

SECRET

MT

PART 2

Confidential Filing

New Hebrides Constitutional Conference.
Independence. Insurrection on Island of Santo.

SB
831

NEW HEBRIDES

Pt 1: August 1979

Pt 2: July 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
24.7.80							
28.7.80							
29/7/80.							
30.7.80.							
<p>PREM 19/317</p>							

This paper to be kept
as top copy on this file

For recent papers
see Vanuatu July 1980
Internal Situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

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New Hebrides

FM VILA 291430Z JUL 80

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 638 OF 30 JULY

INFO FLASH PARIS

IMMEDIATE MODUK (DS11 DCP'S)

PRIORITY CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,
SUVA, HONIARA, PORT MORESBY.

Read in full

ms

FROM STUART

MY TELEGRAM NO 637: NEW HEBRIDES SECURITY.

1. JUST BEFORE THE MIDNIGHT SWEARING IN TONIGHT, MR BLAKER AND I WENT TO SEE M. STIRN, AT HIS REQUEST TO DISCUSS LETTER IN REFTEL, OF WHICH FRENCH HAD RECEIVED AN IDENTICAL FRENCH VERSION.

2. STIRN SAID FRANCE COULD NOT POSSIBLY AGREE TO PUTTING ITS TROOPS UNDER VANUAATU GOVERNMENT. CONTROL MUST REMAIN QUOTE OURS UNQUOTE (BY WHICH HE APPEARED TO MEAN FRANCO/BRITISH). APART FROM THIS FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (A) PURPOSE OF FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND PROMOTE NEGOTIATION, NOT TO REPRESS ANYONE.
- (B) JOINT FORCE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY JOINT AGREEMENT OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE WITH LINI GOVERNMENT.
- (C) PERIOD SHOULD BE SHORT (HE MENTIONED 2 WEEKS BUT LATER SPOKE OF 3).
- (D) FOR OPTICAL INTERNAL PURPOSES FRANCE WOULD HAVE TO DESCRIBE FORCE AS BEING FOR DEFENCE OF ITS NATIONALS. THEY HAD NEVER AGREED IN THE PAST TO SUPPORT ONE PARTY IN AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY AGAINST ANOTHER. (MR BLAKER INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS TO SUPPORT A LEGAL GOVERNMENT AGAINST REBELS).
- (E) THEY COULD NOT AGREE TO STAY MERELY TO PERMIT SMOOTHER TAKE-OVER BY P N G TROOPS, WHICH WOULD THEN INDULGE IN REPRESSION.

3. MR BLAKER REPLIED THAT, WHILE H M G HAD NOT YET STUDIED THE CHIEF MINISTER'S PROPOSALS, HE AGREED THAT ANY JOINT FORCE WOULD HAVE TO STAY UNDER JOINT FRENCH/BRITISH CONTROL. HE BELIEVED MAIN PURPOSE WOULD BE TO PRESERVE SITUATION. SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL WOULD LEAD TO COLLAPSE. PRESERVATION MEANT IN HIS VIEW CONTROLLING LUGANVILLE AND THE AIRPORT, NOT E.G. INVADING VANAFO. NEVERTHELESS SOMETHING MUST BE DONE ABOUT THE ILLEGAL RADIO, WHICH WAS STEVENS MAIN WEAPON. JAMMING MIGHT NEUTRALIZE THE OLDER STATION IN VANAFO, BUT THE NEWER AND STRONGER VEMARANA RADIO IN OR NEAR THE TOWN MIGHT HAVE TO BE TAKEN OUT IF IT COULD BE FOUND. (MR STIRN APPEARED UNBRIEFED BUT DID NOT DISAGREE. WE ARE SENDING OUR JAMMING EQUIPMENT TO LUGANVILLE TODAY, BUT MAY HAVE TO ASK M O D TECHNICAL HELP TO LOCATE SECOND STATION).

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. MR BLAKER

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4. MR BLAKER WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE HAD ALREADY AGREED TO STAY ONE WEEK, BUT WE WERE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE WITHDREW. THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE A COLLAPSE WHICH WOULD BE DISHONOURING. HE HAD DINED THE SAME EVENING WITH MR PEACOCK WHO HAD SAID THAT IF THEY HAD THREE WEEKS, THE PACIFIC COUNTRIES SHOULD (THOUGH HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT HIS GOVERNMENT), BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE SOME POLICE TRAINING, AND THEY HOPED, A NON-PROVOCATIVE JOINT POLICING FORCE DRAWN PERHAPS FROM AUSTRALIANS, N Z, P N G AND FIJI. MR BLAKER TOOK STIRN'S POINT ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY FOR FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS OF APPEARING TO STAY TO ENABLE OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS TO TAKE OVER SMOOTHLY. BUT THIS WOULD BE LESS WORRYING IN BRITAIN THAN IN FRANCE. MOREOVER IF STEVENS BELIEVED THAT NOTHING WOULD TAKE OUR PLACE WHEN WE LEFT, THEN HE WOULD SIMPLY WAIT AND OUR AIM OF FORCING HIM TO NEGOTIATE WITHIN A UNIFIED COUNTRY WOULD BE FRUSTRATED YET AGAIN.

5. M. STIRN TOOK ALL THIS CALMLY (THOUGH THERE WAS NOT TIME TO DEVELOP THE ARGUMENTS), AND GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD BUY THREE WEEKS, PROVIDED IT WAS NOT EXTENDED AND PROVIDED THAT FRENCH NOSES WERE NOT RUBBED IN WHAT WOULD FOLLOW AFTER.

6. AFTER TALKING TO M. STIRN AND MR PEACOCK, MR BLAKER CONSIDERS THAT, PROVIDED THAT IT WAS A JOINT FRANCO/BRITISH FORCE, (WHICH WAS NOT THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ONE WEEK OPTION, WE MIGHT HAVE TO STAY THREE WEEKS. THE REQUESTED EXTENSION TO THREE WEEKS MAY BE PARTLY THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE NEW HESITATIONS OF P N G (PORT MORESBY TELEGRAM NO 84), BUT IT WOULD ALSO OBVIOUSLY TAKE TIME TO CARRY OUT AUSTRALIA'S IDEA OF A REGIONAL POLICING AND POLICE TRAINING FORCE (WHICH WE THINK WOULD BE LESS PROVOCATIVE TO FRANCE THAN THE P N G ARMY). THE INCONVENIENCES AND THE RISKS OF STAYING AS LONG AS THREE WEEKS ARE CONSIDERABLE, BUT IF FRANCE AGREES TO MAINTAIN A JOINT FORCE FOR SO LONG FOR THE PUROPOSES OUTLINED BY M. STIRN (LESS, SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, (D) AND (E) - THE FIRST OF WHICH IS NOT NECESSARY FOR US, AND THE SECOND CAN BE LEFT ON ONE SIDE, SINCE WE ARE NOT SO SUSPICIOUS AS FRANCE OF THE MOTIVES AND ACTIONS OF OTHER PACIFIC COUNTRIES).

7. MR BLAKER THEREFORE HOPES THAT THE CABINET WILL AGREE TO AN EXTENSION TO THREE WEEKS IF THE FRENCH WILL TOO. M O D MAY WELL NOT BE ENTHUSIASTIC. THE MARINES ARE UNDERSTANDABLY UNEASY ABOUT THEIR TRICKY BUT YET BORING TASK, AND THEIR LEAVE SEASON IS COMING UP. BUT IF WE DO LEAVE BEFORE AN EFFECTIVE POLICING FORCE TAKES OVER, THE LAST STATE OF VANUAATU MAY BE WORSE THAN THE FIRST.

ASHFORD

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST.]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTN.

SPD

WED

UND

CABINET OFFICE



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1
 Telephone 01-~~XXXXXX~~ 218 2111/3

MO 14/4

29th July 1980

h.a. Smith
Joan Rodmi

My Secretary of State saw last night Lord Carrington's minute of 28th July about the possible need to retain the British force in the New Hebrides after the territory became independent. Mr Pym's response was passed to your Department by our Resident Clerk last night.

My Secretary of State agreed to the proposals in Lord Carrington's minute of 21st July to the Prime Minister, only on the basis that a joint military force would be retained, should that prove necessary. The outline plan attached to that minute stressed (at serial 17) that any offer to leave British and French troops in the New Hebrides after independence should be made jointly, with a fixed time limit.

My Secretary of State is therefore concerned at the prospect that the French troops might now leave Santo, but the British force should nonetheless be required to stay on. There are military as well as political risks about any form of unilateral action, even for a period of days. If, for some reason, the Papua New Guinea forces are not despatched to Santo on about 5th August, it could be difficult for us politically to refuse a further extension and then to become sucked into an internal security situation in an independent state.

My Secretary of State believes that we should persuade the New Hebrides Government to invite the French troops to stay in Santo with ours, and to press the French to agree that any further military involvement in the New Hebrides should continue

R M J Lyne Esq
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office



to be undertaken jointly in all respects. (I am told this morning that Fr. Lini has now requested French troops to stay in Santo after-independence; if this is so, my Secretary of State assumes that we are therefore pressing the French to agree). Even if a joint force is retained in Santo for a period of days, there is a need to agree with the French (and with the New Hebrides Government) the precise role that the force would play after independence. This is all the more important if only a British force is retained. For example, we would need to determine to whom the British force commander would be responsible and whether the force's role was to be solely in support of the police mobile unit and confined, as it is at present, to Luganville. If so, there could, of course, be no guarantee that the presence of the British force would prevent a recurrence of Mr Stephens' rebellion after the New Hebrides becomes independent.

As your Secretary of State observes, a draft status of forces agreement is carried by FCO officials currently in Vila. But it was drafted in the MOD on the assumption that any continuing requirement in the New Hebrides would be met by an Anglo/French force and it contains no details of the nature of the duties that the force would be expected to undertake. Your officials would need to consider this urgently with ours.

My Secretary of State has noted Lord Carrington's proposal that the Chancellor should agree that the necessary funds for the retention of our troops should be found from the Contingency Reserve. Mr Pym has asked me to say that he could not agree to the costs being met from MOD Votes. Moreover, as you will know our officials are discussing who should meet the considerable extra costs to date of the deployment to the New Hebrides.

My Secretary of State believes that Lord Carrington will understand his concern at the prospect that the British force may have to stay on in Santo. Nevertheless, if Lord Carrington is satisfied that this is the only solution in the circumstances (Lord Carrington's minute acknowledged some of the risks involved), my Secretary of State would not wish to press his objections further, assuming that the force would not be required in the New Hebrides after 5th August.



I am copying this letter to Michael Alexander (No 10)
and to Martin Hall (HM Treasury).

Yours truly
Jonathan Baker

(J D S DAWSON)

29 JUL 1980

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12

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28.7.80

Message approved for dispatch,
from [unclear] [unclear].

Print, 29/7

Dear Michael,

New Hebrides Independence:
Messages from the Prime Minister

The New Hebrides is to become an independent Republic within the Commonwealth, under the name of Vanuatu, at midnight on 29/30 July. It is customary for the Prime Minister to send a message of congratulations to the Head of Government of such a newly independent state.

I attach a draft telegram the text of which Mr Blaker (leader of the British delegation) could deliver to the Hon and Rev Walter Lini, the present Chief Minister of the New Hebrides, who will become the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Vanuatu.

It is also customary for Her Majesty The Queen and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to send messages on such occasions. Arrangements for these are in hand.

yours ever
Rodric Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

Michael Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
London

File No.
Department
Drafted by
(Block Capitals)
Tel. Extn.

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
Precedence
IMMEDIATE
DESKBYZ

SUBJECT.

FOR
COMMS. DEPT.
USE

Despatched (Date)
(Time)Z

POSTBYZ

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin) Z (G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix)
(Security Class.) UNCLASSIFIED (Caveat/
Privacy marking)
(Codeword) (Deskby) Z

TO IMMEDIATE VILA Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post)

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

AND SAVING TO

REPEATED TO (for info) PRIORITY PARIS SERIAL No. T 152 A/80.

LCC Master
ops

SAVING TO (for info)
Vanuatu : Internal Sit : July 80

Distribution:-

- FILES
- SPD
- CCD
- PS
- PS/Mr Blaker
- PS/PUS
- Mr Stratton

cc: No 10 DS

Copies to:-

[TEXT]

Grateful if following message from Prime Minister could be delivered to Fr Lini by Mr Blaker

Begins:

I am very happy to send you, through Mr Peter Blaker, Minister of State, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this message of friendship and goodwill on behalf of myself and the British Government and people.

We extend to you, to your colleagues, and to all the people of your country our warmest congratulations as Vanuatu takes her place in the international community as an independent Republic and a fellow member of the Commonwealth.

Ends

CONFIDENTIAL

New Hebrides



JS
cc MOJ
tmt

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

28 July 1980

NEW HEBRIDES



The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute (FCS/80/132) to the Secretary of State for Defence on this subject. The Prime Minister agrees that our troops should stay in the new Hebrides until 5 August.

The Prime Minister has expressed some surprise that Departments should be finding difficulty in determining who should meet the costs of the troops after independence. The Prime Minister does not regard the sum involved as a large one.

I am sending copies of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence) and John Wiggins (HM Treasury).

M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.





CONFIDENTIAL

FCS/80/132

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

New Hebrides

1. In my minute of 23 July to members of OD, I reported that we and the French had agreed on joint action to restore the authority of the New Hebrides Government (NHG) on the island of Santo. As you know this operation was carried out successfully on 24 July and a force of about 100 Royal Marines and 100 French troops remain on the island.
2. It now seems unlikely that negotiations between the separatists and the NHG will result in a solution before independence on 30 July. If we withdraw our troops on that date or indeed subsequently before an agreement has been reached or before the NHG are able to maintain their authority on the island, the secessionists could once again seize control.
3. The NHG have asked the Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) to assist in maintaining order on Santo after independence. A detachment of PNG troops has already arrived in Vila for the independence celebrations. Their deployment to Santo afterwards requires the approval of the PNG Parliament which will consider the NHG request on 5 August. The PNG Prime Minister has already expressed his willingness to assist and approval by the PNG Parliament seems likely.
4. Father Lini has asked if British troops can remain on Santo until the PNG troops can replace them (about 5 days to one week after independence). It is not yet clear whether a similar request has been made to the French: if it is, the French may well also decide not to withdraw their troops on 30 July.
5. I consider it important that peace and the authority of the NHG should be maintained on Santo until the NHG can make arrangements with PNG or other Pacific States. We should obviously prefer the French to stay with us. But there is a good case for staying on alone. Total withdrawal of both our forces could lead to a

/resumption

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resumption of control of the island by the secessionists. This could cause chaos and result in bloodshed if PNG or other troops had to land by force.

6. Retaining British troops for a limited period would contribute to the maintenance of the present calm on the island. I recognise that the withdrawal of French troops might increase the risk of demonstrations or even violence against our troops. But I hope to minimise this by making clear to the New Hebrides Government that the troops were only to be used as a back up for the New Hebrides Police in maintaining law and order and not in any punitive operation against the secessionists.

7. A draft memorandum covering the status of our forces in the New Hebrides after independence is with officials in Vila. Unless the NHG have substantive amendments to propose to it, it can be signed once agreement for our troops to stay is given.

8. When you agreed to the joint Anglo/French deployment to Santo, you also agreed in principle that our troops could if necessary remain there after independence. I believe that the Ministry of Defence will wish to be reimbursed the full costs of the troops after independence (about £50,000 per week). The New Hebrides Government cannot afford this. The Chancellor's agreement to the expenditure that would be involved was not sought at the time that you and the Prime Minister agreed in principle. This does not mean that I considered that the necessary money could be found within my present Votes. If you and the Prime Minister agree that the troops should stay until 5 August, I should be grateful also for the Chancellor's concurrence on the understanding that it may be necessary to seek supplementary estimates provision.

9. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard,

24 July 1980, columns 801-808

"New Hebrides"

Signed AWayland Date 29 June 2010

PREM Records Team

New Hebrides

PA
MS

STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON THE NEW HEBRIDES BY MR PETER BLAKER MP,
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THURSDAY 24 JULY 1980

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the New Hebrides.

As the House is aware, it has always been the objective of Britain and France to ensure that the New Hebrides Condominium should achieve independence in peace and unity, with its territorial integrity intact.

When I met my French colleague, Monsieur Dijoud, in Paris on Saturday the 19th of July, we agreed that independence should take place as planned on the 30th of July. We also recognised with some regret, that our efforts to achieve a negotiated solution to the problems which have resulted from the activities of Mr Jimmy Stevens and his associates on the island of Santo, had not so far been successful.

We therefore agreed that while our two personal representatives should return to the New Hebrides to continue their efforts to establish a real dialogue between the Government and the various opposition groups, we could not allow the secessionists to continue blatantly to flout the authority of the legitimate government on the island of Santo.

/As a

As a consequence of this decision, during the course of this morning (local time), British and French troops, acting together, carried out an operation to restore the authority of the legitimate government on the island of Santo, thus putting an end to the eight week rebellion.

The operation appears so far to have been a complete success. There have been no casualties and no shots were fired. I should like to congratulate the British and French troops for the efficiency with which this successful operation has been carried out.

The way is now open for the Central Government's representative to return to Santo and for the blockade to be lifted. A fresh attempt will now be made to re-open a dialogue to try to resolve outstanding difficulties before Independence on the 30th of July. In this way we and the French Government have sought to fulfill our obligation to bring the New Hebrides to Independence in peace and unity.

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Document

The following document, which was enclosed on this file, has been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES.

Reference: CC(80) 30th Conclusions, Minute 4 (extract)

Date: 24 July 1980

Signed Wayland Date 29 June 2010

PREM Records Team



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

R Sanders.

✓ *Print - 24/7*

23 July 1980

Dear Michael,

Independence Gift for New Hebrides

In my letter of 14 July seeking the Prime Minister's approval for the proposed presentation I promised to write separately about the tabling of a PQ on the New Hebrides gift. Now that it has been decided that 30 July will remain the date for independence, we suggest that the arranged Parliamentary Question might be tabled on Monday 28 July for answer on Tuesday 29 July.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (Treasury), David Edmonds (Dept of Environment), Colin Egerton (Privy Council Office), Robin Birch (PS/Leader of the House), David Wright (Cabinet Office) and to CASS Gordon, Sir Noel Short and M T Ryle (House of Commons).

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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24 JUL 1980





FCS/80/125

MEMBERS OF OD

ms. Prime Minister

The helicopters are on present plans
 due to land at 2 am, London time on
24 July.

La. Am
Am 23/7

New Hebrides

1. Members of OD will be aware that Mr Blaker met his French counterpart M. Dijoud in Paris on Saturday 19 July.

2. They agreed that:-

- (a) Independence should take place on 30 July;
- (b) the New Hebrides Government should be pressed to improve their proposed Regional and Land Laws, and;
- (c) subject to the approval of the Prime Minister and President Giscard, British and French troops, acting jointly and using minimum force, should restore the Condominium and thus the authority of the Central Government to the island of Santo.

3. The two Ministers agreed that their two Representatives should return to the New Hebrides to prepare the ground for (b) and (c), which they are now doing.

4. The Prime Minister and President Giscard have approved the joint action at (c) and joint directives have been issued to the British and French Force Commanders to mount a limited operation to restore central government on the island of Santo.

5. The operation will be mounted on 24 July by a force comprising about 100 Royal Marines and 100 French Troops from New Caledonia; using French Puma helicopters and British Hercules aircraft. The troops are under strict orders to try to avoid casualties to either side. The French Resident Commissioner went to Santo in advance of the troops to try to persuade Stevens and the French Colons to offer no resistance.



6. The operation will enable us to discharge our joint obligation to restore order and to bring the New Hebrides to Independence with its territorial integrity preserved. The British and French Governments have also agreed to accept a limited commitment to maintain a joint military presence in the New Hebrides after independence should this prove necessary and be requested by the Independent Government.


C
(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

23 July 1980

23 JUN 1980





OVERSEAS OFFICE
HOUSE OF COMMONS SWIA OAA

Telephone 01-219 3000 (switchboard)

01-219 3314 (direct line)

23rd July 1980

Parliamentary Gift to New Hebrides

Thank you for sending me copies of the correspondence with Number 10 on this subject. I enclose copies of the letter I have sent to Mr. Arthur Bottomley together with the suggested question and answer in relation to the Parliamentary gift to the New Hebrides.

I am copying this letter to Alexander at Number 10 and Lyne in your Private Office.

M.T. RYLE
Clerk of the Overseas Office.


J.C. White, Esq.,
Commonwealth Coordination Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London S.W.1A 2AH

Copies to:
M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq.,
R.M.J. Lyne, Esq.,



R Sanders
of the MS
Ant.

With the Compliments of
The Clerk
of the Overseas Office



OVERSEAS OFFICE
HOUSE OF COMMONS SWIA OAA

Telephone 01-219 3000 (switchboard)
01-219 3314 (direct line)

22 July 1980

INDEPENDENCE GIFT TO THE NEW HEBRIDES

As you know, the New Hebrides is due to attain independence on 30 July, and has applied for full membership of the Commonwealth. It is customary for these occasions to be marked by the presentation of a parliamentary gift (in addition to a gift from the British Government) and such a gift had been approved, in principle, by the House of Commons Commission.

I understand that arrangements are to be made for a parliamentary Question to be given a written reply by the Prime Minister on the subject of the Government gift. A similar Reply will need to be given by you on behalf of the House of Commons Commission in respect of the parliamentary gift. I enclose a copy of the suggested Question and Answer, and if you agree I will find an appropriate Member to Table the Question for answer on 29 July.

I am sending a copy of this to Donald Limon, as Secretary to the Commission.

M T RYLE
Clerk of the Overseas Office

Rt. Hon. Arthur Bottomley, O.B.E., M.P.,
House of Commons

c.c. D. W. Limon, Esq.

FOR ANSWER ON 29 JULY 1980

Mr

To ask the Rt Hon Member for Middlesborough, as representing the House of Commons Commission, whether it is proposed that a parliamentary gift should be presented to the House of Assembly of New Hebrides to mark the attainment of independence on 30 July.

Mr Arthur Bottomley

The House of Commons Commission have noted with pleasure the forthcoming independence of New Hebrides. They are sure that the House will wish to offer a suitable gift to their House of Assembly to mark this occasion. An appropriate motion will be moved in due course.

24 JUL 1980

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SECRET*New Hebrides*

21 July, 1980

New Hebrides

The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's minute of 21 July and has approved the course of action agreed between Mr Blaker and M. Dijoud.

Mr Blaker may, therefore, telephone M. Dijoud.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence).

RM J Lyne, Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET



SECRET

This is a copy. The original
has been extracted and retained
under Section 3(h).1

COPY NO. 1

PM/80/60

PRIME MINISTER

Go ahead
A.T.

New Hebrides

1. Mr Blaker met his French counterpart, M. Dijoud, in Paris on Saturday 19 July.
2. They agreed that:
 - (a) independence should take place on 30 July, and issued a press statement to this effect;
 - (b) the New Hebrides Government should be pressed to improve their proposed Regional and Land Laws; and
 - (c) subject to your approval and that of President Giscard, British and French troops, acting jointly and using minimum force, should restore the Condominium and thus the authority of the central government to the island of Santo.
3. The two Ministers agreed that their two Representatives should return to the New Hebrides forthwith, to prepare the ground for (b) and (c).
4. I consider that a limited military action represents the only satisfactory course if we are to meet our obligations to grant independence to the New Hebrides with its territorial integrity intact. / The attached outline plan of the proposed operation was agreed between officials in Paris. Mr Blaker and M. Dijoud agreed to submit their proposal to Heads of Government today, and to telephone each other as soon as authority for the proposed operation had been given. In addition to the specific operation, the two Ministers agreed to seek authority to accept a limited commitment to maintain a joint military presence in the New Hebrides after independence should this prove necessary and be requested by the Independent Government.
5. The provision at paragraph 7(iii) of the agreed minute is not ideal, in that it will take away the element of surprise. However,

/M. Dijoud

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M. Dijoud made it a condition of French acceptance of the plan for joint action that the French Resident Commissioner, M. Robert, should go to Santo shortly before the landing, to do everything possible to avoid colon association with any possible resistance to the operation (and a consequent risk of French troops having to shoot at French citizens). If the colons can be neutralised through the intercession of M. Robert, there is a good chance that the reoccupation of Luganville will be totally unopposed. M. Robert will be accompanied by * ~ ~ ~ * a member of the French security service (DST) based in Vila, and by a British colleague (probably Mr Cooke, the Commander of the British Police Mobile Unit in the New Hebrides).

6. I recommend that Mr Blaker should be authorised to telephone M. Dijoud before close of play today to signify your agreement both to the proposed operation and to the maintenance of a joint military force in the New Hebrides after independence (for a limited and specified period of time to be agreed) should this prove necessary.

7. Francis Pym (to whom I am sending a copy) has been consulted and endorses this minute.

C
/

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 July 1980

* ~ ~ * Name deleted and retained
under Section 3(4).

AWayland
29 June 2010


SECRETJOINTLY AGREED TIMETABLESaturday 19 July

1. Press communique: - Agree 30 July Independence date
- Decide to send back MM Donald/Aribaud to continue their work in pursuit of reconciliation.

Sunday 20 July

2. Donald/Aribaud leave Paris for Vila with following instructions:
 - To improve existing text on Regionalisation.
 - To improve existing text on Land Tenure.
 - To reassure Colons in Vila, and Francophones in general (in particular moderate Francophone leaders eg Leymang).
 - Look into problems on Tanna which have resulted from death of Yolou, and Mackay enquiry. Also question of 54 arrest warrants against people on Santo (re - 28 May.)
 - To say nothing of this agreement until instructed by London/Paris to do so.

Monday 21 July

3. Ministers to consult heads of government about this agreement. They then make a telephone call to confirm agreement.

Tuesday 22 July

4. Donald/Aribaud arrive Vila 0630 London time (1630 Vila time). They maintain complete secrecy on agreed plan.
5. Defence Ministries in London and Paris make contact and meet in London to prepare detailed plan for the operation. Operation to take place at dawn (Vila time) on Thursday 24 July if possible. If not, at dawn on following day. Exact timing left to military experts.
6. London/Paris give authority for operation (see Annex).

SECRET

/Wednesday

SECRET


Wednesday 23 July (Day before operation)

7. i) French officers from Noumea (in civilian clothes) to Vila to coordinate plans with British Marines.
 ij) Donald/Aribaud explain agreement/plan to Stuart and Robert
 iii) Evening before operation
 Robert goes to Santo, accompanied by M. Manton and suitable British equivalent. Robert's instructions as follows:
- Convince Colons to stay at home
 - If possible persuade Stevens to welcome the operation as re-establishment of Condominium.
 - M. Manton (and British colleague) to ensure there are no provocative incidents by individuals.
 - Robert to warn Vila if serious opposition seems likely.
8. Evening before operation (as late as possible) Mr Stuart to inform Fr Lini of plan assisted as necessary by Donald/Aribaud and ~~ask~~ him to sign a letter which:
- i) welcomes decision on 30 July;
 - ii) invites metropolitan powers to take all necessary action to re-establish NHG authority on Santo;
 - iii) gives his undertaking to pursue negotiations with Stevens to seek a peaceful settlement.
9. At dusk on evening before operation, 3 Puma helicopters (empty) from Noumea land at Vila. Refuelled, and guarded by British Marines.

Thursday 24 July

10. At dawn, transport planes 2 x DC3 and 1 x DC4 carrying French paratroops (90 men) land at Vila. 3 pumas take off for Santo immediately carrying a joint force (± 45 men). Land at Pekoa airport, met by Robert, the Mayor of Lugainville (and hopefully Stevens).
11. 30 minutes later, C130s arrive carrying remainder of joint force (totalling 200 - 250 men - rest remain in Vila to ensure order). Troops occupy Lugainville only.

SECRET



SECRET

12. New Hebrides Government District Agent arrives Lugainville.
13. British "Representative of Resident Commissioner" arrives (to parallel existing Representative of French Resident Commissioner).
14. NHG ^{an} ~~acc~~ounce blockade lifted.
15. If all goes well (day of operation of D + 1) Donald/Aribaud arrive, accompanied by Fr Lini. Negotiations begin with Lini/Stevens.
16. Decision on when "Milice" (NHG Policemen) can replace troops in Lugainville.

Before 30 July

17. Decision on whether necessary to offer to leave British and French troops in NH after independence. If we do offer, we do so jointly, with fixed time limit.




SECRET

ANNEX


INSTRUCTIONS TO MM DONALD/ARIBAUD

1. Tuesday 22 July, in the afternoon, DOMTOM and British Embassy agree operation should go ahead, and on what day - either Thursday 24 July or Friday 25 July.
2. British Embassy sends following telegram to Donald in Vila in Cypher:
" For Donald and Aribaud.
1. Action agreed for !.....July."
3. Telegram marked to arrive at 22:2230Z ie 0830 on Wednesday 23 July in Vila.

SECRET



21 JUL 1980



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Prime Minister~~ MW

This is Mr Blaker's
brief for his week-end
talks with Mr Dijoud.

You need not
wade through it, but
might like to have it
around if the talks
generate any publicity.

MAD
18/11
VII


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PS/Mr Blaker

cc: Private Secretary
PS/LPS
PS/PUS
Sir E Youde
Mr Stratton
Mr Fergusson
Defence Department
WED
UND
News Dept

NEW HEBRIDES: MR BLAKER'S MEETING WITH M. DIJLOUD: PARIS 17/18 JULY

1. I attach a brief for Mr Blaker's meeting with M. Dijoud in Paris on 19/20 July.
2. In addition to a short note setting out our objectives, the brief covers points to make on:
 - A: Achievement of 30 July independence date
 - B: The Donald/Aribaud Mission
 - C: Where next? - options
 - D: Last resort fall-back
 - E: UN involvement
 - F: South Pacific Forum interest



C M CARRUTHERS
South Pacific Department

18 July 1980

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NEW HEBRIDES: MR BLAKER'S MEETING WITH MONSIEUR DIJOURD:
PARIS 19/20 JULY

STEERING BRIEF

OBJECTIVES

- A Joint public announcement that we accept 30 July.
- B Agree that outcome of Donald/Aribaud mission was failure.
- C Agree how we achieve 30 July Independence with NHG authority re-established throughout the territory.

TACTICS

1. Seek immediate joint public announcement confirming 30 July independence date.
2. If at all possible, secure agreement that Donald/Aribaud mission was a failure as a result of Stevens' intransigence.
3. Contrast Father Lini's flexibility with Jimmy Stevens' intransigence. Build on Dijourd's undertaking of 25 June to the effect that if Stevens were to prove intransigent, the French would be the first to deal with him.
4. Run through our very limited 'where next?' options highlighting negative aspects.
5. Reach inescapable conclusion that if we are to achieve 30 July independence with territorial integrity intact, the only sure way is to act jointly, using minimum force necessary, to re-establish NHG authority on Santo. Then lift blockade and implement other elements of the Package.

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A 30 JULY INDEPENDENCE DATE

Points to Make

1. We must press ahead with 30 July. If we do not, we risk a UDI from Fr Lini and his government supported by other Pacific States. If this happened, our position would be untenable. Absurd to consider taking action against Fr Lini and legitimate government when we have refused to deal with Stephens.
2. Pleased to see your message to Fr Lini of 13 July (Vila telno 1 to Tarawa) - your assurance that we are trying everything we can to achieve objective of independence on 30 July in peace and unity.
3. We should jointly and publicly announce our agreement to 30 July today.

'A'

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B. DONALD/ARIBAUD MISSION

We should seek an agreed assessment of the outcome (failure) of the Donald/Aribaud mission.

Points to Make

1. Father Lini and NHG proved very flexible on:

- 'B'
- a) Regional law - draft proposals which we have seen (Vila telno 552 and now no 560) are comprehensive. Could not have expected more.
 - b) Land Tenure - NHG willing to pass a law which meets French requirements (minimum lease 30 years - up to 75 years for big investment projects (Vila telno 517).)
 - 'C'
 - c) NHG have prepared a Resolution conferring automatic citizenship on half-castes (Vila telno 573).
 - 'D'
 - d) NHG consistently willing to negotiate with Stevens.

2. Stevens and associates totally inflexible.

- 'E'
- a) Stevens' reaction completely negative on all NHG proposals (Vemerana letter - Vila telno 559)
 - b) Reversion on conclusion of negotiations to original hard line position of 9 July (Vila telno 537). Vemerana position is ludicrous.
- 'F'

/Danger points

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Danger Points

M. Dijoud might attempt to build on the following:

a) A Santo CondominiumPoints to Make

- i) We would be acting unlawfully:
 - breach of self-determination/territorial integrity obligations under UN Charter, and UN Covenant on Human Rights. Trouble at the UN (and possibly, for UK, at International Court of Justice).
- ii) Constitution, and Exchange of Notes of 23/10/79 scrapped.
- iii) New Anglo/French condominium agreement would be required for Santo.
- iv) New Hebrides Act 1980 would require amendment.
- v) Breach of assurances given to Lini by Dijoud and Lord Carrington in recent messages confirming support for independence in unity, under agreed Constitution (Vila telno 1 to Tarawa, and FCO telno 388).

'G'

'H' b) Meeting of Chiefs on 20 July (Vila telno 558)Points to Make

- i) Vemerana inspired rentacrowd.
- ii) To accord any importance to this meeting would exaggerate Stevens status.

c) Officials should return to continue negotiationPoints to make

- i) This suggestion brings us to next point on our agenda - where next?

[Last resort - fall-back position outlined at D]

C. WHERE NEXT? (Assuming prior agreement to 30 July date)

Points to Make

Option I - Joint Ministerial (or official) visit

Negative Aspects

- a) Risk humiliating failure.
- b) Why should a fresh attempt achieve any more than Donald/Aribaud have already done?
- c) Confer unwarranted status on intransigent secessionists - make us look weak.

Option II - Independence on 30 July with Santo remaining in secession

Negative Aspects

- a) The package, most of which Fr Lini has already agreed, is linked to restoration of NHG authority on Santo.
- b) Severe criticism from UN : Committee of 24, and possibly Security Council and UNGA (failure to meet our obligation/territorial integrity etc).
- c) Reaction of Pacific Forum countries: not just criticism, but post independence action to deal with Stevens and French Colon supporters - bloodshed.
- d) Could only make French position in Pacific worse than it already is.

Option III - A joint (military) police action

Positive Aspects

- a) British Advisers think that joint action using minimum force to restore order on Santo would result in minimal casualties.
- b) Reaction of Pacific States and UN.
- c) French position in Committee of 24 (vis a vis New Caledonia) unaffected.
- d) Achieve Independence on target and with honour having fulfilled our obligations.

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D FALL BACK POSITION: FURTHER VISIT BY DONALD/ARIBAUD

Not an attractive option, but if French refuse to contemplate military action now, we would at least be seen to be doing something between now and independence.

In the last resort, we could agree to the return of Mr Donald and M. Aribaud if the following conditions were met:

- (a) They should be armed with a firm brief to say the following to all parties (particularly Stevens):
 - (i) No question of any change in package agreed on 25 June.
 - (ii) Independence for a united New Hebrides agreed for 30 July come what may. Santo considered part of an united New Hebrides.
 - (iii) Britain and France will not give any aid money to islands where NHG does not have complete control.
 - (iv) Blockade of Santo to be enforced (via New Caledonia) indefinitely.
- (b) We set a deadline of midnight (Vila time) on 24 July for Stevens' acceptance of NHG authority on Santo.
- (c) Clear understanding from French that if Stevens has not come into line by 24 July, they will join us in a 'police' action on Santo.
- (d) French paratroop commander to travel to Vila now (ostentatiously) to prepare a joint plan for use if necessary.

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E UN INVOLVEMENT

Points to make (if raised)

1. No objection to Vunibobo visiting the New Hebrides and reporting back to U N General Assembly. But this must not delay Independence.

2. Only agreed because you clearly felt strongly about it - we see little point in the exercise with Independence so close.

F SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM

Points to make (if raised)

I

1. The Forum Resolution (Canberra telno 422) reflects concern of its members.
2. It could have been a lot worse.
3. We briefed our High Commissioner on Tarawa to point out that anything too strident might be counter-productive.

GRS 800

V. Sd letter.

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 131830Z
FM VILA 131126Z JUL 80
TO IMMEDIATE TARAWA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 13 JULY

INFO PRIORITY FCO PARIS

NEW HEBRIDES

FOLLOWING ARE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS OF A MESSAGE FROM THE FRENCH MINISTER PAUL DIJOLD TO FATHER WALTER LINI, NOW IN TARAWA. SINCE THE FRENCH HAVE NO MISSION IN KIRIBATI MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS ASKED IF YOU WOULD BE SO KIND AS TO TRANSMIT BOTH TEXTS TO FATHER LINI TO REACH HIM BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE FORUM MEETING.

BEGINS

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE ET CHER AMI,

J'AI BIEN RECU VOTRE MESSAGE DU 11 JUILLET ET JE VOUS EN REMERCIE.

COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, MON COLLEAGUE BRITANNIQUE M. BLAKER ET MOI-MEME DEVONS NOUS RENCONTRER DANS LES PROCHAINS JOURS POUR TIRER LES CONCLUSIONS DE LA MISSION ENVOYEE AUPRES DE VOUS ET POUR EXAMINER CONJOINTEMENT LES DECISIONS A PRENDRE POUR FAIRE FACE A LA SITUATION AUX NOUVELLES-HEBRIDES.

JE NE SAURAI DONC ANTICIPER SUR LES RESULTATS DE CETTE CONFERENCE QUE NOUS MENERONS EN ETROITE CONFORMITE DE VUES AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE ET QUI TIENDRA LE PLUS GRAND COMPTE DES PROGRES ENREGISTRES PAR LA MISSION ARIBAU/DONALD.

A CETTE OCCASION, NOUS PRENDRONS UNE DECISION SUR LA DATE D'ACCESSION DES NOUVELLES-HEBRIDES A L'INDEPENDANCE. JE TIENS A VOUS ASSURER QUE NOTRE OBJECTIF DEMEURE QUE LES NOUVELLES HEBRIDES SOIENT INDEPENDANTES LE 30 JUILLET, ET NOUS ESSAYONS DE TOUT METTRE EN OEUVRE POUR QU'ELLES Y PARVIENNENT DANS LA PAIX ET L'UNITE.

C'EST DANS L'ESPOIR QUE TOUTES LES PARTIES EN PRESENCE NOUS Y AIDERONT QUE JE VOUS REAFFIRME MON SOUTIEN A VOTRE GOUVERNEMENT ET MON SOUCI DE VOIR L'ENSEMBLE DE L'ARCHIPEL ENTRER DANS LE CADRE CONSTITUTIONNEL QUE NOUS AVONS PREVU

PAUL DIJOLD

ENDS

| BEGINS

BEGINS

DEAR FATHER WALTER LINI,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF JULY 11TH AS YOU KNOW MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, M. BLAKER, AND I ARE TO MEET WITHIN A FEW DAYS TO DRAW CONCLUSION FROM THE MISSION WE SENT TO YOU. JOINTLY WE WILL THEN CONSIDER THE DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEW HEBRIDES.

I WOULD NOT LIKE TO ANTICIPATE THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE IN WHICH WE SHALL ACT IN CLOSE UNITY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WE WILL TAKE THE CLOSEST ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE ARISAUD AND DONALD MISSION.

AT THIS MEETING WE WILL TAKE A DECISION ON THE NEW HEBRIDES INDEPENDENCE DATE. I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS THAT NEW HEBRIDES SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT ON JULY 30TH AND WE ARE TRYING EVERYTHING WE CAN SO THAT THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE REACHED IN PEACE AND UNITY.

IN THE HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED WILL HELP US IN THIS. I CONFIRM MY FULL SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT AND MY CONCERN THAT THE ENTIRE GROUP WILL BE WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK WE HAVE PREPARED.

YOURS FAITHFULLY

PAUL DJJOU

ENDS

FCO PLEASE PASS [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

STUART [PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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CABINET OFFICE

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DESRBY 131000Z
FM VILA 130800Z JUL 80

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 552 OF 13 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

PRIORITY MODUK (DS11) CANBERRA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK SUVA TARAWA

SAVING HONIARA PORT Moresby

MY FIRST IPT

NEW HEBRIDES NEGOTIATIONS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NHG WORKING PAPER ON REGIONALISATION.

1. STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS FOR REGIONS

(A) (AS REGIONAL COUNCIL)

- I) IN EACH REGION THERE SHALL BE A REGIONAL COUNCIL, WHICH SHALL BE AN ELECTED BODY, BUT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO NOMINATE A SMALL NUMBER OF MEMBERS TO REPRESENT CHIEFS, WOMEN AND OTHER INTEREST GROUPS
- II) THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE THE POWER TO ESTABLISH COMMITTEES TO WHOM THE COUNCIL MAY DELEGATE POLICY OR MANAGEMENT FUNCTION.
- III) THE COUNCIL WILL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE LAWS FOR THE REGION IN RESPECT OF MATTERS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE REGION, AS SPECIFIED IN PART 2.
- IV) THE COUNCIL SHALL HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY, THE POWER TO ENTER INTO CONTRACT, HOLD PROPERTY, AND TO SUE AND BE SUED:

(B) PUBLIC SERVICE

- I) THE COUNCIL SHALL BE SERVED BY A REGIONAL SECRETARY AND A DIRECTOR OF FINANCE, WHO SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE COUNCIL. THESE OFFICERS WILL BE SECONDED TO THE COUNCIL FROM THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE, BUT NO OFFICER WILL BE SO APPOINTED UNLESS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL APPROVES OF THE APPOINTMENT.
- II) OTHER PUBLIC SERVANTS MAY BE SECONDED FROM THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE AS REQUIRED AND UPON THE REQUEST OF THE COUNCIL.
- III) THE COUNCIL WILL HAVE THE POWER TO EMPLOY DIRECTLY JUNIOR STAFF LIKE MESSANGER, CLEANERS, CLERKS, ETC..

(C) COURTS

- I) CONSTITUTION AND PROCEDURE OF CUSTOMARY COURTS SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CUSTOM.
- II) SERVICES AND CLERICAL STAFF FOR LOCAL COURTS.

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/2.

2. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

I) THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE LAWS OR AND EXERCISE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY IN RESPECT OF THE FOLLOWING MATTERS:

(A) LOCATION, CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF:

1. SCHOOLS
2. CLINICS
3. ROADS
4. BRIDGES
5. WATER SUPPLIES
6. HOUSES
7. SECONDARY AIRFIELDS
8. WHARVES
9. JETTIES
10. OPEN AIR MARKETS

(B) LOCAL PUBLIC HOLIDAY

LIQUOR LICENSING

TRADE LICENSING

AREA AND VILLAGE COUNCILS

INSHORE FISHERIES

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

ESTABLISHMENT AND CONTROL OF MARKETS

CONTROL OF DOGS, PIGS AND OTHER ANIMALS

BUS AND BOAT SERVICES

AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES

ALLOCATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRIORITY AREAS

REGIONAL LIBRARIES, MUSEUMS AND CULTURAL CENTRES

TRAFFIC CONTROL (POWERS DELEGATED BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT)

REGIONAL LIBRARIES, MUSEUMS AND CULTURAL CENTRES

REGIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING WOMENS INTERESTS AND YOUTH WORK

SPORT RECREATION

POSTAL AGENCIES

RURAL RADIO SERVICES

II) PROVISION WOULD BE MADE FOR THE DELEGATION OF FURTHER FUNCTIONS, BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO THE COUNCIL AS THE COUNCIL PROVED ITSELF ABLE TO TAKE ON THESE FUNCTIONS AND DISCHARGE THEM EFFICIENTLY. THESE FUNCTIONS MIGHT INCLUDE EDUCATION PUBLIC HEALTH, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING AND COLLECTION OF CERTAIN PERENNIES.

III) REGIONAL LAWS SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, BUT THE GOVERNMENT SHALL HAVE NO POWER TO VETO LAWS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE COMPETANCE OF THE COUNCIL.

3. FINANCE

I) THE REVENUE OF THE COUNCIL SHALL CONSIST OF

(A) LOCAL TAXES LEVIED BY THE COUNCIL:

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- (B) INCOME GENERATED BY THE COUNCIL FROM THE PROVISION OF SERVICES, RENTS, AND TRADING ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL:
- (C) ONE HALF OF ALL THE FINES IMPOSED BY A COURT IN RESPECT OF ANY BREACH OF THE LAW IN THE REGION:
- (D) CERTAIN LICENSE FEES:
- (E) CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF DUTIES LEVIED ON EXPORTS FROM THE REGION:
- (F) GENERAL (BLOCK) AND SPECIFIED GRANTS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

- II) THE COUNCIL SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF THE REVENUE. IT SHALL SUBMIT ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE FOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL. THERE WILL BE AN ANNUAL AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE KEPT BY THE COUNCIL.
- III) PROVISIONS MAY BE MADE FOR THE COUNCIL SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE GOVERNMENT TO RAISE MONEY THROUGH LOANS.

FCO PLEASE PASS

STUART

Repetition to TAGAWA
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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DESKBY FCO 151130Z

DESKBY PARIS 151130Z

FM VILA 150901Z JUL 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 560 OF 15 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

PRIORITY MODUK (DS11) CANBERRA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK SUVA HONIARA PORT MORESBY TARAWA

YOUR TELNO 394 : NEW HEBRIDES

1. NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT HAVE FIRMLY HOISTED IN NEED FOR A LAW ON REGIONALISATION TO BE ENACTED BEFORE INDEPENDENCE IN ORDER TO FULFIL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION. ATTORNEY-GENERAL HAS ALREADY PREPARED A DRAFT OF SUCH A LAW WHICH IS MAINLY AN ENABLING BILL TO PERMIT ALL SORTS OF SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE ENACTED IN DETAIL AFTER INDEPENDENCE. ✓

2. AT THE WIND UP MEETING OF THE DONALD/ARIBAUD MISSION WITH THE NHG THIS EVENING (SEE MY TELNO 556) I PUT IT TO THE MINISTERS THAT IN ORDER TO KEEP THE INITIATIVE IN THEIR OWN HANDS AND PREVENT THE WAVES OF SANTO'S SECESSION WASHING OVER OTHER ISLANDS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PUBLISH AT ONCE THEIR REGIONALISATION PROPOSALS ON THE LINES GIVEN TO STEVENS. THIS WOULD SHOW THE OTHER ISLANDS THAT THEY HAD MORE TO GAIN FROM STICKING WITH THE GOVERNMENT THAN WITH THE VAGUE SECESSIONIST IDEAS OF STEVENS. ALTHOUGH INCLINED TO SAY THAT IT WAS NOT FOR US TO LECTURE THEM WHEN WE HAD JUST FAILED IN SANTO, THEY TOOK THE POINT AND SAID THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERING HOW TO PROCEED BEFORE AND AFTER THE PARIS MEETING. good.

3. DURING TELECON CARRUTHERS/STUART I WAS ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH CONSIDERED LINI'S REGIONALISATION PROPOSALS (MYTELNO 552) TO BE REASONABLE. ARIBAUD SAID, BOTH IN DEBRIEFING TO ROBERT

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AND

AND MYSELF, AND AFTERWARDS TO NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT THAT HE AND DONALD HAD PUT THE PAPER TO THE VEMARANA ON THE BASIS THAT THEY WERE GOOD NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS BY NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT WHICH SHOULD FOR A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

ARIBAUD AND LIZOP ALSO SAID PRIVATELY THAT THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSALS FORMED A REASONABLE BASIS FOR REGIONALISATION, BUT THAT THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THEY WERE PROPOSED (IE REGIONAL COUNCILS AS SET OUT IN THE CONSTITUTION) DID NOT SHOW ENOUGH AWARENESS OF HOW THINGS HAD MOVED ON SINCE NOVEMBER. I COMMENTED, AND THEY AGREED, THAT WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO IMPLY THAT PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION WERE UP FOR RENEGOTIATION.

4. I HAVE ONE ADDITIONAL POINT TO ADD TO MY TELNO 555. PARA 1(B) ARIBAUD SAID IN PASSING TODAY THAT ONE WAY OF LEADING UP TO THE USE OF TROOPS (PRESUMABLY MEANING ONE WAY OF PUTTING IT TO DIJOURD) MIGHT BE THAT THE NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT MIGHT THEN BE WILLING TO REVIEW THEIR DECISION ON 30 JULY INDEPENDENCE. YASH GHAI AND I BOTH THINK THAT THIS LAST COULD BE TRUE.

NHG'S FIRMNESS ON 30 JULY IS BECAUSE THEY THINK THE METROPOLITAN POWERS WILL DO NOTHING (MYTEL 555 PARA 1(D).)

IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT IF ORDER IS RESTORED IN SANTO THERE WILL BE MUCH TO DO THERE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. HOWEVER, IF M. DIJOURD DOES PROPOSE INTERVENTION COUPLED WITH DELAY IN INDEPENDENCE, I WOULD RECOMMEND CAUTION IN ACCEPTING IT AS FIXED JOINT METROPOLITAN PACKAGE. IF THE NHG STILL INSISTED ON 30 JULY WE WOULD BE BACK WITH ACCUSATIONS OF INTRANSIGENCE. AND I BELIEVE THEY WILL LOOK FOR ACTION BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANYTHING MORE

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[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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[File 3]

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 573 OF 18 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

NEW HEBRIDES CITIZENSHIP

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT ON CITIZENSHIP DRAFTED BY YASH GHAI AND SIGNED BY CHIEF MINISTER ON 18 JULY.

IT IS TO BE MADE FORMALLY TO ASSEMBLY NEXT WEEK. YASH GHAI AND I HAVE SHOWN THE TEXT TO ROBERT AND LIZOP, WHO PRONOUNCED THEMSELVES SATISFIED. GRATEFUL IF PARIS WOULD SHOW TO ARIBAUD.

BEGIN:-

1. IT APPEARS THAT SOME PEOPLE HAVE NOT UNDERSTOOD THE PROVISIONS FOR THE CITIZENSHIP OF VANUATU CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND THE REGULATIONS MADE BY THIS ASSEMBLY, PARTICULARLY IN SO FAR AS THEY APPLY TO NEW HEBRIDEANS.

IN ORDER TO ALLAY UNFOUNDED FEARS, I SET OUT BELOW THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP, ABOUT WHICH MISUNDERSTANDINGS HAVE ARISEN.

2. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS ARE CONTAINED IN CHAPTER 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION. CITIZENSHIP IS NOT A MERE PIECE OF PAPER OR A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE.

CITIZENSHIP IS EVIDENCE OF BELONGING AND COMMITMENT TO THE COUNTRY: AND OF SHARING IN ITS FORTUNES, FOR BETTER OR WORSE. IN THIS COUNTRY WHERE ONLY ITS OWN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN STATELESS THROUGHTOUT ITS COLONIAL HISTORY, CITIZENSHIP WILL HAVE A SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE.

3. CONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE IS ANOTHER PRINCIPLE. THE

PS
PS/WPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/RUS
SIR E YONDE
MR STRATTON
MR DONALD
Hd/SPD
Hd/WED
Hd/NTD
Legal Advisers
Hd/NEWS D.

TO THIS COUNTRY. WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT LOYALTY THAT PERSON CAN ENJOY THE PASSPORT OF TWO COUNTRIES AND OTHER PRIVILEGES OF CITIZENSHIP.

4. THE CONSTITUTION THEREFORE PROVIDES THAT THE ONLY PEOPLE WHO WILL BECOME CITIZENS OF VANUATU AUTOMATICALLY ARE THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE NEW HEBRIDEAN ANCESTRY AND HAVE NO NATIONALITY AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE. A PERSON IS OF NEW HEBRIDEAN ANCESTRY EVEN IF ONLY ONE OF HIS ANCESTORS IS A NEW HEBRIDEAN. THUS A PERSON BORN OF A NEW HEBRIDEAN MOTHER AND A EUROPEAN FATHER IS A NEW HEBRIDEAN FOR THIS PURPOSE. UNDER THIS PROVISION ALMOST ALL THE NEW HEBRIDEANS, INCLUDING WHAT ARE CALLED 'METISSE' OR 'HALF CASTES' WILL BECOME VANUATU CITIZENS AUTOMATICALLY ON INDEPENDENCE AND WILL NOT NEED TO FILL IN ANY FORM OR TO DO ANYTHING ELSE.

5. IT IS IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY THAT IF A NEW HEBRIDEAN HAS SOME OTHER NATIONALITY HE WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY BECOME A VANUATU CITIZEN. THERE IS A VERY SMALL NUMBER OF NEW HEBRIDEANS WHO HAVE A FRENCH OR BRITISH NATIONALITY BECAUSE, FOR EXAMPLE, THEIR FATHER WAS FRENCH AND BRITISH. NOT EVERY CHILD OF A MIXED PARANTAGE BECOME FRENCH OR BRITISH. WHETHER SUCH A NEW HEBRIDEAN BECOMES A FRENCH OR A BRITISH CITIZEN WAS NOT DECIDED BY US BUT BY FRENCH OR BRITISH LAW.

THUS A WELL KNOWN NEW HEBRIDEAN, MR JIMMY STEVENS, DOES NOT, AS I UNDERSTAND, HAVE BRITISH OR FRENCH NATIONALITY AND WILL, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION BECOME A CITIZEN OF VANUATU AUTOMATICALLY ON INDEPENDENCE. 7

6. NEW HEBRIDEANS WHO HAVE FRENCH, BRITISH OR OTHER NATIONALITY DO HOWEVER, HAVE THE RIGHT TO BECOME CITIZENS OF VANUATU IF THEY WISH. I REPEAT THAT THEY HAVE A RIGHT (LAST WORD UNDERLINED) TO BECOME CITIZENS. ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS TO FILL IN A FORM FOR THIS PURPOSE, WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF INDEPENDENCE. THESE FORMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PRINTED. IF THERE IS A GOOD REASON WHY THEY COULD NOT FILL THE FORM WITHIN THREE MONTHS, THERE IS PROVISION UNDER THE REGULATION TO EXTEND THIS PERIOD BY ANOTHER SIX MONTHS. ONCE THEY HAVE HANDED IN THE FORMS TO A GOVERNMENT OFFICER, THEY BECOME CITIZENS: THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO POWER TO REFUSE CITIZENSHIP. IF SUCH A NEW HEBRIDEAN BECOMES A VANUATU CITIZEN, HE WILL HAVE TO GIVE UP HIS BRITISH OR FRENCH OR OTHER NATIONALITY WITHIN 3 MONTHS OF BECOMING OUR CITIZEN.

So he is a dual for 3 months.

ENDS

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GP 621
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DESKBY 151000Z

FM VILA 150700Z JUL 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 559 OF 15 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

PRIORITY MODUK (DS11) CANBERRA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK SUVA HONIARA PORT MORESBY TARAWA

MIPT : NEW HEBRIDES NEGOTIATIONS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER GIVING VEMARANA'S FINAL VIEWS
AT END OF THIS MORNINGS TALKS

MESSIEURS,

NOUS SALOONS EN VOUS LES ENVOYES DU GOUVERNEMENT
FRANCAIS ET DU FOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE AUPRES DU GOUVERNEMENT
VEMARANA DE SANTO.

NOUS VOUS TEMOIGNONS DE NOTRE PROFONDE GRATITUDE
POUR LES EFFORTS CONSIDERABLES QUE VOUS DEPLOYEZ AFIN DE
PERMETTRE AUX GOUVERNEMENTS DE L'ACHIPEL DE VIVRE EN PAIX
ET DANS UN RESPECT MUTUEL.

LORS DE VOTRE DERNIERE MISSION A SANTO LES 8 ET
9 JUILLET 1980 NOUS VOUS AVONS EXPOSE LES RAISONS QUI
JUSTIFIENT NOTRE MEFIENCE A L'EGARD D'UN GOUVERNEMENT CENTRAL
QUI N'HESITE PAS A FAIRE APPEL A DES ARMEES PUISSANTES
POUR COMATTRE SES RESSORTISSANTS ET A DES MILICES PRIVEES POUR
ASSASSINER SES OPPOSANTS. NOUS VOUS AVONS EGALEMENT
FAIT PART DE NOTRE DETERMINATION DE LUTTER JUSQU'AU BOUT
POUR NOTRE LIBERTE AVEC LE SOUTIEN DE TOUS NOS FRERES
MELANESIENS.

CONFIDENTIAL

AWOURE'D HUI

AUJOURD'HUI VOUS REVENEZ DE PORT-VILA SANS GRANDS
RESULTATS EN DEPIT DE VOS EFFORTS CONSIDERABLES POUR MENER
A BIEN CETTE DIFFICILE NEGOCIATION QUI PIETINE EN RAISON
DE L'INTRANSIGEANCE DU GOUVERNEMENT DE PORT-VILA ET DE SON
DESIR AVOUE DE NOUS ECRASER PAR LA FORCE, MAIS NOUS CONTINUONS
A CONSTATER QUE LE VANUAAKU PATI N'A PAS LES MOYENS DE
NOUS IMPOSER LA THEOCRATIE TOTALITAIRE DONT REVE LES PASTEURS
PRESBYTERIENS ET NOUS PENSONS QU'ACUNE GRANDE PUISSANCE NE
COMMETTA L'ERREUR DE METTRE EN DANGER LA VIE DE SES SOLDATS
POUR COMBATTRE LES RESSORTISSANTS EUROPEENS ET LE PEUPLE
MELANESIENS UNIS DANS LA MEME LUTTE POUR LA SURVIE ET LE
DEVELOPPEMENT DE L'ILE LA PLUS GRANDE ET LA PLUS RICHE DE
TOUT L'ARCHIPEL. L'UTILISATION DE LA FORCE MARQUERAIT LE
DEBUT D'UNE ERE D'INSTABILITE DANS CETTE REGION DU MONDE.

PAR AILLEURS, NOUS VOUS CONFIRMONS NOS PROPOSITIONS
DU 9 JUILLET ET AFIN DE VOUS TEMOIGNER NOTRE PROFOND DESIR
DE NEGOCIER, ACCEPTIONS LA REUNION D'UNE CONFERENCE A
LAQUELLE PARTICIPERAIENT TOUTES LES PARTIES INTERESSEES
AFIN D'ETABLIR ENSEMBLE UN REGIME POLITIQUE ACCEPTABLE PAR
TOUS EN PARTANT DES POSITIONS INITIALES DE CHACUN.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE

JIMMY MOLI STEVENS

FCO PLEASE PASS

STUART

[PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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PS/LPS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/PUS

SIR E YOUDE

MR STRATTON

MR FERGUSSON

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GRS 800

V.S. Letter.

UNCLASSIFIED
DESKBY 131830Z
FM VILA 131126Z JUL 80
TO IMMEDIATE TARAWA
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1 OF 13 JULY

INFO PRIORITY FCO PARIS

NEW HEBRIDES

FOLLOWING ARE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS OF A MESSAGE FROM THE FRENCH MINISTER PAUL DIJOLD TO FATHER WALTER LINI, NOW IN TARAWA. SINCE THE FRENCH HAVE NO MISSION IN KIRIBATI MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE HAS ASKED IF YOU WOULD BE SO KIND AS TO TRANSMIT BOTH TEXTS TO FATHER LINI TO REACH HIM BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE FORUM MEETING.

BEGINS

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE ET CHER AMI,

J'AI BIEN RECU VOTRE MESSAGE DU 11 JUILLET ET JE VOUS EN REMERCIE.

COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ, MON COLLEAGUE BRITANNIQUE M. BLAKER ET MOI-MEME DEVONS NOUS RENCONTRER DANS LES PROCHAINS JOURS POUR TIRER LES CONCLUSIONS DE LA MISSION ENVOYEE AUPRES DE VOUS ET POUR EXAMINER CONJOINTEMENT LES DECISIONS A PRENDRE POUR FAIRE FACE A LA SITUATION AUX NOUVELLES-HEBRIDES.

JE NE SAURAI DONC ANTICIPER SUR LES RESULTATS DE CETTE CONFERENCE QUE NOUS MENERONS EN ETROITE CONFORMITE DE VUES AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE ET QUI TIENDRA LE PLUS GRAND COMPTE DES PROGRES ENREGISTRES PAR LA MISSION ARIBAU/DONALD.

A CETTE OCCASION, NOUS PRENDRONS UNE DECISION SUR LA DATE D'ACCESSION DES NOUVELLES-HEBRIDES A L'INDEPENDANCE. JE TIENS A VOUS ASSURER QUE NOTRE OBJECTIF DEMEURE QUE LES NOUVELLES HEBRIDES SOIENT INDEPENDANTES LE 30 JUILLET, ET NOUS ESSAYONS DE TOUT METTRE EN OEUVRE POUR QU'ELLES Y FARVIENNENT DANS LA PAIX ET L'UNITE.

C'EST DANS L'ESPOIR QUE TOUTES LES PARTIES EN PRESENCE NOUS Y AIDERONT QUE JE VOUS REAFFIRME MON SOUTIEN A VOTRE GOUVERNEMENT ET MON SOUCI DE VOIR L'ENSEMBLE DE L'ARCHIPEL ENTRER DANS LE CADRE CONSTITUTIONNEL QUE NOUS AVONS PREVU

PAUL DIJOLD

ENDS

BEGINS

BEGINS

DEAR FATHER WALTER LINI.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF JULY 11TH AS YOU KNOW MY BRITISH COLLEAGUE, M. BLAKER, AND I ARE TO MEET WITHIN A FEW DAYS TO DRAW CONCLUSION FROM THE MISSION WE SENT TO YOU. JOINTLY WE WILL THEN CONSIDER THE DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO MEET THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE NEW HEBRIDES.

I WOULD NOT LIKE TO ANTICIPATE THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE IN WHICH WE SHALL ACT IN CLOSE UNITY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WE WILL TAKE THE CLOSEST ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE ARISAUD AND DONALD MISSION.

AT THIS MEETING WE WILL TAKE A DECISION ON THE NEW HEBRIDES INDEPENDENCE DATE. I WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS THAT NEW HEBRIDES SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT ON JULY 30TH AND WE ARE TRYING EVERYTHING WE CAN SO THAT THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE REACHED IN PEACE AND UNITY.

IN THE HOPE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED WILL HELP US IN THIS. I CONFIRM MY FULL SUPPORT FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT AND MY CONCERN THAT THE ENTIRE GROUP WILL BE WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK WE HAVE PREPARED.

YOURS FAITHFULLY

PAUL DIJOUR

ENDS

FCO PLEASE PASS [COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

STUART [PASSED AS REQUESTED]

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PP CANBERRA
PP WELLINGTON
GRS 255
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 111800Z JULY 1980
TO FLASH VILA
TELEGRAM NO 388 OF 11 JULY 80
AND TO PRIORITY CANBERRA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON UKNIS NEW YORK
HONIARA PORT MORESBY TARAWA MODUK DS11

YOUR TELNO 546: NEW HEBRIDES

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO CHIEF MINISTER BEFORE
HIS DEPARTURE FOR TARAWA:

BEGINS

DEAR FATHER LINI

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 11 JULY, THE TEXT OF WHICH HAS
BEEN COMMUNICATED TO ME BY MY RESIDENT COMMISSIONER IN VILA.

I HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE VIEWS WHICH YOU HAVE EXPRESSED AND I
SHALL LET YOU HAVE A FULLY CONSIDERED REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF YOUR IMMINENT DEPARTURE FOR TARAWA FOR
THE MEETING OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM I SHOULD LIKE TO
ASSURE YOU THAT IT REMAINS OUR OBJECTIVE TO ACHIEVE
INDEPENDENCE ON 30 JULY AND WE ARE WORKING TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION
OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE NEW HEBRIDES FOR THAT DATE. AS YOU
KNOW THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF MR BLAKER AND M. DIJOURD
ARE ACTIVELY WORKING TO THIS VERY END AT THIS MOMENT AND BOTH
MINISTERS ARE PLANNING TO MEET NEXT WEEK, PROBABLY ON 17 JULY,
TO REVIEW THE SITUATION. I SHALL ASK THEM TO CONSIDER MOST
CAREFULLY THE VIEWS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED.

IN THE MEANTIME PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO
SEE THE NEW HEBRIDES ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE IN PEACE AND UNITY
UNDER YOUR GOVERNMENT AND UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AGREED LAST
YEAR.

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WITH BEST WISHES
ENDS

2. FOR PARIS ONLY. WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER A SIMILAR MESSAGE
TO THAT IN TUR WAS ADDRESSED TO EITHER M. DIJOURD OR M. FRANCOIS-
PONCET. YOU MAY, HOWEVER, SHOW THIS MESSAGE TO THE DOMTOM.

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PS/MR BLAKER

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DESKBY 151000Z

FM VILA 150740Z JUL 66

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 558 OF 15 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

PRIORITY MODUK (DS11) CANBERRA WELLINGTON WASHINGTON

UKMIS NEW YORK SUVA HONIARA PORT MORESEBY TARAWA

NEW HEBRIDES :

ROM DONALD

1. ANGLC/FRENCH MISSION SPENT ANOTHER THREE DAYS IN SANTO. WE HAVE PULLED OUT ALL THE STOPS TO SECURE SOMETHING BANKABLE FROM THE VEMARANA GROUP IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCEPTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT THE ARCHIPELAGO. THE RESULTS ARE NEGATIVE AND THERE IS AT THE MOMENT NO HOPE FOR PUSHING THROUGH THE QUOTE PACKAGE UNQUOTE AGREED BY MINISTERS ON 25 JUNE. VEMARANA'S ATTITUDE IS EPITOMISED BY THE HARD TONE OF THE LETTER DATED 14 JULY, TEXT OF WHICH IS IN MIFT, WHICH WAS PRESENTED TO US TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
2. DURING A HARD MEETING FOR NEARLY THREE HOURS THIS MORNING CONSTEADT'S LAST STATEMENT WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE BLOCKADE WERE LIFTED AND IF SANTO WERE LEFT TO LOOK AFTER ITS OWN AFFAIRS, THE PEOPLE IN SANTO WOULD NOT LOOK FOR TROUBLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN VILA AND THEY WOULD ASSUME THERE WOULD BE RECIPROCITY FROM VILA BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF QUOTE CUSTOM UNQUOTE IN MELANESIAN AFFAIRS. THE FRENCH AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS KNEW ALL ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY ET CETERA BUT THEY WERE OLD COUNTRIES, THE NEW HEBRIDES WAS LIKE A FRESHLY LAID EGG. IT COULD BREAK APART. BUT THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES CAME FROM THE TWO DIFFERENT LANGUAGES. IT WAS NOT SOMETHING CREATED BY THE MELANESIANS THEMSELVES. THE LATTER COULD LIVE ACCORDING TO CUSTOM. IF THE BLOCKADE WERE LIFTED THERE

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WOULD COME A DAY WHEN WITH NEW LEADERS SANTO COULD LIVE IN PEACE WITH THE OTHER ISLANDS.

3. BECAUSE OF THE AVAILABLE TIME LEFT BEFORE THE PLANE LEAVES, I WILL GIVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE LAST THREE DAYS ON MY ARRIVAL IN PARIS. WE HAVE BRIEFED THE NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT WHOSE INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT REALLY SURPRISED AT OUR LACK OF SUCCESS.

4. ARIBAUD AND I ARE DOING OUR BEST TO MAKE NO COMMENT TO THE PRESS AT ALL UNTIL WE REPORT TO MINISTERS IN PARIS, BUT I GREATLY FEAR THAT SOME OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD THEIR TONGUES.

5. THE REFERENCE TO THE MEETING OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE TEXT IN MIFT RELATES TO A MEETING PLANNED FOR 20 JULY BY THE VEMARANA GROUP AT WHICH THEY WILL INVITE QUOTE THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE NORTHERN ISLANDS UNQUOTE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ON REGIONALISATION. I EXPECT IT WILL BE THE SAME RENTACROWD OF QUOTE CHIEFS UNQUOTE THAT WE SAW PRIVATELY LAST WEEK.

6. THE ONLY BRIGHT SPOT IN WHAT HAS BEEN A HARD FORTNIGHT HAS BEEN THE EXCELLENT WAY IN WHICH ARIBAUD HAS PRESENTED THE VIEWS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE MAINTAINED A TOTALLY UNITED FRONT AND THERE WILL BE NO EXCUSE FOR JIMMY STEVENS OR ANYONE ELSE TO HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE JOINT APPROACH OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

FCO PLEASE PASS

STUART

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 422 OF 14 JULY

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 52		
15 JUL 1980		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

NEW HEBRIDES: SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM RESOLUTION

1. DFA HAVE HANDED US THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ON THE NEW HEBRIDES PASSED AT THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM MEETING THIS MORNING 14 JULY.

BEGINS

THE SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM, RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION ON THE NEW HEBRIDES AND THE FRENCH PACIFIC TERRITORIES AT ITS MEETING IN 1979:

1. NOTES WITH DISMAY RECENT EVENTS IN THE NEW HEBRIDES IN WHICH THE AGREED DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE, THE AUTHORITY OF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITY OF THE TERRITORY ARE BEING THREATENED BY THE ILLEGAL ACTIONS OF A FEW, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF LUGANVILLE ON SANTO ISLAND:

2. CALLS UPON AND EXPECTS BRITAIN AND FRANCE, THE TWO ADMINISTERING POWERS, TO MEET THE EXPRESS WISH OF THE ELECTED PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF THE NEW HEBRIDES TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE ON 30 JULY 1980 IN TERMS OF THE AGREED CONSTITUTION:

3. REAFFIRMS ITS VIEW THAT IT IS THE PARTICULAR AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO ADMINISTERING POWERS TO EFFECT A SMOOTH AND FULL TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY TO THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF A UNIFIED AND STABLE INDEPENDENT STATE:

4. CALLS UPON THE TWO ADMINISTERING POWERS TO USE ALL MEANS WITHIN THEIR AUTHORITY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITY, TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER, INCLUDING RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES BY IMMEDIATELY SECURING AN END TO ALL DEFIANCE OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY SO THAT INDEPENDENCE CAN BE ACHIEVED ON THE AGREED DATE OF 30 JULY AND, BEYOND THAT DATE, TO PROMOTE THE STABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE NEW STATE IN SUPPORT OF THE FULL AUTHORITY OF THE NEW HEBRIDES GOVERNMENT:

5. NOTES THAT ITS MEMBERS WOULD BE WATCHING CLOSELY HOW THE TWO ADMINISTERING POWERS DISCHARGE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

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FM VILA 180834Z JUL 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 574 OF 18 JULY

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS

mb.

NEW REBRIDES REGIONALISM

1. YASH GHAI AND I DISCUSSED THE LATEST TEXT WITH ROBERT AND LIZOP THIS EVENING.
 2. ROBERT SAID THAT DRAFT WAS GOOD AS IT STOOD. NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS STILL A DISTINCTION TO BE MADE BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALISATION AND POLITICAL REGIONALISM. THE TEXT WAS NOT AUTONOMY AND WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SELL TO SANTO. HE INSTANCED THAT BUDGETS WOULD STILL HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (THIS SHOWING THAT HE HAD NOT READ THE TEXT CAREFULLY - YASH GHAI WAS ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONTRARY).
 3. ROBERT THEN SAID THAT HE AND LIZOP HAD MADE THEIR OWN DRAFT OF A DECENTRALISATION PROPOSAL AND SENT IT TO PARIS, BUT HAD NOT CONSULTED OR SHOWN IT TO ANYONE. WE ASKED FOR A COPY AND HAVE BEEN PROMISED ONE.
 4. WE JUDGE THAT THEY ARE STILL HUNG UP ON WHETHER AUTHORITY, IN THE LAST RESORT RESIDES IN PARLIAMENT, OR WHETHER SOVERIGN POWER OVER LOCAL AFFAIRS SPRINGS ABINITIO FROM THE REGIONS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SQUARE THE LATTER WITH THE CONSTITUTION. AND DECENTRALISATION BY STATUE IS MORE THAN ADMINISTRATIVE DELEGATION.
- BUT THIS IS ALL HIGHLY QUOTE EUROPEAN UNQUOTE. I FEAR IT IS TRUE THAT THE DRAFT, OR ANY DRAFT, IS PROBABLY UNSALEABLE TO STEVENS AT THE PRESENT TIME, SINCE, AS THE NEGOTIATING TEAM CONCLUDED, HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN REGIONALISM. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE GOVERNMENTS PROPOSALS GIVE THE REGIONS ALL THE POWERS THEY CAN USE.

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(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

STUART

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PART 1 ends:-

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PART 2 begins:-

Em Vila 574 18.7.80.

