

^{G.M.T.H.S.E}
PART 1

MT

Confidential Filing

P.M.'s visit to Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf (Oman, UAE and Qatar) 19-25
April 1981 : Policy

FOREIGN POLICY

PART 1 c/g 18th Feb 1981
ends 13th April 1981

MARCH 1981

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
12.3.81							
19.3.81							
27.3.81							
2.4.81							
6.4.81							
9.4.81							
13-4-81							
PREM 19/4/81							
ENDS.							

PART 1 ends:-

Prime Minister to Michael Brown M.P.
John Brown to Prime Minister

13th April 1981

PART 2 begins:-

Palmer (Mid-East Rep) FCO to MODBA

13/4/81

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF:
19-25 APRIL 1981

Briefs in PMVK(81) series,
 1-18, held in Sect. (CAB 133)
 master copy. This set

1. STEERING BRIEF
2. DEFENCE POLICY IN THE GULF (TO INCLUDE THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE)
destroyed.
3. GULF CO-OPERATION AND GULF SECURITY
*RFO nman
 23 Feb 11*
4. DEFENCE SALES (TO INCLUDE A NOTE ON THOSE PROJECTS TO WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT GIVE A BOOST)
5. TRADE (TO INCLUDE A NOTE ON THOSE PROJECTS TO WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT GIVE A BOOST)
6. HEALTH CO-OPERATION
7. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND MONETARY QUESTIONS (INCLUDING NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE)
 SAUDI ARABIA AND UAE: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
8. ENERGY QUESTIONS
9. REGIONAL QUESTIONS
 - i ARAB/ISRAEL
 - ii IRAQ/IRAN WAR
 - iii AFGHANISTAN
 - iv EURO/ARAB DIALOGUE
 - v EGYPT AND SUDAN
 - vi IRAN
 - vii YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC AND PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
 - viii LEBANON

SAUDI ARABIA

10. BILATERAL POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS (TO INCLUDE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL RELATIONS)
11. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND (TO INCLUDE SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND TOPICS FOR CONVERSATION)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

12. BILATERAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES (TO INCLUDE RENEWAL OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP)
13. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND (TO INCLUDE SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND TOPICS FOR CONVERSATION)

OMAN

14. BILATERAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES (TO INCLUDE THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN OUR AID PROGRAMME AND BRITISH COUNCIL ACTIVITIES)
15. BILATERAL DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP
16. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND (TO INCLUDE SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND TOPICS FOR CONVERSATION)

QATAR

17. BILATERAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES (TO INCLUDE RENEWAL OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP)
18. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND (TO INCLUDE SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND TOPICS FOR CONVERSATION)



file

cc: Trade
FCO

55.

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

13 April 1981

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 24 March informing me of Fred Olsen Ltd.'s interest in the hook-up contract in the Zakum Field development in Abu Dhabi.

I am grateful to you for bringing this project to my attention. During my forthcoming visit to Abu Dhabi, I intend to re-affirm our readiness to co-operate in the economic and industrial development of the country including, in particular, the development of the country's oil industry, and to emphasise the contribution that British industry can make in this connection. I shall have companies such as Fred Olsen in mind.

The Department of Trade had already heard from the company about their interest in this project, and have discussed it with them in more detail. The Embassy in Abu Dhabi are also fully in the picture and will be backing up the company's efforts.

Yours ever,


(sgd) MT

Michael Brown, Esq., MP.

B1<

This is a copy. The original has been seen - MODRA
been extracted and closed, 60 years 13/4/81

From JOHN BROWNE, MSc, MBA, MP



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

13th April 1981

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of April 2nd.

Further to my letter to you of April 10th, I apologise for the low standard of grammar and of presentation. My only excuse is that I was on an exceptionally high pressure overseas business trip from the night of Friday, April 3rd until returning for the three line whip on Thursday, April 9th. It was a rush to say the least. I have, however, attached a page with four important changes to the original text. I also now enclose the summary, as promised.

I will have delivered to your office a copy of the video tape that I mentioned to you and two pictures that I have borrowed from a Saudi bank in the City. The pictures are excellent ones of HM King Khalid and HRH Prince Fahed*
* I submit them in the hope that you may benefit from studying their faces before you meet them.

Again, all good wishes for your visit to the Desert Kingdom - Land of the Prophet.

Yours ever
John.

JOHN BROWNE

Enclosures

~ Passage deleted and closed, 60 years,
under a FOI Exemption. @Wayland
13 October 2011



SUMMARY

The Gulf, and particularly Saudi Arabia, are regions of dynamic growth of a magnitude probably unequalled in human history. The world has known rich men previously but never has there been so much liquid wealth concentrated in personal hands. Now, many individual Arabs can write cheques for \$100M without consulting their bank manager! Added to this, the Arab culture is vastly different from our own and they tend to be very private and complex people. Advice on the area should always be given with humility and as a rough, general guide.

In general, the Arabs are highly intelligent with prodigious memories. They inhabit a land which, in many ways, is still medieval by European standards. Religion is still of great importance, both politically and individually. Ruthless political scheming, often resulting in bloodshed, is commonplace. Despite their religion, there is a huge and growing gulf between rich and poor and between leaders and the led. Rulers are absolute. The conversation of the elite is subtle. However, the Arab mentality is still geared to individuals; institutions have not yet come of age. Therefore, personal style and charisma are of the greatest importance.

The Arabs respect strength, wisdom and style. They are quick to recognise weakness and spurn it - usually by playing 'cat and mouse'; and they have plenty of time and money with which to play. In a national leader they will be looking for those qualities of strength, wisdom and style etc. In you, they will look particularly for the ruthlessness that they may feel you have not yet shown and need to show in order to turn our country around and restore Great Britain to a position where its friendship is of real value - real enough for them to make major concessions in our mutual interest.



Saudi Arabia has, under the Saud family, had excellent relationships with England - the protector and much admired 'Emperor State' of the world. They have used America for her technological expertise and now for defence. They have used the French, Italians, Germans, Lebanese, Japanese, South Koreans, Pakistanis, Palestinians (now no more allowed) and Yemenis to their great mutual benefit. However, they trust none of them as much as they do the British.

The Rulers of Arabia are super-rich. Their need is not money. Furthermore, the countries of the world flock to sell them arms and goods of all sorts. The Arab rulers appear to want for nothing and yet, each of them knows that their power hangs, especially in today's world, by a mere thread. What they need desperately is the political support of powerful, pro-Royalist, friendly nations that they can understand and trust.

Great Britain is friendly and pro-Royalist. The Arabs know us and trust us better than any other non-Arab nation (remember even Richard Coeur de Lion and Saladin). We can offer political support but it falls to you to convince them that we can deliver both power and influence. This will include the exercise of influence over the United States. I believe that you are well placed to convince them of this and that the day will be yours. The way will then be open to the political return of favours by the placing of major defence and project contracts with Great Britain. But such a way must be taken. We must deliver not only the politics but the goods. There will be a great need for co-ordinated follow-up, including the careful guidance, I believe in most cases, of 'over payments' or commissions. Once you have left, they will expect you to deliver. This will take much time and effort. It is for this reason that I suggest the creation and introduction of a 'Supersalesman', with diplomatic credentials and your personal backing.



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It is probably that your key interviews will be with: the King (equivalent to 'Chairman'); Princes Fahed (Crown Prince or 'Managing Director' - pro-American and industrialisation); Abdullah (National Guard - pro-British and conservative); Sultan (Defence); Naif (Interior - part of the Secret Service); Saud al/bin Feisal (Foreign Affairs - probably being groomed for kingship) and with Sheikhs Abu al Khail (Finance); al Qasaibi (Industry); Nasser (Planning); Khalil (Communications) and Yamani (Oil). You will probably also meet, amongst many others, Dr Rashid Pharaon and Khamal Adham (ex Head of the Secret Service) who were both close advisers to King Feisal. The former is still held in high repute although he does not speak good English. (His son is a prominent businessman and on the Board of Governors of Harvard Business School.)

Very great attention will be upon you, more than normal even for a national leader. You are English and you are a woman - a woman with strength and brains, a conservative, anti-socialist and a supporter of President Reagan, with (as they will perceive it) considerable influence over him. I believe the combination beckons a great success.



MEMORANDUM - LAND OF THE PROPHET - 10th April 1981

ERRATA

1. Page 2. Last paragraph should read:

"It is believed that the present Government wishes to reverse this series of failures and is prepared to work to achieve these results."

2. Page 11. Second paragraph should read:

"I am not conversant with exactly what type of presents should be given to whom.⁽²⁾ I would recommend consultations with the Foreign Office but with the above point in mind. I would not tolerate any second-rate or vulgar ideas because they would be counter productive. The presents themselves will reflect your taste and genuine feeling of friendship. It is upon you that the central aim depends."

3. Page 11. Fourth line of last paragraph should read:

"style is most important"

4. Page 20. N.B. should read:

"Falcons. Falconry is a favourite sport of the Gulf Sheikhs, particularly Abu Dhabi and of the Princes of Saudi Arabia. Falconry in Saudi Arabia is equivalent to the same sport at the time of Henry VIII in England. Whilst many Saudi Princes no longer have the time to hunt their own falcons, they much enjoy visits to the desert, particularly in November and March, to watch their falconers to hunt their birds. The falconers have a privileged position in the household of a Saudi Prince - indeed in the old days, pre 1974, the birds travelled first class! Now they mostly travel in private aeroplanes. The birds are prized greatly and are virtually



a national emblem, although here there is a slight conflict with their religious teaching of making 'no graven image'. The sport is held in the highest repute and it is not uncommon to visit a Saudi Prince's office to find three or four falconers seated along one side with the birds so that they can remain accustomed to the voice of their master. Some Princes hunt with falcons from motor transport. Others, more traditionally hunt from horseback⁽¹⁾ or camels.

Whilst the falcon is indeed a most important part of the culture of Arabia, I believe, on reflection, that you are unlikely to have sufficient time to spend upon learning about them. Any forced conversation in that respect may therefore look false or insincere and be counter productive. I think you will learn most effectively from the video tape. Although they will not expect you to be an expert, I still believe that any opportunity to show even an amateur interest in the subject can prove very effective if timed correctly. I would therefore not waste much time on reading the book on falcons.

Note (1) It is interesting to note that, in conquering the country, King Abdulaziz ibn Saud always dispossessed the desert bedouin of their horses, whilst leaving them their camels, goats and sheep etc which they needed for survival. Horses were considered superfluous to survival and an effective fast war vehicle. Until very recently the Royal Family alone were permitted to own horses. Saudi commoners had to restrict their ownership to horses overseas. Now, however, this rule is breaking down and you may well be invited to watch horse-racing and indeed camel racing.



From JOHN BROWNE, MSc, MBA, MP

HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

10th April 1981

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have just returned from a high pressure business trip and have, in great haste, put on paper some of my thoughts on the vast subject of Saudi Arabia. I hope only that it is not too long and that it will be of use to you.

In order to present this paper to you at the earliest possible moment, I have introduced some editing changes which have resulted in some imperfections in the physical presentation. These I hope you will forgive. I have also been left no time in which to prepare a summary. This I will do over the weekend and present to you on Monday.

I believe you are embarking upon a great rescue mission for our country. Nationally you have a weak hand as we have lost much credibility in Saudi Arabia. However, personally you are enormously respected and admired and remember that the Arabs still deal with people. They do not really yet understand institutions. I therefore feel you should be frank and bold in your talks, wrapped in subtlety and charm with maximum use of femininity commensurate with national leadership - like a very feminine Queen. I think it will prove to be a 'Knock Out' and that you will succeed in opening the doors. The next challenge will be effective follow-up.

Despite our recent failures, our country still has a great chance of success in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf. I think you are just what is needed to grasp it.

Yours ever
John.

JOHN BROWNE

P.S. All best wishes for the success of your great mission.



*kg,
Shms*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

FOR THE EYES OF THE PRIME MINISTER ONLY

LAND OF THE PROPHET

CONQUEROR

10th April 1981

VICTRIX



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CONQUEROR

III



PREFACE

WARNING

This paper is written by someone who knows enough about Arabia to know that that knowledge is only a small part of a vast and complex panorama and that recommendations and advice must be given with humility.

There is still a vast cultural gulf between the Christian European and the Muslim of Arabia, a place where rumour and counter rumour move as driven sand in a desert wind.

In the past seven years Arabia and Saudi Arabia in particular has been catapulted from a medieval world, with biblical origins, into the twentieth century, at least partly. So there are still desert dwellers who have never seen an aeroplane and yet their sons may be the pilots of advanced jet fighters.

Furthermore, the financial explosion of the past seven years has been so dramatic and dynamic that it has changed much of the old order and many customs, but not all. For instance, some old rich families are now merely well off (\$10M) whilst one of their old servants may be super-rich (\$1B). Now women are educated, can watch television and travel abroad. Never in known human history has so much wealth been so liquid so that some men can write cheques for \$100M without selling any assets or calling their bank manager.

In such a situation of change advice is sometimes contradictory and often out of date, particularly when given by Arabists who knew the area well before October 1973.

I stress again that this advice is based upon personal views and experiences.



ASSUMPTIONS

It is assumed that the reader will have access to statistics, names and reports from: the Foreign Office; Ministry of Defence; Department of Trade, local British Embassies and from the Secret Services of Britain, the United States and possibly Israel.

Saudi Arabia, the guardian of the holy places, is the key country in Arabia. What succeeds in Saudi Arabia is more likely to succeed in the other States which have a more recent pro-British heritage. The paper therefore concentrates almost exclusively upon Saudi Arabia.

OUTLINE SITUATION

Great Britain, which had relationships with the States of Arabia which were once second to none, has been seriously 'squeezed out' in the battle to recycle petro-dollars. This is the more surprising since Britain is a major armaments producer and arms sales in the area have boomed.

Blame can be widely apportioned to: UK Trade Unions; unco-ordinated defence sales (involving military attaches and Defence Sales under MOD; Department of Trade; and Foreign Office); and indeed manufacturing companies themselves. I believe the greatest blame rests upon top Government who have failed to seize, or even copy the Americans in seizing, a political initiative and have failed to create a 'super salesman' to achieve national gains in an area where the bulk of petro-dollars are spent for political reasons.

It is believed if the present Government wishes to reverse this series of failures and is prepared to work to achieve results,



AIM

The aim of this paper is to provide a personal and secret briefing for the Prime Minister, to supplement other information given her. It suggests an outline to the key conversations she will have with top leaders in the area so that she may seize and win a strategic, political initiative that will greatly enhance the success of follow-up tactics of British Ministers and businessmen in dramatically increasing the sales of British defence equipment and project expertise to Arabia.

MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS ABOUT THE ARABIANS AND SAUDI ARABIA

Religion

For the most of recorded history, the Arabs of Saudi Arabia have had to struggle for life in an inhospitable country under conditions of searing heat (130°F in the shade). They have lived as families or small groups of families. They are therefore tough and very independently minded. They tend to kneel only to God with a religion which was well suited to their desert life.

The Muslim worships the same single God as the Christians and Jews. They recognise Jesus as a prophet but feel Mohammed was both greater and more modern.

The proportion of true believers in Arabia is still large, particularly in the desert and outlying areas. Until recently (4 years ago) about a third of all Saudi depositors at Saudi banks refused to accept interest payments. Even today the private and public power of religion is outstandingly strong.

Islam also encourages charity and good work. Sheikh Suleiman Alrajhi, a local money changer, was seriously criticised last year for not giving enough money to charity.



Leadership

As desert life is a struggle, the quality of a group's leader is key to survival. The best successor is selected from amongst the dead leader's brothers, sons or nephews. If none meet the required standard the Sheikdom passes to another family.

The measure of leadership is telling. "One must ride, eat and sleep with one's men. One must dress like them and yet, in oneself be different." Although dressed poorly and like everyone else, a desert sheikh is usually instantly recognisable by his bearing. I believe that if the late King Faisal were left naked in the desert, he would still be a King.

Prestige

Even to the poorest desert Arab, dignity, bearing and prestige are all important. It is important always to leave them a face saving way of retreat or compromise. It is usually best not to face Arabs with 'head on' embarrassment but to cloak it in a firm but subtle manner and words. Indeed, well directed and controlled flattery and charm are important, particularly at the beginning and end of important conversations.

For instance, care should be taken to ask after health and family and to congratulate the King and senior Princes on the great things they have achieved for the benefit of their people. Remember: always their humble, poor origins and how they have had to cope with unique problems to carry even a part of their Kingdom into the 20th century.

Although of declining importance, the level of introduction is often a crucial factor. The Prime Minister should use her own prestige to introduce people (e.g. businessmen - a 'super salesman' etc) to enhance their success in follow-up negotiations. This can be of very great future value and should justify extraordinary travel expenses.

by Concorde?

Is there a chance you could travel



Power

Desert life is hard and vivid. The Arab greatly respects power. They are very quick to see through mere titles. Power has to be made apparent, even if in a gentle way. Within 24 hours of HRH Prince Philip's arrival in Saudi Arabia in 1978 senior Arabs no longer referred to him as Prince Philip but as the "Husband of the Queen"!

In the Arab world most powerful people have an entourage. Westerners, and particularly the British, have overlooked this to their cost. The French have not. The British Prime Minister would add to her negotiating weapons if she were to have a deliberately large entourage. Indeed the entourage itself has a key role to play. It must be well disciplined both in its bearing and in its open respect for its leader. The Arabs also admire height and good looks. Tall men smartly dressed and of fine bearing (but not pompous⁽¹⁾) with a good sense of humour (they much enjoy the English sense of humour) should be selected, including some senior uniformed service officers.

Time

The desert Arab has often been short of water or food but he has, up to now, always had plenty of time. Time such that he tended to count only in half days. Time that was usually

Note (1) Most Arabs have come from humble backgrounds, indeed their religion teaches humility. They were poor and many of those who attended schools etc in US and UK, particularly the latter, were often kicked around before 1973. They certainly do not admire and some detest the classic pompous English attitude often caricatured by the British Raj. They much resent the attitudes of middle-ranking British diplomats and businessmen in this respect.



filled by a very simple routine.⁽²⁾ There was much time to think. Astronomy, geometry, algebra, mathematics (the use of zero and the decimal point) and language were very highly developed. There were few books, so the Arabs tended to develop phenomenal memories. There were some skirmishes but little else to occupy the long relatively cool evenings round the camp fire other than conversation. Therefore, their language became dynamic and subtle and it was not the great warrior but the great poet and storyteller who was held in highest repute by the village.

This abundance of spare time and absence of books, I believe, had a major influence upon the thought process of the Arab. He tended to revel in knowledge then in subtlety and then in scheming. Politics and sex are staple to Arab males. They admire knowledge and they delight in complex and subtle conversation in which a main theme ebbs and flows amongst totally unrelated thoughts. This can make important business and political conversations very difficult and frustrating for Westerners.

Patience

If ever patience were a virtue it is in Saudi Arabia. The Arab uses time as a negotiating weapon to great effect. It is a very serious mistake to be, or even appear to be, rushed or impatient. One can and should be firm but always subtle and patient. There is also great room for charm but not to be mistaken for weakness.

Note (2) Even the house chores, cooking and child care were the responsibility of the women or harem* (as opposed to concubine) of the family.

Note (*) A harem consists of the women of the household e.g. wife or wives; daughters; aunts; sisters etc.



The Saudi Prince

Most of the senior Princes (sons of the late King Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the present Kingdom) are very fine men. Tall, mahogany skinned, usually very good looking and polite medieval princes with great power, which they understand and use to great effect. They are usually outstandingly smart and graceful. Most have a keen sense of humour.

Most have a most unusual aura of tranquility when in serious conversation and they are earnest listeners. (Some play for time by pretending not to speak English, using the time gained by interpretation*whilst leaving you with the pressure of instant reply). The King and Prince Fahed may well play this game. As I said, in Saudi Arabia, there can be plenty of time so, take it.

Whilst many of the third generation and junior Princes come nowhere near these standards, indeed some are totally spoilt, there is one great exception; HRH Saud bin Faisal al Saud - the Foreign Minister. A graduate of Princeton University, he has many of the looks of his late father and the Bedouin charisma of his father and grandfather (King Abdulaziz). There is little doubt that he is being groomed as a future King.

Most if not all the Princes you will meet as Minister are men of outstanding calibre as natural leaders. The common members of the Cabinet are also men of very great quality, particularly HE Sehikh Mohammed abu al Khail, the Minister of Finance and HE Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Oil Minister, who despite his clipped wings, still has great influence.

Note (*) I strongly advise that if they have an interpreter present you should do likewise. I would not force an embarrassing issue by using him for translation but merely to check that a good and 'fair' translation is being made of your words.



The Veil - Public and Private Worlds

In Arabia, two, often totally distinct, worlds exist side by side. Strict laws apply and are ruthlessly upheld in public whilst a 'Nelsonic eye' is shown in private.

This is very important in international relations. For instance; publically, the Saudis dislike the United States, Egypt and the Rapid Deployment Force. Privately they are strong supporters of all three!

One should therefore be extremely careful when speaking in public. Make the official private meetings count.

Commissions

Since the Lockheed scandal and, more recently, the King Carlos oil scandal, the Saudi Royal Family will not countenance any commissions - even on defence purchases. In private however, these are still required and are paid through more junior officials - now often outside the Kingdom.** It is a complex and risky business. We should study the French.

Decision Making

In the private sector decisions are usually made on economic grounds but not always, because government instructions, backed by some overt or covert subsidy, can influence decisions in this sector.

In the public sector however, both in defence purchases and in major projects, decisions are usually made on political grounds. Sometimes for overall political reasons (e.g. the reward of the French for their help at Mecca with a navy project) or as a result of internal political influence (e.g. the influence of Prince Mohammed bin Fahed over the \$3-6B telephone contract).

Note (**) The US are moving towards an amendment of their anti-commission legislation. Such an amendment would have the effect of opening the present legislation to the more subtle payment of commissions.



People will argue the details but certainly, in the main, (in \$ terms) decisions are political. Even these political decisions often involve commissions. Nonetheless, the triggering of the decision is political. This factor, wise national leaders see as their key role. The tactics and commissions, if applicable, should correctly be left to lesser mortals. The aim of the national leader should be to set the ambiance in which the follow-up negotiators can work with the odds stacked, politically, on their side.

Whilst it is vital that the national leader should succeed in establishing a healthy ambiance, it is important that follow-up salesmen and negotiators should meet and understand the mentality of their Saudi opposite numbers, men who are often very young by Western standards. In this respect British Embassies have the reputation of being "OUT OF TOUCH"! Most British Ambassadors are of high quality although many of them lack the 'cuddly father' relationship that their predecessors developed with the leaders of the Arabian Gulf. However, the middle and junior officers are a very mixed bag, too often of a quality unsuited to the important and subtle requirements of work in this area. They are by no means new rich in terms of personal wealth. However, they are, relative to their life-styles at home, new status rich, with cars and servants etc. Too many of them are full of self-importance and tend to look down upon the Arabs as mere desert natives. They are also offhand to many of their own, non-diplomatic contingent. They tend to stick together and enjoy Embassy parties rather than undertake the harder part of their duty which is, as always, to know the people of the country to which they are posted. Finally, the scruffiness of their dress, in my view, reflects their attitudes more than their lack of wealth and is spurned by Arabs. Some of our Embassy staff are politically left-wing inclined. Furthermore, they tend to try to cultivate big names. They end up cultivating middle names that are often passé and ignore the new young technocrats. This is a generalisation but one that is particularly relevant to us.



Dress

The dress of Saudi women, outside their own homes, reflects the strong wish of Saudis for family privacy. Women therefore wear clothes which both cover their skin and obliterate the contours of their bodies. Thus all women are women outside the home and no outsider knows how physically attractive or unattractive is any particular non family female.

It is interesting to note that this custom was pressed on the desert Saudis of Western Arabia by the Turks under the Ottoman Empire. Today, many young relatively liberated Saudi women who have travelled abroad resent this Turkish custom and flout it openly in public. In this they are aided by the presence of many foreign, especially Western, women in the main cities. However, this female rebellion is much less tolerated*by the menfolk of the Royal Family (absolute Princes). It is therefore looked down upon by Saudi 'society' outside the Royal Family.

The Saudis were particularly flattered when HM Queen Elizabeth wore long dresses with long sleeves, particularly as she had worn more 'open' dresses in Kuwait. Local orthodoxy was well satisfied; and they were greatly flattered!

I believe great care should be taken to wear very discreet dresses with long sleeves on all occasions and even to consider a headdress with the hint of a veil on the more formal occasions. I believe the Queen's dresses should be referred to and borne in mind. Such a manner of dress is important in Saudi eyes, particularly those of the Royal Family. It will be taken as a measure of awareness and a great compliment. We need their friendly disposition to prepare the ground well for your style in the key conversations with the King and with Princes Fahed, Abdullah, Sultan, Naif, Turki and Saud bin Faisal.

Note (*) Indeed, the Islamic revival started in Iran has tended to reverse this trend of permissiveness and more women are returning to the veil or a hint of it, even in Cairo.



Presents

Presents are important in the Arab world. Genuine thought, style and appropriateness are much more important than value - which does not mean much to the multi-billionaires you must win over.

I am not conversant with exactly what should be given or to whom.⁽²⁾ I would consult the Foreign Office but with the above point in mind, not tolerating any second grade or vulgar ideas - which will be counter productive. The presents will reflect you and it is upon you that the central aim depends.

Taste

Until recently, most Saudis were desert dwellers; some rich but mostly poor. The colours of their lives were blue (sky) and khaki (ground) with most of their animals also having khaki coats. Their tents, hair and cloaks were mostly brown or black - all this under the glare of a searing yellow sun.

Therefore upon acquiring wealth and the new city life, most Saudis initial instinct is to go for vivid colours; considered garish in the West.

However, rich Saudis, especially those educated in good schools in the West, soon pass through this stage. Their slightly less new wealth is spent in the best shops and upon the best designers and architects. Their taste is then 'chic' by even best Western - even French standards.

Style

Because until recently individual and physical leadership mattered so keenly and also the fact that most Saudis had plenty of time to spare, style forms a basic part of their lives. This style is more important in gaining the respect of Arabs. It is manifest mainly in manners, conversation and bodily action. Amongst the richer city dwellers it is also an important part of dressing. As all Arabs dress very similarly, style is the main differentiation.



Note (2) The type of presents I would consider, if the King is a shooting man, would be a pair of Purdy shotguns or a high grade rifle with an inscription showing that it is a gift from you as Prime Minister.

Sporting

CONQUEROR



The Desert

To a Westerner, the desert is a remarkable place. To the Saudi it is his romantic home for, apart from the older citizens of the large cities, the Saudis are people of the desert and are proud of it. Indeed their religion is desert-based in application.

The largest portion of Arabia is desert and the most loyal supporters of the Royal Family are the desert Bedouin. The Royal Family therefore spend time in the desert both for hunting and for political reasons, just as MPs do in their constituencies.

The desert is very important to the Royal Family. I believe any invitation to visit it with the King or Prince Fahed should be keenly accepted.

The Young Technocrats

The Saudis' natural admiration of knowledge, their retentive minds and their peasant shrewdness have, until recently, been limited to life in an Islamic desert or city sooq (market place).

The recent explosion in State and oil rich financed education, both at home and abroad, particularly in the US and UK, has resulted in a new, young generation of relatively highly educated technocrats - technocrats who, in the course of their foreign education, have been exposed to the left-wing politics and permissiveness of Western societies. Many of them, especially those of humble origins, return to the social disciplines of a strongly Islamic society to serve in relatively junior positions in the Government, including the defence forces. Their senior superiors are either super rich princes or non royal Ministers, either usually of a very high standard. Their immediate superiors however, are men of poor education and relatively low social status, who may not speak English, but are in senior jobs because they are trusted, long time



Government employees under a very unsophisticated regime or are just older. There is therefore often a void in senior and middle management which lies between top management and the young technocrats. This leads to much concealed frustration.⁽²⁾ Some of the young technocrats also feel that they are underpaid relative to their seniors and to their compatriots in the private sector. However, the Government is aware of this and has made gradual, cautious moves in an effort to rectify the situation.

As has already been said, most decisions relating to the purchase of armaments or major projects are made with a heavy political bias. There is therefore a key role for politicians, particularly national leaders, to play.

However, the technical 'guidance', whether heeded in whole or in part or even discarded, is given and presented by the young technocrats, some of whom are now in important positions. They are therefore able to influence some major decisions, especially in a negative sense. It is indeed a bold Prince who orders several squadrons of modern fighter aircraft after his technocrats have said that they are no good! It is therefore important to be 'in contact and in a position to influence'⁽³⁾ both the new technocrats and, if they are still junior, their senior management. There is therefore a key role to be played by experts⁽⁴⁾ working under the co-ordination of a

Note (2) There is a tendency for these young technocrats to wish to play a role in the political events of their nation. They represent one of the seeds of internal insurrection.

Note (3) Influence should be taken to be by means of personal friendship, expertise or by the 'correct' application of commissions.

(4) Experts should concentrate upon identifying and indeed helping the Saudis to identify their NEEDS and not just 'push' whatever equipment the British happen to have for sale. In my opinion, the Government would be well advised to finance such expert aid or advice on a large scale as is already done by the US Corps of Engineers.



SUPERSALESMAN⁽⁵⁾ who has been introduced, by the national leader, at the highest levels knows personally, all the relevant Ministers and key people below the Ministers, who both present and influence decisions. He should have diplomatic credentials and understand the 'commission payment' system.

The Sheikha Market

Perhaps the most underestimated, at least by Westerners, section of Saudi society are the wives of Sheikhs and Princes. Few Western men have any access to them, especially inside the Kingdom. You will have access and I most urgently urge you to make the very most of it.

Until recently most Saudis had up to four wives, at any one time! King Faisal's last wife persuaded him that one wife was best and Saudi society now tends to follow this custom. However, please remember that most Saudi men were raised in families where their father had many wives. Fathers were thus rather more remote than in the West. A child's mother was everything. Indeed there is an old Arabic saying that "The World is Motherhood" as indeed it was to most Arab children.

Despite the public discrimination⁽⁶⁾ against women in Arabia they have property rights and exercise great influence over their

Note (5) The role of a supersalesman is of key importance to our national success in Saudi Arabia. I believe we must appoint a 'supersalesman' for the Gulf, based in Riyadh. The negotiation of his appointment and his introduction should be undertaken by the Prime Minister in conversations with the King, Prince Fahed and the Minister of Defence, Planning and Industry. Obviously the person should be a man. He should be young and willing enough to establish close contacts not only with Ministers but also with the young technocrats, who will become of increasing importance. Finally, such a man should understand finance. It would be an advantage to understand defence in addition.

(6) Until recently they were not allowed to go to school. Even now they are not allowed to drive and must wear special clothes. They must not marry out of Islam etc, etc.



husbands and especially their sons, in private. Saudi princesses have significant power. You will be the first Western leader with direct access to that power. You should use it to impress them as a fine, kind, English mother who is a heroine standing for many of the things in which they believe and treasure (NB. ex-Secretary of State for Education and your own qualifications). IF you win the wives over, they can exercise valuable pressure upon their key husbands e.g. the King and Prince Fahed etc.

BRIEF BACKGROUND TO ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONSHIPS

During the Great War the British, under Lawrence, stimulated the Arab Revolt in Western Arabia (the Hejaz). They also helped King Abdulaziz ibn Saud al Saud (ibn Saud), using Philby, against the hated Turk, (in the Najd).

Before the 1914 war, the British had, by lending arms and gold coins to ibn Saud, via the ruling Kuwaiti, al Sabah family, helped ibn Saud, who was then in exile in Kuwait, to recapture his family Kingdom in Eastern Arabia based upon Riyadh (the Najd)⁽⁷⁾. Before that the British had acted as 'protectors', against local pirates and raiders for many of the sea port States of Arabia including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al Khaimar, Oman, Aden and the Hadramut (now South Yemen).

Note (7) There is still much rivalry and jealousy within Saudi Arabia between the peoples of the Hejaz and those of the Najd. It is one reason that the Embassies are being moved from Jeddah to Riyadh.



King ibn Saud never forgot⁽⁸⁾ the kindness and help of the Kuwaitis or of the British. Saudi/Kuwaiti relations have been excellent. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the only parts of Arabia that ibn Saud did not take over were the old British protectorates and North Yemen!

King Abdulaziz ibn Saud was very pro-British; despite the fact that he felt ignored during the Great War. Ibn Saud turned to the British for help in the search for water wells and for the development of oil. Sadly the gross arrogance of the British Representative in Kuwait, who conducted negotiations, resulted in a breakdown and ibn Saud calling in the American oil companies, who eventually formed ARAMCO. Contrary to the fervent strategy of the British and French, the British thus allowed the Americans a major foothold in the Gulf - a foothold for which we are still paying dearly. Whilst the rest of the Gulf remained, until Ted Heath's catastrophic military withdrawal in the early 1970s, under British influence, Saudi Arabia fell to the Americans.

Despite the above, most of the Royal Family and important merchants remained pro-British. The British had never been conquerors in Arabia, merely protectors. Furthermore, they had been represented by political agents; soldiers; and bankers who whilst they may not have been the stars of their profession, had and were prepared to spend endless time talking to the Arabs.

Note (8) A friend in need is a friend indeed. The Arabs generally never forget kindness shown in the hour of need. Many of the present senior Saudi Princes were relatively poor under the late King Saud, the elder brother of the late King Faisal and a man whom they all try to forget (please do not mention him). Some of the more wealthy merchants helped the Princes out. Now those Princes have made billionaires of the merchants.



This is a copy. The original has been extracted and closed, 40 years.

Furthermore, they had style, and were honest and were backed by the great prestige of Britain. They became trusted and respected friends of the Arabs. The older Arabs have not forgotten or lost this feeling for Great Britain. They are merely flabbergasted by our apparent weakness, loss of style and failure. Many feel sorry for us and would honestly wish us recovery. They certainly trust us more than any other nation, although the visits of Englishmen of less integrity, especially since 1973, have tarnished our image, but not beyond recovery.

Feelings of the Royal Family towards Britain

King Abdulaziz ibn Saud was pro-British but came to use and admire the Americans, particularly for business expertise. He always trusted the British more and admired their political judgement most. He also much admired the British Royal Family and was thrilled to entertain Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh in Jeddah on their way to their honeymoon visit to Kenya. Sadly British Governments have, until the Spring of 1979, seen fit not to play their overwhelming 'Royal Cards.' Even at the death of the great King Feisal, we could muster nothing better than a dishevelled Defence Minister and a Socialist at that. The Saudis were badly hurt (though they won't now admit it) that either the Prince of Wales or even the Duke of Kent did not attend the funeral of their great and much loved king - the first effective unifier of the Arab world (oil cartel) since Mohammed.

Ibn Saud's eldest son Turki died young, so King Saud
* ~~~~~ * He was succeeded
by the great King Faisal - like his father a classic Bedouin leader.

** ~ * Passage deleted and closed, 40 years,
under a FOI Exemption. @Wayland
13 October 2011*



King Faisal knew both England and America. He was pro-British. He much admired Queen Elizabeth and told me so on more than one occasion. I always felt that he really wished England well.

King Faisal's death came as a great shock⁽⁹⁾. People felt that the then Crown Prince Khalid, who is an expert on birds and spent much of his time hunting, in the desert and appeared disinterested in Kingship, would be passed over for his half brother Fahed, eldest of the powerful group of seven full brothers (Suderine) including: Sultan (Defence); Salman (Governor of Riyadh); Naif (Interior) and Turki (Secret Service), all sons of Queen Suderine. Prince Fahed represented the pro-American and progressive industrialisation faction. The pro-British and conservative faction was led by Prince Abdullah (Head of the National Guard, the main force in the nation being composed largely of loyal bedouin tribesmen). Evidently, the family council (like the Saxon Witan) (Council) set about resolving the problem. One rumoured solution was that Abdullah would be made Crown Prince if he gave up the National Guard. He refused.

Finally, having passed over his elder half brother, Mohammed (grandfather of the princess who was recently publically executed), Prince Khalid was persuaded to become a caretaker King as a temporary compromise. The selection was similar to that of the late Pope John. Like Pope John, King Khalid has turned out very well. He is loved by his people and much respected. Although his health is not good he stays on, I believe out of a sense of duty until the family rift is more settled.

Note (9) Even Sheikh Ahmed Yamani was held as a suspect for several hours as it was he who brought in the little known nephew (the assassin) thinking him to be part of a Kuwaiti delegation.



King Khalid is very proud of the job his Government have done for the people of Saudi Arabia. Whilst he is the figure-head, the main tasks of Government are carried out by Prince Fahed who exercises real power. He is tough but has an excellent sense of humour. It is these two men that you must win over and to whom your supersalesman must be introduced and whose right of 'access' ⁽¹⁰⁾ you should include in any Accord that you sign.

You must also concentrate upon impressing: Prince Saud bin Faisal (Foreign Minister) and Sheikhs: Yamani (Oil) Abu al Khail (Finance), Nasser (Planning), Al Qasaibi (Industry).

Whilst the Saudis may appear cool towards the Americans in public (.e.g over Camp David etc), remember that in private the Saudis were strong supporters (apparently even financially through Bechtel) of President Reagan's election. They like him very much in private (sale of F15 to Saudi Arabia whilst offer only of more financial credit to Israel).

I believe that in public they disapprove of some major facets of the Rapid Deployment Force, in private they are guarded supporters.

YOUR KEY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE KING AND PRINCE FAHED

Perception

I believe that the King and the top Saudi Princes will see you as a woman of quite remarkable qualities - a beautiful heroine standing for most of their own political ideals (respect

Note (10) Prince Fahed can be very difficult to see in private. He is the 'power behind the throne'. He is also, in Saudi eyes, of the same rank as a British Prime Minister -



This is a copy. The original has been extracted and closed, 40 years.

-19a-

Note (10) HM The Queen ranking with King Khalid himself.
Cont. Your conversations with him will, I believe, be the most crucial of the entire Middle East visit. (He has a squint which can be slightly off-putting but also has great charm).

In Arabia, similar to Japan, great store is placed in age. As I said, Prince Mohammed was passed over when his younger half brother Khalid was made King. In family circles, therefore, Prince Mohammed is, in a subtle way, more senior to the King. It is for this reason that the film, Death of a Princess, was of such extreme personal and family embarrassment to the King.

... Passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under a FOI Exemption. CAWayland
13 October 2011

The family order therefore is as follows:
Prince Mohammed (equivalent in American corporate structure to a Chairman); the King (equivalent to an American corporate President); Prince Fahed (Crown Prince and equivalent to a Managing Director); Prince Abdullah (Head of the National Guard and main power force); and Prince Saud bin Feisal (a charismatic 'whizz kid', being groomed for the highest office).



for God, defence, law and order, economy, etc). To them you have a determination, firmness and honesty which leads to credibility. What they may still be looking for is the ruthlessness that you will need for full credibility in turning Britain around.

As I said, they have an eye for beauty, for style and for integrity. You have all that. What they must be reminded of vividly is your power and your knowledge (including chemistry and the law).⁽¹¹⁾ In this your disciplined and large entourage can play a key role. The Saudis will be watching your entourage closely to see their bearing, what they say, how they say it and how they react to you. The eyes of your entourage should never be idle in public, they must be upon you so that you never have to frown or call to receive instant attention from them - not always an easy task in some typical Middle Eastern chaotic organisations!

Basically, Saudis will see you as a most unusual superstar. They will be more than usually curious. In public, I think the style you adopted on the White House lawn will go down superbly. In private, do not hesitate to use your charm in a quiet, serious motherly way, whilst facing them with a tough but helpful proposition, carefully avoiding being either too direct or abrupt and always being patient with any of the complex rambling logic.

Finally, I believe you should be very calm and charming but frank and outspoken on the vital issues, in private.

(N.B. On reflection, I do believe you may not have sufficient time to spend upon learning about falcons. The subject may therefore look false or insincere and be counter productive.)

Note (11) They may need reminding of this but not too openly by you unless in your questions or natural responses in conversation.



OUTLINE PLAN

We in Britain need major public sector orders for defence and projects in order both to recycle and to create profitable demand for our industries at home. Unless we succeed the position of the Conservative Government will be put at serious risk.

The rulers of every State in Arabia (excluding the Yemen) are hanging on to power by a mere thread and they know it. Threats from the PLO, international coups, neighbouring countries and from Russia. They need the friendship, co-operation and credible support of nations with power and influence. Luckily, Great Britain has something concrete to offer in this sphere. The Saudis need the backing of the US but they do not fully trust them. They therefore need and will welcome the firm and credible support and co-operation of Great Britain, a country that, until recently, they have admired beyond all others and whom they still like and trust. Great Britain has power and, in their eyes at least, has influence with the US. Indeed this may have been enhanced, in Saudi eyes, by your most successful meetings with President Reagan. There is therefore an opportunity for you to use some 'big talk' in offering them credible support.

In short, I believe you should approach the Saudis with their own thinking.

A SUGGESTED OUTLINE FORM OF INITIAL KEY CONVERSATION

The opening should be full of charm, style and femininity but as a national leader. References to health and to achievements for his country. Glad at last to have an opportunity to visit. Much looking forward to his State visit to England in Summer 1981.



I think that it is important to flatter the leaders of Saudi Arabia. To explain that in our view they are the most important country in the Middle East and the greatest force for stabilisation in the area and therefore of great benefit to the free world in general in its struggle against Russia.

'We' feel that they have shown great responsibility in their role as political mediator and also in the technical but vital subjects of international oil and money. (N.B. The Saudis have pressed for price moderation and have used their great flexibility of production to hold in check the worst excesses of the Arab oil price hawks. They have also scrupulously obeyed the working practice of the IMF and World Bank.) Indeed, 'we' support their rightfully enhanced position at the International Monetary Fund.

As Conservatives 'we' much admire and support their own conservative policies and ideas.

"However, if British support for Saudi Arabia is to be truly credible, 'my' Conservative Government must regain strength. The Government and I intend to stay in power and we are determined not to be toppled by the Trade Unions. 'We' much value mutual co-operation with conservatives of other nations."

Discuss your visit to Washington and your keen support of President Reagan. As you know, 'we' are strong supporters of the Rapid Deployment Force and always ready to help Saudi Arabia "if called upon by you". 'We' keep our promises and 'we' stand by our friends. "There is no need to remind you of how much we have stood by the US and how much the US depend upon British co-operation in their Middle East policy." (N.B. However, there is a slight difference of opinion over The European Initiative).

Talk of the past - excellent relationships between our two countries, especially under the King's father (Abdulaziz ibn Saud). How right the British Government, at the time, was to support him in his bid to regain his Kingdom. (N.B. You may be interested to see the Fort where the key assault took place, in Riyadh).



"We would like this old and trusted friendship to continue and indeed to be enhanced in the mutual interests of both our countries and of the free, non-communist world." (Islam is an anti-communist religion and the Saudi Royal Family hate the communists more than most others.)

"Not only would we like to enhance our past friendships but we would also like to assure you of our continued strong political support."

"In short, Britain is prepared to give Saudi Arabia maximum real political support with the US and within the EEC. Please rest assured that we in Britain still have much closer relationships and much more influence upon the US than does Holland, Italy, France, Germany, South Korea or Japan. And yet, Britain does not feel it is getting its fair share of defence sales and industrial business in Saudi Arabia. I know you have been a loyal friend in the past but British companies have the capacity to do much more work for Saudi Arabia which will give a vital boost to our economy at home."

"As you know, our trade position is out of balance and we have very serious economic problems, much brought on by the fall in world demand for our products, which threatens increased unemployment and social unrest."

"I believe that it is not only in our individual interests but in our mutual interests that we should develop much stronger political and economic ties. We can offer political support and military support when called upon by you to do so. We can also offer you an alternative source of supplies and contracts, particularly in the defence field." (N.B. At this stage I believe you should outline in some detail exactly what we wish to push in terms of arms sales and construction projects.) "We also have



very considerable resources to offer in the field of education: schools; universities; textbooks; computers; video techniques and other advanced educational technology. (I believe it is vital to pull more Saudis into British schools and universities and to pull them away from the US. Saudi students graduate to become businessmen who tend to have a favoured purchasing bias towards the country in which they were educated. This already shows strongly in the US and to a certain extent in Britain. We must increase our market share in this area, a long term proposition. One of the greatest barriers is the slightly old fashioned entrance standards for some schools and universities. Could we not offer them a more practical and culturally orientated entrance standard?)

Delicate Subjects

Below are listed a number of delicate subjects which are best avoided. However, I have suggested some ideas in case the Saudis force the issue. Obviously your best briefing on these subjects will come from the Foreign Office.

- Death of a Princess

Obviously we very much regret that the film was made and indeed shown. I disapproved of it from the beginning but I hope you will understand that I was not in a position to go against the laws in our country which are specifically designed to protect freedoms of this sort and to prevent political interference.

We try to treat the undoubted trade losses we have suffered from Saudi Arabia as a tax upon our freedom but we hope that that has now been settled and that the subject can be forgotten.

- Israel

Have sympathy with the Palestinian cause. Also have sympathy, but not too strong a sympathy, for their efforts to regain their homeland. Mention the European initiative in this respect.



- Iraq/Iran War

I believe you should remember that most of the Rulers of the Gulf are forced into a position where they are privately happy that the war exists. The war has greatly weakened the thrust of Islamic fanaticism emanating from Iran and which was generally from the extreme left and a severe threat to their own regimes. On the other hand, of course, it has probably enabled Khomeini to survive for longer. Also the Arabs, particularly the Kuwaitis and the Saudis, always feared the power of Iraq and they are happy to see Iraq weakened by the war.

- Rapid Deployment Force

There is no doubt that your statement of linking this to possible action in the Gulf caused political embarrassment within Arabia. I believe that you can, if pressed, show that you meant the Gulf in general terms and that you would never have considered moving forces into the area without first consulting the Rulers of the countries concerned. The initial statement was made apparently to appeal to pressure within the US and also to have a positive effect on our free world struggle with the Russians. The basic message is that the free world considers the Gulf to be an area of vital interest which the Russians are threatening. We seek the co-operation of the local Arab States and would not entertain any unilateral action in the area without their approval.

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(2)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~936 7022~~ 218 2111/3

10th April 1981

Prime Minister

And

Don Michael,

VISIT BY PRIME MINISTER TO THE MIDDLE EAST - TORNADO

Further to my letter of 9th April I now attach a paper summarising the details of the various members of the Tornado "family" (the first two already flying and the second two being "paper" aircraft) for which you asked in your letter to me of 6th April. I also attach a summary of a suggested line that the Prime Minister might take in Saudi Arabia and Oman.

In addition Sir Ronald Ellis has asked me to forward to you a series of brochures on three of the four members "family", prepared by British Aerospace; and he has also asked me to pass on a number of small cards, which, I believe, he undertook to give to the Prime Minister.

Shortage of time precludes the documents being circulated tonight as a formal brief in time for the Prime Minister's weekend box. I am, therefore, enclosing 5 copies of the paper for you (and a further 5 for each of the copy addressees). The paper will be issued in due course as a formal brief.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO) and to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
John Dawson

(J D S DAWSON)

M O'D B Alexander Esq

TORNADO FAMILYBackground

1. To meet the prime objective of a number of Arab States of acquiring a common combat aircraft which meets their differing national requirements, BAe have proposed a family of four aircraft based on Tornado. In chronological order of availability they are:

- a. Tornado IDS (Interdiction Strike Version). Nominally the same aircraft as that to be delivered to UK, Germany and Italy in 1983/84 (the fourth Batch standard). As its name implies, it is optimised for offensive support/ground attack.
- b. Tornado ADV (Air Defence Variant). Nominally the same aircraft to be delivered to the RAF in 1983/84 and optimised for the air interception role.
- c. Developed Tornado ADV. An improved version of the ADV, incorporating new wings, higher thrust engines and better ground attack capability. Apart from increasing the performance of the aircraft the design changes offer better multi-role capability, i.e. ground attack as well as air defence in a single aircraft. It would be available some 3 years after the ADV.
- d. P110. A completely new design incorporating the latest technology combined with major components of the Tornado. The result is a very high performance, extremely agile aircraft with outstanding capability in both air-to-ground and air-to-air roles. It would be developed specifically to meet Middle East requirements with full

/involvement

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- 2 -

involvement of the countries concerned; and could be available from 1988/89.

2. More detailed descriptions are attached.
3. The IDS and ADV Tornados will not be identical to the aircraft being supplied to the RAF but will contain downgraded versions of certain sensitive equipment, for example terrain following radar and electronic warfare equipment.

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LINE TO TAKESaudi Arabia and Oman

The British Government would welcome the opportunity to develop an aircraft specifically designed to meet the special requirements of Middle East countries. British Aerospace have been working in conjunction with the Royal Air Force on an aircraft for the past few years, which we think could form the basis of this design. This aircraft, the P110, would incorporate the most advanced technologies and have a high degree of commonality with the Tornado, a version of which could be made available in the interim if so desired.

Thento Saudi Arabia

The British Government would welcome Saudi participation in joint development of this new aircraft. To fill the gap before delivery, the interdicator strike version of the Tornado, which would have a high degree of commonality with the P110, and Lightning could be made available to complement your excellent F15/air defence fighters. Perhaps officials could explore this possibility together.

to Oman

The British Government would welcome Omani participation in joint development of this new aircraft. To fill the gap before delivery, the interdicator strike version and the air defence variant of the Tornado, both of which have a high degree of commonality with the new design, could be made available to complement your Jaguar aircraft. Perhaps officials could explore this possibility together.

TORNADO IDS (INTERDICTION STRIKE VERSION)

1. The Tornado IDS is optimised for long range interdiction strike attack against ground and sea-borne targets. It achieves this through:

- a. high efficiency Rolls-Royce RB199 engines;
- b. variable sweep wings giving high efficiency over a wide speed range, and a comfortable ride for the crew in high speed low level flight;
- c. terrain contour following by auto pilot control in all weathers and at night;
- d. a blind attack capability with a large load and many different weapons.

2. It is visualised that this version of Tornado would be particularly attractive to Saudi Arabia which lacks a long range deep penetration attack capability. The IDS would complement the F15s and Lightnings which are principally air defence fighters. A long range, all weather interdictor capability would also be attractive to Oman (to complement the Jaguar), Abu Dhabi and Qatar.

TORNADO ADV (AIR DEFENCE VARIANT)

1. The Tornado ADV is more or less the same aircraft as the Tornado IDS except that:
 - a. the Terrain Following system is replaced by a powerful air interception radar capable of detecting targets at all altitudes with a high resistance to electronic counter measures;
 - b. four Skyflash medium range air-to-air missiles plus up to four Sidewinder short range air-to-air missiles are carried.
2. The ADV is optimised for long range patrol and air interception in all weathers and at night. The 2-man crew is provided with a tactical display of the air situation, priority assignments on targets and options on interception patterns with the different weapons available. Data link is available for information exchange with friendly fighters and ground installations. This aircraft has 80% of its structure and systems common with the Tornado IDS.
3. The Tornado ADV would be of particular interest to Oman which has Jaguars for interdiction but lacks a high performance air defence fighter and has no all-weather/night capability in this field.

DEVELOPED TORNADO ADV

1. To meet Arab needs an improved version of the Tornado ADV could be developed:
 - a. The ADV air intercept radar would have an air-to-ground mode added.
 - b. A new navigation and terrain contour following system would be incorporated.
 - c. Air-to-ground as well as air-to-air weapons could be carried.
 - d. The engines would develop higher thrust and new wings of larger area and different profile could be introduced to give better manoeuvring performance.
 - e. Delivery of the first aircraft could occur in 1986/87.
 - f. The high degree of commonality with Tornado IDS and ADV would be retained.

The main objective of this development would be to add a substantial all-weather air-to-ground capability to an aircraft already possessing the highest level of all-weather interception capability.

2. The Developed Tornado ADV would be attractive to countries seeking a long range all-weather interceptor combined with ground attack capability. It is assessed that Oman in particular falls into this category, but it is judged not necessary to raise this version as a special item in discussion.

P110

1. Much of the advanced technology, such as carbon fibre structure material and fly by wire controls, developed during AST 403 studies is used in this new design which also incorporates the major weapon system components of the Tornado developed ADV. The result is a highly agile air combat fighter with good intercept and ground attack capability, having a large degree of commonality with Tornado through use of:

- a. RB199 engines (uprated to higher power) and ancillaries installation;
- b. developed ADV Radar;
- c. the same Skyflash underfuselage installation, with ability to accept the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) when available.

Deliveries of this aircraft could start in 1988/89 given an early decision to proceed.

* * * * *

Given sufficient desire on the part of the Arab States to develop and fund a common aircraft specifically to meet the differing requirements of the countries concerned, this aircraft would be particularly attractive. In the interim, the versions of the Tornado would fill the gap^{providing} whilst/the commonality being sought.



From the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

M O B Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street
London, SW1

Vanusa. 11/4 NS

Pre mail in PA's

brief

And

10 April 1981

Dear Michael

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE GULF

SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEFING ON THE NORTH-WEST DOME GAS-FIELD IN QATAR

- ... I enclose, with reference to your letter of 6 April to Julian West, a Supplementary Brief on the North-West Dome Gas-Field project dealing with the particular points that the Prime Minister has raised. It should, please, be put with Brief PMVK(81)17.

I am sending copies of this letter, with enclosure, to Julian West (Energy) and Francis Richards (FCO).

Yours sincerely

Catherine Capon

CATHERINE CAPON
Private Secretary

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF: 19-25 APRIL 1981

QATAR: BILATERAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES:

Supplementary Briefing by the Department of Trade
on the North-West Dome Gas-Field

Relevant expertise available to British companies

This is best considered under the different areas of the possible development of the Dome Field, as follows:-

I Actual production from the Gas-Field, i.e. drilling of new wells, positioning of gathering-stations and laying pipelines to bring the gas ashore.

(a) Total scheme development:

Both BP and Shell have already been asked to submit proposals for engineering design studies. Their gas and oil operational expertise and project management capabilities are highly relevant;

(b) Platform building:

Wimpey International and Brown & Root (UK);

(c) Management of general platform support services and offshore facilities:

Matthew Hall Engineering,
Warley Engineering (subsidiary of William Press)
Humphreys & Glasgow
Constructors John Brown Offshore (CJB);

(d) Drilling rigs:

British Shipbuilders, Davy McKee;

(e) Pipelines:

BP and Shell for pipe-laying expertise.
Other relevant UK companies are: BSC, William Press/Warley Engineering, McAlpine Services & Pipelines, and Taylor Woodrow;

(f) Terminal design:

CJB Offshore
 Davy McKee
 Foster Wheeler (UK)
 Matthew Hall Engineering
 Humphreys & Glasgow
 Halcrow
 Ewbank;

(g) Offshore maintenance (looking ahead):

Wimpey
 McAlpine
 Humber Oak
 John Wood Group
 P & W Offshore.

II Onshore pipelines to carry the gas to the domestic market

(a) Pipelines: (see (e) above)(b) Generator/compressor sets:

Rolls-Royce
 GEC (Ruston's Gas Turbines)
 John Brown Engineering.

III Construction of LNG Plant for exporting gas

BP
 Shell
 CJB
 Davy McKee
 Humphreys & Glasgow
 Matthew Hall Engineering
 Olasco (subsidiary of Costain)

IV Construction of harbour facilities for LNG carriers

Costain, Balfour Beatty, Taylor Woodrow and Cementation.
 All would probably need to work with such as BP and Shell on a project of this scale. Relevant consulting engineers would include Halcrow, Ewbank, Ove Arup, CJB Offshore and Rendall, Palmer and Tritton.



(V) Tanker ships for carrying LNG to export markets

British Shipbuilders

British companies and subcontractors which might wish to tender

In principle, any company with relevant expertise might be likely to tender. The following companies have either already expressed interest in tendering or are likely to express interest:-

(i) BP and Shell:

Both of which have relevant expertise (see I(a) above). BP are particularly keen to secure a contract for the construction of an LNG plant as it is some years since they last installed one on nearby Das Island off Abu Dhabi and need to update their references for this kind of work. Shell are similarly interested. They have been in Qatar for a long time and last year produced a comprehensive study of the country's future energy needs. But they blotted their record when the first natural gas liquids (NGL) plant at Umm Said (designed by Shell and Bechtel (UK) with Davy Powergas as main contractor), exploded in 1977;

(ii) Wimpey:

Wimpey are planning to establish a fabrication yard in Qatar for offshore structures including platforms in particular, in anticipation of the Dome Field being developed. They are already in a joint venture with BP for offshore inspection and maintenance work, both in the UK and overseas;

(iii) BSC:

Ought to be interested in supplying pipelines. They have not previously had a good name in Qatar on account of their poor bidding performance over a steel plant project;

(iv) Davy McKee:

Have a likely interest in the LNG plant but so far have kept a low profile, perhaps on account of their involvement in the Umm Said NGL plant explosion (see (i) above);

(v) Humphreys & Glasgow:

Have expressed tentative interest in the LNG plant;

(vi) Fred Olsen and CJB:

Are likely to be interested in hook-up work;

(vii) British Gas Corporation

Are interested in the Dome Field as a market for their consultancy and gas technology. They are not uninterested in the Field as a source of supply, but do not, at the moment, expect to be a purchaser, given other more politically secure and closer alternative sources;

(viii) A number of private consultants seem bound to be interested in work at different stages of the development.

British companies are/or will be interested in projects for industrial development that are expected to go hand-in-hand with the opening up of the Dome Field, e g:-

(a) Ewbank:

Have been shortlisted for the consultancy/project management of a new 1500 MW power-station at Ras Laffan. This could result in subsequent business for Rolls-Royce, GEC and John Brown Engineering for the supply of turbines;

(b) British Smelter Constructions/Hill Samuel Developments:

Are already trying to interest the Qatar authorities in an aluminium smelter project;

(c) Weir Westgarth:

Would be interested in supplying pumps for a desalination plant project.

Finance: The UK clearing banks and National/Westminster, in particular, are showing interest in arranging the financing of the development of the Dome Field and of associated projects. The merchant bankers, Hill Samuel, are also interested.



Aspects of the development which are of particular interest

Given the relevant expertise of British companies and the fact, for example, that the UK content accounts for more than 70% of orders placed for North Sea business, almost every aspect of the development of the Dome Field is likely to be of interest to some part of British industry. It has to be recognised, however, that a number of British companies lack the strong financial base and proven capability of their competitors. The fact also that the UK is not expected to be a purchaser of the gas may put British companies at a disadvantage. Subject to these qualifications, the aspect of the development which is perhaps of particular interest to us is the proposed construction of an LNG plant. If this were to go to BP (or Shell), it is hoped that British industry would be well placed to pick up significant orders for other aspects of the development of the Dome Field and industrial development projects that are expected to go with it.

- Notes:
- 1) The list of British companies with expertise and/or interest in the development of the Dome Field should not be regarded as exhaustive. The offshore industry is developing all the time and new, qualified companies may emerge.
 - 2) The gas in place in the Dome Field is now estimated to amount, at the top end of the range, to some 300 trillion cubic feet (cf the figure of 150 trillion cubic feet, at the bottom end of the range, given in paragraph 4 of the main Brief).

Department of Trade
10 April 1981



RH
cc FCO
cc DIC for India trip

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

10 April 1981

Dear Anne,

Thank you for your letter of 16 March enclosing copies of correspondence from Brigadier Clynton-Reed, of Shortheath Beacon, Shortheath, Farnham, Surrey, about his son, Neil, who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. You ask me to request his release and wrote in similar terms to Douglas Hurd.

I fully understand how distressing Brigadier and Mrs Clynton-Reed must find their son's imprisonment. During my forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia I will be discussing a wide range of topics and I expect that there will be an opportunity to refer to the general problems of British citizens who are in prison there. There are four British subjects serving sentences in Saudi Arabia, and the relatives of all four have asked me to intervene on their behalf for acts of clemency. You will see that this places me in some difficulty. I will do what I can, but would not like to raise hopes too high. I gather that in any case Mr Clynton-Reed can expect to be released in about six months if he is given the usual one-quarter remission of his sentence.

I was concerned to learn of the conditions of Mr Clynton-Reed's imprisonment. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have now instructed the Embassy in Jedda to ask the Saudi authorities to move him to another wing of the prison so that he can again be with other British prisoners.

/I

HS

I am returning the enclosures to your letter.

Y
Lounsbury

Raymond
—

The Rt Hon Maurice Macmillan, MP



From the Secretary of State

Michael Pattison, Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

Dear Mike

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO ABU DHABI: ZAKUM FIELD:
LETTER FROM MR MICHAEL BROWN MP

Thank you for your letter of 27 March enclosing one from Mr Michael Brown MP about Fred Olsen Ltd's interest in the hook-up contract for the Zakum Field.

The company had already been in touch with us about Overseas Projects Fund support for their pre-contractual expenses in connection with the project, and have since called in to discuss it with us in more detail. As a result, we think it would be appropriate to let the Prime Minister's party have a note of the company's interest in case the opportunity can be taken to further it during the forthcoming visit to Abu Dhabi. I am sending a separate note about this and in the meantime, I enclose a draft reply to Mr Brown.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Roderic Lyne (FCO).

Yours sincerely

Catherine Capon.

Catherine Capon
Private Secretary

1. ~~MOQBA~~. Yes. *Phd*
Content?
1450,

2. G.R.

To type for PM, and
pass papers to Neill
for inclusion in

9 April 1981

enclosing.

Copy letter to Mr Con, *re.*

MAP

DRAFT LETTER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO SEND TO:-

Michael Brown Esq MP
House of Commons
London SW1A 0AA

Thank you for your letter of 24 March informing me of Fred Olsen Ltd's interest in the hook-up contract in the Zakum Field development in Abu Dhabi.

I am grateful to you for bringing this project to my attention. During my forthcoming visit to Abu Dhabi, I intend to re-affirm our readiness to co-operate in the economic and industrial development of the country including, in particular, the development of the country's oil industry, and to emphasise the contribution that British industry can make in this connection. I shall have companies such as Fred Olsen in mind.

The Department of Trade had already heard from the company about their interest in this project, and have discussed it with them in more detail. The Embassy in Abu Dhabi are also fully in the picture and will be backing up the company's efforts.



From the Secretary of State

Michael Pattison, Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

9 April 1981

Dear Mike

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO ABU DHABI

As foreshadowed in my letter to you about Mr Michael Brown MP and Fred Olsen Ltd., we think it appropriate to let you have the attached note about further project opportunities in Abu Dhabi. Both have surfaced since preparation of the original briefs for the Prime Minister.

Although it would not perhaps be appropriate for the Prime Minister to go into detailed discussions on either of these projects, they could be mentioned as examples of projects where British companies are making competitive bids which we think should receive favourable attention.

Yours sincerely

Catherine Capon

Catherine Capon
Private Secretary



VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER TO ABU DHABI

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

Supplementary Brief on Projects

GAS STORAGE TANKS

Point to make

Emphasise UK interest in Chicago Bridge's bid. Despite the US parentage of the firm, the bid is being made through the UK subsidiary.

Background

Chicago Bridge are bidding for a £117m contract to design, supply and erect several gas storage tanks on Das Island. The client is Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGLC). Likely return to the UK could be £73m in services and equipment. Competition for the contract is between the UK, Japan and France. We believe the French and Japanese shareholders of the ADGLC are pushing their respective national bids. As BP is also a shareholder of ADGLC, we have asked them if they would support Chicago Bridge's efforts. We have no reason to doubt Chicago Bridge's competitiveness on price or technical grounds.

HOOK-UP OF WELLHEAD PLATFORMS

Point to make

Emphasise UK interest in doing more business in the oil industry. Point to the considerable hook-up experience of Fred Olsen Ltd in severe North Sea conditions.



Background

Fred Olsen are bidding for a £20m contract to hook up 20 wellhead jackets in the Upper Zakum field. The competition includes Brown & Root, McDermott (both USA), ETPM, Comex (both French). The American firms are well known in the area and although Olsen have competed against them successfully in the North Sea, they are having to strive particularly hard to establish themselves in what to them is a new market. Olsen believe the effort to be worth it. Success with this initial hook-up project could lead to much similar work and even to entire jacket design and construction.



From the Secretary of State

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

9 April 1981

CF
p/w brief.
(mine only)

Phyl

Dear Michael

Thank you for your letter of 1 April enclosing two letters from the Chairman of Wimpey about prospects for the sale of aluminium smelters to Qatar, Oman and Abu Dhabi.

We agree with Wimpey that the smelter prospects in Qatar and Oman are confidential and that the Prime Minister should not raise them. We are also advised by the Ambassador in Abu Dhabi that she should not raise the question of a smelter there during her visit. There is no evidence that the Abu Dhabians are taking much interest in such a project. The Ambassador suggests, and we agree, that the first step should be for Wimpey and their American associate to interest them in the proposition. The American Ambassador in Abu Dhabi who has also been approached for political support takes a similarly cautious view.

Officials in my Department recently met a representative of Wimpey and explained that as the Prime Minister had a full programme for her short visit to Abu Dhabi it was unlikely she would raise the smelter; particularly as the Ambassador had advised that, as there seemed to be a lack of interest at the top level, the timing was not right. Since you say in your letter that Sir Reginald Smith's letters are to be included in the Prime Minister's briefing, he was, however, told that she would be given the background. The Wimpey representative accepted this and seemed content.

Yours sincerely,
Stuart Hampson

Stuart Hampson
Private Secretary



Pls add - taken from T-R-M

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Type draft at 'A'

R/ 8 April 1981

for P.D.'s signature

Dear Michael,

Paul

Neil Clynton-Reed: Detained in Saudi Arabia

My letter to you of 31 March enclosed a draft reply from the Prime Minister to the Rt Hon Maurice Macmillan MP about the case of Mr Neil Clynton-Reed, who is in prison in Saudi Arabia. I understand that the Prime Minister did not wish to reply in the terms suggested but has asked for a new letter to Mr Macmillan agreeing to seek Mr Clynton-Reed's early release as an act of clemency since his parents are aged and unwell.

Ministers here fully understand the humanitarian reasons for the Prime Minister's wish to reply in this way. But they think it might be helpful if, before reaching a final decision, the Prime Minister could be informed of the position of the other Britons convicted and detained in Saudi Arabia, for all of whom there have been appeals to the Prime Minister to seek clemency. This would allow the case to be seen in its wider context.

There are currently 19 British subjects detained in Saudi Arabia, of whom four have been convicted. These four are Messrs Clynton-Reed, Smith, Wilson and Bate. A short background note on them is attached.

I enclose copies of the most recent correspondence with the Prime Minister's office about these four. Mrs Smith wrote to the Prime Minister on 8 February to say that the health of her husband, who is 59, had deteriorated in prison and would continue to do so; and that she was facing various other difficulties in Saudi Arabia. Mrs Wilson wrote to her MP, Mr Peter Hordern, who in turn wrote to the Prime Minister on 20 March. Mrs Wilson said that her parents, who are elderly, rely on her help and assistance; especially her father, who is 88 and in poor mental health. She is finding it difficult to cope on her own. Mrs Bate wrote to the Prime Minister on 3 March saying that her husband had three small children who desperately needed their father. The replies sent on the Prime Minister's behalf to Mrs Smith and Mrs Bate, and that sent earlier from Mr Luce to Mr Hordern for Mrs Wilson, discouraged hope of the Prime Minister intervening on their husbands' behalf.

/In these



- 2 -

In these circumstances, Ministers here feel that it might be difficult in fairness for the Prime Minister to single out Mr Clynton-Reed for an appeal for clemency. If it became known, it might also be resented by the relatives of the other three who have also appealed to the Prime Minister. It might be better for the Prime Minister to speak in general terms about the four convicted prisoners and the good effect which acts of clemency on humanitarian grounds would have in this country.

/ With this in mind, I attach alternative drafts:

- (A) reflecting the above advice; and
- (B) for use if the Prime Minister prefers to single out Mr Clynton-Reed.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

BRITISH SUBJECTS DETAINED AND CONVICTED IN SAUDI ARABIA

Neil Clynton-Reed

Arrested 2 April 1980. Sentenced September 1980 to two years' imprisonment and 50 strokes for possession of drugs.

Due to be released in October 1981 (with remission).

Desmond O'Callen-Smith

Arrested on 3 September 1980. Sentenced 12 November to three years' imprisonment and 300 strokes for distributing alcohol.

Due to be released in December 1982 (with remission).

Guy Trevor Wilson

Arrested 12 September 1980. Sentenced 24 November 1980 to 18 months and 80 strokes for possession and manufacture of alcohol.

Due to be released in October 1981 (with remission).

Edwin Bate

Arrested 3 November 1980. Sentenced 9 February 1981 to 12 months' imprisonment and 49 strokes for possession, consumption and manufacture of alcohol.

Due to be released in August 1981 (with remission).



DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

Prime Minister

A

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:

Your Reference

The Rt Hon Maurice Macmillan MP
House of Commons
London SW1

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 16 March enclosing copies of correspondence from Brigadier Clynton-Reed, of Shortheath Beacon, Shortheath, Farnham, Surrey, about his son, Neil, who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. You ask me to request his release and wrote in similar terms to Douglas Hurd.

I fully understand how distressing Brigadier and Mrs Clynton-Reed must find their son's imprisonment. During my forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia I will be discussing a wide range of topics and I expect that there will be an opportunity to refer to the general problems of British citizens who are in prison there. There are four British subjects serving sentences in Saudi Arabia, and the relatives of all four have asked me to intervene on their behalf for acts of clemency. You will see that this places me in some difficulty. I will do what I can, but would not like to raise hopes too high. I gather that in any case Mr Clynton-Reed can expect to be released in about six months if he is given the usual one-quarter remission of his sentence.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I was concerned to learn of the conditions of Mr Clynton-Reed's imprisonment. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have now instructed the Embassy in Jeddah to ask the Saudi authorities to move him to another wing of the prison so that he can again be with other British prisoners.

/I am

I am returning the enclosures to your letter.



DSR 11 (Revised)

B

DRAFT: ~~minute~~/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

The Prime Minister

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

The Rt Hon Maurice Macmillan MP
House of Commons
London SW1A

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter of 16 March enclosing copies of correspondence from Brigadier Clynton-Reed, of Shortheath Beacon, Shortheath, Farnham, Surrey about his son Neil, who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. You asked me to request his release and wrote in similar terms to Douglas Hurd.

I fully understand how distressing Brigadier and Mrs Clynton-Reed must find their son's imprisonment. During my forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia I will be discussing a wide range of topics, and I expect that there will be an opportunity to refer to the problems facing British citizens who are in prison there. While there are no legal grounds on which I can make a specific plea for clemency on Mr Clynton-Reed's behalf, I am concerned about reports of Brigadier Clynton-Reed's age and deteriorating health, and for this reason I am, exceptionally, prepared to raise with Saudi Ministers the possibility of their exercising clemency to allow Clynton-Reed to return to this country should a suitable opportunity present itself.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I leave it to your discretion whether ^{to} ~~you~~ advise your constituent of this. You ^{will} understand that raising the matter with the Saudi authorities will not necessarily lead to Mr Clynton-Reed's release ^{and that} The decision whether to exercise clemency or not is, of course, one for the Saudis themselves.

British Aerospace

PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

Brooklands Road
Weybridge
Surrey KT13 0SJ

Telephone: Weybridge (0932) 45522
Telegrams: Britair Weybridge
Telex: 27111

From the Chairman,
SIR AUSTIN PEARCE, CBE

The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

8th April, 1981.

*See to Nott & A for briefs.
+ T.P.L.
H. Andrews*

Dear Prime Minister

I am very conscious and appreciative of your interest in the promotion of sales of Air Defence equipment in the Middle East, and I have been watching the developments in this area very closely, which is of supreme importance in improving our export performance. We have been very active in marketing in the Gulf area, and I will be visiting Saudi Arabia next week. Your visits to these countries following the visit of John Nott will greatly influence events, since the political associations with major defence sales are a dominant factor - particularly as assurances of continuing after sales support is always a sensitive issue.

Dominating the scene at the moment is the possibility of Tornado sales, where particular interest has been expressed in Jordan and Oman. For some weeks we have been working closely with MoD Defence Sales, in an attempt to displace the French Mirage 4000 as the foremost contender in the Middle East market. In the interest of collective defence, a number of the Gulf States are taking steps to invest in a new combat aircraft re-equipment programme, which under French persuasion was to have been based on the Mirage 4000.

As the specific requirements of each of the Arab States could differ to some degree, we feel that we are able to make a more attractive offer than the French, who cannot deliver the fully developed Mirage 4000 until 1987 or thereabouts.

Subject to the approval of the German and Italian Governments we are able to offer, subject to timely decisions and contracts :

- 1) The Tornado IDS (interdiction strike variant) currently in service, in say three years, or
- 2) The Tornado ADV (air defence variant) currently in production, in four years, or
- 3)

- 3) A development of either of the above for delivery at a date dependent on the extent of the development required, or
- as a U.K. development -
- 4) The P.110 project, a new combat aircraft which utilises a significant proportion of Tornado equipment, including the engines. This should be a very attractive export aircraft and one which we believe would be attractive to the Arab nations and this could be available for delivery in 1989 or thereabouts.

I understand that Sir Ronald Ellis has spoken to you about the P.110 project, which has the further merit of being able to meet the significant future requirements of the Royal Air Force. We therefore believe that it would be greatly to the advantage of the Royal Air Force and the British aerospace industry if interest in this new development could be obtained, particularly in sharing the cost of development and production investment to keep within U.K. budgetary profiles. As the French are seeking from the Arab States most of the cost of development and the whole of the production investment of the Mirage 4000, it gives the U.K. a considerable opportunity in spite of the progress already made by the French.

Turning to specific countries which are included in your itinerary :

Saudi Arabia

We are extremely hopeful that shortly there will be an extension of the Memorandum of Understanding between the British Government and the Saudi Government in support of the Royal Saudi Air Force, and any encouragement that can be given towards concluding this would be appreciated.

In the context of Saudi Arabia, an official invitation has been sent to the Minister of Defence inviting a Royal Saudi Air Force pilot to fly in the Tornado to see whether any interest can be developed in this aircraft by the Saudis.

We are also hopeful that they may add the Hawk to their inventory of trainer aircraft. As part of the promotion of the Hawk into the scheme of training of the Royal Saudi Air Force, Mr. Nott offered a visit of a team of Royal Air Force specialists to discuss the system of training used in the United Kingdom, involving the Hawk.

/The opportunities ...

The opportunities for increasing our participation in the development of the Royal Saudi Air Force have not been fully exploited in the sense that various proposals have been made to the Saudi Defence Minister for increasing our participation. We believe that these would be a useful addition to the present scope of activity which foreseeably must decline unless additional contracts are awarded to us, since those activities are based on aircraft which are rapidly becoming obsolescent. Therefore, if we are to maintain our presence at current levels, it will entail either new aircraft or additional support activities or preferably both. Clearly we would be most grateful for any opportunity you may have to promote such ideas.

Oman

In Oman, our major presence there is associated with Jaguar aircraft, Rapier Missiles and Strikemaster trainer aircraft and a management task, now completed, for an Integrated Air Defence Scheme

There is a direct interest in the Tornado ADV and at the time of your visit an Omani pilot should have had flight experience on the Tornado in the U.K. If Oman were to buy the Tornado, it would be a most useful foothold for the aircraft in that part of the world.


U.A.E.

Both Abu Dhabi and Dubai have expressed interest in the Hawk and we would be very pleased to achieve a Hawk sale in both of these countries since once again we are in competition with the French Alphajet, and it would be a significant boost to further sales of Hawk in the Middle East if we could secure these two markets.

In particular in Abu Dhabi, we believe there could be opportunities for Jaguar or Tornado sales as well as an opportunity to develop an Air Training Academy, which would add usefully to our presence in the Middle East.

If possible, I should be grateful to hear from you of any follow-up action that should be necessary subsequent to the visit, so that we can take full advantage of the effect of your talks with the various Heads of State.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'A. S. ...', with a horizontal line underneath it.

THE CURRENT DYNAMICS GROUP SITUATION
IN QATAR, ABU DHABI, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA

QATAR

Rapier

Major General Perkins (Director, Military Assistance Overseas) led a Ministry of Defence team to Qatar to study and report on the reorganisation of the Qatari Armed Forces in November 1980. One of its recommendations was the purchase of up to four low level air defence batteries (40 to 50 fire units), but it recognised that manpower would be a major problem.

In January 1981 MOD(UK) sponsored a visit of a Qatari Air Defence team to the UK and Germany where the RAF Regiment successfully demonstrated Rapier.

Our latest proposal which offered two, three or four batteries of 12 Towed Rapier Fire Units with 50% Blindfire at a cost of up to £270M, was submitted by 21st March 1981. It was well received and following Mr. Nott's visit and with the assistance of our Ambassador, Mr. Colin Brant, our negotiating team was invited out to Dohar to start discussions on the offer on Sunday, 12th April.

The latest word from Doha suggests that all is going well, but the initial contract will only be for one battery with a possible follow-on order once this is operational. Manpower, as expected, is said to be the main problem.

ABU DHABI

The Abu Dhabi Forces already have a battery of Crotale and a battery of Towed Rapier. At the conclusion of a survey, carried out in late 1980 by a team led by Major General Perkins, it was recommended that additional low level systems were required and that to provide increased mobility a Tracked version should be procured.

Accordingly, a proposal for a battery of Tracked Rapier has been prepared and was handed to the Abu Dhabi authorities on 26th March. The battery consists of 12 Tracked Rapier Units, with missiles, at a total cost of some £44M.

We have, as yet, had no further response from the Abu Dhabi authorities.

Continued....

EGYPT

Swingfire

The Swingfire Beeswing Pallet is already in service with the Egyptian Army, one battalion of 40 pallets mounted on the 1 tonne Land Rover. From now on ABD manufactured units will be mounted in the CJ6 Jeep, also manufactured in Egypt.

Arab British Dynamics, of which BAe is an active partner, has undertaken manufacture of Swingfire under licence in Cairo. They presently manufacture some parts of both pallet and missile and then assemble them. They will take on more of the parts manufacture in stages.

Interests now lie in the Combined night sight and the Mark II warhead.

Rapier

Initial discussions on Rapier started in 1974/75, but were inconclusive. Technical discussions were reopened in 1977 and continue to date.

In August 1980 a senior team from the Air Defence Command (ADC) visited an RAF base in Germany and witnessed a successful firing demonstration in the Hebrides. The Vice President and the C in C, ADC visited us at the Farnborough Air Show in September 1980 and discussions have continued in Cairo.

Many technical queries have been raised and despite detailed replies they continue to reappear. Modifications to the equipment to suit their operation are also being discussed.

Our Chairman and Marketing Director are currently in Cairo on the advice of our Ambassador to see if progress can be made.

SAUDI ARABIA

The Saudi Arabian authorities have been encouraged to look to the UK for advice and assistance in establishing a comprehensive air defence system including Rapier as the low level point defence system.

Continued.....

Much interest has been shown in SkyFlash, the medium range air to air missile (already sold to Sweden after detailed evaluation) as armament for the F15 aircraft, but there has been opposition from the US Government and Industry.

Dynamics Group has tendered as Prime Contractor of a group of European aerospace companies including Matra and Thomson CSF and in competition with Hughes and Ford for the proposed communications satellite for the Arab world. The bids are currently being evaluated by the Arabsat organisation in which Saudi Arabia has a powerful voice. A full brief has been submitted to the Prime Minister by the Department of Industry.

JAA/LJF

13th April, 1981

CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-230 7222 218 2111/3

MO 25/3/4

8th April 1981

Dear Michael,

to [unclear]

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Thank you for your letter of 6th April. Supplementary notes on SAS training charges and on places for overseas students at Dartmouth, Sandhurst and Cranwell have been prepared and are being circulated by the Cabinet Office. A note on Tornado derivatives will be available tomorrow.

I am copying this letter to Francis Richards (FCO) and David Wright (Cabinet Office) - the latter with the request that given the sensitive subject matter of the SAS brief (addendum to PMVK(81)2) its distribution should be restricted to members of the Prime Minister's party, and other addressees on the standard list in MOD, FCO and Treasury.

*Yours sincerely
J D S Dawson*

(J D S DAWSON)

M O'D B Alexander Esq

CONFIDENTIAL
COVERING SECRET

Sub

h

Amel

8 April 1981

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from the Managing Director of Leabank Office Equipment Limited. I have acknowledged Mr. Skelton's letter. You may like to send a copy to the Embassy in Qatar.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

F.J. Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SP

Handwritten initials

8 April 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 7 April about your Company's business in Qatar. I shall ensure that those directly concerned are apprised of the contents of your letter.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

M.F. Skelton, Esq.

Handwritten initials

Leabank

OFFICE EQUIPMENT LIMITED

Registered Office:
Holyhead Road Factory Centre, Western Way
Wednesbury, West Midlands WS10 7BW
England
Telephone: 021-556 3311 Telex: 35676

• Our Ref : MFS/SMM/LW

7th April, 1981

R8/4

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland,

No. 10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

Dear Madam,

We understand you will shortly be visiting Qatar, and it is assumed that one of the reasons for your tour will be to encourage increased trading between our two countries.

We are wondering if a member of your staff, if the opportunity occurs, could assist us in developing our trading association with a company based in Doha.

Leabank, along with other English companies, transacted quite a lot of business in the Middle East until some two years ago, when our competitors from the Far East virtually took over that market. Our British based competitors, we believe, have almost abandoned any hope of recapturing the market. This is not so with this company, particularly as we believe the Middle East commercial markets are again showing a preference for British designed products.

Our Marketing and Sales Manager returned last week from a tour of the Middle East bringing with him several very acceptable orders, which have improved the demand in our factory.

During my colleague's visit he learned that a company in Doha already operating in the office equipment field are planning to build their own factory in Qatar in which they plan to manufacture products similar to our current range. The writer has written to the Managing Director offering our services in this venture, in a similar way to that in which we have recently signed a licensing agreement for the manufacture of our products in Trinidad. A copy of a press report of that transaction is enclosed.

/Continued

Directors: P.D. Taylor (Chairman), M.F. Skelton (Managing)
R.J. Hughes, A.F. Alvers, J.E. Dangerfield, C.P. Glasson
B. Moore (Secretary)

Registered in England No. 1304933

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, P.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland,
No. 10 Downing Street, London, S.W.1.

7th April, 1981

My Board and I are convinced that several traditional British markets will become closed to us due to the industrialisation of the developing countries and, although we would prefer to sell our products to those markets, if this is not possible then we would be happy to sell our technical knowledge and designs for, if we do not, we recognise that other nations will take advantage of our shortcomings.

Enclosed is a copy of the letter forwarded to the company in Doha, and any help your staff can give us will be very much appreciated.

May we wish you a successful visit to Qatar, and a safe return.

I have the honour to remain, Madam
Your obedient servant,



M.F. Skelton
Managing Director

BUSINESS EDITOR - Brian Blakeley

Caribbean capers bring £15m deals

A Black Country firm which makes office filing systems and storage equipment, has prised open markets in the Caribbean which should be worth around £15 million over the next 10 years.

Wednesbury-based Leabank Office Equipment, and its sister company Moresecure, have negotiated deals for their products to be made under licence in Trinidad.

Agreement has already been reached for Leabank's filing cabinets and storage cupboards to be made by Universal Metal, of Trinidad.

Sales are expected to reach at least £7 million in the next 10 years.

A similar sales boost will also go to Moresecure when Universal signs an agree-

ment shortly to make storage shelving under licence.

Maurice Skelton, managing director of both Leabank and Moresecure, said the agreements would open up the whole Caricom market — which was closed to such products from outside — as well as the United States and parts of South America.

"The trans-Atlantic markets have effectively been barred to us because shipping costs at £100 a ton," said Mr Skelton.

"Now our products will be made or assembled in Trinidad, using cheaper steel than we can obtain here, and sold at competitive prices throughout the West Indies.

Stylish filing cabinets from Leabank which will be made in Trinidad.

Central and South America."

It will mean more work for the 90 employees at Leabank's manufacturing plant in Newtown, mid-Wales, who will be providing components during the 10-year contract.

The Moresecure shelving will be made entirely in Trinidad using the most up-to-date machinery.

"The deal will not mean any more work for our 90 employees at Wednesbury, who are on short-time, but it will make us financially stonger to weather the UK recession," added Mr Skelton.

"The Universal Metal management visited our Wednesbury factory and were most impressed with our equipment, productivity and attitude of the workforce.

"We believe our policy of ploughing profits back into the latest machinery is helping us attack overseas markets.

"We are hoping to get a major contract for the Iraqi army and also perhaps get our equipment made in Nigeria and Uganda."



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Registered Office:
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Wednesbury, West Midlands WS10 7BW
England
Telephone: 021-556 3311 Telex: 35676

Our Ref · MFS/SMM/LW

3rd April, 1981

Mr. M.H. Baluchi,
M.A.L. Almana & Partners,
P.O. Box 49,
Doha,
Qatar.

Dear Mr. Baluchi,

Our Marketing & Sales Manager, David Burton, has recently returned from your country after having several discussions with your colleague Mr. P.S. Seshadri.

We have confirmed that your company has now been appointed as our sole distributor in Doha, and we look forward to receiving your orders in due course. We are convinced that our products are functionally and aesthetically superior to those manufactured by our competitors, and believe that when marketed by your well respected company the nett results will be beneficial to both of our organisations.

Mr. Seshadri advised David Burton that you are planning to build an organisation to manufacture our type of equipment in Doha, and I would express an interest in discussing this project with you with a view to our assisting you in a similar manner to arrangements which have recently been completed with a company based in Trinidad.

We have supplied the technical know-how, product drawings, and advice on capital equipment and tooling. Our licensee has provided the factory space, capital and all personnel.

We are an autonomous subsidiary of Wagon Industrial Holdings Ltd., a public quoted company, a copy of whose most recent Directors' report is enclosed. As the Managing Director of this company and a storage equipment company, Moresecure Limited, my colleagues and I have been responsible for building these companies into two of the country's leading manufacturers in their fields of operation. For example, Leabank was literally moved to a "green field" site some three years ago without interruption of supplies to the market. We would be happy to discuss making this experience available to you.

/Continued

Directors: P.D. Taylor (Chairman), M.F. Skelton (Managing)
R.J. Hughes, A.F. Alvers, J.E. Dangerfield, C.P. Glasson
B. Moore (Secretary)

Registered in England No. 1304933

3rd April, 1981

Whereas I understand you will be visiting England in the autumn, if you so wished I would be prepared to visit your offices for preliminary discussions before that date. Alternatively we could prepare a questionnaire to be completed by yourselves giving details of various aspects which would enable us to recommend the type of manufacturing unit that you require.

Perhaps you would kindly advise us of your requirements in due course. Irrespective of your decision we hope you will allow us to meet during your forthcoming visit to England. If your programme allows the time may I suggest you visit our factories - you are assured of a most cordial welcome.

Yours sincerely,



M.F. Skelton



Prime Minister

Prime Minister
r f/w briefs

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THE ARAB COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE

You know of the commercial opportunities which the CPRS highlighted and which it is widely recognised will flow from the use of satellites for communication purposes and television. The Arab Communications Satellite is the first opportunity for British Industry to secure a significant overseas order for satellites and this contract could be a prelude to greater commercial success. It is for this reason that I wish to draw the matter to your attention.

We have been supporting the development of communications satellites through the European Space Agency for nearly 10 years. British Aerospace has won prime contractorship in ESA for the development of these satellites. We now wish to see the fruits of our support and industry's efforts. Success here would be the first non-US commercial sale to an overseas customer and we can expect the competition to be disproportionately severe in order to keep us out of the market.

A communications satellite serving all the Arab States does have a pervasive significance which few other sorts of business, even though they may secure much larger orders, can have.



Winning the order would represent a splendid advertisement for British industry generally among the participating Arab States. A measure of the importance we attach to this order is our willingness to provide \$12.5 million by way of support with the French providing a similar amount. We have also been providing both Ministerial and diplomatic support.

Three competitors remain - Hughes (USA), Aerospatiale/Ford (France/USA), and BAe/Matra (UK/France). The outcome of the recent Arab Board of Governors meeting in Washington is not known but they will be making a recommendation to the Arab Minister's Meeting in Amman on 28 April to decide the award of the contract. The timing of your visit is therefore particularly opportune.

You have received some background briefing from my officials but I would like to emphasise some of the points you might make. These are:-

- (i) Britain's aerospace industry is successful in spite of difficult world-wide trading conditions, is currently performing profitably and well;
- (ii) British Aerospace is sharing fully in this success;



- (iii) British Aerospace has long standing links and commercial relations with Arab countries;
- (iv) the strength of British Aerospace has been demonstrated by the success of the recent flotation of their shares;
- (v) the Government does nevertheless maintain close interest in British Aerospace's affairs and is wholly supportive of their space effort (the financial support cannot, of course, be mentioned);
- (vi) British Aerospace has demonstrated its ability to win prime contractorships in the bids for European Space Agency work;
- (vii) British Aerospace is dedicated to making a success of the Arab communications satellite and both we and the French Government are equally dedicated to backing them;
- (viii) the bid is unique in offering ESA expertise for the training of personnel;



- (ix) it is in the interests of the Arab States to diversify their resources of supply for strategic goods and we hope the Arabs will award this contract to BAe. We shall, of course, be glad to help and advise with consultancies and training.

The Arabs are playing things very close to the chest and there is still (7 April) no official word on the relative standing of the three firms. I hope to get a clearer picture if I am able to meet the Arabsat team in Washington later this week. If we have any further information we will ensure that you have it before you leave for India.

This particular project, and your own involvement, should be seen in the light of an arranged PQ which David Price will put down for answer when Parliament reassembles on 27 April. This reflects the fast moving space scene in which we hope to see significant opportunities and successes for British industry during 1981.

I am copying this to the Foreign Secretary and to the Secretary of State for Trade.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Michael Marshall', with a horizontal line underneath.

MICHAEL MARSHALL
Department of Industry
7 April 1981

17 Staindale Drive,
Melbourne Park,
Aspley,
NOTTINGHAM, NG8 5FU

x 9.
7 April 1981

The Right Honourable Mrs Margaret H. Thatcher, M.P.,
The House of Commons,
Westminster
LONDON, SW1A 0AA

Dear Madam,

In the immediate future you will be visiting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Prior to your departure I submit the following for your attention in anticipation that you may be able to assist.

On 25 May 1980, a Mr Paul Brown of Arabian Elder Limited, Al Khabar, Saudi Arabia was murdered. Following this several members of staff had travel restrictions placed on them pending completion of Police inquiries. One of these so affected was Mr STEWART GRAHAM CHRISTIE, 22 STAMFORD COURT, GOLDHAWK ROAD, LONDON, W.6 who is the husband of my sister Mrs Jean B. Christie of the same address.

Mr Christie was allowed to return to the United Kingdom on 1 August 1980 to have his visa renewed and attend to urgent company business, returning to Saudi Arabia on 15 September 1980 whereupon the travel restrictions were re-imposed.

On 8 February 1981 the travel restrictions were lifted on all remaining staff with the exception of Mr Christie, as the Minister of the Interior wished to interview him as the Managing Director of Arabian Elder.

Since then, despite repeated representation to the Minister of the Interior and the Emir of Damman, both of whom state that the reason for the travel restriction is the other's responsibility, there has been no progress.

The detention of Mr Christie has directly been detrimental to the health of his wife and this is causing me some concern. Additional pressures have been caused by his absence in that a legal dispute that he was involved in is now time expired resulting in a bankruptcy notice being filed against his wife. The local press have also become aware of the situation and are obviously anxious to publish, however, they have respected requests not to print to avoid any action being detrimental to the efforts to obtain a lifting of travel restrictions on Mr Christie. The announcement of your visit has, however, brought renewed and more insistent demands for details and somewhat veiled threats to publish to see if the power of the press can succeed where diplomatic effort failed.

I would appreciate if you could give this matter some attention and to receive your comments in due course so that I can advise my sister what course of action to take which will be most beneficial for the release of Mr Christie while not causing any embarrassment to you or your government.

I am, Madam,
Your humble servant


T.C. Hall



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 April 1981

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 3 April about the difficulties you have encountered with the Government of Oman. I have taken careful note of the correspondence and will see if anything can be done while we are in Muscat. You will understand, however, that, since the Ambassador has already taken action on your behalf, it may not be easy to get any further.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Mrs. Jo Harrison.

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CONFIDENTIAL



File

Foreign Policy

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 April 1981

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Prime Minister's Visit to the Gulf

The Prime Minister said at her briefing meeting this afternoon, which was attended by your Secretary of State, that she would like a good deal more information on the potential British role in the development of the North-West Dome gas field in Qatar than is in the briefs. She would like to know what relevant expertise is available to British companies; which British companies and sub-contractors might wish to tender; which aspects of the development we would be particularly interested in etc.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Julian West, Esq.,
Department of Energy.

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

6 April 1981

~~BF~~

Prime Minister's Visit to the Gulf

There was a good deal of discussion at the Prime Minister's briefing meeting this afternoon about defence sales to the Gulf and related topics. As a result I think it would be helpful if you could provide additional briefing on the following points:-

- a. The recovery of the training costs incurred by the SAS in Saudi Arabia. The Prime Minister believes that we were over zealous in the collection of these costs and that our position in Saudi Arabia has been damaged as a result;
- b. The Tornado derivative in which we are trying to interest Arab Governments. The Prime Minister would like a good deal more information about the way in which this aircraft would differ from the two versions of the Tornado at present in prospect. It might be helpful if you were to commission a self-contained paper on the subject;
- c. Places at Sandhurst, Cranwell and Dartmouth. The Prime Minister believes that we should be prepared to offer up to twenty more places per year at each of these colleges if this is necessitated by the demand for them.

I am sending copies of this letter to Francis Richards (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

CS

Brian Norbury, Esq.,
Ministry of Defence.

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MO 5/8/8

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2111/3 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 9000 (Switchboard)

6th April 1981

(4)

mb

Prime Minister

Don Michael

Thompson briefs.

Paul

You mentioned to me on the telephone that the Prime Minister would like to see the record of the discussions between Prince Sultan (the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defence and Aviation) and Mr Nott. The record of the discussions (which were held in restricted session) has just reached me from Sir James Craig, HM Ambassador Jeddah, and I attach a copy as you requested.

James
Thompson

(J D S DAWSON)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

covering CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF MEETING HELD AT THE SAUDI
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ON TUESDAY
24 MARCH 1981

S/S

The Rt Hon John Nott MP
(Secretary of State for Defence)

Sir James Craig KCMG
(HBM Ambassador)

Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Terence Lewin GCB MVO DSC
(Chief of Defence Staff)

Major General K Perkins CB MBE DFC
(Director Military Assistance Office)

His Royal Highness
Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz
Al Saud (Minister of Defence
and Aviation and Inspector
General of the Armed Forces)

General Muhammad Salih Al
Hammaad
(Chief of Defence Staff)

H.E. General Shaikh
Othman al Humaiyid
(Assistant Minister for
Military Affairs MODA)

1. This was a restricted meeting, with most members of the British party waiting outside.
2. After the usual courtesies, which were very friendly, Mr Nott raised the question of the extension of the present Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with regard to the Saudi Arabian Air Defence Project (SADAP). Prince Sultan said that the British side had submitted their recommendations and the Saudis had replied with their comments and suggestions. The ball was, therefore, in the British court. Saudi Arabia had no objection of principle but there were a few technical and financial points to be ironed out. This was only to be expected in any enterprise of this size and there would be no real problem.
3. Prince Sultan said that it would help the Saudis in their deliberations if they could know how long the Lightning would remain in service with the RAF and NATO. The Secretary of State replied

/that

that the Lightning would be in service with the RAF at least until 1984 and possibly longer. Since the proposed extension to the MOU was for three years, i.e. from 1982-85, it was likely that the Lightning would remain in British service over the whole period of the new MOU.

4. Mr Nott then raised the question of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). He said that there had been a good deal of misunderstanding. We in the UK had had for several years a mobile force, ready to move at a few hours' notice. But it had never been our intention to use it in an imperialist role, but only if asked by our friends to co-operate and with our friends' full consent. For example, we had a small force in Belize at the request of the authorities there. Prince Sultan said that the creation of such a force lay within the prerogative of any independent state. But the explanation given by Mr Nott was very different from the way the press had put the matter. The time for colonialist intervention was long past. One had only to look at Vietnam to see that. Mr Nott explained that Mr Haig and Mr Weinberger had discussed with Mrs Thatcher in Washington their anxiety to have a mobile force available in case of need. We in Britain felt that we ought to offer our own participation in such a force, though of course it would be on a fairly small scale. It was from this that Mrs Thatcher's undertaking had arisen. Prince Sultan said that the problem was, in this case as in others, the fuss made by the press, which was always exploited by Israel. The important thing was that the West should provide friendly countries with arms and technology to defend themselves. The Soviet Bloc

was able to help its friends without propaganda and publicity. The West, and especially the USA, were quite different. The problem must be solved. Mr Nott agreed that the press was a problem but freedom of speech was one of our most important traditions. Prince Sultan said he understood that but the situation was nevertheless dangerous. He had been reported in the press as asking for 300 Tornados, whereas he had never expressed a word of interest in the Tornado. He had made a simple enquiry of the West Germans about the Leopard tank and the result had been a public debate in Germany, with the leaders of the various parties making public statements about Saudi military affairs and policies over the heads of the Saudis. The disease of publicity and leaks which had long been known in the American Congress had now infected West Germany and the UK. Did the West want Saudi Arabia to turn to the Soviet Union who could supply what was necessary quietly and without fuss?

5. Mr Nott said that he shared Prince Sultan's frustration. The Tornado affair had arisen after we had heard from King Hussain that the Arabs had decided to buy the Mirage 4000. We had sent a message to King Hussain saying that the Mirage 4000 did not yet exist and that before the Arabs took any decisions they might wish to look at alternatives such as the Tornado. From that the whole affair had been blown up. In the context of Gulf co-operation if there should be a decision to buy a new aircraft we should like the opportunity to make an offer and we should try to do it quietly. Prince

/Sultan

Sultan said that the new Gulf Co-operation Council did not have a military element: it covered only social, cultural, educational and political affairs etc. He knew that the Tornado was a good aircraft and the Saudis had not said no to it. They had not even studied it. They knew that British products were renowned for their quality. If the Saudis sometimes did not buy a particular piece of British equipment that did not mean that they did not like it, but only that in the particular circumstances of their particular requirement it was not suitable. For example, if the Lightning had a longer range they might have made more use of it /this passage was obscure even to Prince Sultan's officials: it is possible that Prince Sultan meant a longer life rather than a longer range7.

6. Prince Sultan then turned to the Palestine question. Europe had at last made a start. The problem must be solved: it caused the States of the Middle East to spend on arms what they should be spending on development. Mr Nott commented that he had told Mr Haig the previous week that Europe must be allowed to have an independent view and the Americans must not try to stop Europe attempting its own move. Prince Sultan said that it was Palestine which had allowed the Soviet Union to get a foothold in the Middle East. Communism had come into the area without a shot being fired, through neglect by the West. If HMG had listened to King Faisal over Aden there would have been no Communism in the South. Mr Nott agreed that the West had neglected the Palestine question in the past but was now remedying

/the

the situation. He fully understood the feelings of his Arab friends.

7. Mr Nott then turned to training. At the King Faisal Air Academy that morning he had heard of Saudi plans for the development of the Academy and other training projects. If it would be helpful he would send out the head of RAF flying training, with a team, to study Saudi requirements and make a report. Clearly the Saudis must be considering the purchase of a new training aircraft. Prince Sultan said he had no objection to receiving the team. But there must be no propaganda made out of it. He did not want to read in the press a statement by some British spokesman to the effect that the British were helping the Saudis to improve their standards. Standards at the Saudi Air Academy were as good as Cranwell. There was much co-operation between Britain and Saudi Arabia already and it was good, flexible and close. Co-operation should exist not only in buying equipment (that was only a transient "deal") but also in training etc.

8. In this context Prince Sultan said that the Saudis had asked us for five places on a military survey course but had been offered only two. Could Mr Nott do something about this? Mr Nott said he would certainly look into the matter. Prince Sultan was confused: it appears that it is five places at Sandhurst that are required, for men who are subsequently going on to a military survey course.7

9. Mr Nott recommended the Hawk aircraft as suitable for Saudi requirements. Prince Sultan said that Saudi requirements in the post-Jet Provost period were still under study. He did not know where the study had reached: no report or recommendation had been put to him yet.

10. Prince Sultan then turned to the FH.70 Howitzer gun. The Saudi Government had agreed the previous night to buy this gun. Their order would be for 72 units. But he would like Mr Nott to give serious consideration to shortening the delivery dates and reducing the prices. Could we send out someone with authority to discuss and negotiate and, if appropriate, sign a contract?

11. Finally, Mr Nott said that he had been discussing with Prince Abdullah the requirements of the National Guard for armour. He intended to send out in the next two or three weeks an officer with written proposals, in respect both of the improved Chieftain heavy tank and the lighter Vickers Valiant. It would make sense if this officer were to discuss the Saudi Army's requirements at the same time. Prince Sultan said that if the information was made available to Prince Abdullah, it would naturally be available to him too [perhaps some element here of inter-family, inter-Service rivalry].

JO HARRISON, 10 GARWAY ROAD, LONDON W2

3 April 1981

C10/4/81

Dear Mrs Thatcher

I see that you will be visiting the Sultanate of Oman later this month, and feel that I must write to you about my appalling experience with the Oman Government. In brief, they owe me nearly £2,000 for work I have done for them over the last 5 years. They do not deny that they owe me this money, but they have not paid me a penny.

I work as a freelance picture librarian and in this capacity have been employed by the Oman Ministry of Information preparing pictures for exhibitions, brochures, lecture tours etc.

The amount that they owe me is covered by two invoices - one for £985 for the period 1976 to 1979, and the other for £901 for the period 1979 to 1980. After sending the Ministry of Information innumerable copies of the invoices and statements, and receiving nothing from them, I wrote in desperation last October to the British Ambassador in Muscat for advice as to what I should do to obtain the money which the Oman Ministry of Information owed me.

After several letters, the Ambassador in fact spoke to the Minister and I enclose a copy of the letter he sent me on 12th January. I am grateful to him for what he did, but I think it was a pity he found it necessary to say that "Embassies are not debt collecting agencies". Of course I never at any time asked the Embassy to collect this debt, but if Embassies are not there to advise small exporters who cannot get paid, I do not know what they are there for at all.

On 1st March Mr Ashworth, the "Personal Adviser" to the Minister, wrote to me apologising for the fact that I had not had any money, and saying that I should be receiving it very soon. I enclose a copy of his letter. However, I still have not had a penny.

£2,000 is a great deal of money to me and the endless delays and unfulfilled promises have made me ill with frustration and worry. I think it is monstrous that the Oman Government should have so little sense of decency as simply to fail to pay for work that has been carried out for them and if there is any way in which you can bring home to them their obligations to behave honourably I should be most grateful.

With good wishes for a successful trip.

Yours sincerely

Jo Harrison (Mrs)

Encs.



BRITISH EMBASSY
MUSCAT

12 January 1981

Mrs Jo Harrison
10 Garway Road
London W2

Dear Mrs Harrison,

In the course of a meeting on 11 January with the Minister of Information, I was able to raise the question of the money which is owed to you.

Mr Rowas said that he was prepared to sign an authority to pay if this were presented to him in the form of a document referring simply to services rendered to the Ministry. What he would not do was to sign anything so detailed as an invoice. I think that this is probably a matter of "face" which, as you know, is always an important consideration in this part of the world.

I understood from the Minister that instructions on the above lines had been telexed by Mr Ashworth to Mr Johnston.

I therefore hope that this will see a satisfactory conclusion to your problem. I really do not think that we can do more: Embassies are not debt collecting agencies, and it is only in exceptional circumstances that I would be prepared to approach a Minister on such a matter.

Yours sincerely,
I T M Lucas

I T M Lucas

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Sultanate of Oman

Ministry of Information & Youth Affairs

P. O. Box 600
Cable : Information
Telex : MB 3265
MUSCAT



سلطنة عُمان

وزارة الاعلام وشؤون الشباب

ص.ب : ٦٠٠
برقيا : الاعلام
تلکس : ٣٢٦٥ أمبي
مسقط

Ref.: Misc. p/o
Date: 1st March 1981.

الإشارة

التاريخ

Ms. JO Harrison
10 Garway Road
London W2
ENGLAND.

After Compliments

Thank you for your letter of the 16th February. I am indeed sorry that you have been kept waiting so long for the matter of your account to be settled, but I am informed that this is now definitely in train and that you should be receiving a communication from the Ministry's Finance Department very soon, if you have not already done so by the time you receive this letter.

Your sincerely

Anthony Ashworth

ANTHONY ASHWORTH
PERSONAL ADVISER TO H.E. THE MINISTER

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CONFIDENTIAL



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Prime Minister

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PRIME MINISTER

OMAN

Further to my minute of earlier today about the Middle East, I thought it worth reporting to you separately on my visit to Oman. This is both because of your own impending visit and because Oman is, in terms of its strategic importance and its defence relationship with us, unique.

2. Taking the broader picture first, the Omanis are keen to make clear that they have little sympathy with other Arab countries on the Arab/Israel issue, and little patience with the Palestinian cause. This attitude is directly reflected in their view of the Soviet threat to the area, which they put first, and to potential United States involvement e.g. through the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which they support. It shows also in their approach to recent cautious moves towards Gulf co-operation. Here they are pressing, against what they admit to be considerable reluctance on the part of some of their Gulf partners, for that co-operation to cover security and defence. This is not to say that they do not recognise the sensitivities of their fellow Arabs over the Palestinian question or their own need not to get too evidently far out of line. Thus their support for US involvement in the area extends to providing facilities but not, and clearly not, to the acceptance of what could be seen as United States bases in their country (they were quite clear that the US would only have access to stores and equipment on the ground with the explicit permission of Oman and that any logistic bases would be jointly manned).

3. Secondly, the Omanis' historical association with us and the major part we now play in the development of their armed services face us with special opportunities and responsibilities. The opportunities lie to some extent in influencing the Sultan's policy, though it is important not to over-estimate our capacity to achieve this. They also clearly lie in the scope for defence sales. We have recently sold them Jaguar, Rapier and fast patrol boats and are well forward in plans to meet their new requirements for main battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers. (They have, in fact, agreed to lease 12 Chieftains pending a decision on a possible purchase of 30 Chieftains).



The Omanis raised with me the question of better credit arrangements for future defence sales and I am looking at this before your visit. We must, of course, guard against the risk that the Sultan devotes too high a proportion of his resources to military expenditure, thus storing up trouble for him and us in the longer term. At the same time we must recognise that if we do not sell when the Sultan wants to buy he will almost certainly go elsewhere, particularly to the Americans who are looking for an entree into this valuable market. Several of his Ministers are, for personal financial reasons, pushing the American cause and we must fend them off.

4. In terms of responsibilities it was made clear to me that the Omanis expect our continuing involvement in providing Loan Service Personnel (LSP). Acquisition of new equipment will increase this need. I have said that we will look at their proposals as sympathetically as we can, given our own needs and resource problems and the longer term requirement to maintain the momentum towards "Omanisation". I have also suggested the need both for regular discussions with them and for a degree of forward planning to be communicated to us, so that we can take their future requirements into account both for LSP and for places on training courses in this country. I think this will improve matters.

5. Perhaps more fundamentally the Omanis are anxious to have some specific commitment from us about what we would do if they were attacked. I expect they will press you on this. We need to be careful here. I have made clear to them that while our major defence commitment is in the NATO area, we do have forces that we can use flexibly elsewhere if the need arises. We might want to do so with our friends, such as the United States, in areas where our help is sought. But we cannot commit ourselves to precise contingency plans in advance. Meanwhile we shall continue our assistance in the way of training and the provision of LSP, and seize the opportunities offered for the peacetime deployment of ships, soldiers and aircraft on training missions.

6. Finally, you will be warmly received in Oman. There is great sympathy for us here and we preserve a good deal of influence. As you know the Sultan has asked for a named officer to fill the new post of Chief of the Defence Staff. I am not convinced that the particular proposal is a wise one but we are hardly in a position to refuse, if the officer wishes to take it. We shall have to watch particularly carefully the way in which American influence in the country develops, and so to ensure that it does not conflict with ours. We shall encourage, on responsible terms, the defence sales opportunities available to

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us, and make use of every Omani offer to persuade their Gulf partners to "standardize" on our equipment.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; the other members of OD; the Secretary of State for Industry; and Sir Robert Armstrong.

SN

Ministry of Defence

2nd April 1981



Prime Minister (2)

MO 25/2/10/2

MS.

Amul

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

I visited a number of states in the Middle East between 23rd March and 1st April - Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. In every case a major effort had been made to make me welcome both in terms of the elaborate ceremonial which accompanied the visit and in the fact that Rulers and their immediate family were all available for talks. I am minuting you separately about Oman, but I would like to report to you the main impressions I formed overall.

2. All the countries I visited perceived the threat from Soviet adventurism. In resisting this they know they must rely primarily on themselves - and they want to - but they made it clear that they were looking to the West, primarily to the United States and ourselves, for help. There is, however, a high degree of ambivalence; sections of the press are clearly highly suspicious of the West's motives. Businessmen, including younger Ministers, prefer not to think too much about an external threat while they are putting away their fortunes and generally whilst they want to feel that the West will protect them should the need arise. There is also a high propensity to wish the threat away. In some Gulf states this was expressed as a determination not to allow the area to become an area of conflict between the super powers. When asked about their attitude towards Afghanistan there is a tendency to suggest that the Afghan freedom fighters were teaching the Russians a substantial lesson! I



do not doubt that the Rulers want our help but they clearly feel under some pressure to play along with woolly concepts such as "zones of peace".

3. Following the Taif conference the practice and means of regional co-operation are much enhanced and I think that this co-operation may in due course be extended into the military sphere (as Oman is already clear that it should be). But it would be unwise to rush the defence aspects of co-operation too hard at this early stage.

4. The Gulf states fully understand the limited nature of the direct military help the United Kingdom could give in an emergency, but they still welcomed the prospect of such help. We have a historic connection and do for them quietly things at which the British Services excell. They welcomed British military assistance in terms of the provision of Loan Service Personnel (LSP) and training in the UK and the receipt of a wide range of military advice. They would like to see some increase of this, often, but not only, in connection with the purchase of British equipment. It is clear that our help must be continued for a number of years. I am reviewing our policy on LSP with the aim of making it possible for us to meet requests more readily and to have personnel in post longer.

5. I should comment on the misunderstandings arising from your brief comments about the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in Washington. The Gulf states appreciate that in a major emergency only the United States would have the clout to resist Soviet aggression and that we would be merely a small part of such a response. But in a way there is something to be said for us talking in terms of independent support simply because there is a feeling that we understand them better than the United States and are less likely to embarrass them with their own public opinion.

6. It was clear that the sale of British defence equipment is



going well and that the market is well disposed towards us. Indeed there is still a strong predilection for us in preference to the French. I hope that my visit went some way in enhancing our prospects and we will put some specific possibilities to you in the context of your own impending visit. I recommend that you do not "tick off" a shopping list of items but concentrate your remarks, where appropriate, on Hawk and Rapier. I believe for instance that we are very far down the road to a £300M order for Rapier in Qatar and the Crown Prince in Dubai confirmed that he would like to order 8 Hawks (although other potential orders particularly the Saudi one are much larger). The difficulty is to get the Hawk sales actually started and I am commissioning a special paper on this subject and will let you know the results before your departure.

7. We must, however, recognise that without recourse to the "Arab methods" employed by the French and by our major competitors, we will, of necessity, always be at some disadvantage. To be really sure of gaining contracts in this region one has not only to demonstrate the quality of equipment and to offer competitive prices and delivery dates, but also to give cause for the right individual to see personal advantage in their negotiation. The French indulge their Middle Eastern customers to a range of physical, financial and proprietorial pleasures which would be outside our Parliamentary sanctions - and these practices pay. Indeed two years in my previous appointment led me to the sorry conclusion that in the project business, orders are increasingly won by those who give them away, or bribe them away.

8. As you will be aware the constant theme of every Arab nation is the Palestinian issue. There is little doubt that the Gulf Rulers while understanding that in some ways the UK has a bridge building role between the United States and Europe on this issue

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This is a pretty selfphic paragraph. But what I think Mr. Nott is trying to say is that it would be nice if we would adopt as "forward" a policy as the French but that he recognizes we can't!

still express intense frustration at our reluctance to lead.

There is a widespread appreciation that the French are out in front. I am not too sure that if the United Kingdom were to detach itself from our European and American Allies in order to make a major advance in favour of the Palestinians that this would enhance our prestige and sales in the Gulf states although it would certainly make us popular. The Saudis in particular play on this issue above all others and its importance cannot be underrated in Ministerial visits to the region. ←
Phd

9. I feel that the most important impression for you to give on your trip will be that there is a new attitude on the part of HMG towards the Gulf. The previous Government (which was by implication under some criticism at several meetings) was reluctant to take too positive a line in the Gulf for a variety of political reasons. On the other hand since the Conservatives came to power we have stepped up enormously the number of visits and have shown an enthusiasm for assistance which the states in the region see as being new. I see every advantage in emphasising that under your leadership we want to make a new start. Incidentally your own personal stock is extremely high among the Rulers of the Gulf and King Khalid in particular expressed a high degree of enthusiasm about your achievements.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary; the other members of OD; the Secretary of State for Industry; and Sir Robert Armstrong.

JW

Ministry of Defence

2nd April 1981

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Foreign Office

JS



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 April 1981

Dear Sir Reginald,

Thank you for your two letters of 31 March about my forthcoming visit to the Gulf. I intend to take a major interest in commercial matters during my visit, and your letters will form an extremely useful part of my briefing. I am most grateful to you for having written.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

Sir Reginald Smith

JS



JS

cc 720

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

1 April 1981

BF 8.4.81

- with PM

I enclose copies of two letters which the Prime Minister has received from the Chairman of Wimpey about her visit to the Gulf. I shall be including Sir Reginald Smith's letters in the Prime Minister's briefing. It would, of course, be useful to have any comments that your Department feels inclined to offer.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, to Francis Richards (FCO).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stuart Hampson, Esq.,
Department of Trade.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

31 March 1981

Type for PR's
Signature

Handwritten initials

Dear Michael,

Neil Clynton-Reed: Detained in Saudi Arabia

I attach a draft reply to the letter of 16 March from the Rt Hon Maurice Macmillan MP to the Prime Minister as requested in your letter of 18 March, together with essential facts.

Mr Macmillan also wrote letters to Mr Hurd on 16 and 17 March with which he enclosed copies of the same correspondence he sent to the Prime Minister, as well as copies of correspondence from Mr Clynton-Reed's employers. We agreed that the Prime Minister's reply should also cover points raised in these letters.

Both Mr Clynton-Reed's father and the wife of his ex-employer ask the Prime Minister to raise his case with the Saudi authorities with a view to securing his release from prison. Mr Hurd has looked carefully into this and other cases with officials.

There seem to be no grounds for the Prime Minister's intervention other than family distress, which I am afraid is a normal consequence of punishment for offences. If the Prime Minister intervened every time that the conviction of a Briton overseas causes distress to the family, there would be no end to it. I understand that Mr Clynton-Reed is about thirty, so one cannot argue that he is simply a callow, misguided youth.

There is, however, another aspect of Mr Clynton-Reed's case which we have asked the Embassy in Jeddah to bring to the attention of the Saudi authorities, that of his conditions of imprisonment. Mr Clynton-Reed is detained separately from other British prisoners in a wing where there is no air conditioning and where there are a number of foreign prisoners serving sentences for such crimes as murder. Until recently Mr Clynton-Reed accepted that he should remain where he was as he was with four other British prisoners. These have now left and we hope that the Embassy will be able to arrange for him to be moved.

Mr Clynton-Reed is due to be released in about six months time if the Saudi authorities decide to award him the normal one quarter remission of his sentence: the maximum allowed.

Yours ever,

Francis Richards
(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing St



DRAFT: [RE-DRAFTED BY MR HURD]
minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: **TEL. NO:**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:
The Rt Hon Maurice Macmillan MP,
House of Commons,
London SW1.

Your Reference

Copies to:

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.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 16 March enclosing copies of correspondence from Brigadier Clynton-Reed, of Shortheath Beacon, Shortheath, Farnham, Surrey, about his son, Neil, who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. You ask me to request his release and wrote in similar terms to Douglas Hurd.

I fully understand how distressing Brigadier and Mrs Clynton-Reed must find their son's imprisonment. During my forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia I will be discussing a wide range of topics and I expect that there will be an opportunity to refer to the general problems of British citizens who are in prison there. However, there appear to be no grounds on which I could make a specific plea for clemency on Mr Clynton-Reed's behalf. I gather that he can expect to be released in about six months if he is given the usual one quarter remission of his sentence.

I was concerned to learn of the conditions of Mr Clynton-Reed's imprisonment. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office have ~~now~~ instructed the Embassy in Jedda to ask the Saudi authorities to move him to another wing of the prison so that he can again be with other British prisoners.

I am returning the enclosures to your letter.

bcc: JEDDA

Enclosures—flag(s).....

ESSENTIAL FACTS

NEIL CLYNTON-REED DETAINED IN SAUDI ARABIA

1. Arrested on 2 April 1980 as entered Saudi Arabia via Dhahran Airport for possession of two grammes hashish. Employed by Baroid Saudi Arabia.
2. On 11 June sentenced to 50 strokes of the cane. Sentence was subsequently increased (in keeping with sentences on drug offences in Saudi Arabia) to two years imprisonment.
3. Since February 1981 has been the only Westerner in the overcrowded drugs and murder wing of Damman Prison. This includes several convicted murderers.
4. Could be released in October if the Saudi authorities choose to award him the maximum remission allowed (25%).

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 730

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FM DOHA 310648Z MAR 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 84 OF 31 MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK. INFO PRIORITY JEDDA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
MUSCAT, BAHRAIN AND KUWAIT
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD AND UKDEL NATO.

VISIT OF S OF S FOR DEFENCE.

1. MR NOTT HAD A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT HERE (28-9 MARCH), THE MAIN EVENT BEING AN EXCELLENT MEETING IN RESTRICTED SESSION WITH THE AMIR, WHO WAS EXTREMELY RELAXED AND AMICABLE.

2. MAIN POINTS WERE:

(A) THE AMIR WAS LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO THE PM'S VISIT AND SENT WARM GREETINGS.

(B) MR NOTT REITERATED HM GOVERNMENT'S SATISFACTION WITH THE RECENT MOVES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES TOWARDS GREATER CO-OPERATION. HE TOLD THE AMIR OF HIS VERY PROFITABLE TWO DAYS OF TALKS WITH PRINCE SULTAN IN ARABIA, ESPECIALLY OVER SERVICE SECONDMENTS.

(C) THE AMIR SPOKE WARMLY OF UK-QATAR RELATIONS. BRITAIN WAS A HISTORIC FRIEND, WHO HAD STOOD BY QATAR ON MANY OCCASIONS IN THE PAST. HE WELCOMED CO-OPERATION BETWEEN US NOW AT ALL LEVELS. HE ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION MR NOTT'S ASSURANCE THAT WE WOULD NEVER SEEK TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY WITH QATAR'S OWN INTERNAL DISPOSITIONS, BUT THAT IF OUR HELP WAS SOUGHT, WE ARE VERY READY TO GIVE MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE. MRS THATCHER WOULD GO INTO MORE DETAIL ON THIS ASPECT DURING HER TALK WITH THE AMIR. BUT ON THE DEFENCE SIDE, THE ASSISTANCE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF MORE HELP WITH PERSONNEL AND THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT. WE WERE FOLLOWING UP THE PERKINS REPORT WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE, E.G. FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW AIR BASE.

(D) THE AMIR WAS GRATIFIED BY HM GOVERNMENTS APPRECIATION, WHICH MR NOTT CONVEYED, FOR HIS HELPFUL OIL PRODUCTION POLICY FOLLOWING THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR. HE SAID HE FOLLOWED SAUDI POLICY CLOSELY IN THIS RESPECT.

(E) ON AIR DEFENCE, THE AMIR CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THE WAY IS NOW OPEN FOR US TO NEGOTIATE A QATARI PURCHASE OF RAPIER - AN ASSURANCE WHICH HE LATER REPEATED TO ME THROUGH HIS CHEF

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IDE CABINET,

DE CABINET, WHO HAD ATTENDED THE DISCUSSION WITH MR NOTT. HE QUESTIONED MR NOTT ON OUR VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, AND WHETHER WE THOUGHT THE IRANIANS WERE LIKELY NOW TO ATTACK THE GULF STATES. MR NOTT SAID THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR HIM TO FORECAST THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT POWER STRUGGLE IN IRAN. BUT HE HAD HAD DISQUIETING INDICATIONS, FROM HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON THE PREVIOUS WEEK, OF SOVIET ACTIVITY ALONG THE JOINT BORDER WITH IRAN. THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT ANY COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY IN IRAN. WE WERE SURE THAT THEY WOULD INTERFERE IF THEY HAD THE CHANCE. THIS WAS WHY WE THOUGHT IT SO IMPORTANT FOR THE GULF STATES TO CO-OPERATE, BOTH FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEFENCE.

(F) THE AMIR WAS INTERESTED IN TALKS WHICH THE IRAQI DEPUTY PM HAD HAD IN LONDON: MR NOTT REFERRED TO OUR DECISION NOT SUPPLY QUOTE LETHAL UNQUOTE EQUIPMENT TO IRAQ AS LONG AS THE THE WAR CONTINUED.

3. MR NOTT AMPLIFIED HM GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THE SUPPLY OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT, AND THE SECONDMENT OF LOAN SERVICE PERSONNEL, AT A FULLER MEETING AT GHQ WITH SHAIKH HAMAD, THE HEIR APPARENT, MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND C-IN-C, AND HIS SENIOR OFFICERS. MR NOTT UNDERTOOK TO DO ALL HE COULD TO ENSURE THAT THE PRICES OFFERED BY UK FIRMS FOR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT WERE REASONABLE, AND DELIVERY SATISFACTORY, AND TO RESOLVE ANY PROBLEMS OVER THE SECONDMENT OF PERSONNEL. THESE ASSURANCES WERE VERY WELCOME TO THE QATARI SIDE: WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING UP AS NECESSARY. ON RAPIER, SHAIKH HAMAD SAID GHQ WAS STILL STUDYING BAE'S LATEST OFFER, PRESENTED LAST WEEK - GHQ WOULD CONTACT ME WHEN THEY HAD APPRAISED THE OFFER.

4. MR NOTT ASKED THAT THE PM SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS TALKS HERE. A FULLER ACCOUNT FOLLOWS BY TONIGHTS' CONFIDENTIAL BAG. IN DEFERENCE TO HIS HOSTS' INCLINATIONS, HE GAVE NO INTERVIEWS TO THE MEDIA.

5. I SHALL PURSUE THE RAPIER OFFER WITH GHQ, TO KEEP THE QATARIS UP TO THE MARK ON THE AMIR'S PROMISE. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT WAS HELPFUL - DESPITE MY EARLIER DOUBTS ON THIS SCORE - FOR THE CHAIRMAN AND SALES DIRECTOR OF BAE TO HAVE BEEN HERE FOR MR NOTT'S VISIT, AND TO HAVE JOINED MY DINNER FOR HIM AND THE QATARIS. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF WE COULD NOW ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT - OR AT LEAST A FIRM COMMITMENT - FROM THE QATARIS IN TIME FOR THE PM'S VISIT. WE

2

/ WILL BE

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WILL BE DOING ALL WE CAN TO SECURE THIS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD AND UKDEL NATO.

BRANT

BT

Copies to: 10. Downing St.

LIMITED
DEFENCE D
MED
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A ACLAND
MR P MOBERLY
SIR J GRAHAM
MR J MOBERLY

[REPEATED AS
REQUESTED]

COPIES SENT TO
No 10 DOWNING STREET

3

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George Wimpey Limited Hammersmith Grove London W6 7EN Telephone 01-748 2000

From the office of the Chairman

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

31st March, 1981

Dear Prime Minister

OMAN AND QATAR

I am sure you will be briefed on your forthcoming visit to the Middle East on the various projects which could bring opportunities for major British exports.

You may know one of our wholly owned subsidiaries, British Smelter, have built the \$1.4 billion Aluminium Smelter complex in Dubai which included in excess of \$500 million of British exports.

We have been in very delicate negotiations with the Governments of Oman and Qatar on the possibilities of two Smelter Contracts each in excess of \$1,000 million. The posts are aware of these negotiations and we fear that there may be pressure on their part to publicise these prospects during your visit.

Whilst we understand the reason, we are, however, now in an advanced stage of negotiations with both these countries and my concern is that such publicity should damage our prospects in that it would open the door to foreign competition. We have permanent offices in Bahrein, Dubai, Qatar and Oman.

I thought you should know the present situation.

There is equally a smelter prospect in Abu Dhabi where confidentiality is not paramount, and I am enclosing a separate letter on this subject.

Yours sincerely
R. B. Smith

(Sir Reginald Smith)





George Wimpey Limited Hammersmith Grove London W6 7EN Telephone 01-748 2000

From the office of the Chairman

The Right Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London, S.W.1.

Dear Prime Minister

31st March, 1981

ABU DHABI

With the strong support of our partners in Dubai, the Al-Futtaim Group of Companies and a leading American company - Southwire, have had discussions with the Government of Abu Dhabi regarding an Aluminium Smelter. I have received a copy of a letter from Southwire to Mr. Keith Haskell, Consul General, Dubai, and I believe that the copy attached is worth your attention.

Whilst these kind of negotiations will take some time, I am of the opinion that for sound commercial and political reasons a great deal of the manufacturing and construction content is likely to be placed with British firms.

I would be most grateful for any support you may be able to lend during your forthcoming visit to Abu Dhabi and hasten to assure you that the company of Al Futtaim Wimpey will do their very best to secure this project with consequent benefit to British export interests.

Yours sincerely
R.B. Smith

(Sir Reginald Smith)





JF #

Mr. M. BROWN
(Obsea Ltd)

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 March 1981

Overdue

check pl

- emphasis) need to get it before India

9/4

I enclose a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from Michael Brown, MP.

I would be grateful for a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Brown, to reach us here by Wednesday 8 April.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Roderic Lyne (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Stuart Hampson, Esq.,
Department of Trade.

H/C



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 March 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 24 March.

I will place this before the Prime Minister and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

Michael Brown, Esq., MP.

Ref. A04576

MR ALEXANDER

for Policy
Top copy on
India: Jan 81 Visit
Policy

Prime Minister's Visits to the Gulf and India: Briefing

The Prime Minister is to hold briefing meetings for these two visits on Monday 6 April at 3.00 pm (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf) and on Thursday 9 April at 4.00 pm (India). The briefs for both visits will be available by close of play on Friday 3 April.

2. You will wish to consider who should attend these two meetings and I should be grateful for your comments on the following proposals:-

Briefing Meeting for the Gulf

Secretary of State for Energy

Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Hurd)

Sir Michael Palliser

Sir Frank Cooper

Sir Donald Maitland

Sir John Graham + *Sir Ronald Ellis*

The Secretary of State for Defence (who will have returned from his own visit to the Gulf on 1 April) would have wished to attend the briefing meeting but is committed to accompanying the US Defence Secretary on visits which he will be making in Britain on 6 April. Later that day, Mr Nott is to go to Bonn for a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group and will not be back before the afternoon of Wednesday 8 April. You may wish to consider whether to invite Lord Trenchard to attend the briefing meeting in Mr Nott's absence. Alternatively, it might be more appropriate to arrange for Mr Nott to have a separate meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss his visit with her.

Briefing Meeting for India

Secretary of State for Trade

Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Blaker)

Sir Michael Palliser

Sir Peter Preston

Sir Kenneth Clucas

Sir John Thomson

Sir Ronald Ellis

Sir John Graham

As requested the Secretary of State for Trade has been asked to arrive 15 minutes early for this briefing meeting.

3. If these proposals are acceptable, I will arrange for those involved to be notified.

D. J. WRIGHT

D J WRIGHT

27 March 1981



10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

This letter from Michael Brown is about the work which Fred Olsen Limited is doing in seeking contracts in the UAE.

We will let you have a draft.

MAP

27 March 1981

From: Michael Brown MP

R27/B

See 10



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

24th March 1981

Rt Hon Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP
The Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
10 Downing Street
Whitehall
London S.W.1.

Dear Prime Minister,

I understand that you are shortly to visit the United Arab Emirates and I am wondering if I might take the opportunity of drawing your attention to the excellent work which Fred. Olsen Limited is doing in seeking contracts for the Zakum Field.

You will be aware that Fred. Olsen Limited is a British Company active in North Sea Oil related industries, such as heavy fabrication, supply services and design and project management, through its operating subsidiaries in Aberdeen, Lerwick and Stornoway.

With their Aberdeen company, they have become the major hook up contractor in the North Sea, winning six out of the last seven contracts awarded in the past two years, including the only one in the Danish sector of the North Sea. This is a part of the construction activity in the North Sea which was once dominated by the by-American contractors, Brown and Root and McDermotts. Fred. Olsen Limited are the only British company tendering for the hook-up contract for the Zakum Field. This is of particular significance because the first phase of the contract is valued at some \$50 million, and as yet no major British offshore oil-related operator has established a firm hold in the Gulf.

Abu Dhabi is the dominant centre for heavy fabricating services in the Gulf, and Fred. Olsen's main competitors are ETPM (French), McDermotts (American), Brown and Root (American) and the local national enterprise, NPCC. All of these competitors have their yards in Abu Dhabi, though Fred. Olsen has organised a facility by arrangement with the established West German company, Admac.

The first phase of the contract is expected to be followed by three more of a similar size and the achievement of this contract would create about 125 jobs overseas for Britons, and about a dozen in the U.K.

If/

If Fred. Olsen Limited is successful in tendering for this contract, it will be a prime example of exporting expertise and technical ability, which you have tried to encourage, and would put them in a position to bid for future large turn key operations.

I have the pleasure of being the Parliamentary Consultant to K.H. Publicity Ltd, who act for Fred. Olsen Limited, and I felt sure that you would wish to be aware of their work prior to your visit, in the hope that if you have any trade discussions, it might be possible for you to discuss this matter.

Yours ever,

Michael.



10 DOWNING STREET

24th March, 1981

Top copy with PM's marking

*p/w briefs etc
for S. Arabia*

SALE OF METEOROLOGICAL BALLOONS - SAUDI ARABIA.

Thank you very much for your letter of 23rd March, with which you enclosed two copies of your fascinating catalogues. *in H.M. attached*

I have handed your letter and its enclosures to the Prime Minister and she will certainly bear this matter very much in mind during her forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia.

With best wishes,

Ian Gow, M.P.
Parliamentary Private Secretary.

T.W. Haslam, Esq.



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TWH/MB

23rd March, 1981

Ian Gow Esq., MP
Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London,

Dear Mr Gow,

Sale of Meteorological Balloons - Saudi Arabia

You may recall I wrote to you on 6th December, 1979 asking whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister to open our new meteorological balloon manufacturing factory at Bury but unfortunately she was unable to do this. The building is now completed and in full production.

I have read in the Press that the Prime Minister is to make a visit to Saudi Arabia in the near future and I am writing to enquire whether it would be possible for the Prime Minister to mention our products to the Saudi Arabian Authorities.

We lost this contract last year owing to that infamous film which appeared on I.T.V.

We are the only Company in the United Kingdom making these products so we are not seeking to gain any advantage over other British Companies. Our only competitors in the world markets are Delacoste & Co. of France, The Weather Balloon Co. and Totex Corporation, both of Japan.

Apart from supplying the British Ministry of Defence the whole of our production is exported and we would be most grateful for any assistance the Prime Minister could render on our behalf.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing two of our catalogues which you will note are printed in Arabic apart from other languages. *- in files attached.*

Yours sincerely,

T.W. Haslam

T.W. Haslam
Deputy Chairman



file KPs
ref

CF.

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1981

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 3 March about your husband who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. Mrs. Thatcher fully understands how worrying this situation must be for you.

You ask in your letter whether the Prime Minister during her forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia could intercede to try to bring about the early release of your husband. As you know, your husband was arrested for breaking the law of Saudi Arabia and was tried and sentenced in accordance with that law. The Prime Minister will be discussing a wide range of topics during her visit and I expect that she will take an opportunity to refer to the general problems of UK citizens who are in prison in Saudi Arabia. However, there would appear to be no grounds on which she could make a specific plea for clemency on your husband's behalf and I cannot therefore assure you that his individual case will be raised. An amnesty such as resulted in the release of American prisoners recently is entirely at the discretion of the Saudi authorities.

I am sorry if you find this disappointing. Consular officers of the British Embassy at Jeddah will continue to visit your husband regularly and will do all they properly can to help him during this difficult time. I understand that you are in close touch with them.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Mrs. Muriel Bate.

sh



This is a copy. The original has been extracted and closed, 65 1/2 year.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

For my signature

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1981

Paul

Dear Michael,

Edwin Bate

I attach a draft reply to Mrs Bate's letter of 3 March to the Prime Minister, together with Essential Facts on the case as requested in your letter of 9 March.

We are considering whether there are any consular cases or any general consular points which we should want to recommend that the Prime Minister might raise during her visit to Saudi Arabia. We shall consider whether to include Mr Bate's name in any such recommendation, but there appear to be no grounds for intervention on his behalf. Contrary to Mrs Bate's claim in her letter, Mr Bate was convicted of possession and manufacture of alcohol. *

Yours ever,

Francis Richards

(F N Richards)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

~

65
Passage deleted and closed, 1/2 years,
under FOI Exemption.

Wayland

13 October 2011

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

PS

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

TO:

Your Reference

Mrs M Bate
 c/o Dr Michael Taylor
 Saudi Medical Centre
 Jedda
 Saudi Arabia

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

SUBJECT:

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 3 March about your husband who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. Mrs Thatcher fully understands how worrying this situation must be for you.

You ask in your letter whether the Prime Minister during her forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia could intercede to try to bring about the early release of your husband. As you know, your husband was arrested for breaking the law of Saudi Arabia and was tried and sentenced in accordance with that law. The Prime Minister will be discussing a wide range of topics during her visit and I expect that she will take an opportunity to refer to the general problems of UK citizens who are in prison in Saudi Arabia. However, there would appear to be no grounds on which she could make a specific plea for clemency on your husband's behalf and I cannot therefore assure you that his individual case will be raised. An amnesty such as resulted in the release of American prisoners recently is entirely at the discretion of the Saudi authorities.

/I am

Enclosures—flag(s).....

I am sorry if you find this disappointing. Consular officers of the British Embassy at Jedda will continue to visit your husband regularly and will do all they properly can to help him during this difficult time. I understand that you are in close touch with them.

This is a copy. The original
has been extracted and
closed, 46 years.
65

ESSENTIAL FACTS

EDWIN BATE DETAINED IN SAUDI ARABIA

1. Arrested on 6 November 1980 in Jeddah for possessing a still and ingredients for producing alcohol. Employed by Saudi National Airline. Wife resident in Jeddah.
2. Paragraph deleted and closed, ⁶⁵ 46 years, under FOI Exemption. *Wayland*
13 October 2011
3. Appeared in court on 9 February 1981 and was found guilty of consumption, possession and manufacture of alcohol. Sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, deportation and 49 strokes.
4. Has been visited regularly by Vice Consul from Embassy in Jeddah since his arrest. Wife visits twice weekly.
5. Embassy officials at present looking into whether remission scheme (which allows for a maximum 25% remission) applies to sentences of a year or less. If so, Bate could possibly be released in August.

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*Foreign
Office*

Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London SW1

PS(81) 6

23rd March 1981

Dear Private Secretary,

Prime Minister's Visit to Saudi Arabia and The Gulf::
19th-25th April 1981

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the Prime Minister's visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf from 19th to 25th April.

The objectives for the visit, as approved by the Prime Minister, are at Annex A. The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex B. Instructions on format are at Annexes C and D. Those preparing briefs should note carefully the details on the format of briefs set out in Annex C, particularly (b) on the structure of briefs.

70 copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready, and should in any event arrive no later than 12.00 noon on Friday, 3rd April. They should be addressed to Mrs. M. Wagner in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Frank Cooper, Sir Kenneth Clucas, Sir Peter Carey, Sir Donald Maitland, Sir Peter Preston, Sir Patrick Nairne, Sir Kenneth Couzens and Mr. Robin Ibbs, and to Michael Alexander, No.10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) D. J. WRIGHT

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF
19th-25th APRIL 1981

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

General

1. To demonstrate the importance we attach to our relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq/Iran war.
2. To affirm that the Ten will pursue seriously their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a just and lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute, as a complement to the activity of the United States, which alone has the power to bring about such a settlement.
3. To establish the degree of common interest within which to pursue political, economic and defence co-operation.
4. To encourage the Gulf States to continue to look to us as an old friend, while we both recognise that the United States must carry the main burden and have a special role in the defence of the region against Soviet expansion.
5. To reaffirm Britain's support within her limited means for the Gulf States' efforts to improve their own defence and security and to indicate areas where we can give practical assistance (e.g. Loan Service Personnel (LSP), training assistance and advice; deployment of Royal Navy ships; security of oil installations; provision of advanced defence equipment; co-operation with Arab aspirations eventually to construct a local industrial base, capable of local assembly and/or manufacture of equipment as a result of the gradual transfer of technology).
6. Thereby to give a strong boost to our efforts to secure a major share of contracts in the fields of defence sales, oil and gas development, civil engineering, medical and health co-operation.
7. To probe Gulf States' thinking about their recent moves towards closer co-operation.
8. To discuss ways in which we can co-operate, especially with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to combat Soviet influence in the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
9. To ensure that Gulf oil production and pricing policies are such as to stabilise the world oil market; and to demonstrate the constructive role of the United Kingdom as a producer and consumer.

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10. To encourage recognition by Gulf producers of their shared responsibility for helping to alleviate the problems of the world economy, especially as they affect the poorer developing countries, perhaps by making more of their surpluses available directly for the development of such countries.

Saudi Arabia

11. To demonstrate the importance we attach to closer consultation with the Saudis on urgent global and regional issues.

12. To express privately our support for Saudi moves to promote security co-operation with their Gulf neighbours and explain how these policies relate to each other and to local security co-operation.

13. To give a boost to our increasingly substantial bilateral relationship; economic co-operation, trade, health, education, defence assistance and equipment sales - and to examine ways of extending this.

14. To endorse the establishment of the Joint Committee on cultural relations as an earnest of our attempt to improve mutual understanding, especially in respect of the media, but to avoid exaggerated expectations.

15. To encourage Saudi aid for pro-Western Governments in the developing world, especially Zimbabwe.

16. To express appreciation of the contribution to the stability of the West's energy supplies made by Saudi Arabia in increasing oil production to make up for losses resulting from the Gulf war and the hope that this helpful policy will continue.

17. To support British oil companies' efforts to gain access to Saudi crude.

UAE

18. To dispel any remaining doubts in Abu Dhabi about the importance we attach to co-operation with the Emirates which will be reconfirmed by a statement that we regard our treaty of friendship as continuing in force.

19. To promote the sale to the Abu Dhabi Air Force of the British Aerospace Hawk trainer aircraft (if no decision has been taken on purchase) and to place it in the context of sales of further aircraft (Jaguar and Tornado) to meet future requirements.

20. To foster a continued role for British oil companies and experts.

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Oman

21. To reassure the Sultan of our determination to match Omani defence requirements with LSP assistance, training and equipment, while emphasising the importance we attach to progress towards Omanisation of the Sultanate's armed forces.
22. To discuss the growing United States involvement in Oman and stress the need to preserve the benefits of the longer-standing United Kingdom/Oman relationship.
23. To soothe the Omanis over the cutback in our aid programme, while underlining that some aid (especially training) will continue, although the overall British financial contribution will be less.
24. To encourage in the Sultan a greater realisation that his defence depends as much on internal developments and the satisfaction of the reasonable aspirations of his people as on military hardware.

Qatar

25. To reinforce our bilateral relations by demonstrating at the highest political level Britain's interest in and sympathy for Qatar's development; to make it clear privately that we regard the treaty of friendship as continuing in force, and are happy to do so.
26. To demonstrate our keen interest in participating in Qatar's development in all fields: especially re-equipping Qatar's armed forces and the development of the country's hydrocarbon resources; to give a boost to major British bids (Rapier for the first; BP and/or Shell for the second; Ewbank for the new power station).

PROBABLE ARAB OBJECTIVES

General

1. To find out where Britain stands on the Arab/Israel dispute and in particular to try to pin us down to independent initiatives matching their hopes but beyond our capacity (or interest) to perform.
2. To underline their objections to the region becoming an area of super power confrontation.
3. While welcoming privately our assurances of support in matters of defence and security, to remind us that too visible a Western military presence or too public a declaration of support is likely to provoke attempts by the Soviet Union at closer involvement in the area, as well as an adverse reaction in the region with its large Palestinian/Northern Arab immigrant population.

4. To establish how far we are willing to enter into collaborative ventures with them involving the transfer of technology, particularly in the field of defence equipment.

Saudi Arabia

5. To demonstrate to their fellow Arab leaders and their own public opinion that their moderate stand on regional and energy issues bring dividends in the form of effective co-operation with major Western countries.
6. To enlist our help in securing changed attitudes in the United States towards the Middle East.
7. To encourage a forthright approach to the Afghanistan problem and support for Pakistan and her Afghan refugees.
8. To enlist our support at the IMF for observer status for the PLO and for a revised quota for Saudi Arabia.
9. To press for improved investment opportunities in the West for their financial surpluses.

Oman

10. To seek an assurance of Britain's willingness to underwrite Oman's security and to help in meeting her increased defence requirements.
11. To take advantage of the visit to enhance the Sultan's image as a statesman both at home and abroad.

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE GULF
19th-25th APRIL 1981

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
<u>General</u>			
1.	Steering Brief	FCO	
2.	Defence Policy in the Gulf (to include the Rapid Deployment Force)	MOD	FCO
3.	Gulf Co-operation and Gulf Security	FCO	MOD Trade
4.	Defence Sales (to include a note on those projects to which the Prime Minister might give a boost)	MOD	FCO
5.	Trade (to include a note on those projects to which the Prime Minister might give a boost)	Trade	FCO Industry
6.	Health Co-operation	DHSS	FCO Trade
7.	International Economic and Monetary Questions (including North/South Dialogue)	Treasury	FCO Trade Industry Energy
8.	Energy Questions	Energy	Treasury FCO

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	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
9.	Regional Questions: (i) Arab/Israel (ii) Iraq/Iran War (iii) Afghanistan (iv) Euro/Arab Dialogue (v) Egypt (vi) Iran (vii) Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	FCO	
<u>Saudi Arabia</u>			
10.	Bilateral Political, Cultural and Economic Questions (to include the Joint Committee on Cultural Relations)	FCO	MOD Trade Industry Treasury DHSS British Council
11.	Saudi Arabia and IMF	Treasury	
12.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	
<u>UAE</u>			
13.	Bilateral Political, Economic and Cultural Issues (to include renewal of the Treaty of Friendship)	FCO	MOD Trade Industry Treasury DHSS British Council

CONFIDENTIAL

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
14.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	
<u>Oman</u>			
15.	Bilateral Political, Economic and Cultural Issues (to include the five-year plan, our aid programme and British Council activities)	FCO ODA	Trade Industry Treasury British Council
16.	Bilateral Defence Relationship	MOD	FCO
17.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	
<u>Qatar</u>			
18.	Bilateral Political, Economic and Cultural Issues (to include renewal of the Treaty of Friendship)	FCO	MOD Trade Industry Treasury DHSS British Council
19.	Historical; Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex D. Those preparing briefs should pay particular attention to ensuring that the following instructions are fully observed:

Content

- (a) Briefs should be concise. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.
- (b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.
- (c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained with all the information required on that particular subject. Briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.

Layout

- (d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.
- (e) As shown in the specimen at Annex D, the top page only of each brief should contain the following details: the symbol and number of the brief in the top left-hand corner (e. g. PMVK(81) 10) with the date of production below; a copy number in red at the top right-hand corner; the visit heading; the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible.
- (f) At the foot of the last page and on the left-hand side, briefs should bear the name of the originating Government Department and the date of origin.

Reproduction

- (g) Briefs should be reproduced throughout on white paper, with each page bearing a security classification at top and bottom (as in Annex D). Care should be taken that the reproduction method employed results in clear readable copies.

- (h) It is important that on arrival at the Cabinet Office, briefs should be complete in all detail - collated, stapled and copy numbered and ready for immediate circulation.

Updating

- (i) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the form described at (e) above, with the brief number (e. g. PMVK(81) 10 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation. Revised briefs and corrigenda should be similarly treated.
- (j) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex B require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.

ANNEX D

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

PMVK(81) [Serial Number as specified in Annex B] COPY NO. [in red]

[Date]

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE GULF: 19th-25th APRIL 1981

[Leave 1½"
margin]

[SUBJECT] [Insert subject in capitals]

Brief by [name of originating Department, eg Foreign and
Commonwealth Office]

[At the foot of the last page:-]
[left-hand side]

[Originating Government Department, eg Foreign and Commonwealth Office
or Department of Industry, not a subordinate section or division]

[Date of origin]

CONFIDENTIAL



*Foreign Policy
File No*

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT
TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 18 March on this subject. She was content with the lists of British objectives and of briefs attached to your minute.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

19 March 1981

CS

CONFIDENTIAL

file SK

18 March 1981

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to thank you for your letter of 16 March.

I will place this before the Prime Minister at once and you will be sent a reply as soon as possible.

N J SANDERS

The Rt. Hon. Maurice Macmillan, M.P.

file BK

M. D. MACMILLAN
(The Clayton - Reed)

18 March 1981

I am enclosing a copy of some correspondence the Prime Minister has received from The Rt. Hon. Maurice Macmillan, MP.

I should be grateful if you could let us have a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Macmillan, to reach us here by Wednesday 1 April.

N J SANDERS

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

RH

CONFIDENTIAL

①

Ref. A04492

MR. ALEXANDER

Prime Minister

Apex Objectives at Flag A +

Yes/No Risk at Flag B ?

Handwritten initials and date: 12/13

Prime Minister's Visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: 19th-25th April

The Prime Minister is to visit Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States of Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar from 19th to 25th April on her way back from visiting India. (In order not to convey the impression that the visit is an appendage to the India trip, arrangements, including briefing, are being kept entirely separate.)

2. The Prime Minister will be able to devote only two working days (i. e. long mornings) and one evening to Saudi Arabia and one day to each of the other States (one-and-a-half for the UAE where she will visit both Abu Dhabi and Dubai). She can expect to have substantive discussions in Saudi Arabia with Crown Prince Fahd (effectively the Prime Minister) and meetings with the Ministers of Defence and Interior and the Commander of the National Guard, and to pay a call on the King; in the UAE, she should have discussions with the President, Shaikh Zaid, and members of his entourage, in Abu Dhabi; and with the Prime Minister, Shaidh Rashid (if he is fit enough) in Dubai; in Oman with Sultan Qaboos and in Qatar with the Amir (Shaikh Khalifa) and his heir apparent. (The Ruler of Qatar is the only one of Mrs. Thatcher's interlocutors whom she has met since becoming Prime Minister.) Where possible, she will have meetings with representatives of the British community. She will be accompanied throughout by Mr. Hurd.

3. This will be the first visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States by a British Prime Minister. It will be much welcomed and will arouse a great deal of interest in the region and world-wide, as well as among our NATO allies. It is designed to demonstrate the degree of importance we attach to our relations with the countries of this region of vital strategic significance for us. It is an area where British influence was once paramount, but where the Prime Minister's visit is needed in order to counteract efforts which our competitors, particularly the French, have been making to secure influence and large contracts.

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4. On the Arab side the main objective will be to discover where Britain stands on the Arab/Israel question. They can also be expected to press the Prime Minister over Britain's association with the Rapid Deployment Force in so far as it affects the Gulf; and to wish to discuss the problems of the region, notably the war between Iraq and Iran, the situation in Iran itself, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

5. The Gulf States were badly shaken by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and worries about their ability to defend themselves have increased further in the light of the current Iraq/Iran war. Last month, the Gulf rulers agreed in Saudi Arabia after months of deliberation to set up machinery which would enable them to co-operate more closely in political and economic matters and from which co-operation on defence and security was not excluded. They will be looking to us for support for their efforts, while warning us of the dangers, as they see them, of a too visible Western military presence and of being seen too publicly to be associated with it. Apart from serving local, and thus indirectly Western, security interests, the practical assistance which we could offer will improve our chances of winning substantial orders for British defence equipment. The aim of the Prime Minister's visit should therefore be to proclaim our determination to maintain a continuing and vigorous interest in the Gulf, to explain the true character of our strategic approach to the Gulf and show how it takes account of - and indeed is designed to advance - Arab interests; and to establish a broad framework of common political, economic and strategic interest within which to pursue enhanced co-operation and then, building on that foundation, to advocate individual British projects as examples of such co-operation. The briefing will cover the projects to which we attach particular importance: e.g. the sale of military aircraft (Tornado and Hawk), air defence systems (e.g. Rapier, the protection of offshore oil installations, the development of the North West dome gas field offshore Qatar, and ARABSAT, on which negotiations may have reached a crucial stage by the time of the Prime Minister's visit. It will also reflect the detailed considerations on these and other bilateral projects set out in

— Mr. Walden's letter of 11th March to you.

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6. I attach at Annex A draft lists of British and probable Saudi/Gulf objectives, and at Annex B a suggested list of briefs, the preparation of which will be coordinated by the Cabinet Office. The objectives have been divided into those common to all the States the Prime Minister is to visit and specific objectives for each individual State. An attempt will be made in the briefing to avoid an overlap between the briefs, but there is bound to be some, given the difference of perspective on some of the key issues amongst the various States. The assessment of the Arabs' objectives is still tentative at this stage and may need to be modified nearer the time of the visit. If you are content with these, I will arrange for the briefs to reach you by midday on Friday, 3rd April.

RAA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

18th March, 1981

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PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF
19th-25th APRIL 1981

UNITED KINGDOM OBJECTIVES

General

1. To demonstrate the importance we attach to our relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq/Iran war.
2. To affirm that the Ten will pursue seriously their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a just and lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute, as a complement to the activity of the United States, which alone has the power to bring about such a settlement.
3. To establish the degree of common interest within which to pursue political, economic and defence co-operation.
4. To encourage the Gulf States to continue to look to us as an old friend, while we both recognise that the United States must carry the main burden and have a special role in the defence of the region against Soviet expansion.
5. To reaffirm Britain's support within her limited means for the Gulf States' efforts to improve their own defence and security and to indicate areas where we can give practical assistance (e.g. Loan Service Personnel (LSP), training assistance and advice; deployment of Royal Navy ships; security of oil installations; provision of advanced defence equipment; co-operation with Arab aspirations eventually to construct a local industrial base, capable of local assembly and/or manufacture of equipment as a result of the gradual transfer of technology).
6. Thereby to give a strong boost to our efforts to secure a major share of contracts in the fields of defence sales, oil and gas development, civil engineering, medical and health co-operation.
7. To probe Gulf States' thinking about their recent moves towards closer co-operation.
8. To discuss ways in which we can co-operate, especially with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to combat Soviet influence in the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
9. To ensure that Gulf oil production and pricing policies are such as to stabilise the world oil market: and to demonstrate the constructive role of the United Kingdom as a producer and consumer.

10. To encourage recognition by Gulf producers of their shared responsibility for helping to alleviate the problems of the world economy, especially as they affect the poorer developing countries, perhaps by making more of their surpluses available directly for the development of such countries.

Saudi Arabia

11. To demonstrate the importance we attach to closer consultation with the Saudis on urgent global and regional issues.

12. To express privately our support for Saudi moves to promote security co-operation with their Gulf neighbours and explain how these policies relate to each other and to local security co-operation.

13. To give a boost to our increasingly substantial bilateral relationship: economic co-operation, trade, health, education, defence assistance and equipment sales - and to examine ways of extending this.

14. To endorse the establishment of the Joint Committee on cultural relations as an earnest of our attempt to improve mutual understanding, especially in respect of the media, but to avoid exaggerated expectations.

15. To encourage Saudi aid for pro-Western Governments in the developing world, especially Zimbabwe.

16. To express appreciation of the contribution to the stability of the West's energy supplies made by Saudi Arabia in increasing oil production to make up for losses resulting from the Gulf war and the hope that this helpful policy will continue.

17. To support British oil companies' efforts to gain access to Saudi crude.

UAE

18. To dispel any remaining doubts in Abu Dhabi about the importance we attach to co-operation with the Emirates which will be reconfirmed by a statement that we regard our treaty of friendship as continuing in force.

19. To promote the sale to the Abu Dhabi Air Force of the British Aerospace Hawk trainer aircraft (if no decision has been taken on purchase) and to place it in the context of sales of further aircraft (Jaguar and Tornado) to meet future requirements.

20. To foster a continued role for British oil companies and experts.

Oman

21. To reassure the Sultan of our determination to match Omani defence requirements with LSP assistance, training and equipment, while emphasising the importance we attach to progress towards Omanisation of the Sultanate's armed forces.
22. To discuss the growing United States involvement in Oman and stress the need to preserve the benefits of the longer-standing United Kingdom/Oman relationship.
23. To soothe the Omanis over the cutback in our aid programme, while underlining that some aid (especially training) will continue, although the overall British financial contribution will be less.
24. To encourage in the Sultan a greater realisation that his defence depends as much on internal developments and the satisfaction of the reasonable aspirations of his people as on military hardware.

Qatar

25. To reinforce our bilateral relations by demonstrating at the highest political level Britain's interest in and sympathy for Qatar's development; to make it clear privately that we regard the treaty of friendship as continuing in force, and are happy to do so.
26. To demonstrate our keen interest in participating in Qatar's development in all fields: especially re-equipping Qatar's armed forces and the development of the country's hydrocarbon resources; to give a boost to major British bids (Rapier for the first; BP and/or Shell for the second; Ewbank for the new power station).

PROBABLE ARAB OBJECTIVES

General

1. To find out where Britain stands on the Arab/Israel dispute and in particular to try to pin us down to independent initiatives matching their hopes but beyond our capacity (or interest) to perform.
2. To underline their objections to the region becoming an area of super power confrontation.
3. While welcoming privately our assurances of support in matters of defence and security, to remind us that too visible a Western military presence or too public a declaration of support is likely to provoke attempts by the Soviet Union at closer involvement in the area, as well as an adverse reaction in the region with its large Palestinian/Northern Arab immigrant population.

4. To establish how far we are willing to enter into collaborative ventures with them involving the transfer of technology, particularly in the field of defence equipment.

Saudi Arabia

5. To demonstrate to their fellow Arab leaders and their own public opinion that their moderate stand on regional and energy issues bring dividends in the form of effective co-operation with major Western countries.

6. To enlist our help in securing changed attitudes in the United States towards the Middle East.

7. To encourage a forthright approach to the Afghanistan problem and support for Pakistan and her Afghan refugees.

8. To enlist our support at the IMF for observer status for the PLO and for a revised quota for Saudi Arabia.

9. To press for improved investment opportunities in the West for their financial surpluses.

Oman

10. To seek an assurance of Britain's willingness to underwrite Oman's security and to help in meeting her increased defence requirements.

11. To take advantage of the visit to enhance the Sultan's image as a statesman both at home and abroad.

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ANNEX B

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE GULF
19th-25th APRIL 1981

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
<u>General</u>			
1.	Steering Brief	FCO	
2.	Defence Policy in the Gulf (to include the Rapid Deployment Force)	MOD	FCO
3.	Gulf Co-operation and Gulf Security	FCO	MOD Trade
4.	Defence Sales (to include a note on those projects to which the Prime Minister might give a boost)	MOD	FCO
5.	Trade (to include a note on those projects to which the Prime Minister might give a boost)	Trade	FCO Industry
6.	Health Co-operation	DHSS	FCO Trade
7.	International Economic and Monetary Questions (including North/South Dialogue)	Treasury	FCO Trade Industry Energy
8.	Energy Questions	Energy	Treasury FCO

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	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
9.	Regional Questions: (i) Arab/Israel (ii) Iraq/Iran War (iii) Afghanistan (iv) Euro/Arab Dialogue (v) Egypt (vi) Iran (vii) Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	FCO	
<u>Saudi Arabia</u>			
10.	Bilateral Political, Cultural and Economic Questions (to include the Joint Committee on Cultural Relations)	FCO	MOD Trade Industry Treasury DHSS British Council
11.	Saudi Arabia and IMF	Treasury	
12.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	
<u>UAE</u>			
13.	Bilateral Political, Economic and Cultural Issues (to include renewal of the Treaty of Friendship)	FCO	MOD Trade Industry Treasury DHSS British Council

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Lead Department</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
14.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	
<u>Oman</u>			
15.	Bilateral Political, Economic and Cultural Issues (to include the five-year plan, our aid programme and British Council activities)	FCO ODA	Trade Industry Treasury British Council
16.	Bilateral Defence Relationship	MOD	FCO
17.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	
<u>Qatar</u>			
18.	Bilateral Political, Economic and Cultural Issues (to include renewal of the Treaty of Friendship)	FCO	MOD Trade Industry Treasury DHSS British Council
19.	Historical, Political and Social Background (to include social customs and topics for conversation)	FCO	

From: The Rt. Hon Maurice Macmillan, M.P.

cc:IG
✓
MB



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

16 March 1981

R18

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to ask your help to obtain the release from prison in Saudi Arabia of a young man who is the son of a constituent of mine. His name is Neil Clynton-Reed and he has served one year of a two year sentence for being found in possession of a very small quantity of cannabis. I have previously been in correspondence with the Foreign Office about this case. They have done everything possible to help. I have seen further detail of the grounds for his request for his release as an act of clemency or mercy. You may remember that when her Majesty the Queen visited Saudi Arabia, some three years ago, all British prisoners were released from Saudi jails. More recently, most of the American prisoners were released at the request of the outgoing Ambassador as a gesture of good will towards the new President. Such gestures on suitable occasions such as your visit are deep seated in Saudi diplomacy.

When you know the details of this particular case I hope you will feel able to request this young man's release, since I am sure that you would be successful and thus bring great relief to his ageing parents who are more desperate than their courage allows them to show.

Yours ever,
Maurice

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP.

NEIL CLYNTON REED - AIDE MEMOIRE

Introduction

1. This memorandum is based on one prepared by Mr. Clynton Reed's father, who is my constituent. He will provide any additional information that may be required. He is :-

Brigadier (Retired) J. Clynton Reed, CBE.,
Shortheath Beacon, Shortheath, Farnham, Surrey.

Telephone Farnham (0252) 71329

2. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Clynton Reed was employed by BAROID International. (Mr. Michael Moore, General Manager Baroid Saudi Arabia, P.O. BOX 37, Damman, Saudia Arabia). Mr. Moore and his firm have been extremely helpful; so have the previous employers, YBA KANOO, (Mr. Ian Phillips, General Manager, YBA Kanoo, Damman Office, P.O., BOX 45, Bahrain, Arabian Gulf.

Arrest, trial and sentence

3. On 2nd April, 1980, Mr. Clynton-Reed was detained on arrival from Athens at Damman airport after a small quantity (2 grammes) of cannabis was found in his coat pocket. Immediate efforts were made by his firm to secure his release, but to no avail.

4. After about two months he was tried before the local court at Shavia. The judge appeared to accept his claim that the drug was brought accidentally into the country since he only took the coat with him from Athens at the last minute, on his mother's insistence, forgetting that the cannabis was in the pocket.

5. However, he was sentence to 50 lashes. This sentence was over-ruled higher up and changed to one of 2 years imprisonment - the usual sentence for bringing cannabis into the country.

Subsequent activity and present situation

6. In June 1980 Brigadier Clynton-Reed appealed (copy attached) to the Minister of the Interior, sending the appeal by hand to Saudia Arabia for forwarding through the proper channels. He was advised to use the flowery words, and on style generally, by an important Saudi resident who knows how to make these sort of approaches, knowing the people concerned well.

/ 7. No reply has

7. No reply has been received. The grounds for clemency set out in the appeal still apply. But Brig-Clynton-Reed is now nearly 77 - his birthday is in July and his health has not improved. His chest complaint is serious, requiring constant treatment. Neither he nor his wife have any relatives other than this son, their only child, on whom his mother would be wholly dependent, were his father to die. Because of their age and health, Brigadier and Mrs. Clynton-Reed feel desperate for his return in these late days of their lives, before it is too late.

8. Mr. Clynton-Reed will have completed one year of his two year sentence on 2nd April 1981. (Arabic year 22nd March 1981)

Possible new Appeal

9. Local people have stated that Mr. Clynton-Reed would be quickly released if the request were made by the Prime Minister, on her forthcoming visit, as an act of clemency or mercy on compassionate grounds, especially as he will have served a full year, half his sentence for a comparatively trivial offence.

10. It has been suggested locally that the request should be made to Prince NAIF (Minister of the Interior) or to Prince FAHAD. Such gestures are deep-seated in the Saudi diplomacy - as is shown by the release of almost all the American prisoners at the request of the outgoing American Ambassador, as a gesture to him and to the new President (Incidentally, Mr. Clynton-Reed is now the only Westerner in his section of the jail). When Her Majesty the Queen visited Saudi Arabia some three years ago, all British prisoners were released from Saudi jails.

Shortheath Beacon,
Shortheath, Farnham,
Surrey, England.

June 1980

His Excellency, The Minister of
the Interior,
Riyadh,
Kingdom of Saudia Arabia.

Your Royal Highness,

I respectfully address you regarding help and assistance which your Royal Highness may be able to afford in obtaining clemency for my son, Neil Clynton -Reed who is presently in prison in Damman for entering the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia through Dhahran Airport on 2nd April 1980 when he was found to be in possession of a very small quantity of an illegal drug.

There was no attempt on his part to hide the drug and he has stated that he was carrying the drug in his pocket by accident and inadvertently. As his father, I know this to be a true statement.

My son has smoked a drug in the past but has not done so for a very considerable time, and he had in fact, forgotten that in the particular jacked he was wearing on that day at Dhahran Airport, there was this very small quantity of a drug.

I would like to say, Your Royal Highness, that it is only right that my son should be punished, and I know that he bitterly regrets that he has broken the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, particularly as it was not intended.

I am making this plea for clemency as my son is the only child and my wife and I have no other relatives. We do not have influential friends, and even if we did have them, we would certainly not call upon them to assist us at this time. I believe that Your Royal Highness will accept this plea for clemency as coming directly from the father of Neil Clynton-Reed and naturally, I am also pleading for clemency for him on behalf of his mother.

I will be 76 in a few weeks time and am presently under specialist treatment for a serious bronchial problem. My wife and I are desperate for the return of our son and his support in these late years of our lives.

/ I retired as

I retired as a Brigadier from the British Army and was decorated by Her Majesty the Queen. I mention this simply to let Your Royal Highness know that we have always considered ourselves to be a God-fearing and law-abiding family and our son has also been brought up in the same atmosphere. In other words, what he has done was not done deliberately. It was a mistake and therefore I pray that you will view his case in a lenient manner, particularly as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is known throughout the world for its justice and compassion.

I am sure you will understand why I have addressed Your Royal Highness and apologise for having to bring this very distressing matter to your Royal Highness's personal attention.

With the utmost respect,

Yours sincerely,

Saudis set to release 28 American prisoners

THE US State Department has welcomed Saudi Arabia's decision to release 28 U.S. citizens held in its prisons on various criminal and civil convictions.

Mr William J. Dyess said the Saudi decision was a gesture of friendship

and goodwill as the new administration takes office.

"Americans held in Saudi prisons because of violations of Saudi law or civil disputes are to be released," he said.

"Needless to say we welcome that

gesture."

Officials said that two other Americans will remain in Saudi prisons until they have court hearings on undisclosed charges.

Of 28 prisoners to be released, 21 are free to leave the country.

But the seven others must remain in Saudi Arabia until they settle debt repayments and other civil disputes.

Officials said the group of 21 Americans were convicted of narcotics, alcohol and other offences.

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CONFIDENTIAL

THP



10 DOWNING STREET.

From the Private Secretary

13 March 1981

Dear Gunge,

BE?

The Prime Minister's Visit
to the Gulf

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 11 March about the objectives of her forthcoming visit to the Gulf. The Prime Minister agrees that the briefing should be prepared along the lines suggested by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. She also agrees that it would be helpful if she were to make a public statement at some point in her tour setting out HMG's interest in co-operation. I should be grateful if work on a draft of such a statement could be put in hand.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade), Ian Ellison (Department of Industry), Don Brereton (Department of Health and Social Security), John Wiggins (HM Treasury) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq., CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

dsj

CONFIDENTIAL

2 PP's Foreign Office



Sir Peter Carey KCB
Permanent Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY
ASHDOWN HOUSE
123 VICTORIA STREET
LONDON SW1E 6RB
TELEPHONE DIRECT LINE 01-212 7005
SWITCHBOARD 01-212 7676

13 March 1981

Sir Michael Palliser GCMG
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

fs.
Rus

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES:
19-25 APRIL

Dear Michael,

Thank you for your letter of 10 March. I am content both with the statement of the overall objectives of these visits and that the Cabinet Office should co-ordinate the briefing. Officials here will make direct contact with lead Department colleagues on our contribution.

Although I recognise that wider political considerations will be a major pre-occupation of the visit I note from your letter the emphasis to be given to commercial and industrial interests. The Prime Minister's visit will be an invaluable opportunity to boost our trade prospects in the area and we must gain the maximum advantage we can. Subject to developments between now and the visit, ARABSAT may need to be accorded real priority. We expect to know by the end of the month the favoured contractor. If it is not the British Aerospace consortium then some very hard selling indeed will be needed if the situation is to be retrieved.

Yours sincerely,

Peter

Peter Carey



(1)

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister. *mb.*

This letter summarises various military & civilian projects which you might raise during your visit to Riyadh. It suggests that our chances of making progress will be enhanced if the projects are placed in a co-operative framework of the kind summarised at reference; & if you make a statement to this effect during your visit.

This all seems sensible. Agree that briefing may proceed accordingly?

Yes *mb* And

12.3.71



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 March 1981

*Dear Michael,*Prime Minister's Visit to the Gulf

Following the recent visit to Saudi Arabia and Oman by the Minister of State Mr Hurd, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary wishes to make the following suggestions about the Prime Minister's own visit to the Gulf in April. These have been discussed with MOD Ministers.

Lord Carrington assumes that the Prime Minister would wish her visit to be seen as part of a fresh and more dynamic approach by HMG towards cooperation with the Gulf countries and the advancement of our strategic and material (eg commercial and defence sales) interests there. Mr Nott will of course be discussing security and defence sales questions during his visit to the region at the end of March.

To achieve the best effect in her discussions, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Lord Carrington believes that the Prime Minister should aim, first, to establish a broad framework of common interest within which to pursue enhanced political and economic cooperation and then, within that framework, to advocate individual British projects as examples of such cooperation. We shall not make the most of our commercial opportunities in Saudi Arabia unless we are prepared to talk to them in the language of cooperation.

In preparing the Prime Minister's briefing for Saudi Arabia, therefore, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary considers that in addition to material on geopolitical questions such as Afghanistan, Soviet encroachment, US plans for rapid deployment, threats to regional stability, Arab/Israel (and the link between these two latter subjects), and to a general presentation of what the UK has to offer both to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf as a whole in the way of political and defence support, officials should pay particular attention to the tactics of using the Prime Minister's visit to advance certain bilateral projects, eg:

a. Air Defence

We are working towards agreement this year on the renewal of the 1978 memorandum of understanding on the Saudi Air Defence Assistant Project (SADAP) which expires in 1982. But this project is based on Lightnings which will be retired in 1985. We therefore need to promote Saudi interest in a new generation of aircraft, Hawk and Tornado in particular. On the former, the plan is to

/offer



offer the Saudis a flying training study which would steer them in the direction of Hawk: the visit of Mr Nott (23-25 March) ~~and of the Red Arrows at about the same time~~, will advance this strategy. On Tornado, the Government are working urgently to clear our lines with the German and Italian Governments, and promoting with BAE and Rolls Royce imaginative proposals, including perhaps Saudi participation in the development of a purpose-built engine, for putting to the Saudis aimed at the kind of thinking outlined in King Hussein's reply to the Prime Minister's message (Amman telno 66).

b. Other Military Equipment (especially tanks)

Lord Carrington believes that it will be important for our general defence sales posture to show interest in supplying tanks. The Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) have asked us (among others) to quote for 50 tanks. The Ministry of Defence and Aviation (MODA) also have a mid-term interest in a new generation main battle tank. They have asked West Germany if the latter would in principle be prepared to supply Leopard II and this is currently a live political issue there. At the same time we have been trying to interest MODA in something comparable: Project 4030/3 - an advance on the Khalid tank on order for Jordan with Chobham armour. The Ministerial visits this spring will therefore present excellent opportunities to press the worth of this and other military equipment.

c. Medical Service for the National Guard (SANGMED)

For 18 months we have been negotiating another government to government project to provide for the acceptance, commissioning and operation of two 500-bed hospitals, as well as the preparation of a plan for the introduction of a nationwide medical service for the Guard and its dependants. Competition first from the Belgians and then from the French has been fought off and towards the end of last year the Guard informally explained that at least a part of the project would come to the UK. However, since the US presidential election, President Reagan has reversed his predecessor's policy and we understand has now offered Prince Abdullah a full scale US option backed by Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The opportunity presented by the spring Ministerial visits must be taken to deal with this threat and to press the advantages to the Guard of putting the whole project to the UK.

d. Protection of offshore oil installations

Lord Strathcona raised this in November with Prince Naif, the Saudi Interior Minister. So did Mr Hurd last month. Of all the industrialised countries, we are uniquely placed to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on this. The

/Director



Director of Naval Assistance Overseas has visited Riyadh and is urgently preparing recommendations (he is in touch with the Security Service who are also advising on installation security), and a programme for an inward visit by Saudis to observe our own procedures. It is important for this to be ready for promotion by both Mr Nott and the Prime Minister, since in due course our recommendations could open up prospects for equipment sales - particularly to telecommunications and radar equipment and above all of Westland helicopters, which could compensate for Westland's disappointment over the collapse in 1978 of the Egypt-based Arab Organisation for Industrialisation in which Saudi Arabia was a major partner. But this is a classic example of the need to talk in terms of cooperation if at the end of the day we are to achieve sales. First we must identify the need with the Saudis, then interest them in the product.

e. University co-operation

In January the President of Riyadh University, Dr Mansour al Turki, brought (at his own suggestion) a large team of his heads of department for a fortnight's tour of universities, arranged by the British Council. Successful follow up should enable us by April to contemplate making a major impact on the academic life of this Saudi university hitherto dominated by American methods. This brought very favourable comment during Mr Hurd's visit. In due course the results in terms of enhanced cooperation over higher education should be considerable. 2

f. Naval base in the Yemen Arab Republic

The YAR have asked us for assistance in the preparation of specifications and costings for a naval base in Khawka on the Red Sea. A study has been done by the Deputy Director of Naval Assistance (RN) and we propose, in conjunction with the Yemenis, to make this available to Saudi Arabia and the UAE with a request for funding for the project (there has already been discussion with the Ambassadors of these countries in Sana'a). Triangular deals are difficult, but if the project prospers there could be a lucrative contract for a British firm (possibly Halcrows); more important, the project could be an ideal vehicle for demonstrating to the Saudis our concern about Russian involvement in the area and our readiness to do something concrete, in co-operation with our friends, to counter it (the Russians are offering assistance to the Yemenis over the naval base which, in the absence of a Western offer, the Yemenis would be hard put to reject).

These are six highly important projects. None of them will be easily achieved. It became clear to the Minister of

/State



State during his visit that all or any of them could be made much more attractive if the Prime Minister was able to offer them within the framework of specific arrangements for co-operation. These should be deliberately tailored to meet known Saudi wishes to improve the level of technology and skills in Saudi Arabia and to construct gradually a modern industrial base. Officials should therefore pay particular attention to what we can offer the Saudis, in relation to each project, in the fields of training, adaptation of UK work to suit Saudi requirements, joint research and development, co-operation, Saudi investment in the UK, and links to plans for joint Arab projects/development. In this connection, it will be of crucial importance to take account of the ideas now evolving amongst Arab countries for meeting their future requirements for military equipment as outlined in King Hussein's letter to the Prime Minister about Tornado.

Lord Carrington is not suggesting that it will be opportune for the Prime Minister to press all such details of our various projects on the Saudi Princes: but, on the other hand, they will soon detect it if she offers cooperation in generalities that we are not ready to elaborate in concrete terms. If this happens, we shall get back from them expressions of goodwill and references to our traditional ties: unproductive rhetoric instead of agreement on concrete issues.

The Saudis are less susceptible to this approach over civil projects. It is a fundamental principle for them that contracts are awarded only as the result of open competitive tender, and the factor that sways them most is price. The transfer of technology is achieved primarily through joint ventures; the Saudis attach great importance also to help from foreign government experts.

Nevertheless, on civil projects the Prime Minister will be able to point to Britain's current contributions to Saudi development:

- a. the 18% increase in our exports in 1980;
- b. the greatly increased interest on the part of British industry in doing business in Saudi Arabia, in joint ventures as well as trade, demonstrated by the record attendance (350) at the CBI Seminar on the Five Year Plan in February;
- c. HMG's willingness to provide expert help to Saudi Ministries, shown by the response we made to numerous Saudi requests at the last Saudi/UK Joint Commission in London in February.

The Prime Minister will also be briefed to speak about British interest in specific projects or joint ventures, in those

/cases



cases where her intervention would be timely and effective.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary hopes that, if the Prime Minister agrees broadly with the above, she will give instructions for her briefing (which is being commissioned separately) to be prepared along the suggested lines. He also hopes that the Prime Minister would wish, at some suitable moment during her Gulf tour, to make a public statement perhaps at the beginning of a press conference, that would proclaim HMG's positive interest in cooperation in the sense described, as well as setting out our political concerns for the stability and security of the region. If she agrees with this, he will initiate work in the FCO on a first draft of such a statement.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Defence, Trade, Health and Social Security, Industry, and to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir Robert Armstrong.

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Foreign Policy

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 March 1981

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO
CABINET OFFICE

*NRPA**Print, 19/3**Sir Robert,*

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF:
19 - 25 APRIL

1. The Prime Minister is to visit Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States of Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar from 19 to 25 April on her way back from visiting India. (In order not to convey the impression that the visit is an appendage to the India trip, arrangements, including briefing, are being kept entirely separate).
2. The Prime Minister will be able to devote only two working days (ie long mornings) and one evening to Saudi Arabia and one day to each of the other States (one and a half for the UAE where she will visit both Abu Dhabi and Dubai). She can expect to have substantive discussions in Saudi Arabia with Crown Prince Fahd (effectively the Prime Minister) and meetings with the Ministers of Defence and Interior and the Commander of the National Guard, and to pay a call on the King; in the UAE, she should have discussions with the President, Shaikh Zaid and members of his entourage, in Abu Dhabi; and with the Prime Minister, Shaikh Rashid (if he is fit enough) in Dubai; in Oman with Sultan Qaboos and in Qatar with the Amir (Shaikh Khalifa) and his heir apparent. (The Ruler of Qatar is the only one of Mrs Thatcher's interlocutors whom she has met since becoming Prime Minister.) Where possible, she will have meetings with representatives of the British community. She will be accompanied throughout by Mr Hurd.

/3.

Foreign Policy

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 March 1981

Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO
CABINET OFFICE

*NRPA**Print 19/3**Dear Robert,*

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF:
19 - 25 APRIL

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/3.



3. This will be the first visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States by a British Prime Minister. It will be much welcomed and will arouse a great deal of interest in the region and beyond, as well as among our NATO allies. It is designed to demonstrate the degree of importance we attach to our relations with the countries of this region of vital strategic significance for us. It is an area where British influence was once paramount, but where an initiative of this kind is now necessary to counteract efforts which our competitors, particularly the French, have been making at our expense to secure influence and large contracts.

4. On the Arab side the main objective will be to discover where Britain stands on the Arab/Israel question. They can also be expected to press the Prime Minister over Britain's association with the Rapid Deployment Force in so far as it affects the Gulf; and to wish to discuss the problems of the region, notably the war between Iraq and Iran, the situation in Iran itself, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

5. The Gulf States were badly shaken by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and worries about their ability to defend themselves have increased further in the light of the current Iraq/Iran war. Last month, the Gulf rulers agreed in Saudi Arabia after months of deliberation to set up machinery which would enable them to cooperate more closely in political and economic matters and from which cooperation on defence and security was not excluded. They will be looking to us for support for their efforts while warning us of the dangers, as they see them, of a too visible Western military presence and of being seen too publicly to be associated with it. Apart from serving local, and thus indirectly Western, security interests, the practical assistance which we could offer will improve our chances of winning substantial orders for British defence equipment. The aim of the Prime Minister's visit should therefore be to proclaim our determination to maintain a continuing and vigorous interest in the Gulf, to explain the true character of our strategic approach to the Gulf and show how it takes account of - and indeed is designed to advance - Arab interests; and to establish a broad framework of common political, economic and strategic interest within which to pursue enhanced cooperation and then, building on that foundation, to advocate individual British projects as examples of such cooperation. The briefing will cover the projects to which we attach particular importance: eg the sale of military aircraft (Tornado and Hawk), air defence systems eg Rapier, the protection of off-shore oil installations, the development of the North West dome gas field off-shore Qatar and ARABSAT.



/ 6. I attach at Annex A and B the suggested outline of British and probable Saudi/Gulf objectives, and at Annex C a suggested list of possible briefs, the preparation of which might, if you and other recipients agree, be coordinated by the Cabinet Office. You will observe that we have divided these into those objectives common to all the States Mrs Thatcher is to visit and specific objectives in each individual State. So far as possible we shall try to avoid overlap in the briefs, but there is bound to be some, given the difference of perspective on some of the key issues amongst the various States. The assessment of the Arabs' objectives is still tentative at this stage and may need to be modified nearer the time of the visit.

Tom, etc,

Michael

Michael Palliser

cc: Sir Douglas Wass GCB
HM TREASURY

Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Sir Donald Maitland GCMG OBE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Sir Kenneth Clucas KCB
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

Sir Peter Carey KCB
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY

Sir Patrick Nairne KCB MC
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SECURITY

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 DOWNING STREET





ANNEX A

UK OBJECTIVES

General

1. To demonstrate the importance we attach to our relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraq/Iran war.
2. To affirm that the Ten will pursue seriously their efforts to contribute to the achievement of a just and lasting solution to the Arab/Israel dispute, as a complement to the activity of the US, which alone has the power to bring about such a settlement.
3. To establish the degree of common interest within which to pursue political, economic and defence cooperation.
4. To encourage the Gulf States to continue to look to us as an old friend, while we both recognise that the US must carry the main burden and have a special role in the defence of the region against Soviet expansion.
5. To reaffirm Britain's support within her limited means for the Gulf States' efforts to improve their own defence and security and to indicate areas where we can give practical assistance (eg Loan Service Personnel (LSP), training assistance and advice; deployment of Royal Navy ships; security of oil installations; provision of advanced defence equipment; cooperation with Arab aspirations eventually to construct a local industrial base, capable of local assembly and/or manufacture of equipment as a result of the gradual transfer of technology).
6. Thereby to give a strong boost to our efforts to secure a major share of contracts in the fields of defence sales, oil and gas development, civil engineering, medical and health cooperation.
7. To probe Gulf States' thinking about their recent moves towards closer cooperation.
8. To discuss ways in which we can cooperate, especially with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to combat Soviet influence in the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.



9. To ensure that Gulf oil production and pricing policies are such as to stabilize the world oil market: and to demonstrate the constructive role of the United Kingdom as a producer and consumer.

10. To encourage recognition by Gulf producers of their shared responsibility for helping to alleviate the problems of the world economy, especially as they affect the poorer developing countries, perhaps by making more of their surpluses available directly for the development of such countries.

Saudi Arabia

11. To demonstrate the importance we attach to closer consultation with the Saudis on urgent global and regional issues.

12. To express privately our support for Saudi moves to promote security cooperation with their Gulf neighbours and explain how these policies relate to each other and to local security cooperation.

13. To give a boost to our increasingly substantial bilateral relationship: economic cooperation, trade, health, education, defence assistance and equipment sales - and to examine ways of extending this.

14. To endorse the establishment of the Joint Committee on cultural relations as an earnest of our attempt to improve mutual understanding, especially in respect of the media, but to avoid exaggerated expectations.

15. To encourage Saudi aid for pro-Western governments in the developing world, especially Zimbabwe.

16. To express appreciation of the contribution to the stability of the West's energy supplies made by Saudi Arabia in increasing oil production to make up for losses resulting from the Gulf war and the hope that this helpful policy will continue.

17. To support British oil companies' efforts to gain access to Saudi crude.

/UAE



UAE

18. To dispel any remaining doubts in Abu Dhabi about the importance we attach to cooperation with the Emirates which will be reconfirmed by a statement that we regard our treaty of friendship as continuing in force.

19. To promote the sale to the Abu Dhabi Air Force of the British Aerospace Hawk trainer aircraft (if no decision has been taken on purchase) and to place it in the context of sales of further aircraft (Jaguar and Tornado) to meet future requirements.

20. To foster a continued role for British oil companies and experts.

Oman

21. To reassure the Sultan of our determination to match Omani defence requirements with LSP assistance, training and equipment, while emphasising the importance we attach to progress towards Omanisation of the Sultanate's armed forces.

22. To discuss the growing US involvement in Oman and stress the need to preserve the benefits of the longer standing UK/Oman relationship.

23. To soothe the Omanis over the cut back in our aid programme, while underlining that some aid (especially training) will continue, although the overall British financial contribution will be less.

24. To encourage in the Sultan a greater realisation that his defence depends as much on internal developments and the satisfaction of the reasonable aspirations of his people as on military hardware.

Qatar

25. To reinforce our bilateral relations by demonstrating at the highest political level Britain's interest in and sympathy for Qatar's development; to make it clear privately that we regard the treaty of friendship as continuing in force, and are happy to do so.

26. To demonstrate our keen interest in participating in Qatar's development in all fields: especially re-equipping Qatar's Armed Forces and the development of the country's hydrocarbon resources; to give a boost to major British bids (Rapier for the first; BP and/or Shell for the second; Ewbanks for the new power station).



ANNEX B

PROBABLE ARAB OBJECTIVES

General

1. To find out where Britain stands on the Arab/Israel dispute and in particular to try to pin us down to independent initiatives matching their hopes but beyond our capacity (or interest) to perform.
2. To underline their objections to the region becoming an area of super power confrontation.
3. While welcoming privately our assurances of support in matters of defence and security, to remind us that too visible ^{Western} military presence or too public a declaration of support is likely to provoke attempts by the Soviet Union at closer involvement in the area, as well as an adverse reaction in the region with its large Palestinian/Northern Arab immigrant population.
4. To establish how far we are willing to enter into collaborative ventures with them involving the transfer of technology, particularly in the field of defence equipment.

Saudi Arabia

5. To demonstrate to their fellow Arab leaders and their own public opinion that their moderate stand on regional and energy issues bring dividends in the form of effective cooperation with major Western countries.
6. To enlist our help in securing changed attitudes in the United States towards the Middle East.
7. To encourage a forthright approach to the Afghanistan problem and support for Pakistan and her Afghan refugees.
8. To enlist our support at the IMF for observer status for the PLO and for a revised quota for Saudi Arabia.
9. To press for improved investment opportunities in the West for their financial surpluses.

/Oman



Oman

10. To seek an assurance of Britain's willingness to underwrite Oman's security and to help in meeting her increased defence requirements.

11. To take advantage of the visit to enhance the Sultan's image as a statesman both at home and abroad.



ANNEX C

LIST OF BRIEFS FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF: 19 - 25 APRIL 1981

<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>Lead Dept</u>	<u>In consultation with</u>
<u>General</u>		
1. Steering Brief	FCO	
2. Defence Policy in the Gulf (to include the Rapid Deployment Force)	MOD	FCO
3. Gulf Cooperation and Gulf Security	FCO	MOD, DOT
4. Defence Sales (to include a note on those projects to which the Prime Minister might give a boost).	MOD	FCO
5. Trade (to include a note on those projects to which the Prime Minister might give a boost)	DOT	FCO, DOI
6. Health Cooperation	DHSS	FCO, DOT
7. International Economic and Monetary Questions (including North/South Dialogue)	Treasury	FCO, DOT/DOI Dept of Energy
8. Energy Questions	Dept of Energy	Treasury, FCO
9. Regional Questions: (i) Arab/Israel (ii) Iraq/Iran War (iii) Afghanistan (iv) Euro/Arab Dialogue (v) Egypt (vi) Iran (vii) Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	FCO	

/Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia

- | | | | |
|-----|---|----------|---|
| 10. | Bilateral political, cultural and economic questions (to include the Joint Committee on Cultural Relations) | FCO | MOD, DOT/DOI,
Treasury, DHSS,
British Council |
| 11. | Saudi Arabia and IMF | Treasury | |
| 12. | Historical, political and social background (to include social customs and topics for conversation) | FCO | |

UAE

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-----|---|
| 13. | Bilateral political, economic and cultural issues (to include renewal of the Treaty of Friendship) | FCO | MOD, DOT/DOI,
Treasury, DHSS,
British Council |
| 14. | [As for 12] | | |

Oman

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-----------------|--|
| 15. | Bilateral political, economic and cultural issues (to include the 5 year plan, our aid programme and British Council activities) | FCO,
FCO/ODA | DOT/DOI,
Treasury,
British Council |
| 16. | Bilateral defence relationship | MOD | FCO |
| 17. | [As for 12] | | |

Qatar

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-----|---|
| 18. | Bilateral political, economic and cultural issues (to include renewal of the Treaty of friendship) | FCO | MOD, DOT/DOI,
Treasury, DHSS,
British Council |
| 19. | [As for 12] | | |

Foreign and Commonwealth Office document

Reference DIPLOMATIC REPORT NO. 115/81

Description IS SAUDI ARABIA UNSTABLE?

Date 9 March 1981

The above FCO document, which was enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed.

Such documents are the responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. When released they are available in the appropriate FCO CLASSES.

Signed OWayland

Date 13 October 2011

PREM Records Team

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Please reply to: Dr Michael Taylor
Saudia Medical Centre
Jeddah
Saudi Arabia

RS/3

The Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
London

3 March 1981

Dear Mrs Thatcher

I am writing to you as both Prime Minister and a Mother.

My husband EDWIN BATE (British Passport Number P 980437) is in JEDDAH prison convicted of owning a 'STILL', not however of producing, having or selling alcohol. He is currently four months through a one year sentence which with remission will end in July. I do not wish to appeal against this sentence as sentences have been known to be increased after an appeal. I want to ask you to make a plea for my husband's rapid deportation. We have three small children ages six, three and one year, and they desperately need their father and miss him.

The American prisoners in Saudi Arabia have all been released regardless of their crimes and sentences.

In light of this Amnesty and your forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia could you please intercede on behalf of myself and my children.

Yours sincerely

Muriel Bate

MURIEL BATE (Mrs)



SOUTHWIRE COMPANY

PRIMARY ALUMINIUM SMELTING &

P. O. Box 1000, Carrollton, Georgia 30117
(404) 832-4242 Telex 542799

March 2, 1981

Mr. Keith Haskell
H. M. Consul General & Counsellor
British Embassy
Dubai

Dear Mr. Haskell:

Thank you for your meeting with our representative during last January in Dubai.

On your request, we send you, in strict confidence, an outline of our project and an analysis of the approximate costs envisaged between the industrial manufactured elements and the constructional services contents of our project.

We are sure, this will graphically underline the immense benefit to be awarded to U.K. industry.

We wish to clarify that our promotional relationship with the British side has been based on our previous experience of British proven ability and effort on similar large scale industrial works.

The project would be designed to encompass the construction of:

- * A primary aluminium smelter complex with a designed capacity of 225,000 mtpy.
- * A special power station of 780 MW.
- * A sea-water desalination plant of 35 mio. gal. day.

The total cost of such a project is estimated to be in the range of two - billion U.S. dollars.

Out of the total costs, it is our intention to plan and manage the project in such a way that the British content in the manufacturing cost and civil mechanical electrical works would be in the range of 1.2 billion U.S. dollars.

./.

"SOUTHWIRE MEANS SERVICE"


Provided we can rely on their having the continued backing and the commercial interest of their Government, we undertake to approach the British manufacturers and contractors for prequalification, upon the conclusion of our agreements with ADNOC for the establishment of our new Joint Company in Abu Dhabi.

It is highly desirable that we proceed with all possible urgency, maintaining strict industrial security. We have no doubt, that Her Majesty's Government will show great interest and determination in recognising and securing such valuable commercial opportunity for the British industry and will assist in every possible way.

Hopefully, the analysis will be found completely suitable to your present requirement but please do not hesitate to seek any further advice or clarification required.

Thanking you for your kindness.

Yours truly,



J. C. Chandler
Executive Vice-President

MAP
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Index

MICHAEL RICE AND COMPANY LIMITED

1 Lowther Gardens, Prince Consort Road, London SW7 2AA. Tel 01-589 3422 Telex 917343 ORYZA G

25 February 1981

Michael Alexander, Esq.,
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,
10 Downing Street,
London SW1

R/F with brief
L Successor.

Phil

Dear Mr Alexander,

Thank you for your letter of 20 February. I am pleased that you are including details of the museum projects in the Prime Minister's brief; and if there is any further information that I can give you, please let me know.

Yours Sincerely

Michael Rice

MICHAEL RICE



10 DOWNING STREET

Handwritten: Mrs. Pamela Smith
India Trip 1981

From the Private Secretary

24 February 1981

The Prime Minister has asked me to thank you for your letter of 8 February expressing concern for your husband who is serving a prison sentence in Saudi Arabia. Mrs. Thatcher fully understands how worrying this situation must be for you.

You ask in your letter if representations could be made to the Saudi authorities for clemency for your husband. As you know, your husband was arrested for breaking the law of Saudi Arabia, and was tried and sentenced in accordance with that law. It would be contrary to international practice for a government to seek to intervene in the judicial system of another country, unless there were prima facie grounds for believing that there had been a miscarriage or denial of justice. This would not appear to be so in your husband's case. The exercise of clemency is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Saudi authorities, and it does not look as if there are grounds for an initiative by the Prime Minister. I am sorry if you find this disappointing. Officials from the British Embassy at Jedda will continue to visit your husband regularly, and will do all they properly can to help him during this difficult time. We are letting them know of your letter and asking them to keep in close touch with you.

M. C. D. A. B. A. D. E. R.

Mrs. Pamela Smith.

Handwritten: R

20 February, 1981.

I am replying on the Prime Minister's behalf to your letter to her of 19 February about your work in Saudi Arabia. I will ensure that your letter is brought to the Prime Minister's attention as part of her briefing for the visit.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

~~Michael Rice, Esq.~~

NMM

MICHAEL RICE AND COMPANY LIMITED

1 Lowther Gardens, Prince Consort Road, London SW7 2AA. Tel 01-589 3422 Telex 917343 ORYZA G

The Rt. Hon. Mrs Margaret Thatcher MP,
10 Downing Street,
London. SW1

19 February 1981

125/2

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

I was delighted to see that you are planning to visit Saudi Arabia in April. Your visit will, I am sure, do much to strengthen still further the ties between this country and the Kingdom; such ties are important for the stability of the area, the more so since the Saudis are concerned, I believe, to develop their links with Europe and to lessen their almost total dependence in all departments in the past on the United States; in this they see Britain discharging a significant role.

You obviously will have projects of much greater scale to preoccupy you during your stay but I thought you might like to know of one British project which is perhaps somewhat out of the ordinary. My company is engaged on the planning, design and installation of museums on eight major archaeological sites throughout Saudi Arabia, under the Department of Antiquities and Museums, part of the Ministry of Education. The very serious way in which the Saudis are tackling the protection and conservation of their physical heritage is, now, remarkable; the museums which we have been commissioned to design are part of that process. They will represent some modest contribution to export, both of talent and of manufacture. We have already completed two other museums in Saudi Arabia as well as others in other peninsular states.

Naturally, I shall be glad to give your office any further information if you require it. I enclose a note which outlines the site museums project in more detail.

Yours very sincerely
Michael Rice

MICHAEL RICE

Enc.

February 1981

SIX SITE MUSEUMS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

Tenders are to be invited shortly by the Ministry of Education in Riyadh for the construction and full equipping of six archaeological Site Museums in the Kingdom.

In July 1978 Michael Rice and Company of London submitted to the Department General of Antiquities and Museums a Planning Study for the Museums, which it had been commissioned to carry out together with a Saudi Arabian firm of architects, Zuhair Fayeze and Associates. It involved carrying out the initial research and planning for the project. Since then work has proceeded through the development of schematic and final designs and research, to the production of detailed drawings, specifications and quantities at the end of 1980.

The Museums are all to be located in areas of outstanding archaeological importance, and the project is a challenging and ambitious one. They will serve their archaeological localities not only as exhibition centres but as protection and research agencies and will be required, in addition, to function as part of the planned network of local and regional museums, of which they are the beginning, throughout the Kingdom.

Saudi Arabia is rich in archaeological sites, few of which have yet been excavated. The plan to build museums on sites which have not yet been exposed to excavation is an

2.

important advance in the protection and conservation of archaeological areas. The museum complexes will contain, in addition to exhibition areas, storage and laboratory facilities, photographic and draughting facilities and accommodation for visiting archaeologists and other scholars. They will provide proper security for the sites' protection, a consideration of special importance once excavation begins. They will also serve, in their immediate localities, as cultural centres for the communities in which they are situated.

The six Museums are:

- Al-'Ula and Mada'in Salih Museum, in a site area in the northwest noted for its various city remains dating from c. 700 BC to the Nabataean city of Hegra at Mada'in Salih, famous for its rock-cut tombs. It is the most spectacular archaeological site in the Kingdom.
- Taima Museum, also in the northwest and perhaps the largest urban archaeological site in the Kingdom. For a brief period in the mid-6th century BC capital of the last Neo-Babylonian King, Nabonidus.
- Dumat al-Jandal Museum, in the oasis of Al-Jawf, the historical cross-roads of northern Arabia. The site of abundant pre-Islamic and notable Islamic remains.
- Najran Museum, the historic city in the southwest, a centre of the pre-Islamic Yemeni civilisation whose prosperity was founded upon the international trade in aromatics. The ancient site (known as Al-Ukhud) has already yielded many fine stone and bronze artifacts.
- The Museum of the Coastal Tihamah, also in the southwest, near Jizan. A culturally distinctive region of Saudi Arabia particularly rich in

3.

ethnographic material and in archaeology with links with the pre-Islamic cultures of the Yemen.

- Al-Hofuf Museum, located in Saudi Arabia's largest oasis, in the Eastern Region. Particularly noted for the continuity of human occupation evidenced there from the Stone Age to the present day.

There are now also plans to proceed with an additional two Museums of the same kind in the Wadi Dawasir region, in the south-central area, and in Al-Qasim province in the north-central area.

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FM AMMAN 181625Z FEB 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 66 OF 18 FEB 81

INFO PRIORITY MODUK (FOR HDS AND D14)

ROUTINE BONN AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING ABU DHABI DOHA KUWAIT MUSCAT RABAT ISLAMABAD ROME

TEL AVIV AND WASHINGTON

T27/81 Subject
Filed in Middle East
Army folder: Pt 1.

YOUR TELNO 22 OF 23 JANUARY (NOT TO RABAT AND ISLAMABAD):
TORNADO

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF KING HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO THE PRIME
MINISTER'S MESSAGE IN YOUR TUR:

BEGINS.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

JUST UPON MY DEPARTURE TO THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT I RECEIVED
YOUR MESSAGE ON THE SUBJECT OF TORNADO.

A GROUP OF COUNTRIES IN OUR AREA INCLUDING IN ADDITION TO
JORDAN, IRAQ, KUWAIT, THE GULF STATES, OMAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
(WE HAVE ALSO TALKED TO MORROCO AND ADVISED PAKISTAN OF OUR
THOUGHTS) HAVE BEEN TALKING FOR A WHILE OF THE NEED TO GRADUALLY
STANDARDIZE OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT UPON THE MOST MODERN SYSTEMS
THAT MEET OUR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. WE HAVE FELT A GROWING URGENCY
TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION TO ENHANCE OUR CAPABILITIES INDIVIDUALLY
AND COLLECTIVELY IN THE FACE OF COMMON THREATS, BY HAVING COMPATIBLE
SYSTEMS AND THE UNIVERSAL TRAINING AND ABILITIES TO USE THEM,
TOGETHER WITH ESTABLISHING WITHIN THE AREA ALL FACILITIES TO
SERVICE AND MODIFY WHEN NECESSARY, AND IMPROVE UPON THEM THROUGH
SENDING OUR PEOPLE, IN RELEVANT CASES, TO WORK WITH THEIR
MANUFACTURERS SO THAT THEY CAN THEN REPRESENT THE NUCLEUS OF A
TECHNOLOGICALLY ABLE AND QUALIFIED ELEMENT WITHIN THIS AREA
WHICH CAN CHANGE US, IN TIME, FROM BEING PURE CONSUMERS OF
MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS, TO COUNTRIES THAT ARE ABLE TO DEPEND
GROWINGLY ON THEIR OWN HUMAN RESOURCES TO SERVICE, MODIFY AND
IMPROVE MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS LEADING TO AN ABILITY TO HANDLE
MODERN TECHNOLOGY.

WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A NEW AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER WITH
ADVANCED ARMAMENTS AND ELECTRONICS WHICH CAN ADEQUATELY MEET
THE CHALLENGE UNTIL THE END OF THE CENTURY AND POSSIBLY BEYOND,
AND WE HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR AN AIRCRAFT THAT CAN MEET OUR
REQUIREMENTS FOR A LONG-RANGE FIGHTER BOMBER THAT CAN DEAL WITH A

CONFIDENTIAL

/VARIETY

VARIETY OF GROUND TARGETS, TOGETHER WITH ELECTRONIC PACKAGES AND EQUIPMENT TAILORED TO MEET OUR EVERY REQUIREMENT. OUR TENDENCY HAS BEEN TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE SUPERPOWERS AND PARTICULARLY TOWARDS THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE FEEL THAT FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY TO BE ABLE TO KEEP ABREAST OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND OBVIOUSLY WHEN COLLECTIVELY WE APPROACH POSSIBLE SUPPLIERS, THE MATERIAL COSTS WOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERABLY MORE ACCEPTABLE DUE TO THE SIZE OF THE ORDERS. THE VITAL QUESTIONS ARE:

A. WHERE CAN WE GET OR HELP DEVELOP AND THEN RECEIVE THE MOST SUITABLE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT?

B. EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT IF NOT MORE SO BASED ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, IS WHAT SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES CAN WE ALL RECEIVE THAT EQUIPMENT WILL BE FORTHCOMING - BOTH CONTRACTED FOR OR ANY IMPROVED EQUIPMENT WHICH COULD BE USED BY US ON OUR AIRCRAFT YET TO BE DEVELOPED AT LATER STAGES - WITHOUT ANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARISING THAT MIGHT CAUSE THE MANUFACTURERS TO STOP OR TEMPORARILY HALT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ORIGINAL AGREEMENT WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, ONE REASON WHY WE ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AWAY FROM THE MONOPOLIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS. A PROMISING AIRCRAFT NOT YET FULLY DEVELOPED IS THE D. MIRAGE 4000 AND A DIALOGUE HAS BEEN ONGOING BETWEEN US AND BOTH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE MANUFACTURERS ON THIS ISSUE. WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY IN DEFINING OUR TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS AS AGAINST THE PRESENT AND FORESEEN THREATS. WE DID NOT CONSIDER TORNADO DUE TO -

1. THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S RELUCTANCE TO SELL ARMS TO OUR AREA.

2. OUR UNCERTAINTY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS GUARANTEEING THE FULFILMENT OF AN AGREEMENT UNTIL "A" IS RESOLVED AND ALSO IN VIEW OF PRECIOUS EMBARGOES WHICH WE, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE AFFECTED BY FROM TIME TO TIME DUE TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPOSED UPON US BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

3. TORNADO IS A DEVELOPED AIRCRAFT WHICH APPEARS EXCELLENT IN ITS ORIGINAL ROLE SEMICOLON HOWEVER, THE A.D.V. VARIANT SEEMS MORE SUITED TO INTERCEPT AND DESTROY LONG-RANGE ENEMY BOMBERS FROM GREAT DISTANCES, RATHER THAN BEING ALSO A SUPERIORITY FIGHTER.

E OBVIOUSLY ALL OF THESE IMPRESSIONS ARE INCONCLUSIVE SINCE WE HAVE AS YET NEVER HAD THE CHANCE TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT TORNADO PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF YOUR MESSAGE AND ALSO SINCE TORNADO IS AN UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT TO US TECHNICALLY BEYOND WHAT IS AVAILABLE IN PUBLICATIONS.

2
CONFIDENTIAL I HAVE

CONFIDENTIAL

I HAVE RELAYED YOUR MESSAGE TO ALL CONCERNED AND SENSED AN INTEREST TO LOOK AT TORNADO BASED ON THE ANSWERS WE ALL RECEIVE FROM YOU OVER THE QUESTIONS I AM NOW RAISING. HOWEVER, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT TIME IS PRESSING AND THAT TALKS ON THE D. MIRAGE 4000 AIRCRAFT ARE FAIRLY WELL ADVANCED AND IT IS THUS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE RECEIVE FROM YOU DEAR PRIME MINISTER, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY YOUR KIND RESPONSES WHICH WOULD EITHER GIVE US THE CHANCE TO LOOK AT TORNADO IN BOTH VARIANTS AS WELL AS D. MIRAGE 4000 OR TO CONTINUE ON OUR ORIGINAL COURSE.

WITH MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND SINCEREST WISHES,

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN I

ENDS.

2. ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW IN CONFIDENTIAL BAG LEAVING HERE ON 25 FEBRUARY.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

LIMITED
NENAD
MED
DEFENCED
WED
PS
PS/LAS
PS/MR HURD
PS/AUS
SIR E YOUDE
SIR J GRAHAM
SIR A AGLAND
MR JC MOBERLY
MR PH MOBERLY
MR FERGUSSON

[PASSED SAVING
AS REQUESTED]

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET

3

CONFIDENTIAL



Commdar Dept for
draft reply please by 19/2

cc/PS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/Mr Howard
(Su File) 11/12

10 DOWNING STREET	
GK (SMI) / D	
11 February 1981	
12 FEB 1981	

From the Private Secretary

11 February 1981

Dear Francis,

I enclose a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister has received from Mrs. Pamela Smith about her husband's imprisonment in Saudi Arabia. I should be grateful if you could let me have the text of a draft reply which I might send to Mrs. Smith on the Prime Minister's behalf.

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Francis Richards, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Riyadh
Saudi Arabia.

The Right Honorable Mrs Margaret Thatcher,
10 Downing Street
Westminster
London.

f.11/2
February 8th 1981

Dear Mrs Thatcher,

RE:- DESMOND O'CALLAN SMITH
Passport No C884696.

Please forgive me for trespassing upon what I know is your very valuable time, but in all honesty I know of none, other than yourself, who may be able to help me.

I am living in Riyadh with my two year old son, where my husband has been working for the past thirteen years, for the Saudi-Arabian Government. I should perhaps clarify the situation by saying that we are both English - time out of mind, with Seneci backgrounds.

Almost six months ago my husband, Isawo, was sentenced to three years imprisonment and three hundred lashes (which he has not yet received) for producing alcohol for his own use. There is no question of his denying having done so, although he has never offered it to, or allowed it to fall into the hands of members of the Muslim community.

My husband is in his fifty-ninth year, and recent press reports must, I feel sure, have informed you that prison conditions here leave much to be desired. His health has deteriorated a little during the past six months, and I fully expect that, at his age, it will continue to do so. In fact I do not expect him to be able to walk out of the prison at the end of his sentence, that particularly as he only excrete it (wanted to one hour or less weekly, (and recently due to one 'escapee's' publicity) only to one hour in a month. He spends his time on his bunk, or walking to the ablution area. He shares his accommodation, living and sleeping, with one hundred and fifty others, and their radio sets.

Despite life's puny rule: "Thou shalt not be found out", the sentence seems cruelly harsh for an offence committed by a non-Muslim, which only contravened the letter of Islamic law, in a society where alcohol is permitted to diplomatic circles and other organisations, not to mention the Saudi Elite, and out here, who isn't!

As my husband's income has ceased, I am, naturally, obliged to earn my living, except that for the past five months my passport has been held by the Police, for what reason is undetermined except possibly to be as difficult as possible, and it has only just been released to me. Most companies and organisations ask for passports before they employ anyone. Now that I have started work, unfortunately the permitted visiting hours fall within my working day, and despite efforts made by the British Vice-Consul, the authorities are unwilling to make any exception in my case. At present, therefore, I am unable to see my husband at all, making even more distressing his absence at a time when an child is just beginning to 'grow up'!

I am wondering if it is in any way possible for representations to be made to the Deputy Premier or the Minister of the Interior for some clearance to be considered in my husband's case, and will be truly grateful for any assistance which you may feel able to give.

Thank you again for your care.

I have the honor to be

Your obedient servant

Pamela Smith.

MRS. PAMELA SMITH.