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
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5-11-14

Begins: 4/7/84.

Ends: 11/7/84.



PO -CH /NL/ ~~AKA~~



~~0883~~

PART A

Chancellor's (Lawson) Papers:

EXTENDING POWER STATION  
ENDURANCE

~~AKA~~  
~~0883~~

PO -CH

PART A

DD's: 25 years

*Phillips*

25/10/95.



~~AR~~  
SECRET AND PERSONAL

4/7/84  
Mr. Levitz  
Ps/Clare. of Gr.

P.01332

MR TURNBULL

Extending power station endurance

I was asked to arrange for my Official Group on Coal (MISC 57) to examine "the possibility of moving coal stocks from pits to power stations during the course of the dispute without losing the production being secured and without provoking retaliatory action elsewhere". This report is now attached. The conclusions and recommendations are summarised in paragraph 6.1.

2. The report explains that although there are substantial coal stocks held by the NCB at pitheads and opencast sites there are some physical and logistical constraints on the extent to which they can be used and on the rate of delivery. There are also risks, assessed in paragraphs 5.1 to 5.3 of the report, to existing deliveries of coal and oil, and potentially major problems of public order discussed in paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5. The industrial relations risks and public order problems would however be less if the operation was confined to movement from those pits and opencast sites which are working to the major coal fired power stations outside the strike bound areas.

3. It is therefore recommended (paragraph 6.1(vii)) that the best way of extending power station endurance is to concentrate on increasing deliveries from working NCB sites to power stations outside the strike bound areas with the objective of raising weekly deliveries by some 100-150,000 tonnes above the current average level of 420,000 tonnes. An extra 150,000 tonnes a week would extend endurance on current assumptions from mid-January to early March 1985.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



M. Lewis  
12/10/87

ENERGY

'84, '85, '86, '87, ~~88~~



~~SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

4. If the Prime Minister and other Ministers are content that action should proceed on these lines, which is a confirmation and development of action already being planned and pursued experimentally by the NCB and CEGB, it would be helpful to know this as quickly as possible.

5. I am sending copies of this minute and the attached report to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretaries of State for Energy, Defence, Scotland, Trade and Industry, Employment and Transport and Sir Robert Armstrong with the request that they should show the papers only to their Ministers and those officials who have been involved in the work of MISC 57 and need to see these papers for the purpose of giving essential advice.

*PLG*  
P L GREGSON

Cabinet Office

4 July 1984

SECRET AND PERSONAL



*AM*

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EXTENDING POWER STATION ENDURANCE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Official Group on Coal was asked to consider the scope for extending power station endurance by moving coal stocks from pits to power stations during the course of the coal dispute without putting at risk the coal production and deliveries of coal and oil to power stations currently being achieved.

1.2 This paper:

- describes the current levels of coal production and delivery;
- illustrates the effect which increased coal deliveries to power stations would have on power station endurance;
- sets out the physical and logistical constraints on increased movement of pithead coal stocks;
- discusses the industrial relations risks and the implications for public order;
- proposes a preferred course of action for consideration by Ministers.

1.3 Except where it is clear that Scotland is included, the figures in this paper apply to England and Wales. Scotland, where circumstances are materially different from those in England and Wales, is discussed at Annex A.

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## PRESENT PRODUCTION AND DELIVERIES

2.1 Coal production in Great Britain has in recent weeks normally been running at around 750,000 tonnes, although the level from week to week has varied depending on the incidence of public holidays and the pattern of annual holidays at particular pits. Production from deep mines has been around 450,000 tonnes and that from open cast sites around 300,000 tonnes. Most of the deep mine production has been moved to customers but the NCB has so far not been able to move the bulk of open cast production.

2.2 Weekly deliveries have normally been at a level not far short of weekly production, ie around 700,000 tonnes. Leaving out of account some coal delivered by means other than road and rail and some small deliveries in Scotland (see paragraph 3 of Annex A), the pattern has been broadly as follows:

	thousand tonnes weekly		
	Deliveries to CEGB power stations	Deliveries to other customers	Total
By rail	200-300	50-60	250-350
By road	200-300	150	350-450
Total	400-500	200	600-700

It should be noted however that the level of rail deliveries to other customers (ie principally to major steelworks) and to a lesser extent to power stations has recently been affected by sympathetic action by the rail unions. To some extent (notably in the case of steelworks) any reduction in rail deliveries can be offset by increased road deliveries. In the week ending 29 June, for example, total deliveries to power stations were expected to be of the order of 420,000 tonnes, of which 270,000 were expected to be made by road and only 150,000 by rail. It is not clear, however, how far this substitution can be carried without risking industrial relations difficulties with NUM members involved in loading lorries at working pits. Moreover, the more road transport is used to maintain existing levels of deliveries, the less capacity will be available to expand deliveries beyond the levels already achieved.



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ENDURANCE: EFFECT OF INCREASED DELIVERIES

3. The effect which increased coal deliveries would have on power station endurance (assuming maintenance of maximum oilburn) is as follows:

Weekly coal deliveries to CEGB power stations  
(thousand tonnes)

300		mid-December
420	(recent average rate)	mid-January
500		early February
600		late March
700		July

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These figures reflect the fact that a tonne delivered in spring or summer, when consumption is low, extends endurance by more than a tonne delivered in winter, when it is high.

3.2 As and when coal production at the NCB's deep mines increases the first priority will be to ensure, as at present, that it is all immediately delivered to appropriate customers so as to avoid the effort and costs of double handling. Deliveries to CEGB power stations already involve however a small amount of draw down of pithead stocks at the pits producing coal. This stock draw has normally been running at some 80,000 tonnes per week but has at its peak been as high as 150,000 tonnes per week. About two-thirds of open cast output is currently going to stock, mainly in those areas where the deep mines are closed. The remainder of this paper is concerned with examining how far power station deliveries might be increased by increasing the draw down of pithead and open cast stocks.

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PHYSICAL AND LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS

Amount and distribution of pithead stocks

4.1 Usable NCB stocks of steam coal amount to about 15 million tonnes at pitheads and on open cast sites, just over 12 million of them in England and Wales. There are also 1 million tonnes of coal which are of a quality better than that required for power stations and which are reserved for domestic,

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industrial and other premium customers. (There are also nearly 5 million tonnes at pitheads which could not be used without further processing: very little of this is in areas where deep mined coal is being produced and distributed, and it is unlikely to be practical to bring these stocks into use in the circumstances of a strike.)

4.2 Power station endurance depends on the 19 main CEEB coal burning stations listed in Annex B. The extent to which pithead coal stocks could in practice be used to supply these stations depends in part on how far distant the power stations are from the coalfields and the distribution of pithead stocks among the coalfields. Stations (Didcot and the 3 Thameside stations) are remote from the coalfields. The distribution of pithead stocks among NCB areas is as follows:

NCB Area	Yorks	Midlands	N.E.	West	S. Wales
Pithead stocks (million tonnes)	0.5	3.8	3.9	1.6	2.3

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4.3 Considerations of coal quality (ie the need to blend coals of inferior quality with better grades prior to use in power stations) also have an effect on the logistics of supply. They apply particularly in the Midland and Western Areas which account for around 5.5 million tonnes of usable stocks. A full appreciation of these and other considerations arising from maldistribution of stocks would require detailed discussions with the NCB and CEEB.

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4.4 It should be noted that stocks in the areas where pits are currently working (in Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Leicestershire, the West Midlands and Lancashire) are around 4 million tonnes. In these areas there are 9 major coal fired stations. Two of these, however, (Ratcliffe and High Marnham), have high stocks because of rail deliveries since the strike began and are thus not suitable destinations for further large quantities from pithead stocks. 6 stations are in solidly strike bound areas (Aberthaw in South Wales, Blyth in the North East and 4 in South Yorkshire).

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Delivery capacity

4.5 In normal times coal deliveries to power stations are virtually all by rail through the "merry-go-round" system of rail links between pits and power stations. Each train carries about 1000 tonnes, the equivalent of 50 tipper trucks (usually of 20 tonnes capacity). Weekly coal deliveries in excess of 1.5 million tonnes are possible by this system. There are however industrial relations constraints. The highest levels of rail deliveries achieved during the strike have been in the range of 200-300,000 tonnes a week: action by the rail unions has recently reduced this rate to the region of 150,000 tonnes a week.

4.6 As the table in paragraph 2.2 shows, about half the coal delivered over recent weeks both to CEGB power stations and to other customers has been by road (around 350,000 tonnes a week). This is a considerable increase over normal road deliveries of coal and the scope for further increases is difficult to assess. There are no up-to-date figures for the national fleet of tipper lorries of the large, rigid kind needed to move coal, but the latest reliable estimate puts it in the region of 16,000 to 20,000 vehicles. There is thus likely to be plenty of spare tonnage available in principle, but it is not possible to say how much would be available in practice and how much could and would be diverted away from other industrial purposes (eg in the construction industry). The switch of iron ore deliveries at Ravenscraig and Llanwern from rail to road has also taken up some of the available capacity. Nevertheless, it is clear that the size of the national lorry fleet is likely to be a much less important constraint than the readiness of contractors and their drivers to be deterred by intimidation and secondary industrial action (for example picketing and blacking). Experience at Ravenscraig, Orgreave, Llanwern and elsewhere shows that some contractors and many drivers have not been so deterred.

4.7 If contractors and drivers were deterred by intimidation and secondary industrial action, Ministers might wish to consider whether they wished work to be done on the possibility of using Service drivers. Formal plans for the use of Servicemen to move coal were abandoned in 1979. It has been the Government's policy that no contingency planning for the use of Servicemen in the current dispute should be carried out. Without prejudice to that policy,



the results are available of studies carried out in 1981 for the Official Group which suggest that, in order to move about 500,000 tonnes a week to the main CEGB coal fired stations, it might be necessary to requisition at least 1650 of the largest types of tipper lorries (about 10 per cent of the national stock of such vehicles) and involve about 4500 Service drivers. The requisitioning would have to be done under the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and Ministers would have to be satisfied that the threat to the essentials of life from an interruption to electricity supplies was sufficient to justify invoking the powers, given the levels of stocks remaining at the time. If Ministers were to decide to consider further the possibility of using Servicemen, detailed feasibility studies involving the Ministry of Defence, CEGB and NCB would be needed to confirm the rate of deliveries attainable in present circumstances. These studies would require a good deal of work in the field and could not be done completely covertly. In addition, the claims of prior commitments of Service manpower would have to be considered in assessing the numbers of men who could be made available.

#### Loading and unloading capacity

4.8 Lifting coal from stock involves considerably more handling than loading new-wrought coal. Handling and loading of stocks at the pits would normally be done by NCB employees: work necessary for their reception at the power stations would be done by CEGB employees. It is possible in principle for coal from stock to be loaded for transport by road even at pits the production from which is normally moved by rail. It is possible also for power stations normally supplied by rail to take road deliveries. Concurrent road and rail deliveries to power stations would however compete for limited unloading facilities. Even if road deliveries could be substantially expanded without prejudicing existing rail deliveries, therefore, the combined capacity for movement of coal by road and rail at any one time might exceed the capacity of the power stations to take deliveries. An increase in road deliveries would also involve increased handling of coal at the power stations, often involving a change from the usual pattern of work for the CEGB employees involved in unloading.



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Overall assessment of physical and logistical constraints

4.9 Making some allowance for the considerations of coal quality and stock distribution discussed in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3, the maximum amount of stock which might in principle be available for distribution from sites in England and Wales is unlikely to be more than 10 million tonnes and could well be less. Although the numbers of suitable tipper lorries which might be available is not precisely known, it seems improbable, taking account of the existing scale of abnormal road movements, that the maximum rate of movement of these stocks could exceed 500,000 tonnes per week. As at present, the costs of road transport would fall on the CEEGB: they would be offset by the fact that the CEEGB is currently spending much less than usual on rail deliveries because of the effects of the strike. The additional 10 million tonnes would extend endurance to April/May 1985. This could be achieved by either:

- a delivery rate of 400,000 tonnes a week starting in July; or
- a delivery rate of up to 500,000 tonnes a week starting in November.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND PUBLIC ORDER CONSIDERATIONS

Industrial relations

5.1 In considering the scope for increasing deliveries of pithead coal stocks it is necessary to assess the risks of the following possible adverse consequences:

in relation to the miners

- industrial action at pits currently working
- inhibiting a return to work at other pits
- increasing the extent, and violence, of picketing

in relation to railwaymen and other transport workers

- increased sympathetic action affecting existing coal and oil deliveries to power stations



in relation to power station workers

- a refusal to handle deliveries at the increased level
- possible refusal to handle coal deliveries at the existing level
- possible withdrawal of cooperation from measures to prolong power station endurance, including maximum oilburn.

5.2 Some of these contingencies have a lower degree of probability attached to them than others. One important factor is the attitudes of the unions and workers involved. At one extreme it now seems unlikely that increased deliveries from pithead stocks could be exploited by the NUM in a way which would bring the Nottinghamshire miners out on strike although there are some sensitivities even in the areas least affected by the strike which might inhibit the degree of cooperation in increased coal movement. At the other extreme the rail unions, who have already made strenuous efforts to curtail existing deliveries to power stations, might be able to exploit a major effort to lift pithead coal stocks in a way which would stop rail deliveries completely. Power station workers come between these two extremes. Many are members of the TGWU, which has resolved nationally to give assistance to the striking miners. The EEPTU and other unions in the industry has advised members to work normally, though this leaves open the possibility that they might refuse abnormal or additional work. At some sites (for example the Fiddlers' Ferry power station) TGWU members have from the outset of the strike been unwilling to handle new coal deliveries although they have cooperated with the CEGB in other respects. CEGB workers at Didcot power station have voted not to handle road deliveries, though it remains to be seen whether this will be upheld in practice. At many other sites, particularly in the Midlands, power station workers have raised no objection about handling new rail borne or road borne coal deliveries. There has also been no difficulty so far with power station workers over maximum oilburn. Power station workers have the ability to affect power station endurance much more directly than any other group of workers. The risk of provoking a loss of cooperation on their part, particularly at power stations in areas where pits are on strike and emotions run high, must therefore be assessed particularly carefully.



5.3 At the pits, as well as at the power stations, the risk of an adverse reaction is dependent both on the scale of any effort to move NCB stocks and on the extent to which it might involve any conspicuous change in normal working. There would for example be particular difficulty in bringing workers into strike-bound pits to load the pithead stocks, a task which would normally be done by miners. The risk of an adverse reaction is lowest where the pits involved have been working normally and where there has already been some discreet lifting of pithead stocks and where the power stations involved are not in striking areas. The use of Service drivers rather than private sector contractors and drivers, if it proved necessary, would sharply increase the emotional temperature both at pits and at power stations.

Public order

5.4 Experience with large scale coal deliveries during the strike so far (for example at Ravenscraig, Llanwern and Orgreave) has suggested that the implications for public order are less critically dependent on tonnages moved than on other factors. These factors include the general degree of tension in which movements take place, the circumstances which have made them necessary, the location of the sites where the coal is being loaded and delivered and the motivation of those driving the lorries doing the loading and receiving the deliveries. They also include the resources of manpower on which the strike leadership can call for picketing and the use to which they put them. Although the largest number of pickets mustered on any one occasion has been 10,000, and although the most militant strikers are thought to be considerably fewer than this figure, astute picketing tactics could clearly pose very difficult problems at a large number of sites.

5.5 An attempt to shift NCB stocks from a large number of sites, some in strike bound areas, to perhaps 19 major coal fired stations, some of which would also be in strike bound areas would almost certainly result in further violent picketing. There would be an additional difficulty in that the distances involved would in many cases be greater than at Ravenscraig, Llanwern and Orgreave. Attempts to achieve the maximum rate of delivery (500,000 tonnes a week) would be very visible and controversial. The lower rate of delivery referred to in paragraph 4.9 (200,000 tonnes a week) would need to be sustained over a much longer period (up to 10 months rather than 5 months) and would need to start very



quickly. The police would not have the resources to protect all the convoys, even at this lower rate of delivery, if there were well-organised and violent mass picketing at a number of sites. The difficulties would be particularly acute if access had to be secured to pits and power stations in strike bound areas. If Ministers were to decide that the NCB and CEBG should be asked to organise a significant movement of pithead coal stocks there would need first to be confidential consultations with the Association of Chief Police Officers to consider whether the additional demands on police resources (together with those involved in protecting miners going to work and in ensuring supplies to steelworks) could be met and, if they could, to permit planning at the localities concerned.

#### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The Group's conclusions and recommendations can be summarised as follows:

- i. There would be worthwhile benefits to endurance in increasing the present rate of coal deliveries to power stations (400-500 tonnes a week of which some 80,000 tonnes is from pithead stocks).
- ii. Taking account of maldistribution of stocks and considerations of coal quality, the theoretical maximum of stocks which it might be feasible to move is probably 10 million tonnes or less; and the maximum rate at which they could be moved is probably 500,000 tonnes a week or less. Moving 10 million tonnes would extend power station endurance to April/May 1985.
- iii. There are however risks in attempting to move as much as 10 million tonnes of NCB stocks. Attempts to move coal from pits in strikebound areas would escalate the intensity of the dispute and could well widen it. Although coal production in Nottinghamshire is perhaps unlikely to be affected, existing rail borne coal deliveries to power stations might cease, oil supplies to power stations could be prejudiced and power station workers might even withdraw cooperation. All this could put existing endurance at risk. Use of Servicemen would exacerbate these dangers.



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iv. Road borne coal movements on this scale would cause major problems of public order, particularly if pits and power stations in strike bound areas were involved. The police would not be able to ensure free or safe passage for this number of convoys if there were well-organised and violent mass picketing at a number of pits.

v. The industrial relations risks and public order problems would be less if the operation was confined to the NCB stocks at those pits and open-cast sites which are working and to the major coal fired power stations outside the strike bound areas.

vi. The NCB and CEGB in consultation with BR and road contractors are already seeking to maximise coal deliveries to power stations, making day to day judgements of what might be feasible without risk of adverse consequences, and are drawing on pithead stocks discreetly.

vii. It is therefore recommended that the most practical way of extending power station endurance with minimum risk to existing coal production and deliveries and minimum strain on the police would be to build on what the NCB and CEGB are doing already and concentrate on increasing deliveries from working NCB sites to power stations outside the strike bound areas. The objective should be to increase deliveries of new-wrought coal and stocks, both deep-mined and open cast, by some 100-150,000 tonnes a week above the current average level (420,000 tonnes a week). Achievement of the higher figure would increase endurance, on current assumptions, from mid-January to early March 1985. In Scotland, the possibility should be kept under review of moving coal stocks to power stations from any pits which achieve sizeable levels of operation.

Cabinet Office

4 July 1984



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

## SCOTLAND

1. Following a recent review of their endurance position, the SSEB have advised the Secretary of State for Scotland that they are confident that, under present circumstances, they can match the endurance of the CEGB system throughout the coming Winter and, at the same time, continue exports on the interconnector at their present level. This is subject to the relatively trouble free operation of all the non-coal fired plants in Scotland. In addition there could be temporary curtailment of exports if there were unexpectedly high peaks of demand caused by abnormal weather conditions. As in England, the Scottish endurance position depends on freedom of interruption to oil supplies.

2. Total NCB coal stocks in Scotland amount to some 3.3 million tonnes. The bulk of this is held at the following four locations:-

	<u>Tonnes</u>
Bilston Glen (Deep Mine)	- 550,000
Monktonhall (Deep Mine)	- 550,000
Westfield (Opencast)	- 1,200,000
Blindwells (Opencast)	- 600,000

The balance is stocked at a number of NCB opencast sites. There is no up-to-date information held centrally on coal stocks at the various relatively small privately owned opencast sites in operation in Scotland.

3. Opencast coal production has continued in Scotland at roughly its normal level during the miners' strike. At NCB sites production is estimated to have been almost 700,000 tonnes. At these sites the workforce made continued production conditional upon coal being stocked, rather than delivered to industry or the electricity boards. It is clear however that, throughout the dispute, some coal supplies have been reaching industry and there have been arrangements for exceptional treatment to be given to schools, hospitals and cases of hardship. Some of these have been met from pithead stocks and some have been supplied



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SECRET AND PERSONAL

from NCB opencast production. But, despite heavy picketing, the more important sources of supply have been privately owned opencast mines and imports; comprehensive figures on the delivery levels in Scotland are not available.

4. Coal production recently started at Bilston Glen colliery but only at very low levels.

5. Consideration of the feasibility of moving NCB coal stocks to power stations has concentrated on the four major locations listed above. At the maximum, an operation based on road transport might be capable of shifting 1,500-2,000 tonnes from each site to the nearest coal-fired power station in a 12 hour working day, equivalent to about 50,000 tonnes per week. Round the clock working would not double the figures, but might increase them to around 75,000 tonnes per week. The use of rail transport instead would roughly double these rates of stock movement though, because of loading and unloading problems, road and rail could not be used in conjunction. These delivery rates compare with normal winter weekly delivery rate to Scottish power stations of about 100,000 tonnes.

6. The existing level of SSEB coal stocks, and their overall endurance position, are such that an attempt to obtain deliveries from NCB stocks would not be justified at present, and would carry the considerable risk of forfeiting the cooperation of workers in power stations. But the position will be kept under review in the light of the level of resumed working at Scottish pits.

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Location of 19 major coal fired power stationsRemote from coalfields (4)

Didcot	Oxfordshire
West Thurrock	Thameside
Tilbury	Thameside
Kingsnorth (partially oil-fired)	Thameside

In strike-bound areas (6)

Aberthaw	South Wales
Blyth	Northumberland
Ferrybridge	Yorkshire
Drax	Yorkshire
Eggborough	Yorkshire
Thorpe Marsh	Yorkshire

Others (9)

West Burton	Nottinghamshire
Cottam	Nottinghamshire
High Marnham	Nottinghamshire
Ratcliffe	Nottinghamshire
Willington	Derbyshire
Drakelow	Warwickshire
Rugeley	Staffordshire
Ironbridge	Salop
Fiddlers' Ferry	Merseyside



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10 DOWNING STREET

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REC.	6 JUL 1984	
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From the Private Secretary

*Shaw to Mr R. S. S. S.*

Mr. Gregson

Extending Power Station Endurance

The Prime Minister has seen your minute to me of 4 July, and was very grateful for the report attached to it. Subject to the views of colleagues, she is content that efforts should now be made to increase deliveries from coal stocks held at NCB sites to power stations outside the strike-bound areas.

I am copying this minute to the Private Secretaries to the Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Energy, Defence, Scotland, Trade and Industry, Employment and Transport, and to Sir Robert Armstrong. It should be shown only to their Ministers and those officials who have been involved in the work for Misc 57.

*AT*

5 July, 1984.

SECRET AND PERSONAL



~~SECRET  
AND  
PERSONAL~~ *PC*

FROM : S A ROBSON  
DATE : 6 JULY 1984

CHANCELLOR OF EXCHEQUER

EXTENDING POWER STATION ENDURANCE

*c*  
*OK?*  
*MOM*  
*6/7*  
*OK*  
*m*

Mr Turnbull's minute of 5 July to Mr Gregson (Cabinet Office).

2. A Group of officials under Mr Gregson were asked to examine the scope for extending power station endurance by moving coal stocks from pits to power stations without putting at risk coal production and current deliveries of coal and oil to power stations.
3. Mr Gregson sent the Groups report - MISC 57(84)8 - to Mr Turnbull under the cover of a letter.
4. Currently some 420,000 tonnes of coal are being delivered to power stations each week by a combination of rail and road transport. Another 200,000 tonnes is delivered to other customers. The bulk of this coal is newly wrought; stock draw has normally been running at 80,000 tonnes a week but has had a peak of 150,000 tonnes.
5. On the basis of a continuing level of deliveries of 400,000 tonnes a week, we have power station endurance until mid January.
6. There are NCB stocks of some 15 million tonnes of usable steam coal at pitheads and open cast sites; 12 million tonnes are in England and Wales. About 4 million tonnes of this are in areas where pits are currently working.
7. These physical and logistical constraints on delivering this coal although it is far from clear precisely when such constraints bite. For example, we have no information about the size of the national fleet of tipper lorries; let alone the amount of spare capacity in that fleet. There are also constraints on the ability of power stations to take deliveries.

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8. More importantly there are clear industrial relations risks in an exercise of this sort as well as risks to public order. As you are aware, the position on the railways is delicately balanced and railmen could react adversely to attempts to step up road deliveries. At some power stations TGWU members are already refusing to handle new coal deliveries. Behind all this there is the risk of losing oil supplies.

9. The Group concluded that the industrial relations and public order risks were least if the attempt to move coal stock was confined to working NCB sites - both deep mine and open cast. This is, of course, what the NCB, CEGB and BR are already seeking to do. The Department of Energy have discussed this with the industries and concluded it should be possible to raise the rate of deliveries by 100-150,000 tonnes a week over the current figure of some 420,000 tonnes. This is the reports recommendation.

10. Mr Turnbull's letter records that the Prime Minister is content to proceed on this basis subject to the views of other Ministers.

11. I recommend you concur. If successful this operation would extend endurance from mid January to early March 1985.

12. If you agree your Office might inform No 10 and Mr Walker's office. It would be best to avoid writing on this subject.

SAR

S A ROBSON

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AND  
PERSONAL



From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

(Handwritten mark)



HOME OFFICE  
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE  
LONDON SW1H 9AT

~~SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

9 July 1984

Dear Andrew,

EXTENDING POWER STATION ENDURANCE

Mr Gregson sent me a copy of his note of 4 July. The Home Secretary is content that action should proceed as recommended by MISC 57.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Energy, Defence, Scotland, Trade and Industry, Employment and Transport, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours ever,  
Hugh Taylor

H H TAYLOR

A Turnbull, Esq.





FROM: MISS M O'MARA  
9 July 1984

*RP*

MR MONCK

**EXTENDING POWER STATION ENDURANCE**

The Chancellor has seen Mr Robson's minute of 6 July and agrees with his recommendation.  
I have informed No.10 and the Department of Energy.

*Mom*

MISS M O'MARA





*AN*

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
 MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1  
 Telephone 01-930722 218 2111/3

MO 19/1

11th July 1984

*Dear Andrew,*

EXTENDING POWER STATION ENDURANCE

My Secretary of State has seen the report of the Official Group on Coal, circulated under Mr Gregson's minute to you of 4th July. He supports the view that the use of servicemen to move existing coal stocks would raise the emotional temperature and recommends that it should not be considered any further at this stage in the dispute. He agrees the conclusion that the NCB and CEBG should be encouraged to increase deliveries from the pithead by some 100-150,000 tonnes a week.

I am copying this note to the private secretaries to the Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretaries of State for Energy, Scotland, Trade and Industry, Employment and Transport and to Richard Hatfield.

*Your sincerely*  
*Nick Evans*

(N H R EVANS)

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REC.	11 JUL 1984
ACTION	
COPIES TO	

A Turnbull Esq

SECRET AND PERSONAL





SCOTTISH OFFICE  
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AU

copy 207

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Prime Minister

EXTENDING POWER STATION ENDURANCE

I have seen a copy of the MISC 57 report, circulated under Mr Gregson's minute of 4 July, about the possibility of moving stocks from pits to power stations.

For my interest I am content with the Group's recommendations. I would certainly want to keep open the possibility of moving coal stocks to Scottish power stations from any of our pits which achieve significant levels of operation although, as you are aware, the present favourable endurance position for the Scottish Electricity Boards does not depend on the replenishment of their coal stocks.

Copies of this minute go to the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Energy, Defence, Trade and Industry, Employment and Transport, and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*G.Y.*

11 July 1984

CH/EXCHEQUER	
G.Y. REC.	16 JUL 1984
ACTION	
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