
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-1/78*

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (36)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
~~MR URE~~
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
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PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
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MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
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DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET
OFFICE

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WASHINGTON 251638Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1888 OF 25 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNOS 290 TO PARIS AND 460 TO UKMIS NEW YORK:

FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

1. I WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH EAGLEBURGER THIS MORNING. HE ASSURED ME THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO MRS KIRKPATRICK THAT IF THE IRISH RESOLUTION CAME TO A VOTE IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE UNITED STATES SHOULD VETO IT. SHE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT THE US POSITION IS TO ENCOURAGE EFFORTS FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT TO DO SO WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM'S RIGHT TO PURSUE MILITARY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. RESOLUTION 502 AFFORDS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT: THE US SHOULD OPPOSE ATTEMPTS TO SUPERSEDE IT AND COULD ONLY ACCEPT AN OUTCOME WHICH WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 502.

2. I EXPLAINED THAT THE NON-ALIGNED HAD PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE IRISH DRAFT WHICH CONSTITUTED SOME IMPROVEMENT BUT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS. I GAVE EAGLEBURGER A GENERAL INDICATION OF THE POINTS OF DIFFICULTY FOR US, MAKING UNEQUIVOCALLY

CATION OF THE POINTS OF DIFFICULTY FOR US, MAKING UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR TO HIM THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT REFERENCES TO MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. I ALSO EXPLAINED THAT WE COULD NOT ENDORSE A RESUMPTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EFFORTS ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS PROPOSALS. NOR DID WE WANT A RESOLUTION WHICH OPENED UP THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT IN SOME RESPECTS THE WORSE THE RESOLUTION THE BETTER. IT WOULD THEN BE EASY FOR THE US TO VETO. THE WORST CASE WOULD BE A RESOLUTION FALLING JUST SHORT OF WHAT WE COULD ACCEPT. THE AMERICANS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR CONTINUING TO PRESENT THE MILITARY ACTIONS WE WERE TAKING AS BEING UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER (I ASSURED HIM THAT WE ALWAYS HAD DONE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO). EAGLEBURGER MADE CLEAR THAT THE FINAL AMERICAN DECISION ON HOW TO VOTE WOULD DEPEND ON THE PRECISE TERMS OF THE TEXT. HE NEEDED NO PERSUADING THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS COMPLETELY UNSOUND AND THAT IMMEDIATE CONSULTATION MUST TAKE PLACE WITH HAIG HERE AS SOON AS WE KNEW THE FINAL SHAPE OF THE RESOLUTION. HE ASKED ME TO REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH HIM AS THE CONSULTATIONS IN NEW YORK PROCEEDED.

4. WE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT OTHER DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BUT I EXPLAINED THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. I ALSO TOOK EAGLEBURGER THROUGH THE OBJECTIONABLE FEATURES FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW OF THE PROPOSALS IN THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 840 TO YOU). EAGLEBURGER UNDERSTOOD THAT MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AND THE TERMS FOR AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, BUT LEFT ME IN NO DOUBT THAT THE AMERICANS ARE ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE BRAZILIANS BOTH IN ORDER TO HELP PRESERVE THEIR POSITION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FORTHCOMING OAS MEETING.

5. ON THE LATTER POINT, EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DONE THEIR UTMOST TO HOLD OFF A MEETING OF THE OAS BUT DID NOT EXPECT TO SUCCEED. THE US AMBASSADOR HAD WEIGHED IN WITH THE BRAZILIANS WHO HAD INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE TRYING TO PLAY A MODERATING ROLE IN THE OAS. EAGLEBURGER AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE BAD AND PREJUDICIAL TO THEIR FUTURE ROLE IF THE BRAZILIANS TABLED A RESOLUTION IN THE UN ON THE LINES OF THE DRAFT LETTER.

6. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT THE FRENCH ARE VERY SHAKY ABOUT THEIR VOTING INTENTIONS, A POINT CONFIRMED TO ME BY HAIG (SEE MIFT).

HENDERSON

ZZ UKMIS NEW YORK

ZZ WASHINGTON

GRS 520

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251120Z MAY 82

TO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 460 OF 25 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS IMMEDIATE TOKYO, DUBLIN.

YOUR TELNO 844: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

1. AS YOU ALREADY KNOW OUR POSITION NOW IS THAT WHILE WE REMAIN WILLING TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE IF ARGENTINA CLEARLY AND IRREVOCABLY COMMITS HERSELF TO VERY EARLY AND TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF HER FORCES, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER CONDITIONS. WE CAN NOT (NOT) CONTEMPLATE ANY PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL OF OUR OWN FORCES. NOR WILL WE NOW ACCEPT ANY INTERIM ADMINISTRATION WHETHER BY THE UN OR ANYONE ELSE.

2. MINISTERS HAVE CONSIDERED THE VARIOUS DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THIS POSITION. THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION IF IT IS PUT TO THE VOTE AS IT STANDS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF YOUR TELNO 842.

3. YOU SHOULD WORK FOR THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO THE IRISH DRAFT AS REVISED BY THE NON-ALIGNED:

- A) IN THE FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH SUBSTITUTE 'REAFFIRMING' FOR 'RECALLING',
- B) DELETE IN TOTO THE FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH, DEALING WITH THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT,
- C) REVISE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 TO READ 'REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502'. (AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE '... GOOD OFFICES TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502'.)

YOU SHOULD ALSO PRESS HARD FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT (OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5) TO BE RENDERED WITHIN 7 DAYS RATHER THAN 2 OR 3 DAYS SO AS TO POSTPONE FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIVITY FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND TO CARRY US THROUGH THE OAS MEETING.

4. IF YOU ARE ABLE TO SECURE THESE AMENDMENTS YOU MAY VOTE FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE YOU SHOULD, WITH REFERENCE TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4, MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT INDICATING THE ONLY TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO US, ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

5. WITH REGARD TO THE JAPANESE DRAFT RESOLUTION, OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 IS UNACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS EFFORTS BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT CONCLUDES BY, IN EFFECT, CITING ONLY TWO OF THE THREE ELEMENTS OF SCR 502, BUT OMITTS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IF THERE IS ANY LIKELIHOOD OF THIS DRAFT BEING TABLED, YOU SHOULD PRESS FOR THE REVISION OF THIS PARAGRAPH TO READ AS FOLLOWS: 'SUPPORTS ONCE AGAIN THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND REQUESTS HIM TO RENEW THE USE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND THE REALISATION OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE'. (AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE '... GOOD OFFICES TO SECURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502'.) THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF THUS AMENDED.

6. YOU SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT DRAWING ATTENTION TO ITS FAILURE TO SPECIFY AN EARLY DATE FOR THE COMPLETION OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND ITS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH CAST IRON LINKAGE BETWEEN CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.

PYM

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D ^{SED}
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
~~EMERGENCY ROOM~~
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
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MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

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GRS 70

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LISBON 251515Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 97 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS8) AND WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 88: USE OF LAJES.

1. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MATHIAS HAS JUST SENT ME LETTER (FULL TEXT BY BAG) AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO STAGING AND REFUELLING OF MAXIMUM OF ONE NIMROD PER DAY AT LAJES. WE ARE ASKED TO MAKE WRITTEN APPLICATION THROUGH MFA FOR CLEARANCE, IN EACH CASE.

2. MIFT CONTAINS FREE TRANSLATION OF KEY PARAGRAPHS OF TEXT.

BYATT

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
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HD/NEWS D
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MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY-ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

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PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
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PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

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GRS 140
CONFIDENTIAL
FM LISBON 251520Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 98 OF 25 MAY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS8) AND WASHINGTON

MIPT: USE OF LAJES.

1. FOLLOWING IS FREE TRANSLATION OF KEY PARAGRAPHS OF PORTUGUESE
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER TO ME OF 25 MAY:

BEGINS.

I HAVE PLEASURE IN CONFIRMING THAT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT,
CONSCIOUS OF THE OVERRIDING INTERESTS OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE
ALLIANCE, HAS DECIDED TO GIVE ITS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO
THE REQUEST FORMULATED BY HMG THROUGH YOU, AFTER DULY
CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH SUCH A SERIOUS STEP WILL
HAVE FOR PORTUGAL. THE DETAILED REQUESTS SHOULD BE MADE
THROUGH THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL FOR APPRECIATION CASE BY CASE.

IT IS THE CONVICTION OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT THAT HMG

~~IT IS THE CONVICTION OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT THAT HMG~~
FOR ITS PART WILL KNOW HOW TO ASSESS WHAT THIS ATTITUDE
REPRESENTS IN TERMS OF PORTUGUESE SOLIDARITY WITH THE UK.
THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT THEREFORE IS CONFIDENT HMG WILL KNOW
HOW TO RESPOND WITH THE SAME SPIRIT IN WHICH THE PORTUGUESE
DECISION WAS TAKEN.

ENDS.

BYATT

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 25/1533Z PJF/~~SECRET~~MAD

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

IMMEDIATE

ADVANCE COPY

PS
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/MR GNSLOW
 PS/PJS
 MR BULLARD
 SIR I SINCLAIR
 MR GIFFARD
 MR WRIGHT
 MR ADAMS
 LORD N G LENNOX
 LORD BRIDGES
 MR URE
 MR GILLMORE
 HD/PUSD (2) *HL/SAFE*
 HD/S AM D
 HD/DEF DEPT
 HD/NEWS DEPT
 HD/EPD
 HD/ECD(E)
 HD/UND
 HD/PLANNING STAFF
 MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
 EMERGENCY ROOM ✓
 RESIDENT CLERK

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 MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
 PS/CHANCELLOR)
 MR ILETT) TREASURY
 MR LITTLER)
 SIR R ARMSTRONG)
 SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
 MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
 MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
 DIO)

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

UNCLASSIFIED

DESKBY 251200Z

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 250845Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 357 OF 25 MAY
 INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO ROUTINE JOHANNESBURG AND PRETORIA
 INFO SAVING BCG CAPE TOWN AND BC DURBAN

MY TELNO 356 (NOT TO ALL) AND FCO TELNO 190: SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA

1. THE FIRST SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT REACTION WAS TO REFUSE TO COMMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY IN RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION QUESTIONS ABOUT PRESS REPORTS OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMS SUPPLIES TO ARGENTINA, THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, GENERAL MAGNUS MALAN, LAST NIGHT (24 MAY) MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT:

BEGINS

I FEEL IT IS MY DUTY TO MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT THIS EVENING IN

I FEEL IT IS MY DUTY TO MAKE A SHORT STATEMENT THIS EVENING IN PARLIAMENT.

IT IS GENERALLY KNOWN THAT IT IS OUR POLICY TO PROVIDE NO DETAILS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSACTIONS IN ARMS, AMMUNITION AND OTHER MILITARY MATTERS. WITH REFERENCE TO TODAY'S SPECULATION I WILL HOWEVER THIS EVENING ON THIS ONE OCCASION DEPART FROM THIS POLICY BECAUSE WE ARE NOW IMPLICATED IN A CONFLICT.

SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOT PROVIDED OR SOLD TO ARGENTINA ANY MISSILES OR AEROPLANE PARTS IN ANY WAY AS HAS BEEN REPORTED, BEFORE OR DURING THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT.

ENDS

2. IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER QUERY THE MINISTER GAVE THE ASSURANCE THAT NO SUCH ARMAMENTS HAD BEEN SUPPLIED DURING THE SAME PERIOD TO ANY SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY FOR POSSIBLE DIVERSION TO ARGENTINA OR TO A SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRY ACTING AS INTERMEDIARY FOR ARGENTINA.

3. EARLIER YESTERDAY (PRIOR TO THE STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE) MR PIK BOTHA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

BEGINS

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY DECLINED TO CONFIRM OR DENY ALLEGATIONS OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERESTS DEMAND THAT THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD NOT BE VIOLATED. THE GOVERNMENT ACCORDINGLY ALSO DOES NOT CONFIRM OR DENY THE EXISTENCE OF ANY CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS WITH ANY SPECIFIC COUNTRY OR WITH ANY SPECIFIC AGENCY OF ANY COUNTRY.

IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL THAT SHOULD THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT UNDERMINE THIS PRINCIPLE, A SITUATION WOULD EVENTUALLY ARISE WHERE PARTICULARS OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO AND FROM ALL OF THE COUNTRIES WITH WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAS DEALINGS WOULD BE DISCLOSED, CAUSING INCALCULABLE HARM TO SOUTH AFRICA'S SECURITY.

THE WHOLE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES IS AN EXTREMELY DELICATE ISSUE BASED UPON MUTUAL TRUST AND INTEGRITY.

CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS NATURE CANNOT BE TAMPERED WITH WITHOUT OTHER COUNTRIES AND AGENCIES IN SUCH COUNTRIES QUESTIONING SOUTH AFRICA'S ABILITY TO ACT WITHIN THE SPIRIT OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

ENDS

ENDS

4. THIS MORNING'S DIE BURGER (25 MAY) REPORTS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER, MR P W BOTHA, TOLD THE NEWSPAPER EARLIER YESTERDAY (ALSO BEFORE GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT) THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS GUIDED BY ITS OWN INTERESTS IN ARMS TRANSACTIONS. QUOTE THIS IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN LAID DOWN SINCE I BECAME MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND WHEN AN ARMS EMBARGO WAS INTRODUCED AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS POLICY SOUTH AFRICA DOES NOT SAY FROM WHOM SHE BUYS WEAPONS OR TO WHOM SHE SELLS THEM. ACCORDINGLY WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE SOLD WEAPONS TO ANYBODY, WE SHALL NOT BE FRIGHTENED OFF THIS POLICY BY POLITICKING. UNQUOTE.

5. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER PRESS ENQUIRIES WE SHALL TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE: QUOTE WE HAVE NOTED AND REPORTED TO LONDON GENERAL MALAN'S STATEMENT THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAS NOT SUPPLIED ARGENTINA WITH MISSILES OR AIRCRAFT PARTS . UNQUOTE.

6. COMMENT TO FOLLOW.

FERGUSSON

NNNN

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PP FCO

PP UKREP BRUSSELS

PP BRUSSELS

PP UKDEL NATO

PP UKMIS GENEVA

GRS 35

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM OSLO 251200Z MAY 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 113 OF 25 MAY 82

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL BRUSSELS, BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS GENEVA.
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, COPENHAGEN.

MY TELEGRAM NO 106 : NORWEGIAN BAN ON ARGENTINE IMPORTS

NORWEGIAN MEASURES ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE IDEFINITELY.
AS LAW AND REGULATIONS CONTAIN NO TERMINAL DATE, IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY FOR NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY FORMAL STEP TO
BRING ABOUT THIS EXTENSION.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING WASHINGTON, COPENHAGEN.

BROWN

NNNN

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CONFIDENTIAL

25 MAY '82

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E.R.

(69)
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GRS 139

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 251500Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 291 OF 25 MAY
AND TO IMMEDIATE STOCKHOLM
INFO MODUK, UKMIS GENEVA

BRASILIA TELNO 204: ASTIZ

1. THE FRENCH AND SWEDISH EMBASSIES HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE REFUSAL OF THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES AND OF ASTIZ TO ANSWER QUESTIONS EITHER PUT DIRECTLY OR THROUGH US. WE ARE HOPING TO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITH THE EMBASSIES TOMORROW 26 MAY IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION IN DETAIL AND ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH AND SWEDES FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONSTRAINTS ON UK ACTION.
2. THE FRENCH AND SWEDES HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT ASTIZ WILL BE SENT BACK FROM ASCENSION BY SHIP TO THE UK, ARRIVING AROUND 6 JUNE, BUT THAT NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ABOUT REPATRIATION.
3. IF ASKED, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL DESCRIBE THE PRESENT POSITION AND CONFIRM THAT THE FRENCH AND SWEDES HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

PYM



The National Archives

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DVA/FCO 883/25

OO FCO

OO MODUK (DS11)

RR MONTEVIDEO

RR BERNE

RR BRASILIA

GRS 200

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS GENEVA 251055Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 268 OF 25 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS11)
INFO MONTEVIDEO, BERNE, BRASILIA

25 MAY 82



MY TELNO 259: REPATRIATION OF POWS

1. JOSSERON OF ICRC TELEPHONED AT NOON ON 25 MAY TO SAY THAT THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES HAD GIVEN THEIR INFORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE REPATRIATION WITH HMS HECLA TO MONTEVIDEO ON THE LINES SET OUT IN YOUR TELNO 173 OF THE 24 PRISONERS CAPTURED ON THE NARWAL.
2. JOSSERON ADDED THAT ICRC ALSO AGREED TO BE INVOLVED AS YOU REQUEST. THEY WOULD LIKE EARLY NEWS OF THE MODALITIES YOU ENVISAGE AND 48 HOURS NOTICE FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THEIR PEOPLE. THEY WOULD PROPOSE TO SEND ONE DELEGATE AND ONE DOCTOR TO MONTEVIDEO TO INSPECT THE PRISONERS AND TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDING THEM ON TO THE ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES. THEY WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER YOU INTEND THAT THAT THEY SHOULD INSPECT THE PRISONERS ON ARRIVAL AT MONTEVIDEO OR IF YOU MEAN TO ARRANGE TO FERRY THEM OUT TO HECLA BEFORE ARRIVAL. GRATEFUL FOR EARLY INSTRUCTIONS.
3. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT JOSSERON ADDED THAT ICRC HAD NOTED NUMEROUS PRESS REPORTS OF THE CAPTURE OF ARGENTINIAN TROOPS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, AND WOULD WELCOME NEWS FROM US. WE ENCOURAGED THE ICRC TO PUT THEIR QUESTIONS DIRECT TO THE MOD ON THE DIRECT TELEX LINK WITH THE MOD INFORMATION BUREAU FOR POWS. BUT WE REASSURED THEM THAT AS SOON AS PRECISE INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE IT WOULD BE GIVEN TO THEM.

MARSHALL

NNNN

SENT AT 25/1120Z MAF/ISD

ADVANCE COPIES: FALKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL (39)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR CUNSLOW
PS/PHS
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR ADAMS
LORD N G LENNOX
LORD BRIDGES
MR URE
MR GILLMORE
HD/PUSD (2)
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF DEPT
HD/NEWS DEPT
HD/EPD
HD/ECD(E)
HD/UND
HD/PLANNING STAFF
MR ANTHONY WILLIAMS W60
EMERGENCY ROOM ✓
RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST (2)
PS/S OF S FOR DEFENCE
MR J STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
PS/CHANCELLOR)
MR ILETT) TREASURY
MR LITTLER)
SIR R ARMSTRONG)
SIR M PALLISER) CABINET
MR WADE-GERY) OFFICE
MR FULLER SAPU/DIO)
DIO)

RM 8 FOR MODUK C IN C FLEET

Miss Dickson, D/ENERGY

[Passed to E.R.]
[Typists a.a.]

CONFIDENTIAL
FM KINGSTON 252022Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 25 MAY
IMMEDIATE INFO UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TELNO 451 TO UKMIS UN NEW YORK (JUST RECEIVED): FALKLANDS
1. UKMIS UN MAY BY NOW HAVE BEEN ABLE TO NOBBLE SHEARER DURING HIS UNEXPECTED VISIT TO NEW YORK ENDING TODAY (25 MAY). IN HIS WND FRANCIS' ABSENCE, I HAVE SPOKEN TO BARNETT, ACTING PERMANENT SECRETARY. SUBJECT TO CONSULTING SHEARER ON RETURN, HE SEEMED READY TO INSTRUCT JAMAICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO INTERVENE. RICHARDSON HOWEVER IS IN HOSPITAL. I DO NOT KNOW LIKELY IMPACT OF HIS DEPUTY, BARLETT.

SMALLMAN

NNNN

DBY 260200Z

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

ADVANCE COPY

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
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HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR COLVIN

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF

CABINET
OFFICE

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 260200Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 260040Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 850 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, DUBLIN, TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING,
MADRID, KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW,
AMMAN, UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELNO 463 (NOT TO ALL); FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. I IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OTUNNU THAT I WAS INSTRUCTED TO VOTE IN
FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT IRISH/NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AS IT HAD EMERGED
(IE THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 848). HE CONSULTED THE ARGENTINES AND
INFORMED THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE POSITION HE
HAD REACHED. DORR RAISED NO DIFFICULTIES. NOR DID THE RUSSIANS
OVER THE TEXT, THOUGH THEY WERE SLIGHTLY RELUCTANT ABOUT VOTING
TONIGHT, SOMETHING WHICH ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WERE
KEEN TO DO. HOWEVER IT TOOK A LONG TIME TO FIND COSTA MENDEZ WHO
HAD BEEN MEETING MRS KIRKPATRICK PRIVATELY AND HAD THEN GONE TO
GROUND. ALL HIS AIDS SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT ARGENTINA COULD

HAD BEEN MEETING MRS KIRKPATRICK PRIVATELY AND HAD THEN GONE TO GROUND. ALL HIS AIDS SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT ARGENTINA COULD ACCEPT THE DRAFT BUT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONFIRMED BY COSTA MENDEZ PERSONALLY. WHEN HE WAS EVENTUALLY FOUND HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NEED TIME TO STUDY THE DRAFT. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE DECIDED TO POSTPONE A VOTE UNTIL TOMORROW (26 MAY). BY THAT TIME EVERYONE, INCLUDING PANAMA AND THE RUSSIANS, WANTED TO GET ON WITH IT AND THE ONUS FOR DELAY LAY SQUARELY WITH ARGENTINA.

2. I THINK THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT THE REVISED DRAFT WILL BE ADOPTED TOMORROW. THERE IS A GENERAL DESIRE TO END THIS PHASE IN THE COUNCIL AND RELIEF THAT OTUNNU HAS APPARENTLY DISCOVERED A WAY OF DOING SO WITHOUT A VETO. BUT THE AGREEMENT IS FRAGILE AND THERE IS AN OBVIOUS RISK THAT COSTA MENDEZ WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT FROM THE GENERALS TO TRY FOR MORE.

3. THE FINAL DRAFT AS CIRCULATED BY OTUNNU CONTAINS "NEGOTIATING" IN PLACE OF "ENSURING" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE TEXT IN MY TELNO 848. THIS DOES NOT SEEM TO ME A CHANGE OF SUBSTANCE AND I HAVE NOT THEREFORE QUESTIONED IT, LEST OTHERS RE-OPEN OTHER PARTS OF THE PRESENT TEXT.

PARSONS

NNNN

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TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
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MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

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PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252040Z MAY 82
TO FLASH F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 848 OF 25 MAY 1982
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS,
INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, TOKYO.

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT STANDS
AT PRESENT, IE INCORPORATING:

- (A) THE NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS OF LAST NIGHT (MY TELNO 844):
- (B) 3 OF THE 4 AMENDMENTS YOU ASKED ME TO WORK FOR IN PARA 3
OF YOUR TELNO 460:
- (C) THE FORMULA SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PLACE OF
THE AMENDMENT PROPOSED IN PARA 3(C) OF YOUR TELNO 460.

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 502(1982) OF 3 APRIL 1982,
NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION
OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) HAS SERIOUSLY
DETERIORATED,
HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE

DETERIORATED,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502(1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES BEARING IN MIND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502(1982) AND THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982:

3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION, WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS):

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE:

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IN ANY CASE WITHIN 7 DAYS OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION.
ENDS

PARSONS

NNNN

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

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SIR I SINCLAIR
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MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON 252204Z MAY 82
TO FLASH FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1894 OF 25 MAY
INFO FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK.

UKMIS TELNOS 847 AND 848 TO YOU: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. WE HAVE KEPT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN TOUCH WITH THE DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK. THE AMERICANS, AS I REPORTED, WERE FIRMLY RESOLVED TO VETO THE ORIGINAL IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN VIEW OF THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HAVE NOW BEEN MADE TO THAT DRAFT, THEY WOULD BE IN VERY CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT IF THEY WERE ASKED TO VETO SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S EARLIER PROPOSALS, IN TERMS WHICH DO NOT COMMIT US TO ANYTHING. THEY ARE CONCERNED, IF POSSIBLE, TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE EVE OF THE OAS MEETING HERE SINCE THAT WOULD RENDER MORE DIFFICULT THEIR TASK IN INFLUENCING THE OAS STATES GENERALLY TO DO AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE IN RESPONSE TO THE

THAT WOULD RENDER MORE DIFFICULT THEIR TASK IN INFLUENCING THE OAS STATES GENERALLY TO DO AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE IN RESPONSE TO THE ARGENTINE REQUESTS FOR ACTION AGAINST US. THEY HAVE ASKED US TO THEM KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OUR INTENTIONS, BUT CLEARLY HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO GO ALONG WITH THE TEXT AS AMENDED.

HENDERSON

NNNN

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OO BONN DESKBY 251700Z

GRS 1005

SECRET

DESKBY 251700Z

FM FCO 251600Z MAY 1982

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 244 OF 25 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, MODUK (DS6, 7, 11 AND 12)

TELECON PEARCE/HUNTER: FALKLAND ISLANDS: DEPLOYMENT OF BLOW-PIPE BATTERY FROM BAOR

1. AS DISCUSSED IN TELECON UNDER REFERENCE, MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED TO DEPLOY AN ADDITIONAL BLOW-PIPE BATTERY TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A REPORT TO THIS EFFECT HAS APPEARED IN THE GERMAN PRESS. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD INFORM THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT AND THE FEDERAL MOD OF OUR DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AT THE LEVEL YOU CONSIDER MOST APPROPRIATE, DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) AS A RESULT OF THE NEED TO ENHANCE THE LOW LEVEL AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AVAILABLE TO BRITISH FORCES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: WE HAVE DECIDED TO REDEPLOY ONE BLOW-PIPE BATTERY (24 FIRE UNITS) FROM BAOR TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC:

(B) THE UNIT CONCERNED IS 21 AIR DEFENCE BATTERY OF 27 FIELD REGIMENT, WHICH IS BEING RECATEGORISED AT NATO A4 STATUS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. NATO AUTHORITIES ARE BEING INFORMED. TOTAL NUMBER OF MEN INVOLVED IS 60:

(C) WE REGRET THE NEED TO WITHDRAW THIS UNIT FROM BAOR, BUT RECENT EVENTS DEMONSTRATE THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT OUR FORCES ON THE FALKLANDS ARE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE AIR DEFENCE. WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW A UNIT FROM BAOR BECAUSE WE HAVE NO SUITABLE UNITS AVAILABLE IN THE UK (THIS INFORMATION IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE) UNFORTUNATELY THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO TO PLUG THE GAP. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SMALL OPERATIONAL RISK CREATED BY THE TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF THE BATTERY IS JUSTIFIED IN THE

CIRCUMSTANCES. THREE BLOW-PIPE BATTERIES REMAIN IN 1 (BR) CORPS.

(D) NO FURTHER WITHDRAWALS OF BLOW-PIPE ARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT CLEARLY WE CANNOT (REPEAT NOT) GIVE ANY CATEGORIC ASSURANCES THAT THIS WILL REMAIN THE CASE. WE WILL, HOWEVER, DO ALL WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES ARE KEPT AS FULLY INFORMED AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE WE INTEND TO RESTORE 21 AIR DEFENCE BATTERY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT WE CANNOT JUDGE AT PRESENT WHEN THAT MIGHT BE:

(E) THESE REDUCTIONS WILL NOT RESULT IN BAOR FALLING BELOW THE LEVEL OF OUR BRUSSELS TREATY COMMITMENT OF 55,000. THE ONLY OTHER WITHDRAWALS FROM BFG TO DATE HAVE BEEN 4 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SPECIALISTS AND 12 ROYAL ENGINEER SPECIALISTS AS WELL AS THE RAF RAPIER UNIT (FCO TELNO 230) TOTALLING 133 MEN. MOD ARE ALSO CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING UP TO 70 SIGNALLERS FROM BAOR TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. NO OTHER DEPLOYMENTS ARE CURRENTLY ANTICIPATED. FOR THE SAME REASON AS SET OUT IN (D) ABOVE, HOWEVER, WE CANNOT (REPEAT NOT) GIVE A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT THIS WILL NECESSARILY REMAIN THE CASE. YOU SHOULD AVOID GIVING ANY SUCH IMPRESSION OR BEING DRAWN INTO DISCUSSION ABOUT THIS.

2. PLEASE EMPHASISE TO THE GERMANS THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 1(C), THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 1(D) AND PARA 1(E). WE ARE DOING WHAT WE CAN TO KEEP THE GERMANS FULLY INFORMED, BUT CLEARLY WE NEED TO BE CONFIDENT THAT NO SENSITIVE INFORMATION REACHES UNAUTHORISED, PARTICULARLY ARGENTINE, EARS. THE INFORMATION WE ARE PASSING TO NATO AUTHORITIES WILL NOT BE AS FULL.

3. MOD WILL NOT BE ANNOUNCING THE BLOW-PIPE DEPLOYMENT TO THE PRESS BUT WILL TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE IF ASKED:

'THE GOVERNMENT HAVE DECIDED TO STRENGTHEN THE AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITY AVAILABLE TO COMMANDER LAND FORCES FALKLANDS BY REDEPLOYING A BLOW-PIPE BATTERY FROM BAOR TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.'
THE MOD HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARY POINTS FOR DEFENSIVE USE:

'QUESTION: HAVE OUR NATO ALLIES BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT THIS?
ANSWER: NATO ALLIES ARE BEING INFORMED THAT THIS UNIT WILL

S E C R E T

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REMAIN AVAILABLE TO NATO. BECAUSE OF ITS DISTANCE FROM THE ALLIANCE AREA, HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE AT A LOWER AVAILABILITY STATUS THAN WOULD NORMALLY BE THE CASE. THIS IS STANDARD PRACTICE FOR DEPLOYMENT OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA.

QUESTION: WHY SEND A UNIT FROM BAOR? DON'T WE HAVE SUFFICIENT ASSETS IN UKLF TO LEND SUPPORT?

ANSWER: I CANNOT COMMENT ABOUT OPERATIONAL PLANS.

QUESTION: WILL TA BLOW-PIPE UNITS BE CALLED UP TO FILL THE GAP IN BAOR?

ANSWER: NO.

QUESTION: WHAT EFFECT DOES THIS WITHDRAWAL HAVE UPON BAOR'S OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY?

ANSWER: SUBSTANTIAL AIR DEFENCE FORCES REMAIN IN BAOR. (IF PRESSED) I CANNOT COMMENT ABOUT OPERATIONAL PLANS.

QUESTION: WHY WAS NOT THIS BATTERY DEPLOYED EARLIER? HAVE YOU IDENTIFIED A NEW AIR THREAT? HOW MANY MEN/LAUNCHERS/MISSILES ARE INVOLVED? HOW WILL THEY MOVE TO THE FALKLANDS? WHEN WILL THEY ARRIVE?

ANSWER: IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT FOR ME TO REVEAL DETAILS ABOUT OUR OPERATIONAL PLANS.'

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE GERMAN PRESS HAVE ACQUIRED FURTHER DETAILS PROBABLY IDENTIFYING THE UNIT AND NUMBER OF MEN CONCERNED. WE GATHER THAT THE COMMANDER 1 (BR) CORPS IS DUE TO HOLD A RECEPTION FOR THE GERMAN PRESS THIS EVENING. IF ASKED HE WILL CONFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF THESE DETAILS, BUT WILL OTHERWISE FOLLOW THE PRESS LINE ABOVE.

4. WE SUGGEST THAT FMOD OFFICIALS MIGHT DRAW ON THIS PRESS LINE IF ASKED ABOUT THE BLOW-PIPE DEPLOYMENT BY THE BUNDESTAG DEFENCE COMMITTEE TOMORROW. THEY SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) REVEAL ANY OF THE MORE SENSITIVE INFORMATION IN PARA 1 TO THE COMMITTEE. MORE GENERALLY, WE SHOULD LIKE FMOD TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE COMMITTEE SHOULD THE LATTER ASK ABOUT THE EFFECT OF OUR SOUTH ATLANTIC DEPLOYMENTS ON NATO:

(A) THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES ARE BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED BY THE UK ABOUT THE EFFECT ON NATO DEPLOYMENTS OF BRITISH OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, BUT CLEARLY THEY CANNOT REVEAL THE

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DETAILS:

(B) THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE REASONS WHY THE UK IS TAKING ACTION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC: THEY ARE RELEVANT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF DETERRENCE IN EUROPE:

(C) UK FORCES CONCERNED REMAIN AVAILABLE TO NATO, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF AVAILABILITY:

(D) THEY ARE CONFIDENT THAT BFG REMAIN FULLY ABLE TO FULFILL THEIR OPERATIONAL ROLE.

5. THIS TELEGRAM IS BEING SENT TO UKDEL NATO FOR THEIR OWN INFORMATION ONLY.

MOD ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFYING THE NATO AUTHORITIES.

PYM

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]
LIMITED

HD/DEFD

HD/EMERGENCY UNIT

HD/S AM D

HD/PLANNING STAFF

HD/UND

HD/NEWS D

HD/ERD

HD/ECD (E)

→ HD/FUSD HD/WED

DEP HD/FUSD

HD/RES D

PS

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/LORD BELSTEAD

PS/FUS

MR BULLARD

SIR I SINCLAIR

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

MR BARRETT

COPIES TO

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PS/ S OF S DEFENCE

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

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MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR O'NEILL

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CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone ~~01-9312312 ext~~ 253 8224

K 03

Sir Antony Acland, KCVO, CMG,
Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Prime Minister

To note

MBL 26/5

Dear Antony,

MS

Israeli Arms Supplies to Argentina

1. As agreed at this morning's meeting of OD(SA), I spoke later in the morning to Lord Sieff, using the "Points to Make" in the enclosure to Holmes's letter to Coles of 24 May. I also drew his attention to the rather disobliging communication put out yesterday by the Israeli Cabinet and told him what had been said about it in Israel as reported in Tel Aviv telegram No. 198.
2. Lord Sieff said that he was disturbed to hear what I had said. He would take steps to see that it "reached the right quarter" and might in due course come back to me about it. I expect in any case to see him on a social occasion on 27 May.
3. I am sending copies of this letter to Robert Armstrong and John Coles.

Michael

Michael
(Michael Palliser)

CONFIDENTIAL

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Prime Minister

DM Has Seen ①

Agree

(a) to attached message to Mr. Muldoon formally accepting offer of frigate?

(b) to attached press release which will issue after (a) has been despatched?

MO 14/12

PRIME MINISTER

A.J.C. 26/5

USE OF RNZN FRIGATE

My officials have been examining as a matter of urgency last week's offer by the New Zealand Prime Minister to make a frigate available to the Royal Navy during the present hostilities in the Falklands.

2. Discussions yesterday with New Zealand House have confirmed that the ship, the Leander Class frigate CANTERBURY, could be most profitably and conveniently employed as a substitute for one of the two RN warships conducting the Indian Ocean patrol (Operation ARMILLA). Over the next few months this would enable two frigates to be released for deployment to the South Atlantic. The CANTERBURY is due to arrive in Singapore today before taking part in exercise STARFISH with us and our Five Power Defence Agreement allies at the beginning of June. Thereafter we would hope that she would take up the planned programme of exercises and port visits in company with the remaining RN ship. It will of course be necessary to consult the posts in question as well as the New Zealand authorities about this but no insuperable problems are foreseen.

3. There must of course, be a possibility that the CANTERBURY or her successor - the New Zealand Navy contemplate replacing her by her sister ship WAIKATO in August - might become involved in military action in the Gulf, especially now that hostilities between Iraq and Iran have again flared up. Mr Muldoon has made it clear that he envisages the frigate operating in every way like a RN ship. As it is, the New Zealand authorities have been approached on the question of Rules of Engagement; it may well be necessary to build in provision for Wellington to be consulted before the ship entered the Gulf in an emergency.

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4. I am in no doubt that we should lose no time in formally accepting this very generous offer, which comes at a most opportune moment after the losses of the last few days. The New Zealanders are themselves forcing the pace and are anxious that the ship should be transferred to CINCFLEET's operational control as a matter of urgency; on present plans this would take place on 27 May. They wish also to make a very early announcement. As Mr Muldoon made the offer to you in person I imagine that you would wish to convey the Government's acceptance of the New Zealand offer yourself. I attach a suitable draft message. The First Sea Lord would send a similar message to his New Zealand counterpart. I would also propose that the attached press release should be issued once your message to Mr Muldoon has been transmitted.
5. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Ministry of Defence
25th May 1982

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER
OF NEW ZEALAND

1. I promised last week that we should look very quickly at how we might make best use of your ^{generous} offer to make a RNZN frigate available during the present hostilities in the Falkland Islands.
2. May I first of all repeat my warmest thanks to you and your Government for the staunch and unwavering support that you have given us over the last difficult weeks. This has been a source of much comfort to us.
3. I am now writing formally to convey my Government's acceptance of your ~~generous~~ offer and to say that we should like to take it up as soon as practicable. I understand that, following an approach by your Chief of Naval Staff to the First Sea Lord, it has been tentatively agreed that our mutual interests would best be served if the HMNZS CANTERBURY were to replace one of the two RN warships on patrol in the Indian Ocean. I would for my part see no difficulty about our Commander in Chief, Fleet assuming operational control of the CANTERBURY as soon as convenient to you.
4. I propose to issue a short announcement of our formal acceptance of your offer. Should you make a public statement on what has been agreed I would hope that you will stress the value which my Government attaches to your offer. We are indeed deeply grateful.

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

1. The Prime Minister has today conveyed to the New Zealand Prime Minister the Government's formal acceptance of the offer to make a New Zealand frigate temporarily available to the Royal Navy. Operational control of the frigate, the HMNZS CANTERBURY, will pass immediately to the Royal Navy and it is envisaged that she will operate in the Indian Ocean. This will enable one of the two RN ships on patrol in the area to be released for other operational duties.

2. The Government is deeply grateful to the New Zealand Government for this generous offer which is indicative of the unstinting support which they have given over the last weeks and is a further example of the close ties which exist between our two navies.

Amend no.

26 MAY 1982



IMMEDIATE ADVANCE COPY [PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

3

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

ms

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)
PS/S OF S DEFENCE
PS/HOME SECRETARY
PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)
PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL
PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER
PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG
PS/SIR M PALLISER
PS/SIR A DUFF
MR WADE-GERY
MR FULLER
MR COLVIN
MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF
DIO
MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD
ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD
DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

CABINET
OFFICE

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 251921Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1889 OF 25 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK,

MIPT: FALKLANDS.

1. AFTER I HAD SEEN EAGLEBURGER, HAIG ASKED ME TO LOOK IN. HE SAID THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR A BRIEFING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT HE THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD HAVE SUCCEEDED MILITARILY WITHIN A WEEK. SOME OF THOSE PRESENT HAD THEN PROCEEDED TO TELL THE PRESS THAT THIS WAS HAIG'S FORECAST (EXCLAM).

2. I THANKED HAIG FOR THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD SENT MRS KIRKPATRICK, ADDING THAT WE WERE WORRIED ABOUT WHAT SHE MIGHT BE COOKING UP WITH THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (FOR WHOM HE HAS AN EQUALLY LOW REGARD). HAIG TOLD ME THAT CHEYSSON WAS COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE. HE HAD JUST TELEPHONED HIM (HAIG) TO SAY THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE US AND FRANCE MIGHT FIND THEMSELVES IN ISOLATION WITH THE UK IN VOTING AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE COULD NOT ALLOW THIS

VOTING AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE COULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. THE FRENCH WERE LIKELY TO ABSTAIN. HAIG HAD TRIED TO PUT SOME MORE BACKBONE INTO HIM. HAIG AGREED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT HAVE GOT AN UNCERTAIN IMPRESSION OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS VIA MRS KIRKPATRICK. HE HAD BEEN AT PAINS TO CORRECT THIS.

3. HAIG WAS ANXIOUS TO GET MY REACTIONS TO THE MESSAGE HE SENT ME LAST NIGHT. I HAD NOT THEN RECEIVED YOUR TELNO 1043 THE GIST OF WHICH I WILL PASS ON. BUT I SAID THAT HE WOULD REALISE THAT IT CONTAINED ELEMENTS THAT WERE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US AND DID NOT FIT THE PRESENT MOOD IN PARLIAMENT OR THE COUNTRY.

4. HAIG SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND THAT WE WOULD NOT NOW ACCEPT MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL. HIS NIGHTMARE, HOWEVER, WAS THAT FOLLOWING THE CAPITULATION OF THE ARGENTINE GARRISON, ARGENTINA WOULD REMAIN IN A STATE OF WAR WITH US OVER THE FALKLANDS WITH CONTINUING AIR FORCE AND SUBMARINE ACTIVITY. THEY WOULD GET HELP FROM OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND CERTAINLY ALSO FROM CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION, WHO WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HELP TO RE-ARM THEM.

5. I INTERJECTED THAT WE WERE WELL AWARE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE LONGER TERM. THE PRESENT SITUATION HAD BEEN FORCED ON US BY THE JUNTA. THE FIRST STEP MUST BE TO GET THE ARGENTINES OFF THE ISLANDS. HAIG AGREED THAT WE HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY JUSTIFIED IN THE MILITARY ACTION WE HAD TAKEN. HE APPLAUDED ITS SUCCESS. IN RESISTING AGGRESSION WE WERE DEFENDING THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD. WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT WHERE HIS LOYALTIES LAY, NAMELY WITH US. THE SAME WENT FOR THE PRESIDENT, WITH WHOM, AS HE HAD TOLD ME, HE HAD DISCUSSED THE SITUATION AT LENGTH YESTERDAY.

6. HAIG ALSO AGREED THAT NOTHING WAS LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED UNTIL WE REACHED THE POINT OF HIGHEST MILITARY PRESSURE. HE ARGUED THAT WE WOULD THEN FACE A TEST OF STATESMANSHIP. THAT WOULD BE THE MOMENT FOR SOME MAGNANIMOUS PROPOSAL TO ARGENTINA TO OFFER SOME WAY OF BRINGING MILITARY ACTIVITY TO AN END, WHILE PROVIDING FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ISLANDS. THIS WAS WHY HE HAD PROPOSED THAT THE US SHOULD BE READY TO CONTRIBUTE TROOPS FOR A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE. HE HAD ALSO PERSUADED THE BRAZILIANS THAT THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE (THOUGH THEY SEEMED TO THINK THAT BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION WOULD BE OBJECTIONABLE TO ARGENTINA BECAUSE OF THEIR TRADITIONAL RIVALRY). HE HOPED THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT THE LONGER TERM.

7. IN THE SHORT TERM, THE AMERICANS FACED SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE OAS MEETING ON THURSDAY. THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO GET THE

7. IN THE SHORT TERM, THE AMERICANS FACED SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE OAS MEETING ON THURSDAY. THEY WERE UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO GET THE BLOCKING THIRD REQUIRED TO PREVENT A MAJORITY IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF SANCTIONS, THOUGH THEY WOULD BE DOING THEIR BEST. HE AGREED THAT LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR ARGENTINA VARIED MARKEDLY FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER. BUT MOST OF THEM WOULD SHOW SOME SUPPORT.

8. HAIG CONCLUDED BY MAKING IT PRETTY CLEAR THAT HE HOPES THAT WE WILL WIN MILITARILY AND SOON, BUT IN DOING SO WILL OFFER SOME PROPOSAL WHICH WILL HELP THE LONG-TERM AND INTERESTS IN THE HEMISPHERE, AND THOSE OF THE US.

HENDERSON

NNNN

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO
TYPISTS]

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (37)

FLASH
ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR ONSLOW
PS/PUS
PS/LORD BELSTEAD
MR BULLARD
SIR I SINCLAIR
MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
MR BARRETT
HD/S AM D
HD/DEF D
HD/PLANNING STAFF
HD/UND
HD/NEWS D
HD/ERD
HD/PUSD
MR REED, PUSD
EMERGENCY ROOM
RESIDENT CLERK

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

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MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

MR COLVIN

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS-
MENTS STAFF

CABINET
OFFICE

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

GR 600

CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 252110Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 847 OF 25 MAY 1982

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON, PARIS,

INFO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, TOKYO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 460: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS.

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE SITUATION AT 2030Z. THERE IS WIDESPREAD ANNOYANCE AMONGST THE NON ALIGNED AT DORR FOR TRYING TO FORCE THE ISSUE IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY. THERE IS A CORRESPONDING DESIRE THROUGH OUT THE COUNCIL TO TERMINATE THE PROCEEDINGS TODAY WITHOUT A VETO IE WITH THE ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE LIKELY TO GET TEN OR ELEVEN VOTES.

2. THROUGH THE MORNING AND AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH, I HAVE NEGOTIATED FIRMLY ON THE IRISH DRAFT AS REVISED BY THE NON-ALIGNED AMENDMENTS, ON THE BASIS OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. AS YOU WILL SEE, WE HAVE CARRIED ALMOST ALL OUR POINTS. THE ORIGINAL FOURTH PRE-
... WE HAVE A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION

WE HAVE CARRIED ALMOST ALL OUR POINTS. THE ORIGINAL FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH HAS BEEN DELETED; WE HAVE A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION OF 502 IN THE FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH (THIS IS THE NORMAL PLACE FOR SUCH RE-AFFIRMATIONS IN RESOLUTIONS WHEN THEY COME ROUND FOR THE SECOND TIME); AND WE HAVE GOT A SEVEN DAY RESPITE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5.

3. THE MAIN OPPOSITION TO THE AMENDMENT WE PROPOSED TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 HAS COME FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. I SPOKE TO HIM AT LUNCH TIME. HE SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND THAT THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS HAD PASSED INTO HISTORY. IF WE WOULD ACCEPT "BEARING IN MIND THE APPROACH..." HE COULD GIVE ME HIS WORD THAT HE WOULD NOT TRY TO EXPOSE OR EMBARRASS US AT THE OUTSET OF A FRESH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE LANGUAGE MUST BE CONSISTENT IE "BEARING IN MIND SCR 502 AND BEARING IN MIND THE APPROACH ..." HE COULD NOT SEE HOW THIS WOULD GIVE US DIFFICULTY SINCE WE ALREADY HAD A CLEAR RE-AFFIRMATION OF 502 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE RESOLUTION, AND AN EQUALLY CLEAR REFERENCE TO IT IN OPERATIVE PARA 1.

4. OZOREZ TYPALDOS (PANAMA) AND OTHERS IN THE NON ALIGNED ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHATEVER THE SECRETARY GENERAL CAN LIVE WITH, AND I AM UNDER VERY STRONG PRESSURE TO AGREE THIS EVENING SO THAT WE CAN GET OUT OF THE COUNCIL BEFORE THIS FRAGILE NEAR-AGREEMENT BREAKS DOWN.

5. I KNOW THAT THIS RESOLUTION IS NOT IDEAL, BUT I DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS WOULD BE PREPARED EVEN TO ABSTAIN IF WE WERE TO VETO SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE PHRASE "BEARING IN MIND THE APPROACH" (WHICH COMMITS US TO NOTHING) AND, FOLLOWING THE RE-AFFIRMATION OF 502 IN PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH ONE, AND ITS CLEAR MENTION IN OPERATIVE PARA 1, BECAUSE ITS THIRD MENTION IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 ONLY BORE THE RESOLUTION IN MIND.

6. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO ACCEPT THIS WITH A SUITABLE EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE. AFTER THE COUNCIL HAS COME SO FAR IN OUR DIRECTION, IT WILL CREATE A VERY BAD ATMOSPHERE IF WE ASK FOR MORE TIME, ASSUMING THAT STRONG PRESSURE RESUMES THIS EVENING FOR A VOTE TONIGHT. IF IT DOES NOT, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR DISCRETION TO PLAY IT BY EAR UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING PROVIDED THAT IT DOES NOT LOOK AS THOUGH THE WHOLE EDIFICE WILL COLLAPSE OVERNIGHT.

7. I HAVE PUT TO MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE THE AMENDMENTS YOU REQUIRE TO HIS RESOLUTION. BUT FOR THE MOMENT IT IS ON THE BACK BURNER WHILE ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON THE REVISED DRAFT

7. I HAVE PUT TO MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE THE AMENDMENTS YOU REQUIRE TO HIS RESOLUTION. BUT FOR THE MOMENT IT IS ON THE BACK BURNER WHILE ATTENTION IS FOCUSSED ON THE REVISED IRISH DRAFT.

PARSONS

NNNN

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 Hrs 25 MAY

U.N.

a) Security Council Debate

A. 836

1. The debate was resumed at 1530Z on 24 May. There were 7 speakers: Uganda, Zaire, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Greece and China. The Kenyan contribution was magnificent; the other Africans were even-handed, calling for an immediate cease-fire and a new mandate for the Secretary-General. China leaned strongly towards Argentina but was not too bad. It would have been better if Greece had not spoken. The debate will be resumed today when Costa Mendez is to make a major statement. The President has called for informal consultations of the whole Council at 1400Z.

b) Draft Resolutions

B.832(Irish)
C.833(Panama)
D.835(Japan)
E.839
F.840(Brazil)
G.842
H.(NAM)

2. Throughout yesterday draft resolutions appeared from the Irish, Panamanians, Japanese and Brazilians. The last named was in the form of a letter from the Brazilian Foreign Minister to the President of the Security Council. Only the Irish draft has been tabled so far. The non-aligned members led by Uganda, have worked out amendments to the Irish draft, which they claim Panama (reluctantly) and the other Latin American Foreign Ministers, including Costa Mendez, would be prepared to accept.

c) Sir Anthony Parsons' assessment

I. 843

3. Sir Anthony Parsons has already made it widely known that we would have to veto the Irish draft as it stands and has urged the Americans and French to do likewise. The same goes for the Panamanian. The Japanese is far less objectionable; and the Non-Aligned's proposed amendments could possibly offer an acceptable way out of our problems at least for a short time.

H. 844

Sir Anthony has asked for instructions by 1400Z.

EC IMPORT EMBARGO

UKREP Brussels
Tels. Nos.

J. 2063
K. and 2076

4. The Foreign Ministers of the Ten meeting in Brussels yesterday agreed to extend the import ban on Argentine goods for an unspecified period until the situation should permit its removal. Ministers converted themselves into a Council to approve the regulation, which will come into force on 25 May. The Italians and Irish maintained their position as

/described

described in their statement of 18 May.

L.
FCO Tel.No.
456 to UKREP
Brussels

U.S. ATTITUDE

Washington
tels. nos.
M. 1878
N. 1881

5. Sir Nicholas Henderson spoke to Secretary of State Haig yesterday as instructed. Haig continued to express concern with the 'long-term issues at stake', but later telephoned Sir Nicholas, 'evidently in an easier frame of mind'. He said that he had had a chat with the President who was 'very solid, more so than those around him.' Haig said that he had sent messages to the Cubans and the 'other party' (Soviet Union?), and was proposing to send a personal message to the Secretary of State.

O. Washington
telno. 1877

RIO TREATY MEETING

6. Our Embassy in Washington reported that the Argentines were expected to submit a formal note yesterday calling for the Foreign Ministers of the Rio Treaty signatories to reconvene in Washington on Thursday, 27 May to consider further action.

Bogota tels.
nos.

COLOMBIAN ATTITUDE

P. 124,125
Q. and 126
R.

7. The Colombian President told our Ambassador yesterday that he had received a reply from President Galtieri to his message and that he looked forward to receiving the Prime Minister's reply. Our Ambassador has suggested that our reply should open by warmly thanking Turbay for the offer of his Government's assistance.

Montevideo
tels. nos.

URUGUAYAN ATTITUDE

372 and
S. 366
T.

8. Our Ambassador in Montevideo has spoken as instructed to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister. He said that time was fast running out for the negotiation of a ceasefire, there was only one last chance, and that he was very worried about the American attitude. Our Ambassador referred to the strong press statement made by the Minister in which he condemned our invasion of the islands. He claimed that it was not 'all that strong' but that we 'must understand that Uruguay's policy had to take into account fast moving events'.

Tel Aviv tel.
no. 198

ISRAELI ATTITUDE

U.

9. The Israeli Cabinet adopted a resolution at its meeting on 23 May, reportedly drafted by Prime Minister Begin personally, expressing deep concern with the hostilities and appealing for a ceasefire.

BBC PANORAMA

Minute
V.

10. BBC Panorama last night carried an interview with Costa Mendez in New York, in which he spoke in standard terms.

/COMMENT

COMMENT

11. The position at the Security Council remains confused with a general reluctance to put forward resolutions which were certain of a British veto. However, a number of resolutions are now around, though only the Irish has yet been formally tabled. As summarised in para 9 of UKMIS New York telno 844, Sir A Parsons needs instructions by 1400Z today on the following:


- (a) confirmation that he should vote against the Irish draft with an explanation of vote; ✓
- (b) confirmation that he should vote against the Panamanian draft with an explanation of vote; ✓
- (c) voting instructions on the Japanese draft. Sir A Parsons recommends voting for or against but not abstaining;
- (d) the position to be taken on the Irish draft as amended by the non-aligned (a version containing the NAM amendment, prepared by the Emergency Unit, is attached).

Flag W

12. We also need to consider further action in Paris and Washington to stiffen French and US positions on voting on the drafts.

13. Although Sir N Henderson's further meetings with Mr Haig showed a somewhat more resolute US attitude, the strength of American concerns about their relations with Latin America and about Soviet influence in the region was again firmly underlined. Mr Haig made clear that a US security guarantee for the Falkland Islands could not be expected if there were simply a return to the status quo ante in the Islands. Mr Haig is sending a personal message to the Secretary of State.

14. A meeting of the Rio Treaty states has now been called for 27 May. Mr Haig is particularly concerned that this will lead to a dangerous degree of US isolation in the region: We may need to consider further lobbying of Trinidad and Guyana in advance of the Rio Treaty meeting.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

25 May 1982

Gifford 5/82

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY PARIS 250630Z
 DESKBY MOSCOW 250500Z
 DESKBY PEKING, TOKYO 250130Z
 DESKBY DUBLIN, ACCRA 250830Z
 DESKBY MADRID, KINSHASA, WARSAW 250730Z
 DESKBY KAMPALA, AMMAN, NAIROBI 250700Z
 DESKBY PANAMA CITY, WASHINGTON, GEORGETOWN 251300Z
 DESKBY UKDEL NATO 250800Z
 FM UKMIS NEW YORK 242025Z MAY 82
 TO IMMEDIATE F C O

(3)

24 MAY 1982



TELEGRAM NUMBER 836 OF 24 MAY 1982
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, PEKING, DUBLIN, MADRID,
 KAMPALA, KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW,
 AMMAN, TOKYO, UKDEL NATO, NAIROBI.

MY TELNO 825: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY

1. THE DEBATE WAS RESUMED AT 1530Z TODAY (24 MAY). IT WAS A MAINLY AFRICAN SESSION: UGANDA, ZAIRE, KENYA, LAOS, LIBERIA, GREECE AND CHINA SPOKE. KENYA WAS MAGNIFICENT, EVEN BETTER THAN THE OLD COMMONWEALTH: OTHER AFRICANS WERE EVEN-HANDED, CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND A NEW MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. CHINA LEANED STRONGLY TOWARDS ARGENTINA BUT WAS NOT TOO BAD. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF GREECE HAD NOT SPOKEN. THE DEBATE WILL BE RESUMED AT 1430Z TOMORROW, WHEN COSTA MENDEZ IS TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT.

DETAIL

2. OTUNNU (UGANDA) SAID THAT UGANDA SHARED THE TWO-PRONGED APPROACH OF THE NAM: ON THE SUBSTANCE, IT RECOGNISED THE JUSTICE OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM: ON PROCEDURE, IT FAVOURED NEGOTIATIONS. IT HAD VOTED FOR SCR 502 BECAUSE OF ITS POSITION ON THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THE CRISIS HAD SINCE EXPANDED. UGANDA'S PRESENT ATTITUDE WAS: SUPPORT FOR SCR 502: REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE OR WAR AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: A CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS: REGRET THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS HAD BROKEN DOWN: AND A WISH THAT HE SHOULD BE MANDATED TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS, AS THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS.

3. MAMANDA (ZAIRE), WHO FANCIES HIMSELF FOR HIS ELOQUENCE, MADE A LONG AND VAPID STATEMENT ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NON USE OF FORCE AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES: ABOUT PEACE AND WAR: ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UN: ABOUT NATIONAL HONOUR AND SO ON. HE CONCLUDED BY URGING THE COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS TO IMPLEMENT SCR 502, ON THE BASIS OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN A FORMAL MANDATE.

4. MAINA (ENYA) MADE AN ADMIRABLY ROBUST STATEMENT WHICH WAS AN EFFECTIVE ANTIDOTE TO ALL THE LATINS HAVE BEEN SAYING ABOUT A CULTURAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND LATIN AMERICA (PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELNO 828 - NOT TO ALL). HE SAID THAT THE BREACH OF THE PEACE HAD STARTED WITH ARGENTINA'S AGGRESSION ON 2 APRIL. THAT WAS A SEPARATE QUESTION FROM THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. SOME OF THOSE WHO "FELT OBLIGED" TO SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S CASE ON SOVEREIGNTY HAD TRIED TO TREAT THE TWO PROBLEMS AS ONE. KENYA WAS FRIENDLY TO BOTH SIDES BUT HAD TO SPEAK OUT IN THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE DECOLONISATION ARGUMENT WAS IRRELEVANT. ALL (UNDERLINED) OF NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA HAD BEEN COLONISED IN THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES. THE TWO CONTINENTS HAD BEEN PEOPLED AS A RESULT OF COLONIALISM: THAT WAS FACT OF THE WORLD'S UNFORTUNATE PAST. THIS WAS NOT A COLONIAL ISSUE: ARGENTINA WAS ENGAGED IN THE PURELY TERRITORIAL CLAIM, IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE ISLANDS. THE ARGENTINE CLAIM COULD NOT BE SETTLED AT THEIR EXPENSE: THEIR INTERESTS WERE PARAMOUNT. IF THE PRINCIPLE OF DECOLONISATION WAS DISTORTED IN ORDER TO REDISTRIBUTE PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE IN REAL TROUBLE: THERE WOULD BE ENDLESS WAR AND DESTRUCTION. ARGENTINA HAD FLOUTED THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT: YET ONLY EIGHT MONTHS AGO SHE HAD INSISTED ON ENTERING RESERVATIONS ON A PASSAGE IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE OF SEPTEMBER 1981 ABOUT SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. WHATEVER SOME DELEGATIONS MIGHT HAVE SAID, THE NAM HAD NEVER SUPPORTED ARGENTINE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE. THERE HAD BEEN A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN OF DISTORTION IN SOME OF THE INTERVENTIONS IN THE DEBATE. THE FACT WAS THAT ARGENTINA HAD IGNORED CALLS FOR RESTRAINT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT WAS PERVERTED REASONING TO SAY THAT AGGRESSION HAD BEGUN WHEN THE UK FORCES MOVED

TO LEAVE THE AREA. ARGENTINA HAD NO RIGHT TO IMPOSE ITS OWN FORM OF COLONIALISM ON THE FALKLANDS. THE UN SHOULD NOT CONDONE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION; THE MATTER SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE ICJ. THE UN'S REACTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS WAS BEING VERY KEENLY WATCHED; THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE CONCERTED ACTION TO PREVENT ANYONE FROM DRAWING THE CONCLUSION THAT AGGRESSION PAID.

5. LAOS WAS BRIEF AND POISONOUS (TO THE US, AS WELL AS TO THE UK). LIBERIA WAS CONFUSED AND EVEN-HANDED. SHE GOT A LAUGH FOR SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS LIKE A MAN WITH TWO WIVES: PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD TO DECIDE WHETHER BRITAIN OR ARGENTINA WAS THE HEAD WIFE. SHE REGISTERED A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE IMPROPRIETY OF ILLUECA'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY.

6. DOUNTAS (GREECE) SAID THAT GREECE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE WHICH WAS BEING FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. ALL FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND A PROVISIONAL UN ADMINISTRATION INTRODUCED IN ORDER TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE. MILITARY INVASION SHOULD NEVER BE CONDONED. GREECE TOOK NO POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE. SCR 502 AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF 21 MAY PROVIDED A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SHOULD BE GIVEN A NEW MANDATE.

7. THE PRESIDENT, LING QING (CHINA), SPEAKING IN HIS NATIONAL CAPACITY, SAID THAT THE FAILURE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS AND THE ARRIVAL OF BRITISH FORCES HAD BROUGHT ABOUT AN ESCALATION WHICH CHINA DEEPLY DEPLORED. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS HAD HAD TO STOP BECAUSE OF THE GAP BETWEEN TWO PARTIES AND BECAUSE "THE PARTY WITH MILITARY STRENGTH HAD TAKEN A TOUGH STAND". THERE SHOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM WAS A LEGACY OF COLONIALISM, ON WHICH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE NAM HAD ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS. CHINA ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO SAFEGUARD THEIR SOVEREIGNTY THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE COUNCIL SHOULD RESPECT THE DECISIONS OF THE NAM AND THE TIAR CONSULTATIVE ORGAN AND SUPPORT ARGENTINA'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. BUT THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT WAS A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

FARSONS

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 241604Z MAY 82

FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 832 OF 24 MAY

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S/S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN.

MIPT: FLAKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502.

NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED.

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE SAME MEETING.

NOTING FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT THE EXTENT TO WHICH POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS.

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION.

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982.

3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION, AND, AS A FIRST STEP TO AGREE TO A COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF PRESENT HOSTILITIES FOR A PERIOD OF 72 HOURS.

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITHIN THAT PERIOD, TO ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO THE NEGOTIATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CONTINUING CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE PERIOD INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

PARSONS

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 241604Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 832 OF 24 MAY

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S/S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN.

MIPT: FLAKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502.

NOTING WITH THE DEEPEST CONCERN THAT THE SITUATION IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED.

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT ITS 2360TH MEETING ON 21 MAY 1982, AS WELL AS THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AT THE SAME MEETING.

NOTING FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT THE EXTENT TO WHICH POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED THROUGH HIS EFFORTS.

CONCERNED TO ACHIEVE AS A MATTER OF THE GREATEST URGENCY A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND AN END TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

1. EXPRESSES APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HAS ALREADY MADE TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), AND THEREBY TO RESTORE PEACE TO THE REGION.
2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, TO UNDERTAKE A RENEWED MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN HIS STATEMENT OF 21 MAY 1982.
3. URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION, AND, AS A FIRST STEP TO AGREE TO A COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF PRESENT HOSTILITIES FOR A PERIOD OF 72 HOURS.
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITHIN THAT PERIOD, TO ENTER INTO CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO THE NEGOTIATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CONTINUING CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE.
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE PERIOD INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 3.

PARSONS

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 241606Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 833 DATED 24 MAY 82

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, WASHINGTON, DUBLIN

MY 2 IPTS: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PANAMANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

NOTING WITH GREAT APPRECIATION THE EFFORTS BEING MADE BY THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL.

EMPHASIZING THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

1. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
TO CEASE ALL FIRING AND TERMINATE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY
IMMEDIATELY;
2. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO START IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE CEASE-FIRE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ALL OF ITS PARTS;
3. DECIDES THAT, IMMEDIATELY AND CONCURRENTLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE,
NEGOTIATIONS SHALL START BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED UNDER
THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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ZZ UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

CO PARIS

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 241626Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 835 DATED 24 MAY 82

AND TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN

MIPT: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

1. RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502 (1982) CONCERNING THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE FALKLAND ISLAND (ISLAS MALVINAS),

2. REGRETTING THAT RESOLUTION 502 HAS NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED,
3. GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE STALEMATE OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES TO THE PARTIES, AND THE SUBSEQUENT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE AREA,
4. REAFFIRMING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN PARTICULAR NON-USE OF FORCE AND SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS,
1. URGES ONCE AGAIN THAT RESOLUTION 502 BE IMPLEMENTED IN ITS ENTIRETY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
2. SUPPORTS ONCE AGAIN THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND REQUESTS HIM TO RENEW THE USE OF HIS GOOD OFFICES ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS AS REPORTED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE 2360TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND REALIZING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE,
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT REGULARLY TO THE COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

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00 BRASILIA

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DESKBY 250100Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250010Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 839 OF 24 MAY 1982

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SOFS PARTY)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRASILIA.

MY TELS NOS 831 TO 835 (NOT TO ALL); FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE LATEST ADDITION TO THE LIST OF RESOLUTION-DRAFTERS IS BRAZIL. THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY (24 MAY) SENT THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL A LONG LETTER (TEXT IN MIFT) WHICH INCLUDES AN EXPANDED VERSION OF THE PIECE OF PAPER MY BRAZILIAN COLLEAGUE SHOWED ME YESTERDAY (MY TELNO 828, PARA 3). YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS CONTAINS THE FAMILIAR INGREDIENTS OF AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, AND A UN ADMINISTRATION, WITH THE NEW IDEA OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE CHARTER TO CARRY OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE TOLD THE BRAZILIANS HERE THAT THE TIME FOR SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IS NOW PAST AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF OUR ALLOWING A RESOLUTION ON THESE LINES TO BE ADOPTED.

2. SEE MIFT.

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25 MAY 1972

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
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 840 OF 24 MAY

AND TO UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BRASILIA.

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.MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF 24 MAY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

BEGINS

EXCELLENCY,

EVER SINCE THE MALVINAS CRISIS BEGAN, BRASIL HAS ACCOMPANIED DEVELOPMENTS WITH PROFOUND INTEREST AND EVER-INCREASING PREOCCUPATION.

THIS CRISIS DEEPLY AFFECTS BRAZIL AND THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, AN AREA WHICH IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE FOR BRAZIL, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT INVOLVES TWO OF OUR TRADITIONAL FRIENDS, BOTH OF THEM COUNTRIES WE CARE DEEPLY ABOUT.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE UNTIRING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE TWO PARTIES AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THIRD PARTIES, TO SEEK FOR A PEACEFUL, JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT FOR THIS QUESTION. WE MAINTAINED FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTACTS, UP TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL, WITH THE COUNTRIES THAT, IN OUR OPINION, COULD MAKE THE MOST DIRECT CONTRIBUTION TO AN UNDERSTANDING. WE DECIDEDLY SUPPORTED THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ONCE THIS INITIATIVE HAD BEEN THWARTED, WE VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTED THE NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS WELL AS HIS PEACE PROPOSALS.

PRESIDENT JOAC BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA FIGUEIREDO MADE A PERSONAL APPEAL TO THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO REQUESTED THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES TO HELP IN ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE.

EVEN SACRIFICING THE DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT AND PRESSING BILATERAL QUESTIONS, PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO DEVOTED THE GREATER PART OF THE TIME HE SPENT CONVERSING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO THAT COUNTRY, EXPLORING AVENUES FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND THE SOLUTION OF THE MALVINAS QUESTION.

IN INTERNATIONAL FORA, IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF, AS WELL AS IN THE MEETING OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, BRAZIL, THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE CRISIS, HAS BEEN A VOICE FOR MODERATION, UNDERSTANDING AND PEACE.

NOW THAT ALL VOLUNTARY EFFORTS SEEM TO HAVE FAILED, NOW THAT HUNDREDS OF LIVES OF YOUNG ARGENTINES AND BRITISH SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN LOST, NOW THAT WE FACE THE PROSPECT OF THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LATIN AMERICA AND FOR THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BRAZIL BELIEVES THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN NO LONGER DELAY TAKING A FIRM AND DECISIVE ACTION TO RESTORE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

IN THE SAME SPIRIT THAT HAS GUIDED BRAZIL THROUGH-OUT THE CRISIS, AND SPEAKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY THAT HAS GIVEN PROOF OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ADHERENCE TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, I BELIEVE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE A DECISION TO PUT AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ESTABLISH

THE P...ES FOR A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BY THE PARTIES, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SUBMIT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH I FIRMLY BELIEVE CAN BE THE BASIS FOR A COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WILL ENSURE A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE, WITHOUT WINNERS OR LOSERS:

1. IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES;
2. SIMULTANECUS WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO CONTINENTAL ARGENTINE TERRITORY AND OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE NORTHEAST DIRECTION TO A DISTANCE EQUIVALENT TO THAT BETWEEN ARGENTINE CONTINENTAL TERRITORY AND THE MALVINAS ISLANDS:
 - A) THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH AND ARGENTINE FORCES SHOULD BE INITIATED 48 HOURS AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THE RESOLUTION;
 - B) ALL ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA WITHIN 21 DAYS, ONE-THIRD OF THE FORCES OF EACH PARTY BEING WITHDRAWN AT SEVEN-DAY INTERVALS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL;
3. APPOINTMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF A PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR THE ISLANDS, WITH EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE, WHICH WILL HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INHABITANTS, TO BE DESIGNATED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:
 - A) THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED SIMULTANECOUSLY WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE AND BRITISH FORCES;
 - B) ALL UNITED NATIONS MEMBER STATES WILL GRANT THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE SUPPORT REQUIRED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.
4. ESTABLISHMENT, UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, OF A COMMITTEE PRESIDED OVER BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND COMPOSED OF THE TWO PARTIES AND OF FOUR OTHER MEMBER STATES, TWO OF WHICH ARE TO BE APPOINTED BY EACH OF THE PARTIES, WITH THE MANDATE OF CONDUCTING URGENT NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION. THE COMMITTEE WILL BEGIN ITS WORK THE DAY FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCES FROM THE AREA AND WILL SUBMIT ITS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOT LATER THAN 31 JANUARY 1983.

BRAZIL IS CONVINCED THAT THESE ELEMENTS, AS A WHOLE, CONSTITUTE AN HONEST, JUST AND EQUITABLE BASIS FOR THE CESSATION OF THE SHEDDING OF BLOOD AND TRAGIC LOSS OF LIVES.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT FERVENTLY APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO, PLACING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND HUMANITY ABOVE ALL ELSE, DETERMINE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES FORTHWITH AND ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT LIKewise APPEALS TO ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SUPPORT, BY THEIR WORDS, BY THEIR ACTIONS AND BY THEIR VOTES, A SOLUTION ALONG THE LINES HERewith PRESENTED.

LET US RENEW OUR DEDICATION TO THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND DEMONSTRATE IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER THAT OUR WORDS WERE NOT EMPTY WORDS WHEN WE ALL PROMISED, AT THE MOMENT THIS ORGANIZATION WAS CREATED, THAT:

“WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DETERMINE TO SAVE SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR.....”

WITH HIGHEST CONSIDERATION,

RAMIRO SARAIVA GUERREIRO
MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE
FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL.

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OO UKREP BRUSSELS (DESKBY 250600Z)

OO PARIS (DESKBY 250600Z)

OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 250830Z)

OO TOKYO (DESKBY 250130Z)

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25 MAY 1982

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY UKREP BRUSSELS 250600Z

DESKBY PARIS 250600Z

DESKBY DUBLIN 250830Z

DESKBY TOKYO 250130Z

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250030Z MAY 82


TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 842 OF 24 MAY 1982

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SOFS'S PARTY).

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, DUBLIN, TOKYO.



MY TELS NOS 831 TO 835 AND 839 TO 840: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS.

1. THE IRISH TABLED THEIR RESOLUTION IN PROVISIONAL FORM AT 2230Z TODAY (24 MAY). THE TEXT IS AS IN MY TELNO 832, WITH MINOR STYLISTIC CHANGES. THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 1400Z TOMORROW (25 MAY).

2. DORR HAD CONSULTED THE NON-ALIGNED THIS AFTERNOON BUT HAD FAILED TO GET A CLEAR STEER FROM THEM (PANAMA WAS SIGNIFICANTLY NOT PRESENT). HE FELT HOWEVER THAT AS HIS TEXT HAD BEEN AROUND ALL DAY HE OUGHT TO TABLE IT FORMALLY. HIS INTENTION IS TO GET IT VOTED UPON BEFORE CLOSE OF PLAY TOMORROW (25 MAY). BUT HE

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RECOGNISED THAT THE SCENARIO MAY CHANGE IF THE NON-ALIGNED PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO HIS DRAFT OR IF THE PANAMANIAN OR THE JAPANESE PURSUE THEIR OWN DRAFTS: THEIR INTENTIONS ARE NOT AT PRESENT CLEAR. MY JAPANESE COLLEAGUE HAS TOLD SOME DELEGATIONS (BUT NOT ME) THAT IF THE IRISH DRAFT IS VETTED, HE MIGHT TABLE HIS OWN DRAFT AND SEEK A VOTE ON IT. THE NON-ALIGNED ARE MEETING THIS EVENING. SOME OF THEM WANT TO AVOID A VETO IF THEY POSSIBLY CAN AND THEY MAY COME UP WITH PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO DORR'S DRAFT. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE BRAZILIAN DRAFT WILL FLY.

3. THE SITUATION IS THUS CONFUSED. DORR MAY PRESS HIS DRAFT TO A VOTE TOMORROW AFTERNOON (25 MAY) (THOUGH THE TIMETABLE IS COMPLICATED BY THE NEVER-ENDING DEBATE ON THE MERCENARY ATTACK ON THE SEYCHELLES WHICH IS DUE TO RESUME AT 2000Z), ALTHOUGH HE MAY WELL LOSE HIS NERVE IF AMENDMENTS ARE FLYING AROUND. I HAVE LEFT DORR IN NO DOUBT THAT WE WILL HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST HIS DRAFT. WE HAVE TAKEN THE FRENCH MISSION THROUGH OUR OBJECTIONS TO IT AND URGED THEM TO RECOMMEND TO PARIS THAT THEY TOO SHOULD VOTE AGAINST. THEY HAVE NOT TOLD US WHAT DE NANTEUIL'S RECOMMENDATION WILL BE (THEY PROBABLY DO NOT KNOW) AND THEY ARE TRYING TO FIND OUT WHERE THE AMERICANS STAND.

4. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD URGENTLY FOLLOW-UP PREVIOUS LOBBYING OF THE FRENCH IN ORDER TO PERSUADE THEM TO JOIN US IN VOTING AGAINST.

5. I AM REPORTING IN MIFT (FCO, UKREP BRUSSELS, AND WASHINGTON ONLY) ON A CONVERSATION WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK THIS EVENING, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN WASHINGTON.

6. IF WE HAVE TO VETO THE IRISH DRAFT, I WOULD PROPOSE TO EXPLAIN OUR VOTE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES. FROM THE BEGINNING WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CEASEFIRE UNLESS THERE WAS CAST-IRON LINKAGE WITH AN IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. A CEASEFIRE WHICH LEFT THE ARGENTINES CONSOLIDATING THEIR POSITIONS ON THE ISLANDS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF ARGENTINE INTRANSIGENCE, WE HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO USE FORCE TO RE-POSSESS THE ISLANDS. THIS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE WHICH WOULD RELIEVE THE CURRENT MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ARGENTINES. WE HAD NEGOTIATED FOR SEVEN WEEKS, IN GOOD FAITH, ON VARIOUS PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD HAVE LINKED A CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIONS WITH ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. IN EVERY CASE THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY THE ARGENTINES.

WOULD CHANGE THE ARGENTINE POSITION. IN ANY CASE, IN THE MILITARY CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE AREA, A LIMITED SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE.

7. A MORE DIFFICULT DECISION WOULD FACE US IF NISIBORI WERE TO TABLE HIS DRAFT (MY TELNO 835) IMMEDIATELY AFTER WE HAD VETOED THE IRISH ONE. AS SEEN FROM HERE, THE ONLY SERIOUSLY OBJECTIONABLE FEATURE IN THE JAPANESE DRAFT IS THE PHRASE IN OPERATIVE PARA 2 "ON THE BASIS OF HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS" AS REPORTED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE 2360TH MEETING OF THE COUNCIL". THIS COULD BE HELD TO OBLIGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO START FROM WHERE HE WAS ON 20 MAY, IE TO REFLOAT PROPOSALS WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT THEN BUT WHICH HAVE BEEN OVERTAKEN BY OUR LANDINGS. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER ABSTAINING: OUR CHOICE SHOULD BE BETWEEN VOTING IN FAVOUR OR VETOING. A VETO OF SUCH A MILD RESOLUTION WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY HERE. I RECOMMEND THEREFORE THAT, IN THE CONTINGENCY DESCRIBED, I SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE JAPANESE DRAFT BUT MAKE A STRONG EXPLANATION OF VOTE. THIS WOULD BE ON THE LINES THAT, AS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD STATED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 20 MAY, OUR PROPOSALS OF 17 MAY WERE NO LONGER ON THE TABLE. OUR SUPPORT OF THE JAPANESE DRAFT SHOULD NOT THEREFORE BE INTERPRETED AS NECESSARILY IMPLYING READINESS ON OUR PART TO ACCEPT ANY (ANY) OF THE IDEAS WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BEFORE 20 MAY: BUT WE OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WOULD WISH TO BUILD ON WHAT COULD BE SALVAGED FROM HIS PREVIOUS EFFORTS: AND WE WERE ALWAYS READY TO LOOK AT FRESH IDEAS. MEANWHILE WE WOULD NOT FEEL IN ANY WAY INHIBITED FROM CONTINUING MILITARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER.

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
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25 MAY 1982



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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250110Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 844 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, TOKYO, DUBLIN.

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 842 AND 843: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS.

1. SINCE MY TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE WERE DRAFTED OTUNNU (UGANDA) AND I HAVE HAD TWO TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE NON ALIGNED MEMBERS (EXCLUDING PANAMA) WERE ANNOYED WITH DORR FOR GOING AHEAD AND TABLING A DRAFT WHICH HE AND EVERYONE ELSE KNEW THAT WE WOULD VETO. THE THREE AFRICANS, JORDAN AND GUYANA WERE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID A DEADLOCK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH COULD BE FOLLOWED BY A MAJOR ROW GENERATED BY THE LATIN AMERICANS IN AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THIS WOULD ONLY POLARISE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REGIONS, BENEFIT THE RADICALS AND DAMAGE ANY PROSPECT THERE MIGHT BE OF A PEACEFUL OUTCOME TO THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM. THEY HAD ACCORDINGLY WORKED OUT THE AMENDMENTS BELOW TO DORR'S DRAFT. IF, AS HE WAS AT PRESENT INSISTING, DORR WOULD NOT BE DRIVEN OFF, THEY MIGHT TABLE THESE AS AMENDMENTS IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THEIR BEING ACCEPTABLE TO US.

2. THE AMENDMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

SUBSTITUTE FOR OPERATIVE 3 THE FOLLOWING NEW LANGUAGE:

"URGES THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATE FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS MISSION WITH A VIEW TO ENDING THE PRESENT HOSTILITIES IN AND AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS)".

AMEND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 TO READ:

"REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO CONTACT IMMEDIATELY WITH THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO ENSURING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DESPATCH OF UN OBSERVERS TO MAINTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE CEASEFIRE".

DORR'S OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 WOULD ALSO BE AMENDED TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON HIS EFFORTS WITHIN A LIMITED PERIOD, SAY TWO OR THREE DAYS.

3. OTUNNU URGED ME TO PUT THESE AMENDMENTS TO YOU AND I AGREED TO DO SO. I SAID TO HIM, SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS SETTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK WHICH THE LATTER WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO UNDERTAKE. I HAD TOLD PEREZ DE CUELLAR AS RECENTLY AS THIS MORNING (24 MAY) THAT, FOR US, A CEASEFIRE COULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IF COMBINED WITH IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WAS A NON-STARTER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THIS POSITION WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA AND WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO CHALK UP A SECOND FAILURE. MEANWHILE, THE CONFLICT WOULD CONTINUE.

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4. OTUNNU TOOK MY POINT BUT ARGUED THAT A BRIEF TIME LIMIT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT MIGHT ENCOURAGE PEREZ DE CUELLAR TO HAVE ONE MORE GO: A FORMAL MANDATE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT GIVE HIM FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT; AND WE WOULD AT LEAST POSTPONE THE HORRORS OF AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

5. OTUNNU HAS SINCE TELEPHONED ME FOR A THIRD TIME TO SAY THAT PANAMA (RELUCTANTLY) AND THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS (INCLUDING COSTA MENDEZ) WOULD ACCEPT THE IRISH DRAFT WITH THESE AMENDMENTS. I DO NOT REGARD THIS AS EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH; THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY WANT TO GET OUT OF THE UN QUICKLY BECAUSE THEY ARE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE VOTES TO JACK UP AN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING A UK VETO AND/OR THAT THEY WANT THEIR HANDS FREE FOR THE RIO TREATY MEETING DUE TO START ON 27 MAY.

6. HOW SHOULD WE REACT TO THESE CLEVERLY DRAFTED AMENDMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE ARE GENUINELY INTENDED TO GET EVERYONE OUT OF THE PRESENT MESS IN THE COUNCIL WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY LOOMING AHEAD? TO BE THOROUGHLY CYNICAL, THEY WOULD NOT TIE OUR HANDS. IT IS IMPLICIT IN THE NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 THAT THE HOSTILITIES WOULD CONTINUE WHILE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION AND, IF HIS MISSION FAILED, THE QUESTION OF UN OBSERVERS WOULD NOT ARISE. ON THE OBVIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MISSION WOULD FAIL, WE WOULD OF COURSE BE BACK IN THE COUNCIL BY THE END OF THE WEEK.

7. IF WE DECIDED TO SUPPORT A DRAFT RESOLUTION SO AMENDED, I WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO MAKE AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE COVERING THE FOLLOWING POINTS. FIRST., I WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE 4TH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AS IN THE IRISH DRAFT (MY TELNO 832)

AND WITH THE LAST PHRASE IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2, ON THE LINES.
I PROPOSED FOR DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE DRAFT - PARAGRAPH 7
OF MY TELNO 842 I WOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT, WHILE THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL PURSUED HIS MISSION, WE WOULD BE IN NO WAY INHIBITED
FROM TAKING MILITARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF
THE CHARTER.

8. AS SEEN FROM THIS END, THIS WOULD BE A CLEVER WAY OF GETTING
OUT OF THE COUNCIL WITHOUT A VETO, AT LEAST FOR SOME DAYS. HOWEVER,
IF YOU WILL FORGIVE ME GOING BEYOND MY BRIEF, YOU MIGHT FEEL THAT
OUR SUPPORT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD REVIVE PRESSURE ON US
AT HOME TO SUSPEND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL A CHANCE (COSTA MENDEZ WOULD BE BOUND TO SAY
AFTER THE VOTE THAT ARGENTINA WOULD DO SO. I COULD OF COURSE
DEAL WITH THIS EASILY). OBVIOUSLY THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE
SINCE IT WOULD ONLY BENEFIT ARGENTINA.

9. TO SUM UP, I NOW NEED THE FOLLOWING LIST OF INSTRUCTIONS
FOR WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE A FAIRLY MESSY DAY:

- (I) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE IRISH DRAFT AS
IT STANDS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF
MY TELNO 842.
- (II) CONFIRMATION THAT I SHOULD VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN
DRAFT WITH AN APPROPRIATE EXPLANATION OF VOTE (OTUNNU TELLS
ME THAT THE PANAMANIAN - EVEN ILLUECA - HAVE DECIDED NOT
TO PURSUE THEIR DRAFT, BUT WE CAN NEVER EXCLUDE SUCH A
CONTINGENCY).
- (III) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE JAPANESE DRAFT.
- (IV) INSTRUCTIONS ON THE IRISH DRAFT, AS AMENDED BY THE NON
ALIGNED. IF YOU THINK THAT SUPPORT FOR THIS DRAFT WOULD
OFFER AN ACCEPTABLE WAY OUT OF OUR PROBLEMS HERE, AT LEAST
FOR A SHORT TIME, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I COULD HAVE
INSTRUCTIONS BY 1400Z 25 MAY, SO THAT I CAN MUDDY DORR'S WATERS
AT THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

PARSONS

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OO UKREP BRUSSELS (DESKBY 250600Z)

GRS 380

S E C R E T

DESKBY 250600Z (UKREP BRUSSELS)
FM UKMIS NEW YORK 250105Z MAY 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 843 OF 24 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR S OF S'S PARTY).
INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

MIPT: TALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS.

1. I HAVE SPOKEN TO MRS KIRKPATRICK WHO WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING A TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS. I TOLD HER THAT THE IRISH TEXT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND WE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST IT. THE CONCEPTS IN PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 WERE BOTH UNACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND UNWORKABLE IN PRACTICE.
2. I ALSO TOLD HER THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT IF IT CAME TO A VOTE. AGAIN IT CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE ETC WITH ABSOLUTELY NO GUARANTEE OF IMMEDIATE ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL.
3. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD NOT HEARD OF THE PANAMANIAN DRAFT AND SCARCELY SEEMED AWARE OF THE JAPANESE DRAFT EXCEPT (RIGHTLY) TO SAY THAT IT MEANT NOTHING AT ALL.

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4. SHE THEN SAID THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THAT OUR 'INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE' HAD TOLD US THAT SHE HAD OMITTED OR CHANGED CERTAIN SENTENCES IN THE STATEMENT WHICH SHE HAD DELIVERED ON 22 MAY AFTER RECEIVING A FINAL TEXT FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT. SHE COULD ASSURE ME THAT NO STATEMENT SHE HAD MADE IN THE UN SO FAR HAD GIVEN HER SUCH DIFFICULTY, AND THAT EVERY SINGLE LAST WORD THAT SHE SPOKE HAD BEEN PERSONALLY CLEARED WITH HAIG. 'SO YOU CAN TELL YOUR INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE THAT THEY GOT IT WRONG'.

5. SHE WENT ON TO SAY THAT SHE DID NOT LIKE THE ACCUSATIONS OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS WHICH WERE COMING FROM BRITISH SOURCES. HER STATEMENT HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IN REGARD TO WHO HAD BEEN IN THE WRONG, BUT THE US HAD TO DO SOMETHING TO PROTECT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA. THEY WERE AFTER ALL PART OF THE SAME HEMISPHERE.

6. MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD CLEARLY ANTICIPATED WHAT OUR ATTITUDE WOULD BE TO THE IRISH DRAFT AND WAS DEMONSTRABLY UNHAPPY. IF IT COMES TO THE VOTE AS IT STANDS, WE SHOULD PULL OUT EVERY STOP IN WASHINGTON TO ENSURE THAT THE AMERICANS STAY WITH US. BY THE SAME TOKEN (SEE MY IPT) I BELIEVE THAT WHATEVER THE AMERICANS DO WILL GREATLY INFLUENCE THE FRENCH. MRS KIRKPATRICK AND DE NANTEUIL WERE CLOSETED TOGETHER FOR A LONG TALK YESTERDAY AFTERNOON.

PARSONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241412Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2063 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS
BONN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO OSLO
OTTAWA CANBERRA WELLINGTON TOKYO ROUTINE STRASBOURG LISBON MADRID
UKMIS GENEVA

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION:

MEETING OF MINISTERS OF THE TEN, BRUSSELS 24 MAY 1982

FALKLANDS

SUMMARY

1. MINISTERS AGREED TO EXTEND THE IMPORT BAN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD UNTIL THE SITUATION SHOULD PERMIT ITS REMOVAL; THIS TO BE DONE ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE DECISION AT LUXEMBOURG ON 17 MAY. THE COMMISSION WILL NOW PUT A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO COREPER AND THE DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AS A 'A' POINT IN THE COUNCIL.

2. THE PRESIDENCY IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESS WILL CONFIRM THE TEN'S POSITION AS STATED AT LUXEMBOURG, AND IN PARTICULAR THEIR WISH TO SEE SCR 502 IMPLEMENTED AND THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS.

DETAIL

3. MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION WAS BRIEF AND THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT. FOR THE UK YOU RECALLED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 21 MAY AND THE DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY THE UK WHICH DEMONSTRATED HOW FAR THE UK HAD BEEN PREPARED TO GO IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS NOT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. WE WERE READY TO TALK AT ANY TIME. HOWEVER THE ARGENTINE POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED IN ANY IMPORTANT WAY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WITHOUT SOME SIGN OF CHANGE THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT. THE MILITARY POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. THE UK HAD USED MINIMUM FORCE IN ITS LANDINGS AND HAD SUFFERED LESS DAMAGE THAN EXPECTED.

8. BULLARD AND OTHERS SPEAKERS DREW ATTENTION TO THE UNDESIRABLE POLARISATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH SEEMED TO BE CREEPING INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. MACKERNAN (IRELAND) STRESSED THAT THE IRISH APPROACH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS TO TRY TO MOVE TOWARDS A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AS A BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE REAFFIRMATION OF SCR 502 A, DIRECT OR INDIRECT CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, A FORMAL MANDATE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND POSSIBLY TO REPORT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ALREADY ACHIEVED IN THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS.

IN REPLY BULLARD POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S TALKS HAD RESULTED IN AGREEMENT ONLY ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH COULD SET A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATION. THE MAIN POINTS OF SUBSTANCE WERE STILL FAR FROM SOLUTION WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD ADMITTED FAILURE. THE COST TO THE UK IN EFFORT AND LIVES OF THE MILITARY OPERATION COULD NOT BE IGNORED. IT WAS NOW DIFFICULT FOR EXAMPLE TO EXPECT THE UK TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE ISLANDS LEAVING ONLY A SMALL LIAISON OFFICE AS PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT MEETING AT UK REQUEST AND THE UK WAS NOT CONVINCED ITS ACTIVITIES COULD BE HELPFUL. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND BEEN ABLE HITHERTO TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SECURITY COUNCIL MANDATE.

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

FCO - PS, EMERGENCY ROOM, CROWE, YOUNG (ECD(E)), PS/PUS
PS/MR ONSLOW

BUTLER

NNNN

RR LISBON


RR MADRID

25 MAY 1982

RR TOKYO

RR UKDEL NATO

GRPS 450



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RESTRICTED

DESKBY 250730Z BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN
LUXEMBOURG ATHENS

DESKBY 250830Z F C O

FM UKREP BRUSSELS 241930Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2076 OF 24 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE ROME DUBLIN PARIS BONN
LUXEMBOURG ATHENS UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON PRIORITY OTTAWA
CANBERRA WELLINGTON OSLO ROUTINE LISBON MADRID TOKYO UKDEL NATO

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (FOREIGN AFFAIRS) 24 MAY:

FALKLANDS-EC IMPORT EMBARGO

SUMMARY

1. MINISTERS CONVERTED THEMSELVES INTO A COUNCIL TO APPROVE A REGULATION EXTENDING THE COMMUNITY'S IMPORT BAN FOR AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD, THUS GIVING FORCE TO THEIR DECISION IN PRINCIPLE THIS MORNING (MY TELEGRAM NO 2063). THE REGULATION WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 25 MAY.

DETAIL

2. COREPER MET THIS AFTERNOON TO CONSIDER TEXTS (SEE MIFT) OF DRAFT REGULATION AND ECSC DECISION PUT FORWARD BY THE COMMISSION.

3. DANES CIRCULATED REVISED STATEMENT (TEXT ALSO IN MIFT) SAYING THAT, SINCE THEIR NATIONAL MEASURES WOULD COME INTO FORCE TOMORROW, THEY WOULD NOT APPLY THE NEW REGULATION. ITALIANS AND IRISH CONFIRMED THAT THEIR POSITION, AS DESCRIBED IN THEIR STATEMENT OF

18 MAY REMAINED UNCHANGED

4. GERMANS RAISED QUESTION HOW COUNCIL DECISION WOULD BE RECORDED IN DUE COURSE. COUNCIL LEGAL SERVICES SAID THAT THE SAME PROCEDURE WOULD APPLY IN REVERSE I.E. A DECISION IN POCO FOLLOWED BY ACTION BY THE COUNCIL. NOTERDAEME (PRESIDENCY) ADDED THAT THE SENSE OF MINISTERS' DECISION EARLIER IN THE DAY HAD BEEN QUITE CLEAR: THE BAN WAS BEING EXTENDED FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD. THERE WAS NO POINT IN DISCUSSING THE MECHANICS OF TERMINATING IT.

5. THE COUNCIL SUBSEQUENTLY APPROVED THE REGULATION WITHOUT DISCUSSION.

6. PLEASE SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

FCO ADVANCE TO:-

FCO - BULLARD, GIFFORD, URE, HANNAY, CROWE, EMERGENCY UNIT

CAB - WADE-GERY, COLVIN, FULLER, HATFIELD

DOT - GRAY (DEP SEC)

BUTLER

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F.R.

SECRET

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GRS 564

SECRET

(126)

FM FCO 24L330Z MAY 82

TO FLASH UKREP BRUSSELS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 456 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM PUS

WASHINGTON TELNO 1869: HAIG'S VIEWS ON THE FALKLANDS

1. OD(SA) THIS MORNING THOUGHT THAT SIR N HENDERSON SHOULD SPEAK TO HAIG AGAIN TODAY. I RECOMMEND THAT HE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING.
2. IT IS DISCONCERTING THAT HAIG SHOULD BE SO VOLATILE. AS HENDERSON HAS POINTED OUT, HAIG WAS URGING US ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION. HENDERSON SHOULD DO ALL HE CAN TODAY AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO KEEP HAIG STEADY. HE MAY WISH TO TRY THE TECHNIQUE OF ASKING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS (SOME ARE SUGGESTED BELOW) SO AS TO ENCOURAGE HAIG TO FOCUS ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION RATHER THAN TO INDULGE IN RAPIDLY CHANGING GENERALITIES.
3. HENDERSON SHOULD POINT OUT TO HAIG THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH BRIDGEHEAD IN THE FALKLANDS IS BOUND TO HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON OUR DIPLOMATIC POSITION. PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD TOLERATE NOTHING LESS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID IN THE HOUSE ON 20 MAY THAT OUR DRAFT INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS WITHDRAWN. WE CANNOT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES CONSIDER THE IDEA OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLANDS OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. THE PARALLEL WITH OUR REPOSSESSION OF SOUTH GEORGIA, AFTER WHICH HAIG AGREED THAT THE DEPENDENCIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT, IS OBVIOUS. HENDERSON SHOULD ADD THAT WE HOPE THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK'S INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE AMENDED (PARA 2 OF WASHINGTON TELNO 1870), IN THE SENSE THAT SHE WOULD VETO ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT ALSO CALLING FOR ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCR 502, OR ANY RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL.
4. HENDERSON SHOULD CONTINUE THAT WE ARE DETERMINED

TO BRING ABOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WITH THE FEWEST POSSIBLE CASUALTIES, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT MADE CLEAR IN PARLIAMENT ON 20 MAY THAT WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502. THE ESSENTIAL HOWEVER IS THAT ARGENTINA DEMONSTRATE A REAL CHANGE OF POSITION, FOR INSTANCE BY INDICATING A WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW WITHIN A FIXED TIME LIMIT.

5. HENDERSON SHOULD ASK HAIG WHETHER HE SEES ANY SIGN THAT ARGENTINA'S WILL TO CONTINUE FIGHTING MAY FAIL AND WHETHER, IF THIS HAPPENED, ARGENTINA WOULD CHANGE HER POSITION REGARDING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

WHAT IS THE US EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES SAYING ON THESE POINTS?

6. HENDERSON COULD ALSO ASK HAIG ABOUT LIKELY EVENTS IN THE OAS AND WHETHER HAIG WOULD ATTEND ANY MEETING.

7. HENDERSON COULD POINT OUT THAT THE EC'S INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST ARGENTINA IS A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN'S POLICIES IN THIS CRISIS. THE ADMINISTRATION TOO CAN GIVE A HELPFUL LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION, AND INDEED TO DOMESTIC OPINION IN THE US, BY CONTINUING TO REITERATE THAT ARGENTINA BEGAN THIS CRISIS BY COMMITTING AGGRESSION, AND THEN REFUSED FOR SEVEN WEEKS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY: AND THAT BRITAIN IS NOW ENGAGED, AS A LAST RESORT, IN USING MILITARY MEANS TO END THE ARGENTINE OCCUPATION AND IS SUFFERING CASUALTIES IN THE PROCESS WHICH SHE WOULD FAR RATHER HAVE AVOIDED.

OUR MILITARY ACTION IS IN NO WAY A REASON FOR THE US CLIMBING BACK ON THE FENCE. WE GREATLY HOPE THAT HAIG WILL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS IN THIS SENSE.

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SECRET

(17)

FM WASHINGTON 242053Z MAY 82
TO IMMEDIATE F C D
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1878 OF 24 MAY
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 456 TO BRUSSELS; FALKLANDS

1. I SAW HAIG TODAY AND SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH ATTITUDE WAS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE: BUT NEVERTHELESS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS PRESUMPTUOUS OF HIM TO DO SO, HE FELT OBLIGED TO POINT OUT THAT THERE WERE LONG TERM ISSUES AT STAKE THAT MIGHT WELL BE JEOPARDISED IF A BREADTH OF VISION WERE NOT SHOWN AT THIS STAGE.
2. HE HIMSELF WAS CONVINCED THAT WE WOULD SUCCEED QUITE QUICKLY IN DEFEATING THE ARGENTINIAN GARRISON ON THE ISLANDS: BUT HE WAS ALSO CERTAIN THAT THIS WOULD NOT END THE PROBLEM. ON THE CONTRARY IT WOULD CREATE ANOTHER ONE THAT COULD GET US INTO INCREASING DIFFICULTIES UNLESS AN EFFORT WAS MADE NOW TO FORESTALL IT.
3. HAIG SPOKE OF THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS THAT WERE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE CORRIDORS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ONE OF THESE INVOLVED A CEASEFIRE AND RENEWAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S MANDATE WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN VETOING THAT BUT THERE WERE OTHER RESOLUTIONS THAT INCLUDED WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS A CEASEFIRE AND THAT ALSO PROPOSED, IN ONE RESOLUTION, AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION BY THE UN AND IN ANOTHER RESOLUTION THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTACT GROUP OF FOUR NATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE CHARTER. THESE, HAIG THOUGHT, WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE BUT HAIG SAID HIS MAIN PROBLEM WAS THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE RIO TREATY. THE ARGENTINIANS WERE CALLING THIS FOR NEXT THURSDAY UNLESS BY TOMORROW THERE HAD BEEN A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. HAIG'S CONCERN ABOUT THE RIO TREATY ORGANISATION WAS THAT THE USA MIGHT BECOME COMPLETELY ISOLATED IF IT OPPOSED THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION THAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE PUT DOWN. THE ONLY SUPPORT THEY MIGHT GET WOULD BE FROM GUYANA AND TRINIDAD. THIS ACTIVITY IN THE OAS WOULD REFLECT THE MOVEMENT, ABOUT WHICH HAIG SPOKE WITH GREAT CONCERN, OF LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY DEDICATED TO SUPPORTING ARGENTINA IN PREPARING FOR A WAR OF REVENGE AND OPENING THE WAY TO INCREASED SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

5. HAIG SAID THAT COSTA MENDEZ, WHOSE TREACHERY KNEW NO BOUNDS, WAS ADVOCATING THE ADOPTION BY BA OF A POLICY OF REBUILDING ARGENTINE MILITARY CAPABILITY WITH THE HELP OF THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS.

6. HAIG SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT, BY COMING DOWN ON THE BRITISH SIDE, HAD ALREADY GREATLY JEOPARDISED US INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. WHAT WAS AT STAKE IN THE FUTURE WAS ENORMOUS. IT WAS NOT SIMPLY A QUESTION OF THE ECONOMIC SACRIFICES INVOLVED BUT OF THE ENORMOUS INCREASE IN SOVIET AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.

7. I INTERJECTED THAT HAIG HAD TOLD ME SEVERAL TIMES THAT GALTIERI HAD ALWAYS PROMISED HIM THAT HE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE SOVIET OPTION. TO WHICH HAIG SAID THAT THINGS HAD MOVED ON FROM THERE. ARGENTINIANS WERE NOW DESPARATE AND WOULD BECOME MORE SO AND WOULD STOP AT NOTHING IN THE PURSUIT OF REVENGE.

8. HAIG'S PROBLEM THEREFORE WAS SOMEHOW TO AVOID A RESOLUTION UNDER THE RIO TREATY LATER THIS WEEK THAT WOULD ISOLATE THE USA STILL FURTHER FROM THE REST OF THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CLUE LAY IN CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH BRAZIL. HE IMPLIED THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USA TO MAINTAIN A TOUGH STANCE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF, BUT ONLY IF, THE USA COULD BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVE IN TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE FALKLAND'S ISSUE ELSEWHERE. THE SAME APPLIED IN THE OAS. HAIG DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY GOOD COULD COME OF SOLUTIONS SUGGESTED EITHER BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE OAS, BUT THAT THIS DID NOT PRECLUDE GREAT DAMAGE TO THE USA IN BOTH ORGANISATIONS UNLESS THEY WERE SEEN TO BE PURSUING SOME ACTIVE LINE OF DIPLOMACY. HENCE HIS IDEA OF TRYING TO GET TOGETHER WITH BRAZIL TO FLOAT NEW IDEAS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

9. HAIG THEN SUGGESTED THE SORT OF PLAN WHICH I HAVE ALREADY
MENTIONED TO YOU MIGHT BE IN HIS MIND (WASHINGTON TELNO 1073) CEASEFIRE
AND WITHDRAWAL, US/BRAZILIAN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION AND DISCUSSIONS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE REGARDING THE FUTURE - IDEAS THAT I TOLD HAIG
HAVE GONE DOWN IN LONDON LIKE A LEAD BALLOON.

10. HAIG REPEATED HIS VIEW ABOUT THE NEED TO KEEP THE BRAZILIANS
IN PLAY. IF THIS DID NOT HAPPEN THE OAS WOULD GET OUT OF CONTROL
AND THIS WOULD SPELL THE END OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR
WHICH THE USA WOULD BE BLAMED. AGAIN HE DILATED UPON THE GREAT
DANGERS OF INCREASED SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE.
IT WOULD BE A DISASTER IF THE OUTCOME OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS WAS
AN INTENSIFICATION OF COMMUNISM AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE
AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. HE QUITE REALISED THE DIFFICULTY FOR US IN
CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL AT THIS STAGE. NEVERTHELESS HE BELIEVED
THAT WE COULD NOT CONTEMPLATE REMAINING ON THE ISLANDS IN GREAT
FORCE INDEFINITELY. IN THE LONG RUN THE ONLY SECURITY FOR THE
ISLANDS WAS SOME AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE USA HAD PARTICIPATED.
IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, HAIG SAID, TO GET A US GUARANTEE FOR A
RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

11. I REMINDED HAIG HOW OFTEN HE HAD ASSURED ME THAT THIS WOULD
NOT BE ANOTHER SUEZ. IF THE US GOVERNMENT NOW TOOK ACTION WHICH
COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF TRYING TO BRING OUR FORCES TO A HALT
BEFORE THEIR MISSION WAS ACCOMPLISHED, THE CHARGE OF ANOTHER SUEZ
COULD BE RAISED. FURTHERMORE CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICES HAD ALREADY
BEEN MADE BY GREAT BRITAIN; THESE MUST NOT BE RENDERED VAIN BY
PREMATURE TERMINATION OF THE TASK. I TOLD HAIG THAT WE NATURALLY
RECOGNISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE USA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN
AMERICAN NEIGHBOURS. NEVERTHELESS HE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE
POSSIBLE RISK TO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE UK AND WESTERN
EUROPE GENERALLY. I MENTIONED THE COMMUNITY'S EXTENSION OF ECONOMIC
MEASURES.

12. HAIG SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED ALL THIS. THAT WAS WHY HE DID NOT
WANT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR BRITAIN;
INDEED HE WANTED TO ACT NOW IN CONCERT WITH BRITAIN. HE WOULD LIKE
TO THINK THAT A JOINT APPEAL BY THE US AND BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENTS
TO BOTH SIDES COULD BE DEvised IN ADVANCE SO AS TO MAKE IT
ACCEPTABLE TO BRITAIN. I REPEATED THAT IF HE WAS THINKING OF AN
APPEAL FOR WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH SIDES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN

INTERIM ADMINISTRATION THIS AS IS IT NOT UN. SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 502 DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINIANS FROM THE
BRITISH. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE OUR TERRITORY. HOW WOULD IT BE
IF THE CUBANS OCCUPIED PUERTO RICO AND WE THEN SAID THAT AS PART
OF ANY SETTLEMENT THE AMERICANS MUST WITHDRAW AS WELL AS THE CUBANS.
RESOLUTION 502 WAS THE SHEET-ANCHOR.

13. HAIG ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTIES FOR US BUT INSISTED UPON
THE NEED TO HAVE THE LONG-TERM IN MIND IN DECIDING ABOUT THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM - BY WHICH I THINK HE
MEANT EXERCISING PRESSURE ON US - WOULD HAVE TO BE FACED BY THE
USA AT SOME STAGE SO PERHAPS IT WAS BETTER TO DO SO NOW. HE WOULD
GIVE THE MATTER FURTHER THOUGHT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR CONVERSATION
AND EITHER TRY TO SPEAK TO YOU ON THE SECRET TELEPHONE OR SEND
YOU A MESSAGE.

14. I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF FEELING IN
LONDON AND THE CONVICTION THAT WE WERE NOW OPERATING ON A
DIFFERENT BASIS FROM THAT OF THE EARLY STAGES OF HIS NEGOTIATIONS.
HAIG SAID THAT HE RECOGNISED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE NOT
LIKELY TO GET NOW THE TERMS THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE GOT HAD THEY
BEEN MORE FAR-SIGHTED IN EARLY APRIL.

15. TO SUM UP: WHAT REALLY WORRIES HAIG AT THE MOMENT IS THE
PROSPECT OF A SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN THE US GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS
WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CHANCES THIS MAY OFFER THE SOVIETS TO
INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. THIS WOULD
BE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION SET AS THEIR
FIRST PRIORITY AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION. THE US GOVERNMENT
THEREFORE MUST TAKE SOME INITIATIVE NOW WHICH, EVEN IF IT DOES NOT
BRING ABOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS PROBLEM, WILL AT
LEAST LIMIT THE DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE TO US INTERESTS BY
ACCUSATIONS OF BEING PRO-BRITISH AND NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE LATIN
AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.

HENDERSON

NNNN

WONFO 006/25

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GR

S E C R E T

FM WASHINGTON 242328Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1881 OF 24 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (~~FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY~~)

UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1878 ; FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME AGAIN EVIDENTLY IN AN EASIER FRAME OF MIND. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN REFLECTING ON OUR CONVERSATION AND HAD ALSO HAD A CHAT WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE LATTER, HE ASSURED ME, WAS QUOTE VERY SOLID, MORE SO THAN THOSE AROUND HIM. THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH HIM. UNQUOTE HOWEVER HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO BE CAUGHT UNAWARES AT THE KEY MOMENT. HE SAW A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AT THE MOMENT WHICH HE THOUGHT SOMEONE SHOULD FILL BECAUSE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE A VACUUM TAKEN OVER BY THE FORCES OF EVIL. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR LONDON TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

2. HE INTERJECTED THAT HE HAD SENT AN EXTREMELY TOUGH MESSAGE TO HAVANA TO WARN THEM OFF FROM ANY QUOTE BARKY PANKY UNQUOTE AND A MORE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE TO THE OTHER PARTY (BY WHICH I PRESUME HE MEANT THE SOVIET UNION).

3. HE WAS NOW PROPOSING TO SEND YOU A PERSONAL MESSAGE THIS EVENING, BUT HE WOULD NOT BE PUTTING ANYTHING FORWARD THAT WOULD BE DISTURBING TO YOU. HIS AIM WAS TO HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT FOR A POSITIVE MOVE AND TO KEEP BRAZIL FROM BEING DISTRACTED TO THE WRONG SIDE.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT MY REPORTS OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM TODAY AND SATURDAY WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN DISTURBING TO LONDON. HE SAID THAT WE HAD BEEN TALKING VERY FRANKLY AND HE WOULD BE MORE SUBTLE IN THE MESSAGE HE SENT YOU.

5. HAVING JUST SEEN ZABLOCKI, CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, I TOLD HAIG THAT HE HAD INDICATED NO SENSE OF DISQUIET ON THE HILL ABOUT BRITISH ACTIVITIES AND THE US GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THEM. ZABLOCKI HAD ADMITTED THAT AMERICA MIGHT NOT DO WELL OUT OF THE WHOLE BUSINESS BUT US OPINION WAS STRONGLY BEHIND BRITAIN. HAD WE NOT TAKEN THE ACTION WE HAVE DONE THIS WOULD HAVE SET A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FROM WHICH EVERY COUNTRY MIGHT SUFFER. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT THIS HAD BEEN ZABLOCKI'S ATTITUDE. HE DID NOT REPEAT TO ME THE WARNINGS HE HAD GIVEN ME ON SATURDAY ABOUT MURMURINGS ON THE HILL.

HENDERSON

NNNN

24 MAY 1982

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
CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 241916Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1877 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK OAS POSTS





FALKLANDS: RIO TREATY

1. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL SUBMIT A FORMAL NOTE LATER TODAY CALLING FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE RIO TREATY SIGNATORIES TO RECONVENE IN WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY 27 MAY TO CONSIDER FURTHER ACTION.

HENDERSON

NNNN

25 MAY 1982



14

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BOGOTA 242130Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 124 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE LIMA, CARACAS, QUITO, LA PAZ, UKMIS NEW YORK

YOUR TEL 106: FALKLANDS/ANDEAN PACT

1. PRESIDENT GRANTED ME SHORT INTERVIEW IN ANTEROOM AFTER CEREMONY.

I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. IN RESPONSE HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) HE LOOKED FORWARD TO RECEIVING REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER. PRESIDENT GALTIERI HAD RESPONDED ALREADY (SEE MIFT).

B) HE HOPED THAT ARMED CONFLICT COULD BE SETTLED QUICKLY WITH MINIMUM FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.

C) ANDEAN PACT MEETING IS TO BE POSTPONED AS ACTION HAS NOW MOVED TO UN. CONSULTATIONS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ARE TAKING PLACE TODAY ON TIME/VENUE OF THE POSTPONED MEETING. (LIMA NOW SEEMS FAVOURITE BUT NO DATE FIXED. BUENOS AIRES HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BUT NOT ACCEPTABLE. PRESIDENT MADE THE POINT THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT MEMBER OF PACT.)

2. PRESIDENT ENDED BY SAYING HE UNDERSTOOD PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY WOULD BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH ME AND ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM AS SOON AS IT IS RECEIVED.

FCO PLSE PASS INFO ADDRESSEES

MACDONALD

NNNN

25 MAY 82

GPS 100



UNCLASSIFIED

FM BCGOTA 242210Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 125 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE LIMA, CARACAS, QUITO, LA PAZ, UKMIS NEW YORK

FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF PRESIDENT GALTIERI'S
REPLY TO PRESIDENT TURBAY'S MESSAGE.

BUENOS AIRES 21 MAY 1982

MR PRESIDENT,

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY. I VALUE AND APPRECIATE EVERY EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OF THE FALKLAND, SOUTH GEORGIA AND SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS.

OUR GOVERNMENT HAS EMPLOYED ITS MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO HELP THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. WE HAVE SHOWN THAT WE ARE FLEXIBLE AND REASONABLE. WE HAVE ABSTAINED FROM USING FORCE AND WE HAVE ONLY DONE SO IN REPLY TO GREAT BRITAIN'S MILITARY AGGRESSION.

WE ARE WITNESSING TODAY A NEW AND SERIOUS PHASE OF THIS ARMED AGGRESSION. THE INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN WHICH, TO RESTORE A COLONIAL, ANACHRONISTIC AND ILLEGAL SITUATION, RESORTS TO VIOLENT MEANS, SHOWS ITSELF ONCE AGAIN AS AN IMMOVABLE OBSTACLE TO ALL DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS.

IT REMAINS TO NEGOTIATE AND ATTACK AT THE SAME TIME, THUS
CREATING A SERIOUS RISK FOR WORLD PEACE. IN THE FACE OF THIS
PICTURE OF AGGRESSION AND INTRANSIGENCE WE ARE COMFORTED BY
REGIONAL SOLIDARITY EXPRESSED IN CONCRETE STEPS TAKEN BY A LATIN
AMERICA WHICH HAS TAKEN THIS ARGENTINE CAUSE AS HER OWN.

OUR REGION, MR PRESIDENT, WILL BE STRENGTHENED BY THIS
SITUATION AND ENRICHED IN ITS FIRM WILL TO DEFEND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM WHICH HAVE ALWAYS CHARACTERIZED IT. THE
REJECTION OF COLONIALISM, AS THE 1948 BOGOTA DECLARATION MAINTAINED,
WILL IDENTIFY OUR AMERICA WITH HER MOST CHERISHED IDEALS, WITH
HER RAISON D'ETRE. EVEN TODAY WHEN OUR MOTHER COUNTRY IS ATTACKED,
WE CONTINUE TO PAY ATTENTION TO ALL INITIATIVES WHICH CONTRIBUTE
TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. THAT IS WHY THE EFFORTS
MADE BY FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WILL FIND IN US THE GREATEST COMPREHEN-
SION AND WILL TO NEGOTIATE.

CORDIALLY,

LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO GALTIERE

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA


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25 MAY 1982

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM BOGOTA 242220Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 126 OF 24 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE LIMA, CARACAS, QUITO, LA PAZ, UKMIS NEW YORK

1. MIPT.
2. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT LETTER DOES NOT CONTAIN SPECIFIC THANKS FOR TURBAY'S MESSAGE OR EFFORTS AND REFERENCE TO REGIONAL SOLIDARITY (PARA 4) IS UNLIKELY TO BE WELCOME TO COLOMBIA. THE TONE IS PATRONISING AND WILL NOT BRING COLOMBIANS OVER TO ARGENTINE SIDE.
3. I RECOMMEND THAT OUR REPLY SHOULD OPEN BY WARMLY THANKING TURBAY FOR OFFER OF COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S ASSISTANCE BEFORE INDICATING OUR POSITION.

FCO PLSE PASS INFCR ADDRESSEES

MACDONALD

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ALL OK???

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
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
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GRS 250A

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM MONTEVIDEO 242250Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 372 OF 24 MAY 1982.


25 MAY 1982



YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 281; CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER.

1. ACTION TAKEN THIS EVENING AND I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. THE FOREIGN MINISTER LISTENED CAREFULLY AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF THESE EARLY COMMENTS ON HIS REMARKS TO ME YESTERDAY EVENING. HE REPEATED SOME OF THE POINTS IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 360 WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONS:
HE SAW HIS FUNCTIONS AT THE RIO TREATY COMMITTEE MEETING ESSENTIALLY AS THAT OF A LISTENER. WHILE HE DID NOT WISH TO MEDIATE, ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM WHATEVER SOURCE WOULD BE HELPFUL. TIME WAS FAST RUNNING OUT FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A CEASEFIRE. THERE WAS ONLY ONE LAST CHANCE. IF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS THEY COULD BE CONVEYED EITHER THROUGH THE AMERICANS OR THROUGH ME HERE. HE WAS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE. THE UNITED STATES HAD ENOUGH INFLUENCE WITH BOTH SIDES TO SECURE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY SURPRISED BY THE ARGENTINE INVASION OF 3 APRIL. (THIS I FEAR IS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE). ON THE OTHER HAND HE FELT THAT WE HAD OVER-REACTED. IT WAS TRAGIC THAT TWO COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE FREE WORLD SHOULD BE FIGHTING EACH OTHER.

3. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REMARK THAT I HAD NOTICED HIS RATHER STRONG STATEMENT TO THE PRESS LAST NIGHT CONDEMNING OUR INVASION OF THE ISLANDS. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK IT ALL THAT STRONG BUT THAT I MUST UNDERSTAND THAT URUGUAYSS POLICY HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FAST MOVING EVENTS.

4. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING ON THE TELEPHONE THIS AFTERNOON TO THE ARGENTINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAD ASSURED HIM OF ARGENTINAS DESIRE FOR A CEASE FIRE.

HUTCHINSON

NNNN

SENT AT 24/2310Z TWV

ERK.
24 MAY 1982 (188)

MOFO 010/24

PP FCO

CRS 100A



UNCLASSIFIED
FROM MONTEVIDEO 242022Z MAY 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 366 OF 24 MAY 1982.

FALKLAND ISLANDS: URUGUAYAN ATTITUDE.

IN A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS LAST NIGHT (23 MAY) THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONDEMNED THE BRITISH ATTACK ON ARGENTINA : CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND ATTACKED THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS SUPPORT FOR COLONIALIST POLICIES OF CONFRONTATION. IN HIS STATEMENT OTERO CLAIMED OUR JUSTIFICATION FOR ACTION AGAINST ARGENTINA HAD NO RELATION TO THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE URUGUAYAN PEOPLE ARE EXTREMELY SENSATIVE TO ANY CONFLICTS WITH ARGENTINA - A COUNTRY WITH WHICH URUGUAY HAS CLOSE HISTORICAL LINKS OF TRUE BROTHERHOOD.

HUTCHINSON

NNNR
SENT AT 24/1928Z TWW

RESTRICTED

FROM TEL AVIV 741400Z MAY 72

TO PRIORITY FOO
TELNO 193 OF 24 MAY 1972

FALKLAND ISLANDS

THE CABINET AT ITS WEEKLY MEETING YESTERDAY (23 MAY) ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS:

QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN IN CONNECTION WITH THE HOSTILITIES AT SEA, IN THE AIR AND ON LAND IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS) AND THE TRAGIC CASUALTIES CAUSED BY THEM. ISRAEL APPEALS TO THE PARTIES TO CEASE FIRE AND TO MAKE AN EFFORT IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS THE SOLUTION OF THIS BLOODY CONFLICT WHICH ENDANGERS WORLD PEACE UNQUOTE.

2. THE STATEMENT IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY. PRESS GUIDANCE SUGGESTS THAT IT WAS DELIBERATELY MEANT TO ECHO WESTERN STATEMENTS AT TIMES OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. THE LABOUR NEWSPAPER DAVAR REPORTS THAT BEGIN HAD TO OVERCOME RESERVATIONS FROM A NUMBER OF MINISTERS, BUT HE ARGUED THAT IF THE BRITISH COULD GIVE ISRAEL ADVICE ON HOW TO BEHAVE ON HER NORTHERN BORDER, ISRAEL HAD THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE FALKLANDS SITUATION.

4. ACCORDING TO DAVAR, BEGIN HOPED THAT THE CABINET STATEMENT WOULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON HYPOCRISY TOWARDS ISRAEL. HE IS QUOTED AS SAYING "A WAR IS GOING ON, PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED, BUT THERE ARE NO PIOUS RESOLUTIONS, NO VENICE MEETING AND NO US PLANS. WHEN A SINGLE SMOKE BOMB IS THROWN IN ISRAEL THERE ARE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, WARNINGS, HEADLINES AND DEMANDS TO JERUSALEM." THE PRIME MINISTER IS ALSO SAID TO HAVE NOTED THAT THE BRITISH HAD PROTESTED ABOUT ISRAELI ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA WHILE OTHER NATIONS HAD SOLD A GREAT DEAL MORE.

UNREPLY

BBC 'PANORAMA': 24 MAY: MAIN POINTS

1. The Argentine Foreign Minister was interviewed in ^{New} York. He made the following points of interest:

- (a) He said that Argentina would defend the Falklands as long as there is 'one Argentine alive in either the continent or in the Islands'. He did not believe that the British troops were consolidating their position.
- (b) Sr Costa Mendez stated that he was still looking for a peaceful solution - they had been seeking one for 17 years in the UN. He went on to state that he considered the invasion to be part of that search for a peaceful settlement.
- (c) Argentina had fully accepted Resolution 502 from the beginning. They had not withdrawn because the UK sent 40 warships.
- (d) Resolution 502 had to be seen as three linked points: negotiation; withdrawal and end of hostilities. It was the UK which had begun hostilities (502 does not 'authorise the UK to impose a solution on Argentina). Withdrawal means that both parties should withdraw and negotiations should begin as withdrawal takes place and hostilities end.
- (e) 'Real good will' will resolve all problems. UK and Argentina had been friends for a long time and it was absurd that they should be now engaged in warfare.
- (f) Costa Mendez expressed faith in the UN. He said that Argentina will 'accept every right that the Islanders would like to have'.
- (g) Argentina was ready to make any concession except sovereignty. This was not, however, a pre-condition.

TEXT OF IRISH DRAFT RESOLUTION, AS AMENDED BY NON ALIGNED MEMBERS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 502.

Noting with the deepest concern that the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas has seriously deteriorated.

Having heard the statement made by the Secretary General to the Security Council at its 2360th meeting on 21 May 1982, as well as the statements of the representatives of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the same meeting.

Noting from the Secretary General's statement the extent to which points of agreement between the parties had already been established through his efforts.

Concerned to achieve as a matter of the greatest urgency a cessation of hostilities and an end to the present conflict between the armed forces of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

1. Expresses appreciation to the Secretary General for the efforts which he has already made to bring about an agreement between the parties, to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 502 (1982), and thereby to restore peace to the region.
2. Requests the Secretary-General, on the basis of the present resolution, to undertake a renewed mission of good offices ~~consistent~~ ^{in accordance with} with Security Council Resolution 502, and in accordance with the approach outlined in his statement of 21 May 1982.
3. Urges the parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in his mission with a view to ending the present hostilities in and around the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).
4. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into contact immediately with the parties with a view to ensuring mutually acceptable terms for a cease-fire, including

if necessary, arrangements for the despatch of UN observers to maintain compliance with the terms of the cease-fire.

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council within [two or three days?]

SECRET

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP: 0700 HOURS, 25 MAY

UN

(a) Security Council

1. The debate continued. Speakers were mainly from Africa. The Kenyan intervention was praised by Sir A Parsons. The Council will meet again at 1430Z today.

(b) Resolutions

2. A rash of draft resolutions has emerged. Ireland has formally tabled its text which is unacceptable. Panama has proposed draft language equally unacceptable, whilst the Brazilians have circulated a letter to the President of the Security Council which builds upon their President's 'initiative'.

3. However, two drafts have surfaced which the Ambassador considers may offer possibilities of avoiding a veto. The Japanese have produced a resolution to be tabled in the event of the Irish Resolution being vetoed and the NAM delegations (excluding Panama) led by Uganda have produced an amended version of the Irish draft. The Ambassador requires instructions on these before the informal meeting of the Council at 1400Z today.

EC Measures

4. Using the Luxembourg formula, Ministers of the Ten agreed to extend the import ban for an unspecified period.

US Attitudes

5. On instructions, Sir N Henderson talked at length to Mr Haig. The latter remained concerned at the serious deterioration in US relations with Latin America and the opportunities this would present to the Russians. However, in a later conversation, Haig appeared to be in 'an easier frame of mind'. He will be sending a personal message to the Secretary of State.

Military Action

6. The MOD confirmed the loss of HMS Antelope, which had been damaged in an air attack on 23 May. On 24 May there were a number of air attacks against the Task Force. Some damage may have been sustained by our ships. Seven Argentine aircraft were shot down and one seriously damaged.

OAS

7. Foreign Ministers of the Rio Treaty signatories will meet in Washington on Thursday 27 May.

25 May 1982

Emergency Unit

SECRET

PART 19 ends:-

24-5-82

PART 20 begins:-

25-5-82.

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