$$
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& \text { PO-CH/VL/0060 } \\
& \text { Part B }
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## Pare. B.

## SECRET

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Chancellor's (Lawson) Papers:
ECONOMIC FORECASTING AND
PERFORMANCE 1984

Disparal Diections 25 Years

## CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER


cc Sir P Middleton
Sir T Burns
Mr Battishill
Mr Evans
Mr Odling-Smee
Mr Culpin
Mr Folder or.
Mr Shields
Mr Horton
Mr Lord
Mr Portillo
Mr Ridley
Mr Lomas - CSO
HE /43

## CYCLICAL PEAKS

You asked how long a sustained period of growth below 3 per cent would have to be for the CSO to define a peak (Mr Peretz's note of 13 June refers).
2. This depends mainly on the extent of the moderation in growth. A slight easing in growth, say from an annual rate of 3 to 2 percent, would probably have to persist for over a year for a peak to be identified. A sharper slowdown in growth would need to persist for a shorter time.
3. On the effects of the miners' strike, the CSO always interpret movements in their indicators with care, especially when they are affected by special circumstances such as strikes. In the current miners' strike the direct effects of lost coal output on GDP and hence the coincident indicator are reasonably easy to calculate. Any apparent peaking in the coincident indicator which was attributable to the direct effects of temporarily lower coal output would be heavily discounted and would not be regarded, or publicly reported, as a definite turning point. (The possible emergence of secondary effects in a very prolonged strike would make it more difficult to assess 'underlying' activity, however).
4. Finally, the diagram in Mr Perez's note is, infect, not quite as nonsensical is appears. The experience of cycles in the late 1950's and 1960s was for 'troughs' in activity to occur at levels of output higher than at previous peaks (this is clear from the attached chart). The 1974-75 and, of course, the 1979-81 recessions broke this pattern, with troughs well below previous peaks.

shelkhugh lon hat.... A surra
BB



CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

cc Chief Secretary Financial Sccrctary Economic Secretary Minister of State Sir Peter Middleton Sir Terence Burns Mr Cassel<br>Mr Monck<br>Mr Battishill<br>Mr Evans<br>Mr Odling-Smee<br>Mr Sedgwick<br>Mr Folder<br>Mr MA Hall<br>Mr Spencer<br>Mr A Smith<br>Mr Lord<br>Mr Ridley<br>Mr Portillo<br>Mr Kavanagh (CSO)

GDP FIGURES FOR THE FIRST QUARTER

The CSO will be publishing provisional estimates for all three measures of GDP tomorrow (Thursday 21 June at 2.30 pm ). A press notice is attached.

A preliminary estimate of the output measure (GDPO) in the first quarter was published last month. This has been revised slightly and now shows an increase of 0.2 per cent from the fourth quarter and of 3.1 per cent from the same period last year. The expenditure measure (GDPE) is estimated to have risen 0.3 per cent since the last quarter but the income measure has gone up 2.1 per cent.

This large spread of estimates produces a rise in the average measure of 0.9 per cent but the output measure, which rose only a little, is generally considered the best guide for quarter to quarter movements. The press notice draws attention to the fact that both average and
output measures are about 3 per cent above their level a year ago.

The growth occurred in spite of the fact that all measures of GDP were depressed somewhat by the effect of the overtime ban and subsequent strike in the coal industry. The effect on GDP (0) in the first quarter is said to be approaching half a per cent.

The figures are consistent with the budget forecast of 3 per cent growth in 1984. Expenditure, income and average measures are now substantially above their 1979 peaks but the output measure is still below its 1979 Q2 level

GDP Index $1980=100$
Output Expenditure Income Average \% change in average on a year earlier

| 1979 | 103.3 | 102.4 | 102.1 | 102.6 | 2.4 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1980 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | -2.6 |
| 1981 | 98.0 | 99.3 | 98.5 | 98.6 | -1.4 |
| 1982 | 99.4 | 101.4 | 101.1 | 100.6 | 2.0 |
| 1983 | 102.2 | 104.9 | 104.5 | 103.9 | 3.3 |
| 1983 Q1 | 101.0 | 105.6 | 103.8 | 103.5 | 3.4 |
| Q2 | 101.2 | 103.8 | 103.9 | 103.0 | 2.7 |
| QU | 102.8 | 103.8 | 104.2 | 103.6 | 3.3 |
| QU | 103.9 | 106.3 | 105.9 | 105.4 | 3.7 |
|  |  |  | 106.6 | 108.0 | 106.3 |

Expenditure grew in spite of a fall in the largest item, consumption. Fixed investment showed a large rise after the substantial increase in the fourth quarter. The largest rise in incomes was in company profits.

## Line to Take

(i) Figures consistent with continued growth of underlying GDP of 3 per cent a year
(ii) Recovery becoming more broadly based with rises in investment and exports.


G R HORTON


PRESS

# CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE <br> GREAT GEORGE STREET PRESS CALLS ONLY 01-233 7489/6187 LONDON SW1P 3AQ 

PERSONAL AND RESTRICTED until release - Press Notice at 2.30 p.m. on Tiluysexy 21 unl

CSO(84) 53
21 June 1984 and thereafter unclassified

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1984

The provisional estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of 1984 show that economic activity has continued to improve. The average measure of GDP at constant factor cost in the first quarter was 2 3/4 per cent higher than a year earlier and 9 per cent above its trough in the second quarter of 1981. The output measure, usually the best indicator of short term movements, showed little change between the fourth quarter of 1983 and the first quarter of 1984 but was 3 per cent above the level of a year earlier.

The first quarter figures for all measures of GDP were depressed somewhat as a result of the reductions in coal output arising from the overtime ban and subsequent strike in the coal industry. The current underlying annual rate of growth of GDP (making broad allowances for erratic movements in the individual series) is estimated to be around 3 per cent per annum.

GDP at. current market prices ("money GDPn) increased by $61 / 2$ per cent between the first quarters of 1983 and 1984. However, this increase is depressed because the figure for the first quarter of 1983 was inflated by the effect on incomes of back pay to health workers and that for the first quarter of 1984 was reduced as a result of the miners' dispute.

|  |  | Gross domestic product |  |  |  |  |  |  | National disposable income at 1980 marke 1 prices | Implied index of total home costs | Implied markel price GDP deflator |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | At current marke? prices | At current facior cost |  | At constant factor cosi 1980 prices |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Average estimate | Based on expenditure date | Based on income date | Average estimate | Based on expenditure date | Based on income datez | Based on output date | Average estimale | Based on expenditure date | Average estimate |
| 1978 |  | 72.9 | 74.9 | 74.1 | 100.2 | 100.7 | 99.6 | 100.4 | 98.5 | 74.3 | 73.0 |
| 1978 |  | 85.6 | 86.0 | 85.8 | 102.6 | 102.4 | 102.1 | 103.3 | 101.7 | 840 | 83.5 |
| 1980 |  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 1000 | 100.0 |
| $198 \%$ |  | $110.0{ }^{4}$ | 109.5 | 108. 6 | 98.6 | 99.3 | 98.5 | 98.14 | 99.5 | 110.3 | 111.7 |
| 1982 |  | 120.5 | 119.0 | 118.74 | 10074 | 101.4 | 101 14 | 99.7 | $101.5^{4}$ | 117.4 | 115.8 |
| 1983 |  | 131.0 | 130.64 | 130.1 | 103.9 | $104.9{ }^{4}$ | 104.5 | 102.2 | 104.7 | 124.5 | 12 E 1 |
| 1978 | 1 | 64.3 | 71.6 | 70.5 | 98.2 | 98.9 | 97.4 | 98. | 95.E | 724 | 70.6 |
|  | 2 | 71.9 | 74.3 | 73.0 | 100.9 | 102. 0 | 10C. 3 | 100.5 | 98.5 | 72.8 | 71.6 |
|  | 3 | 74.2 | 75.8 | 75.6 | 1007 | 100.6 | 100.3 | 101.3 | 99.1 | 75.2 | 73.8 |
|  | 4 | 76.3 | 77.8 | 77.1 | 101.1 | 101.3 | 1004 | 101.6 | 954 | 76.8 | 75.8 |
| 1070 | $\vdots$ | 78.2 | 79.0 | 79.1 | 100.0 | 99.4 | 99.6 | 101.0 | 99.7 | 79.5 | 78.0 |
|  | 2 | 83.9 | 85.2 | 82.3 | 104.0 103.3 | 104.1 103.8 | 103.0 1028 | 104.8 103.4 | 102.8 102. | 81.8 85.2 | 80.5 |
|  | 4 | 88.5 92.0 | 88.7 91.3 | 87.8 91.8 | 103.3 103.2 | 103.8 102.5 | 103.8 | 103.9 | 102. 1 | 85.2 89.0 | 88.3 |
| 1980 | 1 | 95.8 | 94.E | 96.? | 102.2 | 10: 2 | 102.8 | $102.6{ }^{+}$ | 101.8 | 93.5 | 93.6 |
|  | 2 | 99.1 | 98.5 | 99.7 | 100.7 | 100.1 | 101.4 | 100.7 | 100.0 | 984 | 98.6 |
|  | 3 | 101.1 | 101.9 | 100.7 | 98.8 | 99.3 | 98.1 | 99.0 | 98.5 | 102. E | 102.5 |
|  | 4 | 104.0 | 105.0 | 103.5 | 98.2 | 99.3 | 97.8 | 97.7 | 99.3 | 105.7 | 105.6 |
| $198^{\circ}$ | 1 | 105.94 | 107.7 | 104.1 | 98.3 | 100.4 | 97.0 | 97.5 | 100.5 | 107.3 | $107.8{ }^{+}$ |
|  | 2 | 108.3 | 108.2 | 106.0 | 97.5 | 98.5 | 96.5 | 97.7 | 98.5 | 108.8 | 111.2 |
|  | 3 | 111.4 | 108.7 | 110.2 | 98.5 | 98.2 | 98.8 | 98.5 | 99.0 | 111.6 | 1131 |
|  | 4 | 114.4 | 1124 | 114.1 | 100.1 | 100.1 | 101.6 | 98.7 | 100.4 | 112.3 | 114.8 |
| $198 ?$ | 1 | 116.6 | 113.9 | 114.14 | 100.34 | 100.9 | $101.0+$ 100.7 | 98.9 | 101.5 100.5 | 112.94 | 115.4 119.3 |
|  | 2 | 119.7 | 118.4 | 118.0 | 100.1 | $101.0^{+}$ | 100.7 | QS.E | 100.5 | 117.2 | 119.3 |
|  | 3 | 121.7 | 119.4 | 119.9 | 100.5 | 100.5 | 100.9 | 100.0 | 101.3 | 118.9 | 121.0 |
|  | 4 | 124.3 | $124.2+$ | 122.6 | 101.8 | 103.2 | 101.8 | 100.4 | 103 ! | 120.4 | 122.2 |
| 1953 | 1 | 128.1 | 128.7 | 126.5 | 103.5 | 105.6 | 103.8 | 101.0 | 104.7 | 121.9 | 1240 |
|  | 2 | 128.0 | 128.0 | 128.0 | 103.0 | 103.8 | 103.9 | 101.2 | 102.6 | 123.3 | 125.2 |
|  | 3 | 132.0 | 130.8 | 131.3 | 103.6 | 103.8 | 104.2 | 102.8 | 105.2 | 126.0 | 127.3 |
|  | 4 | 135.0 | 134.9 | 134.4 | 105.4 | 10 E. 3 | 105.9 | 103.5 | 106.2 | 12E. | 128.6 |
| 1984 | 1 | 136.5 | 136.0 | 137.8 | 106.3 | $105 . \mathrm{E}$ | 108.0 | 104. 1 | 105.6 | 127.5 | 128.8 |

1 These estimates are given to one decimal place but this does not imply that they can be regarded as accurate to the last digit shown
2 Income data deflated by the index of total home costs.

The real income of the United Kingdom, as shown by gross national disposable income at constant prices, rose by $13 / 4$ per cent in the year to the first quarter of 1984.

The increase compared with a year earlier in the implied index of total home costs ("the factor cost GDP deflator") wasjust over $41 / 2$ per cent in the first quarter of 1984. This compares with an increase of nearly 4 per cent in the market price GDP deflator: the difference mainly reflects reductions in the national insurance surcharge, which is treated as a tax on expenditure in the national accounts and therefore only has an impact on market price assessments. Both of these indices were also inflated in the first quarter of 1983 by the health workers' back-pay.

Estimates of GDP at current and constant prices, of gross national disposable income at constant prices, of the implied index of total home costs and of the market price GDP deflator are given in index number form on page 2 .

Expenditure at constant 1980 prices (Table B)

The expenditure measure of gross domestic product (GDP(E)) has moved somewhat unevenly in recent quarters, with in particular an erratically high figure occurring in the first quarter of 1983. Largely as a consequence of this, the increase in this measure in the year to the first quarter of 1984 was only 1 per cent. The increase between the fourth quarters of 1982 and 1983 was 3 per cent.

Consumers' expenditure fell by over 1 per cent in the first quarter of 1984 but was still 2 per cent higher than a year earlier. Further details are given below. Fixed investment grew by 10 per cent between the first quarters of 1983 and 1984 while general government final expenditure showed no change. There was some destocking in the first quarter of 1984, following the increase in stocks which occurred in 1983, mainly in the first quarter.

Company profits have continued to improve quite strongly. In the first quarter of 1984, company gross trading profits are estimated to have been almost one quarter higher than a year earlier, much the same as the increase in the year 1983 as a whole. Income from employment grew by some $61 / 2$ to 7 per cent between the first quarters of 1983 and 1984 whilst the gross trading surplus of public corporations showed no change: in both cases, the first quarter figures in 1984 have, as mentioned earlier, been depressed to some extent by the effects of the miners' dispute, whilst the income from employment figures in the first quarter of 1983 were also inflated by the health workers' back pay.

When deflated by the index of total home costs, the income measure of GDP increased by 4 per cent between the first quarters of 1983 and 1984. This measure has also moved somewhat unevenly in recent quarters: the increase in the year 1983 as a whole was some 3 to $31 / 2$ per cent.

Output at constant 1980 prices (Table D)
The output measure of GDP was broadly unchanged between the fourth quarter of 1983 and the first quarter of 1984: in the first quarter it was 3 per cent higher than a year earlier. The level of output in the first quarter (and to a much lesser extent the preceding quarter) was affected by the reduction in coal output resulting from the miners' dispute; the estimated effect us to reduee the quarter-on-quarter increase in GDP by approaehing

Output of the production industries was scarcely changed between the fourth and first quarters, reduced coal output offsetting increases elsewhere. Transport and communication output showed little change and distribution activity fell slightly from its buoyant fourth quarter level but there was a continuation of recent growth elsewhere within the service sector.

Consumers' expenditure (Tables E and F)

At constant 1980 prices, consumers' expenditure in the first quarter of 1984 was over 1 per cent below the level of the fourth quarter of 1983, but still 2 per cent above that of the first quarter of 1983.

The figures reflect the lower level of retail sales of all types of goods (food, household durables, etc) in the first quarter following the high levels of the fourth quarter. New vehicle registrations were also down. On the other hand energy consumption, low in the fourth quarter, increased sharply.

At current prices consumers' expenditure increased by $1 / 2$ per cent between the fourth quarter of 1983 and the first quarter of 1984.

## NOTES TO EDITORS

Although estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) based on expenditure, income and output should in principle give the same result, in practice (as shown by the table on page 2) the data may on occasions move differently. The output measure is usually the best indicator of short-term movements (that is, for periods up to around one year); for medium or longer-term comparisons, the average of the three measures is preferred.

In the interpretation of quarterly and annual national accounts estimates, special attention needs to be paid to the higher margins of error attached to series estimated at constant prices when the rate of inflation is changing significantly. This caution applies whether the rate of change is accelerating (as it was at times during the 1970s) or decelerating (as over the period 1980 to 1982).

More detailed estimates of national income and expenditure up to the first quarter, 1984, will be published in an article in the July issue of Economic Trends. They will be based on later data than are available for this press notice and will incorporate the estimates of personal income and expenditure and of industrial and commercial companies' appropriation account which are scheduled for release on 28 June. The revised data can be obtained from the CSO Databank during July. The Databank is a collection of macroeconomic time-series sold to the public in computer-readable form. The service is run on CSO's behalf by SIA Computer Services. Further details can be obtained from SIA Computer Services, Ebury Gate, 23 Lower Belgrave Street, London SW 1W ONW, Telephone: 01-730 4544.

As usual the commentary in the press notice is based entirely on seasonally adjusted data, as shown in the attached tables. $A+$ indicates that the data are new or have been revised. The period so marked is the earliest in the column to have been revised.

EXPENDITURE ON THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT - AT CURRENT PRICES

|  |  | GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT |  |  |  |  | Final expenditure on goods and services at market prices |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Imports of goods and services |  | Adjustment to factor cost |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| * |  |  |  |  |  |  | Total final expenditure |  | Consumers expenditure |  | General government consumption |  |  |  |  |  | Gross domestic fixed capital formation |  | Value of physical increase in slocks and work in progress | Exports of goods and services |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | At market prices |  | * | At factor cost |  |  |  | Total |  | Cent gove | ral rnment |  | orities |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1978 |  | 166 | 502 |  | 147 |  | 212 | 013 |  |  | 99 | 596 | 33 | 071 |  | 808 | 13 | 263 | 29 | 845 | 1716 |  | 785 |  | 511 | 19295 |
| 1979 |  | 194 |  |  | 169 |  | 249 |  | 118 | 503 |  |  |  |  |  | 400 | 34 | 816 | 2126 |  | 163 |  | 541 | 25309 |
| 1980 |  | 227 |  |  | 196 |  | 284 | 925 | 137 | 324 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 39 |  | -3 236 |  | 209 |  | 429 | 30854 |
| 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 39 |  | -3 075 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1982 1983 |  | 275 300 | $745+$ 584 |  | 233 256 | ${ }^{996}+$ | 342 376 | $654+$ 409 | 168 | 390 456 | 59 | $871+$ 635 | 36 39 | $472+$ 980 | 23 | 399 $655+$ | 42 | $381+$ 889 | -1 $-155 t$ 776 | 73 79 | 167 $653+$ | 66 .75 | 909 $825+$ | 417491 43804 |
| 1983 |  |  |  |  | 256 |  |  |  |  |  | 65 |  | 39 |  | 25 | $655+$ | 45 | 889 | 776 | 79 | $653+$ |  | $825+$ | 43804 |
| 1980 | 1 | 54 |  |  | 46 | 510 | 69 | 309 |  | 228 |  |  | 6 | 720 | 4 | 374 | 9 | 606 | -594 |  | 975 | 15 | 278 | 7521 |
|  | 2 |  | 034 |  | 48 | 423 |  |  | 33 | 879 |  |  |  | 092 | 4 | 528 | 9 | 816 | -101 |  | 880 |  | 060 | 7611 |
|  | 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 34 | 717 |  |  |  | 642 |  | 946 | 9 | 875 | -1312 |  | 600 |  | 696 | 7665 |
|  | 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 054 |  | 500 |  |  | 7 | 988 | 5 | 097 | 9 | 944 | -1229 | 15 | 754 | 13 | 395 | 8057 |
| 1981 | 1 |  | 310 |  | 52 |  | 74 | 270 |  | 690 |  |  | 8 | 003 | 5 | 129 | 9 | 737 | - 1192 |  | 903 |  | 960 | 8350 |
|  | 2 |  | 074 |  |  |  | 76 | 116 | 37 | 881 |  |  |  | 200 |  | 280 |  | 630 | -1330 |  | 455 | 14 | 042 | 8864 |
|  | 3 |  | 213 |  |  | 910 |  | 577 | 38 | 755 |  |  |  | 464 | 5 | 484 |  | 761 | -355 |  | 468 |  | 364 | 9 9 303 |
|  | 4 |  | 015 |  |  |  |  | 596 |  | 773 |  |  | 8 | 645 | 5 | 472 | 9 | 882 | -198 | 18 | 022 |  | 581 | 9767 |
| 1982 | 1 |  |  |  |  | $009+$ |  | $984+$ |  |  |  | $485+$ |  |  |  |  |  |  | -206 + |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2 |  |  |  |  | 213 |  |  | 41 | 608 |  | 892 |  | 082 | 5 | 810 |  | 297 | 341 |  | 358 |  |  | 10188 |
|  | 3 |  |  |  |  | 721 |  |  | 42 | 559 |  |  |  |  | 5 | 882 |  | 791 | -587 | 17 | 972 | 16 | 577 | 10487 |
|  | 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 889 |  |  | 9 |  | 6 | 125 |  | 850 | -703 | 18 | 909 |  | 876 | 10460 |
| 1983 | 1 |  | 134 |  | 63 | 273 | 92 | 344 | 44 | 559 |  | 371 |  | 034 | 6 | $337+$ |  | 307 | 588 |  | $519+$ | 18 | $210+$ | 10861 |
|  | 2 |  | 891 |  |  | 925 |  | 640 | 45 | 671 |  | 303 |  | 848 |  | 455 |  | 065 | 36 | 19 | 565 | 18 | 749 | 10966 |
|  | 3 |  | 191 |  |  | 277 |  |  | 46 | 734 |  |  |  | 929 |  | 377 |  | 423 | -53 |  | 560 |  | 779 | 10914 |
|  | 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 47 | 492 |  |  |  |  |  | 486 |  | 094 | 205 |  | 009 |  | 087 | 11063 |
| 1984 | 1 | 77 | 868 |  | 66 | 841 |  | 657 | 47 | $715+$ |  | 756 |  | 250 | 6 | 506 | 12 | 897 | -509 | 21 | 798 | 20 | 789 | 11027 |

Final expenditure on goods and services at market prices


# FACTOR INCOMES IN THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 

Seasonally adjusted
TABLE C

| c | GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT |  |  |  |  | Net property income from abroad | Residual error | GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IINCOME -BASED) |  | Total domestic income |  | Income from employment |  | Gross trading profits or surplus |  |  |  |  | Other income(2) |  | LESS Stock appreciation |  | Memorandum items |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | Company profits net of stock appreciation |  |  |  | Industrial \& commercial companies trading profits(3) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | At market prices |  | At factor cost |  |  |  |  |  |  | Companies(1) |  | Public corporations |  | General government enterprises |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | gros |  |  |  |  |  |  | net(4) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1978 |  | 167 |  |  |  | 147 |  | 868 | 661 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 245 | 145 | 962 | 151 |  |  |  |  | 322 | 5 | 391 | 205 | 23 | 830 |  | 223 |  | 946 |  | 093 |  | 717 |
| 1979 |  |  |  |  |  | 1090 | -1029 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 29 | 982 | 5 | 582 | 190 | 28 |  |  | 739 |  | 787 |  | 277 |  | 082 |
| 1980 |  |  | 430 + |  | 576 + | -66t | -1 810 |  | 452 | 205 |  | 135 |  | 30 |  |  |  | 189 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 199 |
| $1981$ |  |  |  |  |  | 1317 | -195 | 215 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 154 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $1982$ |  | 277 |  | 235 |  | 1. 625 | -1 $516 \dagger$ | 235 | $512+$ | 239 | $402+$ | 156 | $289+$ | 34 | $559+$ | 9 | 068 | 120 | 39 | 366 t |  | $890+$ |  | $495+$ |  | 175 t |  | $111 t$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 1363 | -1 309 | 258 | 089 |  |  |  | 190 |  |  |  | $735+$ | $21+$ | 42 |  |  | 282 |  |  |  | 029 |  | $477$ |
| 1980 | 1 | 53 | $977+$ | 46 | $456+$ | -54t | -1 172 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 41 | 7 |  |  | 776 |  | 580 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2 | 55 | 900 | 48 |  | -134 | -1 065 | 49 | 488 | 50 |  | 33 |  |  | 848 | 1 | 361 | 70 | 8 |  |  | 462 |  | 740 |  | 304 |  | 196 |
|  | 3 |  |  | 50 | 112 | - 5 | 162 | 49 | 945 |  | 392 |  | 721 |  | 807 |  | 498 | 36 | 8 | 330 |  | 447 |  | 657 |  | 414 |  | 264 |
|  | 4 |  |  |  |  | 117 | 265 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 697 | 1 | 643 | 42 | 8 | 515 |  | 889 |  | 018 |  | 487 |  | 808 |
| 1981 | 1 | 61 | 576 | 53 |  | 266 | 1318 |  | 642 | 52 | 889 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 48 | 8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $2$ |  | 468 | 53 | 604 | 394 | + 599 |  | 611 |  |  | 36 | 183 |  | 229 | 1 | 954 | 39 | 8 | 796 |  | 590 |  | 012 |  | 364 |  | 147 |
|  | 3 |  | 535 |  |  | 322 | - 770 |  | 680 |  |  |  |  |  | 099 | 1 | 985 | 59 | 9 | $095$ |  | 584 |  | 795 |  | 331 |  | 027 |
|  | 4 |  |  |  |  | 335 | -1 342 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 2 |  | 8 | 9 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 954 |
| 1982 | 1 |  |  | 56 |  | 103 | -613+ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 41 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2 | 68 | 824 | 58 | 636 | 423 | -350 | 58 | 563 | 59 | 339 | 38 | 933 |  | 390 |  | 215 | 50 |  | $751+$ |  | 776 |  | 911 |  | 567 |  | 088 |
|  | 3 | 69 |  | 59 |  | 462 | -786 | 59 | 507 |  | 423 |  | 128 |  | 995 |  | 341 | 6 |  | 953 |  | 916 |  | 224 |  | 126 |  | 355 |
|  | 4 |  |  |  |  | 637 | 233 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 23 | 10 | 134 |  | 209 |  | 834 |  | 938 |  | 918 |
| 1983 | 1 |  |  |  |  | 424 | 518 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | -5 |  |  |  | 801 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2 |  |  |  |  | -21 | -580 |  | 505 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 628 | - -+ |  | 439 |  | 019 |  | 224 |  | 245 |  | 424 |
|  | 3. |  |  |  |  | 585 375 | -865 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 366 | 26 |  | 700 |  | 204 |  |  |  | 613 |  | 652 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | 375 | -382 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 036 |  | 988 |
| 1984 | 1 | 78 | 137 | 67 | 110 | 269 | -1516 |  | 357 |  |  |  | 634 |  | 240 | 2 | 329 | -18 | 11 | 133 |  | 961 |  | 400 |  | 640 | 12 | 800 |

(1) Including financial institutions.
(2) Income from rent, self employment and imputed charge for consumption of non-trading capital
3) Excluding financial companies and institutions. Their contribution to the gross national product is measured as the difference between bank charges, commissions, etc, on the one hand and the management expenses on the other, and is negative.
(4) Gross trading profits net of stock appreciation

INDEX NUMBERS OF OUTPUT AT CONSTANT FACTOR COST
Seasonally adjusted


# CONSUMERS' EXPENDITURE AT CURRENT PRICES 

Seasonally adjusted
TABLE E

(1) Including the adjustments for international travel, etc. and final expenditure by private non-profit-making bodies.

CONSUMERS' EXPENDITURE AT 1980 PRICES


[^0]FROM: D L C PERETZ
DATE: 22 JUNE 1984

Mr Smith

```
cc Sir P Middleton
    Sir T Burns
    Mr Eattishill
    Mr Evans
    Mr Odling-Smee
    Mr Culpin
    Mr Folger
    Mr Shields
    Mr Horton
    Mr Lord
    Mr Portillo
    Mr Ridley
    Mr Lomas - CSO
    HE/l3
```

CYCLICAL PEAKS
The Chancellor was grateful for your further note of 18 June.
2. The explanation in the fourth paragraph is rather as he thought, and suggests - he thinks - that the CSO methodology should now be brought up to date to take account of the pattern of the two most recent cycles.


D L C Peretz


CYCLICAL PEAKS
Thank you for sending me a copy of your minute to Mr Smith of 22 June. I am afraid that it reveals a misconception about the CSO cyclical indicators methodology, which is not dependent on the pattern of cycles in the way suggested.

The methodology adapts automatically to cycles with differing underlying growth rates. Although in the last two cycles the level of activity fell between the peak and the following trough, the methodology took account of this and could cope perfectly well with a resumption of the previous pattern in which no falls were recorded over the downswing phases. The cyclical indicators describe movements in economic time series relative to their long-term trends. It is an essential feature of the methodology that they can and do adapt to changes in long-term trend.

I realise that it is difficult for the nonspecialist to grasp the full meaning and implications of economic cycles and in particular the statistical methods CSO employ to identify them. If you feel that further explanation would be useful, or perhaps some illustrative examples, we should be happy to supply therm.

FROM: D W OWEN DATE: 29 JUNE 1984
1.

2. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER
 for some time, yon way like t be aware of the finding: ty provide much firer bulking, tough ale 10 mid 1983 , for atimentes of emplannant and empliged
labour fore. HPE
HP 217
cc. Chief Secretary Financial Secretary Economic Secretary Minister of State Sir Peter Middleton Sir Terence Burns Mr Battishill
Mr Culpin Mr Forger Mr Shields ocr
Mr Ridley
Mr Lord
Mr Portillo
Mr Smith

EMPLOYED LABOUR FORCE: REVISED ESTIMATES BASED ON RESULTS OF 1983 LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

Revised estimates of the employed labour force are due to be published at 11.30 am on 18 July.
2. These revisions will affect the series for self employment, employees in employment (in service industries and in manufacturing) and so the employed labour force over the period since mid 1981. The main effects of the revisions, which are not large, are summarised in the attached table. The employed labour force is now estimated to have risen by about 220 thousand between March and December 1983 compared with an increase of 190 thousand on previous estimates.
3. The revisions to the employment series are based on the results of the June 1983 Labour Force Survey (LFS). A comparison of these results with the results of the June 1981 LFS provides a more reliable estimate of employment in June 1983 than the old 'supplementary' estimate, which was based on quarterly sample enquiries but included a 'supplementary addition' to allow for underestimation in the basic series. The supplementary addition - worth 40 thousand per quarter

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until

## 18 July

for employees and 25 thousand per quarter for self employment - was based on the rate of undercounting which occurred between 1979 and 1981. The 1983 LFS results provide the first opportunity to revise these estimates of the supplementary addition.
4. The LFS results suggest that the employed labour force in June 1983 was about 70 thousand higher than the supplementary estimate - the number of employees in employment was 130 thousand higher (with upward revisions for both manufacturing and service sectors), while the number of self employed was 60 thousand lower. The results confirm that the supplementary estimates provided a much more accurate indication of employment movements than did the basic series. The revised estimates of the supplementary addition, derived from these results, are 58 thousand per quarter for employees and 17 thousand per quarter for self employment. Estimates of the employed labour force since June 1983 will now include these revised (and, overall, larger) additions.
5. In future a single series for employment will be published: the basic series will no longer appear. The estimates of employment since June 1983 will be reviewed again when the 1984 LFS results become available in the first half of next year.

# Did Owen 

D W OWEN
EA:

CONFIDENTIAL until

$$
18 \text { July }
$$

## Employed Labour Force in Great Britain

thousand, seasonally adjusted

|  | Present supplementary <br> series | Revised series |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| June 1981 | 23750 | 23750 |
| September 1981 | 23650 | 23643 |
| December 1981 | 23527 | 23531 |
| March | 1982 | 23500 |
| June 1982 | 23398 | 23515 |
| September 1982 | 23257 | 23425 |
| December 1982 | 23184 | 23294 |
| March 1983 | 23139 | 23233 |
| June 1983 | 23167 | 23199 |
| September 1983 | 23221 | 23238 |
| December 1983 | 23327 | 23304 |
| Change: |  | 23421 |
| June 1981- | -611 |  |
| March 1983 | +188 | -551 |
| March 1983- |  | 222 |
| Dec 1983 |  |  |

Bow Bells House, Bread Street, London EC4M 9EL Telephone: 01-236 2040 Telex: 883006
W. Greenwell Inc.,

450 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: $212 \mathbf{8 3 2} \mathbf{7 4 2 8}$

# Monetary Bulletin 

No 161
July 1984

## Introduction

During the last nine months we have been relatively relaxed about the behaviour of the monetary aggregates. In the light of the latest data this position must obviously be thoroughly scrutinised; this is done in some detail below but it may be helpful to begin with a broad summary.

The most striking feature of the monetary statistics at present is the marked acceleration in all of the broader aggregates. The growth of PSL2 has been high for some time but its six month rate of growth has continued to rise since the turn of the year. PSLI and, now, sterling M3 are also growing at rates clearly greater than the target range.

The picture is rather different for the narrower aggregates. Mo remains well within its target range. Currency, on a properly calculated basis, is not too different. The growth of retail Ml looks to be slowing down after a temporary acceleration in March and April, while M2 is trending very slowly upwards in a way that is consistent with reasonable economic growth.

There is, therefore, a striking contrast between the behaviour of the two sets of monetary aggregates. With inflation relatively low and stable and with real interest rates at the height they are now, it is obviously true that a growing portion of genuine savings are being held in the form of interest-bearing money, e.g. with building societies and in bank deposit accounts. It is also true that such savings can subsequently be spent, thereby raising inflationary pressures, but there are no signs yet of a strong spending boom. If anything, retail sales seem to be losing their momentum, and the rise in interest rates must make a further slowdown more probable.

## Monetary Growth in the Month to Mid-June

The seasonally adjusted data for the five weeks to 20 th June were as follows:-

|  | £m. | p.a. |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
|  | 144 | $13 \%$ |
| Currency | 118 | $12 \%$ |
| Retail M1 | 279 | $10 \%$ |
| M1 | 853 | $22 \%$ |
| Sterling M3 | 2,064 | $24 \%$ |
| PSLI | 2,589 | $29 \%$ |
| PSL2 | 3,874 | $27 \%$ |
| Bank lending in sterling <br> to private sector | 1,549 | $17 \%$ |


| R. H. Lawson <br> G.T. Pepper <br> C.E Frappell The Lord Annaly J.A. Rickards <br> L Gooderham <br> T. Quinn | M.T. Higgins D.G. Thomson H.N. Seely T. G. Wakeley J.F.R. Hammond J. Wigglesworth EJ. Fenton | A.J. Bonner <br> N.S. King <br> G.P.P. Stewart <br> K. P. Joseph <br> A. G.P. Davidson <br> P. D. Jones <br> R.L Thomas | KC. Brown J.C. Finch S. J. D. Posford RW. Walker W.EA. Bain R. M. Harvey R. B. Pomphrett | M.R.F. Wonfor AL Bucknall <br> M.S. Jaskel <br> P.B. Lilley <br> AJ.E. O'Sullivan <br> G.R. Addison <br> K.M. Feeny | P. H. Beaufrère KAJ. Crawford J.B. Lake L Maddy R.J.M.L Ottley S. H. Wamsley I.S. White | Limited Partner Samuel Montagu Securities Limited |
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The longer-term picture of monetary growth at mid-June becomes:

| \% p.a. |  | 3 months | 4 months** | 6 months | 1 year |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Narrow money: | Mo | 6 | 7 | 5 | 5 |
|  | Currency | 10 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
|  | Retail M1 | 13 | 15 | 9 | 9 |
|  | Ml | 23 | 27 | 20 | 14 |
|  | M2 | п.a. | n.a. | n.a. | 11* |
| Broad money: | Sterling M3 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 9 |
|  | PSLI | 16 | 17 | 12 | 10 |
|  | PGL2 | 19 | 20 | 17 | 13 |

* $8 \%$ after allowing for reclassification of building society deposits ** Target period so far

The growth of Mo continues to be reassuringly in the middle of its $4-8 \%$ p.a. target range. We estimate that it will have risen by less than $\frac{1}{2} \%$ in banking July, bringing its three, six and twelve month growth rates to $7 \frac{1}{2} \%$ p.a., $5 \frac{1}{2} \%$ p.a., and $6 \%$ respectively.

Currency has grown at a similar rate to Mo over the last six and twelve months, but has been more buoyant over the last three. About half of this more rapid growth arises from the fact that the currency series is based on a single, relatively volatile mid-month calculation rather than on an average of weekly data within a banking month. The latter basis produces a three month growth rate for currency of $8 \% \mathrm{pa}$.

The growth rate of retail Ml was again not very high in the month to mid-June. As we pointed out last month, the growth of retail M1 in real terms was lower after mid-1983 than would have been expected given the trend in interest rates; its acceleration in March and April is no cause for alarm if all that was happening was a return of retail Ml to a normal relationship with interest rates. The last two months' figures suggest that this might be happening. Further, the recent rise in interest rates should cause retail Ml to decelerate sharply, starting in the banking month to mid-August.

As the Chancellor stated in his Financial Statement last March "the increasing share of interest bearing deposits within the total has complicated interpretation and made Ml an increasingly inadequate measure of transactions balances". The reclassification of certain deposits late last summer is still boosting the twelve month growth rate of Ml but not the three and six month rates. More recently, however, Ml has been increased by the introduction of high interest checking accounts by Midland and Barclays. Even after making allowance for these accounts, we estimate that Ml's three, four and six month growth rates remain high at about $19 \%$ pa, $23 \%$ pa and $17 \%$ pa respectively.

M2 will no doubt become the authorities' preferred indicator of narrow money but, as a seasonally adjusted series is not yet available, only its annual growth rate is relevant. After adjusting for the reclassification of certain building society deposits, its annual growth rate continues at a very reasonable 8.3\%.

The very rapid growth in sterling M3 in the month to mid-June reflects an above average PSBR (at twice the rate of the Budget forecast for the year) coinciding with high bank lending, low sales of gilt-edged stock and unfavourable external finance and nondeposit liabilities. This extreme combination of every counterpart is exceptional. Turning to future growth, it should be noted that the recent rise in interest rates has
altered the structure of rates. In particular, banks' deposit rates have risen relative to building society share rates. This should encourage a faster growth of bank deposits and, therefore, of sterling M3. To the extent this merely reflects a change in the form which people hold their savings, this rise in sterling M3 would not be especially worrying.

PSLI \& PSL2 are growing even more rapidly than sterling M3. The growth of PSLI has been boosted by non-bank holdings of eligible bills having risen by more than £lbn in the four months to mid-June. The rapid growth of PSL2 reflects a $22 \%$ p.a. increase in its building society component over the same four months.

## Counterparts to Monetary Growth

Sterling M3 was also giving cause for concern a year ago. An obvious approach is to compare this year's overshoot with that of last year, which is done in Table I.

## TABLE I

Counterparts to Monetary Growth

| £ $\quad$ n | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \text { months } \\ & \text { to June ' } 83 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \text { months } \\ & \text { to Oct ' } 83 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \text { months } \\ & \text { to Feb ' } 84 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{4 \text { months }}{} \\ & \text { to June } 184 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PSBR* | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.1 | 4.0 |
| less CG Debt sales | -2.4 | -5.5 | -4.3 | -3.3 |
| Bank Lending | 3.3 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.5 |
| External Finance and |  |  |  |  |
| banks' non-deposit liabilities | -1.3 | -1.3 | -1.8 | -1.6 |
| Sterling M3 | 4.5 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 4.6 |
| Deviation of sterling M3 from: |  |  |  |  |
| mid-point of target range | +1.8 | -0.5 | -0.8 | +2.0 |
| top of target range | +1.2 | -1.1 | -1.4 | +1.3 |

* plus purchase of local authority \& public corporation debt from non-bank private sector.

Remembering the mini-Budget last July, the surprising factor about the above table is that the most important cause of excessive monetary growth last June was very low debt sales rather than an especially high PSBR. The main cause this year is high bank lending. We discuss the PSBR and bank lending in turn.

## The Profile of the PSBR

Ever since the Budget, the profile of the PSBR has been expected to be skewed this year. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the borrowing requirement is expected to be more than $£ 2 b n$ greater in the first half than in the second half of the year.

This is mainly because the tax changes and the asset sales announced in the Budget will have a very uneven impact. Additional VAT receipts, proceeds from asset sales and EEC rebates will be heavily concentrated in the second half of the year. Table II shows the impact of the Budget changes on the PSBR's expected profile.

## TABLE II

Influences on PSBR Profile in 1984/5

| £m | First Half | Second Half |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| EEC rebate | -400 | -650 |
| Asset sales | -600 | $-1,300$ |
| Extra VAT | -50 | $-1,500$ |
| End of N.I.S. | $-\frac{1}{-1,050}$ | $\underline{+3,100}$ |

It should be noted that on a non-seasonally adjusted basis almost the whole of the PSBR is expected to occur in the first half of the year, $£ 6 \frac{3}{4} b n$ compared with $£ \frac{1}{2} b n$. The published figure of $£ 4.7 \mathrm{bn}$ ( $£ 3.4 \mathrm{bn}$ seasonally adjusted) for the first quarter of the fiscal year is quite consistent with this estimate.

The miners' dispute is likely to have a further impact on the PSBR profile, as well as putting the total under some pressure if it is not settled fairly soon. Our estimate of the weekly rate of loss for the NCB and the rest of the public sector is shown in Table III.

TABLE III
Weekly Accounting Losses

## £ m

NCB: reduced revenue from lower sales 65
reduced expenditure $\underline{\underline{-35}}$
CEGB: increased expenditure on oil 43
reduced expenditure on coal $\underline{-26}$
17
British Rail 4
British Steel 4
Police 4
Income tax lost and benefits paid $\frac{7}{66}$

The impact of the dispute on the PSBR will be different from the accounting losses shown above because it will lead to a fall in the NCB's stocks of coal and the CEGB's stocks of coal and oil, which will release finance. The NCB's coal stocks were virtually unchanged in April but the CEGB's coal and oil stocks fell by $£ 130 \mathrm{~m}$ and $£ 50 \mathrm{~m}$ respectively. Data for May and June have not yet been published but reductions in stocks are likely to be lower because the CEGB increased its purchases of fuel oil and because the seasonal reduction in the demand for electricity enabled coal stocks to be conserved.

Allowing for the finance released by the fall in stocks, our estimates of the effect of the miners' dispute on the PSBR during April, May and June are £115m, £240m and £ 200 m respectively. If the dispute were to end by the beginning of August, which does not now look likely, there would be a PSBR increase of some $£ 230 \mathrm{~m}$ in July. The rebuilding of coal stocks by the NCB and CEGB and the continuation, for a few months, of a higher than normal oil burn by the CEGB would continue to raise the PSBR in subsequent months. These additional effects could amount to some $£ 300 \mathrm{~m}$, of which $£ 100 \mathrm{~m}$ would increase the 1985/6 PSBR.

On the assumption that the miners' dispute ends within a month, its total impact on the PSBR this fiscal year will be less than $£ 1,000 \mathrm{~m}$, as compared with a contingency reserve of $£ 2 \frac{3}{4} b n$ for the year as a whole.

There are further identified claims on the contingency reserve. First, public sector pay increases are running above the $3 \%$ assumption made in the Public Expenditure White Paper. The outcome is likely to be an overrun of about $1 \frac{1}{2} \%$ which would increase expenditure for $1984 / 5$ by $£ 550 \mathrm{~m}$, before any offsetting manpower reductions. The increase in the PSBR will be lower at $£ 325 \mathrm{~m}$, as almost $40 \%$ of the extra wage costs will be offset by higher receipts of income tax and national insurance contributions.

Secondly, unemployment is continuing to rise slowly, compared with the Budget assumption of an unchanged level. Social security costs are likely to be $£ 200 \mathrm{~m}$ higher than planned.

There is one important factor which will reduce the PSBR this year. According to the Budget estimates, receipts of petroleum revenue tax (PRT) and oil royalties will be £8bn in 1984/5. As receipts in a fiscal year are determined by production in a calendar year, information for half of the current year is already available. Not only has the volume of oil production risen by $13 \%$ in the first half but the sterling oil price has also risen with the fall in the sterling/dollar exchange rate. The Budget assumed that "oil prices do not change much from current levels". At that time sterling was above $\$ 1.46$. In the first half of the year it averaged $\$ 1.41$. If the average is, say, $\$ 1.33$ in the second half, and dollar oil prices are maintained, the sterling oil price will be $6 \%$ above the Budget assumption. If these assumptions are correct, receipts from PRT and oil royalties will exceed the Budget estimate by some $£ 500 \mathrm{~m}$.

All these factors suggest that the PSBR will be close to the Budget forecast of $£ 7 \frac{1}{4}$ bn. The PSBR is, however, likely to be under real pressure if the miners' dispute extends very far into the autumn.

## Bank Lending

As Table I shows, high bank lending is an important factor behind the rapid monetary growth in the last four months. Indeed, compared with the same period a year ago, bank lending is more than £2bn higher. A full breakdown is not available but partial data clearly indicate that lending to persons is no higher than a year ago (group data for the London Clearing Banks show that lending to persons was about $£ 1.2 \mathrm{bn}$ in the four months to mid-June, some $£ 50 \mathrm{~m}$ lower than last year). The increase of $£ 2 \mathrm{bn}$, therefore, arises from lending to companies and unincorporated businesses.

The quarterly analysis of bank lending to mid-May confirms that the lending is to companies rather than persons. Further, it is widespread across different industries rather than confined to merely a few.

The other source of information is data for industrial and commercial companies' net borrowing in the first calendar quarter, which have recently been published. In spite of a record financial surplus of $£ 3.6 \mathrm{bn}$, bank lending was still high at $£ 2.6 \mathrm{bn}$. This was not because of a strong build-up of liquid assets, which at only $£ 1.1$ bn were less than a third of the previous quarter's increase. Rather, there was a record level of "unidentified" items, at $£ 5.2 \mathrm{bn}$. These include errors and omissions as well as trade credit and unrecorded transactions, e.g. foreign currency flows and changes in leads and lags of trade. The first quarter accounts, therefore, suggest that corporate bank borrowing in the four months to mid-June may reflect lower remittances to the UK and more rapid transfers abroad, presumably responding to the continued rise in the US dollar.

## A Post-mortem

Before coming to overall conclusions, there are some important lessons to be learned from a post-mortem into the recent rise in short term interest rates. To begin with, we focus on the contrast between three firmly held impressions and reality.

## Impressions

First, it is very widely believed that sterling has hepn weak since March. Confidence in the foreign exchange market is determined to a very large extent by sterling's exchange rate against the US dollar, because the US dollar is involved in the majority of sterling's foreign exchange transactions. Almost invariably, the press concentrates on the sterling/dollar exchange rate. Throughout the period since March there have been continual headlines of sterling falling to new all-time lows.

Secondly, most participants in the money and gilt-edged markets believe that sterling weakness is the single most important cause of increases in short term interest rates. They do so because they have observed that there has nearly always been a foreign exchange explanation when the Bank of England has altered its dealing rates in the bill market or, in the old days, when it altered MLR.

Thirdly, many officials believe that the authorities have to accede to market pressure when expectations of an increase in interest rates become really engrained.

## Reality

Reality was certainly different from the first of the above impressions. If the behaviour of the US dollar is excluded, sterling was not weak during April, May and June. The Bank's index of sterling's "effective exchange rate" measures sterling against a basket of currencies weighted according to their importance in our overseas trade. It is possible to calculate an index leaving out the US dollar. Chart I, at the top of page 7, shows that this index actually rose by some $1 \frac{1}{2} \%$ between 30th March and 25th June. During the same period, the dollar's own effective exchange rate rose by no less than $6 \frac{1}{4} \%$, as shown in Chart II, at the bottom of page 7. The sterling/US dollar exrhange rate fell because sterling rose by substantially less than the US dollar. Despite the newspaper headlines, sterling was not weak before 26th June - the US dollar was strong.

On 26th June the Bank, in a most unusual statement, claimed that "there is no need on monetary policy grounds for any general increase in the level of domestic interest rates". On the 28th June, the West German discount rate was raised from $4 \%$ to $4 \frac{1}{2} \%$. An interpretation of these events was that Germany was following the rise in US interest rates but the UK was not. Sterling's weakness became general. Between 25th June and 10th July its effective rate, excluding the US dollar, fell by some $2 \frac{1}{2} \%$. The first report of substantial selling occurred on the afternoon of Thursday 5th July and this continued into the morning of Friday 6th July. The Bank reacted at once; base rates rose by $\frac{3}{4} \%$ at midday on the Friday and the Bank's dealing rates in the bill market were raised by $1 \%$. The crisis, such as it was, broke extremely quickly.

Sterling continued to be weak in spite of this rise in interest rates. The provisional data for the money supply for the month to mid-June, which were published on Tuesday 10th July, were poor and base rates rose by another $2 \%$ on Wednesday llth July. Sterling's effective rate, excluding the US dollar, has subsequently recovered over threequarters its post-25th June losses.


Chart II
U.S. Dollar's Effective Rate


Turning now to the belief that the behaviour of sterling is the dominant cause of changes in short term interest rates, the authorities continue to claim that they are following a domestic money supply policy and have no target for the exchange rate. The Chancellor has explained the policy on two recent occasions, in his Mansion House Speech last October and in his Mais Lecture in June.

The message has not yet got through. This is not because market participants are simple-minded or do not want to understand. Experience has taught the market to ignore what the authorities say and to pay attention to what they do. The simple fact is that the authorities react to foreign exchange pressure and concede to persistent market expectations of a change in interest rates that are based on sterling's behaviour.

The policy which the authorities are trying to follow is quite subtle. The monthly data for the money supply are volatile. When the data are published, it is often far from clear whether a deviation which appears in the monetary aggregates is a random fluctuation or the start of a trend, and the authorities are right to pay attention to all available information. The behaviour of sterling is an important confirming indicator. Put simply, if sterling's behaviour confirms the latest deviation in the money supply, the authorities tend to act quickly. If it does not, they tend to delay.

There is no doubt that the behaviour of sterling has been a most important factor determining the timing of increases in short term interest rates. Many market participants fail to distinguish between the trigger for a change and the underlying reason for it. The distinction should be important on those occasions when sterling and the money supply persist in giving opposite signals, as they did, for example, during February and March 1983 when sterling was weak but the money supply was under control. Such periods are unusual because domestic monetary pressures have an important influence (although with a lag) on the short term capital account (and balancing item) of the balance of payments and, therefore, on sterling. If such a period of divergence occurs, nonmonetary reasons for sterling's behaviour (eg the current miners' and dockers' strikes) should be assessed and the data for the money supply should be examined to make quite certain that they have been correctly interpreted. If the inconsistency persists, history in the UK shows that it has been right to focus policy on the behaviour of the money supply and adopt a foreign exchange policy of benign neglect. March 1983 was an excellent example.

We now consider the third impression, the belief on the part of many officials that the authorities have to accede to engrained market expectations of a change in interest rates. The true position is as follows:
(i) The authorities cannot control the term structure of money rates, eg they cannot peg the seven day rate and the three month rate at levels at which the difference between them is contrary to market expectations of a change in their levels.
(ii) The authorities cannot for long distort interest rate relatives, in particular they cannot hold down bank base rates relative to LIBOR.
(iii) The authorities definitely have the ability to peg the level of one particular money rate, eg either the seven day rate or the three month rate but not both.

If the authorities were to attempt either of the first two courses of action, arbitrage transactions would soon become overwhelming. The situation on 26 th June, when the Bank issued its statement on interest rates, was quite a good example. The term structure of money rates was wrong. The Bank had been dealing in seven day and three month bills at the same yield, which was not in accordance with market expectations. The statement was issued to reassure the market about the general level of rates when the Bank changed the term structure.

The authorities should definitely be able, however, to peg any one particular money rate, because arbitrage transactions will cancel out. Some officials argue there would be a huge demand for cheap funds from the Bank if the authorities were to peg, say, the seven day rate when there were engrained expectations that it would rise. This argument is fallacious; people would not borrow for seven days and invest for, say, three months if the gradient of the yield curve were allowed to reflect expectations accurately.

There is no doubt that officials who argue that the authorities must react to engrained market expectations have a powerful voice. In practice, they tend to win the argument unless it is clear that the change in interest rates is inconsistent with controlling the money supply.
The belief that the authorities will concede to market pressure and will alter interest rates in accordance with sterling's behaviour is reinforced each time they do so. It is now more firmly engrained than ever.

## The Provisional Money Supply Data

The authorities' statement on the 26th June seemed to be inconsistent with the publication on 10th July of poor provisional data for sterling M3 in banking June. We suspect that the authorities were very surprised by these data. They have up-to-date daily information about the majority of the counterparts to sterling M3, namely the CGBR, sales of central government debt and the government's external transactions; these were satisfactory. Up-to-date data for bank lending and banks' external transactions are not, however, available, and early indications for a banking month have to be obtained by survey. We, ourselves, discuss what has been happening widely within the banking sector. The indications we obtain are usually reasonably accurate providing that proper allowance is made for variation in holdings of commercial bills, in particular in the Bank's own holdings. Our discussions for the banking month of June suggested that lending would be about $£ 1,000 \mathrm{~m}$ lower than it actually was; the error was our largest ever. The Bank was probably surprised in the same way.

The vital practical point is that there was a waning in the belief that monetary growth was satisfactory at the same time as the start of substantial selling of sterling. Arguments for a foreign exchange policy of benign neglect were undermined by poor data for the money supply.

## Conclusions

The behaviour of sterling is a very important factor determining the timing of changes in interest rates. When sterling is weak and monetary growth is satisfactory, however, the authorities should not readily acquiesce in a rise in interest rates. Given the conflicting signals from the broader and narrower money aggregates, the authorities were right to acquiesce to some extent this time. They were wrong, however, to ratify a rise as large as nearly $3 \%$.

Looking through the behaviour of sterling, the reason for the substantial rise in UK interest rates was, of course, the upward trend of those in the US. We are most concerned that US rates may rise still further. Dr Henry Kaufman, amongst others, is forecasting that this will happen. More specifically, his current view is that "the peak in interest rates is not near - both in terms of level and when it will occur . . . much higher interest rates loom ahead".

In America, the contractionary effect of high interest rates is offset by grossly easy fiscal policy. In developed countries other than the US, high interest rates are not generally offset by easy fiscal policy to anything like the same extent as they are in the US. The UK is, in particular, at the opposite end of the spectrum to the US. It can be argued that UK fiscal policy is tight rather than easy. Without the offsetting factor of clearly easy fiscal policy, there is a distinct danger that the economic recovery in the UK will collapse if we follow US rates up again.

Such a collapse is not. yet in sight. It will be preceded, if it occurs, by a slowduwn in the growth of the narrower monetary aggregates in the UK. Historically, the money supply has declined in real terms, i.e. after allowing for inflation, prior to every recession. The slowdown does not, however, necessarily occur in the broader aggregates.

The experience of the second half of 1980 illustrates this. There was at that time a loss of confidence, a rise in the savings ratio (from $11 \frac{1}{2} \%$ to $15 \frac{1}{2} \%$ ) and buoyant growth of the broader aggregates, as genuine savings were invested in bank deposits. Something somewhat similar could happen in the coming months. The possibility of another rise in US rates is a dark cloud overhanging the gilt-edged market. We have recently had a dreadful demonstration of what can happen to our market when the US bond market is in disarray. In these circumstances it would be no surprise at all if sales of government debt in the UK did not respond as they should to the current height of UK interest rates. Investors may easily prefer to hold bank deposits rather than gilt-edged stock.

In his recent Mais Lecture, the Chancellor stressed that Mo and sterling M3 have equal weight in guiding policy decisions. In our view he should modify this rule in the coming months and place greater weight on the narrower monetary aggregates. If these start to decline in real terms, the authorities should act as they did in the second half of 1980 and reduce short term interest rates, even if the broader aggregates are still buoyant.

There remains the question about how sterling would react. Ideally, the UK should strive for international agreement, particularly with Germany and Japan, not to follow US interest rates upwards. If such an agreement cannot be achieved and sterling comes under pressure, the UK authorities should adopt a foreign exchange policy of benign neglect and resist those who argue that they must accede to engrained market expectations of a rise in interest rates.


Chart 1 - Monetary Growth in NOMINAL Terms (\% p.a.)

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Chart 2 - Monetary Growth in REAL Terms (\% p.a.)


Chart 3 - Components of Monetary Growth ( bns )


## STATISTICS

reprinted from Bank of England Banking Statistics

| Money stock: amounts outstanding |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| £ millions | Notes and coin in circuiation with pubiic | UK private sector stering sigit deposits |  | Mooey stock Mi(b) |  |  | Mooey stock EM3 (b] [d] |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | UK <br> private <br> sector <br> sterling <br> time <br> depositr(c) | UX private sector deposits in other currencies (c) | Money stack M3[b] [d] |  |
|  |  | Non-interestbearing [a] | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & \text { Interest- } \\ & \text { bearing } \end{aligned}\right.$ |  |  | Unadjusted |  |  | Seasonaily adjusted | Unadjusted $\|$Seasonally <br> adjusted |  | Unadjusted | Seasonaily adjusted |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mos3 May 18 June 15 | 11,263 11,328 | 18.415 18.564 | 10,656 11,102 | 40,334 40.994 | 40.300 | 53,261 | 93,595 | 94,460 | 13.095 | 106,690 | 107.560 |
| June 15 July 20 | 11,328 11,601 | 18.564 18,978 | 11,102 10,714 | 40,994 41,293 | 41,060 40,860 | 53,803 55,029 | 94,797 | 95,430 95,930 | 13,274 | 108.071 | 107.560 108,700 |
| $\begin{array}{ll}\text { Aug. } & 17 \\ \text { Sept. } & 219 \\ \text { Ocz } & 19\end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11,507 \\ & 11,477 \\ & 11,473 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 18,785 \\ & 18,876 \\ & 19,369 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 10,902 \\ & 10,601 \\ & 11,172 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41,194 \\ & 40,954 \\ & 42,014 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 41.180 \\ & 41,170 \\ & 41.910 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 55,59 \\ & 55,952 \\ & 56,135 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 96,773 \\ & 96,906 \\ & 98,149 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 96,380 \\ & 96,740 \\ & 97,750 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 13,489 \\ & 13.545 \\ & 14.086 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 110,262 \\ & 110,451 \\ & 112,235 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 109,870 \\ & 100,290 \\ & 111,830 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{l} 1,531 \\ 12,119 \\ 11,467 \end{array} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19,264 \\ & 19,990 \\ & 19,320 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{l} 1,352 \\ 11,466 \\ 11,914 \end{array} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42,147 \\ & 43,575 \\ & 42,701 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42,190 \\ & 42,680 \\ & 42,980 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 55,757 \\ & 56,238 \\ & 56,619 \end{aligned}$ | 97,90499.81399,320 | $\begin{aligned} & 97,850 \\ & 99,100 \\ & 99,740 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 14,523 \\ & 15,865 \\ & 16,036 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 112,427 \\ & 115,678 \\ & 115,356 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 112,380 \\ & 114,960 \\ & 115,770 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Feb. } 15 \\ & \text { Mar. } 21(\mathrm{el} \\ & \text { Apr. } 18 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11,531 \\ & 11,641 \\ & 12,044 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 19,018 \\ & 19,467 \\ & 20,572 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11,951 \\ & 12,637 \\ & 13,038 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 42,500 \\ & 43,745 \\ & 45,654 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 43,140 \\ & 44,440 \\ & 45,220 \end{aligned}$ | 56,11955,73555,449 | 98,61999,480101,103 | 99,810101,220101,550 | $\begin{aligned} & 16,754 \\ & 17,047 \\ & 17,329 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 115.373 \\ & 116.527 \\ & 118,432 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 116.560 \\ & 118.270 \\ & 118,870 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| MayJune21616 | 11,83411,941 | 20,59320,646 | $\begin{aligned} & 13,485 \\ & 13,962 \end{aligned}$ | 45,91246,549 | $\begin{aligned} & 45,910 \\ & 46,770 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 55,925 \\ & 57,501 \end{aligned}$ | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & 101,837 \\ & 104,050 \end{aligned}\right.$ | $\begin{aligned} & 102.550 \\ & 104,620 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 15,474 \\ & 15,523 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 117,311 \\ & 119,578 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 118,020 \\ & 120,150 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Money stock: changesti]
Table 11.1 in the
Money stock: amounts outstanding
uarterly Bulletin

a] After deducting $60 \%$ of net debit transit items (see additional notes to Tabie 6 of the Quarterly Bulletin).
M1 equais columns $1+2+3$. $£ \mathrm{M} 3$ equals $\mathrm{M} 1+$ coiumn 5 . M3 equals $£ M 3+$ column 7 .
Including certificates of deposit.
Excluding public sector deposits.
Changes in the monthly-reporting population occurred in these months. See also the additional notes to Table 3 in the Quarterty Bulletin, and, for December 1983 , footnote (o) to Table 3 on page 5 .
Changes in the money stock may differ from those which can be calculated by reference to amounts outstanding. (See additionai notes to Table 11 of the Quarterly Bulletin.)
See additional notes to Tables 6 and 11 of the Quarterty Builetin.

An alternative presentation of counterparts to changes in $£ \mathrm{M} 3$

|  | Public sector borrowing requirement (surpius-) (a] |  | Purchases ( - ) of public sector debt by UK private sector (other than baniks) |  |  |  | External and foreign currency and finance of public sector (increase-) |  | Baniks' sterling lending private sector (c] | External and foreign currency transactions of UK banks [d] |  |  |  | Net nondeposit liabilities (increase-) | Money stock EM3 $\mathfrak{a j}$ columns 1-13) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Central goverament borrowing requirement | Other public sector contribution | Other public sector debt debr | Central go debt Sritish govern- ment stociks | vernment <br> Other |  | Purchases of British government stocks by overseas sector | Other (b) |  | Sterling deposits from, net of market loans to, banks abroad (increase-) | Other <br> overseas <br> sterling <br> deposits | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & \text { Other } \\ & \text { Stering } \\ & \text { lending } \\ & \text { to } \\ & \text { overseas } \\ & \text { sectorie] } \end{aligned}\right.$ | Baniks' net foreign currency deposits liabilities (increase-) |  |  |
| Month ended (unadjusted) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |  | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |
| $\begin{aligned} & 1983 \text { June } \\ & \text { July } \\ & 20 \end{aligned}$ | + $+1,188$ $+1,169$ | $-\quad 960$ $-\quad 429$ |  | ( 748 $-1,18$ | $=1$ | 156 159 | - $\quad 13$ | $\begin{array}{r}\text { a } \\ +\quad 89 \\ \hline \quad 81\end{array}$ | $+1,173$ $+2,036$ | - 561 $+\quad 237$ | $\begin{array}{r}36 \\ \hline+\quad 149\end{array}$ | $+\quad 224$ $+\quad 37$ | $+\quad 25$ $-\quad 108$ | - 23 | $+1,202$ $+1,525$ |
| $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Aug } & 17 \\ \text { Sept } & 21 \\ \text { Oct. } & 19 \end{array}$ | 1,603 $+\quad 764$ +1.021 | $\begin{array}{r}55 \\ +\quad 645 \\ \hline \quad 375\end{array}$ |  | 1,082 $-1,747$ $-\quad 394$ | = 4 | 21 442 434 |  | 83 $+\quad 113$ $+\quad 71$ | + + +1.499 +2.017 | $\begin{array}{r}\text { a } \\ -\quad 237 \\ +\quad 64 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | [ 401 $=\begin{gathered}46 \\ =151\end{gathered}$ | +146 $+\quad 229$ $+\quad 277$ | $\begin{array}{r}\text { a } \\ +\quad 133 \\ +\quad 193 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $=\begin{array}{r}25 \\ \hline\end{array}{ }^{235}$ $=\quad 174$ | $\begin{array}{r} +\quad 451 \\ +\begin{array}{c} 58 \\ +1,243 \end{array} \\ \hline+ \end{array}$ |
| $\begin{array}{rr} \text { Nov. } & 16 \\ \text { Dec. } & 14 \\ 1984 \text { Jas. } & 18 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}1 \\ +\quad 959 \\ +\quad 1,786 \\ \hline 1,362\end{array}$ | $-\quad 32$ <br> $\quad 132$ <br> $\quad 491$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -1,143 \\ & -\quad 572 \end{aligned}$ | - 4 | $\begin{aligned} & 488 \\ & 180 \\ & 239 \\ & 239 \end{aligned}$ | $+\quad 46$ $+\quad 86$ $+\quad 164$ | $=\quad 40$ <br> $\quad 204$ | + + +601 +1.798 | 118 $-\quad 15$ $+\quad 526$ | $=472$ <br>  | $\begin{array}{r}\text { + } \\ +\quad 67 \\ +\quad 890 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}\text { a } \\ +\quad 282 \\ +\quad 193 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | - 182 <br> $\quad 25$ <br> $=685$ | - 245 +1.04 $-\quad 493$ |
| $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Feb. } & 15 \\ \text { Mar. } & 21 \\ \text { Apr. } & 18 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}\text { r } \\ \hline\end{array} \begin{array}{r}127 \\ +3,392 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \\ +\quad 92 \\ \hline \quad 65 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -1,051 \\ & =1121 \\ & -1,048 \end{aligned}$ | - 4 | $\begin{array}{r} 66 \\ 450 \\ 346 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}169 \\ -\quad 105 \\ \hline \quad 283\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}1 \\ -\quad 89 \\ +\quad 92 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | +1.230 +1.461 +1.589 | $\begin{array}{r}\text { - } 226 \\ \hline \quad 110 \\ \hline \quad 645\end{array}$ | $-\quad 328$ <br> $\quad 448$ | P $+\quad 280$ $+\quad 357$ $+\quad 354$ | $\begin{array}{r}\text { [ } \\ \hline\end{array}$ | - $\quad 415$ $=652$ -1.087 | $\begin{array}{r} 701 \\ \mathbf{7 0 0 1} \\ +1,623 \end{array}$ |
| May 16 | + 766 | 299 |  | - 279 | 11 | 114 | $\begin{array}{r}10 \\ +1 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $-117$ | + 506 | - 69 | + 292 | + 85 | - 300 | + 92 | + 573 |
| June 20 | + 2243 | 114 |  | - 374 | 54 | 543 |  |  | +1,541 | $\begin{array}{r}\text { + } \\ +\quad 179 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | - 571 | $\begin{array}{r}+152 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \\ +\quad 20 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | - 524 |  |
| Month ended (seasonally adjusted) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & 1983 \text { June } 15 \\ & \text { July } 20 \end{aligned}$ | $+1,710$ $+1,244$ | $\begin{array}{r}831 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  | \% 748 $-1,018$ | $=18$ | 155 182 | 13 $-\quad 209$ | a $+\quad 83$ $-\quad 87$ | + $+1,125$ |  |  | 260 223 |  | 24 $+\quad 124$ | P $+\quad 935$ +492 |
| $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Aug } & 17 \\ \text { Sept. } & 21 \\ \text { Oct. } & 19 \end{array}$ | + $+\quad 851$ +1.249 $+\quad 789$ | $\begin{array}{r} \\ +\quad 191 \\ \hline \quad 583 \\ \hline\end{array}$ |  | 1,082 $-1,747$ $-\quad 394$ | $-\quad 10$ <br>  | 104 514 415 | -102 <br> $\quad 55$ | $\begin{array}{r} \\ +\quad 77 \\ \hline \quad 119\end{array}$ | +1.219 +1.223 $+1,601$ |  | $\pm$ | 294 325 487 |  | $\begin{array}{r}\text { - } 297 \\ \hline \quad 649 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 459 $+\quad 296$ $+\quad 998$ |
| $\begin{array}{rr} \text { Nov. } & 16 \\ \text { Dec. } & 14 \\ 1984 \text { Jan. } & 18 \end{array}$ | $+1,260$ $+\quad 284$ $+\quad 867$ | $\begin{array}{r}29 \\ +\quad 16 i \\ \hline 807\end{array}$ |  | - 1,143 $=\quad 572$ $=\quad 738$ | $-\quad 36$ <br>  1 | 367 118 253 | $\begin{array}{r} \\ +\quad 86 \\ +\quad 86 \\ \hline \quad 164\end{array}$ | $+\quad 46$ <br> $\quad 210$ <br> $+\quad 48$ | $\begin{aligned} & +1,041 \\ & +1,643 \\ & +\quad 944 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 249 .344 .332 |  |  | + $+\quad 110$ +1.052 $+\quad 649$ |
| $\begin{array}{ll} \text { Feb. } & 15 \\ \text { Mar. } & 21 \\ \text { Apr. } & 18 \end{array}$ | $+1,276$ $+\quad 659$ $+1,502$ |  <br> $+\quad 23$ <br> $\quad 103$ <br> $+\quad 175$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & =1,051 \\ & =121 \\ & -1,048 \end{aligned}$ | - 50 | $\begin{gathered} 51 \\ 508 \\ 251 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r}1 \\ -\quad 69 \\ \hline \quad 105 \\ \hline \quad 283\end{array}$ | $+\quad 95$ <br> $\quad 37$ <br> $-\quad 75$ | $\begin{aligned} & =1.280 \\ & +1.637 \\ & +1,425 \end{aligned}$ |  | $\pm$ | $\begin{aligned} & 320 \\ & 299 \\ & 582 \end{aligned}$ |  | - 891 $=\quad 396$ $=\quad 490$ | $\begin{aligned} & +102 \\ & +1,399 \\ & +\quad+373 \end{aligned}$ |
| May 16 June | + 782 | - 343 |  | - 279 | 11 | 111 | $\begin{array}{r}+10 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | - 123 | + 898 |  | + | 129 |  |  | + 866 |
| June 20 | - 1,236 | + 106 |  | - 374 | 56 | 562 |  |  | +1,549 |  |  | 73 |  |  |  |

(a] Excluding public sector bank deposits.
[b] Including pubiic sector foreign currency bank deposits.
[c] Including net purchases of commercial bills by the issue Department, and holdings of sterling certificates of deposit issued by building societies.
[d] A seasonaily-adjusted breakciown of these transactions is not availabie.
(e] Including net purchases of ECGD-backed promissory notes by the Issue Deparment


[a] After deducting $60 \%$ of net debit transit items (see additional notes to Tabie 6 of the Quarteriy Bulletin).
[b] Non-interest-bearing M1 equais columns $1+2$. M2 equals non-interest-bearing M1+columns $4+5+6$.
[c] See foomore (f) to Table 11.1 on page 3
[d] In November 1983 twenty contributors joined the population providing figures in columns 4,8 and 9 , and seven contributors left the series. All monthly-reporting monetary sector institutions contribute to coiumn 2. (See articie in June 1982 Bulletin, page 225.)

Private sector liquidity, and other deposits

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \& Hqu \& ty, and \&  \& posits \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& [Summary \& bie 12 in the reriy Bulletin! \\
\hline \& Money' \& Other \& Savings uepusis \& stitution d securities \& Certificates tax deposit \& \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& \text { PSLI } \\
\& \text { (columns } \\
\& 1+2+5 \text { ) }
\end{aligned}
\] \& \[
\begin{aligned}
\& \text { PST. } 2 \\
\& \begin{array}{c}
\text { columns } \\
1+2+3+6)
\end{array}
\end{aligned}
\] \& PSL1 \& \& PSL2 \& \& Other silane with buildi \& \(d\) deposits cieties \\
\hline \& Seasonally acjusted \& \begin{tabular}{l}
instruments \\
adjusted
\end{tabular} \& Seasonaily \& adjusted \& Seasonaily \& \begin{tabular}{l}
djusted \\
Column 5
\end{tabular} \& Seasonaily \& Seasonaily \& \& \& \& \& \& ted \\
\hline \& \& \& Total (net) \& of which shares and deposits with building societies [3] \& Issues net of surreaders \& less building sociery doldings \& \& \&  \& \& a \& \& Amount outstanding \& Change in moath \\
\hline Month ended \& 1 \& 2 \& 3 \& 4 \& 5 \& 6 \& 7 \& 8 \& 9 \& \& 10 \& \& 11 \& 12 \\
\hline \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline \[
\begin{aligned}
\& \text { Juy } 20 \\
\& \text { Aug. } 17
\end{aligned}
\] \& 94.479
94,912 \& 3.040
3,265 \& 60,342 \& 56,058
56,950 \& 2,000 \& 1,818 \& 99,519 \& 159,679 \& \(\begin{array}{r}+\quad 549 \\ +\quad 529 \\ \hline\end{array}\) \& \& +1.518 \& +1.0
+1.0 \& \(\begin{array}{r}16,519 \\ 16,632 \\ \hline\end{array}\) \& +14
+1.3 \\
\hline \& \& \& \& 56.95 \& 1,905 \& 1,723 \& 100,082 \& 161,071 \& + 563 \& \& +1.392 \& +1.9 \& 6,712 \& \\
\hline Sept.
Oct

19 \& 95,272 \& 3,081
3,064 \& 61,786
62.037 \& 57.508

58.098 \& $$
\begin{aligned}
& 1.975 \\
& 2.070
\end{aligned}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 1,7744 \\
& 1,852
\end{aligned}
$$
\] \& \& \& \& \& + 764 \& $+0.5$ \& 17.242 \& +530 <br>

\hline Nov. 16 \& 96,369 \& 3,153 \& 62,477 \& 58.952 \& $$
\begin{array}{r}
2,070 \\
2,116
\end{array}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 1,352 \\
& 1,384
\end{aligned}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 101,371 \\
& 101,638
\end{aligned}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 163,190 \\
& 163,883
\end{aligned}
$$
\] \& +1.043 \& \& +1,276 \& +0.3 \& 17,802

18,241 \& +560
+439 <br>
\hline Dec. 14 \& 97,603 \& 3,124 \& 63.073 \& 59.841 \& 2.048 \& 1,795 \& \& \& + 948 \& \& +1.522 \& \& \& <br>
\hline 1984 Jan. 18 \& 988,170 \& 2,954 \& 64,409 \& 61.149 \& 2,077 \& 1,955 \& 103,201 \& 167,488 \& - 451 \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline Feb. 15 \& \& \& 65,673 \& 62.522 \& 1,869 \& 1,726 \& 103,008 \& 168,538 \& - 159 \& \& +1,084 \& +0.6 \& 18,823 \& +103 <br>
\hline Mar. 21 \& 99,684 \& \& \& 63.742 \& 2,077 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& 18.957 \& +134 <br>
\hline Apr.
May
18 \& 99,999

101,052 \& $$
\begin{aligned}
& 2,975 \\
& 3,095
\end{aligned}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 68,178 \\
& 69,453
\end{aligned}
$$
\] \& 64.734

65,690 \& 2,105
1,982 \& 1,917
1,794 \& 105.079

106,129 \& $$
\begin{aligned}
& 173,069 \\
& 175,394
\end{aligned}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{array}{r}
391 \\
+\quad 929 \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$
\] \& \& +1.652 \& +1.0

$+i .3$ \& 19,002
19,002 \& + +15 <br>
\hline June 20 \& 103,091 \& 3,420 \& 70,753 \& 66.852 \& 2,206 \& 2,003 \& 108,717 \& 179,267 \& -2.589 \& +2.4 \& +3,874 \& +2.2 \& 19.002 \& - <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

[a] Inciuding UK non-bank private sector's hoidings of certificates of deposit and time deposits issued by building societies.
(b) Percentage changes are sinown in italics.

CONFIDENTIAL until 18 July


FROM: MISS J C SIMPSON
DATE: 3 July 1984
cc PS/Chief Secretary PS/Financial Secretary PS/Minister of State PS/Economic Secretary Sir P Middleton Sir T Burns Mr Battishill Mr Culpin Mr Forger Mr Evans Mr Shields or. Mr Ridley Mr Lord Mr Portillo Mr Smith

MR D W OWEN

EMPLOYED LABOUR FORCE:
REVISED ESTIMATES BASED ON RESULTS OF 1983 LABOUR FORCE SURVEY

The Chancellor has seen and was grateful for your minute of 29 June.


1. MR FOL GER
2. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER ummony of the in forecourt would havevers still be prepared.
$100^{2} \mathrm{~F}$ We intend to witch who regular renter te on limen and boaters, more interesting
things to say. MIY I
S.7.84

FROM: NEIL MACKINNON
DATE: 5 July 1984
cc Chief Secretary
Financial Secretary
Sir P Middleton
Mr Bailey
Sir T Burns
Mr Cassell
Mr Battishill
Mr H P Evans
Mr Lankester
Mr Scholar
Mr Folder
Mr Culpin
Miss Peirson
Mr Page
Mr A Smith
Mr Lord
Mr Ridley
Mr Portillo
JD/02

## PHILLIPS AND DREW JULY FORECAST

1. P\&D's latest assessment will be released on Friday, 6 July. Their forecasts are summarised in the attached note. The main changes from last month's forecast include
(i) a considerably larger current account surplus this year (now put at $£ 1.7 \mathrm{bn}$ ) and next reflecting "major upward revisions to official invisible estimates." Note that the previous forecast (June) revised downwards the current account surplus for 1984 from $£ 1 \frac{1}{2}$ billion to $£ 0.8$ billion reflecting the effect of the coal strike on oil imports.
(ii) marginal downward revisions to GDP growth this year from 3.2 per cent to 2.9 per cent, again reflecting the effect of the coal strike. However next year GDP grows by 2.6 per cent instead of their previous forecast of 2.2 per cent.
2. In an accompanying press notice (copy attached) $P \& D$ examine "Government attitudes towards the exchange rate" in the light of "the Government's reluctance to contemplate higher base rates." P\&D discuss the current position in which a lower sterling-dollar rate is perceived to be favourable through its beneficial effects on North Sea oil revenues and, therefore, financing of the PSBR. P\&D argue "this policy thinking is some way from that which originally envisaged deep spending cuts and employed strong sterling as a weapon to lower inflation further" - (page 3 of the main text - copy attached).

EF1 suggest the following line to take on the exchange rate:

The Government has no exchange rate target and misleading to suggest that there is change in policy stance. Recent decline in the effective exchange rate has been modest and partly reflects effect of strong dollar. Against the basket of EMS currencies, and the yen, sterling has been steady for several months. Government does not make predictions about interest rates but policy remains sound and underlying trend in rates is downward despite short-term fluctuations.

N MACKINNON
EB

Latest assessment continues to remain close to the Treasury view on output and inflation this year. 1984 GDP increases at a similar rate to last year (about 3 per cent) but with stronger contributions from exports and investment. See effects of coal strike on GDP recasts below. Retail price inflation falls to about 5 per cent by end 1984, rising slightly 6 per cent by end-1985.

## ASSUMPTIONS

- OECD real GNP grows by $4 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent this year reflecting continuation of strong growth in USA and accelerating activity in Europe and Japan. As a result UK export markets expand by 7 per cent this year and, despite a slowdown in US growth, 4 per cent in 1985. OECD inflation rises steadily over the next two years to peak at $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent in mid-1985: the impact of increasing activity is partly offset by the effect of high unemployment on earnings. Total non-oil commodity prices (in SDR terms) rise by 2 per cent from end-1983 to end-1984 and by 3 per cent in the following year. The official crude oil price remains at $\$ 29 / \mathrm{bl}$ up to end-1985.


## POLICY ASSESSMENT

- Current government policy "shows more concern over unemployment, less over depressing inflation further."
- Government abides by "broad thrust" of current MTFS. Positive fiscal adjustments are assumed to be limited to $£ 1 \mathrm{bn}$ pa upto 1988-89 (amounting to less than a third of the planned cumulative fiscal adjustment of $£ 13 \frac{1}{2} \mathrm{bn}$ in the new MTFS) reflecting real increases in public expenditure and "balance of payments constraints on growth and inflation." Net public sector cost of coal strike put at $£ 25 \mathrm{~m}$ a week.
Claimed that exchange rate policy influenced by advantages of lower sterling-dollar rate on North Sea oil revenues and a steady trade-weighted rate on UK inflation.


## FORECAST DETAILS

- GDP growth is revised down to 2.9 per cent from 3.2 per cent this year as a result of the miners' dispute ie lower stockbuilding, higher imports, and lower coal and steel production. However the forecast of GDP growth in 1985 has been raised from 2.2 per cent to 2.6 per cent. These forecasts assume that the coal strike finishes by end July.
- Little change is expected in the saving ratio but rpdi grows by $2 \frac{1}{2}-3$ per cent this year with a slight slowdown to $2-2 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent reflecting the mild rise in inflation. This underpins growth in consumer spending of $2 \frac{1}{2}-3$ per cent in 1984 and 1985.
- Budget measures are expected to bring forward investment expenditures. As a result manufacturing investment (inc. leased assets) rises by 14 per cent this year compared to $6 \frac{1}{2}-7$ per cent pre-budget. Total fixed investment grows by 6-7 per cent in 1984, and 4-5 per cent in 1985 reflecting "more sluggish" public sector investment. Previous forecasts of stockbuilding for 1984 and 1985 have been considerably revised, a little over £lbn in each year (no explanation is given).
- Rising OECD activity sees the volume of exported goods expanding by $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent this year while non-oil export volumes expand by $6 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The current account shows a surplus of $£ 1.7 \mathrm{bn}$ for 1984 (up on their previous forecast as a result of the "recent large revision in the invisible account.")
- Average earnings grow by $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent in the current round. Basic settlements "remain at their recently higher level of abour 6 per cent". The effective exchange rises slightly throughout the forecast period reaching 81.5 by mid-1985.

KEY INDICATORS
(June forecast in brackets)

|  | GDP(A) <br> (\% chg on prev yr) | RPI <br> chg on prev <br> year - Q4) | Unemployment <br> (UK adults-Q4) <br> millions | Balance of payments on <br> current account (£bn) | PSBR <br> (£bn-fiscal |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| year) |  |  |  |  |  |

## EB

6 July 1984

## PRESS INFORMATION

Embargo : 0.01 hours Friday 6 July 1984
Further information: Dr. Paul Neild 01-628 4444 Night: 048065993

Exchange Rate Policy

Our policy section (p.3) this month contains an analysis of Government attitudes towards the exchange rate. This was brought to the forefront of present policy perceptions by the unusual Bank of England statement issued on Tuesday 26 June that it saw no reason on monetary grounds for a rise in UK domestic interest rates. Further, this reference to monetary policy included all the monetary indicators used for assessing policy, including the exchange rate.

The first point to note is that a fall in the US\$/£ rate tends to boost North Sea oil revenues thereby helping to meet the Government's $£ 7 \frac{1}{4} b n 1984 / 85$ PSBR target. This is especially helpful when public spending is, if anything, overshooting. Secondly, it is the movement in the trade-weighted rate (TWR) rather than the US\$/£ rate that influences domestic inflation and growth trends. Hence, sterling weakness against the US\$ occasioned by pure US\$ strength, a situation in which the TWR may not come under strain, is probably viewed with equanimity since public revenues are boosted at little cost to inflation or growth.

However, with the oilmarket soft, the German engineering strike near settlement, the UK coal strike not settled, the German discount rate increased, and little immediate relief on US interest rates in prospect, more general sterling weakness in the shortterm is a distinct possibility. Meanwhile, the recent Bank of England statement reaffirmed the Government's reluctance to contemplate higher base rates. Further, any suggestion of public spending cuts below present plans, an age-old remedy philosophically in keeping with the first Thatcher Administration, now meets with political hostility.

The question therefore arises of what the Government will do if the TWR comes under pressure. As regards inflation objectives, to the extent that TWR weakness stems from soft oil prices, the Government has more scope to do nothing since the inflationboosting effect of the TWR fall will hopefully be partially offset by the inflationdepressive effect of oil price softness. In addition, a base rate hike to protect the TWR could, in present circumstances, trigger a mortgage rate rise. A l point rise

Continued.....
in mortgage rates would directly add $0.3 \%$ to the retail price index. This is a further disincentive to act on inflation grounds. Hence, there is probably some elastic in the TWR before the authorities would feel inclined to overcome their base-rate reluctance for a given inflation objective. However, the Treasury's forecast of $4 \frac{1}{2} \%$ inflation in 1984 Q4 and $4 \%$ in 1985 Q2 was made on the assumption of a TWR constant at the average for last year. This average was about 83 compared with the present near-79. The elastic is probably pretty stretched already if the mid-1985 4\% objective is to be approached.

Finally, as regards the growth objective, the TWR has been allowed to decline at a rate of $7 \frac{1}{4} \%$ p.a. from 1981 Q1 to 1984 Q2, partly to help recovery. Hence officialdom might well be prepared to accept a significantly lower TWR in a year's time on growth account. The speed of any movement rather than the direction would be viewed as more of a problem. A higher base rate would have an independent deterrent impact on growth, quite apart from the protection afforded to the TWR.

All this explains the Government's unwillingness to act. It may be an interesting test.

 C.H.C.S.Sovilile J.Heminigway The Hon.Philip Howard J.B. Hyslop C.A.Marsh $\xrightarrow[\text { R.s. Bialewin }]{\text { W.j.Horwo }}$ W. . Horwood A.P.Joresif
MD D Bayiff ${ }_{\text {J.A.Bradiey }}^{\text {M.D. }}$ A.Bradley

## Policy Assessment

orecasts that follow are based on the policy changes and assessment given below.

## Current Policy Emphasis

In the June issue of Economic Forecasts we explained the current balance of Government policy in terms of using up the unexpected leeway on inflation to dampen unemployment. This was to be distinguished from a policy aimed primarily at promoting growth with the control of inflation only of secondary importance. However, the mix of 1984 Budget measures did in our judgement imply some weakening in the Government's fiscal hold compared with the intentions it set out at the time of the 1983 Budget. We still believe this analysis is broadly correct but the events of late May to mid-June tended to confirm that some shift in policy emphasis has occurred despite the Chancellor's comments in his Mais lecture speech.

Before the May provisional money supply figures were published on 5 June, Bank of England operations made it clear that the Government did not wish to see a second base rate rise at that moment. The subsequently published figures were indeed better than foreseen for two principal reasons. First, private sector bank lending was much lower than figures in previous months, an outcome which we would not expect to last. Secondly, the PSBR was also lower than generally expected but public spending trends may if anything be running slightly ahead of the Government's 1984/85 plans. The explanation of the lower than expected PSBR probably therefore lies in the buoyancy of revenues, principally oil revenues.

It may be thought that the Bank of England action was vindicated by the money supply outturn. However, we think it demonstrated the reluctance of the authorities to accept a base rate increase, which, through its possible effect on the mortgage rates, would jeopardise the achievement of the Treasury's $41 / 2 \%$ retail price index forecast for 1984 Q4. In addition, the authorities proved very sensitive to any suggestion that a fiscal tightening through a midsummer package might be appropriate. Apparently, fiscal insulation from US events can only go so far and no further. Certainly, the impression was given that, on public spending at least, all than can be done has been done. Along with base rate reluctance, this again suggests that the Government feels more constrained in this period of office than in its first, despite its larger majority.
On this point, the new Parliament contains a larger number of conservative MPs in the relatively unemployed areas of the country than did the last. Hence a slight policy shift away from anti-inflation determination and towards greater concern for unemployment would also be explicable in political terms.

We detect that this shift has occurred. What does it amount to? It amounts to the acceptance of $5 \%$ inflation, but it does not amount to 'going for growth' regardless of the inflation consequences. Clearly, a further reduction in inflation below $5 \%$ is seen as desirable, but it might be regarded as a bonus rather than a primary target.

## MAIN POINTS THIS MONTH

$\star$ Current policy emphasis shows more concern over unemployment, less over depressing inflation further.

* Sterling attitude conditioned both by North Sea oil revenue enhancement (lower US $\$ / £$ ) and domestic inflation consequences (steady trade-weighted rate).
$\star$ Spring 1985 Budget to include $£ 1$ bn personal tax relief, half that in MTFS.


## Exchange Rate Strain

Another facet of current Government policy relates to the exchange rate. Here two factors should be borne in mind. First, it is the trade-weighted rate that has a direct effect on domestic inflation. Second, it is the US $\$ / £$ rate that has a direct effect on public sector revenues and hence the PSBR. The present attitude of the Government is probably as follows. A significant fall in the trade-weighted rate in the near future would be unwelcome because it would jeopardise the Government's $41 / 2 \%_{\text {inflation forecast for } 1984 \text { Q4. }}$ However, a gradual fall over the next 12 months or over the medium-term would probably not be unwelcome. Indeed, it may be necessary to produce current account balance at a growth rate sufficient to stabilise unemployment.
A further decline in the US $\$ / £$ rate, on the back of higher US interest rates, would probably not trigger action actively to defend sterling provided other overseas official interest rates did not follow suit and the trade-weighted rate held up. Of course, market forces might in these circumstances put upward pressure on the UK base rate, in which case the Government's aforementioned reluctance to accept a further base hike would come into play and be tested. Rather, the Government would probably not seek to defend sterling out of its own volition if weakness was only being shown against the US\$.

Finally, the Government might even perceive US\$ strength as a help in that a lower US $\$ / £$ rate would increase the sterling value of North Sea oil revenues, thereby helping to finance any overrun in public expenditure which might otherwise threaten the Government's 1984/85 PSBR target. In other words, a falling US $\$ / £$ rate would be useful in financing any spending overrun. Clearly, this policy thinking is some way from that which originally envisaged deep spending cuts and employed strong sterling as a weapon to lower inflation further.

## 1985 Budget

We assume that half of the $£ 2$ bn positive fiscal adjustment shown in the 1984 MTFS for 1985/86 is exhausted by a public spending overshoot and half is available for further tax relief in the 1985 Budget. This may be in the form of another over-indexation of personal tax allowances. Excise duties are assumed to be fully indexed. Further moves on tax reform are also envisaged.

## Public Spending

Given recent pay decisions, public sector pay control is likely to be a key problem in limiting the cash cost of public spending, not only in 1984/85 but also in succeeding years. The Government's projections for unchanged real public spending looks likely to be exceeded and we look for slippage of $1 \%$ pa, on average, to 1988/89. This would still be slower public spending growth than the $11 / 2 \%$ pa average seen between 1978/79 and 1983/84.


FROM: MISS M O'MARA
DATE: 6 July 1984
cc PS/Chief Secretary
PS/Financial Secretary Sir P Middleton
Mr Bailey
Sir T Burns
Mr Cassell
Mr Battishill
Mr H P Evans
Mr Lankester
Mr Scholar
Mr Folger
Mr Culpin
Mr Folger
Miss Peirson
Mr Page
Mr A Smith
Mr Lord
Mr Ridley Mr Portillo

MR MACKINNON

## PHILLIPS AND DREW JULY FORECAST

The Chancellor was grateful for your note of 5 July. He agrees with the proposal to produce a regular note on the Simon and Coates forecast in place of a note on Phillips and Drew.

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MISS M O'MARA
P.S. I've asted Philip Wyan Owe to cine, to mate a discustiv.

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Theres a new wote from Rachel on the latest Greenwell bulletin, opposite.
Point for disussin are:-
(i) Cd the Bat be nure adratima, is guilicy the wathet in nonal tives? And are there wew tricts Rat wolle/p ( $\mathrm{P} . \mathrm{g}$ - dealing ${ }^{1}$ differetwags, a rocasin)
(ii) Shin't we do mure (orless) tha just reliericy the shatage, smeties.
(iii) Ca we articulate pshing better th wale the (uon) orle ghi $x$ Rune clewer (A regular retrospective descripht. $\hbar$ be pullished - Jow monitay issessent?
(iv) What id be dre t cumpl Re thicy of aves better (e.g.t sher2-shage of erations) o(ch

## GREENWELL'S BULLETIN: POST MORTEM

Greenwell's July Bulletin contains Gordon Pepper's reflections on the latest round of base rate rises. Pepper has always been sceptical of the argument that there are times when the authorities cannot resist market pressures. This article reflects some of that scepticism, but argues that the authorities were right to acquiesce "to some extent this time" though wrong to ratify a rise as large as 3 per cent.
2. The discussion of the role of the exchange rate in official thinking is rather helpful. The point that the fall in the effective rate prior to 26 June was primarily a reflection of the strength of the dollar is well illustrated by charts showing the dollar's effective rate and sterling's effective rate against currencies other than the dollar (attached). Greenwell's argue that there is no exchange rate target, but that movements in the exchange rate are an important trigger for changes in interest rates. Worries about monetary growth are acted on quickly only if they are confirmed by the exchange rate. Conversely, the case for benign neglect of the exchange rate depends on monetary growth being under control. Although narrow money is clearly behaving itself, worries about broad money justified some rise in interest rates when sterling weakened more generally at end June and early July.
3. That strikes me as a reasonable summary of past official behaviour, and a defensible description of the thinking behind the first rise in base rates to 10 per cent. Greenwell's do not say whether they would have wanted to go beyond 10 per cent on these grounds. But the authorities certainly did not want to.

The second rise in base rates, to 12 per cent, was forced. By implication, it is this forced element that Greenwell's think could have been avoided.
4. Their reasons for arguing that market pressures could have been resisted are not very fully spelt out and, as stated, do not address the central issue at all squarely. There is no great dispute about what Greenwell's call "the true position", ie. that the authorities cannot control the term structure, or distort interest rate relativities for any length of time, but they can peg the level of any one particular short term money rate. We might be more sceptical about our ability to hold the 3 -month rate than Greenwell's, because it is more heavily influenced by expectations, but we would certainly agree that 7 -day and l-month money market rates are susceptible to considerable official influence.
5. Greenwell's are also quite correct to say that the change in the Bank's dealing rates on 26 June was an attempt to bring the structure of dealing rates more in line with the market. But is does not strike me as a particularly good example of the Bank's inability to control the term structure - except as an instance of how the market yield curve can change without there being any alteration in the Bank's dealing rates. Nor is the reference to "overwhelming arbitrage transactions" particularly apposite in this context.
6. To digress a little, prior to 26 June the market yield curve had steepened, while the Bank's dealing rates had stayed flat, reflecting an earlier structure of market rates. As a result, the Bank had found itself dealing only in longer term paper (Band 4). While daily shortages were small, the situation was manageable. But, with larger shortages in prospect, the Bank were worried that they might have to engage at shorter maturities. The risk was that by doing so at existing dealing rates they might have put upward pressure on very short market rates. To avoid this, they wanted to move Band I and II rates down, and Bands III and IV rates up; but they also wanted to make it clear that, by steepening the yield curve at a time when Lloyds had raised base rates by
$\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, they were not validating the market's implicit expectation that short term rates were set to rise. Hence the attempt to back up a delicate operation with a statement which, as Greenwell's argue, probably misfired.
7. Coming hack to the central argument, no-one disputes the authorities' ability to peg some very short term rate, if they are so minded. What is missing from Greenwell's exposition is any recognition of the quantitative implications of holding rates down, and any discussion of the effect of large money market operations on expectations, and hence on shape of the yield curve, the exchange rate, and ultimately base rates.
8. Greenwell's argue cryptically that "abitrage transactions would cancel out" and criticise officials who "argue there would be a huge demand for cheap funds from the Bank if the authorities were to peg, say, the 7 day rate when there were engrained expectations that it would rise". One interpretation of this passage is that Greenwell's think that money market rates can be pegged, in the face of engrained expectations to the contrary, without the Bank needing to supply additional cash to the market. It is difficult to believe that this is really their view. Gordon Pepper is, after all, a long time advocate of monetary base control, and critic of the Bank's activities as "lender of first resort". And if rates are not held down by varying the amount of cash supplied, it is not clear what other mechanism they have in mind.
9. Another possibility is that Pepper believes that only a modest liquidity operation would have been needed in practice. He may be right, but there was no way of being sure before the event. The argument against trying to peg short term rates on 12 July was not that it would definitely have failed, but that it was very risky, because market expectations had hardened to the point where it might well have required more than a modest intervention to produce the desired results, and because the consequences of large scale money market operations, in such circumstances, are highly unpredictable and potentially counter-productive.
10. Greenwell's failure to explain clearly why they think the authorities could successfully have resisted pressure for higher interest rates undermines the value of their policy prescriptions. In the circumstances, they postulate - a weak exchange rate, but low growth in narrow money and broad money growth high due to funding difficulties - a policy of benign neglect towards the exchange rate would have considerable appeal. But the real problem that may have to be faced is how to put it into practice. As Greenwell's point out "The belief that the authorities will concede to market pressure and will alter interest rates in accordance with sterling's behaviour is reinforced each time they do so. It is now more firmly entrained than ever". Rhetoric may not be enough. To quote Greenwell's again "Experience has taught the market to ignore what the authorities say and to pay attention to what they do". A convincing demonstration of benign neglect may well be needed but there is little doubt in my mind that it will be easier to mount if £M3 is coming back on target. (That was part of the argument for the element of overkill involved in going to 12 per cent).
11. Happily, these problems are looking less immediate. Volcker's statement has had a very cheering effect on the markets; we have sold a lot of stock this morning, the exchange rate is strong, and the money market yield curve is sloping down to $1113 / 16$ at 12 months (with the 3 -month rate only just above 12 per cent).


Chart II
U.S. Dollar's Effective Rate


cc: Chief Secretary Financial Secretary Economic Secretary Minister of State Sir Terence Burns
Mr Cassell
Mr Monck
Mr Battishill
Mr Evans
Mr Odling-Smee
Mr Sedgwick
Mr Folder
Mr G White
Mr Lord
Mr Ridley

## NATIONAL ACCOUNTS STATISTICS

I have held two meetings with the Central Statistical Office to discuss discrepancies in the national accounts and to review progress to try to rectify them. You may wish to know the state of play in the four areas on which we have concentrated.

## I Revisions to estimates of GDP

2. The CSO study shows that initial estimates of the annual growth Late of real GDP in the $1970^{\prime}$ s have been revised up by a little over a $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on average - with some evidence that revisions were larger in up-swings than in down-swings. The corresponding initial estimates of the level of current price GDP were revised upwards on average by $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent after 1 year, $2 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent after 2 years and 4 per cent after 4 years.
3. Ideally, the CSO and other government departments should be able to pinpoint the reasons for these revisions and correct any biases that arise. In practice, the most likely solution may be to make an arbitrary upward adjustment to the published figures. But we need to do some more work before deciding on this. In particular the CSO are currently analysing the components of GDP to see whether a clear picture of the sources of revisions emerges.

Mor ver we shall be able to analyse another batch of revisions, going back several years during the next few weeks when the annual Blue Book (on national accounts) and the Pink Book (on the balance of payments) are available. I hope to come to you with some firm suggestions for dealing with this problem in November.

## II Discrepancies between GDP measures

4. Investigation into the construction industry has revealed that output has probably been understated in recent years. In particular, activity in housing improvements has almost certainly been higher than has been recorded in the output statistics. Correction of this understatement will help to narrow the gap between the output measure of GDP and the other two measures. The example illustrates the general difficulty that definitions of industries do not change as fast as events in the real world and Departments rarely share the CSO's interest in redefining the industries which they sponsor, if it is likely to result in different coverage from their own definitions for sponsorship purposes.

## III The Company Sector

5. Company sector statistics have been causing concern for many years. An additional statistician has been assigned to this area since March. The most worrying feature is the large discrepancy between the financial surplus as measured from income and expenditure and the surplus as measured from its financing. Several errors have now been identified which have reduced this discrepancy or balancing item.
6. Most areas investigated have revealed points where improvements are needed. But there is a great deal more work to be done to reduce the balancing item to an acceptable level. In particular we are concerned about the consistency of oil company data used in the income, expenditure, and output measures of GDP, in the balance of payments and in financial statistics.

## IV Improvements to UK Service sector statistics

7. An inter-departmental group is considering the need for improved data on the service industries. Its recommendations may include some extensions to the data collection system. Industries for
which employment has been used as a proxy for output account for 6 per cent of GDP. The assumption that they enjoy no productivity growth will be changed and this will further narrow the gap between the various GDP measures. Other improvements should follow. These may include some further use of VAT data for statistical purposes.


P E MIDDLETON
cc: Sir J Boreham - Central Statistical Office

PRESS
AND
INFORMATION SERVICE

# CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE <br> GREAT GEORGE STREET PRESS CALLS ONLY 01-233 7489 LONDON <br> SW1P 3 AQ 

CSU(84)69
8 August 1984

ECONOMIC TRENDS - JULY<br>DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN THE UK, 1981/82

Estimates by the Central Statistical Office of personal income distribution in the tax year $1981 / 82$ are published today in an article in Economic Trends for July. They show that, compared with 1978/79, the latest earlier year for which estimates were published, the 10 per cent of people with the highest incomes increased their share of both pre- and post- tax income, while the pre-tax income of those in the lower half of the income distribution fell. The following were among the main findings:

Over three-quarters of personal income before tax went to tax-units in the upper half of the income distribution.

The top 10 per cent of tax-units increased their share of pretax income from 26 per cent in $1978 / 79$ to 28 per cent in 1981/82.

Payment of income tax in $1981 / 82$ reduced the share of the top 10 per cent of tax-units, from 28 per cent of pre-tax income to 26 per cent of post-tax income. It increased the share of the bottom 10 per cent by about a half per cent.

The share of pre-tax income of the lower half of the income distribution fell between $1978 / 79$ and $1981 / 82$ from about 24 to 23 per cent.

Income tax paid in $1981 / 82$ averaged 17 per cent of pre-tax income, a marginal increase over 1978/79. However the income tax burden at both the upper and lower ends of the distribution fell.

[^1]Eighty per cent of the pre-tax income of the top quarter of taxits in 1981/82 was derived from employment, compared with per cent of income of the bottom quarter, whose main sources of income were the National Insurance Retirement Pension and non-taxable social security payments (which at that time included benefits paid to the unemployed).
Percentage shares of income, before and after tax, received by quantile groups 1975/76, 1978/79 and 1981/82

| Quantile group | Percentages ${ }^{\text {' }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Before tax ${ }^{2}$ |  |  | After tax ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |
|  | 1975/76 | 1978/79 | 1981/82 | 1975/76 | 1978/79 | 1981/82 |
| Top 1 per cent | 5.7 | 5.3 | 6.0 |  |  |  |
| 2-5 per cent | 10.7 | 10.7 | 11.6 | 9.7 | 9.8 | 10.7 |
| 6-10 per cent | 9.8 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 9.5 | 9.7 | 10.3 |
| Top 10 per cent $11-20$ per cent | 26.2 | 26.1 |  | 23.1 | 23.4 | 25.6 |
| $11-20$ per cent $21-30$ | 16.1 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 15.9 | 16.3 | 16.4 |
| 21-30 per cent | 13.2 | 13.5 | 13.2 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 13.2 |
| 31-40 per cent | 11.5 | 11.2 | 10.7 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 10.8 |
| 41-50 per cent | 9.2 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 9.3 | 8.8 |
| $51-60$ per cent | 7.5 | 7.3 | 7.0 |  |  | 7.3 |
| 61-70 per cent | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.3 |
| 71-80 per cent | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
| 81-90 per cent | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 4.0 |
| 91-100 per cent | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 4.4 |
| Median income: $£$ | 2370 | 3370 | 4720 | 1970 |  |  |
| Mean income : £ | 2870 | 4110 | 6050 | 2300 | 3420 | 5020 |

The figures in this table are rounded and may therefore not sum to 100 .
Paople in, say, the top ten per cent of the pre-tax income distribution will not all be the same
as those in the top ten per cent of the post-tax income distribution. This arises from differences
to comparisons between one year and another. Undue significance should not be attached to
very small changes, as the figures are rounded estiglates.
These estimates aim to cover the whole of the income-receiving population and all sources of income for a full year. They are thus much more comprehensive than other information available in the field of income distribution statistics. This analysis was formerly made annually, but the frequency of production has now been reduced. It was last carried out for the year $1978 / 79$ and published in Economic Trends for February 1981. Estimates for intervening years are not available.

Economic Trends for July also contains the regular quarterly article on National Income and Expenditure, for the first quarter of 1984.
${ }^{1}$ The distribution of income in the United Kingdom, 1981/82.
Economic Trends No.369, July 1984' is published by HMSO and is marketed by Open University Educational Enterprises Ltd. It is available from government bookshops and through booksellers.

Price £ll. 25 net.
ISBN 011620124 X

## MR FOLGER

cc Sir P Middleton Sir T Burns (or) Mr Battishill (or) Mr Culpin Mr Ridley

The Chancellor was struck, unfavourably, with the press coverage on 9 August of an article in the July Economic Trends on the distribution of income. He was also concerned about the tone of the CSO press notice (of which I attach a copy) that appears to have prompted this report.
2. He has not seen the article itself, but so far as the press notice is concerned he felt it would have given a more balanced picture had it pointed out, for example, that:-
(i) whatever the changes in the distribution of income, incomes at all levels have risen between 1978/79 and 1981/82.
(ii) the change in the distribution post-tax between the two years is the same as the change in distribution pre-tax.
(iii) the changes presumably also reflect changes in the age distribution: the proportion of "tax-units" represented by retired households is presumably rising.
3. Could you and/or Mr Culpin make diplomatic enquiries with the CSO about the background to this article and press notice? The Chancellor is inclined to think the Treasury should, as a matter of normal course, be consulted in advance about such press releases on economic matters - if this does not happen already.


D L C PERETZ CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE
GREAT GEORGE STREET PRESS CALLS ONLY 01-233 7489 LONDON (AFTER 1800 HRS $01-2333000$ ) SW1P 3 AQ

CSO (84) 69
8 August 1984

## ECONOMIC TRENDS - JULY <br> DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN THE UK, 1981/82

Estimates by the Central Statistical Office of personal income distribution in the tax year $1981 / 82$ are published today in an article ${ }^{l}$ in Economic Trends for July. They show that, compared with 1978/79, the latest earlier year for which estimates were published, the 10 per cent of people with the highest incomes increased their share of both pre- and post- tax income, while the pre-tax income of those in the lower half of the income distribution fell. The following were among the main findings:

Over three-quarters of personal income before tax went to tax-units
in the upper half of the income distribution.
The top 10 per cent of tax-units increased their share of pretax income from 26 per cent in $1978 / 79$ to 28 per cent in $1981 / 82$.

Payment of income tax in $1981 / 82$ reduced the share of the top 10 per cent of tax-units, from 28 per cent of pre-tax income to
26 per cent of post-tax income. It increased the share of the bottom 10 per cent by about a half per cent.

The share of pre-tax income of the lower half of the income distribution fell between $1978 / 79$ and $1981 / 82$ from about 24 to 23 per cent.

Income tax paid in $1981 / 82$ averaged 17 per cent of pre-tax income, a marginal increase over 1978/79. However the income tax burden at both the upper and lower ends of the distribution fell.

[^2]Eighty per cent of the pre-tax income of the top quarter of taxunits in 1981/82 was derived from employment, compared with
per cent of income of the bottom quarter, whose main sources of income were the National Insurance Retirement Pension and non-taxable social security payments (which at that time included benefits paid to the unemployed).
Percentage shares of income, before and after tax, received by quantile groups 1975/76, 1978/79 and 1981/82

| Quantile group | Percentages ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Before tax ${ }^{2}$ |  |  | After tax ${ }^{2}$ |  |  |
|  | 1975/76 | 1978/79 | 1981/82 | 1975/76 | 1978/79 | 1981/82 |
| Top 1 per cent | 5.7 | 5.3 | 6.0 |  |  |  |
| 2-5 per cent | 10.7 | 10.7 | 11.6 | 9.7 | 3.9 9.8 | 4.6 10.7 |
| 6-10 per cent | 9.8 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 9.5 | 9.7 | 10.3 |
| Top 10 per cent | 26.2 | 26.1 | 28.3 | 23.1 | 23.4 |  |
| 11-20 per cent | 16.1 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 15.9 | 23.4 16.3 | 25.6 16.4 |
| 21-30 per cent | 13.2 | 13.5 | 13.2 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 16.4 13.2 |
| $31-40$ per cent | 11.5 | 11.2 | 10.7 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 13.2 10.8 |
| 41-50 per cent | 9.2 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 11.3 | 10.8 8.8 |
| 51-60 per cent | 7.5 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 7.7 | 7.7 |  |
| 61-70 per cent | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.3 |
| 71-80 per cent | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.2 |
| 81-90 per cent | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.1 | 5.2 4.0 |
| 91-100 per cent | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 3.0 | 4.1 2.9 | 4.0 2.4 |
| Median income: $£$ | 2370 | 3370 | 4720 | 1970 |  |  |
| Mean income : $£$ | 2870 | 4110 | 6050 | 2300 | 3420 | 5020 |

' The figures in thie tabie are rounded and may therafore not sum to 100.
Paople in, say, the top ten per cent of the pre-tax income distribution will not all be the same
in tax liabitity between tax-units at sumilar levels of ore-tax income. A sumitar quetification apences
to comoarisons berween one yeer and another. Undue signoficance should not be artached to
very small changes, as the figures are rounded estrigates.

These estimates aim to cover the whole of the income-receiving population and all sources of income for a full year. They are thus much more comprehensive than other information available in the field of income distribution statistics. This analysis was formerly made annually, but the frequency of production has now been reduced. It was last carried out for the year $1978 / 79$ and published in Economic Trends for February 1981. Estimates for intervening years are not available.

Economic Trends for July also contains the regular quarterly article on National Income and Expenditure, for the first quarter of 1984 .
${ }^{1}$ The distribution of income in the United Kingdom, 1981/82.
Economic Trends No.369, July 1984'is published by HMSO and is marketed by Open University Educational Enterprises Ltd. It is available from government bookshops and through booksellers.

Price £ll. 25 net.
ISBN 011620124 X

FROM: DAVID PERETZ
DATE: 10 August 1984

## SIR PETER MIDDLETON

cc Chief Secretary Financial Secretary Minister of State Economic Secretary Sir T Burns Mr Cassel Mr Monck Mr Battishill Mr Evans Mr Odling-Smee Mr Sedgwick Mr Folder Mr G White Mr Lord Mr Ridley Mr Portillo

## NATIONAL ACCOUNTS STATISTICS

The Chancellor was grateful for the progress report in your minute of 7 August, on this important subject. He very much welcomes the progress that is beginning to be made.

## Bu P

D L C PERETZ

## F13

FROM: ADAM RIDLEY
DATE: 13 August 1984
MR PERETZ

## CSO ARIICLE ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Like the Chancellor, I was rather surprised by the CSO draft for Economic Trends, and asked myself whether it could and should have been cleared properly with Treasury officials in advance. As you will see from the attached minute, there were some pretty major weaknesses in the exposition in the full text which if corrected could have helped a good deal. It also occurs to me that one could, if we could get the picture clearer, put a short piece in the EPR which might help straighten the record. Not least worth considering because $I$ suspect the $E P R$ is more widely read than Trends!


## A N RIDLEY

PS It was impossible to do much to pre-empt this since I only saw the brief from $S$. Matthews hours before Trends was published.

FROM: ADAM RIDLEY
DATE: 9 August 1984
$\mathfrak{T R}$ FOLGER

cc Mr Byatt<br>Mr Allen<br>Mr Culpin<br>Mr Lord<br>Mr Portillo<br>Mr Matthews

## ECONOMIC TRENDS ARTICLE ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Mr Matthews' brief of August 7 on the economic trends article raises some important points. Since there is a clear possibility, as already noted, that some of the material in this article could be used, or rather misused, if people misinterpret it, it is worth drawing attention to two other issues which may be helpful at some point. First, the article focuses on changes between 78-9 and 81-2 alone, with the exception of the data in Table $A$. The obvious thought to emerge from that fact is that it would be sensible to take a few key figures over a longer period, at least as far back as the early 1970s. Obvious statistics to look at would be the gini co-efficient, the share of gre and post-tax income in various sensitive groups such as the top and bottom quantiles. This might both indicate the extent to which there is variability in such statistics; and might also demonstrate that 75/6 and $78 / 9$ were a bit off trend (without checking back the earlier articles, no one looking at this draft article will have any way of knowing, nor will those who brief on it). Second, much more must surely be made of the points in para 7 of Mr Matthews' draft brief. In particular I cannot help wondering whether one could not make some kind of very crude calculations about the effect of changes since 8l-2, which must have had a major impact since they involved in particular the very substantial increase in personal allowances in the last two budgets.
2. These thoughts and the important issues raised in Stephen Matthew's brief prompt the thought in my mind that the economic trends article is not a very enlightening document. One can imagine more illuminating ways of presenting the latest information in a proper context which are certainly value free and more likely to be of help to the average reader of Economic Trends!


FROM: M T FORGER
DATE: 15 August 1984

cc Sir P Middleton<br>Sir T Burns<br>Mr Battishill<br>Mr Culpin<br>Mr G P Smith DEU4<br>PS/IR<br>KB/01

## JULY "TRENDS": CSO ARTICLE ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Mr Peretz's minute of 10 August asked about the background to this article and the Press Notice on it.

## Article

2. As usual for articles of close interest to other Departments, CSO consulted DEU4 and the Revenue on a draft of this article. The final version clearly stated that:
"Changes in the distribution of income do not necessarily have a bearing on movements in average living standards; real household disposable income per head rose by 4 per cent between 1978 and 1981" [main result (vii) p.98]
"Between 1978 and 1981 real household disposable income per head rose by 4 per cent from $£ 2,470$ per annum to $£ 2,569$ (in 1980 prices). A further small increase was recorded in 1982. This indicates an overall improvement in average living standards."

Thus the article covered the point at sub-paragraph 2(i) of Mr Peretz's note. (So, too, did the defensive briefing of 7 August, prepared at my request by Mr Matthews of DEU4 against publication. A copy of this is attached.)
3. The article also explained the increasingly important role, at the bottom end of the distribution, of social security payments. (These include those paid to retired households, as mentioned in Mr Peretz's 2(iii).) It noted that changes in the composition of income, including occupational pensions, underlie many of the changes observed in its distribution.

The text did not however bring out the fact that the increased inequality in post-tax income distribution as measured by movements in the Gini between 1978-79 and 1981-82, was due entirely to changes in the pre-tax distribution. This would have been a useful point to make and was covered in our defensive briefing note.

## Press Notice

5. It has not hitherto been CSO practice to clear Press Notices about "Trends" with the Treasury. Clearly in this case it would have been helpful had they done so. CSO themselves say that with hindsight the Notice should certainly have made the point about rising real incomes, which might have prevented the popular press getting things quite so wrong.

6 As for other press releases on economic matters, CSO already consult my division and/or EA and others about those on GDP, industrial production, cyclical indicators etc. I see no cause for concern about the way the mechanics of those arrangements are working.

## Action

7. To help avoid repetition of the problems over the income distribution article, I have proposed to the editor of "Trends" that:
(a) he lets EB, and Treasury Divisions concerned with specific articles, should have the opportunity to comment each month on the draft Press Notice on "Trends".
(b) a note of the forward programme for Trends articles be circulated regularly for information, so that we have better early warning of potentially sensitive subjects.
(c) though it does not seem to have been a major problem in this case, he may like to remind all CSO contributors to "Trends" of the importance of inviting comments from concerned Treasury divisions at an early draft stage.



FROM: MISS J C SIMPSON
DATE: 21 August 1984
cc Sir P Middleton Sir T Burns Mr Battishill Mr Culpin Mr G P Smith DEU 4 PS/IR
KB/01

MR FOLGER

## JULY "TRENDS": CSO ARTICLE ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION

The Chancellor has seen and was grateful for your minute of 15 August. He has commented that the action proposed seems to be both necessary and appropriate.

## 3

MISS J C SIMPSON

FROM: MISS J C SIMPSON
DATE: 24 August 1984
cc PS/Chief Secretary
PS/Economic Secretary
Sir P Middleton
Mr Littler
Sir T Burns
Mr Kclly EF
Mr Folger
Mr Culpin
Mr Towers

MR HARRISON

## JULY TRADE FIGURES

The Chancellor has seen your minute of 21 August, and is content with the proposed IDT press line.

## 及

MISS J C SIMPSON

THE CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

## Zo SEPTEMBER 1984

The current account for September was in deficit by an estimated £514 million compared with a deficit of $£ 318$ million in August.

Exports in September amounted to $£ 5857$ million and imports to £6621 million so that trade in goods was in deficit by £ 764 million.

The invisibles account has been projected at a monthly surplus of £250 million; a large surplus on the transactions of the private sector and public corporations being partly offset by a deficit on Government transactions.

## THIRD QUARTER 1984

In the third quarter the current accolint was in deficit by $£ 719$ million compared with a deficit of $£ 2 \varepsilon 3$ million in the second quarter. There was a deficit of $£ 146 \subseteq$ million on visible trade in the latest quarter compared with a deficit of $£ 1193$ million in the previous quarter. The surplus on invisibles is projected at $£ 750$ million.

CURRENT ACCOJNT
TABLE 1
£ million, Seasonally adjusted

a Invisibles are projections and subject to revision as information becomes available.
b One-third of the appropriate calendar quarter's estimate, except for budget refunds received from the European Commity which are allocated to the month they are known to have been received.
c Information relating to credits and debits of the private sector and public corporations can be found in Table 3.
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VISIBLE TRADE IN SEPTEMBER }198
Visible trade in September was in deficit by {764 million compared
with a deficit of {568 million in August.
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At $£ 5857$ million exports were $£ 94$ million ( $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent) lower than in August. Excluding trade in oil and the erratic items, both of which increased in September, exports fell by about 5 per cent between the two months. This fall reflects a return to more normal levels of trade following the August figures which were boosted by the recovery from the July dock strike.

Total imports were valued at £6621 million which was £103 million ( $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent) higher than in August. Imports of oil fell by $£ 166$ million and imports of the erratic items increased by $\{64$ million.

The level of imports in September was 9 percent higher than the average
 forward imports scheduled for later in the year in anticipation of the change in VAT procedures at the beginning of November.

The terms of trade index in September was unchanged compared with August as both the export unit value index and the import unit value index increased by 1 per cent.

RECENT TRENDS

## Visible balance

In the latest quarter there was a deficit on visible trade of £1.5 billion compared with a deficit of $£ 1.2$ billion in the previous quarter. The surplus on trade in oil increased by £O. 3 billion to $£ 1.8$ billion while the deficit on non-oil goods increased by about $£ 0.5$ billion to $£ 3.3$ billion.

## Exports

Exports in the third quarter were valued at $£ 17.3$ billion, an increase of $£ 0.4$ billion ( $21 / 2$ per cent) over the second quarter. Much of this

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increase reflects higher oil deliveries (up by £O.3 billion).
    Exports of the erratic items fell by £O.1 billion and
exports of other gocds, excluding oil, increased by £O.2 billion
reflecting higher deliveries of chemicals and finished manufactures.
In the third quarter of this year export volume was marginally lower than in the previous quarter and was much the same as in the last quarter of 1983. The underlying level of non-oil export volume has remained flat throughout the year.
```

Imports
Total imports in the third quarter were valued at $£ 18.8$ billion, an increase of $£ 0.7$ billion ( $3 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent) over the second quarter. Imports of oil increased only marginaily and imports of the erratic items fell by fo. 1 billion. Imports of other goods increased by £0. 8 billion with passenger motor cars and intermediate goods sh.owing the most significant growth.

Tr.e volume of total imports increased by lper cent in the latest tr.ree months. The trend in non-oil imports was fairly flat during tre first half of 1984 while the underlying position in the last trree months is not yet clear; the latest three month comparison shows a rise of $1 \frac{1}{2}$ percent.

Terms of trade and unit values
The terms of trade index was virtually unchanged in the latest quarter with both the export unit value index and the import unit value index increasing by about $21 / 2$ per cent.
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at $3.30 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$.
Export unit values of food, beverages and tobacco fell slightly in the latest quarter as did those of passenger/cars. Most of the other broad sectors rose by between 2 and 3 per cent although the export unit value indices for fuels and for other seminanufactures increased marginally faster.

```
Import unit values for chemicals (up by 4}4/2\mathrm{ per cent) continue to rise relatively faster than those for most of the other broad sectors. Import unit values for consumer goods other than cars (up by 5 per cent) and for fuels (up by \(4 \frac{1}{2}\) per cent) also increased significantly more than those for other sectors in the third quarter. By contrast import unit values for passenger motor cars fell marginally in the latest quarter.
```

Analysis by Area
The value of exports to the developed countries increased by 4 per cent betweer the lajest two quarters; the result of higher deliveries to the European Community countries (up 7 per cent) and to North Anerica (up 3 per cent). Exports to the developing countries increased by $5 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

```
Inports from the developed countries as a whole increased by 3 per
cent in the latest quarter with imports from North America increasing
by }7\mathrm{ per cent and imports from the European Community countries
increasing by 5 per cent. Imports from the developing countries
fell by 5 per cent.
```


## INVISIBLES

The latest estimates of invisibles - services, interest, profits and dividends and transfers - relate to the second quarter of 1984
and porsenal
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at 3.30 pm .
when credits were $£ 9.3$ billion and debits were $£ 8.4$ billion giving a surplus of $£ 0.9$ billion for the quarter. Invisibles in the private sector and public corporations (excluding transfer) were in surplus by £2.2 biliion. The figures for the third quarter are CSO projections.

The standard notes describe in detail the differences between the Balance of Payments (BOP) and the Overseas Trade Statistics (OTS) bases of compilation. The principal difference is the deduction of freight from the OTS valuation of imports. Copies can be obtained from the address below.

2 VISIBLE TRADE BALANCES BY COMMDDITY (BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BASIS)

Table 16 of the Press Notice shows the value of exports, imports and the visible balance, measured on a comparable (BOP) basis, for each of the major commodity groups including manufactured goods. Monthly data at this level of detail are published in the Monthly Review of External Trade Statistics.

## 3 MONTHLY REVIEW OF EXTERNAL TRADE STATISTICS

The Monthly Review of External Trade Statistics, prepared mainly as an internal working document, is made available publicly by the Department of Trade and Industry (price £3 a copy).

This is a monthly publication containing charts and tables, on the current account of the UK balance of payments, UK exports and imports of goods by commodity and area and certain international comparisons. An annual supplement (No 5), price $\ddagger 4$ a copy, provides longer historical runs for the series shown in the monthly edition and additional international data.

## 4 INVISIBLES: MON THLY FIGURES

For all invisible transactions except European Community budget refunds one third of the appropriate calendar quarter's balance is used as the monthly balance.

European Community budget refunds are allocated to the particular month in which they are known to have been received.

5
ROUNDING

The data published in this Press Notice have been rounded to the nearest £million. Therefore figures may not sum to the aggregates and balances mav not derive exactly from the export and import figures shown.

Enquiries about the Standard Notes, and the Monthly Review, should be addressed to S2A, Room 255 , Department of Trade and Industry, 1 Victoria Street, London SWlH OET, Telephone: 01-215 5703.

CURRENT BALANCE, VISIBLE TRADE AND INVISIBLES
(Balance of Payments basis)

a Invisibles are projections and subject to revision as more information becomes available.
b One third of the appropriate calendar quarter's estimate, except for budget refunds received from the European Community which are allocated to the month they are known to have been received.

Table 3
INVISIBLES

|  |  | I | All Sectors |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Private Sector and Public Corporations ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | of which |  |  |  |  | I |  |  |  |
|  |  | I | Credits | Debits | \| | Balance | 1 |  | 1 | Interest | I |  | 1 | Credits | I | Debits | 1 | Balance |
|  |  |  |  |  | \| |  | 1 | Services | 1 | Profits | 1 | Transfers | I |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 | Dividends | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | I |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | I |  |  |  |
| 1982 |  | \| | 31307 | 28485 | I | + 2822 | 1 | + 3706 | 1 | + 1165 | 1 | - 2049 | 1 | 26898 | 1 | 20395 | 1 | + 6503 |
| 1983 |  | , | 34975 | 31343 | I | + 3632 | 1 | + 3902 | 1 | + 1948 | 1 | - 2218 | 1 | 30530 | 1 | 22696 |  | + 7834 |
| 1982 | Q3 | I | 7560 | 7132 | I | + 428 | 1 | + 789 | 1 | + 347 | 1 | - 708 | 1 | 6655 | 1 | 5105 |  | + 1550 |
|  | Q4 |  | 8169 | 7260 | I | + 909 | 1 | + 907 | 1 | + 568 | 1 | - 566 | 1 | 7114 | 1 | 5176 | 1 | + 1938 |
| 1983 | Q1 |  | 8848 | 7433 | I | $+1415$ | 1 | + 1012 | 1 | + 528 | , | - 125 | 1 | 7361 | 1 | 5377 | 1 | + 1984 |
|  | Q2 |  | 8393 | 7990 |  | $+403$ | 1 | + 1090 | 1 | + 120 | 1 | - 807 | 1 | 7474 | 1 | 5761 | 1 | + 1713 |
|  | Q3 | \| | 8836 | 7638 |  | + 1198 | 1 | + 978 | 1 | + 745 | 1 | - 525 | 1 | 7806 | 1 | 5581 |  | + 2225 |
|  | Q4 | , | 8898 | 8282 |  | + 616 | 1 | + 822 | 1 | + 555 | 1 | - 761 | 1 | 7889 | , | 5977 | 1 | + 1912 |
| 1984 | Q1 | I | 9054 | 8523 |  | + 531 | 1 | + 988 | 1 | + 87 | 1 | - 544 | 1 | 7860 | 1 | 6243 | 1 | + 1617 |
|  | Q2 | 1 | 9273 | 8363 |  | $+\quad 910$ |  | + 1174 | 1 | $+\quad 489$ | 1 | - 753 | 1 | 8329 | 1 | 6086 | 1 | +2243 |

[^3]
e Export unit value index as a percentage of the import unit value index.
VALUE AND VOLUME OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS EXCLUDNG THE MORE ERRATIC ITEMS ${ }^{\text {F }}$
Table 5
(Balance of Payments basis)
seasonally adjusted

f These are defined as ships, North Sea installations, aircraft, precious stones, and silver.
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uititi wiucue of pross nctica on
24 CCT 81
7
seasonally adjuste

| 1 | \| Balance | | Exports of 011 |  |  |  |  | Imports of Oil |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 of |  | Crude 0il I |  |  | Rest of I |  | Crude Oil |  |  | Rest of |
|  | I Trade | Total | [SITC | (REV 2) | 333.0] 1 | Divisim \| | $\mid$ Total | [SITC | (REV 2) | 333.0] | Divisia |
|  | 1 in oil |  |  |  |  | 331 |  |  |  |  | 33 |
|  | 1 £ | £ | $£$ |  | Avg value I | £ | 1 £ | £ |  | Avg value \| | £ |
|  | \| million | | million | million | million \| | per tonnel | million I | I million | million | million | per tanne I | million |
|  | 1 fob | fob | fob | tonnes \| | £ fob 1 | fob 1 | 1 fob | fob | tonnes | £ fob | fob |
| 1 | 1 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | - 1 |  |
| 11982 | $\|+4556\|$ | 10686 | 8542 | 60.3 | 141.6 | 2144 | 6130 | 3861 | 28.3 | 136.6 | 2269 |
| 11983 | $\|+6875\|$ | 12525 | 10111 | 68.4 | 147.8 | 2414 | 5650 | 3265 | 22.8 | 143.3 | 2385 |
| 11983 Q3 | $\|+1485\|$ | 2960 | 2361 | 16.2 | 145.8 | 599 | 1474 | 961 | 6.8 | 140.5 | 513 |
| Q4 | $1+20991$ | 3500 | 2910 | 19.5 | 149.6 | 589 | 1400 | 829 | 5.8 | 144.0 | 571 |
| 11984 Q1 | $\|+2316\|$ | 3654 | 2951 | 19.1 | 154.2 | 703 | 1338 | 643 | 4.3 | 148.6 | 695 |
| Q2 | $1+1548 \mid$ | 3455 | 2766 | 17.5 | 158.4 | 689 | 1907 | 1019 | 6.9 | 148.8 | 888 |
| Q3 | $\|+1818\|$ | 3768 | 3083 | 18.8 | 164.4 | 6851 | 1950 | 11046 | 6.8 | 154.4 | 905 |
| 11983 Sept | $1+512 \mid$ | 1031 | 818 | 5.6 | 147.4 | 2121 | 518 | 1347 | 2.5 | 139.71 | 172 |
| Oct | $1+5501$ | 1100 | 905 | 6.1 | 148.4 | 195 | 550 | 366 | 2.5 | 144.5 | 185 |
| Nov | $1+6521$ | 1117 | 935 | 6.1 | 154.0 | 182 | 465 | 1265 | 1.9 | 141.8 | 200 |
| Dec | $1+8981$ | 1283 | 1070 | 7.3 | 147.0 | 212 \| | 385 | 198 | 1.4 | 145.9 | 186 |
| 1984 Jan | $1+7191$ | 1101 | 874 | 5.81 | 151.8 | 226 | 382 | 1205 | 1.4 | 151.1 | 177 |
| Feb | $1+821 \mid$ | 1277 | 1019 | 6.5 | 156.2 | 258 | 456 | 226 | 1.5 | 149.7 | 230 |
| Mar | $1+7761$ | 1276 | 1058 | 6.9 | 154.2 | 218 | 500 | 212 | 1.5 | 145.1 | 288 |
| Apr | $1+3801$ | 1035 | 828 | 5.3 | 156.8 | 207 | 655 | 365 | 2.5 | 147.8 | 290 |
| May | $1+512 \mid$ | 1175 | 955 | 6.0 | 158.4 | 220 | 663 | 353 | 2.4 | 148.9 | 310 |
| June | $1+6561$ | 1245 | 983 | 6.2 | 159.8 | 262 | 590 | 1301 | 2.0 | 149.9 | 288 |
| July | $1+7841$ | 1265 | 1013 | 6.2 | 162.6 | 252 | 480 | 1285 | 1.9 | 152.3 | 195 |
| Aug | $1+4171$ | 1234 | 1021 | 6.3 | 162.1 | 213 | 818 | 1388 | 2.5 | 153.4 | 430 |
| Sept | $1+6171$ | 1269 1 | 1049 | 6.2 | 168.6 | 220 | 1652 | 1373 | 2.4 | 1583 | 280 |
| Percentage | 1 1 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | - |  |
| I change | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| third | 1 | +9 | +11 \| | $+7 \frac{1}{2}$ | +4 | $-\frac{1}{2}$ | $+2 \frac{1}{2}$ | +21 $\frac{1}{2}$ | $-1$ | $1+4$ | +2 |
| 1 quarter on | 11 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  | $1+4$ |  |
| \| previous | 1 |  | 1 | , | 1 |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| 1 quarter | 11 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |

$\checkmark 9$ Trade in petroleum and petroleum products. These figures differ from those published by the Department of Energy which are on a time of shipment basis (see paragraph 7 of the standard notes).
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Trade in gooos other than oil
(Balance of Payments basis)

f These are defined as ships, North Sea installations, aircraft, precious stones, and silver.
e Export unit value index as a percentage of the import unit value index.



£ million, fob, seesonally adjusted

h These are defined as ships, North Sea installations (together comprising SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones (667), and silver (681.1).
$j$ Based on the United Nations Broad Economic Categories end-use classification.
EXPORTS BY COMMODITY: VOLUNE INDICES
Table 9
(Overseas Trade Statistics basis)
NDICES $1980=100$, seasonally adjusted

| 1 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  | 1 Manufactures excluding erratics ${ }^{\text {h }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | I | Food |  |  | 1 |  | 1 \| | Semi-manufactures |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 11 | bever-1 | \| Basic| |  | \| Total |  |  |  | excluding precious \| |  |  |  | North Sea installations and aircraft |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | \| Total | | \| ages | Mater- Fuels |  |  | $\mid$ Manufac- \| |  |  |  | stones \& 3ilver(PS) \| |  |  |  | $(S N A)$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | and | \| ials |  |  | tures | \| Total | I |  | I | I |  |  | \| Psss-1 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 11 | tobacco |  | I | 1 |  | 1 |  | Total 1 | \| Chemi- | Other |  | Total $\mid$ | 1 enger | Other |  | Inter- |  | ital |
|  | , |  | 11 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | $\mid \mathrm{cals}$ \| |  | 1 |  | $\mid$ Motor | Consumer |  | ediat |  |  |
|  | 1 |  |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | Cars 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| SITC | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | \| 5-8 | 1 | $5+6$ | 11 | 6 | 1 | 7+8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (REV 2) | \| 0-9 | | $0+1$ | 2+4 | 13 | , | 5-8 | \| less |  | leas | 15 | less |  | less \| | j | j |  | j |  | j |
|  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 SNAPS |  | PS | 1 | PS |  | SNA |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Weights | 11000 | 69 | 31 | 1136 | 1 | 735 | 658 |  | 252 | 112 | 141 |  | 406 | 18 | 71 |  | 170 |  | 147 |
| 1982 | \| 101.6 | | 107 | 94 | \| 133 | । | 95 | 197 | 1 | 90 | 106 | 93 | 1 | 96 | 94 | 94 |  | 99 |  | 95 |
| 1983 | \| 102.2 | | 110 | 101 | 1148 | 1 | 93 | 194 | 1 | 102 | 113 | 93 | 1 | 90 | 86 | 96 | \| | 89 |  | 87 |
| 1983 Q3 | \| 99.1 | | 105 | 95 | 1141 | 1 | 92 | 192 | 1 | 100 | \| 113 | 39 | \| | 87 | 80 | 93 | 1 | 86 |  | 86 |
| Q4 | \| 107.6 | | 112 | 1106 | 1163 | 1 | 97 | 1100 | 1 | 108 | 1119 | 1100 | 1 | 95 | 107 | 105 | 1 | 95 |  | 88 |
| 198401 | \| 109.5 | | 119 | 1103 | 1165 | 1 | 100 | 1101 | 1 | 109 | 1121 | 99 | 1 | 96 | 91 | 105 |  | 96 |  | 91 |
| Q2 | \| 108.1 | | 118 | 112 | \| 149 | 1 | 100 | \| 101 | 1 | 110 | 1119 | 1103 | 1 | 96 | 79 | 103 | 1 | 96 |  | 95 |
| Q3 | \| 107.3 | | 110 | 113 | 1159 | 1 | 98 | 1101 | 1 | 108 | 1123 | 96 | , | 97 | 68 | 104 | I | 98 |  | 96 |
| 1984 July | \| 102.4 | | 103 | \| 101 | 1161 | 1 | 92 | 195 | 1 | 101 | -16 | 90 | 1 | 91 | 65 | 104 | 1 | 90 |  | 88 |
| Aug | \| 111.6 | | 125 | 1126 | \| 158 | 1 | 102 | 1106 | 1 | 112 | $1-25$ | 1103 | 1 | 102 | 73 | 105 | 1 | 104 | 1 | 10: |
| Sept | \| 107.8 | | 102 | 1112 | 1158 | 1 | 100 | 1103 | 1 | 109 | $1 \quad 27$ | 195 | 1 | 98 | 66 | 102 | 1 | 100 |  | 99 |
| Percen- | 1 \| |  | 1 | / | 1 |  | I | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  | I |  |
| tage | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| change | $1-\frac{1}{2}$ | -6\% | $1+1$ | $1+6 \frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | $-1 \frac{1}{2}$ | $1{ }^{-\frac{1}{2}}$ | 1 | -2 | $1+3$ | $1-7$ | 1 | +1 | -14 | +1 | 1 | +2 | I | +1 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| Q3/Q2 | 11 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 | I |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |

h These are defined as ships, North Sea installations (together comprising SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792)
precious stones (667), and silver (681.1).
$j$ Based on the United Nations Broad Economic Categories and-use classification.

and paresra!
Luini reiecise of pross rosice on
$240 C T 84$ at 3.30 pm .

INDICES $1980=100$ not sessanally adjusted

h These are defined as ships, North Sea installations (together comprising SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones (667), and silver (681.1).
$j$ Based on the United Nations Broad Economic Categories end-use classification.
EXPORTS BY AREA
Table 11
(Oversess Trade Statistics basis)
£ million, fob, seascnally adjusted

|  | 1 | Developed Countries |  |  |  |  |  |  | Develooing Countries |  |  |  | Centrally planned economies |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total 1 | Total | European <br> Comminty |  | Rest of <br> 1 Europ |  | North Americal | Other $\qquad$ | Total | Oil exporting countries |  | Other |  |
|  | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 | I | 1 | , |  | I |  | 1 |
| 1982 | 55558 | 413931 | 23124 | 1 | 6681 | I | 8353 | 32351 | 130531 | 6445 |  | 6608 | 974 |
| 1983 | 605341 | 465081 | 26516 | I | 7516 | 1 | 9342 | 31331 | 127831 | 6122 | 1 | 6661 | 1112 |
| 1983 Q3 | 14831 \| | 114931 | 6386 |  | 1777 | 1 | 2496 | 8351 | 32021 | 1540 | 1 | 1662 | 290 |
| Q4 | 162341 | 12592 \| | 7234 |  | 2025 | 1 | 2473 | 8601 | 33321 | 1528 | , | 1804 | 271 |
| 1984 Q1 | 16859 1 | 132401 | 7427 |  | 2197 | 1 | 2703 | 9121 | 32631 | 1477 | 1 | 1786 | 340 |
| Q2 | 168661 | 132011 | 7398 |  | 2153 | 1 | 2721 | 9291 | 30981 | 1325 | 1 | 1773 | 441 |
| Q3 | 172101 | 137571 | 7905 | \| | 2168 | 1 | 2797 | 8881 | 32751 | 1361 | , | 1915 | 428 |
| 1984 July | 54501 | 43831 | 2583 | 1 | 745 | 1 | 777 | 2771 | 10321 | 440 | 1 | 593 | 1107 |
| Aug | 59341 | 47741 | 2648 | 1 | 737 | 1 | 1057 | 3321 | 11251 | 485 | I | 641 | 1164 |
| Sept | 58271 | 46011 | 2674 | 1 | 686 | 1 | 962 | 2791 | 11171 | 436 | 1 | 682 | 1157 |
| Percen- | 1 | 1 |  | I |  | I |  | 1 | 1 |  | I |  | 1 |
| tage | +2 1 | $+4$ | +7 | 1 | $+\frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | +3 | $-4 \geqslant 1$ | +51 $\frac{1}{2} 1$ | $+2 \frac{1}{2}$ | 1 | +8 | $1-3$ |
| change | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | - 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |
| Q3/02 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |



|  | 1 |  | 1 | I |  |  |  |  |  | Manufactu | ures | d | g | ratic |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | Food | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | Semi-a | nufsc | tures | Finish | hed | f | ctur |  | ud | ps, |
|  | 1 | bever- |  | Basic 1 |  | \| Total | |  | exclud | ing | ecious I | North | Sea |  | alla |  | $d$ |  |
|  | \| Total | | ages |  | Mater- | Fuels | I Manufac- |  | stones | \& 8 i | ver(PS) \| |  |  |  | (SNA) |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | and |  | ials |  | I tures | \| Total | |  |  | 1 \| |  | Pass |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1 | tobacco |  |  |  | 1 |  | Total 1 | I Chemi | Other I | Total 1 | enger |  | Other |  | ter- | Capital |
|  | 11 |  | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  | cals | 11 |  | Motor |  | ansumer |  | diat |  |
|  | L |  | 1 |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |  | 1 |  | Cars |  |  |  |  |  |
| SITC I | I |  | 1 |  |  | 1.1 | 5-8 \| | $5+6$ |  | 6 | 7+8 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (REV 2) 1 | 10091 | $0+1$ | 1 | 2+4 | 3 | \| 5-8 | | \| less | | less 1 | 5 | \| less | | less I | j | , | j | 1 | J | j |
|  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | \| SNAPS | | PS |  | 1 PS | SNA |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |
|  | 1 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | 1 \| |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |
| 1982 | \| 56978 | | 7251 | 1 | 39301 | 74091 | \| 37114 | | \| 34795 | | 12795 \| | 14179 | \| 86161 | \| 22000 | | 2882 | 1 | 5909 | 1 | 6674 | 6536 |
| 1983 \| | \| 65993 | | 7853 | 1 | 47231 | 70671 | \| 44905 | | \| 41609 | | 14886\| | \| 5120 | 97661 | 267231 | 3659 | 1 | 6902 | 1 | 8121 | 8041 |
| 1983 Q3 \| | \| 16288 | | 1917 | 1 | 11461 | 18131 | \| 11119| | \| 10349 | | 37161 | 1254 | \| 2461 | | 66341 | 1013 | 1 | 1671 |  | 1970 | 1980 |
| Q4 1 | \| 17338 | | 2111 | 1 | 12801 | 18001 | \| 11855| | \| 11243 | | 40531 | 11413 | 2640 \| | 71901 | 881 | 1 | 1936 | 1 | 2189 | 2184 |
| 1984 Q1 \| | \| 18064 | | 2175 | 1 | 13001 | 17921 | \| 125301 | \| 11684 | | 42931 | 1513 | $\|2780\|$ | 73911 | 902 | 1 | 1938 | 1 | 2363 | 2188 |
| Q2 1 | \| 19431 | | 2237 | 1 | 1315 \| | 24631 | \| 13066| | \| 12127 | | 43411 | 11540 | $\|2801\|$ | \| 7786| | 828 | 1 | 2069 | 1 | 2465 | 2424 |
| Q3 1 | \| 19888 | | 2210 | 1 | 1271 \| | 26261 | $113470 \mid$ | 128271 | 45271 | \| 1615 | 29111 | 83001 | 1079 | 1 | 2107 | 1 | 2657 | 2458 |
| 1984 July I | \| 5984 | | 673 | 1 | 3961 | 6941 | 141361 | \| 38751 | 13661 | 483 | \| 8831 | 25091 | 246 | 1 | 645 | 1 | 838 | 780 |
| Aug I | 169521 | 751 | 1 | 4271 | 10111 | 146341 | 144371 | 15891 | 1560 | \| 1029 | | \| 28481 | 1431 | 1 | 735 | 1 | 873 | 810 |
| Sept 1 | 16952 \| | 786 | 1 | 4481 | 9211 | 147001 | \| 4515 | | 15731 | 1573 | 9991 | \| 29431 | 401 | 1 | 726 | I | 947 | 869 |
| Percen- 1 | 11 |  | 1 | 1 |  | 1 | I |  |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |  |
| tage | +2 $\frac{1}{2}$ | -1 | 1 | $-3 \frac{1}{1} 1$ | $+6 \frac{1}{2} 1$ | $1+31$ | $\|+6\|$ | +4it | +5 | $1+4$ | $+6 \frac{1}{2}$ | +30 | 1 | +2 | 1 | +8 | $+1 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| change | 11 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 | I |  |  | 1 |  |  | 1 |  | I |  |  |
| Q3/02 |  |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 11 |  |  | , |  | 1 |  |  |

$h$ These are defined as ships, North Sea installations (together comprising SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones (667), and silver (681.1).
$j$ Based on the United Nations Broad Economic Categories end-use classification.

IMPORTS BY COMMODITY: VOLUME INDICES
Table 13
(Overseas Trade Statistics basis)
NDICES $1980=100$ seasonally adjusted

-h These are defined as ships, North Sea installations (together somprising SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones (667), and silver (681.1).
j Based on the United Nations Broad Economic Categories end-use slassification.

IMPORTS BY COMMODITY: LNIT VALJE INDICES
(Overseas Trade Statistics כesis)

h These are defined as ships, North Sea installations (together comprising SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones (667), and silver (681.1).
j Based on the United Nations Broad Economic Categories end-use classification.
Table 15
IMPORTS BY AREA
(Overseas Trade Statistics basis)


## (Balance of Payments basis)

$£$ million, sesacnally adjusted

| SITC (R2) |  | Food Beverages and Tobacco |  |  |  |  | Basic Mater:als |  |  |  |  |  | Fuels |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $0+1$ |  |  |  |  | $2+4$ |  |  |  |  |  | 3 |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Exports | Imports | 1 | Visible |  | Exports | I | Imports | 1 | $V$ isible |  | Exports | I | Imports | 1 | Visible |
|  |  | fob | fob | 1 | Balance |  | fob | 1 | fob | 1 | Balance |  | fob | 1 | fob | 1 | Balance |
|  |  |  |  | 1 |  |  |  | I |  | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  | I |  |
| :982 |  | 3936 | 6612 | 1 | - 2676 |  | 1354 | 1 | 3315 | 1 | - 1961 |  | 11237 | 1 | 7193 | 1 | + 4043 |
| -983 |  | 4220 | 7203 | 1 | - 2983 |  | 1609 | I | 4012 | 1 | - 2403 |  | 13126 | 1 | 6886 | 1 | + 6241 |
| -982 | Q4 | 1044 | 1629 | 1 | - 585 |  | 339 | 1 | 811 | 1 | - 472 |  | 3165 | 1 | 1636 | 1 | + 1529 |
| -983 | Q1 | 1114 | 1765 | 1 | - 651 |  | 380 | 1 | 919 | 1 | - 539 |  | 3260 | 1 | 1621 | 1 | +1640 |
|  | Q2 | 987 | 1740 | 1 | - 753 |  | 393 | 1 | 1017 | 1 | - 624 |  | 3122 | 1 | 1742 | 1 | + 1380 |
|  | Q3 | 1017 | 1752 | 1 | - 736 |  | 394 | I | 969 | 1 | - 575 |  | 3086 | 1 | 1761 | 1 | + 1325 |
|  | Q4 | 1102 | 1946 | 1 | - 844 |  | 442 | 1 | 1107 | 1 | - 665 |  | 3658 | 1 | 1762 | 1 | + 1896 |
| 1984 | Q1 | 1178 | 2026 | 1 | - 849 |  | 443 | , | 1156 | 1 | - 712 |  | 3805 | , | 1751 | 1 | + 2054 |
|  | Q2 | 1164 | 2072 | 1 | - 909 |  | 508 | 1 | 1170 | 1 | - 663 |  | 3558 | 1 | 2370 | 1 | + 1188 |
|  | 03 | 1091 | 2049 | 1 | - 958 | 1 | 511 | 1 | 1129 | 1 | - 618 |  | 3861 | 1 | 2494 | 1 | +1367 |


|  | Semi-Manufactures |  |  | Finished Menufactures |  |  |  | Total Manufactures |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| SITC (R2) | $5+6$ |  |  | $7+8$ |  |  |  | 5-8 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Exports | 1 Imports | \| Visible | 1 Exports | 1 Imports | 1 | Visible |  | Exports | 1 | Imports | 1 | Visible |
|  | fob | 1 fob | 1 Balance | 1 fob | 1 fob | I | Balance |  | fob | 1 | fob | 1 | Balance |
|  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  | 1 |  | I |  |
| 1982 | 14112 | 112972 | $1+1140$ | 123218 | 121855 | 1 | + 1363 |  | 37330 | 1 | 34827 | 1 | + 2503 |
| 1983 | 15869 | 115672 | $1+198$ | \| 24137 | 126482 | 1 | - 2345 |  | 40006 | 1 | 42153 | 1 | - 2148 |
| 1782 Q4 | 3671 | 13290 | $1+381$ | 15857 | 15672 | 1 | + 184 |  | 9528 | 1 | 8963 | 1 | + 565 |
| 1983 Q1 | 3863 | 3712 | $1+151$ | 15803 | 16387 | 1 | - 584 |  | 9666 | 1 | 10099 | 1 | - 433 |
| Q2 | 3923 | 3942 | $1-20$ | 15924 | 16507 | 1 | - 583 |  | 9847 | 1 | 10449 | 1 | - 603 |
| Q3 | 3980 | 3866 | $1+114$ | 15983 | 16547 | , | - 564 |  | 9963 | , | 10413 | 1 | - 450 |
| Q4 | 4104 | 4151 | $1-48$ | 6427 | 17041 | 1 | - 614 |  | 10530 | 1 | 11192 | , | - 662 |
| 1984 Q1 | 4319 | 4455 | $1-136$ | 16710 | 17231 | , | - 520 |  | 11030 | 1 | 11686 | I | - 656 |
| Q2 | 4539 | 4433 | $1+106$ | 16660 | 17691 | 1 | - 1031 |  | 11199 | 1 | 12123 | 1 | - 925 |
| Q3 | 4433 | 14564 | $1-131$ | 16937 | 18226 | 1 | - 1288 |  | 11370 | 1 | 12790 | , | - 1419 |



DEPARTMENTS OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE - COMMON SERVICES

1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET
Telephone Direct Line 01-215 3055
Switchboard 01-215 7877

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D L C Peretz Esq
Principal Private Secretary
Chancellor of the Exchequer
H M Treasury
Parliament Street
LONDON
SW1P 3AG
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19 October 1984
I am attaching a copy of the draft Press Notice on the Current
Account of the United Kingdom Balance of Payments in September.
The draft was agreed earlier today at the usual interdepartmental
meeting.

Publication is set for Wednesday 24 October at 3.30pm and I should be grateful is you would arrange for the Notice to be cleared by noon Tuesday 23 October 1984 and to inform me accordingly.

A copy of this letter and draft Press Notice is being sent to Sir Peter Middleton.

Yours sincerely


## Note

W E BOYD

Told Mr boyd's secretory that C' was content. $p_{\text {nus. }}$.


## 1. mR xelly

2. CHANCELLOR

FROM: P M UALKER
DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1984

## SEPTEMBER TRADE FIGURES

The September trade figures will be released on Wednesday 24 October. We are content with the DTI press notice which is being sent to you as usual for approval.

## Summary

2. The main features are:
(i). An estimated current account deficit of $£ 514$ million in September ( $£ 318$ million in August) brought the current account deficit for the year so far to £ 530 million. This compares with the FSBR forecast of a £2 billion surplus and a recent internal forecast of a $£ 1 \frac{1}{4}$ billion surplus.
(ii) The deficit on manufactured trade (BOP basis) in the first nine months of the year was £3 billion, equivalent to an annual deficit of $£ 4$ billion, twice the $£ 2$ billion last year.
(iii) The oil surplus in the first nine months was $£ 5 \frac{1}{2}$ billion (an annual rate of $£ 7 \frac{1}{2}$ billion).
(iv) Total imports for the month and the quarter were a record, as was the quarterly visible balance. The current account deficit for the month equalled the previous record in April 1984

Table 2: Exports and Imports (percentage change)


| Total value | $+1 \frac{1}{2}$ | $+3 \frac{1}{2}$ | +24 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total volume | +2 | +1 | +12 |
| Total volume excluding |  |  |  |
| oil and erratics | $+2 \frac{1}{2}$ | $+2 \frac{1}{2}$ | +13 |
| $0 /$ manufactures | - | $+2 \frac{1}{2}$ | $+12 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Fuels (volume) | -2 | +6 | $+33 \frac{1}{2}$ |

To be inserted after Table 1 on page 3.

## Analysis

3. The following tables summarise the latest overall position:

## Table 1: Current Account

|  |  |  |  |  |  | £billlon |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1983 | 1984 | Q3 | July | August | September |
| 011 | $+6.9$ | + 1.5 | $+1.8$ | + 0.8 | $+0.4$ | $+0.6$ |
| Non-oil | - 7.6 | - 2.7 | - 3.3 | - 0.9 | - 1.0 | - 1.4 |
| Total visible trade <br> $0 / w$ : trade in manufactures (BoP) basis) | - 0.7 | - 1.2 | - 1.5 | - 0.1 | - 0.6 | - 0.8 |
|  | - 2.1 | $-0.9$ | $-1.4$ | - 0.3 | - 0.5 | - 0.6 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Invisibles | $+3.6$ | $+0.9$ | $+0.8$ | + 0.3* | + 0.3* | + 0.3 * |
| Current Account | + 2.9 | -0.3 | $-0.7$ | $+0.1 *$ | - 0.3* | - 0.5* |

For Table 2: see page 2.
4. The July dock strike appears to have worked itself out in July and August to little net effect. Neither the July nor the September disputes noticeably affected the September figures.
5. The miners' strike produced in September extra net oil imports of $£ 250$ miliion and extra net coal imports of around $£ 60$ million. Both figures have been rising. The oil surplus was $£ 617$ million, equal to the average of July and August taken together. This ws due to the absence of two special factors behind the August fall; the first a temporary fall in North Sea production, the second imports catching up after the July dock strike.

## * Projection

6. Exports remain considerably higher than their levels of a year ago (table 2). The underlying trend appears, however, to have flattened out (see attached chart). Comparing the third quarter with the second in volume terms, manufactured exports fell marginally and the most significant change was a 14 per cent fall in passenger car exports. By destination, exports to North America in the third quarter were 3 per cent up on the second quarter.
7. Imports in September exceeded an August figure increased by "catching up" from the July dock strike. The attached chart (which excludes oil and erratics) is starting to show a trend rising from a plateau. In individual categories, comparing the third quarter with a year ago, the largest rises were intermediate goods (22 per cent), capital goods (15 per cent), other consumer goods (16 per cent) and chemicals (14 per cent).
8. Comparison with Forecast. The September trade figures put the current account in deficit by $£ 0.7$ billion at an annual rate. This compares with a projected surplus of $£ 1 \frac{1}{4}$ billion in the internal October forecast, and a published current account estimate of $£ 2$ billion in the FSBR.
9. Part of the reasons for this discrepancy is invisibles: we are expecting a surplus of $\dot{4}$ billion for 1984 compared to current cso projections of £3 billion at an annual rate. £ $\frac{1}{2}$ billion of this discrepancy is due to EC refunds, not allowed for in CSO projections: the remainder is because we think the current estimates of the invisibles balance in the first half of 1983 may be too low. The CSO emphasise that their initial estimates on invisibles are provisional (the Q3 figures are in any case only projections), and there has been a history of upward revisions recently to certain series (particularly on return from direct investment).
10. The balance of trade in oil was in line with other October forecasts, and the annual total is not in fact very different from that envisaged in the FSBR, with a lower dollar/sterling exchange rate and higher North Sea oil production, roughly offsetting the effects of the miners' strike. However, the balance of non-oil trade was substantially worse than we had anticipated in the October forecasts: non-oil import volumes were higher,
and exports of erratics lower than forecast. It seems likely that the imports figure in particular is erratically higher, and there may be a partial offset to it in the fourth quarter.
11. Trade Prices. In September, the effective exchange rale averaged 77.3 , $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent lower than in August. This leads to a further 1 per cent increase in imports of manufactures prices, and puts their annual rate of increase at 10-11 per cent. For non-manufactures, however, the picture is much more encouraging: prices for imported food stuff and basic materials were unchanged in September, probably reflecting recent falls in world prices for non-oil commodities. So in aggregate import prices rose 1 per cent, as did export prices, leaving the terms of trade unchanged.

## Briefing

12. I should be grateful for clearance of the attached press briefing.


PM WALKER


## TOTAL EMFOFTS IE: OIL \& EFRATJES



TOTAL IMFOFTS !EX OIL \& EPFRTIES


## SECRET - PERSONAL

## until 3.30 p.m. on WEDNESDAY 24 OCTOBER then UNCLASSIFIED

## DRAFT BRTEFTNG POR IDT

## Points to make

1. (i) July and September dock strikes do not appear to have affected figures. Effect of July strike minimal over July and August taken together. (Mr Tebbit described effect as "negligible and transient").
(ii) Export volumes remain considerably higher than a year ago (table 2). Among individual categories:
(a) total finished manufactures 11 per cent higher in third quarter than a year ago;
(b) consumer goods other than cars 12 per cent higher;
(c) capital goods 12 per cent higher.
(d) intermediate goods 14 per cent higher.
(iii) Oil surplus was $£ \frac{1}{2}$ billion in first nine months; on track to equal or exceed last year's record $£ 7$ billion, despite miners' strike.
(iv) Substantial invisibles surplus $£ 1 \frac{1}{2}$ billion (incorrectly states as £ $\frac{1}{2}$ billion in last month's briefing) in first half of year.

## Defensive

2. Current/trade account deterioration in September? [Imports at record level; current account deficit equalled previous rccord in April 1984]. Figures too volatile for any one month to be reliable guide. Thus main fall in exports was in erratics. Some qualitative evidence that imports are being brought forward to anticipate the 1 November change in the procedures for payment of VAT on imports.

## 3. Current account in deficit in year so far? FSBR forecast of £2 billion

 current account surplus too high?Too early to say what eventual outcome on current balance will be : figures highly volatile and invisibles data highly provisional. No credit has yet been taken for $£ \frac{1}{2}$ billion EC budget refund.
[IF PRESSED] Continuation of miners' dispute will temporarily reduce oil balancebelow what it would otherwise have been. [Although this partly offset by higher NS oil production and a lower $£ / \$$ exchange rate]. But underlying posttion on balance of payments strong enough to absorb temporary alftculties of this kind.
4. Exports flattening out?

Still at considerably higher levels than this time last year (table 2). Good performances in many individual categories (see (1) above).
5. Effect of miners' strike?
[Do not give effects on oil or coal balance.]

Undoubtedly some effect. But oil surplus still on track for last year's record level.
6. Manufactured trade deficit increasing?

Deficit in manufactures offset by substantial surpluses on oil and invisibles.
7. Effect of Sept.ember dock disputcs?

Minimal.

## Advance Circulation

| Chancellor of the Exchequer | Mr H P Evans |
| :--- | :--- |
| Chief Secretary | Mr Folger |
| Economic Secretary | Mr Culpin |
| Sir Peter Middleton | Mr C Mowl |
| Mr Littler | Mr S Robson |
| Sir Terence Burns | Mr Gleed |
| Mr F Cassell | Mr N Towers |
| Mr Unwin | Mr Ridley |
| Mr Lavelle | Mr Gill Mr Turnbull - No 10 |
| Mr Battishill |  |

## Circulation after $3.30 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. on Wednesday 24 October

Financial Secretary
Minister of State
Mr Bailey
Mr Byatt
Mr Wicks (Washington)
Mr Fitchew
Mr Odling-Smee
Mr Lankester
Mr Shields
Mr Gordon

Mr Melliss
Mr Riley
Mr Sedgwick
Mr P Patterson
Mr Kelly (MP
Mr Vernon
Miss Deyes
Mr N McKinnon
Mr Lord
Mr Portillo

$$
\text { Copy No } 10^{\text {f }}
$$

THE CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM baLance of payments

The current account for October is estimated to have been in deficit by $£ 73$ million compared with a deficit of $£ 578$ million in September. Exports in October amounted to $£ 6291$ million and imports to $£ 7142$ million so that trade in goods was in deficit by $£ 851 \mathrm{mililum}$.

> The invisibles balance in October is projected to be in surplus by $£ 778$ million. This comprises $£ 528$ million from the European community budget refund and a projected monthly surplus on other transactions of $£ 250$ million, a large surplus on the transactions of the private sector and public corporations being partly offset by a deficit on Government transactions.

JULY TO OCTOBER 1984 (see note 1 on page 4)
In the four months ended October, the current account was in deficit by $£ 975 \mathrm{million}$ compared with a deficit of $£ 472 \mathrm{million}$ in the previous four months. There was a deficit on visible trade of $£ 2503$ million in the latest four months compared with a deficit of $£ 1559$ million in the previous four months. The surplus on invisibles is projected at $£ 1528$ million.

## CURrENT ACCOUNT

TABLE 1 - E million, Seasonally adjusted

a Invisible are projection and abject to revision as information becomes available.
b One-third of the appropriate calendar quarter's estimate, except for budget refund received from the European Community which are allocated to the month they are known to have been received.
c Information relating to credits and debits of the private sector and public corporations can be found in Table 3.
d This comprises $£ 528$ million from the European Community budget re: t ( z and a projected surplus on other transactions of $£ 250 \mathrm{million}$.
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VISIBLE TRADE IN OCTOBER 1984
The visible trade balance in October was in deficit $£ 851$ million, much the same as the deficit of $£ 828$ million in September. A fall in the surplus on oil from $£ 584$ million to $£ 388$ million was offset by a reduction in the deficit on non-oil trade from $£ 1412$ million to £1239 million.

At $£ 6291$ million exports were $£ 447$ million ( $71 / 2$ per cent) higher than in September. An increase in the erratic items offset a fall in exports of oil. Excluding these, exports increased by 10 per cent between the two months.

Total imports were valued at $£ 7142$ million which was $£ 471$ million ( 7 per cent) higher than in September. Imports of ofl increased by fll2 million and imports of the erratic items increased by £100 million. Excluding these, the value of imports increased by $4 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. This surge in imports will have included goods scheduled for import later in the year brought forward in anticipation of the change in VAT procedures on 1 November.

The terms of trade index fell slightly in October as the export unit value index increased by $1 / 2$ per cent and the import unit value index increased by 1 per cent.

## RECENT TRENDS

Visible balance
In the latest four months there was a deficit on visible trade of $£ 2.5$ billion compared with a deficit of $£ 1.6$ billion in the

# previous four months. The surplus on trade in oil fell by £0.2 billion to $£ 2.1$ billion and the deficit on non-oil trade increased by $£ 0.7$ billion to $£ 4.6$ billion. 

## Exports

Exports in the latest four months were valued at $£ 23.5$ billion compared with $£ 22.6$ billion in the previous four months mainly reflecting an increase in exports of manufactured goods (up by £O. 6 billion).

Export volume increased marginally in the latest four months to be $9 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent higher than a year ago. Figures in recent months now suggest that there has been an increase in the underlying level of non-o1l export volume.

## Imports

Total imports in the four months ended October were valued at $£ 26.0$ billion compared with $£ 24.2$ billion in the four months ended June. Imports of oil increased by $£ 0.4$ billion and imports of manufactures increased by about £O. 9 billion.

Total import volume increased by 4 per cent between the four months ended June and the latest four months. The trend in non-oil import volume was fairly flat during the first half of 1984. While the underlying position in the last four months is not yet clear, the latest four month comparison shows a rise of 5 per cent.

The terms of trade index remained virtually unchanged in the latest four months as both the export and import unit value index increased by $3 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Export unit values for food, drink and tobacco and passenger motor cars were unchanged in the latest four months. Most of the other broad sectors showed increases of between 3 and 4 per cent, although the unit value for fuels increased slightly more and that for other consumer goods slightly less.

Import unit values for fuels, other consumer goods (both up 6 per cent) and chemicals (up $5 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent) showed greater increases than the average in the latest four months. The unit value index for passenger motor cars on the other hand increased only marginally.

## Analysis by Area

By value, exports to the developed countries increased by 5 per cent between the four months ended June and the latest four months. Exports to the other European Community countries increased by $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent and exports to North America increased by $4 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Imports from the developed countries as a whole increased by $51 / 2$ per cent between the four months ended June and the latest four months with much the same growth shown by arrivals from the other European Community countries. Imports from North America grew by 13 per cent and imports from the developing countries increased by 6 per cent.
and parscnal
until release of firs notice on 22 NOV 84
at 3.30 p.m.

## INVISIBLES

The latest estimates of invisibles - services, interest, profits and dividends and transfers - relate to the second quarter of 1984 when credits were $£ 9.3$ billion and debits were $£ 8.4$ billion giving a surplus of $£ 0.9$ billion for the quarter. Invisible in the private sector and public corporations (excluding transfers) were in surplus by $£ 2.2$ billion. The figures for the latest four months are CSO projections.


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until reloase of press notico on
st $3,30 \mathrm{pm}$.

Note 1

Estimates of the value and volume of trade in July and August have been distorted by the effects of the July dock strike. As a result the normal 3 month on 3 month comparisons,
are misleading.
Comparisons of four month periods have been used instead in this press notice.

and pcreonal
22 NGI It
until re:asse of pross notice on $\qquad$ * 8.30 pm .

E Ellilion seesonally adjusted

a Inviaibles are projections and ject to revision eare information becene available.
b One third of the appropriate calendar quarter's estinate, except for budget refunds received frea the European Comanity wich are alleeated to the menth they are komen to heve been racaived.

Table 3
invisibes

|  |  | All Sectore |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $1$ | $\varepsilon$ eillion seasonally edjus Private Sector and Public Corporationed |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | I | 1 | 1 | 1 of mhich |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1 | 1 |  |
|  |  | Credite | 1 Debits | \| Balsme | 1 | 1 | Interast | 1 |  | 1 | Credits | 1 | Debits | 1 | Balance |
|  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 Serviees | 1 | Profits | 1 | Tranfers | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Dividende | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
|  |  |  | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  | I |  | 1 |  |
| 1982 |  | 31307 | 128485 | $1+2822$ | $1+3706$ | 1 | +1165 | 1 | - 2049 | 1 | 26898 | 1 | 20395 | 1 | $+6503$ |
| 1983 |  | 34975 | 131343 | $1+3632$ | $1+3902$ | 1 | + 1948 | 1 | - 2218 | 1 | 30530 | 1 | 22696 | 1 | $+7834$ |
| 1982 | Q3 | 7560 | 17132 | $1+428$ | $1+789$ | 1 | + 347 | 1 | - 708 | 1 | 6655 | 1 | 5105 | 1 | $+1550$ |
|  | Q4 | 8169 | 17260 | $1+909$ | $1+907$ | 1 | + 568 | 1 | - 566 | 1 | 7114 | 1 | 5176 | 1 | +1938 |
| 1983 | Q1 | 8848 | 17433 | $1+1415$ | $1+1012$ | 1 | + 528 | 1 | - 125 | 1 | 7361 | 1 | 5377 | 1 | +1984 |
|  | 02 | 8393 | 17990 | $1+403$ | $1+1090$ | 1 | + 120 | 1 | - 807 | 1 | 7474 | 1 | 5761 | 1 | + 1713 |
|  | 03 | 8836 | 17638 | $1+1198$ | $1+978$ | 1 | + 745 | 1 | - 525 | 1 | 7806 | 1 | 5581 | 1 | + 2225 |
|  | Q4 | 8898 | 1 8282 | $1+616$ | $1+822$ | 1 | + 555 | 1 | - 761 | 1 | 7889 | 1 | 5977 | 1 | + 1912 |
| 1984 | 01 | 9054 | 18523 | $1+531$ | $1+988$ | 1 | + 87 | 1 | - 544 | 1 | 7860 | 1 | 6243 | 1 | $+1617$ |
|  | 02 | 9273 | 18363 | $1+910$ | $1+1174$ | 1 | + 489 | 1 | - 753 | 1 | 8529 | 1 | 6086 |  | +2243 |

d ie oxcluding general Covernment traneactions and trenefers.


- Export unit value index es a percentage of the import unit valee index.

VALLE AND VOLUNE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS EXCLLDIMS TNE MORE ERMATIC ITENS
Table 5 (Balance of Paymenta besia)

and personal
unit: rclace of press notice on 22 MON ot at 3.30 p.m.
seasenally adjusted


[^4]and personal
until ralease of press notice on 22 MOV 84
at $3.30 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$.

f These are defined as shipe, Morth See inatallations, aircraft, precious stones, and silver.

- Export unit value index ase percentage of the inpart unit value index.


[^5]EXPORTS BY CEMODITY: VRLDE INDICES
(Overseas Trade Statistice basia)
Table 9

IWDICES $1980=100$, mesmally adjusted


precious stense (667), and silver (691.1).



IMOICES 19 a $=100$ mat memonally edjuated


[^6]Exports Ey AREA
(Oversees Trade Statistice besis)
Table 11

I million, fob, seasonally sdjusted

and personal
until releess of press notice on 2 ? NON 84
at 3.30 p.m.

h These are defined as ahipe, North See imallatiees (tegether eapriady SITC (BiV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precioese stones (667), and allver (681.1).
j Based on the United Metione Broed Econeme Categeries end-use clasaification.
IMPDRTS BY COMADITY: VELUE IMDICES
Table 13 (Overaese Trade Statistics besis)

INDICES $1950=100$ seasonally adjusted


precious stones (657), and allver (681.1).
j Beoed on the Uaited Matione Bread Eesendic Catogrise ond-nes claesifientian.

h Thees are defined se ships, Morth See inatallations (together cenpising SITC (昰V 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones ( 67 ), and silver (681.1).
j Based on the United Mations Broed Ecenomic Categories end-une claesificatien.
Teble 15
IM DRTS BY ABEA
(Overaes Trede Statistics beals)


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DEPARTMENTS OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE

## - COMMON SERVICES

## 1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET

Telephone Direct Line 01-215 3055
Switchboard 01-215 7877
LONDON SWAP BAG 19 November 1984

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D L C Peretz Esq
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D L C Peretz Esq
Principal Private Secretary
Principal Private Secretary
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Chancellor of the Exchequer
H M Treasury
H M Treasury
Parliament Street

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Parliament Street
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I am attaching a copy of the draft Press Notice on the Current Account of the United Kingdom Balance of Payments in October. The draft was agreed earlier today at the usual interdepartmental meeting.

Publication is set for Thursday 22 November at 3.30 pm and I should be grateful if you would arrange for the Notice to be cleared by noon Wednesday 21 November and to inform me accordingly.

A copy of this letter and draft Press Notice is being sent to Sir Peter Middleton.

Yours sincerely


W E BOYD

FROM: DAVID BARTLETT
DATE: 20 NOVEMBER 1984

1. MR KELLY 20 . 1 . C. Brigurg for $1 D$ and Dill press notice cc as attached list
2. CHANCELLOR

## OCTOBER TRADE FIGURES




The October trade figures will be released on Thursday 22 November. We are content with the DTI press notice, which they are sending to you as usual for approval.

## Summary

2. The main features are:
(i) an estimated current account deficit of $£ 73$ million in October, compared with a $£ 578$ million deficit in September, and comprising
(ii) a record visible deficit of $£ 851$ million ( $£ 828$ million in september) and a projected invisibles surplus of $£ 778$ million, which includes $£ 528$ million ( 90 per cent) of the EC budget refund.
(iii) The current account deficit so far in 1984 is £985 million. This compares with the Autumn Statement forecast of balance in 1984 as a whole.
(iv) Imports figures for all periods back to 1980 have been revised up $\frac{1}{2}-\frac{3}{4}$ per cent, and the current account figures revised down a corresponding amount (see paragraph 4 below for a full explanation).
(v) The deficit on manufactured trade (BoP basis) in the first ten months of 1984 was $£ 3 \frac{3}{4}$ billion, equivalent to an annual rate of about $£ 4 \frac{1}{2}$ billion, compared with roughly £2 $\frac{1}{2}$ billion last year.
(vi) The nil surplus in the first ten months was $£ 6$ billion (an annual rate of about $£ 7 \frac{1}{4}$ billion).
(vii) The underlying level of export volumes appears to be rising again. The underlying imports trend is however obscured by imports being brought forward in anticipation of the change in VAT procedures.

## Analysis

3. The following tables summarise the latest overall position. In line with the DTI press notice, the tables use comparisons of four month periods, because the distorting effects of the July dock strike have rendered the latest three month comparisons misleading.

## Table 1: Current Account

1984
1983

Mar-June July-Oct July Aug Scpt Oct
$+6.9+2.3+2.1+0.8+0.4+0.6+0.4$
$\begin{array}{llllllll}\text { Non-oil } & -8.0 & -3.9 & -4.6 & -1.0 & -1.0 & -1.4 & -1.2 \\ \text { Total visible trade } & -1.1 & -1.6 & -2.5 & -0.2 & -0.6 & -0.8 & -0.9\end{array}$
$o / w$ : trade in manufactures (BoP basis)
Invisibles
Current Account

## Table 2: Exports and Imports (percentage change)

| $\frac{\text { October }}{\text { on }}$ | $\frac{\text { July-Oct }}{\text { on }}$ | $\frac{\text { July-Oct } 1984}{\text { September }}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Sur-June | Ouly-Oct 1983 |  |
|  |  |  |

## (i) Exports

Total value

| $+7 \frac{1}{2}$ | +4 | +18 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| +8 | $+\frac{1}{2}$ | $+9 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| +10 | $+1 \frac{1}{2}$ | +11 |
| +7 | +2 | +11 |
| -8 | $+\frac{1}{2}$ | $+7 \frac{1}{2}$ |

(ii) Imports

Total value
Total volume
$+7+8 \quad+25$

Total volume excluding
oil and erratics $+4 \frac{1}{2}$
$+5+13$
$0 /$ manufactures $0+4+11$
Fuels (volume) $+6+34$
4. The press notice includes upward revisions to imports (and corresponding downward changes to the current account) in all periods back to 1980. Up to now, import figures on an OTS basis (ie based on values declared to Customs) have been adjusted down for the Balance of Payments accounts by the estimated amount declared values exceeded transaction values. But recently available survey data indicate that declared and transaction values have been virtually identical since 1980, and therefore that all adjustments since then have undervalued imports (by $\frac{1}{2}-\frac{3}{4}$ per cent). The current changes mean imports about $£ 350$ million higher in Ql-Q3 1984, and nearly $£ 400$ million higher in 1983 (giving a revised 1983 current account surplus of $£ 2.5$ billion).
5. The coal strike produced in October extra net oil imports of $£ 275$ million ( $£ 250$ million in September) and extra net coal imports of around $£ 80$ million ( $£ 60$ million in September). Thus, since January, the strike has adversely affected the balance of trade by nearly $£ 2$ billion, of which £l. 6 hillion has fallen

## until 3.30 pm on Thursday 22 November

 then CONFIDENTIALon the oil account.
6. Export volumes grew strongly in October, and marginally in the latest four months compared with the previous four (table 2). They remain considerably higher than their levels of a year ago. The underlying trend of non-oil export volumes now appears to have been increasing in recent months (see attached chart). Manufactured export volumes (excluding erratics) grew 2 per cent in the latest four months compared with the previous four. Chemicals performed well, rising $6 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent in volume in the last four months, but passenger car exports fell $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. By destination, exports to the EEC grew $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent and to $N$ America $4 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent in value terms in the latest four months.
7. Imports continued to rise strongly in October, partly as a result of imports being brought forward in anticipation of the 1 November change in VAT procedures. The underlying level of imports, excluding oil and erratics, was fairly flat in the first half of the year (see attached chart), but the trend in the last four months is not yet clear because of the VAT effect. (As you suggested, this point has been brought out in the press notice.) In individual categories, the largest increase in the latest four months compared with the previous four was in passenger cars ( 22 per cent). By area, the largest increase was in imports from $N$ America ( 13 per cent).

## Comparison with Autumn Statement

8. The Autumn Statement forecast for the current account projected balance for 1984. This compares to the deficit of about $£ l b n$ for the year to October. Allowance was made for both the receipt of $E C$ refunds (stated in the press notice text) and for the upward revisions to the import figures on a balance of payments basis (not stated). The text stressed that the forecast was more optimistic than recent CSO figures, and that it "allowed for a rise in exports in the fourth quarter; and a better outcome on invisibles than indicated by recent data and CSo projections." The October figures certainly provide confirmation of the rise in exports, and it is too early to make any judgement on
invisibles.
9. The more worrying aspect of the figures for the forecast is the high level of imports, particularly the increase in basic materials imports and the continuing high level of imports of manufactures. However since the figures are distorted to an unknown extent by attempts to beat the introduction of VAT on imports, we shall need to see the November figures before coming to a judgement on underlying import volumes.

## Trade Prices

10. The behaviour of trade prices in October was encouraging. Despite a fall of 2 per cent in the effective exchange rate between September and October, import prices rose less than 1 per cent, with no increase in food, drinks, tobacco or basic materials' prices from September to October - a reflection of weak world commodity prices for non-oil goods. Fuel imports rose $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent, only half the fall in the $\$ / £$ rate.

## Effect on Markets

11. Sterling's undertone is currently reasonably strong, with the Barclays' base rate cut easily absorbed and rather less market concern about the coal strike. These figures contain both good and bad news, so any pressure either way that develops on the pound could be accentuated by news of the balance of payments position.

## Briefing

12. I should be grateful for clearance of the attached draft press briefing.

## Daid Barlelt

## DRAFT BRIEFING FOR IDT

## Points to make


(a) total manufactures 11 per cent higher;
(b) total finished manufactures 12 per cent higher;
(c) consumer goods other than cars 14 per cent higher;
(d) intermediate goods 13 per cent higher;
(e) capital goods 12 per cent higher.

(liv) Substantial $£ 1 \frac{1}{2}$ billion invisibles surplus in first half of year. Over $£ \frac{1}{2}$ billion ( 90 per cent) of EC refund now received - included in October invisibles figure.

## Defensive

2. Current account in substantial deficit in year so far, despite receipt of EC refund? Autumn Statement Forecast too optimistic?
[Autumn Statement forecast current account balance in 1984. Current account deficit $£ 985$ million Jan-Oct 1984. £528 million (90\%) of EC refund received in October.]

Too early to say, as monthly figures highly erratic. Some evidence that imports being brought forward to anticipate 1 November change in procedures for paying VAT on imports. Forecast takes into account expected fourth quarter rise in exports (exports grew strongly in October) and likely substantial upward revisions to invisibles data and CSO projections.
3. Substantial upward revisions to back data on imports?
[See para 4 of note.]

Revisions made to correct mistaken assumptions about relation between values declared to customs and actual transaction values. But revisions only $\frac{1}{2}-\frac{3}{4}$ per cent of impurts, well within normal margins of error on such data. [Detailed queries to DTI.]

## 4. Record imports and visible deficit in October?

[Imports $£ 7.1$ billion in October; visible deficit $£ 851$ million - both records.]

Yes, but monthly figures very volatile and imports affected by anticipation of $l$ November VAT change.

## 5. Effect of continuing coal strike?

Strike has affected balance of trade on oil and coal to tune of nearly $£ 2$ billion since January. But oil surplus still on track for last year's record $£ 7$ billion. Balance of payments position strong enough to absorb temporary difficulties of
this kind - $£ 2 \frac{1}{2}$ billion 1985 current account surplus forecast in Autumn Statement, assuming strike over. [Do not reveal figures on coal effect. Detailed queries to DTI and D/Energy.]
6. Manufactured trade deficit increasing?
[£33/4 billion deficit in Jan-Oct 1984, after $£ 2 \frac{1}{2}$ billion in 1983.]

In fact, deficit $£ 0.2$ billion lower in October than September. Deficit offset by substantial surpluses on oil and invisibles.
7. Effect of September docks dispute?

Minimal.

## TRADE FIGURES FOR OCTOBER 1984

## Advance Circulation

```
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Chief Secretary
Mr H P Evans
Economic Secretary
Sir P Middleton
Mr Littler o.r.
Sir T Burns
Mr Cassell
Mr Unwin
Mr Lavelle
Mr Battishill
Mr Kelly (EF)
Mr Folger
Mr Culpin
Mr C Mowl
Mr S Robson
Mr Vernon
Mr Gleed
Mr Towers
Mr Ridley
Mr Gill - Bank
Mr Turnbull - No lO
```


## Circulation after 3.30 pm on Thursday 22 November

```
Financial Secretary
Minister of State
Mr Bailey
Mr Byatt
Mr Wicks (Washington)
Mr Fitchew
Mr Odling-Smee
Mr Lankester
Mr Shields
Mr Gordon
```

Mr Melliss
Mr Riley
Mr Sedgwick
Mr P Patterson
Mr Kelly (MP)
Mr Walker O.r.
Miss Deyes
Mr N McKinnon
Mr Lord
Mr Portillo




FROM: P WYNN OWEN
DATE: 21 November 1984
cc PS/Chief Secretary
PS/Economic Secretary
Sir P Middleton
Sir T Burns
Mr Littler
Mr Cassell
Mr Unwin
Mr Lavelle
Mr Battishill
Mr H P Evans
Mr Kelly
Mr Folger
Mr Culpin
Mr Mowl
Mr S Robson
Mr Vernon
Mr Gleed
Mr Towers
Mr Ridley
Mr Gill-B/E
Mr Turnbull - No. 10

## MR BARTLETT

## OCTOBER TRADE FIGURES

The Chancellor has seen your minute of 20 November covering the draft DTI press notice and draft briefing for IDT.
2. He suggests one amendment to the draft DTI press notice. In the second sentence of paragraph 2, after $£ 250$ million insert ",which was in turn made up of".
3. In the draft briefing for IDT:
(a) items (i) and (iii) should switch places.
(b) The new item (iii), formally (i), should be amended to read:
"October current account balance continues to be effected by coal strike (around £350 million net deterioration in coal and oil account).
(c) Delete item (iv) altogether.

C. You asked when we get Q3 1984 employment figures.

Mr Vernon says 16 Jan' 1985 jor publication (couple of dais before for wo.). $\operatorname{los}_{3 / 12}$


Developments over the past month led to more stability in financial markets based on views of the outlook for the UK economy. Sterling traded quietly firmer in the first part of November, since when it has fallen, on renewed dollar strength and weaker oil prices.

Increased confidence combined with falling US interest rates has also contributed to the recent cuts in interest rates by UK clearing banks. Monetary growth remains satisfactory with both target aggregates inside their target ranges.

The twelve month increase in the RPI is still around 5 per cent. Whilst the trend in the inflation rate is encouraging, real earnings continue to rise. UK labour competitiveness has only been maintained by a fall in the exchange rate; there must be concern about the implications of this for the longer term position on competitiveness.

There has been no further increase in the GDP effects of the coal strike in the third quarter, and our estimate of the underlying rate of growth is still between 2 and 3 per cent a year. This is a slow-down from earlier in the year, which is broadly consistent with the somewhat hazy picture given by the cyclical indicators.

The rise in unemployment continues. The rises in October and November were much lower than in the summer, and it is likely that the underlying upward trend remains between 10 and 15 thousand per month, as since mid 1983. There has probably been some further increase in employment during the third quarter.

There are signs of an increase in the underlying level of non-oil export volume. The volume of non-oil imports is also increasing but the underlying position is blurred by the effects of the introduction of new VAT procedures.

In the first seven months of the financial year, the public sector borrowing requirement was $\$ 7.7$ billion. The forecast for $1984-5$ has been revised to $£ 8 \frac{1}{2}$ billion, to take into account the expected effects of the coal strike.

## SOME KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Rates of change:

| Published | Over latest |
| :---: | :--- |
| data | published | Assessment of



* Our best assessment of the current underlying rate of increase after making allowance for temporary distorting factors such as strikes, unseasonal weather effects, etc.

[^7]Changes in output and expenditure


CHART 2
Changes in unemployment


Rate of increase in average earnings, unit wage cost in manufacturing, PPI input prices and retail prices
Month to month percentage changes, smoothed and adjusted for distorting factors where appropriate


Movements in underlying average earnings and the tax and price index comparisons with 12 months previously


CHART 5


Target monthly aggregates (1984/85)
Percentage change from start of target period (seasonally adjusted)


Exports and Imports
CHART 7
Index $1980=100$

${ }^{1}$ Seasonally adjusted data, Balance of Payments basis


[^0]:    (1) Including the adjustments for international travel, etc. and final expenditure by private non-profit-making bodies.

[^1]:    A tax-unit can be either a married couple or an unmarried individual who has left school.

[^2]:    *A tax-unit can be either a married couple or an unmarried individual who has left school.

[^3]:    C ie excluding general Government transactions and all transfers.

[^4]:    $\checkmark 9$ Trade in petrolee and petroleum products. Theee figares diffor froa thoee peabliahed by the Departant of Energy which are on a tiee of shipeent basia (see paragraph 7 of the standard notes).

[^5]:    h These are definad as hips, Warth Sea installatiens (teqether campiaing SITC (PIV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precieus atones (667), and silver (691.1).
    $j$ Based on the United Mations Broed Econamic Categeriee ensume elasaificatien.

[^6]:    h Theae are ofined ashipe, North See installatiens (together cempriaing SITC (REV 2) 793), aircraft (792) precious stones (667), and ailver (681.1).
    I Based on the Vaited Mations Broed Eepomic Categaries clasafiestian.

[^7]:    ** Latest 3 months or quarter compared with same period a year ago. *** Excluding school leavers, adjusted for changes in coverage.
    $\times \quad$ The range is wide because short-term movements are affected by indirect taxes, mortgage interest rates and seasonal food prices.

