PREM 19

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COMMONWEALTH

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**Confidential Filing**

**Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka August 1979 (Policy)**

PM's Briefing in separate Folders Annexed.
See separate files.

1. (Commonwealth - July 1979
   Bi-Lateral meetings)
   2. Another Bi-Lateral
PART 2 begins:

PM’s Opening Statement at CHGM 1.8.79

PART 1 ends:

ECS/Australian For Min Mtg Record 31.7.79

Those Present:
The Rt Hon Lord Carrington
Mr G G H Walden
Mr J S Wall

The Hon Andrew Peacock MP
Mr D W Evans, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

1. Mr Peacock said that he had had useful visits in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. He handed over a copy of a minute from himself to Mr Fraser, summarising his discussions with President Nyerere (copy attached).

2. Lord Carrington commented that Mr Peacock’s discussions were borne out by the talk which he and the Prime Minister had had with President Nyerere earlier in the afternoon which in turn was very much in line with what President Nyerere had told Lord Harlech in June.

3. Mr Peacock asked whether the British Government would be able to give, during the Conference, a clearer idea of what they would be doing over Rhodesia. Lord Carrington said that the Prime Minister would explain our position in general terms on Friday and might be able to give a little bit more the following Monday. Mr Peacock thought that the British Government would have to go further. Lord Carrington pointed out that the issue had not yet been discussed in Cabinet. However, he thought that our general intention would be clear enough. We would not wish to go any further at this stage and the Australians should not press us. We hoped to say that we had heard at the Conference certain things that pointed in a particular direction and that, having heard them, we would go away and put forward firm proposals.

4. Mr Peacock asked how Britain would answer the question of what would happen further down the road. Lord Carrington said that we would not answer that question at this point. Mr Peacock said that President Nyerere had thought that an international supervisory force would not be required in Rhodesia, but he thought that President Nyerere and the West were looking for certain assurances. Lord Carrington said that the entire Commonwealth acknowledged Britain’s responsibility for Rhodesia. There could be no question of assurances, but we would of course pay attention to what was said and be grateful for it. He thought that President Nyerere had been satisfied by his discussions with the Prime Minister that afternoon. Mr Peacock said that President Nyerere was hoping that the British would be able to whisper in his ear from time to time.

5. Mr Peacock said that, during his visit to Nairobi, he had found President Moi very helpful on Rhodesia. The OAU declaration on Rhodesia had just been published. Vice-President Khaki, who had been in Monrovia, had confirmed the initial British reaction that the OAU decision was largely tactical. Lord Carrington said that the OAU decision was not reflected in anything that President Nyerere had said.

6. Mr Peacock said that he had not arrived in Lagos to join Mr Fraser until after the latter’s talks with General Obasanjo. General Obasanjo had said that Nigeria had gone out on a limb to sell the Anglo-American proposals. The Nigerians were now very suspicious of British motives and believed that
Britain should come to GHQ with detailed proposals.

7. Mr Peacock said that Mr Fraser had raised the question of the possible nationalization of BP in Nigeria with General Obasanjo in the car going out to the airport. Mr Fraser had had a somewhat equivocal response, but had come away with the impression that General Obasanjo had confirmed the decision.

8. Lord Carrington enquired whether President Nyerere had raised with the Australians the Uganda issue. Mr Peacock said that he had not, and that he understood that the Nigerians were not proposing to raise the issue in Lusaka. Lord Carrington said that President Nyerere had told the Prime Minister that he was stuck with Uganda and could not extricate himself. In other words it was a mess.

9. Reverting to Rhodesia, Mr Peacock said that Mr Fraser's posture would be a monitoring one, and that Mr Fraser would be ready to use his good offices. He read out from the Australian brief which said that pressure should only be brought to bear if the United Kingdom veered off course and if there were consequent dangers to the Commonwealth. The brief also said that Australia should acknowledge UK sensitivities to outside pressures. Mr Peacock said that Lord Carrington would realise from what he had read out that he had had to "nose down" Mr Fraser. It had not originally been his intention to go to Lagos at all but Mr Fraser had clearly been wound up by what General Obasanjo had told him and Mr Peacock had received an SOS from Australian officials asking him to go to Nigeria to cool things down. He thought he had succeeded for the time being.

---

British High Commission, Lusaka

1 August 1979

Distribution:

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Mr Barltrop
Mr Penn

By bag to:

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PS/Mr Blaker
Mr Cortazzi
Mr Murray
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Rhodesia Department
British High Commission, Canberra

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* Passage deleted and crossed, 40 years, under FOI Exemption.

O N Wayland
29 September 2009
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

CHOCM DISCUSSIONS IN DAR ES SALAAM

I had two very useful discussions in Dar Es Salaam on 29 July with President Nyerere and with his Foreign Minister, Mr Ben Mkapa. I indicated to them both how important you saw the role of President Nyerere in setting the tone for the discussions on Rhodesia in CHOCHM. I outlined to them the basis for the Australian position which was familiar to them, and left with Nyerere your most recent letter. I was encouraged by the moderation and clarity of his views, and I believe that he is genuinely determined to assist in finding an acceptable outcome at CHOCHM and beyond. I told him that, while we saw no central role for ourselves, you are prepared to assist in what way you can. We agreed that the main interest will focus on the British attitude and we both agreed that the present trend of British thinking gave grounds for optimism.

Nyerere was aware that the British are unlikely to be laying down at Lusaka the full detail of their proposed constitutional changes and procedures post-CHOCHM. In general terms he hoped there would be no differences of view at Lusaka; that the constitution needed to be changed, and that further elections would need to be held. These were the essential minimal requirements. Nyerere specifically said that in his presentation on the Friday in opening discussion of the Rhodesia issue, he would assume that the British meant well and he said “I will not raise my voice”.

Tanzania had no particular problem with the reservation of Parliamentary seats for the white minority: what it could not accept was the reservation of power in the entrenched provisions of the present constitution. British preparedness to see the constitution changed to make it truly democratic, and to envisage the holding of free and fair elections under the new constitution, would be an acceptable basis for progress at CHOCHM.
Nyerere said that he hoped that the British would come with actual proposals for constitutional change. However, if they did not do so he would still be content, provided they agreed that the problem was reservation of powers and they agreed to draft a constitution removing the problem.

Asked how he saw developments post-CHOGM, Nyerere said that his assessment was that the British would prepare a democratic constitution and that it would make known the terms of this constitution, inter alia, to himself as Chairman of the Front Line States. It would most probably then call constituent talks as the legal authority to which it would invite representatives of Rhodesia, including the present Muzorewa "Government" as well as the Patriotic Front. Nyerere said that if the constitution, in fact, met the two basic prerequisites of being democratic and providing for fair elections, "I will play my role with the Patriotic Front. I will tell them to go and talk with the British". If they did not they would run the risk of being left out of the settlement. He jokingly said that in these circumstances he was not sure that he could "deliver" the Patriotic Front, but he would certainly try. He made it clear that in such circumstances the Front Line States would have no interest in further underwriting the war which was, after all, damaging to their own economies. He said he did not envisage any direct participation for the Front Line States in any constitutional conference. Provided the British "whispered" their intentions to him he would be satisfied and would assist.

In connection with a cease-fire by the Patriotic Front Nyerere said that if there was agreement on a constitution and all party talks, he would tell the Patriotic Front to end the war before going to the talks. The Patriotic Front might not agree, but they would, nonetheless, need to attend the talks. It should be possible to organise a cease-fire before, or shortly after, the talks started.

Nyerere acknowledged that even if there were agreement on the acceptability of a new constitution, serious practical problems would still remain to be solved. He did not comment on our question as to how the opposing military forces could either be fused or neutralised, although he had in mind that a settlement would involve the departure from Tanzania of Patriotic Front forces. Nyerere did not have any firm ideas as to how new elections could be easily conducted, taking as a starting point the fact that the existing Muzorewa/Smith regime had effective control in Salisbury. At this stage he has developed no firm ideas as to what form of supervision might be desirable, although it was clear from my discussion with Mkapa that the Tanzanians would see impartial international supervisors or even observers of the elections as acceptable. The Patriotic Front might well require more than this.
In commenting on these difficult practical issues, Nyerere remarked that saving face all round ought not be impossible, and if there was a common determination, the mechanics to solve them should not be beyond reach.

Nyerere commented that at Lusaka Commonwealth countries "would not be asking the British anything contrary to their beliefs". He was encouraged that Mrs Thatcher had strongly implied in Parliament last week that she was looking for a solution to that problem this year. He had, himself, exchanged letters with her recently and was aware of her qualities of determination. In response to a question as to whether he thought it was absolutely certain that Britain would not renew the sanctions in November, he replied that if circumstances should warrant a temporary extension while the package was being put into effect, he believed that Mrs Thatcher could put them through, notwithstanding her claim in Australia that this would not be possible. She was, after all, the British Prime Minister with a very large majority and, he assumed, effective whips.

Nyerere responded favourably to my message to him from you that the two of you meet early during the conference, and also to our suggestion that CHOGM be held in Australia in 1981.

My talk with Mkapa covered much the same ground, and was generally consistent with the President’s thinking.

(Andrew Peacock)
PRIME MINISTER

MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

The meeting of the Committee of the Whole went very smoothly this afternoon. The Secretary-General will be circulating the agreed recommendations to Heads of Government later tonight as HGM/79/3; but for present purposes perhaps you could look at the draft (below) which we had in front of us this after/and read it against the comments which follow.

Times of Meetings

These were confirmed and Mr. Ramphal said that 0930 (from Thursday onwards) was intended as a definite time for starting and did not mean "0930 for 1000". Assuming Heads of Government confirmed this, it will mean bringing our morning briefing meeting forward a little. He also said that since the Friday afternoon session (because of the visit to the Agricultural Show) will not start until 1600, it was planned to continue this session until 1800.

Opening Session

No change proposed to the arrangements in HGM/79/2.

Agenda

There were three attempts to add additional items:

(i) Malta said that they wanted a separate sub-item under International Developments on the Mediterranean. There was no support for this from anyone and Ramphal suggested that anything Malta wanted to say could be covered under the World Political Scene sub-item.

(ii) The Gambia wanted an item on their proposal (see Brief B.31) for a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission. There was no support for this and Ramphal suggested that it be raised under the Commonwealth Cooperation item.

(iii) Cyprus wanted an item on the proposed Commonwealth Film and Television Institute (see brief HGM/79/17). Again there was no positive support and a general feeling that if raised it ought to be remitted to the Committee of the Whole.

/I doubt
I doubt if we need go out of our way to oppose discussion of these items - if nothing else, they would leave less time for discussion of Southern Africa! - but they may pose problems when we come to the drafting of the Communique.

**Timetable**

The schedule at Annex 2 of the draft below was agreed, subject to one amendment. The Australians, with Zambian support (clearly obtained in advance), wanted to switch the world economic situation item, which Mr. Fraser will be introducing, from Friday afternoon to Thursday afternoon. This was agreed on the understanding that South East Asia would be completed on Thursday but that the "Island Developing and Other Specially Disadvantaged Members" item would be taken on Friday afternoon. This leaves Southern Africa on Friday morning.

**Committee of the Whole**

The draft arrangements were agreed.

**Attendance at Meetings**

The Opening Session will be in the Grand Hall with large numbers present. Each delegation will have three passes, to use as they wish, for the main executive sessions. Ramphal did not deal with the question of attendance at restricted sessions, but he told me that he had in mind that each Head of Delegation could be accompanied by one Minister but no officials.

**Press**

Ramphal drew attention to the Press Centre in the Parliament building where there would be facilities for press briefings and conferences. He did not suggest any ground rules for these and I had a word with him afterwards about this. I said that the usual practice was that delegations were free to brief on what they had said but not on what other people had said, and was it the intention to stick to this. He said that he thought the answer was 'yes' and that President Kaunda would mention this tomorrow.

/ General Atmosphere
General Atmosphere

Friendly, with an obvious wish on the part of many delegations that the Conference should not be entirely dominated by discussion of Southern Africa. India was particularly helpful over this.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.

31 July 1979
CONFIDENTIAL

Private Secretary

cc: FS/No. 10
Sir J. Hunt
Sir M. Fallisner
Sir A. Duff
Mr. James
Mr. Fenn
Mr. Barltrop

CHQH: ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. It may be useful to set out briefly how I think the discussions on
the economic issues may go.

2. Economic questions arise at two points on the agenda – Item 3(d)
(World Economic Situation and Prospects) and Item 4 (Commonwealth
Cooperation). Item 3(d) is due to be taken on Friday afternoon, 3 August;
Monday 6 August. Item 4 on Tuesday 7 August. The risks are that:

(i) the underlying political tension at the meeting may play
back into the tone of the general economic discussions
and there may be criticism of the industrialised countries
in general (and the UK in particular) for their allegedly
ungenerous and hard-line position on the demands of
developing countries;

(ii) there may as a consequence be increased pressure for
concessions or new commitments on the economic side.

Our objective should be so to handle the discussions as to avert these risks,
without paying an unacceptable price in terms of expenditure or expansion of
bureaucratic activity by the Secretariat.

3. The discussion of world economic problems and prospects is unlikely in
practice to be a real debate, so much as a round of statements (probably not
by all participants) expressing national concerns and priorities, with a
resume at the end by the Chairman prompted by the Secretary-General. He can
be expected to emphasise what the Secretary-General's report calls: "the
real crisis facing the international economy: a crisis of indecision, of
inaction, of postponement."

4. Mr. Fraser is to open this discussion. As at UNCTAD V, he will seek to
show himself a champion of developing country interests, calling on the
industrialised world to conquer its present malaise, reduce inflation and
secure economic growth. He will probably criticise growing protectionism
in industrialised countries and underline the energy problem. He may also
make two specific suggestions:

(a) for accelerating international work on commodity agreements
and on the Second Window of the Common Fund;

(b) for a Commonwealth Working Group to help Commonwealth
governments prepare for the UN Special Session of 1980
(on the International Development strategy for the next
decade), particularly on the proposal for massive new
transfers of funds to developing countries as a means of
helping world economic recovery (see attached summary of
action points and my earlier submission on bilaterals with
Australian Ministers).

CONFIDENTIAL

/Developing
5. Developing country spokesmen can be expected to underline their own special difficulties, many of which they will claim to be due to external causes. The more outspoken ones will deplore the lack of political will shown by industrialised countries.

6. The Prime Minister's contribution to this discussion will be closely listened to. Her developing country colleagues will be looking for indications of her Government's approach. She will no doubt wish to take the opportunity to introduce a better balance into the discussion. From this point of view it would be preferable to wait until a number of others have spoken. Material is provided in Brief A4, which concentrates on the global problems of energy (in the light of the Tokyo Summit), the relationships between growth, inflation, and adjustment and the need (identified at Tokyo) for increased financial flows of all kinds to developing countries. If the Prime Minister is not happy with it in this form, I would be glad to try and reshape it.

7. On specific issues likely to come up under Items 3(d) and 4, I attach a summary of points where action is likely to be called for at Heads of Government level. In each case I have included the nub of the suggested line to take.

8. The constraints upon us are severe. We cannot agree to increases in aid and do not wish to agree to expansion of the Secretariat's activities. But we can expect support on most of these points from at least the Canadians and possibly, on specific points, from others. I do not think any of them are make or break points for the prospects of a harmonious outcome. The most politically prominent suggestion if it is made, is likely to be that, for a Working Group on a Marshall Plan for developing countries. If there is widespread support for this, it may be difficult to kill it without seeming unduly negative. It may therefore in the end seem politically necessary to agree to it. In that case we would need to ensure that it was financed within the existing budget of the Secretariat.

31 July 1979

D M D Thomas
1. **WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS**

   (i) **Marshal Plan for Developing Countries**

   Heads of Government are likely to be invited to support a feasibility of a marshar plan for developing countries, (ie massive additional transfers of financial resources). The economic rationale for this idea is questionable. But in any case a study of various schemes under this heading is already underway in the United Nations.

   **Line To Take**

   Support endorsement of UN study (not new or separate study). Care would be needed to find language which does not pre-judge the outcome of the study.

   (ii) **Energy**

   Heads of Government may be asked to endorse the proposal of the Government of Fiji for a Commonwealth study of energy problems, especially those of oil-dependent developing countries in the Commonwealth.

   **Line To Take**

   Sympathetic towards objective, but they should be undertaken by Commonwealth Science Council.

   (iii) **Urban Development**

   Heads of Government may be asked to endorse the Sri Lankan Government proposals for studies by the Commonwealth Secretariat of the problem of "man and his home" with a view to drawing up an action programme.

   This is a rather half-baked idea which risks duplicating the work of the UN Centre of Human Settlements.

   **Line To Take**

   Sympathetic on general problems of urbanisation but cautious about Sri Lankan proposal. Urge avoidance of duplication of work of UN Centre, which has got off to a good start.

2. **INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION**

   Heads of Government will be asked to endorse the decision of Ministers of Industry (Bangalore March 1979) to establish an Industrial Development Unit (IDU) within the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC).
This involves an initial 3-year programme at a cost of £5 million. Treasury ministers have agreed in principle to a UK contribution of £1.5 million.

**Line To Take**

Support this programme.

3. **ISLAND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND DISADVANTAGED STATES**
   
   Item 4(b)
   
   HCM(79)6
   
   Brief B27

Heads of Government will be invited to endorse in principle the recommendations of a meeting of officials held in London in April 1979.

These recommendations are for action:

- by Commonwealth countries, in the fields of financing needs, food production, training, transport, marketing, regional cooperation, and diplomatic accreditation and training;

- by the Commonwealth Secretariat, in the fields also of financing needs, administrative training, technical assistance, fisheries, and (on non-policy questions) diplomatic accreditation.

**Line To Take**

Welcome thorough paper by Secretariat. Mini states have real problems. We want to be helpful.

But need (rather than size or other special factors) must be the main criterion for aid. Present arrangements (especially regional development appendix, Lome II, etc) should help financing problems of such states.

We will do what we can, but within financial constraints.

\[\text{NOTE: We do not want the Secretariat to start giving/advice to mini States.}\]

4. **COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION (CFTC)**
   
   Item 4(c)
   
   HBM(79)13
   
   Brief B28

If differences of view cannot be resolved in the Committee of the Whole, heads of Government may be asked to resolve them.

The Secretary-General's paper extols (rightly) the value and cost effectiveness of the CFTC and argues from this (wrongly) a case for significant expansion through shifting aid resources from other purposes to the CFTC.
Line To Take

We agree that CFTC is valuable and cost effective. We certainly hope it will be able to maintain its activity this year at the same level as last.

But it needs a period of consolidation. We would be prepared to see moderate growth in future but cannot commit ourselves to a target or to increases in aid for this purpose.
CONFIDENTIAL

GR 40
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO 271425Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA
TELNO 521 OF 27 JUL

YOUR TEL 763: PRIME MINISTER’S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUDA.

1. PLEASE HOLD POSITION FOR THE MOMENT. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, PRIME MINISTER WILL DECIDE ONCE PRESIDENT’S DECISION ON SPEECH IS KNOWN (GABORONE TEL 39 TO YOU).

CARRINGTON

FILES
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CAF.D
PCCD
RHO.D
PS
PS/LPS
FS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLIAMS
MR STRATTON

COPY TO:
SIR J HUNT
CABINET OFFICE

COPIES SENT TO
No. 10 DOWNING STREET
1. IN AN INTERVIEW ON NZ RADIO ON 27 JULY IN WHICH HE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE CONFIRMED HE HAD HAD LETTER FROM MR FRASER BUT HAD FORGOTTEN WHAT IT SAID, MR MULDOON WAS HEARD TO SAY QUOTE I KNOW MALCOLM FRASER IS TAKING A NUMBER OF INITIATIVES OF VARIOUS KINDS AND I KEEP GETTING MESSAGES FROM AUSTRALIA SAYING THAT HE HAS WORKED UP A FEW MORE BUT TIME WILL TELL WHERE THEY ALL END UP. UNQUOTE. MR MULDOON WAS THEN REPORTED AS SAYING THAT HE WILL NOT BE TAKING ANY INITIATIVES BECAUSE HE DOESN'T ASPIRE TO BE A WORLD LEADER AND THAT HE'S GOT ENOUGH PROBLEMS AT HOME.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

SMEDELEY

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MR CORTAZZI
MR WILLIAMS

COPIES TO:
SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE
27 July 1979

I am writing to thank you for your letter of 25 July 1979.

I am grateful to you for passing on to me what the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia said to you about the Prime Minister's visit to Lusaka when you saw them earlier this week.

CLIVE WHITMORE

The Right Honourable William Deedes
At their request I dined last evening privately at the Hyde Park Hotel with the Deputy Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia (Dr. Mundawarara), the Foreign Minister and their small entourage. They are in London for reasons you will know about.

At the end of a long talk I was startled by the anxieties which both the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister expressed to me about threats to the safety of the Prime Minister in Lusaka. They felt no anxiety whatever on the Queen's behalf but spoke - partly among themselves - of those who, as they put it, "would be waiting in the wings for Mrs. Thatcher".

I do not think that Dr. Mundawarara, whom I have come to know a little, was seeking merely to impress me with the iniquity of the enemy.

No doubt these anxieties are already well-known to the security people. But in such matters I would rather be superfluous now than sorry later. So I pass it on. No need to acknowledge.

Private Secretary,
10, Downing Street,
SW1.
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary                       27 July 1979

As I mentioned to you on the telephone this morning Mrs. June Damm has written to the Prime Minister about the blocking in Tanzania of funds due to her, with the implied suggestion that the Prime Minister might be able to take this matter up in some way with the Tanzanians during the Lusaka CHGM.

I enclose a copy of Mrs. Damm's letter, which I have acknowledged. You have kindly agreed to arrange for briefing material to be available during the CHGM so that the matter can, if this is advisable, be raised with the Tanzanians (although not, of course, by the Prime Minister personally). I should in any case be grateful if you would arrange for a suitable reply to be sent to Mrs. Damm after Lusaka, whether or not the matter is raised there, and for a copy to be sent to me in due course for our records here at No.10.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 24 July about your difficulties with the Government of Tanzania over the release of funds due to you from your late husband's estate.

Your letter is being given consideration and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

Mrs. June Damm
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CHOGM AND STATE VISIT

1. AT AN EYE OF CHOGM PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY (25 JULY) PRESIDENT KAUNDA URGED ALL ZAMBIANS TO ACT AS GOOD HOSTS TO COMMONWEALTH DELEGATES. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE QUEEN’S VISIT, DESCRIBING HER MAJESTY AS “A WONDERFUL GUEST” WHOM ZAMBIA WAS HONOURED TO RECEIVE. KAUNDA SAID THAT THE QUEEN’S “CONCERN FOR THE POOR, HANDICAPPED, THE EXPLOITED AND THOSE SUFFERING IS SOMETHING WE VALUE IN HER. SO WHEN SHE COMES HERE, WE MUST SHOW OUR TRADITIONAL HOSPITALITY”.

2. IN RESPONSE TO SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONS KAUNDA DENIED THAT BRITISH SOLDIERS AND POLICE HAD ARRIVED IN ZAMBIA TO REINFORCE THE COUNTRY’S SECURITY. “WE WILL HAVE TO PROVIDE OUR OWN DEFENCE IN CASE OF ATTACK”, HE SAID.

3. ANOTHER QUESTIONER WANTED TO KNOW IF THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD BE ALLOWED TO ATTEND CHOGM. KAUNDA REPLIED THAT THIS WAS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS TO DECIDE TOGETHER. ZAMBIA WAS ONLY THE HOST AND CHAIRMAN OF THE MEETING. IF THE COMMONWEALTH DELEGATIONS DECIDED THAT THEY WANTED THE PF TO ATTEND, ZAMBIA WOULD NOT/NOT STAND IN THEIR WAY.

AKKINSON
**LETTERCODE/SERIES**

PREM 19

**PIECE/ITEM**

9

**CLOSED FOR 40 YEARS**

**UNDER A FOI EXEMPTION**

FO1 klgam no. 515 to Lusaka dated 26 July 1974

**RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)**

OF PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

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THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE ACTING MINISTER
ISSUED TODAY (25 JULY):

BEGIN:

THE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID TODAY THAT THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING, WHICH WILL BE HELD IN THE
CAPITAL OF ZAMBIA, LUSAKA, FROM 1 TO 8 AUGUST 1979, OCCURRED AT A
CRUCIAL JUNCTURE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION WILL BE
LED BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND WILL INCLUDE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, MR
PEACOCK, AND THE MINISTER FOR SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIONS, MR
GARLAND.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS BESET BY PRESSING ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, MANY OF WHICH HAD THEIR ORIGINS
IN THE ERA OF COLONISATION. THE GAP BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALISED AND
NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES CONTINUED TO GROW, OUTSTANDING COLONIAL
PROBLEMS LIKE NAMIBIA AND ZAMBIAWRE STILL AWAITED SOLUTION, AND
NATIONS' READJUSTMENTS TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES HAD RESULTED IN THE
DISPLACEMENT AND SUFFERING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE. THE
COMMONWEALTH, ITSELF LARGELY A PRODUCT OF DECOLONISATION, WAS
THE ACTING MINISTER SAID THAT COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS, WHICH ARE HELD EVERY TWO YEARS, WERE UNIQUE OCCASIONS ON WHICH THE LEADERS OF A LARGE CROSS-SECTION OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS ASSEMBLED TO REVIEW INFORMALLY CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ATTACHED PARTICULAR VALUE TO THESE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AS A MEANS NOT ONLY OF BECOMING ACQUAINTED WITH THE PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES OF A WIDE VARIETY OF STATES BUT OF INJECTING INTO THE GLOBAL DEBATE AUSTRALIA'S OWN VIEWS ON MATTERS OF SPECIAL INTEREST AND CONCERN. AT A TIME WHEN THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONS WAS BECOMING EVEN MORE MARKED AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND CO-OPERATION MORE INSISTENT, IT WAS VITAL FOR AUSTRALIA TO MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE HARMONISATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND HELP PREVENT TENSION AND CONFLICT BETWEEN PEOPLE.


OCCUPYING A CENTRAL PLACE IN THE DISCUSSIONS AT LUSAKA WOULD BE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE LOCATION OF THE MEETING IN ONE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES WOULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE URGENT PROBLEMS OF THE REGION, PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE RHODESIAN ISSUE AND ALSO WAYS OF BRINGING NAMIBIA TO INDEPENDENCE.
The Australian Government considered that though the elections were a step in the right direction, they did not go far enough towards giving Zimbabwe genuine majority rule. In particular the Constitution contains entrenched provisions for the white minority, and amendment of these deficiencies would be necessary before the objectives of Black Zimbabweans, African and Commonwealth opinion and that of the international community at large could be met. Without further progress towards Africanisation in Zimbabwe and endorsement by African and Commonwealth states of an eventual solution, there could be no end to the present political, military and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, while the Australian Government subscribed to the need for greater participation by the majority in Zimbabwe's government, it could not condone the use of force to achieve this aim. It continued to believe that only peaceful means would produce a just and lasting settlement, and that to this end the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka could make a significant contribution.

The Acting Foreign Minister said that the Australian Government would approach these and other important issues at Lusaka in a positive and constructive spirit. Over the years the Commonwealth had developed strong bonds of friendship and understanding between its members and had demonstrated on many occasions its capacity to work amicably towards agreed positions and actions. Australia welcomed the opportunity to continue its dialogue in Lusaka with its fellow members of the Commonwealth, including the participants in CHOGM, and pledged to help make the meeting productive and successful.

ENDS.
In my letter of 6 July, I enclosed a draft letter for the Prime Minister to send to Mr Julian Amery, suggesting that Commandant Garcia might give his information about security at CHGM to the Head of our Central African Department.

You will wish to know that Garcia called on Sankey on 9 July and passed on certain information. This has now been evaluated in the Southern Africa Current Intelligence Group; the conclusion is that the information is of doubtful accuracy, and that the alleged threat to the safety of those attending CHGM can be discounted.

If Mr Amery alludes to this matter again, we suggest that he simply be told that Garcia's information had been taken into account in considering security arrangements for those attending GHGM.

Yours ever,

Stephen

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 830

CONFIDENTIAL

PM LUSAKA 23129/2 JUL 79

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 741 OF 23 JULY

AND TO IMMEDIATE GABORONE

INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, NAIROBI, LILONGWE

ROUTINE MAPUTO, LUANDA.

ZAMBIA ON THE EVE OF THE STATE VISIT AND CHGM

1. ZAMBIA IS PREPARING TO GIVE HER MAJESTY A WARM AND ENTHUSIASTIC WELCOME REFLECTING THE RESPECT IN WHICH SHE IS HELD HERE AND THE VALUE PLACED ON THE BRITISH CONNECTION.

2. DESPITE KAUNDA'S VIEW THAT SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN LESS THAN STRAIGHT WITH HIM OVER RHODESIA I BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN MUCH ENCOURAGED BY YOUR STATEMENT OF 10 JULY RE-AFFIRMING THE GENUINE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIONS UPON WHICH HMG IS EMBARKED. NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR HIS CLOSEST COLLEAGUES WANT "ANOTHER SINGAPORE" BUT SEE THE CHGM AS A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING OVER RHODESIA, A PROBLEM WHICH THE ZAMBIANS REGARD AS HAVING AFFECTED THEIR PEACE AND PROSPERITY WITH PECULIAR VIRULENCE FOR MORE THAN A DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE. THEY ARE THEREFORE DISPOSED TO OFFER A GENUINE WELCOME TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER. PERHAPS THE MOST CONCRETE TOKEN OF KAUNDA'S INTENTIONS HAVE BEEN THE STEPS TAKEN TO CONTROL ZIPRA'S MILITARY CAPACITY DESPITE HIS OWN LONG STANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH NKOMO. THIS HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION EMOTIONALLY FOR KAUNDA.

3. IF WE CAN RETAIN KAUNDA'S CONFIDENCE AT THE CHGM AND THEREAFTER IN THE GENUINENESS OF OUR APPROACH OUR POSITION WILL BE MUCH STRENGTHENED. HE HAS LITTLE LIKING OR RESPECT FOR MUZOREWA BUT IN THE PAST HAS NEGOTIATED WITH PEOPLE (VORSTER AND SMITH) WHOM HE LIKED STILL LESS. HE IS ALREADY WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE MUZOREWA AS ONE OF THE 'CENTRES OF POWER', WHAT THEN ARE HIS DESIDERATA IN

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IN ANY SETTLEMENT? I BELIEVE HE WOULD LOOK FOR: A) AN END TO THE WHITES BLOCKING POWER IN PARLIAMENT SEMICOLON B) A CLEAR PATH TO TOP JOBS IN ALL SERVICES AND PROFESSIONS FOR BLACK RHODESIANS SEMICOLON C) IAN SMITH'S DEPARTURE FROM OFFICE - HELPFUL IF NOT AS IMPORTANT AS A) AND B) SEMICOLON D) SOME RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE PF'S STRUGGLE RATHER THAN MUZOREWA'S WHICH PRODUCED POLITICAL MOVEMENT IN RHODESIA SEMICOLON E) A FRESH ELECTION UNDER EXTERNAL OR POSSIBLY JOINT PF/INTERNAL AUTHORITY SUPERVISION BUT AT ALL EVENTS UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH ENSURED THAT THE EXISTING RHODESIAN ADMINISTRATION WERE PALPABLY UNABLE TO INFLUENCE THE RESULT SEMICOLON AND F) ARRANGEMENTS WHICH AFTER THE ELECTION INDISPUTABLY LEAVE THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THIS LAST WOULD IN ZAMBIAN EYES BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN FULFILLING THE OBJECTIVE SET OUT IF YOUR 10 JULY STATEMENT OF ACHIEVING A SITUATION COMPARABLE TO THAT IN WHICH INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED TO OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (A POINT WELL RECEIVED HERE).

4. THE NEARER WE ARE ABLE TO COME TO KAUNDA'S DESIDERATA THE MORE "RESPECTABLE" IT WILL BECOME FOR HIM IN HIS OWN EYES AND THOSE OF OTHER AFRICAN STATES TO GIVE THE SUPPORT WE DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO LEGALITY IN RHODESIA. KAUNDA IS PRAGMATIC ENOUGH TO REALISE THAT HE MAY NOT ACHIEVE ALL HE SEeks, BUT HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN A FIG LEAF. IT IS ACCORDINGLY CRUCIAL TO ANGLO-ZAMBIAN RELATIONS AND TO THE CONTINUATION OF ZAMBIA'S STANCE AS ONE OF THE MODERATE FRONT LINE STATES, WITHIN LIMITS ABLE AND PREPARED TO EXERCISE A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE WITH THE PF, THAT WE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE USING OUR BEST EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A "RESPECTABLE" SETTLEMENT.

5. SHOULD KAUNDA CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE NOT IN EARNEST ABOUT SEEKING WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THAT WE HAD BEEN LESS THAN FRANK WITH HIM AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO RECOGNISE MUZOREWA IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HE AND OTHER MODERATE AFRICANS WOULD NOT REGARD AS "RESPECTABLE", HE IS SUFFICIENTLY COMMITTED AND EMOTIONAL TO REACT STRONGLY. IN THIS CASE, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE THE AVENUE OF KAUNDA'S CHOICE (AND INDEED ONE WHICH WOULD SPELL HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT BY SOMEONE readier TO FALL IN WITH SOVIET WISHES), THOSE ESPousing THE ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY OF A TURN TO THE SOVIET BLOC WOULD HAVE THEIR HAND STRENGTHENED. DEFENCE SECRETARY ZULU HAS AS YOU KNOW BEEN SHOPPING FOR WEAPONS, AND TRAINING RECENTLY IN THE GDR.

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6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS PRECISELY KAUNDA’S SUBSEQUENT COURSE
OF ACTION BUT MANY LEADING ZAMBians WOULD SHARE SOMETHING OF THE
VIEWS EXPRESSED BY SHAMUYARIRA OF ZANU (MAPUTO TELE 158) BELIEVING
THAT RECOGNITION OF RHODESIAN BY BRITAIN AND SOME WESTERN POWERS
WOULD LEAD TO MORE MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA THUS
LEAVING THE PF AND FLS TO FIGHT IT OUT TO THE BITTER END, WITH
LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO TURN EAST FOR THE WEAPONS AND HELP THEY WOULD
NEED. CAUGHT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN ZIPRA’S PRESENCE, AND A
NEWLY MOBILISED AFRICAN OPINION ON THE ONE HAND AND RHODESIAN
INCURSIONS ON THE OTHER IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW KAUNDA COULD CONTINUE
TO RESIST SUCH A COURSE.

ALLINSON

FILES
RHOD.D.
CADS
N AM D
N DWS D
PUSD
PLANNING STAFF
PS & SD
CCD
FRD
UND
LEGAL ADVS (MR. FREELAND)
(MR. PIPER)
ECOD
P & OD
DEF D
OID
PS
PS/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/MR. RIDLEY
PS/MR. HURD
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
SIR A PARSONS
LORD N G LEONNOX
MISS BROWN
MR. THOMAS
MR. WILLISON
MR. WILLIAMS
ADDITIONAL DISTN.
RHODESIA POLICY
CONFIDENTIAL
This box contains the bulk (which is the right word) of your briefs for the CHGM, so that you can if you wish glance through them over the weekend.

The "B" series of briefs is the main set, designed for your use in the plenary sessions of the Meeting. Many of the more arcane subjects, of course, will be dealt with by officials in the Committee of the Whole. One or two briefs (e.g. Vietnamese refugees) have yet to be completed in the light of current events and I shall submit these separately.

The "C" series of briefs are intended for your bilateral meetings with the other Commonwealth Heads of Government and there is really no need for you to bother with them now.

The third folder contains the papers which have been circulated in advance by the Commonwealth Secretariat and which you may like to glance at simply in order to be aware of their existence.

Finally, following the meeting of OD on 23 July, I shall submit briefs in the "A" series, namely the drafts of your prepared statements at the opening session, in the discussion of the general international situation, in the discussion of Rhodesia and on the world economic situation and Commonwealth co-operation.

I attach an outline programme of your visit to Lusaka as it stands at present, together with a copy of a separate programme which has been prepared for Mr. Thatcher.

20 July 1979
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO LUSAKA FOR THE
CHGM, 30 JULY-9 AUGUST

Monday, 30 July

0815 Leave No. 10 for Heathrow
0900 Depart from Heathrow (South Side) in RAF VC10 for Lusaka
1135 Arrive Nice (to refuel)
1255 Drink and Canapés will be served in the Airport lounge
1300 Depart Nice
1400 Lunch on board
1500 Dinner on board
2225 Arrive Lusaka
2300 Drive straight to bungalow in Mulungushi Village

Tuesday, 31 July

1030 (or 1630) Bilateral meeting with President Kaunda
1200-1300 High Commissioner's reception for you to meet British residents and UK Press
1315 Light lunch at High Commission
1500 Audience with The Queen at State House
1930 Working dinner at Horizon House with Lord Carrington and advisers

Wednesday, 1 August

1030 CHGM opening session (see Commonwealth Secretariat paper No. 2)
1100 Address in reply to President Kaunda's speech of welcome (speaking last)
1200 Noon Mr. Rampal's reception for Heads of Delegation to meet the Press
1500 CHGM second session (probably "International Developments")
Evening The Queen's Banquet for Heads of Delegation (and spouses)
(Followed by reception for Ministers and High Commissioners)

Thursday, 2 August

1000 CHGM third session
1300 Your buffet lunch, at High Commission, for first half (in alphabetical order) of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers
1500 CHGM fourth session
Evening President Kaunda's dinner for Heads of Delegation (and spouses) at State House

Friday, 3 August

1000 CHGM fifth session
1300 Your buffet lunch, at High Commission, for second half of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers
1500 CHGM sixth session (probably beginning discussion of Rhodesia)
Evening The Queen's reception for Commonwealth officials at State House
Possible working dinner at Horizon House

/Saturday.
Saturday, 4 August

Morning

The Queen departs

(Present information is that President Kaunda will
invite all Heads of Delegation, and spouses, to spend
Saturday and Sunday (but not overnight) at State House
in order to "relax"; activities of various kinds will
presumably be arranged but we have no details. It
remains to be seen whether it will be easy for you to
absent yourself, without giving offence, for other
engagements such as a visit to the Jacaranda School
and the Cheshire Home, and presentation of the prizes
after the polo match on Sunday morning. This weekend
will also be the occasion for informal bilaterals but
no officials will be present and you may wish to escape
from time to time in order to de-brief.)

Sunday, 5 August

See above

Monday, 6 August

1000     CHGM seventh session
1300     Possible bilateral or small group lunch
1500     CHGM eighth session
Evening  Free (at present)

Tuesday, 7 August

1000     CHGM ninth session
1300     Possible bilateral or small group lunch
1500     CHGM tenth session
Evening  Presentation of Zambian Press Awards (short speech)
(provisionally)

Wednesday, 8 August

Late evening  CHGM closing session (a.m. or p.m.)
Depart Lusaka by VC 10 for London

Thursday, 9 August

Early morning  Arrive Heathrow
LUSAKA: MR. THATCHER'S PROGRAMME

Thursday, 2 August

0800    Leave Mulungushi Village with Mr. Burke-Gaffney
0815    Visit Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia at Kafue
1045    Visit Chilanga Cement Factory
1200    Visit Turner Asbestos Products, Ltd.
1230    Private family lunch with Mr. Burke-Gaffney

Friday, 3 August

Very early start to visit hunting camp approximately
250 KM west of Lusaka in Kafue National Game Park
Return to Lusaka during afternoon in time for any
evening engagements

Tuesday, 7 August

0700    Depart Lusaka Airport by Flight QZ428 to Kitwe
0800    Arrive Kitwe
0830    Visit Rokana Division of NCCM and tour underground
1230    Lunch at restaurant with mining company officials
1400-1600    Visit Smelter
1615    Visit Shell BP Kitwe Depot
1715    Arrive Shell BP guest house
1930    Dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Burke-Gaffney

Wednesday, 8 August

0830    Leave for Nchanga Division of NCCM at Chingola
0815    Tour Nchanga open pit
1230    Lunch at Chingola Golf Club
1430    Leave Chingola
1530    Collect baggage in Kitwe
1600    Visit Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial (time permitting)
1650    Check in at Kitwe Airport
1750    Depart Kitwe
1830    Arrive Lusaka

(If final day's programme does not tie in with plans for Prime
Minister's departure on 8 August, it would be necessary to bring
forward the departure from Chingola and return to Lusaka by road).
Dear Stephen,

CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF SRI LANKA, MR. R. PREMADASA, AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON 19 JULY 1979

The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mr. Premadasa, called on the Prime Minister at No.10 on 19 July at 1730. He was accompanied by his wife - who was expected to take her leave after a few minutes but in the event remained firmly ensconced throughout the discussion, by the Sri Lankan High Commissioner and by his Private Secretary Mr. Weerakoon. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Cortazzi were present. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during an hour’s discussion.

CHGM

Noting that both she and Mr. Premadasa would be attending their first Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, the Prime Minister said that she expected the main value of the meeting at Lusaka to lie in the opportunities which it provided for personal contact between the Heads of Government taking part; an atmosphere of warmth and understanding could be helpful in resolving problems after the meeting was over. The Prime Minister said that although Southern African issues would clearly be high on the agenda at Lusaka, they should not dominate it: there were major problems in other parts of the world which needed to be discussed. The Prime Minister asked Mr. Premadasa if he planned to make a major intervention himself. Mr. Premadasa told the Prime Minister that he had already circulated a position paper on the question of Commonwealth co-operation in the field of urban development. There was in South Asia a serious shortage of architects, urban planners and also of building materials. He hoped that it would be possible to achieve some pooling of the Commonwealth’s resources in this field.

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Premadasa how his Government viewed the problem of Rhodesia. Mr. Premadasa recalled that Rhodesia had been discussed at the last meeting of the Non-Aligned in Colombo. The Sri Lankan Government wanted democracy to prevail and for the rights of minorities, as well as those of the majority,
to be protected. Sri Lanka wished to see fair play. Mr. Premadasa
then read out, from a typed card, the full text of the relevant
decision of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned, which
denounced Bishop Muzorewa's "illegal" regime and expressed full
support for the Patriotic Front. The Prime Minister commented
that this resolution would seem to indicate more interest
in supporting terrorism than in democracy.

Non-Aligned Movement

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that the UK
and other western Governments were deeply concerned by the
implications of the inclusion of Cuba and Vietnam in the Non-
Aligned Movement. It was important that democratic countries,
such as Sri Lanka, should keep a very sharp eye on the activities
of these countries and on the future course of events in the
Movement. The Cuban claim that non-alignment could be equated
with support for the Soviet Union was a dangerous concept. The
Prime Minister agreed and said that this position was unhelpful
to the genuinely non-aligned countries. The fact was that the
Cubans were very much aligned and acted as proxies for the
Russians.

Sri Lankan Affairs

Mr. Premadasa told the Prime Minister that, despite
continuing propaganda about Sri Lanka's community problems, these
problems had in fact ceased to exist as a result of measures
which the Government had taken. The Tamil language was now
embodied in the constitution and there was only one class
of citizen in Sri Lanka. A small section of the Tamil community
nevertheless continued to demand a separate state, despite the
fact that this idea was unpopular even within the Tamil community
as a whole. The terrorist activities of the Naxalites
continued to be troublesome and the Sri Lankan Government were
preparing anti-terrorist legislation which had been virtually
copied from the UK's Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Mr. Premadasa told the Prime Minister that the Sri Lankan
economy was on the up-turn, following the Government's relaxation
of the rigid state controls imposed by the previous administration;
these had simply bred corruption. The construction industry and
agriculture were now booming. Sri Lanka was keen to attract
investment from the UK and could offer foreign investors very
attractive conditions. The Sri Lankan Government was grateful
for the assistance which the UK, the FRG and Sweden had provided
for the Mahaweli power and irrigation project: if this project
succeeded, it would constitute a major breakthrough for the
economy of Sri Lanka. The Prime Minister made it clear to
Mr. Premadasa that the Government were having to take a very hard
look at UK aid programmes as part of their drive to reduce public
expenditure. Mr. Premadasa referred to delays in the provision
of UK assistance for the Victoria Dam scheme and expressed the
strong hope that this would not fall victim to any cuts which the
British Government were making in their aid programme.

/At the
At the end of the discussion Mr. Premadasa invited the Prime Minister to pay a visit to Sri Lanka as soon as possible. The Prime Minister thanked him and said that this was a tempting offer which she would bear in mind.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (HM Treasury), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

[Signature]

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Briefing Meeting for Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

This briefing meeting is now due to take place at 4.00 pm next Thursday. We suggest that the following be invited:

- Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
- Lord Privy Seal
- Sir Michael Palliser
- Sir Antony Duff
- Sir Peter Preston
- Mr D.M.D. Thomas, Assistant Under Secretary responsible for Economic and North/South matters
- Mr R.A.R. Barltrop, Head of Commonwealth Co-ordination Department
- Mr N.M. Fenn, Head of News Department
- Miss Peggy Metcalfe, Conference Officer
- Sir John Hunt
- Mr Wade-Gery

We do not think it necessary for e.g. the Treasury or the Department of Trade to be represented. This briefing meeting is, of course, to deal with matters other than Rhodesia, which will have been discussed at the meeting of OD on Monday.

M. J. VILE

(M.J. Vile)

20th July, 1979
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary 18 July 1979

COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 16 July, the draft of a reply which the Prime Minister might send to Sir A. Ademola's letter to her about the Commonwealth Foundation.

The Prime Minister has seen your letter and has taken note of the background. She has approved the draft which you sent me and I now enclose the signed original of her reply to Sir Adetokunbo which I should be grateful if you would forward to our High Commission in Lagos for delivery.

J. S. Wall, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Dear Sir Adetokunbo,

Thank you for your letter of 4 July telling me about the current financial difficulties of the Foundation and expressing the hope that at the Meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Lusaka in August the British Government will support an increased contribution to the Foundation.

I am very much aware of the valuable work being done by the Commonwealth Foundation in the promotion of links at the professional level and you may be sure that, subject to its own financial constraints, the British Government will continue to give the Foundation all the support it can.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Commonwealth Foundation

Thank you for your letter of 9 July enclosing a copy of a letter addressed to the Prime Minister by the Chairman of the Commonwealth Foundation, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, in which he asked for the British Government's support at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka for the Foundation's case for an increased income.

The Foundation's budget has not been increased since 1976 and inflation has in consequence forced a serious cut-back in its activities. The case for rectifying this situation and also funding some expansion of the Foundation's remit is set out in the papers mentioned in Sir A Ademola's letter and will be dealt with in the briefing for Lusaka.

I attach a draft reply for the Prime Minister to send to Sir A Ademola, together with a background note on the Foundation.

I am sending a copy of this letter with enclosures to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
To:-
The Rt Hon Sir A Ademola GCON KBE KtCFR
PC
The Commonwealth Foundation
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
LONDON SW1Y 5HU

Thank you for your letter of 4 July telling me about the current financial difficulties of the Foundation and expressing the hope that at the Meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Lusaka in August the British Government will support an increased contribution to the Foundation.

I am aware of the valuable work being done by the Commonwealth Foundation in the promotion of links at the professional level and you may be sure that, subject to its own financial constraints, the British Government will continue to give the Foundation all the support it can.
BACKGROUND NOTE

COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION

1. As a result of a British initiative, the Commonwealth Foundation was set up in 1966 by agreement of Commonwealth Heads of Government, with the basic aims of promoting intra-Commonwealth links at the professional level.

2. The Foundation encourages and supports the convening of conferences of Commonwealth professional bodies and attendance at them, facilitates the exchange of visits amongst professional people, and assists in the setting up of professional associations in countries where they do not exist. It is active in promoting the establishment of Professional Centres where professional associations can share office and conference space, secretarial and library facilities, etc. In addition, the Foundation is now supporting the work of librarians and museum staff, and also Commonwealth language and literature studies.

3. Such activities help to raise professional standards in developing Commonwealth countries, thus contributing to the process of development. Regional co-operation is strengthened and there is a general increase in the cross-pollination of ideas, research and experience. To some extent the Foundation's activities also benefit British professional associations, whose members may be invited to assist in the foundation or development of a corresponding body in other Commonwealth countries, thus helping to promote British influence in a variety of fields. The Foundation is directed by a Chairman, a Director and a Board of Trustees, each contributing government having the right to nominate one member to the Board.

4. To get the Foundation off to a good start and encourage other Commonwealth Governments to support it, the British Government initially contributed 50% of its budget; but at the 1977 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting we stated that our contribution would be reduced from 1976 onwards to the level of 30% normally contributed by us to Commonwealth organisations. The British

/contribution
contribution in 1978/79 was £202,290. We have Treasury authority to contribute up to £232,500 in the current year, £77,500 of which would be provided by the Overseas Development Administration. The British contribution is paid on the condition that it does not exceed 30% of the Foundation's total budgetary receipts.
1. On 13 July President Kaunda took the Resident Commonwealth High Commissioners and many of his senior colleagues and officers on a conducted tour of Mulungushi Village, Mulungushi Hall and the weekend facilities being provided at State House and afterwards entertained us to lunch.

2. The Village really has progressed and is now looking respectable. The outer wall is complete, the gates are guarded by the Para-Military and furniture is being put in the Bungalows. I was not able to inspect Mrs Thatcher's Bungalow, but we were shown one of the Queen's Bungalows. There is no doubt that the Asian architect and the coloured permanent secretary for works, together with the Zambian Minister and many others, have worked wonders. However, I must admit that I remain doubtful about the catering arrangements which I fear will be very slow and I am sure we were right to make it possible for the Prime Minister to be able to eat all meals except breakfast elsewhere.

3. A great deal has been done to Mulungushi Hall as well. The Indian High Commissioner and I suggested (1) that the room for the heads of delegation meeting needed to be made more intimate and (2) that the microphones which had been provided should be removed, as likely to encourage people to make speeches for the record instead of discussing problems informally and genuinely. The President I think has accepted this advice.

4. At State House we saw the work in hand to provide a miniature golf course to supplement the existing nine-hole course. The tennis courts had been resurfaced and the swimming pool done up. I believe riding is also to be available. The Zambians will probably also offer to other members of the delegation a wide range of options for day or overnight visits to game lodges or mines.

5. The President asked us to inform our Governments of the work which had been done and to underline the importance which he attached to the Commonwealth as a force for peace and reconciliation in the world. Certainly the evidence was that very great efforts have been made which considering the difficulties of getting supplies into Zambia represent a very considerable achievement on the part of those involved.

W. L. Allinson
CHGM: STYLE AND FORMAT

Thank you for sending me, with your letter of 6 July, the draft of a reply which the Prime Minister might send to the Commonwealth Secretary General's letter to her of 19 June about the style and format of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

The Prime Minister is content with the proposed reply and I enclose a copy of the letter which she has now sent to Mr. Ramphal.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
NBPS!

With the Compliments of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet

B. G. Cartledge, Esq

Briefing for Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

My PS(79) 20 of 29th June requested 90 copies of each brief. I am now able to offer a modest alleviation of this total; I would be grateful if Departments could provide 80 copies only of briefs.

I am copying this letter to the recipients of PS(79) 20.

(M. J. Vile)

R.A. Burns, Esq
My dear Secretary-General,

Thank you very much for your letter of 19 June and enclosure on the style and format of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

I wholeheartedly endorse the objective of preserving the unique character of these meetings, and agree that everything possible should be done to maintain their traditional informality. I believe that the various proposals put forward by you are well suited to the purpose.

I have only one reservation, which relates to your comments on the communique. As a rule, I believe that communiques are better for being short — and command more attention when they are. CHGM communiques have in recent years tended to be overlong; and I am not at all sure that they should seek to embrace all subjects of interest and concern to Commonwealth leaders, whether or not these have been discussed. I would myself like to see our communiques considerably shorter — and, as you yourself indicate, reflecting the actual discussions.

/I readily agree
I readily agree that your proposals might most usefully be discussed immediately after we have settled the agenda. I share your belief that there should be no press briefing on the substance of restricted sessions. Indeed I hope that the confidentiality of discussions will be preserved in all our meetings.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, Kt, CMG, QC.
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

9 July 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 4 July about the income of the Commonwealth Foundation.

Your letter is being given consideration and a reply will be sent to you as soon as possible.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

The Rt. Hon. Sir Adetokunbo Ademola,
G.C.O.N., K.B.E., C.F.R.
Commonwealth Foundation

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Prime Minister by the Chairman of the Commonwealth Foundation, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, asking for the Government's support at the CHGM in Lusaka for the Foundation's case for an increased income.

I should be grateful for advice on a reply which the Prime Minister might send to Sir Adetokunbo Ademola; and if the matter he has raised could be covered in the briefing which is being prepared for the Prime Minister's use in Lusaka.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Dee Amery.

Thank you for your letter of 2 July enclosing Professor Hutchinson’s information about Comandant Rene Garcia.

I agree that it would be useful if Comandant Garcia were to see officials while he is in London. I should be grateful if you would ask him to get in touch with Mr. John Sankey, Head of Central Africa Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Telephone 233 4176).

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours in case Comandant Garcia should contact them.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Right Honourable Julian Amery, M.P.
CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH
6 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

Nick Sanders wrote on 5 July asking for a draft letter for the Prime Minister to reply to Mr Julian Amery MP, who wrote to the Prime Minister on 2 July suggesting that a Comandant Garcia should see someone in our security services to talk about security at the Commonwealth Conference. We think it would be best, in the first instance, if the Head of Central Africa Department in this Office were to see Comandant Garcia. I enclose a draft reply which the Prime Minister may wish to send to Mr Amery.

Yours ever,

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
To:-

The Right Honourable Julian Amery MP
112 Eaton Square
LONDON
SW1 W9AA

Thank you for your letter of 2 July enclosing Professor Hutchinson's information about Comandant Rene Garcia. I agree that it would be useful if Comandant Garcia were to see officials while he is in London. I should be grateful if you would ask him to get in touch with Mr John Sankey, Head of Central Africa Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (telephone 233 4176).

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of your letter in case C. Garcia should contact them.
6 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

CHGM: Style and Format

In his letter of 22 June Nick Sanders asked for advice on Mr Rampal's letter to the Prime Minister of 19 June about the style and format of the meeting.

As Mr Rampal explains, he intends that his suggestions be considered immediately after the adoption of the agenda. It would not seem necessary therefore to go into his proposals at length at this stage.

Mr Rampal explains the background. Efforts in this decade to preserve the unique informality of these meetings originated with an initiative of Mr Trudeau in 1971. Under his chairmanship the 1973 CHGM at Ottawa was conducted under procedures aimed at making the meeting less rigid and formal: there was for example a shorter agenda and for the first time a working but informal weekend in which Heads of Government could meet individually or in groups to discuss matters privately. The ever-increasing size of the Commonwealth, however, has since then resulted in a trend back towards more formality, and Heads of Government discussed the problem in restricted session during the London CHGM in 1977. It was decided that Mr Rampal should make recommendations to the next CHGM.

There is little in Mr Rampal's suggestions to question or criticise - indeed they reflect to a large degree our own views as conveyed to the Secretariat in the past (see for example the Prime Minister's own comments in her letter of 11 June to Mr Rampal about the agenda). The proposals on speeches appear to us wholly sensible and, if followed, should contribute significantly to the objectives of achieving dialogue rather than debate and maintaining as informal an atmosphere as possible. Mr Rampal is at the same time right not to exclude prepared statements entirely: they may sometimes be necessary, and in addition there will always be some Heads of Governments who find it difficult to contribute without texts in front of them. We must hope that the provisions of A(v) will not add too much to the amount of paper circulating.

The Prime Minister has already told Mr Rampal that she welcomes the proposed greater use of restricted sessions. They could be particularly useful in Lusaka. Mr Rampal's proposals concerning their use seem very suitable. Likewise the suggestions for informal discussions set out in section C seem sensible, aimed
as they are at allowing more opportunities for informal bilateral discussions. Of course, as time pressure builds up in the final 2-3 days of the meeting the 45 minute 'relaxers' will get squeezed out.

So far as section D is concerned, it is clearly right that Heads of Government should be encouraged to attend personally; and the suggestion at D(ii) looks right in principle - provided that the qualification "normal" is intended to cover special circumstances where a Head of Government is genuinely unable to attend (eg through illness), and where the subject matter is such that it is important for the country concerned to be heard. The comments in section E on the Chairman's role seem on the right lines. Some chairmen will no doubt need more support than others in guarding the character of these meetings - and President Kaunda may well be one.

We have one reservation of substance. Section F rightly looks for a shorter communiqué reflecting actual discussion. But we are suspicious of the reference to "an essential vehicle for conveying .......". This still suggests a longer communiqué than we might consider necessary or desirable. We believe that this point is worth picking up in the Prime Minister's reply.

I attach a draft reply to Mr Rampal.

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

Bryan G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON
To:
His Excellency
Mr Shridath S Ramphal Kt CMG QC
Commonwealth Secretary-General
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
LONDON
SW1Y 5HX

Thank you very much for your letter of 19 June and enclosure on the style and format of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.

I wholeheartedly endorse the objective of preserving the unique character of these meetings, and agree that everything possible should be done to maintain their traditional informality. I believe that the various proposals put forward by you are well suited to the purpose.

I have only one reservation, which relates to your comments on the communiqué. As a rule, I believe that communiqués are better for being short - and command more attention when they are. CHGM communiqués have in recent years tended to be overlong; and I am not at all sure that they should seek to embrace all subjects of interest and concern to Commonwealth leaders, whether or not these have been discussed. I would myself like to see our communiqués considerably shorter - and, as you yourself indicate, reflecting the actual discussions.

I readily agree that your proposals might most usefully be discussed immediately after we have settled the agenda. I share your belief that there should be no press briefing on the substance of restricted sessions. Indeed I hope that the confidentiality of discussions will be preserved in all our meetings.
Thank you very much for your letter of 19 June confirming your invitation to me to be one of the Heads of Governments responding to President Kaunda's address of welcome. As I indicated when we met, I should be happy to do so, on the understanding that I speak last.

It was kind of you to express the hope that I might offer some reflections on the Tokyo Summit during the economic discussions; this I will certainly be prepared to do.

(SGD) MARGARET THATCHER

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, Lt, CMG, QC.
Mr. Amery has been pressing to know your decision on this as Comandant Garcia is arriving in London on Monday. If you are content with the reply, could you please ask the Garden Room Girl to telephone Mr. Amery on Sunday?

6 July 1979
I attach a letter the Prime Minister has received from Julian Amery, M.P., together with an enclosure which was sent to him by Professor John Hutchinson. This letter has already been copied to you by Mr. Amery.

The Prime Minister will of course want to reply to Mr. Amery herself and I should be grateful if you could let me have a suitable draft. Given the time scale set out in Mr. Amery's letter, this draft should reach us tomorrow (Friday 6 July).

You should note that the Prime Minister has commented that Commandant Garcia ought to be seen by someone in our own security service who is dealing with the Lusaka Conference and The Queen's visit.

N. J. SANDERS

G G H Walden Esq
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
I understand our Private Office passed the gift of the attached formal card message to your office on 6 July.

J.R. Parkinson
9 July

LONDON, S.W.1
Following discussions between the Secretary-General and His Excellency President Kaunda in Lusaka the President has requested the Secretary-General to bring to the immediate attention of Heads of Government the following statement (embargoed until 1400 hours 6 July) by Mr. Joshua Nkomo, President of ZAPU (Patriotic Front).

BEGINS

"I have been following very carefully and closely propaganda that has been mounted, largely from British circles, imputing malicious intentions to disrupt the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference by harming the distinguished guests of the Zambian Government.

The Rhodesian regime is taking advantage of this propaganda by mounting provocative attacks on our refugee camps in Zambia in order to worsen fears about the Commonwealth and disrupt in turn our relations with Zambia.

We have great deference to the Commonwealth and the role it plays internationally for the benefit of our struggle.

I would like to assure everybody concerned that we would like the Commonwealth Conference to succeed and that we will not yield to subversive propaganda or provocations calculated to disrupt our brotherly relations with the people and Government of Zambia. Consequently, commencing 0001 hours July 25 to 2400 hours August 10, 1979 we will not engage in any such activities at the Zambia-Rhodesia border as are likely to provide pretext to the Rhodesian regime to undermine the prospect of the Commonwealth Conference being held in Lusaka. We will however react vigorously if we are specifically attacked."

ENDS

In the Secretary-General's absence abroad, I am writing to request you to kindly convey this to your Head of Government by the speediest means possible for his personal information before the public announcement is made in Lusaka on Friday 6 July.

E.C. Anyaoku
Deputy Secretary-General
We understand that during his recent visit to Lusaka, Mr. Raphall may have succeeded in persuading Nkomo to issue a public undertaking that, during the period from 2359 hours on 24 July until 2359 on 10 August, there will be a standstill by Zambian-based forces of ZAPU in respect of operations into Rhodesia and that except for action in response to enemy attack, a ceasefire will be observed during the period by these forces on the Zambian/Rhodesian border. Nkomo would make it clear that the decision was in deference to the Commonwealth Heads of Government. The statement may be made tomorrow afternoon, 6 July.

As you know, we attach great importance to the establishment of conditions in Lusaka which will permit the Queen’s visit to take place and Heads of Government to attend the CHGM.

A statement on these lines by Nkomo would be a major contribution to the creation of confidence. However, it would be very important to have a similar undertaking by Bishop Muzorewa in respect of the Rhodesian security forces.

Muzorewa reacted cautiously when Lord Harlech raised this with him on 4 July ( Pretoria Tel. No. 306). In view of the likely timing of Nkomo’s statement we shall probably want you (unless you see objection) to speak urgently to Bishop Muzorewa or to Mundawarara. You would tell them, emphasizing that you were doing so in strict confidence, that we understand that Nkomo is likely to make a statement of this kind, and that, if he does so, we shall be looking to the Rhodesian authorities to respond. Their response should contain a firm undertaking that the Rhodesian armed forces will refrain from incursions into Zambia and will seek to avoid incidents on the border (unless they are themselves attacked) in the period in question.
YOU COULD POINT OUT THAT THIS SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THE SORT OF CEASEFIRE WHICH THE BISHOP APPEARED TO BE ENVISAGING IN HIS TALK WITH LORD HARLECH AND OF WHICH ZAPU COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE. AT A MINIMUM WE MUST TRY TO ENSURE THAT THE RHODESIANS DO NOT IMMEDIATELY REACT NEGATIVELY TO A DECLARATION BY NKOMO, YOU MIGHT THINK IT ADVISABLE TO SPEAK ALSO TO GENERAL WALLS AS SOON AS THE ZAPU STATEMENT IS MADE.

4. IN SPEAKING TO THE BISHOP YOU WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT A STATEMENT ON THESE LINES WOULD EARN CREDIT WITH THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS AND THAT CONVERSELY, A FAILURE TO PROVIDE A PUBLIC UNDERTAKING OF THIS KIND, PARTICULARLY IF ONE WERE GIVEN BY NKOMO, WOULD PUT HIM AT A SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE. IT WOULD RENDER MORE DIFFICULT OUR TASK IN PERSUADING OTHER COMMONWEALTH LEADERS TO ACCEPT A SOLUTION BASED ON THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE INSIDE RHODESIA. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ASKING THE RHODESIANS TO CEASE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THIS PERIOD; THE UNDERTAKINGS IN QUESTION WOULD APPLY TO CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.

5. YOU SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION FOR THE TIME BEING. WE WILL TELEGRAPH OR TELEPHONE AS SOON AS WE HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT THE ZAPU STATEMENT IS TO BE MADE. ALTERNATIVELY, IF WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION WE MAY INSTRUCT YOU TO GO AHEAD ANYWAY. BUT CONFIDENTIALITY UNTIL THE ZAPU STATEMENT IS PUBLIC IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. WE DO NOT WANT THE RHODESIANS TO FOUL UP RAMPHAL'S CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED PLAN BY LEAKING IT IN ADVANCE.

CARRINGTON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO:

SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE
ASSSESSMENTS STAFF " "
SIR P MOORE HUCKINGHAM PALACE

MR WILLIAMS
4 July, 1979

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. M. Thatcher, MP,
Prime Minister,
No.10 Downing Street,
S.W.1.

Dear Prime Minister,

As Chairman of the Commonwealth Foundation I take the liberty of appealing for your government's support when the Foundation's case for an increased income comes before Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting in Lusaka.

Our arguments are set out in documents HGM(79) 4 and 5. I need not repeat them here.

What I do wish to emphasize are the key role which the British Government has played in our affairs since the Foundation was created in 1966 and the significant contribution which the British Trustee, Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown, has made from the outset to our work.

But for a British decision to contribute 50% towards the Foundation's annual income in the early years, it is doubtful whether we should have been able to make so substantial an impact on professional and technical cooperation throughout the Commonwealth.

Unhappily, as we embark on our fourteenth year, the Trustees Face the prospect of having to cut back by close on fifty per cent on what I believe to be a practical and wide-ranging programme of small but worthwhile grant-making activities.

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: COMFOMARL LONDON SW1
activities. In brief, while the Foundation’s staff has been kept from the outset to very modest limits, (it still numbers only ten) its work has been badly affected by inflation.

It is thus my hope that you personally, as Leader of your country's delegation to the Lusaka Conference, may find it possible to pledge your government’s support to the increased contribution to our income which we seek from Britain.

I am, Madam, with respect,

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]
21/7/79

This letter from Julian Amery encloses some correspondence from Professor John Hutchinson. You have already been told about Professor Hutchinson.

Shall we ask for the Foreign Secretary's advice on how you should respond to Julian Amery's suggestions?

4 July 1979

MS
CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH

4 July 1979

Dear Bryan,

CHGM: PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH AT OPENING SESSION

I enclose a draft reply to the Commonwealth Secretary-General's letter of 19 June to the Prime Minister in which he confirmed his invitation to her to be one of the speakers at the formal opening session of the CHGM.

You will note that Mr Ramphal has dodged giving a firm undertaking that the Prime Minister would speak last - which she indicated in their discussion on 18 June was a condition of her acceptance. Mr Ramphal probably feels obliged to avoid a firm commitment on this until he has completed his soundings with other Heads of Governments concerned. We have however suggested making the point again in the Prime Minister's reply.

We have been informed separately by Mr Ramphal that in view of the limited duration of the opening session Heads of Governments responding to President Kaunda's address of welcome are expected to speak for only about 8-10 minutes.

I am sending copies of this letter and enclosures to Martin Vile.

Yours ever,

(P Lever)

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
To:

HE Mr Shridath S Ramphal Kt CMG QC
Commonwealth Secretary-General
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Fall Mall
SW1Y 5 HX

Thank you very much for your letter of 19 June confirming your invitation to me to be one of the Heads of Governments responding to President Kaunda’s address of welcome. As I indicated when we met, I should be happy to do so, on the understanding that I speak last.

It was kind of you to express the hope that I might offer some reflections on the Tokyo Summit during the economic discussions: this I will certainly be prepared to do.
CONFIDENTIAL

GSS 350
CONFIDENTIAL
H. LUSAKA 041530Z JUL
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 593 OF 4 JULY
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, MAPUTO, PRETORIA,
MIRIMBA SALISBURY, ROUTINE LUANDA, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 578: ZAMBIA/RHODESIA

1. THE SITUATION IS STILL CONFUSED. ACCORDING TO A GOVERNMENT
   SPOKESMAN (AND LOCAL RUMOURS) THERE WERE A SERIES OF RAIDS OVER
   THE LONG WEEKEND, 30 JUNE - 3 JULY. OF THESE, THE MOST SERIOUS
   WAS THAT REPORTED IN MY TUR. TODAY'S (4 JULY) NEWSPAPERS REPORT
   THAT THERE WERE TWO ATTACKS ON THIS CAMP (J Z MOYO) ON 1 JULY.

2. A ZAPU SOURCE HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT J Z MOYO CAMP WAS
   ATTACKED ON 1 JULY. IT FORMERLY CONTAINED BOY REFUGEES, BUT
   NOW, ACCORDING TO ZAPU, HOUSES NEW RECRUITS AND SOME WOUNDED.
   OUR INFORMANT ALSO TOLD US THAT THREE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND EIGHT
   INJURED IN THE RAID. THIS ROUGHLY TALLIES WITH THE ZAMBIA GOVERN- 
   MENT' SPOKESMAN'S FIGURES, ALTHOUGH THE PRESS QUOTES A SOURCE
   AT THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING HOSPITAL AS SAYING THAT TEN PEOPLE DIED
   AS A RESULT OF THE HOLIDAY WEEKEND RAIDS.

3. IN ADDITION THE LOCAL PRESS REPORTS THAT THERE WERE LEAFLET
   RAIDS ON RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF LUSAKA, IN WHICH PAMPHLETS WERE
   DROPPED, CALLING ON ZAMBIA'S TO DENOUNCE PATRIOTIC FRONT FORCES.

4. OUR ZAPU CONTACT HAS DENIED THAT THERE WERE ANY ATTACKS OTHER
   THAN THAT ON 1 JULY. THIS DOES NOT/NOT, HOWEVER SQUARE WITH THE
   INFORMATION OF THE INDIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER WHO TOLD ME THAT THE
   RHODESIANS HAD AGAIN LANDED TROOPS IN THE AREA WEST OF LUSAKA ON
   2 JULY. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE RHODESIANS WERE CUGHT ON THE
   GROUND BY ZAMBIAN TROOPS. PARLEYS ANSUED, DURING WHICH THE
   RHODESIANS THREATENED THAT IF THE ZAMBIA'S ATTACKED THEM, THERE
   WOULD BE MASSIVE RETALIATION THE FOLLOWING DAY AGAINST ZAMBIAN
   TARGETS. IT WAS FINALLY AGREED THAT THE RHODESIANS SHOULD BE
   ALLOWED TO GO, BUT BY THIS TIME IT WAS DARK AND THEY HAD TO SPEND
   THE NIGHT IN THE BUSH, DEPARTING ON 3 JULY.

CONFIDENTIAL
5. I was also told today by the Honorary Irish Consul's local employee, who is himself an ex-freedom fighter, that among those caught in the raid on Chikumbi, on 26 June, were 150 cadres newly returned from specialist training in Russia.

Allinson

[Copies sent to No 10 Downing St]
SECRET

GRS 75
SECRET
FM LUSAKA 041425Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 586 OF 4 JULY

MY TELNO 577: GHGM

EDWARD NDLOVU (DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR ZAPU) TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY THAT ZAPU HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KAUNDA THAT THEY AGREED TO RAMPHAL'S PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED CEASEFIRE. MUGABE HAD BEEN INFORMED BUT NO INDICATION GIVEN OF HIS ATTITUDE.

2. NEITHER LOW NOR I ARE CLEAR ABOUT WHEN THE NEXT STEP IS.

ALLINSON

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FILE
HD | CCD
HD | CARD
HD | POS
HD | SAFETY
HD | REO
HD | RHO
P.S.
PS | A
PS | MA BLAKE
PS | MA LUCE
PS | PUS
SIR A. DUFF
MR WILLIAMS
MR STRATTON

COPY TO:
SIR J. HUNT, CABINET OFFICE
ASSESSMENT STAFF, CABINET OFFICE.
SIR P. MOORE,
BUCKINGHAM PALACE
ZAMBIA RADIO CONFIRMED THIS MORNING (2 JULY) THAT A FURTHER RAID TOOK PLACE EARLY ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON. ACCORDING TO THE RADIO ACCOUNT, A ZAPU AMMUNITION DUMP WAS DESTROYED SOME MILES TO THE WEST OF LUSAKA. THE MODUS OPERANDI SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE ROME RAID ON 26 JUNE, WITH GROUND TROOPS BEING LANDED FROM HELICOPTERS. WE HAVE NO CASUALTIES AS YET, BUT FIRST INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE HIGH.

ALLINSON

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION
RHODESIA POLICY

Rhod D          Def D
Qads           QID
RAD            PS
NEWS D        FS/SIR I GILMOUR
FUSD           FS/MR LUCE
PLANNING STAFF FS/MR RIDLEY
ES & SD       FS/MR HUD
CSS            FS/FUS
FRD            SIR A DUFF
UND            SIR A FARSONS
LEGAL ADVISERS
  (MR FREELAND)  MISS BROWN
  (MR STEEL)   MR THOMAS
ECON D        MR WILSON
POD           MR WILLIAMS
1. The Commonwealth Secretary-General, who arrived at the weekend, made a number of public statements in an apparent effort to take some of the heat out of the situation. He described speculation about a change of venue for the CHGM, away from Lusaka, as "nonsense" and expressed great confidence that the Lusaka meeting would be a success.

2. Ramphal had a long talk with me yesterday early afternoon. He said that he had told Kaunda to disregard his public statements. In fact the holding of the conference was on a knife edge. He had floated his idea (which I gather he discussed with you) for a cease-fire and Kaunda had been receptive and offered to arrange a dinner last night with himself, Ramphal and Nkomo alone. Ramphal said he would telephone me after the dinner to let me know how it went.

3. In discussing the proposition I said I thought Nkomo might have difficulty with some of his own people who were already indisciplined, citing consular problems in the Livingstone area where we know only too well that the ZIPRA Commander can do little to keep his men in order. We also discussed the probable attitude of Mugabe. On the question of security I told Ramphal that the most awkward spot near Lusaka was the area to the west on the old Mumbwa Road and mentioned the firing on 12 June and other examples. I could get Kaunda and Nkomo to clear those camps it would be a great help though I added that Kaunda had said only non-combatants would be allowed near town.

4. Undecknowled to us, while we were talking the Rhodesians were raiding in that very area. Accordingly the dinner in fact took place so late that Ramphal only spoke to me this morning before his
DEPARTURE FOR ARUSHA. HE SAID THE DINNER WENT WELL AND KNOMO HAD BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA. HE WOULD HOWEVER NEED TO CONSULT HIS PEOPLE AND ALSO MUGABE. RAMPHAL GOT THE IMPRESSION IT MIGHT ONLY BE A CASE OF INFORMING MUGABE NOT SEEKING HIS AGREEMENT. KNOMO HAD STRESSED THAT THERE MUST BE NO LEAKS IN ADVANCE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS AND STRICT SECRECY MUST BE OBSERVED. HE DISMISSED THE IDEA THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE WITH SOME OF HIS PEOPLE (BUT THAT IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED).

5. ON THE RAID KNOMO SAID THAT IT WAS NOT AN AMMUNITION DUMP THAT HAD BEEN ATTACKED BUT ONLY A TRANSIT CAMP. KAUNDA SAID HIS TROOPS HAD GONE TO THE AREA BUT THE RHODESIANS HAD LEFT BEFORE THEY ARRIVED. BUT THERE HAD BEEN A REAL RISK OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ZAMBIAN AND RHODESIAN TROOPS. KAUNDA SEEMED TO RAMPHAL TO BE RELIEVED THAT THIS HAD BEEN AVOIDED.

6. I HAVE MARKED THIS TELEGRAM ONLY TO YOU IN VIEW OF THE DELICACY OF THE SUBJECT.

ALLISON

FILES
HD/CCD
HD/C AF D
HD/PUSD
HD/SECURITY DEPT
HD/PGD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR A DUFF
MR WILLIAMS

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COPIES TO: SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE
           ASSESSMENT STAFF CABINET OFFICE
           SIR P MOORE BUCKINGHAM PALACE

-2-
SECRET

Dr. Margaret,

Professor John Hutchinson, who is a kind of free-lance expert on Rhodesia, has sent me the enclosed copy of a memorandum he sent to Foreign Minister Pik Botha of South Africa.

I do not know whether Botha thought the information worth passing to Peter Carrington when he saw him recently. I do not pretend either to attempt to make an assessment myself beyond noting that it seems to confirm some of the statements contained in one of the documents captured and published by Rhodesia after one of their raids on Nkomo's headquarters.

This morning Professor Hutchinson rang me to say that his informer Comandant Rene Garcia is arriving in London on 9th July by BA 377 at 12.35 and will stay for about three days. Professor Hutchinson has suggested that I should see him along with the other addressees of his letter of 25th June. I will gladly do so if that is what you would wish; but without knowing much about the situation in Lusaka and details of the Queen's and your programme I doubt whether I am really competent to judge the significance of what he may have to say.

In these circumstances and in view of the Queen's imminent departure for Africa, I wonder if it would not be better if our own security and intelligence people took over the case and made their own assessment. Will you say what you would wish?

I am copying this letter to Peter Carrington and to the recipients of Hutchinson's original letter.

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.

cc. The Rt. Hon. The Lord Carrington, K.C.V.O., M.C.
    The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Boyd of Merton, C.H.
    The Rt. Hon. The Lord Home of the Hirsel, K.T.
    Mr. Stephen Hastings, M.P.
June 25, 1979

Julian Amery
Lord Boyd
Stephen Hastings
Lord Home

Dear Julian,

I have attached a memorandum which went from here on June 18 via South African channels to Foreign Minister R. F. Botha in London, intended to reach him in time for his meeting with Lord Carrington. It involves an exile Cuban appreciation of the matter of security at the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka.

As you will see, the purpose was not to circumvent Lord Carrington but to ensure that the issue was quickly and properly discussed. That is also the purpose of this note to you.

Let me hereby introduce to you Comandant Rene Garcia of a Cuban exile group named Comando Militar 2506. I have not met him, but understand he is a man of substantial influence and responsibility in the exile Cuban movement. He is a frequent visitor to Central Africa, and like his colleagues I have met, greatly concerned with Castro’s intentions toward Zimbabwe Rhodesia in general and the Lusaka Conference in immediate particular. I do not know what he will tell you, but am assured he is alarmed.

Comandant Garcia will be in London during the first two weeks in July and will attempt to reach each one of you. I hope you will be able to see him, either separately or together.

I have sent this note and attached memorandum to Sir Philip Moore.

Best regards,

[Signature]

JH:cp
encl.

"Let’s let us have some beef, father?"
June 16, 1979

To: Foreign Minister R.F. Botha

From: Professor John Hutchinson, Graduate School of Management, University of California at Los Angeles

Subject: Fidel Castro and the Lusaka Conference

I have recently been meeting with representatives of an anti-Castro emigre Cuban group called Comando Militar 2506, based in Miami.

I was an observer at the recent election in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. While there I was informed by military leaders in general and by Sir Roy Welensky in particular of the disintegration of law and order in Zambia and the high danger Queen Elizabeth will be in if she attends the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka.

The great fear in Salisbury is that someone will kill the Queen and blame it on Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I believe Sir Roy is making some representation to London in the matter, but aside from additional security precautions there seems to be no change of plan about the Commonwealth Conference. A steel fence has been erected around the British Commissioner's quarters. Mortar fire, of course, is parabolic.

The Cuban representatives I have met with believe that the Queen and other participants in the Conference are in grave danger. They believe that Castro in general intends to invade Zimbabwe Rhodesia if security deteriorates sufficiently, and that in particular he may well intend to disrupt the Commonwealth Conference if only to distract attention from his own efforts to dominate the conference of non-aligned nations in Havana.

I am aware of the special interest of the emigre Cubans in painting Castro in unsaintly terms, but on this issue I am satisfied with the legitimacy of their concern and of the proximate evidence on which it is based.
I have been shown, that is to say, a letter which originated last year in Cuba. It is addressed to a leading figure in Comando 2506, and says in part:

"It has been only a few days since...told me he saw with his own eyes, entering the Russian naval base at Cienfuegos, a little railway (tram) car loaded with from 10 or a dozen African Blacks and an official of the Russian Navy. The blacks carried knapsacks and each one an AK47 rifle. The Russian alighted from the car and presented his papers to the Cuban guard post. Further along there is another portal that is Russian territory, and they do not permit Cubans to pass through. The situation is that the black Africans passed into the Russian submarine and did not re-appear. The logical explanation is that they (the Russians) are utilizing submarines to infiltrate African guerrillas on the coasts of South Africa and Namibia. Don't you think that if they were travelling to African Marxist countries, it would be via aircraft?"

(Letter then discusses visit to Cuba of Joshua Nkomo, Dan Madzimbamuto and Joseph Dube).

"From the mouth of a functionary of Cusito Malmierca (Cuban Foreign Minister)...these people (Southern African terrorists) are going to change tactics and assassinate non-communist black opposition leaders in order to throw the blame at the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa. Pass the word because it is confirmed. I am finishing this because I believe that the material I sent you should be rapidly utilized. Await my news to arrive very soon because something is cooking of the greatest secrecy and right now I have not been able to learn what it is. Receive an abrazo from your brother....."

****

I was given this letter last week with the following written
comments by one of the Cuban amigre representatives with whom I have been meeting.

"The above letter was the first word from inside Cuba to our people of the results of a Cuban/African terrorist rethink concerning the need for new tactics to deal with the recent internal settlement initiative at that time in Namibia and Rhodesia.... The assassination of Herero Chief Klemens Kapuo but several weeks after transmitting the warning in the letter was confirmation of the authenticity of our information.... some of the specially trained killer groups have been intercepted or destroyed, others have periodically killed secondary black leaders in Rhodesia, Ovamboland and around Windhoek.... Individual leaders who let down their guard will be assassinated where possible and particularly, any political meetings attended by important black or Western supporters of Rhodesia's internal settlement or that of Namibia will be suitable targets of said violence. This would include the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference at Lusaka and those in attendance."

"Cuban-trained saboteurs and assassins have been operating inside Zambia for some time, and it is significant that it was with Nkomo's ZAPU that the training of such elements was initiated. Should any attack be made on this conference or its participants it will be led by black terrorists and an effort will be made to blame it on Ian Smith & Co. or South Africa. Therefore those concerned with the security of this conference should take this warning into consideration as deriving from more than one Cuban anti-Castro source from inside the island."

****

I have not transmitted this information - received only this past week - to Lord Carrington because I have no means of confidential transmission.
You may wish to inform him, however, that I hope to arrange for a visit to London of a high-level emigre Cuban representative of military background and have already asked mutual friends of Lord Carrington and myself to receive that representative. Again I would have raised the matter directly with Lord Carrington but was not sure if he would be embarrassed or available. One of the purposes here, that is, is not to circumvent Lord Carrington but to make sure he receives reliable if morbid information through the most responsible hands. The other purpose, of course, is to acquaint you directly with information directly affecting the security of South Africa.

My best personal regards to Lord Carrington, and of course to you. I will keep you informed.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

John Hutchinson
Professor of Industrial Relations
Graduate School of Management
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024

Tel (213) 525-3124
(213) 825-3506 Secretary
(213) 476-2345 Residence
SECRET

FM LUSAKA 020930Z JUL 79
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 577 OF 2 JULY

PERSONAL FOR SIR ANTONY DUFF

CHGN

1. THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY - GENERAL, WHO ARRIVED AT THE WEEKEND, MADE A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO TAKE SOME OF THE HEAT OUT OF THE SITUATION. HE DESCRIBED SPECULATION ABOUT A CHANGE OF VENUE FOR THE CHGN, AWAY FROM LUSAKA, AS "NONSENSE" AND EXPRESSED GREAT CONFIDENCE THAT THE LUSAKA MEETING WOULD BE A SUCCESS.

2. RAMPHAL HAD A LONG TALK WITH ME YESTERDAY EARLY AFTERNOON. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD KAUNDA TO DISREGARD HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IN FACT THE HOLDING OF THE CONFERENCE WAS ON A KNIFE EDGE. HE HAD FLOATED HIS IDEA (WHICH I GATHER HE DISCUSSED WITH YOU) FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND KAUNDA HAD BEEN RECEPTIVE AND OFFERED TO ARRANGE A DINNER LAST NIGHT WITH HIMSELF, RAMPHAL AND NKOMO ALONE. RAMPHAL SAID HE WOULD TELEPHONE ME AFTER THE DINNER TO LET ME KNOW HOW IT WENT.

3. IN DISCUSSING THE PROPOSITION I SAID I THOUGHT NKOMO MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH SOME OF HIS OWN PEOPLE WHO WERE ALREADY INDISCIPLINED, CITING CONSULAR PROBLEMS IN THE LIVINGSTONE AREA WHERE WE KNOW ONLY TOO WELL THAT THE ZIPRA COMMANDER CAN DO LITTLE TO KEEP HIS MEN IN ORDER. WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROBABLE ATTITUDE OF MUGABE. ON THE QUESTION OF SECURITY I TOLD RAMPHAL THAT THE MOST AKWARD SPOT NEAR LUSAKA WAS THE AREA TO THE WEST ON THE OLD MUNBWA ROAD AND MENTIONED THE FIRING ON 12 JUNE AND OTHER EXAMPLES. I HE COULD GET KAUNDA AND NKOMO TO CLEAR THOSE CAMPS IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP THOUGH I ADDED THAT KAUNDA HAD SAID ONLY NON-COMBATANTS WOULD BE ALLOWED NEAR TOWN.

4. UNBEKOWN TO US, WHILE WE WERE TALKING THE RHODESIANS WERE RAIDING IN THAT VERY AREA. ACCORDINGLY THE DINNER IN FACT TOOK PLACE SO LATE THAT RAMPHAL ONLY SPOKE TO ME THIS MORNING BEFORE HIS

/DEPARTURE FOR/
DEPARTURE FOR ARUSHA. HE SAID THE DINNER WENT WELL AND NKOMO HAD BEEN RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA. HE WOULD HOWEVER NEED TO CONSULT HIS PEOPLE AND ALSO MUGABE. RAMPHAL GOT THE IMPRESSION IT MIGHT ONLY BE A CASE OF INFORMING MUGABE NOT SEEKING HIS AGREEMENT. NKOMO HAD STRESSED THAT THERE MUST BE NO LEAKS IN ADVANCE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS AND STRICT SECRECY MUST BE OBSERVED. HE DISMISSED THE IDEA THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TROUBLE WITH SOME OF HIS PEOPLE (BUT THAT IS ONLY TO BE EXPECTED).

5. ON THE RAID NKOMO SAID THAT IT WAS NOT AN AMMUNITION DUMP THAT HAD BEEN ATTACKED BUT ONLY A TRANSIT CAMP. KAUNDA SAID HIS TROOPS HAD GONE TO THE AREA BUT THE RHODESIANS HAD LEFT BEFORE THEY ARRIVED. BUT THERE HAD BEEN A REAL RISK OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND RHODESIAN TROOPS. KAUNDA SEEMED TO RAMPHAL TO BE RELIEVED THAT THIS HAD BEEN AVOIDED.

6. I HAVE MARKED THIS TELEGRAM ONLY TO YOU IN VIEW OF THE DELICACY OF THE SUBJECT.

ALLINSON

FILES
HD/COD
HD/C AF D
HD/PUSD
HD/SECURITY DEPT
HD/PCD
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/MR LUCB
PS/PU3
SIR A DUFF
MR. WILLIAMS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO: SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE
ASSESSMENT STAFF CABINET OFFICE
SIR P MOORE HUCKINGHAM PALACE

- 2 -
SECRET
Dear Private Secretary,

**Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting**

**Lusaka: 1st-8th August 1979**

This letter sets out the briefing arrangements for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka.

The list of briefs to be prepared, with an indication of Departmental responsibility, is at Annex A. Instructions on format are at Annexes B and C. Departments should apply the guidance in sub-paragraph (b) of Annex B as appropriate i.e. for those briefs which may be drawn upon in a meeting, where a succinct summary of Points to Make can be made use of.

**Category A** briefs, i.e. the prepared statements by the United Kingdom, should be drafted in speech form for statements that will take c. 10 minutes to deliver.

Ninety copies of each brief should be sent to the Cabinet Office as soon as they are ready, and in any event to arrive no later than **5.00 pm on Tuesday, 17th July**. They should be addressed to Mrs. Wagner in Committee Section, who should be consulted (tel. no. 233 7628) about any technical points arising.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Douglas Wass, Sir Kenneth Couzens, Sir Peter Carey, Sir Frank Cooper, Mr. B. D. Hayes, Sir John Garlick, Sir William Fraser, Sir Brian Cubbon, Sir Kenneth Clucas, Sir Jack Rampton and Sir Kenneth Berrill, and to Bryan Cartledge, No. 10.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) M.J. VILE
LIST OF MINISTERIAL BRIEFS FOR COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
LUSAKA 1-8 AUGUST 1979

ANNEX A

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<td>Southern Africa</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>World Economic Situation and Prospects</td>
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<td>Treasury, Department of Trade, Department of Industry</td>
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<td>As appropriate (including Cabinet Office)</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS</td>
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<td>Middle East (Peace Negotiations)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>MOD</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Arms Control and Non-Proliferation</td>
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<td>No.</td>
<td>Subject</td>
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<td>World Economic Situation and Prospects (including Tokyo Summit)</td>
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<td>North/South Dialogue including (a) UNCTAD V (b) Common Fund (c) Programme of Commodities</td>
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**COMMONWEALTH CO-OPERATION**

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| 26. | Regional Co-operation                                                 | FCO             | Treasury, Cabinet Office                   |
| 27. | Problems of Island Developing and other Specially Disadvantaged States | FCO             |                                           |
| 28. | Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation                          | FCO             | Treasury                                  |
| 29. | Commonwealth Youth Programme                                          | FCO             | Treasury                                  |
| 30. | Commonwealth Foundation                                               | FCO             | Treasury                                  |</p>
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<td>II.</td>
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<td>Bahamas/Barbados/Dominica/St. Lucia Grenada/Guyana/Jamaica/Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<td>Fiji/Kiribati (Gilbert Islands - including Banaba issue)/Papua New Guinea/Solomon Islands/Tonga/W. Samoa</td>
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<td>Mauritius/Seychelles</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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ANNEX B

INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT FORMAT

All briefs should be laid out in the same way with a top page in accordance with the specimen layout at Annex C. Those preparing briefs should note the following:-

(a) Briefs should be as concise as possible. Each brief should if possible be no more than four sides long.

(b) The main body of each brief should comprise two sections, a concise list of Points to Make, followed by a factual Background section which distinguishes clearly between information which can be freely used and information which should not be disclosed.

(c) Briefs should be complete and self-contained and with all the information required on that particular subject. Except where indicated in the List of Briefs, briefs should not be divided into separate self-contained sub-sections.

(d) Briefs should be typed in double spacing, using both sides of the paper. Pages should be numbered at the foot of each page.

(e) The top page only should bear the symbol and number of the briefs in the top left-hand corner (e.g. PMVT(79) A3), with the date of production below; a copy number in the top right-hand corner; and the visit heading, the title of the brief (in capitals) and the name of the Department responsible (as in Annex C).

(f) Briefs should bear at the foot of the last page, on the left-hand side, the name of the originating Department and the date of origin.

(g) If late developments require a brief to be amended or updated, an addendum should be prepared. It should be set out in the standard way with the brief number (e.g. PMVT(79) A3 Addendum) and title to which it relates at the top of the front page. The Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet should be informed when an addendum is in preparation.

(h) Additions to the list of briefs in Annex A require the authorisation of the Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet.
I attach a copy of a letter the Prime Minister has received from the Commonwealth Secretary-General about the style and format of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings. The Secretary-General intends to table this at Lusaka.

I should be grateful to have advice on the content of the letter and on the terms of a reply.

NJS

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
CONFIDENTIAL
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
ELAND HOUSE
STAG PLACE LONDON SW1E 5DH
Telephone 01-243 4819

22 June 1979

Sir Peter Preston KCB
Permanent Secretary

Sir John Hunt GCB
Cabinet Office
Whitehall SW1

Dear John,

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: LIST OF BRIEFS

I have no comments on the list of briefs enclosed with Tony Duff's letter of 14 June to yourself, except to say that I have no objection to the intention to deal with Multilateral Aid Matters (which may be of some importance in this context) in Brief No B 18 on UK Aid Policy. Anything which can reduce the number of briefs (which seems formidable) must be right.

Yours ever,

Peter Preston

cc

Sir Antony Duff, KCMG, FCIO
Sir Douglas Wass KCB, HM Treasury
Sir Kenneth Clucas KCB, DCT
Sir Robert Armstrong KCB CVO, Home Office
Sir Jack Hampton KCB, Department of Energy
Sir Patrick Haire KCB MC, DMiss
Sir Peter Carey, KCB, Dept of Industry
E D Hayes Esq CB, MAFF
J I Smith Esq CB, Dept of Agriculture & Fisheries for Scotland
Sir Frank Cooper, GCB CMB, MOD
Private Secretary, No 10 Downing Street
Martin Vile Esq
Cabinet Office

Dear Martin,

You asked us to let you have any comments on the list of briefs for the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting circulated with Sir Antony Duff’s letter of 14 June to Sir John Hunt. We have also subsequently seen Sir Antony’s letter of 21 June suggesting that there is no need for a meeting of Permanent Secretaries.

We have only two small points on the list of briefs, which would not seem sufficient in themselves to justify a meeting. The first is that the emphasis in the brief on the North/South dialogue (Category B: No. 16) should, we think, be more on the prospects for the dialogue generally following UNCTAD V, and less on commodities and the Common Fund, than the note circulated with Sir Antony Duff’s letter implies. We are inclined to doubt whether commodity issues will feature prominently in discussion at the meeting, bearing in mind the agreement reached in UNCTAD in March on the fundamental elements of the Fund.

The second point is that we would be grateful if FCO could consult us on the brief on Nigeria (Category C: No 22), in view of our current trade difficulties with that country, and on the contingency brief on East-West relations (Category B: No. 40) if this deals in any detail with our commercial relations with Eastern Europe.

Sir Antony also raised the question of timing. I should like to make a plea that we should be given as much time as possible to prepare briefs of this sort. The time available for preparing briefing for the Prime Minister’s visit to Australia was extremely compressed. While we were able to comply with your requirements, this was not without a certain
amount of inconvenience to our Secretary of State, who as you know is required under the new arrangements set out in Mr Stowe's letter of 8 June to approve briefs of this sort.

I am copying this letter to the Private Secretaries to the recipients of Sir Antony Duff's letter of 14 June.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

R M WATSON
Private Secretary
CABINET OFFICE

With the compliments of
Sir John Hunt GCB
Secretary of the Cabinet

B. G. Cartledge, Esq.

70 Whitehall, London SW1A 2AS
Telephone: 01-223 8319
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: LIST OF BRIEFS

Thank you for your letter of 14th June and for the enclosed list. Unless those to whom you copied your letter have any substantial comments on the list which they would like to discuss at a meeting I see no need to call a meeting of Permanent Secretaries at this stage, especially as the timetable looks like being fairly tight.

I have asked Martin Vile to check with the Private Secretaries of all those concerned. Subject to this, I propose to ask Richard Hasted-Smith to call a meeting next week to discuss arrangements and timetable for the preparation and clearance of the briefs at official and, if necessary, Ministerial level. Besides co-ordinating briefing arrangements, this group could also deal with any other practical matters relating to our delegation which need to be discussed interdepartmentally. But I would propose to leave Departments to take the initiative in raising such matters.

As regards timing, I think we must aim to get the final versions of the briefs to No. 10 at latest by 20th July, with a view to having a briefing meeting some time during the following week. We can decide whether a Permanent Secretaries meeting is needed later on in the light of progress made by Richard Hasted-Smith's group.

I am sending copies of this letter to the recipients of yours.

Sir Antony Duff, KCMG

JOHN HUNT
Dear Mr. Minister,

The Prime Minister's Discussion with the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at 10 Downing Street on 20 June 1979

The Prime Minister's tête-à-tête discussion with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew this morning, which I have recorded in separate letters, was followed by a working lunch at which the other senior members of Mr. Lee's party, as well as the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Trade, Mr. Peter Blaker and our High Commissioner in Singapore, were present. During lunch, there was a discussion of the Rhodesia problem and, in particular, of its likely impact on the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka. The following is a summary of the main points that arose.

The Prime Minister told Mr. Lee that there could be no question of renewing United Kingdom sanctions against Rhodesia in November; it would simply not be possible to secure Parliamentary approval for this. It was clear that the discussions on Rhodesia at Lusaka would be very difficult. Mr. Lee suggested that the Prime Minister might study the "Shanghai Communiqué" as a classic example of how two irreconcilable views could be expressed and endorsed within a single document. Mr. Lee said that in his view it was essential that Bishop Muzorewa should invite the leaders of the Patriotic Front to meet him in Salisbury, in order to involve them in the democratic process of creating the new Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. If the Bishop could be persuaded to take this initiative, it was quite possible that Joshua Nkomo would be tempted to accept.

The Prime Minister stressed that the April elections had created a new situation, which offered the prospect of a settlement which could bring immense benefit, not only to Rhodesia, but to Zambia and the other countries of the region. Bishop Muzorewa was now genuinely in charge in Salisbury; but he was so far concentrating on his external relations and had not moved fast enough in promoting internal change. The Prime Minister said that she recognised that some amendments to the Constitution might be needed: but the white

/Members of Parliament
Members of Parliament could operate a blocking mechanism and if any attempt were made to bypass it they might leave the country, thereby precipitating economic collapse. It was essential to give Bishop Muzorewa support, in order to encourage Sithole to cleave to him: if the Bishop seemed to be faltering, Sithole would split away and fulfill the most pessimistic forecasts of the whites. Mr. Lee repeated that Bishop Muzorewa should make it clear that he was ready to discuss the Constitution with the Patriotic Front, in return for an undertaking on their part to suspend terrorist activity.

Mr. Hennings suggested that a possible amendment to the Constitution might be an arrangement whereby the eight white Members of Parliament who were at present nominated by the other twenty members of the white caucus should, instead, be nominated by Parliament as a whole.

Mr. Lee made it clear that he, and some other Heads of Government who thought like him, were seeking some good reason for changing the position into which, as he put it, they had been corralled by Andrew Young and Dr. David Owen. If they were to turn through 180°, there had to be some development that would give them an excuse to do so. If the Patriotic Front were encouraged to believe they could win on their own, they would be unreceptive to any proposals which might be put to them; if they were uncertain of their prospects of winning unaided, however, the Patriotic Front might split through a change of position on the part of Nkomo. This, said Mr. Lee, would give Heads of Government like himself a good reason for changing their own stance. The Patriotic Front knew very well that no Commonwealth Government wanted a Marxist Rhodesia.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

Yours ever,

[Signature]

Stephen Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Bryan,

Cabinet Office would like to hear if you have any comments on the draft to Hunt letter of 14 June (at flap) and the proposed brief? Could they have an answer by Friday lunchtime please?

Gillian
19 June 1979

Dear Prime Minister,

I am deeply grateful that, despite your many other preoccupations, you gave me so much of your time yesterday to discuss various issues of Commonwealth interest in the context of the forthcoming Lusaka Meeting. I greatly valued the opportunity to converse in such a friendly atmosphere and, as I mentioned to you, my services are at your disposal in our common objective of strengthening the Commonwealth and making the most of the opportunities which Lusaka will present.

You were kind enough to agree to be one of the Heads of Government who will respond to President Kaunda’s address of welcome at the formal Opening Session on 1 August. I am proceeding on that basis, and will be in touch with you again in respect of your wish to speak last.

For the rest of the Meeting it is intended to have only a single introductory statement to the main Agenda items and sub-items in order to promote a greater and more meaningful exchange of views. In consultation with President Kaunda, I have asked Prime Minister Fraser to introduce the discussion on the World Economic Scene where, as you will have seen from my explanatory letter, no subdivision into individual topics is envisaged; I hope, however, that you will consider making an early intervention which would include your reflections on the Tokyo Summit.

With deep respect,

[Signature]

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
10 Downing Street
SW1
At London, in June 1977, Heads of Government, after discussing in restricted session the question of the style and format of their meeting, asked me to put forward for consideration at Lusaka suggestions responsive to their general wish to strengthen the special qualities of their consultations.

High among these qualities, as emphasized by Commonwealth leaders at London, was the character of the occasion as 'their meeting' - as a meeting of Heads of Government. It is this character which, in many respects, gives the meeting its unique flavour - even among other summit meetings. Heads of Government are not there to place their imprimatur on resolutions hammered out by ministers over preceding days or even in committees sitting contemporaneously. They do not come to deliver addresses to each other and to wider audiences beyond the conference room. They come to meet; to be with each other; to talk to one another; to strengthen their practical ways of co-operating within the Commonwealth association; to try to enlarge understanding of each other's point of view, and, therefore, the prospects for their convergence. They come knowing that they will not always agree, but mindful that their jointly shared objectives (as agreed, for example, at Singapore in the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles) imply that where they must agree to differ it should be on means, not ends.

Many elements of the style and format of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings have contributed to giving them these qualities - and those elements have developed in pragmatic ways responsive to need, not fashion. As the Commonwealth has grown in number and variety there has come a greater consciousness of the importance of preserving these elements. The Ottawa meeting in 1973 represented a particularly important moment of awareness, and the work of Commonwealth Senior Officials that preceded that meeting contributed to the significant strengthening of the element of informality. The call in London was essentially for the avoidance of its erosion as the Commonwealth continues to grow from 32 member countries at Ottawa to 39 in Lusaka.

The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of Great Britain.
SECRET

In responding to the request for suggestions then made I have, of course, taken full account of the discussion of this matter by Heads of Government at the London meeting. I also sought the help of Senior Officials at their last meeting in Kuala Lumpur and have been greatly assisted by their ideas in formulating the suggestions now set out in the attached note. I hope these suggestions might be considered by Heads of Government immediately after the adoption of their Agenda at Lusaka so that the consultation there may benefit from the decisions reached upon them.

With deep respect,

[Signature]

SECRET
SECRET

The Style and Format of
CONMIONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS
Suggestions by the Secretary-General

A   Speeches

i) It should be the general understanding among Heads of Government that set speeches in the form of prepared texts read at the meeting would be avoided. This does not exclude interventions on the basis of prepared notes, nor does it debar a prepared statement where a Head of Government considers that special circumstances warrant it.

ii) As an exception to (i), Heads of Government requested to be lead speakers on particular Agenda items may, if they wish, make prepared presentations or, alternatively, speak to such a presentation which might then be circulated.

iii) As a corollary to (ii), it will be the aim to restrict lead speakers to one for each principal Agenda item or sub-item, although in special cases individual Heads of Government may be asked to initiate discussion on a particular issue within an item or sub-item.

iv) Apart from lead speakers, and then only where appropriate, interventions would not be in the nature of tours d'horizon but aim to be succinct and pithy, more in the nature of dialogue than debate.

v) Heads of Government could, where they consider it essential, ask the Secretariat to circulate to their colleagues prepared texts on particular issues on the Agenda of the meeting - either in advance of its commencement or during its course.

B. Restricted Sessions

i) It should be the aim to have more restricted sessions - i.e. sessions limited to Heads of Government and the Secretary-General. No official record will be kept of these sessions, but, where they result in a consensus position, the Chairman will normally report this to the executive session and so have it incorporated in the records of the meeting.
ii) There should be no press briefing on the substance of discussions in restricted sessions, either privately or on behalf of the meeting. Unless otherwise agreed, the press will simply be informed of the subject being discussed in particular restricted sessions.

iii) It will be for Heads of Government themselves to determine during each meeting how many of their sessions or parts of sessions should be restricted; but provision would be made in the draft time-table of each meeting for at least two restricted sessions – one before and one after the week-end 'retreat'.

iv) In putting forward the annotated Agenda the Secretary-General may suggest particular matters for discussion in restricted sessions; but, since these sessions are essentially an aid to Heads of Government in attaining the objectives of the meeting, there must be maximum flexibility at the meeting itself as to the subjects or aspects of agenda items to be discussed in restricted sessions as well as to the question of timing, frequency and duration of such sessions.

C. Informal Discussions

Opportunities for informal discussion between Heads of Government on a one to one basis or in groups are a greatly valued element of Commonwealth meetings. They should not be limited to the week-end 'retreat' but consciously provided during the course of the meeting. The following are three suggestions for enlarging these opportunities:

a) slightly longer coffee-breaks, say, to thirty minutes;

b) a forty-five minute 'relaxer' at the end of each day's proceedings for conversations over refreshments in the executive lounge;

c) the formal social programme to be kept to the minimum so as to allow maximum opportunity for informal 'get-togethers' over lunch and dinner.
D. Representation

i) In general terms, given its character as 'their meeting', everything possible should be done to encourage attendance by Heads of Government themselves.

ii) Correspondingly, it would be understood that heads of delegation who are not themselves Heads of Government would not normally catch the Chairman's eye in preference to those who are.

E. The Chairman

It would be the understanding of all Heads of Government that at each meeting the Chairman is the principal custodian of the meeting's informal character and of its traditional style and format. As such, he would be on guard to preserve them, to prevent discussions becoming stylised, to encourage a free exchange of ideas and opinions, and to promote a meeting of minds. In doing so, he would be entitled to expect the support and co-operation of his colleagues.

F. Communiqué

The Communiqué is an important element of every Heads of Government Meeting. It is an essential vehicle for conveying to the people of the Commonwealth and the wider international community the wide-ranging interests and concerns of Commonwealth leaders. It should be the aim to maintain it within manageable proportions; to convey the true character of the conversations between Heads of Government, and to highlight areas of consensus and decisions for co-operation.
Dear Sir/Madam,

Call on the Prime Minister by the Commonwealth Secretary General at 10 Downing Street on 18 June 1979

The Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Ramphal, paid his first call on the Prime Minister at No. 10 at 1715. Sir Antony Duff was present. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during just over an hour’s discussion.

The Commonwealth

Mr. Ramphal said that he could report to the Prime Minister that the Commonwealth was in good shape. Rhodesia presented a special problem but, apart from that, the Commonwealth was at a high level of collective confidence. The period which had been marked by doubts on the part of the new members as to whether the Commonwealth was practicable or useful, and on whether it was still dominated by the UK, had passed; and the general mood was now more confident and relaxed. The public view of the Commonwealth was, however, less satisfactory. There was still a tendency to see the UK's decision to join the EEC as an act of voluntary separation from the Commonwealth, despite the fact that this view was not held to any significant extent, if at all, within the Commonwealth itself. Some countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, had their own problems with the EEC and there were current difficulties over the Lome renegotiation: but there was no hostility whatsoever within the Commonwealth to UK membership of the Community. The Commonwealth was, Mr. Ramphal said, highly valued in the international community, particularly by men like Secretary General Waldheim and Mr. McNamara. They recognised that the Commonwealth community was sufficiently small to make it possible to do business within it but that, at the same time, it had a wide geographical and racial spread. For these reasons, the Commonwealth could draw on an immense reservoir of international goodwill.

/Rhodesia
Rhodesia

Some remarks by Mr. Ramphal about the nature of the meetings of Commonwealth Heads of Government led into a discussion of the substance of the Rhodesia problem. The Prime Minister said that there would be certain things which she would have to say and do about Rhodesia which she was convinced were right: once the grounds for Rhodesia's illegal status had been purged, certain consequences had to follow. The UK and others had recently recognised a number of African regimes - for example, Uganda and Ghana - who did not owe their authority to any kind of democratic elections and whose constitutions were in no way superior to the present constitution of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. At Lusaka, all those concerned would have to put forward their respective views on Rhodesia; but, the Prime Minister said, it would be important to avoid a heated argument about the issue.

Mr. Ramphal said the Front Line Presidents would tend to argue that the First Principle had not yet been fulfilled and that Rhodesia did not in fact enjoy majority rule; President Carter's determination would have reinforced them in this view. Lord Harlech's mission might, Mr. Ramphal said, contribute to a good climate for discussion and perhaps point the way forward. Mr. Ramphal emphasised that the Front Line Presidents, even President Machel, had a very real concern lest developments in Rhodesia could lead eventually to the strengthening of Soviet influence in Southern Africa.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that President Machel was not particularly well placed to talk about Soviet influence. In the eyes of the ordinary British citizen, there was now no reason for not helping Bishop Muzorewa. If he were not supported, the war would intensify. Rhodesia could contribute so much to the region, not least to Zambia, and the British Government had a duty to bring Rhodesia back to legality and to lift sanctions. When Mr. Ramphal suggested the the Front Line Presidents might take the line that the war should first be ended by discussions leading to a ceasefire, the Prime Minister pointed out that some of the Front Line Presidents were harbouring terrorists on their territory. The Prime Minister recalled President Kaunda's statement to her that "force was the only way". The Prime Minister stressed that the British Government was confronted by a problem of timing: sanctions would lapse in November since there was no way in which Parliamentary approval could be won for their renewal. The Prime Minister said that her fear was that the talks in Lusaka would get nowhere and that positions would then harden on all sides.
Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the Front Line Presidents were taking their discussions with Lord Harlech very seriously: none of the Heads of Government wanted the Lusaka meeting to be another Singapore – they did not wish the fabric of the Commonwealth to be damaged. Mr. Ramphal explained that he thought that the other Heads of Government would react positively to a frank explanation by the Prime Minister, in restricted session, of the Parliamentary dimension to the Government's handling of the Rhodesia problem although they would, of course, respond by describing their own political difficulties on the issue. Sir Antony Duff said that he thought that the Front Line Presidents were genuinely concerned that a solution should be found but that the issues had been totally obscured by emotion and by their hatred for Mr. Smith; since 1976, they had seen no way of making progress except by means of force. A thorough political discussion in restricted session at Lusaka could create an easier relationship which would be valuable to the UK when the Government did what it would have to do. The Prime Minister said that it would be important to show the African Heads of Government that she was not simply waiting to recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime as soon as the Lusaka Conference was over. In further discussion of Rhodesia, the Prime Minister stressed that it would be important to give Bishop Muzorewa some kind of support and encouragement in order to strengthen him against the possibility of a Marxist Zimbabwe under Mugabe. The Prime Minister made it clear that there could be no accommodation with terrorism of any kind: she was not prepared to accept arguments to the effect that what could not be achieved politically should be achieved by the bullet. When Mr. Ramphal said that he thought that the Patriotic Front would be more interested in negotiation than in the continued use of force, the Prime Minister commented that they were only interested in negotiations if they were confident of ending up on top. Mr. Ramphal said that President Nyerere would take the view that there would be a better chance of keeping Marxism out of Rhodesia by reaching a settlement now, even if Robert Mugabe were to become President.

C.H.G.M.

Mr. Ramphal told the Prime Minister that he would be sending her a letter about the procedure for the C.H.G.M. He explained the importance of the restricted sessions at those meetings. It would be important to choose the right moment to begin the discussion on Rhodesia. The Prime Minister agreed that this part of the debate could best begin once a good relationship had been established on other issues; her own preference would be to tackle Rhodesia on the Friday afternoon. Mr. Ramphal strongly agreed with this approach.
and said that he thought that President Nyerere would be the best opening speaker in the discussion on Rhodesia; he could be relied upon to tackle the matter in a balanced manner and to set the tone for what followed. Mr. Ramphal said that the Conference would then adjourn for the weekend but that there would be opportunities on Saturday and Sunday for bilateral discussions from which he hoped that some convergence of view would emerge. He had been urging President Kaunda to take the chair for the discussion of Rhodesia, in the hope that the duties of chairmanship would act as a constraint on his sometimes emotional approach.

Mr. Ramphal went on to say that he hoped that the Prime Minister could agree to be one of the four speakers who would respond to President Kaunda’s speech of welcome to the participants on the first day of the meeting; the other speakers he had in mind were Mr. Malcolm Fraser, President Zia of Bangladesh and, if he attended the meeting, General Obasanjo of Nigeria. The Prime Minister said that she would be prepared to make one of the opening speeches, provided that her speech could be the last of the four. She said that she appreciated that Mr. Ramphal was trying to be helpful to her in making his proposal.

Mr. Ramphal said that after the opening session, which was the only public occasion during the meeting, there would be a general debate on the international political situation, which he hoped Mr. Desai would open; this would cover such topics as détente, disarmament and the changing power structure in the world. On the Thursday morning, there would be a specific debate on the problems of South East Asia, including those of Indo-China, the policies of the "new" China and of the Vietnamese refugees. He had been intending to ask the Malaysian Prime Minister to open this debate but in view of recent developments doubted whether he would now be suitable. Mr. Ramphal said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would take part in this debate and say a word about the problems of Hong Kong. These debates, together, would take the meeting up until the afternoon of Friday, 3 August and the discussion of Rhodesia could then begin. Other political topics which would be tackled at the beginning of the following week were Belize and Cyprus. These would be followed by an economic debate, to be opened by Mr. Fraser and in which Mr. Manley would speak on the deficit situation in the L.D.C.S. Mr. Ramphal said that he hoped that the Prime Minister would tell the meeting, during this debate, about the Economic Summit in Tokyo. Finally, Mr. Ramphal said, there would be a number of functional issues to discuss: follow-up to the Bangalore Meeting on industrialisation, multilateral aid programmes and, Mr. Ramphal suggested, the phenomenon of the micro-states.

/ I should be
I should be grateful if Mr. Ramphal's suggestions for the Lusaka agenda could be borne in mind in the preparation of the draft list of briefs for the C.H.G.M..

I am sending a copy of this letter to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

J. M. Leeuw.

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
10 DOWNING STREET

PRIME MINISTER

This is the letter from President Kaunda which the Zambian High Commissioner delivered to you today. I have asked the FCO for advice on how you might respond.

15 June 1979

[Handwritten notes: 8/6/79, Mr., Re]
Prime Minister

You may like to see this before you meet Mr Ramphal on 18 June: an oral “thank you” would be

CHGM: Annotated Agenda

Thank you for your letter of 14 June attaching a copy of Mr Ramphal’s letter to the Prime Minister of 13 June with the enclosed annotated agenda.

The agenda is much as forecast in Mr Ramphal’s letter to the Prime Minister of 22 March and it meets the views expressed by the Prime Minister in her reply of 11 June. Mr Ramphal has kept the customary broad headings. He has also taken account of the Prime Minister’s comment that it would be useful to address common economic problems in a global setting in his letter (para 3(d)) and seems to have tried generally to curtail the number of sub-items. Although he does mention specific subjects under the economic heading (eg Lome) he does not refer to the Common Fund or IMF conditionality, which were mentioned by the Prime Minister as examples of issues which have received detailed discussion elsewhere.

We understand that the Asian/Pacific countries generally welcomed discussion of South East Asia; Fiji and New Zealand asked for discussion of world energy; Australia expressed interest in commodity marketing; Zambia did likewise on Law of the Sea; and Sri Lanka suggested Housing, Urbanisation and the Environment. Cyprus and Gambia revived their pet ideas of a Commonwealth Film and TV Institute and a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission respectively.

Although it is not clear when Southern Africa will come up at the meeting— it lies at present third under “International Developments” - the Prime Minister may wish to steer Mr Ramphal towards the idea of beginning the Southern Africa discussions on, say, Friday afternoon and concluding on Monday, with the private weekend in between. On the format of CHGMs Mr Ramphal says he will be putting forward separately suggestions to increase informality (para 2).

I enclose a short draft reply to Mr Ramphal’s letter.

J S Wall

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
FROM: The Prime Minister

TO: HE Mr Shridath S Ramphal Kt CMG
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1Y 5HX

SUBJECT:

Thank you for your letter of 13 June with which you enclosed notes on the agenda and documentation for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in August.

I very much enjoyed meeting you on Monday.
10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

15 June 1979

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No. T 263/79T

It was with great pleasure that I received on 4 June by the hand of your Minister of Education your letter extending a welcome to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held in Lusaka in August.

I am looking forward to attending the meeting. I share your belief in the value of the Commonwealth Association, in its principles and in the important role which it has to play in world affairs. The British Government has made clear its firm commitment to the Commonwealth and I am sure the meeting under your Chairmanship will strengthen both the Commonwealth and our already close bilateral relations.

(signed) M.T.

His Excellency Dr. K. D. Kaunda
Dear Sir/Madam,

I should be grateful if you would forward to our High Commission in Lusaka, for delivery to President Kaunda, the enclosed letter from the Prime Minister responding to the President's invitation to her to attend the CHCM in Lusaka in August.

I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

[Signature]

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Dear Sir/Madam,

Call on the Prime Minister by the High Commissioner of Zambia on 15 June 1979

The Zambian High Commissioner, Miss Chibesakunda, called on the Prime Minister today, at her own request, at 1515 in order to deliver a message from President Kaunda on Rhodesia. I enclose a copy of President Kaunda’s message, on which I should be grateful for early comments and for advice on how the Prime Minister should respond. The following is a summary of the main points which arose during a discussion which lasted for 40 minutes.

CHGM, Lusaka

Miss Chibesakunda told the Prime Minister that President Kaunda sent her his very best wishes and that he was looking forward to seeing her in Lusaka. The President would greatly welcome an opportunity to have an informal meeting with the Prime Minister, on the margin of the Lusaka Conference and at as an early a stage as possible, in order to discuss Rhodesia. The Prime Minister indicated that she would be glad to do this and suggested that the meeting should be restricted to two a side (she would like the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to be present) with note-takers. Miss Chibesakunda suggested that the meeting might take place on the evening of the Prime Minister’s arrival in Lusaka and the Prime Minister undertook to look into this possibility.

The Prime Minister said that Miss Chibesakunda would have noticed that the British Government were encountering one or two problems in connection with The Queen’s presence in Lusaka for the CHGM. The Government was engaged in quiet enquiries relating to The Queen’s security and concerning, in particular, the possibility of an attack on The Queen’s aircraft by ground-to-air missiles. The Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Muldoon, had called
had called on her on 11 June and had mentioned to her his concern for The Queen's safety. Mr. Muldoon had subsequently decided to share his concerns with the press. As a result of this, the Prime Minister was having to deal with a number of questions in the House of Commons and with suggestions that the conference should be moved to an alternative venue. In reply, the Prime Minister was saying that she hoped that The Queen would go to Lusaka and that The Queen's safety was a paramount consideration. The Government were thus doing everything they could to provide reassurance: but the final reassurance could only come from President Kaunda if he were to ensure that all missiles were removed from the guerrilla forces in Zambia and that no maverick fired one. The Prime Minister said that The Queen wished to go to Lusaka, that she herself wished The Queen to do so and that she, the Prime Minister, would go to Lusaka in any case. The Queen's safety, however, had to be seen to be protected and the Prime Minister was answerable to Parliament for this. She had to judge that everything possible had been done to ensure the safety of The Queen's aircraft, both on its inward and on its outward flights, although she recognised that there could be no guarantees.

Miss Chibesakunda said that she appreciated the Prime Minister's concern. The Zambian Government was aware of the problem and had done all in their power to ensure The Queen's safety. She pointed out that the incidents which had given rise to concern in the UK had all happened outside Zambian territory: she had every confidence so far as the territory under President Kaunda's control was concerned. Within Zambia's own borders, the Zambian Government could give the necessary guarantees.

Miss Chibesakunda went on to suggest that the Prime Minister might use the British Government's influence with the Rhodesian forces as well: they, too, were undisciplined and the UK should exert leverage on them. Miss Chibesakunda undertook to report the Prime Minister's remarks to President Kaunda.

Rhodesia

After handing over President Kaunda's message, Miss Chibesakunda told the Prime Minister that the President had asked her to say that he hoped the Prime Minister would keep very much in mind the fact that the Zambian and British Governments shared the same goal. Zambia needed a stable neighbour to the south. The British Government's present approach to the Rhodesia problem was, in President Kaunda's view, the surest way of opening Southern Africa to Eastern bloc influence. President Kaunda hoped that the UK would concentrate on bringing the parties together in order to discuss a cease-fire and to tackle the real causes of the present war.

/President Kaunda
President Kaunda wished the Prime Minister to know, Miss Chibesakunda said, that if any action should be taken to deprive one of the parties to the conflict of access to the UK, this would create the possibility of access to other powers, in the East. The Prime Minister asked what was meant by "access to the UK". Miss Chibesakunda said that if the Patriotic Front were to feel that the UK was reinforcing the internal arrangements in Salisbury without regard to the Patriotic Front's interests, the Patriotic Front would have to look elsewhere for support. The Prime Minister commented that Nkomo was already receiving funds from the Soviet Union, and Mugabe assistance from the Chinese. Miss Chibesakunda replied that Nkomo would have no reason to seek such help if the root causes of the war were to be removed.

The Prime Minister asked Miss Chibesakunda if Nkomo would take part in an All-Party Conference. Miss Chibesakunda replied that Nkomo would take part in a genuine attempt to reach a solution and that Mugabe would also do so, on certain conditions, such as a change in the Rhodesian constitution. Miss Chibesakunda asked whether there was any scope for a transitional period in Salisbury to allow all the parties to adjust to the new situation. The Prime Minister said that Bishop Muzorewa was now undoubtedly in charge in Salisbury. She was certainly concerned by the problems which existed between him and Mr. Sithole but the fact remained that a 64 per cent election turnout, and the high vote which the Bishop had received, could not be ignored.

Miss Chibesakunda argued that there had been no basic change in Rhodesia and that the new constitution was deficient by international standards. The Prime Minister commented that both Zambia and the UK recognised a number of states, such as Angola, Mozambique and Uganda, in which no elections had been held and whose constitutions neither Government would accept for their own people. If the last of the six principles were shown to have been satisfied, the ground for Rhodesia's illegality would have disappeared. Everybody agreed that there was now a new situation in Rhodesia.

Miss Chibesakunda said that, as Rhodesia's neighbour, Zambia did not believe that there had been a change there: the status quo still existed. Would Bishop Muzorewa be able to cope with the continuing war? The Prime Minister remarked that one feature of the war had been attacks on mission schools. Miss Chibesakunda said that the incidents involving Viscount aircraft had been regrettable but there was no evidence that the so-called terrorists had attacked mission targets; there was, on the other hand, evidence that these attacks had been carried out by the Selous Scouts, disguised in guerilla uniforms. The Patriotic Front only used terror as a last resort. The Prime Minister recalled that Nkomo had told Mr..Cledwyn Hughes, / during his mission
during his mission to Southern Africa, that the Patriotic Front could achieve what they wanted by the gun. When Miss Chibesakunda seemed disposed to question the good faith of Lord Boyd’s team of observers which had covered the elections in Rhodesia, the Prime Minister remarked that she was beginning to wonder whether she would be welcome in Lusaka and brought the conversation to an end.

I should be grateful if you would ensure that this letter is given a suitably limited distribution. I am sending a copy to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

[Signature]

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
CONFIDENTIAL


Sir John Hunt, GCB,
Cabinet Office.

Dear John,

COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: LIST OF BRIEFS.

You may remember that it was agreed in March that the FCO should coordinate arrangements until the end of May; and that we should then let you have our proposals for briefing on the basis (if possible) of the annotated agenda. This has now reached us and I enclose a copy along with a proposed list of briefs.

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2. The draft list of briefs has been prepared on the same basis as in 1977, with four categories: A - prepared statements; B - Briefs for Ministerial use at the Meeting; C - Briefs for bilateral discussions; and D - background briefs intended for the use of officials. We have tried to ensure that over-briefing and duplication are avoided. The list is still formidable. This reflects

(a) the fact that the meeting will extend over 8 days and can be expected to cover much ground;

(b) the fact that the Committee of the Whole will be sitting simultaneously and taking some subjects remitted directly to them;

(c) the expected presence of representatives of up to 39 Commonwealth countries with many of whom the Prime Minister and Secretary of State may have some bilateral discussion; and

(d) the inadequate communications facilities in Lusaka which mean that consultation with London will be more difficult than in many capitals.

3. For discussion purposes we have for the time being left the format of the Category A Section the same as in 1977.

/We

CONFIDENTIAL
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We are not yet sure whether the Prime Minister will speak during the opening session, which is traditionally reserved for five speakers: the Host, the Secretary-General and three Heads of Government who reply to the address of welcome. We understand that for Lusaka four Heads of Government may be invited to do this, and that one may be the British Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister will in any case want to make some general remarks when she first speaks. We shall need to prepare draft statements on the world political and economic scene, Southern Africa and Commonwealth Cooperation. I do not think the briefs proposed in Categories B, C and D need explanation.
We have largely followed the headings proposed by the Secretariat. Some of the briefs will be wide in scope (e.g. that on arms control and non-proliferation). We have avoided Category D briefs on subjects already covered elsewhere. Three of the briefs that will be required - "Housing, Urbanisation and the Environment" (Category B, proposed by Sri Lanka); "Resolutions of Ministers of Health" (Category B, inserted at request of Commonwealth Health Ministers); and "Current Situation in Northern Ireland" (Category D, background) - will require Cabinet Office commissioning from the appropriate Departments, with whom we have not been in touch.

4. I understand that you originally envisaged calling an early meeting of Permanent Secretaries to consider the draft list of briefs before submission to the Prime Minister.
I presume that in any case the Cabinet Office will now assume overall responsibility for coordination.

cc Sir Douglas Wass, KCB, Treasury.
Sir Leo Hieatt, KCB, Dept. of Trade.
Sir Robert Armstrong, KCB, CVO, Home Office.
Sir J. Rampton, KCB, Dept. of Energy.
Sir Patrick Nairne, KCB, MC, DESS.
Sir Peter Carey, KCB, Dept. of Industry.
B.D. Hayes, CB, MAFF.
J.I. Smith, Esq., CB, Dept. of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland.
Sir P. Cooper, KCB, CMG, MOD.
Sir Peter Preston, KCB, Overseas Development Administration.
Private Secretary, 10 Downing St.
### List of Ministerial Briefs for use at the Meeting

**Category A: Prepared Statements by the United Kingdom**

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13 June 1979

I attach a message to your Head of Government on the subject of the Agenda for the forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka in August together with four extra copies. I should be grateful if you would ensure that the original is transmitted to your Head of Government as quickly as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Encl.
In my letter of 22 March I sought views on the Agenda for the forthcoming Meeting of Heads of Government. From the many replies I have received and in the light of the further personal consultations I have been able to have I now enclose a draft Agenda for your consideration. I also attach a list of background papers which the Secretariat will shortly distribute. It remains the general wish of Governments to keep documentation to the minimum. I have therefore sought not only to reduce the number of documents but also to keep them as short as possible. Some Governments have also indicated that they are likely to submit papers.

Heads of Government have concurred that the Agenda should again, as is customary, combine broad political and economic issues with more specific topics including areas of Commonwealth co-operation. In consequence, and in the hope of promoting informality, I have consciously endeavoured to curtail the number of sub-items. Inevitably, however, it has been necessary in the field of Commonwealth co-operation to be more specific. I hope that the following comments by way of annotation of the draft Agenda will prove helpful.

1. OPENING SESSION

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President Kaunda’s address of welcome will be followed by a few speeches in reply taking in all about an hour and a quarter. Heads of Delegation will then adjourn for the formal photograph, to be followed by my pre-lunch reception at noon at the National Assembly nearby which is designed to provide an informal opportunity for you to meet representatives of the press,
of whom will be in Lusaka specially to cover the Meeting.

The ground rules for the reception include no recorders and no cameras except for the Secretariat's officially designated photographer.

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As is usual, senior officials will meet on the eve of the Meeting to discuss the Order of Agenda and related matters. Their report will be available for consideration by the Meeting at its first Executive Session.

In addition, Heads of Government may wish at the very outset to consider the suggestions which, as requested at London, I shall be putting forward separately regarding the style and format of the Meeting - suggestions designed to strengthen the tradition of informality of Heads of Government meetings.

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It is intended to embrace under this heading all relevant topics not dealt with specifically in terms of Commonwealth co-operation or proposals for such co-operation. The listing of certain sub-items is not intended to exclude discussion of other topics, some of which are noted below, that might appropriately be raised.

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It is envisaged that under this sub-item Heads of Government, as in the past, will wish to discuss from the particular point of view of their countries some of the many political changes in the world at large which have occurred in the two years since their last Meeting in London, such as the evolution of detente, shifts in the world's power structure and the changing nature of power itself, the problems of the Middle East and the prospect for the future, changes in Iran and current aspects of disarmament. In addition, Heads of Government will wish to consider developments affecting Cyprus, Belize and other areas of more direct Commonwealth concern not covered by separate sub-items.

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This heading is intended to cover not only developments in South East Asia and Indo-China but also the wider implications of China's current orientation. While such developments cannot be divorced from the world political scene, Heads of Government have welcomed the proposal to focus specially on this area. A particular problem of concern to many Commonwealth countries is that of the refugees from Vietnam.

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The uncertainties and dangers in Southern Africa
are no less pressing now than when I wrote to Heads of Government on 22 March. What the situation will be as regards Zimbabwe and Namibia at the time of the Meeting remains impossible to forecast. It is certain, however, that Commonwealth concern with developments in this area will be as intense as ever - as will be continuing antipathy to the policies of South Africa. The hope has been expressed by many Heads of Government that the Meeting itself may provide the opportunity to advance the cause of peace and stability through enduring settlements, enabling the Commonwealth to play a constructive role in relation to these major international problems.

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Heads of Government have once again indicated their wish to review the world economic situation and the developments that have taken, and are taking, place in this area including the multilateral trade negotiations, the evolution of the Common Fund, the outcome of UNCTAD V and the continuing recession. Almost all countries are feeling what could be the first tremors of a disintegrating world economic system, and there is widespread disquiet among Heads of Government over the current situation. They will almost certainly wish to address themselves to common economic problems in their global setting. It is equally evident, however, that there is a wide variety of individual preoccupations and approaches which Heads of Government wish to emphasise in the discussions. It seems prudent, therefore, not to try to compartmentalise the discussion by introducing sub-items, but to encourage a discussion which highlights the elements of major concern. Amongst the subjects which Heads of Government wish to raise are the serious balance of payments problems of many countries, inflation, the world energy situation, commodity problems, the renegotiation of the Lome Convention, 'Law of the Sea' issues, and, in one case, housing, urbanisation and the environment. A strong desire has been expressed that the discussion will generate ideas for specific Commonwealth initiatives designed to assist the progress of wider international negotiations on key economic issues.

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Although at Heads of Government Meetings the spotlight of publicity falls on those major political and economic issues with which Heads of Government are inevitably concerned, a vital element of the Commonwealth is the multitude of co-operative activities undertaken both at the official and unofficial level. In addition to reflections on ongoing activities, there will be the opportunity this year to consider important new proposals for further co-operation in the broad area of economic and social development. Before moving to the individual sub-items, however, Heads of Government may see value in exchanging thoughts on the general theme of Commonwealth co-operation and assessing its significance in wider
...terms as well as discussing its regional dimension, particularly the innovation last year of the Heads of Government Regional Meeting so successfully held in Sydney. In addition, the Government of The Gambia has raised the possibility of reviving the proposal for a Commonwealth Human Rights Commission, which was first made at the London Meeting in 1977, and the Government of Cyprus has signified its intention of proposing the establishment of a Commonwealth Film and Television Institute.

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As you will know, Ministers met in Bangalore in March of this year to consider the Report of the Team of Industrial Specialists set up following the Heads of Government Meeting in Kingston. They agreed on a Commonwealth Action Programme on Industrial Co-operation to utilise the complementary resources existing within the Commonwealth in order to accelerate the process of industrialisation in developing member countries. They also agreed that the Programme should be developed and implemented by an Industrial Development Unit to be established by the Secretariat within the CFTC. Ministers asked me to submit their conclusions to Heads of Government together with an elaboration of the structure and scope of activities of the Unit. Given the correlation between development and industrialisation, and the tangible benefits that Commonwealth co-operation can yield in this area, the blessing of Heads of Government for this new endeavour, backed by an appropriate financial commitment for the Industrial Development Unit over the next three years, could be one of the significant achievements of the Lusaka Meeting.

(b) Island Developing and Other Specially Disadvantaged Members

A number of Commonwealth meetings in the past two years have considered the particular and unique problems of the smaller members of the Commonwealth whose number has increased considerably in recent years. Senior Officials at their meeting in 1978, and Commonwealth representatives at a subsequent meeting held in London in April 1979, discussed at length a Secretariat paper which canvassed various approaches to this issue. In the light of these meetings, a revised memorandum is being put forward for consideration by Heads of Government containing proposals specifically designed to help to alleviate the problems of island developing and other specially disadvantaged countries in the field of both development and international representation. There has already been widespread acknowledgement by member Governments of the importance of the subject and of the need for the Commonwealth to give a timely lead in this matter to the international community.
(c) Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation

In the course of my visits to a large number of member countries I have been constantly impressed by the tributes paid to the assistance provided by the CFTC and its value in developmental terms. There is, however, a real risk that the future effectiveness of the Fund, which is the pre-eminent mechanism for development-oriented co-operation within the Commonwealth, could be seriously undermined in the absence of greater assurance about its long-term financial strength. I shall, therefore, be submitting to Heads of Government for their consideration proposals aimed at obtaining such a commitment at Lusaka.

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In the past, Heads of Government have affirmed their belief in the need to improve the opportunities available to Youth and some years ago established the Commonwealth Youth Programme. However, pledges to the Programme have fallen far short of the one million pounds that the Commonwealth Youth Affairs Council envisaged in 1976 as being necessary for the range of activities then agreed. The ravages of inflation have further curtailed the Programme's effectiveness and the Committee of Management have advised that unless substantial additional funds are rapidly forthcoming the Commonwealth Youth Affairs Council will have to consider severely reducing the scope of the Programme, with its attendant implications for the three Regional Youth Centres. Such an outcome will clearly be a setback to many years of effort, and Heads of Government will wish to consider how it can be avoided.

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At Kuala Lumpur last November, Senior Officials commended the work of the Commonwealth Foundation which now finds itself with insufficient resources to meet adequately its existing commitments, let alone undertake the expanded role which was the subject of discussion in Kuala Lumpur. The Chairman and Trustees will therefore be inviting Heads of Government to make it possible for the Foundation to discharge its mandate effectively, due regard also being paid to certain new areas of activity which might commend themselves to Governments.

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As indicated in my letter of 22 March the Report of the Advisory Committee on Relationships between the Official
and Unofficial Commonwealth was the subject of discussion by Senior Officials in Kuala Lumpur last November. Heads of Government may wish to pursue the matter to a conclusion by taking decisions on the recommendations that were made by the Advisory Committee.

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At their Meeting in London in 1977 Heads of Government considered the question of women and development and charged me with certain responsibilities. I shall be reporting on the work undertaken in the Secretariat and inviting Heads of Government to consider what further activities they would wish to see pursued.

5. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

This agenda item is intended to allow for consideration of the report of the Committee of the Whole on any matters, other than the draft communiqué, that may have been sent to it for preliminary consideration.

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There are one or two matters which it seems appropriate to include under this heading.

Some Heads of Government wish to raise the concept of special membership of the Commonwealth which Heads of Government agreed in 1968 could be made available to meet the special requirements at that time of Nauru and subsequently also of Tuvalu which achieved independence in 1978. This subject was discussed by the meeting of Commonwealth representatives referred to at 4(b) above. I have received an indication that the Government of Nauru would welcome the matter being considered afresh.

There are two further topics so far noted. The first relates to the wish of Commonwealth Ministers of Health at their recent meeting in Geneva to bring to the attention of Heads of Government two resolutions which they passed on health matters. The second is a similar wish expressed by Commonwealth Youth Leaders that the outcome of their meeting in Colombo should also be brought to the attention of Heads of Government.

Each Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting provides many challenges and opportunities. I hope these annotations
of the draft Agenda will encourage you to share my belief that the Commonwealth can both respond constructively to the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities that Lusaka will offer.

With deep respect,

Shridath S. Ramphal
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
LUSAKA 1-8 AUGUST 1979

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2. ORDER OF AGENDA AND FORMAT

3. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
   a) World Political Scene
   b) South East Asia
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   a) Industrial Co-operation
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   a) the Government of Cyprus on the proposed Commonwealth
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   on Alternative Sources of Energy.
14 June 1979

I am writing on the Prime Minister's behalf to thank you for your letter of 13 June, in which you set out for her an annotated draft agenda for the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Lusaka.

I am of course bringing your letter to the Prime Minister's immediate attention.

BGC

His Excellency
Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, Kt., C.M.G., Q.C.
10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

14 June 1979

CHGM, Lusaka

You have seen a copy of the Prime Minister's reply, dated 11 June, to the Commonwealth Secretary-General's letter of 22 March about the agenda for the forthcoming CHGM in Lusaka. Mr. Ramphal has now written to the Prime Minister again, setting out an annotated agenda for the meeting. I enclose a copy of his letter.

I should be grateful for early comments on Mr. Ramphal's proposals: it would be helpful to the Prime Minister to have at least a preliminary view on them before Mr. Ramphal calls on her on 18 June at 1715.

I am sending copies of this letter to Martin Hall (H.M. Treasury), John Chilcot (Home Office), Garth Waters (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Andrew Duguid (Department of Industry), Tom Harris (Department of Trade) and Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
In my letter of 22 March I sought views on the Agenda for the forthcoming Meeting of Heads of Government. From the many replies I have received and in the light of the further personal consultations I have been able to have I now enclose a draft Agenda for your consideration. I also attach a list of background papers which the Secretariat will shortly distribute. It remains the general wish of Governments to keep documentation to the minimum. I have therefore sought not only to reduce the number of documents but also to keep them as short as possible. Some Governments have also indicated that they are likely to submit papers.

Heads of Government have concurred that the Agenda should again, as is customary, combine broad political and economic issues with more specific topics including areas of Commonwealth co-operation. In consequence, and in the hope of promoting informality, I have consciously endeavoured to curtail the number of sub-items. Inevitably, however, it has been necessary in the field of Commonwealth co-operation to be more specific. I hope that the following comments by way of annotation of the draft Agenda will prove helpful.

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The Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher, M.P.  
Prime Minister of Great Britain.
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With deep respect,

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

11 June 1979

My dear Secretary, Mr. Gresh.

I am writing in reply to your letter of 22 March about the agenda for the 1979 Heads of Government Meeting.

I note that you suggest keeping the customary pattern for the meeting, thus enabling us to discuss both global political and economic issues and also specific topics, including Commonwealth functional co-operation. In adopting this approach, however, I believe it will be important for us to discipline ourselves in the amount of time we spend on any one particular subject.

Economic matters will be of great concern to us all, and I expect there will be a general discussion and a review of the global economic situation and prospects. We shall want to consider the state of the relationship between the developed and developing countries. But I believe that the most useful approach would be for Heads of Government to aim to transcend artificial divisions such as "North/South", and to address ourselves to common economic problems in a global setting, rather than to repeat the detailed discussion of specific questions, such as the Common Fund or IMF conditionality, which will recently have taken place at UNCTAD and elsewhere.

Under the economic heading we may wish to exchange views briefly about the new Lomé Convention; Heads of Government will wish to consider the proposals put forward at the Bangalore Conference with a view to deciding whether and how to put them into effect.

/With regard
With regard to relationships between the official and unofficial Commonwealth, I hope that Heads of Government will have time to focus again on the very valuable work of the Commonwealth Foundation, and that member states will be encouraged to fulfil, or even increase, their contributions.

I am glad that you intend to make greater use of restricted sessions at the Conference. I also hope that we shall all be able to do without lengthy prepared statements which detract from the "informality and purposefulness" which, as you mention, Heads of Government are concerned to retain.

I look forward to discussing these matters further with you when we meet on 18 June.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency Mr. Shridath S. Ramphal, Kt, CMG, QC.
8th June, 1979.

My Dear Prime Minister,

May I again congratulate you on your deserved assumption to the high office of Prime Minister of Great Britain. As I said in my earlier note, I look forward to meeting you at the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference here in Lusaka and offer my congratulations in person.

I cannot over-emphasize the importance of your country to Zambia. Britain is one of Zambia's biggest trading and development partners. And in terms of the calculable practical demands of everyday life, the Zambian people have more ties with the people of Britain than with any other people in the world. This tradition of close relations is and must continue to be of benefit to both of us. It is the buttress of our mutual cooperation.

I thought I should write you early and somewhat at length on Rhodesia which, as you know, for Zambia is a problem of the highest priority. In this connection I thank you for sending Mr. Patrick Cosgrave for a quiet exchange of views on this matter. I hope by now you have had the opportunity to hear his report of the meeting I had with him.

Rhodesia - the thorny rebellion by Ian Smith against the British Crown - is clearly the only problem that has forcibly come to divide Zambia and Britain sharply and one that has continually soured our otherwise very warm fellowship.
I am therefore writing to put to you my candid view of the rule that has now been set up in Rhodesia by the rebel leader Ian Smith as a further twist to the thirteen-year constitutional crisis in that rebel territory. This new phase marks the point at which you are directly entering the crisis of the Rhodesian rebellion as Prime Minister of Great Britain.

I will confine myself to this current situation. But in doing so, I am assuming that you already understand Zambia's involvement, contribution and firm stand on the Liberation Struggle in Rhodesia from its beginning to this day. This position remains unchanged. And it is with this background that I am looking at the new development in Rhodesia.

As you are aware, the events that have been taking place inside Rhodesia have culminated into the conversion of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and into the formation of a coalition government by Bishop Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa and rebel leader Ian Douglas Smith - the Muzorewa/Smith rule.

As you equally know, this process inside Rhodesia leading to the formation of the Muzorewa/Smith rule followed a path separate from and opposed to the path of the process that was preferred and promoted by the international community and acknowledged by the fighting Liberation Movement of Zimbabwe.

Whatever its negative and positive aspects, the Muzorewa/Smith political framework for Rhodesia is a creation that lies outside and is contrary to the intentions of the fighting Liberation Movement and the intentions of the international community as clearly expressed in the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other progressive forums around the world as well as in the long liberation struggle and war by the people of Rhodesia.

In this respect the Muzorewa/Smith rule, as a solution for the Rhodesian crisis, is an imposition upon the fighting Liberation Movement and the international community in the same manner that the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in 1965 was an imposition.

To all intents and purposes, the Muzorewa/Smith rule is a direct extension and growth of the original UDI. It is not a break from UDI. It is Smith's own response - damning response - to the Rhodesian and international attitude towards the abominous political conditions foisted by his UDI and rebellion on Rhodesia.
Smith has not broken his stand. He has not broken his rebellion. He has merely reorganised and reconstituted his set-up in order to survive the new Rhodesian, African and international political environments forced upon the territory by the armed liberation struggle against him in the colony.

As a result of this new development, two crucial questions, calling for answers, have arisen and are actively exercising everyone's mind. These are:-

(a) notwithstanding its negative and positive aspects, is the Muzorewa/Smith rule the right formula for Rhodesia - right in the sense that it is the kind of rule that the fighting Liberation Movement of Zimbabwe and the international community have considered and accepted as the final solution? The answer obviously to this question is a Big No.

(b) regardless of the negative reply to (a) above, is the Muzorewa/Smith rule a formula that has the capacity to end the war and to settle the Rhodesian crisis once and for all? The answer to this question is also a big no.

It is my considered view that no person who has closely followed, lived with and has been fully involved with the drama of the Rhodesian rebellion over the past thirteen years can candidly answer the above two questions differently.

The truth of the matter is that rather than being a solution, the new Muzorewa/Smith rule is a further strategy for more war in Rhodesia. By this strategy the white rebel leader has made it possible for a black and equally rebel leader in the context of the fighting Liberation Movement, to lead politically the white side against the black side in the Liberation War. Smith has merely succeeded in indigenising the rebellion in his determination to carry on and have his own political way. He has barricaded his institutionalised white rebellion with a body of political blacks.
My perception of the present new turn of events and the manoeuvring by Smith in Rhodesia (and this is crystal clear in my own mind) is that the Western world, if it swallows the Muzorewa/Smith bait, hook, line and sinker, will now be effectively tricked into taking a dangerous position which will damage not only the destiny of Zimbabwe but damage materially the vital interests of the West in Southern Africa. That damage could well tilt the political attitude of the entire African continent against Western sentiment for a long time, especially for the decisive near future.

As I see it, while the Muzorewa/Smith strategy may provide the apparently tired West with the excuse to walk away from the Rhodesian crisis, that same strategy is the device that will have the West running back in panic when the whole of Southern Africa will burst into flames. The difference between now and that time will be that the West will have permanently lost a great deal in material interests; and will have lost almost completely the edge of advantage it now has to solve the remaining three problems in Southern Africa largely by negotiation. The West's insensibility and lack of foresight will have plunged the region into an ideological war as finally the only option to rub out entrenched racism.

As I see it, the Muzorewa/Smith rule

(a) neither covers the whole area of the constitutional crisis in Rhodesia nor does it exhaust the crisis.

(b) cannot and will not end the Liberation war. It does not have the ideological capacity to do so.

(c) will on the contrary escalate the war and more Rhodesians will die and are already dying each day than before the so-called election to impose this new rule.

(d) will not, despite the entrenched clauses and the special political barricade of political blacks, retain the whites in Rhodesia. The whites will run away and lose their property. Nothing will protect them. Many will die.
(e) will cause a quick transformation of the war from firstly, a mere liberation struggle to a white-inspired black civil war which will as quickly transform into a purist ideological conflict.

(f) will commit the West in Rhodesia on the wrong side of liberation and force the West to fight from this negative approach not only in Rhodesia but also in Namibia and South Africa and be seen generally by Africa to take a negative political line towards the broader aspirations of the continent.

(g) will commit firmly the black liberation forces in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa to the East to whom the fighters will be ever grateful for military assistance.

(h) the Muzorewa/Smith framework has drawn to itself some characteristics of the solution being sought for to make it look like that solution. But in truth and reality it is far from that solution. It is an artful resemblance. The rebellion and the war in Rhodesia cannot and will not be ended by deceptive resemblances. A straight, clear-cut and hard solution is called for and it is upon this that legality peace and stability can be restored to Rhodesia.

While the West has not participated in the military support of the armed struggle in Rhodesia, it has nevertheless participated noticeably in finding a just and fair negotiated settlement. Significant steps have been taken towards such a settlement.

As things now stand, the Muzorewa/Smith rule is a desperate attempt by Ian Smith to stand in the way of this fair and just negotiated solution. It would be both unfair, misguided and totally wrong to ask (a) the international community, (b) Africa, (c) Frontline States and (d) the fighting Liberation Movement of Rhodesia to trade all their past and present efforts and sacrifices in return only for the Muzorewa/Smith rule which is an incomplete process and one clearly without the capacity to end the crisis and bring peace and stability to the territory.
May I, indeed, say that it is not possible for me to see the Rhodesian crisis as a person from the West would see it. I only see the Rhodesian crisis as an African, as a member of the Frontline States, as a person who has been involved in it from its beginning, as a leader who has given the crisis the highest priority and one whose country and people have suffered tremendous sacrifices in search of a fair and just solution by supporting firmly negotiation, struggle and war.

But however, if I were for one moment to look at the Muzorewa/Smith rule not as I am, but from the side of the West and therefore attach some kind of value to it, the highest positive value I would give to this rule is that it is one reality though unfortunate among many and more valuable realities in the current transitional process of Rhodesia from a rebellious colony to a free and independent state.

In this context, I would say the new Muzorewa/Smith rule is a reality, just like the UDI itself, that has to be taken into account with the other more constructive realities in the honest and impartial search for the solution to the crisis.

But in whatever positive way one looks at it, the Muzorewa/Smith rule does not and cannot constitute the complete and final solution that the blacks of Rhodesia seek to find and one for which thousands have been and continue to be killed, maimed and to suffer horrors. The Muzorewa/Smith rule is not the finality of the desired settlement. For anyone person to allow oneself even to appear to see this rule as a finality is to open oneself to dangerous reckless political cheating.

No one can cheat the people of Zimbabwe into independence. No genuine independence, peace and stability will be brought to Rhodesia by a trick no matter how clever such a deception might be conceived and carried out.

In my view the new Government of the United Kingdom should do the one thing which only that Government alone can do at this point in the Rhodesian constitutional crisis:

(a) resolve to act to give Rhodesia speedily a broad-based and lasting solution.
(b) in preference for this broad-based and lasting solution, firmly withhold recognition of the Muzorewa/Smith rule as a finality in the settlement of the Rhodesian crisis and hold equally firmly to the existing order of sanctions imposed upon the rebellion by the free will of international community.

(c) accept the Muzorewa/Smith rule as only one of the many conflicting realities and centres of power in the crucial transition of the territory of Rhodesia from a colony in rebellion to a free and united independent state in the African and world community.

(d) endorse the true fact that the Muzorewa/Smith rule taken alone and in isolation is not and can never be a rising centre of power but a fading centre of power in the broad process of the political evolution of Rhodesia.

(e) announce publicly a clear policy position on Rhodesia declaring the Muzorewa/Smith rule as only one of many conflicting features which characterise the transition of the territory and call upon the elements of the leadership inside and the elements of the leadership outside Rhodesia to an all party conference to reach a finality in the settlement of the crisis.

If the new Administration in Britain pronounced itself clearly and firmly on the above, it would immediately give the correct political standing and direction to the new Muzorewa/Smith rule. This approach would promote the forward movement to a fair, just and broad-based independence incorporating the participation of all the significant elements of the leadership of political life in Rhodesia and move the whole country towards a political process and rule that would be genuinely and freely acceptable to Rhodesians and the international community.
As I see it, the new Government in Britain must act correctly in Rhodesia and avoid taking a narrow and precipitous course which will destroy the forward movement to a broad-based and lasting solution which is already in sight and obviously within reach.

In generating and maintaining the forward movement to an all party conference leading to the establishment of an all party political framework and election for Zimbabwe, the new British Government should seek the vigorous assistance of all those able and willing to help to end this crisis. The Government should avoid blurring the clarity of its vision by isolating and over-emphasizing the individual centres of power in the current crisis of the transition.

All significant centres of power in Rhodesia must have access to the confidence of the British Government as the co-ordinator of the decolonisation. Britain must not overplay the Muzorewa/Smith set-up inside Rhodesia vis-a-vis the Patriotic Front of the fighting Liberation Movement. Taking into account all things, the logic of political change has it that the fighting Liberation Movement is certainly the rising or expanding centre of power in the evolution of Rhodesia. It is futile to attempt to neutralise it. The positive effort must be directed to harnessing and giving this centre of power full and effective play in a broad and firmly-controlled process of change.

While Zambia's position is abundantly clear and her firm support for the Liberation Movement remains completely unchanged, I have written to you to show in my view what action and how that action can be accepted and acted upon by Britain as the colonial authority in order to reach a broader finality in the settlement of the Rhodesian constitutional crisis as from this moment in time.

Britain has an inescapable duty to God, humanity and the people of Rhodesia to see this problem settled correctly once and for all. The problem of Rhodesia has for a long time now been ripe for solution but only for the will and resolution of Britain to act correctly and decisively.

/...
As always, Zambia stands ready to do everything in her power to support and contribute to any honest and correct resolve to bring to an end the rebellion and tragic situation in Rhodesia and give the territory a broad-based settlement that can end the war and upon which can be built peace and stability. Zambia needs a free, independent, peaceful and viable Zimbabwe.

I have instructed my High Commissioner in London to remain ready to consult with you on the spot and render any help you may require of her in promoting a broad-based settlement for Rhodesia as quickly as possible.

I send you, Your Excellency, kindest regards and personal best wishes.

God bless.

Yours sincerely,

Kenneth-David Kaunda

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
Prime Minister

I have amended this draft to take account of your comments. You have agreed to see Mr. Bamshad on 18 June.

Yours,

My dear Secretary-General
CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE ZAMBIAN MINISTER OF EDUCATION
AT NO. 10 ON 4 JUNE 1979

As you know, the Zambian Minister of Education, Dr. Goma, called on the Prime Minister at 1115 this morning in order to hand over a message from President Kaunda. President Kaunda's message, of which I enclose a copy, was simply his formal invitation to the Prime Minister to attend the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka. Dr. Goma also conveyed to the Prime Minister President Kaunda's greetings. The Prime Minister commented that both she and the President were people who spoke frankly and Dr. Goma agreed that it was helpful if whatever steps a government might take were seen to result from a clearly-defined position. The Prime Minister promised to send a formal reply to President Kaunda's invitation in due course. Dr. Goma said that the President had, of course, assumed that Mrs. Thatcher would come to Lusaka, although they had received no definite word to this effect. The Prime Minister said that she, for her part, had assumed that she would be invited - she hoped and expected to be there. Dr. Goma told the Prime Minister that President Kaunda looked forward to a bilateral meeting at which he and the Prime Minister could discuss matters other than CHGM business. The Prime Minister readily agreed to this:

The Prime Minister told Dr. Goma that she had never been to Zambia before and hoped that she would be able to see something of the country while she was there. Dr. Goma said that the Zambian Government were thinking in terms of a possible visit to a game park or to Livingstone, in order to see the Victoria Falls.

I am sending a copy of this letter, and enclosure, to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

B. G. CARTLEDGE

J.S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Emissary from President Kaunda

The Zambian High Commission informed us this afternoon that Professor Goma, Minister of Education, would arrive in London tomorrow, Saturday 2 June, as a personal emissary of President Kaunda to convey a message to the Prime Minister. He will stay in London until Monday evening and I understand that the Prime Minister is prepared to see him at 11.15 on Monday, 4 June.

The Zambian High Commission have no details of the substance of President Kaunda's message, but we can think of no subject of sufficient importance to the Zambians at present to justify the sending of a special emissary, except Rhodesia.

I enclose a brief for the Prime Minister's use. The points to make are based on the assumption that the emissary will bring a message about Rhodesia. However, the "essential facts" include a paragraph about the Zambian decision to prosecute their case against the British oil companies which was announced this week.

I enclose a personality note on Professor Goma and an extract from Lusaka telno 318, giving the Zambian Foreign Minister's views on Rhodesia as expressed to Mr Luce.

J S Wall
Private Secretary

Bryan Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street
POINTS TO MAKE.

1. Express appreciation of the fact that Professor Goma has come specially to London to deliver message personally.

2. Will consider message most carefully. Professor Goma will understand if no detailed comments on its substance at this stage.

3. [If the message deals with Rhodesia] Professor Goma will know **HMG's policy is** to return Rhodesia to legality with widest possible international acceptance.

4. Therefore early consultations with Front Line Presidents - Lord Harlech leaving about 11 June, in Lusaka about mid-June; we will propose specific dates to Zambians very soon. Genuine exchanges on the way forward - not merely presentational exercise.

5. Recognise problems caused for Zambia by Rhodesian conflict - a major aim to bring peace to Rhodesia and surrounding states.

6. [Defensive] We intend to have consultations with the Patriotic Front leaders.

7. Hope that the Zambians will help us in finding a way forward - we need their co-operation.

8. Look forward to constructive discussion on Rhodesia at Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.
ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. Of all the Front Line Presidents, President Kaunda is the most sensitive over Rhodesia. Zambia has borne the brunt of UDI economically; the Zambian and Rhodesian economies were interdependent, and sanctions have hit Zambia severely. The re-opening of Zambia’s southern rail route through Rhodesia to South African ports for essential supplies last year has left Zambia a hostage to the Rhodesians. Zambia also acts as "host" to some 15-20,000 ZAPU guerrilla followers of Mr Nkomo, whose presence is unwelcome to many Zambians, not least because of the Rhodesian attacks on ZAPU bases.

2. President Kaunda recognises the urgent need for a Rhodesian settlement. But he has a long-standing personal commitment to Mr Nkomo. There is also a history of animosity between the President and Bishop Muzorewa. With his deeply held principles but emotional temperament, it is difficult for President Kaunda to adopt a pragmatic approach towards the Rhodesian problem and he is clearly suspicious of British intentions.

Oil supplies to Rhodesia

3. In a speech to the OAU Sanctions Committee on 29 May, President Kaunda announced that he would prosecute vigorously the Zambian Government's legal proceedings against British oil companies for supplying oil to Rhodesia in breach of UN sanctions (commenced in 1977 but not actively pursued recently). He also called upon /African
African states to develop a "sanctions bomb" to be used against countries and organisations which had deliberately broken sanctions against Rhodesia.
22. COMA, LAMECK K H (DR)

Minister of Education and nominated MP.

Born 1930, Landazi, Eastern Province. Studied at Lubwa Mission, Munali Secondary School, Fort Hare University College (South Africa), Cambridge and London Universities. Holds BSc (Rhodes) MA (Cantab) and PhD (London).


Hard working and dedicated to the University he has fought financial and other pressures in order to maintain high academic standards. Gained respect for his handling of student confrontation with Government in 1971 but was criticised by staff for the low profile he adopted during student unrest in 1976. Quiet, rather shy with a good sense of humour. An adequate administrator he regrets having to abandon his own field of research. Became Minister at a time when education is under major review. By inclination he would probably oppose the egalitarian and non-academic emphasis of the original discussion paper but he is not a strong man and probably carries little weight in Cabinet.

His wife is from Sierra Leone and in addition to managing their farm she lectures at the National Resources Development College.
CONFIDENTIAL
LUSAKA 25/MAY 79
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 318 OF 25 MAY
INFO MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, LUANDA, LAGOS, ADDIS ABABA,
CAPE TOWN, MIRIMBA SALISBURY, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA,
UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): MR LUCE’S VISIT TO LUSAKA - RHODESIA

1. BEFORE SPEAKING ABOUT NAMIBIA (MIPT), MR LUCE TOLD THE ZAMBIA
FOREIGN MINISTER THAT IF HE WISHED TO DISCUSS RHODESIA, MR LUCE
WOULD BE VERY READY TO HEAR WHAT HE HAD TO SAY, TO TAKE NOTE AND
TO INFORM YOU. MR CHAKULYA ACCORDINGLY SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT
RHODESIA AFTER A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE ON NAMIBIA. HE CALLED ON
HIS NOT TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF THE RHODESIAN ELECTIONS. ZAMBIA
HAD BEEN SHOCKED AT THE HANDLING OF RHODESIA BY SUCCESSIVE BRITISH
GOVERNMENTS. ACCORDING TO BRITISH STANDARDS, REBELS SHOULD BE
TREATED LIKE REBELS. ZAMBIA’S MULTI-RACIAL SOCIETY HAD BEEN
THREATENED BY RHODESIAN DEVELOPMENTS, AND ZAMBIA HAD SUFFERED
KILLINGS AND EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. THEY HAD BEEN AMAZED AT PREDICTIONS
BY CONSERVATIVE PARTY SPOKESMEN IN OPPOSITION TO RECOGNISE THOSE
IN RHODESIA RESPONSIBLE FOR MURDER AND MUGGLE. THERE HAD BEEN
IN RHODESIA RESPONSIBLE FOR MURDER AND PILLAGE. THERE HAD BEEN
OBVIOUS FLAWS IN THE ELECTIONS: NO REGISTRATION, NO VOTING CARDS
OR ASSIGNMENT TO CONSTITUENCIES. MANY NON-RHODESIANS HAD VOTED.
THE BISHOP WAS A POLITICAL NEWCOMER WHO HAD CLIMBED ON THE BAND
VAGON. WHY HAD THE COUNTRIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ANGLO/AMERICAN
PROPOSALS NOW THROWN THEM AWAY? IT WAS WRONG TO ACCUSE ZAMBIA OF
SUPPORTING NKOMO. ZAMBIA SUPPORTED DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT OF THE
RHODESIAN PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN LEADERS. MUZOREWA WAS A
BLACK SMITH. THE OBJECT OF THE RHODESIAN RAIDS WAS TO INTERNATION-
ALISE THE PROBLEM AND JUSTIFY SOUTH AFRICAN AND ULTIMATELY BRITISH
AND AMERICAN INTERVENTION AGAINST COMMUNISM. WHY WOULD HMG NOT
BRING EVERYBODY ROUND XCE CONFERENCE TABLE TO DISCUSS A SETTLEMENT?
BRITAIN SHOULD TELL THE SOUTH AFRICANS NOT TO INTERFERE, INSTEAD
OF WORRIED ABOUT SOVIET INFLUENCE. ZAMBIA BELIEVED VERY STRONGLY
IN THE COMMONWEALTH, TO WHICH IT BELONGED BY FREE CHOICE. BUT IF
IT WAS NECESSARY TO LEAVE IT THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THAT DECISION.
MEANWHILE THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY THEIR PART IN STRENGTHENING
IT. SIMILARLY THEY WANTED TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE
UK, WITH WHICH THEY HAD MUCH IN COMMON: SO THEY HOPED THAT
DEVELOPMENTS WOULD NOT LEAD TO A BREACH OF RELATIONS. EACH
COUNTRY HAD STRONG DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND COOPERATED IN MANY
WAYS. KASANDA (PERMANENT SECRETARY, MFA) ASKED ABOUT THE
STATIONING OF A BRITISH DIPLOMAT IN SALISBURY.
31 May 1979

CHGM, Lusaka

In preparing the briefs for the Prime Minister on the security situation in Lusaka, which were discussed at your meeting yesterday, you will wish to bear in mind that the Prime Minister is also concerned by the Soviet intelligence presence in Zambia and by the possible impact of this on the CHGM. She has in mind not only the obvious eavesdropping threat but also the possibility that the KGB might mount some provocative action designed to disrupt the proceedings or bring harm to the participants in it.

I should be grateful if this aspect, including details of what we know of the KGB/GRU presence in Lusaka, could be covered in a separate note annexed to your main brief.

BGC

Sir John Hunt, G.C.B.

SECRET
The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Rampal, wrote to Heads of Government on 22 March setting out suggestions for the Agenda at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHGM) to be held in Lusaka from 1 - 8 August. He asked for replies by the end of April. Mr Callaghan sent an interim reply on 16 April.

I now attach a draft reply from the Prime Minister, on which we have consulted other Departments.

Discussion at Heads of Government Meetings has traditionally been under broad "global" political and economic headings. According to his letter, Mr Rampal seems to intend that the usual pattern should be followed. He is moreover aware that non-African Commonwealth Heads of Government will not wish to spend a disproportionate amount of time discussing Southern Africa, although they no doubt recognise that, not least because of the venue, Southern Africa is bound, as Mr Rampal puts it, to "occupy a high place" in the Agenda.

Mr Rampal has also outlined areas for discussion in the economic field as well as in areas of Commonwealth cooperative action, to follow up, for example, the Ministerial meeting on industrial cooperation held in Bangalore in March, and the discussion of how the Commonwealth might help its smallest members, which has taken place so far at official level.

The draft reply is largely self-explanatory. It emphasises the hope that Heads of Government will be able to discuss economic problems in a global setting rather than risk repeating sterile and possibly acrimonious discussion of detailed questions, such as the Common Fund. To this end the Treasury have in mind the possibility of advising the Prime Minister to circulate an economic paper before the meeting. But this could not be finalised until much nearer August (to take account of whatever emerges from the Tokyo Summit and also perhaps UNCTAD); and it is difficult at this stage to offer firm advice as to whether or not it would be useful to put in a paper.

We have suggested including a reference to the report of the Advisory Committee on relationships between the official and unofficial Commonwealth, if only to encourage discussion of the Commonwealth Foundation and its need for continuing support from member countries.

B G Cartledge Esq
10 Downing Street

/Prime Minister
The Prime Minister may wish to welcome Mr Ramphal’s reference to the possibility of more restricted sessions (attended only by Heads of Government and himself) which make for franker and more informal discussions. It might also be useful to express the hope that the meeting can avoid lengthy prepared speeches. It is obviously desirable to encourage as intimate and informal a meeting as possible (while recognising the limitations when there may be as many as 38 or 39 Heads of Government around the table).

The Prime Minister may wish - perhaps a little later - to invite Mr Ramphal to call for an informal discussion of the Meeting and the Agenda. Mr Ramphal is keen to call on the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary and the Secretaries of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Industry and Trade; and also to Martin Vile in the Cabinet Office.

(J S Wall)
I am writing in reply to your letter of 22 March about the agenda for the 1979 Heads of Government Meeting.

I am glad that you suggest keeping the customary pattern for the meeting, thus enabling us to discuss both global political and economic issues and also specific topics, including Commonwealth functional cooperation. In adopting this approach, however, I believe it will be important for us to discipline ourselves in the amount of time we spend on any one particular subject, remembering that with almost forty countries present no one area of the world will be of overriding interest to everybody. Moreover, I hope we can take the "global" political and economic subjects under single broad headings, as was the case in London and Kingston. I accept that (not least because of the venue) Southern Africa will be a major area for discussion.

Economic matters will be of great concern to us all, and I should welcome a general discussion on the basis, customary, of a review of the global economic situation and prospects. We shall want to take stock of the state of the North-South Dialogue. But I believe that the most useful approach would be for Heads of Government to aim to transcend artificial divisions such as "North/South", and to address ourselves to common economic problems in a global setting, rather than to repeat the detailed discussion of specific...
questions, such as the Common Fund or IMF conditionality, which will recently have taken place at UNCTAD and elsewhere.

Under the economic heading we may wish to exchange views briefly about the new Lome Convention; and I agree with you that the recent Ministerial conference at Bangalore was successful and that the Heads of Government will wish to consider the proposals put forward, with a view to deciding whether and how to put them into effect.

With regard to relationships between the official and unofficial Commonwealth, I hope that Heads of Government will have time to focus again on the very valuable work of the Commonwealth Foundation, and that member states will be encouraged to fulfill, or even increase, their contributions.

I am glad that you intend to make greater use of restricted sessions at the Conference. I also hope that we shall all be able to do without lengthy prepared statements which detract from the "informality and purposefulness" which, as you mention, Heads of Government are concerned to retain.

I greatly look forward to the Meeting and to meeting you personally before long.

Farewell with you when we met on 18 June.

Pyth

23 May 1979
Arrangements are well in hand for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka which, as I informed you in my message of 11 January, will be held from 1 to 8 August this year. I am now writing to seek your views on the subjects which you would like to see discussed at the Meeting and to submit for consideration some preliminary ideas.

The consultations I have had with Heads of Government so far and the views of others as reflected at the Senior Officials Meeting in Kuala Lumpur indicate that the Agenda should retain its customary pattern of a combination of global political and economic issues and specific topics, including Commonwealth functional co-operation.

In the two years since Commonwealth Heads of Government last met in London we have witnessed changes in the political field of worldwide significance and the initiation of other processes not yet complete. Perhaps by the time of the Meeting it will be possible to record a satisfactory outcome in certain of these areas. If the political scene has shown signs of change the same can hardly be claimed of the world economic scene. Despite the multitude of meetings that have taken place in a variety of international forums and at different levels since the middle of 1977 it is not possible to record much progress in the vital task of improving the lot of the world’s poor.

In considering those matters of particular concern to the Commonwealth, Heads of Government will undoubtedly wish to do so in the wider context of their global setting. The

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P.
Prime Minister of Great Britain
10 Downing Street
London
SW1
developments that have occurred in South East Asia and the greater activity and new orientation of China in its external relations will be of interest not only to Commonwealth members in Asia and the Pacific but more generally. Similarly the efforts that have been made and are still being made to bring peace to the Middle East, although not directly involving any Commonwealth member, are of significance for the world at large. The reverberations of the change of regime in Iran have not only a political but also an economic impact of considerable significance.

On subjects of special Commonwealth interest developments in Southern Africa will inevitably and rightly occupy a high place in the Agenda. Lusaka will be the first occasion on which Commonwealth Heads of Government have held one of their regular Meetings on the continent of Africa and Zambia has been one of the leaders in the liberation struggle. As I write there are so many uncertainties and imponderables that no-one can forecast what the situation in either Zimbabwe or Namibia will be by the time the Meeting takes place. We can be certain, however, that whatever developments may ensue there will surely be both scope and need for continuing Commonwealth concern with and assistance in the area.

The Meeting will also provide an opportunity to review developments in Cyprus and the work of the Ministerial Committee on Belize established at the London Meeting.

In the economic sphere, Heads of Government will wish, as is customary, to review the world economic situation and prospects in the light of the continuing dialogue on restructuring international economic relations. The MTNs, the Common Fund Negotiating Conference and UNCTAD V would have ended and their outcome would undoubtedly be major points of reference for the discussions in Lusaka. Of interest to many will also be the progress made in the negotiation of a new Lome Convention. The Meeting will provide an opportunity to evaluate developments and to consider how the Commonwealth, building on recent achievements, can make a purposeful contribution to progress in important areas of the "North/South" dialogue. The Commonwealth has, for example, an important stake in international commodity trade and with the Common Fund negotiations hopefully concluded, there may be interest in other aspects of commodity trade and production - progress in the establishment of International Commodity Agreements and the expansion of processing in the raw material producing countries.

In the area of international finance, the restrictive conditionality measures of the IMF have posed major constraints on the use of IMF resources by many Commonwealth countries which have found themselves in serious balance of payments
difficulties. I wonder whether you would see value in a frank discussion of this issue?

In the specifically Commonwealth field, we have just witnessed a very successful Ministerial Meeting on Industrial Cooperation. Ministers saw immense value in launching an action-oriented Commonwealth programme designed to accelerate industrialisation and agreed that an Industrial Development Unit with catalytic functions should be established within the Secretariat for this purpose. They also requested me to establish a Working Group to investigate further all relevant issues related to the creation of a Commonwealth Venture/Capital Company or alternative arrangements to meet identified needs for equity capital. In the light of their discussions at Kingston and London, Heads of Government will, I am sure, wish to consider arrangements to put these decisions into effect, including the provisions of the additional resources identified as being needed over a three-year period for the Industrial Development Unit.

Another area in which the Commonwealth may be able to make a contribution relates to the special problems faced by very small states. As you will probably be aware, a meeting of Commonwealth officials to consider this subject is to be held in London in the second half of April and the results of that meeting will be submitted for consideration by Heads of Government in Lusaka. It is my hope that through practical measures of assistance we can find ways of responding to the particular problems of our smallest member countries.

The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation continues to be the prime agency for functional cooperation within the Commonwealth. It is at the heart of an ever-widening range of joint Commonwealth assistance programmes and also provides an instrument for corporate action at the direction of Commonwealth leadership as a whole—such as the Commonwealth programmes of assistance in Southern Africa. Such practical manifestations of the Commonwealth's solidarity on major global issues, and its capacity to contribute in a meaningful way to the development efforts of its member countries, has been of immense and enlarging value. It is my hope that Heads of Government will wish to consider the measures necessary to strengthen this unique instrument for mutually beneficial cooperation.

The Commonwealth Youth Programme is another manifestation of such cooperative effort. Given the importance which Heads of Government have attached to work in the youth field, it would be helpful to have a discussion on the objectives and resources of the Programme in the light of its present financial constraints.
SECRET

At their London Meeting, Heads of Government asked me to establish an Advisory Committee on relationships between the official and unofficial Commonwealth. There was some preliminary discussion of the Committee's Report at the Commonwealth Senior Officials Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November last but final decisions on the recommendations have yet to be taken.

The foregoing are, of course, my own thoughts although they may well reflect views of those Heads of Government with whom I have had the privilege of discussion in recent months. I should be glad to have your views on the shape of the Agenda together with any suggestions you may have for specific topics for discussion. It would be useful if you could also let me know whether you plan to submit any papers to the Meeting. The Secretariat will be preparing a number but it is my hope to keep these to the minimum in both quantity and length.

In London in June 1977, in closed session, Heads of Government discussed the style and format of their future meetings with a view to enhancing their informality and purposefulness. A number of suggestions were made, and I was asked to pursue the matter further and put forward recommendations. Following my discussion of this issue with Commonwealth Senior Officials at Kuala Lumpur, I am in the process of consulting as many Heads of Government as I can and will submit specific proposals for your consideration nearer the time of the Meeting. It is already clear, however, that there is a general wish for more restricted sessions than in the past, and in formulating your thoughts on the Agenda you might perhaps wish to bear this in mind for the opportunities it will present.

I am aiming to prepare and circulate an annotated draft agenda for your consideration by the end of May and I should therefore welcome replies by the end of April.

With deep respect,

[Signature]

SECRET
State House
Lusaka, Republic of Zambia

18th May, 1979.

Dear Prime Minister,

Once again, the Commonwealth Heads of Government will be meeting to consider important regional and world matters in an atmosphere of informality and frankness. I believe that their deliberations as representatives of free and equal nations will, as in the past, be a source of inspiration to the rest of the world.

We in Zambia, feel greatly honoured that we will be hosting this important Meeting in Lusaka from 1st to 8th August, 1979. We strongly believe and have great faith in the principles which guide this unique Community of free and equal member States. We also believe in unity in diversity which characterises the Commonwealth and the important role this has played in world affairs.

Madam Prime Minister, it is within this context that I am personally extending a warm welcome to you and look forward to your presence during the forthcoming Meeting of Heads of Government in Lusaka.

I look forward to sharing views with you, not only on general world affairs, but also on those that will consolidate and enhance the very good relations that already exist between our two countries.

With fraternal wishes and God’s blessings.

[Signature]

Kemeth D. Kaunda
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
LONDON.
Filmed at the National Archives (TNA) in London
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