

PREM19

10

COMMONWEALTH

(Lusaka
bilaterals)

PREM 19/10



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Commonwealth

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT KAUNDA
OF ZAMBIA AT THE END OF THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
MEETING IN LUSAKA, ON 8 AUGUST 1979

Present

The Prime Minister
Mr. C.A. Whitmore
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

President Kaunda
Mr. Mark Chona

* * * * *

[At President Kaunda's request the Prime Minister called on him at his Villa in Mulungushi Village, Lusaka, on 8 August at 0910.]

President Kaunda said that he was delighted that the Prime Minister had come to Lusaka. He recognised that the advance build-up given to her visit by the Zambian press had not been very encouraging: but he wished to tell the Prime Minister that in his view the successful outcome of the week's discussions had been due, in no small measure, to the spirit in which the Prime Minister herself had approached them. This had been the first Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting she had attended and, naturally, she had come to Lusaka not knowing what to expect. As he had said publicly at the Press Association dinner on 6 August, the Prime Minister would be in his prayers: neither he nor she had an easy task ahead.

After thanking President Kaunda very warmly for his hospitality and for the way in which he had steered the week's discussions to such a successful conclusion, the Prime Minister said that the main difficulty now would be to bring the hostilities to an end. As Lee Kuan Yew had said during the meeting, it was no easy task to persuade people to abandon an armed struggle, since violence tended to become a way of life. Some people actually enjoyed it. It would be necessary to give a very firm lead from the top. The Prime Minister asked President Kaunda whether, in his view, President Machel

/shared their

shared their anxiety to bring the fighting to an end. President Kaunda replied that he was certain that President Machel was with them 100 per cent. He was a man with a good political sense and would certainly bring pressure to bear on Robert Mugabe. The Prime Minister told President Kaunda that by early September significant progress should have been made towards a Constitutional Conference.

The Prime Minister congratulated President Kaunda very warmly on the organisation of the Conference which had, she said, been a terrific feat. The President had had to cope with thirty-nine prima donnas and had done so superbly. President Kaunda admitted that he was tired but added that he was also very happy.

The discussion ended at 0930.

B.M.

cc PS/FCO
Sir John Hunt

8 August 1979



LETTERCODE/SERIES <i>REM 19</i>	INITIAL RELEVANT BOX
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Commonwealth

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA HELD IN HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, AT 1045 ON SATURDAY 4 AUGUST 1979

Present

The Prime Minister
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
Mr. C.A. Whitmore

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser
The Hon. Andrew Peacock
Mr. A.D. Campbell

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that there was likely to be pressure put on her at the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government later that morning to go into more details about British plans for Rhodesia than she had done in her statement to the Lusaka Conference the previous day. To do so would make the task for the British Government at home much more difficult, for it would appear to the public that we had given in to African coercion. None the less, the fact was that the British Government had to move much much faster than was generally realised. It was essential that something had been achieved by the time of the Conservative Party Conference which would be held in early October. We had already done some work on the Rhodesian constitution, and we expected to have contacts with all the parties by the beginning of September. This was an indication of how rapidly we now had to move. She was, however, concerned that the Patriotic Front might step up its military action during the next few weeks in order to bring pressure to bear on the British Government.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that British public opinion was one problem. A second was to avoid arousing suspicions in Salisbury about the British Government's plans to a point where there was a refusal to contemplate the amendment of the constitution. So far, Bishop Muzorewa had managed to hold the line but the mistrust of the whites for what we were doing could easily be aroused.

Mr. Fraser said that when he and President Nyerere had met earlier that day, the President had said that he saw no problem about Bishop Muzorewa participating in the new elections which would be required following agreement on in the new constitution as the Prime Minister of Rhodesia. President Nyerere appeared anxious to marshal as many

/arguments

arguments as possible to persuade the Patriotic Front to participate in the process of trying to reach agreement upon a new constitution. At the same time he seemed to want to be able to maximise the isolation of the Patriotic Front if they refused to take part in the talks. President Nyerere was focussing on what would happen during the period between agreement upon the constitution and the holding of fresh elections and he seemed to visualise some form of transitional government. His main concern was that there should clearly be a manifestation of British authority during this transitional period, although he did not seem to rule out the possibility that this would have to be done using the fabric of the existing administration in Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister agreed that the Patriotic Front would be wrong-footed if they were invited to attend talks on the constitution and they refused to attend. As regards transitional arrangements, there was bound to be a gap between reaching agreement on the constitution and holding elections. We would have to discuss with the parties participating in the talks what arrangements should be made for the interim period. It was not for Britain to dictate now what should be done: it had to be remembered that Rhodesia had been self-governing since 1923.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that it was important that we did not get drawn into discussion about transitional arrangements now. If this happened, it would give those we wanted to participate in the talks on the constitution an excuse for not attending. We had to give complete priority now to trying to reach agreement upon the constitution. Once that had been achieved, it should not be so difficult to decide upon transitional arrangements. Indeed, if the area of discussion at the constitutional conference was to be extended now to include transitional arrangements, there might be a suspicion that Britain did not want to reach agreement.

Mr. Fraser said that he did not believe that President Nyerere would want to go into the details of the transitional arrangements. His only concern was likely to be that all should agree that it would be necessary for British authority, in some form, to be exercised during the interim period.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that there was a very real risk that if attempts were made to pin us down on the transitional arrangements, the constitutional conference would fail and the opportunity to solve the Rhodesia problem would then be lost. The only winners would, in the long run, be the Soviet Union. One of the British Government's difficulties was that even now, despite her speech the previous day, some countries - and in particular Nigeria - believed that Britain was pursuing the course which had been advocated by Mr. Julian Amery. His argument was that Rhodesia had become illegal because the six principles had not been satisfied. But he maintained that all the principles had now been fulfilled, including the fifth. Lord Boyd and Lord Home had also taken the view that, as a result of the April elections, the fifth principle had been met. Mr. Amery argued that both morally and in fact the basis of illegality had disappeared and the necessary legal steps should now be taken to restore legality and to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's government. Given that the April elections had been based on one man, one vote, and had had a 65 per cent turn-out, there was undoubtedly considerable substance in the view that the fifth principle had been fulfilled and that to restore legality would be the honourable course to take. But the British Government had deliberately not made a judgement about whether the fifth principle had been satisfied because to take the view that it had been fulfilled on the basis of the April elections would not be enough to carry other countries with us, and for this reason the British Government was seeking another way forward. This required us to make constitutional proposals which dealt with the two problems of the blocking mechanism and the Public Service Commissions in the present Rhodesian constitution. There was in fact nothing in that constitution which prevented the Rhodesians from removing its defects. The votes of only six white members of the Rhodesian Parliament were needed to allow Bishop Muzorewa to make the necessary amendments, and it should not be difficult for him to gain such support.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that a new factor in the situation was that the Front Line Presidents now recognised that they had got too far out on a limb in their support for the Patriotic Front and they were now trying to distance themselves from Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe.

/Mr. Fraser

Mr. Fraser said that the Front Line Presidents had political problems of their own and it would be difficult for them to distance themselves from the Patriotic Front. They would need sound and convincing arguments which they could use to justify this course.

The Prime Minister said that Britain's critics were taking an internally inconsistent line. They said that the United Kingdom should give Rhodesia a new constitution. But at the same time they were trying to fetter the United Kingdom in the exercise of its responsibility by, for example, raising the question of the transitional arrangements. There was no need for them to attempt to establish Britain's responsibility by going into the transitional arrangements now. The responsibility was already ours, and they could not fetter it. But what they could do was to abort our exercise of it.

Mr. Fraser said that he agreed that the right approach was to concentrate on reaching agreement on the constitution and only thereafter to work out the transitional arrangements with all the parties. All President Nyerere was seeking to do was to establish that technically Britain was the constitutional authority in Rhodesia in the interim period between reaching agreement on the constitution and holding the elections. President Nyerere was also likely to want a reference to free and fair elections in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting communique. There was also something to be said for mentioning sanctions and recognition in the communique: it might, for example, be desirable to say that at a certain point sanctions would be lifted and recognition given.

The Prime Minister said that if we had too much in the communique, we might well defeat the cause which we were desperate to see succeed. The communique should not describe future elections as free and fair, since many people already felt that the April elections deserved that description. Moreover, she could not agree with Mr. Fraser's proposal that the communique should contain a reference to sanctions and recognition in the terms he had suggested. To include a reference on those lines would enable the Patriotic Front to see that we never reached the point at which sanctions could be lifted and recognition given. We did not want a communique that would embarrass us in the negotiations on the constitution. Ideally, the communique should say only that efforts would be made to reach agreement on the constitution.

JWS.

Mr Cartledge

cc: Mr Walden
Sir J Hunt
Sir M Palliser
Sir A Duff
Mr Barltrop
Mr Fenn

Prime Minister. *has seen.*
✓
You sh. see this 2/8
before the bilateral
this evening. Do
you want to glance
at it during this
meeting.

28/8
3/8

PM's BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENTS OF UGANDA AND KENYA:
AID QUESTIONS

1. The Ugandan and Kenyan Presidents are both likely to renew requests for UK financial help during their talks with the Prime Minister this evening. The position on Uganda has moved on a little since preparation of the briefs in London. I attach a revised line to take which replaces that given in brief B41.

2. On Kenya, the Points to Make and Background given in brief B15 are still up-to-date. But the Prime Minister will wish to know that President Moyo's reaction to her letter explaining our inability to increase the offer of £15 million, was one of extreme disappointment. He may raise this again and press again for improved credit terms for British defence equipment, as something which would greatly ease his foreign exchange position. Our difficulty with this is that to adjust credit terms to take account of price increases for Kenya, would establish a precedent which would be very difficult to refuse to other countries and could prove extremely expensive. I hope therefore that the Prime Minister will be able to stick to the line suggested in the brief.

3 August 1979

D. M. Thomas
DMD THOMAS

UK AID TO UGANDA

Points to Make

1. Recognise extreme seriousness of Ugandan economic situation. President Binaisa brought out clearly yesterday the things that need to be done most urgently. We will continue to do our best to help, both financially and with technical assistance.
2. In April and May we made a contribution of £2 million to help ease the immediately bottle necks in the Ugandan economy. We have also agreed, last month, to restore short term credit facilities for British exports to Uganda. This should help meet the essential needs of Uganda's consumers, without the need to remit foreign exchange in advance. The EEC has also recently agreed to a £12 million emergency package to which we contributed.
3. For longer term problems, we want further British aid to be based on a considered assessment of Uganda's needs. And we want it to be coordinated with the programmes of others.
4. We recognise that the first meeting of Donors (Kamapala 25/26 July) was disappointing. We will ourselves be able to decide how best to contribute to a further effort when our own review of public expenditure is completed. [If President Binaisa presses for an immediate increase, and if the Prime Minister judges it politically necessary, in the context of this Conference, to be more forthcoming.]
5. Explain difficulty. At home we are telling ordinary people that they must take a cut in their standard of living and in Government spending in order to accommodate the oil price increase and squeeze inflation out of the economy. Nevertheless, we understand Uganda's special difficulties. Not able to enter into any commitment now. But will undertake to have the problem looked at again at home.

/Background

Background

6. The Seers report (a Commonwealth initiative) concluded that Uganda needed immediately £130 million and a further £130 million over six months if the problems of food shortage, transport, cooking fuel etc were to be sufficiently overcome to get the economy back to 1970 levels. About half these sums can be obtained, over time, from the IMF and from bank lending. 1)
7. The UK has given a total of £2 million in April and May. ECGD have since agreed to restore short term cover and dispense with the confirmation requirement for Letters of Credit. The EEC has also agreed a 12 months emergency package for Uganda.
8. Further UK aid in the current year is not entirely ruled out, despite cuts in the aid budgets. But it would be at someone else's expense. This would shift the problem to other shoulders. Substantial commitments must in any case wait until the public expenditure review is completed and we know the size of the future aid programme.
9. If the Prime Minister decides to undertake to have a further look at Uganda's problems on return to London, it would be essential that this should result in some further immediate response. The difficulties of finding even a small amount of additional aid, given the existing danger of over spending the aid budget in the present financial year, should not be underestimated. It would only be worth playing this card if a substantial dividend in terms of Rhodesia could be obtained in return.

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NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF UGANDA,
HIS EXCELLENCY MR. GODFREY BINAISA, AT THE UGANDAN VILLA IN MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE,
LUSAKA, ON 3 AUGUST, 1979 AT 1945 HOURS

<u>Present:</u>	Prime Minister	President Binaisa
	Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. Otema Allimadi - Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Mr. B. G. Cartledge	Other Ugandan officials

* * * * *

The Prime Minister asked President Binaisa about the present situation in Uganda. President Binaisa said that the country was in bad shape and that the infrastructure of the economy had been virtually destroyed. Uganda had abundant manpower but virtually no tools or materials. There were 22 rural hospitals, of 100 beds each, all of which were in desperate need of drugs and medical equipment. Uganda's major teaching hospital, of 1200 beds, also needed complete re-equipment. In the health field as a whole, Uganda's immediate needs were enormous. The country's manufacturing plants, especially those processing sugar and producing simple agricultural implements, also needed overhaul and new machinery.

President Binaisa went on to say that Uganda's road system had been completely neglected: Amin had spent nothing on roads, except for the highway between Kampala and Entebbe. The disrepair into which the main international highway running into Ruanda had^{fallen} caused great hardship to the Ruandans, who were dependent on it for their links with the outside world. President Binaisa expressed appreciation of the help which the UK had given in training the Ugandan police force.

Turning, at the Prime Minister's request, to the political situation in Uganda, President Binaisa said that the National Liberation Front consisted of a Consultative Council of 30 members, together with a number of Executive Committees - a political and diplomatic committee, headed by the Minister for Communal Development and Rehabilitation; a military committee, headed by the Minister for Internal Affairs; and a finance and administration committee. The Front had been formed by 28 separate groups, including the old political parties, in order to get rid of Amin. The Front had elected Mr. Lule to be President and he had taken office under the 1967 constitution established by Mr. Obote. It had, however, been agreed that Lule would observe the Moshi Agreements. Lule had in practice ignored these, claiming that he could act by virtue of the constitution alone. Although he had not been elected, Lule had

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/ behaved

behaved as if he had a full popular mandate under the constitution. He had, for example, appointed senior officials without seeking the approval of the Consultative Council.

President Binaisa said that before elections could be held, it would first be necessary to conduct a census prior to the preparation of electoral rolls, registers and constituency boundaries: nothing had been done on this since 1961 and existing records were both out of date and incomplete.

The Prime Minister asked what Amin was up to at present. President Binaisa said that he was in Sudan and was massing troops on Sudan's border with Uganda. Lord Carrington asked whether Amin was expected to launch an attack on Uganda. President Binaisa replied that this was very probable; now that President Nimeiri had relinquished the Chairmanship of the OAU, he would feel under less constraint. The Prime Minister asked whether, in that event, Uganda would be wholly dependent on President Nyerere's troops. President Binaisa said that Uganda had no other defence forces, only bands of guerrillas. His policy was to recruit into the armed forces only those with a minimum of seven years education; and to require education up to and including 'O' level standard for officer cadets. He was determined that the re-structuring of Uganda's army would be undertaken on a rational basis. Lord Carrington asked whether the Ugandan civil service had continued to operate during the period of turmoil. President Binaisa said that it had but that the service was riddled with personal rivalries and there had been much feathering of nests. One civil servant had arranged for his retirement at the age of 38 on full pension. Amin's regime had been financed partly by President Quadafi of Libya; Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had also assisted Amin as a fellow Muslim. Amin had supplemented this income by killing all the elephants in Uganda and exporting the ivory.

Returning to the possibility of a renewed war, President Binaisa said that this caused him great concern. President Nimeiri had broken his promise not to raise the issue of relations between Uganda and Tanzania at the OAU meeting in Monrovia. He had made a highly tendentious speech and when President Binaisa had endeavoured to speak in rebuttal, General Obasanjo, who was in the Chair, had prevented him from doing so. President Binaisa said that General Obasanjo had behaved in this way despite the fact that he had previously sent a Ugandan goodwill mission to Nigeria. He thought that the explanation for Obasanjo's behaviour lay in the fact that he had never forgiven President Nyerere for backing Biafra in the Nigerian civil war; Uganda was being made the scapegoat for this.

/ Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington asked what part Milton Obote was likely to play. President Binaisa replied that Obote was at present in Dar es Salaam. He urged the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington not to be taken in by the current scare about Obote's activities. Obote would not play any role in Uganda and would not return to the country. It would be at least two years before elections could be held and the NLF would govern the country in the meantime. There would be no role for Obote in this. Lord Carrington asked whether it would be possible for political parties to be formed freely. President Binaisa said that this would depend on the arrangements for the elections. In the process of enlarging the Consultative Council, to which he intended to add a further 60 members, a general debate on the constitution would be opened up. He recalled that the one party system had been introduced by Obote in 1969. He himself intended to follow British constitutional practice so far as possible.

The discussion ended at 2020.

Ben.

4 August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT MOI OF KENYA
AT PRESIDENT MOI'S BUNGALOW IN MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, ON 3 AUGUST 1979
AT 1900 HOURS

<u>Present:</u> Prime Minister Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Mr. B. G. Cartledge	 H.E. Mr. Daniel T. Arap Moi, MP - President of Kenya The Hon. Charles Njonjo, MP - Attorney-General The Hon. Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, MP Minister for Foreign Affairs
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The Prime Minister asked President Moi what had happened during the restricted session earlier in the afternoon, after her departure. President Moi said that the question of the Secretary-Generalship had been discussed. India, alone, had expressed reservations about the present Secretary-General but everybody else present had agreed that Mr. Ramphal should continue in office for a further five years. The Prime Minister said that Mr. Mehta was a fine person who had loyally served a number of Indian Prime Ministers; but that Mr. Ramphal was doing very well and should continue.

The Prime Minister said that President Moi had asked her to look at the question of possible assistance to Kenya in easing the burden of her defence expenditure commitments. She had asked for advice on how the UK could help and had sent it back repeatedly for further consideration by officials. She wished very much that the UK could have done more: but the most that could be done was to accelerate the £15 million in programme aid which had already been agreed. The UK had massive debts of her own and, despite all her own efforts, the British Government could not possibly do any more.

The Prime Minister expressed her gratitude to President Moi for the moderate line which he had taken during the morning debate on Southern Africa. She felt very deeply indeed about the continuing bloodshed in Rhodesia; she had never believed that anybody had the right to pursue their aims by means of violence. She assured President Moi that the British Government would move very quickly on Rhodesia as soon as the Lusaka Conference had ended. There had already been a major debate in the House of Commons on Southern Africa and the intensive consultations which the Government had initiated were continuing during the CHGM. She asked President Moi to understand, however, that it was simply not possible for her, politically or constitutionally, to formulate final proposals about a Rhodesian settlement until after the Lusaka Conference. The Prime

/Minister

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Minister commented that if she had formulated firm proposals in advance of Lusaka she would have been accused of refusing to listen to African opinion. But when she explained that she simply could not formulate specific proposals in advance of further consultation not only in Lusaka but with her colleagues in London, she was again attacked for not going far enough. In her speech that morning, she had tried to outline the UK approach more clearly. The British Government's aim was to give Rhodesia a constitution similar to those given to other newly independent states who were now colleagues within the Commonwealth. If all concerned adopted a reasonable approach, this objective could be achieved. The outcome, however, must not be determined on the basis of personal preferences for certain individuals rather than on that of a democratic constitution.

President Moi said that he wished to thank the British Government for all the help it had already given to Kenya, including the writing off of debts at a time of acute difficulty for his country. The acceleration of the new amount of programme aid already agreed by the UK would be of great assistance to Kenya. It might be that, in time, additional resources could be made available. The President recalled his recent visit to the UK with great pleasure, and said that he had been most appreciative of the warm reception accorded him by The Queen, by the Government and by all the people of the United Kingdom. The UK was providing Kenya with valuable technical assistance and also with trained teachers. Kenya herself gave help to Malawi, Lesotho and Zimbabwe in the field of vocational training, and especially in agriculture. The President said that he himself attached great importance to the development of youth and that his Government received significant help in this field from the UK. The UK was also helpful to Kenya in Brussels, in the context of her relations with the EEC.

Turning to Rhodesia, President Moi said that Kenya would help the UK as much as she could, both in public speeches and in private. President Moi said that following his discussions in Arusha, he had the impression that President Nyerere had very much come down to earth. He had emphasised, at Arusha, that a real change had taken place to which the appointment of a black President and a black Prime Minister gave testimony. President Nyerere had gone so far as to say (and the President asked not to be quoted) that he would welcome a visit by Bishop Muzorewa, whether in / or on neutral ground, in, for example, Kenya. President Moi said that he had not liked President Binisa's remarks in the meeting about elections.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister said that there was no point in having a good constitution if it was never operated. Its value could be tested only in the light of practical experience. President Moi urged the Prime Minister to speed up the presentation of her case so that her critics had no time to concert their tactics. The Prime Minister agreed that this made sense.

President Moi said that it was essential to put an end to the loss of life in Rhodesia. The Prime Minister said that Sir Seretse Khama was sympathetic towards the UK's approach and as keen as anybody to get talks under way. It would probably be better if such talks were not to be held in Salisbury, but they could take place anywhere in East Africa or, of course, in London. The problem of integrating the guerrilla armies into Rhodesia's security forces was real and difficult. It should be approached step by step: the security forces were apprehensive of integration and the re-organisation should be approached with due care and deliberation.

President Moi went on to say that he was deeply concerned about Uganda. Mr. Lule was a pleasant man, but Kenyans knew Uganda and people there were suspicious of anybody who had any connection with Amin. Mr. Lule had been one of the few who had no such connection, having left the country before Amin seized power, and the people therefore trusted him. Kenya, however, had serious problems with the Sudan: Amin was there with between 35,000 and 40,000 troops, most of them massed on the South Sudanese border, but some of them positioned in Zaire. President Moi said that the Commonwealth should oblige the South Sudan to compel the rebels to respect frontiers. Ugandan people should be allowed to take the final decision on their political future but an imposed political/economic solution could not work.

The Prime Minister asked President Moi whether he thought that Amin would invade Uganda. President Moi and his colleagues said that this was virtually certain and commented that although Tanzania still had 30,000 troops in Uganda, the country had no other defensive military resources. The apparent acquiescence of the OAU in the removal of a fellow Head of State was an uncomfortable precedent.

Lord Carrington asked about Mr. Obote's plans. President Moi replied that Obote would definitely take over from Binaisa before too long. Existing disagreements should be resolved, but the bitterness of the Buganda against Obote was an obstacle. President Moi expressed the view that, given genuine freedom of choice, the people of Uganda would choose Mr. Lule as their President.

/ Lord Carrington

Lord Carrington asked whether the Sudan would support Obote. President Moi said that the Sudan would not. Tanzania would continue to give Obote full support since President Nyerere greatly admired him. President Moi said that in the meantime his Government was trying to resolve their difficulties with the Somalis.

Reverting to the question of Rhodesia, Lord Carrington said that his real concern was that some members of the Commonwealth would pressure the Prime Minister into making her proposals more specific. If the Prime Minister and he were able to return to London with a clear picture of where she wanted to go and without conditions having been imposed upon her, there would be hope for a settlement. President Moi repeated that it would be essential to pick up speed in this process.

The discussion ended at 1935.

gjm.

3 August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE OF A MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF
BOTSWANA IN MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, AT 1816 ON FRIDAY 3 AUGUST 1979

Present

The Prime Minister

HE Sir Seretse Khama

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

The Hon. A.M. Mogwe

Mr. C.A. Whitmore

HE Mr. A.W. Kgarebe

* * * * *

The Prime Minister said that she would welcome Sir Seretse Khama's assessment of how the Commonwealth Heads of Government discussion on Rhodesia that morning had gone. She was very worried about how the Rhodesian problem was going to develop: it had now existed for fourteen years and there was still no solution to it. Some of their colleagues that morning had said that recent changes in Salisbury, such as the April elections, were unimportant and could be ignored. They had made it plain that they saw Bishop Muzorewa as Mr. Smith's puppet. She accepted that there were aspects of the constitution such as the blocking mechanism in favour of the whites which were defective, as she had said in her statement to the Conference that morning. But there was no gain-saying that there had been an election based on one man, one vote, which had enabled the people of Rhodesia to choose their own Prime Minister who had a black majority in his Cabinet, and to elect a Parliament with a majority of black members. This was something on which we could and must build. If we did not, the opportunity would slip by and might be lost forever: this was something which we simply could not afford to let happen. She had been encouraged by the similarities between her speech and that of President Nyerere that morning. But she had been discouraged by the later speakers. She hoped that they were doing no more than letting off steam. During the recent debate in the House of Commons she had declined to put forward detailed proposals for a solution of the Rhodesia problem, taking the line that there were further consultations to be undertaken at the CHGM and that it would be wrong to pre-empt these. She had said much the same thing that morning, though she had gone a little further. None the less, a number of Heads of Government had pressed her to go into details. But it was impossible for her to put

/forward

forward proposals of this kind in Lusaka when she had not yet consulted the British Cabinet. What she now had to do was to return to London at the end of the Conference, to review all the consultations which had been held in recent weeks and then to formulate proposals which, when she had the approval of her Cabinet, could be put to all the parties. As she had said that morning, the British Government would move very quickly. Perhaps the most important reason for speed was the weekly toll of killings in Rhodesia about which she felt both bitterly and deeply. Although the present British Government had been in power for only three months, they had already moved rapidly and resolutely on Rhodesia. She had set out in her speech that morning what the British Government saw as wrong in the present situation in Rhodesia, and they were determined to put it right. This seemed to her to be a reasonable approach, although she recognised that politics were not based on reason. Although the constitutional responsibility remained Britain's, the British Government wanted help.

Sir Seretse Khama agreed that the position of the British Government was a reasonable one. He felt that this was an occasion for talking openly. All that the various parties to the Rhodesia problem were seeking was power for themselves. When they talked of democratic constitutions they were speaking a different language from Britain and Botswana. Botswana believed in free elections and thought that such elections should be held in Rhodesia. They did not agree with the recent OAU resolution describing the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Rhodesia, and he believed that the resolution should be ignored. Similarly, he did not believe that the United Nations had much to offer. He felt the way ahead should rest on what the Commonwealth had to say about the issue. What was needed was a Commonwealth resolution on Rhodesia which put the emphasis on human rights and democracy. As for that morning's discussion, he thought that the Prime Minister's statement had been well received, as had President Nyerere's.

The Prime Minister said that there were marked similarities between what she and President Nyerere had said, and she and he knew each other's mind well.

Mr. Mogwe said that the Prime Minister's statement had had both positive and negative aspects. One of the latter was the argument that Bishop Muzorewa was not Mr. Smith. More importantly, there was uncertainty about British intentions with regard to the constitution. Although the constitution had been described as defective, it was not clear whether Britain was thinking of simply amending the existing one, which was the constitution that had brought Bishop Muzorewa to power, or of coming forward with a totally new one. If it was proposed to proceed by amending the present constitution, this would lead to trouble. Botswana had not found it necessary to provide for minorities in her constitution. Her minorities were part and parcel of Botswana society. None the less, it was clear from the morning's discussion that many of the participants at the CHGM were ready to accept that the Rhodesian constitution should make provision for minorities but that what was not acceptable was entrenchment. In approaching the problem of the constitution, Britain should remember that many members of the Commonwealth were also members of the OAU. He was sure that it was not the Prime Minister's intention to rock the Commonwealth boat unnecessarily.

The Prime Minister said that there was bound to be considerable similarity between any constitution proposed by Britain and the existing Rhodesian constitution. Most constitutions enshrined certain general principles, though there were often differences of detail to take account of the particular circumstances of the countries concerned. The present Rhodesian constitution contained some clauses taken from the 1961 constitution, some based on the Anglo-American proposals and some which reflected the constitutional position in the United Kingdom. The question was whether it really mattered if, in appropriate cases, clauses from the existing constitution were precisely carried over into any new constitution put forward by Britain or whether it was essential to use different language. The reality surely was that what counted was what the constitution actually said. It would not be a constitution for those seeking power. Rather, it would be a reasonable and democratic constitution intended to enable the people of Rhodesia to choose their own leaders. She doubted whether it would ever be possible to produce a

/constitution

constitution which satisfied every member of the Commonwealth. But it was of paramount importance to devise a constitution which would be acceptable to the British Parliament.

Sir Seretse Khama said that it was essential that Britain devised a constitution and remained in charge of the exercise. It would be a big mistake if the British Government allowed Muzorewa to take over the production of the new constitution.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there would be absolutely no doubt that what would be put forward would be Britain's proposals for the constitution. We would have to be able to assure the British Parliament that the proposals were just and reasonable and were comparable to the terms of earlier independence constitutions which we had given to other countries. It would then be for the parties to the Rhodesia problem to accept or reject what we offered. The difficulty was that while Sir Seretse Khama was talking rightly about democracy, many of the players in the cast were not interested in democracy.

The Prime Minister re-emphasised that there was no question of the constitution being anything other than a British proposal and that it would have to be one which could be got through the British Parliament.

Mr. Mogwe repeated that Britain could not just take the "Smith-Muzorewa constitution" and amend it. Everybody was expecting the United Kingdom to come forward with what would seem to be a new constitution of its own for Rhodesia, even if much of the language in it was the same as that of the existing constitution.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that this was precisely what we were going to do, but there was no escaping the fact that some of our language would be the same as the present language, if only because Britain had prepared the 1961 constitution, some of which had been carried over into the present constitution.

/In reply to a

In reply to a further question by Mr. Mogwe about what had been meant by the remark that Bishop Muzorewa was not Mr. Smith, the Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa was the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, enjoying a black majority in his Cabinet and a black majority in Parliament. He was running the daily business of the Government. He was the head of the security forces. There was nothing in the constitution that made it necessary for him to defer to Mr. Smith or made it inevitable that he would be a weak Prime Minister. If the reality was otherwise, this was not the fault of the constitution. But it was true that his power was fettered in two respects. First, he could not change the constitution without the support of at least six white members of the Rhodesian Parliament. In her own view she would not have thought it difficult for the Bishop to win that support, if he wished. But she recognised that others took a different view, and she accepted that these provisions in the present constitution would have to be changed. Second, there was the problem of the Public Service Commissions. It was, of course, quite normal to have commissions of this kind to restrict the powers of the executive in making certain senior appointments. But it was ridiculous that Bishop Muzorewa could not decide who should be the secretary of his own Cabinet. Changes would plainly be needed in this area as well. There was, of course, a lot of pressure on Bishop Muzorewa to show that he was bringing about substantial change in Rhodesian society, but this was difficult for him. The fact was that much of the racially discriminatory legislation which had caused so much offence in the past in Rhodesia had been abolished before the Bishop came to power, and there was now very little more that he could do in this field.

Sir Seretse Khama said that, legalistically speaking, Bishop Muzorewa was not the Prime Minister, since he had come to power under an arrangement which had not been approved by the United Kingdom as the constitutional authority.

Mr. Mogwe said that since the British Government had not given its approval for the April elections he did not see how Bishop Muzorewa could be different from Mr. Smith. So long as Africa did not accept the present arrangements in Rhodesia, the war would go on. This was not

/what Botswana

what Botswana wanted: she wanted to see an end to the problem. But Botswana's great fear was that at the forthcoming Conference of the Non-Aligned at Havana, just as at the recent OAU Conference, the Patriotic Front would be confirmed as the sole legitimate representatives of the Rhodesian people, and this could only encourage and strengthen them. This was why it was important for Britain to do something now, but nobody knew what the United Kingdom's proposals were.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that there was a contradiction in the line which many countries were taking. They all said that it was the United Kingdom alone who had constitutional responsibility for Rhodesia; and Britain accepted that responsibility. Indeed, the Prime Minister had gone further in her statement that morning when she had said that we not only accepted our responsibility, but that we would try to achieve a constitution which was comparable with earlier independence constitutions granted by the United Kingdom and which got rid of the two difficulties in the existing Rhodesian constitution. But if attempts were made to tie Britain down and to force her to go beyond what the Prime Minister had said - which was what the Nigerians were attempting to do - it would put us in an impossible position and would be bound to lead to the failure of the present attempts to find a solution. The British Government was on a tightrope over Rhodesia. We had to think not only of the African parties - both inside and outside Rhodesia - to the problem, but we also had to have in mind public opinion in the United Kingdom, which was very largely behind Bishop Muzorewa. If Britain did anything which appeared in Salisbury to be a sell-out to the Patriotic Front, there would be no question of getting the whites to agree to change the constitution. Britain was surrounded by different pressures, and we needed all the help we could get if we were not to fall off the tightrope.

Sir Seretse Khama said that he understood the metaphor of the tightrope. There had undoubtedly been a disposition in Salisbury when the Conservative Government had been elected ^{to believe} that everything would be rosy. In the event the actions of the British Government had made the Salisbury regime change its view. At the same time the Prime Minister's various speeches and statements had made the Patriot Front realise that the United Kingdom was prepared to talk. His fear was that the British Government would

/recognise

recognise Bishop Muzorewa while the OAU recognised only the Patriotic Front. This was why he argued for a Commonwealth position which avoided both of these extremes. He wanted to keep Britain on the tightrope. He was sure that there was no intention on the part of African people to push the United Kingdom into doing anything which the United Kingdom did not think was right. But it was not only Britain which faced a problem. Some of the Front Line Presidents had come to realise that they had made a mistake by encouraging the leaders of the Patriotic Front to think that they were going to be the "top dogs" and they were trying to undo their error. It was, however, a difficult process.

Mr. Mogwe said that similarly Britain should not give precedence to Bishop Muzorewa, whatever view they took of him privately. It was vital that Britain convened an all-party meeting. If Bishop Muzorewa was allowed to convene it, it would be impossible to bring all of the parties along. The Prime Minister said that President Nyerere in his speech that day had gone a long way to put distance between the Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front in the way Sir Seretse Khama had described. He clearly wanted Britain, and nobody else, to put the new system in Rhodesia into place. There was no question of a process in which Bishop Muzorewa was in the lead. Britain would chair an all-party Conference involving both the Patriotic Front and the internal parties. Bishop Muzorewa would be neither in front of nor behind the other participants. She was very grateful to Sir Seretse Khama for what had been a most helpful meeting.

JWS.

4 August 1979

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, MR. JOE CLARK, IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM IN MULUNGUSHI HALL, LUSAKA, ON 2 AUGUST 1979 AT 1820 [as the fourth session of the CHGM ended late, the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark agreed to stay behind in the Conference Room in order to have the bilateral discussion which was to have taken place at Horizon House at 1800]

Present

The Prime Minister
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

Premier Clark
Miss Flora MacDonald

* * * * *

Outlining her approach to the debate on Southern Africa on the following day, the Prime Minister stressed to Mr. Clark that she could not accept the imposition on the United Kingdom of any conditions for bringing Rhodesia back to independence. Mr. Clark said that there could well be strong pressures during the Conference to force the UK's hand. The Prime Minister made it clear that, both from a political and from a constitutional point of view, it was simply not possible for her to return to London committed to any particular course of action. Mr. Clark agreed.

The Prime Minister gave Mr. Clark a general account of the impressions which she had derived from her bilateral conversations with President Nyerere and President Kaunda. Mr. Clark said that these coincided almost exactly with those which he had from his own discussions. He had found President Nyerere, in particular, very reasonable. The question was, would these attitudes hold during the forthcoming debate? Miss MacDonald said that she thought that they would if the Prime Minister could impress on the Conference a clear sense of direction in UK policy, for example a clear indication of determination to achieve changes in the constitution and to create the conditions in which a ceasefire would be possible. The Prime Minister said that a ceasefire and the withdrawal of support for the terrorists by the Front Line States was absolutely vital. The point had to be made that, given a reasonable constitution for Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front would have nothing to fight against.

Mr. Clark asked whether the Prime Minister had given thought to the participation of the Rhodesians outside the country in the constitutional forms. His own discussions had confirmed that there was considerable

/discontent

discontent with the reserved powers of the whites in the Rhodesian Parliament and with the operation of the Commissions. He thought that the degree of support which could be achieved for a new constitution would depend on the extent to which the Patriotic Front could be involved in the new political process. The Prime Minister said that the Patriotic Front could not be given a right of veto over a constitution which was reasonable in terms of the constitutions which Britain had given to other newly independent countries. Miss MacDonald said that President Kaunda had told the Canadians that Zambia would back, even against the Patriotic Front, a constitution which was genuinely reasonable. Mr. Clark agreed that this was so but asked whether the Front Line Presidents could really deliver.

Mr. Clark went on to say that Canada wanted to be as helpful as possible to the UK in the handling of the Rhodesia issue. He had told the Canadian press that the British Prime Minister would be a model of patient understanding. He had also made it clear to the press that any solution on Rhodesia could only come after, and not during, the CHGM. He had outlined to the press five points which he thought could be the probable elements in a settlement. These were: changes to the existing constitution; participation in a settlement by the Patriotic Front; the departure of Ian Smith, who had become a symbol to the Africans; the means of assuring popular support for a settlement; and guarantees from the Front Line States of a cessation of hostilities. The Prime Minister said that these points really represented the limit to which the UK could go. Miss MacDonald said that it was important that Ian Smith should not be in a key position in the Salisbury Government, even if he were to be elected to Parliament.

The Prime Minister said that the main objections which had been raised on the Commissions under the present constitution were justified. It was, however, relevant that President Kaunda had said in a public interview that if Mr. Smith were to be elected on the basis of a democratic constitution, he would work with him. Mr. Clark agreed and added that President Nyerere had spoken in virtually identical terms.

/ Mr. Clark

Mr. Clark went on to say that the real problem would be the Communique. He thought that the debate on the following day should go quite well. Miss MacDonald said that it would be important, during the debate, for the UK to give a sense of direction which could act as a point of reference during the informal discussions over the weekend. Mr. Clark told the Prime Minister that her speech at the opening session had been excellent but that President Kaunda's had been disappointing. He was hopeful that if some progress could be made towards agreement on the Communique during the coming weekend, it might be possible to avoid a continuation of the debate on Monday. It would be important, during Friday's debate, to prevent the discussion from becoming too drawn out, since this would inevitably get into too much detail. Mr. Clark said that he might suggest to Mr. Malcolm Fraser that they should both abstain from intervening in the discussion. Ideally, the UK and the Front Line States should be the only participants.

Mr. Clark made the further point that it would be important, from the point of view of subsequent leverage on the Front Line States, that it should be driven home to them that they, too, had an obligation to create the circumstances for a settlement. President Nyerere had implied in private discussion with him that he would be prepared to send his own troops into Zambia if President Kaunda needed help in dealing with the guerrillas. President Nyerere had also said categorically that, given an acceptable constitution, he would deny asylum to Mugabe.

The Prime Minister agreed with Mr. Clark that the Front Line States had to offer a quid pro quo; and they must also be made to accept that the Patriotic Front did not have a right of veto. Once a constitution had been agreed, the identity of the elected Prime Minister was a matter for the Rhodesians and was nobody else's business. Mr. Clark agreed; he said that it was clearly in Zambia's interest to achieve stability, given the current economic problems. He suggested that the Prime Minister's objective during Friday's debate should be to reassure rather than to rebut. Miss MacDonald commented that it would be difficult for President Nyerere, having spoken in virtually identical terms to at least three or four heads of government, to take an entirely different line during the debate.

The discussion ended at 1850.

BGM

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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Principal Private Secretary

2 August 1979

Dear George,

MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT ZIA OF BANGLADESH

When President Zia of Bangladesh, who was accompanied by his Foreign Minister and the Bangladeshi High Commissioner in London, entertained the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to breakfast today in his villa in Mulungushi Village, Lusaka, the discussion concentrated almost wholly on British aid to Bangladesh.

The President said that Bangladesh had a major problem in trying to feed itself. The World Bank had recently reported that the Bangladeshi agricultural programme should be four times its present size. Food imports were at a high level, notwithstanding successful efforts in recent years to increase food production. This year food imports would be even higher than usual because his country was suffering from an unprecedented drought. They also had difficulties in the field of energy, though in the long term this should not be a problem. Bangladesh had enormous reserves of coal and its reserves of natural gas were estimated to be the eleventh largest in the world. No oil had yet been discovered but a number of oil firms, including BP, were showing an interest once more in exploration. In the immediate future, however, Bangladesh was very dependent, in both the industrial and agricultural fields, on foreign aid. He understood the reasons why the United Kingdom was contemplating making reductions in the aid which it gave to his country and he wondered whether it might ease our difficulties if our assistance took the form of long-term loans.

The Bangladeshi High Commissioner then gave some examples of the activities of British firms in Bangladesh. A company known as Imeg, which was being backed by a consortium of American, Swiss, German and British banks, was negotiating for a contract to explore a natural gas field, convert the gas into LNG and then export it. Bangladesh's natural gas potential was huge: there were proven reserves of 9,000 billion cubic feet. There were extensive opportunities for British firms to exploit. The President added that the Americans had described Bangladesh as "floating on a sea of gas".

The High Commissioner continued that following a conversation with the British Secretary of State for Employment, his Government were now in touch with British firms about the development of the fishing potential of the Bay of Bengal. The United Kingdom was also one of the biggest participants in a consortium that was constructing a large petro-chemical plant for the production of fertilisers. This was a typical aid project and its successful completion would have considerable

/ benefits

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benefits at a number of levels of the economy right down to individual peasant farmers. The scheme was now approaching its final phase, but unfortunately, as part of its plans for reducing its aid programme, the United Kingdom was now threatening to cut back its contribution, even though the orders for the equipment which was needed to finish the plant had already been placed. In 1978/79 Britain had disbursed aid worth £40 million to Bangladesh. The comparable figure for 1979/80 was estimated to be £66 million. Britain was now proposing to limit expenditure in 1979/80 to the 1978/79 level. Much of current expenditure was required to finance projects which had been started as long ago as 1972 and which, like the petro-chemical plant, were now well advanced. Similarly, there were technical assistance programmes which were already being implemented but which now appeared to be jeopardised by the proposed cuts in the British aid programme. Bangladesh had planned to send 320 students to the United Kingdom in the present year. Of these, some 90 were either already in the United Kingdom or were virtually on their way when the order to freeze the programme came. The rest had been preparing to leave for Britain but had now been told to stand down. This sudden turn of events had inevitably had political repercussions in his country. The possibility of reductions in British aid had come as a severe shock to the system in Bangladesh. The sums of money involved were a drop in the ocean for Britain, but for Bangladesh they were substantial. If necessary, Britain should give Bangladesh special treatment. Bangladesh had been receiving aid for only eight years, whereas India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka had been enjoying British assistance for over thirty years. It was unjust - and he used this word advisedly even though he recognised that it was a strong term - for Britain to treat his country in exactly the same way as others when cuts in aid had to be made. Bangladesh had given 1½ million lives for democracy, and it should therefore be protected. Britain had a special relevance in this situation. Moreover, Britain not only gained the direct and immediate benefits of the exports tied to its aid for Bangladesh, but the future leaders of the country who were being educated in the United Kingdom would be encouraged to look to Britain to help meet Bangladesh's needs in the long term.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that President Zia and the High Commissioner had made a very eloquent case against any reduction in Britain's aid to Bangladesh. Unfortunately, many other countries could make exactly the same case. It had to be borne in mind that Britain was already giving aid only to deserving countries. If we said that we could no longer afford to maintain our aid programme at its planned level, this was bound to seem unjust to countries like Bangladesh. But the British Government faced major economic problems. It had inherited from its predecessor public expenditure programmes which the country could no longer afford and which therefore had to be reduced. It would be impossible to convince the British public that the United Kingdom's aid programme should be left untouched, when other public expenditure programmes such as the education service, housing and the road programme were being reduced.

The Prime Minister said that the cut in the aid programme was in fact very small. She had come to listen to what President Zia had to say, and she recognised that there were longstanding projects which were coming to maturity this year and next. She understood the difficulties that would arise if these programmes were denied adequate finance in their final stages. The British Government would review their aid programme to Bangladesh project by project before deciding on any changes as a result of the need to cut public expenditure. If the problem of Rhodesia could be solved, it would no longer be necessary to give aid to Mozambique, which was running at £22 million in the present year.

/ After she had

After she had left President Zia's villa, the Prime Minister asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to arrange for a review of our aid programme to Bangladesh to be carried out on the lines she had described to the President. She also said that we should look closely for savings in our aid programmes which were not tied to British exports. It was a pity that we could not make more use of the European Community's food surpluses for countries like Bangladesh which were having very real difficulties in feeding their populations.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had instituted a study to see how to make the best use of the available money in the aid programme. There was at present some disagreement about what our approach should be. There were those on the one hand who argued that we should concentrate our aid on Commonwealth countries, for to do otherwise implied that the Commonwealth meant nothing. On the other hand, there were others who felt that we should concentrate our aid on projects that brought the best return for British firms. A possible way forward was to tie aid to British industry but, in the process, to do as much as possible for Commonwealth countries.

The Prime Minister would be grateful if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary could let her know, in due course, what conclusions he and the Chancellor of the Exchequer had come to as a result of their review of the aid programme.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Tony Battishill (HM Treasury) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,
Hwi.

G.G.H. Walden, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF
NEW ZEALAND, MR. ROBERT MULDOON, AT HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, ON 1 AUGUST
1979 AT 1800

Present

The Prime Minister
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

The Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon
Mr. A.M. Bisley (Prime
Minister's Department)

* * * * *

The Southern Pacific

Mr. Muldoon told the Prime Minister that he was very concerned about the total withdrawal of the UK's diplomatic presence from the South Pacific islands. The leaders of the new micro-states were totally inexperienced and vulnerable. The Prime Minister of Tuvalu, for example, had put the whole of his country's reserves on deposit with a real estate speculator in Texas, Greenacres Real Estate. The same Prime Minister had just made a down-payment of \$50,000 for a leadership course in the United States. Kiribati was in a similar predicament. In both islands, the local leadership relied heavily on New Zealand's High Commissioners for advice but they could do with a great deal more.

The Prime Minister expressed considerable concern at what Mr. Muldoon had told her and said that she would ask for a report.

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that some of the speeches made during the CHGM opening ceremony that morning had not been very helpful, but this was not unexpected. She told Mr. Muldoon that three main points had emerged from Lord Harlech's consultations during his mission to Southern Africa as the British Government's envoy. Firstly, there was general agreement that the April elections in Rhodesia had changed the situation and that a 65 per cent turn-out could not be ignored. Secondly, all were agreed that only the UK could give Rhodesia legal independence. Finally, it was generally agreed that there were shortcomings in the present constitution: criticism had centred on the reserved powers

/for the

for the white Members of Parliament and on the way in which the Commissions operated. The Prime Minister said that no decisions had yet been put to the Cabinet for endorsement but the Government would be sticking to the position that the UK had given other countries in Africa honourable independence constitutions and would do the same for Rhodesia. Time, however, was running out and it was more than ever essential to stop the war. The British Government would tell the Front Line States that if the UK could secure reasonable changes in Rhodesia's existing constitution (but without losing the confidence of the white population) and produce what would be seen by the world to be a reasonable constitution they, the Front Line States, should be prepared to say that they would not continue their support for the Patriotic Front, if the leaders of the Patriotic Front still criticised the situation. The Prime Minister told Mr. Muldoon that her private discussions so far indicated that some, at any rate, of the Front Line Presidents would accept this approach while expressing some doubts as to whether they could actually succeed in persuading the Patriotic Front to stop the war.

The Prime Minister went on to say that Rhodesia had come an enormously long way during the past two years. There was no point in other African countries supporting an armed struggle against a constitution which was in many respects so similar to those which they had themselves been given on independence. Mr. Muldoon said that he would expect President Kaunda and President Nyerere to create difficulties during the CHGM discussions on Rhodesia, although Sir Seretse Khama might be easier. President Kaunda's popularity had suffered a significant decline and he was experiencing great problems with his own Party. Mr. Muldoon said that he had been impressed, during the previous twenty-four hours, by the extent to which President Kaunda seemed to be the prisoner of his Party and to which he acted merely as its mouthpiece. The young Turks were moving up behind him and, in the meantime, he was faced by immense economic problems. It might make a great deal of sense for both Zambia and Tanzania to go hard for a solution on Rhodesia which would put an end to the fighting and enable them to rebuild their shattered economies. The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Peacock, had apparently found that Nyerere was taking a very different line in private to that which he still adopted in public.

/Mr. Muldoon

Mr. Muldoon agreed with the Prime Minister that the April elections had been a major triumph for Bishop Muzorewa: the vote, however, had been above all a vote for peace. The Prime Minister commented that it had equally been a vote against terrorism. Mr. Muldoon expressed the view that similar votes in Zambia and Tanzania, if they could be held, would produce the same result.

Mr. Muldoon went on to say that he thought that a solution might lie in getting some of the key figures at present in Lusaka who were concerned with the Rhodesia problem to meet privately together on the margins of the Conference, and particularly during the coming weekend at State House, to hammer out the terms of a CHGM declaration or statement with which they could live. When the Prime Minister said that the British Government would have to move very fast as soon as the Conference was over, Mr. Muldoon replied that it was equally important to make progress during the CHGM itself. From this point of view, it was essential that the Prime Minister should not take too hard a line in the CHGM debate on Rhodesia on 3 August.

The Prime Minister said that it would be equally important not to seem to be taking part in an onslaught on Bishop Muzorewa. The Bishop was understandably frightened of losing the confidence of his white population or, alternatively, if he acquiesced in too drastic changes in the constitution, losing his own credibility.

Mr. Muldoon said that, in his view, the white Rhodesians were already resigned to black majority rule. Ideally, one would wish to see Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe working together in the Cabinet of an independent Rhodesia. ^{But} / life was not like that and any such outcome would evoke cries of betrayal from the Patriotic Front. Mr. Muldoon said that he nevertheless believed that if, in Lusaka, an agreed statement or declaration could be worked out, to the effect that given certain specified changes in the constitution the CHGM accepted that hostilities should end, this would be a major step forward. Such a statement would, of course, have to be supported both by President Nyerere and President Kaunda. Nigeria would probably prove to be the most awkward customer in discussing such a proposal.

/The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister told Mr. Muldoon about Nigeria's nationalisation of BP. Mr. Muldoon mentioned that Commissioner Adefope, who was leading the Nigerian delegation in Lusaka, was a difficult man and given to sudden snap decisions, such as that which had pulled the Nigerian team out of the Commonwealth Games at Edmonton. Mr. Muldoon said that he thought that Kenya would be helpful, since the Kenyans would like to see Nyerere back down. There were many other countries which would acquiesce in such an arrangement and the West Indians, for example, would always back the winning side. Mr. Muldoon commented that Mr. Michael Manley had calmed down a great deal during the past two years: he had foregone his ambition to lead the Third World and was now concentrating on remaining the leader of Jamaica. Mr. Muldoon repeated that if Nyerere and Kaunda could be persuaded to adopt a softer public line, the whole Rhodesia problem could quite possibly be settled in Lusaka. The Prime Minister said that she saw little sign of this so far.

When Mr. Muldoon reverted to his idea of asking Mr. Ramphal to coordinate private discussions on the margin of the Conference, the Prime Minister said that she would not want a Commonwealth committee or any body of that kind. She accepted that the UK had to consult as widely as possible in order to achieve the maximum acceptance for Rhodesia's return to legality. It was important to stress that Bishop Muzorewa had demonstrated the possibility of achieving one's objectives by peaceful and democratic means.

Mr. Muldoon said that politicians often had to settle for second best and Bishop Muzorewa was clearly willing to do so. The Prime Minister said that she admired him for it; she recognised the importance of retaining the confidence of the whites. Mr. Muldoon said that Tanzania was faced by serious problems as a result of its action in Uganda; President Nyerere was clearly ready to look for a peaceful way out, and so was President Kaunda. Their governments, unlike the governments of New Zealand or the United Kingdom, could easily survive a drastic U-turn in their policies towards Rhodesia. After a week, the Zambian press would be hailing President Kaunda as the great peacemaker. Mr. Muldoon expressed his conviction that it should be possible to work along the lines of the Gleneagles weekend, by bringing together a limited number (five or six) of the countries directly interested in the Rhodesia problem, during the

/coming weekend,

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coming weekend, and to entrust Mr. Ramphal with the orchestration. An agreed text could be arrived at and then presented to the full Conference on the morning of Monday, 6 August. The other countries could then simply be asked to endorse the text, which could consist of a fairly lengthy preamble followed by a short list of the specific constitutional proposals which the UK would put forward. These might include the condition that Ian Smith should retire from government. A declaration or statement on these lines would give the British Government something to build on. He thought it likely that neither Nkomo nor Mugabe any longer believed that following the elections that time was on their side. They were getting older and there were rivals for their positions. Mr. Muldoon commented, in passing, that he thought that Mr. Fraser was on the wrong tack and that his current statements on Southern Africa contained an excessive element of appeasement.

Mr. Muldoon agreed with the Prime Minister that the battle in Rhodesia was no longer between black and white but between black and black; racialism was no longer the dominant issue - tribalism was now the greater danger.

The conversation ended at 1845.

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1 August 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

Not circulated

BGC

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

THE PRIME MINISTER'S DINNER WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA IN LUSAKA
ON 31 JULY

Commenting on the discussion over the dinner which, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, she attended as President Kaunda's guest at the State House in Lusaka on 31 July, the Prime Minister said that the only significant advance over what she had been told by President Nyerere earlier in the day was Kaunda's statement to the effect that if the United Kingdom got the Rhodesia constitution right, he would be bringing pressure to bear, in advance of new elections, to bring the fighting to an end. President Kaunda had also said that if the United Kingdom were to offer a constitution which was in his judgement fair and reasonable, and if President Nkomo were to refuse to accept it, he would take this into account in deciding what action he should adopt vis-a-vis Nkomo. Kaunda had claimed that Zambia wanted to see dramatic changes in the constitution and that the United States and the United Kingdom did so, too. The Prime Minister had made it clear to Kaunda that this was not true so far as the UK was concerned.

BW.

31 July 1979

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER,
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AT HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, ON 31 JULY 1979
AT 1830

Present

The Prime Minister

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

Mr. B.G. Cartledge

The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Fraser

The Rt. Hon. Andrew Peacock

Notetaker

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After an initial discussion of the internal political situation in Nigeria, Mr. Fraser said that the line on Rhodesia in Lagos was still tough. Commissioner Adefope, however, was pleasant to deal with and would say rather little at the CHGM. Mr. Fraser said that he had only learned a few minutes before his departure from Lagos of the rumour that the Nigerian Government intended to nationalise BP in Nigeria. He had put it to the Nigerians that this would be an unhelpful step to take on the eve of the CHGM. The Nigerians had retorted that this step was being taken because BP had been selling oil to South Africa; they insisted that the measure was unrelated either to the CHGM or to the Rhodesia problem.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Fraser that, despite a vitriolic local press about Bishop Muzorewa and herself, the atmosphere of her private talks had been quite different. The same applied to the line which President Nyerere had taken with the press on the previous evening after the Front Line Summit. The moderate Africans now accepted that only the UK could give Rhodesia her independence constitution while maintaining that this must lead to genuine black majority rule. The Prime Minister said that the Africans to whom she had spoken clearly expected that events would now move quickly, almost as if they had had

/enough of

enough of the present situation. Many Africans now accepted that the Rhodesia elections had been a significant advance and could not be ignored. There was also general agreement that some parts of the constitution required amendment and that it was important that Rhodesia should be recognised by other countries than the UK.

In response to a question from Mr. Fraser, the Prime Minister said that the British Government had taken no final decisions. The proposals which the Government would eventually make would be addressed to all the parties to the conflict: the war simply had to be stopped. The Prime Minister said that she hoped that if a right and reasonable constitution could be devised, the grounds on which the Front Line States played host to the guerrillas would be removed.

Lord Carrington said that he had already asked President Nyerere whether, if there were to be general agreement on an amended constitution, the Patriotic Front would then stop the war. Nyerere had said that he would try and that the Patriotic Front could not continue their activities without the support of the Front Line States. Mr. Fraser recalled that General Obasanjo had told him that if Ian Smith were to be elected in Salisbury on the basis of a genuinely democratic constitution, he would send him a telegram of congratulations. The General had urged that changes should be made to the present constitution and that this should lead to supervised elections; supervision by the present government in Salisbury would not be trusted. Mr. Peacock told the Prime Minister that President Nyerere had said to him that Tanzania

/trusted the

trusted the British, who had carried out these independence operations before. Nyerere had suggested that the UK should send observers to a new round of Rhodesian elections and that these need not all be British. President Nyerere had admitted that he might have difficulty in selling this approach to the Patriotic Front.

Lord Carrington commented that this approach seemed to ignore the difficulty, which had so often proved insuperable, of what was to be done about the Rhodesian security forces. Mr. Fraser said that President Kaunda (whom he had just seen) had not raised this problem. Kaunda had taken the line that there were two essential preconditions. These were that there should be no recognition of the Muzorewa regime and no lifting of sanctions until the whole process of making and accepting proposals had been completed. These proposals should be put by the UK to a constitutional convention. Kaunda had taken his usual line about the inevitability of Soviet, Cuban or East German intervention if the war were to continue much longer.

The Prime Minister said that President Nyerere had agreed that there could be no sanctions against a genuinely democratic constitution. Mr. Peacock said that if President Nyerere were to be satisfied, during the next few days, with the Prime Minister's approach - of discussing, consulting, consulting again and then deciding - the British approach to the CHGM itself might be critical.

Lord Carrington said that it was now planned to begin the discussion of Southern Africa on the morning of Friday, 3 August, and to conclude it on Monday, 6 August. The Prime Minister and he would then fly home to consult their colleagues and then would get on with their proposals. Mr. Fraser said that he thought it very important that the Africans at the CHGM should go home to their countries prepared to testify /that the

that the UK was now on the right track so far as Rhodesia was concerned. Mr. Peacock pointed out that, in this context, they might like to see something included in the Communique to tie the UK down. The Prime Minister suggested that the press should be told that she and Lord Carrington were to get down to the working out of proposals as soon as they returned to the UK. They could give an indication of the broad timescale. Mr. Fraser said that it would be very helpful to know more about the time-scale of the UK scenario. If the time-scale were to be very short it might not be necessary to meet President Kaunda's precondition that recognition should not be given nor sanctions lifted until proposals on the constitution had been put and accepted.

The Prime Minister said that it was essential to get into a position in which Africans would be encouraged to say that it did not matter who reached the top so long as the constitutional basis was right. Mr. Peacock recalled that President Nyerere had once told him that he would be happy to work with Bishop Muzorewa.

The Prime Minister said that the UK had given "reasonable" constitutions to all her former colonies. What they did with these constitutions subsequently was their own business. The main difficulty would be with the whites in Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa was anxious not to lose his credibility.

Mr. Peacock said that President Moi of Kenya would, he thought, present no problem. Mr. Fraser said that the key would be what the Africans needed in order to live with their own public opinion, while the UK continued her process of negotiation. The Prime Minister and Lord Carrington agreed that the UK advisers should be put to work on possible formulations for inclusion in the Communique.

/ Mr. Peacock

Mr. Peacock expressed the view that if the revised constitution were to enshrine the basic essential elements, the Patriotic Front would be out-maneuvred. It should be borne in mind that Nyerere was faced with acute problems as a result of the cost of stationing his troops in Uganda. It seemed clear that he intended to keep them there for some time yet. Mr. Fraser said that one card for the UK to play would be to offer to arrange independent supervision of new elections in Rhodesia, rather than leaving it to the present regime there.

Lord Carrington said that he very much doubted whether the Patriotic Front would agree to anything which the UK could propose. Nkomo knew that he would have no chance of victory in a "free and fair election", since he was not a Shona. Equally, Mugabe would be doubtful of victory and ideologically opposed to the process. Mr. Fraser said that changes to the constitution were essential in order to detach the Front Line States from their support of the Patriotic Front. The Prime Minister said that the worst problem still remained that of how to get rid of Nkomo and Mugabe; the Prime Minister commented that they had nowhere to go other than Rhodesia.

Lord Carrington said that if the UK could get President Nyerere and President Kaunda to accept that the UK Government were being very reasonable, the two Presidents might perhaps be screwed down into abandonment of the Patriotic Front if the Front were to reject the UK's constitutional proposals.

The discussion ended at 1930.

31 July 1979

NOTE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, MR. SPYROS KYPRIANOU, AT MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, ON
31 JULY 1979 AT 1730

<u>Present:</u>	Prime Minister	President Kyprianou
	Mr. B.G. Cartledge	Mr. H. Vovides

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The Prime Minister said that it was her understanding that the inter-communal talks were now adjourned. President Kyprianou said that this was correct. He had entertained great hopes of the initial agreement but the Turks had quickly started to make statements which showed that they had no intention of abiding by it. His impression was that the Turks did not wish to continue the talks for the time being. They had tried to impose conditions on their resumption. The Greek Cypriots had told the Turks that they could raise any subject they wished during the course of the talks but that it was unacceptable that they should seek to impose pre-conditions. The Turks had rejected this approach and had talked about "bi-zonality". The Greeks had argued that there was no such term in any constitution. (The Prime Minister agreed that it was not a term in use in international law). The Turks, President Kyprianou continued, had then revealed the true purpose of this term, namely to rule out federation and substitute a disguised form of partition. This was completely unacceptable. The Greek Cypriots had been prepared to accept federation in order to facilitate matters, despite the fact that even British experts had ruled it out. The next step would be to find out what Turkey was really aiming at.

President Kyprianou told the Prime Minister that at the time of the agreement his impression had been that Mr. Ecevit genuinely wanted it and wished to make it work; subsequently, his position had become weaker. He had himself suggested that all troops should be withdrawn from the Republic of Cyprus (a term which excluded the SBAs), whatever their nationality. Troops could be replaced by a mixed local police force under U.N. supervision. This would remove fears about security and allow the people of Cyprus to make their own choice.

President Kyprianou said that he was very disappointed. A great deal of hard work had gone into securing the agreement of 19 May and the Turks had begun to create problems almost immediately. Some people said that the Turks

/ were simply

were simply playing for time so that their fait accompli would become solidified into confederation or partition. If this happened, the Cyprus problem would become permanent. It was, the President said, not a problem between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots so much as a problem between Cyprus and Turkey. The Greek Government was careful not to become involved, since it had other preoccupations. There was a difficult period ahead.

The Prime Minister asked the President when he thought the inter-communal talks would resume. President Kyprianou said that they were unlikely to restart in the near future. Nobody was inclined to blame the Greek side for the present situation. The Turks could not be expelled from Cyprus by force: the only weapon available to the Greek Cypriots was the moral support of the international community. The Government of Cyprus would raise the issue once more in the forthcoming General Assembly and the problem would have to go to the Security Council, since the inter-communal talks had originated from a Security Council Resolution. He himself intended to raise the matter during the CHGM, under the "international political situation" item.

President Kyprianou said that the Commonwealth, and the UK in particular, could give significant help to Cyprus. He would welcome a bilateral discussion at some stage on the question of what the UK could and should do as a former colonial power, a guarantor power, a member of the Security Council and a member of the Commonwealth. President Kyprianou noted that one of the guarantor powers had engineered a coup while another had invaded the island. In any future structure of guarantees, the Cyprus Government could not accept Greece or Turkey as guarantor powers. The UK, however, could remain and would have an important role to play. The UK had been the only guarantor who had not been involved in recent developments, although it would have been open to her to intervene militarily. President Kyprianou said that, in his view, the UK should take the initiative and see what could be done to resolve the problem, especially by exerting pressure on Ankara.

President Kyprianou said that his Government would have preferred to deal with Ecevit over a settlement, since he had been Prime Minister at the time of the invasion. They had offered to meet Ecevit, but he had declined. Mr. Ecevit himself was probably in favour of a meeting but there were others, for example the military, who took a different line.

/ President Kyprianou

President Kyprianou said that in parallel with the inter-communal talks, which could not be resumed without some progress in Ankara, efforts could be made to create a helpful climate for a settlement in the various international fora. He, for his part, could never forget that 40% of the territory of Cyprus was under occupation and 70% of the island's resources was under foreign control. The refugee problem was also intense for Cyprus. The relatives of missing persons numbered thousands. An agreement on missing persons had been reached with the UN Secretary General but the Turks were refusing to implement it.


Turning to the sovereign bases, President Kyprianou said that despite some agitation from the Left, the UK had no cause to worry; the situation was quiet and there was really no problem. The main issue at present was the long delay in the UK's payments for the bases: payment had been agreed for the first five years but, since 1965, no further payments had been made. He asked the Prime Minister if she could let him have a note about the reasons for this. The Prime Minister undertook to do so. President Kyprianou added that there was no need for the whole sum to be paid at once.

The Prime Minister asked President Kyprianou how the rise in oil prices would affect Cyprus. The President said that Cyprus was well placed for hydro-electric power but agreed that problems could quickly arise.

The Prime Minister asked President Kyprianou whether Dr. Waldheim was now seeking a basis for a resumption of the inter-communal talks. President Kyprianou said that so far as he was concerned, the basis was already there. He agreed, however, that Dr. Waldheim was currently disillusioned. He should insist strongly on the withdrawal of foreign troops and on the implementation of the relevant UN Resolutions.

President Kyprianou said that meetings such as the CHGM were helpful to Cyprus; but there could be no solution unless discussions could be both continued and widened. Agreement on the communique would, he thought, be reached: the passage on Cyprus was not long and he would welcome the UK's help in securing it. The Prime Minister gave a non-committal reply.

The meeting ended at 1805.



1 August 1979

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH LIFE PRESIDENT BANDA OF
MALAWI IN THE MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA, ON 31 JULY 1979 AT 1630

Present: Prime Minister Life President Banda
Mr. B. G. Cartledge

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After giving the Prime Minister an enthusiastic account of The Queen's visit to Malawi, Dr. Banda told her that it should be her turn next. The Prime Minister thanked Dr. Banda and went on to say that the CHGM would be a difficult meeting for the United Kingdom at which complex issues affecting her would be raised. The local press had not given the meeting an encouraging start. The Prime Minister said that she would greatly welcome Dr. Banda's advice on how to approach the meeting. It was important that Rhodesia should not dominate the Conference: the problems of South East Asia, the Caribbean and of the refugees were all of great importance, as was the future of the world economy, and all these questions should be given proper weight. Nevertheless, Rhodesia would inevitably be the main focus.

The Prime Minister said that she had tried to make the British Government's position clear in the House of Commons a week before; but no decisions had been put to the Cabinet for approval. The British Government first wished to complete the process of consultation on which it had embarked and the CHGM was its last stage. The Government was concerned to bring genuine majority rule to Rhodesia, to restore legality to that country and to stop the war which was costing 500 African lives every week. Lord Harlech's mission had shown that there were three points on which everybody was agreed: that the election in Rhodesia was a great advance which had changed the situation; that it was the responsibility of the UK to restore Rhodesia to legality; and that the new constitution was open to criticism with regard to the blocking power of the minority of white Members of Parliament and to the manner in which the Commissions operated. The fact that the Prime Minister could not choose his own top officials, rather than the existence of the Commissions as such, was open to challenge. The situation should be reversed so that the Prime Minister had the power while the Commissions were consulted. The Prime Minister repeated that she would welcome Dr. Banda's advice, as an old hand at Commonwealth meetings and as an old friend, on how to tackle these issues in Lusaka.

/ Dr. Banda

Dr. Banda asked the Prime Minister whom she had already seen. The Prime Minister said that she had called on President Nyerere, whose views did not appear to be very different from those which the British Government had recently put forward. She had stressed to President Nyerere that it was vital to end the war and that Rhodesia's return to legality should be the signal for its termination. The question was, would Rhodesia's return to legality be sufficient in itself to bring the war to an end? The Prime Minister said that she assumed that all the participants in the Conference wished to achieve an acceptable settlement in Rhodesia : she would welcome Dr. Banda's views.

Dr. Banda said that the Prime Minister might not like his views. He had maintained, ever since 1965, that Rhodesia was Britain's problem and that Britain should solve it as she thought best. Other countries must accept the course which Britain chose to adopt; they had no right to interfere or to dictate to Britain. Some governments threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Britain failed to take this or that step: when Mr. Wilson had asked him for advice, he had said that these countries should be told that they were welcome to leave the Commonwealth if that was their wish. Dr. Banda said that he had never changed this view and still believed that nobody should dictate to the UK.

The Prime Minister said that she totally accepted this assessment. The UK had given Malawi an independence constitution as the result of agreement between their two governments; the same had been true of Nigeria and of other countries. The same should be true with regard to Rhodesia. But it was also important that this should be the signal to an end to the war and that other countries should recognise Rhodesia in company with the UK. Dr. Banda repeated that it was all right for the UK to consult and to discuss; but she should not accept dictation from anybody.

Reverting to the constitution, the Prime Minister said that the two criticisms which had been made of it - relating to the blocking mechanism and to the Commissions - were valid. The blocking mechanism did not appear in this form in any other independence constitution, although there were many precedents for reserved Parliamentary seats for minorities. Dr. Banda commented that, nevertheless, some people might oppose this provision, on the grounds that all Parliamentary seats should be elective. The Prime Minister

/ said

said that the function of reserved seats was to give confidence to minority groups. Dr. Banda agreed and recalled that Malawi's independence constitution had contained such a provision.

The Prime Minister said that she accepted that Rhodesia should follow precedent and accept her constitution from the UK. The UK nevertheless wanted other countries to recognise Rhodesia as well; and to help to bring the war to an end.

Dr. Banda, telling the Prime Minister that he would like to speak freely and honestly, said that some people were disposed to introduce the factor of their personal friendships into the Rhodesian problem. This should not be allowed to happen. It would be quite wrong if he were to say that he would like a friend of his to be President of Rhodesia. Mr. Sithole was his friend, but he had told him frankly that only two men could assume power in a democratic Rhodesia: Bishop Muzorewa or Mr. Mugabe. This was because they were both Shonas. Dr. Banda said that he did not like Mugabe because he was too close to the Russians; but he was a Shona nevertheless. Joshua Nkomo could never rule Rhodesia since he came from a minority tribe and had no chance of winning power. Bishop Muzorewa commanded a majority, whether one liked him or not. The Bishop hoped to make his government acceptable to the rest of the world but it was the UK's problem to bring this about.

Dr. Banda commented that what had happened in Rhodesia was not just an advance but a revolution. Many people forgot that Rhodesia had never been a British colony in the classical sense, but the private property of Cecil Rhodes and subsequently of a company. Eventually, in 1922, the Rhodesians had been asked to choose between union with South Africa, union with Northern Rhodesia or going it alone. Not wishing to accept Boer rule or indefinite support for a poor Northern neighbour, the Rhodesians had chosen to go it alone. This did much to explain, although not to excuse, the phenomenon of UDI.

The Prime Minister said that, given the current attitudes of the local press, the situation could only get better. Dr. Banda said that he thought that the press would remain sour for a while longer yet. The Prime Minister said that she was anxious not to drag her feet in resolving the Rhodesia problem and Dr. Banda agreed that she should not. It was sometimes argued that Nkomo and Mugabe would continue to fight on after independence had been granted. He did not share this view, which assumed that the Russians would

/ intervene

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intervene openly; there was so far no evidence that they might. The Prime Minister asked whether Mugabe was under Russian control. Dr. Banda replied that he thought not; equally, President Machel was not in his view a client of the Soviet Union. Shonas like Robert Mugabe were very individualistic by temperament. The Prime Minister commented that this should make them capitalistic as well!

The discussion ended at 1720.

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31 July 1979

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NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT NYERERE OF
TANZANIA HELD AT MULUNGUSHI VILLAGE, LUSAKA AT 1530 ON TUESDAY 31 JULY

<u>Present:</u>	Prime Minister	President Nyerere
	Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	The Hon. B. Mkapa
	Mr. C. A. Whitmore	H.E. Mr. Daniel Mloka
	Mr. B. G. Cartledge	

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Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that the aim of the British Government was to bring Rhodesia back to legality under genuine black majority rule. The question was how to achieve that aim. The British Cabinet had not yet taken a decision: Britain wished to wait for the CHGM. President Nyerere had been very helpful in letting Lord Harlech have his views. He had attended the meeting of Front Line States the previous day. And he would be opening the Conference's debate on Southern Africa. Could he help on the problem of how the British Government should accomplish its objective?

President Nyerere said that there should be no difference between Africa and Britain about the objective of genuine majority rule for Rhodesia. As the Prime Minister had said, the problem was how to get there. The Conference should try to agree upon this aim, and then all should pull their weight together on the means of achieving it. But they would have to rely heavily on the Prime Minister. The United Kingdom had the responsibility for achieving the objective. The others could only help.

The Prime Minister agreed that the responsibility for bringing Rhodesia back to legality was Britain's. This was one of the three main points on which Lord Harlech's and Mr. Luce's consultations had shown that there was general agreement. The second was that as a result of the elections something different had happened in Rhodesia on which it was possible to build. Third, there was widespread criticism of the present Rhodesian constitution. This focussed on the provisions for a blocking mechanism for the whites and for the public service commissions. It would be helpful to know how the Front Line States saw the matter generally.

/President Nyerere

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President Nyerere said that he could summarise very simply the position which the Front Line States had agreed upon the previous night. They did not believe that a situation had yet been reached in Rhodesia where there was a government that should be recognised and sanctions lifted. More positively, they thought that Britain should look at the constitution, whether the present one or a new one. It was not so much a matter of whether there had been free and fair elections: it was the constitution that was the main problem. There was no difficulty about making provision in the constitution to reserve seats for minorities. Tanzania's independence constitution had done this, though subsequently the minorities had come to feel that there was no need for such an arrangement and the constitution had been amended accordingly. Moreover, he saw the value of public service commissions which were intended to stop excessive interference by the executive. The problem with the present Rhodesian constitution, however, was the particular powers which were entrenched for the white minority. He hoped that the Prime Minister would be able to help progress to be made to a point where the Commonwealth countries could say that the constitution proposed for Rhodesia was a democratic one that they could support. There should then be fresh elections, and some method would need to be devised to satisfy the Commonwealth that the elections were free and fair. They might need to be supervised by the Commonwealth or by the UK. If the Commonwealth agreed on a constitution and it was announced that fresh elections would be held on the basis of the constitution, that would be enough to allow him to say that he no longer supported the war and to persuade the Patriotic Front to stop hostilities. He could not guarantee that the Patriotic Front would then cease fighting, but the fact was that they could not continue the war without the support of the Front Line States. This was how the Front Line States were approaching the problem, and he would be speaking in this sense when he opened the Conference's debate on Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister said that if President Nyerere addressed the Conference in such terms, she would be able to make much the same speech as she had made in the House of Commons on 25 July. It might then be possible to move forward. At the moment, Rhodesia was bleeding to death, with 500 deaths a week. But if Rhodesia could be brought back to legality and sanctions lifted, the prize for Rhodesia itself and for its neighbours was enormous. She could help feed the surrounding countries and she had raw materials to export. Britain recognised that once independence had been granted, an independent country could follow what constitutional course it wished. But the blacks in Rhodesia wanted to keep the confidence of the whites who could help sustain the Rhodesian economy. This admirable approach was an indication of their maturity.

/ The Prime Minister

The Prime Minister added that she did not want to see an exodus of Rhodesians of any kind.

When President Nyerere asked the Prime Minister whether she had the power to achieve the British Government's objective on Rhodesia, the Prime Minister said that she had to carry her Cabinet and the British Parliament with her. In response, President Nyerere said that if anybody had the power to solve the problem, it was Britain.

Uganda

In response to the Prime Minister's enquiry about developments in Uganda, President Nyerere said that a new phase had begun and Uganda was trying to settle down. Professor Lule, who had been a personal friend, had expected him to back him with the Tanzanian army. President Binaisa was now in power, and Tanzania would help him. The fact was that Tanzania was stuck in Uganda, where the local army and police were ineffective. He would pull out if someone else would take over. Keeping the Tanzanian army in Uganda was very expensive. But there was no alternative to staying on for the time being.

Namibia

President Nyerere said that SWAPO, who had been represented at the Front Line meeting on the previous evening, wanted peace in Namibia. Elections had taken place there, but they had done nothing towards the implementation of the U.N. plans. Tanzania would help the U.N. Secretary-General as far as they could.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that when the Conservative Government had come to power, they had felt that they had a card to play with the South African government because they had not been associated with what the South Africans regarded as the duplicity of the Five. He had therefore seen the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, and had persuaded him not to reject the U.N. plan. But Mr. Botha was concerned about the interpretation of aspects of the plan. If these difficulties could be overcome, he would stick with the plan. Sir James Murray, who had been appointed to speak for the Five, was going to South Africa for further discussions. There was therefore a chink of light.

President Nyerere said that he would put it no higher than that.

The discussion ended at 1600.

31 July 1979

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Filmed at the National
Archives (TNA) in London

February 2010