

Confidential Filing

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister, Dr. Hammadi
to the U.K.; March 1981

IRAQ

NOVEMBER 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
21.1.81							
6.2.81							
10.3.81							
18-3-81							

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PREM 19/4/97



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

18 March 1981

Dear Sir,

Visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister,
Dr Sa'Adoun Hammadi: 9-11 March 1981

As expected, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was questioned closely during this visit by Dr Hammadi on the Government's policy towards arms supplies to Iraq and Iran. This subject came up first in *tete à tete* conversation, and the points made were subsequently reaffirmed in the official talks.

Dr Hammadi pressed Lord Carrington strongly not to allow any defence supplies, and in particular tank spares, to be shipped to Iran. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained our general policy and pointed out that, while hostilities continued, we had to take account of the obligations of neutrality. We had decided not to allow arms and ammunition ('lethal items') to go to either side while the present level of hostilities lasted.

On the question of spare parts, Dr Hammadi questioned the distinction between 'lethal' and 'non-lethal' items. He argued that spare parts could make the difference between a tank being operational and, therefore, 'lethal', and non-operational. Lord Carrington undertook that no spare parts would be supplied to Iran without the Iraqis being told in advance.

On the Kharg, Lord Carrington said that no decision had been taken on its release, but he pointed out that we might have to address this question in due course, and that the vessel could hardly be used effectively in the war by the Iranians since it was in poor condition; it was merely a support vessel and was only very lightly armed. He questioned whether its eventual release to the Iranians could in any way pose a threat to Iraq. Dr Hammadi nevertheless pointed out that it did have a gun and implied that the Iraqis would be reluctant to see it released to Iran.

Dr Hammadi said that British businessmen would be welcome to help in the reconstruction of war damage in Iraq provided their prices were right. He said that Iraq was keen to import a very large quantity of arms - if they could be had at the right price - because

/because

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because of the high level of British technology and for reasons of language; there would be no need to go through the usual processes of tendering and so on. He specifically said that the Iraqi Trade Minister looked forward to accepting HMG's outstanding invitation in June and that the Iraqi Oil Minister also looked forward to visiting Britain. Lord Carrington considers that Dr Hammadi came here with the intention of taking a deliberate step towards the further improvement of Iraqi/British relations and that the visit was a success in this respect.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to other members of OD, and Sir Keith Joseph, Mr David Howell, Sir R Armstrong and the Head of Defence Sales.

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

Yours over.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'F N Richards', written in a cursive style.

Brian Norbury Esq
PS/Secretary of State for
Defence
Whitehall
London SW1

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TRA 8 JS
cc mod

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 March 1981

Dear Francis,

VISIT BY DR. HAMMADI

The Foreign Minister of Iraq, Dr. Hammadi, called on the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon. I enclose a record of their discussion.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

JS

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Sec. Monitor out

SUBJECT

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ, DR. SA'ADOUN HAMMADI, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 9 MARCH AT 1700

Present

The Prime Minister	Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi
The Hon. Douglas Hurd	H.E. Mr. Shawi
H.E. Mr. S.L. Egerton	Mr. Ahmad al Samarrai
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander	

* * * * *

Bilateral Relations

After an exchange of courtesies, in the course of which Dr. Hammadi conveyed greetings from his President, and the Prime Minister thanked Dr. Hammadi for the action taken by his Government in the Sparkes case, the Prime Minister asked Dr. Hammadi how he viewed the general situation at present. Dr. Hammadi said that in the past there had been ups and downs in relations between Iraq and the United Kingdom. But during Lord Carrington's last visit, it had been agreed to make a new start. The Iraqi Government had decided to expand the relationship, assuming that was acceptable to the British Government. There were no impediments on the Iraqi side to such an expansion, whether in the fields of political, economic or cultural relations. Of course, improved relations should be seen as benefiting both parties. They would be based on respect for each side's political positions. But there were complementarities in the interests of both countries. The Prime Minister recalled the visit paid by Mr. John Davies to Baghdad when he had been the Opposition Spokesman for Foreign Affairs. This had opened the way to a new chapter in relations between the two countries. She was delighted to see Dr. Hammadi in London and would value closer bilateral relations, particularly in the economic field. Dr. Hammadi said that he found the Prime Minister's words very encouraging.

/Iran/Iraq War

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Iran/Iraq War

Dr. Hammadi said that the Prime Minister was no doubt aware of the background to the conflict between Iraq and Iran. Iraq had crossed the Iranian frontier on 22 September. But the war had in fact started on 4 September with Iranian shelling of Iraqi cities. Iraq had always wanted good relations with Iran but the new regime in Tehran had thought they could overthrow other established governments, starting with that in Baghdad. They had sought to destabilise Iraq from within. They had stimulated subversive activities and had begun to play the old game of encouraging the Kurds. This last was a particularly sensitive issue for the Iraqi Government and they had resisted. Ultimately, large-scale military intervention had resulted.

As regards the longer term origin of the war, Dr. Hammadi said that in 1975 the Iraqi Government had had to accept the division of the Shatt Al Arab. This had been part of a package deal. When the Shah's regime had collapsed, his successors had wanted to hold on to their half of the package without observing the Iraqi part. Even if the war had not started in September, it would have started at some other time. The Iraqi Government was anxious to end the war, but they were very firm about regaining the Shatt Al Arab and the lands occupied by Iran. Iranian interference in Iraq would have to cease. The Iraqi Government had no ambitions in Iran. They did not want to disrupt the unity of the country. They wanted a stable and peaceful neighbour. More time would probably be needed to achieve this. Eventually the present abnormal situation in Tehran would end and the Iranians would come to their senses. At present it was impossible for the Iranian Government to take decisions.

The Iraqi Government was aware that Iran's military equipment came mainly from the West, including the United Kingdom. They knew of Iran's contacts with the British Government with a view to buying spare parts. In their view anything that was supplied to Iran would be used against Iraq. It would not help peace in the area.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that normal relations between the UK and Iran had not yet been resumed since Mr. Pyke was still in prison. Economic sanctions had lapsed but there were still limitations on the supply of military equipment. The British Government understood the requirements of neutrality in the Iran/Iraq conflict. Iraq had already been supplied with certain non-lethal equipment - including radios. Dr. Hammadi himself would be discussing with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office other related issues, including the repair of military equipment.

The Prime Minister asked about the effect of the conflict inside Iraq. Presumably the interruption of oil supplies was having an effect on the Iraqi economy. Dr. Hammadi said that there had been no adverse effects of any significance. The oil supply would soon be restored. The country's financial position was, in any case, sound. The population as a whole was more united than ever. They were agreed that while they wanted peace, they would not surrender. This was not only a question of simple nationalism. Iraq had always been regarded by Iran as a small country lying within Tehran's sphere of influence. The Iraqi people wanted to put an end to this and to be accepted as equals. The Prime Minister commented that Iraq had always been regarded here as a powerful and influential country.

Arab/Israel Dispute

Dr. Hammadi said that in recent months he had seen both M. Thorn and Mr. van der Klaauw. He had explained the Iraqi reaction to the various points in the European plan. He had the impression that Europe might be thinking that a plan lying somewhere between the outcome envisaged at Camp David and the conditions laid down by the Baghdad Conference would provide a solution. He had to say that such an approach would not be acceptable to the Arab countries as a whole. The points laid down at the Baghdad Conference represented the minimum that could form the basis of a plan likely to meet with the approval of the Arabs.

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
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The Gulf

Dr. Hammadi said that any increase in the military presence of the United States or European powers in the Gulf area would only result in an increase in the Soviet presence and of tension. There was already a Soviet presence in South Yemen. The Arab countries hoped that it might be possible to wean South Yemen away from the Soviet Union. An increased Western presence would have the opposite effect: the Soviet presence in South Yemen would increase. There was in any case no reason for an American military presence. This would not be popular as people in the area did not want a return to the old policy of military bases. The Prime Minister said that unless the countries in the region wanted it, there could be no military presence. She had told the Americans in Washington that if a Rapid Deployment Force was to be formed, the United Kingdom would be ready to make a modest contribution. A Rapid Deployment Force would not be for use only in the Gulf and it would not be stationed anywhere. But unless the Force had been organised, Western Governments would not be able to respond to appeals for help. There would be no question of bases. Western Governments would not want them. The Force would not be deployed unless and until it had been invited. Dr. Hammadi commented that there were already naval forces in the region. Mr. Hurd pointed out that they were not in the Gulf itself. Nor did their presence seem to have resulted in an increase in tension. The Prime Minister commented that we had been very anxious that tankers could continue to transit the Straits of Hormuz. Some of our friends in the region had been pleased that we had taken steps to ensure this. Things were now, of course, calmer than they had been last autumn. Dr. Hammadi said that he was relieved that the super powers had kept their distance from the Iran/Iraq conflict. However, he remained concerned about the implications of an increased military presence for the situation in South Yemen.

The discussion ended at 1745.

10 March 1981



E.R.

Ray

OK. *[Signature]*

MR. ALEXANDER

The Foreign Office rang this afternoon to ask whether Douglas Hurd and our Ambassador to Iraq could attend Monday's meeting when the Prime Minister is due to see the Iraqi Foreign Minister. He will be accompanied by his Ambassador.

I told the Foreign Office that if it was their recommendation that these two should be invited, then you would also consent.

Agree?

[Signature]

6 March 1981



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

When the F.I.O. say that Mr
Hammadi is not an easy inter-
locutor, they mean (I think) that
he is a rather nasty & thoroughly
prissy character. I doubt that
you will change his mind on
anything. I think it would
probably be a good idea not to
get too deeply into the Arab/Israeli
dispute, & particularly the P.O.: he
will inevitably say something awful!
Given the size of the contracts that
may be at issue, generalities might be
best.

Paul



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 March 1981

Dear Michael,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Iraqi Foreign Minister

9 March 1981

The Prime Minister has agreed to see Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi at 5.00 p.m. on 9 March. We assume that she will want Mr Hurd to be present.

Dr Hammadi will be accompanied by Ahmad al Samarrai, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign-Affairs and by Mr Shawi, the Iraqi Ambassador.

I enclose a brief, covering Points to Make and Essential Facts, and a copy of the Steering Brief by which the Foreign Secretary will be guided in his official talks on 10 March. I also enclose a Personality Note on Dr Hammadi, and Mr Ahmed al Samarrai.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes, despite the numerous obstacles to developing closer relations with the Iraqi regime, that we have to try to create the right political climate in which to allow our exporters to exploit the enormous potential which Iraq offers. The Iraqis are seeking to diversify their sources of military supplies and have expressed interest in a wide range of military equipment. The long-term prospects for sales across the board are enormous. The Foreign Secretary, therefore, sees the visit of Dr Hammadi as an opportunity to seek to convince the Iraqis that we want our relations on a firmer footing. He will also want to establish from the Iraqis how they would like to see this relationship develop. It will provide an opportunity for a frank exchange of views on bilateral issues, including some potentially awkward ones, like the case of Mr John Smith (whom we believe the Iraqis want to swap for the convicted assassin Hassan, now that they have released Mr Ned Sparkes): the Lord Privy Seal has agreed to tackle this at the lunch he is hosting for Dr Hammadi on 10 March. But Lord Carrington will also want to hear what they have to say on regional matters, particularly their attitude towards Gulf co-operation and on the current state of their relations with the Soviet Union.

Lord Carrington considers it is important that the visit should be a success. It has been made clear that other Iraqi Ministers will not visit the UK until Hammadi himself has done so successfully. Dr Hammadi is unfortunately not an easy interlocutor and tends to be taciturn. Lord Carrington will be meeting him briefly before he calls on the Prime Minister, when he hopes to get the visit off to a good start.

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The half hour available for the call on the Prime Minister will not allow for detailed discussion of any one subject. She may, therefore, need to steer Dr Hammadi away from any attempt to make the conversation one-sided. She may wish to keep the discussion to general points, perhaps referring to our interest in fostering closer relations and touching briefly on our hope that a solution can be found to the war. She will also wish to mention, when Hammadi raises the question, our wish to be as helpful to the Iraqis as we can on such matters as the sales of military equipment. If time permits, she may want to refer to her recent visit to Washington (Hammadi may ask her about her reported comments on the Gulf and the Rapid Deployment Force), in which the Iraqis will be particularly interested. The Iraqis will be flattered if she is prepared to give a brief account of her impressions of the American Administration.

Yours ever,
F N Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

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IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER -
9 MARCH

POINTS TO MAKE

Anglo/Iraqi relations

1. Hope your visit will lead to strengthening of bilateral relations. Regular contacts at Ministerial level valuable. Hope to see other Iraqi Ministers here in coming months. We want to establish closer ties across the board. Much encouraged that British companies have been successful in winning contracts. Believe we have much to offer each other in all fields.

Arab/Israel

2. European attitude positive. Venice Declaration marked beginning of an attempt to contribute to a negotiated settlement. Urgent need for a settlement. European efforts will continue. But Arab position must also evolve if progress is to be made. Each side should recognise rights of the other.

Iran/Iraq War

3. We hope that current Islamic initiative for cease-fire will be successful. We are not taking sides nor apportioning blame. We want to see peace in an area so vital to world economy. Continuing hostilities and instability will create opportunities for further Soviet encroachment in South Asia. How are the Islamic Good Office Committee progressing in their role as mediators?
Soviet aims in the area

4. Russian proposals for making the area a peace zone would only be credible if the Soviet Union withdrew their troops from Afghanistan.

/Gulf

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Gulf Cooperation (defensive)

5. We believe Gulf states themselves must take the lead over their own security. We therefore welcomed the recent agreement between certain Gulf states on cooperation. We would like to remain in close consultation with all the Gulf states. Look forward to my own visit in April.

Arms supplies (defensive)

6. We wish to be as helpful to Iraq as possible within the constraints of our neutrality obligations. We have authorized numerous deliveries of non lethal items. Arms and ammunition more difficult. Understand discussions now under way for overhaul in Jordan of Chieftains captured from Iran.

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ESSENTIAL FACTS

Anglo/Iraqi relations

1. Iraqis frequently harp on about our 'colonial' past and 'responsibility' for Palestine. Sensitive and quick to take offence. Appear interested in strengthening their ties with the West, and with Europe in particular. Some evidence that they want to improve relations with Britain.
2. Iraqis treat politics and trade as interlinked. We need to create right political climate to exploit the enormous potential Iraqi market. Development budget in excess of US \$10,000 million in 1979 and expected to rise steadily. British companies successful in recent months in winning a number of sizeable contracts. Exports in 1980 were £322 million approx (60% up on 1979) and still rising. But though we are gradually recovering from the freeze imposed at the time of our 1978 expulsion of the Iraqi diplomats, we remain (at 6.4% of the market) well behind Japan (24%), West Germany (18%), France (10%), Italy (8%) and the USA (8%).

Arab/Israel

3. Iraq never accepted Resolution 242. Views are hardline. But since Camp David the Iraqis have not pressed their opposition to negotiated settlement: their hostility has been directed at Camp David. Their attitude to European efforts is politely sceptical. They do not believe that we have any influence on US and Israel.

Iran/Iraq war

4. The war has bogged down. New tactics and offensives expected in Spring. Iraq unlikely to win military victory over the Iranians. Ready to negotiate. Unlikely to meet Iranian precondition of complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian soil. Olof Palme believes he is making slow progress in his mediation. Good Office Committee appointed by Islamic Conference currently in the area. Some indications

/that

that their efforts to obtain a ceasefire, followed by Iraqi withdrawal supervised by an Islamic force, may win serious consideration from the two sides.

Gulf cooperation

5. Six Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman) signed an agreement on 4 February to promote political and economic cooperation. Though defence matters were not mentioned, there is little doubt that the Gulf states' common defence interests was a strong motive behind their cooperation. They claim that the Iraqis agreed to be excluded, for the time being at least, but Iraqi silence on the 4 February agreement suggests this may be over-optimistic.

Iraq/Gulf

6. Iraq's relations with Moscow have cooled in the past couple of years (notably over Afghanistan) as they have ended their isolation in the Arab world. These two factors have facilitated a rapprochement with the conservative Gulf states, as with Jordan. But there is residual distrust of them in the Gulf, both because of their size and military strength and because of their past record as trouble-makers for the traditional regimes.

Arms sales

7. The Iraqis are disillusioned with the USSR as arms suppliers and seeking alternatives in the West. The French are briskly grasping the opportunity, and the Italians (and perhaps other European countries also) are likely to emulate them. The potential is enormous since the Iraqis have the oil wealth to replace, in due course, their Russian arsenal and a larger population and a better technological base on which to build than any other Arab country east of Suez. We are constrained by our neutrality obligations, the danger of driving Iran into the arms of the Russians, and doubts about the durability and responsibility of the Iraqi regime. Nevertheless, we want to exploit the market as best we can under present circumstances and above all to

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keep the door open for the massive future sales which could occur. We need therefore to appear as positive as possible to Hammadi, who will probably probe us searchingly on our attitude in principle to supplying Iraq.

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VISIT OF THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER, 9-11 MARCH 1981

STEERING BRIEF

General

1. The visit of Dr Hammadi is an important step in the tricky and necessarily slow process of trying to establish a sound working relationship with Iraq, from which we can expect to derive considerable benefits, both politically and commercially.
2. Our relationship with Iraq has been generally bad since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. As Iraq has grown in importance economically since the mid 70s (second in the league of Arab oil producers in the Middle East until recently and with a market of US \$10,000 million +) so it has become increasingly important to rectify this. The Iraqis have shown signs of movement away from isolated extremism on many issues. They have become increasingly disillusioned with the USSR with whom they have a special friendship treaty and on whom they have relied heavily for arms supplies and technology, especially in the oil industry. In the past two to three years there has been a realignment of their foreign policies. Albeit for reasons of pragmatism, they are now co-operating more closely with their neighbours in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They are looking to the West, and in particular to the EEC, as an alternative supplier of equipment across the board. This new situation is to our advantage and we should seek to exploit it. France has developed a special relationship with Iraq and is reaping the rewards. They have been successful in winning a number of major contracts, especially for the supply of military equipment.
3. The Secretary of State's visit to Baghdad in July 1979 was the first step towards putting our relations on a sounder footing. The release of Mr Ned Sparkes may be seen as evidence of the Iraqi interest in taking the process further. Dr Hammadi's

/visit

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visit will provide an opportunity to convey to the Iraqis our wish to strengthen relations. He is however not a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and does not cut much ice in Baghdad. But the Iraqis are protocolaire and clearly see the Hammadi visit as the prerequisite before others come eg the Trade and Oil Ministers, and in due course perhaps an influential figure like Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister. Only through contacts with senior Iraqis will we be able to have the full and frank exchange of views necessary to get along side this difficult regime. It is important therefore that we make the Hammadi visit a success. It may not be easy. Dr Hammadi unfortunately lacks charm and tends to be taciturn. He may not prove an easy interlocutor.

UK Objectives

4. a) to convey to the Iraqis our wish to have closer relations, but based on mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
- b) to explain our policy on arms supplies while hostilities with Iran continue: and to promote our interest in negotiating a wide range of military contracts on a longer term basis, and in enlarging our share of the lucrative Iraqi market for goods and services of all kinds.
- c) to have an exchange of views of regional and international issues.

Probable Iraqi objectives

- a) to establish our policy on arms supplies to them, and more particularly what we intend to supply to Iran.
- b) to present their case for the invasion of Iran and to seek to convince us that right is on their side.
- c) to raise such perennial irritants as media coverage and alleged support of Iraqi dissidents in this country.
- d) to discuss bilateral agreements covering legal, cultural and trade matters.

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5. Dr Hammadi is calling briefly on the Secretary of State shortly after his arrival on 9 March. He will then call on the Prime Minister. Two hours have been set aside for official talks on 10 March. The Secretary of State may wish to ask Dr Hammadi how he wishes to tackle the agenda. Subject to that, the discussion will probably have to start with the Iran/Iraq war, Arab/Israel and Soviet aims in the area (Briefs 7-9). British policy on arms supplies to Iraq and Iran (Brief 3) could follow from the discussion of the war between the two countries, but in any case there are a number of bilateral issues (including arms) to be covered and the Secretary of State may need to steer the discussion towards these after about an hour. Rather than become involved in detailed talks on the three agreements on cooperation Lord Carrington may wish to suggest that these be taken by officials at a separate session in the afternoon (Briefs 4-6). The Iraqis may be interested to have an account of the Secretary of State's impressions of the new American Administration.
6. If there is insufficient time to get through the agenda for the official talks, Mr Hurd has agreed to hold a brief meeting immediately after the LPS' lunch to cover outstanding points.
7. The social side of the programme includes a Theatre/Supper party hosted by Mr Hurd, a lunch hosted by the LPS and a dinner hosted by the Secretary of State.
8. A copy of the official programme is attached.
9. Leading personality reports on Dr Hammadi and Mr Ahmed Hussain Samarraï are attached.

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67 SA'DOUN HAMMADI (DR)

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Born Kerbala 1930. Shia. Graduate of American University of Beirut; PhD (agriculture) Wisconsin University 1957; editor of the newspaper "Al Jumhuriya" after the 1958 Revolution; undertook the organisation of the Ba'ath Party in Libya in early 1960s and was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment; after serving about one year, was sent back to Baghdad, where he was put in prison by Qasim, January 1963; released and became Minister of Agrarian Reform February 1963; replaced because of his support for Ali Salih al Sa'adi's extremist group November 1963; after the November 1963 coup variously reported to be under arrest or to have fled the country; appointed an expert in agricultural planning with the United Nations December 1966.

Member of the Planning Board in October 1968 and Chairman of the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) November 1968; Minister of Oil and Minerals December 1969 (in addition to the Chairmanship of INOC); lost the Chairmanship of INOC mid-1971 but re-appointed 1973; Minister of Foreign Affairs November 1974.

Sa'adoun Hammadi played a leading part in the negotiations leading to Russian assistance to INOC in the Rumaila field and in all the negotiations with IPC culminating in the latter's nationalisation in 1972. As the responsible Minister and Chairman of INOC, he must be considered one of the architects of Iraq's present oil policy. But he was very obviously not the decision-taker, despite his talents, and the same applies in his present post. Is thought to have had Marxist leanings. As a Shia he may feel insecure. He is noted by fellow Ba'athis for taciturnity and lack of charm, personal handicaps which may partly account for his low position in the pecking-order. Though glum, poker-faced and not well disposed to the west, he has a first class mind and is both hard-working and professionally competent.

Married. Fluent English.

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15 AHMAD HUSSAIN AL SAMARRAI

Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Born c.1930. Native of Samarra. Career diplomat. Ambassador to Bulgaria 1975-77, Spain 1977-79, Iran 1979-80. Appointed senior Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, 1980.

Competent and presentable, with little force of character and no influence. Friendly and helpful within his narrow limits, but careful not to speak out of turn.

Good English but prefers to use an interpreter, some Spanish.

Irak
dc 12/1

VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY DR SA'ADOUN HAMMADI,
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

9 - 11 MARCH 1981

ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(to be read in conjunction with programme attached).

TRANSPORT

Cars are provided by Government Hospitality Fund and seating plans are shown at Annex 1.

MONDAY 9 MARCH

Arrival

The following will be at the airport to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

The Hon Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Brig J A C Cowan, Secretary, Government Hospitality Fund

Group Captain Robert Thomson, Escort Officer.

Call on Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

The following will also be present:

IRAQ

Sd Ahmaq̄d Hussain al-Sammarrāi

Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi

Sd Muhammad Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf

Call on the Prime Minister

The following will also be present:

IRAQ

Sd Ahmaq̄d Hussain al-Sammara'i

Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi

Sd Muhammad Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr D Hurd

Theatre/Supper evening

The following are also invited:

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammara'i

Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi

Sd Muhammad Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf

Mr S Egerton

/Tuesday 10 March

TUESDAY 10 MARCH 1981

OFFICIAL TALKS AT FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The following will also be present:

Iraq

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Samarra'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub

United Kingdom

Mr D Hurd
Sir John Graham/Mr J C Moberly
Mr S L Egerton
Mr H D A C Miers
Mr W I Rae

LUNCH HOSTED BY LORD PRIVY SEAL

The following are also invited:

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Samarra'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub
Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani
Mr S L Egerton

BRITISH MUSEUM

The following will accompany the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Mr S L Egerton

DINNER HOSTED BY SECRETARY OF STATE

The following are also invited:

Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Samarra'i
Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani
Mr S L Egerton

J H W Reid (Miss)
Visits Section
Protocol and Conference Department

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
5 March 1981

Car Seating Plan

Monday 9 March

Airport to Hotel

Car P	Foreign Minister Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammarra'i Escort Officer Special Branch
Car 1	Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub Special Branch
Car 2	Sd Abdul Latif Muhi Nuaimi Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani Mr S L Egerton

Hotel to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 Downing Street and return to hotel

Car P	Foreign Minister Sd Ahmed Hussain Al-Sammarra'i Escort Officer Special Branch
Car 1	Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf Mr S L Egerton Special Branch

Hotel to Coliseum, Savoy and return to hotel

as on journey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Tuesday 10 March

Hotel to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

as on previous journey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Hotel to Admiralty House

Car 2	Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub Sd Mawafaq Mahmud Al-Ani
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Admiralty House

as on journey to Foreign and Commonwealth Office

/Admiralty House to

Admiralty House to British Museum return to Hotel

Car P Foreign Minister
Sd Muhammed Sa'eed Al-Sahhaf
Mr J L Egerton
Escort Officer
Special Branch

Admiralty House to Hotel

Car 1 Sd Ahmad Hussain Al-Sammarra'i
Ambassador Hisham al-Shawi

Car 2 , Sd Isam Abdul Ghani Mahbub
Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani

Hotel to 1 Carlton Gardens and return to hotel

Car P Foreign Minister
Sd Ahmad Hussain al-Sammarra'i
Escort Officer
Special Branch

Car 1 Ambassador Hisham Al-Shawi
Sd Muhammad Al-Sahhaf
Special Branch

Car 2 Sd Mowafaq Mahmud Al-Ani
Mr S L Egerton

Wednesday 11 March

Hotel to Press Attaché's office

Car P Foreign Minister
Escort Officer
Special Branch

Two cars will be available for the members of the official suite who wish to attend the Press Conference.

Central London to airport

as on inward journey from airport.

DISTRIBUTION (of programme and administrative plan)

10 Downing Street

Private Secretary/Prime Minister (2)
Press Office (2)

Iraq Embassy (6)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

PS/Secretary of State (2)
PS/Lord Privy Seal (2)
PS/Mr Hurd (2)
Sir John Graham (1)
Mr J C Moberly (1)
Mr H D A C Miers (1)
Mr I Rae, MED (6)
News Department (3)
Security Department (3)
Resident Clerk (1)
Protocol and Conference Department (6)

Government Hospitality Fund

MFJ

B/P 6. 3. 81

drag

21 January 1981

Brief requested by
phone SP 27.1.

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 20 January about the visit of Dr. Hammadi to this country in March. She would be prepared to see Dr. Hammadi from 1700-1730 on Monday 9 March.

MODBA

G G H Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister-

You will see from the two letters attached that it seems likely we shall have the Foreign Ministers of Mexico & Iraq in London at the same time early in March. You have already agreed to see the Iraqi & will therefore, I fear, have to see the Mexican as well. You can manage them both, in fairly terms, on the afternoon of Monday 9 March. We would ensure there was an hour's gap between the two half hour meetings. Agree?

Yes Mr. Prime



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

20 January 1981

Dear Michael,

Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister, March 9, 10, 11

Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi has now accepted the Foreign Secretary's invitation to visit this country from 9 to 11 March. Paul Lever's letter of 14 November explains the background to this visit.

In your letter of 18 November you said that the Prime Minister had agreed in principle to receive Dr Hammadi. We now want to discuss an outline programme for the visit with the Iraqis and I should be grateful if you would let me know a suitable time for Dr Hammadi to call on Mrs Thatcher. At the moment, we have in mind official talks at the FCO on the morning of 10 March. Would the Prime Minister perhaps agree to see Dr Hammadi in the afternoon of that day?

G G H Walden
(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

Iraq.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

18 November 1980

UK/Iraq Relations

As you will already be aware, the Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 14 November and has agreed that if the Iraqi Foreign Minister visits London she would receive him.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

①
I doubt whether underlying Iraqi attitudes have changed all that much. However the situation has changed & Sparkes has been released. Considerations of 'realpolitik' argue in favour of your receiving Hammadi. Agree?

14 November 1980

Am

Yes
ms

Dear Michael,

UK/Iraq Relations

The Prime Minister may have seen, from FCO telno 496 to Baghdad (copy attached), that the Iraqis have suggested that it might now be opportune to ask the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Dr Sa'adoun Hammadi, to pay an official visit to the UK. This is in line with the recent overtures we have received from the Iraqis suggesting that they would like to develop a new and more favourable relationship with us.

The Prime Minister will remember that the visit which the Iraqi Foreign Minister was to have paid to this country in the summer was postponed at the last minute. One reason for this was the non-inclusion of a call on the Prime Minister in his programme.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that the climate of Iraq/UK relations has now changed and that we should seek to develop our relations. He thinks that we should sound out the Iraqis on whether their expressions of goodwill are genuine.

The problems which clouded our relationship in the summer have receded. Mr Sparkes has been released. Several months have passed since the seige of the Iranian Embassy in which the Iraqis were implicated. We have not had many recent reports of unsavoury activity by Iraqi agents in the UK.

Lord Carrington therefore proposes to pursue the idea of the Iraqi Foreign Minister paying a visit to the UK. Whether or not this becomes an official visit remains to be seen. But he is only likely to come if we can assure him that, provided the dates fit, a call on the Prime Minister can be included in his programme. The Foreign and

/Commonwealth

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing St

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Commonwealth Secretary very much hopes that the Prime Minister can agree to this.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

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PP BAGHDAD

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CRS 478

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FM FCO 131730 NOV 1980

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 496 OF 13TH NOVEMBER 1980

INFO ROUTINE UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN

UK/IRAQ RELATIONS

FCO TELNO 477 (NOT TO ALL)

1. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON GRAHAM ON 13 NOVEMBER AT HIS OWN REQUEST. AFTER FRIENDLY REFERENCES TO THE RELEASE OF SPARKES AND THE FAVOURABLE DOE DECISION ON PLANNING PERMISSION FOR THE IRAQI SCHOOL, HE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS HOW OUR RELATIONS COULD BE FURTHER IMPROVED. MR HURD HAD ENQUIRED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HAMMADI VISITING THE UK ON HIS WAY BACK FROM NEW YORK. SHAWI SAID HE WONDERED WHETHER THE TIME MIGHT BE OPPORTUNE FOR US TO ASK HAMMADI TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK, RATHER THAN ONE MADE IN PASSING. A VISIT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER MIGHT THEN LEAD TO VISITS BY OTHER MINISTERS. THE PROPOSAL FOR THE MOU ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH ITS PROVISION FOR A MIXED COMMISSION TO MEET REGULARLY, MIGHT BE REVIEWED: AND THE PROPOSAL FOR UPDATING THE ANGLO/IRAQI CULTURAL AGREEMENT PURSUED.
2. GRAHAM SAID THAT HE BELIEVED A VISIT BY HAMMADI ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK WOULD BE USEFUL. WE HAD NOT SUGGESTED AN OFFICIAL VISIT ON THIS OCCASION BECAUSE SUCH VISITS TOOK TIME TO ARRANGE AND DEPENDED UPON THE AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH MINISTERS, WHO WOULD WISH TO GIVE FULL AND FURTHER ATTENTION TO IT, IN ADDITION, WE HAD NOT WISHED TO SUGGEST THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS DEPENDED UPON THE IRAQIS AGREEING TO RESUSCITATE THE OFFICIAL VISIT BY HAMMADI THAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED DURING THE SUMMER AND THEN POSTPONED. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOW LOOK INTO SHAWI'S PROPOSAL.
3. ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS GENERALLY, GRAHAM SAID THAT THERE WERE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MIXED COMMISSIONS.

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THERE WAS A TENDENCY FOR THESE TO START ENTHUSIASTICALLY BUT THEN TO FIND DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING MOMENTUM. HE WAS NOT AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH IN THE CULTURAL AGREEMENT THAT NEEDED UPDATING, THOUGH WE WERE ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE THE STATUS OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN IRAQ. WE FOR OUR PART HAD BEEN VERY WILLING TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ EVER SINCE GRAHAM HIMSELF HAD GONE TO BAGHDAD AS AMBASSADOR IN 1974. HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE NOW TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. HE REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE VISIT OF GENERAL JANAB. HE COMMENTED THAT THE IRAQIS TENDED TO SET TESTS FOR THOSE WITH WHOM THEY CONTEMPLATED CO-OPERATION. THEY THEN ASSUMED THAT IF THEIR PROSPECTIVE PARTNERS DID NOT PASS ALL THOSE TESTS, THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN CO-OPERATION. BUT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY RIGHT. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT WAR, WE MIGHT PASS SOME TESTS BUT NOT ALL. SHAWI WOULD DO ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS A GOOD TURN IF HE COULD GET IT ACROSS TO HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THERE WAS GOODWILL ON THE BRITISH SIDE, BUT NOT EVERYTHING WAS POSSIBLE AT ONCE.

4. GRAHAM ALSO SOUGHT SHAWI'S HELP OVER THE ALTANIN (YOUR TELNO 495). ICRC WAS MAKING THE RUNNING ON THIS QUESTION BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF SHAWI COULD URGE THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO FACILITATE THE ALTANIN'S PASSAGE DOWNSTREAM. SHAWI UNDERTOOK TO TAKE THIS UP WITH BAGHDAD.

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