

PO-CH/NL/0084

PART A

Part A.

**SECRET**

(Circulate under cover and  
notify REGISTRY of me

Begins : 27/4/87

Ends : 6/6/87



PO -CH /NL/0084



PART A

Chancellor's (Lawson) Papers:

PROJECT PINDAR THE  
BUILDING OF A NEW  
CABINET WAR ROOM

*Project Pindar*

PO -CH /NL/0084

PART A

PART A

Disposal Directions: 25 Year

*Anderson*

31/7/95

9/86



*Mr Meadows*  
*I assume this does not*  
*open the possibility of*  
*reduced requirements*  
*in the Cabinet Office's PES?*

MO 20/11/1V

30/6/86

CH/EXC. ORDER	
REG.	01 JUL 1986
NO.	MR MEADOWS
ES	CST
IN	SIR P MIDDLETON
	MR FER BUTLER
	MR KITCAT
	MR JAMESON
	MR JASTON

*to*  
*11/7*  
*Mr A.A. Burton*

*You should be aware*  
*of this which abandons*  
*the idea of a stopgap for*  
*PINDAR.*

PRIME MINISTER

*the CST to the PM*

*I propose just a brief schedule*  
*welcoming this decision. Are there likely to*  
*be any problems*  
*a to MOD's side?*

PROJECT PINDAR AND RELATED FACILITIES

When my predecessor minuted you on 20th November 1985 about Project PINDAR (protected accommodation for the Joint Operations Centre(JOC) and the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) and their communications during a period of conventional war), he mentioned that the Ministry of Defence were preparing proposals for a cheap and quick stop-gap facility to cover the period before PINDAR enters service (on current plans mid-1989 though the works element should be completed in 1988), as a back-up to JOC and COBR proper in case of emergency. This concept was known as EJOC - Emergency JOC/Defence Intelligence Centre/COBR.

2. I am writing now to let you know that I have accepted the advice of the Chiefs of Staff and my officials, with which Cabinet Office officials concur, that an EJOC would not be cost-effective and that the idea should therefore not be pursued further. Assuming some measure of ADP support - without which the EJOC would be of very limited effectiveness - it would cost £2M and take two years to set it up. This would take us to the Spring of 1988, not much more than a year before PINDAR itself is due to enter service. In practice the latter date

13/86




4. I am copying this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Environment Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

C.4.

Ministry of Defence


30 June 1986

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Ref. 27/4 to NIGER

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Sir P Middleton  
Office circulation  
MGT 13/4

**CABINET OFFICE**

70 Whitehall London SW1A 2AS

01-270 0101

(087)

*From the Secretary of the Cabinet and Head of the Home Civil Service*

Sir Robert Armstrong GCB CVO

Ref. A087/1066

10 April 1987

*Dear Charles,*

Project PINDAR

As you know, Project PINDAR concerns the construction and operation of a protected crisis management facility for the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office for use during Transition to War and Conventional War. The Cabinet Office element, which is intended to replace the existing, vulnerable, Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), will include the Government Emergency Rooms (embracing the current COBR roles), the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the Cabinet Office COMCEN and very small Ministerial, Permanent Secretary and Private Office elements from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Treasury, the Department of Energy and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. In addition, the Prime Minister with two Private Secretaries and two typists, the Lord Chancellor and his Private Secretary, the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Secretary of the Cabinet will be included. Ministerial approval for the realisation of the project was given in 1982.

The planning and construction of Project PINDAR have now reached an advanced stage; the project is due to be fully operational in 1990, although we still hope to achieve a limited capability during 1989 for the Cabinet Office element. The attached Cabinet Office Concept of Operations gives the background and principles of the project and calls for the interested Departments to begin to consider the necessary detailed planning to ensure a close liaison between their Minister, Permanent Secretary and Private Secretary (where applicable) who will be in PINDAR, and their parent Department. As a first, educational, step in this process, it would be helpful if you and each of the Private

/Offices to whom

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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Offices to whom this letter is copied, could contact the Cabinet Office PINDAR Project Manager (Mr Leigh 270 0383) in the near future to arrange for a preliminary discussion of the facilities we plan to offer Ministers. He has a detailed model of their proposed offices and can explain further details not covered in the Concept of Operations. We would hope that this process can be completed by the end of April, if possible. Thereafter, we plan to invite all Departments to a presentation in the Cabinet Office which will be followed by a more formal discussion of the project as it affects your Ministers and Departments.

3. I am copying this letter to Richard Stoate, Tony Galsworthy, Alex Allan, Stephen Boys-Smith, Geoff Dart and Shirley Stagg in the Ministers' Private Offices and to Sherard Cowper Coles, Dick Saunders, Christine Stewart, Edmund Quilty, Katrina Williams and Malcolm McKinnon in the Permanent Secretaries' Private Offices.

*Yours ever,*

*T A Woolley*

(T A Woolley)  
Private Secretary

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July 1986 (amended to  
30 March 1987)

THE CABINET OFFICE IN PINDAR: A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Project PINDAR concerns the construction and operation of a protected crisis management facility for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Cabinet Office. The aim of this paper is to establish a concept of operations for the Cabinet Office in PINDAR which will form the basis for more detailed planning.

Background

2. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) in 70 Whitehall and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) at the MOD provide facilities, to which no alternatives exist, for certain functions of central government and for the control of military operations during periods of crisis and conventional war. They are also the primary centres for the national control of the United Kingdom's nuclear forces. At present the COBR and JOC are in separate locations, both above ground and both vulnerable to nuclear, chemical and conventional air attack and to sabotage.

3. In the early 1970s, when the COBR and the JOC (then the Defence Situation Centre) were developed, the threat to their survivability was assessed as being of insufficiently high order to justify the cost of providing hardened protection against conventional attack. However, more recent Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments, on which assumptions for home defence planning are based, indicate -

a. in conventional war, an increasing threat from Soviet air attacks directed against military associated targets and a possibility of chemical attacks; and

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b. in a period of tension, a sabotage threat from Soviet Special Purpose Forces aimed principally at the destruction of primary centres of national nuclear command and control.

4. In 1979, in the light of these assessments, Cabinet Office and MOD officials examined the feasibility of providing hardened accommodation for COBR and JOC. This study (now known as project PINDAR) identified the South Citadel under the MOD Main Building as being the most suitable site for development. This two-floor reinforced concrete structure was purpose built as a protected command facility for the Air Ministry during the 1939-45 war. It was estimated that, apart from the replacement of existing generating and life support systems, only limited refurbishment and improvements to its survivability would be required. There was enough space to house the essential functions and personnel of both COBR and JOC and an existing tunnel between the Cabinet Office and the MOD could be refurbished to provide discreet access from Downing Street. Following further detailed studies, Ministerial approval for the realisation of the project was given in November 1982. The facility is due to become operational in 1989/90.

5. PINDAR was originally intended to provide full protection against conventional bombing, sabotage, biological and chemical attack, flooding and the effects of blast, radiation and EMP from all but a direct hit or very near miss by a nuclear weapon. More recent assessments suggest that it could be vulnerable to sustained conventional attacks by the most modern precision guided weapons. It is planned that PINDAR should be capable of independent operation for up to 30 days including the further capability of closing down completely for up to 7 days in the event of an attack using persistent chemicals or the threat of nuclear fall-out.

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Costs

6. The total cost of the PINDAR project was estimated at £16 million (3rd quarter 1982 prices) of which approximately £0.5 million falls to the Cabinet Office for communications and office equipment. The Cabinet Office contribution towards the cost of some items shared with MOD has yet to be decided but is likely to amount to a further £0.25 million.

Accommodation

7. The Cabinet Office will occupy the upper of the two levels in PINDAR - to be known as "the Cabinet floor" - with the JOC on the lower level. (The upper level will also house certain common facilities such as the kitchen and dining rooms.) The three elements with accommodation on the Cabinet floor will be -

- a. a Government Emergency Rooms (GER) element comprising -
  - i. the Prime Minister, 2 Private Secretaries and 2 typists ;
  - ii. the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Energy Secretary (or their appointed representatives) and their Private Secretaries;
  - iii. the Secretary of the Cabinet and Permanent Secretaries of the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HM Treasury, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Department of Energy and Department of Trade and Industry (or their appointed representatives);
  - iv. typists to serve Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and other elements;

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v. further representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (subject to final approval); and

vi. the Defence and Oversea Affairs (OD) Secretariat who have overall responsibility for the operational and administrative arrangements for the GER

b. a Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) element.

c. a Telecommunications Secretariat and Cabinet Office Communications Centre (COMCEN) element

The proposed layout of the Cabinet floor is at Annex A.

#### PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION

8. The prime function of the Cabinet Office in PINDAR will be to provide advice and crisis management support facilities in the GER for the Prime Minister, Ministers and senior officials during transition to war (TTW) and war, including nuclear release.

9. All other crisis management functions - principally, in the event of terrorist incidents or civil contingencies in peacetime - will continue to be exercised from the existing COBR. However, the PINDAR facility could provide an alternative location for the management of such crises should existing facilities be rendered inoperative (through accidental fire, for example).

10. In addition, it is planned that the Cabinet Office COMCEN will transfer its facilities to PINDAR as soon as is operationally possible and work from there permanently. Thus, in normal peacetime operation, the COMCEN will be located in PINDAR whilst the OD and Telecommunications Secretariats and the JIO (including the Duty Intelligence Officer) will continue to work in 70 Whitehall.

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11. The JOC will transfer permanently to the lower level of PINDAR as soon as is operationally feasible. It will be manned by MOD according to three Readiness States (RS) -

RS 3 - normal peacetime manning;

RS 2 - increased manning in a limited national crisis, probably not involving NATO; and

RS 1 - full manning TTW and war.

With the exception of the relocated COMCEN, it is anticipated that the crisis management elements of the Cabinet Office will move into PINDAR only when the JOC is at RS 1. However, it may be operationally desirable for some elements to work from peacetime locations for as long as possible during TTW. Indeed, it is thought unlikely that Ministers would wish to move permanently into PINDAR unless there was evidence that an attack on London was imminent.

12. The concepts of operation for the Cabinet Office in PINDAR must therefore take into account not only the requirements of the fully operational PINDAR facility but also the implications in peacetime of the relocation of the COMCEN and the continuing role of the existing COBR. The OD and Telecommunications Secretariats and the JIO must develop plans for working between their normal locations and PINDAR in peacetime, various stages of TTW and war. Additionally, Private Offices and Departments represented in the GER element must develop plans for maintaining operational contact with PINDAR. Plans must take account of manpower and other resource constraints, security, communications requirements and contingency arrangements. Although the Cabinet floor will operate independently of the JOC, plans should also take account of the operational desirability of shared facilities and the need for agreed common procedures, especially when there is a risk of PINDAR being closed down against NBC attack.

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MODES OF OPERATION

13. Central decision-making in a TTW crisis would be the responsibility of Ministers in Cabinet or Ministerial Committee. Ministers would receive assessments produced by the JIC and would be advised by a series of crisis management committees, principally the Emergency Measures Committee (EMC), comprising Permanent Secretaries and a military adviser and chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet, and its executive sub-committee (EMC(E)), chaired at Deputy Secretary level. Given their departmental and other commitments - including their contribution to the maintenance of public morale - it is unlikely that Ministers would wish to meet regularly in PINDAR until late in the crisis. On the other hand, it would be operationally and logistically essential for the central United Kingdom control point (codenamed MONMOUTH) and other GER support facilities to be located in PINDAR from the first stages of the crisis.

14. This suggests that PINDAR would be manned progressively as a crisis developed. The likely pattern of progression might be:

i. Normal peacetime work with the Cabinet Office COMCEN permanently relocated in PINDAR. The GER element in PINDAR unmanned but maintained at readiness for activation at one hours notice. JIO at normal peacetime readiness but no presence in PINDAR. Routine security checks and equipment tests.

ii. As at i. but with the COBR in 70 Whitehall activated in response to a terrorist incident or civil contingencies crisis. COMCEN manning levels increased.

iii. In a period of rising East/West tension and early TTW up to declaration of NATO Military Vigilance: MONMOUTH and other GER crisis management support facilities move to instant readiness in PINDAR with full 24 hour manning on 12 hour shifts; JIO operating from 70 Whitehall but with a presence in PINDAR.

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iv. From declaration of NATO Military Vigilance up to NATO Reinforced Alert. MONMOUTH and other GER support facilities activated in PINDAR: crisis management committees meeting in 70 Whitehall/Downing Street but Departments activating plans for maintaining contact with Ministers and Permanent Secretaries should a move to PINDAR be necessary; JIO operating in PINDAR but drawing on support from 70 Whitehall.

v. From declaration of NATO Reinforced Alert up to NATO General Alert: Ministers or appointed representatives meeting in PINDAR.

vi. From declaration of NATO General Alert: Nominated Ministers and Permanent Secretaries or their appointed representatives move permanently into PINDAR.

vii. PINDAR closed down in anticipation of attack.

Each element in PINDAR should develop their own modes of operation accordingly. The relationship between elements' modes of operation might vary according to circumstances.

#### Manning

15. The expected manning levels in PINDAR at each stage are shown at Annex B.

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ANNEX A

PINDAR

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ROOM NUMBER	USE
200	Common Services/FCO
201	GER Conf Room II
202	GER Annex 1
203	GER Annex 2
204	GER Office
205	GER Annex 3
206	Minister
207	Minister
208	Minister
209	Minister
210	Minister
211	Minister
212	GER Office
213	GER Annex 4
214	GER Conf Room I
215	GER Annex 5
216	PM Private Office
217	PM Office
218	PM Bedroom
219	GER Annex 6
220	GER Annex 7
221	COMCEN Store
222	COMCEN Store
223	Male Toilets
224	Female Toilets
225	Male Toilets
226	Dormitory 1
227	Dormitory 2
228	Dormitory 5
229	Dormitory 3
230	Dormitory 6
231	Dormitory 4
232	Dormitory 7
233	Kitchen
234	Male Toilets
235	Female Toilets
236	Decontamination Unit
237	Senior Officials and Ministers Mess
238	Female Toilets

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ROOM NUMBER	USE
239	Male Toilets
240	Duty Officer's Flat
241	Duty Officer's Flat
242	Duty Officer's Flat
243	Duty Officer's Flat
244	Sick Bay
245	Exit from Decontamination Unit
246	Entry to Decontamination Unit and Security Post/Incident Control Room
247	Lamson Tube reception point
248	Incident Control Room
249	Cabinet Office COMCEN
250	Minister's sleeping accommodation
251	Minister's sleeping accommodation
252	Minister's sleeping accommodation
253	Minister's sleeping accommodation
254	Minister's sleeping accommodation
255	Minister's sleeping accommodation
256	Minister's sleeping accommodation
257	Minister's sleeping accommodation
258	Cabinet Office COMCEN office
259	Cabinet Office COMCEN office
260	Moscow-Line (COMCEN)
261	Cable Vault (COMCEN)
262	COMCEN
263	CCTV Studio
264	CCTV Workshop
265	Messengers/Store
266	Bunk Bedroom 4
267	Bunk Bedroom 3
268	Bunk Bedroom 2
269	Bunk Bedroom 1
270	Female Toilet
271	Male Toilet
272	FCO
273	Food store
274	Sleeping cubicles
275	Sleeping cubicles
276	Store
277	Store
278	JIO

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
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ROOM NUMBER	USE
279	Electrical plant room
280	JIO
281	JIO
282	JIO
283	JIO
284	JIO
285	JIO
286	JIO
287	JIO
288	
289	COMCEN STS Room
290	Perm Sec 7
291	Perm Sec 6
292	Perm Sec 5
293	Typing
294	Perm Sec 4
295	Perm Sec 3
296	Perm Sec 2
297	Secretary of the Cabinet
298	Dining Room
299	Food store

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SYMBOLS

[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]
[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]
[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]
[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]	[Symbol]

PROJECT 1046

NO.	DATE

PINDAR: ANTICIPATED PROGRESSION OF MANNING

	Occasion	Defence Secretariat Staff	Ministers* Private Secretaries, Permanent Secretaries* and Extra FCO Staff	JIO	COMCEN	Total Numbers
i	Normal Peacetime Use	-	-	-	11	11
ii	Peacetime Incident; Terrorist or Civil Contingency	-	-	-	12	12
iii	Rising tension up to and possibly including MIL VIG	11	-	#	13	24
iv	TTW - MILVIG/Simple Alert	13	3	20	18	54
v	TTW - Reinforced Alert	20	19	20	18	77
vi/vii	Reinforced/General Alert - War	20	26/33	20	18	84/91

\* Or appointed representatives.

# Numbers to be decided according to circumstances.

Alex?



CH/EXCHEQUER	
REC.	05 MAY 1987
ACTION	MR MEADOWS
COPIES TO	CST
	SIR P MIDDLETON
	MR F E R BUTLER
	MR ANSON
	MR HALPIN
	MR ROBSON
	MS SEAMMEN
	MR INSTONE

MR J M G TAYLOR

30/4/87.

MO 20/11/1E

Nigel  
(want for advice)  
Morr

PRIME MINISTERPROJECT PINDAR

I am writing to let you know of developments concerning Project PINDAR since I last wrote on 30th June 1986.

2. On the positive side, the main works contract has been let, and satisfactory progress is being made on that front. In addition, I have agreed that the National Strategic Targeting Centre should be situated in PINDAR rather than under the North Citadel of MOD Main Building, at a saving of several million pounds.

3. I have also to report some difficulties. First, the previous estimated in-service date of mid-1989 is no longer attainable. The Project Definition studies completed at the end of November 1986 (the purpose of which included the establishment of a realistically attainable timescale) together with subsequent analysis have shown that the complexity of the requirement, particularly in the communications and ADP areas, is such that the facility cannot now come fully into service before late 1990. Secondly, the JIC have recently re-assessed the threat from Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) effects (JIC(87)(N)23); this confirms the previous assessment of the threat from nuclear explosions but also indicates that by the



mid-1990s there may be a threat from Soviet non-nuclear EMP devices. The adequacy and extent of EMP protection levels in PINDAR are currently under urgent review. Finally, there is a potential problem over whether sufficient space will be available in PINDAR for all the associated communications equipment. The extent of any difficulties will not become clearer until the systems design work is nearer completion.

4. In view of the complexities of the PINDAR project, and the advanced technological systems involved, it is not surprising that we have encountered difficulties. But I am taking steps to ensure that the project management team is strengthened and that there is a higher level of involvement in steering the project to completion.

5. The costs of the works element of the project is now estimated to be £20.75 million. This represents a real increase of some 15% over the estimate reported to you in November 1985, which is attributable to a clearer understanding of the difficulties of construction in the confined site available and to some necessary design changes. The cost of the associated project to reprovide and upgrade the Ministry of Defence command, control and communications and information systems currently in service is now assessed, following the Project Definition study, to be £47 million at 1986/87 prices.



6. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Environment Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Q4

Ministry of Defence

30<sup>th</sup> April 1987

SECRET



FROM: N G FRAY

DATE: 27 April 1987

CHANCELLOR

cc: Mr Allan

PROJECT PINDAR

Project Pindar concerns the construction and operation of a protected crisis management facility for the Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet Office during Transition to War and Conventional War. The project is expected to be completed in 1990, though some elements of the complex will be operational before hand. It is situated five floors beneath the South Citadel in the MOD Main Building.

2. I attended a meeting earlier today at the Cabinet Office where the role of Pindar was explained and details given of the facilities available to those Cabinet Ministers forming Pindar's ... Ministerial contingent during a time of war. The attached note gives the history of Pindar and the principles of operations.

3. When fully operational Pindar will be manned by an absolute maximum of 400 people. The majority of this number (around 320) will be MOD and Service personnel. The Cabinet Office element, which is intended to replace the existing, vulnerable, Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), will include the Government Emergency Rooms (embracing the COBR roles), the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the Cabinet Office COMCEN and very small Ministerial, Permanent Secretary and Private Office elements from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Treasury, the Department of Energy and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. In addition, the Prime Minister with two Private Secretaries and two typists, the Lord Chancellor and his Private Secretary, the Permanent Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry and the Secretary of the Cabinet will be included.

*one subject to  
get the  
under crop up  
Ch  
Looks OK to me &  
@ no  
problems  
AA*





4. The number of personnel (ie 400) is a very strict maximum that Pindar can accomodate, not only because of the space available, but because the life support systems have been designed to protect 400 people for a period of seven days when closed down. Having seen the scale model of Pindar, I can confirm that conditions will be extremely claustrophobic. However, the accomodation for Cabinet Ministers have been designed to make conditions a little more tolerable. Each Minister has been allocated an office, which he shares with his Private Secretary and sleeping quarters comprising of bed, bedside table, lamp, chair and coat stand. Each Permanent Secretaries' office will have to double as a bedroom. All Private Secretaries will be expected to sleep in a dormitory furnished with bunkbeds.

5. Prior to Pindar being sealed, Ministers will be able to have access to officials from their own department as required until close down and will have the use of a secure telephone during the entire period Pindar is in operation. On close down Pindar will be sealed to prevent contamination from NBC weapons. During this period, no one will be able to enter or leave Pindar, which will be under armed guard.

6. The Cabinet Office assume that each Minister will wish to take a Private Secretary together with the Permanent Secretary. However, as typing facilities are extremely scarce (two typists for six Cabinet Ministers), arrangements could be made for a typist to go to Pindar, but at the expense of the Private Secretary. Cabinet Office advise that the two typists allocated should suffice as, in a period of war, situations will be changing rapidly and the majority <sup>of</sup> communications will be by word of mouth.

7. During Transition to War it is envisaged that Cabinet Ministers will not gain access to Pindar through the MOD Main Building main door, but via the Cabinet Office and the connecting tunnel underneath Whitehall. This is to prevent the press etc seeing Ministers going into the "bunker" and there, by damaging morale.



8. Are you content with these arrangements?

*N G Fray*  
N G FRAY

Subject to Cabinet Ministers' agreement to these preliminary proposals, the Cabinet Office intend to give a formal presentation for Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and Private Secretaries.

**SECRET**July 1986 (amended to  
30 March 1987)

## THE CABINET OFFICE IN PINDAR: A CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

1. Project PINDAR concerns the construction and operation of a protected crisis management facility for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Cabinet Office. The aim of this paper is to establish a concept of operations for the Cabinet Office in PINDAR which will form the basis for more detailed planning.

Background

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3. In the early 1970s, when the COBR and the JOC (then the Defence Situation Centre) were developed, the threat to their survivability was assessed as being of insufficiently high order to justify the cost of providing hardened protection against conventional attack. However, more recent Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments, on which assumptions for home defence planning are based, indicate -

- a. in conventional war, an increasing threat from Soviet air attacks directed against military associated targets and a possibility of chemical attacks; and

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b. in a period of tension, a sabotage threat from Soviet Special Purpose Forces aimed principally at the destruction of primary centres of national nuclear command and control.

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Costs

6. The total cost of the PINDAR project was estimated at £16 million (3rd quarter 1982 prices) of which approximately £0.5 million falls to the Cabinet Office for communications and office equipment. The Cabinet Office contribution towards the cost of some items shared with MOD has yet to be decided but is likely to amount to a further £0.25 million.

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  - iii. the Secretary of the Cabinet and Permanent Secretaries of the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HM Treasury, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Department of Energy and Department of Trade and Industry (or their appointed representatives);
  - iv. typists to serve Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and other elements;

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v. further representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (subject to final approval); and

vi. the Defence and Oversea Affairs (OD) Secretariat who have overall responsibility for the operational and administrative arrangements for the GER

b. a Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) element.

c. a Telecommunications Secretariat and Cabinet Office Communications Centre (COMCEN) element

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8. The prime function of the Cabinet Office in PINDAR will be to provide advice and crisis management support facilities in the GER for the Prime Minister, Ministers and senior officials during transition to war (TTW) and war, including nuclear release.

9. All other crisis management functions - principally, in the event of terrorist incidents or civil contingencies in peacetime - will continue to be exercised from the existing COBR. However, the PINDAR facility could provide an alternative location for the management of such crises should existing facilities be rendered inoperative (through accidental fire, for example).

10. In addition, it is planned that the Cabinet Office COMCEN will transfer its facilities to PINDAR as soon as is operationally possible and work from there permanently. Thus, in normal peacetime operation, the COMCEN will be located in PINDAR whilst the OD and Telecommunications Secretariats and the JIO (including the Duty Intelligence Officer) will continue to work in 70 Whitehall.

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11. The JOC will transfer permanently to the lower level of PINDAR as soon as is operationally feasible. It will be manned by MOD according to three Readiness States (RS) -

RS 3 - normal peacetime manning;

RS 2 - increased manning in a limited national crisis, probably not involving NATO; and

RS 1 - full manning TTW and war.

With the exception of the relocated COMCEN, it is anticipated that the crisis management elements of the Cabinet Office will move into PINDAR only when the JOC is at RS 1. However, it may be operationally desirable for some elements to work from peacetime locations for as long as possible during TTW. Indeed, it is thought unlikely that Ministers would wish to move permanently into PINDAR unless there was evidence that an attack on London was imminent.

12. The concepts of operation for the Cabinet Office in PINDAR must therefore take into account not only the requirements of the fully operational PINDAR facility but also the implications in peacetime of the relocation of the COMCEN and the continuing role of the existing COBR. The OD and Telecommunications Secretariats and the JIO must develop plans for working between their normal locations and PINDAR in peacetime, various stages of TTW and war. Additionally, Private Offices and Departments represented in the GER element must develop plans for maintaining operational contact with PINDAR. Plans must take account of manpower and other resource constraints, security, communications requirements and contingency arrangements. Although the Cabinet floor will operate independently of the JOC, plans should also take account of the operational desirability of shared facilities and the need for agreed common procedures, especially when there is a risk of PINDAR being closed down against NBC attack.

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MODES OF OPERATION

13. Central decision-making in a TTW crisis would be the responsibility of Ministers in Cabinet or Ministerial Committee. Ministers would receive assessments produced by the JIC and would be advised by a series of crisis management committees, principally the Emergency Measures Committee (EMC), comprising Permanent Secretaries and a military adviser and chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet, and its executive sub-committee (EMC(E)), chaired at Deputy Secretary level. Given their departmental and other commitments - including their contribution to the maintenance of public morale - it is unlikely that Ministers would wish to meet regularly in PINDAR until late in the crisis. On the other hand, it would be operationally and logistically essential for the central United Kingdom control point (codenamed MONMOUTH) and other GER support facilities to be located in PINDAR from the first stages of the crisis.

14. This suggests that PINDAR would be manned progressively as a crisis developed. The likely pattern of progression might be:

i. Normal peacetime work with the Cabinet Office COMCEN permanently relocated in PINDAR. The GER element in PINDAR unmanned but maintained at readiness for activation at one hours notice. JIO at normal peacetime readiness but no presence in PINDAR. Routine security checks and equipment tests.

ii. As at i. but with the COBR in 70 Whitehall activated in response to a terrorist incident or civil contingencies crisis. COMCEN manning levels increased.

iii. In a period of rising East/West tension and early TTW up to declaration of NATO Military Vigilance: MONMOUTH and other GER crisis management support facilities move to instant readiness in PINDAR with full 24 hour manning on 12 hour shifts; JIO operating from 70 Whitehall but with a presence in PINDAR.

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iv. From declaration of NATO Military Vigilance up to NATO Reinforced Alert. MONMOUTH and other GER support facilities activated in PINDAR: crisis management committees meeting in 70 Whitehall/Downing Street but Departments activating plans for maintaining contact with Ministers and Permanent Secretaries should a move to PINDAR be necessary; JIO operating in PINDAR but drawing on support from 70 Whitehall.

v. From declaration of NATO Reinforced Alert up to NATO General Alert: Ministers or appointed representatives meeting in PINDAR.

vi. From declaration of NATO General Alert: Nominated Ministers and Permanent Secretaries or their appointed representatives move permanently into PINDAR.

vii. PINDAR closed down in anticipation of attack.

Each element in PINDAR should develop their own modes of operation accordingly. The relationship between elements' modes of operation might vary according to circumstances.

#### Manning

15. The expected manning levels in PINDAR at each stage are shown at Annex B.

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ANNEX A

PINDAR

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ROOM NUMBER	USE
200	Common Services/FCO
201	GER Conf Room II
202	GER Annex 1
203	GER Annex 2
204	GER Office
205	GER Annex 3
206	Minister
207	Minister
208	Minister
209	Minister
210	Minister
211	Minister
212	GER Office
213	GER Annex 4
214	GER Conf Room I
215	GER Annex 5
216	PM Private Office
217	PM Office
218	PM Bedroom
219	GER Annex 6
220	GER Annex 7
221	COMCEN Store
222	COMCEN Store
223	Male Toilets
224	Female Toilets
225	Male Toilets
226	Dormitory 1
227	Dormitory 2
228	Dormitory 5
229	Dormitory 3
230	Dormitory 6
231	Dormitory 4
232	Dormitory 7
233	Kitchen
234	Male Toilets
235	Female Toilets
236	Decontamination Unit
237	Senior Officials and Ministers Mess
238	Female Toilets

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ROOM NUMBER	USE
239	Male Toilets
240	Duty Officer's Flat
241	Duty Officer's Flat
242	Duty Officer's Flat
243	Duty Officer's Flat
244	Sick Bay
245	Exit from Decontamination Unit
246	Entry to Decontamination Unit and Security Post/Incident Control Room
247	Lamson Tube reception point
248	Incident Control Room
249	Cabinet Office COMCEN
250	Minister's sleeping accommodation
251	Minister's sleeping accommodation
252	Minister's sleeping accommodation
253	Minister's sleeping accommodation
254	Minister's sleeping accommodation
255	Minister's sleeping accommodation
256	Minister's sleeping accommodation
257	Minister's sleeping accommodation
258	Cabinet Office COMCEN office
259	Cabinet Office COMCEN office
260	Moscow-Line (COMCEN)
261	Cable Vault (COMCEN)
262	COMCEN
263	CCTV Studio
264	CCTV Workshop
265	Messengers/Store
266	Bunk Bedroom 4
267	Bunk Bedroom 3
268	Bunk Bedroom 2
269	Bunk Bedroom 1
270	Female Toilet
271	Male Toilet
272	FCO
273	Food store
274	Sleeping cubicles
275	Sleeping cubicles
276	Store
277	Store
278	JIO

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
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ROOM NUMBER	USE
279	Electrical plant room
280	JIO
281	JIO
282	JIO
283	JIO
284	JIO
285	JIO
286	JIO
287	JIO
288	
289	COMCEN STS Room
290	Perm Sec 7
291	Perm Sec 6
292	Perm Sec 5
293	Typing
294	Perm Sec 4
295	Perm Sec 3
296	Perm Sec 2
297	Secretary of the Cabinet
298	Dining Room
299	Food store

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Legend or key information for the floor plan, including symbols for doors, windows, and other architectural features.

—	Door
—	Window
—	Corridor
—	Room
—	Staircase
—	Elevator
—	Other

**PROJECT 1046**



PINDAR: ANTICIPATED PROGRESSION OF MANNING

	Occasion	Defence Secretariat Staff	Ministers* Private Secretaries, Permanent Secretaries* and Extra FCO Staff	JIO	COMCEN	Total Numbers
i	Normal Peacetime Use	-	-	-	11	11
ii	Peacetime Incident; Terrorist or Civil Contingency	-	-	-	12	12
iii	Rising tension up to and possibly including MIL VIG	11	-	#	13	24
iv	TTW - MILVIG/Simple Alert	13	3	20	18	54
v	TTW - Reinforced Alert	20	19	20	18	77
vi/vii	Reinforced/General Alert - War	20	26/33	20	18	84/91

\* Or appointed representatives.

# Numbers to be decided according to circumstances.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PINDAR OFFICE PLAN

FROM: K J PIKE  
DATE: 6 May 1987

MR MEADOWS

cc: Mr Hansford  
Mr F Martin  
Mr Hodgson (with attachment)


PROJECT PINDAR

The Defence Secretary's minute of 30 April to the Prime Minister records that the works element of the project is now estimated to be £20.75m.

2. You have taken the lead in previous correspondence and on 13 November 1986 you approved a revised estimate of £20m which was said to be the total cost. The Defence Secretary's minute puts the works element at £20.75m. It is not clear whether the figures are in effect the same and whether further PES transfers from MOD to PSA are required. Mr Hodgson is in the lead on the equipment procurement, now estimated to cost £47m, which is being funded from Votes 2E1, 2F2 and 2F4 and you will want to liaise with him on that aspect. Paragraph 2 of the Defence Secretary's minute refers to savings on the siting of the National Strategic Targeting Centre. I am afraid this means nothing to me.

3. Please let me know if there is anything you require from me. I would like the opportunity to comment on LG2's draft submission to the Chancellor.

4. If Treasury approval is required, Mr Robson has suggested that LG2 should arrange for No.10 to be alerted so the PM does not minute "OK".



K J PIKE





Nigel

MO 20/11/1V

PRIME MINISTER

30/6/87.

CH/EXCHEQUER	
REC.	01 JUL 1987
ACTION	MR MEADOWS
COPIES TO	CST SIR P MIDDLETON
	MR F E R BUTLER
	MR ANSON
	MR HALTIN
	MR ROBSON
	MS SEAMEN
	MR INSTONE
	MR J M G TAYLOR

PROJECT PINDAR

In my minute of 30th April reporting on developments concerning Project PINDAR, I informed you that the adequacy and extent of Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) protection levels in the complex were under urgent review in the light of a new JIC assessment of the EMP threat. This review is now complete.

2. The future threat of EMP attack is greater than it appeared in 1983 when we agreed to provide EMP protection for PINDAR: in particular there is now a threat of non-nuclear EMP attack during conventional hostilities. Changes since 1983 in the configuration of PINDAR with the use of more sophisticated electronics and wider distribution of sensitive equipment mean that the scale of EMP protection currently being provided will be less effective than was originally intended. There is a risk that essential areas of PINDAR would be disabled by an EMP attack and its operational capability thereby severely degraded. I have decided therefore to extend the EMP protection in PINDAR at an estimated additional cost of £3.35 million; it is expected that this can be achieved without delaying its In Service Date of late 1990.



3. I am sending copies of this minute to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Environment Secretary and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

*C.Y.*

Ministry of Defence

30 June 1987

S E C R E T

FROM: R J MEADOWS

DATE: 3 July 1987

1. MR INSTONE
2. CHANCELLOR

cc PS/Chief Secretary  
 Sir P Middleton  
 Mr F E R Butler  
 Mr Anson  
 Mr Hawtin  
 Mr Robson  
 Mr Hansford  
 Mr F Martin  
 Mr Brazier

*c/letter to issue?*

*CR 317*

*JK-*

## PROJECT PINDAR

The Secretary of State's minute of 30 June has advised the Prime Minister of his decision to extend EMP protection for project PINDAR at a cost of £3.35 million.

2. The purpose of PINDAR is to provide accommodation for the Joint Operations Centre and the Cabinet Office Briefing Room and their communications during a period of conventional War.

3. The project was approved in April 1984 at an estimated cost of £12.5 million. The Secretary of State for Defence advised the Prime Minister in his previous progress report of 30 April that the estimated cost of the project had increased to £20.75 million, which, after taking account of price increases represented a real increase of some 15%. The price increases include a sum of £2.3 million resulting from the extension of VAT to refurbishment work. The real increase is due to changes in specification and variations in design as the project has

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
developed. In approving additional expenditure in November 1986 the Treasury made it clear that there should be a clear presumption against any further design changes in view of the risks that they would present in terms of cost and time overruns.

4. The further work estimated to cost £3.35 million will be on top of the existing estimate of £20.75 million. This is to extend the extent of Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) protection. MOD have argued that if this work is not done equipment outside the existing envelope of EMP protection would be at risk. PINDAR's operational capability would be seriously degraded if this equipment were put out of action. The extra EMP work cannot be treated as a separate project as it will need to be built into the structure as the existing contract proceeds.

5. We propose to authorise the additional expenditure of £3.35 million subject to the cost being met from within existing Defence Budget provisions.

6. I attach a minute for your Private Secretary to send to No.10 if you are content.

7. That and the advice in this submission have been agreed with DM.



R J MEADOWS

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

FROM: PS/CHANCELLOR

DATE: July 1987

MR WICKS

PROJECT PINDAR

The Chancellor has seen the Secretary of State for Defence's minute of 30 June about project PINDAR.

2. ~~He has asked me to say that~~ In view of the increased risks of EMP dislocation which the Ministry of Defence now perceives, ~~he~~ <sup>The Chancellor</sup> does not wish to dissent from the Secretary of State's decision, subject to extra expenditure of £3.35 million being met from within existing allocations. This will increase the total works cost estimate to £24.1m.

3. <sup>The Chancellor</sup> He hopes, however, that there will be no need for further extensions to this project, which has a long history of cost escalation.

4. I am copying this to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Environment Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A C S ALLAN

S E C R E T

SECRET



cc: PS/CST  
Sir P Middleton  
Mr F E R Butler  
Mr Anson  
Mr Hawtin  
Mr Robson  
Mr Hansford  
Mr F Martin  
Mr Brazier  
Mr Meadows

*prop*

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG  
01-270 3000

Nigel Wicks Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON SW1

6 July 1987

*Dear Nigel*

**PROJECT PINDAR**

The Chancellor has seen the Secretary of State for Defence's minute of 30 June about project PINDAR.

In view of the increased risks of EMP dislocation which the Ministry of Defence now perceives, the Chancellor does not wish to dissent from the Secretary of State's decision, subject to extra expenditure of £3.35 million being met from within existing allocations. This will increase the total works cost estimate to £24.1 million. The Chancellor hopes, however, that there will be no need for further extensions to this project, which has a long history of cost escalation.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Environment Secretary and Sir Robert Armstrong.

*Yours  
Allan*

**A C S ALLAN**  
Principal Private Secretary