PREM 19/504
Meetings with the Taoiseach
Mr. Haughey
Anlo - Irish Joint Committee

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P1's Programme - briefing for Anglo India Summit on 8.12.80 in separate folder.
ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT 8 DECEMBER 1980

List of Briefs

1. STEERING BRIEF

2. NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICAL SITUATION

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12. OTHER COMMUNITY ISSUES: EMS

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\[ \text{Mote Set on} \]
\[\text{briefs, PMVF(80)1-13, held in CAB 133/507. This set destroyed.}\]

E. Power
29 May 2011
Need to control violence

Cross border cooperation

Sudanese - Nobi de K-Nobi
- [unreadable]
AGENDA

Bilateral: Northern Ireland: Political/Economic/Security Energy Voting rights for British citizens in Republic

Community: C.A.P. Budget Fisheries E.M.S.

International: Poland Iran/Iraq Afghanistan East/West relations Middle East South Africa Namibia Security Council Structures for European political cooperation
PART 3 ends:

Dublin Tea 60 5.3.87

PART 4 begins:

N. Waterfall to Dr. Paisley
11/3
The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Signed [Signature]  
Date 10 May 2011

PREM Records Team
CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 0511644 Z MARCH 1981
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 60 OF 5 MARCH 1981

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 35: POSTPONEMENT OF JOINT STUDIES

1. I SAW THE TAOISEACH EARLY THIS AFTERNOON AND SPOKE IN THE SENSE OF PARAS 2 AND 3. HE FULLY AGREED AND WAS GRATEFUL. HE DID NOT MIND THAT AN ADVANCE TEXT WOULD NOT BE READY UNTIL LATER.

FIGG
RID
MR FERGUSSON

COPY TO:
SIR R. ARMSTRONG
MR. WADE BERRY
SIR K. STOWE, N.I.O.
MR. ALEXANDER, NO.10 DOWNING STREET

CONFIDENTIAL
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of 2 March to me on this subject. She would prefer that the two Study Group meetings planned for 6 March should be postponed until the following week. She sees no need to interfere with the meetings due to be held on 10–11 March.

As regards informing Mr. Haughey, she feels this should be done early in the afternoon of Thursday 5 March. She believes that Mr. Haughey will understand the reasons for the postponement.

M. O’D. B. ALEXANDER

3 March 1981
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 February 1981

As your Department is now involved in the joint studies with the Irish, you will find it helpful to have the enclosed extract from the record of the Prime Minister's discussion with the Taoiseach in Dublin on 8 December 1980.

This record was given a very limited distribution, and I should be grateful if you could ensure that it is handled on a strict need to know basis within your Department.

I am sending a copy of this letter, without enclosure, to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. Pattison

J. D. West, Esq.,
Department of Energy.
At the suggestion of the Irish, it was agreed in mid-February that the first two meetings of Joint Study Groups (one on structures and one on security) should take place in Dublin on 6th March. Although none of the Irish and most of the British participants do not know it, this turns out to be the day the Prime Minister will be visiting Northern Ireland. We have considered the Northern Ireland Office whether this coincidence matters and whether there is anything we should do about it.

2. It was announced a month ago that the studies had "just started" and were taking place in London and Dublin (Hansard 3rd February, col. 142). At that stage only the supervisory steering group had in fact met (in London on 30th January). After the first two Study Groups meet on 6th March the other three Study Groups are to have their first meetings on 10th-11th March, also in Dublin. Neither side will be publicly revealing the precise timetable for these meetings. Experience so far suggests that they are unlikely to leak by accident, but the possibility cannot be excluded. If there were to be questions, e.g. because some official's presence on an aeroplane to Dublin were noticed by a journalist, we should have to say that, as announced, the Studies are under way and involve meetings which take place sometimes in London and sometimes in Dublin, that we cannot give any further details, and that it is pure coincidence that the 6th March was chosen (before the date of the Prime Minister's visit was known) as the date for one of these meetings.

3. If no leak occurs, the coincidence of events on 6th March will not become known - except to the Irish Government to whom we can readily explain that it is coincidence. If there is a leak, the present highly-charged atmosphere in Northern Ireland would no doubt enable Dr. Paisley to make some emotional and rhetorical play with the fact that, at the very moment when the Prime Minister was in Northern Ireland seeking to give personal reassurance to the Province, her minions were in Dublin plotting the betrayal.
of the North. He could of course make virtually the same point if the Dublin meetings took place a few days earlier or later, and leaked: the real crime in Paisleyite eyes is that the Studies are taking place at all.

4. The question is whether the coincidence - or the use that Dr. Paisley might make of it - would create sufficiently extra damage to warrant our trying to alter the 6th March meetings in Dublin at this notice. The risk of a leak is not very great: the party going to Dublin does not include any obviously identifiable officials. It would be very awkward to postpone the meetings now: the Irish would feel messed about and the atmosphere of the Studies might be soured. The fact that we had postponed might itself leak, and give rise to erroneous conclusions. The NIO agree that we should let the meetings go ahead. On all rational grounds I am sure that they are right; but we are not dealing with rational people or a rational situation, and I can see Dr. Paisley making some very effective debating points about the Prime Minister's perfidy and double-tonguedness: simultaneously offering soft soap to The Queen's loyal subjects in Belfast with one hand and a surreptitious sell-out to the enemy in Dublin with the other.

5. If the Prime Minister thinks that we ought not to take the risk, however small it may be, and should therefore postpone the meetings in Dublin, I think that in order to minimise the risk of damage we should ask Her Majesty's Ambassador to explain privately and under the seal of total confidence, to Mr. Haughey why we are asking for a postponement. This would involve extending at least to the British Ambassador in Dublin and to Mr. Haughey advance knowledge of the Prime Minister's visit to Belfast, and thus some additional security risk, however slight. But it is in Mr. Haughey's interest as well as ours to preserve good relations and not to wreck the Studies: I believe he would both understand the reasons for postponement and respect the confidence.

(Handwritten Signature)

2nd March 1981

(SECRET AND PERSONAL)
From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Scope of the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 20 February on the relationship between the joint studies and "constitutional matters". She is not happy with the line you propose.

The Prime Minister has commented that she does not believe extradition is a constitutional matter (your paragraph 3 refers). Her recollection is that extradition is not forbidden by the Irish constitution but that the Irish interpret their international obligations in a way which precludes extradition. In the Prime Minister's view, both we and the Irish will find ourselves in difficulty if we discuss either the Irish Article 2 or our own Act of 1973.

Clearly all this will have to be discussed further after the Prime Minister's return from Washington.

I am sending copies of this minute to Stephen Gomersall (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office).

23 February 1981

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER
1. I do not believe that extradition is a constitutional matter. My recollection is that

Ref: A4305

MR. ALEXANDER

No. 2 I think we need to be careful about "constitutional matters". The problem arises from the vagueness of the phrase.

2. It is a matter of presentation. There is no difficulty of substance. It is clear, and understood by both sides, that in the joint studies we do not discuss, still less negotiate, changes in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Any such change could come about only with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom Parliament. In that sense the talks are not about "constitutional matters".

3. But we cannot, and it would not be in our interests to, exclude from discussion in the joint studies (which are, under the Dublin communiqué, in the context of "the totality of relationships within these islands") anything to which the adjective "constitutional" can be applied. For instance, extradition of terrorists has a constitutional aspect, since it is the Republic's position that their Constitution has the effect of barring extradition for crimes with a political motive. We cannot refuse to talk - as we know the Irish expect to do - about the "constitutional claim" in Article 2 of their Constitution, as an obvious stumbling block to "mutual understanding"; but we shall not discuss it, in the sense of asking them to change it. If they offered to discuss the possibility of changing it, if we would discuss the possibility of modifying the guarantee, we should make it clear that that was a matter which we had no mandate to discuss, though we could explain the nature of the guarantee (if necessary) until the cows come home. If either of these matters features in the joint studies at all, they are likely to appear in the eventual report only as a restatement of the existing position on each side - in which form they might be beneficial as a signal that we had given nothing away on the guarantee.
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4. But that leaves us with the presentational problem. In the joint studies context the adjective "constitutional" has become a dirty word for Protestants in Northern Ireland. For the Protestants in Northern Ireland "constitutional matters" means only the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. If that meaning was universally accepted, we could say that "constitutional matters" are ruled out of discussion in the joint studies. But for most people the phrase has a wider meaning: so we cannot say simply that "constitutional matters are ruled out". Nor can we say that "constitutional matters are not ruled out except for the constitutional status of Northern Ireland". That would be unlikely to allay unjustified suspicion: Protestant opinion could well fasten on the first half of that sentence and ignore or disbelieve the second, and the sentence could become more grist for Dr. Paisley's mill in his electoral campaign.

5. The best way out of this dilemma is to take a firm public line that the studies take place within the existing constitutional framework and that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom is thus outside the scope of the studies and is not a matter we are prepared to discuss in the studies, but otherwise to decline for reasons of intergovernmental confidentiality to make any statement on the content of the studies. This avoids the question of "other" constitutional topics. It also provides a line which should be sustainable, unless and until we and the Irish deliberately and jointly decide that we want to be more forthcoming.

6. This line is fully consistent with the confidential letter the Prime Minister sent Mr. Molyneaux on 16th February. It is also consistent with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland's supplementary Answer to Mr. Molyneaux in Parliament on 15th January (Hansard, Col. 1516) which indicated that extradition and the Republic's claim to Northern Ireland were both "proper matters to be discussed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Republic" - since this answer deliberately did not refer to the joint studies as such. It is also consistent with the Prime Minister's statement to Mr. Powell on 10th February (paragraph 4 of Mr. Gow's record) that she would never agree to discuss with the Irish Government the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.
CONFIDENTIAL

7. The Irish have already told us, in the discussions we had on 30th January on procedure, that they would like the "mutual understanding" joint study to consider Articles 2 and 3 of their Constitution (i.e., their claim to the North) and also our guarantee to the North. We have recognised that an Anglo-Irish Treaty (on Franco-German lines) might incorporate provisions relating to both subjects, in the sense that it might be necessary for such a treaty to restate and thus entrench both the Articles in the Irish Constitution and the guarantee; and that the matters might therefore be relevant to the "institutional structures" study. We have also warned them of the need for extreme caution in this area. When they revert to the subject in the discussions of substance, in either study, we shall make quite clear that for our part we are not mandated to discuss the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom, and that we shall need to go on referring, publicly and truthfully, to the fact that we are not prepared to discuss it; but that, subject to this, we are ready to consider anything they have to suggest.

8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Lord Privy Seal and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

(Robert Armstrong)

20th February 1981

-3-
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your minute to me of 12 February on this subject.

16 February 1981
Call by Lord Moyola and Lord Brookeborough

As you know, Lords Brookeborough and Moyola called on the Prime Minister at the House of Commons this afternoon. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was also present.

Lord Moyola said that he and Lord Brookeborough had requested a meeting with the Prime Minister before Dr. Paisley's latest antics. However, the parade on the hillside and Dr. Paisley's performance in the House of Commons this afternoon had increased the sense of concern which had led them to suggest a meeting. It looked increasingly likely that Dr. Paisley wanted an independent Northern Ireland in which he would be in absolute control. His tactics might be to go for a head-on collision with the British Government and the Army. He might seek this through a general strike in the course of which he would demand devolved government on his own terms. If he did not get what he wanted and if he could engineer clashes in which some of his followers were killed he would probably opt for a UDI. Lord Moyola said that he might be exaggerating a little but not very much. One should not underestimate Dr. Paisley's ambitions.

One reason for Dr. Paisley's present success was that he had succeeded in manufacturing a great deal of fear and suspicion out of the way the hunger strike and the Anglo/Irish talks in Dublin had been handled. In Northern Ireland today every story and every rumour was believed unless it was instantly denied. It was essential that HMG should institute more effective PR arrangements. Rapid reaction to, and rebuttal of, every allegation was necessary. The Government statements issued after the hillside parade last week had been good but too slow. Lord Moyola also thought that it would be extremely useful if someone in authority would be prepared to confront Dr. Paisley on the television. This would of course be a formidable undertaking but ought to be attempted.

On the general political situation in Northern Ireland, Lord Moyola commented that other political figures were not giving the lead they should. The statement issued by Mr. Molyneaux yesterday had been useful but had come too late. There was widespread confusion at present. Dr. Paisley's accusations about what had happened in Dublin were taking hold. He was likely to do well in the local government elections in May. The candidates being put forward by the other Parties were of very low calibre and his own followers would not hesitate to indulge in intimidation.
Lord Brookeborough said that the problem was not only with the talks in Dublin. Although he agreed with Lord Moyola that reassurance about them was required and that it would be, for instance, very useful to spell out what the Working Parties were doing, something else was also required. This was evidence to show the people in Northern Ireland that HMG were actively interested in cementing the unity of the UK. A gesture of this kind would give Dr. Paisley's Protestant opponents something to fight for and with. It would help to limit the number of people who sign his covenant. Neither Lord Brookeborough nor Lord Moyola were very clear about what kind of initiative or gesture was required. They mentioned at various points a Northern Ireland Privy Council; a Council of MPs to advise the Secretary of State; the re-introduction of a Governor or a rephrasing of the formula used by Ministers on the Guarantee. Lord Brookeborough seemed to attach particular importance to the last point. He thought the present language too unenthusiastic and hoped that it would be possible to find a form of words which suggested that HMG actively wanted to keep Northern Ireland within the UK.

The Prime Minister said that any question of a sell-out was, of course, utterly ridiculous. However, she understood the importance of preventing scaremongering from taking hold. The fact was that the more trouble Dr. Paisley created, the less inclined people in the UK would be to continue making the sacrifices which present policy demanded. She wondered whether the people of Northern Ireland would support Dr. Paisley in trying to split Northern Ireland from the UK when they came to realise, eg, the economic consequences of separation. She thought that there would be difficulties about the institutional proposals mentioned by Lord Moyola but would certainly look at the question of the formula used on the Guarantee. The Secretary of State commented that the difficulty about the proposal for a Council of MPs was the absence of any Member from the SDLP in the House of Commons at present. The idea of a Northern Ireland Privy Council was being looked at. On the PR front, he agreed about the need for more voices in Northern Ireland to oppose Dr. Paisley. He wondered whether Lord Moyola and Lord Brookeborough would be prepared to take a hand.

Neither Lord Moyola nor Lord Brookeborough responded to this last point. The meeting ended with both stressing the gravity of the situation in Northern Ireland as they saw it. The next few weeks might offer the last opportunity to cut Dr. Paisley down to size. If it proved possible to do this, he might never regain his support.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

 Yours sincerely,

 Michael Alexander.

Roy Harrington, Esq.
Northern Ireland Office.
UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 12/1233Z FEB 1981

TO PRIORITY F CO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 37 OF 12 FEB

AND TO PRIORITY NI/O (BELFAST)

DAIL P Q'S ON POSSIBLE DEFENCE PACT.
1. ON 11 FEB MR HAUGHEY REPLIED TO TWO QUESTIONS IN THE DAIL ABOUT POSSIBLE DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE U K AND THE REPUBLIC.

2. DR NOEL BROWNE ASKED: "WHETHER THE QUESTION OF A DEFENCE PACT BETWEEN IRELAND AND THE U K IS CURRENTLY ON THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN BRITISH AND IRISH OFFICIALS: AND WHETHER THIS ISSUE IS LIKELY TO ARISE WITHIN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE". ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE TAOISEACH TOLD DR BROWNE THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM OR DENY NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT A DEFENCE PACT WITH BRITAIN HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING
3. Dr Garret Fitzgerald asked "whether any reference has been made in discussions between himself and the British Prime Minister, to a possible defence relationship between Britain and Ireland". Mr Haughey replied that the joint studies commissioned by Mrs Thatcher and himself included possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic cooperation and measures to improve mutual understanding. It had been agreed that the details of the studies should be treated as confidential for the present. If details were given, it would vitiate the value of that type of personal discussion. Dr Fitzgerald then commented that there had been press reports about the possibility of a defence relationship, and that was a matter which should be discussed first in the House before being broached with a foreign Prime Minister — a fact which the Taoiseach had not denied. Mr Haughey countered this by saying that Dr Fitzgerald was making an assumption which he was not in a position to confirm or deny because this would breach the confidentiality of the discussions.

4. The debate became heated as Dr Browne asked whether Ireland’s traditional policy of neutrality was now in question as a result of the clause in the communique mentioning "the totality of relationships". Mr Haughey said that there was an understanding on all sides of the House that in the context of European political union, if some defence arrangement was agreed, Ireland would participate in it. Asked by Dr Browne about de Valera’s provision that Ireland would not enter into a defence pact with Britain while the latter still occupied the north, Mr Haughey replied that Ireland was still not able to join NATO because of its implications for the six county situation. He went on to say in response to a question from Mr Cluskey that although Ireland was not a member of a military alliance, it was a member of the EEC, and was not neutral on many political issues arising in the context of international affairs.

5. We will send the verbatim text of these exchanges by bag, when this becomes available.
Ref: A04250

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The Irish Government are certainly approaching these Studies with an engagingly Irish lack of urgency. They have not yet agreed who will lead all their teams; they are not yet able to tell us when they will be ready to meet; and when they do so, they will give us two weeks notice of actual meeting dates. All things considered, it seems very unlikely that any further joint work at all will have been done before the end of this month. If we go on like this, we shall find that, when the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have their next meeting, not only shall we still be travelling hopefully: we shall not have got very far along the road.

2. If the Prime Minister agrees, I do not propose to show any excessive zeal. There would be quite a lot to be said for these Studies not to get too far this side of the local elections in Northern Ireland and a possible General Election in the Republic. We have told the Irish that we are ready to start when they are; the ball is in their court, and I do not propose to take any steps to expedite the return of service.

Robert Armstrong

12th February 1981
Ref: A04205

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

The terms of reference for the 5 joint studies were provisionally agreed at the meeting of the Joint Steering Group on Friday, 30th January. There was one specific point on which the Irish team felt it necessary to refer back to Ministers, and all the terms of reference were therefore formally regarded as ad referendum on both sides. On the British side that was a pure formality: the terms of reference were only very slightly revised from those approved by Ministers, and we had no need for a specific reservation.

2. Mr. Nally has now informed me that their reservation is lifted and the terms of reference are formally agreed on their side. I have confirmed that they are acceptable to us, and can be regarded as formally agreed on our side as well.

3. The way is therefore clear for the joint teams conducting the individual studies to be formed and to start their work.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Walden and Mr. Wade-Gery.

Robert Armstrong

5th February 1981
CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319
Meeting with the Irish: The Maze and Security Co-operation

It was helpful to have your brief on these related topics. I was able to get across both main points.

Just as we had concluded the main business of the meeting (setting the joint studies into motion), Dermot Nally said that the Taoiseach had asked him to impress upon us the importance of doing all in our power to prevent a recurrence of hunger striking in the Maze. Although Mr. Haughey had not yet decided when to call elections - Mr. Nally told me privately later that this was likely to be within the next six months - it would be extremely difficult for him, in what was for practical purposes the run up to an election, to take a strong line against those in the Republic who campaigned in support of such action. He hoped that we might be able to deal flexibly with the situation, if that were necessary "to get over a hump". If matters went off the rails, the consequences could be very serious. I replied that we would continue to look for ways of winding down the tension, within the principle that we could not concede to some prisoners the right to a different regime from others. Mr. Nally said that that principle was not in any way in question, and was fully accepted.

This exchange gave me the opening to point out to the Irish that, although - as we gladly acknowledged - practical co-operation between our respective police forces was excellent, the unwillingness of Irish Ministers to take credit for their efforts in public speeches allowed the myth of Irish unco-operativeness to flourish in the North. Michael Moriarty endorsed my remarks. Mr. Nally replied that the Taoiseach was due to make an important speech on 13th or 14th February and undertook to see whether a passage could be included which might go some way to meeting our point. We shall see.

I am sending copies of this letter to Michael Palliser and Brian Cubbon, and to Michael Alexander.

Sir Kenneth Stowe, KCB, CVO

CONFIDENTIAL
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen and taken note of your minute to her of 30 January about the first meeting of the Anglo/Irish Steering Group.

MODBA

2 February 1981
We had an uneventful first meeting of the Steering Group for these studies this morning.

2. The representatives of the Irish Government agreed without difficulty with our proposals for conducting the studies. We agreed draft terms of reference with them: they accepted our drafts for the 5 working groups, subject to minor changes of drafting, and we accepted a brief preamble suggested by them which referred back to the Dublin communiqué. I attach the terms of reference agreed at the meeting; these are ad referendum on both sides, though the only caveat put on the table related to the wording of the terms of reference for item 2 of the joint study on security matters, where the representative of the Irish Government wanted to make sure that their Department of Justice was content with what was proposed.

3. We also agreed on arrangements for handling Parliamentary and Press inquiries. We agreed a "Text for the Record" (copy attached), which confirms the basis for a draft answer to a Parliamentary Question which I have submitted separately to Mr. Sanders. We agreed that it was of the utmost importance to keep confidential all details of the composition, terms of reference and working methods of the working parties. We agreed to stand on this "Text for the Record" and to consult with each other in advance, if it seemed to either of us necessary to go any further than that. We also agreed, however, that it could be made unattributably clear to the Press that Ministers were not expected to be involved in these studies until the time came to report back to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach and that the Steering Group was led on the British side by the Secretary of the Cabinet and on the Irish side by the Secretary of the Government.

4. The Secretary of the Government made it clear to me in private conversation that the Taoiseach was expecting to call a General Election some time within the next 6 months, and that he did not expect or wish to
see any outcome of the joint studies until after his own election and the district council elections in Northern Ireland which are due to take place on 20th May. We noted that we should need to report to the next meeting of the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach; and it became clear in my private conversation with Mr. Nally that the Taoiseach was hoping that the meeting could be held in July 1981, and would not be postponed until the autumn.

Robert Armstrong

30th January 1981
The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach agreed in Dublin on 6th December to commission joint studies at official level in the fields of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation, and measures to encourage mutual understanding. These studies are being conducted by official working parties under the supervision of a steering group of senior officials. The progress of these studies will be reported to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach for their next meeting some time later this year.
DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES

Having regard to the degree of mutual understanding reached by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach at their meetings on 21 May and 8 December 1980 as expressed in the communiqués issued following those meetings and in particular the reference to the need to bring forward policies and proposals

(1) to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability

and

(2) to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries,

the Working Groups are asked to make proposals to assist the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach in their special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands.

The terms of reference of the Working Groups are as follows:
A. JOINT STUDY ON POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

1. To identify possible new institutional structures which might help in achieving the broad objectives described in the Communiqués of 21 May and 8 December, including the scope for improving existing arrangements for co-operation and consultation.

2. To consider the role of any new institutional structures in relation to measures which might be recommended in the other joint studies.

B. JOINT STUDY ON CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

1. To review the rights and privileges accorded to citizens of each country while residing within the jurisdiction of the other, including those relating to voting, social security, employment and consular protection; to compare these with the rights and privileges enjoyed by citizens of the host country; and to consider whether these rights and privileges could be further assured, harmonised and extended on a mutual basis.

2. To review the obligations and duties of citizens of each country residing within the jurisdiction of the other, including those in respect of taxation and jury service; and to compare these with the obligations and duties of citizens of the host country.

3. To consider any anomalies revealed by these reviews and whether they might usefully be rectified.
C. JOINT STUDY ON SECURITY MATTERS

1. To consider and make recommendations on the scope for increased co-operation, as fellow members of the western community, over the arrangements made by each of the two countries to ensure their security internationally in modern circumstances.

2. To review co-operation between the authorities of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Ireland concerning the administration and working of the criminal law.

D. JOINT STUDY ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

To examine the scope for still closer economic and technical co-operation, both bilaterally and in the context of membership of the European Community, including the possibilities for -

i. resolving differences, and removing obstacles, which may inhibit economic or social development;

ii. reducing the impact of the land and sea frontiers on the everyday lives of the peoples of both countries;

iii. further facilitating trade and communications;

iv. mutually beneficial collaboration in respect of industrial and regional development and energy;

v. harmonising and/or co-ordinating the position of the two countries in multilateral economic and technical organisations.
E. JOINT STUDY ON MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

1. To analyse the reasons for misconceptions in each country over attitudes and Government policies in the other.

2. To consider measures which the two Governments might take, jointly or separately, to remove such misconceptions and improve mutual understanding; including measures in the fields of youth and other exchanges, secondment of officials, and co-operation over educational, scientific and cultural matters.

3. To consider measures which might be taken in co-operation with non-governmental organisations.
Ref: A04148

MR. SANDERS

We discussed the handling of the Question which Mr. Peter Robinson MP has put down to the Prime Minister for Answer on Monday, 2nd February about Anglo/Irish Joint Studies.

2. I understand that the Prime Minister has agreed to take the Question.

3. I attach a draft answer and background note.

Robert Armstrong

30th January 1981
Mr. Peter Robinson (Belfast East): To ask the Prime Minister, if she will give the complete list of subjects for which it has been agreed to commission joint studies with the Government of the Republic of Ireland: how often the joint study groups on each of these subjects have met: when and where such meetings took place: and who was present.

DRAFT ANSWER

The Taoiseach and I agreed in Dublin on 8th December to commission joint studies at official level in the fields of possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation, and measures to encourage mutual understanding. These studies are being conducted by official working parties under the supervision of a steering group of senior officials. The progress of the studies will be reported to us for our next meeting sometime later this year.
BACKGROUND NOTE

The first meeting of the joint steering group was held in London on 30th January. The steering group agreed to set up 5 working groups, one for each of the subjects named in the communiqué of 8th December. Both the representatives of the Irish Government and the representatives of the United Kingdom Government agreed that it was very important for the success of the studies that details of the composition, terms of reference, working methods and timetable of the working groups should remain completely confidential: once either of us began to disclose particular details, we should both be vulnerable to persistent questioning. We agreed therefore to a statement for the record which would simply make it clear that we were setting up working parties for each of the 5 subjects named in the Dublin communiqué, and that these working parties would report to an overseeing steering group. It is intended that, if further Questions are asked, either in Parliament or by the Press, we should rest on the answer which is given to this Question.

In attributable background briefing of the Press, we agreed that we might go slightly further in two respects:

(a) The working parties will report to the steering group of senior officials, which will in turn report to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. Ministers of the two Governments will not be involved until the progress of the studies is reported to the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach.

(b) The representatives of the Irish Government do not wish any formal announcement to be made about the leadership of the steering group; but they would not object if it was made known to the Press, unattributably and for background briefing, that the steering group of senior officials was under the leadership on the British side of the Secretary of the Cabinet and on the Irish side of the Secretary of the Government.
Prime Minister

Agree the terms of reference?

Exchanges will be raised under C
This, it is unlikely that we will
get very far.

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The Ministerial Sub-Committee of OD on Anglo-Irish Relations met yesterday and accepted the
recommendations of officials contained in OD(AI)(81)2
subject to a small number of changes to the terms of
reference for the joint studies to be put to the Irish. I
attach the draft terms, as agreed by the Sub-Committee.

2. Sir Robert Armstrong intends to be guided
accordingly in handling his meeting with Irish officials
on 30th January.

Can I see a draft
a guide back at
them please

27th January, 1981

D.J. Wright
A. JOINT STUDY ON NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES

1. To identify possible new institutional structures which might help in achieving the broad objectives described in the Communiqués of 21 May and 8 December; and to examine in particular the scope for improving or formalising existing arrangements for co-operation and consultation between the two countries.

2. To consider the role of any new institutional structures in relation to measures which might be recommended in the other joint studies.

B. JOINT STUDY ON CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

1. To review the rights and privileges accorded to citizens of each country while residing within the jurisdiction of the other, including those relating to voting, social security, employment (including in Government Service and the Armed Forces), and consular protection; and to compare these with the rights and privileges enjoyed by citizens of the host country.

2. To review the obligations and duties of citizens of each country residing within the jurisdiction of the other, including those in respect of taxation, jury service and service in the Armed Forces if conscripted; and to compare these with the obligations and duties of citizens of the host country.

3. To consider any anomalies revealed by these reviews and whether they might usefully be rectified.

4. To review the claim of the Irish constitution to part of the territory of the United Kingdom.
C. JOINT STUDY ON SECURITY MATTERS

To consider and make recommendations on -

a. the further improvement of co-operation between the authorities of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Ireland concerning the enforcement and administration of the criminal law;

b. the scope for increased co-operation, as fellow members of the western community, over the arrangements made by each of the two countries to ensure their security in the international context.

D. JOINT STUDY ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

Having regard to the two countries' common membership of the European Community, to examine the scope for still closer economic and technical co-operation between them, and in particular the possibilities for -

i. resolving outstanding differences between the two countries, and removing obstacles, which may inhibit economic or social development;

ii. reducing the impact of the land and sea frontier on the everyday lives of the peoples of both countries; while having regard to security matters.

iii. further facilitating trade and communications;

iv. mutually beneficial collaboration in respect of industrial and regional development and energy;

v. harmonising and/or co-ordinating the position of the two countries in multilateral economic and technical organisations.
E. JOINT STUDY ON MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

1. To analyse the reasons for the widespread misconceptions in each country over attitudes and Government policies in the other.

2. To consider measures which the two Governments might take, jointly or separately, to remove such misconceptions; including measures in the fields of youth and other exchanges, secondment of officials, and co-operation over educational and scientific matters.

3. To consider measures which might be taken in co-operation with non-governmental organisations.
IRISH POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Most political commentators believe that Mr Haughey's position has strengthened in recent months. The Fianna Fail victory in the Donegal by-election and the satisfactory outcome of the Anglo-Irish summit have largely contributed to this. Though public opinion was already moving his way in the autumn following his firm handling of a major strike by petrol tanker drivers and the successful negotiations with the unions of a national understanding on wage increases. By contrast Fine Gael is still in the disarray caused by the Donegal by-election result. The possibility of a coalition victory at the next election is not helped by Labour's decision at their party conference in October to contest the next election without a pre-election pact with Fine Gael. The latest opinion polls bear out the views of the political commentators. A September poll showed that 34% would vote Fine Gael or Labour, 36% would vote Fianna Fail and 26% were undecided. By November 35% would vote Fine Gael/Labour, the undecided had dropped to 20% and the Fianna Fail vote had increased to 42%.

2. The next general election must take place by June 1982 but the likelihood is that Mr Haughey will opt for an election this year, maybe even as early as March. (the Fianna Fail Party Conference is due to be held in mid-February). The budget is due on 28 January and the details of the budget may give a clearer idea of Mr Haughey's plans. The main argument for a relatively early election is that the economic situation is serious and likely to get worse. There is a deepening recession and unemployment now stands at 122,000 or 12% of the working population, an increase of 39% in a year. The budget deficit reached £533 million by December 1981, some £200 million over the budget estimate. Mr Haughey has so far refrained from increasing taxation or cutting public expenditure which could both be politically damaging in the context of a forthcoming election. Instead he had chosen to borrow abroad. He may well consider that the sooner he can win an election and then introduce the severe economic measures needed to rectify the situation, the better.
CONFIDENTIAL

3. WITHIN THIS GENERAL PICTURE THE GOVERNMENT IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE RISING DISSATISFACTION AMONG FARMERS (IT WAS THE DEFECTION TO FIANNA FAIL OF THE FARMERS WHICH PLAYED A KEY PART IN THE COALITION DEFEAT IN THE 1977 GENERAL ELECTION). IT IS ESTIMATED THAT FARM INCOMES HAVE FALLEN BY SOME 40% IN THE LAST TWO YEARS IN REAL TERMS GIVEN THAT INFLATION REMAINS AT NEARLY 20% AND THAT CAP PRICE INCREASES HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY MODEST. THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE AT THE FORTHCOMING CAP PRICE FIXING WILL BE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN MR HAUGHEY’S JUDGEMENT OF THE CORRECT TIME TO GO TO THE COUNTRY. HIS DIFFICULTIES HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THE UNFORTUNATE DEATH OF MR GUNDELACH WITH WHOM THE IRISH WERE IN NEGOTIATION OVER A PACKAGE OF SUPPLEMENTARY AIDS FOR IRISH FARMERS WHICH WAS WIDELY SEEN AS AN ELECTORAL DEVICE.

4. IT IS A REASONABLE ASSUMPTION THAT THE NEXT ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT WILL NOT BE BEFORE JUNE/JULY 1981. GIVEN THE FACTORS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT IS OUR BEST GUESS THAT THERE WILL BE AN IRISH ELECTION BEFORE THEN. IF SO THERE IS NO REASON WHY MR HAUGHEY SHOULD WANT TO MAKE PRESENTATIONAL CAPITAL OUT OF THE PROGRESS OF THE JOINT STUDIES, INDEED HE IS LIKELY TO WANT TO REST ON THE OUTCOME OF THE DUBLIN CASTLE MEETING. HOWEVER, IF THE ELECTION DOES NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL AFTER THE NEXT ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT, HE WILL BE MUCH MORE CONCERNED THAT THE SUMMIT PRODUCED SOMETHING WHICH HE CAN REASONABLY PRESENT TO HIS ELECTORATE AS A SUCCESS. BUT ALL THAT IRISH OFFICIALS HAVE SAID TO US SUGGESTS THAT THEY WILL BE ANXIOUS TO KEEP THE PROGRESS OF THE JOINT STUDIES COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE SUMMIT.

SMITH

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CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Jim,

I have noted the points made by the Ulster Unionist Council at their recent meeting, as reflected in your letter of 13 January.

I am grateful for the Council’s appreciation of the Government’s handling of the recent difficult situation at HM Prison Maze. We have always set our faces firmly against granting any kind of political status. Successive administrations since 1972 have in fact made it plain that those prisoners who have been placed in a special category and are at present lodged in the compounds at Maze, in no sense enjoy political status. But it is certainly true that they are held under special conditions, and I made it clear in answering Enoch Powell on 15 January that I do not like that state of affairs. But as you know, shortage of cellular accommodation makes any change in the regime of special category prisoners impracticable at present. Even when that constraint has been removed we shall have to consider very carefully, in the light of the extent to which public faith may have been pledged by successive governments, whether it would be right to change the conditions in which these particular prisoners serve their sentences.

On the subject of the arrangements made following my meeting with the Taoiseach in Dublin last month, on which we
have already exchanged correspondence, there is really nothing to add at present to what I said in reply to your question in the House on 15 January. Arrangements for the conduct of the joint studies are still at a preliminary stage, and we shall take account of your suggestions as these arrangements develop.

On your final point, you may be assured that the Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Great Britain on the subject of Northern Ireland's future constitutional status. Such a referendum would be inconsistent with the principle that Northern Ireland will not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the people of the Province and the agreement of Parliament at Westminster.

Yours ever,

(SGD) MT

James H. Molyneaux, Esq., J.P., M.P.
Dear Michael

Following our telephone conversation this morning, I attach a redraft of the letter to Mr Molyneaux for the Prime Minister's consideration.

Yours sincerely

M W HOPKINS
I have noted the points made by the Ulster Unionist Council at their recent meeting, as reflected in your letter of 13 January.

I am grateful for the Council’s appreciation of the Government’s handling of the recent difficult situation at HM Prison Maze. We have always set our faces firmly against granting any kind of political status, and successive administrations since 1972 have in fact made it plain that those prisoners who have been placed in a special category and are at present lodged in the compounds at Maze, in no sense enjoy political status. But it is certainly true that they are held under special conditions, and I made it clear in answering Enoch Powell on 15 January that I do not like that state of affairs. But as

\(\text{I know,}\)
you know

shortage of cellular accommodation makes any change in the regime of special category prisoners impracticable at present. Even when that constraint has been removed we shall have to consider very carefully, in the light of the extent to which public faith may have been pledged in this House by successive governments, whether the conditions in which these particular prisoners serve their sentences should be changed.

On the subject of the arrangements made following my meeting with the Taoiseach in Dublin last month, on which we have already exchanged correspondence, there is really nothing to add at present to what I said in reply to your question in the House on 15 January. Arrangements for the conduct of the joint studies are still at a preliminary stage, and we shall take account of your suggestions as these arrangements develop.

On your final point, you may be assured that the Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Great Britain on the subject of Northern Ireland's future constitutional status. Such a referendum would be inconsistent with the principle that Northern Ireland will not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the people of the Province.
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On the subject of the arrangements made following my meeting with the Taoiseach in Dublin last month, on which we have already exchanged correspondence, there is really nothing to add at present to what I said in reply to your question in the House on 15 January. Arrangements for the conduct of the joint studies are still at a preliminary stage, and we shall take account of your suggestions as these arrangements develop.
On your final point, you may be assured that the Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Great Britain on the subject of Northern Ireland's future constitutional status. Such a referendum would be inconsistent with the principle that Northern Ireland will not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the people of the Province and the agreement of Parliament at Westminster.
21 January 1981

Nick Sanders Esq
10 Downing Street
London SW1

Dear Nick,

Thank you for your letter of 14 January. As requested I attach a draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to Mr James Molyneaux, in reply to his of 13 January.

The three points that he raises, on behalf of the Ulster Unionist Council, have all been dealt with recently in statements by the Prime Minister; the line recommended here is publicly known, and although Mr Molyneaux published his own letter, we see no advantage on balance in publishing the reply. (Mr Molyneaux's letter received little public attention, even in Northern Ireland).

Yours sincerely,

Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS
I have noted the points made by the Ulster Unionist Council at their recent meeting, as reflected in your letter of 13 January.

I am grateful for the Council's appreciation of the Government's handling of the recent difficult situation at HM Prison Maze. We set our faces firmly against granting any kind of political status, and successive administrations since 1972 have in fact made it plain that those prisoners who have been placed in a special category and are at present lodged in the compounds at Maze, in no sense enjoy political status. But it is certainly true that they are held under special conditions, and I made it clear in answering Enoch Powell on 15 January that I do not like that state of affairs. But as you know, there would be practical difficulties

/about withdrawing
about withdrawing special category status, so long as cellular accommodation remains short. Beyond that, I believe that we should have to think very carefully indeed before detracting from the terms on which any group of prisoners were serving their sentences - while they continued to behave themselves.

On the subject of the arrangements made following my meeting with the Taoiseach in Dublin last month, on which we have already exchanged correspondence, there is really nothing to add at present to what I said in reply to your question in the House on 15 January. Arrangements for the conduct of the joint studies are still at a preliminary stage, and we shall take account of your suggestions as these arrangements develop.

On your final point, you may be assured that the Government has no intention of holding a referendum in Great Britain on the subject of Northern Ireland's future constitutional status. Such a referendum would be inconsistent with the principle that Northern Ireland will not cease to be part of the United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of the people of the Province.
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen and approved your minute to her of 20 January setting out the composition and terms of reference of the Ministerial Sub-Committee of OD which will oversee our preparations for the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies.

I am sending a copy of this minute to George Walden (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

MODBA

21 January 1981
Anglo/Irish studies

The Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had a brief discussion yesterday afternoon about Ministerial responsibility for the inter-departmental preparations for the Anglo/Irish studies flowing from the Dublin Summit last month. It was agreed that the Lord Privy Seal should take the chair at Ministerial meetings of the inter-departmental committee.

It was also agreed that the Lord Privy Seal should deal with Parliamentary Questions arising from the Anglo/Irish studies except insofar as these fell within the competence of individual departments such as the Northern Ireland Office or the Department of Energy. By the same token News Department in the Foreign Office would be responsible for the press handling of general questions relating to the studies.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office), Robin Birch (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office), John Halliday (Home Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Ref: A04038

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

Following your meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 19th January, I now propose that we set up a Ministerial Sub-Committee of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (OD), with the following composition and terms of reference:

Lord Privy Seal (Chairman)

Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General

Secretary of State for Defence

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

Secretary of State for Trade

Secretary of State for Energy

Chief Secretary, Treasury

Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Raison)

"To give instructions for and oversee Her Majesty's Government's participation in the Anglo-Irish Joint Studies commissioned by the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach on 8th December 1980."

2. If you are content, we will make arrangements accordingly.

3. You also agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that Parliamentary and Press questions relating to particular areas of study should be answered by Ministers and Departments responsible for the subject of the Study; general questions about the studies (and questions about new institutional structures and about economic co-operation) should be answered by a Foreign Office Minister and the Foreign Office News Department.

4. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

Robert Armstrong

20th January 1981
Ref: A04022

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister is to discuss the outstanding questions on this with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary this afternoon.

2. There are three problems:-
   (a) Which Minister is to chair the Ministerial Sub-Committee of OD which will oversee the project on our side?
   (b) Which Minister or Ministers are to answer Parliamentary Questions?
   (c) Which Press Office is to take Press queries?

Chairman of Ministerial Sub-Committee

3. Given that we want to put these studies firmly in the context of Anglo/Irish relations, the obvious choice would be a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister. The Prime Minister has said that she would be content with Sir Ian Gilmour or Mr. Hurd. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary takes the view that, given the somewhat critical reaction to the Dublin Communiqué, it would not be in the best interests of Government policy on Northern Ireland if a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister were to take the lead: he argues that the Foreign Office is associated in peoples minds with "sell out".

4. If it is to be a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister, the obvious choice is Sir Ian Gilmour: this would put the project in a European as well as in an Anglo/Irish context.

5. If it is not to be a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister, the choice would seem to be between Mr. Whitelaw, who has said that he would take it on (though he thinks that some people in Northern Ireland would also associate him with "sell out") and Mr. Pym, who was not Secretary of State for Northern Ireland long enough to become tarred with any particular brush,
CONFIDENTIAL

Parliamentary Questions and Press Queries

6. While questions relating to some of the particular areas of study (e.g. citizenship) could be answered by Ministers and Departments concerned, there are really only three possibilities for general questions: the Prime Minister and the No. 10 Press Office; Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office News Department; and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and his Press Office.

7. We clearly do not want the questions handled regularly by the Northern Ireland Office, which would give the impression of putting Anglo/Irish joint studies in a North/South context.

8. The arguments in favour of the Prime Minister and the No. 10 Press Office are that the joint studies resulted from a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach and the Cabinet Office is taking the lead in their preparation and conduct. On the other hand the Prime Minister thinks that it will be undesirable if it appears that she herself is taking personal charge of the exercise on the United Kingdom Side.

9. That leaves the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which really seems the right Department to deal with general questions about the joint studies, until such time as we are once again approaching a meeting with the Taoiseach.

10. I suspect that the Prime Minister may find that she can reach agreement with Lord Carrington that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should handle Parliamentary and Press questions, if she is prepared to concede that Mr. Whitelaw or Mr. Pym should chair the Ministerial Sub-Committee.

Robert Armstrong

19th January 1981
I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from James Molyneaux, M.P. I should be grateful if you could suggest a draft reply, to reach us here by Wednesday 21 January.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure for information to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. W. Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 13 January. I will place your letter before her at once and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

James H. Molyneaux, Esq., J.P., M.P.
This letter from Jim Molyneaux is about the Anglo/Irish consultations and Dr. Paisley's referendum proposals. We will let you have a draft reply.

14 January 1981
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 12 January on this subject. She agrees that we must await the return of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretaty before taking matters further.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

14 January 1981
13 January, 1981.

Dear Prime Minister,

The Ulster Unionist Council which met on Saturday, 10 January, 1981, invited me to convey to you their views on three issues.

The delegates expressed warm appreciation of your forthright reply to me in the House on 18 December on the Maze prison issue. As you rightly said, granting any form of political status to people who have committed murder and other terrible crimes puts at risk the lives of many innocent men, women and children. The Council looks to you urgently to bring to an end as soon as possible the existing political status in the Maze prison.

Secondly, the Council endorsed my letter to you, dated 10 December, 1980, on the subject of the Dublin summit and unanimously urged that no study groups should be established unless and until the six subjects set out in my letter are accepted at the head of the agenda by the Government of the Irish Republic. In our view the "unique relationship" referred to in the joint communique is unique only in the sense that the Irish Republic continues to assert its claim to a part of the territory of the United Kingdom. So long as that claim is maintained, it is quite intolerable that the proposed study groups should purport to be finding ways to make relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic closer.

Finally, the Council is appalled by the proposal of the Democratic Unionist Party that Northern Ireland's constitutional future should be decided by a referendum in Great Britain from which Ulster electors would be excluded but in which citizens of the Irish Republic would be permitted to vote.

The Council wishes you to know that it will not weaken or abandon the principle, which you yourself have so firmly reasserted, that Ulster's membership of the United Kingdom is a matter wholly in the hands of the people of the province and cannot be changed or dissolved against their will.

Yours ever,

J. H. Molyneaux

The Right Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP.,
10 Downing Street,
London, SW1.
From the Private Secretary

MR. WRIGHT  
CABINET OFFICE

Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The Prime Minister has seen Sir Robert Armstrong's minute to me of 9 January on this subject. I have passed the Prime Minister's thanks for the Taoiseach's message direct to his office in Dublin.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

12 January 1981
Ref: A03975

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

In Mr. Whitmore's minute of 23rd December, he said that the Prime Minister would be grateful if I would put to Lord Carrington the revised arrangements for the Anglo/Irish Joint Studies which were set out in the second paragraph of his minute.

2. I subsequently had a word with the Prime Minister, who indicated that, if Lord Carrington thought that Mr. Hurd could not undertake the chairmanship of the proposed Ministerial Group, it would be acceptable for the Lord Privy Seal to do so.

3. I have put the proposal to Lord Carrington. He still takes the view that, given the somewhat critical reaction to the Dublin Communiqué, it would not be in the best interests of Government policy on Northern Ireland if the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were to get involved to the degree proposed.

4. I do not think that we can get this matter any further until Lord Carrington gets back. Perhaps there could be a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary early next week. That would just give us time to get a group set up to take delivery of the work of the officials before the meeting with the Irish arranged for 30th January. At a pinch I think we could in fact get through that first meeting with the Irish without there having been a meeting of the Ministerial Group; the instructions to the British team could be agreed in correspondence. The meeting is likely to be largely procedural, though of course there are political overtones even in the procedure in this business.

5. When a meeting is arranged, I will provide a comprehensive brief for the Prime Minister.

6. The Prime Minister should be aware that we are already beginning to have questions about the Studies. Mr. Ivor Stanbrook has asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (for Answer on 15th January) to describe more fully the "institutional structures" referred to in the Dublin Communiqué. The draft reply reads:-
"No Sir; it is one of the objects of the Joint Studies themselves to consider what possible new institutional structures might be devised as a means of developing the unique relationship between this country and the Republic of Ireland."

(Robert Armstrong)

12th January 1981
CONFIDENTIAL

DESKY 0913902
FK F C O 0911562 JAN 91
TO IMMEDIATE JUELIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 02 OF 9 JANUARY
INFO NIO BELFAST.

ANGLO-IRISH JOINT STUDIES

1. SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG AND DERMOT NALLY AGREED BEFORE CHRISTMAS THAT OFFICIALS SHOULD MEET IN LONDON IN THE SECOND HALF OF FEBRUARY.
2. YOU SHOULD NOW PASS TO NALLY OUR SUGGESTION THAT THE MEETING BE HELD AT 10.30 ON FRIDAY, 30 JANUARY. SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG WOULD OFFER A WORKING LUNCH, AND IF NECESSARY THE MEETING COULD CONTINUE IN THE AFTERNOON. IF 30 JANUARY IS DIFFICULT FOR THE IRISH, WE COULD, THOUGH THIS WOULD BE A LITTLE LESS CONVENIENT, OFFER THE AFTERNOON OF THURSDAY, 29 JANUARY, AFTER A WORKING LUNCH AT, SAY, 13.30.
3. SIR R ARMSTRONG WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY WADE GERY (CABINET OFFICE) ONE OR POSSIBLY TWO OFFICIALS FROM THE FCO, AND ONE FROM THE NIO, AND OF COURSE BY HM AMBASSADOR IF HE IS ABLE TO COME. WE ASSUME THAT THE IRISH WILL SEND AN EQUALLY SMALL TEAM ON THIS OCCASION.

CARRINGTON
Anglo-Irish Joint Studies

The first meeting with the Irish has now been settled for Friday, 30th January.

2. In the course of making the arrangements for this meeting, the Irish Chargé d'Affaires asked me to convey to the Prime Minister the Taoiseach's expression of personal concern and sympathy about the parcel bomb addressed to the Prime Minister which had been intercepted. Mr. Dempsey said that this message of concern was sent irrespective of the source of the bomb. I promised to convey the Taoiseach's message to the Prime Minister, and I said that I was sure that the Prime Minister would wish me to ask that her thanks be expressed to the Taoiseach.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9th January, 1981
C.A. Whitmore, Esq.

CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319
Dear George,

I have now discussed with the Prime Minister, following my discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the arrangements for handling the proposed Anglo-Irish studies.

The Prime Minister is content that the Cabinet Office should chair the official group and take the lead in the overall steering of the studies themselves on the United Kingdom side. She is not, however, very happy about the arrangements which I discussed with Lord Carrington for chairing the Ministerial steering group, and for handling Press queries and Parliamentary Questions. She thinks it important that, so far as handling the Press and Parliament is concerned, the studies should be seen to be in the context of relationships between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic and of their joint membership of the European Community; this suggests that Parliamentary Questions and Press queries should be handled from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

As to the chairmanship of the Ministerial group, for the same sort of reason she would prefer to see the Chairman provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. She wonders, however, whether it is necessary to have this Ministerial group at Cabinet Minister level, and she would like to consider with Lord Carrington whether the group might be at Minister of State level and chaired by Mr. Douglas Hurd.

I dare say that opportunities for the Prime Minister to discuss this with Lord Carrington may arise over the Christmas break.

Yours ever,

Robert Armstrong

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.
23 December 1980

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter to her of 23 December. I have of course placed the message which you enclosed from the Taoiseach before the Prime Minister.

MODBA

His Excellency Dr. Eamon Kennedy
23rd December 1980

Dear Prime Minister,

The Taoiseach has asked me to transmit to you the enclosed letter of reply to a recent letter he received from you following your visit to Dublin on 8th December.

May I renew my good wishes for Christmas and the New Year.

Yours sincerely,

Eamon Kennedy
Ambassador

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Encl.
Anglo/Irish Joint Studies

When you saw the Prime Minister this morning, she had a word with you about your minute A03844 of 18 December 1980 about the handling of the Anglo/Irish Joint Studies.

The Prime Minister told you that she was unhappy about the proposed arrangements. She felt that the combination of the Cabinet Office taking the lead at official level and the No. 10 Press Office handling press enquiries would inevitably make it appear that she herself was taking personal charge of the exercise on the UK side. She thought that this would be undesirable. She was content for the Cabinet Office to chair the official group and to take the lead in coordinating the studies. But since we were seeking to set the follow-up to her visit to Dublin firmly in a UK/Republic context, she thought it right that, at Ministerial level, the FCO should be seen clearly to be in the lead. She did not insist, however, on the chair of the Ministerial group being taken by either the Foreign Secretary himself or by the Lord Privy Seal. She was quite ready to see Mr. Hurd chair the group: indeed, there might be considerable advantage in pitching the Ministerial group at Mr. Hurd’s level rather than at Cabinet Minister level. If FCO Ministers were in the lead, it would follow that the FCO should handle Parliamentary Questions and Press enquiries.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if you could put these revised arrangements to Lord Carrington. She also agreed that you should have a word before Christmas with the Taoiseach’s office to let them know that we have already begun the process of following up the Dublin meeting and that we envisage that the first meeting between British and Irish officials might take place in the second half of January.

C. A. WHITMORE

December 23 January 1980
M O'D B Alexander Esq  
Private Secretary  
No 10 Downing Street  
London SW1

22 December 1980

Dear Michael

You will remember that as you were leaving Dublin you confirmed that you would kindly send me some record of what was said at the private meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey at the Dublin Castle meeting. I should be grateful if you could let me have something fairly soon after Christmas.

Yours 

L C W Figg
20 Dec 1980

Dear Prime Minister,

I want to thank you very sincerely for seeing me on 18th December at a time when you had so many urgent and important matters on your mind.

As I mentioned, I was particularly relieved by your assurance that the Dublin Talks would not in any way undermine the work of the Northern Ireland Boundary Commission or the legislation to give effect to its recommendations.

With very best wishes for 1981

Yours ever, Jim
GRS 269
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 1917002
FM FCO 1916152 DEC 80
TO IMMEDIATE LISBON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 19 DECEMBER
MIPT: FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF MESSAGE.
BEGIN:
1. I WAS ASTONISHED TO LEARN THAT ON 17 DECEMBER THE ASSEMBLY
OF THE REPUBLIC PASSED A RESOLUTION ON NORTHERN IRELAND WHICH
WILL BE WIDELY SEEN AS INSULTING TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN
IRELAND WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO GRIEVOUSLY FROM TERRORIST ACTS
COMMITTED BY THE PROTESTING PRISONERS AT THE MAZE PRISON AND
THE ORGANISATIONS TO WHICH THEY BELONG. I WAS
SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THIS RESOLUTION
HAD THE SUPPORT NOT ONLY OF THE COMMUNISTS BUT ALSO OF THE PARTIES
OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE. THE RESOLUTION MAKES ASSERTIONS
WHICH ARE DEMONSTRABLY UNTRUE. THE APPALLING CONDITIONS IN
WHICH THE PROTESTING PRISONERS HAVE BEEN LIVING HAVE BEEN CREATED
BY THEMSELVES IN PURSUIT OF A DEMAND FOR POLITICAL STATUS, A
DEMAND WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SUPPORTED BY ANY REPUTABLE
ORGANISATION ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD. IN PARTICULAR IT HAS NOT
RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC OR
OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. AND IT HAS BEEN EXPLICITLY REJECTED
BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
2. YOU WILL HAVE HEARD THAT THE PROTESTING PRISONERS HAVE NOW
GIVEN UP A HUNGER STRIKE WHICH HAS BEEN UNDERWAY SINCE
27 OCTOBER IN PURSUIT OF THIS DEMAND FOR POLITICAL STATUS. IT
IS THE WISH AND HOPE OF HMG THAT THE PROTEST AS A WHOLE WILL BE
BROUGHT TO AN END VERY SOON. IF IT IS, THE PRISONERS WILL
HAVE EXTENSIVE PRIVILEGES RESTORED TO THEM AND WILL IN FACT BE
LIVING IN CONDITIONS WHICH COMPARE FAVOURABLY WITH THOSE IN
PRISONS ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD.

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED
RID PS/MR HURD
NAD PS/MR RIDLEY
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER
WED PS/FUS
MAED SIR A ACLAND
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK
SECURITY D MR ADAMS
PUSD MR BULLARD
PS MR FERGUSSON
PS/LPS LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTR.
NORTHERN IRELAND

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8356 - 1

OO LISBON DESKBY 191645Z

GRS 101
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 191645Z
FROM FCO 191615Z DEC 80
TO IMMEDIATE LISBON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 19 DECEMBER
YOUR TELS 253 TO 256: NORTHERN IRELAND

1. MIPT GIVES TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM ME WHICH YOU SHOULD DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FREITAS DO AMARAL. YOU SHOULD GIVE COPIES TO BALSEMÃO AND RIBEIRO TELES, AND YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION WRITE IN SIMILAR TERMS TO MARIO SOARES. PLEASE TELEGRAPH AS SOON AS MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELIVERED. WE SHALL THEN BRIEF PRESS ACCORDINGLY, BUT WITHOUT RELEASING TEXT.

2. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL HAS SUMMONED THE PORTUGUESE AMBASSADOR FOR 14.45Z AND WILL SPEAK ON SIMILAR LINES.

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED
RID
NAD
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PS
PS/LPS

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PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PS
SIR A ACLAND
CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

CONFIDENTIAL
Anne Minister.

The only point in this which seems to me difficult is the suggestion that the Pps office here should handle Pps queries.

Whatever one says, this will create an impression of close involvement by No 10 in the day to day conduct of the studies. However if the FCO can't do it, there may be no alternative.

Anna

10 Downing Street
I am very unhappy about your proposals.

Prime Minister
F.O. must take the lead, otherwise the relationship with the Republic will be impaired with a wholly different view from the F.O. Letter. Support Rogers. Summer

I believe you need to think carefully about the proposals in Sir Robert Armstrong's minute below for handling the Anglo/Irish joint studies.

Cameron chaired on Monday.

It often happens that, at official level, the Cabinet Office take the lead on subjects which span a number of Departments: this is one of their main roles. But, in such cases the lead at Ministerial level is almost invariably taken not by you as the "Minister for the Cabinet Office" but by the Minister whose Department has the strongest interest in the subject. A good example is Community business: Lord Carrington chairs OD(E), and Foreign Office Ministers lead in the House on Community matters generally, but the Official Committee supporting OD(E) is chaired by the Cabinet Office. In the case of Anglo/Irish joint studies, we have been at great pains to set your meeting with the Taoiseach and the action flowing from it in a UK/Republic context, and this points to the FCO taking the lead at Ministerial level.

If, on the other hand, we organise ourselves in the way suggested in Sir Robert Armstrong's minute and in particular put the No. 10 Press Office in the lead in dealing with Press enquiries, this will give the impression, as Mr. Alexander says in his manuscript note below, that No. 10 are closely involved in the joint studies and that you personally are overseeing the exercise in a much closer way than would normally be the case.

There is another, perhaps obscure, point which may give us trouble in due course. If Bernard Ingham is in the lead on Press enquiries, it will rapidly become plain to the outside world that the Cabinet Office are running the exercise at official level, and this could well lead to demands from any Select Committee that decides to take an interest in the Anglo/Irish studies (as one is surely bound to do) for Cabinet Office officials to /give evidence
give evidence to it. But, we have always tried to prevent the Cabinet Office appearing before Select Committees on the grounds that they do not have responsibility for matters of policy.

But Lord Carrington has made it quite clear to you and, separately, to Sir Robert Armstrong that he does not want the FCO to take the lead on all this, and you may take the view that you have no alternative but to go along with the arrangements proposed in Sir Robert Armstrong's note. I thought, however, that I should draw your attention to some of the drawbacks.

19 December 1980
In this note I make proposals for the handling of the Joint Studies on which you and Mr. Haughey agreed on 8th December. I have discussed these matters with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Northern Ireland Office and Mr. Ingham.

2. Although the Northern Ireland Office will have much to contribute to the Studies, they are clear - and rightly so - that they cannot take any kind of lead, since the essence of the exercise from our point of view is that it concerns relations between the Republic and the whole United Kingdom, not just the United Kingdom's Northern Irish province. In normal circumstances the lead Minister and Department, for negotiations with an overseas Government, would be Lord Carrington and the Foreign Office. But Lord Carrington, as I think he has told you (and has certainly told me), feels strongly that neither he nor any Foreign Office Minister nor his Department should take the lead, though he accepts that they will have a major supporting role. His prime concern arises from possible suggestions that he and his Department are associated with "sell-out", e.g. over Rhodesia or the Falklands and are preparing to play a similar role in the Irish question. He has a subsidiary point, which I think is also correct, that it is in our interest for the lead on the Dublin side to be taken by the Taoiseach's office rather than the Foreign Ministry, and that objective is most likely to be secured if the lead on our side is seen to be taken by the nearest thing we have to a Prime Minister's Department.

3. At the official level, no problem should arise. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Irish Secretary are content for the Cabinet Office to take the lead, both within Whitehall and vis-a-vis Dublin, and we are making arrangements accordingly. The proposal is that before Christmas we should tell the Irish Government that the Cabinet Office will be leading from our side (supported by the Foreign Office and other Departments...
as appropriate), that we imagine the Taoiseach's office will be similarly leading on theirs, and that we have in mind a first meeting at official level, probably in London, in the second half of January, to discuss and if possible reach agreement on the matters which are to be the subjects of studies and the way in which the studies are to be carried out. This timing would allow the Cabinet Office-led official committee, which we have now established, to clear its lines after Christmas with the Ministerial group which will oversee the project on our side. The meeting in the second half of January might in effect be the first meeting of a steering group, to which a series of suitably constituted sub-groups would report the various subject-studies.

4. The natural Ministerial group for this purpose would be a sub-committee of OD, reporting to OD as necessary. Lord Carrington does not wish to chair the group, for the reasons indicated in paragraph 2 above. He suggests that the Home Secretary should do so. The Home Secretary is a little reluctant, because he feels slightly tarred with the Sunningdale brush. But Lord Carrington does not regard that as a serious obstacle; whereas he would feel less happy about the only other obvious candidate, Lord Soames, who also has connotations of "foreign affairs" and Rhodesian sell-out. I have ascertained that the Home Secretary is prepared to take this on, and I recommend accordingly.

5. A sub-committee under Mr. Whitelaw might consist of the Lord Privy Seal, the Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland, Trade and Energy, the Chief Secretary, Treasury, and the Paymaster General. The Lord President could be added to this, if you wish. Other Ministers would be invited ad hoc when their departmental interests were involved (e.g. Secretary of State for Industry or Ministers of Transport or Agriculture).

6. Lord Carrington feels strongly that the Foreign Office News Department should not handle Press queries on the Joint Studies: quite apart from his own position, there is the fact that Mr. Fenn, Head of the FCO News Department, handled the Press side of the Rhodesia Conference and Settlement. Press questions about the Cabinet Office are handled by your Press Office, and if the Cabinet Office is to be in the lead it seems logical that the No. 10 Press Office should handle queries about the Joint Studies. Mr. Ingham is, somewhat
reluctantly, prepared to accept this. If you wanted to appear to distance yourself a little from this, perhaps Mr. Ingham could deputize the handling of the queries on this subject to, say, Mr. Anson.

7. As to questions in the House of Commons, those relating to some of the particular areas of study (e.g. citizenship or energy) could of course be answered by the departmental Ministers concerned. I am afraid that I think that you would have to take more general questions yourself. The same principle could be followed for questions in the Lords, with Lord Soames as the obvious choice to answer general questions.

8. It is bound to become known that the Cabinet Office is taking the lead, if indeed you agree that it should. We might as well be open about this from the outset, and at least gain whatever credit there is to be gained from not having the Foreign Office in the lead.

9. If you agree with what is proposed in this minute, we will set up the Ministerial sub-committee, the official committee will get straight to work, and we will be in touch with Dublin on the lines suggested in paragraph 3 above.

(Robert Armstrong)

18th December 1980
18 December 1980

I tried to ring you this afternoon to tell you that as the Prime Minister has urgent business tomorrow at 1100, I hope it will not inconvenience you to postpone your meeting with her by half an hour.

The Prime Minister looks forward to seeing you in her room at the House at 1130 tomorrow.

C.S.

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.
18 December, 1980.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister.

Dear Mrs. Thatcher,

I am glad you enjoyed your visit to Dublin and I will be happy to pass on your appreciation to those involved in the arrangements.

I agree we have carried the development of relations between our Governments a stage further and I share your wish to continue along this path, despite the difficulties which the reactions you mention have shown to exist.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Oifig an Taoisigh, Tithe an Rialtais, Baile Átha Cliath 2.
Call by Mr. James Molyneaux, M.P.

As you know Mr. Molyneaux called on the Prime Minister this evening. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was also present.

Mr. Molyneaux said that he entirely accepted the Prime Minister's word about the significance of her visit to Dublin and about the meaning of the Communiqué. He had welcomed the fact that the Prime Minister had been accompanied by a large delegation since this had made it clear that the agenda would not be limited to the problems of Northern Ireland. He had not been surprised that the Prime Minister had chosen to make no statement on her return. Indeed he had told Mr. Powell a day or two previously that he did not expect the Prime Minister to make a statement since she had not made one after her recent visit to Rome.

Mr. Molyneaux said that none the less he and those whom he represented did have one or two worries. He himself was concerned that while the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State might be clear about the purpose of the study groups, the study groups themselves might "gain a momentum and a mind of their own". He thought it important that Ministers should keep a very close eye on the work of the study groups in order that they did not find themselves presented with "faits accomplis". The Prime Minister told Mr. Molyneaux that the work of the study groups would be closely supervised.

Mr. Molyneaux said that he himself had no objection to the building up of close working relationships between the United Kingdom and the Republic. However it was necessary to bear in mind that the Government in Dublin were past masters at separating out Northern Ireland problems and at finding ways of dealing with those problems in isolation. They would also try to deal direct with Ulster though this would be more difficult than it had been in the days of Stormont. In this context, the sort of phrases in the Communiqué which worried his constituents were "bring forward policies and proposals", "commission joint studies", and "new institutional structures". Was there for instance any chance
that the study groups would go on indefinitely and that new structures would be erected in parallel. As an example of the kind of suspicions that existed in Northern Ireland, Mr. Molyneaux mentioned that some people connected with the present work of the Boundary Commission there were asking whether it was worth carrying on!

The Prime Minister indicated that the fears were groundless. In relation to the institutional structures, the Prime Minister stressed that the studies would be of "possible new institutional structures". As her letter to Dr. Paisley had made clear there was no guarantee that the two Governments would reach agreement on the establishment of any new structures. The Secretary of State noted that a number of structures already existed in the economic and security fields. Nothing that had happened in Dublin would or could have the slightest effect on the work of the Boundary Commission.

Mr. Molyneaux said that he welcomed the Prime Minister's firm policy on the hunger strike and in particular the statement she had made in the House this afternoon. He said that he and his colleagues had been discouraging their own people in Northern Ireland from responding to demonstrations in favour of the hunger strikers. The Secretary of State said that this had been most helpful. The Prime Minister reiterated that political status would not be given to the hunger strikers. The Government's position would be repeated in a statement which Mr. Atkins would be making to the House tomorrow.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Michael Alexander

R. Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
Thank you for your letter of 10 December. The Government will certainly take into account your list of possible subjects for the joint Anglo-Irish studies.

I note your general observations on the communiqué. I think that you will be well aware that it underlies our whole approach to these issues that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise.

Yours sincerely,

James H. Molyneaux, Esq., J.P., M.P.
MR LENIHAN'S GAFPE

1. I think it was on the BBC radio news at 7pm on Friday 12 December that I heard Mr Lenihan reported as saying that as a result of the Dublin Summit everything was on the table, including constitutional matters. That evening Barney Smith rang me at home to say that RID had telephoned to us the text of the Prime Minister's proposed statement responding to what Mr Lenihan had said. I telephoned Michael Alexander with a suggested amendment, which in the end was not required because the paragraph concerned had been deleted. However, Michael took the opportunity of telling me that the Prime Minister wished Mr Lenihan to know how she felt about his remarks and hoped this could be done that evening.

2. I was able to get hold of Wally Kirwan who had clearly been expecting us to react (as had Dermot Nally), expressing the hope that perhaps the Foreign Minister could be persuaded to take a holiday and stay away from correspondents. Anyway, he undertook to see that the Prime Minister's wishes were followed through that evening. He must have acted quickly because Mr Lenihan's gloss was reported in Saturday's Evening Press on sale about 3pm and I saw a shot of him on the 10pm ITV News on the Saturday evening where he was clearly recovering lost ground and putting the relevant passage of the communiqué in the proper perspective. It is unfortunate that although he was quoted as saying essentially the same thing by the Evening Press and the Sunday Tribune as well as ITN the DFA have told us that there is no official text and his remarks were not picked up in Monday's Dublin papers.

Copied to:-
M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
Sir Kenneth Stowe KCB CVO  
Permanent Under-Secretary of State  
Northern Ireland Office  
Great George Street  
London SW1  

Dear Ken  

BRIEFING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER: ENERGY  

1. I have been re-reading the briefs prepared for the Anglo-Irish Summit in the light of those portions of the discussions in which I participated. I hope you will not mind my observing that in the light of the actual discussion on co-operation in energy, the brief prepared (PMV 87) was somewhat inadequate. Although the Northern Ireland Office wrote the brief, I do not think that it would be fair to lay the blame at their door - it is not for them to pronounce on the question of the Wales/Wexford electricity link. But the fact that there was no effective input from the UK Department of Energy on this question meant that the Prime Minister was understandably unsighted when discussion moved on to this topic in the Plenary Session at the end of the morning. Mr Haughey seemed to be similarly unaware of the precise state of the game, so no harm was done. However, this illustrates the dangers and difficulties we are likely to face in the Joint Studies exercise if someone does not keep a very close eye on the overall co-ordination.  

2. I should also like to recall that I suggested, at the meeting Mr Atkins had with Mr Lenihan on 13 October, the preparation of a joint brief covering all energy matters in time for the December Summit. It was a pity we didn't follow up.  

Yours  

[Signature]  

Copied to:—  
M J Newington Esq, RTD, FCO  
M D'O B Alexander Esq, No 10 Downing Street, SW1  

L C W Figg
Dear Nick

... With reference to your letter of 10 December, I attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister to Mr James Molyneaux's letter of the same date.

Noting that Mr Molyneaux has already tabled a question to the Prime Minister (for answer on 15 January) as to whether she has transmitted his list to Mr Haughey and whether any of the topics are considered appropriate for joint study, we recommend that the Prime Minister should not make any commitments. It is evident from the content that the list is not one he would expect us to take seriously, still less one that could in practice be a basis for discussion with the Irish. We therefore think a brief acknowledgement is all that is required.

Yours sincerely,

M W Hopkins

M W HOPKINS
Thank you for your letter of 10 December. The Government will certainly take into account your list of possible subjects for the joint Anglo-Irish studies.

I note your general observations on the communiqué. I think that you will be well aware that it underlies our whole approach to these issues that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise.
UNCLASSIFIED

FROM WASHINGTON 162220Z DEC 80
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELEGRAM 4931 OF 16 DECEMBER
INFO NIO BELFAST, NIO LONDON, DUBLIN, BIS NEW YORK.
INFO SAVING CG'S IN U.S.A.

MY TELNO 4923: THE DUBLIN SUMMIT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN EDITORIAL FROM THE WASHINGTON STAR OF 15 DECEMBER: BEGINS:

AS UNLIKELY AS IT MIGHT HAVE SEEMED, THE TROUBLED ATMOSPHERE IN NORTHERN IRELAND MADE LAST WEEK A PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE TIME FOR BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER TO PAY HER FIRST OFFICIAL CALL IN DUBLIN. THE BRITISH DELEGATION, INCLUDING ALSO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT TO VISIT IRELAND SINCE THE FORMATION OF THAT STATE ALMOST SIX DECADES AGO.

THE FIVE HOURS OF TALKS WITH IRISH PRIME MINISTER CHARLES HAUGHEY AND HIS TOP AIDES, FOLLOWED BY AN EXPRESSION OF JOINT RESOLVE TO PURSUE NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE IN THE SIX COUNTIES, PUT THE FOCUS WHERE IT BELONGS. THIS IS ON THE ROLE OF THE ELECTED, RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS, BASED ON SENSIBLE NATIONAL INTERESTS RATHER THAN ON THE COMBINATION OF HYSTERIA AND PURPOSEFUL MISCHIEF-MAKING THAT FREQUENTLY RULES IN NORTHERN IRISH AFFAIRS.


BUT IN THAT NERVOUS PROVINCE, EMOTIONS THREATEN TO BURST INTO ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF DESTRUCTION BECAUSE OF THE CULMINATING HUNGER STRIKE BY SEVEN CONVICTED TERRORISTS AT THE MAZE PRISON NEAR BELFAST. THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE PROTEST IS TO FORCE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE SPECIAL POLITICAL STATUS FOR IRA PRISONERS WHO NOW ARE TREATED THE SAME AS NON-POLITICAL PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENT CRIME. ON CAN ARGUE THE MERITS OF THE DISTINCTION SO DEAR TO THE IRA, BUT NO ONE CAN SAY SERIOUSLY THAT THE ISSUE OF PRISON PERQUISITES IS CENTRAL TO THE QUESTIONS OF NATIONALITY AND METHOD OF GOVERNANCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

/YES THE
YET THE PRISON PROTEST IS BEING FLOGGED BY PRO-IRA PROPAGANDISTS TO PRODUCE ALMOST DAILY DEMONSTRATIONS. GENUINE CONCERN FOR THE ENDANGERED MEN IS MIXED WITH CYCLICAL EXPLOITATION OF THEIR PLANNED MARTYRDOM FOR IRA AIMS, AND IT IS HARD TO PERCEIVE WHERE ONE ENDS AND THE OTHER BEGINS. THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE PROTEST GROWS OUT OF YEARS OF AGITATION INVOLVING SELF-IMPOSED CONDITIONS AT LONG KESH.

IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY IF THE SELF-STARVATION STARTS TAKING LIVES, HAS THE POTENTIAL OF INSPIRING FRESH COMMUNAL VIOLENCE BETWEEN ULSTER’S CATHOLIC MINORITY AND PROTESTANT MAJORITY. BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAVE MADE CONCILIATORY GESTURES TO DEFUSE THE BOMB, BUT HAVE NOT GRANTED THE MAIN IRA DEMAND.

ANY SPECIFIC NEW IRISH-BRITISH UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WHAT TO DO ON THE IMMEDIATE THREAT OF TURBULENCE AND HOW TO PROCEED TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN ULSTER, AWAIT UNVEILING. DUBLIN IS NECESSARILY INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE INESCAPABLE QUOTE IRISH DIMENSION UNQUOTE OF THE CONTROVERSY. THE THATCHER GOVERNMENT’S INITIATIVES ON NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE BEEN SLOW AND TENTATIVE, AND THIS INCREASES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTREMISTS TO DOMINATE THE SCENE WITH THE EMOTIONAL SIDE ISSUES THEY PREFER.

THE MAIN QUESTION IS HOW NORTHERN IRISH OF ALL PERSUASIONS CAN BE BROUGHT TO SHARE THEIR CORNER OF THE ISLAND WITHOUT FEAR. LET’S HOPE THE THATCHER AND HAUGHEY GOVERNMENTS DEVELOP SOME PROMISING IDEAS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THIS, ENDS.

HENDERSON

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED
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NAD PS/MR RIDLEY
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER
WED PS/PUS
MAED SIR A ACLAND
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK
SECURITY D MR ADAMS
PUSD MR BULLARD
PS MR FERGUSSON
PS/LPS LORD N G LENNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
NORTHERN IRELAND
I enclose, somewhat belatedly, a copy of a record of the Plenary discussions held during the Prime Minister's visit to Dublin last week.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office), John Wiggins (HM Treasury), Julian West (Department of Energy) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Dear Mike,

Meeting with Dr. Paisley

I am writing to confirm, as I have already told you on the telephone, that the Prime Minister will be receiving Dr. Paisley at 1100 next Friday 19 December in her room in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister hopes that Mr. Atkins will be able to attend.

It would be helpful if you could let me have a brief the previous evening.

JF

Michael Alexander

Mike Hopkins, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
Prime Minister,

(attach
(a) a lettergram from Mr Paisley
(b) an extract from the
transcript of Lenihan's
interview (unhelpful but not so
bad as Paisley asserts)
(c) a line which Bernard
might take this evening on
your behalf and on the record.
(substitute 'the Prime Minister' for 'I')
I think it important to get out a
rebuttal as soon as possible.

12.12.
RADIO ULSTER NEWS SUMMARY - FRIDAY 12 DECEMBER 1980

THE DUP LEADER, THE REV IAN PAISLEY, HAS REINFORCED HIS DEMAND FOR AN ASSURANCE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF NORTHERN IRELAND WILL NOT BE ON THE AGENDA DURING ANY TALKS HELD BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS IN THE WAKE OF THE DUBLIN SUMMIT. DR PAISLEY'S MOVE CAME AFTER THE REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN MINISTER, BRIAN LENIHAN, MADE THE CLEAREST EXPRESSIONS SO FAR OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS. PETER GOULD REPORTS:--

"MR LENIHAN SPELT OUT HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION DURING AN INTERVIEW THIS MORNING WITH JOHN SIMPSON ON RADIO ULSTER. THE MINISTER MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE REGARDS THE CREATION OF NEW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT."

MR LENIHAN:--

"OF COURSE I DO AND INDEED THE COMMUNIQUE MAKES THAT QUITE CLEAR. IT SAYS NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, SECURITY MATTERS, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION - SO THE ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IS SEPARATE FROM INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES. I'M TALKING ABOUT.

JOHN SIMPSON:--

"SO IT WOULD BE FAIR TO INTERPRET THAT, AS YOU SAY, AS BEING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALISATION"

PETER GOULD:--

"THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE DUBLIN CUMMIT MERELY REFERRED TO JOINT STUDIES ON POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES. MR LENIHAN WAS MORE SPECIFIC:--

"AS FAR AS WE'RE CONCERNED EVERYTHING IS ON THE TABLE. THIS HAS BEEN THE CONSISTENT ATTITUDE OF THE TAOISEACH AND AS FAR AS NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES ARE CONCERNED WE REGARD THAT AS NEW POLITICAL WAYS OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS THAT EXIST BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AND WITHIN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND BETWEEN THE 2 PARTS OF IRELAND AND BRITAIN, IN WHICH WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A LOT OF PATIENT HARD WORK AND PROPOSALS COMING FORWARD - THEY MAY NOT MEET EVERYBODY'S POINT OF VIEW BUT AT LEAST PROPOSALS WILL COME FORWARD AND WILL BE CONSIDERED AT THE NEXT MEETING WHICH WILL GIVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AS I SAID IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO THESE PROPOSALS. OF COURSE THE ACCEPTABILITY BY THE UNIONISTS IS AN ALL IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THIS AND INDEED THE ACCEPTANCE BY ANYBODY NOT JUST THE UNIONISTS BUT BY ANY AND EVERY PARTY WHO IS CONCERNED, WITH THE FUTURE OF THIS COUNTRY, THAT WE CANNOT IMPOSE OR COERCSE BUT WE WOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE."

VVTITIT

BUT MR LENIHAN'S COMMENTS BROUGHT AN ANGRY RESPONSE FROM DR PAISLEY. HE IMMEDIATELY SENT A TELEGRAM TO MRS THATCHER DEMANDING THAT SHE REPUDIATE THEMINSITER'S WORDS. IF SHE SAID SILENT, HE SAID. IT WOULD CONFIRM THE WORST FEARAGES OF UNIONISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND THAT SHE INTENDED TO BETRAY ULSTER.
Mr. Lenihan will no doubt explain for himself what he had in mind. But I wish to make two points in response to Dr. Paisley.

Firstly, the Dublin Communiqué makes clear, and I have repeated since, that the subject of the joint Anglo/Irish studies will be possible "institutional" structures not "constitutional" structures. My letter of 10 December to Dr. Paisley said that "Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise". That position has not changed in the last 36 hours and will not do so.

Secondly, I strongly deplore the emotive language used in recent days by Dr. Paisley and others. The Government is not going to "betray" Northern Ireland; my visit to Dublin was not a "mini-Munich". HMG is deeply concerned to bring peace and reconciliation to the people of Northern Ireland. We have been working to that end since we came into office. My meetings with Mr. Lynch and Mr. Haughey have been an integral part of our effort: and the people of Northern Ireland have benefited greatly from the improved security co-operation across the border which has resulted. Those who have spoken so violently in recent days should ask themselves whether their words are contributing to the same objective or not.
The Foreign Secretary of the Irish Republic has just announced on BBC radio Ulster that all matters including the constitutional position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom are on the table in the ongoing joint studies with the Republic. If you do not immediately repudiate this, then the worst fears of the Unionist people in Northern Ireland will be confirmed that you and your team in Dublin intend in fact to betray Ulster.

Ian Paisley

Col 10...
PRIME MINISTER

Visits and Visitors - 1981

I attach a summary of your programme of outward visits and inward visitors next year as it is at present shaping up. I also attach the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's programme together with a background note.

Subject to your views, your programme seems to me at present to be manageable. However, I hope you will agree that it would be wise to resist proposals to extend it much further. In particular the programme of inward visits is already looking rather ambitious: there will inevitably be a considerable number of unforeseen additions.

*The FCO would like to give an (unstated) invitation to Dr. Mugabe early next year for a visit to London next year. Agree?

12 December 1980
PRIME MINISTER'S VISITS AND VISITORS - 1981

OUTWARD VISITS

Fixed, in hand or highly probable

United States of America
European Council - Maastricht
India/Gulf
North/South Summit - Mexico
European Council - Luxembourg
Ottawa Summit
CHGM - Melbourne
Anglo-German Summit - Bonn

Proposals

Portugal - now looks less attractive
Strasbourg 1 day

Late February/early March
23-24 March
15-23 April
Early June
29-30 June
19-21 July
30 September - 7 October
? October
December - 1 day

INWARD VISITORS

Fixed, in hand or highly probable

Panama President
Ghana President
Romania Prime Minister
Anglo-German Summit
Anglo-Italian Summit
Anglo-French Summit
Anglo-Irish Summit
European Council

30 March - 1 April
Early 1981
13-16 April
11-12 May
? May or later
? June
June/July
26-27 November

/ Proposals
Proposals

Mauritius Prime Minister  Early February
French Prime Minister    Early 1981 - if at all
Zimbabwe Prime Minister
Jamaican Prime Minister
Belgian Prime Minister    Late 1981
Cameroon President
Peruvian Prime Minister
Dominican Prime Minister

Notes

(i) The Prime Minister of Singapore is likely to visit the United Kingdom under his own steam in 1981, to become a Freeman of the City of London.

(ii) The Sultan of Brunei is coming for 4-6 weeks in the Spring to learn about the arts of government.

(iii) The Prime Minister of Fiji may also come under his own steam.
COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY
DUBLIN

11 December 1980

M O'D B Alexander Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON

Dear Michael,

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO DUBLIN

1. I enclose a draft record of the short plenary discussions which took place just before lunch on 8 December.

Yours,

LB Smith

cc G G H Walden Esq
Private Secretary
FOO
RECORD OF PLENARY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE IRISH PRIME MINISTER, AN TAOISCH, HELD AT DUBLIN CASTLE ON MONDAY 8 DECEMBER 1980

Present

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP
The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KG MC
The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP
The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Sir Kenneth Stowe KCB CVO
Sir Kenneth Couzens KCB
The Lord Bridges CMG
Mr M O’D B Alexander
Mr G G H Walden
Mr B Ingham
Mr L Figg CMG
Mr L B Smith
Mr Charles Haughey TD
Mr B Lenihan TD
Mr M O’Kennedy TD
Mr D Nally
Mr T O’Sullivan
Mr A O’Rourke
Mr D Neligan
Mr F Dunlop
Mr W Kirwan
Mr M Horgan
Mr S Whelan
Mr M Burke

1. Mr Haughey began by saying that he had had a most interesting tête-à-tête with the Prime Minister. It was important for him to have an outline of British economic policy for the next 12 months without which he could not easily formulate his own policies. Mrs Thatcher asked who would be responsible for the joint studies. Mr Atkins said there were a number of areas where the two Governments needed to cooperate and urgent studies had to be put in hand. Some of this activity already...
already took place in the meetings of the Anglo-Irish Economic Steering Group. There might be advantage in a Ministerial input to these meetings. There were areas in which the two countries were rivals, e.g. the attraction of inward investment.

Mr. Haughey said that he had agreed with the Prime Minister on the need to combat violence, which was a major problem for both countries. The burden of security expenditure was, in per capita terms, heavier on the Republic than on the UK. They had both been satisfied with cross-border cooperation in the security area. He hoped that the Atkins statement would form the basis on which a solution to the H-Block situation could be brought forward. This was a dangerous situation which could interfere with security cooperation.

Mrs. Thatcher said that she hoped that the statement would serve to terminate the situation. It contained the complete list of concessions which the British Government had made. No one had ever seen all these brought together in one document before. The British Government had been concerned for some months about the situation and had been considering a concession on civilian clothes. In view of the imminent hunger strike it had been agreed that for humanitarian reasons a decision should be made quickly. This had not elicited from the prisoners the sort of response which had been hoped for. There were no further concessions. The Government would never grant political status. There would be no concessions for murderers. The hope was that the full significance of the Government’s position and Mr. Atkins statement would be explained to all those on hunger strike. There would be no surrender to violence which was the negation of democracy.
CONFIDENTIAL

3. 

Mr Hough er said he had asked for details of the legislation which set up the enterprise centre in Belfast. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it was in some ways similar to the Shannon concept. 4. Mrs Thatcher said that she had not realised that the Republic also burned oil to generate electricity. This was expensive, she noted, as each time the oil price went up, Mr Hough er said he hoped that the Prime Minister would do two things:

(a) show direct personal interest in cross-border studies; and

(b) put political impulse behind the feasibility study for the Wales/Wexford electricity link.

Mr Atkins said he thought it was important that the North/South interconnector should be re-established. Mr Hough er agreed but said that he was really interested in the Wales/Wexford electricity link. Would HMG be prepared to share in the cost of a feasibility study? It was explained that a feasibility study was being produced by the respective Departments of Energy. Mr Hough er said that he hoped that more could be done about the cross-border studies. He had met those concerned with the Derry/Donegal and Erne catchment area studies: they were dissatisfied with the lack of impetus on the British side. He would like to be assured that the British Government attached importance to them. Mr O’Kennedy explained that some of these projects were funded from the non-quota section of the Community’s Regional Fund. Mr Hough er summed up by saying that he hoped that more political push could be given to these studies. The Prime Minister agreed.

Mr Hough er said he wished to underline the importance to Ireland of the CAP and the social implications of inadequate incomes for farmers. Mr Hough er said that the discussion at Luxembourg had been bleak, unemployment was...
very bad throughout the Community; things were worse than the communiqué had indicated; everything depended on the price of oil. It was vital to defeat inflation: she was watching developments in the United States with great concern. If the States did not come out of recession we would all be in a bad position. Mr. Haughey said that the Irish Government intended to go ahead with voting reciprocity for British citizens in the Republic, though there were still some technical problems connected with the new British Nationality Act. He hoped that it would be possible for the two Governments to cooperate on the Security Council. Finally he asked to be kept fully up-to-date on questions like Poland, on which Ireland had relatively little information.
FM DUBLIN 11/1600Z DEC 1980  

TO IMMEDIATE F CO  

TELEGRAM NUMBER 372 OF 11 DEC  

AND TO IMMEDIATE N IO BELFAST  

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON B I S NEW YORK  

DAIL DEBATE ON THE MEETING BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND MR HAUGHEY

1. THIS MORNING THE DAIL DEBATED A MOTION moved by the government that ""THIS HOUSE TAKES NOTE OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE MEETING BETWEEN THE TAOISEACH AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER IN DUBLIN, ON 8 DECEMBER 1980"", FULL TEXTS OF THE TAOISEACH'S OPENING AND CLOSING SPEECHES AND THOSE OF MESSRS FITZGERALD AND CLUSKEY FOLLOW BY TOMORROW'S BAG.

2. MR HAUGHEY OPENED THE DEBATE WITH A CAREFULLY PHRASED, SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE STATEMENT. HE DESCRIBED THE BRITISH DELEGATION AS ""THE MOST IMPORTANT TO VISIT THIS COUNTRY SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THIS STATE ON INDEED FOR A LONG TIME BEFORE THEN"", AND THE TALKS AS ""EXTREMELY VALUABLE ...CONDUCTED THROUGHOUT IN THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT."" HE REFERRED REPEATEDLY TO THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH ""DEScribes SPECIFICALLY WHAT EMERGED"" FROM THE MEETING.

3. THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF HIS STATEMENT REFERS TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE COMMUNIQUE: ""THE JOINT STUDIES WILL EMBRACE POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, SECURITY MATTERS, ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE UNDERSTANDING. IT WOULD BE OUR WISH AND OUR INTENTION THAT THE APPROACH TO POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES WOULD BE OPEN AND FLEXIBLE, UNRESTRICTED BY PREJUDICE AND THAT DIFFERENT CONCEPTS WOULD BE CONSIDERED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTED TOWARDS PEACE AND RECONCILIATION , THE WORDS ""TOTALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THESE ISLANDS"" IN MY VIEW SIMPLY MEAN THAT THE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO WHICH OUR NEXT MEETING WILL BE DEVOTED DOES NOT EXCLUDE ANYTHING THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ACHIEVE PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND STABILITY , AND TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES ... IT IS SCARCELY TO BE EXPECTED...""
THAT THERE WILL BE A FULL COINCIDENCE OF IDEAS. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THAT THERE IS AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT JOINT STUDIES IN WHICH ALL WAYS FORWARD CAN BE EXPLORED WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT ON EITHER SIDE.

4. ON H BLOCK, MR HAUGHEY SAID THAT THE "IRISH GOVERNMENT'S DEEP CONCERN AND ANXIETY ABOUT THE...SITUATION FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN OUR DISCUSSION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT CONCERN AND I BELIEVE THAT OUR MEETING AND THE STATEMENT INCLUDED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ABOUT THE H BLOCK PROTEST CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A PROCESS WHEREBY A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND". HE ADDED, "WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, AS OUTLINED BY THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 4TH, THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND."

5. MR HAUGHEY DESCRIBED THE SAFETY AND WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, PARTICULARLY THE UNIONIST SECTION OF THAT COMMUNITY" AS A "SPECIAL PERSONAL PRIORITY", AND AFFIRMED, "NORTHERN IRELAND'S POLITICAL LEADERS CLEARLY HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT PART TO PLAY IN ANY SOLUTION AND I WOULD LIKE TO SEE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR APPROPRIATE INVOLVEMENT OF SUCH LEADERS IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THEY HAVE PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE JOINT STUDIES ON SECURITY MATTERS WHICH COULD WELL BE INTER-RELATED WITH THOSE ON POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES."

6. MR HAUGHEY DEVOTED MUCH OF THE REMAINDER OF HIS SPEECH TO A DEFENCE OF THE MEETING AGAINST "COMMENTATORS WHO FOR THEIR OWN REASONS HAVE TRIES TO PUT DIFFERENT GLOSSES ON WHAT WAS SAID."

7. THE FINE GAEL LEADER DR GARRET FITZGERALD SPOKE NEXT. HIS STATEMENT WAS MEASURED AND RESTRAINED. HE STRESSED AT THE OUTSET THAT HE DID NOT PROPOSE TO REFER TO THE H BLOCK ISSUE WHICH HE SAID WAS A MATTER ON WHICH HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MR CLUSKEY AND THE TAOISEACH IN THE PAST WEEK SEMICOLON "NOTHING THAT COULD BE SAID IN THIS HOUSE AT THE PRESENT TIME ON THIS ISSUE COULD ADD ANYTHING USEFUL TO WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY SAID". TURNING TO MEETING ITSELF, DR FITZGERALD SPOKE OF HIS "REGRET" THAT MRS THATCHER "SHOULD HAVE PLACED THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AS DERIVING FROM THE FACT THAT OUR STATE IS THE ONLY ONE WITH WHICH THE UK SHARES A LAND FRONTIER", HE THOUGHT THAT THE UNIQUENESS STEMMED FROM CLOSE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL LINKS THAT WERE THE PRODUCTS OF JOINT HISTORY. HE ALSO REGRETTED THAT SHE "SHOULD HAVE FELT IT NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO POSSIBILITY OF CONFESSION FLOWING FROM THE DISCUSSIONS AT DUBLIN CASTLE", DR FITZGERALD CONCLUDED THAT THE TAOISEACH'S CHOICE OF AN INDIRECT APPROACH WHICH INVOLVED IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AS THE CONTEXT FOR

RESTRICTED /CHANGE IN
CHANGE IN ATTITUDES IN THE NORTH WAS A LONG ROAD, AND THE
MATTER WOULD NOT BE SETTLED OVER THE HEADS OF THE PEOPLE IN THE
NORTH. HOWEVER, HE WISHED THE TAOISEACH’S EFFORTS WELL.

8. PREDICTABLY, MR CLUSKEY WAS MORE AGGRESSIVE, ALTHOUGH HE
PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING THAT HE TOO DID NOT PROPOSE TO
SPEAK ABOUT THE H BLOCK SITUATION. HE SAID THAT BUT FOR THE DIFFERING
INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN OF THE OUTCOME OF THE
MEETING, HE WOULD HAVE HAD CAUSE TO CONGRATULATE THE TAOISEACH.
HE CONTRASTED MR HAUGHEY’S STATEMENTS IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE
("FULL OF IMPLICATION, HINTING, INNUNENDOES") WITH MRS THATCHER’S
CLEAR EXPLANATION OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE SAID THAT MR HAUGHEY
HAD SPOKEN IN THIS WAY IN ORDER TO GAIN POLITICAL ADVANTAGE
AND SUGGESTED, (AMID HUROWS OF ‘DISGRACEFUL’ FROM THE
FIANNA FAIL BENCHES) THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN TRUTHFUL. IN HIS VIEW,
EXPLOITING THE RISING SECTARIAN TENSIONS IN THE NORTH WAS
NOTHING SHORT OF CRIMINAL, AND HE CHALLENGED THE TAOISEACH TO
SAY WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE MEETING.

9. THERE FOLLOWED A SERIES OF SHORT SPEECHES. MR LENIHAN
STRESSED THAT THE REACTION TO THE MEETING BY THE MEDIA HAD BEEN
HIGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE" AND THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT IN MOBILISING
PUBLIC SUPPORT IN IRELAND AND BRITAIN.
WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS POSITIVE THINKING. THE REMAINDER OF HIS
SPEECH WAS TIED CLOSELY TO THE COMMUNIQUE.
MR NEIL BLANEY CHARACTERISTICALLY ASSAULTED THE GOVERNMENT FOR
HAVING TALKS WITH THE BRITISH AT A TIME WHEN THE COUNTRY WAS STILL
PARTITIONED AND WHEN IRISHMEN WERE DYING IN BRITISH JAILS.
FAR FROM BEING "UNIQUE", HE THOUGHT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND IRELAND WAS "BIZARRE". HE DEMANDED TO KNOW WHY
THE REPUBLIC SHOULD HAVE TO PAY TO MAINTAIN THE BORDER,
AND WHETHER THE TAOISEACH HAD ASKED MRS THATCHER TO DECLARE HER
INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING THE BRITISH PRESENCE FROM IRELAND.

10. MR MICHEAL O’KENNEDY REPLIED MR CLUSKEY’S CRITICISMS. HE THOUGHT
THAT THE LABOUR LEADER’S INSISTENCE ON KNOWING WHAT PRECISELY
WOULD BE DONE AT EACH STAGE WAS A MARK OF HIS WANT OF "EXPERIENCE"
IN DEALING WITH SUCH "DEEP HISTORICAL PROBLEMS". HE THEN TOUCHED
ON HIS BY NOW FAMILIAR THEME, THE SHORT COMINGS OF THE NORTHERN
IRELAND ECONOMY. WHAT WAS NEEDED, HE THOUGHT, WAS AN
ADAPTATION OF STRUCTURES THERE TO MEET THE FUTURE.
IN THIS CONTEXT HE THOUGHT THE JOINT STUDIES WOULD BE USEFUL,
BUT HE ADDED THAT HE PROBLEMS OF DERRY, STRABANE, AND CARRICKFERGUS
WOULD "TAX INGENUITU"
WINDING UP FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE TAOISEACH DELIVERED A LOW KEY STATEMENT, REITERATING HIS BELIEF THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN "CONSTRUCTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT". DESCRIBING MR CLUSKEY'S INTERVENTION AS MORE THAN USUALLY DEPRESSING". AND STATING CATEGORICALLY THAT NO DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND HIMSELF EXISTED. HE STRESSED IN REPLY TO AN EARLIER QUESTION FROM MR PADDY HARTE (FINE GAEL SPOKESMAN ON THE NORTH) THAT HE HAD "NEVER ONCE USED THE WORDS 'CONFEDERATION', OR FEDERATION' OR THE WORD 'CONSTITUTION'". HE SAID HE HAD WATCHED MRS THATCHER ON THE TELEVISION, AND WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH HER WHEN SHE SAID THAT "WE ARE EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEING WHETHER WE CAN GIVE SOME FORM OF INSTITUTIONAL EXPRESSION TO THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES SO AS TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY AND IMPROVE RELATIONS". HE ADDED "WE ARE CONCERNED IN THIS PARTICULAR COMMUNIQUE WITH INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVES WHICH WE HAVE IN MIND. I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS ANY ROOM FOR AMBIGUITY ABOUT THAT......."

THE MOTION WAS CARRIED.

FIGG

FOO/WHITEHALL ADDITIONAL DISTR.
RID NORTHERN IRELAND

4

RESTRICTED
Thank you so much for your warm hospitality on Monday. I greatly enjoyed my brief visit and our discussions together. I also much appreciated the immense trouble which had obviously been taken over the arrangements - particularly on the security side. I should be grateful if you could arrange for my thanks to be conveyed to all those concerned.

We have carried the development of relations between our two governments a stage further. The reactions to the Communiqué have already shown how great the difficulties are going to be but I believe the path on which we have set out is the right one.

Yours sincerely,
Margaret Thatcher

Mr Charles Haughey, TD
I have arranged for Ian Paisley to come and see you at 11.00 a.m. next Friday. At the moment I have told him that the meeting will be in the House of Commons but would you like me to change it to No. 10?

11 December 1980
10 Downing Street

The Prime Minister

10 December 1980

Dear Mr. Paisley,

Thank you for your letter of 9 December about reaction in Northern Ireland to my meeting on Monday with Mr. Haughey and the communiqué (a copy of which I enclose) issued after it. I should be sorry if there were to be any misapprehension in Northern Ireland about the outcome of that meeting, and would therefore be glad to meet you shortly as you suggest. My office will be in touch with you to arrange a time.

Perhaps in advance of our meeting I can say a word of reassurance. As I have repeatedly underlined since my return from my meeting with Mr. Haughey, Northern Ireland Unionists have nothing to fear from the further development of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic or from the programme of joint studies on which the two Governments are to embark. The major part of the programme of studies - dealing with citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding - covers matters which self-evidently merit closer attention and further development.

As regards the other topic - which you single out in your letter - I cannot answer for what Mr. Haughey may have said about the studies of possible new institutional structures. But it is

[clear to me that]
clear to me that such institutions, assuming that the two Governments reached agreement on them, would be intended solely to bring the United Kingdom and the Republic closer together in a friendly and fruitful relationship. Many other nations have found such institutions beneficial. Since it is part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland would, of course, be involved with any such new structures and would, I believe, benefit greatly from them.

In your letter you attribute special significance to the use of the word 'dissent' in the communique. You are wrong to do so. The fact that there are differences in Northern Ireland is hardly open to question. It is against that background that the communique recognises, as I am sure you do, the need for peace, reconciliation and stability in Northern Ireland. The development of relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic could have an important part to play in helping to meet that need.

Finally, let me stress that it remains a fundamental assumption of all Government thinking on these matters that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and will remain so unless its people and the Westminster Parliament decide otherwise. I could hardly have made that clearer than I have done in recent days both in the House of Commons and outside it.

Unless you see objection, I propose to make public the text of this letter at the same time as news of your appointment with me is released.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.
1. The Taoiseach, Mr C J Haughey, TD, today met the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, in Dublin Castle. The Taoiseach was accompanied by Mr Brian Lenihan, TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Mr Michael O'Kennedy, TD, Minister for Finance. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Geoffrey Howe, MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins, MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

2. The meeting, which was the first of those on which the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed when they met in London on 21 May, covered a range of international issues, and the future development of the European Community, including the Budget, the Common Agricultural Policy, EMS and fisheries, as well as other matters of concern to both countries.

3. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the useful exchanges at Ministerial and official level since their last meeting, leading to new and closer co-operation in energy, transport, communications, cross-border economic developments and security. They agreed that further improvements in these and other fields should be pursued.

4. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed that the economic, social and political interests of the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic are inextricably linked, but that the full development of these links has been put under strain by division and dissent in Northern Ireland. In that context they accepted the need to bring forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability; and to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries.

5. They considered that the best prospect of attaining these objectives was further development of the unique relationship between the two countries.
6. They accordingly decided to devote their next meeting in London during the coming year to special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands. For this purpose they have commissioned joint studies, covering a range of issues including possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding.

7. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister recalled the statements issued on behalf of their Governments on 4 December about the situation in the H Blocks and reiterated the hope that the statement made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 4 December would provide the basis on which the issues could be resolved.

8. The discussions were regarded by both sides as extremely constructive and significant.

10 Downing Street
Whitehall    SW1
8 December 1980.
INTERVIEW ON THE "WORLD AT ONE" WITH THE RT. HON. ENOCH POWELL, M.P., WEDNESDAY, 10 DECEMBER

(Interviewer: Robin Day)

I asked Mr. Powell first if he had any idea or hunch as to what the Thatcher/Haughey talks really mean.

EP: I don't think we've heard everything yet which transpired. And very often the most important parts of an iceberg are under the surface. But I would have thought the public themselves were in a position to form a fair judgment by seeing the Prime Minister and three senior members of the British Government go across to hob-nob with the Prime Minister of a country which actually claims sovereignty over a part of the United Kingdom and come away with an agreed Communiqué almost dictated in his own language. I think they'll form their own opinion about that, though maybe they'll form it more swiftly about this mini-Munich than they did about the major Munich in 1938. But I don't know. That remains to be seen.

RD: On what grounds do you describe it as a 'mini-Munich'?

EP: Because it's a visible humiliation of the Government of the United Kingdom to go and hob-nob, as I say, with a nation which claims sovereignty over part of its territory and to discuss with it the internal affairs of part of the United Kingdom, namely, the management of Her Majesty's Prisons.

RD: Now, you notice that Mr. Haughey has said that these talks achieved an historic breakthrough . . .


RD: I was going on about that. And the Joint Communiqué says that the talks were extremely constructive and significant. Now, don't these words, allowing for a Communiqué jargon, suggest that something big is going on behind the scenes and we're not being told?

/EP: They
EP: They certainly suggest that the United Kingdom is being sold out. There is no doubt who's pleased about it and there's no doubt who stands to gain from it. Obviously the Irish Prime Minister in his forthcoming elections. That does give it a certain resemblance to the major events of 1938. I suppose being a mini nation now we can only have mini-Munichs. But they're still just as shameful and humiliating.

RD: But on what grounds are you suggesting that these talks mean that the United Kingdom is being sold out? I take your point about 'hob-nobbing in Dublin' but that in itself - because talks like this have happened before - that does not, in itself, prove a sell-out.

EP: Well, I don't know about that because if I were dealing with the leader of a country which claims sovereignty over part of the United Kingdom I'd tell him if he wanted to talk to me he'd better come to my capital.

RD: But it's not the first time British Ministers have gone to Dublin to talk?

EP: No. It's not the first time that British Ministers have failed to understand the trap in which they involve themselves when dealing in this way with the Irish public.

RD: What do you understand by this curious Community phrase about 'special consideration will be given' and I quote 'to the totality of relations between these islands'? What do you think that means?

EP: Well, that's fluffed. So that the Irish can interpret it as meaning the relationship of the Province of Ulster with the Irish Republic and so that the British Prime Minister - at any rate until the Foreign Office take her for another ride - can maintain that it's only concerned with the relationships between the United Kingdom as such and the Irish Republic as such.

/RD: May
RD: May I put to you a supposition, Mr. Powell? And, of course, I know even less about what happened than you do.

EP: I doubt it.

RD: Well, supposing the Government's idea was to create a new relationship - perhaps by treaty - between the Republic and the UK, and the UK, including, of course, Northern Ireland, with certain new institutions to deal with common cross-border problems. Would such a scheme, or one like it, would that be odious to the Ulster majority?

EP: That would depend on how they dealt with what problems. For example, if it meant that the Irish Republic removed from its constitution the clause on which, of course, all the activity of the IRA and all the opponents of the union are based, which asserts that Northern Ireland is part of the territory of a Republic - if they did that. And if they agreed to extradite to the United Kingdom those who are on criminal charges in the United Kingdom. If that was the attitude, if that was going to be the arrangement, then I'm sure everyone would welcome it, including Ulster.

RD: Perhaps that has been part of the historic breakthrough of which Mr. Haughey talks?

EP: Well, if you'll believe that, you'll believe anything, especially after reading the Communique.

RD: Do you not fear a time, Mr. Powell, when the British public may lose patience with the overwhelming Ulster majority if they are seen to obstruct a possible way of going forward to peace?

EP: Yes, of course. If they were obstructing the maintenance of law and order and of the enforcement of the Queen's laws throughout the United Kingdom, then I would say they didn't deserve to be part of the United Kingdom. But if that majority
says to Parliament in which it is shortly going to be fully represented... it is already substantially represented... if it says to Parliament 'We accept the laws which Parliament makes. We accept the United Kingdom as our nation. We want the same rights - no more, no less - and the same treatment for everyone in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the United Kingdom' then I say that whatever people imagine, they would find when they came to it that it would impossible to expel their fellow subjects from their own country.
10 December 1980

I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from James Molyneaux M.P. We have already sent you an advance copy of this letter.

I should be grateful if you would suggest a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Molyneaux. Unless you feel that there are good reasons for suggesting a faster or slower timetable, may we please have that draft by close of play on Tuesday, 16 December?

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure for information to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

N J SANDERS

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
10 December 1980

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 10 December, which I will place before her at once.

You will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N J SANDERS

James Molyneaux, Esq., M.P., M.P.
PRIME MINISTER

Here is James Molyneaux's response to your agreement in the House yesterday to accept from him a list of subjects for possible inclusion in the joint studies with the Irish Government.

We will let you have a draft reply, to go to him after the weekend.

10 December 1980
10 December, 1980.

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for agreeing to let me put before you a list of some of the subjects to which the joint studies mentioned in the Dublin communique of 8 December might usefully be directed.

1. Arrangements for extradition from the Republic of persons charged with serious offences in the United Kingdom.

2. The removal from the constitution of the Republic of the claim to include in its territory a part of the United Kingdom.

3. A review of the citizenship laws of the two countries with a view to eliminating (A) the anomalous position whereby nationals of the Republic possess the franchise in the United Kingdom (a hang-over from the time when the United Kingdom continued to consider the Free State as constitutionally analogous to the Dominion of Canada) and (b) those provisions of the Republic’s citizenship law which afford dual citizenship to unduly extended categories of persons.

4. Delimitation of the international frontier in the Foyle estuary and Carlingford Lough and outwards to the Two hundred mile or median limits.

5. Modification of the 'Common Travel Area' with a view to (a) the enforcement of U.K. and E.E.C. law on movement and immigration and (b) better identification and verification of persons.
MOVING BETWEEN THE TWO STATES.

6. IMPROVED CO-OPERATION IN THE MAINTENANCE OF CUSTOMS AND SECURITY SURVEILLANCE ON THE COMMON FRONTIER.

The above appear to us to be among the most important and urgent topics; but I am sure you would permit me, if others arise from time to time, to bring them to your attention. Perhaps, however, as I have referred to the terms of the communique, I might append certain observations in order to avoid any doubt or misapprehension as to the position of the Ulster Unionist Party.

The Right Honourable Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP.
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.
APPENDIX.

10 December, 1980.

While favourable to commercial activity between the United Kingdom and the Republic, we believe that any state intervention designed to promote and assist it is best co-ordinated, when necessary, at national level, and not at the level of provincial and local authorities.

We consider that it is profoundly misconceived to apply the description "division and dissent" to the terrorist campaign waged against Northern Ireland and its people with a view to detaching them from the Union, or to the consequences for every part of the community which that terrorist attack has produced. In desiring to see an end to that campaign, virtually all the people of Northern Ireland are as one. The end will only come when the aggressors are made to understand that their object is unattainable.

We regret that the attempt of certain prisoners in HM Prisons to extort by breach of prison discipline and by hunger striking a status which the Government has rightly made it clear can not and will not be conceded were described in the communiqué as "issues" to be "resolved" and that they were brought within the ambit of discussions with another Government. We would respectfully remind you of your repeated assertions that the internal affairs of the United Kingdom and all its parts are exclusively a matter for this country and for its Parliament and Government, and we regret that the Dublin meeting and the communiqué will be widely misinterpreted as conflicting with those assertions.
By large Mr Haughey seems to me to have played with a fiddling the straight ball. It would have been all too easy for him to have gone a bit further.

My Telno 368 and Telecon Newington-Staples of this morning:
Meeting between Mrs Thatcher and Mr Haughey.

1. Following are extracts from our transcript of the press conference which the Taoiseach gave after his meeting with Mrs Thatcher on the evening of 8 December.

Question:
Could you please explain a little more what the communiqué means by the phrase "joint studies covering a range of issues including possible new institutional structures"? Is this a reference to some sort of new Irish plan that we have heard about, with the...
TO SOME SORT OF NEW IRISH PLAN THAT WE HAVE HEARD ABOUT, WITH THE IDEA OF PERHAPS OF CONFEDERATION BEING LOOKED AT AND STATE ASSEMBLIES IN BELFAST AND DUBLIN? COULD YOU PERHAPS EXPAND ON THAT PHRASE AT ALL?

MR HAUGHEY: THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDIES IS TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT SORT OF INSTITUTIONS MIGHT BE BROUGHT FORWARD TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PURPOSES OUTLINED IN THE PARAGRAPH. FOR MY PART I DON’T SET ANY LIMIT TO WHAT INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE CONCEIVED OR BROUGHT FORWARD AS LONG AS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THIS ISLAND GENERALLY AND TO BRINGING ABOUT PEACE AND RECONCILIATION THROUGHOUT THIS ISLAND.

QUESTION: IN RELATION TO PARAGRAPH 6 THERE’S A SENTENCE MENTIONING THE ”TOTALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THESE ISLANDS”, THEN YOU GO ON TO TALK ABOUT THE ”JOINT STUDIES”. IS IT TRUE TO SAY THAT THIS PUTS AN EMPHASIS ON THE S.D.L.P. APPROACH, THAT WE’RE GETTING AWAY FROM POWER SHARING REGIME WITHIN THE NORTH AND THAT YOUR APPROACH IS NOW THAT, IT SEEMS TO BE AN APPROACH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE ON, THAT IN LONDON YOU WANT NOW AN OVERALL APPROACH POSSIBLY, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN ASKED, A FEDERAL SOLUTION BUT THAT YOU ARE GOING AWAY FROM THE POWER SHARING SOLUTION AS A ROLE TO SOME KIND OF FEDERAL SOLUTION?

MR HAUGHEY: WHAT’S YOUR QUESTION?

QUESTION: I’M ASKING YOU, HAVE YOU GONE AWAY FROM YOUR POWER SHARING? HAS THE IRISH GOVERNMENT DITCHED A POWER SHARING SOLUTION IN ADVANCE OF ANY OTHER TYPE OF SOLUTION BE IT FEDERAL OR AN UNITED IRELAND? THAT IS SIMPLY AND BLUNTLY THE QUESTION IF YOU WANT IT THAT WAY.

MR HAUGHEY: THE IRISH GOVERNMENT IS NOT DITCHING ANY POSSIBLE PROPOSALS OR SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM.

QUESTION: DOES THIS MEAN THAT MRS THATCHER HAS ACCEPTED THAT THERE MUST BE A RELATIONSHIP OF DUBLIN IN ANY NEW SETTLEMENT FOR NORTHERN IRELAND? THAT IT’S NO LONGER JUST AN INTERNAL PROBLEM?

MR HAUGHEY: I THINK THE COMMUNIQUE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT...
MR HAUGHEY: I THINK THE COMMUNIQUE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT IT'S THROUGH A DEVELOPMENT OF A BETTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS THAT A SOLUTION WILL EMERGE.

QUESTION: ARE YOU NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF A NEW FRIENDSHIP TREATY, A FRIENDSHIP ARRANGEMENT WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT?

MR HAUGHEY: THAT IS SOMETHING WHICH MAY POSSIBLY EMERGE FROM THE JOINT STUDIES.

QUESTION: YOU HAVE INDICATED THAT YOU WANT TO SEE THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND RAISED TO AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL LEVEL ON A BIPARTISAN APPROACH AS IT WERE BETWEEN LONDON AND DUBLIN. HAS THIS MEETING GONE ANYWAY TOWARDS ACHIEVING ANY PROGRESS ALONG THOSE LINES?

MR HAUGHEY: I THINK THAT'S INHERENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

QUESTION: COULD YOU INDICATE WHAT PROGRESS YOU FEEL HAS BEEN MADE?


QUESTION: DO YOU FEEL THAT THE FAILURE AS YOU'VE SAID OF THE ATKINS CONFERENCE INDICATES THAT THE POLITICIANS IN NORTHERN IRELAND NO LONGER HAVE A PART TO PLAY IN THE SEARCH FOR THAT SOLUTION?

MR HAUGHEY: NO, I DON'T THINK SO, I THINK THAT THE PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT PART TO PLAY AT ANY STAGE OF THE BRINGING FORWARD OF A SOLUTION.

QUESTION: SO HOW WOULD THE MACHINERY WORK AS YOU SEE IT? DO YOU SEE THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ARRIVING AT A SOLUTION AND PRESENTING IT AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND REPRESENTATIVES?

MR HAUGHEY: WELL I DON'T WANT TO GO TOO FAR AHEAD. SUFFICIENT FOR THE DAY IS THE ACHIEVEMENT THEREOF... WHAT WE BROUGHT FORWARD TODAY IS THE CONCEPT OF THESE SPECIAL STUDIES, THESE JOINT STUDIES - WHICH WILL THEN BE CONSIDERED SPECIALLY AT A MEETING IN LONDON.
WHICH WILL THEN BE CONSIDERED SPECIALLY AT A MEETING IN LONDON. I REGARD THAT AS VERY, VERY CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS, I THINK IT'S HISTORIC PROGRESS.

QUESTION: WHAT POLICIES WILL YOU ACTUALLY CONSIDER IN THESE STUDIES?

MR HAUGHEY: THEY ARE ELABORATED THERE IN THE COMMUNIQUE, POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, SECURITY MATTERS, ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

QUESTION: COULD I ASK YOU WHEN YOU SPEAK OF POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES WHAT YOU HAVE IN MIND, ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES GOVERNING IRISH-BRITISH RELATIONSHIPS OR NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES WITHIN NORTHERN IRELAND, OR A COMBINATION OF THE TWO?

MR HAUGHEY: A COMBINATION — BOTH ARE POSSIBLY YES. WE SET NO LIMIT ON WHAT INSTITUTIONS MIGHT BE BROUGHT FORWARD, MIGHT BE CONSIDERED, MIGHT BE DESIGNED, MIGHT BE CONCEIVED AS LONG AS THEY SEEM TO BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE OBJECTIVES SET OUT IN THE PARAGRAPHS.

QUESTION: WILL THESE PROPOSALS ON NEW INSTITUTIONS WHEN THEY COME FORWARD BE FOLLOWED BY CONFERENCE OF BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS AND POSSIBLY PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES FROM NORTHERN IRELAND?

MR HAUGHEY: THEY WILL BE BROUGHT FORWARD FOR SPECIAL CONSIDERATION AT A MEETING IN LONDON WHICH WILL SPECIALLY CONSIDER THEM. BEYOND THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY.

QUESTION: DOES THAT MEAN THEN THAT THESE STUDIES WILL BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR YOUR NEXT MEETING WITH MRS THATCHER? WILL THAT BE BEFORE NEXT JUNE?

MR HAUGHEY: AGAIN I CAN'T SET A DATE ON THAT.

QUESTION: THE LAST TIME YOU SPOKE, THE ATKINS INITIATIVE WAS GOING ON IN MAY. THAT HAS NOW FAILED COMPLETELY. DO YOU FEEL THAT MRS THATCHER NOW RECOGNISES WHAT YOU WERE SAYING THAT A SOLUTION WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ONLY WAS NOT POSSIBLE?

MR HAUGHEY: I THINK A QUESTION LIKE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED TO MRS THATCHER HERSELF. I CAN ONLY SPEAK FOR MY VIEWS AND MY POSITION.
QUESTION: ACCORDING TO PARAGRAPH 2, BOTH SIDES REGARDED THE TALKS
QUOTE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT UNQUOTE. FOR THE BENEFIT
OF OUR VIEWERS WHO ARE NOT AWARE OF COMPLEXITIES OF COMMUNIQUES
COULD YOU SUM UP FOR US WHAT YOU FEEL THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
ELEMENTS IN TODAY'S TALKS HAVE BEEN?

MR HAUGHEY: IN MY VIEW THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IS THE DECISION
to commission joint studies on these very important areas and the
decision to give them special consideration at a further meeting
in London.

QUESTION: YOU TALK ABOUT THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
two countries and you say you have an open mind about that relation-
ship, would you in the long term exclude the possibility of the
united ireland having some association with the commonwealth?

MR HAUGHEY: I DON'T THINK THAT THE COMMONWEALTH IS A LIVE ISSUE
AT ALL IN THIS CONTEXT.

QUESTION: YOU HAVE USED THE WORD THERE EARLIER IN TALKING ABOUT
PARAGRAPH 6 THAT THERE WAS AN QUOTE HISTORIC UNQUOTE — I THINK
YOU USED THE PHRASE WHEN YOU WERE REPLYING TO ONE QUESTION — IT
WAS A RATHER HISTORIC CONFERENCE TODAY. ARE WE THEN IN SUMMING UP
to say that you mean by using the word historic that it was a
SIGNIFICANT BREAK-THROUGH TODAY IN THE SENSE THAT THE IRISH
QUESTION WAS PUT ON A PLANE THAT THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS
WOULD SOLVE IT, MOVE TOWARDS A SOLUTION AT THIS LONDON CONFERENCE
AFTER THE JOINT STUDIES HAVE BEEN PRESENTED, ARE WE TODAY
IN THE MIDDLE OF AN HISTORIC BREAK-THROUGH?

MR HAUGHEY: I WOULD BE HOPEFUL THAT WE ARE, AND I WOULD ACCEPT YOUR
STATEMENT THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOW FIRMLY ON A NEW PLANE FOR
DISSCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE IRISH GOVERNMENTS.

QUESTION: DO YOU THINK FROM YOUR PERSONAL CHEMISTRY WHICH EXISTED
BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND YOURSELF TODAY DO YOU FEEL OPTIMISTIC
THAT SHE HAS GOT A REAL GRASP OF THE PROBLEM ESPECIALLY THE
H-BLOCK SITUATION BECAUSE IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SUGGESTED THAT ONE
OF THE PROBLEMS IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS IS A LACK OF AWARENESS
OF THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM ESPECIALLY AMONGST TORY
POLITICIANS. DO YOU THINK THAT MRS THATCHER UNDERSTANDS THE
SITUATION?

MR HAUGHEY: I CERTAINLY AM SATISFIED THAT MRS THATCHER
FULLY Grace AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION BUT RECURS
MR HAUGHEY: I CERTAINLY AM SATISFIED THAT MRS THATCHER HAS A FULL GRASP AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION BUT PERHAPS I MIGHT REFER TO THE COMMUNIQUE AGAIN HERE WHERE IT MENTIONS THAT WE'VE GOT TO BRING FORWARD POLICIES AND PROPOSALS FOR BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING - I THINK THAT VERY IMPORTANT, I THINK IN THAT AREA OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE TWO ISLANDS THERE IS GREAT SCOPE FOR WORK AND DEVELOPMENT.

QUESTION: ARE YOU HAPPY WITH MRS THATCHER'S LEVEL OF UNDERSTANDING?

MR HAUGHEY: YES.

QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THAT THE LOYALISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE ANY REASON TO BE CONCERNED AS A RESULT OF WHAT HAPPENED HERE IN THE CONFERENCE TODAY?

MR HAUGHEY: CERTAINLY NOT, NO. I WOULD HOPE THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THAT WE ARE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH SECURING PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND PROMOTING THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF ALL THESE ISLANDS. I THINK I MIGHT RECALL WHAT I SAID IN MY ARD FHEIS SPEECH THAT WE WOULD AWARD A SPECIAL PRIORITY TO THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND PARTICULARLY THE UNIONIST SECTION OF THAT COMMUNITY.

QUESTION: DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU WILL BE MAKING CHANGES IN THE LAW HERE TO TRY AND ACCOMMODATE THOSE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH?

MR HAUGHEY: THAT IS SOMETHING WHICH COULD EMERGE IN THE FUTURE ARISING OUT OF THESE STUDIES.

QUESTION: YOU SAID THAT YOU THINK TODAY'S MEETING WAS HISTORIC OR YOU HOPE IT WAS, AND THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE FAILURE OF THE ATKINS' INITIATIVE MAKES LONDON LOOK TO SOME EXTENT MORE AT DUBLIN FOR A MIDDLE-TERM SOLUTION?

MR HAUGHEY: I WOULD PREFER NOT TO COMMENT ON THAT. I JUST TAKE TODAY'S MEETING ON ITS OWN MERITS AS A VERY SUCCESSFUL MEETING, A SIGNIFICANT MEETING, A CONSTRUCTIVE MEETING, A MEETING WHICH IN MY VIEW HAS BROUGHT VERY CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL MOVEMENT FORWARD INTO THIS TRAGIC SITUATION OF NORTHERN IRELAND.

QUESTION: SOME OF THE BEST EXPERTS SAY THAT THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM IS THAT THERE IS NO SOLUTION. WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON THAT?
MR. HAUGHEY: I WOULD TOTALLY DISOWN ANY SUCH PROPOSITION. I BELIEVE THAT THE NORTHERN IRELAND SITUATION CAN BE SOLVED, AND WILL BE SOLVED, AND I BELIEVE WE'VE TAKEN A MAJOR STEP IN THAT DIRECTION TODAY.

FIGG.

NNNNNN

SENT/43:RECD AT 101643Z HMT/SAR
NORTHERN IRELAND: ADVANCE COPIES

PS N IRELAND OFFICE - PS TO Sec of State
PS/LPS RM 66 A/2 GGS
PS/PUS [4 copies]
MR BULLARD SIR K STOWE
MR FERGUSSON MR MORIATy
HD/RID MR MARSHALL
HD/PSUD (2) MR BUXTON
HD/IPT
LD/NEWS DEPT CABINET OFFICE - SIR R ARMSTRONG
... NO 10 DOWNING STREET
...

RESIDENT CLERK

ADVANCE COPY

GRS .275
CONFIDENTIAL
FROM DUBLIN 1017302 DECEMBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 378 OF 10 DECEMBER.
AND TO IMMEDIATE N I O (BELFAST) FOR INFO.

YOUR TELNO 115: ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT.

1. COUNSELLOR CONVEYED THE MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TUR TO BOTH NALLY (TAOISEACH'S DEPARTMENT) AND NELIGAN (DFA) THIS AFTERNOON. NALLY'S OWN REACTION WAS READY ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF OUR MESSAGE, AND HE UNDERTOOK TO SUBMIT IT VERY RAPIDLY IN THE LIGHT OF TOMORROW'S DAIL DEBATE. LATER HE CONVEYED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN REPLY:

QUOTE WE HAVE RECEIVED THE MESSAGE AND HAVE FOLLOWED WITH ADMIRATION THE VERY SKILLFUL WAY IN WHICH QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED. WE ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND WILL DO NOTHING TO EXACERBATE THEM. WE PROPOSE TO FOLLOW SUIT IN DEALING WITH THE MATTER WITH GREAT CARE. UNQUOTE.
2. THE DUBLIN PRESS, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO INTERPRET THE Taoiseach AS CONFIRMING THAT IDEAS OF CONFEDERATION ARE ON THE TABLE.
I HAVE ALREADY DRAWN ATTENTION (MY TLENO 369, PARAGRAPH 3) TO THE IRISH TIMES ATTRIBUTION YESTERDAY TO QUOTE AN IRISH GOVERNMENT SOURCE UNQUOTE OF A STATEMENT IN THIS SENSE. TODAY'S IRISH PRESS INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH:

QUOTE THE CONTROVERSY WHICH WILL BE CARRIED OVER INTO TOMORROW'S DEBATE CENTRES ROUND THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN MR HAUGHEY'S INTERPRETATION OF THE JOINT STUDIES...MR HAUGHEY SAID THAT THEY OFFERED ALL KINDS OF POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW FEDERAL OR CONFEDERAL ARRANGEMENT TO RESOLVE THE NORTHERN IRELAND PROBLEM: MRS THATCHER BY CONTRAST HAS STATED THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO POSSIBILITY OF A CONFEDERATION FLOWING FROM THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. UNQUOTE.

FICC.

NNNNN

[Signature]
Dear Michael,

Anglo/Irish Summit

I attach a copy of FCO telegram no 155 to Dublin which we sent at your request this morning.

The Counsellor in Dublin spoke as instructed to Mr Nally this afternoon. Mr Nally subsequently telephoned the following message, which clearly had the Taoiseach's approval:

"We have received the message and have followed with admiration the very skilful way in which questions have been answered. We are fully aware of the difficulties and will do nothing to exacerbate them. We propose to follow suit in dealing with the matter with great care."

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roy Harrington in the Northern Ireland Office.

Yours ever,

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL

OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 1014152)
GRS 175
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKBY 1014152
FM FCO 1013312 DEC 80
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 155 OF 10 DECEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE NIO BELFAST

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
1. PLEASE TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO THE TAOISEACH'S OFFICE, PREFERABLY NALLY, ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO SPEAK SIMILARLY TO THE DFA IF YOU THINK IT USEFUL.

2. WE READILY UNDERSTAND THAT THE TAOISEACH HAS PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS IN EXPLAINING PARA. 6 OF THE COMMUNIQUE, AND THAT HE IS BOUND TO COME UNDER PRESSURE TO COMMENT ON SUGGESTIONS THAT 'NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES' MIGHT INCLUDE FEDERAL OR CONFEDERAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE HAVE NOTED THE CARE WITH WHICH HE RESPONDED TO SUCH SUGGESTIONS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, BUT THIS DID NOT STOP THE PRESS FROM INTERPRETING WHAT HE SAID AS CONFIRMATION THAT SUCH IDEAS ARE ON THE TABLE. WE HOPE THE TAOISEACH WILL RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH REPORTS CAUSE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR HMG AND THAT HE WILL TAKE GREAT CARE, BOTH IN TALKING TO THE PRESS AND IN TOMORROWS DAIL DEBATE, TO SAY NOTHING WHICH WOULD ENCOURAGE SPECULATION OF THIS KIND.

CARRINGTON

---

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED

RID
PS/MR HURD

NAD
PS/MR RIDLEY

INFORMATION D
PS/MR BLAKER

WEED
PS/PUB

MAED
SIR A ACLAND

NEWS D
CHIEF CLERK

SECURITY D
MR ADAMS

PUSD
MR BULLARD

PB
MR FERGUSON

PS/LPS
LORD N G LENNOX

MR BRAITHWAITE

CONFIDENTIAL
10 December, 1980

Many thanks for your help on Monday. I am sorry that you thought the overall standard of debate so low. Nonetheless we seem to have started something!

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

L B Smith, Esq
Dublin
Dear Nick,

You sent Roy Harrington, with your letter of 9 December, a copy of Dr Paisley's letter to the Prime Minister protesting about Monday's meeting in Dublin. My Secretary of State certainly agrees that it would be right that the Prime Minister should see Dr Paisley, and the sooner the better. I attach a draft reply confirming that, and taking up briefly the points made in his letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Paul Lever (FCO).

Yours sincerely,

M W Hopkins
M O'D B Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
No 10 Downing Street
London SW1

9 December 1980

Dear Michael

1. You may remember just before lunch yesterday that when Mr Haughey was showing the Prime Minister the throne in the main central Throne Room he invited her to sit on it. She firmly disclaimed any intention of doing so but suggested he should do so if he wished. They both laughed and went off to lunch. Barney Smith, Head of Chancery, has now told me that after the press conference, which took place while we were going off in the helicopter to the airport, Haughey returned to the Throne Room, where a lot of his officials were still milling around and drinking. He then ascended the throne and sat on it, his feet not quite touching the floor, and told the company they should now all kneel. He has a good sense of fun, and we might as well take comfort from the fact that he clearly thought the day had gone well.

Yours ever,

Leonard.

L C W Figg

Copied to:-

G G H Walden Esq
Private Secretary
Private Office
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1
9 December, 1980.

I write on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of today's date. I will place your letter before the Prime Minister at once, and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N. J. SANDERS

The Reverend Ian Paisley, M.P.
I attach a letter the Prime Minister has received this afternoon from Dr. Paisley. As I said to Mike Hopkins on the telephone, unless you have strong feelings about timing, we would propose that the Prime Minister should sign a reply tomorrow night. If you feel that it would make better sense for her to write before tomorrow's debate, I am sure that she would be willing to consider that possibility.

We think that the draft reply ought to deal with the first two paragraphs of Dr. Paisley's letter as well as his request to meet the Prime Minister, and I should be grateful if you could suggest a suitable draft. As I told Mike, the Prime Minister is very ready to meet Dr. Paisley and we have in mind that she might do so between now and Christmas.

May we please have something from you by close of play tomorrow, or earlier if you think that the reply should be sent at an earlier time?

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
I attach a letter the Prime Minister has received this afternoon from Dr. Paisley. As I said to Mike Hopkins on the telephone, unless you have strong feelings about timing, we would propose that the Prime Minister should sign a reply tomorrow night. If you feel that it would make better sense for her to write before tomorrow's debate, I am sure that she would be willing to consider that possibility.

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May we please have something from you by close of play tomorrow, or earlier if you think that the reply should be sent at an earlier time?

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

[Signature]

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
This letter from Ian Paisley is the expected request for a meeting. We have asked the Northern Ireland Office to let you have a draft that you could sign tomorrow night - or possibly earlier if they think that you should write before tomorrow's debate.

9 December, 1980.
9th December 1980.

The Rt. Hon. The Prime Minister,
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP,
House of Commons,
LONDON.

Dear Prime Minister,

The Ulster Unionist community is enraged at the communique issued after the summit meeting in Dublin yesterday.
They note that they have been portrayed as dissenters and thus made the minority in their own nation. They are further enraged by the fact that Mr. Haughey stated that the institutions referred to in the communique are new institutions for the future Government of Northern Ireland.

In this present crisis with the H-Blocks issue I think that the elected representatives of the Ulster people should be consulted by yourself.

As the Unionist who had the largest number of votes ever recorded for any candidate in Northern Ireland, and as the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party in the Commons, it is my duty to ask now for an urgent meeting with you.

Sincerely,

Ian Paisley
Prime Minister's Visit to Dublin

I enclose a copy of the record of the Prime Minister's discussion with the Taoiseach in Dublin Castle yesterday morning. I shall be grateful if the record could be given a very limited distribution.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office). I am also sending copies together with that section of the record dealing with the economic situation to John Wiggins (HM Treasury) and Kate Timms (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food).

Paul Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 09/16452 1980

TO IMMEDIATE F G O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 358 OF 09 DEC

AND TO IMMEDIATE N I OBELFAST PRIORITY WASHINGTON "IS NEW YORK

MEETING BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND MR HAUGHEY: IRISH MEDIA REACTIONS

1. YESTERDAY'S MEETING BETWEEN MRS THATCHER AND MR HAUGHEY IN DUBLIN CASTLE IS THE LEAD STORY IN TODAY'S IRISH TIMES, IRISH INDEPENDENT, AND IRISH PRESS, WHICH ALL CARRY EXTENSIVE REPORTS OF THE MEETING AND THE SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCES IN DUBLIN AND LONDON, AS WELL AS EDITORIAL COMMENT.


3. IT IS PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAS DRAWN THE MOST ATTENTION IN THE PAPERS. IRISH TIMES POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT DICK WALSH SINGLES THIS OUT, AND QUOTES MR. HAUGHEY'S STATEMENT DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THERE WAS IN HIS VIEW NO LIMITS TO THE "INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE CONCERNED OR BROUGHT FORWARD" UNDER THE JOINT STUDIES (THIS WAS TAKEN TO INCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFEDERATION). HE ALSO QUOTES AN IRISH GOVERNMENT SOURCE AS SAYING AFTERWARDS THAT THESE STUDIES MIGHT INCLUDE "FEDERATION, CONFEDERATION AND INNOVATION STRUCTURES YET TO BE DEFINED..." THE IRISH INDEPENDENT ALSO STRESSES THE SETTING UP OF INSTITUTIONS, BUT POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT CHRIS GLENNAN SPEAKS OF A "YAWNING GULF" BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVERNMENTS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH. THE IRISH PRESS POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT REPORTS MORE HOPEFULLY THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH HAD "MOVED ON TO A NEW POLITICAL LEVEL WHEN THE TAOISEACH MR. HAUGHEY AND THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER, MRS. THATCHER AGREED TO THE SETTING UP OF JOINT STUDIES BETWEEN THE IRISH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS".

EDITORIALS


5. THE IRISH PRESS EDITORIAL IS ALSO HOPEFUL: "EVEN WITHOUT TAKING THE MORE EUPHORIC INTERPRETATIONS WHICH WERE PLACED ON THE IRISH SIDE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE IT SEEMS SAFE TO SAY THAT A GOOD DAY'S WORK WAS DONE." THE EDITORIAL SINGLES OUT THE SETTING UP OF "JOINT STUDIES" AS SOMETHING WHICH "CANNOT BE DECRIED AS SOME THING OF NO SIGNIFICANCE" BUT ENDS ON A CAUTIOUS NOTE, REMARKING ON THE TROUBLING SPECTRE WHICH HANGS OVER THE TALKS IN THE FORM OF "THE H BLOCK ISSUE".

6. THE IRISH INDEPENDENT EDITORIAL IS LESS CONFIDENT: "NOTHING WAS REVEALED THAT JUSTIFIES THE DESCRIPTION "HISTORIC" BEING APPLIED TO THE MEETING", ALTHOUGH IT GRUDGINGLY CONCEDES THAT "MR. HAUGHEY PROBABLY COUNTS IT AS AN ADVANCE THAT BRITAIN AND
APPLIED TO THE MEETING", ALTHOUGH IT GRUDGLINGLY CONCEDES THAT "MR HAUGHEY PROBABLY COUNTS IT AS AN ADVANCE THAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND WILL BE DISCUSSING AND OFFERING SOLUTIONS TO A PROBLEM WHICH BRITAIN INSISTED ON CLAIMING AS HER OWN DOMESTIC PROBLEM FOR A LONG TIME".

7. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF MR HAUGHEY'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY BAG.

FIGG

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 09:1849Z DH/RWS
1. The Taoiseach, Mr C J Haughey, TD, today met the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP, in Dublin Castle. The Taoiseach was accompanied by Mr Brian Lenihan, TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by Mr Michael O'Kennedy, TD, Minister for Finance. The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Rt Hon The Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Rt Hon Geoffrey Howe, MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins, MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

2. The meeting, which was the first of those on which the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed when they met in London on 21 May, covered a range of international issues, and the future development of the European Community, including the Budget, the Common Agricultural Policy, EMS and fisheries, as well as other matters of concern to both countries.

3. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction the useful exchanges at Ministerial and official level since their last meeting, leading to new and closer co-operation in energy, transport, communications, cross-border economic developments and security. They agreed that further improvements in these and other fields should be pursued.

4. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed that the economic, social and political interests of the peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic are inextricably linked, but that the full development of these links has been put under strain by division and dissent in Northern Ireland. In that context the accepted the need to bring forward policies and proposals to achieve peace, reconciliation and stability; and to improve relations between the peoples of the two countries.

5. They considered that the best prospect of attaining these objectives was further development of the unique relationship between the two countries.
6. They accordingly decided to devote their next meeting in London during the coming year to special consideration of the totality of relationships within these islands. For this purpose they have commissioned joint studies, covering a range of issues including possible new institutional structures, citizenship rights, security matters, economic co-operation and measures to encourage mutual understanding.

7. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister recalled the statements issued on behalf of their Governments on 4 December about the situation in the H Blocks and reiterated the hope that the statement made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on 4 December would provide the basis on which the issues could be resolved.

8. The discussions were regarded by both sides as extremely constructive and significant.

10 Downing Street
Whitehall    SW1
8 December 1980.
Mr. Smith will speak on 9th.

Vote at 10 and 11 am.
DRAFT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE

1. The Taoiseach, Mr Charles Haughey TD, had discussions today 8 December at Dublin Castle with the British Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher MP, who was accompanied by The Rt Hon the Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, The Rt Hon Humphrey Atkins MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Mr Brian Lenihan TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr Michael O'Kennedy TD, Minister of Finance were present. The meeting, which was the first of those on which the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed when they met in London on 21 May, covered a range of European Community and international problems as well as bilateral [political and economic] issues.

2. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister agreed that the economic, social and political interests of the peoples of the United Kingdom [of Great Britain and Northern Ireland] and the Republic [of Ireland] are inextricably linked. They further agreed that the constructive development of these links [on which progress had already been made at ministerial and official level in the fields of energy, transport and communications, and security] would be to the advantage of all their peoples.

3. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister decided to give [special/further] consideration to the development of these links at their meeting in London next year. To this end they commissioned joint studies of practical measures which might be taken [and the institutions to carry them forward]. [The joint studies would cover a range of issues of joint concern including citizenship, security and legal matters, economic co-operation, [possibly new institutional structures] and measures to encourage mutual understanding].

4. The Taoiseach and the Prime Minister noted/discussed the situation/protest in the Maze and Armagh prisons, and agreed that the statement made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr. Atkins, on 4 December provided the basis on which the issues could be resolved.
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO DUBLIN.
FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE:

BEGINNS

MEETING BETWEEN TAOISEACH AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER.


2. THE MEETING, WHICH WAS THE FIRST OF THOSE ON WHICH THE TAOISEACH AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED WHEN THEY MET IN LONDON ON 21 MAY, COVERED A RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, AND THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE BUDGET,
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE BUDGET, THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, E.H.S., AND FISHERIES, AS WELL AS OTHER MATTERS OF CONCERN TO BOTH COUNTRIES.

3. THE TAOISEACH AND THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE USEFUL EXCHANGES AT MINISTERIAL AND OFFICIAL LEVEL SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING, LEADING TO NEW AND CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN ENERGY, TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS, CROSS-BORDER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY. THEY AGREED THAT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN THESE AND OTHER FIELDS SHOULD BE PURSUED.


5. THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE BEST PROSPECT OF ATTAINING THESE OBJECTIVES WAS THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

6. THEY ACCORDINGLY DECIDED TO DEVOTE THEIR NEXT MEETING IN LONDON DURING THE COMING YEAR TO SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF THE TOTALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THESE ISLANDS. FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY HAVE COMMISSIONED JOINT STUDIES COVERING A RANGE OF ISSUES INCLUDING POSSIBLE NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, SECURITY MATTERS, ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.

7. THE TAOISEACH AND PRIME MINISTER RECALLED THE STATEMENTS ISSUED ON BEHALF OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS ON 4 DECEMBER ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE H BLOCKS AND REITERATED THE HOPE THAT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND ON 4 DECEMBER WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS ON WHICH THE ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED.

8. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE REGARDED BY BOTH SIDES AS EXTREMELY CONSTRUCTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT.

8TH DECEMBER 1982

ENDS
The Taoiseach began by saying that he had had a most interesting tete-a-tete with the Prime Minister. It was important for him to have an outline of British economic policy for the next 12 months without which he could not easily formulate his own policies. The Prime Minister asked who would be responsible for the joint studies. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said there were a number of areas where the two Governments needed to cooperate and urgent studies had to be put in hand. Some of this activity already took place in the meetings of the Anglo-Irish Economic Steering Group. There might be advantage in a Ministerial input to these meetings. There were areas in which the two countries were rivals, e.g. the attraction of inward investment.

The Taoiseach said that he had agreed with the Prime Minister on the need to combat violence, which was a major problem for both countries. The burden of security expenditure was, in per capita terms, heavier on the Republic than on the UK. They had both been satisfied with cross-border cooperation in the security area. He hoped that Mr. Atkins' statement of 4 December would form the basis
on which a solution to the H-Block situation could be brought forward. This was a dangerous issue which could interfere with security cooperation. The Prime Minister said that she also hoped that the statement would serve to terminate the strike. It contained a complete list of what was available to the strikers if they conformed. This material had never been brought together in one document before. The British Government had been concerned for some months about the situation and had been considering a change in the rules on civilian clothes. In view of the imminent hunger strike it had been agreed that for humanitarian reasons a decision should be made quickly. This had not elicited from the prisoners the sort of response which had been hoped for. There was no possibility of further concessions. The Government would never grant political status. She hoped that the full statement of the Government's position would have some effect on those on hunger strike. But there would be no surrender to violence which was the negation of democracy.

The Taoiseach said he had asked for details of the legislation which set up the enterprise zone in Belfast. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that it was in some ways similar to the Shannon concept.

The Prime Minister said that she had not realised that the Republic burned oil on a large scale to generate electricity. The Taoiseach said he hoped that the Prime Minister would do two things:-

(a) take a direct personal interest in the cross-border studies; and
(b) put a political impulse behind the feasibility study for the Wales/Wexford electricity link.

Mr. Atkins said he thought it was important that the North/South interconnector should be re-established. The Taoiseach agreed but said that he was really interested in the Wales/Wexford electricity link. Would HMG be prepared to share in the cost of a feasibility study? It was explained that a feasibility study was being produced by the respective Departments of Energy. The Taoiseach said that

/ he hoped that
he hoped that more could be done about the cross-border studies. He had met those concerned with the Derry/Donegal and Erne catchment area studies: they were dissatisfied with the lack of impetus on the British side. He would like to be assured that the British Government attached importance to them. Mr. O'Kennedy explained that some of these projects were funded from the non-quota section of the Community's Regional Fund. The Taoiseach summed up by saying that he hoped that more political push could be given to these studies. The Prime Minister agreed.

The Taoiseach said he wished to underline the importance to Ireland of the CAP and the social implication of inadequate incomes for farmers. The Prime Minister said that the discussion at Luxembourg had been bleak. Unemployment was very bad throughout the Community; things were worse than the communique had indicated; everything depended on the price of oil. It was vital to defeat inflation; she was watching developments in the United States with great concern. If the States did not come out of recession we would all be in a bad position.

The Taoiseach said that the Irish Government intended to go ahead with voting reciprocity for British citizens in the Republic, though there were still some technical problems connected with the new British Nationality Act. He hoped that it would be possible for the two Governments to cooperate on the Security Council. Finally, he asked to be kept fully up to date on questions like Poland, on which Ireland had relatively little information.

16 December 1980
RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH, MR. CHARLES HAUGHEY, IN DUBLIN CASTLE ON 8 DECEMBER 1980 AT 1045

SUBJECT

Present:-

Prime Minister
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

The Taoiseach
Mr. Dermot Nally

The Hunger Strike

The Taoiseach said that he thought the statement issued by the British Government on 4 December had been very good. The opening that had been left for further discussion of humanitarian issues was particularly important. The Irish Government were pressing very hard for this to be taken up. The hunger strikers were still receiving relatively little support. The turnout at the march in Dublin on 6 December had been very disappointing for the organisers. However, the Irish Government was still very anxious that a solution should be "brought forward". They felt there was still a need for some additional face-saving device. The Prime Minister said that the statement was intended to be a final one. The Government could not go on making offers. Everyone in the North had said that there was no point in continuing the hunger strike. The Church had come out strongly in this sense. She was delighted with the statement which John Hume had made. There was now nothing left to give. The Taoiseach said that Mr. Hume could play a very important role.

The Taoiseach said that in his view the next step should be for the Northern Ireland Office to talk "quietly and unobtrusively" to the hunger strikers about coming off the strike. Of course no more concessions should be made. The Prime Minister asked who precisely the Taoiseach had in mind. He replied that the three prison Chaplains would be the best channel. The Northern Ireland Office should use them as intermediaries with the hunger strikers. They should not try to use any other intermediary, e.g. more senior members of the Church or other prisoners. The more nearly there
were direct talks between the Northern Ireland Office and the prisoners the better. The Prime Minister expressed some concern as to whether the presence of a representative of the Northern Ireland Office might not stiffen the resistance of the hunger strikers. She asked whether, for instance, a representative of the Northern Ireland Office and one of the priests should see the hunger strikers together. The Taoiseach initially said that he was not sure but on a subsequent occasion indicated that he thought that this might be the best formula. He thought that the priests were honest and direct. He trusted them. The Prime Minister asked whether they knew that the Irish Government wanted a solution. The Taoiseach said "very much so". His understanding was that the hunger strikers accepted that political status was not achievable and that they were looking for a way of getting off the hunger strike.

The Prime Minister asked whether the hunger strikers themselves had the authority to abandon the strike. The Taoiseach said that the picture was not altogether clear but that he thought they could decide for themselves. Their leader was Brendan Hughes. It was he who would probably take the decision, and it was through him that the effort to end the hunger strike would have to be made. The Taoiseach repeatedly stressed the great importance that he attached to ending the strike. Already the strike had enabled the PIRA to recover influence in Belfast. People who had not been seen there for years had recently been reappearing. If the hunger strikers started to die, the scene in Ireland would change radically.

The General Political Situation

The Taoiseach said that his Government were hoping for some political movement. He had been able to carry his people with him on his policy towards Northern Ireland so far. But he needed to have something to show for his efforts soon. One paradoxical consequence of the success of the policies pursued in recent months had been to import violence into the Republic. As a result of the diminution of the flow of funds from the United States, the IRA had started robbing banks in the Republic. Three policemen had lost their lives. Moreover, the cost to the Irish taxpayer of
the increased security co-operation was considerable. It cost
the Irish three times as much per head to maintain security efforts
related to Northern Ireland as it cost the British: £25 per head
as against £8 per head. In a real sense, events in Northern Ireland
were distorting life in the Republic.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the PIRA operated from the
South against the North. The Taoiseach admitted the point but said
that PIRA violence by and large now originated in and was controlled
from Belfast. Most Southerners of significance had been locked up.
His ambition was to isolate the PIRA leaving them with no support
and no platform. If he and the Prime Minister could develop some
new ideas, if there could be some political movement, he would use
this as the basis for a crusade to end the violence. He would
throw his personal prestige behind the crusade and was confident
of his ability to mobilise considerable backing. His line would
be that "We are looking at the problems constructively, we are
considering suggestions, and pending this the violence must cease".
He wished therefore to propose to the Prime Minister that a joint
conference between the two Governments should be held next year to
review "in a fundamental way the totality of our relationship".
In such a conference he hoped that something might be thrown up
which would help to resolve the difficulties which the British
Government had encountered in the talks which had followed the
publication of their White Paper.

The Prime Minister said that she thought it was too soon for
such a conference. She was very pleased at how the cross-border
studies had gone. An effort should be made to extend cross-border
co-operation into other areas e.g. the electricity connector, the
electricity cable joining the Republic and South Wales, tourism,
etc. The two Governments had to demonstrate their ability to
coopoperate effectively across the border despite the problems.
The Taoiseach said that he did not think that cross-border studies,
though good in themselves, would carry things very far. It was
essential to talk Government to Government. The Unionists looked
to London and the Nationalists to Dublin and it was only therefore
in the context of Government to Government talks that their problems
could be tackled. He wondered therefore whether he and the Prime Minister could not commission some studies which could form the basis for a future meeting. The Prime Minister agreed that such studies could be commissioned and justified on the basis of the unique relationship between the two countries. But it was essential that such studies should address themselves to practical ways of improving co-operation between Westminster and Dublin and across the border. What exactly did the Taoiseach have in mind for the joint studies? The Taoiseach said that his Government were ready to talk realistically about reciprocal voting rights. They had taken the necessary political and legal steps. There only remained the question of whether or not they should wait for the publication of the British Nationality Bill. They would also be willing to talk about energy and about tourism. Finally, they envisaged studies about the possibility of developing new structures, evolving out of the unique relationship between the two countries, into which Northern Ireland might fit. In general he hoped that the studies would serve to show how closely the two Governments were working together.

The Taoiseach said that he would be delighted if the Prime Minister could herself make some form of personal input into the cross-border studies. He himself had seen those responsible for the Londonderry/Donegal study and the Lough Erne study. He had the impression that those involved were satisfied with the input from the Republic but less satisfied with that from Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister expressed surprise and undertook to look into the problem. More generally, endorsing the suggestions made by the Taoiseach, the Prime Minister said that it was no good limiting relations between the two Governments to meetings every six months. There had to be greater continuity at all levels. The Taoiseach agreed. The two Governments must work together and be seen to be doing so.

The Prime Minister expressed her gratitude for the contribution that the Irish authorities were making to cross-border co-operation in the security field. She thought the joint effort was going very well indeed. The Taoiseach agreed. It was hard to see at present
present how it could be greatly improved. It was however relevant that the Irish Government were instigating a general up-grading of their security capability. This would be very expensive. They were looking at communications/transport. They would be acquiring new helicopters and light aircraft. It was essential that the violence be contained, and in particular, that the bank raids should be stopped.

The Prime Minister commented on the general threat to all Governments posed by international terrorist violence. The PIRA was of course as much a threat to the Government in Dublin as to anyone else. The Taoiseach agreed. The PIRA sought the overthrow of both States. However, he thought that between them, the Prime Minister and he could solve the problem of Northern Ireland. He recognised that broader defence issues would have to be involved at some stage. He accepted, and would be happy to repeat, the sort of formula used by Mr. de Valera: the Irish Government entirely accepted that the United Kingdom was entitled to be completely satisfied about Ireland's strategic position. The Republic would not allow itself to be used as a springboard for action against the United Kingdom. The Irish would be ready to make the "necessary arrangements" to give expression to this assurance. The Prime Minister noted what the Taoiseach had said. As regards Northern Ireland, it was clear that the only way to progress would be by persuasion. Mr. de Valera himself had recognised that the use of violence against Northern Ireland would get nowhere. She herself would have to stand by the guarantee long since given to the majority in Northern Ireland. There was no possibility of her doing otherwise. The Taoiseach said that the corollary of this must be to provide a political basis which would make violence irrelevant and baseless.

The Economic Situation

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, the Taoiseach said that his Government were now experiencing major problems in the agricultural sector. The CAP "meant everything" to them. Forty per cent of the work force in the Republic was still, either directly or indirectly, dependent on agriculture. The contribution made by agriculture to Ireland's GNP was far greater than was the
case for the United Kingdom. The Irish Government's approach to the CAP was therefore diametrically opposed to that of the British Government. They would be arguing that Ireland was a special case. It was a country "remote from the centre" and heavily reliant on agriculture. They would argue for a maximum price rise. In answer to a question from the Prime Minister about the effect of such a price rise on consumers, the Taoiseach replied that for them the benefits of a substantial price rise would outweigh the drawbacks.

In the course of a general discussion about the economic situation the Taoiseach commented that the gap between the exchange rates of the pound and the punt had been of some advantage to the Irish but less than might have been expected. They were competing in the British market with United States and continental suppliers rather than with British suppliers. The Irish were experiencing no difficulty in financing their PSBR because they had a good credit rating and people seemed anxious to lend to them. They were having to phase out their programme of tax incentives for inward investment because of Community pressure. The programme had been very successful in the past but was now proving expensive: it would cost the Irish Government £100 million this year. More fundamental problems facing the Irish Government were the very inadequate infrastructure in the country and the youth of their population: half the population would soon be under 25. The Prime Minister, in reply, explained her own economic policies. She stressed the need to get down inflation and to expand the more efficient industries with the aid of incentives. The Taoiseach expressed considerable interest in the enterprise zone concept and the Prime Minister undertook to ensure that he was provided with details. The Taoiseach asked whether the Prime Minister's attack on inflation was compatible with reducing the level of unemployment. The Prime Minister said that in the short run it was not but that in the long run it was the only answer. The Taoiseach asked whether she thought that any upturn in the present recession was in sight. The Prime Minister said that much would depend on what happened to the American economy and to the price of oil. But her own hope was that we were coming to the bottom
of the trough. She hoped that there would be some improvement towards the end of next year. She did not expect this to be rapid or dramatic.

Poland

There was a brief discussion of the situation in Poland. The Prime Minister said that the Soviet Union had completed their preparations for intervention. But she doubted whether anything would happen until President Brezhnev returned from India.

United Nations

The Taoiseach said that the Irish would wish to keep particularly close to the British during their time on the Security Council. The Prime Minister welcomed this.

Political Co-operation

The Taoiseach asked about the British Government's proposals to develop the political co-operation machinery further. The Community had not reacted sufficiently quickly over Afghanistan. The Prime Minister said that she thought political co-operation was developing well but it was true that the Nine had been slow off the mark at the time of Afghanistan. She thought that they would be unlikely to make the same mistake again.

The discussion ended at 1215.

9 December 1980
MR. ALEXANDER

Prime Minister's Visits Overseas and Visitors 1981

'I have checked through Roderick Lyne's letter to you of 1 December and can confirm all the dates he mentions on page 4, both for the outward visits and the inward visitors. I would be grateful, however, if when you write back to him you could ask him to go firm as quickly as possible with any of his "proposals". I think it would also be a good idea to show the Prime Minister the whole programme.

The FCO ask for a specific date for Sir S. Ramgoolam. I can manage a dinner on either Wednesday 11 or Thursday 12 February and talks on either day, though the 12th would be infinitely preferable. Not much alternative around that time.

I really am going to be in great difficulty fitting anything more in.

5 December 1980
"Concern has been expressed on humanitarian grounds about conditions in the Maze prison in Northern Ireland. I set out below the real facts about the living conditions which are open to all prisoners in Northern Ireland; and explain the special measures which have already been taken on humanitarian grounds in respect of the living conditions of the protesting prisoners.

The ten prisoners in Northern Ireland are on hunger strike in support of a demand that all protesting prisoners be granted ‘political status’, which would be intended to differentiate them from all other prisoners. The government will not concede that demand.

The specific demands by the male protesters are for five changes in their prison regime. They are the right:..."

(I) To wear their own clothes:
(II) To refrain from prison work:
(III) To associate freely with one another:
(IV) To organise recreational facilities and to have one letter, visit and parcel a week:
(V) To have lost remission fully restored.

Such changes would go far to give, and are intended to give, the protesting prisoners control over their lives in prison, and could not be agreed to by the government, since to do so would be to legitimise and encourage terrorist activity. What the government is committed to is to ensure that, for all prisoners, the regime is as enlightened and humane as possible. This
STATEMENT CLARIFIES, IN RELATION TO THE PROTESTORS' DEMANDS, HOW FAR THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED.

UNDER PRISON RULES, PRESCRIBED UNDER STATUTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, PRISONERS ARE ENTITLED TO CERTAIN RIGHTS AND MAY, IF THEY CONFORM WITH THE RULES, ENJOY CERTAIN PRIVILEGES. RIGHTS MAY NOT BE WITHHELD - ALTHOUGH PRISONERS CAN - AND THE PROTESTORS DO - CHOOSE NOT TO TAKE THEM UP. PRIVILEGES, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAY BE WITHHELD IF A PRISONER IS IN BREACH OF THE RULES. IF PRISONERS ABIDE BY THE RULES, THEN THE PRIVILEGES ARE ACCORDED AS A MATTER OF COURSE. THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES COMPARE WITH THE PROTESTORS' DEMANDS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) CLOTHING: THE PROTESTORS WANT THE RIGHT TO WEAR THEIR OWN CLOTHING AT ALL TIMES. PRISON RULES REQUIRE PRISONERS TO WEAR PRISON-ISSUE CIVILIAN CLOTHING (OR SPECIAL CLOTHES APPROPRIATE TO THEIR WORK) DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS ON WEEK-DAYS (7.30 AM TO 5.00 PM). BUT, AS A PRIVILEGE, PRISONERS MAY, UNLESS THEY ARE ENGAGED ON ORDERLY DUTIES, WEAR THEIR OWN CLOTHING FOR THE REST OF THE EVENING DURING THE WEEK, AND, THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND. THEY MAY ALSO WEAR THEIR OWN CLOTHING WHEN RECEIVING VISITS. FOR SECURITY REASONS, COLOUR AND DESIGN OF PRISONERS' OWN CLOTHING IS SUBJECT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNOR.

IT WILL BE SEEN THAT A PRISONER CONFORMING WITH THE RULES MAY WEAR HIS OWN CLOTHING FOR ALMOST HALF THE TIME HE WOULD EXPECT TO BE OUTSIDE HIS CELL. FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TIME, THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION OF 23 OCTOBER MEANS THAT CONFORMING PRISONERS WILL BE WEARING CIVILIAN CLOTHING ISSUED BY THE PRISON AUTHORITIES.

(B) WORK: THE PROTESTING PRISONERS SEEK THE RIGHT TO REFRAIN FROM PRISON WORK. PRISON RULES REQUIRE CONVICTED PRISONERS TO 'ENGAGE IN USEFUL WORK', AND FOUR MAIN TYPES OF SUCH WORK ARE UNDERTAKEN. FIRST SOME PRISONERS UNDERTAKE DOMESTIC TASKS IN THE KITCHENS, DINING AREAS, ABLUTIONS AND WINGS. SECOND, AN EXTENSIVE RANGE OF INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT IS PROVIDED
IN PRISON WORKSHOPS. THIRD, VOCATIONAL TRAINING IS AVAILABLE TO TEACH A WIDE RANGE OF SKILLS. COURSES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SKILLS TESTING SERVICE OF THE CITY AND GUILDS OF LONDON INSTITUTE. FOURTH, EDUCATION CLASSES ARE PROVIDED DURING WORKING HOURS (FROM 2 TO 20 HOURS A WEEK) TO COVER A WIDE RANGE OF PRISONERS' NEEDS FROM REMEDIAL EDUCATION TO OPEN UNIVERSITY COURSES. CLASSES IN CRAFT THEORY ARE GIVEN TO COMPLEMENT THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING SIDE Whilst TuITION IS PROVIDED IN A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS ENABLING PRISONERS TO STUDY FOR ROYAL SOCIETY OF ARTS, CITY AND GUILDS LITERACY AND NUMERACY CERTIFICATES, GCE 'O' AND 'A' LEVEL CERTIFICATES.

IN BRIEF, WHILE PRISON RULES REQUIRE A PRISONER TO 'ENGAGE IN USEFUL WORK', WORK IS INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE ORDERLY DUTIES, INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT, VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND EDUCATION.

(C) ASSOCIATION: THE PROTESTORS WANT THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE FREELY WITH ONE ANOTHER. THE PRISON RULES PROVIDE, AS A PRIVILEGE, THAT EACH WEEK-DAY EVENING FOR 3 HOURS AND THROUGHOUT THE DAY AT WEEKENDS, PRISONERS HAVE 'ASSOCIATION' DURING WHICH WITHIN EACH 25-CELL WING THEY MAY WATCH TV, PLAY INDOOR GAMES, FOLLOW HOBBIES AND EXERCISE IN THE YARD ATTACHED TO EACH WING. A WIDE RANGE OF EVENING CLASSES IS PROVIDED AND THERE IS SOME DOVETAILING WITH DAYTIME COURSES. APART FROM TEXT BOOKS THE NE EDUCATION AND LIBRARY BOARDS PROVIDE WELL-STOCKED LIBRARIES. BOOKS AND NEWSPAPERS MAY BE TAKEN TO BE READ IN CELLS.

IN SHORT, THERE IS ALREADY AS A PRIVILEGE FREE ASSOCIATION WITHIN EACH WING OUTSIDE NORMAL WEEK-DAY WORKING HOURS.

(D) RECREATION: THE PROTESTORS DEMAND THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE RECREATIONAL FACILITIES. PRISON RULES ALLOW THE USE OF A GYMNASIUM OR PLAYING PITCH FOR ABOUT 3
HOURS A WEEK IN EXERCISE PERIODS, IN ADDITION TO THE
NORMAL EXERCISE PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN ONE HOUR EACH
DAY IN THE OPEN AIR. DURING ASSOCIATION PERIODS,
PRISONERS MAY USE THE HOBBIES ROOM FOR SUPERVISED
HANDICRAFT AND ARTISTIC ACTIVITIES.

(E) VISITS, LETTERS AND PARCELS: THE PROTESTORS DEMAND
ONE VISIT, ONE PARCEL AND ONE LETTER EACH WEEK.
UNDER PRISON RULES, EACH PRISONER ENJOYS AS OF RIGHT
ONE LETTER AND ONE VISIT PER MONTH. THE RULES
PROVIDE, AS A PRIVILEGE, SEVEN ADDITIONAL LETTERS PER
MONTH AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PRISON, THREE ADDITIONAL
VISITS, AND A WEEKLY PARCEL. SPECIAL PARCELS ARE ALSO
ALLOWED AT CHRISTMAS, EASTER AND HALLOWEEN.

THE EXISTING PRIVILEGES IS ALREADY MORE GENEROUS
THAN THE PROTESTORS' DEMAND.

(F) REMISSION: THE PRISONERS ARE DEMANDING THE RESTORATION
IN FULL OF THE REMISSION THAT THEY HAVE LOST WHILE
ENGAGED IN THE PROTEST. PRISON RULES PROVIDE THAT A
PRISONER SERVING A TERM OF MORE THAN ONE MONTH RECEIVES
REMISSION, SUBJECT TO GOOD CONDUCT, UP TO ONE-HALF OF
HIS SENTENCE. THIS IS A MORE GENEROUS RATE OF
REMISSION THAN IS AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE IN THE UK.
REMISSION MAY BE FORFEITED AS A PUNISHMENT FOR BREACH
OF PRISON RULES: BUT IT MAY BE RESTORED AFTER
SUBSEQUENT GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

THE PROTESTORS HAVE LOST ONE DAY'S REMISSION FOR EACH
DAY THEY HAVE BEEN IN BREACH OF PRISON RULES. THE
OPPORTUNITY TO REGAIN LOST REMISSION ALREADY EXISTS.

THE ABOVE DEALS BRIEFLY WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGIME:
THIS REGIME IS EVIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN
AND DEVELOP HUMANE AND ENLIGHTENED CONDITIONS FOR ALL PRISONERS
IN ITS CARE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. A FULLER ACCOUNT IS BEING
PUBLISHED SEPARATELY TOMORROW AND A COPY IS BEING DEPOSITED IN
THE LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE.

THE PROTESTORS HAVE FORFEITED A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE REGIME
DESCRIBED ABOVE. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOVERNMENT, ACKNOWLEDGING
THE INJUNCTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW THEIR REACTION TO THE PROTESTORS, HAS IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR TAKEN THE FOLLOWING STEPS:

(I) ON 26 MARCH THE PROTESTING PRISONERS WHO BY THEIR FAILURE TO CONFORM WITH PRISON RULES HAVE FORFEITED THE PRIVILEGES AFFORDED TO CONFORMING PRISONERS WERE NEVERTHELESS OFFERED EXERCISE IN SPORTS GEAR, 3 LETTERS IN AND OUT EACH MONTH IN ADDITION TO THEIR STATUTORY MONTHLY LETTER, AND 2 VISITS A MONTH INSTEAD OF 1.

(II) SINCE THE LATE SUMMER THE PROTESTING PRISONERS HAVE BEEN OFFERED:

(A) AN HOURS' PHYSICAL EXERCISE A WEEK:
(B) ONE EVENING ASSOCIATION A WEEK IN PRISON UNIFORM:
(C) ACCESS TO BOOKS AND NEWSPAPERS (WHICH ARE AVAILABLE IN THE CELL BLOCKS BUT NOT TAKEN) IN THE ROOMS WHERE MASSES ARE HELD ON SUNDAYS:
(D) 'CLOSED' VISITS (I.E. IN WHICH THE PRISONER IS PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM HIS VISITOR) AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A BODY SEARCH:
(E) COMPASSIONATE HOME LEAVE ON THE SAME BASIS AS CONFORMING PRISONERS.

(III) THE PROTESTING PRISONERS HAVE NEVER BEEN DENIED THEIR DAILY HOUR'S EXERCISE.

THUS THE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN ITSELF READY, DESPITE THE PROTEST, TO DEAL WITH THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE CONDITIONS THAT THE PROTESTING PRISONERS HAVE IMPOSED UPON THEMSELVES.

THE GOVERNMENT TAKES NO PLEASURE IN THE SIGHT OF YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN INFlicting SUFFERING ON THEMSELVES AND THEIR FAMILIES. WE AGREE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT WHILE THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION OF THEIR HAVING POLITICAL STATUS, WE SHOULD BE READY, IN THE FACE OF PROTEST, NEVERTHELESS TO DEAL WITH THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE CONDITION IN THE PRISONS ARISING FROM THE PROTEST. IT IS A MATTER OF VERY GREAT REGRET THAT CHANGES MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION HAVE BEEN REJECTED. WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AND STILL ARE WILLING TO
DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE PRISON ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND WITH ANYONE YOU SHARED OUR CONCERN ABOUT IT.

THE GOVERNMENT REMAINS DETERMINED THAT, SUBJECT ALWAYS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY AND WITHIN THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE, THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN RECENT YEARS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF NORTHERN IRELAND PRISONS SHOULD BE CONTINUED TO MEET THE LEGITIMATE NEEDS OF ALL CONCERNED. ENDS.

CARRINGTON

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED
RID 
NAD 
INFORMATION D 
WEB 
MAED 
NEWS D 
SECURITY D 
PUSD 
PS 
PS/LPS

ADDITIONAL DISTR.
NORTHERN IRELAND.
PS/MR HURD
PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR A AUCLAND, SEC.
CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LEXNOX
MR BRAITHWAITE
Dr Garret Fitzgerald, the Leader of the Fianna Fail Party, called on Lord Carrington this morning. The purpose of the call was to discuss work which Dr Fitzgerald is doing for the Trilateral Commission on the Middle East: a call arranged for last month had had to be postponed. At the end of their discussion Dr Fitzgerald said that he had on the previous day had a long discussion with the Taoiseach, in which Mr Cluskey, the leader of the Irish Labour Party, had also taken part in an attempt to find a common response to the British Government's announcement on the Maze Prison. This was the first time that the Taoiseach had held discussions with the other parties on anything to do with Northern Ireland. In the event it had not been possible to find an agreed form of words: the principal sticking point had been the Taoiseach's refusal to express explicitly his support for the British Government's refusal to grant the hunger strikers political status. The Taoiseach had made clear during the course of the discussion that if there were a similar demand by prisoners in the Irish Republic, he would be prepared to see them die rather than grant it. But he was unwilling to involve himself directly in the issue in Northern Ireland.

5 December 1980

cc: PS
PS/LPS
Mr Bullard
Mr Fergusson
R A Harrington Esq (NIO)
M O'D B Alexander Esq (No. 10)
HMA, Dublin
Michael Alexander Esq.,  
No. 10 Downing St.,  
LONDON SW1  

Dear Michael,  

NORTHERN IRELAND: PRISON HUNGER STRIKE  

You may like to have a summary of the immediate responses to the statement made yesterday by my Secretary of State in a written answer to a PQ, about the prison regime in relation to the hunger strike.  

The two most important reactions are of course those of the Irish Government and of the SDLP through John Hume. The Irish Government's statement (appended) is only moderately constructive. It contains no call to the strikers to desist, nor any hint of denial of the validity of the claim to political status. The expression of hope that people concerned with the issue will take up our willingness to discuss it is less than we might have expected from Mr. Haughey, who still seems determined to keep his options open.  

John Hume, by contrast, commented helpfully. Following his call on Mr. Atkins, he made a statement (also appended) appealing to the hunger strikers to call off their protest, and to their relatives and supporters to take up the opportunity given by the Government's statement to resolve the problem satisfactorily.  

He then discussed with officials how the step-by-step approach might be implemented, beginning with a restoration of privileges regarding visits, letters and parcels and later association. Relatives could then be encouraged to send in parcels of clothing so that prisoners could wear their own clothes for substantial periods. Later, prisoners would be seen individually by education and training officers to discuss their particular educational and vocational needs. Following a period of good behaviour, remission could be restored, again on an individual basis, but subject to the Secretary of State's control. Mr. Hume felt that the scope for movement within the rules and privileges which had been outlined could end the protests.  

Mr. Hume telephoned the Northern Ireland Office today and reported that both our statement and his own had been well received by the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. The influential parent of
one of the hunger strikers had contacted him and would be seeing him on Sunday evening. He too was disappointed with the reaction from the Taoiseach and said he would do what he could over the weekend to persuade Dublin to be more helpful. He undertook to keep in touch and remained optimistic about developments.

We have had some indication of the attitude of the two prison chaplains who were commended to us by the Vatican, Fathers Toner and Murphy. They said this morning that they expected the statement to have little influence with the hunger strikers, considering that they had rejected Cardinal O'Fiaich's appeal to them out of hand. However, the Priests then said that they would each be visiting the hunger strikers over the weekend, (one today, one tomorrow and both on Sunday), would show them the statement, and seek a response as the message sunk in. We expect a report back from them on Sunday evening, so that if there is anything significant the Prime Minister can be told before her meeting with Mr. Haughey.

The statement was given major treatment by the British and Irish news media last night and this morning. The point was well taken by most of them, that while the Government remained firm on the issue of political status, it continued willing to consider humanitarian aspects. Several commentators, noting the emphasis on that point by John Hume and the Irish Government, have concluded that there is scope for a way out of the deadlock. But warnings from Unionist spokesmen (Paisley, Brookeborough, etc.) about the consequences of the Government going soft are starting to emerge. There are obviously more reactions to come. The media are seeking comments from such people as Cardinal O’Fiaich and Bishop Daly, who refused to pronounce overnight. Analysis of the statement by the foreign press continues, and there has not yet been much significant comment from interested parties in the United States or Western Europe.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Paul Lever in the FCO and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,

Mark W. Hopkins
Dear Michael,

Anglo-Irish Summit:
Continental Shelf Delimitation

At their meeting on 21 May, the Taoiseach mentioned briefly to the Prime Minister the question of Continental Shelf delimitation (your letter of 21 May) and suggested a scheme for 'joint administration'. In my reply of 4 August I said that we had explained to the Irish why we found difficulty with the proposal. We had hoped that they would not pursue the suggestion further but at the last round of official discussions in Dublin on 1 December the Irish returned to the charge. It seems therefore possible that Mr Haughey may raise it at his forthcoming meeting with the Prime Minister.

If he does so, it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could explain that we do see real difficulty with what the Irish propose. A scheme of joint administration would need to be agreed in detail between the two governments, and with the licensee companies, and this would require much further discussion. On our side it would also require legislation. All this would cause considerable extra delay which would be particularly undesirable at a time when both governments are agreed on the need to make rapid progress. We wish to urge the Irish to study carefully the proposals, put forward by the UK in June 1980, for an interim regime; these are more modest, and in our view therefore more practicable, while at the same time protecting the essential interests of both countries.

In February 1980 we agreed in principle to the Irish proposal for ad hoc arbitration, but discussion on the modalities has since been proceeding very slowly. Five meetings have taken place: in April 1980 the UK tabled a draft Arbitration Agreement, and a further article (dealing with interim arrangements for oil exploration pending the outcome of the arbitration) in June. We expected substantive Irish reactions at the 1 December meeting, but their response was disappointing, and they have shown no readiness to tackle the substantive problems which need to be solved. If the opportunity arises therefore it would be helpful if the Prime Minister could point out
point out that further delays in setting up the arbitration can only inhibit the oil exploration activity which is important for both of us. We are concerned at the slow progress being made on settling the terms of the Arbitration Agreement, and hope the Irish side will soon be in a position to respond constructively to the proposals made by the UK on the key issues.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington (NIO), Julian West (Dept of Energy) and Bill Beckett (Law Officers' Dept).

Yours ever,

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
GROUPS 125
UNCLASSIFIED
FROM DUBLIN 041841 Z DECEMBER
TO IMMEDIATE F C D
TELEGRAM NUMBER 359 OF 04 DEC 1980

H-BLOCKS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED TONIGHT BY THE IRISH
GOVERNMENT.

BEGIN: - THE GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE INCLUSION IN THE STATEMENT
ISSUED TODAY BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO
DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF THE PRISON ADMINISTRATION
IN NORTHERN IRELAND WITH ANYONE WHO SHARES THEIR CONCERN ABOUT
IT. AS IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT IT IS ALONG THESE LINES
THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE REACHED THEY EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT
THIS OFFER WILL BE TAKEN UP AND PURSUED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE
AND SECURITY OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THIS ISLAND THAT A WAY OUT OF THE
PRESENT SITUATION SHOULD BE FOUND AND THEY AGAIN INDICATE THAT THEY
ARE READY TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO ANY MOVES WHICH WOULD OFFER
A REASONABLE HOPE OF ACHIEVING A SOLUTION. ENDS.

FIGG.

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED
RID PS/MR HURD
KAD PS/MR RIDLEY
INFORMATION D PS/MR BLAKER
WED PS/PUS
MAED SIR A ACLAND
NEWS D CHIEF CLERK
SECURITY D MR ADAMS
PS/MR BULLARD
PUSB MR FERGUSSON
PS LORD N G LENNOX
PS/LPS MR BRAITHWAITE

ADDITIONAL DISTN.
NORTHERN IRELAND.
Statement by Mr John Hume, Leader of the SDLP following a meeting with the Secretary of State, Mr Atkins.

I met the Secretary of State, Mr Humphrey Atkins, today to express concern at the situation that obtains in Northern Ireland today arising out of the protest in the Maze prison. This is an issue in which there are deep and divided feelings throughout the whole community and which, if not resolved, threatens to create a level of sectarian confrontation and violence which we have not seen for many years. I believe that all people of good will in Northern Ireland wish to see a satisfactory solution of this issue. I reiterated to the Secretary of State the SDLP's position that the only punishment to which prisoners should be subjected is the deprivation of liberty. All other punishments threaten humanitarian standards in prisons. This position is completely in accord with the recent judgment of the European Commission for Human Rights. Because of the deep and divided emotions involved in this issue it is difficult for anyone in Northern Ireland to have an objective or impartial view of it. I accept, however, that the European Commission for Human Rights is both an impartial and objective body which is seen to be so by most people, not alone in Northern Ireland, but internationally as well and I accept their judgment on this issue. I have asked the Secretary of State to pursue a resolution of the problem in the context of that judgment and I believe that in that context it is possible to achieve a step-by-step de-escalation of the problem which will be satisfactory to everyone involved.

The European Commission for Human Rights state that there is no basis in national or international law or in the European Convention of Human Rights for the claim to political status but also state that the Government in dealing with the issue was more concerned with punishment than with seeking a way out of the impasse. I, therefore, welcome the Secretary of State's indication to me today that the Government is not immovable in this regard and is ready, despite the protest, to deal with humanitarian conditions in the prison and to discuss these matters with anyone in Northern Ireland who is concerned about it in order to find a way out of the impasse.
I welcome this as an important first step in a process that could lead to a satisfactory solution of the problem and I appeal to those prisoners on hunger strike to recognise it as such and to call off their protest in order to allow an examination of the problems to take place in an atmosphere devoid of tension.

I appeal in particular to all those active in support of the prisoners to support my call and I ask the relatives who are the people most deeply concerned to recognise this opportunity for a satisfactory resolution to the problem and to use all their influence to help to bring it about. I repeat again my offer that my own good offices are available if requested to progress the matter further.
GOVERNMENT.

BEGINNS:- THE GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE INCLUSION IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED TODAY BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF THE PRISON ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND WITH ANYONE WHO SHARES THEIR CONCERN ABOUT IT. AS IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THAT IT IS ALONG THESE LINES THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE REACHED THEY EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THIS OFFER WILL BE TAKEN UP AND PURSUED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY.

THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THIS ISLAND THAT A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION SHOULD BE FOUND AND THEY AGAIN INDICATE THAT THEY ARE READY TO GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO ANY MOVES WHICH WOULD OFFER A REASONABLE HOPE OF ACHIEVING A SOLUTION. ENDS.

FIGG.
Prime Minister

Content with this proposed statement on prisoners in N.Ireland?

Duty Clerk

2.12.

Michael Alexander Esq.,
No. 10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1

Dear Michael,

With your letter of 2 December you enclosed a note of the meeting in Luxembourg at which it was agreed that the Government should issue a fresh statement on the rights and privileges obtaining in Northern Ireland prisons. I attach a draft statement for the Prime Minister's consideration.

The draft takes account of points made by my Secretary of State on earlier versions of the text; he has not yet had an opportunity of clearing the final version, but will do so on his return to London from Northern Ireland tomorrow.

We will also wish to look at the statement tomorrow to see whether, at an appropriate point, useful reference can be made to the role of the Prison Officers on whose loyalty the whole structure obviously depends. We will of course let you have any further amendments during the course of tomorrow as the need arises.

The Prime Minister should know that John Hume is aware that the Secretary of State had in any case been intending to issue our next statement on Thursday. The general thrust of this draft will come as no surprise to him (especially its reference to the judgement of the European Commission on Human Rights), on page 6. He will be meeting the Secretary of State prior to the issue of the statement and we understand is likely to respond to it positively and publicly.

The document giving a detailed account of the prison regime in Northern Ireland which my Secretary of State envisaged publishing this week is well in hand and should be ready for publication on Thursday. We have in mind to place copies in the House of Commons Library.
I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Halliday (Home Office), Paul Lever (PCO), David Omand (MOD) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Hugh Jenkins

M.W. HOPKINS
The Prison Regime in Northern Ireland

Ten prisoners in Northern Ireland are on hunger strike in support of a demand that all protesting prisoners be granted "political status". The demand implies that those who have murdered, wounded and bombed for what they claim as "political" motives should be treated as if they were less criminally culpable than ordinary offenders. The Government will not concede that demand.

The specific demand for "political status"/for five changes in the prison regime, such changes to be accorded only to the protestors. They are the right:

(i) to wear their own clothes;
(ii) to refrain from prison work;
(iii) to associate freely with one another;
(iv) to organise recreational facilities and to have one letter, visit and parcel a week;
(v) to have lost remission fully restored.

Such changes would go far to give the prisoners control over their lives in prison, and could not be agreed to by the Government, since to do so would be to legitimise and encourage terrorist activity. What the Government is committed to is to ensure that, for all prisoners, the regime is as enlightened and humane as possible. This statement clarifies, in relation to the protestors' demands, how far this has already been achieved.

Under Prison Rules prescribed under statute by the Secretary of State, prisoners are entitled to certain rights and may, if they conform with the Rules, enjoy certain privileges. Rights may not be withheld - although prisoners can - and the protestors do -
choose not to take them up. Privileges, on the other hand, may be withheld if a prisoner is in breach of the Rules. If prisoners abide by the Rules, then the privileges are accorded as a matter of course. The rights and privileges compare with the protesters' demands as follows:

(a) Clothing: the protesters want the right to wear their own clothing at all times. Prison Rules require prisoners to wear prison-issue civilian clothing (or special clothes appropriate to their work) during normal working hours on week-days (7.30 am to 5.00 pm). But, as a privilege, prisoners may, unless they are engaged on orderly duties, wear their own clothing for the rest of the evening during the week, and, throughout the weekend. They may also wear their own clothing when receiving visits. For security reasons, colour and design of prisoners' own clothing is subject to the discretion of the Governor.

It will thus be seen that a prisoner conforming with the rules may wear his own clothing for almost half the time he would expect to be outside his cell. For the remainder, the Government's decision of 23 October means that conforming prisoners will be wearing civilian clothing issued by the prison authorities.

(b) Work: The protesting prisoners seek the right to refrain from prison work. Prison Rules require convicted prisoners to "engage in useful work", and four main types of such work are undertaken. First some prisoners undertake domestic tasks in the kitchens, dining areas, ablutions and wings.
Second, an extensive range of industrial employment is provided in prison workshops. Third, vocational training is available to teach a wide range of skills. Courses have been developed to the requirements of the skills testing service of the City and Guilds of London Institute. Fourth, education classes are provided during working hours (from 2 to 20 hours a week) to cover a wide range of prisoners' needs from remedial education to Open University courses. Classes in craft theory are given to complement the vocational training side whilst tuition is provided in a wide range of subjects enabling prisoners to study for RSA, City and Guilds Literacy and Numeracy certificates, GCE 'O' and 'A' level certificates.

In brief, while Prison Rules require a prisoner to "engage in useful work", work is interpreted to include orderly duties, industrial employment, vocational training, and education.

(c) Association: the protestors want the right to associate freely with one another. The Prison Rules provide, as a privilege, that each week-day evening for 3 hours and throughout the day at weekends, prisoners have "association" during which, within each 25-cell wing they may watch TV, play indoor games, take education classes, follow hobbies and exercise in the yard attached to each wing. A wide range of evening classes is provided and there is some dove-tailing with daytime courses. Apart from text books the NI Education and Library Boards provide well-stocked libraries. Books and newspapers may be taken to be read in cells.
In short, there is already as a privilege free association within each wing outside normal week-day working hours.

(d) Recreation: the protesters demand the right to organise recreational facilities. Prison Rules allow the use of a gymnasium or playing pitch for about 3 hours a week in exercise periods, in addition to the normal exercise period of not less than one hour each day in the open air. During association periods, prisoners may use the Hobbies Room for supervised handicraft and artistic activities.

(e) Visits, letters and parcels: the protesters demand one visit, one parcel and one letter each week.

Under Prison Rules, each prisoner enjoys as of right one letter and one visit per month. The Rules provide, as a privilege, seven additional letters per month at the expense of the prison, three additional visits, and a weekly parcel. Special parcels are also allowed at Christmas, Easter and Halloween.

Thus the existing privilege is already more generous than the protesters' demand.

(f) Remission: the prisoners are demanding the restoration in full of the remission that they have lost while engaged in the protest. Prison Rules provide that a prisoner serving a term of more than one month receives remission, subject to good conduct, up to one-half of his sentence. This is a more generous rate of remission than is available elsewhere in the UK.

Remission may be forfeited as a punishment for breach
CONFIDENTIAL

of Prison Rules; but it may be restored after subsequent good behaviour.

The protestors have lost one day’s remission for each day they have been in breach of Prison Rules. The opportunity to regain lost remission already exists.

The above deals briefly with certain aspects of the regime. A fuller account is being published separately [Today].

The protestors have forfeited a substantial part of the regime above. Nevertheless, the Government, acknowledging the injunction of the European Commission on Human Rights to keep under constant review their reaction to the protestors, has in the course of this year taken the following steps:

(i) On 26 March the protesting prisoners who by their failure to conform with prison rules have forfeited the privileges afforded to conforming prisoners were nevertheless offered exercise in sports gear, 3 letters in and out each month in addition to their statutory monthly letter, and 2 visits a month instead of 1.

(ii) Since the late summer the protesting prisoners have been offered:

(a) an hour’s physical exercise a week;
(b) one evening association a week in prison uniform;
(c) access to books and newspapers (which are available in the cell blocks but not taken) in the rooms where masses are held on Sundays;
(d) "closed" visits (i.e. in which the prisoner is physically separated from his visitor) as an alternative to a body search;
(e) compassionate home leave on the same basis as conforming prisoners.

(iii) The protesting prisoners have never been denied their daily hour's exercise.

This regime is evidence of the Government's commitment to maintain and develop humane and enlightened conditions for all prisoners in its care in Northern Ireland. It has shown itself ready, despite the protest, to deal with the humanitarian aspects of the conditions that the prisoners have imposed upon themselves.

This Government takes no pleasure in the sight of young men and women inflicting suffering on themselves and their families. We agree with the European Commission of Human Rights that while there can be no question of their having political status, we should be ready, in the face of the protest, nevertheless to deal with the humanitarian aspects of the condition in the prisons arising from the protest. It is a matter of very great regret that changes made by the Government in response to the Commission have been rejected. We have always been and still are willing to discuss the humanitarian aspects of the prison administration in Northern Ireland with anyone in Northern Ireland who shares our concern about it.

For the future the Government remains determined that, subject always to the requirements of security and within the resources available, the progress achieved in recent years in the administration of Northern Ireland prisons should be continued to meet the legitimate needs of all concerned.
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 2 December 1980

Dear Roy,

MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH

I enclose the record of the discussion which took place in Luxembourg last night between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. You are already working on the follow up action to the discussion.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Michael Alexander

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.
Dear Michael,

Prime Minister's Overseas Visits and Visitors 1981

Lord Carrington has been considering possible programmes of visits and visitors for the Prime Minister and himself in 1981. I enclose a schedule of existing plans at Prime Ministerial level and of Lord Carrington's additional proposals, as well as a schedule of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's own plans. We assume of course that events are likely to necessitate additional visits, outward and inward, which cannot now be foreseen.

The Queen

As background, I should recall the plans for State Visits next year. The recommendations are likely to be that King Khalid of Saudi Arabia be invited in June and President Shagari of Nigeria in November. If there is a recommendation for a State Visit in March, it may be for President Marcos of the Philippines or President Banda of Malawi. The Queen will visit Norway in May, Australia for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM) in September/October, and New Zealand and Sri Lanka later in October. Canada is a possibility in July.

Outward Visits by the Prime Minister

In view of the UK Presidency in the second half of 1981, the Prime Minister may prefer to fit as many of her outward trips as possible into the first half of the year.

Lord Carrington welcomes the idea that the Prime Minister should visit the Gulf in early January or in connection with her Indian Visit in April. He suggests that the best countries to visit would be Saudi Arabia, Oman and

/
the United Arab Emirates. If the Prime Minister agrees, we shall submit draft telegrams to the Posts with instructions and detailed suggestions. (There will not be time to include visits to all six Arab states in the Persian Gulf, but the Prime Minister has met in the relatively recent past the Amir of Qatar, and the Prime Ministers of Bahrain and Kuwait. They will be borne in mind for another Ministerial visit in the not too distant future.)

The proposals in the schedule for visits to the US and to the North/South Summit in Mexico need little explanation. Lord Carrington will make specific suggestions in due course. We shall also make detailed suggestions about a visit to India in April. A visit to Spain would only be appropriate if the Lisbon Agreement on Gibraltar is implemented. If this condition was met, a visit during the UK Presidency would be particularly appropriate. A visit to Portugal (Paul Lever's letter of 7 November) could be extremely brief, but the Portuguese would wish it to be separate from any visit to Spain.

The schedule of outward visits does not include an Anglo/Italian Summit in Rome in November. The Prime Minister may feel that the frequency of these meetings could be eased by suggesting in due course to the Italians that the second Summit due in 1981 might be postponed because of the UK Presidency until early 1982.

**Inward Visits**

Sir S Ramgoolam, although Prime Minister of Mauritius since independence, has never paid an official visit to Britain. Despite his age he is not expected to retire soon. He is firmly pro-Western and his country is among the few which have preserved the Westminster model of Parliamentary democracy. Lord Carrington recommends that Sir S Ramgoolam should be invited here in the second week of February, when the Mauritian parliament (where the government have a slender majority) will be in recess and when The Queen should be able to receive him. Given the short time available, we would be grateful to know the Prime Minister's wishes as soon as possible.

An invitation to Mr Mugabe would be an excellent way of keeping up the momentum of our relations with Zimbabwe. One of the regular Anglo/Irish Summits will be due in mid-year and should probably be held after the Northern Ireland

/local
local government elections in June. We shall be writing shortly with detailed suggestions about inviting M. Barre. It would be a suitable gesture to invite the Belgian Prime Minister for a brief visit before we hand over the Presidency to Belgium at the end of the year.

An invitation to Mr Seaga would be an excellent goodwill gesture after the change of government in Jamaica.

We have tended to neglect Cameroon, a stable, moderate country which is one third Anglophone. The Cameroon market, with its sound agricultural base and significant oil reserves, is buoyant and attractive. President Ahidjo, in office since independence in 1960, has just started another 5 year term. Lord Carrington recommends an official invitation in 1981.

Peru has recently returned to democratic government. The economy is strong and offers opportunities for investment and exports. Dr Úlloa, the Prime Minister, is also Minister of the Economy and Commerce and the most important person after the President. An official visit could win us a valuable friend.

The new, moderate Dominican Government would welcome an invitation to the Prime Minister, Miss Charles. There is advantage in demonstrating support for governments favouring stability in the volatile Eastern Caribbean.

You will see that Lord Carrington's schedule of inward visits includes the possibility of inviting the Polish Foreign Minister. But, depending on how things go in Poland, we may later wish to sound the Poles about the possibility of a higher level contact instead.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD and David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
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<th>Dates</th>
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<td><strong>OUTWARD VISITS</strong></td>
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<td>Morocco/Egypt</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels</td>
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<td>Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>Foreign Ministers' informal weekend</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>NATO Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>2 days in May</td>
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<td>22-23 June</td>
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<td>European Council</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels</td>
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<td>30 September - 7</td>
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<td>CHGM Melbourne</td>
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<td>Anglo-German Summit</td>
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<td>?October</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels</td>
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<td>16-17 November</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs Council - Brussels</td>
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<td>December</td>
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<td>7-8 December</td>
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Proposals

USA
Pakistan en route to Hong Kong
FRG
Moscow
Nigeria
France for brief Bilateral
North/South Summit - Mexico
Netherlands (handover visit to outgoing Presidency)
UNGA (speaking engagement in US?)
Luxembourg: Churchill Memorial Lecture
Berlin after the Anglo-German Summit
ASEAN two countries en route to or from CHGM

INWARD VISITORS

Fixed or in hand
Mozambique Foreign Minister
Foreign Ministers' informal weekend
Anglo-German Summit
Anglo-Italian Summit
Anglo-French Summit
Political Cooperation Foreign Ministers
European Council
Iraqi Foreign Minister (perhaps in 1980)

?February/March
?26 March
Early 1981
Early 1981
February 1981
Early June
One day late June
September
One day October
October
September-October

26-29 January
5-6 September
?May
?May
?June
13 October
26-27 November

/Proposals
Proposals

Foreign Ministers of:

Poland                     Venezuela
Yugoslavia                 Brazil
India                      Sweden
Luxembourg                 Finland
Mexico
Botswana

Notes
(i) The Department may wish later to recommend that the Secretary of State should attend the opening session of the Global Negotiations, which may be in late January.
(ii) New Australian Foreign Minister likely to come under own steam in 1981.
(iii) The same applies to the Portuguese Foreign Minister;
(iv) and to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister.
(v) The Foreign Minister of Guinea may come in early 1981 as a COI Visitor.
RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE TAOISEACH, MR. CHARLES HAUGHEY, IN LUXEMBOURG ON MONDAY
1 DECEMBER AT 1915

Présent

The Prime Minister
Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary
Mr. Michael Alexander

The Taoiseach
Mr. Lenihan
Mr. Nally

The Prime Minister said that her meeting with the Taoiseach in Dublin now seemed likely, owing to the hunger strike, to take place in circumstances which had not been foreseen when it was arranged. The British Government had done what they could to prevent the hunger strike beginning. She recalled her meeting with the Irish Ambassador in London on the eve of the strike when she had informed him of the Government's decision about clothing for prisoners in Northern Ireland. That decision had been the result of several months' discussion. It had been taken because the Cabinet felt that the change in the regulations was justified on grounds of dignity and humanity. Nonetheless, it had failed to prevent the strike. Since the strike had begun, various statements had been made, in particular by prominent members of the Roman Catholic Church, which had been both forthright and helpful. But the strike continued.

Mr. Haughey said that the Irish Government were enormously worried about the situation. As a result of the hunger strike it had become very volatile. So far public opinion in the Republic had been behind the Government in intensifying security cooperation. But the hunger strike was a highly emotional issue. It might enable the FIRA to mobilise support in a way that they had been unable to do for several years. It would be very helpful to the Irish Government if it were possible for the Prime Minister to / take

CONFIDENTIAL
take some kind of initiative before her arrival in Dublin. There was every reason to expect the meeting between the two Heads of Government to be constructive, but the hunger strike problem was "poisonous". Mr. Haughey stressed that his Government accepted that there could be no compromise on the question of political status. Indeed, if the British Government were to grant the hunger strikers political status, it would embarrass the Irish Government since they did not themselves accord political status to those accused of similar crimes. But a humanitarian gesture would undoubtedly help.

Mr. Lenihan asked whether, for instance, it would not be possible to let the prisoners wear clothing of their own choice. The Prime Minister said that this would be impossible. The British Government had taken their decision on the clothing issue and could go no further. They had already been severely criticised for their decision. Mr. Lenihan said that prisoners in the Republic were allowed to wear their own clothes. There was a slight additional burden on the security guards, who had to search the parcels of clothing coming to prisoners, but few other consequences.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in his view the hunger strikers would settle for nothing less than political status. Mr. Haughey said that he did not agree with Lord Carrington. The hunger strikers would settle for less. Some movement on the conditions of their imprisonment, e.g. on clothes, or on work, would suffice not only to end the strike but to end the other forms of protest the prisoners had been engaged in. He had hard evidence to this effect. It was, of course, understood that any concession on clothing would not imply that the prisoners would be allowed to wear IRA clothing.

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any other areas in which Mr. Haughey thought that concessions could be useful. Mr. Lenihan referred to exercise and to the possibility of prisoners being allowed to study. The Prime Minister then / read
read to Mr. Haughey a list of the concessions which had been available to the protesting prisoners since 26 March, which they had rejected. She said that other ameliorations would be available to them if they conformed. She undertook to have a list of these produced.

Mr. Haughey asked whether there was any possibility of nominating a distinguished Englishman to "look at" the prison regime in Northern Ireland. The Prime Minister said that she could not see what purpose this would serve. The British Government had for long made it plain that had nothing to hide in the prisons in Northern Ireland. TV cameras had been into The Maze more than once. Mr. Lenihan acknowledged the point but asked again whether it would not be possible for the British Government to do "something special" for the prisoners. This should, of course, fall far short of giving them political status. The Prime Minister said that at the time the Government had taken their decision about clothing it had been argued that concessions should be made during the hunger strike rather than before it. She had, however, decided that the concessions should be made before the hunger strike began in the hope of preventing it. She had gone a long way and now could go no further. However, she would of course be prepared to consider "dressing up" what had already been offered.

Mr. Lenihan said that this could be important. Cosmetic changes were really what he and Mr. Haughey had been talking about. Mr. Haughey confirmed that what he had in mind was something presentational. He was confident that the hunger strikers could be "pushed off" the strike. The Prime Minister agreed to look again at the presentation of the improvements in prison conditions which were already on offer to the hunger strikers. But she stressed that she did not wish to mislead Mr. Haughey. No other new concessions would be made. She had already taken "a lot of stick." Mr. Haughey said that he understood. A further look at the sort of points the Prime Minister had already summarised was what he wanted.

/ It was
It was agreed that officials in London would see what could be done to re-package the suggestions already on the table. The outcome would be communicated to the Irish authorities in Dublin before the end of the week.

The discussion ended at 1935.

1 December 1930
Ref. A03674

MR. ALEXANDER

European Council, Luxembourg: Northern Ireland

We have heard from the Northern Ireland Office that the Irish Prime Minister, Mr. Charles Haughey, is anxious to have a few minutes' discussion with the Prime Minister about Northern Ireland in the margins of the Council. If Mr. Haughey should take such an initiative, the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to hear what he has to say (Mr. Haughey may want to give a preliminary indication of how he sees the Dublin talks going) but she should not enter into substantial discussion. The Prime Minister could, if necessary, take the following line:

"I am much looking forward to our meeting in Dublin next week (8th December). This opportunity to exchange views is extremely important. I shall want to give close attention to any ideas you may have. We shall be meeting against a background of rather heightened tension in view of the prisoners' hunger strike. As you know, we have set our faces firmly against any concessions leading to what the protesters could describe as political status. Nevertheless, we are trying to maintain a caring and humanitarian regime in the prisons, and we shall not be deflected from that".

2. I am copying this minute to Roy Harrington (NIO) and to George Walden (FCO).

D. J. WRIGHT

27th November, 1980
SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: 8 DECEMBER

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 24 November on this subject. She has approved the text at Annex A and the List of Briefs at Annex C.

MODBA

26 November 1980
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall,
London, SW1

PS(80) 27

25th November 1980

Dear Private Secretary,

Anglo-Irish Summit: 8th December 1980

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the Anglo-Irish Summit which is to take place in Dublin on 8th December.

The objectives for the Summit, as approved by the Prime Minister, are at Annex A. The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex B. Instructions on format are at Annexes C and D. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex C, particularly b. on the structure of briefs.

65 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready, and should in any event arrive no later than 12 noon on Friday, 28th November. They should be addressed to Mrs. M. Wagner in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Donald Maitland, Sir Brian Hayes, Sir Kenneth Stowe and Mr. Robin Ibbs, and to Michael Alexander, No. 10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D. J. WRIGHT
ANNEX A

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: 8th DECEMBER 1980

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

1. To ensure, as far as possible, that the Taoiseach is given no pretext or incentive to reverse his present cautious policy over Northern Ireland; and to encourage him to maintain the present high level of security co-operation.

2. Cautiously to explore the extent to which it may be possible, and in the United Kingdom's interest, to devise arrangements under which the Northern Ireland problem can be considered by the two governments in the context of an evolving 'unique relationship'. But to avoid any commitment which would risk provoking a loyalist backlash in Northern Ireland.

3. To influence Irish positions on international issues and, with reference to Irish membership of the Security Council, to encourage them to work closely with us.

4. To gain Irish support on European Community issues of concern to us.

IRISH OBJECTIVES

1. To secure the agreement of the Prime Minister to procedures (either a conference or some other form of consultative process) under which the Irish Government would be seen to have a role in relation to the future of Northern Ireland. And to ensure that the Taoiseach is in a position to derive the maximum electoral advantage from such an agreement.

2. To convince the Prime Minister (but without making detailed commitments which could be politically risky in an election year) that the evolution of the 'unique relationships' offers a chance of progress towards an 'agreed Ireland' on a basis which would meet the real interests and concerns of the Protestant Community in the North and which would be in the long term interests of Her Majesty's Government.

3. To emphasise the paramount importance to the Irish economy of the Common Agricultural Policy and the need to safeguard Irish interests during future discussion of 'restructuring'.
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<tr>
<th>PMVF(80)</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Lead Department</th>
<th>In consultation with</th>
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<td>Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Political Situation</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>The Hunger Strike and the Prison Protests</td>
<td>NIO</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>North/South Economic Co-operation (excluding Energy)</td>
<td>NIO</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>The Northern Irish Economy</td>
<td>NIO</td>
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<td><strong>Bilateral Issues</strong></td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Energy (including North/South Co-operation on energy matters)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Policy</td>
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<td>(c) East/West Relations</td>
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<td>(e) South Africa/Namibia</td>
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ANNEX C

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex D. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

(a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.

(b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.

(c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.

Layout

(d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.

(e) As shown in the specimen at Annex D, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (e.g. PMVF(80) ?) with the date of production below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.

(f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

(g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex D). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.
(h) It is important that on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

(i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number (e.g. PMVF(80) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation. Revised briefs and corrigenda should be similarly treated.

(j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex B require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.
ANNEX D

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

PMVF(80) [Serial No. as specified in ANNEX E]  COPY NO [In red]

[Date of production]

ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT
8 DECEMBER 1980

[Subject] [Insert subject in capitals]

[Leave 1½" margin] Brief by [name of originating Department e.g. Foreign and Commonwealth Office]

[At the foot of the last page:]
[Left-hand side]

[Originating Government Department, e.g. Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department of Industry, not a subordinate section or division]

[Date of origin]

[Classification]
Ref. A03635

MR. ALEXANDER

Anglo-Irish Summit - 8th December

The Prime Minister is to visit Dublin on 8th December for talks with Mr. Haughey. She will be accompanied by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and one other Minister. The Prime Minister has suggested that this should be the Chancellor of the Exchequer: Sir Geoffrey Howe has said that he will be available.

2. When they met in London on 21st May, the Prime Minister and Mr. Haughey agreed to this being the first of a series of "regular" meetings. Its broad purpose is to develop what was described in the communique from that meeting as the unique relationship between the two countries, although in practice by far the most important topics for discussion will be those relating to Northern Ireland. But it is well understood in Dublin that a wide-ranging agenda is needed, and there will be scope for useful exchanges on European Community and other international issues. In this context, it is relevant that the Irish Republic will be on the United Nations Security Council for the next two years. The meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach should offer an opportunity to urge the Republic to follow policies in the Security Council which are consistent with the general Western interest, and to offer close collaboration between our two Missions in New York. For, while Irish positions on international affairs are generally compatible with our own and the Irish work wholeheartedly within the political co-operation machinery of the Nine, their traditional neutrality has caused them to take an independent and occasionally unhelpful line on issues such as some aspects of East/West relations and South Africa.

3. On Northern Ireland, we have been placed on notice that Mr. Haughey will propose an inter-governmental conference which would in some as yet undefined way enable the future of the Province to be considered in a wider framework than that within which it has hitherto been confined. Mr. Haughey's aim seems likely
to be to secure the Prime Minister's agreement that the Republic has a special role to play over Northern Ireland and not simply that of an interested bystander. We do not yet know how far he will wish to press this line but he may seek to secure some commitment from the Prime Minister over Northern Ireland at either this meeting or the next one which he can exploit for electoral purposes. He will probably want to be able to show that he has secured something in return for the assistance he has been giving in improving Northern Irish security since he became Taoiseach. It will, on the other hand, be in our interest to try to obtain from Mr. Haughey himself an endorsement of the British Government's line on the Maze hunger strikers whose condition is likely to be becoming increasingly critical at the time of the Dublin meeting.

4. The current plan is that the visit should take place inside one day. The Prime Minister's party would arrive at about 10.30 am. She would then go straight into a tête-à-tête with Mr. Haughey until lunch, while other Ministers met separately. After lunch there would be a plenary session, with the Prime Minister and her party departing at around 4.30 pm. Neither these plans nor the venue for the meeting and the lunch have yet been fixed: there will be a need for a high level of security for the Prime Minister, particularly since the Maze Prison hunger strike will be reaching a critical stage at the time she is in Dublin.

5. I enclose at Annexes A and B statements of the British and Irish objectives and at Annex C a proposed list of briefs. The agenda is likely to fall into three broad sections: Northern Ireland issues, other bilateral issues, international and European Community issues. The Northern Ireland briefs are likely to contain very sensitive material and will have to be given a different and more restrictive distribution than the others. Although time is short, I would hope to be able to let you have the briefs by Friday, 28th November. But it could be necessary to extend the deadline into the beginning of the following week with some of the briefs only arriving in time for the briefing meeting arranged for Wednesday, 3rd December.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

24th November, 1980
ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: 8 DECEMBER 1980

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

1. To ensure, as far as possible, that the Taoiseach is given no pretext or incentive to reverse his present cautious policy over Northern Ireland; and to encourage him to maintain the present high level of security cooperation.

2. Cautiously to explore the extent to which it may be possible, and in the United Kingdom's interest, to devise arrangements under which the Northern Ireland problem can be considered by the two governments in the context of an evolving 'unique relationship'. But to avoid any commitment which would risk provoking a loyalist backlash in Northern Ireland.

3. To influence Irish positions on international issues and, with reference to Irish membership of the Security Council, to encourage them to work closely with us.

4. To gain Irish support on European Community issues of concern to us.
ANGLO-IRISH SUMMIT: 8 DECEMBER 1980

IRISH OBJECTIVES

1. To secure the agreement of the Prime Minister to procedures (either a conference or some other form of consultative process) under which the Irish Government would be seen to have a role in relation to the future of Northern Ireland. And to ensure that the Taoiseach is in a position to derive the maximum electoral advantage from such an agreement.

2. To convince the Prime Minister (but without making detailed commitments which could be politically risky in an election year) that the evolution of the "unique relationship" offers a chance of progress towards an "agreed Ireland" on a basis which would meet the real interests and concerns of the Protestant Community in the North and which would be in the long term interests of Her Majesty's Government.

3. To emphasise the paramount importance to the Irish economy of the Common Agricultural Policy and the need to safeguard Irish interests during future discussion of 'restructuring'.
Anglo-Irish Summit: 8th December 1980

List of Briefs (with suggested lead Departments indicated)

1. **Steering Brief (with Secret limited distribution annex on the "unique relationship")**
   - FCO/NIO

Northern Ireland

2. Political Situation
   - NIO
3. Security
   - NIO
4. The Hunger Strike and the Prison Protests
   - NIO
5. North/South Economic Co-operation (excluding Energy)
   - NIO
6. The Northern Irish Economy

Bilateral Issues

7. Energy (including North/South co-operation on energy matters)
   - NIO/Energy
8. Economic and Monetary Policy
   - Treasury
   - FCO/Home Office

European Community Issues

10. Budget Restructuring and CAP Reform
    - FCO/Treasury/MAFF
11. Fisheries
    - FCO/MAFF
12. Other Community Issues (including EMS)
    - FCO/Treasury/other Depts. as necessary

International Affairs

13. Iran/Iraq
    - FCO
    Arab/Israel
    East-West Relations
    Afghanistan
    South Africa/Namibia
Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

21 November 1980

M. Alexander, Esq.,
Private Secretary,
10, Downing Street

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 19 November. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will be pleased to accompany the Prime Minister to Dublin for the Anglo/Irish Summit Meeting on 8 December.

Copies to the recipients of your letter.

Yours ever,

John Wiggins

A.J. WIGGINS

BF to Dai
for Minnab. check.
OO DUBLIN (DESKRY 2013302)
GRS 210
CONFIDENTIAL
DESKRY 2013302 NOV 80
FM FCO 2011502 NOV 80
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 132 OF 20 NOVEMBER
FROM CONFERENCE SECTION
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT
1. FURTHER POINTS TO FCO TEL 131 FOR YOUR MEETING WITH THE IRISH
   TODAY.
2. PASSES.
   WE ASSUME THE IRISH WILL BE ORGANISING BOTH PERSONAL PASSES FOR
   ENTRY TO THE VENUES AND SPECIAL IDENTIFICATION FOR OFFICIAL
   HIGHLANDS, INCLUDING SAFE-HAND CARS. WE SHALL NEED TO CONSIDER THE
   PROVISION OF SPECIAL UK PASSES PRINTED IN LONDON IN CASE MEMBERS
   OF THE PARTY NEED ACCESS TO THE CHANCERY.
3. PRESS ARRANGEMENTS.
   THERE ARE, AT PRESENT, NO FIRM PLANS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OR
   MR. INGHAM TO SPEAK TO THE PRESS AT THE END OF THE TALKS, BUT IF
   THERE IS A BRIEFING, WE ASSUME IT IS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE AT THE
   VENUE OF THE TALKS OR AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE DEPARTURE. FOR
   SECURITY REASONS ONE WOULD NOT WISH TO TRAVEL TO A SEPARATE LOCALE.
4. WE MUST EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT THE NUMBERS IN PARAGRAPH 3 IN
   TEL. 131 ARE AN OUTSIDE ESTIMATE AND THE PARTY OVERALL MAY WELL
   BE SMALLER. NONETHELESS WE SHOULD BEAR THEM IN MIND FOR
   CONTINGENCY ACCOMMODATION ARRANGEMENTS.
5. WE MAY BE USING MOBILE RADIO EQUIPMENT AS WE DID FOR THE
   DUBLIN COUNCIL, BUT ON A LIMITED SCALE. ASSUME THERE WILL BE NO
   DIFFICULTIES WITH IRISH AUTHORITIES.

CARRINGTON

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MR FARGUSSON

COPIES TO:
NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
Anglo/Irish Summit: 8 December

As you may be aware, the Prime Minister sometime ago expressed the wish that a third member of the Cabinet, in addition to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary, should be included in the party to accompany her to Dublin next month.

She had originally envisaged taking either the Minister of Agriculture or the Secretary of State for Trade. However, the Minister of Agriculture and his Irish opposite number will be attending a meeting of the Agriculture Council in Brussels on 8 December, and the Irish, who have been consulted, have suggested that there might not be much of substance to discuss in the trade field. (In fact it may well be that Irish doubts on the latter point arise primarily from the position of the Irish Minister for Commerce and Industry, Mr. O'Malley, as a leading member of the anti-Haughey faction in the Irish Cabinet).

The Taoiseach has suggested instead that the meeting on 8 December might be attended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Irish Finance Minister, Mr. O'Kennedy. This would allow scope for a discussion on economic and monetary policies, exchange rates and the EMS, as well as, if it were thought appropriate, Community Budget restructuring and the CAP.

The Prime Minister regards this as a sensible suggestion. She would be grateful therefore if, his other commitments permitting, the Chancellor of the Exchequer could accompany her to Dublin.

I am sending copies of this letter to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

[Signature]

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

John Wiggins, Esq.,
HM Treasury.
GRPS 200
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 17:1750Z NOVEMBER 1980
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 326 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1980

YOUR TELS NO’S 124 AND 128 : PRIME MINISTERIAL VISIT

1. THE IRISH HAVE NOW GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE PROGRAMME:–
   10.30 ARRIVE IN DUBLIN
   11.00 ARRIVE AT MEETING PLACE
   11-12.30 TETE A TETE AND MINISTERIAL PAIRINGS
   12.30-2.30 LUNCH, PRECEDED BY DRINKS
   2.30-4.00 PLENARY SESSION
   4.00 DEPART FOR AIRFIELD
   4.30 LEAVE DUBLIN

2. THE IRISH HAVE YET TO MAKE DECISIONS ON THE VENUE FOR THE TALKS AND THE LUNCH. THUS THE CONSEQUENT SECURITY PROBLEMS HAVE YET TO BE ADDRESSED. WE WELCOME THE PROPOSED VISIT BY THOSE NAMED IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELNO 124 AS THIS SHOULD SERVE TO FOCUS MINDS ON THE NEED FOR DECISION ON THESE QUESTIONS AND WE SUGGEST THURSDAY 20TH AS THE MOST CONVIENT DAY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

3. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR A CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENT FOR OVERNIGHT ACCOMODATION WITH THE GARDA. THEY ARE OF THE VIEW THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE UNTIL THE VENUE HAS BEEN DECIDED. BUT THEY ARE IN ANY CASE OPPOSED TO BOOKING IN A HOTEL UNLESS AN ENTIRE BUILDING CAN BE TAKEN OVER.

CONFIDENTIAL / 4. UNLESS
CONFIDENTIAL

4. UNLESS U.K. MINISTERS ARE TO BE MOVED EVERYWHERE BY HELICOPTER YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO SUPPLEMENT OUR TWO EXISTING PROTECTED VEHICLES FOR THE DURATION OF THE VISIT.

5. OUR OWN TENTATIVE VIEW IS THAT THE PARTY SHOULD ARRIVE AT BALDONNEL AND LEAVE FROM DUBLIN AIRPORT TO MINIMISE THE RISK OF DEPARTURE BEING PREVENTED BY FOG BUT HERE AGAIN THE CHOICE OF VENUE WILL BE THE CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ANY DECISION.

STAPLES
[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]
[THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED]

LIMITED
F & C D
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SECURITY D
CDD
OTSD
FS
FS/FUS
MR FERGUSSON

- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
GRS 200

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DUBLIN 17/1130Z NOV 1980

TO ROUTINE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 325 OF 17 NOV

AND TO ROUTINE N 1 O (BELFAST)

MYTTELNO 320:

1. THE "GULLIVER'S WORLD" COLUMN IN THE SUNDAY PRESS
   OF 16 NOVEMBER CARRIED THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE:

   BEGINS

   FOR THE PAST SOME WEEKS MARGARET THATCHER AND CHARLES J. HAUGHEY
   HAVE KEPT MONDAY THE EIGHTH AND TUESDAY THE NINTH OF DECEMBER
   FREE. THEY HOPE TO MEET IN DUBLIN DURING THESE DAYS. MRS. THATCHER
   WAS TO STAY AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN MURPHYSTOWN ROAD, SANDYFORD,
   CO. DUBLIN.

   THESE WILL HARDLY NOW BE THE DATES FOR THE MEETING AND MRS. THATCHER
   WILL NOT STAY OVERNIGHT AT THE EMBASSY. INDEED, IT IS QUITE
   POSSIBLE THAT THE MEETING MAY TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE THESE ISLANDS,
   THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO REASON, APART FROM CONVENIENCE, WHY
   THEY SHOULD TAKE PLACE EITHER IN BRITAIN OR IN IRELAND.

   IT IS THOUGHT UNLIKELY THAT BY DECEMBER 8 AND 9, THE TIME WOULD
   BE OPPORTUNE FOR A VISIT BY THE BRITISH PREMIER. IT IS NOT THAT
   HER SECURITY COULD NOT BE GUARANTEED, THERE IS NO QUESTION WHATSOEVER
   OF THE SECURITY SERVICE BEING UNABLE TO GIVE HER ALL NECESSARY
   PROTECTION, BUT IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE
   TO BE SO EXTENSIVE AS TO MAKE THE OPERATION EMBARRASSINGLY BIG.

   FOR THE H-BLOCK HUNGER STRIKE WOULD THEN BE ENTERING ITS EIGHTH
   WEEK.

   ENDS

   F I G G

   MINIMAL
   R I D
   E D (E)
   F & O D
   N E W S D
   O I D
   S E C D
   E S & S D

   [NOT ADVANCED]
Mr Fergusson

ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT: 8 DECEMBER

1. I submit below a self-explanatory draft letter to No. 10.

2. I think it might be as well if the Treasury were given advance warning of the suggestion that the Chancellor or another Treasury Minister might attend the summit. Perhaps PS/PUS could telephone the Private Secretary to Sir A Rawlinson, who attended Sir Robert Armstrong's meeting on Northern Ireland last week, and is generally aware of the background.

MJ Newington
Republic of Ireland Dept

14 November 1980

cc: Mr Spreckley, ECD(I)

My feeling is that the Private Secretary might like to touch base with No. 10. If a Treasury Minister is to be available, he or she should be aware of the Chancellor's Office's views better.
CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM: PS

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

TO: Mr M O'D B Alexander
10 Downing Street

Your Reference

Copies to:

SUBJECT: ANGLO/IRISH SUMMIT: 8 DECEMBER

1. In your letter of 20 September you said that the Prime Minister would like to include one other Minister (i.e. in addition to Lord Carrington and Mr Atkins) in the party to visit Dublin, and that she suggested either the Minister of Agriculture or the Secretary of State for Trade.

2. The Minister of Agriculture and his Irish opposite number will be attending a meeting of the Agriculture Council in Brussels on 8 December. We accordingly suggested to the Irish that the meeting might be attended by the Secretary of Trade and Mr O'Malley, the Irish Minister for Commerce and Industry. They have now come back to say that the Taoiseach has doubts as to whether there was much of substance to discuss in the trade field (though it is likely in fact that his doubts arise rather more from Mr O'Malley's position as a leading member of the anti-Haughey faction of the Cabinet). He suggested that the meeting might be attended
CONFIDENTIAL

attended by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Irish Finance Minister, Mr O'Kennedy. This would allow scope for a discussion on economic and monetary policies, exchange rates, and the EMS, as well as Community budget restructuring and the common agricultural policy, which were of course already on the provisional agenda.

3. This seems a sensible suggestion which fits well with our wish to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both Governments. Lord Carrington accordingly recommends that we should accept the Taoiseach's suggestion. It would of course be open to us to suggest another Treasury Minister if the Chancellor is otherwise engaged.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington at the Northern Ireland Office, Mr Hall, Private Secretary to the Chancellor and to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

CONFIDENTIAL
The Prime Minister's Visit to Dublin

I agree with the line which you propose News Department should take if questioned about postponement or cancellation of the Prime Minister's visit to Dublin.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office).

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

6 November 1980

Dear Michael,

The Prime Minister's visit to Dublin

In your letter of 31 October to Roy Harrington you recorded the Prime Minister as saying that if developments at the Maze prison made a visit to Dublin inadvisable, she would be content to meet Mr Haughey in the margins of the European Council Meeting in Luxembourg. We shall of course say this if the Irish raise the matter in terms which suggest that Mr Haughey himself has decided that it would be better to postpone the visit.

So far of course we have no reason to suppose that he has reached such a decision; if he were to do so it would be with considerable reluctance, not least because it would be seen as a PIRA victory. It seems to us important therefore that nothing be said in London which would convey the impression that the Prime Minister herself has doubts about going to Dublin in present circumstances. There has already been speculation in one Dublin newspaper that the visit might be called off, and we may be asked to comment. We propose, if you agree, that News Department should say no more than that arrangements for the next meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach are under discussion between the two Governments; that we have no reason to suppose that the hunger strike at the Maze will affect these arrangements; and that for self-evident security reasons details will not be divulged until much nearer the time.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Roy Harrington in the Northern Ireland Office.

Yours are

P. Lever
Private Secretary

M O D'B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

CONFIDENTIAL
10 DOWNING STREET

23 October, 1980.

Message from the Taoiseach

As you know, the Irish Ambassador called on the Prime Minister this afternoon to deliver the enclosed message from the Taoiseach to the Prime Minister about the threatened hunger strike at the Maze Prison. Dr. Kennedy emphasised that the Irish Government did not propose to reveal the fact that a message had been sent.

Dr. Kennedy said that Mr. Haughey was deeply concerned about the dangers posed by the strike. Mr. Haughey thought that his Government had made considerable progress on the security front. Subversives in the Irish Republic had become isolated and demoralised. This had been made possible by the degree of public support enjoyed by the Government. That support might well be shaken by a prolonged hunger strike. Moreover the strike might well result in the revival of the flow of funds and arms from the United States. The Irish Government had ample experience of the effects of hunger strikes. They feared that the consequences of an H Block hunger strike could only be damaging.

The Prime Minister said that she greatly appreciated the efforts which had been made in every quarter to tackle the security problem. She and her colleagues valued what had been achieved. They were also aware of the possible consequences of a hunger strike. It was with both points in mind that the Cabinet had that morning held a prolonged discussion of its policy towards the hunger strike. They had in the end decided to make the major gesture of allowing prisoners in Northern Ireland to wear civilian clothes instead of prison uniform. It had not been an easy decision. She hoped that the prisoners in the Maze would recognise that one of their major demands had been met, and would call off the hunger strike. She also hoped that Cardinal O’Fiach would feel able to offer his full cooperation in the effort to avert the strike.

Dr. Kennedy warmly welcomed what the Prime Minister had said (which obviously came as news to him). He said that he was sure the Taoiseach also would be highly appreciative. He was confident

CONFIDENTIAL

/ that
that his Government would urge Cardinal O'Fiaich to use his influence against the strike. It would obviously now be far more difficult for the men who were "on the blanket" to pursue their plans.

I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosure to Paul Lever (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Roy Harrington, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

CONFIDENTIAL
8th October 1980

My dear Mr. Alexander,

It was very kind of you to acknowledge, in your letter of 2nd October, the receipt of Mr Jack Lynch's report of his recent visit to China. I shall be very happy indeed to convey the thanks of the Prime Minister to Mr Lynch which I am sure he will greatly appreciate.

Yours sincerely,

Eamon Kennedy
Ambassador

Mr Michael Alexander
Private Secretary
No.10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1
From the Private Secretary

2 October 1980

Thank you for arranging for us to see a copy of Mr. Jack Lynch's report of his recent visit to China. We greatly value exchanges of information of this kind. The Prime Minister has asked me to pass on her thanks to Mr. Lynch and I should be grateful if I could do this through your good offices.

The Chinese appear to have given Mr. Lynch a very full account of their present policies and future targets and we were most interested to read his assessment of the current situation in the light of his talks in Peking.

M O'D. B. ALEXANDER

His Excellency Dr. Eamon Kennedy.
Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 20 September enclosing a copy of Mr Jack Lynch's report on his visit to China.

It is true that there is an undertaking (the spirit of which the Irish appear to have observed more zealously than we would have done) that the Nine should keep each other informed about important events in their foreign relations. We therefore think that an acknowledgment is called for.

Since there is no letter from Mr Lynch (or the present Taoiseach) we see no need for the acknowledgment to be at Prime Minister level. We therefore suggest a reply from yourself to the Irish Ambassador asking him to pass on to Mr Lynch the Prime Minister's thanks for the report and expressing our general interest in exchanges of information of this kind between the member countries of the European Community. This approach has the merit of removing the need to decide whether an acknowledgment from the Prime Minister should be addressed to Mr Lynch or to the present Taoiseach.

Mr Lynch's report contains no surprises (and there have of course been many changes in China since May). The Chinese appear to have treated him as well as they would treat any former Head of Government of a friendly country: Deng's comments on the international and domestic situation are on standard lines.

Yours truly,

R M J Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London
FROM: Mr Alexander

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO: 

TO: HE Dr Eamon Kennedy
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Irish Embassy
17 Grosvenor Place
LONDON SW1X 7HR

SUBJECT:

Thank you for arranging for us to see a copy of Mr Jack Lynch’s report of his recent visit to China. We greatly value exchanges of information of this kind. The Prime Minister has asked me to pass on her thanks to Mr Lynch and I should be grateful if I could do this through your good offices.

The Chinese appear to have given Mr Lynch a very full account of their present policies and future targets and we were most interested to read his assessment of the current situation in the light of his talks in Peking.
20 September 1980

I enclose a copy of a report by the former Taoiseach, Mr. Jack Lynch, on a visit which he paid to China in May of this year. The report has been handed to me by a member of the Irish Embassy here.

This report has, I understand, been prepared in accordance with an undertaking that the Heads of Government of the Nine should keep each other informed about contacts with other Heads of Government. It is, of course, slightly puzzling that this report is on a visit which appears to have been made by Mr. Lynch as a private citizen but I report the explanation that I have been given!

You may like to consider whether the Prime Minister should write a letter of thanks for the report and if so whether the letter should go to Mr. Lynch or to the present Taoiseach.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Report by Mr. Jack Lynch, T.D., on Visit to China

In March, 1980 my wife and I received an official invitation from the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to pay an official visit to that country.

We arrived in China via Hong Kong on Monday, 26th May, accompanied by Mr. Dermot Kinlen, S.C., who had accompanied the former President the late Cearbhall O Dalaigh and Mrs. O Dalaigh on a similar visit in 1977. After a brief stop in Canton we flew to Peking that evening and we were met by Mr. Zhu, Deputy Secretary General of the Institute of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Hong, Head of the Western European Department of the Institute.

On Tuesday, 27th May, I had a two-hour meeting with Mr. Hao Deqing, President of the Institute. We discussed a variety of topics of mutual concern to our two countries. I gave Mr. Hao a resume of the economic and political situation in Ireland, particularly the Northern Ireland situation. Our discussions, however, referred in the main to the current political and economic situation in China.

Mr. Hao spoke of the four modernisations, agriculture, industry, science and technology and defence, which dominated Chinese activities. He referred only in passing to the Gang of Four. He dealt with the Russian policies of Hegemonism and spoke of Russian designs on the Gulf States and instanced the Russian invasion of Afghanistan as a grave threat and as part of the Russian design. In subsequent discussions at different levels I found that "Russian Hegemonism" dominated the fears of the Chinese. Mr. Hao said that the Russians either took direct initiative themselves as in the case of Afghanistan or through agents as in the case of Kampuchea. He said that the invasion of Kampuchea was clearly an initial step as seen by the Russians in their desire to control territory right down to the Straits of Malacca.
These two events, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, were neither isolated nor chance occurrences. It would be misleading for the rest of the world to think that the Russians will stop there. When these two parts of the Russian plan had been completed Russia would then be in a strong position to move further in their ultimate plan of world domination. After Afghanistan they will "interfere" in Iran, Pakistan and possibly Turkey. He said that unless the Russians were stopped in this design they would provoke a world war by 1984-85 and the rest of the world would be in a weak position to resist them because of their control of the Gulf States and of the Malacca Straits. He said that the rest of the world must stop Russia and he was rather critical of American policies in this connection.

I asked him what specific action he thought the US should take - that it was obvious that the US did not want to take provocative action that would lead to war. He did not comment further on this point. I put it to him also that because of the American experience in Vietnam any US administration would find it difficult to bring the American people with them in creating a confrontation in the Far East. I pointed out that to take action of this nature was a far more difficult proposition for a democracy than it was for any totalitarian state.

Although Mr. Hao did not mention it specifically, I got the impression that the Chinese were apprehensive that their own supplies of oil would be insufficient by the middle 80s without recourse to Gulf oil and this, of course, would not be available if the Russian plan had succeeded by that time.

Mr. Hao said that if the Soviets were allowed to succeed in their strategic purpose in "Western" Asia, South East Asia and the Middle East then the situation will be one in which "Europe will not be able to fight a battle even if it wanted and the Soviet Union would be able to take over Europe". In order to control Western Europe their strategy is to outflank and encircle Western Europe in the Middle East and North Africa. "That is why when we (the Chinese), America, Japan and Europe touch on these subjects we must see if we can agree or not. Because of differences in several countries the Russians are able to make progress". He repeated that there is a possibility of world war in the 1980s.
On Friday, 30th May, I had a meeting lasting an hour-and-a-half with Mr. Deng Xiaoping. Mr. Deng, who is the senior Vice-Premier and is generally regarded as the strong man of China, went over some of the same ground as Mr. Mao. Without specifically referring to the Gang of Four, he complained rather pointedly about the disruption of China's progress over the past eleven or twelve years. For example, their iron and steel industry, which should now be producing about 60 million tons per annum, was producing only about half that amount. During that period of destruction workers would not work and students would not learn. I saw evidence of the aftermath of students' disinclination to learn when I visited Beijing University the previous day. It was obviously very underpopulated and they seemed only slowly to be attaining the level of attendances which the various faculties were capable of accommodating.

Mr. Deng went on to say that it was only after smashing the disruption that had taken place could they begin to implement the four modernisations as laid down by Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. Now the people are totally dedicated to achieving them without any interference. This they were determined to do over the next two decades.

With reference to the huge population, now well over 900 million, he said that they are trying to control it by family planning but even if they are successful there will be, by the end of this century, 1,200 million. He referred to a question put to him by the Japanese Premier some time ago as to what their economic aim was. He said it was difficult for him to answer but taking all his courage in his hands he replied "by the year 2,000 A.D. the income per head will be US $1,000 at their present value". This was a position that countries like Japan, France and possible the United Kingdom had attained in the 1950s and therefore they were a very long way behind. To reach their goal they would have to increase their GNP threefold in 20 years and that will not be easy.

They were lucky, he continued, that they already have a strong base for industry, agriculture, science and technology. China has many natural
resources and its people are very hardworking. If there are no obstacles they are confident that they will achieve their targets. This confidence was reflected in the briefing sessions I had, some an hour long, with the directors of the various enterprises that I visited - communal fish farm, tea plantation, pharmaceutical and silk factories, goods display centres, etc. - in Shanghai and Hangzhou. The confidence and commitment were reflected in their subordinates at different levels and there was certainly plenty of evidence of hard work on the shop floor. They were, however, not self-contained, Mr. Deng continued, and they would hope to use the expertise of other countries.

Vice Premier Deng is obviously anxious to put younger men at the top in both the Party and the Government and his mild liberalism seems to be generally well accepted. His recent decision to retire from one of his positions, that of senior Vice Premier, is I believe intended to show earnest of his desire to promote young people.

In the Beijing Hotel, the largest in Beijing and probably in the whole of China, there is a legend on a very big tapestry at one end of the foyer to the effect "We have friends all over the world". I think this is indicative of two main points, one that they need friends and want to cultivate new friendships amongst other nations and, secondly, that they want to maintain their independence and that they do not wish these friends to be 'allies' in the same sense as it is understood in the West. Rather do they seek world support in their opposition to Russian Hegemonistic policies.
From the Private Secretary

20 September, 1980.

Dear Paul,

Visit to Dublin

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 19 September about the arrangements for her visit to Dublin. She agrees that she should be accompanied to Dublin by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. She would also like to take one other Departmental Minister with her in order to make it clear that her visit is not simply to talk about Northern Ireland. She suggests either the Secretary of State for Trade or the Minister of Agriculture.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours very truly,

Michael Alexander

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL
Thank you for your letter of 11 September to Stephen Gomersall. We have now heard from Dublin that the dates which we proposed are acceptable and that the Taoiseach's strong preference is for the Prime Minister to stay in Dublin overnight. If the Prime Minister is to be back in London by mid-day on 9 December she will need to take off at around 0945, which suggests that the most which could be fitted in that morning would be a press conference, perhaps at the airport. We shall be consulting the Irish about accommodation arrangements and will let you have recommendations in due course.

British and Irish officials met in London last week. The object was to prepare the ground for the meeting between the Taoiseach and the Prime Minister by exploring ways of giving substance to the "unique relationship". In the course of the meeting the Irish Ambassador made what was clearly a carefully prepared statement about the broad approach which the Taoiseach would wish to adopt. He underlined the importance the Taoiseach attached to new and close political cooperation between the two governments, but his prime concern was with the search for enduring peace and stability in Northern Ireland and "within these islands". While the Taoiseach would be anxious to have a broad discussion, his main aim would be to make some advance over the continuing grave situation in the North. The Irish Government had been in no way dismissive of the British Government's political initiative: they merely thought it inadequate. Their assessment was that it was highly unlikely that the continuing discussions between the Northern Ireland Secretary and the political leaders in Northern Ireland would be able to establish a worthwhile measure of agreement. In the Irish Government's view, the only way of making progress would be to raise the issue to an intergovernmental level, with the involvement of the political leaders in Northern Ireland. It was of course for the British Government to decide when to draw conclusions from the current discussions. The Taoiseach had in mind that when he saw the Prime Minister he would propose that "at an appropriate date, following the drawing of these conclusions", a conference should be convened between the two governments and the Northern Ireland political parties to discuss the three dimensions of the problem: relations between the communities in Northern Ireland; between the North and the South; and between Dublin and London.
In reply British officials said that they hoped the Irish Government were in no doubt that for the British Government to accept any such proposal would represent a very significant reversal of policy; and that they could see no grounds on which such a reversal could be recommended. But this was not the only obstacle: had the Irish any grounds for supposing that leaders of Unionist opinion in Northern Ireland would be ready even to contemplate attending such a conference? There was no reply.

The idea of a conference has been a central plank in the SDLP’s policy for some time, and it is no surprise that the Taoiseach should have decided to press for it. If he could secure British endorsement of the idea, he could certainly expect to derive considerable advantage in domestic political terms. However, informal exchanges with Irish officials over the weekend suggest that the Taoiseach himself is in no doubt as to the Prime Minister’s likely response to the proposal for a conference; that he is not at present looking for a confrontation; and that he would not necessarily envisage any publicity being given, at least for the time being, to his having put the proposal to the Prime Minister. Officials in the FCO and the NIO will of course be giving a good deal of thought to how we can best hope to head the Irish off. And there will be further opportunities to explore these matters with the Irish before briefing for the Prime Minister/ Taoiseach meeting has to be prepared.

Officials have naturally stressed to the Irish the need to ensure that the Northern Ireland problem was not allowed to dominate the meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. The Irish accepted this, and there seem to be several areas (eg Transport, Energy and European Community issues) in which there would be scope for useful exchanges at Ministerial level. It ought therefore to be possible to devise an adequate and balanced agenda. As regards Ministerial attendance it would seem appropriate for the Prime Minister to be accompanied by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. It would also be open to the Prime Minister to take one or two other Ministers who had business to transact with their opposite numbers. But the Irish left us with the impression, without saying so in terms, that the Taoiseach is not much in favour of this idea, and would prefer other Ministers to meet separately from and perhaps in advance of the summit. It would be helpful to know the Prime Minister’s preference on this point, which was left unresolved pending a firm decision as regards dates.

/I am

CONFIDENTIAL
I am copying this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours
Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London
CONFIDENTIAL

GROUPS 40
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM DUBLIN 181646Z SEPT 1980
TO ROUTINE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 256 OF 18 SEPT 1980
AND TO ROUTINE INFO N I O (B)

YOUR TELNO 111: MEETING BETWEEN MR LENIHAN AND MR ATKINS.

1. THE D F A HAVE TODAY CONFIRMED 13 OCTOBER AS THE DATE FOR THE MEETING. THEY AGREE WITH THE SORT OF TIMETABLE WE PROPOSE, AND ADD THAT MR LENIHAN DOES NOT INTEND TO STAY OVERNIGHT IN LONDON.

STAPLES.

THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT ADVANCED

LIMITED
RID
HAD
OID
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MAED
NEWS DEPT
SECURITY DEPT
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PS/IR HURD
PS/IR RIDLEY
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NORTHERN IRELAND

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GRPS 160
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 16:1200Z SEPTEMBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 254 OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1980
AND TO IMMEDIATE N10 (BELFAST)

VISIT TO NORTHERN IRELAND BY THE TAOISEACH.

1. NELIGAN (DFA) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE TAOISEACH WAS
ACCEPTING AN INVITATION TO ATTEND THE FIRST NIGHT OF A PLAY IN
LONDONDERRY ON TUESDAY 23 SEPTEMBER. HE ADDED THAT THIS
ACCEPTANCE HAD NOT YET BEEN CONVEYED TO THE ORGANISERS OF THE
OCCASION.

2. I ASKED FOR DETAILS BUT NELIGAN WAS NOT ABLE TO ADD MUCH AT
THIS STAGE, BEYOND THE FACT THAT THE PLAY IN QUESTION WAS BY
BRIAN FRIEL, AND THAT THE INVITATION TO THE TAOISEACH HAD COME FROM
REG RYAN OF THE FOYLE DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION. IT WAS THE
TAOISEACH'S INTENTION TO TRAVEL BY CHARTERED AIRCRAFT TO EGLINTON
AND TO RETURN THE SAME DAY WITHOUT MAKING AN OVERNIGHT STOP.
NELIGAN ADDED THAT MR HAUGHEY HAD IT IN MIND TO UNDERTAKE ONE OR
TWO OTHER ENGAGEMENTS AT THE SAME TIME. I REPLIED THAT WE WOULD
NATURALLY NEED TO HAVE DETAILS OF THESE TOO.

3. NELIGAN ALSO SAID THAT THE GARDA WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THE
RUC DIRECT ABOUT THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE VISIT, AND THAT
RICHARD HINCHY (ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES),
WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE ORGANISING OF THE TAOISEACH'S
EARLIER VISIT TO ARMAGH, WOULD TRAVEL TO LONDONDERRY THIS WEEK
TO DISCUSS DETAILS OF THE THEATRE VISIT WITH THE ORGANISERS.

STAPLES

NORTHERN IRELAND
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PS/MR RIDLEY
PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
NORTHERN IRELAND

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GRPS 120
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 1611352 SEPTEMBER 1980
TO IMMEDIATE FCDO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 253 OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1980
AND REPEATED FOR INFO TO ROUTINE NI0 (BELFAST)

MY TELNO 252: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH.

1. NELIGAN (DFA) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE TAOISEACH ACCEPTED
THE DATES WE HAD PROPOSED, IE 8/9 DECEMBER. THERE WAS A CLEAR
PREFERENCE ON THE IRISH SIDE FOR THE OVERNIGHT STOP, SO THAT
MR HAUGHLEY COULD GIVE A DINNER FOR MRS THATCHER.

2. NELIGAN WAS NOT ABLE AT THIS STAGE TO DISCUSS FURTHER DETAILS
OF TIMING AND ACCOMMODATION. HE HAD, HOWEVER, HOISTED IN WHAT
WAS SAID TO HIM IN LONDON LAST WEEK ABOUT THE NEED FOR MRS THATCHER
TO MAKE AN EARLY START FROM DUBLIN ON 9 DECEMBER AND REMARKED
THAT THIS WOULD NOT LEAVE TIME FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS THAT
MORNING, OTHER THAN THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRESS CONFERENCE
AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE DEPARTURE. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO GUIDANCE
ON HOW THAT POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN LONDON, AND NELIGAN
SAID THAT A PRESS CONFERENCE COULD ALTERNATIVELY BE HELD AT THE
CLOSE OF THE FORMAL TALKS THE DAY BEFORE.

STAPLES

NORTHERN IRELAND
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MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

NORTHERN IRELAND
GG DUBLIN DESKBY 121500Z
GRS 258
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DESKBY 121500Z
FN: FC0 121215Z SEP 80.
TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 110 OF 12 SEPTEMBER.
AND TO ROUTINE NIO (BELFAST)
YOUR TELNO. 246: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE TAOISEACH
1. PLEASE CONFIRM TO THE IRISH THAT, AS YOU INDICATED TO
NELIGAN, THE PRIME MINISTER CANNOT MANAGE ANY OTHER DATES IN
NOVEMBER. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE POSSIBLE FOR HER EITHER TO
TRAVEL TO DUBLIN ON THE MORNING OF 8 DECEMBER, LUNCHING THERE
AND RETURNING THE SAME DAY, OR TO TRAVEL TO DUBLIN IN THE
AFTERNOON OF 8 DECEMBER, STAYING OVERNIGHT AND RETURNING THE
FOLLOWING MORNING. IN THE LATTER CASE IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO BE BACK IN LONDON BY NOON ON
9 DECEMBER. PLEASE ENQUIRE WHETHER THIS DATE WOULD BE
CONVENIENT FOR THE IRISH AND IF SO WHICH ALTERNATIVE THEY WOULD
PREFER.
2. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE DISCUSSED THE MATTER INFORMALLY
WITH NELIGAN AND KIRWAN (TAOISEACH'S OFFICE) IN THE MARGINS OF
THE MEETING ON 11 SEPTEMBER. THEY THOUGHT THE TAOISEACH
WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED THAT A NOVEMBER MEETING CANNOT BE
ARRANGED BUT RECOGNIZED THAT WE COULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR THIS.
THEY COULD NOT OF COURSE COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED DATE, BUT
KIRWAN SAID HE WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE TAOISEACH WOULD
LIKE TO OFFER THE PRIME MINISTER A DINNER AND WOULD THEREFORE
OPT FOR AN OVERNIGHT STAY. BOTH HE AND NELIGAN WERE CONFIDENT
 THAT IN THAT EVENT THE IRISH WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
ACCOMMODATION ARRANGEMENTS (NOT NECESSARILY AT DUBLIN CASTLE)
IF FOR ANY REASON IT WERE DECIDED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD
NOT STAY AT GLENCAIRN.

CARRINGTON

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SIR A ACLAND
CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR PERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

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NORTHERN IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL
Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Haughey

I have discussed with the Prime Minister Myles Wickstead's letter to me of 9 September about the Prime Minister's visit to Dublin. As you know, the Prime Minister was unable to offer the Taoiseach any other dates in November. It would, however, be possible for the Prime Minister either to make a visit to Dublin on 8 December, returning the same day and lunching in Dublin, or to go to Dublin on the afternoon of 8 December, staying overnight and returning the following morning. It would be essential for the Prime Minister to be back in London by noon on 9 December. Perhaps you could let me know whether these dates are possible for the Irish and, if so, which alternative they would prefer.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Stephen Gomersall, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office
10 DOWNING STREET

Sirie Minister

Visit to Dublin.

8/9 December looks a reasonable time for your visit to Dublin. May we put these dates in the list?

Yes

10.9.80.
I don't think we can consider a more closely timed visit period in Nov.

as for Dec

This is extremely inconvenient.

We could either

(a) say "very sorry" & offer a date in early December (we have made it very clear how inconvenient November is); or

(b) offer to fly over on the evening of 6 November after questions & return on the late morning or early at lunch time on 7 November. But these dates are getting very close to the Lords Players Banquet & you will want to concentrate on the speech at some stage. If nothing were to fail to be on the
6 or rather than the 5th. I'm
sure we would no doubt want the
whole visit to be on the 7th in
which case you might prefer to say you would not stay
for dinner.

[Signature]
1. NELIGAN (DFA) ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING AND SAID THAT DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED WHEN THEY HAD ACCEPTED THE DATES PROPOSED BY US, NOW MADE IT NECESSARY FOR THE IRISH TO GO BACK ON THEIR ACCEPTANCE. THE FACT WAS THAT THE TAOISEACH HAD DECIDED IT WAS NECESSARY TO MOVE THE WRIT FOR THE ELECTION DOWNGRADE BY-ELECTION (CAUSED BY THE DEATH OF THE SPEAKER,...)
They had accepted the dates proposed by us, now made it necessary for the Irish to go back on their acceptance. The fact was that the Taoiseach had decided it was necessary to move the writ for the pending Donegal by-election (caused by the death of the Speaker during the recess) as soon as possible after the Dail reassembled. The effect of this was the polling for the by-election would have to take place on 5 or 6 November. The Taoiseach accordingly felt that it would not be appropriate for him to receive the Prime Minister in Dublin during the closing stages of the by-election campaign. The Irish would therefore like to propose as an alternative any day during the period 7-13 November (inclusive).

2. I reminded Neligan that, as I had originally told O'Rourke, it would be very difficult for the Prime Minister to find any date before the European Council other than what we had proposed, but I undertook to convey his proposal immediately to London.

3. The Taoiseach's decision to move the Donegal by-election writ at this stage will not be disclosed publicly for some time and Neligan asked us to keep it in strict confidence.

Staples

NNNNNN

Sent at 09:1035Z GB
Recd at 09:1035Z PEP
Tuesday 28 October
0800  Breakfast
0900  Messrs. Howe, Gow, Ingham and Sanders
0930-1030  Mr. George Bull for interview with "Director"
1300  Lunch and Questions briefing  No. 10
1515  Questions  H/C

Wednesday 29 October
1000  Visit to BBC
1900  Three Line: Vote
2200  Three Line: Vote

Thursday 30 October
0830  Hair
0900  Chancellor
0930  Messrs. Howe, Gow, Ingham and Sanders
1030  Cabinet
1300  Lunch and Questions briefing
1515  Questions  H/C
1600-1730  Briefing meeting
Keep free for CTU speech
?Three Line: Vote

Friday 31 October
0930  Media
Afternoon  Keep free for CTU speech

Saturday 1 November
Hair ?
CTU Conference
To Chequers  Hexagon Centre Reading

Monday 3 November
0830  Hair
1000  Media
1015  Chief Whip
1045  Chief Whip, Chairman and Home Secretary
1200  Keep free for Mr. Ingham
1300  Lunch: Carlton Club + I.G.
Keep free

Tuesday 4 November
0800  Breakfast
0900  Messrs. Howe, Gow, Ingham and Sanders
0915-1015  Keep free for Queen's Speech
Keep free
1300  Lunch and Questions briefing
1515  Questions  H/C
1830  Audience

Wednesday 5 November
0930-1030  Keep free for Lord Mayor's Banquet speech  No. 10
1130  Talks
1300  Lunch for President Stevens of Sierra Leone  H/C
1945 for  Progress Trust Dinner +I.G.
Thursday 6 November
08 Hair
09 Chancellor
0930 Messrs. Gow, Howe, Ingham and Sanders
1030 Cabinet
1300 Lunch and Questions Briefing
1515 Questions

Friday 7 November
0930 Media
0945 Keep free for Lord Mayor's Banquet Speech
1300 for Lunch for Top Salaries Review Body + Private Sec. No. 10
1315

Saturday 8 November
1900 Festival of Remembrance +D.T. Royal Albert Hall

Sunday 9 November Remembrance Sunday - Cenotaph

Monday 10 November
0830 Hair
1000 Media
1015 Chief Whip
1045 Chief Whip, Home Secretary and Chairman
1115 Keep free for speech for rest of the day
1830 Lord Mayor's Banquet +D.T.
Reply to the toast: "Her Majesty's Ministers"

Tuesday 11 November
0800 Breakfast
0900 Messrs. Howe, Gow, Ingham and Sanders
1300 Lunch and Questions briefing
1515 Questions H/C
1600-1730 Keep free for Briefing meeting for West German visit
1830 Audience
? Dinner in honour of H.M. The Queen Mother +D.T. No. 10

Wednesday 12 November
1030 Cabinet
1245 for Lunch: Industrialists + D.T. No. 10
1300 Keep free for speech
1930 for Dinner Party for Members of Government Black Tie No. 10
2000 Reception: United & Cecil Club Carlton Club

Thursday 13 November
0830 Hair State Opening of Parliament
1800 - Debate on Queen's Address H/C
1830 Mr. Ingemund Bergtsson: Speaker of the Swedish Riksdag

Friday 14 November Keep free for Queen's Speech Debate

Saturday 15 November Chequers
Evening Return to London
Sunday 16 November
? Hair
? To West Germany

Monday 17 November
West Germany

Tuesday 18 November
0800 Breakfast
0900 Messrs. Howe, Gow, Ingham and Sanders
1300 ? Arrival of the King of Nepal
1315 Lunch and Questions briefing
1515 Questions
State Banquet for King of Nepal + D.T. H/C

Wednesday 19 November
1100-1130 Hand over three Motability cars
Horseguards
+ S/S for Social Services and Min for Disabled
+ B.I.
1830 Lunch: Guinea Club
Audience
Dinner: King of Nepal?

Thursday 20 November
0830 Hair
0900 Chancellor
0930 Messrs. Howe, Gow, Ingham and Sanders
1030 Cabinet
1300 Lunch and Questions briefing
1315 Questions /
1600-1730 Keep free for Rome briefing
Dinner: King of Nepal?

Friday 21 November
0900 Media
1030 Depart London
1130 Open Day Centre, Finchley Old People's Welfare
Committee
The Herbert Wilmot Luncheon Club, Market Place, N2
1215 for Finchley Ladies Luncheon
1245
1530 Surgery
Return to London

Saturday 22 November
1100-1430 Finchley Conservative Association Fair

Sunday 23 November
Hair
To Rome

Monday 24 November
Rome
Late eve. Return to London

Tuesday 25 November
0800 Breakfast
0900 Messrs. Gow, Howe, Ingham and Sanders
1300 Lunch and Questions briefing
1515 Questions H/C
Wednesday 26 November
0800 Hair
0915 Strategy meeting Central Off.
1015 First meeting for Welsh CBI Conference speech 12/18
1245 for Lunch: National Enterprise Board + TPL Grosvenor Gds
1300 Keep free for European Council briefing meeting Buckingham Palace
Evening Reception for Diplomatic Corps + D.T.

Thursday 27 November
0900 Chancellor
0930 Messrs. Gow, Howe, Ingham and Sanders
1030 Cabinet
1300 Lunch and Questions briefing
1515 Questions
1600-1800 Keep free for European Council Briefing Meeting

Friday 28 November
0930 Media

Saturday 29 and Sunday 30 November
Chequers

Monday 1 December
0830 Hair
Depart for Luxembourg European Council, Luxembourg

Tuesday 2 December
European Council, Luxembourg

Wednesday 3 December
0830 Hair
1530 Statement in the House

Thursday 4 December
0900 Chancellor
0930 Messrs. Gow, Howe, Ingham and Sanders
1030 Cabinet
1300 Lunch and Questions briefing
1515 Questions

Friday 5 December
0930 Media
0945-1045 Keep free for Welsh Speech Finchley
1300 for Lunch for Junior Ministers
1315
1930 Contact Dinner

Saturday 6 December
Morning Surgery
? Post Office Sorting Office
1300 Buffet lunch, Finchley Old People's Welfare Cttee
Silver Jubilee
1430 Distribute fuel vouchers
1800 Red Lion Estate Old People's Dinner

Monday 8 December
0830 Hair
1000 Media
1015 Chief Whip
MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR HAUGHEY

Thank you for your letter of 2 September. The immediate Irish response, as you will have seen from Dublin telegram no. 242 of 4 September, was that 3/4 November was acceptable. However they have just told us that for domestic political reasons the Taoiseach cannot after all manage that date. The explanation, which was conveyed in strict confidence because of its party political implications, is that the Taoiseach has decided to move a by-election writ as soon as the Dáil reassembles in mid-October; voting will be on 5 or 6 November, and the Taoiseach feels that it would not be appropriate for him to be meeting the Prime Minister in Dublin in the last stages of the campaign. He asks therefore whether the Prime Minister could manage any day between 7 and 13 November inclusive. The Irish have been told that this is likely to be very difficult.

For the reasons set out in Paul Lever's letter of 11 August to Mike Pattison, we would still see advantage in the meeting being held before the European Council on 1/2 December. But we have already shown willing, and if it proves impossible to offer a date between 7 and 13 November, we could perfectly well suggest that the meeting be in December. There is no great urgency from the UK viewpoint.

/I am

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL
I am copying this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

M A Wickstead
CONFIDENTIAL

FM DUBLIN 04/14152 SEPT 1980

TO IMMEDIATE F CO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 242 OF 04 SEPT

AND TO PRIORITY INFO N 1 O (BELFAST)

YOURTEL NO 189 AND MY TELECON WITH NEWINGTON OF TODAY;

ANGLO-IRISH MEETINGS

1. I PUT THE DATES IN YOUR TUR TO O’ROURKE (SECRETARY D FA) TODAY. HE SAID THAT THESE WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRISH, AND ADDED THAT HE PRESENTED THE PROGRAMME FOR 3 NOVEMBER WOULD INCLUDE A DINNER.

2. O’ROURKE ENQUIRED WHERE THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD STAY OVERNIGHT. I SAID THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT SPECIFIC: WE WOULD NOT DOUBT BE GIVING THOUGHT TO THE QUESTION, AND WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE IRISH AUTHORITIES.

3. ON THE CONTENT OF THE MEETING AND THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF OTHER MINISTERS, O’ROURKE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT THE TAOISEACH HAD SAID TO H M AMBASSADOR ON 19 AUGUST (DUBLIN TELNO 233 PARA 2).

4. AS O’ROURKE SAID NOTHING ABOUT A POSSIBLE EARLIER MEETING BETWEEN MR ATKINS AND MR LENIHAN (DUBLIN TELNO 233, PARA 3), I DID NOT RAISE THE POINT.

STAPLES

PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAIRE
SIR A ACLAIRE
CHIEF CLERK
MR ADAMS
MR BULLARD
MR FERGUSSON
LORD N G LENNOX
MISS BROWN

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NORTHERN IRELAND

CONFIDENTIAL
Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Haughey

The Prime Minister has seen George Walden's letter to Mike Pattison of 29 August on this subject. She has noted that November will be a particularly busy month for her but has none the less agreed that the Irish should be told that she would be willing to come to Dublin on the afternoon of Monday 3 November, returning to London early on the morning of 4 November. If these dates are not convenient for the Irish, it is not going to be easy to find other dates before the European Council.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

S.J. Gomersall, Esq.,
Lord Privy Seal's Office.
CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister,

Yes, this is not a good month but we might just be possible to squeeze in a visit on the afternoon of Friday 3 Nov. You could be back here by mid-morning on 4 Nov. Shall we pursue this?

Meeting Between the Prime Minister and Mr Haughey

Thank you for your letter of 13 August. As you will have seen (Dublin telegram no. 283), Mr Haughey has now agreed that the next Anglo-Irish "Summit" should be in Dublin in November, with a preference for the early part of the month. It is now for us to suggest a date, or preferably two alternatives.

We can see no objection in principle (nor can the Northern Ireland Office at official level) to a meeting in early November, i.e. before the State Opening of Parliament. If the Prime Minister agrees, perhaps you would let me have one or two dates which we could offer the Irish.

The Prime Minister will also need to consider whether she wishes to spend a night in Dublin (as she will in Bonn and Rome later in the month). Although Mr Haughey has not yet said so, the Ambassador believes that he would welcome the opportunity which an overnight stay would give him of arranging a suitable social occasion in the evening. We might envisage the party arriving in Dublin in the late afternoon or early evening and leaving before lunch the following day. But if the Prime Minister prefers, it would of course be perfectly possible to fly to Dublin and back the same day.

I am copying this letter to Roy Harrington in the Northern Ireland Office and to David Wright in the Cabinet Office.

(G H H Walden)
Private Secretary

M A Pattison Esq
No. 10 Downing Street
21 August 1980

Prime Minister

To see the enclosed Irish press cutting, illustrating the speculation which Clive discussed with you earlier in the month - I attach the letter in which the reported royalty was described as "Irish Times". I thought you might find it helpful to see the article concerned.

The Prime Minister's intended examination of the relationship between the UK and the Republic was of course mentioned in Clive's letter. (McKittrick, as you will see, claims she promised specifically to study Mr Haughey's suggestion for "a completely new relationship"). You should know that the Prime Minister's concern, as set out in Clive's letter, is being studied by the FCO and ourselves, together with the Cabinet Office.

Yours sincerely,
Mike Hopkins

M W HOPKINS
Atkins prospect of even minimal agreement receding

I HAVE here, on a grubby bit of paper, the evidence of a wager made with a SDLP politician last autumn. He bet me £20 that an administrative assembly would be in operation in Northern Ireland by May 1989. He was wrong: we have seen no such assembly (nor, incidentally, have I seen the £20).

When the bet was laid, there was an outside chance that he would win it. The British were pushing hard, big plans were being made, and it really seemed that a real drive was on to bash the local politicians' heads together and put them to work. But, somewhere along the way, things got complicated, continued, and, by now, Humphrey Atkins must feel that the prospect of even minimal agreement on anything important is receding rather than coming closer.

Atkins's hopes were based on the private and public utterances of two men — Ian Paisley and Gerry Fitt. Paisley had been given a new confidence by his big European vote. Atkins hoped he would now feel strong enough to compromise. Fitt was then at the head of the SDLP, and, privately, he was saying what he later said in public — that an Irish dimension was essential, nor was full power-sharing.

Atkins misjudged both men, though it took him a long time to realise it. He was dismayed when Fitt parted company with the SDLP. But, he still toyed with the idea of the DUP leader as Prime Minister in a new assembly.

At a private gathering last spring, just after the end of his conference, he said he was almost ready to announce a new scheme which he thought most people would support. A critic of Paisley's asked if he thought Paisley would ever accept Catholics in government. Atkins pondered, then replied: "I don't think Paisley actually hates Catholics, do you? He seems to get on quite well with John Hume."

* * *

The Secretary of State now realises that agreement — on any scale — isn't going to come as easily as he thought. Since the spring, Northern Ireland Office people had said, privately, that Queen Elizabeth's speech, which opens the new session of the British Parliament in November, would contain legislative proposals for a new assembly. Now, suddenly, they've begun to say that November was only a kind of target date, not a firm commitment.

With everything being pushed back, the goal of holding elections to a new assembly in the springtime has also been shelved. This postponement will have one useful side-effect at least — the elections to provide a valuable indication of party strengths. It was the council elections of 1977 which decimated the minor parties and established that only four parties — Official Unionist, SDLP, DUP and Alliance — had significant support. This time, the key question will be the relative strengths of Paisley and the official Unionists.

Meanwhile, Atkins is about to go on his holidays. Like the rest of us, he will be waiting to see what frame of mind his Prime Minister is in when he comes back. It's not clear whether Atkins knows this, or not, but it is now known that Margaret Thatcher promised Charlie Haughey to spend the summer thinking about his suggestion for a completely new relationship between these islands. Nor does anybody know if she's going to "do a Gladstone" and become an Irish Nationalist. Almost certainly she isn't. But, the fact that all previous policy decisions could suddenly be rendered inoperative has helped create an air of uncertainty. That's why the Stormont Castle people are always talking about keeping all options open. Some day, they'll have to choose one of the options but — after a year-and-a-half of Tory rule — there's no real indication of when that will be.

* * *

On the security front, this hasn't been too bad a year for the authorities. Loyalist paramilitary groups have occasionally been active, but in a way which has been both more limited and more selective than their record in previous years. The Provisionals are still on the go, of course, but their activities are clearly directed against easy targets.

Almost all the deaths caused by the Provisionals are those of members of the security forces, or prison warders. They are killed in two ways — they are blown up, on duty, by radio-controlled bombs, or they are killed while off-duty by hit-and-run assassins. Both systems involve little risk to the killers.

This pattern is interpreted in some quarters as a sign that the Provos' capabilities have been considerably reduced. People are still being killed, the argument runs, but the Provos can only manage soft targets now.

The RUC and the Ulster Defence Regiment have managed progressively to take over more and more security responsibilities from the British Army. The police coped with the traditional Bogside August 12th riot this week, while in Fermanagh the UDR is now back in areas like the Short Strand and Balmoremore Estate — places where their presence would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.

But, of course, nothing ever goes that smoothly. There was an RUC detective-sergeant was charged with the murder of a police sergeant in Co. Antrim in 1977. This week, also, the episode of the policemen convicted of murdering a Catholic shopkeeper and kidnapping a Catholic priest was resurrected when the Apprentice Boys carried a flag donated by one of them in Derry.

The Chief Constable, John Hermon, issued a statement promising both the public and the members of his force that any wrong-doing in the ranks would be mercilessly rooted out. Public reaction to it all seems to fall into two main camps. One lot holds that this is just the tip of the iceberg, and that many more rogues lurk within the RUC, not yet brought to justice.

The other view is that the RUC deserves a lot of credit for rooting out any bad apples — and that the force has proved successful in relating those who argue that police forces never adequately police themselves. Hermon's hope is that he can salvage something from the mess by promoting and encouraging that second view. After all, however, it looks as though his task — like that of Humphrey Atkins is becoming harder rather than easier.
GRPS 230
CONFIDENTIAL
FM DUBLIN 19:16102Z AUGUST 1980
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 233 OF 19 AUGUST 1980
AND FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE N10(3)
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 101: ANGLO/IRISH MEETINGS.
1. I SAW MR HAUGHEY THIS AFTERNOON AND SPOKE AS IN PARA's
1 AND 2 OF TUR. HE WAS HOPING FOR A DATE LATE IN OCTOBER WHICH
WOULD ENABLE HIM TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE QUEEN'S
SPEECH. HOWEVER, HE ACCEPTED THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND HIS
PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A DATE EARLY IN NOVEMBER. I TOLD HIM
THAT AS REGARDS OTHER MEETINGS, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH OFFICIALS
WOULD MEET ON 11 SEPTEMBER AND WE WERE PROPOSING THAT MR LENIHAN AND
MR ATKINS SHOULD MEET ON 1 OCTOBER. HE THOUGHT A PROGRAMME ON
THOSE LINES WOULD BE FINE.

2. I STRESSED THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A BROAD AGENDA FOR
HIS MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THAT IN ADDITION TO
MR LENIHAN AND MR ATKINS THERE MIGHT BE OTHER MINISTERS PRESENT.
AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL IN LONDON THE SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT
PERHAPS THE MINISTERS FOR ENERGY MIGHT ATTEND, BUT I EMPHASISED
THAT THIS WAS JUST AN IDEA AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL. WE THOUGHT
THAT AT THEIR MEETING ON 11 SEPTEMBER OFFICIALS COULD DISCUSS THE
AGENDA. I INVITED HIM TO SUGGEST WHAT PARTICULAR SUBJECTS HE THOUGHT
MIGHT BE SUITABLE BUT HE PREFERRED TO SAY NOTHING JUST NOW.
HE WOULD LIKE TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT. AS REGARDS THE PROPOSED
PLACE FOR TALKS, HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO RECEIVE THE PRIME
MINISTER IN DUBLIN.

3. IN MR LENIHAN'S ABSENCE, I SUBSEQUENTLY SAW MR O'ROURKE,
THE SECRETARY OF THE DFA, TO PROPOSE 1 OCTOBER FOR THE MEETING WITH
MR ATKINS. HE TOLD ME THAT UNFORTUNATELY MR LENIHAN WOULD BE AWAY
IN NEW YORK THEN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND WOULD HAVE ANOTHER
MEETING ELSEWHERE ABROAD IN EARLY OCTOBER. THE DFA WILL BE IN
TOUCH WITH US SOON AFTER MR LENIHAN RETURNS FROM GENEVA TOMORROW
NIGHT TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE DATE.

NORTHERN IRELAND
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PP DUBLIN
GRS 270
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FM FCO 141505Z AUGUST 80
TO PRIORITY DUBLIN
TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 15 AUGUST
REPEAT FOR INFO TO NIO (BELFAST)
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 224: ANGLO IRISH MEETINGS

1. WE AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO SEE MR HAUGHEY
ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS NEXT MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.
YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MEETING
IN NOVEMBER, PERHAPS IN DUBLIN. IF MR HAUGHEY AGREES WE
MIGHT TRY TO IDENTIFY A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATE FAIRLY
SOON.

B) IF MR HAUGHEY EXPRESSES A PREFERENCE FOR SEPTEMBER OR
OCTOBER, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR
THE PRIME MINISTER. YOU MIGHT ADD THAT A MEETING IN
NOVEMBER, IE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON
1/2 DECEMBER, WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR A DISCUSSION
WHICH WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE COMMUNITY ISSUES: AND WOULD
ALLOW TIME FOR THE MEETING TO BE PROPERLY PREPARED.

C) WE ENVISAGE A BROAD AGENDA WITH THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS
BEING ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER MINISTERS (AS AGREED ON 21 MAY).
DETAILS MIGHT BE DISCUSSED BY BRITISH AND IRISH OFFICIALS ON
11 SEPTEMBER. BUT THE BRITISH SIDE WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE AN FCO
MINISTER AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY.

2. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE ENCOURAGE MR HAUGHEY TO EXPOSE HIS OWN
THINKING ON THE RANGE OF ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED.

3. WHEN YOU SEE MR LENIHAN, YOU SHOULD ENQUIRE WHETHER WEDNESDAY
1 OCTOBER WOULD BE A CONVENIENT DATE FOR HIS NEXT MEETING WITH
MR ATKINS: IF SO, WE SUGGEST THE MEETING BE IN LONDON. THIS
WOULD THEN ENABLE THE LORD PRIVY SEAL TO OFFER A WORKING LUNCH.

CARRINGTON

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MR. PATTISON

You asked me to look out a date for a possible visit to Dublin by the Prime Minister. The only one that might suit is Friday 28 November, though you really must check with her first because it is going to give her a hectic period. You ought to be aware of other major engagements around that time:

Monday 10 November
Lord Mayor's Banquet

Thursday 13 November
State Opening of Parliament

Monday 17 November
Visit to West Germany

Sunday 23/Monday 24 November
Visit to Rome

Friday 28 November
Dublin?

Monday 1/Tuesday 2 December
European Council, Luxembourg

It is a hell of a programme.

13 August 1980
Thank you for your letter of 11 August, about Anglo/Irish relations.

The Prime Minister has considered the question of timing and frequency of meetings with Mr Haughey. She has commented that the one firm decision from their last session was a commitment to regular meetings, and that we should, therefore, indicate that we are ready to meet at least annually. She agrees that these meetings should be expected to cover a broad agenda with a number of Ministers participating.

The Prime Minister also agrees that September would be too early for the next session. She is content to examine the possibilities of arranging a meeting in November, and she would be prepared in principle to meet in Dublin.

I am sending copies of this letter to Roy Harrington (Northern Ireland Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
RESTRICTED

GRPS 140
RESTRICTED
FM DUBLIN 13:1155Z AUGUST 1980
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 224 OF 13 AUGUST 1980.

FOLLOWING FOR NEWINGTON, RID, FCO.

1. BEFORE I GO ON LEAVE ON 2 SEPTEMBER I THINK I SHOULD CALL ON MR HAUGHEY AND TELL HIM SOMETHING ABOUT THE LIKELY DATE FOR THE NEXT MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. RECENT PRESS SPECULATION UNDERLINES THE NEED TO DO THIS SOON. AT THE SAME TIME I SHOULD LIKE TO TRY AND DRAW HIM OUT ABOUT WHAT HE HAS IN MIND FOR THE FUTURE. IN THIS CONNECTION IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT IF ANYTHING I MIGHT TELL HIM OF OUR IDEAS.

2. MR LENIHAN ATTENDED MY DUBLIN HORSE SHOW RECEPTION ON FRIDAY AND I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD CALL ON HIM BEFORE I LEFT. I NEED NOT SAY ANYTHING PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO REFER TO THE FORTHCOMING OFFICIAL MEETING IF IT IS NOW FIRM AND THE LIKELY DATE OF HIS MEETING WITH MR ATKINS.

3. AS MR HAUGHEY IS HALF ON HOLIDAY FOR THE REST OF THE MONTH, I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT IN AN EARLY BID TO SEE HIM. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS. PLEASE COPY AS NECESSARY.

PIGG

NORTHERN IRELAND LIMITED

Rid SIR A ACLAND
NAD CHIEF CLERK
QID MR ADAMS
IPD MR BULLARD
WED
MAED LORD N G LENNOX
NEWS DEPT MISS BROWN
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PS/MLR RILEY
PS/MLR BLAKER

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NORTHERN IRELAND

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Here is a long Foreign Office essay on Anglo-Irish relations, together with some comments by Sir Robert Armstrong.

The points for decision now are the frequency of meetings with Mr. Haughey and the timing of the next one.

In Venice Mr. Haughey mentioned September. There has been some recent press speculation in Ireland that a meeting is now being arranged. The FCO feel that September is too early, but that a meeting before the December Council would be worth while, and that this might take place in Dublin. They also recommend our agreeing to meetings at least once a year, with the participation of other Ministers and with a broad agenda.

Sir Robert Armstrong agrees with the drift of this, but recommends that we do not make a formal commitment to annual meetings, leaving them to be arranged as seems necessary - which will undoubtedly lead to at least annual meetings. He also suggests that there is a case for a Chequers session in preference to a Dublin session. In addition, he stresses the political advantages in relation to the north of having wide-ranging agendas for these meetings.

1. Agree that we should discuss with the Irish a November meeting?
2. Are you prepared to consider going to Dublin, or would you like to press for Chequers/London?
3. Would you prefer to adopt Sir Robert Armstrong's approach to frequency, which would avoid a formal commitment to a particular pattern of meetings?

13 August, 1980.
CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. A02881

MR. PATTISON

Anglo-Irish Relations

Paul Lever wrote to you on 11th August to convey the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendation to the Prime Minister that she should agree to establish meetings with the Taoiseach at least once a year with the participation of other Ministers and with a broad agenda.

2. There are two objections to this proposal, one general and one particular. The general objection is that the Prime Minister is becoming increasingly burdened with regular summit meetings of various kinds with broad agendas which do not always justify the amount of time and trouble which they demand. The particular objection is the obvious point that such regular meetings with Mr. Haughey will be offensive to Protestant opinion in Northern Ireland and with their sympathisers in the rest of the United Kingdom.

3. On the other hand the advantages of such regular meetings could be considerable. Paul Lever's letter spells out some of them. More generally, if the present political initiative in Northern Ireland shows any signs of success, it could only be helpful if it is reinforced by regular meetings between the Prime Minister and Mr. Haughey. If on the other hand the political initiative looks like losing its momentum, a regular series of meetings with Mr. Haughey will provide something on which to fall back and thereby refute charges that the Government are now bereft of ideas.

4. As the FCO say, the broader the agenda of a meeting the less the potential offensiveness to Protestant opinion in the North.

5. Finally there is the important point that Mr. Haughey has been led by the May meeting to look forward to regular meetings. We do not want at this stage to disappoint him.

6. I doubt whether it is necessary to lay down a regular frequency for these meetings. Recent experience suggests that there will be meetings at least once a year; a commitment to regularity will not add much. Indeed, it could well
be advantageous not to be committed to meeting once a year or once every six months, but to be free to arrange a meeting when it was convenient to do so. There may be times when we (or the Irish) want to suggest one at quite short notice; there may be others when it would suit us not to be bound by a fixed schedule. It should be sufficient for present purposes to start talking about the date for the next meeting.

7. As to that, September is clearly too soon; we should give the talks in Northern Ireland a chance to see if any progress is possible; but we probably cannot and should not put off a meeting with Mr. Haughey beyond the end of the year. This suggests that some time in November - perhaps in the second half, just after the Debate on the Address and before the next European Council - might be a good time.

8. Mr. Lever's letter does not discuss where the meeting should be. Last time Mr. Haughey came to London; would the Prime Minister be ready to contemplate going to Dublin? I think she is entitled to say that this might be difficult, politically as well as from the security point of view. Another possibility is Chequers. It might be helpful if you could give the Foreign Office some indication of the Prime Minister's views on this.

(Robert Armstrong)

12th August, 1980
Dear Mike,

Anglo-Irish Relations

In the communiqué issued after their meeting on 21 May the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach expressed a common wish 'to develop new and closer political cooperation between their two governments' and an agreement 'to hold regular meetings, on a continuing basis, accompanied by other Ministers as appropriate'. FCO and NIO officials have been considering how this commitment should be carried forward in such a way as to help over the Northern Ireland initiative.

Although no details have yet been worked out about the way in which 'political cooperation' will be pursued, the relationship set up by the Prime Minister's agreement with the Taoiseach matches in outline that between HMG and France (once a year) and the FRG and Italy (twice a year). We have no such relationship with the other small countries of the European Community and, other things being equal, there would be little advantage for HMG in treating Ireland differently. For obvious historical reasons, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom are already very close. Direct links already exist between Government departments in the two countries and there are grounds for arguing that there is no need for further institutionalisation - that the links work well and should be allowed to continue without change (indeed, in the past, the Republic of Ireland has been chary of getting too close to the UK partly for fear of being swamped and partly because it has seen the development of its own separate identity as requiring some degree of deliberate distance from the UK). However, in the context of the Government's initiative over Northern Ireland, a fuller development of relations between London and Dublin could offer important benefits to us, and could be of interest to the Republic.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has to consider how he can accommodate the SDLP demand for a wider, or Irish, dimension to any Northern Ireland settlement without making it unacceptable to the Protestants. At the same time we have to maintain the active cooperation of the Irish Government, from whom we are now getting the security cooperation which is essential to us, and whose acquiescence in HMG's initiative (despite their doubts about it) and lead in countering IRA propaganda, particularly in the USA we also need (Mr Haughey has recently come out strongly against US support for PIRA). We cannot express an interest in Irish unity
unity nor give the Irish Government the role in negotiations on Northern Ireland that they want. But to keep Mr Haughey on board, we must give him the opportunity to maintain that he has an input. The SDLP and Mr Haughey both talk of the need to see the Northern Ireland problem in terms of three dimensions or axes, that is, between the two communities in the North, between Dublin and Belfast, and Dublin and London. The Protestants are not ready to accept a firm arrangement along the Belfast-Dublin axis which is what the SDLP want, but the Northern Ireland Office believe (and have good reason to believe) that it would substantially help the SDLP if some kind of institutional development could take place along the London-Dublin axis; for their part the Protestants, who recognise that they have no locus standi in the direct relations between the two sovereign states, could have no valid cause for complaint.

We believe that Mr Haughey also sees the value in developing this relationship, although ideally he would like it to develop along a different track: ultimately his eye is on developing the Dublin-Belfast axis and it is inevitable that he sees relations between London and Dublin primarily as a means to this end. He wishes to establish a close personal rapport with the Prime Minister because he hopes that it will help him to persuade HMG to accord the Irish Government a role in Northern Ireland negotiations. However, since Mr Haughey's tete-a-tete discussions with the Prime Minister in May there has been little hard information about what is in his mind. On the one hand it seems clear that he is keen on the possibility of an Anglo-Irish conference on Northern Ireland once it is apparent that our present initiative is not prospering. On the other, there is some evidence that he is looking for a structure to embody and give expression to the relationship between our two countries, and believes that it would have both a symbolic and presentational value, not least because it would be a substitute for the Dublin-Belfast axis which he knows is at present unattainable because of Unionist objections. Mr Haughey's ideas are, however, based on the assumption that the Northern Ireland initiative will break down and that the way will then be open for him to step in. It is essential for us to put across the message that this is not so, that an Anglo-Irish Conference on Northern Ireland is a non-starter, and that in the circumstances his interests can only be served by developing the London-Dublin axis on a more general basis.

The form that further cooperation takes and the speed with which it develops are important. Any outcome of the Northern Ireland initiative likely to be acceptable to the Protestants (for instance the 'second option') is likely to be difficult for the SDLP and the Republic to swallow. That is why political cooperation, which means the development of the

/London-Dublin
London-Dublin axis, must move forward in parallel with the Northern Ireland initiative in a manner which will satisfy the Irish Government and the SDLP. It is true that Northern Ireland is bound to be a major feature on the agenda of any meeting. But at the same time we must not alarm the Protestants, who will be immensely suspicious of any discussions between London and Dublin which focus too narrowly on the North/South issues rather than Republic/UK ones. The broader the range of subjects covered, the less ground they will have for complaining. They will have no valid grounds for doing so, the more that Anglo-Irish political cooperation can be shown as paralleling eg Anglo-French and Anglo-German cooperation, with regular meetings at Head of Government and Ministerial level across the whole range of issues of common interest to them. The Northern Ireland Office are for these reasons particularly keen that HMG should indicate clearly that they are serious about building on the commitment to 'political cooperation' with the Irish Government and mean to give substance to it. It is worth adding that one of the proposals for future cooperation, the IONA concept ('Islands of the North Atlantic') put forward by Mr Biggs-Davison, is believed to have - if only because of the name - an emotional pull for both communities in the North.

The chances are that meetings along these lines would appeal to Mr Haughey if only as a second best, not least because they would visibly enhance Ireland's status as an equal partner of the UK in the European Community. He will of course understand the implications for the Republic's relations with the North.

The Way Forward

UK and Irish officials are planning to meet in early September to discuss the way forward. The aim will be to find out from the Irish, who have so far been reluctant to discuss this, just how far Mr Haughey is prepared to go and to explore possible areas for political cooperation.

The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Irish Foreign Minister are then due to hold their next regular meeting in early October. This will present a useful opportunity to take the first steps at Ministerial level. It would be helpful, in the wider context, for the agenda to cover other issues, eg EC questions, and an FCO Minister, if possible the Lord Privy Seal, will participate.

So far as the timing of the Prime Minister's meeting with the Taoiseach is concerned, I understand that, in Venice, Mr Haughey suggested that the next meeting should be in September. In our view this is too soon. (I gather in any case that you
told Dermot Nally that a date in September would be difficult to fit in.) There will not be time for the necessary preparation if matters of substance are to be addressed, and if Mr Haughey is merely looking for a shift in HMG's policy so as to give him a visible role in Northern Ireland, he will come away empty handed. This argues for some delay; and it would be entirely credible with our objectives to exploit the link with the Community timetable in order to achieve it without appearing to rebuff Mr Haughey. Although Ireland's voice is not decisive in respect of likely Community business, it could none the less be useful to hold a meeting in the run-up to the European Council on 1-2 December. As for the future, the needs of our relationship with the Republic in the Northern Ireland context indicate that meetings ought to be envisaged at least once a year.

US Implications

The US Presidential election on 4 November is a potentially complicating factor for the Northern Ireland initiative. Even if Northern Ireland has not so far been an issue in the campaign it could easily become so, particularly if the initiative is passing through a difficult phase. For instance, Senator Kennedy has recently repeated his view that Dublin should be included in negotiations on Northern Ireland's future in a letter to the Ambassador in Washington. Between now and 4 November, therefore, it will be a helpful answer to charges that the initiative has broken down, that HMG are not pursuing it actively enough, or have failed to recognise the Irish dimension, if a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach is already under discussion. This is a further argument for not going along with the September date suggested by Mr Haughey and for holding the meeting after the Presidential election, which in any case would fit in better with the European Community programme.

Conclusions

Taking all these considerations together, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recommends that the Prime Minister should agree to establish meetings with the Taoiseach at least once a year, with the participation of other Ministers and with a broad agenda. We should let the Taoiseach's Office know, as soon as possible, that the September date suggested by Mr Haughey to the Prime Minister in Venice is too early; we should however propose that the first such meeting, possibly in Dublin, should be held whenever a convenient date can be found before the next European Council in Luxembourg on 1 and 2 December.

I am copying this letter to Roy Harrington and David Wright.

M A Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

(P Lever)
Private Secretary
PART 3 begins:

FCO to MAP 11.8.80
RTA 6 MAP 12.8.80

PART 2 ends:

From Dublin 221 8:8:80