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~~MR. ALEXANDER~~

WESTERN STRATEGY IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVIET INVASION
OF AFGHANISTAN

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Wayland, 25/2/10

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THE WEST

1. The West constitutes a group of sovereign states whose principles are best summed up in the preamble to the NATO Treaty (1949): 'democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'. By 'democracy' we understand 'representative democracy'; by individual liberty we understand free enterprise as well as freedom of conscience. We look on the phrase 'the West' as being synonymous with 'the free world' which is in some ways a superior formulation; for it enables us to rank free countries of the East such as Australia or Japan, as being inextricably associated with the old states of Christendom, a formulation generally current before the Nineteenth Century.

2. The countries of the West are limited by the bonds of trade, self interest, common ideals and traditions, as well as a number of interlocking alliances. At the centre of these alliances there is the USA unquestionably the strongest military power in this association of nations. However, unlike the institutions which link many other groups of nations (the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned countries, the Organisation of American States, the Communist bloc, etc., the European Economic Community, there is no institutional link between the countries of the West. There might be advantage in exploring whether such an informal link would have benefits: it could help to preserve any of the principles of the West when these seem at stake, and would assist in the preparation of victories in the battles of ideas. The promulgation of both the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the Charter of the United Nations (1945) had a considerable effect at the time.

3. Many tribal societies may still be unready for representative democracy; a democracy requires a general acceptance of common rules for it to function. That cannot be said to apply in much of the world; even so, nothing has happened in the Twentieth Century to suggest that, broadly, our nation of democracy would not be of benefit to most peoples; nor indeed that such a nation would not be supported by the majority of the populations
/in most countries

in most countries if a choice were to be put to them. The world itself and world commerce would be benefited also since democracies have a tendency to be pacific. This point is of special importance if it is recalled that those great famines and emigrations have been exacerbated, if they have not been caused, by war.

II

THE THREAT TO THE WEST: THE SOVIET UNION

4. In the course of the Twentieth Century, the West has faced several great threats: that of German militarism (1914-18); nazism (1933-45); Soviet Communism (since 1917 and particularly since 1945); militant Islam (sporadically since the beginning of the Century); some commercial anti-democratic alliances such as OPEC; and perhaps the IBA (the International Bauxite Association); and various militaristic, terrorist or anarchist organisations (before 1914 and since 1968). At the present time, the only serious threat of a global nature is that of Soviet Communism. Terrorism, or Chinese Communism or OPEC or militant Islam can, or could, cause difficulties to the West but none for the foreseeable future on the scale of that posed by the Soviet Union (though some of them may be exploited also by the Soviet Union or its allies). In December 1976, for example, Castro called in the oil producers to unite with less developed countries in "one simple front in the common struggle against their historical exploiters".

III

SOVIET AIMS

5. The Soviet Government seized power in 1917 after a coup d'etat in the expectation that that act would trigger an international revolution leading to the revolutionary conquest of the world. That did not occur. But it evidently remains the main aims of Soviet policy. Most of the institution- and dispositions of the Russian Government have been arranged to serve that end, often described as 'the complete and final victory of Communism on a world scale'.

6. It seems possible to designate three other aims of Soviet international politics in a lessening order of bombast:

(i) "World hegemony", a state of affairs in which, though the Soviet Union would not actually be responsible for the government of the whole globe, no state would be able, or wish, to do things which the Soviet Union did not want; and all states would give the Soviet Union such favourable terms, in economic or cultural or military matters, as would be demanded; world Finlandisation, in fact.

(ii) A state of affairs whereby the Soviet Union would automatically be a party to the resolution of all matters "of any significance" - the definition of significance to be up to the Soviet leaders: Gromyko, in a well-known speech at the 24th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1971 echoing Brezhnev on 14 March 1970, claimed that this aim had broadly already been achieved;

(iii) Preservation or 'active defence' of the Soviet homeland and its ring of satellites particularly those in Eastern Europe.

7. In all these roles, the Soviet leaders like to see themselves still as a "vanguard" of the world revolution. 'Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism' are the justification for Soviet (or Cuban, or East German) subversion of poor peoples and rich ones alike. At the same time, there is a plain, though never acknowledged connection between revolutionary Marxism and traditional Russian foreign policy for which the former sometimes seems a 'verbal smokescreen'. Certainly, Russia has now had many centuries of applying external and internal pressures on neighbours in order to fatten them up for conquest. (4)

8. The distractions between the four aims of Soviet policy listed in paragraph 4 above should not be exaggerated; when it comes to the subjection of, say, Afghanistan, or the continued repression over Czechoslovakia, the idea of the preservation of the Soviet homeland may seem uncommonly close to that of revolutionary world conquest.

9. We are not impressed by the view that Russia's expansion is due to its sense of insecurity and the consequent need for "buffer states". Russia's geography, bad communications, low population density, great depth of defence, have made it a difficult country to conquer, as Charles XII, Napoleon and Hitler all found. Also as Richard Piper puts it "today's buffers have a way of becoming tomorrow's homeland which require new buffers to protect it. (Piper,)

10. Nuclear weapons (separately considered in paragraph below), may have somewhat altered the tactics of Soviet governments since 1945, but the overall plans of Soviet Russia have not changed since 1917. No Soviet leader could deny that, however many little excursions into detentes or 'peaceful co-existence' or collective security or 'pacts' with enemies there might have to be, "there can be no permanent peace between the countries of labour and the countries of exploitation", as Radek put it in 1920 at the first Congress of Peoples of the East in Baku. (6) "Nothing", Raymond Aron pointed out in 1978, "allows us to think the USSR has been converted to a philosophy of stability" (7).

11. It seems desirable to point out that the foregoing might be looked upon by the majority of Western democrats and by many of their leaders as "out of date", more characteristic of J. Edgar Hoover at 'the height of the cold war' than those of any good judge of international affairs in 1980. As Malcolm Mackintosh has written, "the Soviet Union is ahead of the West in the recognition that the struggle is for the world" (6A). A deliberate, continuous and considered effort at public education in

/Western democracies

Western democracies would seem desirable to explain the reality of the 'armed truce' which is all that we now have with the Soviet Union - the phrase being that of the ex-Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, in a private conversation in 1946. (9) Compare Goering in 1936: 'We are already at war. But there is no shooting' (8)

IV

SOVIET STRATEGY

12. In order to carry out the above aims, the Soviet Union has used the following methods:

(a) Military Methods

- (i) the deployment of outright military force by the Soviet armed forces;
- (ii) the threat of military force by the Soviet armed forces or psychological bullying;
- (iii) the use of surrogate forces belonging to states friendly to the Soviet Union and specially trained for the purpose (North Korea, Vietnam, East Germany, Cuba, perhaps Yemen) - specially useful for the pursuit of Soviet designs outside the boundaries of classical East-West relations as defined in discussions of SALT, European Security, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

(b) Propaganda

campaigns to support the Soviet Union's line on e.g. foreign bases, the "neutron bomb", the consequences of nuclear war, nuclear energy, detente, China. These have been waged by:

- (i) technical means - radio, films, television; and
- (ii) front organisations, such as the Anti-Imperialist League, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African countries, the World Peace Council, and the International Union of Journalists.

(c) Open political methods such as

- (i) organising local Communist parties for the 'peaceful capture of congress parliaments';
- (ii) support of other political movements, e.g. those led by Nasser or De Gaulle (or Giscard) which might serve aims of Soviet foreign policy;

/(iii)

- (iii) organising Communist-dominated trade unions.
- (d) Subversion such as the organisation of
 - (i) direct espionage - by either the KGB or GRU - of long-term or immediate benefit to the Soviet Union; *
 - (ii) secret parties either in free societies or despotisms, one of whose aims is to penetrate clandestinely that society's institutions, particularly the police and security services, but also the Church,** Civil Service or trade unions;
 - (iii) backing for terrorist and/or guerilla movements - also often done by surrogates, en place, or in East Yemen, Cuba or Russia, etc;
 - (iv) penetration of international organisations.

V

SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE

13. Like all countries which believe themselves in conflict with other states, the Soviet Union mounts a formidable economic war against the West: much of the detail may be unknown. Still, at his open speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev said that Communist parties "should increase and deepen the contradictions in capitalist countries and that capitalist countries could be severely hindered by the Communist penetration of overseas markets and sources of raw materials" - perhaps by deliberate intervention to encourage recession in prosperous nations. Aid programmes might be specifically designed to further foreign policy. Thus a country which might offer the Soviet Union a strategic advantage in the event of war (or might let the Soviet Union have access to a scarce material which might one day be of benefit)[†] - is offered a soft loan, at a lower rate than might be available from the World Bank. The country would use the credit to buy Soviet goods. The Soviet Union would accept repayment by imports from the country concerned. The

* It has been alleged that a quarter of Russian diplomats abroad are spies, and Soviet Ambassadors and Embassies have always played a very large part in Soviet subversion: e.g. Zorin (Prague 1948); Soled (Egypt, 1953; Guinea, 1966).

** E.G. the Armenian Church in the 1920s, the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1960s.

† E.G. Bauxite (Guinea, Jamaica); phosphates (Morocco, Sahara ...)

administration of the loan would allow Soviet technicians to go to the country concerned and, if this did not immediately lead to the establishment of Soviet domination of the economy, it might lead at least to dropping of Western defence agreements.

14. Another example is that the Soviet Union has been active in establishing itself as a major fuel supplier (oil, natural gas and some uranium to Western reactors) to West Germany and Italy. The consequence could be to establish conditions of economic dependence which could one day be partially exploited.

15. Other economic tactics since 1971 have been to pursue foreign loans for the Soviet Union itself. However striking an admission of economic failure that change of policy was, (and perhaps that point could have been emphasised more strongly in Western propaganda) there have been many benefits to Russia: assistance to the Soviet Union to meet some consumer demands and encouragement of an attitude by some Western governments and banks to support the well-being of the Soviet economy - so that they can at least service their loans, now believed to amount to \$50 billion.

SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH

16. The continuation of these methods has had a serious effect on the whole of the Western world. The guerilla training in Africa, for example, may have tipped the balance on the outcome of all the wars of independence in the four ex-Portuguese colonies (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verde Islands) and perhaps in Rhodesia too. The Kalashnikov 7.62 automatic rifle produced by the million in Russia has killed thousands in Africa and the SAM 7 has made a mark too. It seems fairly evident that military force has been much the most generally reliable backing to any Soviet policy. The use of it has never disappointed any Soviet government: it gained the victory for them in 1921 and 1945; it enabled (and enables) Russia to dominate East Europe; and it alone enables it to face the United States as a "super power".

17. Doubtless there are many motives for the increase of Soviet armaments which have been so striking a characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. Russian leaders may feel that the policy of co-existence (which otherwise has brought benefits to Russian plans (see paragraph below)) might lead to internal relaxation and hence to a dissolution of the system - unless there is a display of force available. Some Russians who are still in the Soviet Union may, like Solzenitsyn, perceive in Western consumer culture a decline in public spirit. But the main purpose of the military investment must be to lead to those "foreign policy benefits"* mentioned by Dr. Kissinger in his speech at Brussels in September 1979. These armaments are not intended for use but for victory**. In the last resort, no doubt, Soviet nuclear strength is intended to have the capacity to force the US to withdraw in a nuclear confrontation. Should that fail the Russians plan to win the nuclear exchange and to keep their system going: as they have repeatedly said "there is profound harm in the disorientating claims of Congress ideologists that there would be no victor in a thermo-nuclear war. (10A) In the short run, however, the armaments must be intended to intimidate and to threaten, in however vague a way, any country from which the Soviet Union wants something which it does not want to give. The widely spread rumour that, at some time in the 1980s, because of the allegedly vulnerability of her land-based missiles, the US may not be in a strategic position to reduce a Soviet counter blow to tolerable levels may or may not

/reflect

* "Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved superiority in all significant weapons categories without seeking to put it into some foreign policy benefits(11).

** "Do you want war?" Bismarck was asked. "Of course not, I want victory" he allegedly replied.

reflect the true situation; the belief that it may be true is certainly a factor which helps the Soviet Union's place in power politics - not only in Europe but throughout Asia. If it turns out to be true a major question must be whether this disputed strategic advantage will be made use of either by pressure in Europe or Asia or by a threat towards the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Certainly this military strength will help Russia to do what she has always preferred: to take the initiative.

18. Perhaps this is the moment to recall that, whether we have been living in an era of detente or not, the Soviet Union has fairly continuously built up all its forces, integrated them well with those of her allies, and developed in Cuba and elsewhere useful surrogate forces. This applies not only to missiles, under tanks and then under arms, but the Navy has been continuously developed, from a coastal defence force designed to help a land army into being one which can be used in all manner of remote seas. (The mercantile marine under naval direction has similarly grown). Long range intervention forces (air transport, airborne divisions, amphibious forces) have been developed too, while industry and technology has been permanently harnessed for war. An increase of spending of 4 to 5 per cent of its GNP spent on arms has characterised the 1970s. Perhaps a third of all metallurgic products, a sixth of chemical products and energy resources are given over to the armed forces.

19. Russia has always since 1914 operated essentially as a war economy already. What country at "peace" has ever before had 15 per cent of its GNP devoted to war? Aggregate comparisons are not always helpful. But steel production must still be an indication of a nation's capacity for war: in 1944 Germany planned to produce 22 million tons of steel. Whereas in 1972 Russia produced 125 million. (13)

20. The 1970s have also seen the "militarisation" of Mr. Brezhnev. Mr. Brezhnev is Chairman of the Defence Council and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He is also a Marshal of the Soviet Union. His Minister of Defence Marshal Ustinov, a close associate, was not a military man. This articulates the place of military thinking in current Soviet planning.

20A. Brezhnev, like most of his colleagues, have spent their lives in conditions of violence and force. They gained their first employment in the Civil War. They rose in the specially violent circumstances of Stalin's Russia. Probably they all had relations swept away in the agricultural revolution - since most are the sons of peasants. The metaphors of war come as easily to these men brought up in the world class war as the practice of it. Marxism preaches conflict and Lenin's confirmed it - even if Khrushchev for a time questioned it. All the great experiences of Russian national life in their times have reinforced the warlike and bullying nature of Russian leaders.

VI

AFGHANISTAN

21. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan must be judged against this background. Afghanistan might have been absorbed by Tsarist Russia's conquest of Central Asia between 1860 and 1890 had it not been for Britain. The agreed neutral status of Afghanistan between Britain and Russia was symbolised by the deliberate session of the thin sliver of Wakhen mountain territory to Afghanistan to forestall a common frontier. But Afghanistan has been tipping towards the Soviet Union since 1953: in that year, Daoud assumed the premiership and opened commercial relations with Russia. Afghanistan became the first non-Community country to seek development aid from Russia. One thousand Army officers a year went to study in the Soviet Union.

22. In 1963 Daoud was overthrown by Sahadd tribesmen who refused to accept the closure to them by Pakistan of the Pakistani-Afghan frontier following Daoud's Pashtunistan policies. For ten years, Afghanistan seemed to be heading for the west and capitalism under a new prime minister Mohammad Maiwandwal.

23. But in 1973 Daoud returned, overthrew the King and Maiwandwal (later murdered), and re-established a close relationship with the USSR. This phase of Afghan-Soviet relations was expressed by a road between Kabul and the Russian frontier capable of carrying 80 ton vehicles - there were no such vehicles in either Russia or Afghanistan except for Russian tanks. (15) In many other ways, Daoud took Afghanistan close to the status of a Russian satellite. But none of this worked very well and the Soviet connection became unpopular. The consequence was a turn back towards the West (or to the Middle East; Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates all offered development aid. The Muslim clergy gave Daoud support.

24. This move led in 1978 to a coup d'etat by the Khalq Communist party of Afghanistan. Presumably the Russians helped or inspired it. The new rulers (Taraki, President; Alafizollah Amin as Prime Minister) governed as if Afghanistan were already a part of the Soviet bloc. They concluded 25 agreements with COMECON, Castro visited them, and Russia gave extensive military assistance against opponents to the government in (in particular) Nuristan. Taraki proceeded with land reform which was ineffective: no one wanted land, they wanted water; with rural co-operatives, which were highly unpopular; and the gradual bureaucratisation of the countryside leading to the end of the old markets smuggling and tax free life on which Afghan nomads had lived since time immemorial. The revolt in Nuristan grew. An Afghan regiment was captured. In December 1978 the Nuristanis declared their independence.

25. Meantime Russian assistance to the Khalq government also grew. After a joint meeting of the Afghan Cabinet and the Soviet Politburo in November 1978, a Soviet-Afghan treaty was signed: Article 3 provided for the "expansion of co-operation between organisations of state power" and Article 4 for developing co-operation in the military field. This led to the intensification of the rebellion. The replacement by Amin of Taraki made no difference.

26. The background to the Soviet decision to intervene more forcefully may not be clear for many years: even now we do not know much about the reasons for the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950*. Evidently some (or all) of the following local Afghan ("regionalist") reasons must have been prevailing:

- (i) The alternative to action would have been the collapse of a pro-Soviet regime and the triumph of rebels. Russian leaders may have recalled Stalin's remarks in Marxism and the National Question (IRO). Either they join forces with Russia and then the toiling masses of the border regions will be emancipated from imperialist oppression; or they will join with the Entente and then the yoke of imperialism is inevitable. (16)
- (ii) the Russian military mission already in Afghanistan was inadequate; to withdraw was unthinkable; the effect on internal Russian politics would have been considerable, particularly in Central Asia; therefore, as usually occurs in Russian affairs, a larger-scale military response seemed essential;
- (iii) anxiety about the effect of a Muslim rebellion in a Soviet satellite (such as Afghanistan had virtually become) may have been heightened by the flight of Sheikh Mohseni of Kandahar to Qom where he had begun to publicise the cause of Muslim rebels. Russia has probably been reluctant to stir up as much trouble over the years in Islamic states on her border as she might have for fear of the consequences in Russia: the establishment of an Iranian base for an anti-Soviet religious cause could not have been welcome.

*Krushchev said that Hungary had divided the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev said the same of Czechoslovakia. Who knows if it is true?

27. But there are plainly many important general consequences of the Soviet action. They must have been taken into account beforehand. If the subjection of Afghanistan is successful, Russia will be in an improved position versus Pakistan (and hence China). Pressure on Pakistan would probably bring India closer to Russia. Soviet control of Afghanistan obviously would make it much easier to intimidate an unstable Iran or to support a pro-Soviet regime there. The connection between the South West part of Afghanistan and the Straits of Hormuz is barely 300 miles. Even if the roads are bad Russian short-range aircraft would be in a better position to catch the Persian Gulf in one part of a pincer (the other part being in Soviet-controlled South Yemen, slightly further to the South West). The assistance of the Baluchis - surely not too difficult to obtain - might assure Soviet control of the whole of the coastline between the Straits of Hormuz and Karachi. Soviet leaders must also have been anxious to give the impression in the Arab world which they probably wish to dominate (at least establish "hegemony") that they are capable of acting decisively, brutally and effectively. That would be a good way of threatening both China and the US. Fear can play a decisive part in the politics of unstable states.

VII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AFGHANISTAN

28. If the conquest of Afghanistan were to be completed, some of the above things would have been achieved. Soviet leaders would be able to embark upon a new "peace offensive", with hopes of dividing the Western alliance and perhaps by diverting the Muslim world with a new initiative or highlighting in propaganda the continuing humiliation of the US in respect of the hostages.

29. On the other hand, the Soviet Government has suffered some setbacks by:

(i) the UN vote of January 29, with the unprecedented reaction of 34 Muslim nations;

/(ii)

- (ii) the UN vote of January which lost Cuba her seat in the Security Council;
- (iii) the loss of prestige in the fall of the Soviet people by the boycott of the Olympics. The important point here will be the absence of the United States, and its refusal to be present will surely be one of the best propaganda gains for the United States before the Soviet people themselves since the cold war began.
- (iv) the revival in the minds of the United States and of the Western nations in general of a realistic appreciation of the Soviet threat. If this can really be maintained, the tragedy of Afghanistan will seem a turning point. In particular it is encouraging to see (see paragraph below) that at long last SALT II has been linked to general questions of Soviet behaviour.

30. It stands to reason that many, perhaps all of the Soviet gains noticed above, will vanish if the conquest of Afghanistan is drawn out or incomplete.

31. Afghanistan has been a regular constituted and independent state since the Eighteenth Century, unlike several other Soviet satellites. On the other hand, it might be undesirable to state this too strongly since otherwise it would seem to give the Soviet Union some right to behave as it likes in, e.g. East Europe, Cuba or even Ethiopia (with whom the Soviet Union has a treaty similar to that which she concluded in 1978 with Afghanistan. The 'Brezhnev doctrine' is not something to accept absolutely.

VIII

THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO DATE

32. The West's response was essentially stated by President Carter on January The most important special measures were:

- (i) a suspension of further debate in the SALT II treaty;
- (ii) a recommendation of a boycott in the Moscow Olympics;

/(iii)

- (iii) a denial of the Soviet Union the benefits of recent fisheries agreements;
- (iv) a ban on grain sales and of advanced technology to the Soviet Union.

33. We also assume that some Western assistance is now being given to the Afghan rebels in the form of arms.

34. In the State of the Union message, President Carter said that he would carry out various other measures. (The 1980-81 defence budget had already been announced before the invasion of Afghanistan: it included an increase in over three per cent in that budget, a Caribbean joint task force headquarters, modernisation of existing weapons systems, continuation with the MX missile, establishment of a rapid deployment force for non-NATO contingencies). In the State of the Union message, the President added that:

- (i) US intelligence would be made to operate more effectively (i.e. less hamstrung by Congress)*;
- (ii) a military and economic assistance programme for Pakistan;
- (iii) a search for military facilities in the Gulf or South Asia of a modest nature.

35. The President also said that he would regard any attempt [implicitly by the Soviet Union] to intervene in the free flow of oil to the Middle East as an act of war. (CHECK EXACT WORDING).

36. The tone of the President's message to Congress was vigorous. If it leads to real achievements in keeping with the tone it would scarcely be bettered. The President explained the movement to the one constituency as ^{one}of "the most serious challenges in the history of the nation". He pointed out that the Soviet Union had built "a war machine far beyond any reasonable requirements for their own defence and security". He pledged "equivalence" in the face of that threat; and he recognised that the US had to "pursue a global foreign policy".

37. Those remarks seem to be encouraging. Four points, however, need to be made:

- (i) except for the immediate support of the US by Great Britain the reaction of the European and other allies was halting and remains inadequate;
- (ii) there are indications in US action as opposed to declarations that the full change required is Western policy to face the Soviet threat will not be carried through. For example, the President shows still more faith than would seem desirable in the continuation of SALT II (see paragraph .. below);
- (iii) It seems still necessary for the administration to put all its measures on 'covert warfare' to several Senate Committees before approval. That effectively negates the possibility of any real reply to the Soviet Union in the field of subversion where they operate with the most skill;
- (iv) the search for military facilities in South Asia or the Persian Gulf seems not to have been successful. A recent statement by Mr. Harold Brown raises doubts about the capacity and will of the US really to do very much even if the entire Persian Gulf were captured by a Soviet armoured thrust.
- (v) the unstable regimes of the Gulf remain vacillating and uncertain;
- (vi) There are several disquieting suggestions that the President's line in his State of the Union message may be reversed for electoral reasons;
- (vii) nor did the President reverse his decision not to go ahead with a new B.1. bomber or to suspend the advanced radiation weapon. Further, some of the new defence plans admirable though they are in themselves, may (like the new ships for the Marine Corps) take four or five years to be built.

IX

FURTHER DESIRABLE MEASURES OF A WESTERN RESPONSE

38. We believe, therefore, that the West's strategy in the wake of Afghanistan should be strengthened further. The measures we suggest are noticed in what we take to be a

/rough order

rough order of importance:

(i) DETENTE

39. First the "cold war" and "detente": we do not wish to labour what is essentially a matter of nomenclature. But there is no point in saying that such-and-such a measure would take us back to the "height of the cold war". The fact is that, during the years 1945-55 (the years to which reference is presumably made), the West's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was better than it is now. Throughout the years of peaceful co-existence (1955-1964) or detente (say 1967-1979), the Soviet Union was, as earlier noticed, developing one missile after another and extending its area of operation in many ways. The actual significance of this era was summed up adequately by the Russian commentator, Vitaly Korionov in The World Market Review (October 1974) when he said: "The policy of peaceful co-existence of states with differing social systems is a special form of the class struggle. Its aim is to curb the more aggressive imperialist elements and thereby create even more favourable conditions for the development of the liberation revolution [in the Third World]."

40. There have been some inconveniences to the Soviet Union from the last few years of good relations to the West: for example, a heightening of the dispute with China, which has not wished to be left out in what has seemed like a partition of the world between two 'super powers'. Then to say that the cold war is over must be to raise questions in Russia as to why the repression (justified in the past by the need to fight spies and traitors) needs to go on. Detente may have helped the growth of a generation of Soviet dissidents.

41. There are also some gains to the West: for example, such as the easier emigration of Soviet Jews, and the opening of relations with East Germans.

42. On the other hand, detente in the West has
(a) helped to make Communism seem respectable again in trade union circles;

/(b)

- (b) secured for the Soviet Union the European security force they had desired since 1954 - on their terms;
- (c) given the Russian Ambassador in Washington almost free access to the President, so enabling him to know of US intentions much better than is the case with his opposite number in Moscow;
- (d) given the Soviet Union many loans and economic and technical assistance;
- (e) above all, given the impression in the impressionable and peace-loving West that the Soviet Union is just one more state in the world; hence the nature of the Soviet threat has been concealed; while the size and momentum of the threat has grown - particularly in Africa and Asia. The consequence is a lack of preparedness which contrasts with the resolve so characteristic of the West between 1945 and 1953. (1) It is essential to the West to appreciate that in the words of Stanley Hoffman "we do not have a choice between co-operation and competition but between different forms of competition"
- (18) A modest rise in the 'level of hostility' might be an incentive to Western work forces to work harder to preserve their liberation.

(ii) SALT II

43. We know that the present US administration and its predecessor have devoted much time to this. We were relieved, however, when we heard that it would be suspended but were aghast at recent statements that it might be revived. We do not believe that the advantages of SALT II (e.g. co-operation in measures of intrusive verification, a start on controlling qualitative improvements in missile development) outbalance the disadvantages (the failure to reduce the deployment of warheads, the neglect to deal with the Soviet heavy missiles, the SS20 and the Backfire). One of the effects of SALT II was to divide Western Europe and to cause her to look with suspicion at an agreement concluded above her head: an aim which fits well into the evident long-term of Soviet European policy which is to detach Western Europe from dependence on the US and make it dependent on the USSR.

/(iii) Contacts

(iii) Contacts with the Soviet Union

44. We would not advocate a complete break in all relations with the Soviet Union but we think that where these occur much greater effort should be spent in trying to ensure that there is contact between peoples and not just between governments.

45. Every concession to the USSR (like, for example, the sale of butter - even 'old' butter - by the EEC to Russia) should be accompanied by a commensurate quid pro quo in return: for example, help and encouragement to Soviet dissidents.

46. We are not encouraged by the idea of imposing economic sanctions on any country, as an alternative to war. Not only have they never worked but they have always assisted the state allegedly under attack (Italy, 1936; Spain, 1946-7; Cuba 1961 onwards; Rhodesia, 1968). Anything like full economic sanctions on a permanent basis with the Soviet Union by the USA would also to be effective have to cover all the US's allies and all the USSR's (including Ethiopia, Poland, etc). We therefore do not think that much will come of the plans to cut off grain, butter, etc.

47. On the other hand, we see no reason why we should not introduce a very strict ban in all Western countries on the sale to the Soviet Union of all material (including technology) which would be critical for waging an aggressive war. There is, of course, difficulty in deciding what such material is: but the subject has been dealt with before.

(iv) WESTERN PROPAGANDA

48. The battle for the minds of the world is, short of actual conflict, almost the most important side to our competition with the Soviet Union. We suspect that the status of "agitprop" in the Communist world is at every stage higher than and more centrally linked than it is in the West: the British Council, for example, is hardly
/looked

looked on by anyone as important a career as the foreign service. It could be made so. The external services of the BBC are one of the few trump cards in British hands. But we think that it might be possible to improve this even more by (a) longer hours of broadcasting (b) larger transmitters (c) better co-operation with the Voice of America and other allied radio services.

49. There are some specific themes which could usefully be emphasised more than seem at present to be the case.

These include:

- (i) a major subtle and determined in the Middle East to demonstrate that the Soviet threat is a greater menace to the Muslim world than is Israel;
- (ii) more emphasis on the known link between the Soviet Union, Cuba, East Germany and terrorism generally, whether or not managed via South Yemen, Algeria or the PLO.
- (iii) lavish illustrations of the apparent racial discrimination to blacks in particular among students in the Soviet Union;
- (iv) illustration of the failure of Russian aid programmes which have usually concentrated on weapons or showpiece projects, or guaranteed purchase of cash crops, or direct currency subventions (e.g. to Cuba). Russian goods have often gone wrong because of bad quality, lack of durability of goods, delay in shipment, bullying at the point of delivery. All these things need emphasis;
- (v) we should remind the world persuasively that on the evidence democracy usually represents peace and dictatorship, war. Recall that Soviet Russia has been on a war footing since 1914.
- (vi) the Soviet conquest of Central Asia (1921-35) could be direct upon by an aggressive series of programmes in the Middle East demonstrating the lack of understanding for the Muslim world felt by the Russians in particular, and Communists in general. The massacre at Kikand (February 1918) was one of the worst atrocities of modern Asian history; 14,000 were killed; few know of it.

50. The UN has become primarily a place for the exchange of propaganda. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked a major reversal for the USSR at the UN. Whenever the USSR or its allies commit an act of aggression, the issue should instantly be raised, as a matter of course, at the Security Council. We look on the failure to put the issue of Angola or Ethiopia on the agenda as unwise.

51. After the Second World War recourse was often had to special committees for the discussion of specific themes. The UN Special Committee for the Balkans (1946) kept the essential facts of the Greek civil war before the public and the objective and persistent of truth neutralised the communist propaganda on the origins of that struggle. The communist abduction of Greek children into Bulgaria for indoctrination aroused world public opinion very greatly.

(v) THE PERSIAN GULF AREA

52. The importance of the oil in the close proximity to the Persian Gulf, in Saudi Arabia, the UAR, Israel, Kuwait, Bahrein, and Iran, make this region and its access to the sea at Hormuz the critical region. It would seem essential for some permanent Western base to be established there. Masira (Oman) is too far, so is Mombassa and Berbere. It is presumably easier for Britain to return to old bases abandoned in 1971 than for the US to start anew. Perhaps the whole question of an allied presence in the Gulf could start from a reconsideration of the decision to withdraw, which a close observer of the events concerned, Mr. Douglas Hurd, referred to as having been crowned by a failure of will. ()

53. Until and unless this is done, Israel and now perhaps Egypt constitutes what Fred Hoyle has described as the "one firm base" from which the West could operate to prevent Russia from seizing direct control of the Middle East. (19) That is why the Soviet Union would plainly like to reduce Israel to the status of an impotent minor power. This is a fact of power priorities which should not be ignored in the general search for a Palestinian settlement.

54. Mr. Harold Brown in a statement to US News and World Report said "we can move two carrier forces into the region reasonably quickly - within a couple of weeks". He also said that he could expect some help from two Western allies in the Indian Ocean: presumably Britain and France. He did not give much sense of urgency: "I'm not predicting it but it may be that some of our allies will expand their presence at some point". He also specifically ruled out the establishment of any fleet in the region. Surely this is a little under-ambitious. The French, the Dutch, the Australians, the British, could all make some contribution to help our allied fleet established to protect the access to the Persian Gulf. (see Dov S. Zakheim in Survival, XXII, I).

55. Professor Stanley Hoffman has suggested (20) a "co-operative security framework" in the Persian Gulf composed of the riparian states. It is inconceivable that that would survive, though he is no doubt correct to say that a US alliance with a military presence with say Saudi Arabia might "accelerate the disintegration".

56. It has only recently been appreciated that the Straits of Hormuz are supremely important to the West. Why? Are there other places whose significance we have similarly neglected until almost too late? South Africa?

(viA) AFGHANISTAN

56A Aid to the rebels in Afghanistan is highly desirable in itself. A prolonged counter-revolutionary war there could only have the most profound effects on the whole Soviet System. Certainly anything in the nature of a Soviet "Vietnam" - to use an analogy which has been widely employed - would presumably have the same effect on a government in Moscow as the real Vietnam did in Washington. We trust the Western leaders are prepared for the enormous beneficial possibilities that could just possibly open up if the Afghan rebellion were to succeed.

57. It stands to reason that the OS should not contemplate the surrender of the Shah of Iran to the tribunals at Teheran. It may seem unnecessary to say so. Even so, no step could have a more amazing effect on the morale of other allies, already very bad in the region.

(vi) EUROPE

58. The Economist pointed out that no meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the EEC took place till two weeks after Afghanistan. The response was, it was said, "slow, and confused".(21) But the EEC is not a political undertaking: it is an economic one. If it is desired to have a political response some kind of political secretariat should be established on the lines of that suggested by President Pompidou in 1972.

59. On the other hand, it would seem that, short of a new European Defence Community (which no one seems to desire), there is less cause for the Foreign Ministers to deal with issues of this nature in the EEC. It is a matter for Defence Ministers as well as Foreign Ministers and NATO at the moment at least is the forum for such discussions.

60. We realise that, of course, most members of the EEC are not members of NATO. Ireland is the odd country out. But would it not be possible to raise the question of Irish membership of the Alliance - as indeed of other European countries which have the benefits of the Alliance without bearing any of the burdens? It should at least be an aim. We are not sure that it has even been discussed.

61. Similarly, it might be appropriate to raise once again the question of NATO's Zone of reference. The Persian Gulf would seem as critical for NATO as any part of the Mediterranean.

62. If it is decided to press other countries to join NATO, it would be best to go ahead with this as soon as possible. A special case exists with reference to Spain, whose government has pronounced in favour of joining NATO, but is hesitant about so doing till after the next European Security Conference in Madrid (which we suppose may still be held) in September 1980. We think that we should do all we can to encourage Spain to take this step as soon as possible. The Soviet Union will use that Security Conference to try and persuade the Spaniards to keep out of NATO. Spanish Governments can fall.

(vii) WESTERN INITIATIVES

63. The Western position in the present stage of competition with the Soviet Union would be enhanced by some positive initiative, designed to reverse the Soviet tide. The Russians have had many setbacks since 1947 (the firmness and consistency of Western Europe between 1948 and 1951; the Berlin airlift, 1948-49; two expulsions from Iran in 1919-21 and 1945-46; economic setbacks; the "armed struggle" in Latin America in the 1960s; Malaya, 1950s; Egypt, 1972; Greece, & Turkey in 1946-47). Apart, however, from the Russian failure to create psychological dominance in the Northern Pacific (which led to the Japanese-Chinese Treaty against hegemony in 1978), there have been no Western victories in the competition with the Soviet Union since Saigon fell in 1975. We think it should be possible and desirable deliberately to seek an instance where, pour encourager les autres, a Soviet position could be reversed. Perhaps, of course, Lord Carrington's scheme for a neutral Afghanistan could have this effect.

64. Exposed nerves in the Soviet Empire where the Russians are already the defenders would seem to be:

- (i) Angola (and, or Cabinda);
- (ii) Cuba;
- (iii) Guinea;
- (iv) Congo (Brazzaville);
- (v)

65. The West should also look very carefully at places where the Soviet Union might be expected to "strike next". Apart from the obvious instances of Pakistan, the Gulf, and Iran, (and perhaps Rhodesia), possibilities would seem to be:

- (i) Turkey
- (ii) Morocco-Sahara
- (iii) Thailand
- (iv) Yugoslavia
- (v) The Basque country (?)
- (vi) Puerto Rico (referendum in 1981)
- (vii) Jamaica
- (viii) Belize
- (ix) El Salvador
- (x) Namibia
- (xi) Zaire (again)
- (xii) Oman

66. A combination of factors presupposes us to think that the West could be expected to win a victory in Angola. These factors include:

- (i) unpopularity of the new government of Fernando Santos;
- (ii) unpopularity of the Cubans;
- (iii) availability of well entrenched guerilla forces, now apparently on the Western side;

- (iv) contiguity of Namibia;
- (v) exposed position of Angola in the South Atlantic.

The victim would be worth while because:-

- (i) it would defeat the myths of Cuba;
- (ii) it would, therefore, have disruptive effects elsewhere where the Cubans are acting as the Russians' surrogates;
- (iii) it would have a bad effect in Cuba itself and perhaps help to dislodge the communist government there - which would have the most salutary effect in Latin America probably leading thus to a general halt to the slide in the Caribbean;
- (iv) it would greatly help the emergence of a democratic Namibia;
- (v) it would guarantee the Angolans' oil to the West*.

It could be followed by taking up the suggestion of Lord Home recently in the House of Commons that the UN should be required to call on Cuba to withdraw from Africa.

67. It also seems to us of the greatest importance to ensure a Western victory in Morocco over Sahara: not only of strategic importance but essential from the point of view of phosphates the significance of which is as important for western agriculture as oil is for its industry.

68. In this respect it may be that Britain's long experience in irregular warfare could suggest a more important role than that of the US whose hamfistedness has been less than encouraging in these spheres.

/ (viii)

* Admittedly Gulf Oil get what they need at the moment. But the tap could be turned off.

(viii) CHINA

69. At present, China is not a military ally of the West. Why not? Is there not otherwise a danger that sometime in the 1980s there might not be a Soviet pre-emptive war to humiliate and conquer China (as suggested by William Hyland) (22). The USSR has now tried every means, from appeals to sentiment to leaked rumours of a nuclear strike, to bring back China into the fold. All have failed. Force, always successful-- with Afghanistan anyway - may be the chosen instrument. Perhaps in the end Russia will try and break up China with independent units - Sinking, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria. Unless Russia does so act, China will be modernised one day and be a much more formidable enemy, still talking no doubt of frontier revision in her favour. An actual military alliance between China and the West would greatly limit the chances of this action.

X

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

70. In this Section, we thought it worth while to collect together some general considerations:

(i) the illusion survives among some that if only the President of the US could "get his hands on Brezhnev", the seemingly insurmountable problems of world politics would melt away. This is an illusion. Summits with the Soviet leaders since 1945 have usually been unsuccessful for the West.

(ii) The West have consistently been persuaded since the 1950s to refrain from supporting dissident or minority groups for fear of being provocative, or risking war. We think that policy unnecessarily cautious: Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Ukraine have each of them their martyrs in a liberation struggle.

/ (iii)

(iii) the divisions and subdivisions within Islam are such that for that reason alone the concept of 'militant Islam' is a disconcerting and inadequate one.

XI

71. The aim of the West is to maintain her strength and her principles until the time when the Soviet Union collapses. We think that prospect is not close; nor is it impossible. The likely stresses and strains of the 1980s are many: demographic, oil shortages*, agricultural and industrial failures, burdens of the defence budget, need for western technology and cynicism of the majority of Russians about their own ideology. There is no reason to suppose that the peace that is no peace, as Orwell put it, will last to the end of time.(23) On the other hand, nothing ensures that our own brilliant civilisation can last if it does not defend itself adequately and does not take advantage of the opportunities which may occur.

* At least affecting satellites

- (1) Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa Lago Cuba in the World (Pittsburgh 1979), 76
- (2) Pravda August 8, 1973 quoted
Institute for the Study of Conflict, March 1978, p.5
- (3) Adelphi Papers 151, p.9
- (4) Richard Pipes (Ed) Soviet Strategy in Europe,
London 1976, 22.
- (5) Pipes, p.9
- (6) George quoted Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran
1918-1948 (Ithaca 1948)
- (6A) Malcolm MacLuntroz Strategy and Tactics of Soviet
Foreign Policy, (Oxford 1962) p.311
- (7) Raymond Aron, Alistair Buchan lecture 1978, published
in Survival, January/February 1979
- (8) Quoted Alan Milward, The German Economy at War
(London 1965) p.27
- (9) Source?
- (10) Ian Greig The Communist Challenge to Africa
(Richmond 1977) p. 142
- (10A) AS Milodor and VG Kozlor, quoted I.S.C. May 1978 p.25
- (11) Quoted Survival, November/December 1980
- (12) Marshall in Adelphi Papers, 152.
- (13) Milward, 26
- (14) David Holloway, SOURCE?
- (15) David Chaffetz, International Affairs, January 1980
- (16) Stalin, Marxism and the National Question

- (18) Foreign Affairs, December 1979
- (19) Fred Hoyle, Energy or Extinction? The case for nuclear
energy (London 1977) p.2
- (20) New York Review of Books, March 6, 1980
- (21) Economist, February 9, 1980
- (22) David Hyland, in Adelphi Papers, 151.
- (23) George Orwell, Collected Works, VI, p. 10

PART 4 begins:-

Fco to MODBA 28.2.80

PART 3 ends:-

Telegram Moscow 168 28.2.80

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
OD(80) 1 st Meeting, Item 2	22/01/80
CC(80) 3 rd Conclusions, Item 2 (Extract)	24/01/80
CC(80) 4 th Conclusions, Item 2 (Extract)	31/01/80
CC(80) 5 th Conclusions, Item 2 (Extract)	07/02/80
CC(80) 6 th Conclusions, Item 2 (Extract)	14/02/80
CC(80) 7 th Conclusions, Item 2 (Extract)	21/02/80
CC(80) 8 th Conclusions, Item 2	28/02/80

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate **CAB** (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed *A. Wayland*

Date 25 February 2010

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Afghanistan
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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 168 OF 28TH FEBRUARY

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND ROME.

YOUR TELNO 152 AND MY LETTER OF 27 FEBRUARY TO FERGISSON:
NEUTRALITY FOR AFGHANISTAN.

1. MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE YESTERDAY ASKED KOVALYEV (HEAD OF MFA DEPARTMENT DEALING WITH AFGHANISTAN) WHETHER HE COULD GIVE ANY INFORMAL INTIMATION OF SOVIET THINKING ON THE IDEAS FOR THE NEUTRALISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AIRD BY THE COMMUNITY. KOVALYEV REFERRED MACCOTTA TO BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF 22 FEBRUARY, DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN BY BREZHNEV FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES AND THE NEED FOR GUARANTEES FROM THE US AND THE NEIGHBOURS OF AFGHANISTAN AGAINST EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. HE DID NOT REJECT THE IDEA OF NEUTRALISATION AND SAID THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNITY'S SCHEME WHICH WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SOVIET POSITION AS SET OUT BY BREZHNEV.

2. BYKOV, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE WITH MINISTER YESTERDAY. BYKOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET POSITION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR BY BREZHNEV: THE COMMUNITY IDEAS SEEMED TO HAVE POSITIVE FEATURES AND, DEPENDING ON HOW THEY WERE DEVELOPED, SOME COMBINATION OF THEM WITH BREZHNEV'S CONDITIONS COULD PERHAPS BE WORKED OUT OVER TIME.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND AN AUTHORITATIVE AND HARD LINE 'PETROV' ARTICLE IN TODAY'S PRAVDA (SUMMARY IN MIFT) MERELY HAMMERS AT EXTERNAL AND SPECIFICALLY AMERICAN AND PAKISTANI RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISTURBANCES IN AFGHANISTAN. DESPITE THE MORE ENCOURAGING NOISES FROM KOVALEV, BYKOV AND LOUIS I AM NOT YET INCLINED TO ALTER THE ASSESSMENT IN MY LETTER TO FERGISSON.

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PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR BLAKER

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR D MAITLAND

MR BULLARD

MR EDWARDS

MR HURRAY

MR FERGISSON

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PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
MR BULLARD

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CABINET OFFICE

MR P H MOBERLY
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 193 OF 27 FEB

YRTELNO 119 TO ANKARA AND GUIDANCE 201

PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN

1. DURING A LONG CONVERSATION WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD LAST NIGHT I RAISED THIS QUESTION AND ASKED IF SAUDI ARABIA WOULD TAKE ANY OPPORTUNITY AVAILABLE OF SUPPORTING THE PROPOSAL. FAHD WAS WELL AWARE OF THE PROPOSAL AND INDEED DESCRIBED THE ARGUMENTS IN ITS FAVOUR. HE SAID HE WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT; SAUDI ARABIA WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD.

CRAIG

Afghanistan

PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/MR HURD
PS/FUS
SIR D MAITLAND
SIR A ACLAND
MR CORTAZZI
MR FERGUSSON
MR MURRAY
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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 207 OF 25 FEBRUARY

INFO KABUL, MOSCOW, ISLAMABAD AND DELHI

INFO SAVING UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

YOUR TELNO 119 (NOT TO WASHINGTON): AFGHANISTAN - TREATY OF NEUTRALITY.

1. I DECIDED TO USE THESE INSTRUCTIONS AS A REASON TO CALL ON REZA TAGHAVI, THE NEWLY APPOINTED DIRECTOR GENERAL IN THE MFA WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR AFRICA AND ASIA, WHO DOUBLES THAT ROLE WITH CHEF DE CABINET TO THE PRESIDENT. HE IS A CAREER DIPLOMAT WHO SERVED IN KABUL IN 1971 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT THE UN.

2. I SAW TAGHAVI THIS MORNING. I SAID THAT I HAD COME TO SOUND HIM ABOUT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THE IDEA FLOATED BY YOU THAT ONE WAY OUT OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM MIGHT BE TO FORMALLY IN SOME WAY THE NON-ALIGNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

IDEA FLOATED BY YOU THAT ONE WAY OUT OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM MIGHT BE TO FORMALISE IN SOME WAY THE NON-ALIGNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

I GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON 19 FEBRUARY. WE STARTED FROM THE POSITION THAT WE ALL WISHED TO SEE AN INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN WITH RUSSIAN TROOPS REMOVED. THE RUSSIANS GAVE FOREIGN INTERVENTION BY THE US AND PAKISTAN, AS A PRETEXT FOR THEIR INVASION AND THE CONTINUED BUILD-UP OF THEIR TROOPS. WE COULD EXPLOIT THIS WHETHER IT WERE TRUE OR FALSE, BY OFFERING AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE FEAR OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION ON THEIR SOUTHER BORDER, AND PROVIDE THEM WITH A FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR EXTRACTING THEMSELVES FROM WHAT LOOKED LIKE AN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT SITUATION. TO PROPOSE THE FORMALISATION OF AFGHANISTAN'S NON-ALIGNMENT AND NEUTRALITY, THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT TO WHICH THE US, THE SOVIET UNION, AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBOURS AND OTHERS, WAS NOT AN INTERFERENCE WITH AFGHAN SOVEREIGNTY: AFGHANISTAN HAD HERSELF BEEN A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND WE BELIEVED THAT TRUE INDEPENDENCE UNIMPEDED BY ALLIANCES WAS WHAT THEY WOULD THEMSELVES WISH. MOREOVER, THERE WERE RESPECTABLE PRECEDENTS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF AUSTRIA, WHERE THE DEVICE HAD BEEN USED IN PRECISELY SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES TO PROCURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. WE HAD NOT ELABORATED ANY DETAILS, DELIBERATELY, SINCE WE WISHED TO CONSULT OTHERS.

3. TAGHAVI SAID THAT IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE CASE THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD RESIST RUSSIAN DOMINATION, AND THAT INSURGENCE WAS GROWING. HE KNEW WELL FAGHADI (?), KARMAL'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER, WHO HAD BEEN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN HE HAD BEEN IN KABUL. HE MIGHT WRITE TO FAQADEH WHO WAS A MAN WHO WOULD WANT TO SEE A STAUNCHLY INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN. A SCHEME ON THE LINES WE WERE PUTTING FORWARD WAS ATTRACTIVE: IT WAS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT OF AFGHAN SOVEREIGNTY. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PROPAGATED THROUGH THE RUSSIANS, SINCE THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT AGENT. HE WOULD DISCUSS THE IDEA WITH QOTBZADEH AND BANI SADR AND WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN TO GIVE ME THEIR REACTION.

4. I TOLD THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR I WOULD BE DOING THIS. HE RAISED NO OBJECTION. HE HIMSELF WAS TO SEE KHARAZI THE DEPUTY MINISTER IN THE MFA, TO-DAY AND INTENDED TO DRAW HIS ATTENTION TO THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.
GRAHAM

AFGHANISTAN [ADVANCE COPIES] (x32)

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 25 FEBRUARY ..

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW, ROME, UKDEL NATO, UKMIS NEW YORK.

YOUR TELNO 119: AFGHANISTAN: NEUTRALITY

1. AFTER SENDING A BRIEF NOTE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 21 FEBRUARY COMMENDING THE CONCEPT TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, I RAISED THE MATTER WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE M.F.A TODAY. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE CERTAINLY INTERESTED. HAD WE SOUNDED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT? I SAID THAT SO FAR AS I KNEW WE HAD NOT BUT THE RUSSIANS WERE ON RECORD THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN ONCE THE ALLEGED REASONS FOR THEIR INVASION HAD BEEN REMOVED.

2. YIGIT SAID THAT THE NEUTRALITY FORMULA MIGHT SAVE RUSSIAN FACE AND FACILITATE A WITHDRAWAL. PERSONALLY HE WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT THEY WOULD REMOVE THEIR TROOPS UNTIL THEY HAD SECURED THEIR OBJECTIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY INCLUDED THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF A REGIME FAVOURABLE TO THEMSELVES. WAS THE TYPE OF REGIME CONSIDERED IN OUR CONCEPT ? I REPLIED THAT IF THERE WERE A SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE OF NEUTRALITY THE PRECISE COLOUR OF THE REGIME SHOULD MATTER LESS. YIGIT COMMENTED THAT THE NEUTRALITY PROPOSAL WOULD AT LEAST HAVE THE EFFECT OF TESTING RUSSIAN INTENTIONS.

3. I THINK THAT WE CAN COUNT ON A POSITIVE TURKISH REACTION WHEN THE QUESTION IS TAKEN FURTHER .

4. I HAD HOWEVER A STICKIER TIME WITH MY ITALIAN COLLEAGUE WHEN I SPOKE TO HIM AS INSTRUCTED BEFORE ACTING VIS-A-VIS THE TURKS. HE SUGGESTED THAT A BRITISH APPROACH WOULD NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY WHICH THE NINE WERE SETTING UP, AND ON WHICH A LETTER HAD JUST BEEN HANDED BY THE PRESIDENCY TO THE TURKS (YOUR TELNO 120) . HE ASKED THAT I SHOULD HOLD MY HAND UNTIL HE HAD CONSULTED ROME. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION I PERSUADED HIM THAT MY APPROACH WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY A BILATERAL ONE, AND WOULD NOT DETRACT FROM A LATER APPROACH TO THE TURKS BY THE PRESIDENCY ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE NINE. I MADE THE POINT TO YIGIT THAT THE MATTER WAS NO BEING FURTHER CONSIDERED WITHIN THE POLITICAL CO-OPERATION MACHINERY OF THE NINE AND FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD NO DOUBT TAKE PLACE THROUGH THESE CHANNELS.

LAURENCE

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SECRET

→ Afghanistan (P 3)

9

Subject copy filed on Germany (P 2) 'Chancellor Schmidt Visit
book'

Partial Record of a Meeting between the Prime
Minister and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Herr Schmidt, at No. 10/^{Downing Street} on Monday 25 February 1980

Present:

Prime Minister
Mr. M. Alexander

Chancellor Schmidt
HE Dr. Jurgen Ruhfus

International Situation in the wake of Afghanistan

The Prime Minister said that the need to settle the British budgetary problem was given additional urgency by the present international situation. It was a bad time for Europe to be divided: the more so since there were signs both that the European reaction to events in Afghanistan was becoming better coordinated and that the situation in Afghanistan itself was deteriorating. Chancellor Schmidt said that he strongly agreed. The Prime Minister asked whether there was any truth in the stories in the morning's newspapers that Herr Brandt had been asked to act as a mediator between the United States and the Soviet Union. Chancellor Schmidt said that he did not believe there was any substance to the stories. He had seen the text of a message which Herr Brandt had recently received from Mr. Brezhnev. He had also seen the record of Herr Brandt's talks with President Carter. Neither supported the newspapers reports. They appeared to have been invented by Der Spiegel. Despite its reputation, Der Spiegel was a thoroughly unreliable journal. The Prime Minister said that she was glad to learn this. She would have felt uncomfortable had a German as prominent as Herr Brandt been cast in the role of a neutral between the US and the Soviet Union on this issue.

Chancellor Schmidt expressed his disquiet at the repeated failures of the Americans to consult with their allies in the course of the present crisis. They would not always be able to find sufficient people who were prepared to clap their hands on hearing the latest American policy decisions on the radio. The present American tendency to ignore the fact that other Governments had

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their own priorities and domestic considerations was thoroughly dangerous. The effect in Germany of the recent threat by Dr. Brzezinski to use nuclear weapons in response to further Soviet moves in South West Asia was a case in point. The threat, in particular the way it had been made, was preposterous, the more so since there was an indication that the weapons would not necessarily be used in the area where the Soviet move had been made. The effect of such statements in the Federal Republic, which had more than 5,000 nuclear weapons on its soil and was an obvious target for a pre-emptive strike, could readily be imagined. The American performance on the Olympic Games had been similarly thoughtless. The Germans had checked with the Americans twice in the period immediately before President Carter's statement on this subject and had been told that no policy announcements were in prospect (one of the checks had been made personally by Chancellor Schmidt with Mr. Christopher). The Americans had consulted the Federal Republic neither about the impact of their announcement in Germany nor about its desirability. One consequence had been that Chancellor Schmidt had delivered a major address to the Bundestag the day before the American boycott was announced and had made no mention whatever of the Olympic Games. As a final example, Chancellor Schmidt said that he had asked Mr. Vance during his visit to Bonn the previous week whether the Americans had invoked the Nixon/Brezhnev doctrine with the Russians during the early stages of the Afghanistan crisis. Mr. Vance said that the Americans had done so. This was the first that Chancellor Schmidt had heard of it. Had he known earlier on, he would have seen more consistency in the American reaction in January.

Chancellor Schmidt said that there was an undercurrent of feeling in the Federal Republic that there is now a clear and present danger of a Third World War. Many leaders in Eastern Europe, notably Messrs. Gierek and Kadar were deeply frightened. One consequence of the present situation was that they were losing what little independence they had achieved in the last 15 or 20 years. Mr. Kadar had been told that his Foreign Minister should cancel his impending visit to Bonn if the Hungarian Government wished the Soviet Government to observe an agreement on energy supplies which had just been negotiated. The East Europeans, including the East Germans, deeply resented the invasion of Afghanistan, but were

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anxious that the West should not react in a way that led the Soviet Union to forcibly reassert their authority. The situation in Poland was in any case likely to get worse. The recent sacrifice of the Prime Minister there would make no difference.

Chancellor Schmidt made it clear that he thought that the American reaction to the situation was inadequate. They had not analysed the situation that lay ahead with sufficient care and seemed unaware of the need/^{for}and nature of consultation with their allies. (Chancellor Schmidt noted with regret the disappearance of the old East Coast establishment figures and the absence of any credible replacements.) The Americans were inclined to talk about punishing the Russians. This was an erroneous idea. Punishment should not be an element in the international policy of a major power. The object now was to get the Russians out of Afghanistan and prevent them trying the same thing again. Boycotting the Olympic Games was a pinprick. What was necessary was to make it clear beyond doubt that if the Russians were, for instance, to move against the Yemen Arab Republic, something serious would happen. The Americans had also failed to show sufficient subtlety and sensitivity in their handling of the Third World. They should, for instance, already be working to ensure that the idea of neutrality for Afghanistan was taken over and promoted by Third World countries. The American failure to take into account the sensibilities of the countries in the Gulf region when announcing their guarantee had been glaring. The United States after all had had no fewer than three special Ambassadors dealing with Middle East problems in the last two years. It was not surprising that their policies lacked finesse. It was a pity that they had not sought the advice of eg the British whose expertise in the area was so much greater than their own.

Chancellor Schmidt said that this was by no means the first crisis that he had lived through. But he could not recall a previous instance where there had been so much muddle. He accepted that the Americans had a difficult hand to play. They had, simultaneously, to be clear in their own minds what they wanted to do; to act as leaders of the West; and yet to disguise the fact that they were doing so. Nonetheless, it was disastrous that matters had been allowed to get so far without a process of active and continuing consultation having been put in hand. The recent visit of Mr. Vance

had been very important in this context. But how was it going to be followed up? He had suggested that Mr. Vance should have regular consultations with the British, German and French Ambassadors in Washington. This was a sensible idea in itself but did not overcome the fundamental difficulties caused by the fact that so many decisions were taken in ^{the} White House without the prior knowledge of the State Department.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with many of the points made by Chancellor Schmidt but wondered whether the European reaction had not itself been partly to blame. She had been bitterly disappointed by the slowness with which the other members of the Nine had acted. Chancellor Schmidt said that he accepted this, but that much of the blame should be laid at the door of the Presidency. It had been for them to act. Perhaps they should have been pushed, but there was a natural reluctance to do so. The prospect in the autumn, of Luxembourg being in the Chair, was not much more cheerful.

The Prime Minister asked what advice, assuming they had been asked, the Europeans would have given President Carter in January. She believed that President Carter had been right to advocate the boycotting of the Olympics. It was the best way to bring home to the Soviet people the gravity of what had occurred in Afghanistan. She accepted that it was wrong to think in terms of punishing the Soviet Government but presumably it was not wrong to speak of bringing pressure to bear on them. What kind of pressure would Europe have been advocating? Was a cut-off in exports of technology part of the stick with which the Russians should be threatened? Chancellor Schmidt said that he did not disagree with what the Prime Minister had said about the Olympics. He did, however, disagree about the way the card had been played. Now that the United States' deadline had expired, it no longer had any value. Moreover, it was not in itself enough. As regards technology, he might have been prepared to have seen this brought into the equation. But the Americans should show more awareness of the implications of this for the Federal German Government. One per cent of the German work-force was directly/ ^{affected by} trade with the Soviet Union. The/ ^{trade} had been built up for good political reasons. The Americans for their part had never sold anything of major importance to the Russians

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(the only exceptions admitted by Chancellor Schmidt were computers and drilling equipment: it was very debatable whether it would be to the advantage of the West to cut off supply of the latter given that it might lead to increased Soviet competition for oil resources elsewhere). Exports in any case played, relatively speaking, a tiny part in the US economy. Chancellor Schmidt said he was not prepared to make sacrifices simply for the sake of doing so. He was not only critical of the line the American Government had taken on this issue: he deeply resented it.

On the question of giving advice to the Americans, Chancellor Schmidt said that it was not easy for his Government to do so. Had he been sitting in the White House he would have been in little doubt as to what to do. As it was, he was representing a power which had a burden of guilt from the last war; which had 60 million hostages in East Germany and 2 million in Berlin; and which was in a militarily untenable geographical position. The Prime Minister said that she saw no reason why the Federal Republic should not tender advice. The events of the last war were no longer a factor of major significance in this context. Moreover, everyone knew that the defence of the West depended on the reaction of four powers, the US, the UK, France and the Federal Republic. As regards Germany's exposed position, this in many respects made it easier for her to give advice and have it listened to rather than the contrary.

Chancellor Schmidt acknowledged the points the Prime Minister had made. He said that the West's response to events in Afghanistan would have to be a combination^{of} stick and carrot. The dialogue between the American and Soviet Governments had to continue. The need for the Russians to save face had to be borne in mind. There should be no pinpricking and no sabre rattling. At the same time the West should find a way of doing something that really hurt the Soviet Union. This meant pushing them out of some country in which they were already established - Angola, Ethiopia, the PDRY or some similar country (Chancellor Schmidt noted that this was the kind of point that he could not put to anyone in writing: he asked that it should not be recorded or disseminated).

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with Chancellor Schmidt's approach. She was sceptical about the chances of

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pushing the Russians out of Afghanistan (Chancellor Schmidt agreed), but thought it might be done elsewhere. However, this clearly could not be done hamfistedly. The fact that there were election campaigns underway in the United States and the Federal Republic was a complicating factor. Chancellor Schmidt said that he would put his own election campaign out of his mind when dealing with the international situation. But he hoped that allied governments would bear the election campaign in mind. He was grateful to the Prime Minister for the way she had handled Herr Strauss' letter about the cultural centre in Berlin. Notwithstanding the election campaigns and some recent public pronouncements, he hoped that the United States would not be under any misapprehension about the position of the Federal Republic and indeed of France. Both were very strong allies indeed. Both would support the Americans. Indeed they would support the Americans even where they thought the policies were wrong, eg on the boycott of the Olympics. Chancellor Schmidt said that in discussing the political dangers, the looming dangers in the economic field should not be overlooked. If, as a result of developments in the Gulf, the West's supply of oil was interrupted, even for a short period, the international banking system could easily collapse. The Euro currency market was inadequately supervised and a chain of bankruptcies could be set off. The economic actions of the Arab governments were not predictable. Taken as a whole, the prospects were frightening. Finance Ministers should be discussing questions such as how to cope with a crisis of confidence in the Euro currency market.

Future Action

At various points in their discussion the Prime Minister and Chancellor Schmidt touched on the question of action in the weeks ahead. They agreed that the Summit meeting in Venice was an obvious opportunity for substantial discussion of the West's reaction to events in Afghanistan but that it was a long way off. They therefore envisaged a timetable including the following elements:-

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a. Trilateral discussions, perhaps at official level, between France, the FRG and the UK to prepare comments on the American paper recently circulated by Mr. Vance. (Recent British and German papers would provide a good starting point.) For the most part these comments should be conveyed to the Americans in written form, but it should be envisaged that some of the comments might have to be oral;

b. Co-ordination of the European viewpoint at the meetings of the Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs) in Brussels on 10/11 March and, possibly, at the subsequent meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Nine in April. It was for consideration whether the Americans could be associated with one of these meetings in some way. Whether or not this was possible there should be

c. At least one and possibly two meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Four (US, UK, FRG and France) before the Venice meeting.

d. A meeting of the Four Heads of Government, together with their Foreign Ministers, immediately before the Venice summit. The meeting should allow for several hours discussion. It should be either in Italy or, if this proved impossible to arrange in view of Italian susceptibilities, before the Heads of Government concerned arrived in Italy. Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister were both prepared to envisage Italian participation but thought that this was unlikely to be acceptable to the French. It was agreed that urgent thought would be given to this proposal in the next few days and that a considered British view would be communicated to Chancellor Schmidt before his visit to Washington next week.

e. The Venice summit should not be exclusively devoted to a discussion of economic problems, serious though these were. The first day should be devoted to political problems and the second to the usual agenda. While recognising that there

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might be difficulties with the Japanese, both Chancellor Schmidt and the Prime Minister considered that it was time the Japanese were involved in discussion of the political issues.

f. The Prime Minister hoped that the communique of the Venice summit would be short and could be limited to the subjects actually discussed at the summit. Chancellor Schmidt agreed.

[The above summary of the discussion on future action has been agreed with Dr. Ruhfus.]

Ruhfus
-

25 February, 1980.

CS

Prime Minister

②

fs. Hurd

Another example of poor coordination
1 year.

Hurd - 25/2

Afghanistan

Mr Mallaby

AFGHANISTAN: CALL BY THE US AMBASSADOR

Mr Brewster saw the Secretary of State briefly this afternoon at his own request. He explained that he had been instructed to see the Prime Minister, but thought that would be overdoing things.

He handed over the attached talking points giving the initial US reaction to Brezhnev's speech, together with the statement which the State Department were issuing in Washington today. He explained that the main purpose of his call was to ensure that our responses to Brezhnev were coordinated as far as possible, to avoid the West being picked off one by one.

Lord Carrington said that our preliminary view was that the remarks by Brezhnev and Gromyko left the door open for the Nine to float their neutrality proposal in Moscow as evidence of our seriousness. We were thinking of discussing this in the Nine later in the week. It would be a pity to pass up the opportunity Brezhnev's speech appeared to offer. He wondered whether the first paragraph of the American statement might not sound a little cold. Mr Brewster commented that the American position was not frozen over, and the statement was meant to indicate that they were still interested. Lord Carrington asked whether there was a risk of the West appearing divided if the American statement were contrasted with the intention of the Nine to push ahead with their proposal on neutrality. Mr Brewster thought that this could be overcome by the Americans making it clear that they supported the Nine's action with the Russians when this came. Meanwhile, it was agreed that, when asked to comment on the American statement, we would avoid saying whether we agreed or disagreed with the American assessment of Brezhnev's speech as "insufficient"; say that we were still assessing the implications of the Brezhnev/Gromyko remarks in the light of the developing situation in Afghanistan; and that meanwhile our neutrality proposals were still on the table.

In response to a question by Lord Carrington, Mr Brewster said he knew nothing about the suggestion in this morning's Times that Herr Brandt might mediate over Afghanistan. He intended to telephone Mr Vance this evening about our reaction to Brezhnev's speech and would ask him about The Times' report.

G. G. H. Walden

(G G H Walden)

25 February 1980

- cc:- PS
- PS/LPS
- PS/Mr Hurd
- PS/Mr Blaker
- PS/PUS
- PS/Sir D Maitland
- Mr Bullard
- Mr Carrington
- SAD
- News Dept
- NAmD

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25 FEB 1980



CONFIDENTIAL

-- While we would welcome a concrete proposal that would lead to a prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan and to the establishment of a neutral and non-aligned government in Kabul acceptable to the people of Afghanistan, we find the statement of the Soviet position as set forth in President Brezhnev's speech of February 22 insufficient.

-- Soviet statements continue to cite external aggression as a justification for the Soviet invasion and for the continued presence of Soviet forces. It is amply evident however that the events now taking place in Kabul and throughout the country reflect the determination of the Afghan people to defend their independence by resisting the Soviet invaders.

-- The United States supports the restoration of a genuinely neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, which would threaten none of the nations of the region. We are prepared to work toward that end.

mt

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-- Brezhnev's February 22 formulation on Afghanistan appears similar to public and private statements the Soviets have made since the invasion of Afghanistan which seem designed to shift the responsibility for their presence there.

-- In fact, the Brezhnev statement is less forthcoming than some earlier Soviet formulations in that Brezhnev said that withdrawal could only "begin" when "all forms of interference" against Afghanistan were terminated. A February 13 Tass account of India-Afghan discussions reported that Afghanistan gave assurances that Soviet troops "would be withdrawn" as soon as there are firm guarantees that outside aggression has ended.

-- Some media analyses have drawn attention to the Gromyko election speech of February 18 which includes expressions of Soviet readiness to negotiate on all international problems. However this statement was made in the context of Soviet disarmament proposals, not Afghanistan.

-- Negative Soviet media reaction to President Carter's February 13 expression of support for a neutral Afghanistan and to the EC proposal of February 19 tends to support the conclusion that the Brezhnev linkage of withdrawal to a "guarantee" against intervention was more propagandistic than substantive.

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- 2 -

-- At the same time, Brezhnev's statement offers a possible opportunity to maintain pressure for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

-- To date we have avoided detailed comment on Brezhnev's speech, emphasizing the need for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces while promising to give careful study and consideration to any further clarification of the Soviet position on Afghanistan.



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MIPT: BREZHNEV'S SPEECH: AFGHANISTAN.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT TO MAKE OF THE PASSAGE ON
AFGHANISTAN. I SAW ZEMSKOV IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEECH
HAD BEEN DELIVERED AND ASKED HIM WHETHER, IN REPORTING IT,
THERE WAS ANYTHING I SHOULD UNDERLINE. HE SAID HE HAD NOT
HEARD IT - AND WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT THE CANADIAN ELECTION.
SO THERE CAN SCARCELY BE ANY CONCERTED NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE.

SO THERE CAN SCARCELY BE ANY CONCERTED NEW DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEREAS THE FIRST PASSAGE ON AFGHANISTAN RESTATES THE STANDARD LINE, ADDING ONLY A REFERENCE TO THE VIEWS OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ITSELF, THE SECOND HALF LOOKS AS THOUGH IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A LATE ADDITION AND THE INTRODUCTORY PHRASE ("I WANT TO STATE VERY DEFINITELY") SUGGESTS THAT THE IDEA OF A GUARANTEE OF THE AFGHANISTAN FRONTIER IS INTENDED TO LOOK LIKE A SERIOUS PROPOSAL. MY PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR WITHDRAWAL MADE SOME IMPRESSION. GROMYKO'S APPARENT FAILURE IN NEW DELHI MAY HAVE ADDED TO THIS AND THE LEADERSHIP MAY NOW SEE A RISK THAT THE IDEA OF A NEUTRALITY TREATY MAY GAIN AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE OF SUPPORT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THEY NEEDED TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE WITH A STATEMENT WHICH WAS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ASSERTION THAT THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS WAS NECESSITATED BY EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE, WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED AS OFFERING A BASIS FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION, BUT WHICH WOULD HAVE AS ITS MAIN PURPOSE THE DEFLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE WHILE THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING INTERNAL CONTROL WAS PURSUED.

3. A MORE CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT MAY BE POSSIBLE WHEN WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO SEE HOW THE SPEECH IS FOLLOWED UP BY THE OFFICIAL COMMENTATORS.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO BONN, PARIS, ROME AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

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AND SAVING TO PARIS, BONN, ROME AND UKDIS NEW YORK.

BREZHNEV SPEECH.

BREZHNEV MADE HIS ELECTORAL SPEECH LAST NIGHT. HE DWELT IN ITS OPENING PASSAGES ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEEDS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY, ASSURING HIS LISTENERS THE SOVIET UNION HAD EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO REPEL "ANY MILITARY PROVOCATION". UNITY BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR WAS ESSENTIAL AND

UNITY BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE USSR WAS ESSENTIAL AND HISTORY SHOWED IT WAS DEMONSTRATED WITH PARTICULAR FORCE WHEN ANYONE TRIED TO SPEAK TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THE LANGUAGE OF FORCE.

2. IN THE HALF OF HIS SPEECH DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, BREZHNEV STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITY OF ACTION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. VIETNAM HAD HAD THEIR SUPPORT IN THE PAST AND WOULD HAVE IT AGAIN IF NEED BE. SO TOO WOULD LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO PEACE AND DETENTE WAS VITAL. SECURE PEACE WAS A NECESSITY FOR ALL PEOPLES, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, WHICH WAS WHY SOVIET RELATIONS WERE SO GOOD WITH MANY ASIAN AFRICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THE USSR WAS PROUD OF ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND DEFENCE EFFORTS OF A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. SOVIET RELATIONS WERE PARTICULARLY GOOD WITH INDIA AND SYMBOLISED BY THE RECENT AGREEMENT ON A JOINT SPACE FLIGHT BY SOVIET AND INDIAN COSMONAUTS. IN CONTRAST, THE IMPERIALISTS, AND ESPECIALLY THE USA, WERE DISCONTENTED WITH DETENTE AND THE SUCCESS OF LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. THEY HAD RESPONDED TO THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH MANY CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, TO HELSINKI AND TO THE REVOLUTIONARIES' VICTORIES IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA BY DRAGGING OUT SALT II, ENCOURAGING SADAT'S TREACHERY, STEPPING UP DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND FRUSTRATING DISARMAMENT TALKS, AND, FINALLY, DEPLOYING NEW ROCKETS IN EUROPE, "DIRECTED AGAINST THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES." THE DETERMINATION OF THE US LEADERSHIP TO WORK AGAINST DETENTE WAS CLEAR, NOT UNEXPECTED, AND SHOULD BE RESISTED. AFTER DECIDING TO DEPLOY THEIR ROCKETS IN EUROPE, THE AMERICANS HAD TURNED THEIR EYES TO ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, SENDING THEIR FLEET TO THE SHORES OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAN AND THEN SEIZING ON THE CONVENIENT EXCUSE OF AFGHANISTAN TO UNLEASH AN UNPRECEDENTED ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN.

3. CARTER AND HIS COLLEAGUES, BREZHNEV SAID, KNEW PERFECTLY WELL THERE HAD BEEN NO RUSSIAN 'INTERVENTION' IN AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN INTERVENTION FROM PAKISTAN TERRITORY. THE LATTER HAD, INDEED, BEEN DIRECTED BY THE AMERICANS, TOGETHER WITH THE CHINESE AND HAD CREATED A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION AND THE SECURITY OF THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF THE SOVIET UNION. BREZHNEV THEN CONTINUED : "THE WHITE HOUSE ALSO KNOWS THAT THE USSR WILL WITHDRAW ITS MILITARY CONTINGENTS FROM AFGHANISTAN AS SOON AS THE REASONS THAT CAUSED THEIR PRESENCE THERE DISAPPEAR AND THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. THE UNITED STATES

PRESENCE THERE DISAPPEAR AND THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT DECIDES THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS NO LONGER NECESSARY. THE UNITED STATES LOUDLY DEMANDS THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS BUT IN FACT IS DOING EVERYTHING TO PUT OFF THIS POSSIBILITY; IT IS CONTINUING AND BUILDING UP ITS INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFGHANISTAN. I WANT TO STATE VERY DEFINITELY; WE WILL BE READY TO COMMENCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR TROOPS AS SOON AS ALL FORMS OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE DIRECTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN ARE FULLY TERMINATED. LET THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH THE NEIGHBOURS OF AFGHANISTAN GUARANTEE THIS, AND THEN THE NEED OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL CEASE TO EXIST. ON ITS PART, AS IS KNOWN, THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN HAS CLEARLY STATED ITS INTENTION TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS, IN PARTICULAR, WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. NATURALLY, WE WELCOME THIS POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN."

4. WHY, THEREFORE, BREZHNEV ASKED, DID WASHINGTON RAISE SUCH A FUSS? AS A COVER FOR ITS EXPANSIONIST POLICIES (ESPECIALLY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN), NOT JUST IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THE ISSUE FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. BUT TIMES HAD CHANGED, AND THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WOULD NOT BE DECEIVED. "IN WASHINGTON THEY LOVE TO TALK OF THE NEED TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THE SUPPLY OF OIL TO THE USA. ONE CAN UNDERSTAND THIS TO SOME EXTENT." BUT SUPPLIES COULD NOT BE ASSURED BY TURNING THE REGION INTO A POWDER KEG. ADVENTUROUS "DOCTRINES" WERE DANGEROUS FOR ALL. NO ONE COULD INTIMIDATE THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH STOOD FOR STRENGTHENING DETENTE, NOT RUINING IT.

5. FOR COMMENT, PLEASE SEE MIFT.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO BONN, PARIS, ROME AND UKMIS NEW YORK

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TO PRIORITY CERTAIN MISSIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
GUIDANCE TELEGRAM NUMBER 20 OF 22 FEBRUARY 1980

PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN

1. AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING IN ROME ON 19 FEBRUARY, FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE NINE LAUNCHED THE IDEA THAT THE CRISIS IN AFGHANISTAN COULD BE OVERCOME CONSTRUCTIVELY THROUGH AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN TO BE OUTSIDE COMPETITION BETWEEN THE POWERS.
2. THIS INITIATIVE, CONVEYED IN A PRESIDENCY PRESS BRIEFING, IS BASED ON AN IDEA PUT FORWARD BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND WELCOMED BY HIS COLLEAGUES. AT A BRIEFING FOR JOURNALISTS, LORD CARRINGTON EXPLAINED THAT MINISTERS HAD TRIED TO CONTRIBUTE ONCE AGAIN TO THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS AND TO MAKE A POSITIVE STEP FORWARD IN DEFUSING A DANGEROUS SITUATION. THE COMMUNITY IS WELL PLACED TO FLOAT THIS IDEA. IT HAS STRONGLY CONDEMNED THE

/SOVIET INVASION

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SOVIET INVASION BUT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION REMAIN OPEN. EUROPE HAS SPECIAL INTEREST IN DETENTE. THIS COULD BE AN EXAMPLE OF DETENTE IN ACTION. THE NINE HAVE A VAST FUND OF EXPERIENCE AND TRADITIONAL TIES IN THE REGION.

3. YOU MAY DRAW ON PARAS 1 TO 8 IN ANSWERING GENERAL QUESTIONS ON THE PROPOSAL SUPPLEMENTING THEM WITH POINTS IN THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESS BRIEFING (VS 022). IN SECURING THE INTEREST OR SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENTS YOU MAY USE PARAS 9 - 12 AT YOUR DISCRETION.

LINE TO TAKE

4. THE IDEA IS NOT A PROPAGANDA PLOY BUT A GENUINE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE IT OFFERS POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS. YOU SHOULD COMMEND IT TO GOVERNMENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE BELONGING TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. WE REGARD IT AS IMPORTANT THAT THE IDEA SHOULD GENERATE SUPPORT FROM THESE GROUPS AND NOT BE SEEN INCORRECTLY AS A WESTERN SUGGESTION FIRED AS A SHOT IN AN EAST-WEST EXCHANGE.

FURTHER POINTS

5. THE PROPOSAL IS MADE WITHIN THE SPIRIT OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF 14 JANUARY WHICH APPEALS TO ALL STATES TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNED CHARACTER OF AFGHANISTAN AND REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THAT COUNTRY.

6. THE IDEA IS NOT A RIGID PROPOSAL. THE NINE ARE URGENTLY MEETING NEXT WEEK TO FLESH IT OUT. THEY WILL CONCERT THEIR POSITION ON THE SUBJECT WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AND WITH ALL COUNTRIES HAVING AN INTEREST IN THE EQUILIBRIUM AND STABILITY OF THE REGION.

7. THE NINE ADHERE TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS SET OUT IN THEIR DECLARATION OF 15 JANUARY. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN REMAINS THEIR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE. THE NEW INITIATIVE AIMS TO ESTABLISH A

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FRAMEWORK FOR SUCH A WITHDRAWAL.

8. THOUGH SOME IDEAS HAVE BEEN CULLED FROM THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY OF 1955, IT DOES NOT OFFER AN EXACT PARALLEL TO AFGHANISTAN. WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO ANY PARTICULAR APPROACH, AND OUR INTENTION IS TO BE FLEXIBLE.

9. THE PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED INTER ALIA TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S PROFESSED FEARS OF WESTERN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ARE GROUNDLESS. THE RUSSIANS HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT THEIR TROOPS WILL WITHDRAW WHEN THE REASON (ALLEGED WESTERN AND CHINESE INTERFERENCE) FOR THE INTERVENTION NO LONGER EXISTS AND MR GROMYKO STATED ON 18 FEBRUARY THAT 'THERE IS NO DISPUTED ISSUE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, NO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, UPON WHICH WE WOULD NOT BE READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS, FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON AN EQUAL BASIS'.

FOR USE WITH GOVERNMENTS

10. THE PROPOSAL ESTABLISHES A SPECIFICALLY EUROPEAN POSITION. (IT HAS NOT BEEN MADE WITHIN NATO MACHINERY). WHILE THE NINE HAVE CONDEMNED THE SOVIET INVASION, THEY HAVE ALSO KEPT THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN TO MOSCOW.

11. THE BEST WAY OF PROCEEDING IS UNDER DISCUSSION. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE A UN CONFERENCE CONVENED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. ANOTHER COULD BE AN AD HOC CONFERENCE CALLED BY A THIRD PARTY.

12. THE ITALIANS IN THEIR PRESIDENCY CAPACITY WILL BE BRIEFING THE SOVIET UNION FAIRLY SOON.

CARRINGTON
BY TELEGRAPH

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TELEGRAM NO 95 OF 22 FEBRUARY 89.
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, TEHRAN, DELHI, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON,
UKDEL NATO, UKAIS NEW YORK AND MODUK (DIA).
MY TELEGRAM NO 94 : KABUL : DEMONSTRATION.

ACTIVITY CONTINUES IN KABUL. HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS AND THREE
PAIRS OF JETS, 2 SU7S, 2 MIG 21S AND 2 MIG 23S HAVE CONTINUALLY
CRISS-CROSSED THE TOWN SINCE 1100 HOURS. NONE HAS LAUNCHED
ANY ROCKETS AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL.
OUR ASSUMPTION IS THAT ALL AIRCRAFT ARE FLOWN BY SOVIETS.
FIRING IN TOWN AND OUTSKIRTS HAS BEEN HEARD FREQUENTLY, MOSTLY
SMALL ARMS WITH OCCASIONAL LIGHT CANNON. ONE PARTICULARLY
HEAVY BURST NEAR TO THE EMBASSY WAS, APPARENTLY, A TANK FIRING

HEAVY BURST NEAR THE EMBASSY WAS, APPARENTLY, A TANK FIRING
MACHINE GUNS OVER THE HEADS OF THE PEOPLE TO SEND THEM HOME.
UNCONFIRMED REPORTS FROM TOWN SPEAK OF SEVERAL ATTEMPTED
GATHERINGS OF CROWDS, ONE OF GREEN FLAGS BEING CARRIED AND ONE
OF AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE BETWEEN CROWD AND AFGHAN TROOPS. ROAD
BLOCKS OF AFGHAN TROOPS AND AFGHAN ARMED CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN
SET UP IN MANY PLACES IN TOWN. THE AMERICANS, WHO ARE NEXT
DOOR TO RADIO AFGHANISTAN, REPORT SOVIET TROOPS AND ARMoured
VEHICLES RINGING THE RADIO AND TV BUILDING. WE HAVE NO OTHER
REPORTS OF SOVIET FOOT SOLDIERS IN TOWN. AFGHAN POLICE OFFICERS
HAVE WARNED MANY, PROBABLY ALL, FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN TOWN TO
KEEP THEIR PERSONNEL OFF THE STREETS.

KABUL RAIDO HAS ANNOUNCED A CURFEW FROM 2000 HOURS TONIGHT,
BANNED GATHERINGS OF MORE THAN 4 PEOPLE AND ORDERED ALL
CIVILIANS TO HAND IN THEIR WEAPONS WITHIN 24 HOURS.

WE HAVE NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES BUT SOME WOULD SEEM LIKELY
UNLESS ALL THE FIRING HAS BEEN OVER HEADS. WE BELIEVE ALL OF
OUR COMMUNITY TO BE SAFE. ALL EMBASSY STAFF AND WIVES ARE
INSIDE THE COMPOUND.

MOST REPORTS OF THIS DEMONSTRATION HAVE SPOKEN OF 3 DAYS,
THURSDAY TO SATURDAY. WE WILL REPORT ANY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS.
THE PATTERN SO FAR AFGHAN TROOPS ON FOOT AND IN ARMoured
VEHICLES TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATORS WHILE SOVIET JETS AND
HELICOPTERS INTIMIDATE.

FCO ONLY.

WESTERN JOURNALISTS IN KABUL WILL NO DOUBT HAVE THE STREETS
RUNNING IN BLOOD. IT WOULD BE A KINDNESS TO TELEPHONE EMBASSY
NEXT OF KIN TO ASSURE THEM WE ARE ALL SAFE. PLEASE TELL MY
WIFE ON GERRARDS CROSS 82009 THAT SHE MAY FIND FLIGHT TO KABUL
DELAYED IF TROUBLE CONTINUES, BUT AS SITUATION IS AT THIS
MOMENT SHE SHOULD COME AS PLANNED.

HOWELL.

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 212315Z FEB 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELGRAM NUMBER 360 DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1980

INFO ROME, LUXEMBOUR, THE HAGUE, PARIS, BONN, BRUSSELS
COPENHAGEN, UKREP BRUSSELS, DUBLIN AND UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 119 TO ANKARA: AFGHANISTAN: TREATY OF NEUTRALITY

1. I RAISED THIS SUBJECT AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF THE
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NINE. THERE WAS A GENERAL
CONSENSUS AMONGST MY COLLEAGUES THAT, IF THIS IDEA WAS TO
TAKE ROOT AND FLOURISH, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT A PROMINENT
PART SHOULD BE PLAYED BY THE NON-ALIGNED. IF THE IDEA
WAS PERCEIVED AS A SOLELY WESTERN INITIATIVE, IT WOULD BE
STIGMETISED HERE AS A COLD WAR MANOEUVRE AND THE NON-ALIGNED
WOULD SHY AWAY FROM SUPPORTING IT. WE AGREED THEREFORE THAT
THE SENSIBLE THING HERE WAS FOR US TO TALK INFORMALLY TO
LEADING AND WELL-DISPOSED NON-ALIGNED REPRESENTATIVES AND TRY
TO BUILD UP SOME MOMENTUM AMONGST THEM. THIS WOULD REPEAT
THE TACTICS WE SUCCESSFULLY EMPLOYED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST MONTH. I THINK IT PARTICULARLY
IMPORTANT THAT, IF A CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES IS TO BE
CONVENED (PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE), THIS SHOULD
INVOLVE AS MANY NON-ALIGNED STATES AS POSSIBLE FROM THE OUTSET.
2. I WILL TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO WALDHEIM. BUT
THIS WILL PROBABLY NOT BE UNTIL NEXT WEEK. HE IS AT PRESENT
WHOLLY PREOCCUPIED WITH IRAN AND RHODESIA.

PARSONS

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AFGHANISTAN

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Subject USA: May 79. Visits
to UK by Mr Vance.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE MR CYRUS VANCE AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON THURSDAY, 21 FEBRUARY 1980 AT 19.45 HRS

Present:-

Prime Minister

Mr Cyrus Vance

Foreign & Commonwealth
Secretary

HE Mr Kingman Brewster

Mr M O'D B Alexander

Mr Vance said that he had found his trip to Europe extremely useful. So far as he could see there was a common assessment of the threat and a common assessment of the objectives which the allies should be pursuing. There were, however, still some differences about the precise way those objectives should be achieved. The Prime Minister said that she was concerned lest the reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan should be a 9-day wonder. It was essential that the West's response should be sustained and should not dwindle after six months as it had done in the case of the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Mr Vance said that President Carter entirely agreed with the Prime Minister on this point.

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Original filed
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PRIME MINISTER

Community Affairs

[If not taken under the Foreign Affairs item.] The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary might be invited to report on the 19th February Ministerial meeting of the Nine in political co-operation, at which he put forward the United Kingdom proposal for the neutralisation of Afghanistan.

2. The Minister of Agriculture might report on the 18th February Agriculture Council, which approved a package on wine, had an inconclusive first exchange of views on the Commission's price proposals for 1980-81, and showed signs of an emerging move to buy off the French on sheepmeat in advance of their compliance with the European Court judgment.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

(Robert Armstrong)

20th February 1980

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 185 OF 20 FEBRUARY
INFO PARIS WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO
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Pages 2 + 12
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VANCE'S VISIT TO BONN

1. SECRETARY VANCE ARRIVED IN BONN ON THE EVENING OF 19 FEBRUARY AND LEFT THIS AFTERNOON FOR ROME. HE HAD A SMALL WORKING DINNER AND BREAKFAST WITH HERR GENSCHER: A QUOTE PLENARY UNQUOTE MEETING WITH THREE OR FOUR OFFICIALS PRESENT ON EITHER SIDE: AND A WORKING LUNCH WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR AT WHICH ONLY GENSCHER AND VON STADEN WERE ALSO PRESENT ON THE GERMAN SIDE.
2. BLECH (POLITICAL DIRECTOR) HAS GIVEN THE MINISTER THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE PLENARY (HE WAS NOT YET INFORMED ABOUT WHAT PASSED AT THE LUNCH). MR VANCE BEGAN BY DISTRIBUTING A PAPER WHICH SET OUT FIVE GOALS FOR ALLIANCE ACTION POST-AFGHANISTAN:
 - (A) TO BUTTRESS DEFENCE FORCES AND REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL ENERGY SUPPLIES.
 - (B) TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION FROM FURTHER EXPANSIONIST ACTION BY MAKING THEM PAY A PRICE FOR AFGHANISTAN, AND TO PREVENT SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING BETWEEN THE US AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIES.
 - (C) TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN QUOTE SO THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD SERVE AS A BUFFER UNQUOTE.
 - (D) TO MAINTAIN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND PROTECT US AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL).
 - (E) TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN POSITION IN SOUTH ASIA.
3. VANCE DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL ON ENERGY, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE FOR DISCUSSION AT VENICE. DEFENCE MEASURES WOULD BE FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING, BUT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER FOUR HEADS: (A) MEETIN FORCE GOALS: (B) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LTDP: (C) INSURING THAT ALL ALLIES MET THE 3 PER CENT TARGET: (D) KEEPING UP TO THE MARK ON AWACS - APPARENTLY A REFERENCE TO BELGIUM. GENSCHER HAD RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE CENTRAL WESTERN AIM SHOULD BE TO GET THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF AFGHANISTAN IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UN RESOLUTION. HE AGREED ON THE NEED TO CONTAIN FURTHER SOVIET EXPANSION: THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY STABILISING THE REGION AFFECTED AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE QUOTE COMPENSATING MEASURES IN SECURITY POLICY UNQUOTE WITH A VIEW TO PROMOTING THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE AND OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THIS WOULD BOTH STRENGTHEN THE WEST'S CAPACITY FOR ACTION AND IMPRESS THIS CAPACITY ON THE SOVIET UNION AND ALSO ON THE THIRD WORLD. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT WOULD BE AID FOR THOSE ALLIES WHICH WERE IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY - HENCE THE IMPORTANCE THE FRG ATTACHED TO AID FOR TURKEY. ON THE MILITARY FRONT, THE FRG'S MAIN CONTRIBUTION WOULD CONTINUE TO BE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BUT GERMAN MILITARY AID

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/ TO TURKEY

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TO TURKEY MUST ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. A SERIES OF MEASURES (NOT SPECIFIED EXCEPT FOR A VAGUE REFERENCE BY BLECH TO AMMUNITION STORAGE) FOR STRENGTHENING THE BUNDESWEHR WAS NOW UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION: THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SAY SOMETHING CONCRETE ABOUT THIS IN WASHINGTON.

4. GENSCHER THEN MADE A PRESENTATION DESIGNED TO IMPRESS ON VANCE THE FRG'S READINESS TO ACCEPT ITS SHARE OF THE MILITARY BURDEN, INCLUDING ITS SHARE OF RISKS. THE FRG'S DEFENCE EFFORT SHOULD BE LOOKED AT IN TERMS OF WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS: THE BUNDESWEHR HAD BEEN MAINTAINED AT A HIGH DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY. BECAUSE OF CONSCRIPTION PERSONNEL COSTS WERE A SMALLER ELEMENT IN THE FRG DEFENCE BUDGET THAN FOR COUNTRIES WITH PROFESSIONAL ARMIES AND THERE WAS A VERY LARGE CORPS OF RESERVISTS IN BEING WHICH COULD BE READY FOR ACTIVE SERVICE AT SHORT NOTICE. (HENCE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON NATIONAL CEILINGS IN MBFR). THE NEED FOR CONSCRIPTION WAS FULLY ACCEPTED BY PUBLIC OPINION, AS HAD BEEN THE DECISIONS ON LRTNF MODERNISATION. NO OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD HAD ACCEPTED AS HIGH A CONCENTRATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS THICKLY POPULATED AREAS AS HAD THE FRG. GENSCHER HAD THEN DEVELOPED THE GERMAN THEORY OF QUOTE DIVISION OF LABOUR UNQUOTE ON FAMILIAR LINES.

5. VANCE HAD AGREED ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF HELPING TURKEY. IN RESPONSE TO A GERMAN ACCOUNT OF THE MATTHOEFER MISSION TO ANKARA AND THE NEED FOR URGENT BRIDGING AID TO TURKEY EVEN BEFORE THE PLEDGING CONFERENCE FORESEEN FOR 25 MARCH, VANCE HAD SAID THAT THE US WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE ANY NEW PAYMENTS TO TURKEY BEFORE FY81. EVEN A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET COULD NOT BE GOT THROUGH CONGRESS BEFORE SEPTEMBER. THE DIVISION OF LABOUR APPLIED TO THE US TOO : IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL AID FOR TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE THINGS THE US COULD NOT DO. IN FY81, THE US WAS THINKING OF AID FOR TURKEY OF THE ORDER OF 250 MILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY AID AND 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AID. (BLECH COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS NO MORE THAN THE US HAD BEEN CONTEMPLATING BEFORE AFGHANISTAN).

GENSCHER HAD SAID THAT THE FRG WAS HOPING THAT THE PLEDGING CONFERENCE WOULD AGREE TO A FIVE YEAR AID PROGRAMME FOR TURKEY, OF WHICH 1.2 BILLION DOLLARS WOULD BE PAID IN THE FIRST YEAR. THE AMOUNTS FOR THE SUCCEEDING YEARS WOULD NOT BE DEFINED BUT WOULD DEPEND ON TURKEY'S PERFORMANCE. REFERRING TO SUGGESTION BY PRESIDENT CARTER THAT FRG AID TO TURKEY SHOULD BE TREBLED AND AID FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD BE DOUBLED, GENSCHER POINTED OUT THAT THE FRG HAD NEVER REDUCED ITS AID TO TURKEY AND WAS THEREFORE STARTING FROM A HIGH LEVEL. THE PROPOSED QUADRUPLING OF US AID WOULD IN PRACTICE SIMPLY BRING THE US BACK TO ITS PREVIOUS LEVEL.

6. ON PAKISTAN, GENSCHER HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF A DEBT RESCHEDULING OPERATION. THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF PAKISTAN'S ABILITY TO ABSORB INCREASED WESTERN AID. COOPER (US) SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS MISSING AN OPPORTUNITY BY DEFERRING ANY CONCRETE REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AID UNTIL THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT HAD COMPLETED ITS SURVEY OF WHAT WAS REQUIRED. THIS MEANT THAT NO AMOUNT COULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE DRAFT BUDGET FOR FY81:

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A SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET WOULD BE NEEDED AND THIS ALWAYS CAUSED DIFFICULTIES WITH CONGRESS.

7. ON CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, VANCE HAD REFERRED TO TALKS STILL GOING ON WITH LAMBSDORFF IN WASHINGTON. GENSCHER HAD REFERRED TO ARTICLE V OF THE LONG-TERM CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE SOVIET UNION AS AN OBSTACLE TO ACTION BY THE FRG ON HERMES GUARANTEES. THE PROBLEM WAS LEFT FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

8. ON COCOM, VANCE HAD SAID THAT THE US WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF A SINGLE EXPANDED LIST WHICH WOULD INCLUDE QUOTE SOFTWARE UNQUOTE TECHNOLOGY AS A GREY AREA. EXCEPTIONS WOULD BE MADE FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (AND BY IMPLICATION CHINA) BUT NOT FOR THE SOVIET UNION. THE GERMANS SAID THEY AWAITED MORE SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS ON THIS. BUT THEY HAD BEEN GRATIFIED TO HEAR VANCE EMPHASISE THAT THE US DID NOT ENVISAGE THE ABROGATION OF ANY EXISTING AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE OBSERVANCE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE WAY OF MAINTAINING THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE.

9. GENSCHER HAD GIVEN VANCE AN ACCOUNT OF THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NINE ON 19 FEBRUARY AND HAD REFERRED WITH APPROVAL TO THE UK INITIATIVE ON THE NEUTRALITY. HE HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING ANY APPEARANCE OF SEEKING TO IMPOSE A REGIME ON AFGHANISTAN. VANCE HAD INDICATED THAT THE US WERE THINKING ON VERY MUCH THE SAME LINES AS THE NINE ON THE NEUTRALITY ISSUE.

10. ON THE OLYMPICS, GENSCHER HAD SAID THERE WAS BASIC AGREEMENT AMONG THE NINE THAT IT WAS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH ATHLETES FROM ALL COUNTRIES COULD GO TO MOSCOW. THE NINE HAD FAILED TO AGREE ON A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT FOR PROCEDURAL RATHER THAN SUBSTANTIVE REASONS. (BLECH COMMENTED THAT THIS MEANT FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO PUT THEIR NAMES TO A STATEMENT THE DAY BEFORE THE 20 FEBRUARY DEADLINE EXPIRED: HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING ONCE THE DEADLINE HAD PASSED.)

11. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, GENSCHER HAD STRESSED THE LINK BETWEEN THE ISLAMABAD CONFERENCE'S RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN AND ITS RESOLUTION ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS ILLUSTRATED THE NEED FOR WESTERN ACTION TO PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM EXPLOITING THE ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM TO ITS ADVANTAGE. GENSCHER HAD REFERRED IN GENERAL TERMS TO QUOTE BRITISH IDEAS UNQUOTE IN THIS CONNECTION WHICH WOULD BE WORTH FOLLOWING UP.

12. THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET QUOTE DOUBLE STRATEGY UNQUOTE IN EUROPE: I.E. PRESSURE ON INDIVIDUAL WESTERN COUNTRIES (EG PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON NORWAY AND SEMENOV'S DEMARCHE IN BONN ABOUT THE OLYMPICS) COMBINED WITH THE FIRST STAGES OF A PEACE OFFENSIVE: IE GIEREK'S PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, GDR READINESS TO DISCUSS NEW LARGE-SCALE PROJECTS WITH THE FRG. (ON BERLIN BLECH COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WERE KEEPING THINGS QUIET THERE FOR THE MOMENT. HE DID NOT EXPECT SOVIET ACTION IN DIRECT BREACH OF THE

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QA, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO GO AS FAR AS THAT IN ORDER TO CREATE A CRISIS ATMOSPHERE IN BERLIN AND DAMAGE CONFIDENCE.)

13. IN CONCLUSION, GENSCHER HAD SUMMARISED WHAT HE AND VANCE HAD AGREED AT THEIR EARLIER, PRIVATE SESSION AS BEING THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD CONTINUE: PREPARATIONS FOR MADRID SHOULD CONTINUE: CBMS HAD ACQUIRED ENHANCED IMPORTANCE: WESTERN OFFERS ON ARMS CONTROL AND IN MBRF SHOULD REMAIN ON THE TABLE: AND—MOST IMPORTANT—WINDOWS TO THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN AND THE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

14. BLECH COMMENTED THAT THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN EXCELLENT. THE GERMAN SIDE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED AT AMERICAN RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST GOING. THE RESTRAINED WAY IN WHICH THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD AGREED TO PLAY THE HAMBURG SCIENTIFIC FORUM WAS ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE THAT THEY MEANT WHAT THEY SAID ON THIS SCORE. THE REQUIREMENT NOW WAS TO MAINTAIN A PROCESS OF CONTINUOUS (WITH THE STRESS ON CONTINUOUS) CONSULTATION ON THE WESTERN SIDE. THE THORNY, PRACTICAL QUESTIONS HAD STILL TO BE TACKLED. BUT AS A RESULT OF THE VANCE VISIT THE OMENS WERE BETTER.

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THE PRIME MINISTER

19 February 1980

Dear Jack

Thank you for your letter of 29 January enclosing an article from the Guardian of 26 January about the Government's approach to British/Soviet relations following the invasion of Afghanistan.

You will know the details of our policy from Peter Carrington's statement in the House of Lords on 24 January and my speech opening the Foreign Affairs Debate in the House of Commons on 28 January. We wish to show the Soviet Union that it must pay a heavy price for the aggression in Afghanistan, and thereby to deter it from taking similar action again. This does not mean that we are seeking to place a total ban on commercial, cultural and other contacts with the Soviet Union as the Guardian article seems to imply.

We did not renew the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement when it expired on 16 February. Its terms are too favourable to the Soviet Union, since the interest rates are lower than those extended to economically comparable countries. Trade with the Soviet Union must be mutually beneficial and we cannot continue to subsidise it in this way. However, this does not mean that we wish to deny credit on normal terms or to put British companies at a competitive disadvantage in the Soviet market. The Export Credits Guarantee Department will therefore be in a position to offer credit on a case by case basis on the terms foreseen by the OECD Consensus, to which we believe all OECD countries should adhere.

/Nor

Nor is it our intention to impose a total embargo on cultural exchanges. We have acted to stop cultural events of kinds which are likely to enhance Soviet prestige or which might give the impression that we condoned Soviet aggression. We have told the Soviet authorities that we expect them to cancel a tour of this country by the Red Army Choir in May-June. They have done this. The British Council has advised the English Chamber Orchestra to cancel a planned tour of the Soviet Union this spring. However, we have decided that some exchanges may proceed because they are in the British interest or because the events have been arranged by independent impresarios and organisations. While the Government might wish to intervene in some cases (I have mentioned the proposed tour by the Red Army Choir), we think it is best generally that the people responsible for these events should take their own decisions about whether to proceed. This applies to most of the organisations mentioned in the Guardian article and also to the recent appearances at the Round House by the Rustaveli Theatre Company from Soviet Georgia.

When these actions are seen together with other measures which we have taken or are considering with our partners and allies, I do not think our response can be called ineffective. Moreover we want the moves to be part of a measured and sustained Western response, which we believe is the best way of making the Soviet Union understand that it must not commit aggression again.

Yours sincerely

MT

Jack Dormand, Esq., M.P.

Afghanistan

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TO IMMEDIATE PARIS

TELEGRAM NUMBER 99 OF 15 FEB

FCC TELS 86 AND 87: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1 THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GISCARD IS BEING TRANSMITTED DIRECTLY FROM NO 10 TO THE ELYSEE.

'MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE FRANCO/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS. I WAS GLAD TO LEARN THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR KEEPING ME INFORMED ABOUT THE OUTCOME.

THE VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE ARE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL. THOSE SHARED INTERESTS ARE INCREASINGLY FINDING EXPRESSION AS OUR RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPS. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AGREED BY YOU AND HELMUT SCHMIDT LAST WEEK, LIKE THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED BY PETER CARRINGTON AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING ON 5 FEBRUARY, IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN A PROCESS WHICH WILL, I HOPE, BE CARRIED FURTHER AT THE MEETING OF THE NINE IN ROME ON 19 FEBRUARY. IT SEEMS TO ME OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT A COMMON APPROACH SHOULD BE AGREED ON THAT OCCASION.
WITH BEST WISHES''

CARRINGTON

NNNN

FCC/WHITEHALL

WED

SUBJECT

*Master
Ops
Afghanistan*

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T27/80**

V

ZZ 142030Z
PARIS FROM LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL GOVERNMENTAL 0002
BT
MONSIEUR VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

14 FEBRUARY, 1980

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF 6 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE FRANCO/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS. I WAS GLAD TO LEARN THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR KEEPING ME INFORMED ABOUT THE OUTCOME.

THE VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE ARE ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL. THOSE SHARED INTERESTS ARE INCREASINGLY FINDING EXPRESSION AS OUR RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN DEVELOPS. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AGREED BY YOU AND HELMUT SCHMIDT LAST WEEK, LIKE THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED BY PETER CARRINGTON AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING ON 5 FEBRUARY, IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN A PROCESS WHICH WILL, I HOPE, BE CARRIED FURTHER AT THE MEETING OF THE NINE IN ROME ON 19 FEBRUARY. IT SEEMS TO ME OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT A COMMON APPROACH SHOULD BE AGREED ON THAT OCCASION.

WITH BEST WISHES,

MARGARET THATCHER (PRIME MINISTER)

BT

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THE PRIME MINISTER

14 February, 1980

My Dear President,

Thank you for your message of 6 February about the Franco/German consultations. I was glad to learn that the meeting had been successful. I am most grateful to you for keeping me informed about the outcome.

The vital security interests of the nations of Western Europe are essentially identical. Those shared interests are increasingly finding expression as our response to events in Afghanistan develops. The joint communique agreed by you and Helmut Schmidt last week, like the principles outlined by Peter Carrington at the Council of Ministers' Meeting on 5 February, is an important element in a process which will, I hope, be carried further at the Meeting of the Nine in Rome on 19 February. It seems to me of great importance that a common approach should be agreed on that occasion.

With best wishes,

(Margaret Thatcher)

M. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing
President of the French Republic.

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

Date

My Dear President,

Thank you for your message of 6 February about the Franco/German consultations. I was glad to learn that the meeting had been successful. I am most grateful to you for keeping me informed about the outcome.

The vital security interests of the nations of Western Europe are essentially identical. Those shared interests are increasingly finding expression as our response to events in Afghanistan develops. The joint communique agreed by you and Helmut Schmidt last week, like the principles outlined by Peter Carrington at the Council of Ministers' Meeting on 5 February, is an important element in a process which will, I hope, be carried further at the Meeting of the Nine in Rome on 19 February. It seems to me of great importance that a common approach should be agreed on that occasion.

With best wishes

CONFIDENTIAL

HS
Afghanistan

*B/f end may
for laws telegram to*

14 February 1980

Message from President Giscard

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 13 February on this subject and the text enclosed with it. She would prefer to send a message to President Giscard along the lines of the text enclosed.

She agrees that no message need be sent to Chancellor Schmidt.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SA

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan

IMMEDIATE

- PS
- PS/LPS
- /MR BLAKER
- PS/MR LUCE
- PS/MR HURD
- PS/PUS
- SIR D MATTLAND
- SIR A ACLAND
- MR CORTAZZI
- ~~MR FERGUSSON~~
- MR MURRAY
- MR BULLARD
- ~~LORD H C BENNON~~
- MR P H MOBERLY
- MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
- HD/FED
- HD/PUSD (2)
- HD/UND
- HD/SEAD
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CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 131635Z FEB 88
TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O.
TELEGRAM NUMBER 696 OF 13 FEBRUARY.
INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, ROME.

YOUR TELNO 91 TO BONN: AFGHANISTAN: POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTERS'S MEETING.

1. VANCE IS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE. HE HAS HAD A TALK WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WHICH HE THINKS HAS CLEARED SOME OF THE AIR. HIS AIM IN MAKING A TRIP TO EUROPE WILL OF COURSE BE TO ACHIEVE A UNIFYING, NOT A DIVISIVE, EFFECT. HE WILL LET ME KNOW LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW WHAT HIS LATEST SUGGESTIONS ARE, BUT MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY ARE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
2. IN THIS CONNECTION I SHOULD TELL YOU OF A DISCUSSION I HAD WITH WARREN CHRISTOPHER ON 11 FEBRUARY, BEFORE YOUR TELEGRAM ARRIVED HE ASKED TO SEE ME TO EXCHANGE VIEWS VERY INFORMALLY ABOUT HOW TO GET THE ALLIED WAGON GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. WITHOUT IN ANY WAY BEING ACRIMONIOUS, HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE BEING VERY DIFFICULT; BUT THEN THEY ALWAYS WERE. APART FROM THE THINGS I WOULD KNOW FROM THE PRESS INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY HOSTILE BRIEFING IN PARIS HE MENTIONED THE FRENCH COMPLAINT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT

I WOULD KNOW FROM THE PRESS INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY HOSTILE BRIEFING IN PARIS. HE MENTIONED THE FRENCH COMPLAINT THAT THE U.S. HAD NOT CONSULTED THEM ABOUT POSTPONING THE REGULATIONS IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON IRAN. I INTERJECTED THAT I ALSO HAD BEEN EXPECTING SOME U.S. NOTIFICATION ON THIS POINT PARTICULARLY AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN PRESSING US SO INTENSIVELY TO INTRODUCE SANCTIONS. ON THE FRENCH ATTITUDE GENERALLY I TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE POLITICAL AND HISTORIC BACKGROUND THAT AFFECTS THE FRENCH STANCE ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AS REGARDS THE TECHNIQUE OF DEALING WITH THEM IT WAS CRUCIAL TO RESPECT CONFIDENTIALITY: IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE IF THINGS LEAKED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES BEFORE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN CONSULTED. THIS QUESTION OF CONSULFLTXXMFVAKAKVSBQ - WHEN IN DOUBT ALWAYS CONSULT - AND I ADDED THAT THE SAME GOLDEN RULE COULD ALSO BE APPLIED TO US HOWEVER MUCH WE MIGHT SEEM TOLERANT AND REASONABLE. EVEN IF ALL THESE PRINCIPLES WERE FOLLOWED, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE TO FIND IT DIFFICULT TO REFLECT PUBLICLY THE REALITY OF THEIR BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

3. CHRISTOPHER ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT OUGHT TO BE DONE ABOUT THE PRESENT IMPASSE OVER A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. HE WAS FRANKLY AT A LOSS TO KNOW HOW TO PROCEED. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT MY OWN VIEW WAS THAT IF THEY WERE TO HAVE THE FRENCH INVOLVED THEY MUST THINK IN TERMS OF A FOUR-POWER MEETING: AND THE OTHER ESSENTIAL WAS THAT WHATEVER WAS DECIDED SHOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. IF THEY WERE SKILFUL THE AMERICANS WOULD SO CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS THAT THE FRENCH WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE THEMSELVES THAT IT WAS THEIR IDEA THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MEETING.

4. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP A FOUR-POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING CONFIDENTIAL. I SAID THAT THE PRECEDENT AND PATTERN HAD BEEN SET BY THE FOUR-POWER MEETINGS ON BERLIN. THESE WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH. THEY MANAGED TO REMAIN SECRET, THOUGH OF COURSE THEY ALWAYS TOOK PLACE IN THE SHADOW OF NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. HE UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE SUBJECT WITH VANCE IN THE LIGHT OF OUR TALK.

5. BY THE WAY, IT IS UNTHINKABLE THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE A TRILATERAL MEETING WITH THE FRENCH AND GERMANS WITHOUT US: INDEED THEY WERE A BIT AMAZED THAT I SHOULD THINK IT NECESSARY TO CLARIFY THE POINT.

6. I ASKED CHRISTOPHER HOW HE WAS THE IDEA OF A FRAMEWORK OR WEB OF SECURITY COOPERATION FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA

SECURITY COOPERATION FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA
DEVELOPING. HE REPEATED WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE IDEA OF A DIVISION
OF LABOUR AND A SERIES OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITIES.
BUT IT WAS EVIDENT TO ME THAT HE DOES NOT THINK THAT ANYTHING IS
GOING TO COME OF ANY IDEA LINKING THEM. NOR DO I BELIEVE THAT HE
THINKS THAT THIS MATTERS. EVEN IF IT WERE DESIRABLE I AM SURE THAT
HE SEES THE SUBJECTS INVOLVED AS BEING SO DISPARATE AND COMPLICATED
THAT THERE IS NO SINGLE RUBRIC UNDER WHICH THEY COULD BE ASSEMBLED.

HENDERSON

NNNN

PRIME MINISTER

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GISCARD

You will recall the message President Giscard sent to you last week about the Anglo/French Summit. I attach (Flag A) the proposed draft reply submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office together with Mr. Walden's covering letter. (This also deals with the question of a message from you to Chancellor Schmidt).

The draft letter to President Giscard has, I understand, been cleared by Lord Carrington and by Sir Ian Gilmour. My own view is that it is not very aptly phrased. Even assuming that nothing of great substance is to be said, I would have preferred something on the following lines:-

"My Dear President,

Thank you for your message of 6 February about the Franco/German consultations. I was glad to learn that the meeting had been successful. I am most grateful to you for keeping me informed about the outcome.

The vital security interests of the nations of Western Europe are essentially identical. Those shared interests are increasingly finding expression as our response to events in Afghanistan develops. The joint communique agreed by you and Helmut Schmidt last week, like the principles outlined by Peter Carrington at the Council of Ministers' Meeting on 5 February, ^{is an} ~~are~~ important elements in a process which will, I hope, be carried further at the Meeting of the Nine in Rome on 19 February. It seems to me of great importance that a common approach should be agreed on that occasion".

Do you agree that a message should go to President Giscard? If so, would you prefer the FCO draft or something on the lines above?

Peter Young

/Are you content

The FCO draft is too abrupt

Are you content that no message should go to Chancellor Schmidt? (Flag B) If you wish to send a message, shall I re-draft the FCO text to bring it into line with that above?

And
—

13 February 1980

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

13 February 1980

Dear Michael,

Message from President Giscard

In your letter of 7 February enclosing the text of a message received by the Prime Minister from President Giscard you asked for advice about a reply to President Giscard and about a message to Chancellor Schmidt.

Lord Carrington sees advantage in the Prime Minister replying to the President's message and I enclose a draft text for your consideration in the form of a telegram to Paris.

HM Embassy Paris have established from the Elysee that the message from President Giscard was not sent to any other Prime Minister of the Nine, though there may have been a similar message to President Carter.

As to a possible message to Herr Schmidt, having consulted our Embassy in Bonn we have concluded that the Chancellor's health is not bad enough to warrant a special message on that account (he seems to be suffering from the after-effects of a bad attack of flu). Lord Carrington considers that there are insufficient general grounds for a message at present, given that Herr Schmidt has not addressed one to the Prime Minister himself and that the Five Power Foreign Ministers' meeting which the Americans were aiming to convene in Bonn on 20 February has been called off. However, in case the Prime Minister would like to send some message to balance her reply to President Giscard I attach a draft in the form of a telegram to Bonn.

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL

13 Feb 1980

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8 7 6 5 4
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File No.
Department WED
Drafted by
(Block Capitals) A CARTER
Tel. Extn. 233 3254

OUTWARD
TELEGRAM

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL
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[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 193:
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GISCARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. Please convey the following reply from the Prime Minister.

Begins

Quote My dear President, thank you for your message about the Franco-German consultations. I am glad that the meeting was successful and am grateful to you for keeping me informed about the outcome.

I believe that we in Europe are increasingly coming to recognise ^{our own} ~~the identity of our vital~~ security interests. ^{are identical.} In working out a European response, I hope we can build on elements of ~~the~~ your joint communiqué, and on the principles which

/Peter Carrington

Copies to:-

CONFIDENTIAL

Peter Carrington put forward at the
Community meeting on 5 February, to
agree a common approach by the Nine on
19 February. Unquote
Ends

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

OUTWARD

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

Department WED

TELEGRAM

Precedence

IMMEDIATE

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) A CARTER

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Private Office, MOD

[TEXT]

YOUR TELNO 83:
MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

1. Thank you for the helpful advice in your TUR.
Please now convey the following message from the Prime Minister to the Chancellor.

Begins

Quote My dear Chancellor, I should like to congratulate you on the terms of the communiqué issued in Paris on 5 February following your meeting with President Giscard.

I believe that we in Europe are increasingly coming to recognise the identity of our vital security interests. In working out a European response, I hope we can build on elements of ~~the~~ your

Copies to:-

/joint

joint communiqué, and on the principles which Peter Carrington put forward at the Community meeting on 5 February, to agree a common approach by the Nine on 19 February.

As you will now know, Francis Pym will be visiting Berlin on 25 February. I believe he will be the first member of a Western Government to do so since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. His object will be to reaffirm the British commitment to Berlin, but he will also restate the need for continued negotiation with the East on arms control since, as I have said elsewhere, we all have to live in the same world. Unquote. Ends.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

GAF

cc Econ POT #3
Venice Economic Summit

12 February 1980

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER

You are preparing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Carter's message to her of 10 February. You will wish to take into account in your text the following minute by the Prime Minister on her copy of President Carter's message: "Can we put forward the idea of an 'in the wake of Afghanistan' debate at the Venice Summit?"

— M. O'D. B. ALEXANDER

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

TCE

Afghanistan

PS/LPS
 PS/MR BLAKER
 PS/MR LUCE
 PS/MR HURD
 PS/FUS
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 SIR A ACLAND
 MR CORTAZZI
~~MR FRIDGESON~~
 MR MURRAY
~~MR HILLARD~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
 MR P H MOBERLY
 MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 153 OF 12 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, ROME

YOUR TELNO 91:

AFGHANISTAN: POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BONN

1. I SAW GENSCHER THIS MORNING AS INSTRUCTED. HE CONFIRMED THAT HE SHARED YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE COLLAPSE OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE BONN MEETING AND HAD TOLD BOTH THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH SO. AS FOR THE WAY FORWARD, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH BETTER IF BOTH THE AMERICANS AND THE FRENCH HAD HANDLED THE MATTER MORE DISCREETLY. IT WAS NOW HIS VIEW THAT WE HAD TO LET THE DUST SETTLE. THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN TRYING TO REESTABLISH A MEETING ON 20 FEBRUARY. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CHOOSE SOME OTHER POINT IN TIME AND START AGAIN. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAD NO PARTICULAR AMBITIONS TO BE THE HOST NOR WAS IT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT NUMBERS. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD MEET ANYWHERE AND IN ANY CIRCLE. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET THE SUBSTANCE DISCUSSED AND IF POSSIBLE AGREED UPON.

2. GENSCHER SAID THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE ATTACHED VERY

2. GENSCHER SAID THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE ATTACHED VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN POLITICAL COOPERATION IN ROME. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM AND THAT A COMPREHENSIVE DECLARATION SHOULD BE ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING STATING PRECISELY WHERE THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES STOOD BOTH ON THE SOVIET INVASION AND ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE THOUGHT YOUR DOCUMENT CIRCULATED IN BRUSSELS ON 5 FEBRUARY PROVIDED A GOOD FRAMEWORK; HE WOULD HAVE SOME IDEAS TO CONTRIBUTE IN ROME. GENSCHER CONFIRMED THAT VANCE WOULD BE COMING TO BONN ON 20 FEBRUARY AS ALREADY ARRANGED.

3. I MENTIONED TO GENSCHER THAT THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE AT MUNICH OVER THE WEEKEND HAD REVEALED A CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND GERMANS AND IN PARTICULAR BETWEEN WHAT THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO EXPECT THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO DO AND WHAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO DO. TO THIS GENSCHER REPLIED THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE MADE MUCH EASIER IF THERE WERE QUIET CONSULTATIONS. HE ILLUSTRATED THIS BY REFERENCE TO THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES. AS SOON AS THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL WAS MADE PUBLIC, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD HAD CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GERMAN NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE AND HAD EXPRESSED VERY CLEAR VIEWS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE ULTIMATE DECISION WAS AN AUTONOMOUS ONE FOR THE NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE ITSELF. WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME, THE GERMAN NATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE HAD FINALLY COME TO SEE THE CORRECTNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH AND WERE NOW VOLUNTARILY FOLLOWING THE GOVERNMENT LINE. SIMILARLY, OVER REARMAMENT MEASURES. IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER TO HAVE A THOROUGH-GOING DISCUSSION OF THIS WITH THE AMERICANS AND SEE WHETHER IT WOULD NOT MAKE MORE SENSE TO HAVE A DIVISION OF LABOUR AMONG THE ALLIES. FOR EXAMPLE THE GERMANS WERE INTENDING TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT OVER TURKEY. THAT SEEMED TO BE A MUCH BETTER GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING THE ALLIANCE'S OBJECTIVES THAN TO SPEND THE MONEY ON MORE TANKS FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO ROOM.

4. GENSCHER SENT HIS GREETINGS TO YOU AND SAID HE MUCH LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING ALL THESE MATTERS WITH YOU IN ROME.

WRIGHT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

HS

FOR
HMT
D/T
CO

B/F 18.2.80

11 February 1980

I enclose a copy of a message to the Prime Minister from President Carter which was delivered by the American Embassy this afternoon. This surveys a range of foreign policy issues, and is one of a series of letters to Economic Summit participants.

You will no doubt let Michael Alexander have an appropriate draft reply in due course.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to Brian Norbury (Ministry of Defence), John Wiggins (H.M. Treasury), Stuart Hampson (Department of Trade) and David Wright (Cabinet Office).

M.A. PATTISON

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 February 1980

I am writing on behalf of the Prime Minister to acknowledge your letter of 10 February, enclosing a message from President Carter, which was delivered by hand this afternoon.

I will of course bring this to the Prime Minister's attention immediately.

M.A. PATTISON

His Excellency the Honourable Kingman Brewster

Prime Minister
MA 4/2

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UNCLASSIFIED

FM LUSAKA 110357Z

TO PRIORITY FCO

TEL NO. 161 OF 11 FEBRUARY 1980.

REPEATED TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW.

MY TWO IPTS : ZAMBIA/AFGHANISTAN.
(NOT TO MOSCOW).

1. WHEN HE RECEIVED A PARTY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS ON 10 FEBRUARY, PRESIDENT KAUNDA EXPRESSED INCOMPREHENSION OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S STAND ON AFGHANISTAN. SOUTH AFRICA HAD SENT ITS TROOPS INTO NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA, BUT CARTER AND THE WEST HAD SAID NOTHING. SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS WERE NOW ON ZAMBIAN SOIL, AND STILL THE WEST SAID NOTHING. WERE THEY ONLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTION BECAUSE AFGHANS WERE WHITE?

2. KAUNDA NEVERTHELESS MADE CLEAR THAT ZAMBIA CONDEMNED THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, "AS STRONGLY AS WE CONDEMNED THEM OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA". THE AMERICANS SHOULD NOW CONDEMN AND ISOLATE SOUTH AFRICA FOR ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

3. ACCORDING TO THE NORMALLY LESS RELIABLE OF THE TWO ZAMBIAN NEWSPAPERS, KAUNDA ALSO SAID THAT ZAMBIA WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS.

NEILSON.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 148 OF 11 FEBRUARY
AND TO PRIORITY WASHINGTON
INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW PARIS UKDEL NATO ROME

*President Genscher will have
found this pretty unpalatable*

ms. Runt

FRG-U S RELATIONS: STATEMENT BY GENSCHER

1. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF A STATEMENT ENTITLED QUOTE SAFEGUARD FREEDOM AND PEACE TOGETHER WITH AMERICA UNQUOTE WHICH WAS MADE YESTERDAY BY GENSCHER IN HIS CAPACITY AS FOREIGN MINISTER.

THE AIM OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS TO COOPERATE WITH ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS TO EFFECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN, TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF EUROPE ALSO IN THE FUTURE, TO MAINTAIN THE PRE-REQUISITES FOR THE CONTINUATION OF OUR REALISTIC POLICY OF DETENTE AND TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT CRISIS, CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN CLOSE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. U S-EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE TO HELP THE AMERICANS IN SOMETHING WHICH IS AN AMERICAN BUT NOT A EUROPEAN AFFAIR: AFGHANISTAN AFFECTS EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS TO THE SAME EXTENT.

THIS SOLIDARITY MUST BE EXPRESSED IN JOINT ACTION BASED ON A COMMON STRATEGY. SUCH A COMMON STRATEGY MUST UTILIZE THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL ALLIANCE PARTNERS TO REACH THE COMMON GOAL BY A DIVISION OF LABOUR. SEEN IN THIS LIGHT, DIVISION OF LABOUR DOES NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EUROPEANS ASSUME THE PLEASANT TASKS AND ALLOCATE THE UNPLEASANT ONES TO THE AMERICANS. CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS ARE INDISPENSABLE, BUT THE FORM THESE CONSULTATIONS TAKE IS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE. EUROPE'S WEIGHT IN DRAWING UP A COMMON STRATEGY INCREASES AS AGREEMENT AMONG EUROPEANS GROWS. BUT THIS WEIGHT WILL ALSO INCREASE AS EUROPE'S WISH FOR SOLIDARITY BECOMES MORE EVIDENT. DEFENCE IN PARTICULAR IS A COMMON TASK. THIS ALSO MEANS THE WILLINGNESS TO ASSUME ADDITIONAL BURDENS. NO EUROPEAN CAN EVADE THIS RESPONSIBILITY. POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY ALSO MEANS DRAWING PEOPLE'S ATTENTION TO THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURE FOR COMMON SECURITY. FREEDOM AND SECURITY HAVE THEIR PRICE. THERE MUST ALSO BE U S-EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY ON THE QUESTION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES. I REPEAT: QUOTE THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE TASK OF CREATING THE PRE-REQUISITES FOR THE HOLDING OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES. WE EXPECT SOLIDARITY FROM THE USA IN BERLIN AND WE SHALL NOT REFUSE SOLIDARITY OVER THE OLYMPICS QUESTION. UNQUOTE. THIS POSITION WILL NOT CHANGE. THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN SPORTS ASSOCIATION, WILLI WEYER, HAS SET AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE PRESIDENT OF THE LARGEST SPORTS ORGANISATION SEES HIS POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A FREE SOCIETY. HE CONSIDERS THAT THE MEANING OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THIS VIEW WILL ALSO FIND ACCEPTANCE AMONG THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE.

(THE UNITED)

THE UNITED STATES ARE DETERMINED TO ASSERT THEIR LEADING ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD POLITICS. THIS DETERMINATION IS BORNE BY THE AMERICAN NATION. IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE FOR EUROPEANS TO UNDERESTIMATE THIS OR MERELY REGARD IT AS AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN DEVICE. IN THE PAST THERE HAVE BEEN VOICES FROM EUROPE BEMOANING THE ABSENCE OF AMERICA'S WILL TO LEAD AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY IN WORLD POLITICS. AMERICA SHOULD NOT BE CRITICISED FOR THIS NOW. IT IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO BRING THE OPINIONS OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE PARTNERS TO BEAR IN A DIALOGUE AMONG THE ALLIANCE PARTNERS. THIS DIALOGUE IS A MATTER OF COURSE AMONG EQUAL PARTNERS.

OUR WISH TO MAINTAIN THE PRE-REQUISITES FOR OUR REALISTIC POLICY OF DETENTE CAN ONLY BE REALISED ON THE BASIS OF EQUILIBRIUM. THIS EQUILIBRIUM EXISTS ONLY WITH AMERICA. NO ONE IN EUROPE SHOULD FORGET THAT. THE ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES IS A VITAL PRE-REQUISITE FOR OUR REALISTIC POLICY OF DETENTE FOUNDED ON EQUILIBRIUM AND NOT A HINDRANCE TO IT.

WE ARE NOW EXPERIENCING A PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE WHICH IS INTENDED TO CONVINCE EUROPEANS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE TO BLAME FOR ALL THE TENSION IN THE WORLD AND THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE DRAGGED INTO THIS DEVELOPMENT. THE ONLY POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THIS IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR PROGRESS IN SECURING PEACE AND DETENTE BY WITHDRAWING ITS FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN. OUR PLACE IS AT THE SIDE OF THE UNITED STATES AND NOT BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS. THIS FUNDAMENTAL DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN: IT IS AT THE SAME TIME A DECISION IN FAVOUR OF FREEDOM, HUMAN DIGNITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION. ANYONE WHO WANTS TO SAFEGUARD PEACE, ANYONE WHO WANTS TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS, MUST FIRST MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO DIVIDE EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES IS FUTILE. FOR US THIS IS ONE OF THE BASIC CONSTANTS IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH ONLY THUS REMAINS PREDICTABLE IN EAST AND WEST. THE PROSPECTS FOR THE PROPOSALS OF ARMS CONTROL ADOPTED IN DECEMBER 1979 AND THE PROSPECTS OF AVOIDING A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR ARE INCREASED AND NOT DIMINISHED BY SOLIDARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

IN RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES MUST MAKE IT EVEN CLEARER THAT THEY WANT EQUAL PARTNERSHIP AND NOT SUPREMACY. NEVER BEFORE HAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT BEEN FELT SO STRONGLY IN THE THIRD WORLD AS IN THE FACE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. ONLY THE SAFEGUARDING OF NON-ALIGNMENT CAN SAFEGUARD PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. THEREFORE, THE WEST MUST NOT TRANSFER THE EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES TO THE THIRD WORLD. THAT IS ALSO PART OF THE COMMON STRATEGY.

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 11 FEBRUARY 1980.

AND TO WASHINGTON

INFO PARIS AND ROME

BONN TELNO 145

AFGHANISTAN : POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BONN

1. THE GERMANS MUST BE ESPECIALLY DISAPPOINTED, AS I AM, THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING IN BONN ON 21 FEBRUARY HAVE FALLEN THROUGH. THE NEED FOR CONSULTATION AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL REMAINS, AND I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF SIR O WRIGHT WOULD ASK GENSCHER HOW HE SEES THE WAY FORWARD.

2. I SHOULD ALSO LIKE SIR N HENDERSON TO PUT THE SAME QUESTION TO MR VANCE. THE FRENCH HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO US MORE THAN ONCE OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH THEIR PRINCIPAL ALLIES, PROVIDED THIS IS DONE CONFIDENTIALLY. BUT FOR THEIR OWN REASONS THEY CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE DOING THIS PUBLICLY. TIRESOME THOUGH THIS MAY BE, IT IS A CURRENT FACT OF LIFE, AND WE HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF IT IF WESTERN COOPERATION POST-AFGHANISTAN IS TO BE EFFECTIVE. THERE WERE TOO MANY SIGNS LAST WEEK THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS.

3. SIR N HENDERSON SHOULD ADD THAT I TRUST THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF MR VANCE TAKING PART IN A TRILATERAL MEETING WITH GENSCHER AND FRANCOIS-PONCET DURING HIS FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN VISIT. THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ME. I HOPE VANCE WILL NOT FORGET THE ITALIANS. IS HE PLANNING TO INCLUDE ROME IN HIS ITINERARY?
CARRINGTON

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AFGHANISTAN

CABINET OFFICE

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Can we put forward
the issue of an
"in the wake of
M. J. Harrison's debate
at the Venice Summit
and pub.

PRIME MINISTER 2.

FCO will suggest a draft
reply to President Carter's
attached message. He has
written to all
economic summit
participants

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON

February 10, 1980

MPD
11/2

Dear Prime Minister:

I have been asked to deliver the enclosed
message to you from President Carter, which
was received at the Embassy this morning.

Sincerely,

Kingman Brewster
Kingman Brewster
Ambassador

Enclosure:
(SECRET)

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London.

SECRET

SUBJECT

*cc Mather SA
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PM Town Add.
July 79 Venice Eca
Summit*

February 10, 1980

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 24/80

Dear Margaret:

I want to express to you my deep personal appreciation for your words in the Commons on January 28, condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and pledging your support for a firm Allied response to that outrage. I agree with you that our actions should make it clear to Soviet leaders that they must pay a price for invading Afghanistan. We can do much to help deter them from further aggression, to contribute to the security and stability of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, and to improve Western relations with the crucial states in that area. It is also very important to remove from Soviet expectations any hope that they can drive a wedge between the Western Allies with a so-called "Peace Offensive" aimed at any of us.

Our response to the Afghan crisis can also serve as a catalyst for making progress on some of the West's most pressing problems. One such problem is our defensive capability, which should be enhanced both inside and outside Europe. Another lesson of the current crisis is the need to reduce the industrial world's dependence on Mideast oil. I know that our two countries will work closely with others at the planned meeting next month to reduce oil consumption and, through the International Energy Technology Group, to devise means for increasing alternative energy sources.

Each of us in the West has different assets -- economic, military, and political -- as well as different constraints on our ability to act. We need a thorough exploration of how we can assure that our policies are complimentary and of how we can share the necessary tasks. In this message, I want to give you my thoughts on what steps should be taken next. I am also writing to the leaders of the other countries that participate in the Economic Summit.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.,
Prime Minister,
London SW1.

SECRET

I have been pleased to learn that your Government is giving serious thought to increased economic assistance to Pakistan. In reviewing possible responses to the present crisis, we consider this effort a matter of the highest priority. General Zia has told us that he wants to know what others will contribute in the way of increased aid through the present consortium before making important decisions. Dr. Brzezinski and Warren Christopher have returned from extensive discussions with the Pakistanis. Our military survey team will be returning shortly with its recommendations. We hope you will make specific contributions in financing and equipment in accordance with our joint determination of Pakistan's security needs.

I also assume that the U.K. will again be contributing generously to the Turkey consortium that the Federal Republic is organizing, and I hope you will work to disburse last year's pledge as soon as possible. I believe, as you do, that Turkey remains a keystone of European defense and Mideast stability. In the case of both Turkey and Pakistan, it is important that the aid be untied, in order to increase its usefulness.

With regard to the situation in the Persian Gulf, we have already briefed members of your government about our desire to expand facilities on Diego Garcia. I understand that your people are studying our plans, which include increased facilities for aircraft, fuel storage, ship-docking and an improved water supply, as well as arrangements to ensure maximum flexibility of use. We will be in close touch on the details of these proposals in the coming weeks and I hope we can count on your support.

Also, I very much hope that your Government will increase its presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and provide staging areas to facilitate transit of U.S. forces from the continental United States to that region. I assume you will not want to draw down your ground forces committed to NATO, and, therefore, that your emphasis will be on Naval and Air commitments. In this regard, we would be pleased to coordinate the use of facilities in the area with you and to assist your deployments there with logistic support. This, too, is an area that needs to be discussed in detail by our experts over the coming weeks.

The decisions you have taken thus far not to renew your official credit line with the Soviets is a positive step, and one we appreciate. We continue to believe that a severe restriction of such credits by the United Kingdom and other major lenders would send a powerful signal of Allied solidarity to the Soviets. As you know, Japan has recently taken action to restrict credits. We continue to urge that you not provide any new official export credits or guarantees to the USSR.

With respect to exports of high-technology items to the Soviet Union, I ask that your authorities not request exceptions in the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) to the embargo on strategic goods and technology destined for the USSR, except in hardship cases or where Western security interests dictate. This "no exceptions" policy to the COCOM list as negotiated in 1979 will mark an important and prudent shift in the Allied approach. As to computers -- where I understand that 1976 standards are still in effect -- I urge that no exceptions be made to those standards until new standards are negotiated.

In addition, I believe the list of items covered by the COCOM embargo should be expanded to include technology critical to the modernization and expansion of the Soviet industrial base. Submissions to COCOM for approval of these items would be reviewed case by case, with a presumption against approval. What I have in mind here is limited in scope, but in my judgment important. We believe that the introduction of Western technology to the Soviet industrial modernization program will lead to a significant improvement in the productivity of those industries, which would directly affect both the quantity and quality of military equipment produced in the Soviet Union.

In the industrial area, neither ALCOA nor ARMCO will go forward with proposed major projects in the Soviet Union. To preserve the impact of this withdrawal, it is essential that the place of the American companies not be taken by industrial firms elsewhere. I hope we can count on British cooperation in this area. We are looking into the possible existence of similar situations where we should discourage Western and Japanese companies from bidding on large-scale projects in the Soviet Union for the time being. We will keep you informed. We hope that restraint will be evidenced until we mutually agree that circumstances have changed.

SECRET

-4-

Let me reaffirm the deep appreciation we feel for the numerous actions your Government has already taken to demonstrate your condemnation of recent Soviet actions. In particular, we applaud your leadership in launching the Olympic boycott, which seems now to be gaining strength. Americans admire the leadership that the United Kingdom and you personally are displaying.

Finally, I believe it is important that we move quickly to adopt firm agreement on a coordinated plan of action. You know that, as always, I would welcome any thoughts of yours on these subjects.

Sincerely,

/s/

Jimmy Carter

SECRET

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Prime Minister

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 8 FEBRUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON MOSCOW EEC POSTS UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

Analysis of Schmidt's preoccupations *MAF 14/2*

MY TELNO 136

AFGHANISTAN: FRG VIEWS

1. VON STADEN IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY EXPERIENCED OFFICIAL AND AN HONEST MAN. WHAT HE SAID CLEARLY REPRESENTED THE CHANCELLOR'S THREE MAIN PRE-OCCUPATIONS: TO MAINTAIN THE ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN NATO, COMMUNITY AND OSTPOLITIK POLICIES. FOR THIS HE NEEDS TO RESTORE HIS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, MAINTAIN HIS PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE AND TRY AND RESCUE AS MUCH AS HE CAN FROM THE WRECKAGE OF HIS RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. ALL THIS HE HAS TO DO IN AN ELECTION YEAR WHEN HIS VICTORY WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON WHETHER HIS PARTY SUPPORTS HIM OR LETS HIM DOWN. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT HE IS NOT IN THE BEST OF TEMPER, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL VERBAL FIREWORKS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO INFLUENCE HIS ACTIONS, WHICH REMAIN COOL, CALM AND DELIBERATE.
2. VON STADEN'S ACCOUNT WAS ALSO ACCURATE IN THAT IT HAD LITTLE PLACE FOR BRITAIN AT THE CENTRE OF THE CHANCELLOR'S PREOCCUPATIONS. I HAD TO REMIND HIM AT THE END OF OUR TALK THAT WE EXISTED: AND ONLY TO PROVOKE THE OBLIQUE BUT EXPECTED RESPONSE THAT OUR POLICIES IMPRESS THE CHANCELLOR ONLY TO IRRITATE HIM. OUR INSTINCTIVE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICANS AND OUR ROOT AND BRANCH CONDEMNATION OF THE RUSSIANS ARE NO HELP TO THE CHANCELLOR IN KEEPING HIS TROIKA - NATO - COMMUNITY - AND OSTPOLITIK - AND THEREBY THE SPD UNDER CONTROL. MY COMMENT ON THAT IS THAT IT WOULD MATTER LESS IF WE DID NOT NEED THE CHANCELLOR'S GOODWILL OVER OUR COMMUNITY BUDGET PROBLEM. AS IT IS, THE CHANCELLOR'S SYMPATHY FOR OUR PROBLEM HAS BEEN VISIBLY WANING SINCE CHRISTMAS. WHETHER THIS IS IN PART CAUSE AND EFFECT I CANNOT PROVE, BUT IT WOULD SURPRISE ME IF IT WEREN'T.
WRIGHT

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THE PRIME MINISTER

8 February 1980

Dear John,

Thank you for your letter of 25 January with which you enclosed correspondence you have received from two of your constituents and one of your branches about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

We have strongly condemned this Soviet act of aggression. We played a leading role in leading the discussion in the United Nations which led to 104 Member States condemning the Soviet action.

I agree with the sentiment, which comes through strongly in the correspondence you sent me, that mere oral condemnation, even by the great majority of the international community, is not enough. We therefore initiated urgent consultations with our NATO and European Community partners with a view to achieving agreement on a series of measures which we and our Allies would take against the Soviet Union.

The measures we are taking were announced on 24 January by Peter Carrington. They embrace action in the areas of credit, high-level visits, cultural links and other aspects of our bilateral relations. In addition, we are pursuing urgent discussions with our Allies and EEC partners about further measures, for instance on the export of advanced technology and agricultural produce to the Soviet Union.

/The purpose

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
The purpose of these measures is to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that they can no longer commit acts of aggression against sovereign and independent countries with impunity, and to deter them from further adventures of this kind.

Peter Carrington's tour of a number of Middle East and Asian States has enabled us to form a clearer picture of their concerns and requirements. They rightly fear for their security and independence and should receive Western assistance and firm support. We are currently considering with our Allies what help we can provide.

You will be aware of my views on the Olympics. I believe that the Games should be transferred from Moscow and have asked the Chairman of the British Olympic Association to propose to the International Olympic Committee that an alternative venue be found. I enclose a copy of my letter to Sir Denis Follows. I have been encouraged at the growing international support for such a move.

I very much hope that these actions will make the Soviet Union realise that its invasion of Afghanistan was a serious miscalculation. The responsibility for a return to a sound and stable East-West relationship now rests with them.

I am returning your constituents' letters.

J.J. Wells, Esq., MP.

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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 136 OF 8 FEBRUARY

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON MOSCOW EEC POSTS UKDEL NATO UKREP BRUSSELS

Read in full.
M.

AFGHANISTAN: FRG VIEWS

1. I CALLED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON ON VON STADEN, PRINCIPAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO CHANCELLER SCHMIDT AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON. I SAID THAT YOU HAD SUMMONED ME AND MY COLLEAGUES IN COMMUNITY POSTS BACK TO LONDON NEXT WEEK FOR A BULL SESSEION ON AGHANISTAN AND THE COMMUNITY. I HOPED TO SEE VON DOHNANYI ABOUT COMMUNITY MATTERS, BUT I SHOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM HIM, VON STADEN, HOW THE CHANCELLOR NOW SAW THE SITUATION, PARTICULARLY SINCE HIS VISIT TO PARIS.
2. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR WAS IN NO DOUBT AT ALL IN HIS MIND THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ALLY AND THAT WE ALL HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER. HE WAS HOWEVER CONCERNED AT WHAT APPEARED TO HIM TO BE AN ABSENCE OF AN OVERALL CONCEPT IN WASHINGTON. HIS SECOND MOST IMPORTANT PREOCCUPATION WAS TO KEEP THE EUROPEAN CONVOY TOGETHER AND THIS MEANT THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO KEEP THE CONVOY TOGETHER THAN TO PROCEED AT THE SPEED OF THE FASTEST SHIP. THIRDLY, THE CHANCELLOR HAD NO ILLUSIONS AT ALL ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND RECOGNISED THAT DETENTE COULD ONLY BE MAINTAINED ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY BALANCE: IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT HE HAD, DESPITE GREAT DOMESTIC DIFFICULTY, INSISTED ON THE PROGRAMME OF TNF MODERNISATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS AN ESSENTIAL CONCOMITANT OF ARMS CONTROL.
3. ON SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE CHANCELLOR RECOGNISED THE GREAT SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES. NONETHELESS HE THOUGHT THAT GISCARD HAD A POINT WHEN HE COMPLAINED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ANNOUNCED THEIR DECISION WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS AND EXPECTED THE ALLIES TO FALL INTO LINE AT ONCE. THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT GISCARD HAD SHOWN GREAT RESTRAINT. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT HAVE COLLECTIVELY GOT A BETTER RESULT IF THE WHOLE MATTER HAD BEEN BETTER PREPARED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD THE TNF MODERNISATION DECISION. THIS APPLIED ALSO TO THE THIRD WORLD. THE LIST OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WHO HAD SO FAR COME OUT IN

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FAVOUR OF A BOYCOTT WAS NOT IMPRESSIVE.

4. BUT WHATEVER THE SYMBOLIC VIEW OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES MIGHT BE THE SUBSTANCE LAY ELSEWHERE. IN THE ARC OF CRISIS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECOGNISED THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF TURKEY, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND WITH ARMS SUPPLIES. THEY WOULD SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY'S EFFORT TO PROMOTE SOLIDARITY WITH THE GULF STATES. THEY WOULD SUPPORT HELP FOR PAKISTAN. BUT THEY WERE VERY WORRIED THAT CARTER'S DRAWING A LINE AND SAYING TO THE RUSSIANS QUOTE THIS FAR AND NO FURTHER UNQUOTE, WAS NOT AT PRESENT MATCHED BY THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO MEET THE COMMITMENT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE RUSSIANS SHOULD NOT MISCALCULATE AGAIN AS, IN THE CHANCELLOR'S VIEW, THEY HAD OVER AMERICAN REACTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN. HE HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SENDING SIGNALS TO MOSCOW AND THAT THEY WERE BEING ACCURATELY RECEIVED.

5. IN EUROPE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY IN NOT SUPPLYING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DENIED THE RUSSIANS. THEY WOULD SUPPORT A TIGHTENING OF THE COCOM PROCEDURES. BUT SO LONG AS THE RUSSIANS FULFILLED THEIR ECONOMIC OBLIGATIONS TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC UNDER THE VARIOUS TREATIES AT PRESENT IN FORCE, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD FULFIL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATIES TO THE RUSSIANS. THIS MEANT THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY HERMES CREDITS. IF THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES FAILED TO OBSERVE THE TERMS OF THE TREATIES THEN A NEW SITUATION WOULD ARISE. SO FAR THEY HAD NOT DONE SO.

6. IN GENERAL, THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO EVOLVE A MORE BALANCED APPROACH. THEY FEARED THAT THE AMERICANS, BY ANNOUNCING A BOYCOTT OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES, REDUCTION OF GRAIN SHIPMENTS AND CANCELLATION OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY ETC ALL AT ONCE, HAD FIRED OFF ALL THEIR AMMUNITION, LEAVING THEMSELVES WITH NO FURTHER SHOTS IN THE LOCKER. THE CHANCELLOR PREFERRED TO KEEP SOME AMMUNITION IN RESERVE FOR FURTHER EMERGENCIES. THE CHANCELLOR'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVOY TOGETHER BUT IT REQUIRED IMMENSE DIPLOMATIC SKILL GIVEN THE IMPATIENCE OF THE AMERICANS AND THE SLOWNESS OF SOME OF THE EUROPEAN SHIPS. IT WAS A WEARYING BUSINESS.

7. I ASKED VON STADEN WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS WERE SATISFIED WITH THE GERMAN RESPONSE SO FAR. HE REPLIED THAT THE AMERICANS, HE THOUGHT, UNDERSTOOD THE GERMAN POSITION. THE CHANCELLOR WAS VERY STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT ONLY AN ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE BUT ALSO A POLITICAL CONTROLLING FUNCTION (IE THE SOVIET NEED FOR WESTERN

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GOODS ENCOURAGED TOLERABLE BEHAVIOUR AND THE FLOW OF TRADE REGISTERED THE DEGREE OF CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO BEHAVE PROPERLY). THE GERMANS WERE NOT PREPARED TO LET ANYBODY ELSE PLAY THAT CARD FOR THEM. AS FOR DEFENCE, VON STADEN INVITED ME TO NOTE THE CHANCELLOR'S VERY CAREFUL FORMULATION IN A RECENT SPIEGEL INTERVIEW. HE SAID THAT THE GERMAN MILITARY BUDGET WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN QUOTE ON THE TABLE UNQUOTE IF ONLY BECAUSE THE OPPOSITION WOULD INSIST THAT IT DID. BUT THE CHANCELLOR, AS I WOULD UNDERSTAND, WAS UNDER VERY SEVERE DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS. (VON STADEN WAS, I THINK, SIGNALLING THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME INCREASE IN GERMAN DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, BUT THAT THE CHANCELLOR NEEDED TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN ORDER TO BRING THE SPD ALONG WITH HIM).

8. I ASKED VON STADEN WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN ORDER TO CONGRATULATE THE CHANCELLOR ON BRINGING GISCARD SO FAR ALONG IN AN EXPRESSION OF LOYALTY TO THE ALLIANCE. VON STADEN DID NOT LIKE THAT FORMULATION AT ALL. HE SAID THAT THE TWO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN CLOSETTED TOGETHER FOR TEN HOURS IN ALL AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE ALLIANCE IN THE JOINT DECLARATION REPRESENTED A JOINT POSITION, BASED ON CONVICTION ON BOTH SIDES. HE THOUGHT THAT GISCARD HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE COURAGE IN GOING ON RECORD TO THAT EFFECT. (QUITE CLEARLY, THE CHANCELLOR DOES NOT WANT PUBLIC CREDIT FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT, NOT LEAST IN CASE IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNULLED).

9. I TOLD VON STADEN THAT I HAD DETECTED CERTAIN VIBRATIONS OF IRRITATION AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM RECENTLY. TO THIS VON STADEN REPLIED WITH A NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO OCCASIONS WHEN THE UNITED STATES, REPEAT UNITED STATES, HAD NOT CONSULTED THE ALLIES, A FACTOR WHICH MADE THE PROBLEM OF KEEPING THE EUROPEAN CONVOY TOGETHER MORE DIFFICULT. HE SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR, WHILE A VERY SHORT-TEMPERED MAN, WAS IN HIS ACTIONS VERY CAUTIOUS AND BALANCED. SOMETIMES HE USED WORDS AS A SAFETY VALVE WHILE KEEPING HIS ACTIONS MODERATE: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S FRIENDS SHOULD NOT TAKE TOO MUCH NOTICE OF THEM.

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TELNO 126 OF 7 FEB

INFO ROUTINE TO BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO AND ROME.

PARIS TELEGRAMS NO'S 171 AND 177: FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT.

1. AN ARTICLE IN LAST NIGHT'S IZVESTIA BY THE PAPER'S PARIS CORRESPONDENT CLAIMED THAT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY INTENSIVE PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON AND FROM BRITAIN (CITING YOUR VISIT TO PARIS). IT ARGUED THAT PARIS AND BONN HAD "AMENDED" THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER NOT TO IRRITATE THEIR SENIOR ATLANTIC PARTNER. THE FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF THE DECLARATION WAS NEVERTHELESS MARKED BY NUANCES. GISCARD HAD EMPHASISED THAT FRANCE REMAINED COMMITTED TO DETENTE, THAT IT DID NOT WANT ANY AGGRAVATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND SOUGHT TO PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT POLICY. IZVESTIA ALSO POINTED TO THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE COMMITMENT TO DETENTE AND THE DECISION TO COLLABORATE ON PRODUCING A NEW TANK. THE ARTICLE ENDED WITH A STANDARD ATTACK ON THE US FOR ATTEMPTING TO UPSET RELATIONS BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

2. A TASS COMMENTARY ISSUED LAST NIGHT ATTACKED THE PROPOSITION THAT DETENTE WAS INDIVISIBLE, ON THE LINES THAT THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND WAS PUT FORWARD BY THOSE WHO WERE HOSTILE TO GENUINE DETENTE. IT CLAIMED THAT THE PROPOSITION DESCRIBED AS A NATO CONCEPT, HAD MET WITH OBJECTIONS IN A NUMBER OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. IT DENIED THAT THE SENDING OF TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN VIOLATED THE JOINT DECLARATION SIGNED IN BONN IN MAY 1978. IT CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DECLARE FOR CONTINUING DETENTE IN EUROPE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO EXPRESS SOLIDARITY WITH US POLICY DIRECTED AT FRUSTRATING IT, BOYCOTTING THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS AND CURTAILING CONTACTS: EQUALLY ONE COULD NOT SUPPORT ARMS CONTROL AND AT THE SAME TIME DEPLOY NEW MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE S IN EUROPE.

3. BOTH PIECES WERE GIVEN PROMINENCE ON THIS MORNING'S BBC WORLD SERVICE NEWS. THE TASS PIECE IS NOT AN AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNCEMENT AND MAKES NO MENTION OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT. NEVERTHELESS THE TWO ARTICLES TAKEN TOGETHER SHOW A DEGREE OF CONCERN AT THE WAY WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO AFGHANISTAN ARE DEVELOPING.

KEEBLE

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HS

B/R 11.2.80

7 February 1980

Message from President Giscard

I enclose the text of a message received by the Prime Minister from President Giscard overnight.

You are already considering whether the Prime Minister should send a message to Chancellor Schmidt about his health. You will no doubt wish to consider whether the Prime Minister should be advised to send a reply to President Giscard. If so, the two messages should, I think, be considered together. Clearly the question of whether or not to reply to President Giscard would be affected by whether or not the enclosed message is a circular message to other members of the Nine or is specific to the Prime Minister.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

George Walden, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SC

SUBJECT.

V

cc. *Wester*
JS

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 23/80

FLASH 062145Z FEB 1980
FROM PARIS
TO LONDON

T.O.R. 2245Z/06

PARIS,
6 FEBRUARY 1980

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
THE LENGTHY MEETINGS THAT I HAVE HAD WITH THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR ON THE OCCASION OF THE LATEST FRANCO-GERMAN CONSULTATIONS HAVE BROUGHT OUT THE SIMILARITY OF OUR ANALYSES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, CONSEQUENT ON THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, AS WELL AS THE ATTITUDE THAT WE JUDGE IT NECESSARY TO ADOPT IN VIEW OF THE THREATS RESULTING FROM THIS SITUATION.

WITH THE CONVICTION THAT THIS SIMILARITY OF VIEWS CONSTITUTED A POSITIVE FACTOR CAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE REDUCTION OF THE PRESENT TENSION THE CHANCELLOR AND I HAVE DECIDED TO SET IT OUT IN A JOINT DECLARATION OF WHICH YOU CERTAINLY HAVE KNOWLEDGE.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PARTICULAR PLACE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES OCCUPY BOTH BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY REPRESENT ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND BY THEIR ACTION IN FAVOUR OF DETENTE, FRANCE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS POLICY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN OF ITS SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, IT APPEARED TO US TO BE IMPORTANT THAT THEY MADE THEIR VOICES HEARD.

IN MAINTAINING FIRM LANGUAGE PRESCRIBED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THE SOLIDARITY WHICH LINKS THE WESTERN POWERS AND RECALL THE ENGAGEMENTS THEY HAVE CONTRACTED.

AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE INDICATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO SEARCH FOR MEANS AND CONDITIONS PERMITTING THE MAINTENANCE OF FRUITS OF DETENTE.

SUCH IS THE SPIRIT IN WHICH WE HAVE SET OUT THIS DECLARATION WHICH SHOULD SERVE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES, NOTABLY IN PREVENTING THE SOVIET UNION FROM COMMITTING AN ERROR OF APPRECIATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF ITS PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ENTENTE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC FROM WHICH THE CHANCELLOR AND I HAVE COME, OF OFFERING NEW TESTIMONY, IS A TRUMP CARD FOR EUROPE AS WELL AS FOR THE WHOLE OF THE FREE WORLD.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER, I SEND YOU MY BEST WISHES.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

++++

Z 062145Z FEB 1980

LONDRES DE PARIS

SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL - NR 028.

BT

A MADAME THATCHER
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI
LONDRES

DE M. VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
PARIS

PARIS, LE 6 FEVRIER 1980

MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE,

LES ENTRETIENS TRES APPROFONDIS QUE J'AI EUS
AVEC LE CHANCELIER FEDERAL, A L'OCCASION DES DERNIERES
CONSULTATIONS FRANCO-ALLEMANDES, ONT FAIT RESSORTIR
L'IDENTITE DE NOS ANALYSES SUR LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE,
A LA SUITE DES EVENEMENTS D'AFGHANISTAN, AINSI QUE DE
L'ATTITUDE QUE NOUS JUGIONS NECESSAIRE D'ADOPTER FACE AUX
MENACES RESULTANT DE CETTE SITUATION.

AVEC LA CONVICTION QUE CETTE IDENTITE DE VUES
CONSTITUAIT UN FACTEUR POSITIF SUSCEPTIBLE DE CONTRIBUER
A LA REDUCTION DES TENSIONS ACTUELLES, LE CHANCELIER ET
MOI-MEME AVONS DECIDE DE L'EXPRIMER DANS UNE DECLARATION
COMMUNE DONT VOUS AVEZ CERTAINEMENT PRIS CONNAISSANCE.

COMPTE TENU DE LA PLACE PARTICULIERE QU'OCCUPENT
NOS DEUX PAYS A LA FOIS PAR CE QU'ILS REPRESENTENT SUR LE
CONTINENT EUROPEEN ET PAR LEUR ACTION EN FAVEUR DE LA
DETENTE, LA FRANCE DES L'ORIGINE DE CETTE POLITIQUE, ET
LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE ASSOCIEE A CERTAINS DE SES DEVELOPPE-
MENTS SIGNIFICATIFS, IL NOUS A PARU IMPORTANT QU'ILS
FASSENT ENTENDRE LEUR VOIX.

EN TENANT LE LANGAGE FERME QU'APPELLENT LES
CIRCONSTANCES, NOUS AVONS SOULIGNE LA SOLIDARITE QUI LIE LES
PUISSANCES OCCIDENTALES ET RAPPELE LES ENGAGEMENTS QU'ELLES
ONT CONTRACTES.

EN MEME TEMPS NOUS AVONS INDIQUE NOTRE VOLONTE
DE RECHERCHER LES MOYENS ET LES CONDITIONS PERMETTANT
DE MAINTENIR LES ACQUITS DE LA DETENTE.

FIN DE PAGE 1

LONDRES DE PARIS - Z 062145Z - PAGE 2.

TEL EST L'ESPRIT DANS LEQUEL NOUS AVONS ARRETE
CETTE DECLARATION QUI DOIT SERVIR NOS OBJECTIFS COMMUNS,
NOTAMMENT EN EVITANT QUE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE COMMETTE
UNE ERREUR D'APPRECIATION SUR LA DETERMINATION DE SES
PRINCIPAUX PARTENAIRES EUROPEENS.

LA SOLIDARITE DE L'ENTENTE ENTRE LA FRANCE ET LA
REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE, DONT NOUS VENONS, LE CHANCELIER ET
MOI, D'OFFRIR UN NOUVEAU TEMOIGNAGE, EST UN ATOUT POUR
L'EUROPE, COMME POUR L'ENSEMBLE DU MONDE LIBRE.

JE VOUS PRIE DE CROIRE, MON CHER PREMIER MINISTRE, EN MES
SENTIMENTS AMICAUX.

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING

BT

N

SECRET

has seen + written 'Poppycock!'



Prime Minister

8

KS.

Ans

8 1/2

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG
01-233 3000

PRIME MINISTER

AFGHANISTAN: THE NEXT STEPS

TPM

In his minute of 1st February to you under the above heading, the Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary said that he was commissioning various studies and would make more detailed proposals for further action by ourselves when these studies were complete; and he added that his proposals would seem to be bound to cost money but that it would be possible to give only rough figures pending further discussion with our allies.

2. Some of the measures already taken in the agricultural field, including those by the Americans, may themselves involve expenditure for us. I need hardly stress, in the light of recent Cabinet discussions, the objections to adding to public expenditure in present circumstances; and I should have to ask that any new expenditure which may be proposed should be found from within the reduced programmes on which we have just agreed. I take it that no new proposals for action by ourselves in the Afghanistan context will be advanced in discussion with our allies before we have decided whether, and how, such costs could be met.

3. More widely, I wonder whether it would not be preferable to leave much more of the initiative on matters likely to make additional demands on our economy to our allies. All experience would seem to suggest that for us to take any

/sort of

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sort of lead in discussing proposals with other countries would involve an element of commitment on our part to incur a share - perhaps a disproportionate one - in the costs involved.

4. I am sending copies of this minute to the members of the OD Committee, to the Secretary of State for Energy, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "G.H." with a flourish underneath.

(G.H.)

6 February, 1980

-7 FEB 1960

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130

COMMUNICATIONS

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*Mr Whitmore**Prime Minister**As you agreed with Lord Carrington earlier today,
this is a very odd business indeed.*

(2)

CC: PS
 PS/LPS
 PS/Mr Hurd
 PS/PUS
 Mr Bullard/Mr Fergusson
 Mr Braithwaite
 Mr Mallaby
 Mr White
 News Dept

Sir D Maitland

AFGHANISTAN AND MR FRASER

Am - 4/2

The Australian Prime Minister telephoned Lord Carrington again this evening. He said that it was clear from his conversation with President Giscard that he had liaised with Chancellor Schmidt. Giscard had expressed the same concerns, though in a more sophisticated way. He had not specifically asked Mr Fraser to call in at Washington on his way back, but Mr Fraser's impression was that Giscard expected him to do this. On the Olympics, Giscard had said that there would be less likelihood of the French participating in the Games if the Russians were still in Afghanistan. [This passage was unclear.]

Lord Carrington said that it seemed rather humiliating for the French and Germans to have to ask others to take their messages to Washington for them. He was surprised they did not simply pick up the telephone. Mr Fraser said that he had made this point himself. However, the French had told him that there had been so many arguments on currency, inflation and nuclear proliferation (eg in Brazil) that they were loathe to start another one. There seemed to be a communication block between Washington on the one hand, and Bonn and Paris on the other. Lord Carrington commented that Mr Fraser seemed to have no option but to go.

Mr Fraser said that there were obviously some differences between Paris and Bonn [he did not elaborate]. He had been in touch with President Carter, and would go to Washington unless the Americans objected. He agreed it was all rather odd. As the leader of a small nation, who believed in the wisdom, coordination and consultation of the big Four, he felt that the prospects were distressing. It would be important to get the public presentation of his visit right. This would be something on the lines that he would be calling in at Washington to continue the discussions he had had on the way over to Europe. Giscard had said that he could take the line that the Chancellor had proposed this, and that the French President had acquiesced. Lord Carrington expressed the opinion that this might be putting it a bit high. Mr Fraser agreed, and said that it might raise other questions which would be difficult to answer. Lord Carrington said that it was not as if there were appalling dissension between the Americans and the Europeans; things were not as bad as they seemed. Schmidt had been in something of a state for some time. Mr Fraser said that he assumed that the British, if asked, would say that we assumed that he had gone to Washington to continue his discussions with the Americans, and imply that we approved.

Mr Fraser said that he had sent a message calling for a temporary halt to any announcement about our initiative on the Olympics. There should be consultation to arrange a meeting, before any announcement was made.

J. J. H. Walden

(G G H Walden)

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Sir D Maitland

Afghanistan

The Australian Prime Minister telephoned the Secretary of State on an open line from Paris this morning.

Mr Fraser said that during his visit to London he had not had time to describe fully to Lord Carrington the concern he felt about American policy on Afghanistan. In Washington Mr Fraser had found a great sense of determination but no sign of a co-ordinated strategy.

Mr Fraser had had three hours with Chancellor Schmidt in Bonn yesterday. Schmidt shared Mr Fraser's deep concern about the dangerous lack of co-ordination in Washington, and between the Americans and the Europeans. Mr Fraser described the Chancellor's approach to him as "almost a cry from the heart": Schmidt had been very emotional. The Chancellor was worried that where the Americans had a number of options they were likely to go direct from step one to step ten, and without consulting their allies.

Chancellor Schmidt had suggested that Mr Fraser should stop in the United States on his way home to impress on President Carter the need for caution and the vital importance of consulting the allies of the United States. Mr Fraser wanted Lord Carrington's advice on whether he should do this. He found it curious that a distant and relatively unimportant country like Australia should be asked to broke between France, the FRG and the United States.

Lord Carrington said that in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the co-ordination between Western Europe and the United States had not worked well from either end. The Europeans had been at fault in not rapidly reaching an agreed position between themselves. And, having called one meeting, the Americans had then gone ahead with unilateral action. Lord Carrington suggested that Mr Fraser should discuss Chancellor Schmidt's suggestion with the French Government (with whom he would be having talks today). It was important not to cross wires. The French and Germans had recently discussed the idea of holding an early meeting with the Americans on this subject. Mr Fraser said that Cyrus Vance had told him of the German proposals to hold a special meeting of Foreign Ministers before the Venice Summit. Lord Carrington said that the French and Germans were now thinking of a smaller meeting at a much earlier date. He urged Mr Fraser to discuss this with the French. If the French supported Chancellor Schmidt's request that Mr Fraser should approach the Americans, Lord Carrington could see no harm in the idea.

Mr Fraser indicated that he might telephone later today after speaking to the French.

CONFIDENTIAL

R M J Lyne

6 February 1980

(R M J Lyne)

ccs:-

PS

PS/LPS

Mr Bullard

Mr Mallaby

PS/Mr Hurd

PS/DIS

Mr Braithwaite

Mr White

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GRS 370

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 051800Z FEB 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 177 OF 05 FEBRUARY 1980.

INFO PRIORITY BONN, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,
MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO. *no*

INFO SAVING OTHER EC POSTS.

MY TELNO 171: FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT, 3-5 FEBRUARY

1. THE OUTCOME OF THE 35TH FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT IS MAKING LESS OF A SPLASH IN THE PRESS THAN THE BUILD-UP TO IT DID. THE JOINT DECLARATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAS THE MERIT OF BEING SHORTER THAN MOST OF ITS KIND, BUT IT IS WELL WITHIN ITS CLASS FOR LACK OF PRECISION.

2. IT IS IN FACT COINED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS. THE WARNINGS TO THE SOVIET UNION ARE FIRM ENOUGH (INTERVENTION IS QUOTE UNACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE: SHOULD END QUOTE WITHOUT DELAY UNQUOTE) AND CONFIRM A TOUGHENING OF THE FRENCH PUBLIC POSITION. BUT THE STATEMENT IS WHOLLY LACKING IN SPECIFICITY. WHILE INDICATING THE NEED FOR A PARTICULAR EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS, IT PROVIDES NO BLUEPRINT FOR DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER ACTION. DETENTE IS SEEN AS QUOTE MORE UNCERTAIN UNQUOTE, BUT THE IMPLICATION OF (III) IS THAT FRANCE (AND THE FRG) WILL REGARD DETENTE AS DEAD ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A REPEAT PERFORMANCE OF AFGHANISTAN ELSEWHERE. EVEN THE REFERENCE TO THE EFFECTS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND, PRESUMABLY, CSCE IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF (VI) IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET FAILURE TO WITHDRAW IS THOROUGHLY ELLIPTICAL.

3. THE STATEMENT REFLECTS THE FRG'S NEED TO AFFIRM CLOSE LINKS WITH THE ALLIES. THE LAST SENTENCE OF POINT (III) GOES FURTHER THAN COULD NORMALLY BE EXPECTED OF PRESIDENT GISCARD IN A STATEMENT OF HIS OWN, WHILE THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE AS A WHOLE IS, I PRESUME, WEAKER THAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT MIGHT HAVE ADOPTED IN A GERMAN UNILATERAL STATEMENT.

/4. IN OTHER

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4. IN OTHER WORDS, AS ONE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED, THE COMMUNIQUE IS A COMPROMISE, AND MAY TO A LARGE EXTENT BE A PAPER EXERCISE. IT IS A BRAVE EFFORT TO SHOW OUR HELMUT AND GISCARD AS THE ONLY ONES IN STEP, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN KEEP IT UP ON THE STRENGTH OF SUCH GENERALISATIONS. ONLY AFTER THE DISCUSSION AMONG THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS TODAY AND AS A RESULT OF FURTHER WORK AMONG THE NINE IN COMING WEEKS WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO JUDGE WHETHER THERE IS CONCEALED BEHIND THE STATEMENT, AN INTENTION TO PROCEED TO MORE SPECIFIC ACTION.

5. TO JUDGE BY THIS AFTERNOON'S PRESS, THE REST OF THE SUMMIT WAS SOMEWHAT THIN ON SUBSTANCE WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE MINISTERS OF DEFENCE TO DEVELOP A JOINT FRANCO-GERMAN MAIN BATTLETANK.

CCN PARA 3. LINE TWO SHOULD READ QUOTE OF POINT (II) GOES UNQUOTE.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ROME, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,
LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG AND
DUBLIN

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 171 OF 5 FEBRUARY 198φ

AND TO IMMEDIATE UKREP BRUSSELS (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY)

INFO PRIORITY BONN UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKDEL NATO
INFO SAVING TO OTHER EEC POSTS

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MY TELNO 167: FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT, 3 - 5 FEBRUARY: COMMUNIQUE

1. THE FOLLOWING JOINT STATEMENT WAS ISSUED IN PARIS THIS MORNING
(EMBASSY TRANSLATION):

"THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AND THE CHANCELLOR OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MADE A THOROUGH EXAMINATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN. THEY
AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS WHICH DEFINE THE POLICY OF THE
TWO COUNTRIES IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES:

- (I) THEY JUDGE THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN
TO BE UNACCEPTABLE, CREATING GRAVE DANGERS FOR THE STABILITY
OF THE AREA AND FOR PEACE. IN THEIR OPINION, IT IS INDIS-
PENSABLE THAT THE INTERVENTION SHOULD END WITHOUT DELAY, AS
A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
HAS REQUESTED. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY OF RESTORING A SITUA-
TION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE AND
WITH THE DEMANDS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE.
- (II) THEY CONSIDER THAT THE CURRENT CRISIS COULD TRIGGER OFF A
PROCESS WHICH, STEP BY STEP AND WHATEVER MAY BE THE INTEN-
TIONS, COULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
WORLD. THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO RESTATE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
THE FAITHFUL ADHERENCE OF THEIR TWO COUNTRIES TO THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO HONOUR THEIR COMMITMENTS
TO IT.
- (III) THEY RECOGNISE THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS OF AFGHANI STAN,
DETENTE HAS BECOME MORE DIFFICULT AND MORE UNCERTAIN, AND
THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM
AFGHANI STAN IS NECESSARY. THEY DECLARE THAT DETENTE COULD

/NOT

NOT WITHSTAND ANOTHER SHOCK OF THE SAME ORDER. IN THAT CA
FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WOULD, IN LIAI
WITH THEIR ALLIES, TAKE THE MEASURES REQUIRED IN THOSE
CIRCUMSTANCES TO GUARANTEE THEIR SECURITY AND TO MAINTAIN
INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.

Mr Gandhi?
(IV) THEY UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS SHOWN BY COUNTRIES GENUINELY
ATTACHED TO NON-ALIGNMENT, AND THEY STATE THAT THESE COUNT-
RIES HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY CONCERNING THE PEACE AND
STABILITY OF THE WORLD. THEY ARE THEREFORE AGREED ON THE
NEED TO AVOID EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION SPREADING TO THE THIRD
WORLD.

(V) FRANCE AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, WHOSE PEOPLES
HAVE SUFFERED THE EXPERIENCE ON THEIR SOIL OF TWO WORLD WARS,
HAVE WORKED FOR THIRTY YEARS TO BRING ABOUT A MORE STABLE
AND MORE PEACEFUL WORLD. THEIR MUTUAL RECONCILIATION,
THEIR COMMON PARTICIPATION IN THE BUILDING OF EUROPE, THEIR
PARALLEL ACTIVITY IN FAVOUR OF DETENTE, CONSTITUTE STEPS IN
THAT DIRECTION. THEY CONSIDER THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES
EUROPEAN POWERS HAVE PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITIES. THEY
UNDERLINE THEIR DETERMINATION TO EXERCISE THOSE RESPONSI-
BILITIES, WHILE ENSURING, IN CONCERT WITH THEIR ALLIES,
THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL BALANCES WHICH UNDERPIN THE SECURITY
OF THEIR TWO COUNTRIES AND THAT OF EUROPE ARE GUARANTEED.

(VI) THEIR EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS WILL HAVE NO MEANING
UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS HER WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND.
THEY HAVE NOTED THE STATEMENTS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS
EXPRESSED HER INTENTION TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES FROM AFGH-
ANISTAN. IT IS NECESSARY FOR THESE STATEMENTS TO BE TRANS-
LATED INTO FACT. THAT IS NECESSARY TO THE SUCCESS OF THE
DISCUSSIONS ON WHICH SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF PEACE
DEPEND. ”

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

HIBBERT

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[PASSED] SAVING AS REQUESTED]

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With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319

SECRET AND PERSONAL



Alghawit 7
M. Whitmore MW
bi
of: Punt

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

Ref: A01325

5th February 1980

South West Asia

Further to my letter of 30th January, I enclose (for you and your Secretary of State to see) a copy of another message from Brzezinski giving a preliminary (and, on the face of it, somewhat euphoric) impression of his visit to Pakistan.

I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Michael Alexander.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Sir Michael Palliser, GCMG

ZCZCWAGA

MR. WADE-GERY. 4.

ZCZCWAG006

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O 041328Z FEB 80
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON
ZEM
S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE WH80177

TO: ROBERT WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE
LONDON

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
WHITE HOUSE

FEB. 4, 1980

+DEAR ROBERT+

AS I LEAVE PAKISTAN, I WANT TO SEND YOU A BRIEF REPORT ON WHAT WARREN CHRISTOPHER AND I ACCOMPLISHED THERE.

IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT PAKISTAN HAS MADE A FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE. IT IS GOING TO STAND UP TO SOVIET PRESSURE AND AGGRESSION. I WAS IMPRESSED BY THE DETERMINATION OF THE PAKISTANIS, AND ALSO WITH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE FIGHTERS -- THE MUJAHIDIN, -- WHOM I ENCOUNTERED DURING MY VISIT TO A REFUGEE CAMP ON THE FRONTIER. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING SOLID TO WORK WITH IN FRUSTRATING SOVIET AMBITIONS TOWARD THE SOUTH.

IT IS NOT ALWAYS GOING TO BE EASY. PRESIDENT ZIA HAS HIS OWN SET OF POLITICAL IMPERATIVES. WE WILL, FOR INSTANCE, HAVE TO DELAY SUBMISSION OF OUR LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE BECAUSE OF ZIA'S PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH HIS PUBLIC OPINION.

WE DID, HOWEVER, GET ACROSS CLEARLY TO ZIA AND TO THE PAKISTANIS THAT THEY DO NOT STAND ALONE. OUR COMMITMENT TO THEM IS FIRM AND WE -- AND OTHERS -- ARE PREPARED TO PUT SUBSTANCE TO THAT COMMITMENT. THE PAKISTANIS NEED ALL THE SUPPORT THEY CAN GET AND MAKE CLEAR THEIR HOPE THAT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WILL BE COMING FROM THEIR TRADITIONAL DONORS. I SOLICIT YOUR CONTINUED, STRONG PERSONAL SUPPORT IN MOBILIZING RESOURCES FROM AS MANY DIRECTIONS AS POSSIBLE. I WILL PRESS THIS POINT WITH THE SAUDIS WHEN I GET TO RIYADH.

I WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH YOU BEFORE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, I JUST WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY CONVICTION THAT THAT THE MATERIAL FOR A SUCCESSFUL SOUTHWEST ASIA POLICY IS THERE FOR US TO WORK WITH.

SINCERELY,
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
S E C R E T
REVIEW ON FEBRUARY, 1986
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MR FERGUSSON
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MR BULLARD
LORD N G LENNOX
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Sir A Acland

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MR AUST LEGAL ADVISER

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 108 OF 4 FEBRUARY 1980

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AFGHANISTAN:

1. WHEN MR HILLERY, IRISH PRESIDENT, AND MR LENIHAN, FOREIGN MINISTER, MET PRESIDENT NYERERE ON 3 FEB THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN.

2. NYERERE SAID THAT HE HAD FOR LONG BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO APPLY A BOYCOTT TO SOUTH AFRICA. IF THERE WAS NOW GOING TO BE A WESTERN BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOV OLYMPICS OVER AFGHANISTAN, HE MIGHT GO ALONG WITH IT AS SETTING A USEFUL PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. NYERERE HIMSELF RECOGNISED THAT THIS WAS A SOMEWHAT CYNICAL APPROACH

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RIDING HIS TIME OVER TAKING A PUBLIC POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN
IN ORDER EVENTUALLY TO EXTRACT GREATEST ADVANTAGE FROM IT IN
THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING TO BRUSSELS THE HAGUE ROME LISBON ATHENS
ANKARA COPENHAGE AND OSLO

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IGNITION

Original on Australia, Jan 80
Visit by Fraser

CONFIDENTIAL

Afghanistan Situ

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, MR. MALCOLM FRASER, AT NO.10
DOWNING STREET ON 4 FEBRUARY, 1980, AT 12 NOON

Present:

Prime Minister	The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. Michael MacKellar
Sir Robert Armstrong	Sir G. Yeend
Sir Michael Palliser	Mr. P. Henderson
Sir Frank Cooper	Mr. W. Pritchett
Mr. Hugh Cortazzi	Mr. R. Fernandez
Mr. Michael Alexander	

Post-Afghanistan Situation

In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, Mr. Fraser said that he had detected in the United States a new sense of determination and unity. A number of senior American politicians (Mr. Fraser mentioned Messrs. Muskie and Javits) had told him that the sense of cohesiveness in the country and the determination not to be pushed around was greater than at any time since the war. Nonetheless the position of the United States remained a lonely one. They felt the need for friends and for support. Failing this, there was a risk that they would once more become introspective and self-questioning, and that the leadership they were now giving would falter. The Administration intended to build up the country's defensive capability. They were talking of making additional deployments in the Indian Ocean. At the same time there was a sharp realisation of the limits of their conventional power in that part of the world. A start had been made with the commitments given in President Carter's State of the Union Message, but much work would be needed to make those commitments credible. There would be a role here for a number of countries.

/ The Australian

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The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Peacock, on his recent trip to South East Asia, had found the Governments there prepared to take a robust attitude - at least in private. However, they were conscious of the weakening of the American commitment to the area which had occurred in the latter stages of the Vietnam war, and which they associated with President Nixon's statement on Guam. They were doubtful about the United States' determination to face up to the Soviet Union. Once they had brought themselves to believe in this, they would be prepared to be more robust in public. Mr. Peacock had also seen Mrs. Gandhi. She had taken a less helpful line with him than she had done in her press conference after her meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. She had delivered a tirade against the United States whose role in Vietnam she had said was no different from that of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Mr. Fraser said that he expected continuing difficulties with India and Pakistan. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Mrs. Gandhi was anti-American but not necessarily pro-Soviet. She was afraid of the Chinese. She had told President Giscard that she intended to play a leading role in the non-aligned movement. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that in his view there would be a considerable role for Western Europe and Australia in keeping India in play. The Americans had so far played the hand clumsily. The latest evidence of this was the imbalance in the delegations they had sent to Delhi and Islamabad. Mr. Clifford was a considerably less significant figure than Mr. Brzezinski.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with what Mr. Fraser had said about the United States. It was essential that the West stick together in the face of recent events. The Soviet Union's action in Afghanistan did not represent a change of policy. But it had served to reveal that policy to the world at large. What was now required was continuing condemnation and continuing watchfulness. It was no use expecting that the Soviet Union would change its policy. But resistance to the Soviet Union demanded that the West should stand together. We should highlight the threat to the right of the non-aligned to determine their own destiny.

CONFIDENTIAL Mr. Fraser

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Mr. Fraser repeated that he saw the critical element in the situation as being the need to bring home to the Russians the reality of President Carter's State of the Union Message. He did not himself see how the United States could in the present circumstances defend the Persian Gulf. There would be attractions for the Russians in a move against the Gulf now. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he did not think the immediate danger was the military one. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan gave them greatly enhanced possibilities for subversion, e.g. in Iran or South Yemen. The Prime Minister commented that the West had been very slow to focus on the need to develop techniques of counter-subversion. There was a considerable difference in the susceptibility of democratic and totalitarian states to subversion. Successful resistance by the countries of the Middle East to subversion would require an effort on their own part. Mr. Fraser said that whether the immediate challenge was subversive or military, he was concerned that the West's failure to respond would lead the states in the Middle East to regard the West as a spent force. Once they had reached that conclusion they would look for an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the judgement of the Soviet Union as to how far they could force matters in the Middle East was not to be relied upon. It looked as though they had miscalculated the effects of the invasion of Afghanistan. They could easily make another miscalculation about the ability and will of the Americans to resist a move, for example, into Iran. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that Messrs. Kissinger and Bush did not agree that the Soviet invasion had been the result of a miscalculation. They argued that the Russians knew they at present enjoyed superior military strength, and that the next two or three years would offer them a unique opportunity to exploit that superiority. Mr. Fraser repeated that whichever analysis was correct, the vital thing now was to ensure that President Carter's position was credible.

/ Mr. Fraser

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Mr. Fraser asked about the attitudes of the Europeans. He argued that the threat in Europe was now less pressing than that elsewhere. In Europe the demarcation lines were clearly drawn. Elsewhere the situation was less well defined, and the options for Soviet action and mischief-making were much greater. Moreover, whereas action in Europe would certainly meet a united response by the Allies, this was much less likely in other parts of the world. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had spent some time in the previous two days discussing the situation with the French Foreign Minister. M. Francois Poncet. The French analysis was exactly the same as his own. The only difficulty was that they did not wish to be seen to be following the lead of the Americans. In retrospect, it had perhaps been a mistake not to have summoned a meeting of the Foreign Ministers very shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan and to have attempted to elaborate a joint reaction before individual Western Governments had taken up their positions. As regards the Germans, their position was different in certain important respects to the other Western Allies: the Germans had to deal with the problem of the GDR, of Berlin, of Ostpolitik and of the impending elections. They agreed with our analysis, but might not respond in the same way. Both France and Germany clearly recognised the Soviet threat to the Middle East oil fields, to the Straits of Hormuz and to access to the Red Sea.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister about the next steps, Mr. Fraser said that Australia intended to play its part. They would be participating in extended patrolling and surveillance of the Indian Ocean from Tangeh and Butterworth. (The Australians had been planning to withdraw from Butterworth next year following the acquisition of new fighter aircraft, but were now reconsidering the situation.) They would probably be expanding their armed forces generally. A decision in principle had been taken. They would be building up their own naval bases, and might be offering the Americans the use of one in Western Australi

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They would be offering additional exercise facilities for the Americans in Australia. (Mr. Fraser specifically mentioned facilities for the B52 bomber.) They would be offering additional training for members of ASEAN. Australian civil aid to the small nations of the South Pacific would be stepped up, and opportunities for the Russians to interfere there reduced. Permission for Soviet cruise ships to operate in the area had been withdrawn. The Australian Government would also like to discuss with the American and British Governments the possibility of drawing up an embargo on the export of certain strategic raw materials similar to that operated under the COCOM rules in the sphere of high technology.

Mr. Fraser asked whether something could be done to breathe life into the 5 power defence arrangements. He had not spoken to the other signatories, but he thought that they would welcome the resuscitation of the agreement. There might be an increase in the number of visits by British naval vessels or a ship might be based in the area. Annual consultations might take place. The steps might not in themselves amount to much, but they would help to convince the ASEAN nations that the West meant what it said. Sir Frank Cooper recalled ^{that} the communique signed by the 5 powers in 1971, provided for a consultation among them in the event of a threat in the area. British military involvement in the region was at present very small. We carried out some training, and had participated in two exercises in the previous year. We intended to increase our naval presence somewhat this year. The options for the immediate future were either to increase the amount of training we carried out, which was a matter of priorities; or to increase the level of consultation, which was only meaningful if it led to something concrete. The Prime Minister said that the matter should be looked at. It could be of importance in what was at present essentially a psychological war. Mr. Fraser agreed that it was in this context that even modest action could be useful at present. No one was talking of re-establishing the joint task force. But more exercises, more visits and more consultation could be valuable. He noted

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in this connection that the forthcoming meeting of ANZUS had been brought forward and transferred from New Zealand to Washington.

The Prime Minister asked about the role of Japan. Despite that country's great wealth, Japan was not at present contributing to the defence of the free world.

Mr. Fraser said that even today visits by Japanese military vessels to ASEAN or Australian ports would cause difficulties. But there was no reason why they should not be active in the North West Pacific, and thereby free American ships for action elsewhere. Mr. Brown had argued strongly for this during his recent visit to Tokyo. A growing body of opinion in Japan was inclined to agree. The Japanese would be participating in exercises with the Canadians and Australians later in the year. Anything the British Government could do to encourage the Japanese in this direction, as well as in the direction of increasing their civil aid to the smaller Pacific States, would be welcome. It would of course be important to consult the ASEAN countries at every step.

Reverting to the Middle East, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary commented on the ambivalence of attitudes in the Middle East to United States military involvement there. On the one hand, Middle East Governments wanted the backing of the United States Government; on the other hand, they were reluctant to provide bases. Saudi Arabia would offer nothing; Oman might offer facilities, but would not be prepared to have any "white faces" there; Somali and Kenya might be prepared to do something; Diego Garcia was too far away. When one was considering the question of European re-involvement in South East Asia, it should be borne in mind that the Americans might wish to re-involve the Europeans in the Middle East as well. Sir Frank Cooper noted that the American attitude was very ambivalent at present. For many years they had been arguing that the Europeans should concentrate on Europe. Now, recognising how little they knew about the regions where the threat was increasing, they were seeking to interest the

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Europeans in problems outside Europe. Sir Michael Palliser said that the Arab/Israel dispute inevitably complicated the situation in the Middle East. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the Americans had completely misunderstood the Arab reactions to the Camp David process. Mr. Linowitz was still hoping that pressure on the Israelis would make an autonomy agreement possible. But in fact such an agreement would have no effect on the Arabs. They wanted the Palestinian problem solved, and did not believe that this could be done on the Camp David basis. The Americans were blamed by the Arabs for the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and as a result were equated with the Russians. Mr. Fraser wondered whether the Americans could not be persuaded to move towards the Arab position. Mr. Vance had accepted in discussion with him during his visit to Washington the need to be firmer than ever with Israel. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he had been pressing the Americans for some time on this.

Iran

Mr. Fraser said that the Americans were approaching the hostage issue much more coolly now than previously. They were placing their hopes on the new President, Mr. Bani Sadr. They were not looking for further action before the forthcoming elections in Iran. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that Mr. Cutler had, earlier in the day, been optimistic about the chances of progress.

The discussion ended at 1310, and the participants adjourned for lunch. The discussion there is recorded separately.

Handwritten signature

4 February 1980

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NO 538 OF 1 FEBRUARY

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AFGHANISTAN: EAST-WEST RELATIONS

1. DURING AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY, COOPER (UNDER SECRETARY, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS) GAVE BRIDGES THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF US THINKING ON PUNITIVE ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. VEST (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS) AND HINTON (ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS) WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. COOPER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WERE NOW ALMOST READY TO CIRCULATE PROPOSALS ON THIS QUESTION. THEIR IDEAS WERE IN FOUR MAIN AREAS:

I) OLYMPIC GAMES.

THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD ISSUE NO EXPORT LICENCES FOR ANY GOODS CONNECTED WITH THE OLYMPIC GAMES. THEY HOPED THAT THEIR ALLIES WOULD FOLLOW SUIT BUT THIS WOULD BE A MATTER FOR INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT.

II) COMPUTERS.

THE US WOULD PROPOSE THAT, WHILE DISCUSSIONS OVER UP-DATING THE 1975 CCCOM COMPUTER LIST SHOULD CONTINUE, NO REVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE TIME BEING, AND NO EXCEPTIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE USSR (AS DISTINCT FROM EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OR CHINA)

III) ENERGY RELATED CONTRACTS.

THERE HAD BEEN A LENGTHY DEBATE ON HOW TO TREAT ENERGY RELATED CONTRACTS. SOME HAD ARGUED THAT THESE SHOULD BE EMBARGOED TO ENHANCE THE PUNITIVE EFFECT. OTHERS HAD ARGUED THAT THE US HAD A WIDER INTEREST IN ENCOURAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ENERGY RESOURCES. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT COME TO ANY HARD AND FAST CONCLUSIONS ABOUT WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE. BUT COOPER THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SALES OF GOODS AND EQUIPMENT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE OTHER.

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(iv)

IV) CAPITAL EQUIPMENT.

THE AMERICANS WOULD PROPOSE THAT NO FURTHER CONTRACTS SHOULD BE SIGNED WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE SUPPLY OF WESTERN CAPITAL EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO INCREASING SOVIET SECURITY. THEY WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE PROHIBITION SHOULD COVER HEAVY INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT (EG STEEL MILLS OR PLANT FOR MANUFACTURING VEHICLES) BUT WOULD EXCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, MACHINERY FOR MAKING DOMESTIC EQUIPMENT. THEIR THINKING WAS CLEARLY FLUID ABOUT THE PRECISE COVERAGE. IT HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHETHER TO PROPOSE CHANGES TO COCOM LISTS OR TO SEEK NATIONAL ACTION.

3. EXPLAINING THE BACKGROUND TO THESE IDEAS, COOPER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEGUN BY SUSPENDING ALL EXPORT LICENCES FOR THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING ALL FOOD. THEY WOULD IN DUE COURSE CONTINUE TO EMBARGO EXPORTS OF KEY FOODS (MEAT AND POULTRY AS WELL AS GRAINS) BUT RESUME LICENSING ALL OTHER GOODS WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS IMPLIED BY THE IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH 2.

4. COOPER SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S THINKING ON ALL THIS WAS TENTATIVE. THEY WANTED TO CONSULT THEIR PARTNERS BEFORE REACHING FINAL CONCLUSIONS. THEY WOULD BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO US EMBASSIES IN ALLIED CAPITALS PROBABLY WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS.

5. INVITED TO COMMENT, BRIDGES SAID THAT ON AGRICULTURAL ITEMS WE HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS IN BRUSSELS. HE GAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THIS DRAWING ON RECENT REPORTING TELEGRAMS FROM UKREP BRUSSELS. HINTON TENDED TO DISMISS ACTION ON BUTTER AS RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT. BUT COOPER TOOK THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY ON THE HILL, THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD BE SEEN TO TAKE ACTION THAT WAS SIMPLY FOLLOWING ON US COAT-TAILS. THIS WOULD HELP TO MEET CRITICISM OF THE ALLIES WHICH BOTH COOPER AND VEST SAID WAS ON THE INCREASE.

6. ON THE NON-AGRICULTURAL ITEMS, BRIDGES SAID WE WOULD NEED TO DISCUSS THE AMERICAN IDEAS WHEN WE RECEIVED THEM. HE EMPHASISED THAT WE SHARED US OBJECTIVES, FOR WHICH THERE HAD BEEN STRONGER SUPPORT IN LONDON THAN IN OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS. ON ENERGY RELATED CONTRACTS, HE MENTIONED A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT CONTRACTS AT PRESENT UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN BRITISH FIRMS AND SOVIET ENTERPRISES. COOPER OFFERED NO COMMENT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT TO EXCLUDE CONTRACTS OF THIS KIND. BRIDGES ALSO MENTIONED THE DISCUSSIONS IN WHICH DEUTSCHE BP WERE INVOLVED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A GAS PIPELINE FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE URG. THE US EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD RAISED THIS WITH HIM. WE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO PURSUE THIS WITH THE GERMANS.

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7. BRIDGES TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THE FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS ON THE UK/USSR AIR SERVICES (FCO TEL NO 65 TO MOSCOW) AS AN EXAMPLE OF STEPS WE WERE TAKING INDEPENDENTLY TO MAKE LIFE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS.

8. COOPER APPEARED TO RECOGNISE THAT THESE AMERICAN IDEAS WOULD BE LIKELY TO CAUSE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES FOR THE FRENCH AND GERMANS NOT ONLY FOR POLITICAL REASONS BUT BECAUSE THEY WERE MORE HEAVILY INVOLVED THAN OTHERS IN TRADE WITH THE USSR, AND ESPECIALLY THE SUPPLY OF CAPITAL EQUIPMENT. BUT HIS ACCOUNT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE AMERICAN THINKING HAD THE FULL ENDORSEMENT OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE STRONG POLITICAL PRESSURE HERE FOR EARLY ACTION.

HENDERSON

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AFGHANISTAN

SECRET

Prime Minister

(2)
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A proper report. The idea of a Treaty of Neutrality for Afghanistan is an interesting one (para 9).

La.

MS.

Para 1/2

PM/80/8

PRIME MINISTER

Afghanistan: The Next Steps

1. In our discussion at OD on 22 January we agreed on a number of measures proposed in my minute PM/80/5 of the previous day. Action to put these into effect is now in hand, in concert with our European partners and the Americans where appropriate. We should now look at the next stage and consider what further action we need to set in train.

2. The decisions we have already taken were intended to promote two major objectives:
 - (a) to secure widespread condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and to impose certain penalties on the Soviet Union;
 - (b) to find ways of supporting the countries of South West Asia and the Middle East against further Soviet attempts to secure advantage by subversion, if not by force. I shall shortly be circulating an analysis of the situation in the countries under threat.

3. These two objectives remain valid and need to be sustained. I am looking into a second series of actions which might be taken when NATO stocktaking is complete and when we have been able to judge the effect on the Soviets of the West's initial response.

4. Our ultimate aim should be to create a situation in which the Soviet Union concludes that it has ^{*much to lose*} nothing to gain from further adventures. This must be part of the process of putting the East/West relationship on to a more stable basis, free of the illusions which characterised the 1970s.

5. Within this framework, there are a number of other objectives

/which

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which we should pursue. All contribute to our ultimate aim; some would be of value in themselves. I have the following in mind:

Afghanistan

6. First, the future of Afghanistan itself. Two ideas are already been pursued. The first is support for patriots inside Afghanistan through the covert supply of arms and training, amongst other things. French officials favour this; the Chinese are also interested; and the US are already active in this respect. Moslem money is already flowing, and may be sufficient. There is a risk that the Russians would see this as a pretext for raiding over the Afghan frontier. The Pakistanis are understandably nervous.

7. Secondly, the various Afghan patriotic organisations announced a few days ago that they were setting up a joint organisation. They have asked for representation in the Islamic conference. This may be a sign that the Afghans are trying to overcome their chronic disunity. This new body may not survive. But in so far as we can see, we should encourage the Islamic countries to support a united "Afghan Liberation Organisation".

8. The purpose of these actions is to maintain military pressure on the Russians inside Afghanistan; to demonstrate more widely that the Russians are not having things all their own way there; and to maintain an alternative Afghan regime. The prospect of an early Russian departure is, of course remote. But both for our immediate purpose and with a view to the longer term we should, at least in our public statements, continue to demand this, and encourage others to do the same.

9. The demand for Soviet withdrawal would be more plausible if a positive solution to the Afghan problem could be proposed. One possibility would be a Treaty of neutrality for Afghanistan, guaranteed by the countries of the region, including the Soviet Union, Iran, Pakistan, China and India. At the least, once such

*I would
be
needed!*

/a



a proposal entered the public domain, it would substantially increase political pressure on the Russians. There is a model to hand in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which the Russians signed amongst others. The idea might best be promoted by the Islamic countries, or by one of the countries of the region. I have set studies in train.

*NATO
was near.*

Sino-Indian Relations

10. The effectiveness of action to contain the Soviet presence in Afghanistan will depend to a considerable extent on India, and on the extent to which India continues to rely on the Soviet Union for diplomatic and military support. This in turn will be affected by the state of Sino-Indian relations. The Indians will not be reliable, nor detach themselves from the Russians, as long as they fear the Chinese. Both the Chinese and the Indians have an interest in a gradual process of rapprochement. But mutual suspicions remain; each regards the other as its natural enemy and rival for influence in the area; and the recent Soviet actions will polarise them still further, particularly over their differing attitudes towards Pakistan. I have asked my officials to consider what we can do to encourage both sides to look at each other more objectively. But we have to accept that the Chinese will not be ready to offer the Indians much, until they see from evidence that they are distancing themselves from the Soviet Union; and whatever the Chinese offer, the Indians will in practice continue to cleave to the Soviet Union.

Western Unity

11. Finally, the present crisis has demonstrated yet again how difficult it is for the Europeans to unite effectively with the United States and even among themselves. Despite our basic community of interest, our perceptions and our short-term needs inevitably differ. The secret four power talks between British, French, German and American officials in London last week showed that it was not too difficult to reach agreement on the analysis. But the particular interests of the French and Germans lead them

_____/to



to differing conclusions about policy. We need consciously to exploit the present crisis in East/West relations to strengthen unity amongst the European countries rather than the reverse. President Carter has suggested a new ad hoc body; and the Italians have pressed that they should be included. I am not sure that a proliferation of groups will help much. But none of the present bodies include the Japanese, apart from the Economic Summit, whose purpose is different. There may be room for something which would include them. My officials are studying this matter.

12.. When the studies which I have commissioned on these and other related issues are complete, I shall make more detailed proposals for further action by ourselves. These seem bound to cost money, but pending further discussion with our Allies it will be possible only to give very rough figures.

13. I am sending copies of this minute to other member of OD, the Secretary of State for Energy and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 February 1980

1- Feb 1980



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 February 1980

OTO
Dear Michael,

As. Pmt - 8/2

Briefing on Soviet Affairs

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary suggests that the Prime Minister might wish, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to meet a small number of FCO officials who deal with Soviet affairs and who have worked in the Embassy in Moscow.

A meeting might be arranged next week, which could be attended by the Prime Minister, Lord Carrington, Roderic Braithwaite and Christopher Mallaby. Braithwaite is the Head of Planning Staff and Mallaby of the Eastern European and Soviet Department.

If the Prime Minister agrees, the meeting could begin with a short briefing by Mallaby on the Soviet leadership and the domestic and economic problems it faces. There could then be a discussion of these matters and of Soviet foreign policy on which I have today sent you an assessment.

Walden
GGH

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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-4 FEB 1980



WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET ENERGY

1. The last complete assessment of Western European dependence on imported Soviet oil, ^{and} natural gas related to 1976. The following pattern emerged.

DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET IMPORTS AS % OF TOTAL
CONSUMPTION

COUNTRY	TOTAL ENERGY	OIL	GAS	COAL*
Finland	55.7	75	87.5	31.1
Iceland	19.0	70		-
Greece	13.9	18.2		2.0
Portugal	12.7	14.4		17.8
Austria	19.5	13	60	23.6
Italy	11.9	12.2	12.4	23.2
		(10-12 in 1978)	(12 in 1978)	
Denmark	18.3	9.7		70.7
Sweden	6.1	9.2		10.0
Belgium	5.6	7.6		7.9
Switzerland	4.0	7.3		5.0
Netherlands	3.9	6.9		14.3
FRG	4.8	5.9	9.1	1.4
		(7.0 in 1978)	(10.0 in 1978)	
France	5.1	4.9	4.3	10.1
UK	2.0	4.4		2.0
Spain	4.1	4.2		7.1
Ireland	5.4	3.0		13.2
Norway	1.0	2.5		22.8

* Soviet and Polish coal: *there are no other energy exports from E. Europe.*

2. Dependence on Soviet oil has been reduced by many Western European countries and will diminish further (with the exception of Finland) towards 1985 as the Russians have less oil to export. Against this, dependence on Soviet natural gas is expected to increase and 1985 estimates for selected countries' dependence (as % of total gas consumption) are:

Italy	c25
FRG	21
France	15

Overall by 1985 Soviet supplies could account for 25% of Western European gas consumption.

3. French and FRG dependence on Soviet supplies as percentage of total energy consumption in 1985 is estimated as 2-5% and 6-7% respectively.

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MYTEL NO 403: AFGHANISTAN: US MEDIA COVERAGE OF ALLIED RESPONSE

1. AMERICAN PRESS AND TELEVISION ARE INCREASINGLY POINTING TO THE LACK OF SUPPORT FROM THEIR ALLIES EXCEPT FOR BRITAIN.
2. A 30 MINUTE CBS TV NEWS SPECIAL, BROADCAST NATIONWIDE LAST NIGHT (31 JANUARY), CONCENTRATED ON THESE THEMES. WALTER CRONKITE OPENED THE PROGRAMME BY REFERRING TO THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE US POSITION FROM BRITAIN, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA, CONTRASTING THIS WITH THE LUKEWARM RESPONSES OF FRANCE, GERMANY AND JAPAN WHO WERE ACCUSED OF UNWILLINGNESS TO CURB LUCRATIVE TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION OR SUPPORT A BOYCOTT OF THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS.
3. CRONKITE HIGHLIGHTED YOUR INTERVIEW, SAYING TWICE THAT YOU WERE THE ONLY GOVERNMENT LEADER IN ANY MAJOR EUROPEAN COUNTRY WHO AGREED TO SPEAK TO CBS (TRANSCRIPTS OF THIS AND YOUR INTERVIEW LAST WEEK WITH JENNINGS OF ABC ON RELOCATING THE OLYMPICS FOLLOW BY BAG TO NEWS DEPARTMENT). CBS GAVE PROMINENCE TO YOUR REMARKS ON THE NEED FOR STRONG MEASURES AGAINST MOSCOW, AND THEN DWELT ON THE THEME OF A DIVISION IN THE ALLIED RANKS. THEY TELEVISED YOUR

THE THEME OF A DIVISION IN THE ALLIED RANKS. THEY TELEVISED YOUR REFERENCE TO THE JOINT COMMUNITY AND NATO STATEMENTS, AND YOUR EXPLANATION THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE WILL BE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY.

4. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR CARRIED AN ARTICLE BY KIDDER ON 31 JANUARY QUOTE A NEW LEASE FOR THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE UNQUOTE. QUOTE A NEW FLOWER IS SPROUTING FROM AN OLD BULB: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE UNQUOTE. THE PRIME MINISTER'S 28 JANUARY SPEECH WAS SEEN AS AN AFFIRMATION OF TOTAL SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S STANCE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WERE SHOWING INCREASED INTEREST IN MRS THATCHER. HER VISIT IN DECEMBER RANG SYMPATHETICALLY ACROSS THE NATION. KIDDER WENT ON TO ASK WHETHER THE IMPROVING ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WOULD DRAW BRITAIN FURTHER AWAY FROM ITS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PARTNERS. THE SLOW RESPONSE OF THE CONTINENTAL COUNTRIES TO THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN CONTRASTED SHARPLY WITH THE DECISIVENESS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT. ALONE AMONG EUROPEAN NATIONS BRITAIN SENT A TOP LEVEL EMISSARY TO TOUR MUSLIM COUNTRIES AFTER THE INVASION. QUOTE THE CENTRE OF WESTERN LEADERSHIP HAS RATHER QUICKLY SWUNG AWAY FROM THE CONTINENT AND TOWARDS THE MID-ATLANTIC. UNQUOTE

5. IN A LONG WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE ON 30 JANUARY FELIX KESSLER SAID THAT THE SHARP SPLIT BETWEEN THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES WAS PROVIDING THE SOVIET UNION WITH A POLITICAL BONUS. QUOTE ASIDE FROM BRITAIN, AMERICA'S MAJOR EUROPEAN PARTNERS, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY, SO FAR HAVE NOT RESPONDED WITH MUCH BEYOND THE VERBAL CONDEMNATION THAT CARTER SAYS IS NOT ENOUGH TO DETER THE RUSSIANS FROM FURTHER AGGRESSION UNQUOTE.

6. THIS EVENING'S WASHINGTON STAR (1 FEBRUARY), IN A PIECE CONCERNED PRINCIPALLY WITH PLANS FOR MEETING OF ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS TO COORDINATE REACTIONS TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, DESCRIBES THE BRITISH POSITION AS BEING ONE OF QUOTE WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT UNQUOTE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S ACTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND QUOTES AN UNNAMED WASHINGTON OFFICIAL AS SAYING QUOTE THE BRITS HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY UNQUOTE IN SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT'S LINE.

7. TIME MAGAZINE, IN AN ARTICLE HEADED QUOTE WHERE ARE THE ALLIES WHEN NEEDED? - MOSTLY DEBATING, DELAYING OR LOOKING THE OTHER WAY UNQUOTE, DESCRIBES THE PRIME MINISTER AS QUOTE ONE OUTSTANDING EXCEPTION UNQUOTE. WHILE NOTING THAT QUOTE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT THE SPIRIT IS VASTLY DIFFERENT UNQUOTE, TIME SUGGESTS THAT QUOTE FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD CARRINGTON RECOMMENDS THAT THE US AND BRITAIN OFFER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO NATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA AND EVEN THAT ANGLO-AMERICAN FLEETS BE STATIONED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE INDIAN OCEAN TO COUNTER ANY SOVIET MOVE TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF UNQUOTE.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

1 February 1980

*La
Pons*

Mt.

Dear Michael,

Soviet Foreign Policy After Afghanistan

/ I enclose a note on this subject. Lord Carrington will see this over the weekend.

*To see
G.G.H.*

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AFTER AFGHANISTAN

1. The main aim of Soviet foreign policy is to accumulate power and influence in the world while also preserving the security of the Soviet State. The Soviet Union recognises that this will lead to its being engaged in continuing competition with the US, and to a lesser extent with China whose emergence as a world power the Soviet Union wishes to slow down. One of the Soviet purposes in seeking influence in developing countries is to win ground in this competition. But the need to preserve Soviet security means that the USSR must avoid actions which might provoke an uncontrollable process leading to nuclear confrontation with the US. The USSR under Brezhnev has sought reasonable relations with the US and Western Europe, partly to reduce the risk that the East-West contest would produce such crises. The Soviet leaders also have an interest in obtaining Western technology to help modernise the sluggish and inefficient Soviet economy, and grain to compensate for the great failures of Soviet agriculture.

2. To reconcile their security needs, and their wish to have reasonable relations with the West, with their aim of increasing their power and influence in the developing world, the Soviet leaders propounded their own version of 'detente'. Their idea was that East-West relations could be improved in certain fields, so that they would get the things they wanted and also would secure, in negotiations with the US, the recognition which they coveted that they were now one of two super-powers. But the Russians never thought of detente as being comprehensive. They excluded from it their freedom to maintain dominance in Eastern Europe and dictatorship at home, to wage a struggle of ideas against the West and to acquire power bases in the Third World.

3. After the Vietnam war the US was far less willing to resist actively Soviet encroachment in the developing world.

/The Russians

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The Russians exploited what seemed to them weakness by proxy interventions in Angola and Ethiopia. Vietnam took over Cambodia. Although there were strong local reasons for the Russian move over Afghanistan, the Russians will have added to them the potential strategic gains from a decisive move on their part. The Western failure to react on earlier occasions, except by words, probably encouraged the Russians, after years of steadily building up their influence in Afghanistan, to believe that the West would not be unduly disturbed by Soviet military intervention there, even though it would be the first use of Soviet combat forces in the developing world. The Soviet leaders probably also calculated that there would be few dividends in 1980 from their relationship with the West, so that the cost in that regard should not be great. The invasion was thus an extrapolation of existing Soviet foreign policy. The West's failure was to realize in advance how selective was the Soviet concept of detente and that the Russians would exploit to the maximum whatever latitude for aggression in the Third World Western behaviour and local circumstances seemed to allow.

4. The Russians will persist in their drive for influence whenever possible. There will be further occasions when they will consider the use of force. They will assess carefully what latitude exists for this in the light inter alia of Western and world reactions to Afghanistan. At the same time, they will have reasons for wishing in due course to return to reasonable East-West relations, notably their desire to avoid hostilities with the US coupled with their need for Western technology. Since they cannot readily find substitutes for this, their need will persist whether or not the flow of technology from the West is seriously interrupted as a result of Afghanistan. The Russians will probably also want arms control negotiations to get going again (although not in earnest until after the US elections), since they fear that the US, with its greater economic and scientific resources, would suffer less from an all-out arms race; they

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will also want to avoid the greater international instability which an all-out arms race might create. The question is whether they can be convinced that detente, if the West is to play ball, must be reciprocal and global, and that the aggressive pursuit of Soviet aims in the developing countries will put an end to it.

5. While a firm and lasting Western response to Afghanistan would have a fair chance of causing the Russians to be more cautious, the short term Soviet reactions will be truculent. The Soviet leaders are intensely sensitive to the risk of appearing to give way under pressure. They are therefore likely to take some steps designed to show that they are not taking punishment lying down. There is still no question of a sudden Soviet attack on the West, and armed intervention in another developing country is unlikely, at least in the short term, for the Russians will be wary while the non-aligned and the West remain vigilant and critical after Afghanistan. The most likely Soviet steps are ones which the Russians want to take anyway and the cost of which is reduced because East-West relations are at present bad. The deportation of Sakharov from Moscow can be seen in this light. A reduction in the recent record flow of Jewish emigration, a resumption of full-scale jamming of Western broadcasts or cancellation of some cultural events like book exhibitions in the USSR are possible. So is an attempt to reduce the freedom of manoeuvre of some of the East European countries. They may well increase the pressure in sensitive and vulnerable areas; e.g. in Berlin, by restricting the return of ethnic Germans, in the Northern Seas, and on the Bulgarian/Macedonian question. Though the Helsinki Final Act is still regarded as a major achievement of the Brezhnev era, and the Soviet Union will want the Madrid Review meeting to be held next winter as planned, the value to them of Madrid is not such as significantly to inhibit such actions if they are thought desirable on other grounds.

6. The Soviet leaders will also wish to exploit differences
/among

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among Western countries about how to react to Afghanistan. Brezhnev in a Pravda interview has sought to do so. But Soviet actions have not been well calculated for this purpose. Sakharov was arrested when the President of the French Assembly was in Moscow. Although West Germany's special interests have made it hesitant about following the US and UK in reacting to the invasion of Afghanistan, high level meetings planned by the Federal Republic with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany have been postponed, no doubt at Soviet instigation. The reason is probably that Moscow anticipates that the West will try to develop its relations with Eastern Europe while freezing those with the USSR. Soviet wedge-driving tactics could involve a move towards the French on their proposal for a European Disarmament Conference (however unattractive to them it may be in its present form) or the dangling of major export contracts in front of French or West German firms.

7. Soviet relations with China were already bad before Afghanistan. These factors will intensify Soviet fears that any crisis with the West or with China could become a crisis with both. This arouses long-standing fears of encirclement. The Russians are likely in the long-run to seek a stable and controlled relationship with China as well as with the West. But for at least some years to come the balance of advantage for the Soviet Union will lie in developing its relationship with the West rather than with China.

8. In pursuing their drive for influence in the developing world, the Soviet leaders will seek, subject to the need to avoid East-West confrontation, to make new gains whenever opportunities arise. When they consider this necessary and the risk acceptable they will continue to be prepared to use force. Opportunities for new influence may grow if the Arab-Israeli dispute continues, particularly since, despite the inherent antagonism between Islam and Communism, the Russians may see their best opportunities, after the furore over

/Afghanistan

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Afghanistan subsidizes, in the unstable Islamic countries of the Middle East and South West Asia. From their established base in South Yemen they already are making efforts in the Yemen Arab Republic. They have strong motives for seeking influence in Iran, because of its oil and strategic location, but will also be conscious that the Western reactions would be far greater than over Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Border troubles between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which they may not instigate but which are likely to drag them in, will offer opportunities to intimidate and infiltrate the latter. There will be a major effort to consolidate Soviet influence on India under Mrs Gandhi. The Russians will also hope for further opportunities in Southern Africa. They will support Cuba in its efforts to gain strong influence in other Caribbean and Central American countries.

9. The Soviet leaders are not likely to invade Yugoslavia when Tito goes. They will seek to play on economic problems and the differences between the nationalities, in the hope of creating opportunities for reintegrating Yugoslavia into their sphere of influence, even in time by invasion, although the Russians will be watching carefully for a military response by the West.

CONCLUSION

10. Before Khrushchev became top dog, he seemed as colourless as Stalin's other henchmen. In a totalitarian oligarchy, change can be arbitrary. It is possible that Brezhnev's successors will adopt a different foreign policy. It is possible for instance that they will reckon that detente has not produced enough results for the USSR and that, with the West and China coming closer together and the West taking more trouble about its defences, a Soviet policy of assertiveness in the developing world and no detente should be tried. But the leaders would fear that such a policy could increase the risk of East-West escalation, and might think that the absence of detente would not enable them to gain ground faster in the developing world. So the likelihood remains that the next leadership will be influenced by the

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same factors as the present one and that foreign policy will not radically change course. We are in for a difficult period in East-West relations. Western firmness will be indispensable. Provided that the Soviet Union faces consistent and determined opposition to its aims, its own self-interest may lead it to be less assertive in pursuing them, and more anxious to look for agreement in areas of mutual interest. In this way, it could be brought in time to accept a more balanced view of detente.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office
31 January 1980

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TELNO 154 OF 30 JANUARY

REPEATED FOR INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, KABUL, DELHI, MOSCOW, JEDDA.

MY TELS NOS 143 TO 147.

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

1. DESPITE AGHA SHAHI'S FOREBODINGS, THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A RESOUNDING SUCCESS FOR PAKISTAN AND I SHOULD JUDGE ALSO FOR THE WEST. IN THE END, EVERYONE OF IMPORTANCE TURNED UP EXCEPT SYRIA. THE MAIN RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN WAS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS AND INDEED MAY HAVE GONE A BIT FURTHER THAN THE PAKISTANIS THEMSELVES WANTED. AS A BONUS, THERE WAS AN EQUALLY EXPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. THE BALANCING RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN AND OUTSIDE PRESSURES ON ISLAMIC STATES WERE BY CONTRAST RELATIVELY MILD AND THE PALESTINE RESOLUTION AROUSED NO CONTROVERSY AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS.

2. BEING IN THE CHAIR, THE PAKISTANIS WERE UNABLE TO MAKE MUCH OF THE RUNNING AND THIS TASK, ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACTS, WAS HANDLED BY SAUDI ARABIA AND BANGLADESH, BACKED UP BY MALAYSIA, THE GULF STATES AND ONE OR TWO HELPFUL AFRICANS LIKE SENEGAL. THIS GROUP CONCENTRATED ON KEEPING THE LARGE MAJORITY OF MODERATES AND ANTI-SOVIET COUNTRIES, NUMBERING THROUGHOUT BETWEEN 27 AND 30, INTACT AND IN LINE THE MAIN DISSIDENTS (THOUGH NOT UNITED) WERE IRAN, LIBYA, IRAQ, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE PLO, WHO WERE VERY MUTED THROUGHOUT, AND ALGERIA.

3. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ANTI-SOVIET GROUP WAS TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE DISCUSSIONS, SECURE A CLEAR CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET ACTIONS AND NOT ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO BE DIVERTED INTO CONDEMNATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES' ACTIONS IN IRAN AND ELSEWHERE. THEIR TACTICS WERE TO RELEGATE IRAN AND ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS TO SEPARATE AND IF POSSIBLE WATERED DOWN RESOLUTIONS.

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4. IN THIS THEY SUCCEEDED ALMOST COMPLETELY AND THE AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTION EMERGED INTACT AND WITH UNANIMOUS SUPPORT. THE MAIN DIFFICULTY WAS WITH THE IRANIAN DELEGATE WHO SAID THAT HE HAD ONLY BEEN ALLOWED TO ATTEND BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ON CONDITION THAT THERE WAS A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE UNITED STATES. HE NEARLY WALKED OUT ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION. IN REPLY IRAQ, NO DOUBT FOR THEIR OWN REASONS, LED A VIGOROUS ATTACK ON THE IRANIANS OVER THE HOSTAGE QUESTION AND CLAIMED THAT THE THREAT TO IRAN FROM THE UNITED STATES WAS THE DIRECT RESULT OF THE INEXCUSABLE IRANIAN ACTION IN HOLDING THE HOSTAGES. 8 OR 10 SPEAKERS FOLLOWED IN THE SAME VEIN AND OUR CONTACTS SAY THAT THE IRANIANS WERE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE DISAPPROVED OF THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES AND EXPECTED IRAN TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT QUICKLY. AFTER THIS, THE IRANIAN, WHO WAS TOTALLY INEXPERIENCED IN CONFERENCE MATTERS, ALLOWED HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION TO BE MUCH WATERED DOWN.

5. LIBYA AND IRAQ, IN PROMOTING ANTI-AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS SIMILARLY FOUND THEMSELVES UP AGAINST A SOLID MAJORITY AND SETTLED FOR THE RATHER VAGUE AND EVEN-HANDED RESOLUTION CONDEMNING OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE AND WARNING AGAINST THE DANGERS OF BEING DRAWN INTO A SUPER POWER STRUGGLE.

6. ON THE LAST DAY, THE ANTI-SOVIET GROUP DECIDED TO PUSH THEIR LUCK FURTHER IN BACKING A SOMALI RESOLUTION. THEY SUCCEEDED IN WIDENING THE RESOLUTION TO INCLUDE THE WHOLE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN WRITING IN THE NAME OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT AT THE COST OF PROLONGING THE CONFERENCE UP TO YESTERDAY EVENING AND ATTRACTING 7 RESERVATIONS (EQUIVALENT TO ABSTENTIONS).

7. THERE REMAINS A FAIR AMOUNT OF FOLLOW-UP ACTION, SOME OF WHICH COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES :-

(1) THE CALL FOR THE SEVERING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN IS NOT ENTIRELY WELCOME TO THE PAKISTANIS, BUT OUR CONTACTS SAY THAT IT WAS RECOGNISED THAT SOME COUNTRIES MIGHT THINK THIS LESS ADVISABLE THAN OTHERS : IN PRACTICE, PAKISTAN WILL NO DOUBT WAIT FOR MOST OF THE OTHERS TO DO IT FIRST BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO PLEAD THAT THEY (AND PERHAPS IRAN) ARE SPECIAL CASES. THE PAKISTANIS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY DO NOT ANTICIPATE PRESSURE TO CUT OFF THE TRANSIT TRADE WITH AFGHANISTAN.

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(II) THE RECOGNITION OF THE ALLIANCE OF AFGHAN PARTIES AS EITHER A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE OR A MEMBER OF THE ISLAMCI CONFERENCE WAS HELD OVER DESPITE A MARATHON SESSION BETWEEN THE AFGHANS AND THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THE GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN THROWN TOGETHER TOO HASTILY TO BE CREDIBLE AND HAD YET TO PROVE THAT IT REPRESENTED ALL THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS.

(III) GENERAL ZIA'S IDEA FOR AN ISLAMIC DEFENCE FRONT WAS HELD OVER UNTIL THE NEXT MEETING ON THE GROUNDS THAT MUCH FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONSIDERATION WAS NEEDED, BUT PRINCE SAUD, ON DEPARTURE LAST NIGHT, SAID THAT IT WAS A VERY IMPORTANT SUGGESTION, THAT OTHER NATIONS WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN IT AND THAT SOME CONCRETE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN AT THE NEXT MEETING.

(IV) CONTINUING MACHINERY HAS BEEN SET UP TO COLLECT AND DISBURSE FUNDS FOR THE AFGHAN REFUGEES. THE PAKISTANIS SAY THIS IS ENTIRELY FOR REFUGEE PURPOSES THOUGH OTHER DELEGATIONS SAY THAT IT COULD BE USED TO COLLECT OTHER FUNDS FOR PAKISTAN. THIS IS A WATERED DOWN VERSION OF A BANGLADESH PROPOSAL THAT A STANDING COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE SET UP TO KEEP THE AFGHAN SITUATION AND ACTION AGAINST THE SOVIETS UNDER REVIEW.

8. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GET HIGH LEVEL PAKISTAN REACTIONS TO ALL THIS BUT THEY MUST BE WELL PLEASED AND ARE NOW IN A STRONG POSITION TO TALK TO THE INDIANS (NO DOUBT QUOTING THE SECOND RESOLUTION TO THEM), AND ALSO TO DEAL WITH THE AMERICAN OFFERS AND THE CHRISTOPHER/BRZEZINSKI VISIT.

9. F C O PLEASE REPEAT FURTHER AS NECESSARY.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 462 OF 30 JANUARY 1980.

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, UKDEL NATO, BONN, PARIS, MOSCOW.

U.S. POLICY POST-AFGHANISTAN.

1. TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES CARRIES AN ARTICLE BY RICHARD BURT ENTITLED "CARTER CONCEDES U.S. ALONE CANNOT DEFEND PERSIAN GULF". KEY EXTRACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

PRESIDENT CARTER SAID TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ^{IT S} OWN, PROTECT OIL SUPPLIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND THAT THE ^{ON} ASSISTANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS WELL AS WESTERN ALLIES WOULD BE NEEDED.

MR CARTER, SPEAKING TO A GROUP OF OUT-OF-TOWN EDITORS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO PROTECT WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. HOWEVER, HE ADDED: "I DON'T THINK IT WOULD BE ACCURATE FOR ME TO CLAIM THAT AT THIS TIME OR IN THE FUTURE WE EXPECT TO HAVE ENOUGH MILITARY STRENGTH AND ENOUGH MILITARY PRESENCE THERE TO DEFEND THE REGION UNILATERALLY." HE SAID THAT, TO PROTECT OIL SUPPLIES, THE UNITED STATES WAS SEEKING MILITARY TIES WITH PERSIAN GULF STATES AND WAS ALSO "COORDINATING OUR EFFORTS WITH NATIONS WHO ARE NOT LOCATED IN THE REGION BUT ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT, EVEN MORE THAN WE, ON OIL FROM THAT REGION." AN ALLUSION TO WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN.

COMPLAINTS VOICED IN PRIVATE.

AMERICAN OFFICIALS HEVE REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING IN PUBLIC ON THE SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES IN RESPONDING TO THE AFGHANISTAN SITUATION BECAUSE TALKS ARE STILL UNDER WAY ON COLLECTIVE MEASURES FOR DEALING WITH MOSCOW. IN PRIVATE, HOWEVER, AIDES FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, STATE DEPARTMENT AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SAY SOME GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING WEST GERMANY AND FRANCE, HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO BACK AMERICAN EFFORTS TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION.

THE AIDES EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT APPARENT DOUBTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN OVER JOINING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN SHORING UP DEFENSES AROUND THE PERSIAN GULF, THE WEST'S PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF OIL.

/ DIFFERENT

DIFFERENT STAKES IN DETENTE.

WHITE HOUSE AND PENTAGON AIDES SAID, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO SHOULDER MOST OF THE BURDEN IN STRENGTHENING WESTERN DEFENSES IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THERE IS GROWING SUPPORT WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION FOR ASKING THE ALLIES TO SPEND MORE ON THEIR OWN DEFENSE TO ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO CONCENTRATE OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

SOME OFFICIALS SAID THAT, EVEN IF THE ALLIES AGREED, IT WOULD BE HARD TO AVOID FUTURE STRAINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. "IT WOULD BE HARD TO EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WHY OUR BOYS WERE DYING TO PROTECT EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE OIL IN THE PERSIAN GULF." A WHITE HOUSE AIDE SAID.

HENDERSON

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Top copy filed on Italy (Jan 80) 'Visit of Cossiga'

RECORD OF A MEETING, IN PLENARY SESSION, BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SIGNOR COSSIGA, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 30 JANUARY 1980 AT 1115 HOURS

Present

Prime Minister	Signor Cossiga
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	Signor Ruffini
Lord Privy Seal	HE Signor Cagiati
Sir Robert Armstrong	Signor Gardini
Sir Michael Palliser	Signor Squillante
Sir Ronald Arculus	Signor Bucci
Sir Michael Franklin	Signor Ruggiero
Mr. C.W. Whitmore	Signor Bottiglieri
Mr. Julian Bullard	Signor Santarelli
Mr. David Hannay	Signor Berlinguer
Mr. Bernard Ingham	Signor Lcy
Mr. Michael Alexander	Signor Masala
Mr. David Gladstone	Signor Santini
	Signor Ortona

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that in the restricted session, most time had been spent on the Community Budget. Signor Cossiga had said he would try to resolve the problem as President. There had been no time for discussion of world affairs and she would be interested in an account of Signor Cossiga's visit to Washington.

Signor Cossiga said he had thought it important as President of the Community to accept promptly the invitation from Washington, although he had stressed that he had no mandate from the Nine. Apart from stressing the importance of a close military relationship as a principal component in US/Italian relations, he had told President Carter that Italian foreign policy rested on three institutional bases: the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community and US/Italian relations. These three were inextricably linked. He had gone on to explain that Italian foreign policy had a security and a detente component. The former embraced the security of the West as a whole and not

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just Italy; the latter was an essential component in the political and military balance between East and West. Detente was an essential instrument for achieving a more secure peace, but it was not an umbrella under which the Soviet Union could extend its influence. A political and military balance in Europe was an essential component of detente. Moreover, detente was indivisible: there could be no global detente if it did not hold in each separate region of the world. If the process was now temporarily suspended, that was not the fault of the West. The US and Europe had conducted an honest policy of detente.

The Prime Minister said she agreed with the general framework set out by Signor Cossiga in every particular. Signor Cossiga said that apart from a short spell at the time of Mussolini, the United Kingdom and Italy had been in agreement since 1848.

Signor Cossiga said he had told President Carter that there was a general crisis against the background of which individual problems had to be judged. The common thread which linked the problem areas in the world (S.E. Asia, Caribbean, Middle East, Afghanistan) was Soviet involvement in each of them. What was the Soviet Union seeking? Why had it invaded Afghanistan when that country was already under its political control? The object had presumably been to send a message to the countries of the region, to the United States and to the West generally, that the Soviet Union was ready to resort to military force in pursuit of its interests. Perhaps there were internal reasons, too. He thought that Afghanistan was also linked to the TNF modernisation issue. He did not understand why Brezhnev in his East Berlin speech had claimed that there was balance between East and West. Perhaps in Soviet eyes an underlying imbalance (in their favour) in Europe was now an integral part of a balance in the world as a whole. If so, it implied that, as far as the Russians were concerned, Western Europe did not matter. It was a pawn, a marginal factor in the relationship with the United States. The less

/Europe

Europe mattered the happier the Russians were. The invasion of Afghanistan, and the consequent threat to Western oil supplies, could be seen as promoting the basic imbalance in Europe.

The Prime Minister interjected that the United States must also be affected: the West as a whole would be in a hopeless position to fight without oil.

Signor Cossiga said that the invasion of Afghanistan did not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union wished to interrupt detente. But they certainly intended to exploit the situation to gain advantages elsewhere. He had emphasised to President Carter that, whereas on the Eastern side only the Soviet Union conceived and executed policy, in the West there was more than one. It was impossible to ignore Western European interests. In Europe there was a strand of neutralist thought, as the TNF debate had shown. Therefore, it was essential for the United States and Western Europe to forge a unified strategy. This would help to prevent Europe becoming more neutralist. Moreover, once there was such a strategy, Europe could, where appropriate, pursue different tactics. There were areas where Western Europe was better equipped than the United States. He instanced relations with Iran, Iraq and the PLO. It was not the United States that had solved the Rhodesia problem. Some European countries had better relations with states in South America than did the USA. However, the key point was that it was dangerous for each country to pursue its own policy except in the context of a common strategy. History showed that wars broke out owing to the mistaken assessments of others. Would Hitler have started World War II had he foreseen that the United States and Britain would unite against him? The Soviet Union must be clear about the closeness of links between Europe and the USA. On the other hand, it was also very important not to arouse unnecessary fears in the Soviet Union. All totalitarian states feared attack and encirclement.

/Signor Cossiga

Signor Cossiga said he had told President Carter that one must have a global strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. One could not take a fresh initiative every day without giving the impression of an absence of coherent strategy. The aims of that strategy must be firstly to convince the Soviet Union that the West would maintain its own security, and secondly to find a way of continuing detente. The alternative to detente was war or the cold war, and he doubted whether Europe was ready for either. The West had invested much in detente: many links had been created between East and West. Some progress had been made. But detente separated from security was capitulation. Detente had to offer advantages to both sides. It could be used by the West to expose Soviet aims to the Third World: by contrast, if Europe abandoned detente, this would tend to increase Soviet influence in the Third World. In MBFR and CSCE the Soviet Union would be on the defensive following Afghanistan, and ^{might} thus provide political capital which could be put to good use in e.g. Italy, the FRG and the Netherlands.

Signor Cossiga said he had therefore proposed to President Carter that there should be a high level Western meeting to evaluate the situation. A global strategy could not be sustained if the Europeans were not associated with its formulation and execution. Such a high level meeting would be a signal to the Soviet Union ^{they would not divide Europe and the US.} that/President Carter had favoured bringing forward the Venice Summit. Signor Cossiga thought that the inclusion of Japan would enhance Soviet fears of encirclement. He therefore favoured a meeting of the Six.

The Prime Minister asked whether Signor Cossiga thought that the Western response to Afghanistan had been adequate. The Soviet Union was watching to see whether the Europeans supported the United States with action.

Signor Cossiga thought the response had not been adequate because it was not united. In his view, the unity of the response was more important than the level.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

The Prime Minister asked what more could be done? The British Government had taken and announced a number of measures. Signor Cossiga said that he had cancelled the Ivanov mission to Italy though this was contrary to Italian economic interests. However, the day after he had conveyed his decision to Ivanov, he had visited France. The Prime Minister said that Gromyko would not be coming to Britain.

Signor Cossiga said that Italy was doing its bit but the Soviet Union would be bound to see disunity in the varying Western responses. The United States had made a mistake in raising the Olympics issue because sporting concerns were not prepared to see sport mixed with politics. The Prime Minister said HMG had supported the US administration on this issue because if one was cutting off cultural contacts it was only logical to include sport.

Lord Carrington said that it was striking that the Nine Foreign Ministers had not met immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because of Christmas. He would be discussing ways of preventing this happening again at the political cooperation meetings the following week. They would also discuss the Italian Presidency's ideas. But he thought it a mistake to set up high level meetings without knowing what one wished to achieve. The ground must be carefully prepared.

The Prime Minister said that a system was needed which would cope with any emergency. Asked by Signor Cossiga how one could coordinate European and American views, Lord Carrington said this could best be done in NATO. He saw a danger of establishing too many fora.

Signor Ruffini said that the USA sometimes took measures, announced them, and expected their allies to follow. Some form of consultation machinery was needed to ensure that this did not happen.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

The Prime Minister suggested that the press should be told that the Heads of Government had discussed the Community Budget together with the problem of responding quickly and in concert with the USA to world crises. They could also say that they had reviewed world problems.

The discussion ended at 1200.

AmS

30 January 1980

→ AF/la Sir

Extract from a letter MODSI to Walder (Fco) 30.1.80 recording

PMs Conversation over lunch with Signor Cossiga.

East/West Relations

Top copy filed on Italy (Jan 80)
Visit of Cossiga

Signor Cossiga said that he attached great importance to the need for Europe and the United States to co-ordinate their policies on East/West relations in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There must be no impression that Europe was going off on its own. Equally the United States had to be brought to understand the particular problems which individual European Governments, e.g. that of the Netherlands, were encountering.

Signor Cossiga said that he felt eventually the subject would have to be discussed at Heads of Government level. President Carter shared this view. However it was not easy to decide on the forum. There would, for instance, be difficulties in meetings in NATO at Foreign Minister or Head of Government level because this would be interpreted as an escalation of the situation. The Schloss Gymnich formula for meetings between the President of the Community and the President of the United States would not be practicable in present circumstances. A summit involving the Japanese would give rise, on the Soviet side, to fears of encirclement.

Signor Ruffini commented that a meeting of the Six (i.e. the countries involved in the London meeting chaired by Mr. Christopher) might work well if the Nine had co-ordinated their position in advance. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, while agreeing on the need for a forum small enough to be effective and sufficiently representative to make possible US participation, observed that the meeting of the Six had not been a great success. The Americans had simply taken note of the discussions and then made their own decisions without further consultation.

/The Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

The Prime Minister commented that she was not unduly concerned about the Soviet reaction to a meeting involving Japan. Japanese participation could be very important. However the prime consideration was that any meeting that took place should produce agreement. This would be the only way to impress the Soviet Union. To organise a meeting before agreement was in sight would be a recipe for disaster. This meant that it would have to be very carefully prepared. There would have to be early agreement on the agenda, the questions to be resolved, etc. Papers would have to be written. It would have to be decided soon who should write these papers.

As regards timing of a Heads of Government meeting, the Prime Minister expressed doubt as to whether the preparation could be completed much before June. She noted that there was already a Summit meeting taking place in Venice in that month. Signor Cossiga was clearly doubtful whether this would be soon enough. But after further discussion the following programme was agreed:-

- (a) the Foreign Ministers of the Nine would have a preliminary discussion of the problems at their meeting on Tuesday. They would
- (b) commission a preliminary paper on the problems. This might be based on a draft already prepared by the Nine's experts on East/West relations;
- (c) discussion would continue of a possible forum in which Europe and the United States could be associated in the medium term. Particular account would be taken of the problem of French sensitivities; and
- (d) the longer term objective would be for an informal discussion among Heads of Government in the margins of the Summit meeting in Venice in June. This might take place over a meal.

Signor Cossiga undertook to discuss this programme in the very near future with Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard. He would try to arrange for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to be briefed before his meeting with M. Francois Poncet at the weekend.

I am sending a copy of this letter to David Wright (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Michael Alexander.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL



CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO
Secretary of the Cabinet

M. O'D. B. Alexander, Esq

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-233 8319

SECRET



Alghamdan 6
②

Prime Minister

CABINET OFFICE

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS Telephone 01-233 8319

Phms

From the Secretary of the Cabinet: Sir Robert Armstrong KCB, CVO

307

Ref: A01277

30th January 1980

h.g.
Phms 31/1
[Signature]

I mentioned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and you this morning a further message I have had from Dr. Brzezinski. I attach a copy herewith. As you know, these communications are very much confined to the White House to 10 Downing Street link and I should be grateful if you would not give it any circulation in the Foreign Office, though of course you will want to show it to the Secretary of State.

Brzezinski's letter confirms that he and Warren Christopher are visiting Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at the end of this week. When we discussed this earlier today, we thought that such a visit could only exacerbate Indian suspicions. We have to think whether we should suggest to Brzezinski that, in order to avoid that, he should include New Delhi in his itinerary. Even if we suggest it, he probably will not do so, partly because he will see no practical benefit and partly because Clark Clifford is the President's Special Representative for talks with the Indian Government. But we shall at least have warned. If we are going to do anything of this kind, we must do it very quickly: I could telephone Brzezinski, or send him an immediate response on the Telex link.

The second element in Brzezinski's letter is the proposal for a meeting of "appropriate representatives" on 11th February. Though the invitation is to me and other appropriate representatives, it appears that David Aaron is to host the meeting. That suggests that it will be appropriate for us to be represented by Robert Wade-Gery, perhaps accompanied by someone from the Assessments Staff.

I have no doubt that you will agree that we should concur in this proposal in principle. The question for immediate consideration is, I think, whether we should suggest to Brzezinski that he might come here on his way back from Pakistan to Washington, and whether we should offer to host a meeting here of the same 4 who met in Paris on 14th January. These two are separable: we ^{could} ~~can~~ invite Brzezinski to stop here on his way back for "bilaterals" even if we were not going to propose a multilateral meeting in that context; and then Wade-Gery could go across to Washington for the meeting envisaged by Brzezinski.

/Before

Sir Michael Palliser, GCMG

SECRET

Before I send any reply to Brzezinski, I think that it would be sensible to get in touch with Wahl and von Staden to find out how they are reacting, and perhaps to try out our ideas on them first. But before I get to that point, I should very much like to have your reactions and comments.

Perhaps we could discuss as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter and of Brzezinski's message to Michael Alexander.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

VZCZC 00004
00 1024
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O 090315Z JAN 80
FM THE WHITE HOUSE
TO CABINET OFFICE, LONDON
TEL

S E C R E T VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS SENSITIVE WH80088

JANUARY 29, 1980

TO: BOB ARMSTRONG
CABINET OFFICE, LONDON

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR BOB,

IN THE SPIRIT OF CONTINUING CLOSE COOPERATION ON THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, I WANT TO CONFIRM TO YOU THAT I WILL BE TRAVELLING ALONG WITH WARREN CHRISTOPHER TO PAKISTAN AND SAUDI ARABIA AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. THE PURPOSE OF OUR VISIT WILL BE TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE REGION FOLLOWING THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND TO TRY TO REACH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING WITH THEM ON HOW TO APPROACH THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES AT HAND. WE WILL ALSO BE HOLDING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN ISLAMABAD ABOUT LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE AS WELL AS DETAILED TALKS WITH THE PAKISTANI MILITARY. IN PARTICULAR, WE INTEND TO EXPLORE FURTHER, WITH BOTH THE PAKISTANIS AND THE SAUDIS THE TYPES AND LEVELS OF SUPPORT FROM SOURCES IN THE REGION AND ELSEWHERE THAT THE PAKISTANIS URGENTLY NEED.

AFTER THESE DISCUSSIONS, I WILL ENSURE THAT THE RESULTS ARE REPORTED FULLY TO YOUR GOVERNMENT. THAT SHOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR DELIBERATIONS ON HOW BEST TO MANIFEST OUR SHARED DETERMINATION TO HELP PAKISTAN IN THE FACE OF THIS NEW THREAT.

I WOULD ALSO PLAN TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR DISCUSSIONS OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THE ARABIAN PENINSULA BY INVITING YOU AND OTHER APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES TO COME TO WASHINGTON TO MEET ON FEBRUARY 11. FRANK CARLUCCI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WILL REPORT ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE AREA AND THE RESULTS OF MY TRIP WILL BE SHARED AS WELL. IN ADDITION, I HOPE THAT YOUR SIDE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE YOUR VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN THE PENINSULA AND IN YEMEN. DAVID AARON WILL HOST THE MEETING AND GO INTO THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF OUR PLANNING AS WELL AS SHARE OUR THOUGHTS ON FUTURE WORK AMONG US.

I HOPE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR YOU. IF NOT, WE WILL TRY TO ADJUST THE DATE AND, OF COURSE, WE ARE ALWAYS PREPARED TO MEET IN EUROPE IF THAT IS MORE CONVENIENT. I AM SENDING THIS MESSAGE TO THE OTHER TWO OF OUR GROUP AND YOU MAY WISH TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM.

PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHETHER YOU CONCUR IN THIS PROPOSAL AND, IF SO, WHO WILL BE PARTICIPATING FROM YOUR SIDE.

WARM REGARDS.

/S/ ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

0457
00701



30 JAN 1980



SECRET

5



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister (2)

29 January 1980

Dear Michael,

Handwritten initials and date: "Hand - 29/1"

Handwritten note: "F.C.O. Hand 29/1"

Quadripartite Meetings

As a result of a leak in the German press on 26 January and again this morning, the Italians have become aware of a Quadripartite meeting of Political Directors held in London on 24/25 January to discuss Afghanistan. (As you know, these meetings are held from time to time, either in secret or under the camouflage of a meeting to discuss Berlin and Germany.) The Italians are strongly opposed to any top table from which they themselves are excluded. They have questioned the Germans about the reported meeting, and have been given evasive answers which will not have satisfied them.

Signor Ruffini has not so far raised this subject with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, nor I understand did Signor Cossiga with the Prime Minister. But if asked about we will seek to avoid giving a direct answer to the question whether a meeting did or did not take place in London last week as reported. If pressed, we will say that, as the Italians are aware, the 4 powers with special responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole have for many years met periodically both at ministerial and at lower levels. If further pressed, we will concede that other subjects also come up; but will add that no amount of discussion in other groupings can take the place of coordination among the Nine, a process to which the Italians at the moment hold the key in their Presidential capacity.

Yours etc

Handwritten signature: "Paul"

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

cc
PS/Sir R Armstrong

SECRET



29 JAN 1980

CONFIDENTIAL

Original filed China



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Weekend Box

London SW1A 2AH

Ⓢ

Pennie Minister

29 January 1980

Print 29/1

MS

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan: Forward Planning: China

You may find it useful to see the enclosed internal FCO memorandum on policy towards China. Lord Carrington agrees generally with its conclusions and has given instructions for matters to be carried forward, as agreed by Ministers in OD on 22 January. I will keep you informed of progress,

yours ever

Roderic Lyne

(R M J Lyne)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

POLICY TOWARDS CHINA AFTER AFGHANISTAN

1. The Russians argue that in recent decades the 'correlation of forces' has been moving in their favour. We need, after Afghanistan, to find ways of making it clear to them that things are not moving inexorably their way; and that if they try to change the rules of the game in one sphere they must expect to find the rules changed against them in others. The deliberate development of closer ties with China is one possibility which could be considered. This paper sets out some preliminary thoughts.

SINO-BRITISH CONSIDERATIONS

2. Unlike the Soviet Union, China presents no threat to the West, at least in the short and medium term. There is no prospect in the foreseeable future of a reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union or of the re-emergence of a monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc. Externally, China's global and regional importance seems likely to grow steadily. The Chinese domestic political situation now seems relatively stable. The Cultural Revolution decade (1965-76) looks increasingly like an aberration, and although a reversion cannot be ruled out it is a reasonable assumption that current pragmatic policies will continue through the 1980s. Modernisation will be slow, but China will gradually become an important force in world trade. There is thus good scope for continuing to develop the bilateral relationship with China which we have built up in recent years. But there are limitations to this process. As communists, the Chinese have long term aims and interests different from ours. They have embarked on a new relationship with the West for reasons of self-interest. They want to see a strong NATO and a politically united Western Europe for their own anti-Soviet reasons. They also see us as a source of cheap credits, cheap technology and advanced military equipment at bargain rates. There is, in short, only a limited coincidence of interests between the West and China, unlike the broad community of interests which exists among the Western countries themselves.

/SOVIET

SOVIET CONSIDERATIONS

3. The Russians are irrationally nervous about China (the 'Yellow Peril' syndrome). They have reacted badly to the development so far of Western ties with China. They would be concerned by major new moves in this direction, particularly in the defence field. Their alarm would be stridently expressed. The West would want to stop short of the point at which the Russians saw a threat to their vital interests.

4. Action by the UK alone might marginally improve prospects for trade with China (and help us over Hong Kong). But it would be unlikely to have any real effect on the Russians except to reinforce the Soviet conception of us as the European power most prepared to align itself with the US and expose us to selective Soviet reprisals. This underscores the need to carry as many allies as possible (including Canada and Australia) with us in any deliberate strengthening of relations with China, partly to avoid difficulties with them and partly to present any new policy as a general Western one. Moreover, we shall undoubtedly wish to work for an improvement in relations with Moscow at some time in the future. This suggests that we should look for measures which would have as much impact as possible in the short term but would not tie our hands for the future.

WESTERN PARTNERS

5. The Americans have been moving fast towards China. Public pronouncements during the visit to Peking of Defence Secretary Brown (the timing of which was settled long before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan) have given the impression that the US is no longer making any pretence of even-handedness as between Moscow and Peking. The Americans are now prepared to sell dual civil/military purpose technology to China and have told us that they intend to sound out their partners about establishing a 'China differential' in COCOM (we are hoping to arrange bilateral consultations first). But they still maintain their policy of refusing to sell defence equipment. This position could well change in the next 3 to 4

/years

years. In the meantime the Americans are likely to view more sympathetically sales of strategic materials by their allies. If the Americans are moving towards direct defence sales, we must try to ensure that they do not promote policies in this field which suit their interests but are incompatible with ours. All this argues for UK firms getting firmly into the market now. There have been some hints from Washington that this is what the US expects and wants to see.

6. Other Western countries are likely to be more diffident about arms sales and defence co-operation and may seek to restrain us. The Germans and Japanese do not wish to sell arms to China and have some reservations about others doing so. The French and Italians have no such inhibitions; but the French at least are more constrained by their relationship with the Soviet Union and are unlikely to favour any linkage between Afghanistan and increased defence co-operation with China.

OTHER COUNTRIES

7. We would need to take great care with India and the ASEAN countries. India's position is crucial, particularly given Mrs Gandhi's known views. The Indians already regard China as aggressive and irresponsible; the 'punishment' of Vietnam was an uncomfortably close parallel to China's action against India in 1962. They are nervous about increased Western support for Pakistan and would be increasingly worried if China matched Western efforts or, worse, began to force the pace. In general the ASEAN countries are currently less concerned because their attention remains concentrated on Vietnam's actions in Indo-China. But it would not take much - if Indo-China gradually went off the boil - to persuade at least Indonesia and possibly also Malaysia that the long term threat still came from China.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR STRENGTHENING UK RELATIONS WITH CHINA

8. (a) THICKENING-UP MILITARY CO-OPERATION
 i visit by the Secretary of State for Defence.
 Mr Pym has suggested that he should visit
 China in March to open the SBAC exhibition

/((Sir K Joseph

(Sir K Joseph cannot now go). HM Ambassadors in Peking and Moscow see advantages in such a visit post-Afghanistan but it might worry the Indians. The Department will be submitting separately;

- ii defence sales. Ministers decided in June 1979 to give case-by-case consideration to projects as they arise. A number of major projects in which the Chinese have expressed interest are being considered interdepartmentally and the Defence Secretary will shortly be consulting his colleagues in OD. Difficult decisions will be required. Although some of the Soviet constraints have now been removed, national security, the views of our Western partners and the possible impact on relations with other countries will still inhibit sales of sensitive equipment or offensive weapons. But even though the Chinese appear to be giving a low priority to defence at present, the opportunity to improve defence sales ought not to be missed;
 - iii naval visit. A separate submission recommends that 3 ships from a Naval Task Group should visit Shanghai in the late summer;
 - iv military exchanges and training. Consideration should be given to further exchanges at various levels. We are recommending separately a visit by the CNS this year. The RCDS are proposing another visit to China in 1981. Staff college exchanges and, possibly, offers of military training in the UK for Chinese officers might now be considered.
- (b) ROYAL VISITS: the Prince of Wales has it in mind to go to China in 1981. A visit by the Duke of Gloucester is to take place this April. There is no real scope for further visits in the near

/future

future - and in any case Royal visits may be an inappropriate vehicle for making too blunt a political point;

- (c) EXPANSION OF MINISTERIAL VISITS: Lord Carrington has already recommended that the Prime Minister should take up Premier Hua's return invitation this year (or, alternatively, that he himself might go). A visit might now be given higher priority. Several other Ministers are already scheduled to visit China in 1980 and while much less important in the Soviet context than the Prime Minister's or Mr Pym's visits, these will help to underline our developing ties with China compared to the freeze in our relations with the Soviet Union;
- (d) BROADENING OF OFFICIAL AND OTHER CONTACTS: we might now propose regular (eg annual) political consultations, possibly at Political Director level;
- (e) AID AND CONCESSIONARY CREDIT: we could consider whether the political advantages would outweigh the likely commercial disadvantages (eg stimulating a credit race).

9. Whatever their longer term effect, the public announcement of measures such as these could in the short term have a considerable impact on the Russians. Careful publicity and timing would therefore be important.

CONCLUSIONS

- 10. (a) there are good reasons, Afghanistan apart, for continuing to develop our relations with China. There is some scope for accelerating the process as part of our response to the Christmas coup in Kabul;
- (b) if our action is to have a significant impact on the Soviet Union, and to avoid singling us out, we would need to carry our allies and other Western partners with us as far as possible;

/(c)

Original in G/R

Afghanistan

~~CF to ADE~~
~~and keep~~

28 January 1980

Dear Freddie

IN CONFIDENCE

Thank you for your letter of 4 January and for your expressions of support for the line we have taken on the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The geographical position of Afghanistan and the cynical violation of international principles involved in the Soviet invasion, make recent events a matter of very deep concern. You know how much I value both your experience of the area and the backing you give me on the policy we have developed.

You raise a question about a very sensitive matter and I know that you will understand when I say that the amount of detail I can let you have is limited. However, it is not entirely right to say that we in the West were caught unawares. You may be interested to know, in confidence, that we were aware of a build-up quite early on. We could not be absolutely sure that the Russians planned to intervene. But nonetheless on 20 December a senior official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office summoned the Minister Counsellor from the Soviet Embassy in London and expressed our concern about the situation. He referred to the statement made a short time before by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine that the people of Afghanistan should be free to determine their future for themselves. An assurance was sought that no Soviet intervention was contemplated that would infringe that freedom.

/ You are

2/18

You are familiar with the rest of the story. I do not need to tell you that an assurance was not given, and subsequent Soviet actions have confirmed our worst fears. It is vital that we now take sustained and effective measures to prove to the Russians that they have miscalculated. If we do not take such action we lose the chance to convince them not to try to do the same thing again somewhere else.

signed

MT

You raise a question about a very sensitive matter and I know that you will understand when I say that the amount of detail I can give you is limited. However, it is not entirely true to say that we in the West were caught unaware. You may be interested to know in confidence that we were aware of a Bulgarian plot which was being conducted in London and the Russians planned to intervene. But notwithstanding this we were not aware of the details of the plot until the 20th January when a British official in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was informed of the plot.

Sir Frederic Bennett, M.P. was the British representative in Moscow at the time and he was the first to inform the British Government in London and expressed our concern about the situation. He referred to the situation as a "black and white" matter by the Foreign Office.

Afghanistan

CONFIDENTIAL - COVERING SECRET



File

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

26 January 1980

Dear George,

Your letter to me of 24 January enclosed a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Carter about Afghanistan and Iran. I now enclose the signed text. You may wish to telegraph it to Washington for delivery simultaneously with the Prime Minister's speech on Monday afternoon.

Yours ever

Michael Alexander

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

cc. MUSEL ops. 4 DSG

cc FW.

file 7/8/80

SOBJEKT



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

PRIME MINISTER'S

26 January 1980

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T12/80.

Dear Mr. President

Thank you for your letter which Warren Christopher handed to me on 14 January. I was very glad to talk to him and Ambassador Brewster about the situation resulting from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They will have reported my views to you. I deliberately delayed this written reply until Peter Carrington had returned from his tour of the area and we had considered the action we ourselves could take. Peter Carrington announced a number of measures in the House of Lords on 24 January, and you will have seen a report of his statement. We are also taking other measures, which I shall describe later in this letter.

You will already know that I fully agree with your analysis. A central principle of great strategic importance is at stake. For many years now, the West has sought to develop a sensible relationship with the Soviet Union which could minimise the risk of war, lower the level of armaments and develop mutually beneficial changes in the field of trade and human contacts. The Russians have chosen to interpret "detente" much more narrowly, and have continued to pursue a policy of expansion and subversion wherever they felt they could get away with it. They may well have thought that they could nibble away at our interests indefinitely. They need to be reminded in clear terms that this is not so. I therefore welcome and support the various measures that you have taken, including those you announced in your State of the Union message on 23 January.

/ For our part,

SECRET

For our part, Peter Carrington has announced that the British/Soviet Credit Agreement which expires on 16 February will not be renewed. Credit will in future be considered case by case and - assuming that the other Western countries take the same position - will not be provided at rates more favourable than those set by the international consensus. We are ready to study with you and our other partners the tighter application of the COCOM rules for controlling the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. The European Community has decided not to export food to the Soviet Union which directly or indirectly would replace supplies denied by the United States. The United Kingdom is also pressing for an end to subsidised butter, meat and sugar sales from the Community's surpluses. We will avoid high level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union for the time being; military exchanges which were under consideration will be cancelled, and certain cultural and other events will be avoided.

I have sent you a copy of the letter I have written to the Chairman of the British Olympics Association. I believe that the move to shift the Olympic Games from Moscow will grow in strength following the arrest of Professor Sakharov.

These are the immediate political and economic measures which we intend to direct at the Soviet Union. We also intend to encourage the non-aligned countries, and particularly the Muslims, to continue their denunciation of the Soviet action and if possible to take measures against the regime in Afghanistan. This will require some delicacy, lest some amongst the non-aligned accuse the West of trying to introduce the cold war into the Third World. We will accelerate negotiations over the sales of British defence equipment to Oman, Saudi Arabia and other States in the Gulf. We shall do what we can in this field for Pakistan, though there are technical difficulties over credit guarantees. We intend to provide friendly States in the Gulf, Pakistan and India with more information about our assessments of Soviet activities and intentions in the area: it was clear from Peter Carrington's trip that many of the Governments there are not well informed. This is an area where you too might wish to act.

I should add, however, that Peter Carrington was struck by the deep conviction expressed by the Saudis and others that the whole Western position in the area was undermined by the Arab/Israel conflict and the failure to solve the Palestinian problem.

For our part we shall encourage closer cooperation among the Gulf States, for example, over the security of the Straits of Hormuz. We shall work for an EEC/Gulf dialogue, though here again there are a number of commercial and industrial policy difficulties and it may take the Community some time to work out its position. We shall do what we can to increase Western influence in the Yemen Arab Republic, and encourage the Saudis and Omanis to be more active there as well: the threat of Soviet subversion leading to an amalgamation of the two Yemens cannot be ignored, and this would represent a further major gain by the Russians. We are looking at sensible ways of strengthening our links with China, including arms sales, on which our people are having early talks with yours.

We are also looking at a variety of possibilities for covert action.

Peter Carrington was much impressed by the difficulties we face in the Sub-Continent. There is deep distrust between India and Pakistan. Both countries have an obsession, almost indeed a paranoia, about encirclement. I know that the Pakistanis have been talking to you about strengthening the security guarantee you made in 1959. For her part, Mrs. Gandhi speaks too readily for the Russians in her public statements. But she cannot relish the prospect of Russian forces on India's borders. She must know that any such development would seriously disturb the Muslim population in India itself. Nevertheless, if we do not handle the Indians carefully, they might slip further towards the Soviet Union. They speak of an axis linking Pakistan, China and the United States, and fear that the super-power confrontation will simply be imported into the Sub-Continent. Nonetheless we must do all we can to strengthen our relationship with the Indians. It was fortunate that Peter Carrington was able to see Mrs. Gandhi so soon

/ after

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SECRET

after her election. President Giscard is in Delhi now. I am glad to know that Clark Clifford will soon be there.

You spoke of the need for Western unity. We recognize that this is a prime condition for bringing effective pressure to bear on the Russians. At the same time our immediate preoccupations do not necessarily coincide. It is understandable, for example, that the Germans should be nervous at the prospect of losing some of the ground which they have made over Berlin and East Germany in the last decade. They have considerable human, political and economic investments there. We are aware not only of the need for unity, but of the importance of the effective American leadership which you are providing. We have already detected an evolution in European attitudes as the full significance of Soviet actions is becoming clearer.

Finally, there is the problem of Iran. I believe the Iranians are coming to see for themselves where the real threat to their interests lie. I very much hope that the discreet exchanges in which you are engaged will be fruitful. And I continue to admire the restraint with which you are handling this difficult and sensitive issue.

Warm personal regards.

Yours sincerely

Raymond D. White

The President of the United States of America.

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

25 January 1980

Original in GR
CF to note

Dear John.

Your Private Secretary wrote to mine on 9 January enclosing a copy of a letter you had received from the Paddington Liberal Association about action the Government might take following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I agree that our condemnation of the Soviet intervention must be followed by positive action.

The Association suggest that the British Ambassador to Moscow be withdrawn. Some other countries have recalled their Ambassadors, and we have considered the possibility. However, his presence in Moscow, from where he can advise us at first hand at this difficult time, has so far seemed preferable to our recalling him for consultations.

On the question of economic and cultural links with the Soviet Union, we have been considering a number of possible steps in consultation with our allies, and we have now announced certain measures on export credit and the sale to the Soviet Union of advanced technology. We think it is important that measures by Western countries should be concerted, especially in the economic field, where solidarity with our Community partners will be particularly important.

/You

DS
cc 710

JS

You will know my view on the Olympic Games: I favour trying to move the venue from Moscow. There are clearly practical difficulties about this; but we have put our views to the British Olympic Association and they have undertaken to pass them on to the International Olympic Committee, with whom the decision will lie.

Yours sincerely

Robert Peel

John Wheeler, Esq., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 January 1980

①

*6/2 Type for
signature*

Prime Minister

Apex list? Print

Dear Michael,

President Carter wrote to the Prime Minister on 14 January about Afghanistan.

/ I attach a draft reply. As you suggested, this touches briefly on Iran.

*As amended
previously
no*

*7-22
8-2*

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

DRAFT: ~~x~~minute/letter/teletype/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:

PRIME MINISTER

Reference

3

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:

PRESIDENT CARTER

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

Thank you for your letter which Warren Christopher handed to me on 14 January. I was very glad to talk to him and Ambassador Brewster about the situation resulting from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They will have reported my views to you. I deliberately delayed this written reply until Peter Carrington had returned from his tour of the area and we had considered the action we ourselves could take. Peter Carrington announced a number of measures in the House of Lords on 24 January, and you will have seen a report of his statement. We are also taking other measures, which I shall describe later in this letter.

You will already know that I fully agree with your analysis. A central principle of great strategic importance is at stake. For many years now, the West has sought to develop a sensible relationship with the Soviet Union which could minimise the risk of war, lower the level of armaments and develop mutually beneficial changes in the field of trade and human contacts. The ^{Russians} ~~Soviets~~ have chosen to interpret "detente" much more narrowly, and have continued to pursue a policy of expansion and subversion wherever they felt they could get away with it. They may well have thought

Enclosures—flag(s).....

that they could nibble away at our interests indefinitely. They need to be reminded in clear terms that this is not so. I therefore welcome and support the various measures that you have taken, including those you announced in your State of the Union message on 23 January.

For our part, Peter Carrington has announced that the British/Soviet Credit Agreement which expires on 16 February will not be renewed. Credit will in future be considered case by case and - assuming that other Western countries take the same position - will not be provided at rates more favourable than those set by the international consensus. We are ready to study with you and our other partners the tighter application of the COCOM rules for controlling the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. The European Community has decided not to export food to the Soviet Union which directly or indirectly would replace supplies denied by the United States. The United Kingdom is also pressing for an end to subsidised butter, meat and sugar sales from the Community's surpluses. We will avoid high level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union for the time being; military exchanges which were under consideration will be cancelled, and certain cultural and other events will be avoided.

I have sent you a copy of the letter I have written to the Chairman of the British Olympics Association. I believe that the move to shift the Olympic Games from Moscow will grow in strength following the arrest of Professor Sakharov.

These are the immediate political and economic measures which we intend to direct at the Soviet Union. We also

intend to encourage the non-aligned countries, and particularly the Muslims, to continue their denunciation of the Soviet action and if possible to take measures against the regime in Afghanistan. This will require some delicacy, lest some amongst the non-aligned accuse the West of trying to introduce the cold war into the Third World. We will accelerate negotiations over the sales of British defence equipment to Oman, Saudi Arabia and other States in the Gulf. We shall do what we can in this field for Pakistan, though there are technical difficulties over credit guarantees. We intend to provide friendly States in the Gulf, Pakistan and India with more information about our assessments of Soviet activities and intentions in the area: it was clear from Peter Carrington's trip that many of the Governments there are not well informed. This is an area where you too might wish to act. I should add however that Peter Carrington was struck by the deep conviction expressed by the Saudis and others that the whole Western position in the area was undermined by the Arab/Israel conflict and the failure to solve the Palestinian problem.

For our part we shall encourage closer cooperation among the Gulf States, for example, over the security of the Straits of Hormuz. We shall work for an EEC/Gulf dialogue, though here again there are a number of commercial and industrial policy difficulties and it may take the Community some time to work out its position. We shall do what we can to increase Western influence in the Yemen Arab Republic, and encourage the Saudis and Omanis to be more active there as well: the threat of Soviet subversion leading to an amalgamation of the two Yemens cannot be ignored, and this would represent a further major gain by the Russians. We are looking at
/sensible ways

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We are also looking at a variety of possibilities for covert action.

Peter Carrington was much impressed by the difficulties we face in the Sub-Continent. There is deep distrust between India and Pakistan. Both countries have an obsession, almost indeed a paranoia, about encirclement. I know that the Pakistanis have been talking to you about strengthening the security guarantee you made in 1959. For her part, Mrs Gandhi speaks too readily for the Russians in her public statements. But she cannot relish the prospect of Russian forces on India's borders. She must know that any such development would seriously disturb the Muslim population in India itself. Nevertheless, if we do not handle the Indians carefully, they might slip further towards the Soviet Union. They speak of an axis linking Pakistan, China and the United States, and fear that the super-power confrontation will simply be imported into the Sub-Continent. Nonetheless we must do all we can to strengthen our relationship with the Indians. It was fortunate that Peter Carrington was able to see Mrs Gandhi so soon after her election. President Giscard is in Delhi now. I am glad to know that Clark Clifford will soon be there.

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~~Europe~~ ^{We} recognise that this is a prime condition for

/ bringing

bringing effective pressure to bear on the Russians. At the same time our immediate preoccupations do not necessarily coincide. It is understandable, for example, that the Germans should be nervous at the prospect of losing some of the ground which they have made over Berlin and East Germany in the last decade. They have considerable human, political and economic investments there. ~~Nevertheless, the Europeans~~ ^{We} are aware not only of the need for unity, but of the importance of the effective American leadership which you are providing. We have already detected an evolution in European attitudes as the full significance of Soviet actions is becoming clearer.

Finally, there is the problem of Iran. ~~The Soviet invasion of any Muslim country does of course transpose the context.~~ I believe the Iranians are coming to see for themselves where the real threat to their interests lies. I very much hope that the discreet exchanges in which you are engaged will be fruitful. And I continue to admire the restraint with which you are handling this difficult and sensitive issue.

Published Papers

The following published paper(s) enclosed on this file have been removed and destroyed. Copies may be found elsewhere in The National Archives.

House of Commons Hansard
Columns 655-669

24 January 1980
Afghanistan

Signed A Wayland Date 25 February 2010

PREM Records Team



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

24 January 1980

For Paul - 25/1

Dear Michael,

/ I enclose the revised text of the statement which Lord Carrington intends to make in the House of Lords this afternoon on Afghanistan.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries of the members of OD and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours etc

(P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

HOUSE OF LORDS: STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN ON 24 JANUARY 1980

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an event of the widest significance. For the first time since the Second World War, Soviet combat troops have been used in massive numbers outside Europe to establish a military hold on a sovereign, non-aligned country.

The Soviet action is a breach of all the conventions which have governed East-West relations for the last decade. It is a vivid demonstration of the Soviet drive to gain wider influence wherever possible, by propaganda, by subversion, and where necessary by force.

Together with the arrest of the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Dr Sakharov, it reflects cynical disregard for world opinion. It is bound to affect our attitude in current and future negotiations between East and West, though we naturally want these to continue where they clearly serve our own interests as well as those of the Soviet Union.

/But the

But the present crisis is not in the first instance an East-West confrontation between super powers. Although the significance of the Soviet action is world wide, its immediate impact has been on the region of South West Asia, and on the neighbouring Muslim countries.

Afghanistan is a strategic salient into the region. One is bound to ask oneself where the Russian drive is to stop. If the Russians are to be deterred, a sustained and significant response will be needed, not only from the West, but from the countries which themselves feel threatened.

I discussed these issues with the governments of the region during my tour between 9 and 18 January. This took me to Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India, with a brief call at Bahrain.

Despite the obvious differences of perspective, certain important points of agreement emerged. One was that the West and the countries of the area have a common interest in the stability and integrity of the Gulf and the Straits of

/Hormuz.

Hormuz.

Secondly, in the light of the Soviet threat, Pakistan must be able to count on the material and political support of its friends.

Thirdly, the real threat to Iran's recent revolution and to her future security came from the Russians.

And finally, there was of course a general repugnance in the Islamic countries I visited at the Soviet onslaught on another Islamic nation.

An effective response to the Soviet threat in South West Asia and its neighbourhood is above all a matter for the peoples of the region. All the statesmen with whom I spoke recognised the Soviet threat of intervention, by force or subversion, which now extends across the region as far as the Yemen, and they accepted the responsibilities that flowed from this assessment.

In particular, the need for solidarity among like-minded people, and for a fresh effort to overcome the divisions of

/the past

the past was widely recognised.

This will not be easy. Conflicts of local interest have to be overcome, and in some cases the present crisis has sharpened them.

In India, where I was able to meet Mrs Gandhi and some of her Ministers very soon after they took office, I found a deep concern that Western military aid to Pakistan could disturb the delicate political balance in the Sub-Continent. The Indians have no desire to see their part of the world become the arena for a clash between the superpowers.

I pointed out to Mrs Gandhi that Western help for Pakistan was a direct consequence of the incursion of the Soviet superpower, and that Russia is after all the only superpower with a powerful military presence on the Sub-Continent.

Mrs Gandhi made it clear that she wished to continue the process of better understanding with Pakistan which she herself had begun with the Simla Agreement of 1972. President Zia had already assured me in Pakistan that he too

/looked

looked forward to a development of the Simla process.

I found this encouraging. It will be a major contribution to peace of mind in the Sub-Continent if each country's worries about the other can be dissolved.

The response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not, of course, the exclusive responsibility of the people of the region, even though theirs is the most immediate interest. They need - and they look for - material Western assistance, and a firm Western commitment to their security and independence.

The West itself needs to find ways to make the Russians understand they they cannot break the rules of international behaviour with impunity, either now or in the future. This entails responses by individual countries, and by the West's collective organisations, above all by NATO and the European Community.

In the region itself, the first need is to help Pakistan.

There are already half a million Afghan refugees there. This number could soon double. Many of them bitterly

/oppose

oppose the Soviet invasion of their country, and are determined to return. Their condition is wretched. We have already sent blankets, tents and medicines. The United Nations Commissioner for Refugees is active. Other countries, and especially the United States, are helping too. Pakistan needs further help to tackle her political, economic and military problems. We are discussing with our Allies how best to do this.

We are also considering other measures to help the countries of the region as a whole, both in the short term, and in their struggle against the long-term threat of Soviet disruption and subversion.

We need to develop our cooperation with Turkey both bilaterally and multilaterally.

We need to strengthen our links with the countries of the Arab peninsula.

We look forward to rebuilding a mutually satisfactory relationship with the people and government of Iran once the American hostages in Tehran have been released.

Above all we believe that one of the most important of all possible contributions to the political stability of the area would be a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict which recognised the rights of the Palestine people as well as Israel.

Immediately after the Russian invasion, the British Government proposed that the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community should discuss the measures we might take, bilaterally and collectively, to impress on the Russians how seriously we view their actions.

Some of our allies, notably the United States, have already acted. I expect others to follow suit. I shall now announce the measures which the British Government have so far decided to take. These are in addition to the measures related to Afghanistan which my Honourable Friend the Minister of State announced in another place on 14 January.

The British/Soviet credit agreement, concluded by the Labour Government in 1975, expires on the 16th of February. Its terms were too favourable to the Soviet Union,

/since

since the export credit was subsidised more than that which we extend to other countries.

The Government's view is that all trade should be pursued on a basis of mutual advantage. We shall apply that principle to British/Soviet trade. We do not propose to renew the credit agreement when it expires. Credit in future will have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Assuming that other Western countries do likewise - which would be very much to our collective advantage - we shall not provide export credit to the Soviet Union at rates more favourable than those set by the international consensus on credit terms.

On technology, we are studying with other countries the tighter application of the COCOM rules for controlling the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union.

The European Community has decided not to export any food to the Soviet Union which would directly or indirectly replace supplies denied by the United States. The

/Community

Community has therefore decided to curb exports of grain in the future. Britain is also pressing for an end to subsidised sales of butter, meat and sugar to the Soviet Union.

The Government have also decided to avoid high level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union for the time being. They will cancel military exchanges which were under consideration. They will avoid the kind of cultural and other events which would give an impression that nothing has changed and thus appear to condone Soviet aggression.

In accordance with the agreement between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the BBC, I have approved an increase in broadcasts by the External Services of the BBC to listeners in the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

I now turn to the question of the Olympic Games. Her Majesty's Government sympathise deeply with the Olympic ideal that young people from all over the world should be able to compete freely together with no overtones of

/politics.

politics. But this view has never been shared by authoritarian governments, which exploit such events for their political advantage.

As in 1936 for the Germany of the day, so now for the Soviet Union the Olympic Games are a major political undertaking designed to impress the whole world with the prestige of the system.

For the Games now to be held in Moscow would appear to condone Soviet aggression abroad and repression at home.

But for the Games to be cancelled entirely would be a bitter blow to the dedicated athletes, in Britain and elsewhere, who have trained so hard for so many years.

This is why the British Government believes that the Summer Games should be moved. That will not be easy. But it should not be beyond the capacity of the 104 countries which condemned the Soviet Union in the United Nations.

If necessary the Games could be held in more than one country.

/My Right

My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister has accordingly urged the British Olympic Association to approach the International Olympic Committee to propose that the Summer Games be moved from Moscow. The Government are fully prepared to help with arrangements for those parts of the Games which might be held in this country.

I do not conceal from the Noble Lords that recent Soviet actions in Afghanistan and at home are not a happy augury for the future. They undermine much of what has been achieved over the past decade and more to provide the basis for a stable and mutually satisfactory relationship between East and West.

They underline the need, above all, to develop political solidarity among the members of the European Community and between the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. It is from that political solidarity, and from the defensive arrangements which accompany it, that our dealings with the Russians have to start.

But both East and West live on one planet. The consequences of serious miscalculation could be disastrous for very
/many

many of its inhabitants.

It is right that the Russians should feel the strength of our disapproval. That should help them to avoid miscalculation in future. But it is also right that we should where possible continue the search for arms control agreements, commercially justified trade, and other arrangements of mutual benefit. In the long run both we and the Russians need a sound East-West relationship.

But the Russians must understand that there can be no such relationship so long as they behave as outrageously as they have done in Afghanistan.

END

24 JAN 1960



- ? Bacon Smul reports.
- ? No action until CD fails.
- ? bring 'EEL into line'
- ? Sov. overflying rights in S. Arabian.

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2.

Afghanistan

→ Afghanistan (Pt 3) 'Situation'

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET ON
WEDNESDAY 24 JANUARY 1980 AT 1630 HOURS

Present: *Subject copy filed on Jordan (June 1979) 'Visits to London
by King Hussein'*

The Prime Minister

King Hussein

The Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary

Mr. J.C. Moberly

Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander

* * * * *

General

King Hussein said that the Arab, and indeed the entire Muslim, world was facing the risk of a serious split. The danger had been, with difficulty, kept under control since the Camp David Agreement but was now re-appearing. He had been trying to keep in touch with all parties but the situation was deteriorating. There were differences in attitude towards the Soviet Union. The effect of events in Iran, which initially had been positive, was now increasingly unhelpful and on an expanding scale. The situation in that country was entirely unpredictable. The leaders there had no experience. They were acting in a way that was alien to Muslim traditions and to the interests of the area as a whole. What had happened in Afghanistan showed that the Russians were moving. They were trying to get closer to the oil producing regions. The Prime Minister asked whether, in King Hussein's view, that was the basic reason for the Soviet action in Afghanistan. King Hussein confirmed that that was his view.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that it was misleading to think of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan as purely military. Initially there had been a campaign of subversion. This was then followed by military action. King Hussein agreed and the Prime Minister noted that one could expect to see the pattern repeated. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the problem which now faced the area was that there was a puppet Government in Afghanistan and the Russians had established a centre

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FM BONN 231232Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 79 OF 23 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY PARIS

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON

Prime Minister

Worth reading in full.

ms

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.39 TO PARIS: ATTITUDES TO AFGHANISTAN

1. GENSCHER IS REPORTING TO THE FEDERAL CABINET TODAY ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. I WILL REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE OUTCOME AND ON ANY CONSEQUENT CHANGES IN THE GERMAN ATTITUDE. THERE IS ALREADY A MARKED DIFFERENCE OF TONE ON THE LINE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS PEDDLING FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION - THAT ALL IS SWEETNESS AND LIGHT - AND ON THE MOOD IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE, WHICH APPROACHES ANGER. MEANWHILE THE STATE OF GERMAN THINKING REMAINS BROADLY AS DESCRIBED IN MY TELEGRAM NO.71.
2. GERMAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS HAVE DEVELOPED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE THE NEWS OF THE SOVIET INVASION FIRST BROKE. THE CRUCIAL GERMAN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION (AND WITH THE GDR): THE TIMING OF THE INVASION OVER CHRISTMAS: THE ABSENCE OF SCHMIDT ON HOLIDAY IN MAJORCA: - SEEM AT FIRST TO HAVE LED THEM TO HOPE THAT THE CRISIS COULD BE CONTAINED AND NEED NOT NECESSARILY HAVE MORE THAN A GLANCING IMPACT ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE, AND THAT MONEY FOR TURKEY AND PAKISTAN WOULD BE A SUFFICIENT GERMAN RESPONSE. HENCE THE CAUTIOUS TONE OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S NEW YEAR MESSAGE (THE FINAL VERSION OF WHICH WAS RECORDED ON 28 DECEMBER), / HIS DECISION NOT TO CUT SHORT HIS HOLIDAY, TO PROCEED TO MADRID AND TO LOOK IN ON GISCARD ON HIS WAY BACK. ONCE THE CHANCELLOR GOT BACK TO BONN HOWEVER THE FULL SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MOVE AND THE STRENGTH OF WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD REACTIONS TO IT HAD SUNK IN. SINCE THEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN ACUTELY TORN BETWEEN THEIR RECOGNITION ON THE ONE HAND OF THE PARAMOUNT NEED TO BACK THE UNITED STATES AND PARTICIPATE IN A CO-ORDINATED AND EFFECTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION AND, ON THE /OTHER

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OTHER HAND, THEIR EXTREME RELUCTANCE TO PUT FRG/SOVIET RELATIONS DIRECTLY AT RISK WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH THAT MIGHT HAVE FOR PROGRESS IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND STABILITY IN BERLIN. MOREOVER 14 PER CENT OF WEST GERMAN SUPPLIES OF NATURAL GAS COMES FROM THE SOVIET UNION, 38 PER CENT OF THE ENRICHED URANIUM USED IN THE FRG IS PROCESSED UNDER CONTRACT IN THE USSR. THE WEST GERMANS UNDOUBTEDLY SHARE MANY ELEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION (PARIS TELNO. 104) AND WILL CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN KEEPING IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH, BUT THE LINE THEY HAVE BEEN STEERING SO FAR STEMS PRINCIPALLY FROM AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR OWN (CONFLICTING) INTERESTS AND ONLY SECONDARILY FROM A DESIRE TO KEEP IN STEP WITH THE FRENCH, THOUGH THAT REMAINS A DESIRABLE OBJECT OF POLICY TOO. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SCHMIDT/GENSCHER BRAND OF OSTPOLITIK - WHICH INCLUDE STABILITY IN AND AROUND BERLIN, A DEVELOPING DIALOGUE WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE STABLE AND MUTUALLY PROFITABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION - ARE OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO ANY GERMAN GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS BEING MAJOR PLANKS IN THE COALITION'S ELECTION PLATFORM. THEY HAVE MADE A CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO SCHMIDT'S PRESENT STRONG POSITION IN HIS OWN PARTY, WHICH WARMLY APPLAUDED HIS SPEECH IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 17 JANUARY. THE CONSEQUENCES OF JEOPARDISING THESE ACHIEVEMENTS COULD BE VERY SERIOUS ELECTORALLY AND FOR THE UNITY OF THE SPD.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHOCK WHICH AFGHANISTAN HAS ADMINISTERED TO THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S OSTPOLITIK HAS BEEN BASED HAS CAUSED A CERTAIN DIFFERENCE OF PERCEPTION BETWEEN GENSCHER AND SCHMIDT (WHICH THEY BOTH HAVE AN OVERRIDING INTEREST IN RECONCILING) AND HAS GIVEN THE OPPOSITION ITS FIRST REAL OPPORTUNITY SINCE STRAUSS BECAME CHANCELLOR-CANDIDATE TO QUESTION THE CORRECTNESS OF THAT POLICY AND THE SOUNDNESS OF THE CHANCELLOR'S JUDGEMENT. BUT SO FAR STRAUSS HAS BEEN CURIOUSLY MUTED IN EXPLOITING THIS OPPORTUNITY AND IS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE SITUATION CALLS FOR A BIPARTISAN RESPONSE, BUT ONE WHICH WILL REFLECT HIS OWN AVOWEDLY MORE HARD-HEADED APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS. MEANWHILE THE OPPOSITION HAS COME OUT FIRMLY IN FAVOUR OF BOYCOTTING THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS, /AND IS

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- 2 -

from which they could operate throughout the region. (King Hussein described it as a wedge dividing the Muslim world in half.) If the Russian advance was to be contained certain things were necessary:

- (a) The Islamic reaction, which had been very good so far, must be sustained. It would not be enough for the Islamic Conference to meet at the weekend and to think it would suffice to issue a single condemnation. There had to be a continuing process in which outrage would be expressed and action taken;
- (b) Pressure from the non-aligned world would have to be sustained;
- (c) The dangers of Communist subversion would have to be brought home to the countries of the region, notably Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The leaders whom he had met on his recent tour of the area had a worrying tendency to accept that subversion happened in other countries but not in their own. Moreover, they tended to take a simplistic view of the threat and to under-estimate the sophisticated nature of subversion today. Saudi Arabia, for instance, was "ripe for plucking".

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AND IS CONTINUING TO CRITICISE THE GOVERNMENT FOR GIVING INSUFFICIENT BACKING TO THE UNITED STATES AND FOR GENERAL INDECISIVENESS. SCHMIDT AND SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE DUE TO MEET STRAUSS AND HIS COLLEAGUES ON 24 JANUARY TO BRIEF THE OPPOSITION ON AFGHANISTAN AND TO GIVE THE GOVERNMENT'S REPLY TO STRAUSS'S (HEAVILY QUALIFIED) PROPOSAL ON BIPARTISANSHIP. ALTHOUGH THE OPPOSITION IS LIKELY, FOR ELECTORAL REASONS, TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT FOR A TOUGHER REACTION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION, THEY TOO ARE ALIVE TO THE DANGERS FOR THE FRG OF LOSING THE (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) ACQUIS OF OST-POLITIK AND REVERTING TO A COLD WAR SITUATION. THEY ARE THEREFORE COUGHT (ALBEIT TO A LESSER EXTENT) IN THE SAME DILEMMA AS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THE PRECISE ISSUE OF THE OLYMPICS HAS GIVEN THEM A FOCUS ON WHICH TO DRAMATISE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

4. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT HOW FAR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE WILL HARDEN IF THE CRISIS IS PROTRACTED. IT WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE TWO SUPER POWERS PLAY THEIR RESPECTIVE HANDS. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, THE LONGER THE CRISIS LASTS AND THE SHARPER THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION BECOME, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WILL BE FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BLUR THE CHOICE BETWEEN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS IT IS BOUND TO ATTACH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO THE FORMER. I WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT TO SEE IT MOVE PAINFULLY AND STEP BY STEP TOWARDS A POSITION OF HARDER CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WRIGHT

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DESKBY F C O 231800Z

FROM PARIS 231652Z JAN 80

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 109 OF 23 JANUARY 1980

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, BONN AND UKDEL NATO

TELECONS VEREKER/YOUNG: AFGHANISTAN: FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION

1. PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE, MORE THAN IN BRITAIN, TAKES ITS COLOUR FROM THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE FACT THAT THIS HAS BEEN LOW PROFILE AND RATHER LIMP HAS MEANT THAT PUBLIC REACTIONS HAVE OFTEN TENDED TO BE INDISTINCT. ON THE OTHER HAND THE INITIAL LIMPNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS PUT IT IN A GOOD POSITION TO EVOLVE AN ATTITUDE IN RESPONSE TO THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION.

2. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN NO OPINION POLLS. TO THE AVERAGE FRENCHMAN, AFGHANISTAN IS REMOTE. THERE ARE NO HISTORIC OR CULTURAL LINKS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THAT PART OF ASIA WHICH MIGHT HAVE PROVOKED AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM THE FRENCH PUBLIC. IN THE EARLY DAYS OF JANUARY, PARTICULARLY AT THE TIME OF THE REMARKS MADE BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER (MY TELNO 26) THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF CRITICISM, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE ARTICULATE PUBLIC IN PARIS, AT THE SOFTNESS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S REACTION. NO DOUBT THIS, TOGETHER WITH FOREIGN REACTIONS, LED TO THE RATHER STRONGER LANGUAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE A FEW DAYS LATER (MY TELNO 41).

3. FIFTY PER CENT OF THE FRENCH PUBLIC VOTES FOR THE COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PARTIES. THERE ARE CROSS-CURRENTS ON AFGHANISTAN IN BOTH OF THEM, BUT BROADLY THE PCF FOLLOWERS WANT TO AVOID TROUBLE WITH MOSCOW, AND PS FOLLOWERS SEEM MORE CONCERNED TO PICK HOLES IN GOVERNMENT ACTION OR PCF ARGUMENTS THAN TO PROPOUND A CLEAR LINE OF THEIR OWN. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT INFORMED ELEMENTS IN PUBLIC OPINION ACCEPT MOST OF THE CONSIDERATIONS IN MY TELNO 104, BUT WOULD PREFER TO SEE MORE ROBUST PUBLIC CRITICISM BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOVIET ACTION.

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4. THERE IS A FAIRLY WIDESPREAD FEELING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE GONE TOO FAR, PARTICULARLY IN THE STRIDENT TONE OF ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THERE IS ALSO THE FEELING THAT THIS MAY DRIVE THE SOVIET UNION INTO A CORNER AND BRING ABOUT A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR, AGAINST WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN MUCH CONDITIONED. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THEREFORE HAVE HAD UP TILL NOW LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN PERSUADING THE PUBLIC THAT THE FRENCH POSITION SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT AND UNALIGNED TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

5. OUTSIDE EVENTS ARE HAVING AN INFLUENCE ON THE WAY FRENCH OPINION EVOLVES. SOVIET TREATMENT OF SAKHAROV, FOR EXAMPLE, IS LIKELY TO AFFECT FRENCH REACTIONS, INCLUDING PERHAPS AS REGARDS ATTENDANCE AT THE OLYMPICS (THE FRENCH OLYMPIC COMMITTEE YESTERDAY ACCEPTED THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE'S INVITATION TO SEND A FRENCH TEAM). A NUMBER OF FRENCH PERSONALITIES (SARTRE, RAYMOND ARON, ROBERT FABRE) ARE BEGINNING TO COME OUT AGAINST FRENCH PARTICIPATION. THE DECISION OF THE SPEAKER OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO CUT SHORT HIS VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION AS A RESULT OF THE SAKHAROV AFFAIR SHOWS THE EXTENT TO WHICH EVEN FRENCH POLITICIANS ARE SENSITIVE TO THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC IMPACT OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS MOSCOW.

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Afghanistan

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THE PRIME MINISTER

23 January 1980

Dear Malcolm,

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T17/80

Thank you for your timely letter about Afghanistan. I very much agree with your approach. The Russians have cynically imposed their will on a non-aligned country by military force in gross violation of international law and under the flimsiest of pretexts.

If we are to prevent a recurrence of what has happened it will be essential to convince the Russians that, in planning their intervention in Afghanistan, they seriously under-estimated the likely world reaction. The West has a major role to play in this. I agree that the measures we take are unlikely to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan itself (though it may be harder than they think to control that country). But unless there is a sustained Western reaction, the temptation for the Russians to choose the military option again will be the greater. Their next victim could be a country of even greater and more direct importance to the West than Afghanistan.

I therefore welcome the firm measures which the Australian Government have announced. I am particularly glad that Australia, the United States, Canada and the EEC have taken action on grain sales to the Soviet Union. This should have a major effect in bringing home to the Soviet Union the gravity of their action and the seriousness of the Western response.

The United Kingdom played an active part in initiating the very telling condemnation of the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly resolution for which 104 countries voted. Later

/this week

this week we shall be announcing other measures. High level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union will be suspended. Military exchanges will be cancelled and certain other events which might convey a public impression of business as usual will be avoided. On technology we shall call for a review in COCOM of means of tightening its rules vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The British/Soviet credit agreement which expires on 16 February, will not be renewed and we shall not maintain the very favourable export credit terms which it prescribed. Peter Carrington has just finished his tour of Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India. We are considering in the light of his talks ways in which the countries of the region can be helped to meet the challenge of the Soviet invasion.

To be effective, Western action needs to be concerted. There has been much discussion in NATO and the Nine and, although there are differences, we hope that most of our Allies will take steps similar to the British ones.

The following are some of the matters on which the British and Australian Governments will, I hope, keep in touch:-

- (i) Relocation or a widespread boycott of the Olympic Games would severely hurt Soviet prestige. There are of course practical difficulties because it is not in our Governments' powers to take the necessary decisions. But Western Governments would be failing in their duty if they did not make their views plain. Yesterday I asked our national Olympic Association here to consider urgently an approach to the International Olympic Committee proposing that the Games should be moved. I know that you have taken a similarly clear line with your own Association.

/(ii) We

- (ii) We need to support Pakistan and, as a corollary, provide reassurance to India about what we are doing. We should aim to encourage greater understanding between Pakistan and India.
- (iii) The situation in Iran remains complex and unstable. The question of the hostages continues to face the Americans with very serious difficulties. But the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has changed the situation radically. The Iranians must be convinced that their long-term interests lie with the West.
- (iv) We need to encourage the moderate non-aligned countries to maintain their present firm stance.

Your remarks about the longer term are equally important. There is a pressing need for a more coherent Western policy to manage crises in the Third World and to deter Soviet opportunism. It may be that the lack of a firm Western reaction to earlier events in Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia encouraged the Russians to believe that the West would tolerate their actions in Afghanistan.

I welcome the chance of discussing all this personally with you on 4 February. Meanwhile I suggest that our governments should continue to exchange views through our High Commissions.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) MT

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser, CH, MP.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 104 OF 22 JANUARY 1980

AND TO PRIORITY BONN

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON

Prime Minister
Work reading is full.

mt

YOUR TELNO 39: FRENCH ATTITUDE TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS

1. YOU WILL NOW HAVE SEEN MY TELNO 90 WHICH GOES SOME WAY TOWARDS ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS IN YOUR TUR. THERE HAS NOT BEEN A THOROUGH POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO HAVE A THOROUGH DISCUSSION WITH THE FRENCH ABOUT THEIR WAY OF ASSESSING THE SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO PUT TOGETHER THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WHICH FEATURE IN THE FRENCH ATTITUDE:

- (A) THE FRENCH DO NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT CARTER'S DESCRIPTION OF THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO WORLD SECURITY SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THEY WOULD COUNT THE KOREAN WAR, THE BERLIN BLOCKADE, THE COMMUNISATION OF CHINA AND THE CUBA MISSILE CRISIS AS HAVING ALL BEEN IN THEIR TIME MUCH MORE DANGEROUS.
- (B) THEY APPEAR TO CLASS THE AFGHAN CRISIS WITH SUCH HAPPENINGS AS THE CRISES IN ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA AND CAMBODIA. THEY SEEM TO SEE THEM AS BEING CHARACTERISTIC OF A PERIOD OF NUCLEAR BALANCE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS WHEN POLITICAL ERRORS BY OTHERS CREATE SITUATIONS IN WHICH SOVIET OPPORTUNISM CAN HAVE FULL PLAY WITHOUT ANY RISK OF BEING COUNTERED BY IMMEDIATE US MILITARY ACTION. THE FAVOURABLE SITUATION IN ANGOLA WAS CREATED BY SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY ACTION, THAT IN ETHIOPIA BY SOMALI MILITARY ACTION, THAT IN CAMBODIA BY THE ATROCITIES OF POL POT AND THAT IN AFGHANISTAN BY THE COLLAPSE AND MIS-DIRECTION OF IRAN UNDER KHOMEINI.

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/(C) THE

- (C) THE FRENCH DO NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE PROPOSITION THAT DETENTE IS INDIVISIBLE. THEY SEEM TO REGARD THIS AS A DANGEROUS OVER-SIMPLIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IF USED AS A GUIDE TO ACTION. THEY ARE PREPARED ONLY TO ADOPT THE MORE VAGUE PROPOSITION THAT DETENTE HAS TO BE GLOBAL (IE, THERE IS A CERTAIN INTERDEPENDENCE BUT IT HAS A RELATIVE AND NOT AN ABSOLUTE VALUE).
- (D) THEY SEE THE MAIN PROBLEM POSED BY THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AS A REGIONAL ONE, THAT IS TO SAY AS A PROBLEM OF RALLYING AND STRENGTHENING THE SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES TO STAND UP TO THE SOVIET UNION. THIS REQUIRES ABOVE ALL THE REBUILDING OF IRAN IN SOME FORM AND A BRIDGING BY SOME MEANS OF THE DEEP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA.
- (E) THEY DO NOT ACCEPT THAT DETENTE IN EUROPE IS A BUSTED FLUSH. THEY REGARD IT AS DE GAULLE'S INVENTION, AND THEY THINK IT IS FUNCTIONING SATISFACTORILY AS A MEANS OF KEEPING TENSION DOWN IN THE MOST VITAL AREA OF EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION AND AS A MEANS ALSO OF SLOWLY LIMITING ALL THE SOVIET UNION'S OPTIONS OTHER THAN THE MILITARY ONES.
- (F) THEY IN NO WAY REGARD DETENTE AS INCOMPATIBLE WITH MODERNISATION AND STRENGTHENING OF ARMAMENTS. THEY FAVOUR THE LATTER, BUT OF COURSE THEIR LONGSTANDING NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO NATO SEVERELY LIMITS THEIR ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON CAUSE IN THIS FIELD.
- (G) THE FRENCH SEE NO PURPOSE IN TRYING TO PUNISH THE SOVIET UNION OTHER THAN BY ORGANISING THE WORLD TO CONTAIN THE SOVIET UNION. THEY DO NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO DEEPEN THE EAST/WEST ASPECT OF THE CRISIS, AND THEY SEEM TO THINK THAT ANY SUCH DEEPENING WOULD DAMAGE WESTERN INTERESTS WITHOUT INCREASING SECURITY.
- (H) THEY QUESTION PRESIDENT CARTER'S WISDOM AND STABILITY, SEEING IN IRAN SOME OF THE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO HAVE BEEN A DANGEROUSLY EXAGGERATED HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, AND REMINDING THEMSELVES DAILY THAT ONE OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATIONS IS HIS CAMPAIGN FOR RE-ELECTION.

- (1) THEY DO NOT REGARD EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AS ENTAILING A NEW THREAT TO YUGOSLAVIA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN EUROPE, AND THEY DO NOT SEE TITO'S SUCCESSION AS CAUSING AN EARLY, UNEXPECTED CRISIS.
2. THE ABOVE TENETS APPEAR TO BE SINCERELY HELD IN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY DO ALSO OF COURSE CONVENIENTLY RATIONALISE FOREIGN PROBLEMS IN A WAY WHICH SUITS FRANCE'S INTERNAL POLITICAL INTERESTS AND NECESSITIES. IT SUITS PRESIDENT GISCARD AND HIS GOVERNMENT VERY WELL THAT FRANCE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE INDEPENDENT POLITICALLY (PARTICULARLY OF THE UNITED STATES) AND THAT THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE A MATTER OF CONTROVERSY WITH THE POWERFUL LEFT-WING, WHETHER SOCIALISTS OR COMMUNISTS.
3. A FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN HAS BEEN THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN DETERMINED NOT TO BE HUSTLED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES NOT FOR TAKING A FIRM LINE BUT FOR WORKING UP TOO MUCH PUBLIC EXCITEMENT ABOUT WESTERN SOLIDARITY. PRESIDENT CARTER'S DESPATCHING OF MR WARREN CHRISTOPHER TO EUROPE TO PRESIDE OVER A PUBLICISED MEETING OF SIX NATIONS IN LONDON TO SET THE TONE FOR WESTERN REACTIONS TO THE AFGHAN INVASION WAS BOUND TO GRATE ON SOME FRENCH SUSCEPTIBILITIES. AT EACH STAGE SINCE THEN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS TENDED TO BE MORE CONCERNED TO MAKE ITS INDEPENDENCE CLEAR THAN TO SHOW SOLIDARITY WITH ALLIES. FRANCE HAS FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO BE MORE SOLID ON THE QUESTION OF IRAN WHERE THERE HAS BEEN LESS PUBLIC DECLAMATION THAN ON THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN WHERE THEY HAVE FELT THE NEED TO DETACH THEMSELVES FROM RHETORIC USED ELSEWHERE.
4. THE FRENCH ATTITUDE APPEARS TO CONTINUE TO BE THAT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY NOW SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO EFFORTS TO STABILISE IRAN (IF ANY CAN BE DEvised) AND TO EFFORTS TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN AND INDIA AND TRY TO BRING THEM CLOSER TOGETHER. THEY WOULD ALSO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE STABILISATION OF TURKEY. THE FRENCH ARGUE THAT THE AIM OF POLICY SHOULD BE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO WAY BY WHICH THIS COULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY FORCE OR CONFRONTATION AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE WAY TO REMEDY THE SITUATION WILL BE BY NEGOTIATING SOMEHOW WITH THE SOVIET UNION, PREFERABLY FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THE REGION.

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5. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN THE REASONING WHICH LIES BEHIND THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF IT CONTINUES TO TAKE LAMENTABLE FORMS. THE LATEST EXTRAORDINARY EPISODE IS THE VISIT OF M CHABAN-DELMAS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, TO MOSCOW, PRECEDED AND ACCOMPANIED BY OSTENTATIOUS STATEMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE HOLDING OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES THERE. THERE IS SOME IMPLIED AND A LITTLE OPENLY STATED CRITICISM OF THIS EVEN IN THE FRENCH PRESS. FOR PRESIDENT GISCARD THE DIVIDEND IS PRESUMABLY AN INTERNAL ONE IN THAT IT IS A GAULLIST WHO IS BEING THE PATHFINDER ON A PATH WHICH OTHERS ARE TRYING TO CLOSE. THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN GIVEN THAT THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS THE FRENCH ATTITUDE HAS EVOLVED UNDER PRESSURE AND THAT IT IS LARGELY (AND CYNICALLY) RELATED TO INTERNAL OR SPECIFICALLY FRENCH CONSIDERATIONS RATHER THAN TO ANY LONGTERM VIEW OF THE WAY IN WHICH PEACE CAN BE PRESERVED IN THE WORLD. NEVERTHELESS, THE FRENCH DO HAVE A LONGTERM VIEW COMPOSED OF THE ELEMENTS LISTED ABOVE, AND THEIR DEFICIENCIES IN EXECUTION SHOULD NOT BE MISTAKEN FOR DEFICIENCIES OF PURPOSE OR SERIOUSNESS.

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 101 OF 22 JANUARY 1980

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO MOSCOW AND UKMIS NEW YORK
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MY TELNO 90 (PARA 8): FRENCH REACTIONS TO SOVIET INVASION OF
AFGHANISTAN

1. THE QUAI ANNOUNCED ON THE EVENING OF 21 JANUARY THAT, "FOLLOWING THE PROPOSAL MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IN HIS MESSAGE OF 15 JANUARY" TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV, KORNIENKO WOULD VISIT PARIS ON 24 JANUARY FOR TALKS AT THE QUAI "ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN". THE COMMUNIQUE PLACED THE TALKS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FRANCO/SOVIET PROTOCOL OF 13 OCTOBER 1970 WHICH SPECIFIES THAT THE FRENCH AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTACT EACH OTHER "WITHOUT DELAY" IN THE EVENT OF A THREAT TO THE PEACE OR "INTERNATIONAL TENSION".

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 January 1980

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan

Thank you for your letter of 14 January enclosing a copy of a letter from the Australian Prime Minister. As requested, I enclose a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Fraser. You will have seen Canberra Telno 40 of 16 January with the latest information about the Australian decisions on reactions to the Soviet Intervention.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street

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22 JAN 1980

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DRAFT LETTER

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret, Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.

To:-

The Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser CH MP
Prime Minister of Australia

From
Prime Minister
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

Thank you for your timely letter about Afghanistan. I very much agree with your approach. The Russians have cynically imposed their will on a non-aligned country by military force in gross violation of international law and under the flimsiest of pretexts.

If we are ~~made~~
~~I believe our main aim now should be to prevent a recurrence of what has happened. This means first that we must convince the Russians that, in planning their intervention in Afghanistan, they seriously under-estimated the likely world reaction. The West has a major role to play in this. I agree that the measures we take are unlikely to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan itself (though it may be harder than they think to control that country), but a firm Western response will help to deter any future aggression. Unless there is a sustained Western reaction, the temptation for the Russians to choose the military option will be the greater, next time and their next victim could be a country of far greater importance than Afghanistan.~~
it will be essential to
even + more direct to the West

I therefore welcome the firm measures which the Australian Government have announced. I am particularly glad that

/Australia

Australia, the United States, Canada and the EEC have taken action on grain sales to the Soviet Union. This should have a major effect in bringing home to the Soviet Union the gravity of their action and the seriousness of the Western response.

The United Kingdom played an active part in ~~launching the~~ ^{initiating the} moves in the United Nations which produced a very telling condemnation of the Soviet Union in the ^{United Nations} General Assembly resolution for which 104 countries voted. ~~Early next~~ ^{later this} week, ~~after Peter Carrington's return~~ we shall be announcing other measures. High level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union will be suspended. Military exchanges will be cancelled and ^{certain} other events which might convey a public impression of business as usual will be avoided. On technology we shall call for a review in COCOM of means of tightening its rules vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The British/Soviet credit agreement, which expires on 16 February, will not be renewed and we shall not maintain the very favourable export credit terms which it prescribed. Peter Carrington has just finished his tour of Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India. ^{We are concerned in the light of} ~~His talks with their leaders will help us to~~ ~~determine~~ ways in which the countries of the region can be helped to meet the challenge of the Soviet ^{invasion} ~~intervention~~.

To be effective, Western action needs to be concerted. There has been much discussion in NATO and the Nine and, although there are differences, we hope that most of our Allies will take steps similar to the British ones.

SECRET

Governments

Which the British Ambassador

The following are some of the matters on ~~which you and I~~ ^{which the British Ambassador} ~~ought to~~ ^{will, I hope,} keep in touch:-

- (i) Relocation or a widespread boycott of the Olympic Games would severely hurt Soviet prestige. ~~though,~~ ^{though,} as we all know, ^{of course} there are ~~a great many~~ practical difficulties because it is not in our Governments' powers to take the ^{necessary} ~~required~~ decision. But I ~~believe~~ ^{believe} ~~that~~ Western Governments would be failing in their duty if they did not make their views plain; ~~in the House of Commons yesterday I asked my national Olympic Association here to consider urgently an approach to the approach to persuade the International Olympic Committee ^{informing that} ~~to move the Games.~~ ^{should be moved} Would you be willing to join in an approach to the IOC? ~~Might there be a chance of holding the Games in Melbourne.~~~~
- (ii) We need to support Pakistan and, as a corollary, provide reassurance to India about what we are doing. ^{should aim} We wish ~~to encourage~~ ^{to encourage} greater understanding between Pakistan and India. ~~Might it be useful to encourage Pakistan to seek to renew her Commonwealth membership?~~
- (iii) The situation in Iran remains complex and unstable, and how to handle ~~the~~ ^{the} question of the hostages continues to face the Americans with very serious difficulties. But the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has changed ^{situation radically} ~~some of the ground rules~~ and we must exploit the new situation skilfully, both to prevent Soviet meddling and, when we can, to ^{must be announced} ~~convince~~ the Iranians that their long-term interests lie with the West.

[17 January]

If they agree to do so I would hope that other I know that you have taken a similarly clear line with your own Association

(iv)

(iv) We need to encourage the moderate non-aligned countries to maintain their ^{present} firm ^{stance} ~~reactions~~.

Your remarks about the longer term are ^{equally} ~~even more~~ important. There is a pressing need for a more coherent Western policy to manage crises in the Third World and to deter Soviet opportunism. ~~Indeed,~~ ^{it} may be that the lack of a firm Western reaction ^{earlier} to events in Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia encouraged the Russians to believe that the West would tolerate ^{their} ~~its~~ actions in Afghanistan.

I welcome the chance of discussing all this personally with you on 4 February. Meanwhile I suggest that our governments should continue to exchange views through our High Commissions.

Afglanistan



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Handwritten initials

21 January 1980

Dear Michael,

Afghanistan

The Prime Minister and those attending the OD meeting tomorrow will wish to see the attach draft statement to be made in the House of Lords tomorrow. This is being submitted to Lord Carrington overnight. The Secretary of State has not himself seen this draft.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the members of OD, the Private Secretaries to the Secretaries of State for Industry and Energy, the Private Secretary to the Attorney-General, the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Secretary at the Dept of Environment and to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Handwritten signature

(G G H Walden)
Private Secretary

Handwritten mark

M O'D B Alexander Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

- Top Secret.
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To:-

From

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

HOUSE OF LORDS
DRAFT STATEMENT

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Noble Lords will expect me to describe the Government's position about the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, in the light of my visit to Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India, and a brief call at Bahrain, between 9 and 18 January.

The view of Her Majesty's Government, which I expressed to all whom I met on my tour is that set out in some detail by my honourable friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when he spoke in another place on 14 January. Briefly, the Soviet Union acted for selfish reasons to establish a military hold on a sovereign country. The invasion cynically violated all the international principles which the Soviet Union constantly calls on others to observe. It was a demonstration of the Soviet drive to gain wider influence wherever possible and to use force for the purpose. The geographical position of Afghanistan and its presence in the Moslem world give the events there the greatest significance. I found that most of those to whom I talked shared our assessment of Soviet objectives, and our estimate of the dangers to the security and integrity of other states in the region, and with the need for a significant and sustained response, both from the West and from those countries which feel threatened.

Naturally the leaders in different countries all viewed the crisis and Soviet actions from their own standpoints, but

certain important points of agreement emerged. One was that the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz are now a region where the interests of the countries of the area and the Western powers are identical: there is a pressing need for stability and freedom against attack.

A second important point was the urgent need for Pakistan's friends to recognise that the Soviet threat requires their full support for Pakistan in the face of the economic, political and now military problems which this country ~~now~~ faces.

A third and very important consideration is the real need for Pakistan and India each to lose the fear and distrust which it has for the other's motives and intentions. They have a common interest in the stability and prosperity of the Sub-Continent. The achievement of this will be the best guarantee of the region's future stability.

I visited Turkey first, a NATO ally deeply concerned about events in the region. It is clear that Turkey needs the commitment of Western support as much as ever under present circumstances.

I went on to Oman and Saudi Arabia: countries very concerned at the Soviet attack on another Islamic country. There, as in Turkey, I also discussed Iran. There was a general feeling that the real threat to Iran's recent revolution and to her future security lay not in the past relationship of the US to the country's former regime, but in the present menace from the Soviet invasion.

I had significant talks with President Zia and his Foreign Affairs adviser Mr Agha Shahi. As Noble Lords would expect, they ~~were~~ deeply concerned at the new threat on Pakistan's Western frontier. Their resolution to defend their country is emphatic but they made it clear that they
/need

need the support of their friends materially as well as politically.

I also went to see the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. President Zia told me there were over half a million already there. This is a serious problem for Pakistan. We have sent aid from Britain in the form of blankets, tents and medicines. The UN Commissioner for Refugees is seeking more world aid. But the problem for Pakistan is not just dealing with the humanitarian needs of the refugees. Amongst these refugees are Afghans bitterly opposed to the Soviet conquest of their country and determined to return to Afghanistan. The Pakistan Government are worried that the Soviet Union might make this a pretext to make attacks into Pakistan or for Soviet-inspired subversion. There were similar worries expressed elsewhere during my tour about a regional threat.

In India, a country with which we have had long close and friendly relations, I was particularly pleased to be able to see Mrs Gandhi and members of her Government so soon after they had taken office. In Pakistan President Zia had assured me of his wish for the process of better understanding between the two countries, begun under the Simla agreement of 1972, to be continued. I found a similar wish on the part of the Indian Government, and this is encouraging. However, I must tell Noble Lords frankly that the Indian Government is concerned with the effect on the Sub-Continent of the provision of assistance to Pakistan from the US and other Western countries. On this the British Government is quite clear that any support to Pakistan would not reduce Indian security: it is a direct consequence of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. This ^ecreates a very special case for a generous response as well

as understanding on the part of the ^{leaders} ~~Government~~ of India.

The Government are urgently considering a range of possible measures that will help countries of the region - the most urgent need is to respond to Pakistan's request for assistance. We are consulting with allied governments about how we can play our part in helping Pakistan. I am also seeking to strengthen cooperation with Turkey both bilaterally and multilaterally in as many fields as possible. I will keep the House informed of progress. But it is axiomatic that all the countries themselves must make up their own minds how to act to meet the present dangerous situation. A firm political commitment to the security and independence of the countries of this area is perhaps the most reassuring thing the West can give.

I turn now to another important aspect of the situation facing the world after the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan: the effect on our relations with the Soviet Union. The immediate motive for the Russians' move may have been to consolidate their influence in Afghanistan. But if the Soviet Union is to be deterred from similar aggression in the future, perhaps in countries of great importance to us all, it is essential that we show that their action affects the whole range of the world's contacts with the Soviet Union. Concrete steps are needed. Noble Lords will know that Britain proposed the intensive

discussions which have been taking place in the North Atlantic Alliance and among the members of the European Community. Some of our Allies, notably the United States, have already announced measures in their ~~x~~ relations with the Soviet Union, I expect others to follow suit. I shall now announce the measures which the British Government have so far decided to take.

The British/Soviet credit agreement, concluded by the Labour Government in 1975, expires on the 16th of February. Its terms were too favourable to the Soviet Union for the export credit was subsidised more than that which we extend to other countries. The Government's view is that all trade should be pursued on a basis of mutual advantage and we shall apply that principle to British/Soviet trade. We do not propose to renew the credit agreement when it expires. Assuming that other Western countries do likewise - it is very much to our collective advantage, that we~~x~~ all ~~xxxx~~ do so. We shall not provide export credit to the Soviet Union at rates more favourable than those ~~set~~ by the international consensus on credit terms.

On technology we are studying with other countries the tighter application of the COCOM rules for controlling the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union.

The European Community has decided not to export food to the Soviet Union which directly or indirectly would take the place of the supplies denied by the ~~x~~ United States. The Community has thus decided to curb exports of grain *in the future*. Britain also favours an end to subsidised butter, ~~meat~~ and sugar sales and we ~~x~~ are pressing for this. ~~3~~

The Government have also decided to avoid high level and Ministerial contacts with the Soviet Union for the time being, to cancel military exchanges which were under consideration and to avoid the kind of cultural and other events which would give ~~an~~ an impression ~~of~~ that nothing has changed and thus appear to condone Soviet aggression.

As Noble Lords

~~Amended Version~~

cc Mr Ferguson
Mr Mallaby
Mr Morgan

As Noble Lords will have seen from the statement of my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister in another place on 17 January, Her Majesty's Government is deeply concerned at the prospect of the Olympic Games taking place in the Soviet Union.

Sadly, one can no longer divorce sport from politics, as was the case in 1936. So now for the Soviet Union the Olympic Games are a major political undertaking designed to gain prestige in the world. It would be wrong for those people and countries which deplore aggression to cooperate in giving the Soviet Union the success it is seeking. To do so could give the appearance of condoning what is happening in Afghanistan.

The practical difficulties of moving the games are formidable but should not be beyond the capability of the 104 countries which condemned the Soviet Union in the United Nations. If necessary the Games could be held in more than one country. We ourselves have some facilities: we would be particularly well equipped to help over football.

Noble Lords will know that President Carter has asked the National Olympic Committee of the United States to approach the International Olympic Committee urgently to propose that the Summer Games be relocated. My Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister has addressed a similar request to the British Olympic Association.

Britain has outstanding sportsmen and women who have been training for years for these Olympics. The Government want to see them win as many medals as possible in Games which give no comfort to the Soviet Union.

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Italy, Jan 80,
Visit by Cossiga



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

21 January, 1980.

Dear Paul,

Telephone call from Signor Cossiga

The Italian Prime Minister, Signor Cossiga, rang the Prime Minister this evening from Rome. He said that he would be leaving shortly for the United States and that he wanted to discuss one or two of the topics on his agenda with the Prime Minister before his departure. He stressed that he had no mandate to speak on behalf of the Nine, and had no intention of doing so.

Signor Cossiga said that he thought it was important for the West to be firm and to take a clear line on the Soviet action in Afghanistan while at the same time being sufficiently flexible to avoid prejudicing detente. The Soviet Union must be brought to understand that the present position in Afghanistan was not compatible with detente. Signor Cossiga said that one aspect of the present situation concerned him. It was important for the European States to show maximum solidarity in reacting to the Soviet Union. Divisions among the members of the Community could do a lot of harm. He wondered therefore whether it might not be necessary for the Foreign Ministers of the Nine to have a further discussion of closer political cooperation on these issues.

Signor Cossiga said that in addition to agreeing a strategy on the question of sanctions against the Soviet Union and Iran, the Nine also needed a common strategy on relations with the Arab world. The scale of the threat needed to be brought home to the Arabs. An effort was going to be made to try to help Turkey and Pakistan: the same had to be done for the Arabs. Signor Cossiga added that for this reason he valued the cautious line taken by President Carter vis-a-vis Iran.

While noting that Afghanistan was the most important single issue, Signor Cossiga said that the problem of Yugoslavia was particularly sensitive for Italy. He believed that the Community's negotiations with Yugoslavia should be brought to an early conclusion.

Reverting to the overall problem, Signor Cossiga said that the lack of a common position among the Nine might allow the neutral

/ forces

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forces to take over. (He did not make it clear whether he meant neutral forces in Europe or neutralist forces in the Third World.) He asked the Prime Minister for her views on the forum in which a common line might best be concerted. Would she prefer another meeting of the Six (i.e., the group which met in London under Mr. Christopher's Chairmanship) or a meeting of the Nine at Foreign Minister level?

In reply, the Prime Minister said that she agreed with Signor Cossiga that Afghanistan was the most important current crisis. It was essential that the West should take firm action. Recent meetings of the Nine and of NATO in Brussels had agreed in deploring the situation, but had signally failed to agree on action. The plain fact was that Europe was at present not united in its view as to what should be done. Europe's political leaders would be failing President Carter and the West as a whole if they contented themselves with condemning the actions of the Soviet Government.

On the Olympic Games, about which Signor Cossiga had asked her opinion, the Prime Minister recalled that she had come out strongly in favour of a move of venue for the games. She would be replying tomorrow to President Carter following a discussion with Ministerial colleagues. HMG would support the President in urging the International Olympic Committee to attempt to find another home for this year's Olympics.

As regards other actions on Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said that the Nine had already agreed to back President Carter on grain. In her view the Nine should go further. It was very wrong for the Community to be exporting butter to the Soviet Union: this was a view she held very strongly indeed. As regards high technology, COCOM's rules should be tightened up in order to restrict sales.

The Prime Minister said that she agreed with Signor Cossiga about the need to conclude an improved trade agreement with Yugoslavia as soon as possible.

On Iran, the Prime Minister expressed concern that the imposition of sanctions might not in fact help to secure the release of the hostages. In foreign policy terms, the correct policy vis-a-vis Iran at present was that the West should be trying to persuade the Iranian Government of the danger from the Soviet Union and of the wisdom of friendship with the West. She therefore hoped that the Americans would go slow on sanctions for the time being.

The Prime Minister said she thought that the best way to coordinate joint action might be a further meeting of the Six. But if a meeting of the Nine Foreign Ministers was preferred, it would be essential that it should be carefully prepared in advance.

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- 3 -

Certain questions should be identified before the meeting took place. Foreign Ministers should bring answers with them. If there was not some measure of advance preparation, and indeed of advance agreement, the meeting was unlikely to be fruitful. Indeed it might do more to show up the divisions within the Community than its unity.

Signor Cossiga did not respond to the Prime Minister's observations on this point. He said that he looked forward to seeing the Prime Minister in London next week.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Richard Alexander

Paul Lever, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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SPB

SUBJECT,

cc. ~~Mastor~~
els
~~Cossiga visits.~~

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Pmt

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE
PRIME MINISTER OF ITALY, SIGNOR COSSIGA ON MONDAY 21 JANUARY 1980

Prime Minister: Hello, Mr. Cossiga. I am well and you?

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 15/80

Signor Cossiga: I am well.

PM: I am full of problems but I expect you are too.

SC: I am ringing as I wish to speak to you about some problems that I will speak to President Carter about. I have my interpreter here and I think the best way to speak together

PM: Very well, yes, go ahead.

SC: Prime Minister, there is one first thing the Prime Minister is well aware that he has no mandate and he has neither any intention to represent the Nine countries of the EEC or European NATO members when talking to President Carter or members of the US Administration who we are going to meet very soon as you are aware. Anyway I thought it would really be a good idea and also necessary to talk to you before leaving for the United States in particular because Italy has now the Presidency in the Common Market and I thought it would be useful to talk to you first. Is that all right?

PM: It is very useful and it is understood and I am very grateful.

SC (through Interpreter): I think it is ever so important to be firm and also to take a clear position and at the same time be as flexible as possible so as not to prejudice detente. On the other hand, it is necessary to make the Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact understand that detente is not compatible with the facts placed in front of us.

what
PM: Yes, well/I am concerned about, if you would tell Signor Cossiga, is that we all seem to be

Interpreter; May Mr. Cossiga go on?

PM: Yes, of course Signor Cossiga may go on.

Interpreter: I am rather worried about the situation. I think it is very important that right now we should all try to obtain the maximum of solidarity in our direction to the United States because I think that any division of the European States right now would really do a lot of harm. This is why I wonder whether it would not be necessary to have a consultation among our Foreign Ministers - that is within the EEC - in view of discussing the question of closer political co-operation. There is the problem for instance of sanctions against the Soviet Union in connection with their intervention in Afghanistan and also the problem of sanctions against Iran. I also believe it is necessary to have a common strategy in our relations with the Arabic countries because they should better understand how enormously they are being threatened also by the Soviet Union. On our side we are going to try and help as much as possible Turkey and Pakistan. I believe that we should try and do a little more also for the Arabic countries and this is why I do appreciate the rather cautious action of Carter towards Iran and this means that the most important fact of the international scenario continues to be Afghanistan. And now we also have in addition the problem of Yugoslavia. For Italy it is a particularly delicate problem. This is why I believe the countries of the Common Market should do all in their power to lead to a happy end the negotiations and agreements that are going on between the EEC and Yugoslavia. I am rather worried that if there is a lack of a common position on the side of the European States then this might mean that the neutral countries would take over - the neutral forces would take over, they would be strengthened by that. In addition we have the problem of the Olympic Games and I would appreciate very much to learn your opinion on that and we must bear in mind also the reaction of public opinion in connection with withdrawal from the Olympic Games. We must see what the man in the street thinks about it and how he reacts. I have been thinking over what might be the best forum in order to take a common line. Either we might have another meeting among the Six as the one we had in London or, and that would be in my opinion a better solution, we could have a meeting of the Nine. What do you think about that?

PM: Well now may I make one or two comments. First, I agree with Signor Cossiga that Afghanistan is the most important crisis of them all and that we must take firm action on that. My worry is that the Foreign Ministers met in Europe last week and the NATO Council met and they all deplored what the Soviet Union had done but they could not agree on any course of action to take and my worry is that Europe is not united when it comes to deciding what to do. Now I do feel that we shall all fail - we shall fail President Carter and we shall fail the Western way of life - if we just say the Soviet Union has done wrong and condemn her and we just leave it at that. And I think therefore we must get some concerted action in Europe and I agree with Signor Cossiga. May I refer to one or two things? The Olympic Games. I came out strongly in favour of trying to move them when I spoke last week in Parliament in reply to a question. We shall be replying tomorrow to President Carter's message and tomorrow morning we meet to decide the precise terms but we shall be supporting him on urging the International Olympic Committee to try to find another venue for the Games so we shall be with him on that. Secondly, we have been trying to persuade our European partners to back up President Carter in his wheat sanctions on the Soviet Union. I know we are not going to export wheat but we in this country think it very wrong to export butter cheaply from the butter pile in Europe to Russia. That view is held very strongly in Britain indeed. We should therefore not want to sell butter to Russia. On the sale of high technology we think we must get together with a view to tightening up the rules of the COCOM Committee to restrict the sale of technology to Soviet Russia and if we can do that for a start it will be something. I agree with Signor Cossiga on his worries about Yugoslavia and we ought to be able, in the EEC, to do a rather better trade agreement with Yugoslavia than we have been prepared to do so far. May I say just one other thing. Iran. We are a little bit worried at the moment that sanctions against Iran will not help to release the hostages and we believe therefore that as far as those are concerned we should go slow on sanctions against Iran for the time-being because it does not seem to be helping with its desired objective and we all know what in foreign policy terms as

distinct from hostage terms, in foreign policy terms we ought to be trying to persuade Iran of the dangers of the Soviet Union and the wisdom on her part on trying to stay friendly with the West and how very unwise of her it is to detain hostages under those circumstances. So with those few remarks I don't think that Signor Cossiga and I are very far apart except that we must get concerted action in Europe and it must be more than words. I think that I would agree with him that the Warren Christopher Committee which took place in London - the Committee of the Six - which set up two Working Parties is probably the best way to continue our joint action. Over to you.

Interpreter: Prime Minister, what would you think about a meeting of the Nine Foreign Minister for political co-operation,

PM: I think that it will be important before they meet to have got some agreement between them as to the course of action ahead. I think if they just meet without a lot of preparation it will not be a fruitful meeting but I (cut off)

PM: Hello, I was saying whether we should have a meeting of the Nine Foreign Minister and I was saying that if that was to happen it must be very carefully prepared beforehand. If they just go and sit down round a table they will not come away with any conclusions. They must be asked certain questions must be put to them on the agenda and they must be asked to come along with answers. But my fear, would you tell Signor Cossiga, is that the meeting will not show up the unity it will show up the division. Would you translate that?

Interpreter: Thank you very much Prime Minister for this opinion. We are going to meet very soon in London.

PM: Yes I think we will talk about it further,

Interpreter: I will also have more elements at my disposal.

PM: Yes, yes. We must support our American friends as much as we can. But I am just a little bit concerned that we are not getting the hostages released with our present policy and I am also concerned because I think both Iran and Afghanistan are part of the same problem namely the Soviet attitude towards the West. I am sure that is very much in line with what Signor Cossiga was saying to me and I don't think I can add anything else. I wish him a very happy and successful visit and I am sure it will be successful and I look forward to hearing all about it from him in London.

SC: Thank you very much Mrs Thatcher

PM: Oh hello. Just one tiny little point. I will not be able to meet you at the airport myself because I have to answer Questions in the House of Commons but I will be ^{re}hear to greet you. I look forward to it.

SC: Oh. Goodbye.

PM Thank you very much for phoning. Goodbye.

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Ref. A01196

PRIME MINISTER

OD: Afghanistan

BACKGROUND

Your ad hoc meeting on 16th January invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to put forward a paper on issues for decision on the Afghanistan crisis. Lord Carrington's minute to you of 19th January (PM/80/5) is the result, both of that remit and of his travels in the area from 9th-18th January. It is strong on general diplomatic and political measures. But it skates lightly over Economic measures against the Soviet Union (over which the Cabinet on 10th January expressed serious doubts, in relation to Lord Carrington's earlier minute of 8th January). It contains no firm proposal on the Olympic Games; but see paragraph 4 below.

2. Your 16th January meeting decided

- (i) that the case for helping the Americans over Afghanistan was stronger because of our comparative inability to help over Iran;
- (ii) that on economic measures against the Soviet Union we should
 - (a) keep in step with our allies;
 - (b) limit credit to consensus terms; →
 - (c) not renew the Anglo-Soviet Credit Agreement;
 - (d) explore tightening and widening of COCOM restrictions; -
 - (e) oppose subsidised Community sales of butter, sugar or meat;
- (iii) that on the Olympic Games
 - (a) we should think further about lobbying for transfer away from Moscow;
 - (b) failing that, we should think further about advising athletes to boycott;
 - (c) there should be no official British presence if the Games are in Moscow.

*C. am.
Fr
U.S.
Japan
C. am.*

3. The Cabinet discussion on 17th January took no further decisions.

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4. President Carter has now written to the United States Olympic Committee. Lord Carrington is to send you and OD this evening a draft letter to the British Olympic Committee urging them to lobby the IOC in favour of transfer (but not boycott); and a draft letter to President Carter reporting this action.

5. Lord Carrington is to make a statement in Parliament on 22nd January. He will circulate a text to OD today.

6. You owe President Carter a reply to the message delivered by Mr. Christopher on 14th January. The draft on the Olympics (paragraph 4 above) is likely to cover some but not all of this.

HANDLING

7. You will wish to begin with the general argument in paragraph 2(i) above.

8. Lord Carrington should then be invited to introduce his paper.

Discussion should centre on the 15 recommendations in his paragraph 4:-

- (a) This subsumes economic measures and the Olympics. You may wish to recall the economic decisions at paragraph 2(ii)(a)-(e) above, to which there should be little to add; and to agree to revert to the Olympics at the end of the meeting (see paragraph 10 below).
- (b) Moslem opinion. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.
- (c) Pakistan/United States. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.
- (d) Defence sales. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.
- There will be Treasury and ECGD problems.

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← (e) Arab/Israel. A major subject, not yet considered by OD. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary should be invited to produce a paper.

(f) Information policy. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.

(g) Counter-subversion. Agree, within financial limits of Aid programme. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.

(h) Gulf co-operation. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.

(i) EEC/Gulf. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.

(j) YAR. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.

(k) Anti-Soviet insurgency. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead. Financial implications?

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- (l) Aid to Turkey. Agree, within limits of Aid programme. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead. Note that an interdepartmental group of officials under CPRS chairmanship has also been established.
- (m) India-Pakistan. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.
- (n) China. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.
- (o) Yugoslavia. Agree. Foreign and Commonwealth Office lead.

9. It should be noted that, in most of these areas, the policy recommendation is blameless but its implementation will be far from easy.

10. Olympics. Discussion should focus on the draft letter to the British Olympics Committee. Does the Committee endorse this? Do they agree that boycott should not be further considered, at least until attempts at transfer have failed? (The Americans are reported to be considering withholding passports. Could we?) Is it the case that the Government has little chance in practice of making any real headway on either?

11. Parliament. Is the Committee content with Lord Carrington's statement? Note that the Commons debate on 28th January will call for a further statement.

CONCLUSION

12. You may wish to aim at agreement as follows.

- (a) Diplomatic measures. Endorse Lord Carrington's proposals, but not expect easy results.
- (b) Economic measures. Endorse decisions of 16th January meeting.
- (c) Olympics. Endorse letters to British Olympic Committee and to President Carter.
- (d) Parliament. Endorse Lord Carrington's statement.
- (e) President Carter. Lord Carrington to send you a draft reply, on non-Olympic matters, to the Christopher message.

RTA

(Robert Armstrong)

21st January, 1980

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AFGHANISTAN/IRAN.

1. THE PUS HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS ON 18 FEBRUARY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY KIBRIA, AND WAS RECEIVED FOR HALF AN HOUR BY PRESIDENT ZIA. AFGHANISTAN WAS VIRTUALLY THE ONLY TOPIC (WITH IRAN). ALL THREE EXPRESSED PROFOUND CONCERN AND SUSPICION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS BANGLADESH. THE PRESIDENT ALSO RAISED BRIEFLY THE QUESTION OF BRITISH AID (EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT LETTER AND OF OUR READINESS TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF OUR AID AT £40 MILLION: TOGETHER WITH THE HOPE THAT WE MIGHT NEVERTHELESS BE ABLE TO DO A BIT MORE EXCLAM.) BUT HE DELIBERATELY SET THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE THREAT TO BANGLADESH FROM COMMUNISM IN WEST BENGAL. FAILURE BY THE GOVERNMENT TO MEET ITS DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. IN THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE REGION, IT MUST SURELY BE A WESTERN AS WELL AS A BANGLADESHI INTEREST TO SEE STABILITY MAINTAINED IN BANGLADESH.
2. THE PRESIDENT ASKED THE PUS TO CONGRATULATE YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER WARMLY ON YOUR SUCCESS OVER RHODESIA, ABOUT WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND KIBRIA WERE ALSO FULL OF PRAISE. THEY ALL WELCOMED YOUR RECENT TRIP, BUT WERE PRIMARILY INTERESTED TO HEAR HOW YOUR TALK WITH MRS GANDHI HAD GONE. THEY HAD NOTED WITH PLEASURE THE MORE CRITICAL TONE OF HER REMARKS OVER THE SOVIET INCURSION INTO AFGHANISTAN MADE AFTER HER TALK WITH YOU: AND ATTRIBUTED THAT CHANGE TO YOUR EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY. THEY UNDERLINED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE INDIAN ATTITUDE IN ALL THIS. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ARE VISITING DELHI THIS WEEK. THEY CLEARLY HOPED THAT YOU WOULD HAVE USEFULLY SOFTENED UP MRS GANDHI FOR THEM. THE PUS GAVE THEM SOME ACCOUNT OF YOUR TALK WITH MRS GANDHI AND OF

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/ WHAT YOU

WHAT YOU HAD SAID TO THE PRESS ABOUT IT AFTERWARDS. HE EXPLAINED THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TRIP: TO GET FIRST HAND INFORMATION, REASSURE THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF AND PAKISTAN IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, AND TO ASSESS WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO COUNTER THAT THREAT.

3. KIBRIA SAID THAT WE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT THE RUSSIANS INTENDED ANY FORM OF FRONTAL ASSAULT ON THE OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY REALISED THAT THAT COULD BE A CASUS BELLI FOR THE UNITED STATES. THEIR PREFERRED TACTIC WOULD BE TO ENCIRCLE OIL PRODUCERS BY PICKING OFF THROUGH SUBVERSION THE NON-ALIGNED NON-PRODUCERS. THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE WEST WOULD CONFINE THEIR REACTIONS TO WORDS IN THE BELIEF THAT THEIR VITAL INTERESTS DEPEND ONLY ON THE OIL PRODUCERS. HE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER REFERRED GLOOMILY TO SOVIET DOMINATION OF ETHIOPIA, SOUTH YEMEN AND NOW AFGHANISTAN. WHERE WOULD IT STOP? THE PUS TOOK HIM UP ON THIS. OF COURSE WE WERE INTERESTED IN THE OIL PRODUCERS. BUT WE ALSO HAD A MAJOR INTEREST IN STABILITY THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THAT WAS WHY WE WERE DETERMINED TO ACT SO AS TO CONVINCE THE RUSSIANS THAT CRIME WOULD NOT PAY.

4. IRAN. PRESIDENT ZIA SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE PRESSURES ON PRESIDENT CARTER AND WAS TRENCHANT IN HIS CRITICISM OF THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES AND OF KHOMEINI PERSONALLY. BUT HIS SUBORDINATES WERE VERY CONCERNED TO CRITICISE THE AMERICANS FOR INSISTING ON THE SANCTIONS RESOLUTION AND TO JUSTIFY THE BANGLADESH ABSTENTION. HOWEVER THEY FULLY ACCEPTED THE NEED TO INDUCE IRAN TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND THE PRESIDENT CLAIMED TO BE WORKING HARD ON THE IRANIANS TO THAT END. (THEY ALSO CLAIMED THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN HAD SOME USEFUL CONNECTIONS THERE.). BANGLADESH AS A NON-ARAB MUSLIM COUNTRY HAD TIES WITH IRAN WHICH HE WAS TRYING TO USE TO GOOD EFFECT. THIS WAS A FURTHER ARGUMENT FOR CAUTION AND TACT IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE PRESIDENT ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF THE SHAH BEING RETURNED TO IRAN BUT SHOWED NO SURPRISE WHEN THE PUS SAID HE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF THAT.

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER TENDED TO ARGUE THAT THE AFGHANISTAN DEBACLE SO DWARFED THE PROBLEM OF THE HOSTAGES THAT THE AMERICANS COULD REALISE HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THEM TO MEND THEIR FENCES WITH IRAN. BUT HE ALSO CONCEDED THE COUNTER ARGUMENT BY THE PUS THAT IT EQUALLY UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR IRAN TO MEND FENCES WITH THE U.S. HE SAID THAT HE EXPECTED " ALMOST TOTAL UNANIMITY " OVER AFGHANISTAN AT THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE MORE PARTICULARLY AS IT SEEMED THAT ALGERIA IRAQ LIBIA AND SYRIA WOULD NOT ATTEND. BUT HE HIMSELF COULD NOT GO BECAUSE OF THE DELHI TRIP. BANGLADESH WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY THE FINANCE MINISTER, DR HUDA.

6. IN SHORT, THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH ARE VERY WORRIED INDEED ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS, COMPLETELY SHARE OUR VIEWS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR BUT ARE NOT SURE HOW MUCH THEY COULD COUNT ON THE WEST IN A CRISIS: AND ARE DISTINCTLY FRIGHTENED OF WHAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT DO TO THEM POLITICALLY BY SUBVERSION OR ECONOMICALLY, E.G. BY NOT MAKING THEIR USUAL LARGE PURCHASES OF TEA. THEY WILL BE ROOTING FOR US FROM THE SIDE LINES, BUT DO NOT INTEND TO GET OUT IN FRONT AGAIN.

SCOTT

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