

5B
831

Visits of Vice President Mubarak

EGYPT

MAY 1979

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
29.5.79							
7.6.79							
13.6.79							
15.6.79							
18.6.79							
26.5.80							
27.5.80							
29.5.80							
4.6.80							
26.6.80							
1.9.80							
3.9.80							
8.9.80							

PREM 19/451



file 50
afco

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

8 September 1980

Your Excellency

I was greatly touched to learn, after your departure from here, of the extremely generous present which you had left for me. The carpet is superb: I have placed it in my study where it looks splendid. Thank you, equally, for the gift of fruit which your Ambassador has had delivered on your behalf.

I hope that you enjoyed our discussions together as much as I did, and that your visit to Farnborough was successful.

Please convey my best wishes to your wife.

Yours sincerely
Margaret Thatcher

His Excellency Vice President Husni Mubarak

✓ P 50

CONFIDENTIAL

OSG

File

Egypt

3 September 1980

CALL BY VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK

As you know, Vice-President Mubarak called on the Prime Minister yesterday. I enclose a record of the discussion together with copies of the correspondence between President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin which Vice-President Mubarak left with the Prime Minister.

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Stephen Gomersall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, MR. HUSNI MUBARAK,
AT No. 10 DOWNING STREET ON TUESDAY 2 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 1150

PRESENT

The Prime Minister	H.E. Mr. Husni Mubarak
Sir John Graham	H.E. Mr. Abou Se'eda
Sir Michael Weir	Dr. Usama Al Baz
Mr. M. O'D. B. Alexander	

After an exchange of courtesies, Mr. Mubarak asked the Prime Minister whether she had seen the text of President Sadat's latest message to Prime Minister Begin and, on learning that the text was not yet available in London, he handed a copy of the letter, together with copies of earlier exchanges between President Sadat and Mr. Begin, to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister commented favourably on the wording of President Sadat's letter of 27 August.

Mr. Mubarak said that Mr. Begin was trying to impose unilaterally conditions which the Egyptians had rejected earlier in the negotiations. The Knesset had approved a new law on Jerusalem. There seemed to be a threat of a similar law on the status of the Golan Heights being passed. Mr. Begin had repeatedly made unhelpful statements about the settlements on the West Bank and about South Lebanon. The Egyptians had told the Israelis that these actions were damaging the prospects for the negotiations. It was difficult to know how to deal with the Israelis: the Israeli Ambassador to Egypt had conveyed to Vice President Mubarak a private message from Prime Minister Begin saying that while the Israeli Government could not say so publicly everything was in fact negotiable. Having conveyed this message, the Ambassador then went on to make it plain that in fact the position on Jerusalem was not negotiable. Similarly the Israelis were arguing that because the Egyptian press had criticised Mr. Begin, the Egyptian Government had violated the Camp David Agreement. But the Camp David Agreement only referred to hostile propaganda: the articles in the Egyptian press were nothing of the kind. Moreover, the Israeli press criticised the Egyptian Government policy. The Egyptian Government did not suggest that this was a breach of the Camp David Agreement.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The Prime Minister asked whether the Egyptians expected these difficulties to continue so long as Mr. Begin was in charge of the Government. Mr. Mubarak said that President Sadat had suggested a new Summit precisely because he expected Mr. Begin's present obstinacy to last until Israeli elections were held. Mr. Begin had been very angry that President Sadat had made this proposal without previously clearing it with the Israeli side. The Prime Minister commented that there might be a long wait for the Israeli elections since these need not be held until November 1981. A Summit would be a good place to cross examine Mr. Begin and exert pressure on him. Mr. Mubarak said that this was precisely why President Sadat had suggested a Summit. Unfortunately, there seemed to be no chance of a Summit being held before the US elections. ^{The} Egyptians, for their part, were not prepared to resume bilateral negotiations in the present atmosphere. Mr. Linowitz was keen to get negotiations under way but the US Ambassador in Cairo had been told that it would be detrimental to the interests of all parties to propose a new round of negotiations. Mr. Linowitz had just been to Israel and would be seeing President Sadat the following day. Mr. Linowitz would probably indulge in a shuttle in order to give an impression of movement in the period between now and the US elections. The Egyptians did not expect this activity to produce results. Mr. Begin would no doubt continue to demand the resumption of negotiations but his statements were making this impossible. The Prime Minister said that when the Summit was held, it would have to be very carefully prepared. A failed Summit was worse than no Summit. Just as the present atmosphere was not conducive to bilateral negotiations, it was presumably not favourable for a Summit. Mr. Mubarak agreed that the Summit would have to be prepared with care. (Later in the conversation he said that it would have to be "pre-arranged").

The Prime Minister asked how Mr. Mubarak saw Europe's role in the present situation. Mr. Mubarak said that President Sadat had asked him to thank the Prime Minister for her role in the negotiation of the Venice Declaration in June. President Sadat was very satisfied with the Declaration. It represented valuable support for the peace process. It leaned neither to one side nor the other. President Sadat considered it was good for him personally. He was aware of and appreciated the part played by the UK Government in producing the Declaration. The Prime Minister said that the UK had

/set out

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

set out to make it clear that each side would have to recognise the other's rights. The essence of any solution would have to be mutual respect by both sides. But Europe's role in the future was not clear. Should they be seeking to influence Israel; to influence the US to bring pressure to bear on Israel; ^{or} seeking to increase the understanding of other Arab countries for Egypt's problems? Egypt's position was a unique one. It was central to the Arab/Israel dispute and also had a wider East/West dimension because of the Communist threat in territories bordering on Egypt, e.g. Libya and Ethiopia. Egypt was making a great contribution in tackling both sets of problems. Should Europe be seeking increased understanding for this?

Mr. Mubarak said that Europe should be trying to influence the Israelis. If sufficient progress could be made, Egypt's problems with the moderate Arab countries would cease to be of concern. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE only wished to save face. They would be happy to disassociate themselves from the rejectionists who were in the Soviet camp. What bothered them was Jerusalem. In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Mubarak said that Jerusalem was the most sensitive issue from an Arab point of view but not, in his view, the most difficult to resolve. President Sadat was ready to be extremely flexible about Jerusalem. He had already told the Israelis that he was ready to agree to free access for all to both halves of Jerusalem; to councils in Eastern and Western Jerusalem under an overall council for the city. If agreement could be reached on Jerusalem, including the flying of a flag symbolising the special status of the religious area, it would attract the support of 800 million Arabs. President Sadat was willing to look at more or less any alternative provided early progress was made. ^{to the problem} But a solution / of the autonomy of the West Bank was in many ways more difficult to envisage because of the Israeli policy on settlements.

The Prime Minister said that she kept in close touch with Jewish leaders in this country. Mr. Begin's settlement policy had no friends anywhere. It was condemned by the Jewish community here. Nor did the community accept Mr. Begin's ideas on Samaria and Judaea. But they were worried by the PLO and by Communist infiltration into it. They did not object to the PLO because it represented the

CONFIDENTIAL

/Palestinians

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Palestinians - though they did not accept that the PLO were the sole representative of the Palestinians - but because they were financed from Moscow. Mr. Mubarak said that Egypt would, of course, be opposed to the creation of an independent Palestinian State under Soviet influence since this would be a threat to Egypt. But there would be a transitional period after any agreement during which the Palestinians would determine their own future. They could opt to join Jordan. In this transitional period, King Hussein would have a key role. Although the Egyptians could not say so publicly, King Hussein was already preparing the ground and actively working for the solution on these lines. The Saudis and other moderate Arabs would be equally opposed to a Communist Palestinian State. Dr. Al Baz pointed out that an independent Palestinian State would not be viable and would depend on aid from other Arab countries. Moreover, such a State would have to be de-militarised and military aid would be forbidden. Commenting on an observation by Mr. Mubarak that the PLO would grow stronger in the absence of an agreement, the Prime Minister asked whether the Palestinians would be prepared to give up their present military role once a settlement had been reached. Mr. Mubarak said that they would find it difficult to secure finance for such a role. After a settlement, Arab aid would go to developing the West Bank. Dr. Al Baz said that even now the PLO was not basically a military organisation. Only one-tenth of its funds were spent on terrorism and military activity. The rest went on conferences, propaganda, welfare, etc. There was also a good deal of corruption. Moreover, there was a well-established tendency for organisations like the PLO to undergo a form of metamorphosis once they had obtained independent authority. Mr. Mubarak questioned the extent of PLO authority within the Palestinian community. He said that the PLO had no influence among the Palestinians in Jordan. Even on the West Bank much of the leadership was provided by the Mayors. There was, of course, a great deal of intimidation by the PLO but this would change after a settlement. The Prime Minister asked why, in this case, so many Arab States recognised the PLO as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people. Dr. Al Baz said that it was because they were the only organised group. Mr. Mubarak repeated his confidence that moderate Palestinian leaders would emerge after a settlement.

/The Prime Minister asked

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

The Prime Minister asked whether the problem represented by the Palestinians in other Arab States would diminish after a settlement. Mr. Mubarak said that there would be a continuing problem but it would certainly be reduced. The ex-patriate Palestinians would have to behave more moderately than they had in the recent past. It would, after all, be possible for other Governments to expel them since there would be somewhere for them to go. Dr. Al Baz said that the situation would be quantitatively different in the aftermath of a settlement. Sir Michael Weir said that the absence of a solution had tended to create grievances among the Palestinians. Sir John Graham commented that it had also prevented the absorption of Palestinians in Third countries.

The Prime Minister asked whether, if Mr. Begin lost the Israeli elections, there was any likelihood that a settlement would be easier to reach with his successors. Sir Michael Weir said that at least the leaders of a Labour Government in Israel seemed likely to be more open to argument than Mr. Begin. Dr. Al Baz saw two major differences between a Labour Government and Mr. Begin. Their approach to the problem would be more flexible, e.g. they were already encouraging the Jordanians to join in the search for a settlement. Secondly, the Labour Party had links outside Israel and were, therefore, amenable to outside influence. Mr. Begin, on the other hand, had no outside links and wanted none.

Following a brief discussion on the domestic policies of the Egyptian Government, the meeting ended at 1255.



2 September 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Lunch for the Vice President of Egypt
Tuesday, 2 September

I attach the list of guests attending
the lunch tomorrow together with a draft
seating plan.

Do you agree the seating please?

Sue Goodchild
—

Mered

mt

1 September 1980

Copy to: Mr. Denis Thatcher

LIST OF GUESTS ATTENDING THE LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MR. DENIS THATCHER IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND MRS. MUBARAK ON TUESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 1.00 PM FOR 1.15 PM

The Prime Minister
and Mr. Denis Thatcher

His Excellency Mr. Husni Mubarak
and Mrs. Mubarak

Vice President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt

His Excellency the Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt
and Mrs. Seeda

Mr. Ezz El Din Moukhtar

First Chamberlain

Dr. Usama Al Baz

First Under Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Abdul Waheb Zaki

Private Secretary to the
Vice President

Colonel Nazih Helmy

ADC to the Vice President

HM Government
The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames
and Lady Soames

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour, MP

Labour Party

The Hon. Greville Janner, MP
and Mrs. Janner

Industry

The Lord Selsdon

COMET

Mr. G.R. Jefferson
and Mrs. Jefferson

British Aerospace Dynamics
Chairman designate, Post Office

Press

Sir Denis Hamilton

Chairman, Times Newspapers

Mr. Andrew Knight
and Mrs. Knight

Economist

Others

Mr. John Reddaway
and Mrs. Reddaway

Director, CAABU

Mr. Jack Collard
and Mrs. Collard

author of books on Egypt

Officials

Sir Michael Weir
and Lady Weir

HM Ambassador, Cairo

10 Downing Street

Mr. Ian Gow, MP

Mr. Bernard Ingham

Mr. Michael Alexander

DRAFT SEATING PLAN FOR LUNCH ON TUESDAY, 2 SEPTEMBER 1980

Mr. Michael Alexander

Mr. Jack Collard

Mr. Abdul Waheb Zaki
(NAME TO FOLLOW)

Mr. Andrew Knight

Mrs. Reddaway

Sir Michael Weir

Sir Denis Hamilton

Mrs. Janner

Mrs. Jefferson

The Lord Selsdon

The Rt. Hon. Lord Soames

HE The Ambassador of the Arab
Republic of Egypt

MRS. MUBARAK

THE PRIME MINISTER

MR. DENIS THATCHER

HE MR. HUSNI MUBARAK

Mrs. Seeda

The Lady Soames

The Rt. Hon. Sir Ian Gilmour

Mr. Ezz El Din Moukhtar

Dr. Usama Al Baz

Lady Weir

The Hon. Greville Janner

Mr. G.R. Jefferson

Mrs. Knight

Mr. Ian Gow

Col. Nasih Helmy

Mrs. Collard

Mr. John Reddaway

Mr. Bernard Ingham

ENTRANCE

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

29 August 1980

Dear Michael,

VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

Vice President Husni Mubarak is calling on the Prime Minister at 11.45am on Tuesday, 2 September. I attach a brief for the call, a biographical note on the Vice President and a copy of his programme. The Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher may additionally like to see the enclosed notes on possible topics of conversation in preparation for their lunch for the Vice President and his wife on the same day.

The Vice President will be accompanied by the Egyptian Ambassador, Mr Abou Se'eda, (whom the Prime Minister has already met) and probably one other Egyptian official. Both Sir Michael Weir, our Ambassador in Cairo, and Sir John Graham would like to attend from our side. Could you please confirm that this will be acceptable?

*Agreed
mb*

*Yours ever,
Myles*

M A Wickstead
Assistant Private Secretary
to the Lord Privy Seal

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

Speaking Notes

① Pleasure to welcome Vice President Mubarak on official visit to Britain. Although had opportunity to meet him when he was here on a short visit in May and many other distinguished Egyptian visitors have been here in the last year, this visit is the first official visit by an Egyptian leader since the present Government came into office and marks something of a milestone.

② Not necessary to go over the long history of relations between Britain and Egypt. Our relations have had their ups and downs. ^{To-day} But there can have been few times when our interests and concerns have been as close as they are today.

③ We have followed with the greatest admiration President Sadat's quest for peace in the Middle East. Like you, we believe that there can be no solution unless both sides are prepared to recognise the political rights of each other - the Israeli right to secure boundaries and the Palestinians' right to determine their own future. A solution can and must be found for the security of us all. We wish you well in your attempt to work for such a solution and as I made clear at the European Council meeting in Venice we stand ready to play our part.

We also share your concern for the stability of the region and your determination to check the spread of Soviet influence. Afghanistan is a terrible warning to the peoples of the Middle East as it is to the peoples of Western Europe. Egypt, the most populous Arab country, the traditional leader of the Arabs, has a vital role to play in countering this threat.

On the bilateral level, we have much in common. Anglo-Egyptian trade is booming. We are Egypt's second largest overseas market and we, in our turn, are selling almost £300 million worth of goods and services to Egypt every year. We are both anxious to see an increase in British investment in Egypt. And, although our aid programme faces financial pressures, we are proud of the contribution we have been able to make through capital aid and technical co-operation programmes in the fields of technical education, planning and agricultural development.



Our relationship is not only at the level of governments. The British people have great respect and admiration for the Egyptian people. We have always been captivated by the cultural and historical marvels of Egypt - the millions who flocked to see the Tutenkhamen exhibition here testify to this. But our respect is not only for your past but also for your present - for the freedom of expression, the liberalisation of your economy and your sincere and genuine efforts of peace-making.

Great pleasure in welcoming you as a friend and as one of the leaders of a great country. Hope that your visit will lead to even closer contacts between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Toasts - The Queen

- The President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT HUSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT, 1-5 SEPTEMBER 1980

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER, TUESDAY 2 SEPTEMBER

Points to Make

Arab/Israel

1. Continue to wish Egyptian peace efforts well, but appreciate difficulties caused by Israeli actions, eg over Jerusalem. Achievements of Camp David must be built on, not lost.
2. Attitudes on both Arab and Israeli sides hardening. Little can be expected before US elections, but thereafter major effort to make progress required. Nine ready to contribute but still assessing situation on basis of contacts.

East/West Relations

3. Want more constructive East/West relations: not resigned to perpetual confrontation. But Soviet behaviour untrustworthy. Withdrawal from Afghanistan essential before restoration of 'business as usual'.
4. How does Egypt view Soviet aims in the Middle East and Africa?
5. Poland (if raised). Crisis is a Polish internal affair. Hope all countries will recognise this.
6. Afghanistan. UNGA is next opportunity to keep up pressure on Soviet Union. Hope that many countries will renew condemnation of Soviet occupation.
7. Arms for the resistance (defensive). Which do the Egyptians regard as the most effective resistance group? Do Egyptians think the arms reaching the resistance are being used effectively?

Bilateral Relations

8. Hope that cooperation in manufacture of military equipment with British companies (eg Rolls Royce, BAE) can continue despite demise of former AOI. Understand that Egyptians are considering purchase of Hawk and Rapier. Excellent equipment in use with RAF and British Army.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Arab/Israel

1. The autonomy talks remain suspended following the passage of the Knesset law on Jerusalem. The suspension was followed by an increasingly acrimonious exchange of letters between President Sadat and Mr Begin, each seeking to shift the blame on to the other. Both sides, looking particularly to a US audience, stress their desire to continue the talks in the right circumstances. In practice President Sadat has written off any chance of progress before the US elections and has lost faith in Mr Begin's willingness to make any significant concessions. His proposal for a fresh summit after the elections has been received hostilely by the Israelis and non-committally by the Americans. The Americans continue to talk of their desire to see the talks restarted but appear increasingly resigned to at least a lengthy pause.

2. Egypt's relations with the rest of the Arab world remain poor, despite efforts by Morocco and Tunisia to create a greater degree of unity around the common cause of Jerusalem. President Sadat remains committed to the Camp David approach and is contemptuous of rhetoric from the other Arabs. His main objective is to bring the US President (preferably Carter) to put pressure on Israel. He is unlikely to change policy radically as long as he believes this to be possible. But there are some signs that he is flirting with other possibilities in the meantime, including the Romanian idea of a new multilateral conference attended by all the parties, including the PLO and both the US and USSR. The Egyptians have also shown an increasing interest in contacts with Europe and European peace efforts. These are seen primarily as another means of influencing US policy. M. Thorn is visiting Egypt on 30/31 August, as one of the last stops of his tour. On past form he will brief Ambassadors there on his talks and a telegraphic account should be available before the Prime Minister sees Mr Mubarak. The Egyptians are likely to stress the need not to cut across their own efforts but otherwise to encourage Thorn to build on the success of Camp David.

3. M. Thorn has so far been welcomed everywhere, including Israel,

/but

but reactions have varied in substance. The Israelis continue to reject totally the Venice declaration, in particular any role for the PLO and to oppose any significant European role. M. Thorn was depressed by his meeting with Mr Begin. The Arabs on the other hand wish to encourage European efforts (although they do not think the Nine's principles go far enough in their direction to be a basis for a settlement) with a particular view to putting pressure on the Americans. The Arabs have sought to convince M. Thorn that a full peace settlement can be reached if only Israel will withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967 but that this withdrawal must not be accompanied by Israeli preconditions. They have also stressed the need for recognition of the PLO and implementation of Palestinian self-determination but have been vague on what the latter means in practice. M. Thorn is due to present a written report on his first round of contacts to his Nine colleagues on 16 September. The shape of European action thereafter remains open but we are anxious for M. Thorn to maintain his own personal involvement at least until the US elections. Part of his task should be to try to pin down the Arabs, and particularly the Palestinians, on the details of self-determination and their willingness to accept Israel.

East/West Relations

4. Since the expulsion of Soviet advisers in 1972, the Egyptians have sought to counter Soviet influence in the region. Various attempts at reconciliation with Moscow have floundered first on Soviet condemnation of the Camp David agreements and more recently following the invasion of Afghanistan. Egyptians resent Soviet support for the hard line opponents of Camp David and believe that Africa is a prime target for Soviet subversion. They see events in Libya, Chad, the Horn and Sudan as evidence of a Soviet plan to encircle Egypt and give limited military help to Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and probably to some Eritrean rebel groups. Dr Butros Ghali, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs spoke at length to Mr Hurd in December 1979 about the need for the West to help fight Soviet influence in Africa.

Egypt/Iran

5. President Sadat gave refuge to the Shah and his family. The Prime Minister has expressed admiration for this in the House. It seems likely that Empress Farah will now stay in Egypt permanently. Given Egypt's present abhorrence of the Iranian regime she may become a focus for political activity around the Iranian royal family designed to overthrow the present regime.

Afghanistan

6. Egypt, which has admitted supporting the Afghan resistance, with arms, was one of the 32 signatories to a letter asking for Afghanistan to be inscribed on the agenda for the UNGA. There will be an emergency session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in New York prior to the General Assembly. This will meet a commitment made at the Islamic Conference in May. Afghanistan will presumably be discussed.

7. When Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, saw Lord Carrington in July he mentioned the idea of a General Assembly resolution calling for a conference between the countries of the region, the United States, the USSR, the Babrak Karmal regime and perhaps others with the three other permanent members of the Security Council. He thinks a constructive element will be necessary in the resolution this time if it is not to attract less support than in January. We responded that any conference which included the Babrak Karmal regime but excluded the resistance would enhance the status of the regime and play into Russian hands.

Bilateral Relations

8. Anglo/Egyptian relations are good and are maintained by regular ministerial and official visits. Sadat's liberalisation of the Egyptian economy has led to a rapid growth in Anglo-Egyptian trade in recent years. RAF aircraft regularly overfly and occasionally stage in Egypt en route to the Far East and East Africa, and our warships regularly transit the Suez Canal. Egypt's main importance to the UK derives from the extent to which prospects for peace in the Middle East are determined by the policies she follows. Egypt

looks to the UK for political support for weapons and military technology, for military training, as a market for her exports (her second largest in 1979) and for aid.

9. UK companies involved with the former Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) (BAe, Rolls Royce and Westlands) were placed in a difficult position by the break up of the Organization (other Arab states withdrew financial support as a protest against Camp David). The Swingfire missile project has been revived with a new agreement between BAe and the Egyptian rump AOI and Rolls Royce are pursuing new arrangements involving overhaul of helicopter engines. But the Lynx Helicopter/Gem Engine contracts are in suspense. Westlands, but not Rolls Royce, have resorted to arbitration as a way out of the impasse. The former Gulf partners of AOI (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar) have not responded to the arbitration proceedings, but Egypt has resorted to legal action against Westlands in the Egyptian courts. HMG are not a party to these disputes, but hope that profitable business in Egypt for Rolls Royce (refurbishment of MIG 21 aircraft) and Westlands (Sea King helicopter sales) can be preserved despite legal action.

10. Against this background, British defence equipment manufacturers are trying to maintain a footing in what has in recent years been a profitable market for them, but in the face of increasing Egyptian dependence on American equipment supplied under aid and soft loan arrangements. The best prospects for major British sales appear to be for 30 Hawk aircraft (for which Ministers have agreed a special ECGD allocation) and 8 batteries of Rapier anti-aircraft missiles. Both could eventually be suitable for manufacture under licence in Egypt.

CONFIDENTIAL

MUBARAK, MUHAMMAD HUSNI SAID

Vice President (April 1975)

Born 1928. Military Academy 1949. Air Academy 1950. Fighter pilot. Spent considerable periods in 1959 and 1961 in the Soviet Union on navigation courses and instructor courses. Seems to have been closely associated with TU16s since their first delivery to Egypt in late 1951. In 1962 he may have been commanding the TU16s operating over the Yemen. In 1964 he again visited Russia to attend a high level staff course and also headed a mission in the same year to study naval TU16 ASM versions. In January 1966 he was appointed Station Commander of Cairo West Air Field, in 1967 Director of Air Academy and in January 1969 Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force. He was promoted to Air Vice-Marshal in November 1969 and appointed Commander of the Egyptian Air Force in April 1972. Promoted Air Marshal in February 1974.

In the period following the expulsion of the Soviet advisers in July 1972, he was thought to be one of the few top Egyptian officers still acceptable to the Russians. He was employed by Sadat in a military fence-mending exercise at the end of that year, visiting Moscow with Prime Minister Sidqi and leading a military delegation. Despite (or because of) the absence of Soviet advisers his Air Force performed satisfactorily in the secondary role allocated (realistically) to it in the war of October 1973. He proved an efficient and impressive Air Force Commander. Despite his long previous association with the Russians, he has been critical of them in private and has appeared eager to improve relations with the Royal Air Force and to buy British equipment; but he has displayed at least equal enthusiasm for French equipment and his main concern, at least until massive amounts of American military assistance become available, has been to make Egypt independent of any single source of supply. His sudden elevation to the Vice-Presidency came as a considerable surprise. It no doubt owed much to the fact that President Sadat wanted an active 'military' Vice President in order to demonstrate the support of the armed services for his policies. Of all the military commanders, Mubarak was the only one significantly younger than Sadat himself and thus able to ensure continuity of policy. Furthermore he comes from Sadat's own district in the Delta and his loyalty to the President is unquestioned. His political position strengthened significantly in the course of the summer of 1978 as he was prominent in the creation of the National Democratic Party which replaced the old ruling Arab Socialist Union and General Gamassy, with whom he was known to have had disagreements, left the Government.

Over the last two years his influence has continued to increase. Since March 1980 all business destined for the President has been

/routed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

routed through him. The Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs appointed in May 1980 are close to him. He retains the post of Coordinator of Intelligence and was in 1979 appointed to the High Council (Sadat is Chairman) of the AOI. He is Secretary-General of the governing National Democratic Party (Sadat is again Chairman) and in effect runs the Party. He deputises for Sadat as President and Prime Minister frequently. He is in Sadat's company on all major occasions and is clearly trusted by the President. His voice is probably now heard on all government business, and his position as the most likely natural successor to Sadat seems firm.

He is no intellectual but is always friendly and cheerful. His repeated travels abroad have enabled him to rub shoulders with many international statesmen. While he is in no way profound and still apt to express simplistic views, he has become an experienced and accomplished political operator. His affable exterior evidently conceals a degree of ruthlessness since it seems likely that he has conducted some successful political infighting to maintain his position. He has succeeded in ousting or at least surviving all other prominent figures in the government or armed forces. Nevertheless his reputation is free of any taint of corruption or malpractice and he is not thought to have made many enemies.

He allegedly speaks Russian as well as English. His two children speak English as does his wife. They make up an attractive and amusing family who obviously enjoy good living and who make good company.

VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT HUSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT 1-5 SEPTEMBER 1980

Biographies of official party

1. Mr Ezzedine Moukhtair First Chamberlain at the Presidency. Graduated Second Lieutenant from War College 1943. Served and was wounded in Palestine war 1948. Sole Egyptian representative in Decathlon at 1948 Olympics. Specialist in track and field events. 1950-51 Advanced Physical Training course at Aldershot. 1956 Served HQ. 1967 Served at HQ and wounded in battle. Sent as Military Attache to Paris. 1973 War, Deputy Chief Military Spokesman. 1974 appointed to Presidency. Involved in sports administration in Egypt. Former Secretary of Egyptian Olympic Committee. Speaks good English and French.
2. Dr Usama Al Baz First Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Born 1931. After joining the Egyptian Foreign Service he had 7 years leave of absence studying in the US where he obtained a PhD (at either Harvard or MIT). As a result he has never yet served in an Egyptian mission overseas. Nevertheless sometime before 1970 he was appointed as a Counsellor to be the senior instructor in the MFA's training institute. He also worked in the Arab Socialist Union's Youth Secretariat following the dismissal of the left-wing supporters of Ali Sabri in May 1971. In late 1973 or early 1974 Ismail Fahmi (who had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs the previous October) brought him in as deputy head of his private office. Early in 1975 he was promoted Ambassador and replaced the previous Chef de Cabinet, Umar Sirri, on the latter's transfer. Fahmi's resignation in November 1977 did no harm to his meteoric rise: in December 1977 he was in quick succession appointed one of the three Egyptian delegates to the Cairo Conference called by President Sadat after his visit to Jerusalem, named Chef de Cabinet to the Vice-President and promoted within the MFA. He played a leading role in the peace negotiations during 1978, and impressed both the Americans and the Israelis by his technical competence. At Camp David he was the member of the Egyptian delegation who assisted President Carter in drafting the agreements. His detractors argue that he should have used his position to dissuade President Sadat from accepting the two agreements without a more substantial 'link' between them. An interesting personality: of a diminutive stature yet with considerable 'stage presence'. He has an extremely sharp and questioning mind, some charm and a good sense of humour. In short very interesting company but not always easy. He enjoys arguments for their own sake and seems to have no very deep political commitments. His rise has earned him some animosity in the MFA and there is friction between him and Butros Ghali. His brother Faruq has been a senior official with the American NASA (with a crater on the moon named after him) and is also something of a Presidential favourite, being his adviser on scientific matters. His wife Hama, who was one of his pupils at the Diplomatic Institute and then did post-graduate work at Oxford, is a member of the Egyptian Foreign Service presently serving in London. They have one son.

/3. Colonel

3. Colonel Adil Al Bahraw Deputy Chief of Presidency Security Department. Appointed 4/5 years ago to Security Department of the Presidency. Equivalent to full Colonel. Originally an Infantryman.. Keen and quiet.
4. Colonel Gamal Abdel Aziz Private Secretary to the Vice President. Military, sporting background. Graduate of Physical Training Institute. Attached to the Air Force as Private Secretary to Mubarak when he was Commander of the Air Force, transferred with him to Presidency. Vice President's principal squash partner.
5. Hussein Badran Chamberlain at the Presidency
Former Cavalry Officer.
6. Abdel Waheb Zaki Private Secretary to the Vice President
Former Air Force Private Secretary to Mubarak. A former pilot.
7. Colonel Nazih Helmy ADC
Decorated with Egypt's highest medal, the Sinai Decoration, for his part in the 1973 war.

The official party will be accompanied throughout by the Egyptian Ambassador,

HE Hasan Ali Aban Se'eda Ambassador to London since February 1980. Born 13 October 1930. BSc in Military Science 1949. Graduate of the War College, Nasser Military Academy.

As a Major-General command the 2nd Infantry Division in the 1973 war. Subsequently Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Third Army and then until 1977 Commander of the Western Military Zone. He held this post during the Egypt/Libya confrontation of July 1977. Director of Operations of the Egyptian Armed Forces from 1978 until his posting to London.

Reputed to be a protege of President Sadat and one of the most popular officers in the Egyptian Armed Forces.

Married with one son.

VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT HUSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT 1-5 SEPTEMBER 1980

Topics of conversation - Vice President Mubarak

Mubarak speaks English well. He is affable and unstuffy and there should be no difficulty in discussing a wide variety of issues with him particularly since he now has responsibility in all sections of government.

1. Party organisation Mubarak has played a leading role from the beginning in the establishment of the Egyptian National Democratic Party and is now Secretary-General. He should be interested in all aspects of Party organisation, especially ways of reaching grass roots opinion. He has recently been chairing a party committee which has been selecting party candidates for the new Second Chamber, the Maglis Al Shura. His views will be of interest on the role of this new consultative body compared with other second chambers (eg the House of Lords), and on the relationship between government and opposition in Egypt.

2. Land Reclamation and Housing Egypt has a major programme of reclaiming the desert and constructing new cities away from existing scarce agricultural land. Such cities are 10th Ramadan (which is well advanced) and Sadat city (which is just beginning). British companies hope to play a major role in the West Nubariya Land Reclamation project near Alexandria, and British consultants have played an important part in designing low cost housing in the three canal towns of Suez, Ismailia and Port Said.

3. Aircraft Mubarak is an accomplished pilot and will have views on civil as well as military air developments. He was Air Force Commander during the 1973 war with Israel. We are grateful for permission for Concorde to overfly Egypt en route to the Gulf.

4. Suez Canal The Canal is still well run, and brings in valuable foreign exchange. Widening to permit two-way traffic, should be complete by the end of this year. Britain is proud to have been associated with Arab contractors in constructing the first tunnel under the Canal, the Ahmed Hamdy tunnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Dealing with the Russians Mubarak has visited the Soviet Union on several occasions and reportedly speaks Russian. In the period following the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972 he was employed by Sadat in a military fence-mending exercise with Moscow. Nevertheless despite his long association with the Russians he has been highly critical of them and their role in Egypt.
6. Vocational Training Britain is making a major contribution to the development of technical training in Egypt, through schools such as Moharrem Ebey in Alexandria. We are fortunate in having experts who adapt modern techniques to local conditions.
7. Tourism There is tremendous potential for development in Egypt. Western tourists are increasing and Arabs now coming back after the breach over the treaty with Israel. Hotels are being built in Cairo but there will be a bottleneck in Luxor. Egyptians also visit the UK in large numbers each year.
8. Oil Egypt now produces almost twice the oil it consumes. Agreements with foreign companies including Shell and BP work well. There are prospects of further finds, particularly of gas. Petrol in Egypt is probably the cheapest in the world.
9. Egyptian medicine Already famous throughout the Arab world for its doctors, Egypt has gained increased recognition in Britain for the work of Dr Magdi Yacoub, the heart transplant surgeon at the Hammersmith Hospital. There are close links between the medical professions in the two countries.
10. Princess Alexandria's visit (November 1978) This was an unqualified success. The Princess enjoyed her visit and had expressed interest in maintaining a connection with Egypt. She met the Mubaraks at dinner with President Sadat and Mrs Mubarak came, with Mrs Sadat, to the Premiere of 'Death on the Nile'.
11. Sport Mubarak is a keen squash player. Egyptians are good squash players, as they are good swimmers. They have some good young tennis players.

VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT HUSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT 1-5 SEPTEMBER 1980

Topics of conversation - Mrs Mubarak

Mrs Mubarak speaks good English. Her mother, who died two years ago, was Welsh. Her British relations, however, should not be referred to unless mentioned by the Mubaraks themselves. It is thought that they may wish to play the connection down.

1. Social work About three years ago in association with the American University of Cairo (where she is a pupil) Mrs Mubarak started a project in one of the poorest areas of Cairo to develop local primary schools as centres for the community. Helped by a group of Egyptian ladies, but without fanfare or open soliciting of funds, she has already considerable achievements to her credit. The group now sponsors five primary schools for boys and girls from the ages of six to twelve. They start by improving the buildings, trying to raise the standards of the staff, and providing a square meal a day for each child, medical checks annually and equipment such as libraries, on which Mrs Mubarak is particularly keen. They are working to keep the children occupied in the summer holiday months by using school premises for PT, games, art and music classes, and their activities extend to the families of the children and their problems.
2. Mrs Mubarak's studies She took a degree in Sociology at the American University of Cairo from 1972-76 and is continuing her studies there for a master's degree.
3. Women in Egypt Since the 1920s women have played a significant part in Egyptian political life. Educated and emancipated Egyptian ladies do not welcome moves by Islamic groups to put women back behind the veil. Family planning is an area of vital importance to Egypt where Mrs Sadat has given a lead. We are helping in Upper Egypt to the tune of £5 million.
4. The Ballet She is fond of the ballet and will be disappointed that the party could not arrive in time for an evening at the Royal

/Festival

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Festival Hall to see 'La Sylphide'.

5. The Family The Mubarak family is close. The two sons, Alaa (aged about 20) and Gamal (aged about 16) are both studying economics at the American University of Cairo; Gamal, who is said to be particularly intelligent, having recently started there. The boys are interested in waterskiing, football and tennis and popular music.

OUTLINE PROGRAMME

MONDAY 1 SEPTEMBER

- 1910 hrs * Arrival by Special Aircraft at London
 Heathrow Airport.
- * Met by Minister of State for Foreign and
 Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Peter Blaker, MP
- 1955 Arrive Claridge's, Brook Street, W1.
(approx)

TUESDAY 2 SEPTEMBER

- 1015 Arrive Ministry of Defence, Main Building.
- Call on the Secretary of State for Defence,
 The Rt Hon Francis Pym, MP
- 1050 Leave Ministry of Defence
- 1100 Arrive Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
- Call on the Lord Privy Seal
 The Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour, MP
- 1142 Leave the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
- 1145 Arrive 10 Downing Street
- Call on the Prime Minister
 The Rt Hon Margaret Thatcher, MP
- 1300 Luncheon given by Her Majesty's Government for
for Vice President and Mrs Mubarak
- 1315

Hosts : The Prime Minister and Mr Denis Thatcher

pm No official engagements

1600 Press Conference given by Dr Usama Al Baz at Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 75 South Audley Street, W1.

1800 hrs Reception given by His Excellency the
to Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt and
1930 Mrs Abou-Seé da at Egyptian Embassy.

Arrive Lancaster House, St James's, SW1.

2015 Dinner given by Her Majesty's Government
for at Lancaster House

2030 Host : The Secretary of State for Defence,
The Rt Hon Francis Pym, MP

WEDNESDAY 3 SEPTEMBER

0940 Depart Battersea Heliport in Wessex Helicopter of The Queen's Flight.

1000 Arrive RAE Farnborough.

1005 Coffee in the President's Chalet.

1030 Tour of Farnborough International 80 Exhibition and Static Aircraft Park under arrangements made by SBAC.

1300 Luncheon in the President's Chalet.
Host : Mr Eric Beverley, President SBAC.

1400 View Flying Display.

1640 Depart RAE Farnborough by Wessex Helicopter
of The Queen's Flight.

1700 Arrive Battersea Heliport.

2000 Dinner given by Her Majesty's Government at
for 1 Carlton Gardens.

2015 Host : The Lord Privy Seal,
The Rt Hon Sir Ian Gilmour, MP

THURSDAY 4 SEPTEMBER

Visit to Royal Automobile Club, Epsom

Return to London in the afternoon

2015 Dinner given by His Excellency the Ambassador of
for the Arab Republic of Egypt and Mrs Abou-Seéda
2030 at the Egyptian Embassy.

FRIDAY 5 SEPTEMBER

0815 Depart from London Heathrow Airport by Special
Aircraft.

Special Representative of the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Sir Donald Logan,
will bid farewell.



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

27 August 1980

Thank you for your letter of 26 August, about proposals for a dinner party on 1 September in honour of the Egyptian Vice-President.

The Prime Minister would be entirely content for Mark Thatcher to be included but he is at present abroad, and is not expected to return to this country before the weekend. We have no knowledge of his engagements next week.

If you want to pursue the idea, you could contact Caroline Stephens here, so that she could leave a message for Mark Thatcher to see on his return. But this would leave a question mark over one of the guests until the last moment.

We shall take no further action on this unless the Department approaches Caroline Stephens.

M. A. PATTISON

Christopher Jebb Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

TWC



The President

August, 27, 1980

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter dated August 18. When I sent you my first letter, it was not my intention to start any rhetorical or polemical exchange which would not serve any useful purpose. Rather, I was motivated solely by my keen desire to explore every available avenue to ascertain whether a common ground existed for the resumption of the autonomy talks. In my opinion, such common ground would consist of the willingness of both parties to create, by their actions and deeds alike, a favorable atmosphere for reaching agreement. Having gone that far in the current exchange of letters and views, I think that it is neither necessary nor helpful to go further in arguing for this or that position.

I am certain that you know quite well that we have not violated, or attempted to violate, any commitment we made under the peace accords. Our record bears out this fact. We said repeatedly that we would honor all our commitments and you know that we always keep our word regardless of the risks or challenges involved. Our experiment in peace - making in my opinion, needs all the understanding and sincerity we can give. I am sure that you agree with me that we should spare no effort to promote confidence and friendship between our peoples. I also believe that it is a historic inevitability that we will reach agreement sooner or later, on all outstanding issues. I do not want either of us to look back and say; was it really

..!...



The President

- 2 -

necessary to make all these complications? What was the whole point?

Given the present circumstances, I still believe that our common interest is better served by a summit conference at the proper time. Let us look forward to a meaningful and fruitful meeting.

With best wishes,

Mohammed Anwar El Sadat



✓ Sue Goodhill

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 August 1980

Dear Mike,

We spoke this morning about the Egyptian Vice-President's official visit to the United Kingdom next week.

Because of a last minute change in the Vice-President's travel plans, our Department is now trying to rearrange a dinner party at Admiralty House at 9pm (approximately) on 1 September. The suggested guest list so far includes:

Vice President, wife and two sons
Mr & Mrs Luce
Two members of Egyptian party
Mr R Banks MP
Lady Egremont
Head and Deputy Head of FCO Geographical Department

Our Geographical Department feel that it would be appropriate to extend an invitation to Mark Thatcher, as the Vice President's two sons will be at the dinner.

I should be grateful for early advice as to whether this is possible or not.

*Yours ever
C. G. Jebb.*

(C Q G Jebb)
Assistant Private Secretary

M Pattison Esq
10 Downing Street

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, August 18, 1980

Dear President Sadat,

I thank you for your letter which reached me on August 15. I have read it with no less attention than I did your previous communication and I will gladly respond to the seven points you raise. But let me start with a reflection on the passage at the end of your introduction.

You write to me: "The story of the Israelites began in the land of Egypt. It is apparent that it is the will of God Almighty that the story would find its completion in Egypt also."

His Excellency
Mohammed Anwar El Sadat
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

./2

The history of the people of Israel did not begin in Egypt. It started in the country from which I write this response. In those ancient days the country was called Canaan. Abram (he was not yet Abraham) arrived in Canaan directly from Haran, which he reached after having left Ur-Kasdim (Mesopotamia). Thus, is it recorded in the Book which is the inspiration of monotheism:

"And Abram passed through the land unto the place of Schem unto Eilon Moreh and the Canaanite was then in the land. And the Lord appeared unto Abram and said, unto thy seed will I give this land..." (Genesis, Chapter 12, Verses 6;7).

Since the days of the Prophet Samuel, Canaan was called Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel ("Now there was no smith found throughout all the land of Israel" - 1 Samuel, Chapter 13, Verse 19). Only in the second century of the Christian era did the Roman Emperor Hadrianus, having crushed the revolt of Bar Kochba with the help of legions, from Britain and Germany, rename the land, Syria et Paleastina. The origin of this name stems from our ancient enemies, the Philistines, and thus did it enter into the common usage of many nations. The mighty Emperor also renamed, or misnamed Jerusalem, Aelia Capitolina. Except for students of ancient history, this name is now almost completely forgotten.

To go back to Canaan, or the Land of Israel, and to its association with Egypt - old Abram spent a short time in Egypt and then returned to Canaan. Only his grandson, Jacob, named also Israel, descended (to use the Biblical expression) with all his family to Egypt and there the events unfolded as described in the Book. In their wake the children of Israel returned to Canaan, just as we, the descendents of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob - Israel, returned through the course of history, time and again, having never severed our ties with this land of our ancestors. Throughout the generations Jews have never left the Land and have always dwelt in it.

None of us mortals can know the will of God Almighty, but surely as the history of the Egyptian people will find its completion in Egypt, so the history of the Jewish people will find both its expression and consummation in their own land, the Land of Israel.

1. "Both parties should refrain from arguing for the sake of escalating the disagreement and creating unnecessary rifts." These are your words. I agree with them without qualification. However, it is my duty to bring to your attention a quotation from an article which appeared in the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Gomhuriya, several days ago:

"Begin requested clarification. We will not give a clarification, we will offer an apology. We apologize to the late Hitler. Hitler did not kill the will for peace of the nations of the world but made of it a hope and a goal. Hitler did not kill the will of the Jews to live but intensified their dedication to life. He, above all, was responsible for the establishment of the State of Israel for it was he who brought every Jew to dream about the Land of the Return as he sees it. But

Menachem Begin is the one who kills the hope for peace in the hearts of men in Egypt, Israel and the Arab countries."

I shall withhold direct comment for a while.

You will recall that on May 27, 1980, I wrote to you a private, confidential letter in which I quoted from another article in a Cairo newspaper, Al-Akhbar, which wrote:

"Hitler was an extreme racist who called for the rule of the Aryan race over the whole world. Begin (is) an extreme racist who calls for the rule of the Jews over all races in the world, claiming that he belongs to the chosen people," etc. etc.

Our Ambassador, Dr. Eliyahu Ben Elissar, brought to you my letter. General Ali, your Foreign Minister, was present at the meeting. Since it was

a confidential diplomatic exchange, I will not now divulge its contents. But I can cite you as saying that in your opinion - which you clearly expressed - my complaint was completely justified. In the wake of that article came the cartoon in which Hitler bestows medals upon me; notably the swastika, and now comes the above-mentioned "apology" - to the late Adolph Hitler.

Mr. President, I do not complain any more. I desist from doing so. I wish, only, to analyse together with you what was said in the capital of Egypt of somebody whom you called your friend.

As you know, I did not ask for any "clarification," as the author of the above-quoted paragraph asserts. I only drew your attention to what was written in Al-Akhbar. But now we have before us for all to read the "apology". It is the most shameful profanity ever written since a long,

rambling speech was published in the form of a book called "Mein Kampf." I would wish the editor of Al-Gomhouriya success in getting the forgiveness of Herr Hitler.

He stated, moreover, that Hitler made peace a "hope and a goal;" that "he did not kill the will of peace," etc. He only killed tens of millions of people in order to make the Aryan race the ruler of the whole world. "Hitler did not kill the will of the Jews to live ...;" he only ordered to shoot them, to bury them alive, to gas them, to burn them, to drown them, to annihilate six million men, women, children and babies. He only killed a million-and-a-half Jewish children, torn from the arms of their mothers. How many Einsteins, Bergsons, Freuds, sages, philosophers, writers, poets, might, would, have emanated out of them? And yet the good Egyptian people is being informed and educated on the newest theory that Hitler "intensified the Jews' dedication to life!"

Above all, "Hitler was responsible for the establishment of the State of Israel ...". Quoting this heresy, I cannot but say, God Almighty! in whom we both believe - not the builders, the pioneers, the fighters for freedom, the prisoners, the executed heroes, the generation of the holocaust, the revolt, the heroism, the victory, the redemption - none of these are responsible for the renewal of our independence; but who is responsible? The enemy of mankind who "scientifically" massacred millions of potential citizens of that Jewish State.

After all this, you advise me that both parties "should refrain from arguing for the sake of escalating the disagreement ...". But what is even more serious and dangerous, you write in paragraph seven: "It is a law of nature, not only of physics, that every action has a reaction which is basically similar in kind and degree." In deep sorrow I must say that the venomous

campaign continues daily and even escalates, whilst your own words could, perhaps, unintentionally be construed by editors and journalists as justification for all the hostility - including that "apology" to the late Hitler - which has become the dominant tone of the Egyptian press.

2. Hostile propaganda is clearly forbidden by our mutual peace treaty, and in my previous letter, I brought clear proofs of such conduct by your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - in Africa, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Most recently there was the communique signed by him in Bucharest which is a complete departure from the Camp David agreement. It is, therefore, my sad duty to register for the sake of truth and for the record, that Egypt is not fulfilling its commitment under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to abstain from hostile propaganda.

3. On settlements, you write that I gave an undertaking at Camp David "to observe a moratorium on building new settlements for the duration of the negotiations. It was understood by all sides that the negotiations referred to in this commitment were the autonomy talks."

This statement does not conform to the facts as confirmed in the minutes of the Camp David talks. The document I hold before me is a letter addressed by me to President Carter on September 17, 1978.

I quote:

"Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to inform you that during the agreed period of negotiations (three months) for the conclusion of the peace treaty no new settlements will be established in the area of the Government of Israel.

Sincerely yours,

Menachem Begin"

Not only did I stress the negotiations for the peace treaty (meaning, of course, between Egypt and Israel) but I intentionally noted in parenthesis "three months," which was the time we allotted in the Camp David Framework for Peace to conclude our negotiations; (in fact, they took six months). This, and no other, was our commitment we gave on settlements and that undertaking came to an end on December 17, 1978. It never entered my mind to give a commitment lasting for the then indefinite duration of negotiations concerning the autonomy for the Arab inhabitants in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

I do not claim that because of my letter to President Carter, as quoted above, we have the agreement of the United States Government to construct new settlements. I merely made clear both Israel's undertaking and when it would come to an end. Did not your advisors inform you of the contents of my letter on the day we signed the Camp David accords in Washington D.C.? I, for my part, made the matter crystal clear.

The statement I made in my last letter of August 4 in response to your demand that all settlements in Judea, Samaria, etc. be removed is termed by you, "negativism". I wonder. I said in the Aswan press conference: "We are no foreigners to this land ... we have a perfect right to live there." And when one says that Jews and Arabs can live together (and I remember your enthusiasm on seeing Jews and Arabs living together in Haifa) - what is that? Negativism? I believe that from the moral point of view the concepts should be reversed. We stand by our positive position.

4. On Jerusalem, I have told you everything I can, both orally and in writing. I do not wish now to repeat either the contents of the documents I attached to my previous letter nor my statements during our friendly talks. You have our position.

Jerusalem is our capital, one city, indivisible, with guaranteed free access to the holy places for all religions. Prince Fahd, of oil-rich Saudi Arabia, therefore, calls on his Arab brothers to march on Israel in a holy war - jihad. We are not impressed. You know me by now. I hate war with every fibre of my soul. I love peace. My colleagues and I made great sacrifices for the sake of peace. If there are, anywhere, ungrateful men who prefer to forget what we did and the sacrifices we made for the sacred cause of peace - then let them buy oil, let them sell arms, let them be friends of tyrants like the ruler of Iraq (to mention just one), let them sell principles and dignity - they will not change the irrefutable facts.

The threats of Prince Fahd are of no concern to us. He does not know - how can he? - what this generation of Jews, who suffered the indescribable fall and the unprecedented triumph, is capable of sacrificing

and doing in order to defend the people, the country, Jerusalem. He may have the billions of petro-dollars; we have the motivation in the service of a just cause.

But let it be known to all: We do not want military victories. We want peace - for our people and for the other nations. And we were glad to note that Egypt did not concur with Saudi Arabia's war slogan.

Jerusalem, of course, is indivisible and is a part of this peace. You write to me again that Jerusalem should be undivided under two sovereignties. This, I must admit, I do not understand. I do not blame anybody for my inability to comprehend. But I say to you, in full candor, I simply do not grasp the idea. I do not understand the project to have one city under two sovereignties, or two sovereignties over one city.

5. On Resolution 242 you mention semantics: "all the territories;" "the territories;" "territories". To us, the Israelis, these are no mere semantics. The two initial formulae (containing the definite article) were proposed in those almost forgotten days of November 1967, but they were rejected. Their rejection was deliberate and meaningful. Written into Resolution 242 are the words, "from territories," and by those words we are in no sense committed to carry out what is called "complete withdrawal."

This is also one of the reasons why we did not withdraw to the pre-1967 armistice lines on the southern sector. You mention Sinai. Of course, there we made the greatest sacrifices for the sake of peace. But, under the Camp David accords and the peace treaty, Israel did not withdraw behind the 1967 Gaza District armistice line. This fact, this example, should not be ignored when we deal with other sectors. There is

a general concensus in Israel, by all parliamentary parties except for the Communists, not to retreat in any sector, East, North or South, to the pre-4th June, 1967, armistice lines.

6. When I asked you: Can Egypt bring representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, to the negotiation table, you replied with another question: "And what did you do to encourage them?" Allow me to answer.

You speak about "repression." I would be interested to know what would any country, Egypt included, have done if its citizens were assassinated, its children massacred and all this under the slogan to liquidate the "Zionist entity" which is Israel? I remember certain events in your country and the inescapable reaction of the authorities in charge. Let not the blameless be blamed for the guilt of the murderers.

Permit me to remind you again what I stressed in my last letter, that the boycott by the Palestinian Arabs of the autonomy talks began ab initio, even before we started our talks and immediately after the signing of the Camp David agreement.

7. And now, I come to the final point. As I understand it, at the end of your letter you make a double suggestion:

a) Not to renew our autonomy talks until after November 4, 1980, on an undefined date following the elections in the United States.


b) After that date, to hold a tripartite summit conference in which you, President Carter and I will participate.

Dear President Sadat,

If I understood you well, I feel it my duty to ask you: Why again for the fourth time does Egypt interrupt, or suspend, or disrupt our talks? Why should we not continue with our negotiations? You always contend that a solution is urgent. Were we to accept your suggestion, we would have agreed to a suspension of nearly six months or more. That is a long time indeed. Where is the sense of urgency? You, yourself, tell me that our world is one of plurality, of different opinions. Such difference of opinion exists between us as well. Of course, it takes at least two to negotiate. However, if you persist in your negative attitude, the negotiations will remain disrupted for the simple and only reason that Egypt repeatedly suspends the talks. On our side, I repeat our suggestion to renew without any further delay the tripartite autonomy negotiations.

And, what of the "summit" idea? I understand that President Carter was not consulted. Permit me to say that both he and I should have been consulted through a diplomatic, confidential exchange. Let us at least now, however, quietly consider the matter, the venue and the date should all three parties accept the principle itself. This should not, under any circumstances, preclude the renewal and the uninterrupted continuation of the autonomy talks. This is my concrete, positive suggestion to you.

With best wishes,


Menachem Begin

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

August 14

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Thank you for your letter dated August 4.

I am pleased to learn that you have fully recovered and that you are able now to assume your responsibilities.

I am glad, also, that you reiterated, anew, your commitment to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. This commitment, which we share, constitutes the very foundation of the peace process which was set in motion by my journey to Jerusalem and was reinforced by our joint effort thereafter. However, you would certainly agree with me that, for this commitment to be meaningful, it should not stop at the verbal assertion. Rather, it must be reflected in the actual behaviour of the parties concerned.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(2)

On the other hand, you spoke, in your letter, of the necessity for having a dialogue among us on the essential issues under consideration. I agree. But let us first agree that a real dialogue entails a genuine exchange of views for the purpose of reaching agreement. If any party raises certain points of substance, they should be examined carefully and be given adequate attention by the other party in the spirit of mutual accommodation and understanding. Both parties should refrain from arguing for the sake of escalating the disagreement and creating unnecessary rift. The overriding factor should be seeking the truth and common interest.

Let me discuss with you another side issue before getting into the main points of

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(3)

substance. Several Israeli officials have been stating, privately or in public, that Israel considers all the issues negotiable and, hence, it would be quite willing to discuss them. I know that you told former British Prime Minister Callaghan that you considered everything negotiable except one thing: the destruction of Israel. This is a healthy and positive attitude. But let us agree on the meaning of the word "negotiable". To my mind; the connotation of the term goes beyond the formal or procedural scope of placing the subject on the agenda. There is another substantive and practical aspect, namely that both parties should be open-minded and defer any judgment or action to the end of the negotiations. All actions

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(4)

or measures should reflect the outcome of the talks rather than the arbitrary will of one party. A party who acts in good faith should do his best to keep the issue in a "neutral position" throughout the talks so that the negotiators may find a happy solution freely and in the spirit of mutuality. Parties should refrain from any action which is designed or likely to predetermine the outcome of the negotiations. This is the negotiability as I see it.

Having said that, I find it necessary to set the record straight with respect to several points which you referred to in your letter. I am doing so, not only

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(5)

for the sake of the truth, but most importantly, for the sake of peace and better understanding between our peoples. Therefore, I will confine myself, as usual, to stating the facts in objective terms and in the hope that this may enable us to see events and their implications more clearly and succinctly. In all that, I am inspired by the unique surroundings. The thoughts which I am sharing with you now occurred to me as I was on the peak of Mount Moses, reciting the Koran and worshipping God in this sacred part of the land of Egypt which witnessed the birth of a great mission. As I was reciting the Koran on this unparalleled spot, I became more certain of a fact I have stated

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(6)

before ... that my peace initiative was a sacred mission. The story of the Israelites began in the land of Egypt. It is apparent that it is the will of God almighty that the story would find its completion in Egypt also. This is the destiny of Egypt and its people. Such is a sacred mission perhaps no other country is equally qualified to fulfil.

Let us proceed, now, to examine together the following facts:

First:

That the formula we agreed upon at Camp David with respect to the Palestinian question does not constitute a final solution. This is so, not only in accordance with the explicit

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(7)

language used in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, but also because none of the participants in that summit had the right to impose a settlement on the Palestinian people. You would recall that I made a statement to that effect in the first encounter between us. What we agreed upon was merely a transitional arrangement for a limited period of time. Hence, all provisions and arrangements for this transitional period are temporary in duration. It is incorrect to claim that the insertion of the phrase "and beyond" in the section related to security measures in the "Framework" meant that any security arrangements which are agreed upon for

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(8)

the transitional period are extended ipso facto beyond the transitional period. This is merely a reminder of the need to devise certain security measures in the interest of both parties, in the course of the second phase of the negotiations.

As it is only a transitional period, certain issues were deferred to the next set of negotiations where the Palestinians can have their say and actively participate in determining the outcome. These matters are related to the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. However, several principles and criteria were laid down in the "Framework" so that the negotiators will not be starting from a vacuum.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(9)

Second:

Related to this is the fact that the Camp David accords addressed themselves squarely to the question of Jerusalem. It would be wrong to say that the Camp David formula is blank so far as Jerusalem is concerned. You will certainly recall that, throughout our conversations in Camp David, the issue of Jerusalem figured quite prominently. The draft "Framework for Comprehensive peace in the Middle East" I presented to you and to our friend President Carter on September 6, 1978, i.e., prior to the beginning of the Camp David talks devoted an article to the subject and laid down a comprehensive formula that safeguarded the interests of all

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(10)

those concerned. Four U.S. drafts submitted on September 11, 12, 13, 16 contained similar, though not quite comprehensive, provisions. When I found the proposed text inadequate with respect to Jerusalem, I requested President Carter to delete it. Thus, the overall solution of the problem was deferred to the stage of the final settlement. While the three participants in the Camp David Summit registered their respective positions, certain aspects of the question were dealt with directly or otherwise in the Framework even during the transitional period. Section A of Framework institutes a transitional regime for the West Bank and Gaza. The term "West Bank" comprises East

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(11)

Jerusalem by any geographic or political standard. This is a universal consensus of which Israel can not detract. No nation has recognized the unilateral annexation of Arab Jerusalem. It is on this basis that your representatives at the autonomy talks have been discussing with ours such issues as the voting right of the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem within the context of electing the S G A . On the other hand, paragraph A(c) of the Framework laid down the legal foundation for the negotiated final settlements. Prominent on the list was the following item:

"all the provisions and principles of U N Security Council Resolution 242".

As you well know, that Resolution contains a total prohibition against the acquisition

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(12)

of territory by war. As East Jerusalem was seized during the 1967 war, that provision applies to it, not only in our view, but also in the view of the entire World community. How far can these realities be ignored?

In your letter, you made a distinction between the rights and sentiments of Muslims and Christians with regard to Jerusalem on the one hand and the Jewish people on the other. I think that this distinction is unwarranted and unfounded. All believers in God, the people of the scripture that is, hold the city high in their thought and heart. It is part of their cultural and spiritual heritage. All of them have both rights and strong spiritual attachment to that holy place which

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(13)

symbolizes the oneness of the Divine truth.
I need not illustrate on the historical
and spiritual aspects of this unique bond.
As to the Palestinian people, Arab
Jerusalem acquires the added dimension
of being part of their national rights
as well. This is a reality no one can
escape from or disregard.

You stated, also, that the formula
I have proposed for solving the problem
of Jerusalem constituted what you called
"a contradiction in terms". I beg to
differ. I see no contradiction whatsoever
between the existence of two sovereignties
and the administrative or municipal unification
of the City. Many Israelis and prominent

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(14)

leaders of Jewish communities abroad did not fail to see the logic of this imaginative prescription for reconciliation and harmonious coexistence between the followers of the World's greatest faiths. To insist on a rigid solution based on the logic of "all or nothing at all", as advocated by the rejectionists on both sides, would be a grave historic mistake. It does nothing but perpetuate the conflict and deepen friction among cousins who should devote their efforts to a more creative and positive endeavor.

Third:

You asked, in your letter, whether the settlements were mentioned at all in the Camp David accord. Let me seize this

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(15.)

opportunity to clarify this point. You certainly remember that, in Camp David, we spoke extensively of the necessity to end all settlement activities in the occupied Arab territories and withdraw the settlers in order to rehabilitate them in their own country instead of seizing other peoples' land. In view of the stand you took and the considerations you mentioned then, the commitments you made with respect to the settlements were not entered in the main text of the accord. Instead, they took the form of two undertakings from you to President Carter which were conveyed to us. The first one referred to Israeli settlements in Sinai while the other was related to settlements in

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(16)

the West Bank and Gaza, In the former undertaking, you promised to submit a motion before the Knesset within two weeks for a vote on the removal of Israeli settlers from Sinai. In the second commitment, you undertook to observe a moratorium on building new settlements for the duration of the negotiations. It was understood by all sides that the negotiations referred to in this commitment were the autonomy talks. The first commitment was honored and it contributed greatly to the beginning of the process of implementing the peace accords. I will not dwell, here, on the fate of the second commitment, for this is not the purpose of my letter. Suffice it to say that the understanding was

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(17)

that the issue would be subject to review in the negotiations in which the Palestinians are to participate. You are aware of the universal rejection of the settlement policy pursued by your government. Its adverse reaction is not confined to a certain group of countries. Most of Israel's traditional supporters took the same critical view, including Jewish communities everywhere. It might be appropriate to mention here what I said on this point at the National Press Club in Washington on April 10, 1980:

"The policy of building Israeli settlements in Arab occupied territories is a serious obstacle to peace. It is unfounded, ill-conceived and illegal. It generates

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(18)

hatred and friction. It is the worst formula for co-existence. In fact it is an invitation to further violence and unrest. Much has been said about the right of Jews to live anywhere. Certainly, all peoples must be treated equally and without any discrimination. However, no people has any right to live in other peoples' territory without their consent and free acceptance. To say otherwise would not only run contrary to the norms of international law and legitimacy, but it would also create a dangerous precedent none of us can live with. The effort which is wasted on such futile exercises should be directed towards imaginative ways

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(19)

and means for promoting peace and good-neighborly relations".

At this point, I think that it is useful to help you recollect our conversation in El-Arish, a conversation which, in my opinion, should not have given rise to any controversy. Without getting into the details, the gist of what I told you was that we should look at the case as a whole and in all its aspects, rather than the Israeli-Egyptian dimension of it. in this context; I said that if we agree on an imaginative solution to the questions of Jerusalem and the settlements, we would be willing to consider providing you with water for the purpose of rehabilitating the settlers

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(20)

in new quarters in the Negev; i.e., in their own land. As I told you then, I was willing to do that in order to find a way out of this dilemma for all the parties involved. It is common knowledge that I take it upon myself to find a way out for my Arab brothers although I am under no obligation to do that. Here, I am motivated solely by my unshakable commitment to peace between Arabs and Jews. To this end, I have taken many risks and I remain willing to double my effort, despite the negative attitude of those who were supposed to bear this responsibility with me. This is a historic mission I fully accept. If the generous offers I make for

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(21)

the sake of peace are neither appreciated nor acted upon, we will have to start with a clean slate, but we will not be deterred in our holy search for peace and justice for all the peoples of the area.

I regret the fact that you made a sweeping statement in your letter that none of the settlements in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights will ever be removed . This is the kind of statement that should be avoided under all circumstances. By saying that, are you precluding the possibility that the parties might agree on the removal of these settlements in the future ? Is this what you

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(22)

call "the negotiability of all issues?"

Fourth:

I think that it is a disservice to the Camp David accord to say that it did not contain one word about the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. As you well know, the Camp David formula makes the determination of the final status of the West Bank and Gaza subject to the second stage negotiations to be held within three years. However, there are certain unmistakable indications in the "Framework" as to which form this determination should take. Let me quote here the following sentence from Section A(c) of the Framework":

The solution from the negotiations must

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(23)

also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian People and their just requirements."

What are these rights if they do not include the fundamental right to self-determination which is part of the jus cogens of the contemporary world?!

When we call for recognizing the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, we are by no means taking a new position. In my address to the Israeli people on November 20, 1977 I stated our position in no ambiguous terms. I said: "If you have found the legal and moral justification for establishing a national home on a land which was not entirely owned by you, a fortiori, you should understand the determination of the Palestinian people

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(24)

to reestablish their state on their land."

Fifth:

Linked to this, is your claim that Security Council Resolution 242 does not call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. Unwilling to get into an argument of this nature, I would merely mention that we should not indulge into such semantic arguments which belong to the past. The question is not one of the insertion or absence of a definite article here or there. Ideally, it should not even be one of a given text at all. The stake is too high for all of us to hinge on a word, a sentence or even on a whole text. It is a matter of will to establish a just peace of which all the parties benefit. The remaining

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(25)

details are nothing but technicalities. But if it a matter of interpretation of Resolution 242, it has been established beyond doubt that the absence of the definite article is immaterial. In our Peace Treaty, we set a good precedent when we upheld the principle of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity. This was a good application of Resolution 242. It produced very positive results which were considered impossible even to dream of only a few months before. Why not follow this successful example on the other fronts? Let me also remind you of what I said in my address before the Knesset on that point: "In all candor, and in the spirit which prompted me to come here today, I say to

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(26)

you that you should abandon for good all
expansionist designs based on conquest.
You must also stop thinking that force
is the best way to deal with the Arabs

.....
.....

There are Arab territories which Israel
occupied and still occupies. We insist
on total withdrawal from these territories,
including Arab Jerusalem Jerusalem
to which I came as the city of peace which
has been, and will always remain, the
living symbol of coexistence between all
followers of the three great religions".

Sixth:

In your letter, you asked the rather
rhetorical question whether Egypt can

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(27)

bring the Palestinians to the table of the negotiations. In turn, let me ask you what you did to encourage them to do so. Do you really believe that such actions and statements on Jerusalem and the settlements constitute any attraction for the Palestinians?

How about the escalation of repression in the occupied territory? The imposition of long curfews arbitrarily, the banishment of Mayors, the closing down of universities and other institutes of learning? Do negative statements on the future of the West Bank and Gaza provide any incentive for the most moderate elements among the Palestinians? As to what we did, you know only too well the burden we accepted to bear under the most difficult circumstances.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(28)

We went as far as offering you our life-line, the water of the Nile if we succeed to solve the problems of Jerusalem and the settlements. No one else would have done that for the sake of comprehensive peace. We volunteered this offer despite the excesses we were subjected to from our Arab brothers and despite the misunderstanding of our intention on your part. But this is our role to play in the area and such is our commitment to peace.

Seventh:

You alleged in your letter that Egypt has violated the Peace Treaty when it took a critical view of certain aspects of the Israeli policy. Let me correct you on that point which is too serious to be

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(29)

taken lightly. We have stated repeatedly that we will honor all our commitments under the Peace Treaty. Similarly, I have not hesitated to recognize your carrying out of your undertakings arising from the Treaty in good faith. I consider it a matter of top priority to reinforce our peoples' confidence in the peace process. Therefore; I do not think that it serves any useful purpose to raise such a sensitive point outside the proper context.

The undertaking to abstain from hostile propaganda does not at all mean that either party should accept the policies or actions of the other whether he finds them right or not.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(30)

We remain free to differ on certain issues and criticize certain policies. This is the nature of international life. It is the case in the dealings among old friends. We live in an age of diversity and multiplicity.

While I stated on previous occasions that I do not recommend personal attacks in the press for any reason, we can not possibly prevent our press from taking issue with certain actions and statements. It is a law of nature, not only of physics, that every action has a reaction which is basically similar in kind and degree. Thus, extremism and negativism can breed only sharp reactions. I wish we can do without both action and reaction.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(31)

You made a remark that the Egyptian press is not free of government influence. This is a gross and unfortunate misrepresentation. You should know by now that we take pride in the fact that we have established a democratic system of government under which people are free to take whatever views they deem fit. The Egyptian government is being criticized daily on various issues and we consider this a shining feature of our democracy.

Finally, you complained that our officials "influence African governments not to renew diplomatic relations with Israel." This allegation is based on misinformation and on the wrong notion that African governments formulate their policy and take their decisions on the basis of the influence they fall under.

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(32)

This is far from the truth, for our African brothers who assume the responsibility in their countries are all veteran freedom fighters who are endowed with vision and high moral standards. They make their policy according to the dictates of their conscience, their own independent evaluation of events and their perception of the pan-African interest. They value their hard-won independence very highly.

Do you really believe that actions in the West Bank and Gaza and the negative statements which have been made in the past few months were likely to win for you the support of African leaders? Has it occurred to you why all governments in different parts of the World should

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(33)

take this view of your policy?

Dear Prime Minister Begin,

Perhaps what I regret most is that you did not respond to several points I raised in my previous letter. Thus, the obstacles on the road to peace remain there and I can not see how we can resume the negotiations under these circumstances. As I told you, my allegiance to the cause of peace prevents me from accepting a situation where the peace negotiations degenerate into a meaningless exercise which erodes our peoples' faith and confidence in peace. It is not my intention to get involved into a verbal or rhetorical exchange which is not likely to serve the

*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(34)

interests of any of us, not to mention the interest of peace. As we committed ourselves to continue our work until we end the dispute peacefully, I believe that the best course of action for us is to hold a summit conference in an attempt to stem these lingering differences before they jeopardize our mission. On the other hand, it would be unfair and discourteous to impose this problem on our friend and full partner President Carter at this point in view of his other preoccupations which are obviously more pressing. You remember that I described him at Camp David as the unknown soldier who dedicated himself to the cause of peace. The least we can do in recognition of his contribution is to appreciate his


*The President
of the Arab Republic of Egypt*

الرئيس

(35)

position and hold the summit when these
preoccupations are over. I am sure that
you share this view with me.

With best wishes.



Mohammed Anwar El Sadat.

AUG. 14 , 1980

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, August 4, 1980

Dear President Sadat,

I thank you for your letter dated August 2, 1980, which I studied carefully yesterday evening.

Thank God, my health is good. May I tell you something of my thoughts during the illness which suddenly befell me. My good doctors put me under a machine, made in Israel, unique in its sophistication, which you saw in Haifa, and which we even export to the United States. After nearly two hours of ordeal they had a photo of my heart. The Professor decided to show it to me.

So what is the human heart? Simply, it is a pump. And I thought, God Almighty, as long as this pump is working, a human being feels, thinks, speaks, writes, loves his family, smiles, weeps, enjoys life, gets angry,

His Excellency
Mohamed Anwar El Sadat
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

gives friendship, wins friendship, prays, dreams, remembers, forgets, forgives, influences other people, is influenced by other people - lives. But when this pump stops - no more! What a wonder in the Cosmos is this frailty of the human body, without which the mind, too, becomes still, helpless or hapless.

Therefore, it is the clear duty of every man who is called upon to serve his people, his country, humanity, a just cause - he is duty-bound to do his best as long as the heart pumps.

I agree with you wholeheartedly that there is no nobler task than to work for peace, yes indeed, a comprehensive peace between all nations and, notably, between our nations which originate from and live in our region, known as the Middle East.

You will, I hope, forgive me for this quasi-philosophical introduction. It is relevant. Both our nations yearn for peace. I believe that both of us, too, want peace.

It is in this spirit that for the sake of sincerity and clarity, I must make several remarks concerning your detailed letter. Because, whenever you mention our meetings at Camp David, in Alexandria, in Aswan, etc., you always remind me of what you told me; but what about my response? You will agree with me that in none of our meetings was there a monologue either by you or by me. We conducted always a dialogue. You spoke; I responded. I spoke; you answered. Let us, therefore, refresh our memories.

1. You write in your paragraph 14:

"You would also recall that I offered (in El-Arish) to provide you with water that could reach Jerusalem, passing through the Negev ... You misunderstood the idea behind my offer when you said that the national aspirations of your people are not for sale."

I believe, Mr. President, that when you recreate by memory our short dialogue in El-Arish, you will agree with me that:

a) You suggested to me bringing water from the Nile to the Negev; in that conversation you never mentioned bringing the water to Jerusalem.

b) I never said that the national aspirations of my people are not for sale. That would be gross language and I never used such language in our talks. You took the initiative and made to me a double proposal. You said: We must act with vision. I am prepared to let you have water from the Nile to irrigate the Negev; and let us solve the problem of Jerusalem, because if we solve this problem, we will have solved everything.

I then responded:

"Mr. President, water from the Nile to the Negev - a good idea, indeed a great vision, but we must always distinguish between moral historical values, and such is Jerusalem, and material achievements. Let us separate the two issues: Jerusalem on the one hand, and water from the Nile to the Negev on the other hand."

2. I will, of course, come back to the issue of Jerusalem, but I would like now to respond to another point in your letter, on which you dwell rather extensively: good faith, goodwill, mutual understanding, promoting peace and cooperation.

These are the facts:

a) Your Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Boutrus Ghali, pays visits to African countries and repeatedly influences their governments not to renew diplomatic relations with Israel. Is not this unilateral action a clear breach of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, annex III, article 5, section 3, which stipulates:

"The parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other."

This, certainly, is hostile propaganda in third countries which used to say that they cannot renew diplomatic relations with Israel as long as there is a state of war between it and an African state (Egypt). But now there is peace between

Egypt and Israel. A peace treaty was signed between us and duly ratified. Why, then, this unilateral act of hostility towards Israel?

b) If the Egyptian delegate to the United Nations Emergency General Assembly votes for the most hostile anti-Israel resolution since that other abominable resolution was adopted in the Assembly equating Zionism - one of the most humane, national liberation movements in history - with racism, (of which we, the Jews, have been and are the first victims), is not this a unilateral act of hostility contrary to our peace treaty?

c) The Egyptian delegate voted for a resolution demanding that by November 15, Israel withdraws from Judea, Samaria, (my language), the Gaza District, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem. Is not this a flagrant contradiction of the Camp David agreement? There it is written: "A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations" - this, following the election of the self-

governing authority (administrative council). It is also written in the Camp David agreement: "All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond."

"The transitional period," as agreed between Egypt, the United States and Israel, is five years; "beyond" is indefinite. "The remaining forces" mean army units which remain (in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District). Yet your delegate voted in the United Nations in favour of an "ultimatum" to Israel to commence evacuation of these territories in less than five months.

d) The Egyptian delegate made a speech at the United Nations in which he said, inter alia:

i) Israel should withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines, whether on the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Where, Mr. President, is this written in the Camp David agreement? The quotations mentioned above tell us of stipulations that are completely different.

ii) Israeli withdrawal should be complete including that of the military forces, settlements should be dismantled and settlers removed. Where is this passage mentioned in the Camp David agreement? Are settlements mentioned at all in the Camp David accord?

iii) "The Palestinian people should exercise, without any external interference, the inalienable and fundamental right to self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state on the West Bank and Gaza."

Thus, the Egyptian delegate to the United Nations.

However, not one word about self-determination (which, of course, means a state), or about an independent (Palestinian) state appears in any one of the pages, paragraphs, sections, subsections etc. of the Camp David agreement. Dr. Ghali, speaking on behalf of Egypt, committed almost incomprehensible deviations from, and total contradictions to, the Camp David accord which you and I signed and which our friend President Carter signed as witness, and which all of us are obligated to carry out in good faith in accordance with the old golden rule: Pacta sunt servanda.

It is not Israel, Mr. President, which commits a breach of our peace treaty or of the other, not yet fulfilled, part of the Camp David agreement; spokesmen of Egypt, of various levels, do.

3. In this conjunction it is also my duty to turn your attention again to the fact that one of your official newspapers likened me to the "embodiment of all evil in mankind," (to use a Churchillian description), Adolph Hitler. I would not refer back to this shame, were it not for the fact that this "hostile propaganda," which Egypt undertook to abstain from conducting still goes on and on in a press which is not free of Government influence. Again I was called, by one of the Egyptian newspapers, "Shylock," an epithet hurled at the Jew by all his haters and detractors who originally, in Germany, were termed "Anti-Semites." (Of course, we Arabs and Jews are all Semites). I will refrain from listing other names, or articles, or curses. But, Mr. President, is this the way "to foster mutual understanding"?

4. On Jerusalem: With this letter I attach three documents: a) my letter to President Carter of September 17, 1978; b) the Law of the Holy Places adopted by the Knesset in June 1967; and c) the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, adopted by the Knesset last week.

I am aware that you wrote a letter about Jerusalem to President Carter, who also wrote to me a letter after having withdrawn his first draft. About that draft we said to our American friends that should it become official we shall not sign the Camp David agreement which was already completed on that Sunday, September 17, 1978.

I put to you a simple, logical question: By what letter should we, Israel, stand? By yours? By President Carter's? Or by the letter of Israel's Prime Minister who, on this matter, speaks for ninety-five per cent of the Israeli people, without distinction of party affiliation?

I have never misled you, nor anybody else. Time and again I repeated that Jerusalem, in its entirety, is the capital of Israel, a city re-united and indivisible for all generations.

Yes, indeed, there are in Jerusalem places holy to Christians and Moslems. We respect them. It was not so under Jordanian occupation as far as the Jewish Holy Places were concerned. Israel assures men and women of all religions absolutely free access to the places sacred to them, guaranteed by the Basic Law forever. We know that from the point of view of religious faith Jerusalem is holy to Christians and Moslems. To the Jewish people Jerusalem is not only holy; it is their history for three millenia, their heart, their dream, the visible symbol of their national redemption.

You assure me, Mr. President, that you are for the unity of Jerusalem, but in your speech at the National Press Club in Washington, a few months ago, you demanded that "Eastern Jerusalem" be put under Arab sovereignty. This is a contradiction in terms. Two sovereignties over one city mean its re-partition. Impossible.

Jerusalem is and will be one, under Israel's sovereignty, its indivisible capital in which Jews and Arabs will dwell together in peace and in human dignity. Whosoever declares that the sovereign acts of our democratic Parliament are null and void makes a declaration which is null and void.

The same applies to our settlements in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District and the Golan Heights. They are legal and legitimate and they are an integral part of our national security. None of them will ever be removed. I made a statement to this effect in Aswan, in your presence, in public, before the press and media of the world. I said the same, of course, to President Carter time and again since July, 1977.

5. You mentioned Resolution 242. As you will recall, that Resolution refers to withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories - not the territories - and the Resolution's authors have consistently affirmed that it does not command Israel to withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

Mr. President, we travelled a long road towards peace. There were discussions, nocturnal sessions, crises, renewed efforts - and let us never forget those of President Carter - until our labours bore fruit. Let us continue. We would like to have representatives of the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District (not the PLO) around the table. But, incited and intimidated by the inflammatory and terrorist actions of the PLO they don't come ab initio. We cannot force them. Can Egypt bring them to the table? You know the facts as well as I do. All of us invited King Hussein; he recently declared that he will never join negotiations under the Camp David agreement. Can anyone of us change his attitude? I read your speeches on this subject.


Israel showed its good faith. We could have said: let us rather wait with the autonomy negotiations until Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian Arabs join the talks. We did not say so. You were willing to go ahead with these negotiations; we accepted and we negotiate with you.

However, four times Egypt unilaterally suspended the autonomy talks. Do these repeated suspensions contribute to the urgent need of solving the problems under the Camp David accord?

Let us, therefore, dispense with further unilateral suspensions. Let us renew our negotiations. We have differences of opinion. They do not, they should not, exclude another agreement on full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza (Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District) as written in the Camp David agreement.

Let us negotiate. Let us determine together the date for the renewal of the talks. Let us, as the past proves, reason together until we reach the agreement and pave the way for peace in this region, the cradle of human civilization.

With my best wishes to you and Mrs. Sadat,


Menachem Begin

Encl.

September 17, 1978.

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967 - Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "The Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the state to any part of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel - Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,

(SIGNED)

MENACHEM BEGIN

PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES LAW, 5727-1967

1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.

2. (a) Whosoever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years.

(b) Whosoever does anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of five years.

3. This Law shall add to, and not derogate from, any other law.

4. The Minister of Religious Affairs is charged with the implementation of this Law, and he may, after consultation with, or upon the proposal of, representatives of the religions concerned and with the consent of the Minister of Justice make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation.

5. This Law shall come into force on the date of its adoption by the Knesset.

LEVI ESHKOL
Prime Minister

ZERACH WARHAFTIG
Minister of Religious Affairs

SHNEUR ZALMAN SHAZAR
President of the State

June 27, 1967

BASIC LAW: JERUSALEM, CAPITAL OF ISRAEL

1. Jerusalem united in its entirety is the capital of Israel.
2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court.
3. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.
4. (a) The Government shall diligently persist in the development and prosperity of Jerusalem and the welfare of its inhabitants, by the appropriation of special resources, including a special annual grant to the Jerusalem Municipality (Capital City Grant) with the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset.

(b) Jerusalem shall be given particular priority in the activities of the State's authorities for the development of the city in the financial and economic spheres and in other areas.

(c) The Government shall constitute a special body or bodies for the implementation of this Section.

July 30, 1980.

cc Mrs Goodchild

EGYPT



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Will you be submitting 30 July 1980
this is the usual way?

Ans 30/7

Dear Michael,

Luncheon for Vice President Mubarak
of Egypt: 2 September 1980

You wrote on 7 July to say that the Prime Minister had kindly agreed to offer lunch to Vice President Mubarak and Mrs Mubarak on 2 September.

I enclose a suggested guest list. Since the date of the luncheon is so close to the holiday season and some people may still be away from London (as will Lady Caroline Gilmour), it includes a larger than usual number of reserves.

Yours etc

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S LUNCHEON FOR VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK : 2 SEPTEMBER
1980

Suggested Guest List

Host

Prime Minister

Guest of Honour

Vice President Mubarak and Mrs Mubarak (c/o Egyptian Embassy)

Politicians

Sir Ian Gilmour (c/o FCO)

Lord Strathcona and Lady Strathcona (c/o MOD, 218 6621)

The Hon Greville Janner QC, MP and Mrs Janner (c/o House of Commons) 219 4469

or

2 Linnel Drive NW11 (455 5157)

Mr and Mrs Andrew Faulds, MP (c/o House of Commons, 219 4192)
Secretary: 219 5235

or

14 Albemarle St W1 (499 7589)

Reserves

Mr and Mrs I L Evans MP, JP (c/o House of Commons, 219 3546)
or

169 Eastcote Rd, Ruislip (717 5251)

Mr and Mrs J Browne, MP (c/o House of Commons, 219 4403)

or

Barclays Bank International (283 8989 Ext 3072)

Officials and Ex-Officials

*Sir Philip and Lady Adams (Former Ambassador) 78 Sussex Sq W2
(262 1547)

or

Ditchley Park, Enstone Oxon OX7 4ER (0608 72346)

Sir John and Lady Graham (c/o FCO)

Sir R and Lady Ellis (MOD)

/Reserves

Reserves

Mr and Mrs John Burgh, Director General, British Council
(c/o 10 Spring Gardens SW1, 2568 2052 Tie line)

General Sir E Bramall KCB, OBE and Mrs Bramall, Chief of
General Staff (c/o MOD Main Building)

Sir Peter Preston KCB and Lady Preston, PUS/ODA
(c/o Room E936, Eland House, Stag Place, SW1E 5DH
Office - 213 4841
Home - 277 2099)

*Sir Harold Beeley KCMG, OBE and Lady Beeley (ex Ambassador
to Egypt) 2 Ormond Road, Richmond, Surrey (01 940 1193)

Sir Denis Spotswood GCB, KCB, Marshal of the RAF and Vice
Chairman Rolls Royce Ltd (c/o Rolls Royce Ltd, 65 Buckingham
Gate, SW1, 222 9020)

Sir Willie Morris KCMG and Lady Morris (ex Ambassador to
Egypt) 2 Abberbury Avenue, Iffley, Oxford (0865 779 340)

Ambassadors

HE Hassan Abou Se'eda and Mrs Se'eda (Egyptian Ambassador)
Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 26 South St W1 (499 2401)

Businessmen

Lord and Lady Selsdon, COMET, 114 Old Broad St EC2 (01 588 6464)
33 Cadogan Lane, SW1 (01 235 8692)

Mr and Mrs G E Jefferson, Managing Director, British Aerospace
Dynamics (c/o British Aerospace, Six Hills Way, Stevenage,
Hertfordshire
Office - 0438 2422
Home - 0462 4067)

Mr and Mrs W A Hawken, Chairman, William Press Ltd (c/o 22 Queen
Anne's Gate SW1, 930 5731)

Reserves

Sir Alastair and Lady Pilkington, Chairman, Chloride Group
52 Grosvenor Gardens SW1 (730 0866)

Mr and Mrs J M Haseldine, Senior Partner, John Taylor and
Son, Artillery House, Artillery Row SW1 (01 222 7050)

Rt Hon The Lord Beswick PC, JP and Lady Beswick, Chairman
British Aerospace, Brooklands Road, Weybridge, Surrey
Office - 974 5522
Home - 946 2088

Mr and Mrs Michael Caine, Chairman, Booker McConnell
(c/o 83 Cannon St EC4, 248 8051)

The Hon David Douglas-Home and Mrs Douglas-Home, Director
Morgan Grenfell
Office - 23 Great Winchester St EC2 (588 4545)

or
17 Bloomfield Terrace SW1

*Mr and Mrs John Reddaway CMG, OBE, Director, CAABU
19 Woodsyre, Sydenham Hill SE26 (670 1041)

Sir Arnold Hall and Lady Hall, Chairman and Managing
Director, Hawker Siddley (c/o St James's Square SW1,
930 6177)

Journalists

*Sir C Denis Hamilton and Lady Hamilton, Editor-in-Chief, Times
Newspapers Ltd, New Printing House Square WC1 (837 1234)

*Peter Mansfield, Freelance Journalist (c/o CAABU, 21 Collingham
Road SW5, 373 8414

or
10 Weatherby Gardens SW, 370 6646)

*Mr and Mrs Robert Stephens, The Observer, 8 St Andrews Hill EC4
(236 0202)

Reserves

Mr and Mrs M H Fisher, Editor, Financial Times (c/o
Bracken House, Cannon St EC4, 248 8000)

Mr and Mrs Andrew Knight, Editor, Economist (c/o
25 St James St SW1, 839 7000 or 930 5155)

Others

*Dr and Mrs Edwards, Former Keeper of Egyptian Antiquities at
the British Museum
(Home - 648 6923)

*Mr and Mrs Jack Collard (pseudonym John Marlowe), Author of
Books on Egypt, Springvale, Mill Lane, Gerrard's Cross, 498 5022

Reserves


Professor and Mrs Cowan (c/o School of Oriental and African
Studies, Malet St, 637 2388)

Professor and Mrs Vatikiotis (c/o School of Oriental and
African Studies, Malet St, 637 2388)

Mr Robert Anderson, Hon Secretary, Egypt Exploration Society
3 Doughty Mews WC1, 242 1880

Dr and Mrs D Hopwood, Director Mid East Studies, Oxford
University (c/o St Anthonys College, Oxford, 0865 59651)

Professor Henry S Smith and Mrs Smith, Edwards Prof of
Egyptology Univ Coll, London (c/o Ailwyn House, Upwood,
Huntingdon, Cambs, 0487 812196)



Prof H Thomas and Mrs Thomas, Chairman, Conservative
Centre, Policy Studies (c/o 29 Ladbrooke Grove W11,
01 727 2288)

Lord and Lady Vaizey, Professor of Economics and Head
Social Science, Brunel University (c/o 24 Heathfield
Terrace W4, 994 7994)

* Proposed by the Lord Privy Seal



cc Mr Goodland

1 BF 30-7-80
2 BF 1-9-80

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 July, 1980.

Visit of Vice-President Mubarak of Egypt

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 2 July about Vice President Mubarak's visit to this country in September. She would be happy to offer Vice-President Mubarak and Mrs. Mubarak lunch on Tuesday, 2 September. The lunch would be preceded by an hour's talk. Subject to your views, the lunch might be for 32 guests.

It would be helpful if we could have a draft guest list by Wednesday, 30 July. The brief for the talk should reach us on Monday, 1 September.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jonathan Dawson (Ministry of Defence).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TWR

Mr. Goodchild



Prime Minister (2)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

*Would you like to
offer the Vice-President a
dinner on Tuesday 2 September?*

2 July 1980

Paul

Dear Michael,

Visit of Vice-President Mubarak
of Egypt

Vice-President Mubarak has accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to visit the United Kingdom as a Government guest at the time of the Farnborough Air Show. I attach a copy of Cairo telegram No 417 confirming this.

Yes

Can we assume that the Prime Minister would be willing to host a meal for the Vice-President and his wife and to offer him a ~~half~~-hour call beforehand. If so, would either dinner on the evening of Monday, 1 September, or luncheon on Tuesday, 2 September be convenient? Mubarak will be visiting the Farnborough Show on 3 September and will be returning to Cairo on 4 September.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jonathan Dawson (MOD).

Luncheon - Tues 2nd Sep

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
Private Secretary
10 Downing Street

GPS 600A

RESTRICTED

DATE

(15)

RESTRICTED

TOP COPY

FM CAIRO 271200Z JUN

TO ROUTINE FCO

TELEGRAM NR 417 OF 27 JUN 80
INFO ROUTINE MODUK (DS13)

NFE 026/2
1 JUL 1980

YOUR TELNO 251: VISIT OF VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK.

1. THE OBJECT OF THIS VISIT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WILL OF COURSE BE NOT SO MUCH TO LEARN MUBARAK'S VIEWS, AS TO MAKE A SUITABLE FUSS OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL EGYPTIAN AFTER SADAT, AND HIS LIKELY SUCCESSOR, ON HIS FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UK. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM (WITH HIS WIFE, WHO IS GOOD VALUE) A FORMAL LUNCH OR DINNER WITH A VARIETY OF DISTINGUISHED GUESTS WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN EGYPT. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE PEOPLE FROM THE COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL FIELD AS WELL AS POLITICIANS AND DEFENCE REPRESENTATIVES. FOR PRESENTATIONAL PURPOSES A SEPARATE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT SAY A HALF-HOUR CALL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE MEAL WOULD FILL THE BILL.
2. A CALL ON THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ABSENCE) AND A MEETING WITH THE DEFENCE SECRETARY AT FARNBOROUGH WOULD CERTAINLY BE APPROPRIATE. I WOULD ALSO RECOMMEND IF CONVENIENT A CALL ON PRINCESS ALEXANDRA, WHO MET THE MUBARAKS DURING HER VISIT HERE IN 1978, AND HAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KEEPING UP THE CONNECTION WITH EGYPT.
3. MUBARAK WAS THE CINC OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE DURING THE 1973 WAR AND WOULD I AM SURE BE FACINATED TO SEE SOMETHING OF A FRONT-LINE RAF STATION, IF POSSIBLE WITH RAPIER DEFENCE. THERE MIGHT ALSO BE A CASE FOR A VISIT TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND A MEETING WITH THE CAS IN ADDITION TO FARNBOROUGH. (WE ARE ALREADY IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MOD ABOUT A SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESENT CINC EAF AND AN ACCOMPANYING TEAM, WHO ARE VISITING FARNBOROUGH, SHOULD ALSO SEE AN OPERATIONAL RAF STATION. CAREFUL CO-ORDINATION WILL BE NECESSARY BUT THERE IS NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY MUBARAK).
4. MUBARAK IS SPENDING A LOT OF TIME ON HIS NEW DUTIES AS SECRETARY - GENERAL OF THE GOVERNING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND WOULD PROBABLY APPRECIATE A VISIT TO THE HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT

RESTRICTED

/AND

RESTRICTED

AND PERHAPS ALSO TO A PARTY HEADQUARTERS.

5. ON THE COMMERCIAL FRONT, THE DEPT OF TRADE OR ODA WILL BE ABLE TO SUGGEST FIRMS INVOLVED IN BIG PROJECTS HERE WHICH MUBARAK MIGHT VISIT, AND PERHAPS SOME ENTERTAINMENT IN OR BY THE CITY OF LONDON.

6. FINALLY WE SHOULD CONSIDER AN EVENING AT THEATRE OR BALLET, SUBJECT TO MUBARAK'S TASTES, AND SIGHTSEEING OUTSIDE LONDON. HOWEVER WE SHOULD TAKE CARE NOT TO OVER-LOAD THE PROGRAMME. MUBARAK REMARKED TO ME THE OTHER DAY THAT IT IS ONLY ON TRIPS TO EUROPE (AS DISTINCT FROM THE STATES) THAT HE GETS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REST AND RELAXATION.

8. I ASSUME THAT THE INVITATION WILL EXTEND TO MRS MUBARAK, WHO IS EXTREMELY ATTRACTIVE AND INTELLIGENT. SHE IS STUDYING FOR A POST-GRADUATE DEGREE IN SOCIOLOGY AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, AND HAS STARTED A MODEST AND PRACTICAL WELFARE PROJECT FOR HELPING DEPRIVED CHILDREN IN SCHOOLS IN THE POOREST QUARTERS OF CAIRO, WHICH SHE RUNS WITHOUT PUBLICITY. SHE WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME A VISIT TO ANYTHING COMPARABLE IN LONDON. SHE IS HALF WELSH, WITH RELATIVES STILL LIVING IN PONTYPRIDD, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO WISH TO INCLUDE CONTACTS WITH THEM IN THE OFFICIAL PROGRAMME: WE WILL ENQUIRE. THERE ARE TWO TEENAGE SONS WHOM THE MUBARAKS WOULD PROBABLY LIKE TO BRING (AND POSSIBLY TO FARNBOROUGH) WITH THEM IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE.

9. I SHOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO PUT PROPOSALS TO THE VICE-PRESIDENT OR HIS OFFICE IN NEXT WEEK OR TWO AND DISCOVER WHETHER HE HAS ANY IDEAS OF HIS OWN. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET US HAVE A DRAFT OUTLINE PROGRAMME DRAWING ON THE ABOVE WHICH WE CAN PUT TO THEM.

THIS TELEGRAM
WAS NOT
ADVANCED

WEIR

FILES	PS/MR HULD
NENAD	PS/PUS
DEF. D	SIR E YOUNG
PS	MR J.C. MOBERLY
PS/LPS	

2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Egypt



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 June 1980

Mr. Hurd
 Mrs. Thatcher
 26/6
 Annie Penister (2)
 Mrs. 26/6
 Dear Michael,

Visit of Vice-President Mubarak of Egypt

The Egyptian Ambassador called on 25 June and handed to Mr Hurd the attached message from Vice- President Mubarak of Egypt to the Prime Minister confirming his acceptance of her invitation to visit the UK this September. The Prime Minister may be interested to see the terms in which Mubarak refers to their recent meeting.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretary at the MOD since Mr Pym will be seeing Mubarak at the Farnborough Air Show.

7-
 ew
 JGH

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

RESTRICTED



EMBASSY OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
26, SOUTH STREET, LONDON, W.1
TELEPHONE: 01-499 2401

ORAL MESSAGE FROM VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK
TO THE RT. HON MRS MARGARET THATCHER

I WAS VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE.
THE TALKS WE HELD DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO YOUR FRIENDLY
COUNTRY WERE MOST INFORMATIVE AND STIMULATING THEY REAFFIRMED
OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS AND CONSULTATIONS
WITH YOU IN THE FUTURE I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT
PRESIDENT SADAT WAS EQUALLY PLEASED BY THE OUTCOME OF OUR
DISCUSSION.

I AM HONOURED TO ACCEPT YOUR KIND INVITATION WHICH WOULD GIVE
US A CHANCE TO PURSUE OUR CONVERSATION FOR THE GOOD OF OUR TWO
COUNTRIES AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE. GREETINGS TO LORD CARRINGTON.



Egypt

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
Telephone 01-~~833 7332~~ 218 2111/3

MO 14/8

9th June 1980

Dear Paul,

Lg
JDS

INVITATION TO VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

We spoke on Friday about your letter of 5th June to Michael Alexander. I have subsequently spoken to Sir Charles Pringle of the Society of British Aerospace Companies, who are the organisers of the Farnborough Air Show and who would therefore be the official hosts of all guests (including my Secretary of State). They have agreed that, if Vice President Mubarak accepts the invitation to attend the show, they would arrange for him to be at the same luncheon table as my Secretary of State, although they have pointed out - and my Secretary of State agrees - that the Vice President and my Secretary of State would of course have different programmes of visits to stands at the show. It follows, therefore, that the text of the telegram to Egypt conveying the invitation will require to be amended to reflect the above.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10).

JDS
Jonathan Dawson

(J D S DAWSON)

P Lever Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Egypt.
JS
ccmed

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 June 1980

INVITATION TO VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 5 June on this subject. She agrees that the invitation to Vice-President Mubarak should issue, but she would prefer that the second sentence of the text enclosed with your letter should read: "I would now like formally to invite you to visit the United Kingdom".

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (MOD).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

R.

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister. ①

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Mubarak seems to be a rising man. An invitation might be a good investment. Agree to visit?

5 June 1980

Yes as considered. No

Dear Michael,

Paul

signature

Invitation to Vice-President Mubarak of Egypt

Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian Vice-President whom the Prime Minister met recently, has on a number of occasions expressed a wish to visit the Farnborough Air Show, which is to be held this year from 1 - 6 September. He is a former Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force and retains a considerable interest in Egyptian arms purchases.

Both Lord Carrington and the Defence Secretary have had it in mind to invite him here at the time of Farnborough this year and the Lord Privy Seal put an invitation to him informally during a recent visit to Cairo. In Lord Carrington's judgement, however, an invitation would most appropriately come from the Prime Minister. Mubarak's position in Egypt is becoming increasingly dominant. He played a major part in the recent Egyptian Government reshuffle and it was he and not Sadat who saw the new ministers on their appointment. Moreover, should anything happen to Sadat it is almost certain that he would take over at least as the interim ruler and probably for longer. In these circumstances only an invitation from the Prime Minister would satisfy Egyptian sensitivities.

Lord Carrington hopes that it may be possible for the Prime Minister to agree to host this visit. It need involve her in no more than a meal or a formal call, and could benefit our relations with the Egyptians, particularly in the arms sales field, considerably. If the Prime Minister agrees, we could telegraph to Mubarak on the lines of the attached draft.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

DSR 11 (Revised)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

DRAFT MESSAGE TO VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

CAVEAT.....

I enjoyed our recent discussion about the Middle East and was grateful to you for stopping in London to brief myself and Lord Carrington on Egyptian views. I would now like to ~~issue you with a formal invitation~~ ^{formally to invite you -} to visit the UK from 1-4 September this year as a guest of Her Majesty's Government. Mr Pym would be your host at Farnborough on 3 September and there would be an opportunity for more general discussions with myself and other ministers.

mb

Enclosures—flag(s).....

Egypt.

na
MAR

CONFIDENTIAL

29439 - 1

OO CAIRO
OO TEL AVIV
PP JEDDA
GRS 338
CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 291400Z MAY 80
TO IMMEDIATE CAIRO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 221 OF 29 MAY
AND TO TEL AVIV, UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR PS/LPS)
PRIORITY WASHINGTON, JEDDA, BONN
INFO SAVING KHARTOUM, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, TUNIS, PARIS
YOUR TELNO 341 (NOT TO ALL): VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT MUBAREK
OF EGYPT

1. FOLLOWING VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND BONN, MUBAREK CALLED SEPARATELY ON PRIME MINISTER AND S OF S ON 27 MAY. HE EXPLAINED TO BOTH THE REASONS FOR THE EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS (THE KNESSET VOTE ON JERUSALEM AND THE JEWISH AGENCY PROPOSAL FOR 14 NEW SETTLEMENTS). THEY WERE PREPARED TO RESUME ONLY IF THE UNITED STATES GAVE THEM ASSURANCES THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT SETTING PRECONDITIONS AND WERE NOT SEEKING TO PREJUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WERE NOT SANGUINE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING SUCH ASSURANCES FROM BEGIN AT THE PRESENT TIME.
2. THE EGYPTIANS WOULD WELCOME A EUROPEAN INITIATIVE, BUT THEY SAW DANGERS IN A NEW SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NOW. SUCH A MOVE COULD ALLOW THE ISRAELIS TO ESCAPE FROM THEIR CAMP DAVID RESPONSIBILITIES, AND WOULD FACE A US VETO. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, HELP THE EGYPTIANS IF THE EC FORMALLY DECLARED ITS POSITION ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS. FROM WHAT MUBAREK SAID TO THE S OF S IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE ANTICIPATED SUCH A DECLARATION BEING MADE AT THE VENICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING.
3. THE S OF S ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE EC TO APPOINT AN EMISSARY TO TALK WITH ALL INTERESTED PARTIES INCLUDING THE PLO. MUBAREK THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE. EGYPT WOULD CERTAINLY ACCEPT SUCH AN EMISSARY, BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS

CONFIDENTIAL

OR THE SYRIANS WOULD. THE MODERATE ARABS HAD TOLD THE EGYPTIANS THAT THEY WANTED THE AUTONOMY TALKS TO CONTINUE, SO WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME A EUROPEAN MOVE.

4. (FOR CAIRO ONLY) THE SUBJECT OF VISIT TO FARNBOROUGH WAS NOT RAISED. WE ARE CONSIDERING FURTHER THE TERMS OF AN INVITATION. S OF S WILL BE AWAY AT THE TIME SO CANNOT ACT AS HOST.

CARRINGTON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NEVAD
MED
NAD
UND
EESD
EOD
WED

MAED
ES & SD
FED
ECON D
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
CABINET OFFICE 2

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL

SWP
Egypt

29 May 1980

I enclose a copy of a farewell message received from the Egyptian Vice-President following his visit.

I take it that no further response is required from our end.

M. A. PATTISON

SP
Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

00.

مصر للطيران

EGYPTAIR



TICKET COUNTER · No. 3 BUILDING :
LONDON HEATHROW AIRPORT · HOUNSLOW · MIDDLESEX · TEL. 01-759 1520
FREIGHT DEPT. - 01-759 1311

CABLE ADDRESS
EGYAIR LONDON W1
TELEX No. 21832 LHRAPMS

28th May 1980.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,

As we depart from your friendly Country after a rewarding and satisfying visit, I am pleased to express to you our heartfelt gratitude for your hospitality and warm reception. The talks we held demonstrated the growing friendship and co-operation between our two countries and peoples. President Sadat and the entire Egyptian People highly value your positive contribution to the cause of peace in the Middle East and the promotion of Anglo-Arab co-operation. We look forward to the intensification of our exchange and mutual co-operation in all fields.

Mohammed Housni Mubarak.

CONFIDENTIAL



File

cc: C.O.

Egypt. VBS

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

27 May 1980

Dear Paul,

Visit by the Vice President of Egypt

Vice President Mubarak of Egypt, accompanied by the Egyptian Ambassador, called upon the Prime Minister at 1630 today. John Moberly was also present.

After being welcomed by the Prime Minister, the Vice President said that President Sadat had asked him to call upon the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt on his way back to Egypt from his visit to Washington. In fact he had seen Herr Genscher in Chancellor Schmidt's absence from Bonn the previous day. President Sadat had sent him to Washington to discuss with President Carter and Mr. Muskie the next steps in the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. It had originally been the intention that there should be 10 days of intense negotiations in Israel, followed by a further round of talks in Alexandria, with the objective of achieving results by 26 May. In practice, the Egyptians had found that the Israelis had tried to slow down the negotiations during the round in Israel. The Egyptians had put forward proposals about security as it affected the West Bank, but the Israeli response had been that, for historic reasons, internal security on the West Bank was a matter for Israel alone. The Egyptian delegation had told the Israelis that their position was not consistent with the Camp David agreements. At this point the Egyptians had returned home, hoping to continue the negotiations in Alexandria. President Sadat had announced on 14 May in the Egyptian Parliament that Egypt would carry on with the autonomy talks. But then on 15 May the Egyptians had heard about a draft law which had been brought before the Knesset by an Israeli backbencher confirming Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This proposal, which would have changed Israeli basic law, had been approved by most members of the Knesset, and the Israeli Government had not sought to oppose it. At the same time the Jewish Agency had announced plans to establish 14 new settlements in the occupied territories. Egypt was most anxious to continue the peace process but, with the proposals for the new law and the new settlements, Israel was virtually setting pre-conditions for the autonomy negotiations and was prejudging their outcome. In these circumstances Egypt had had no alternative but to call off

/ the talks in

CONFIDENTIAL

DSC

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

the talks in Alexandria. President Carter had asked President Sadat to start up the negotiations again, and President Sadat's response had been to send him to see President Carter to discuss the next moves.

Vice President Mubarak continued that he had explained to President Carter that Egypt was ready to resume the talks, provided the United States gave them assurances that the Israelis were not setting pre-conditions and were not seeking to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations. The Egyptians could not continue with the talks if the Israelis were going to go ahead with the new law now before the Knesset and with the additional settlements. The assurances which they wanted from the Americans would have to be based on discussions between President Carter and Prime Minister Begin. But the Egyptians were not sanguine that President Carter would be successful. Prime Minister Begin was very obstinate, and President Sadat doubted whether President Carter would be able to apply sufficient pressure on him, in the period preceding the U.S. Presidential Election. President Carter had told him that he might be able to exert some pressure after he had secured the Democratic nomination, but the Egyptians were doubtful whether this would be enough to move the Israelis. Indeed, President Sadat was inclined to believe that there would now be little progress in the negotiations until the U.S. Presidential Election was out of the way.

The Prime Minister commented that if President Carter gave undertakings about the negotiations to the U.S. electorate over the next few months, it would probably not be until some time after the Election before he felt able to act.

Vice President Mubarak said that he agreed with the Prime Minister. The Egyptians were now waiting to see whether President Carter was able to produce the assurances they had asked for. Mr. Begin was likely to ask for time. But though they had been patient hitherto, the Egyptians were subject to pressures too. They could not sit on their hands while Mr. Begin made daily statements arguing against full autonomy. They did not want a vacuum to develop. They were anxious to resume the negotiations as soon as possible, but only if they had the assurances from the Americans they were seeking. If the Prime Minister had any advice to offer on how best to handle the present difficult situation, the Egyptians would be very happy to have it.

The Prime Minister said that she wished she could help. She wondered how President Sadat saw matters developing if Egypt and Israel were unable to make any further progress in the autonomy talks. What would be the effect in the Arab world if it were seen that the negotiations had come to a halt?

/ Vice President

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Vice President Mubarak said that Egypt had a number of options available if the talks reached a dead end. They would certainly not do nothing, but would launch new initiatives. One possibility would be to put forward a new Security Council Resolution. If they did that, however, it would be essential to use the language of Camp David, for otherwise the Israelis would be released from their Camp David obligations and would seek to begin negotiations with Egypt from scratch. As regards the reactions of the Arab world, secret contacts with other Arab countries made it plain that they wanted the negotiations to continue at least until such time as they could put stronger pressures on the United States. The fact was that the other Arab Governments had no alternative for solving the problem.

The Prime Minister asked Vice President Mubarak whether Egypt would prefer Europe not to contemplate an initiative so long as the present autonomy talks offered some hope of progress.

Vice President Mubarak said that he was inclined to believe that it would be better to wait and see what became of President Carter's efforts to obtain from the Israelis the assurances which Egypt wanted before she could agree to a resumption of the talks. If the European Community had in mind a new Security Council Resolution, it would be essential that it was based on Camp David and that its wording and timing should be agreed with the United States, if an American veto was to be avoided.

Mr. Moberly said that it was impossible to envisage agreement in the Security Council on any Resolution that embodied Camp David language, since the Arab States would be bound to oppose any such Resolution. Would it be possible to contemplate the Europeans taking steps, without cutting across the negotiations, to explore the views of the various parties? It might be that the Europeans could speak more easily to some of the parties than the Americans. Action of this kind might help to prevent the development of a vacuum in the next few months.

Vice President Mubarak said that it would help the Egyptians while they were waiting to see what progress the United States could make with Israel, if the European Community declared its position on the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlement policy and Palestinian rights.

The Prime Minister said that she thought that Egypt was being very patient. Even if the negotiations were resumed, it was difficult to see the Israelis allowing much progress in view of their settlement policy - which

/ the British

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

the British Government believed was wrong - and their attitude to autonomy for the West Bank. Vice President Mubarak had explained the Egyptian position very clearly, and she was grateful to President Sadat for arranging for him to come to London for that purpose. The British Government would be as helpful as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

Alvin White.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 May 1980

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

Dear Alexander,

VISIT OF VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK

I enclose a brief for the call on the Prime Minister by Vice-President Mubarak of Egypt at 16.30 tomorrow, 27 May. I am sending a copy to Paul Lever in Lord Carrington's office.

Yours ever,

Resident Clerk

Enc.

cc.
Mr P Lever, PS/Secretary of State

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT, 4.30 pm, 27 MAY 1980

POINTS TO MAKE

ARAB-ISRAEL

1. Prospects for autonomy talks? Gap between two sides looks wide. Sympathy for Egyptian view.
2. Anxious that momentum of peace efforts should not be lost in US election year. Europe may be able to play a rôle, but no intention of sabotaging Egyptian efforts. Will wish to consult Egypt closely about our ideas.
3. Continuing to discuss in the Nine, but no decisions taken. New Security Council Resolution a possibility but difficulty of US veto this year. Aim to lay groundwork for new peace efforts in 1981.

DEFENCE SALES

4. Delighted to hear you have accepted invitation to Farnborough. Hope it goes ahead. Interested in cooperating in areas such as Hawk and Rapier. No reason why demise of AOI should now be a barrier.

AID

5. Aid programme underconsiderable pressure but hope to help with Cairo sewerage.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

6. Vice-President Mubarak is stopping briefly in London on his way back from Washington. A Personality Note is attached. The Egyptian Ambassador has spoken of important matters to discuss, but has not been specific. Mubarak's trip to Washington was presumably connected with the autonomy talks (he had a personal message from President Sadat for President Carter for delivery on 23 May) but he may have also discussed defence cooperation. He will be accompanied on the call by Usama Al Baz, his Chef de Cabinet, who has played a considerable rôle in President Sadat's peace efforts and impressed both Americans and Egyptians by his competence; and by the recently arrived Egyptian Ambassador, Mr Abou Se'Eda, who has an impressive military record but is still feeling his way in the diplomatic field.

.../Autonomy Talks

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTONOMY TALKS

7. In an abrupt reversal of a decision on 14 May to allow the autonomy talks to go ahead again, the Egyptians announced on 15 May that they would not resume the talks pending further moves by Israel. The ostensible reason was a draft law before the Israeli Knesset confirming Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which the Egyptians described as incompatible with international law, the Camp David agreements and the pursuit of peace. However, general Egyptian frustration at the lack of progress and the current troubles on the West Bank probably contributed to the decision.

8. The Americans profess optimism that President Sadat will eventually agree to resume the talks (he has little option if he is not to admit the failure of his policies), but accept that some time may elapse before this is possible. President Sadat has written to President Carter and Mr Begin and appears to be waiting for them to 'create conditions' which would allow a resumption of the talks. The Israelis are unlikely to retreat on substance (and will not wish to be seen to be at Sadat's beck and call) but some form of words on procedural device sufficient to satisfy President Sadat is likely to be possible.

EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

9. The Egyptians are keenly interested in European intentions. During Sir Ian Gilmour's recent visit, those he spoke to (he did not see Sadat) expressed support for a move by Europe as long as it built on Camp David. However, they accept that Arab sensitivities mean that any link is likely to be implicit. President Sadat's own views are not clear and his intentions, as ever, are unpredictable.

DEFENCE SALES

10. Sir Ian Gilmour invited Vice-President Mubarak to pay an official visit to Farnborough in September. Mubarak said he would like to come. The Egyptians are particularly interested in the Hawk jet trainer (a potential deal of £120 million) and the Rapier missile (potential of some £70 million). The United States have virtually cornered the Egyptian market in the last year, particularly since the demise of the Arab Organisation for Industry (AOI) joint project with Europe, following withdrawal by Saudi Arabia and others.

AID

11. British aid to Egypt is small (£6.6 million in 1980/81) but effective. Future projects have been affected by financial pressures but a scheme for improving Cairo sewerage (we offered £50 million in 1978) has survived. Its timing and implementation will depend on Egypt providing detailed proposals.

CONFIDENTIAL

MUBARAK, MUHAMMAD HUSNI SAID

Vice President (April 1975)

Born 1928. Military Academy 1949. Air Academy 1950. Fighter pilot. Spent considerable periods in 1959 and 1961 in the Soviet Union on navigation courses and instructor courses. Seems to have been closely associated with TU16s since their first delivery to Egypt in late 1951. In 1962 he may have been commanding the TU16s operating over the Yemen. In 1964 he again visited Russia to attend a high level staff course and also headed a mission in the same year to study naval TU16 ASM versions. In January 1966 he was appointed Station Commander of Cairo West Air Field, in 1967 Director of Air Academy and in January 1969 Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force. He was promoted Air Vice-Marshal in November 1969 and appointed Commander of the Egyptian Air Force in April 1972. Promoted Air Marshal in February 1974.

In the period following the expulsion of the Soviet advisers in July 1972, he was thought to be one of the few top Egyptian officers still acceptable to the Russians. He was employed by Sadat in a military fence-mending exercise at the end of that year, visiting Moscow with Prime Minister Sidqi and leading a military delegation. Despite (or because of) the absence of Soviet advisers his Air Force performed satisfactorily in the secondary role allocated (realistically) to it in the war of October 1973. He proved an efficient and impressive Air Force Commander. Despite his long previous association with the Russians, he has been critical of them in private and has appeared eager to improve relations with the Royal Air Force and to buy British equipment; but he has displayed at least equal enthusiasm for French equipment and his main concern – like that of Sadat – is to make Egypt independent of any single source of supply. His sudden elevation to the Vice-Presidency came as a considerable surprise. It no doubt owed much to the fact that President Sadat wanted an active “military” Vice President in order to demonstrate the support of the armed services for his policies. Of all the military commanders, Mubarak was the only one significantly younger than Sadat himself and thus able to ensure continuity of policy. Furthermore he comes from Sadat's own district in the Delta and his loyalty to the President is unquestioned. His political position strengthened significantly in the course of Summer 1978 as he was prominent in the creation of the NDP, and General Gamassy, with whom he was known to have disagreements, left the Government. He is undoubtedly the most likely successor to Sadat.

He is no intellectual but is always friendly and cheerful. Speaks Russian and English. His two children speak excellent English as does his wife who is half Welsh (her mother lives in Cardiff). An attractive and amusing family who obviously enjoy good living and who make good company.

for Hurd

(2)

PRIME MINISTER

Vice President of Egypt

The Egyptian Embassy have informed us, at very short notice, that the Vice President of Egypt is passing through London next Tuesday and Wednesday and hopes to see you. The Egyptian Ambassador said that if it was not possible for you to see him, Mr Mubarak would not come to London at all! I suspect that before consulting anyone here the Egyptian Ambassador had promised his Vice President that he would get him into No.10. I was initially inclined to be unsympathetic to the Egyptian approach. But the Foreign and Commonwealth Office think that it would, on balance, be useful if you could find the time to see Mr. Mubarak. I have therefore agreed that you would see him for thirty minutes on the afternoon of Tuesday 27 May. (The Egyptians were pressing for an answer by 1600 this afternoon.)

Mr. Hurd will be in attendance.

MS.

Hurd

23 May 1980

ARS 050
UNCLASS

FM CAIRO 181015Z JUN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NR 514 OF 18 JUN 79

SAVING TO PARIS WASHINGTON AND UKREP BRUSSELS

VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK:

1. AL AHAM TODAY (18 JUNE) CARRIES AN INTERVIEW WITH VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK ON HIS VISITS TO WASHINGTON PARIS AND LONDON. MUBARAK DESCRIBES HIS TALK WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AS "MORE THAN EXCELLENT". THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS WAS CLEAR AND PRECISE, AND IT HAD MADE PLAIN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE TREATY AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. MUBARAK SAYS THAT "IN DISCUSSING COOPERATION IN ARMS PRODUCTION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THERE HAD BEEN NO NEED TO DO MORE THAN RECONFIRM WHAT WAS ALREADY IN FACT ESTABLISHED".
2. MUBARAK EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH HIS VISIT TO FRANCE (WHICH HAS RECEIVED FAR MORE MEDIA COVERAGE HERE THAN THAT TO THE UK). PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD SAID THAT HE SAW THE TREATY NOT AS A SEPARATE PEACE, BUT AS A FIRST STEP TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THEY HAD DISCUSSED THE ROLES FRANCE, THE EEC AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT MIGHT PLAY IN ADVANCING THE PEACE PROCESS. (AL AHAM'S EDITORIAL YESTERDAY CALLED FOR "POSITIVE STEPS" FROM THE EEC, PARTICULARLY THE FORMULATION OF A EUROPEAN VIEW ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY).
3. MUBARAK SAID THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM ITS READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN EGYPT'S ARMS PRODUCTION PROGRAMME.

4. FCO PSE PASS SAVINGS TO PARIS WASHINGTON AND UKREP BRUSSELS.
WEIR

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD	EID
MED	WED
DEF D	MAED
IUSD	ES & SD
NEWS D	FRD
N AM D	ECON D
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
IPD	CABINET OFFICE
OID	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

[PASSED SAVING AS REQUESTED]

2
Prime Minister
Sub
19/6

X-8

Egypt 2

23650 BOSTAN G

ADVANCE COPY

PS
PS/LAS
PS/MATHURD
PS/PUS
Smt. H. PARSONS
Mr. J.C. MORRIS
HD. MENAD
HD. NEWS D

Prime Minister

John
H. W.

H. E. MRS. MARGARET THATCHER, M.P.
THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER.

PS/M.10. Douglas

AT

(Jill)

IT PLEASES ME WHILE LEAVING YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY TO EXPRESS
TO YOUR EXCELLENCY IN MY NAME AND ON BEHALF OF THE ATTENDING
PARTY MY DEEP THANKS FOR THE COURTESY AND WARM WELCOME WHICH
THE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
ACCORDED US.

THE VISIT GAVE US THE CHANCE TO HAVE FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE
TALKS WITH A VIEW TO PROMOTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THEY WILL HELP AS WELL IN CONSOLIDATING THE FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND THE FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES
FOR THEIR MUTUAL BENEFIT AND FOR THE SAKE OF WORLD PEACE AND
SECURITY.

THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN EXPRESSING THEIR HIGH APPRECIATION
FOR YOUR POSITIVE STAND IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACEFUL MARCH IN OUR
REGION AND THEY LOOK FORWARD IN CONFIDENCE TO THE CONTINUATION

OF THIS ACTIVE ROLE SO THAT PEACE MAY PREVAIL THE MIDDLE EAST
ARENA AND THE PEOPLES OF THIS REGION MAY SHARE IN BUILDING
A BETTER HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY.

WITH MY MOST SINCERE REGARDS I WISH YOUR EXCELLENCY GOOD HEALTH
AND HAPPINESS AND THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
CONSTANT PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY

MOHAMED HOSNY MOBARAK

VICE PRESIDENT

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

23650 BOSTAN G

263563 FRDRME G

CONFIDENTIAL



FILE

Egypt

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

15 June 1979

Dear Paul,

Vice President Mubarak's Call on the Prime Minister on
14 June 1979

Vice President Mubarak of Egypt, accompanied by the Egyptian Ambassador and Mr. al-Baz, called on the Prime Minister at her room in the House of Commons yesterday at 1715. Sir Anthony Parsons was present.

I enclose a copy of my note of the discussion. Parts of it, dealing with Mr. Begin's call on the Prime Minister three weeks ago, are particularly sensitive and I should therefore be grateful if you would ensure that the record is given a very restricted circulation indeed. I have nevertheless recorded the discussion fully, against the possibility that the Egyptians might at some stage disclose parts of it to the press. Since Vice President Mubarak was due to meet the press shortly after his call on the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Parsons arranged for the Egyptian Ambassador to be contacted and told that the Prime Minister hoped that Vice President Mubarak would respect the private and confidential nature of their conversation: the Ambassador gave his undertaking that the Vice President would not say anything about his discussion with the Prime Minister when he met the press.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Bryan Cartledge.

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

VLE

CONFIDENTIAL

cc. Master set
Middle East sitⁿ

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF EGYPT, MR. MUHAMMED HUSNNI MUBARAK, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 14 JUNE 1979 AT 1715 HOURS

Present:-

The Prime Minister
Sir Anthony Parsons
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Vice President Muhammed Husnni Mubarak
HE The Egyptian Ambassador
Mr. al-Baz

After welcoming the Vice President, the Prime Minister said that the British Government supported the position of the Egyptian Government on the West Bank issue: the negotiations which lay ahead would clearly be very difficult. Vice President Mubarak said that the Egyptian Government expected them to be so. President Sadat had asked him to convey his warm regards to the Prime Minister; he felt that there was strong support among the new British leadership for the peace process.

Vice President Mubarak went on to summarise the discussions between President Sadat and Mr. Begin at El Arish. President Sadat had told Mr. Begin that the delegations which were about to begin their negotiations in Beersheba would need a firm directive from their Heads of Government if they were to make progress. When the Egyptian Prime Minister, Dr. Khalil, had met the Israeli delegation in Alexandria shortly afterwards, however, the Israelis had taken a tough and difficult stance, with all media representatives present, taking the line that the settlement of the West Bank by Israel would continue and that the United States should be given only observer status in the negotiations, rather than that of full participant as the Camp David Agreements required. Moreover, Vice President Mubarak said, Mr. Begin had delivered a series of statements about the West Bank and Israeli settlement policy before the Beersheba negotiations had even begun. This was all the more regrettable since the moderate Arab states were looking for an excuse to split away from the rejectionist camp. The Israeli Defence Minister, Mr. Weizman, had, moreover, threatened

CONFIDENTIAL

/that if

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

that if Egypt were to violate the peace treaty Israel would reoccupy Sinai for the fourth time. Egypt had done everything to promote the spirit of the treaty by opening her borders and the air corridor between Egypt and Israel and by issuing visas at Cairo Airport to Israeli tourists. Provocative Israeli statements nevertheless continued to be made. This was putting President Sadat in a difficult position in front of his own people but he had refrained from engaging in a war of statement and counter-statement, since he knew that this would not help the negotiations on the West Bank.

The Prime Minister said that she wished she could say that she was surprised by what the Vice President had told her. Mr. Begin had visited London three weeks before and she had tackled him about Israeli policy on settlements: to suggest a freeze on further statements was, after all, not much to ask of Israel. The Prime Minister said that she had been unable to make any headway with Mr. Begin, who was already angry that the question of settlements had been raised with him at a meeting with Members of Parliament. Mr. Begin had handed over a copy of the Judgement of the Israeli Supreme Court in justification of Israeli settlement policy; but this amounted to acting as judge and jury in one's own cause. The settlements raised the basic issue of sovereignty. If the West Bank territory belonged to anybody it was to Jordan. But Mr. Begin had refused to accept that this land was not part of biblical Israel.

The Prime Minister told Vice President Mubarak that her meeting with Mr. Begin had been one of the most difficult she had experienced. She had told him that, in international legal terms, she had never come across an arrangement by which a people were given political autonomy without having sovereignty over the territory on which they lived. The Prime Minister said that she had gained the impression that not all Mr. Begin's colleagues supported his position. She had emphasised to Mr. Begin that President Sadat, after his courageous moves, deserved support not only for his own sake but for that of Israel as well.

/Sir Anthony Parsons

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Sir Anthony Parsons said that he thought the Prime Minister had made some impression on Mr. Begin when she had asked him if he valued the peace treaty with Egypt: when Mr. Begin had replied that he did, the Prime Minister asked him why, in that case, he was willing to endanger it. The Prime Minister went on to say that when Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia had called on her at the beginning of May, she had told him that the British Government strongly supported President Sadat's efforts. Prince Salman had made clear that the Saudis were prepared to judge the peace treaty and the negotiations which were to follow it on their merits. The position of Saudi Arabia was clearly of great importance to Egypt, and also to the West as a whole.

Vice President Mubarak agreed that Mr. Begin seem impervious to reason or criticism. Mr. Vance had told him in terms that the West Bank settlements were illegal. Some people thought that Mr. Begin was actually trying to undermine President Sadat's position. He was giving the moderate Arabs no grounds for supporting Egypt. The Prime Minister commented that if this was Mr. Begin's policy, he risked losing everything. It would be important for Egypt to keep close to the Saudis, despite the occasional hot words which passed between them.

Vice President Mubarak agreed and said that Saudi Arabia was trying to find an excuse to split away from the rejectionists. The Saudis had told Egypt that if President Sadat could find any possibility of bringing about a change in Jerusalem, this would give them the excuse they sought. President Sadat had put this to Mr. Begin, but without result. The Prime Minister agreed that Jerusalem would be the most difficult aspect of a settlement for the West Bank. The Prime Minister repeated that the British Government supported Egyptian arguments in every way and fully shared Egyptian concern about the prospects.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that the harder the line Mr. Begin took, the more open the split within the Israeli Cabinet and in the Knesset was becoming: this could have a real effect on the prospects for the negotiations. Vice President Mubarak said that Dr. Khalil had been told by Mr. Burg that Mr. Begin still held complete power in Israel. The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

/commented

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

commented that in politics a great deal could change in 24 hours.

Vice President Mubarak went on to say that Mr. Robert Strauss would be coming to Cairo on 4 July and Mr. Begin would also come there to meet him. If Mr. Begin could not be made to understand that everything depended on finding a solution to the problem of the West Bank and the Palestinians, there would be no hope for an agreement. If he persisted with his policy of new settlements, that would be the end of the negotiations; Egypt was already being urged by other Arabs to break them off. After a further discussion of Mr. Begin's tactics of brinkmanship, Sir Anthony Parsons expressed the view that if the negotiations could only be kept going the change which was taking place in Israeli public opinion might produce a helpful effect. It was true that Mr. Begin would probably win an election now but not if the negotiations were to collapse.

Vice President Mubarak said that Mr. Burg had been told frankly that the negotiations could not continue if Israel's policy on settlements went on.

Sir Anthony Parsons said that he had just returned from visits to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and had found the Saudis in a more pessimistic mood than at the time of Prince Salman's call on the Prime Minister. They showed understanding for the UK's position of support for the peace process, while disagreeing with it. They believed that time was running out for President Sadat and that the Arab world would become increasingly rejectionist. The way to return to "total negotiation", which meant Geneva, was blocked.

Vice President Mubarak said that no other Arabs had so far done much for the cause of peace. He thought that King Hussein wanted the West Bank as part of his Kingdom, or so he had told President Sadat in confidence. (The Prime Minister expressed some doubt as to whether King Hussein could really relish the prospect of taking over the West Bank.) President Asad, for his part, was quite content with the present situation since Israeli

CONFIDENTIAL /occupation

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

occupation of the Golan Heights was helpful to his regime politically. But if Israel kept Golan for another five years it would be theirs for good.

The Prime Minister said that she would certainly take up the whole problem with President Carter when she met him in Tokyo at the end of June. It was clear that if there were not some move forward the whole peace process would fall apart. Quite apart from her friendship for Egypt, it was not in the UK's own self-interest that this should happen. She hoped that President Sadat would do his best to keep close to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf rulers.

The discussion ended at 1755.

Bym.

15 June 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Vice President Mubarak

Egypt: Briefs at back of file

I attach below briefs for Vice President Mubarak's call on you in the House of Commons at 1715 tomorrow.

The Vice President will be accompanied by Mr. al-Baz, who has been the chief Egyptian negotiator in their peace talks with the Israelis. I should warn you that Mr. al-Baz has an unusually loud voice!

Would you like Mr. Moberly, the FCO Under Secretary in charge of the Middle East, to be present?

SM

13 June 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

FM CAIRO 131305Z JUN

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NR 506 OF 13 JUN 79

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON:

EW *SK*
SM
17/2

VISIT OF EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT

1. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO GIVE US ANY PRECISE INDICATION OF THE PURPOSE OF VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER TOMORROW. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THE EGYPTIANS SIMPLY WANT TO PRESENT THEIR CASE TO THE NEW BRITISH GOVT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, ESPECIALLY IN THE WAKE OF MR BEGIN'S VISIT TO LONDON, AND TO KEEP US INFORMED OF THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THE AUTONOMY TALKS HELD IN ALEXANDRIA OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS). MUBARAK MAY ALSO PRESS FOR BRITISH HELP IN DISSUADING THE ISRAELIS FROM ESTABLISHING MORE SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN URGING THEM TO TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING LINE OVER PALESTINAIN AUTONOMY.
 2. THERE HAVE BEEN RUMOURS HERE THAT MUBARAK HAS HELD TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON POSSIBLE US INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB ORGANISATION FOR INDUSTRIALISATION, WHICH EGYPT PROPOSES TO TAKE OVER AS AN EGYPTIAN CONCERN. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT HE WILL RAISE THIS SUBJECT IN LONDON. IF HE DOES, HE IS UNLIKELY TO BE BRIEFED IN DETAIL AND WILL PROBABLY SAY SIMPLY THAT EGYPT CAN AND WILL GO IT ALONE. IT WOULD BE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND HIM OF THE FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF THE BRITISH FIRMS INVOLVED, WHICH MUST BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN ANY DECISIONS THE FIRMS MAKE, AND OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE AOI IN ITS PRESENT FORM AT LEAST UNTIL IT IS FORMALLY DISSOLVED.
- WEAR [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD	EID
MED	WED
DEF D	MAED
FUSD	ES & SD
NEWS D	FRD
N AM D	ECON D
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
LPD	CABINET OFFICE
OLD	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

12 June, 1979

Dear Bryan,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Vice-President
Mubarak of Egypt, 14 June

P.O. [initials]
13/6

Thank you for your letter of 7 June recording the Prime Minister's agreement to receive Vice-President Mubarak on 14 June. We have explained the pressures on the Prime Minister's time to the Egyptian Ambassador here, and have asked the Embassy in Cairo to speak in similar terms to the Vice-President's office.

The Vice-President will be accompanied to the meeting by Usama al-Baz, the official in charge of the peace negotiations within the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, and by the Egyptian Ambassador. John Moberly will be available if the Prime Minister wishes an FCO official to be present.

I enclose a brief for the meeting with a personality note on the Vice-President.

Yours GSK

P Lever

B Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
London S W 1

CONFIDENTIAL



BRIEF

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT MUBARAK
OF EGYPT, 14 JUNE

POINTS TO MAKE

Arab/Israel

1. Admiration for President Sadat's courage. Congratulations on success in first round of elections. Glad to see attempts to suspend Egypt from Non-Aligned Movement successfully resisted.
2. Government support Egypt/Israel Treaty as step towards comprehensive settlement. Importance of progress in autonomy negotiations. Have made views on this and on Israeli settlements clear to Mr Begin.
3. The Egyptian position on the autonomy proposals has our backing.
4. Nine will consider how they can help the autonomy negotiations either jointly or individually.
5. Important that Egypt set about restoring discreet contacts with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Shall make same point to King Hussein next week.

Aid to Egypt (if raised by Mubarak)

6. Expect this to be raised at Tokyo Economic Summit. Cuts in public spending will make it difficult for Britain to do more to help.

Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI)

7. Regret decision of Egypt's partners to seek liquidation of the AOI. Important that interests of British companies which participated in good faith should not suffer. Hope some continuing cooperation between British firms and Egypt can be negotiated.

EGYPT: BASIC FACTS

Political Structure A Republic with an executive President, a Vice-President, a Cabinet largely composed of technocrats and an elected Assembly.

Area 386,198 square miles

Population 38 million (estimated in 1975); average annual increase 2.2%

Religion Islam with a Coptic (Christian) minority of about 10%

GNP \$12,230 million (1977)

Real Growth rate (1970-76) 5.47%

Per capita \$310 (1977)

World Trade

Exports (1977) total \$1,676 million

Principal markets: Italy (23%)

Other Arab States (pre-boycott) (20%)

USA (10%)

USSR (8.3%)

UK (8.1%)

Imports (1977) total \$4,289 million

Principal sources: FRG (15%)

France (10%)

Japan (10%)

Italy (9%)

UK (8.5%)

UK TRADE (1978)

Exports \$394.6 million

Imports \$195.2 million



ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. A personality note on Vice-President Mubarak and a fact sheet on Egypt are attached. The Vice President is in practice President Sadat's deputy and most likely successor.
2. President Sadat's National Democratic Party won 172 out of 196 seats in the first round of the Egyptian elections on 10 June. Run-off elections in constituencies where no candidates got an absolute majority will be held on 14 June. These are the first multi-party general elections held in Egypt since 1952.
3. Other Arab states are seeking to have Egypt suspended or expelled from a number of international bodies including the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU. The meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in Colombo on 10 June condemned the Egypt/Israel Treaty but postponed consideration of suspending Egypt until its summit meeting in Havana in September. This was a set-back for the anti-Sadat Arabs.
4. Vice-President Mubarak is reported to be bearing a message for the Prime Minister from President Sadat. This is likely to explain how he sees the way ahead in the autonomy negotiations. He may also ask for Britain's support in specific ways. The Prime Minister can point to the action she has already taken with Mr Begin. Foreign Ministers of the Nine will try to reach agreement on 18 June on ways in which the Community can help, e.g a statement of the Nine's views on joint negotiations though French objections to the Egypt/Israel Treaty may prevent joint action. Mubarak may suggest that HMG should spell out its views on what should be achieved in the autonomy negotiations. There are risks in public statements which go too deeply into detail of negotiations with which we are not directly involved. But we could make useful representation to the Israelis to convey our views on the scope and the powers which a Self-Governing Authority on the West Bank and Gaza should have. If Mubarak suggests that HMG should establish a dialogue with the PLO the Prime Minister might undertake to consider this but point out that the PLO's refusal to recognise Israel's right to exist makes it difficult for the PLO to be accepted as a valid negotiating representative of the Palestine people in any talks aimed at a settlement based on Security Council Resolution 242.

5. President Sadat has treated his natural allies in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, high handedly. As a result, both have gone along wholeheartedly with sanctions against Egypt, and the Saudis talk in private of their hope that Sadat will be removed from power. Following American mediation, the Egyptians and Saudis have agreed to refrain from further invective against each other. The need now is to reestablish discreet contacts as a first step towards rebuilding Egypt's links with the Arab world. Mubarak has in the past been a messenger from Sadat to the Saudis.

Aid to Egypt

6. President Sadat has appealed for massive economic assistance from the West to replace aid from the Arab states. Unless peace produces tangible benefits for the Egyptian people, popular support for it may quickly be lost. The shortfall for Egypt this year from the cut off of Arab aid is probably of the order of \$500 million. So far the only new commitment has been from the US which will give a further \$100 million of civil aid (it already gives \$1 billion a year). The Americans are trying to stimulate a coordinated Western response and are likely to raise the matter at the Tokyo Economic Summit. The FRG and Japan are particular targets. British aid to Egypt is at present about £10 million per annum due to increase to £15 million.

Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI)

7. The AOI was founded by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for the joint purchase and manufacture of arms. Three UK companies - Rolls Royce, British Aerospace and Westlands - have substantial contracts with the AOI, for the sale of Lynx Helicopters and the Swingfire anti-tank missile. These contracts are worth some £400 million.

8. Following the Egypt/Israel Treaty Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have said they intend to dissolve the organisation. President Sadat has issued a Decree which treats this as a decision by the three countries simply to withdraw from the Organisation and provides for the AOI to continue in operation as an Egyptian enterprise. Egypt however will find it hard to raise the necessary funds. Britain's interest is to see agreement between the Arab members that

CONFIDENTIAL



will allow the funds committed to the AOI to be used for continued business between the British companies and the individual states. Orderly liquidation would suit us best. But we need to be cautious about pressing for this given President Sadat's determination to keep the AOI in existence.

CONFIDENTIAL

Vice President (April 1975)

Born 1928. Military Academy 1949. Air Academy 1950. Fighter pilot. Spent considerable periods in 1959 and 1961 in the Soviet Union on navigation courses and instructor courses. Seems to have been closely associated with TU16s since their first delivery to Egypt in late 1961. In 1962 he may have been commanding the TU16s operating over the Yemen. In 1964 he again visited Russia to attend a high level staff course and also headed a mission in the same year to study naval TU16 ASM versions. In January 1966 he was appointed Station Commander of Cairo West Air Field, in 1967 Director of Air Academy and in January 1969 Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force. He was promoted Air Vice-Marshal in November 1969 and appointed Commander of the Egyptian Air Force in April 1972. Promoted Air Marshal in February 1974.

In the period following the expulsion of the Soviet advisers in July 1972, he was thought to be one of the few top Egyptian officers still acceptable to the Russians. He was employed by Sadat in a military fence-mending exercise at the end of that year, visiting Moscow with Prime Minister Sidqi and leading a military delegation. Despite (or because of) the absence of Soviet advisers his Air Force performed satisfactorily in the secondary role allocated (realistically) to it in the war of October 1973. He proved an efficient and impressive Air Force Commander. Despite his long previous association with the Russians, he has been critical of them in private and has appeared eager to improve relations with the Royal Air Force and to buy British equipment; but he has displayed at least equal enthusiasm for French equipment and his main concern - like that of Sadat - is to make Egypt independent of any single source of supply. His sudden elevation to the Vice-Presidency came as a considerable surprise. It no doubt owed much to the fact that President Sadat wanted an active "military" Vice President in order to demonstrate the support of the armed services for Sadat's policies. Of all the military commanders, Mubarak was the only one significantly younger than Sadat himself and thus able to ensure continuity of policy. Furthermore he comes from Sadat's own district in the Delta and his loyalty to the President is unquestioned. Views differ on whether he is likely to succeed Sadat as President. He attends most of the President's meetings and in the past year has carried out foreign policy assignments of some importance, notably a visit to China in April, 1976. On the other hand he generally fails to impress Western visitors and seems to lack political flair.

He is no intellectual but is always friendly and cheerful. Speaks Russian and English. His two children speak excellent English as does his wife who is half Welsh (her mother lives in Cardiff). An attractive and amusing family who obviously enjoy good living and who make good company.

CONFIDENTIAL

Egypt

file

JD



BF 12.6.79

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 June 1979

Vice-President Mubarak of Egypt

Thank you for your letter of 1 June about Vice-President Mubarak's forthcoming visit to London. I understand that he will now be here from 14-16 June, rather than on the earlier dates mentioned in your letter.

The Prime Minister's diary is, in fact, extremely full at the time of the Vice-President's visit. The Prime Minister has, nevertheless, agreed to see Vice-President Mubarak on Thursday, 14 June, at 1715 in her room at the House of Commons. I should be grateful if it could be clearly explained to the Egyptian Ambassador that the Prime Minister will be receiving Vice-President Mubarak at a very busy time, and in the midst of the debate on the Budget; and that she consequently regrets that their conversation, to which she is looking forward, will not be able to last for more than forty minutes at the most. The Prime Minister has another engagement at 1800.

It would be helpful if briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with Vice-President Mubarak could reach me not later than 1700 on Tuesday, 12 June.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3-3
500



Prime Minister

As you received Mr. Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 June 1979

begin, I think it might be misunderstood if you were not to see the Egyptian Vice-President, crowded as your diary is: could you give him 45 minutes at 1715, in the House, on 14 June? ~~Yes, provided the appointment~~

Dear Bryan,

Possible Call on the Prime Minister by Vice President Mubarak of Egypt

Agreed
as.

Vice President Mubarak of Egypt is being sent as an emissary by President Sadat to certain European capitals, including London, during June. The Egyptian press reported that President Sadat would give him a message for the Prime Minister, and that he would hope to discuss developments in the Middle East.

We have now been told by the Egyptian Embassy that Vice President Mubarak would like to be in London on ~~14~~ and 15 June for this purpose. The Embassy are aware that the dates proposed coincide with the visit of President Moi of Kenya, and would try to rearrange Vice President Mubarak's itinerary, if necessary, but they are constrained by their need to fit in the other sections of his European visit.

Vice President Mubarak is effectively President Sadat's Deputy, and the second most powerful man in Egypt. He is not personally very impressive, but it would be damaging to President Sadat's confidence in British support if it were not possible for the Prime Minister to receive him. President Sadat's message is likely to contain an exposition of his view of the autonomy negotiations with Israel and the need to give the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza substantial, genuine autonomy as an interim step toward an overall peace settlement. Lord Carrington recommends therefore that the Prime Minister should try to find time to receive Vice President Mubarak and accept President Sadat's message. The Egyptian position on the autonomy proposals has our general support (even though President Sadat's commitment to an independent Palestinian state, and the return of all Arab Palestinians, including East Jerusalem, is more categorical than our own) and it is important that we should do all that we can to bolster his position in the face of overwhelming Arab opposition to the negotiations.

Vice President Mubarak need not take a great deal of the Prime Minister's time. If it were possible for Mrs Thatcher to give him three-quarters of an hour on 13 or 14 June, it would be quite adequate. Alternatively, we could propose other dates in mid-June which might be more convenient for the Prime Minister, but we should have to do so fairly soon to enable Vice President Mubarak to rearrange his European plans. I should be grateful if you would let me know how the Prime Minister would wish us to respond.

Yours GEN

Paul
(P Lever)

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Egypt

P S TO P M NO 10 DOWNING ST

180

RESTRICTED

FM CAIRO 291235Z MAY

lru
aa
but
3/75

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 454 OF 29 MAY

VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK

1. AL AHAM TODAY (29 MAY) REPORTS THAT VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK PLANS TO VISIT LONDON DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS "TO MEET MRS MARGARET THATCHER AND GIVE HER A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SADAT. HE WILL ALSO MEET MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST". AL AHAM ADDS THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT IS EXPECTED TO VISIT A NUMBER OF OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) EUROPEAN CAPITALS.

2. THE PRESIDENCY SAY THAT THIS STORY IS AN UNAUTHORISED LEAK. VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK HOPES TO VISIT LONDON SHORTLY, BUT HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHAT DATES HE WOULD WISH TO PUT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. THEY SAY THEY WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE US A FIRMER IDEA OF HIS PROPOSED DATES TOMORROW. HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE PROPOSING A VISIT THIS WEEK: PRESIDENT SADAT IS CURRENTLY ON HOLIDAY AND THE VICE PRESIDENT IS CARRYING OUT HIS ENGAGEMENTS.

WEIR

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NENAD	EID
MED	WED
DEF D	MAED
PUSD	ES & SD
NEWS D	FRD
N AM D	ECON D
UND	CONS D
EESD	CONS EM UNIT
IPD	CABINET OFFICE
OID	

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE

RESTRICTED